Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Contract Guard Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of Contract Guards
Published: 2010-04-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: To accomplish its mission of protecting about 9,000 federal facilities, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) currently has a budget of about $1 billion, about 1,225 full-time employees, and about 15,000 contract security guards. FPS obligated $659 million for guard services in fiscal year 2009. This report assesses the challenges FPS faces in managing its guard contractors, overseeing guards deployed at federal facilities, and the actions, if any, FPS has taken to address these challenges. To address these objectives, GAO conducted site visits at 6 of FPS's 11 regions; interviewed FPS officials, guards, and contractors; and analyzed FPS's contract files. GAO also conducted covert testing at 10 judgmentally selected level IV facilities in four cities. A level IV facility has over 450 employees and a high volume of public contact.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: FPS faces a number of challenges in managing its guard contractors that hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. FPS requires contractors to provide guards who have met training and certification requirements, but 7 of 7 guard contractors we reviewed were not in compliance with this requirement. Specifically, we reported in July 2009 that 62 percent, or 411, of the 663 guards employed by 7 of FPS's 38 contractors and deployed to federal facilities had at least one expired certification, including those showing that the guard has not committed domestic violence, which make the guards ineligible to carry firearms. As of February 2010, according to FPS data, 435 of the 663 guards are now fully certified, 167 are not fully certified, and 61 guards are no longer working on the contract. FPS's guard contract also states that a contractor who does not comply with the contract is subject to enforcement action. FPS did not take any enforcement actions against these 7 contractors for noncompliance. In fact, FPS exercised the option to extend their contracts. FPS also did not comply with its requirement that a performance evaluation of each contractor be completed annually and that these evaluations and other performance-related data be included in the contract file. FPS also faces challenges in ensuring that many of the 15,000 guards have the required training and certification to be deployed at a federal facility. In July 2009, we reported that since 2004, FPS had not provided X-ray and magnetometer training to about 1,500 guards in one region. As of January 2010, these guards had not received this training and continued to work at federal facilities in this region. X-ray and magnetometer training is important because guards control access points at federal facilities. In addition, once guards are deployed to a federal facility, they are not always complying with assigned responsibilities (post orders). For example, we identified security vulnerabilities when GAO investigators successfully passed undetected through security checkpoints monitored by FPS guards with components for an improvised explosive device concealed on their persons at 10 level IV facilities in four cities in major metropolitan areas. Since July 2009, FPS has conducted 53 similar tests, and in over half of these tests some guards did not identify prohibited items, such as guns and knives. In response to GAO's July 2009 testimony, FPS has taken a number of actions that once fully implemented could help address challenges it faces in managing its contract guard program. For example, FPS has increased the number of guard inspections at federal facilities in some metropolitan areas. FPS also revised its X-ray and magnetometer training; however, guards will not all be fully trained until the end of 2010, although they are deployed at federal facilities. FPS recognized that its guard program has long-standing challenges and in 2009 contemplated a number of changes to the program, including assuming responsibility for all guard training and/or federalizing some guard positions at some federal facilities. However, FPS has not taken any actions in pursuing these ideas.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Over 1 million government employees work in federal facilities, and  members of the public visit such facilities each year. Protecting these  facilities from a potential terrorist attack or acts of violence remains a  daunting challenge. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) is the primary  agency with responsibility for providing law enforcement and related  security services for the nearly 9,000 facilities that are under the control  and custody of the General Services Administration (GSA). To accomplish  its mission of protecting federal facilities, FPS currently has a budget of  about $1 billion, about 1,225 full-time employees, and about 15,000  contract security guards (guards) deployed at about 2,360 federal facilities  across the country. In fiscal year 2009, FPS obligated $659 million for  guard services, which represents the single largest item in its budget.
FPS’s contract guard program is the most visible component of its  operations as well as the first public contact for individuals entering a  federal facility. FPS relies heavily on its guards and considers them to be  the agency’s “eyes and ears” while performing their duties. Guards are  primarily responsible for controlling access to federal facilities by (1)  checking the identification of government employees who work there as  well as members of the public who visit, and (2) operating security  equipment, such as X-ray machines and magnetometers to screen for  prohibited materials, such as firearms, knives, explosives, or items  intended to be used to fabricate an explosive or incendiary device.
Guards do not have arrest authority but can detain individuals who are being disruptive or pose a danger to public safety.
You requested that we evaluate FPS’s oversight of its contract guard  program. We provided you with testimony on our preliminary findings in  July 2009 in which we specified a number of our concerns with FPS’s  management of its contract guard program. This report provides  additional information and analysis on the challenges FPS faces in  managing its guard contractors and guards, and it describes what actions,  if any, FPS has taken to address these challenges. During our review, FPS  transferred from the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to the National Protection  and Programs Directorate (NPPD) on October 28, 2009.
subsections: section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the challenges FPS faces in managing its guard contractors  and guards, we conducted site visits at 6 of FPS’s 11 regions. To select  these 6 regions, we considered the number of FPS guards, contractors,  and federal facilities, and the geographic dispersion of the regions across  the United States. At each region, we observed FPS’s guard inspection  process and interviewed FPS’s regional manager, contract guard program  managers, inspectors who are responsible for conducting guard  inspections; guards, and contractors. We also interviewed officials at GSA  headquarters and regional security officials in all 11 FPS regions, to  identify any concerns GSA has with FPS’s contract guard program. We  also met with representatives of the National Association of Security  Companies to learn about the contract security guard industry. In addition,  we reviewed and analyzed FPS’s contract requirements and training and  certifications requirements, and reviewed the Security Guard Information  Manual. We also randomly selected 663 out of approximately 15,000 guard  training records that were maintained in FPS’s Contract Guard  Employment Requirements Tracking System (CERTS) and validated them  against the contractual requirements that were in effect at the time of our  review. To assess the reliability of the CERTS data, we interviewed agency  officials about data quality, reviewed relevant documentation, and  performed our own electronic testing of the data. Because CERTS was not  fully reliable for our purpose of determining the extent to which there  were guards with expired certifications or training records, we  corroborated our findings using FPS regional spreadsheets and  information provided by the contractors, or the actual guard files.
