Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Training Integration and Increase Transparency of Training Resources
Published: 2011-07-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent over $80 billion on developing and fielding a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) comprised of various land-and sea-based elements employed by multiple combatant commands and services. Since the time available to intercept a missile is short, integrating training among all organizations involved is important to connect seams where commands and elements must work together. In response to House Report 111-491 which accompanied H.R. 5136, GAO assessed the extent to which DOD has (1) developed a plan for integrating ballistic missile defense training across and among commands and multiple elements, and identified training roles, responsibilities, and commensurate authorities; and (2) identified and budgeted for the resources to support training. To do so, GAO analyzed DOD training instructions, plans, exercises, and budgets and assessed the extent to which the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the services have agreed on training cost estimates and funding responsibilities.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD has identified roles and responsibilities and developed training plans for individual ballistic missile defense elements and combatant commands, but has not developed a strategy for integrating training among ballistic missile defense organizations and elements in a manner that requires them to operate as they would in an actual engagement. A Joint Staff Instruction sets out tenets of joint training including "train the way you operate" and DOD guidance requires synchronization of training among the services and combatant commands. The services and combatant commands are conducting some integrating training--training across and among combatant commands and services--but our analysis of exercises shows that there may be some training gaps. For example, although some exercises included more than one combatant command, few included multiple live elements. GAO's guide for assessing training programs states that a training program should include an overall training strategy and an organization that is held accountable for achieving training goals. However, DOD has not developed an overall strategy that includes requirements and standards for integrating ballistic missile defense training because DOD has not clearly designated an entity to be responsible for integrating training across and among all organizations involved and provided it with the authority to do so. Without an overall strategy that includes requirements and standards for integrating training, DOD runs the risk that the organizations that need to work together may have limited opportunities to realistically interact prior to an actual engagement. DOD lacks visibility over the total resources that may be needed to support ballistic missile defense training since the funds are currently dispersed across MDA and the services, and some of the services' budget estimates do not separately identify ballistic missile defense training. A further complication is that agreements between MDA and the services on funding responsibilities and life-cycle cost estimates--which include training--have not been completed and approved for all elements. GAO compiled budget documents and data from various sources and estimated about $4 billion has been planned for ballistic missile defense training from fiscal years 2011 through 2016. However, some of the services' resources for ballistic missile defense training are not easily identifiable since some training is funded as part of a more comprehensive training program. GAO found examples of gaps between training requirements and budgeted resources, such as a $300 million requirement in the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense program that is not included in MDA's budget plans. DOD and MDA policies identify the need to complete cost estimates and funding responsibilities for elements as they are developed; however, there are no procedures or deadlines in place requiring that MDA and the services agree on funding responsibilities and complete training cost estimates before elements are fielded. As a result, DOD and congressional decision makers do not have a full picture of the resources that will be needed over time and risk training gaps.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD designate an entity with authority to develop a strategy for integrating training, and set a deadline to complete training cost estimates and funding agreements and report total BMDS training cost estimates. DOD generally concurred with the merits of our recommendations but did not commit to a timeframe for implementation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In 2002, the President of the United States directed the Department of  Defense (DOD) to field an integrated, interconnected, and layered  Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) capable of defending the U.S.  homeland, deployed troops, friends, and allies against ballistic missiles of  all ranges in all phases of flight. DOD has spent over $80 billion to  develop the BMDS, and since its initial fielding has added additional  capabilities. Since there is limited time available to intercept an incoming  missile, integrating training among all organizations involved is essential  to connect the seams where the commands and services must work  together. However, DOD recognizes that funding for training will face  significant budget pressures amid the department’s competing demands  for current operations, acquisitions, and personnel expenses.
The BMDS is comprised of various land- and sea-based elements,  including radars, interceptors, and command and control systems that  are employed together to effectively intercept an incoming missile.  Ballistic missile defense is an inherently joint operation that may require  the simultaneous involvement of multiple commands and services which  operate the system’s elements. For example, each combatant command  is responsible for ballistic missile defense operations in its geographic  area and individual ballistic missile defense elements are operated by a  lead military service. In addition, a combatant command and the service  units and organizations in one geographic area may have to work with  their counterparts in another geographic area to intercept a ballistic  missile that crosses from one area into another. Since the time available  to identify, track, and intercept ballistic missiles is generally less than 30  minutes, effective integration of all the commands and elements is critical  to successful ballistic missile defense operations. Training of the  combatant commands and services in a joint environment is essential to  such integration.
This report responds to House Report 111-491 which accompanied a bill  for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (H.R.  5136). In the House Report, the committee expressed concerns that  current training programs for missile defense do not fully reflect the global  and inherently joint nature of ballistic missile defense system operations.  The House Report directed GAO to provide information describing  existing training and education programs for ballistic missile defense, an  assessment of synchronization and standardization across training  programs and recommendations for training improvements. In response,  this report assesses the extent to which DOD has (1) developed a plan  for integrating ballistic missile defense training across and among  commands and multiple elements and identified training roles,  responsibilities, and commensurate authorities; and (2) identified and  budgeted for resources to support ballistic missile defense training.
