Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers
Published: 2007-10-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In general, a fusion center is a collaborative effort to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. Recognizing that fusion centers are a mechanism for information sharing, the federal government--including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), which has primary responsibility for governmentwide information sharing and is located in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence--is taking steps to partner with fusion centers. In response to Congressional request, GAO examined (1) the status and characteristics of fusion centers and (2) to what extent federal efforts help alleviate challenges the centers identified. GAO reviewed center-related documents and conducted interviews with officials from DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE, and conducted semistructured interviews with 58 state and local fusion centers. The results are not generalizable to the universe of fusion centers. Data are not available on the total number of local fusion centers.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Most states and many local governments have established fusion centers to address gaps in information sharing. Fusion centers across the country vary in their stages of development--from operational to early in the planning stages. Officials in 43 of the centers GAO contacted described their centers as operational, and 34 of these centers had opened since January 2004. Law enforcement entities, such as state police or state bureaus of investigation, are the lead or managing agencies in the majority of the operational centers GAO contacted; however, the centers varied in their staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies. Nearly all of the operational fusion centers GAO contacted had federal personnel assigned to them. For example, DHS has assigned personnel to 17, and the FBI has assigned personnel to about three quarters of the operational centers GAO contacted. DHS and DOJ have several efforts under way that begin to address challenges fusion center officials identified. DHS and DOJ have provided many fusion centers access to their information systems, but fusion center officials cited challenges accessing and managing multiple information systems. Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for state and local personnel and set timeliness goals. However, officials cited challenges obtaining and using security clearances. Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers contacted reported facing challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 fusion centers reported challenges with funding, some of which affected these centers' sustainability. The officials said that these issues made it difficult to plan for the future and created concerns about the fusion centers' ability to sustain their capability for the long-term. To support fusion centers, both DHS and the FBI have assigned personnel to the centers. To help address funding issues, DHS has made several changes to address restrictions on the use of federal grants funds. These individual agency efforts help address some of the challenges with personnel and funding. However, the federal government has not clearly articulated the long-term role it expects to play in sustaining fusion centers. It is critical for center management to know whether to expect continued federal resources, such as personnel and grant funding, since the federal government, through the information sharing environment, expects to rely on a nationwide network of centers to facilitate information sharing with state and local governments. Finally, DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have taken steps to develop guidance and provide technical assistance to fusion centers, for instance, by issuing guidelines for establishing and operating centers. However, officials at 31 of the 58 centers said they had challenges training their personnel, and officials at 11 centers expressed a need for the federal government to establish standards for training fusion center analysts to help ensure that analysts have similar skills. DHS and DOJ have initiated a technical assistance program for fusion centers. They have also developed a set of baseline capabilities, but the document was still in draft as of September and had not been issued.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: A breakdown in information sharing was a major factor contributing to the  failure to prevent the attacks of September 11, 2001, according to the  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the  9/11 Commission). Since then, most states and some local governments  have, largely on their own initiative, established fusion centers to address  gaps in homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement information  sharing by the federal government and to provide a conduit of this  information within the state. Indeed, developing a fusion center was a high  priority of state homeland security directors, according to a 2006 National  Governors Association survey. Although fusion centers vary because they  were primarily established to meet state and local needs, a fusion center is  generally “a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide  resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of  maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to  criminal and terrorist activity.” Fusion centers may include a range of  federal, state, and local entities and collect and analyze information  related to homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement.
With information-sharing weaknesses recognized as a major contributing  factor to the nation’s lack of preparedness for the 9/11 attacks, a number  of information-sharing initiatives were mandated by the Homeland  Security Act of 2002 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention  Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act). The Homeland Security Act, for  example, requires that the President prescribe and implement procedures  under which federal agencies can share relevant and appropriate  homeland security information with other federal agencies and with  appropriate state and local personnel, such as law enforcement agencies  and first responders. The President assigned most responsibilities for  executing this requirement to the Secretary of the Department of  Homeland Security in July 2003. The Intelligence Reform Act, as amended  in August 2007 by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11  Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission  Act), mandates a more  extensive information-sharing regime that requires the President to take  action to facilitate the sharing of terrorism and homeland security  information by establishing an Information Sharing Environment (ISE)  that is to combine policies, procedures, and technologies that link people,  systems, and information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and  tribal entities and the private sector. This act also requires, among other  things, that the President appoint a program manager to oversee  development and implementation of the ISE, which the President did in  April 2005.
Recognizing that state and local fusion centers represent a critical source  of local information about potential threats and a mechanism for providing  terrorism-related information and intelligence from federal sources, the  Program Manager for the ISE (PM-ISE), the Department of Homeland  Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are taking steps to  partner with and leverage fusion centers as part of the overall information  sharing environment. The PM-ISE issued an implementation plan in  November 2006 that incorporated presidentially approved  recommendations for federal, state, local, and private sector information  sharing and largely relied on efforts under way by DHS and DOJ with  respect to fusion centers. Recognizing that the collaboration between  fusion centers and with the federal government marks a tremendous  increase in the nation’s overall analytic capacity that can be used to  combat terrorism, the plan envisions that the federal government will  work to leverage and promote fusion center initiatives to facilitate  effective nationwide terrorism-related information sharing, with fusion  centers becoming the focal point of this sharing. Under the plan, DHS and  DOJ are to work with states to designate a primary fusion center to serve  as the statewide or regional hub to interface with the federal government  and through which to coordinate the gathering, processing, analyzing, and  disseminating of terrorism-related information. DHS and DOJ are to  assume the responsibility for technical assistance and training to support  the establishment and operation of the fusion centers. Finally, according  to PM-ISE officials, the plan envisions that in order to receive grant  funding, each designated fusion center must develop a coordinated  approach with any other fusion centers in the state and will eventually  achieve a baseline level of capability and ensure compliance with all  applicable privacy laws and standards. Both DHS and DOJ have  established program offices to oversee their relationships with fusion  centers.
In addition, the 9/11 Commission Act contains several provisions related to  fusion centers. For example, the act requires the Secretary of DHS, in  consultation with the Attorney General, the PM-ISE, and others to  establish a state, local, and regional fusion center initiative within DHS to  establish partnerships with state, local, and regional fusion centers that  will, among other things, provide operational and intelligence advice and  assistance, as well as management assistance, and facilitate close  communication and coordination between fusion centers and DHS. In  addition, the initiative is to provide training to fusion centers and  encourage the centers to participate in terrorism-threat-related exercises  conducted by DHS.
In response to your request to describe state and local fusion centers and  federal efforts underway to support them, this report answers the  following two questions:    What are the stages of development and characteristics of state and  local fusion centers?
To what extent do efforts under way by the PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ  help to address some of the challenges identified by fusion centers?
To answer these questions, we reviewed relevant directives, plans, and  documents and interviewed officials—including many of those from the  PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ—who are involved with those entities’ efforts to  support fusion centers. In addition, we spoke with officials from  11 organizations conducting research on state and local information  sharing, including officials at the Congressional Research Service (CRS)  who released a report in July 2007 on fusion centers. We also conducted  semistructured telephone interviews with the director (or his or her  designee) of every state fusion center, the District of Columbia fusion  center, and eight local fusion centers to obtain information about the  centers’ characteristics, challenges encountered, and support received  from DHS and DOJ. Our selection criteria for the local fusion centers  included their relationships with the state fusion center, stage of  development, and geographic diversity. Where a fusion center was in the  planning stages, we spoke with officials involved in the planning and  establishment of the center, such as directors of homeland security  offices. From February through May 2007, we spoke with officials from all  50 states, the District of Columbia, and 8 local jurisdictions. While we did  contact officials in all state fusion centers, we did not contact officials in  all local fusion centers; therefore our results are not generalizable to the  universe of fusion centers. Data were not available to determine the total  number of local fusion centers.
To describe the challenges fusion centers encountered in establishing and  operating, we asked officials during our semistructured telephone  interviews whether they encountered challenges in 10 different categories  and, if so, the extent to which the category was a challenge both at  establishment and, for operational centers, in day-to-day operations. These  categories included federal partnerships, personnel, guidance, training,  funding, access to information, and security clearances. Fusion center  officials provided open-ended, descriptive responses of challenges faced  by their centers. On the basis of a content analysis of fusion center  officials’ responses, we identified, categorized, and counted similar  challenges. Fusion center officials may not have indicated that they  encountered all the challenges discussed in the report. In addition,  individual fusion center officials may have identified multiple challenges in  a given category, for example funding.
We also obtained and summarized descriptive information from the fusion  centers including structure, organization, personnel, and information  technology systems used. Finally, to obtain detailed information about  centers’ operations and challenges encountered, we conducted site visits  to fusion centers in Atlanta, Georgia; Phoenix, Arizona; Richmond,  Virginia; Baltimore, Maryland; West Trenton, New Jersey; and New York,  New York. Our selection criteria for these centers included their stage of  development, extent of federal partnerships, and geographic  representation. Appendix I provides further details on our objectives,  scope, and methodology. We performed our work from August 2006  through September 2007 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: DHS’s Role in Fusion Centers
paragraphs: As part of its mission and in accordance with the Homeland Security Act,  DHS has responsibility for coordinating efforts to share homeland security  information across all levels of government, including federal, state, local,  and tribal governments and the private sector. Specifically with respect to  fusion centers, DHS envisions creating partnerships with state and local  centers to improve information flow between DHS and the centers and to  improve their effectiveness as a whole. As such, the Office of Intelligence  and Analysis (I&A) was designated in June 2006 by the Secretary as the  executive agent to manage a program to accomplish DHS’s state and local  fusion center mission. The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and  Analysis approved the establishment of the State and Local Program Office  (SLPO) under the direction of a Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary to  implement this mission. Specifically, the office is responsible for deploying  DHS personnel with operational and intelligence skills to state and local  fusion centers to facilitate coordination and the flow of information  between DHS and the center, provide expertise in intelligence analysis and  reporting, coordinate with local DHS and FBI components, and provide  DHS with local situational awareness and access to fusion center  information. As part of this effort, DHS is conducting needs assessments at  fusion centers to review their status and determine what resources, such  as personnel, system access, and security, are needed. As of September  2007, DHS had conducted 25 fusion center needs assessments. The SLPO  also coordinates the granting of DHS security clearances for personnel  located in fusion centers and the deployment of DHS classified and  unclassified systems for use in the fusion center.
The Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) awards funds to states,  territories, and urban areas to enhance their ability to prepare for, prevent,  and respond to terrorist attacks and other major disasters. HSGP consists  of five separate programs, three of which can be used by states and local  jurisdictions, at their discretion, for fusion center-related funding. The  State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) supports the implementation of  the State Homeland Security Strategies to address the identified planning,  equipment, training, and exercise needs for preventing acts of terrorism.  The Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP) provides  resources to law enforcement and public safety communities to support  critical terrorism prevention activities. Each state receives a minimum  allocation under SHSP and LETPP and additional funds are allocated  based on the analyses of risk and anticipated effectiveness. The Urban  Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program addresses the unique planning,  equipment, training, and exercise needs of high-threat, high-density urban  areas and assists them in building an enhanced and sustainable capacity to  prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism.  UASI funds are allocated on the basis of risk and anticipated effectiveness  to about 45 candidate areas. The fiscal year 2007 HSGP grant guidance  specified the establishment and enhancement of state and local fusion  centers as a prevention priority, making them a priority for LETPP.  DHS’s  Federal Emergency Management Agency National Preparedness  Directorate (FEMA/NPD) manages the grant process and allocates these  funds to state and local entities.
section_title: FBI’s Role in Fusion Centers
paragraphs: The FBI serves as the primary investigative unit of DOJ, and its mission  includes investigating serious federal crimes, protecting the nation from  terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, and assisting federal, state, and  municipal law enforcement agencies. Following the attacks on September  11, 2001, the FBI shifted its primary mission to focus on counterterrorism;  that is, detecting and preventing future attacks. The FBI primarily  conducts its counterterrorism investigations through its Joint Terrorism  Task Forces (JTTF), which are multi-agency task forces that generally  contain state and local officials. As of September 2007, there were JTTFs  in 101 locations, including one in each of the FBI’s 56 field offices. Since  2003, each of the 56 field offices has also established a Field Intelligence  Group (FIG) to serve as the centralized intelligence component  responsible for the management, execution, and coordination of  intelligence functions.
Recognizing that fusion centers are becoming focal points for the sharing  of homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement information among  federal, state, and local governments, the FBI has directed that its field  offices, through their FIGs, become involved in the fusion centers in order  to enhance the FBI’s ability to accomplish its mission and “stay ahead of  the threat.” In June 2006, the FBI’s National Security Branch directed each  field office to assess its own information sharing environment and, when  appropriate, detail a FIG special agent and intelligence analyst to the  leading fusion center within its territory. The FBI’s Directorate of  Intelligence established an Interagency Integration Unit in January 2007 to  provide headquarters oversight of FBI field offices’ relationships with  fusion centers. While the FBI’s role in and support of individual fusion  centers varies depending on the interaction between the particular center  and the FBI field office, FBI efforts to support centers include assigning  FBI special agents and intelligence analysts to fusion centers, providing  office space or rent for fusion center facilities, providing security  clearances, conducting security certification of facilities, and providing  direct or facilitated access to the FBI. FBI personnel assigned to fusion  centers are to provide an effective two-way flow of information between  the fusion center and the FBI; participate as an investigative or analytical  partner uncovering, understanding, reporting, and responding to threats;  and ensure the timely flow of information between the fusion center and  the local JTTF and FIG.
section_title: Role of the Program Manager of the Information Sharing Environment in Fusion Centers
paragraphs: Established under the Intelligence Reform Act, the PM-ISE is charged with  developing and overseeing implementation of the ISE, which consists of  the policies, processes, and technologies that enable the sharing of  terrorism information among local, state, tribal, federal, and private sector  entities as well as foreign partners, and, as such, released an ISE  Implementation Plan in November 2006. Recognizing that the  collaboration between fusion centers and with the federal government  marks a tremendous increase in the nation’s overall analytic capacity that  can be used to combat terrorism, the plan—integrating presidentially  approved recommendations for federal, state, local, and private sector  terrorism-related information sharing—calls for the federal government to  promote the establishment of a nationwide integrated network of state and  local fusion centers to facilitate effective terrorism information sharing.  The plan outlines several actions on the part of the federal government,  largely through DHS and DOJ, to support fusion centers, including  providing technical assistance and training to support the establishment  and operation of centers.
