Special Operations Forces: Several Human Capital Challenges Must Be Addressed to Meet Expanded Role
Published: 2006-07-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since the Global War on Terrorism, the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to expand the role of the United States Special Operations Command (Command) and its forces. In response, the Command has transformed its headquarters to coordinate counterterrorism activities, and DOD has increased funding and the number of special operations forces positions. Given the expanded mission, it is critical that the Command has personnel with the right knowledge and skill sets. GAO was asked to assess: (1) whether the Command has determined all of the personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded role; (2) the progress and challenges in meeting growth goals; and (3) any effect of deployments on the Command's ability to provide trained forces, and the progress made in managing deployments. GAO performed its work at the Special Operations Command and its service components, analyzed personnel data against requirements, and examined policies and directives.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Although DOD plans to significantly increase the number of special operations forces personnel, the Special Operations Command has not yet fully determined all of the personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded mission. While it has determined the number of personnel needed to increase its number of warfighter units, it has not completed analyses to determine (a) how many headquarters staff are needed to train and equip these additional warfighters or (b) how many headquarters staff are needed to plan and synchronize global actions against terrorist networks--a new mission for the Command. DOD plans to begin increasing the number of headquarters positions and has requested funds for these positions in its fiscal year 2007 budget request. Until these analyses are completed, the Special Operations Command cannot provide assurances to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress that currently planned growth in the number of personnel for the Command's headquarters will meet, exceed, or fall short of the requirements needed to address the Command's expanded mission. The military services and the Special Operations Command have made progress since fiscal year 2000 in recruiting, training, and retaining special operations forces personnel, but they must overcome persistently low personnel inventory levels and insufficient numbers of newly trained personnel, in certain specialties, to meet DOD's plan to increase the number of special operations forces. In addition, GAO's review of the service components' annual reports required by the Special Operations Command shows that the reports have not provided the information needed to determine whether they have enough personnel to meet current and future requirements. Without such information, the Command will be unable to determine whether the service components' human capital management approaches, including recruiting, training, and retention strategies, will be effective in meeting the planned growth targets. Since fiscal year 2000, the number of special operations forces personnel deployed for operations has greatly increased, and the number deployed for training has simultaneously decreased. The Special Operations Command has taken action to manage the challenge of increased deployments; in August 2005, it began requiring active duty personnel to remain at least an equal amount of time at home as deployed. But the Command's service components have not consistently or fully implemented this policy. This is because the policy lacks clear guidance on the length of time that the components must ensure that personnel remain within the deployment policy guidelines. In addition, officials with the Command's Army and Navy service components expressed concerns regarding the reliability of their information required to track the deployments of their personnel. Without consistent and reliable data, the Special Operations Command does not have the information it needs to effectively manage the personnel deployments of special operations forces, which affects its ability to maintain the readiness, retention, and training of these personnel.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) established the United States Special  The Department of Defense (DOD) established the United States Special  Operations Command (Command) in 1987 with the primary purpose to  Operations Command (Command) in 1987 with the primary purpose to  train and equip special operations forces and provide these forces to the  train and equip special operations forces and provide these forces to the  department’s geographic combatant commands. Since 2003, DOD has  department’s geographic combatant commands. At DOD’s  intends to further increase these forces through fiscal year 2011.
The five geographic combatant commands—U.S. Central Command, U.S. European  Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern  Command—are responsible for U.S. military operations within their areas.
DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 2006). conventional force requirement, and they often require covert, clandestine,  or low-visibility capabilities. Each of the military services provides special  operations forces to the Special Operations Command, and thus the  military services and the Special Operations Command have a shared  responsibility to ensure that a sufficient number of special operations  forces personnel are available. For example, the military services recruit  new candidates for special operations training, while, in general, the  Special Operations Command provides the combat specialty training for  these forces.
Since the onset of the Global War on Terrorism, DOD has deployed  substantial numbers of special operations forces to conduct a range of  military operations. These forces have conducted combat missions in  Afghanistan and Iraq and, in addition, have helped train indigenous  military personnel in these countries and in other parts of the world,  including countries in Asia and Africa, to build the capabilities of partner  nations to combat terrorists more effectively within their own countries.  Several documents published by DOD, including the National Defense  Strategy and the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on  Terrorism, emphasize the capabilities provided by special operations  forces. As a result, the increased pace of deployments for these forces is  likely to continue in the near term. Recently, the Special Operations  Command has taken steps to manage the impact of deployments, which  has included establishing policy guidelines for the frequency of personnel  deployments.
This report responds to your request and addresses the following  questions: (1) the extent to which the Special Operations Command has  determined personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded mission;  (2) what progress the military services and the Special Operations  Command have made since fiscal year 2000 in recruiting, training, and  retaining special operations forces personnel, and what challenges they  face to meet future growth; and (3) the effect that deployments since fiscal  year 2000 have had on the Special Operations Command’s ability to  provide an adequate number of trained forces for the full range of its  worldwide missions, and what progress the Command has made in  managing personnel deployments.
To assess the extent to which the Special Operations Command has  identified all of the personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded  mission, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials involved with  determining personnel requirements with the Special Operations  Command, and with the Army, Navy, and Air Force service components.  We also met with Marine Corps officials to discuss plans for growth in  Marine Corps special operations forces. We analyzed the plans for growth  in these personnel through fiscal year 2011. To assess the progress the  military services and the Special Operations Command have made since  fiscal year 2000 in increasing the number of special operations forces  personnel, we discussed the processes used by the Army, Navy, and Air  Force to recruit, train, and retain these forces with officials from the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Special Operations Command, and  the military services. We focused on these processes for the active  components of the military services. To determine what challenges the  military services and the Special Operations Command face to meet future  growth, we analyzed personnel inventory levels for special operations  forces in the active component military services for fiscal years 2000  through 2005, and we collected and analyzed data from the schools that  train new special operations forces personnel. In addition, we reviewed  relevant Special Operations Command directives and analyzed the annual  reports prepared by the service components to determine the extent to  which the information in these reports met reporting requirements. To  assess the effect of increased special operations forces deployments, we  analyzed the trends in the deployment of special operations forces for  fiscal years 2000 through 2005, and we discussed the impact of  deployments with officials from the Special Operations Command and the  military services. We reviewed available data for inconsistencies and  discussed the data with DOD officials. Our assessments of data reliability  revealed some concerns that are discussed in this report; however, we  concluded the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We  conducted our review from April 2005 through June 2006 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. A more detailed  discussion of our scope and methodology is contained in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Special Operations Command Legislative Responsibilities
paragraphs: In 1986, the Congress called for the establishment of a joint service special  operations capability under a single command. In April 1987, the  Secretary of Defense established the Special Operations Command with  the mission to provide trained and combat-ready special operations forces  to DOD’s geographic combatant commands. Section 167(e) of Title 10, U.S.  Code directs that the Commander of the Special Operations Command be  responsible for and have the authority to conduct all affairs of such  command related to special operations activities. Under this section, the  Commander is also responsible for and has the authority to conduct  certain functions relating to special operations activities whether or not  they relate to the Special Operations Command, including: preparing and  submitting to the Secretary of Defense program recommendations and  budget proposals for special operations forces and for other forces  assigned to the Special Operations Command; exercising authority,  direction, and control over the expenditure of funds; training assigned  forces; and monitoring the promotions, assignments, retention, training,  and professional military education of special operations forces officers.
