Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of Key Issues Associated with the Transition to NextGen
Published: 2008-09-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: To prepare for forecasted air traffic growth, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in partnership with other federal agencies and the aviation industry, is planning and implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), a new, satellite-based air traffic management system that is expected to increase the safety and enhance the capacity of the air transport system. NextGen will replace the current radar-based air traffic control (ATC) system. Within FAA, the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is responsible for implementing the transition to NextGen, and ATO's Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) is coordinating efforts to plan for this transition, including developing a 20-year research and development (R&D) agenda for NextGen. JPDO has drafted three basic planning documents for NextGen--a Concept of Operations, an Enterprise Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan (IWP). This testimony responds to six questions about NextGen and JPDO raised by the House Committee on Science and Technology, and addresses two related challenges identified by GAO. The statement is based on recent related GAO reports and testimonies, including a report issued today that reflects GAO's analysis of interviews with 25 key NextGen stakeholders about progress and challenges involved in the transition to NextGen.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Have the Views of Industry and Air Traffic Controllers Been Adequately Incorporated in NextGen Planning Documents? FAA and JPDO have established mechanisms for obtaining stakeholder views. However, given the large number of NextGen stakeholders and the evolution of opportunities for participation in NextGen, we believe that stakeholders will continue to differ on how adequately their views have been incorporated in NextGen planning. Is the Current Version of IWP Sufficiently Detailed for Effective Use in Overseeing and Managing NextGen? No. The current version lacks some needed information, but the next version, to be released this month, is to contain more detail, including schedule information, and is automated and searchable, making it more user friendly and useful for oversight. How Confident Should Congress Be that IWP Will Provide a Sufficient Basis for Achieving NextGen's Goals? The current plan does not provide a sufficient basis for Congress to be confident. The upcoming version will provide a firmer basis for confidence, but additional R&D issues that are not part of the plan will have to be addressed, including technology transfer issues. Can JPDO Continue to Be Viewed as an "Honest Broker" in Light of FAA's Recent Restructuring? The restructuring made JPDO a component of ATO rather than an independent office, but other federal agencies are reportedly still cooperating with JPDO, suggesting that they continue to view it as an honest broker. However, it is too early to tell if the restructuring addresses stakeholders' concerns about the fragmentation of management responsibility for NextGen activities. What Needs to Be Done to Move JPDO from Proposing R&D to Articulating a Clear R&D Program with Defined and Prioritized Tasks? The move is underway. JPDO needs to continue collaborating with its partner agencies to identify and prioritize R&D and leverage their R&D programs. It is too soon to assess the results of steps JPDO and the partner agencies have taken thus far. What Metrics Should Congress Use to Evaluate the Progress of NextGen? Schedule information in the upcoming version of IWP and cost information in the subsequent version will help provide Congress with metrics for evaluating NextGen's progress. Additional Infrastructure and Human Capital Challenges Identified by GAO. NextGen's implementation further depends on FAA's reconfiguring and maintaining its ATC facilities, expanding runways, and hiring staff with the engineering and contract management skills needed to provide oversight.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the  status of issues associated with the Next Generation Air Transportation  System (NextGen)—the planned air traffic management system intended  to address current and anticipated aviation congestion. Today, the nation’s  air traffic control (ATC) system is experiencing some of the worst delays  in recent times, with one in four flights delayed. Currently, the U.S. air  transportation system handles roughly 50,000 flights over a 24-hour period.  By 2025, air traffic is projected to double or triple, increasing to 100,000 to  150,000 flights every 24 hours. Stakeholders acknowledge that the current  air transportation system will not be able to meet these air traffic  demands.
Recognizing the need to transform the current system and to prepare for  the forecasted growth in air traffic, Congress in 2003 mandated the  creation of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) to  conceptualize and plan for NextGen. JPDO works in partnership with the  Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense (DOD), and  Homeland Security (DHS); the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); the  National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); the White House  Office of Science and Technology Policy; and the private sector. Housed  within FAA—first as an independent office and now, following  restructuring, as a component of FAA’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO)— JPDO is responsible for coordinating the related efforts of these partners  to plan the transformation to NextGen. JPDO initially prepared three basic  planning documents for NextGen—the Concept of Operations, Enterprise  Architecture, and Integrated Work Plan (IWP)—which, collectively, form  the basis of the joint planning environment for NextGen.
