Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Collection of Unmanned Aerial Systems and Aerostats Data
Published: 2017-02-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: As the lead federal agency charged with securing U.S. borders, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) CBP has employed a variety of technologies and assets to assist with its border security efforts. In support of its mission, CBP operates a fleet of remotely piloted Predator B UAS and uses aerostats, including tactical aerostats and TARS. GAO was asked to review CBP's use of UAS and aerostats for border security.
This report addresses the following questions: (1) How does CBP use UAS and aerostats for border security activities, and to what extent has CBP developed and documented procedures for UAS coordination? and (2) To what extent has CBP taken actions to assess the effectiveness of its UAS and aerostats for border security activities? GAO reviewed CBP documents; analyzed Predator B UAS, tactical aerostat, and TARS data on use and effectiveness from fiscal years 2013 through 2016; interviewed field and headquarters officials; and conducted site visits to observe CBP's use of UAS and aerostats along U.S. borders.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses Predator B unmanned aerial systems (UAS) for a variety of border security activities but could benefit from documented coordination procedures in all operating locations. CBP uses its Predator B UAS to support a variety of efforts, such as missions to support investigations in collaboration with other government agencies (e.g., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement) and to locate individuals illegally crossing the border. GAO found that CBP established various mechanisms to coordinate with other agencies for Predator B missions but did not develop and document coordination procedures in two of its three operational centers. Without documented coordination procedures in all operating locations consistent with internal control standards, CBP does not have reasonable assurance that practices in all operating locations align with existing policies and procedures for joint operations with other federal and non-federal government agencies.
CBP uses aerostats—unmanned buoyant craft tethered to the ground and equipped with video surveillance cameras and radar technology—to support its border security activities along the southern U.S. border. In south Texas, the U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) uses relocatable tactical aerostats equipped with video surveillance technology to locate and support the interdiction of cross-border illegal activity. At eight fixed sites across the southern U.S. border and in Puerto Rico, CBP uses the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) program to support its efforts to detect occurrences of illegal aircraft and maritime vessel border incursions.
CBP has taken actions to assess the effectiveness of its UAS and aerostats for border security, but could improve its data collection. CBP collects a variety of data on its use of Predator B UAS, tactical aerostats, and TARS including data on their support for the apprehension of individuals, seizure of drugs, and other events (asset assists). For Predator B UAS, GAO found mission data—such as the names of supported agencies and asset assists for seizures of narcotics—was not recorded consistently across all operational centers, limiting CBP's ability to assess the effectiveness of the program. CBP has not updated its guidance for collecting and recording mission information in its data collection system to include new data elements added since 2014, and it does not have instructions for recording mission information such as asset assists. In addition, not all users of CBP's system have received training for recording mission information. Updating guidance and fully training users, consistent with internal control standards, would help CBP better ensure the quality of data it uses to assess effectiveness. For tactical aerostats, GAO found that Border Patrol collection of asset assist information for seizures and apprehensions does not distinguish between its tactical aerostats and TARS. Consistent with internal control standards, data that distinguishes between support provided by tactical aerostats and support provided by TARS would help CBP collect better and more complete information and guide resource allocation decisions, such as the re-deployment of tactical aerostat sites based on changes in cross-border illegal activity.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is making five recommendations, including that CBP document coordination procedures for Predator B operations in all operating locations, update guidance and implement training for collection of Predator B mission data, and update Border Patrol's data collection practices for aerostat asset assists. CBP concurred and identified planned actions to address the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for securing U.S. borders to  prevent acts of terrorism and the unlawful movement of people, illegal  drugs, and other contraband across U.S. borders. Within CBP, the U.S.  Border Patrol (Border Patrol) reported apprehending over 300,000 illegal  entrants and seizing over 1 million pounds of marijuana and 10,000  pounds of cocaine in fiscal year 2015. CBP is responsible for securing  the U.S. border across nearly 4,000 miles with Canada and 2,000 miles  with Mexico, and CBP law enforcement personnel are responsible for  securing U.S. borders to prevent acts of terrorism and the unlawful  movement of people, illegal drugs, and other contraband across U.S.  borders. To help secure the border, CBP law enforcement personnel use  a variety of technologies, which are critical to their ability to detect and  identify the illegal entry of narcotics and people between ports of entry.  For example, Border Patrol agents use, among other things, towers  equipped with surveillance cameras and radar technology to detect the  illegal entry of people between ports of entry. Along the south Texas  border, Border Patrol also uses tactical aerostats, which are relocatable  unmanned buoyant craft tethered to the ground equipped with video  surveillance cameras.
In addition to surveillance technologies used by Border Patrol, CBP’s Air  and Marine Operations (AMO) uses its air and maritime assets both  independently and as members of partnerships, task forces, and other  whole-of-government networks, to help detect and identify illegal entrants  and smugglers. AMO’s fleet of air assets includes Predator B unmanned  aerial systems (UAS) equipped with video and radar surveillance  technology to conduct border security efforts. AMO also operates the  Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) program which includes fixed  site, aerostat-based radar systems that provide air surveillance across the  southern U.S. border and in Puerto Rico. According to CBP’s strategic  plan, the use of technology in the border environment—including UAS,  tactical aerostats, and TARS—better enables it to detect, identify,  monitor, and appropriately respond to threats in the nation’s border  regions.
You asked us to review CBP’s use of UAS and aerostats, including  Predator B UAS, TARS, tactical aerostats, and small UAS and its efforts  to assess their effectiveness to secure the border. This report addresses  the following questions: (1) How does CBP use UAS and aerostats for  border security activities, and to what extent has CBP developed and  documented procedures for UAS coordination? (2) To what extent has  CBP taken actions to assess the effectiveness of its UAS and aerostats  for border security activities?
To address both questions, we reviewed DHS and CBP documents  related to UAS, aerostats, and surveillance technology for border security,  including strategies, plans, reports, concepts of operation, and standard  operating procedures. We also reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and  past GAO work related to UAS, aerostats, and surveillance technologies  used for border security activities. We conducted site visits to observe  CBP’s use of Predator B UAS and aerostats in Arizona, California, North  Dakota, and Texas and interviewed CBP officials responsible for their  operation. Findings from our observations and interviews cannot be  generalized to all occurrences of CBP’s use of Predator B UAS and  aerostats, but provided insights into how these assets are used and  contribute to border security operations along U.S. borders.
To determine how CBP uses Predator B UAS and aerostats, we reviewed  and analyzed CBP information and data and met with responsible CBP  officials. For Predator B UAS, we analyzed mission and flight hour data  from fiscal years 2013 through 2016, the time period for which data were  available in CBP’s current system for recording Predator B mission data.  We assessed the reliability of these data by examining data for any  anomalies, reviewing CBP guidance and documents, and interviewing  CBP officials to understand their methods for collecting, reporting, and  validating the data. We found that data to be sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of our report. We compared CBP’s available documentation of  its procedures for coordination of its use of Predator B UAS with  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. In addition,  we reviewed provisions included in the Trade Facilitation and Trade  Enforcement Act of 2015 (Trade Facilitation Act) requiring CBP, acting  through AMO, to develop standard operating procedures to provide  command, control, communication, surveillance, and reconnaissance  assistance with UAS, including establishment of a process and procedure  for the submission, approval, prioritization and coordination of air support  requests from non-CBP law enforcement agencies. For tactical  aerostats and TARS, we reviewed CBP documents and information  related to its use of TARS and tactical aerostats for border security  activities.
