Critical Infrastructure Protection: An Implementation Strategy Could Advance DHS's Coordination of Resilience Efforts across Ports and Other Infrastructure
Published: 2012-10-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: U.S. ports are part of an economic engine handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually, and a disruption to port operations could have a widespread impact on the global economy. DHS has broad responsibility for protection and resilience of critical infrastructure. Within DHS, the Coast Guard is responsible for the maritime environment, and port safety and security, and IP works to enhance critical infrastructure resilience. Recognizing the importance of the continuity of operations in critical infrastructure sectors, DHS has taken initial steps to emphasize the concept of resilience. GAO was asked to review port resilience efforts. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS has provided a road map or plan for guiding resilience efforts, and (2) the Coast Guard and IP are working with port stakeholders and each other to enhance port resilience. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed key legislation and DHS documents and guidance. GAO conducted site visits to three ports, selected based on geography, industries, and potential threats; GAO also interviewed DHS officials and industry stakeholders. Information from site visits cannot be generalized to all ports, but provides insights.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is developing a resilience policy, but an implementation strategy is a key next step that could help strengthen DHS resilience efforts. DHS defines resilience as the ability to resist, absorb, recover from, or adapt to adversity, and some high-level documents currently promote resilience as a key national goal. Specifically, two key White House documents emphasize resilience on a national level--the 2011 Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the 2012 National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security. Since 2009, DHS has emphasized the concept of resilience and is currently in the process of developing a resilience policy, the initial steps of which have included creating two internal entities--the Resilience Integration Team and the Office of Resilience Policy (ORP). According to ORP officials, they saw a need to establish a policy that provides component agencies with a single, consistent, departmentwide understanding of resilience that clarifies and consolidates resilience concepts from high-level guiding documents, and helps components understand how their activities address DHS's proposed resilience objectives. ORP officials hope to have an approved policy in place later this year. However, DHS officials stated that currently there are no plans to develop an implementation strategy for this policy. An implementation strategy that defines goals, objectives, and activities; identifies resource needs; and lays out milestones is a key step that could help ensure that DHS components adopt the policy consistently and in a timely manner. For example, an implementation strategy with goals and objectives could provide ORP with a more complete picture of how DHS components are implementing this policy.
The Coast Guard and the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) work with stakeholders to address some aspects of critical infrastructure resilience, but they could take additional collaborative actions to promote portwide resilience. The Coast Guard is port focused and works with owners and operators of assets, such as vessels and port facilities, to assess and enhance various aspects of critical infrastructure resilience in ports--such as security protection, port recovery, and risk analysis efforts. In contrast, IP, through its Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP), conducts assessments with a broader regional focus, but is not port specific. An RRAP assessment is conducted to assess vulnerability to help improve resilience and allow for an analysis of infrastructure "clusters" and systems in various regions--for example, a regional transportation and energy corridor. The Coast Guard and IP have collaborated on some RRAP assessments, but there may be opportunities for further collaboration to conduct port-focused resilience assessments. For example, IP and the Coast Guard could collaborate to leverage existing expertise and tools--such as the RRAP approach--to develop assessments of the overall resilience of specific port areas. Having relevant agencies collaborate and leverage one another's resources to conduct joint portwide resilience assessments could further all stakeholders' understanding of interdependencies with other port partners, and help determine where to focus scarce resources to enhance resilience for port areas.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DHS develop an implementation strategy for its resilience policy and that the Coast Guard and IP identify opportunities to collaborate to leverage existing tools and resources to assess port resilience. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: U.S. ports, waterways, and vessels are part of an economic engine  handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually, according to the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and a major disruption to this  system could have a widespread impact on global shipping, international  trade, and the global economy. For example, a 2006 report by the  Congressional Budget Office estimated that a 1-week halt to all container  traffic through the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach would result in a  loss of gross domestic product of $65 million to $150 million per day.  This type of potential economic impact caused by a disruption in port  operations underscores the importance of ensuring that ports remain  operational to the maximum extent possible. Recognizing the importance  of the continuity of operations in the maritime critical infrastructure  subsector, among other sectors, DHS has begun to take steps to  emphasize the concept of resilience—defined by DHS as the ability to  resist, absorb, recover from, or successfully adapt to adversity or a  change in conditions.
