Defense Logistics: Army Should Track Financial Benefits Realized from its Logistics Modernization Program
Published: 2013-11-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: LMP is an Army enterprise resource planning system that supports industrial operations conducted by AMC at its life cycle management commands and its maintenance, manufacturing, and storage sites. Increment 1 of LMP was fully deployed in October 2010, and the Army has spent approximately $1.4 billion on LMP through fiscal year 2012. In order to expand the system's capabilities, the Army plans to deploy a second increment of LMP. The life cycle cost for LMP Increment 1 and Increment 2, from fiscal year 2000 through 2026, is estimated to be over $4 billion. GAO was asked to evaluate AMC's use of LMP. This report assesses the extent to which (1) LMP supports AMC's industrial operations and (2) the Army has realized the expected benefits from deploying LMP. GAO reviewed Army documents regarding LMP usage and interviewed officials from AMC headquarters, the LMP product office, and 14 AMC sites that use LMP to conduct their operations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army Materiel Command (AMC) is using the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) Increment 1 to support its industrial operations, but additional development is necessary, according to the Army, because the current system does not support certain critical requirements, including enabling the Army to generate auditable financial statements by fiscal year 2017. Officials at the 14 AMC sites GAO visited stated that LMP provided the core functionality they needed to support their operations and that they are improving in their ability to use the system. Additionally, some sites have locally developed tools to augment LMP capabilities. Army officials stated that although LMP is functional, it currently does not support certain critical requirements that have emerged since its initial development, such as automatically tracking repair and manufacturing operations on the shop floor of depots and arsenals. In addition, according to Army officials, the current system will not enable the Army to generate auditable financial statements by 2017, the statutory deadline for this goal. Increment 2, which is estimated to cost $730 million through fiscal year 2026, is expected to address these shortcomings. The Army is in the process of developing Increment 2 and expects to complete fielding by September 2016.
The use of LMP Increment 1 has provided the Army some benefits, but whether the system has delivered the expected financial benefits to date is unknown because AMC does not have a process for tracking financial benefits realized. Since its deployment, LMP has provided some benefits to the Army. For example, because LMP relies on accurate data to perform effectively and efficiently, the Army has made data accuracy a priority and improved the accuracy of its data by conducting data assessments, correcting data problems, and placing management emphasis on data accuracy. Additionally, the use of LMP has improved accountability for inventory stored at AMC depots, increased visibility over Army assets, and resulted in other efficiencies--such as providing faster access to information. AMC officials also stated that LMP has enabled them to develop and begin to implement a set of standardized, enterprise-wide performance measures to better assess the business operations of AMC sites. The officials stated that these performance measures, which were being used during AMC leadership reviews in June 2013, were necessary because the measures previously used to assess AMC performance were inadequate. However, the extent to which financial benefits have been realized from deploying LMP is unknown. The Army expected LMP to lead to over $750 million in financial benefits by fiscal year 2012 and eventually achieve more than two dollars in benefits for every dollar spent. Army officials told us that there currently is no accurate process in place to track financial benefits associated with LMP. Officials stated that the inability to quantify benefits from LMP-driven performance improvements was due in part to the fluctuations in AMC workload resulting from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army is in the process of developing a performance baseline for sites that will pilot Increment 2, and it intends to apply these metrics to other AMC sites before May 2015. Federal guidelines and standards outline the need for assessing whether the benefits expected from an investment are achieved. Without a process in place to track the financial benefits associated with LMP, the Army does not have a way to determine whether LMP's projected financial benefits are materializing.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: To enable the Army to determine whether the expected financial benefits of LMP are being achieved, GAO recommends that the Army develop and implement a process to track the extent of financial benefits realized from the use of LMP during the remaining course of its life cycle. This process should be linked with the LMP performance baseline now being developed by the Army for use at AMC industrial sites. The Army concurred with GAOs recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Army’s Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) is among a new  generation of enterprise resource planning systems that are replacing  older legacy systems in the Department of Defense (DOD). The Army  initiated LMP in 1999 and completed final deployment of Increment 1 of  the system in 2010. LMP is deployed at about 50 industrial operations  sites within Army Materiel Command (AMC), including its life cycle  management commands, maintenance depots, arsenals, and ammunition  manufacturing and storage sites and has over 20,000 users. As of fiscal  year 2012, the Army had spent $1.4 billion on LMP. The Army projected  that LMP would provide over $750 million in financial benefits by fiscal  year 2012 through, for example, reducing inventory and legacy system  costs.
We have conducted several prior reviews that identified weaknesses in  the Army’s planning and deployment of LMP. In our most recent review,  in November 2010, we reported that it was unclear whether the system  would provide sites with all the software functionality they needed to  conduct their operations, whether data maintained in the system were  sufficiently accurate, and whether the Army would achieve all the  expected benefits from its investment in the system. Given the long- standing challenges associated with the Army’s deployment of LMP, we  recommended that the Army provide periodic reports to Congress on the  progress of LMP deployment, the costs of addressing missing LMP  functionality, and the benefits gained from using LMP. Although DOD  concurred with our recommendation, it has not yet provided any such  reports to Congress.
