Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated Investment Strategy
Published: 2007-04-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to invest $109 billion in its tactical air forces between 2007 and 2013. Long term, DOD plans to replace aging legacy aircraft with fewer, more expensive but more capable and stealthy aircraft. Recapitalizing and modernizing tactical air forces within today's constrained budget environment is a formidable challenge. DOD has already incurred substantial cost and schedule overruns in its acquisition of new systems, and further delays could require billions of dollars in additional investments to keep legacy aircraft capable and sustainable. Because of the large investments and risk, GAO was asked to review investment planning for tactical aircraft. This report describes the current status of DOD's new tactical aircraft acquisition programs; identifies current impacts on legacy aircraft modernization programs and retirement schedules; and assesses DOD's overall investment plan for tactical aircraft.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD's efforts to recapitalize and modernize its tactical air forces have been blunted by cost and schedule overruns in its new tactical aircraft acquisition programs: the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the Air Force F-22A, and the Navy F/A-18E/F. Collectively, these programs are expected to cost about $400 billion--with about three-fourths still to be invested. The JSF program, which is expected to make up the largest percentage of the new fleet, has more than 90 percent of its investments still in the future. Increased costs and extended development times have reduced DOD's buying power, and DOD now expects to replace legacy aircraft with about one-third fewer new aircraft compared to original plans at each program's inception. The outcomes of these acquisition programs directly impact existing tactical aircraft systems. Until new systems are acquired in sufficient quantities to replace legacy fleets, legacy systems must be sustained and kept operationally relevant. Continual schedule slips and reduced buys of new aircraft--particularly in the F-22A and JSF programs--make it difficult for program managers to allocate funds for modifying legacy aircraft to meet new requirements or to set retirement dates for legacy aircraft. Lengthening the life of legacy systems also impacts DOD's new tactical aircraft acquisition programs. DOD has become increasingly concerned that the high cost of keeping aging weapon systems relevant and able to meet required readiness levels is a growing challenge in the face of forecast threats and reduces the department's flexibility to invest in new weapons. DOD's tactical aircraft investments are driven by the services' separate acquisition planning. Moving forward, these plans are likely unexecutable given competing demands from future defense and non defense budgets. The EA-6B--providing tactical radar jamming capabilities for all services and one of the few examples of a joint asset--is also expected to be replaced by separate and unique aircraft for each of the services. Without a joint, DOD-wide strategy for tactical aircraft investments, it is difficult to identify potential areas where efficiencies might be achieved or where capability gaps might occur in DOD's tactical aircraft acquisitions.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Over the past three decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent  Over the past three decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent  $534 billion to develop, procure, and modify its tactical air forces. Tactical  $534 billion to develop, procure, and modify its tactical air forces. Tactical  air forces are critical to achieving and maintaining air dominance during  air forces are critical to achieving and maintaining air dominance during  combat operations and account for a significant share of the defense  combat operations and account for a significant share of the defense  dollar. After procuring large numbers of fighter and attack aircraft in the  dollar. After procuring large numbers of fighter and attack aircraft in the  1970s and 1980s, DOD shifted its emphasis to procuring bombers,  1970s and 1980s, DOD shifted its emphasis to procuring bombers,  airlifters, and other systems. DOD now seeks to recapitalize and  airlifters, and other systems. DOD now seeks to recapitalize and  modernize its tactical air forces to ensure the total force has sufficient  modernize its tactical air forces to ensure the total force has sufficient  capabilities and capacity to meet operational requirements today and in  capabilities and capacity to meet operational requirements today and in  the future. Over the next 20 years, DOD plans to replace several thousand  the future. Over the next 20 years, DOD plans to replace several thousand  aging tactical aircraft with a substantially smaller number of more  aging tactical aircraft with a substantially smaller number of more  expensive but more capable and stealthy new aircraft, while continuing to  expensive but more capable and stealthy new aircraft, while continuing to  modify and sustain its current fleets in order to keep them operationally  modify and sustain its current fleets in order to keep them operationally  viable until sufficient numbers of the new systems are fielded.  viable until sufficient numbers of the new systems are fielded.
Recapitalizing and modernizing tactical air forces to meet the warfighter’s  Recapitalizing and modernizing tactical air forces to meet the warfighter’s  needs within today’s constrained budget environment is a formidable  needs within today’s constrained budget environment is a formidable  challenge. Our work in this area has shown that DOD has incurred  challenge. Our work in this area has shown that DOD has incurred  substantial cost increases and delays in its acquisition of new systems.  substantial cost increases and delays in its acquisition of new systems.  Further delays in delivering these aircraft, cost increases, and cuts in  Further delays in delivering these aircraft, cost increases, and cuts in  quantity could easily occur, meaning billions of dollars in additional  quantity could easily occur, meaning billions of dollars in additional  investments could be needed to keep current (legacy) aircraft both  investments could be needed to keep current (legacy) aircraft both  capable and sustainable for longer periods of time than currently planned.  capable and sustainable for longer periods of time than currently planned.
Because of the costs, complexities, and interrelationships of the tactical  Because of the costs, complexities, and interrelationships of the tactical  air forces, and the need for greater insight, the Chairman of the Air and  air forces, and the need for greater insight, the Chairman of the Air and  Land Forces Subcommittee, House Committee on Armed Services, asked  Land Forces Subcommittee, House Committee on Armed Services, asked  GAO to look at DOD’s investment planning for recapitalizing and  GAO to look at DOD’s investment planning for recapitalizing and  modernizing its tactical fighter and attack aircraft force portfolio. This  modernizing its tactical fighter and attack aircraft force portfolio. This  report addresses (1) current risks for DOD’s new tactical aircraft  report addresses (1) current risks for DOD’s new tactical aircraft  acquisition programs; (2) impacts on legacy aircraft modernization  acquisition programs; (2) impacts on legacy aircraft modernization  programs and retirement schedules; and (3) the extent to which DOD has  programs and retirement schedules; and (3) the extent to which DOD has  developed an overall investment plan for future tactical aircraft that  addresses capability gaps, limits redundancies, and considers the timing  and affordability of planned actions. To conduct our work, we evaluated  new acquisition and legacy modification plans, budgets, retirement and  delivery schedules, and results to date for recapitalizing and modernizing  tactical air forces. We analyzed Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps plans  and processes for establishing force and capability requirements and  reviewed joint efforts and initiatives to look at integrated DOD-wide  solutions. We also drew extensively on work conducted under other GAO  engagements concerning weapon systems and force structure. We  performed our work from June 2006 through March 2007 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I  further discusses this report’s scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Tactical air forces are critical to achieving and maintaining air dominance  during combat operations. These forces include Air Force, Navy, and  Marine Corps fixed-wing fighters and attack aircraft with air-to-air combat,  air-to-ground attack, and defense suppression missions, and related  equipment and support activities. These forces operate in the first days of  a conflict to penetrate enemy air space, defeat air defenses, and achieve  air dominance. This allows follow-on ground, air, and naval forces  freedom to maneuver and attack in the battle space. Once air dominance is  established, tactical aircraft continue to vigorously and persistently strike  ground targets for the remainder of the conflict. Some tactical aircraft are  also essential to protect the homeland by defending against incoming  missiles or enemy aircraft.
Current operational tactical aircraft (referred to as legacy systems) are the  Air Force’s F-15, F-16, F-117A, and A-10 systems and the Navy and Marine  Corps F/A-18, EA-6B, and AV-8B. Most of these aircraft were purchased in  the 1970s and 1980s and are considerably aged as measured by the number  of flying hours accumulated by an aircraft compared to its estimated life  expectancy. Weapon systems also tend to cost more to operate and  maintain as they age. To meet national defense security requirements,  DOD sustains its legacy fleets and also modernizes some with new  capabilities and enhanced structures to keep aircraft operationally viable  until new systems can be delivered in sufficient quantities and the legacies  can be retired.
DOD is continuing efforts to recapitalize its tactical air forces (replace  legacy with new) by acquiring and fielding the Air Force’s F-22A, the  Navy’s F/A-18E/F and EA-18G, and the joint service F-35 Joint Strike  Fighter (JSF) weapon systems. Recapitalization plans began 20 years ago  with the start-up of the F-22A program and are now expected to take  another 20 years or more to fulfill culminating with the final JSF  procurements. The JSF is being developed in three variants for the U.S.  and allied forces. The Air Force’s version, a conventional take-off and  landing aircraft, is intended to replace the F-16 and A-10 and complement  the F-22A. The Navy’s carrier-capable version is intended to replace   F/A-18C/D aircraft and complement the F/A-18E/F. The Marines Corps is  acquiring a short field take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant to  replace its AV-8B and F/A-18D fleets. Table 1 shows the new aircraft with  the legacy systems they are expected to replace.
subsections: section_title: Tactical Air Forces Costs
paragraphs: Tactical air forces account for a significant share of the defense budget.  DOD spends billions of dollars every year to develop, procure, and  modernize its tactical air forces. Figure 1 shows the trend in actual and  projected investment over the 36-year period from fiscal year 1976 to 2011.  To reflect the trend in relative buying power, we normalized the data to  express costs in fiscal year 2007 dollars. The total investment for research,  development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement during this  time period approaches $1 trillion in constant dollars. The figure illustrates  the large investments throughout the 1980s when most of the legacy fleets  were acquired and the subsequent decrease in investment during the 1990s  as DOD focused on other procurement priorities. The rise in investment  starting in the mid-1990s reflects the build up and acquisition of the new  systems. This data does not include another $3.3 billion requested by DOD  for tactical aircraft in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental and fiscal year  2008 budget request for the Global War on Terror.
In addition to the large expenditures for development and procurement,  the services spend billions more annually to operate, support, maintain,  and man the tactical air forces. Over the past decade, the tactical air forces  share of the total defense budget has stayed remarkably consistent,  annually receiving about 11 to 12 percent of the total DOD budget and  about 15 to 16 percent of the investment appropriations. DOD  programmed a total of $331.6 billion for personnel, operations and  maintenance, military construction, and acquisition costs for the tactical  air forces for fiscal years 2006 to 2011, an annual average of $55.3 billion.  Appendix III shows the breakdown by military service and by  appropriation.
section_title: New Acquisition Programs Are Spending Significantly More Dollars and Delivering Fewer Tactical Aircraft Later Than Originally Planned
paragraphs: Midway through a 40-year effort to recapitalize and modernize its tactical  air forces, DOD’s efforts have been blunted by relatively poor outcomes in  its cornerstone new acquisition programs. Increased costs, extended  development times, requirement changes, and budget pressures have  reduced DOD’s buying power, and DOD now expects to replace legacy  aircraft with about 1,500 fewer new tactical aircraft than it had originally  planned—a reduction of one-third. Additionally, delivery of these new  systems has lagged far behind original plans, not only delaying the fielding  of capabilities to the warfighter, but also increasing operating and  modernization costs to keep legacy aircraft relevant and in the inventory  longer than expected.
subsections: section_title: DOD Plans for New Aircraft and Their Implications for the Total Force
paragraphs: DOD’s recapitalization plans center on the acquisitions of the JSF, F-22A,  F/A-18E/F, and its electronic attack variant, the EA-18G. Collectively, these  programs are expected to cost about $400 billion—with almost three- fourths still to be invested—to acquire about 3,200 aircraft (see table 2).  Through the end of fiscal year 2006, Congress has appropriated about   $111 billion, and the services have taken delivery on 480 new aircraft.  Table 2 also shows that about 72 percent of the expected investment and  85 percent of the planned procurement quantity is in the future. The F-22  and the F-18 series acquisition programs are expected to be mostly  completed over the next five years, but the JSF program is only halfway  through development with procurement starting in 2007 and continuing  until 2034. With most of its program still ahead, its sheer size, and its   tri-service impact, the JSF is, in many ways, the linchpin of DOD’s   tactical aircraft future.
