Foreign Police Assistance: Defined Roles and Improved Information Sharing Could Enhance Interagency Collaboration
Published: 2012-05-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In April 2011, we reported that the United States provided an estimated $3.5 billion for foreign police assistance to 107 countries during fiscal year 2009. We agreed to follow up that report with a review of the extent to which U.S. agencies evaluated and coordinated their foreign police assistance activities.
As such, this report (1) updates our analysis of the funding U.S. agencies provided for foreign police assistance during fiscal years 2009 through 2011, (2) examines the extent to which DOD and State/INL assess or evaluate their activities for countries with the largest programs, and (3) examines the mechanisms U.S. agencies use to coordinate foreign police assistance activities. GAO focused on DOD and State because they have the largest foreign police assistance programs.
GAO analyzed program and budget documents and interviewed officials from DOD, State, Energy, the U.S. Agency for International Development, Justice, the Treasury, and Homeland Security.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The United States provided an estimated $13.9 billion for foreign police assistance during fiscal years 2009 through 2011. Funds provided by U.S. agencies rose and then fell between fiscal years 2009 and 2011. During fiscal years 2009 through 2011, the United States provided the greatest amount of its foreign police assistance to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Colombia, Mexico, and the Palestinian Territories. Department of Defense (DOD) and State (State) funds constituted about 97 percent of U.S. funds for police assistance in fiscal year 2009 and 98 percent in fiscal years 2010 and 2011.
DOD and States Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/INL) have acknowledged limitations in their procedures to assess and evaluate their foreign police assistance activities and are taking steps to address them. DOD assesses the performance of the police forces it trains and equips in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. However, the assessment process for Afghanistan does not provide data on civil policing effectiveness. DOD plans to expand its assessments to obtain data to assess the ability of these forces to conduct civil policing operations. In addition, recognizing that it had conducted only one evaluation of its foreign police assistance activities because it lacked guidelines, State/INL is developing an evaluation plan that is consistent with States February 2012 Evaluation Policy. This evaluation plan includes conducting evaluations for its largest programs in Iraq and Mexico.
U.S. agencies have implemented various mechanisms to coordinate their foreign police assistance activities as part of wider foreign assistance activities, such as the National Security Councils (NSC)-led interagency policy committees that coordinate policies at a high level and various working groups at the overseas posts. However, GAO noted some areas for improvement. Specifically, NSC has not defined agencies roles and responsibilities for assisting foreign police. Further, DOD and State do not consistently share and document information. For example, DOD did not provide copies of its capability assessments of the Iraqi police to State, which is now responsible for police development in Iraq, because it destroyed the database containing the assessments at the end of its mission to train the police. Further, some U.S. embassies, including the one in Bogotá, Colombia, do not publish agendas or minutes of their proceedings.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that (1) NSC complete its efforts to define agency roles and responsibilities, and (2) the Secretaries of Defense and State establish mechanisms to better share and document information among various U.S. agencies. NSC provided technical comments, but did not comment on our recommendation. DOD concurred and State partially concurred, noting the importance of interagency collaboration.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: It is important to U.S. national security objectives that the United States  effectively work with the security forces of other countries. The United  States has devoted significant resources to training and equipping foreign  police units in some of the most unstable countries in the world to build  their counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and anticrime  capabilities. As such, assessments or evaluations of U.S. efforts to train  foreign police forces are critical to the ability of agencies to make  informed decisions about future programming. The first phase of our work  in response to your request focused on funding and agencies providing  foreign police assistance in fiscal year 2009. In April 2011, we reported  that the United States provided an estimated $3.5 billion for foreign police  assistance to 107 countries during fiscal year 2009. We agreed to follow  up that report with a review of the extent to which U.S agencies evaluated  and coordinated their foreign police assistance activities.
This report (1) provides an updated analysis of the amount and type of  assistance U.S. agencies provided for foreign police assistance  worldwide during fiscal years 2009 through 2011, (2) examines the extent  to which the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State’s  (State) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs  (State/INL) assess or evaluate their foreign police assistance activities for  countries with their largest programs, and (3) examines the mechanisms  U.S. agencies use to coordinate their foreign police assistance activities.
For objective 2, we focused on DOD and State/INL because they have  the largest programs that provide assistance to foreign police forces.
To address our objectives, we analyzed agency program documents and  past GAO reports, relevant legislation, and agency and congressional  budget documents. We also interviewed officials from DOD, State, the  U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the Departments of  the Treasury (Treasury), Justice (DOJ), Energy (DOE), and Homeland  Security (DHS); and the U.S. embassies in Colombia and Peru, two  countries with large foreign police assistance programs. We focused on  Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Colombia, Mexico, and the Palestinian  Territories because they had the largest programs between fiscal years  2009 and 2011. To obtain total U.S. government funding, we analyzed  estimated funding data provided by DOD, State, DOE, USAID, Treasury,  and DOJ. According to agency officials, these amounts are estimates  because activities to train and equip police are not generally categories  the agencies use to track funding. Appendix I provides a detailed  discussion of our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2011 through May 2012  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our work objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Although numerous U.S. agencies are engaged in U.S. efforts to provide  assistance to foreign police forces, DOD and State are the major  providers—providing police training around the world through a variety of  authorities. DOD trains and equips foreign police forces to support its  counterinsurgency operations. It also provides support for the  counterdrug activities of foreign law enforcement agencies for purposes  including counterdrug training of foreign law enforcement personnel. DOD  provides such assistance around the world through a variety of  authorities. For example, section 1004 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1991,  as amended, authorizes DOD to provide support for the counterdrug  activities of foreign law-enforcement agencies for purposes including  counterdrug training of foreign law-enforcement personnel, if requested  by an appropriate official of a federal agency with counterdrug  responsibilities.
State trains and equips foreign police to support a variety of U.S. foreign  policy objectives, including suppressing international narcotics trafficking,  combating terrorism, and developing and implementing U.S. policies to  curb the proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction. Different  State bureaus carry out police assistance under different authorities. For  example, according to State/INL officials, State/INL carries out its mission  under authorities in Chapter 8 of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, which among other things, authorizes the provision of law-enforcement  training. DOE provides training and equipment to overseas law  enforcement, both at national borders and to police and security forces, as  part of the mission of its National Nuclear Security Administration’s Second  Line of Defense program to strengthen the capability of foreign  governments to deter, detect and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and  other radioactive materials across international borders, through the global  maritime shipping system, and by equipping teams to be deployed  throughout their countries. USAID provides community-based police  assistance as part of its role in promoting the rule of law through assistance  to the justice sector. Treasury provides training as part of its mission to  support the development of strong financial sectors and sound financial  management overseas. DOJ and DHS implement foreign police assistance  activities primarily funded by State. Treasury also receives some funds  from State.
