Defense Acquisitions: Departmentwide Direction Is Needed for Implementation of the Anti-tamper Policy
Published: 2008-01-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) invests billions of dollars on sophisticated weapon systems and technologies. These may be at risk of exploitation when exported, stolen, or lost during combat or routine missions. In an effort to minimize this risk, DOD developed an anti-tamper policy in 1999, calling for DOD components to implement anti-tamper techniques for critical technologies. In March 2004, GAO reported that program managers had difficulties implementing this policy, including identifying critical technologies. This follow-up report (1) describes recent actions DOD has taken to implement its anti-tamper policy and (2) identifies challenges facing program managers. GAO reviewed documentation on actions DOD has taken since 2004 to implement its anti-tamper policy, and interviewed officials from the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent's Office, the military services, other DOD components, and a cross-section of program offices.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since 2004, DOD has taken several actions to raise awareness about anti-tamper protection and develop resources that provide program managers with general information on its anti-tamper policy. These actions include developing a Web site with anti-tamper information and events, establishing an online learning module on anti-tamper protection, and sponsoring research on generic anti-tamper techniques. However, DOD lacks departmentwide direction for implementation of its anti-tamper policy. Without such direction, individual DOD components are left on their own to develop initiatives. For example, the Navy is developing a database that is intended to provide a horizontal view of what DOD components have identified as critical program information. While many officials we spoke with pointed to this database as a potential tool for identifying critical technologies that may need anti-tamper protection, the database is currently incomplete. Specifically, the Missile Defense Agency is not providing information because its information is classified at a level above what the database can support. Also, the Air Force is not currently providing information because not all commands have provided consent to participate. At the same time, program managers face challenges implementing DOD's anti-tamper policy--due largely to a lack of information or tools needed to make informed assessments at key decision points. First, program managers have limited information for defining what is critical or insight into what technologies other programs have deemed critical to ensure similar protection across programs. Determining whether technologies are critical is largely left to the discretion of the individual program manager, resulting in an uncoordinated and stove piped process. Therefore, the same technology can be identified as critical in one program office but not another. Second, program managers have not always had sufficient or consistent information from the intelligence community to identify threats and vulnerabilities to technologies that have been identified as critical. The potential impact of inconsistent threat assessments is twofold: If the threat is deemed to be low but is actually high, the technology is susceptible to tampering; conversely, if the threat is deemed to be high and is actually low, an anti-tamper solution is more robust than needed. Finally, program managers have had difficulty selecting sufficient anti-tamper solutions--in part because they lack information and tools, such as risk and cost-estimating models, to determine how much anti-tamper protection is needed. As a result, program managers may select a suboptimal solution. Given these combined challenges, there is an increased risk that some technologies that need protection may not be identified or may not have sufficient protection.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Each year, the Department of Defense (DOD) invests billions of dollars to  develop and produce sophisticated weapon systems and technologies to  maintain military superiority. As such, these weapons and technologies are  highly sought after and at risk of exploitation when exported, stolen, or  lost or damaged during combat or routine missions. Such exploitation can  weaken U.S. military advantage on the battlefield and erode the U.S.  industrial base’s technological competitiveness in the international  marketplace.
In an effort to protect U.S. weapons and technologies from exploitation,  DOD established a policy in 1999 requesting each military service to  implement anti-tamper techniques, which include software and hardware  protective devices, when technologies are determined to be critical and  vulnerable to exploitation. In March 2004, we reported on several  difficulties program managers faced in implementing this policy, including  determining which technologies were critical—the basis for considering  the need for anti-tamper protection. Difficulties with implementing DOD’s  anti-tamper policy, as well as vulnerabilities in related government  programs, prompted GAO to designate the effective protection of  technologies critical to U.S. national security as a new high-risk area in  2007.
The Senate report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 2006 requires us to conduct a follow-up review to our  March 2004 report. In response, we identified (1) recent actions DOD has  taken to implement its anti-tamper policy and (2) challenges facing  program managers.