My statement today responds to the six questions you raised about  NextGen and JPDO and addresses two related challenges that we have  identified in the course of our work—infrastructure issues associated with  the configuration of ATC facilities and the capacity of airport runways and  staffing issues related to FAA’s in-house technical expertise. Your six  questions are as follows:  1.  Have the views of industry and active air traffic controllers been  adequately incorporated in NextGen plans, such as those embodied in  the Concept of Operations, Enterprise Architecture, and IWP?  2.  Is the current version of IWP sufficiently detailed and prioritized for  effective use in overseeing and managing the NextGen-related research  of multiple agencies?  3.  How confident should Congress be that progress in meeting the  research, development, and testing activities set out in IWP will  provide a sufficient basis for achieving NextGen’s goals and timetable  for quieter, cleaner, and more efficient air traffic operations?  4.  Can the other partner agencies continue to view JPDO as an “honest  broker” in light of FAA’s recent restructuring action?  5.  What needs to be done to move JPDO from proposing research and  development (R&D) for NextGen to articulating a clear R&D program  with defined and prioritized tasks?  6.  What metrics should Congress use to evaluate the progress of the  NextGen initiative?
This statement is based on recent related GAO reports and testimonies,  including a report to this committee and other congressional requesters  we are issuing today. Our work on this most recent report included  interviewing 25 key NextGen stakeholders about the progress of and  challenges to planning for and achieving the transition to NextGen. We  conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  work to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: NextGen is a multidecade, multiagency effort to transform the current  ATC system to the next generation air transportation system by moving  from relying largely on ground-based radars to using precision satellites;  digital, networked communications; and an integrated weather system.  Often characterized as “curb to curb,” NextGen involves every aspect of  air transportation, from arrival at the airport to departure from the  destination airport, and it is expected to increase the safety and enhance  the capacity of the air transport system. JPDO was charged with  coordinating the research activities of the federal partner agencies with  the goal of developing a 20-year R&D agenda for NextGen. FAA will play  the central role in implementing NextGen, since it will be responsible for  acquiring, integrating, and operating the new ATC systems. Industry  stakeholders will also play a key role in implementing NextGen because  they are expected to develop, finance, and operate many of the new  NextGen systems that will need to be installed in aircraft. FAA plans to  spend roughly $5.4 billion from fiscal years 2009 through 2013 on NextGen  development and capital costs. JPDO estimated that total federal spending  for NextGen may range from $15 billion to $22 billion through 2025. The  agency also noted that it expects system users to incur $14 billion to       $20 billion in costs to equip themselves with the advanced avionics  necessary to realize the full benefits of some NextGen technologies.
JPDO’s authorizing legislation requires the office to create an R&D plan  for the transition to NextGen. This requirement led JPDO to develop initial  versions of the Concept of Operations, Enterprise Architecture, and IWP.  The Concept of Operations is the fundamental planning document from  which the other two documents flow. Version 2 of the Concept of  Operations, issued in June 2007, describes how the NextGen system is  envisioned to operate in 2025. Version 2 of the Enterprise Architecture,  issued in July 2007, is a technical description of the NextGen system, akin  to blueprints for a building. The Enterprise Architecture provides a means  for coordinating among the partner agencies and private sector  manufacturers, aligning relevant R&D activities, and integrating  equipment. Version 0.2 of IWP describes the integrated framework needed  to transition to NextGen from the current system to the end state and will  continually be refined and enhanced to reflect current priorities, budgets,  and programs. It is JPDO’s plan for achieving NextGen. Version 1.0 of IWP  is scheduled to be released at the end of this month.
