Military Prepositioning: Observations on Army and Marine Corps Programs During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Beyond
Published: 2004-03-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since the Cold War, the Department of Defense (DOD) has increased its reliance on prepositioned stocks of military equipment and supplies, primarily because it can no longer plan on having a large forward troop presence. Prepositioned stocks are stored on ships and on land in the Persian Gulf and other regions around the world. Prepositioning allows the military to respond rapidly to conflicts. Ideally, units need only to bring troops and a small amount of materiel to the conflict area. Once there, troops can draw on prepositioned equipment and supplies, and then move quickly into combat. Today's testimony describes (1) the performance and availability of Army and Marine Corps prepositioned equipment and supplies to support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); (2) current status of the stocks and plans to reconstitute them; and (3) key issues facing the military as it reshapes these programs to support DOD's force transformation efforts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The importance of prepositioned stocks was dramatically illustrated during OIF. While they faced some challenges, the Army and Marine Corps relied heavily on prepositioned combat equipment and supplies to decisively defeat the Iraqi military. They both reported that prepositioned stocks were a key factor in the success of OIF. Prepositioned stocks provided most of the combat equipment used and, for the most part, this equipment was in good condition and maintained high readiness rates. However, the Army's prepositioned equipment included some older models of equipment and shortfalls in support equipment such as trucks, spare parts, and other supplies. Moreover, the warfighter did not always know what prepositioned stocks were available in theater, apparently worsening an already overwhelmed supply-and-distribution system. The units were able to overcome these challenges; fortunately, the long time available to build up forces allowed units to fill many of the shortages and adjust to unfamiliar equipment. Much of the prepositioned equipment is still being used to support continuing operations in Iraq. It will be several years--depending on how long Iraqi Freedom operations continue--before these stocks will be available to return to prepositioning programs. And, even after they become available, much of the equipment will likely require substantial maintenance, or may be worn out beyond repair. The Army has estimated that it has an unfunded requirement of over $1 billion for reconstituting the prepositioned equipment used in OIF. However, since most prepositioned equipment is still in Southwest Asia and has not been turned back to the Army Materiel Command for reconstitution, most of the funding is not required at this time. When the prepositioned equipment is no longer needed in theater, decisions will have to be made about what equipment can be repaired by combat units, what equipment must go to depot, and what equipment must be replaced with existing or new equipment to enable the Army to reconstitute the prepositioned sets that were downloaded for OIF. DOD faces many issues as it rebuilds its prepositioning program and makes plans for how such stocks fit into its future. In the near term, the Army and Marines must necessarily focus on supporting ongoing OIF operations. While waiting to reconstitute its program, the Army also has an opportunity to address shortfalls and modernize remaining stocks. For the longer term, DOD may need to (1) determine the role of prepositioning in light of efforts to transform the military; (2) establish sound prepositioning requirements that support joint expeditionary forces; and (3) ensure that the program is resourced commensurate with its priority and is affordable even as the force is transformed. Congress will play a key role in reviewing DOD's assessment of the cost effectiveness of various options to support its overall mission, including prepositioning and other alternatives for projecting forces quickly.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on logistical issues  related to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), focusing on prepositioned  stocks. Since the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense (DOD)  has increased its reliance on prepositioned reserves of military equipment  and supplies since it can no longer plan on having a large forward troop  presence. Prepositioned stocks are stored on ships and on land in the  Persian Gulf and other regions around the world. Prepositioning can speed  response times. Ideally, the military needs only to bring troops and a small  amount of materiel to the area of conflict. Once there, troops can draw on  prepositioned equipment and supplies, and then move rapidly into combat.
My statement today reflects our preliminary observations drawn from  ongoing work as well as previously published reports. As requested, my  testimony today will focus on the performance, reconstitution, and future  of prepositioning programs. Specifically, it describes (1) the performance  and availability of Army and Marine Corps prepositioned equipment and  supplies to support OIF; (2) the current status of the stocks and plans to  reconstitute them; and (3) key issues facing the military as it reshapes  these programs to support the military’s force transformation efforts.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The basic purpose of prepositioning is to allow DOD to field combat-ready  forces in days rather than in the weeks it would take if the forces and all  necessary equipment and supplies had to be brought from the United  States. However, the stocks must be (1) available in sufficient quantities to  meet the needs of deploying forces and (2) in good condition. For  prepositioning programs, these factors define “readiness.” If on-hand  stocks are not what is needed—or are in poor condition—the purpose of  prepositioning may be defeated because the unit will lose valuable time  obtaining or repairing equipment and supplies. U.S forces had months to  build up for OIF, so speed was not imperative. Prepositioning sites became  reception and staging areas during the months leading up to the war, and  afforded the military the necessary time and access in Kuwait to build up  its forces for the later offensive operations of OIF.