To determine the extent to which CBP assesses the effectiveness of  Predator B UAS and aerostats, we reviewed and analyzed CBP  information; asset assist data for seizures, apprehensions, and other  events; and met with responsible CBP program officials. For Predator B  UAS, we analyzed flight hour goal, asset assist, and launch rate data  from fiscal years 2013 through 2016, the time period for which data were  available in CBP’s current system for recording Predator B mission  data. For tactical aerostats, we reviewed operational availability data  and analyzed asset assist data from May 2014 through fiscal year 2016,  the most recent time period for which data were available in CBP data  systems. For TARS, we reviewed operational availability and asset  assist data from fiscal years 2013 through 2016, the time period starting  when CBP assumed control of the program from the Department of  Defense. To determine the reliability of Predator B, tactical aerostat, and  TARS data, we examined data for any anomalies, reviewed CBP  guidance and documents, and interviewed CBP officials to understand  their methods for collecting, reporting, and validating the data. We found  these data were sufficiently reliable for our reporting purposes of  providing summary data on CBP’s measures of effectiveness for Predator B UAS, tactical aerostat, and TARS across fiscal years 2013 through  2016, including launch rate, operational availability, and asset assists for  seizures, apprehensions, and other events. We assessed CBP’s data  collection and management practices for Predator B UAS and tactical  aerostats for mission information and asset assists against the  management standards and practices contained in Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2015 to February  2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix II for more  details on our objectives, scope, and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: CBP’s Predator B UAS Program
paragraphs: CBP began operation of Predator B aircraft in fiscal year 2006, and as of  fiscal year 2016, operates nine Predator B aircraft from four AMO  National Air Security Operations Centers (NASOC) in Arizona, Florida,  Texas, and North Dakota. Based on CBP data provided to us for fiscal  year 2015, annual obligations for CBP’s Predator B program were  approximately $42 million and the cost per flight hour was $5,878. AMO  is responsible for operation of CBP’s Predator B aircraft and coordinates  with other CBP components and government agencies to perform federal  border security activities. CBP’s Predator B aircraft are equipped with  video and radar sensors primarily to provide intelligence, surveillance,  and reconnaissance capabilities. For more information on sensors  equipped on Predator B aircraft, see figure 1. CBP’s Predator B aircraft  are launched and recovered at its NASOCs in Sierra Vista, Arizona;  Corpus Christi, Texas; and Grand Forks, North Dakota; while the NASOC  in Jacksonville, Florida remotely operates Predator B aircraft launched  from other NASOCs. Each NASOC where Predator B aircraft are  launched and recovered is generally assigned a broad geographic area of  responsibility (AOR); see figure 1 for more information.
CBP is responsible for operating Predator B aircraft in accordance with  Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) procedures for authorizing UAS  operations in the national airspace system. Pursuant to FAA  requirements, all Predator B flights must comply with procedures for  obtaining Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COA). The COA- designated airspace establishes operational corridors for Predator B  activity both along and within 100 miles of the northern border, and along  and within 25 to 60 miles of the southern border, exclusive of urban  areas. COAs issued by FAA to CBP also include airspace for training  missions which involve take offs and landings around a designated  NASOC and transit missions to move Predator B aircraft between  NASOCs. CBP reported 80 percent of Predator B aircraft flight hours  were along border and coastal areas of the United States in COA- designated airspace (see fig. 2).
section_title: CBP’s Tactical Aerostat Program
paragraphs: CBP began operation of tactical aerostats in August 2012 in south Texas.  As of the end of fiscal year 2016, it had deployed five tactical aerostats in  Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley sector and one tactical aerostat in  Laredo sector. For locations of CBP’s tactical aerostats, see figure 3.
Based on data CBP provided to us for fiscal year 2015, annual obligations  for CBP’s tactical aerostat program were approximately $41 million and  the cost per flight hour ranged between $424 to $677, depending on the  type of aerostat.
CBP currently operates three types of tactical aerostats equipped with  video surveillance cameras that vary in size and altitude of operation.  CBP is responsible for operating its tactical aerostats in accordance with  FAA regulations through the issuance of a COA authorizing use of  moored balloons. CBP’s tactical aerostats were obtained through its  Department of Defense ReUse program and are comprised of a mix of  Department of Defense-loaned and CBP-owned equipment. CBP  manages the technology and operation of each tactical aerostat site  through contracts, and Border Patrol agents operate tactical aerostat  video surveillance cameras and provide security at each site. See figure 4  for a photograph of a CBP tactical aerostat.
section_title: CBP’s TARS Program
paragraphs: The former U.S. Customs Service began the TARS program in 1978 with  the establishment of its first site located in Florida followed by a second  site in Arizona in 1983. From 1988 to 1991, the U.S. Customs Service  established additional TARS sites at Yuma, Arizona, and three sites in  Texas, including Marfa, Eagle Pass and Rio Grande City. In 1992,  management of the TARS program was transferred to the Department of  Defense, with the U.S. Air Force designated as the executive agent.  During the Department of Defense’s management of the TARS program,  sites were located in Florida, Texas, Arizona, Puerto Rico and the  Bahamas.
In July 2013, the TARS program was transferred from the Department of  Defense to DHS with a total of eight sites. At the time of transfer, two  TARS sites were inoperable due to past system crashes and CBP  restored operations at those sites in September 2014. Based on data CBP provided to us for fiscal year 2015, annual obligations for CBP’s  TARS program were approximately $45 million and the cost per flight  hour was about $950. CBP manages the technology and operation of  each TARS site through contracts and CBP’s Air and Marine Operations  Center (AMOC) has operational control over each asset. As of fiscal year  2016, there were a total of eight TARS sites along the southern U.S.  border and in Puerto Rico. For a map of TARS sites, see figure 3 above.
section_title: CBP Uses UAS and Aerostats for a Variety of Border Security Activities, but Could Benefit from Documented Procedures for Coordinating Predator B Operations with Other Government Agencies
subsections: section_title: CBP Uses Predator B UAS to Support a Variety of Activities and Government Agencies, but Could Benefit from Documenting Coordination Procedures
paragraphs: CBP uses Predator B aircraft to conduct various border security activities  and to support a range of government agencies. First, with regard to the  types of activities for which Predator B aircraft are used, our analysis of  CBP data showed that over 80 percent of Predator B missions were in  support of law enforcement and extended border missions, as shown in  table 1. In particular, about 67 percent of missions were for law  enforcement activities, such as use of Predator B aircraft to locate  individuals illegally crossing the border and provide aerial surveillance  during investigations in joint operations with federal law enforcement  agencies and during special security events like Pope Francis’s visit to  Juarez, Mexico, in February 2016. About 16 percent of missions were in  support of extended border operations, which are operations beyond U.S.  territorial lands and seas in support of federal and international law  enforcement partnerships. For example, CBP uses its Predator B  aircraft for interdiction operations with Joint Interagency Task Force –  South, including maritime patrol missions in the source and transit zones,  which encompass the area from South America through the Caribbean  Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean that is used to transport illicit drugs to  the United States (transit zone) from drug producing countries in South  America (source zone). In addition, about 14 percent of missions were  for training, and about 1 percent was for non-enforcement activities, such  as for natural disaster recovery efforts.
With regard to CBP’s use of Predator B aircraft in support of government  agencies, based on our analysis of CBP data, we found that half of all  Predator B flight hours from fiscal years 2013 through 2016 (51 percent)  were in support of Border Patrol to help, among other things, in its efforts  to detect the illegal entry of goods and people between U.S. ports of  entry. We also found that 32 percent of Predator B flight hours from  fiscal years 2013 through 2016 were in support of AMO, such as for  missions to train AMO UAS pilots. CBP’s Predator B operations in  support of other federal agencies accounted for 15 percent of Predator B  flight hours from fiscal years 2013 through 2016, such as conducting  aerial surveillance for investigations during controlled deliveries of illegal  contraband by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. We found  that 2 percent of Predator B flight hours from fiscal years 2013 through  2016 were attributed to support for state and local government agencies.  For example, CBP’s Predator B operations in support of local law  enforcement agencies have included performing aerial surveillance during  officer safety incidents, such as an active shooting incident.
As part of using Predator B aircraft to support other government  agencies, CBP has established various mechanisms to coordinate  Predator B operations. For example, at NASOCs, personnel from other  CBP components are assigned to support and coordinate mission  activities involving Predator B operations. Border Patrol agents assigned  to support NASOCs assist with directing agents and resources to support  its law enforcement operations and collecting information on asset assists  provided for by Predator B operations. Further, two of DHS’s joint task  forces help coordinate Predator B operations. Specifically, Joint Task  Force – West, Arizona and Joint Task Force – West, South Texas  coordinate air asset tasking and operations, including Predator B  operations and assist in the transmission of requests for Predator B  support and communication with local field units during operations, such  as Border Patrol stations and AMO air branches. Further, CBP uses a  dedicated system—called BigPipe—to coordinate Predator B operations.  BigPipe distributes operational mission data to supported federal, state,  and local law enforcement agencies. In particular, BigPipe distributes  real-time and recorded mission information, including information from  sensors on AMO assets, including Predator B aircraft. According to CBP  officials, BigPipe allows for seamless and efficient secure communication  between AMO, Joint Task Force – West, Arizona, and other locations.
