Defense Acquisitions: Sound Practices Critical to Ensuring Value for the Defense Logistics Agency's Acquisitions
Published: 2009-09-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The nation's ability to project and sustain military power depends on effective logistics. As the Department of Defense's (DOD) largest combat support agency, providing worldwide logistics support in both peacetime and wartime, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) supplies almost every consumable item the military services need to operate, from Meals Ready-to Eat to jet fuel. Given current budgetary pressures and the crucial role DLA plays in supporting the military service in the United States and overseas, it is vital that DOD ensure DLA is getting value for the commodities and services it acquires. The committee asked GAO to identify the challenges DOD faces in ensuring DLA gets value for the taxpayer's dollar and obtains quality commodities in a cost-efficient and effective manner. This testimony focuses on sound practices GAO has identified regarding obtaining value when contracting and how they can also apply to DLA's acquisition of commodities. GAO has made numerous recommendations aimed at improving DOD's management and oversight of contractors, and DOD has concurred with many of them. GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD faces challenges ensuring DLA gets value for the taxpayer's dollar and obtains quality commodities in a cost-efficient and effective manner. GAO's previous testimonies before this committee on weapons system acquisition and service contracts highlighted how essential it is that DOD employ sound practices when using contractors to support its missions or operations to ensure the department receives value regardless of the type of product or service involved. These practices include clearly defining its requirements, using the appropriate contract type, and effectively overseeing contractors. With regard to DLA, GAO's prior work has identified the following challenge areas: (1) Accurate Requirements Definition - Without a good understanding of customers' projected needs, DLA is not assured it is buying the right items in the right quantities at the right time. GAO's prior work has identified instances where problems in properly defining requirements can lead to ineffective or inefficient management of commodities. For example, GAO reported in 2005 that while DLA had a model to forecast supply requirements for contingencies, this model did not produce an accurate demand forecast for all items, including Meals Ready-to-Eat. As a result, the demand for these items was underestimated and some combat support units came within a day or two of exhausting their Meals Ready-to-Eat rations. (2) Sound Business Arrangements - Selecting the appropriate type is important because certain contracting arrangements may increase the government's cost risk where others transfer some of that cost risk to the contractor. For example, GAO noted in 2007 that DLA's Defense Energy Support Center was able to purchase fuel and supply products for the forces in Iraq more cheaply than an Army Corps of Engineers contractor because DLA was able to sign long-term contracts with the fuel suppliers. (3) Proper Contract Oversight and Management - Failure to provide adequate contract oversight and management hinders DOD's ability to address poor contractor performance and avoid negative financial and operation impacts. For example, in June 2006, GAO found that DLA officials were not conducting required price reviews for the prime vendor contracts for food service equipment and construction and equipment commodities. Agency officials acknowledged that these problems occurred because management at the agency and supply center level were not providing adequate oversight to ensure that contracting personnel were monitoring prices. DLA has taken some actions to address these challenges. For example, DLA has begun adjusting acquisition strategies to reassign programs to a best procurement approach. DLA has also established contracting officer's representative training requirements to ensure these individuals are properly trained to carry out their responsibilities.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss challenges the Department of  Defense (DOD) faces to ensure the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) gets  value for the taxpayer’s dollar and obtains quality commodities in a cost- efficient and effective manner. The nation’s ability to project and sustain  military power depends on effective logistics. As the department’s largest  combat support agency, providing worldwide logistics support in both  peacetime and wartime, DLA supplies almost every consumable item the  military services need to operate, from Meals-Ready-to Eat to jet fuel. In  fiscal year 2008, DLA provided more than $42 billion in goods and services  to all military services worldwide, including significant support to both  Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Secretary  of Defense has noted that with two major ongoing campaigns, the  economic crisis and resulting budget pressures will force hard choices on  DOD, including hard choices regarding defense acquisitions. He further  identified defense acquisition as the chief institutional challenge facing the  department. Given these budgetary pressures and the crucial role DLA  plays in supporting the military service in the United States and overseas,  it is vital that DOD ensure DLA is getting value for the commodities and  services it acquires.
