Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism
Published: 2003-03-03T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In GAO's past work, we have stressed the importance of a national strategy to combat terrorism. We stated that such a national strategy should provide a clear statement about what the nation hopes to achieve. A national strategy should not only define the roles of federal agencies, but also those of state and local governments, the private sector, and the international community. A national strategy also should establish goals, objectives, priorities, outcomes, milestones, and performance measures. In essence, a national strategy should incorporate the principles of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, which requires federal agencies to set strategic goals, measure performance, and report on the degree to which goals are met.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: We view the new strategies as a positive step forward. While it will take some time for us to fully evaluate whether they form a cohesive and comprehensive framework, there are some positive indications. The new strategies show cohesion in that they are organized in a hierarchy, share common themes, and cross-reference each other. For example, they provide high-level goals and objectives on the issues of national security in general, and how combating terrorism fits into that larger picture, how to provide for homeland security, and how to combat terrorism overseas. In addition, they provide more detailed goals and objectives for specific functions or areas that include military operations, weapons of mass destruction, money laundering, cyber security, and the protection of physical infrastructures. In addition, the collective strategies are more comprehensive than the single strategy they generally replace because, consistent with our earlier recommendations, they include not just the federal government, but also state and local governments, the private sector, and the international community. There will be many challenges to implementing these strategies in a manner that is strategy-driven, integrated, and effective. Given the recency of these strategies, it is premature to evaluate their collective implementation. Regarding the question of whether these strategies are driving programs, it is important to note that these strategies reflect a host of pre-existing programs: some of the programs to implement the new strategies have been in place for several years. Nonetheless, the strategies address the implementation of some programs more vigorously than before. Regarding the integration of programs, it is important that federal agencies have clear roles and responsibilities to combat terrorism. Given the number of agencies, it is also important that there be mechanisms to coordinate across agencies. We have identified federal agency roles and responsibilities and coordination mechanisms for both homeland security and combating terrorism overseas and will continue to evaluate their effectiveness. For example, we recently have designated the implementation and transformation of the Department of Homeland Security as a high-risk federal activity. Moreover, implementation must extend beyond the federal level to integrate these efforts with state and local governments, the private sector, and the international community. Regarding the effectiveness of these strategies, performance measures will be important to monitor the successes of programs. One key to assessing overall performance that we previously have identified is that strategies should define an end-state of what the strategies are trying to achieve. Some strategies meet this test, but they generally do not include detailed performance measures. This raises the importance of individual federal agencies having performance measures and reporting their progress. Beyond federal agencies, national measures of success may require a dialogue on appropriate performance measures for state and local governments, the private sector, and the international community. Congress also has an important role in authorizing, funding, and overseeing the implementation of these strategies to protect the American people from terrorism both at home and abroad.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to participate in this hearing  on national strategies related to combating terrorism. More than 2 years  ago, in July 2000, GAO testified before this subcommittee on this very  topic and cited concerns over a potential proliferation of overarching  national strategies. At that time, we stated that there should be only one  national strategy to combat terrorism. We added that additional planning  guidance (e.g., at more detailed levels for specific functions) should fall  under the one national strategy in a clear hierarchy. My testimony today is  based upon GAO’s body of work for this and other committees and  subcommittees conducted over the past 6 years—much of it related to  national strategies and their implementation. At the end of my statement is  a list of related GAO products.
Over the last year or so, the administration developed and published  several new national strategies related to combating terrorism. This  constellation of strategies generally replaces a single strategy issued in  December 1998—the Attorney General’s Five-Year Interagency  Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan—that focused on federal  efforts. To date, we have identified 10 other national strategies related to  terrorism    National Security Strategy of the United States of America,    National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002;    National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003;    National Military Strategy of the United States of America,    National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, October    National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December    National Money Laundering Strategy, July 2002;    National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, February 2003;    National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical  Infrastructures and Key Assets, February 2003; and    National Drug Control Strategy, February 2002.
