Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform Security Clearance Processes
Published: 2008-02-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act to reform security clearance processes. Much of GAO's experience in evaluating personnel security clearance processes over the decades has consisted of examining the Department of Defense's (DOD) program, which maintains about 2.5 million clearances on servicemembers, DOD civilian employees, legislative branch employees, and industry personnel working for DOD and 23 other federal agencies. Long-standing delays in processing applications--and other problems in DOD's clearance program--led GAO to designate it a high-risk area in 2005. GAO also has documented clearance-related problems in other agencies. For this hearing, GAO was asked to identify key factors that could be applied in personnel security clearance reform efforts. To identify key factors, GAO drew upon its past reports and institutional knowledge. For those reports, GAO reviewed laws, executive orders, policies, reports, and other documentation related to the security clearance process; examined samples of cases of personnel granted top secret eligibility; compared documentation in those sampled cases against federal standards; and interviewed a range of cognizant government officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Current and future efforts to reform personnel security clearance processes should consider, among other things, the following four key factors: determining whether clearances are required for positions, incorporating quality control steps throughout the clearance processes, establishing metrics for assessing all aspects of clearance processes, and providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements of security clearance reform. Requesting a clearance for a position in which it will not be needed, or in which a lower- level clearance would be sufficient, will increase both costs and investigative workload unnecessarily. For example, changing the clearance needed for a position from a secret to top secret increases the investigative workload for that position about 20-fold and uses 10 times as many investigative staff hours. Emphasis on quality in clearance processes could promote positive outcomes, including more reciprocity among agencies in accepting each others' clearances. Building quality throughout clearance processes is important, but government agencies have paid little attention to quality, despite GAO's repeated suggestions to place more emphasis on quality. Even though GAO identified the government's primary metric for assessing quality--the percentage of investigative reports returned for insufficiency during the adjudicative phase--as inadequate by itself in 1999, the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel Management continue to use that metric. Concerns about the quality of investigative and adjudicative work underlie the continued reluctance of agencies to accept clearances issued by other agencies; as a result, government resources are used to conduct duplicative investigations and adjudications. Many efforts to monitor clearance processes emphasize measuring timeliness, but additional metrics could provide a fuller picture of clearance processes. The emphasis on timeliness is due in part to recent legislation that provides specific guidelines regarding the speed with which clearances should be completed and requires annual reporting of that information to Congress. GAO has highlighted a variety of metrics in its reports (e.g., completeness of investigative and adjudicative reports, staff's and customers' perceptions of the processes, and the adequacy of internal controls), all of which could add value in monitoring clearance processes and provide better information to allow improved oversight by Congress and the Executive Branch. Another factor to consider in reform efforts is providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements to implement changes to security clearance processes. DOD's August 2007 congressionally mandated report on industry clearances identified its immediate funding needs but did not include information on the funding requirements for fiscal year 2009 and beyond. The inclusion of less than 2 future years of budgeting data in the DOD report limits Congress's ability to carry out its long-term oversight and appropriations functions pertaining to industry personnel security clearances.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to be here today for this hearing on security  clearance reform which is intended to cover efforts being undertaken to  improve the process, impediments to those reforms, planned future steps,  and possible changes in the strategy for improving clearance processing  timeliness. Congress passed and the President signed into law the  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) to  mandate a variety of steps be taken to reform security clearance  processes.
One recent step taken to reform security clearance processes was the  formation of an interagency security clearance process reform team in  June 2007. Agencies included in this governmentwide effort are the Office  of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Defense (DOD),  the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Office of Personnel  Management (OPM). The team’s memorandum of agreement indicates that  it seeks to develop, in phases, a reformed DOD and intelligence  community security clearance process that allows the granting of high- assurance security clearances in the least time possible and at the lowest  reasonable cost. The team’s July 25, 2007, terms of reference indicate that  it plans to deliver “a transformed, modernized, fair, and reciprocal security  clearance process that is universally applicable” to DOD, the intelligence  community, and other U.S. government agencies, no later than December  31, 2008.