Increased costs, schedule delays, and budget pressures have combined to  decrease procurement quantities of new tactical aircraft. Total quantities  have been reduced by one-third compared to original plans at each  program’s inception (see table 3).
The cumulative impacts of delayed deliveries and reduced quantities on  the total force (see fig. 2) have slowed the recapitalization of the legacy  force and made it more expensive to modernize, operate, and maintain.  Collectively, this means that the warfighters will have fewer of the newest  and most capable aircraft throughout the recapitalization period. With  fewer buys of new systems, legacy aircraft will make up a larger  proportion of the future force and for a longer period of time than  originally envisioned. Although legacy aircraft are still very capable—and  will be expected to remain so through upgrades and life extension  efforts—they are becoming increasingly more expensive to operate and  maintain. Service officials are confident that new systems will provide  improved capabilities compared to legacy systems they replace, but worry  whether the numbers of aircraft acquired are sufficient to meet national  security requirements at an acceptable level of risk. They are also  concerned with managing risks using legacy systems in the near- and   mid-terms.
section_title: Cost, Schedule, and Performance Issues for New Acquisition Programs
paragraphs: Over the years, our extensive reviews of DOD’s major weapon system  acquisitions have usually found positive outcomes when programs follow  the evolutionary, knowledge-based strategy espoused by the best practices  of leading commercial firms and now established in DOD policy. This  includes establishing a solid business case that accurately and realistically  matches available resources (technologies, money, expertise, and time) to  warfighter needs. The Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment  report in January 2006 also found that a disciplined business approach was  needed to improve DOD’s weapon system acquisition process. One  particular and key practice recommended was for time-certain  development programs—delivery of the first unit to operational forces  within about six years from the Milestone A decision point. We have  usually found poorer outcomes—significant cost increases, reduced  procurement quantities, and schedule delays—in programs not following  these practices. For example, immature technologies, design problems,  and changes in threats and requirements underpinning the original  business case, contributed to major cost increases for the F-22A program,  a doubling of its years spent in development, and a sharp reduction in  quantities deemed affordable. We are concerned that the JSF is on a  similar risky path with highly concurrent plans to begin production while  still early in development and with little testing completed. On the other  hand, the F/A-18E/F program is employing a more evolutionary approach  and is experiencing better cost and schedule outcomes. We have some  concerns that its new electronic attack variant, the EA-18G, is pursuing a  too-aggressive and more concurrent strategy, increasing its risks of poor  program outcomes in the future. Table 4 summarizes outcomes to date on  these four tactical aircraft programs.
An overview of key observations on each new system follows. More details  on each system’s mission, program status, major work activities, and  funding are provided in appendix IV.
The F-22A “Raptor” needs a new business case that more accurately  and realistically supports the changed conditions and the program of  record, including justification for additional investments of $6.3 billion  to incorporate more robust ground attack and intelligence-gathering  capabilities. There is a 198 aircraft difference between the Air Force’s  stated need for 381 aircraft and the 183 aircraft the Office of Secretary  of Defense (OSD) says is affordable. We have previously recommended  that DOD develop a new business case for the F-22A program before  further investments in new aircraft or modernization are made. DOD  has not concurred with this recommendation, stating that an internal  study of tactical aircraft has justified the current quantities planned for  the F-22A. Because of the frequently changing OSD-approved  requirements for the F-22A, repeated cost overruns, significant  remaining investments, and delays in the program we continue to  believe a new business case is required and that the assumptions used  in the internal OSD study be validated by an independent source.
The JSF “Lightning II” acquisition strategy’s high degree of concurrent  development and production weakens its business case and poses  substantial risks for cost overruns, schedule slips, and late delivery of  promised capabilities to the warfighter. The program has contracted to  deliver full capabilities for the three different variants in a single-step,  12-year development program and plans to begin production in 2007  with immature technologies, incomplete designs, undemonstrated  system integration, and little knowledge about performance and  producibility. Costs have increased another $31.6 billion from the fiscal  year 2004 rebaselined amount. Due to affordability pressures, DOD is  beginning to reduce annual procurement quantities; recent plans  indicate a 28 percent decrease in maximum annual buy quantities  compared to last year’s program of record.
The F/A-18E/F “Super Hornet” program adopted a more evolutionary  and less risky approach, having substantial commonality with its  predecessor C/D models and leveraging previous technology. Planned  upgrades incrementally add new capabilities, some of which are having  performance problems and delays according to OSD testers. Over half  of the planned fleet has been delivered, and some have been used in  combat. The mature and stable production program is on its second  multiyear contract and is delivering aircraft ahead of the contract  schedule and within cost targets.
The EA-18G “Growler” is the newest program and shares the same   F/A-18F platform, but incorporates airborne electronic attack  capabilities. Its acquisition schedule is very aggressive and concurrent.  Only two of its five critical technologies are fully mature to best  practice standards even though the program is well into development  and plans to start producing electronic attack-capable aircraft this year.  OSD’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation also cites its  aggressive schedule to achieve an initial operational capability and  special risks in integrating the electronic attack capabilities onto the  F/A-18F platform.
section_title: New Acquisition Costs and Delays Have Made Resourcing Decisions for Legacy Systems Reactive and Less Efficient
paragraphs: The problems and delays encountered by the new tactical aircraft  acquisition programs have direct and significant impacts on legacy  systems plans and costs. Funding needs and plans for new and legacy  aircraft are by nature interdependent, and decisions to sustain, modernize,  or retire legacy systems are largely reactive to the outcomes of new  systems. The military services accord new systems higher funding priority,  and the legacy systems tend to get whatever funding is remaining after the  new systems’ budget needs are met. If new aircraft consume more of the  investment dollars than planned, the buying power and budgets for legacy  systems are further reduced to remain within DOD budget limits.  However, as quantities of new systems have been cut and deliveries to the  warfighter delayed, more legacy aircraft are required to stay in the  inventory and for longer periods of time than planned, requiring more  dollars to modernize and maintain aging aircraft. Table 5 summarizes  budgeted investments (development and procurement funding) for new  and legacy systems. Over the next 7 years, DOD plans to invest about  $109.3 billion in tactical aircraft to acquire about 570 new systems and  modernize hundreds of legacy systems.
Uncertainty about new systems costs and deliveries makes it difficult to  effectively plan and efficiently implement modernization efforts and legacy  retirement schedules. With unpredictable quantities and delivery  schedules of the new systems, program managers for legacy aircraft are  challenged to balance reduced funds for modifications with requirements  to keep legacy systems operational and relevant longer than they had  planned. Stable retirement plans are critical to effective management and  efficient resource use, but in this environment retirement plans keep  changing. Program managers are hard-pressed to allocate funds or set  sunset schedules for legacy fleets until the outcomes of new acquisitions  are known. Furthermore, the longer the services retain legacy systems in  their inventories, the more money they will need for operation and  maintenance costs in order to keep legacy aircraft operational and  relevant. DOD has become increasingly concerned that the high cost of  keeping aging weapon systems relevant and able to meet required  readiness levels is a growing challenge in the face of forecast threat  capabilities and is depleting modernization accounts, reducing the  department’s flexibility to invest in new weapons.
Operating costs per flying hour for Air Force legacy systems are shown in  figure 3. It illustrates that operation and maintenance costs typically  increase as weapons systems age. It also shows the relatively high  operating costs for the F-117A, a factor in the decision to retire that fleet  early. Some officials believe that operating costs for new systems will be  less expensive than the legacy systems they replace, but others challenge  that notion, citing such factors as the higher technology, stealth  characteristics, and private sector support arrangements.
Since legacy programs typically receive less funding than requested,  program managers must prioritize and fund first those modifications that  are absolutely necessary—ones that are related to safety of flight or that  will cause the aircraft to be grounded. As a result, there are large pent up  demands of unfunded requirements the warfighters report as necessary to  meet their mission requirements. Current estimates for unfunded  modernization and sustainment requirements on legacy systems total  several billions of dollars. The services are considering substantial service  life extension programs and additional modernization enhancements for  several of the legacy fleets, but many of these costs are not reflected in  current programmed budgets or have yet to be estimated.
Some of these issues and concerns about legacy systems are not new, but  perhaps have gained more immediacy because of their interdependency  with the large scale new systems recapitalization efforts. GAO has  previously reported on the condition, program strategies, and funding for  key existing DOD weapon systems, including tactical aircraft. Our 2005  report found that the military services had incomplete long-term  strategies and funding plans for some systems, in that future requirements  are not identified, studies are not completed, funding for maintenance and  upgrades was limited, or replacement systems were delayed or not yet  identified. We recommended that DOD reassess and report annually on its  near- and long-term programs for key systems until replacements are  fielded. DOD partially concurred to reassess programs stating that it  already does this in its planning, programming, budgeting, and execution  process. It did not concur that additional annually reporting to Congress of  this information was necessary as they stated the annual budget  submission already includes a balanced overall program within available  resources.
subsections: section_title: The Air Force Is Increasing Investments in Legacy Systems to Keep Them Relevant and Capable
paragraphs: The Air Force plans to invest more than $7.1 billion from fiscal year 2007  to 2013 to modernize legacy aircraft (table 6). These investments are  heavily influenced by the ability of the Air Force to complete its  recapitalization strategy for the F-22A and the JSF aircraft as currently  planned. Further reductions in quantities and delays in delivering these  new aircraft will impact the number of legacy aircraft retained and the  amount of time they must remain in service. Future investments beyond  those shown, including service life extension efforts costing billions of  dollars, may be required to keep legacy fleets relevant and operational  longer. Officials said the time is approaching when hard decisions on  retiring or extending the life of legacy aircraft must be made.
The following provides an overview of key observations on the Air Force  legacy systems. Additional details on these systems are in appendix IV.
The Air Force will retain the A-10 “Warthog” fleet in its inventory much  longer than planned because of its relevant combat capabilities— demonstrated first during Desert Storm and now in the ongoing Global  War on Terror. However, because of post-Cold War plans to retire the  fleet in the early 1990s, the Air Force had spent little money on major  upgrades and depot maintenance for at least 10 years. As a result, the  Air Force faces a large backlog of structural repairs and  modifications—much of it unfunded---and will likely identify more  unplanned work as older aircraft are inspected and opened up for  maintenance. Major efforts to upgrade avionics, modernize cockpit  controls, and replace wings are funded and underway. Program  officials identified a current unfunded requirement of $2.7 billion,  including $2.1 billion for engine upgrades, which some Air Force  officials say is not needed. A comprehensive service life extension  program (if required) could cost billions more.
F-15 “Eagles” will not be fully or as quickly replaced by F-22As as  planned. For years, the Air Force modification efforts and funds have  been concentrated on about half the fleet—the number projected as  required to complement the new F-22A aircraft. With the F-22A  quantities now reduced, more F-15s need to be modernized and  retained for longer periods of time. Officials identified near-term  unfunded requirements of $2.3 billion and much more if life extension  efforts are needed. The newest F-15E aircraft with enhanced strike  capabilities will be retained even longer. The Air Force deferred the  start up of a major radar upgrade effort costing $2.3 billion, and  program officials identified another $1.7 billion in unfunded  requirements to address avionics, structural, and engine concerns  among other efforts proposed for the F-15E.
Newer F-16 “Falcon” aircraft may be needed to stay viable and  operational longer due to JSF schedule delays and deferrals. The F-16  fleet consists of several different configurations that were acquired in a  long and successful evolutionary program. The Air Force has invested  billions over the years to upgrade capabilities, engines, and structural  enhancements needed to achieve its original life expectancy of   8,000 hours. The program office estimated $3.2 billion in unfunded  requirements, including radar upgrades to the aircraft capable of  suppressing enemy air defenses, the Air Force’s only platform for that  mission. Significant unknowns exist about extending the life beyond  8,000 hours should that be necessary.  This makes any additional JSF  schedule delays, deferrals, and cost growth very problematic for the  overall Air Force fighter structure.