To determine what actions, if any, FPS has taken against contractors for  not complying with the terms of the contract, we reviewed the contract  files for 7 of FPS’s 38 guard contractors. We selected these 7 contractors  because our previous work showed that they had contract compliance  issues. In addition to reviewing FPS’s contract files, we interviewed  contracting officials in these locations to learn about what information  should be included in the contract files. We also requested all contract  evaluations for January 2006 through June 2009. We estimate that the  number of guard contracts requiring a performance evaluation during this  period would have totaled approximately 375. We analyzed a random  sample of 99 FPS contractor evaluations to determine how FPS evaluated  the performance of its contractors on an annual basis. We conducted  covert testing at 10 judgmentally selected level IV facilities. The facilities  were selected from FPS’s most current listing of federal facilities by  security level. The criteria for choosing these facilities include public  access, location in a major metropolitan area, and level IV facility security  level. The results of our audit work are not generalizable. However, almost  54 percent of FPS’s 15,000 guards and 52 percent of the 2,360 facilities that  have guards are located in the 6 regions where we conducted our audit  work. Because of the sensitivity of some of the information in our report,  we cannot provide information about the specific locations of the  incidents discussed.
To determine what actions, if any, FPS has taken to address challenges  with managing its contract guard program, we reviewed new contract  guard program guidance issued since our July 2009 testimony. We  conducted follow-up site visits at 3 of the original 6 FPS regions that we  visited and interviewed FPS officials, contractors, and guards who are  responsible for implementing FPS’s new contract guard program guidance.
We also observed guard inspections and covert testing done by FPS in  August and November 2009.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 to February 2010 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in  Oklahoma City, FPS has relied on a substantial contract guard force to  help accomplish its mission of protecting federal facilities. The level of  security FPS provides at each of the 9,000 federal facilities varies  depending on the building’s security level. While the contractor has the  primary responsibility for training and ensuring that the guards have met  certification requirements, FPS is ultimately responsible for oversight of  the guards and relies on about 752 inspectors located in its 11 regions to  inspect guard posts and verify that training, certifications, and time cards  are accurate. It is also responsible for providing X-ray and magnetometer  training to the guards. Figure 1 shows the location of FPS’s 11 regions and  the number of guards and federal facilities with guards in each of these  regions, as of July 2009.
Some of the key responsibilities of FPS’s guards include controlling  access, enforcing property rules and regulations, detecting and reporting  criminal acts, and responding to emergency situations involving the safety  and security of the facility. Guards may only detain, not arrest, an  individual, and their authority typically does not extend beyond the  facility. Before guards are assigned to a post or an area of responsibility at  a federal facility, FPS requires that they all undergo background suitability  checks and complete approximately 128 hours of training provided by the  contractor or FPS, including 8 hours of X-ray and magnetometer training.  Guards must also pass an FPS-administered written examination and  possess the necessary certificates, licenses, and permits as required by the  contract. FPS also requires its guards to complete 40 hours of refresher  training every 2 to 3 years, depending on the terms of the contract. Some  states also require that guards obtain additional training and certifications.  In addition, in response to our July 2009 report, in August 2009, FPS  revised its X-ray and magnetometer training requirements and began  requiring its guards to watch a 15-minute digital video disc (DVD) on bomb  component detection that addresses types of bombs, bomb components,  abnormal behavioral such as apprehension or nervousness, and actions to  take if a bomb threat is detected. FPS also requires the contractor to  ensure that all guards view this DVD when they receive refresher training,  which occurs every 2-3 years after the basic training.
As of October 2009, FPS had 125 guard contracts with 38 different  contractors. The majority of FPS guard service contracts are for routine  security services at federal facilities and are for a 12-month base period.  They also have four 12-month options. FPS’s contractors are responsible  for providing and maintaining all guard services as described in the  contract statement of work, including  licensing.
FPS has three Consolidated Contracting Groups (CCG) located in  Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Grand Prairie, Texas; and Federal Way,  Washington, that provide contracting support for guard services and other  FPS mission-related acquisitions. Within the CCGs, 43 warranted  contracting officers are dedicated to FPS contracts. After awarding a  contract, the contracting officers are responsible for enforcing the terms  and conditions of the guard contracts, including authorizing and  negotiating any changes to the contract. Each year the contracting officer  is required to perform an annual review of the contract and take  enforcement action if the services have not been provided, in accordance  with the terms of the contract. The contracting officer also issues  modifications and ensures proper payments are made in accordance with  the contract.
In addition to the 43 warranted contracting officers, approximately 60  Contracting Officer Technical Representatives (COTR) work with the  contracting officers to complete annual contractor performance  evaluations and determine if a contract option should be exercised.  COTRs are responsible for daily contract oversight, assessing a  contractor’s performance, and ensuring that the contractor is meeting all  training, certification, and suitability requirements. Many of the COTRs are  current or former inspectors and may have other job duties in addition to  their COTR responsibilities, depending on their regional resource  alignment.