In addition, Section 167 directs the Special Operations Command to be  responsible for the following activities as they relate to special operations:  (1) direct action, (2) strategic reconnaissance, (3) unconventional warfare,  (4) foreign internal defense, (5) civil affairs, (6) psychological operations,  (7) counterterrorism, (8) humanitarian assistance, (9) theater search and  rescue, and (10) other activities such as may be specified by the President  or the Secretary of Defense. Appendix II defines these activities assigned  to the Special Operations Command. DOD has also assigned additional  activities to the Special Operations Command.
section_title: Expanded Special Operations Command Mission
paragraphs: Over the past 3 years, DOD has expanded the role of the Special  Operations Command to include responsibility for planning and leading  the department’s efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. In addition to  training, organizing, equipping, and deploying combat-ready special  operations forces to the geographic combatant commanders, the  Command has the mission to lead, plan, synchronize, and, as directed,  execute global operations against terrorist networks. The specific  responsibilities assigned to the Special Operations Command include:  integrating DOD strategy, plans, intelligence priorities, and operations  against terrorist networks designated by the Secretary of Defense;    planning campaigns against designated terrorist networks;    prioritizing and synchronizing theater security cooperation activities,  deployments, and capabilities that support campaigns against designated  terrorist networks in coordination with the geographic combatant  commanders;    exercising command and control of operations in support of selected  campaigns, as directed; and    providing military representation to U.S. national and international  agencies for matters related to U.S. and multinational campaigns against  designated terrorist networks, as directed by the Secretary of Defense.
In addition, the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism  establishes the approach DOD will take in fulfilling its role within the  larger national strategy for combating terrorism. The strategy provides  guidance on the department’s military objectives and their relative priority  in the allocation of resources. In addition, this strategy implements the  designation of the Special Operations Command as the supported  combatant command for planning, synchronizing, and, as directed,  executing global operations against terrorist networks.
section_title: Increased Funding for Expanded Responsibilities
paragraphs: The Special Operations Command has received considerable increases in  funding to meet its expanded responsibilities in the Global War on  Terrorism. Specifically, funding for the Command has increased from  more than $3.8 billion in fiscal year 2001 to more than $6.4 billion in fiscal  year 2005. In addition, the Command received more than $5 billion in  supplemental funds from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2005. During  this time, funding for military personnel costs for the Special Operations  Command increased by more than $800 million, representing a 53 percent  increase. DOD plans further increases in funding for the Command. The  President’s fiscal year 2007 budget request for the Special Operations  Command is $8 billion, and the department plans additional increases for  the Command through fiscal year 2011.
section_title: Organization of Special Operations Forces
paragraphs: The Special Operations Command is comprised of special operations  forces from each of the military services. In fiscal year 2005, personnel  authorizations for Army special operations forces military personnel  totaled more than 30,000, the Air Force 11,501, the Navy 6,255, and the  Marine Corps 79. Roughly one-third of special operations forces military  personnel were in DOD’s reserve components, including the Army, Navy,  and Air Force Reserve, and the Army and Air National Guard. Figure 1  provides a summary of DOD’s special operations forces military  authorizations in the active component and reserve component.
Special operations forces are organized into several types of units. For  example, Army special operations forces are organized into Special  Forces, Rangers, Aviation, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and  support units. Air Force special operations forces are organized into fixed  and rotary wing aviation squadrons, special tactics squadrons, a combat  aviation advisor squadron, and an unmanned aerial vehicle squadron.  Naval Special Warfare forces include SEAL Teams and SEAL Delivery  Vehicle Teams and Special Boat Teams. When fully operational, Marine  Corps special operations forces will include foreign military training units  and marine special operations companies. Table 1 provides an overview  and description of DOD’s special operations forces.
Special operations forces personnel possess highly specialized skill sets  including cultural and regional awareness. Duty in special operations is  undertaken on a voluntary basis, and many personnel volunteering for  special operations, particularly those in Army Special Forces and Air  Force flight crews, have already served for some time in the military  before becoming qualified for special operations forces. In order to  become qualified, military personnel must complete a rigorous  assessment, selection, and initial training process that, on average, takes  between 12 and 24 months. This difficult training regime causes high  attrition, and often over 70 percent who start special operations training  do not finish. In general, servicemembers who are unable to complete the  special operations training return to their previously held specialty or are  retrained into another specialty, depending on the needs of their military  service.
The Special Operations Command’s Army, Air Force, and Navy service  components have schools to train and develop special operations forces.  For example:    The U.S. Army Special Operations Command, located at Ft. Bragg, North  Carolina, operates the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and  School. This school assesses, selects, and trains Special Forces soldiers,  and trains civil affairs and psychological operations soldiers. In addition,  the school provides advanced special operations training courses.
The Air Force Special Operations Command, located at Hurlburt Field,  Florida, has several subordinate training squadrons that provide initial and  advanced training for Air Force rotary and fixed wing special operations  pilots, special tactics personnel, combat aviation advisors, and unmanned  aerial vehicle personnel.
The Naval Special Warfare Command, located on the Naval Amphibious  Base Coronado, California, operates the Naval Special Warfare Center.  This school trains SEAL candidates through the Basic Underwater  Demolition SEAL course and the SEAL Qualification Course, and trains  special warfare combatant crewmen through the Special Warfare  Combatant Crewmen course. In addition, the school provides advanced  special operations training courses.
section_title: Analyses to Ensure That Special Operations Command Personnel Requirements Are Linked with Expanded Mission Are Still in Progress
paragraphs: The Special Operations Command has not yet fully determined all of the  personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded mission. While the  Command has determined the number of special operations forces  personnel who are needed to increase the number of its warfighter units, it  has not completed analyses to determine (a) the number of headquarters  staff needed to train and equip these additional warfighters or (b) the  number of headquarters staff needed to plan and synchronize global  actions against terrorist networks—a new mission for the Command.  Although the Command’s analyses for these determinations were in  progress at the time of our review, DOD has nonetheless planned to  increase the number of positions for the Command’s headquarters, and  has requested related funds beginning in fiscal year 2007.
subsections: section_title: DOD and the Special Operations Command Have Determined Requirements for Additional Special Operations Forces Warfighters
paragraphs: Several recent DOD studies have concluded that additional special  operations forces warfighters are needed in order for the Special  Operations Command to achieve the national military objectives in the  Global War on Terrorism. A December 2002 report conducted by the  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and  Low Intensity Conflict found that efforts should be made to expand the  size of special operations forces and institute a more sustainable rotational  base of forces, while realigning the force to meet current and future  challenges. Furthermore, the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense  Review Report stated that one of the key programmatic decisions the  department proposes to launch in fiscal year 2007 is to increase special  operations forces to defeat terrorist networks.
The Special Operations Command has determined the number of special  operations forces personnel needed to meet increases in its warfighter  units. To determine the requirements for special operations forces  warfighter units, the Command uses its Joint Mission Analysis process.  Based on planning scenarios provided by DOD that special operations  forces will be needed to support, the Command determines the minimum  number of warfighters necessary to achieve its military objectives with the  least amount of risk to mission success. This level of special operations  forces is the baseline force used to measure risk, and is the starting point  for developing a more attainable force based on fiscal constraints.
