Nuclear Waste: Benefits and Costs Should Be Better Understood Before DOE Commits to a Separate Repository for Defense Waste
Published: 2017-01-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:
DOE planned for decades to store defense and commercial nuclear waste in a single repository in Yucca Mountain, Nevada. However, it terminated this plan in 2010 and, in 2015, the President accepted DOE’s recommendation to develop separate repositories—one primarily for defense waste and another for commercial waste—citing various benefits, including cost efficiencies.
But we found that DOE's cost-benefit analysis of the two repositories was unreliable because it didn't account for billions of dollars in significant costs. We recommended that DOE redo its analysis to comprehensively assess the costs and benefits of having two repositories.

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOE had long planned to store defense and commercial nuclear waste in a single repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, funded largely from commercial power fees. In 2010, DOE terminated this plan, and then considered developing separate defense and commercial repositories. This approach requires a Presidential finding under the NWPA. In 2015, DOE provided information to the President supporting separate repositories and cited several benefits, including cost efficiencies. On the basis of this information, the President in 2015 reversed a 1985 presidential finding and determined that a separate repository for defense waste was required, setting DOE down the path of developing separate repositories. Taxpayers would likely fund a defense waste repository rather than industry fees. GAO reviewed DOE's efforts to develop a separate defense waste repository. This report assesses (1) the information on benefits DOE provided to the President; (2) the reliability of DOE's cost and schedule estimates; and (3) DOE's efforts to site a defense HLW repository. GAO reviewed DOE documents and interviewed more than 50 experts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The information that the Department of Energy (DOE) provided to the President about whether a separate defense waste repository was required did not quantify cited benefits, when possible, show how these benefits could be achieved, or show the risks if certain benefits could not be realized as planned. In the information provided to the President, DOE stated that separate repositories for defense high-level waste (HLW) and commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) would produce certain benefits. DOE cited benefits in each area required by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA)—cost efficiency, public acceptability, regulation, transportation, national security, and health and safety—in concluding that there is a strong basis for a defense HLW repository. Federal guidance states that benefits must be quantified when possible, and that the risk that a benefit may not be realized as planned should be factored into the cost-benefit analysis. DOE officials said their plan was still conceptual and the guidance did not yet apply. Nevertheless, DOE did not show that benefits outweighed costs in recommending to the President that the nation should depart from its longstanding nuclear waste strategy.
DOE's preliminary cost and schedule estimates for the two-repository approach that it provided to the President are not reliable because the estimates do not meet industry best practices. DOE's cost estimates excluded major costs, such as site selection and site characterization costs that could add tens of billions of dollars. Regarding its schedule estimates, DOE did not provide information on how its schedules would be achieved. GAO found that DOE's estimates leave little time for major activities and that DOE's schedule appears optimistic, given its past repository siting experiences. Without reliable estimates that reflect best practices, DOE provided information to the President that supported a decision that could commit the nation to expending undisclosed but significant future resources and to a time frame that appears optimistic.
DOE is planning to develop a process to obtain consent for an eventual repository site; however, DOE faces significant public opposition and certain prerequisites have not yet been established. These prerequisites include updated health and safety regulations, which are necessary for the public to consider as part of a consent-based siting process. Without updated health and safety regulations, which establish radiation exposure limits, the public cannot provide meaningful input into a consent-based siting process and local communities cannot effectively be engaged in hosting potential repository sites. DOE officials acknowledge that health and safety regulations—which were developed in the 1980s—need to be updated and revised for any future defense HLW or mostly commercial SNF repository. Revising such regulations is the responsibility of other federal agencies. Experts and stakeholders told GAO that updated health and safety regulations are a precondition for having discussions with the public and for screening potential sites. An internal project management requirement directs DOE to perform key “preconceptual” planning activities to enhance front-end planning. In proceeding with siting activities without ensuring key prerequisites have been established, DOE runs the risk of increasing public opposition and potentially wasting resources.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOE (1) assess benefits, costs, and schedule estimates, and (2) reassess its decision to conduct site selection activities. DOE agreed on the need for a more thorough assessment, but disagreed on the need to reassess site selection activities, citing benefits of its approach. GAO continues to believe its recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: From 1944 until the 1980s, the United States used nuclear reactors to  produce plutonium and other materials for nuclear weapons. These  defense-related activities produced about 14,000 metric tons of nuclear  waste, consisting of high-level waste (HLW) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF)  that are currently stored in facilities in five states and managed by the  Department of Energy (DOE). In addition, the nation has nearly 80,000  metric tons of commercial SNF from the nation’s fleet of nuclear power  reactors—an amount that is expected to increase by more than 2,000  metric tons per year. DOE estimates that the amount of commercial SNF  will increase to about 140,000 metric tons over the next several decades.  Commercial SNF accounts for about 85 percent of the nation’s nuclear  waste. For the most part, this material is stored where it was generated,  at 80 sites in 35 states. DOE is responsible for disposing of the nation’s  nuclear waste.
The nation has struggled for decades with the question of how to  permanently dispose of nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of  1982 (NWPA) required the President to determine whether the  development of a separate repository—separate from a repository for  commercial SNF—was required for the disposal of HLW resulting from  atomic energy defense activities. According to DOE, in 1985, President  Reagan found that there was no basis to conclude that a defense-only  repository was required. According to DOE, the President based his  finding on an evaluation prepared by DOE that concluded that cost  efficiency was the only difference between developing a separate defense  HLW repository and commingling defense and commercial nuclear  waste. In 2008, DOE submitted a license application for a commingled  repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, about 100 miles northwest of Las  Vegas. In 2010, however, DOE terminated its efforts to license Yucca  Mountain and at that time offered no alternative for managing or  disposing of these defense and commercial nuclear wastes. In 2011, we  reported that from fiscal year 1983 to DOE’s license submittal, DOE spent  nearly $15 billion to investigate developing a repository.
In March 2015, President Obama reversed President Reagan’s 1985  finding and found that a separate repository for defense HLW was  required. The report that DOE provided to the President that served as  the basis for his finding was publicly released in March 2015. In this  report, DOE’s justification for a separate repository cited a number of  factors, devoting particular attention to ways in which the circumstances  have changed since 1985. For example, because defense HLW is cooler  and less radioactive than commercial SNF, DOE reported to the  President that a defense-only repository would allow greater flexibility in  the selection of geologic media in which a repository could be sited.  Specifically, in its report, DOE identified five possible geologic media,  including salt, sedimentary, shale, and crystalline, such as granite.  Because of this and other factors, DOE reported that it could save time by  beginning to dispose of defense HLW first, which could lead to lessons  learned that could apply to a subsequent, more complex and mostly  commercial SNF repository. Under the current presidential finding, DOE  may plan to develop two repositories—one for defense HLW and one for  mostly commercial SNF.
According to DOE officials, under current authority, funding for a defense  HLW repository would likely come from defense appropriations, whereas  DOE’s earlier proposed commingled repository—Yucca Mountain—was  mostly funded by the Nuclear Waste Fund, a trust fund that was  established under the NWPA to pay industry’s share of the cost of a  nuclear waste repository and that is funded by fees from commercial  power generators. Stakeholders from potentially affected states and  communities have raised concerns about the potential increased costs to  defense appropriations that could result from DOE’s plan.
A May 2015 request from the Chairman and Ranking Member of the  Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces asked us to  review DOE’s efforts to permanently dispose of defense HLW separate  from commercial SNF. In addition, a Senate report accompanying the  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 directed us to  annually report on DOE’s expenditures and grants related to SNF,  repository siting, and development of a consent-based siting program.  This report assesses the information provided to the President that  served as a basis for the finding that a separate defense HLW repository  was required. Specifically, this report assesses (1) what DOE cited as the  benefits of a separate defense HLW repository in its recommendation to  the President; (2) the reliability of DOE’s cost and schedule estimates for  its new plan to site, license, and construct a defense HLW repository; and  (3) DOE’s efforts to site a defense HLW repository and key challenges, if  any, to siting the repository.
For all three objectives, we reviewed DOE documents; interviewed DOE  officials from DOE’s offices of Nuclear Energy, Environmental  Management, and General Counsel; and analyzed information contained  in DOE’s March 2015 report, which contained the information that DOE  provided to the President, according to DOE officials.
To assess the benefits DOE cited in its recommendation to the President  about the need for a separate defense HLW repository, we reviewed  DOE’s March 2015 report and additional planning and cost documents  supporting that report. We interviewed 52 experts and stakeholders from  23 key entities that represented a wide range of viewpoints and expertise  on nuclear waste management and disposal issues. To ensure balance  among the entities, we interviewed representatives from (1) independent  groups and academia, (2) community interest groups, (3) industry, (4)  state and local governments, and (5) the federal government. We also  reviewed federal guidance on planning, budgeting, and acquiring capital  assets, including Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance on  benefit-cost analyses to guide management at key decision points for  major activities.
To assess what is known about the projected costs and schedule of  DOE’s planning efforts to site, license, and construct a defense HLW  repository, we reviewed DOE cost and schedule documents and  interviewed DOE officials about the estimates they developed for their  new plan. We also interviewed staff from Sandia National Laboratories  who were familiar with the information presented to the President or who  contributed to DOE’s March 2015 report and supporting documentation.  We also compared DOE’s preliminary estimates against the best  practices in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (Cost  Guide). To assess the reliability of DOE’s schedule estimates, we  compared DOE’s preliminary schedule estimates against GAO’s  Schedule Assessment Guide (Schedule Guide), which is intended to  complement the Cost Guide by providing best practices for estimating  project schedules. To identify potential limitations of DOE’s cost and  schedule estimates, we interviewed DOE officials and evaluated the  assumptions DOE included or excluded in its estimates. We compared  these estimates to estimates DOE developed for other programs, such as  the Yucca Mountain program.
To examine DOE’s efforts to site a defense HLW repository and key  challenges, if any, to siting the repository, we interviewed DOE officials  and reviewed DOE reports on previous and current efforts to site and  develop nuclear waste repositories. We reviewed transcripts of the public  meetings DOE held to solicit public input to develop a more collaborative  consent-based siting process. We also reviewed previous GAO reports,  as well as relevant reports on siting from other entities, such as the Blue  Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future and the National  Academies of Science. We also interviewed experts and stakeholders on  DOE’s siting process and siting challenges. Additionally, we reviewed  DOE’s project management orders on “pre-conceptual” planning activities  and other DOE documents that provide direction for front-end planning  activities. (See app. I for further information on the scope and  methodology of our review.)
