Littoral Combat Ship: Deployment of USS Freedom Revealed Risks in Implementing Operational Concepts and Uncertain Costs
Published: 2014-07-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The LCS was intended to be a low-cost surface combatant that uses innovative operational concepts, such as minimal crew size, to lower operations and support costs. In 2013, the Navy deployed USS Freedom , one of two LCS variants, to Singapore to “prove its concept,” demonstrate operational capabilities, and collect data on the ship's manning, training, maintenance, and logistics needs.
The House report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated that GAO analyze the Navy's sustainment plans for its LCS program—including lessons from the USS Freedom deployment. This report addressed (1) the benefits and limitations of the operational data that have been collected on LCS ships; (2) the extent to which the Navy has evaluated risk in its operational support and sustainment concepts for LCS; and (3) how LCS life-cycle cost estimates compare with those for other surface-ship classes. GAO analyzed documents from the 2013 deployment, and LCS and surface-ship life-cycle costs, and interviewed program officials and USS Freedom crews.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The USS Freedom deployment provided beneficial data on operational support and sustainment concepts for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), but these data have limitations, and the Navy still lacks key data on LCS ships and concepts. The USS Freedom deployed for 10 months with a surface-warfare mission package, and the Navy collected data on items such as systems reliability and crew sleep hours. However, several factors limited the operational lessons learned. For example, mechanical problems prevented the ship from spending as much time at sea as planned. Further, the Navy continues to lack operational data for key operational and warfighting concepts, such as deployment with the other mission packages—mine countermeasures and antisubmarine warfare—and data on the other LCS variant which, under current plans, will comprise half the ship class.
Although the Navy is adjusting some operational support and sustainment concepts, it has not yet addressed risks that remain in executing key concepts.
Manning: The crew experienced high workload and fell short of the Navy's sleep standards despite adding personnel for the deployment.
Training: Gaps remain in fully training LCS sailors prior to deployment.
Maintenance: The Navy is adjusting maintenance requirements and has not yet determined the optimal mix of contractor and crew workload to perform preventative maintenance.
Logistics: The Navy is reallocating duties among crew and shore support, but the infrastructure needed to support both variants is incomplete.
Without fully analyzing risks in key concepts, the LCS may have operational limitations, deficits in personnel and materiel readiness, and higher costs.
The Navy has produced life-cycle cost estimates for the LCS seaframes and mission modules. Although those estimates contain uncertainty and there are inherent difficulties in comparing the life-cycle costs of ships with differing capabilities and missions, the best available Navy data indicate that the annual per ship costs for LCS are nearing or may exceed those of other surface ships, including those with greater size and larger crews, such as frigates.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is emphasizing its prior recommendations that, before buying more LCS ships, the Navy (1) conduct and consider the results of a risk assessment and (2) collect additional data and update cost estimates. The Department of Defense expressed concerns that its life-cycle cost data are not comparable across ship types. GAO believes the analysis provides a reasonable comparison using the best available data from the Navy, as discussed in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: For over 10 years, the Navy has been refining the concept of operations  for its newest class of surface warship—the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).  The LCS was intended to be a comparatively low-cost surface-combatant  ship that could operate in the shallow waters close to shore, known as the  littorals. Its design concept consists of two distinct parts—the ship itself  (seaframe) and the interchangeable mission modules it is expected to  carry and deploy (i.e., surface warfare, mine countermeasures, and  antisubmarine warfare). In early 2013, the Navy deployed its first LCS— USS Freedom—to Singapore to “prove its concept,” demonstrate  operational capabilities, and collect cost and other data on the ship’s  manning, training, maintenance, and logistics needs in the actual  overseas environment in which it is expected to operate. The Navy  recognizes that the LCS program faces distinct challenges as it continues  to assess a number of operational support and sustainment concepts— such as reliance on shore support and the use of flyaway maintenance  teams (i.e., contractors flown to the ship to conduct maintenance)—to  determine whether they can be used together to minimize crew size and  lower operations and support costs over the long term. As we previously  reported, the Navy’s acquisition approach to the LCS program involves a  significant degree of concurrency; that is, the Navy is buying the ships  while key concepts and performance are still being tested. The Navy is  procuring two seaframe variants of different hull types from two different  contractors.seaframes, 12 of each variant, and plans to contract for up to 8 additional   To date, the Navy has committed to procuring 24  seaframes—while still testing the operational concepts it will use to  employ the vessels.
In prior reports, we identified numerous challenges related to the  acquisition of LCS seaframes and mission modules and the  implementation of their unique operational concepts. In February 2010,  we reported several potential risks in implementing the new operational  concepts for the LCS.Only report and found deficiencies in the Navy’s LCS life-cycle cost  estimates, noting that uncertainty exists in these estimates because they  were developed without actual operational and cost data. We  recommended that the Navy conduct and consider the results of a risk  assessment to identify operational limitations if the Navy’s approach to  personnel, training, and maintenance cannot be implemented as  envisioned and that the Navy collect additional operational data and  update its cost estimates before contracting for additional ships. The  Navy partially concurred with the risk recommendation and concurred  with the operational data and updated cost estimates recommendation,  but has not yet completed implementation of these recommendations.
For this  concepts for the LCS in the areas of manning, training, maintenance, and  logistics; and (3) how LCS life-cycle cost estimates compare with those  for other surface-ship classes.
To address the benefits and limitations of the operational data that have  been collected on LCS ships, we analyzed and compared USS  Freedom’s planned deployment schedule with its actual executed  schedule. We reviewed documentation related to USS Freedom’s  operational activities while it was deployed, including execution orders,  concepts of operations, and exercise briefings. We also interviewed  forward-deployed crew members in Singapore and Navy officials  responsible for the ship’s operational employment at 7th Fleet in Japan to  discuss the successes and challenges of the deployment, including any  limitations. Further, we analyzed the operational activities of USS  Independence and interviewed Navy officials to determine what  operational data have been collected on the Independence variant.  Finally, we reviewed and analyzed the LCS wholeness and warfighting  concepts of operations to identify any additional LCS operational and  warfighting concepts that still need to be demonstrated in an operational  environment.
To assess the extent to which the Navy has evaluated risk in its  operational support and sustainment concepts for the LCS in the areas of  manning, training, maintenance, and logistics, we reviewed relevant data- collection and analysis plans and mid-point and final reports on the  Freedom 2013 deployment to Singapore from the Commander Naval  Surface Forces Pacific, 7th Fleet, and the Center for Naval Analyses. We  also interviewed officials from organizations responsible for collecting and  analyzing data from this deployment. We reviewed the LCS wholeness  concept of operations, the life-cycle sustainment plans for the LCS, and  various other Navy documents associated with LCS manning, training,  maintenance, and logistics, and interviewed USS Freedom crews who  participated in the 2013 deployment to obtain their perspectives on the  implementation of these concepts.