In my statement today, after providing some background on the strategies,  I will discuss the questions raised in your letter inviting GAO to testify. I  have divided the five hearing questions into two major topics. The first  major topic addresses whether the new national strategies form a  framework that is cohesive and comprehensive. The second major topic  addresses whether the strategies will facilitate implementation of  programs that are strategy-driven, integrated, and effective. Both topics  present difficult questions to answer definitively at this point. The  strategies by themselves, no matter how cohesive and comprehensive, will  not ensure a strategy-driven, integrated, and effective set of programs to  combat terrorism. The ultimate value of these strategies will be in their  implementation. Also related to implementation, 9 of the 10 strategies are  less than 14 months old, and 3 are less than 1 month old. Notwithstanding  these limitations, I will provide GAO’s observations to date on these  strategies.
In our past work, we have stressed the importance of a national strategy to  combat terrorism. We stated that such a national strategy should provide  a clear statement about what the nation hopes to achieve. A national  strategy should not only define the roles of federal agencies, but also those  of state and local governments, the private sector, and the international  community. A national strategy also should establish goals, objectives,  priorities, outcomes, milestones, and performance measures. In essence, a  national strategy should incorporate the principles of the Government  Performance and Results Act of 1993, which requires federal agencies to  set strategic goals, measure performance, and report on the degree to  which goals are met.
subsections: section_title: Background on National Strategies Related to Terrorism
paragraphs: National efforts to combat terrorism derive from a series of presidential  directives going back at least as far as 1986. The previous administration  issued a federal strategy for combating terrorism—the Attorney General’s  Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan—in  1998. The Congress mandated this plan, which was intended to serve as a  baseline strategy for coordination of national policy and operational  capabilities to combat terrorism both at home and abroad. The  Department of Justice said that plan, in combination with several related  presidential directives, represented a comprehensive national strategy.  The plan identified several high-level goals aimed at preventing and  deterring terrorism, maximizing international cooperation to combat  terrorism, improving domestic crisis and consequence planning and  management, improving state and local capabilities, safeguarding  information infrastructure, and leading research and development efforts  to enhance counterterrorism capabilities. The plan set forth efforts by the  Department of Justice in partnership with other federal agencies to  improve readiness to address the terrorist threat. The Department of  Justice issued annual updates to the Five-Year Plan in 1999 and 2000,  which did not revise the basic plan but tracked agencies’ progress in  implementing the original plan. More recently, Justice Department officials  told us they are no longer providing annual updates because other  interagency plans have been released, as discussed below.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, a series of new  national strategies were developed and published to help guide U.S. policy.  Some of these national strategies are specific to combating terrorism,  while others involve terrorism to lesser degrees. Table 1 describes various  national strategies related to combating terrorism.
subsections: section_title: Some Strategies Define Terrorism and Include an Assessment of the Threat
paragraphs: The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, the  National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and the National Strategy  for Homeland Security all define terrorism. For example, the National  Strategy for Homeland Security characterizes terrorism as “any  premeditated, unlawful act dangerous to human life or public welfare that  is intended to intimidate or coerce civilian populations or governments.”  This description, according to that strategy, captures the core concepts  shared by the various definitions of terrorism contained in the U.S. Code,  each crafted to achieve a legal standard of specificity and clarity. This  description covers kidnappings; hijackings; shootings; conventional  bombings; attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear  weapons; cyber attacks; and any number of other forms of malicious  violence. Terrorists can be U.S. citizens or foreigners, acting in concert  with others, on their own, or on behalf of a hostile state.