section_title: Have the Views of Industry and Air Traffic Controllers Been Adequately Incorporated in NextGen Planning Documents?
paragraphs: JPDO, FAA, and industry stakeholders have different perspectives on  whether the views of industry and air traffic controllers have been  adequately incorporated in NextGen planning. JPDO’s organizational  structure and processes provide for industry representatives and, to a  lesser extent, air traffic controllers to participate in NextGen planning, but  nearly all the industry stakeholders we spoke with questioned both the  meaningfulness of their involvement and the usefulness of the NextGen  planning documents. Furthermore, active air traffic controllers maintain  that they have not participated in NextGen development activities.  According to FAA, however, their involvement will increase as NextGen  efforts shift from planning to implementation.
JPDO includes several organizations with industry participants, and  industry representatives have reviewed and provided input to key JPDO  planning documents. For example, JPDO’s NextGen Institute serves as a  vehicle for incorporating the expertise of industry, state and local  governments, and academia into the NextGen planning process.  Additionally, the Institute Management Council, composed of top officials  and representatives from the aviation community, including air traffic  controllers, oversees the policies, recommendations, and products of the  Institute and provides a means for advancing consensus positions on  critical NextGen issues. JPDO also includes nine working groups, through  which federal and private sector stakeholders come together to plan for  and coordinate the development of NextGen technologies. JDPO created  the working groups in early 2007 to replace its integrated product teams  and, in part, to address concerns expressed by stakeholders about their  participation. Unlike the previous teams, which were chaired by a  representative from a federal agency, the working groups, which have the  same members as the previous teams, are jointly led by government and  industry officials. (See table 1.) JPDO expected the working groups to be  more efficient and output- or product-focused than the integrated product  teams. Currently, 265 industry representatives participate in JPDO. In  addition, JPDO provided a draft of the Concept of Operations and IWP to  industry representatives for review and comment. For example, version  0.2 of IWP was circulated to stakeholders and, according to a senior JPDO  official, the office received about 1,100 stakeholder comments, which were  addressed and incorporated in version 1.0 of the document.
With these efforts, JPDO has sought to obtain participation from industry  stakeholders and air traffic controllers in its planning activities, and we  have reported that many stakeholders felt they did have an opportunity to  participate. In fact, one industry stakeholder group told us that it worked  closely with JPDO to help revise an early version of the Concept of  Operations. However, other stakeholders said they frequently attended  meetings, but were frustrated by a lack of tangible products being  developed and a lack of progress being made during these meetings.  Furthermore, 13 of 15 stakeholders who discussed the issue stated that  they did not feel that their level of participation in either JPDO’s planning  for or FAA’s implementation of NextGen allowed for sufficient or  meaningful input toward decision making. Some stakeholders expressed  concern that JPDO and FAA did not include their input in planning  documents and other products. In their view, critical issues they raised are  not being addressed or incorporated in NextGen plans. In particular, some  stakeholders noted that planning documents were drafted by JPDO staff  and then provided to them for review and comment. This approach, one  industry stakeholder noted, did not take full advantage of stakeholders’  capabilities. Others were critical of FAA’s decision-making structure for  implementing NextGen and indicated they felt that FAA and JPDO should  lay out the broad plans and schedules for NextGen and then obtain  industry input on the best ways to accomplish the technical changes for  NextGen. Another stakeholder indicated it had the opportunity to provide  input to FAA on decisions such as the deployment of ADS-B technology,  but did not feel its input was considered by the agency. Still others felt that  FAA provided sufficient briefings on NextGen activities, but allowed no  opportunity for their input or comments.
