Homeland Security: Actions Needed to Better Manage Security Screening at Federal Buildings and Courthouses
Published: 2015-03-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: FPS and USMS conduct building security screening at thousands of GSA buildings across the country. Given continued concerns related to the security of federal buildings, GAO was asked to examine the: (1) challenges federal entities face in their efforts to prevent prohibited items and individuals who may pose a security threat from entering GSA buildings and (2) actions federal entities have taken to assess the effectiveness of their screening efforts, and the results of those actions. GAO conducted site visits to 11 selected buildings in three metropolitan areas based on a variety of criteria, including security level, agency officials' recommendations, and for FPS, possible inconsistencies in its data on prohibited items, and other factors. GAO analyzed FPS's and USMS's data, reviewed relevant documentation, and interviewed FPS and USMS officials in headquarters and the field.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS) and the Department of Justice's (DOJ) United States Marshals Service (USMS) experience a range of challenges in their efforts to provide effective security screening, including:
Building characteristics and location may limit security options : many General Services Administration (GSA) buildings were designed and constructed before security screening became a priority.
Balancing security and public access : striking an appropriate balance between facilitating the public's access to government services and providing adequate security can be difficult, for example, when there is a high volume of visitors.
Operating with limited resources : some FPS protective security officers are not fully trained to conduct security screening, and FPS and USMS may have limited funding for additional training or additional security officers.
Working with multiple federal tenants : many tenant stakeholders at multi-tenant GSA buildings have differing needs and priorities that may not always align when trying to build consensus for security-screening decisions.
To assess security-screening efforts, both FPS and USMS have taken steps such as conducting covert and intrusion tests and collecting data on prohibited items. From fiscal years 2011 to 2013, FPS data show that protective security officers passed covert tests on security-screening procedures at a low rate. In October 2012, FPS reduced the number of screening scenarios used for covert testing, but has since reinstated some of them. USMS data show that court security officers passed intrusion tests on security screening at a higher rate. For example, USMS reported that court security officers passed 83 percent of intrusion tests on security screening in fiscal year 2010, 91 percent in fiscal year 2011, and 92 percent in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. Although USMS tests more frequently than FPS, it has not met its intrusion-test frequency requirement per building each year. In addition, FPS's and USMS's data on prohibited items show wide variations in the number of items identified across buildings. For example, FPS reported it had detected approximately 700,000 prohibited items in 2013; however, FPS data showed that there were 295 buildings with no reported data on prohibited items from fiscal years 2004 through 2013. While FPS and USMS may use the results of covert and intrusion tests to address problems at the individual building or FPS region or USMS district level, to some degree, they do not use the results to strategically assess performance nationwide. The benefits of using data in this manner are reflected in the Interagency Security Committee's (ISC) guidance, as well as key practices in security and internal control standards GAO has developed. Without a more strategic approach to assessing performance, both FPS and USMS are not well positioned to improve security screening nationwide, identify trends and lessons learned, and address the aforementioned challenges related to screening in a complex security environment.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that FPS and USMS each develop and implement a strategy for using covert and intrusion testing, and prohibited-items data to improve security-screening efforts. Specifically, for FPS, the strategy would, among other things, help determine which covert testing scenarios to use. For USMS, the strategy would, among other things, help determine the appropriate frequency of intrusion testing. DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Federal buildings continue to be targets of terrorist attacks and other acts  of violence, as evidenced by high-profile domestic events such as the  2013 shooting at the Washington Navy Yard in Washington, D.C.; the  terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; and the 1995 bombing of the  Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. These  incidents highlight the importance of protecting the over 1-million  government employees who work in, as well as the public who visits the  over 8,900 buildings in the United States that are held or leased by the  General Services Administration (GSA). As recently as late October 2014,  the Federal Protective Service (FPS) took actions designed to enhance  its presence and security at various federal buildings it protects in light of  recent world events targeting government personnel and buildings. FPS,  a subcomponent of the National Protection and Programs Directorate  within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the primary agency  responsible for protecting federal buildings. The United States Marshals  Service (USMS), a component of the Department of Justice (DOJ), has  primary physical security responsibility for federal courthouses. Securing  federal real property continues to be a challenge for agencies and is  among the major reasons GAO designated federal real property  management as a high-risk area.
The Interagency Security Committee (ISC) defines a prohibited item as an item, legal or  illegal in nature, where possession is restricted from entry into a facility by federal, state,  or local law, regulation, court order, rule, or facility security committee policy. ISC, Items  Prohibited from Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee Standard  (Washington, D.C.: February 2013). officers are security guards contracted to provide various security  functions at federal buildings. These officers are generally the first contact  with federal agencies for individuals entering federal buildings and  courthouses. Protective security officers and court security officers are  primarily responsible for controlling access to these federal buildings by  checking the identification of government employees and visitors and  operating security equipment, such as x-ray machines and walk-through  magnetometers, to screen for and prevent the entry of prohibited items  including illegal items such as firearms.
Given continued concerns related to the security of federal buildings, you  requested that we examine the effectiveness of FPS’s and USMS’s  efforts to prevent prohibited items and individuals who may pose a  security threat from entering GSA buildings. Specifically, this report  examines (1) challenges that federal entities face in their efforts to  prevent prohibited items and individuals who may pose a security threat  from entering GSA buildings and (2) actions that federal entities have  taken to assess the effectiveness of their screening efforts and the results  of those actions.
This report is a public version of a previously issued report identified by  DHS and DOJ as containing information designated as For Official Use  Only, which must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this  report omits sensitive information regarding FPS’s and USMS’s covert-  and intrusion-testing data, specific examples of the types of covert and  intrusion tests these two entities used, and the names and locations of  the buildings we visited, among other things. The information provided in  this report is more limited in scope as it excludes such sensitive  information, but it addresses the same questions as the For Official Use  Only report and the overall methodology used for both reports is the  same.
We selected two civilian federal tenant entities: the judiciary and the  Social Security Administration (SSA). We selected the judiciary and SSA  because the missions of these tenant entities result in high levels of  public interaction and public visits to their offices within GSA buildings.  We also selected the judiciary and SSA because they occupy a large  proportion of GSA’s federally owned building inventory, with the judiciary  having the largest presence overall. We then identified a  nongeneralizable sample of 11 federally owned buildings held by GSA  with a facility security level (FSL) of IV, in three major metropolitan areas  for our site visits. The Interagency Security Committee (ISC) defines the  FSL categorization based on the analysis of several security-related  facility factors, which can range from security levels I to V, with a FSL V  building considered to be the highest risk. The FSL serves as the basis  for the implementation of physical security measures specified in ISC  standards. We selected these 11 buildings because FSL IV buildings are  considered to have a “high” level of risk, and also based on a variety of  other criteria, including the presence of our two selected tenant entities,  recommendations received from agency officials, and, for FPS, possible  inconsistencies in its data on prohibited items, among other factors.