In response to your request that we evaluate AMC’s use of LMP, this  report assesses the extent to which (1) LMP supports AMC’s industrial  operations and (2) the Army has realized the expected benefits from  deploying LMP.
To assess the extent to which LMP supports AMC’s industrial operations,  we met with and obtained information from Army officials who are  responsible for implementing and overseeing LMP. We reviewed status  reports that had been submitted to AMC headquarters by subordinate  commands and individual sites. We visited 14 AMC sites where the  system is deployed, including all five Army life cycle management  commands, all five Army depots, one Army arsenal, and three  ammunition sites. We also reviewed our prior work related to the  deployment of LMP and followed up on issues that we had previously  identified. We obtained information from AMC and the LMP product office  on the Army’s future plans for LMP and reviewed key documents, such as  the business case and an accompanying economic analysis, that were  developed to support expanded capabilities to the system. To determine  the extent to which the Army has realized expected benefits from  deploying LMP, we reviewed pertinent Army documents that outlined the  expected financial benefits from deploying LMP. We requested  information from AMC, the LMP product office, and individual AMC sites  that we visited regarding actual benefits, if any, achieved to date.  Appendix I provides further information on our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to November  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Army initiated LMP in 1999 to replace two aging materiel  management systems—the Commodity Command Standard System and  the Standard Depot System. In replacing these systems, which had been  used for more than 30 years to manage inventory, depot maintenance,  and arsenal manufacturing operations, the Army expected LMP to help  transform its logistics operations. A modified commercial off-the-shelf  system, LMP was intended to support AMC industrial operations and  improve business processes and practices in areas such as operations at  depots and arsenals and inventory management. By providing a single  source of data and integrated decision-making tools, LMP was expected  to increase efficiencies in AMC operations—such as buying and  managing spare and repair parts and conducting depot level  maintenance. For example, in the area of planning future maintenance  capacity, the Army expected improvements to AMC budget forecasts and  adjustments through reduced repair cycle time, better resource allocation,  increased production throughput, reduced production cost, and more  accurate production schedules. With LMP’s deployment, the Army  expected to achieve benefits that included reduced equipment repair  times, improved inventory forecasting, and cost savings. Additionally,  LMP is part of the Army’s broader strategy to implement enterprise  resource planning systems in other areas and, as such, is expected to  integrate with other Army systems, to include the General Fund  Enterprise Business System and the Global Combat Support System- Army.
The deployment of LMP Increment 1 across AMC occurred in three  phases between 2003 and 2010. The first phase of LMP deployment  occurred at the Communications-Electronics Command and Tobyhanna  Army Depot in July 2003. LMP was originally expected to be fully  deployed across AMC by June 2004, but problems experienced during  the first phase of deployment caused the Army to delay further  deployment until these problems were resolved. The second phase of  LMP deployment occurred at the Aviation and Missile Command and  Corpus Christi and Letterkenny Army Depots in May 2009. The third and  final deployment phase occurred in October 2010 at depots, arsenals,  and other sites within the Army Sustainment Command, the Joint  Munitions and Lethality Command, and the Tank-automotive and  Armaments Command.
The Army has plans to expand the capabilities of LMP. On December 27,  2011, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics signed an Acquisition Decision Memorandum that categorized  the deployed components of LMP as Increment 1 and considered all new  LMP acquisition activities after December 28, 2011, to be Increment 2.  The memorandum directed the Army, in preparing for the next acquisition  milestone review of Increment 2, to submit an updated business case  along with other specified documents. The Army prepared and submitted  documents in response to the memorandum, including an updated  business case and an accompanying economic analysis, for an  acquisition milestone review that was held on June 25, 2013. As a result  of this review, the Army received approval for Increment 2 to move into  the engineering development phase of its acquisition. The Army intends  to deploy Increment 2 in three waves, beginning in December 2013, and  is planning for the deployment to be completed by September 30, 2016.  Figure 1 shows a timeline for LMP development and deployment,  including both Increment 1 and Increment 2.
As of May 2013, the Army had increased its projections for the system’s  total life cycle costs from $2.6 billion (fiscal years 2000 through 2021) to  more than $4 billion (fiscal years 2000 through 2026). This estimate  includes the fielded components of LMP—Increment 1—as well as the  expansion of LMP capabilities under Increment 2 (see table 1).
section_title: LMP Supports AMC’s Industrial Operations, but Additional Development Is Needed to Meet Certain Critical Requirements
paragraphs: AMC is using LMP to support its industrial operations, but additional  development of LMP is necessary, according to the Army, because the  current system does not support certain critical requirements that have  emerged since the initial development of LMP and because the current  system will not enable the Army to generate auditable financial  statements. Officials at the 14 AMC sites we visited stated that LMP  provided the core functionality they needed to support their operations.  They stated that over time they are improving in their ability to use LMP,  and some sites have locally developed tools to augment its capabilities.  Army officials stated that although LMP is functional, the current system  does not support certain critical requirements, such as requirements  related to automatically tracking repair and manufacturing operations on  the shop floor of depots and arsenals. In addition, according to Army  officials, the current system will not enable the Army to generate financial  statements validated as ready for audit by 2017, the statutory deadline for  this goal. Increment 2 is intended to address these shortcomings.