FPS’s inspectors are also involved in the oversight of contract guards. The  inspectors help the COTRs oversee guards and contractors. For example,  the COTR relies on inspectors to perform guard inspections and report any  problems with respect to the performance of guards on post to the COTR.  Finally, FPS has a contract guard program manager in each of its 11  regions who is responsible for coordinating with the contracting officers  and the COTRs to ensure that performance monitoring and reporting are  being used to ensure continuous high-quality contractor performance in  their regions.
section_title: FPS Faces Challenges Managing Its Guard Contractors That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities
subsections: section_title: Some FPS Guard Contractors Did Not Always Comply with the Terms of Contracts
paragraphs: FPS continues to face challenges with overseeing its guard contractors  that hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. FPS generally requires  its contractors to provide guards who have completed the training and  certification requirements shown in table 1. The most notable area where  FPS contract requirements vary is regarding X-ray and magnetometer  training. For example, for 3 of the 7 contractors we reviewed, FPS’s  contracts do not require X-ray and magnetometer training if the guards  were not assigned to an access control point. In contrast, guards employed  by the other 4 contractors we reviewed were required to receive X-ray and  magnetometer training regardless of their duty station.
On the basis of our review of FPS’s contractual requirements and guard  training and certification records maintained by FPS and/or the  contractor, we reported in July 2009 that 62 percent, or 411, of the 663  guards employed by 7 of FPS’s 38 guard contractors and subsequently  deployed to a federal facility had at least one expired certification.  Examples of expired certifications included firearms qualification,  background investigation, domestic violence declaration, CPR, or first aid  training certification. More specifically, we also found that over 75 percent  of the 354 guards at one level IV facility had expired certifications or the  contractor had no record of the training. According to the contractor  information for another contract, almost 40 percent of the 191 guards at  another level IV facility had domestic violence declarations that had  expired. Guards are not permitted to carry firearms unless they have such  declarations.
Since our July 2009 report, we have requested information from FPS to  determine whether the status of these guards’ certifications had changed.  FPS’s data showed that of the 663 guards, 435 are now fully certified and  trained, 167 are not fully certified and trained, and 61 guards are no longer  working on the contract.
We also testified in July 2009 that some guard contractors were not  providing building-specific training, such as on actions to take during a  building evacuation or a building emergency. This lack of training may  have contributed to several incidents in which guards neglected their  assigned responsibilities. For example,    At a level IV facility, the guards did not follow evacuation procedures and  left two access points unattended, thereby leaving the facility vulnerable.
At a different level IV facility, a guard allowed employees to enter the  building while an incident involving suspicious packages was being  investigated.
At a level III facility, a guard allowed employees to access an area that was  required to be evacuated because of a suspicious package.
In addition to receiving insufficient building-specific training, guards  generally said that they did not receive scenario-based training and thus  were not sure what they should do in certain situations. During our site  visits at 6 FPS regions, we interviewed over 50 guards and presented them  with an incident that occurred at a federal facility in 2008. Specifically, we  asked the guards whether they would assist an FPS inspector chasing an  individual escaping from a federal facility in handcuffs. According to FPS  policies and in accordance with contract requirements, contract guards  are responsible for detecting, delaying, detaining, or apprehending persons  attempting to gain unauthorized access to government property or  otherwise violating laws, rules, and regulations. The guards’ responses  varied, however. Some guards stated that they would assist the FPS  inspector and apprehend the individual, while others stated that they  would likely do nothing and stay at their posts because they feared being  fired for leaving their posts. Some guards also told us that they would not  intervene because of the threat of a liability lawsuit for use of force and  did not want to risk losing their jobs.
Moreover, guards employed by some contractors were not always  complying with post orders once they were deployed to federal facilities.  FPS’s post orders describe a number of things that guards are prohibited  from doing while on post. For example, guards are prohibited from  sleeping, using government property such as computers, and test-firing a  weapon unless at a range course. However, as we testified in July 2009,  when FPS routinely inspects guard posts, it has found incidents at level IV  facilities where guards were not complying with post orders, including the  following:    A guard was caught using government computers while he was supposed  to be standing post, to further his private for-profit adult Web site.
A guard attached a motion sensor to a pole at the entrance to a federal  facility garage to alert him whenever a person was approaching his post.  Another law enforcement agency discovered the device and reported it to  FPS.
A guard, during regular business hours, accidentally fired his firearm in a  restroom while practicing drawing his weapon.
A guard failed to recognize or did not properly X-ray a box containing  semiautomatic handguns at the loading dock at one federal facility we  visited. FPS became aware of the situation only because the handguns  were delivered to FPS.
In each of these incidents, the guards were fired or disciplined. However,  FPS continues to find instances where guards are not complying with post  orders. For example, 2 days after the July 2009 hearing, another guard  fired his firearm in a restroom in a level IV facility while practicing  drawing his weapon.
section_title: FPS Has Not Taken Actions against Some Contractors for Not Meeting the Terms of the Contract
paragraphs: FPS has not taken actions against some guard contractors that did not  comply with the terms of the contracts. According to FPS guard contracts,  a contractor has not complied with the terms of the contract if the  contractor has a guard working without valid certifications or background  suitability investigations, falsifies a guard’s training records, does not have  a guard at a post, or has an unarmed guard working an armed post. If FPS  determines that a contractor does not comply with these contract  requirements, it can—among other things—assess a financial deduction  for nonperformed work; elect not to exercise a contract option; or  terminate the contract for default or cause. Deductions are one type of  action FPS may use to address contractor nonperformance issues.