In addition to these mechanisms, CBP has also documented procedures  for coordinating Predator B operations among its supported or partner  agencies in Arizona specifically by developing a standard operating  procedure for coordination of Predator B operations through its NASOC in  Arizona. These documented procedures include a description of the  responsibilities of participating agencies; procedures for sharing mission  information and collecting asset assist information from supported  agencies related to seizures and apprehensions; and requirements for  reviewing and tasking of air support requests for Predator B aircraft from  non-CBP government agencies. Joint Task Force – West, Arizona also  created an air integration strategy outlining the surveillance assets and  associated capabilities available to support operations in its AOR,  including a model to guide use of air and ground assets, including  Predator B aircraft and towers equipped with video and radar surveillance  technology. According to CBP officials we met with in Arizona, the  integration strategy, in conjunction with information on surveillance  technology deployment, were used to help plan and prioritize Predator B  patrol missions in areas lacking existing surveillance technology; for  example, along federal and tribal lands in Tucson Border Patrol sector’s  AOR.
However, CBP has not documented procedures for coordination of  Predator B operations among its supported agencies through its NASOCs  in Texas and North Dakota. CBP has established national policies for its  Predator B operations that include policies for prioritization of Predator B  missions and processes for submission and review of Predator B mission  or air support requests. However, these national policies do not include  coordination procedures specific to Predator B operating locations or  NASOCs, such as local tasking of air support requests to Predator B  versus other aircraft, procedures for sharing mission information across  multiple locations and agencies, and collection and reporting of asset  assist information from supported agencies during and after Predator B  missions. For example in Texas, Predator B operations are coordinated in  part through DHS’s Joint Task Force – West, South Texas and air support  requests for Predator B aircraft may be submitted by government  agencies to the NASOC in Texas. Without documented coordination  procedures for Predator B operations in Texas, it is not clear how  requests submitted to the NASOC in Texas are reviewed, prioritized, and  coordinated with Joint Task Force – West, South Texas, including how  both entities reach agreement on requests that may involve competing  priorities.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that  significant events should appear in management directives, policies, or  operating manuals to help ensure management’s directives are carried  out as intended. The Trade Facilitation Act also requires that, as part of  standard operating procedures regarding use of UAS, AMO is to develop  a formal procedure to determine how UAS mission requests from non- CBP law enforcement agencies are prioritized and coordinated. Further,  CBP’s strategic plan states that integrating surveillance capabilities into  the planning and execution of law enforcement operations is enabled by  sound standards, procedures, and processes that require interagency  coordination. CBP’s Predator B aircraft are national assets used primarily  for detection and surveillance during law enforcement operations,  independently and in coordination with federal, state, and local law  enforcement agencies throughout the United States. AMO officials  acknowledged that developing documented coordination procedures for  Predator B operations in North Dakota and Texas could strengthen  ongoing coordination efforts; however, CBP has not yet taken actions to  develop documented coordination procedures in those operating  locations due to differences across those locations. For example, AMO  officials told us that the current coordination process in Texas, which  relies on direct operator to operator coordination, may be inefficient at  times. Further, AMO officials stated that a coordination process through  Joint Task Force – West, South Texas is under development and that documented coordination procedures for Predator B operations could  strengthen CBP’s coordination with other government agencies. Without  documenting its procedures for coordination of Predator B operations with  supported agencies, CBP does not have reasonable assurance that  practices at NASOCs in Texas and North Dakota align with existing  policies and procedures for joint operations with other government  agencies.
section_title: CBP Uses Tactical Aerostats to Detect Cross- Border Illegal Activity in South Texas
paragraphs: Within CBP, Border Patrol uses tactical aerostats to identify cross-border  illegal activity through video surveillance cameras attached to an aerostat  during flight, and these aerostats are deployed in south Texas. Border  Patrol agents operate video surveillance cameras on tactical aerostats in  flight from a local command and control center to detect, identify, monitor,  and track items of interest. For example, Border Patrol agents can  position video surveillance cameras to observe an item of interest such as  a person attempting to illegally enter the United States from Mexico by  crossing the Rio Grande River using a raft. Once an item of interest has  been identified, a Border Patrol agent operating a video surveillance  camera can relay information to other agents through direct land-mobile  radio communication or through a Border Patrol station Tactical  Operations Center. For an example of Border Patrol’s use of tactical  aerostat technology, see figure 5.
In its Aerostat Operational Need Statement, Border Patrol’s Rio Grande  Valley sector stated that video surveillance cameras on tactical aerostats  in flight can be used to detect items of interest across wide coverage  areas. The Operational Need Statement further stated that video  surveillance cameras on tactical aerostats in flight can enhance  surveillance coverage by increasing the elevation and viewing angle to  overcome obstructions from vegetation and bends in the Rio Grande  River, which limit the use of tower-mounted camera systems. Further,  CBP reported that video surveillance cameras on tactical aerostats can  view items of interest from a distance between 10 to 24 kilometers based  on the type aerostat and altitude of operation.
Border Patrol agents also use tactical aerostats in south Texas to support  bi-national law enforcement efforts between Border Patrol and the  government of Mexico. Border Patrol officials we met with in south Texas  told us that information from video surveillance cameras on tactical  aerostats shared with the government of Mexico has resulted in seizures  of weapons and narcotics. For example in fiscal years 2014 through  2016, Border Patrol reported over 60,000 pounds of known marijuana  seized by the government of Mexico through assistance provided by  tactical aerostats.
Border Patrol agents use other surveillance technologies to aid in  identifying items of interest with tactical aerostat video surveillance  cameras. For example, Border Patrol agents may use tactical aerostat  and relocatable tower video surveillance cameras concurrently within  tactical aerostat command and control centers. According to CBP  officials, video surveillance cameras on these towers help to enhance the  coverage area and provide continued coverage when aerostats are not in  flight. Border Patrol agents assigned to tactical aerostat sites are also  able to access information from unattended sensors, which can provide  cueing information to locate items of interest with tactical aerostat video  surveillance cameras.
Border Patrol plans to use tactical aerostats until Remote Video  Surveillance System technology is deployed in Rio Grande Valley and  Laredo Border Patrol sectors, but is too soon to tell when such technology  will be deployed. According to CBP officials, as of fiscal year 2016,  there are no plans to deploy any additional tactical aerostats. In April  2016, DHS approved deployment of Remote Video Surveillance System  technology in two Border Patrol station AORs in Rio Grande Valley  sector. Specifically, CBP plans to deploy 18 Remote Video Surveillance  System technology sites in Rio Grande City and 12 in McAllen stations’  AORs. According to CBP officials, as of November 2016, CBP had  chosen its sites for Remote Video Surveillance System technology  deployment in the two AORs and initiated survey studies to plan activities  for its chosen sites. CBP has not finalized plans for deployment of  Remote Video Surveillance System technology in other areas of Rio  Grande Valley or Laredo Border Patrol sectors.
section_title: CBP Uses TARS to Support Domain Awareness along the Southern Border
paragraphs: CBP uses TARS to provide domain awareness along U.S. southern  borders. TARS captures continuous radar information and detects  moving objects passing through its radar coverage area that can include  lawful and unlawful aircraft, vessels, or vehicles entering or approaching  the United States. TARS provides radar coverage from an altitude of  operation up to 15,000 feet and can detect objects within 200 nautical  miles. The elevated radar sensor on the TARS aerostat mitigates  curvature of the earth and terrain masking limitations of common ground  based radar systems. According to CBP data provided to us for 2015, the  eight TARS sites collectively detected approximately 4.73 billion moving  objects such as aircraft and vessels. Data captured from TARS are  disseminated to AMOC. Two TARS sites in Florida and Puerto Rico  provide constant radar surveillance of vessel traffic to enable maritime  domain awareness. One TARS site in Eagle Pass, Texas is also  equipped with a video surveillance camera to assist Border Patrol Del Rio  sector’s efforts to detect cross-border illegal activity in its Eagle Pass  South Border Patrol station’s AOR.