The Air Force plans to retire the F-117A “Nighthawk” stealth fighter in  fiscal years 2007 and 2008, stating that there are other more capable  assets that can provide low observable, precision penetrating weapons  capability. Program Budget Decision 720, dated December 2005,  directed the Air Force to develop a strategy to gain congressional  support for this plan. Program officials estimate that the drawdown of  the fleet and the shutdown of government and contractor offices and  facilities would cost approximately $283 million. There is currently no  funding allocated for these retirement costs of the F-117A. This cost  does not include storage and maintenance of the fleet after such a  retirement.
section_title: Plans for Navy and Marine Corps Legacy Systems Are Evolving and Likely to Require More Funding
paragraphs: The Navy plans to invest about $4.6 billion in its legacy tactical aircraft  over the next seven years (table 7). Officials are relying heavily on the  acquisition of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the JSF as planned to  complete its recapitalization strategy. Delays in the JSF program could  require additional modifications beyond those already budgeted for the  F/A-18C/D and AV-8B aircraft. Work on EA-6B aircraft is dependent on the  timely delivery of the EA-18G Growler, its naval replacement, and on  evolving Marine Corps plans for its future electronic attack capability.
The following provides an overview of key observations on the Navy and  Marine Corps legacy systems. Additional details on these systems are in  appendix IV.
The F/A-18C/D “Hornet” fleet may be given extra life to ameliorate a  fighter shortfall projected by Navy officials. Service officials are  considering efforts to extend the life of the legacy aircraft until  replaced by the JSF.  A service life assessment effort to be completed  in December 2007 will determine the feasibility, scope of work, and  total costs for extending the life of the system. A preliminary estimate,  including the costs of the assessment, is about $2 billion, but officials  said that number could very well increase substantially as the  assessment progresses and cost estimates mature. Also included in the  above estimate is the Center Barrel Replacement to eliminate  structural limitations caused by cracking in the central fuselage. This  effort is about half completed and will cost about $970 million. A Naval  Air Systems Command official said they could very well identify  additional modifications and structural work required beyond what is  funded. Further delays in JSF could exacerbate problems.
The Navy will retire its EA-6B “Prowler” aircraft by 2013 and replace  them with the new EA-18G, but the Marine Corps’s future plans are still  evolving. The Navy will transition its most capable aircraft to the  Marines who will operate and maintain them until retirement. The  Marine Corps had planned to retire its EA-6B fleet starting in 2015, but  officials said plans could change depending on the transition of aircraft  from the Navy and that they may need to keep these aircraft in the  inventory longer depending on the JSF delivery schedule. The Marine  Corps has not yet made firm plans as to its future electronic attack  capability and is considering employment of the JSF and other assets.
The Marine Corps has requested a total of $379 million in the fiscal year  2007 global war on terrorism supplemental and the fiscal year 2008  global war on terror request to upgrade an additional 18 EA-6Bs with  the Improved Capability III electronic attack suite and for other  modernization enhancements.
The Marine Corps wants to replace its entire AV-8B “Harrier” fleet with  the JSF STOVL aircraft as expeditiously as possible. The Harrier—the  original STOVL aircraft—is costly to maintain, and has a relatively high  attrition rate. Program officials have budgeted very little future funds  for Harrier modifications, but delays in JSF deliveries and possible  cutbacks in quantity may require some redirection. Harriers may need  to be retained in inventory longer than expected, but officials have not  determined the extent of work required, nor the potential cost.  Between 1994 and 2001, the majority of AV-8Bs were remanufactured  with new fuselages to add structural life and to accommodate night  attack modifications and a higher performance engine. Currently, five  day attack aircraft are being upgraded to night attack capability, and  two training aircraft are being refurbished.
section_title: A Joint Enterprise- Level Investment Strategy for Tactical Aircraft Is Lacking As Services Plan Independently
paragraphs: DOD does not have a single, integrated investment plan for recapitalizing  and modernizing its tactical air forces. Rather, each service independently  develops its requirements and programs its resources to size and shape its  individual force structure. These plans to date have underperformed in  terms of higher acquisition costs and fewer quantities delivered, and  officials from each service forecast near-term and future shortfalls in the  capabilities and numbers of aircraft. Moving forward, projected plans are  likely unaffordable given competing demands from future defense and  nondefense budgets.
Efforts to build a more joint position continue with some promise, but  recent studies did not significantly impact service acquisition plans.  Without a joint, integrated investment strategy for tactical aircraft that  plans and addresses requirements on a DOD enterprise-wide basis, it is  difficult to evaluate the efficacy and severity of capability gaps or,  alternatively, areas of redundancy. Also, it is difficult to fully account for  and assess real and potential contributions from other current and future  non-tactical systems providing similar capabilities, including bombers,  missiles, and unmanned aircraft.
subsections: section_title: Services Plan Tactical Aircraft Investments Independently
paragraphs: The national defense strategy, which comes from an enterprise level in  DOD, requires the services to be able to successfully and simultaneously  defend the homeland, win two overlapping major contingencies, operate in  forward locations around the world to deter aggression, and handle lesser  operations as needed such as humanitarian and peace-keeping missions.  Defense strategy continues to evolve with an increased emphasis on the  “long war”—the Global War on Terror--and other asymmetric operations  and a reduced emphasis on major theater combat and conventional  adversaries.
While OSD and the joint staff provide oversight and may make  adjustments, each military service is primarily responsible for assessing  tactical aircraft requirements, sizing its force structure, developing  investment plans, and programming resources to meet its individual  assignments within the total national defense policy requirements. The  future forces planned by the military services will be smaller than today’s  force, but more capable and stealthier, according to officials (see table 8).  Even so, Service officials are forecasting shortfalls in force structure  capabilities and numbers throughout this period.
Two important factors in sizing and shaping forces are the types of forces  and systems needed (capabilities) and the overall size of the force to meet  operational demands (capacity). This means maintaining a force structure  that not only has modern systems with advanced capabilities to meet  projected threats, but also has enough assets to cover assigned targets,  threats, and territories. Each Service also wants to size their force  structure to enable them to employ rotational plans that cycle force  packages through sequential phases of active deployment, return from  deployment to reconstitute, and preparation for the next deployment.
subsections: section_title: Department of the Navy Future Tactical Aircraft Plans
paragraphs: The Navy sizes and shapes its tactical fighter requirements to fill 10   carrier strike forces. Each future force would comprise 44 aircraft—  24 F/A-18 E/Fs and 20 carrier capable Joint Strike Fighters—with  equivalent capabilities and a mix of stealthy and non stealthy aircraft.   EA-18Gs will also be assigned to carriers to provide tactical jamming  support for the strike force.
Marine Corps fighter squadrons are attached to Marine expeditionary units  and are sized and positioned to provide direct fire support and protection  to front-line forces and reinforcements. The future Marine Corps combat  air force is tied to success of the JSF acquisition program as officials plan  to have an all-JSF force in the future. The future force will also have   40 percent fewer aircraft assigned to each infantry battalion.
In 2003, the Department of the Navy began implementing a tactical air  integration plan to address affordability concerns. The plan was aimed at  more closely integrating Navy and Marine Corps strike fighter inventories,  in effect managing tactical air assets as a common pool. The Navy  projected net savings of $18.5 billion through fiscal year 2021 by reducing  the number of operational legacy fighters required and, in turn, the  number of new aircraft needed for recapitalization. This reduced future  procurement plans by 409 JSFs and 88 F/A-18E/F aircraft. At the same  time, it was recognized that integration would increase operating and  maintenance costs because the smaller number of aircraft would need to  be maintained at higher rates of readiness in order to meet emergency  surge deployments.
Actual and planned inventory levels for combined Navy and Marine Corps  tactical aircraft from fiscal year 1990 through fiscal year 2025 are shown in  figure 4. The Department of the Navy tactical aviation forces peaked in the  early 1990s at about 1,800 aircraft and shrunk to about 1,200 by 2006,  principally through retirement of the A-6 fleet and beginning draw downs  on the F-14 fleet. By 2025, the total tactical inventory is slated to decrease  another 300 aircraft, or 25 percent (refer back to table 8). Therefore, the  total inventory in 2025 is projected to be one-half the inventory in the early  1990s. Legacy aircraft would be virtually replaced by the more capable  new systems.
Shortfalls Forecast by Navy and Marine Corps Officials  Navy officials are projecting persistent future shortfalls in both legacy and  new FA-18 aircraft. The amounts of the shortfall vary depending on two  key variables—the rate of procurement on the Joint Strike Fighter and  service life estimates for F/A-18s. Navy and Marine Corps officials told us  that buying the JSF at the current planned rate—requiring a ramp-up to   50 aircraft per year by fiscal year 2015—will be difficult to achieve and to  afford, particularly if costs continue to increase and schedules slip.  According to one study, a likely scenario assumes acquiring fewer JSFs  annually and achieving a modest increase in flying hour life for legacy   F/A-18C/Ds; this scenario would project shortfalls starting in 2010 and  peaking at 167 legacy strike fighters by 2017. Navy officials also project a  shortfall of 131 F/A-18E/Fs by 2024 based on estimated usage, attrition,  and assuming an increase in flying hour life from 6,000 to 9,000 hours.  Options to erase these shortfalls include buying more new aircraft and  extending the life of legacy aircraft.
Marine Corps officials project a near-term shortfall in the AV-8B fleet  ranging from 8 to 14 aircraft between fiscal years 2006 to 2011. Erasing this  shortfall after 2011 depends upon acquiring the JSF STOVL in the numbers  and time frames currently planned. According to officials, a one-year slide  in the JSF schedule increases the shortfall by approximately three aircraft  per year. As a result, the fleet would need to examine squadron structure  and additional reductions to aircraft would be expected to negatively  impact deployment capabilities.
section_title: Department of the Air Force Future Tactical Aircraft Plans
paragraphs: The Air Force sizes its tactical air forces to meet warfighting requirements.  In order to fill peacetime defense needs, the Air Force schedules ten air  and space expeditionary forces, the planned organizations of Air Force  aircraft, personnel, and support for operations and deployments. These  individual force constructs are applied against rotational national security  requirements. The Air Force’s future plan for combat aircraft that is  believed affordable is termed the programming force and is shown in  figure 5.
This plan assumes buying the 183 F-22As deemed affordable by OSD and  the current program of record for the JSF, but with a slowdown in fielding.  The programming plan projects the total number of tactical aircraft  decreasing by about 700 aircraft--from 2,500 currently to about 1,800 in  2025 (refer back to table 8). This plan continues the overall decline in  inventory since 1990 when the Air Force fielded about 4,000 tactical  aircraft. The programming force shows significant quantities of A-10 and  F-15C/D/E aircraft remaining in the force by 2025 with phased drawdown  of all F-16s. The 2025 force is now projected to be roughly 60 percent new  systems and 40 percent legacy systems. This is a significant shift from  earlier projections which had planned on an almost all new force. This  shift reflects changes due to the cuts in total F-22A purchases and the  reduced annual buys of JSF with consequent slowdown in fielding.
Shortfalls Forecast by Air Force Officials  Officials at Air Combat Command--the requirement-setting command that  supports the warfighter--told us that the programming (funded) force is  not sufficient to meet national security requirements at acceptable levels  of risk. According to these officials, the funded program would support  only 100 combat aircraft (tactical fighters and bombers) in each air and  expeditionary force compared to 150 aircraft today. While the new  systems are expected to provide improved capabilities compared to the  legacy systems they replace, officials do not think the force would have  sufficient capacity to cover future security needs with acceptable risks.
