Military Base Realignments and Closures: More Guidance and Information Needed to Take Advantage of Opportunities to Consolidate Training
Published: 2016-02-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The 2005 BRAC round was the fifth round of base closures and realignments undertaken by DOD since 1988, and it was the largest, most complex, and costliest. DOD has relied on the BRAC process to reduce excess infrastructure and realign bases to meet changing force structure needs. According to the Secretary of Defense, BRAC 2005 provided opportunities to foster jointness among the military services. House Report 113-446 included a provision for GAO to review the status of BRAC 2005 recommendations to reduce infrastructure and promote opportunities for jointness. This report evaluates the extent to which DOD has (1) implemented the recommendations requiring the services to relocate select training functions to increase opportunities for jointness and (2) determined if implementing these recommendations has achieved cost savings. GAO reviewed guidance, course listings, and cost data; interviewed DOD and service officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: For each of the six recommendations GAO reviewed from the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, the Department of Defense (DOD) implemented the recommendations by requiring military services to relocate select training functions; however, GAO found that two of the six training functions reviewed were able to take advantage of the opportunity provided by BRAC to consolidate training so that services could train jointly. In implementing the remaining four BRAC recommendations, DOD relocated similar training functions run by separate military services into one location, but the services did not consolidate training functions. For example, they do not regularly coordinate or share information on their training goals and curriculums. DOD's justification for numerous 2005 BRAC recommendations included the assumption that realigning military department activities to one location would enhance jointness—defined by DOD as activities, operations, or organizations in which elements of two or more military departments participate. For these four training functions, DOD missed the opportunity to consolidate training to increase jointness, because it provided guidance to move personnel or construct buildings but not to measure progress toward consolidated training. Without additional guidance for consolidating training, the services will not be positioned to take advantage of such an opportunity in these types of recommendations as proposed by DOD and will face challenges encouraging joint training activities and collaboration across services.
DOD cannot determine if implementing the 2005 BRAC joint training recommendations that GAO reviewed has resulted in savings in operating costs. For three of the recommendations in this review, the services did not develop baseline operating costs before implementing the BRAC recommendations, which would have enabled it to determine whether savings were achieved. Without developing baseline cost data, DOD will be unable to estimate any cost savings resulting from similar recommendations in any future BRAC rounds. Further, costs reported to DOD by the training functions business plan managers for implementation of two of the six recommendations in this review likely did not include all BRAC-related costs funded from outside the BRAC account. A DOD memo requires BRAC business plan managers to submit all BRAC-related expenditures, including those funded from both inside and outside of the BRAC account. GAO identified at least $110 million in implementation costs that likely should have been reported to DOD in accordance with the memo but were not; therefore the $35.1 billion total cost reported for BRAC 2005 is likely somewhat understated. A DOD official stated that it was up to the military departments to ensure that all BRAC implementation costs were accounted for and that the military departments had the flexibility to determine which costs were associated with the BRAC recommendation and which were attributed to other actions. GAO found that this flexibility in determining which costs were to be reported as BRAC costs led to inconsistencies in what kinds of projects had their costs counted as BRAC implementation costs. By clarifying in guidance what is to be included as a BRAC implementation cost, DOD can help ensure that it has an accurate accounting of the final costs for any future BRAC implementation and that DOD and Congress are able to determine how much money is spent on any future BRAC rounds.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: To help improve the implementation of jointness-focused recommendations in any future BRAC rounds, GAO recommends that DOD provide additional guidance for consolidating training and reporting BRAC costs and require the development of baseline cost data. DOD partially concurred with the recommendation to clarify guidance for reporting BRAC costs but did not concur with the other recommendations, stating that GAO misunderstood its approach to joint training. GAO believes its findings and recommendations are valid and addresses these points in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round was the fifth  round of base closures and realignments undertaken by the Department  of Defense (DOD) since 1988, and it was the largest, most complex, and  costliest BRAC round of the five. DOD has relied on the BRAC process  as a means of reducing excess infrastructure and realigning bases to  meet changing force structure needs. However, in 2005, in a letter to the  chairman of the BRAC Commission, the Secretary of Defense noted that  the decade since the previous BRAC round had been a period of  dramatic change involving new challenges posed by international  terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ungoverned  areas, rogue states, and nonstate actors. The Secretary saw BRAC 2005  as different from previous BRAC rounds, which focused on reducing  excess infrastructure. The Secretary saw it as a unique opportunity to  adjust U.S. base structure to meet these new challenges and to be  positioned to meet further challenges anticipated during the next two  decades, such as where to locate forces returning to the United States  from overseas bases. Therefore, in addition to reducing excess  infrastructure and producing savings, BRAC 2005 provided opportunities  for furthering transformation and fostering jointness.
In contrast to recommendations from prior rounds, many of the  recommendations that came out of the BRAC 2005 round were aimed at  creating opportunities to develop jointness, such as expanding and  establishing joint military medical centers, creating joint bases, pursuing  opportunities to promote joint training, and consolidating all of the military  services’ medical training for enlisted personnel at one installation. BRAC  2005 included several recommendations that created new joint training  centers of excellence and realigned training functions to, among other  things, provide opportunities to enhance jointness. According to DOD’s  justification for several of the joint training-related recommendations  contained in the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment  Commission Report, one part of the purpose for those recommendations  was to provide a “train as we fight: jointly” perspective to training.
Since 2005, we have issued over 30 reports and testimonies on BRAC  2005 planning, implementation, costs, and savings; this work highlights  information DOD can use to improve the process for developing and  implementing BRAC recommendations. For example, in our March 2013  report on lessons learned from the BRAC 2005 round, we found that  DOD’s process for providing the BRAC Commission with cost and  savings estimates was hindered by underestimating recommendation- specific requirements and that DOD did not fully anticipate information  technology requirements for many of the recommendations. Our report  made several recommendations designed to improve any future BRAC  rounds and also suggested legislative changes that Congress should  consider to enhance its oversight of any future BRAC rounds. DOD  concurred with three and partially concurred with two out of the 10  recommendations in this report but has not taken any actions because,  according to DOD officials, these recommendations can only be  implemented if another round of BRAC is conducted. The Related GAO  Products page at the end of this report provides a list of our BRAC reports  and testimonies. In addition, see appendix I for findings,  recommendations, and DOD’s response and actions from selected  BRAC-related reports.
House Report 113-446, which accompanied a proposed bill for the  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, included a  provision for us to review the status of DOD’s actions to implement the  BRAC 2005 recommendations that were designed to reduce  infrastructure and promote opportunities for jointness. This report  evaluates the extent to which DOD has (1) implemented the BRAC 2005  recommendations requiring the military services to relocate select training  functions to increase opportunities for joint training and (2) determined if  implementing these BRAC 2005 recommendations has achieved cost  savings.
To address these objectives, we first identified the BRAC 2005  recommendations that were designed to reduce infrastructure and  promote opportunities for jointness. Based on communication with your  staff and language in the report provision that referred to joint centers of  excellence and joint training activities, we focused our review on joint  training functions created by BRAC 2005. We reviewed all 198  recommendations in the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment  Commission Report and identified 13 recommendations that were  designed to (1) merge or consolidate a training function to make it more  joint, (2) reduce infrastructure, and (3) focus on training or developing  centers of excellence. From those 13 recommendations focused on  training or on developing centers of excellence, we identified and selected  six for this review that were directed at multiple services and called for  consolidating infrastructure at one location. Specifically, we identified five  recommendations that met all of our criteria: (1) Joint Center for  Consolidated Transportation Management Training, (2) Joint Center of  Excellence for Culinary Training, (3) Joint Center of Excellence for  Religious Training and Education, (4) Joint Strike Fighter Initial Joint  Training Site, and (5) Undergraduate Pilot and Navigator Training. In  addition, we chose to review the recommendation related to Ft. Bragg,  North Carolina, because one part of this recommendation was to move  the Army’s 7th Special Forces Group to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, to  support joint training with the Air Force Special Operations unit located  there. We visited the locations of all six training functions, interviewed  officials, and collected relevant data and information. Appendix II contains  the text of the BRAC recommendations we reviewed, and table 1 shows  the recommendations that we reviewed, the location of the new training  function, and the services involved.
To evaluate the extent to which DOD has implemented the BRAC 2005  recommendations requiring the military services to relocate select training  functions to increase opportunities for joint training, we reviewed the 2005  Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report and  implementing guidance for each recommendation. We compared this  guidance to leading practices we developed in our prior work on  consolidations. We also reviewed documentary evidence, such as  course listings, and interviewed DOD, service, and installation officials  responsible for the implementation and oversight of these BRAC  recommendations to gain a better understanding of the process used to  implement each recommendation and to determine the extent to which  each training function created by the BRAC recommendation was able to  take advantage of the opportunities provided by the BRAC  recommendation to develop more consolidated training.
To evaluate the extent to which DOD has determined whether  implementing these BRAC recommendations has achieved cost savings,  we spoke with relevant program and budget officials with knowledge of  program budgets. We attempted to gather data on operating costs of  these six training functions from before and after BRAC implementation;  however, we found that these data were not consistently available, as  discussed in the report. We assessed practices reported by these officials  against practices identified in our prior work on cost baselines. Any  operating costs presented in this report are estimates included to illustrate  possible cost changes or to highlight inconsistencies in the data. In  addition, we gathered data from the services on the costs of implementing  these six BRAC recommendations and compared it to the data the  services provided to DOD in 2012. We examined the data in light of  DOD’s August 2010 memo requiring BRAC business plan managers to  submit all BRAC-related expenditures, including those funded from both  inside and outside of the BRAC account. We discussed with relevant  service officials differences in and the oversight of the available data.  Specifically, we discussed the reasons for the differences and which  costs were in fact implementation costs. We discuss the limitations of the  data in this report.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2014 to February  2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The BRAC 2005 Commission Report contains 198 recommendations  approved by the BRAC Commission for closing or realigning DOD  installations. The text of each recommendation contains several sections  with important contextual information:
Cost and Savings Information
Secretary of Defense Recommendation
Secretary of Defense Justification By law, DOD must implement the actions recommended by the  Commission unless the President terminates the process, or Congress  enacts a resolution of disapproval.
BRAC 2005 differed from prior rounds in three significant ways—the  circumstances under which it took place, its scale, and its scope. Unlike  prior BRAC rounds, which were implemented during times of declining  defense budgets and in which the focus was on eliminating excess  capacity and realizing cost savings, BRAC 2005 was conducted in a  global security environment characterized by increasing defense budgets  and increasing military end strengths after the events of September 11,  2001 and was conducted concurrently with overseas contingency  operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, DOD was  engaged in an initiative to relocate thousands of personnel from overseas  to the continental United States.
The scale of BRAC 2005 was much larger than the scales of the prior four  rounds. BRAC 2005 generated more than twice the number of BRAC  actions as all prior BRAC rounds combined. Table 2 compares the  number of individual actions embedded in the BRAC 2005  recommendations with the number of individual actions needed to  implement the recommendations in the prior rounds and shows that the  number of individual BRAC actions was larger in BRAC 2005 (813) than  in the four prior BRAC rounds combined (387).
The scope of BRAC 2005 was broader than the scope of prior BRAC  rounds. In addition to the traditional emphasis on eliminating unneeded  infrastructure to achieve savings, DOD’s goals for the 2005 BRAC round  included transforming the military by correlating base infrastructure to the  force structure and enhancing joint capabilities by improving joint  utilization to meet current and future threats.  As shown in table 2, the  2005 BRAC round had the second lowest number of major closures, the  largest number of major realignments, and the largest number of minor  closures and realignments. Part of this transformation effort included a  focus on providing opportunities to increase jointness, though many of the  BRAC recommendations focused on consolidations and reorganizations  within the military departments rather than across departments. However,  the six recommendations we reviewed, as well as other  recommendations, including creating joint bases, focused on jointness  across multiple services.
section_title: DOD Implemented BRAC 2005 Recommendations to Relocate Selected Training Functions but Missed Some Opportunities to Consolidate Training to Increase Jointness
paragraphs: DOD implemented the BRAC 2005 recommendations we reviewed by  requiring military services to relocate selected training functions; however  we found that, although DOD’s justifications for collocating each of the six  training functions that we reviewed mentioned jointness or inter-service  training as a potential benefit, two of the six training functions took  advantage of the opportunity provided by BRAC to consolidate training to  increase jointness. Specifically, we found that DOD implemented all six  recommendations by relocating the select training functions—as  recommended by the BRAC Commission—but that opportunities for joint  training were realized in only two locations. Figure 1 shows the  relocations associated with each recommendation.
Based on our meetings with officials, we found that officials implementing  two of the six training functions created by those recommendations—the  Joint Center of Excellence for Culinary Training and the 7th Special  Forces Group—had found ways to take advantage of being located  together to consolidate training and train jointly. For example, officials at  the Joint Center of Excellence for Culinary Training stated that while the  Air Force conducts its culinary training separately, the Army, Navy, and  Marine Corps have successfully consolidated two of the three phases of  their training and use a joint curriculum to train students. These officials  stated that they were successful at consolidating the culinary training  curricula for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps because the leadership  involved with implementing this recommendation was supportive of  finding a way to train jointly even if that meant changing their curricula.  Additionally,  Army and Air Force Special Operations Forces officials  stated that the relocation of the 7th Special Forces Group to Eglin Air  Force Base allowed for increased joint training operations with the Air  Force Special Operations Forces located at Hurlburt Field, near Eglin Air  Force Base. These officials stated that they were successful at  consolidating training and increasing jointness because they were already  conducting joint training prior to the BRAC 2005 round and that since their  move, being in closer proximity has made it even easier to train jointly.