subsections: section_title: AMC Is Using LMP to Support Its Industrial Operations
paragraphs: AMC is using LMP to support operations at its industrial sites. Officials at  all 14 of the sites we visited between October 2012 and March 2013 told  us that LMP provided the core functionality they needed to conduct their  operations. Specifically, officials from each of the five Army depots stated  that they were able to perform their maintenance, repair, and overhaul  responsibilities using LMP; Rock Island Arsenal officials stated that they  could perform their manufacturing operations using LMP; and officials at  the Army ammunition sites we visited told us they used LMP to manage  their inventory. Similarly, officials at the life cycle management commands  stated that they were able to carry out their operations, which include the  management of spare parts inventory. Additionally, periodic status reports  submitted to AMC headquarters show that industrial sites where LMP has  been deployed have been able to conduct their repair and manufacturing  operations. These reports—which include data on the workload planned  and completed for the current fiscal year—are submitted and discussed  during regularly-held meetings to provide AMC headquarters with an  update on the status of operations. Furthermore, the Army’s fiscal year  2013 and 2014 working capital fund budget documents state that LMP is  functional at each of AMC’s life cycle management commands.
We reported in November 2010 that the Army Sustainment Command,  the Joint Munitions and Lethality Command, and arsenals under the  Tank-automotive and Armaments Command—all of which had been in  the final deployment phase of LMP in October 2010—required additional  system functionality to perform their unique operations and that this  functionality had not yet been delivered. We followed up on each of  these previously reported issues for our current review.
The Army Sustainment Command needed (1) an interface between  LMP and the Army War Reserve Deployment System, a separate  system used to track inventory and transfer accountability of pre- positioned stocks to units and (2) software functionality to conduct  mass uploads—the automated movement of thousands of items of  inventory between the Army Sustainment Command and the  warfighter. During our current review, we found that the Army  Sustainment Command had established an interface between LMP  and the Army War Reserve Deployment System, and officials stated  that LMP now has the capability to perform a mass upload.
The Joint Munitions and Lethality Command required specific  functionality to ship, receive, inventory, and perform stock movements  for ammunition. To accomplish these tasks, the Joint Munitions and  Lethality Command required the development of an interface between  LMP and a system commonly referred to as SmartChain. We found  during our current review that the interface between LMP and  SmartChain has been established, and officials stated that LMP and  SmartChain provide the capability needed to perform these tasks.
The Tank-automotive and Armaments Command required specific  functionality at its arsenals to automatically report data for items it  manufactures. When Rock Island Arsenal and Watervliet Arsenal  switched from their legacy system to LMP, they lost this capability  because LMP does not include a manufacturing and execution system  that provides this capability. We found during our current review that  Rock Island Arsenal has since developed its own software tools and  manual processes to provide similar functionality. Specifically, Rock  Island Arsenal uses three legacy systems, which together cost  approximately $300,000 per year to operate. Arsenal officials told us  that they developed an additional system to report manufacturing data  and track the status of items being manufactured—at a cost of about  $400,000. They hired additional personnel to manage these systems,  which includes manually entering data into LMP. According to  documents provided by Rock Island officials, annual costs for these  systems and personnel will average $3.6 million from fiscal years  2013 through 2016. Arsenal and AMC officials stated that they expect  Increment 2 to replace systems they are currently using to manage  their shop floor operations. (We did not visit Watervliet Arsenal for this  review).
Officials at AMC sites we visited stated that over time they are improving  in their ability to use LMP, and some locations have developed tools and  processes to better extract and analyze LMP data, or to fill in gaps in  existing LMP functionality. In addition to the manufacturing tracking tools  and processes developed at Rock Island Arsenal, as discussed above,  we found the following examples:
Red River Army Depot officials created a tool that enables users to  generate customizable reports based on data extracted from LMP.  Officials said they use these reports to brief depot leadership on areas  such as schedule performance and inventory. Tobyhanna Army Depot  created a tool using Microsoft Excel that extracts data from LMP and  develops visual reports—in graphs and charts—to analyze depot  workload and perform capacity planning. According to Tobyhanna  officials, these reports allow them to manage depot operations by, for  example, determining whether workload schedules need to be  adjusted or personnel reassigned to higher priority tasks.
