Traffic Safety: NHTSA's Improved Oversight Could Identify Opportunities to Strengthen Management and Safety in Some States
Published: 2008-07-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Traffic crashes kill thousands of Americans every year--in 2005, it was the leading cause of death among young Americans. To try to improve highway safety, Congress authorized a grant program overseen by the Department of Transportation's (DOT) National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). In 2003, GAO recommended that NHTSA improve the consistency of its management reviews, a key aspect of NHTSA's oversight. In response to a legislative mandate, GAO assessed (1) how states have used grant funding to address safety goals, (2) NHTSA's progress in improving consistency in its management reviews, (3) the usefulness of its management review recommendations, and (4) approaches to further improve safety. In performing this work, GAO reviewed traffic safety data, analyzed state spending patterns, conducted site visits with eight states, and interviewed agency officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: From fiscal year 1999 through 2007, states directed about 54 percent of NHTSA's State and Community Highway Safety formula grant funding toward programs, including traffic enforcement, that address the leading causes of traffic fatalities--alcohol-impaired driving and driving without a safety belt, both of which are national safety goals. States directed the rest of this grant funding to a variety of safety programs, many of which address national goals but some of which target state-specific safety challenges such as driving safely in winter weather. To address safety goals, state highway safety offices disperse federal funding to "subgrantees," such as local law enforcement or nonprofit agencies that carry out the safety programs. NHTSA implemented both Congress' requirement that it conduct management reviews of states and territories on a 3-year schedule as well as GAO's prior recommendation to improve the consistency with which it uses these reviews. GAO analyzed NHTSA's management reviews and identified some variation in how information was documented. However, in 2007 NHTSA took several steps, such as instituting a team to review the quality of management review reports, which should further improve the consistency of information contained in these reports--information NHTSA could use to assess the impact of its recommendations on state safety programs. GAO found NHTSA's management review recommendations useful because they are designed to address fundamental management principles such as improving program planning and ensuring states' compliance with statutes governing safety grants. Also, state officials said NHTSA's recommendations serve as a useful management tool. However, NHTSA does not analyze the recommendations on a national level to target its technical assistance to common state challenges. GAO conducted such an analysis and found that the recommendations revealed common state challenges such as the need to improve monitoring of subgrantee activities and expenditures, which helps ensure that funds are used for the intended purpose. NHTSA also frequently recommended that states spend grant funding more quickly, which NHTSA officials believed would expand safety programs and, in turn, improve safety. From 1997 through 2006, the national traffic fatality rate--the number of traffic fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled--declined 14 percent, but traffic fatalities remained at about 43,000 per year as factors such as increases in the number of miles driven offset the decrease in the rate. NHTSA uses several approaches to help states reduce fatalities, including requiring program reviews in states that are not making adequate progress in reducing alcohol-impaired driving and increasing safety belt use. Yet some states with low or average fatality rates but a high number of fatalities may not be eligible for a required review under NHTSA's current criteria. States with high total numbers of fatalities offer an opportunity to save the greatest number of lives, but for these states to receive an in-depth program review, the states must request and pay for such safety expertise.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Traffic crashes were the leading cause of death for young people in the  United States in 2005, and, according to estimates by the National  Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), traffic crashes cost the  United States over $230 billion in 2000 (about $275 billion in 2007 dollars).  Congress has developed many approaches to help states and communities  reduce fatalities, including grants to support state highway safety  programs as well as federal oversight of, and technical assistance to, state  programs. Specifically, in 1966 Congress authorized a formula grant  program—the State and Community Highway Safety Grant Program (23  U.S.C. § 402), commonly referred to as the Section 402 program—that  requires that each state have an approved highway safety program  designed to address traffic safety issues. States can use Section 402  funding for law enforcement activities to reduce speeding, improvements  to motorcycle safety training, or media campaigns to encourage drivers to  use their safety belts, among other initiatives. More recently, the Safe,  Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for  Users (SAFETEA-LU), authorized a total of nearly $2.4 billion for fiscal  years 2005 through 2009 for traffic safety programs—including over   $1 billion for the Section 402 program and about $1.3 billion for safety  incentive grants that focus on specific national safety priorities, such as  alcohol-impaired driving. Some of these grants include eligibility criteria  designed to encourage states to pass safety legislation or that target states  with certain rates of fatalities to receive additional funds.
NHTSA—located within the Department of Transportation (DOT)—is  responsible for overseeing state highway traffic safety programs. It does  so by reviewing states’ management of state safety programs, as well as by  providing training and technical assistance to state safety officials. This  approach is designed to ensure that state safety programs have instituted  essential planning and management processes for developing a highway  safety program that can improve safety. In 2003, we found that NHTSA’s   10 regional offices conducted oversight inconsistently—specifically, the  regional offices made inconsistent use of management reviews and  resulting improvement plans that the offices developed for states. We  recommended that NHTSA provide specific guidance to its regional offices  on when to use these reviews. We reported that NHTSA’s management  reviews had commonly found problems with state safety programs. Since  NHTSA did not routinely conduct these reviews, however, it was difficult  to ensure that states were using federal funds for their intended purpose  and in compliance with law. Further, in 2005 SAFETEA-LU added section  412 to 23 U.S.C., which among other things included a requirement that  NHTSA strengthen its oversight of state use of federal safety grants by  reviewing each state’s management of these grants once every three years  and making recommendations.
This report addresses your interest in information on how states have used  Section 402 safety grants and other approaches currently available to  improve safety outcomes and responds to a mandate enacted in  SAFETEA-LU that GAO determine whether NHTSA implemented the  changes in its oversight approach that SAFETEA-LU added. Specifically,  this report assesses (1) how states have used Section 402 funding to  achieve national safety goals, (2) the progress NHTSA has made toward  addressing consistency in the management review process, (3) how useful  NHTSA’s management reviews and recommendations are in improving  management of state safety programs, and (4) the approaches currently  available to improve safety outcomes.
To assess these issues, we reviewed legislation, guidance, and procedures  relevant to NHTSA’s oversight of state highway safety grants, including  NHTSA’s management review process. We interviewed officials with  NHTSA headquarters and regional offices and the Governors Highway  Safety Association—a nonprofit association representing state highway  safety programs. We also conducted site visits to eight states—Arizona,  Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin—to  gather state officials’ views of NHTSA’s oversight, including the  management review process, and to discuss how states use Section 402  grants. In addition, we analyzed data provided by NHTSA on how states  spent highway safety grants for fiscal years 1999 through 2007, and  conducted a content analysis of the recommendations in all management  reviews and completed corrective action plans developed in fiscal years  2005 through 2007. We conducted this performance audit from July 2007  through July 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for  more details on our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Section 402 program provides over $1 billion for fiscal years 2005  through 2009 in federal funding to states for highway safety programs  aimed at reducing traffic crashes and related deaths, injuries, and property  damage. Each year, after states submit a highway safety plan to NHTSA  that describes how they plan to use Section 402 funding, this funding is  distributed to all states according to a formula that accounts for state road  miles and population but not differences in safety statistics such as fatality  rates among states. These grants are administered by state highway safety  officials who identify traffic safety priorities of greatest importance to  their state and select and fund subgrantees to carry out safety programs  (see fig. 1). Some states have hundreds of subgrantees, and state  subgrantees typically include a variety of different organizations, such as  state and local law enforcement agencies, fire departments, nonprofit  organizations, and advertising agencies.
In fiscal year 2007, states spent over $203 million in Section 402 funding on  traffic safety programs. States may use Section 402 grants to fund a wide  range of programs that are designed to improve traffic safety primarily by  influencing drivers’ behavior and that reflect one of nine national safety  priorities established by NHTSA regulation. (See table 1 for a list of the  national priorities and examples of programs that address each priority.)  States may also use Section 402 funding to support safety issues specific to  the state that are not addressed in the national safety goals—for example,  winter driving safety in cold-weather states or street racing—if state  officials submit supporting information to NHTSA.
While the Section 402 program provides flexible traffic safety funding for  states, incentive grants are structured to encourage states to implement  specific traffic safety initiatives. In 2005, SAFETEA-LU reauthorized  funding for 2 incentive grants related to safety belt use and alcohol- impaired driving and authorized funding for 5 new incentive grants that  encourage states to (1) implement legislation governing the use of safety  belts, (2) implement legislation governing the use of child safety seats, (3)  promote safety training for motorcyclists and increase awareness of  motorcyclists among other drivers, (4) improve state traffic safety data  systems, and (5) prohibit racial profiling. In fiscal year 2007, states spent  over $191 million in incentive grant funding on traffic safety programs (see  table 2). Unlike Section 402 grants, which are distributed to all states,  incentive grants require states to meet certain criteria to qualify for the  grants. Also, the amount of incentive grant funding a state receives in a  given year depends in part on the total number of states receiving the  grant.
