National Airspace System: FAA Has Made Progress but Continues to Face Challenges in Acquiring Major Air Traffic Control Systems
Published: 2005-06-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) multibillion-dollar effort to modernize the nation's air traffic control (ATC) system has suffered from cost, schedule, and/or performance shortfalls in its system acquisitions for more than two decades and has been on our list of high risk programs since 1995. FAA's performance-based Air Traffic Organization (ATO) was created in February 2004, in part, to address these legacy challenges. In this report, GAO examined (1) FAA's experience in meeting cost, schedule, and performance targets for major ATC system acquisitions; (2) steps taken to address legacy problems with the program and additional steps needed; and (3) the potential impact of the constrained federal budget on this program.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The ATO met its acquisition goal for fiscal year 2004. However, prior to the establishment of the ATO, FAA had experienced more than two decades of cost, schedule, and/or performance shortfalls in acquiring major systems under its ATC modernization program. For example, 13 of the 16 major system acquisitions that we reviewed in detail have experienced cost, schedule, and/or performance shortfalls when assessed against their original milestones. These 13 system acquisitions experienced total cost growth from $1.1 million to about $1.5 billion; schedule extensions ranging from 1 to 13 years; and performance shortfalls, including safety problems. We found that one or more of four factors--funding, requirements growth and/or unplanned work, stakeholder involvement, and software complexity--have contributed to these legacy challenges. While FAA met its recent acquisition goal, it is important to note that this goal is based on updated program milestones and cost targets for system acquisitions, not those set at their inception. Consequently, they do not provide a consistent benchmark for assessing progress over time. Also, as indicators of annual progress, they cannot be used in isolation to measure progress over the life of an acquisition. Although additional steps are warranted, FAA has taken some positive steps to address key legacy challenges it has had with acquiring major systems under the modernization program. For example, the ATO has cut funding for some major systems that were not meeting their goals and is reassessing all capital investments to help ensure that priority systems receive needed funding. The ATO has improved its management of software-intensive acquisitions and information technology investments and begun to more actively involve stakeholders. As we recommended, the ATO plans to establish an overall policy to apply its process improvement model to all software-intensive acquisitions. However, additional steps could be taken to improve its management of system acquisitions. For example, the ATO could use a knowledge-based approach to managing system acquisitions, characteristic of best commercial practices, to help avoid cost, schedule, and performance problems. The ATO will also be challenged to modernize the ATC system under constrained budget targets, which would provide FAA with about $2 billion less than it planned to spend through 2009. To fund its major system acquisitions and remain within these targets, the ATO has eliminated planned funding to start new projects and substantially reduced planned funding for other areas. However, when forwarding its budget submission for review by senior officials at FAA, DOT, the Office of Management and Budget, and Congress, the ATO provides no detail on the impact of the planned funding reductions on ATC modernization and related activities to modernize the NAS. Our work shows that the ATO should provide these decision-makers with detailed information in its budget submissions about the impact of funding decisions on modernization efforts. Without this type of information, decision-makers lack important details when considering FAA's annual budget submissions.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In 1981, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began what it initially  envisioned as a 10-year modernization program to upgrade and replace the  National Airspace System’s (NAS) facilities and equipment to meet  projected increases in traffic volumes, enhance the system’s margin of  safety, and increase the efficiency of the air traffic control (ATC) system—a  principal component of the NAS. To date, FAA has spent $43.5 billion for its  NAS modernization effort and plans to spend an additional $9.6 billion  through fiscal year 2009, primarily to upgrade and replace ATC systems and  facilities. For more than two decades, ATC system acquisitions under the  NAS modernization program have experienced significant cost growth,  schedule delays, and performance problems. As a result, the ATC  modernization program has been on our list of high-risk programs since  1995. To improve FAA’s management of the modernization program,  Congress, in 1995, gave the agency acquisition and human capital  flexibilities, which FAA has largely implemented.
In 2000, Congress and the administration took further steps to improve the  modernization program’s management. Through legislation and an  executive order, they laid the foundation for, among other things, a  performance-based organization to manage FAA’s ATC investments and  operations and a chief operating officer to lead it. In response, FAA hired a  chief operating officer in August 2003 and created the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) in February 2004. The ATO inherited the decades-long  legacy of cost, schedule, and/or performance problems with major ATC  system acquisitions and at the same time received $400 million less for  fiscal year 2005 than it had planned to spend for ATC modernization. In  addition, projected funding levels from the administration are about $2  billion less than FAA had planned to spend for fiscal years 2005 through  2009.
The ATC modernization program is critical to meeting future air traffic  safety, capacity, and efficiency needs. FAA reported that U.S. airlines  carried nearly 690 million passengers in 2004 and that it expects the  number of passengers to reach 1 billion by 2015. According to FAA, the  agency has spent about 58 percent, or $25.1 billion, of the $43.5 billion total  for NAS modernization on system acquisitions designed to replace or  upgrade various ATC systems.
In light of past problems with and continuing concerns about funding  major ATC system acquisitions under the ATC modernization program, you  asked us to examine (1) FAA’s experience in meeting cost, schedule, and/or  performance targets for major system acquisitions under its ATC  modernization program; (2) the steps FAA has taken to address long- standing challenges with the ATC modernization program and additional  steps that are needed; and (3) the potential effects of the constrained  budget environment on FAA’s ability to modernize the ATC system. To  address these objectives, we reviewed in detail 16 of the 55 system  acquisitions under the ATC modernization program, primarily by  interviewing FAA officials and obtaining and analyzing key acquisition documents. We selected these 16 systems in July 2004, when this review  was still a part of our broader work on FAA’s efforts to modernize the NAS. Specifically, we selected the 16 ATC system acquisitions with the  largest life-cycle costs that met the following criteria: each system had cost,  schedule, and performance targets; was discussed in prior GAO and  Department of Transportation Inspector General (DOT IG) reports, had not  been fully implemented or deployed by 2004, and received funding in 2004.  We reviewed this list with FAA officials to ensure that we did not exclude  any significant system. In fiscal year 2005, these 16 major ATC system  acquisitions account for about 36 percent of FAA’s facilities and equipment  budget. (See app. I for additional information on these 16 systems.) We  also collected information on the remaining 39 system acquisitions under  this program, which account for about 19 percent of FAA’s facilities and  equipment account for fiscal year 2005. (See app. II for additional  information on these 39 systems.) In addition, we reviewed past GAO and  DOT IG reports. We interviewed FAA officials within the recently created  ATO and collected and analyzed the documents they provided. We also  interviewed officials with the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Air  Transport Association, Department of Defense (DOD), National Air Traffic Controllers Association, and RTCA. Furthermore, we convened a panel of  international aviation experts. Our review did not focus on FAA’s efforts  to modernize its airports and other agency facilities. We conducted our  review from November 2004 through May 2005 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. (See app. III for  additional information on our objectives, scope, and methodology.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The mission of FAA, as a DOT agency, is to provide the safest, most  efficient aerospace system in the world. To fulfill its mission, FAA must rely  on an extensive use of technology, including many software-intensive  systems. FAA constantly relies on the adequacy and reliability of the  nation’s ATC system, which comprises a vast network of radars; automated  data processing, navigation, and communications equipment; and ATC  facilities. Through this system, FAA provides services such as controlling  takeoffs and landings and managing the flow of traffic between airports.