Corpus Christi Army Depot, using a combination of legacy systems,  manual processes, and a locally-developed software tool, gained,  among other things, the ability to automatically track the progress of  work on the shop floor and record employee’s labor charges. Depot  officials stated that the use of this tool, in conjunction with LMP, has  provided them with detailed data that helps them to better manage  their operations and achieve efficiencies by improving depot  processes, such as decreasing the cost to repair UH-60 helicopters  (from $7.58 million per helicopter in fiscal year 2011 to $6.82 million  per helicopter in fiscal year 2012) while increasing the quantity of UH- 60 helicopters they can repair (from 48 in fiscal year 2011 to 51 in  fiscal year 2012).
section_title: Additional LMP Development Needed to Meet Certain Critical Army Requirements
paragraphs: The Army is continuing development of LMP because, as currently  deployed, it does not provide all of the functionality the Army needs to  meet certain critical requirements, according to Army officials. According  to the Army’s business case for Increment 2, the new functionality the  Army is developing as part of Increment 2 is intended to address critical  requirements that have emerged since the initial development of LMP and  that are not addressed by Increment 1. The business case stated that the  current system does not support certain critical AMC requirements  pertaining to shop floor automation, Army business transformation goals  (for example, maintaining data on the maintenance status of equipment),  and requirements outlined in DOD guidance (for example, requirements  related to item unique identification). Requirements for Increment 2 can  be categorized into six components: (1) further integration with other  Army and Defense Logistics Agency enterprise resource planning  systems, (2) controlling and maintaining visibility over material managed  by non-Army sources of supply, (3) additional capability to manage Army  prepositioned stocks, (4) managing repair operations at Army  installations, (5) expanded ammunition management capability, and (6)  tracking repair and manufacturing operations on the shop floor. Table 2  summarizes the six components and the time line for their deployment.
In addition to the critical requirements identified in the Army’s business  case for Increment 2, the Army has stated that additional development is  necessary because LMP, as currently deployed, will not enable the Army  to generate auditable financial statements. The National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required the development of a plan  to ensure that the financial statements of DOD are validated as ready for  audit not later than the end of fiscal year 2017. LMP product office and  AMC officials told us that the Army cannot meet this requirement with the  functionality currently provided by Increment 1, and the Army’s fiscal year  2013 and 2014 working capital fund budget documents state that  although LMP is functional at AMC’s life cycle management commands, it  requires the enhancements and upgrades of Increment 2 to generate  auditable financial statements. In general, DOD considers the successful  implementation of enterprise resource planning systems—which include  LMP—critical to addressing long-standing weaknesses in financial and  supply chain management, and DOD officials have stated that these  systems are critical to ensuring that the department meets its requirement  to have auditable consolidated financial statements.
According to Army officials, a key LMP improvement in Increment 2 that  supports audit readiness is the addition of the shop floor automation tool  (part of the Enhanced Industrial Base component listed in table 2). The  tool provides a standardized approach for managing shop floor operations  across AMC’s depots and arsenals. This tool, according to Army officials,  will provide the capability to track the labor and material expenses to  specific work tasks and customers, which is a more detailed reporting  capability than what is currently provided by Increment 1. Army officials  acknowledged that some locations such as Corpus Christi Army Depot  have developed local tools to manage shop floor operations but asserted  that such tools cannot support the Army’s achievement of audit  readiness. They stated that a significant investment of funds would be  needed to make locally developed tools auditable, and that doing so  would not be economically feasible.
In addition, according to Army officials, it would not be possible to gain all  of the capabilities to be delivered with Increment 2 simply by upgrading  legacy systems and modifying processes. For example, the Army is  currently continuing to use one of the legacy systems that LMP was  intended to replace—the Commodity Command Standard System—to  control and maintain visibility over material managed by non-Army  sources of supply. According to officials from the LMP product office and  AMC, this legacy system cannot currently support the Army’s need for  auditable financial statements by fiscal year 2017 and thus needs to be  replaced. By implementing this component of Increment 2, the Army  expects to fully eliminate its need for the Commodity Command Standard  System. Another example is related to item unique identification.  According to DOD, financial management information necessary for the  management of the department’s mission critical assets is also required  to support future financial statement audits. This financial management  information includes item unique identification, which cannot be  accomplished using existing systems or through a completely manual  process because, according to Army officials, some unique item  identifiers are not human-readable. Instead, Army officials stated that  AMC requires an electronic scanner that is planned to be included in the  deployment of Increment 2. As a further justification for expanding LMP,  the Army estimates that Increment 2 will cost $730 million through fiscal  year 2026 but achieve approximately $1.4 billion in financial benefits.  Table 3 shows the financial benefits that the Army has projected for  Increment 2.
The financial benefits shown in table 3 include both anticipated cost  savings and cost avoidance. The Army is anticipating cost savings  totaling approximately $1.1 billion from reduced contractor support,  overtime, legacy information technology, legacy operations, and AMC  industrial operations personnel. According to officials from the LMP  product office and AMC, cost savings will be realized as reductions to the  Army’s planned budgets starting in fiscal year 2017. Officials cited an  AMC memo which states that approximately $30 million of the cost  savings from reduced contractor support, overtime, and AMC industrial  operations personnel should be realized in fiscal year 2017; $60 million  should be realized in fiscal year 2018; and $90 million should be realized  in fiscal year 2019 and annually thereafter for the life of LMP. According  to the officials, the memo is referring to reductions in planned Army  budgets in the specified fiscal years. The approximately $250 million in  remaining financial benefits expected from Increment 2 includes cost  avoidances from implementing the National Maintenance Program  component of Increment 2, providing automatic item unique identification  recording capability that will eliminate the need to manually perform those  tasks, and reducing excess non-Army managed item inventory.