Air Combat Command develops another force plan known as the vision  force (later reworked into a planning force by Air Force headquarters) that  the requiring command believes provides the right mix and numbers to  meet future needs at an acceptable level of risk. This plan would procure  the full complement of JSFs and the Air Force’s stated requirement for   381 F-22As, which would allow a full operational squadron to be assigned  to each of the 10 air and space expeditionary forces. Under this plan,  almost all legacy aircraft would be retired by 2025 with the exception of  the F-15E, the latest model in the F-15 series that has an enhanced strike  capability. This plan is not constrained by resources, and command  officials estimated it would cost more than $100 billion over the funding  levels currently expected through 2025.
section_title: Affordability of Long- Range Plans Is Questionable
paragraphs: Looking forward over the next 20 years, DOD’s collective tactical aircraft  recapitalization plans are likely not affordable as currently planned.  Acquisition strategies and plans assume favorable assumptions about cost  and schedule and the ability to sustain funding at high levels over a  considerable period of time. Historically, however, costs increase;  quantities are reduced; and delivery schedules are delayed. The JSF  program represents 90 percent of the investments to go for new tactical  aircraft and projected plans are likely unaffordable given projected future  budget constraints and competing demands.
First, plans for new systems are based on conservative estimates of future  cost growth to complete the programs but optimistic estimates on the  availability of future funding, production rates, and quantities of new  aircraft delivered to the warfighter on time. While it is understandable to  project that programs will execute to cost and quantity targets as planned,  the prevailing and historical evidence suggests otherwise. In 1997 we  reported that the historical average cost growth of major acquisition  systems was at least 20 percent. Our annual assessment of weapon  systems continue to show today that many programs cost more, take  longer to develop, and deliver fewer assets than planned. While the   F/A-18E/F program has generally executed to schedule, the F-22A did   not, and we believe the recent cost escalation and potential delays in  production indicate that the JSF is on a similar path. Air Force and Marine  Corps officials told us that the planned maximum procurement rates for  the JSF will be very difficult to sustain and there are already pressures to  reduce or delay procurement before it even begins. The fiscal year 2008  budget has reduced near-term quantities and current planning projections  suggest that the Air Force will significantly reduce annual procurement  quantities midterm in the program and defer these aircraft to later years,  extending the procurement period by 7 years.
Second, the tactical aircraft plans do not consider billions in potential  added costs for legacy systems. As discussed earlier in this report,  substantial service life extension programs and additional modernization  enhancements are under serious consideration for many of the legacy  fleets. Some of these costs are not reflected in current programmed  budgets or have yet to be estimated. For example, the Navy is considering  options to extend the life of its F/A-18 fleets, but has not yet developed  comprehensive cost estimates. An initial estimate is for $2 billion, but an  official told us the cost will likely be much larger. The Air Force is now  planning to keep the A-10 in inventory for a longer period of time, but the  full costs to extend the life are not known, and some other potential costs,  including $2.1 billion to improve the engines, are not funded. One estimate  for extending the A-10’s life in total was $4.4 billion. We also learned that  $283 million to retire the F-117A during fiscal years 2007 and 2008 has not  yet been funded, and given officials’ comments about unstable divestiture  schedules and changing retirement dates, it may be the case that other  programs have also not factored in retirement costs to close contractor  facilities and government programs. Furthermore, as legacies remain in  the operational force longer, substantial funding for additional  sustainment costs and annual operating and maintenance costs will be  necessary, particularly if plans to defer JSF procurements are  implemented.
Third, tactical aircraft plans will face increasing competition for the  defense dollar from other new procurements and from continuing costs  for the Global War on Terror. DOD is planning the start-up of several   big-ticket items including a new strategic tanker aircraft, a next generation  strike aircraft, unmanned aircraft, and other more transformational  programs. Projected costs for ongoing military operations in the Global  War on Terror will continue to put pressure on defense investment  accounts and are also expected to increase the share of the total budget  going to ground forces which could decrease the share for aviation  programs. Flat or lower funding levels and future systems that can  perform the same or similar tactical air missions may substantially alter  the ultimate mix, timing, and rate at which combat aircraft are acquired.
Fourth, any questions on affordability must be viewed in a larger context  relative to federal spending, demographic trends, and impacts on  discretionary funding. The Comptroller General testified last year on the  nation’s unsustainable fiscal path and its large and growing structural  deficit due primarily to known demographic trends, rising health care  costs, and lower federal revenues as a percentage of the economy. Federal  discretionary programs, including defense spending, will face serious  budget pressures. Even so, defense programs are commanding larger  budgets. Over the past 5 years, the department has doubled its planned  investments in new weapon systems from about $700 billion in 2001 to  nearly $1.4 trillion in 2006.
The Congressional Budget Office evaluated the long-term implications of  defense plans and determined that current investment plans would require  sustained funding levels at higher real (inflation-adjusted) amounts than  since mid-1980s, due to sustained purchase of new equipment, increased  costs for new capabilities, increased operations and maintenance costs for  aging legacy systems, and costlier new systems. At the same time, the  Congressional Budget Office notes that increased medical and operating  support costs competing for the defense dollar and national demographic  trends will continue to put pressure on federal discretionary spending.
Figure 6 illustrates the affordability challenge. It contrasts DOD’s  optimistic future-funding plans with a more conservative estimate. DOD’s  plan (top-line in figure 6) assumes funding levels well above historical  amounts. The spike in funding required starting in 2008, clearly shows the  typical bow wave effect in which weapon system budget requirements  tend to move to the right (delayed to future years) as programs fail to  receive full funding or do not execute as planned. DOD’s projections show  an optimistic bent that tactical aircraft procurement will be able to  significantly increase its share of defense funding, exceeding historical  levels when many project flat or falling funding levels. The lower line  (shaded portion of fig. 6) assumes funding at the same level as fiscal year  2006 carried forward with annual inflationary increases. This more  conservative projection is in line with historical experience. Our analysis  of future-year defense plans indicates that the military services in total and  the tactical aircraft procurement in particular have received similar shares  of the defense dollar over time, a finding that argues against a strategy that  requires a substantial increase in order to succeed. The gap between the  lines thus represents DOD plans that are likely unaffordable.
section_title: Efforts to Build Forces from a Joint Perspective Continue, but Recent Studies Have Not Had Substantial Impacts on Acquisition Plans
paragraphs: DOD continues broad efforts to improve jointness and bring a more  integrated cross-service perspective to its plans and programs. There are  promising, but still rather new efforts to enhance capabilities-based  planning and portfolio management that could be used to better integrate  and hone joint tactical aircraft requirements. However, recent efforts to  apply jointness to tactical aircraft have not had much direct impact on  service investment plans and strategies. We also note that one of the few  mission capabilities that have been provided jointly, the tactical airborne  electronic attack mission carried out by the EA-6B, is now expected to be  replaced in the future by separate and unique aircraft for each of the  services.
subsections: section_title: New Planning Efforts Show Promise
paragraphs: DOD has several promising efforts to enhance jointness and bring a  capabilities-based approach to defense investments. The Joint  Capabilities, Integration, and Development System (JCIDS), portfolio  management, and other initiatives are evolving mechanisms designed to  bring top commanders’ needs up-front and take a more joint, enterprise- wide view of requirements and funding decisions. Continuing efforts to  develop joint capabilities-based assessment and planning methodologies  will be essential to understand contributions to the warfighter, develop  DOD-wide priorities, and craft investment strategies to mitigate shortfalls  or eliminate duplication.
JCIDS is a major, but relatively new initiative to shift from a service- centric focus on individual acquisition programs to a more top-down and  joint view of warfighting capabilities and effects. JCIDS is intended to  involve a wide range of stakeholders, including combatant commanders, in  identifying capability needs and alternative solutions. JCIDS introduces  new methodologies intended to foster jointness and groups warfighting  needs into eight functional areas based on warfighting capabilities—such  as, force application, battle-space awareness, and focused logistics—that  cut across the military services and defense agencies. JCIDS process  emphasizes early attention to the fiscal implications of newly identified  needs, including identifying ways to pay for new capabilities by divesting  the department of lower priority or redundant capabilities. Our recent  report discusses JCIDS and other steps DOD is taking to better identify  and prioritize joint warfighting needs, but finds that DOD’s service-centric  structure and fragmented decision-making processes hinder successful  implementation.
Another promising and related initiative is joint capability portfolio  management. The intent is to manage groups of like capabilities across the  enterprise to improve interoperability, minimize capability redundancies  and gaps, and maximize capability effectiveness. This would help build  budgets around a set of capabilities instead of traditional military  accounts. The idea is to take a more joint look at what capabilities  combatant commanders and warfighters need, as opposed to the current  more service-centric way in which the services independently buy and  field capabilities they deem important. By shifting the focus from service- specific programs to joint capabilities, DOD should be better positioned to  understand the implications of investment and resource trade-offs among  competing priorities. In September 2006, DOD management selected four  test cases for experimentation with the joint capability portfolio  management concept. Depending on this outcome, tactical aviation would  appear to be an excellent candidate for portfolio management by cross- decking similar capabilities in each service. Although the implementation  of these portfolio management initiatives seems to have the potential for  improving interoperability and minimizing capability redundancies and  gaps, DOD still has a long way to go before the effectiveness of this  capability-based planning and management effort can be determined.
The Air Force is also implementing a new “associate wing” concept that is  similar in its aims as the Navy-Marine Corps integration effort. Associate  wings would pair up active and reserve component units to share the same  aircraft and facilities, while retaining separate chains of command. Rather  than each unit’s operating and maintaining its own wings, the two would  now operate and maintain just one wing in common. While still very new,  the expected outcomes would be reduced inventories, reduced operating  costs, and fewer future replacements needed.
section_title: Joint Studies Have Not Been Very Directive
paragraphs: Despite the Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) and other studies, there  are many unanswered questions about whether services can achieve  overarching goals for modernizing aging tactical aircraft fleets. In  testimony on the results of the department’s 2006 QDR, the Secretary of  Defense stated that continued U.S. air dominance depends on a  recapitalized fleet. Surprisingly, however, DOD’s 2006 QDR report, issued  in February 2006, did not present a coherent joint investment strategy for  tactical aircraft systems that addressed needs, capability gaps,  alternatives, and affordability. The Joint Strike Fighter, the largest aircraft  acquisition program, was not mentioned and the F-22A only in relation to  multi-year contracting. The QDR report did include some non prescriptive  direction for joint air capabilities, emphasizing systems with greater range  and persistence, larger and more flexible payloads, and the ability to  penetrate and sustain operations in denied areas.
In a 2005 testimony, we suggested that the QDR would provide an  opportunity for DOD to assess its tactical aircraft recapitalization plans  and weigh options for accomplishing its specific and overarching goals. By  not specifically addressing these issues, the DOD missed an opportunity.  With limited information contained in the QDR report, many questions are  still unanswered about the future of DOD’s tactical aircraft modernization  efforts.
In addition, DOD conducted a joint air dominance study that looked at  current acquisition plans and capabilities. While it validated the need for  three JSF variants, the study did not receive wide services support. Air  Force officials said they submitted their own recommendations that were  not adopted. Another consultant study, directed by the Deputy Secretary  of Defense and intended to replicate the Navy-Marine Corps integration  effort on a DOD-wide basis, also appears not to have had much direct  impact on altering service acquisition plans going forward.
section_title: Joint Tactical Radar Jamming Mission May End
paragraphs: In conducting military operations, U.S. and allied aircraft can be at great  risk from enemy air defenses, such as surface to air missile systems. The  airborne electronic attack mission employs specialized aircraft to  suppress, destroy, or temporarily degrade enemy radars and  communications and is a critical enabler to successful tactical air  operations. Because these specialized aircraft protect aircraft of all  services in hostile airspace, the electronic attack mission crosses  individual service lines. DOD considers airborne electronic attack to be a  key capability for many contingencies and predicts increasing roles and  missions for aircraft with these capabilities. Since 1995, the EA-6B has  been DOD’s only tactical standoff radar jammer aircraft and has provided  support to all services during numerous joint and allied operations against  both traditional and nontraditional threats.