We reviewed the official contract files for the 7 contractors who, as we  testified in July 2009, had guards performing on contracts with expired  certification and training records to determine what action, if any, FPS had  taken against these contractors for contract noncompliance. According to  the documentation in the contract files, FPS did not take any enforcement  action against them for not complying with the terms of the contract, a  finding consistent with DHS’s Inspector General’s 2009 report. In fact,  FPS exercised the option to extend the contracts of these 7 contractors.  FPS contracting officials told us that the contracting officer who is  responsible for enforcing the terms of the contract considers the  appropriate course of action among the available contractual remedies on  a case-by-case basis. For example, the decision of whether to assess  financial deductions is a subjective assessment in which the contracting  officer and the COTR take into account the value of the nonperformance  and the seriousness of the deficiency, according to FPS contracting  officials. According to FPS’s Acquisitions Division Director, financial  deductions are rarely taken for contract noncompliance and when they are  the amount is generally insignificant.
section_title: FPS Did Not Always Comply with Its Procedures for Completing Annual Performance Evaluations
paragraphs: FPS requires that a performance evaluation be completed annually and at  the conclusion of the contract for those contracts exceeding $100,000.  Contractor performance evaluations are one of the most important tools  available for ensuring that the contractor meets the terms of the contract.  According to contracting officials, monetary deductions do little to change  contractor behavior, but contractors recognize the importance of  evaluations and that FPS uses them to help determine whether to extend  the contract. FPS policy also requires contracting officials to consider past  performance as one of several technical evaluation factors in awarding  new contracts. In addition, given that other federal agencies rely on many  of the same contractors to provide security services, the need to complete  accurate evaluations of a contractor’s past performance is critical.
FPS’s contracting officers and COTRs did not always evaluate contractors’  performance as required, and some evaluations were incomplete and not  consistent with contractors’ performance. We reviewed a random sample  of 99 contract performance evaluations from calendar year 2006 through  June 2009. These evaluations were for 38 contractors. Eighty-two of the 99  contract performance evaluations showed that FPS assessed the quality of  services provided by the majority of its guard contractors as “satisfactory,”  “very good,” or “exceptional.” For the remaining 17 evaluations, 11 showed  that the contractor’s performance was “marginal,” 1 as “unsatisfactory,”  and assessments for 5 contractors were not complete. According to  applicable guidance, a contractor must meet contractual requirements to  obtain a satisfactory evaluation and a contractor should receive an  unsatisfactory evaluation if its performance does not meet most contract  requirements and recovery in a timely manner is not likely. Nevertheless,  we found instances where some contractors received a satisfactory or  better rating although they had not met some of the terms of the contract.  For example, contractors receiving satisfactory or better ratings included  the 7 contractors that had guards with expired certification and training  records working at federal facilities. In addition, some performance  evaluations that we reviewed did not include a justification for the rating  and there was no other supporting documentation in the official contract  file to explain the rating. Moreover, there was no information in the  contract file that indicated that the COTR had communicated any  performance problems to the contracting officer.
section_title: FPS Did Not Always Comply with Procedures for Maintaining Contract Files
paragraphs: FPS’s contracting officials told us that the contract files should contain  annual performance evaluations. In addition, if a contractor has not met  the terms of the contract, the contract file should also contain guard  inspection reports and correspondence between the contracting officer  and contractor, and any other written reports that can be used to evaluate  the contractor’s performance in meeting the terms of the contract. In  addition, DHS’s Office of Procurement Operations has also established  procedures for preparing and organizing contract files and has provided  contracting officials with a standard checklist to identify the  documentation required in each stage of the contract award life cycle.  According to this checklist, the contract file should contain information  about performance monitoring, quality assurance records, and evaluations  of contractor performance for contracts over $100,000. The Federal  Acquisition Regulation (FAR) also prescribes requirements for  establishing, maintaining, and disposing of contract files. It requires the  head of each office that performs contracting, contract administration, or  payment functions to establish files containing records of all contractual  actions.
FPS’s CCGs did not follow these procedures for the contract files we  reviewed. Specifically, our review of the official contract files for the 7  contractors who had guards with expired training and certification records  working at federal facilities showed that the files were poorly  documented, did not contain all of the required performance-related  information, and varied among the CCGs. For example, contract files for 5  of the 7 contractors we reviewed did not have guard inspection reports,  justifications for extending the contract, or annual performance  evaluations. Without the performance-related information, FPS has  difficulty deciding whether to exercise a contract option. Moreover,  because federal agencies rely on many of the same contractors to provide  security services, the need to consistently document contractor  performance is important in determining future contracts.
section_title: FPS Faces Challenges with Overseeing Guards That Raise Concern about Protection of Federal Facilities
subsections: section_title: FPS Is Not Providing All Guards with X-ray and Magnetometer Training in Some Regions
paragraphs: While FPS has given its guard contractors the responsibility to conduct  most of the training of guards, FPS is responsible for conducting the 8  hours of X-ray and magnetometer training that all guards are required to  have. However, as we reported in July 2009, FPS was not providing some  of its guards with all of the required training in the six regions we visited.  For example, in one region, FPS has not provided the required X-ray or  magnetometer training to its almost 1,500 guards since 2004. X-ray and  magnetometer training is important because the majority of the guards are  primarily responsible for using this equipment to monitor and control  access points at federal facilities. Controlling access to a facility helps  ensure that only authorized personnel, vehicles, and materials are allowed  to enter, move within, and leave the facility.