To address our objectives we obtained and analyzed relevant  documents—including reports, instructions, and data—related to ballistic  missile defense training and interviewed officials from across DOD such  as the Missile Defense Agency (MDA); the Office of the Under Secretary  of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics; the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; the combatant  commands; and various organizations within the Departments of the  Army, Navy, and Air Force. To assess the extent to which DOD has  developed a plan for integrating ballistic missile defense training across  and among commands and multiple elements and identified training roles,  responsibilities, and commensurate authorities, we obtained and  reviewed DOD, combatant command, and service instructions and  training plans. We also analyzed ballistic missile defense exercise  information from fiscal years 2009 and 2010 to determine the extent to  which integrating training across and among commands and service- operated elements has occurred. To assess the extent to which DOD has  identified and budgeted for resources to support ballistic missile defense  training, we analyzed MDA and service budget documents and assessed  training budget data and compared budget documents and data to  training requirements to assess whether there were shortfalls between  budget estimates and training requirements. We also assessed the extent  to which MDA and the services have agreed on training cost estimates  and funding responsibilities.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2010 to July 2011 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Further details on our scope  and methodology can be found in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: There are several levels of DOD organizations that are involved in  ballistic missile defense operations. In general, these organizations can  be categorized into “tiers” as shown in the figure below:  Integrating training is training that includes live participants from more  than one tier and/or multiple organizations from within the same tier. Live  participants refer to personnel who participate in the exercises using  equipment that requires them to operate as they would in an actual  ballistic missile defense engagement. According to a Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction the joint training vision is for everyone  required to conduct military operations to be trained under realistic  conditions and to exacting standards prior to execution of those  operations. The instruction also sets out tenets of joint training, including  “train the way you operate” and states that joint training must be based on  relevant conditions and realistic standards. In addition, according to joint  doctrine for joint operations to counter theater air and missile threats  across the range of military operations, coordination between  organizations involved in cross-boundary missile defense operations must  be rehearsed—i.e., trained—not just planned. Depending on the type of  ballistic missile defense engagement, not all four tiers need to be involved  in each event for the training to be realistic; however, ballistic missile  defense operations generally necessitate integration both horizontally  across a tier, and vertically between at least two tiers. For example,  engaging a ballistic missile threat may require horizontal coordination  across more than one combatant command and multiple elements as well  as vertical coordination from the combatant commands down to the  elements. Finally, DOD recognizes the importance of integrating ballistic  missile defense training horizontally and vertically. DOD’s Strategic Plan  for the Next Generation of Training for the Department of Defense  considers synchronizing training among the services, combatant  commands, and others to be a requirement of training integration and  states that an immersive training environment must support full-spectrum  operations, including missile defense. To enhance training integration for  the BMDS the U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command,  and MDA began organizing the Ballistic Missile Defense Training and  Education Group, which also includes combatant commands and the  services in July 2010. According to the draft charter, goals for the group  include identifying, evaluating, and coordinating ballistic missile defense  training requirements and, in coordination with key ballistic missile  defense stakeholders, increasing the effectiveness of ballistic missile  defense training by promoting the development and implementation of a  standardized training program.
DOD faces training challenges as it concurrently develops the elements  and transitions the elements to the services to operate them. Table 1  includes a description of selected BMDS elements, the lead service for  each element, and shows when each element was initially fielded.
In order to facilitate the transition of responsibilities for ballistic missile  defense elements—including responsibilities for training—from MDA to  the services, MDA has overarching memoranda of agreement with the  Army, Navy, and Air Force. Each of these overarching agreements  provides a framework for the service and MDA to develop specific  agreements on responsibilities, including developing doctrine, training,  and facilities requirements for each element. In addition, DOD intends to  develop element-specific agreements to specify which organization will  fund specific operating and support costs, including training. In 2008,  DOD created the BMDS Life Cycle Management Process, in part, to  manage the BMDS as a portfolio and develop a ballistic missile defense  budget that includes funding for MDA support of ballistic missile defense  training.
This report is one in a series of reports we have issued on ballistic missile  defense. For example, we reported earlier this year that while MDA has  improved the transparency and accountability of its acquisition decisions,  we found issues limiting the extent to which cost, schedule, and  performance can be tracked and unexplained inconsistencies in unit and  life-cycle cost baselines. Also this year, we reported that DOD’s  implementation of the European Phased Adaptive Approach faces  challenges including a lack of clear guidance and life-cycle cost  estimates. In addition, in September 2009 we reported that DOD had not  identified its requirements for BMDS elements and had not fully  established units to operate the elements before making them available  for use. DOD generally concurred with our recommendations in these  reports, and in their comments indicated plans to take some action to  address them. For a list of GAO reports on ballistic missile defense, see  the list of Related GAO Products at the end of this report.