FAA is organized into several staff support offices and five lines of  business, which include Airports, Aviation Safety, Commercial Space  Transportation, the Office of Security and Hazardous Materials, and the  newly formed ATO. The ATO was formed in February 2004 to, among  other things, improve the provision of air traffic services and accelerate  modernization efforts. To create the ATO, FAA combined its Research and  Acquisition and Air Traffic Services into one performance-based  organization, bringing together those who acquire systems and those who  use them, respectively. The ATO is led by FAA’s chief operating officer,  consists of 10 service units, and has 36,000 of FAA’s 48,000 employees.
The ATO is the principal FAA organizational unit responsible for acquiring  ATC systems through the use of the agency’s Acquisition Management  System (AMS). Because FAA formerly contended that some of its  modernization problems were caused by federal acquisition regulations,  Congress enacted legislation in November 1995 that exempted the agency  from most federal procurement laws and regulations and directed FAA to  develop and implement a new acquisition management system that would  address the unique needs of the agency. In April 1996, FAA implemented  AMS. AMS was intended to reduce the time and cost of fielding new system  acquisitions by introducing (1) a new investment system that spans the life  cycle of an acquisition, (2) a new procurement system that provides  flexibility in selecting and managing contractors, and (3) organizational  and human capital reforms that support the new acquisition system.
AMS provides high-level acquisition policy and guidance for selecting and  controlling ATC system acquisitions through all phases of the acquisition  life cycle, which is organized into a series of phases and decision points  that include (1) mission analysis, (2) investment analysis, (3) solution  implementation, and (4) in-service management. To select system  acquisitions, FAA has two processes--mission analysis and investment  analysis–that together constitute a set of policies and procedures, as well  as guidance, that enhance the agency’s ability to screen system acquisitions  submitted for funding. Also through these two processes, FAA assesses and  ranks each system acquisition according to its relative costs, benefits,  risks, and contribution to FAA’s mission; a senior, corporate-level decision- making group then selects system acquisitions for funding. After a system  acquisition has been selected, FAA officials are required to formally  establish the life-cycle cost, schedule, benefits, and performance targets— known as acquisition program baselines, which are used to monitor the  status of the system acquisition throughout the remaining phases of its life  cycle.
Through its NAS modernization program, FAA is upgrading and replacing  ATC facilities and equipment to help improve the system’s safety, efficiency,  and capacity. These systems involve improvement in the areas of  automation, communication, navigation and landing, surveillance, and  weather to support the following five phases of flight (see fig. 1):  Preflight – The pilot performs flight checks and the aircraft is pushed- back from the gate. For preflight, we looked at Collaborative Decision  Making (CDM) and OASIS.
Airport Surface – The aircraft taxis to the runway for takeoff or, after  landing, to the destination gate to park at the terminal. For airport  surface, we examined the Airport Surface Detection Equipment – Model  X (ASDE-X).
Terminal Departure – The aircraft lifts off the ground and climbs to a  cruising altitude. For terminal departure, we examined the following  systems: Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR-11), Integrated Terminal  Weather System (ITWS), Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS),  Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS), and  Traffic Management Advisor (TMA).
En route/Oceanic -- The aircraft travels through one or more center  airspaces and approaches the destination airport. For en route and  oceanic, we examined the following systems: Air Traffic Control Radar  Beacon Interrogator-Replacement (ATCBI-6), Advanced Technologies  and Oceanic Procedures (ATOP), Controller-Pilot Data Link  Communications (CPDLC), and User Request Evaluation Tool (URET).
Terminal Arrival -- The pilot lowers, maneuvers, aligns, and lands the  aircraft on the destination airport’s designated landing runway. For  terminal arrival, we looked at the systems already listed under terminal  departure: ASR-11, ITWS, LAAS, STARS, and TMA.
In addition, for the major ATC systems that support multiple phases of  flight, we examined the following systems: En Route Communications  Gateway (ECG), En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM), Next- Generation Air-to-Ground Communication (NEXCOM), and Wide Area  Augmentation System (WAAS). Furthermore, for major ATC systems that  support NAS infrastructure, we examined FAA Telecommunications  Infrastructure (FTI) and NAS Infrastructure Management System (NIMS)–  Phase Two. (See app. I for additional information on these 16 systems.)
section_title: FAA Has Had Difficulty Meeting Cost, Schedule, and/or Performance Targets for Major System Acquisitions, but Made Progress in Fiscal Year 2004
paragraphs: For more than two decades, FAA has experienced cost growth, schedule  extensions, and/or performance problems in acquiring major systems  under its ATC modernization program and has been on our list of high-risk  programs since 1995. For example, 13 of the 16 major system acquisitions  we reviewed in detail continue to experience cost, schedule, and/or  performance shortfalls when assessed against their original baselines. The  three other major system acquisitions that we reviewed in detail are  currently operating within their original cost, schedule, and performance  targets, but are experiencing challenges symptomatic of past problems. Of  the remaining 39 system acquisitions within the ATC modernization  program, few have had problems meeting cost and schedule targets.  However, the ATO made progress during its first year of operation by  meeting its acquisition goal for fiscal year 2004.
subsections: section_title: Thirteen of the 16 Major ATC System Acquisitions We Reviewed in Detail Continue to Experience Shortfalls When Assessed against Original Performance Targets
paragraphs: Thirteen of the 16 major system acquisitions that we reviewed in detail for  this engagement under the ATC modernization program have continued to  experience cost growth, schedule delays, and/or performance problems  when assessed against their original performance targets (see table 1).  These major system acquisitions had total cost growth ranging from $1.1  million to about $1.5 billion over their original cost targets. In addition,  these systems required extensions in their initial deployment schedules  ranging from 1 to 13 years. Furthermore, several systems experienced  safety-related performance problems.
