Homeland Security: DHS and TSA Face Challenges Overseeing Acquisition of Screening Technologies
Published: 2012-05-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Within DHS, TSA is responsible for developing and acquiring new technologies to address transportation-related homeland security needs. TSAs acquisition programs represent billions of dollars in life-cycle costs and support a wide range of aviation security missions and investments, including technologies used to screen passengers and checked baggage such as AIT and EDS, among others. GAOs testimony addresses three key DHS and TSA challenges identified in past work: (1) developing and meeting technology program requirements, (2) overseeing and conducting testing of new screening technologies, and (3) identifying acquisition program baselines (or starting points), program schedules, and costs. This statement will also discuss recent DHS and TSA efforts to strengthen TSAs investment and acquisition processes. This statement is based on reports and testimonies GAO issued from October 2009 through April 2012 related to TSAs efforts to manage, test, and deploy various technology programs.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAOs past work has found that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have faced challenges in developing and meeting program requirements when acquiring screening technologies. GAOs past work has demonstrated that program performance cannot be accurately assessed without valid baseline requirements established at the program start. In June 2010, GAO reported that more than half of the 15 DHS programs GAO reviewed awarded contracts to initiate acquisition activities without component or department approval of documents essential to planning acquisitions, setting operational requirements, or establishing acquisition program baselines. At the program level, in January 2012, GAO reported that TSA did not fully follow DHS acquisition policies when acquiring advanced imaging technology (AIT)commonly referred to as a full body scanner that identifies objects or anomalies on the outside of the bodywhich resulted in DHS approving full AIT deployment without full knowledge of TSAs revised specifications. In July 2011, GAO reported that in 2010 TSA revised its explosive detection systems (EDS) requirements to better address current threats and planned to implement these requirements in a phased approach; however, GAO reported that some number of the EDSs in TSAs fleet were configured to detect explosives at the levels established in 2005 while the remaining ones were configured to detect explosives at 1998 levels and TSA did not have a plan with time frames needed to deploy EDSs to meet the current requirements.
GAO also reported DHS and TSA challenges in overseeing and testing new technologies. For example, in January 2012, GAO reported that TSA began deploying AIT before it received approval for how it would test AIT. Contrary to DHSs acquisition guidance, TSA approved AIT for deployment prior to DHSs approval of the AIT testing and evaluation plan. In July 2011, GAO also reported that TSA experienced challenges collecting data on the properties of certain explosives needed by vendors to develop EDS detection software and needed by TSA before testing EDS prior to procurement and deployment to airports. TSA and the DHS Science and Technology Directorate experienced these challenges because of problems safely handling and consistently formulating some explosives. The challenges related to data collection for certain explosives resulted in problems carrying out the EDS procurement as planned.
DHS and TSA have experienced challenges identifying acquisition program baselines, program schedules, and costs. GAOs prior work has found that realistic acquisition program baselines with stable requirements for cost, schedule, and performance are among the factors that are important to successful acquisitions delivering capabilities within cost and schedule. GAO also found that program performance metrics for cost and schedule can provide useful indicators of the health of acquisition programs. In April 2012 GAO reported that TSAs methods for developing life-cycle cost estimates for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program did not fully adhere to best practices for developing these estimates.
DHS has efforts underway to strengthen oversight of technology acquisitions. In part due to the problems GAO highlighted in DHSs acquisition process, the implementation and transformation of DHS remains on GAOs high-risk list.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is not making any new recommendations. In prior work, GAO made recommendations to address challenges related to deploying AIT, EDS, and other screening technology to meet requirements; overseeing and conducting testing of AIT and EDS technologies; and incorporating information on costs and schedules, among other things, in making technology acquisition decisions. DHS and TSA concurred and have actions underway to address these recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our past work examining the  Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) progress and challenges  in developing and acquiring new technologies to address homeland  security needs. TSA acquisition programs represent billions of dollars in  life-cycle costs and support a wide range of aviation security missions  and investments, including technologies used to screen passengers,  checked baggage, and air cargo, among others. Within the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS), the Science and Technology Directorate  (S&T) has responsibility for coordinating and conducting basic and  applied research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation  activities relevant to DHS components, which also have responsibilities  for developing, testing, acquiring, and deploying such technologies. For  example, TSA is responsible for securing the nation’s transportation  systems and, with S&T, researching, developing, and deploying  technologies to, for example, screen airline passengers and their  property.