Information from TARS is primarily used by CBP detection enforcement  officers (DEO) at AMOC in combination with other information to detect  and identify tracks of interest (TOI) or potential occurrences of illegal air,  land, and maritime border incursions (see fig. 6 below). Specifically,  radar information captured across all TARS sites is integrated through  AMOC’s operational system—the Air and Marine Operations Surveillance  System (AMOSS). AMOSS provides a single display showing multiple  real-time radar images, including from TARS and FAA and Department of  Defense radar systems, as a single fused output or track. AMOSS  provides users with information from government databases, such as  FAA databases for aircraft registration and flight plan information. CBP’s  law enforcement databases are also integrated with AMOSS to provide  users with enforcement and case-related information. AMOSS  automatically populates information from other government databases  which is available in real-time along with a single radar image including  information from multiple radar systems and TARS. According to CBP  officials, the ability of DEOs to detect border incursions through AMOSS  is significantly diminished when a TARS site is not operational since there  are limited radar systems near TARS sites and none that can provide  similar radar coverage.
As of November 2016, CBP has a study underway to evaluate future use  of TARS. As we reported in May 2016, CBP is conducting an analysis of  alternatives for the TARS program to inform future decisions related to  the legacy program. According to CBP, TARS are obsolete and no  longer manufactured or supported and could be out of service by early  2020. CBP officials told us TARS sites face immediate risks of being out  of service earlier than 2020 should a crash occur at a TARS site  rendering the radar components inoperable because there are no spare  radar systems available. CBP has no specific plans for replacement or  modernization of TARS, but is currently undergoing an analysis of  alternatives to determine whether the agency should modernize or  replace them. According to CBP officials, the analysis of alternatives for  TARS is expected to be completed during fiscal year 2017. The purpose  of the analysis of alternatives is to identify the most appropriate capability  that CBP should consider to fill the impending gap in persistent  surveillance of the air domain provided by the eight current TARS sites.
section_title: CBP Has Taken Actions to Assess Effectiveness of Its UAS and Aerostats, but Could Improve Data Collection
subsections: section_title: CBP Has Studied and Collects Various Data to Assess the Effectiveness of Its Predator B Program, but Could Strengthen Its Efforts through More Consistent Data Collection
paragraphs: CBP has initiated various studies and evaluations to help assess the  effectiveness of its Predator B program, and also collects and tracks  various data related to Predator B operations. With regard to studies and  evaluations, in October 2015 AMO initiated a capability gap assessment  process to evaluate how specific AMO platforms, including Predator B  aircraft, contribute to its border security mission. Further, in 2015 AMO  also initiated a study to analyze the contributions of its assets and identify  metrics for domain awareness along the southwestern U.S. border.  AMO’s objectives for this study include (1) defining domain awareness as  it pertains to border security; (2) characterizing and measuring AMO  operations in terms of their contributions to domain awareness; and (3)  developing candidate metrics for domain awareness. In June 2016, as  part of this study, AMO released a report including analysis of Predator B  aircraft Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VADER)—a radar  system which collects radar images of moving objects—use along the  U.S-Mexico border in Arizona and proposed performance metrics for  missions involving domain and situational awareness. AMO officials told  us it plans to analyze VADER use along the U.S.-Mexico border in Texas  as part of this study starting in fiscal year 2017.
In addition, in August 2015 DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate  (S&T) initiated a study of CBP’s Predator B program through DHS’s Joint  Requirements Council in partnership with AMO. The purpose of this  study is to (1) identify a recommended number of Predator B aircraft  assigned to operating locations or NASOCs and (2) determine whether  expanding the use of Predator B aircraft is the best use of funds for  border security. The study was initiated in response to the findings of a  2014 DHS Office of Inspector General report on CBP’s Predator B  program and following a January 2015 Acquisition Decision Memorandum  that called for CBP to provide the Joint Requirements Council with  justification for the number of Predator B aircraft and their assignment to  operating locations.
In September 2016, DHS released a report based on the S&T-led study  that recommended CBP not expand its Predator B program beyond its  current nine aircraft based on challenges identified in the report.  Challenges identified in DHS’s report included, for example, the  availability of UAS pilots and staff to operate, maintain, and repair  Predator B aircraft. According to CBP officials, the agency plans to  resolve the challenges identified by the S&T-led study and maintain the  nine aircraft already in its Predator B program.
With regard to data on Predator B operations, CBP collects and tracks  data that can help it monitor operational effectiveness, including (1) asset  assists, (2) detections of cross-border illegal activity, (3) the launch rate of  Predator B aircraft (i.e., the percentage of launched versus scheduled  missions), and (4) annual flight hour goals.
Asset assists. CBP collects and maintains data on known assists for  apprehensions and seizures attributed to support by Predator B  aircraft. According to CBP data provided to us, Predator B aircraft  assisted in the apprehension of 7,951 individuals from fiscal years  2013 through 2016 as shown in table 2. Further, CBP data shows  Predator B aircraft support assisted with the seizure of 9,190 pounds  of cocaine and 223,817 pounds of marijuana from fiscal years 2013  through 2016.
Detections of cross-border illegal activity. CBP tracks the number  of detections made using VADER equipped on its Predator B aircraft.  CBP began use of VADER at its NASOCs in Arizona in fiscal year  2012 and Texas in fiscal year 2015. In 2014, CBP began collecting  data on the number of individuals detected by VADER in relation to  cross-border illegal activity. Our analysis of CBP data showed that  from fiscal years 2014 through 2016 about 98 percent of these  detections (20,858 of 21,384 detections) were attributed to VADER  used on Predator B aircraft operated from CBP’s NASOC in  Arizona.
Launch rate. CBP tracks the launch rate of its Predator B aircraft.
Our analysis of Predator B aircraft launch rate data showed a 69  percent launch rate from fiscal years 2013 through 2016. CBP also  tracks reasons for Predator B mission cancelations. Our analysis of  Predator B mission cancellations found that 20 percent of all Predator  B scheduled missions from fiscal years 2013 through 2016 were  canceled due to weather. We also found that CBP’s NASOC in Texas  had the highest percentage of weather-related mission cancelations  (37 percent) among NASOCs, followed by North Dakota (28 percent)  and Arizona (26 percent), for Predator B missions scheduled from  fiscal years 2013 through 2016. Other reasons identified for  cancellations of scheduled missions from fiscal year 2013 through  2016 include aircraft maintenance (5 percent of scheduled missions)  and lack of available crew (4 percent of scheduled missions), among  others. For more information on the limitations related to CBP’s use of  Predator B aircraft, see appendix III.
Annual flight hour goals. CBP sets and tracks annual Predator B  program flight hour goals as part of AMO’s annual operational flight  hour planning process. Our analysis of CBP data showed that CBP  met 93 percent of its set flight hour goals from fiscal years 2013  through 2016. For more information on CBP’s Predator B flight hour  goals, see table 3.
These studies and data collection efforts provide CBP with useful  information for assessing the effectiveness of its Predator B program.  However, CBP could strengthen these efforts by more consistently  recording data on Predator B missions across its operating locations. Our  analysis of CBP data found that users recorded information about  supported agencies and asset assists inconsistently across Predator B  operating locations within its system for recording Predator B mission  data. We found that for law enforcement missions in support of multiple  agencies and part of operations through joint task forces, users did not  consistently record the name of the joint task force supported. For  example, some users listed the supported agency only as ”joint task  force” without identifying the task force name, while others identified the  name of the task forces supported.