In the absence of the X-ray and magnetometer training, one contractor in  the region said that it is relying on veteran guards who have experience  operating these machines to provide some on-the-job training to new  guards. FPS officials subsequently told us that the contract for this region  requires that only guards who are assigned to work on posts that contain  screening equipment are required to have 8 hours of X-ray and  magnetometer training. However, in response to our July 2009 testimony,  FPS now requires all guards to receive 16 hours of X-ray and  magnetometer training. As of January 2010, these guards had not received  the 16 hours of training but continued to work at federal facilities in this  region. FPS plans to provide X-ray and magnetometer training to all guards  by the end of 2010.
Lapses and weaknesses in FPS’s X-ray and magnetometer training have  contributed to several incidents at federal facilities in which the guards  neglected to carry out their responsibilities. For example, at a level IV  federal facility in a major metropolitan area, an infant in a carrier was sent  through the X-ray machine. Specifically, according to an FPS official in  that region, a woman with her infant in a carrier attempted to enter the  facility, which has child care services. While retrieving her identification,  the woman placed the carrier on the X-ray machine. Because the guard  was not paying attention and the machine’s safety features had been  disabled, causing the belt to operate continuously, the infant in the carrier  was sent through the X-ray machine. FPS investigated the incident and  dismissed the guard. However, the guard subsequently sued FPS for not  providing the required X-ray training. The guard won the suit because FPS  could not produce any documentation to show that the guard had received  the training, according to an FPS official.
section_title: FPS Lacks Assurance That Its Guards Have Required Certifications
paragraphs: As we reported in July 2009, FPS’s primary system—CERTS—for  monitoring and verifying whether guards have the training and  certifications required to stand post at federal facilities is not fully reliable.  Moreover, five of the six regions we visited did not have current  information on guard training and certifications. Guard contractors are  responsible for maintaining the status of each element of the guards’  certifications, such as firearms qualification, domestic violence  certification, and first aid training. These certifications are subsequently  entered into and tracked in CERTS by FPS personnel in the regional  program offices. According to FPS officials in these five regions, updating  CERTS is time-consuming and they do not have the resources needed to  keep up with the thousands of paper files. Consequently, these five regions  were not generally relying on CERTS and instead were relying on the  contractor to self-report training and certification information about its  guards.
Not having a fully reliable system to better track whether training has  occurred may have contributed to a situation in which a contractor  allegedly falsified training records. As we reported last summer, in 2007,  FPS was not aware that a contractor who was responsible for providing  guard service at several level IV facilities in a major metropolitan area had  allegedly falsified training records until it was notified by an employee of  the company. According to FPS’s affidavit, the contractor allegedly  repeatedly self-certified to FPS that its guards had satisfied CPR and first  aid training requirements, as well as the contractually required biannual  recertification training, although the contractor knew that the guards had  not completed the required training and were not qualified to stand post at  federal facilities. According to FPS’s affidavit, in exchange for a $100  bribe, contractor officials provided a security guard with certificates of  completion for CPR and first aid. The case is currently being litigated in  U.S. District Court.
section_title: FPS Has Limited Assurance That Guards Are Complying with Post Orders once They Are Deployed to Federal Facilities
paragraphs: FPS has limited assurance that its 15,000 guards are complying with post  orders. As we testified in July 2009, we identified substantial security  vulnerabilities related to FPS’s guard program. Each time they tried, our  investigators successfully passed undetected through security checkpoints  monitored by FPS guards with the components for an improvised  explosive device (IED) concealed on their persons at 10 level IV facilities  in four cities in major metropolitan areas. We planned additional tests but  suspended them after achieving 100 percent test results, which highlighted  the vulnerabilities federal facilities face. The specific components for this  device, items used to conceal the device components, and the methods of  concealment that we used during our covert testing are classified, and thus  are not discussed in this report. Of the 10 level IV facilities we penetrated,  8 were government owned and 2 were leased facilities. The facilities  included field offices of a U.S. Senator and a U.S. Representative as well as  agencies of the Departments of Homeland Security, Transportation, Health  and Human Services, Justice, and State, and others. The 2 leased facilities  did not have any guards at the access control point at the time of our  testing. In August 2009, FPS told us that the 2 leased facilities did not have  guards because the facilities were recently reclassified from a level IV to  level II based on the new Interagency Security Committee security  standards.
Using publicly available information, our investigators identified a type of  device that a terrorist could use to cause damage to a federal facility and  threaten the safety of federal workers and the general public. The device  was an IED made up of two parts—a liquid explosive and a low-yield  detonator—and included a variety of materials not typically brought into a  federal facility by employees or the public. Although the detonator itself  could function as an IED, investigators determined that it could also be  used to set off a liquid explosive and cause significantly more damage. To  ensure safety during this testing, we took precautions so that the IED  would not explode. For example, we lowered the concentration level of  the material.
To gain entry into each of the 10 level IV facilities, our investigators  showed photo identification (state driver’s licenses) and walked through  the magnetometer machines without incident. The investigators also  placed their briefcases with the IED material on the conveyor belts of the  X-ray machines, but the guards detected nothing. Furthermore, our  investigators did not receive any secondary searches from the guards that  might have revealed the IED material that we brought into the facilities. At  security checkpoints at 3 of the 10 facilities, our investigators noticed that  the guard was not looking at the X-ray screen as some of the IED  components passed through the machine. A guard questioned an item in  the briefcase at 1 of the 10 facilities, but the materials were subsequently  allowed through the X-ray machine. At each facility, once past the guard  screening checkpoint, our investigators proceeded to a restroom and  assembled the IED. At some of the facilities, the restrooms were locked.  Our investigators gained access by asking employees to let them in. With  the IED completely assembled in a briefcase, our investigators walked  freely around several floors of the facilities and into various executive and  legislative branch offices.