The implementation of the remaining four BRAC recommendations that  we reviewed relocated—moved separate functions to one location—but  did not consolidate training functions. According to officials at the  locations that did not consolidate training, they do not regularly coordinate  or share information on their training goals and curricula, despite the fact  that part of the Secretary of Defense’s justification for the moves in the  BRAC 2005 process was that they would bring a “train as we fight: jointly”  perspective to the learning process or would otherwise allow for joint  training. Service officials told us that after these recommendations were  proposed by DOD and approved by the BRAC Commission, they  compared each of their original curricula but did not identify many areas  of overlap. Training function officials stated that they had received  minimal guidance related to consolidating training. Therefore, we found,  they did not adjust curricula to take advantage of their proximity to  consolidate training and possibly be more joint and consolidate space.  Training function officials also stated that their four training functions have  very different missions, making consolidation of their training more  difficult. For example, while both the Navy and the Air Force train their  navigators at Pensacola Naval Air Station, they train them to fly in  different scenarios (e.g., over land or over sea) and in different airplanes.
Although the services may have differences in their training, the 2005  BRAC Commission Report noted that the Secretary of Defense had  described the 2005 BRAC round as an opportunity to promote jointness.  The BRAC Commission Report stated that while the 2005 BRAC  recommendations would “not move the ball across the jointness goal line,  Commission decisions would help move the ball down the field” toward  more jointness. Table 3 summarizes the status of each of the six BRAC  recommendations that we reviewed.
We found that four of the six training functions in our review missed the  opportunity to consolidate training to increase jointness, because DOD  provided minimal guidance to direct those implementing the  recommendations. Service officials stated that to direct the  implementation of the six recommendations we reviewed, DOD provided  them with the language from the BRAC Commission report as well as  guidance for developing business plans. Using the guidance provided,  each of the military departments’ headquarters developed a business  plan. This guidance focused on movement of personnel or construction.  In our previous work on consolidation of physical infrastructure and  management functions, we identified key practices, including developing  an implementation plan for the consolidation. Such a plan should include  essential change management practices such as active, engaged  leadership of executives at the highest possible levels; a dedicated  implementation team that can be held accountable for change; and a  strategy measuring progress toward the established goals of the  consolidation. None of the guidance given to the military departments  provided this type of direction. For example, the language from the BRAC  Commission report for each recommendation we selected for review is  generally less than one page long and contains high level summary  information on costs, the action being recommended, DOD’s justification  for the recommendation, community concerns, and the BRAC  Commissions findings and recommendations. The business plans  developed by the military departments included the text of the BRAC  2005 recommendation, a description of costs and savings for each  moving organization, a list of organizations moving, a time table for the  movement of organizations, details on any military construction, and  environmental information.
According to a September 2005 memorandum issued by the Office of the  Secretary of Defense (OSD) and related to planning for BRAC 2005  implementation, the business plans were to serve as a foundation for the  complex program management necessary to ensure that the  recommendations were implemented efficiently and effectively.  Additionally,  the memorandum states that the implementation challenges  presented by transformational recommendations—particularly  recommendations to establish joint operations—underscore the utility and  necessity of the plans. However, officials from the Basing Directorate  under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and  Environment, the group that oversaw the implementation of BRAC 2005,  stated that while the business plans do not include the BRAC 2005  language containing DOD’s justification related to consolidating training to  increase jointness, it is the business manager’s responsibility to  implement the recommendation, taking into account the intent of the  recommendation as described in the justification language. During our  review, however, we found that officials responsible for certifying that  these six recommendations had been implemented were not required by  OSD to certify whether or not they had taken advantage of the opportunity  to increase jointness. Rather, the business plan managers were focused  on the completion of the construction of buildings and the movement of  personnel. Further, officials at the four training functions that did not  consolidate training told us that although they had initially compared each  service’s curricula to identify common training, they felt that there was not  enough overlap in the training for it to be consolidated. They also stated  that they had not received direction from OSD or the military services on  how to consolidate curricula in order to foster jointness in the event that  course curricula had few similarities, prepared personnel to perform  different missions, or used different equipment.
Like the BRAC 2005 recommendations that directed the relocation of  several training functions in order to promote jointness or consolidate  similar training, another BRAC 2005 recommendation directed the  consolidation of 26 service-specific stand-alone installations into 12 joint  bases to take advantage of opportunities for efficiencies and reduce  duplication of similar support services. In order to implement this joint  basing recommendation, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued  guidance in January 2008 designed to establish a comprehensive  framework to consolidate installation-support functions while meeting  mission requirements. OSD also created an oversight structure for  handling disputes and established a set of common standards for the  installation support to be provided by each joint base. Furthermore, DOD  issued a directive on military training that gives the Undersecretary of  Defense for Personnel & Readiness the responsibility to oversee and  provide policy for individual and functional training programs for military  personnel and the collective training programs of military units and  staffs.
If DOD and the services believe that the training functions in our review  can still capitalize on the opportunity to promote jointness provided by the  BRAC 2005 recommendations, additional guidance will be an important  first step toward being able to take advantage of this opportunity. Officials  from the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness agreed  that additional guidance would potentially be helpful in providing  opportunities to consolidate training to increase jointness. Further, in the  event of a future BRAC round, such guidance could provide a useful  framework for taking advantage of the opportunities provided by similar  recommendations focused on developing joint training capabilities.
section_title: DOD Cannot Determine Cost Savings from Implementing BRAC 2005 Joint Training Recommendations, and It Likely Did Not Report All Implementation Costs
paragraphs: DOD cannot determine if implementing the 2005 BRAC joint training  recommendations that we reviewed has resulted in savings in operating  costs. In addition, implementation costs reported to DOD by the training  functions’ business plan managers likely did not include all costs funded  from outside the BRAC account—we found at least $110 million in costs  that likely should have been included based on DOD guidance requiring  all BRAC-related costs to be reported, even those from outside the BRAC  account. As a result, DOD may have incomplete or inaccurate cost  information when trying to determine annual cost savings or total  implementation costs of these BRAC recommendations.
subsections: section_title: DOD Cannot Determine Operating Cost Savings Resulting from BRAC 2005 Joint Training Recommendations
paragraphs: Although we reported in 2012 that DOD had projected that four of the  recommendations in our review would result in annual savings in  operating costs, we found that DOD could not determine whether  implementing the 2005 BRAC joint training recommendations that we  reviewed resulted in savings in operating costs. For two of the training  functions in our review, DOD was able to provide complete baseline cost  data; however, officials for these training functions could not determine  whether cost fluctuations were due to the BRAC moves. For three of the  training functions in our review, DOD was unable to provide complete  baseline operating costs from before it implemented the BRAC  recommendations, but officials representing these training functions  indicated that implementing the recommendations may have increased  some costs. The Joint Strike Fighter training program established by  recommendation #125 was a new program and therefore there were no  operating cost data prior to BRAC implementation.
In our prior work, we have identified the importance of developing  baseline and trend data. By developing baseline operating costs,  agencies can better evaluate whether they are achieving their cost  savings targets. In addition, in our 1997 report on lessons learned from  the four prior BRAC rounds, we found that initial cost and savings  estimates for prior BRAC rounds were not based on reliable baseline  data, because they were not of budget quality, were not consistently  developed, and were poorly documented. As we also noted in our 1997  report, sound estimates of savings are important, because DOD may rely  on savings from BRAC for other purposes. In 2014 we found that DOD  was unable to determine whether the consolidation of training at the  Medical Education and Training Campus resulted in cost savings,  because it had not developed baseline cost information as part of its  metrics to assess success. We recommended that DOD develop  baseline cost estimates as part of its metrics to assess cost savings for  future consolidation efforts within the Medical Education and Training  Campus, and DOD concurred with this recommendation. To date, DOD  has not taken any actions to implement this recommendation, because,  according to DOD officials, they cannot take action on these  recommendations until another BRAC round is authorized.
Two of the training functions in our review—Undergraduate Navigator  Training and Ft. Bragg, North Carolina (7th Special Forces Group move  to Eglin Air Force Base)—were able to provide complete baseline cost  data. However, for these two training functions, officials could not  determine whether subsequent cost fluctuations were due to the BRAC  moves, non-BRAC events, or some combination. For example, the  budget officials from the Air Force’s Air Education and Training Command  were able to provide us with detailed operating cost data for their  undergraduate navigator training, going back to 1996. However, even  with these detailed cost data, the budget officials we met with stated that  they could not account for all of the different events that had resulted in  cost fluctuations during that time. Air Force budget officials further stated  that multiple events such as sequestration, maintenance issues, and  changes in how certain expenses are funded that occurred while BRAC  was being implemented made it extremely difficult to determine whether  any savings in the program’s operating costs were due to the  implementation of the BRAC recommendation or to these other factors.
For the remaining three training functions—Culinary training,  Transportation Management training, and Religious training— the  programs could not provide complete operating cost information from  prior to the move. For example, according to Army budget personnel,  the Army culinary, transportation management, and chaplain training  programs did not have data for various reasons, including a change in  accounting systems, and because they are not required to keep data that  far back. In addition, according to Air Force officials, because the Air  Force culinary program is part of a larger multidisciplinary training  program that includes subjects such as fitness and mortuary services, it is  not possible to isolate the costs for the culinary portion of the training.
While these programs either did not have any baseline operating cost  data or detailed operating cost baselines, in some instances officials were  able to provide examples of where they believed operating costs have  increased as a result of the respective BRAC moves. For example:
Air Force officials estimated that they spend an additional $300,000  annually to operate the department’s Chaplain Corps College at Fort  Jackson, South Carolina than they did to operate the one at Maxwell  Air Force Base, Alabama. Navy officials provided operating cost data  for their chaplain training program showing that they have spent an  average of approximately $182,000 more per year since relocating to  Ft. Jackson. Officials with both services cited increased travel costs  as the primary driver of these increases, because Ft. Jackson does  not have room for the students to stay on base. Therefore, according  to officials, students from both services must stay at hotels in  Columbia, South Carolina, and officials have to provide transportation  to and from the base.
A Navy culinary official estimated that sending students to Ft. Lee  costs the service an additional $200,000 per year for airfare compared  to what it cost when all training was at Naval Station Great Lakes,  Illinois. This official also estimated that this travel takes about three  days per student, which results in about $400,000 in lost work time  per year. In addition, the official added that there are other costs  related to getting the students to and from airports. Additionally,  the  Navy culinary official added that the training program has incurred  additional administrative costs because the Army and Navy student  tracking systems are not linked. Specifically, because the systems are  not configured to exchange data, all Navy student data must be  manually entered twice, once in each system. The official said that  this equates to thousands of records per year and could take about  $45,000 in labor costs to accomplish.
For training functions we reviewed, Navy Joint Strike Fighter officials were  able to identify a cost avoidance as a result of implementing the BRAC  recommendation. As part of implementing this recommendation, the Air  Force built a $59 million Academic Training Center at Eglin Air Force  Base to serve the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. The Navy Joint  Strike Fighter officials stated that if they had not colocated their program  with the Air Force, the Navy would have had to pay to build and operate  its own Academic Training Center.
It is now likely not possible to determine baseline costs for implementing  the recommendations in our review in order to determine the extent to  which the implementation of these recommendations resulted in cost  savings. Also, subsequent changes to the programs make it difficult to  determine the effect of implementing the BRAC recommendations.  Although it can sometimes be difficult to attribute costs and savings to a  specific event, such as a BRAC change, DOD will not be able to estimate  whether it has achieved annual savings in operating costs if it does not  collect complete baseline cost data with which to measure progress.
section_title: Final Implementation Costs Reported to DOD for Some Joint Training Recommendations Likely Did Not Include All Implementation Costs
paragraphs: In 2012, we reported on DOD’s estimates of its final implementation costs  for the BRAC 2005 recommendations; however, for two of the six  recommendations in this review—the Joint Strike Fighter Initial Training  Site and the 7th Special Forces Group move to Eglin Air Force Base—we  found that at least $110 million in implementation costs funded from  outside of the BRAC account that likely should have been included were  not reported to DOD by the business plan managers. Thus DOD’s  previously reported total cost of $35.1 billion to implement BRAC 2005 is  likely somewhat understated. The statute authorizing BRAC 2005  established a special treasury account for purposes related to  implementing the BRAC 2005 recommendations. During the lifetime of  this account, DOD could also fund certain BRAC-related costs from  outside the BRAC 2005 account to complete actions needed to  implement the recommendations. For example, the services could use  money obtained through their military construction process to renovate  existing space or build new facilities. In 2010, we recommended that DOD  take steps to capture and appropriately report to Congress any BRAC- related implementation costs that were funded from outside the BRAC  account. DOD concurred with the recommendation, and in August 2010  the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment)  issued a memo requiring BRAC business plan managers to submit all  BRAC-related expenditures, including those funded from both inside and  outside of the BRAC account. We reviewed the business plans for all six  recommendations in our review, as well as data reported by the services  to DOD, and found that none of them contained projects funded from  outside of the BRAC account. Army and Air Force officials that we spoke  with stated that there were general criteria for what could be included as a  BRAC cost in the BRAC 2005 round. According to former business plan  managers for some of the training functions in our review, and Army and  Air Force service headquarters officials, some of these criteria included  that the project be related to the physical move, the cost be for moves  within the continental United States, the project not be related to  addressing a deficiency that existed at the time of the BRAC  recommendation, and the project be needed in order to comply with the  original BRAC recommendation and not be used to accommodate  personnel or mission expansion that happened after the BRAC decision.  However, neither service nor OSD officials could provide us with any  written guidance to this effect. Air Force officials also stated that language  in the Form 1391—the DOD document to submit requirements and  justification to Congress for funding for military construction projects— would indicate whether the project was BRAC-related.