Similarly, we found that some users listed one or multiple agencies that  are members of the Joint Interagency Task Force – South (such as U.S.  Coast Guard or AMO) rather than identifying the task force itself. Users  also misidentified supported agencies for other types of missions. For  example, users did not consistently record AMO as the supported agency  for maintenance and training missions and at times recorded Border  Patrol instead as the supported agency. We also found users did not  consistently record information on asset assists for Predator B missions.  For example, no asset assist information for seizures of narcotics were  recorded for CBP’s NASOC in North Dakota from fiscal years 2013  through 2015 despite participation in law enforcement operations  involving investigations related to the illegal production and distribution of  narcotics. For example in fiscal year 2013, Predator B aircraft launched  from its NASOC in North Dakota provided aerial support for investigations  related to methamphetamine production and marijuana cultivation;  however, as CBP does not consistently record information on asset  assists, it is not known if those investigations resulted in the seizure of  narcotics.
CBP’s written guidance for recording Predator B mission data has not  been updated since 2014 to include new data variables and system  functions added to its system for recording Predator B mission data.  Further, it does not include definitions and instructions for collecting and  recording information on missions with multiple supported agencies and  asset assists for seizures and apprehensions. According to AMO officials,  guidance for recording Predator B mission information has not been  updated due to resource and time constraints.
AMO officials at NASOCs responsible for recording Predator B mission  information told us that in the absence of updated guidance from CBP,  they developed local guidance to address changes made to CBP’s  system for recording Predator B mission data. However, according to  AMO officials, not all data are collected and recorded consistently at  NASOCs as a result of differing local guidance. For example, in Arizona,  NASOC officials record multiple supported agencies while NASOC  officials in North Dakota only record the agency submitting the air support  request even if more than one agency is supported. Moreover, according  to AMO officials, not all users across Predator B operating locations have  received training to use its system for recording Predator B mission data.  While AMO has provided training to users responsible for recording  mission information for manned aircraft and vessels in the same system  at its operating locations, such as air branches, according to AMO  officials, no training has been provided at its NASOCs for Predator B  operations. According to AMO officials, a working group of NASOC  officials met in 2015 to discuss Predator B mission data collection across  its NASOCs and identified the need to record data consistently across  operating locations. AMO officials we spoke with told us that limited  resources have affected its ability to develop and implement training  across all Predator B operating locations. According to NASOC officials  responsible for recording Predator B mission information, updated  guidance and training could help ensure data is collected consistently  across locations as its system for recording Predator B mission data is  periodically updated with new features and requirements.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for  pertinent information to be recorded and communicated to management  in a form and within a time frame that enables them to carry out internal  control and other responsibilities. This includes the accurate recording and reporting of data necessary to demonstrate agency operations.  Additionally, internal control standards state that all transactions and  other significant events need to be clearly documented, and the  documentation should be readily available for examination. The  documentation should appear in management directives, administrative  policies, or operating manuals and may be in paper or electronic form.  Without clear guidance and training, users may continue to record  Predator B mission data inconsistently for certain mission variables such  as supported agencies and outcomes for asset assists. As a result, CBP  is not well positioned to capture complete and consistent data from which  to assess the effectiveness of its Predator B program. Updated guidance  and training for users for Predator B mission data collection would help  CBP ensure consistent recording across all Predator B operating  locations to support CBP’s efforts to assess the effectiveness of its  Predator B program.
We also found that CBP collects additional information on its use of  Predator B aircraft for non-CBP law enforcement agencies, but this  information is not linked to data in its system for recording Predator B  mission data. As mentioned previously, CBP uses Predator B aircraft to  conduct missions in support of a variety of government agencies which  are submitted to AMO as air support or mission requests. AMO  Procedure 2014-07 includes procedures for submission and review of  requests for Predator B aircraft from non-CBP law enforcement agencies  and states that Predator B air support requests provide for oversight to  ensure that mission requests are vetted and prioritized and requires an  electronic archive be kept of all requests. CBP’s procedures require  requests from non-CBP law enforcement agencies for Predator B aircraft  support to be submitted through an air support request form which is  reviewed and approved by CBP. Although CBP has a process for  submission and review of air support requests for Predator B aircraft by  non-CBP law enforcement agencies, these air support request forms are  not recorded in its system for recording Predator B mission data.  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government notes that  internal controls are an integral part of each system that management  uses to regulate and guide its operations, and that communication of  information and control activities are an integral part of an entity’s  planning, implementing, review, and accountability for stewardship of  government resources and achieving effective results. Furthermore, the  standards state that control activities, which include a wide range of  diverse actions and maintenance of related records, need to be clearly  documented and help to ensure that all transactions are completely and  accurately recorded. CBP currently tracks air support request forms  submitted from non-CBP law enforcement agencies for Predator B  missions using a separate internal system. However, by not logging or  recording these requests in its system for recording Predator B mission  data, CBP does not document in a single system complete information  about its use of Predator B aircraft for non-CBP law enforcement  purposes, such as the names of the state and local government agencies  supported, making it more difficult for CBP to analyze its Predator B  mission data.
While CBP currently documents requests, recording air support request  forms in its system for recording Predator B mission data could allow CBP  to further facilitate implementation of provisions included in the Trade  Facilitation Act by ensuring such requests are documented in the same  system as mission data. Specifically, these provisions require CBP to  develop a process and procedure for the submission, approval,  prioritization and coordination of air support requests from non-CBP law  enforcement agencies for command, control, communication,  surveillance, and reconnaissance assistance through unmanned aerial  systems. By documenting Predator B air support request forms in its  system for recording Predator B mission data, CBP could also better oversee implementation of procedures related to Predator B air support  requests along with mission information.
section_title: CBP Collects and Tracks Data to Assess Effectiveness of Its Use of Tactical Aerostats, but Could Strengthen its Data Collection Efforts
paragraphs: CBP has conducted two evaluations of tactical aerostats and collects and  tracks data on its use of tactical aerostats. First, with regard to the two  evaluations, CBP conducted these to inform its initial deployment in 2012  and continued use in 2014. In August 2012, CBP, in collaboration with the  Department of Defense, conducted an initial evaluation of the operational  utility of tactical aerostats in Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley sector.  CBP completed a second evaluation of its use of tactical aerostats in July  2014 to further assess the operational utility and functionality of tactical  aerostats within Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley sector. The purpose of  the second evaluation was to support Border Patrol’s continued use of  tactical aerostats by examining operational effectiveness and comparison  of capabilities and performance of tactical aerostats compared to other  existing surveillance technology—for example, towers equipped with  video surveillance cameras and ground sensors. CBP concluded that  tactical aerostats enhance Border Patrol’s situational awareness; are  deployable over typical terrain with proper planning and site preparation;  are operable and maintainable in the operational environment; and are a  visual deterrent to transnational criminal organizations. CBP also  concluded that tactical aerostats contributed to its operational  effectiveness and that they provide greater cumulative surveillance  coverage than towers or other ground-based systems.
Second, with regard to data, CBP collects and tracks data on its use of  tactical aerostats to assess effectiveness, including data on (1)  operational availability (i.e., percentage of time an aerostat is in flight  providing surveillance data to CBP), (2) asset assists for apprehensions  of individuals and seizures of narcotics, and (3) the number of detections  of items of interest.
Operational availability. According to CBP data provided to us,  tactical aerostat operational availability from May 2015 through fiscal  year 2016 across all sites averaged 62 percent with a range of 51 to  81 percent. CBP set a performance goal of greater than 60 percent for  tactical aerostat operational availability. A variety of factors can  influence operational availability of a tactical aerostat, including  equipment maintenance and weather as aerostat flight is subject to  weather restrictions. See appendix III for more information about  limitations on CBP’s use of tactical aerostats.
Asset assists. Border Patrol collects and maintains data on known  assists for apprehensions and seizures attributed to support provided  by tactical aerostats. Border Patrol collects data on asset assists for  known seizures and apprehensions using DHS’s Enforcement  Integrated Database (EID), which includes an asset assist data field in  which Border Patrol agents can specify whether an asset, such as a  tower or ground sensor, contributed to the apprehension of individuals  and seizure of drugs and other contraband. In May 2014, CBP  added an asset assist data field in EID to capture known asset assist  data for “aerostats”. Our analysis of CBP data showed that a majority  of asset assists attributed to aerostats for the apprehension of  individuals and seizure of narcotics were in Rio Grande Valley Border  Patrol sector from May 2014 through fiscal year 2016. Specifically, 98  and 99 percent of total asset assists for apprehensions of individuals  and seizures of narcotics were recorded in Rio Grande Valley Border  Patrol sector, respectively. For more information on asset assists  attributed to aerostats for seizures of narcotics and apprehension of  individuals, see appendix IV.