We conducted this performance audit from July 2015 to January 2017 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: This section describes the public’s longstanding opposition to siting  nuclear waste repositories, DOE’s efforts to develop a repository under  the NWPA and its amendments, and DOE’s efforts since terminating the  Yucca Mountain repository to develop other strategies to manage and  store nuclear waste.
subsections: section_title: Longstanding Public Opposition to Siting Nuclear Waste Repositories
paragraphs: Public opposition has prevented the federal government from siting  nuclear waste repositories for decades. Between the 1950s and 1983,  three different federal entities managed disposal responsibilities for  nuclear waste. During the 1960s, the Atomic Energy Commission  attempted to develop a high-level waste repository near Lyons, Kansas,  but abandoned its plans largely due to public opposition. Federal efforts  failed for similar reasons for nuclear disposal and storage facilities in  Michigan, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. In 1984, an independent  panel concluded that these kinds of failures, among other things,  contributed to the federal government’s lack of credibility with the public in  selecting potential sites for nuclear waste storage. The panel described  site selection as largely a political process and recommended the creation  of a special advisory siting council made up of various key stakeholders  for site selection and that, once sited, creation of a separate entity to  develop a repository, largely because of the lack of trust in the federal  government.
section_title: DOE’s Efforts to Develop a Repository under the NWPA
paragraphs: DOE is responsible for disposing of the nation’s nuclear waste, including  defense nuclear waste (see table 1).
Most DOE-managed waste is defense HLW—a by-product of weapons  production and other defense-related activities—and much of it is  currently stored in liquid or semiliquid form in large underground tanks.  DOE has agreements with the states in which this nuclear waste is stored  that govern how the nuclear waste is managed. These agreements can  include various dates by which DOE agrees to complete certain activities,  such as processing HLW, transferring SNF and HLW to safer storage,  and removing certain nuclear waste from the site. Some of these  agreements include penalties if these dates, known as milestones, are  not met. DOE has sites in, and agreements with, five states where it  stores its waste.
In enacting the NWPA, Congress allowed for multiple repositories for the  nation’s nuclear waste. For example, to address equity among states, the  act required that at least two repositories for commercial SNF be  considered so that, according to experts, no single state would bear the  long-term disposal obligations for the entire nation’s commercial SNF. In  addition, the NWPA directed the President to evaluate whether the  development of a repository for the disposal of defense HLW activities is  required or if defense HLW could be commingled with commercial SNF in  a common repository. In particular, section 8(b)(1) of the NWPA directed  the President to make the evaluation on the basis of six factors: (1) cost  efficiency, (2) health and safety, (3) regulation, (4) transportation, (5)  public acceptability, and (6) national security. As noted above, in 1985,  President Reagan found there was no basis to conclude that a separate  repository for defense HLW was required. President Reagan’s finding  relied on a DOE evaluation concluding that cost efficiency favored a  commingled repository, specifically, commingling defense HLW with  commercial SNF was estimated to cost, at that time, about $1.5 billion  less than developing two separate repositories.
The NWPA provides for separate funding for defense nuclear waste and  commercial SNF. Specifically, the federal government would pay for the  management and disposal of defense waste. In practice, these payments  have come through defense appropriations, which is also the source of  money used to clean up and prepare nuclear waste at DOE-sites for  eventual disposal. For the management and disposal of commercial  waste, the NWPA created the Nuclear Waste Fund—a trust fund  established to collect fees to pay industry’s share of a repository. Under  the NWPA, DOE is to determine how much industry should contribute to  the fund, annually review the established amount, and evaluate whether  the collection of the fee will provide sufficient revenue. The rate was  originally set at one-tenth of a cent per kilowatt-hour of nuclear-generated  electricity.
Under its NWPA authority, DOE studied six sites in the West and three  sites in the South, and by 1986, the agency recommended three  candidate sites for further study or “site characterization:” Yucca Mountain  in Nevada, Deaf Smith County in Texas, and Hanford in Washington.  DOE was also authorized to contract with commercial nuclear reactor  operators to take custody of their SNF for disposal at the repository not  later than January 1998. In 1987, however, Congress amended the act  to direct DOE to focus its efforts only on Yucca Mountain. As a result,  DOE went from considering several repositories to only one at Yucca  Mountain, which the state of Nevada vigorously opposed. Under the  amendment, DOE was to perform studies to determine if the site was  suitable for a repository and, if the site met certain requirements, make a  site recommendation to the President. After spending nearly $15 billion  over about 25 years to investigate and assess a potential repository  site, in June 2008, DOE submitted a license application to the Nuclear  Regulatory Commission (NRC) seeking authorization to construct a  repository at Yucca Mountain that would commingle defense and  commercial waste. In 2010, DOE terminated its licensing efforts at  Yucca Mountain. Figure 1 shows key events in the nation’s nuclear waste  management program over the past several decades.
The NWPA requires DOE to annually review the amount of the fees  collected from industry and evaluate whether these fees will provide  sufficient revenues to offset costs. DOE reported in 2013 that the fund’s  projected balance was adequate to pay for industry’s share—about 80  percent—of the costs of a commingled repository. Since DOE terminated  its efforts to license the Yucca Mountain repository in 2010, the balance  of the Nuclear Waste Fund is about $34 billion. Lawsuits filed in federal  appeals court by the Nuclear Energy Institute and the National  Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners resulted in suspension of  the fee collection in 2014. In addition, since 1998, owners and  generators of commercial SNF have sued DOE primarily in the U.S. Court  of Federal Claims for failing to meets its obligations under the contracts  that DOE had entered into with them to dispose of commercial SNF. As of  the end of fiscal year 2015, the federal government had reimbursed  owners and generators about $5.3 billion in connection with such  lawsuits. The reimbursements come from the U.S. Department of  Treasury’s judgment fund. DOE estimates that future federal liability for  litigation related to storing spent nuclear fuel will amount to $23.7 billion  through 2071.
Presently, the nation’s inventory of defense nuclear waste and  commercial SNF remains stored at 80 sites in 35 states, generally where  it was generated (see fig.2).
section_title: DOE Efforts to Develop Its New Approach to Managing Nuclear Waste since Terminating the Yucca Mountain Repository
paragraphs: After DOE terminated its efforts to license Yucca Mountain in 2010, it  formed the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future at the  direction of the President to, among other things, evaluate alternatives to  managing and disposing of the nation’s nuclear waste. In 2012, the Blue  Ribbon Commission reported that decades of failed efforts to develop a  nuclear waste repository have produced frustration and a deep erosion of  trust in the federal government. The commission recommended that the  federal government develop a consent-based approach to siting—in  which affected units of state, local, or tribal governments willingly enter  into legally binding agreements—and create a new organization to  implement the waste management program. However, the Blue Ribbon  Commission reported that it did not reach consensus on whether defense  and commercial nuclear waste should be disposed of separately or in a  commingled repository. The Blue Ribbon Commission reported that it  did not have the resources to study the merits of a commingled repository  versus separate repositories for defense and commercial nuclear waste,  but the commission urged the administration to review the implications of  re-evaluating the 1985 finding or leaving it in place.
In October 2014, responding to the Blue Ribbon Commission report, DOE  issued a report that provided its analysis of disposal options and  recommended that DOE pursue separate disposal options for defense  HLW and some DOE-managed SNF. In January 2015, DOE submitted  a report to the President that included an analysis of the six factors that  the NWPA required be reviewed to determine whether to separately store  or commingle defense HLW and commercial SNF. On the basis of this  information, in March 2015, the President found that the development of a  repository for the disposal of defense HLW is required. DOE issued a  report available to the public in March 2015 that officials said reflected all  the information it provided to the President that served as a basis for the  presidential finding.
According to the information DOE provided to the President, a defense  HLW repository allows for different geologic media and repository designs  to be considered because defense HLW—which is typically older than  commercial SNF and has already been reprocessed or otherwise  treated—is generally cooler and less radioactive than commercial SNF. In  addition, DOE noted in the March 2015 report that the defense HLW most  likely considered for a separate repository consists of no more than 15  percent of the nation’s total nuclear waste by volume, and about 3  percent of the total waste’s radioactivity, which is measured in curies (see  fig. 3). In the information DOE provided to the President to support his  finding, DOE also stated it intends to study the disposal of some defense- related HLW in 5-kilometer-deep boreholes—vertical shafts about 17  inches in diameter—in which HLW capsules with certain highly  radioactive elements can be lowered and the shafts sealed.
section_title: In Recommending a Separate Defense High-Level Waste Repository, DOE Did Not Quantify Cited Benefits or Show How Certain Benefits Would Be Achieved or the Effect If Not Realized
paragraphs: In the information DOE provided to the President, DOE cited benefits of a  separate defense HLW repository but did not quantify the benefits when  possible, nor did it provide detailed support demonstrating that the  benefits it cited could be achieved or show the risks if certain benefits  could not be realized as planned. For example, DOE cited cost efficiency  as a benefit, but it did not quantify any cost efficiencies, nor did it estimate  the likelihood that any cost efficiencies could be achieved. Federal  guidance on planning, budgeting, and acquiring capital assets states that  estimated benefits and costs should be quantified in monetary terms  whenever possible and that estimates of costs and benefits should show  explicitly the performance and budget changes that result from  undertaking the project. The OMB guidance further states that a benefit- cost (or cost-effectiveness) analysis could be used by senior  management at key decision points to help decide how best to reduce the  performance gap. Furthermore, this guidance states that benefits and  cost estimates involve some degree of uncertainty and that the risk that a  benefit may not be realized as planned should be factored into the cost- benefit analysis.
How the Department of Energy Evaluated  the Six Factors under the Nuclear Waste  Policy Act (NWPA)  The Department of Energy (DOE) reported  that in evaluating the six factors required under  the NWPA, it included (1) a summary of the  1985 evaluation conclusions; (2) a discussion  of post-1985 changes and new information  bearing on the cost efficiency factor; and (3)  conclusions as to whether each factor  supports a finding that a defense   high-level radioactive waste repository is  required. For the cost efficiency factor, DOE  reported that “cost efficiency” is a synonym for  “cost effectiveness,” a term that, according to  DOE, captures both the cost of an action and  its benefits.