Beginning in fiscal year 2002, DOD increased the number of positions for  the Special Operations Command to augment the increase in the number  of its warfighter units. Specifically, from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal  year 2005, DOD increased the number of military positions for special  operations forces by more than 5,000 positions, or about 12 percent. With  these increases in military positions, the Special Operations Command has  also increased the number of special operations forces units, including  Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units. DOD plans to  further increase the number of military positions for the Command  through fiscal year 2011, and the Command plans to increase other special  operations forces units such as Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs, and Air  Force unmanned aerial vehicle and intelligence squadrons. The increase  in military positions will also support the establishment of a Marine Corps  component to the Special Operations Command, which was approved in  October 2005. Table 2 provides examples of increases in the number of  active duty special operations forces warfighter units from fiscal year 2001  through fiscal year 2011.
section_title: DOD Plans Personnel Increases for the Command’s Headquarters to Meet Expanded Mission, Although Analyses Are Still in Progress
paragraphs: DOD’s budget request for fiscal year 2007 includes increases in the number  of personnel for the Special Operations Command’s headquarters, even  though the Command had not completed studies for headquarters’  personnel requirements in two key areas. First, the Commander of the  Special Operations Command is responsible for training assigned special  operations forces, and developing and acquiring special operations- peculiar equipment. Accordingly, the Command believes that it has a  commensurate need for additional headquarters staff to perform these  responsibilities to support the increased number of warfighters necessary  to win the Global War on Terrorism. Second, DOD’s decision to expand  the mission of the Special Operations Command calls for the Command to  be responsible for planning and synchronizing global actions against  terrorist networks. The Command further believes that it needs additional  headquarters personnel to fulfill this responsibility.
The Special Operations Command determines personnel requirements for  its headquarters by conducting formal personnel studies. These studies are  directed and approved by the Special Operations Command’s leadership.  The study teams conduct a variety of analyses to determine personnel  requirements and interview individuals within the reviewed organization  to determine the tasks they perform and the level of effort necessary to  fulfill the workload requirements. The studies are used to validate the  personnel requirements and support data-based decisions for allocating  additional resources during the Special Operations Command’s planning,  programming, and budgeting processes. The Command is currently  conducting studies to determine the number of military and civilian  personnel who are needed at its headquarters to meet the Command’s  expanded responsibilities.
Although these studies were in progress at the time of our review, DOD  has already made the decision to increase the number of military and  civilian positions for the Command’s headquarters, beginning with its  fiscal year 2007 budget request. According to currently approved plans,  DOD will increase the number of military and civilian positions for the  Special Operations Command headquarters by more than 75 percent  between fiscal years 2007 and 2011. These increases include more than 700  additional positions for the Command’s Center for Special Operations,  which combines the intelligence, operations, and planning functions at the  headquarters to plan and direct the Global War on Terrorism. However,  given the fact that the Command’s internal analyses of personnel  requirements were ongoing at the time of our review, the intended  increase is not based on a comprehensive analysis of personnel  requirements.
Our prior work has shown that strategic workforce planning addresses  two critical needs for an organization. First, strategic workforce planning  aligns an organization’s human capital program with its current and  emerging mission and programmatic goals. Second, such planning  develops long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining the  staff needed to achieve programmatic goals. A key principle in strategic  workforce planning calls for determining the critical skills and  competencies that will be needed to achieve current and future  programmatic results. However, until the Special Operations Command  fully completes its analyses of the personnel requirements needed to carry  out its Title 10 responsibilities and its expanded mission, it cannot provide  assurances to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress that currently  planned growth in the number of personnel for the Command’s  headquarters will meet, exceed, or fall short of the requirements needed to  address the Command’s expanded mission.
section_title: Despite Progress, the Military Services and the Special Operations Command Face Challenges to Meet Planned Growth Goals
paragraphs: The military services and the Special Operations Command have made  progress since fiscal year 2000 in recruiting, training, and retaining special  operations forces personnel; however, the military services and the  Special Operations Command must overcome persistently low personnel  inventory levels and insufficient numbers of newly trained special  operations forces personnel in some cases to meet DOD’s plan to increase  the number of special operations forces personnel through fiscal year  2011. In addition, the Special Operations Command does not have  complete information from its service components on human capital  challenges, including low personnel inventory levels and training  limitations, and planned corrective actions, which it needs to evaluate the  success of its service components’ human capital approaches.
subsections: section_title: The Military Services and the Special Operations Command Have Taken Measures to Recruit, Train, and Retain Greater Numbers of Special Operations Forces Personnel
paragraphs: The military services and the Special Operations Command have taken  measures to recruit and train greater numbers of special operations forces  personnel. In addition, DOD has implemented a set of initiatives intended  to retain greater numbers of experienced special operations forces  personnel.
subsections: section_title: Increased Recruiting Goals
paragraphs: The Army and Navy have increased the recruiting goals for several of their  special operations forces occupational specialties. These goals are set by  the military services to determine the number of accessions, or new  recruits, who will enter training each year. From fiscal year 2000 to fiscal  year 2005, the Army increased the recruiting goal for active duty enlisted  Special Forces soldiers by 72 percent, or 1,300 recruits. Similarly, the  Navy increased its annual goal for enlisted SEAL recruits from 900 in fiscal  year 2004 to 1,100 in fiscal year 2005. In addition, the Navy established an  annual goal for enlisted special warfare combatant crewman recruits for  the first time in fiscal year 2005.
To meet these recruiting goals, the military services have offered  enlistment bonuses to enlist a sufficient number of new recruits.  Collectively, the military services paid more than $28 million in these  bonuses during fiscal year 2005 to enlist servicemembers in their special  operations forces occupational specialties. Beginning in fiscal year 2003,  the Army offered these bonuses to its initial accession Special Forces  recruits and in fiscal year 2005 the Army paid up to $20,000 per soldier.  Similarly, in fiscal year 2005, the Air Force offered enlistment bonuses of  up to $10,000 to recruits in the combat controller and pararescue  occupational specialties. In fiscal year 2005, the Navy paid enlistment  bonuses for enlisted SEAL and special warfare combatant crewman  recruits up to a maximum of $15,000. The Army met or exceeded its  recruiting goals for active duty enlisted Special Forces soldiers in 5 out of  the 6 years between fiscal years 2000 and 2005. From fiscal year 2000  through fiscal year 2005, the Air Force increased the number of enlisted  airmen recruits for the combat controller and pararescue occupational  specialties by about 400 percent and 60 percent, respectively. In fiscal year  2005, the Navy exceeded its recruiting goal for enlisted special warfare  combatant crewmen. However, while the Navy met its recruiting goal for  enlisted SEALs for fiscal year 2004, it met 80 percent of its recruiting goal  in fiscal year 2005.
section_title: Expanded Training Capacity
paragraphs: The Special Operations Command and the service components have taken  several actions to train greater numbers of special operations forces  recruits. For instance, the Command and the service components have  increased the number of instructors at several special operations forces  schools to produce a larger number of newly trained personnel, with  additional increases in the number of instructors planned through fiscal  year 2011. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command, for example,  hired 45 additional civilian instructors in fiscal year 2004 as part of its  Institutional Training Expansion program, and plans to add more than 300  additional civilian instructors through fiscal year 2011. Similarly, beginning  in fiscal year 2006, the Naval Special Warfare Command plans to add 145  military and civilian instructors through fiscal year 2008.