Detections of items of interest. Border Patrol also collects  information on the number of detections of items of interest at each  tactical aerostat site using video surveillance cameras on tactical  aerostats through an internal system. Border Patrol developed a  system for agents operating tactical aerostat surveillance cameras to  record detections made at each site. According to Border Patrol  officials, detections recorded by agents are detections of cross-border  illegal activity and exclude other activities observed through tactical  aerostat surveillance cameras such as recreational activities including  fishing. Table 4 summarizes the number of detections recorded  across all tactical aerostat sites from fiscal years 2014 through 2016.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that  agencies should promptly and accurately record transactions to maintain  their relevance and value for management decision making. In  collecting and recording asset assist information, Border Patrol does not  distinguish between tactical aerostats and TARS. Border Patrol issued  guidance in May 2016 to users for recording tactical aerostat asset assist  information in EID, which stated users were to include tactical aerostat  and TARS under the same asset assist data field for aerostat. Without a  separate mechanism to record tactical aerostat asset assists, users could  potentially misidentify asset assist information related to tactical aerostats  to TARS, limiting the completeness and usefulness of the data. For  example, CBP has two tactical aerostats and one TARS deployed in Rio  Grande City Border Patrol station’s AOR (see figure 3), and the two types  of systems provide distinct types of support when assisting with, for  example, seizures and apprehensions. By recording asset assist  information in EID for TARS and tactical aerostats under the same data  field, CBP is not able to determine the contribution of each separate  program. According to Border Patrol officials, the agency has not yet  taken actions to develop a mechanism to collect asset assist information  that distinguishes between TARS and tactical aerostats, but such a  mechanism would be useful and could be developed outside of EID. In  addition, according to Border Patrol officials, asset assist data in  conjunction with detection information has been used to evaluate tactical  aerostat site deployment locations related to proximity to cross-border  illegal activity. Specifically, CBP officials told us the data were used to  inform the relocation of a tactical aerostat site due to changes in cross- border illegal activity in Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol sector. Due to  the constant change in cross-border illegal activity, costs associated with  re-deployment of tactical aerostat sites (between $60,000 to over  $100,000 per site), and time needed to locate and obtain access for land  use for re-deployment, better data collection practices to distinguish  between asset assists associated with tactical aerostats and TARS would  help CBP to better ensure its data are complete to help guide resource  allocation decisions.
section_title: CBP Collects and Tracks Data on its Use of TARS To Assess Effectiveness
paragraphs: CBP collects and tracks data on its use of TARS to assess effectiveness,  including (1) operational availability or percentage of time an aerostat is in  flight providing surveillance data to CBP, (2) tracks of interest (TOI)  identified using TARS, and (3) assets assists associated with TOIs from  TARS. Specifically:
Operational availability. CBP collects performance information on  TARS at each site by tracking operational availability. CBP  established a performance goal of greater than 64 percent operational  availability across all eight TARS sites. According to CBP data  provided to us, operational availability across all TARS sites for fiscal  years 2013 through 2016 ranged between 59 to 61 percent, with a  range across each site of 34 to 85 percent. Table 5 shows operational  availability of TARS sites from fiscal years 2013 through 2016.  According to CBP data provided to us, weather-related TARS  downtime resulted in an average 30 percent reduction in operational  availability across all TARS sites from fiscal year 2013 through 2016.  Other factors that affect operational availability include, for example,  maintenance or incursion of an aircraft into the restricted airspace  encompassing a TARS site.
TOIs. CBP collects and tracks information on TOIs identified by DEOs  at AMOC using information from TARS. According to CBP data,  DEOs identified 1,989 TOIs from TARS from fiscal years 2013 and  2016 as shown in table 6. Further, CBP data shows that TARS were  used to identify 50 to 63 percent of total TOIs detected by AMOC  along the southwest border between fiscal years 2013 through 2016.  From fiscal years 2013 through 2016, over 90 percent of TOIs  detected were short landings in Mexico and aircraft border  incursions. Specifically, we found 73 percent (range of 55 to 80  percent) of TOIs were short landings and 20 percent (range of 15 to  30 percent) were aircraft border incursions. See table 6 for more  information on TOIs identified by DEOs at AMOC.
Asset assists. CBP collects known asset assist information on TOIs  identified by DEOs using TARS by coordinating with mission partners.  The majority of asset assists were violations issued related to federal  regulations for operation of aircraft entering, exiting, and flying in U.S.  airspace. From fiscal years 2013 through 2016, CBP identified 377  violations issued related to federal regulations attributed to TOIs  detected by DEOs through information from TARS; for example, pilot  deviations related to penetration of restricted airspace without  permission. CBP also reported 14 arrests and 40 seizures attributed  to TOIs identified through TARS. See table 7 for more information on  known asset assists associated with TOIs identified using TARS from  fiscal years 2013 through 2016.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: CBP uses a variety of technologies and assets to secure the border,  including Predator B UAS. CBP’s Predator B aircraft are used as national  assets and support numerous federal and non-federal government  agencies. CBP established and implemented collaborative efforts to  coordinate its Predator B operations among the government agencies it  supports. By documenting its procedures in all operating locations, CBP  could better oversee coordination procedures as use changes based on  needs and cross-border illegal activity.
CBP currently has ongoing efforts to assess the effectiveness of its  Predator B program. However, improving its collection of Predator B  mission data by updating guidance and implementing training would help  to ensure information is collected and recorded in a standardized and  consistent way across all operating locations and could also further its  efforts to assess the effectiveness of its Predator B program. CBP uses  tactical aerostats in south Texas to support Border Patrol’s ability to  detect and interdict cross-border illegal activity. CBP’s tactical aerostats  may be relocated as cross-border illegal activity changes, and collecting  data on effectiveness of these assets could help better guide CBP’s use  and deployment of these assets. Border Patrol currently collects  information on asset assists for its tactical aerostat program for  apprehensions and seizures, but this information does not distinguish  asset assists from CBP’s other aerostat program—TARS. Revising its  collection of asset assist data to distinguish between tactical aerostats  and TARS would help better position CBP to support its use and  deployment of tactical aerostats.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve its efforts to coordinate Predator B operations among  supported agencies and assess the effectiveness of its Predator B and  tactical aerostat programs, we recommend that the Commissioner of CBP  take the following five actions:
Develop and document procedures for Predator B coordination  among supported agencies in all operating locations.
Update and maintain guidance for recording Predator B mission  information in its data collection system.
Provide training to users of CBP’s data collection system for Predator  B missions.
Record air support forms for Predator B mission requests from non- CBP law enforcement agencies in its data collection system for  Predator B missions.
Update Border Patrol’s data collection practices to include a  mechanism to distinguish and track asset assists associated with  TARS from tactical aerostats.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS  provided written comments, which are noted below and reproduced in full  in appendix V, and technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate. DHS concurred with the five recommendations in the report  and described actions to address them as noted below.
With regard to the first recommendation related to developing and  documenting procedures for Predator B coordination among supported  agencies in all operating locations, DHS concurred. DHS stated that CBP  plans to develop and implement an operations coordination structure and  document its coordination procedures for Predator B operations through  Joint Task Force – West, South Texas by September 30, 2018. DHS also  stated that CBP plans to document its coordination procedures for  Predator B operations through its NASOC in Grand Forks, North Dakota  by September 2017.
With regard to the second recommendation related to updating and  maintaining guidance for recording Predator B mission information in its  data collection system, DHS concurred and stated that CBP will take  actions to update and maintain guidance for recording Predator B mission  information, including incorporating a new functionality in its data  collection system to include tips and guidance for recording Predator B  mission information and updating its user manual for its data collection  system by September 2019.