A number of stakeholders also expressed concerns about the usefulness of  JPDO’s three planning documents and of FAA’s implementation plan for  NextGen (a document previously known as the Operational Evolution  Partnership and now called the NextGen Implementation Plan). Nineteen  of 21 industry stakeholders who discussed the issue said that these  planning documents lack the information that industry participants need  for successful planning. Many of the stakeholders we interviewed said that  while the planning documents provide a high-level view of NextGen  benefits, they do not provide specific details such as a catalog of critical  needs, clearly defined and prioritized intermediate objectives, and a  structured plan for achieving tangible results. According to stakeholders  who manufacture aviation equipment, the plans lack specific details to  inform them about the types of technology they need to design for  NextGen or to provide insights to market, build, and install systems that  support NextGen. Some industry stakeholders further noted that the  current planning does not identify all of the key research for NextGen,  establish priorities for R&D, or show how to obtain those results. In  addition, several stakeholders characterized the documents as long and  confusing—qualities that detracted from their usefulness. We agree that  the latest publicly available versions of these documents lack information  that various stakeholders need. For example, the documents do not  include key elements such as scenarios illustrating NextGen operations; a  summary of NextGen’s operational impact on users and other  stakeholders; and an analysis of the benefits, alternatives, and trade-offs  that were considered for NextGen. Our review of the upcoming version of  IWP confirmed that it is to have information that is lacking in the current  document. According to JPDO and FAA officials, it includes schedule  information that has been updated to reflect newly available information,  coordination with FAA’s schedule and plans, and revisions in response to  public comments received on the previous version. In addition, a senior  JPDO official noted and we agree that these documents are not the  appropriate place for some of the detailed information stakeholders would  like and need, such as specific information on the types of technology  stakeholders need to design or install.
Active air traffic controllers are represented on JPDO’s Institute  Management Council, and other controllers and aviation technicians  participate in certain JPDO efforts. However, stakeholders from the  National Air Traffic Controllers Association—an FAA employee union— have indicated that although the union participates in FAA meetings and  briefings related to NextGen, it does so as a recipient of information rather  than an equal party in the development of NextGen. Technicians in  another FAA employee union—the Professional Aviation Safety  Specialists—have indicated that they do not participate in NextGen  planning or development activities. Although air traffic controllers and  technicians will be responsible for a major part of the installation,  operations, and maintenance of the systems that NextGen will comprise,  our work has shown that these stakeholders have not fully participated in  the development of NextGen. Insufficient participation on the part of these  employees could delay the certification and integration of new systems  and result in increased costs, as we have seen in previous ATC  modernization efforts.
FAA officials, however, note that both unions are represented on its NextGen  Management Board, a decision-making body for resolving emerging NextGen  implementation issues. Furthermore, FAA has indicated that air traffic  controllers, pilots, and airline operations center personnel will be a part of the  extended team that is directly involved in the planning and execution of a  gradual rollout of NextGen technologies and procedures in a Florida  demonstration. In addition, according to FAA, these stakeholders will  continue to be heavily involved in NextGen throughout its life cycle through  their participation on advisory committees such as RTCA, the Air Traffic  Management Advisory Committee, the Performance-Based Operations  Aviation Rulemaking Committee, and the Research, Engineering and  Development Advisory Committee.
FAA and JPDO have established mechanisms for obtaining stakeholder  views. However, given the large number of NextGen stakeholders and the  evolution of opportunities for participation in NextGen, we believe that  stakeholders will continue to differ on how adequately their views have  been incorporated in NextGen planning.
section_title: Is the Current Version of IWP Sufficiently Detailed for Effective Use in Overseeing and Managing NextGen?
paragraphs: Our work indicates that the current version of the IWP lacks critical  information and is not sufficiently “user friendly” to be effectively used to  oversee and manage NextGen activities. For instance, 19 of the 21  stakeholders who discussed the issue said that the planning documents  did not provide specific details such as a catalog of critical needs, clearly  defined and prioritized intermediate objectives, and a structured plan for  achieving tangible results. However, the next version of the plan, to be  released at the end of September, is to have further details and research  priorities that should be useful for NextGen oversight. According to senior  JPDO officials, this next version will identify the specific operational  improvements and capabilities that NextGen will incorporate and will  show what policies, research, and other activities are needed to enable  those improvements and capabilities, when they are needed, and what  entities are responsible for them. Moreover, this version includes schedule  information that has been updated to reflect newly available information,  coordination with FAA schedules and plans, and public comments  received on the previous version, according to JPDO and FAA officials.  Our review of the upcoming version—which is an automated, searchable,  user-friendly database—verified that it will have the capability to track  dates and identify programs that are behind schedule, making it useful, but  not sufficient, for oversight.