This capability—one of the few examples of a truly joint asset shared by  the military services—is now expected to diminish, to be replaced by  separate and unique aircraft for each of the services. Concerned about a  gap in defense suppression capabilities as a consequence of increasing  modernization of enemy air defenses and aging of the EA-6B, DOD  conducted an analysis of alternatives for airborne electronic attack. The  May 2002 report concluded that the EA-6B inventory would be insufficient  to meet DOD’s future needs and identified many potential platform  combinations to address capability shortfalls. DOD adopted a system-of- systems approach in which a multitude of systems are needed to provide  required capabilities across the electronic spectrum. The report stated that  before a service can begin a formal acquisition program, services decisions  should consider whether one service will provide DOD’s core capability  and whether it would reside in a single platform.
Subsequent to the report, the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps each  decided to develop individual and unique electronic attack capabilities to  replace the EA-6B in the stand-off tactical jamming role. The Navy is  developing the EA-18G, but plans to procure only enough to support its  carrier strike forces. The Air Force initially proposed a modified B-52 for  the standoff radar jamming role. With OSD concurrence, the Air Force  cancelled this program because of its high estimated costs, and is now  considering other options. In the near-term, the Marine Corps will  continue to use upgraded EA-6B aircraft, but anticipates using in the  future an electronic attack-capable Joint Strike Fighter integrated with  unmanned aerial systems. There is an OSD directed study underway to  validate the services’ requirements.
While DOD continues to tout joint capabilities, it is a concern that one  area of success is being curtailed. A September 2004 memorandum of  understanding between the military services and joint staff stated that the  Navy expeditionary EA-6B squadrons will decommission between fiscal  years 2009 and 2012 to be replaced by indigenous Navy, Air Force, and  Marine Corps electronic attack capability. DOD continues to assess  requirements and options.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Tactical air recapitalization and modernization is a costly and very  challenging enterprise, requiring a delicate and dynamic balancing of  funding, fielding schedules, and retirement plans between new system  acquisitions and legacy aircraft to ensure that current and future forces  can meet national security requirements at reasonable levels of risk. New  tactical aircraft programs, for the most part, have not adequately employed  evolutionary, knowledge-based acquisition strategies—resulting in  escalating costs that undercut DOD’s buying power, reduces aircraft  purchases, and delays delivering needed capabilities to the warfighter.  Because funding needs and plans for new and legacy aircraft programs are  interdependent, cost, schedule, or performance problems experienced in  acquiring new systems cause perturbations in modernization costs and  retirement schedules throughout the operational fleets. Dependent largely  on the future course of the Joint Strike Fighter, legacy programs are  placed in reactive modes with uncertain and changeable future  requirements, unstable retirement plans, and potential unfunded  requirements in the billions of dollars. While the services strive to reduce  war-fighting risks by fielding new systems and limiting investment in  legacy systems, they are faced with increased prices and schedule risks for  new aircraft while maintaining aging, capability-limited legacy aircraft. In  the past, we have recommended the department use an evolutionary  acquisition approach to develop weapon system programs coupled with a  process that ensures at the start of development that requirements have  been reduced to match mature technologies, a feasible design, and a  reasonable expectation of available funding. While the department’s  acquisition policy has included such practices, DOD has not fully  embraced the use of these practices as it executes current acquisition  programs.
Despite DOD’s repeated declaration that recapitalizing its aging tactical  aircraft fleet is a top priority, the department does not have a single,  comprehensive, and integrated investment plan to adequately craft joint  priorities, identify critical capability gaps, and allocate scarce funds.  Instead, planning has been separately done by the services. Each military  service independently plans and resources individual programs that,  collectively, are likely unaffordable and that make it difficult to identify  and quantify DOD-wide capability gaps or duplication. DOD needs to bring  overall tactical aircraft investments into line with more realistic, long-term  projections of overall defense funding and the amount of procurement  funding expected to be available for aircraft purchases, and then establish  and adhere to a plan that is militarily justified and can be executed within  that amount. Efforts to improve joint capabilities-based planning and to  manage tactical air assets as a portfolio should be encouraged.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In order to recapitalize and sustain capable and sufficient tactical air  forces that reflect what is needed and affordable from a joint service  perspective and that has high confidence of being executed as planned,   we are making two recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. The  Secretary should  take decisive actions to shorten cycle times in delivering needed  combat capabilities to the warfighter including    adopting a time-certain development cycle that can deliver an  increment of new capability within 5 to 6 years after the start of  system design and development; and  reassessing requirements for ongoing weapon system acquisition  programs to identify ways to reduce requirements and speed up  delivery of initial capabilities; and    develop an integrated enterprise-level investment strategy that  is based on a joint assessment of warfighting needs and a full set of  potential and viable alternative solutions, considering not only new  acquisitions but also modifications to legacy aircraft to achieve this  balance within realistic and affordable budget projections for DOD;    strikes a balance between maintaining near-term readiness and  addressing long-term needs; and    considers the contributions of bombers, long range strike aircraft,  unmanned aircraft, missiles, and other weapons currently in the  inventory and those planned that can be employed to attack the  same type targets as the tactical aircraft.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Response
paragraphs: DOD concurred with both recommendations in written comments on a  draft of this report. These comments appear in appendix II. They also  provided technical comments that we incorporated in the final report as  appropriate.
Regarding our first recommendation that DOD take decisive actions to  shorten cycle times in developing and delivering weapon systems, DOD  stated that this is consistent with a major initiative of the Under Secretary  of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics intended to put  military capability into the hands of the warfighters faster and more  affordably. The Department is also pursuing other efforts supporting such  actions, including acquisition personnel pay incentives, acquisition policy  changes, focused research and engineering investments in technology, and  revised, earlier in-process reviews of requirements and proposed solutions  by OSD and Joint Staff. At the same time, however, DOD stated that  aircraft development is a highly complex engineering challenge and that it  would be unreasonable to uniformly apply a six year cycle time to  complex programs like the JSF.
We think that it is precisely because of complexity that programs like the  JSF could stand to benefit most from adopting a more evolutionary  acquisition process to develop and evolve weapon systems through small,  time-phased development increments. DOD’s history of substantial cost  growth and extended development times for major weapon systems  acquisitions were factors driving recent policy changes to require a more  knowledge-based evolutionary process with time-phased development  increments—key recommendations also in the Defense Acquisition  Performance Assessment report.  We note that the JSF’s predecessor, the  F-16 fighter program, delivered an initial increment of capability to the  warfighter within about 4 years after development began and then  successfully delivered 2,200 aircraft with incremental improvements as  technology became available over the span of about 30 years.  We believe  this alternative, less risky and more evolutionary approach is feasible and  still available to the JSF as it seeks to develop multiple variants to  recapitalize aging tactical fleets involving three services and international  partners.
Regarding our recommendation that DOD develop an integrated and  affordable enterprise-level investment strategy for tactical aviation, DOD  concurred but stated it already had elements of such a strategy. Officials  cited key decisions to invest in fifth generation systems such as the JSF  and F-22, prudent life extension programs for selected legacy aircraft, the  Joint Air Dominance study conducted during the 2006 QDR, and new  processes—the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System  and portfolio management—as bringing integrated capabilities-based  approaches in  formulating a tactical aircraft investment strategy. We  agree that the Department is making strides toward an integrated  enterprise-wide investment strategy but that key processes are still in their  beginning stages and that annual budget decisions are still primarily driven  on a service-centric, weapon system-specific basis. The new Joint  capability portfolio management initiative is a reaction to the current  environment in which the services independently budget, buy, and field  capabilities.  It has the potential to bring a joint warfighter, cross-service  view and disciplined budgeting over sets of mission area capabilities, but  test cases for experimenting and proving the concept are just beginning.  The 2006 QDR had the potential, but did not present a coherent joint  investment strategy that addressed needs, capability gaps, alternatives,  and affordability. These are critical, but now largely missing, elements to  the comprehensive and integrated investment strategy we are  recommending.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of  the Marine Corps, and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.  Copies will also be made available to others upon request. In addition, the  report will be available at no charge on the GAO web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions  concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine current risks and future plans for DOD’s new tactical aircraft  acquisition programs, we evaluated plans, budgets, delivery schedules, and  results to date on the JSF, F-22A, F/A-18E/F, and EA-18G. We compared  cost, schedule, and performance data to prior estimates to identify  significant changes and their causes. We discussed concerns and emerging  issues with officials from the program offices, the requiring commands,  and service headquarters. To limit impacts on the services and leverage  our work, we drew extensively upon prior and ongoing GAO engagements  on the JSF, F-22A, and EA-18G.
To determine impacts on legacy systems and retirement schedules, we  reviewed work content and funding requirements for ongoing and  projected modernization and sustainment projects for tactical aircraft. We  discussed future plans for legacy systems, retirement schedules, and the  degree they have been affected by cost, schedule, and performance  outcomes for new acquisition systems. We compiled lists of unfunded  requirements and estimates of costs for service life extension programs.
To determine the extent to which DOD has developed an integrated  investment plan for future tactical aircraft, we analyzed Air Force, Navy,  and Marine Corps plans and processes for establishing force and capability  requirements, the factors used to size and shape future force structure to  meet national security requirements, and how capability gaps or  redundancies are addressed. We reviewed OSD and joint staff  responsibilities and processes for exercising program management and  oversight of service programs and new initiatives intended to improve  enterprise planning and look for integrated DOD-wide solutions.
In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed officials  from the F-22A System Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,  Ohio; F/A-18 System Program Office, Patuxent River, MD; program offices  for Air Force legacy systems, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio;  program offices for Navy and Marine Corps legacy systems, Patuxent  River, MD.; Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, VA; Naval Air  Systems Command, Patuxent River, MD; Navy, Marine Corps, and Air  Force headquarters offices, OSD, and Joint Chiefs of Staff offices,  Washington, D.C. We performed our work from June 2006 through March  2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: Tactical Air Forces Funding Fiscal Years 2006 to 2011
section_title: Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft Systems Ongoing and Future Efforts
paragraphs: This appendix provides more details on new and legacy tactical aircraft to  expand upon summary information provided in the body of this report. We  include a brief description of each aircraft’s mission, program status, and  our observations on program execution and outcomes. Where applicable,  we also highlight recent GAO work on some systems. The appendix also  includes a funding table for each aircraft that consolidates the budget  requests in the Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget, the Fiscal Year 2007  Global War on Terrorism Supplemental, and the Fiscal Year 2008 Global  War on Terror request. The budget information in these tables is expressed  in current (then year) dollars and the totals may not add exactly because  of rounding. The fiscal year 2007 funding shown in these tables has been  appropriated by Congress except for the supplemental requests.
subsections: section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The F-22A is the Air Force’s next generation air superiority fighter and  incorporates a stealthy and highly maneuverable airframe, advanced  integrated avionics, and a supercruise engine. It will replace or  complement the F-15 as the Air Force’s primary air-to-air fighter and was  originally intended to counter threats posed by the Soviet Union. The Air  Force has decided to add more robust air-to-ground and intelligence- gathering capabilities not previously envisioned at program start, but now  considered necessary to increase its utility.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: Demonstration and validation began in October 1986 and system  development in June 1991. Low-rate initial production was approved in  August 2001 and full-rate production in March 2005. The first production  aircraft was delivered in June 2003 and, as of October 2006, 78 aircraft had  been delivered to the operational forces. The program of record is to  acquire a total of 183 aircraft at a total cost of $62.6 billion. The Air Force  plans to complete procurement in 2010 under a multiyear contract.