To help ensure that states are managing this highway safety funding  efficiently, in compliance with laws and regulations, and in a manner that  will effectively address state safety problems, NHTSA oversees state  highway safety programs through its national headquarters office and 10  regional offices across the country. Each regional office has jurisdiction  over several states. For example, NHTSA’s Region 1 office, located in  Cambridge, Massachusetts, oversees state highway safety programs in  Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and  Vermont.
NHTSA’s oversight approach has evolved over time in response to  congressional and state concerns, our recommendations, and NHTSA’s  own efforts to improve its oversight. According to NHTSA officials, over  time, Congress has given NHTSA different levels of oversight authority  over state highway safety programs. For example, prior to 1998, NHTSA  had the authority to approve or disapprove state spending on specific  safety programs, but Congress later removed this authority in response to  a congressional and state concern that the program-by-program approval  process was too restrictive. In response, NHTSA adopted a performance- based oversight approach in 1998, requiring states to develop performance  plans that identify key state safety problems and set goals and  performance measures to address these problems. In 2003, we raised a  concern that NHTSA’s oversight of states was inconsistent across its  regional offices and recommended that NHTSA provide more specific  guidance to its regional offices on when to conduct management reviews  of state highway safety programs and how to measure state progress  toward meeting safety goals. In response to the additional specificity in  Section 412 of SAFETEA-LU regarding the scheduling of management  reviews and our recommendation, NHTSA made several changes to its  oversight approach, including clarifying and revising guidance to regional  offices on the processes for conducting regular reviews of state use of  grant funding.
Currently, NHTSA’s oversight approach includes processes that assess  both state management capabilities as well as state performance in  meeting safety goals. With respect to assessing state management  capabilities, NHTSA regional officials monitor state grant spending  throughout the year to determine whether states are expending funds in a  timely fashion and to ensure that states are directing funds to the  programs identified in their highway safety plans. In addition, regional  officials conduct on-site management reviews once every 3 years to assess  state operations to ensure efficient administration and effective planning,  programming, implementation, and evaluation of the state’s highway  safety program. After completing the management review, regional  officials generally issue the following report to the state containing  recommendations for improvement and jointly with state officials develop  the following plan for implementing these recommendations. See figure 2  for a summary of NHTSA’s Management Review Process.
Management review reports: Management review reports document the  process NHTSA officials used to evaluate the state’s grant management,  identify areas in which the state excelled, and summarize NHTSA’s  recommended improvements to the state on how to more efficiently and  effectively manage its grant program. NHTSA’s recommendations can  require that the state take action if the state is not in compliance with  federal or state law, or can present a best practice that, if implemented,  may improve management of the grant program or prevent the state from  developing a compliance problem in the future. However, because NHTSA  cannot require states to take action on best practice recommendations,  they are not binding on the state.
Corrective action plans: When necessary based on the results of the  review, NHTSA and the state highway safety office jointly develop a  corrective action plan to address open recommendations in the  management review final report, including tasks to complete the actions,  target dates for completion of each task, and status notes indicating state  progress on each required action.
As required since SAFETEA-LU, in section 412, Title 23 U.S.C., NHTSA  also compiles annual reports that summarize its management review and  findings during each fiscal year. These reports, available on NHTSA’s Web  site, list some of the most common recommendations.
While NHTSA’s oversight of state grant management helps ensure that  states have management processes that are the basis for an effective  highway safety program, it uses several additional approaches to assess  state performance in improving safety outcomes.
Evaluation of state established traffic safety goals with safety outcomes:  To evaluate whether states are improving safety outcomes, NHTSA  regional and headquarters officials annually review states’ progress toward  safety goals. With input from NHTSA, each state annually establishes its  goals and accompanying performance measures, as well as the programs it  will fund to achieve these goals in the state’s performance and highway  safety plans. NHTSA regional staff review these plans using standard  checklists for uniformity in their evaluation. At the end of the year, each  state describes the outcomes of its efforts in an annual report, which  NHTSA uses to track each state’s progress against the goals the state  established and provide feedback to states on the strengths and  weaknesses of their programs. NHTSA officials told us that while they  have the authority to approve state plans as a whole, they cannot require  states to act on the feedback NHTSA officials offer.
Special management reviews: Each fiscal year, NHTSA headquarters  officials compare state performance in two national safety priorities— alcohol-impaired driving and safety belt use—over the prior 3 years with  average national performance in these areas over the same time period.  For those states that have consistently had below-average safety belt use  or an above-average impaired driving fatality rate and less than half of the  national average improvement, NHTSA regional and headquarters subject  matter experts conduct special management reviews, which involve an in- depth evaluation of a state’s alcohol-impaired driving or safety belt  program and result in recommendations for improvement. Regional  officials follow up periodically with states to determine whether states  have acted on these recommendations; however, because  recommendations in a special management review generally do not relate  to compliance issues, NHTSA cannot require state action.
Technical program assessments: At the request of a state, NHTSA officials  told us they will coordinate a technical program assessment to evaluate  one particular area of a state’s highway safety program, such as traffic  records, motorcycle safety, or emergency medical services, among others.  NHTSA facilitates the assessment by bringing together leading experts in a  particular program area to evaluate the state’s program against the  national highway safety program guideline for that subject. After  completing the assessment, these experts produce a final report  containing recommendations for strengthening the state’s program. The  report is the property of the state, and the state is not bound to implement  any of its recommendations.
Finally, NHTSA complements its oversight of states with training and  technical assistance for state officials. NHTSA offers formal training  through the Transportation Safety Institute in Oklahoma City on a range of  highway safety topics, including courses on highway safety program  management, financial management, and data analysis and evaluation.  Most of the regional officials we spoke with said that NHTSA’s regional  offices also provide training for state officials, including some of the  highway safety courses offered through the Transportation Safety  Institute. In addition to offering formal training, NHTSA officials are  available to states for technical assistance, which includes support on a  broad range of issues. For example, several NHTSA regional officials told  us that they share best practices, such as a model policy and procedures  manual, between the states in their regions, and other regional officials  told us that they provide feedback to states on incentive grant  applications. NHTSA headquarters officials provide expert advice to states  on the effectiveness of different strategies to address traffic safety  problems, such as the relative effectiveness of laws, enforcement, and  media campaigns in increasing safety belt use.
section_title: States Primarily Direct Section 402 Funding to National Safety Priorities
paragraphs: In recent years, states spent about 54 percent of their Section 402 funding  to support safety programs, including traffic enforcement, intended to  reduce alcohol-impaired driving and unbelted driving, the primary factors  contributing to traffic fatalities and injuries. In addition to addressing  these two national safety priorities, states have also used Section 402  funding to address state-specific problems—many of which are also  national safety priorities, such as improving pedestrian and bicycle safety,  but some of which are not, such as reducing aggressive driving. Highway  safety officials in the eight states we visited said that Section 402 funding  provides flexible and stable support for a variety of safety programs. Some  officials also noted that Section 402 grants are complemented by incentive  grants and that, in combination, these funding sources allow states to  expand their key safety efforts and initiate innovative safety programs. To  address safety goals, state highway safety offices distribute Section 402  funding to local agencies and state organizations, known as subgrantees,  that carry out traffic safety programs across the state. State officials also  monitor subgrantees to ensure that the funding is used appropriately.
subsections: section_title: States Use Section 402 Grants to Address the Main Causes of Traffic Fatalities and State- Specific Safety Problems
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 1999, states have directed about 54 percent of their  Section 402 funding to traffic safety programs, such as traffic law  enforcement, aimed at reducing alcohol-impaired driving and unbelted  driving, the leading national causes of traffic fatalities and injuries.  According to data from NHTSA’s Grants Tracking System (GTS), states  spent almost $1.5 billion in Section 402 funding on traffic safety programs  for fiscal years 1999 through 2007. As shown in table 3, states spent over  half of this funding on three program areas: traffic law enforcement,  occupant protection (safety belt use), and alcohol-impaired driving.  According to a NHTSA official, traffic law enforcement is a strategy used  primarily to reduce alcohol-impaired driving and increase safety belt use.  During this time period, states also targeted Section 402 funding toward  other key factors contributing to traffic fatalities by directing about $37  million to programs aimed at reducing speeding and about $10 million to  programs intended to improve motorcycle safety (see table 3).