For three of the recommendations we reviewed, the military construction  implementation costs reported to us were approximately the same as  those reported to DOD in 2012. Business plan managers for  recommendation 124—Joint Center for Excellence for Religious Training  and Education—reported military construction implementation costs of  approximately $11.6 million to DOD in 2012 and approximately $11.8  million to us in the course of this review. For recommendations 122— Joint Center for Consolidated Transportation Management Training—and  123—Joint Center of Excellence for Culinary Training—business plan  managers reported combined military construction implementation costs  of approximately $87.6 million to DOD in 2012, and approximately $89.4  million to us in the course of this review. For a fourth recommendation— Undergraduate Pilot and Navigator Training, recommendation #128—we  could not determine what the total military construction implementation  costs reported to DOD in 2012 were, because this was a bundled  recommendation that contained projects on multiple bases, not just at  Pensacola Naval Air Station, Florida. However, the final Pensacola  military construction costs reported to us—$90.1 million—were close to  the preliminary military construction estimates of $89.5 million for those  projects.
In the case of the Joint Strike Fighter and the Ft. Bragg, North Carolina  recommendations, some projects that appear to be related to the BRAC  move and were funded with non-BRAC money were not included in what  was reported to DOD as required by DOD’s August 2010 memo.  Examples of some of these projects that were not reported as BRAC  implementation costs are
Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) Parking Apron. In the official Form 1391  proposing this project and the need for the parking apron, the title of  the project is “BRAC F-35 A/C Parking Apron.” Further, in the  “Requirement” section of the document, the justification provided by  the Air Force states that the build-up for Joint Strike Fighter  operations includes relocating joint military instructor pilots and  operations support personnel from Luke Air Force Base; Sheppard Air  Force Base; Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California; Naval Air  Station Oceana, Virginia;; and the Naval Air Station at Pensacola, the  moves required by this BRAC recommendation. Air Force  headquarters officials stated that they did not include this as a BRAC  implementation cost because they and the Navy headquarters officials  agreed this cost was not related to the move. However, Air Force  officials at Eglin Air Force Base as well as the Navy Business Plan  Manager indicated that the Parking Apron was a necessary  implementation cost. Furthermore, the cost for every other Air Force  project that cited “BRAC” in the Form 1391 project title was counted  as an implementation cost. By including this reference to BRAC in the  1391, this project was presented to Congress as a BRAC-related cost.  The preliminary estimate for this project was $29 million dollars.
Other Joint Strike Fighter Support Projects. This includes four  projects related to the establishment of the Joint Strike Fighter training  program.  Three of these projects have language identical to that in  the BRAC Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) A/C Parking Apron in the  Requirement section of their Form 1391, which states that the build- up for Joint Strike Fighter operations includes relocating joint military  instructor pilots and operations support personnel from Luke Air Force  Base, Sheppard Air Force Base, Marine Corps Air Station Miramar,  Ca., Naval Air Station Oceana, VA and the Naval Air Station at  Pensacola. The Form 1391 for the fourth project cites the impending  overcrowding as a result of establishing the Joint Strike Fighter  training program as the justification for the project. Air Force  headquarters officials stated that, for these projects, Air Education  and Training Command or Air Force Materiel Command did not  submit the project to the Air Force BRAC office to determine if it was a  BRAC requirement. However, given the requirement language that  cites the BRAC moves and the impending overcrowding, it is not clear  to us that these were not BRAC implementation costs. Furthermore,  Air Force documentation and headquarters officials acknowledged  that one of these projects—the first phase of the Hydrant Refueling  System Station—was a companion project to the BRAC F-35 A/C  Parking Apron. The combined final cost for these projects was  approximately $20.6 million.
Housing. Neither the Joint Strike Fighter nor the Ft. Bragg business  plan managers included the housing they built for Joint Strike Fighter  pilot trainees or Special Forces Group soldiers as BRAC  implementation costs. Air Force headquarters officials stated that  there was a disagreement between the Air Force and the Navy about  who should pay for the Joint Strike Fighter housing and how it should  be paid for. In order to complete the housing prior to the arrival of  students, the Air Force agreed to pay for the first housing unit and the  Navy agreed to pay for the second unit. Regarding the barracks for  the 7th Special Forces Group, at least one of these housing units was  originally scheduled to be built with BRAC funding. However, Army  headquarters and Special Operations Command officials stated that,  due to construction delays, the Army reconsidered which funding  source to use for some projects. As a result, all of the housing units  ended up being built with regular military construction money as part  of a larger project and no part of that project was counted as BRAC  implementation costs. The decisions not to count the Joint Strike  Fighter housing unit and the 7th Special Forces Group housing unit as  BRAC implementation costs is inconsistent with the fact that housing  for the culinary and transportation students at Ft. Lee, as well as the  housing for navigator students at Pensacola Naval Air Station, were  counted as BRAC implementation costs. The Joint Strike Fighter  housing unit cost was $17.6 million and the cost of the three Army  housing units ranged from $6.5 to 6.7 million each.
7th Special Forces Group Training Ranges. The Army built several  training ranges on Eglin Air Force Base to support the move of 7th  Special Forces Group from Ft. Bragg to Eglin Air Force Base. Army  headquarters officials told us that the cost of the ranges was initially to  be considered part of the BRAC implementation cost, and  documentation shows that the Army planned to use BRAC funds to  construct these ranges. However, due to the previously mentioned  construction delays and changes to the funding source of projects, the  ranges ended up being funded with Army military construction funds.  When implementation costs were reported to DOD in the final  business plan, the business plan managers did not indicate that there  were any implementation costs funded from outside the BRAC  account. The reasons for not including the ranges as a BRAC  implementation cost are unclear. Both Army and Air Force  headquarters officials stated that this may have been because the Air  Force already had ranges at Eglin Air Force Base that the Army could  have used. Air Force headquarters officials added that it may have  been because the 7th Special Forces Group did not have these  ranges at Ft. Bragg. However, officials with the Army Special  Operations Command and the 7th Special Forces Group stated that  the existing Air Force ranges at Eglin Air Force Base were insufficient  for their training needs, and that they had all of the ranges in question  when they were at Ft. Bragg. Not including the ranges as a BRAC  implementation cost was also inconsistent with the other  implementations of BRAC recommendations we reviewed, where the  training facilities were counted as BRAC implementation costs.  Construction of the ranges at Eglin Air Force Base cost a combined  $39.3 million.
An official with the Basing Directorate under the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment—the group that  oversaw the implementation of BRAC 2005—stated that the business  plan managers were expected to include costs that were funded from  outside the BRAC account in their final business plans and that, along  with OSD General Counsel, they reviewed and provided comments on  the cost submissions. However, the Basing Directorate official further  stated that it was up to the military departments to ensure that all BRAC  implementation costs were accounted for, and that the military  departments had the flexibility to determine which costs would be  associated with the BRAC recommendation and which would be  attributed to other actions. We found that this flexibility  in determining  which costs were to be reported as BRAC costs led to inconsistencies in  what kinds of projects were counted as BRAC implementation costs. By  clarifying in guidance what is to be included as a BRAC implementation  cost, DOD can help ensure that it has an accurate accounting of the final  costs for any future BRAC implementation and that DOD and Congress  are able to determine how much money is actually spent on any future  BRAC rounds.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: BRAC 2005 provided DOD with the opportunity to consolidate  infrastructure and also to become more efficient and effective in its  operations. To that end, the recommendations for consolidating and  developing joint training programs provided DOD with new opportunities  for furthering transformation and promoting jointness to meet the new  challenges DOD faces. However, two of the six recommendations  focused on training have led to joint training rather than colocation,  despite the opportunity to jointly train the force as it fights. All six  recommendations were implemented as approved, but without additional  guidance, DOD cannot ensure that it takes advantage of the opportunities  provided by BRAC. If Congress approves a future BRAC round, DOD will  have another opportunity to promote jointness should the department  choose to propose such recommendations to a future BRAC  Commission. However, without specific guidance that the military services  can use in implementing jointness-focused recommendations—for  instance on responsibility for monitoring implementation and measuring  progress—the department may again face challenges in moving beyond  colocation of functions.
In implementing the training-focused jointness recommendations we  examined, DOD did not collect baseline cost data for all of the  recommendations as part of its implementation process, and without  these data it could not determine the actual savings, if any, of  implementing the recommendations. Unless DOD develops baseline cost  data for the recommendations in any future BRAC rounds, it will be  unable to determine the budgetary effect of its actions. Given that we  found some implementation costs were paid for from other than the  BRAC 2005-specific accounts, if DOD does not clarify in guidance the  types of costs that are to be included as BRAC implementation costs,  decision makers will lack reasonable assurance that the department’s  cost data for any future BRAC round recommendations are fully reliable.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To make further progress toward taking full advantage of the opportunity  of consolidating training in order to increase jointness following the  implementation of the BRAC 2005 recommendations, for the training  functions that did not consolidate training beyond colocation, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Secretaries of the military  departments to provide guidance to the program managers on  consolidating training, if DOD decides that taking advantage of an  opportunity to increase jointness is still appropriate.
To improve the ability of the military departments to take advantage of  any opportunities provided by recommendations to develop joint training  capabilities in a future BRAC round, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness—in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Energy, Installations, and Environment—to develop and provide specific  guidance for the military departments to use in implementing  recommendations designed to consolidate training to increase jointness.
To improve DOD’s ability to estimate savings, if any, from future  consolidation of training—including any consolidation resulting from a  future BRAC round—we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  the military departments to develop baseline cost data.
To improve the accounting of any future BRAC rounds, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense  for Energy, Installations, and Environment to issue guidance clarifying  what costs should be included in final BRAC accounting.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In  response, DOD non-concurred with three recommendations and partially  concurred with one recommendation.
In its letter, DOD stated that our report misunderstands DOD’s approach  to joint and common training and does not completely recognize the  unique circumstances of BRAC recommendation development and  implementation. We recognize that there is a difference between joint and  common training; however, these BRAC recommendations, which DOD  proposed and the BRAC Commission approved, emphasized jointness,  not just common training. In fact, for several of these recommendations,  the Secretary of Defense’s justification included “enhancing jointness” as  part of the rationale, or proposed that the recommendation would allow  DOD to “train as we fight; jointly.”
DOD further stated that our report undervalues the importance of  providing DOD components flexibility to determine BRAC costs and has a  misplaced emphasis on estimating savings for transformational  recommendations. We recognize the importance of flexibility  among DOD  components for most military decisions; however, as our report notes,  flexibility  in reporting BRAC costs led to inconsistencies in reporting of  these costs across the department. In addition, cost and savings  estimates are a part of the BRAC process. Both DOD and the  Commission develop such estimates for each recommendation and did  so for these six recommendations. Moreover, DOD emphasized savings  in some of the six recommendations in its justification to the Commission.  Specifically, DOD’s justification for the Joint Center of Excellence for  Culinary Training reads in part “It is the military judgement of the JCSG  that consolidation at the location with the largest amount of culinary  training produces the greatest overall military value to the Department  through increased training efficiency at lower cost.” Similarly, for the Joint  Center of Excellence for Religious Training and Education, DOD’s  justification to the Commission reads in part “Consolidation at Fort  Jackson, SC creates a synergistic benefit by having each Service’s officer  and enlisted programs conducted in close proximity to operational forces.  Realized savings result from consolidation and alignment of similar officer  and enlisted educational activities and the merging of common support  functions.” Saving money in implementation of any federal program is an  important goal. We continue to believe that it is important for DOD’s goals  to include saving money where possible.
DOD did not concur with our first recommendation, to provide guidance to  the program managers of the training functions created under BRAC  2005 on consolidating training. In its response, DOD stated that our report  misunderstands the definition of joint training and that DOD and the  services are constantly seeking ways to improve training opportunities by  either consolidating or collocating individual skills training. DOD further  stated that the Interservice Training Review Organization would be the  proper entity to address the issues identified in our report. In our report,  we noted that the training functions were reviewed and these reviews did  not find much overlap in training between services. Several of these  reviews were conducted by the Interservice Training Review  Organization. Further, one of the purposes of several of these  transformational recommendations was to create opportunities to  enhance jointness, as stated by DOD in proposing them to the  Commission. Enhancing jointness would be going a step further than  colocating services and aspiring to consolidate common training. DOD  also states in its comments that the Interservice Training Review  Organization was involved in implementing the Chaplain  recommendation. Still, we found that, even with this involvement, DOD  did not take advantage of opportunities to consolidate training to increase  jointness in the Chaplain recommendation. We also noted that, in the  absence of guidance from DOD, four of the training functions in our  review did not make any further effort to consolidate training. We continue  to believe that if DOD believes the training functions in this review would  benefit from more consolidation of training, it should issue guidance.
