Diplomatic Security: Key Oversight Issues
Published: 2017-09-07T00:00:00

Fast Facts:
Terrorist attacks against U.S. diplomats and personnel overseas have underscored the need to protect U.S. people, property, and information. The State Department has taken steps to improve diplomatic security, such as building more secure embassies and requiring counter threat training for personnel.
We identified 11 key diplomatic security issues for congressional oversight—highlighting numerous challenges from our prior reports. For example, we found many diplomatic residences that didn't meet security standards. As of August 14, 2017, 24 of our 27 open priority recommendations for State are related to diplomatic security.

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Terrorist attacks against U.S. diplomats and personnel overseas have led to increased attention of State's diplomatic security efforts. In this special publication, GAO identifies key issues affecting Diplomatic Security for Congressional oversight. These issues were identified from a body of related GAO work and State and other reports. GAO also interviewed U.S. officials from State and other agencies to obtain their views on key issues, obtain updated information and data, and follow up on actions they have taken on past GAO and other oversight report recommendations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In response to increasing threats to U.S. personnel and facilities at overseas diplomatic posts since 1998, the Department of State (State) has taken a number of steps to enhance its risk management and security efforts. State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security) leads many of these efforts with assistance from other bureaus and U.S. government agencies. Given the ongoing threats and the amount of resources needed to counter them, GAO has identified 11 key issues regarding Diplomatic Security that warrant significant Congressional oversight to monitor the cost, progress, and impact:
Diplomatic Security Funding : Diplomatic Security funding has increased considerably in reaction to a number of security incidents overseas and domestically. In fiscal year 2016, total funding for Diplomatic Security operations--which includes its bureau managed funds as well as other funding such as personnel salaries--was almost $4.8 billion.
Diplomatic Security Staffing Challenges : Diplomatic Security's workforce--including 3,488 direct-hire, 1,989 other U.S. government, and 45,870 contract personnel--continues to grow. However, potential challenges exist regarding the distribution of domestic and overseas positions, posting fully qualified individuals in the assignments with the greatest needs, and ongoing efforts to fill language-designated positions.
Physical Security of U.S. Diplomatic Facilities : Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations collaborate to meet safety standards when constructing new embassies and mitigating risks at existing facilities. However, GAO made recommendations to address gaps in State's security related activities and processes.
Physical Security of Diplomatic Residences and Other Soft Targets : State has taken steps to address residential security vulnerabilities and manage risks at schools and other soft targets overseas. However, GAO recommended actions to address weaknesses in State's efforts.
Security Training Compliance : While State has robust security training requirements, it lacks consistent monitoring and enforcement processes, particularly for its Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training and for security refresher briefings at posts.
Embassy Crisis and Evacuation Preparedness : Gaps in State's implementation and monitoring of crisis and evacuation preparedness could endanger staff assigned to overseas posts and the family members accompanying them. GAO has recommended actions to address these issues.
Department of Defense (DOD) Support to U.S. Diplomatic Missions : Following the Benghazi attacks, DOD increased its support to U.S. diplomatic missions by creating dedicated military forces to respond to crises and expanding the Marine Security Guard program at overseas missions. However, State and DOD reported that they have experienced some logistical and other challenges.
Dissemination of Threat Information : State has processes for communicating threat information to post personnel and U.S. citizens in-country. However, post personnel--including locally employed staff--have not always received important information in a timely manner. GAO has recommended steps State needs to take to address this concern.
Countering Human Intelligence Threats : Foreign intelligence entities from host nations and third parties are motivated to collect information on U.S. operations and intentions. State has established measures to counter the human intelligence threat and works with other U.S. government agencies to identify and assess this threat.
Ensuring Information Security : GAO has designated federal information security as a government-wide high-risk area and made recommendations to address these issues. State faces evolving threats and challenges to maintaining obsolete technology, defining clear roles and responsibilities for information security, and overseeing technology contractors.
Status of Recommendations Made in Reports following the Benghazi Attack : In response to the Benghazi attack, State formed interagency teams to evaluate the security at 19 dangerous posts, convened an Accountability Review Board (ARB) to investigate the attack, and established panels to conduct further assessments. As of June 2017, State reported having addressed recommendations as follows: 268 of 287 made by the interagency teams, 26 of 29 by the ARB, and 64 of 75 by the panels.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: While State has taken steps to close recommendations made in past GAO reports, GAO identified 27 open recommendations from these reports (as of August 2017) that it believes should be given high priority for implementation. Of the 27 priority recommendations, 24 were related to diplomatic security.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: On August 7, 1998, terrorists bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi,  Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 220 people and injuring  4,000 others. The 1998 bombings marked a pivotal moment in the  conduct of U.S. diplomacy, as it became clear that terrorist networks had  the ability and intent to exploit security vulnerabilities at American  diplomatic missions. Since 1998, U.S. personnel working in diplomatic  facilities overseas have faced increasing threats to their safety and  security, including numerous attacks in high-risk locations. On September  11, 2012, U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, came under attack, and four  U.S. officials—including the Ambassador—were killed. In the same  month, a car bomb hit U.S. government vehicles in Pakistan, injuring two  Americans, and protesters in Egypt, Yemen, Sudan, and Tunisia overran  the U.S. embassies’ security defenses and broke into the embassy  compounds. These attacks resulted in close scrutiny of the Department of  State’s (State) security practices overseas. In response to these security  incidents over the years, and in light of its policy to maintain diplomatic  missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other increasingly dangerous  environments, State has taken a number of steps to enhance its risk  management and security efforts aimed at protecting U.S. personnel and  facilities at its overseas diplomatic posts.
State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security) is responsible  for the protection of people, property, and information at State’s 275  overseas posts and 152 domestic locations. In addition to guarding  against threats from terrorism, Diplomatic Security must also counter a  range of other threats, such as crime, espionage, visa and passport fraud,  technological intrusions, political violence, and weapons of mass  destruction. To fulfill its mission, Diplomatic Security collaborates with other State entities—such as the Bureaus of Overseas Buildings  Operations (OBO) and Information Resource Management—and other  U.S. government agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD).
Given the ongoing threats facing U.S. personnel overseas who carry out  U.S. foreign policy and the amount of resources needed to counter those  threats, we prepared this special publication to identify a number of key  issues for Congress to consider in its oversight of U.S. diplomatic  security. We believe these issues warrant significant oversight because of  their cost and impact and the need to ensure progress. This report  contains 11 enclosures, each including information based largely on prior  GAO work in the following specific areas:
Diplomatic Security Funding: Since 1998, Diplomatic Security funding  has increased considerably in reaction to a number of security  incidents overseas and domestically. In fiscal year 2016, total funding  for Diplomatic Security operations—which includes its bureau  managed funds as well as other funding, such as personnel salaries,  managed by other bureaus and offices—was almost $4.8 billion.
Diplomatic Security Staffing Challenges: Diplomatic Security’s  workforce—including 3,488 direct-hire, 1,989 other U.S. government,  and 45,870 contract personnel—continues to grow. However,  potential challenges exist regarding the distribution of domestic and  overseas positions, posting fully-qualified individuals in the  assignments with the greatest needs, and ongoing efforts to fill  language-designated positions.
Physical Security of U.S. Diplomatic Facilities: Diplomatic Security  and OBO collaborate to ensure that safety standards are met when  constructing new embassies and mitigating risks at existing facilities.  However, we found weaknesses in their process to address some  security vulnerabilities, among other things. In addition, State does not  have guidelines in place for security at temporary facilities, which they  use in dangerous posts, such as Kabul, Afghanistan.
Physical Security of Diplomatic Residences and Other Soft Targets:  State has taken steps to address residential security vulnerabilities  and manage risks at schools and other soft targets overseas.  However, we found weaknesses in State’s process to address  residential security vulnerabilities.
Security Training Compliance: While State has robust security training  requirements, it lacks consistent monitoring and enforcement  processes, particularly for its Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training  and for security refresher briefings at posts.
Embassy Crisis and Evacuation Preparedness: Gaps in State’s  implementation and monitoring of crisis and evacuation preparedness  could endanger staff assigned to overseas posts and the family  members accompanying them.
Department of Defense Support to U.S. Diplomatic Missions:  Following the Benghazi attacks, DOD increased its support to U.S.  diplomatic missions by creating dedicated military forces to respond to  crises in Africa and the Middle East and expanding the Marine  Security Guard program at overseas missions. However, State and  DOD reported that they have experienced some logistical and other  challenges in implementing this increased support. State and DOD  continue to update their plans and policies for coordination in times of  crisis.
Dissemination of Threat Information: State has processes for  communicating threat information to post personnel and U.S. citizens  in country. However, post personnel—including locally employed  staff—have not always received important information in a timely  manner. In addition, infrequent drills to test that the system used to  alert other U.S. citizens in the country to potential threats may  increase the risk to their security.
Countering Human Intelligence Threats: Foreign intelligence entities  from host nations and third parties are motivated to collect information  on U.S. operations and intentions. State has established measures to  counter the human intelligence threats—which are tailored to the  threat level of the post—and works with other U.S. government  agencies to identify and assess the human intelligence threats to  overseas posts.
Ensuring Information Security: GAO has designated federal  information security as a government-wide, high-risk area. State faces  evolving threats and challenges to maintaining obsolete technology,  defining clear roles and responsibilities for information security, and  overseeing technology contractors.
Status of Recommendations Made in Reports following the Benghazi  Attack: State has addressed many recommendations stemming from  the reports generated by a group of Interagency Security Assessment  Teams and the Accountability Review Board, both of which were  convened subsequent to the 2012 attacks in Benghazi.
This report also includes six appendixes with additional supporting  information, comprising the following:
Appendix I contains additional details about our scope and  methodology.
Appendix II provides a time line of selected attacks against U.S.  diplomatic missions and subsequent legal and policy changes.