In recent years, we have reported that DHS has experienced challenges  in managing its multibillion-dollar acquisition efforts, including  implementing technologies that did not meet intended requirements and  were not appropriately tested and evaluated, and has not consistently  included completed analyses of costs and benefits before technologies  were implemented.
My testimony today focuses on the key findings of our prior work related  to TSA’s efforts to acquire and deploy new technologies to address  homeland security needs. Our past work has identified three key  challenges: (1) developing and meeting technology program  requirements, (2) overseeing and conducting testing of new screening  technologies, and (3) identifying acquisition program baselines—or  starting points, program schedules, and costs. This statement will also  discuss recent DHS and TSA efforts to strengthen its investment and  acquisition processes.
This statement is based on reports and testimonies we issued from  October 2009 through May 2012 related to TSA’s efforts to manage, test,  acquire, and deploy various technology programs.obtained updated information in May 2012 from TSA on the number of  currently deployed AIT units and from DHS officials on the status of the  current EDS acquisition. For our past work, we reviewed program  schedules, planning documents, testing reports, and other acquisition  documentation. For some of the programs we discuss in this testimony,  we conducted site visits to a range of facilities, such as national  laboratories, airports, and other locations to observe research,  development, and testing efforts. We also conducted interviews with DHS  component program managers and S&T officials to discuss issues related  to individual programs. More detailed information on the scope and  methodology from our previous work can be found within each specific  report. We conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the department’s creation in 2003, we have designated the  implementation and transformation of DHS as high risk because DHS had  to combine 22 agencies—several with major management challenges— into one department, and failure to effectively address DHS’s  management and mission risks could have serious consequences for  U.S. national and economic security. This high-risk area includes (1)  challenges in strengthening DHS’s management functions—financial  management, human capital, information technology (IT), and acquisition  management—(2) the effect of those challenges on DHS’s mission  implementation, and (3) challenges in integrating management functions  within and across the department and its components. On the basis of our  prior work, in September 2010 we identified and provided to DHS 31  actions and outcomes that are critical to addressing the challenges within  the department’s management areas and in integrating those functions  across the department. These key actions and outcomes include, among  others, validating required acquisition documents in accordance with a  department-approved, knowledge-based acquisition process.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) established TSA as  the federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the nation’s  civil aviation system, which includes the screening of all passengers and  property transported from and within the United States by commercial  passenger aircraft. In accordance with ATSA, all passengers, their  accessible property, and their checked baggage are screened pursuant to  TSA-established procedures at more than 450 airports presently  regulated for security by TSA. These procedures generally provide,  among other things, that passengers pass through security checkpoints  where they and their identification documents, and accessible property,  are checked by transportation security officers (TSO), other TSA  employees, or by private-sector screeners under TSA’s Screening  Partnership Program.
TSA relies upon multiple layers of security to deter, detect, and disrupt  persons posing a potential risk to aviation security. These layers include  TSOs responsible for screening passengers and their carry-on baggage  at passenger checkpoints, using technologies that include x-ray  equipment, magnetometers, and Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT),  among others. In response to the December 2009 attempted terrorist  attack, TSA revised its procurement and deployment strategy for AIT,  commonly referred to as full-body scanners, increasing the number of AIT  units it planned to procure and deploy. TSA stated that AIT provides  enhanced security benefits compared with walk-through metal detectors,  such as enhanced detection capabilities for identifying nonmetallic threat  objects and liquids. AIT produces an image of a passenger’s body that a  screener interprets. The image identifies objects, or anomalies, on the  outside of the physical body but does not reveal items beneath the  surface of the skin, such as implants. As of May 2012, TSA has deployed  more than 670 AIT units to approximately 170 airports and reported that it  plans to deploy a total of about 1,250 AIT units. In January 2012, we  issued a classified report on TSA’s procurement and deployment of AIT  that addressed the extent to which (1) TSA followed DHS acquisition  guidance when procuring AIT and (2) deployed AIT units are effective at  detecting threats. Another layer of security is checked-baggage  screening, which uses technology referred to as explosive detection  systems (EDS) and explosives trace detection (ETD).