Earlier this year we testified before this committee that significant  improvement in DOD’s acquisition of weapons systems is possible and that  the ability to measure knowledge, processes, and outcomes is critical to  achieving such improvements. We also testified that DOD continues to  face challenges in employing sound practices when contracting for and  managing service contracts. While DOD’s acquisition of commodities  differs from weapons system and service contract acquisitions, our body  of work demonstrates how essential it is that DOD employ sound practices  when using contractors to support its missions or operations to ensure the  department receives value regardless of the type of product or service  involved. The practices include clearly defining its requirements, using the  appropriate contract type, and effectively overseeing contractors. We have  made recommendations on all of these practices, and DOD has concurred  with many of them. My statement today will focus on these sound  practices and how they can also apply to DLA’s acquisition of  commodities. Our statement is based on work we have completed over the  past decade, which demonstrates ongoing weaknesses in DOD’s  management of contracts. Our work was conducted in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD operates a worldwide supply system to buy, store, and distribute  inventory items. Through this system, DOD manages several million types  of consumable items, most of which are managed by DLA. DLA is DOD’s  largest combat support agency, providing worldwide logistics support in  both peacetime and wartime to the military services as well as civilian  agencies and foreign countries. DLA supplies almost every consumable  item the military services need to operate. To do this, DLA operates three  supply centers, including the Defense Supply Center in Philadelphia,  Pennsylvania which is responsible for procuring nearly all the food,  clothing, and medical supplies used by the military. In addition, DLA has  supply centers in Richmond, Virginia and Columbus, Ohio. The Defense  Distribution Center operates a worldwide network of 25 distribution  depots that receive, store, and issue supplies. In addition, DLA’s Defense  Energy Support Center has the mission of purchasing fuel for the military  service and other defense agencies. DLA also helps dispose of excess or  unusable materiel and equipment through its Defense Reutilization and  Marketing Service.
To meet its mission, DLA relies on contractors as suppliers of the  commodities and as providers of services including the acquisition and  distribution of certain commodities. Traditionally, DLA buys consumable  items in large quantities, stores them in distribution depots until they are  requested by the military services, and then ships them to a service facility  where they are used. For example, DLA procures military uniforms  through competitive contracts. Defense Supply Center-Philadelphia’s  Clothing and Textile Directorate procures commodities such as battle  dress uniforms, footwear, and body armor directly from contractors and  stores them until they are needed by the services.
DLA also relies on service contractors to help with the acquisition,  management, and distribution of commodities. For example, DLA has a  prime vendor arrangement in which a distributor of a commercial product  line provides those products and related services to all of DLA’s customers  in an assigned region within a specified period of time after order  placement. Under the prime vendor process, a single vendor buys items  from a variety of manufacturers and the inventory is stored in commercial  warehouses. A customer orders the items from the prime vendor. Once the  Defense Supply Center-Philadelphia approves the order, the prime vendor  fills, ships, and tracks the order through final acceptance. The prime  vendor then submits an invoice to Defense Supply Center-Philadelphia,  which authorizes payment to the prime vendor and bills the customer.  According to DLA, the benefits of prime vendor contracts include  improved access to a wide range of high-quality products, rapid and  predictable delivery, and reduced overhead charges. Other benefits of  prime vendor contracts include significant reductions in the manpower  needed to manage and warehouse these items at DLA and reduced  transportation costs. In addition, prime vendor contracts provide for surge  and broader mobilization capabilities, and worldwide customer support.
DLA also uses service contractors to provide services other than the  acquisition of commodities. For example, the Defense Reutilization and  Marketing Service uses contractors to support the disposal of government  equipment and supplies considered surplus or unnecessary to DOD’s  mission. Similarly, DLA uses service contractors to provide oversight,  audit, and verification procedures for the destruction of DOD scrap  property; operate Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office locations  around the world including sites in Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan; and run  the Defense Distribution Center, Kuwait, Southwest Asia which provides  distribution services and surge capability to all four service components to  support the warfighters operating in the region. Current commodities  distributed by the center are repair parts, barrier/construction materiel,  clothing, textiles, and tents. The center also provides consolidated  shipment and containerization services, as well as, routine logistic support  to the military community in the U.S. Central Command’s theater of  operations.