Appendix III provides information on Diplomatic Security  responsibilities, components, and collaboration with other U.S.  government agencies.
Appendix IV provides a comparison of Diplomatic Security staffing  levels in fiscal years 2008, 2011, and 2017.
Appendix V contains a list of open GAO recommendations regarding  Diplomatic Security and made to State that should be given high  priority for implementation.
Appendix VI contains a list of GAO products directly related to this  report and each of the enclosures.
To identify key issues affecting Diplomatic Security, we reviewed GAO’s  body of work related to this issue and reports issued by State and other  entities. We also interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and  Arlington, Virginia, from State, DOD, and the U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID) to obtain their views on key issues,  obtain updated information and data, and follow up on actions State and  its partner agencies have taken on past GAO and other oversight report  recommendations. We undertook steps to ensure that the updated data  were sufficiently reliable for our purposes, as described in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2017 to September  2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to State, DOD, and USAID for review.  None of the agencies provided formal comments. However, State  provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as  appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and to the USAID  Administrator. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-8980 or courtsm@gao.gov, or the individual(s)  listed at the end of each enclosure. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff members who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VII.
Background  The Department of State’s (State)  Bureau of Diplomatic Security  (Diplomatic Security) manages  much of the security-related  funding within State’s Diplomatic  and Consular Programs budget,  the largest category of which  comes from the Worldwide  Security Protection account.  Salaries for Diplomatic Security  personnel are managed  separately by State’s Bureau of  Budget and Planning.
Issue  Total funding for Diplomatic Security operations was almost $4.8 billion in  fiscal year 2016. Total funding for Diplomatic Security includes its bureau  managed funds as well as other funding—such as personnel salaries— managed by other bureaus and offices but necessary for Diplomatic  Security operations. Diplomatic Security’s bureau managed funds ($3.3  billion in fiscal year 2016) are composed of funds received through  annual appropriations, fees collected through visa processing,  reimbursements from other agencies, and appropriated funds carried  over from prior fiscal years. These funds support regular, ongoing  operations and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) for temporary,  war-related operations. State directed an additional $1.5 billion to  Diplomatic Security and its employees in 2016, through other bureaus  and offices.
Key Findings  In fiscal year 2016, Diplomatic Security’s bureau managed funds totaled  approximately $3.3 billion. Bureau managed funds have increased in  response to multiple security incidents since the 1998 bombings of the  U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. (Fig. 1 shows that Diplomatic  Security’s bureau managed funds had tremendous growth from 1998  through 2016 in both real and nominal dollars.)
F Figure 1: Historical Trend in Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security Managed Funds, 1998-2016  From 1995 to 1998, Diplomatic Security’s bureau managed funds  averaged about $173 million annually. After the 1998 bombings in Africa,  bureau managed funds grew to $784 million in 1999 as Congress  provided Diplomatic Security with emergency supplemental funding to  address security vulnerabilities at posts worldwide. By fiscal year 2009,  bureau managed funds had grown to about $2.0 billion, largely due to  new security procedures put in place after 1998 as well as the need to  provide security for diplomats in the conflict zones of Iraq and  Afghanistan. Bureau managed funds increased in 2010 to $2.7 billion and  in 2012 to $3.3 billion, as the U.S. military began to withdraw from Iraq  and Diplomatic Security assumed many of the protective and security  functions previously provided by the U.S. military in that country.  Congress appropriated less funding in 2013 to the Worldwide Security  Protection account because, according to Diplomatic Security,  appropriated funds were carried over from prior years. The subsequent  increases in funding for that account in 2014 through 2016 followed the  2012 attack in Benghazi, Libya.
Since 2012, OCO supplemental funding has made up 34-62 percent of  Diplomatic Security’s bureau managed funds. For example, in fiscal year  2016, OCO funding totaled over $2.0 billion—or 62 percent—of bureau  managed funds for that year. According to a bureau official, State’s OCO  funding was intended to be temporary funding to support operations in  Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan but continues to exist, given the security  situation in those countries, and has expanded beyond those three  countries. Some State officials are concerned that if OCO is discontinued,  State would not have sufficient funding to provide necessary security  services. For fiscal year 2018, the administration is requesting less OCO  funding than the final appropriated amount for fiscal year 2017.
Funding for Diplomatic Security operations totaled almost $4.8 billion in  fiscal year 2016. This amount includes both bureau managed funds— which were almost $3.3 billion—and other funding directed to Diplomatic  Security and its employees but managed by other bureaus and offices  within State (personnel salaries, Antiterrorism Assistance funding, guard  services funding, and fraud prevention and detection fees), which totaled  almost $1.5 billion. For example, State’s Bureau of Budget and Planning  manages the salaries of Diplomatic Security personnel. Funding for  Diplomatic Security personnel increased from $12 million in 2000 to $419  million in 2016. In addition, State allocates funding to its Bureau of  Overseas Buildings Operations for security construction at overseas  facilities.
Point of Contact  For more information, contact:  Michael J. Courts, (202) 512- 8980, courtsm@gao.gov   1.  What impact has Diplomatic Security’s increased funding had on its  ability to carry out its mission? Are current funding levels sufficient?  2.  What are State’s plans for utilizing future Diplomatic Security funding?
Will there be additional carryover funds in future years, as in 2013?
Background  The Department of State’s (State)  Bureau of Diplomatic Security  (Diplomatic Security), which is  responsible for the protection of  State’s people, property, and  information, relies on a broad  workforce to carry out its mission  and activities. Its workforce  includes direct-hire personnel,  military support, and contractors.  Posts also engage locally  employed staff.
Issue  Over the last 2 decades, Diplomatic Security’s mission and activities have  expanded in response to a number of security incidents, which has led to  a dramatic increase in the size of its workforce. The growth in its  responsibilities overseas began with the 1998 attacks in Africa and  continued with the U.S. policy of maintaining a diplomatic presence in war  zones such as Afghanistan and Iraq and other increasingly hostile  environments. In addition, the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks  underscored the importance of enhancing domestic security, including  Diplomatic Security’s investigative capacity, technical programs, and  counterintelligence work. This sustained and at times rapid growth has  taxed Diplomatic Security’s ability to staff positions with the appropriate  level of experience and skills.
Key Findings  Diplomatic Security’s workforce—numbering over 51,000 direct-hire,  other U.S. government, and contract personnel as of May 2017—has  experienced continued growth in almost all staffing categories. We  previously reported in 2009 that Diplomatic Security’s direct-hire work  force doubled from 1998 to 2008. Since then, it has increased by another  36 percent to 3,488 personnel in 2017. If State’s current hiring freeze is  lifted, Diplomatic Security officials told us that they plan to hire an  additional 384 special agents in 2017 through 2018. The number of other  U.S. government personnel reporting to Diplomatic Security increased by  60 percent, driven largely by the expansion of the Marine Security Guard  program after the 2012 Benghazi attacks. Diplomatic Security increased  its contracted and support staff by 22 percent. (Table 1 provides  information on the increases in Diplomatic Security staff from 2008  through 2017; see app. IV for further staffing details.)
In response to a Benghazi Accountability Review Board recommendation,  State established a panel to reexamine Diplomatic Security’s organization  and management. In 2013, the panel reported that, in part, Diplomatic  Security had become more focused on its law enforcement and personnel  protection functions. This was not surprising, according to the panel,  given that Diplomatic Security provided security in two war zones and  numerous other high-threat posts. Simultaneously, Diplomatic Security  had experienced an increased demand on its domestic criminal  investigative and dignitary protection programs.
Nonetheless, the panel noted that Diplomatic Security’s primary mission  is “to provide a secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign  policy” and stated that Diplomatic Security should reflect this priority in  its allocation of manpower and other resources. For example, the panel  recommended that Diplomatic Security review personnel allocations  both domestically and abroad. As of June 2017, Diplomatic Security had  completed an initial classified review of its staffing and begun a follow- on study to (1) determine how Diplomatic Security has distributed its  staff relative to its priorities; and (2) develop a methodology to assess  the quantity, mix, and distribution of Diplomatic Security staff worldwide.  According to Diplomatic Security, the second study is expected to result  in two tools that Diplomatic Security can use for evaluating its staffing  levels: one for domestic staffing and one for overseas staffing.
In fiscal year 2010, we reported that 34 percent of Diplomatic Security’s  positions were filled with officers below the position’s grade. In 2013, the  organization and management panel noted that many Diplomatic  Security regional director positions were filled by officers holding ranks  below the levels established for that position (not including agents  posted to Baghdad, Iraq). The panel recommended that Diplomatic  Security prioritize filling these positions with at-grade personnel. While  State concurred, as of June 2017, it had not identified any new, concrete  actions for implementing this recommendation. Instead, State noted that  it “will continue to make every effort to place at-grade, experienced, and  highly qualified individuals into these positions.”
As of December 2016, Diplomatic Security had 422 staffed language- designated positions (LDP), of which 304—or 72 percent—were filled  with special agents who met the language requirement. This is an  improvement since 2009, when we reported that only 47 percent of  Diplomatic Security special agents at LDPs met the requirement.  Officials cited two reasons for this increase in compliance: (1) greater  agency emphasis on the need for agents to have language skills  following the 2012 Benghazi attacks and (2) increased emphasis on  speaking rather than reading skills. As a result, Diplomatic Security has  an increased number of “asymmetrical” language requirements, where  the speaking-level requirement is higher than the reading-level  requirement. Diplomatic Security also adopted the “Alert” language  training program, which provides special agents with speaking skills  relevant to their technical work, particularly for languages spoken at  certain high-threat posts. State officials told us that agents can become  proficient in 10 weeks using this program, versus 30 weeks typically  required for traditional methods.