section_title: LMP Has Provided Some Benefits to the Army, but the Extent of Financial Benefits to Date Is Unknown
paragraphs: The use of LMP has provided the Army some benefits, but whether the  system has delivered the expected financial benefits to date is unknown  because AMC does not have a process to track these benefits. Since its  deployment, LMP has provided some benefits to the Army. For example,  because LMP relies on accurate data to perform effectively and  efficiently, the Army has made data accuracy a priority. The Army has  made progress in improving the accuracy of its data by conducting data  assessments, correcting data problems, and placing management  emphasis on data accuracy. Additionally, the use of LMP has improved  accountability for inventory stored at AMC depots and has increased  visibility over Army assets. However, the full extent of the financial  benefits realized from LMP—which the Army projected would be over  $750 million by the end of fiscal year 2012—is unknown because the  Army has not tracked the benefits. Federal guidelines and standards  outline the need for assessing whether expected benefits from an  investment are achieved. To support the development of Increment 2,  the Army is developing a performance baseline for sites that will initially  deploy Increment 2. Without a process in place to identify and document  financial benefits linked to LMP-driven performance improvements, the  Army will be unable to track whether it is achieving the expected financial  benefits from its sizeable investment.
subsections: section_title: LMP Has Provided Some Benefits to the Army
paragraphs: Since its deployment, LMP has provided the Army some benefits. During  our prior reviews of LMP before the final deployment phase had occurred,  we reported that sites using LMP stated it was an improvement over  legacy systems, because it increased visibility over assets and provided a  single source of data for decision making. During our visits to AMC  headquarters and the 14 AMC sites for the current review, officials  provided examples of various benefits resulting from using LMP, such as  increased visibility over inventory and maintenance operations.
We also found that, since our prior reviews, AMC has made progress in  improving the accuracy of LMP data that it uses to support industrial  operations by conducting data assessments, correcting data problems,  and placing management emphasis on data accuracy. Data accuracy is  necessary in order for enterprise resource planning systems such as LMP  to perform effectively and efficiently. For example, to support repairs of  vehicles, LMP contains data that identify the number of vehicles  scheduled for repair at a depot, the number of parts needed to support  these repairs, and the capacity of the depot to perform the repairs. Based  on these data, LMP will recommend to item managers that they purchase  a specific quantity of spare parts by a certain date in order to support the  scheduled repairs. In order for these recommendations to be correct, the  data they are based on must be accurate. If the data on which they are  based are not accurate, item managers may purchase either too many or  too few spare parts, or the purchases may not be made in time to support  the scheduled repair—which could lead to repairs not being completed  according to the planned schedule. According to the AMC Data Integrity  Strategy, a data accuracy rate of 95 percent or greater—depending on  the type of data—is consistent with the industry standard.
The Army has instituted several processes to enhance data accuracy. A  key effort involves periodic assessments at AMC sites to evaluate the  accuracy of LMP data. AMC has determined that these assessments,  which are conducted by its Logistics Support Activity, should focus on 29  critical data objects—groupings of data based on function—such as bills  of material, purchase orders, or a sequence of repair activities. Between  August 2010 and November 2012, the Logistics Support Activity  performed 361 assessments across AMC that covered 18 of the 29  critical data objects. The results of these assessments are documented in  reports, and the root causes of any problems are identified for correction.  Logistics Support Activity officials stated that their goal is to focus  attention on these root causes so that data problems do not continue to  occur. They will then perform a follow-up assessment, if it is deemed  necessary, to assess whether data accuracy has improved. For example,  in August 2011, the Logistics Support Activity conducted a review of bills  of material at various sites across AMC and assessed the accuracy of  AMC’s bills of material at 51 percent—well below their 95-percent  standard. In a follow-up review conducted in May 2012, the Logistics  Support Activity assessed the overall accuracy of AMC’s bills of material  at 92 percent. Furthermore, officials from the Logistics Support Activity  stated that follow-up assessments at individual AMC sites have revealed  improvements in data accuracy. For example, an initial assessment of  work center data at the Letterkenny Munitions Center showed data  accuracy to be 27 percent, while the follow-up assessment showed data  accuracy to be 100 percent. Officials estimated that sites meet the 95- percent standard during initial data assessments only half of the time, but  in follow-up assessments they meet the standard about 90 percent of the  time.
AMC sites we visited are also performing their own internal reviews of  LMP data accuracy. For example, Letterkenny Army Depot has a data  quality team that has conducted a number of internal assessments. One  of these assessments, conducted in October 2012 on the bill of material  for a TOW missile, found that multiple materials were listed on the bill of  material as required but had no or very limited consumption. Depot  officials told us that, based on these types of assessments, the depot  intends to make changes to its data to more accurately reflect usage of  materials during repairs. Similarly, in order to assess and improve the  data in LMP, officials at Anniston Army Depot mapped out the entire end- to-end repair process for the M9 Armored Combat Earthmover, which  enabled them to identify data errors in LMP that they corrected. Officials  at Red River Army Depot told us that they prepare weekly reports for  depot management, and that data accuracy is discussed during meetings  held by the depot commander. Officials also stated that they are  emphasizing the importance of maintaining accurate LMP data and are  holding users accountable for their management of LMP data. For  example, officials at all five Army depots stated that LMP users and their  supervisors are expected to ensure that the data they manage are  accurate.