In addition, the PM-ISE has established a National Fusion Center  Coordination Group (NFCCG), led by DHS and DOJ, to identify federal  resources to support the development of a national, integrated network of  fusion centers. The NFCCG is to ensure that designated fusion centers  achieve a baseline level of capability and comply with all applicable  federal laws and policies regarding the protection of information and  privacy and other legal rights of individuals. The NFCCG also is to ensure  coordination between federal entities interacting with these fusion centers  and has been tasked to develop recommendations regarding funding  options relating to their establishment. However, to date, the efforts of the  NFCCG have not included delineating whether such assistance is for the  short-term establishment or long-term sustainability of fusion centers. In  addition, the PM-ISE, in consultation with the Information Sharing  Council—the forum for top information sharing officials from departments  and agencies with activities that may include terrorism-related  information—has also established a Senior-Level Interagency Advisory  Group that oversees the NFCCG as part of its overall responsibility to  monitor and ensure the implementation of the ISE.
section_title: DHS’s and DOJ’s Networks and Systems for Sharing Information That Fusion Centers May Access
paragraphs: We reported in April 2007 that DHS and DOJ have 17 major networks and  4 system applications that they use to support their homeland security  missions, including sharing information with state and local entities such  as fusion centers. In addition, state and local governments have similar  information technology initiatives to carry out their homeland security  missions. Table 1 provides information on the primary networks and  systems used by fusion centers.
section_title: State and Local Fusion Centers Vary in Their Stages of Development and Characteristics
paragraphs: Established by state and local governments to improve information  sharing among federal, state, and local entities and to prevent terrorism or  other threats, fusion centers across the country vary in their stages of  development—from operational to early in the planning stages. Those  centers that are operational vary in many of their characteristics, but  generally have missions that are broader than counterterrorism, have  multiple agencies represented—including federal partners—in their  centers, and have access to a number of networks and systems that  provide homeland security and law enforcement-related information.
subsections: section_title: Fusion Centers Have Been Established in Most States
paragraphs: Since September 2001, almost all states and several local governments  have established or are in the process of establishing a fusion center.  Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted described their  centers as operational as of September 2007. Specifically, officials in 35  states, the District of Columbia, and 7 local jurisdictions we contacted  described their fusion center as operational, officials in 14 states and 1  local jurisdiction considered their centers to be in the planning or early  stages of development, and 1 state did not have or plan to have a fusion  center, as shown in figure 1. In 6 states we contacted, there was more than  one fusion center established.
Officials cited a variety of reasons why their state or local jurisdiction  established a fusion center. To improve information sharing—related to  homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement—among federal, state,  and local entities and to prevent terrorism or threats after the attacks of  September 11 were the most frequently cited reasons. For example,  officials in one state said that their state was “mentioned 59 times in the  9/11 Commission Report, the majority of which were not complimentary,”  and as a result established a 24-hour-per-day and 7-day-per-week  intelligence and information analysis center to serve as the central hub to  facilitate the collection, analysis, and dissemination of crime and  terrorism-related information. Several officials cited the need to enhance  information sharing within their own jurisdictions across disciplines and  levels of government as the reason why their jurisdiction established a  center. While most officials from fusion centers that were in the planning  or early stages of development stated that they were establishing a fusion  center in general to enhance information sharing or protect against future  threats, officials in a few centers also noted that their jurisdictions were  discussing or establishing fusion centers because of available DHS grant  funding or their perception that DHS was requiring states to establish a  center. Appendixes II and III provide basic information about operational  fusion centers and fusion centers in the planning and early stages of  development, respectively. Appendix IV provides a state-by-state summary  of state and local areas’ efforts to establish and operate fusion centers.
section_title: Operational Fusion Centers and Their Characteristics
paragraphs: Officials in operational fusion centers provided varying explanations for  their centers’ stage of development. Officials in 16 of the 43 operational  fusion centers said that their fusion centers were at an “intermediate”  stage of development, that is, the centers had limited operations and  functionality. For instance, several of these officials said that while they  had many operational components (such as policies and procedures,  analytical personnel, or technical access to systems and networks) in  place, at least one of these components was still in the process of being  developed or finalized. For example, officials in one fusion center said that  its analysts have completed training and are producing products, but the  center is still in the final stages of reconstructing its facility and  establishing access to systems and networks. Officials in 21of the  43 operational fusion centers considered their fusion centers to be  “developed,” that is, fully operational and fully functional. For example, an  official in one center said that the fusion center has analysts from DHS,  FBI, and state and local entities; operates at the Top Secret level; and has a  Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). Additionally,  several officials also stated that even though their centers were developed,  the centers would continue to expand and evolve. Officials in the  remaining six fusion centers considered their centers to have more than  limited operations and functionality but not yet be fully operational. For  example, one official said that the center would like to develop its  strategic component, for example related to risk assessments. Another  official stated that his center would like to expand its operations but does  not have enough personnel.
Thirty-four of the operational centers are relatively new, having been  opened since January 2004, while 9 centers opened in the couple of years  after September 11, as shown in figure 2.
Consistent with the purpose of a fusion center, as defined by the Fusion  Center Guidelines, officials in 41 of the 43 operational centers we  contacted said that their centers’ scopes of operations were broader than  solely focusing on counterterrorism. For example, officials in 22 of the  43 operational centers described their centers’ scopes of operations as all  crimes or all crimes and counterterrorism, and officials in 19 operational  centers said that their scopes of operations included all hazards. There  were subtle distinctions in officials’ descriptions of an all-crimes scope;  however, they generally either said that their center focused on all  “serious” crimes, such as violent crimes or felonies, or specified that the  center focused on those crimes that may be linked to terrorist activity.
Officials who described their centers as including an all-hazards focus  provided different explanations of this scope, including colocation with  the state’s emergency operations center or partnerships with emergency  management organizations or first responders. One official referred to  Hurricanes Katrina and Rita as reasons why the center had an all-hazards  scope of operation.
Officials provided two primary explanations for why their fusion centers  have adopted a broader focus than counterterrorism. The first explanation  was because of the nexus, or link, of many crimes to terrorist-related  activity. For example, officials at one fusion center said that they have an  all-crimes focus because terrorism can be funded through a number of  criminal acts, such as drugs, while another said that collecting information  on all crimes often leads to terrorist or threat information because  typically if there is terrorist-related activity there are other crimes involved  as well. The second reason why officials said that their fusion centers had  a broader focus than counterterrorism was in order to include additional  stakeholders or to provide a sustainable service. For example, one official  said that because the state is rural with only two metropolitan areas and  many small communities, the center needed to have a broader focus than  terrorism to obtain participation from local law enforcement. Officials in  another center said that their center opened in the months after  September 2001, so it focused on homeland security and terrorism, but  since then has evolved to include an all-hazards focus as it has established  partnerships with agencies outside of law enforcement. An official in  another center said that while counterterrorism is the primary mission of  the center, in the past year the center has included an all-crimes element  since on average the center only receives three terrorism-related tips a  day, and as a result, it is difficult to convince agencies to detail a staff  person to the center for this mission alone.
The majority of the operational fusion centers we contacted were  primarily led by law enforcement entities, such as state police or state  bureaus of investigation. Some of these centers were established as  partnerships between state or local law enforcement entities and the FBI,  and others were established as partnerships with the state homeland  security offices. While all of the operational fusion centers we contacted  had more than one agency represented in the centers, the staff size and  agencies represented varied. For example, three centers we contacted had  fewer than five people on their staff representing fewer than five agencies.
Whereas, 2 of the centers we contacted had over 80 people staffed to the  center, representing about 20 agencies. In its fusion center report, CRS  determined that the average number of full-time staff at about 27 persons.  In addition to law enforcement agencies, such as state police or highway  patrol, county sheriffs, and city police departments, 29 of the  43 operational centers we contacted had personnel assigned to their  centers from the state’s National Guard, and some centers’ also included  emergency management, fire, corrections, or transportation partners.
At least 34 of the 43 operational fusion centers we contacted had federal  personnel assigned to their centers.  Officials in about three quarters of the  centers we contacted reported that the FBI has assigned personnel,  including intelligence analysts and special agents, to their centers. Most  had one or two full-time intelligence analysts or special agents at their  center. Additionally, 12 of the 43 operational centers we contacted were  colocated in an FBI field office or with an FBI task force, such as a JTTF  or a FIG, allowing the center’s personnel access to FBI systems and  networks.  Also, officials in 17 of the 43 operational centers reported that  DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis had assigned intelligence officers  to their centers.  These officers are assigned to fusion centers on a full- time basis and are responsible for, among other things, facilitating the flow  of information between the center and DHS, providing expertise in  intelligence analysis and reporting, and providing DHS with local  situational information and access. Finally, officials in 19 of the  43 operational centers reported that they had other DHS and DOJ  components represented in their centers including personnel from U.S.  Customs and Border Protection; U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (ICE); United States Secret Service; United States Coast  Guard; Transportation Security Administration; United States Attorneys  Office; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; Drug Enforcement  Administration (DEA); or the United States Marshals Service.
As we have previously highlighted, operational fusion centers we  contacted reported having access to a variety of networks and systems for  collecting homeland security, terrorism-related, and law enforcement  information. For example, as of September 2007, 40 and 39 of the  43 operational fusion centers we contacted told us they had access to  DHS’s and FBI’s unclassified networks, such as HSIN and LEO,  respectively. Further, about half of the operational centers also said that  they had access to one of the RISS networks. In addition, 16 of the  43 operational centers we contacted reported that they had access or had  plans to obtain access to HSDN, and 23 indicated that they had access or  were in the process of obtaining access to FBINet or FBI’s other classified  networks. Further, 3 centers also reported having access to FBI’s Top  Secret network. Additionally, several operational fusion centers reported  having access to other classified and unclassified federal systems and  networks providing defense, financial, drug, and immigration-related  information, including the Department of Defense’s Secret Internet  Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet), Financial Crimes Enforcement  Network (FinCEN), El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), and the Student  and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS).
Thus far, products disseminated and services provided also vary. Fusion  centers reported issuing a variety of products, such as daily and weekly  bulletins on general criminal or intelligence information and intelligence  assessments that, in general, provide in-depth reporting on an emerging  threat, group, or crime. For example, one center’s weekly bulletin  contained sections on domestic and international terrorism, cold case  investigations, missing persons, officer safety, and items of interest to law  enforcement.
Some centers provide investigative support for law enforcement officers.  For example, one fusion center reported that it provided response within  20 minutes to requests for information from law enforcement officers who  were conducting traffic stops or responding to major crime scenes.  Further, several of the centers in our review were organized into two  sections—an operational section that manages and processes the  information flowing into the center and an analytical section responsible  for analyzing the information and disseminating products.
section_title: Fusion Centers in the Planning and Early Stages of Development and Their Characteristics
paragraphs: Officials in 7 states and one local jurisdiction said that their fusion centers  were in the early stages of development and officials in 7 states said that  they were in the planning stage. For example, one official said that the  center is developing memorandums of understanding for agency  representation at and support of the center, working to get the center’s  secure space certified, and placing equipment and furniture. Officials from  another state said that they had appointed an officer-in-charge and are in  the process of acquiring additional staff members but had not acquired  access to federal networks and systems. Officials in 6 of the 15 centers  said that their centers had already opened or were expected to open by the  end of 2007.
Efforts to establish a fusion center are being led by homeland security  offices, law enforcement entities, and in some states, by a partnership of  two or more state agencies. As with operational centers, these centers  planned to include all crimes and all hazards scopes of operations. While  most of these centers were being newly established, a few were in the  process of transitioning from existing law enforcement intelligence units  or criminal intelligence centers.  For example, an official in one center  said the fusion center is in the planning stages and is transitioning from an  intelligence center, which was established prior to the 2002 Winter  Olympics.  One state, Wyoming, was planning to partner with an adjacent  state instead of building a physical fusion center.
section_title: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Support Fusion Centers Help to Address Some Reported Challenges and Provide Further Assistance
paragraphs: In light of the importance of fusion centers in facilitating information  sharing among levels of government, DHS and DOJ have several efforts  under way that begin to address challenges that fusion center officials  identified in establishing and operating their centers. DHS and DOJ have  made efforts to provide fusion centers access to federal information  systems, but some fusion center officials cited challenges accessing  relevant, actionable information and managing multiple information  systems. As a result, these center officials said that their ability to receive  and share information with those who need it may be limited. Additionally,  both DHS and the FBI have provided clearances to state and local officials,  but some fusion center officials told us they had encountered challenges  obtaining and using security clearances, which interfered with their ability  to obtain classified information. Further, notwithstanding DHS and FBI  efforts to deploy personnel to fusion centers and DHS’s grant funding to  support their establishment and enhancement, fusion center officials  noted challenges obtaining personnel and ensuring sufficient funding to  sustain the centers. Finally, DHS and DOJ have taken steps to develop  guidance and provide technical assistance and training, but fusion center  officials cited the need for clearer and more specific guidance in a variety  of areas to help address operational challenges.
subsections: section_title: DHS, FBI, and the PM-ISE Have Some Actions Under Way to Address Challenges Some Fusion Center Officials Cited with Accessing and Managing Multiple Information Systems
paragraphs: As described earlier, DHS and FBI have provided access to their primary  unclassified systems (HSIN and LEO) to many of the 43 operational fusion  centers we contacted. Further, DHS and DOJ have outlined plans to  provide access to their primary classified networks, HSDN and FBINET, to  state and local fusion centers that have federal personnel at the center.  However, officials in 31 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted told us that  they had difficulty obtaining access to federal information networks or  systems. For example, officials in some centers cited challenges with DHS  and FBI not providing fusion center personnel with direct access to their  classified systems. In these centers, fusion center personnel must rely on  federal personnel who are assigned to the center or other state personnel  assigned to FBI task forces to access these systems, obtain the relevant  information and share it with them. Further, officials in 12 of 58 fusion  centers reported challenges meeting system security requirements or  establishing technical capabilities necessary to access information  systems. For example, officials cited challenges with the cost and logistics  of setting up a secure room or installing the requisite hardware to access  the information systems.
DHS and FBI have taken steps to address these logistical challenges to  providing access to classified systems. For example, as part of its needs  assessment process, DHS reviews the fusion centers’ security status and  assesses its adequacy in light of DHS’s intention to assign personnel and  information systems in the center. The FBI has provided fusion centers  access to classified systems through JTTF members and has colocated  with some fusion centers in FBI space. Finally, several FBI field offices  have coordinated with fusion centers to rent or build and certify facilities  or secure rooms for those centers located outside of FBI-controlled space.  For example according to FBI field offices, it is paying estimated costs of  about $40,000 and $50,000 respectively to provide secure facilities in two  fusion centers.
While officials in many fusion centers cited challenges obtaining access to  systems, primarily classified systems, officials in 30 of the 58 fusion  centers we contacted told us that the high volume of information or the  existence of multiple systems with often redundant information was  challenging to manage. More specifically, officials in 18 fusion centers said  that they had difficulty with what they perceived to be the high volume of  information their center receives, variously describing the flow of  information as “overwhelming,” “information overload,” and “excessive.”  For example, officials said that center personnel must sort through the  large amount of information, much of which is not relevant to the center,  to find information that is useful or important to them. Additionally,  officials in 18 fusion centers found the lack of integration among these  multiple, competing, or duplicative information systems challenging, or  said that they wanted a single mechanism or system through which to  receive or send information. Finally, officials in 11 centers said that the  redundancy of information from these multiple sources posed a challenge.  For instance, an official said that the center receives volumes of  information that contain redundancies from DHS and the FBI. CRS also  reported that one of the most consistent and constant issues raised by  fusion center officials relates to the plethora of competing federal  information-sharing systems, including, but not limited to, DHS and DOJ  systems such as HSIN, HSDN, LEO, and RISS.