Michael J. Courts, (202) 512- 8980, courtsm@gao.gov  ensure that it has the appropriate quantity, mix, and distribution of  staff to address its overseas and domestic responsibilities?  2. What steps has Diplomatic Security taken to ensure that its positions  are filled with appropriately experienced staff?  3. What is State doing to further close the gaps in Diplomatic Security’s  LDPs?
Background  Responsibility for the security of  the Department of State’s (State)  diplomatic facilities falls principally  on State’s Bureaus of Overseas  Buildings Operations (OBO) and  Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic  Security). OBO is responsible for  the design, construction,  acquisition, maintenance, and sale  of U.S. diplomatic property abroad.  Diplomatic Security is responsible  for establishing security and  protective procedures at posts and  developing and implementing the  physical security programs.
Maintaining the physical security of U.S. diplomatic facilities is a critical  component of ensuring the safety of U.S. personnel, property, and  information. According to OBO, State maintains approximately 1,600  work facilities at 275 diplomatic posts worldwide under chief-of-mission  authority. In addition, State has a limited number of temporary work  facilities, mostly in dangerous locations such as Afghanistan. All facilities  at a post are expected to meet physical security standards set by the  Overseas Security Policy Board. In fiscal years 2009 through 2016, State  allocated about $11.1 billion to the construction of new, secure facilities  and physical security upgrades to existing and acquired facilities. While  Diplomatic Security has a few small programs to provide physical security  upgrades to facilities abroad, OBO managed most of the allocated funds.
Key Findings  Following the 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,  State determined that diplomatic facilities in over 180 posts—more than  half of U.S. overseas missions—needed to be replaced to meet security  standards. In 1999, State began a new embassy construction program,  administered by OBO, to replace these posts. To expedite the delivery of  new, secure compounds, OBO adopted a standard embassy design  (SED) approach. However, some stakeholders raised concerns about the  aesthetics, quality, location, and functionality of those facilities. For  example, the 10-acre lot specified by the SED sometimes required  situating an embassy far from urban centers, where foreign government  offices and other embassies are located. In response to these concerns,  State established the “Excellence” approach in 2011. (See fig. 3 for a  picture of an embassy built under SED and a rendering of a consulate to  be delivered under the Excellence approach.)
OBO’s changes under the Excellence approach focus on producing more  innovative, functional, and sustainable embassies that are just as secure  as those built using the SED. However, some stakeholders have raised  concerns that the new approach may result in embassies that take longer  and cost more to build. This would delay getting U.S. personnel into   facilities that meet current security standards. In 2017, we reported that,  while the Excellence approach may result in improvements, it carries  increased risk to cost and schedule—including up to 24 additional months  to develop designs. While OBO is attempting to manage this risk, it does  not have performance measures specific to the Excellence goals and,  therefore, cannot fully assess the merits of the new approach. We made  four recommendations to strengthen performance measures and  reporting, monitoring mechanisms, and data systems. While State  concurred with these recommendations, they remain open.
When facilities do not or cannot meet certain security standards, State  works to mitigate identified vulnerabilities through various construction  programs and its waivers and exceptions process. However, in 2014, we  reported that the waivers and exceptions process had weaknesses. Of  the 43 facilities we reviewed, none met all applicable security standards  and therefore required waivers, exceptions, or both. However, we found  that neither posts nor headquarters systematically tracked the waivers  and exceptions and that State had no process to reevaluate waivers and  exceptions when the threat or risk changes. Furthermore, posts did not  always request required waivers and exceptions or consistently take  required mitigation steps. We concluded that with such deficiencies, State  cannot be assured it has all the information needed to mitigate facility  vulnerabilities. We made 13 recommendations for State to address gaps  in its security-related activities, standards, and policies. State generally  agreed with our recommendations and, as of June 2017, had addressed  five of them.
Future State construction in dangerous posts—such as Kabul,  Afghanistan—will likely entail the continued use of temporary office or  residential facilities, especially in conflict areas. However, in 2015, we  found that in Kabul—without security standards or other guidance to  guide temporary facility construction in conflict environments—State  inconsistently applied alternative security measures that resulted in  insufficient and different levels of security for temporary offices and  housing as well as increased costs and extended schedules. We  concluded that without temporary facility security standards or guidance,  future construction in conflict environments could encounter similar  problems. We recommended that State consider establishing security  standards or guidance for temporary facilities in conflict zones. State  partially concurred and subsequently reported that it was developing  additional guidance relating to physical security systems such as  Hardened Alternative Trailer Systems, surface-mounted, antiram barriers,  and anticlimb wall toppings. As of May 2017, State was continuing to  address this recommendation.
Michael J. Courts, (202) 512- 8980, courtsm@gao.gov   schedules associated with the Excellence approach to building new  embassies?  2.  To what extent do State’s facilities have or require waivers and  exceptions to security standards? What steps has State taken to  address weaknesses in its waivers and exceptions program?  3.  How extensively does State rely on temporary facilities that have been  in place for extended periods of time? What progress has State made  in creating additional guidance relating to temporary facilities?
Background  The Secretary of State, in  consultation with the heads of  other federal agencies, is  responsible for protecting U.S.  government personnel on official  duty abroad, along with their  accompanying dependents. At  overseas posts, the Department  of State’s (State) Bureaus of  Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic  Security)—represented by a  Regional Security Officer  (RSO)—and Overseas Buildings  Operations share responsibility  for the security of residences and  other soft targets overseas.
More than 25,000 U.S. diplomatic personnel live overseas with their  families in an environment that presents myriad security threats and  challenges. While State has taken measures to enhance security at its  embassies and consulates since the 1998 East Africa embassy  bombings, these same actions have given rise to concerns that would-be  attackers may shift their focus to what they perceive as more accessible  targets, such as diplomatic residences, schools, and other places  frequented by U.S. personnel and their families. For example, a 2014  posting on a jihadist website called for attacks on American and other  international schools in the Middle East. (See fig. 4 for examples of  diplomatic residences.)
Key Findings  State acquires housing for overseas personnel by leasing, purchasing, or  constructing various types of residences, each of which is subject to a set  of security standards. State assesses risks to residences using a range of  activities—including a periodic security survey to identify and address  vulnerabilities. In fiscal years 2010 through 2016, State allocated about  $175 million for residential security upgrades. However, in 2014, we  found that State did not complete all residential surveys as required,  thereby limiting its ability to address vulnerabilities. In addition, we  reviewed 68 overseas diplomatic residences and found that 38 did not  meet all of the applicable standards, potentially placing their occupants at  risk. In instances when a residence does not and cannot meet applicable  security standards, posts are required to either seek other residences or  request exceptions, which identify steps to mitigate vulnerabilities.  However, we found that Diplomatic Security had an exception on file for  only 1 of the 38 residences that did not meet all standards. We concluded  that without documenting the necessary exceptions, State lacked a  complete picture of security vulnerabilities at residences and information  that would enable it to make better risk management decisions. In  addition, more rigorous security standards that went into effect in July  2014 would likely increase posts’ need for exceptions and lead to costs  for upgrades. We made four recommendations regarding the  management of risks to residences. State concurred with all four and, as  of May 2017, had addressed one. (Fig. 5 portrays key security standards  at a notional residence.)
State has taken a variety of actions to manage risks to schools and other  soft targets. These actions fall into three main categories: (1) funding  security upgrades at K-12 schools with enrolled U.S. government  dependents and off-compound employee association facilities, (2) sharing  threat information and providing advice for mitigating threats at schools  and other soft targets, and (3) conducting security surveys to identify and  manage risks to schools and other soft targets. However, RSOs at most  of the posts we reviewed in 2015 were unaware of some guidance and  tools for securing these facilities—such as a booklet and compact disc  entitled “Security Guide for International Schools” aimed at assisting  international schools in designing and implementing a security program.  As a result, we concluded that RSOs may not have been taking full  advantage of State’s programs and resources for managing risks at soft  targets. We recommended that State take steps to ensure that RSOs are  aware of existing guidance and tools regarding the security of soft targets.  In response, State issued a cable to all diplomatic and consular posts  updating policies and procedures for State's Soft Targets Security  Upgrade Program for overseas schools and department-chartered  employee associations, thereby distributing important information to  security personnel who were previously unaware of available guidance  and information.
Michael J. Courts, (202) 512- 8980, courtsm@gao.gov  standards at overseas residences? Have the standards implemented  in July 2014 affected the number of waivers and exceptions  requested?  2.  What steps has State taken to ensure that posts conduct residential  physical security surveys and request security exceptions, when  needed, in a timely manner?  3.  To what extent has State adapted its Soft Targets Security Upgrade  Program in light of recent public terrorist attacks?
Background  To help safeguard and prepare  U.S. personnel to live and work in  some of the most dangerous  overseas locations, the  Department of State’s (State)  Bureau of Diplomatic Security  (Diplomatic Security) provides  training on personal security skills  necessary for recognizing,  avoiding, and responding to  potential terrorism and other  threat situations.  Diplomatic  Security  also provides refresher  briefings on certain topics, as well  as cyber and technical security  training. To consolidate the  hands-on training that Diplomatic  Security provides, State is  constructing a training center in  Fort Pickett, Virginia, which it  expects will be completed in  2019.
Issue  State has a robust security awareness training program provided by  Diplomatic Security. For example, State requires specified U.S. personnel  traveling for less than 45 days in a calendar year to certain posts to  complete its online High Threat Security Overseas Seminar (HTSOS). If  specified U.S. personnel are traveling for 45 days or more in a calendar  year, State requires that they complete the 5-day Foreign Affairs Counter  Threat (FACT) training before departure. Diplomatic Security designed  the FACT course to address the dangers that U.S. personnel might face  in a number of high-threat, high-risk locations overseas. The course  provides hands-on instruction in topics such as detection of surveillance,  familiarization with firearms, and awareness of improvised explosive  devices (see fig. 6 for examples of other FACT training topics).
