Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate Data
Published: 2010-05-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In the 8 years since a contract was awarded, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)--a tri-agency program managed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)--has experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and ineffective interagency management. The launch date for a demonstration satellite has been delayed by over 5 years and the cost estimate for the program has more than doubled--to about $15 billion. In February 2010, a Presidential task force decided to disband NPOESS and, instead, have the agencies undertake separate acquisitions. GAO was asked to (1) assess efforts to establish separate satellite programs; (2) evaluate the status and risks of the NPOESS components still under development; and (3) evaluate the implications of using the demonstration satellite's data operationally. To do so, GAO analyzed program management and cost data, attended program reviews, and interviewed agency officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: NOAA and DOD have begun planning to transition the NPOESS program to separate acquisitions, but neither has finalized its plans. NOAA has developed preliminary plans for its new program--called the Joint Polar Satellite Program--to meet the requirements of the afternoon NPOESS orbit. DOD expects to make decisions on the spacecraft and sensors by June and October 2010, respectively. Because neither agency has completed its plans, the impact of the decision to disband the program on expected costs, schedules, and promised capabilities has not been fully determined. Moving forward, the agencies face key risks in transitioning from NPOESS to their separate programs. These risks include the loss of key staff and capabilities, delays in negotiating contract changes and establishing new program offices, the loss of support for the other agency's requirements, and insufficient oversight of new program management. Until these risks are effectively mitigated, it is likely that the satellite programs' costs will continue to grow and launch dates will continue to be delayed, which could lead to gaps in the continuity of critical satellite data. While NOAA and DOD are establishing plans for their separate acquisitions, the development of key components of the NPOESS program is continuing. In recent months, a critical imaging sensor has been completed and integrated onto the spacecraft of a demonstration satellite, called the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP). In addition, the program continues to work on components of the first and second NPOESS satellites, which are to be transferred to NOAA and DOD to become part of their respective follow-on programs. However, the expected launch date of the NPP satellite has been delayed by 9 months due to technical issues in the development of a key sensor. Further, the program is slowing down and may need to stop work on key components because of potential contract liabilities and funding constraints, but has not developed a prioritized list on what to stop first. This may further delay NPP and the components of the first NOAA and DOD satellites under their new programs. Because the NPP demonstration satellite was designed as a risk-reduction mission, not as an operational asset, it has several limitations. These limitations include fewer ground-based data processing systems, fewer security controls, and a shorter satellite lifespan than exist for current or planned operational satellites. These design limitations mean that, in some cases, NPP's data will not be as timely, useful, and secure as other polar satellites and that there is a risk of a gap in the nation's climate and weather services should NPP fail before the next satellite is launched. Agency officials acknowledge these limitations and are assessing options to make NPP data more timely and secure.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is making recommendations to NOAA and DOD to address key risks in transitioning to their respective new programs. Both agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations and identified plans for addressing them. GAO is making recommendations to NOAA and DOD to address key risks in transitioning to their respective new programs. Both agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations and identified plans for addressing them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System  (NPOESS) program was planned to be a state-of-the-art, environment- monitoring satellite system that would replace two existing polar-orbiting  environmental satellite systems. Managed jointly by the Department of  Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),  the Department of Defense (DOD)/U.S. Air Force, and the National  Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the program was  considered critical to the nation’s ability to maintain the continuity of data  required for weather forecasting (including severe weather events such as  hurricanes) and global climate monitoring through the year 2026.
However, in the 8 years since the NPOESS contract was awarded, the cost  estimate has more than doubled—to about $15 billion, launch dates have  been delayed by over 5 years, significant functionality has been removed  from the program, and the program’s tri-agency management structure has  been ineffective. Importantly, delays in launching the satellites put the  program’s mission at risk. To address these challenges, a task force led by  the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)  reviewed the management and governance of the NPOESS program. In  February 2010, the OSTP Director announced his decision to disband the  NPOESS acquisition and, instead, to have NOAA and DOD undertake  separate acquisitions, with NOAA responsible for satellites in the  afternoon orbit and DOD responsible for satellites in the early-morning  orbit. While NOAA and DOD begin the transition to separate acquisitions,  the development of key components of the NPOESS program is  continuing—including the development of sensors and ground systems  supporting a demonstration satellite called the NPOESS Preparatory  Project (NPP).
This report responds to your request that we (1) assess efforts to plan for  separate satellite acquisitions, (2) evaluate the status and risks of the key  NPOESS components still under development, and (3) evaluate the  implications of using the demonstration satellite’s data operationally. To  assess efforts to plan for separate satellite acquisitions, we reviewed the  task force’s decision to disband the NPOESS program and NOAA’s  preliminary plans for a replacement satellite program, and we interviewed  OSTP, NOAA, and DOD officials. To evaluate the status and risks of key  program components, we reviewed program documentation including  status briefings, monthly program management documents, and cost  reports. To evaluate plans for and implications of using the demonstration  satellite’s data operationally, we compared the agencies’ plans for using  NPP data to the plans for using NPOESS data and interviewed relevant  NOAA, NASA, and DOD officials. In addition, this report builds on work  we have done on environmental satellites over the last several years.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 to May 2010 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our objectives, scope,  and methodology are provided in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate operational  polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-orbiting  Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, which is managed by  NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), which  is managed by the Air Force. These satellites obtain environmental data  that are processed to provide graphical weather images and specialized  weather products. These satellite data are also the predominant input to  numerical weather prediction models, which are a primary tool for  forecasting weather days in advance—including forecasting the path and  intensity of hurricanes. The weather products and models are used to  predict the potential impact of severe weather so that communities and  emergency managers can help prevent and mitigate its effects. Polar  satellites also provide data used to monitor environmental phenomena,  such as ozone depletion and drought conditions, as well as data sets that  are used by researchers for a variety of studies such as climate monitoring.