Pub. Law No. 87-195, as amended.
Investigation (FBI) Academy in Virginia, and at various DOD training  facilities. Trainers provided by various U.S. agencies also travel overseas  to provide instruction. Foreign law enforcement personnel are also trained  at State-funded international law enforcement academies located in El  Salvador, Thailand, Hungary, Botswana, and Peru. The training covers a  variety of subject matter, including crime scene investigation, postblast  investigations, forensics, and behavioral analysis.
section_title: The United States Made Available an Estimated $13.9 Billion for Foreign Police Assistance during Fiscal Years 2009 through 2011
paragraphs: We estimate the U.S. government made available $13.9 billion for foreign  police assistance during fiscal years 2009 through 2011. Most U.S.  funding made available for foreign police assistance during fiscal years  2009 through 2011 provided training and equipment to Afghanistan, Iraq,  Pakistan, Colombia, Mexico, and the Palestinian Territories. DOD and  State funds constituted about 97 percent of the U.S. funds for police  assistance in fiscal year 2009 and 98 percent of U.S. funds for police  assistance in fiscal years 2010 and 2011. Four other agencies provided the  remaining amount.
subsections: section_title: Funds Made Available for U.S. Foreign Police Assistance Rose and Then Fell during Fiscal Years 2009 through 2011
paragraphs: On the basis of data provided by DOD, State, DOE, USAID, Treasury,  and DOJ, we estimate that the U.S. government made available $3.5  billion in foreign police assistance in fiscal year 2009, $5.7 billion in fiscal  year 2010, and $4.7 billion in fiscal year 2011 (see fig. 1).made available focused on sustaining the counternarcotics,  counterterrorism, anticrime, and other civilian policing efforts of police  forces around the world.
GAO, Combating Terrorism: Pakistan Counterinsurgency Funds Disbursed, but Human  Rights Vetting Process Can Be Enhanced, GAO-11-860SU (Washington, D.C.:   Sept. 11, 2011). million in fiscal year 2011. State’s activities included support to the  Colombian National Police’s aviation program and training on weapons  and other equipment to rural police units. DOD support included training  for a special unit of the Colombian National Police. In Mexico, DOD and  State funds made available decreased from an estimated $167 million in  fiscal year 2010 to $21 million in fiscal year 2011. Activities in Mexico  included State’s Mérida Initiative, which provided training and equipment  including aircraft and boats, inspection equipment, and canine units. DOD  support to Mexico included training on aviation, communications  equipment, maintenance, and information sharing. For the Palestinian  Territories, State’s funds made available increased from an estimated $97  million in fiscal year 2010 to $142 million in fiscal year 2011. State  provided battalion-level basic law enforcement and security training  conducted at the Jordanian International Police Training Center located  outside Amman, Jordan. Appendix IV contains additional information on  activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Colombia, Mexico, and the  Palestinian Territories.
section_title: Other U.S. Agencies Also Made Available Assistance to Foreign Police
paragraphs: Four other agencies—DOE, USAID, Treasury, and DOJ—also made  available about $83 million, or 2 percent of the estimated funds, for  foreign police assistance in fiscal year 2011 (see table 1). DOE made  available the majority of the funds ($52 million) for its nuclear security  programs; USAID, Treasury, and DOJ made available the remaining  amounts.
section_title: DOD and State Are Taking Steps to Address Limitations in Their Procedures for Assessing and Evaluating Foreign Police Assistance Activities
paragraphs: DOD and State/INL have acknowledged limitations in their procedures to  assess and evaluate their foreign police assistance activities and are  taking steps to address them. DOD assesses the performance of the  national police forces it has trained and equipped for counterinsurgency  operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan—countries that were the  three largest recipients of DOD’s foreign police assistance funds during  fiscal years 2009 through 2011. However, according to an October 2011  DOD report to Congress, the assessment process for Afghanistan does  not provide data on civil policing operations such as referring cases to the  justice system, a fact that hampers the department’s ability to fully assess  the effectiveness of the training it provides to the ANP. DOD plans to  begin collecting these data to assess civil policing effectiveness. As of  April 2012, State/INL had conducted only one evaluation of a program  that includes foreign police assistance activities. Recognizing the need to  conduct such evaluations, State/INL is developing an evaluation plan that  is consistent with State’s February 2012 Evaluation Policy and  implementing its June 2010 guidelines that recommended including  evaluation as a part of its budget and planning documents for programs in  Iraq and Mexico. Other priority programs for evaluation include ones for  Afghanistan, Colombia, the Palestinian Territories, and Pakistan.
subsections: section_title: DOD Assesses the Performance of Police Forces It Trained and Equipped in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan
paragraphs: DOD assesses the performance of the national police forces it has trained  and equipped for counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and  Pakistan—countries that were the three largest recipients of DOD’s  foreign police assistance funds during fiscal years 2009 through 2011.
For Afghanistan, DOD has assessed the Afghan National Security  Forces, which consists of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and ANP,  using its Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool. The assessment tool  provides quantitative data for security force units, including personnel,  equipment, and training, and qualitative assessments for functions such  as training and education. In addition, the assessment tool reports on the  operational performance of the ANA and ANP units using rating definition  levels. Rating definition levels include (1) independent, (2) effective with  advisers, (3) effective with assistance, (4) developing, (5) established,  and (6) not assessed. As of August 2011, DOD reported 26 ANP units  were rated as independent. We previously reported on U.S. efforts to train  and equip the ANP in 2009 and more recently in 2012.
For Iraq, DOD used a readiness assessment system to determine when  units of the Iraqi security forces, including the Iraqi national police, could  assume the lead for conducting security operations. This system’s  classified assessments were prepared monthly by the unit’s coalition  commander and Iraqi commander. According to multinational force  guidance, the purpose of the assessment system was to provide  commanders with a method to consistently evaluate units. It also helped  to identify factors hindering unit progress, determine resource shortfalls,  and make resource allocations. Units were evaluated in the areas of  personnel, command and control, equipment, sustainment/logistics,  training, leadership, operational effectiveness, and reliability, including  how militia and sectarian influences affected the loyalty and reliability of  Iraqi police and military forces. Further information on the results of these  assessments is classified.