To assess how LCS life-cycle cost estimates compare with those for other  surface-ship classes, we modified a framework used in a similar  comparison published by the Congressional Budget Office in 2010.do this, we reviewed cost estimates in the current LCS Seaframe  Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate (2011) and the LCS Mission Module  Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate (2013). Although the Navy to date has  not updated these life-cycle cost estimates to reflect changes in the  program, the Navy adjusted the estimates for inflation to fiscal year 2014  dollars. Using these data, we calculated an annual per ship life-cycle cost  estimate for the combined LCS seaframes and mission modules to  account for differences in the number of ships and mission modules and  their respective expected service lives. We also obtained life-cycle cost  data in fiscal year 2014 dollars from the Navy for five surface ships, patrol  coastal ships, mine countermeasures ships, frigates, destroyers, and  cruisers, and used these data to calculate an annual per ship life-cycle  cost estimate for each of these five surface ships. We then compared  these data with the data we calculated for the LCS seaframes and  mission modules. We analyzed and assessed these data and found them  to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting the estimated life- cycle costs of these surface ships. We selected the non-LCS surface  ships used for our comparison because cost data were readily available  and they all conduct at least one mission that the LCS is also expected to  perform. A more detailed-description of our scope and methodology is  presented in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2013 to July 2014  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The LCS was intended to be a comparatively low-cost surface combatant  that could address the challenges of operating U.S. military forces in the  shallow waters close to shore, known as the littorals. The ship is designed  for three principal missions: surface warfare, mine countermeasures, and  antisubmarine warfare—to address threats posed by small surface boats,  mines, and submarines, respectively. Its design concept consists of two  distinct parts—the ship itself (seaframe) and the interchangeable mission  modules it is expected to carry and deploy. These mission modules  consist of containers carrying various unmanned systems, sensors, and  weapons that provide different combat capabilities for the ship’s three  principal missions. These mission modules are intended to give the Navy  the flexibility to change equipment to meet different mission needs while  forward deployed. The mission modules, when combined with the  mission-module crew and an aviation detachment—consisting of an MH- 60 helicopter and its flight and support crew, as well as vertical takeoff  unmanned aerial vehicles—make up a mission package. The LCS is  designed to embark with only one mission package at a time.
The Navy envisioned the LCS as a ship that could operate with a much  smaller crew size than other surface combatants, with preventative  maintenance duties performed primarily by contractors. This concept  would in turn lead to lower operations and support costs, which  traditionally account for about 70 percent of the total cost over a ship’s  lifetime. The Navy planned the LCS to have a core crew of 40 sailors and  mission-module crews of 15 to 20 sailors—far fewer than the crew of  approximately 170 sailors for a frigate and approximately 250 sailors for a  destroyer. To meet its operational, maintenance, support, and  administrative needs with these reduced manning levels, the Navy is  developing a new maintenance and support concept. Unlike other ships,  the LCS would have no onboard administrative personnel and a limited  ability to conduct maintenance at sea; instead, it would rely heavily on  shore-based support, including flyaway maintenance teams made up of  contractors flown in to conduct scheduled maintenance. The Navy also  opted to use a rotational crewing concept, whereby three crews rotate  between two ships, one of which is forward deployed. The Navy has used  a different form of rotational crewing on ballistic missile submarines for  years but has not used it widely on surface combatants.
As of July 2014, the Navy has accepted delivery of four LCS seaframes— two of each variant—and has already contracted for 20 more seaframes  (10 of each variant). The Navy plans to award contracts for up to eight  additional seaframes. at the same time the Navy is in the process of incrementally developing  and procuring the three mission packages.
The Navy had planned to contract for up to 28 additional seaframes, but on February 24,  2014, the Secretary of Defense announced that as part of its fiscal year 2015 budget  proposal the Navy would contract for no more than 32 LCS—instead of the 52 ships  previously planned—(a further reduction from the original 55-ship plan), until the Navy  evaluates potential courses of action, including the current LCS program and provides a  report to the Secretary of Defense, which is due by July 31, 2014. across the program.description of how the council tracks progress through the LCS Plan  of Action and Milestones, and a status update on the LCS Plan of  Action and Milestones can be found in appendix II.
section_title: USS Freedom Deployment Provided Some Data on LCS Operations, but the Navy Still Lacks Key Operational Data on LCS Ships and Concepts
paragraphs: The USS Freedom’s deployment to Singapore was an opportunity for the  Navy to learn lessons about the feasibility and sustainability of unique  LCS operational support and sustainment concepts in an operational  environment. The Navy was able to collect data during the deployment on  items such as systems usage and reliability and crew sleep hours.  However, several factors, such as mechanical failures during the  deployment, limited the operational lessons learned and the extent to  which they are projectable across the LCS class. Additionally, the Navy  continues to lack overseas deployment data for the Independence variant  ships and for additional operational and warfighting concepts—such as  overseas mission-package swaps and deployment with the mine  countermeasures and antisubmarine-warfare mission packages.
subsections: section_title: Deployment to Singapore Intended to Examine Operational Concepts
paragraphs: In March 2013, the Navy deployed its first LCS—USS Freedom—to  Singapore with an increment 2 surface-warfare mission package for the  first-ever overseas-based operational deployment of an LCS.officials saw the deployment as an opportunity to examine the feasibility  of LCS manning, training, maintenance, and logistics concepts in an  operational environment including, among other things, using a minimally  sized crew, swapping out one crew with another while forward deployed,  and maintaining the ship primarily with private contractors. Although the  Navy concept of operations envisioned 40 sailors in the LCS core crew,  the core crew was increased to 50 for the Singapore deployment as a  pilot program to address crew fatigue and workload concerns that the   Navy  Navy was already aware of before the deployment. USS Freedom  deployed for 10 months and conducted one crew swap midway through  the deployment, operating in 7th Fleet’s area of responsibility and using  Singapore as a logistics and maintenance hub (see fig. 1).
section_title: USS Freedom Deployment Provided Some Useful Data on Operational Support and Sustainment Concepts, but Several Factors Limited the Lessons Learned
paragraphs: During its 10-month deployment to the 7th Fleet area of responsibility,  USS Freedom participated in joint exercises with regional partners,  maritime security operations, and disaster-relief efforts in the Philippines  following Typhoon Haiyan. Figure 2 provides an overview of the  operational area for the USS Freedom deployment and shows the sites of  selected events.
The ship and crew implemented some of the LCS-specific operational  support and sustainment concepts, including a crew swap that took place  in August 2013 as well as the use of contractor teams for scheduled  maintenance periods in Singapore. Additionally, several commands and  organizations responsible for analyzing lessons learned from the  deployment—including the Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific, the  Naval Warfare Development Command, and the Center for Naval  Analyses—collected data during the USS Freedom deployment on  equipment reliability rates and crew-reported sleep statistics, among other  things. For example, the Freedom crew provided daily reports on the  amount of time they spent sleeping, training, and completing preventative  and corrective maintenance. After USS Freedom returned to San Diego,  nearly every LCS stakeholder—including the operational commander of  the ship in Singapore (Commander, Destroyer Squadron Seven) and  each of the USS Freedom crews—produced lessons-learned summaries.  According to Navy officials, they were able to learn some operational  lessons from the 10-month deployment. For example:
The Freedom deployment demonstrated the LCS’s ability to  participate in theater security-cooperation activities, such as joint  exercises with regional navies, and helped carry out the Navy’s  forward-presence mission in Southeast Asia—thereby freeing larger  multimission warships to carry out other high-priority Navy duties.
Navy officials are implementing a condition-based maintenance  system on the LCS, whereby sensors provided some useful data on  system usage and reliability. For example, medium-pressure air  compressors had seen high casualty rates on USS Freedom prior to  the deployment. However, Navy officials reported that USS Freedom  did not experience significant failures of these compressors during the  Singapore deployment because they were constantly monitored by  sensors and were replaced before they could fail.
Navy officials reported that data and lessons learned collected during the  USS Freedom deployment will be used to develop and refine the concept  of operations for the USS Fort Worth (Freedom variant) deployment and  the LCS wholeness concept of operations. USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) is  scheduled to deploy to Singapore in late 2014, and the next revision of  the wholeness concept of operations is scheduled for completion in  November 2014.
Although the Navy collected some useful data from the deployment,  mechanical issues reduced time at sea with 55 total mission days lost,  limiting the operational lessons learned. The operational effect of these  lost mission days was that the ship had to cut short its participation in two  joint exercises and did not complete at least two of its planned presence  operations. Our analysis of USS Freedom’s actual executed schedule  showed that these mechanical failures contributed to limiting the ship’s  underway time to 35 percent of its deployment in the 7th Fleet area of  responsibility (see table 1). Underway time includes all time the ship  operated outside of port in the 7th Fleet area of responsibility including  time spent transiting to and from Singapore.