The three program areas support programs intended to reduce the  incidence of alcohol-impaired and unbelted driving. Such programs  include overtime hours for police officers dedicated to traffic law  enforcement, training for police officers on identifying and assessing  drivers who are under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, and media  campaigns aimed at increasing safety belt use as well as campaigns  targeting populations that are at high risk for driving while impaired by  alcohol. Further, states increased the amount of Section 402 funding that  they spent on alcohol-impaired and unbelted driving from about   $95 million in 2007 dollars (54 percent of spending) in fiscal year 1999 to  about $119 million in 2007 dollars (58 percent of spending) in fiscal year  2007. Most noticeably, during this time, states increased the funding that  they directed towards traffic law enforcement by about $23 million in 2007  dollars (a 55 percent increase).
State highway safety officials with whom we spoke said that Section 402  funding provides flexible support that ensures their ability to address a  variety of state-specific traffic safety problems, many of which are also  national safety priorities. GTS data for fiscal years 1999 through 2007  indicate that, after targeting about 54 percent of their Section 402 funding  to alcohol-impaired and unbelted driving, states directed the remaining 46  percent of this funding toward 18 additional program areas. Many of  these program areas address national safety priorities such as improving  emergency medical services, data from traffic records, motorcycle safety,  pedestrian and bicycle safety, and speed control and enforcement (see  table 3). In addition, officials in one state told us that they have used  some of their Section 402 funding to address state-specific concerns that  are not explicitly included in the national safety priorities, including  reducing aggressive driving and improving safety among young drivers,  and NHTSA officials told us that cold weather states fund winter driving  safety initiatives.
Some state highway safety officials noted that incentive grants  complement Section 402 funding and that, in combination, these grants  allow states to expand their efforts to address key traffic safety problems  and to support innovative traffic safety programs. Unlike Section 402  funding, incentive grants are statutorily designed to target specific safety  issues and have eligibility requirements that states must meet to receive  the funding. In this way, these grants are less flexible than Section 402  grants—for instance, the Motorcyclist Safety incentive grant is designed to  fund rider training and driver-awareness educational programs. However,  officials in all eight states we visited said they have used incentive grants  to expand the core traffic safety activities they fund with Section 402  grants. For example, officials in one of these states told us they have used  incentive grants aimed at improving traffic records to build upon the  traffic data programs the state was already supporting with Section 402  funds. Further, officials in two states told us they also use incentive grant  funding to support innovative traffic safety programs they would not have  been able to support with Section 402 dollars alone. For instance, officials  in both states used an incentive grant targeted at alcohol-impaired driving  to test and pilot innovative programs such as Driving While Intoxicated  (DWI) courts that focus primarily on adjudicating cases involving alcohol- impaired drivers.
section_title: States Fund Local Agencies to Implement Safety Programming
paragraphs: State highway safety offices work to achieve safety goals by distributing  federal funding to local agencies and state organizations (subgrantees)  that implement safety programming. State highway safety offices are  designed to provide a link between federal funding and agencies that can  implement safety programs, but these offices generally do not carry out  programs themselves. Rather, state highway safety offices manage federal  funding and grant requirements and develop partnerships with agencies— such as the state highway patrol, local law enforcement agencies, fire  departments, nonprofit organizations, and advertising agencies—that have  the resources to implement or support safety programming. The Section  402 program requires states to use at least 40 percent of this funding to  directly support or for the benefit of political subdivisions, which can  include directly funding a local organization to conduct safety  programming in its surrounding community or funding the salaries of state  patrol officers that provide traffic enforcement services to rural  communities that do not have a local police department. Several state  officials we spoke with noted that they exceed the 40 percent minimum  requirement and distribute higher amounts to local subgrantees.
State traffic safety officials administer the Section 402 program by  identifying key state traffic safety problems, developing related safety  goals, selecting and funding subgrantees to carry out programs that  address these safety goals, and monitoring subgrantees. Highway safety  officials are required to use a data-driven process to identify state traffic  safety problems and establish performance goals. For example, Nevada’s  fiscal year 2008 plan identified impaired driving as the most common  cause of fatal crashes and established a performance goal of reducing the  number of such fatalities to 5.75 per 100,000 people by 2008 (which would  be down from 6.31 in 2005). After identifying state safety goals, officials  identify potential subgrantees to initiate safety programming that can help  the state improve safety outcomes. The states we visited accomplished  this by issuing statewide requests for proposals requesting grant  applications, by contacting potential subgrantees directly to encourage  them to apply for funding, or by using both strategies. After soliciting grant  applications, officials in most of the states we visited used a formal  process to evaluate these applications and select subgrantees. Finally,  state officials are required to monitor subgrantees’ use of Section 402  funding to ensure that subgrantees are using funding in accordance with  federal grant requirements and for the activities approved by the state. In  all eight states we visited, officials monitored subgrantees by reviewing  performance reports documenting the activities implemented with grant  funding—for instance, the number of overtime hours worked by law  enforcement officers—as well as documentation of the expenses related  to these activities.
section_title: NHTSA Has Improved the Consistency of Its Management Review Process and Instituted New Processes That Could Help to Assess the Impact of Its Oversight
paragraphs: NHTSA implemented both the requirement that it conduct management  reviews of states and territories on a 3-year schedule as well as our  recommendation to improve the consistency with which it uses these  reviews. NHTSA also refined management review guidance for its regional  offices and developed the corrective action plan—a tool to track state  implementation of management review recommendations and encourage  states to act on NHTSA’s advice. Our analysis of management review  reports and corrective action plans for fiscal years 2005 through 2007  revealed some differences among the regions with respect to the  information the regions included in these documents, as well as how these  documents organized information. As a result, NHTSA cannot use these  reports to describe on a national level the extent to which states acted on  its advice or assess the impact of its recommendations to states. NHTSA  recently took steps to respond to state concerns and further improve  consistency in the management reviews. These measures should improve  the information available to NHTSA for analysis that could further  enhance its oversight.
subsections: section_title: NHTSA Addressed Section 412 Requirements and Our Previous Recommendations to Consistently Use Management Reviews
paragraphs: NHTSA implemented both the Section 412 requirement that it conduct  management reviews of states and territories on a 3-year schedule as well  as our recommendation to improve the consistency with which it uses  these reviews. During the 3-year period of fiscal years 2005 through 2007,  NHTSA conducted 56 of the required 57 reviews or about 15 to 20 reviews  per year. Each of the 10 NHTSA regional offices performed one or more  management reviews per year to ensure it reviewed each state or territory  in its region during the 3-year cycle.
NHTSA also refined its management review guidance for its regional  offices. This guidance clarified the process each region is to use to initiate,  conduct, and publish a final management review report. For example, it  requires regional offices to provide to state highway safety offices   (1) advanced notice before beginning a management review,   (2) information on aspects of the state highway safety program that  NHTSA officials would review, (3) a schedule of work, and (4) a list of  materials and documents that the state highway safety office would need  to provide the NHTSA regional office prior to the review. Some state  officials told us that this guidance added clarity and consistency to the  management review process, as they knew what to expect and had time to  prepare more effectively for the review. NHTSA’s guidance also provided  its staff with more information on the aspects of the state highway safety  office that NHTSA regional staff should analyze during a management  review (what NHTSA referred to as “the elements of the review”),  including issues related to organization and staffing, program  management, and financial management. Lastly, NHTSA provided  guidance to its regional offices on developing a draft report to incorporate  states’ comments and on preparing a final report that addressed all  elements reviewed, including issues with compliance, best practices or  commendations, recommendations, and other comments. This guidance  was designed to ensure that NHTSA’s regional offices would provide each  state with a final management review report that outlined areas of  improvement leading to changes in the state’s grant management process  and by extension each state’s traffic safety program.