DHS/DOJ’s current joint guidance on operating fusion centers—the  Fusion Center Guidelines—does not delineate the primary systems to  which fusion centers should have access or provide guidance to centers  about how to manage multiple systems with potentially redundant  information. For example, the guidance recommends that fusion centers  obtain access to a variety of databases and systems and provides a list of  17 available system and network resources that provide homeland  security, terrorism-related, or law enforcement information, including the  LEO, RISS, and HSIN, but do not identify which of the 17 available systems  are critical to sharing information with federal counterparts. In addition,  we have previously reported on the redundancies and lack of coordination  among DHS’s HSIN and other systems. For example, we found in April  2007 that in developing HSIN, DHS did not work with the two key state  and local initiatives comprising major portions of the RISS program,  thereby putting itself at risk that HSIN duplicated state and local  capabilities. In that report, we recommended that DHS identify existing  and planned information-sharing initiatives and assess whether there are  opportunities for DHS to avoid duplication of effort. In response, DHS  initiated efforts to accomplish this goal—such as creating a bridge  between the RISS and HSIN systems to allow reports to flow back and  forth between these two systems—though it is currently too early to  determine the effect of these efforts.
The PM-ISE also reported that in consultation with the Information  Sharing Council, it has been coordinating the efforts of a working group  intended to address the issue of duplicative or redundant information  systems that handle sensitive but unclassified information. Officials from  the PM-ISE stated that this group has completed a review of the most  commonly used systems, such as LEO, RISS, and HSIN. According to the  officials, the review included an examination of the services provided by  the systems and the needs of the systems’ users to identify any potential  areas to streamline system access. The review is in accordance with  recommendations that fusion centers made during the National Fusion  Center Conference in March 2007. Specifically, fusion centers  recommended the federal government explore using a single sign-on or  search capability, which would facilitate accessing multiple systems.  Further, in our interviews, officials in 23 of the 58 fusion centers said that  DHS and DOJ, to facilitate the implementation of a national network of  fusion centers, should streamline existing systems or develop a unified  platform or mechanism for information sharing with fusion centers. In  addition, PM-ISE officials said that they, along with DHS and DOJ and  other federal agencies, were taking steps to improve the quality and flow  of information through the development of an Interagency Threat  Assessment Coordination Group (ITACG). As part of the National  Counterterrorism Center, this group will provide advice, counsel, and  subject-matter expertise to the intelligence community regarding the types  of terrorism-related information needed by state, local, and tribal  governments and how these entities use that terrorism-related information  to fulfill their counterterrorism responsibilities. In doing so, ITACG will  enable the timely production by the National Counterterrorism Center of  clear, relevant, and federally coordinated terrorism-related information  products intended for dissemination to state, local, and tribal officials. As  of September 2007, ITACG has achieved an initial operational capability,  according to PM-ISE officials. Additionally, the 9/11 Commission Act,  enacted in August 2007, made the ITACG a statutorily mandated body.
section_title: DHS and FBI Provide Clearances to Fusion Center Officials and Have Set Timeliness Goals for Doing So, but Officials Cited Some Challenges Obtaining and Using Clearances
paragraphs: Both DHS and the FBI have provided clearances for numerous state and  local personnel and have set goals to shorten the length of time it takes to  obtain a security clearance. DHS and the FBI provide clearances at the  Secret level for state and local officials with a need-to-know national  security information classified at the Confidential or Secret level, and the  FBI, when necessary, also provides clearances at the Top Secret level to  state and local officials with a need-to-know national security information  classified at this level and who need unescorted access in FBI facilities.  For instance, to date DHS reported that it had provided security  clearances, typically granted at the Secret level, for 1,291 state and local  personnel—not necessarily personnel in fusion centers.  The FBI, in  fiscal year 2007, reported that as of April it had provided 520 security  clearances, typically granted at the Top Secret level, to state and local  fusion center personnel.  Further, CRS reported that on average, as of  July 2007, each fusion center appeared to have 14 staff with Secret  clearances and 6 staff with Top Secret clearances. However, officials in  21 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted reported difficulties obtaining the  clearances necessary to access different levels of classified materials.
DHS and FBI also have provided centers with information for state and  local personnel about the security clearance process, stating that  processing time for individual security clearances can vary depending on  complexity. For example, DHS set a goal of 90 days to complete a Secret  clearance, and FBI set a goal of 45 to 60 days to complete a Secret  clearance and 6 to 9 months to complete a Top Secret clearance. Yet,  officials in 32 of the 58 fusion centers at the time we contacted them  reported difficulties with the length of time it takes to receive a security  clearance from DHS or the FBI. For example, in one center that receives  security clearances from both DHS and the FBI, officials said that it was  taking 6 to 9 months for a Secret clearance and 1 year to 1½ years for a  Top Secret clearance. While some fusion center officials acknowledged  that the process (and the associated length of time) was necessary—to  perform the requisite background checks to ensure that clearances are  only given to individuals who meet the requirements—others said it was  detrimental to the fusion center because newly hired or newly promoted  analysts were unable to work without the clearances to perform their  duties. To address timeliness concerns, the FBI has taken steps to reduce  the turnaround time for clearances. According to the FBI, Top Secret  security clearances granted by the FBI to state and local personnel in  March 2007 took an average of 63 days to complete, down from an average  of 116 days in fiscal year 2006. The FBI is also implementing both short- term solutions—including prioritization of background investigations for  state, local, and tribal officials and the electronic submission of  fingerprints—and long-term solutions, such as training fusion center  security officers to conduct preliminary background checks, according to  a May 2007 FBI Interagency Integration Unit review of security clearances.  Indeed, officials at one fusion center told us that when the center was  opening in 2003, it took approximately 2 years to obtain a clearance, but in  January 2007, it took only 3 months to obtain a security clearance for new  personnel.
While law and executive order provide that a security clearance granted by  one federal agency should generally be accepted by other agencies,  officials in 19 fusion centers we contacted said they faced challenges with  federal agencies, particularly DHS and the FBI, accepting each others’  clearances. This reported lack of reciprocity could hinder the centers’  ability to access facilities, computer systems, and information from  multiple agencies. For example, an official at one fusion center who holds  an FBI security clearance said he was unable to access other federal  agencies’ facilities. An official at another fusion center said that DHS did  not accept clearances that had been issued by the FBI to fusion center  personnel and therefore would not provide access to information  technology or intelligence.
DHS and DOJ officials said that they were not aware of fusion centers  encountering recent challenges with reciprocity of security clearances, but  they said that there were complications in the clearance process. For  example, a DHS official said that multiple federal agencies carry out their  own clearance processes and grant clearances without central  coordination. For example, both DHS and the FBI could each be  conducting a separate security clearance investigation and determining  eligibility for access to classified information on the same individual. An  FBI official also explained that some agencies and some parts of the  Department of Defense do require a polygraph examination to obtain a  clearance and some do not, so reciprocity among those agencies with  different standards may be an issue. Indeed, the DHS official  acknowledged that, overall, federal agencies do not have a consolidated  system for granting and handling security clearances and said that  currently there are not sufficient federal efforts to develop such a system.
section_title: Fusion Center Officials We Contacted Cited Challenges with Personnel and Funding; DHS and FBI Are Helping to Address These Issues to Some Extent but Have Not Defined Plans for Long- Term Support
paragraphs: Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted reported facing  several challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 of the  centers reported encountering funding challenges when establishing and  operating their centers, challenges which some of these officials also  indicated affected their centers’ sustainability. Although many of these  reported challenges were attributed to difficulties at the state and local  level, DHS and FBI have efforts under way to help support fusion centers  by providing some personnel and grant funding.
subsections: section_title: Obtaining and Retaining Qualified Personnel Was Reported as a Challenge for Many Centers
paragraphs: Officials in 37 of the 58 centers we contacted said they had difficulty with  state, local, and federal agencies assigning personnel to the center—one  means of staffing the centers—primarily as a result of resource  constraints. Most (27 of the 37) of these officials identified challenges with  state and local agencies rather than with federal agencies contributing  personnel. For instance, an official at one fusion center said that, because  of limited resources in state and local agencies, it is challenging to  convince these agencies to contribute personnel to the center because  they view doing so as a loss of resources. In addition, officials in 8 of the  58 centers we contacted said that they had difficulty with state and local  agencies contributing personnel to their centers specifically because the  state and local agencies had to continue to fund the salaries of personnel  assigned to the fusion centers from their own budgets. Similarly, CRS  reported that there are many cases in which local law enforcement  agencies appear unconvinced of the value of fusion centers—and by their  cost/benefit analysis, it does not benefit their agencies to detail personnel  to the center. In terms of federal personnel, officials in 11 of the 58 fusion  centers said that they encountered challenges with federal agencies not  contributing personnel to their centers.
In addition, officials in 20 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted said that  they faced challenges finding, attracting, and retaining qualified personnel.  Specifically, officials from 12 of these centers said that they had difficulty  finding qualified personnel. For instance, an official from one fusion  center said that finding personnel with the expertise to understand the  concept behind the development of the center and to use the tools to build  the center was challenging, while an official at another fusion center  acknowledged that there was a very limited number of qualified  candidates in the state from which to hire personnel. Additionally, officials  in eight centers reported that retention was a challenge because of  competition with other entities, particularly higher-paying federal agencies  and private sector companies. In some cases, such as for those analysts  hired by the FBI, the official said that the federal salaries are almost twice  what the center could afford to pay. An official at another fusion center  expressed concern that, if fusion centers do not find a way to offer state  and local analysts a career path comparable to that offered by the federal  agencies, fusion centers will see a plateau in the quality of available  analysts.
section_title: DHS and FBI Have Deployed Personnel to Fusion Centers
paragraphs: To support fusion centers and facilitate information sharing, DHS and FBI  have each assigned federal personnel to centers. As of September 2007,  DHS had deployed intelligence officers to 17 of the 43 operational fusion  centers we contacted, and was in the process of staffing 6 additional  centers we contacted. The FBI had assigned personnel to about three  quarters of the operational fusion centers we contacted. Additionally, DHS  was in the process of staffing 2 local fusion centers we did not contact,  and the FBI had assigned personnel to 7 local fusion centers that were not  included in our review.
In terms of the future, DHS plans to place intelligence officers in as many  as 35 fusion centers by the end of fiscal year 2008. DHS has not  determined to what extent it will provide additional staff to centers after  the first round of assessments and placements are completed. For its part,  FBI officials noted in January 2007 that the FBI process and criteria for  staffing personnel to fusion centers remains ongoing. Because of the  variety of fusion centers, the FBI—through its field office leaders— conducts its staffing efforts on a case-by-base basis using criteria such as  whether the fusion center has a facility, connectivity to state and local  systems, and personnel from multiple agencies.
section_title: Fusion Center Officials Cited Challenges with the Federal Grant Process, Obtaining Sustainable Funding, and Federal Grant Restrictions
paragraphs: Officials in 35 of the 58 centers we contacted cited a variety of challenges  with the federal grant process, including its complexity, and challenges  related to uncertain federal funding or declining federal funding,  challenges that led to overall concerns about the sustainability of the  centers. For example, officials in 16 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted  said that they faced challenges with the federal grant process, including  unclear and changing grant guidance and a lack of understanding of how  federal funding decisions are made. One official said that the fusion center  did not perceive a link between the work performed at the center and the  level of federal funding received, and hence, he did not understand how  DHS made its funding decisions for fusion centers. The official added that  it is important for local units of government to better understand these  issues to help them understand the need to provide funding for fusion  centers. Further, officials in 22 of the fusion centers said that they  encountered challenges related to the sustainability of federal funding,  such as the potential for, or actual, declining federal funding, which  created concerns for the officials about their centers’ ability to sustain  capability for the long term. Officials at another fusion center said that  they are concerned that they will establish a fusion center with DHS  funding only to have the funding end in the future and the center close  because the region is unable to support it. When asked about key factors  for sustaining their centers, officials in 41 of the 58 fusion centers  indicated funding, and several specified a sustainable source or  mechanism for that funding.
Officials in 40 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted identified challenges  with finding adequate funding for specific components of their centers’  operations—in particular personnel, training, and facilities—and officials  in 24 of those 40 centers related these challenges to restrictions and  requirements of federal grant funding. Specifically, officials in 21 fusion  centers we contacted said that obtaining adequate funding for personnel  was difficult, and officials in 17 fusion centers found federal time limits on  the use of DHS grant funds for personnel challenging—challenges that  they said could affect the sustainability of their centers. For example, one  official at another fusion center said that the 2-year time limit on the use of  DHS grant funds for personnel makes retaining the personnel challenging  because state and local agencies may lack the resources to continue  funding the positions, which could hinder the fusion center’s ability to  continue to operate. Officials in eight of the fusion centers expressed  concerns about maintaining their personnel levels, particularly if federal  funding declines. For instance, one fusion center official said that a state  police official did not want to fund analysts with federal grant funds  because of a concern that, if the federal grant funds end, the center will  lose qualified personnel who will take away their knowledge base.  Furthermore, officials in 17 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted found  complying with the DHS grant requirement for training newly hired  analysts (that they attend training within 6 months or have previous  analytical experience) or the funding costs associated with training  challenging. For example, one fusion center official said that the center  found limitations on the particular training the grant funds can be used for  to be challenging. In addition, officials in 14 of the centers said that they  had difficulty funding training costs, such as when using the funds for  training conflicted with buying equipment or other tangible goods. Finally,  officials in 14 fusion centers said that funding their facilities poses a  challenge, particularly because of DHS restrictions on the use of grant  funds for construction and renovation. For example, officials in eight  fusion centers said that the DHS grant restrictions on construction and  renovation have made it challenging to meet security requirements for  their facilities, build a secure room, or build or renovate their facilities.
Officials in 17 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted said that competition  for funding with state and local entities was challenging, particularly as a  result of the pass-through requirement associated with DHS grant funding  in which the state must make no less than 80 percent of the total grant  available to local units of government. For example, one fusion center  official said that it is very difficult for state-run fusion centers to cover  costs such as hiring analysts and completing renovations to their physical  space out of the 20 percent of the DHS grant funds they are eligible to  receive after the state complies with the pass-through requirement. Other  officials noted that, even after the state has complied with the pass- through requirement, fusion centers must still compete with other state  and local entities for the remaining DHS funding. For instance, one fusion  center official said that the state emergency management agency wants to  dedicate DHS funds to priorities other than the fusion center, such as the  purchase of new fire-fighting equipment. CRS also reported that the  80 percent funding requirement was cited continually by fusion center  officials as a major hurdle in channeling homeland security funds toward  statewide fusion center efforts.
Officials in 28 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted told us that they also  had difficulty obtaining state or local funding for a variety of other  reasons, including state or local budgetary constraints; challenges with  convincing state officials, for example, in disciplines other than law  enforcement, to provide funding to support the fusion center; and  managing state and local officials who thought the federal government  should be responsible for funding fusion centers. Further, 5 of these fusion  center officials expressed concerns about their centers’ long-term  sustainability without state or local funding. For example, one official said  that federal funding for the center will eventually end and the state will  need to provide funding to support the fusion center, but the state  currently has no plan for providing that support. However, an official at  another fusion center expressed concern that federal funding could cause  states to lose autonomy over their centers, and the centers would become  federal fusion centers located in a state rather than the state fusion centers  originally envisioned.
section_title: DHS Has Provided Grant Funding for Fusion-Related Activities and Made Some Changes to Grants for Fusion Centers
paragraphs: DHS homeland security grant programs, such as SHSP, LETPP, and UASI,  have provided funding to state and local entities for data collection,  analysis, fusion, and information-sharing projects, and DHS has adjusted  the programs for fusion centers. Table 2 shows that from fiscal years 2004  through 2006, DHS allocated almost $131 million to states and local areas  from these programs for what DHS defined as fusion-related activities.
