Defense Acquisitions: An Analysis of the Special Operations Command's Management of Weapon System Programs
Published: 2007-06-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) duties have greatly increased since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Today, Special Operations Forces are at work in Afghanistan and Iraq, and SOCOM has been assigned to lead U.S. efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. SOCOM's acquisitions budget has also greatly increased in this period--more than doubling from $788 million in 2001 to approximately $1.91 billion in 2006. In light of SOCOM's expanded duties, Congress requested that GAO review SOCOM's management of its acquisition programs. GAO's evaluation includes an assessment of: the types of acquisition programs SOCOM has undertaken since 2001 and whether the programs are consistent with its mission; the extent to which SOCOM's programs have progressed as planned; and the challenges SOCOM faces in managing its acquisition programs.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: SOCOM has undertaken a diverse set of acquisition programs that are consistent with the command's mission to provide equipment that addresses the unique needs of the Special Operations Forces. SOCOM has committed to spend about $6 billion on these programs. About 88 percent of the programs are relatively small, have short acquisition cycles, and use modified commercial off-the-shelf and nondevelopmental items or modify existing service equipment and assets. SOCOM's acquisition plans--as reflected in its current 5-year plan--continue to focus on relatively small-scale, short-cycle programs with modest development efforts. Overall, SOCOM's acquisition program performance has been mixed. About 60 percent of the acquisition programs SOCOM has undertaken since 2001 have progressed as planned, staying within the original cost and schedule estimates. Included in this grouping are programs that had cost increases because of the need to buy additional quantities of equipment for ongoing combat operations. The other 40 percent of SOCOM's acquisition programs have not progressed as planned and experienced modest to, in a small number of cases, significant cost increases and schedule delays because of a range of technical and programmatic issues. Although fewer in number, the programs that experienced problems comprise about 50 percent of acquisition funding because they tend to be the larger and costlier, platform-based programs that SOCOM is acquiring and those where SOCOM depends on one of the military departments for equipment and program management support. SOCOM faces management and workforce challenges to ensure its acquisition programs are consistently completed on time and within budget. Urgent requirements to support SOCOM's ongoing combat missions have and will continue to challenge SOCOM's ability to balance near- and long- term needs against available funding resources. In addition, SOCOM has difficulty tracking progress on programs where it has delegated management authority to one of the military departments and has not consistently applied a knowledge-based acquisition approach in executing programs, particularly the larger and more complex programs. Furthermore, SOCOM has encountered challenges ensuring it has the workforce size and composition to carry out its acquisition work.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was established in 1987 to  oversee the training, doctrine, and equipping of all U.S. Special Operations  Forces (SOF). A key objective in establishing a unified command was to  ensure that the Special Operations Forces of the military services would  be equipped with the right weapon systems to carry out their unique  missions. The SOCOM commander was granted the authority to  independently develop, acquire, and field specialized equipment. This  “special operations forces-peculiar” equipment may be newly created or  standard equipment modified to meet SOF needs, but may not duplicate  equipment provided from the other military services.
In the past several years, SOCOM’s acquisition program budget has  increased significantly—from $788 million in 2001 to approximately   $1.91 billion in 2006—as the role of the special operations forces in U.S.  military operations has grown. For example, in 2003, the Secretary of  Defense expanded SOCOM’s duties to include leading the Department of  Defense’s (DOD) global war on terrorism (GWOT) operations. In keeping  with this expanded role, DOD has begun to re-tool SOCOM from primarily  a supporting command into a command responsible for planning and  executing missions in GWOT. The change became more prominent with  the fiscal year 2004 budget request, in which the President proposed a   47 percent increase in SOCOM’s funding.
In light of SOCOM’s expanded acquisition duties, Congress requested that  GAO review SOCOM’s management of its acquisition programs. To do so  we addressed the following questions:    What types of acquisition programs has SOCOM undertaken since 2001  and are they consistent with SOCOM’s mission?
To what extent have SOCOM’s acquisition programs progressed as  planned, meeting their initial cost and schedule estimates?
What challenges if any does SOCOM face in managing its acquisition  programs?
SOCOM has encountered difficulties over the past several years with two  of its flagship acquisition programs—the Advanced SEAL Delivery System  (ASDS) and the CV-22 Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft. The ASDS program  is funded by SOCOM and managed by the Navy. The basic CV-22 platform  is funded by the Air Force and produced under a Navy contract. SOCOM  funds SOF-peculiar modifications to the CV-22. Both the ASDS and CV-22  programs have experienced significant cost, schedule, and performance  problems because of requirements, technology, and design issues. Since  both programs began before 2001, we did not include them in our analysis.  However, we have reported separately on the programs, and those reports  are listed at the end of this report.
To assess SOCOM’s management of its acquisition programs, we collected  and reviewed information on all programs undertaken by the command  between 2001 and 2006. We analyzed the information to determine what  types of systems were being acquired and whether programs were meeting  planned cost, schedule, and quantity objectives. To identify the challenges  they face, we examined and analyzed pertinent documentation to include  DOD, military departments, and SOCOM directives, instructions, policies,  and operating procedures related to the Defense Acquisition System, and  we interviewed key officials from SOCOM’s Special Operations Acquisition  and Logistics and Resources and Requirements organizations. We relied  on previous GAO work as a framework for knowledge-based acquisition.