Finally, NHTSA developed the corrective action plan to address open  recommendations in the final management review report. NHTSA regional  offices and states jointly develop corrective action plans to identify tasks  the state should take to complete actions, target dates for the completion  of each task, and status notes indicating progress of each action—as well  as any issues preventing states from completing actions—to address the  recommendations. NHTSA headquarters officials told us that based on the  guidance they provided to regional officials, they expected that each  region would produce a corrective action plan to track any open  recommendations in the management reviews, including both compliance- based findings and best practice management considerations, although if  states were able to address a recommendation prior to the final  management review report being issued, regional offices did not need to  include it in the corrective action plan.
section_title: Despite Increased Consistency in the Use and Implementation of Management Reviews, Regions Provided Varying Information in Recent Reviews
paragraphs: Our analysis of fiscal year 2005 through 2007 management review reports  and corrective action plans revealed some differences among the regions  with respect to the information the regions included in these reports as  well as how these documents organized information. This type of variation  makes it more difficult for NHTSA to assess the impact of its oversight and  advice to states on a national level. Some regional officials told us there  were differences in how their office interpreted NHTSA’s guidance for  conducting the management reviews compared with other regional offices.  We observed the following differences:    Organization and content in the management review reports varied:  Regional officials adopted different approaches to documenting state  performance on the management review elements. Some documented  information when they identified problems or offered commendations,  while others summarized information on each review element, indicating  whether the states were achieving a satisfactory level of performance,  needed improvement, or had exemplary performance. The number of  recommendations also varied greatly among regional offices—for  example, one region averaged almost 28 recommendations per review,  while another averaged about 10. While this disparity could mean that  states in some regions performed worse than states in other regions, it  may also indicate that some regions were more stringent in their review  than others. We noted, however, that many of the management reviews  conducted in fiscal year 2007 more consistently organized information.  NHTSA officials explained that in the fall of 2007 it rolled out a new  template for the management reviews to improve consistency in report  organization and content.
Variation in information summarized from NHTSA’s review of  subgrantee program documentation: States must keep documentation of  the safety programs performed and expenses of state subgrantees  receiving highway safety funding, and NHTSA analyzes this documentation  during management reviews. However, we found variation in the extent to  which management review reports summarized the outcomes of NHTSA  staff’s analysis. Some management review reports included a list of  programs for which NHTSA officials had examined documentation, but no  summary of whether the documentation was adequate. Other reports  included several recommendations to the state on how to improve this  documentation. A few reviews cited the adequacy of documentation for  each program reviewed, noting specific inadequacies or that the program  contained sufficient documentation of subgrantee activities and expenses.
Reviewing documentation provided by subgrantees ensures that states and  their subgrantees are spending federal funding on allowable costs, in  keeping with federal requirements, and that the states have adequate  documentation to support expenses. Such reviews can also identify  misuse of federal funding. For example, officials from one regional office  told us they uncovered a subgrantee embezzling funds during a review of  the program’s documentation, which led NHTSA officials to contact the  state inspector general and other authorities to resolve this issue. The  Department of Transportation’s Office of the Inspector General (DOT IG)  noted in its recent evaluation of NHTSA’s highway safety program that  several recent cases of false claims for work performed and embezzlement  of grant funds resulted in convictions and the recovery of $119,000 in  highway safety grant funding. The DOT IG recommended that NHTSA  encourage states to conduct substantive testing of subgrantee grant  expenditures to detect fraud, waste, and abuse—testing that NHTSA  officials support but also recognize may be difficult for states given limited  resources and that most state highway officials are program specialists  rather than auditors. Consistent and thorough reporting of the outcomes  of the program file reviews that NHTSA conducts during its management  reviews would increase state accountability for comprehensively  reviewing subgrantee documentation of activities performed and expenses  incurred, and NHTSA’s revised management review guidance should add  consistency to the documentation of project file reviews.
Recommendations were inconsistently characterized: Management  reviews did not always clearly distinguish between recommendations that  addressed instances in which the state program was not complying with  laws and regulations and was therefore statutorily required to take  remedial actions and recommendations that were management best  practices that would improve the state’s program but on which NHTSA  could not require the state to act. As a result, according to officials in some  of the states we visited, state leadership penalized some state highway  safety offices because it appeared that the state had multiple compliance  problems in the management review report. NHTSA officials stated that  they were not made aware of such incidents, and we did not independently  confirm these statements. Nevertheless, as discussed in the next section,  NHTSA has taken steps to improve the clarity of its management review  reports.
Inconsistent use and content of the corrective action plans: NHTSA  inconsistently used its corrective action plans, which it developed to track  state implementation of its recommendations and encourage state action.  As of March 2008, we found that 38 of the 56 states receiving a  management review in fiscal years 2005 through 2007 had a corrective  action plan, even though all reviews had recommendations and NHTSA  headquarters’ expectation was that regional staff would develop a plan any  time there were open recommendations. The content of the corrective  action plans also varied—for instance, some regions included all of the  recommendations from the management review, while others included  only some of the recommendations from the management review. In  addition, corrective action plans did not always include information on  whether states had implemented recommendations.
As a result, NHTSA cannot describe—and we were unable to assess—on a  national level the extent to which states are acting on NHTSA’s  recommendations, some of which require action on compliance issues.  Further it cannot assess the impact of these recommendations on states.  The DOT IG’s evaluation also noted that NHTSA could improve its  oversight, among other issues, by implementing a nationwide  recommendation tracking system that could improve accounting for the  disposition of recommendations to ensure follow-up for unresolved items,  and NHTSA agreed to do so. Such information would allow NHTSA to  identify how often states implemented its recommendations—both those  that require action as well as those that NHTSA cannot require states to  implement—and, to the extent that states did not act on NHTSA’s advice,  NHTSA could identify the barriers that prevented states from doing so.
section_title: NHTSA Responded to State Concerns and Further Improved Consistency in the Management Reviews, Improving Information Available for Analysis
paragraphs: NHTSA recently took steps to respond to state concerns and further  improve consistency in the management reviews—steps that should  improve the information available for analysis that could further enhance  NHTSA’s oversight. In 2006, NHTSA began working with the Governors  Highway Safety Association (GHSA) to refine how it categorizes  recommendations in its management reviews, and NHTSA implemented  new guidance in the summer of 2007. Specifically, NHTSA and GHSA  collaborated to clearly distinguish between recommendations that NHTSA  can require state offices to act on because the state is not in compliance  with federal rules or regulations and recommendations that represent a  management best practice. NHTSA updated its guidance in July 2007 and  now differentiates between “findings” that are compliance-based problems  the state is statutorily required to address, and “management  considerations” that identify improvements to the state’s highway safety  program but for which NHTSA cannot require state action.
In addition to its collaboration with GHSA, NHTSA initiated several new  processes related to how regional officials document management review  reports and corrective action plans that should help NHTSA address some  of the inconsistencies we found in the reports and plans for fiscal years  2005 through 2007. In November 2007, NHTSA trained regional staff on its  recently updated management review guidance and introduced new  templates associated with the management review process. These  templates include initiation letters, close-out letters, and checklists for the  review process, among others. NHTSA also established a team to read  draft management review reports and ensure that recommendations are  made in similar circumstances, that compliance issues include a  description and reference to the relevant law or regulation, and that  definitions and language are used consistently across the regions. Also,  NHTSA’s recent management review guidance indicates that regional  office officials should summarize major issues identified during the review  of state subgrantee program documentation. Several regional officials  told us they thought these efforts will add more consistency to the  management review reports.