In addition, recent FPS penetration testing—similar to the covert testing  we conducted in May 2009—showed that guards continued to experience  problems with complying with post orders. Since July 2009, FPS has  conducted 53 penetration tests in the six regions we visited. The guards  identified the prohibited items (guns, knives, and fake bombs) in 18 tests  but did not identify the items in 35 tests.
More specifically, in August 2009, we accompanied FPS on 2 of these  penetration tests at a level IV facility. During 1 test, FPS agents placed a  bag containing a fake gun and knife on the X-ray machine belt. The guard  failed to identify the gun and knife on the X-ray screen, and the  undercover FPS official was able to retrieve his bag and proceed to the  check-in desk without incident. During a second test, a knife was hidden  on an FPS officer. During the test, the magnetometer detected the knife, as  did the hand wand, but the guard failed to locate the knife and the FPS  officer was able to gain access to the facility. According to the FPS officer,  the guards who failed the test had not been provided the required X-ray  and magnetometer training. Upon further investigation, only 2 of the 11  guards at the facility had the required X-ray and magnetometer training. In  response to the results of this test, FPS debriefed the contractor and  moved one of the guard posts to improve access control.
In November 2009, we accompanied FPS on another test of security  countermeasures at a different level IV facility. As in the previous test, a  FPS agent placed a bag containing a fake bomb on the X-ray machine belt.  The guard operating the X-ray machine did not identify the fake bomb and  the inspector was allowed to enter the facility with it. In a second test, a  FPS inspector placed a bag containing a fake gun on the X-ray belt. The  guard identified the gun and the FPS inspector was detained. However, the  FPS inspector was told to stand in a corner and was not handcuffed or  searched as required. In addition, while all the guards were focusing on  the individual with the fake gun, a second FPS inspector walked through  the security checkpoint with two knives without being screened. In  response to the results of this test, FPS suspended 2 guards and provided  additional training to 2 guards.
section_title: Recent Actions Taken by FPS May Help Improve Oversight of the Contract Guard Program
subsections: section_title: FPS Is Increasing Guard Inspections at Facilities in Some Metropolitan Areas, while the Number of Inspections at Other Facilities May Not Increase
paragraphs: In response to our July 2009 testimony, FPS has increased the number of  guard inspections at federal facilities in some metropolitan areas. FPS  currently requires two guard inspections to be completed a week at level  IV facilities. Prior to this new requirement, FPS did not have a national  requirement for guard inspections, and each region we visited had  requirements that ranged from no inspection requirements to each  inspector having to conduct five inspections per month.
Overall, FPS’s data show that the number of guard inspections has  increased nearly 40 percent, from 4,639 inspections in July 2009 to 6,501 in  October 2009. However, about 54 percent of these inspections occurred  either at level IV facilities or in metropolitan areas and not in rural areas,  where we found that guard inspections are rarely done. In our 2008 report,  we found incidents in which guards deployed to federal facilities in rural  areas had not been inspected in over 1 year or where the inspections were  done over the telephone, instead of in person. In addition, while FPS’s  Director authorized overtime to complete the additional inspections,  previous funding challenges that resulted in FPS limiting overtime raise  questions about whether it will be able to continue to authorize overtime  to fund these increased inspections. Moreover, concerns remain about the  quality of guard inspections. According to officials in one region, guard  program officials recently provided training for inspectors on how to  conduct and document guard inspections. However, despite this training,  program officials said that the quality of the guard inspections and reports  remains inconsistent. The guard inspection reports are one of the key  factors FPS uses to assess a contractor’s performance.
section_title: FPS Is Modifying X-ray and Magnetometer Training Requirements for Inspectors and Guards, but Has Not Addressed Other Training Issues
paragraphs: FPS is in the process of providing additional X-ray and magnetometer  training, in response to our July testimony, but guards will not be fully  trained until the end of 2010. FPS plans to train its inspectors—who will  subsequently be responsible for training the guards—first. Under the new  program, FPS will require inspectors to receive 30 hours of X-ray and  magnetometer training and guards to receive 16 hours of training. Prior to  this new requirement, FPS required guards to receive 8 hours of training  on X-ray and magnetometer machines. In July 2009, FPS also required  each guard to watch a government-provided DVD on bomb component  detection by August 20, 2009. According to FPS, as of January 2010,  approximately 78 percent, or 11,711, of the 15,000 guards had been  certified as having watched the DVD.
While the changes FPS has made to its X-ray and magnetometer training  will help to address some of the problems we found, there are some  weaknesses in the guard training. For example, one contractor told us that  one of the weaknesses associated with FPS’s guard training program is  that it focuses primarily on prevention and detection but does not  adequately address challenge and response. This contractor has  developed specific scenario training and provides its guards on other  contracts with an additional 12 hours of training on scenario-based  examples, such as how to control a suicide bomber or active shooter  situation, evacuation, and shelter in place. The contractor, who has  multiple contracts with government agencies, does not provide this  scenario-based training to its guards on FPS contracts because FPS does  not require it. We also found that some guards were still not provided  building-specific training, such as what actions to take during a building  evacuation or a building emergency. According to guards we spoke to in  one region, guards receive very little training on building emergency  procedures during basic training or the refresher training. These guards  also said that the only time they receive building emergency training is  once they are on post. Consequently, some guards do not know how to  operate basic building equipment, such as the locks or the building  ventilation system, which is important in a building evacuation or building  emergency.