Further, according to DHS, 49 states and 37 local jurisdictions submitted  grant investment justifications in fiscal year 2007 in support of  information-sharing and dissemination efforts, with requests for funding  totaling nearly $180 million, though exact funding amounts had not been  determined as of August 2007. Exact funding amounts for fusion centers  will be determined on the basis of the prioritization and allocation of funds  by states. For fiscal year 2007, DHS included language in its grant  guidelines emphasizing fusion center activities and explicitly made  establishing and enhancing fusion centers a priority for the Law  Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program. However, these grant  programs are not specifically targeted at or limited to fusion centers. As a  result, funding provided to states may not necessarily reach a particular  fusion center because, as a DHS official noted, states are free to  reprioritize their use of grant funds after submitting their grant  justifications to DHS and receiving allocated funds. Thus, fusion centers  cannot be certain that they will receive funds to sustain fusion center  activities from year to year or over the long term.
Over time, DHS has also made several changes to help address challenges  identified by fusion centers by focusing homeland security grants on  fusion-related activities, by taking steps to ease the grant process, and by  adjusting some of the restrictions on the timing and use of grant funds. For  example, DHS expanded grant funding in fiscal year 2006 in the area of  allowable costs for information sharing and collaborative efforts. Funds  could be used by states to develop and enhance their fusion centers,  particularly by hiring contract or government employees as intelligence  analysts; purchasing information technology hardware, software and  communications equipment; hiring consultants to make recommendations  on fusion center development; or by leasing office space for use by a  fusion center. In addition, DHS continued to make Homeland Security  Grant Program adjustments in fiscal year 2007 based on outreach to grant  program stakeholders. For example, DHS gave potential applicants more  time to complete the grant application process and the period for  performance under HSGP grants increased from 2 years to 3 years.
section_title: DHS and DOJ Have Provided Guidance, Technical Assistance, and Training to Fusion Centers
paragraphs: DHS and DOJ have collaborated to provide guidance and technical  assistance to fusion centers and, along with the PM-ISE, have sponsored  regional and national conferences, in part to determine the needs of fusion  centers. For example, DHS and DOJ jointly issued their most recent  Fusion Center Guidelines in August 2006 that outline 18 recommended  elements for establishing and operating fusion centers. The Guidelines  were intended as a way to ensure state and local fusion centers could be  established and operated consistently and were developed to help fusion  center administrators create policies, manage resources, and evaluate  fusion center services. Officials in 48 of the 58 fusion centers told us that  the Guidelines were generally good and useful. However, officials in 20 of  the 58 fusion centers we contacted found the available federal guidance  lacking in specificity, conflicting, confusing, or difficult to implement in  their individual centers. For example, some of these officials said that the  Guidelines were broad and did not provide guidance on specific issues  relevant to operating a fusion center, such as how to connect the multiple  information-sharing systems or set up their physical space. In addition,  officials in 19 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted said that they lacked  guidance on specific information-sharing policies and procedures, such as  sharing or handling sensitive or classified information or privacy and civil  liberties issues. For example, officials in some fusion centers we contacted  said that they lacked guidance on sharing and handling classified  information, and officials in five fusion centers said the lack of guidance  on privacy and civil liberties issues is a concern when sharing or storing  information. To illustrate, officials at one fusion center said that the  absence of an encompassing guideline to use as a standard makes it  difficult to manage information sharing across levels of government and  among states because of the variations in state and federal privacy laws  and regulations. For instance, federal regulation provides that certain  information on individuals may not be retained for longer than 5 years,  whereas the center’s state requirement provides that information may not  be retained for longer than 1 year.
FEMA/NPD, DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), and the FBI have  partnered to provide a program of technical assistance services for fusion  centers to facilitate information sharing. As shown in table 3, many of the  technical services provided under this program provide an overview or  general information, and the technical assistance efforts focus on giving  the state or local area the basic tools they need to successfully establish  and operate a fusion center, such as helping to create a governance board,  assisting with the development of a fusion process of implementation plan,  and providing the basics of fusion center operations. As of September  2007, there have been 35 service deliveries to 19 fusion centers, according  to FEMA/NPD and BJA officials.
DHS and DOJ have numerous efforts to provide training to fusion centers.  Also, DHS offers over 90 courses from 45 training partners and is working  to increase the availability of training under Homeland Security Grant  Program funding. According to FEMA/NPD officials, DHS recently  approved for funding three courses, two of which involve analyst training.  DHS and BJA provide a number of training services under their joint  technical assistance program, and the FBI provides ongoing training for  fusion centers through its field offices. However, officials in 21 of the  58 fusion centers we contacted said that the availability of adequate  training for mission-related issues, such as training on intelligence analysis  was a challenge. Further, officials in 11 fusion centers we contacted, most  of whom were in fusion centers that had been in operation for more than  2 years, said that they lacked national standards or guidelines for analyst  training or qualifications. For example, one fusion center official said that  no one federal agency has taken responsibility for determining a single,  standardized training agenda—including content and length of time—for  both new and experienced analysts. Officials in another fusion center said  that the center had difficulty creating a training program for its analysts  because of the lack of a coordinated, trusted set of training guidelines.  Two other officials said that they would like to see a federal baseline for  appropriate and necessary training for analysts with a certification  attached to its completion or a standardized course of analyst training to  ensure that analysts are trained in the same way nationwide. They said  that this would help fusion center analysts better communicate and be  more likely to share information with analysts in other centers.
DHS and FBI officials noted some challenges with designating a single  training curriculum for fusion center analysts because agencies and  training groups differ on what should constitute the minimum baseline.  To remedy this, the NFCCG has developed and documented minimum  baseline capabilities for state and major urban area fusion centers, and as  of September 2007 was in the process of evaluating the current level of  capability of designated state and major urban area fusion centers. The  minimum baseline capabilities require fusion centers to develop a training  plan to ensure their personnel are knowledgeable of fusion center  operations, policies, and procedures, including training on the intelligence  and fusion processes, analytic processes and writing skills, security policy  and protocols, and the fusion center mission and goals. However, it is too  soon to determine the extent to which the baseline document sets out  minimum training standards for fusion center analysts that would address  the challenges fusion centers reported to us.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Although state and local governments created fusion centers to fill their  information needs, the centers have attracted the attention of the federal  government as it works to improve information sharing with state, local,  and tribal entities in accordance with the Homeland Security and  Intelligence Reform Acts, as amended.  Indeed, recognizing that the  collaboration between fusion centers and the federal government marks a  tremendous increase in the nation’s overall analytic capacity that can be  used to combat terrorism, the PM-ISE’s implementation plan envisions  that the federal government will work to promote fusion center initiatives  to facilitate information sharing and designates fusion centers as the focus  of sharing with state, local, and tribal governments. Given the federal  interest in fusion centers and the fusion centers’ interest in supporting  such a national network, it is important that the federal government  continue to provide fusion centers with added value as an incentive to  facilitate such a network. To date, DHS’s and DOJ’s efforts to assist fusion  centers, such as providing access to information systems, security  clearances, personnel, funding, and guidance have begun to address a  number of the challenges fusion center directors identified to us.  However, it is also important for fusion center management to understand  the federal government’s longer-term role with respect to these centers.  Many fusion center officials were uncertain about the level of future  resources and the sustainability of federal support. Although the federal  government cannot make promises regarding future resources, decisions  could be made and articulated to fusion centers regarding whether the  federal government views its role with respect to providing resources— such as grant funding, facilities, personnel, and information-sharing  systems—to fusion centers as short term for start-up resources or longer  term for operational needs. The National Fusion Center Coordination  Group (NFCCG) is already tasked with identifying grant funding, technical  assistance, and training to support fusion centers. However, to date, the  efforts of the NFCCG have not included delineating whether such  assistance is for the short-term establishment or for the long-term  sustainability of fusion centers. The NFCCG, through the PM-ISE and the  Information Sharing Council, would be in the best position to articulate  whether fusion centers can expect to continue to receive this support over  the longer term.
section_title: Recommendation
paragraphs: To improve efforts to create a national network of fusion centers, we  recommend that the NFCCG, through the Information Sharing Council and  the PM-ISE, determine and articulate the federal government’s role in, and  whether it expects to provide resources to, fusion centers over the long- term to help ensure their sustainability. Particular emphasis should be  placed on how best to sustain those fusion center functions that support a  national information sharing capability as critical nodes of the ISE.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of  Homeland Security, the Acting Attorney General, and the Program  Manager for the Information Sharing Environment or their designees. In  commenting on drafts of the report, DHS and the PM-ISE concurred with  our recommendation that the federal government should determine its  long-term fusion center role and whether it expects to provide resources  to centers to help ensure their sustainability.  DOJ had no comments on  the draft.  Further, DHS commented that it, along with its federal partners,  is reviewing strategies to sustain fusion centers as part of the work plan of  the National Fusion Center Coordination Group. This group plans on  presenting these strategies to the federal departments before the end of  the year.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. We will then send copies of this report to the Secretary of the  Department of Homeland Security, the Acting Attorney General, the  Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, selected  congressional committees, and other interested parties. In addition, this  report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact information for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of our review were to (1) describe the stages of  development and characteristics of state and local fusion centers and  (2) identify to what extent efforts under way by the Program Manager for  the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), Department of Homeland  Security (DHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ) help to address some of  the challenges identified by fusion centers.
To describe the stages of development and characteristics of state and  local fusion centers, we conducted semistructured telephone interviews  with the director (or his or her designee) of every state fusion center, the  District of Columbia fusion center, and eight local fusion centers. We  defined “local fusion center” to include centers established by major urban  areas, counties, cities, and intrastate regions. Our selection criteria for  local fusion centers included their relationships with the state fusion  center, stage of development, and geographic diversity. Fusion center  officials we spoke with included state and local police officials, agents in  state bureaus of investigation, state homeland security directors, and  directors in state public safety departments. Where a fusion center was in  the planning stages, we spoke with officials involved in planning and  establishing the center, such as directors of state homeland security  offices. We asked fusion center officials about the status and  characteristics of the fusion centers, including their stages of  development, reasons for establishing, scopes of operations, and the types  of funding the centers received. We relied on the centers’ own definitions  of themselves as fusion centers and did not evaluate their status,  characteristics, or operations. From February through May, we spoke with  officials from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 8 local  jurisdictions. While we did contact officials in all state fusion centers, we  did not contact officials in all local fusion centers; therefore our results are  not generalizable to the universe of fusion centers. Data were not available  to determine the total number of local fusion centers.
We also obtained and summarized descriptive information from the fusion  centers including structure, organization, personnel, and information  technology systems used. We provided the summaries to the fusion  centers for a review of accuracy. However, we did not independently  verify all of the information provided to us. We also interviewed officials  from 11 agencies conducting research on state and local information  sharing, including RAND, the Police Executive Research Forum, the  International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the Congressional  Research Service (CRS), which released a report in July 2007 on fusion  centers. Finally, to obtain detailed information about centers’ operations,  we conducted site visits to fusion centers in Atlanta, Georgia; Phoenix,  Arizona; Richmond, Virginia; Baltimore, Maryland; West Trenton, New  Jersey; and New York, New York. Our selection criteria for these centers  included their stages of development, extent of federal partnerships, and  geographic representation.
To identify to what extent efforts under way by the PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ  help to address some of the challenges identified by fusion centers, we  analyzed fusion center responses to our semistructured telephone  interviews, reviewed applicable documents, and interviewed officials at  the PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ, as well as several organizations conducting  research about fusion centers. Specifically, to describe the challenges  fusion centers encountered in establishing themselves and operating, we  asked officials during our semistructured telephone interviews whether  they had encountered challenges in 10 different categories and, if so, the  extent to which the category was a challenge both at establishment and,  for operational centers, in day-to-day operations. These categories  included federal partnerships, personnel, guidance, training, funding,  access to information, and security clearances. Fusion center officials  provided open-ended, descriptive responses of challenges faced by their  centers. On the basis of a content analysis of fusion center officials’  responses, we identified, categorized, and counted similar challenges.  Fusion center officials may not have indicated that they encountered all  the challenges discussed in the report. In addition, individual fusion center  officials may have identified multiple challenges in a given category, for  example funding. We also reviewed CRS’s July 2007 report to obtain  information on fusion center challenges.
In addition, to determine to what extent efforts under way by the PM-ISE,  DHS, and DOJ help to address some of the challenges identified by fusion  centers, we reviewed applicable federal laws, executive orders, directives,  briefings, testimonies, plans, reports, and documents to identify efforts of  the PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ to address challenges identified by fusion  centers. We interviewed officials at the PM-ISE’s office, DHS’s Office of  Intelligence and Analysis, the Federal Emergency Management Agency  National Preparedness Directorate, the Federal Bureau of Investigation  (FBI), and DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance and discussed efforts under  way to address challenges identified by fusion centers. We also asked  fusion center officials in our semistructured telephone interviews to  describe the support they had received and were interested in receiving  from DHS and the FBI.
We performed our work from August 2006 through September 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Operational Fusion Centers
paragraphs: Table 4 presents information about operational fusion centers as reported  to us by fusion center officials during semistructured interviews, as of  September 2007. During these interviews, we asked officials to  characterize their fusion centers as being in one of the following stages:  planning, early development, intermediate (limited operations and  functionality), or developed (fully operational and fully functional).
section_title: Appendix III: Fusion Centers in the Planning and Early Stages of Development
paragraphs: Table 5 presents information about fusion centers in the planning and  early stages of development, as reported to us by fusion center officials  during semistructured interviews as of September 2007. During these  interviews, we asked officials to characterize their fusion centers as being  in one of the following stages: planning, early development, intermediate  (limited operations and functionality), or developed (fully operational and  fully functional).
section_title: Appendix IV: Summary of State and Local Fusion Centers GAO Contacted
paragraphs: Following is a summary of the status and selected characteristics of the  state and local fusion centers we contacted between February and May  2007. The summaries are primarily based on documents provided to us by  fusion centers and interviews we conducted with fusion center officials.  Specifically, we obtained and summarized documentation about the  centers that covered a variety of topics including mission; lead agency;  staffing; federal, state, and local entities represented; and types of services  performed and products disseminated. During semistructured interviews  with officials, we asked about the stage of development of the fusion  center, reasons for establishing the center, and the scope of operations  (e.g., counterterrorism). In some instances we augmented the information  provided to us by fusion center officials with publicly available  information about the fusion center or information provided to us by the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the FBI. We sent the  summaries to the fusion centers for a review of accuracy as of September  2007. However, we did not independently verify all of the information  provided to us.
subsections: section_title: Alabama
paragraphs: The Alabama Department of Homeland Security is in the final planning  stage of establishing the Alabama Information Fusion Center. The center  intends to use information not normally considered crime-related to  prevent terrorist activity, but it will also adopt an all-crimes scope of  operations. The fusion center has appointed an officer in charge and is in  the process of acquiring additional staff members.  However, the center is  not yet fully operational. The executive order that will establish the office  has been submitted to the Governor for approval, and it is expected that  the fusion center will open for business in the fall of 2007.
section_title: Alaska
paragraphs: The Alaska Fusion Center is in the advanced planning stage with the major  concentration being on defining the missions, developing the governance,  and outlining potential products and services. The fusion center will be a  combined effort of the Alaska Department of Public Safety and the Alaska  Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. While they  do not have a physical fusion center, planning officials have partnerships  established with the FBI, other federal and state law enforcement, the U.S.  Attorney’s Office, the U.S. Coast Guard, the military, and the Federal  Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Through these partnerships, the  member agencies already share information and coordinate activities. The  officials said that they are considering the advantages of a joint,  permanently staffed facility. If feasible and advantageous, they will plan to  build or move into an available facility in the future.