Cost Efficiency. DOE did not quantify the benefits associated with  cost efficiencies of separate repositories that it provided to the  President, nor did DOE estimate the likelihood that a defense  repository would result in cost efficiencies. DOE reported that the  costs of developing two repositories will generally be greater than  developing a single repository within each type of geologic media  (e.g., salt, shale, or crystalline rock such as granite), but it cited  potential cost efficiencies that could result from developing a separate  defense HLW repository. For example, a defense HLW repository  would allow greater flexibility in choosing different geologic media,  since certain geologies and repository designs that might not be  considered for commercial SNF may be acceptable for the cooler,  less radioactive defense HLW. Figure 4 below compares DOE’s cost  estimates of a single, commingled repository with the cost estimates  of two separate repositories, and the amount of radioactivity  associated with each set of costs. DOE also reported that developing  a defense HLW repository could result in cost efficiencies for a  subsequent, mostly commercial SNF repository by applying lessons  learned from the defense HLW repository process. In addition, DOE  reported that disposing of defense HLW may allow the department to  avoid future storage and treatment requirements for defense HLW,  thus reducing future costs. However, we found that DOE did not  identify all costs, which we discuss later in this report, nor did it  quantify its reported benefits, evaluate the likelihood that these  benefits could be achieved, or demonstrate that the benefits  outweighed those of a single commingled repository. Some experts  agreed that DOE may learn lessons in developing a defense HLW  repository, and these lessons could be applied to a subsequent,  mostly commercial SNF repository. However, the experts stated that  the potential benefits of such lessons—such as improving  organizational structure, developing efficiencies in coordinating work,  or making better decisions on prioritizing funding—would not result in  significant cost savings. Other experts told us that differences  between the repository requirements for defense HLW and for  commercial SNF would further limit the benefits of lessons learned  and likely would not result in cost savings.
Public acceptability. In the information provided to the President,  DOE did not demonstrate that a separate defense HLW repository  could result in public acceptability benefits, nor did it assess the  potential effect on its analysis if the public acceptability benefits could  not be realized. The information DOE provided to the President stated  that there is greater likelihood for public acceptance of a defense  repository because of the smaller volume and lower heat and  radioactivity of the waste destined for it and because the waste  derives from national defense activities. In addition, DOE reported to  the President that developing a defense HLW repository would  improve the public’s trust and confidence in DOE’s planning and  development of repositories, which could help the agency achieve  public confidence in a subsequent, mostly commercial repository.  DOE also stated that the successful siting of a defense HLW  repository could demonstrate to the public that the consent-based  siting process DOE plans to develop will be successful for a mostly  commercial SNF repository. However, DOE provided to the  President little evidence to support its assertion that the public would  be more likely to support a defense HLW repository than a  commingled repository. Reports spanning several decades have cited  public opposition as the key obstacle to siting and building a  repository for disposal of nuclear waste. Furthermore, experts and  stakeholders we interviewed generally did not agree with the public  acceptability benefits DOE claimed. Specifically, several experts and  stakeholders—those representing a community group, an  independent entity, and a state government—disagreed with DOE’s  statement that nuclear waste is more acceptable to the public if it is  related to defense activities. Experts from two independent entities  said they generally agreed with DOE’s statements about public views  on a defense HLW repository, but these experts cited as their support  DOE’s experience with the development of the Waste Isolation Pilot  Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico, where the state agreed to host a  defense repository for “transuranic” waste after DOE efforts to site a  commingled repository for HLW and SNF there failed because of the  lack of public acceptance.
Public Acceptance of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant  The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides an example of a success story of a repository for defense nuclear waste, but it took  decades to open because of broad and significant opposition from the state and general public. In the end, if not for significant DOE  concessions that allowed the state of New Mexico to regulate the waste that DOE would store at WIPP, the repository might not have  opened, according to a state government official and DOE contractors. Over time, the public came to support the repository. For  example, after two separate accidents at WIPP in February 2014 that led to the suspension of the facility’s operations, local officials  have publicly supported DOE’s efforts to reopen the facility.
Regulation. In the information provided to the President, DOE did not  demonstrate that a defense HLW repository could be easier or quicker  to demonstrate regulatory compliance, as DOE reported, nor did it  assess the potential effect on its analysis if the regulatory benefits  could not be realized. The information DOE provided to the President  stated that regulatory compliance for a defense HLW repository would  be simpler to demonstrate and could result in NRC licensing a  defense HLW repository sooner than it might a single, commingled  repository. DOE acknowledged that for any repository, the  regulations—first developed by the Environmental Protection Agency  (EPA) and NRC in the early 1980s to assess radiation containment  requirements to protect future populations—need to be updated. In  1992, Congress required more study and directed EPA to create a  separate set of regulations specifically for Yucca Mountain. EPA  finalized the regulations in 2001, but certain provisions of the  regulations were vacated as a result of legal challenges. The agency  subsequently issued revised regulations in 2008. These Yucca  Mountain-specific regulations do not apply to any other repository.  Consequently, to support the licensing of a repository other than  Yucca Mountain, EPA would either have to rely on the generally  applicable safety standards developed in the 1980s that, according to  DOE, need to be updated, or create a new set of regulations. Such  regulations would likely be similar to the regulations created for Yucca  Mountain, including having a broader array of assessment tools and a  longer compliance period, but the regulations could also incorporate  new methods of evaluating disposal system performance, according  to EPA. DOE also reported that developing a defense HLW repository  would provide lessons learned that could facilitate the licensing of a  subsequent, mostly commercial SNF repository. However,  stakeholders and federal officials told us that the regulatory licensing  process would be lengthy for any repository. Moreover, stakeholders  from an entity representing community action groups told us that  although the reduced volume, temperature, and radioactivity of  defense HLW might make it simpler for DOE to meet regulatory  requirements, developing the regulatory requirements will still be a  time-consuming, complex undertaking. They said developing new  regulations would involve public hearings and adjudication  proceedings and, as a result, licensing a defense HLW repository  might not necessarily take less time than a commingled repository.
Issuing Regulations for a Nuclear Waste  Repository  The Nuclear Waste Policy Act directed the  Administrator of the Environmental Protection  Agency (EPA) to promulgate generally applicable  standards to protect the environment from offsite  releases from radioactive materials in  repositories. In addition, the act directed the  Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to  develop its own regulations to license and  regulate repositories consistent with EPA’s  standards. Although the law allowed NRC to  finalize its regulation on licensing before EPA  finalized its regulations, if NRC did so, it would  have had to revise its regulations, if necessary, to  make them consistent with EPA’s standards.  Developing and finalizing the regulations can be a  lengthy process involving multiple stages that  require specific time frames for public notification  or comment. Certain requirements may affect the  rulemaking process, such as the time required for  environmental studies or public input. Legislation  and lawsuits may also affect the duration of the  rulemaking process, such as the Energy Policy  Act of 1992, which required EPA to contract with  the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a  study to find and recommend “reasonable”  standards to protect the health and safety of the  general public from a repository at Yucca  Mountain. EPA would in turn base its own  standards on the study’s findings and  recommendations. According to federal  rulemaking officials, these processes may take  several years.
Transportation. DOE did not explain the rationale for the benefits it  cited for transportation, nor did DOE estimate the likelihood that the  benefits it cited could be achieved or assess the potential effect if the  benefits could not be realized. The information DOE provided to the  President stated that the development of a defense HLW repository  would provide an early opportunity to develop and exercise  institutional procedures for transporting nuclear waste. However, we  found that lessons learned from such procedures are not likely to  provide benefits for the mode of transportation that will be used for  commercial SNF. Specifically, representatives of state entities and  communities noted that DOE plans to transport commercial SNF by  rail, but it plans to transport defense HLW by truck. It is not clear how  transporting defense HLW by truck to a defense HLW repository could  provide benefits to DOE’s plan to transport commercial SNF by rail to  a commercial SNF repository.
National security. DOE did not show that the national security  benefits it cited could be achieved. DOE reported that if a separate  defense HLW repository is developed earlier than a mostly  commercial SNF repository, DOE might be able to remove Navy SNF  from the Idaho National Laboratory and allow the Navy to avoid  potential financial penalties for storing SNF there beyond a certain  date. DOE and the Navy may have to pay the state of Idaho $60,000  for each day SNF remains in the state past January 1, 2035,  according to agreements with Idaho. We reported in 2011 that the  Navy is concerned that if DOE does not remove SNF from Idaho by  2035 then Idaho may bar further Navy shipments of SNF, potentially  affecting the Navy’s ability to refuel its nuclear fleet after 2035.  However, DOE did not show that the national security benefits it cited  can be fully achieved. DOE officials reported that it is not likely all of  the Navy SNF would be included in the same repository with defense  HLW because newer Navy SNF may be too thermally hot and  radioactive to be stored in a defense HLW repository. If  development of a defense HLW repository delays the development of  a subsequent, mostly commercial SNF repository—as some experts  and stakeholders say is likely to happen—then the disposal of new  Navy SNF would also likely be delayed, and the benefits that DOE  said would be achieved under this NWPA factor might not be realized  because DOE may not meet the deadlines in its agreement with  Idaho.
Health and safety. DOE reported few differences in health and safety  benefits between the two repository scenarios because the same level  of health and safety protection would be met under any scenario.