For 12 of the 13 major system acquisitions we reviewed in detail with  cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls, one or more of the following  four key factors contributed to these shortfalls: (1) The funding level received was less than called for in agency  planning documents. Most major ATC system acquisitions have cost,  schedule, and performance baselines that are approved by FAA’s Joint  Resources Council--the agency’s body responsible for approving and  overseeing major system acquisitions. Each baseline includes annual  funding levels that the council agrees are needed for a system acquisition to  meet its cost, schedule, and/or performance targets. The estimated cost for  a given year assumes that the program received all funding for prior fiscal  years as described in the baseline. In practice, however, this is not always  the case. For example, when FAA’s budget level does not allow all system  acquisitions to be fully funded at the levels approved in their baselines,  FAA may elect to fully fund higher-priority acquisitions and provide less  funding for lower-priority acquisitions than called for in their baselines.  When a system acquisition does not receive the annual funding levels called  for in its baseline, its ability to meet cost, schedule, and/or performance  targets can be jeopardized, for example, by requiring the agency to defer  funding for essential development or deployment activities until sufficient  funding becomes available, which, in turn, could require FAA to maintain  costly legacy systems until a new system is deployed. Receiving less  funding than the agency approved for a given acquisition was a factor  contributing to the inability of 8 of the 16 major system acquisitions we  reviewed in detail to meet their cost, schedule, and/or performance targets.  The ASR-11 acquisition, a digital radar system, illustrates how reduced  funding has resulted in schedule delays. FAA officials stated that because  of funding reductions and reprogramming, the program received $46.45  million less than requested for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 and program  officials plan to request that the program’s deployment schedule be  extended to 2013. According to FAA officials, in general, schedules for  system acquisitions may slip under such circumstances (e.g., the rate of  software development may be reduced and planned hardware and software  deployments may be delayed). The ATO’s chief operating officer testified in  April 2005 that receiving multiyear rather than annual funding from  Congress for system acquisitions would help FAA to address this problem  by providing funding stability for system acquisitions. In addition,  according to a senior DOT official, 50 percent of cost growth is a result of  an unstable funding stream.  (2) The system acquisition experienced requirements growth and/or  unplanned work. Requirements that are inadequate or poorly defined prior  to developing a system may contribute to the inability of system  acquisitions to meet their original cost, schedule, and/or performance  targets. In addition, unplanned development work can occur when the  agency misjudges the extent to which commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)/  nondevelopmental item (NDI) solutions, such as those procured by  another agency, will meet FAA’s needs. Requirements growth and/or  unplanned work contributed to the inability of 7 of the 16 major system  acquisitions we reviewed in detail to meet their cost, schedule, and/or  performance targets.  (3) Stakeholders were not sufficiently involved in design and  development: Insufficient involvement of relevant stakeholders, such as air  traffic controllers and maintenance technicians, throughout the  development and approval processes for a system acquisition can lead to  costly changes in requirements and unplanned work late in the  development process. Not involving stakeholders sufficiently contributed  to the inability of 4 of the 16 major system acquisitions to meet their cost,  schedule, and/or performance targets.  (4) The complexity of software development was underestimated.  Underestimating the complexity of developing software for system  acquisitions or the difficulty of modifying available software to fulfill FAA’s  mission needs may contribute to unexpected software development, higher  costs, and schedule delays. Underestimation contributed to the inability of  3 of the 16 major system acquisitions we reviewed in detail to meet their  cost, schedule, and/or performance targets. (See table 2.)
Several of the 16 major systems acquisitions we reviewed in detail  effectively illustrate how these four factors can interact to contribute to  cost growth, schedule extensions, and performance problems. For  example, for WAAS, a precision approach and landing system augmented  by satellites, two of the four key factors came into play: underestimation of  software complexity and insufficient stakeholder involvement. Specifically,  FAA underestimated the complexity of the software that would be needed  to support this system when it accelerated the implementation of  performance targets, which included moving up the commissioning of  WAAS by 3 years. FAA originally planned to commission WAAS by 2000;  however, at the urging of government and aviation industry groups in the  1990s, it decided to change the commissioning date to 1997. FAA then tried  to develop, test, and deploy WAAS within 28 months, although the software  development alone was expected to take 24 to 28 months.
In retrospect, FAA acknowledged that the agency’s in-house technical  expertise was not sufficient to address WAAS’s technical challenges and  that expert stakeholders should have been involved earlier. Although  WAAS was being developed by an integrated product team that included  representatives from several FAA offices, the team did not effectively  resolve problems in meeting a required performance capability—that pilots  be warned in a timely manner when a system may be giving them  potentially misleading and therefore hazardous information. Consequently,  in 2000, FAA convened a panel of expert stakeholders to help it meet this  requirement. These actions resulted in unplanned work and contributed to  the rise in WAAS’s cost from the original estimate of $509 million in 1994 to  $2.036 billion in 2005, and to a 6-year extension in its commissioning date.  According to FAA, adding 6 years to the program’s life cycle also  contributed to increased costs.
Another example involves STARS, a joint program of FAA and DOD that  replaced outdated monochromatic controller workstation monitors with  multicolor monitors in ATC facilities. While joint FAA and DOD  acquisitions offer the opportunity to leverage federal resources, in the case  of STARS, the interaction of insufficient stakeholder involvement and  subsequent unplanned work contributed to cost growth and schedule  extensions. Specifically, FAA and DOD decided to acquire COTS  equipment, rather than developing a new system. This strategy envisioned  immediately deploying STARS to the highest priority ATC facilities and  making further improvements later, thereby avoiding the increasing cost of  maintaining the legacy system. However, this strategy provided for only  limited evaluation by FAA and DOD controllers and maintenance  technicians during the system’s development phase, although these  employees were identified as stakeholders in developing the system’s  requirements. While DOD controllers adopted and began using the original  COTS version of STARS, FAA elected to modify the acquisition strategy and  suspended the STARS deployment to address FAA controller and  technician concerns with the new system. These concerns included, for  example, that many features of the old equipment could be operated with  knobs, allowing controllers to focus on the screen. By contrast, STARS was  menu-driven and required the controllers to make several keystrokes and  use a trackball, diverting their attention from the screen. The maintenance  technicians also identified differences between STARS and its backup  system that made it difficult to monitor the system. For example, the visual  warning alarms and the color codes identifying problems were not the  same for the two systems.