We performed our review from July 2006 through May 2007 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: SOCOM is one of ten combatant commands directly responsible to the  Secretary of Defense. The command was established by the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, and codified in 10 USC  Section 167. As a functional command, SOCOM’s primary responsibility is  to prepare the special operations forces (SOF) to carry out assigned  missions. When appropriate, SOCOM may be called upon to conduct  special operations activities unilaterally or provide support to other U.S.  military forces. In 2003, the Secretary of Defense expanded SOCOM’s role  to include leading the DOD’s GWOT operations. In this central role,  SOCOM plans, directs, and executes special operations in the conduct of  the GWOT in order to disrupt and destroy terrorist networks that threaten  the United States, its citizens, and its interests worldwide. SOCOM also  organizes, trains, and equips SOF warriors provided to the geographic  combatant commanders and to the American ambassadors and their  country teams. In keeping with this expanded role, DOD has begun to   re-tool SOCOM from primarily a supporting command into a command  responsible for planning, synchronizing, and executing missions in the  GWOT. SOCOM is headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa,  Florida, and has four component commands, and one sub-unified  command located at different military bases. The Marine Corps Special  Operations Command joined SOCOM on February 24, 2006. Table 1 shows  the end strength of each of the component commands.
Congress created SOCOM to improve the ability of the United States to  conduct special operations. Congress vested the command with the  responsibility and the authority for the development and acquisition of  SOF-peculiar equipment, the authority to exercise the functions of the  head of agency, and the authority to execute its own budget. SOF-peculiar  equipment is defined as equipment, materials, supplies, and services  required for SOF activities for which there is no service-common  requirement. According to SOCOM, these are limited to items and services  initially designed for, or used by, SOF until adopted for service-common  use by other DOD forces; modifications approved for application to  standard items and services used by other DOD forces; and items and  services critical for the immediate accomplishment of a SOF activity.
To fund the acquisition of SOF-peculiar equipment, SOCOM was also given  responsibility for supervising a separate Major Force Program-11 budget  account. Congress determined that a dedicated funding mechanism was  necessary because, in the past, the military departments had tended to  give lower priority to SOF’s equipment needs than to their own needs.   For fiscal year 2006, SOCOM’s total budget was $7.2 billion, of which   $1.9 billion was for development-and-acquisition-related purposes.
In acquiring SOF equipment, SOCOM falls under the same DOD acquisition  policies and guidelines and workforce requirements that apply to the  military departments and other defense agencies. The military  departments and SOCOM are governed by DOD’s 5000 Series for the  Defense Acquisition System. Similarly, each military department, along  with SOCOM, has its own policies and procedures to implement higher  level directives and guide the management of acquisition activities within  the military departments or command.
SOCOM’s acquisition workforce training and tenure is governed by the  Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), enacted in  1990. The Act specifically created a formal acquisition corps and defined  educational, experience, and tenure criteria needed for key positions,  including program managers, contracting officers, and other personnel  involved in the acquisition process. According to DOD, members of the  acquisition corps may earn three progressive certification levels—basic  (Level I), intermediate (Level II), and advanced (Level III). Each  certification level is comprised of a combination of education, experience,  and training elements. Certification recognizes the level to which a  member of the acquisition workforce has achieved functional and core  acquisition competencies required by a specific career field. Members of  SOCOM’s acquisition workforce are required to meet the same training  and certification requirements as those in the military departments.
SOCOM’s approach to acquisition management also has some distinctive  features. The command is unique in DOD in that it plans, funds, acquires,  and sustains weapon systems all under one roof. Specifically, all the key  entities involved in the acquisition life-cycle process—requirements  developers, comptroller, contracting personnel, logistics planners, and  program offices—are colocated. SOCOM also uses a centralized approach  to assess and prioritize requirements and select programs based on  competing needs and available resources. SOCOM’s customers—the SOF  warriors—are directly involved in determining what weapon systems are  pursued. In addition, SOCOM can arrange to transfer program  management and milestone decision authority responsibilities to one of  the military departments to execute the program on behalf of SOCOM.  SOCOM has done this with many of its programs that involve some  modification of military department-provided equipment or in cases where  the military departments may have greater technical and program  management expertise. Further description of how SOCOM is structured  to manage its acquisitions is provided in appendix II.
section_title: SOCOM’s Acquisition Programs Are Consistent with the Command’s Mission
paragraphs: SOCOM has undertaken a diverse set of acquisition programs since  January 2001 that are consistent with the command’s mission to address  unique SOF needs and those needs for which there are no service-common  requirement. SOCOM has committed about $6 billion to date on these  programs. The vast majority of SOCOM’s acquisition programs are ACAT  III level in size, have short acquisition cycles, and use modified  commercial off-the-shelf and nondevelopmental items or modify existing  service equipment and assets. In acquiring systems, SOCOM has  emphasized the need for “80 percent” solutions that provide improved  capabilities incrementally to the warfighter in reasonable time frames,  rather than major development efforts that require advanced technologies  and years of research and development. Both the ASDS and CV-22  programs were started in the 1990s. Since 2001, SOCOM has undertaken  only one ACAT I level program. It was to develop a common avionics  package for its fleet of transport, tanker, and gunship aircraft. SOCOM’s  acquisition plans for the future—as reflected in its current Future Year  Defense Program—continue to maintain its SOF-peculiar focus.
subsections: section_title: Most of SOCOM’s Acquisition Programs Are Small
paragraphs: SOCOM initiated 86 acquisition programs from 2001 to 2006 to meet SOF- peculiar requirements, which can be grouped into five major areas: rotary  wing, fixed wing, maritime systems, information and intelligence systems,  and special operations forces warrior equipment (e.g., vehicles and  weapons). Table 2 shows the number and funding for these programs by  each major grouping.