Initial operational capability was declared in December 2005. In its  December 2006 annual report, DOD’s Director of Operational Test and  Evaluation has determined that the F-22A is operationally effective in the  air-to-air mission role and in the air-to-ground mission against fixed targets  using the Joint Direct Attack Munition. The aircraft is not yet operationally  suitable due to reliability and maintainability deficiencies. Operational  users report that the aircraft has performed excellently in military  exercises against representative threats and represents a large advantage  over the F-15.
The Air Force is implementing a modernization and reliability  improvement program and plans to invest another $6.3 billion to develop  and integrate more robust ground attack, intelligence-gathering, and other  new capabilities. Formally established in 2003, the F-22A’s modernization  program is currently being planned for three increments of increasing  capability to be developed and delivered over time, from fiscal year 2007  to 2013. Additional modernization is expected, but the content and costs  have not been determined or included in projected budgets beyond 2013.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: The Air Force’s current stated need is for 381 F-22As. However, because of  past cost overruns and current budget constraints, OSD states that 183 are  all that is needed and affordable. This leaves a 198-aircraft gap with the Air  Force’s stated need. We have reported on F-22A issues for many years and  have recommended that a new and executable business case be prepared  that more accurately and realistically supports the current program of  record and which resolves a capability gap between what the Air Force  requires and what DOD can afford. During the more than 20 years the  aircraft has been in development, the conditions underpinning the original  business case substantively changed—threat and employment plans  changed, costs increased, the development period doubled, and new  mission requirements were added. Without a new relevant business case— on the appropriate number of F-22As for our national defense—it is  uncertain whether additional investments in the modernization program  are advisable.
The Air Force is working with the contractor to fix structural deficiencies  on the F-22A. Fatigue testing identified cracks in the aircraft near the  horizontal section tail of the aircraft. The Air Force is planning  modifications to strengthen the structure to get the 8,000-hour service life.  The Air Force estimates the costs to modify 72 F-22As will be  approximately $124 million. These modifications will not be fully  implemented until 2010.
At the start of modernization, all three critical technologies essential to  achieving capability requirements were considered mature by best  practice standards. Since that time, however, the program added three  additional critical technologies, all of which are immature. Immature and  untested technologies, as the program pushes forward, significantly  increase the risk of poor cost and schedule outcomes.
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The JSF program goals are to develop and field an affordable, highly  common family of stealthy, next-generation strike fighter aircraft for the  Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S. allies. The carrier suitable variant  will provide the Navy a multirole, stealthy strike aircraft to complement  the F/A-18E/F. The conventional take-off and landing variant will primarily  be an air-to-ground replacement for the Air Force’s F-16 and the A-10  aircraft, and will complement the F-22A. The short take-off and vertical  landing (STOVL) variant will be a multi-role strike fighter to replace the  Marine Corps’ F/A-18 and AV-8B aircraft.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: The JSF program is DOD’s most costly aircraft acquisition program. DOD  estimates that the total cost to develop and procure its fleet of aircraft will  be $276 billion, with total costs to maintain and operate the JSF adding  another $347 billion over its life cycle. It is also DOD’s largest cooperative  development program. Eight partner countries are providing funding for  system development and demonstration: Australia, Canada, Denmark,  Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
Concept demonstration began in November 1996. The program entered  system development and demonstration in October 2001 and is expected  to run through fiscal year 2013. Manufacture and assembly of test aircraft  is continuing, and first flight of the Air Force’s variant occurred in  December 2006. Overall, the cost estimate to develop the JSF has  increased from $34.4 billion in 2001 to $44.5 billion in 2005—about   29 percent. Procurement costs have increased from $196.6 billion in 2001  to $231.7 billion in 2005—about 18 percent. Since program start, JSF  quantities have been reduced by 530 aircraft. Current estimated program  acquisition unit costs are about $112 million, a 38 percent increase since  2001.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: We recently issued our third annual report on the JSF acquisition. The  development team has achieved first flight and has overcome major design  problems found earlier in development. However, the current acquisition  strategy still reflects very significant risk that both development and  procurement costs will increase and that aircraft will take longer to deliver  to the warfighter than currently planned. Even as the JSF program enters  the midpoint of its development, it continues to encounter significant cost  overruns and schedule delays. As a result of the program reporting a  Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach, a new baseline was established in 2004  with additional costs of $19.4 billion; since then, estimated costs to  complete the acquisition have increased another $31.6 billion. OSD cost  analysts are concerned about worsening cost performance and believe the  cost to complete the program will further escalate. The program has also  experienced delays in several key events, including the start of the flight  test program, delivery of the first production representative development  aircraft, and testing of critical missions systems.
Our past reports have found that the acquisition program is not following a  knowledge-based evolutionary approach that places it at risk of continued  poor program outcomes. The degree of concurrency between development  and production in the JSF’s acquisition strategy includes significant risks  for cost and schedule overruns or late delivery of promised capabilities to  the warfighter. For example, at the time of the low-rate initial production  decision, only one aircraft will have flown; less than 1 percent of the flight  test program will have been completed; and none of the three variants will  have a production representative prototype built. The 7-year flight test  program of more than 11,000 hours of testing just began in December 2006.  It will not be until 2011 that a fully capable, integrated JSF is scheduled to  begin flight testing. By that time, DOD expects to have committed to buy   103 production aircraft for $20 billion. Therefore, almost all of critical  flight testing remains to confirm the aircraft will indeed deliver the  required performance. Manufacturing and technical problems can delay  the completion of the flight test program, may necessitate design changes,  increase the number of flight test hours needed to verify the system will  work as intended, and affect when the capabilities are delivered to the  warfighter.
DOD appears to be taking some actions to lessen funding risk—the ability  to sustain funding in times of austere budgets or against competing  priorities. DOD’s plan in 2006 assumed extremely high annual funding  rates averaging $14 billion between 2012 and 2023. This is an extremely  large annual funding commitment that carries a correspondingly high level  of funding risk as the program moves forward and must annually compete  with other programs for the defense dollar. Due to affordability pressures,  DOD is beginning to reduce procurement budgets and annual quantities.  The recently released fiscal year 2008 defense budget shows declining  procurement quantities for the first years of production. To meet future  constrained acquisition budgets, Air Force and Navy officials and planning  documents suggest a decrease in maximum annual buy quantities from   160 shown in the current program of record to about 115 per year, a   28 percent decrease. While this will reduce annual funding requirements,   it will also stretch the procurement program at least seven years to 2034,  assuming buy quantities are deferred rather than eliminated.
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet program was approved as a major  modification in the F-18 series in May 1992. It is a twin engine, single- and  two-seat, multi-mission tactical aircraft designed to perform fighter escort,  interdiction, fleet air defense, and close air support missions. The   F/A-18E/F is replacing the F/A-18A/B/C, has improved range and payload,  and is less detectable. In addition to the procurement quantity of 462 E/F  aircraft, the Navy is also procuring 84-90 airframes for the EA-18G  program (total acquisition up to 552 aircraft).
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: Development began in 1992, procurement in 1996, and initial operational  capability was declared in September 2001. Through fiscal year 2006, the  Navy has taken delivery of 272 aircraft and has 210 aircraft on a 5-year  multiyear contract. The Navy has received an unsolicited draft proposal  for a third multiyear contract that would complete the planned program.  Navy officials believe this could reduce unit costs, but told us to be  effective the contract would need a quantity higher than the 70 aircraft  remaining to be bought. This would seemingly require an increase in Navy  buys or the addition of potential foreign military sales.
Super Hornet aircraft have flown over 340,000 hours by the end of  December 2006 and have been employed in combat operations. The Navy  originally planned to buy 1,000 aircraft, but the quantity was reduced to  548 by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, expecting to transition more  quickly to the JSF, but with provisions for additional procurement if the  JSF is delayed. In 2003, the quantity was further reduced to 462 when a  study showed closer integration of Navy and Marine Corps aviation fleets  would provide greater efficiency for common assets.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: The F/A-18E/F acquisition program is mature and has had relatively good  procurement cost and schedule outcomes. One substantive reason for  good outcomes is the low risk, evolutionary acquisition strategy adopted.  The E/F variant is part of the F/A-18’s family of aircraft that has gradually  upgraded capabilities since delivery of the original F-18 in the late 1970s.   It has substantial commonality with its predecessor C/D models and  leveraged previous technologies. For example, the initial release of the E/F  models incorporated the avionics suite from the C/D models with  provisions for upgrades to occur subsequent to the basic air vehicle  development. Planned upgrades to the F/A-18E/F continue to  incrementally add capabilities. Current production is phasing in block  upgrades including the active electronically scanned array radar, advanced  crew station, network-centric operation, and time-critical strike  modifications. Navy program officials cited that, for the past three years,  full rate production aircraft have been consistently delivered up to   3 months ahead of schedule, that the program is mature, and its current  costs remain well-defined and within targets.
While platform production and fielding has been successful, the December  2006 report of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation identified  ongoing tests and deficiencies in several of the aircraft’s major systems,  including radar, defensive countermeasures, and weapons. The report  states it is paramount that all systems interoperate properly in order to  allow for optimal operational effectiveness and suitability.
The program has reported two Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433) breaches  in unit cost since 1999, but these are attributable more to external factors  than to system development, production, or management problems. The  first breach occurred in 1999 when the procurement quantity was  significantly reduced by the QDR. The second breach occurred in 2005  when the quantity was again reduced.  Also, the OSD Comptroller decided  to break out program reporting for the EA-18G aircraft separate from the  E/F models. In doing so, common support costs for both programs were  budgeted in the E/F program.
Prior to this review, we last reported on the E/F program specifically in  our 2003 annual weapon systems’ assessment. At that time program  officials noted that the aircraft demonstrated two to three times the quality  of the F/A-18C/D and have provided measurable improvements to  squadron readiness. In addition, all F/A-18E/F preplanned upgrades  continued to track to their program schedules. Program officials also  stated that the active electronically scanned array radar program  continues to execute as planned, and the program received the first  engineering and manufacturing development unit in 2003.
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The EA-18G is the replacement for the Navy’s EA-6B Prowler and will  provide carrier strike forces with electronic attack and tactical jamming  capabilities to defeat enemy air defenses and to protect strike fighters and  the carrier group. Derived from the combat proven F/A-18F aircraft, the  EA-18G incorporates advanced airborne electronic attack avionics for the  suppression of enemy air defenses, including accurate emitter targeting for  employment of onboard weapons such as the High-Speed Anti-Radiation  Missile.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: The two-seater EA-18G airframe is about 90 percent common with the   F/A-18F airframe and is procured under the same multiyear contract. The  two models diverge at a point in the production line and airframes  destined to be Growlers receive the electronic attack subsystems. System  demonstration and design was about 70 percent complete by October  2006. Two test articles were delivered in 2006 and first flight was in August  2006. The low-rate initial production decision is scheduled for late April  2007 and initial operational capability is planned for the last quarter in  2009.
The Navy is proposing to reduce the total quantity of EA-18Gs from 90 to  84. The reduction is a result of re-evaluating inventory requirements in  association with the Navy’s fiscal year 2008 budget and the application of  tiered readiness, as well as a reduction of four aircraft from the first low- rate production buy. The Navy expects to receive its first EA-18G in 2009.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: We reported in 2006 on the EA-18G’s acquisition schedule for integrating  the electronic attack subsystems. Our analysis showed that the program  was not fully following the knowledge-based approach espoused in best  practices and DOD’s acquisition guidance, thus increasing the risk of cost  growth, schedule delays, and performance problems. None of its five  critical technologies were fully mature when system development started,  and, at the time of our review, flight testing hadn’t begun. The Navy  proposed buying one-third of the total quantity as low-rate initial quantity  aircraft based on limited demonstrated functionality. We recommended  DOD consider outfitting additional EA-6Bs with the improved electronic  suite for an interim capability, which would allow the restructuring of   EA-18G production plans to begin procurement after full functionality was  demonstrated.