Unlike geostationary satellites, which maintain a fixed position relative to  the earth, polar-orbiting satellites constantly circle the earth in an almost  north-south orbit, providing global coverage of conditions that affect the  weather and climate. Each satellite makes about 14 orbits a day. As the  earth rotates beneath it, each satellite views the entire earth’s surface  twice a day. Currently, there is one operational POES satellite and two  operational DMSP satellites that are positioned so that they cross the  equator in the early morning, midmorning, and early afternoon. In  addition, the government is also relying on a European satellite, called the  Meteorological Operational (MetOp) satellite. Together, they ensure that,  for any region of the earth, the data provided to users are generally no  more than 6 hours old. Besides the four operational satellites, six older  satellites are in orbit that still collect some data and are available to  provide limited backup to the operational satellites should they degrade or  fail. The last POES satellite was launched in February 2009 and declared  operational in early June 2009. The Air Force plans to launch its two  remaining DMSP satellites as needed. Figure 1 illustrates the current  ustrates the current  operational polar satellite configuration.  operational polar satellite configuration.
subsections: section_title: Polar Satellite Data and Products
paragraphs: Polar satellites gather a broad range of data that are transformed into a  variety of products. Satellite sensors observe different bands of radiation  wavelengths, called channels, which are used for remotely determining  information about the earth’s atmosphere, land surface, oceans, and the  space environment. When first received, satellite data are considered raw  data. To make them usable, processing centers format the data so that  they are time-sequenced and include earth location and calibration  information. After formatting, these data are called raw data records. The  centers further process these raw data records into channel-specific data  sets, called sensor data records and temperature data records. These data  records are then used to derive weather and climate products called  environmental data records. These environmental data records include a  wide range of atmospheric products detailing cloud coverage,  temperature, humidity, and ozone distribution; land surface products  showing snow cover, vegetation, and land use; ocean products depicting  sea surface temperatures, sea ice, and wave height; and characterizations  of the space environment. Combinations of these data records (raw,  sensor, temperature, and environmental data records) are also used to  derive more sophisticated products, including outputs from numerical  weather models and assessments of climate trends. Figure 2 is a simplified  depiction of the various stages of satellite data processing, and figure 3  depicts examples of two different weather products.
section_title: NPOESS Overview: Inception, Management Structure, and Acquisition Strategy
paragraphs: With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would  reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994  Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the  two satellite programs into a single satellite program capable of satisfying  both civilian and military requirements. The converged program,  NPOESS, was considered critical to the nation’s ability to maintain the  continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global climate  monitoring.
To manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency  Integrated Program Office. Within the program office, each agency has the  lead on certain activities: NOAA has overall program management  responsibility for the converged system and for satellite operations; the Air  Force has the lead on the acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility  for facilitating the development and incorporation of new technologies  into the converged system. NOAA and DOD share the cost of funding  NPOESS, while NASA funds specific technology projects and studies. In  addition, an Executive Committee—made up of the administrators of  NOAA and NASA and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics—is responsible for providing policy guidance,  ensuring agency support and funding, and exercising oversight authority.  Figure 4 depicts the organizations that make up the NPOESS program  office and lists their responsibilities.
NPOESS is a major system acquisition that was originally estimated to  cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program from its  inception in 1995 through 2018. The program includes satellite  development, satellite launch and operation, and ground-based satellite  data processing. When the NPOESS engineering, manufacturing, and  development contract was awarded in August 2002, the cost estimate was  adjusted to $7 billion.
Acquisition plans called for the procurement and launch of six satellites  over the life of the program, as well as the integration of 13 instruments— consisting of 10 environmental sensors and 3 subsystems. Together, the  sensors were to receive and transmit data on atmospheric, cloud cover,  environmental, climatic, oceanographic, and solar-geophysical  observations. The subsystems were to support non-environmental search  and rescue efforts, system survivability, and environmental data collection  activities.
In addition, a demonstration satellite, called the NPOESS Preparatory  Project (NPP), was planned to be launched several years before the first  NPOESS satellite in order to reduce the risk associated with launching  new sensor technologies and ensure continuity of climate data with  NASA’s Earth Observing System satellites. NPP is a joint mission between  the NPOESS program office and NASA. NPP was to host four NPOESS  sensors and provide the program office and the processing centers an  early opportunity to work with the sensors, ground control, and data  processing systems.
When the NPOESS development contract was awarded in 2002, the  schedule for launching the satellites was driven by a requirement that the  NPOESS satellites be available to back up the final POES and DMSP  satellites should anything go wrong during the planned launches of these  satellites. Early program milestones included (1) launching NPP by May  2006, (2) having the first NPOESS satellite available to back up the final  POES satellite launch then planned for March 2008, and (3) having the  second NPOESS satellite available to back up the final DMSP satellite  launch then planned for October 2009. If the NPOESS satellites were not  needed to back up the final predecessor satellites, their anticipated launch  dates would have been April 2009 and June 2011, respectively.
section_title: Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and Technical Problems Led to a Decision to Restructure NPOESS in 2006
paragraphs: Over several years, we reported that NPOESS had experienced continued  cost increases, schedule delays, and serious technical problems. By  November 2005, we estimated that the cost of the program had grown  from $7 billion to over $10 billion. In addition, the program was  experiencing major technical problems with a critical imaging sensor that  were expected to delay the launch date of the first satellite by almost 2  years. These issues ultimately required difficult decisions to be made  about the program’s direction and capabilities.
The Nunn-McCurdy law requires DOD to take specific actions when a  major defense acquisition program’s cost growth exceeds certain  thresholds. Where applicable, the law requires the Secretary of Defense to  certify the program to Congress when it is expected to overrun its current  baseline by 25 percent or more. In November 2005, NPOESS breached the  25 percent threshold, and DOD was required to certify the program for it  to continue. The requirements for certifying a program, as relevant here,  involved a determination that (1) the program is essential to national  security, (2) there are no alternatives to the program that will provide  equal or greater military capability at less cost, (3) the new estimates of  the program’s cost are reasonable, and (4) the management structure for  the program is adequate to manage and control costs. DOD established tri- agency teams—made up of DOD, NOAA, and NASA experts—to work on  each of the four elements of the certification process.