Funding ($M)
As table 3 shows, 76 of SOCOM’s 86 acquisition programs are ACAT III  level in size, and the majority of these programs use nondevelopmental  and commercial off-the- shelf items to meet SOF-peculiar needs. A further  breakdown of these programs, depicted in table 4, indicates that most cost  less than $25 million. The small number of larger, ACAT I and II level  programs are fixed and rotary wing systems, costing $200 million or more.  These larger programs involve modifications to existing platform systems  and more substantial technology development efforts. The one ACAT I  level program SOCOM initiated since 2001—the Common Avionics  Architecture for Penetration (CAAP) program—is intended to provide  specialized capabilities for MC-130H and AC-130H/U transport, tanker, and  gunship aircraft, including low probability of detection and improved  terrain following and avoidance radar.
Several key examples of the types of programs SOCOM has undertaken  are described below.
subsections: section_title: Leaflet Delivery System
paragraphs: The leaflet delivery system is an ACAT III program that was fielded by  SOCOM at a cost of about $20 million. The system uses a fully reusable,  commercial-off-the-shelf, unmanned aerial vehicle as a component of the  autonomously guided parafoil system it has developed. The delivery  system is capable of delivering leaflets or psychological operations  materials to target audiences in peacetime and in war. It took SOCOM  about 8 months to field this capability to the SOF warrior. It can be ground  launched from the back of a high-mobility multiwheeled vehicle and air  launched from a C-130, C-141, or C-17 cargo aircraft. Figure 1 below shows  the leaflet delivery system.
SOCOM’s current family of sniper rifles was acquired as  nondevelopmental and commercial off-the-shelf items, which according to  the program office, enables rapid acquisition of an initial capability as well  as efficient spiral development of enhanced capabilities as mission  requirements direct. SOCOM currently has four rifles in its family of sniper  rifles, the MK 11—7.62mm Sniper Support Rifle, the MK 12—5.56mm  Special Purpose Rifle, the MK 13—.300 Winchester Magnum, and the   MK 15—.50 caliber. Each will only fire one type of ammunition and with  varying effective ranges. Two of the sniper rifles, MK 11 and MK 12, will be  replaced by the Sniper Support Rifle variant of the SOF Combat Assault  Rifle, which is an ACAT III program consisting of a modified commercial  off-the-shelf system, and is estimated to cost about $50 million. The new  sniper rifle is a modular design, and the caliber of the rifle can be changed  by replacing the barrel, bolt, and trigger modules. The life expectancy of  the SOCOM rifles shown in figure 2 is about 5 years. Therefore, according  to the SOF Warrior program office, SOF plans a phased replacement of  like or enhanced capability every 5 years.
SOCOM has an ACAT II program underway, estimated to cost about   $200 million, which modifies the Army’s service-common CH-47 helicopter  to meet its SOF-peculiar requirements. Several features on the aircraft are  SOCOM-peculiar such as the long aerial refueling probe on the front of the  aircraft, the standardized extended range fuel tank, and the common  aviation architecture systems cockpit. The CH-47 helicopter, when  modified by SOCOM, becomes a MH-47G helicopter that provides SOCOM  with a heavy assault helicopter with the latest avionics, sensors, aircraft  survivability features, and weapons systems. All MH-47 helicopters in  SOCOM’s inventory—which includes the MH-47D and the MH-47E  aircraft—will be converted to the MH-47G configuration over time.  According to SOCOM, at least two of the SOF-peculiar features on the   MH-47G helicopter were adopted by the Army and are now service- common features. SOCOM developed standardized engines and an  enhanced air transportation kit that were designed to meet a SOF-peculiar  requirement. However, once they operational, the Army decided it could  use the capability as well and adopted it. Figure 3 shows some of the basic  modifications to the CH-47 that were provided by the Army and those that  were provided by SOCOM.
section_title: Some SOCOM Programs Are Targeted to Urgent Needs
paragraphs: In addition to regular acquisition programs, SOCOM has acquired various  equipment and material to meet urgent needs related to planned and  ongoing military operations. According to SOCOM officials, urgent needs  qualify for consideration if they meet one of two criteria: a potential  mission failure or loss of life. Because of the urgency of these needs,  SOCOM’s focus is on acquiring readily available equipment in short time  frames. Since 2001, SOCOM has addressed about 50 urgent mission needs  and fielded equipment to its deployed SOF warriors at cost of about   $339 million. For example, to address an urgent operational need to move  personnel and materiel more effectively in Afghanistan and Iraq without  attracting local attention or projecting an overt military presence, SOCOM  acquired and modified about 150 commercial off-the-shelf 4x4 trucks,  sedans, and sport utility vehicles and fielded them in about 4 weeks.  Figure 4 below shows an example of a modified commercial truck used by  SOCOM.
According to SOCOM officials, urgent needs are not to be used as a means  of circumventing or accelerating the normal program approval or funding  processes. To that end, equipment acquired via the urgent needs process is  fielded and sustained only for the duration of the military operation. The  sponsoring Component Commander is responsible for determining post- operation disposition of any equipment acquired as a result of an urgent  needs request.
SOCOM has also fielded critical combat-related technologies through  DOD’s Advanced Concept Technology Development program. DOD  initiated the program in 1994 to help get new technologies that meet  critical military needs into the hands of users faster and at less cost than  the traditional acquisition process. Over the past 5 years, SOCOM has  fielded seven Advanced Concept Technology Development programs at a  cost of about $385 million. For example, as shown in the figure 5, SOCOM  fielded the MANPACK radio threat detector which was an Advanced  Concept program. The MANPACK is designed to provide the basic  capability to identify and locate threat and friendly emitters, locate  unknown emitters, and provide situational awareness to the SOF operator  with little or no interaction from the user.