For Pakistan, DOD reported that, since March 2009, the Strategic  Implementation Plan has been the principal mechanism for monitoring and  assessing the administration’s progress in attaining the core Pakistan- related objectives of the President’s Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, which  include developing the counterinsurgency capabilities of Pakistan’s Frontier  Corps and army. Although details of these and supporting assessments  are classified, DOD reported that a series of events beginning in late 2010  heightened bilateral tension between the United States and Pakistan.  Pakistan’s military subsequently requested significant reductions in U.S.  military personnel in Pakistan. According to the report, the reduced number  of U.S. military personnel and trainers, along with continued delays in  obtaining visas, hindered the United States’ provision of security-related  assistance to Pakistan. As a result, the progress achieved since 2010 in  training, advising, and equipping Pakistan security forces has eroded,  particularly in the area of counterinsurgency effectiveness for tactical- and  operational-level combat forces.
section_title: DOD Reported It Lacks Data on Civil Policing Effectiveness for Afghanistan, but Plans to Expand Its Assessment Process to Include Such Data
paragraphs: Although DOD is assessing ANP’s operational performance, the  department recently reported it lacked data to assess civil policing  effectiveness. According to a DOD October 2011 report, DOD uses the  same report template to assess ANA’s and ANP’s ability to meet their  counterinsurgency mission, but it does not address civil policing and the  other roles and responsibilities of ANP. In 2008, we reported that the  deterioration of Afghanistan’s security situation since 2005 had led to  increased ANP involvement in counterinsurgency operations, resulting in  additional training in weapons and survival skills and counterinsurgency  tactics. We also reported that ANP’s role is to enforce the rule of law,  protect the rights of citizens, maintain civil order and public safety, control  national borders, and reduce the level of domestic and international  organized crime, among other activities. In its report, DOD acknowledged  that transitioning ANP’s role from performing counterinsurgency  operations to a community police force that interacts with the population  will be challenging, especially in contested areas.
DOD reported that it plans to create a separate ANP report template that  will include data on law enforcement operations in 2012. According to the  DOD report, the ANP report template will provide data on community  policing and law enforcement operations (see table 2). For example, DOD  plans to include questions in the ANP report template that will assess the  extent to which ANP units are recording complaints from the public.
In developing the new template, DOD is working with the International  Police Coordination Board (IPCB), according to the department’s report.  First established in the Afghanistan Compact at the London Conference  in 2006, IPCB serves as the main coordination board for police reform in  Afghanistan. Upon its establishment, IPCB had 13 member nations,  including the United States. To increase DOD’s ability to assess civil  policing effectiveness, IPCB has established a partnership with the  International Security Assistance Force-Joint Command. According to  the DOD report, IPCB is assisting DOD by having law enforcement  professionals report data in its report template, and DOD is assisting  IPCB by sharing current and historical ANP data. IPCB has also assisted  DOD with drafting targeted questions that will be used within the ANP  report template to provide data on the ANP units’ ability to conduct law  enforcement operations, which we defined earlier.
section_title: State/INL Has Conducted Limited Evaluation of Its Foreign Police Assistance Activities
paragraphs: State/INL issued guidelines in June 2010 that recommended conducting  evaluations. These guidelines were developed in response to the  Secretary of State’s June 2009 directive for systematic evaluation and to  promote a culture change among program offices that included support  for conducting evaluations, according to State/INL officials. The bureau’s  guidelines recommend that State/INL programs have    a defined strategy and written performance management plan that  identifies performance measures, including indicators and targets, and  establishes an approach for evaluation;    program implementation documents such as letters of agreement,  interagency agreements, and contracts that specify State/INL, host  country, and implementing partner responsibilities for conducting  evaluations; and    budget proposals for programs that identify funding for evaluations as  a separate item.
State/INL guidelines for monitoring and evaluation also identify the types  of evaluations that should be performed and the timing for them based on  project length and budget. For example:    Projects shorter than 2 years may focus on output metrics such as the  number of trained and equipped law enforcement personnel.    Projects longer than 2 years or greater than $25 million must evaluate  outcomes and impacts.    Programs that have a life cycle longer than 5 years or exceed $5  million should conduct one or more midterm evaluations, as well as a  final evaluation.
Programs that exceed $25 million must conduct periodic midterm  evaluations and a final evaluation. To leverage external expertise for  programs exceeding $25 million, State/INL has recommended final  evaluations be conducted by an independent party.
As a key component of effective program management, evaluation  assesses how well a program is working and helps managers make  informed decisions about current and future programming. Evaluation  provides an overall assessment of whether a program works and  identifies adjustments that may improve its results. Types of evaluation  include process (or implementation), outcome, impact, and cost-benefit  and cost-effectiveness analyses. First, process (or implementation)  evaluation assesses the extent to which a program is operating as it was  intended. Second, outcome evaluation assesses the extent to which  program goals or targets are met. Third, impact evaluation is a form of  outcome evaluation that assesses the net effect of a program by  comparing program outcomes with an estimate of what would have  happened in the absence of the program. Finally, cost-benefit and cost- effectiveness analyses compare a program’s outputs or outcomes with  the costs to produce them.
The bureau has conducted only one evaluation of a program that includes  foreign police assistance activities because it lacked guidelines and a  culture among program offices that supported evaluation, according to  State/INL officials. For State/INL’s one outcome evaluation, State/INL  reported that the U.S. Embassy, Beirut, hired a contractor to evaluate its  training program for the Lebanese Internal Security Forces between  November 2010 and May 2011. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess if the training had been successful, as well as to provide  recommendations for its improvement. The final report was submitted to  State/INL in June 2011. It identified what elements of the program worked  and why the training failed to achieve its higher-order objectives. For  example, the evaluators noted that the police training program had  trained over 5,000 Lebanese Internal Security Forces personnel and that  the training had been largely effective. However, the report concluded  that the design of the training was not informed by a systematic  assessment of training needs and engagement from the Lebanese  Internal Security Forces during the planning process.
section_title: State/INL Is Developing an Evaluation Plan That Is Consistent with State’s Evaluation Policy
paragraphs: In response to State’s February 2012 Evaluation Policy, State/INL is  developing its annual evaluation plan, according to State/INL officials.  The new policy requires that (1) all large programs, projects, and activities  be evaluated at least once in their lifetime or every 5 years, whichever is  less; (2) bureaus determine which programs, projects, or activities to  evaluate; (3) bureaus evaluate two to four projects, programs, or activities  over the 24-month period beginning with fiscal year 2012; and (4)  program managers identify up to 3 to 5 percent of their resources for  evaluation activities. State/INL officials said the bureau will assess its  guidelines to ensure they are consistent with State’s policy and  incorporate them into its annual evaluation plan.
