Border Security: Summary of Covert Tests and Security Assessments for the Senate Committee on Finance, 2003-2007
Published: 2008-05-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: From January 2003 to September 2007, GAO testified before the Committee on three occasions to describe security vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit to enter the country. GAO's first two testimonies focused on covert testing at ports of entry--the air, sea, and land locations where international travelers can legally enter the United States. In its third testimony, GAO focused on limited security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored border areas between land ports of entry. GAO was asked to summarize the results of covert testing and assessment work for these three testimonies. This report discusses the results of testing at land, sea, and air ports of entry; however, the majority of GAO's work was focused on land ports of entry. The unmanned and unmonitored border areas GAO assessed were defined as locations where the government does not maintain a manned presence 24 hours per day or where there was no apparent monitoring equipment in place. GAO assessed a nonrepresentative selection of these locations and did not attempt to evaluate all potential U.S. border security vulnerabilities. Further, GAO's work was limited in scope and cannot be projected to represent systemic weaknesses. In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since 2003. GAO did not attempt to verify the information provided by DHS, but has included the response in this report.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO investigators identified numerous border security vulnerabilities, both at ports of entry and at unmanned and unmonitored land border locations between the ports of entry. In testing ports of entry, undercover investigators carried counterfeit drivers' licenses, birth certificates, employee identification cards, and other documents, presented themselves at ports of entry and sought admittance to the United States dozens of times. They arrived in rental cars, on foot, by boat, and by airplane. They attempted to enter in four states on the northern border (Washington, New York, Michigan, and Idaho), three states on the southern border (California, Arizona, and Texas), and two other states requiring international air travel (Florida and Virginia). In nearly every case, government inspectors accepted oral assertions and counterfeit identification provided by GAO investigators as proof of U.S. citizenship and allowed them to enter the country. In total, undercover investigators made 42 crossings with a 93 percent success rate. On several occasions, while entering by foot from Mexico and by boat from Canada, investigators were not even asked to show identification. For example, at one border crossing in Texas in 2006, an undercover investigator attempted to show a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer his counterfeit driver's license, but the officer said, "That's fine, you can go" without looking at it. As a result of these tests, GAO concluded that terrorists could use counterfeit identification to pass through most of the tested ports of entry with little chance of being detected. In its most recent work, GAO shifted its focus from ports of entry and primarily performed limited security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored areas between ports of entry. The names of the states GAO visited for this limited security assessment have been withheld at the request of CBP. In four states along the U.S.-Canada border, GAO found state roads that were very close to the border that CBP did not appear to monitor. In three states, the proximity of the road to the border allowed investigators to cross undetected, successfully simulating the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from Canada. For example, in one apparently unmanned, unmonitored area on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to GAO's activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate the investigators and their simulated contraband. Also on the northern border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry in one state on the northern border that had posted daytime hours and were unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment was in operation, but that the only preventive measure to stop an individual from crossing the border into the United States was a barrier across the road that could be driven around. GAO also identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. GAO concluded that CBP faces significant challenges on the northern border, and that a determined cross-border violator would likely be able to bring radioactive materials or other contraband undetected into the United States by crossing the U.S.-Canada border at any of the assessed locations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Intelligence officials believe that the United States will face a persistent  and evolving terrorist threat and that the terrorist group al Qaeda will  intensify its efforts to put operatives here. From January 2003 to  September 2007, we testified on three occasions before your Committee to  describe security vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit to enter the  country. The vulnerabilities are related to traveler screening and border- protection efforts that were consolidated under Customs and Border  Protection (CBP), a component of the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS), in March 2003. Our first two testimonies were focused on covert  testing at ports of entry—the air, sea, and land locations where  international travelers can legally enter the United States. For our third  testimony, we focused on limited security assessments of unmanned and  unmonitored border areas between ports of entry.