According to FAA, the original COTS acquisition strategy that limited the  involvement of controllers and maintenance technicians to just prior to  deployment caused unplanned work for the agency because it had to revise  its strategy for acquiring and approving STARS; this contributed to an  increase in the overall cost of STARS of $500 million and a schedule  extension of 5 years to deploy the system to its first site. The interaction of  these factors also contributed to the agency’s ability to deploy STARS at  only 47 of the 172 facilities initially planned. As of February 2005, FAA was  developing a long-term acquisition plan to modernize or upgrade the  highest-priority Terminal Radar Approach Control facilities that direct  aircraft in the airspace that extends from the point where the tower’s  control ends to about 50 nautical miles from the airport. The plan consists  of alternatives to STARS, including the existing Common Automated Radar  Terminal System (CARTS), which STARS was designed to replace. Finally,  to help avoid similar problems in the future, stemming from the insufficient  involvement of stakeholders during critical phases of a system’s design,  development, and implementation, FAA has been more proactive in  involving the stakeholders that will operate and maintain system  acquisitions.
A final example of how these factors can interact is FAA’s acquisition of  OASIS, which is designed to replace outdated technology in FAA’s  automated flight service stations. The new system is intended to improve  the ability of air traffic specialists to process flight plans, deliver weather  information, and provide search and rescue services to general aviation  pilots. In August 1997, FAA awarded a contract to replace the Flight Service  Automation System and console workstations. However, unplanned work,  insufficient involvement of stakeholders, and lower funding than the  agency had determined was needed to meet cost, schedule, and  performance targets have together contributed to cost growth and  schedules extensions. For example, the agency saw the system acquisition  schedule slip because of a larger-than-planned development effort.  According to the DOT IG, FAA identified a number of significant concerns,  including the inadequate weather graphics capabilities for air traffic  specialists. In our view, this indicates that stakeholders were not  sufficiently involved throughout the system’s design and development  phases. As a result, FAA eliminated the option of COTS procurement. In  addition, the OASIS program was rebaselined in March 2000, when the  system acquisition received only $10 million of the $21.5 million called for  in its baseline for that year. This reduction in funding reduced the rate of  software development, delayed and reduced the rate of planned hardware  and console deployments, and led to the incremental deployment of  operational software. This contributed to a delay in the first-site  implementation from July 1998 to July 2002. According to FAA officials,  because OASIS received less funding than the agency had approved for  fiscal year 2004 and 2005, its deployment to automated flight service  stations was postponed.
As of February 2005, FAA had deployed 19 OASIS units: 16 at automated  flight service stations and 3 at other sites. Software upgrades that are under  way will be completed by June 2005. FAA plans neither installations nor  software upgrades beyond those at the automated sites, because the  agency awarded a contract to a private vendor in February 2005 to operate  flight service stations. Until then, FAA has directed the program to remain  within its current Capital Investment Plan funding levels for fiscal years  2004 through 2006. According to FAA, since it completed its evaluation of  OASIS in February 2005, planning for the program’s implementation and  baseline remain unchanged. FAA plans to phase out OASIS between March  2006 and March 2007 in accordance with the new service provider’s  transition plan.
section_title: Three of the Major ATC System Acquisitions We Reviewed in Detail Currently Operate within Their Original Cost, Schedule, and Performance Targets, Despite Challenges
paragraphs: Three of the 16 major ATC system acquisitions we reviewed in detail are  currently operating within their original cost, schedule, and performance  targets; however they have experienced challenges, including symptoms of  one or more of the four factors cited earlier, such as requirements growth.  These system acquisitions include (1) ECG, a communications system  gateway that serves as the point of entry and exit for data used by FAA  personnel to provide air traffic control at 20 en route facilities; (2) ERAM, a  replacement for the primary computer system used to control air traffic;  and (3) ATOP, an integrated system for processing flight data for oceanic  flights.
While ECG has not exceeded its original cost, schedule, and performance  targets, it encountered requirements growth when FAA added a new  capability to address a security weakness. According to FAA officials,  correcting this weakness cost about $25,000, and an additional $480,000  will likely be needed to improve the monitoring capability for this system’s  operation. However, these cost increases will not exceed the system’s cost  or schedule targets. ERAM and ATOP also have areas that warrant  attention. For example, ERAM is a high-risk effort because of its size and  the amount of software that needs to be developed—over 1 million lines of  code are expected to be written for this effort. In addition, the DOT IG  reports that, to date, ERAM has experienced software growth of about  70,000 lines of code. While the DOT IG considers this amount of software  growth to be modest, given FAA’s long-standing difficulties with developing  this volume of software for system acquisitions while remaining within  cost, schedule, and/or performance targets, sustained management  attention is warranted. For ATOP, when FAA tried to accelerate the initial  deployment of this system by 14 months, it was unable to do so, because of  poorly defined requirements, unrealistic schedule estimates, and  inadequate evaluation by the contractor. In addition, according to contract  provisions, FAA assumed responsibility in February 2005 for the cost of  resolving any additional software problems it identifies.