State/INL officials said that the bureau is implementing its monitoring and  evaluation guidelines in phases beginning with its largest programs in Iraq  and Mexico. Other priority programs for independent external  evaluations include Afghanistan, Colombia, the Palestinian Territories,  and Pakistan. For Iraq, State/INL officials said they have established a  three-person monitoring and evaluation unit for the bureau’s Police  Development Program. The unit recently used its civilian police advisers  to conduct a baseline assessment of Iraqi law enforcement capabilities  and is relying on advice from State/INL’s Office of Resource  Management. For example, the office is assisting the unit with developing  program objectives and performance measures to ensure they are  specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and timely.
State/INL officials identified numerous goals, functions, objectives, tasks,  and indicators for the bureau’s Police Development Program in Iraq. For  example:
Goal: Iraq’s Police Training Systems provide basic and advanced  instruction to impart the skills required while promoting community  policing, gender, and human rights.
Function: Community Policing/Community Relations—Police  specifically trained in establishing and maintaining positive  relationships between the law enforcement agency and the public for  the purpose of identifying and solving crimes, enhancing public  service, and building community trust in the police.
Objective: Ministry of Interior establishes Community Policing Training
Task 1: Review existing curriculum for community policing  training.
Task 2: Assist General Directorate for Training Qualification as  requested to ensure community policing curriculum adopts and  integrates international human rights standards in terms of police  service delivery.
State/INL’s program office for Mexico has dedicated $3 million in fiscal  year 2011 funds to conduct evaluations of its programs and is in the  process of identifying contracting mechanisms to complete them,  including institutions of higher education in Mexico.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Coordinate Foreign Police Assistance Activities, but Some Areas for Improvement Exist
paragraphs: U.S. agencies have implemented various mechanisms to coordinate their  foreign police assistance activities as part of wider foreign assistance  activities. Such mechanisms include (1) interagency policy committees  chaired by the National Security Council (NSC) that coordinate policies at  a high level; (2) headquarters working groups established to coordinate  specific issues, such as antiterrorism and nonproliferation; (3) various  working groups at the overseas posts; and (4) special positions to  coordinate foreign police assistance activities. However, we noted some  areas for improvement, including lack of defined agency roles and  responsibilities and inconsistent information sharing.
subsections: section_title: The United States Has Implemented Mechanisms at Headquarters and Overseas Posts to Coordinate Foreign Police Assistance Policy, Guidance, and Activities
paragraphs: Interagency groups at various levels coordinate policy, guidance, and  activities related to assistance to foreign police. NSC coordinates policies  at the highest level of government through interagency policy committees.  For example, an NSC-led interagency policy committee on security sector  assistance, which includes assistance to foreign police, is conducting a  policy review of the security sector. This committee does not conduct  coordination or oversight of the actual provision of assistance. One of the  goals of the committee is to define the roles and missions of U.S.  agencies providing such assistance. The committee is also attempting to  establish interagency goals and guidelines to better shape, integrate,  prioritize, and evaluate U.S. government efforts in this sector. The review  of security sector assistance was proposed for a variety of reasons  related to a desire to improve the integration, effectiveness, and  responsiveness of security sector assistance, including a proposal by  Secretary of Defense Gates, according to a U.S. Institute for Peace  report. In addition, according to a State official, the committee was  established as a result of NSC concerns about DOD’s increasing role in  providing foreign assistance. According to officials of agencies  participating in the committee, membership includes NSC, Office of  Management and Budget, DOD, State, USAID, Treasury, DOJ, and DHS.  The attendees are usually assistant secretaries or deputy assistant  secretaries. Working-level officials participate in subgroups such as those  on roles and responsibilities. The table below provides examples of  various coordination mechanisms.
In addition, for Iraq, from 2009 through the end of 2011, the key  mechanism for managing the transfer of responsibilities from DOD to  State was the Iraq Enduring Presence Working Group composed of  individuals from offices in Baghdad and Washington, D.C. In addition to  this working group, the embassy’s management section operated an  interagency structure composed of 13 sub-working groups that covered  all major areas of the transition—provincial affairs, police training,  security, and administrative and support initiatives.
section_title: NSC-Led Interagency Policy Committee Has Not Defined Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: According to State, DOD, DOJ, and DHS officials, the interagency policy  committee on security sector assistance has met sporadically since its  inception, which has contributed to delays in issuing a final report and  associated recommendations that would address the roles and  responsibilities of the various agencies and provide overall U.S.  government policy guidance on security sector assistance. Agreeing on  roles and responsibilities is a key practice that can enhance interagency  collaboration. According to State, DOD, USAID, and DOJ officials, the  committee began meeting sometime in 2009 but stopped in December  2010. A State/INL official said the committee reconvened in June 2011  and met or provided documents for review weekly through September.  The committee met for a final session to review conclusions and policy  recommendations in April 2012. State and DOD officials stated that they  reviewed and commented on a draft policy directive on roles and  responsibilities that was issued in 2011 and one that was issued in early  2012. Agencies reviewed proposed draft policy on roles and missions in  April 2012 for final review. State officials attributed the lack of regular  meetings to National Security Staff turnover and workload issues.
section_title: Overseas Posts Do Not Always Document Information Sharing
paragraphs: While State and DOD had mechanisms to manage the transition from  DOD to a State-led police development program in Iraq, they did not  consistently share information. Establishing collaborative mechanisms to  share information with partners is also a key practice for enhancing and  sustaining interagency collaboration. Moreover, timely dissemination of  information is critical for maintaining national security. The key  mechanism for managing the transition was the Iraq Enduring Presence  Working Group, composed of individuals from offices in Baghdad and  Washington, D.C. In addition, the 2010 Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq—a  strategic document composed and approved by top State and DOD  officials in Iraq—included tasks State would need to consider as part of  the transition. Despite these mechanisms, there was inconsistent and  incomplete sharing of operational readiness assessments of the Iraqi  police by DOD. Though State requested official copies of these  assessments, DOD did not provide them. According to a former DOD  civilian police adviser, DOD destroyed the database that contained the  assessments of the Iraqi police forces during the transition, because it  had completed its mission to train the Iraqi police. As a result, State  developed a baseline assessment of Iraqi law enforcement capabilities  without the benefit of DOD’s assessments.