NHTSA also updated its guidance on the use of corrective action plans,  which are now used when NHTSA identifies compliance-based findings  and will not include management considerations. NHTSA plans to track  management considerations in separate documents maintained by the  regional offices. Specifically, in May 2008, NHTSA officials stated they  developed the recommendation action tracking form that regional offices  will be able to use to track state action in response to management  considerations. Regional officials will follow up with states semiannually  to update states’ progress. According to NHTSA officials, GHSA and states  requested that NHTSA drop management considerations from the  management reviews altogether and base the reviews solely on  compliance related issues. However, NHTSA officials disagreed, stating  that they view NHTSA’s role as including responsibility to disseminate best  practices, and management considerations allow for this opportunity. In  previous reports on similarly structured federal programs, we have  recommended that other federal agencies disseminate best practices to  state agencies or other grantees receiving federal funds. Additionally, in  the long term, action on management considerations may prevent states  from having compliance issues.
section_title: NHTSA’s Management Review Recommendations Address Fundamental Management Principles and Could Be Analyzed at the National Level to Identify Common State Challenges
paragraphs: NHTSA’s management review recommendations—both its compliance- based findings and management considerations—address fundamental  management principles, and state officials with whom we spoke said the  review recommendations serve as a useful management tool and, in some  cases, helped them obtain needed resources from state leadership. In the  future, NHTSA could use information from the reviews to identify  common state problems at a national level and direct resources  accordingly. We conducted such an analysis and found that states  experienced a number of common challenges such as needing to improve  monitoring of subgrantees—an issue the DOT IG also identified in its  report as a process in need of strengthening—and spending highway  safety grant funding in a more timely fashion. As noted earlier, some of  NHTSA’s recent initiatives should improve the consistency of information  documented in management reviews and corrective action plans. Such  improvements could help NHTSA not only assess the impact of its  oversight, but also identify common state challenges for which NHTSA  may be able to provide additional assistance to states.
subsections: section_title: NHTSA’s Management Review Recommendations Address Fundamental Management Principles, and State Officials Found These Reviews Helpful
paragraphs: In its management reviews, NHTSA recommended actions to improve  planning and implementation of programs, strengthen internal controls,  ensure compliance with relevant laws and regulations, and address  fundamental management principles. These actions are consistent with  guidance and evaluation tools from the Office of Management and Budget  (OMB) and GAO regarding oversight of federal grants and good  management practices. For example, OMB guidance indicates that a  recipient of a federal grant demonstrate that its planning will allow it to  make effective use of federal funding. NHTSA’s fiscal year 2005 through  2007 management reviews examined several aspects of state highway  safety office planning and made several recommendations that states  could use to strengthen planning processes—for example, by using data  on fatalities and injuries to better target federal dollars to the safety issues  that are of greatest significance to the state. In addition, our work on  internal controls and other management practices as well as OMB  guidance suggests that processes like regular monitoring of the quality of  state programs’ performance over time, financial management  accountability that provides assurances that programs are using funding in  the intended manner, and having sufficient levels of well-trained staff to  conduct the programs’ work, can ensure that programs are run efficiently  and effectively. NHTSA’s management reviews and recommendations  addressed each of these areas, as well as others that our work indicates  are necessary for effective programs.
State officials with whom we spoke viewed NHTSA management reviews  favorably. They indicated that the recommendations served as a useful  management tool and helped them focus on specific areas needing  improvement. For example, officials from one state commented that the  recommendations identified several ways the state could improve its  processes, communication among staff, and monitoring of subgrantees.  Officials from another state said that implementing the recommendations  improved the state’s highway safety program, for example, by  recommending they hire a coordinator for youth programs. Officials from  two other states noted respectively that the reviews helped the office  focus on accomplishing important, basic aspects of their traffic safety  program and gave them the “push” to complete projects such as updating  their policy and procedures manual. Some state officials also told us that  NHTSA sometimes made recommendations to assist the state highway  traffic safety office in obtaining resources from state leadership that have  authority over the office’s budget or staff allocation. For example, NHTSA  recommendations helped one state to hire additional staff and assisted  another in obtaining funding from state leadership to send staff to training.
section_title: Monitoring Subgrantees and Spending Grants in a Timely Manner Were Common State Challenges in Recent Management Reviews
paragraphs: Our analysis of the fiscal year 2005 through 2007 management review  recommendations indicated that states face several common challenges  in managing highway safety programs. These challenges include  improving monitoring of subgrantees; resolving financial management issues such as ensuring that expenses  submitted by subgrantees were paid promptly and for the correct amounts  or that the state used federal planning and administration funds for staff  salaries only when appropriate;   strengthening planning processes and programming to better address    staffing issues such as clearly defining staff functions and the processes  staff should use to perform their roles, as well as providing necessary  training and development; improving implementation of safety programming, such as ensuring that  states have written requirements for subgrantees about how they manage  their programs and reports the state expects to receive regarding  subgrantee activities and progress toward milestones; and    spending grant funding in a timely fashion. (See table 4 for a summary of  the most common NHTSA recommendations.)
The most common recommendations we observed related to the need for  state highway safety offices to strengthen the processes they use to  monitor subgrantees. Federal regulations require monitoring of recipients  of federal funds, including subgrantees. The DOT IG noted in its recent  evaluation of NHTSA’s highway safety program that such monitoring helps  ensure that funds are being used for (1) their intended purpose, (2) for  programs that will help the state meet its safety goals, and (3) in  compliance with laws and regulations. Federal highway safety grant  funding generally passes through state highway safety offices to local  agencies and other subgrantees to implement programs. Because the  structure of this grant program involves many organizations across a state,  NHTSA often recommended that state highway safety offices develop and  execute monitoring processes such as  tracking and evaluating subgrantee performance, which could include  reports on how many citations a local police department issued during  overtime enforcement of impaired driving or the number of child safety  seats a nonprofit agency installed in the cars of low income families;  financial accountability, which could include ensuring that subgrantees  spent funds on items reviewed and approved by the state highway safety  office and that the costs claimed are supported with documentation; and   maintenance of inventories of equipment costing more than $5,000 and  purchased with federal funds, which OMB requires.
Some NHTSA regional officials told us that because state highway safety  staff perform numerous duties, they can overlook monitoring and  documenting subgrantee activities. In addition, some of these officials  noted that new state staff often require training in monitoring, which  suggests the importance of continual training on these processes. The  DOT IG recommended that NHTSA encourage states to conduct  comprehensive on-site reviews of subgrantee internal controls over grant  expenditures, substantive testing of grant expenditures, or other  procedures to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse.
Another frequently made recommendation and one that some NHTSA  officials identified as potentially having an effect on state progress toward  achieving its safety outcomes, was the need for states to liquidate grant  funding in a timely fashion. In its management reviews, NHTSA  recommended that 33 of the 56 states and territories reviewed increase the  rate at which they spend federal dollars. Our analysis of data from  NHTSA’s Grants Tracking System, which contains information on state  highway safety grant spending, showed that from fiscal year 1999 through  2007, states spent between about 63 percent and 73 percent of Section 402  funding each year. States can carry unused funding into the next fiscal  year—for example, states carried over about $103 million from fiscal year  2007 into fiscal year 2008, which is nearly half of the total Section 402  funds available to states in fiscal year 2007. Some NHTSA regional officials  told us that low levels of expenditures indicate that states are not  implementing as much safety programming as the states have funding for,  which means that each year states could expand their efforts and  potentially reduce fatalities, injuries, and crashes beyond what the state is  currently accomplishing. Furthermore, according to NHTSA headquarters  officials and as included in their recommendations to states in some  management reviews, a fundamental expectation of Congress is that funds  made available to states will be used promptly and effectively to address  the highway safety problems for which they were authorized. Finally, one  of the measures NHTSA uses in assessing the effectiveness of a state’s  highway safety program is whether available program funds are expended  on a timely basis or whether funds remain largely unexpended and carried  forward into a subsequent year.
Many of the state officials we spoke with recognized liquidation rates as an  issue but explained that such delays occur when the federal government  operates under a continuing budget resolution, which prevents NHTSA  from releasing the full amount of Section 402 funding to the states and in  turn delays distribution of the funds to subgrantees. NHTSA officials we  spoke with appreciated this concern, and headquarters officials noted that,  in addition to delayed passage of appropriation bills, other factors can  prevent states from spending the full amount of grants, including states  awarding or implementing contract awards late, slow spending by  subgrantees, or delayed project starts by subgrantees. Also, officials from  some regional offices said that states often do not plan a large enough  safety program to spend all of the Section 402 funding each year,  regardless of whether a continuing budget resolution is likely, and better  planning and management could increase liquidation rates.
section_title: Management Review Recommendations Identify Common State Challenges That Could Help Direct Resources
paragraphs: By documenting areas of improvement for each state managing highway  safety grants, management review recommendations provide insight into  common state challenges. When analyzed systematically at a national  level, such information could be used to direct technical assistance and  training resources accordingly. Although NHTSA officials stated that they  continually review the effectiveness of their recommendations and  policies, NHTSA does not currently use the management reviews for this  purpose. In its report, the DOT IG made a related observation and  recommended that NHTSA develop a process to electronically track  recommendations on a national level and provide all regional offices with  access to this system to identify solutions for states with similar issues.