Senior JPDO officials expect subsequent versions of IWP to include cost  information and more detail on which programs are responsible for  completing particular actions. We believe that JPDO’s upcoming version of  the work plan shows progress in providing needed details and making the  document more useful than earlier versions. With cost information,  subsequent versions of the plan should be even more useful for NextGen  oversight.
section_title: How Confident Should Congress Be that IWP Will Provide a Sufficient Basis for Achieving NextGen’s Goals?
paragraphs: The research, development, and testing activities set out in the current  IWP do not provide a sufficient basis for Congress to be confident that the  goals of NextGen will be achieved. However, the enhanced information  that is planned for inclusion in the upcoming version will provide a firmer  basis for congressional confidence. The current plan can best be viewed as  a necessary but not a sufficient step in the planning and early  implementation of NextGen. However, additional issues that are not part  of the current plan will have to be addressed to achieve NextGen goals,  such as obtaining the necessary funding, establishing the infrastructure to  support the scope of needed R&D, and filling the gap that may exist  between basic research and the research needed to bring technologies far  enough along for transfer to industry for further development.
JPDO and FAA have determined that research gaps now exist because of  cuts in NASA’s aeronautical research funding and NextGen’s expanded  research requirements. In the past, NASA performed a significant portion  of aeronautics R&D. However, NASA’s aeronautic research budget  declined from about $959 million in fiscal year 2004 to $511 million in  fiscal year 2008. While NASA still plans to focus some of its research on  NextGen needs, the agency has moved toward a focus on fundamental  research and away from developmental work and demonstration projects.  As a result, in some cases, NASA’s research focuses on developing  technologies to a lower—and therefore less readily adopted—maturity  level than in the past.
Budget requests for FAA have increased to help provide the needed R&D  funding for NextGen. According to FAA, the agency will spend an  estimated $740 million on NextGen-related R&D during fiscal years 2009  through 2013. The administration’s proposed budget for fiscal year 2009  requests $56.5 million for FAA R&D to support the integration and  implementation of NextGen programs, a substantial increase over the  $24.3 million authorized for fiscal year 2008. The actual and projected  increase in FAA’s overall R&D funding reflects the expected increases in  NextGen research funding. (See fig. 1.) In addition, increased funding for  NextGen R&D is contained in proposed legislation to reauthorize FAA,  although that legislation has not been enacted.
If FAA is authorized to receive increased R&D funding for NextGen, some  observers believe that the agency lacks the R&D infrastructure to  adequately address the developmental research needed for NextGen.  According to a draft report by the Research, Engineering and Development  Advisory Committee, establishing the infrastructure within FAA to  conduct the necessary R&D could delay the implementation of NextGen  by 5 years. Unless an adequate R&D infrastructure is in place as funds  become available, the implementation of NextGen could be delayed.
One critical area in which an R&D gap has been identified is the  environmental impact of aviation. According to a JPDO analysis,  environmental impacts will be the primary constraint on the capacity and  flexibility of the national airspace system unless these impacts are  managed and mitigated. FAA’s Continuous Lower Energy, Emissions, and  Noise (CLEEN) initiative, in which NASA would participate as an adviser,  is intended to address the gap between NASA’s fundamental research in  noise reduction and the need for near-term demonstrations of technology.  This program would establish a research consortium of government,  industry, and academic participants that would allow for the maturation of  these technologies via demonstration projects. In proposed legislation  reauthorizing FAA, $111 million for fiscal years 2008 through 2011 may be  used for a new FAA program to reduce aviation noise and emissions. This  program would, over the next 10 years, facilitate the development,  maturation, and certification of improved airframe technologies.