DOD did not concur with our second recommendation to develop and  provide specific guidance for the military departments to use in  implementing recommendations designed to consolidate training to  increase jointness in the event of future BRAC rounds. DOD stated that  while consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy,  Installations, and Environment would be required within a future BRAC  round, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness  already has the authority to develop this guidance. We recognize that the  Under Secretary has the authority but as our report points out, it has not  exercised it in this instance, and that guidance is needed to ensure that  DOD takes advantage of the opportunities provided by BRAC.
DOD did not concur with our third recommendation to develop baseline  cost data in the event of any future consolidation of training. DOD stated  that data calls for BRAC must ensure that the questions asked do not  provide the personnel answering the questions insight into the various  scenarios being considered and that all installations must be treated  equally. Moreover, DOD stated that this is critical to maintaining the  fairness and objectivity of the analysis by preventing the supplied data  from being influenced by gaining and losing locations. During BRAC  2005, DOD estimated that it had collected over 25 million pieces of data  from hundreds of defense installations and presumably was able to do so  in a way that maintained fairness and objectivity without inappropriately  disclosing to personnel providing the information something to which they  should not be privy. DOD further stated that collecting baseline cost data  for training activities in advance of an authorized BRAC process is not  effective because the department will not be able to use previously  supplied uncertified data. Nothing in our recommendation requires DOD  to collect data prior to the implementation of a future, authorized BRAC  round. Finally, DOD stated that it is not clear that a future BRAC round  would include joint training. However, baseline cost data is needed for  measuring either increased costs or savings for changes to any program,  not just joint training. Thus, we continue to believe that without sufficient  baseline cost information, DOD will be unable to determine the budgetary  effect of its actions, including demonstrating cost savings.
DOD partially concurred with our fourth recommendation, to issue  clarifying guidance regarding what costs should be included in final BRAC  accounting. DOD stated that micromanaging every cost decision across  such a vast program would have been unreasonable and that ultimately,  whether or not to fund various requirements from the BRAC account was  a judgment call made by military headquarters officials. However, DOD  agreed that it would be reasonable to consider placing additional  emphasis on accounting for BRAC costs. We agree that managing a  program as large as BRAC is difficult and that guidance on what costs  should be included in the final BRAC accounting would help DOD to more  accurately report the costs of implementing BRAC.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense  for Personnel and Readiness, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Energy, Installations, and Environment. In addition, the report is available  at no charge on our website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: List of Prior GAO Reviews Related to BRAC 2005, Related Recommendations, and DOD Actions to Date
paragraphs: The following table lists selected prior GAO reports on the Base  Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 round, our recommendations in  those reports, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) response, and DOD’s  actions to date in response to the recommendations. The 24 reports listed  contained 69 recommendations. DOD concurred or partially concurred  with 57 of these recommendations and has implemented 37 of them.  According to DOD officials, DOD will be unable to take actions on many  of these recommendations until another BRAC round is authorized.
GAO  recommendation  GAO-15-274—Military Base Realignments and Closures: Process for Reusing Property for Homeless Assistance Needs  Improvements (Mar. 16, 2015).  Update the Base Realignment and Closure  (BRAC) homeless assistance regulations to  require that conveyance statuses be tracked.  These regulatory updates could include  requiring the Department of Defense (DOD)  to track and share disposal actions with the  Department of Housing and Urban  Development (HUD) and requiring HUD to  track the status following disposal, such as  type of assistance received by providers and  potential withdrawals by providers.
Partial concur. DOD stated that while it  concurs with the value of tracking homeless  assistance and other conveyances, it can do  so without any change to existing  regulations. DOD did not identify any actions  it will take on how to track the homeless  assistance conveyances in the absence of a  regulatory update and did not indicate that it  would work with HUD to update the  regulations. Moreover, DOD did not explain  how program staff would know to track the  conveyance status in the absence of  guidance requiring them to do so.   Partial concur. DOD stated that while it  already provides generic information about  the property, the Local Redevelopment  Authorities (LRA) and interested homeless  assistance providers can undertake facility  assessments following the tours. However,  DOD did not provide additional detail or  explanation about how it would provide  information about the condition of the  property or access to it.
Pending.  Awaiting authorization of a  future BRAC round.
Pending.  Awaiting authorization of a  future BRAC round.
Specific guidance that clearly identifies  the information that should be provided  to homeless assistance providers during  tours of on-base property, such as the  condition of the property.
DOD actions  Pending.  Awaiting authorization of a  future BRAC round.
Original DOD response  Non-concur.  DOD stated that the existing  regulatory guidance is adequate for  providers’ expressions of interest given that  these expressions evolve as the  redevelopment planning effort proceeds and  they learn more about the property.  Partial concur. DOD did not commit to  taking any actions to provide this information  and instead noted that any action should  ensure that a legally binding agreement  does not bind DOD to disposal actions it is  unable to carry out. DOD further noted that  the purpose of the legally binding agreement  is to provide remedies and recourse for the  LRA and provider in carrying out an  accommodation following property disposal.   Non-concur.  DOD stated that providers  may be considered only through specific  expressions of interest in surplus BRAC  property, and these suggested alternatives  may be considered only within the context of  what is legally permissible given the specific  circumstances at each installation.
Pending.  Awaiting authorization of a  future BRAC round.
Specific information on legal alternatives to  providing on-base property, including  acceptable alternative options such as  financial assistance or off-base property in  lieu of on-base property, information about  rules of sale for on-base property conveyed to  homeless assistance providers, and under  what circumstances it is permissible to sell  property for affordable housing alongside the  no-cost homeless assistance conveyance.  GAO-14-577—DOD Joint Bases: Implementation Challenges Demonstrate Need to Reevaluate the Program (Sept. 19, 2014).  Evaluate the 44 support functions identified in  DOD’s guidance for joint base implementation  to determine which functions are still suitable  for consolidation. Subsequently, identify and  make any changes that are appropriate to  address limitations reported by the joint bases  in consolidating installation-support functions,  such as limitations related to workforces and  geography.
Pending.  Awaiting authorization of a  future BRAC round.
Concur.  DOD stated that it had already  removed some installation-support functions  from joint basing because they were not  compelled for inclusion as part of the BRAC  recommendation and otherwise did not offer  opportunities for savings or consolidation. It  further stated that in April 2014, the Senior  Joint Base Working Group principals tasked  their staffs to identify which installation  support functions and performance  standards were not providing value to the  joint bases’ various military missions and to  explore whether these functions and  standards should continue to be included in  joint basing. DOD did not provide time  frames for completing such actions.
Pending.  In July 2015, an OSD official  stated that DOD will not revise the 12  memorandums of agreement for the  existing joint bases to show that some  of the functions should not be  consolidated but are using an  abbreviated list of functions—excluding  the functions we identified as poor  candidates for consolidation—in  evaluating the viability of new joint  bases.
GAO  recommendation  Take policy actions, as appropriate—such as  issuing additional guidance—to address any  challenges resulting in inefficiencies and  inequities regarding efforts to consolidate  installation-support functions—including, at a  minimum, those identified in this report.
Original DOD response  Partial concur. DOD stated that it is mindful  of challenges in implementing and operating  joint bases and agreed that policy actions  can address some challenges. However,  DOD stated that it does not agree that these  challenges require Office of the Secretary of  Defense (OSD) level policies, citing instead  the existing responsibilities and authorities  already assigned to the military departments  and the Joint Management Oversight  Structure.
Evaluate the purpose of the program and  determine whether DOD’s current goals of  achieving greater efficiencies and generating  cost savings for the joint basing program, as  stated in the 2005 BRAC Commission  recommendation, are still appropriate or  whether goals should be revised, and  communicate these goals to the military  services and joint bases and then adjust  program activities accordingly.  Subsequent to the evaluation above, provide  direction to joint bases on their requirements  for meeting the joint base program’s goals.  DOD’s leadership should work with the  military services to determine what reporting  requirements and milestones should be put in  place to increase support and commitment for  the program’s goals.
Non-concur.  DOD stated that the goal of  joint basing remains to increase the  efficiency of delivering installation support at  the 12 joint bases as described in the BRAC  Commission’s recommendation number 146.
DOD actions  Pending.  In July 2015, an OSD official  told us that DOD is taking action on our  recommendation to address any  challenges resulting in inefficiencies and  inequities regarding efforts to  consolidate installation-support  functions. DOD has drafted a joint  basing handbook, which has been  signed by the Air Force and the Navy,  to  address inconsistent service-level  guidance. In addition, the Senior  Installation Management Group now  meets quarterly to handle conflicts and  disputes between service policies and  to address any challenges resulting in  inefficiencies and inequities regarding  efforts to consolidate installation- support functions.  None planned.  As of November 2015,  DOD stated that no action is expected.
Non-concur.  DOD stated that the joint  bases have been fully operational since  October 2010 and have proven that they can  deliver measurable and tangible savings  across the installation-support portfolio.  Therefore, DOD stated that it does not  believe OSD should establish program  milestones.
None planned.  As of November 2015,  DOD stated that no action is expected.
GAO  recommendation  GAO-14-630—Defense Health Care Reform: Actions Needed to Help Realize Potential Cost Savings from Medical Education and  Training (July 31, 2014).  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health  Affairs should direct the Director of the  Defense Health Agency (DHA) to conduct a  fully developed business case analysis for the  Education and Training Directorate’s reform  effort. In this analysis the Director should  Identify the cost-related problem that it seeks  to address by establishing the Education and  Training Directorate,  Explain how the processes it has identified  will address the cost-related problem, and  Conduct and document an analysis of  benefits, costs, and risks.
Concur.  DOD stated that Medical Education  and Training is the only shared service that  has never had any type of oversight by the  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  for Health Affairs or the pre-DHA TRICARE  Management Activity.
Develop baseline cost information as part of  DHA’s metrics to assess achievement of cost  savings.
Concur.  DOD stated that Medical Education  and Training is the only shared service that  has never had any type of oversight by the  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  for Health Affairs or the pre-DHA TRICARE  Management Activity.
Pending.  In a September 2014 letter,  the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Health Affairs stated that baseline  costing would be a key component of  the Medical Education and Training  Directorate’s strategic plan and would  be presented in the form of a  “deliverable” in moving forward to the  Directorate’s final operating capability.  The letter also noted that an inventory  of all education and training products  and services within the Military Health  System will be undertaken shortly, and  that this had never been accomplished  before. However, the letter did not  specifically address the development of  metrics to assess achievement of any  cost savings as we recommended. As  of September 2015, no further actions  have been taken.   Pending.  According to a September  2014 letter from the Assistant Secretary  of Defense for Health Affairs, the  completion of a business case analysis  will be a key component of the  Directorate’s strategic plan and will be  presented in the form of a “deliverable”  to achieve its final operating capability.  The letter did not specifically identify the  cost-related problem that DOD seeks to  address by establishing the Directorate  nor did it specifically state if this would  be addressed in its business case  analysis under development as we  recommended. As of September 2015,  no further actions have been taken.
GAO  recommendation  GAO-14-538—Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Improve Its Efforts to Identify Unutilized and Underutilized Facilities (Sept. 8,  2014).  Establish a strategic plan as part of a results- oriented management framework that  includes, among other things, long-term  goals, strategies to achieve the goals, and  use of metrics to gauge progress to manage  DOD’s real property and to facilitate DOD’s  ability to identify all unutilized or underutilized  facilities for potential consolidation  opportunities.
Concur.  DOD stated that a strategy review  is currently under way with initial guidance  and initiatives.
Pending.  In response to a requirement  under the Office of Management and  Budget’s (OMB) Reduce the Footprint  policy, DOD officials told us in July 2015  that they had developed a draft DOD  Real Property Efficiency Plan that  describes DOD’s strategic and tactical  approach to managing its real property  effectively  and efficiently. Officials  stated that this draft plan would also  address our recommendation in  September 2014 that DOD establish a  strategic plan to manage it’s real  property and to facilitate its ability to  identify potential consolidation and  disposal opportunities. This plan has not  been finalized and implemented. As of  October 2015, an official from the Office  of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  for Energy, Installations, and  Environment stated that the plan is still  under review and has not been provided  to OMB.  The official did not have an  estimate for when the plan will be  finalized and implemented. Officials also  stated that a recently developed draft  guide for calculating facility utilization  should complement the draft plan in  improving utilization data to better  identify excess facilities.
GAO-13-436—Defense Infrastructure: Communities Need Additional Guidance and Information to Improve Their Ability to Adjust to  DOD Installation Closure or Growth (May  14, 2013).  Direct the Secretary of the Army to issue  guidance, consistent with DOD guidance, on  specific levels of maintenance to be followed  in the event of a base closure, based on the  probable reuse of the facilities.
Concur.  DOD stated that the Army agrees  to publish property maintenance guidance  prior to closing installations in the event of  future base closures.
Pending.  Awaiting authorization of a  future BRAC round. In July 2015, DOD  stated that the Army  has agreed to  publish property maintenance guidance  prior to closing installations in the event  of future base closures. There have  been no additional base closures since  the date of the report.
GAO  recommendation  Direct the Secretaries of the Army,  the Navy,  and the Air Force to consider developing a  procedure for collecting service members’  physical addresses while stationed at an  installation, annually updating this  information, and sharing aggregate  information with community representatives  relevant for local planning decisions, such as  additional population per zip code, consistent  with privacy and force protection concerns.