In June 2006, DOD (with the agreement of both of its partner agencies)  certified a restructured NPOESS program, estimated to cost $12.5 billion  through 2024—an increase of $4 billion more than the prior life-cycle cost  estimate. This restructuring decision delayed the launch of NPP and the  first two satellites (called C1 and C2) by roughly 3 to 5 years—a deviation  from the requirement to have NPOESS satellites available to back up the  final POES and DMSP satellites should anything go wrong during those  launches. The restructured program also reduced the number of satellites  to be produced by relying on European satellites for the midmorning orbit  and planning to use NPOESS satellites in the early-morning and afternoon  orbits. In addition, in order to reduce program complexity, the Nunn- McCurdy certification decision decreased the number of NPOESS  instruments from 13 to 9 and reduced the functionality of 4 sensors. Table  1 summarizes the major program changes made by the Nunn-McCurdy  certification decision and table 2 describes the sensors that were planned  for NPP and NPOESS after the Nunn-McCurdy certification.
The changes in NPOESS sensors affected the number and quality of the  resulting weather and environmental products. In selecting sensors for the  restructured program during the Nunn-McCurdy process, decision makers  placed the highest priority on continuing current operational weather  capabilities and a lower priority on obtaining selected environmental and  climate measuring capabilities. As a result, the revised NPOESS system  had significantly less capability for providing global climate, ocean, and  space environment measures than was originally planned. Specifically, the  number of environmental data records was decreased from 55 to 39, of  which 6 were of a reduced quality. The 39 data records that remain include  cloud base height, land surface temperature, precipitation type and rate,  and sea surface winds. The 16 data records that were removed include  cloud particle size and distribution, sea surface height, net solar radiation  at the top of the atmosphere, and products to depict the electric fields in  the space environment. The six data records that are of a reduced quality  include ozone profile, soil moisture, and multiple products depicting  energy in the space environment.
After the 2006 Nunn-McCurdy decision, the NPOESS Executive Committee  decided to add selected sensors back to individual satellites in order to  address concerns from the climate community about the loss of key  climate data. In January 2008, the Committee approved plans to include  the Clouds and the Earth’s Radiant Energy System sensor on the NPP  satellite. In addition, in May 2008, the Committee approved plans to  include a Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor on the C1 satellite.  Table 3 shows which sensors were planned for NPP and the four satellites  of the NPOESS program, called C1, C2, C3, and C4, as of May 2008.  Program officials acknowledged that these configurations could change if  other parties decide to develop the sensors that were canceled.
section_title: NPOESS Continued to Experience Management Challenges, Cost Overruns, and Schedule Delays after the 2006 Restructuring
paragraphs: After the program was restructured, the NPOESS program continued to  experience cost growth, schedule delays, and management challenges. In  April 2007, we reported that DOD’s plans to reassign the Program  Executive Officer would unnecessarily increase risks to an already risky  program. We also reported that, while the program office had made  progress in restructuring NPOESS after the June 2006 Nunn-McCurdy  certification decision, important tasks leading up to finalizing contract  changes remained to be completed. Specifically, executive approval of key  acquisition documents was about 6 months late at that time—due in part  to the complexity of navigating three agencies’ approval processes. To  address these issues, we recommended that DOD delay the reassignment  of the Program Executive Officer until all sensors were delivered to NPP,  and that the appropriate agency executives finalize key acquisition  documents by the end of April 2007.
In May 2008, we reported that DOD had reassigned the Program Executive  Officer and that key acquisition documents were more than a year late. We  reiterated our prior recommendation that the agencies immediately  complete the acquisition documents. In addition, we reported that poor  workmanship and testing delays caused an 8-month slip to the expected  delivery date of the Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS)  sensor. This late delivery caused a corresponding delay in the expected  launch date of the NPP demonstration satellite, moving it to June 2010.
In June 2008, we also reported that the program’s life-cycle costs,  estimated at $12.5 billion, were expected to rise by approximately $1  billion because of problems experienced in the development of the VIIRS  and Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS) sensors, the need to revise  outdated operations and support cost estimates, and the need to modify  information security requirements on ground systems. Program officials  subsequently modified their life-cycle cost estimate in December 2008 to  $13.95 billion, which included about $1.15 billion for revised pre- and post- launch operations and support costs and about $300 million to address  development issues. The revised cost estimate did not include funds to  modify information security requirements.
In June 2009, we added to our previous concerns about the tri-agency  oversight of the NPOESS program. Specifically, we reported that the  Executive Committee was ineffective because the DOD acquisition executive  did not attend committee meetings; the committee did not track its action  items to closure; and many of the committee’s decisions did not achieve  desired outcomes. We also reported that the life-cycle cost estimate of $13.95  billion was expected to rise by another $1 billion, and the schedules for NPP  and the first two NPOESS satellites were expected to be delayed by 7, 14, and  5 months, respectively. (See table 4 for the history of cost and schedule  estimates for the program.) We recommended that the DOD Executive  Committee member attend and participate in Executive Committee meetings,  and that the Executive Committee better track and manage risk and action  items. Additionally, we recommended that the program develop plans to  mitigate the risk of gaps in satellite continuity and establish a realistic time  frame for revising the program’s cost and schedule baselines.