The Special Operations Command’s service components have also  expanded the capacity of some schools to train more students and have  reorganized some of their curricula so that their recruits move through the  training programs more efficiently. Beginning in fiscal year 2006, the U.S.  Army Special Operations Command increased the frequency of a phase of  its Special Forces qualification training that is focused on core battle  skills. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command plans to increase the  frequency of this phase from starting four courses per year, to starting a  new course approximately every 2 weeks. This increase in frequency will  expand the capacity of the training course from 1,800 student spaces to  about 2,300 per year.
The Air Force Special Operations Command established a training  program in fiscal year 2001 to provide advanced skills training for combat  controllers. In addition, the training program was intended to provide  standardized training for special operations pararescue personnel, special  operations combat weathermen, and special tactics officers. Since its  inception, the program has increased the graduation rate of combat  controllers, and in addition, the training program has provided special  operations pararescue airmen, combat weathermen, and special tactics  officers with advanced special operations training.
In fiscal year 2005, the Naval Special Warfare Command reorganized the  training course for SEALs intended to reduce student attrition.  Specifically, the Naval Special Warfare Command eliminated the class  administered during the winter months, which historically had the highest  attrition, while increasing the class sizes for the remaining classes. In  addition, the Naval Special Warfare Command has begun providing  focused training for those students who have completed the most  physically challenging portion of the training but who require additional  practice in specific skills, rather than requiring students to begin the  training from the start.
In some cases, the Special Operations Command and the service  components have increased the number of newly trained special  operations forces personnel. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year  2005, for example, the school that trains new Special Forces soldiers  increased the number of active duty enlisted graduates by 138 percent, or  458 additional Special Forces soldiers.
section_title: Retention Incentives for Experienced Personnel
paragraphs: DOD has also taken action to retain experienced special operations forces  personnel in order to meet the planned growth in these forces. According  to the Special Operations Command, it cannot accomplish planned growth  solely by adding new special operations forces personnel. Rather, the  growth must be accomplished by balancing an increase in the number of  new personnel with the retention of experienced special operations forces  servicemembers. In 2004, DOD authorized a set of financial incentives to  retain experienced special operations forces personnel. These incentives  include reenlistment bonuses of up to $150,000 for personnel in several  special operations forces occupational specialties with 19 or more years of  experience who reenlist for an additional 6 years. The military services  spent more than $41 million in fiscal year 2005 to retain 688 special  operations forces servicemembers with this reenlistment bonus, according  to data provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel  and Readiness. Additionally, DOD authorized increases in special pays for  warfighters assigned to the Special Operations Command, for some special  operations forces personnel who remain on active duty with more than 25  years of experience, and bonuses for new Special Forces and Naval  Special Warfare warrant officers.
section_title: Personnel Inventory Levels and Insufficient Numbers of Some Special Operations Forces Training Graduates May Limit the Special Operations Command’s Ability to Meet Future Growth Targets
paragraphs: While the military services and the Special Operations Command have  taken steps to increase the number of newly trained special operations  forces personnel and to retain its experienced operators, the military  services and the Special Operations Command face several human capital  challenges in fully meeting planned growth in special operations forces.  These challenges include persistently low personnel inventory levels for  many special operations forces occupational specialties and insufficient  numbers of new graduates in some cases to meet current authorized  personnel levels or planned growth targets.
subsections: section_title: Low Personnel Inventory Levels in Some Special Operations Forces Occupational Specialties May Limit Future Growth
paragraphs: We reported in November 2005 that DOD faced significant challenges in  recruiting and retaining servicemembers, and that the military services  were unable to meet authorized personnel levels for certain occupational  specialties, including several special operations forces occupational  specialties. At that time, we reported that several of these specialties in  the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps were underfilled for 5 out of  the previous 6 fiscal years. Such occupational specialties included active  duty enlisted Army Special Forces assistant operations and intelligence  sergeants and Special Forces medical sergeants, enlisted Navy SEALs and  special warfare combatant crewmen, and enlisted Air Force combat  controllers and pararescue personnel. According to DOD officials, the  special operations forces occupational specialties were underfilled for  several reasons, including extensive training or qualification requirements  and recent increases in the number of authorized personnel positions.
Our analysis of the personnel inventory levels for the special operations  forces active component occupational specialties identified by the Special  Operations Command’s Directive 600-7 shows that hundreds of  authorized positions for special operations forces personnel within each of  the Command’s service components have been persistently unfilled. As  shown in table 3, from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, 74 percent  to 87 percent of the active component occupational specialties in this  directive were underfilled, each year, by an amount ranging from less than  5 percent to more than 86 percent.
In fiscal year 2005, more than 50 percent of these specialties were  underfilled by at least 10 percent. For example:    personnel authorizations for active duty enlisted Special Forces assistant  operations and intelligence sergeants were underfilled by 58 percent,    personnel authorizations for active duty enlisted pararescue airmen were  underfilled by 27 percent, and    personnel authorizations for active duty enlisted SEALs were underfilled  by 14 percent.
Given the military services’ inability to fill current and past positions in  their special operations forces specialties, it may be increasingly difficult  to meet DOD’s plan to increase the number of special operations forces  through fiscal year 2011. During our review, the Special Operations  Command’s service components provided data indicating that, in several  cases, the measures the military services and the Special Operations  Command are taking to recruit and train greater numbers of special  operations forces personnel may enable the military services and the  Command to meet the increases in the numbers of authorized positions.  However, the data also show that some of the special operations forces  specialties that are currently underfilled are likely to remain so after  additional authorizations have been added. For example, Navy officials  told us that although additional authorizations for enlisted SEALs will be  added by fiscal year 2008, it will not be able to fill all of these positions  until at least 2011, at the earliest. Similarly, the Air Force projects that the  additional active duty enlisted combat controller positions that have been  added in fiscal year 2006 will remain underfilled through at least fiscal  year 2008.
Not only do current low personnel inventory levels suggest that the  military services and the Special Operations Command will be challenged  to meet planned growth goals, but officials told us that low personnel  levels in certain occupational specialties have created challenges at the  unit level as well. For example, officials from the U.S. Army Special  Operations Command told us that low personnel inventories of Special  Forces warrant officers and medical sergeants have resulted in their  having fewer numbers of these personnel per unit, which has limited the  manner in which some Special Forces units have deployed on the  battlefield. Similarly, the low personnel inventory levels in the Air Force  combat controller and pararescue occupational specialties have resulted  in the Air Force’s special tactics squadrons being underfilled. According to  Air Force officials, the low personnel inventory levels in these units have  increased the frequency of personnel deployments, which has had an  impact on the amount of time available to conduct training and has  adversely affected retention.
section_title: Insufficient Numbers of Some Special Operations Forces Personnel Graduates
paragraphs: One reason that personnel inventory levels have been low in several  special operations forces occupational specialties is the schools that train  new special operations forces personnel have not graduated a sufficient  number of these personnel, in some cases, to meet authorized personnel  levels. Furthermore, the number of newly trained personnel in several  special operations forces specialties has been insufficient to meet planned  growth targets. For example:    The U.S. Army Special Operations Command is not graduating enough  new pilots for the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment to meet  future growth targets. In fiscal year 2005, the Command graduated only 58  percent of the MH-47 Chinook helicopter pilots and 47 percent of the MH- 60 Blackhawk helicopter pilots that the Army determined were needed to  meet planned growth for this unit. According to Army officials, the  capacity of the school that trains new pilots has been insufficient to meet  the requirements for future personnel levels. Officials stated that the  Special Operations Command has provided additional funding beginning  in fiscal year 2006 for the school to hire a greater number of instructors,  which will increase the capacity of the school to train these pilots.