As noted, the consistency of the information documented in management  reviews and corrective action plans is a current barrier to analyzing  problems that occur in many states. For example, regional officials did not  consistently categorize similar recommendations—one region’s  management review classified the need for staff to receive training as a  program management issue while another region listed it as a financial  management issue, and yet another as an organization and staffing issue— thus making it more difficult to analyze recommendations on a national  level. However, the steps NHTSA has recently implemented should  improve the information included in the management reviews and  corrective action plans developed in the next 3-year period. In addition,  several other planned and currently available resources could be used to  facilitate an analysis.
NHTSA officials told us, and indicated in their response to the DOT IG’s  recommendations, that they plan to create a compendium of management  review recommendations on their intranet that would be searchable by all  regional offices. Regional officials could use the compendium to see how  other offices addressed challenges similar to ones they encountered—a  practice NHTSA headquarters officials thought would improve  consistency. If the database included all recommendations (findings and  management considerations) from the fiscal year 2008 through 2010  management reviews and information on whether states implemented the  recommendations, NHTSA could also use it to analyze recommendations  in the database to identify common state problems. As of February 2008,  NHTSA was developing such a tracking system but had not yet  implemented it.
To fulfill a requirement in Section 412, NHTSA currently develops brief  summaries of the management reviews that list the common  recommendations from each of the three review areas (organization and  staffing, program management, and financial management) and has so far  completed fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006 summaries. NHTSA’s  summaries do not include—and Section 412 does not explicitly require— an analysis of the relative importance or potential effect these common  problems could have on state programs or how these common issues  could inform NHTSA’s plans for training, technical assistance, or  oversight, which are NHTSA’s resources for influencing state programs.  NHTSA officials stated that while they try to continually improve their  programs, they do not currently use the recommendation summaries for  this purpose.
NHTSA has a fairly extensive training and technical assistance program for  states that includes formal classes on grant requirements, using data to  identify safety challenges, and financial management of the grant program.  In addition, each region organizes annual conferences to discuss topics  like emerging safety issues and innovative programs states are testing. The  states we visited all complimented NHTSA’s support, and many noted  several different areas in which NHTSA staff provided expert advice,  including grant management and safety programming. NHTSA could use  data from management reviews to efficiently direct some of these  information-sharing resources to common challenges that states  experience.
section_title: NHTSA’s Approaches and Existing Financial Incentives Encourage States to Improve Safety, While Refinements Could Further Help States
paragraphs: NHTSA uses several approaches to help states improve their traffic safety  outcomes, and Congress has established incentive grants and, under  Sections 154(c) and 164(b) to Title 23 U.S.C., penalty transfer programs to  encourage states to improve safety. NHTSA provides expert advice to all  states through its evaluation of state progress toward safety goals and  performance measures established annually by each state, special  management reviews for states not making adequate progress in the areas  of alcohol-impaired driving and safety belt use, and voluntary technical  program assessments for states requesting additional assistance in a  variety of areas. Congress also offers financial incentives to improve state  safety, including incentive grants that encourage states to pass safety  legislation and achieve certain performance benchmarks, as well as  penalty transfer programs that shift federal funding from road  construction to behavioral safety programs for states that fail to pass  safety legislation. However, it is too early to assess the impact of recently  established incentive grants on traffic fatalities or to determine whether  other types of incentives might be needed. Further, while the national  traffic fatality rate has decreased, the number of fatalities has remained  fairly constant over the last 10 years, offset by factors such as increases in  population and the number of vehicle miles traveled. In addition, the DOT  IG found that NHTSA could improve its annual oversight of state  performance by encouraging states to use consistent performance  measures in their safety plans and annual reports. We also found that  some states have a consistently high number of fatalities but do not meet  NHTSA’s current selection criteria for a special management review. As a  result, NHTSA must rely on the states to take advantage of the technical  assistance offered by regional officials or to request a technical program  assessment. Finally, existing incentive grants do not target states that have  low or average fatality rates but high total numbers of fatalities.
subsections: section_title: NHTSA Provides Expert Advice to Help States Make Progress toward Safety Goals, While Grant Programs Offer Financial Incentives for States to Improve Safety
paragraphs: NHTSA uses three approaches to evaluate state progress toward safety  goals and provide states with expert advice to make the best use of traffic  safety funding. These approaches are different from NHTSA’s management  reviews in that NHTSA focuses on aspects of a state’s highway safety  program that more directly address safety outcomes while management  reviews focus on improving grant management processes. Each of  NHTSA’s performance evaluation processes is designed to target a slightly  different group of states and provides a different type of advice.
Oversight of state performance: Each year, NHTSA evaluates the progress  all states and territories made toward their established safety goals—such  as reducing state traffic fatalities by a certain number—which ensures that  all states receive at least some advice from NHTSA on how to improve  their safety programs and outcomes. States develop safety goals annually  in their highway safety and performance plans, and NHTSA provides each  state with an analysis of state-level traffic safety data, such as fatality  rates, safety belt use, and alcohol-related fatalities. NHTSA also shares  countermeasures that address safety problems specific to each state—for  example, the use of sobriety checkpoints used by law enforcement officers  to determine whether drivers are impaired—and provides feedback on  state planning with respect to the programs the state plans to fund with its  federal highway safety grants. Further, each December, states must submit  to NHTSA regional offices an annual report on the previous fiscal year’s  program activities and the progress the state made toward achieving its  goals. This process allows NHTSA to assess individual state performance  in improving safety outcomes and to provide feedback to states on  strengths and weaknesses in their programs. However, NHTSA officials  told us that while they have the authority to approve state plans as a  whole, they cannot require states to act on the feedback NHTSA officials  offer unless there is a compliance issue.
Special management reviews: Beyond its annual evaluations, NHTSA  targets additional resources toward states not making adequate progress  in NHTSA’s priority areas of reducing impaired driving fatalities and  increasing safety belt use by selecting these states for special management  reviews, which it began implementing in fiscal year 2005. NHTSA  conducted 30 special management reviews, 2 of which NHTSA officials  noted actually combined elements of a special management review and  technical program assessment, in the initial 3-year review cycle from  January 2005 through September 2007 and, as of June 2008, planned to  conduct at least two of these reviews in fiscal year 2008. Special  management reviews involve an in-depth evaluation by NHTSA regional  and headquarters officials of a state’s impaired driving or safety belt  program, including issues related to state leadership and state priorities,  issues related to the funding and implementation of individual safety  projects, program evaluation issues, and legislative issues such as the  presence of safety legislation. NHTSA officials indicated that they often  identify deficiencies in the state’s safety program through these reviews  and recommend steps that could improve the state program and  potentially the state’s safety outcomes. However, NHTSA officials stated  that they cannot require the state to act on these recommendations unless  there is a compliance issue. NHTSA officials told us that NHTSA pays the  cost of these reviews and that they recently formed a team to examine the  consistency and effectiveness of the special management review process.
Technical program assessments: NHTSA officials told us that they also  coordinate voluntary technical program assessments for any state that  wishes to improve its outcomes on specific traffic safety issues. Technical  program assessments differ from special management reviews in several  ways. First, assessments are available to any state, not just those with high  fatality rates related to alcohol-impaired driving and low safety belt use  rates, and states must request an assessment—unlike with special  management reviews where states are selected for evaluation by NHTSA.  Second, assessments bring together leading independent experts in a  particular topic area to evaluate the state’s program; in contrast, special  management reviews are conducted by NHTSA officials with subject- matter expertise. Third, assessments cover a wider range of safety issues,  including alcohol-impaired driving, occupant protection (safety belts),  occupant protection for children, motorcycle safety, emergency medical  services, traffic records, and standardized field sobriety testing. Fourth,  according to NHTSA officials, states pay most of the costs of the  assessments, although in some cases NHTSA pays for a facilitator to  participate in the assessment. NHTSA officials and highway safety officials  in two of the states we visited noted that these assessment reports carry  more authority with state leadership than special management reviews  due to their independent nature. However, NHTSA officials noted that they  cannot require states to implement the experts’ recommendations.