To address risks and challenges, the NPOESS Executive Committee  sponsored a series of reviews of the program. Two of the reviews,  conducted in 2007 and 2008, examined the feasibility of alternative  management strategies. Both of these reviews recommended against  changing the prime contractor and made recommendations to improve  other aspects of program management—including the government’s  executive and program management and the contractor’s management. In  the fall of 2008, an independent review team assessed the program and  delivered its final report in June 2009. Among other things, the  independent review team found that the program had a low probability of  success, the continuity of data was at risk, and the priorities of DOD and  NOAA were not aligned. The team recommended using NPP data  operationally to mitigate potential gaps in coverage, co-locating the  program at an acquisition center, and involving the White House to resolve  priority differences. In March 2009, in response to a draft of the review  team’s report, the NPOESS Executive Committee decided to use NPP data  operationally.
section_title: Executive Office Review Led to a Decision to Disband the NPOESS Program
paragraphs: In August 2009, the Executive Office of the President formed a task force,  led by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), to investigate  the management and acquisition options that would improve the NPOESS  program. Specifically, the task force sought to identify a governance  structure that would address the problems in schedule and budget, and the  risk of a loss of satellite data due to delays in launching the satellites. In  performing its review, the task force worked with NOAA, DOD, and NASA  representatives and attended Executive Committee meetings.
In February 2010, the Director of OSTP announced that NOAA and DOD  will no longer jointly procure the NPOESS satellite system; instead, each  agency would plan and acquire its own satellite system. Specifically,  NOAA is to be responsible for the afternoon orbit and the observations  planned for the first and third NPOESS satellites. DOD is to be responsible  for the morning orbit and the observations planned for the second and  fourth NPOESS satellites. The partnership with the European satellite  agencies for the midmorning orbit is to continue as planned. In addition,  the task force explained that partnerships between DOD, NOAA, and  NASA should continue and encouraged the agencies to continue joint  efforts in the areas that have been successful in the past, such as the  command and control of the satellites. Moving forward, while NOAA and  DOD develop plans for separate acquisitions, the development of key  components of the NPOESS program is continuing. Specifically, the  program is continuing to develop the instruments and ground systems  supporting NPP and selected components of the first two NPOESS  satellites, which will likely be needed by the NOAA and DOD follow-on  programs.
section_title: Agencies Have Begun Planning for Separate Acquisitions, but the Impact of This New Approach Is Not Fully Known and Key Transition Risks Exist
paragraphs: NOAA and DOD have begun planning to transition the NPOESS program  to separate acquisitions, but the agencies are at different stages in  planning and neither has finalized its plans. NOAA has developed  preliminary plans for a new program to fulfill the requirements of the  afternoon NPOESS orbit. DOD has just begun planning how it will meet  the requirements of the morning orbit, and expects to have initial  decisions on how it will proceed in acquiring the spacecraft and sensors  by June 2010 and October 2010, respectively. Because neither agency has  completed its plans, the impact of the decision to disband the program on  expected costs, schedules, and promised capabilities has not yet been fully  determined. However, it is likely that the decision will further delay the  first satellite’s launch schedule, add to the overall cost, and remove  selected capabilities. Moving forward, the agencies face key risks in  transitioning from NPOESS to two separate programs. These risks include  the loss of key staff and capabilities, added delays in negotiating contract  changes and establishing new program offices, the loss of support for the  other agency’s requirements, and insufficient oversight of new program  management. Until these risks are effectively mitigated, it is likely that the  satellite programs’ costs will continue to grow and launch dates will  continue to be delayed. Further delays are likely to jeopardize the  availability and continuity of weather and climate data.
subsections: section_title: NOAA and DOD Have Begun Planning for Their Separate Acquisitions, but the Impact on Cost, Schedule, and Capabilities Is Not Fully Known
paragraphs: NOAA and DOD have begun planning to transition the NPOESS program  to separate acquisitions, but the two agencies are at different stages in  planning. NOAA has developed preliminary plans for its new satellite  acquisition program—called the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS).  Specifically, NOAA developed plans for two satellites to fly in the  afternoon orbit. NOAA plans to have the first JPSS satellite, formerly  NPOESS C1, available for launch in 2015, and the second JPSS satellite,  formerly NPOESS C3, available for launch in 2018. NOAA will also  provide the ground systems for both the JPSS and DOD programs. Current  plans estimate that the life-cycle cost of the JPSS program will be  approximately $11.9 billion, which includes $2.9 billion in NOAA funds  spent on NPOESS through fiscal year 2010.
NOAA is also considering technical changes to the program that involve  the size of the spacecraft and the sensors to be included on each of the  satellites. Specifically, NOAA is considering using a smaller spacecraft  than the one planned for NPOESS. NOAA is also considering removing  sensors that were planned for the NPOESS C1 and C3 satellites and  obtaining those data from other sources, including international  satellites. Table 5 includes preliminary plans for which sensors will be  accommodated on the JPSS satellites.
The management of the JPSS satellites will also change from that of the  NPOESS satellites. NOAA plans to transfer the management of acquisition  from the NPOESS program office to NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center,  so that it can be co-located at a space system acquisition center as  advocated by the NPOESS independent review team. According to NOAA  officials, the agency will provide direction, requirements, and budget to  NASA. NOAA will also provide staff, including a program director and  program scientist. A NASA employee will function as program manager. In  addition, NOAA has developed a team to lead the transition from NPOESS  to JPSS and has included representatives from NOAA, NASA, and DOD.  Because this team has just been formed, they have not yet fully developed  plans to guide the transition. NOAA officials plan to begin transitioning in  July, and complete the transition plan—including cost and schedule  estimates—by the end of September.
DOD is at an earlier stage in its planning process, in part because it has  more time before the first satellite in the morning orbit is needed. DOD  officials are currently reviewing requirements for the morning orbit and  plan to define how to proceed by the end of June 2010. After this review is  completed, DOD plans to analyze alternatives for meeting the  requirements and to develop a plan for the chosen alternative. DOD  anticipates making a decision on whether to use the NPOESS spacecraft  by June 2010 and to make a decision on which sensors it will include— including the Space Environment Monitor and the Microwave  Imager/Sounder—by October 2010. DOD acquisition officials expect to  begin the program in fiscal year 2013.
Table 6 compares key attributes of the NPOESS program when it was  restructured in 2006 to the NPOESS program at the time of the task force  decision in 2010 and to preliminary plans for the separate NOAA and DOD  acquisitions.