Overall, although these system acquisitions are currently operating within  their cost, schedule, and performance targets, the challenges they have  experienced thus far indicate that they will require the sustained attention  of FAA’s senior managers to help ensure that they stay on track.
section_title: FAA Has Experienced Cost Growth and Schedule Extensions for the Remaining 39 System Acquisitions under the ATC Modernization Program
paragraphs: For the 39 system acquisitions that make up the balance of FAA’s ATC  modernization program, only 9 are considered “major” or directly  comparable to the 16 major ATC system acquisitions we reviewed in  detail.(See table 3.) Of these 9 major systems, 2 have required changes in  their cost targets. For example, for an automated weather observation  system, the Aviation Surface Weather Observation Network,the cost has  increased by 15 percent because of system capacity issues, among other  things. For another system that will be used on an interim basis for  managing air traffic until the new primary computer system is available, the  Host and Oceanic Computer System Replacement, the cost has decreased  by 13 percent because the agency determined that parts of the existing  system could be sustained through fiscal year 2008, which is within the  scope of the program.The remaining 30 systems are not directly  comparable, because they do not involve acquiring a new system. Instead,  they are what FAA terms “buy-it-by-the pound” purchases—systems that  are commercially available and ready for FAA to use without modification,  such as a landing system purchased to replace one that has reached the end  of its useful life. (See app. II for additional information on these 39  systems.)
To its credit, FAA has reported that it met its annual acquisition  performance goal for fiscal year 2004--to meet 80 percent of designated  milestones and maintain 80 percent of critical program costs within 10  percent of the budget as published in its Capital Investment Plan.  Specifically, it set annual performance cost goals and schedule milestones  for 41 of the 55 system acquisitions under the ATC modernization program.  For these 41 system acquisitions, FAA set 51 schedule milestones and met  46 of them—with “meeting the goal” defined as achieving 80 percent of its  designated program milestones. It also set and met its annual cost  performance goals for each of these 41 system acquisitions. In our opinion,  having and meeting such performance goals is commendable, but it is  important to note that these goals are updated program milestones and  cost targets, not those set at the program’s inception. Consequently, they  do not provide a consistent benchmark for assessing progress over time.  Moreover, as indicators of annual progress, they cannot be used in isolation  to measure progress in meeting cost and schedule targets over the life of an  acquisition. Finally, given the problems FAA has had in acquiring major  ATC systems for over two decades, it is too soon to tell whether meeting  these annual performance goals will ultimately improve the agency’s ability  to deliver system acquisitions as promised.
section_title: FAA Has Taken Some Positive Steps to Address Key Legacy Challenges, but Additional Steps Are Warranted to Reduce Risk and Strengthen Oversight
paragraphs: FAA has taken a number of positive steps, primarily through the ATO, to  address key legacy challenges in acquiring major systems under its ATC  modernization program; however, we have identified additional steps that  are warranted to reduce risk and strengthen oversight. Some of the steps  FAA has taken directly address the four factors we identified as  contributing to cost, schedule, and/or performance problems, while others  support more general efforts to improve the modernization program’s  management. The steps taken and additional steps needed are discussed  below by key areas.
subsections: section_title: Steps Taken to Address the Four Factors We Identified As Contributing to Performance Shortfalls and Additional Steps Needed
paragraphs: To address the concern that some system acquisitions have had difficulty  meeting performance targets because they have not received annual  funding at the levels called for in key planning documents, the ATO has  taken several steps. For example, the ATO has demonstrated a willingness  to cut major programs that were not meeting their performance targets  even after a significant investment of agency resources. The ATO is  currently reviewing all of its capital projects to reassess priorities. Both of  these actions should help improve the chances that sufficient funding will  be available for priority system acquisitions to conduct the annual activities  necessary to keep them on track to meet cost, schedule, and performance  targets.
Specifically, for fiscal year 2005, the appropriation for FAA’s facilities and  equipment budget, which funds the ATC modernization program, was $393  million less than the agency had planned to spend. FAA absorbed the $393  million reduction largely by cutting funding for three of the major system  acquisitions we reviewed in detail: a digital e-mail-type capability between  controllers and pilots was suspended (CPDLC); the next generation air-to- ground communication system had the funding cut for a major component  (NEXCOM); and a precision-landing system augmented by satellites for use  primarily by commercial airlines (LAAS) was returned to research and  development to focus the remaining funding for the system on resolving a  key performance shortfall. FAA also plans to defer funding for CPDLC and  LAAS for fiscal year 2006.
FAA decisions to cut or eliminate funding for system acquisitions in its  current ATC modernization system may prove to be positive in the long  run. For example, although FAA and National Air Traffic Controllers  Association officials say that the cuts the agency made to 3 of its 16 major  ATC system acquisitions will delay system benefits until the acquisitions  are fully developed and deployed, the cuts demonstrate FAA’s willingness  to suspend major ATC system acquisitions, despite large resource  investments. In addition, by delaying a system acquisition, FAA may later  be able to save time and money by leveraging the experiences that others  have had with developing and deploying systems that provide similar  capabilities (e.g., the controller-pilot e-mail-type capability for which FAA  cut funding is now in use in both Canada and Europe). Furthermore, as  FAA continues to reassesses its funding priorities, it could explore cost- saving options including taking steps to systematically (1) evaluate the  costs and benefits of continuing to fund system acquisitions across the ATC  modernization program at current and planned levels to identify potential  areas for savings and (2) identify potentially lower-cost alternatives to  current system acquisitions, such as lower-cost controller workstations.
FAA has also taken a number of steps to address two other factors—reduce  the risk of requirements growth and/or the need to undertake unplanned  work—and to improve its ability to better assess and manage the risks  associated with acquiring major ATC systems that require complex  software development. However, additional steps are needed in these  areas.
Processes for acquiring software and systems: FAA has made progress  in improving its process for acquiring software-intensive systems-- including establishing a framework for improving its system  management processes, and performing many of the desired practices  for selected FAA projects. The quality of these systems and software,  which are essential to FAA’s ATC modernization program, depends on  the value and maturity of the processes used to acquire, develop,  manage, and maintain them. In response to our previous  recommendations, FAA developed an FAA-integrated capability  maturity model (iCMM). Since FAA implemented the model, a growing  number of system acquisitions have adopted the model, and its use has  paid off in enhanced productivity, higher quality, greater ability to  predict schedules and resources, better morale, and improved  communication and teamwork. However, ATO did not mandate the use  of the process improvement model for all software-intensive acquisition  projects. In response to our recommendation, the ATO informed us of  its plans to establish, by June 30, 2005, an overall policy defining the  ATO’s expectations for process improvement, and by September 30,  2005, a process improvement plan to address and coordinate  improvement activities throughout the organization.