DHS has broad responsibility for protection and resilience of critical  infrastructure in the United States. Within DHS, the U.S. Coast Guard is  responsible for the maritime environment and the safety and security of  ports, including recovery after an incident. The Office of Infrastructure  Protection (IP) in the National Protection and Programs Directorate  employs a number of activities designed to enhance critical infrastructure  resilience across a number of sectors. At the department level, DHS  focuses on an all-hazards approach to infrastructure protection and risk  management, as enhancing resilience is one way to increase protection  and reduce risks. Accordingly, each of the four elements of DHS’s  resilience definition broadly corresponds to some resilience-enhancing  measure. For example, resilience involves preparation before, mitigation  during, response immediately following, and recovery after an adverse  event. Another key aspect of critical infrastructure resilience relative to  ports involves understanding the interdependencies that exist between  assets and critical infrastructure sectors (e.g., energy and water)  necessary for operation of the port system as a whole. Generally, these  interdependencies span wide geographic areas that can encompass the  entire port and also extend beyond the port area.
We previously reported on DHS’s evolving efforts to emphasize the  importance of and promote resilience among critical infrastructure  stakeholders through the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)and programs and assessments used to work with asset owners and  operators.resilience into these programs and assessments were evolving.  Additionally, we found that DHS was developing or updating programs to  assess vulnerability and risk at critical infrastructure facilities and within  groups of related infrastructure, regions, and systems to place greater  emphasis on resilience. However, we also found that program  management could be strengthened. We recommended that IP develop  performance measures to assess the extent to which asset owners and  operators are taking actions to resolve resilience gaps, and also update  guidance for its Protective Security Advisors (PSA), who serve as liaisons  between DHS and security stakeholders—to include asset owners and  operators—in local communities. DHS concurred with these  recommendations and has implemented one of them by providing  resilience training to all PSAs. We also recommended that DHS assign  responsibility to one or more components to determine the feasibility of  overcoming barriers and developing an approach for disseminating  information on resilience practices to critical infrastructure owners and  operators. DHS responded that it is internally considering how it might  implement this recommendation.
We found, among other things, that efforts to incorporate  Given DHS’s increased focus on resilience since 2009, you asked us to  examine the issue of recovery and resilience in the port environment. Our  first report, issued in April 2012, focused on Coast Guard efforts to  address recovery and salvage planning. to which   This report addresses the extent
DHS has provided a road map or plan for guiding component  the Coast Guard and IP are working with port area stakeholders and  each other to enhance resilience efforts at individual ports.
GAO, Maritime Security: Coast Guard Efforts to Address Port Recovery and Salvage  Response, GAO-12-494R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2012).
To address these objectives, we reviewed key planning documents  governing DHS efforts to assess critical infrastructure resilience (e.g., the  NIPP and the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review ), a draft  policy on resilience, and an IP resilience assessment containing port- related information. We also reviewed legislation and guidance  governing Coast Guard security, recovery, and risk assessment efforts,  as well as proposed guidelines for a Coast Guard–Canadian initiative  being developed to enhance maritime port resilience. We have also  incorporated information from our recent work on various Coast Guard  and IP efforts to enhance security or resilience of critical infrastructure  assets; these reports contain more detailed information on the  methodologies used in their preparation. We compared the existing draft  policy and other documents on DHS resilience efforts (supplemented by  information gathered through interviews, discussed below) with criteria for  effective program management; specifically, our prior work on the  characteristics of effective strategies and our Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government.on federal efforts to enhance critical infrastructure resilience from the   We also reviewed third-party work  National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) and the State, Local,  Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council.
We supplemented our document reviews with interviews of officials at  relevant organizational units at DHS headquarters, including the Office of  Policy, IP, and the Coast Guard. At the field level, we conducted site visits  to meet with Coast Guard and IP officials from a sample of three Group I  (highest-risk) ports—New Orleans, Louisiana; Puget Sound, Washington;  and the Delaware Bay region to discuss various efforts to work with port  area stakeholders in enhancing port resilience. selected to represent a mix of geographic diversity; industries (e.g., cruise  ship, petroleum, and container), potential threats (earthquake, hurricane,  or terrorism), and varied Coast Guard command units. During these port  visits, we also interviewed officials from approximately four to five  different industry stakeholders (owners/operators of assets such as  container terminals or refineries, marine exchanges, port representatives,  etc.) to gather their views on Coast Guard or IP efforts to address port  resilience through assessments or stakeholder groups. In addition, we  interviewed Coast Guard and IP officials at the four remaining Group I  port areas. While the information gathered from Group I port interviews  cannot be generalized to all maritime ports, it provided important  perspective to our analysis.