section_title: Some Integrating Ballistic Missile Defense Training Occurs but Gaps May Exist and Current Efforts Are Not Guided by a Holistic Strategy
paragraphs: DOD has identified roles and responsibilities and developed training plans  for individual ballistic missile defense elements and combatant  commands, but it has not developed an overarching strategy for  integrating ballistic missile defense that specifies requirements for training  across and among commands and multiple elements. DOD and Joint  Staff guidance emphasize the importance of realistic joint training based  on relevant conditions and realistic standards. In addition, DOD’s  strategic plan for training sets out requirements for training integration  including synchronizing DOD component training among the services and  combatant commands. The services and combatant commands conduct  some integrating training; however, our analysis showed that there are  some training gaps such as limited training across more than two tiers  and simulated rather than live participation in exercises. For example,  only 7 of the 45 exercises we analyzed included live combatant  commands, regional operations centers, and tactical units participating  together. DOD officials stated that realistic training for the BMDS should  include multiple live elements operated by service personnel—rather than  simulations—and multiple tiers interacting in the same training scenario,  but there are no clear requirements for how much integrating training  would be sufficient. GAO’s guide for assessing training programs states  that a training program should include the development of an overall  training strategy. However, DOD has not developed an overall training  strategy for the BMDS because it has not identified an entity to be  responsible for doing so. Without a clear strategy for conducting  integrating ballistic missile defense training across and among commands  and elements, DOD faces the risk that organizations that need to work  together may have limited opportunities to realistically interact prior to an  actual engagement.
subsections: section_title: DOD Is Conducting Some Ballistic Missile Defense Integrating Training but Gaps May Exist
paragraphs: We analyzed 45 ballistic missile defense exercises that occurred in fiscal  years 2009 and 2010 and found examples of integrating training that  occurred across and among tiers. The combatant commands conduct  major exercises for training their staffs and assigned forces in their  mission-essential tasks—of which ballistic missile defense is one—and  hosted 21 exercises that included ballistic missile defense in fiscal years  2009 and 2010. These exercises often included live participation from  regional operations centers and some live tactical units. At the tactical  level, the Navy requires ships to train at least every 6 months in an  integrated ballistic missile defense exercise that always includes live  Aegis ballistic missile defense ships and often includes cross-element  training with live Patriot units. These exercises also occasionally included  integrating training with the Command, Control, Battle Management, and  Communications and Ground-based Midcourse Defense elements, and  often included live participation from regional operations centers. In  addition, U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Functional Component  Command for Integrated Missile Defense sponsors integrating training  events synchronized with MDA equipment tests. Although these events  focus on testing they also provide integrating training opportunities for  combatant command staff, regional operations centers, and tactical units.
While DOD is performing some integrating BMDS training, our analysis of  ballistic missile defense exercises showed some gaps. For example, we  found limited live participation of BMDS tactical units and only 10 of the  45 exercises included more than two tiers. Specifically, only 7 of the 45  exercises that we analyzed included live combatant commands, regional  operations centers, and tactical units, and only 1 of those also included all  four tiers. Moreover, as can be seen in table 2, live participation of BMDS  tactical units was limited mostly to Aegis and Patriot. (More detailed  results of GAO’s ballistic missile defense exercise analysis are provided  in app. II.)
Although most of the exercises we analyzed included the participation of  either regional operations centers or tactical units, DOD officials at  several organizations stated that more training focused on integrating  those two tiers is necessary in order to achieve realistic training as  identified in DOD policy. Officials also identified the need for an  affordable, scalable, distributed, and fully integrated training capability  that would allow for more integrating training with live participants within  and across the tiers. To address this need, officials indicated DOD is  planning a more robust missile mission training capability to enable  integrating training through the tiers, but officials said this capability is  early in development and, at this time, does not include tactical-level  BMDS elements.
section_title: DOD Has Not Developed a Strategy for Integrating BMDS Training
paragraphs: GAO’s guide for assessing training programs states that a training  program should include the development of an overall training strategy  and an organization that is held accountable for achieving training goals.  Additionally, DOD officials stated that increased frequency of integrating  training would be beneficial but there are no clear requirements for how  much integrating training would be sufficient. However, DOD has not  developed such a training strategy for the holistic BMDS that specifies  clear requirements and standards for integrating training because DOD  has not clearly designated an entity to be responsible for integrating  ballistic missile defense training across and among combatant commands  and services and provided the entity with the authority to do so.
Individual combatant commands and services have training  responsibilities within their own organizations but generally do not  establish training requirements for other organizations. Table 3 below  shows training responsibilities of various DOD organizations.