Key Findings  State’s oversight of compliance with the FACT training requirement has  weaknesses that limit its ability to ensure that U.S. personnel are  adequately prepared for work in high-threat environments. We reported in  2011 and 2014 that State did not have the ability to systematically identify  which people required to take the course had not taken it. We made  several recommendations to State to improve its management oversight  of compliance with mandatory FACT training. These included four  recommendations for State to update its policy guidance to reflect  changes made to the FACT training requirement in June 2013 (State had  doubled the number of countries for which it required FACT training) and  to provide clear information on which personnel are required to take  FACT training. State concurred with the recommendations and took steps  to address them. However, our recommendation that State monitor or  evaluate overall levels of compliance with the FACT training requirement  remains open. In May 2015, State officials said they were developing a  plan to utilize various electronic systems to monitor overall levels of  compliance with the FACT training requirement. As of June 2017, State  reported that it continues to work on this issue. This lack of oversight is  particularly concerning given the significant increase in the number of  students taking Diplomatic Security-provided FACT training, from 912 in  fiscal year 2006 to 4,482 in fiscal year 2016 (see fig. 7).
In addition, in July 2014, State expanded the FACT training requirement  to apply to all posts (not just those in high-threat, high-risk locations) by  2019. The gaps we have previously identified in State oversight may  increase the risk that personnel do not complete FACT training,  potentially placing their own and others’ safety in jeopardy.
We reported in 2016 that weaknesses exist in State’s guidance on and  management oversight of refresher briefings related to transportation  security, potentially putting U.S. personnel overseas at greater risk. We  found that personnel had difficultly remembering key details covered in  new arrival briefings or described the one-time briefings as inadequate.  We found that State lacked a clear requirement for Diplomatic Security to  provide and track compliance with periodic refresher briefings that could  help reinforce information covered in new arrival briefings. In part, this  may result from State guidance lacking clarity and comprehensiveness on  this matter. Specifically, its guidance states that regional security officers  must conduct refresher briefings “periodically” at “certain posts where  personnel live under hostile intelligence or terrorist threats for long  periods” but does not define “periodically” or “long periods.” Further,  according to Diplomatic Security officials, there is no requirement for  affirming that post personnel have received refresher briefings. We  recommended that State clarify existing guidance on refresher briefings,  such as by delineating how often briefings should be provided at posts  facing  different types and levels of threats, which personnel should  receive them, and how their completion should be documented.  Diplomatic Security headquarters officials stated that most violations of  post travel policies are due to personnel forgetting the information  conveyed in new arrival briefings. Without effective reinforcement of the  information that is covered in new arrival briefings, State cannot ensure  that U.S. personnel and their families overseas have the knowledge they  need to protect themselves from transportation-related security risks.
subsections: section_title: Point of Contact
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paragraphs: Michael J. Courts, (202) 512-8980,  courtsm@gao.gov  compliance with all applicable security training requirements, including  mandatory HTSOS and FACT training? 2.  Does State have the capacity to train the number of U.S. personnel  required to take Diplomatic Security-provided FACT training? 3.  What steps is State taking to reinforce information covered in new  arrival briefings with U.S. personnel and their families?
Background  The Department of State’s (State)  Bureau of Diplomatic Security  (Diplomatic Security) is  responsible for ensuring that  overseas post personnel and  their family members are  prepared for crisis situations and  evacuations.
Issue  From October 2012 to September 2016, in response to various threats,  such as terrorism, civil unrest, and natural disasters, State evacuated staff  and family members from 23 overseas posts. During this period, several  posts—such as Embassy Bujumbura in Burundi and Consulate Adana in  Turkey—evacuated post staff or family members on more than one  occasion. Overseas posts undergoing evacuations generally experience  authorized departure or ordered departure of specific post staff or family  members before leading to suspended operations. To help mitigate risks,  State requires posts to create Emergency Action Plans (EAP), practice  security drills and, if an evacuation is needed, review the event in order to  learn from the experience.
Key Findings  State requires every post to update its EAP on an annual basis. EAPs  contain information to assist overseas posts in responding to  emergencies, such as checklists of response procedures and decision  points to help determine when to evacuate post staff or family members.  In 2017, we found that, from fiscal years 2013 through 2016, a quarter of  overseas posts, on average, were late completing required annual EAP  updates. While the completion rate improved from 46 percent to 92  percent of posts completing updates on time in fiscal years 2013 and  2016, respectively, our review of a nongeneralizable,  judgmental sample  of EAPs from 20 posts that had been approved by Diplomatic Security  showed that only 2 of 20 had updated all key EAP sections. We also  found that EAPs are viewed as lengthy and cumbersome documents that  are not readily usable in emergency situations, as required by State  policy. We recommended that State take several actions to improve their  EAPs, such as developing a procedure to ensure that overseas posts  complete comprehensive, annual EAP updates on time; develop  a  monitoring and tracking process to ensure EAP updates are reviewed;  and make  the EAP more readily usable during emergency situations.  State agreed with all of our recommendations and reported that it has  started to address them. For example, State is developing a redesigned  EAP that will minimize redundancy, group content according to posts’  planning and response needs, and make the EAP better organized and  more user-friendly.
Posts are required to conduct nine types of drills each fiscal year to  prepare for crises and evacuations. In 2017, we found that, on average  for fiscal years 2013 through 2016, posts worldwide reported completing  52 percent of required annual drills; posts rated high or critical for political  violence or terrorism reported completing 44 percent of these drills.  Overall, less than 4 percent of posts reported completing all required drills  during fiscal years 2013 through 2016. As shown in figure 8 below, 78  percent of posts reported completing duck-and-cover drills, but only 36  percent of posts reported completing evacuation training drills. We  recommended that State improve the completion and reporting of  required drills. State concurred and is updating the system it uses to  report drills.
After an authorized or ordered departure has terminated, State’s Foreign  Affairs Handbook requires post staff to transmit an after-action report  listing any lessons learned from the experience to State headquarters. In  2017, we found that, during fiscal years 2013 through 2016, there were  31 evacuations from overseas posts; however, according to State  officials, none of the posts submitted the required lessons learned report.  These reports could have been used to modify the post’s guidance on  how to best respond to an emergency situation. According to State  officials, these reports also could help staff at other posts learn about the  challenges faced by the evacuated posts, identify relevant best practices,  and prepare for potential future evacuations. We recommended that State  take steps to improve the completion and submission of required lessons  learned reports following evacuations from overseas posts. State  concurred and has developed tools to improve the process.
Michael J. Courts, (202) 512- 8980, courtsm@gao.gov   annually update their EAPs and (2) Diplomatic Security  comprehensively reviews key EAP sections?  2.  What efforts is Diplomatic Security making to ensure that posts  complete and report completion of required crisis and evacuation drills  within required time frames?  3.  What steps is State taking to ensure that overseas posts complete  required lessons learned reports following evacuations and submit  those reports to State headquarters for analysis?
Background  The Department of Defense  (DOD) has long provided military  protection and support for the  security and safety of U.S.  diplomatic missions and  personnel during normal  operations and emergencies.  This support is particularly critical  in times of crisis, such as when  DOD provides security  reinforcements to facilities under  threat or assists with evacuations.  Several entities within DOD and  the Department of State (State)  prepare for and coordinate these  efforts. Memoranda of Agreement  between State and DOD  establish frameworks for  cooperation on scenarios  requiring security augmentation,  crisis response, and evacuation  for U.S. diplomatic and consular  missions overseas.
The September 2012 attacks in Benghazi, Libya, and the related wave of  protests and threats to U.S. missions in Africa and the Middle East  prompted a reexamination of how State and DOD collaborate to provide  emergency military protection and other support to overseas posts. The  possibility of similar threats and attacks requiring additional DOD support  at U.S. diplomatic facilities is spread across a large geographic area.  Given the chaos and complexities inherent in such acute crises, and the  possibility that unrest could affect multiple U.S. facilities at one time, the  need for DOD support will likely continue. From 2013 to 2016, 24  overseas posts experienced some level of increased threat resulting in  the evacuation of some or all U.S. personnel. While not all periods of  increased threat warrant additional DOD assistance, many do. For  instance, in 2014 alone, the U.S. military provided support for embassy  reinforcement, military-assisted departures, or evacuations, including in  South Sudan, Libya, and Iraq. (Fig. 9 shows one of the DOD units and  aircraft that may be used in evacuations or other emergencies.)
Key Findings  As part of the reorganization following the 2012 attacks, DOD—in  coordination with State—increased the military resources provided to  overseas posts. According to State and DOD officials, this represented a  whole-of-government approach to countering threats to U.S. overseas  personnel and facilities. Drawing from existing U.S. Marine Corps and  U.S. Army units, DOD created three dedicated military forces to respond  to crises across Africa and the Middle East: (1) a Special Purpose Marine  Air-Ground Task Force for Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) assigned to  DOD’s U.S. Central Command, which supports U.S. diplomatic missions  in the Middle East; (2) a SPMAGTF-CR assigned to U.S. Africa  Command, which supports U.S. missions in North and West Africa;  and (3) the East Africa Response Force, a U.S. Army force that supports  U.S. diplomatic missions in East Africa. These forces can provide a  variety of functions, from security reinforcement during increased threats,  to military-assisted departures and evacuation support. According to DOD  officials, in 2014, U.S. Africa Command experienced some logistical  challenges associated with covering such a large geographic area, with  particular concern should multiple crises occur simultaneously.
In 2014, State and DOD announced several changes to the Marine  Security Guard (MSG) program, which deploys units of marines to  provide certain types of security to U.S. overseas missions. Specifically,  in coordination with State’s implementation of the Benghazi Accountability  Review Board recommendations, DOD has since increased the size of  MSG detachments at all posts, with further increases at high-threat posts;  accelerated the deployment of additional detachments to other U.S.  diplomatic facilities; and created a Marine Security Guard Security  Augmentation Unit based in Quantico, Virginia, to provide additional  support on short notice. State and DOD officials reported in June 2017  that they have experienced some challenges associated with deploying  the increased MSG units, including obtaining sufficient numbers of  marines to fill the desired number of units and logistical and other support  at some posts. The agencies continue to work to add certain nonlethal  weapons to the MSG equipment set.