The 7th Fleet concept of operations for the USS Freedom deployment  stated that the ship should spend more time outside of Singapore (i.e.,  greater than 50 percent) than in port in Singapore. However, during its  10-month deployment, USS Freedom spent 58 percent of its time in port  in Singapore (see fig. 3). According to 7th Fleet officials, other ships  deployed to the 7th Fleet area of responsibility typically spend about 20  percent of their time in port. LCS program officials explained that the  unique LCS maintenance concept—USS Freedom returned to port every  25 days to undergo a 5-day preventative maintenance availability and  every 120 days for more-intensive 2-week intermediate maintenance— resulted in a rigid deployment schedule with more port time than other  deployed Navy ships. However, Navy officials acknowledged that the  mechanical issues on this deployment extended the ship’s time in port.  LCS program officials told us that while equipment problems limited  operational lessons learned, the Navy gained experience conducting  emergent repairs overseas and putting stress on the LCS maintenance  concept.
Additionally, some Freedom systems, such as several water-jet  components and the satellite communication system, are unique to that  hull, and their performance data cannot be generalized even to other  Freedom variant ships. USS Freedom is different in several respects from  later (follow-on) ships of its own variant, since some major equipment has  been changed. As a result, learning about these systems’ performance  during deployment cannot be directly applied to predict how the  replacement systems might perform on other ships of the Freedom  variant. According to the Navy, improving these systems should mean  that future deployments of other ships from the Freedom variant will not  incur the same number of equipment problems as USS Freedom did.  However, as the Department of Defense’s Director of Operational Test  and Evaluation noted, no formal operational testing has been conducted  to verify and quantify the effect of these changes, so further deployments  or additional underway time, or both, will be necessary before the effects  of these improvements on ship availability can be determined.
section_title: The Navy Continues to Lack Operational Data on the Other LCS Variant
paragraphs: The Navy continues to lack operational data, specifically overseas  deployment data, on the other LCS variant—the Independence variant— which, under current plans, is expected to comprise half of the LCS ship  class (see fig. 4).
In September 2013, we reported that the Navy had not scheduled an  overseas operational deployment for an Independence variant LCS and  therefore would not have comparable actual data and lessons learned for  this variant. We recommended that the Navy collect actual operational  data on this variant and the Navy concurred, stating that it would identify  the actions and milestones needed to collect additional actual operational  data on the Independence variant. However, the Department of Defense’s  Director of Operational Test and Evaluation noted in January 2014 that  the core combat capabilities of the Independence variant seaframe  remain largely untested and that equipment reliability problems have  degraded the operational availability of USS Independence (LCS 2).
While the Navy deployed a Freedom variant LCS to Singapore for nearly  all of 2013, our analysis found that, over the same period, USS  Independence spent about 8 months, or 65 percent, of 2013 in port or dry  dock maintenance periods, limiting any operational data that the Navy  could obtain when operating the ship out of its homeport in California. In  addition, according to Navy officials, from October 2012 to December  2013, USS Independence spent only 44 days under way. Navy officials  told us that an Independence variant LCS needs to deploy to Singapore  to determine whether the LCS operational support and sustainment  concepts will be feasible and effective in supporting this variant, since not  only does it have different systems than the Freedom variant that require  different logistical support, but Singapore presents unique environmental  conditions such as high humidity and warm ocean temperatures. At the  time of our review, the Navy stated that it has notional plans to deploy an  Independence variant LCS sometime before 2017. Navy officials also  noted that an extended test period is planned in 2014 for the mine  countermeasures mission package for USS Independence. This testing  will take place in the Gulf of Mexico near Florida, and the ship will use  Pensacola to exercise the maintenance concept outside of homeport.
section_title: Additional LCS Concepts Need Operational Demonstration
paragraphs: LCS operational and warfighting concepts that require demonstration in  an operational environment include overseas mission-package swaps,  deployments of the mine countermeasures and antisubmarine warfare  mission packages, and tests of warfighting concepts in exercises related  to operational plans, among others.Freedom deployment concept of operations, the Freedom deployment  was intended to support validation of warfighting and wholeness  concepts. However, the deployment largely focused on sustainment  concepts, and key warfighting concepts were not demonstrated. Table 2  shows the key LCS systems and concepts demonstrated during the USS  Freedom deployment to Singapore and those that require future  deployments to demonstrate their feasibility.
section_title: The Navy Has Not Yet Fully Addressed Risks to Its Operational Support and Sustainment Concepts That Were Identified by the USS Freedom Deployment
paragraphs: Although the Navy is adjusting some operational support and sustainment  concepts based on data collected and lessons learned during the USS  Freedom deployment, it has not yet addressed some risks that remain in  executing and sustaining key manning, training, maintenance, and  logistics concepts. Federal standards for internal controls state that  decision makers should comprehensively identify risks associated with  achieving program objectives, analyze them to determine their potential  effect, and decide how to manage the risk and identify what actions  should be taken. This is an ongoing process, since operating conditions  continually change. In 2010, we reported that the Navy faced several  risks in implementing new LCS concepts for manning, training, and  maintenance necessitated by the small crew size, and recommended that  the Navy conduct and consider the results of a risk assessment to identify  operational limitations if the Navy’s approach to manning, training, and  maintenance cannot be implemented as envisioned; develop possible  alternatives to these concepts; and make policy and process changes to  reduce risks to the LCS program. At the time of this review, the Navy  had not fully addressed our prior recommendation, although Navy officials  told us that they have undertaken a number of activities to manage risks  in the LCS program. For example, the LCS program office convenes a  risk-management board on a regular basis to identify potential program  risks. As the program attempts to manage and mitigate these risks, the  maiden deployment of USS Freedom identified additional issues with the  manning, training, maintenance, and logistics concepts that have not  been fully addressed by the Navy. Key observations from the deployment,  the actions the Navy has taken to address them, and the outstanding  risks that still remain in further implementing LCS operational support and  sustainment concepts are summarized below in table 3.
Our work shows that the Navy has not fully identified, analyzed, and  mitigated the risks associated with LCS concepts. Having such a risk  assessment would enable decision makers to identify and assess the  operational effects if these concepts cannot be implemented as  envisioned; alternatives to mitigate these risks; and information to link the  effectiveness of these new operational concepts with decisions on  program investment. If the operational concepts for manning, training,  maintenance, and logistics cannot be implemented as desired, the Navy  may face operational limitations, may have to reengineer its operational  concept, or may have to make significant design changes to the ship after  committing to building most of the class. The 2013 deployment of USS  Freedom to Singapore highlighted that these risks remain. Therefore, we  continue to believe that our 2010 recommendation is valid.