Moreover, overseas posts do not consistently document or share the  results of their coordination efforts. In 2009, we reported that information  is a crucial tool in national security and its timely dissemination is critical  for maintaining national security. However, State/INL officials stated that  overseas posts do not provide documentation of the results of their  coordination efforts. In addition, several State Inspector General reports  have discussed the need for agendas and minutes for interagency  groups, including in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Mexico. For example, the  Inspector General reported that although the working group at the U.S.  embassy in Colombia concisely addressed law enforcement issues during  these meetings, there was no published agenda or minutes of these  proceedings. In another case, while the law enforcement working group  at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad issues minutes to the embassy  executive office, it does not necessarily share them with headquarters.
The Deputy Chief of Mission for the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia,  acknowledged that the Homeland Security Group did not record the  results of its coordination but stated that it will begin to issue an agenda  and minutes for the meetings. The failure of overseas posts to document  and disseminate their coordination efforts may hamper the agencies’  ability to have all the information they need to analyze the results of their  foreign police assistance activities.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Foreign partners’ counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, counterterrorism,  and anticrime capabilities are critical to U.S. national security objectives.  As such, interagency collaboration is essential to ensuring that U.S.  agencies effectively and efficiently manage the resources they contribute  to training and equipping foreign police forces. However, U.S.  government agencies lack clearly defined roles and responsibilities for  providing security sector assistance, including assistance to foreign police  forces. While NSC has been tasked with leading efforts to define  agencies’ roles and responsibilities, progress to date has stalled. U.S.  agencies providing foreign police assistance need to define and agree on  their roles and responsibilities to ensure that they make the most rational  decisions about U.S. efforts to enhance foreign police forces’ capability.  In addition, the lack of information sharing and documentation among  agencies at some overseas posts providing foreign police assistance can  inhibit the effectiveness of future U.S. assistance efforts.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better prioritize, evaluate, and avoid duplication of U.S. efforts to  provide foreign police assistance, we recommend that NSC complete its  efforts to define agency roles and responsibilities.
To ensure that information is available for future U.S. foreign police  assistance efforts, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and  State establish mechanisms to better share and document information  among various U.S. agencies.
section_title: Agency Comments and our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, DOE, USAID, Treasury,  DOJ, DHS, and NSC.  State and DHS provided written comments which  are reproduced in appendices VI and VII. DOD provided comments by e- mail. In addition, State, DOD, DOE, Treasury, DOJ, and NSC provided  technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. USAID noted  that it had no comments.
NSC did not comment on the report’s recommendations. DOD concurred  with the report’s recommendation to establish mechanisms to better  share and document information among various U.S. agencies. State  partially concurred and described actions it was continuing to take to  collaborate with other federal agencies. State noted that it will work with  its interagency partners to identify ways to improve the sharing of best  practices and lessons learned concerning U.S. foreign police assistance  efforts. DHS noted that it remains committed to continuing its work with  interagency partners such as the U.S. Department of Justice and other  relevant agencies. This includes work to better define agency roles and  responsibilities, as appropriate.
As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents  of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from  the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries  of Defense, State, Energy, Homeland Security; and the Treasury; the  Attorney General; the Administrator of USAID; the Executive Secretary of  the National Security Council; and interested congressional committees.  The report will also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Public Affairs and Congressional Relations may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix IX.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To identify U.S. agencies that trained and equipped foreign police forces  during fiscal years 2009 through 2011, we reviewed past GAO reports,  relevant legislation, and agency websites. To identify the amount of U.S.  government funding made available for foreign police training and  equipment activities, we examined past GAO reports; congressional  budget submissions, including the Department of State’s (State) Bureau  of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs’ (State/INL)  program and budget guides for fiscal year 2011; the Afghanistan Security  Forces Fund fiscal year 2012 congressional budget justification; and the  Department of Defense (DOD) fiscal year 2012 congressional budget  justification and other budget documents. To identify countries and police  assistance activities, we reviewed funding amounts reported to GAO by  agencies, the fiscal year 2012 budget appendix, congressional budget  submissions, agency annual reports, interagency agreements, and other  program documents. We also interviewed officials from the Departments  of Defense, State, and Energy (DOE); the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID; and the Departments of the Treasury, Justice  (DOJ), and Homeland Security (DHS). We collected data for fiscal year  2010 and fiscal year 2011 to update foreign police assistance funding  information provided in our prior report.
We used the same definition of police assistance that we used in the  previous report. We defined police training and equipment activities (which  we referred to as “police assistance”) as all training—regardless of its  content—and equipment provided to law enforcement units or personnel  with arrest, investigative, or interdiction authority. Officials from the Office of  the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global  Threats (DASD-CN>) updated information on DOD police assistance  from fiscal year 2009 for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 using the definition we  developed with State. DASD-CN> has oversight of program funding  through a web-based database. However, specific funds for police  assistance are managed at the combatant command level. The data  DASD-CN> compiled included allotments for fiscal years 2010 and  2011 that were provided by combatant commands for training and  equipping activities. Using our definition, DOD’s Defense Threat Reduction  Agency provided funding data based on allotments from DOD’s  defensewide operations and maintenance account. We also obtained total  amounts made available after reprogramming for Afghanistan, Iraq, and  Pakistan from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, Iraq Security Forces  Fund, and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund from the Comptroller’s Office  in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We reviewed these figures along  with congressional budget justifications and DOD’s fourth quarter, fiscal  year 2011 report to Congress on the Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistan Security  Forces, as required by Section 9009 of DOD’s Appropriation Act for fiscal  year 2011. We combined data from all funding sources to derive the DOD  total. We included funding for equipment and transportation, training, and  sustainment. We excluded any infrastructure costs because such costs are  not typical of most police assistance activities. We compared the DOD data  for reasonableness of the reported information and questioned DOD  officials about their methodology and the reliability of the data. Some of the  data may have included both military and civilian police personnel, which  might result in overestimating DOD funding. However, for fiscal years 2010  and 2011, the majority of DOD funds (over 90 percent) were provided  through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, Iraq Security Forces Fund,  and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, which separate funds provided to  military and civilian personnel. To identify any discrepancies in the funding  data, we compared the data from fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 with  that provided for fiscal year 2009. We reconciled discrepancies with the  agencies and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our  purposes.