As stated earlier, federal guidance provides that estimated benefits and  costs should be quantified in monetary terms wherever possible,  estimates of costs and benefits should show explicitly the performance  and budget changes that result from undertaking the project, and benefit- cost analysis could be used by senior management at key decision points  to help decide how best to reduce the performance gap. DOE, however,  did not adhere to such guidance. In addition, the guidance states that the  risk that a benefit may not be realized as planned should be factored into  the cost-benefit analysis. DOE officials stated that the information DOE  provided to the President to support the requirement for a separate  defense HLW repository addressed the requirements of the NWPA and  did not have to adhere to OMB’s guidance. They stated that there are no  specific requirements under the NWPA for the quality and completeness  of information that is provided to support a presidential finding. DOE  officials told us they are at the conceptual stages of studying options for a  separate defense repository, but they said that when they move from  studying repository options to planning for a separate defense HLW  repository, they will comply with OMB’s guidance. Nevertheless, by DOE  not providing the President with complete and, where possible, quantified  benefits, the President made a decision that potentially commits the  nation to spending tens of billions of dollars and decades of work without  the level and type of information federal agencies need to justify key  decisions and inform decision makers. Moreover, in choosing to pursue a  separate repository for defense HLW without fully assessing the benefits  of doing so, DOE appears to have circumvented key front-end planning  principles, something DOE has recently emphasized as critically  important in planning for new projects. By using quantified and complete  benefits to inform its recommendation to the President, DOE would have  greater assurance that the benefits of its approach to storing highly  radioactive nuclear waste are greater than the costs.
section_title: DOE’s Estimates for the Projected Costs and Schedule to Site, License, and Construct a Defense High-Level Waste Repository Are Not Reliable
paragraphs: The preliminary cost and schedule estimates DOE provided to the  President for a defense HLW repository are not reliable. Best practices for  cost estimating state that, even at the early stages of project  development, a reliable cost estimate should encompass all likely costs  and be comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible to the  extent possible in order to inform decision making. In addition, best  practices for schedule estimating state that at early stages of project  development, reliable schedule estimates should be connected to the  work planned and represent an integrated series of activities. According  to DOE officials, they did not develop reliable estimates to reflect all likely  costs and schedule activities because their plan was still at the  conceptual stage, and DOE officials did not have enough information to  generate cost and schedule estimates that met best practices; however,  industry best practices documented by GAO state that it is possible to  generate reliable estimates of cost and schedule even when information  is limited.
subsections: section_title: DOE’s Cost Estimates Are Not Reliable
paragraphs: In the information DOE provided to the President, DOE prepared “rough  order of magnitude” cost estimates for the defense HLW repository, which  included cost ranges to design, construct, operate, and close the  repository. DOE also included cost estimates for a second, mostly  commercial SNF repository. The cost ranges corresponded to different  geologies where the repository might be located and within each geology.  DOE set each high and low cost range by assuming a predetermined  amount of contingency, instead of by assessing the risk that costs may  vary. According to DOE documents, each type of geology presents  advantages and disadvantages for construction, long-term waste storage,  and other technical characteristics. For example, DOE found that  crystalline rock, which includes hard rock such as granite, would be more  costly because the repository would need additional engineered barriers  to contain the radioactive waste. In contrast, DOE told us that bedded salt  would be less costly because, among other things, it isolates the waste  sufficiently from the environment such that waste packaging requirements  are reduced. DOE also provided cost ranges for additional geologies and  designs; for example, DOE provided estimated cost ranges for a  repository in sedimentary rock in which the nuclear waste would be  allowed to decay and then sealed with earth (known as “backfilled”) after  100 years. DOE’s cost estimates are shown in table 2.
We assessed DOE’s cost estimates against the characteristics of high- quality, reliable cost estimates as established by industry best practices,  which are documented in our Cost Guide. These best practices apply to  cost estimates throughout a project’s life cycle, including early, rough- order-of-magnitude estimates developed at or before project initiation.  According to cost estimating best practices, four characteristics make up  reliable cost estimates—they are comprehensive, well-documented,  accurate, and credible. Reliable cost estimates are crucial tools for  decision makers, according to industry best practices. Cost estimates are  considered reliable if each of the four characteristics is substantially or  fully met. If any of the characteristics are not met, minimally met, or  partially met, then the estimates cannot be considered reliable. OMB  guidance also notes the importance of reliable cost estimates at the early  stages, stating that early emphasis of cost estimating during the planning  phase is critical to successful life cycle management—in short,  determining whether benefits outweigh costs.
We found that DOE’s cost estimates were not reliable because they  excluded major costs that will likely add tens of billions of dollars, were  minimally documented, lacked transparency, and were not fully credible.  Table 3 summarizes our assessment of DOE’s cost estimates.
We shared with DOE officials the results of our assessment of DOE’s cost  estimates that DOE provided to the President. A complete analysis of  DOE’s cost estimates and DOE’s response is found in Appendix II. We  summarize our assessment and DOE’s responses below.
Comprehensive. We found that DOE’s estimate did not fully conform  to best practices for reliable cost estimates because it excluded major  activities that could cost tens of billions of dollars. According to  industry best practices, comprehensive cost estimates should be  structured in sufficient detail to ensure that cost elements are neither  omitted nor double counted. Where information is limited and  judgments must be made, the cost estimates should document all  ground rules and assumptions that may influence the cost estimates’  results. DOE’s cost estimate, however, did not estimate the cost of  major activities that would be required to develop its two proposed  nuclear waste repositories. For example, DOE’s estimates did not  include the following costs:
Site selection. This would likely require scientific investigation of  several candidate locations, along with a lengthy consent-based siting  process. DOE’s past experience with site selection indicates that site  selection could cost billions of dollars. For example, a 2013 DOE  study estimated that site selection costs for a new repository will  exceed $3 billion, based on the historical costs incurred by Yucca  Mountain. Notably, because DOE now must site two repositories, the  cost of selecting a site would apply twice—once for each of the two  separate sites.
Site characterization. Site characterization cost about $2.6 billion for  WIPP and about $8.5 billion for Yucca Mountain, according to DOE  officials. As with site selection, the costs of site characterization for  two repositories would apply twice—once for each of the two separate  sites.
Waste transportation. DOE excluded the cost of packaging,  shipping, and transporting the nuclear waste. In 2013, DOE had  separately estimated these costs to be a total of about $20 billion.
In response to our analysis, DOE officials stated that DOE was not  required to provide the President with comprehensive estimates of  life-cycle costs that met industry best practices, in part because of the  early stage of their plan’s development and because potential sites  had not been selected, which could change repository costs. We  recognize that at the early phases of a project, cost estimates are  preliminary and may not include the details needed in the later stages  of project development. However, industry best practices, as  documented in our Cost Guide, state that a full accounting of all life- cycle costs is helpful in examining alternatives to identify which are  most feasible.
Figure 5 shows the cost estimates DOE provided to the President,  reflecting DOE’s highest estimated costs and lowest estimated costs over  time for developing a defense HLW repository. These costs would be  funded with defense appropriations. As shown in figure 5, the costs are expected to be high during construction, followed by reduced but  consistent costs during transportation and operations, then a period of  increased costs for closure, followed by substantially reduced costs for  monitoring. The figure also shows the activities for which DOE excluded  costs; the amounts required are uncertain but will likely add billions of  dollars to the estimates. The information DOE provided to the President  did not discuss the potential budgetary impact of a defense repository  funding needs—up to $1.7 billion per year over several years—on other  defense programs managed by DOE.
Well-Documented. We found that DOE’s cost estimate minimally met  the characteristic of a well-documented estimate. According to  industry best practices, a well-documented cost estimate allows  tracing of the data it contains to source documents and has thorough  documentation, including evidence of management review and  approval. DOE officials told us that from 2012 through 2015, DOE  produced hundreds of pages of engineering reports analyzing how  different combinations of nuclear waste might be disposed within  different geologies, including rough engineering plans and preliminary  cost and schedule estimates. Officials told us that DOE used these  engineering reports to support the cost estimates it presented in its  March 2015 report to the President. However, when we requested  DOE’s original calculations for its final cost estimates, DOE officials  had to re-create these calculations. In addition, DOE’s supporting  documentation for its cost estimates was not transparent. Specifically,  DOE did not make many of its supporting documents available to the  public, such as posting them on the agency’s website. As a result,  members of the public and the scientific community were not able to  evaluate the basis of DOE’s cost estimates.
In response to our analysis, DOE officials agreed that DOE’s overall  methodology was not clearly documented, but they stated that they  provided us with documents that contained all data and assumptions  DOE used to develop the cost estimates. However, we found that  many of the cost figures that DOE provided to the President could not  be traced to the support documents that DOE provided without  acquiring additional documentation and consulting with DOE officials.
Accurate. We found that DOE’s cost estimates partially met the  characteristics of an accurate estimate. To be considered accurate,  according to industry best practices, cost estimates should provide  results that are: unbiased and not overly conservative or optimistic;  based on an assessment of most likely costs; adjusted properly for  inflation; reflect risk and uncertainty; and contain few, if any, mistakes.  DOE’s cost estimates conformed to industry best practices in that  DOE took inflation into account and the figures appeared to contain  only minor mathematical errors. In addition, there was little variance  between planned and actual costs, since DOE had not yet spent  money to execute its plan. However, DOE’s cost estimates did not  fully meet this criterion because DOE did not calculate its cost  estimate ranges based on industry best practices using statistical  calculations called for by industry best practices and as described in  DOE’s cost estimation guidance. If decision-makers are to  understand the risk of cost overruns and make wise decisions, they  must understand the level of confidence DOE had in its cost  estimates. In contrast, DOE did not set the high and low ranges of its  cost estimates by assessing risk, but by assuming a predetermined  amount of contingency—an amount of funds that DOE officials added  for dealing with potential unplanned costs.
In response to our analysis, DOE officials stated that at this stage,  DOE does not have the details needed for the kind of statistical  analysis called for by best practices. However, best practices  describe how a statistical analysis can be undertaken with limited  information and communicated to decision makers. Presently, it is not  possible to determine whether DOE’s estimates are at risk of being  either overly conservative or overly optimistic, and decision makers  cannot know how much confidence they should have in DOE’s  estimates.
Credible. We found that DOE’s estimates minimally met the “credible”  characteristic, which reflects the extent to which a cost estimate can  be trusted, according to GAO’s Cost Guide. To be credible, a cost  estimate should be checked for its level of uncertainty using an  independent cost estimate to identify and correct potential bias and a  sensitivity analysis to determine how much an estimate could vary as  assumptions or conditions change. DOE did check some components  of its estimates. For example, DOE documents indicate that a peer  review, which served as an independent check, was conducted on  some of DOE’s source documents. However, DOE has not yet  undertaken an independent cost estimate or a sensitivity analysis  showing how the assumptions DOE used may affect the results of its  cost estimates, as called for by industry best practices.
In response to our analysis, DOE officials stated that they believed the  development of their estimates were well-documented. DOE officials  said that departmental orders do not require the same level of  analysis at this early stage that is required at later stages. We note,  however, that even rough-order-of-magnitude estimates benefit from  identification of potential sensitivities, and including them is an  industry best practice. Without analyzing how DOE’s assumptions or  conditions may affect the results of its cost estimates, DOE’s  estimates cannot be viewed as credible.