To determine challenges federal entities face in their efforts to prevent  prohibited items and individuals who may pose a security threat from  entering GSA buildings, we interviewed GSA headquarters officials, FPS  and USMS officials responsible for security issues at the headquarters  level, FPS regional and USMS district level officials, and also officials at  the building level for our 11 selected GSA buildings. Although information  from our building visits is not generalizable to all GSA buildings, this  information provides illustrative examples and context for our  understanding of the challenges faced by FPS and USMS when  conducting building security screening. This approach yielded diverse  perspectives as our selected group of buildings varied in building type,  use, size, and composition of federal tenant entities. We also reviewed  FPS and USMS documentation on efforts to manage security screening,  including security assessments and various reports for buildings we  visited.
To determine actions federal entities have taken to assess the  effectiveness of their screening efforts and the results of these efforts, we  compared FPS’s and USMS’s efforts to comply with GAO’s Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government,wide standards and key practices as identified by the ISC, including The  Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities and the Items Prohibited   as well as to government- from Federal Facilities. We also reviewed FPS and USMS agency  directives, policies, and guidance related to security-screening  assessment tools. These FPS and USMS tools include conducting covert  and intrusion tests and collecting data on prohibited items. In addition, we  obtained and analyzed FPS and USMS data submissions for these  assessment areas.conducted a data reliability assessment for the data we reviewed. We  found the data on FPS covert tests and USMS intrusion tests were  sufficiently reliable for describing the tests conducted from fiscal years  2010 through 2013 and the results of those tests. See appendix I for more  details on our scope and methodology.
We also interviewed agency officials about data and  We conducted this performance audit from January 2014 to March 2015  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: GSA serves as federal agencies’ landlord and designs, builds, manages,  and maintains federal facilities. According to fiscal year 2013 data, over  8,900 buildings in the United States are held or leased by the GSA, and  these buildings provide workspace for over 1-million federal employees  and average 1.4-million daily visitors. FPS, a subcomponent of the  National Protection and Programs Directorate within DHS, is the primary  agency responsible for providing law enforcement and related security   USMS, a component of DOJ, has received  services at GSA buildings.delegations of authority for building security from GSA and has primary  responsibility for providing the security for federal judicial facilities and  personnel.
Security screening consists of the electronic, visual, or manual inspection  or search of persons, vehicles, packages, and containers for detecting the  possession or attempted introduction of prohibited items including illegal  and other dangerous items into a federal facility or secure area within a  federal facility. An individual in possession of or attempting to introduce a  prohibited item, including an illegal or dangerous item into a federal  building, is considered an individual who may pose a security threat. For  the purposes of this report, we focused our efforts on the security  screening of persons at access control points. This process varies at  each federal building based on a variety of factors, but a visitor to a FSL  IV federal building, for example, may undergo a full security screening,  which may include a protective security officer or court security officer  checking his or her government-issued identification, having his or her  belongings go through an x-ray machine, and the visitor physically  walking through a walk-through magnetometer. Federal employees may  undergo different levels of security screening at a federal building  depending on a variety of security-related factors unique to that building.  Screening of federal employees may range from a protective security  officer or court security officer verifying that the employee has a valid  government-issued identification card or an agency-issued credential, to  full screening that would require the employee to go through a similar  process as a visitor to a FSL IV federal building, as described above.
FPS’s protective security officers—contract security guards—are the most  visible component of FPS’s operations, as well as the first contact with  federal agencies for individuals entering a federal building. FPS relies  heavily on its protective security officers and considers them to be the  entity’s “eyes and ears” while performing their duties. FPS protective  security officers are responsible for controlling access to federal buildings,  conducting security screening at access control points, enforcing property  rules and regulations, detecting and reporting criminal acts, and  responding to emergency situations involving building safety and security.  FPS protective security officers (1) control access to federal buildings by  checking the identification of government employees who work there as  well as members of the public who visit, and also (2) operate security- screening equipment, such as x-ray machines and walk-through  magnetometers, to ensure prohibited items—including illegal items, such  as firearms, explosives, knives, and drugs—do not enter federal  buildings. In general, FPS protective security officers do not have arrest  authority, but can detain individuals who are being disruptive or pose a  danger to public safety. According to FPS, it has around 13,000  protective security officers at approximately 2,700 of the 8,900 FPS- protected federal buildings across its 11 regions. Of those, FPS  conducts security screening of visitors and employees at approximately  2,400 buildings. FPS’s budget for fiscal year 2014 was over $1.3 billion.
USMS has primary responsibility for protecting the federal judicial process  by ensuring safe and secure conduct of proceedings and protecting  federal judges, jurors, and members of the visiting public, in GSA  buildings housing the judiciary. USMS’s responsibilities include managing  court security officers and security systems and equipment, including x- ray machines, surveillance cameras, duress alarms, and judicial  chambers’ entry control devices. USMS court security officers, also  contract security guards, are responsible for screening for and  intercepting weapons and other prohibited items from individuals  attempting to bring them into federal courthouses. USMS court security  officers also assist in providing security at facilities that house federal  court operations. According to USMS, as of May 2014, USMS court  security officers conducted entrance security screening at 410 federal  buildings, 121 of which (approximately 30 percent) are multi-tenant  federal buildings across the 94 federal court districts. USMS oversees  the daily operation and management of security services performed by  more than 5,000 court security officers. The USMS’s fiscal year 2014  enacted budget totaled more than $2.7 billion across multiple  appropriations, with nearly $460 million designated for judicial and  courthouse security. The Judicial Conference of the United States is the  principle policy-making body for administering the federal court system,  and its Committee on Judicial Security recommends security policies for  federal judges and courts. The Administrative Office of the United States  Courts (AOUSC) coordinates with the federal courts, USMS, FPS, and  GSA to implement the judiciary’s security program.
Since FPS is responsible for enforcing federal laws and regulations, and  providing building entry and perimeter security at GSA buildings, among  other responsibilities, FPS and USMS seek to closely coordinate security  activities for federal buildings that contain courtrooms and judicial officers.  The responsibilities for FPS and USMS are defined as part of a 1997  memorandum of agreement.
More specifically, in multi-tenant federal buildings that are primarily  courthouses (i.e., judicial or judicial-related space comprise more than  75 percent of the building), USMS provides court security officers for  security screening at access control points at the building entrances,  access control, and security for all judicial areas while FPS may assist  in providing perimeter-roving patrol and after hour coverage.  In multi-tenant federal buildings that house federal courts, where  judicial or judicial-related space comprise less than 75 percent of the  building, FPS would generally provide protective security officers for  security screening at access control points at the building entrances,  as well as perimeter-roving patrol. USMS court security officers would  conduct security screening at access control points for the judicial  space within the building.