Prepositioning programs grew in importance to U.S. military strategy after  the end of the Cold War, particularly for the Army. Recognizing that it  would have fewer forward-stationed ground forces—and to support the  two-war strategy of the day—the Army used equipment made available  from its drawdown to field new sets of combat equipment ashore in the  Persian Gulf and in Korea. It also began an afloat program in the 1990s,  using large ships to keep equipment and supplies available to support  operations around the world. The Marine Corps has had a prepositioned  capability since the 1980s. Its three Marine Expeditionary Forces are each  assigned a squadron of ships packed with equipment and supplies—the  Marines view this equipment as their “go-to-war” gear. Both the services  also have retained some stocks in Europe, although the Army stocks have  steadily declined since the end of the Cold War. Today, the Army has sites  in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy, while the Marine Corps retains  stocks in Norway. Figure 1 shows the location of Army and Marine Corps  prepositioned equipment prior to OIF.
Prepositioning is an important part of DOD’s overall strategic mobility  calculus. The U.S. military can deliver equipment and supplies in three  ways: by air, by sea, or by prepositioning. Each part of this triad has its  own advantages and disadvantages. Airlift is fast, but it is expensive to use  and impractical for moving all of the material needed for a large-scale  deployment. Although ships can carry large loads, they are relatively slow.  Prepositioning lessens the strain on expensive airlift and reduces the  reliance on relatively slow sealift deliveries. However, prepositioning  requires the military to maintain equipment that essentially duplicates  what the unit has at home station. Moreover, if the prepositioned  equipment stocks are incomplete, the unit may have to bring along so  much additional equipment that using it could still strain lift, especially  scarce airlift in the early days of a conflict.
section_title: Prepositioned Equipment Performed Well in OIF, Despite Shortfalls and Other Logistical Challenges
paragraphs: The Army and Marine Corps reported that their prepositioned equipment  performed well during OIF but that some problems emerged. We reviewed  lessons-learned reports and talked to Army and Marine Corps officials  who managed or used the equipment. We heard general consensus that  major combat equipment was generally in good condition when drawn and  that it performed well during the conflict. However, Army officials said  that some equipment was out-of-date and some critical items like trucks  were in short supply and parts and other supplies were sometimes not  available. The officials agreed that, overall, OIF demonstrated that  prepositioned stocks could successfully support major combat operations.
Most of the issues we heard were with the Army’s program. Marine Corps  officials reported few shortfalls in their prepositioned stocks or  mismatches with unit equipment. This is likely due to two key differences  between the services. First, the Marines view prepositioned stocks as their  “go-to-war" gear and give the stocks a very high priority for fill and  modernization. Second, the units that will use the prepositioned stocks are  assigned in advance and the Marine Corps told us that the combat units  feel a sense of “ownership” in the equipment. This manifests itself in  important ways. For example, the Marines have periodic conferences with  all involved parties to work out exactly what their ships will carry and  what the units will need to bring with them to the fight. Such an effort to  tailor the prepositioned equipment increases familiarity, allows for prewar  planning, and thus minimizes surprises or last-minute adjustments. The  Marines also train with their gear periodically. By contrast, the Army does  not designate the sets for any particular unit and provides little training  with the equipment, especially with the afloat stocks.
subsections: section_title: Prepositioned Combat Equipment Performed Well
paragraphs: Personnel who used and managed the equipment agreed that the tanks,  infantry fighting vehicles, and howitzers were in good condition when they  were drawn from the prepositioned stocks; moreover, the equipment  generally stayed operational throughout the fight. For example, the Third  Infantry Division after-action report said that new systems and older  systems proved to be very valuable and the tanks and Bradleys were both  lethal and survivable. Additionally, according to Army Materiel Command  documents, combat personnel reported that their equipment, in many  cases, worked better than what they had at home station. Moreover,  operational readiness data we reviewed showed that major combat  equipment stayed operational, even in heavy combat across hundreds of  miles. In fact, officials from both services agreed that OIF validated the  prepositioning concept and showed that it can successfully support major  combat operations. Moreover, the U.S. Central Command, in an internal  lessons-learned effort, concluded that prepositioned stocks “proved their  worth and were critical in successfully executing OIF.”
section_title: Some Prepositioned Equipment Was Out-of-Date or Did Not Match Unit Needs
paragraphs: Some of the Army’s prepositioned equipment was outdated or did not  match what the units were used to at home station. At times, this required  the units to “train down” to older and less-capable equipment or bring  their own equipment from home. Examples include:    Bradleys—The prepositioned stocks contained some older Bradley  Fighting Vehicles that had not received upgrades installed since Operation  Desert Storm. Such improvements included items like laser range finders,  Global Positioning System navigation, thermal viewers, battlefield  identification systems, and others. In addition, division personnel brought  their own “Linebacker” Bradleys instead of using the outdated  prepositioned stocks that would have required the crew to get out of the  vehicle to fire.