section_title: DHS and TSA Have Experienced Challenges in Developing and Meeting Key Performance Requirements for Various Screening Technologies
paragraphs: Our past work has found that technology program performance cannot be  accurately assessed without valid baseline requirements established at  the program start. Without the development, review, and approval of key  acquisition documents, such as the mission need statement and  operational requirements document, agencies are at risk of having poorly  defined requirements that can negatively affect program performance and  contribute to increased costs. For example, in June 2010, we reported  that more than half of 15 DHS programs we reviewed awarded contracts  to initiate acquisition activities without component or department approval  of documents essential to planning acquisitions, setting operational  requirements, or establishing acquisition program baselines.currently have ongoing work related to this area and we plan to report the  results later this year. We made a number of recommendations to help  address issues related to these procurements as discussed below. DHS  has generally agreed with these recommendations and, to varying  degrees, has taken actions to address them.
In addition, our past work has found that TSA faces challenges in  identifying and meeting program requirements in some of its aviation  security programs. For example:
We reported in January 2012 that TSA did not fully follow DHS  acquisition policies when acquiring AIT, which resulted in DHS  approving full AIT deployment without full knowledge of TSA’s revised  specifications. Specifically, DHS’s Acquisition Directive 102 required  TSA to notify DHS’s Acquisition Review Board (ARB) if AIT could not  meet any of TSA’s five key performance parameters (KPP) or if TSA  changed a KPP during qualification testing. Senior TSA officials  acknowledged that TSA did not comply with the directive’s  requirements, but stated that TSA still reached a “good decision” in  procuring AIT and that the ARB was fully informed of the program’s  changes to its KPPs. Further, TSA officials stated that the program  was not bound by the directive because it was a new acquisition  process and they believed that the ARB was not fully functioning at  the time. DHS officials stated that the ARB discussed the changed  KPP but did not see the documents related to the change and  determined that TSA must update the program’s key acquisition  document, the Acquisition Program Baseline, before TSA could  deploy AIT units. However, we reported that, according to a February  2010 acquisition decision memorandum from DHS, the ARB approved  TSA for full-scale production without reviewing the changed KPP.  DHS officials stated that the ARB should have formally reviewed  changes made to the KPP to ensure that TSA did not change it  arbitrarily. According to TSA, it should have submitted its revised  requirements for approval, but it did not because there was confusion  as to whether DHS should be informed of all changes. We had  previously reported that programs procuring new technologies with  fluctuating requirements will have a difficult time ensuring that the  acquisition is meeting program needs. DHS acquisition oversight  officials agreed that changing key requirements is not a best practice  for system acquisitions already under way. As a result, we found that  TSA procured and deployed a technology that met evolving  requirements, but not the initial requirements included in its key  acquisition requirements document that the agency initially  determined were necessary to enhance the aviation system. We  recommended that TSA should develop a roadmap that outlines  vendors’ progress in meeting all KPPs. DHS agreed with our  recommendation.
In July 2011, we reported that TSA revised its EDS requirements to  better address current threats, and plans to implement these  requirements in a phased approach. However, we reported that  some number of EDS machines in TSA’s checked baggage screening  fleet are configured to detect explosives at the levels established in  the 2005 requirements. The remaining EDS machines are configured  to detect explosives at 1998 levels. When TSA established the 2005  requirements, it did not have a plan with the appropriate time frames  needed to deploy EDSs to meet the requirements. To help ensure that  TSA’s checked baggage screening machines are operating most  effectively, we recommended that TSA develop a plan to deploy EDSs  to meet the most recent explosive-detection requirements and ensure  that the new machines, as well as machines deployed in airports, are  operated at the levels in established requirements. DHS concurred  with our recommendation and has begun taking action to address it;  for example, DHS reported that TSA has developed a plan to evaluate  its current fleet of EDSs to determine the extent to which they comply  with these requirements. However, our recommendation is intended to  ensure that TSA operate all EDSs at airports at the most recent  requirements. Until TSA develops a plan identifying how it will  approach the upgrades for currently deployed EDSs—and the plan  includes such items as estimated costs and the number of machines  that can be upgraded—it will be difficult for TSA to provide reasonable  assurance that its upgrade approach is feasible or cost effective.