The training responsibilities of these DOD organizations do not clearly  identify an organization with responsibility for integrating ballistic missile  defense training across and among tiers. For example, although U.S.  Strategic Command is responsible for synchronizing planning for missile  defense, officials explained that the command is only responsible for  synchronizing planning for operations and it does not have the  responsibility or authority for integrating ballistic missile defense training.  U.S. Joint Forces Command is designated as the joint force trainer, but  officials explained their role is to support combatant commands’ joint  training by providing the technical capabilities for different organizations  to train together, not to set training requirements for any particular  mission, such as ballistic missile defense. MDA provides initial training  for new and upgraded elements, most of the training for the Ground- based Midcourse Defense element and all training for the Command,  Control Battle Management and Communications element. MDA is not  responsible for developing training requirements for other DOD  organizations. In addition, Joint Staff guidance for joint training charges  the Chairman with responsibility for formulating policies for joint training  and requires the development of training plans, but officials said the  training policy generally does not include setting training requirements for  any particular mission.
DOD recognizes the need for a cross-cutting group to examine BMDS  training issues, but its latest effort is structured differently from other  groups created to establish joint training requirements and as a result  may not be as effective. In 2010, DOD organized a group, called the  Ballistic Missile Training and Education Group. According to the group’s  draft charter, the department does not have a coordinated ballistic missile  defense training and education approach “that will ensure  effective  synergistic employment of assets…” In addition, the draft charter sets out  the group’s goals which include identifying, evaluating, and coordinating  ballistic missile defense training requirements and, in coordination with  key ballistic missile defense stakeholders, increasing the effectiveness of  ballistic missile defense training by promoting the development and  implementation of a standardized training program. However, the draft  charter does not indicate that the group itself will have the authority to set  ballistic missile defense training requirements and standards, or that its  members will have the authority to speak on behalf of the organizations  they represent. Instead, the group is expected to review issues that  members nominate and make recommendations for improving training to  the group’s senior leadership—comprised of U.S. Strategic Command,  U.S. Joint Forces Command, and MDA—which may, in turn, raise issues  to the Missile Defense Executive Board. At a March 2011 meeting, the  group identified several issues such as improving distributed training  capabilities and training devices. However, the group has not identified  the need to develop a strategy for integrating training across and among  tiers that would include training requirements and standards. Although  DOD officials have expressed confidence in this group, the group is not  quite a year old, is still finalizing its charter and its effectiveness in  identifying and resolving training issues is unproven. Further, it is not  clear that any of the three organizations comprising the group’s senior  leadership would have the authority to develop an integrating training  strategy or requirements that all tiers must meet. In similar instances,  DOD has designated a lead organization with clearly defined  responsibilities and the authority to establish joint training requirements.  For example, the Joint Staff has issued instructions for Joint Interface  Training and for joint training on the Global Command and Control  System. In both instances, the instructions defined responsibilities and  provided the designated groups with the authority to develop and  implement training requirements.
Without a clear strategy that specifies requirements and standards for  integrating ballistic missile defense training across and among the  commands involved, DOD may have difficulty identifying and resolving  training gaps. The lack of a strategy also means that some organizations  that are developing a capability to increase live participation in integrating  training are doing so without guidance or goals on which organizations  should participate and at what frequency—factors that may influence the  design and capacity of the training capability. In addition, different  organizations may develop varying training requirements and priorities for  integrating their training programs with other organizations. Further,  without a strategy, DOD runs the risk that organizations that need to work  together may have limited opportunities to realistically interact prior to an  actual engagement and this risk may increase over the next few years as  more elements are fielded.
section_title: Ballistic Missile Defense Training Funds Are Dispersed and Total Resources Not Easily Identified
paragraphs: DOD lacks visibility over the total resources that may be needed to  support ballistic missile defense training since the funds are currently  dispersed across MDA and the services, and some of the services’  budget estimates do not separately identify ballistic missile defense  training. An additional complication is that agreements between MDA and  the services on funding responsibilities and life-cycle cost estimates— which include training—have not been completed and approved for all  elements. We compiled budget documents and data from various  sources and estimated about $4 billion is planned to support ballistic  missile defense training from fiscal years 2011 through 2016 but this  number could vary as additional capabilities are added. We also found  examples of gaps between training requirements and budgeted  resources, such as a $300 million requirement in the THAAD Program  that is not included in MDA’s budget plans. DOD and MDA policies  identify the need to complete cost estimates and funding responsibilities  for elements as they are developed. However, DOD has not yet identified  the total resources necessary to support ballistic missile defense training  and has not determined the long-term funding responsibilities because  there are no procedures or firm deadlines in place requiring that MDA and  the services agree on funding responsibilities and complete training cost  estimates before elements are fielded. As a result, DOD and  congressional decision makers do not have a full picture of the resources  that will be needed over time and risk training gaps.
subsections: section_title: Ballistic Missile Defense Training Funds are Dispersed Across Multiple Organizations and Difficult to Identify
paragraphs: DOD’s budget and Future Years Defense Program include funds for  ballistic missile defense training, but funds are dispersed across MDA and  multiple accounts across the services, making it difficult for DOD to  identify the total training resources. Currently, MDA’s budget supports  new equipment training for BMDS elements, the portion of combatant  command exercises that include ballistic missile defense events, general  ballistic missile defense education courses, all training for the Command,  Control, Battle Management, and Communications element, and most  training for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element. The Army  and Navy budgets support individual, unit, and sustainment training for  their elements, and facilities to support this training.