SOCOM’s acquisition plan for the future—as reflected in its current Future  Year Defense Program—continues to maintain a focus on providing   SOF-peculiar equipment. The acquisition programs SOCOM plans to start  over the fiscal year 2007 to 2011 time frame are similar to the programs  that SOCOM is currently acquiring. There are 13 acquisition programs  remaining in SOCOM’s fiscal year 2007 to 2011 plan, and all are at the  ACAT III level. These programs continue to be small scale, low cost, and  will employ modified commercial-off-the-shelf and nondevelopmental  items. For example, the SOF Combat Assault sniper rifle was among the  remaining 2007 to 2011 programs and is SOF-peculiar and a  nondevelopmental item.
section_title: SOCOM’S Acquisition Program Performance Has Been Mixed
paragraphs: Fifty-one (about 60 percent) of the 86 acquisition programs SOCOM has  undertaken since 2001 have progressed as planned, either staying within  original cost and schedule estimates or experiencing cost increases  unrelated to progress, such as for adding quantities to support ongoing  combat operations . The other 35 (40 percent) of SOCOM’s 86 programs  have experienced or are likely to experience modest to, in a number of  cases, significant cost increases and schedule delays due to a range of  technical, programmatic, or funding issues. Although fewer in number,  these programs make up about 50 percent of SOCOM’s total funding for its  acquisition programs. Ten of the programs have an estimated schedule slip  of at least one year, and several programs were canceled because of a  need to fund higher priorities or because of technical issues encountered  in developing the weapon system. The programs that have not progressed  as planned tend to be the larger, more complex platform-based programs  SOCOM is developing and programs where SOCOM is dependent on the  military departments for the basic platform or for equipment and/or other  resources, such as program management support. Programs that are  smaller, with less development risk, have better results.
As shown in table 5, there are some differences in the type of programs  that are and are not progressing as planned, but the overall picture is  mixed.
In terms of the number of programs, fixed wing and SOF warrior systems  comprise a large proportion (25 out of 35) of those that are not meeting  original cost and schedule estimates. However, when viewed by the  amount of funding allocated to these programs, fixed and rotary wing  systems make up the majority ($1,844 million out of $2,521 million) that  are not progressing as planned. We were not able to put these results in  context, that is, to compare them with DOD as a whole to determine  whether SOCOM’s performance was typical or atypical. This is primarily  because of the fact that DOD does not keep aggregate performance data  on ACAT III programs—which comprise most of SOCOM’s acquisition  portfolio.
Many of the fixed and rotary wing programs are the larger programs in  SOCOM’s portfolio, involving modifications to existing military-service or  special-operations platform systems. As such, these programs require  more systems engineering and design/integration efforts than other  smaller programs being acquired by SOCOM. For example, the estimated  costs for SOCOM’s fixed-wing AC-130U 30-millimeter gun-modification  program has increased 92 percent because of technical and design issues,  and the program has been deferred until fiscal year 2008 when additional  funding may be available. Likewise, the AC-130U+4 program, which is  intended to modify the C-130 aircraft into a side-firing gunship, has been  delayed by 7 months because of technical issues with the aircraft ‘s  configuration and design.
Many of SOCOM programs that are not progressing as planned are also  programs in which the military departments are involved in a management  capacity. As shown in table 6, 22 of the 35 programs that have not stayed  within original cost and schedule estimates have one of the military  departments in a management role—either as the milestone decision  authority or program manager or both. All of the fixed and rotary wing  programs that are not progressing as planned are in this category. In  contrast, however, SOCOM does manage its five largest information and  intelligence system programs, but they are not progressing as planned.
In assessing how programs have progressed, we identified a small number  of programs (8 out of 86) that SOCOM canceled or deferred because of a  need to fund higher priorities or because of technical issues encountered  during development. Most of these programs were canceled early before  significant funding and time were committed. In the other few programs,  however, we found significant time and effort was invested before they  were cancelled. For example, SOCOM’s High Power Fiber Optic Towed  Decoy program, which was being developed to provide a fiber optic towed  decoy capability to SOCOM’s fleet of AC and MC-130 aircraft, was  canceled after spending about $85 million because of higher funding  priorities. SOCOM’s one ACAT 1 program, the Common Avionics  Architecture for Penetration (CAAP) program was also subsequently  terminated. The CAAP program, which was managed by the U.S. Air  Force, was being designed to provide SOF-peculiar avionics capability to  the U.S. Air Force’s Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) on the   MC-130 H and AC-130H/U aircraft. It was designed to give SOF-peculiar  capabilities to the aircraft, including enhanced abilities to follow terrain  and avoid detection while using Air Force-provided radar. However,  SOCOM terminated all funding for the CAAP program in its fiscal years  2008 to 2013 program objective memorandum. SOCOM determined that it  was cost prohibitive to continue the program after the Air Force ran into  problems with the AMP program and determined that the cost to complete  development of both AMP and CAAP would more than double the original  estimates.
section_title: SOCOM Faces Management and Workforce Challenges in Its Acquisition Programs
paragraphs: SOCOM faces management and workforce challenges in ensuring its  acquisition programs are completed on time and within budget. Urgent  requirements arising from SOCOM’s role in Iraq and Afghanistan, and its  new role in the GWOT have and will continue to challenge SOCOM’s  ability to balance near- and long-term needs against available funding  resources. For example, in order to fund almost 50 urgent deployment  acquisitions in the past 5 years, SOCOM has had to reallocate $259 million  from existing and planned acquisition programs. Additionally, even though  SOCOM employs elements of a knowledge-based acquisition approach, it  is not consistently applied, and some programs have started without a  good match between requirements and resources. SOCOM also has  difficulty tracking progress on programs for which it has delegated  management authority to the military departments and addressing  problems earlier in these programs. Moreover, a key SOCOM tool for  managing its acquisition programs has not been consistently maintained  with up-to-date information. In addition, SOCOM has encountered  workforce challenges such as being able to hire civilian personnel in  reasonable time frames and ensuring that its military personnel are fully  compliant with DOD standards.