Commonly accepted definitions of such terms as terrorism and homeland  security help provide assurance that organizational, management, and  budgetary decisions are made consistently across the organizations  involved in a crosscutting effort. For example, they help guide agencies in  organizing and allocating resources and can help promote more effective  agency and intergovernmental operations by facilitating communication. A  common definition also can help to enforce budget discipline and support  more accurate monitoring of expenditures. Without commonly accepted  definitions, the potential exists for an uncoordinated approach to  combating terrorism caused by duplication of efforts or gaps in coverage,  misallocation of resources, and inadequate monitoring of expenditures.  We previously recommended that the President direct the Office of  Homeland Security to (1) develop a comprehensive, governmentwide  definition of homeland security and (2) include the definition in the   forthcoming national strategy. Both recommendations were implemented  with the publication of the National Strategy for Homeland Security.
As we have testified before this subcommittee, an important step in  developing sound strategies to combat terrorism is to develop a thorough  assessment of the terrorist threat. Intelligence and law enforcement  agencies continuously assess the foreign and domestic terrorist threats to  the United States. To be considered a threat, a terrorist group must not  only exist, but also have the intention and capability to launch attacks. In  prior reports, we have recommended that the federal government conduct  multidisciplinary and analytically sound threat assessments. Threat  assessments are part of a risk management approach that can be used to  establish requirements and prioritize program investments.  In 1999 we  recommended that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conduct a  national-level authoritative threat assessment. According to FBI officials,  they have recently completed their threat assessment related to our  recommendation. We are in the process of reviewing the assessment to  determine the extent it is consistent with our recommendation. We hope  that such an assessment will be kept up to date and used to further  develop and implement the new national strategies related to combating  terrorism.
Some of the new strategies we reviewed include some assessment of the  threat. While some of the new strategies lay out the nature of the threats  and the vulnerabilities in detail, others briefly describe the threat in  general terms. For example, the National Strategy for Combating  Terrorism discusses the nature of the terrorist threat today, including the  structure of terrorism, the changing nature of terrorism, the  interconnected terrorist organizations, the availability of weapons of mass  destruction, and the new global environment. Some strategies describe  both the threat of and vulnerability to terrorist attacks. For example, the  National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace discusses cyberspace threats and  vulnerabilities facing the United States. It lays out the threats and  vulnerabilities as a five-level problem—home user/small business, large  enterprises, critical sectors and/or infrastructures, national issues and  vulnerabilities, and global. Also, the National Strategy for the Physical  Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets and the National  Strategy for Homeland Security discuss both the threat and vulnerability  of a terrorist attack. Other strategies we reviewed only briefly described  the threat or simply defined the threat in general terms. For example, the  National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction defined the  threat, while the National Money Laundering Strategy provided limited  discussion about the nature and extent of the threat.
section_title: New Strategies Form Framework
paragraphs: Now I will discuss the key topics that the subcommittee wants to address  in this hearing, starting with the question of whether the new national  strategies form a cohesive and comprehensive framework. While it will  take some time for us to fully answer this question, we view the new  strategies, and the framework they provide, as a positive step. The new  strategies show cohesion in that they are organized in a hierarchy, share  common themes, and cross-reference each other. In addition, the  collective strategies are more comprehensive than the single strategy they  generally replace because they include more detailed functions and more  players.
subsections: section_title: New Strategies Show Cohesion through Hierarchy, Common Themes, and Linkages
paragraphs: In our analysis, we found specific indicators that the strategies form a  cohesive framework. For the purpose of this testimony, we are defining  cohesiveness as the extent that the strategies have some hierarchy, share  common themes, and link to each other.
Regarding a hierarchy among strategies, I would like to again reference  our July 2000 testimony. At that time, we stated that there should be one  national strategy to combat terrorism with additional planning guidance  (e.g., for specific functions) under the one strategy in a clear hierarchy.  While the administration has not taken that exact path, its approach is  similar. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America  provides the overarching strategy related to national security as a whole,  including terrorism. The National Strategy for Homeland Security and  the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism provide, respectively, the  more specific strategies related to combating terrorism at home and  overseas. This differs from what we had envisioned in that there are two  top-level strategies dedicated to terrorism instead of one. However, this  approach is consistent with our earlier views because the two strategies  cover separate topics—the first covers defensive domestic issues and the  second covers offensive overseas issues. The other strategies provide  further levels of detail on the specific functions related to military  operations, money laundering, weapons of mass destruction, cyber  security, and protection of physical infrastructure.