In addition to NHTSA’s approaches, Congress designed financial  incentives—incentive grants and penalty transfers—to encourage states to  improve outcomes by passing safety legislation or meeting performance- based benchmarks. The incentive grants are designed to encourage states  to do both of these things. Studies have shown a relationship between  strong safety legislation and improvements in safety outcomes—for  example, a 2006 NHTSA study found that states with primary safety belt  laws had much lower fatality rates than all other states—and the  Occupant Protection and Safety Belt Use incentive grants encourage states  to pass such legislation by making that legislation one of the criteria for  grant eligibility. Similarly, to qualify for the Child Safety and Booster Seat  Use incentive grant, states must pass a law requiring any child under the  age of 8 riding in a passenger vehicle to be secured in an appropriate child  restraint system, with certain height and weight exceptions. In addition,  several incentive grants use positive performance-based eligibility criteria  to encourage and reward states for achieving certain levels of  performance. For example, states that have not passed a primary safety  belt law can qualify for the Safety Belt Use incentive grant if the state has  achieved a safety belt use rate of at least 85 percent in the 2 preceding  calendar years. States with very low rates of impaired driving fatalities  (an alcohol-related fatality rate of 0.5 or less fatalities per 100 million  vehicle miles traveled) can automatically qualify for the Alcohol Impaired  Driving Countermeasures incentive grant.
Congress also uses penalty transfer programs to encourage states to pass  other types of safety legislation that are expected to improve safety  outcomes. For example, the law requires that a percentage of the state’s  Federal-Aid Highway program funding be transferred to the state’s Section  402 safety program if the state fails to pass an open container law, which  prohibits the possession of an open alcoholic beverage container or the  consumption of any alcoholic beverage in a motor vehicle.
section_title: Refinements to NHTSA’s Approaches Could Help States Improve Safety, but More Time Is Needed to Assess the Impact of Incentive Grants
paragraphs: While the national traffic fatality rate has declined, the number of traffic  fatalities has remained fairly level since 1997, as factors such as increases  in population and the number of vehicle miles traveled offset  improvements in the fatality rate. Although NHTSA provides expert  advice to states, some opportunity to improve state—and thus national— outcomes such as decreasing fatalities could come from refinements to  certain aspects of NHTSA’s approaches to reviewing and providing  feedback on state performance. For example, a recent DOT IG evaluation  of NHTSA’s highway safety program identified one opportunity for NHTSA  to strengthen its annual review of state safety goals and outcomes—an  approach NHTSA uses to ensure that all states receive some feedback on  their performance. Specifically, the DOT IG found that states did not  always use consistent performance measures between the performance  plans that identify annual state safety goals and the annual reports that  document state progress toward these goals. For example, the DOT IG  noted that none of the 12 performance measures in one state’s  performance plan carried over to the state’s annual report and 9 measures  had no measurable targets. According to the DOT IG, the measures that  states use in performance plans and annual reports must be comparable  for NHTSA to effectively analyze states’ progress. To better track state  performance, the DOT IG recommended that NHTSA promote the  development and adoption of consistent performance measures in state  plans and provide guidance to the states to ensure state performance  reports include trend lines determining whether the state is on track to  meet its highway safety goals. In partnership with GHSA, NHTSA hired a  contractor to develop a common set of performance measures that it plans  to use to track progress at the national level and encourage states to use  these measures as part of highway safety planning.
Further, fatality data suggest that states other than those meeting the  selection criteria for a special management review may benefit from  additional technical assistance or review. Specifically, we found that some  states have low or average fatality rates but a consistently high number of  fatalities over time. From 1997 through 2006, national traffic fatalities per  100 million vehicle miles traveled declined by approximately 14 percent,  from 1.65 to 1.41, while the number of fatalities remained fairly level at  about 43,000 per year during this time period (see fig. 3) likely due to  factors such as increasing population, the number of vehicle miles  traveled, and use of motorcycles, among other factors.
On a state level, from 1998 through 2006, 27 states had average alcohol- related fatality rates that were equal to or below the national average of  0.61 fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled. However, despite their  low or average fatality rates, 10 of these 27 states had an above-average  number of fatalities, or an average of more than 336 fatalities per year.  During this time period, these 10 states accounted for a total of more than  55,000 fatalities, or over a third of the number of alcohol-related fatalities  nationwide. Figure 4 below compares the average annual alcohol-related  fatality rate per state and average annual number of alcohol-related  fatalities per state from 1998 through 2006 and shows that states with  relatively low to average fatality rates can have high levels of fatalities.
Given the relatively low fatality rates of these states, the high number of  fatalities does not necessarily indicate a problem with the state’s safety  program. For example, many of the 27 states with below-average or  average fatality rates have relatively large populations and, therefore, have  a relatively high number of vehicle miles traveled and a relatively high  number of fatalities. Specifically, 16 of these states had estimated  populations of over 5 million as of July 1, 2006. In addition, NHTSA  officials offered the following illustration. From 2000 through 2006, 12,292  people died in Texas and 11,480 people died in California in alcohol- related crashes. Although the number of fatalities suggests these states  have similar alcohol-related crash problems, on a per-mile driven basis,  Texans were 53 percent more likely to die in an alcohol-related crash than  Californians. Neither Texas nor California have met NHTSA’s selection  criteria for a special management review.
Yet, states with high total numbers of fatalities offer an opportunity to  save the greatest number of lives. Targeting these states could provide an  opportunity to focus on reducing the total number of fatalities nationwide.  Currently, these states receive feedback from NHTSA on their safety  programs as a part of NHTSA’s annual evaluation of state progress toward  its performance goals, and NHTSA regional officials provide technical  assistance as part of their oversight activities of states throughout the  year. However, these states may not receive an in-depth programmatic  review that could identify additional opportunities to reduce fatalities. For  example, under NHTSA’s current criteria for special management reviews,  these states would not be selected for a review. In addition, although all  states can request a technical program assessment and would receive  similar programmatic advice as they would through a special management  review, since January 2005, 3 of the 10 states that had an above-average  number of alcohol-related fatalities per year requested and received an  assessment focused on impaired driving.
Recently established incentive grants primarily target states that take  steps to improve safety outcomes either by passing legislation that  research indicates improves safety outcomes or by achieving high levels of  safety performance. However, current incentive grants are not specifically  designed to target states with low or average fatality rates but high  numbers of fatalities. In addition, these incentive grants have been in  effect since October 2005, and it is too early to determine whether they  will be effective in significantly improving state safety outcomes. Initial  state responses to these incentives have varied. As we reported earlier this  year, a number of states have been unable to pass the safety legislation  necessary to qualify for incentive grants. In addition, some have yet to  pass legislation that would allow them to avoid penalty transfers of  funding from state road construction to traffic safety. At the end of 2007,  about half of the states had passed primary safety belt laws, and about  one-fourth of the states had passed child safety and booster seat laws.  Seven of the eight states we visited had not passed primary safety belt  laws—attributed by officials in one state to the political climate and the  opposition of key legislators.
Further, some states are still working to obtain incentive grants based on  performance. For example, according to a NHTSA official, 5 states  qualified for the Safety Belt Use incentive grant in fiscal year 2008 by  achieving an 85 percent safety belt use rate in 2006 and 2007. In addition,  officials in several of the states we visited as well as officials from GHSA  noted that fewer states may qualify for grants like the Alcohol Impaired  Driving Countermeasures incentive grant in the future because the  performance and programmatic criteria that states must meet become  more stringent over time. While a number of incentive grants provide  resources to states achieving high levels of performance, the Alcohol  Impaired Driving Countermeasures incentive grant also provides funding  to the ten states with the highest alcohol-related fatality rates.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Through its positive working relationship with states and GHSA and its  own initiatives for continuous improvement, NHTSA has made  considerable progress in improving the consistency of its oversight of state  highway safety programs. Our analysis of the recommendations NHTSA  made in its fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2007 management reviews  showed that NHTSA focuses on fundamental management principles that  can improve state management of highway safety programs. However, our  analysis also showed that states experienced several common problems,  some of which, if left unaddressed, could produce negative consequences  such as lost equipment or misuse of federal funds. A periodic analysis of  these recommendations on a national level could help NHTSA direct its  training, technical assistance, and oversight to issues that could have the  widest impact on improving state programs. Furthermore, a periodic  analysis of the extent to which states acted on NHTSA’s recommendations  would help NHTSA to evaluate the impact of its recommendations and  identify barriers that prevent states from taking action to improve  management of their programs. NHTSA has worked to continually make  improvements to its oversight of states, including recent steps to further  improve the consistency of information available about its  recommendations. A more systematic analysis of this information would  likely enhance these efforts.