The CLEEN program would be a step toward further maturing emissions  and noise reduction technologies, but experts agree that the proposed  funding is insufficient to achieve needed emissions reductions. While  acknowledging that CLEEN would help bridge the gap between NASA’s  R&D and manufacturers’ eventual incorporation of technologies into  aircraft designs, aeronautics industry representatives and experts we  consulted said that the program’s funding levels may not be sufficient to  attain the goals specified in the proposal. According to these experts, the  proposed funding levels would allow for the further development of one or  possibly two projects. Moreover, in one expert’s view, the funding for  these projects may be sufficient to develop the technology only to the level  that achieves an emissions-reduction goal in testing, not to the level  required for the technology to be incorporated into a new engine design.  Although we believe that this level of funding is a step in the right  direction, additional funds would permit the agency to “buy down” R&D  risks—that is, the more projects that can be funded, the greater the chance  that at least one of the projects will yield a product for the next stage of  development. FAA recognizes the implications of the proposed funding  structure for CLEEN and characterizes the program as a “pilot.”
We are guardedly optimistic that the NextGen goals and timetable for  quieter, cleaner, and more efficient air traffic operations can be achieved.
The administration has requested increased funding for NextGen R&D and  FAA and JPDO recognize the need to establish an R&D infrastructure and  fill any gaps that may exist between basic research and the transfer to  industry for further development.
section_title: Can JPDO Continue to Be Viewed as an “Honest Broker” in Light of FAA’s Recent Restructuring?
paragraphs: Prior to May 2008, when FAA restructured ATO, JPDO reported directly to  both the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of ATO and the FAA  Administrator. Figure 2 shows FAA’s management structure as of  November 2007, with the shaded boxes showing offices with  responsibilities for NextGen activities. We expressed concerns about this  dual reporting status, suggesting that it might keep JPDO from interacting  on an equal footing with ATO and the other partner federal agencies. We  recognized that JPDO needed to counter the perception that it was a proxy  for ATO and, as such, was not able to act as an “honest broker” between  ATO and the partner federal agencies, but we also understood that JPDO  must continue to work with ATO and its partner agencies in a partnership  in which ATO is the lead implementer of NextGen. Therefore, we reported  that it was important for JPDO to have some independence from ATO and  pointed out that, to address this issue, the JPDO Director could report  directly to the FAA Administrator. We observed that such a change could  also lessen what some stakeholders perceived as unnecessary bureaucracy  and red tape associated with decision making and other JPDO and  NextGen processes.
Since ATO was reorganized in May 2008, JPDO has been housed within the  new NextGen and Operations Planning Office and reports through the  Senior Vice President for NextGen and Operations Planning only to ATO’s  COO. (See fig. 3.) Now that JPDO is no longer a separate, independent  office within FAA and no longer reports directly to the FAA Administrator,  its organizational position within FAA has declined. Nonetheless, we  believe that it is too early to tell whether JPDO will be able to act as an  “honest broker” between FAA and the other federal partner agencies.  Currently, according to a senior JPDO official, JPDO’s partner agencies are  cooperating with JPDO, indicating that the office is apparently maintaining  its status as an honest broker.
However, it is also too early to tell if ATO’s reorganization sufficiently  addresses concerns that many industry stakeholders expressed about the  adequacy of the previous organizational relationship between FAA and  JPDO—when JPDO reported directly to both the COO and the  Administrator—for the transition to NextGen. Proposed legislation  reauthorizing FAA would address the earlier concern of stakeholders by  designating the Director of JPDO as the Associate Administrator for the  Next Generation Air Transportation System, appointed by and reporting  directly to the Administrator. The proposed legislation would also  address observations we have made about JPDO’s organizational  placement within FAA.