For additional details and information on our observations from the  deployment, actions the Navy has taken to address them, and the  outstanding risks that still remain in further implementing LCS concepts in  the areas of manning, training, maintenance, and logistics, see appendix  III.
section_title: Available LCS Cost Data Are Limited, but Annual Per-Ship Costs May Be Approaching Those of Other Multimission Surface Ships with Larger Crews
paragraphs: Although the Navy’s life-cycle cost estimates for the LCS seaframe and  mission modules contain uncertainty, they indicate that the annualized  per ship costs for the LCS may be approaching those of other  multimission surface ships with larger crews. The Navy planned to use  data collected during USS Freedom’s deployment, particularly data on  maintenance costs, to update and improve the life-cycle cost estimates  for the LCS seaframe. The Navy collected cost data during USS  Freedom’s deployment to Singapore; however, Navy officials explained  that much of the data may be of limited usefulness for projection across  the LCS ship class. We reported in September 2013 that a lack of  operational data had prevented the Navy from developing life-cycle cost  estimates for the LCS seaframe above a relatively low confidence level.  Although the Navy’s LCS cost estimates contain uncertainty, especially in  regard to operations and support costs, and there are inherent difficulties  associated with comparing the life-cycle costs of various surface ships  with differing capabilities and mission sets, we found that the per ship per  year cost estimates for the LCS program are nearing or may exceed the  costs of other surface ships, including multimission ships with greater size  and more crew members, such as guided-missile frigates and destroyers.
subsections: section_title: Usefulness of USS Freedom Deployment for Updating LCS Cost Estimates May Be Limited
paragraphs: During the course of our prior review, Navy officials explained that they  planned to update and improve life-cycle cost estimates for the LCS  seaframe, in part by using data collected during USS Freedom’s  deployment to Singapore. The deployment provided additional data  associated with actual operations and support costs specific to USS  Freedom, including maintenance and emergent repair costs. However,  according to Navy officials, much of these data may be of limited  usefulness for projection across the LCS ship class. In early 2014, Navy  officials said that they were evaluating the deployment data but that first- time deployments on any ship class include costs related to issues that  are not representative of the entire ship class and will therefore limit their  ability to update the LCS life-cycle cost estimate for the seaframes. Two  such factors are described below:
Certain problematic engineering systems that required emergent  repairs and increased the overall deployment cost figures have been  or will be replaced on future LCSs.
The fuel capacity and efficiency of USS Freedom will differ from other  Freedom and Independence variant ships.
In September 2013, we recommended that the Navy identify actions and  milestones to collect additional actual operational data on the  Independence variant and to update operations and support cost  estimates for both variants. Navy officials said that an updated life-cycle  cost estimate for the LCS seaframe would likely be available in the fall of  2014. However, based on the Navy’s LCS deployment schedule, this  update will likely not include additional overseas deployment-related cost  data for either LCS variant; USS Fort Worth will not deploy until late 2014,  and the Navy has only notional plans to deploy an Independence variant   Navy officials explained that the Navy will  LCS sometime before 2017.not have a life-cycle cost based on actual deployment data for the LCS  until it is operating multiple LCSs from a forward location such as  Singapore in accordance with employment and operational concepts.
section_title: LCS Life-Cycle Cost Estimates Contain Uncertainty
paragraphs: The Navy estimated in 2011 that operations and support costs for the  LCS seaframes would be about $50 billion over the life of the ship class.  In 2013, it estimated that operations and support costs for the mission  modules would be about $18 billion. Both of these estimates were  calculated in fiscal year 2010 dollars. However, as we reported in  September 2013, the seaframe estimate is at the 10 percent confidence  level, meaning that there is 90 percent chance that costs will be higher  than this estimate. We reported that those estimates were at a low level  of confidence due to overall lack of operational data on both LCS  seaframes and operating concepts that are unique among the surface  fleet. In lieu of actual LCS data, the Navy used operations and support  data from other surface ships, such as frigates, and modified them to  approximate LCS characteristics (referred to by the Navy as modified  analogous data) to build the LCS cost estimate. For example,  maintenance cost estimates were calculated by modifying analogous data  from frigates and destroyers, among other ships, even though the  maintenance concepts for these ships differ from those for the LCS.  Moreover, since the time when the Navy developed the seaframe  estimate in 2011, it has made several programmatic changes to LCS  concepts that will increase the overall cost to operate and sustain the ship  class.
The number of shore personnel to support the ship has more than  tripled—from 271 to 862—since the estimate was developed in 2011,  as support requirements have become better understood.
The Navy has increased the total number of core crew members  onboard each ship from 40 to 50 in order to better address workload  and watch-standing requirements.
As the Navy continues to better understand the work requirements  associated with the ship class, the required numbers of shore support and  ship crew have risen. Navy officials explained that such changes are  necessary for the success of the program and acknowledged that those  changes would increase the overall costs of the LCS and should be  included in future LCS life-cycle cost estimates.
section_title: LCS Costs May Be Approaching Those of Other Surface Ships with Larger Crews
paragraphs: From the outset of the program, the Navy has described the LCS as a  low-cost alternative to other ships in the surface fleet, yet the available  data indicate that the per year, per ship life-cycle costs are nearing or  may exceed those of other surface ships, including multimission ships  with greater size and larger crews. The LCS consists of two distinct  parts—the ship itself (seaframe) and the interchangeable mission  modules it is expected to carry and deploy. These mission modules  consist of various unmanned systems, sensors, and weapons that  provide different combat capabilities for the ship’s three principal  missions. Many LCS cost estimates only refer to the acquisition cost of  individual seaframes rather than the total life-cycle cost of the seaframe  and mission modules. The operations and support costs for the LCS  seaframe that are included in the life-cycle cost estimates are  significant—due in part to unique LCS operational concepts—while the  LCS mission modules that provide each ship with operational capability  account for a significant component of the costs for the ship class. As we  noted above, the cost estimates for both the seaframe and the mission  modules contain uncertainty; however, we believe that when combined  they provide the best available estimate to date of the overall life-cycle  costs for the LCS program. Moreover, because the Navy has  acknowledged it has made several programmatic changes to LCS  concepts that will increase the overall costs to operate and sustain the  ship class, it is likely that the per ship, per year life-cycle costs for the  program will be higher than this current estimate.
We analyzed the Navy’s life-cycle cost estimates for LCS seaframes  (2011) and mission modules (2013), which the Navy adjusted for inflation  to fiscal year 2014 dollars, and used updated Navy life-cycle cost  estimates provided in April 2014 by Naval Sea Systems Command for  patrol coastal ships, mine countermeasures ships, frigates, destroyers,  and cruisers. These ships were selected for comparison because they have been in the surface fleet for decades and historical cost data are  readily available, and they all conduct at least one mission that the LCS is  also expected to perform. We calculated the life-cycle costs on a per ship  annualized basis to account for differences in the number of ships and  expected service life of each class. As shown in figure 5, we found that  per ship life-cycle costs per year for the LCS program are nearing or may  exceed those for other surface ships, including guided-missile frigates  and multimission destroyers.
We are providing a descriptive comparison of annual life-cycle costs per  ship using available data and are not assessing the relative benefits and  capabilities of these various ship classes. Navy officials point out that the  below estimates may not include the full costs of developing,  modernizing, and sustaining software and combat systems installed on  the surface ships we use for comparative purposes (e.g., Aegis ballistic  missile defense system used on cruisers and destroyers). Additionally,  officials stated that the acquisition costs presented are not to be  interpreted as replacement costs since a replacement value for the  specific ship would have to take into account changes in productivity,  design specifications, and legislative and contracting environments.  Despite the inherent difficulties associated with comparing the life-cycle  costs of various surface ships with differing capabilities and mission sets,  and at different points in their respective service lives, we believe this  analysis is useful because it provides a framework for comparing the life- cycle cost estimates of various surface ships on a per ship, per year  basis, thereby accounting for variations in expected service life and the  number of ships. For an overview of the surface ships used in figure 5,  including their missions and crew sizes, see appendix IV. We used the  Navy’s expected ship service lives of record, although the Navy has made  decisions to retire vessels before they’ve reached their expected service  lives in some instances and has extended the service lives of other  vessels, such as destroyers. For LCS seaframes, the Navy used a 25- year expected service life to calculate life-cycle costs, which is an  average of the 20-year service-life threshold and 30-year service-life  objective outlined in key performance parameters.
Although the LCS has been identified by the Navy as a low-cost  alternative to other surface ship classes, the available data indicate that  the costs of the LCS may exceed or closely align with the costs of other  multimission surface ships with larger crews. Without comprehensive life- cycle cost estimates, the Navy may be hindered in its ability to evaluate  the merits of investing in LCS ships compared with other alternatives,  conduct long-term budgetary planning, or determine the level of  resources required to implement the program in accordance with the LCS  concept of operations.