According to OMB guidance, poor cost estimates can undermine a  program or create an unexecutable plan. DOE excluded certain costs— even in cases where reasonable comparisons were available—without  indicating their eventual effect on the lifecycle cost. In doing so, the  information DOE provided to the President to support the decision to  develop a separate repository for defense HLW omitted billions of dollars  in expected costs and was not fully comprehensive, well-documented,  accurate, or credible. In this case, because not all costs were included— along with confidence levels to reflect the risks that could adversely affect  the program—DOE officials do not know whether a benefit-cost analysis  would have shown that a single, commingled repository would be more  cost efficient.
section_title: DOE Did Not Develop Reliable Schedule Estimates
paragraphs: In the information DOE provided to the President, DOE estimated that  both repositories could be ready to receive nuclear waste by 2048. We  assessed DOE’s schedule estimate against the characteristics of high- quality, reliable schedule estimates as established by industry best  practices, which are documented in our Schedule Assessment Guide.  We found that DOE’s estimates for developing and operating both  repositories were not well-constructed and that beginning operations at  two repositories by 2048 appears optimistic.
As part of its justification to develop a defense HLW repository, DOE  reported to the President that a defense HLW repository, if developed  first, could benefit the siting and development of a subsequent, mostly  commercial repository. DOE did not report any specific time frames for  when it might begin operations at a defense HLW repository, but it did  report that its goal was to begin operations at a mostly commercial  repository by 2048, and that a separate defense HLW repository could be  available before then. The key steps required to begin operations at a  repository include selecting the site, assessing or characterizing the  geologic characteristics of the site, and, if the geology meets  requirements, designing and constructing the repository and obtaining a  license to receive and possess nuclear material. DOE provided us with  its preliminary schedule estimates for developing both a defense HLW  repository and a subsequent mostly commercial repository. DOE’s  preliminary estimates showed that DOE could finish emplacing waste in  both repositories about 47 years after site construction. DOE officials told  us that these estimates were preliminary and rough order of magnitude  (see table 4).
DOE’s goal to open a commercial SNF repository by 2048 and a defense  HLW repository even sooner appears optimistic. According to DOE’s  estimates, design and construction will require 15 to 25 years; therefore,  these activities would have to begin between 2023 and 2033 for DOE to  meet its 2048 goal. As a result, DOE would need to complete site  selection and characterization activities in 6 to 16 years (i.e., between  2022 and 2032). DOE would have even less time to complete the site  selection and characterization activities required to open a separate  defense HLW repository before 2048. DOE did not provide a schedule  estimate for completing site selection and characterization activities for  either repository, nor did DOE explain how these activities could be  achieved in this timeframe. Notably, in 2013, DOE reported to Congress  that such activities for a new single, commingled repository would take 28  years to complete. Furthermore, DOE spent 15 years to complete site  characterization activities for WIPP, and it took 21 years to complete such  activities for Yucca Mountain.
We also found that DOE’s estimates for the time frames of certain  activities did not adhere to industry best practices for constructing reliable  schedule estimates. A reliable, well-constructed schedule is integrated  and connects all planned work in a collection of logically linked  sequences of activities whose forecasted dates are automatically  recalculated when activities change. However, DOE did not provide any  documentation about how it calculated its time frames for key activities. In  addition, DOE’s time frame estimates remain the same regardless of  geology or the types of nuclear waste emplaced within either of the two  planned repositories. Also, DOE’s estimates exclude site selection and  site characterization, which could add decades to the time frames, based  on past DOE experience and plans. These excluded schedule activities  could prolong the duration of the project and thereby increase the  project’s costs. According to the Cost Guide, schedule delays have an  effect on the costs of all aspects of a program, such as the costs of  additional staff time.
We shared the results of our assessment of DOE’s time frame estimates  for the two repositories as summarized in DOE’s March 2015 report with  DOE officials. The DOE officials agreed with our conclusion that, without  a fully developed and documented integrated management schedule, it is  not possible to evaluate the time frames of certain activities to determine  the schedule estimate’s reliability. They also said that it was too early to  construct a reliable schedule and that the schedule they developed was  high-level and based on expert judgment developed from past repository  experiences, most notably Yucca Mountain. DOE officials told us that  they expect site characterization would not take as long if a site was  selected through a consent-based process. We recognize that at the early  phases of a project, schedule estimates are preliminary and lack the  details applicable to the later stages of project development. However,  the level of detail in the schedule should reflect the level of information  available according to our Schedule Guide, and DOE excluded time  frame estimates for activities where reasonable comparisons exist while  providing little support for a schedule estimate that leaves little time for  such activities.
section_title: DOE Is Planning a Consent-Based Siting Process, but It Has Not Addressed Issues that Are Prerequisite to Siting Considerations
paragraphs: DOE is planning to develop a consent-based siting process for a defense  HLW repository with the intention of attaining consent for an eventual  repository site. However, DOE likely faces significant opposition and  distrust as it develops this process. Moreover, DOE is planning to develop  a consent-based siting process before it has addressed certain  prerequisites—such as the possible need for EPA to update health and  safety regulations—which are necessary to solicit public comment on its  consent-based siting process, screen potential sites for a repository, and  engage in site selection discussions with local communities.
subsections: section_title: DOE Is Planning a Consent-Based Siting Process for a Defense HLW Repository
paragraphs: In December 2015, DOE announced plans to solicit public opinion to help  develop a consent-based siting process with the ultimate purpose of  attaining consent at a site for an eventual repository. DOE planned to  collect public input by mail, telephone, various electronic means, and in  person at a series of public meetings it planned to hold around the  country. As of July 21, 2016, DOE had completed all of its nine scheduled  public meetings held at various locations across the country. DOE  developed a series of questions to elicit public input and included topics  such as how to be fair and who should participate in consent-based  siting. DOE announced that, as a result of its public solicitation effort, it  had collected more than 10,000 comments; in September 2016, DOE  officials issued a report that summarized the public comments it received.  DOE announced plans to issue a draft report on the factors it planned to  consider for siting nuclear storage or disposal facilities in December 2016.  DOE stated that some of the factors it plans to consider include what  constitutes consent and who should provide it, socioeconomic issues, and  transportation requirements. DOE stated it plans to use these criteria to  work collaboratively with potential host communities in selecting a site for  a defense HLW repository.
DOE likely faces significant public opposition and distrust as it develops  its consent-based siting process. In commenting on DOE’s plans to solicit  public input on its consent-based siting process, experts representing  independent organizations, state entities, and community interest groups  identified public opposition as a major obstacle DOE will have to  overcome in siting any nuclear disposal or storage facility. In addition, we  reviewed transcripts of DOE’s meetings and found that participants raised  the theme of distrust of DOE at every meeting. In summarizing the  public comments DOE had received as part of its public solicitation on  consent-based siting, DOE reported in September 2016 that a lack of  trust and credibility—particularly, lack of trust in DOE—were recurring  themes and major impediments to the success of a consent-based siting  process. We have previously reported that social and political  opposition, not technical issues, are the key obstacles to developing a  new repository; we also reported that some stakeholders told us that a  final siting decision is inherently a political process and should be made  by Congress if the decision is to have any lasting effect.
Despite DOE’s commitment to developing a consent-based siting  approach, its recent efforts to conduct research on borehole disposal  show that it may be underestimating the extent of the public opposition it  faces. Specifically, DOE issued a contract for $35 million to conduct  research on borehole disposal in Pierce County, North Dakota. Despite  DOE’s assertions that it had no plans to use the site for future disposal of  radioactive waste and that it did not plan to use any nuclear waste in the  research, county residents expressed distrust of DOE’s long-term  intentions. For example, some residents stated that if the research shows  boreholes can successfully be used, there were no guarantees that DOE  would not dispose of nuclear waste in deep boreholes in the future. The  county commission placed a moratorium on permits for deep borehole  drilling in the county. DOE’s contractor then considered a site in Spink  County, South Dakota, to conduct the research. According to DOE, the  contractor held public meetings and engaged local elected officials, but  the public raised similar concerns and DOE and the contractor mutually  agreed to terminate the contract. DOE officials acknowledged that the  lack of public support has been a major impediment to conducting  research on borehole disposal and, in August 2016, DOE issued a new  solicitation that, in part, is to address public opposition by allowing for  early government and public engagement, something that did not happen  in DOE’s earlier efforts.
section_title: DOE Has Not Addressed Certain Prerequisites That Are Needed before It Can Effectively Solicit Public Input, Screen Potential Repository Sites, or Engage Local Communities in Selecting a Site
paragraphs: DOE has not yet addressed certain prerequisites that are needed to  develop a site selection process, particularly the health and safety  regulations that—as we stated earlier—DOE has said need to be  updated. Without updated regulations, the public cannot provide  meaningful input into a consent-based siting process, DOE may not be  able to effectively screen potential sites for a repository, and local  communities cannot be effectively engaged in a meaningful discussion on  hosting a nuclear waste repository. For example, current regulations,  which were developed in the 1980s, state that for a repository other than  Yucca Mountain, the federal government must show that the repository  can safely isolate radioactive material for 10,000 years. For Yucca  Mountain specifically, regulations require a time period of 1 million years.
Since EPA has not yet determined whether or how to update existing  standards, EPA officials stated that EPA has not determined the length of  time that the federal government must show it can safely store nuclear  waste, but they said that EPA would consider requiring a duration longer  than 10,000 years. Nevertheless, knowing the time period of compliance  is a key prerequisite for the public and potential host communities to have  when commenting on siting criteria, for communities to engage in  discussions to host a site, or for DOE to screen a site as a potential  repository.
Representatives of four state entities told us that DOE may be premature  in soliciting public comment for a consent-based siting process because  DOE has not yet addressed certain issues that are prerequisites for  having discussions with the public and soliciting their input.
In particular, regarding the prerequisite for updating regulations, it is  important that regulations are developed before siting a repository to  avoid suspicion that the regulations would change to suit the repository.  In particular, we found in 2011 that simultaneous development of safety  regulations and a license application for Yucca Mountain galvanized  opposition against DOE. The Blue Ribbon Commission recognized this  risk in its 2012 report, stating that safety regulations—and how to  demonstrate compliance with them—should be developed before  selecting a site to avoid public suspicion that standards are being  adjusted to fit the site.