Since 1974, we have been examining personnel security clearance  processes on behalf of the Congress. Through scores of reports and  testimonies, we have acquired broad institutional knowledge that gives us  a historical view of key factors that should be considered in clearance  reform efforts. See a list of our related GAO products at the end of this  statement. My comments will focus on four key factors that should be  considered in clearance reform efforts. Before offering observations on  these factors, I would like to provide some background information on our  prior work and recent government reform efforts.
Our reports have documented a wide variety of problems present in DOD’s  clearance program. Some of the problems that we noted in our 2007 high- risk report included incomplete and delayed investigative reports from  OPM, which supplies about 90 percent of all federal clearance  investigations, and DOD adjudicators granting clearance eligibility even  though data were missing from the investigative reports used to make  such determinations. While some of those findings are now about 2 years  old, DOD’s August 2007 congressionally-mandated report on clearance  investigations for industry personnel noted continuing problems. For  example, during the first 6 months of fiscal year 2007, the end-to-end  processing of initial top secret clearances took an average of 276 days;  renewal top secret clearances averaged 335 days; and both initial and  renewal secret clearances averaged 208 days. On the other hand, DOD’s  report also noted progress that the department had made to improve its  industry clearance program, including submitting 100 percent of the  clearance requests electronically to improve timeliness and reduce the  number of rejected applications and conducting research in an effort to  improve the accuracy of its projections for future industry clearance  needs.
Much of our experience in evaluating personnel security clearance  processes over the decades has emphasized examinations of DOD’s  program that maintains approximately 2.5 million clearances on  servicemembers, DOD civilian employees, industry personnel for DOD and  23 other federal agencies, and employees in the federal legislative branch.  Long-standing delays in determining clearance eligibility and other  clearance challenges led us to designate DOD’s personnel security  clearance program as a high-risk area in January 2005 and continue that  designation in the updated list of high-risk areas that we published in  2007. The areas on our high-risk list received their designations because  they are major programs and operations that need urgent attention and  transformation in order to ensure that our national government functions  in the most economical, efficient, and effective manner possible.
You asked that we identify key factors that should be considered in  personnel security clearance reform efforts. As requested, my statement  today will address four factors for your consideration based on our prior  work. They are (1) having a sound requirements-determination process in  place, (2) building quality into every step of the clearance processes, (3)  having a valid set of metrics for evaluating efficiency and effectiveness,  and (4) providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements of  security clearance reform. My statement draws on our prior work on  clearance processes, which included reviews of clearance-related  documents and interviews of senior officials at DOD and OPM, which has  the primary responsibility for providing investigation services to DOD. Our  work was performed in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions, based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence we obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Although our high-risk designation covers only DOD’s program, our  reports have also documented clearance-related problems affecting other  agencies. For example, our October 2007 report on state and local  information fusion centers cited two clearance-related challenges: (1) the  length of time needed for state and local officials to receive clearances  from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) and (2) the reluctance of some federal  agencies—particularly DHS and FBI—to accept clearances issued by other  agencies (i.e., clearance reciprocity). Similarly, our April 2007 testimony  on maritime security and selected aspects of the Security and  Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act) identified the  challenge of obtaining clearances so that port security stakeholders could  share information through area committees or interagency operational  centers. The SAFE Port Act includes a specific provision requiring the  Secretary of Homeland Security to sponsor and expedite individuals  participating in interagency operational centers in gaining or maintaining  their security clearances.
Our reports have offered findings and recommendations regarding current  impediments, and they offer key factors to consider in future reforms. For  example, as the interagency security clearance process reform team  develops a new governmentwide end-to-end clearance system, this reform  effort provides an opportune time to consider factors for evaluating  intermediate steps and the final system in order to optimize efficiency and  effectiveness. The Director of National Intelligence’s July 25, 2007,  memorandum provided the terms of reference for the security clearance  process reform team and noted that a future Phase IV would be used to  perform and evaluate demonstrations and to finalize the acquisition  strategy.