subsections: section_title: SOCOM Management Challenges
paragraphs: Addressing high-priority urgent needs from the field will continue to  challenge SOCOM’s ability to complete existing programs on time and  within budget. In its roles in Iraq, Afghanistan, and GWOT, SOCOM will  continue to fulfill urgent needs with acquisition programs. But because of  the short time frames involved, funding for these programs is not built into  the budget. In the past 5 years, SOCOM reallocated about $259 million  from budgeted programs to fund almost 50 urgent deployment  acquisitions. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, SOCOM did begin to receive  money from Congress in its budget—about $80 million and $22 million  respectively—to help defray some of the costs of its urgent deployment  acquisition programs. According to SOCOM’s Acquisition Executive,  urgent deployment acquisitions are expected to continue over the next  several years, and the command anticipates requesting about $20 to   $25 million each year from 2008 to 2013 to help pay for these needs.  Although funding shifts are disruptive in SOCOM, as they are in the  military departments, SOCOM’s strategic planning structure for assessing  and selecting programs is well-suited for making the trade-offs among  priorities needed to address urgent needs.
SOCOM also has difficulty tracking progress and addressing problems  early in programs where it has delegated management authority to the  military departments. Having access to all the military departments  provides SOCOM the means to leverage resources and expertise that may  not reside at SOCOM, such as program management, engineering and  technical services, testing and evaluation support, and logistical support.  However, in some cases when SOCOM has relied on the military  departments for technical or basic capabilities, its programs have been  adversely affected when the department-provided capabilities are delayed.  When delays occur, there tends to be a cascading effect on SOCOM  programs. For example, initial schedule delays in the U.S. Air Force’s AMP  for C-130 aircraft resulted in delays in SOCOM’s ability to acquire the  CAAP program on the C-130 aircraft. The AMP program was to provide a  basic cockpit configuration and avionics capability for different C-130  aircraft, and SOCOM’s CAAP capability would provide additional avionics  capabilities for SOF missions. The AMP program encountered technical  and integration problems during installation trials and is now being  restructured. Because of delays and cost growth with AMP, cost to  complete the CAAP program increased significantly leading to SOCOM’s  decision to cancel the CAAP program and defer this capability.
According to SOCOM’s acquisition executive, although SOCOM has over- arching memorandums of agreement establishing program management  arrangements with each of the military departments, not all of the  agreements are signed at the appropriate levels of authority within the  military departments. While the agreement with the Army is signed by the  Secretary of the Army, the Air Force and Navy agreements are signed by  the chiefs of staff. This is a challenge to SOCOM because acquisition and  budget authority resides with the military department secretary and not  with the chief of staff. When problems occur in programs managed by the  Air Force or Navy, SOCOM may have less standing to make a case that  they are not living up to the memorandums of agreement, than the  command would with the Army. SOCOM also acknowledges that  memorandums of agreement for specific programs—particularly the  larger, more complex programs SOCOM delegates to the military  departments—have not been detailed enough in terms of laying out the  roles, responsibilities, and expectations for executing programs, nor  detailed enough in laying out how SOCOM will be able to track progress  and participate in regular program reviews with the military departments.  While written agreements by themselves may not result in better   SOCOM-military department programs, they are important in that they  provide a foundation for effective program management. SOCOM is  currently taking steps to update the written agreements with the military  departments and also examining whether some of its programs would be  better under SOCOM management.
SOCOM employs elements of a knowledge-based acquisition approach, but  it is not consistently applied. We have frequently reported on the need to  develop a solid, executable business case before committing resources to  a new product development effort. A business case should be based on  DOD’s acquisition policy and lessons learned from leading commercial  firms and other successful DOD programs. Our work has shown that the  business case in its simplest form demonstrates evidence that (1) the  warfighter’s needs are valid and that they can best be met with the chosen  concept, and (2) the chosen concept can be developed and produced  within existing resources—that is: proven technologies, design knowledge,  adequate funding, and adequate time to deliver the product when it is  needed. We found that although SOCOM has a systematic strategic  planning process to prioritize and select programs, it has started some  programs, particularly the larger and more complex programs, without  ensuring that there was a solid match between the requirements and  resources to complete the development. For example, SOCOM terminated  the Common Avionics Architecture for Penetration Program because of  excessive cost growth resulting from technical problems and schedule  delays with the Air Force’s Avionics Modernization Program. While  SOCOM attributes the cause of program problems in part to poor  contractor performance, it also acknowledges that technology challenges  and development costs were significantly underestimated when the  program started. In addition, the Navy-managed Advanced SEAL Delivery  System (ASDS), which has been one of SOCOM’s largest investments since  ASDS started in the mid-90s, encountered significant problems because  the capabilities required for the delivery system outstripped the  developer’s resources in terms of technical knowledge, time, and money.  Although the first boat was accepted for operational use in 2003, it did not  meet technical or performance requirements. Currently, reliability issues  with the boat are being examined, and an assessment of alternate material  solutions are underway to determine how best to address the remaining  operational requirements.