Because neither agency has finalized plans for its acquisition, the full  impact of the task force decision on the expected cost, schedule, and  capabilities is unknown. However, it appears likely that the combined cost  of the separate acquisitions could be higher than the last NPOESS  estimate, the schedule for the first satellite’s launch will be later than the  last NPOESS estimate, and selected capabilities will be removed from the  program.
Cost: NOAA anticipates that the JPSS program will cost approximately  $11.9 billion to complete through 2024. Although this estimated cost is  less than the baselined cost of the NPOESS program, DOD will still need to  fund and develop satellites to meet the requirements for the early morning  orbit. DOD’s initial estimates are for its new program to cost almost $5  billion through fiscal year 2015. Thus, it is likely that the cost of the two  acquisitions will exceed the baselined life-cycle cost of the NPOESS  program.
Schedule: Neither NOAA nor DOD have finalized plans that show the full  impact of the restructuring on the schedule for satellite development. We  have previously reported that restructuring a program like NPOESS could  take significant time to accomplish, due in part to the time taken revising,  renegotiating, or developing important acquisition documents, including  contracts and interagency agreements. With important decisions and  negotiations still pending, it is likely that the expected launch date of the  first JPSS satellite will be delayed.
Capabilities: Neither agency has made final decisions on the full set of  sensors—or which satellites will accommodate them—for their respective  satellite programs. Until those decisions are made, it will not be possible  to determine the capabilities that these satellites will and will not provide.
Timely decisions on cost, schedule, and capabilities would allow both  acquisitions to move forward and satellite data users to start planning for  any data shortfalls they may experience. Until DOD and NOAA finalize  their plans, it is not clear whether the new acquisitions will meet the  requirements of both civilian and military users.
section_title: NOAA and DOD Face Key Transition Risks That Threaten Satellite Continuity
paragraphs: Moving forward, the agencies face key risks in transitioning from NPOESS  to their new programs. These risks include the loss of key staff and  capabilities, delays resulting from negotiating contract changes and  establishing new program offices, the loss of support for both agencies’  requirements, and insufficient oversight of new program management.
Loss of key staff and capabilities—The NPOESS program office is  composed of NOAA, NASA, Air Force, and contractor staff with  knowledge and experience in spacecraft procurement and integration,  ground systems, sensors, data products, systems engineering, budgeting,  and cost analysis. These individuals have knowledge and experience in the  status, risks, and lessons learned from the NPOESS program. This  knowledge will be critical to moving the program forward both during and  after the transition period. However, program office staff have already  begun leaving—or looking for other employment—due to the uncertainties  about the future of the program office. Unless NOAA is proactive in  retaining these staff, the new program may waste valuable time if staff  must relearn program details and may repeat mistakes made and lose  lessons learned by prior program staff.
Delays in negotiating contract changes and establishing new  programs—We have previously reported that restructuring a program like  NPOESS could take significant time to accomplish, due in part to the time  taken revising, renegotiating, or developing important acquisition  documents, including contracts and interagency agreements. According  to NOAA officials, the plan for JPSS may require negotiations with  contractors and between contractors and their subcontractors. In  addition, both NOAA and DOD will need to establish and fully staff  program offices to facilitate and manage the transition and new programs.  However, these contract and program changes have not yet occurred and  it is not clear when they will occur. These changes could take significant  time to complete. Meanwhile, the NPOESS program office continues to  support—and fund—development activities that may not be used in the  new programs, because neither NOAA nor DOD have made key decisions  on the technologies, such as the spacecraft and sensors, that will be  included on the new programs. Until decisions are made on how the  program is to proceed with contract changes and terminations, the  contractors and program office cannot implement the chosen solution and  some decisions, such as the ability to hold schedule slips to a minimum,  could become much more difficult.
Failure to support the other agency’s requirements—As a joint program,  NPOESS was expected to fulfill many military, civilian, and research  requirements for environmental data. The task force decision to  restructure NPOESS noted that decisions on future satellite programs  should ensure the continuity of critical satellite data. However, because  the requirements of NOAA and DOD are different, the agencies may  develop programs that meet their own needs but not the other’s. DOD,  NOAA, and NASA will still need to work together to ensure that  requirements are known, agreed upon, and managed, and that changes in  their respective program’s capabilities do not degrade the continuity  requirements. For example, NOAA officials reported that they do not plan  to include the Microwave Imager/Sounder in their follow-on program and  will instead procure data from a different sensor on an international  satellite. However, it is not clear that NOAA’s plans will meet the needs of  all of DOD’s users, including the Navy and Army. Similarly, it is not clear  that DOD will continue to support the climate community’s requirements  for highly calibrated and accurate measurements. If the agencies cannot  find a way to build a partnership that facilitates both efficient and effective  decision-making on data continuity needs, the data continuity needs of  both agencies may not be adequately incorporated into the new programs.
Insufficient oversight of new program management—Under its new  JPSS program, NOAA plans to transfer parts of the NPOESS program to  NASA, but it has not yet defined how it will oversee NASA’s efforts.  Transferring the program to NASA will not necessarily resolve existing  cost, schedule, and subcontractor management issues. We recently  reported that the acquisition challenges faced in major NASA acquisitions  are similar to the ones faced by DOD acquisitions, including NPOESS.  Specifically, we reported that NASA has consistently underestimated time  and cost and has not adequately managed risk factors such as contractor  performance. Because of these issues, we listed NASA’s acquisition  management as a high-risk area in 1990, and it remains a high-risk area  today. In addition, our work on the GOES I-M satellite series found that  NOAA did not have the ability to make quick decisions on problems  because portions of the procurement were managed by NASA.
Specifically, this management approach limited NOAA’s insight and  management involvement in the procurement of major elements of the  system. NOAA officials reported that they are developing a management  control plan with NASA and intend to perform an independent review of  this plan when it is completed. They could not provide a time frame for its  completion. Without strong NOAA oversight of NASA’s management of  program components, JPSS may continue to face the same cost, schedule,  and contract management challenges as the NPOESS program.