Direct the Secretaries of the Army and the Air  Force to consider creating or designating a  civilian position at the installation level to be  the focal point and provide continuity for  community interaction for future growth  installations and to consider establishing such  a position at all installations.
Original DOD response  Partial concur. DOD stated that it agrees  that information pertaining to the physical  location of installation personnel helps  affected communities plan for housing,  schools, transportation and other off-post  requirements and that existing policy  requires the military departments to share  planning information with states and  communities. DOD also stated that in the  event of future basing decisions affecting  local communities, it will work with the  military departments to assess and  determine the best means to obtain,  aggregate, and distribute this information to  help ensure that adequate planning  information is made available.  Partial concur. DOD stated that it agrees  with the need for a designated position at  the installation level and will ensure that  each military department is meeting this  need through current practices. DOD also  stated that many growth installation officials  already serve as “ex-officio members” of the  community’s growth management  organizations and community officials agree  that this has been quite valuable for both the  department and affected growth  communities.
DOD actions  None planned.  In July 2015, DOD  stated that there is no immediate need  to undertake these efforts.
Pending.  Awaiting authorization of a  future BRAC round. In July 2015, DOD  stated that in the event the Department  of Defense proceeds with future  realignments that could result in a  reduced footprint, there are provisions  for Base Transition Coordinators to be  designated as liaisons with affected  communities. In the event these future  realignments result in an expanded  footprint or personnel growth, the  department would consider this  recommendation at that time.
GAO-13-149—Military Bases: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Base Realignment and Closure Rounds (Mar. 7, 2013).  Work with the military services, defense  agencies, and other appropriate stakeholders  to improve the process for fully identifying  recommendation-specific military construction  requirements and ensuring that those  requirements are entered into the Cost of  Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model  and not under stated in implementation cost  estimates prior to submitting  recommendations to the BRAC Commission.  Establish a process for ensuring that  information technology requirements  associated with candidate recommendations  that are heavily reliant on such technology  have been identified to the extent required to  accomplish the associated mission, before  recommendations and cost estimates are  submitted to the BRAC Commission.
Non-concur.  DOD stated that the primary  advantage of COBRA is to provide real-time  comparison of scenarios to aid analysis and  decision making, not to develop budget- quality estimates.
None planned.  As of November 2015,  DOD stated that no action is expected.
Partial concur. DOD acknowledged that  information technology costs should be  better estimated but added that a separate  process is not necessary and stated that it  can improve cost estimating by reevaluating  the standard factors used in COBRA and by  providing additional guidance as  appropriate.
Pending.  Awaiting authorization of a  future BRAC round.
GAO  recommendation  Ensure that, during the development and  comparison of BRAC scenarios, all  anticipated BRAC implementation costs— such as relocating personnel and  equipment—are considered and included in  the COBRA model when comparing  alternatives and generating cost estimates.  Take steps to ensure that COBRA’s standard  factor for information technology is updated  and based on technological developments  since the most recent COBRA update.  Update COBRA guidance to require users to  provide a narrative explaining the process,  sources, and methods used to develop the  data entered into COBRA to develop military  personnel position-elimination savings.  Identify appropriate measures of  effectiveness and develop a plan to  demonstrate the extent to which the  department achieved the results intended  from the implementation of the BRAC round.
Original DOD response  Non-concur.  DOD reiterated that COBRA is  not designed to develop budget quality  estimates, nor can it reflect future  implementation investment decisions made  after BRAC recommendations become  binding legal obligations for DOD.
DOD actions  None planned.  As of November 2015,  DOD stated that no action is expected.
Concur.
Pending.  Awaiting authorization of a  future BRAC round.
Concur.
Pending.  Awaiting authorization of a  future BRAC round.
Non-concur.  DOD stated that military value  based on force structure and mission needs  should continue to be the key driver for  BRAC. DOD also stated that its business  plan process is the best way to measure  effectiveness.  Non-concur.  DOD stated that goals or  overarching capacity targets would subvert  the intent of the BRAC statute to develop  recommendations based on military value  and would preclude examination of a full  array of closure and realignment options.
None planned.  As of November 2015,  DOD stated that no action is expected.
Establish a target for eliminating excess  capacity in its initiating guidance to high-level  department-wide leadership, consistent with  the BRAC selection criteria chosen for a  future BRAC round.
None planned.  As of November 2015,  DOD stated that no action is expected.
Limit the practice of bundling many potential  stand-alone realignments or closures into  single recommendations.
Non-concur.  DOD does not believe that  bundling is problematic and stated that the  examples we cited had been bundled  because they shared a common mission and  purpose, and bundling maximized military  value. The practice of bundling can limit  visibility into the estimated costs and savings  for individual closures or realignments that  are elements of the bundle and can make  the Commission’s review more difficult,  although DOD disputed this latter point. The  2005 BRAC Commission’s executive staff  told us that bundling made their review more  difficult because they needed to deconstruct  the bundle to assess whether any changes  were necessary. In some cases bundling is  warranted, and it is for this reason that we  recommended limiting the practice, not  prohibiting it.
None planned.  As of November 2015,  DOD stated that no action is expected.
GAO  recommendation  If DOD determines that bundling multiple  realignments or closures into one  recommendation is appropriate, itemize the  costs and savings associated with each major  discrete action it its report to the BRAC  Commission.  Develop a process to ensure that any data- security issues are resolved in time to provide  all information to the BRAC Commission in a  timely manner by conducting a security  review of all BRAC data during DOD’s  recommendation development process, to  include a review of the aggregation of  unclassified data for potential security  concerns and possible classification, if  necessary.  GAO-13-134—DOD Joint Bases: Management Actions Needed to Achieve Greater Efficiencies (Nov. 16, 2012).
Original DOD response  Partial concur. DOD stated that where  appropriate, the department could highlight  cost and savings associated with major  actions, and that action would meet the  intent of our recommendation.
DOD actions  Pending.  Awaiting authorization of a  future BRAC round.
Concur.
Pending.  Awaiting authorization of a  future BRAC round.
None planned.  As of November 2015,  DOD stated that no action is expected. paring unnecessary management  personnel,  consolidating and optimizing contract  requirements,  establishing a single space management  authority to achieve greater utilization of  facilities, and  reducing the number of base support  vehicles and equipment.
Non-concur.  DOD said that such targets  would burden and restrict the authority of  local commanders to manage the merger of  the formerly stand-alone bases into joint  bases while implementing new  organizational structures, which would  unnecessarily risk negative effects to  mission support when operational  effectiveness of the bases is paramount.  DOD stated that the department should  continue its patient approach to obtaining  savings and efficiencies at joint bases,  because it is working. All of the Air Force-led  joint bases reduced civilian positions, and  the Navy  chose not to fill all of its civilian  vacancies. Finally, the creation of the joint  bases is equivalent to the mergers of  corporations with very different financial  systems, management structures, operating  procedures, and cultural differences. DOD  stated the importance of empowering joint  base commanders to design, implement,  and adapt cost efficient and effective  approaches to their unique situations while  adopting new and cross-cutting business  practices, as incubators of innovation. DOD  decided to allow for an extended transition  period and to defer near-term savings.
GAO  recommendation  Continue to develop and refine the Cost  Performance and Visibility Framework in  order to eliminate data reliability problems, facilitate comparisons of joint basing costs  with the cost of operating the separate  installations prior to implementing joint  basing, and identify and isolate the costs and savings  resulting from actions and initiatives  specifically resulting from joint basing and  excluding DOD- or service-wide actions and  initiatives.
Original DOD response  Partial concur. DOD stated that its Cost  Performance and Visibility Framework  already provides a method to collect  quarterly data on performance toward the  Common Output Level Standards, annual  data on personnel assigned, and funds  obligated for each joint base. However, DOD  is addressing inconsistencies in the current  data captured in the Framework and is  improving its data reliability with  considerable investment and the expectation  to begin assessing joint base efficiencies by  the end of fiscal year 2012. DOD stated that  it would be able to make several  comparisons–such as comparing the current  fiscal year financial and performance data  with the baseline and previous year’s  obligations and the joint base’s baseline  data with the costs of operating the separate  installations—prior to implementing joint  basing. DOD acknowledged that the  comparison of the costs of operating  separate installations would not identify cost  savings resulting solely from joint basing and  asserted the impracticality of isolating and  distinguishing joint basing cost savings from  the savings that result from DOD- or service- wide actions using the data contained in  DOD’s Framework. Further, DOD pointed  out that it did not believe that accounting  systems were designed to track savings but  to track expenses and disbursements.  Partial concur. DOD stated that a quarterly  feedback process on the joint base common  standards and an annual review process  that incorporates input from the joint bases  already exist. Further, standards may need  changing as priorities change and missions  evolve, but the current process strikes an  appropriate balance between the analytical  burden of repeated reviews and the need for  clarity and refinement. DOD also stated that  it believes that reviewing all the standards  simultaneously does not allow for the depth  of analysis required to make sound  decisions, and suggested that GAO conduct  a qualitative assessment of the standards,  because the findings appear to be based on  an anecdotal assessment.
DOD actions  Complete. DOD provided guidance to  the joint bases that resulted in improved  quality of the data obtained for fiscal  year 2012. Subsequently, DOD  performed an analysis comparing this  improved operating cost data with what  it had projected would be the costs of  operating the separate installations if  the joint bases had not been created.  This analysis showed that the joint  bases were saving money relative to the  costs of operating the separate  installations. Together these actions  met the intent of our recommendation  and provided DOD with an improved  picture of the cost of operating the joint  bases as well as a comparison of the  cost of operating the joint bases with the  cost of operating the separate  installations.
Direct the joint bases to compile a list of those  common standards in all functional areas  needing clarification and the reasons why  they need to be clarified, including those  standards still being provided or reported on  according to service-specific standards rather  than the common standard.
None planned.  As of November 2015,  DOD stated that no action is expected.
GAO  recommendation  Amend the OSD joint standards review  process to prioritize review and revision of  those standards most in need of clarification  within this list.
Original DOD response  Partial concur. See above.
DOD actions  None planned.  As of November 2015,  DOD stated that no action is expected.
Develop a common strategy to expand  routine communication between the joint  bases, and between the joint bases and OSD,  to encourage joint resolution of common  challenges and sharing of best practices and  lessons learned.
Partial concur. DOD stated that it believed  there were already mechanisms in place to  facilitate routine communication between the  joint bases, as well as between OSD and the  joint bases, and that it is increasing those  opportunities. DOD listed the various  opportunities it has for sharing joint basing  information, including yearly joint base site  visits and an annual management review  meeting with the joint base commanders.
Develop guidance to ensure that all the joint  bases develop and provide training materials  to incoming personnel on how installation  services are provided on joint bases.
Partial concur. DOD stated that it would  ensure that each of the services is providing  training materials to incoming personnel;  however, joint base commanders need  flexibility to tailor training to the needs of  their installations.
Complete. DOD added an annual  meeting beginning in February 2013 for  Joint Base commanders to discuss  issues the bases are facing, and in  August 2013 distributed contact  information for all Joint Base  commanders and Deputy Joint Base  commanders to each of the joint bases.  As a result, joint bases have had  expanded opportunities to share  information on best practices and  lessons learned and to resolve common  challenges. In part because the annual  Joint Base commander’s meeting takes  place as part of an annual program  review meeting with OSD, together  these actions address the intent of this  recommendation.  Pending.  In July 2015, an OSD official  told us that OSD is taking action on our  recommendation to develop and provide  training materials to incoming joint base  personnel. DOD has drafted a joint  basing handbook, which has been  signed off on by the Air Force and the  Navy,  to address inconsistent service  level guidance. In addition, the Senior  Installation Management Group now  meets quarterly to handle conflicts  between service policies and to address  any challenges that have resulted in  inefficiencies and inequities regarding  efforts to consolidate installation- support functions.
GAO  recommendation  GAO-11-814—Excess Facilities: DOD Needs More Complete Information and a Strategy to Guide Its Future Disposal Efforts (Sept.  19, 2011).  Develop and implement a methodology for  calculating and recording utilization data for  all types of facilities, and modify processes to  update and verify  the accuracy of reported  utilization data to reflect a facility’s true status.
Partial concur. DOD has already begun  some efforts to improve its utilization data  and will to develop and implement  appropriate procedures. DOD did not specify  what actions it has completed to date or its  time frames for completion.
Develop strategies and measures to enhance  the management of DOD’s excess facilities  after the current demolition program ends,  taking into account external factors that may  affect future disposal efforts.
Concur.  DOD stated that it will work with the  military departments to continue to develop  and implement the most effective and  efficient methods to eliminate excess  facilities and excess capacity, but it did not  provide any details or specific time frames  for these efforts.
Complete. In January 2014, the Under  Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,  Technology and Logistics) issued an  update to DOD’s policy on inventory  and accountability of real property  assets. It includes procedures for  inventory data requirements such as  including accurate data submission in  real-time or near real-time, and the  creation of a Real Property Accountable  Officer who is responsible for property  inventory at the installation level. DOD’s  corrective action plan and updated  policy address our concerns with  calculating, recording, updating, and  verifying the accuracy of utilization data.  Complete. The services have  incorporated demolition into their  installation planning and other facility  space management programs. For  example, the Air Force has incorporated  demolition as a key feature in its  ongoing initiative to consolidate space  and personnel, and to achieve a 20  percent reduction in its property  inventory by 2020. Also, DOD is more  proactively managing its processes to  meet historic preservation requirements,  to address environmental preservation  concerns, and to expedite completion of  required environmental mitigation.  Further, the services have begun  implementing a policy in line with a  January 2014 update to DOD’s policy  on inventory and accountability of real  property assets, which clarified the roles  and responsibilities of the officer  responsible for managing property  inventory at the installation level,  including the requirement to ensure that  all disposal records are accurately  recorded.