M113 Personnel Carriers—The prepositioned stocks contained many  older model M113A2 vehicles. This model has difficulty keeping up with  Abrams tanks and requires more repairs than the newer model M113A3,  which the units had at home station.
Trucks—The prepositioned stocks included 1960s-vintage model trucks  that had manual transmissions and were more difficult to repair. Most  units now use newer models that have automatic transmissions. The effect  of this was that soldiers had to learn to drive stick shifts when they could  have been performing other tasks needed to prepare for war; in addition,  maintenance personnel were unfamiliar with fixing manual transmissions.
Tank Recovery Vehicle—The prepositioned stocks contained M-88A1  recovery vehicles. These vehicles have long been known to lack sufficient  power, speed, and reliability. We reported similar issues after Operation  Desert Storm. According to data collected by the Army Materiel  Command, these vehicles broke down frequently, generally could not keep  up with the fast-paced operations, and did not have the needed capabilities  even when they were in operation.
None of these problems, however, were insurmountable. The U.S. forces  had months to prepare for OIF, and plenty of time to adjust to the  equipment they had available. Additionally, the U.S. forces faced an  adversary whose military proved much less capable than U.S. forces.
section_title: Army Faced Spare Parts Shortfalls and Theater Distribution Issues
paragraphs: Our preliminary work also identified shortfalls in available spare parts and  major problems with the theater distribution system, which were  influenced by shortages of trucks and material handling equipment. Prior  to OIF, the Army had significant shortages in its prepositioned stocks,  especially in spare parts. This is a long-standing problem. We reported in  2001 that the status of the Army’s prepositioned stocks and war reserves  was of strategic concern because of shortages in spare parts. At that time  the Army had on hand about 35 percent of its stated requirements of  prepositioned spare parts and had about a $1-billion shortfall in required  spare parts for war reserves.
Table 1 shows the percentage of authorized parts that were available in  March 2001 in the prepositioned stocks that were later used in OIF. These  stocks represent a 15-day supply of spare and repair parts for brigade units  (Prescribed Load List) and for the forward support battalion that backs up  the brigade unit stocks (Authorized Stockage List). While the goal for  these stocks was to be filled to 100 percent, according to Army officials  the Army has not had sufficient funds to fill out the stocks. In March 2002,  the Army staff directed that immediate measures be taken to fix the  shortages and provided $25 million to support this effort. The  requirements for needed spare and repair parts were to be filled to the  extent possible by taking stocks from the peacetime inventory or, if  unavailable there, from new procurement.
By the time the war started in March of 2003, the fill rate had been  substantially improved but significant shortages remained. The warfighter  still lacked critical, high-value replacement parts like engines and  transmissions. These items were not available in the supply system and  could not be acquired in time. Shortages in spare and repair parts have  been a systemic problem in the Army over the past few years. Our recent  reports on Army spares discussed this issue and, as previously noted, our  2001 report highlighted problems specifically with prepositioned spares.  According to Army officials, the fill rates for prepositioned spare parts— especially high-value spares—were purposely kept down because of  systemwide shortfalls. The Army’s plan to mitigate this known risk was to  have the units using the prepositioned sets to bring their own high-value  spare parts in addition to obtaining spare parts from non-deploying units.
Nonetheless, according to the Third Infantry Division OIF after-action  report, spare parts shortages were a problem and there were also other  shortfalls. In fact, basic loads of food and water, fuel, construction  materials, and ammunition were also insufficient to meet the unit  sustainment requirements.
The combatant commander had built up the OIF force over a period of  months, departing from doctrinal plans to have receiving units in theater  to receive the stocks. When it came time to bring in the backup supplies,  over 3,000 containers were download from the sustainment ships, which  contained the required classes of supply—food, fuel, and spare parts,  among others. The theater supply-and-distribution system became  overwhelmed. The situation was worsened by the inability to track assets  available in theater, which meant that the warfighter did not know what  was available. The Third Infantry Division OIF after-action report noted  that some items were flown in from Europe or Fort Stewart because they  were not available on the local market. Taken together, all these factors  contributed to a situation that one Army after-action report bluntly  described as “chaos.”