In 2015, we reported on State and DOD’s post-Benghazi approach to  provide additional military support to U.S. overseas posts. While State  and DOD had updated some guidance to reflect the new approach, we  recommended that the departments more clearly define the roles,  responsibilities, and circumstances under which DOD support would be  provided and that they update related interagency and departmental  guidance. In response to our recommendations, State and DOD have  taken steps to update such interagency guidance. These steps included  interdepartmental exercises and other collaboration, which resulted in a  joint concept paper and a subsequent December 2016 State-DOD  memorandum of agreement outlining common terms, roles,  responsibilities, and scenarios under which DOD assistance may be  requested, among other things. State and DOD officials have indicated  that each department will produce further department-specific guidance in  the form of a forthcoming diplomatic cable; a DOD update to a 2013  military order; and a new, related DOD instruction. DOD officials expect to  issue the updated order by the end of fiscal year 2017 and to complete  the instruction in fiscal year 2018.
John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-  3489, pendletonj@gao.gov   to ensure support to U.S. missions in crisis situations?  2.  What is the progress of increasing MSG detachments at identified  diplomatic facilities? What challenges exist to providing the personnel  or support needed for these additional units?  3.  What steps have been taken to ensure that recent State and DOD  policy and procedure updates are institutionalized and readily  available in future emergencies?
Background Issue  The Department of State’s (State) Diplomatic Security and overseas posts have processes for  Bureau of Diplomatic Security communicating threat information to post personnel (U.S. employees and  (Diplomatic Security) is locally employed staff) as well as U.S. citizens in country. However, these  responsible for disseminating populations do not always receive important threat information in a timely  threat information to posts. At manner. Diplomatic Security’s Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis,  posts, the Emergency Action based at State headquarters, analyzes threat information from multiple  Committee (EAC), which includes sources, including the U.S. Intelligence Community, and shares the results  the Regional Security Officer of its analysis with posts’ RSOs via cables and other reports. Before  (RSO) and Consular Officer, analyzing the information, Diplomatic Security sends an initial notification  among other subject matter to posts, according to bureau officials. In addition, posts collect, analyze,  experts, disseminates threat and report threat information to headquarters for further distribution. At  information to post personnel, as posts, RSOs, at the direction of the EAC, may adjust the post’s security  appropriate. In addition, consular posture and disseminate threat information to post personnel. In addition,  officers are responsible for if State shares information with the official U.S. community, its policy is to  disseminating information to the make the same or similar information available to the nonofficial U.S.  nonofficial U.S. community—U.S. community if the threat applies to both. (See fig. 10 for a schematic of  citizens living in or traveling State’s threat information dissemination process.)  through the affected area.
Key Findings  State has taken steps to improve RSOs’ reporting of terrorism-related threat  information to headquarters. In June 2015, we found that RSOs at some  posts designated critical for terrorism were not complying fully with directions  from the Secretary of State to use terrorist reporting cables to report all  terrorism-related incidents or threats to ensure proper handling and  dissemination of the information. For example, we found that in some cases,  terrorism-related incidents were not reported in required terrorist reporting  cables. We concluded that without comprehensive and accurate reporting,  State may lack assurance that it received complete information about  terrorist threats that could help prevent and mitigate such threats. We  recommended that Diplomatic Security take steps to remind RSOs and posts   of the critical importance of using the proper type of cable to report all  terrorism-related threats. In December 2015, State sent guidance to all  posts specifying that terrorism-related threats must be reported through  terrorist reporting cables to ensure appropriate dissemination of the  information. Further, in January 2017, State provided reporting  instructions to RSOs to help ensure the timely and accurate reporting of  all security-related information through the correct reporting channels.
Diplomatic Security uses various methods to communicate threat  information to overseas post personnel—both U.S. and locally employed  staff. However, in our 2016 report on transportation security, we reported  that post personnel do not always receive threat information in time to  avoid potential threats. We found that several factors can lead to untimely  receipt of transportation-related threat information. We recommended that  State address these factors. First, some RSOs reported that they send  security notices exclusively to state.gov e-mail addresses; however, not  all post personnel have state.gov e-mail addresses. In one case, this  resulted in post personnel traveling through a prohibited area and an  embassy vehicle being attacked with rocks and seriously damaged.  Second, limited guidance existed for RSOs on how to promote timely  communication of threat information. Third, RSOs and other staff at some  posts mistakenly believed that RSOs cannot share threat information with  the official U.S. community until consular officials received approval from  State to share the same information with the nonofficial U.S. community— a clearance process that can take as long as 8 hours. State reported that  it is reviewing the option to forward e-mails outside its system. It also  reported that it is developing a two-way emergency notification system  that would provide a redundant method for distributing messages during  crises. In addition, State updated its policy manual to clarify that RSOs’  sharing of threat information should not be delayed by the clearance  process, according to Diplomatic Security officials.
To ensure that overseas posts can disseminate information to U.S.  citizens in country in the event of an emergency, disaster, or threat, State  requires posts to annually conduct a drill of the consular warden system.  The consular warden system is a pyramidal contact system designed to  reach the U.S. citizen population. However, we found in 2017 that, on  average between fiscal years 2013 and 2016, 78 percent of overseas  posts did not report the completion of required consular warden system  drills. We concluded that this gap in State’s crisis and evacuation  preparedness creates a risk that U.S. citizens in country may be  insufficiently warned about emergency situations. We recommended that  State take steps to improve the completion and reporting of required  drills, and State concurred, noting it is forming a working group to review  its policies.
Michael J. Courts, (202) 512- 8980, courtsm@gao.gov  nonofficial U.S. community been in past emergencies?  2.  What is the status of State’s plan to use new technology to  disseminate information to U.S. personnel and U.S. citizens  overseas?   3.  What steps has State taken to ensure that posts complete the annual  tests of the consular warden system?
Background  The Department of State’s (State)  Counterintelligence Division— under the Office of Investigations  and Counterintelligence in the  Bureau of Diplomatic Security  (Diplomatic Security)—is  responsible for overseeing  State’s counterintelligence efforts,  including assisting Regional  Security Officers (RSO) with  implementation at overseas  posts.
Foreign intelligence entities from host nations and third parties are  motivated to collect information on a variety of sensitive topics of national  importance, including intelligence, defense, and economic information.  These entities may attempt to collect information through the use of  sophisticated overt, covert, and clandestine means, including human  intelligence collection. Because State operates diplomatic posts in many  countries, State and other U.S. agency employees at these posts—and  their family members—can be targeted by host governments and other  entities. National counterintelligence guidance requires that State and  other executive agencies implement programs to counter the intelligence  threat to U.S. national security and interests by protecting personnel and  information.
Key Findings  State has established several measures to counter the human  intelligence threat at overseas posts. Those measures include  (1) requiring all State and other agency personnel serving at these posts  to report contacts with foreign nationals, particularly those from countries  with critical human intelligence posts; (2) prescreening State personnel  assigned to certain posts against 13 criteria designed to identify  vulnerabilities and directing other agencies to prescreen their personnel;  and (3) briefing personnel about what to expect when working and living  in potentially hostile intelligence environments. While State prepares  personnel at all posts to be aware of human intelligence threats, it uses  enhanced counterintelligence strategies for personnel assigned to posts  designated as “critical threat” for human intelligence. For example,  personnel at critical threat posts receive counterintelligence briefings  before departure and annually while serving at these posts. (See fig. 11.)
Diplomatic Security assesses counterintelligence efforts at overseas  posts through Counterintelligence Post Surveys and Post Security  Program Reviews, making recommendations to improve any gaps  identified in countermeasures. In addition, as part of a government-wide  effort, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence evaluates State’s  counterintelligence activities to identify gaps and make recommendations  to strengthen State’s counterintelligence program.
Michael J. Courts, (202) 512- 8980, courtsm@gao.gov  by State domestically and overseas changed in recent years?   2.  How does State ensure that personnel are prepared to live and work  at posts facing a high or critical human intelligence threat?  3.  How does State evaluate the effectiveness of its human intelligence  countermeasures domestically and at overseas posts? How does  State adjust its countermeasures, if warranted?
Background  The Department of State (State)  created its information security  program to address requirements  in both the Omnibus Diplomatic  Security and Antiterrorism Act of  1986 and the Federal Information  Security Modernization Act of  2014 (FISMA). State’s Bureaus of  Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic  Security) and Information  Resource Management (IRM)  share responsibility for  implementing the information  security responsibilities in these  laws. In May 2017, Diplomatic  Security created the new  Directorate for Cyber and  Technology Security to  consolidate relevant elements  from other directorates.
Issue  Since 1997, GAO has designated federal information security as a  government-wide high-risk area and in 2003 expanded this area to  include computerized systems supporting the nation’s critical  infrastructure. The number of information security incidents reported by  federal agencies—including State—increased from 5,503 in fiscal year  2006 to 77,183 in fiscal year 2015. Cyberattacks forced State to shut  down its unclassified e-mail system and parts of its public website in both  2014 and 2015 after finding evidence that its systems had been  breached. Cyber-based threats to federal systems and information come  from unintentional sources, such as natural disasters, coding errors, and  careless employees, or from intentional sources, such as disgruntled  insiders, hackers, or hostile nations. State’s outdated technology makes it  increasingly difficult to ensure security. In addition, State’s information  security program is split between two bureaus, each responsible for  aspects of the program. Further, State makes extensive use of  contractors to perform information security functions such as the  monitoring and assessment of systems. Protecting those systems and  information from unauthorized disclosure or alteration is particularly  important at State, where inappropriate disclosure could cause  catastrophic harm to the nation’s diplomacy and security.