GAO  recommendation  GAO-11-165—Defense Infrastructure: High Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs  Beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program (Jan. 26, 2011).  Update regulations and clarify guidance for  the Defense Access Roads certification and  funding process; develop working-level  guidance for potential program users; and  effectively  communicate the regulations and  working-level guidance to all federal, state,  and local stakeholders.
Partial concur. DOD stated that although it  will work with the Department of  Transportation to update Defense Access  Roads regulations and clarify guidance, it  believes that sufficient guidance for and  awareness of the program exists.
Complete. In response to our  recommendation, in August 2012 DOD  and the Department of Transportation  agreed to more closely coordinate  approaches to transportation issues.  Additionally, in March 2013, DOD  officials stated that, based on the results  of coordinating a potential change to the  Defense Access Roads eligibility  criteria, leadership determined that the  best approach would be to direct the  Defense Access Roads program to  update its guidance to ensure that the  existing criteria are applied flexibly, as  has been the case for urban areas  during the implementation of BRAC  2005. Lastly, in June 2013, the Under  Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,  Technology and Logistics) issued a  memo directing the Defense Access  Roads Program to update its guidance.  In addition, the Military Surface  Deployment and Distribution Command  Defense Access Roads Program office  has begun communicating directly with  the commanders of each growth  installation to address previously  reported issues regarding unawareness  of the Defense Access Roads Program.  These actions will allow program  guidance to be updated to include the  program’s procedures and will ensure  that the guidance is effectively  communicated to all stakeholders so  that the program can be used to its  fullest extent.
GAO  recommendation  Routinely coordinate with the Secretary of  Transportation to meet regularly, identify all  existing federal transportation funding  resources, and develop a strategy for  affording priority consideration for the use of  those funds and other resources for the  benefit of communities most severely affected  by DOD.
Original DOD response  Partial concur. DOD stated that the  department would continue to work closely  with the department of Transportation to  assist communities affected by DOD actions  but that the Department of Transportation  does not have discretionary funds that it can  use to target communities affected by DOD,  and instead, state and local communities  must advance defense-related transportation  projects.
DOD actions  Complete. In response to this  recommendation, DOD hosted a  meeting of the Economic Adjustment  Committee in August 2012 to examine  Defense Access Roads funding and  coordination issues. An outcome of that  meeting was consensus that, as DOD  develops future re-stationing decisions,  greater coordination with local planning  entities is essential to assessing effects  on transportation. In June 2013, the  Under Secretary of Defense  (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)  issued a letter to the congressional  defense committees detailing the  proposed plan for improving the  Defense Access Roads Program. As  stated in the plan, DOD’s goal is to  improve the assessment of effects on  transportation; enhance collaboration  with planning entities; expand the range  of mitigation measures, including joint  funding opportunities; and promote  additional measures for managing  transportation demand. These actions  will allow for the effective interagency  and intergovernmental coordination that  is needed to help address the unmet  transportation needs of defense- affected communities.
GAO-10-725R—Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Is Taking Steps to Mitigate Challenges but Is Not Fully Reporting  Some Additional Costs (July 21, 2010).  Take steps to capture and appropriately  report to Congress any BRAC-related  implementation costs that are funded from  outside the BRAC process.
Concur.  DOD noted that it is in the process  of drafting new BRAC guidance, which will  direct the services and defense agencies to  provide a final accounting for all BRAC costs  (both inside and outside of the account),  among other items,.
Complete. On August 5, 2010, the  Deputy Undersecretary of Defense  (Installations and Environment) issued a  guidance memo to the military services  and DOD agencies requiring all BRAC  business plan managers to fully capture  the costs and savings of BRAC 2005 by  submitting a final BRAC financial  display that captures all BRAC related  expenditures (both inside and outside  the BRAC account), which will give  Congress more visibility over all BRAC  implementation costs.
GAO  recommendation  GAO-10-602—Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning Systems to Better Support Installations  Experiencing Significant Growth (June 24, 2010).  Develop and implement guidance that  requires the Army Criteria Tracking System to  be updated as changes to facility design and  criteria are made.
Concur.  DOD stated that the Army has  already taken action to enhance the  accuracy of its planning systems to better  respond to changing requirements.
Develop and implement policies and  procedures for linking other systems, such as  the Army Range Requirements Model and the  Army Health Planning Agency’s system, to  the Real Property Planning and Analysis  System in order to eliminate any potential  confusion as to the correct range and medical  facility requirements.
Concur.  DOD stated that it plans to partly  address our recommendation by fielding a  comprehensive range planning tool.
Complete. In May  2010 the Army  incorporated the functionality of the  Army Criteria Tracking System into its  web-based Real Property Planning and  Analysis System, thereby linking the two  systems and ensuring that as one is  reviewed the other is reviewed and as  one is updated the other is updated.  The Real Property Planning and  Analysis System is web based and  changes can be made in real time.  Similarly, because the Army Criteria  Tracking System is now incorporated  into the Real Property Planning and  Analysis System, the Army Criteria  Tracking System is now web based and  changes to it can be made in real time.  Complete. The Army  stated that as of  June 2010, the Army Range  Requirements Model was being used to  generate the range requirements in the  Real Property Planning and Analysis  System and that because the Army  Health Facility Planning Agency does  not have an automated system to  generate requirements, the Army was  manually obtaining hospital  requirements and inputting them into  the Real Property Planning and  Analysis System. These actions  eliminated two sets of requirements for  ranges and hospitals, reducing any  potential confusion.
GAO  recommendation  Develop a streamlined mechanism to  expedite the flow of stationing information to  installations.
Original DOD response  Concur.  DOD stated that the Army has  already initiated improvements in its process  and is evaluating additional streamlining  measures.
Modify  existing guidance to enhance  communication between decision makers and  installations so that installation facility  planners are notified when stationing actions  are changed.
Concur.  DOD stated that the Army has  already initiated improvements in its  communication process and that the  department is evaluating additional  measures to ensure that data integrity and  transparency are achieved.
DOD actions  Complete. In January 2012, DOD  reported that the Army  continues to  enhance the flow of stationing  information. All unit moves are now  combined by installation and by fiscal  year, significantly reducing the number  of actions being processed. In August  2010, the Army  staff issued guidance to  the field (Installation Management  Command) that clarified formal lines of  communication and established protocol  to differentiate between official and  unofficial taskings, enabling installation  commanders to focus on approved  official actions. All stakeholders are  better involved in the early stages of  force structure actions, force design  updates, concept plans, and leadership  direction. In April 2012, DOD reported  that a copy of the August 2010 Army  staff guidance that clarified formal lines  of communication was provided to the  field (Installation Management  Command).  Complete. In August 2010 the Army  issued guidance to better synchronize  installations’ participation in stationing  efforts. Specifically, the guidance (1)  clarified formal lines of communication  to ensure that all stakeholders are  better involved in the early stages of  force structure actions and force design  updates and (2) established protocols to  enable communication between staff at  installations and Army Headquarters  during stationing action implementation  to ensure efficient completion of  stationing actions. As a result, we  believe the Army’s actions met the  intent of our recommendation.
GAO-09-703—Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings Estimates and Continue to Address  Challenges in Consolidating Supply-Related Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations (July 9, 2009).  Remove savings estimates that are not  clearly the direct result of 2005 BRAC actions  (including savings sometimes referred to as  “BRAC enabled”).  Update its 4-year-old data to reflect the most  recent estimate of inventory levels available  for consolidation.
Concur.  DOD stated that such savings  estimates will be removed from savings  estimates reported in the August 2009  business plan submission.  Concur.  DOD stated that it will use the most  recent estimate of inventory levels available  and update the savings calculations for  inventory reductions in its August 2009  business plan.
Complete. In DOD’s 2009 biannual  Business Plan, the Defense Logistics  Agency had removed those savings  from its estimates.   Complete. In DOD’s 2009 biannual  Business Plan, the Defense Logistics  Agency used updated inventory levels  in its current estimate for savings  related to this BRAC recommendation.
GAO  recommendation  Apply current information on the timing of  inventory consolidations (specifically, when  they will begin and how long they will take)  and exclude projected savings for  consolidating Army and Marine Corps  inventories with the Defense Logistics  Agency.
Original DOD response  Concur.  DOD stated that savings  calculations for projected inventory  reductions will reflect the current schedule of  consolidating materiel and will be updated in  the August 2009 business plan. Moreover,  DOD stated that the update will show that no  Army or Marine Corps inventory is available  for consolidation.
Revise and finalize an approved methodology  which implements these steps and can be  consistently followed by all the services and  the Defense Logistics Agency over time.
Concur.  DOD stated that the new  calculations would be documented in the  August 2009 business plan and updates and  revisions would be incorporated and staffed  by the end of calendar year 2009.
DOD actions  Complete. In DOD’s August 2009  biannual Business Plan, The Defense  Logistics Agency used current  information regarding a later timetable  for inventory consolidations and  eliminated any savings from the Army  and Marine Corps inventories since  there will not be any available to  consolidate. The resulting savings  estimate will provide better information  for congressional oversight and help  maintain public confidence in the BRAC  process.   Complete. According to DOD, in 2010  and 2011, the department documented  updates and revisions to the  methodologies for projecting or tracking,  or both, BRAC savings associated with  the supply, storage, and distribution  functions and inventories in the Cost  and Savings Tracking Plan, which was  in its second coordination cycle.
GAO-09-336—Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better  Inform Congress of Facility Sustainment Funding Uses (March 30, 2009).  Periodically review the installation support  standards as experience is gained with  delivering installation support at the joint  bases and make adjustments, if needed, to  ensure that each standard reflects the level of  service necessary to meet installation  requirements as economically as possible.
Partial concur. DOD stated that further  action to implement the recommendation  was not necessary because the joint base  memorandum of agreement template  already requires periodic reviews to ensure  that installation support is delivered in  accordance with appropriate, common,  output level standards.
Periodically review administrative costs as  joint basing is implemented to minimize any  additional costs and prevent the loss of  existing installation support efficiencies.
Complete. In January 2011, DOD  stated that the department now reviews  the installation support standards  annually for appropriateness,  applicability, and performance. In  addition to the annual review, the  department implemented a cost and  performance visibility framework under  which the joint bases report how well  the standards are being met. DOD  stated that the reported information can  assist in determining whether any  adjustments need to be made to the  standards.  None planned.
Partial concur. DOD stated that further  action to implement the recommendation  was not necessary because it had already  established a process to periodically review  joint basing costs as part of its planning,  program, budget and execution system and  that the joint base memorandum of  agreement template requires periodic  reviews of effects on missions and  resources.
GAO  recommendation  Complete a detailed analysis of the estimated  installation support costs from the initial joint  bases and report the results of the analysis to  Congress in the department’s documents  supporting the administration’s annual budget  submission or other documents deemed  appropriate.
Original DOD response  Partial concur. DOD stated that it is  collecting estimated installation support cost  information at the joint bases and that the  information will be provided if Congress  requests it.
Increase the attention given to facility  sustainment spending by summarizing and  reporting to Congress the amount of  budgeted sustainment funds spent on other  purposes in the department’s documents  supporting the administration’s annual budget  submission or other documents deemed  appropriate.
Partial concur. DOD stated that it would  collect and summarize the amount of  budgeted sustainment funds spent on other  purposes and that the information would be  provided if Congress requested it.
DOD actions  Complete. In July 2011, DOD stated  that it had established procedures for  collecting installation support costs at  the 12 joint bases and, by using a cost  and performance visibility framework,  the joint bases report cost and  manpower annually six weeks after the  end of the fiscal year. According to  DOD, the information is analyzed in  conjunction with performance data  reported quarterly, to get an overall  assessment of how well the standards  for installation support are being met  and the costs associated with those  standards. DOD stated that it will  continue to respond to requests for  information from Congress with regard  to the joint basing initiative.  Complete. In July 2011, DOD stated  that the department was monitoring the  budgeting and execution of facilities  sustainment in order to determine how  much of the funding budgeted for  sustainment is diverted to other  purposes. DOD also stated that the  department was currently collecting  information at a sampling of installations  across DOD on the sustainment tasks  that are deferred in a given year and  that the information would help inform  decision-making with regard to facilities  sustainment funding. Finally, DOD  previously stated that it would provide  Congress with information on the  amount of budgeted sustainment funds  spent on other purposes, if Congress  requests it.
GAO  recommendation  GAO-09-217—Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is  Not Consistently Updating Savings Estimates (Jan. 30, 2009).  Modify  the recently issued guidance on the  status of BRAC implementation to establish a  briefing schedule with briefings as frequently  as OSD deems necessary to manage the risk  that a particular recommendation may not  meet the statutory deadline but at a minimum  at 6-month intervals through the rest of the  BRAC 2005 implementation period, a  schedule that would enable DOD to  continually assess and respond to the  challenges identified by the services and  defense agencies that could prevent DOD  from completing the implementation of a  recommendation by September 15, 2011.  Modify  the recently issued guidance on the  status of BRAC implementation to require the  services and defense agencies to provide  information on possible mitigation measures  to reduce the effects of those challenges.