The Alaska Fusion Center will have an all-crimes, all-hazards, and all- source scope of operations. As a result of Public Safety and Homeland  Security and Emergency Management involvement in developing the  fusion center, the center will have both law enforcement and emergency  management components. All-source includes law enforcement as well as  economic information and infrastructure issues. The center will have three  focus areas: day-to-day compilation, distillation, and distribution of  information products; analyses and assessments of patterns and trends in  the risks, threats, and hazards facing Alaska; and serving as an operational  planning group serving all agencies when a threat emerges or a disaster  occurs.  The center has access to DHS’s Homeland Security Information  Network (HSIN), Department of Justice’s Law Enforcement Online (LEO),  and the Department of Defense’s Secret Internet Protocol Router Network  (SIPRNet).
section_title: Arizona
paragraphs: The Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (AcTIC) opened in  October 2004 as a cross-jurisdictional partnership among local, state, and  federal law enforcement; first responders; and emergency management.  Mandated by the Governor’s Arizona Homeland Security plan, AcTIC’s  mission is to protect the citizens and critical infrastructures of Arizona by  enhancing intelligence and domestic preparedness operations for all local,  state, and federal law enforcement agencies. Mission execution will be  guided by the understanding that the key to effectiveness is the  development of information among participants to the fullest extent  permitted by law or agency policy. AcTIC has an all-crimes focus and both  an analytical and investigative scope of operations.
AcTIC is run jointly by the FBI and the Arizona Department of Public  Safety. There are 24 state, local, and federal agencies represented in the  center. Among them are the Arizona Department of Public Safety; Arizona  Department of Homeland Security; Arizona National Guard; Arizona Motor  Vehicle Department; Arizona Department of Liquor License & Control; a  number of county and city fire and law enforcement departments; the  Rocky Mountain Information Network; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,  and Firearms (ATF); U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE);  the Department of State; DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A);  and the FBI. AcTIC is colocated in the same building with the FBI’s Joint  Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and Field Intelligence Group (FIG). These  FBI groups are located in a separate suite and operate at the Top  Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) level. In addition,  AcTIC has collaborated with Arizona State University-West Campus to  create an internship program. Overall, there are about 240 personnel in  AcTIC, including investigators, analysts, and support personnel. Most  AcTIC personnel receive Secret clearances from the FBI. AcTIC is  overseen by a Management Board that consists of the leader of every  agency represented in the center and a governor-appointed Oversight  Committee that provides guidance to the center.
Within AcTIC, there is a Watch Center that is the central location for all  information coming into the AcTIC. In addition, the facility houses the  Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) squad, the HAZMAT/Weapons of Mass  Destruction unit, a computer forensics laboratory, the Criminal  Investigations Research Unit, Geographical Information Systems, and the  Violent Criminal Apprehension Program.
AcTIC concentrates on an all-crimes focus for gathering information,  which is collected from a variety of Web sites; federal, state, and local  databases and networks; the media; and unclassified intelligence bulletins.  DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the center  include LEO Special Interest Groups, HSIN-Intel, HSIN-Intel Arizona, and  HSDN. AcTIC has direct connectivity to FBI classified systems and  networks.  However, those AcTIC personnel with Top Secret clearances  must enter the JTTF suite and access an FBI system. AcTIC has access to,  among others, Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) Automated  Trusted Information Exchange (ATIX), SIPRNet, the National Criminal  Information Center (NCIC), International Criminal Police Organization  (INTERPOL), Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), and El  Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). In total AcTIC has over 100 law  enforcement and public source databases available to it. AcTIC produces  biweekly intelligence briefings, advisories, citizens’ bulletins, information  collection requirement bulletins, information bulletins, intelligence  bulletins, and threat assessments. These products are primarily created for  law enforcement entities and specific community partners, but some are  for the public (e.g., advisories and citizens’ bulletins). The products are  typically disseminated via e-mail, Web site postings to LEO or HSIN, or  faxes on occasion.
section_title: Arkansas
paragraphs: The Arkansas State Police is in the early stage of development of the  Arkansas Fusion Center. The focus of the Arkansas Fusion Center will  initially be all crimes and all threats, although the intent is to incorporate  an all-hazards element in the future. Currently, the center has  commitments from the following federal, state, and local agencies to  assign between 12 to 13 full-time personnel to the center: FBI, Arkansas  Highway Police, Arkansas Crime Information Center, Arkansas National  Guard, Arkansas Department of Corrections, Arkansas Department of  Health, Arkansas State Police, Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, the  Arkansas Association of Chiefs of Police, and the Arkansas Sheriff’s  Association. The officials said that they expect to receive funding in the  fall of 2007, and that the center may be able to begin limited operations by  the winter of 2007.
section_title: California
paragraphs: In addition to the State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (STTAC),  California has established four regional fusion centers known as Regional  Terrorism Threat Analysis Centers (RTTACs) that are located in San  Diego, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Sacramento and correspond to the  FBI’s four field office regions. The mission of the RTTACs is to collect,  fuse, and analyze information related to terrorism from local law  enforcement, fire departments, and public health and private sector  entities. Each RTTAC is uniquely organized, but each is closely linked with  local sheriffs. We contacted the STTAC, the Los Angeles RTTAC, known as  the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC), and the Sacramento RTTAC.
subsections: section_title: State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center
paragraphs: Former Governor Gray Davis and Attorney General Bill Lockyer created  the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center on September 25, 2001,  and in December 2005 the center was transformed into the State Terrorism  Threat Assessment Center. STTAC is a joint partnership of the Governor’s  Office of Homeland Security, California Department of Justice, and the  California Highway Patrol. The mission of STTAC is to serve as a joint  operation among the parties with the function of receiving, analyzing, and  maintaining relevant intelligence information obtained from various  federal, state, local, and tribal sources, and disseminating  counterterrorism intelligence information in appropriate formats to  individuals and entities in California for the purpose of protecting  California’s citizens, property, and infrastructure from terrorist acts.
STTAC’s core mission is serving as California’s central all-crimes and  counterterrorism criminal intelligence center. STTAC is also to perform  warning functions with the California State Warning Center in the Office of  Emergency Services.
STTAC operates in close cooperation with the Office of Homeland  Security, California Highway Patrol, Office of Emergency Services, the  four RTTACs, and federal agencies including DHS and FBI. STTAC’s  authorized staff level is 44, and the staff is composed primarily of  California Department of Justice and Office of Homeland Security analysts  and investigators. There are also representatives from the California  Highway Patrol and the state National Guard. STTAC does not have DHS  or FBI staff assigned directly to it. However, DHS has provided one senior  intelligence officer who resides at the Sacramento RTTAC and supports  STTAC and another officer who resides at the Los Angeles JRIC. The FBI  provides support to STTAC upon request and has assigned personnel to all  of the California RTTACs.  An Executive Management Board consisting of  leaders from the partner agencies provides strategic oversight of STTAC.
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion  center include HSIN (e.g., the Law Enforcement, Counterterrorism, and  Intel portals), LEO, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) portal, and the  Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force portal, as well as several California  law enforcement and justice information and intelligence systems and  commercially available databases.
STTAC provides intelligence support to all state agencies and disseminates  situational awareness products. For instance, it supports regional  intelligence analysis and criminal investigations by supplying the RTTACs  analytical support, field investigations, and intelligence assessments and  reports, among other things. STTAC produces a variety of intelligence  products including, but not limited to, the following: advisories that  provide a brief description of a local tactical issue, suspect, event, or  situation that may be of immediate concern to law enforcement or key  policy makers; intelligence bulletins that provide a strategic in-depth  review of a particular terrorist group, event, or public safety issue  affecting the state; alerts that are issued when there is a specific, validated,  and verified threat; special reports that provide extensive overviews of a  particular group or issue and contain background information, methods  and geographical areas of operation, violence potential, conclusions, and  recommendations for interdicting the activity; and threat assessments.
section_title: Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center
paragraphs: The Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) opened in July  2006. However, according to Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and  FBI officials, the three founding agencies of JRIC—the Los Angeles  Sheriff’s Department, FBI Los Angeles, and the Los Angeles Police  Department (LAPD)—came together and realized that the region needed a  center to address counterterrorism and critical infrastructure protection  missions after the events of 9/11. The County Sheriff, the Chief of LAPD,  and the Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI Los Angeles Field Office  jointly decided to develop the center to cover the seven counties in the Los  Angeles/southern California area. JRIC brought together the FBI’s FIG,  LAPD’s Major Crimes Division, and the Sheriff Department’s Terrorism  Early Warning (TEW) group.
JRIC has an all-crimes and counterterrorism scope of operations.  Specifically, JRIC collects information using an all-crimes approach,  converts the information into operational and strategic intelligence, and  disseminates the intelligence to prevent terrorist attacks and combat  crime in the Central District of California. Its mission is intelligence intake,  fusion, and analysis, with an emphasis on terrorist threat intelligence;  providing timely, regionally focused, and actionable information to  consumers and producing assessments; and identifying trends, patterns  and terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures; and sponsoring training  opportunities.
In addition to JRIC’s founding agencies, cooperating agencies in JRIC  include DHS I&A, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Governor’s Office of  Homeland Security, and California Department of Justice. DHS I&A has  assigned an intelligence officer to JRIC, and the center includes about 30  full-time personnel representing 14 agencies.  JRIC personnel receive  Secret or Top Secret clearances from the FBI. TLOs connect law  enforcement and public safety partners in the seven-county region to JRIC  by collecting, assessing, and passing on information, intelligence, tips, and  leads to the center and then distributing advisories, bulletins, assessments,  and requests for information to their home agencies.
JRIC collects information from national reporting; leads and tips from the  FBI, LAPD, the Sheriff’s Department and the TLOs; and from private sector  outreach. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to  JRIC include LEO; every HSIN portal (e.g., Intelligence, Law Enforcement,  Emergency Management); the classified Homeland Security Data Network  (HSDN); and all of the system and databases available in the FBI’s  FBINet/Trilogy system. The center also has access to the FBI’s Top Secret  network, the Sensitive Compartmental Information Operational Network  (SCION) through a facility located on the same floor as JRIC.  JRIC  disseminates information to, among others, JTTFs, California Office of  Homeland Security, DHS and LEO portals, law enforcement and public  safety partners, affected municipality and critical infrastructure owners,  and the originator of the information (in the form of feedback). JRIC also  produces daily and weekly reports.
section_title: Sacramento Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center
paragraphs: The Sacramento RTTAC was established primarily to bring analysts from  different state, local, and federal agencies together to work on terrorism- related issues. The center has been located in its current building, which  has a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), and operating  at its current level of functionality, at the TS/SCI level, since November  2006. Prior to that, the center operated at a Law Enforcement Sensitive  level for about 2 years in a different facility. RTTAC has an all-crimes and  counterterrorism scope of operations and handles all of the critical asset  management and threat assessment capabilities in its area of  responsibility.
Participating agencies include the National Guard, FBI, U.S. Attorney’s  Office, ICE, and representatives from fire, law enforcement, and public  health disciplines. DHS I&A has assigned an intelligence officer, and the  FBI has assigned two analysts and one intelligence research specialist, and  recently added a JTTF threat squad to the RTTAC team to vet tips and  leads.  In addition, there are other state and local analysts in the center.  The FBI also provides RTTAC personnel with TS/SCI security clearances.
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion  center include LEO, HSIN, HSIN-Counterterrorism portal, HSDN, as well  as FBI systems, such as the Automated Case Support (ACS) system and  SCION. The RTTAC also has access to SIPRNet, among other federal and  state systems and networks.
section_title: Colorado
paragraphs: The Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC) became operational in  October 2004 under the direction of the Colorado Bureau of Investigation.  The Colorado State Patrol took over operation and management of CIAC  in March 2005, and it moved into its new facility in April 2005. CIAC was  originally opened to support and respond to credible threats during the  elections in 2004, but has since evolved to have an all-crimes and all- hazards scope of operation. Its mission is to provide an integrated,  multidiscipline information-sharing network to collect, analyze, and  disseminate information to stakeholders in a timely manner in order to  protect the citizens and critical infrastructure of Colorado. CIAC has no  investigative power but does have the ability to collect, analyze, and vet  information for authenticity. When additional investigation is necessary,  CIAC sends information to the DHS, the FBI’s FIG, and to local law  enforcement.
CIAC is staffed full-time by the Colorado State Patrol, the National Guard,  the Department of Revenue, and the FBI. There are part-time participants  in CIAC from the Colorado Departments of Agriculture, Public Health,  Corrections, Education, and the Colorado Springs Police Department, as  well as from the U.S. Marshals Service. The University of Denver also  provides interns to CIAC. DHS I&A has conducted a needs assessment of  CIAC. However, at the time of our review, it had not placed an intelligence  analyst in the center. CIAC has access to a regional DHS protective  security advisor.
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to CIAC include  HSIN, LEO, and the FPS portal. In addition, the center has access to,  among others, Rocky Mountain Information Network, U.S. Northern  Command, and SIPRNET, which is accessed through the FBI. CIAC  produces several types of bulletins and summaries, including For Official  Use Only and Law Enforcement Sensitive versions of a monthly summary  of reported incidents, daily reports, officer safety bulletins, and early  warning and special reports. These products are e-mailed to a number of  recipients, including members of the critical infrastructure sectors.   Products are also distributed directly to law enforcement officers via in- car mobile data computers. The monthly summaries are produced with the  FBI FIG and also cover incidents in Wyoming, and some of the special  reports are produced jointly with the FBI and the U.S. Northern  Command.
section_title: Connecticut
paragraphs: The Connecticut Intelligence Center (CTIC) opened in April 2005 as the  centralized point of information sharing for the state. CTIC is a multi- agency operation representing various jurisdictions that serves to collect,  analyze, and disseminate criminal and terrorism-related intelligence to all  law enforcement agencies in the state. CTIC has an all-crimes scope of  operations and endeavors to identify emerging threats or crime trends.
Colocated with an FBI field office and jointly led by the FBI and the  Connecticut State Police, CTIC’s 12-member staff includes representatives  from the FBI, the U.S. Coast Guard, the state department of corrections,  State Police, and local law enforcement agencies. DHS I&A placed an  intelligence officer in the center in September 2007.  FBI personnel serve  in both supervisory and analytical roles in CTIC. For example, CTIC  Operations Supervisor is also the FBI FIG supervisor. Day-to-day  operations are managed by an FBI Supervisory Special Agent and  supported by two Intelligence Coordinators, one from the state police and  one from the FBI. The FBI also provides Top Secret clearances to CTIC  personnel.
The state is divided into five regions, each of which is represented in CTIC  by a Regional Intelligence Liaison Officers. The officers are appointed by  the corresponding Connecticut Police Chiefs Association and represent  local law enforcement agencies in the center. The officers maintain full- time positions at CTIC and serve a recommended minimum of 2 years after  obtaining a Top Secret clearance. CTIC offers a stipend for each  municipality that places an officer in the center. The officers serve as the  communication link between CTIC and a network of Intelligence Liaison  Officers who are specially trained officers who represent local  departments within each region. The Intelligence Liaison Officers are  responsible for providing information to CTIC and for providing statewide  and jurisdictional-specific information from CTIC to their respective  agencies. CTIC has an Advisory Board that meets quarterly and defines  strategy and policy for the center. CTIC also has partnerships with the  private sector through Connecticut Infragard.