Our interpretation of the hierarchy among strategies is somewhat different  from how the administration has presented it. According to the  administration, the National Security Strategy of the United States of  America and the National Strategy for Homeland Security are top-level  strategies that together address U.S. security both overseas and  domestically. According to the administration, these two strategies  establish a framework that takes precedence over all other national  strategies, plans, and programs. However, we do not view the hierarchy as  that absolute because some strategies contain independent elements that  do not overlap with the other strategies. For an example of the latter, both  the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and the National Money  Laundering Strategy include some domestic criminal elements not  associated with national security or terrorism. Further, the National Drug  Control Strategy has relatively little overlap with these other strategies.  Figure 1 is an attempt to display graphically how some of these national  strategies fit into a hierarchy and overlap.
Within the hierarchy of strategies, more detailed functional strategies  might be useful, as illustrated by the National Strategy to Combat  Weapons of Mass Destruction. In our August 2002, report on the  Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration’s  research and development (R&D) program, we recommended that the  Office of Homeland Security clarify that agency’s Nonproliferation and  Verification R&D Program’s role in relation to other agencies conducting  counterterrorism R&D and to achieve an appropriate balance between  short-term and long-term research. We also reported that there is a  conflict among Department of Energy laboratories between short- versus  long-term research and that this conflict has created a gap in which the  most important immediate needs of users, or highest risks, are in some  cases going unaddressed in favor of an advanced technology that only can  be delivered over the long term. The National Strategy to Combat  Weapons of Mass Destruction addresses our concerns, in part, by noting  that the new Counterproliferation Technology Coordination Committee  will act to improve interagency coordination of U.S. government  counterproliferation research and development efforts. The committee is  expected to assist in identifying gaps and overlaps in existing programs  and in examining options for future investment strategies.
The various strategies also show cohesion by sharing common themes.  For example, nearly all of the strategies contain either goals or objectives  relating to strengthening international relationships and cooperation and  strengthening intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities, while just  over half of the strategies contain either goals or objectives relevant to the  strengthening of capabilities to deter, prevent, and respond to weapons of  mass destruction. Moreover, among the four strategies most relevant to  homeland securitythe National Strategy for Homeland Security, the  National Strategy for Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and  Key Assets, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, and the National  Money Laundering Strategy all contain a number of additional, similar  themes. With the exception of the National Money Laundering Strategy,  which does not address critical infrastructure and key asset protection, all  of these homeland security-related strategies contain either goals or  objectives aimed at strengthening intergovernmental and private sector  relationships, critical infrastructure and key asset protection, and  information-sharing capabilities. Similarly, among the strategies more  relevant to combating terrorism overseassuch as the National Security  Strategy of the United States of America, the National Strategy for  Combating Terrorism, the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass  Destruction, and the National Military Strategy of the United States of  Americaall contain either goals or objectives relating to strengthening  international relationships; strengthening intelligence gathering and  analysis capabilities; and improving capabilities to deter, prevent, and  respond to weapons of mass destruction. As mentioned earlier, the  National Drug Control Strategy has relatively little overlap with the other  strategies. It does not share many of these themeswith the exception of  strengthening border control capabilities and, to some extent, the  strengthening of international relationships and cooperation.