Experts and stakeholders told us that until such regulations are revised,  DOE should not screen potential host communities to determine which  ones DOE should enter into discussions with regarding siting. These  experts and stakeholders added that it would be premature for DOE to  site a defense HLW or a subsequent, mostly commercial SNF repository  until health and safety regulations are revised. EPA has responsibility for  revising the regulations, but EPA officials told us that they do not plan to  invest resources in revising health and safety regulations without specific  direction from Congress. Some attendees of DOE’s public solicitation  meetings stated that having informed consent was an important element  of a consent-based siting process and that lack of information on current  health and safety standards did not allow them to provide meaningful  consent. If the health and safety standards need to be updated for any  future repository other than Yucca Mountain, as we describe earlier in this  report, the public cannot provide informed input into a consent-based  process if, for example, it does not know what level of protection from  exposure will be required.
DOE’s project management order requires that prior to approving a  mission-related need, DOE perform “pre-conceptual” planning activities,  such as safety planning, development of capability gaps, and defining  high-level project conditions that are to be attained. DOE officials stated  that they did not fulfill all pre-conceptual planning requirements because  they do not yet consider the defense HLW repository a project. They told  us that they will not consider it a major project until additional planning is  conducted on site selection. By not yet completing key pre-conceptual  planning activities—namely, what health and safety regulations will apply  to siting an eventual repository—it is unclear how DOE can screen  potential sites or choose which communities to engage with as part of its  new consent-based approach. Moreover, without first knowing what  health and safety regulations might apply to a future repository, it is  difficult for any member of the public to provide informed input into a  consent-based siting process. DOE may risk wasting resources if it  screens sites before knowing what health and safety regulations might  apply because revisions to such regulations may exclude certain sites  that do not meet the requirements, or local communities may oppose  hosting a repository once the regulations are revised. If DOE first  addresses the need to revise health and safety regulations, it might  reduce the risk of public opposition and better ensure that its resources  are expended on potential sites that fit its permissible selection criteria.  DOE did not provide sufficient information to the President on the  prerequisites for developing a consent-based siting process and engaging  local communities in siting a nuclear waste repository or the amount of  time it might take to address these issues.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: For decades, the nation has struggled with how to dispose of its inventory  of defense-related and commercial HLW and SNF. Since the passage of  the NWPA, the nation has spent more than $16 billion to investigate and  assess a single, commingled repository, but the prospects of developing  a repository do not seem any better now than they did nearly 30 years  ago when Yucca Mountain was selected. The information DOE provided  to the President in 2015—concluding that a strong basis exists to find that  a defense HLW repository is required—served as the basis for the  decision that started the nation down the path of developing two  repositories. However, the information DOE provided on the estimated  costs and schedule was not well-documented, accurate, or credible, and  it omitted billions of dollars in expected costs. The information DOE  provided to the President also did not quantify benefits, when possible,  explain the likelihood of achieving these benefits; or describe the potential  impact of costs on future defense budgets. Unlike a single, commingled  repository, which would have received most of its appropriations from  industry fees, a defense HLW repository will likely have to be fully funded  by funds appropriated for the defense budget. Without comprehensively  quantifying benefits and calculating the likelihood of achieving them, or  fully reflecting all costs and time frames associated with key activities,  DOE asked the President to make a decision that could commit the nation  to spending tens of billions of dollars and performing decades of work  without knowing whether the benefits outweigh the costs, particularly  when compared to the benefits and costs of a single, commingled  repository.
DOE faces significant public opposition in developing a consent-based  siting process and engaging in site selection discussions with local  communities, in part because DOE has not yet addressed certain  prerequisites that are needed for the site selection process, such as the  possible need to revise health and safety regulations. We and others  have previously found that the greatest obstacles to the success of any  nuclear waste storage or disposal effort are not technical, but social and  political—that is, addressing public opposition that has been created by  decades of distrust between DOE and the local communities where  nuclear waste repositories may be sited. While seeking the public’s input  on a siting process may go a long way toward addressing public  opposition, DOE is seeking the public’s input before the public has all the  information it needs. DOE may appear disingenuous if it embarks on a  consent-based siting process without first providing information to the  public that is a precondition for discussion and that could influence public  input. Moreover, DOE may risk wasting resources if it screens sites  before knowing what health and safety regulations might apply— essentially putting the cart before the horse—because revisions to such  regulations may ultimately exclude certain sites or local communities may  oppose hosting a repository if they are uncomfortable with the revised  regulations.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making two recommendations in this report.  1.  The Secretary of Energy should direct the Office of Nuclear Energy to  conduct a comprehensive assessment, which adheres to OMB  guidance and best practices, of the benefits, costs, and schedules of  the options it reviewed and provided to the President in 2015, and, in  light of the new information and results of its assessment, revise—if  needed—the report’s conclusion that a strong basis exists to find that  a defense HLW repository is required.  2.  The Secretary of Energy should direct the Office of Nuclear Energy to  reassess its decision to engage in discussions with potential host  communities, screen sites, or conduct other site selection activities  until key prerequisites to these efforts—such as revising health and  safety regulations—have been addressed.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided NRC and DOE with a draft of this report for their review and  comment and we provided EPA with relevant excerpts of the draft for its  review and comment. NRC provided technical clarifications which we  incorporated as appropriate, in addition to written comments, reproduced  in appendix V, stating that NRC had no significant comments after  reviewing the draft report. EPA did not have any comments on our draft  report, but provided us with technical clarifications which we incorporated  as appropriate. DOE provided written comments, which are printed in full  in appendix VI, as well as technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate. In its comments, DOE generally agreed with the intent of our  first recommendation, disagreed with our second recommendation, as  discussed below.
Regarding our first recommendation, DOE stated that the department  agreed that there is a need to understand and evaluate more fully the  benefits and costs of a separate repository for defense waste. DOE  stated that the presidential finding, as required by section 8 of the NWPA,  was necessary before DOE could begin a more detailed analysis of the  benefits and costs of a separate defense waste repository. DOE stated  that with the Presidential finding, it now plans to acquire the information  needed to analyze in greater detail the benefits, risks, costs, and  schedule of a separate defense waste repository. In its comments, DOE  also stated that the report did not recognize the limited nature of the  analysis required by section 8 of the NWPA.  We recognize that DOE was  at the early stages of its analysis when it recommended to the President  that separate repositories be considered, but, as discussed in the report,  we believe a more thorough analysis was needed to determine whether  such a recommendation should have been made in the first place.  Further, the NWPA did not preclude the Department from providing the  President that information, particularly a more thorough analysis on  whether the benefits of departing from the nation’s longstanding nuclear  waste storage strategy outweigh the costs.  Specifically, we acknowledge  in the report that the NWPA only requires an evaluation of six factors, but,  as noted above, the NWPA does not preclude DOE from conducting its  analysis of benefits and costs in accordance with best practices or its own  planning requirements for major acquisitions.  As we note in our report,  industry best practices apply to cost estimates throughout a project’s life  cycle, including early, rough-order-of-magnitude estimates. Moving  forward, DOE’s stated plans to complete detailed analysis and evaluation  of the costs, risks, benefits, and schedule is consistent with our  recommendation and are imperative to support—or revise as needed— the department’s basis for a separate defense HLW repository.
Regarding our second recommendation, DOE disagreed. In its letter,  DOE stated that although it agreed that the NRC and EPA regulations  governing generic repositories need to be updated, it believed that the  consent-based siting process should be initiated as soon as possible to  identify one or more volunteer host communities before such updates  occur. DOE stated that this parallel approach would support its plans to  begin screening candidate site(s) as early as possible, allowing volunteer  communities the opportunity to provide input in the rule-making  processes. DOE also noted that establishing a relationship with a  community could reduce schedule and cost risks associated with the  siting process since detailed cost estimates cannot be made until a  community is identified.  However, as we stated in our report, the public  cannot provide meaningful input into a consent-based siting process  without having key information that is a precondition for discussion and  which could influence public input. Some of this information includes the  status of the health and safety regulations, the degree of local and state  regulatory oversight, and the durability of agreements reached. Since we  provided our draft report to the department for review and comment, DOE  issued draft plans in December 2016 for finalizing a consent-based siting  process and developing a defense waste repository. However, DOE’s  plans to develop a consent-based siting process while simultaneously  engaging in site selection discussions with local communities— particularly before addressing key prerequisites that members of the  public may need when providing input—may risk compounding public  opposition that has been created by decades of distrust between DOE  and the local communities over nuclear waste repositories. Therefore, we  believe that DOE should reassess its decision to simultaneously pursue  such activities until key prerequisites have been addressed.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Energy, the Chairman of the Nuclear  Regulatory Commission, the EPA Administrator, the Secretary of  Transportation, and other interested parties. In addition, this report is  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the benefits that DOE cited in its recommendation to the  President about the need for a separate defense HLW repository, we  reviewed DOE’s March 2015 report and additional planning and cost  documents supporting that report. For example, we reviewed DOE’s  October 2014 report, which DOE used as a basis for developing its  March 2015 report. We also interviewed DOE officials in DOE’s Office of  Nuclear Energy, Office of Environmental Management, Las Vegas field  office, and Office of General Counsel, and staff from the Sandia National  Laboratories who were familiar with the information presented to the  President or who contributed to DOE’s March 2015 report and supporting  documentation. In addition, we reviewed federal guidance on setting  objectives and on planning, budgeting, and acquiring capital assets.  Specifically, federal internal controls state that management should  identify risks and define risk tolerances for the objectives. Risk tolerance  is the acceptable level of variation in performance relative to the  achievement of objectives and should be set as part of the objective- setting process. Also, OMB guidance states that when considering a new  capital asset, management should assess risks and should determine  whether accepting risks are justified considering the return on investment.  The guidance also states that benefits and costs should be quantified in  monetary terms whenever possible and that all types of benefits and  costs should be included. The level of detail should be commensurate  with the size and criticality of the investment. The OMB guidance states  that certain benefit-cost or cost-effectiveness analysis could be used by  senior management to make key decisions. Furthermore, the guidance  states that benefits and cost estimates involve some degree of  uncertainty and that the risk that a benefit may not be realized as planned  should be factored into the cost-benefit analysis.