Concur.  DOD noted that BRAC business  managers had and would continue to  provide briefings on the status of  implementation actions associated with  recommendations exceeding $100 million,  and that these briefings provide a forum for  BRAC business managers to explain their  actions to mitigate challenges.
Complete. The Deputy Under Secretary  of Defense (Installations and  Environment) issued a memo in  November 2008 requiring the military  services and defense agencies to  provide the OSD BRAC Office status  briefings. According to OSD, the  briefings were needed to ensure senior  leadership was apprised of significant  issues affecting BRAC implementation  by the statutory deadline. The first  round of status briefings took place in  December 2008.
Concur.  DOD noted that BRAC business  managers had and would continue to  provide briefings on the status of  implementation actions associated with  recommendations exceeding $100 million,  and that these briefings provide a forum for  BRAC business managers to explain their  actions to mitigate challenges.
Complete. According to DOD, in 2009  and 2010, the department required  business managers to identify specific  mitigation measures for BRAC  recommendations that have  construction projects that are scheduled  to complete within 3 months of the  statutory deadline. The purpose of  these mitigation measures is to reduce  the risk of not completing  implementation of a recommendation by  the BRAC deadline. These mitigation  measures are identified and monitored  in a tracking tool to help ensure they are  implemented and the risk is reduced. As  appropriate, the DOD basing office  conducts additional follow-up meetings  with business managers for specific  issues or follows up via other contacts  that occur between the routine 6 month  briefing intervals. This helps to ensure  DOD is making progress and  implementation of recommendations is  on track. As part of this process, six  recommendations were identified as  having particular risk. DOD briefed  these six recommendations to key  Senate and House staff in March 2010.
GAO  recommendation  Take steps to improve compliance with  DOD’s regulation requiring updated BRAC  savings estimates.
Original DOD response  Concur.  The department stated that it is  emphasizing savings updates during its  briefings and in all future business plan  approval documentation.
DOD actions  Complete. On August 5, 2010, the  Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  (Installations and Environment) issued a  guidance memo to the military services  and DOD agencies regarding BRAC  2005 Final Business Plans and Other  Reporting Requirements. Among other  things, this guidance emphasized to the  military services and defense agencies  that it is imperative that the final  financial displays for BRAC 2005  contain updated projections of recurring  savings.
GAO-08-665—Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD- Related Growth (June 17, 2008).  Develop and implement guidance—no later  than the end of fiscal year 2008—that is  consistent with DOD Directive 5410.12 for the  timely, complete, and consistent  dissemination of DOD planning information  such as estimated time lines and numbers of  personnel relocating, as well as demographic  data such as numbers of school-aged  children, and update this information  quarterly.
Concur.  Although DOD indicated it would  continue to work with the cognizant DOD  components to ensure compliance with the  directive, actions taken to date have not  resulted in the military services’  development and implementation of  guidance that we believe is necessary for  providing more complete and consistent  personnel relocation planning data to  affected communities. Moreover, DOD did  not explicitly say what steps it intends to  take to ensure that the military services have  implemented such guidance by the end of  fiscal year 2008. With respect to our  recommended action to provide information  updates on a quarterly basis, DOD indicated  that not all situations are conducive to  quarterly updates.
Complete. From January through  March 2011, the military services and  the head of the Defense Logistics  Agency issued guidance for the timely,  complete, and consistent dissemination  of DOD planning information, such as  military and civilian personnel changes  and school-age children increases and  decreases in accordance with DOD  Directive 5410.12. Although DOD  missed the deadline for implementing  our recommendation, issuing this  guidance facilitates the preparation of  effective plans to minimize the  economic impacts on communities  resulting from changes in defense  programs.
GAO  recommendation  Implement Executive Order 12788 by holding  regular meetings of the full executive-level  Economic Adjustment Committee and by  serving as a clearinghouse of information for  identifying expected community effects and  problems, as well as identifying existing  resources for providing economic assistance  to communities affected by DOD activities. In  addition, this information should be updated  at least quarterly and made easily available to  all interested stakeholders at the local, state,  and federal levels.
Original DOD response  Concur.  DOD stated that it will develop an  information clearinghouse that will identify  federal programs and resources to affected  communities, present successful state and  local responses, and provide the Economic  Adjustment Committee members with a  basis to resource their assistance programs.  Based on DOD’s comments, it is unclear as  to whether DOD, as chair of the Economic  Adjustment Committee, intends to call and  periodically hold meetings of the full  executive-level committee to provide the  high-level federal leadership that we believe  is necessary to more effectively  coordinate  federal agency assistance to impacted  communities.
DOD actions  Complete. DOD regularly reconvened  the full executive level Economic  Adjustment Committee meetings from  February 25, 2009 to September 2,  2010 and completed actions that met  the intent of our recommendation by  establishing a clearinghouse website in  December 2009 to support states and  communities undertaking local  economic adjustment activity and  federal agencies working to support  such activities. By  reconvening the full  executive level Economic Adjustment  Committee and setting up the  clearinghouse website, DOD increased  its ability to engage other federal  agencies at a high level to promote  interagency and intergovernmental  cooperation and share information on a  continual basis. DOD activated a  publicly accessible website in  December 2008  (www.eaclearinghouse.gov), managed  by the Office of Economic Adjustment,  which contains information such as  service migration information,  information on federal agency  assistance programs, community  profiles, and community redevelopment  plans.
GAO-08-315—Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key  Supply-Related BRAC Recommendations (March 5, 2008).  Revise its business plans to exclude all  expected savings that are not the direct result  of BRAC actions.
Non-concur.  DOD stated that while the  $172 million in potential savings for  implementing the supply, storage, and  distribution recommendation and the $71  million in potential savings for implementing  the depot-level reparable recommendation  were not directly the result of BRAC actions,  the estimated savings were enabled by  BRAC actions and should be attributable to  the recommendations. According to DOD,  enabled savings are savings initiatives that  were enhanced in some way by  the BRAC  implementation actions (e.g. increased  scope, more aggressively pursued, or  moved in new directions).
None planned.
Original DOD response  Concur. clear metrics for measuring the  magnitude of actual costs and  savings,  a comparison of the actual costs and  savings to the prior estimates to  coincide with the required  semiannual business plan updates,  and  explanations for actual cost and  savings variances from estimates  presented in the business plans.
DOD actions  Complete. According to DOD, in 2009,  the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense (Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics) established a standard DOD  format for measuring the magnitude of  actual costs and savings, and required  DOD components to submit business  plans in February and August that  compared current costs and savings  with prior estimates and justify any  changes, by funding category. The  Defense Logistics Agency has since  updated cost and savings for BRAC  recommendations on a semi-annual  basis synchronized with the  programming and budget cycles and  compared actual costs and savings to  prior year estimates. The magnitude of  actual costs and savings are collected  in a relational data base that was  developed to compare actual costs and  savings to prior year estimates. The  data base has data on BRAC  Recommendation 176-Depot Level  Reparable Management and BRAC  Recommendation 177-Supply, Storage,  and Distribution Reconfiguration. For  example, in the February 2009 business  plans for BRAC Recommendation 176  and BRAC Recommendation 177, the  Defense Logistics Agency compared  costs and savings to prior estimates for  each funding category and when there  was a variance in a funding category, it  included an explanation for the change  in cost and savings.
GAO  recommendation  Ensure that necessary funding to meet  implementation milestones is reflected in all  service and Defense Logistics Agency budget  submissions for the remainder of the  implementation period ending in fiscal year  2011.
Original DOD response  Concur.
DOD actions  Complete. According to DOD, the  BRAC decision memorandums provide  the resources to fully fund  implementation during the 6-year BRAC  implementation statutory period.  Annually the DOD BRAC office goes  through an extensive analysis to  compare each business plan  requirement to program funding  (Program Review). If funding shortfalls  are identified, the components are  directed via a Program Decision  Memorandum to fully fund  requirements. The office of the Under  Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,  Technology and Logistics) issued a  June 22, 2007 memorandum directing  DOD Components to fully fund BRAC  implementation during the 6-year  statutory period.
GAO-08-159—Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve (Dec.  11, 2007).  Explain, in DOD’s BRAC budget submission  to Congress, the difference between annual  recurring savings attributable to military  personnel entitlements and annual recurring  savings that will readily result in funds  available for other defense priorities.
Concur.  DOD noted that military personnel  reductions attributable to a BRAC  recommendation as savings are as real as  savings generated through end strength  reductions. DOD also stated that while it  may not reduce overall end strength, its  reductions in military personnel for each  recommendation at a specific location are  real and these personnel reductions allow  the department to reapply these military  personnel to support new capabilities and  improve operational efficiencies.
Complete. The fiscal year 2009 DOD  budget estimates for BRAC 2005  included language that stated, “To the  extent that savings generated from  military personnel reductions at closing  or realigning installations are  immediately used to fund military  personnel priorities, these resources are  not available to fund other Defense  priorities.” Such language was not  included in the prior year (fiscal year  2008) budget submittal to Congress.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense  stated that the insertion of this language  would provide a better explanation to  Congress of its estimated annual  recurring savings resulting from BRAC.
GAO  recommendation  GAO-07-1040—Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed  Forces Reserve Centers (Sept. 13, 2007).  Develop a plan for routinely bringing together  the various stakeholders as a group, to  include the state Army National Guard when  appropriate, to monitor for and develop steps  to mitigate implementation challenges should  they occur. These steps should include ways  to monitor and mitigate the effects of potential  challenges on BRAC completion time frames,  project cost and scope, construction quality,  and capacity of the facility to meet changing  mission requirements.
Partial concur. DOD believes that GAO  overlooked the various groups, forums, or  plans that the Army  has in place to assist  with BRAC execution and management.  DOD stated that the Army  already has a  plan in place to bring the various  stakeholders together, however Army BRAC  headquarters officials acknowledged that  they could be more proactive in outreaching  and communicating with the stakeholders on  how to deal with and mitigate particular  challenges associated with constructing 125  AFRCs. DOD also stated that the Army  BRAC office will begin quarterly BRAC  program reviews with the Assistant  Secretary of the Army for Installations and  Environment, which will further provide a  forum for discussing and vetting issues  affecting the BRAC program.
Complete. The Army  BRAC Office has  taken several steps to implement the  recommendation. In March 2009, the  Army BRAC Office provided a BRAC  2005 program update to the Army Vice  Chief of Staff, with representation from  the Army National Guard and Reserves.  In addition, the Army BRAC Division  Reserve Component Branch, the Army  Reserve Division, and the full time Army  National Guard and Army  Reserve  liaisons assigned to the Army BRAC  Office collaborated at BRAC summits in  October 2009 and April 2010 where  issues affecting US Army Reserve  Command were discussed with Army  National Guard and Army  Reserve  Command presenting their concerns.
GAO-07-1007—Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely Infrastructure Support for Army Installations  Expecting Substantial Personnel Growth (Sept. 13, 2007).  Determine why there are data differences  between headquarters and gaining bases  with respect to the number of arriving and  departing personnel.
Partial concur. DOD stated that the Army  had determined the cause of the differences  and taken corrective action by establishing  the Army Stationing Installation Plan (ASIP)  as the single, unified source of installation  planning population data to be used Army- wide.
Complete. In January 2007 the Army  designated the ASIP as the single,  unified source of installation planning  population data to be used Army-wide.  In May  2008, the Army issued guidance  that helped reduce the differences  between the populations reported by  Headquarters and the installations by  ensuring that ASIP population data be  used for reporting external to the Army  and allowing pre-decisional unit moves  to be used for internal planning. Lastly,  in a memorandum of agreement signed  in May  2009, the Army established an  ASIP  quarterly edit cycle to resolve  discrepancies between Army official  force structure data and “on the ground”  situation.
GAO  recommendation  Ensure that Army headquarters and base  officials are collaborating to agree on Army  personnel movement plans so that base  commanders and surrounding communities  can effectively plan for expected growth. This  collaboration to reach agreement should  continue as expected personnel movement  actions are revised over time.
Original DOD response  Partial concur. DOD stated that the Army  had already taken corrective action. The  Army stated that in May  2007 it issued  guidance that allowed installations to plan  for anticipated unit moves that may not be  reflected in the ASIP  and to discuss these  plans with local communities as long as they  are appropriately identified as pre-decisional  and subject to change. Army officials also  stated that, in June 2007, they would ensure  that installations forward all population and  stationing issues to the Department of the  Army headquarters for resolution.
DOD actions  Complete. In May  2007, the Army  issued guidance that allowed  installations to plan for anticipated  moves that may not be reflected in the  ASIP  and to discuss these plans with  local communities as long as they are  appropriately identified as pre- decisional and subject to change. In  addition, in May  2009 the Army  issued a  memorandum of agreement between  the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff  for Installation Management and the  Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G- 3/5/7 to close information gaps and  improve timely reconciliation of  disparate data among installation  planners, force planners, and  headquarters. The memorandum  established an ASIP quarterly edit cycle  to resolve discrepancies between Army  official force structure data and the “on  the ground” situation.
GAO-07-641—Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate Challenges and Improve Communication to Help  Ensure Timely Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations (May 16, 2007).  Develop a mitigation strategy to be shared  with key stakeholders that anticipates,  identifies, and addresses related  implementation challenges. At a minimum,  this strategy should include time frames for  actions and responsibilities for each  challenge, and facilitate the ability of Air  National Guard headquarters officials to act to  mitigate potential delays in interim  milestones.