In addition, the strategies show evidence of cohesion through linkages  among them. These linkages occur through specific citations and cross- references from one document to another. At least half of the strategies  cite either the National Security Strategy of the United States of America  or the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The most extensively  linked strategies include the National Security Strategy of the United  States of America, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the  National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and the National Strategy to  Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. Strategies that cover topics  beyond terrorism, such as criminal law enforcement, are less extensively  linked to these documents. For example, the National Strategy to Secure  Cyberspace and the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of  Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets solely cite each other and the  National Strategy for Homeland Security. The National Drug Control  Strategy and the National Money Laundering Strategy contain no explicit  linkages to any of the other strategies, but are referenced in the National  Strategy for Homeland Security. There are some areas where linkages  could be improved. For example, the National Strategy for Homeland  Security is the only strategy to explicitly cite virtually all of the strategies  and explain their relationships to it and to one another. Some strategies  contain broad themes that are covered in more detail by other strategies,  but do not cite these documents. For instance, although the National  Strategy for Combating Terrorism mentions the topic of terrorist  financing, it does not mention the National Money Laundering Strategy.  Nevertheless, it mentions the National Drug Control Strategy, a document  with considerably less thematic overlap in terms of terrorism. The  National Security Strategy of the United States of America covers many  broad strategic themes, but refers to no other national strategies, although  many of the strategies refer back to it.
section_title: New Strategies Include Key Functions and Organizations
paragraphs: Potential indicators of comprehensiveness are whether the strategies  include all relevant functions and organizations. As stated earlier, they  collectively provide not only the broader context of combating terrorism,  but also the more detailed strategies for the functions of military  operations, money laundering, weapons of mass destruction, cyber  security, and protection of physical infrastructure. While parts of the  strategies overlap, GAO has not yet done a complete analysis to determine  whether gaps exist in the collective coverage of these strategies. However,  some of our work for this subcommittee indicates that intelligence is a  critical function that cuts across all the other strategies, but does not have  a strategy itself related to terrorism, at least according to Central  Intelligence Agency officials with whom we spoke.
Regarding the inclusion of all relevant organizations, the collective  strategies are more comprehensive than the Attorney General’s Five-Year  Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan that they  generally replaced. In our September 2001 report on combating domestic  terrorism, we had characterized this plan as a “federal” plan and not a  “national” plan because it did not include state and local governments,  where appropriate. In addition, our more recent work on homeland  security stressed the need for partnerships with state and local  governments and the private sector. Consistent with GAO’s earlier  findings and recommendations, some of the new strategies include not just  the federal government, but also these other players as well as the  international community.
section_title: Potential Challenges in Implementing the Strategies
paragraphs: The strategies by themselves, no matter how cohesive and comprehensive,  will not ensure a strategy-driven, integrated, and effective set of programs  to combat terrorism. The ability to ensure these things will be determined  through time as the strategies are implemented. Given that these strategies  are relatively new, GAO has not yet evaluated their implementation, either  individually or collectively. However, we have done work that  demonstrates the federal government, and the nation as a whole, will face  many implementation challenges. For example, we have designated the  implementation and transformation of the Department of Homeland  Security as a high-risk federal activity. The Congress also will play a key  role in implementing these strategies.
subsections: section_title: New Strategies Reflect Long-Standing Programs
paragraphs: Regarding the question of whether these strategies are driving programs, it  is important to note that these new strategies reflect a host of pre-existing  programs. For example, certain themes and related programs contained in  the new strategiespreventing and deterring terrorism, maximizing  international cooperation to combat terrorism, improving domestic crisis  and consequence planning and management, improving state and local  capabilities, safeguarding information infrastructure, and leading research  and development efforts to enhance counterterrorism capabilities—were  included in the Attorney General’s Five-Year Interagency  Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan. Some of the related  policies and programs have been in place for several years. For example,  the State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program, which provides  assistance to other countries to improve their capabilities, has existed  since 1983. In another example, federal assistance programs for state and  local first responders to help them prepare to respond to weapons of mass  destruction—the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici training—was established in 1996.