To promote a regional approach to port security, DHS aggregates individual ports into  “port areas” for grant funding purposes. DHS determines the level of risk faced by U.S.  port areas and then assigns those port areas to one of three groups (Groups I, II, and III)  based on that risk, with Group I representing the highest risk. There are seven Group I  port areas in the United States—Delaware Bay (which includes Philadelphia,  Pennsylvania; Trenton, New Jersey; Wilmington, Delaware; and other ports in the region);  Houston-Galveston, Texas; Los Angeles-Long Beach, California; New Orleans, Louisiana  (which includes Baton Rouge and other ports); New York, New York, and New Jersey;  Puget Sound (which includes Seattle, Olympia, Tacoma, and other ports in Washington);  and San Francisco Bay, California (which also includes Oakland and other ports in  California). We interviewed officials from the seven Coast Guard sectors that correspond  with these Group I port areas.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2012 through October  2012, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Federal Legislation, Roles, and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Port Security
paragraphs: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 provides the basis for DHS  responsibilities in the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure. The  act assigns DHS responsibility for developing a comprehensive national  plan for securing critical infrastructure and for recommending the  measures necessary to protect the key resources and critical  infrastructure of the United States in coordination with other agencies and  in cooperation with state and local government agencies and authorities,  the private sector, and other entities. Other legislation enacted over the  last decade has produced major changes in the nation’s approach to  maritime security. Much of the federal framework for port security is  contained in the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA).  The MTSA establishes requirements for various layers of maritime  security, including requiring a national security plan, area security plans,  and facility and vessel security plans. DHS has placed some  responsibility for this and other MTSA requirements with the Coast Guard.  In October 2006, the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of  2006 (SAFE Port Act) further refined the nation’s port security framework,   For  creating and codifying certain port security programs and initiatives.example, the SAFE Port Act required the development of protocols for  resumption of trade following a transportation security incident, as well  as Salvage Response Plans.
DHS emphasizes the importance of resilience through key documents like  the NIPP, QHSR, and directives. As the lead federal agency for the  Marine Transportation System, the Coast Guard is responsible for  facilitating the recovery of the system following a significant transportation  disruption and working with maritime stakeholders in the resumption of  trade. The Coast Guard is also the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) for the  Maritime subsector of the Transportation sector and coordinates the  preparedness activities among the sector’s partners to prevent, protect  against, respond to, and recover from all hazards that could have a  debilitating effect on homeland security, public health and safety, or  economic well-being.
IP is responsible for working with public and private sector critical  infrastructure partners and leads the coordinated national effort to  mitigate risk to the nation’s critical infrastructure. IP also has the overall  responsibility for coordinating implementation of the NIPP across 18  critical infrastructure sectors; overseeing the development of 18 Sector- Specific Plans; providing training and planning guidance to SSAs and  owners and operators on protective measures to assist in enhancing the  security of critical infrastructure within their control; and helping state,  local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners develop the capabilities  to mitigate vulnerabilities and identifiable risks to their assets.
IP’s Protective Security Coordination Division provides programs and  initiatives to enhance critical infrastructure protection and resilience and  reduce risk associated with all-hazards incidents. To carry out these  responsibilities, IP has deployed PSAs in 50 states and Puerto Rico, with  deployment locations based on population density and major  concentrations of critical infrastructure. One PSA duty is to coordinate  and conduct voluntary assessment services to assist critical infrastructure  owners and operators in reviewing and strengthening their security  posture. Specifically, PSAs coordinate and carry out various IP protective  programs such as the Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection (ECIP)  initiative, which is a voluntary program focused on forming or maintaining  partnerships between DHS and critical infrastructure owners and  operators of high-priority assets and systems, as well as other assets of  significant value. The PSAs also coordinate and participate in Site  Assistance Visit vulnerability assessments to identify security gaps and  provide options for consideration to mitigate these identified gaps.
These assessments are on-site, asset-specific, nonregulatory  assessments conducted at the request of asset owners and operators.
section_title: Port Area Operations Cross Several Critical Infrastructure Sectors
paragraphs: Port operations involve a complicated system of systems, which operates  across multiple sectors. The port area consists of many assets that are  interdependent with other sectors, such as power and water, to continue  normal operations. For example, container terminals have large energy  needs to operate the cranes that load and unload cargo. In most cases,  backup generators cannot produce enough power to keep these cranes  operational, so reliable energy production and transportation are vital to  maintaining normal port operations. Similarly, refinery, chemical plant,  cruise line, ferry, and other port operations also have high energy and  water needs. In addition, many port operations rely heavily upon trucking  and rail transportation to move personnel and cargo in and out of the port  area. Furthermore, the availability of a functional labor force and  information technology support—which may be located within or outside  of a port area—is important for port stakeholders’ operations.