Currently, there are seven courthouses participating in a pilot program  where USMS has also assumed control of perimeter security. The roles  and responsibilities of USMS and FPS under this pilot program are  outlined in a 2008 memorandum of understanding.
The ISC develops governmentwide physical security standards and best  practices for federal security professionals responsible for protecting  nonmilitary federal buildings in the United States. The ISC was  established in 1995 by Executive Order 12977 following the 1995  bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City,  Oklahoma. The ISC is an interagency organization chaired by the DHS  and is comprised of representatives from more than 50 federal agencies  and departments. FPS is a member agency of the ISC, along with other  federal entities such as GSA, USMS, SSA, and the federal judiciary.  Executive Order 12977 directs each executive agency and department to  cooperate and comply with the ISC policies and recommendations issued  pursuant to the order. The ISC’s mission is to enhance the quality and  effectiveness of the security and protection of nonmilitary federal  buildings in the United States and to provide a permanent body to  address continuing governmentwide security issues for these facilities.  For example, in February 2013, the ISC developed a baseline list of items  that are prohibited in federal buildings in order to provide some  consistency. Federal management regulations identify items generally  prohibited from being introduced into a federal building—such as  explosives, firearms, or other dangerous weapons—except for law  enforcement purposes (and other limited circumstances). The ISC  standard also establishes a process for preventing prohibited items from  entering into federal buildings and identifies responsibilities for denying  entry to those individuals who attempt to enter with such items.
Federal buildings vary in their assigned FSL and implemented security  countermeasures.  FPS is to coordinate with the building tenants, law  enforcement and intelligence partners, and other stakeholders to gather  information and identify the risks unique to each building being assessed.  The initial evaluation of risks is used by FPS in calculating the FSL  proposal. The facility security committee or court security committeethen uses this proposal to establish the final FSL determination. FPS and  USMS are to work in partnership with tenant facility security committees  and court security committees to build a consensus regarding the type of  countermeasures appropriate for each individual facility. Facility security  committees and court security committees, which are composed of  representatives of tenant entities at federal buildings and other  stakeholders, have broad latitude in determining the security measures  appropriate for their facility. The decision regarding the optimal  combination of physical countermeasures (such as security barriers, x-ray  machines, closed circuit television, and number and type of security- screening access control points staffed by FPS protective security officers  and USMS court security officers) is based on a variety of factors. These  factors include a facility security assessment report conducted by FPS,the FSL, and the security needs of individual tenants. It is important to  note that facility security committees and court security committees,  rather than FPS and USMS, render the final decision regarding the  number and type of security-screening access control points and  technical countermeasures that are to be installed in each individual  building. Facility security committees and court security committees have  broad latitude in determining which items, if any, can be prohibited in their  respective facilities, in addition to those specifically prohibited by law, as  discussed later in the report.
section_title: FPS and USMS Face a Range of Challenges with Security Screening
paragraphs: FPS and USMS experience a range of challenges in their efforts to  provide effective security screening. Such challenges can create a  complex environment in which to conduct effective security screening.  These challenges include: (1) building characteristics and location that  may limit security options; (2) balancing security and public access; (3)  operating with limited resources; (4) working with multiple federal tenants;  and (5) effectively informing the public of prohibited items.
subsections: section_title: Building Characteristics and Location May Limit Security Options
paragraphs: Many GSA buildings were designed and constructed prior to the  occurrence of several high-profile incidents where federal buildings were  targets of acts of violence and consequently before security screening  became more of a priority. GSA reported in 2011 that the lack of  reinvestment funding is a challenge it faces as the average age of its  buildings was 47 years old and has accelerated the deterioration of an  already aged portfolio.be challenging for FPS and USMS because they have to work within the  parameters of the building’s original layout, physical location, and  composition of tenants. For example, at the majority of the buildings that  we visited, the public is required to undergo full screening upon entering  the building, while employees typically undergo limited screening once  their government identification cards are checked. However, according to  USMS officials at a building that we visited, the layout of the building   As a result, conducting security screening may  makes it difficult for court security officers to conduct any type of security  screening on the employees entering the building from the underground  parking garage. The elevators to enter the building from the underground  employee parking garage are physically located behind the building’s  screening access control points. As such, the employees who enter the  building from the parking garage receive little to no screening beyond  checking their identification cards upon entry into the garage. Further,  according to USMS officials, in the instance that USMS determines the  building needs to increase its security, it would be difficult to screen  employees entering the building from the parking garage because the  court security officers would not be able to utilize most of the screening  equipment at the access control point due to the location of the elevators  relative to the access control point.
Further, if a GSA building is considered to be historically significant—that  is, it is listed on the National Register of Historic Places or is eligible for  listing—renovations by federal agencies must follow the requirements of  the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended. Under the  act, federal agencies are to use historic properties to the maximum extent  feasible and retain and preserve the historic character of the property  when making infrastructure changes or rehabilitating a property. As we  have reported in the past, buildings listed on the National Register of  Historic Places or aging buildings may not be able to support, or may  make it more difficult to implement, security changes when complying  with the National Historic Preservation Act’s requirements.
Also, when trying to make security screening enhancements that will alter  the design or layout of a public space in a GSA building, such as to a  security screening access control point for the public, FPS and USMS  officials reported that it is challenging to coordinate such efforts with GSA  due to factors including GSA’s limited budget and initiatives such as  GSA’s First Impressions Program. The program emphasizes making  better “first impressions” for the visiting public and also for the building’s  tenants, in the public spaces of existing federal buildings. Therefore,  GSA’s First Impressions Program’s goals can sometimes conflict with  what the tenant entities or FPS or USMS believe to be needed screening- security enhancements. According to USMS officials, working with GSA  can be challenging when trying to install new security enhancements or  making alterations to the space because the changes may not meet the  aesthetic framework GSA desired for the public space. For example,  there is a severe glare caused by the sun’s reflection through the  windows into the lobby during a significant portion of the day, where the  security screening access control point for the public is located at a  building that we visited. According to USMS officials at the building, the  glare obscures the court security officer’s ability to see incoming visitors.  The glare also affects the court security officer’s view of the x-ray  machine’s computer monitor, potentially impeding the court security  officer’s ability to appropriately screen items sent through the x-ray  machine (see fig. 1 below). However, according to USMS officials, GSA  will not allow USMS to apply a tinting on the windows to reduce the  impact of the glare because it would alter the aesthetics of the public  space. At the time of our review, USMS and GSA had not resolved this  issue. At a different entrance at the same building, solar glare made it  difficult for court security officers to see individuals entering the building.  USMS, however, was able to work with GSA to come up with a mutually  agreeable solution. GSA suggested and created a “living wall” by planting  foliage to help cover an exterior plain white wall, which had reflected  sunlight into the building (see fig. 2 below).