State/INL analyzed data reported in its annual program and budget  guides to provide allocations for police-assistance activities that fit our  definition. The funding data covered all country programs funded through  the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)  account directed to law enforcement, stabilization operations,  counternarcotics, border control, and transnational crime. State also used  the definition to identify police assistance funded through other foreign  assistance accounts. State analyzed appropriations and obligations  funding data from the Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking  System database, which tracks data on U.S. foreign assistance  programs. Allotments or allocations were provided for the Assistance for  Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia account and the Nonproliferation,  Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs account. State also  provided obligations for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund,  which received funds transferred from DOD’s Pakistan  Counterinsurgency Fund, and allotments from funding transferred from  DOD to State under Section 1207 authority of the fiscal year 2006  National Defense Authorization Act. We compared State’s data for fiscal  year 2009 with data for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 for reasonableness.  We also questioned State officials about their methodology, reviewed the  program and budget guides, reviewed other GAO reports that used the  same data sources, and discussed data reliability with agency officials.  We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.  We combined the data from the various funding accounts to derive the  State total. The State data included funding provided to Treasury, DOJ,  and DHS. It excluded funding provided to State from other agencies, with  the exception of Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund  and 1207  funds transferred from DOD. We excluded any infrastructure costs  because such costs are not typical of most police assistance activities.
DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration provided allotments and  obligations funding data for police assistance for fiscal year 2010 and  fiscal year 2011 in response to our request for funding data based on our  definition. DOE’s funds were made available from its Defense Nuclear  Nonproliferation account. USAID reviewed the Foreign Assistance  Coordination and Tracking System database by program element to  identify programs that might have a civilian policing component. USAID  then consulted with its geographic bureaus and its overseas missions to  obtain detailed data not available at headquarters. USAID provided us  with funding data based on allotments for activities that included civilian  police training. We reviewed the data for reasonableness and discussed  their reliability with agency officials. We determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We excluded programs that did not  meet our definition, such as judicial exchanges. Treasury provided  appropriations funding for police assistance from its Economic Crimes  division for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 in response to our request for  funding data based on our definition. Funds were made available from the  Treasury International Affairs Technical Assistance account and included  supplemental funding provided during fiscal year 2010.
For DOJ, we used funding data provided by the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The  FBI explained that the primary purpose of its foreign police training is not  to provide ‘foreign assistance. Rather, the primary purpose of such  training is to further the FBI’s statutorily authorized mission to detect,  investigate, and prosecute crimes against the United States, which  include federal crimes of terrorism and other crimes that the FBI is  authorized to investigate extraterritorially. FBI provided funding data using  its definition of police assistance: any activity, including the provision of  equipment in association therewith, that is intended to develop or  enhance foreign law enforcement capabilities to prevent, deter, detect,  investigate, or respond to criminal or terrorist acts or support public safety  and security. Such training occurs both in the United States and abroad.  FBI officials explained that our definition would exclude some types of law  enforcement personnel, such as crime lab technicians, who do not have  arrest authority, and that they could not isolate such individuals from their  submission. FBI provided data on obligations that were also disbursed  based on its definition. This definition did not materially affect the total  amount of U.S. funding. We reviewed the data for reasonableness and  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. DEA  provided data on obligations that were also disbursed in response to our  request for data based on our definition. DEA provided funding data by  country for Afghanistan, Colombia, and Mexico, but neither DEA nor FBI  provided total funding data by country.
We combined the funding data provided by DOD, State, DOE, USAID,  Treasury, and DOJ to obtain total U.S. government funds made available.  The amounts are estimates because, according to agency officials,  agencies do not generally track funding by a category specifically for  activities to train and equip foreign police. In addition, to estimate funding  for all elements of police training, the agencies relied on project code  reports, manual estimates, and data calls to overseas posts. On the basis  of our review of the data and discussions with agency officials, we  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for a broad estimate of  U.S. government funding.
To assess the extent to which DOD and State/INL report on the results of  their police assistance activities for countries with their largest programs,  we reviewed GAO reports, including those that examined the capabilities  of the Iraqi Security Forces and Afghan National Security Forces,  including the Iraqi national police and Afghan National Police (ANP). We  also reviewed DOD’s October 2011 Report on Progress toward Security  and Stability in Afghanistan. Within DOD, we spoke with officials from  U.S. Central Command and the Afghan National Security Forces Desk.  Within State, we spoke with officials from relevant components about  State/INL’s monitoring and evaluation guidelines, including the Office of  Resource Management, Office of Program Assistance and Evaluation,  Office of Iraq Programs, and the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan. To  identify reporting requirements, we reviewed letters of agreement and  interagency agreements provided by State/INL. Further, we reviewed  relevant documents including State/INL guidelines for program monitoring  and evaluation and one evaluation completed by State/INL for its police  assistance activities.
To examine the mechanisms U.S. agencies use to coordinate their police  assistance activities, we reviewed GAO reports, including those  describing practices for enhanced interagency collaboration; State Office  of Inspector General reports; and other reports, legislation, and  documents describing NSC’s interagency policy committees. We also  interviewed State, DOD, DOJ, DHS, Treasury, and USAID officials,  including officials who participated on the NSC Security Sector  Assistance Interagency Policy Committee. We also interviewed State and  U.S. law enforcement officials at the U.S. embassies in Bogotá,  Colombia, and Lima, Peru. On the basis of the document review and the  testimonial evidence, we identified mechanisms for coordinating foreign  police assistance and areas for improvement. We did not assess the  overall effectiveness of the coordinating mechanisms.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2011 through May 2012  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our work objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: DOD and State Funds Made Available for Police Assistance, by Region and Country, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011
paragraphs: This appendix provides information on DOD and State funds made  available for police assistance activities during fiscal years 2010 and  2011, by region and country. DOD and State funds constituted about 98  percent of U.S. funds for these purposes. We did not include funds made  available from other agencies because they provided only 2 percent of  U.S. funds and not all agencies provided information by individual  countries. These graphs also do not include regional funds, which totaled  $182 million for DOD and State in fiscal year 2010 and $186 million for  DOD and State in fiscal year 2011.
Our analysis of DOD and State data shows that both DOD and State  made available funds for police assistance activities in 8 of 12 recipient  countries in the South and Central Asia region for fiscal years 2010 and  2011 (see fig. 5). For Afghanistan, agencies made available more than $3  billion each year, and for Pakistan, agencies made available between  $176 million and $299 million each year. Agencies made available less  than $10 million per country each year for 8 of the remaining 10 countries.