section_title: Sound Practices Vital to Ensuring DLA Receives Value When Acquiring Commodities
subsections: section_title: Proper Requirements Definition Is Essential to Obtaining Value
paragraphs: DLA determines what and how many items it buys based on requirements  from its military service customers. Without a good understanding of  customers’ projected needs, DLA is not assured it is buying the right items  in the right quantities at the right time. Properly defined requirements are  therefore fundamental to obtaining good value for contracts administered  through DLA. As with any contracting decision, a prerequisite to good  outcomes is a match between well-defined requirements and available  resources. Our previous testimonies before this committee on weapons  system acquisition and service contracts have highlighted several cases  where poorly defined and changing requirements have contributed to  increased costs, as well as services that did not meet the department’s  needs. We also noted that the absence of well-defined requirements and  clearly understood objectives complicates efforts to hold DOD and  contractors accountable for poor acquisitions outcomes. In addition,  requirements which are based on unrealistic assumptions make it  impossible to execute programs that are within established cost, schedule,  and performance targets. Our prior work has identified instances where  problems in properly defining requirements can lead to ineffective or  inefficient management of commodities.
Inaccurate demand forecasting may result in inventory that does not  match demand. The military services and DLA manage the acquisition  and distribution of spare parts for defense weapon systems. Whereas  the military services manage their own reparable spare parts, DLA  provides the services with most of their consumable parts—that is,  items of supply that are normally expended or intended to be used up  beyond recovery. In prior work, we have reported that the Air Force,  the Navy, and the Army had acquired billions of dollars of spare parts  in excess to their current requirements. For example, for fiscal years  2004 to 2007, the Army had on average about $3.6 billion of spare parts  inventory that exceeded current requirements, while also having  inventory deficits that averaged about $3.5 billion. During that same  time period, the Navy had secondary inventory that exceeded current  requirements by an average of $7.5 billion dollars, or 40 percent of  total inventory. Mismatches between inventory levels and current  requirements were caused in part by inaccurate demand forecasting. In  our Navy work, for example, we noted that requirements frequently  changed after purchase decisions had been made and that the Navy  had not adjusted certain inventory management practices to account  for the unpredictability in demand. The military services’ difficulty in  forecasting demand for spare parts is among the reasons we have  placed DOD’s supply chain management on our high-risk series since  1990. In addition, we are currently reviewing DLA’s management of  consumable spare parts for its service customers. We are evaluating  (1) the extent that DLA’s spare parts inventory reflects the amounts  needed to support current requirements and (2) the factors that have  contributed to DLA having any excesses or deficits in secondary  inventory. As part of our review, we expect to report on how demand  forecasting may affect inventory levels compared with requirements  and what actions DLA is taking to understand and mitigate problems  with demand forecasting.
Inaccurate requirements and supply forecasts can affect the  availability of critical supplies and inventory for the military, which, in  turn, can result in a diminished operational capability and increased  risk to troops. For example, as we reported in 2005, the Army’s failure  to conduct an annual update of its war reserve requirements for spare  parts since 1999, as well the Army’s continued decisions to not fully  fund war reserve spare parts, resulted in the inventory for some  critical items being insufficient to meet initial wartime demand during  Operation Iraqi Freedom. These items included lithium batteries,  armored vehicle track shoes, and tires for 5-ton trucks, where demand  exceeded supply by over 18 times the amount on hand. Similarly, while  DLA had a model to forecast supply requirements for contingencies,  this model did not produce an accurate demand forecast for all items,  including Meals Ready-to-Eat. Therefore, Army officials had to  manually develop forecasts for Operation Iraqi Freedom, but did not  always have sufficient or timely information needed to forecast  accurate supply requirements. As a result, they underestimated the  demand for some items. For example, demand for Meals Ready-to-Eat  exceeded supply in February, March, and April 2003, when monthly  demand peaked at 1.8 million cases, while the inventory was only  500,000 cases. Some combat support units came within a day or two of  exhausting their Meals Ready-to-Eat rations, putting Army and Marine  Corps units at risk of running out of food if the supply distribution  chain was interrupted.