Our recent report on logistics activities in OIF described a theater  distribution capability that was insufficient and ineffective in managing  and transporting the large amount of supplies and equipment during OIF.  For example, the distribution of supplies to forward units was delayed  because adequate transportation assets, such as cargo trucks and materiel  handling equipment, were not available within the theater of operations.  The distribution of supplies was also delayed because cargo arriving in  shipping containers and pallets had to be separated and repackaged  several times for delivery to multiple units in different locations. In  addition, DOD’s lack of an effective process for prioritizing cargo for  delivery precluded the effective use of scarce theater transportation  assets. Finally, one of the major causes of distribution problems during  OIF was that most Army and Marine Corps logistics personnel and  equipment did not deploy to the theater until after combat troops arrived,  and in fact, most Army personnel did not arrive until after major combat  operations were underway.
section_title: Continuing Support of Operations Will Likely Delay Reconstitution
paragraphs: Forces are being rotated to relieve personnel in theater. Instead of  bringing their own equipment, these troops are continuing to use  prepositioned stocks. Thus, it may be several years—depending on how  long the Iraqi operations continue—before these stocks can be  reconstituted.
The Marine Corps used two of its three prepositioned squadrons (11 of  16 ships) to support OIF. As the Marines withdrew, they repaired some  equipment in theater but sent much of it back to their maintenance facility  in Blount Island, Florida. By late 2003, the Marine Corps had one of the  two squadrons reconstituted through an abbreviated maintenance cycle,  and sent back to sea. However, to support ongoing operations in Iraq, the  Marine Corps sent equipment for one squadron back to Iraq, where it is  expected to remain for all or most of 2004. The Marine Corps is currently  performing maintenance on the second squadron of equipment that was  used during OIF, and this work is scheduled to be completed in 2005.
Most of the equipment that the Army used for OIF is still in use or is being  held in theater in the event it may be needed in the future. The Army used  nearly all of its prepositioned ship stocks and its ashore stocks in Kuwait  and Qatar, as well as drawing some stocks from Europe. In total, this  included more than 10,000 pieces of rolling stock, 670,000 repair parts,  3,000 containers, and thousands of additional pieces of other equipment.  According to Army officials, the Army is repairing this equipment in  theater and reissuing it piece-by-piece to support ongoing operations. Thus  far, the Army has reissued more than 11,000 pieces of equipment, and it  envisions that it will have to issue more of its remaining equipment to  support future operations. Thus, it may be 2006 or later before this  equipment becomes available to be reconstituted to refill the  prepositioned stocks. Officials also told us that, after having been in use  for years in harsh desert conditions, much of the equipment would likely  require substantial maintenance and some will be worn out beyond repair.  Figure 2 shows OIF trucks needing repair.
Both the Army and the Marine Corps have retained prepositioned stocks in  the Pacific to cover a possible contingency in that region. While the Marine  Corps used two of its three squadrons in OIF, it left the other squadron  afloat near Guam. The Army used most of its ship stocks for OIF, but it  still has a brigade set available in Korea and one combat ship is on station  to support a potential conflict in Korea, although it is only partially filled.  Both the Army and the Marine Corps used stocks from Europe to support  OIF. The current status of the services’ prepositioned sets is discussed in  table 2.
Army and Marine Corps maintenance officials told us that it is difficult to  reliably estimate the costs of reconstituting the equipment because so  much of it is still in use. As a result, the reconstitution timeline is unclear.  Based on past experience, it is reasonable to expect that the harsh desert  environment in the Persian Gulf region will exact a heavy toll on the  equipment. For example, we reported in 1993 that equipment returned  from Operation Desert Storm was in much worse shape than expected  because of exposure for lengthy periods to harsh desert conditions. The  Army has estimated that the cost for reconstituting its prepositioned  equipment assets is about $1.7 billion for depot maintenance, unit level  maintenance, and procurement of required parts and supplies. A request  for about $700 million was included in the fiscal year 2004 Global War on  Terrorism supplemental budget, leaving a projected shortfall of about  $1 billion. Army Materiel Command officials said they have thus far  received only a small part of the amount funded in the 2004 supplemental  for reconstitution of the prepositioned equipment, but they noted that not  much equipment has been available. Additionally, continuing operations in  Iraq have been consuming much of the Army’s supplemental funding  intended for reconstitution. Since much of the equipment is still in  Southwest Asia, it is unclear how much reconstitution funding for its  prepositioned equipment the Army can use in fiscal year 2005. But it is  clear that there is a significant bill that will have to be paid for  reconstitution of Army prepositioned stocks at some point in the future, if  the Army intends to reconfigure the afloat and land-based prepositioned  sets that have been used in OIF.