This report summarizes the findings of the covert tests and security  assessment work performed for your Committee and reported at hearings  on January 30, 2003; August 2, 2006; and September 27, 2007. It is  important to note that fugitives, smugglers, illegal immigrants, or other  criminals could also take advantage of the vulnerabilities we identified. To  summarize our work, we reviewed our prior testimonies and the work  papers associated with them. We also requested information in writing  from DHS related to recent efforts to secure U.S. borders and address the  vulnerabilities highlighted by our work.
For our testing at ports of entry, we entered the states of Washington,  Idaho, Michigan, and New York from Canada; the states of California,  Arizona, and Texas from Mexico; the state of Florida from Jamaica; and  the state of Virginia from the Bahamas. To create counterfeit documents  we used software, hardware, and materials that are available to the public.  The tested ports of entry were a nonrepresentative selection we identified  using publicly available information. Because we tested a  nonrepresentative selection, it is not possible to project the results of our  work to any other ports of entry. The unmanned and unmonitored border  areas we visited were defined as locations where CBP does not maintain a  manned presence 24 hours per day or where there was no apparent  monitoring equipment in place. We performed limited security  assessments at a nonrepresentative selection of these locations and did  not attempt to evaluate all potential U.S. border security vulnerabilities.  Where possible, and at your request, investigators attempted to simulate  the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband  to highlight the severity of the vulnerability at these border areas. DHS  considered some of our results to be law-enforcement sensitive and  requested that we not include certain information in our report, such as  the names of states we visited for our September 2007 work on unmanned  and unmonitored locations.
We prepared this report from January to May 2008. However, all covert  tests and security assessment work were performed prior to DHS’s  January 31, 2008, revised document procedures for U.S. citizens at ports of  entry and it is therefore not possible to project our results to these new  procedures. We are reporting on the results of testing at land, sea, and air  ports of entry; however, the majority of our work was focused on land  ports of entry. Further, the results of our covert testing and security  assessments are applicable only to U.S. border security efforts and do not  relate to efforts made by other governments. Our work was limited in  scope and cannot be projected to represent systemic weaknesses in DHS  border-protection efforts. Further, it does not address the entry of  terrorists into the Bahamas, Canada, Jamaica, or Mexico. As noted in our  prior testimonies, we performed all covert testing and security assessment  work in accordance with standards prescribed by the President’s Council  on Integrity and Efficiency.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: CBP is the lead federal agency in charge of securing the nation’s borders.  When CBP was created, it represented a merger of components from three  agencies—the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Immigration and  Naturalization Service (INS), and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection  Service. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, its implementing  regulations, and CBP policies and procedures, CBP officers are required to  establish, at a minimum, the nationality of individuals and whether they  are eligible to enter the country at ports of entry. All international travelers  attempting to enter the country through ports of entry undergo primary  inspection, which is a preliminary screening procedure to identify those  legitimate international travelers who can readily be identified as  admissible.
Regarding land ports of entry, the United States shares over 5,000 miles of  border with Canada to the north (including the state of Alaska), and 1,900  miles of border with Mexico to the south. Individuals attempting to legally  enter the United States by land present themselves to a CBP officer at one  of the 170 ports of entry located along these borders. During the period of  our investigations, U.S. citizens could gain entry to the United States by  establishing their citizenship to the satisfaction of U.S. officials at a land  port of entry. While this frequently involved a citizen presenting their birth  certificate, photo identification (e.g., a driver’s license), or baptismal  records, the law did not require U.S. citizens to present any of these  documents as proof of citizenship. Until recently, U.S. citizens could enter  the country at land ports of entry based only on oral statements. However,  as of January 31, 2008, U.S. citizens age 19 and older are required, under  the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, to present both proof of identity  and citizenship when attempting to enter the United States by land.  Documents that would fulfill this requirement could include a passport, a  military ID with travel orders, or an enhanced driver’s license. In the  absence of a single document that establishes both proof of identity and  citizenship, U.S. citizens require multiple documents, such as a driver’s  license and a birth certificate, to enter the United States. Requirements for  entering the United States by sea are similar to those for entering by land.  Regarding air ports of entry, starting on January 23, 2007, U.S. citizens  were required, under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, to present  a passport or secure travel document when entering the United States.  Prior to the implementation of this initiative, U.S. citizens entering the  country by air from such locations as the Bahamas, Mexico, and Jamaica  could establish their citizenship by oral assertions and documents such as  drivers’ licenses and birth certificates.