In designing a new personnel security clearance system, the Government  Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) may be a useful resource for  the team designing the system and the congressional committees  overseeing the design and implementation. GPRA provides a framework  for strategic performance planning and reporting intended to improve  federal program effectiveness and hold agencies accountable for achieving  results. Agencies that effectively implement GPRA’s results-oriented  framework clearly establish performance goals for which they will be held  accountable, measure progress towards those goals, determine strategies  and resources to effectively accomplish the goals, use performance  information to make the programmatic decisions necessary to improve  performance, and formally communicate results in performance reports.  Our reports have also identified a number of directly relevant factors, such  as those found in our November 2005 testimony that evaluated an earlier  governmentwide plan for improving the personnel security clearance  process.
section_title: Four Key Factors Should Be Considered in Efforts to Reform Security Clearance Processes
paragraphs: I will address the need for consideration of four key factors in my  testimony: (1) a strong requirements-determination process, (2) quality  emphasis in all clearance processes, (3) additional metrics to provide a  fuller picture of clearance processes, and (4) long-term funding  requirements of security clearance reform.
subsections: section_title: A Strong Requirements- Determination Process Can Help Manage Clearance Workloads and Costs
paragraphs: The interagency security clearance process reform team established in  July 2007 might want to address whether the numbers and levels of  clearances are appropriate since this initial stage in the clearance process  can affect workloads and costs in other clearance processes. For instance,  the team may want to examine existing policies and practices to see if they  need to be updated or otherwise modified. We are not suggesting that the  numbers and levels of clearances are or are not appropriate—only that any  unnecessary requirements in this initial phase use government resources  that can be utilized for other purposes such as building additional quality  into other clearance processes or decreasing delays in clearance  processing.
Figure 1 highlights the fact that the clearance process begins with  establishing whether an incumbent’s position requires a clearance, and if  so, at what level. The numbers of requests for initial and renewal  clearances and the levels of such clearance requests (phase 2 in fig. 1) are  two ways to look at outcomes of requirements setting in the clearance  process.
In our prior work, DOD personnel, investigations contractors, and industry  officials told us that the large number of requests for investigations could  be attributed to many factors. For example, they ascribed the large  number of requests to the heightened security concerns that resulted from  the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. They also attributed the large  number of investigations to an increase in the operations and deployments  of military personnel and to the increasingly sensitive technology that  military personnel, government employees, and contractors come in  contact with as part of their jobs. While having a large number of cleared  personnel can give the military services, agencies, and industry a great  deal of flexibility when assigning personnel, the investigative and  adjudicative workloads that are required to provide the clearances and  flexibility further tax a clearance process that already experiences delays  in determining clearance eligibility.
A change in the level of clearances being requested also increases the  investigative and adjudicative workloads. For example, in our February  2004 report on impediments to eliminating clearance backlogs, we found  that a growing percentage of all DOD requests for clearances for industry  personnel was at the top secret level: 17 percent of those requests were at  the top secret level in 1995 but 27 percent were at the top secret level in  2003. This increase of 10 percentage points in the proportion of  investigations at the top secret level is important because top secret  clearances must be renewed twice as often as secret clearances (i.e., every  5 years versus every 10 years). In August 2006, OPM estimated that  approximately 60 total staff hours are needed for each investigation for an  initial top secret clearance and 6 total staff hours are needed for the  investigation to support a secret or confidential clearance. The doubling of  the frequency along with the increased effort to investigate and adjudicate  each top secret reinvestigation adds costs and workload for the  government.
Cost. For fiscal year 2008, OPM’s standard billing rate is $3,711 for an  investigation for an initial top secret clearance; $2,509 for an investigation  to renew a top secret clearance, and $202 for an investigation for a secret  clearance. The cost of getting and maintaining a top secret clearance for  10 years is approximately 30 times greater than the cost of getting and  maintaining a secret clearance for the same period. For example, an  individual getting a top secret clearance for the first time and keeping the  clearance for 10 years would cost the government a total of $6,202 in  current year dollars ($3,711 for the initial investigation and $2,509 for the  reinvestigation after the first 5 years). In contrast, an individual receiving a  secret clearance and maintaining it for 10 years would result in a total cost  to the government of $202 ($202 for the initial clearance that is good for 10  years).