section_title: DHS and TSA Have Encountered Challenges in Overseeing and Testing New Screening Technologies
paragraphs: Our prior work has also shown that not resolving problems discovered  during testing can sometimes lead to costly redesign and rework at a later  date. Addressing such problems before moving to the acquisition phase  can help agencies better manage costs. Specifically:  In January 2012, we reported that TSA began deploying AIT before it  received approval for how it would test AIT. For example, DHS’s  Acquisition Directive 102 required DHS to approve testing and  evaluation master plans—the documents that ensure that programs  are tested appropriately—prior to testing. However, we found that  DHS did not approve TSA’s testing and evaluation master plan until  January 2010, after TSA had completed qualification and operational  tests and DHS had already approved TSA for full AIT deployment.  According to DHS, the DHS Director of Operational Testing and  Evaluation assessed the testing of AIT prior to the September 2009  ARB meeting and recommended approving the decision to procure  AIT at that meeting, even though the ARB did not approve its testing  plans. Additionally, we reported that DHS approved TSA’s AIT  deployment in September 2009, on the basis of laboratory-based  qualification testing results and initial field-based operational testing  results that were not completed until later that year. According to DHS  officials, the department initially had challenges providing effective  oversight to projects already engaged in procurement when the  directive was issued. For example, they noted that TSA had begun  conducting qualification testing in 2009, but DHS’s first AIT oversight  meeting under the new directive was not until later that year. As a  result, we reported that TSA procured AIT without DHS’s full oversight  and approval or knowledge of how TSA would test and evaluate AIT.
In July 2011, we reported that TSA revised the explosive detection  requirements for EDS checked baggage screening machines in 2005  though it did not begin operating EDS systems to meet these 2005  requirements until 2009. We also reported that TSA made additional  revisions to the EDS requirements in January 2010 but experienced  challenges in collecting explosives data on the physical and chemical  properties of certain explosives needed by vendors to develop EDS  detection software to meet the 2010 requirements.also needed by TSA for testing the machines to determine whether  they meet established requirements prior to their procurement and  deployment to airports. TSA and S&T have experienced these  challenges because of problems associated with safely handling and  consistently formulating some explosives, which have also resulted in  problems carrying out the EDS procurement as planned. Further, TSA  deployed a number of EDSs that had the software necessary to meet  the 2005 requirements, but because testing to compare false-alarm  rates had not been completed, the software was not activated,  subsequently; these EDSs were detecting explosives at levels  established in 1998. According to TSA officials, once completed, the  results of this testing to compare false alarm rates would allow them  to determine if additional staff are needed at airports to help resolve  false alarms once the EDSs are configured to operate at a certain  level of requirements. TSA officials told us that they planned to  perform this testing as a part of the ongoing EDS acquisition. We  recommended that TSA develop a plan to ensure that TSA has the  explosives data needed for each of the planned phases of the 2010  EDS requirements before starting the procurement process for new  EDSs or upgrades included in each applicable phase. DHS stated that  TSA modified its strategy for the EDS’s competitive procurement in  July 2010 in response to the challenges in working with the explosives  for data collection by removing the data collection from the  procurement process. TSA’s plan to separate the data collection from  the procurement process is a positive step, but to fully address our  recommendation, a plan is needed to establish a process for ensuring  that data are available before starting the procurement process for  new EDSs or upgrades for each applicable phase.