Unrealistic time frames for acquisition and delivery of commodities  can also have negative impacts on obtaining value. We previously  testified that the Army’s decision to issue black berets to all of its  forces in just 8 months placed enormous demands on DOD’s  procurement system. Due to the extremely short time frame for  delivery of the berets to the Army, DLA contracting officials took a  number of actions to expedite award of the contracts, including  undertaking contract actions without providing for “full and open”  competition as required by the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984.  According to contract documents, the contract actions were not  competed because of an “unusual and compelling urgency,” one of the  circumstances permitting other than full and open competition.  Despite these actions, DLA was unable to meet its deadline due to  quality and delivery problems and had to terminate several contracts  because the contractors could not meet delivery requirements.
section_title: Sound Business Arrangements Are Essential to Reducing the Government’s Risks
paragraphs: When contracting for commodities or services, DLA has a number of  choices regarding the contracting arrangements to use. Selecting the  appropriate type is important because certain contracting arrangements  may increase the government’s cost risk whereas others transfer some of  that cost risk to the contractor. We have previously testified before this  committee that once the decision has been made to use contractors to  support DOD’s missions or operations, it is essential that DOD clearly  defines its requirements and employs sound business practices, such as  using appropriate contracting vehicles. For example, we testified that we  had found numerous issues with DOD’s use of time-and-materials  contracts that increased the government’s risks. These contracts are  appropriate when specific circumstances justify the risks, but our findings  indicate that they are often used as a default for a variety of reasons— ease, speed, and flexibility when requirements or funding are uncertain.  Time-and-materials contracts are considered high risk for the government  because they provide no positive profit incentive to the contractor for cost  control or labor efficiency and their use is supposed to be limited to cases  where no other contract type is suitable.
With regard to commodities, it is equally important that DLA use the  appropriate contracting arrangements to result in the best value and  lowest risk to the government. Our prior work over the past 10 years and  the work of others has identified instances where using the wrong  contracting arrangement led to the ineffective or inefficient acquisition of  commodities. For example, as discussed above, when DLA was tasked to  purchase black berets for the Army, the extremely short time frame placed  DOD in a high-risk contracting situation. In their eagerness to serve the  customer, DLA contracting officials shortcut normal contracting  procedures to expedite awarding the contracts, allowing little time to plan  for the purchase of the berets and little room to respond to production  problems. In awarding a contract to one foreign firm, using other than full  and open competition, the DLA contracting officer was confronted with a  price that was 14 percent higher than the price of the domestic supplier.  However, the contracting officer performed a price analysis and  determined the price was fair and reasonable, explaining that given the  deadline, there was no time to obtain detailed cost or pricing data, analyze  those data, develop a negotiation position, negotiate with a firm, and then  finally make the award. When competition was introduced into the  process at a later date, prices declined. As another example of higher costs  resulting from using a particular contract type to acquire commodities, we  reported in July 2004 that the Air Force had used the Air Force Contract  Augmentation Program contract to supply commodities for its heavy  construction squadrons. While contractually permitted, the use of a cost- plus-award-fee contract as a supply contract may not be cost-effective.  Under such contracts, the government reimburses the contractors’ costs  and pays an award fee that may be higher than warranted given the  contractors’ low level of risk when performing such tasks. Air Force  officials recognized that the use of a cost-plus-award-fee contract to buy  commodities may not be cost-effective and under the current contract  commodities may be obtained using a variety of contracting arrangements.  Similarly we noted in a 2007 report on the Army Corps of Engineers  Restore Iraqi Oil Contract that DLA’s Defense Energy Support Center was  able to purchase fuel and supply products for the forces in Iraq more  cheaply than the contractor because the Defense Energy Support Center  was able to sign long-term contracts with the fuel suppliers, an acquisition  strategy the contractor did not pursue because of the incremental funding  provided by the Army. In addition, in 2008, the DOD Inspector General  found that DLA was unable to effectively negotiate prices or obtain best  value for noncompetitive spare parts when it contracted with an exclusive  distributor—a company that represents parts suppliers to the U.S.  government. Furthermore, the DOD Inspector General concluded that  the exclusive distributor model was not a viable procurement alternative  for DOD in part because of excessive pass-through charges, increased lead  times to DOD, and an unnecessary layer of redundancy and cost.