Key Findings  In 2016, we surveyed 24 federal agencies—including State—to identify  the sources of malicious attacks on their high-impact systems—any  system that holds sensitive information, the loss of which could cause  individuals, the government, or the nation catastrophic harm.  Consequently, these systems warrant increased security to protect them.  Eighteen of these 24 agencies—including State—identified cyberattacks  originating from nation states as the most serious and frequent threat to  the security of their systems. They identified e-mail cyberattacks as the  most serious and frequent delivery method. We made recommendations  to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to improve security over  federal systems, including those at State.
State relies on several aging and obsolete technology systems, which  require significant resources to operate and create challenges to ensuring  information security. We found that State spent about 87 percent of its  information technology budget on operating and maintaining its computer  systems in 2015. This segment of State’s technology budget increased by  approximately $109 million between 2010 and 2015. A State official  stated that the increase is largely due to the cost of maintaining the  infrastructure, including meeting security requirements. For example,  three of State’s visa systems were more than 20 years old. The software  for one of these systems is no longer supported by the vendor, creating   challenges related to information security. State is planning to upgrade  the software to a newer version that also is not supported by the vendor.  As a result, we recommended that State identify and plan to modernize or  replace legacy systems, consistent with OMB guidance.
FISMA directs State and other agencies to designate a Chief Information  Security Officer (CISO)—who, at State, reports to the Chief Information  Officer in IRM—to develop, document, and implement a department-wide  information security program that protects the agency from cyberattacks.  In a 2016 report, we evaluated 24 federal agencies to determine whether  they followed FISMA and other requirements defining the CISO’s  responsibilities. Twenty-two of the 24 agencies—including State—had  defined almost all CISO responsibilities properly. However, we found that  State had assigned responsibility for responding to information security  incidents—a FISMA-designated CISO responsibility—to Diplomatic  Security without also defining the CISO’s role in that activity. We  concluded that not having a defined role may limit the CISO’s ability to  effectively oversee State’s information security incident response  process. We recommended that State define the CISO’s role in  department policy for ensuring that State had procedures for incident  detection, response, and reporting. State concurred with the  recommendation and noted that IRM and Diplomatic Security coordinate  communications for the incident response process.
Gregory C. Wilshusen, (202)  512-6244, wilshuseng@gao.gov  contractors, what unique information security challenges, if any, does  it face? How does it manage its global cybersecurity program?  2.  Given the rapidly changing nature of technology, how does State  assess and address threats to its systems and users from changing  cyber threats?  3.  How will the new Directorate for Cyber and Technology Security  improve State’s capability to address cybersecurity issues?   4.  To what extent, if any, does assigning CISO responsibilities to  multiple bureaus increase State’s risk for duplication, overlap, or  fragmentation of information security responsibilities?
Background  The Secretary of State is  generally required by law to  convene Accountability Review  Boards (ARB) in cases of serious  injury, loss of life, or significant  destruction of property involving  U.S. diplomatic missions or  personnel abroad, and in any  case of a serious breach of  security involving intelligence  activities of a foreign government  directed at a mission abroad.  State has convened 12 ARBs  since 1998. ARBs are  responsible for reporting their  findings about the circumstances  of the attack and making  recommendations.
Issue  On September 11, 2012, the acquired facilities at the U.S. Special  Mission in Benghazi, Libya, came under attack (see fig. 13). Tragically,  four U.S. officials were killed, including the U.S. Ambassador. In response  to the attack, the Department of State (State), working with the  Department of Defense, formed Interagency Security Assessment Teams  to evaluate the security at 19 dangerous posts. Those teams made a  number of recommendations to improve physical and procedural security  at each post. In addition, an ARB was convened in response to the  Benghazi attack; it resulted in 29 recommendations, including several  concerning how State manages risk at dangerous posts. Furthermore,  two of State’s actions resulting from that ARB led to additional reports  that included more recommendations.
Key Findings  The Interagency Security Assessment Teams assessed all facilities at the  19 posts for any security vulnerabilities—physical or procedural. Their  assessments resulted in 287 recommendations including for State to  install physical security upgrades, improve security procedures, and  construct or acquire new or replacement facilities. State officials told us  that State immediately began implementing the recommendations. In  addition, State created the new High Threat Programs Directorate within  its Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security) to ensure that  those posts facing the greatest risk receive additional, security-related  attention. As of June 2017, State reported having addressed 268 of the  287 recommendations.
In December 2012, the ARB that State convened to investigate the  Benghazi attack released the report of its investigation. The ARB made  23 unclassified recommendations in six areas: (1) overarching security  considerations; (2) staffing dangerous posts; (3) training and awareness;  (4) security and fire safety equipment; (5) intelligence and threat analysis;  and (6) personnel accountability. In addition, the ARB, according to State,  made six classified recommendations. State accepted   all 29 of the ARB’s recommendations and pledged to fully implement  them. For example, in response to the ARB, State expanded the  mandatory Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training requirement to all  dangerous posts (and, subsequently, to all posts by 2019). As of June  2017, State reported having addressed all but three of the ARB’s  recommendations.
In response to the Benghazi ARB’s second recommendation, State  established a panel to evaluate the organization and management of  Diplomatic Security. In May 2013, the panel provided its report to State. It  made 35 recommendations in three areas: (1) organization, (2) training,  and (3) management. State accepted 29 of the panel’s 35  recommendations. For instance, State did not accept a recommendation  for Diplomatic Security to establish a chief of staff position at the GS-15  level within its Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary’s office, noting that no  other bureau has an equivalent position. As of June 2017, State reported  having addressed 28 of the 29 recommendations it accepted. For  example, as a result of the panel’s report, Diplomatic Security is  undertaking a strategic review of its staffing.
In response to the Benghazi ARB’s fourth recommendation, State  established a panel to help Diplomatic Security identify best practices for  operating in dangerous environments. The panel provided its report to  State in August 2013. It made 40 recommendations in 12 areas, including  organization and management; program criticality and acceptable risk;  lessons learned; training and human resources; intelligence, threat  analysis, and security assessments; and host nations and guard forces’  capability enhancement, among others. State accepted 38 of the panel’s  40 recommendations. State did not accept the panel’s first  recommendation, that it establish an Under Secretary for Diplomatic  Security. It asserted that doing so would compound the “stove-piping” that  the ARB and others reported in the wake of the Benghazi attack. In  addition, State did not accept the panel’s 13th recommendation, which  stated that waivers to established security standards should only be  provided subsequent to the implementation of all mitigating measures.  State noted that in time-sensitive situations, exceptions might be  appropriate when some mitigating measures are in place. As of June  2017, State reported having addressed 36 of the 38 recommendations it  accepted. For example, as a result of the panel’s report, Diplomatic  Security created a Strategic Advisory Unit within Diplomatic Security to  advise and perform ad hoc analysis for the Assistant Secretary.
Michael J. Courts, (202) 512- 8980, courtsm@gao.gov  recommendations?  2.  What effect, if any, has implementing the Benghazi-related  recommendations had on the security of diplomatic facilities,  personnel, and information?  3.  Since 1998, 12 attacks have resulted in the formation of ARBs. What  is the status of all recommendations made by the 12 ARBs?
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: This special publication is largely based on previously published GAO  work. To generate a list of possible key issues, we reviewed past  products concerning the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of  Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security), by GAO, State’s Inspector  General, and the Congressional Research Service. Working with GAO’s  subject matter experts, we narrowed the list of issues and identified  potential oversight questions. We interviewed cognizant agency officials  in Washington, D.C., and Arlington, Virginia, from State—including from  the Bureaus of Management, Diplomatic Security, Overseas Buildings  Operations (OBO), and Information Resource Management—the  Department of Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International  Development. We used these interviews to refine our key issues, gain  updated information and data, follow up on actions taken regarding our  past recommendations, and identify relevant lessons learned. We also  worked with the officials to determine what portions of our past classified  or restricted work could be presented in a public product. We then  synthesized this information to provide a balanced and comprehensive  overview for each issue and to formulate oversight questions.
We updated relevant data when possible and performed additional data  reliability assessments when necessary. These additional assessments  were conducted only on data that we had not previously reported; all  other data were assessed as part of our work for our previously  published reports. We assessed the reliability of various types of data— funding, staffing, and training—from Diplomatic Security and, as  appropriate, its partner agencies. Specifically, we assessed the reliability  of the following data:
Diplomatic Security bureau managed funds, from fiscal years 2010  to 2016. (We used previously reported data for fiscal years 1998 to  2007, and updated previously reported data for fiscal years 2008 to  2009.)
Dedicated allocations to Diplomatic Security and OBO for physical  security at diplomatic facilities for fiscal years 2015 to 2016. (We  used previously reported data for fiscal years 2009 to 2014.)
Diplomatic Security staffing numbers for its workforce of direct-hire  employees, other U.S. government support staff, and contractors.  (We used previously reported data for 1998, 2008, and 2011.)
Number of students who completed Diplomatic Security-provided  Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training for fiscal years 2011 to 2016.  (We used previously reported data for fiscal years 2006 to 2010.)