Finally, it is too early to tell if the reorganization of FAA’s management  structure addresses concerns that stakeholders have expressed about the  fragmentation of management responsibility for NextGen activities.  Specifically, some industry stakeholders expressed frustration that a  program as large and important as NextGen does not follow the industry  practice of having one person authorized to make key decisions. They  pointed out that although FAA’s COO is nominally in charge of FAA’s  NextGen efforts, the COO must also manage the agency’s day-to-day air  traffic operations and may therefore be unable to devote enough time and  attention to managing NextGen. In addition, these stakeholders noted that  many of NextGen’s capabilities span FAA operational units both within  and outside ATO. The reorganization does not address concerns about this  fragmentation, since other offices in ATO and FAA continue to have  responsibility for parts of NextGen and the division of responsibility for  NextGen efforts among them is not clear. A senior FAA official noted that  ATO executives are knowledgeable and supportive of the reorganization,  but that the agency could better communicate the changes to stakeholders  outside of FAA. A focused outreach to industry stakeholders would help to  get their buy-in and support of FAA’s efforts.
section_title: What Needs to Be Done to Move JPDO from Proposing R&D to Articulating a Clear R&D Program with Defined and Prioritized Tasks?
paragraphs: To articulate a clear R&D program with defined and prioritized tasks,  JPDO must continue to collaborate with its partner agencies—FAA, NASA,  DOD, DHS, and Commerce—to identify and prioritize the R&D needed for  NextGen. As it issues new versions of IWP, JPDO continues to update the  R&D plans of the partner agencies. However, JPDO has not yet determined  what NextGen R&D needs to be done first and at what cost to demonstrate  and integrate NextGen technologies into the national airspace system. The  next version of IWP, scheduled to be released later this month, is to  identify the sequence of research activities that the partner agencies must  complete before specific NextGen capabilities can be implemented. The  plan should serve as a useful tool in prioritizing and tracking NextGen  research. In addition, JPDO has worked with the Office of Management  and Budget (OMB) to develop a process that allows OMB to identify  NextGen-related research and acquisition projects across the partner  agencies and consider NextGen as a unified, cross-agency program. Under  this process, JPDO and its partner agencies can jointly present OMB with  business cases for the partner agencies’ NextGen-related efforts, and these  business cases can be used as inputs to funding decisions for NextGen  research and acquisitions across the agencies.
In addition, JPDO needs to continue to leverage the R&D programs of the  partner agencies, which will conduct and define the research. For  example, JPDO monitors NASA’s and FAA’s efforts to coordinate their  research. NASA and FAA have developed a strategy to identify, conduct,  and transfer to FAA the R&D needed for NextGen. The strategy establishes  four “research transition teams” that align with JPDO’s planning  framework and outlines how the two agencies will jointly develop  research requirements—FAA will provide user requirements and NASA  will conduct the research and provide an understanding of the engineering  rationale for design decisions. In addition, the strategy calls for clearly  defining metrics for evaluating the research. According to JPDO, as of  August 2008, four teams had been established and have conducted initial  meetings.
JPDO has begun to move from proposing research to articulating a defined  and prioritized R&D program. In addition, JPDO, FAA, and NASA have  established mechanisms, such as research transition teams, to define and  prioritize R&D. We believe, however, that it is still too early to assess the  adequacy of these efforts.
section_title: What Metrics Should Congress Use to Evaluate the Progress of NextGen?
paragraphs: Version 1.0 of IWP, scheduled to be released later this month, will provide  a baseline for measuring NextGen progress. Congress can use the  information contained in the plan to help evaluate whether the actions  needed to achieve NextGen are on schedule and whether the specific  operational improvements and capabilities that will make up NextGen are  being accomplished. Specifically, subsequent versions of the plan will  allow the development of metrics to show progress, by agency, in             (1) achieving key activities and deploying technology, (2) issuing policies  and guidance, and (3) prioritizing resources.
Furthermore, subsequent versions of IWP are expected to include cost  information that decision makers can use to help understand the rationale  for budget requests, monitor costs, and improve future cost estimates for  acquisitions. This information will be helpful to decision makers when  budget constraints do not allow all system acquisitions to be fully funded  at planned and approved levels and they must decide which programs to  fund and which to cut or delay according to their priorities.
section_title: Two Related Challenges
paragraphs: At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly discuss two additional  issues that present challenges to realizing the full potential of NextGen.  The first, an infrastructure challenge, is to implement NextGen plans for a  new configuration of ATC facilities and enhanced runway capacity. The  second, a human capital challenge, is to ensure that FAA staff have the  knowledge and skills needed to implement NextGen.