To conduct our work, we obtained information and documentation on  actions DOD has taken to implement its anti-tamper policy since 2004 and  interviewed officials from the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent’s Office,  military services, other DOD components, and the intelligence community  about these actions. We also determined the status of our 2004 report  recommendations. We conducted structured interviews with officials from  a cross-section of programs that the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent’s Office  and DOD components identified as considering and/or implementing anti- tamper protection. We discussed with these program officials their  procedures for implementing anti-tamper protection and any challenges  they faced. We also interviewed officials from program offices not  identified by the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent and DOD components to  obtain their perspective about the anti-tamper policy. We did not evaluate  whether programs had implemented sufficient anti-tamper protection. We  conducted this performance audit (from January 2007 to January 2008) in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.   Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.  We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. For more on scope and  methodology, see appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: To protect its critical assets, DOD has established several protection  measures for weapon systems. These measures include information  assurance to protect information and information systems, software  protection to prevent the unauthorized distribution and exploitation of  critical software, and anti-tamper techniques to help delay exploitation of  technologies through means such as reverse engineering when U.S.  weapons are exported or lost on the battlefield. Examples of anti-tamper  techniques include software encryption, which scrambles software  instructions to make them unintelligible without first being reprocessed  through a deciphering technique, and hardware protective coatings  designed to make it difficult to extract or dissect components without  damaging them.
In 1999, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics (AT&L) issued a policy memorandum for implementing anti- tamper protection in acquisition programs. In the following year, AT&L  issued a policy memorandum stating that technologies should be routinely  assessed during the acquisition process to determine if they are critical  and if anti-tamper techniques are needed to protect these technologies. In  2001, an AT&L policy memorandum designated the Air Force as the Anti- Tamper Executive Agent. The executive agent’s office, which currently has  four staff, is responsible for implementing DOD’s anti-tamper policy and  managing anti-tamper technology development through the Air Force  Research Laboratory. The executive agent also holds periodic information  sessions to educate the acquisition community about anti-tamper policy,  initiatives, and technology developments. To coordinate activities, military  services and defense agencies, such as the Missile Defense Agency, have  an anti-tamper point of contact. Program managers are responsible for  ensuring anti-tamper protection is incorporated on any weapon system  with critical technologies that need protection. Since it is not feasible to  protect every technology, program managers are to conduct an assessment  to determine if anti-tamper protection is needed.
When assessing if anti-tamper protection is needed, program managers  make several key decisions regarding the identification of critical  technologies, assessment of threats and vulnerabilities, and determination  of anti-tamper techniques or solutions. The process begins with  determining whether or not their system’s critical program information  includes any critical technologies. If it is determined that the system has  no critical technologies, program managers are to document the decision  and request concurrence from either the office within their component  that is designated with anti-tamper responsibilities or the Anti-Tamper  Executive Agent. For systems that are determined to have critical  technologies, the next key steps are to identify potential threats and  vulnerabilities and select anti-tamper techniques to protect those  technologies. Techniques are ultimately verified and validated by a team  composed of representatives from the DOD components. The program  manager documents decisions in an annex of the program protection  plan.
In 2004, we reported that program managers had difficulty in carrying out  DOD’s anti-tamper policy on individual weapons, such as identifying  critical technologies and experiencing cost increases or schedule delays  when applying anti-tamper techniques—particularly when the techniques  are not fully developed or when the systems are already in design or  production. We made several recommendations, including increasing  oversight over the identification of critical technologies across programs,  improving tools and resources for program managers in identifying critical  technologies, ensuring early identification of anti-tamper costs and  solutions, monitoring the development of generic anti-tamper solutions  and evaluating their effectiveness, and developing a business case to  determine whether the current organizational structure and resources are  adequate. DOD concurred or partially concurred with these  recommendations. DOD has taken some steps to implement our  recommendations including identifying available anti-tamper technical  resources and developing a searchable spreadsheet of critical  technologies, incorporating information in the Defense Acquisition  Guidebook on the need for early identification of anti-tamper solutions in a  weapon system, and sponsoring a study on anti-tamper techniques and  their general effectiveness. While DOD has taken these steps to address  parts of the recommendations, all remain open.