In 2013, we recommended that the Navy collect actual operational data  on the Independence variant and update operations and support cost  estimates for both variants prior to contracting for additional LCS ships in  2016. Our work shows that the Navy still lacks operational data and that  life-cycle cost estimates are still not comprehensive. We continue to  believe that the Navy should have greater clarity on the performance of its  operational concepts and greater confidence in its cost estimates before it  enters into contracts for additional LCS ships.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense  (DOD) noted it is concerned with the conclusions drawn from the analysis  of life-cycle cost data across ship classes. DOD added that due to known  gaps in existing ship class cost data, the available data do not allow for  an accurate comparison of the life cycle costs among LCS and other  existing surface ship classes. DOD’s comments are summarized below  and reprinted in their entirety in appendix V. DOD also provided technical  comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.
In its comments, DOD noted differences in the scope of cost data across  the ship classes and differences in life-cycle phases among the ship  classes included in our life-cycle cost analysis. For example, DOD  commented that there are gaps in the Navy’s record keeping for  operations and support costs, so that some potential costs may not be  captured in the estimates the Navy provided us, such as system  modernization, software maintenance, and program startup, which could  understate the costs of the other surface ships. However, these data are  the most comprehensive operations and support cost data that the Navy  could provide us. As we noted in the report, the Navy also has used these  data from other surface ship classes to build its LCS life-cycle cost  estimates. Moreover, we discussed in the report the known limitations to  comparing the life-cycle costs of these ship classes, including that the  estimates may not include the full costs of developing, modernizing, and  sustaining software and combat systems installed on the ships, as well as  past acquisition costs not aligning with what current production costs  would be, and the ships being at different points in their service lives.  Despite the known limitations, we believe our analysis uses the best  available data to provide a reasonable comparison of the life-cycle costs  across the ship classes. Consequently, we have made no revisions to the  report, as suggested by DOD.
Finally, DOD provided us with additional information to clarify that the  Navy’s mission-module program life-cycle cost estimate is at the 50  percent confidence level. We verified this information and updated the  report to include this confidence level.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy. In  addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this  report, please contact me at (202) 512-3489 or at pendletonj@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to  this report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To address the benefits and limitations of the operational data that have  been collected on Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), we analyzed and  compared the planned USS Freedom deployment schedule with the  actual executed schedule. We reviewed documentation related to  operational activities while deployed including execution orders, concepts  of operations such as the 7th Fleet USS Freedom deployment concept of  operations, and exercise briefings. We also analyzed operational data  from the deployment, including readiness data and equipment casualty  reports. We interviewed forward-deployed crew members in Singapore as  well as Navy officials responsible for the ship’s operational employment at  7th Fleet in Japan to discuss the successes and challenges of the  deployment, including any limitations. Further, we analyzed the  operational activities of USS Independence and interviewed Navy officials  to determine what operational data has been collected on Independence  variant ships. Finally, we reviewed and analyzed the LCS wholeness and  warfighting concepts of operations to determine any additional LCS  operational and warfighting concepts that still require demonstration.
To assess the extent to which the Navy has evaluated risk in its  operational support and sustainment concepts for the LCS in the areas of  manning, training, maintenance, and logistics, we reviewed relevant data- collection and analysis plans and mid-point and final reports on the  Freedom deployment to Singapore in 2013 from Commander Naval  Surface Forces Pacific, 7th Fleet, and the Center for Naval Analyses, and  we interviewed officials from organizations responsible for collecting and  analyzing data from this deployment. We reviewed the LCS wholeness  concept of operations, the life-cycle sustainment plans for the LCS, LCS  manpower estimate report, LCS training plans, and various other Navy  documents associated with LCS manning, training, maintenance, and  logistics, and interviewed USS Freedom crews who participated in the  2013 deployment, to obtain their perspectives on the implementation of  these concepts. We also reviewed the extent to which the Navy has  analyzed the costs and benefits associated with the use of contractor  flyaway maintenance teams. Finally, we discussed with LCS program  office officials and other LCS stakeholders any actions that were being  taken to analyze potential risks or mitigate them for future LCS  deployments.
To assess how LCS life-cycle cost estimates compare with those for other  surface-ship classes, we modified a framework used in an earlier and  similar comparison conducted by the Congressional Budget Office. To  do this, we reviewed cost estimates in the current LCS Seaframe  Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate (2011) and the LCS Mission Module  Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate (2013), both prepared by the cost- estimating division of the Naval Sea Systems Command, and determined  that these are the latest estimates available from the Navy. Although the  Navy to date has not updated these life-cycle cost estimates (which were  estimated using fiscal year 2010 dollars) to reflect changes in the  program or the number of ships to be purchased, the Navy adjusted the  estimates for inflation to fiscal year 2014 dollars. Using these data, we  calculated an annual per ship life-cycle cost estimate for the combined  LCS seaframes and mission modules to account for differences in the  number of ships and mission modules and their respective expected  service lives. We also obtained life-cycle cost data in fiscal year 2014  dollars from the Navy for five surface ships (patrol coastal ships, mine  countermeasures ships, frigates, destroyers, and cruisers) and used  these data to calculate an annual per-ship life-cycle cost estimate for  each of these five surface ships so as to account for differences in the  number of ships and their expected service lives. We then compared  these data with the annual per ship life-cycle cost data we calculated for  the LCS seaframes and mission modules. We analyzed and assessed  these data and found them to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  reporting the estimated life-cycle costs of these surface ships. The five  non-LCS surface ships we used for our comparison were selected  because historical cost data were readily available and they all conduct at  least one mission that the LCS is also expected to perform. Further, we  interviewed Navy LCS program officials and cost estimating officials to  determine the extent to which data from the USS Freedom deployment in  2013 may be used to refine future life-cycle cost estimates.
We interviewed officials, and where appropriate obtained documentation,  at the following locations:
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Naval Sea Systems Command
Program Executive Office Littoral Combat Ship, Fleet Introduction
Program Executive Office, Ships
U.S. Fleet Forces Command
Naval Warfare Development Command
Navy Manpower Analysis Center
Southwest Regional Maintenance Center
Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
Naval Supply Systems Command
Commander, Logistics Force Western Pacific
Commander, Destroyer Squadron Seven
Navy Region Center, Singapore
LCS Class Squadron Forward Liaison Element
Center for Naval Analyses  We conducted group discussions with USS Freedom blue and gold crew  officer and enlisted personnel who participated in the 2013 Singapore  deployment. The discussions involved small-group meetings designed to  gain more in-depth information about specific issues that cannot easily be  obtained from single or serial interviews. Our design included multiple  groups with varying characteristics but some homogeneity—such as rank  and responsibility—within groups. For example, with few exceptions we  met with officers separately from enlisted personnel and we met  separately with personnel from each major ship department such as  engineering, combat systems, and operations. Most groups involved  three to five participants. Participants were selected based on their  availability by USS Freedom commanding and executive officers in  Singapore and the LCS Class Squadron in San Diego to ensure we had  at least three members from each major ship function. Discussions were  held in a semistructured manner using a broad list of discussion topics to  encourage participants to share their thoughts and experiences related to  the crew-swap experience, crew integration, maintenance, systems  reliability, training, logistics support, quality of life, and overall satisfaction  with the LCS experience. We assured participants that we would not link  their names to their responses.
To gain a broad perspective of crew experience during the USS Freedom  deployment, we conducted 17 small-group sessions with USS Freedom  officers and enlisted personnel across all ship departments. Table 4  provides a summary of the composition of the group discussions held by  GAO analysts in Singapore (during deployment) and in San Diego  (postdeployment). All discussions were held aboard USS Freedom.