section_title: FPS Is Developing a New System to Monitor Guard Training and Certifications, but More Work Remains
paragraphs: In 2007, FPS began developing a new system to replace several legacy GSA  systems including CERTS, Security Tracking System, and other systems  associated with the facility security assessment program. The new system,  referred to as the Risk Assessment Management Program (RAMP), is  designed to be a central database for capturing and managing facility  security, including the risks posed to federal facilities and the  countermeasures that are in place to mitigate risk. It is also expected to  enable FPS to manage guard certifications and to conduct and track guard  inspections electronically as opposed to manually. RAMP will also allow  FPS to produce regular reports on the status of guards and guard  contracts and to address issues with guards and contractors as they arise.  According to FPS officials, the first phase of RAMP training started in  some regions in October 2009. However, as of December 2009, about half  of the 752 inspectors had not received RAMP training. FPS also has  experienced technical difficulties with RAMP, for example, server issues,  and the system is not always available for use. Consequently, the 386  inspectors that were trained are not able to use RAMP and are doing guard  inspections manually, a fact that increases the risk of inaccurate data.
We are encouraged that FPS is attempting to replace some of its legacy  GSA systems with a more reliable and accurate system. However, FPS has  not fully addressed some issues associated with implementing RAMP. For  example, we are concerned about the accuracy and reliability of the  information that will be entered into RAMP. According to FPS, the agency  plans to transfer data from several of its legacy systems, including CERTS,  into RAMP. In July 2009, we testified on accuracy and reliability issues  associated with CERTS. Since that time, FPS has taken steps to review and  update all guard training and certification records. For example, FPS is  conducting an internal audit of its CERTS database. As of February 2010,  the results of that audit showed that FPS was able to verify the status for  about 8,600 of its 15,000 guards. FPS is experiencing difficulty verifying the  status of the remaining 6,400 guards, in part because it does not have a  system to obtain reliable information on a real-time basis.
Despite FPS’s recent efforts, challenges remain. While RAMP is a step in  the right direction, it is not fully operational. Equally important, RAMP will  not put FPS in an effective position to provide the oversight and decision  making that are necessary to ensure that its 15,000 guards deployed at  federal facilities in metropolitan and rural areas, private contractors, and  1,225 full-time employees in headquarters and 11 regions are performing as  required and achieving FPS’s facility protection mission. We have  previously reported that for an agency to effectively manage and control  its operations, it must have relevant and reliable information relating to its  mission on a real-time basis. FPS does not have this capability. FPS relies  on its 11 regions to manage its contract guard program, including the  collection and analysis of performance information. However, each of the  11 regions differs in how it manages, collects, and reports contract guard  information. Without the ability to access contract guard information on a  real-time basis, FPS cannot ensure appropriate oversight and  accountability, or that the agency’s facility protection mission is  accomplished.
In addition, since 2002, we and DHS’s Inspector General have reported  that oversight of the contract guard program is a challenge for FPS. For  example, in 2008, we reported on the poor quality of contract guards and  the lack of guard inspections. However, FPS has only recently begun  addressing some of these challenges and has not undertaken a  comprehensive review of the agency’s use of contract guards to protect  federal facilities since the bombing of Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in  1995. We also identified a number of changes that have had a cascading  impact on FPS’s management of the contract guard program. Chief among  them is FPS’s decision to move to an inspector-based workforce. Under  this approach, FPS eliminated its police officer position and is primarily  using about 752 inspectors and special agents to oversee its 15,000  contract guards, provide law enforcement services, conduct building  security assessments, and perform other duties as assigned. Many  inspectors in the regions we visited stated that they are not provided  sufficient time to complete guard inspections because FPS’s priority is  physical security activities, such as completing facility security  assessments. The combined effect of recent changes and long-standing  challenges has contributed to the poor oversight of the contract guard  program, and we believe it indicates a need for a reassessment of the  current approach to protect federal facilities and greater oversight.
FPS also has not completed a workforce analysis to determine if its  current staff of about 752 inspectors will be able to effectively complete  the additional inspections as required and provide the X-ray and  magnetometer training to 15,000 guards in addition to their current  physical security and law enforcement responsibilities. Our previous work  has raised questions about the wide range of responsibilities inspectors  have and the quality of facility security assessments and guard oversight.  According to the Director of FPS, while having more resources would help  address the weaknesses in the guard program, the additional resources  would have to be trained and thus could not be deployed immediately.  Finally, according to the Director of FPS, the agency recognized that its  guard program has long-standing challenges, and in response to recent  concerns about the guard program identified by GAO and others, FPS  contemplated assuming responsibility for all guard training and/or  federalizing some guard positions at some federal facilities. However, FPS  decided not to pursue federalizing guard positions because of the cost.  While federalizing guard positions may not be cost-beneficial, we believe  that given the long-standing challenges FPS faces with managing its guard  program, it should continue to conduct research to determine if other  options for protecting federal facilities may be more cost-beneficial.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: FPS continues to face challenges in ensuring that its $659 million guard  program is effective in protecting federal facilities. While FPS has recently  taken some actions, such as requiring more guard training and inspections,  to address these long-standing challenges, guards employed by private  contractors continue to neglect or inadequately perform their assigned  responsibilities. We believe that FPS continues to struggle with managing  its contract guard program in part because, although it has used guards to  supplement the agency’s workforce since the 1995 bombing of the Alfred  P. Murrah Federal Building, it has not undertaken a comprehensive review  of its use of guards to protect federal facilities to determine whether other  options and approaches would be more cost-beneficial. FPS also has not  acted diligently in ensuring that its guard contractors meet the terms of the  contract and taking enforcement action when noncompliance occurs. In  addition, we believe that FPS’s overall approach to protecting federal  facilities, coupled with many unresolved operational issues, has hampered  its oversight of the contract guard program. The combined effect of these  long-standing challenges suggests that FPS needs to do more to protect  the over 1 million government employees and members of the public who  visit federal facilities each year. Thus, we believe that among other things,  FPS needs to reassess how it protects federal facilities and take a stronger  role in overseeing contractor performance.