Similarly, many businesses and communities rely on the port for their  normal operations. Energy, food, and product shipments are vital to port  operations, port stakeholders, and the broader community. Interruptions  in the supply chain often have secondary and tertiary impacts that may  not be immediately obvious to businesses and communities. Figure 1  illustrates some of the key stakeholders within a port and the importance  of their interactions. Understanding the interdependencies among various  port area stakeholders and other critical partners outside the port area is  necessary to ensure and enhance a port’s resilience.
section_title: DHS Is Developing a Resilience Policy, but an Implementation Strategy Could Help Ensure Consistency and Accountability
subsections: section_title: High-Level Documents Promote Resilience, and DHS Has Begun to Develop a Resilience Policy
paragraphs: National high-level documents currently promote resilience as a key  national goal. Specifically, two key White House documents emphasize  resilience on a national level—Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) and  the National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security.
PPD-8 defines resilience as the ability to adapt to changing conditions  and withstand and rapidly recover from disruption due to  emergencies.
The National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security endorses  building a layered defense, addressing threats early, and fostering a  resilient system that can absorb and recover rapidly from  unanticipated disruptions.
Key federal entities, including DHS, are currently working to develop  frameworks or other strategies for implementing the goals and objectives  of these documents, which should provide greater insights into how they  plan to strengthen national resilience.
Since 2009, DHS has also emphasized the concept of resilience through  two high-level documents—the NIPP and QHSR.
The NIPP identifies resilience as a national objective for critical  infrastructure protection and defines resilience as the ability to resist,  absorb, recover from, or successfully adapt to adversity or a change  in conditions.
The QHSR identifies ensuring resilience to disaster as one of the  nation’s five homeland security missions.resilience as fostering individual, community, and system robustness,  adaptability, and capacity for rapid recovery.
According to DHS, resilience is one of the foundational elements for a  comprehensive approach to homeland security; thus, its missions and  programs designed to enhance national resilience span the department.  Accordingly, DHS is currently developing a policy to bring a cohesive  understanding of resilience to its components and establish resilience  objectives. DHS took steps to foster departmentwide resilience initiatives  by creating two internal entities—the Resilience Integration Team (RIT)  and the Office of Resilience Policy (ORP). In April 2010, DHS formed RIT  to develop new initiatives that support the overarching resilience mission  set forth in the QHSR. To date, RIT has been the key DHS-wide working group charged with developing and disseminating resilience concepts.According to agency officials, RIT brings together subject matter experts  from all components whose missions affect resilience in some manner for  monthly meetings. DHS formed ORP in March 2012 to coordinate and  promulgate resilience strategies throughout the department.
In 2010, RIT officials surveyed components about how their activities  addressed resilience in an attempt to gauge components’ understanding  of resilience, as discussed in the QHSR. According to RIT officials,  component responses showed that component resilience actions were  very diverse and represented stovepiped efforts that were still “works in  progress.” ORP officials told us that these differing approaches to  implementing and identifying resilience efforts were part of the reason  they saw a need for one DHS resilience policy. Specifically, ORP saw a  need to establish a policy that provides component agencies with a  single, consistent, departmentwide understanding of resilience; clarifies  and consolidates the concepts from the four high-level guiding documents  discussed above; and helps components understand how their activities  address DHS’s proposed resilience objectives. The policy is currently in  draft status, and ORP officials hope to have an approved policy in place  later this year.
section_title: Developing a Strategy Could Help Guide Components’ Efforts in Implementing DHS’s Resilience Policy
paragraphs: Although DHS is developing a policy to establish a departmentwide  resilience framework, DHS officials stated that they currently have no  plans to develop an implementation strategy for DHS’s resilience policy.  An implementation strategy that defines goals, objectives, and activities  could help ensure that the policy is adopted consistently and in a timely  manner by components, and that all components share common priorities  and objectives. Additionally, an implementation strategy with specific  milestones could help hold ORP and DHS components accountable for  taking actions to address resilience objectives identified in the new policy  in a timely manner. ORP officials acknowledged that an implementation  strategy could be beneficial because it could provide concrete steps for  employing DHS’s new resilience policy and harmonizing component  efforts.
In previous work, we identified key characteristics that should be included  in a strategy, as discussed below.
Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures  set clear desired results and priorities, specific milestones, and  outcome-related performance measures while giving implementing  parties flexibility to pursue and achieve those results within a  reasonable time frame.
Organizational roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms for  coordinating their efforts identify the relevant departments,  components, or offices and, where appropriate, the different sectors,  such as state, local, private, or international sectors. The strategy  would also clarify implementing organizations’ relationships in terms  of leading, supporting, and partnering.
Resources, investments, and risk management identify, among other  things, the sources and types of resources and investments  associated with the strategy, and where those resources and  investments should be targeted.