CTIC takes an all-crimes approach to information collection and has  access to a number of state and federal systems and networks. DHS and  DOJ information systems or networks accessible to CTIC include HSIN,  LEO, and ACS, Guardian, and Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW)  through the FBI. In addition, CTIC has access to the New England State  Police Information Network, which is part of RISSNet, and SIPRNet. CTIC  produces a variety of intelligence products, including weekly bulletins on  criminal activities; weekly intelligence bulletins; intelligence assessments,  which provide in-depth reporting on an emerging threat, group, or crime;  and intelligence information reports. Their primary customers are the law  enforcement officers, emergency managers, and the private sector in the  state and Northeast region.
section_title: Delaware
paragraphs: After the September 11, 2001, attacks, Delaware officials identified a need  to establish a conduit for information flow, both to and from the federal  government and local entities and in and out of Delaware. Led by the  Delaware State Police, the Delaware Information Analysis Center (DIAC)  was subsequently opened in December 2005. DIAC, through a  multijurisdictional and multidiscipline effort, is committed to providing a  coordinated, professional, and all-hazards approach in preventing,  disrupting, and defeating criminal and terrorist activity while safeguarding  individuals’ constitutional guarantees. Specifically, using an all-crimes and  all-hazards approach, DIAC will collect, analyze, and disseminate criminal  intelligence; conduct crime analysis; provide officer and public safety  alerts to all disciplines; and disseminate critical infrastructure information  to those persons in law enforcement, government, and the private sector  who have both a right and need to know, with the objective of protecting  the citizens, infrastructure, and key assets of the state.
Partners from other state agencies include Public Health, Department of  Technology and Information, Department of Corrections, Transportation,  Division of Revenue, and Natural Resources, as well as the Delaware  Volunteer Firemen’s Association and all other law enforcement entities in  the state, including local and federal agencies. At the time of our review,  DIAC staff included six full-time analysts and two Delaware National  Guard analysts, as well as three personnel assigned to critical  infrastructure protection. DIAC also has two Delaware State Police  commissioned officers assigned in administrative roles.  Two of the six  state police analysts have Top Secret clearances that were granted by the  FBI. At the time of our review, there were no DHS or FBI personnel  represented in DIAC.
Analysts produce a variety of products, including a weekly intelligence  report for law enforcement and a weekly infrastructure bulletin for private  sector partners as well as situational reports and homeland security and  situational alerts. Tactical alerts and reports on multijurisdictional  criminal activity are supplied to Delaware law enforcement agencies in  many forms such as officer safety warnings, warnings and indicators of  terrorist events, site-specific critical infrastructure and asset alerts, and  informational bulletins and assessments. DHS and DOJ information  systems or networks accessible to the fusion center include HSIN, LEO,  and FPS portal. In addition, DIAC has access to information from High  Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) and the Information Sharing and  Analysis Centers, which are private sector critical infrastructure  protection sharing centers. Both information and intelligence are collected  from and disseminated to other state fusion centers, DHS, the FBI, the U.S.  Coast Guard, local law enforcement, the private sector, the Delaware  National Guard, Dover Air Force Base, other state agencies, and the  Information Sharing and Analysis Centers.
section_title: District of Columbia
paragraphs: After a planning stage that began in 2005, the Metropolitan Washington  Fusion Center (MWFC) opened in the spring of 2006 to provide local  governments and agencies with an approach and capability for networked  information sharing. Led by the Metropolitan Police Department, MWFC  has multiple agencies and disciplines represented and serves the National  Capital Region.
MWFC has a 24/7 command center that provides a constant flow of  information and looks at that information for patterns of activity alongside  the crime analysis unit. MWFC is an all-crimes center, but also has an all- hazards function as it follows the National Infrastructure Protection Plan,  in particular focusing on the large number of national monuments located  within the Washington metropolitan area. The all-hazards function is  supported by partnerships with the Department of Health, which helps  with responding to health issues such as pandemics and natural disasters,  and the Washington, D.C., National Guard, which helps with the analysis  of patterns and response to events.  It is also coordinated with the MWFC’s  Emergency Management Agency functions. An official said that MWFC did  not want to focus only on crime because important threat information and  information that leads analysts to detect suspicious patterns occurs in  many other areas as well. In addition, it was also important to MWFC to  adopt the dual all-crimes, all-hazards focus because the fusion center  wanted to give a number of partner agencies “a seat at the table” to  increase support of the center. An official also noted that the MWFC has  created a Fusion Center Regional Programmatic Workgroup to develop a  regional strategy, product development, and charter, and to form a solid,  cohesive, common operating picture for the region.
The FBI and DHS I&A have assigned personnel to MWFC. At the time of  our review, the fusion center was located in secure space provided by the  FBI. However, according to the official, the center is planning to move into  D.C. government space within 30 months. DHS and DOJ information  systems or networks accessible to the fusion center include LEO and  FBINet. The center will be a RISS node through the Middle Atlantic-Great  Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network and is in the review  process with DHS to receive HSDN.
section_title: Florida
paragraphs: The Florida Fusion Center is a component of the Florida Department of  Law Enforcement’s (FDLE) Office of Statewide Intelligence.  According to  FDLE officials, the Office of Statewide Intelligence was created in 1996  with the primary mission “to provide FDLE leadership with sufficient  information so that they (sic) may make informed decisions on the  deployment of resources.” The office is responsible for the coordination of  FDLE’s intelligence efforts and analysis and dissemination of intelligence  and crime data information.  The office has always had an all-crimes  approach that was reflective of FDLE’s investigative strategy and focus  areas. This approach was enhanced with the addition of a domestic  security mission after 9/11.  Under the coordination of FDLE, seven  regional domestic security task forces were created, along with an  analytical unit within the Office of Statewide Intelligence to enhance  domestic security and counterterrorism investigative efforts. Each task  force is cochaired by an FDLE Special Agent in Charge and a sheriff from  the region.  The task forces include multidisciplinary partners from  education, fire rescue, health, communications, law enforcement, and  emergency management. These disciplines are also reflected in the  composition of the fusion center.
The Florida Fusion Center was established in January 2007 with a mission  to protect the citizens, visitors, resources, and critical infrastructure of  Florida by enhancing information sharing, intelligence capabilities, and  preparedness operations for all local, state, and federal agencies in  accordance with Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy.  The fusion center  will serve as the state node and will provide connectivity and intelligence  sharing amongst Florida’s regional fusion centers.  The center consists of  approximately 45 FDLE members, federal agencies, state multidisciplinary  partners, and includes outreach to private sector entities.  FDLE members  who are part of the fusion center have assignments to various squads  within the Office of Statewide Intelligence, to include counterterrorism  intelligence, financial crime analysis, critical infrastructure, and a  24/7 situational awareness unit, the Florida investigative support squad.   FFC also has full-time analysts from DHS I&A and the FBI working at the  center, as well as representation from the U.S. Attorney’s Office.  The  center will add a full-time analyst from the Florida National Guard in  October 2007.
State agencies and departments that have committed to participate as  members of the Fusion Center Executive Policy Board and have  designated an intelligence liaison officer or analyst to the fusion center  include: Agriculture; Business and Professional Regulation; Corrections;  Education; Emergency Management; Environmental Protection; Fish and  Wildlife Conservation Commission; Financial Services; Health; Highway  Safety; FDLE; Transportation; and the National Guard.
DHS and DOJ systems and networks the center has access to include LEO,  HSIN, HSIN-Intel, HSIN-Florida, and HSDN.
section_title: Georgia
paragraphs: The Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC) was  established in October 2001 and falls under the responsibility and  management of the Georgia Office of Homeland Security. The initial focus  of GISAC was to address terrorism and the information gap among federal,  state, and local law enforcement in providing homeland security  intelligence. Its mission is to serve as the focal point for collection,  analysis, and dissemination of information on threats or attacks of a  terrorist nature within and against the State of Georgia, its citizens, or  infrastructure.
GISAC is one of the three components of the Georgia Office of Homeland  Security and is divided into four sections—law enforcement, criminal  intelligence, fire services/hazmat, and emergency management. GISAC has  a staff of 27, the majority of whom are personnel from the Georgia Bureau  of Investigation. Other state agencies with assigned personnel at the  center include the Georgia Emergency Management Agency, Georgia State  Patrol, Georgia Department of Corrections, and Georgia National Guard.  The Georgia Sheriffs’ Association, Georgia Fire Chiefs Association, and  Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police have each assigned one person to  the center. DHS I&A has assigned two staff to GISAC; one Southeast  region representative and one intelligence officer. There are no FBI  personnel assigned directly to GISAC. However, there are two GISAC  personnel assigned to the JTTF, and all analysts have access to the FBI  FIG, whereby they have access to FBI systems. GISAC is also located in  the same building as the FBI field office with its JTTF and FIG.
GISAC produces a variety of products, including an open source report  weekly, which is posted on the Office of Homeland Security-Georgia  Emergency Management Agency Web site and distributed electronically; a  monthly intelligence report that is For Official Use Only and distributed  electronically; alerts and notices, which are produced on an as-needed  basis; a monthly outbreak and surveillance report from the Georgia  Department of Health; and an Georgia Bureau of Investigation-produced  joint GISAC/FBI multipage monthly bulletin that contains GISAC statistics  combined with FBI information. DHS and DOJ systems and networks to  which GISAC has access include HSIN, HSDN, and LEO. In addition,  GISAC analysts are able to access FBI systems, such as E-Guardian, IDW,  and ACS.
section_title: Hawaii
paragraphs: According to a State of Hawaii Department of Defense official, for the past  2 years officials from civil defense and state law enforcement have  discussed the possibility of establishing a fusion center in Hawaii.  Specifically, they have discussed establishing an intelligence unit under  state and local law enforcement control to complement the FBI’s JTTF in  Honolulu. A state fusion center would provide intelligence and analysis to  all disciplines, especially law enforcement. Planning officials are not  seeking a center that is only focused on the prevention and disruption of  terrorism, but one that would complement other departments, agencies,  and task forces within the context of all hazards. The official noted that  the establishment of a fusion center in Hawaii depends on the adequacy  and allocation of Homeland Security grant funds in fiscal years 2007 and  2008.  According to the official, Hawaii’s fiscal year 2007 allocation will not  support the current investment strategy for a fusion center. The official  said that they will have to wait until fiscal year 2008 or find an alternative  funding strategy.
section_title: Idaho
paragraphs: Idaho does not have and is not planning to establish a physical fusion  center. However, according to the directors of the Bureau of Homeland  Security and Idaho State Police, the state has a “virtual fusion process.”  The fusion process grew out of monthly information-sharing meetings  prior to September 11 that were held by the Idaho Bureau of Hazardous  Materials with other federal, state, and local officials in Idaho. In October  2001, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Idaho offered to serve as  the cornerstone of an information-sharing effort. A member of the U.S.  Attorney’s Office, who is also a member of the Anti-Terrorism Advisory  Council, provides the overarching structure for the fusion process by  facilitating connections between federal sources of intelligence in Idaho  and state and local law enforcement. This individual holds meetings  several times a year, provides information and analyses to consumers by  way of the Internet and coordinates with the two JTTFs in the area.  Participants in the fusion process also use HSIN.
The officials articulated several reasons why they are not planning to  establish a fusion center, including the state’s commitment to support the  efforts of the U.S. Attorney’s Office to conduct threat analyses and share  information, political concerns about the role of the government in  information sharing, local agencies’ lack of interest in participating in a  fusion center because they perceive the centers to be intelligence- gathering entities, and local communities do not want law enforcement to  be involved in gathering intelligence, the state’s low risk for international  terrorism, and difficulties staffing a center because state and local  agencies would not have the capacity to provide personnel to work in a  fusion center.
section_title: Illinois
paragraphs: There are two fusion centers in Illinois, the Statewide Terrorism and  Intelligence Center (STIC) and the Chicago Crime Prevention and  Information Center (CPIC).
subsections: section_title: Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center
paragraphs: Led by the Illinois State Police, the Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence  Center (STIC) was established in May 2003 with the mission to provide  timely, effective, and actionable intelligence information to local, state,  and federal law enforcement and private sector partners in order to  enhance public safety, facilitate communication between agencies, and  provide support in the fight against terrorism and criminal activity. STIC is  an all-crimes fusion center that is colocated with the Illinois Emergency  Management Agency, with which it works closely during disasters. When  STIC was established, it absorbed the state police intelligence unit, which  focused on general crimes (e.g., violent crimes, narcotics, sex offenders),  because, in part, the planners wanted to combine all of the silos of  information needed to prevent criminal and terrorist activity.
STIC is organized into two sections: a terrorism section, which staffs the  24/7 watch, and the field support section, which has a criminal intelligence  unit with specialists working on drugs, violent crimes, motor vehicle theft,  and sex offenses. The Illinois State Police and the Illinois National Guard  provide nearly all of the personnel, including 7 sworn officers, 18 terrorism  research specialists, 4 narcotics analysts, 3 other crime/violent crime  analysts, 1 senior terrorism lead analyst, 1 firearms analyst, 2 motor  vehicle theft analysts, 6 Internet crime analysts, 1 America’s Missing:  Broadcast Emergency Response (AMBER) Alert analyst, and 2 office  assistants. The FBI has assigned two analysts to work terrorism-related  cases, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has assigned one  analyst to work narcotics cases, and DHS I&A has assigned one analyst to  work on homeland security issues. The Illinois Terrorism Task Force,  which is composed of representatives from state and local agencies  involved in emergency planning in the event of a critical incident, provides  support to the Illinois State Police and approves the funding for STIC.
STIC also has partnerships with the private sector. For example, the  Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police and its Public-Private Liaison  Committee, along with STIC, initiated the Infrastructure Security  Awareness program in September 2004. The program was designed to  share critical and sensitive non-law-enforcement information in a timely  manner with corporate security executives as well as provide a forum for  information exchange among private security professionals. This program  enables STIC to provide threat information to major corporations and to  receive reports of suspicious activity. STIC provides information to private  security partners by using HSIN, which allows for the exchange of data,  text messages, meeting dates, and the building of specialized tools to meet  various applications through a secure Internet connection.
STIC’s terrorism research specialists collect, analyze, and disseminate  terrorism-related intelligence data; complete in-depth threat assessments;  and identify predictive, incident-based indicators of potential terrorist  activities within the state. The specialists have access to various state and  federal law enforcement intelligence databases, public records databases,  and financial databases. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks  accessible to STIC include HSIN, JRIES, LEO, RISSNET, R-DEX, and the  FPS portal as well as FinCEN and HIDTA. The officials said that they will  have access to FBI and DHS classified systems when their SCIF, for which  the FBI is funding the construction, is completed.
STIC provides a variety of services to support officers in the field,  including a 20-minute workup on requests from officers conducting traffic  stops and responding to major crime scenes, lead management and  development, on-scene analytical services, and statewide deconfliction to  all law enforcement agencies by using the HIDTA nationwide network.  STIC recently adopted the Internet Crimes Analysis Unit, which takes calls  from the public regarding fraud, sexual predators, terrorism, and other  issues and also administers the AMBER Alert program.
section_title: Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center
paragraphs: The Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center (CPIC), led by the  Chicago Police Department, opened in April 2007 with the mission “to  enhance partnerships which foster a connection between every facet of  the law enforcement community. CPIC will afford the men and women,  who are dedicated to protecting the public and addressing violence, with  all available intelligence resources, and communications capabilities.”  CPIC’s goal is to be the clearinghouse of information that is fused and  delivered to stakeholders. CPIC has an all-crimes and counterterrorism  focus. The Chicago Police Department is involved in the fusion process as  it relates to violent crime, and the department has an in-house  counterterrorism section.