While NOAA, NASA, and DOD acknowledge that there are risks associated  with the transition to new programs, they have not yet established plans to  mitigate these risks. Until these risks are effectively mitigated, it is likely  that the satellite programs’ costs will continue to grow and launch dates  will continue to be delayed. Further launch delays are likely to jeopardize  the availability and continuity of weather and climate data. For example,  the POES satellite currently in the afternoon orbit is expected to reach the  end of its lifespan at the end of 2012. If NPP is delayed, there could be a  gap in polar satellite observations in the afternoon orbit. Similarly, a delay  in the launch of the first JPSS satellite may lead to a gap in satellite data  after NPP reaches the end of its lifespan.
Data continuity gaps pose different implications for DOD and NOAA. For  both agencies, a loss of satellite data represents a reduction in weather  forecasting capabilities. Within the military, satellite data and products  allow military planners and tactical users to focus on anticipating and  exploiting atmospheric and space environmental conditions. For example,  accurate wind and temperature forecasts are critical to any decision to  launch an aircraft that will need mid-flight refueling. For NOAA, satellite  data and products are provided to weather forecasters for use in issuing  weather forecasts and warnings to the public and to support our nation’s  aviation, agriculture, and maritime communities. NOAA also faces risks in  losing longer-term climate observations. Maintaining the continuity of  climate and space data over decades is important to identify long-term  environmental cycles (such as the 11-year solar cycle and multiyear ocean  cycles, including the El Niño effect) and their impacts, and to detect trends  in global warming. Figure 5 shows the current and planned satellites and  highlights gaps where the constellation is at risk.
section_title: NPOESS Development Continues, but Demonstration Satellite Has Been Delayed and New Challenges Threaten Further Delays
paragraphs: While NOAA and DOD are establishing plans for separate acquisitions, the  development of key NPOESS components is continuing. In recent months,  the critical VIIRS sensor has been completed and integrated onto the NPP  spacecraft. In addition, the program continues to work on components of  the first and second NPOESS satellites, including sensors and ground  systems. These components may be transferred to NOAA and DOD to  become part of their respective follow-on programs. However, the  expected launch date of the NPP satellite has been delayed by 9 months  due to technical issues in the development of a key sensor, and the  development of the VIIRS sensor for the first NPOESS satellite is  experiencing cost overruns. In addition, the program is slowing down and  may stop work on key components in order to address potential contract  liabilities and funding constraints. This would further delay the launches  of the NPP satellite and the first NOAA and DOD satellites under their new  programs.
subsections: section_title: NPOESS Components Making Progress, but Technical Issues Have Delayed NPP Launch
paragraphs: In recent months, selected components of the NPOESS program have  made progress. Specifically, the program completed the development of  the critical VIIRS sensor and delivered it to NASA for integration onto the  NPP satellite. Four of the five sensors intended for NPP are now on the  spacecraft. In addition, the program has continued to develop key sensors  intended for the first NPOESS satellite (VIIRS, CrIS, OMPS, and the  Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder sensors), and a key sensor for  the second NPOESS satellite (the Microwave Imager/Sounder). These  components may be transferred to NOAA and DOD to become part of their  respective follow-on programs.
However, the program experienced technical issues on the Cross-track  Infrared Sounder (CrIS) sensor intended for the NPP satellite. Specifically,  in January 2009 after the CrIS sensor completed its thermal vacuum tests,  an anomaly was discovered on a circuit card that then led to the discovery  of unrelated design flaws on two additional circuit cards. During final  testing of new parts in August 2009, components intended for CrIS were  damaged after the subcontractor failed to adhere to proper test processes.  After investigating the problem and possible solutions for several months,  the program decided to replace damaged parts and send the instrument  through a limited thermal vacuum test. In total, this testing error resulted  in an 11-month delay in the delivery of CrIS and a 9-month delay to the  NPP satellite launch date (bringing it to September 2011, at the earliest). In  addition, the program continues to face technical challenges and cost  overruns in developing the VIIRS sensor for the first NPOESS satellite.  Details on the status of key components for NPP and the first two  NPOESS satellites are provided in table 7.
section_title: New Challenges Threaten Further Delays
paragraphs: In the months leading up to an official transition from the NPOESS  program to the successor NOAA and DOD programs, NPOESS officials  face key challenges that further threaten environmental satellite  continuity. Specifically, the NPOESS program is slowing down and may  stop work on key components in order to address potential contract  liabilities and funding constraints. According to agency officials, the prime  contract includes a clause requiring termination liability be funded in the  current year’s budget. This means that if NPOESS development were to  continue according to schedule, the program would need to stop all  development work in August 2010 in order to fund the approximately $84  million in potential termination liability for this year. To mitigate this risk,  in April 2010, the prime contractor was directed to slow down work on all  development activities so that work could continue through the end of the  fiscal year.
In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010  placed limitations on the amount of DOD funding available to the program  until certain requirements were met. Although the program met those  requirements in March 2010, agency officials noted that DOD funding  could be rescinded if not obligated quickly. According to program officials,  if these funds are rescinded, DOD may have to terminate the NPOESS  contract by the end of the fiscal year.