section_title: DOD Lacks Departmentwide Direction for Implementing its Anti- tamper Policy
paragraphs: DOD has recently taken several actions aimed at raising awareness about  its anti-tamper policy and assisting program managers in implementing  anti-tamper protection on a weapon system. Despite these actions, DOD  still lacks departmentwide direction to implement its anti-tamper policy.  Without such direction, DOD components are left to develop their own  initiatives to assist program managers in implementing anti-tamper  protection. While individual efforts are important, such as a database to  track critical program information DOD-wide, their effectiveness may be  limited because they have yet to be accepted and adopted across all DOD  components.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Developed Some Resources for Program Managers to Use in Implementing Anti-tamper Protection
paragraphs: Since our 2004 report, DOD, through the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent,  has developed some resources aimed at assisting program managers as  they go through the anti-tamper decision process. DOD’s resources range  from providing general information about the anti-tamper policy to  research on anti-tamper solutions. Specifically, DOD has    developed a guidebook that includes a checklist to assist program  managers in identifying security, management, and technical  responsibilities when incorporating anti-tamper protection on a  weapons system;    developed a searchable spreadsheet to assist program managers in    developed a Web site for program managers to provide general anti- tamper information, policy resources, conference briefings,  implementation resources, and current events;    coordinated with Defense Acquisition University to design and launch  an online learning module on anti-tamper protection;  funded Sandia National Laboratories to study anti-tamper techniques  and their general effectiveness; and    sponsored research to develop generic anti-tamper techniques through  Small Business Innovation Research, a research program that funds  early-stage research and development projects at small technology  companies.
DOD has also updated two acquisition documents with general anti- tamper information. The first document—DOD Instruction 5000.2,  Operation of a Defense Acquisition System—currently states that one of  the purposes of the System Development and Demonstration phase of a  weapon system is to ensure affordability and protection of critical  program information by implementing appropriate solutions such as anti- tamper protection. The second document—the Defense Acquisition  Guidebook—has been updated to include some basic information on the  importance of implementing anti-tamper protection early in the  development of a weapon system and describes program managers’  overall responsibilities for implementing the anti-tamper policy.
section_title: DOD Has Not Provided Direction to Implement Its Anti-tamper Policy
paragraphs: While DOD has issued broad policy memorandums that reflect the  department’s desire for routinely assessing weapon systems to determine  if anti-tamper protection is needed, the department has not fully  incorporated the anti-tamper policy into its formal acquisition guidance.  Specifically, DOD Instruction 5000.2 mentions anti-tamper protection, but  the department has not provided direction for implementation of anti- tamper in a formal directive or instruction. Currently, the department is  coordinating comments on a draft instruction (DOD Instruction 5200.39)  on protection of critical program information that includes anti-tamper  implementation. However, in commenting on the draft instruction, several  DOD components have raised concerns about when and how to define  critical program information that warrants protection, which have  contributed to long delays in finalizing the instruction. In addition, the  department has not provided specific guidance for program managers on  how to implement anti-tamper protection in a DOD manual because DOD  officials said this process cannot begin until the instruction is finalized.  The date for finalizing the instruction has not yet been determined.