We also interviewed experts and stakeholders from various entities about  the benefits that DOE cited. To ensure balance among the entities, we  considered representation among specific categories that GAO had  identified and used in prior engagements. These categories covered (1)  independent groups and academia, (2) community interest groups, (3)  industry, (4) state and local governments, and (5) the federal government.  We began interviews with experts and stakeholders in nuclear waste  management from entities we had already identified in our prior work.  Before we began each interview, we asked the individual to provide  information on his or her background—including education, employment  history, and experiences related to nuclear waste management—to  assess his or her level of expertise and familiarity with DOE’s new plan.  Using our professional judgment, we assessed each individual’s level of  expertise and familiarity in the different issues we considered in our  analysis. Opinions of experts on a topic outside their own area of  expertise are presented as the opinions of “stakeholders.” In some cases,  the same individual might be considered an expert in one specific issue,  but a stakeholder on another issue. As our interviews progressed, we  added other entities to our list based on input from the experts and  stakeholders, stopping when we felt information had become repetitive or  when we felt no new information could be gained through additional  interviews. Once we identified the entities, we contacted individuals within  each entity and confirmed their familiarity with the issues. We interviewed  52 experts and stakeholders from 23 entities that represented national  organizations with a wide range of viewpoints and expertise on nuclear  waste management and disposal issues. The experts and stakeholders  from those entities are listed in Appendix IV. To ensure we asked  consistent questions among the identified experts and stakeholders, we  developed a standard set of questions that included broad questions  related to DOE’s plan to separately dispose of defense HLW and more  specific questions regarding certain elements of DOE’s plan. We  analyzed the interviews to identify patterns and themes which we  reported as appropriate, attributing the responses to the categories of people rather than to individuals. Our interviews with experts and  stakeholders are nongeneralizable, meaning that opinions cannot be  generalized to other experts and stakeholders, either within or across  types of expertise.
To assess what is known about the projected costs and schedule of  DOE’s new plan to site, license, and construct a defense HLW repository,  we reviewed DOE reports and documents and interviewed DOE officials  about the estimates they developed for DOE’s new plan. Regarding the  extent to which DOE presented reliable cost estimates in its March 2015  report, we compared DOE’s preliminary estimates against the best  practices in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (Cost Guide),  which has been used to evaluate cost estimates across the government.  To develop our assessment, we interviewed DOE officials and contractors  who prepared the cost estimates about their cost estimation  methodologies and the findings used to support the cost estimates in  DOE’s March 2015 report. We compared this information with the best  practices identified in the Cost Guide to determine whether the cost  estimates were (1) comprehensive, (2) accurate, (3) well documented,  and (4) credible. After a review of all source data, we assessed the extent  to which the cost estimates met these best practices by calculating the  assessment rating of each criterion within the four characteristics. After  conducting our initial analysis, we shared it with DOE officials to provide  them an opportunity to comment and identify reasons for observed  shortfalls in cost estimating best practices. We took their comments and  any additional information they provided and incorporated them to finalize  our assessment. More information about this methodology is provided in  Appendix II.
To determine the extent to which DOE developed reliable schedule  estimates, we requested information from DOE regarding the  development of time frame estimates. We evaluated this information to  determine whether the DOE-developed schedules were (1)  comprehensive, (2) well-constructed, (3) credible, and (4) controlled.  These four characteristics are identified in GAO’s Schedule Assessment  Guide (Schedule Guide), which is intended to expand on the scheduling  concepts introduced in the Cost Guide by providing best practices to help  managers and auditors ensure that the  program schedule is reliable.
To examine DOE’s efforts to site a defense HLW repository and to  examine siting challenges, if any, we interviewed DOE officials and  reviewed DOE reports on previous and current siting efforts. We reviewed  transcripts of the public meetings DOE held to solicit public input on a  consent-based siting process. DOE held nine meetings during 2016. We  attended one of those meetings and reviewed transcripts of all of them.  We also reviewed DOE’s September 2016 summary of the public input it  received. We also reviewed previous GAO reports, as well as relevant  reports on siting from other entities, such as the Blue Ribbon Commission  on America’s Nuclear Future and the National Academies of Science.  One of the questions in our standard set of questions focused on DOE’s  efforts to develop a consent-based siting process. Thus, we solicited  input from the experts and stakeholders who we interviewed for our first  objective and asked them a standard set of questions on DOE’s consent- based siting process, on the specific elements of consent-based siting  that should be included or excluded, and the associated challenges with  consent-based siting. We also reviewed DOE’s project management  orders regarding “pre-conceptual” planning activities and similar DOE  documents indicating the importance of front-end planning.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO’s Analysis of DOE’s Cost Estimates
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In a March 2015 report, the Department of Energy (DOE) provided  rough-order-of-magnitude cost estimates for (1) a separate defense high- level waste (HLW) repository and (2) a subsequent commingled  repository to manage the remaining commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF)  and DOE-managed nuclear waste. DOE had previously published these  cost estimates in October 2014. For each of these two cost estimates,  DOE provided estimates for different geological media.
section_title: Criteria GAO Used for This Analysis
paragraphs: A reliable cost estimate is critical to the success of any program. Such an  estimate provides the basis for informed investment decision making,  realistic budget formulation and program resourcing, meaningful progress  measurement, proactive course correction when warranted, and  accountability for results. As we have observed in our GAO Cost  Estimating and Assessment Guide (Cost Guide), the Office of  Management and Budget (OMB) has set the expectation that programs  will maintain current estimates of cost, and cost estimates should  encompass the full life cycle of the program. Among other things, the  Cost Guide states that the ability to generate reliable cost estimates is a  critical function necessary to support OMB’s capital programming  process. Without this capability, agencies are at risk of experiencing  program cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls.
We performed a summary analysis by combining the best practices for  sound cost estimating into four general characteristics. Our research has  identified cost estimating best practices in the GAO Cost Estimating and  Assessment Guide (Cost Guide). We conducted a summary, or  abridged, analysis by summarizing portions of the best practices because  DOE’s cost estimate were early in the acquisition life cycle. While rough order of magnitude estimates should never be considered high-quality  estimates, rough-order-of-magnitude estimates can be considered  reliable by fully or substantially meeting industry best practices. For  example, we have found that other rough order of magnitude estimates  substantially or fully met various characteristics of a reliable cost  estimate, such as cost estimates prepared by the Department of  Defense and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection within the  Department of Homeland Security. Moreover, DOE cost guidance states  that, “regardless of purpose, classification, or technique,” DOE cost  estimates should demonstrate quality sufficient for its intended use, be  complete, and follow accepted standards such as GAO’s Cost Guide.  DOE’s cost guidance also describes good cost estimates as including a  full life-cycle cost estimate, among other things. These best practices  should result in reliable and valid cost estimates that management can  use for making informed decisions. According to GAO’s Cost Guide, the  four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate are:
Comprehensive: The cost estimate should include both government  and contractor costs of the program over its full life cycle, from  inception of the program through design, development, deployment,  and operation and maintenance to retirement of the program. It should  also completely define the program, reflect the current schedule, and  be technically reasonable. Comprehensive cost estimates should be  structured in sufficient detail to ensure that cost elements are neither  omitted nor double counted. Specifically, the cost estimate should be  based on a product-oriented work breakdown structure (WBS) that  allows a program to track costs and schedule by defined deliverables,  such as hardware or software components. Finally, where information  is limited and judgments must be made, the cost estimate should  document all cost-influencing ground rules and assumptions.
Well-documented: A good cost estimate—while taking the form of a  single number—is supported by detailed documentation that  describes how it was derived and how the expected funding will be  spent in order to achieve a given objective. Therefore, the  documentation should capture in writing such things as the source  data used, the calculations performed and their results, and the  estimating methodology used to derive each WBS element’s costs.  Moreover, this information should be captured in such a way that the  data used to derive the estimate can be traced back to and verified  against their sources so that the estimate can be easily replicated and  updated. The documentation should also discuss the technical  baseline description and how the data were normalized. Finally, the  documentation should include evidence that the cost estimate was  reviewed and accepted by management.
Accurate: The cost estimate should provide for results that are  unbiased, and it should not be overly conservative or optimistic. An  estimate is accurate when it is based on an assessment of most likely  costs, adjusted properly for inflation, and contains few, if any, minor  mistakes. In addition, a cost estimate should be updated regularly to  reflect significant changes in the program—such as when schedules  or other assumptions change—and actual costs, so that it is always  reflecting current status. During the update process, variances  between planned and actual costs should be documented, explained,  and reviewed. Among other things, the estimate should be grounded  in a historical record of cost estimating and actual experiences on  other comparable programs.
Credible: The cost estimate should discuss any limitations of the  analysis because of uncertainty or biases surrounding data or  assumptions. Major assumptions should be varied and other  outcomes recomputed to determine how sensitive they are to changes  in the assumptions. Risk and uncertainty analysis should be  performed to determine the level of risk associated with the estimate.  Further, the estimate’s cost drivers should be crosschecked, and an  independent cost estimate conducted by a group outside the acquiring  organization should be developed to determine whether other  estimating methods produce similar results.
section_title: Limitations to the Analysis
paragraphs: DOE intended its rough-order-of-magnitude cost estimates to support a  legal determination and spark discussion, and not to be rigorous  milestone cost estimates, according to DOE officials. As a result, DOE’s  cost estimation documentation may not be compiled as would be  standard practice for a more rigorous cost estimate. As stated previously,  it is our practice to conduct a summary analysis in cases in which the  agency develops and provides cost estimates early in the acquisition life  cycle, such as for DOE’s rough order of magnitude estimates.
section_title: Summary of DOE’s Methods for its Rough- Order-of-Magnitude Cost Estimates
paragraphs: DOE’s March 2015 report provided rough-order-of-magnitude cost  estimates for (1) a separate defense HLW repository and (2) a  subsequent repository to dispose of commercial SNF and DOE-managed  nuclear waste (which DOE described as a “Common NWPA Repository  excluding Defense HLW”). For each of these two cost estimates, DOE  provided estimates for five different geological media (crystalline, bedded  salt, clay/shale, shale unbackfilled, and sedimentary unbackfilled). The  cost estimates provided estimates for some activity phases of the life- cycle costs for developing a geological repository (design, construction,  start-up, operations, closure, and monitoring), but other phases of the life- cycle cost, such as storage, transportation, siting, and other tasks were  excluded.
As DOE stated in its report to the President, the combined cost of two  repositories is generally greater than one. Table 5 below displays DOE’s  March 2015 cost estimates for two separate repositories. For comparison,  table 5 also shows DOE’s estimates for a single repository to dispose of  all nuclear waste.