section_title: Implementation Requires Integration Among Many Sectors
paragraphs: Integrating federal agencies is a major challenge in implementing the new  strategies. It is important, for example, that federal agencies have clearly  defined roles and responsibilities. The new strategies define the roles and  responsibilities of agencies for functional areas to varying degrees. Some  of the strategies described lead agency roles responsibilities in detail. For  example, the National Strategy for Homeland Security described lead  agency responsibilities for various functional areas, such as intelligence  and warning, border and transportation security, and protecting critical  infrastructure and key assets. Other strategies, including the National  Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key  Assets and the National Money Laundering Strategy, also identified key  agencies’ roles and responsibilities in leading various functional areas.  Other strategies we reviewed either were silent in terms of identifying  agencies to lead functional areas or only generally described agency roles  and responsibilities. For example, the National Strategy to Combat  Weapons of Mass Destruction focused more on areas of national priorities  and initiatives and did not identify agency roles and responsibilities. In  addition, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism only briefly  identified lead functional areas for agencies. We recognize that documents  other than these strategies, such as presidential directives, also assign  agency roles.
A key component in integrating federal agencies is interagency  coordination. While the strategies generally do not address such  coordination mechanisms, we identified them for both homeland security  and combating terrorism overseas. Homeland security is coordinated  through the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security  Council, which have 11 interagency working groups (called policy  coordination committees) to manage crosscutting issues in such areas as  detection, surveillance, and intelligence; law enforcement and  investigation; and WMD consequence management. The Department of  Homeland Security is responsible for coordination with other federal  agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector. In addition,  the new department will serve a coordination role by consolidating several  agencies that currently are under separate departments. In combating  terrorism overseas, the National Security Council plays a major  coordinating role by sponsoring a policy coordination committee called  the Counterterrorism Security Group, which has several subordinate  interagency working groups on such topics as interagency exercises and  assistance to other countries. Coordination overseas occurs in other ways  as well, through interagency groups at U.S. embassies and regional  military commands.
The challenge of integration goes beyond the federal level to include state  and local governments, the private sector, and the international  community. As mentioned earlier, the strategies do address these other  entities, but in varying degrees of detail. For example, the National  Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for the  Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets provide  extended discussions of the importance of partnerships among various  federal agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and to a  lesser degree, the international community. In contrast, the National  Security Strategy of the United States of America discusses the role of  the international community in more general terms.
section_title: New Strategies Generally Do Not Include Performance Measures
paragraphs: Performance measures are important for monitoring the successes of  strategies and their related programs. One key to assessing overall  performance that we have previously called for in strategies is that they  define an end-state—what a strategy is trying to achieve. Some of these  strategies do this, although the clarity of their end-states varies  considerably. For instance, the National Strategy for Combating  Terrorism details a very specific desired end-state where the scope and  capabilities of global terrorist organizations are reduced until they become  localized, unorganized, unsponsored, and rare enough that they can be  dealt with exclusively by criminal law enforcement. Other end-states focus  on federal capabilities, rather than the terrorist target. For example, the  National Strategy for Homeland Security stresses the need for a fully  integrated national emergency response system that is adaptable enough  to deal with any terrorist attack, no matter how unlikely or catastrophic.  Finally, some end-states are more strategic in nature, the prime example  belonging to the National Security Strategy of the United States of  America, which seeks to create a “balance of power that favors human  freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for  themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty.”
Although some strategies identify an end-state, most strategies lack  detailed performance goals and measures to monitor and evaluate the  success of combating terrorism programs. In our past work concerning a  national strategy for homeland security, we said the national strategy  should establish explicit national objectives, outcome-related goals, and  performance measures to guide the nation’s homeland security efforts.  This approach would provide a clearer statement on what the nation  hopes to achieve through its programs to combat terrorism. The strategies  generally describe overarching objectives and priorities, but not  measurable outcomes. More explicit actions or initiatives in some of the  plans begin to provide a greater sense of what is expected, but these often  are in the form of activities or processes, which are not results-oriented  outcomes. For example, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection  of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets discusses coordinating and  consolidating federal and state protection plans, but does not give a clear  description of the result of such coordination and consolidation. The  National Money Laundering Strategy devotes a section to measuring  effectiveness and calls for developing measures and institutionalizing  systems for such measures.