SOCOM’s tool for managing its acquisition programs—called the Special  Operations Acquisition and Logistics Information System (SOALIS)—lacks  sufficient oversight and maintenance. At the time of our review, we found  that information for most programs was out of date and that some  programs had not been updated in years, even though the program  executive officers and program directors are required to keep SOALIS  accurate and up to date on at least a monthly basis. Further, we found no  enforcement mechanism to ensure oversight of this important  management tool. According to SOCOM’s Standard Operating Procedures  Directive, SOALIS is intended to give SOCOM decision makers and  stakeholders essential information on the status and progress of ongoing  acquisition efforts. Although regular progress reviews take place on  individual programs, the lack of up-to-date information on all programs  can impede SOCOM’s ability to conduct effective oversight.
section_title: SOCOM Workforce Challenges
paragraphs: SOCOM’s acquisition workforce has remained relatively small for many  years, but plans are underway to increase the size of the acquisition  workforce about 75 percent by the end of 2008. This is being done to  address the growth in acquisitions work that has taken place over the past  several years as well as expected future growth in acquisitions with  SOCOM’s expanded role in the GWOT. Since 2001, SOCOM’s workforce  has remained fairly stable, growing by only 10 positions to a total of   185 government—civilian and military—acquisition employees. SOCOM  plans to expand its governmental acquisition workforce to about   300 employees. Currently, the governmental workforce is heavily  supplemented by contractors. Specifically, contractors comprise about  two-thirds of the overall workforce supporting SOCOM’s acquisition  activities. The contractor support includes logistics, training, education,  and testing support, and engineering and technical services. In order to  prepare for the upcoming workforce expansion, SOCOM is conducting a  manpower study. The study, which is scheduled to be completed in fiscal  year 2008, is designed to assess the composition of the workforce and  determine workloads associated with each SOCOM position—including all  acquisition positions—to aid SOCOM officials in their placement of newly  hired government employees. Also, to lower costs, SOCOM’s acquisition  executive anticipates a reduced reliance on contractors in conjunction  with the expansion of the governmental acquisition workforce. How much  of a reduction will be based on the outcome of the ongoing manpower  study and resource considerations.
As can be seen in table 7, the majority of SOCOM’s current civilian  acquisition workforce has attained DOD’s level III certification.
Additionally, SOCOM’s senior level civilian acquisition workforce at the  GS-14, GS-15, and senior executive service levels, along with those  assigned to Critical Acquisition Positions that require level III  certification, have all earned level III certification. We found that the  vacancy rate for civilian acquisition positions is about 10 percent and that  the bulk of the unfilled positions are at the GS-14 and GS-15 levels, leaving  vacancies in some key management positions. The command has  encountered challenges in filling vacancies in the upper-level, civilian- acquisition-workforce positions. According to SOCOM’s acquisition  executive, the difficulty in hiring qualified personnel to fill these critical  vacancies is due, in part, to the lengthy process required to hire qualified  acquisition personnel. SOCOM uses the Air Force personnel system as its  executive hiring agency. However, this process has taken as long as   240 days to hire at the upper levels.
SOCOM’s military acquisition workforce certification rated at level III is  not as high as its civilian counterparts. This is particularly true for critical  acquisition positions, which usually involve significant supervisory or  management responsibilities (e.g., program manager). As table 8 shows,  about 40 percent of these positions are held by officers who do not meet  the level III certification standards required by DOD.
While DOD guidelines allow acquisition officers to attain the appropriate  certification up to 24 months after being assigned to a critical position, we  found that 3 of SOCOM’s 22 military officers filling these positions are still  lacking the required certification. Although waivers are permitted on a  case-by-case basis, at the time of our review SOCOM did not have a  process in place to review and grant required waivers for those officers  not in compliance with DOD standards.
One of the challenges SOCOM faces in filling military acquisition positions  is that the command often requires military operational experience and/or  specialized skills. According to SOCOM, Army and Navy policies require  their acquisition officers to have operational assignments before being  assigned to the acquisition career field, but officers in the Air Force do not  have to gain prior operational experience. In addition, some of the  acquisition positions at SOCOM require unique special operations  experience. For instance, some of the Navy’s acquisition positions at  SOCOM are designated to be filled by Navy SEAL personnel, a group in  short supply and generally not trained in acquisition. Since SOCOM is  reliant on the services to provide military acquisition personnel to the  command, SOCOM runs the risk of not being able to fill acquisition  positions if it turns down candidates sent forward by the services who do  not meet all the position requirements.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Thus far, SOCOM has done well with small acquisitions that modify readily  available commercial technologies and nondevelopmental items. It has  had more difficulty delivering the more complex systems that involve  significant development and reliance on the military departments. As  SOCOM prepares for more growth in its acquisition function to meet the  expanding needs for special operations forces, it will be important for the  command to leverage its experience into better results in the future. For  those more complex acquisitions that must be undertaken, opportunities  exist for SOCOM to improve its results by ensuring that better business  cases exist before embarking on such acquisitions, especially if they  depend on acquisitions being managed by other military departments.   In addition, the foundation for all acquisitions can be improved by   (1) ensuring that the size and composition of the workforce is a good  match for the acquisition workload undertaken by SOCOM and (2) having  a sound management information system to track programs.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Actions
paragraphs: To better position SOCOM to achieve the right acquisition program  outcomes, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following  three steps to ensure:    SOCOM establishes sound business cases for its more complex and  military department-managed acquisition programs. Integral to this is  applying the elements of a knowledge-based acquisition strategy  (That is: programs match requirements with resources.) and having  effective agreements in place with the military departments that  specify clear roles, responsibilities, and expectations for executing  programs.    as SOCOM increases its acquisition workforce, it (1) obtains  personnel with the skills and abilities needed for more complex  acquisitions, (2) makes sure personnel meet DOD acquisition  certification level requirements, and (3) has the ability to make the  hiring process as efficient as possible.