The Air Force has not produced a sufficient number of active duty enlisted  special tactics personnel, such as combat controllers and pararescue  personnel. For example, from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the  Air Force trained only 53 percent of the active duty enlisted combat  controllers and 40 percent of the active duty enlisted pararescue airmen  needed to meet authorized personnel levels. Air Force officials stated that  several constraints have limited the number of students who could attend  the schools that train these personnel. Officials explained the Air Force  has taken steps to increase the number of personnel that will graduate  from its special tactics training programs. For example, in August 2005, the  Air Force began construction on a new classroom and aquatic facility to  train greater numbers of combat controllers, and it recently opened a new  combat dive course to meet both combat controller and pararescue  training requirements. Such measures are intended to reduce the  constraints on the ability of the Air Force to train new special tactics  personnel.
From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the Naval Special Warfare  Command did not produce an adequate number of enlisted SEALs to  sustain authorized personnel levels. While the Naval Special Warfare  Command needed to graduate 200 new enlisted SEALs each year to meet  authorized personnel levels, only about 150 new enlisted personnel  graduated each year during this period. In addition, Navy officials stated  that to meet the planned growth for SEALs, the Naval Special Warfare  Command must produce 250 enlisted SEALs annually. According to Navy  officials, it has recruited an insufficient number of enlisted candidates who  could successfully pass the physical test to qualify for SEAL training. As a  result, the Navy has not filled the SEAL school to capacity each year, and  this in turn has resulted in insufficient numbers of graduates to fill the  requirements for enlisted SEALs. According to officials, the Navy began to  implement several measures in January 2006 that, in part, are intended to  increase the quantity and quality of enlisted recruits entering SEAL  training, thereby improving the chances that more of these recruits will  successfully graduate from the training.
section_title: Special Operations Command Lacks Key Information Needed to Evaluate Human Capital Initiatives
paragraphs: The Special Operations Command does not have complete information,  including measurable performance objectives and goals, to evaluate the  progress that the Command’s service components have made in meeting  the human capital challenges that could impede the Command’s ability to  achieve planned growth.
The Special Operations Command has an established program through  which it monitors the status of its personnel. The goal of the program is to  ensure there are sufficient numbers of special operations forces personnel  to meet current and future mission requirements. The implementing  directive requires the special operations component commanders to  provide the Special Operations Command with annual reports that contain  data on several topics related to the human capital management of special  operations forces, including personnel inventory levels, accession plans,  reenlistments and loss management programs, and military education  opportunities for special operations forces officers. Command officials  told us they use these reports to monitor the status of special operations  forces.
Our analysis of the service components’ annual reports for fiscal years  2000 through 2005 shows that the reports provide some of the information  required by the directive, such as information on personnel inventory  levels and professional military education opportunities. However, the  reports have not provided information for several key requirements called  for by the directive that would provide information on the service  components’ progress in meeting the planned growth targets. For  example, the service components are required to provide accession plans  for several of the special operations occupational specialties, including  Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs, and Air Force special tactics personnel.  The accession plans should provide detailed information on the number of  new accessions for initial training and projections for the following year.  Our review of the annual reports shows that since fiscal year 2003, none of  the service components’ submissions contained this information.
Additionally, the directive requires the service components to provide  detailed analyses to support each category discussed in the annual report,  including trends developed over recent years and predictions for the  future. Further, the annual reports should fully discuss any concerns by  describing the concern in context, providing past actions taken to resolve  the concern, and presenting recommendations to address the concern in  the future. However, our analysis of the components’ annual submissions  shows that the reports have often failed to provide detailed analyses of  their human capital challenges and the corrective actions that should be  taken to address these challenges. For instance:    The U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s annual report for fiscal year  2005 did not identify a 79 percent personnel fill rate for the Special Forces  medical sergeant occupational specialty as a challenge. However, officials  with whom we spoke indicated that insufficient numbers of these  personnel have limited both the operational capabilities of some deployed  Special Forces units and the ability to provide medical life-support to  personnel in these units. In other cases, the U.S. Army Special Operations  Command’s annual reports identified challenges but did not propose  corrective actions. For example, the report for fiscal year 2005 states a  concern that, because the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment had  insufficient training resources, it produced only 50 percent of the  requirement for MH-47 Chinook helicopter pilots. However, the report did  not discuss in detail what actions should be taken to address this  challenge.
Since its fiscal year 2000 annual report, the Air Force Special Operations  Command has identified a concern that the experience level of its rated  pilots has been decreasing. As a result, there have been an insufficient  number of aircraft commanders and instructor pilots within several of the  special operations squadrons. However, the Air Force Special Operations  Command’s annual reports do not contain any information to support the  specific decrease in the number of experienced pilots in its special  operations forces units. Moreover, the reports do not specify how the  actions taken to address the issue have impacted the level of experience of  pilots, or what further actions are needed to address this challenge. In  addition, although the combat controller and pararescue occupational  specialties have been underfilled since at least fiscal year 2000, the Air  Force’s annual reports have not provided detailed information on the  specific actions that should be taken to overcome the challenges of low  personnel inventory levels in these specialties.
The Naval Special Warfare Command’s annual reports have consistently  identified a critical challenge regarding the insufficient number of new  enlisted Navy SEALs who have graduated from the school each year.  Further, the reports provide some information on the actions taken in the  previous fiscal year to address this concern. However, the annual reports  have not included detailed information on the Naval Special Warfare  Command’s accession plans, or the effects that recruit shortfalls have had  on personnel inventory levels, which are specifically required by the  directive.
Furthermore, the service components’ annual reports lack performance  objectives and goals that link key personnel data with future growth plans  and assessments of personnel needs. Our prior work has shown that high- performing organizations use relevant and reliable data to determine  performance objectives and goals that enable them to evaluate the success  of their human capital approaches. These organizations identify current  and future human capital needs, including the appropriate number of  employees, the key competencies and skills mix for mission  accomplishment, and the appropriate deployment of staff across the  organization, and then create strategies for identifying and filling gaps.  However, our analysis of the Command’s Directive 600-7 shows that the  requirements for the annual reports do not include instructions for the  service components to develop performance objectives, goals, and  measures of progress for achieving planned growth. As an example, the  Command requires the service components to provide personnel  reenlistment data within these reports. Specifically, the Command requires  information and analysis on the number of eligible special operations  forces personnel who chose to reenlist and comparative information on  the number of personnel reenlistments in each military service. However,  the service components’ annual reports do not clearly link the number of  experienced warfighters who have been retained with the number who are  needed to meet planned growth. This is particularly important because the  parent military services have not set goals for the reenlistments of their  special operations forces personnel in a way that is clearly linked with the  planned growth in these forces. Each of the active component military  services tracks retention according to years of service and whether a  servicemember is on a first, second, or subsequent enlistment.