DOE’s cost estimates indicate that developing two separate repositories  is about one-third higher than the costs to develop a single commingled  repository in a similar geology. This is partly because some costs would  be spent twice—once for each repository. However, DOE’s cost  estimates understated this cost difference because DOE omitted certain  costs from its estimates that must be spent for each separate repository.  For example, DOE omitted the costs of selecting and characterizing  separate sites, which would be in the tens of billions of dollars for each  repository, according to DOE documents and its past experiences in  developing geologic repositories at Yucca Mountain and in New Mexico. If  the nation develops separate repositories, these costs would be spent  again for each separate repository. Because DOE did not include the  costs of selecting and characterizing sites for separate repositories, DOE  understated the costs that would result from developing separate  repositories. As a result, decision-makers are unable to directly compare  DOE’s cost estimates for separate repositories with its cost estimates for  a single, commingled repository.
DOE provided GAO with supporting documentation for the cost estimates  DOE presented in its March 2015 report:
A published November 2012 DOE report (Hardin et al. 2012) provides  estimates of SNF repository costs in five different geologies (salt,  crystalline, clay/shale, shale open, sedimentary).
A draft, unpublished July 2012 DOE report (Carter et al. 2012)  provides estimates of a separate defense HLW repository in one  geology (salt).
A published January 2013 DOE report compared the cost of disposing  of current and future nuclear waste volumes with future receipts of the  nuclear waste fund.
An October 2015 spreadsheet, transmitted directly to GAO, details  how DOE officials used the reports described above to calculate the  cost estimates for both the defense HLW repository and the  subsequent repository for commercial SNF and DOE-managed  nuclear waste that it presented to the President and published in its  March 2015 report.
section_title: GAO Analysis Summary
paragraphs: Based on this analysis, we determined that DOE’s cost estimate are not  reliable. A cost estimate is considered reliable if the overall assessment  ratings for each of the four characteristics are substantially or fully met. If  any of the characteristics are not met, minimally met, or partially met, then  the cost estimate does not fully reflect the characteristics of a high-quality  estimate and cannot be considered reliable. Our review accounted for the  nuclear waste repository estimates’ early stage in the typical DOE  acquisition management system for other capital asset projects. After  reviewing documentation DOE submitted for its cost estimates,  conducting numerous interviews, and reviewing relevant sources, we  determined that the DOE’s rough-order-of-magnitude cost estimates  minimally met two of the four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate,  and partially met two of these four characteristics.
Comprehensive: Partially met. To determine whether an estimate is  comprehensive, we examine whether the cost estimate includes all  life cycle costs, including both government and contractor costs  required to develop, produce, deploy, and sustain a particular  program. In addition, we examine whether an objective review was  performed to certify that the estimate’s criteria and requirements have  been met, since they create the estimate’s framework. This step also  infuses quality assurance practices into the cost estimate. In this  effort, the reviewer checks that the estimate captures the complete  technical scope of the work to be performed, using a logical WBS that  accounts for all criteria and requirements. In addition, we examined  whether assumptions and exclusions on which the estimate is based  are clearly identified, explained, and reasonable.
Well-documented: Minimally met. To determine whether an estimate  is well-documented, we examine whether the cost estimate’s  documentation explicitly identifies the primary methods, calculations,  results, rationales or assumptions, and sources of data used to  generate each cost element. Furthermore, we assess whether the  documentation justifies all assumptions and describes each  estimating method (including any cost estimating relationships) for  every WBS element. Also, we determine whether the documentation  was detailed enough so that the derivation of each cost element can  be traced to all sources, allowing for the estimate to be easily  replicated and updated. Best practices state that documentation of  management approval demonstrates that upper management has  been made aware of the approach to the cost estimate, its risks and  uncertainties, and its strengths and limitations. Without this, agencies  cannot demonstrate that their management was made aware of these  considerations regarding the reliability of the estimates.
Accurate: Partially met. Validating that a cost estimate is accurate  requires thoroughly understanding and investigating how the cost  model was constructed. For example, we checked cost elements to  verify that calculations are accurate and account for all costs,  including indirect costs. Moreover, proper escalation factors should be  used to inflate costs so that they are expressed consistently and  accurately. Checking spreadsheet formulas, databases, or cost model  data inputs is imperative to validate cost model accuracy. Besides the  basic checks for accuracy, we reviewed the estimating technique  used for cost elements. Presenting a range of potential costs that has  a clear link to a factor of confidence helps express a degree of  uncertainty about the estimate. Using a risk and uncertainty analysis  as the basis for a range of potential costs and contingency reserves  improves decision makers’ understanding of an estimate’s accuracy.
Credible: Minimally met. To determine an estimate’s credibility, key  cost elements should be tested for sensitivity, and other cost  estimating techniques should be used to cross-check the  reasonableness of the ground rules and assumptions. It is also  important to determine how sensitive the final results are to changes  in key assumptions and parameters. A sensitivity analysis identifies  key elements that drive costs and permits what-if analyses, often used  to develop cost ranges and risk reserves.
Additional details are provided in table 6 (below).
section_title: Appendix III: Timeline of Key Events in Managing Nuclear Waste, 1983-2015 (Text for Interactive Figure 1)
paragraphs: Appendix III: Timeline of Key Events in  Managing Nuclear Waste, 1983-2015   (Text for Interactive Figure 1)
The President signed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA). The act directed,  among other things, that (1) the Department of Energy (DOE) study sites for a repository, (2)  DOE contract with industry to begin taking title to and disposing of commercial spent nuclear  fuel (SNF) in 1998; and (3) the President evaluate the capacity for the disposal of high-level  radioactive waste (HLW) resulting from atomic energy defense at one or more repositories  developed for the disposal of commercial SNF.  The Department of Energy (DOE) issued environmental assessments on nine sites  considered for a repository. Under NWPA, DOE was to assess various sites and  recommend the best sites for further study. Six sites were in the West and three were in the  South.  After conducting a Section 8(b)(1) of NWPA evaluation, President Reagan found that  there was no basis to conclude that a separate defense HLW repository was required.  DOE recommended three sites for further study for the nation’s first repository. Of the  nine sites studied, the Secretary of Energy recommended to the President three sites for  further study: Yucca Mountain, NV; Deaf Smith County, TX; and Hanford, WA.  Congress amended the NWPA to direct DOE to investigate only Yucca Mountain for a  national repository. The amendment also directed that funding for other candidate sites be  phased out. Opponents referred to this amendment as the “Screw Nevada” bill and used it  to galvanize opposition to a repository at Yucca Mountain.  DOE missed the contractual deadline called for in NWPA to begin taking title to and  disposing of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF). DOE issued a “viability assessment”  reporting that DOE still considered Yucca Mountain to be a viable repository site. However,  DOE’s inability to take custody of commercial SNF for disposal resulted in industry lawsuits  against DOE.  Congress approved Yucca Mountain as the site for a national repository. As per the  process outlined in the NWPA, DOE recommended to the President approval of the Yucca  Mountain site as a national repository; the then-President recommended the site to the  Congress. The Governor of Nevada submitted a notice of disapproval; and Congress  effectively overrode the disapproval by joint resolution.  DOE submitted a license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for  the construction of a permanent repository at Yucca Mountain. Under NWPA, the NRC  had three years—which could be extended by a year if needed—to review the license and  issue a final decision approving or disapproving the issuance of a construction authorization  for a repository at Yucca Mountain. Additional legislation would be needed to begin any  actual construction, if the NRC approved the license application.  DOE terminated its efforts to license the Yucca Mountain repository and established  the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, at the President’s  direction, to review alternatives. DOE submitted a motion to the NRC’s Atomic Safety and  Licensing Board to withdraw its license application, but the Board denied DOE’s motion.  Acting on directions from the President, DOE established the Blue Ribbon Commission and  directed that the commission conduct a comprehensive review of policies for managing  nuclear waste, including defense and commercial SNF and HLW.  NRC suspended its review of DOE’s license application for Yucca Mountain.
The Blue Ribbon Commission issued its report. The commission’s report recommended,  among other things, that DOE adopt a new consent-based adaptive approach to siting and  developing nuclear waste facilities, and that a new organization be created to implement the  waste management program. However, the commission reported that it did not have the  time or resources necessary to evaluate whether a new organization should manage  defense waste or whether defense and commercial waste should be commingled. The  commission urged the administration to review these issues.  DOE issued a new strategy based on the Blue Ribbon Commission’s  recommendations. DOE’s strategy included temporary storage of SNF at two interim  storage sites and disposal of defense and commercial HLW and SNF in a single,  commingled repository.  NRC resumed its review of the Yucca Mountain license under an order from the U.S. Court  of Appeals.  DOE issued a technical study on various options for disposal of defense HLW and  SNF. The October 2014 report evaluated three primary disposal options, which included (1)  a single commingled repository for all defense and commercial waste, (2) two repositories,  one primarily for defense waste and one primarily for commercial SNF, and (3) boreholes for  the disposal of smaller waste forms.  The President found that a separate repository for defense HLW and SNF was  required. A March 2015 report summarized the information that was provided to the  President to support the Presidential finding.  Separately, in January, the NRC generally found that DOE’s license application for Yucca  Mountain met nearly all applicable regulations. The NRC must still complete a separate  adjudicatory process which could take several more years and cost about $330 million,  according to the NRC.
section_title: Appendix IV: Experts and Stakeholders We Interviewed
paragraphs: Appendix IV: Experts and Stakeholders We  Interviewed Waste Control Specialists, LLC  New York State Energy Research and Development Authority  Eddy County, New Mexico  National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences  Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board  TA Frazier and Associates, LLC  Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment  Eddy-Lea Energy Alliance, LLC  The Council of State Governments, Midwestern Office  Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board  Institute for Energy and Environmental Research  Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board  National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners  Nuclear Energy Institute  National Conference of State Legislatures  Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board  Holtec International, Inc.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Energy
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Nathan Anderson, Assistant  Director; Kevin Bray; Mark Braza; Martin G. Campbell; Lee Carroll; Jennifer  Echard; Emile Ettedgui; Robert S. Fletcher; Cristian Ion; Katrina Pekar- Carpenter; Karen Richey; Robert Sanchez; Dan C. Royer; and Jack Wang  made key contributions to this report.