We compiled available budget documents and data from MDA and the  services and estimated about $4 billion is planned to support ballistic  missile defense training from fiscal years 2011 through 2016. While we  were able to compile an approximate budget estimate, some of the  service’s ballistic missile defense specific training budgets are not easily  identifiable since some ballistic missile defense training for the services is  provided and funded as part of a more comprehensive training program  and some training budget estimates were not able to be identified. For  example, the budget estimates to support multimission elements like  Aegis and Patriot include training for ballistic missile defense in addition  to training for missions other than ballistic missile defense. Furthermore,  an Army official was unable to provide budget estimates for the AN/TPY-2  radar from fiscal years 2011 to 2016 because they only recently began  using the Army’s budget development system and have not yet estimated  costs across the Future Years Defense Program. Table 4 below  summarizes GAO’s compilation of MDA and the services’ budget  estimates for training.
In addition to the limitations discussed above, funding responsibilities may  become increasingly dispersed as DOD transitions responsibilities for the  elements from MDA to the services. For example, the Army’s budget for  the THAAD element will increase over time as the Army assumes full  responsibility for individual training in fiscal year 2015. Also, if a lead  service is designated responsible for the Command, Control, Battle  Management, and Communications element, some of the training and  funding responsibilities for that element would likely transfer from MDA to  the lead service.
section_title: MDA and the Services Have Not Agreed on Funding Responsibilities and Cost Estimates That Could Better Inform Training Budgets
paragraphs: Another factor that complicates estimating the resources to support  ballistic missile defense training is that MDA and the services have not  fully identified funding responsibilities and life-cycle cost estimates for  each of the BMDS elements. MDA’s Acquisition Directive identifies the  need to develop life-cycle cost estimates—which include training—for the  elements at certain phases of development. The Strategic Plan for the  Next Generation of Training for the Department of Defense developed  by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness highlights the importance of aligning resources to meet  training goals. We found that eight of the nine BMDS elements included in  our analysis have been fielded, yet planning documents detailing the  transition of training responsibilities and life-cycle cost estimates—which  include training costs—have not been fully developed and approved for  about half of the fielded elements with a designated lead service. In  addition, three of the completed agreements do not include service- specific funding to support training. As a result, DOD does not have  element-specific agreements or approved training cost estimates for MDA  and the services to use in budget development.
In addition to the overarching memoranda of agreement, which include a  general description of MDA and service roles and responsibilities for the  elements, DOD intends for MDA and the services to develop specific  agreements for each element that would include funding agreements with  details on MDA and the services’ funding responsibilities for training as  the element transitions from MDA to the service. However, MDA and the  services have had difficulty completing these element-specific  agreements, and to date have only fully completed agreements for three  out of seven BMDS elements requiring element-specific agreements.  For example, officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics stated that MDA and the Army  have had difficulty agreeing on funding for the AN/TPY-2 radar and have  delayed the completion of the agreement until the Missile Defense  Executive Board issues further guidance. Furthermore, while officials from  the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics are responsible for monitoring the completion of the agreements  and have identified very general deadlines (by fiscal year) to complete  them, officials stated that the completion of the agreements is not  schedule driven. Officials also stated that while the remaining element- specific agreements are in staffing, in some cases the services and MDA  have not agreed on completion times and that they are uncertain when  the agreements will be finalized.
The overarching memoranda of agreement also identify the need for MDA  and the services to complete joint life-cycle cost estimates for each of the  elements, which would include training cost estimates. MDA and the  Army have signed an agreement explaining how they will work together to  develop operations and support cost estimates to inform their budgets for  the THAAD, Ground-based Midcourse Defense, and AN/TPY-2  elements. However, according to Army officials, some cost estimates  are still in development and have not been approved by the Army Cost  Review Board and none of the operations and support cost estimates— including training cost estimates—have been reviewed by DOD’s Cost  Assessment and Program Evaluation office. For example, Army officials  stated that the Army Cost Review Board has not approved the estimates  for THAAD, Ground-based Midcourse Defense, and forward-based  AN/TPY-2 radar elements. Officials stated that while the methodology  behind the MDA and Army cost estimates is accurate, the Army does not  agree with some assumptions on which the cost estimates are based. For  example, Army officials said that the most recent THAAD estimate did not  include unit training costs to relocate THAAD batteries, yet that estimate  was used to inform the Army’s budget request for THAAD operations.  Furthermore, DOD officials confirmed that they only recently began  developing operations and support cost estimates with the Navy for the  Aegis ballistic missile defense element.