With regard to the third recommendation related to providing training to  users of CBP’s data collection system for Predator B missions, DHS  concurred and stated that CBP is developing a schedule to train users of  its data collection system for Predator B mission information. DHS  provided an estimated completion date for the training of September  2018.
With regard to the fourth recommendation, related to recording air support  request forms for Predator B mission requests from non-CBP law  enforcement agencies in its data collection system for Predator missions,  DHS concurred and stated that AMO plans to develop a process and  disseminate guidance to users explaining how to maintain Predator B air  support request forms in its data collection system for Predator B  missions. DHS provided an estimated completion date of September  2017.
With regard to the fifth recommendation related to updating Border  Patrol’s data collection practices to include a mechanism to distinguish  and track asset assists associated with TARS from tactical aerostats,  DHS concurred and stated that Border Patrol is making improvements to  capture data to ensure asset assists are properly reported and attributed  to TARS and tactical aerostats. DHS provided an estimated completion  date of September 2017. DHS’s planned actions, if implemented  effectively, should address the intent of our recommendations.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Recent Efforts to Implement a Small Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Program
paragraphs: CBP has taken steps to implement a small UAS program to support the  U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol). Specifically:
CBP collaborated with the Department of Homeland Security’s  Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) to demonstrate and  analyze the potential benefits, limitations and risks of operating  existing commercial off-the-shelf small UAS technology. Starting in  June 2014, through its Robotic Aircraft for Public Safety (RAPS)  project, S&T evaluated more than 22 small UAS platforms to assess  the extent to which they could provide situational awareness in  support of Border Patrol. In July 2016, S&T’s Silicon Valley Office  released a solicitation for small UAS capabilities and technologies to  augment CBP and Border Patrol mission capabilities. In fiscal year  2017, S&T initiated a project to perform assessments of small UAS  sensors, similar to RAPS, to fill or mitigate identified Border Patrol  operational capability gaps. Border Patrol officials told us it plans to  continue collaboration with S&T to leverage results from past and  ongoing work for asset selection, training, and concepts of operation  in fiscal year 2017.
CBP established a memorandum of agreement with the Federal  Aviation Administration for small UAS operations in September 2016.  The memorandum of agreement specifies provisions for operation of  small UAS by CBP in the national airspace system, including advance  notification requirements prior to each launch and operations at an  altitude of operation at or below 1,200 feet.
In September 2016, CBP conducted a small UAS feasibility  assessment in El Paso Border Patrol sector. The purpose of the  assessment was to assess the capability of small UAS technology to  provide situational awareness to support Border Patrol’s mission  along the southwest U.S.-Mexico border and the ability of Border  Patrol agents to employ small UAS. The assessment was a joint effort  between CBP’s Border Patrol and Air and Marine Operations and  included two small UAS platforms provided by the U.S. Army.
section_title: Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report addresses the following questions:
How does U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) use unmanned  aerial systems (UAS) and aerostats for border security activities, and  to what extent has CBP developed and documented procedures for  UAS coordination?
To what extent has CBP taken actions to assess the effectiveness of  its UAS and aerostats for border security activities?
For the purposes of our report, UAS includes Predator B UAS and  aerostats include tactical aerostats and the Tethered Aerostat Radar  System (TARS) program. As of November 2016, CBP is currently  developing a small UAS program to support the U.S. Border Patrol  (Border Patrol), see appendix I.
To address both questions, we reviewed Department of Homeland  Security (DHS) and CBP strategic plans, such as DHS’s fiscal years 2014  to 2018 strategic plan, CBP’s fiscal years 2015 to 2020 strategic plan,  Border Patrol’s fiscal years 2012 through 2016 strategic plan, and Air and  Marine Operation’s (AMO) strategic plan. We also reviewed DHS  strategies for border security, such as its Campaign Plan for Securing the  U.S. Southern Border and Approaches 2015 to 2018 and Northern Border  Strategy. In addition, we reviewed DHS and CBP documents related to  UAS, aerostats, and surveillance technology, for example: plans, reports,  concepts of operation, operational requirements, and standard operating  procedures. We also reviewed relevant laws; Federal Aviation  Administration (FAA) procedures, requirements and regulations for  operation of UAS and aerostats in the national airspace system; and past  GAO work related to UAS, aerostats, and surveillance technologies used  for border security activities. We also conducted site visits to observe  CBP’s use of Predator B UAS and aerostats in Arizona, Texas, North  Dakota, and California and interviewed CBP officials responsible for their  operation. Specifically:
Arizona: We visited AMO’s National Air Security Operations Center  (NASOC) in Sierra Vista, Arizona to observe Predator B operations;  TARS site at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; and met with CBP officials  responsible for their operation.
Texas: We visited AMO’s NASOC in Corpus Christi, Texas to observe  Predator B operations; three, of six total, tactical aerostat sites in  south Texas to observe their use; and met with CBP officials  responsible for their operations. The three tactical aerostat sites we  visited included one of each type of tactical aerostat used by CBP.
North Dakota: We visited AMO’s NASOC in Grand Forks, North  Dakota to observe Predator B operations and met with responsible  CBP officials.
California: We visited CBP’s Air and Marine Operations Center in  Riverside, California to observe use of the Air and Marine Operations  Surveillance System which includes radar information from TARS  sites used to detect border incursions and met with responsible CBP  officials.
Findings from our observations and interviews during our site visits  cannot be generalized to all occurrences of CBP’s use of Predator B UAS  and aerostats, but provided useful insights about the operations of these  assets.
To determine how CBP uses Predator B UAS and aerostats, we reviewed  and analyzed CBP data and information and interviewed responsible CBP  program officials. Specifically:
For Predator B UAS, we reviewed and analyzed CBP data on  Predator B aircraft flight hours and types of mission activities from  fiscal years 2013 through 2016, a time period for which data was  available in CBP’s current system for recording Predator B mission  data—Tasking, Operations, and Management Information System.  We compared CBP’s available documentation of its procedures for  coordination of its use of Predator B UAS with Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government. In addition, we reviewed  provisions included in the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement  Act of 2015 requiring the establishment of standard operating  procedures for CBP’s UAS program to address coordination of  mission requests, among other things.
For tactical aerostats, we reviewed CBP documents, such as Rio  Grande Valley Border Patrol sector’s Fiscal Year 2015 Aerostat  Operational Need Statement, and information on bi-national law  enforcement efforts between Border Patrol and the government of  Mexico from fiscal years 2014 through 2016, a time period for which  information was available.
For TARS, we reviewed information on CBP’s Air and Marine  Operations Surveillance System and ongoing analysis of alternatives  for the TARS program.
To determine how CBP assesses the effectiveness of its Predator B UAS  and aerostats for border security activities, we analyzed CBP  performance assessment documentation, such as reports and concepts  of operation, related to use of Predator B UAS and aerostats and  interviewed CBP officials responsible for performance measurement  activities. We also analyzed and reviewed CBP data on Predator B UAS  and aerostat performance for assists provided for apprehensions of  individuals, seizures of narcotics, and other events (asset assists).  Specifically:
For Predator B UAS, we analyzed asset assist, launch rate, and flight  hour goal data from fiscal years 2013 through 2016, a time period for  which data was available in CBP’s current system of record for  Predator B mission data—Tasking, Operations, and Management  Information System.
For TARS, we reviewed summary data on asset assists and  operational availability from fiscal years 2013 through 2016, the time  period starting when CBP assumed control of the program from the  Department of Defense.
For tactical aerostats, we analyzed asset assist data beginning in May  2014 through fiscal year 2016, a time period starting when CBP  began collecting information in Border Patrol’s system of record for  assist information—e3 within DHS’s Enforcement Integrated  Database. We also reviewed summary data on tactical aerostat  operational availability from May 2015 through fiscal year 2016, a time  period for which data was available.
To determine reliability of Predator B and aerostat data, we examined  data for any anomalies, reviewed CBP guidance and documents, and  interviewed CBP officials to understand their methods for collecting,  reporting, and validating the data. We found these data were reliable for  our purposes of reporting summary data across fiscal years 2013 through  2016. We assessed CBP’s data collection and management practices for  Predator B UAS and tactical aerostats for usage and performance data  against the management standards and practices contained in Standards  for Internal Control in the Federal Government.