section_title: Balancing Security and Public Access
paragraphs: Striking an appropriate balance between providing security at federal  buildings, and facilitating the public’s access to government offices for  services and other business transactions, continues to be a major  challenge, as we have reported in the past. FPS and USMS officials at 6  of the 11 buildings we visited noted this challenge. We previously  reported that GSA’s goal is to create an environment that reflects an  open, welcome atmosphere, as well as to protect against those with the  intent to do harm. GSA also considers federal workers’ convenience and  privacy an important part of these considerations. For example, federal  employees may undergo different levels of security screening depending  on a variety of building-specific factors which may range from a federal  identification check to a full screening, as the general public would  experience. Federal agencies face particular challenges in GSA buildings  with high public demand requiring regular public access. Such buildings  include courthouses and federal office buildings that house agencies such  as the SSA, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services  (USCIS), and the Internal Revenue Service.
According to the ISC, the potential threat to federal tenant entities within a  multi-tenant building is based on several factors, which include, but are  not limited to whether:  the tenant entity’s mission and interaction with certain segments of the  public is adversarial in nature (e.g., criminal and bankruptcy courts,  high-risk law enforcement);  the tenant entity’s mission draws attention of organized protest groups  (e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, courthouses, Department of  Energy); and  the building is located in a high-crime area, as determined by local law  enforcement.
For example, according to SSA headquarters officials, the majority of  challenges the agency experiences results from the tension between  trying to provide effective security while accomplishing its mission. The  SSA’s mission is to deliver social security services that meet the needs of  the public. To accomplish its mission, the SSA has 1,256 field offices  where the agency provides in-person services to the public. Security has  become such a pressing concern that there are armed FPS protective security officers at all SSA offices that involve customer interactions. Furthermore, many field offices are specifically located in areas easily  accessible to the public, which requires some offices to be located in  higher risk crime areas, increasing their security risks.
In some instances, the SSA has delegated security authority from FPS, and would then  be responsible for providing the armed security officers. each day, primarily for services provided by USCIS or the Internal  Revenue Service. USCIS created separate entrances with screening  access control points at two buildings we visited, to provide additional  security while also managing the number of visitors to the USCIS offices.  At both buildings, USCIS paid for the dedicated screening access control  points for its customers, including the screening equipment and the  additional protective security officers. According to FPS officials at both  buildings, USCIS funded the screening-security enhancements to better  serve its customers and to streamline the process that would have been  required had USCIS gone through the facility security committee’s  approval and budget process.
section_title: Operating with Limited Resources
paragraphs: According to FPS headquarters officials, some protective security officers  are not fully trained to address all security-screening scenarios presented  to them at screening-access control points. In 2010, 2013, and in 2014,  we concluded that FPS continued to experience difficulty ensuring that its  protective security officers have their required screening training and  certifications, in part due to FPS’s limited resources. As a result,  protective security officers deployed to federal buildings may have been  operating x-ray and walk-through magnetometer equipment for which  they have not been trained to use, thus raising questions about their  ability to fulfill a primary responsibility at screening access control points.
We have made recommendations for FPS to improve upon its security- screening procedures, and FPS has taken some steps to do so.Specifically, FPS has begun to implement its16-hour National Weapons  Detection Training program. This program, referred to as “screener  training,” was included in all new solicitations for contract protective  security-officer vendor companies issued in fiscal year 2014, according to  FPS headquarters officials. This program doubles the screener training  that protective security officers had received under prior contracts and  includes performance-oriented training and testing. In February 2014, the  first contract was awarded that included the 16-hour “screener training,”  according to FPS headquarters officials. FPS-certified inspectors are to  provide the “screener training” to those protective security officers  covered under the new contract. According to FPS officials at the  headquarters and regional level, the initial feedback from the protective  security officers who have undergone the new training has been very  positive. The implementation of this program, however, will take time.  Typically, protective security-officer vendor contracts are for 5-year  periods, and according to a FPS headquarters official, contracts can be  modified at any time to add within scope changes such as the new  “screener training” provision. In addition, to offset resource demands on  FPS for providing the additional “screener training” and to increase  accountability for all new solicitations, FPS selected four contracts in  three regions for a “Train the Trainer” pilot. FPS is to train and certify  instructors from the contract protective security officer companies at the  National Weapons Detection Training program and the certified contract  instructors are to then deliver the 16-hour training to their companies’  respective contract protective security officers. FPS and the respective  protective security officer companies modified four contracts in March  2014. The “Train the Trainer” pilot officially began in April 2014.
Limited resources may contribute to the added challenge of not having  enough protective security officers. According to FPS headquarters  officials, limited staff is due to limited funding at the facility level (building- specific) or tenant agency level (tenant-specific). For example, despite  ISC standards that specify that each protective security officer should  only be responsible for one screening task at a security-access control  point, during our building visits, we found several instances when a  protective security officer was conducting multiple screening tasks due to  limited staff. For example, at one building we visited, there are three  security screening access control points, each with two protective security  officers who are responsible for (1) checking employee identification, (2)  manning the x-ray machine, and (3) manning the walk-through  magnetometer. According to an FPS regional official, despite the fact that  this building is the largest building in the West Coast by square footage,  there is a limited FPS presence on-site, relative to the size of the building.  In some instances, a roving protective security officer may backfill at a  security screening access control point if it gets busy, but screening may  not be within his or her responsibilities or an area he or she is specifically  trained in. At another building we visited, USMS officials made the  decision to close one of its three security screening-access control points  in November 2013 due to budget shortfalls.
According to USMS headquarters officials, obtaining adequate resources  and funding is always an issue, but USMS is continuing to take steps to  develop its security program. In 2013, USMS doubled the annual training  requirement for court security officers, focused primarily on security  screening. USMS is also examining the current level of court security  officer training as compared with screening test passage rates, which we  discuss below, to see if there are any trends and any potential actions  that can be taken to improve its security training. Also, USMS  headquarters officials told us that it would be helpful to have additional  funding for more court security officers. As such, USMS is currently doing  an analysis to determine the optimal number of court security officers that  should be stationed at a security screening access control point, in order  to determine the extent to which more resources may be needed in the  field.
section_title: Working with Multiple Federal Tenants
paragraphs: Multi-tenant GSA buildings pose additional challenges in the security  screening process because there are many federal stakeholders involved  in the facility security committees and court security committees (if the  judiciary is involved). As noted above, these stakeholders are responsible  for building security screening decisions, among other security  responsibilities. However, we found, as we did in August 2010, that tenant  entity representatives in the facility security committee may not have  security knowledge or experience, but nonetheless are expected to make  security decisions for their respective agencies. During our site visits,  multiple FPS regional and USMS district level officials identified the lack  of security knowledge as a challenge in trying to work with federal tenants  to implement recommended security-screening enhancements.