As DHS implements its resilience policy, an implementation strategy with  these characteristics could provide ORP with a clear and more complete  picture of how DHS components are implementing this policy, as well as  how the various programs and activities are helping to enhance critical  infrastructure resilience in their areas of responsibility. For example,  establishing desired results and priorities, such as departmentwide  resilience objectives, could help components better understand and  communicate how their actions and strategies fulfill those policy  objectives. It could also help ORP maintain awareness of various  component actions and how these actions align with the policy while also  helping components identify which actions are most critical to addressing  these objectives. Additionally, milestones could help to ensure that ORP  is receiving timely input from components regarding their actions to  address resilience objectives, and help ORP and components determine  whether adjustments to the policy are needed.
Furthermore, as part of the strategy, developing performance measures,  such as the number of components that have reported back on resilience  efforts, would help provide ORP with more complete information for  gauging the level of component acceptance of the policy and  understanding of how components’ actions address resilience objectives.  Moreover, identifying relevant government entities and implementing  organizations could provide components with clear expectations for  collaborating with other partners inside and outside of DHS, and reporting  this collaboration back to ORP. This step could also clearly define  departmental components responsible for promoting resilience by  identifying critical stakeholders and subject matter experts within and  outside of DHS. Moreover, clarifying relationships among components,  other government entities, and private partners could foster a greater  understanding of their dependence on one another and provide valuable  perspective for ORP. Finally, identifying the types of resources and  investments needed, and where they should be targeted, could help  provide guidance to the implementing components to manage resources  and lead them to consider where resources should be invested now and  in the future based on balancing risk reductions and costs. ORP officials  stated that they have focused initial efforts on developing the resilience  policy, and had not given consideration to developing an implementation  strategy for this policy. Going forward, we believe that focusing efforts on  developing an implementation strategy that includes the elements we  identified could benefit DHS components’ efforts to enhance resilience.
section_title: The Coast Guard and IP Have Addressed Some Aspects of Critical Infrastructure Resilience, but Could Better Coordinate to Promote Portwide Resilience
subsections: section_title: The Coast Guard Works with Stakeholders to Address Aspects of Resilience
paragraphs: The Coast Guard works with asset owners and operators to assess and  enhance various aspects of port critical infrastructure resilience—such as  security protection, port recovery, and risk analysis efforts, as described  in table 1.
In general, officials from the seven Coast Guard sectors we interviewed  and various industries at the three ports we visited cited the efforts  depicted in table 1 as helpful in addressing or raising awareness of  resilience-related issues (e.g., port security and recovery). Their views on  the value of some of these key efforts are summarized below.
AMSCs. Coast Guard officials we met with at each of the seven  sectors stated that they maintain working relationships with port  stakeholders via the AMSCs and other groups, which provide a forum  for regular communication among port stakeholders on issues related  to security and recovery—key elements of resilience. At the three  ports we visited, industry stakeholders also cited the importance of the  AMSCs in raising awareness of security or resilience issues. In  addition, our prior work has illustrated the importance of AMSCs in  facilitating information sharing at the port level. One example of  Coast Guard efforts to promote resilience at the local level through the  AMSC is occurring at Sector Delaware Bay. Coast Guard officials  there reported working with members of the local maritime exchange  to develop a guide to business continuity planning—an important  element in enhancing resilience. According to sector officials, the  guide was developed to assist smaller businesses in the port area that  lacked the capability or funds to develop a business continuity plan in- house. Delaware Bay officials reported that they have shared this  template with other Coast Guard sectors as well.
Port security exercises. Officials from six of the seven sectors and  industry officials at the three ports we visited cited the importance of  addressing recovery and resilience planning issues through various  training exercises, whether sponsored by the Coast Guard or other  entities. For example, officials in one Coast Guard sector spoke about  the importance of a training exercise focused on waterway recovery in  getting intermodal stakeholders (such as container terminal operators)  to think beyond impacts on their own facilities and consider the  resilience of the port area as a whole (e.g., how the port would meet  the needs of partners dependent on its shipping services).
PSGP. Officials at five of the seven Coast Guard sectors—as well as  industry stakeholders at the three ports we visited—cited the PSGP  as an important means of addressing risk management and resilience  issues in port areas. For example, one river pilots’ association  reported that it used PSGP funds to expand the use of a radar system  for tracking vessels and provided access to the information to the  Coast Guard, police, and other authorities. Thus, this system could  both increase portwide awareness and aid in recovery efforts  following an incident. In addition, officials at four Coast Guard sectors,  as well as industry stakeholders, pointed to the PRMP as helpful in  identifying security gaps and priorities to be addressed.
MSRAM.