This year, our follow on review as part of our annual assessments of major  weapon systems determined that progress has been made but that three of  the five critical technologies are still not fully mature to best practices  standards with production slated to start in 2007.  Flight testing is  underway and, until full functionality is demonstrated, there are risks of  redesign and retrofit. Fifty-six aircraft are already on the F-18 multiyear  contract, most procured as low-rate initial production aircraft based on  limited demonstrated functionality. A fully functioning Growler, one that  meets or exceeds the upgraded EA-6B capability, will not complete  operational testing until January 2009, 20 months after production starts  and after more than one-third of the total fleet has already been bought.
Navy officials agree that EA-18G’s schedule is aggressive, but disagreed  with our overall assessment of the EA-18G. Officials reported that the  program has been stable since its schedule was developed in 2003 and is  meeting or exceeding all cost, schedule and performance parameters.  Furthermore, officials stated that some technologies are evolutionary  upgrades of systems previously tested on its EA-6B aircraft with  demonstrated effectiveness. We note, however, that these technologies are  in new environments with form and fit challenges, including space  constraints, which could impact performance and ultimate design. The  December 2006 annual report from the Director of Operational Test and  Evaluation stated that the schedule remains aggressive with plans to fully  assess risk areas to achieve initial operational capability in fiscal year  2009. The Director reported that the primary risks include the integration  of multiple components of the electronic attack system onto the F/A-18E/F  platform and the operator workload for the two-man crew in missions  currently performed by the four-person EA-6B aircraft.
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The A-10 was the first Air Force aircraft specially designed for close air  support of ground forces. It is a simple, effective and survivable twin- engine jet used against all ground targets, including tanks. Officials cite  exceptional combat results during Desert Storm and the Global War on  Terror. Some aircraft are specially equipped for airborne forward air  control.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: Because of the A-10’s relevant combat capabilities—demonstrated first  during Desert Storm and recently in the Global War on Terror—the Air  Force now plans to keep it in the inventory longer than anticipated. How  long and with what upgrades is also dependent on whether the JSF aircraft  are delivered on schedule. The Air Force is pursuing several major  modifications to upgrade systems and structures on the A-10 fleet. A major  re-winging effort is planned for 2007 through 2016 that will replace the  “thin skin” wings on 242 aircraft at an estimated cost of $1.3 billion. This  effort will help to extend the A-10’s service life to 16,000 hours. Precision  Engagement modernizes cockpit controls and upgrade avionics and  weapons. All 356 aircraft in the force are slated to receive the Precision  Engagement suite. Total cost to complete the modification is estimated to  be $420 million.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: Significant investments are underway and others planned or proposed to  modernize 356 A-10s and to extend service life from 8,000 to 16,000 flying  hours in order to achieve the goal of keeping the aircraft in service until  2025 or later. However, because of post-Cold War plans to retire the  aircraft starting in the early 1990s, the A-10 fleet received no money for  major modifications or programmed depot maintenance during the 1990s.  As a result, the Air Force is now faced with a very large backlog of  maintenance, structural repairs, and extensive modifications to modernize  the A-10 fleet and keep it viable. Officials have begun major upgrades to  modernize the cockpit and major subsystems and to replace the wings on  most of the fleet. Officials are also finding that as older aircraft are  inspected and opened up for modification, additional and more costly  structural and sustainment work is being identified beyond initial plans.
Even with the higher priority accorded the aircraft, program officials  identify at least another $2.7 billion in unfunded requirements. Chief  among these are an engine upgrade program estimated at $2.1 billion. It is  intended to provide the A-10 with significantly improved engine  capabilities. However, the proposal was deferred by the requiring  command because of limited funding and higher warfighter priorities. The  Air Force’s Fleet Viability Board, which assesses aging aircraft fleets and  recommends to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force whether  aircraft should be retired or continued in service, recently determined that  the A-10 is still viable and validated many of the modifications and repairs  already underway.  The Board recommended funding this engine upgrade  in order to extend the A-10’s service life until 2030. The Board’s  assessment identified mission limitations due to insufficient thrust to  maximize survivability in the current threat environment with existing  engines. Although agreeing that the engine upgrade would be desirable if  funds were available, the requiring command continues to defer this  program as a lower priority. We note that the Air Force has requested  development funding of $230 million for the engine upgrade program in  the 2008 supplemental request.
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The F-15A/B/C/D Eagle is a single- and two-seat, twin-engine, all-weather  tactical fighter designed to gain and maintain air supremacy over the  battlefield. The F-15E Strike Eagle is a two-seater dual-role fighter  designed to perform air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. An array of  avionics and electronics systems gives the F-15E the capability to strike  targets at low altitude, day or night, and in all weather.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: The Air Force has a number of ongoing improvement efforts for the F-15  fleet, including    helmet mounted cueing system,    a new identification friend-or-foe system,    various computer upgrades, and    new radar for the F-15E  The Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System is planned for several DOD  systems and provides pilots the capability to aim weapons and sensors by  looking at the intended target. The new friend-or-foe identification system  will solve obsolescence issues, add capability, and be upgradeable for the  future. Computer upgrades also resolve obsolescence issues, enhance on- board computers, and improve avionics performance. The F-15E model  will receive the improved active electronically scanned array radar.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: For years, modernization efforts and funding for the F-15C/D aircraft had  been concentrated on about half the fleet—178 aircraft of its total  inventory of 391. These were the number of aircraft the Air Force  projected was needed to provide sufficient force structure to meet defense  requirements and to complement the F-22A. That projected number was  predicated upon the Air Force receiving its full F-22A stated requirement  of 381 aircraft. However, due to affordability, the Air Force now faces a  198 aircraft shortfall in the quantity of F-22As it is slated to receive. As a  result, officials expect more F-15C/Ds need to be modernized and retained  for longer periods than planned. Originally planned for retirement by 2015,  the Air Force now needs to keep substantial numbers of F-15C/D aircraft  operational to 2025 and perhaps beyond.
A multi-staged improvement program for the 178 aircraft, including recent  upgrades of the engines and radar, is mostly complete. Officials identified  near-term unfunded requirements on these aircraft totaling $2.3 billion,  including new radars and countermeasure sets. In addition, potential  service life extension efforts on the fleet and backlogged unfunded  requirements to modernize aircraft in addition to the 178 may be needed  but the full costs have not been identified.
The Air Force also plans to keep 224 F-15Es in service beyond 2025. These  are the newest F-15s with enhanced strike capabilities. The major  upcoming upgrade effort on the F-15E is a radar modernization program to  add active electronically scanned array radar. Estimated to cost   $2.3 billion, the Air Force has delayed funding for this effort and now plans  to start procurement in 2010. Program officials identified unfunded  requirements totaling about $1.7 billion, including upgraded radar warning  receivers, helmet mounted cueing system, and long-term sustainment  efforts to address electrical, structural, and power plant concerns to keep  the aircraft viable for another 25 or more years.
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The F-16 Fighting Falcon is a single engine multi-role fighter with full air- to-air and air-to-ground combat capability. It provides a relatively low cost,  high-performance weapon system for the United States and allied nations.  The F-16 currently comprises more than half of the Air Force’s fighter  force. The fleet includes several different configurations or blocks. The  newest blocks incorporate the high-speed anti-radiation missile targeting  system, the Air Force’s only platform specifically for the suppression of  enemy air defenses.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: The Air Force is not currently purchasing any new F-16’s, but the  contractor is still producing them for foreign sale. The production is slated  to continue past 2009 to accommodate recent sales. If the Air Force were  to buy new aircraft, officials estimated that it would cost $380 million for  development and about $50 million per aircraft procured.
The Air Force has a number of ongoing improvement efforts for the F-16,  including    structural airframe modifications,    avionics and capabilities upgrades,    engine service life extension program, and    new engines for some F-16 models.
Falcon STAR is an effort to modify the airframe to allow the F-16 to reach  the original 8,000 hours estimated for its flight life. Due to increased  workload and weight that exceed the original specifications of the aircraft,  the F-16 must be structurally modified to compensate for the increases. A  number of common avionics and capabilities upgrades are necessary to  provide increased processor speed and memories, color displays, and  incorporate the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System. The F110 engine  service life extension program addresses safety, reliability and  maintainability concerns and new engines for the Block 42 aircraft will  provide needed thrust improvements.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: With over 1,300 aircraft, the F-16 fleet comprises more than one-half the  Air Force’s fighter and attack forces. The fleet includes several different  configurations that were acquired and upgraded in evolutionary fashion  over a considerable period of time. Reduced annual buy quantities on the  JSF and deferred deliveries to the warfighter means that F-16s slated to be  replaced by the JSF and retired will need to remain operable and relevant  for additional years. Already investing several billions of dollars to keep  the fleet operable, improve capabilities, and sustain it to meet its original  expected service life, a preliminary unfunded cost estimate to increase the  life expectancy of the newer fighters is $4.5 billion.
Without improvements, almost 90 percent of the fleet would exceed design  limits on engines by 2010. High usage, increased stresses, and more weight  than planned threatened to cut life expectancy in half. Significant  unknowns exist about extending the life beyond 8,000 hours should that  be necessary.  This makes any additional JSF schedule delays, deferrals,  and cost growth very problematic for the overall Air Force fighter  structure.
If it becomes necessary to enable the newest F-16 aircraft to reach a   10,000 flying hour life, a program official estimated an additional cost of  $2.2 billion for structural enhancements. The program office also  identified another $3.2 billion in unfunded requirements, including radar  upgrades to aircraft capable of suppressing enemy air defenses. The oldest  F-16s are to be retired over the next few years, and the Air Force has  halted modifications and funding for these aircraft.
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The F-117A Nighthawk is the world’s first operational aircraft designed to  exploit low observable stealth technology. This precision strike aircraft  penetrates high-threat airspace and uses laser-guided weapons against  critical targets.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: As part of its transformation plans, the Air Force proposed retiring the   F-117A aircraft in 2007 and 2008, stating that there are other more capable  assets that can provide low observable, precision penetrating weapons  capability. Program Budget Decision 720, dated December 2005, directed  the Air Force to develop a strategy to gain congressional support for this  plan. Congress has agreed, with certain limitations, mandating that the Air  Force retire F-117As in “pristine” storage in case the aircraft would need to  be recalled into service.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: Program officials estimate that the drawdown of the fleet and the  shutdown of government and contractor offices and facilities would cost  approximately $283 million. However, there is currently no funding  allocated for these retirement costs of the F-117A. This cost does not  include long-term storage and maintenance of the fleet after such a  retirement.
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The F/A-18A/B/C/D is an all-weather fighter and attack aircraft also known  as the Hornet. It is a single- and two-seat, twin engine, multi-mission  fighter/attack aircraft that can operate from either aircraft carriers or land  bases. The F/A-18 fills a variety of roles: air superiority, fighter escort,  suppression of enemy air defenses, reconnaissance, forward air control,  close and deep air support, and day and night strike missions.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: The major modification effort ongoing is the Center Barrel Replacement to  eliminate structural limitations caused by cracking in the central fuselage.  This effort is expected to cost about $970 million. During scheduled  inspections of the aircraft, the Navy also identified cracks in the wing  structure in about 40 percent of the aircraft. These could cause safety of  flight issues in the future but are not thought to be serious enough at this  time to ground the aircraft or to require immediate repair.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: The F/A-18s are the backbone of the naval tactical aircraft fleet, but are  quickly running out of service life. The Navy plans to soon retire the A and  B models, and the Marine Corps plans to transition entirely to the JSF for  its future strike force. The Navy’s modernization efforts are focused on the  remaining 421 F/A-18C/D aircraft. The Navy has an ongoing assessment of  the service life of this aircraft that is expected to be completed in  December 2007. At this time, it is not clear as to the need for or extent of  future modifications, but a Naval Air Systems Command official said the  assessment could very well identify additional modifications and  structural work required beyond what is funded. Further delays in JSF  could exacerbate funding shortfalls to sustain and modernize the  operational fleet.