Our analysis of NHTSA’s recent management review recommendations  identified several common challenges that states experienced during the  initial 3-year cycle of management reviews—challenges that NHTSA could  address in the near future. For example, the most common  recommendation addressed the need for states to improve monitoring of  subgrantee performance, expenditures, and equipment inventories—an  issue the DOT IG also noted in its report and one that has the potential to  prevent and detect misuse of federal funds. In addition, because the  structure of the highway safety grant program involves many subgrantees  across a state, monitoring these subgrantees helps ensure that funds are  used for their intended purpose and for programs that will help the state  meet its safety goals. NHTSA also frequently recommended that states  increase the amount of grant funding states spend each year, an action  that some NHTSA officials believe might contribute to improving safety  outcomes by expanding the number or scope of safety programs the state  implements each year. Making the best use of federal funding as possible  each year can help to improve safety outcomes, and identifying the  underlying causes of current liquidation rates as well as strategies to help  states improve could accomplish this.
Finally, our review found that states are directing Section 402 program and  incentive grant funding primarily toward the two leading causes of  fatalities in car crashes, and NHTSA takes an active role in providing  oversight and technical assistance to help states achieve safety-related  performance goals. However, the total number of fatalities has remained at  about 43,000 for the last 10 years, and achieving further reductions in  fatalities could be challenging as the national rate of traffic fatalities  already declined by 14 percent during this period. NHTSA currently  conducts special management reviews for states having the highest rates  of fatalities related to alcohol-impaired driving and lowest rates of safety  belt use, and all states can request that NHTSA coordinate a technical  program assessment. However, because some states with a high total  number of fatalities may not meet NHTSA’s selection criteria for a special  management review and may not elect to participate in an assessment,  these states may not receive an in-depth programmatic review that could  identify additional opportunities to reduce fatalities. In addition, current  incentive grants do not specifically target these states, although these  states may be eligible for incentive grants based on other criteria.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the  Administrator of NHTSA to take the following five actions:    Periodically analyze, on a national level, all recommendations made to  states to identify common challenges and areas in which NHTSA may need  to focus its oversight or states may need additional help, such as training  or technical assistance.
Periodically assess the extent to which states have implemented NHTSA’s  recommendations, and, when states have not, identify the barriers that  prevent states from doing so and alter the type or focus of future  recommendations as needed.
Identify options, such as new guidance or training for states, to strengthen  state monitoring of subgrantee performance, activities, and expenditures.
Develop a working group with GHSA and state highway traffic safety  offices as appropriate to identify the reasons for low annual rates of grant  expenditures and solutions that could help address these challenges.
Identify options to target safety expertise and technical assistance to  states with a high number of fatalities that would not qualify for a special  management review.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Transportation  (DOT) for review and comment. On behalf of DOT, the Senior Associate  Administrator, Traffic Safety Control, provided comments via e-mail. DOT  officials generally agreed with the analysis and conclusions of this report  but disagreed with one of our draft recommendations—that NHTSA  evaluate the need to revise its criteria for selecting states for special  management reviews to include states that have a high number of  fatalities. While DOT officials agreed that directing resources and  technical assistance to states that have high numbers of fatalities  represents an opportunity to save the greatest number of lives, they did  not agree that conducting special management reviews would be the best  way to do so. Specifically, DOT officials stated that special management  reviews are initiated based on evidence that a state’s program area  performance is deficient, which is not necessarily the case for states with  high numbers of fatalities. We continue to believe that these states would  benefit from additional technical assistance or review and revised our  recommendation to provide NHTSA with flexibility to determine the best  approach to target expertise and technical assistance to these states. We  revised our draft recommendation in this area accordingly. DOT did not  comment on our other four recommendations. DOT also provided  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate throughout  the report.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and the Administrator of  NHTSA. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A  Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) added Section 412 to Title 23 U.S.C.,  which among other things included a requirement that GAO analyze the  effectiveness of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s  (NHTSA) oversight of traffic safety grants and usefulness of the NHTSA’s  advice to states on the management of safety programs. In addition, as the  federal government prepares to reauthorize highway safety programs, the  Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and the  House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure asked us to  provide information on how states have used Section 402 safety grants and  how NHTSA oversees state progress under these grants. To address these  issues, we examined (1) how states have used Section 402 funding to  achieve national safety goals, (2) the progress NHTSA has made toward  addressing consistency in the management review process, (3) how useful  NHTSA’s management reviews and recommendations are in improving  management of state safety programs, and (4) the approaches currently  available to improve safety outcomes.
To address each of our objectives, we reviewed relevant legislation, rule  making, and guidance and conducted interviews with key officials.  Specifically, we interviewed NHTSA officials from headquarters and the   10 regional offices, as well as officials from the Governors Highway Safety  Association (GHSA), a nonprofit association representing state highway  safety programs, to gather their perspectives on these issues. To obtain  insight from state officials on our objectives, we conducted site visits with  eight traffic safety departments in Arizona, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota,  Nevada, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin and interviewed state  highway traffic safety staff as well as two to three state subgrantee  recipients of NHTSA’s highway traffic safety funding in each state. We  chose these states based on several criteria, including states that had (1) a  management review in 2005 or early 2006, (2) varying amounts of Section  402 grant funding and incentive grants that added to their overall safety  grant funding, and   (3) different geographic areas and NHTSA regions. See table 5 below for a  summary of these criteria.
We complemented our discussions with officials from NHTSA, the states,  and GHSA with additional methodologies specific to each of the  objectives. To determine how states have used Section 402 funding to  achieve national safety goals, we analyzed data from NHTSA’s Grants  Tracking System (GTS) on state Section 402 and incentive grant  expenditures from fiscal years 1999 through 2007. Specifically, we used the  data to determine the percentage of Section 402 funding that states spent  on individual safety goals over fiscal years 1999 through 2007 and looked  for changes in spending patterns over this time period. Prior to our  analysis, we reviewed NHTSA’s technical documentation related to GTS  and assessed the reliability of this data by interviewing NHTSA  headquarters officials as well as highway safety officials responsible for  entering data into GTS in the 8 states we visited, and we found that GTS  data was reliable for the purposes of our report.
To assess the progress NHTSA has made toward addressing consistency in  the management review process, we reviewed prior GAO reports on  NHTSA’s oversight of states, NHTSA’s 2004 report to Congress on changes  to the management review process, NHTSA’s guidance for carrying out  management reviews, and templates NHTSA developed for written  products produced during the review process. We also reviewed NHTSA’s  management review schedule to determine the approximate number of  reviews completed yearly and the total number completed. In addition, we  reviewed 56 management review reports representing reviews conducted  in fiscal years 2005 through 2007 to assess the consistency of these reports  with respect to organization and content. We also reviewed the 38  corrective action plans available as of March 2008 to determine how often  regional offices developed these plans, the number of management review  recommendations included in the plans, and the extent to which the plans  included information on whether states had implemented NHTSA’s  recommendations.
To determine how useful management reviews and NHTSA’s  recommendations are to improving state safety programs, we reviewed  GAO reports and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) publications  related to oversight of federal grants, internal controls, and management  principles related to running efficient and effective grant programs. We  compared the management principles in these documents to NHTSA’s  guidance on the elements that should be examined in a management  review to assess whether the management reviews address fundamental  management principles established by GAO and OMB. In addition, we  conducted a content analysis of 56 management review reports from fiscal  years 2005 through 2007 to determine the total number of  recommendations that NHTSA made to states over this time period and  assess whether there were commonalities in the recommendations that  NHTSA made across states. With respect to liquidation rates, we used data  from GTS to identify the average rate at which states liquidated Section  402 funding from 1999 through 2007. We also reviewed NHTSA’s  summaries of the management reviews conducted in fiscal years 2005 and  2006 and summarized information from NHTSA’s corrective action plans  to determine the extent to which these tools had been used consistently by  the regional offices.
To describe the approaches NHTSA uses to improve safety outcomes, we  reviewed NHTSA’s procedures for (1) conducting special management  reviews; (2) annual evaluations of state highway safety plans, performance  plans, and annual reports; and (3) technical program assessments. We also  reviewed the criteria NHTSA uses to select states for special management  reviews and the schedule for conducting these reviews and technical  program assessments over the last 3 years. Finally, we analyzed data  provided by NHTSA on state performance with respect to the total number  of alcohol-related fatalities and fatality rates as well as the number of  unbelted fatalities and fatality rates from 1998 through 2006.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 through July 2008 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, other key contributors to this  report were Cathy Colwell (Assistant Director), Caitlin Croake, Colin  Fallon, Joah Iannotta, Bert Japikse, Thomas James, Thanh Lu, Grant  Mallie, SaraAnn Moessbauer, and Nitin Rao.