Coast Guard officials have stated that, as part of the  evolution of MSRAM, it is taking preliminary steps to make MSRAM  more helpful in assessing resilience. Specifically, the agency is  considering ways to use MSRAM data and other tools to help mitigate  the criticality or risk levels of key critical infrastructure while also  improving its estimates of secondary economic impacts of an event.  According to MSRAM program officials, these efforts are in very early  stages.
section_title: IP Conducts Asset-Specific and Regional and Resilience Assessments
paragraphs: While not focused specifically on ports, IP assists critical infrastructure  owners and operators of individual assets throughout the nation in  understanding their own level of resilience through voluntary  assessments and surveys. IP also conducts assessments of regional  resilience in some areas of the country. As discussed earlier, IP employs  voluntary assessments and security surveys aimed at helping these  owners and operators identify and potentially address vulnerabilities,  among other things. In addition, IP has two key efforts designed to help  enhance resilience—its Resilience Index/Assessment Methodology and  Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP), described below.
Resilience Index/Assessment Methodology. IP has developed a  Resilience Index for its vulnerability assessments and security  surveys. This index is intended to provide the levels of resilience at  critical infrastructure, guide prioritization of resources for improving  critical infrastructure, and also provide information to  owners/operators about their facility’s standing relative to those of  similar sector assets and how they may increase resilience. IP is  also in the process of developing a new Resilience Assessment  Methodology to improve DHS’s ability to assess asset-level resilience,  inform regional resilience efforts, and measure progress in enhancing  resilience.
RRAP. These assessments are conducted to assess vulnerability to  help improve resilience and allow for an analysis of infrastructure  “clusters” and systems in various regions. This program, which uses  vulnerability assessments and surveys, along with other tools, has  included ports as a transportation hub element of a larger regional  analysis, but has not yet been applied to focus solely on a port. The  RRAP evaluates critical infrastructure on a regional level to examine  vulnerabilities, threats, and potential consequences from an all- hazards perspective to identify dependencies, interdependencies,  cascading effects, resilience characteristics, and gaps. For example,  an RRAP review could involve compiling information from reviews of  critical infrastructure assets—such as electricity providers and  transport companies—to form an overall assessment of a key  transportation and energy corridor within a state. The RRAP  assessments are conducted by DHS officials, including PSAs in  collaboration with SSAs; other federal officials; state, local, territorial,  and tribal officials; and the private sector, depending upon the sectors  and assets selected as well as a resilience subject matter expert or  experts. The results of the RRAP are to be used to enhance the  overall security posture of the assets, surrounding communities, and  the geographic region covered by the project.
According to DHS officials, the results of specific asset-level assessments  conducted as part of the RRAP are made available to asset owners and  operators and other partners (as appropriate), but the final analysis and  report are delivered to the state where the RRAP occurred. Further,  according to DHS, while it continues to perform surveys and assessments  at individual assets, prioritizing efforts to focus on regional assessments  allows DHS to continue to meet evolving threats and challenges. IP  officials also informed us that through the RRAPs, the focus of its  vulnerability assessment efforts has evolved over the years from a single- facility assessment to an approach that integrates the results of multiple  single-facility assessments to inform a regional analysis of resilience and  security through the study of dependencies and interdependencies  between and among asset operators.
IP officials stated that the Coast Guard participates in RRAPs that include  a maritime component. The officials have also informed us that the results  of Coast Guard reports and assessments are included in the Resiliency  Assessment (the RRAP final report) for RRAPs that include a maritime  component, and the information is appropriately derived to alleviate any  information-sharing concerns. IP also reports that it has done some  ECIPs/Site Assistance Visits at facilities associated with ports (e.g.,  refineries, storage facilities, and marine terminals). In addition, officials we  spoke with from four Coast Guard sectors and PSAs representing five  areas report maintaining relationships with one another through the  AMSCs or other venues to facilitate information sharing.
section_title: DHS Components Have Opportunities to Collaborate and Leverage Existing Tools to Assess Port Resilience
paragraphs: While the Coast Guard and IP have collaborated on some regional  resilience assessments, there may be opportunities for further  collaboration and use of existing tools to conduct portwide resilience  assessment efforts. For example, IP and the Coast Guard could leverage  some of the expertise and tools discussed above—such as the RRAP  approach—to develop assessments of the overall resilience of one or  more specific port areas. Currently, many of the Coast Guard’s formal  security assessments (i.e., facility security plan reviews and MSRAM) are  focused on asset-level security. For example, our prior work on MSRAM  demonstrates that this tool assesses security risks to individual assets,  not regions or systems of assets. In addition, the facility security plan  reviews are not voluntary, but are conducted to fulfill regulatory  requirements.