Officials from the executive agent’s office stated that departmentwide  direction would give credence to the anti-tamper policy in practice. Anti- tamper points of contact told us that the policy memorandums are not  sufficient to ensure that program managers are implementing anti-tamper  protection on weapon systems when necessary. One service anti-tamper  point of contact stated that program managers might disregard the policy  memorandums because they are high-level and broad. Another service  anti-tamper point of contact said that implementation is ultimately left up  to the individual program manager. While a program manager’s decision  should be approved by the milestone decision authority and documented  in the program protection plan, some service and program officials said  that programs are not always asked about anti-tamper protection during  the review.
section_title: Absent Departmentwide Direction, Components Have Been Left to Develop Their Own Anti-tamper Initiatives
paragraphs: Lacking departmentwide direction for the anti-tamper policy, DOD  components have been left to develop their own initiatives to assist  program managers in anti-tamper implementation. However, the  usefulness of these initiatives depends on the extent to which other  components participate in these efforts.
For example, the Missile Defense Agency developed a risk assessment  model to help program managers identify how much anti-tamper is needed  to protect critical technologies. Specifically, the model helps program  managers assess the criticality of the technology relative to the risk of  exploitation. However, when the Missile Defense Agency sought  comments on the initiative, the executive agent and services indicated that  it was too lengthy and complex to use. The executive agent, in  coordination with anti-tamper points of contact from the Missile Defense  Agency and services, has taken over this effort, and it is still in  development.
The Navy is also implementing an initiative: a database intended to capture  the information that programs across DOD components have identified as  critical. Many officials we spoke with pointed to this database as a  potential tool to improve identification of critical program information  across DOD components. To date, the Navy and the Army are submitting  information for the database, but the Missile Defense Agency and Air  Force are not. The Missile Defense Agency anti-tamper point of contact  stated that its information is classified at a level above what the database  can support and its program managers will not submit information for the  database unless DOD requires submissions by all DOD components.  However, the Missile Defense Agency does have access to the database  and uses it as a cross-check to determine if it is identifying similar critical  program information. The Air Force has been briefed on the initiative but  does not yet have consent from all of the commands to participate.  Without full participation across all DOD components, the usefulness of  this database as a tool to identify critical technologies that may need anti- tamper protection will be limited.
section_title: Program Managers Face Several Challenges in Identifying Critical Technologies, Threats, and Sufficient Anti-tamper Solutions
paragraphs: To determine whether anti-tamper protection is needed, program  managers must identify which technologies are deemed critical, determine  the potential threats and vulnerabilities to these technologies, and identify  sufficient anti-tamper solutions to protect the technologies. Such decisions  involve a certain level of subjectivity. However, program managers lack  the information or tools needed to make informed assessments at these  key decision points. As a result, some technologies that need protection  may not be identified or may not have sufficient protection.
subsections: section_title: Limited Information and Coordination on What Is Critical Increase the Risk That Some Technologies May Not Be Identified
paragraphs: Determining technologies that are critical is largely left to the discretion of  the program managers. While DOD has some resources available to  program managers to help identify critical technologies, they may be of  limited use. For example, the executive agent’s searchable spreadsheet of  critical technologies may not be comprehensive because it relies on DOD’s  Militarily Critical Technologies List, which we reported in 2006 was largely  out of date. Also, some program offices have used a series of questions  established in a 1994 DOD manual on acquisition systems protection to  help guide their discussions on what is critical. However, these questions  are broad and subject to interpretation, and can result in different  conclusions, depending on who is involved in the decision-making  process.
In addition, identifying what is critical varies by DOD component and  sometimes by program office. For example, one Air Force program office  tried various approaches, including teams of subject matter experts, over 2  years to identify its list of critical program information. In contrast, the  Army took the initiative to establish a research center to assist program  managers in identifying critical program information, but Army officials  stated that the approach used by the center has led to an underestimating  of critical program information and critical technologies in programs.