In June 2011 we reported that S&T’s Test & Evaluation and  Standards Office, responsible for overseeing test and evaluation of  DHS’s major acquisition programs, reviewed or approved test and  evaluation documents and plans for programs undergoing testing, and  conducted independent assessments for the programs that completed  operational testing. DHS senior-level officials considered the office’s  assessments and input in deciding whether programs were ready to  proceed to the next acquisition phase. However, the office did not  consistently document its review and approval of components’ test  agents—a government entity or independent contractor carrying out  independent operational testing for a major acquisition. We  recommended, among other things, that S&T develop mechanisms to  document its review of component acquisition documentation. DHS  concurred and reported actions underway to address them.
In October 2009, we reported that TSA deployed explosives trace  portals, a technology for detecting traces of explosives on passengers  at airport checkpoints, in January 2006 even though TSA officials  were aware that tests conducted during 2004 and 2005 on earlier  models of the portals suggested the portals did not demonstrate  reliable performance in an airport environment. In June 2006, TSA  halted deployment of the explosives trace portals because of  performance problems and high installation costs. In our 2009 report,  we recommended that, to the extent feasible, TSA ensure that tests  are completed before deploying new checkpoint screening  technologies to airports. DHS concurred with the recommendation  and has taken action to address it, such as requiring more-recent  technologies to complete both laboratory and operational tests prior to  deployment.
section_title: DHS and TSA Have Experienced Challenges Identifying Acquisition Program Baselines, Program Schedules, and Costs
paragraphs: We have found that realistic acquisition program baselines with stable  requirements for cost, schedule, and performance are among the factors  that are important to successful acquisitions delivering capabilities within  cost and schedule. Our prior work has found that program performance  metrics for cost and schedule can provide useful indicators of the health  of acquisition programs and, when assessed regularly for changes and  the reasons that cause changes, such indicators can be valuable tools for  improving insight and oversight of individual programs as well as the total  portfolio of major acquisitions.be accurately assessed without valid baseline requirements established   Importantly, program performance cannot  at the program start, particularly those that establish the minimum  acceptable threshold required to satisfy user needs. According to DHS’s  acquisition guidance, the program baseline is the contract between the  program and departmental oversight officials and must be established at  program start to document the program’s expected cost, deployment  schedule, and technical performance. Establishing such a baseline at  program start is important for defining the program’s scope, assessing  whether all life-cycle costs are properly calculated, and measuring how  well the program is meeting its goals. By tracking and measuring actual  program performance against this baseline, management can be alerted  to potential problems, such as cost growth or changing requirements, and  has the ability to take early corrective action.
We reported in Aril 2012 that TSA has not had a DHS-approved  acquisition program baseline since the inception of the EBSP program  more than 8 years ago. Further, DHS did not require TSA to complete  an acquisition program baseline until November 2008. According to  TSA officials, they have twice submitted an acquisition program  baseline to DHS for approval—first in November 2009 and again  February 2011. An approved baseline will provide DHS with additional  assurances that TSA’s approach is appropriate and that the  capabilities being pursued are worth the expected costs. In November  2011, because TSA did not have a fully developed life-cycle cost  estimate as part of its acquisition program baseline, DHS instructed  TSA to revise the life cycle cost estimates as well as its procurement  and deployment schedules to reflect budget constraints. DHS officials  told us that they could not approve the acquisition program baseline  as written because TSA’s estimates were significantly over budget.  TSA officials stated that TSA is currently working with DHS to amend  the draft program baseline and plans to resubmit the revised  acquisition program baseline before the next Acquisition Review  Board meeting, which is currently planned for July 2012. Establishing  and approving a program baseline, as DHS and TSA currently plan to  do for the EBSP, could help DHS assess the program’s progress in  meeting its goals and achieve better program outcomes.
In our 2010 report of selected DHS acquisitions, 12 of 15 selected DHS  programs we reviewed exhibited schedule delays and cost growth beyond  initial estimates. We noted that DHS acquisition oversight officials have  raised concerns about the accuracy of cost estimates for most major  programs, making it difficult to assess the significance of the cost growth  we identified. Leading practices state that the success of a large-scale  system acquisition, such as the TSA’s EDS acquisition, depends in part  on having a reliable schedule that identifies: (1) when the program’s set of  work activities and milestone events will occur, (2) how long they will take,  and (3) how they are related to one another. Leading practices also call  for the schedule to expressly identify and define the relationships and  dependencies among work elements and the constraints affecting the  start and completion of work elements. Additionally, best practices  indicate that a well-defined schedule also helps to identify the amount of  human capital and fiscal resources that are needed to execute an  acquisition.