Management of information technology investments: In 2004, we  reported that FAA has made considerable progress in managing its  information technology investments.However, we also found that  FAA’s lack of regular review of investments that are more than 2 years  into their operations is a weakness in the agency’s ability to oversee  more than $1 billion of its information technology investments as a total  package of competing investment options and pursue those that best  meet the agency’s goals. FAA recently informed us that it has taken a  number of steps aimed at achieving a higher maturity level, including  establishing service-level mission need statements and service-level  reviews, which address operational systems to ensure that they are  achieving the expected level of performance. While these steps could  resolve some of the deficiencies that we previously reported, we have  not yet performed our own evaluation of these steps. FAA could  potentially realize considerable savings or performance improvements if  these reviews result in the discontinuation of some investments, since  operating systems beyond their second year of service accounted for 37  percent of FAA’s total investment in information technology in fiscal  year 2004.
Enterprise architecture: FAA has established a project office to develop  a NAS enterprise architecture—a blueprint for modernization—and  designated a chief architect, and has committed resources to this effort,  and issued its latest version of its architecture. However, FAA has not  yet taken key steps to improve its architecture development, such as  designating a committee or group representing the enterprise to direct,  oversee, or approve the architecture; establishing a policy for  developing, maintaining, and implementing the architecture; or fully  developing architecture products that meet contemporary guidance and  describe both the “As Is” and “To Be” environments and developing a  sequencing plan for transitioning between the two.
To help address concerns that stakeholders have not been sufficiently  involved throughout the development of major systems acquisitions, FAA  has taken a number of steps. For example, when the ATO was created, it  brought together the FAA entities that develop systems and those who will  ultimately use them. Specifically, it reorganized FAA’s air traffic services  and research and acquisition organizations along functional lines of  business to bring stakeholders together and integrate goals. The ATO is  also continuing with a phased approach to system acquisitions that it began  using under Free Flight Phase 1, through which it has begun to involve  stakeholders more actively throughout a system acquisition’s development  and deployment. However, as we reported in November 2004, FAA needs to  take additional steps to ensure the continued and active involvement of  stakeholders in certifying new ATC system acquisitions. In addition, the  union that represents the specialists who install, maintain, troubleshoot,  and certify NAS systems, recently testified that over the past 2 years, FAA  has systematically eliminated the participation of these specialists in all but  a few modernization programs. Given the importance of stakeholder  involvement in the development and deployment of new ATC systems, their  continued involvement in ATC modernization efforts will be important to  help avoid the types of problems that led to cost growth and delays for  STARS.
section_title: Other Steps FAA Has Taken to Improve the Modernization Program’s Management and Additional Steps That Are Needed
paragraphs: Reassessment of capital investment to decrease operating costs: Both the  FAA Administrator and the ATO’s chief operating officer have committed to  basing future funding decisions for system acquisitions on their  contribution to reducing the agency’s operating costs while maintaining  safety. This is consistent with our 2004 recommendation that FAA consider  its total portfolio of investments as a package of competing options.
Currently, only 1 of the 55 system acquisitions in FAA’s ATC modernization  program—FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure—helps to reduce the  agency’s operating costs. Most of FAA’s major system acquisitions are  aimed at increasing the capacity of the NAS and delivering benefits to  system users. The ATO is in the process of reviewing all of its capital  investments, including system acquisitions under the ATC modernization  program, to identify areas of cost savings and to focus limited funding on  investments that will reduce operating costs. However, because FAA has  only recently begun to incorporate this type of analysis of the costs and  operational efficiency of system acquisitions into the decision-making and  management processes, it is too early to assess the results.
Acquisition Management System: The ATO has taken a number of steps to  improve its Acquisition Management System (AMS). For example, it has  revised AMS to require that acquisition planning documents be prepared in  a format consistent with that prescribed by OMB for use in justifying all  major capital investments. In addition, the ATO revised AMS in December  2004, in part to respond to recommendations we made about needed  changes in its investment management practices for information  technology. However, we have not yet independently assessed the  sufficiency of these changes. Moreover, additional changes to AMS are  warranted. For example, while AMS provides some discipline for acquiring  major ATC systems, it does not use a knowledge-based approach to  acquisitions, characteristic of best commercial and DOD practices. A  knowledge-based approach includes using established criteria to attain  specific knowledge at three critical junctures in the acquisition cycle,  which we call knowledge points, and requiring oversight at the corporate  executive level for each of these knowledge points. Experience has shown  that not attaining the level of knowledge called for at each knowledge point  increases the risk of cost growth and schedule delays. We recommended,  among other things, that FAA take several actions to more closely align its  acquisition management system with commercial best practices. FAA said  that our recommendations would be helpful to them as they continue to  refine this system.
Cost accounting and cost estimating practices: FAA has improved its  financial management by moving forward with the development of a cost  accounting system, which it plans to fully deploy by 2006. Ultimately, FAA  plans to use this cost information routinely in its decision-making. When  implemented, this cost accounting system will address a long-standing  GAO concern that FAA has not had the needed cost accounting practices in  place to effectively manage software-intensive investments, which  characterize many of agency’s major ATC system acquisitions. This type of  information can be used to improve future estimates of cost for these  acquisitions.
Organizational culture: FAA has also sought to establish an organizational  culture that supports sound acquisitions. We have ongoing work to assess  FAA’s efforts concerning cultural change.
ATO business practices: To improve its investment management decision- making and oversight of major ATC acquisitions, the ATO has informed us  that it has initiated the following steps, which we have reported are  important to effective oversight:   integrated AMS and OMB’s Capital Planning and Investment Control  Process to develop a process for analyzing, tracking, and evaluating the  risks and results of all major capital investments made by FAA;  conducted Executive Council reviews of project breaches of 5 percent  in cost, schedule, and/or performance to better manage cost growth;  issued monthly variance reports to upper management to keep them  apprised of cost and schedule trends; and  increased the use of cost monitoring or earned value management  systems to improve oversight of programs.
However, much work remains before the ATO will have key business  practices in place.
Specifically, according to the ATO’s chief operating officer, it will be at least  2 years before the ATO has completed the basic management processes  needed to use the new financial management systems it has been putting in  place.