When FPS recommends countermeasures for a building in its facility  security assessment, the facility security committee’s chairperson  is  made aware of the recommendations. For example, a recommended  countermeasure may be to add an additional protective security officer,  so each protective security officer is only responsible for one screening  task at each screening access-control point, as outlined in ISC standards.  FPS and USMS officials told us that federal tenant entities, who may have  different needs, may not always agree with what level of security and  security countermeasures are needed at their building, or agree with the  costs that may be associated with those enhancements. Security  countermeasures must compete with other program objectives for limited  funding. Also, we previously found that the facility security committee’s  tenant-entity representatives often do not have the authority to commit  their respective organizations to fund security countermeasures.result, competing requirements, standards, and priorities for a building  cannot always be reconciled, and the chairperson, on behalf of the facility  or court security committee, may agree to accept the risk of not  implementing a specific countermeasure. According to ISC policy, when a  recommended countermeasure is not implemented, it must be clearly  documented, as appropriate:
Why the necessary level of protection cannot be achieved.
What is the rationale for accepting the risk?
What alternate strategies are being considered or implemented?
What opportunities are in the future to implement the necessary level  of protection?
For example, some possible rationales for risk acceptance are: physical  site or structural limitations, historical or architectural integrity, impact on  an adjacent structure, and funding priorities.
Executive branch agencies, with the exception of certain intelligence- related exemptions, are required to comply with the ISC’s policies and  recommendations. The ISC is required to develop a strategy for ensuring  compliance with its standards; however, we previously found that the ISC  did not formally monitor agencies’ compliance with ISC standards, in part,  because it lacks the staff and resources to conduct monitoring. Currently, in place of a formal monitoring program, ISC officials hold  quarterly meetings and participate in ISC’s working groups along with  their member agencies. ISC officials said that the information sharing that  occurs through these channels helps them achieve a basic understanding  of whether and how member agencies use the standards. This approach,  however, does not provide a systematic assessment of ISC member  agencies’ use of the standards, and provides no information on non- member agencies’ physical security practices. The ISC stated in its 2012  to 2017 action plan that it plans to establish protocols and processes for  monitoring and testing compliance with its standards by fiscal year  2014. We previously recommended that DHS direct ISC to conduct  outreach to executive branch agencies to clarify how its standards are to  be used, and develop and disseminate guidance on management  practices for resource allocation as a supplement to the ISC’s existing  physical-security standards. According to ISC officials, as of September  2014, the ISC has created a compliance working group and is in the  beginning stages of developing a standard for ensuring compliance with  its established policies.
GAO, Federal Facility Security: Additional Actions Needed to Help Agencies Comply  with Risk Assessment Methodology Standards, GAO-14-86 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5,  2014).
section_title: Effectively Informing the Public of Prohibited Items
paragraphs: FPS and USMS face challenges in effectively informing the visiting public  about what items are prohibited from being brought into GSA buildings as  lists of prohibited items vary among the buildings and among tenants in  multi-tenant buildings. Based on various factors, such as the composition  of federal tenants, and in the case of courthouses, decisions by judicial  districts, each GSA building may have a unique list of prohibited items  that, according to FPS and USMS officials, can cause some confusion to  the visiting public. Facility security committees and court security  committees have broad latitude in determining which items, in addition to  those specifically prohibited by law (i.e., illegal items), can be prohibited  from their facilities. These additional items may not necessarily be  “illegal.” In addition, some items may be admissible for some individuals,  while not for others. For example, a courthouse may restrict the general  public from possessing a cell phone or laptop in a court space, but may  permit such a device to be carried by a court employee or an attorney  representing a client. Further, the visiting public may not know that an  item is prohibited from the building until they are already there. In these  instances, the protective security officer or court security officer might tell  individuals to take the item back to their vehicle, or surrender the item. In  some instances, court security officers may also be responsible for  helping to store a prohibited item (such as a cell phone or laptop in a  court space), until the individual returns to get it. According to USMS  officials we met with, this adds to the responsibilities of the court security  officers.
Though we did not specifically evaluate signage as part of this review,  during our building visits, we observed a wide range in the types of  signage posted informing the visiting public about what items were  prohibited from the building. All signage in a GSA facility is under the  direct control of the GSA building manager. GSA requires agencies to  post signage at each of its buildings, such as signs that list prohibited  items.with the GSA building manager to ensure that signage is in place to  inform their visitors and employees of the items that are prohibited within  that building. However, we found that some signs were small, posted in   The facility security committee and court security committee work  an obscure location, or very difficult to see or read (see fig. 3 below). We  also saw some signs on the public entrance doors at one building we  visited, with regulatory language on prohibited items from July 1999, even  though current regulations were last revised in November 2005 (see fig. 4  below). Conversely, we found that some buildings had large, informative  signs for visitors, and the signs were posted in key locations to help  facilitate the security-screening process (see examples of signage in figs.  5 and 6 below).
section_title: FPS and USMS Have Taken Steps to Assess Screening, but Each Lacks a Strategic Approach for Using the Data Collected to Improve Performance
paragraphs: Both FPS and USMS have taken steps to assess their security screening  efforts such as conducting covert and intrusion tests and collecting data  on prohibited items. Our work showed that according to FPS data from  fiscal years 2010 through 2013, FPS has experienced low covert-testing  passage rates, and FPS has also limited the number of screening  scenarios that can be used for testing. However, in fiscal years 2012 and  2013, for example, USMS data showed that court security officers passed  92 percent of intrusion tests on security screening. Although USMS tests  more frequently than FPS, it has been unable to meet its intrusion-test  frequency requirement per building each year. Also, FPS and USMS data  on prohibited items show a wide variation in the number of items  identified across buildings for both entities. Overall, FPS and USMS may  use the results of covert and intrusion tests to address problems at the  individual building or FPS region or USMS district level, to some degree,  but they do not readily use the results to strategically assess performance  nationwide. The benefits of using performance data in this strategic  manner are reflected in ISC guidance, as well as key practices in security  and internal control standards GAO has developed. Without a more  strategic approach to assessing performance, both FPS and USMS are  not well-positioned to improve security screening, identify trends and  lessons learned, and address the aforementioned challenges related to  screening in a complex security environment.
subsections: section_title: FPS and USMS Have Taken Steps to Assess Security-Screening Efforts
paragraphs: FPS and USMS have established testing programs to help officials  assess security screening efforts at buildings they protect. For example,  in 2010, FPS developed a policy requiring regional offices to conduct  covert testing of security countermeasures with the goals of (1) assessing  the effectiveness of countermeasures; (2) identifying policy and training  deficiencies; (3) ensuring immediate corrective action; and (4)  documenting, analyzing, and archiving results. As part of FPS’s covert  testing program, a “report of investigation” is to be developed after the  conclusion of each test. In these reports, the responsible FPS official  details the actions taken to prepare for each covert test, to execute it, and  to assess it. USMS has also developed tools for measuring the  effectiveness of its security screening practices at the building level. For  example, USMS implemented a policy directive over 10 years ago for  conducting a specified number of intrusion tests on security-screening  procedures at court facilities each year. These tests primarily consist of  attempts to (1) circumvent the public-screening access control points of  either the building or the judicial areas and (2) access the court building  with a prohibited item such as a weapon. Following each intrusion test,  USMS is to complete a facility-security test form that includes detailed  information about the test conducted.