To assess the reliability of the data, we interviewed cognizant officials  about how the data were produced and their opinion of the quality of the  data, specifically the data’s completeness, accuracy, and comparability  to previously reported data. We also worked with the cognizant officials  to identify any limitations associated with the data and to mitigate those  issues or note these limitations in our report, as appropriate. In addition,  we updated previously reported data on the percentage of Diplomatic  Security employees who do not speak and read foreign languages at the  level required by their positions and interviewed knowledgeable officials  to corroborate and clarify the data. We determined that the data  mentioned above were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
We prepared this report under the authority of the Comptroller General to  conduct work on his initiative because of broad congressional interest in  the oversight and accountability of providing security to U.S. personnel  working at diplomatic missions and to assist Congress with its oversight  responsibilities.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2017 to September  2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Attacks against U.S. Diplomatic Missions and Subsequent Legal and Policy Changes
paragraphs: U.S. diplomatic missions have faced numerous attacks that were followed  by legal and policy changes. Between 1998 and 2016, there were 419  attacks against U.S. diplomatic interests, according to the Department of  State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Several of the deadly attacks  against U.S. personnel and facilities overseas were followed by new  legislation, independent reviews with corresponding recommendations, or  both. For example, the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism  Act of 1986, which followed the attacks against the U.S. embassy in  Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983, established the Bureau of Diplomatic Security  and set forth its responsibility for post security and protective functions  abroad. The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of  1999, which followed the Africa embassy bombings of 1998, set  requirements for colocation of all U.S. government personnel at an  overseas diplomatic post (except those under the command of an area  military commander) and for a 100-foot perimeter setback for all new U.S.  diplomatic facilities.
In addition, the Secretary of State is generally required by law to convene  an Accountability Review Board (ARB) following incidents that result in  serious injury, loss of life, or significant destruction of property involving  U.S. diplomatic missions or personnel abroad. An ARB is responsible for  reporting its findings about the circumstances of an attack and making  recommendations as appropriate. Since 1998, 12 attacks have resulted in  the formation of an ARB, the most recent of which was formed in  response to the 2012 attacks in Benghazi. (See fig. 14 for a time line of  selected attacks and related laws and reports.)
section_title: Appendix III: Diplomatic Security Responsibilities, Components, and Collaboration with Other U.S. Agencies
paragraphs: The Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security  (Diplomatic Security) has responsibilities set forth in State’s Foreign  Affairs Manual; to help meet its responsibilities, the bureau relies on  multiple organizational components within State. (Fig. 15 highlights State  offices with key security responsibilities.) State also collaborates with  other U.S. government agencies to secure U.S. missions overseas.
subsections: section_title: Diplomatic Security- Related Responsibilities
paragraphs: As established by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,  host country governments are required to protect the diplomatic  personnel and missions of foreign governments. More than two decades  later, following an attack against the U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon,  Congress enacted the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act  of 1986 to provide enhanced diplomatic security and to combat  international terrorism. The act assigns the Secretary of State  responsibility for providing security for all diplomatic operations, in  consultation with the heads of other federal agencies that have personnel  or missions abroad. The act also created Diplomatic Security to provide a  broad range of security and protective functions internationally and  domestically. In addition, the act specifies that other federal agencies will  cooperate with State to fulfill all security operations of a diplomatic nature.
section_title: Diplomatic Security Components
paragraphs: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security is State’s security and law  enforcement arm. The bureau’s eight operational directorates—listed  below—are collectively known as the Diplomatic Security Service. In  addition, Diplomatic Security has three administrative offices that assist  the mission: Executive Office, Strategic Advisory Unit, and Public Affairs.
International Programs: Directs the formulation, planning,  coordination, policy development, and implementation of security  programs that protect U.S. diplomatic missions for most posts.  Manages high-profile security programs such as the Embassy Local  Guard Program, Emergency Action Planning, the Worldwide  Protective Services Program, Surveillance Detection, and the Marine  Security Guard Program.
High Threat Programs: Directs the formulation, planning, coordination,  policy development, and implementation of security programs that  protect U.S. diplomatic missions at high-threat, high-risk posts.  Manages security programs to include personnel recovery, tactical  and strategic planning, special operations, evacuation operations, and  State’s responses to international crises at high-threat, high-risk  posts. Diplomatic Security created this directorate following the 2012  attack on Benghazi to ensure that those posts facing the greatest  risk—now designated as high-threat, high-risk posts—received  additional, security-related attention.
Domestic Operations: Oversees criminal investigations domestically  and abroad related to State personnel, facilities, and visiting foreign  dignitaries, including passport and visa violations, counterintelligence  investigations, and use of force incidents involving State personnel.  Oversees the protection of the Secretary of State, the U.S.  Ambassador to the United Nations, foreign dignitaries, and other  persons of interest.
Training: Formulates and implements all security and law enforcement  training programs and policies for Diplomatic Security. Directs the  formulation, coordination, and implementation of security and law  enforcement training programs that promote the professional  development of Diplomatic Security personnel. Oversees specialized  security training at overseas posts on a regular and emergency basis  and provides emergency security support to posts abroad during  periods of high threat, crisis, or natural disaster.
Threat Investigations and Analysis: Directs, coordinates, and  conducts the analysis of terrorist threats and hostile activities directed  against U.S. government personnel, facilities, and interests abroad.  Conducts protective intelligence investigations, coordinates foreign- government and private-sector requests for assistance relating to  terrorist incidents, and directs the operations of the Diplomatic  Security Command Center and the Overseas Security Advisory  Council.
Security Infrastructure: Manages all matters relating to security  infrastructure in Diplomatic Security functional areas of personnel  security and suitability and insider threats. Formulates strategic  operational planning, priorities, and funding for security infrastructure  operations.
Countermeasures: Manages, plans, and develops policy for worldwide  physical and technical security countermeasures programs.  Represents State in negotiations with other federal agencies on  issues regarding physical and technical security countermeasures.  Directs the offices of Physical Security Programs, Security  Technology, and Diplomatic Courier Service.
Cyber and Technology Security: Manages cyber and technical  elements of State’s security program. In May 2017, Diplomatic  Security created this new directorate by consolidating cyber  technology and investigative support elements from other  directorates. The goal is to increase State’s ability to enable secure  innovation in areas such as e-mail messaging services, Wi-Fi, cloud  services, mobile communications, and social media.
section_title: Other State Bureaus and Offices Collaborate with Diplomatic Security
paragraphs: To complete parts of its mission, Diplomatic Security collaborates with  other State entities, most notably the overseas missions and the Bureaus  of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) and Information Resource  Management (IRM).
Overseas Missions: At posts, the Chief of Mission (Ambassador or  Principal Officer), is ultimately responsible for the security of facilities,  information, and all personnel under chief-of-mission authority. He or  she is assisted by Diplomatic Security, which is represented at post by  a head special agent known as the Regional Security Officer (RSO).  RSOs—working with assistant RSOs and other security personnel— are responsible for implementing a wide range of duties such as  protecting personnel and property, documenting threats and  residential vulnerabilities, and identifying possible mitigation efforts to  address those vulnerabilities. The overseas missions also play a role  in setting post-specific security measures and funding some physical  security upgrades, with approval from Diplomatic Security. In addition,  each post has an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) that provides  guidance in preparing for and responding to potential changes in risk  that might affect the safety and security of the post and the American  citizens in country. The EAC may include the Ambassador, Deputy  Chief of Mission, Principal Officer, Defense Attaché, Political Officer,  Economic Officer, RSO, Management Officer, Consular Officer, Public  Affairs Officer, Human Resources Officer, Medical Officer, U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission Director,  Community Liaison Office Coordinator, and others, including non- State officials, as appropriate. Further, as the 2005 Iraq Accountability  Review Board (ARB) noted, all mission personnel bear “personal  responsibility” for their own and others’ security.
Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO): OBO manages the acquisition,  design, construction, maintenance, and sale of U.S. government  diplomatic property abroad. Through the Capital Security Construction  Program, OBO replaces and constructs diplomatic facilities to provide  U.S. embassies and consulates with safe, secure, functional, and  modern buildings. In addition, OBO tracks information on State’s real  properties, including residences; provides funding for certain  residential security upgrades; and funds and manages the Soft  Targets Program, State’s program for providing security upgrades to  schools attended by U.S. government dependents and off-compound  employee association facilities.
Information Resource Management (IRM): State’s Chief Information  Officer leads IRM to provide the information technology and services  State needs to carry out its foreign policy mission. The Federal  Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) directs the  heads of federal agencies, including State, to designate a Chief  Information Security Officer to develop, document, and implement a  department-wide information security program.
In addition, the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation  (M/PRI) tracks State’s implementation of ARB recommendations.  Diplomatic Security, OBO, IRM, and M/PRI all report to the Under  Secretary for Management.
section_title: Other U.S. Agencies Also Play a Role in Securing U.S. Missions Overseas
paragraphs: Diplomatic Security coordinates its work overseas with a number of U.S.  government entities and agencies:
The Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) develops security  standards for executive agencies working overseas. Chaired by the  Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, OSPB includes  representatives from approximately 20 U.S. agencies with personnel  overseas, including intelligence, foreign affairs, and other agencies.
State incorporates the OSPB’s physical security standards in the  Foreign Affairs Handbooks. Diplomatic facilities overseas—whether  permanent, interim, or temporary—and residences are required to  meet the standards applicable to them. The OSPB standards vary by  facility type, date of construction or acquisition, and threat level. If  facilities do not meet all applicable standards, posts are required to  request waivers, exceptions, or both.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has long provided military  protection and support for the security and safety of U.S. diplomatic  missions and personnel during normal operations and emergencies.  For example, DOD provides Marine Security Guards at some U.S.  diplomatic missions to help protect U.S. personnel, classified material,  and property. DOD support is particularly critical in times of crisis,  such as when DOD provides security reinforcements to facilities under  threat or assists with evacuations. Several entities within State, DOD,  and the military branches prepare for and coordinate these efforts.  Memoranda of Agreement between State and DOD establish  frameworks for cooperation on scenarios requiring security  augmentation, crisis response, and evacuation for U.S. diplomatic and  consular missions overseas.
USAID maintains its own Office of Security, which is responsible for  the physical security of its facilities and coordination with Diplomatic  Security.