Despite progress to date, until the agency addresses the residual issues  cited above, it will continue to risk the project management problems  affecting cost, schedule, and/or performance that have hampered its ability  to acquire systems for improving air traffic control.
section_title: A Constrained Budgetary Environment Could Further Challenge the ATO’s Efforts to Modernize the ATC System
paragraphs: The ATO will be further challenged to modernize the ATC system in the  current constrained budget environment and remain within the  administration’s future budget targets, which are lower than those of recent  years. Specifically, for fiscal year 2005, FAA requested $393 million less  than it had planned to spend for activities under the facilities and  equipment budget account, which funds the ATC modernization program  and related modernization activities. In addition, the President’s fiscal year  2006 budget submission calls for an additional cut to this budget account of  $77 million from FAA’s planned level, which would bring the fiscal year  2006 funding level to about $470 million below the fiscal year 2004  appropriation. Moreover, FAA officials told us that funding for the facilities  and equipment account is likely to hold near fiscal year 2004 levels, or at  about $2.5 billion annually, for the next 5 years. In total, FAA plans to spend  $4.4 billion during fiscal years 2005 through 2009 on key modernization  efforts, despite FAA receiving about $2 billion less than it had planned in  appropriations over this 5-year period for its facilities and equipment  budget, which funds the ATC modernization program and related  modernization activities.
To fund its major system acquisitions while remaining within the  administration’s budget targets, the ATO has eliminated planned funding to  start new projects and substantially reduced planned funding for other  areas. These funding decisions are reflected in FAA’s updated Capital  Investment Plan. This plan shows substantially reduced funding for two  major system acquisitions in fiscal year 2005—CPDLC and LAAS--and  defers funding for them in fiscal year 2006. For the remaining 14 major ATC  system acquisitions we reviewed in detail, FAA plans to increase funding by  $533 million between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2009. In contrast, for  the remaining 39 system acquisitions, FAA has reduced funding by $420  million for this period.
The planned increases in funding for these 14 major system acquisitions  also come at the expense of other modernization activities outside the ATC  modernization program, such as capital expenditures to replace aging ATC  facilities that will house the system acquisitions. For example, FAA reports  that it needs $2.5 billion (2005 dollars) annually to renew its aging physical  infrastructure—assuming a $30 billion value of its assets and a 7- to 12-year  useful life. According to the ATO, much of its physical infrastructure,  including the buildings and towers that house costly ATC systems, is over  30 years old and needs to be refurbished or replaced. However, FAA plans  to reduce funding for facilities by nearly $790 million between fiscal year  2005 and fiscal year 2009—a plan that runs counter to its reported need to  refurbish or replace its physical infrastructure. Furthermore, FAA also  plans to cut $1.4 billion from its spending plans for fiscal years 2005  through 2009 for, among other things, new system acquisitions in the ATC  modernization pipeline that do not yet have agency-approved cost,  schedule, and performance targets or baselines (e.g., a new technology that  would allow pilots to “see” the location of other aircraft on cockpit  display).
Our work has shown that FAA has taken some important steps to prioritize  the 55 system acquisitions under its ATC modernization program. These  revised priorities are reflected in its most recent plans, which detail the  areas where FAA plans to make cuts within its facilities and equipment  budget to live within its expected means during fiscal years 2005 through  2009. However, our work has also shown that these plans do not provide  detailed information about the trade-offs that are underlie decisions to fully  fund some systems and to defer, reduce, or eliminate funding for others and  how these cuts will affect FAA’s modernization efforts, including what  impact they will have on interdependent system acquisitions. To convey  information to decision-makers on the impact of reduced funding on  modernization, the ATO should detail its rationale and explicitly identify  the trade-offs it is making to reach the administration’s budget targets,  highlighting those programs slated for increased funding and those slated  for reduced funding. Key information includes delayed benefits, the impact  of cutting one ATC system acquisition on related or interdependent  systems, and increased costs for maintaining legacy systems until new  systems are deployed. Overall, the ATO needs to explicitly identify the  implications of deferring, reducing, or cutting funding for a particular  system or activity on the agency’s ability to modernize both the ATC system  and related components of the NAS in the near, mid, and longer term. While  funding deferrals, reductions, and cuts to ATC system acquisitions and  related activities in FAA’s facilities and equipment budget may be beneficial  and necessary in the long run, it is important for senior agency, department,  OMB, and congressional decision-makers to have complete information to  make informed decisions about the trade-offs that are being made when  they consider annual budget submissions.
As part of our research, we sought the perspective of an international  group of experts, who also suggested that the ATO should provide the  administration and Congress with detailed information in its budget  submissions about the impact of reduced budgets on both ATC and NAS  modernization. These experts were a part of an international panel of  aviation experts we convened to address, among other issues, how federal  budget constraints have affected ATC modernization and what steps the  ATO could take in the short term to address these constraints.