Our group discussions were not designed to (1) demonstrate the extent of  a problem or to generalize results to the entire USS Freedom crew  population or to other LCS variants, (2) develop a consensus to arrive at  an agreed-upon plan or make decisions about what actions to take, or (3)  provide statistically representative samples or reliable quantitative  estimates. Instead, they were intended to generate in-depth information  about the discussion group participants’ attitudes and reasons for their  attitudes toward specific topics and to offer insights into the range of  concerns and support for an issue. The generalizability of the information  produced by our discussion groups is limited for several reasons. First,  the information represents the responses of USS Freedom officers and  enlisted personnel from the 17 groups described above. Second, while  the composition of the groups was designed to assure a distribution of  Navy officers, enlisted personnel, seniority, and ship departments, the  group participants were not probabilistically sampled. Third, participants  were asked questions about their specific experiences on the Singapore  deployment. The experiences of other USS Freedom personnel who did  not participate in our group discussions may have varied. Because of  these limitations, we did not rely entirely on group discussions, but rather  used several different methodologies to corroborate and support our  conclusions.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2013 to July 2014  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Littoral Combat Ship Plan of Action and Milestones, as of March 2014
paragraphs: In 2012, the Chief of Naval Operations received the results of four internal  studies he requested to assess, among other things, the Littoral Combat  Ship (LCS) across aspects of manning, training, and maintenance to  assist in preparing the USS Freedom for deployment in March 2013. Two  of the four studies were independent Navy studies—one conducted by  the Board of Inspection and Survey (the Navy’s ship-inspection entity)  and one conducted by the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. These  two studies identified concerns with, among other things, LCS manning,  training, and maintenance, and recommended steps to improve aspects  of the program. The other two studies were two war game reports, which  identified findings and made recommendations on LCS operations and  sustainment. All four of these reports identified numerous operational  support and sustainment issues, such as insufficient manning of ships  leading to crew fatigue, inadequate training of crews, incomplete  maintenance plans, and insufficient shore support, and culminated in  about 170 recommendations for improvement.
The LCS Council developed a Plan of Action and Milestones document  as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations to address the findings and  recommendations from the four internal Navy reports. The Plan of Action  and Milestones is organized around lines of operation (e.g., fleet  introduction and sustainability, platform and capabilities evolution, and  developing and aligning concept of operations and other documentation)  and has over 1,000 action items and milestones—many directly  addressing operational support and sustainment issues. Each of the lines  of operation has subordinate action items, with a stakeholder assigned  responsibility for each action item, and both a start date and expected  finish date for the tasking. Table 5 below provides an update on the  number of discrete (nonrecurring) subtasks that the Navy has completed  as of March 2014.
section_title: Appendix III: Remaining Risks in Implementing Littoral Combat Ship Operational Support and Sustainment Concepts
paragraphs: The Navy is adjusting some operational support and sustainment  concepts based on data collected and lessons learned during the USS  Freedom deployment, but it has not yet addressed some risks that remain  in executing and sustaining key manning, training, maintenance, and  logistics concepts.
subsections: section_title: Manning Risks and Navy Actions to Address Them
paragraphs: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) manning concept calls for a relatively  small crew to operate the ship. The minimal crew size drives many of the  other LCS concepts, since LCS sailors are expected to spend most of  their time operating the ship rather than performing training, maintenance,  or administrative functions. The last revision of the LCS wholeness  concept of operations, approved in January 2013, called for a core crew  size of 40 and mission-module crews of 15 to 19 sailors. The maximum  number of core crew members allowed by LCS key performance  parameters is 50.beyond 50, the ships would require significant design changes. A number  of internal Navy reports issued in 2012 raised concerns about the  adequacy of a 40-member core crew size, with crew fatigue and overwork   To add berthing spaces for additional crew members  as potential negative effects of this manning concept. In response to  these concerns, the Navy added 10 sailors to the USS Freedom core  crew deploying to Singapore as part of a pilot program. Navy leadership  determined early in the deployment that these additional crew members  were helpful in performing maintenance and watch-standing duties, and  decided to permanently increase LCS core crews to 50 sailors. The Navy  also added three ensigns to the Freedom crews prior to deployment, and  intends on continuing and expanding this program to attach four ensigns   In addition to the core and mission-module crews,  to each LCS crew.contractors were also onboard during the course of the deployment to  assist with equipment troubleshooting and repair.
Despite the addition of 10 sailors to the core crew and contractor support,  data collected from the Freedom’s deployment show that sailors’ sleep  hours did not increase compared to the sleep hours reported in studies  that examined LCS with 40-member crews; this suggests that the Navy  has not fully addressed crew fatigue issues by increasing crew size. Specifically, the Center for Naval Analyses found that Freedom crews  averaged about 6 hours of sleep per day compared to the Navy standard  of 8 hours; some key departments, such as engineering and operations,  averaged even fewer. While Navy officials told us that sailors do not  realistically expect 8 hours of sleep while they are under way and may  choose to have more down time rather than sleep, the LCS must adhere  to Navy manpower standards, including those for crewmember fatigue  levels and workload hours found in Navy standard workweeks. These  standards are set to minimize potential adverse effects on morale,  retention, and safety. Crew members told us that their sleep hours  decreased significantly during major equipment casualties, particularly  those affecting the ship’s diesel generators and other engineering  systems. Navy officials said that follow-on ships have been outfitted with  different systems that are supposed to be more reliable than those on  Freedom, which should decrease the amount of corrective maintenance  required, and thereby decrease crew fatigue on future deployments.  However, as previously discussed, these systems have not been fully  tested or operated on the LCS, and their reliability has yet to be proven by  actual experience.
Additionally, we found that core crews depended heavily on sailors from  the surface warfare mission-module crew to perform watch standing,  training drills, and engineering maintenance over the course of the  deployment. This is a departure from what was envisioned in the concept  of operations, and creates a situation that may not be sustainable under a  different pace of operations or with a different mission module deployed.  Officers and enlisted sailors from both core and mission-module crews  told us that mission-module sailors were heavily leveraged to help  complete core crew functions and that the crews were fully integrated.  The crews added that the surface warfare mission module is uniquely  qualified to help with core crew functions, since these sailors’ billet  structure—their mix of skills and expertise—completely aligns with that of  the core crew. For example, there are engineers in the surface-warfare  mission-module crew to operate and maintain the motors on the module’s  rigid-hull inflatable boats. Since these boats are not part of the  antisubmarine warfare mission modules, there are no engineers in those  crews. Sailors from the core crews’ engineering department told us they  depended on the qualified mission-module engineers to assist them and  were at a loss as to how the engineering department would function  effectively if deployed with the other mission modules. Figure 6 shows the  extent of overlap between the core crew billets and the three mission- module crew billets.
Core crews also relied heavily on support from the maintenance  contractors embarked during the course of the deployment. Program  officials and crew members cited these contractors’ expertise with  engineering systems and said they were of great assistance, essentially  becoming additional highly experienced engineers always on watch in the  engineering space. Engineering department crew members told us that  the ship would not have gotten under way if not for these contractors.  Program officials do not yet know whether contractors will always be  embarked during future LCS deployments, but they said that the Navy  utilizes contractors on other surface combatants when they are deployed  and underway. Navy officials noted that USS Fort Worth, deploying in late  2014, will have two contractor personnel onboard.
NAVMAC leads the manpower requirements-determination process, which identifies  multiyear manpower requirements to support the budgeting process. that they expect some changes to the LCS manning structure based on  their initial observations.