Slowing or stopping work under either scenario could further delay the  launches of the NPP satellite and the first NOAA and DOD satellites under  their new programs. However, officials have not established detailed  priorities among different components to guide any work stoppages.  Unless selected components are able to continue scheduled development,  the launches of NPP and the first few satellites could be further delayed.
section_title: Limitations on the Demonstration Satellite May Adversely Affect the Usefulness of Its Data
paragraphs: As originally designed, NPP was planned to reduce the risk associated  with launching new sensor technologies in the NPOESS program and to  ensure continuity of climate data with NASA’s Earth Observing System  satellites. Therefore, NPP was not expected to be an operational satellite  used for weather forecasting. However, in March 2009, delays in the  expected launch of the first NPOESS satellite led the Executive Committee  to decide to use NPP data operationally. Because the NPP demonstration  satellite was not designed as an operational asset, it has several  limitations. These limitations include fewer ground-based data processing  systems, fewer security controls, and a shorter satellite lifespan than  current or planned operational satellites. These design limitations mean  that in some cases, NPP’s data will not be as timely and useful as current  polar satellites or as secure as planned satellites. In addition, there is a risk  of a gap in the nation’s climate and weather data should the NPP satellite  or its sensors fail before the next satellite is launched. Agency officials  acknowledge these limitations and are assessing options to make NPP  data more timely and secure.
subsections: section_title: NPP Will Have Fewer Ground-Based Data Processing Systems than NPOESS
paragraphs: While NOAA, NASA, and DOD plan to have a ground-based data  processing system in each of four central data processing centers when  NPOESS (or its successors’) satellites are in operation, the data processing  system will be in only two of the centers for the NPP demonstration  satellite. This arrangement means that the two centers that do not have  the data processing systems will experience a lag in obtaining NPP data.  Specifically, under current operations, the four satellite data processing  centers receive polar satellite data within about 100 to 150 minutes. NPP’s  data will be available to the two centers with the data processing system  within approximately 140 minutes; it will be available to the two other  centers within about 170 minutes. This presents a delay of 20 to 70 minutes  from current operations for the two centers without the data processing  system.
Because of this delay, NPP data will not be as useful to DOD as the data  from legacy DMSP and POES satellites. DOD officials reported that they  plan to incorporate NPP data when and where they can to supplement  data from the legacy satellites. However, DOD’s centers will not be able to  incorporate NPP data into all of their operational products, due to the time  delay. For example, officials from one data processing center reported that  the delay in obtaining NPP data could adversely affect their atmospheric  and oceanographic numerical weather prediction capabilities. This  situation would be exacerbated if POES or DMSP satellites fail in orbit  before the first NPOESS/JPSS satellite is launched because the DOD  centers may not be able to use NPP data to make up for the data loss.  According to DOD officials, the three DOD centers are currently  investigating options to shorten the time it will take for the data to go from  the one center with the data processing system to the other two that lack  the system, but do not have a timeline for making decisions on how to  proceed. NASA officials reported that there are other options for  shortening the time lag. For example, JPSS officials are considering  accelerating the development of the data processing systems in their new  program. This could allow all four centers to have a processing system  shortly after NPP is launched and would eliminate the additional time lag  for two of the centers.
section_title: NPP Was Designed Using Information Security Guidelines That Are Now Outdated
paragraphs: When originally designed, the NPP ground systems included information  security controls that were based on the DOD security requirements that  existed at that time. However, these standards—approved in 1998—do not  include all of the security controls applicable to newer systems. According  to NOAA officials, the limitations in NPP’s security controls relate  primarily to the risk of data loss, denial-of-service, and continuity of  operations, rather than a risk to the command and control of the satellite.
In 2008, program officials evaluated the security requirements of the  NPOESS program. Specifically, they evaluated whether to increase the  security controls before the NPP launch, before the first NPOESS satellite  launch, or before the second NPOESS satellite launch. They decided  against updating the NPP security requirements, because it would cost the  program up to $280 million to make such a change, and could risk NPP’s  scheduled launch date. According to NOAA officials, they recently  evaluated the impact of the weaknesses in NPP’s security controls and  made decisions on a majority of security controls in April 2010.
section_title: NPP’s Expected Life Span Is Shorter than That of NPOESS
paragraphs: The NPP satellite was only designed to support a 5-year mission life,  unlike the 7-year mission life of the NPOESS satellites. Because NPP’s  design life is only 5 years, it has the potential to fail before the next  satellite is launched. If NPP launches as planned in October 2011, the  satellite, based on current design, may remain functional until 2016. Thus,  data from the next polar-orbiting satellite may be needed as early as 2016.
Although the first JPSS satellite launch is planned for 2015, it may need a  year or more to perform an on-orbit accuracy check. Thus, it is very  likely that there will be gaps in climate and weather data if NPP cannot  survive beyond its design life. Further delays in the development and  launch of the next satellite will increase the risk of a gap. NOAA officials  acknowledge this limitation and are evaluating ways to mitigate the risk of  a gap. NASA officials reported that the NPP spacecraft is based on a legac design; thus, they estimate that the spacecraft will likely last for 7 years or more. However, they questioned the reliability of key sensors— particularly VIIRS, CrIS, and OMPS—on NPP, due to poor workmanship  and mission assurance weaknesses during development.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: At the end of this fiscal year, the federal government will have spent 16  years and over $5 billion to combine two legacy satellite programs into  one, yet will not have launched a single satellite. Faced with expected cost  growth exceeding $8 billion, schedule delays of over 5 years, and  continuing tri-agency management challenges, a task force led by the  President’s Office of Science and Technology Policy decided to disband  NPOESS so that NOAA and DOD could pursue separate satellite  acquisitions. While the two agencies are scrambling to develop plans for  their respective programs, it is not yet clear what the programs will  deliver, when, and at what cost. Timely decisions on cost, schedule, and  capabilities are needed to allow both acquisitions to move forward. As the  agencies develop plans for their respective satellite programs, they face  risks associated with the loss of critical staff with knowledge and  experience, delays in negotiating contract changes and setting up new  program offices, the two agencies not fulfilling each other’s core  requirements, and insufficient program oversight. Neither agency has  developed plans to mitigate these risks.
Until the transition is completed, the NPOESS program is continuing to  develop components of the NPP satellite and components of the first two  satellites. However, program officials reported that they have slowed all  development work, and may need to stop work on these deliverables  because of potential contract liabilities and funding constraints. Slowing  or stopping work could further delay the satellites’ launches, and the  program has not developed a prioritized list of what to stop first to  mitigate impacts on satellite launches. Until it does so, there may be an  increased risk of gaps in satellite data.