It is illegal to enter the United States at any location other than a port of  entry. The U.S. Border Patrol, a component of CBP, patrols and monitors  areas between ports of entry. However, given limited resources and the  wide expanse of the border, the U.S. Border Patrol is limited in its ability  to monitor the border either through use of technology or with a  consistent manned presence. Commensurate with its perception of the  threat, CBP has distributed human resources differently on the northern  border than it has on the southern border. According to CBP, as of May  2007, it had 972 U.S. Border Patrol agents assigned to the northern border  and 11,986 agents assigned to the southern border. The number of agents  actually providing border protection at any given time is far smaller than  these figures suggest. As mentioned above, in the September 2007 hearing  on border security before your Committee, a CBP official stated that  roughly 250 U.S. Border Patrol agents were patrolling the U.S.–Canada  border at any given time—about a quarter of all agents reportedly assigned  to patrol the northern border during that period.
section_title: Security Vulnerabilities at U.S. Ports of Entry
paragraphs: We found two types of security vulnerabilities in our covert testing at ports  of entry. First, we found that, in the majority of cases, the government  inspectors who reviewed our undercover investigators’ counterfeit  documentation did not know that they were bogus and allowed them to  enter the country. Second, we found that government officials did not  always ask for identification. Although it was not a requirement for  government officials to ask for identification at the time we performed our  tests, we concluded that this was a major vulnerability that could allow  terrorists or other criminals to easily enter the country.
In table 1 below, each individual instance of an investigator crossing the  border is noted separately, although, in some cases, investigators crossed  the border in groups of two or more.
We consider our attempts to enter the country through sea and air ports of  entry as different from our land crossings. For one thing, we did not  perform the same amount of testing that we performed at land ports of  entry. For another, the standard for admittance via air ports of entry  continues to be stricter than via land and sea routes. In table 2 below, each  individual instance of an investigator entering the United States via air or  sea is noted separately.
Selected details related to these covert tests are discussed below.
subsections: section_title: Counterfeit Identification Accepted as Proof of Citizenship in Most Cases
paragraphs: For our 2003 testimony, investigators successfully entered the United  States using counterfeit drivers’ licenses and other bogus documentation  through a land port of entry in Washington. They also entered Florida via  air from Jamaica using the same counterfeit documentation. Similar  follow-up work was performed throughout 2003 and 2004, resulting in  successful entry at locations in Washington, New York, California, Texas,  and Virginia using counterfeit identification. In 2006, investigators  successfully entered the United States using counterfeit drivers’ licenses  and other bogus documentation through seven land ports of entry on the  northern and southern borders, adding the states of Michigan, Idaho, and  Arizona to the list of states they had entered.
In the majority of cases, investigators entered the country by land using  rental cars. When requested, they displayed counterfeit Virginia and West  Virginia drivers’ licenses and birth certificates to the government officials  at ports of entry. They also used bogus U.S. passports and, in one case, a  fake employee identification card in the name of a major U.S. airline.  Government officials typically inspected the documentation while  inquiring whether our undercover investigators were U.S. citizens. On  some occasions, the officials asked whether our investigators had  purchased anything in Canada or Mexico. In several instances, CBP  officials asked our investigators to leave their vehicles and inspected the  vehicles; they appeared to be searching for evidence of smuggling. In only  one case on the northern border, one of our undercover investigators was  denied entry because a CBP officer became suspicious of the expired U.S.  passport with substituted photo offered as proof of citizenship.