The general lack of specific performance goals and measures in the  strategies makes it more important that individual federal agencies have  explicit performance goals and related measures. The primary vehicle for  setting federal strategic and annual performance goals is the Government  Performance and Results Act of 1993, commonly referred to as GPRA or  the Results Act.  The Results Act provides agencies with a systematic  approach for managing programs. The Results Act’s principles include  clarifying missions, developing a strategy, identifying goals and objectives,  and establishing performance measures. We believe that federal agencies  with national strategy responsibilities should address them through the  Results Act process.
The Department of State is an example of an individual agency that has  performance measures related to combating terrorism. The department’s  Performance Plan for Fiscal Year 2003 specifically identifies countering  terrorism as one of the department’s strategic goals. The goal is to reduce  international terrorist attacks, especially against the United States and its  citizens. To measure its progress toward achieving this goal, the  department identified the following performance indicators and targets for  fiscal year 2003:    Some 25 bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism consultations will  be completed.
Some 96 countries will implement United Nations Security Council  Resolution 1373, which requires all member states to suppress and  prevent terrorism.
Some 210 Antiterrorism Assistance training courses will be provided to  60 countries, with all programs reviewed within 18 months after the  training. This training is expected to increase the ability of key  countries to fight terrorism.
The Foreign Emergency Support Team will deploy to participate in two  of the Combatant Commanders’ International Counterterrorism  Exercises.
All of the reviews of foreign terrorist organizations will be completed  within 1 year.
Beyond federal agencies, national goals and measures of success may  warrant a dialogue about performance goals and measures for nonfederal  partners—state and local governments, the private sector, and the  international community. In the absence of definitive nonfederal goal and  measurement approaches, we believe there is a strong potential the  national strategies will revert to primarily a federal responsibility. While  this is a difficult area given federalism principles, international  sovereignty, and private sector independence, national strategies to  combat terrorism require national (and international) performance  expectations if they are to be successfully implemented.
section_title: Many Other Management Issues Will Make Implementation a Challenge
paragraphs: In addition to the implementation issues in the subcommittee’s letter— whether implementation will be strategy-driven, integrated, and  effective—we have identified several other management challenges. Our  previous work regarding homeland security and the establishment of the  Department of Homeland Security raised several issues that are applicable  to implementing the new strategies. We designated the implementation  and transformation of the department as a high risk for three reasons.  First, the size and complexity of the effort make the challenge especially  daunting, requiring sustained attention and time to achieve the  department’s mission in an effective and efficient manner. Second,  components being merged into the department already face a wide variety  of existing challenges that must be addressed. Finally, the department’s  failure to effectively carry out its mission exposes the nation to potentially  very serious consequences.
Successful implementation will require adherence to certain management  practices and key success factors. These factors include strategic  planning, risk management, information technology management, human  capital strategy and management, and a variety of other critical  management processes and tools that will improve opportunities for  achieving significant combating-terrorism objectives. For example, strong  financial management will be necessary to assure accountability over  significant direct and indirect federal expenditures. Improvements in  leveraging information technology also will be necessary to not only  enhance the effective utilization of management systems, but also to  increase information sharing among and between all parties. Additionally,  implementing the strategic framework for combating terrorism will require  addressing key, specific federal management capabilities. Some of the  federal departments and agencies assigned to carry out the strategy face  management challenges in administering their programs, managing their  human capital, and implementing and securing information technology  systems. Federal agencies will need to address these challenges as well as  develop or enhance specific homeland security management capabilities,  such as identifying threats, risks, vulnerabilities, and responses and  effectively working in interagency, intergovernmental, and private sector  relationships.