We reported in January 2012 that TSA did not have plans to require  vendors to meet milestones used during the AIT acquisition. We  recommended that TSA should develop a roadmap that outlines  vendors’ progress in meeting all KPPs because it is important that  TSA convey vendors’ progress in meeting those requirements and full  costs of the technology to decision makers when making deployment  and funding decisions. TSA reported that it hoped vendors would be  able to gradually improve meeting KPPs for AIT over time. We  reported that TSA would have more assurance that limited taxpayer  resources are used effectively by developing a roadmap that specifies  development milestones for the technology and having DHS  acquisition officials approve this roadmap. DHS agreed with our  recommendation.
In July 2011, we reported that TSA had established a schedule for the  acquisition of EDS machines but it did not fully comply with leading  practices, and TSA had not developed a plan to upgrade its EDS fleet  to meet the current explosives detection requirements. These leading  practices state that the success of a large-scale system acquisition,  such as TSA’s EDS acquisition, depends in part on having a reliable  schedule that identifies when the program’s set of work activities and  milestone events will occur, amongst other things. For example, the  schedule for the EDS acquisition is not reliable because it does not  reflect all planned program activities and does not include a timeline  to deploy EDSs or plans to procure EDSs to meet subsequent phases  of explosive detection requirements. We stated that developing a  reliable schedule would help TSA better monitor and oversee the  progress of the EDS acquisition. DHS concurred with our  recommendation to develop and maintain a schedule for the entire  EBSP in accordance with the leading practices identified by GAO for  preparing a schedule. DHS commented that TSA had already begun  working with key stakeholders to develop and define requirements for  a schedule and to ensure that the schedule aligns with the best  practices outlined by GAO.
In April 2012, we reported that TSA’s methods for developing life  cycle cost estimates for the EBSP did not fully adhere to best  practices for developing these estimates. As highlighted in our past  work, a high-quality, reliable cost estimation process provides a sound  basis for making accurate and well-informed decisions about resource  investments, budgets, assessments of progress, and accountability  for results and thus is critical to the success of a program. We  reported that TSA’s estimates partially met three characteristics and  minimally met one characteristic of a reliable cost estimate.concurred with our recommendation that TSA ensure that its life cycle  cost estimates conform to cost estimating best practices, and  identified efforts underway to address it. DHS also acknowledged the  importance of producing life cycle cost estimates that are  comprehensive, well documented, accurate, and credible so that they  can be used to support DHS funding and budget decisions.
section_title: DHS Has Efforts Underway to Strengthen Oversight of Technology Acquisitions
paragraphs: In part due to the problems we have highlighted in DHS’s acquisition  process, the implementation and transformation of DHS remains on our  high-risk list. DHS currently has several plans and efforts underway to  address the high-risk designation as well as the more specific challenges  related to acquisition and program implementation that we have  previously identified. For example, DHS initially described an initiative in  the January 2011 version of its Integrated Strategy for High Risk  Management to establish a framework, the Integrated Investment Life  Cycle Model (IILCM), for managing investments across its components  and management functions; strengthening integration within and across  those functions; and ensuring mission needs drive investment decisions.
The department seeks to use the IILCM to enhance resource decision  making and oversight by creating new department-level councils to  identify priorities and capability gaps, revising how DHS components and  lines of business manage acquisition programs, and developing a  common framework for monitoring and assessing implementation of  investment decisions. We reported in March 2012 that, from the time DHS  first reported on the IILCM initiative in January 2011 to its December 2011  revision of its high-risk strategy, the initiative had made little progress  though DHS plans to begin using the IILCM by the end of September  2012.