section_title: Undercover Investigators Did Not Show Identification in All Cases
paragraphs: For our 2003 testimony, we found that INS inspectors did not request  identification at a sea port of entry in Washington and a land port of entry  in California. Our investigators’ oral assertions that they were U.S. citizens  satisfied the INS inspectors and they were allowed to enter the country.  Later, while conducting our 2006 covert tests, we found that CBP officers  did not request identification during several foot crossings from Mexico.  For example, on February 23, 2006, two investigators crossed the border  from Mexico into Texas on foot. When the first investigator arrived at the  port of entry, he was waved through without being asked to show  identification. At this point, the investigator asked the CBP officer whether  he wished to see any identification. The officer replied, “OK, that would be  good.” The investigator began to remove his counterfeit Virginia driver’s  license from his wallet when the officer said “That’s fine, you can go.” The  CBP officer never looked at the license. However, the CBP officer did  request identification from the investigator who was walking behind the  first investigator.
In another test on March 15, 2006, two investigators entered Arizona from  Mexico by foot. They had received a phone call in advance from another  investigator who had crossed the border earlier using genuine  identification. He said that the CBP officers on duty had swiped his  driver’s license through a scanning machine. Because the counterfeit  drivers’ licenses the other two investigators were carrying had fake  magnetic strips, the investigators realized they could be questioned by  CBP officers if their identification cards did not scan properly. When the  two investigators arrived at the port of entry, they engaged one of the  officers in conversation to distract him from scanning their drivers’  licenses. After a few moments, the CBP officer asked the investigators if  they were both U.S. citizens. They said, “yes.” He then asked the  investigators if they had purchased anything in Mexico, and they  responded, “no.” The CBP officer then said, “Have a nice day” and allowed  them to enter the United States. He did not ask for any identification.
section_title: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations
paragraphs: We first reported on potential security vulnerabilities at unmanned and  unmonitored border areas in our 2003 testimony. While conducting testing  at U.S.–Canada ports of entry, we found that one of our investigators was  able to walk into the United States from Canada at a park straddling the  border. The investigator was not stopped or questioned by law  enforcement personnel from either Canada or the United States. In our  September 2007 testimony, we reported on similar vulnerabilities at  unmanned and unmonitored locations on the northern and southern  borders. The unmanned and unmonitored border areas we visited were  defined as locations where CBP does not maintain a manned presence 24  hours per day or where there was no apparent monitoring equipment in  place. Safety considerations prevented our investigators from performing  the same assessment work on the U.S.–Mexico border as performed on the  northern border.
We found three main vulnerabilities during this limited security  assessment. First, we found state roads close to the border that appeared  to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate the cross- border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband from  Canada into the United States. Second, we also located several ports of  entry that had posted daytime hours and which, although monitored, were  unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment  was in operation but that the only observable preventive measure to stop a  cross-border violator from entering the United States was a barrier across  the road that could be driven around. Finally, investigators identified  potential security vulnerabilities on federally managed lands adjacent to  the U.S.–Mexico border. These areas did not appear to be monitored or  have a noticeable law enforcement presence during the time our  investigators visited the sites. See table 3 for a summary of the  vulnerabilities we found and the activity of investigators at each location.
Selected details related to these covert tests are discussed below.
subsections: section_title: State Roads Close to the Border
paragraphs: According to CBP, the ease and speed with which a cross-border violator  can travel to the border, cross the border, and leave the location of the  crossing are critical factors in determining whether an area of the border  is vulnerable. We identified state roads close to the border that appeared  to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate the cross- border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband from  Canada into the United States. For example, on October 31, 2006, our  investigators positioned themselves on opposite sides of the U.S.–Canada  border in an unmanned location. Our investigators selected this location  because roads on either side of the border would allow them to quickly  and easily exchange simulated contraband. After receiving a signal by cell  phone, the investigator in Canada left his vehicle and walked  approximately 25 feet to the border carrying a red duffel bag. While  investigators on the U.S. side took photographs and made a digital video  recording, the individual with the duffel bag proceeded the remaining 50  feet, transferred the duffel bag to the investigators on the U.S. side, and  returned to his vehicle on the Canadian side. The set up and exchange  lasted approximately 10 minutes, during which time the investigators were  in view of residents both on the Canadian and U.S. sides of the border.  According to CBP records of this incident, an alert citizen notified the U.S.  Border Patrol about the suspicious activities of our investigators. The U.S.  Border Patrol subsequently attempted to search for a vehicle matching the  description of the rental vehicle our investigators used. However, the U.S.  Border Patrol was not able to locate the investigators with the duffel bag,  even though they had parked nearby to observe traffic passing through the  port of entry.