DOD has not yet identified the total resources necessary to support  ballistic missile defense training and has not determined the long-term  funding responsibilities because there are no procedures or firm  deadlines in place to ensure that either the element-specific agreements  or life-cycle cost estimates—to include training—be completed before  elements are fielded or in time to inform budget development. Without  completed memoranda of agreement or cost estimates for supporting  MDA and service ballistic missile defense training, there is no  transparency over the total resources that DOD may need to fully support  ballistic missile defense training. As a result, DOD is at risk of training  gaps that may prevent the services and combatant commands from  meeting their training requirements. For example, while the Army and  MDA are working to prioritize funding to address training for the THAAD  element, Army officials identified a $308.6 million discrepancy between  MDA’s funding and the Army’s documented equipment requirements to  support individual and unit training. Army officials said that without this  equipment, they will have difficulty keeping up with the demand for  individual and unit training. Specifically, some critical tasks that would  normally be trained at the institution would need to be performed by the  units on actual tactical equipment rather than training devices, which  would result in additional wear and tear on tactical equipment and  increase overall training costs. In addition, the Army has identified a  $960,000 requirement to upgrade training materials to support sensor  manager training for the AN/TPY-2 radar. However, MDA has not funded  this requirement, and an Army official indicated that without upgraded  training materials, properly trained crews may not be available to operate  the radar. Without MDA and service cooperation to develop complete and  transparent ballistic missile defense training cost estimates, decision  makers do not have the necessary visibility to budget for ballistic missile  defense training or identify and address training shortfalls, an issue that  may become more problematic as additional elements are fielded. Since  training to support ballistic missile defense has been identified as a high  priority within the department, the lack of transparency in the funds  needed to support ballistic missile defense training hinders DOD’s ability  to assess competing priorities and decide how to allocate scarce  resources to meet training goals.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Defending against ballistic missile attacks requires quick responses and  an integrating training strategy is important to connect seams where  commands, tiers, or elements must work together. However, there are no  DOD requirements and standards for integrating training across and  among all of the tiers. Although individual organizations are taking some  initial steps, training across and among tiers is still relatively infrequent. In  similar instances, DOD has issued guidance to designate an organization  with the responsibility and authority for establishing joint training  requirements. However, DOD has not designated an organization with the  responsibility and authority to develop a strategy that would include  specific requirements and standards for integrating training across and  among all of the tiers for ballistic missile defense. As a result, the  department runs the risk that personnel may have had limited  opportunities to interact across the training tiers and elements under  realistic conditions prior to an actual ballistic missile defense  engagement. A number of DOD organizations have identified the need for  an affordable, scalable, distributed, and fully integrated training capability  that would develop the capabilities necessary for all tiers to experience  realistic training at a frequency to prepare them for ballistic missile  defense operations. Without an entity responsible for developing an  integrating training strategy, the department’s ability to develop  requirements and standards for integrating training across and among all  of the tiers, and to assess the advantages and disadvantages of a  standardized approach for improving integrating training capabilities may  be hindered.
Given that DOD has identified ballistic missile defense as a high-priority  mission area and has expended substantial resources to develop the  BMDS, it is important that funding for training be clearly and easily  identified to ensure that training priorities are being met and budgets are  aligned to support training requirements and address any training  shortfalls. No full picture of the total service and MDA BMDS training  budget exists since funding is dispersed across the department and there  is no procedure or deadline mandating that funding agreements and  training cost estimates be completed and approved in time to inform  annual budget development. As a result, DOD and congressional  decision makers lack visibility over the ballistic missile defense training  budget to assess whether budgeted resources are adequate to support  ballistic missile defense training and ensure there are no significant  training gaps. Until the department addresses these challenges, DOD will  likely face increasing risks over time to its ability to provide necessary  integrating training as more elements are developed and fielded.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three  actions:  To enhance DOD’s ability to identify and resolve issues in integrating  ballistic missile defense training across and among combatant commands  and services and to improve training realism, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff, issue guidance that:    designates an entity to be responsible for integrating training across  and among combatant commands and elements and provide that  entity with the authority to develop an overall ballistic missile defense  training strategy which includes specific requirements and standards  for integrating training and identifying and resolving any gaps in  capabilities to enhance integrating training across and among all tiers  (or combatant commands and elements).
To improve the transparency of the resources to support ballistic missile  defense training requirements and to inform budget development, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the  Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Director of the Missile Defense  Agency to:  set a firm deadline to complete training cost estimates and element- specific agreements for elements already fielded and establish  procedures that require the training cost estimates and element- specific funding agreements delineating funding responsibilities  between MDA and the services be completed before additional  elements are fielded; and    establish procedures that require annual development and reporting  of the total BMDS training budget (i.e., all Missile Defense Agency  and service costs for individual, unit, and sustainment training and  combatant command and service exercise costs).