Because NPP was built to be a demonstration satellite, its data may not be  as timely and useful as current polar satellites and not as secure as  planned satellites. In addition, the limited lifespan of NPP further  increases the risk of gaps in climate and weather data. Agency officials  acknowledge these limitations and are assessing options to make NPP  data more timely, but do not have time frames for deciding among  alternative options.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In order to ensure that the transition from NPOESS to its successor  programs is efficiently and effectively managed, we recommend that the  Secretaries of Defense and Commerce take the following four actions:    direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs to expedite decisions  on the expected cost, schedule, and capabilities of their planned programs;    direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs to develop plans to  address key transition risks, including the loss of skilled staff, delays in  contract negotiations and setting up new program offices, loss of support  for the other agency’s requirements, and oversight of new program  management;    direct the NPOESS program office to develop priorities for work  slowdown and stoppage to allow the activities that are most important to  maintaining launch schedules to continue; and    direct NOAA and DOD officials to develop time frames for making key  decisions on—or accepting the risks related to—the timeliness of NPP’s  data.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We received written comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary  of Commerce, who transmitted NOAA’s comments (see app. II), the  Director of Space and Intelligence within DOD (see app. III), and the  Associate Administrator for the Science Mission Directorate of NASA (see  app. IV). In addition, a senior policy analyst from the Office of Science and  Technology Policy/Executive Office of the President provided technical  comments on a draft of this report via email, which we incorporated as  appropriate.
In their comments, both NOAA and DOD agreed with our  recommendations and identified plans to implement them. For example,  NOAA plans to work with NASA to develop requirements and acquisition  plans, identify the organization and staffing, and establish a cost and  schedule baseline for JPSS. In addition, DOD officials reported that the  agency plans to make decisions on capability, cost, and schedule following  a series of meetings taking place in June 2010.
In addition, regarding the potential need to slow down or stop work on the  NPOESS program to deal with potential contract liabilities and funding  constraints, NOAA, NASA, and DOD reported that the NPOESS program  office has identified priorities for work stoppage so that key activities  could continue. At the end of March 2010, the program executive officer  provided high-level guidance on the priorities of the program, such as  ensuring that NPP development continues and ensuring that key sensor  development is transferred to the JPSS program. Subsequently, program  officials stated that the contractor agreed to slow all of its development  work through the end of the fiscal year to avoid a work stoppage.  However, slowing all work activities does not reflect a prioritization of the  most important activities. Unless the key activities that are on the critical  path are able to continue scheduled development, the launches of NPP  and the first few satellites could be further delayed.
NASA also commented on our finding that NOAA would need to provide  enhanced oversight of NASA’s management of the JPSS program. We  called for enhanced oversight based, in part, on NASA’s history of poor  performance in managing major acquisitions. NASA officials asserted that  the proper basis for comparison should not be their leading edge research  missions, but, instead, should be the operational environmental satellite  missions it has developed for NOAA in the past. NASA noted that its role  in JPSS will be structured similar to the Polar-orbiting Operational  Environmental Satellite (POES) and Geostationary Operational  Environmental Satellite (GOES) programs, where NOAA and NASA have a  long and effective partnership. However, we believe that enhanced  oversight is warranted. The JPSS program differs from the recent POES  and GOES programs in that it includes leading edge sensor technologies.  The complexity of these sensor technologies has been a key reason for the  cost growth and schedule delays experienced to date on the NPOESS  program. In addition, the program continues to discover technical  problems on the sensors currently being developed for the follow-on  programs. Thus, it will be important for both NOAA and NASA to ensure  that the subcontractors are adequately managed so that technical, cost,  and schedule issues are minimized or mitigated.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from  the date of this letter. We are sending copies of this report to interested  congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of  Defense, the Administrator of NASA, the Director of the Office of  Management and Budget, and other interested parties. In addition, this  report will be available on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512- 9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to (1) assess efforts to plan for separate satellite  acquisitions; (2) evaluate the status and risks of key program components  still under development; and (3) evaluate implications of using the  demonstration satellite’s data operationally.
To assess efforts to plan for separate satellite acquisitions, we reviewed  the presidential directive that established the National Polar-orbiting  Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) as well as  materials related to the program restructuring in 2006. We also reviewed  the White House task force’s terms of reference and final decision to  disband the NPOESS program. We reviewed preliminary plans for the  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) new program  to replace two of the NPOESS satellites. We compared the strategy and  plans to best practices for program planning and requirements  management and met with members of the task force responsible for the  final restructuring decision. We also interviewed agency officials from the  Department of Defense (DOD), the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA), and NOAA, as well as members of the NPOESS  task force and the NPOESS program office.
To evaluate the status and risks of key program components, we reviewed  briefings, weekly updates, and monthly program management reports. We  reviewed cost reports and program risk management documents and  interviewed program officials to determine program and program segment  risks that could negatively affect the program’s ability to maintain the  current schedule and cost estimates. We also interviewed agency officials  from DOD, NASA, and NOAA and the NPOESS program office to  determine the status and risks of the key program segments. We also  observed senior-level management review meetings to obtain information  on the status of the NPOESS program.
To evaluate plans for and implications of using the demonstration  satellite’s data operationally, we reviewed program documentation for  using the demonstration satellite’s data and compared them to plans for  using the NPOESS satellite data. Additionally, we interviewed program  office, NOAA, NASA, and DOD officials about plans for using the data.
We primarily performed our work at the NPOESS Integrated Program  Office and at DOD, NASA, and NOAA offices in the Washington, D.C.,  metropolitan area. In addition, we conducted work at the Fleet Numerical  Meteorology and Oceanography Center in Monterey, California; the Naval  Oceanographic Office in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi; and the Air Force  Weather Agency in Omaha, Nebraska.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 to May 2010 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Colleen Phillips, Assistant  Director; Kate Agatone; Neil Doherty; Franklin Jackson; Lee McCracken;  and Matthew Strain made key contributions to this report.