Manpower requirements for the other variant and mission modules have  not yet been validated. A similar study to determine the requirements for  Independence variant crews is scheduled to begin in 2016. Since the  mine countermeasures and antisubmarine warfare mission modules are  still being developed, validation of their crews has not been scheduled.  Without validating the optimal crew size and billet structure for all LCS  crews and without accounting for the full scope and distribution of work  performed by sailors across all ship departments, the Navy risks that crew  fatigue will exceed Navy standards and could negatively affect crew  members’ performance as well as morale, retention, safety, and ultimately  the operational readiness of the ship class.
section_title: Training Risks and Navy Actions to Address Them
paragraphs: The LCS training concept calls for sailors to report to a core or mission- module crew qualified to stand watch and carry out their other duties.  Most LCS training is conducted off the ship in a classroom or simulator  setting as operational demands do not allow sufficient time for training  during operational periods. Crews are expected to be fully trained  (qualified and certified) prior to deployment, and there is no training  department embedded within the crew and no training required while  under way.
During discussions with Freedom crews, we found that not all sailors had  completed training prior to deploying to Singapore. The 10 sailors added  to the crew as part of the “plus-up” pilot program were identified in the  months leading up to the March 2013 deployment date and did not  undergo LCS-specific training or complete their qualifications prior to  deploying. Some of these 10 additional crew members were junior sailors  and told us they had limited sailing experience but were ultimately able to  earn their qualifications over the course of the deployment. More- experienced core crew members who completed LCS training were in  part responsible for instructing and training these additional 10 sailors, a  collateral duty not accounted for within the standard LCS workday or  envisioned in the LCS concept of operations. The Navy is in the process  of reviewing and defining training needed for the 10 additional sailors, but  since the training pipeline for LCS service can take about 2 years to  complete, the Navy risks repeating this situation on upcoming  deployments.
While the Navy is reviewing training for the late-addition ensigns and the  10 “plus-up” sailors, it considers the training process to have been  validated by the Freedom deployment, since no major training omissions  or deficiencies were identified. However, we found that in addition to the  10 “plus-up” sailors not receiving all training prior to deployment, sailors  from the original 40-person crews were training over the course of the  deployment as well. The Center for Naval Analyses found that more than  half of the qualification and instructed training that occurred during the  deployment was for the original core crews, not the crew plus-ups. The  Center for Naval Analyses added that sailors will train no matter what—at  times out of necessity but also to maintain proficiency and in support of  career development and well-being—and that time must be made  available for training during deployments. The Center for Naval Analyses  calculated the average amount of training conducted by all crew members  over the course of the deployment to be about an hour a day. However,  this hour is unaccounted for in the Navy’s expected LCS workday and  detracts from the time a sailor could otherwise be resting or performing  other collateral duties. The most common reasons for performing training,  drills, and underway instruction while deployed were to cover training that  was not provided prior to the deployment or to maintain proficiency. LCS  program officials explained that much of this training was planned to be  conducted during the deployment, and that underway training will likely  continue until the new curriculum is fully implemented over the next  several years. However, requiring LCS sailors to train while deployed was  not envisioned in the LCS wholeness concept of operations, and it can  exacerbate crew fatigue levels and negatively affect performance, morale,  retention, safety, and the operational readiness of the ship.
In addition to sailors not being fully trained prior to deployment, we heard  concerns about the quality of the training the sailors received. The Navy  is aware of this and is investing heavily in virtual reality–based training  simulations and a curriculum to prepare sailors for LCS service as  envisioned in the concept of operations. Specifically, the Navy has  budgeted for construction of another LCS training facility in Mayport,  Florida, and awarded several contracts valued up to $300 million to  develop training simulations. While the final LCS training infrastructure is  being developed, the program is training sailors through a combination of  classroom instruction, vendor training (whereby contractors or original- equipment manufacturers train sailors on how to operate certain  equipment), shore-based trainers, and very limited on-hull “school ship  periods” to complete the qualification and certification process. Enlisted  sailors from both core crews across ship departments expressed general  dissatisfaction with the LCS training they received prior to the  deployment. Some cited the obsolescence of vendor training and the  limited utility of the 3-week LCS Academy in preparing them to serve on  the LCS, and others stated that insufficient training left them ill-prepared  to deal with contingencies on the deployment. Freedom officers said that  it will take time for training to adapt to the needs of LCS sailors, but that it  would make sense to cut the training that is not proving useful to LCS  sailors in the short term until a more-tailored curriculum is developed.  Navy training officials told us that they are aware of some of the quality  issues with the current training and are attempting to make reasonable  improvements that are cost-effective, but they pointed out that this interim  training will be phased out over the next several years. While the program  seeks to have useful and applicable training available for sailors  progressing through the training pipeline now, the officials added that it  would not be prudent to make major investments to overhaul temporary  training.
Navy officials told us that they are in the process of reviewing a revised  LCS training plan that should be released in 2014. The training plan will  lay out the schedule and process for replacing current training with the  new simulations being developed. While this plan was not released early  enough for inclusion in our review, earlier versions of LCS training plans  did not include measures of effectiveness or training effectiveness- evaluation plans. In light of crew feedback on the inadequacy of current  training, and unless the Navy acts on this feedback and builds  effectiveness measures into its new training plan, it risks making  significant investments to develop training that will not meet LCS sailors’  training needs. Additionally, the Navy risks deploying LCS crews that are  not properly qualified and certified, which in turn could negatively affect  the crews’ ability to operate and maintain the ship and perform warfighting  duties as expected.
section_title: Maintenance Risks and Navy Actions to Address Them
paragraphs: Because of the relatively small size of LCS crews, the maintenance  concept calls for contractors to perform most preventative maintenance  during regularly scheduled in-port periods. During the Singapore  deployment, USS Freedom executed this concept, returning to port every  25 days to undergo a 5-day preventative maintenance availability and  every 120 days for a more-intensive 2-week intermediate maintenance  availability. Flyaway maintenance teams of about 30 contractors were  flown to Singapore for the 5-day maintenance periods, and about 60-70  contractors for the 2-week periods. Because of the regular returns to  Singapore for maintenance availabilities, the USS Freedom had a  somewhat limited range in theater, and Navy officials noted that this rigid  maintenance periodicity limited operational flexibility. Navy officials  explained that this was a deliberate decision and that future deployments  will have a longer, more-flexible interval for scheduling in-port  maintenance. During the maintenance availabilities, there were some  maintenance checks that could not be completed because the needed  parts, tools, or equipment were not prepositioned by the contractor in  time. The Navy attributes some of these issues to changing the  maintenance schedule without enough lead time for the contractor to  adequately respond. The Navy notes that contractor execution rates  improved over the course of the deployment, and the Navy has  established an improved maintenance scheduling process that should  help prevent this problem on future deployments.
Although contractors reportedly improved their positioning of materiel in  time for the scheduled maintenance periods, Navy officials and Freedom  crews said that lack of continuity in contractor personnel is an issue. They  said that it is not unusual to see different contractors sent every month to  perform scheduled maintenance. This presents a problem, since there is  a learning curve associated with new maintainers coming onboard to  execute their assigned maintenance checks. Freedom sailors told us that  the burden of teaching new contractors how to complete their checks  often falls on them, as does the task of repairing any equipment broken in  the course of an inexperienced or unqualified contractor trying to maintain  it. While Navy officials said that quality-assurance provisions will be  included in the maintenance contracts expected to be awarded later in  2014, officials acknowledged that these provisions may not address this  problem.
Although contractors perform much of the preventative maintenance on  LCS, the crews are still responsible for performing limited checks  between scheduled maintenance periods. Sailors are largely responsible  for performing more-frequent daily or weekly maintenance checks, and  contractors for those that are required monthly or quarterly. During the  deployment, the Center for Naval Analyses reported that Freedom sailors  performed both scheduled and corrective maintenance actions each day  (see fig. 7).