At the same time, there has been limited coordination across programs on  technologies that have been identified as critical—creating a stove piped  process—which could result in one technology being protected under one  program and not protected under another. While informal coordination  can occur, programs did not have a formal mechanism for coordinating  with other programs, including those within their service. For example,  officials from one program office stated they had little interaction from  programs within their service or other services to ensure protection of  similar technologies. A program under one joint program executive office  had not coordinated with other programs to identify similar technologies  as critical. In addition, according to an Army official, contractors who  have worked on programs across services have questioned why one  service is applying anti-tamper solutions to a technology that another  service has not identified as critical. Finally, one program office we spoke  with identified critical program information on its system but indicated  that a similar system in another service had not identified any critical  program information and, therefore, had no plans to implement anti- tamper protection.
Despite the risk that some technologies that need protection may not be  identified or may not be protected across programs, no formal mechanism  exists within DOD to provide a horizontal view of what is critical.  However, any effort to do so could be undermined by the programs’ and  services’ different definitions and interpretations of “critical program  information” and “critical technologies.” The Anti-Tamper Executive Agent  defines critical program information as capturing all critical technologies.  In contrast, the Army’s interpretation is that critical program information  only includes critical technologies that are state-of-the-art. For the Navy,  critical program information includes software, while hardware is part of  what the Navy defines as critical technologies. One program that is part of  a joint program office identified critical program information as including  company proprietary information. As a result, tracking critical program  information may not provide a horizontal view of all technologies services  and programs have identified as needing anti-tamper protection.
section_title: Contradictory and Insufficient Intelligence Information Has Hindered Some Programs in Identifying Potential Threats
paragraphs: Once a program office identifies critical technologies, the next step in the  anti-tamper decision process is to identify threats to those technologies.  DOD’s Program Manager’s Guidebook and Checklist for Anti-tamper  states that multiple threat assessments should be requested from either  the service intelligence organization or counterintelligence organization.  One program office we visited stated that it has requested and received  multiple threat assessments from the intelligence community, which have  sometimes contradicted one another, leaving the program office to  decipher the information and determine the threat. According to an anti- tamper point of contact, other programs have received contradictory  information—typically relating to foreign countries’ capabilities to reverse  engineer. The potential impact of contradictory intelligence reports is  twofold: If the threat is deemed to be low but is actually high, the  technology is susceptible to reverse engineering; conversely, if the threat  is deemed to be high and is actually low, the anti-tamper solution is more  robust than needed.
To assist with the process of identifying threats, program offices may  request threat assessments from a group within the Defense Intelligence  Agency. However, this group was not able to complete assessments for  approximately 6 months during 2006. While the group has resumed  completing assessments, an agency official stated that it is not able to  produce as many assessments as before due to limited resources. The  Defense Intelligence Agency does not turn down program offices that may  request assessments, but does have to put them in a queue and provide  them with previous assessments, if they exist, until it can complete a full  assessment for the program office. One program office indicated that it  took 6 to 9 months for the agency to complete its assessment.
section_title: Program Managers Need Tools to Assist in Designing Effective Anti- tamper Solutions and Estimating Related Costs
paragraphs: Program managers also lack the tools needed to identify the optimal anti- tamper solutions for those critical technologies that are vulnerable to  threats. Most notably, program managers lack a risk model to assess the  relative strengths of different anti-tamper solutions and a tool to help  estimate their costs.
According to National Security Agency officials, who are available to  provide support to program managers considering or implementing anti- tamper protection, program managers and contractors sometimes have  difficulty determining appropriate solutions. Four of five programs we  spoke with that had experience in this area of the anti-tamper decision  process had difficulty identifying how much anti-tamper protection was  enough to protect a critical technology. For example, one program official  told us that an anti-tamper solution developed for one of the program’s  critical technologies may not be sufficient to prevent reverse engineering.  Another program office stated that it is difficult to choose between  competing contractors without knowing how to determine the appropriate  level of anti-tamper protection needed. An anti-tamper point of contact  said that program managers need a tool to help them assess the criticality  of a technology versus the types of threats to that technology.