To fully realize NextGen’s capabilities, a new configuration of ATC  facilities and enhanced runway capacity will be required to go along with  new technologies and procedures. According to a senior ATO official, the  agency plans to report on the cost implications of reconfiguring its  facilities in 2009. However, FAA has no comprehensive plan for  reconfiguring its facilities. Until the cost analysis is completed and a plan  for facilities reconfiguration has been developed, the configurations  needed for NextGen cannot be implemented and potential savings that  could help offset the cost of NextGen will not be realized. Some FAA  officials have said that planned facility maintenance and construction  based on the current ATC system are significant cost drivers that could,  without reconfiguration, significantly increase the cost of NextGen.  Additionally, some of the capacity and efficiency enhancements expected  from the implementation of NextGen maybe curtailed if the system’s  infrastructure needs are not fully addressed.
In the meantime, FAA faces an immediate task to maintain and repair  existing facilities so that the current ATC system continues to operate  safely and reliably. The agency is currently responsible for maintaining  over 400 terminal facilities. While FAA has not assessed the physical  condition of all of these facilities, the agency rated the average condition  of 89 of them as “fair.” Based on its assessment of these 89 facilities, FAA  estimated that a one-time cost to repair all 400 terminal facilities would  range from $250 million to $350 million. Two FAA employee unions  (NATCA and PASS) contend that many of the 400 facilities are  deteriorating for lack of maintenance and that working conditions are  unsafe because of leaking roofs, deteriorating walls and ceilings, and  obsolete air-conditioning systems. According to FAA officials, while some  of these facilities can accommodate NextGen’s new technologies and  systems, many of them are not consistent with the configurations that will  be needed under NextGen. Once FAA develops and implements a facility  consolidation plan, the costs of facility repairs and maintenance may be  reduced. In the meantime, FAA will have to manage its budgetary  resources so that it can maintain legacy systems and legacy infrastructure  while configuring the national airspace system to accommodate NextGen  technologies and operations.
The transformation to NextGen will also depend on the ability of airports  to handle greater capacity. While NextGen technologies and procedures  will enhance this ability, new or expanded runways will likely be needed  also to handle the expected increases in traffic. FAA has developed a  rolling 10-year plan for capacity improvements at the nation’s 35 busiest  airports, and some airports are building new runways. However, even with  these planned runway improvements, FAA analyses indicate that 14 more  airports will still need additional capacity. Moreover, without significant  reductions in emissions and noise around some of the nation’s airports,  efforts to expand their capacity could be stalled or the implementation of  NextGen delayed. We believe that this is a significant issue that FAA and  JPDO will have to address.
To manage the implementation of NextGen, FAA will need staff with  technical skills, such as systems engineering and contract management  expertise. Because of the scope and complexity of the NextGen effort, the  agency may not currently have the in-house expertise to manage the  transition to NextGen without assistance. In November 2006, we  recommended that FAA assess the technical and contract management  skills FAA staff will need to define, implement, and integrate the numerous  complex programs that will be involved in the transition to NextGen. In  response to our recommendation, FAA contracted with the National  Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to determine the mix of skills  and number of skilled persons, such as technical personnel and program  managers, needed to implement NextGen and to compare those  requirements with FAA’s current staff resources. NAPA expects to  complete its assessment in September 2008. We believe this is a  reasonable approach that should help FAA begin to address this issue,  recognizing that once the right skills have been identified, it may take  considerable time to select, hire, and integrate what FAA estimates could  be 150 to 200 more staff. This situation could contribute to delaying the  integration of new technologies and the transformation of the national  airspace system.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased  to respond to any questions that you or other members of the Committee  may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
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