Moreover, the Special Operations Command has not established specific  performance objectives or goals for the special operations forces retention  initiative that DOD authorized in December 2004. As a result, it is difficult  to assess the progress that DOD has had with this initiative in retaining a  sufficient number of experienced personnel to meet planned growth—a  key rationale for the initiative. Many of the special operations forces  servicemembers who were eligible for the bonuses offered as part of this  initiative did reenlist, as shown by information provided to us. However,  Special Operations Command officials were unable to provide specific  goals to measure the effectiveness of the retention initiatives because they  lacked clear performance objectives that are linked to comprehensive  analyses of personnel needs.
Special Operations Command officials stated the Command had not fully  enforced the reporting requirements in its directive because it is outdated  and some of the information required in the annual reports is less relevant,  given the Command’s expanded role in the Global War on Terrorism.  However, the Command most recently updated this directive in April 2003,  and at that time, it maintained the annual reporting requirements. In  addition, officials stated that data and information on the status of special  operations forces personnel are available to the Special Operations  Command through other processes, including monthly and quarterly  readiness reports, monthly personnel status summaries, and annual  conferences hosted by the Command to discuss personnel issues. The  Defense Manpower Data Center also provides the Command with analyses  on the trends in the continuation rates of special operations forces  personnel. While these processes may provide information on the status  of special operations forces, they do not provide detailed analyses and  discussions of concerns and corrective actions that are required by the  Command’s directive. In addition, the annual reports are a means by which  the Command has provided information to stakeholders within the  department—including the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the  military services—on the status of special operations forces. Without  complete information on human capital challenges, the Special Operations  Command will be unable to determine whether the service components’  human capital management approaches, including their recruiting,  training, and retention strategies, will be effective in meeting the planned  growth targets.
section_title: More Deployments for Operations Mean Fewer Deployments for Training; Special Operations Command Has Sought to Manage This Effect
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2000, special operations forces have experienced a  substantial increase in the deployment of personnel for operations and a  simultaneous decrease in the deployment of personnel for training. To its  credit, the Special Operations Command has taken action to manage the  challenge of increased deployments by establishing a policy intended to  maintain the readiness, retention, and training of special operations forces  personnel. However, the Command’s service components have not yet  consistently or fully implemented this policy.
subsections: section_title: Data Trends Show Increase in Deployments for Operations and Decrease in Training
paragraphs: The Special Operations Command Directive 525-1 establishes the  Command’s policy to collect and monitor information on the deployments  of special operations forces personnel. Accordingly, the Command gathers  deployment information on a weekly basis from the service components  and the geographic combatant commands. These reports include  information on the number of special operations forces personnel and  special operations forces units that are deployed around the world. In  addition, the components report the type of the deployment, such as  deployments for operations or for training. From these weekly updates,  the Special Operations Command develops a comprehensive deployed  forces report, which is presented to the Commander of the Special  Operations Command and included in updates for the Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Our review of Special Operations Command data shows that since fiscal  year 2000, deployments of special operations forces personnel have  substantially increased. Specifically, as shown in figure 2, the average  weekly number of deployed special operations forces personnel was 64  percent, or about 3,100 personnel, greater in fiscal year 2005 than in fiscal  year 2000.
Our analysis also shows that the vast majority of recent deployments  outside of the United States were to the Central Command area of  responsibility, which accounted for 85 percent of deployed special  operations forces in fiscal year 2005. Significantly, more than 99 percent of  these deployments supported ongoing combat operations. In contrast, in  fiscal year 2000, only 20 percent of special operations forces deployments  were to the Central Command. As shown in figure 3, the percentage of  special operations forces personnel deployed to the European Command,  the Pacific Command, and the Southern Command decreased between  fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2005.
While special operations forces have experienced a substantial increase in  deployments for operations, there has been a simultaneous decrease in  deployments for training. As shown in table 4, from fiscal year 2000  through fiscal year 2005, the percentage of special operations forces  personnel deployed for operations increased, while the percentage of  personnel deployed for training decreased.
The decrease in deployments for training appears to have had at least two  effects. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, for example, the  amount of time for which special operations forces deployed for training  to maintain proficiency in battle skills decreased by 50 percent. Officials  with the Army, Navy, and Air Force service components told us that since  many of their units have been deployed to the Central Command area of  responsibility, they have had fewer opportunities to conduct proficiency  training for all mission tasks. As a result, special operations forces units  are focusing their training on the tasks that are required for operations in  the Central Command and are assuming some risk by not training for  other mission tasks. For example, officials with the U.S. Army Special  Operations Command told us that specialized training such as military free  fall and underwater combat operations have been reduced to a minimum,  since these skills are not required to support ongoing operations.
Similarly, officials with the Air Force Special Operations Command stated  that increased deployments for operations had affected the ability of its air  crews and special tactics squadrons to achieve all required mission- essential training. However, officials stated that this has not degraded  overall readiness, because not all of these training tasks are currently  being performed in the Central Command. In addition, officials stated that  if mission priorities were to shift away from the Central Command and  different missions needed to be performed, not all of its special operations  forces personnel would be required to have achieved those training tasks  in order for a mission to be successfully carried out.
Additionally, although our analysis shows that special operations forces  deployed less frequently for skills proficiency training from fiscal year  2000 through fiscal year 2005, we were told that the amount of training  that special operations forces accomplished may not have been greatly  affected. In particular, we were told that Army special operations forces  units do not necessarily have to deploy in order to accomplish training  that can be done at their home station. In addition, the fact that many  special operations forces units are deploying for combat operations results  in ample opportunities to maintain proficiency in essential skills. Officials  with the U.S. Army Special Operations Command explained that special  operations forces no longer train to fight because they are training as they  fight. However, not all special operations forces can accomplish training  tasks at their home station. According to Naval Special Warfare Command  officials, Naval Special Warfare units do not have adequate home station  training ranges and are required to deploy in order achieve most training  tasks. Yet, from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2005, the amount of time that  Naval Special Warfare personnel deployed for skills proficiency training  decreased by more than 30 percent.
Special operations forces have also deployed less frequently to train with  foreign military forces overseas. As we have previously reported, this type  of training is important because it enables special operations forces to  practice mission skills such as providing military instruction in a foreign  language and maintaining language proficiency and familiarity with local  geography and cultures, which are essential in the foreign internal defense  and unconventional warfare missions. These deployments of special  operations forces to train with the armed forces and other security forces  of friendly foreign countries are commonly referred to as joint combined  exchange training. Between fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2005, however,  the amount of time in which special operations forces personnel deployed  for joint combined exchange training decreased by 53 percent.
Our analysis of DOD data reported to the Congress also shows the  participation of special operations forces in joint combined exchange  training events decreased since fiscal year 2000. As shown in figure 4, from  fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the number of these events that  special operations forces completed decreased by about 50 percent.  Further analysis shows that the number of events conducted in most of the  geographic combatant command areas of responsibility decreased from  fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005. Specifically, joint combined  exchange training events conducted in the European Command decreased  by about 75 percent, while events conducted in the Southern Command  and Pacific Command also decreased during this time. Conversely, the  number of such training events conducted in the Central Command  increased from 7 exercises in fiscal year 2000 to 14 exercises in fiscal year  2005.