Implementing a suboptimal anti-tamper solution can have cost and  performance implications for the program. Specifically, if the solution  provides less anti-tamper protection than is needed, the program may have  to retrofit additional anti-tamper protection to allow for a more robust  solution. Not only can such retrofitting add to a program’s costs, it can  compromise performance.
Given limited resources and tools for determining anti-tamper solutions,  some program office officials told us that to satisfy anti-tamper solutions  they relied on other protection measures. For example, officials in one  program office stated that anti-tamper protection and information  assurance were interchangeable and indicated that following the National  Security Agency’s information assurance requirements—which number in  the hundreds—should be sufficient as an anti-tamper solution for this  system. This same program was not aware of anti-tamper resources and  did not coordinate with an anti-tamper validation and verification team on  its solutions. Also, an official from another program office indicated that  anti-tamper protection and information assurance are similarly defined.  While DOD and service officials agreed that some information assurance  and anti-tamper measures may overlap, fulfilling information assurance  requirements does not guarantee a sufficient anti-tamper solution.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In establishing various policies to protect its critical assets, DOD saw anti- tamper as a key way to preserve U.S. investment in critical technologies  while operating in an environment of coalition warfare and a globalized  industry. Program managers are ultimately responsible for implementing  DOD’s anti-tamper policy. However, a lack of direction, information, and  tools from DOD to implement its policy has created significant challenges  for program managers. Further, this policy can compete with the demands  of meeting program cost and schedule objectives, particularly when the  optimal anti-tamper solution is identified late in the schedule. Until DOD  establishes a formal directive or instruction for implementing its policy  departmentwide and equips program managers with adequate  implementation tools, program managers will continue to face difficulties  in identifying critical technologies and implementing anti-tamper  protection.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: As DOD examines its policies for protecting critical assets, we are  recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in coordination with the Anti- Tamper Executive Agent and the Under Secretary of Defense for  Intelligence, to issue or be involved in developing and providing  departmentwide direction for application of its anti-tamper policy that  prescribes how to carry out the policy and establishes definitions for  critical program information and critical technologies.
To help ensure the effectiveness of anti-tamper implementation, we also  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Anti-Tamper  Executive Agent to identify and provide additional tools to assist program  managers in the anti-tamper decision process.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our  recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Anti-Tamper  Executive Agent to identify additional tools to assist program managers in  the anti-tamper decision process. DOD stated that the Anti-Tamper  Executive Agent is drafting Anti-Tamper Standard Guidelines to facilitate  proper implementation of anti-tamper protection across the department.
DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) in coordination  with the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent and the Under Secretary of Defense  (Intelligence) to issue departmentwide direction for application of its anti- tamper policy that prescribes how to carry out the policy and establishes  definitions for critical program information and critical technologies. DOD  stated that the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) has primary  responsibility for DOD Directive 5200.39, a security and  counterintelligence support directive to acquisition programs, and its  successor, DOD Instruction 5200.39 regarding protection of critical  program information. The Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) is  currently coordinating an update to this directive. Once it is issued, the  department plans to update DOD 5200.1-M, which provides the execution  standards and guidelines to meet the DOD Instruction 5200.39 policy.
While DOD has issued broad policy memorandums beginning in 1999 that  reflect the department’s desire for routinely assessing weapon systems to  determine if anti-tamper protection is needed, the department has not fully  incorporated anti-tamper policy into its formal acquisition guidance. As we  have reported, service officials indicated collectively that these policy  memorandums are high-level, broad, and leave implementation ultimately  up to the individual program manager. DOD did not indicate when the  update of DOD Directive 5200.39 might be complete and guidance on anti- tamper implementation issued. We continue to believe that such direction  is currently needed and that the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, who issued the policy  memorandums and is responsible for anti-tamper policy, should be  involved in developing and providing the appropriate direction whether it  be the update to DOD Directive 5200.39 or another vehicle. That direction  should include how to implement the anti-tamper policy and how critical  program information and critical technologies are defined. We continue to  believe that the direction, which has been lacking since the policy was  initiated in 1999, should not be further delayed. If DOD continues to  experience delays in updating DOD Directive 5200.39, it should consider  interim measures to meet the immediate need for anti-tamper direction.