In addition to testing security-screening procedures, FPS and USMS also  require protective security officers and court security officers to document  prohibited items identified during the screening process. FPS policy  requires protective security officers to document each prohibited item  discovered by using a designated reporting form that includes information  such as the item type and description. The data for each prohibited-item  report are to be entered into FPS’s web-based Enterprise Information  System. In USMS’s statement of work for court security officers, these  officers are responsible for providing statistical information on the number  of prohibited items including weapons detected during the screening  process, and USMS districts are responsible for reporting these items to  the USMS Office of Court Security on a monthly basis. The data are  compiled at the end of the fiscal year by the USMS Office of Court  Security and forwarded to the AOUSC. According to USMS officials, this  information is used for supporting, among other things, the AOUSC’s  annual budget request related to courthouse security.
section_title: Low FPS-Passage Rates on Covert Tests and Reduced Number of Testing Scenarios
paragraphs: FPS has consistently experienced low passage rates for covert tests  since implementing its covert-testing program in fiscal year 2010. The  covert-testing data we reviewed were from fiscal years 2010 through  2013 and related to buildings with a specific FSL. In addition, we found  that in October 2012, FPS reduced the number of screening scenarios  that can be used for covert testing. However, in December 2014, FPS  reinstated some testing scenarios. For this publicly available report, we  are not including the specifics about the covert tests themselves or the  related passage rates due to the sensitivity of the information.
section_title: USMS Court Security Officers Pass Most Intrusion Tests
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2010, USMS has recorded high-intrusion test passage  rates, and USMS reported that it has experienced improvements in the  effectiveness of its security-screening efforts for the years we reviewed.  For example, USMS reported that the intrusion-test passage rate for  security-screening tests improved from 83 percent in fiscal year 2010, to  91 percent in fiscal year 2011, and to 92 percent in fiscal years 2012 and  2013. Furthermore, USMS reported that it has improved its intrusion- test passage rate while consistently increasing the number of tests it  conducted. For instance, in fiscal year 2010, USMS conducted 335  intrusion tests on security-screening procedures, and by fiscal year 2013,  the agency nearly doubled that number by completing 628 intrusion tests  on security-screening procedures. See figure 7 for an overview of the  number of USMS intrusion tests conducted from fiscal years 2010  through 2013 on security-screening procedures.
USMS conducted significantly more intrusion tests than FPS conducted  covert tests; however, we did not determine the reasons for this  difference or what would constitute an adequate number of tests.  Nevertheless, while USMS has increased the number of intrusion tests it  conducts, we found that some USMS districts were conducting tests less  frequently than required. Current USMS policy requires its 94 USMS  districts to conduct an intrusion test at each court facility a specified  number of times a year. However, for the four USMS districts we visited,  we found that none of the districts complied with this requirement. For  example, one district we visited completed only 1 of the many intrusion  tests it was required to conduct from fiscal years 2010 through 2013.  Additionally, USMS conducts security screening at 11 buildings in another  district we visited, and the district did not complete any covert tests during  fiscal years 2012 and 2013. Furthermore, from fiscal years 2010 through  2013, USMS conducted only 14 percent of the intrusion tests that they  were required to conduct at these 11 buildings. Overall, the 94 USMS  districts conducted 45 percent of the total intrusion tests that USMS policy  required these districts to conduct at their 410 buildings. Further, at the  four USMS districts we visited, from fiscal years 2010 through 2013, there  was a large range in each district’s compliance rate from 2 percent to 63  percent. According to USMS headquarters officials, USMS lacks the  appropriate resources to complete the required number of intrusion tests  in each district. For example, USMS headquarters officials told us that  each district manages its own resources and faces unique challenges that  affect testing rates, such as the size of the district, geographical  distances, workload, and manpower. As such, USMS is in the process of  reviewing its current policy and expects to reduce the number intrusion  tests required.
section_title: Data on Prohibited Items Show Wide Variations in the Number of Items Detected across Buildings
paragraphs: As discussed earlier, aside from their efforts to conduct covert and  intrusion screening tests, FPS and USMS both collect data on prohibited  items that are detected through the screening process. For example, FPS  reported that in 2013, protective security officers detected approximately  700,000 prohibited items. FPS policy directs FPS’s Risk Management  Branch to ensure that prohibited-items reports are collected correctly and  that information is properly entered into the Enterprise Information  System on a weekly basis. However, our visits to selected FPS  buildings and analysis of their reporting process indicated that these FPS  data can vary widely from building to building. For example, one building  we visited reported over 230,000 prohibited items from fiscal years 2004  through 2013, an average of approximately 23,000 items per year. By  contrast, a different building we visited reported just over 2,000 prohibited  items during this same time period, an average of about 200 items per  year, even though it is a much larger building with many more visitors  (approximately 4,100 daily visitors) than the first building mentioned  above (approximately 670 daily visitors).
Furthermore, for the larger building mentioned above, we identified 5  years (fiscal years 2009 through 2013) where no prohibited items were  reported by FPS. However, during our visit to the building, FPS officials  stated that prohibited items had been identified during that time period  and provided physical evidence of prohibited items recently collected at  the building (see fig. 8 below). According to FPS headquarters officials, in  2009, the prohibited items policy at the building—set by the facility  security committee, not FPS—was for protective security officers to turn  away anyone attempting to enter the building with a prohibited item. As a  result, the protective security officers did not report identified prohibited  items, believing that the policy was to report only items that had been  confiscated. FPS headquarters officials stated that they had not been  aware that there was a misinterpretation of the policy and that this  resulted in a 5-year lapse in FPS oversight.
We also reviewed data on prohibited items for FPS buildings that we did  not visit and found that there were 295 buildings with no reported  prohibited items during the 10-year period from fiscal years 2004 through  2013. These data alone would not allow us to definitively determine that  prohibited items were detected and not reported at these buildings.  However, the wide variation in the number of items detected warrants  further analysis by FPS, which is discussed later in this report.