Our prior work reported that DLA has taken some steps to determine if the  appropriate contracting arrangement is being used or if contractors should  be used at all. As we reported in 2006, DLA has recognized that the prime  vendor concept may not be suitable for all commodities and has begun  adjusting acquisition strategies to reassign programs to a best  procurement approach. For example, DLA evaluated the acquisition of  food service equipment and determined not to continue acquiring food  service equipment through a prime vendor. Instead, DLA decided to  develop a new acquisition strategy that will require the development of a  contractual relationship primarily with manufacturers or their  representatives for equipment and incidental services. DLA has also  initiated several actions aimed at strengthening oversight, such as  modifying contracts to change the price verification process and  establishing additional training for contracting officers and managers. In  addition, DLA has taken some steps to determine whether contractors are  the most efficient means to meet certain requirements. For example, in  2005, DLA conducted a public-private competition for warehousing  functions at 68 sites used for disposing of surplus or unnecessary  government equipment and supplies. DLA ultimately determined that it  was more cost effective to retain the government employees at these sites  than convert to contractor performance.
section_title: Proper Contract Oversight and Management Key to Obtaining Value
paragraphs: In addition to ensuring requirements for contracts awarded through DLA  have been properly defined and the appropriate type of contract has been  put in place, proper contract oversight and management is essential to  ensure DOD gets value for taxpayers’ dollars and obtains quality  commodities or services in a cost-efficient and effective manner. Failure to  provide adequate oversight hinders the department’s ability to address  poor contractor performance and avoid negative financial and operational  impacts. In previous testimony before this committee, we noted that we  have reported on numerous occasions that DOD did not adequately  manage and assess contractor performance to ensure that its business  arrangements were properly executed. Managing and assessing post  award performance entails various activities to ensure that the delivery of  services meets the terms of the contract and requires adequate  surveillance resources, proper incentives, and a capable workforce for  overseeing contracting activities. If surveillance is not conducted, is  insufficient, or not well documented, DOD is at risk of being unable to  identify and correct poor contractor performance in a timely manner.
As an agency responsible for billions of dollars of contracts for  commodities and services, it is important that DLA ensure effective  contract oversight and management and thereby obtain those commodities  and services in an economic and efficient manner. However, we have  identified several long-standing challenges that hinder DOD’s effective  management of contractors, including the need to ensure adequate  personnel are in place to oversee and manage contractors, the importance  of training, and the need to collect and share lessons learned. Our prior  work has found while these challenges have affected DLA’s ability to  obtain value, in some cases DLA has also taken actions to address these  challenges.
First, having the right people with the right skills to oversee contractor  performance is critical to ensuring the best value for the billions of dollars  spent each year on contractor support. DOD’s difficulty in ensuring  appropriate oversight of contractors exists is among the reasons DOD  contract management has been on GAO’s high-risk series since 1992.  While much of our work on contract management has been focused on  weapons system acquisition and service contractors, we have found  similar challenges with DOD’s acquisition of commodities.
In June 2006, we found that DLA officials were not conducting  required price reviews for the prime vendor contracts for food service  equipment and construction and equipment commodities. For  example, the contracts for food service equipment required  verification of price increases, but officials from the supply center  were unable to provide documentation on why the price of an aircraft  refrigerator increased from $13,825 in March 2002 to $32,642 in  September 2004. Both logistics agency and supply center officials  acknowledged that these problems occurred because management at  the agency and supply center level were not providing adequate  oversight to ensure that contracting personnel were monitoring prices.
We also found poor contract management can cause lapses in contract  support and can lead to operational challenges, safety hazards and  waste. For example, in 2007 DLA was given the responsibility to  contract for services to de-gas, store, and refill gas cylinders in Kuwait.  Warfighters use gas cylinders for a variety of purposes including, but  not limited to, caring for those who are hospitalized, equipment  maintenance, and construction. However, as of July 2009, DLA has yet  to compete and execute this contract. As a result, instead of receiving  refilled cylinders from Kuwait, warfighters are continually buying full  gas cylinders from local markets in the Middle East. This may lead to  operational challenges and waste as warfighters must make efforts to  purchase gases in Iraq while cylinders that could be refilled remain idle  in Kuwait.