As shown in figure 6, both DOD and State made funds available for police  assistance activities in 3 of the 13 recipients in the Near East for fiscal  year 2010 and 4 of the 13 recipients in the Near East for fiscal year 2011.  State alone made assistance available for 10 recipients in fiscal year  2010 and 9 recipients in fiscal year 2011. State and DOD made available  more than $972 million for Iraq in fiscal year 2010 to train and equip the  Iraqi security forces, including the provision of equipment, supplies,  services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, and renovation. State  alone made available $97 million and $142 million to the Palestinian  Territories in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, respectively. Agencies made  available less than $10 million per country in each fiscal year for 9 of the  remaining 11 countries.
Figure 7 shows that both DOD and State made funds available for police  assistance activities in 7 of 20 countries in fiscal year 2010 and in 6 of 18  countries in fiscal year 2011 in the Western Hemisphere. DOD alone  made funds available for assistance in 7 countries each fiscal year, while  State alone made funds available in 6 countries in fiscal year 2010 and 5  countries in fiscal year 2011. In fiscal year 2010, Colombia, Mexico, and  Haiti each had more than $100 million made available for police  assistance activities, while in fiscal year 2011, only Colombia had more  than $100 million made available. In fiscal year 2010, agencies made less  than $10 million available in police assistance for 14 countries, and in  fiscal year 2011, agencies made less than $10 million available in police  assistance for 13 countries.
Figure 8 shows that both DOD and State made available police  assistance in 11 of 21 countries in fiscal year 2010 and 10 of 20 countries  in fiscal year 2011 in Europe and Eurasia. DOD alone made assistance  available to 7 countries in fiscal year 2010 and 5 countries in fiscal year  2011, while State alone made assistance available to 3 countries in fiscal  year 2010 and 5 countries in fiscal year 2011. In fiscal year 2010,  agencies made available between $1 million and $22 million in police  assistance to each of 11 countries, while agencies made available less  than $1 million to each of 10 countries. In fiscal year 2011, agencies  made available between $1 million and $8 million in police assistance to  12 countries, while agencies made available less than $1 million to each  of 8 countries.
As shown in figure 9, both DOD and State made police assistance  available in the Africa region in 12 of 29 countries in fiscal year 2010 and  12 of 35 countries in fiscal year 2011. DOD alone made assistance  available in 6 countries in fiscal year 2010 and 16 countries in fiscal year  2011. State alone made assistance available in 11 countries in fiscal year  2010 and 7 countries in fiscal year 2011. DOD and State made available  between $1 million and $14 million to each of 16 countries in fiscal year  2010, and from $1 million to $11 million to each of 13 countries in fiscal  year 2011. Agencies made less than $1 million available to each of 13  countries in fiscal year 2010 and less than $1 million to 22 countries in  this region in fiscal year 2011.
Figure 10 shows that both DOD and State made funds available for police  assistance in 6 of 12 countries for fiscal year 2010 and 6 of 14 countries  for fiscal year 2011 in the East Asia and Pacific region. DOD alone made  assistance available in 3 countries in fiscal year 2010 and 5 countries in  fiscal year 2011, while State alone made funds available in 3 countries  each fiscal year. DOD and State made between $1 million to $16 million  available to each of 6 countries in this region in fiscal year 2010 and 5  countries in fiscal year 2011. Agencies made less than $1 million  available in police assistance to 6 countries in fiscal year 2010 and 9  countries in fiscal year 2011.
section_title: Appendix III: DOD and State Amounts Made Available for Police Assistance, by Account, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011
paragraphs: This appendix provides information on DOD and State amounts made  available for police assistance activities by account during fiscal years  2010 and 2011 (see tables 4 and 5). For a description of accounts, see  table 4. For the amounts made available from each account, see table 5.
section_title: Appendix IV: Profiles of Selected Countries Receiving Foreign Police Assistance, Fiscal Year 2010 and Fiscal Year 2011
paragraphs: Profiles on Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Colombia, Mexico, and the  Palestinian Territories can be found on the following pages.
Related GAO Work  In GAO-09-280, we reported that  the Combined Security Transition  Command-Afghanistan had begun  retraining Afghan National Police  units through its Focused District  Development program. However, a  lack of military personnel  constrained the command’s plans  to expand the program.
We also reported in GAO-10-291  that U.S. agencies reported  progress within counternarcotics  program areas, but we were unable  to fully assess the extent of  progress because of a lack of  performance measures and interim  performance targets to measure  Afghan capacity.
GAO Recommendations  In GAO-09-280, we recommended  that the Secretaries of Defense  (DOD) and State provide dedicated  personnel to support creation of  additional police mentor teams to  expand and complete the Focused  District Development program. In  September 2010, we closed this  recommendation as implemented  because DOD and State took  actions to increase trainers and  mentors for the Afghan police. centers in Kunduz and Heart
Provided antiterrorism assistance to build capacity in protection of  national leadership and explosives incident countermeasures
Provided introductory and advanced training to members of the  Sensitive Investigation Unit of the Counternarcotics National  Police. This training focused on investigative methods for  apprehending drug traffickers.
Related GAO Work  During April and May 2012, we  provided briefings to staff on  selected committees regarding U.S  security assistance to Iraq.  The  Sensitive But Unclassified briefings  covered the transition of lead  responsibility from DOD to State for  U.S. assistance to Iraq’s military  and police.   Assumed full responsibility for the U.S. presence in Iraq in fiscal    Funding for 2010 supported U.S. personnel hired to position State  to assume responsibility for the police development mission in  Iraq. Activities included developing plans and requirements for  transitioning police development from DOD to State, training  curricula, statements of work, position descriptions,  comprehensive work plans, and oversight and administrative  processes.
GAO Recommendations  Not applicable.
Related GAO Work  GAO-11-860SU is sensitive but  unclassified
Provided aviation support through flight and maintenance training  to civilian Pakistani law enforcement agencies
Provided training, technical assistance, and equipment to law  enforcement entities, including train-the-trainer and instructor  development courses
Provided training and equipment to Pakistani law enforcement
Provided antiterrorism assistance to build capacity in protection of  national leadership, critical incident management, and protection  of digital infrastructure
Provided equipment, including protective equipment such as  helmets and night vision devices to the Frontier Corps
Provided counternarcotics training and equipment
Provided radiation detection equipment to the Port of Qasim. The  program included refresher training for Pakistani officials on  radiation detection equipment.