See figure 1 for a photograph of our investigator crossing the northern  border at another unmanned, unmonitored location on the northern  border with simulated contraband.
In contrast to our observations on the northern border, our investigators  observed a large law enforcement and Army National Guard presence near  a state road on the southern border, including unmanned aerial vehicles.  On October 17, 2006, two of our investigators left a main U.S. route about a  quarter mile from a U.S.–Mexico port of entry. Traveling on a dirt road that  parallels the border, our investigators used a GPS system to get as close to  the border as possible. Our investigators passed U.S. Border Patrol agents  and U.S. Army National Guard units. In addition, our investigators spotted  unmanned aerial vehicles and a helicopter flying parallel to the border. At  the point where the dirt road ran closest to the U.S.–Mexico border, our  investigators spotted additional U.S. Border Patrol vehicles parked in a  covered position. About three-fourths of a mile from these vehicles, our  investigators pulled off the road. One investigator exited the vehicle and  proceeded on foot through several gulches and gullies toward the Mexican  border. His intent was to find out whether he would be questioned by law  enforcement agents about his activities. He returned to the vehicle after 15  minutes, at which time our investigators returned to the main road. Our  investigators did not observe any public traffic on this road for the 1 hour  that they were in the area, but none of the law enforcement units  attempted to stop our investigators and find out what they were doing.  According to CBP, because our investigators did not approach from the  direction of Mexico, there would be no expectation for law enforcement  units to question these activities.
section_title: Ports of Entry with Posted Hours
paragraphs: We also identified several ports of entry with posted daytime hours in one  state on the northern border. During the daytime these ports of entry are  staffed by CBP officers. During the night, CBP told us that it relies on  surveillance systems to monitor, respond to, and attempt to interdict  illegal border crossing activity. For example, on November 14, 2006, at  about 11:00 p.m., our investigators arrived on the U.S. side of one port of  entry that had closed for the night. Investigators observed that  surveillance equipment was in operation but that the only visible  preventive measure to stop an individual from entering the United States  was a barrier across the road that could be driven around. CBP provided  us with records that confirmed our observations about the barrier at this  port of entry, indicating that on one occasion a cross-border violator drove  around this type of barrier to illegally enter the United States. Although the  violator was later caught by state law enforcement officers and arrested by  the U.S. Border Patrol, we were concerned that these ports of entry were  unmanned overnight.
section_title: Federally Managed Lands
paragraphs: Investigators identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally  managed land adjacent to the U.S.–Mexico border. These areas did not  appear to be monitored or have a manned CBP presence during the time  our investigators visited the sites. For example, on January 9, 2007, our  investigators entered federally managed land adjacent to the U.S.–Mexico  border. The investigators had identified a road running parallel to the  border in this area. Our investigators were informed by an employee of a  visitor center that because the U.S. government was building a fence, the  road was closed to the public. However, our investigators proceeded to  the road and found that it was not physically closed. While driving west  along this road, our investigators did not observe any surveillance cameras  or law enforcement vehicles. A 4-foot-high fence (appropriate to prevent  the movement of a vehicle rather than a person) stood at the location of  the border. Our investigators pulled over to the side of the road at one  location. To determine whether he would activate any intrusion alarm  systems, one investigator stepped over the fence, entered Mexico, and  returned to the United States. The investigators remained in the location  for approximately 15 minutes but there was no observed law enforcement  response to their activities.