section_title: Issues Facing the Prepositioning Program
paragraphs: The defense department faces many issues as it rebuilds its prepositioning  program and makes plans for how such stocks fit into the transformed  military. In the near term, the Army and the Marine Corps must focus on  supporting current operations and reconstituting their prepositioning sets.  Moreover, we believe that the Army may be able to take some actions to  address the shortfalls and other problems it experienced during OIF. In  the long term, however, DOD faces fundamental issues as it plans the  future of its prepositioning programs.
subsections: section_title: Near-Term Issues
paragraphs: As it reconstitutes its program, the Army would likely benefit from  addressing the issues brought to light during OIF, giving priority to actions  that would address long-standing problems, mitigate near-term risk, and  shore up readiness in key parts of its prepositioning program. These  include     ensuring that it has adequate equipment and spare parts and sustainment  supplies in its prepositioning programs, giving priority to afloat and Korea  stocks;    selectively modernizing equipment so that it will match unit equipment  and better meet operational needs; and    planning and conducting training to practice drawing and using  prepositioned stocks, especially afloat stocks.
Based on some contrasts in the experiences between the Army and the  Marine Corps with their prepositioned equipment and supplies in OIF,  some officials we spoke to agree that establishing a closer relationship  between operational units and the prepositioned stocks they would be  expected to use in a contingency is critical to wartime success. The  Marines practice with their stocks and the Army could benefit from  training on how to unload, prepare, and support prepositioned stocks,  particularly afloat stocks. While the Army has had some exercises using its  land-based equipment in Kuwait and Korea, it has not recently conducted  a training exercise to practice unloading its afloat assets. According to  Army officials, such exercises have been scheduled over the past few  years, but were cancelled due to lack of funding.
section_title: Long-term Issues
paragraphs: The long-term issues transcend the Army and Marines, and demand a  coordinated effort by the department. In our view, three main areas should  guide the effort.
Determine the role of prepositioning in light of the efforts to  transform the military. Perhaps it is time for DOD to go back to the  drawing board and ask: what is the military trying to achieve with these  stocks and how do they fit into future operational plans? If, as indicated in  Desert Storm and OIF, prepositioning is to continue to play an important  part in meeting future military commitments, priority is needed for  prepositioning as a part of transformation planning in the future.
Establish sound prepositioning requirements that support joint  expeditionary forces. If DOD decides that prepositioning is to continue  to play an important role in supporting future combat operations,  establishing sound requirements that are fully integrated is critical. The  department is beginning to rethink what capabilities could be needed. For  example, the Army and Marines are pursuing sea-basing ideas—where  prepositioning ships could serve as offshore logistics bases. Such ideas  seem to have merit, but are still in the conceptual phases, and it is not  clear to what extent the concepts are being approached to maximize  potential for joint operations. In our view, options will be needed to find  ways to cost-effectively integrate prepositioning requirements into the  transforming DOD force structure requirements. For example, Rand  recently published a report suggesting that the military consider  prepositioning support equipment to help the Stryker brigade meet  deployment timelines. Such support equipment constitutes much of the  weight and volume of the brigade, but a relatively small part of the costs  compared to the combat systems. Such an option may be needed, since  our recent report revealed that the Army would likely be unable to meet its  deployment timelines for the Stryker brigade.
Ensure that the program is resourced commensurate with its  priority, and is affordable even as the force is transformed. In our  view, DOD must consider affordability. In the past, the drawdown of Army  forces made prepositioning a practical alternative because it made extra  equipment available. However, as the services’ equipment is transformed  and recapitalized, it may not be practical to buy enough equipment for  units at home station and for prepositioning. Prepositioned stocks are  intended to reduce response times and enable forces to meet the demands  of the full spectrum of military operations. Once the future role of  prepositioning is determined, and program requirements are set, it will be  important to give the program proper funding priority. Congress will have  a key role in reviewing the department’s assessment of the cost  effectiveness of options to support DOD’s overall mission, including  prepositioning and other alternatives for projecting forces quickly to the  far reaches of the globe.
Mr. Chairman, I hope this information is useful to Congress as it considers  DOD’s plans and funding requests for reconstituting its prepositioned  stocks as well as integrating prepositioning into the department’s  transformation of its military forces.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any  questions that you or the Members of the Subcommittee may have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact William M. Solis at  (202) 512-8365 (e-mail address: Solisw@gao.gov), Julia Denman at (202)  512-4290 (e-mail address: denmanj@gao.gov), or John Pendleton at (404)  679-1816 (e-mail address: pendletonj@gao.gov). Additional individuals  making key contributions included Nancy Benco, Robert Malpass, Tinh  Nguyen, and Tanisha Stewart.
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