Time/Workload. The workload is also affected by the scope of coverage  in the various types of investigations. Much of the information for a secret  clearance is gathered through electronic files. The investigation for a top  secret clearance, on the other hand, requires the information needed for  the secret clearance as well as data gathered through time-consuming  tasks such as interviews with the subject of the investigation request,  references in the workplace, and neighbors. Since (1) the average  investigative report for a top secret clearance takes about 10 times as  many investigative staff hours as the average investigative report for a  secret clearance and (2) the top secret clearance must be renewed twice  as often as the secret, the investigative workload increases about 20-fold.  Additionally, the adjudicative workload increases about 4-fold. In 2007,  DOD officials estimated that it took about twice as long to review an  investigative report for a top secret clearance, which would need to be  done twice as often as the secret clearance.
Unless the new system developed by the interagency security clearance  process reform team includes a sound requirements process, workload  and costs may be higher than necessary.
section_title: Emphasis on Quality in All Processes Could Promote Positive Outcomes Such as Greater Clearance Reciprocity
paragraphs: Since the late 1990s, GAO has emphasized a need to build more quality and  quality monitoring into clearance processes to achieve positive goals such  as promoting greater reciprocity and maximizing the likelihood that  individuals who are security risks will be scrutinized more closely. In our  November 2005 testimony on the earlier governmentwide plan to improve  the clearance process, we noted that the plan devoted little attention to  monitoring and improving the quality of the personnel security clearance  process, and that limited attention and reporting about quality continue.  When OMB issued its February 2007 Report of the Security Clearance  Oversight Group Consistent with Title III of the Intelligence Reform and  Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, it documented quality with a single  metric. Specifically, it stated that OPM has developed additional internal  quality control processes to ensure that the quality of completed  investigations continue to meet the national investigative standards. OMB  added that, overall, less than 1 percent of all completed investigations are  returned to OPM from the adjudicating agencies for quality deficiencies.  When OMB issued its February 2008 Report of the Security Clearance  Oversight Group, it did not discuss the percentage of completed  investigations that are returned to OPM or the development or existence  of any other metric measuring the level of quality in security clearance  processes or products.
As part of our September 2006 report, we examined a different aspect of  quality—the completeness of documentation in investigative and  adjudicative reports. We found that OPM provided incomplete  investigative reports to DOD adjudicators, which the adjudicators then  used to determine top secret clearance eligibility. Almost all (47 of 50) of  the sampled investigative reports we reviewed were incomplete based on  requirements in the federal investigative standards. In addition, DOD  adjudicators granted clearance eligibility without requesting additional  information for any of the incomplete investigative reports and did not  document that they considered some adjudicative guidelines when  adverse information was present in some reports.
GAO has long reported that it is problematic to equate the quality of  investigations with the percentage of investigations that are returned by  requesting agencies due to incomplete case files. For example, in October  1999 and again in our November 2005 evaluation of the governmentwide  plan, we stated that the number of investigations returned for rework is  not by itself a valid indicator of quality because adjudication officials said  they were reluctant to return incomplete investigations in anticipation of  further delays. We additionally suggested that regardless of whether this  metric continues to be used, the government might want to consider  adding other indicators of the quality of investigations, such as the number  of counterintelligence leads generated from security clearance  investigations and forwarded to relevant units. Further, our September  2006 report recommended that OMB’s Deputy Director of Management  require OPM and DOD to (1) submit their procedures for eliminating the  deficiencies that we identified in their investigative and adjudicative  documentation and (2) develop and report metrics on completeness and  other measures of quality that will address the effectiveness of the new  procedures. We believe that our recommendation still has merit, but the  previously cited passage from the February 2007 OMB report does not  describe the new procedures or provide statistics for the recommended  new quality measures and the 2008 OMB report is silent on quality  measures.