DOD’s letter is reprinted in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, as well as the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Office of  Management and Budget; and the Assistant to the President for National  Security Affairs. In addition, this report will be made available at no  charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or calvaresibarra@gao.gov if you or  your staff have any questions concerning this report. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Others making key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To identify actions the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken to  implement its anti-tamper policy since 2004, we reviewed DOD policies  and guidance governing anti-tamper protection on weapon systems and  obtained documents on various initiatives. We interviewed officials from  the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent, military services, and other DOD  components such as the Missile Defense Agency; Acquisition, Technology  and Logistics; Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; and  the Air Force Research Laboratory about initiatives or actions taken  regarding anti-tamper. Through these interviews and documents, we also  determined the status of our 2004 anti-tamper report recommendations.  We interviewed DOD officials from Networks and Information Integration,  Science and Technology, and Counterintelligence to discuss anti-tamper  protection and how it relates to other program protection measures.
To determine how program managers implemented DOD’s anti-tamper  policy, we interviewed officials from 14 program offices. We are not  identifying the names of the programs due to classification concerns. We  conducted structured interviews with 7 of the 14 program offices to  discuss and obtain documents about their experiences with implementing  the anti-tamper decision process and identify any challenges they faced.  We selected 6 of these programs from a list of weapon systems identified  in Anti-Tamper Executive Agent, services, and component documents as  considering and/or implementing anti-tamper protection and a seventh  program considering anti-tamper that we identified during the course of  our fieldwork. Systems we selected represented a cross section of  acquisition programs and various types of systems in different phases of  development. For the remaining programs, we interviewed 7 not identified  by the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent or the services as considering and/or  implementing anti-tamper to obtain their viewpoints on DOD’s anti-tamper  policy and implementation. We selected these programs by identifying lists  of DOD acquisition programs and comparing them to the Anti-Tamper  Executive Agent’s, services’, and components’ lists of program considering  and/or implementing anti-tamper. We did not evaluate whether programs  had implemented sufficient anti-tamper protection.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Anne-Marie Lasowski (Assistant  Director), Gregory Harmon, Molly Whipple, Karen Sloan, John C. Martin,  and Alyssa Weir made major contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January  2007.
Export Controls: Challenges Exist in Enforcement of an Inherently  Complex System. GAO-07-265. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2006.
Defense Technologies: DOD’s Critical Technologies Lists Rarely Inform  Export Control and Other Policy Decisions. GAO-06-793. Washington,  D.C.: July 28, 2006.
President’s Justification of the High Performance Computer Control  Threshold Does Not Fully Address National Defense Authorization Act of  1998 Requirements. GAO-06-754R. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006.
Export Controls: Improvements to Commerce’s Dual-Use System Needed  to Ensure Protection of U.S. Interests in the Post-9/11 Environment.  GAO-06-638. Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2006.
Defense Trade: Enhancements to the Implementation of Exon-Florio  Could Strengthen the Law’s Effectiveness. GAO-05-686. Washington, D.C.:  September 28, 2005.
Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Ensure Its Oversight of Contractors  under Foreign Influence Is Sufficient. GAO-05-681. Washington, D.C.:   July 15, 2005.
Defense Trade: Arms Export Control Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies  in the Post-9/11 Security Environment. GAO-05-468R. Washington, D.C.:  April 7, 2005.
Defense Trade: Arms Export Control System in the Post-9/11  Environment. GAO-05-234. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Better Support Program Managers’  Implementation of Anti-Tamper Protection. GAO-04-302. Washington,  D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Defense Trade: Better Information Needed to Support Decisions  Affecting Proposed Weapons Transfers. GAO-03-694. Washington, D.C.:  July 11, 2003.