Similar to FPS, in assessing USMS’s data on prohibited items, we found  wide variations in the number of prohibited items identified during the  security screening process. In fiscal year 2013, court security officers  detected over 1.3 million prohibited items in federal courthouses,  according to USMS data. However, one USMS district we visited— District of Columbia—did not report detecting any prohibited items for 3  consecutive years (fiscal years 2005 through 2007) during the 10-year  period we reviewed. In total, 24 of the 94 USMS districts (26 percent) did  not report any prohibited items for at least 1 year, and 11 districts (12  percent) did not report prohibited items for multiple years during the 10- year period. According to USMS headquarters officials, in cases when no  prohibited items are reported by a district, USMS headquarters officials  accept that it is possible no prohibited items were identified or confiscated  in a district, and no follow-up is conducted. As with FPS, however, the  wide variation across buildings would warrant further analysis, which is  discussed below.
section_title: Strategic Use of Performance Data Would Better Position FPS and USMS to Assess Screening Efforts
paragraphs: The benefits of using performance data strategically are reflected in ISC  guidance, as well as key practices in security and internal control  standards GAO has developed. The ISC identified the use of  performance measurement and testing as a key management tool and  reported that performance measurement data is essential to appropriate  decision making on the allocation of resources. In addition, our prior  work on key practices in facility protection noted that monitoring and  testing, as well as other methods of measuring performance, can help  gauge the adequacy of facility protection, improve security, and ensure  accountability for achieving goals.
We have also found that internal  control activities help ensure that management’s directives are carried out  and goals are met. Internal control activities are an integral part of an  entity’s planning, implementing, reviewing, and accountability for  stewardship of government resources and achieving effective results.  These controls call for comparisons and assessments relating different  sets of data to one another so that analyses of the relationships can be  made and appropriate actions taken.
FPS officials said that they use covert testing to help determine  weaknesses in personnel capabilities and performance at the building  level. These weaknesses may then be addressed through training or  corrective actions. The FPS officials also use covert testing to determine  gaps in screening, security countermeasures, and access control  processes at the building level. However, FPS headquarters officials also  said that that they had difficulty determining how to use the test results for  improving their security-screening efforts overall. For example, they said  there are multiple reasons why a protective security officer or screening  access control point can fail a covert test such as: poor protective- security-officer performance (e.g., a protective security officer may have  ignored training or access control point instructions); insufficient training;  and security-screening systems or conditions that may not be conducive  to success (e.g., inadequate lighting or unsuitable position of screening  equipment). FPS’s difficulty in using the covert test results may stem from  its lack of a strategy or systematic approach to linking performance data  with corrective actions on a nationwide basis by determining trends and  helping inform which types of scenarios to use for the covert tests. Even  though FPS collects covert-testing data, it does not systematically  analyze the data at the headquarters or regional level. A systematic  analysis of data could help FPS adhere to the internal control standard  related to data analyses and comparisons, and be better-positioned to  target the primary causes for covert test failures.
While USMS has experienced higher intrusion-test passage rates, it  similarly lacks a strategic approach to using and analyzing screening data  that could aid in further improving its passage rates. USMS headquarters  officials said that they do not systematically analyze intrusion-testing data.  Instead, they collect testing data to measure the quality of services that  contractors provide at the district level, and they feel that their current  reporting efforts accomplish that goal. USMS headquarters also does not  conduct any follow-up with its districts to ensure compliance with the  intrusion-testing program, and testing data are not used to  comprehensively assess the program. Nonetheless, these data could be  useful to USMS in determining whether its intrusion-test passage rates  are acceptable and whether goals should be set for higher passage rates.  Greater use of the data could also help USMS determine the number and  frequency of tests that would be adequate and attainable within its  available resources.
A more strategic approach to assessing screening efforts could also  include analyses of data on prohibited items. FPS and USMS do not  conduct systematic analyses of the data on prohibited items they collect.  At the time of our review, FPS officials told us that they did not conduct  any follow up with the regions that did not report on the prohibited items  they identified. USMS headquarters officials said that prohibited items are  defined by individual districts, which makes data across districts difficult to  compare. However, a more strategic approach to analyzing data on  prohibited items would allow FPS and USMS to determine (1) the reasons  for wide variations in these data, (2) whether data are incomplete, and (3)  if there are lessons learned that could be applied nationwide. It may also  be useful in determining how best to communicate prohibited items policy  to the public through signage.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Federal buildings held and leased by GSA have been targets of acts of  violence in recent years and providing security screening at these  buildings can be challenging for a variety of reasons, including balancing  security and public access and operating with limited resources. Due to  the sensitivity of certain FPS and USMS information regarding covert and  intrusion testing, that information was omitted for the purposes of this  publicly available report. However, the results of our analysis of all the  information we reviewed provided the groundwork for our  recommendations to both DHS and DOJ—actions we believe will improve  FPS’s and USMS’s security-screening efforts. In recent years, FPS and  USMS have taken steps to improve their security-screening efforts, such  as implementing various policies, conducting covert and intrusion tests of  security-screening procedures, and collecting data on prohibited items  identified at screening access control points. However, FPS has  experienced low covert-testing passage rates and has limited the number  of security-screening testing scenarios it uses during covert tests. USMS  has recorded higher intrusion-test passage rates. And although USMS  tests security screening more frequently than FPS, it has been unable to  meet its intrusion-test-frequency requirement. Also, FPS and USMS data  on prohibited items show wide variation in the number of items identified  across buildings. Compounding these issues, both entities lack an  approach or strategy to systemically assess screening performance. The  benefits of using performance data in this manner are reflected in ISC  guidance, as well as key practices in security and internal control  standards that GAO has developed. Without a more strategic approach to  assessing performance, FPS and USMS are not well-positioned to  improve security screening, to identify trends and lessons learned, and to  address the range of challenges related to screening in a complex  security environment.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making two recommendations—one to the Secretary of the  Department of Homeland Security and one to the Attorney General:  We recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland  Security direct FPS to develop and implement a strategy for using covert- testing data and data on prohibited items to improve FPS’s security- screening efforts. The strategy should, at a minimum, aim to ensure that:  covert-testing data are used to systematically monitor, review, and  improve performance nationwide;  covert-testing data are used to determine which testing scenarios will  be implemented or reinstated; and data on prohibited items are analyzed to determine the reasons for  wide variations in the number of reported prohibited-items detected  across buildings and to assist with managing the screening process  and informing policy.