A second long-term challenge for DOD’s contract oversight and  management is training. We have made multiple recommendations over  the last decade that DOD improve the training of contract oversight  personnel. We have found that DLA has recognized the need to improve  training.
As discussed above, our June 2006 report found that DLA officials  were not conducting required price reviews for some prime vendor  contracts. Senior DLA officials acknowledged that weaknesses in  oversight led to pricing problems and stated that they were instituting  corrective actions. Among the weaknesses were the lack of knowledge  or skills of contracting personnel and a disregard for the contracting  rules and regulations. To address this weakness, DLA has established  additional training for contracting officers and managers. In addition,  DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Director, DLA  provide continual management oversight of the corrective actions  taken to address pricing problems.
DLA has also taken some actions to help ensure that contracting  officer’s representatives are properly trained. For example, DLA’s  Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service has recognized that  performance-based contracts will only be effective if contracting  officer’s representatives accurately report contractor performance and  contracting officers take appropriate actions. DLA has established  contracting officer’s representative training requirements to ensure  these individuals are properly trained to carry out their  responsibilities. These requirements increase for contracts that are  more complex or present higher risks to the government. While we  have not evaluated the performance of DLA contracting officer’s  representatives, our previous work shows that when contracting  officer’s representatives are properly trained, they can better ensure  that contractors provide services and supplies more efficiently and  effectively. In addition, a working group from DOD’s panel on  contracting integrity in September 2008 recognized the importance of  more in-depth contracting officer’s representative training for more  complex contracts or contracts that pose a greater risk to DOD.
In February 2009, we reported that businesses and individuals that had  been excluded from receiving federal contracts for egregious offenses  continued to be awarded contracts. Our work demonstrated that  most of the improper contracts and payments identified can be  attributed to ineffective management of the governmentwide database  which tracks excluded contractor information or to control  weaknesses at both the agency which excluded the contractor and the  contracting agency. Specifically, our work showed that excluded  businesses continued to receive federal contracts from a number of  agencies, including DLA, because officials (including contracting  officers) at some agencies failed to enter complete information in the  database in a timely manner or failed to check the database prior to  making contract awards. In addition, some agencies like DLA used  automated purchasing systems which did not interface with the  database. In commenting on our report agency officials stated that  most of the issues we identified could be solved through improved  training.
A third long-term challenge for DOD’s contract oversight and management  is the need to collect and share institutional knowledge on the use of  contractors, including lessons learned and best practices. Our prior work  has found that DLA has taken some actions to improve the collection as  well as the application of lessons learned. For example, in January 2000,  we identified DLA’s prime vendor program as an example of DLA adopting  a best commercial practice for inventory management. Our work found  that DLA was developing a policy to establish the basis for lessons learned  from the reviews of prime vendor programs. Key points of the policy  include specific requirements for management oversight such as pricing  and compliance audits; requiring all prime vendor contracts to comply  with an established prime vendor pricing model; annual procurement  management reviews for all prime vendor contracts; and requiring  advance approval by headquarters for all prime vendor contracts,  regardless of dollar value. However, because this policy was still in draft  form at the time of our review, we did not evaluate it.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, DLA has a key role in supporting the warfighter  by providing a vast array of logistics support. In providing this support,  DLA depends on contractors and as such must ensure that it is obtaining  good value for the billions of dollars it spends every year. Regardless of  whether DLA is buying commodities or services, well-defined  requirements, appropriate contract types, and proper contract oversight  and management are critical to ensuring that DLA gets what it pays for.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this concludes my  testimony. I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.
section_title: Contributors and Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact William Solis,  Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, on (202) 512-8365 or  solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations  and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony. Other  key contributors to this testimony include Carole Coffey, Lionel Cooper,  Laurier Fish, Thomas Gosling, Melissa Hermes, James A. Reynolds, Cary  Russell, Michael Shaughnessy, and Marilyn Wasleski.
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