While the F/A-18C/D legacy aircraft are currently meeting both the Navy’s  and Marine Corps’s force structure requirements and readiness levels,  inventory reductions though the Navy-Marine Corps tactical aircraft  integration plan, JSF delays, and better defined structural limits of the   F/A-18C/D have created a shortfall starting in 2011 in the number of  aircraft that Navy officials project as needed to support its war-fighting  plans. One option the Navy is considering would be the purchase of  additional F/A-18E/F models to resolve this shortage.
Another option under consideration is extending the life of its F/A-18C/D  fleets to mitigate projected shortfalls. The full cost of the life extension  program is not known at this time. The service life assessment effort to be  completed in December 2007 will determine the feasibility, scope of work,  and total costs for extending the life of the system. Current estimate for  extending service life, including the costs of the assessment, is about   $2 billion, but officials said that number could very well increase  substantially as the assessment progresses and cost estimates mature.
Concerned over the looming gap in the Navy’s inventory, in May 2006, the  Senate Committee on Armed Services recommended that the Navy  consider buying more F/A-18E/Fs to mitigate any possible shortfall in  aircraft until JSF aircraft are delivered.
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The primary mission of the EA-6B Prowler is the suppression of enemy air  defenses in support of strike aircraft and ground troops by interrupting  enemy electronic activity and obtaining tactical electronic intelligence  within the combat area. The Prowler is a long-range, all-weather aircraft  with advanced electronic countermeasures capability, and enhances  combat survivability of strike force aircraft and weapons by denying,  delaying, and degrading the acquisition of friendly forces by enemy air  defense systems. Both the Navy and Marines maintain Prowler assets.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: In 1995, the EA-6B was selected to become the sole tactical radar support  jammer for all services after the Air Force decided to retire its fleet of   EF-111 aircraft. This decision resulted in increased use of the EA-6B, as  the Prowler provided airborne electronic attack capability during  numerous joint and allied operations since 1995. The Navy plans to start  retiring its EA-6B in 2008 and replace it with the EA-18G as its core  airborne electronic attack component. The Marine Corps had expected to  retire their EA-6B assets in 2015, but that could change as future plans for  its replacement are still evolving.
Three significant upgrades to the EA-6B are  the Improved Capability electronic suite modification (ICAP III),  which provides the EA-6B with greater jamming capability;    an upgrade to the aircraft’s current electronic pods, which improves   frequency band capability; and  replacement of the wing center sections of the entire fleet and outer  wing panel replacement on portions of the fleet.
The ICAP-III modification includes the addition of software to allow the  EA-6B to automatically pinpoint enemy signals and better receive and  utilize data. Aircraft not receiving ICAP III are having the current  electronic attack systems upgraded. Funding to replace the wing center  sections was added by Congress. To date, 114 wings have been procured  and 100 have been installed on aircraft. In addition forty-seven EA-6Bs are  also in need of an outer wing panel replacement; Navy officials said that  the first four pairs have already been delivered, and procurement will be  ramped to 18 sets per year in order to receive deliveries through 2008.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: In 2006 GAO reported that, as a result of DOD’s decision to move to an  electronic attack system of systems, the EA-6B would be able to meet the  defense suppression needs of the Navy until 2017 and those of the Marine  Corps until 2025 if the aircraft were fitted with the ICAP-III electronic suite  upgrade. Because the EA-18G’s five critical technologies were not fully  mature and posed a costly risk for design changes, GAO recommended  that DOD consider outfitting additional EA-6Bs with the ICAP III suite,  which would allow the Navy to slow EA-18G low rate production until its  technologies become fully mature and functionality demonstrated.
The Navy and Marine Corps operate the EA-6B, which provides electronic  attack support DOD-wide at this time. The EA-6B has been upgraded over  time to increase its reactive jamming capability. The most important on- going effort to the EA-6B is the ICAP-III electronic suite modification,  which provides more rapid emitter detection, selective reactive jamming,  and expanded coverage. The Navy has two squadrons currently deployed  with ICAP-III and plans to equip a total of 15 of its EA-6Bs with the   ICAP-III suite. The Navy plans to start decommissioning the EA-6B from  its fleet starting in 2008 and retire all aircraft by 2013, replacing them with  the new EA-18G that will provide electronic attack support to its carrier  strike forces.
The Navy will start transferring aircraft to the Marine Corps in fiscal year  2010 and complete transfers in 2013 with delivery of the ICAP III aircraft.  The Marines Corps planned to retire its EA-6Bs by 2015, but officials said  plans could change depending on the transfer schedule and that they may  need to keep these aircraft in the inventory longer depending on the JSF  delivery schedule. The Marine Corps has not yet made firm plans for its  future electronic attack capability and is considering employment of the  JSF and unmanned aircraft systems. We note that the Marine Corps has  requested a total of $379 million in the fiscal year 2007 and 2008 global war  on terror requests to upgrade an additional 18 EA-6Bs with the ICAP-III  suite and for other modernization enhancements.
section_title: Mission
paragraphs: The AV-8B Harrier II is a short field take-off and vertical landing (STOVL)  jet aircraft that deploys from naval ships, advanced bases, and  expeditionary airfields. Its mission is to attack and destroy surface targets  and escort friendly aircraft, day or night, under all weather conditions  during expeditionary, joint or combined operations. The Harrier is  responsible for conducting close air support, armed reconnaissance and  air interdiction, offensive and defensive anti-air warfare, including combat  air patrol, armed escort mission, and offensive missions against enemy  ground-to-air defenses. The first Harrier squadron is expected to be  replaced by the JSF starting in fiscal year 2011.
section_title: Program Status
paragraphs: The AV-8B, a more powerful and longer range model, than its predecessor  the AV-8A, was introduced in 1985. The AV-8Bs were originally designed as  day attack only aircraft, but some were later upgraded to add night attack  and radar capabilities. The night attack and radar upgrades enhance the  pilot’s ability to locate and destroy targets under various weather  conditions and at night. Some of the AV-8Bs received an upgrade to  enhance night attack with improved multimode radar in 1991-1992.  Between 1994 and 2001, the majority of AV-8Bs were remanufactured with  new fuselages to add structural life to the airframe and to accommodate  the new radar upgrade.
Currently there are several on-going efforts to add capabilities and  improve sustainment for the AV-8B until replaced by the JSF, including  remanufacturing 5 old, day attack aircraft to receive the night attack  capability and refurbishing 2 training aircraft;    using a more accurate method to track the useful life of the aircraft;    continuing efforts to improve sustainment through a readiness  management plan for the airframes and an engine life management  plan.
The AV-8B was originally designed to last for 6,000 flying hours. This  estimate was based on engineering fatigue projections on a 20 year service  life, flying 300 hours per year, on very rigorous mission profiles. However,  the aircraft have typically not been flown in such stressful flight envelopes  and the Marines estimate they will be able to exceed the original   6,000 hour service life and maintain an additional 66 aircraft in service  through 2015. In addition, the Marine Corps plans a set of modifications,  largely unfunded, that would add important capabilities by 2012 or later to  enable the Harriers to be more effective in future threat environments.
section_title: GAO Observations
paragraphs: The AV-8 aircraft was DOD’s first STOVL system. The aircraft is costly to  maintain and has a relatively high attrition rate. The Marine Corps has   134 AV-8Bs in its current fleet and plans to replace them all with STOVL  JSFs by 2025. The new fuselages increased the estimated service for the  AV-8Bs from 6,000 to 9,000 flight hours. Further, the AV-8Bs have not been  used as vigorously as mission profiles used to project its useful life and  officials believe that the fleet can remain in inventory well beyond the  expected delivery dates of the JSF, if necessary.
Ongoing and planned modernization efforts are minimal. The Marines are  upgrading five AV-8Bs that did not get previous upgrades so that they will  now have the night attack capability, and refurbishing two training aircraft  In fiscal year 2007, the Marine Corps began repairs on four aircraft  damaged during combat operations using supplemental funding. As  another step to mitigate potential slips in JSF production, officials are also  increasing the amount of depot level maintenance on the AV-8B fleets to  ensure sufficient numbers are available and capable. The Harrier is  scheduled to remain in service until at least 2021, but its retirement is  dependent upon the delivery of the JSF.
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Principal contributors to this report were the Assistant Director   Michael Hazard, Bruce Fairbairn, Marvin Bonner, Erin Clouse,   Matthew Lea, Sara Margraf, Robert Miller, and Karen Sloan.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.   GAO-07-406SP. Washington D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon  System Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes.   GAO-07-388. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Analysis of Costs for the Joint Strike Fighter  Engine Program.  GAO-07-656T. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2007.
Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain. GAO-07-360.  Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007.
Tactical Aircraft: DOD Should Present a New F-22A Business Case  before Making Further Investments. GAO-06-455R. Washington, D.C.:  June 30, 2006.
Electronic Warfare: Option of Upgrading Additional EA-6Bs Could  Reduce Risk in Development of EA-18G. GAO-06-446. Washington, D.C.:  April 26, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Get Better Results on Weapon  Systems Investments. GAO-06-585T. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2006.
Tactical Aircraft: Recapitalization Goals Are Not Supported by  Knowledge-Based F-22A and JSF Business Cases. GAO-06-487T.  Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2006.
Systems Acquisition: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience  Cost and Schedule Problems under DOD’s Revised Policy. GAO-06-368.  Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.  GAO-06-391. Washington D.C.: March 31, 2006.
Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing  Demonstrates Acceptable Performance. GAO-06-356. Washington D.C.:  March 15, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Business Case and Business Arrangements Key  for Future Combat System’s Success. GAO-06-478T. Washington D.C.:  March 1, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Management Approach and Processes Not  Well-Suited to Support Development of Global Information Grid.   GAO-06-211. Washington D.C.: January 30, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive  Fees Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-06-66. Washington D.C.:  December 19, 2005.
DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change. GAO-06-257T.  Washington D.C.: November 15, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Progress and Challenges Facing the DD(X)  Surface Combatant Program. GAO-05-924T. Washington D.C.: July 19,  2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Incentives and Pressures That Drive Problems  Affecting Satellite and Related Acquisitions. GAO-05-570R. Washington  D.C.: June 23, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Development Risks in the Army’s  Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to Fielding Future  Force. GAO-05-669. Washington D.C.: June 15, 2005.
Tactical Aircraft: F/A-22 and JSF Acquisition Plans and Implications  for Tactical Aircraft Modernization. GAO-05-519T. Washington D.C.:  April 6, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.  GAO-05-301. Washington D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Changes in E-10A Acquisition Strategy Needed  Before Development Starts. GAO-05-273. Washington D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Tactical Aircraft: Air Force Still Needs Business Case to Support F/A-22  Quantities and Increased Capabilities. GAO-05-304. Washington D.C.:  March 15, 2005.
Tactical Aircraft: Opportunity to Reduce Risks in the Joint Strike  Fighter Program with Different Acquisition Strategy. GAO-05-271.  Washington D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Tactical Aircraft: Status of F/A-22 and JSF Acquisition Programs and  Implications for Tactical Aircraft Modernization. GAO-05-390T.  Washington D.C.: March 3, 2005.