The use of LMP has also increased visibility over inventory. AMC officials  stated that LMP provides the capability to automatically calculate the  parts needed to conduct a repair at a depot. If the depot does not have  these parts, LMP recommends that the needed parts be purchased from  some other source of supply. In order for this process to work effectively,  all inventory at the depot should be recorded in LMP so the system does  not recommend ordering parts the depot already has. Officials at AMC  sites we visited told us that prior to LMP, parts might be purchased by the  Army and stored at the depot but not necessarily recorded in the legacy  systems. Accordingly, item managers could make unnecessary  purchases of inventory items that were available but not visible within the  legacy systems. AMC stated that, due to the inventory reviews following  the deployment of LMP and corrections made to inventory records, it  entered more than $200 million worth of inventory into LMP that had  already been purchased by the Army and was physically located at the  depots but was not recorded in the legacy systems. Accordingly, AMC  officials expect that officially tracking inventory that had already been  purchased could result in a cost avoidance in the future. Similarly,  Aviation and Missile Command officials stated that the better visibility of  inventory in LMP enabled them to identify excess inventory that was on  hand, which resulted in a cost avoidance of $1.2 million due to reduced  inventory storage costs.
The use of a single source of data provided by LMP, according to AMC  officials, has resulted in other efficiencies. For example, officials at the  AMC War Reserve Division stated that they are now able to provide near  real-time updates to address questions on the status of war reserves to  Army headquarters. These officials stated that, prior to LMP, the process  to answer questions from Army headquarters would require 3 weeks to  collect and analyze data from the life cycle commands; now, the process  can be completed by extracting a report from LMP in minutes.  Additionally, AMC officials stated that the single source of data has  reduced the number of meetings that need to be held. For example, AMC  officials who manage secondary inventory items stated that they are able  to track the status of obligations across each of the life cycle  management commands by extracting a consolidated report directly from  LMP. The officials stated that, prior to LMP, they would hold bi-weekly  meetings with the life cycle commands to capture the same information.  Additionally, officials at Red River Army Depot stated that LMP provides  visibility of inventory at all AMC locations, which has enhanced their  ability to redistribute parts to support production needs. These officials  stated that, prior to LMP, they had to call other depots to see if additional  parts were available; with LMP, they are able to quickly identify which  locations have the additional parts.
Finally, AMC officials stated that LMP has enabled them to develop and  begin to implement a set of standardized, enterprise-wide performance  measures to better assess the business operations of AMC sites. They  told us that the measures previously used to assess AMC performance  were inadequate, in part because they were not standardized. For  example, officials stated that there was no standard measure for the rate  of inventory turnover—which measures the number of times an inventory  item is used and replaced during a given period—but that AMC was  working on developing such a measure. At the time of our review, the  standardized performance measures that AMC had developed included  one for inventory turnover, as well as others for depot schedule  performance, depot cost performance, forecast accuracy, supplier  delivery performance, and direct versus indirect labor hours. According to  documents provided by AMC, these measures were being used during  regularly-held meetings with AMC headquarters beginning in June 2013.
section_title: Extent of Financial Benefits to Date from Deploying LMP Is Unknown
paragraphs: The extent to which expected financial benefits have been realized to  date from deploying LMP is unknown, because AMC does not yet have a  process to track these benefits. Without a process in place to track  financial benefits associated with LMP, the Army does not have a way to  determine whether LMP’s projected financial benefits are materializing.  The Army expected significant financial benefits from the deployment of  LMP Increment 1 across AMC, which was completed in October 2010.  According to a 2009 study prepared by the Army to support the fiscal year  2010 Investment Review Board certification of LMP, the system was  expected to lead to over $750 million in financial benefits by fiscal year  2012 and eventually achieve more than two dollars in benefits for every  dollar spent. In its fiscal year 2014 budget documents, the Army  projected that LMP would provide an estimated net financial benefit of  nearly $1.3 billion through 2020. The Army expected these financial  benefits to be achieved largely by LMP-driven improvements to the  performance of AMC operations through, for example, reducing inventory,  improving productivity, and reducing costs for legacy systems.