Partial concur. DOD suggested a  modification to the recommendation to clarify  that the director, Air National Guard, is  normally tasked by the Chief, National  Guard Bureau. DOD also stated that  mitigation plans cannot be released until  they have been thoroughly vetted with all of  the key stakeholders.
Complete. The National Guard Bureau  implemented a Strategic  Communication Plan that provides  affected units with the information they  need to successfully complete BRAC  actions and develop opportunities for  follow-on missions at BRAC-affected  locations. The Air National Guard  Strategic Planning process, which is  based on state involvement at all levels  of the planning process, is the  cornerstone and allows states to  provide input to the Air National Guard  Strategic Plan and ensures that states  have the necessary information to  implement those plans. The National  Guard Bureau Strategic Communication  Plan also incorporates Air Force  communications.
GAO  recommendation  Expand the Strategic Communication Plan to  include how the Air National Guard  headquarters will provide the affected Air  National Guard units with the information  needed to implement the BRAC-related  actions.
Original DOD response  Partial concur. DOD stated it is incumbent  upon the Air National Guard and all effected  units to maximize established chains of  leadership and communication to effectively  manage and execute BRAC actions. The  Director, Air National Guard, acknowledges  that there are challenges in communicating  with the units and that some unit  commanders may not have the information  that they feel they need to implement the  BRAC recommendation and their new  missions.
DOD actions  Complete. The National Guard Bureau,  an oversight organization over Air  National Guard, is providing key  stakeholders with access to detailed  BRAC implementation action timelines  and programming plans, including  BRAC contacts at each Air National  Guard-affected base. Further, the Air  National Guard Strategic  Communication Playbook, which was  updated in 2009, now focuses  leadership attention to various strategic  priorities including the implementation of  Air National Guard BRAC  recommendations. In addition, the Air  National Guard Strategic Planning  Process includes both Air Force level  and National Guard Bureau level  communication with various state-level  Adjutants Generals about BRAC  implementation. As such, the Air Force  Chief of Staff and Air National Guard  Director have hosted a meeting for all  state-level Adjutants Generals to  discuss BRAC actions. As a result of  implementing our recommendation, Air  National Guard headquarters’ ability to  identify strategies and determine  resources needed to effectively  meet  BRAC goals has improved.  None planned.
Report in the Air Force annual BRAC budget  submission the costs and source of funding  required to establish replacement missions  for the Air National Guard units that will lose  their flying missions as a result of BRAC  2005.
Non-concur.  DOD does not believe these  costs are BRAC-related, because  establishment of replacement missions was  not part of the recommendations. DOD  stated that BRAC funds cannot be used to  establish these missions and that the costs  in question have been appropriately  programmed and budgeted in the Air Force’s  regular military construction account.
GAO  recommendation  GAO-07-304—Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers Are Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to  Track Actual Savings and Overcome Certain Challenges (June 29, 2007).  Update the business plan for the fleet  readiness centers (1) to reflect only savings  that are directly related to implementing the  recommendation, and (2) update projected  onetime savings when data are available.
Concur.  DOD stated it considers military  personnel reductions attributable to BRAC  recommendations as savings that are just as  real as savings generated through end- strength reductions. While the department  may not reduce overall end-strength, it  believes that the reductions in military  personnel for each recommendation at a  specific location are real.
Complete. The Commander, Fleet  Readiness Centers, updated the  business plan in August 2009 to reflect  savings directly related to the BRAC  action to establish fleet readiness  centers. The Navy  updated projected  savings directly related to implementing  the recommendation, showing that  overall savings projections of $1.151  billion from the August 2007 version of  the business plan should not change,  since changes to projected savings  targets in some of the six Fleet  Readiness Center locations that  exceeded savings targets in some years  were offset by the inability to meet  savings targets at other locations or in  other years. The Navy updated  projected one-time savings when data  became available by changing some  savings projected in the 2009 version of  the business plan (from our  recommendation to re-categorize  approximately $25 million per year from  recurring savings) to one-time savings.
GAO  recommendation  Monitor implementation of the  recommendation to determine the extent to  which savings already taken from the Navy  budget are actually achieved.
Original DOD response  Concur.
DOD actions  Complete. The Navy  has demonstrated  sustained leadership devoted to  implementing the BRAC  recommendation for establishing Fleet  Readiness Centers, as evidenced by  successive leaders who have  developed implementation plans and  completed each phase of  implementation over time. In addition,  the Navy’s implementation guidance for  Fleet Readiness Centers specifies that  key measures include, in part, achieving  savings targets. As a result, the Navy’s  monthly report to the Fleet Readiness  Center Commanders includes an  analysis of the variance between  savings projected and those actually  achieved at the six Fleet Readiness  Centers. These reports provide  objective, outcome-oriented metrics for  improving readiness and detailing six  separate savings categories.  Commanding Officers or Officers-in- Charge of specific centers are  evaluated for their results and held  accountable for achieving savings  targets. Management tools developed  by the implementation team for Fleet  Readiness Centers have supported the  identification of additional opportunities  to realize savings. Continuing efforts to  monitor implementation and develop  mechanisms to improve performance  and accountability have allowed the  Navy  to determine the extent to which  savings already taken from the Navy  budget for aircraft maintenance are  actually achieved.
GAO  recommendation  GAO-07-166—Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite  Transfer of Unneeded Property (Jan. 30, 2007).  Report all costs (Defense Environmental  Restoration Program and non- Defense  Environmental Restoration Program)—past  and future—required to complete  environmental cleanup at each BRAC  installation and to fully explain the scope and  limitations of all the environmental cleanup  costs DOD reports to Congress. We suggest  including this information in the annual BRAC  budget justification documentation, since it  would accompany information Congress  considers when making resource allocation  decisions.
Concur.  DOD concurred with our basic  recommendation; however DOD’s  comments reflect only a partial concurrence,  because DOD did not agree with our  suggestion to include this information in the  annual BRAC budget justification  documentation. DOD stated its belief that  this would be counterproductive and that  Congress has prescribed the types of  environmental information it wants  presented in the budget documentation,  which DOD complies with.
Require that the military services periodically  report to OSD on the status and proposed  strategy for transferring unneeded BRAC  properties and include an assessment of the  usefulness of all tools at their disposal. We  suggest placing this information in an easily  shared location, such as a website, so that  each service, and even the local communities  and private sector, can share and benefit  from lessons learned.
Concur.  DOD concurred with our  recommendation to require the military  services to periodically report to the Office of  the Secretary of Defense on the status and  proposed strategy for transferring BRAC  properties and to include an assessment of  the usefulness of all tools at their disposal.  Although DOD did not comment on our  suggestion to accomplish this through a  shared website in order to maximize the  sharing of lessons learned, DOD officials  embraced the idea as something easily to do  in comments they made during our exit  interview with the department.
Complete. DOD stated that in October  2008, the Assistant Deputy Under  Secretary of Defense for the  Environment, Safety,  and Occupational  Health determined that the Annual  Report to Congress is the appropriate  and best format to provide Congress  with cleanup information on the DOD  BRAC environmental programs. The  annual report data is updated annually,  via the electronic reporting system from  the DOD components to the Deputy  Under Secretary of Defense for  Installations and Environment. The  2007 annual report provided BRAC site  cost data through FY2007 and the  estimated cost to complete for FY2008.  The annual report is a comprehensive  document designed to answer the many  stakeholder questions that have  developed over the many years of  executing BRAC cleanup. The cost and  budget data that appears in the annual  report are also in the annual budget  justification submitted to Congress in  support of the President’s Budget  Request.   Complete. According to DOD, military  departments are required to report on  the status of all excess real property  and to include the available acreages  and the authority under which the land  was transferred, conveyed, or otherwise  disposed of. In June 2011, we  contacted the responsible OSD office  and were provided sufficient evidence  that all four of the military services are  now (within the last two years) reporting  the status of excess real property to  OSD. In addition, the DOD Inspector  General’s written response of February  25, 2011, in closing out our  recommendation, stated that the Deputy  Under Secretary of Defense  (Installations and Environment)  continually reviews the need for new  authorities and changes to existing  authorities.
GAO  recommendation  GAO-05-785—Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for Base Closures and  Realignments (July 1, 2005).  Establish mechanisms for tracking and  periodically updating savings estimates in  implementing individual recommendations,  with emphasis on both savings related to the  more traditional realignment and closure  actions and those related more to business  process reengineering.
Concur.  No written comments provided. In  providing oral comments on a draft of this  report, the Deputy Under Secretary of  Defense for Installations and Environment  concurred with our recommendation.
Complete. The Joint Action Scenario  Team, a joint team DOD set up to  develop and propose various joint  reserve component recommended  actions, incorporated our suggestions to  include specific information in its  summary reports and supporting  documentation in order to withstand  scrutiny and provide a clear  understanding to outside parties— including us and the military service  audit agencies—of the process leading  to the ultimate decisions regarding  recommended BRAC actions.
GAO-04-760—Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need for a Base Realignment and Closure Round  (May  17, 2004).  Include in the Secretary of Defense’s May  2005 report on recommendations for base  closures and realignments a full discussion of  relevant assumptions, and allowances made  for potential future force structure  requirements and changes, including the  potential for future surge requirements.
Concur.
Complete. The Secretary of Defense’s  May  2005 report to the BRAC  Commission addressed several of these  factors. For example, the report  contained a discussion about current  and future national security threats the  department considered during its  deliberations. In addition, the report  included a copy of the Secretary of  Defense’s January 2005 “Policy  Memoranda Seven – Surge,” which  outlined five steps DOD would take to  meet the statutory requirements to  consider a surge in the development of  BRAC recommendations. Further, some  of the military departments and joint  cross service groups discussed during  their analyses the steps they took to  incorporate the possibility of future  surge requirements.
section_title: Appendix II: Text of BRAC Recommendations Included in Our Review
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Gina Hoffman (Assistant  Director), Leslie Bharadwaja, Michele Fejfar, Joanne Landesman, Amie  Lesser, Stephanie Moriarty,  Carol Petersen, Matthew Spiers, and Michael  Willems made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Military Base Realignments and Closures: Process for Reusing Property  for Homeless Assistance Needs Improvements. GAO-15-274.  Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2015.
DOD Joint Bases: Implementation Challenges Demonstrate Need to  Reevaluate the Program. GAO-14-577. Washington, D.C.: September 19,  2014.
Defense Health Care Reform: Actions Needed to Help Realize Potential  Cost Savings from Medical Education and Training. GAO-14-630.  Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2014.
Defense Infrastructure: Communities Need Additional Guidance and  Information to Improve Their Ability to Adjust to DOD Installation Closure  or Growth. GAO-13-436. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2013.
Military Bases: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Base Realignment  and Closure Rounds. GAO-13-149. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2013.
DOD Joint Bases: Management Improvements Needed to Achieve  Greater Efficiencies. GAO-13-134. Washington, D.C.: November 15,  2012.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: The National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency’s Technology Center Construction Project.  GAO-12-770R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2012.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Updated Costs and Savings  Estimates from BRAC 2005. GAO-12-709R. Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2012.
Defense Health Care: Applying Key Management Practices Should Help  Achieve Efficiencies within the Military Health System. GAO-12-224.  Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2012.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Key Factors Contributing to  BRAC 2005 Results. GAO-12-513T. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2012.
Excess Facilities: DOD Needs More Complete Information and a Strategy  to Guide Its Future Disposal Efforts. GAO-11-814. Washington, D.C.:  September 19, 2011.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Review of the Iowa  and Milan  Army Ammunition Plants. GAO-11-488R. Washington, D.C.: April 1,  2011.
GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington,  D.C.: February 17, 2011.
Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is  Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the  Defense Access Roads Program. GAO-11-165. Washington, D.C.:  January 26, 2011.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Is Taking Steps to  Mitigate Challenges but Is Not Fully Reporting Some Additional Costs.  GAO-10-725R. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.
Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning  Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing Significant Growth.  GAO-10-602. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2010.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have  Increased While Savings Estimates Have Decreased Since Fiscal Year  2009. GAO-10-98R. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transportation Impact of  Personnel Increases Will Be Significant, but Long-Term Costs Are  Uncertain and Direct Federal Support Is Limited. GAO-09-750.  Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings  Estimates and Continue to Address Challenges in Consolidating Supply- Related Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations. GAO-09-703.  Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2009.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support  Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of  Facility Sustainment Funding Uses. GAO-09-336. Washington, D.C.:  March 30, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in  Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently  Updating Savings Estimates. GAO-09-217. Washington, D.C.: January  30, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing Plans to  Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen  Proving Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-1010R.  Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help  Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth.  GAO-08-665. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road  Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. GAO-08-602R.  Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2008.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower  Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC  Recommendations. GAO-08-315. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations  Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. GAO-08-244R.  Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2008.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have  Increased and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. GAO-08-341T.  Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have  Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. GAO-08-159.  Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating,  Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute of  Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage,  and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics  Agency. GAO-08-121R. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007.
Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely  Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial  Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13,  2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor  Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve  Centers. GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the  2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers  Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and  Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2007.
Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate  Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely  Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641.  Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental  Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property.  GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007.
Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and  Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905.  Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and  Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785.  Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC  Rounds. GAO-05-614. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need  for a Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760. Washington,  D.C.: May 17, 2004.