Related GAO Work  In GAO-09-71, we found that U.S.- funded helicopters provided the air  mobility needed to rapidly move  Colombian counternarcotics and  counterinsurgency forces. U.S.  advisers, training, equipment, and  intelligence assistance helped  professionalize Colombia's military  and police forces. We also reported  that State and the other U.S.  departments and agencies had  accelerated their nationalization  efforts, with State focusing on  Colombian military and National  Police aviation programs.
GAO Recommendations  We recommended that State, in  conjunction with the other  departments, USAID, and  Colombia, develop an integrated  nationalization plan that defines  U.S. and Colombian roles and  responsibilities, future funding  requirements, and timelines. State  agreed and noted that its annual  multiyear strategy report offers the  most useful format to address our  recommendation. However, we did  not believe this report sufficiently  addressed our recommendation. In  September 2011, State/INL officials  in Colombia reported it reached  agreement with the government of  Colombia to nationalize aircraft,  contractor personnel, facility  maintenance, and other programs.  For example, State/INL officials in  Colombia told us they plan to  nationalize 103 aircraft by 2014,  which would represent an annual  cost savings of $83 million.
Related GAO Work  In GA0-10-837, we reported on the  Mérida Initiative, which provides  training and equipment to law  enforcement in Mexico and Central  American countries. We found that  deliveries of equipment and  training had been delayed by  challenges associated with an  insufficient number of staff to  administer the program,  negotiations on interagency and  bilateral agreements, procurement  processes, changes in  government, and funding  availability. We also found that  while State had developed some of  the key elements of an  implementation strategy, its  strategic documents lacked certain  key elements that would facilitate  accountability and management. In  addition, State had not developed a  comprehensive set of timelines for  all expected deliveries, though it  plans to provide additional  equipment and training in both  Mexico and Central America.
Provided training and equipment under the Mérida Initiative to  help address the problem of increasing crime and violence in  Mexico and Central America. Equipment included aircraft and  boats.
Provided antiterrorism assistance to build capacity in protection of
Provided counternarcotics support including pilot and  maintenance training, surveillance aircraft, information sharing,  technical advice, and related support  SLD provided radiation detection equipment for cargo scanning at  five Mexican ports. This includes fixed and handheld equipment,  maintenance and in-country training to officials in the ports of  Altamira, Lazaro, Cardenas, Manzanillo, and Veracruz.   Additional technical assistance was provided to Mexican Customs  officials at a national level.
GAO Recommendations  We recommended that the  Secretary of State incorporate into  the strategy for the Mérida Initiative  outcome performance measures  that indicate progress toward  strategic goals and develop more  comprehensive timelines for future  program deliveries. State agreed  and is working to develop better  metrics and more comprehensive  timelines. As of April 2012, State is  revising its performance measures,  according to State officials. GAO  will examine the extent to which  these efforts address the  recommendation in a separate  engagement.
GAO Summary  In GAO-10-505, we reported that  although U.S. and international  officials said that U.S. security  assistance programs for the  Palestinian Authority had helped  improve security conditions in  some West Bank areas, State and  the Office of the United States  Security Coordinator (USSC) had  not established clear and  measurable outcome-based  performance indicators to assess  progress. State and USSC officials  noted that they planned to  incorporate performance indicators  in a USSC campaign plan to be  released in mid-2010.
Open GAO Recommendation  We recommended that, as State  developed the USSC campaign  plan for providing security  assistance to the Palestinian  Authority, the Secretary of State  should define specific objectives  and establish outcome-based  indicators enabling it to assess  progress. State partially concurred  with this recommendation. It  agreed with the need for more  performance-based indicators but  noted that factors outside its  control influence progress. GAO  continues to monitor this  development.
section_title: Appendix V: Supplemental Information on DOD Assessment Process for the Iraqi and Afghan National Police Forces
subsections: section_title: Afghanistan
paragraphs: As a part of its assessment process in Afghanistan, DOD uses criteria— called capability milestones—to assess the professionalism and capacity  of departments under the Afghan Ministry of Interior, including  components of the ANP. Departments are assessed against four  capability milestones that range from 1 to 4. A department rated at 1 is  fully capable of conducting its primary operational mission but may  require coalition oversight. By contrast, a department rated at 4 has been  established but cannot accomplish its mission.
section_title: Iraq
paragraphs: DOD’s basic assessment system in Iraq contained capabilities ratings in  the areas of personnel, command and control, equipment,  sustainment/logistics, training, and leadership. Commanders used the  assessment results and their professional judgment to determine a unit’s  overall readiness level. The assessment reports also included the  commanders’ estimates of the number of months needed before a unit  could assume the lead for counterinsurgency operations. DOD also  reported readiness assessments for headquarters service companies,  such as engineering and signal units that support combat units. The  assessment reports included the coalition commander’s narrative  assessments of the Iraqi unit’s overall readiness level, known as the  Performance Capability Assessment, which was designed to clarify the  overall assessment. The narrative assessed the Iraqi unit’s leadership  capabilities, combat experience, and ability to execute intelligence-based  operations, and described any life support issues affecting the Iraqi unit’s  capabilities. Commanders also explained and addressed any regression  in the unit’s overall assessment level and listed the top three issues  preventing the unit from assuming the lead for counterinsurgency  operations or advancing to the next level. Remarks were intended to  provide information and details that would help resolve the problems that  degrade the unit’s status.
section_title: Pakistan
paragraphs: Details on DOD’s assessments of the Pakistan Security Forces are  classified.
The table below provides definition of the capability milestones, as  identified in DOD’s October 2011 Report on Progress toward Security and  Stability in Afghanistan.
According to DOD’s October 2011 report, advisers from the North Atlantic  Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan and Combined  Security Transition Command–Afghanistan used capability milestones to  assess individual offices and cross-functional activities on a quarterly  basis against specific end-state objectives, quarterly milestones, and skill- building requirements. For example, DOD reported in October 2011 that  the Afghan National Civil Order Police advanced from requiring some  coalition assistance to requiring minimal coalition assistance.
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Judy McCloskey (Assistant  Director), Lynn Cothern, Brian Egger, Mark Needham, and La Verne  Tharpes made key contributions to this report.
Robert Alarapon, Martin De Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Mary Moutsos, and  Anthony Pordes provided technical support.