Similarly, we must recognize that a number of agencies will face  challenges in meeting dual or unrelated missions while maintaining and  strengthening their combating terrorism operations. Additional actions to  clarify missions and activities will be necessary, and some agencies will  need to determine how best to support both combating terrorism and non- combating terrorism missions. For example, in a recent report we raised  issues regarding the need for the Federal Emergency Management Agency  and U.S. Coast Guard—both now part of the Department of Homeland  Security—to balance multiple missions. Creating an effective structure  that is sensitive to balancing the needs of homeland security and non- homeland security functions will be critical to the successful  implementation of the strategies.
Finally, many agencies tasked with carrying out the initiatives and  objectives of the various strategies have long-standing human capital  problems that will need to be addressed. One of these challenges has been  the ability to hire and retain a talented and motivated staff. For example,  we reported that the Immigration and Naturalization Service was unable to  reach its program goals in large part because of such staffing problems as  hiring shortfalls and agent attrition. Moreover, to accomplish national  and homeland security missions some agencies have recognized the need  for new skills in the workforce. It is anticipated that agencies will need  employees skilled in information technology, law enforcement, foreign  languages, and other proficiencies. For example, we have reported that the  FBI has an action plan to hire translators, interpreters, and special agents  with language skills—areas where the federal government currently has a  shortage.
section_title: The Next Steps in Implementing Programs to Combat Terrorism
paragraphs: To implement the new constellation of national strategies, we see some  additional next steps that should be taken. These are based upon our body  of work on federal programs to combat terrorism. Among other unfinished  business, the Executive Branch will have to (1) establish and refine  performance measures, (2) establish milestones for completing tasks, (3)  link resources to threats and strategies, and (4) use a risk management  approach.
section_title: The Congress Will Play an Important Role in Implementing the Strategies
paragraphs: The Congress will play an important role as well in addressing the  challenges faced in implementing these strategies. The Congress recently  passed legislation reorganizing the federal government to combat  terrorism by creating the Department of Homeland Security. The Congress  will be appropriating funds—billions of dollars—to that department and  other federal agencies that combat terrorism. And finally, the Congress  will need to provide oversight, in hearings like this one today, to ensure  that the programs are appropriately designed and implemented. GAO will  continue to assist this subcommittee, and the Congress as a whole, in  helping the federal government develop and implement programs to  protect the United States from terrorism both at home and abroad.
This concludes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to respond to any  questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Raymond J. Decker at (202) 512-6020.
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Individuals making key contributions to this statement include Stephen L.  Caldwell, Mark A. Pross, Sharon L. Caudle, James C. Lawson, David W.  Hancock, Michael S. Arbogast, Susan K. Woodward, and David S. Epstein.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of  Homeland Security. GAO-03-102. Washington, D.C.: January 2003.
Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership.  GAO-03-260. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Funding Data Reported to Congress Should Be  Improved. GAO-03-170. Washington, D.C.: November 26, 2002.
Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons  Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal  Agencies. GAO-03-293SP. Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2002.
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to  Success. GAO-02-1013T. Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002.
Nonproliferation R&D: NNSA’s Program Develops Successful  Technologies, but Project Management Can Be Strengthened. GAO-02-904.  Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002.
Immigration Enforcement: Challenges to Implementing the INS Interior  Enforcement Strategy. GAO-02-861T. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2002.
Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but  Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.
Foreign Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to Correct  Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls. GAO-02-375. Washington, D.C.: Jan.  31, 2002.
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide  Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related  Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
International Crime Control: Sustained Executive-Level Coordination of  Federal Response Needed. GAO-01-629. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal  Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and  National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied  Capabilities: Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination.   GAO-01-14. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources.  GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Comments on Bill H.R. 4210 to Manage Selected  Counterterrorist Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-172. Washington, D.C.: May  4, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to  Combat Terrorism. GAO/NSIAD-00-85. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs.  GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and  Biological Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.: October 20,  1999.
Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk  Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163.  Washington, D.C.: September 7, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve  Counterterrorism Operations. GAO/NSIAD-99-135. Washington, D.C.: May  13, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat  Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues.   GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize  and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.:  April 9, 1998.