As we noted in September 2006, the government cannot afford to achieve  its timeliness goal by providing investigative and adjudicative reports that  are incomplete in key areas required by federal investigative standards and  adjudicative guidelines. Incomplete investigations and adjudications  undermine the government’s efforts to move toward greater clearance  reciprocity. An interagency working group, the Security Clearance  Oversight Steering Committee, noted that agencies are reluctant to be  accountable for poor quality investigations and/or adjudications  conducted by other agencies or organizations. To achieve fuller  reciprocity, clearance-granting agencies need to have confidence in the  quality of the clearance process. Without full documentation of  investigative actions, information obtained, and adjudicative decisions,  agencies could continue to require duplicative investigations and  adjudications. Earlier, we stated that reciprocity concerns continue to  exist, citing FBI and DHS reluctance to accept clearances issued by other  agencies when providing information to personnel in fusion centers.
section_title: Government Clearance Metrics Emphasize Timeliness Measurement, but Additional Metrics Could Provide a Fuller Picture of Clearance Processes
paragraphs: Much of the recent quantitative information provided on clearances has  dealt with how much time it takes for the end-to-end processing of  clearances (and related measures such as the numbers of various types of  investigative and adjudicative reports generated); however, there is less  quantitative information on other aspects of the clearance process. In our  November 2005 testimony, we noted that the earlier government plan to  improve the clearance process provided many metrics to monitor the  timeliness of clearances governmentwide, but that plan detailed few of the  other elements that a comprehensive strategic plan might contain. A  similar emphasis on timeliness appears to be emerging for the future  governmentwide clearance process. In the Director of National  Intelligence’s 500 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration issued on  October 10, 2007, the core initiative to modernize the security clearance  process had only one type of metric listed under the heading about how  success will be gauged. Specifically, the plan calls for measuring whether  “performance of IC  agency personnel security  programs meet or exceed IRTPA guidelines for clearance case processing  times.”
While the February 2007 and 2008 OMB reports to Congress contain  statistics and other information in addition to timeliness metrics (e.g., use  of information technology and reciprocity-related procedures) and the  joint team developing the new clearance process may be considering a  wider range of metrics than timeliness only, an underlying factor in the  emphasis on timeliness is IRTPA.  Among other things, IRTPA established  specific timeliness guidelines to be phased in over 5 years. The Act also  states that, in the initial period which ends in 2009, each authorized  adjudicative agency shall make a determination on at least 80 percent of  all applications for personnel security clearance within an average of 120  days after the receipt of the application for a security clearance by an  authorized investigative agency. The 120-day average period shall include  a period of not longer than 90 days to complete the investigative phase of  the clearance review and a period of not longer than 30 days to complete  the adjudicative phase of the clearance review. Moreover, IRTPA also  includes a requirement for a designated agency (currently OMB) to  provide information on among other things the timeliness in annual  reports through 2011, as OMB did in February 2008.
Prior GAO reports as well as inspector general reports identify a wide  variety of methods and metrics that program evaluators have used to  examine clearance processes and programs. For example our 1999 report  on security clearance investigations used multiple methods to examine  numerous issues that included:    documentation missing from investigative reports;  the training of investigators (courses, course content, and number of  trainees);  investigators’ perceptions about the process;    customer perceptions about the investigations; and  internal controls to protect against fraud, waste, abuse, and  mismanagement.