Federal guidelines and standards outline the need for assessing whether  expected benefits from an investment are achieved. According to the  Office of Management and Budget’s Circular A-94, which provides  general guidance for benefit-cost analysis of federal programs, an  element of benefit-cost analysis is verification of expected benefits. The  circular states that retrospective studies to determine whether anticipated  benefits and costs have been realized are potentially valuable. Such  studies can be used to determine necessary corrections in existing  programs and to improve future estimates of benefits and costs in these  programs or related ones. Agencies should have a plan for periodic,  results-oriented evaluation of program effectiveness. They should also  discuss the results of relevant evaluation studies when proposing  reauthorizations or increased program funding. The Office of  Management and Budget’s Capital Programming Guide also states that a  post-implementation review of an information technology project should  evaluate an investment’s efficiency and effectiveness to determine how  well the investment achieved the planned functionality and anticipated  benefits. Additionally, GAO’s Information Technology Investment  Management framework states that a critical process for building a  foundation for information technology investment success is providing  investment oversight. The purpose of this critical process is to ensure  that the relevant organization provides effective oversight for its  information technology projects throughout all phases of their life cycles.  Such oversight should include observing the project’s progress toward  expected cost, schedule, and benefits. Furthermore, federal internal  control standards state that managers should compare actual  performance to planned or expected results throughout the organization  and analyze significant differences.
However, the extent to which the Army has realized the expected  financial benefits from LMP is unknown because AMC does not yet have  a process to identify and document financial benefits realized as a result  of performance improvements gained through the use of LMP. We asked  AMC headquarters officials for information on the total financial benefits  achieved from using LMP, but they were unable to provide such  information because they could not quantify the impact LMP had on  inventory value or provide measurements of improved productivity.  Officials did not provide an explanation for why they did not have a  process to track financial benefits, but they stated that the inability to  quantify financial benefits from LMP-driven performance improvements  was due in part to the fluctuations in AMC workload resulting from  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, most AMC sites we  visited reported that LMP had not led to financial benefits that they could  quantify. Specifically, officials at 12 of the 14 sites we visited stated that  LMP either had not resulted in any quantifiable financial benefits or that  they could not provide us with any documentation that quantified the  financial benefits.
The LMP product office and two AMC sites reported financial benefits  from LMP. According to the LMP product office, an estimated $114 million  of financial benefits were attributed to legacy system costs that were  avoided through fiscal year 2012 as a result of LMP deployment.  Additionally, in March 2013, the Aviation and Missile Command reported  a $1.2 million cost avoidance due to reduced storage costs from the  disposal of excess inventory. Finally, as noted earlier in this report,  Corpus Christi Army Depot reported that use of LMP, in conjunction with  a locally-developed software tool and manual processes, enabled it to  improve depot processes and decrease the costs to repair UH-60  helicopters by approximately $760,000 per helicopter. Because 51 UH-60  helicopters were repaired in fiscal year 2012, AMC officials estimated a  total cost savings of approximately $39 million.
LMP product office and AMC officials told us that there was not an  accurate process currently in place to track financial benefits associated  with LMP-driven performance improvements. Further, the officials stated  that retroactively producing an accurate assessment of benefits realized  to date from LMP would be difficult, because the Army had not  established a baseline for performance prior to the implementation of  LMP against which LMP-driven improvements could then be measured.  The officials added that the Army has learned this lesson and has  incorporated operational performance metrics in its plans for Increment 2.  (These operational metrics are separate from the enterprise-wide  performance measures discussed earlier in this report that AMC began to  use in June 2013.) Specifically, the Army is in the process of developing  an initial operational performance baseline for sites that will pilot  Increment 2. According to documents provided by the LMP product office,  these operational metrics include assessing the time needed to repair a  weapon system or component; the direct labor charges needed to support  production at industrial activities; program support overtime (i.e., the  amount of overtime for indirect labor—such as schedulers, planners, and  resource managers); data entry lag time; tracking the labor and materials  expended for rework operations; and inventory visibility managed outside  of LMP. Officials from the LMP product office and AMC stated that the  process to baseline performance against these metrics is ongoing and  primarily focused on the Increment 2 pilot sites, with the intention of  assessing performance across all of AMC before the next milestone  decision for Increment 2 in May 2015. Because the baseline is still under  development, the degree to which these operational metrics will enable  the Army to demonstrate financial benefits from deploying Increment 2 is  unknown.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Over the last decade, the Army has made progress using LMP to support  its industrial operations, has improved data accuracy in LMP, and has  realized benefits. However, because the Army has not established a  process for tracking LMP’s financial benefits, it is not in a position to  determine whether it is realizing a return on its sizeable investment in  LMP. The Army plans to spend another $1.7 billion on operating the  deployed components of LMP Increment 1 over the course of the  system’s life cycle, in addition to spending another $730 million on  Increment 2. Given the magnitude of the investment already committed  and planned to be committed to LMP, oversight by decision makers in  DOD and the Congress would likely improve with a better understanding  of what financial benefits have been realized from deploying LMP to  determine whether the Army’s goals for the system are being met and  resources are being used effectively.