In October 2011, to enhance the department’s ability to oversee major  acquisition programs, DHS realigned the acquisition management  functions previously performed by two divisions within the Office of Chief  Procurement Officer to establish the Office of Program Accountability and  Risk Management (PARM). PARM, which is responsible for program  governance and acquisition policy, serves as the Management  Directorate’s executive office for program execution and works with DHS  leadership to assess the health of major acquisitions and investments. To  help with this effort, PARM is developing a database, known as the  Decision Support Tool, intended to improve the flow of information from  component program offices to the Management Directorate to support its  governance efforts. DHS reported in its December 2011 Integrated  Strategy for High Risk Management that senior executives are not  confident enough in the data to use the Decision Support Tool developed  by PARM to help make acquisition decisions. However, DHS’s plans to  improve the quality of the data in this database are limited. At this time,  PARM only plans to check the data quality in preparation for key  milestone meetings in the acquisition process. This could significantly  diminish the Decision Support Tool’s value because users cannot  confidently identify and take action to address problems meeting cost or  schedule goals prior to program review meetings.
We reported in March 2012 that DHS has made progress strengthening  its management functions, but the department faces considerable  challenges. Specifically, DHS has faced challenges overseeing the  management, testing, acquisition, and deployment of various technology  programs including AIT and EDS. Going forward, DHS needs to continue  implementing its Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management and show  measurable, sustainable progress in implementing its key management  initiatives and corrective actions and achieving outcomes including those  related to acquisition management. DHS reported that it plans to revise its  Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management in June 2012, which  includes management initiatives and corrective actions to address  acquisition management challenges, among other management areas.  We will continue to monitor and assess DHS’s implementation and  transformation efforts through our ongoing and planned work, including  the 2013 high-risk update that we expect to issue in early 2013.
Chairmen Issa and Mica, Ranking Members Cummings and Rahall, and  members of the committees, this concludes my prepared statement. I  would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact Steve Lord at (202)  512-4379 or lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement  include Dave Bruno, Assistant Director; Scott Behen, Analyst-in-Charge;  Emily Gunn, and Katherine Trimble. Other contributors include: David  Alexander, Tom Lombardi, Jason Lee, Linda Miller, and Jerry Seigler.  Key contributors for the previous work that this testimony is based on are  listed within each individual product.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Checked Baggage Screening: TSA Has Deployed Optimal Systems at the  Majority of TSA-Regulated Airports, but Could Strengthen Cost  Estimates. GAO-12-266. Washington D.C.: April 27, 2012.
Transportation Security Administration: Progress and Challenges Faced  in Strengthening Three Key Security Programs. GAO-12-541T.  Washington D.C.: March 26, 2012  Aviation Security: TSA Has Made Progress, but Additional Efforts Are  Needed to Improve Security. GAO-11-938T. Washington, D.C.:  September 16, 2011.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining  in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11.  GAO-11-881. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2011.
Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and  Development of New Technologies. GAO-11-829T. Washington, D.C.:  July 15, 2011.
Aviation Security: TSA Has Taken Actions to Improve Security, but  Additional Efforts Remain. GAO-11-807T. Washington, D.C.: July 13,  2011.
Aviation Security: TSA Has Enhanced Its Explosives Detection  Requirements for Checked Baggage, but Additional Screening Actions  Are Needed. GAO-11-740. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2011.
Homeland Security: Improvements in Managing Research and  Development Could Help Reduce Inefficiencies and Costs.  GAO-11-464T. Washington D.C.: March 15, 2011.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington D.C.: February  16, 2011.
Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex  Acquisitions. GAO-10-588SP. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010.
Aviation Security: Progress Made but Actions Needed to Address  Challenges in Meeting the Air Cargo Screening Mandate. GAO-10-880T.  Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010.
Aviation Security: TSA Is Increasing Procurement and Deployment of  Advanced Imaging Technology, but Challenges to This Effort and Other  Areas of Aviation Security Remain. GAO-10-484T. Washington, D.C.:  March 17, 2010.
Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and  Begun Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but  Continue to Face Challenges. GAO-10-128. Washington, D.C.: October  7, 2009.
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