SOCOM improves the accuracy, timeliness, and usefulness of its  acquisition management information system. To accomplish this,  SOCOM should (1) establish enforcement mechanisms to make sure  program managers submit updated information on a regular basis  and (2) conduct quality checks to make sure the information is  reliable.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In DOD’s letter commenting on a draft of our report, DOD partially  concurred with the first recommendation and fully concurred with the  other two recommendations. In partially concurring with the first  recommendation, DOD agreed with the need to update memorandums of  agreement between SOCOM and the military departments and apply  elements of a knowledge-based acquisition strategy but only after it is  defined by DOD within the 5000 series of documents. This should not  result in a delay in action on DOD’s part as DOD’s acquisition policy  already includes the key elements of a knowledge-based acquisition  approach particularly regarding technology, design, and production. It is  important that SOCOM follow this policy because we have found that  programs experience cost, schedule, and performance problems when  they proceed into system development and initial manufacturing with  lower levels of knowledge than specified in DOD’s acquisition policy.   We believe that if properly implemented and enforced, a knowledge-based  acquisition approach, as defined in DOD acquisition policy, can help  reduce development risks and lead to better program outcomes on a more  consistent basis.
DOD’s written comments appear at appendix III. Additionally, SOCOM  provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to this report to the Secretary of  Defense, Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy, and other  interested parties. We will also provide copies to others on request.   In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site  at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  on (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in  appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess what type of programs SOCOM has undertaken and whether  they have progressed as planned, we collected and reviewed information  on all programs undertaken by the command between 2001 and 2006. We  collected specific information on each program pertaining to its size, use  of commercial off-the-shelf and non-developmental items, and acquisition  strategy. In addition, we collected data on planned versus actual cost,  schedule and quantities to be fielded. We analyzed this information to  determine what types of systems were being acquired and the extent to  which programs were meeting planned cost, schedule, and quantity  objectives. We relied on GAO’s Applied Research and Methodology teams  to array and analyze the acquisition programs in our review. Further, we  interviewed SOCOM’s senior-level program executive officers to access  and review available data on about 50 urgent acquisition systems  programs, and a small number of the Advanced Concept Technology  Demonstration programs transitioned by SOCOM to its forces.
To assess and determine the management and workforce challenges facing  SOCOM, we (1) reviewed and analyzed the current impact that unfunded  near-term requirements had on the regular approved acquisition programs;  (2) we reviewed and analyzed the command’s key acquisition program  management tool—the Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics  Information System—for managing its acquisition programs; and (3) to  assess the workforce challenges that SOCOM faces, we interviewed key  SOCOM acquisition officials from SOCOM’s Special Operations  Acquisition and Logistics Center and key civilian and military personnel  management officials at Tampa, Florida. We relied on previous GAO work  as a framework for knowledge-based acquisition.
We performed our review from July 2006 through June 2007 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: SOCOM’s Policies, Procedures, and Organizational Structure for Managing Acquisitions
subsections: section_title: SOCOM Plans, Resources, Acquires, and Sustains Weapon Systems All under One Roof
paragraphs: Unlike the military departments, which have geographically dispersed  acquisition organizations, SOCOM’s acquisition activities are  geographically consolidated. All acquisition support functions integral to  SOCOM’s acquisition activities—contracting, budgeting, and requirements  setting—are located at SOCOM headquarters.
The SOCOM Commander has duties analogous to both service Secretaries  and the service Chiefs. For example, like the Secretaries, he has budget,  programming, research, development and acquisition, contracting, and  procurement authority, and he can direct investigations and audits. Similar  to the service Chiefs, the Commander of SOCOM is charged with  organizing, training, and equipping SOF personnel, establishing  requirements, conducting operational testing, and providing operational  logistics. Unlike other combatant commanders, the SOCOM Commander  has both command and acquisition authorities—he is the only combatant  commander with a “checkbook.” This arrangement allows SOCOM  officials to plan, resource, and acquire SOF-peculiar equipment.
SOCOM decides what weapon systems and equipment to acquire through a  centralized strategic-planning and resource allocation process where  requirements are assessed and prioritized and programs are selected  based on competing needs and available resources. The process has many  of the characteristics of an integrated portfolio management framework  that GAO recently reported as lacking at DOD in its departmentwide  approach to weapon system investments. That is, SOCOM addresses  weapon system programs collectively from an enterprise level, rather than  as independent and unrelated programs. Proposed programs are assessed  through a screening process that weighs the relative costs, benefits, and  risks of each, and selects those that help SOCOM balance near and future  term opportunities, different SOF component capability needs, and  available resources against the demand for new and ongoing systems and  equipment.
SOCOM has a close relationship with its customers—the SOF  community—and receives inputs regarding capability needs directly from  SOF operators and component commands on an ongoing basis. SOCOM  officials with operational experience and expertise in different program  areas assess and prioritize the requests from the component commands on  a bi-annual basis. These officials rate each proposal in terms of its  potential to fulfill required military operational tasks. The officials then  forward their assessments to SOCOM’s central decision-making body—  the Board of Directors—for a final determination of what acquisition  programs should be undertaken by the command and where resources  should go.