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To determine whether the Army is achieving its estimated financial  benefits in LMP, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Secretary of the Army to develop and implement a process to track the  extent of financial benefits realized from the use of LMP during the  remaining course of its life cycle. This process should be linked with the  LMP performance baseline now being developed by the Army for use at  AMC industrial sites.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. The Army  provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix II. The  Army concurred with our recommendation and stated that it will develop a  process to track the extent of financial benefits recognized within LMP,  which will be linked to the LMP performance baseline. The Army also  stated that it is initiating a series of workshops to establish an enduring  process to capture the financial benefits realized from the use of LMP.  These actions, when implemented, will meet the intent of the  recommendation. In addition, the Army provided technical comments,  which we have incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army. In  addition, this report will be made available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,  please contact me at (202) 512-5257 or merrittz@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key  contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which LMP supports AMC’s industrial operations,  we met with officials at AMC headquarters responsible for overseeing  LMP to discuss the system’s deployment and usage. We reviewed our  prior work related to the deployment of LMP and followed up on issues  that we had previously identified. We also obtained and reviewed  pertinent documents, including reports submitted to AMC headquarters by  the life cycle management commands and subordinate sites on the status  of their industrial operations. We met with officials at 14 AMC sites— including all five AMC life cycle management commands and all five AMC  maintenance depots—where LMP is deployed. Specifically, we visited the  following individual sites:
Army Sustainment Command, Rock Island, Illinois
Aviation and Missile Command, Huntsville, Alabama
Communications-Electronics Command, Aberdeen, Maryland
Joint Munitions and Lethality Command, Rock Island, Illinois
Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, Michigan
Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Alabama
Corpus Christi Army Depot, Corpus Christi, Texas
Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania
Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas
Tobyhanna Army Depot, Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania
Rock Island Arsenal (Joint Manufacturing and Technology Center),
Anniston Defense Munitions Center, Anniston, Alabama
Letterkenny Munitions Center, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania
McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, McAlester, Oklahoma  We judgmentally selected Rock Island Arsenal to visit based on its  proximity to the headquarters of Army Sustainment Command and the  Joint Munitions and Lethality Command, McAlester Army Ammunition  Plant based on the scope of its manufacturing and storage mission, and  Anniston and Letterkenny Munitions Centers based on their proximity to  Army depots. During these site visits, we interviewed officials and  obtained relevant documentation regarding the extent to which they used  LMP to conduct their operations, were taking actions to improve the  accuracy of the data used in LMP, and had realized nonfinancial and  financial benefits from LMP.
We also obtained and analyzed Army documents, including the business  case and an accompanying economic analysis, that were developed to  support the Army’s proposal to move forward with the development and  acquisition of Increment 2. We met with officials from AMC headquarters  and the LMP product office to discuss their plans for Increment 2, and we  also discussed the Army’s plans for Increment 2 with officials at individual  AMC sites.
To determine the extent to which the Army has realized expected benefits  from deploying the system, we obtained and reviewed Army  documentation describing the expected benefits to be achieved from  deploying LMP, including briefings describing the expected benefits and  functionality of the system, a 2009 study supporting the fiscal year 2010  Investment Review Board certification of LMP, Army budget documents,  and evidence that AMC headquarters, the individual sites, and the LMP  Product Office were able to provide regarding actual benefits, if any,  achieved to date. We also met with officials at AMC’s Logistics Support  Activity to discuss their efforts to improve the accuracy of data used in  LMP, and we obtained and reviewed AMC’s strategy for LMP data  accuracy as well as documentation on LMP data accuracy assessments  performed by the Logistics Support Activity. To assess the reliability of  LMP data, we reviewed related documentation on LMP data accuracy  and interviewed officials knowledgeable about LMP data. We determined  the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to November  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of the Army
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Thomas Gosling (Assistant  Director), Cynthia Grant, Joanne Landesman, Jim Melton, Geoffrey Peck,  Amie Steele, and Michael Willems made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: DOD Financial Management: Reported Status of Department of  Defense’s Enterprise Resource Planning Systems. GAO-12-565R.  Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2012.
Defense Logistics: Oversight and a Coordinated Strategy Needed to  Implement the Army Workload and Performance System. GAO-11-566R.  Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2011.
Defense Logistics: Additional Oversight and Reporting for the Army  Logistics Modernization Program Are Needed. GAO-11-139. Washington,  D.C.: November 18, 2010.
DOD Business Transformation: Improved Management Oversight of  Business System Modernization Efforts Needed. GAO-11-53.  Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2010.
Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve Implementation of the  Army Logistics Modernization Program. GAO-10-461. Washington, D.C.:  April 30, 2010.
Defense Logistics: Observations on Army’s Implementation of the  Logistics Modernization Program. GAO-09-852R. Washington, D.C.: July  8, 2009.
DOD Business Transformation: Lack of an Integrated Strategy Puts the  Army’s Asset Visibility System Investments at Risk. GAO-07-860.  Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2007.
Army Depot Maintenance: Ineffective Oversight of Depot Maintenance  Operations and System Implementation Efforts. GAO-05-441.  Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.
DOD Business Systems Modernization: Billions Continue to Be Invested  with Inadequate Management Oversight and Accountability. GAO-04-615.  Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2004.
DOD Competitive Sourcing: Plan Needed to Mitigate Risks in Army  Logistics Modernization Program. GAO/NSIAD-00-19. Washington, D.C.:  October 4, 1999.