However, crew members told us that unexpected levels of maintenance  activities impacted crew fatigue levels. Navy officials stated this  maintenance effort reflects the materiel reliability issues that they say  have been remedied for follow-on LCS ships. Yet crew members told us  of several instances where some of their preventative maintenance  responsibilities would be better suited to contractors and other examples  of how some routine maintenance activities could be shifted from  contractors to crew. For example, members of the combat systems  department crew reported that approximately 90 percent of combat  systems spaces are sensitive and therefore require the presence of LCS  crew members in the workspace while contractors complete maintenance  on department systems. Crew members must essentially “shadow”  contractors as they perform such basic tasks as changing batteries and  cleaning filters. Each maintenance activity has a tag that specifies the  amount of time it should take to perform the check, and crew members  voiced frustration over having to watch contractors take the full amount of  time to perform the check even if they could have performed it in a  fraction of the time specified on the tag.
A major action item in the LCS Plan of Action and Milestones calls for  developing an integrated and coordinated plan for the planning,  executing, tracking, reporting, and quality assurance of planned  maintenance between the ship’s force, shore sailors, the LCS Squadron,  and contractors on both variants. However, this broad action item, as well  as another action item calling for the continuous review of maintenance  requirements, extends out to December 2015 for completion. Program  officials said that the current process for refining maintenance  requirements—where changes in the frequency or responsibility for  maintenance actions is reviewed and approved by the Navy’s in-service  engineering agents or through maintenance effectiveness reviews—is  adequate, but added that the program is still working to develop a tool  that would allow better management and coordination of maintenance  activities. For example, greater visibility into the full scope of planned  maintenance work performed by both crew and contractor personnel  would allow program managers greater foresight into how and when  certain parts should be repaired or replaced.
The Navy is implementing a pilot condition-based maintenance program,  whereby sensors installed on ship systems collect usage and reliability  data, with the intention of conducting maintenance based on the condition  of the equipment rather than according to a predetermined schedule. As  more data are collected on equipment failure rates by condition-based  maintenance sensors and as knowledge of LCS systems grows, the Navy  intends for some maintenance requirements to be eventually phased out  without increasing the risk of failure or sacrificing reliability. For example,  there are a number of shut-off valves on the Freedom variant with a  scheduled maintenance requirement to check them every month. These  could be continuously monitored by sensors rather than being checked by  a contractor or crew member on a monthly basis. The LCS program office  has plans to expand the condition-based maintenance program on other  LCS ships; for example, USS Fort Worth is being fitted with additional  sensors in preparation for its late 2014 deployment.
The maintenance concept for LCS may be changed in the future. The  LCS program office requested that a business-case analysis be  conducted to develop a sustainment strategy that will provide the most  cost-effective solution for providing LCS maintenance outside the  continental United States. The analysis, completed in April 2013,  compared five alternatives to the current contractor-based maintenance  approach and recommended shifting responsibility from contractors to  shore-based Navy personnel to achieve cost savings and other  improvements. The Navy is exploring options to enact this  recommendation under different scenarios and plans to do so as more  LCSs are deployed to more forward operating stations. For example, the  Navy plans to use reservists to conduct some LCS maintenance in lieu of  contractors and intends to shift more maintenance responsibility to shore- based Navy personnel. However, program officials said that they may be  somewhat limited in carrying out the recommendation by statutory  maintenance requirements that govern how maintenance is performed  abroad for ships, such as the LCS, that are homeported in the United   The Navy is planning to award 5-year maintenance contracts  States.later this year, and officials said there will be enough flexibility built into  the contracts to allow experimentation with different maintenance  alternatives.
section_title: Logistics Risks and Navy Actions to Address Them
paragraphs: Shore-based support networks perform LCS logistics functions such as  administrative tasks, emergent repairs, and management of ship support  needs. Primary support is provided by the LCS Squadron in San Diego.  For the USS Freedom deployment, several entities based in Singapore  provided additional support, including the LCS Squadron Forward Liaison  Element—12 LCS Squadron personnel sent to Singapore for the course  of the deployment to provide local support and coordination on  maintenance activities and ship reporting—and the Commander, Logistics  Group, Western Pacific—7th Fleet’s principal logistics group stationed in  Singapore, which was responsible for emergent maintenance on USS   Navy officials noted several command and control–related  Freedom.challenges associated with this distance support concept during the  Freedom deployment. For example, the ship’s crew did not follow  established distance support processes to address emergent  maintenance needs, resulting in significant opportunity costs and  duplication of effort. The LCS Squadron is revising its written instructions  to resolve this issue for future deployments. However, some of the  reporting duties that were supposed to be performed by shore support  teams under original distance support concepts—such as reporting of  equipment casualties—have now become crew responsibilities. Officials  said the time difference between San Diego and Singapore was creating  a lag in reporting and response times and cited this as a reason for  shifting some reporting duties back to the crew. As mentioned earlier,  adding additional responsibilities to an LCS sailor’s already-full workday  may exacerbate crew fatigue and may require reallocation of workloads  or other revisions to the LCS concept of operations.
We found several additional limitations of the LCS support infrastructure  over the course of the deployment. For example, the Navy noted that  existing Internet resources ashore were insufficient for managing  maintenance, and the Navy continues to explore options with the host  nation for improving connectivity. Another issue still being resolved is  finding adequate providers for facilities maintenance and ship cleaning,  as the services contracted for Freedom’s deployment were not up to  sailors’ expectations. The Navy would also prefer to have LCS hulls  cleaned while deployed and is in the process of determining a cost- effective way to execute this task in compliance with statutory  maintenance requirements. Finally, USS Freedom required nearly three  times as many underway refuelings as were scheduled. Navy  logisticians in Singapore scheduled seven at-sea refuelings for the  deployment but 18 were eventually required. LCS program officials say  that this was a scheduling error rather than an indication of higher-than- expected fuel burn rates. As the Navy gains more operational experience  in an overseas environment, it expects to learn additional lessons about  more-accurately scheduling LCS refuelings.
Additionally, Navy officials acknowledged that the logistics footprint  needed to support four LCSs in Singapore by 2017 must be defined and  expanded over the next several years. The Navy is in the process of  determining the final logistics requirements to support additional ships at  Singapore and other forward operating stations; these efforts are  scheduled to be completed by April 2014. Currently, there is only a  temporary tension-fabric structure in Singapore to house spare parts,  tools, and working space for maintenance contractors, but this temporary  structure does not have adequate space to house support elements for  four LCS of both variants, according to Navy officials. Permanent support  facilities have not been built in Singapore or other potential forward  operating stations, and the lack of operational data on the Independence  variant limits the Navy’s ability to accurately plan for logistics support  when both variants deploy. Without a clear understanding of the logistics  needs of both variants, the Navy risks being underprepared to support  both while forward deployed.
section_title: Appendix IV: Overview of Navy Surface Ships Used in Life-Cycle Cost Comparison
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Suzanne Wren, Assistant  Director; Steven Banovac; Kristine Hassinger; Joanne Landesman; Carol  Petersen; Michael Silver; Amie Steele; Sabrina Streagle; Grant Sutton;  and Chris Watson made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship  Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost.  GAO-13-738T. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2013.
Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship  Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost.  GAO-13-530. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2013.
Defense Acquisitions: Realizing Savings under Different Littoral Combat  Ship Acquisition Strategies Depends on Successful Management of  Risks. GAO-11-277T. Washington, D.C.: December 14, 2010.
Navy’s Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat  Ship Program. GAO-11-249R. Washington, D.C.: December 8, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the  Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities. GAO-10-523.  Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2010.
Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost  Estimates and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts.   GAO-10-257. Washington, D.C.: February 2, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Realistic Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy  Shipbuilding Programs. GAO-07-943T. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Plans Need to Allow Enough Time to Demonstrate  Capability of First Littoral Combat Ships. GAO-05-255. Washington, D.C.:  March 1, 2005.