Other agencies operating overseas—such as the Departments of  Commerce or the Treasury—may also have security offices, but none  of them operating under chief-of-mission authority maintain their own  facilities outside of Diplomatic Security’s responsibility.
section_title: Appendix IV: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Staffing Levels
paragraphs: The Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic  Security) employs a broad workforce of over 51,000 individuals to carry  out its mission and activities. Its workforce includes direct-hire security  specialists and management support staff, military support, and  contractors. See table 2 for a description of each position and a  comparison of Diplomatic Security staffing levels in fiscal years 2008,  2011, and 2017.
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Recommendations regarding the Bureau of Diplomatic Security
paragraphs: Over the course of our work on the Department of State’s (State) Bureau  of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security) and related efforts, we have  identified conditions that affect the success of its programs and  recommended a range of improvements that should be considered in  program planning and implementation. For example, we have made  recommendations on the need for State to address gaps in its security- related activities, standards, and policies, such as developing a process  to ensure that mitigating steps agreed to in granting waivers and  exceptions for older, acquired, and temporary work facilities have been  implemented. We have also made recommendations on the need for  improved information sharing between Diplomatic Security directorates,  such as sharing information with each other on the residential security  exceptions they have processed to help provide Diplomatic Security with  a clearer picture of security vulnerabilities at residences and enable it to  make better risk management decisions. State and its partner agencies  have generally concurred with our recommendations and have taken  steps to address a number of them, several of which are noted in the  enclosures. In addition, we have identified several existing conditions— such as gaps in State oversight of personnel compliance with mandatory  security training and many overseas diplomatic residences not meeting all  applicable security standards—that continue to challenge the U.S.  government’s ability to protect its people, property, and information  around the world.
In letters addressed to the Secretary of State, we identified which of these  recommendations we believe should be given high priority for  implementation. As of August 14, 2017, State had 27 open  recommendations that have been deemed by GAO as being among the  highest priorities for implementation. Of the 27 priority recommendations,  24 are listed below (see table 3) and are related to this report in four  areas, as follows:
Security of overseas personnel. Fully implementing GAO’s priority  recommendations on personnel security, such as those related to the  Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) training, would help ensure  that State personnel are prepared to operate in dangerous situations.
Security of overseas facilities. Fully implementing GAO’s priority  recommendations on physical security at overseas posts, such as  those regarding risk management associated with physical security of  diplomatic facilities, will improve the safety and security of personnel  serving overseas, particularly in high-threat locations.
Transportation security. Fully implementing recommendations related  to transportation security would improve State’s efforts to manage  transportation-related security risks overseas.
Information security. Fully implementing GAO’s priority  recommendation regarding obsolete computer systems will improve  State’s ability to secure its information technology systems and  access to potentially sensitive information.
GAO will continue to monitor State’s progress in implementing these  recommendations and will update their status on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
section_title: Appendix VI: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: This appendix provides a list of recent GAO products related to each  enclosure. Copies of most products can be found on our website:  http://www.gao.gov/.
GAO also has done work on some of the key issues identified in the  enclosures that resulted in Sensitive But Unclassified or Classified  products. (Report numbers with an SU suffix are Sensitive But  Unclassified, and those with a C suffix are Classified.) Sensitive But  Unclassified and Classified reports are available to personnel with the  proper clearance and need-to-know, upon request. For a copy of a  Sensitive But Unclassified or Classified report, please call or e-mail the  point of contact listed in the related enclosure.
section_title: Enclosure I: Diplomatic Security Funding
paragraphs: State Department: Diplomatic Security Challenges. GAO-13-191T.  Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2012.
State Department: Diplomatic Security's Recent Growth Warrants  Strategic Review. GAO-10-156. Washington, D.C.: November 12, 2009.
section_title: Enclosure II: Diplomatic Security Staffing Challenges
paragraphs: Department of State: Foreign Language Proficiency Has Improved, but  Efforts to Reduce Gaps Need Evaluation. GAO-17-318. Washington,  D.C.: March 22, 2017.
State Department: Diplomatic Security Challenges. GAO-13-191T.  Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2012.
State Department: Diplomatic Security's Recent Growth Warrants  Strategic Review. GAO-10-156. Washington, D.C.: November 12, 2009.
section_title: Enclosure III: Physical Security of U.S. Diplomatic Facilities
paragraphs: Embassy Construction: State Needs to Better Measure Performance of  Its New Approach. GAO-17-296. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2017.
Afghanistan: Embassy Construction Cost and Schedule Have Increased,  and Further Facilities Planning Is Needed. GAO-15-410. Washington,  D.C.: May 19, 2015.
Diplomatic Security: Overseas Facilities May Face Greater Risks Due to  Gaps in Security-Related Activities, Standards, and Policies.  GAO-14-655. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2014.
Diplomatic Security: Overseas Facilities May Face Greater Risks Due to  Gaps in Security-Related Activities, Standards, and Policies.  GAO-14-380SU. Washington, D.C.: June 5, 2014.
section_title: Enclosure IV: Physical Security of Diplomatic Residences and Other Soft Targets
paragraphs: Diplomatic Security: State Department Should Better Manage Risks to  Residences and Other Soft Targets Overseas. GAO-15-700. Washington,  D.C.: July 9, 2015.
Diplomatic Security: State Department Should Better Manage Risks to  Residences and Other Soft Targets Overseas. GAO-15-512SU.  Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2015.
section_title: Enclosure V: Security Training Compliance
paragraphs: Diplomatic Security: State Should Enhance Its Management of  Transportation-Related Risks to Overseas U.S. Personnel. GAO-17-124.  Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2016.
Diplomatic Security: State Should Enhance Management of  Transportation-Related Risks to Overseas U.S. Personnel.  GAO-16-615SU. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2016.
Diplomatic Security: Options for Locating a Consolidated Training Facility.  GAO-16-139T. Washington, D.C.: October 8, 2015.
Diplomatic Security: Options for Locating a Consolidated Training Facility.  GAO-15-808R. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2015.
Countering Overseas Threats: Gaps in State Department Management of  Security Training May Increase Risk to U.S. Personnel. GAO-14-360.  Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2014.
Countering Overseas Threats: Gaps in State Department Management of  Security Training May Increase Risk to U.S. Personnel in High-Threat  Countries. GAO-14-185SU. Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2014.
Diplomatic Security: Expanded Missions and Inadequate Facilities Pose  Critical Challenges to Training Efforts. GAO-11-460. Washington, D.C.:  June 1, 2011.
section_title: Enclosure VI: Embassy Crisis and Evacuation Preparedness
paragraphs: Embassy Evacuations: State Should Take Steps to Improve Emergency  Preparedness. GAO-17-714. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2017.
Embassy Evacuations: State Should Take Steps to Improve Emergency  Preparedness. GAO-17-560SU. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2017.
section_title: Enclosure VII: Department of Defense Support to U.S. Diplomatic Missions
paragraphs: Interagency Coordination: DOD and State Need to Clarify DOD Roles and  Responsibilities to Protect U.S. Personnel and Facilities Overseas in  High-Threat Areas. GAO-15-219C. Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2015.
section_title: Enclosure VIII: Dissemination of Threat Information
paragraphs: Embassy Evacuations: State Should Take Steps to Improve Emergency  Preparedness. GAO-17-714. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2017.
Embassy Evacuations: State Should Take Steps to Improve Emergency  Preparedness. GAO-17-560SU. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2017.
Diplomatic Security: State Should Enhance Its Management of  Transportation-Related Risks to Overseas U.S. Personnel. GAO-17-124.  Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2016.
Diplomatic Security: State Should Enhance Management of  Transportation-Related Risks to Overseas U.S. Personnel.  GAO-16-615SU. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2016.
Combating Terrorism: Steps Taken to Mitigate Threats to Locally Hired  Staff, but State Department Could Improve Reporting on Terrorist Threats.  GAO-15-458SU. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2015.
section_title: Enclosure X: Ensuring Information Security
paragraphs: Federal Chief Information Security Officers: Opportunities Exist to  Improve Roles and Address Challenges to Authority. GAO-16-686.  Washington, D.C.: August 26, 2016.
Information Technology: Federal Agencies Need to Address Aging  Legacy Systems. GAO-16-468. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2016.
Information Security: Agencies Need to Improve Controls over Selected  High-Impact Systems. GAO-16-501. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2016.
Federal Information Security: Agencies Need to Correct Weaknesses and  Fully Implement Security Programs. GAO-15-714. Washington, D.C.:  September 29, 2015.
Information Security: Agencies Need to Improve Oversight of Contractor  Controls. GAO-14-612. Washington, D.C.: August 8, 2014.
State Department Telecommunications: Information on Vendors and  Cyber-Threat Nations. GAO-17-688R. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2017.
section_title: Enclosure XI: Status of Recommendations Made in Reports following the Benghazi Attack
paragraphs: Diplomatic Security: Overseas Facilities May Face Greater Risks Due to  Gaps in Security-Related Activities, Standards, and Policies.  GAO-14-655. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2014.
Diplomatic Security: Overseas Facilities May Face Greater Risks Due to  Gaps in Security-Related Activities, Standards, and Policies.  GAO-14-380SU. Washington, D.C.: June 5, 2014.
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made  key contributions to this report: Thomas Costa (Assistant Director),  Miriam Carroll Fenton (Analyst-in-Charge), Esther Toledo, Mason  Calhoun, David Dayton, Neil Doherty, David Hancock, Thomas Johnson,  Owen Starlin, and Sally Williamson.
The following individuals provided technical assistance and additional  support: Joshua Akery, J.P. Avila-Tournut, Jeffrey Baldwin-Bott, Amanda  Bartine, John Bauckman, Aniruddha Dasgupta, Mark Dowling, Wayne  Emilien, Ian Ferguson, Justin Fisher, Brian Hackney, Brandon Hunt, Guy  LoFaro, Michael Rohrback, and Martin Wilson.
In addition, each GAO report cited in the preceding enclosures and in  appendix VI includes a list of staff who contributed to that product.