For example, aviation experts emphasized the need for the ATO—which is  now the organizational entity responsible for acquiring ATC systems—to  prioritize its capital investments, as well as its investment in operating  systems, with affordability in mind. These experts believe that the ATO  needs to review all of its spending plans for modernization, determine  which programs can realistically be funded, and select programs to cut.  Moreover, they indicated that the ATO should have a mechanism to explain  to Congress the implications that cutting one system has on other systems.  For example, according to one of these experts, the current budget process  tears apart a highly layered, interdependent system and does not reveal  synergies between projects. Then, when the budget request goes to  Congress, he said, “you have no opportunity to try to explain to anybody  the interconnections of these programs.” As a result, when the  appropriators decide not to fund a project, they may not understand how  their decision will affect other projects.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The constrained budgetary environment makes it more important than ever  for FAA to meet cost, schedule, and performance targets for each of the  major ATC systems it continues to fund and to ensure that related  activities, such as those to refurbish or replace the buildings that house  ATC modernization systems, receive sufficient funding. The need for FAA  to accommodate a 25 percent increase in demand for air travel over the  next decade underscores the importance of these efforts. FAA has  demonstrated a commitment to live within its expected means during fiscal  years 2005 through 2009 by setting priorities among its ATC system  acquisitions and identifying areas where it plans to cut funding. However,  without detailed information about the trade-offs that underlie decisions to  fully fund some systems and to defer, reduce, or eliminate funding for  others, FAA’s plans do not allow senior agency, department, OMB, and  congressional decision-makers to assess the implications of approving  annual budget submissions for the ATC modernization program and related  modernization activities that support more comprehensive efforts to  modernize the NAS.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that key administration and congressional decision-makers  have more complete information to assess the potential impact of annual  budget submissions on individual ATC system acquisitions, the overall ATC  modernization program, and related larger-scale NAS modernization  activities funded through the facilities and equipment budget, we  recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct FAA to identify  which activities under the ATC modernization program have had funding  deferred, reduced, or eliminated and to provide detailed information about  the impact of those decisions on FAA’s ability to modernize the ATC system  and related components of the NAS in the near, mid, and longer term. This  information should be reported to Congress annually.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a copy of our draft report to DOT for review and comment.  The draft was reviewed by officials throughout DOT and FAA, including the  Vice President for Acquisition and Business Service. These officials  provided comments through email. They generally agreed with the report  and provided technical comments on specific aspects of the report, which  we incorporated as appropriate. The FAA officials said they are continuing  to consider our recommendation and indicated they would provide a  response to it as required by 31 U.S.C. §720.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested  congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and the  Administrator, FAA. We will also make copies available to others upon  request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please call me at (202) 512-2834 if you or your staff have any questions  about this report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations  and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key  contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Background and Status of FAA’s 16 Major System Acquisitions We Reviewed in Detail
subsections: section_title: En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM)
subsections: section_title: Purpose and Status
paragraphs: Modular and expandable, ERAM will replace software and hardware in the  host computers at FAA’s 20 en route air traffic control centers, which  provide separation, routing, and advisory information. ERAM’s flight data  processing capabilities will provide flexible routing around restrictions,  such as congestion and weather. It will improve surveillance by increasing  the number and types of surveillance sources, such as radars. ERAM will  provide safety alerts to prevent aircraft collisions and congestion.
ERAM has not breached schedule or cost parameters, but it remains a high- risk program because of its size and its amount of software code (more  than 1 million lines). The contractor has reported that engineering costs are  rising because of lower productivity than originally planned and an  increase in the number of lines of software code. According to FAA  officials, the contractor’s management reserve can absorb additional  software development costs.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: We examined (1) FAA’s experience in meeting cost, schedule, and/or  performance targets for major system acquisitions under its ATC  modernization program, (2) the steps FAA has taken to address long- standing challenges with the ATC modernization program and additional  steps that are needed, and (3) the potential effects of the constrained  budget environment on FAA’s ability to modernize the ATC system.
To address the first objective, we selected 16 of the 55 system acquisitions  in the ATC modernization program to review in detail. We selected these  16 systems in July 2004, when this review was still a part of our broader  work on FAA’s efforts to modernize the National Airspace System (NAS).Specifically, we selected the 16 ATC system acquisitions with the largest  life-cycle costs that met the following criteria: each system had cost,  schedule, and/or performance targets, was discussed in our prior and  Department of Transportation Inspector General reports, had not been  fully implemented or deployed by 2004, and received funding in 2004. We  reviewed this list with FAA officials to ensure that we did not exclude any  significant system. (See app. I for additional information on these 16  systems.) FAA does not have a formal definition of major systems under its  Acquisition Management System; however, agency officials told us that if a  system acquisition has a formally approved baseline, we could consider it  “major.” Using this definition, we determined that 25 of the 55 system  acquisitions under the ATC modernization program are major. The  remaining 30 system acquisitions are generally what FAA refers to as buy-it- by-the-pound systems that are commercially available and ready to use  without modification, such as those to replace a system that has reached  the end of its useful life.
For fiscal year 2005, the 55 systems accounted for about 55 percent of  FAA’s facilities and equipment (F&E) budget, or $1.38 billion of the $2.52  billion appropriated for the F&E budget. The 16 major systems accounted  for 36 percent ($917.3 million), and the other 39 system acquisitions  accounted for about 19 percent ($460 million). The remaining 45 percent of  the F&E budget will be spent on facilities, mission support, and personnel- related activities ($1.14 billion).
To assess the 16 major system acquisitions, we relied largely on data  collected from FAA and contracting officials for two engagements we  issued in November 2004 on FAA’s acquisition and certification processes.  In turn, we updated this information and collected data on the remaining 39  systems under the modernization program, primarily through interviews  with FAA officials and analyses of the data they provided, including key  acquisition documents. (See app. II for additional information on these 39  system acquisitions.) In addition, we reviewed our past reports and those  of the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General. Furthermore, we  interviewed FAA officials within the recently created ATO and collected  and analyzed the documents they provided. We also interviewed officials  with the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Air Transport Association,  Department of Defense, National Air Traffic Controllers Association, and  RTCA. Furthermore, we convened a panel of international aviation  expertsto obtain their views on, among other things, the factors that have  affected the cost, schedule, and/or performance of FAA’s ATC  modernization program.
In addition, we assessed the reliability of FAA’s cost and schedule  estimates. Through interviews with FAA officials about their data system  and quality controls, we determined that the cost and schedule estimates  were appropriate for use in our report. Specifically, the estimates are  sufficiently authoritative, appropriate, and reliable to allow us to use them  without conducting any further assessment. The estimates appear to be  based on reasonable assumptions. Our review did not focus on FAA’s  efforts to modernize its facilities.
To address the second objective, we interviewed FAA officials, primarily  within the recently created ATO, and collected and analyzed the documents  they provided. We also interviewed officials with the Aircraft Owners and  Pilots Association, Air Transport Association, Department of Defense,  National Air Traffic Controllers Association, and RTCA.
We also reviewed past GAO reports and those of the Department of  Transportation’s Inspector General. In addition, we obtained the views of  the international aviation experts who participated in our panel on what  steps the ATO could take in the short term to address the factors that have  affected the cost, schedule, and/or performance of FAA’s ATC  modernization program.
To address the third objective, we interviewed officials within FAA’s ATO  and obtained and analyzed data on FAA’s capital investments and annual  budgets. We also interviewed officials with other organizations cited above.  In addition, we obtained the views of the international aviation panelists on  how federal budget constraints have affected ATC modernization and what  steps the ATO could take in the short term to address these constraints. We  conducted our review from November 2004 through May 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the person named above, Beverly L. Norwood, Tamera  Dorland, Seth Dykes, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Brandon Haller, Bert Japikse,  Maren McAvoy, and Ed Menoche made key contributions to this report.