In contrast, IP’s RRAP allows for a broader, more systemic analysis of  resilience, and industry provides information to IP on a voluntary basis. IP  officials stated that IP has not conducted any RRAPs focused exclusively  on ports, and does not intend to, because of the Coast Guard’s role as  lead agency for ensuring port safety, recovery planning, and security, and  because IP has limited resources for conducting additional RRAPs.  However, IP has conducted RRAPs of regional corridors that have a  nexus to a port or waterside critical infrastructure assets. For example,  one recent RRAP review focused on a regional transportation and energy  corridor and discussed the critical importance of a local port in providing  fuel, medicine, and other “life-sustaining” goods throughout the state. The  report found, among other things, that the port had no emergency power- generating capability; thus, a disruption to the power grid supporting port  operations could seriously affect distribution of these life-sustaining goods  to state residents. The report recommended that the port work to  establish an agreement with another local entity to secure emergency  power supplies. This work illustrates the potential vulnerabilities—and  mitigation steps—that could be identified through a port-focused  resilience review. In addition, NIAC supports further use of RRAPs,  reporting that the RRAP is viewed in the field as a “model of  collaboration” in understanding regional and community resilience and  recommended that its use be expanded “as quickly as feasible.” ORP  officials have also stated that having Coast Guard and IP leverage  resources and collaborate on systematic portwide resilience assessments  could be beneficial.
In addition, during the course of our review, we learned of a state-led,  ongoing effort to assess portwide resilience at one port area that could  prove to be an example of beneficial collaboration that enhances the  understanding of port resilience. The New Jersey Office of Homeland  Security and Preparedness is leading an effort to develop a computer- based decision support tool that could model the impacts of various  disruptions on all critical infrastructure owners and operators within the  New York/New Jersey port area. The project team—in collaboration with  federal, state, local, and private stakeholders—is examining data from  critical facilities and prior assessments to develop decision-making tools  to model various scenarios. In addition, according to involved officials, the  model is designed to be expandable and transferrable to other ports.  Project officials stated that cooperation by critical industry stakeholders  has been a key factor in the project’s development so far. These officials  stated that they hope to develop three key tools: (1) a decision support  tool that identifies port area vulnerabilities; (2) a port recovery and  resumption-of-trade plan that helps to develop strategic issues to be  addressed; and (3) a compendium of specific recommendations in the  area of resilience, some aimed at specific facilities, some requiring  portwide cooperation to address.
Various stakeholder groups have noted that in addition to the  development of tools to enhance resilience, collaboration among partners  is also key because of the expertise that each party can contribute to a  better understanding of resilience. For example, NIAC and the State,  Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council have  reported on a general lack of understanding by state and local community  partners of the nature of interdependencies among infrastructure sectors  and across communities. Both organizations recommended that IP take a  lead role in developing tools and techniques that could help community  partners at the state and local levels identify and assess infrastructure  interdependencies.
We have reported in the past on how collaborating agencies can better  identify and address needs by leveraging one another’s’ resources to  obtain additional benefits that would not be available if they were working  separately.also states that program management should ensure there are adequate  means of communicating with, and obtaining information from, external  stakeholders that may have a significant impact on the agency achieving   Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  its goals. Thus, a collaborative effort between the Coast Guard and IP to  assess portwide resilience—leveraging tools and assessment  approaches developed by either component, which could include MSRAM  and the RRAP—could yield benefits. Specifically, the Coast Guard’s  assessments of port/maritime assets coupled with IP’s assessments of  other critical infrastructure with a port nexus could lead to a better  understanding of the interdependencies critical to keeping a port  operational. DHS officials have stated that any collaborative efforts to  assess portwide resilience must take into account the difference between  the Coast Guard’s regulatory and IP’s voluntary missions. For example,  certain information gathered by IP from industry through voluntary  assessments, surveys, or programs such as RRAP cannot be shared with  the Coast Guard (or other federal entities) for regulatory purposes, though  it can be shared for conducting other types of analyses, such as port  security reviews.structuring any such collaboration, DHS would have to protect such  information. DHS’s support for enhancing resilience is already evident in  IP’s voluntary assessments, as well as DHS’s involvement in and  endorsement of the New York/New Jersey port area project. Identifying  opportunities to leverage tools and resources to collaboratively conduct  portwide resilience assessments could enhance stakeholders’  understanding of interdependencies with other port partners, and help to  focus scarce resources to enhance resilience for the port area. This  understanding is important to maintaining port operations, thus minimizing  the potential adverse economic impact on the U.S. economy in the event  of a disruption in port operations.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DHS has taken initial steps to emphasize the concept of resilience among  its components by developing a resilience policy. This has been an  important step and is appropriately intended to provide component  agencies with a single, consistent, departmentwide understanding of  resilience. Developing an implementation strategy for this new policy is  the next key step that could help strengthen DHS’s resilience efforts. For  example, an implementation strategy that identifies goals and objectives  could help DHS components to identify, among other things, the actions  that are most critical to addressing DHS’s policy objectives. Similarly, an  implementation strategy that identifies responsible entities and their roles,  as well as specific milestones and performance measures, could provide  components with clear expectations for collaborating with other partners,  and enhance DHS’s awareness of components’ understanding and  implementation of the policy. This collective information, in turn, would  allow DHS to better assess the progress being made by its components  in addressing DHS resilience objectives.