The increase in the amount of time that special operations forces have  deployed to support operations in the Central Command has, to some  extent, resulted in an increase in the number of cancelled joint combined  exchange training events. Officials with the Special Operations Command,  European Command, Pacific Command, and Southern Command with  whom we spoke stated that joint combined exchange training can be  cancelled for various reasons, including the availability of funding for the  training, the availability of host nation forces, or the operations tempo of  U.S. special operations forces. Officials stated, however, that due to the  increased requirement for special operations forces deployments to  support operations in the Central Command, there has been a  corresponding increase in the number of cancelled joint combined  exchange training events. Our analysis shows that from fiscal year 2000  through fiscal year 2005, the percentage of cancelled training events due to  the operations tempo of special operations forces increased from 0  percent to more than 60 percent.
While the primary purpose of joint combined exchange training is to train  U.S. forces, this training can also have an ancillary benefit in that it can be  used by the geographic combatant commanders and ambassadors to fulfill  regional and country engagement objectives. For instance, the geographic  combatant commands use joint combined exchange training to help  achieve foreign engagement objectives in their designated areas of  responsibility. DOD documents regarding the department’s strategy for the  Global War on Terrorism identify combined training, such as joint  combined exchange training, as an important element to strengthen  partner nations’ counterterrorism capabilities. However, with continuing  support being required for operations in the Central Command’s area of  responsibility, there have been fewer special operations forces available to  execute these types of training activities.
section_title: Special Operations Command Has Established a Policy to Manage Increased Deployments, but the Policy Has Not Been Consistently or Fully Implemented
paragraphs: The Special Operations Command has taken action to manage the  challenge of increased personnel deployments. Monitoring the status of  personnel deployments has been an area of congressional and DOD  concern. The management of personnel tempo is important to the quality  of life and retention of military personnel. Section 991 of Title 10 of the  U.S. Code states that the deployment (or potential deployment) of a  member of the Armed Forces shall be managed. Moreover, DOD has  recognized that failure to effectively manage personnel tempo can result in  the continued loss of trained personnel, a consequent loss of readiness  capability, and an increased recruiting challenge. In addition, we have  previously reported that high personnel tempo for special operations  forces can affect readiness, retention, and morale.
In August 2005, the Special Operations Command established a policy  intended to maintain the readiness, retention, and training of active duty  special operations forces personnel. The policy requires the Command’s  active duty personnel to remain at least an equal amount of time at their  home station as they do deployed for operations and training. The policy  also requires that the Special Operations Command’s service components  develop internal tracking mechanisms to ensure that their active duty  special operations forces personnel remain within the policy’s deployment  requirements. However, the Command’s service components have not  consistently or fully implemented the deployment policy.
One challenge lies in the fact that the policy’s guidelines are not clear.  Officials with the Command’s service components noted a lack of clear  guidance regarding how the components should implement the  deployment guidelines, and consequently they were implementing it  differently from one another. For example, the policy does not identify the  length of time for which the components must ensure that personnel  remain within the deployment guidelines. In addition, it does not state  whether a servicemember must remain at a home station immediately  following one deployment for an equal amount of time before a next  deployment. Because of the lack of clear guidance, the Special Operations  Command’s service components have had to interpret the intent of the  policy’s requirements to ensure that their personnel remain in compliance.
A second challenge lies in the difficulty of achieving full implementation.  Officials with the Naval Special Warfare Command stated that they have  been unable to comply with the deployment guidelines because personnel  lack adequate home station training ranges. Specifically, Naval Special  Warfare personnel must deploy for both unit training and operations. This  combination of deployments has resulted in personnel having exceeded  the policy’s requirement. Naval Special Warfare Command officials  indicated that they were working with the Special Operations Command  and the Navy to implement the deployment policy. According to Navy  officials, the Navy plans to provide the Naval Special Warfare Command  with additional funds to improve the home station ranges used to train the  SEAL force, which is anticipated to reduce the current pace of operations  tempo due to deployments for training. However, because these personnel  have been required to deploy for most unit training, they have been unable  to comply with the policy’s requirement.
To determine whether special operations forces are meeting the intent of  the policy requires the service components to maintain internal tracking  systems with complete, valid, and reliable data on their personnel  deployments. However, officials with the Command’s Army and Navy  components expressed concerns regarding the reliability of the  information they use to track the individual deployments of their  personnel.
While we did not independently validate the reliability of the data for  personnel deployments, an official with the U.S. Army Special Operations  Command stated the Army did not have a high level of confidence in the  data recorded by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s units in  the Army’s system on personnel deployments. Officials told us that they  are developing a separate internal management tool in order to fully  comply with the deployment policy; however, that tool will not be ready  until July 2006.
Naval Special Warfare Command officials told us that comprehensive  reporting of personnel tempo information was suspended after the onset  of the Global War on Terrorism. The reporting of this information was  suspended because the Naval Special Warfare Command could not meet  the Navy’s personnel tempo standards due to an increase in the pace of  deployments in support of ongoing operations. As a result, the Naval  Special Warfare Command does not have comprehensive and reliable data  on Naval Special Warfare personnel deployments. Officials stated that the  Naval Special Warfare Command was in the process of reestablishing  personnel tempo reporting with a goal of full reporting for all units by the  end of April 2006.
Without consistent and reliable data, the Special Operations Command  does not have the information it needs to effectively manage the personnel  deployments of special operations forces, which affects the Command’s  ability to maintain the readiness, retention, and training of special  operations forces personnel.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The decision by DOD to expand the responsibilities of the Special  Operations Command in the Global War on Terrorism has created new  challenges to determine personnel requirements and acquire, train, and  equip a greater number of warfighters to support ongoing military  operations. The Congress and DOD have provided resources to enable the  Command to augment its personnel. Given the Command’s expanded  mission, however, it is critical that the Command complete its analyses of  personnel requirements and fully determine the number of personnel, who  possess the right knowledge and skill sets, for the Command to meet its  new role. Without this information, the Command cannot reasonably  assure the Secretary of Defense and the Congress that the currently  planned growth in the number of personnel for the Command will meet,  exceed, or fall short of the requirements necessary to carry out its  expanded mission.