In addition to Chicago Police Department officers, the FBI has assigned  three analysts to the CPIC.  The center also has personnel from ICE, ATF,  HIDTA (5 days a week), Chicago’s Metrarail, the Cook County Sheriff’s  Department, the Illinois State Police, and 35 suburban police departments.  CPIC is in the process of establishing a transportation “desk” staffed with  Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Amtrak, Federal Air  Marshal Service (FAMS), and local agency personnel. DHS I&A has  conducted a needs assessment. However, at the time of our review, it had  not placed an intelligence analyst in the center.
CPIC is tactically oriented and designed to provide direct, near-real-time  support to law enforcement personnel on the street. It provides, among  other things, real-time violent crime detection monitoring and response,  continual assessment of available resources for the purpose of possible  redeployment of manpower, instantaneous major incident notification,  analysis and identification of retaliatory violence and automated  construction of enforcement missions to thwart retaliatory violence, crime  pattern identification, and immediate access to in-depth background data  on persons of investigative interest. DHS and DOJ systems and networks  accessible to CPIC include HSIN, HSDN, FPS Portal, LEO, FBI’s ACS and  IDW, as well as NCIC, FinCEN, RISSNET, RISS ATIX, INTERPOL,  International Justice and Public Safety Information Sharing Network  (NLETS), EPIC, National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), Treasury  Enforcement Communications System, and numerous other state and  local systems and data sources.  CPIC also recently added a satellite  tracking system that traces stolen bank funds and the offender.
CPIC focuses on producing products to assist police officers on the street.  A primary product is the District Intelligence Bulletin System, which is a  Web-based application that uses multiple data sources to provide officers  with a law enforcement road map. It provides officers with calls for  service, wanted persons, most recent shootings/homicides, and additional  intelligence in a succinct format. All of this information is automatically  updated on a continuous basis throughout the day and is accessible by  deployed patrol officers. It allows an officer to review information by  district and deployment area. CPIC also publishes a daily intelligence  briefing, which is designed to give officers a more detailed overview of  potential threats based on international, national, and local events, and a  weekly version for the private sector.
section_title: Indiana
paragraphs: The Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center (IIFC), which opened in December  2006, was established with the mission to collect, evaluate, analyze, and  disseminate information and intelligence data regarding criminal and  terrorist activity in the State of Indiana while following Fair Information  Practices to ensure the rights and privacy of citizens. In addition to  collecting information on all crimes, IIFC will specifically collect  information as it relates to terrorism and its impact on Indiana. IIFC has an  all-crimes approach, acting as an intelligence group for the state. However,  there is a terrorism nexus to the fusion center’s work.
IIFC is operated by the Indiana Department of Homeland Security and has  been staffed as a task force entity with federal and state partners.  Indiana  state agency, department, and association partners in IIFC are: Homeland  Security, National Guard, State Excise Police, Natural Resources,  Association of Chiefs of Police, Gaming Commission Division of Gaming  Agents, Indiana State Police, Corrections, Sheriff’s Association, Marion  County Sheriff’s Department, and the Indiana Campus Law Enforcement  Association. Federal partners in IIFC include the FBI, and the U.S.  Attorneys for the Northern and Southern Districts of Indiana. The FBI has  assigned two FIG analysts to IIFC. DHS I&A has conducted a needs  assessment of IIFC. However, at the time of our review, it had not yet  placed an intelligence analyst in the center. A 12-member executive  committee oversees IIFC’s activities.
The center is a 24/7 intelligence operations center that works in  conjunction with statewide law enforcement liaisons, providing for  intelligence-led policing throughout the state. IIFC operates a 1-800 tip line  and an IIFC e-mail box and produces a bulletin three times a week. DHS  and DOJ systems and networks that IIFC has access to include HSIN-Intel,  HSDN, RISS, FPS portal, LEO, as well as SIPRNet, RISS, NCIC, and EPIC.  The FBI has built a Top Secret secure room within IIFC, and also provided  access to the ACS and Guardian systems in the secure space.
section_title: Iowa
paragraphs: The Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center was established in December 2004  with the mission to enable the State of Iowa to proactively direct core  resources with its partners to avert or meet current, emerging, and future  public safety and homeland security threats. Following the attacks of  September 11, Iowa established a Homeland Security Advisory Council to  enhance the state’s capability to implement the Iowa Homeland Security  Initiative. In the spring of 2002, the council’s Information and Intelligence  Sharing Task force was formed to make recommendations for sharing  intelligence and information, and among other things, it recommended the  establishment of a fusion center.
Built on the backbone of the Iowa Law Enforcement Intelligence Network,  the Intelligence Fusion System consists of the fusion center, six regional  fusion offices, and a number of partner agencies and organizations.  The  fusion center is led by the Iowa Department of Public Safety and serves as  a centralized information collection, analysis, and dissemination point. It  is staffed with 18 full-time analysts (16 of whom are state funded), 11  investigator/collectors, and 5 support staff. Nearly all are Iowa Department  of Public Safety personnel.  However, there is an Iowa National Guard  analyst assigned to the center, and the Midwest HIDTA provides funding  for one intelligence analyst in the center.  Although no federal agencies  have assigned personnel to the fusion center yet, the center conducts  regular meetings with the FBI’s FIG and JTTF, the U.S. Attorney’s Office,  and the DHS Protective Security Advisor. The fusion center has placed one  Department of Public Safety agent full-time at the JTTF and conducts  regular and as-needed coordination and information-sharing meetings with  the state Homeland Security Advisor, the Iowa Homeland Security and  Emergency Management Division, the Iowa Department of Agriculture and  Land Stewardship, and the Iowa Department of Public Health, among  others.  The six regional fusion offices are strategically located across the  state. A fusion center agent is assigned to each regional office and is  partnered with two to four local officials at each site. Fusion system  personnel also regularly participate in meetings of the local InfraGard  chapter. In addition, the Department of Public Safety is part of the  Safeguard Iowa Partnership, which is a voluntary coalition of business and  government leaders who combine their efforts to prevent, protect from,  respond to, and recover from catastrophic events. The Safeguard Iowa  Partnership was formally launched in January 2007.
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion  center include LEO and HSIN (law enforcement and counterterrorism  portals), as well as RISSNET. HSIN–Secret has been deployed to the State  Emergency Operations Center, but DHS has not deployed the system to  the fusion center. Fusion center personnel who are JTTF members are  granted Top Secret clearances and can access FBI systems at the JTTF  office.
section_title: Kansas
paragraphs: The Adjutant General of Kansas, Kansas Bureau of Investigation, and  Kansas Highway Patrol formed the Kansas Threat Integration Center  (KSTIC) in June 2004 with the mission to assist Kansas law enforcement  and other related agencies in their mission to protect the citizens and  critical infrastructures within Kansas through enhanced gathering,  analysis, and dissemination of criminal and terrorist intelligence  information. KSTIC focuses on the development, gathering, analyzing, and  dissemination of criminal and terrorist threat information in order to  protect citizens, property, and infrastructure in Kansas. Additionally,  KSTIC works to increase threat awareness among law enforcement, other  governmental agencies, and private infrastructure providers in the state.  KSTIC’s scope of operations is primarily focused on terrorist/extremist  activities with a secondary all-crimes scope of operations that comes into  play when criminal acts serve as a prelude to terrorist or extremist  activities. It is not an all-hazards facility, but KSTIC is colocated with the  Kansas Division of Emergency Management and therefore has access to its  resources.
KSTIC is a joint operation of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, National  Guard, and Highway Patrol. An Executive Board, consisting of one  member from each agency, provides oversight and the KBI representative  is responsible for the day-to-day operations of KSTIC. There are three full- time staff—a Kansas Bureau of Investigation senior special agent, an  investigator from the Highway Patrol, and a National Guard Captain— however, KSTIC can use Kansas Bureau of Investigation analysts for  assistance as needed. Personnel hold TS/SCI clearances. KSTIC is in the  process of hiring two to four analysts depending on funding availability.  While KSTIC has no federal partners, it interfaces with state FBI JTTFs on  a regular basis and is discussing the possibility of colocating with the  JTTF.
KSTIC accesses sensitive but unclassified bulletins and reports and open  source information to report on terrorist/extremist threats to Kansas in  particular and the Midwest in general. Additionally, KSTIC receives tip and  other information directly from citizens and state law enforcement. KSTIC  uses access to classified systems to identify and monitor potential threats  to Kansas. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to  KSTIC include HSIN, HSIN-Secret, LEO, FPS portal, as well as SIPRNet  and FinCEN. KSTIC personnel also have full access to the FBI’s various  databases (i.e., Guardian and IDW) at an FBI field office or JTTF location.  Through the National Guard, the KSTIC is planning to construct a SCIF,  which when completed will provide space for approximately 15 personnel  as well as secure connectivity to a variety of Top Secret and other systems.
KSTIC produces intelligence/information bulletins for state and regional  law enforcement. All information disseminated is sensitive but  unclassified, with the exception of the periodic open source bulletins  published for dissemination to a public/infrastructure distribution list.  Bulletins are posted on several secure sites, such as LEO and FPS Web  sites, as well as distributed via statewide teletype and e-mail. The  distribution list includes state, local, and federal agencies in Kansas as  well as other agencies around the country.
section_title: Kentucky
paragraphs: The Kentucky Intelligence Fusion Center (KIFC) opened in December  2005 as an all-crimes fusion center. The fusion center focuses on all  crimes, rather than those with a nexus to terrorism, primarily to obtain  buy-in from local agencies. KIFC was established with support from the  Kentucky Office of Homeland Security; the Kentucky State Police, which  transferred its intelligence center to KIFC; and the Kentucky  Transportation Cabinet, which provides KIFC its facility. Other agencies in  the fusion center include ATF, the Kentucky Department of Corrections,  Kentucky Department of Military Affairs, Kentucky Vehicle Enforcement,  and the Lexington Metro Police. The FBI has assigned one full-time FIG  analyst to the center. KIFC does not have any DHS personnel assigned to  the center.
The fusion center provides all-crimes and terrorism intelligence analytical  services; supports the JTTF with counterterrorism investigators; assists all  federal, state, and local law enforcement with requests for information on  suspects; assists law enforcement in the location of subjects, suspect  vehicle registration, and suspect driver’s license photo and data; provides  link analysis charts such as association links, communication links, and  event flow; serves as the conduit for law enforcement’s request for  information from other state fusion centers; provides access to HSIN-KY,  the state Web site for law enforcement information sharing; and serves as  a repository for the state’s identified critical infrastructures. Some KIFC  components are operational 24/7, such as the law enforcement  communication and the transportation component.
KIFC receives statewide all-crimes tips through a toll-free hotline and  through Web site submission and has law enforcement radio and data  communications capability through Kentucky State Police  Communications, which is located in the fusion center. DHS and DOJ  information systems or networks accessible to the fusion center include  HSIN and LEO, as well as RISS/Regional Organized Crime Information  Center. The official said that KIFC does not have the capacity to receive  classified information because the facility has no secure room or SCIF.
section_title: Louisiana
paragraphs: Established in October 2004, the Louisiana State Analysis & Fusion  Exchange (La-SAFE), which is led by the Louisiana State Police, evolved  from existing state police analytical units. The state police Investigative  Support Section has been in place since the late 1960s and early 1970s,  with an intelligence collection and analysis unit that was developed  primarily to handle organized crime. As the investigative and intelligence  needs of the police shifted over time, so too did the mission of the  intelligence component, expanding from organized crime to gangs, drug  trafficking, and, post-September 11, homeland security. The police  intelligence unit was engaged in all-crimes collection of intelligence to  support all criminal investigations. La-SAFE has adopted an all-crimes/all- hazards scope of operations.
The mission of La-SAFE is to (1) promote a collaborative environment for  governmental and corporate partners to work together in providing timely  information for use in providing public safety and promoting national  security against terrorist and other criminal threats; (2) actively work to  collect and analyze information from various sources to provide those  responsible for protecting state resources with information that is  pertinent in decision-making processes, allows for the maximizing of  resources, and improves the ability to efficiently protect the citizens of  Louisiana in matters of infrastructure protection and against organized  criminal activity; and (3) evaluate all information provided and ensure that  the information La-SAFE retains and utilizes is directly related to  legitimate law enforcement purposes and has been legally obtained. La- SAFE will not interfere with the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed  rights and privileges of individuals.
La-SAFE is staffed by 3 commissioned personnel and 20 analysts with  experience in case support, information production, and information  sharing in the areas of organized crime and terrorism. Louisiana State  Police, the Louisiana Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and  Emergency Preparedness, Louisiana National Guard, East Baton Rouge  Parish Sheriff’s Office, DHS I&A, and FBI have assigned full-time analysts  to La-SAFE.  The center recently established a relationship with the U.S.  Coast Guard.
La-SAFE produces a variety of information and intelligence products,  including general information bulletins (e.g., notices on general crimes or  intelligence); daily incident briefs (i.e., daily reports of incidents reported  to the center from a variety of sources); a weekly homeland defense  bulletin covering homeland security issues around the world; and a  summary of monthly regional crime information called the Intelligator.
DHS and DOJ systems and networks accessible to La-SAFE include HSIN,  LEO, and the U.S. Coast Guard’s Homeport. Louisiana has a state HSIN  portal, HSIN-LA, that provides a secure capability to share information and  collaborate with public and private sector partners. It allows users to  report suspicious activities to the fusion center for review and action.  There are currently over 800 participants representing law enforcement,  first responders, and critical infrastructure with access to HSIN-LA.  Information currently being shared within HSIN-LA includes safety  bulletins, intelligence reports, training opportunities, information-sharing  meetings, and requests for information.
section_title: Maine
paragraphs: The Maine Intelligence and Analysis Center is a collaborative effort  between the Maine State Police and the Maine Emergency Management  Agency to share resources, expertise, and information to maximize  homeland security efforts and to detect and assist in the deterrence of  terrorist activity. Maine has had a traditional state police criminal  intelligence unit for 30 years, but the state’s background in  counterintelligence was limited to traditional criminal enterprises. The  Governor decided after September 11 that the state needed a  counterintelligence unit that was homeland-security driven to deliver  information to the Governor.  The center was formally established by an  executive order that was effective December 2006. The Maine Intelligence  and Analysis Center is in the early stages of development and at the time  of our review was not yet fully functional. For example, the center has  physical space and personnel, has developed standard operating  procedures, and is in the process of conducting outreach with state and  local entities.
The center’s mission is to support the Maine State Police and the Maine  Emergency Management Agency in their respective roles of public safety  protector and homeland security incident manager for the citizens of the  State of Maine. The center is to be a clearinghouse of and central  repository for intelligence and information related to Maine’s homeland  security and any terrorist-related activity that may threaten the lives and  safety of the citizens of the United States and the State of Maine. Its scope  of operations is counterterrorism. However, the center plans to expand its  focus in the future to include an all-crimes approach.