To identify costs associated with UAS and aerostats, we obtained and  reviewed financial summary data and cost per flight hour information for  Predator B UAS, TARS, and tactical aerostats. These data include  summary information on end-of-year obligations and expenditures by cost  category compiled by CBP for fiscal year 2015, the most recent fiscal  year for which complete data was available. We also reviewed Aviation  Governance Board Bulletin 2015-001: DHS Standard Aviation  Comparable Cost per Flight Hour Reporting Methodology and supporting  documentation to determine how CBP applied that methodology to  develop its fiscal year 2015 cost per flight hour for Predator B UAS,  TARS, and tactical aerostats. We determined that CBP’s summary  financial and obligation data and cost per flight hour information for its  Predator B, tactical aerostat, and TARS programs were sufficiently  reliable for our reporting purposes.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2015 to February  2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix III: Limitations Related to U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Use of Predator B Unmanned Aerial Systems and Tactical Aerostats for Border Security
subsections: section_title: Predator B Aircraft
paragraphs: Based on our review of data and interviews with CBP officials, CBP’s use  of Predator B aircraft is limited, in part, due to weather and airspace  access. For example:
Weather. Hazardous weather can directly impact take off and landing  of Predator B aircraft at Air and Marine Operations (AMO) National Air  Security Operations Centers (NASOC), including storms and cloud  cover. As previously mentioned, weather accounted for 20 percent of  Predator B mission cancelations from fiscal years 2013 through 2016.  Hazardous weather can also limit where Predator B aircraft operate  away from its NASOC launch site. According to CBP officials we  spoke with in North Dakota, weather in locations distant from where a  Predator B aircraft is launched can also limit operating locations as  there are no diversion airports along the U.S.-Canadian border for  CBP’s Predator B aircraft to land. CBP took steps to mitigate the  impact of hazardous weather in January and February 2016 by  deploying Predator B aircraft from Corpus Christi, Texas, to San  Angelo, Texas, at San Angelo Regional Airport which had favorable  weather conditions. CBP’s deployment of Predator B aircraft at San  Angelo Regional Airport was in accordance with a Federal Aviation  Administration (FAA)-issued Certificate of Waiver or Authorization  (COA) to conduct its border security mission in Texas, lasted  approximately 3 weeks, and was supported by an existing AMO Air  Unit co-located at San Angelo Regional Airport. According to AMO  officials, three Predator B aircraft are scheduled to be deployed to  San Angelo Regional Airport from January 2017 through April 2017.
National airspace access. CBP’s Predator B aircraft operations are  limited to COA-designated and restricted airspace. To fly outside of  COA-designated airspace, CBP must request and receive an  addendum to an existing COA or submit a new COA to FAA. CBP’s  Predator B operations in special use or restricted airspace are subject  to agreements established between CBP and the Department of  Defense which may limit airspace access to certain time periods.  According to CBP officials we spoke with in Arizona, Predator B flights  are often excluded from restricted airspace managed by the  Department of Defense along border areas which can affect the ability  of Predator B aircraft to support U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol).  For example, CBP officials told us Predator B aircraft infrequently  support Yuma Border Patrol sector as portions of its area of  responsibility (AOR) along the border are covered by an area of  restricted airspace managed by the U.S. Marine Corps who typically  limit Predator B aircraft access to one hour or less per day. In  addition, CBP officials also told us it infrequently flies Predator B  aircraft in southern California due to airspace restrictions related to  the volume of commercial air traffic in and around Los Angeles,  California and San Diego, California.
section_title: Tactical Aerostats
paragraphs: Based on our review of documents and interviews with CBP officials,  CBP’s use of tactical aerostats is limited, in part, due to weather, access  to airspace, and real estate. For example:
Weather. According to CBP officials, weather has the greatest impact  on CBP’s ability to use tactical aerostats, including storms which  require CBP to cease flight operations. For example in May 2015, a  tactical aerostat broke free from its tether as of the result of severe  winds during a thunderstorm.
Access to airspace. We also found that airspace access can impact  CBP’s ability to deploy and use tactical aerostats in south Texas as  aerostat site placement is subject to FAA approval to ensure the  aerostat does not converge on dedicated flight paths. According to  CBP, airspace access is limited in Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley  sector’s Weslaco and Rio Grande City stations’ AOR.
Real estate. Aerostat sites used by CBP may involve access to  private property, and according to CBP, it would generally seek land  owner approval prior to placement. According to CBP, tactical  aerostat sites are used by CBP at no cost to the government and  challenges may arise with respect to processes for landowners to  request compensation for use of their property or restoration of land  back to its original condition. In addition, according to CBP officials, it  must take into consideration any relevant environmental and wildlife  impacts prior to deployment of a tactical aerostat, such as flood  zones, endangered species, and migratory animals, among others.
section_title: Appendix IV: Summary Statistics on the Reporting of Asset Assist Data for Apprehensions and Seizures for Aerostats, May 2014 through Fiscal Year 2016
paragraphs: Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Enforcement Integrated  Database includes a field that enables U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol)  agents to identify whether a technological or nontechnological asset  assisted in the apprehension of illegal entrants or the seizure of drugs or  other contraband. This appendix provides summary statistics on the  reporting of asset assists by Border Patrol agents for the data field  “aerostat” across all Border Patrol sectors from May 2014 through fiscal  year 2016.
As mentioned earlier, the asset assist data field “aerostat” does not  distinguish asset assists identified by Border Patrol agents from U.S.  Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) tactical aerostats and Tethered  Aerostat Radar System program. As of fiscal year 2016, CBP deployed  one tactical aerostat in Laredo and five tactical aerostats in Rio Grande  Valley Border Patrol sectors. CBP’s Tethered Aerostat Radar System  Program includes sites in Yuma, Arizona; Fort Huachuca, Arizona;  Deming, New Mexico; Marfa, Texas; Eagle Pass, Texas; Rio Grande City,  Texas; Cudjoe Key, Florida; and Lajas, Puerto Rico.
As shown in table 8, the majority of apprehension and seizure events with  asset assists attributed to aerostats occurred in the Rio Grande Valley  sector from May 2014 through fiscal year 2016 (98 and 99 percent,  respectively).
As shown in table 9, the majority of seizure events and largest quantity of  narcotics seized occurred in the Rio Grande Valley sector from May 2014  through fiscal year 2016. Specifically, asset assists attributed to aerostats  in Rio Grande Valley sector accounted for 674 seizure events, including  257,692 and 129 pounds of marijuana and cocaine, respectively.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Kirk Kiester (Assistant Director),  Chuck Bausell, Eric Hauswirth, Daniel McKenna, Amanda Miller, Sasan J.  (Jon) Najmi, and Carl Potenzieri made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Border Security: DHS Surveillance Technology Unmanned Aerial  Systems and Other Assets. GAO-16-671T. Washington, D.C.: May 24,  2016.
Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Has Strengthened Management,  but Execution and Affordability Concerns Endure. GAO-16-338SP.  Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2016.
Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Assess  Resource Deployment and Progress. GAO-16-465T. Washington, D.C.:  March 1, 2016.
Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Implement  and Assess Infrastructure and Technology. GAO-15-595T. Washington,  D.C.: May 13, 2015.
Unmanned Aerial Systems: Department of Homeland Security’s Review  of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Use and Compliance with  Privacy and Civil Liberty Laws and Standards. GAO-14-849R.  Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2014.
Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Collaborative  Mechanisms along the Southwest Border. GAO-14-494: Washington,  D.C.: June 27, 2014.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed  to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-14-411T.  Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2014.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed  to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-14-368.  Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2014.
Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS Implementation and  Assessment Efforts. GAO-13-653T. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2013.
Border Security: DHS’s Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S.  Borders. GAO-13-414T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2013.
Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of  DHS’s Air and Marine Assets. GAO-12-518. Washington, D.C.: March 30,  2012.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing,  Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2011 Expenditure Plan.  GAO-12-106R. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and  Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. GAO-12-22. Washington, D.C.:  November 4, 2011.