The Board of Directors is composed of the SOCOM commander, all SOF  component commanders, as well as the Assistant Secretary of Defense,  Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC))—OSD’s  principal advisor on special operations activities and the organization  charged with interfacing with SOCOM. ASD(SO/LIC)’s position on the  Board of Directors allows DOD insight and a voice into what acquisition  programs SOCOM undertakes. Although DOD has an oversight role and  decision authority over ACAT I programs, as previously discussed, over   95 percent of SOCOM’s acquisition programs are below the ACAT I level.  Therefore, ASD(SO/LIC) has no direct day-to-day oversight role in the bulk  of SOCOM programs. The Board of Directors is SOCOM’s primary and  final approval authority regarding regular planned SOF-peculiar  acquisition programs.
Once the need for a SOF capability is verified and approved through  SOCOM’s strategic planning process, it is reviewed through DOD’s Joint  Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to verify that it  is a SOF-unique requirement, and not duplicative of a Service-common  system. However, according to SOCOM officials, JCIDS often fails to  resolve time-sensitive SOF capabilities gaps that may be identified during  active combat. Therefore, to support SOF acquisition priorities, SOCOM  established its own version of the larger joint-requirement-setting  process—the SOF Capabilities Integration and Development System— which interoperates with the command’s Acquisition Management System  and Strategic Planning Process.
SOCOM employs a two-tiered SOF Capabilities Integration and  Development System—standard and fast track—to support SOF priorities.  The standard capabilities process parallels the JCIDS process although it  is internal to SOCOM to specifically address SOF-unique capability gaps.  The fast track process is used when a SOCOM component identifies an  urgent and critical capability gap—derived from a combat-mission need  statement. This process is not intended as a means to circumvent the  command’s standard acquisition portfolio management process, rather it is  SOCOM’s method to accelerate its response to compelling and time- sensitive SOF-peculiar needs.
Under the SOF Capabilities Integration and Development System,  validation and approval of a combat mission need statement mandates an  offset of resources as it constitutes a “must-pay” bill for SOCOM. Once the  mission need statement is approved through the Fast-Track CIDS process,  SOCOM officials initiate an urgent deployment acquisition to expedite the  acquisition and field the required equipment. At this point, command  officials reallocate resources to fund the urgent deployment acquisition.  SOCOM’s goal is to field equipment within 180 days of approval.
section_title: SOCOM Has Unique Program Management Structure Options
paragraphs: SOCOM can arrange to transfer program management and milestone  decision authority (MDA) responsibilities to one of the military  departments to execute the program on behalf of the command. SOCOM  has delegated responsibilities to the military departments in many of the  acquisition programs underway that involve some modification of military  department-provided equipment or in cases where the services have  greater technical and specific platform program management expertise,  such as fixed and rotary wing aircraft or submarine programs. SOCOM’s  Acquisition Executive is the milestone decision authority for all SOCOM  acquisition programs, unless the executive delegates that authority.  However, through memorandums of agreement with the Army, Navy, and  Air Force, SOCOM employs a range of program management structures.  The command has the following three basic options for managing  individual programs:     SOCOM can manage a program in-house by designating both a  SOCOM program manager and MDA to execute the program.
SOCOM, through a program specific memorandum of agreement  with a military department, can agree on appointment of a  department program manager to manage the program under the  direction of a SOCOM MDA.
SOCOM can transfer both program management and MDA  responsibility to a military department through a program-specific  memorandum of agreement, to execute the program on behalf of  SOCOM.
Applicable policies and procedures vary somewhat for each of the  program management options just described. For example, for SOCOM  MDA and SOCOM managed programs, SOCOM’s acquisition and logistics  directives and standard operating procedures apply, and according to  SOCOM, any exceptions are noted in the acquisition program’s Acquisition  Decision Memorandum. Secondly, for SOCOM MDA and military  department managed programs, responsibilities and exceptions to SOCOM  procedures are intended to be defined in program specific memorandums  of agreement. Finally, for programs with a military department MDA and  program manager, the military department’s policies and procedures  normally apply. Table 9 illustrates how the acquisition executive has  delegated or retained decision authority for programs undertaken from  2001 to 2006.
SOCOM is the MDA for over 60 percent of its acquisition programs. The  SOCOM MDA could be the Acquisition Executive or a program executive  officer, depending on the size and importance of the program. The  Acquisition Executive has delegated the MDA role to the military  departments for approximately 37 percent of SOCOM’s acquisition  programs. For programs managed directly by SOCOM, the command has a  hierarchical management structure, as shown in figure 6, which resembles  the military departments in its internal acquisition organizational make-up.
The program executive offices utilize program managers and system  acquisition managers organized by program. System acquisition managers  are charged with assisting the military department in program planning  and execution and also representing SOCOM at military department-led  integrated-product teams, technical conferences, and program reviews.  System acquisition managers are normally used when the MDA and  program manager or both options are assigned to a military department.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact above, John Oppenheim, Assistant Director,  Leon S. Gill, John Ortiz, Michele Williamson, Julia Kennon, Greg Campbell,  and Marie Ahearn made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Acquistions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.   GAO-07-406SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Defense Acquistions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.   GAO-06-391. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006.
Defense Acquistions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.   GAO-05-301. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Defense Acquistions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs.   GAO-04-248. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Defense Acquistions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs.   GAO-03-476. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.
Defense Acquistions: Advanced SEAL Delivery System Program Needs  Increased Oversight. GAO-03-442. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2003.
Defense Acquistions: Readiness of the Marine Corps’ V-22 Aircraft for  Full-Rate Production. GAO-01-369R. Washington, D.C.: February 20, 2001.
Navy Aviation: V-22 Cost and Capability to Meet Requirements Are Yet  to Be Determined. NSIAD/GAO-98-13. Washington, D.C.: October 22, 1997.