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with one  recommendation and partially concurred with two recommendations.  Although DOD generally concurred with our recommendations, DOD’s  response did not include specifics about when it intended to complete  actions to implement these recommendations. Considering that DOD has  identified ballistic missile defense as a high-priority mission area, we  believe it is important that DOD take action as soon as possible. After we  received DOD’s comments, the department completed its security review  and determined that this report is unclassified and contains no sensitive  information. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix  III. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into  the report as appropriate.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that DOD issue guidance that  designates an entity to be responsible for integrating training across and  among combatant commands and elements and provide that entity with  the authority to develop an overall ballistic missile defense training  strategy. The department further stated that Office of the Under Secretary  of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and U.S. Strategic Command,  with the assistance of the Joint Staff will provide the policy and required  advocacy for the development of an integrated training strategy for  ballistic missile defense. Although DOD concurred with this  recommendation and stated its intention to issue policy for developing an  integrating training strategy, the department did not state when it intended  to do so. Since defending against ballistic missile attacks requires a quick  response, it is important that DOD develops an integrating training  strategy to connect seams where commands, tiers, or elements must  work together. Therefore, we believe that DOD should issue this policy as  soon as possible.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretaries of  the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Director of the Missile Defense  Agency set a firm deadline to complete training cost estimates and  element-specific agreements for elements already fielded and establish  procedures that require the completion of training cost estimates and  element-specific funding agreements delineating funding responsibilities  between MDA and the services before additional elements are fielded. In  its comments, DOD stated that new ballistic missile defense capabilities  are essential to defense and must not be delayed. The department  acknowledges the benefit of establishing training cost estimates but  believes that these estimates and funding agreements can be developed  in parallel with the fielding of additional capabilities. Although DOD  partially concurred, DOD did not state that it would set a firm deadline to  implement the recommendation. DOD generally requires that weapons  systems complete life-cycle cost estimates—including training cost  estimates—prior to a system being fielded. As we noted in our report,  DOD has not completed cost estimates or funding agreements. Further,  we reported that MDA and the services have had difficulty completing the  agreements for each element that would include details on MDA and the  services’ funding responsibilities as the elements transition from MDA to  the services. Without completed and approved training cost estimates to  inform the funding agreements and annual budget development, there is  no clear identification of the resources that DOD may need to support  ballistic missile defense training and DOD is at risk of training gaps. In  fact, we noted examples of discrepancies between funding and training  requirements. Given that DOD has identified ballistic missile defense as a  high-priority mission area, has had difficulty completing cost estimates  and funding agreements in the past, and there are already examples of  some funding gaps, we continue to believe that DOD should establish a  firm deadline to ensure that training cost estimates and element-specific  agreements are completed before additional elements are fielded.
Finally, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the  Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Director of the  Missile Defense Agency establish procedures that require annual  development and reporting of the total BMDS training budget (i.e., all  Missile Defense Agency and service costs for individual, unit, and  sustainment training and combatant command and service exercise  costs). In its comments, DOD stated that the department defines total  ballistic missile defense training costs as those direct or incremental  ballistic missile defense system training costs associated with the fielding  and sustaining element mission readiness for ballistic missile defense  capabilities. DOD further stated that the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness will work with the services and the  Missile Defense Agency to develop policy for capturing and reporting total  ballistic missile defense training costs as defined above. As we stated in  our report, no full picture of the total service and MDA BMDS training  budget exists since funding is dispersed across the department and there  is no procedure or deadline mandating that funding agreements and  training cost estimates be completed and approved in time to inform  annual budget development. As a result, DOD and congressional  decision makers do not have a full picture of the resources to inform  budget development and risk training gaps. Considering that funding for  training could face significant budget pressures amid the department’s  competing demands for current operations, acquisitions, and personnel  expenses, we continue to believe it is important that DOD implement the  policy for developing and reporting cost estimates for ballistic missile  defense training as soon as possible.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense  for Personnel and Readiness, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  the combatant commands, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air  Force, and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency. In addition, this  report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has  developed a plan for integrating ballistic missile defense training across  and among commands and multiple elements we reviewed combatant  command and service training plans and assessed whether these plans  addressed ballistic missile defense training. To determine the extent to  which DOD has identified training roles, responsibilities, and  commensurate authorities, we assessed DOD, combatant command, and  service instructions, policies, and training plans to identify where training  roles, responsibilities, and authorities were clearly identified and whether  these documents clearly identified roles, responsibilities, and authorities  for integrating training across and among commands and services.  Finally, we discussed our results with DOD officials to corroborate our  analysis and discussed any areas where responsibilities may not be  clearly identified.
To quantify the extent to which the Ballistic Missile Defense System,  (BMDS) training is integrated horizontally across the combatant  commands and elements and vertically from the combatant commands  down through the elements (i.e. through all tiers) we first developed a  standard definition of the training tiers using the description in the Joint  Functional Component Command for Integrated Air and Missile Defense’s  Fiscal Year 2010 through 2011 Annual Training Plan as a guide and  confirmed the definitions with various DOD commands. Next, we  gathered and analyzed information on 45 training exercises that included  ballistic missile defense and were conducted during fiscal years 2009 and  2010. We included all of the exercises led by combatant commands,  operations centers, and the services within this time frame. We also  included an average representation of the participants in weekly training  provided by the Joint Staff to officials at tier one. For each exercise, we  gathered information to identify participants at each tier and whether each  participant was live or simulated. We summarized the data and  corroborated the results with the commands that provided the information.