We also believe that completing the required contract performance  evaluations for its contractors and maintaining contract files will put FPS  in a better position to determine whether it should continue to exercise  contract options with some contractors. FPS’s decision to increase guard  inspections at federal facilities in metropolitan areas is a step in the right  direction. However, it does not address issues with guard inspections at  federal facilities outside metropolitan areas, which are equally vulnerable.  Thus, without routine inspections of guards at these facilities, FPS has no  assurance that guards are complying with their post orders. In addition,  ensuring that its guards are adequately trained to respond to building- specific situations, for example, how to handle an evacuation or shelter in  place situation at a federal facility, is equally important. The lack of  building-specific and scenario-based training may have contributed to  several incidents in which guards neglected their assigned responsibilities.
Moreover, maintaining accurate and reliable data on whether the 15,000  guards deployed at federal facilities have met the training and certification  requirements is important for a number of reasons. First, without accurate  and reliable data, FPS cannot consistently ensure compliance with  contract requirements and lacks information critical for effective oversight  of its guard program. Second, given that other federal agencies rely on  many of the same contractors to provide security services, the need to  complete accurate evaluations of a contractor’s past performance is  critical to future contract awards. Finally, until FPS develops and  implements a management tool, in addition to RAMP, that provides it with  reliable contract guard data on a real-time basis, the agency will not be in  an effective position to provide the oversight and decision making that are  necessary to ensure that its 15,000 guards deployed at federal facilities in  metropolitan and rural areas, private contractors, and 1,225 full-time  employees in headquarters and 11 regions are performing as required and  achieving FPS’s facility protection mission.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: Given the long-standing and unresolved issues related to FPS’s contract  guard program and challenges in protecting federal facilities, employees,  and the public who use these facilities, we recommend that the Secretary  of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary of NPPD and the  Director of FPS to take the following eight actions:  identify other approaches and options that would be most beneficial and  financially feasible for protecting federal facilities;  rigorously and consistently monitor guard contractors’ and guards’  performance and step up enforcement against contractors that are not  complying with the terms of the contract;    complete all contract performance evaluations in accordance with FPS  issue a standardized record-keeping format to ensure that contract files  have required documentation;    develop a mechanism to routinely monitor guards at federal facilities    provide building-specific and scenario-based training and guidance to its    develop and implement a management tool for ensuring that reliable,  comprehensive data on the contract guard program are available on a real- time basis; and    verify the accuracy of all guard certification and training data before  entering them into RAMP, and periodically test the accuracy and reliability  of RAMP data to ensure that FPS management has the information needed  to effectively oversee its guard program.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS  concurred with seven of the eight recommendations in this report.  Regarding the report’s recommendation—issue a standardized record- keeping format to ensure that contract files have required  documentation—DHS concurred that contract files must have required  documentation and did not concur that a new record-keeping format  should be issued. DHS commented that written procedures already exist  and are required for use by all DHS’s Office of Procurement Operations  staff and the components it serves, including NPPD. We believe that the  policies referenced by DHS are a step in the right direction in ensuring that  contract files have required documentation; however, although these  policies exist, we found a lack of standardization and consistency in the  contract files we reviewed among the three Consolidated Contract  Groups. In response to this recommendation, DHS also commented it will  conduct an internal audit of the contract files to determine the extent and  quality of contract administration. We agree with this next step.
In addition, while DHS agreed with our other recommendations, we are  concerned that some of the steps it described may not address our  recommendation—to develop a mechanism to routinely monitor guards at  federal facilities outside metropolitan areas. In response to this  recommendation, FPS commented that to provide routine oversight of  guards in remote regions it will use an employee of a tenant agency  (referred to as an Agency Technical Representative) who has authority to  act as a representative of a COTR for day-to-day monitoring of contract  guards. However, during the course of this review, several FPS regional  officials told us that the Agency Technical Representatives were not fully  trained and did not have an understanding of the guards’ roles and  responsibilities. These officials also said that the program may not be  appropriate for all federal facilities. We believe that if FPS plans to use  Agency Tenant Representatives to oversee guards, it is important that the  agency ensures that the representatives are knowledgeable of the guards’  responsibilities and are trained on how and when to conduct guard  inspections as well as how to evacuate facilities during an emergency.
Furthermore, while we support FPS’s overall plans to better manage its  contract guard program, we believe it is also important for FPS to have  performance metrics to evaluate whether its planned actions are fully  implemented and are effective in addressing the challenges it faces  managing its contract guard program. DHS’s comments are presented in  appendix I. Finally, DHS provided technical clarifications, which we  incorporated into the report as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to appropriate  congressional committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other  interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on  GAO’s Web site at http//www.gao.gov. If you have any questions about this  report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made  major contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact name above, Tammy Conquest, Assistant  Director; Jonathan Carver; John Cooney; Collin Fallon; Brandon Haller;  Daniel Hoy; Susan Michal-Smith; and Josh Ormond made key  contributions to this report.