We recommend that the Attorney General direct USMS to develop and  implement a strategy for using intrusion-testing data and data on  prohibited items to improve USMS’s security-screening efforts at federal  courthouses held by GSA. The strategy should, at a minimum, aim to  ensure that:  intrusion-testing data is used to systematically monitor and review  performance nationwide;  intrusion-testing data are used to determine, with stakeholders, what  frequency of testing is appropriate; and data on prohibited items are analyzed to determine the reasons for  wide variations in the number of reported prohibited-items detected  across buildings and to assist with managing the screening process  and informing policy.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the AOUSC, DHS, DOJ, GSA, and  SSA for review and comment. DHS and DOJ concurred with the  recommendations directed at FPS and USMS, respectively. DHS stated  that moving forward, FPS will continue to develop an overall strategy to  better define how to leverage covert testing and prohibited items data to  systematically monitor, analyze, and improve screening processes  nationwide and inform policy. DHS’s official written response is reprinted  in appendix II. DOJ conveyed its concurrence with the recommendation in  an e-mail. AOUSC, DHS, DOJ, and GSA provided technical comments,  which we incorporated as appropriate. SSA agreed with the report as  written and did not have any technical comments.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate  congressional committees; the Director of AOUSC; the Secretary of  Homeland Security; the Attorney General of the United States; the  Administrator of GSA; and the Commissioner of SSA. In addition, the  report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2834 or GoldsteinM@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report focuses on security screening at General Services  Administration (GSA) buildings. Specifically, our review addressed the  following questions: (1) What challenges do federal entities face in their  efforts to prevent prohibited items and individuals who may pose a  security threat from entering GSA buildings? and (2) What actions have  these federal entities taken to assess the effectiveness of their screening  efforts, and what have been the results?
This report is a public version of a previously issued report identified by  DHS and DOJ as containing information designated as For Official Use  Only, which must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this  report omits sensitive information regarding FPS’s and USMS’s covert-  and intrusion-testing data, specific examples of the types of covert and  intrusion tests these two entities used, and the names and locations of  the buildings we visited, among other things. The information provided in  this report is more limited in scope as it excludes such sensitive  information, but it addresses the same questions as the For Official Use  Only report and the overall methodology used for both reports is the  same.
For our review, we selected two civilian federal tenant entities: the   We selected the  judiciary and the Social Security Administration (SSA).judiciary and SSA because the missions of these tenant entities result in  high levels of public interaction and public visits to their offices within GSA  buildings. We also selected the judiciary and SSA because they occupy a  large proportion of GSA’s federally owned building inventory, with the  judiciary having the largest presence overall. For the purposes of this  report, we focused our efforts on the security screening of persons.
To inform both objectives, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of 11  federally owned buildings held by GSA in three major metropolitan areas  for our site visits. The focus of our review was on federally owned  buildings held by GSA with a facility security level (FSL) IV. We selected these 11 buildings because FSL IV buildings are considered to have a  “high” level of risk, and also based on a variety of other criteria, including  the presence of our two selected tenant entities, recommendations  received from agency officials, and, for the Federal Protective Service  (FPS), possible inconsistencies in its data on prohibited items.
To determine challenges federal entities face in their efforts to prevent  prohibited items and individuals who may pose a security threat from  entering GSA buildings, we interviewed GSA headquarters officials, FPS  and USMS officials responsible for security issues at the headquarters  level, FPS regional and USMS district level officials, and also officials at  the building level for our 11 selected GSA buildings. FPS is the primary  agency responsible for providing law enforcement and related security  services at GSA buildings. USMS has primary responsibility for various  aspects of protecting federal courthouses and other federal buildings with  a court presence. Although information from our building visits is not  generalizable to all GSA buildings, this information provides illustrative  examples and context to our understanding of the challenges faced by  FPS and USMS when conducting building security screening. This  approach yielded diverse perspectives as our selected group of buildings  varied in building type, use, size, and composition of federal tenant  entities. Prior to our building visits, we reviewed FPS and USMS  documentation on efforts to manage security screening. We requested  and reviewed security assessments and reports for buildings we visited  as well as other buildings located in the FPS regions and USMS districts  we visited, to the extent they were available. In preparation for our site  visits, we also provided the appropriate FPS regional and USMS district  officials with a series of questions regarding security-screening  challenges, and asked for their responses. To further understand the  challenges that FPS and USMS may face, we also spoke with members  of the National Association of Security Companies, which is the nation’s  largest contract security officer association and its membership includes  companies that provide government contract security officers. The  National Association of Security Companies officials provided their  perspectives regarding security screening issues at federal buildings,  such as challenges faced by security officers.
To determine actions federal entities have taken to assess the  effectiveness of their screening efforts and the results of these efforts, we  compared FPS’s and USMS’s efforts to comply with the Interagency  Security Committee’s (ISC) standards, including The Risk Management  Process for Federal Facilities and the Items Prohibited from Federal  Facilities. We also reviewed FPS and USMS agency directives, policies,  and guidance related to assessment tools such as collecting data on  prohibited items and conducting covert and intrusion tests at security- screening entrances, and we obtained and analyzed FPS and USMS data  submissions for these assessment areas. For example, we reviewed FPS  and USMS’s data on prohibited items from fiscal years 2004 through  2013. For FPS, we also obtained covert-testing data at the national,  regional, and building level from fiscal years 2010 through 2013. For  USMS, we obtained agency-wide results of its intrusion tests and detailed  data for the districts we visited from fiscal years 2010 through 2013. To  gather detailed examples of security-screening data issues and to learn  about the processes by which data are collected and submitted, we  compared our findings from our building visits with the data provided by  selected agencies. We then assessed FPS’s and USMS’s processes for  managing these data against agency requirements and GAO’s Standards  for Internal Control in the Federal Government. According to GAO’s  standards for internal control, internal controls are a major part of  managing an organization and comprise the plans, methods, and  procedures used to meet missions, goals, and objectives. Internal  controls, which are synonymous with management controls, help  government program managers achieve desired results through effective  stewardship of public resources, and control activities contribute to data’s  accuracy and completeness.the data and conducted a data reliability assessment for the data we  reviewed. We posed questions to officials at FPS and USMS about the  collection and reporting of prohibited items and covert and intrusion- testing data. We determined that the agencies’ data on prohibited items  are not always complete or properly reported. As a result, agencies  cannot ensure that prohibited-items data are sufficiently reliable to  support sound management and decision making about security- screening issues. However, based on information gathered for covert and  intrusion tests conducted by FPS and USMS, we determined that the data  were sufficiently reliable for describing the tests conducted from fiscal  years 2010 through 2013 and the results of those tests.
We also interviewed agency officials about  We conducted this performance audit from January 2014 to March 2015  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, other key contributors to this  report were David Sausville, Assistant Director; Catherine Kim, Analyst-in  Charge; Russell Burnett; Raymond Griffith; Geoffrey Hamilton; Delwen  Jones; Hannah Laufe; Tom Lombardi; and Josh Ormond.