To determine the extent to which DOD has identified and budgeted for the  resources to support ballistic missile defense training, we gathered and  analyzed available training budget documents and data provided by the  Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the services to support ballistic  missile defense training from fiscal years 2011 through 2016 to include  budget estimates for training in schools, exercises and for facilities such  as simulators. To determine the funding for Patriot unit training, Army  officials provided the average estimated training cost for one unit that the  Army uses to develop its budget and we multiplied that amount by the  total number of units across fiscal years 2011 to 2016. We documented  instances where the services could not identify training resources specific  to ballistic missile defense, and reported that these budget estimates are  to support training for missions in addition to ballistic missile defense or  instances that ballistic missile defense specific budget estimates were  unavailable. We also obtained documentation from MDA and the services  on their actual costs to support ballistic missile defense training in fiscal  year 2010. We interviewed DOD, combatant command, and service  officials to corroborate our compilation of available training budget  estimates, and to identify areas where there may be a mismatch or  shortfall between training requirements and budget estimates. We  interviewed MDA and service officials to determine whether element- specific annexes and joint life-cycle cost estimates for each of the  elements have been completed and approved. To ensure the reliability of  our data we provided the tables showing the estimated budgeted  amounts for ballistic missile defense training to DOD and service officials  for review. Furthermore, to assess the reliability of the computer- processed data provided by the Army to support their ballistic missile  defense training budgets, we interviewed knowledgeable officials about  the data and internal controls on the system that contains them. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  audit.
We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards from July 2010 to July 2011.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO’s Analysis of Ballistic Missile Defense Exercises
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Patricia W. Lentini, Assistant  Director; Brenda M. Waterfield; Randy F. Neice; Meghan E. Cameron;  Joseph J. Watkins; Rebecca Shea; Joel Grossman; Karen Nicole Harms;  and Erik Wilkins-McKee made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and  Accountability. GAO-11-372. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2011.
Ballistic Missile Defense: DOD Needs to Address Planning and  Implementation Challenges for future Capabilities in Europe.  GAO-11-220. Washington, D.C.: January 26, 2011.
Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach Acquisitions Face  Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability Challenges.  GAO-11-179R. Washington, D.C.: December 21, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Program Instability Affects  Reliability of Earned Value Management Data. GAO-10-676. Washington,  D.C.: July 14, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-10-388SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Transition Provides Opportunity to  Strengthen Acquisition Approach. GAO-10-311, Washington, D.C.:  February 25, 2010.
Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and  Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities.  GAO-09-856. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2009.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and  Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European  Sites. GAO-09-771. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2009.
Defense Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When  Considering Changes to Missile Defense Agency’s Roles and Missions.  GAO-09-466T. Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense  Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned.  GAO-09-338. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2009.
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost  Estimates for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense.  GAO-08-1068. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2008.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve the Process for  Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities. GAO-08-740.  Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but  Program Is Short of Meeting Goals. GAO-08-448. Washington, D.C.:  March 14, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency’s Flexibility Reduces  Transparency of Program Cost. GAO-07-799T. Washington, D.C.: April  30, 2007.
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Information for Supporting  Future Key Decisions for Boost and Ascent Phase Elements.  GAO-07-430. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Needs a Better Balance between  Flexibility and Accountability. GAO-07-727T. Washington, D.C.: April 11,  2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates  Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost. GAO-07-387. Washington,  D.C.: March 15, 2007.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning  and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense. GAO-06-473.  Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability but  Falls Short of Original Goals. GAO-06-327. Washington, D.C.: March 15,  2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for  Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense  System.GAO-05-817. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify  New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach.  GAO-05-962R. Washington, D.C.: August 4, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify  New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach.  GAO-05-540. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in  2004. GAO-05-243. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve  Transparency of DOD’s Projected Resource Needs. GAO-04-514.  Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and  Accountability. GAO-04-409. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing  Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed. GAO-04-254.  Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2004.
Missile Defense: Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing System for  Intercepting Long-Range Missiles. GAO-03-600. Washington, D.C.:  August 21, 2003.
Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and  Surveillance System Need to Be Considered. GAO-03-597. Washington,  D.C.: May 23, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but  Risks Remain. GAO-03-441. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Decision Making Needed to Reduce  Risks in Developing Airborne Laser. GAO-02-631. Washington, D.C.: July  12, 2002.
Missile Defense: Review of Results and Limitations of an Early National  Missile Defense Flight Test. GAO-02-124. Washington, D.C.: February  28, 2002.
Missile Defense: Cost Increases Call for Analysis of How Many New  Patriot Missiles to Buy. GAO/NSIAD-00-153. Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2000.
Missile Defense: Schedule for Navy Theater Wide Program Should Be  Revised to Reduce Risk. GAO/NSIAD-00-121. Washington, D.C.: May  31, 2000.