The military services and the Special Operations Command have faced  human capital challenges in recruiting, training, and retaining a sufficient  number of these forces, and many of these challenges continue. In large  part, these challenges are attributable to the rigorous selection and  training processes set for these personnel. Nonetheless, we believe the  Command would be better able to address these challenges if it had a  clearer understanding of the progress its service components have made in  achieving planned growth, which is clearly linked with appropriate goals  and measures. Furthermore, the Command is attempting to meet its  growth goals at a time of heightened personnel deployments. However, the  Command is managing these deployments without reliable data. Such  information would further enable the Command to meet the full range of  its missions while maintaining the readiness, retention, and training of its  personnel.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, U.S.  Special Operations Command, to  1.  establish specific milestones for completing the Command’s ongoing  analyses of personnel requirements and, once completed, make any  needed adjustments to the current plans for personnel increases for  the Command’s headquarters and related future funding requests;  2.  revise the Command’s directive for its program to monitor the status of  special operations forces to include performance objectives, goals, and  measures of progress for achieving planned growth; and enforce all of  the directive’s reporting requirements; and  3.  clarify the methodology that the Command’s service components  should use for enforcing the deployment policy, and take steps to  ensure that the service components have tracking systems in place  that utilize reliable data to meet the requirements of the policy.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with one  recommendation and partially concurred with our two remaining  recommendations. DOD’s comments are included in appendix III. DOD  also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report,  as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the Special  Operations Command to establish specific milestones for completing its  ongoing analyses of personnel requirements and, once completed, make  any needed adjustments to the current plans for personnel increases for  the Command’s headquarters in related future funding requests. DOD  stated that the personnel requirements for the Command’s headquarters  are being determined by an extensive study scheduled for completion in  March 2007. DOD stated that it will monitor the progress and validate the  results of this study, which we believe to be important steps. However, as  we noted in this report, DOD has already requested funding to  substantially increase the number of military and civilian positions at the  Command’s headquarters beginning in fiscal year 2007, without the benefit  of the results from the Command’s study of personnel needs. As a result,  we would expect DOD to re-evaluate its funding needs upon completion of  the Command’s study, and adjust its requests accordingly.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to require the Special  Operations Command to revise the Command’s directive for its program to  monitor the status of special operations forces, to include performance  objectives, goals, and measures of progress for achieving planned growth,  and enforce all of the directive’s reporting requirements. DOD stated that  the Special Operations Command is updating the directive for its program  to monitor the status of special operations forces, and that the department  and the Command are continuously developing new tools and metrics to  more accurately measure the actual health of special operations forces.  DOD further stated that it is difficult to compare personnel data across the  services because each of the Command’s service components presents  data using the metrics of its parent service, adding that it is highly  desirable to have each component format its service-derived data in a  common database. While we recognize the military services have different  metrics, the intent of our recommendation is that the Special Operations  Command develop a set of reporting metrics that would give the  Command the data it needs to monitor progress in meeting growth goals.
Finally, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the  Special Operations Command to clarify the methodology that its service  components use for enforcing the Command’s deployment policy, and  take steps to ensure that the service components have tracking systems in  place that utilize reliable data to meet the requirements of the policy. DOD  stated that the Special Operations Command leadership and all of its  service components have implemented the Command’s deployment policy,  which is in compliance with the department’s force deployment rules for  Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. In addition, DOD stated  that the department will work toward developing a multi-service database  and metrics to standardize deployment and other metrics across the joint  community to overcome the challenge associated with the fact that each  service uses different metrics for calculating deployment time. While we  recognize the use of different metrics presents a challenge, our point, as  we state in this report, is that the Command’s policy is unclear concerning  the length of time for which the components must ensure that personnel  remain within the deployment guidelines, and whether a servicemember  must remain at a home station immediately following one deployment for  an equal amount of time prior to a subsequent deployment. As a result, the  Command’s service components have interpreted the intent of the policy’s  requirements inconsistently. We continue to believe that additional  clarification to the Command’s deployment policy is warranted to assist its  service components in ensuring that special operations forces personnel  remain in compliance with this policy. We also believe that the planned  actions to standardize deployment and other metrics should include  establishing procedures for recording reliable and relevant data on  personnel deployments since, as we reported, officials with two of the  Special Operations Command’s service components did not have  confidence in the reliability of the information that was used to track the  individual deployments of their special operations forces personnel. Such  data are an important tool to enable the Command to maintain the  readiness, retention, and training of special operations forces personnel.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the  date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air  Force, the Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps,  and the Commander, United States Special Operations Command. We will  make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will  be made available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this  report, please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which the Special Operations Command  (Command) has identified all of the personnel requirements needed to  meet its expanded mission, we identified the Joint Mission Analysis  process and the Command’s formal manpower studies as the primary  processes in which the Command develops its force structure and  personnel requirements. To assess the plans to increase the number of  special operations forces units and personnel requirements for the  Command’s headquarters, we conducted site visits and interviewed  officials involved with determining personnel requirements with the  Special Operations Command, and the Army, Navy, and Air Force service  components. We also met with Marine Corps officials to discuss plans for  growth in Marine Corps special operations forces. We analyzed the plans  for growth in these personnel through fiscal year 2011. We reviewed  Department of Defense (DOD) documents identifying the increases in the  Special Operations Command’s military authorizations and funding since  fiscal year 2000 and its plans for personnel growth through fiscal year  2011. We reviewed past reports prepared by GAO that discuss effective  strategies for workforce planning. However, we were unable to determine  whether all of the Special Operations Command’s personnel requirements  had been identified because, at the time of our review, the Command had  not completed all of its analyses of the personnel requirements needed for  its expanded mission responsibilities.
To assess the progress the military services and the Special Operations  Command have made since fiscal year 2000 in increasing the number of  special operations forces personnel, we discussed the processes used by  the military services and DOD to recruit, train, and retain these forces with  officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Special  Operations Command, and the military services. We focused on these  processes for the active components of the military services. To determine  what challenges the military services and the Special Operations  Command face to meet future growth, we analyzed personnel inventory  levels for special operations forces in the active component military  services for fiscal years 2000 through 2005. We collected and analyzed data  to determine whether the schools that train new special operations  personnel are producing enough newly trained personnel in order to meet  current authorized personnel levels or planned growth targets. We  reviewed relevant Special Operations Command directives and analyzed  annual reports prepared by the service components to determine the  extent to which the information in these reports met reporting  requirements.
To assess the effect of increased special operations forces deployments,  we analyzed deployment data from the Special Operations Command for  fiscal years 2000 through 2005. We analyzed the trends in deployments for  operations, training, and administrative activities and the trends in  deployments by geographic region. We discussed the impact of decreased  deployments for training and increased deployments for operations with  officials from the military services and the Special Operations Command.  We reviewed the Special Operations Command’s policy to manage special  operations forces personnel deployments and conducted interviews with  component command officials to determine their ability to implement and  fully comply with this policy. We reviewed available data for  inconsistencies. Our assessments of data reliability revealed some  concerns which are discussed in this report. Specifically, some of the  personnel inventory data provided by the military service headquarters  were incomplete. To overcome this challenge, we gathered additional  information from the Special Operations Command’s service components.  In addition, we interviewed officials with the service headquarters and the  Special Operations Command’s service components who were  knowledgeable about the data to discuss the validity of the information  provided to us. We concluded the data were sufficiently reliable to answer  our objectives. We conducted our review from April 2005 through June  2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards.
We interviewed officials and obtained documentation at the following  locations:    U.S. Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.    U.S. Army Reserve Command, Ft. McPherson, Georgia    U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina    Chief of Naval Operations, Arlington, Virginia    Naval Recruiting Command, Millington, Tennessee    Naval Special Warfare Command, Coronado, California    U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C.    Air Education and Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas    Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida  Office of the Secretary of Defense    Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Washington, D.C.    Office of the Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness),   Washington, D.C.
Office of the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity  Conflict), Washington, D.C.
section_title: Appendix II: Description of Activities Assigned to the Special Operations Command
paragraphs: Section 167(j) of Title 10, U.S. Code lists 10 activities over which the  Special Operations Command exercises authority insofar as they relate to  special operations. Table 5 defines these activities.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, David Moser, Assistant Director;  John Pendleton, Assistant Director; Colin Chambers, Jeremy Manion,  Stephanie Moriarty, Joseph Rutecki, Christopher Turner, Matthew  Ullengren, Cheryl Weissman, and Gerald Winterlin also made key  contributions to this report.