At the port level, U.S. ports, waterways, and vessels are part of a major  economic engine, and a significant disruption to this system could have a  widespread impact on the U.S. economy, as well as global shipping,  international trade, and the global economy. Coast Guard and IP actions  have addressed some aspects of critical infrastructure resilience, but the  Coast Guard and IP could take additional action to enhance their  collaboration and use existing tools and resources to promote portwide  resilience. For example, IP and the Coast Guard could leverage existing  expertise and tools—such as IP’s RRAP approach—to develop  assessments of the overall resilience of one or more port areas. Having  relevant agencies collaborate and leverage one another’s resources to  conduct joint portwide resilience assessments could further all  stakeholders’ understanding of interdependencies with other port  partners, and better direct scarce resources to enhance port resilience.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better ensure consistent implementation of and accountability for  DHS’s resilience policy, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland  Security direct the Assistant Secretary for Policy to develop an  implementation strategy for this new policy that identifies the following  characteristics and others that may be deemed appropriate:  steps needed to achieve results, by developing priorities, milestones,  and performance measures; responsible entities, their roles compared with those of others, and  mechanisms needed for successful coordination; and sources and types of resources and investments associated with the  strategy, and where those resources and investments should be  targeted.
To allow for more efficient efforts to assess portwide resilience, the  Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Assistant Secretary of  Infrastructure Protection and the Commandant of the Coast Guard to look  for opportunities to collaborate to leverage existing tools and resources to  conduct assessments of portwide resilience. In developing this approach,  DHS should consider the use of data gathered through IP’s voluntary  assessments of port area critical infrastructure or regional RRAP  assessments—taking into consideration the need to protect information  collected voluntarily—as well as Coast Guard data gathered through its  MSRAM assessments, and other tools used by the Coast Guard.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security  for review and comment. In its written comments reprinted in appendix I,  DHS concurred with both of our recommendations.
With regard to our first recommendation, that DHS develop an  implementation plan for its forthcoming resilience policy, DHS stated that  while its RIT has worked to draft a resilience policy including findings and  policy statements from key strategic documents such as the QHSR, the  department has yet to commence developing an implementation strategy.  DHS also noted that it has undertaken a range of activities that support  resilience and that further avenues—such as an implementation  strategy—are under consideration. Developing an implementation  strategy for its resilience policy that addresses the steps needed to  achieve results; identifies entities responsible for implementing the policy,  their roles, and coordination mechanisms; and determines the resources  and investments associated with the strategy would address the intent of  our recommendation.
With regard to our second recommendation, that DHS seek opportunities  for IP and the Coast Guard to collaborate in assessing portwide  resilience, DHS stated that the two components would work with ORP in  defining their roles in contributing to port resilience. DHS also stated that  the RIT would create a subcommittee this fiscal year to provide a forum  for discussing the harmonization of resilience activities and programs  across DHS. These proposed actions appear to be positive steps in  enhancing IP and Coast Guard collaboration that would address the  intent of this recommendation.
DHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of  Homeland Security, applicable congressional committees, and other  interested parties. This report is also available at no charge on GAO’s  website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Stephen L. Caldwell, (202) 512-9610 or CaldwellS@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director,  and Adam Couvillion, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment.  Adam Anguiano, Michele Fejfar, Eric Hauswirth, Tracey King, and Jessica  Orr made significant contributions to the work.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime  Transportation Security Act. GAO-12-1009T. Washington, D.C.:  September 11, 2012.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Could Better Manage Security  Surveys and Vulnerability Assessments. GAO-12-378. Washington, D.C.:  May 31, 2012.
Maritime Security: Coast Guard Efforts to Address Port Recovery and  Salvage Response. GAO-12-494R. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2012.
Coast Guard: Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, but More Training  Could Enhance Its Use for Managing Programs and Operations.  GAO-12-14. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.
Port Security Grant Program: Risk Model, Grant Management, and  Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-12-47.  Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Has Taken Action Designed to  Identify and Address Overlaps and Gaps in Critical Infrastructure Security  Activities. GAO-11-537R. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2011.
Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port  Security. GAO-10-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Efforts to Assess and Promote  Resiliency Are Evolving but Program Management Could Be  Strengthened. GAO-10-772. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2010.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Update to National Infrastructure  Protection Plan Includes Increased Emphasis on Risk Management and  Resilience. GAO-10-296. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2010.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One  Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in  Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.:   March 28, 2007.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and  Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure.  GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing,  but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention.   GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005.