In another example, on January 23, 2007, our investigators arrived on  federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.–Mexico border. In this area,  the Rio Grande River forms the southern border between the United States  and Mexico. After driving off-road in a 4x4 vehicle to the banks of the Rio  Grande, our investigators observed, in two locations, evidence that  frequent border crossings took place. In one location, the investigators  observed well-worn footpaths and tire tracks on the Mexican side of the  river. At another location, a boat ramp on the U.S. side of the Rio Grande  was mirrored by a boat ramp on the Mexican side. Access to the boat ramp  on the Mexican side of the border had well-worn footpaths and vehicle  tracks. An individual who worked in this area told our investigators that at  several times during the year, the water is so low that the river can easily  be crossed on foot. Our investigators were in this area for 1 hour and 30  minutes and observed no surveillance equipment, intrusion alarm systems,  or law enforcement presence. Our investigators were not challenged  regarding their activities.
After performing our limited security assessment of these locations,  investigators learned that a memorandum of understanding exists between  DHS (of which CBP is a component), the Department of the Interior, and  the Department of Agriculture regarding the protection of federal lands  adjacent to U.S. borders. Although CBP is ultimately responsible for  protecting these areas, officials told us that certain legal, environmental,  and cultural considerations limit options for enforcement—for example,  environmental restrictions and tribal sovereignty rights.
section_title: Corrective Action Briefings and DHS Actions
paragraphs: We held corrective action briefings with CBP in 2006 and 2007 to discuss  the results of our prior work. CBP generally agreed with our August 2006  findings and acknowledged that its officers are not able to identify all  forms of counterfeit identification presented at land border crossings. In  addition, in response to our August 2006 work, CBP officials stated that  they supported the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and were  working to implement it. This initiative has several parts, the most recent  of which went into effect on January 31, 2008. In response to our  September 2007 report, CBP indicated that resource restrictions prevent  U.S. Border Patrol agents from investigating all instances of suspicious  activity. CBP stated that the northern border presents more of a challenge  than the southern border for several reasons, including the wide expanse  of the border and the existence of many antiquated ports of entry.
In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous  border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since  2003. To directly address vulnerabilities related to bogus documentation,  DHS stated that measures have been implemented to enhance CBP  officers’ ability to detect fraudulent documents, such as    providing updated fraudulent document training modules to the CBP  Academy for inclusion in its curriculum, implementing mandatory refresher training in detecting fraudulent  documents, and   providing the 11 ports of entry that have the highest rate of fraudulent  document interceptions with advanced equipment to assist with the  examination and detection of fraudulent documents.
DHS also pointed out that, effective January 31, 2008, it has ended verbal  declarations of citizenship at border crossings and now requires  documents for U.S. citizens. If implemented effectively, this would address  some of the vulnerabilities we identified in our 2003 and 2006 testimonies.  According to DHS, although the full implementation of its Western  Hemisphere Travel Initiative has been delayed, the implementation will  also address vulnerabilities cited in our testimonies.
In addition, DHS indicated that it has taken a number of actions related to  the security of the northern border. In particular, DHS states that, as of  April 2008, there were 1,128 agents assigned to the Northern Border—a 16  percent increase from the 972 agents identified in our 2007 report.  Furthermore, DHS plans to double personnel staffing levels over the next  2 years to over 2,000 agents by the end of fiscal year 2010. DHS also  indicates that CBP has established a field testing division to perform  covert tests that appear similar to our own tests, with a particular focus on  detecting and preventing illicit radioactive material from entering the  United States. We addressed DHS technical and sensitivity comments as  appropriate. We did not attempt to verify the information provided by  DHS, but have included its full response in appendix I.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we will plan no further distribution until 30 days from  the report date. At that time, we will provide copies of this report to the  Secretary of Homeland Security and interested congressional committees  and members. We will also make copies available to others upon request.  In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site  at http://gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-6722 or kutzg@gao.gov if you or your staffs  have any questions concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report  included John Cooney, Assistant Director; Andy O’Connell, Assistant  Director; Barbara Lewis, Andrew McIntosh, Sandra Moore, and Barry  Shillito.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security