Including these and other types of metrics in regular monitoring of  clearance processes could add value in current and future reform efforts  as well as supply better information for greater congressional oversight.
section_title: Long-Term Funding Requirements Information Could Enable More Informed Congressional Oversight of Security Clearance Reform
paragraphs: The joint Security Clearance Process Reform team may also want to  consider providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements to  implement changes to security clearance processes enabling more  informed congressional oversight. In a recent report to Congress, DOD  provided funding requirements information that described its immediate  needs for its industry personnel security program, but it did not include  information about the program’s long-term funding needs. Specifically,  DOD’s August 2007 congressionally mandated report on clearances for  industry personnel provided less than 2 years of data on funding  requirements. In its report, DOD identified its immediate needs by  submitting an annualized projected cost of $178.2 million for fiscal year  2007 and a projected funding need of approximately $300 million for fiscal  year 2008. However, the report did not include information on (1) the  funding requirements for fiscal year 2009 and beyond even though the  survey used to develop the funding requirements asked contractors about  their clearance needs through 2010 and (2) the tens of millions of dollars  that the Defense Security Service Director testified before Congress in  May 2007 were necessary to maintain the infrastructure supporting the  industry personnel security clearance program.
As noted in our February 2008 report, the inclusion of less than 2 future  years of budgeting information in the DOD report limits Congress’s ability  to carry out its oversight and appropriations functions pertaining to  industry personnel security clearances. Without more information on  DOD’s longer-term funding requirements for industry personnel security  clearances, Congress lacks the visibility it needs to fully assess  appropriations requirements. In addition, the long-term funding  requirements to implement changes to security clearance processes are  also needed to enable the executive branch to compare and prioritize  alternative proposals for reforming the clearance processes. As the joint  Security Clearance Process Reform team considers changes to the current  clearance processes, it may also want to consider ensuring that Congress  is provided with the long-term funding requirements necessary to  implement any such reforms.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: We were encouraged when OMB undertook the development of an earlier  governmentwide plan for improving the personnel security clearance  process and have documented in our prior reports both DOD and  governmentwide progress in addressing clearance-related problems.  Similarly, the current joint effort to develop a new governmentwide end- to-end security clearance system represents a positive step to address past  impediments and manage security clearance reform efforts. Still, much  remains to be done before a new system can be designed and  implemented. GAO’s experience in evaluating DOD’s and governmentwide  clearance plans and programs as well as its experience monitoring large- scale, complex acquisition programs could help Congress in its oversight,  insight, and foresight regarding security clearance reform efforts.
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes  my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you  may have at this time.
section_title: Contact and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at  (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this  testimony are Jack E. Edwards, Acting Director; James P. Klein, Joanne  Landesman, Charles Perdue, Karen D. Thornton, and Stephen K. Woods.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable  More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.:  February 13, 2008.
Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some  Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.  GAO-08-35. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Defense Business Transformation: A Full-time Chief Management Officer  with a Term Appointment Is Needed at DOD to Maintain Continuity of  Effort and Achieve Sustainable Success. GAO-08-132T. Washington, D.C.:  October 16, 2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found  For Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007.
Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port  Act. GAO-07-754T. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007.
High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: January  2007).
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed To  Improve The Security Clearance Process, GAO-06-1070. Washington, D.C.:  September 2006.
Managing Sensitive Information: DOD Can More Effectively Reduce the  Risk of Classification Errors, GAO-06-706. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record  Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security  Clearance Process. GAO-06-693R. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances  for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments  Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2006.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance  Program and the Government Plan for Improving the Clearance Process.  GAO-06-323R. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain. GAO-06- 233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.
Defense Management: Better Review Needed of Program Protection Issues  Associated with Manufacturing Presidential Helicopters. GAO-06-71SU.  Washington, D.C.: November 4, 2005.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance  Program. GAO-05-988R. Washington, D.C.: August 19, 2005.
Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Ensure Its Oversight of Contractors  under Foreign Influence Is Sufficient. GAO-05-681. Washington, D.C.: July  15, 2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles  Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk  Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.
DOD’s High-Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation Requires  Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership. GAO-05-520T.  Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2005.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January 2005.
Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11  Commission’s Proposed Reforms. GAO-04-1084T. Washington, D.C.:  September 14, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce  Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for  Industry Personnel. GAO-04-632. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs  and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry  Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004.
Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its  Oversight Ensures the Protection of Classified Information. GAO-04-332.  Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to  Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size. GAO-04-344. Washington,  D.C.: February 9, 2004.
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