The Maine Intelligence and Analysis Center has one intelligence analyst  and one homeland security specialist, along with a backbone of four  analysts from the Maine State Patrol Criminal Intelligence Unit.  An official  indicated that the center will absorb the Criminal Intelligence Unit in the  near future forming a single unit. While there are no federal personnel  assigned to the center, it has partnered with FBI’s JTTF, the U.S.  Attorney’s Office Anti-Terror Section, U.S. Customs and Border Protection  (CBP), TSA, U.S. Coast Guard, ICE, Maine National Guard, other state and  local law enforcement agencies with intelligence sections, and the Maine  Anti-Terror Intelligence Network, which is organized by the U.S.  Attorney’s Office to facilitate interaction between partner agencies’  analysts. The center is overseen by an Advisory Board consisting of three  members who meet at least twice annually.
The center conducts research and analysis to provide actionable  intelligence for field units and policy makers, and provides quick (i.e.,  within 15 minutes) response to queries from the field to allow officers to  take action within constitutionally reasonable time frames. DHS and DOJ  information systems or networks accessible to the fusion center include  LEO and HSIN, as well as RISS ATIX, RISS, FinCEN, INTERPOL, EPIC,  and NLETS. The center also has access to a variety of state and  commercial information systems and databases. Products include notices,  bulletins, briefing information, reports, and assessments that cover day-to- day events, warnings, and officer safety issues. First responders, law  enforcement, emergency managers, civilians, and the private sector (e.g.,  utilities, chemicals, food supply, and technology) are among the center’s  customers.
section_title: Maryland
paragraphs: The Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC) is operated by  the Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council Executive Committee and is  governed by a charter that was developed with input from the FBI and  approved by the Executive Committee. MCAC began operations in  November 2003 in response to the events of September 11 and the need for  ways for the FBI and local agencies to disseminate terrorist-related  information. MCAC has an all-crimes and counterterrorism scope of  operations and consists of representatives of 24 agencies who staff the  center, including the FBI, DHS, U.S. Army, U.S. Coast Guard, and  Maryland state and local organizations. DHS I&A has assigned one analyst,  and the FBI has seven analysts, one special agent, and one supervisory  special agent assigned to MCAC.
MCAC, which operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, is organized into  two sections, the Watch Section and the Strategic Analysis Section. The  Watch Section provides support to federal, state, and local agencies by  receiving and processing information, monitoring intelligence resources,  coordinating with Maryland law enforcement, and disseminating  intelligence information. The Watch Section primarily consists of  representatives from Maryland police and sheriffs, along with  representation from the U.S. Army and the Maryland National Guard. As  information enters MCAC, it is passed through the Watch Section, which  either passes that information on to federal or state entities or the  Strategic Analysis Section or enters it into federal and state databases,  such as the FBI’s Guardian. The Strategic Analysis Section receives,  processes, analyzes, and disseminates information. MCAC has 12 analysts,  and the section is staffed by representatives from various organizations,  including the Maryland State Police, FBI, U.S. Coast Guard, and the  Maryland National Guard.
Information enters MCAC through a variety of ways, including tips from  the general public or law enforcement, as well as from the National Guard  or emergency response personnel. Information is received via a tip line or  e-mail. DHS and DOJ systems and networks accessible to MCAC include  HSIN, HSDN, LEO, FBINet, SCION, as well as RISS/Middle Atlantic-Great  Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network, SIPRNET, NCIC,  INTERPOL, EPIC, and NLETS, among others. MCAC provides a daily  report to every police chief in the state as well as other state fusion  centers and any other organization that is on its distribution list. Entities  such as the Maryland JTTF, Terrorism Screening Center, and National  Counterterrorism Center receive information from MCAC. Terrorism- related law enforcement information is also shared and entered into the  FBI’s Guardian database. Products include a daily watch report, which is a  brief summary of tips and requests for information received by the Watch  Section over the previous 24-hour period, and intelligence bulletins, which  are intelligence/law enforcement-related information disseminated to law  enforcement and homeland security personnel by fax, teletype, or e-mail,  and may also be posted to LEO or RISS. Other products include threat  assessments, covering, for example, threats to military-recruiting stations,  propane cylinders, agroterrorism, or gang activity.
section_title: Massachusetts
paragraphs: The Commonwealth Fusion Center (CFC) was established in October 2004  on the foundations of the State Homeland Security Strategy and an  executive order designating it the state’s principal center for information  collection and dissemination. Its mission is to collect and analyze  information from all available sources to produce and disseminate  actionable intelligence to stakeholders for strategic and tactical decision  making in order to identify, disrupt, or deter domestic and international  terrorism as well as criminal activity. CFC takes an all-threats, all-crimes  approach and has both criminal and counterterrorism analytical support  roles. The center focuses on precursor crimes—such as organized crimes,  which can be indicators of terrorism. CFC also supports the state’s  Emergency Management Agency, which is responsible for handling all  hazards.
CFC works with various federal and state and agencies including FBI, ICE,  U.S. Coast Guard, HIDTA, Secret Service, TSA, ATF, the United States  Marshals Service, U.S. Attorney’s Office, the Massachusetts Emergency  Management Agency, Massachusetts Department of Fire Services,  Department of Public Health, Department of Corrections, and the National  Guard. There are 15 analysts assigned to CFC, the majority of who are  Massachusetts State Police employees.  However, officials said that four of  these analysts are assigned to other duties, such as the Crime Reporting  Unit or security officer, or are otherwise engaged. The Department of  Corrections and the Army National Guard have also each assigned an  analyst to CFC. All analysts and most sworn members of CFC have Secret  clearances, and a few sworn members have Top Secret clearances. The  FBI has assigned both an intelligence analyst and special agent to CFC.  DHS has assigned an intelligence officer to the center.
CFC also possesses an investigative component through the  Massachusetts State Police Criminal Intelligence Section that provides  5 state troopers and the Massachusetts JTTF, which has 11 state troopers  in Boston and Springfield, for a total of 16 investigators assigned to CFC.   CFC also has a railroad representative and is involved in public/private  outreach through Project Sentinel, which is a program targeting  businesses likely to identify precursor terrorist activity. CFC also has  personnel assigned to the Boston Regional Intelligence Center, which is  the regional intelligence center for the Boston/Cambridge Urban Areas  Security Initiative (UASI) region and is led by the Boston Police  Department.
CFC analysts produce information and intelligence briefings and  assessments and provide support to the statewide assessment of critical  infrastructure. Past products include an overview of gang activity in the  state, an assessment on prison radicalization in the state, a report on  trafficking and possible links to terrorism, a report on the stock market  and possible indicators of terrorism, and an overview of white supremacist  activity in the state. CFC also uses Geographic Information Systems to  develop products and provide data to law enforcement and critical  infrastructure stakeholders. DHS and DOJ unclassified systems and  networks accessible to CFC include HSIN and LEO, and CFC also has  access to FBI and DHS classified systems on site. Briefings and  assessments are posted on CFC secure Web site, HSIN-MA, which also  provides a document library and information-sharing capability to  Massachusetts’ law enforcement, public safety, and critical infrastructure  sectors. CFC has developed e-mail lists and extensive contact lists for  state, local, and federal law enforcement partners, military stakeholders,  fire services, transportation, and other critical infrastructure sectors.
section_title: Michigan
paragraphs: There are two fusion centers in Michigan, the statewide Michigan  Intelligence and Operations Center (MIOC) and the Detroit and  Southeastern Michigan Regional (Detroit UASI) Fusion Center.
subsections: section_title: Michigan Intelligence and Operations Center
paragraphs: Led by the Michigan State Police, MIOC opened in December 2006 and  went to a 24/7 operation in January 2007. The center was built on the  preexisting foundation of the Michigan State Police Intelligence and  Operations sections. MIOC’s mission is to collect, evaluate, collate, and  analyze criminal justice-related information and intelligence and, as  appropriate, disseminate this information and intelligence to the proper  public safety agencies so that any threat of terrorism will be successfully  identified and addressed. Additionally, MIOC will provide criminal justice  information to appropriate law enforcement agencies to aid in the  successful prosecution of individuals involved in criminal behavior. MIOC  has an all-crimes, all-threats scope of operations with a focus on the  prevention of terrorism.
MIOC is divided into two components: (1) the operational, 24/7 portion  where all tips, requests for information, and initial information flow into  MIOC, and (2) the intelligence portion, where information is processed,  analyzed, disseminated, and reviewed. MIOC’s 45-person staff includes  operational, intelligence, and administrative personnel, most of whom are  Michigan State Police personnel. There are 26 intelligence personnel  (detectives and analysts) and 13 operational personnel (officers and  dispatchers). Included in the intelligence personnel are five analysts  assigned by the National Guard, one responsible for narcotics and four  responsible for HSIN-Intel and critical infrastructure protection at a  statewide level. The state Department of Corrections has assigned a  person 2 days per week, and the Michigan State University Police  Department has assigned a full-time inspector.
The FBI has assigned one analyst and one special agent to MIOC. Three  Michigan State Police detectives are also assigned to the JTTF. DHS I&A  has conducted a needs assessment of MIOC and posted the position for an  analyst. However, at the time of our review an analyst an analyst had not  yet been assigned to the center. Additionally, MIOC is expecting the  assignment of a U.S. Coast Guard intelligence lieutenant and a DEA  analyst.  MIOC has established an internship program with the Michigan  State University Criminal Justice Program.  MIOC’s 14-member advisory  board, which includes representatives from state and federal entities, civil  rights groups, the Detroit UASI Fusion Center, and state law enforcement  associations, provides advice and counsel to MIOC.
MIOC collects and disseminates information regarding criminal  investigations of all natures and serves as a direct case support for various  investigations. Its personnel are divided into the four priority areas of  international terrorism, domestic terrorism, organized crime, and  smuggling. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to  MIOC include HSIN, LEO, and HSDN, as well as RISS/MAGLOCLEN. MIOC  is planning to have access to SIPRNET, ACS, and Guardian, for members  of those agencies residing at MIOC. MIOC disseminates information via  briefings and bulletins (weekly and special) to law enforcement, responds  to requests for information, prepares intelligence analysis reports,  provides case support, operates a Tip Line, provides support services  (such as K-9, underwater recovery, hazmat, forensic artists, and  emergency support team), and posts its products on sites such as LEO,  HSIN-Law Enforcement, and MAGLOCLEN. Non-law-enforcement  homeland security and critical infrastructure protection partners receive  information through postings on HSIN-Michigan.
section_title: Detroit and Southeastern Michigan Regional Fusion Center
paragraphs: The Detroit and Southeastern Michigan Regional (Detroit UASI) Fusion  Center is in the early stages of development. Led by the Detroit Homeland  Security and Emergency Management, there are seven regional partners in  the urban area that are planning the center, including Wayne County, the  City of Detroit, and five other surrounding counties. The vision for the  fusion center is to identify, monitor, and provide analysis on all terrorism,  all crimes, and all hazards in the Southeast Michigan Region in support of  law enforcement, public safety, and the private sector’s prevention,  preparedness, and response activities. The center will focus on prevention  and protection by serving as a conduit to local police officers and  emergency managers in the field and will follow up on tips, conduct a  watch function, and provide “foresight on emerging situations.”
The fusion center is in the first phase of planning, which is expected to  culminate in the center being fully operational in January 2008. At the time  of our review, planning officials were in the process of establishing  partnerships, selecting and training analysts, and planning to move into  the center’s new facility, which will be colocated with the Michigan  HIDTA. Federal partners identified include ICE, CBP, TSA, Secret Service,  U.S. Coast Guard, FBI, Federal Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Attorney’s Office,  and HIDTA. The center did not have access to DHS and DOJ systems, but  would obtain access to FBI systems once it was colocated with the  HIDTA. Additionally, the fusion center plans to work with MIOC to  leverage technology purchases and utilize similar policies and standard  operating procedures.
section_title: Minnesota
paragraphs: The Minnesota Joint Analysis Center (MN-JAC) opened in May 2005 as a  partnership of the Department of Public Safety, the FBI, and several local  police departments. Its mission is the collection, management, and  distribution of strategic and tactical information and the development and  implementation of useful and meaningful information products and  training, focusing on all crimes and all hazards within and affecting  Minnesota. MN-JAC has an all-crimes and all-hazards scope of operations.  However, the center is not a law enforcement or investigative agency  because of restrictions imposed by state law. As the center works to  determine its position relative to the existing laws, it serves primarily to  coordinate among FBI and DHS and state and local agencies. One of the  ways MN-JAC accomplishes its information-sharing function is through the  development and maintenance of its information-sharing Web portal, the  Intelligence Communications Enterprise for Information Sharing and  Exchange (ICEFISHX).
MN-JAC has 10 employees, 2 of whom are provided by the state, and the  remainder from local law enforcement agencies and the National Guard.  MN-JAC does not have an FBI analyst staffed to its center. However, MN- JAC and the FBI’s field office are colocated in the same building, and MN- JAC personnel have access to the FBI’s systems and networks. DHS I&A  has conducted a needs assessment of MN-JAC. However, at the time of our  review, it had not yet placed an intelligence analyst in the center.
DHS and DOJ systems and networks accessible to MN-JAC include HSIN,  HSIN-Law Enforcement, FPS portal, LEO, ACS, the FBI Intelligence  Information Reports Dissemination System, as well as SIPRNet. The  center also has access to HSIN-Secret. However, the system is accessible  only at the state’s Emergency Operations Center. MN-JAC produces two  weekly briefs, one for all subscribers that covers critical infrastructure and  one for law enforcement agencies that is law enforcement sensitive, as  well as situation analyses of incidents and threats and special threat  assessments.
section_title: Mississippi
paragraphs: The Mississippi Office of Homeland Security and Mississippi Department  of Public Safety are in the early stages of developing a state fusion center.  The Mississippi Analysis & Information Center (MSAIC) is expected to  open its door at the end of September 2007 and become operational at that  time. Currently, planning officials are developing memorandums of  understanding for agency representation at and support of the center,  certifying the center’s secure space, and placing equipment and furniture.
The fusion center will have a broad scope of operations—focusing on all  crimes, all hazards, and all threats—in order to support the needs of the  state and to help with the sustainability of the center. For instance, the  official said that with an all-crimes scope of operations, the fusion center  could give something back to local law enforcement entities, many of  which have limited resources and access to information. In terms of all  hazards, the fusion center is to support the state strategy to aid in  prevention and deterrence and will be colocated with the state emergency  management agency.
section_title: Missouri
paragraphs: The Missouri Information Analysis Center was established in December  2005 with the mission to provide a public safety partnership, consisting of  local, state, and federal agencies, as well as the public sector and private  entities, that will collect, evaluate, analyze, and disseminate information  and intelligence to the agencies tasked with homeland security  responsibilities in a timely, effective, and secure manner. The main goal of  the center is to serve as the fastest means for sharing information during  hazards, along with the ability to acquire and disseminate information  throughout the state. The center was initially established with analysts  who were transferred from the Missouri Highway Patrol Criminal  Intelligence and Analysis Unit. The center, which is led by the Missouri  Highway Patrol, has an all-crimes and all-hazards focus, which was  established in part as a result of the center’s partnerships. The center is a  member of the RISS project and is partners with the Missouri Department  of Public Safety, the Missouri Emergency Management Administration,  and the Missouri National Guard, the latter two with which it is colocated.
In addition to its director, the Missouri Information Analysis Center has 21  other personnel, including an assistant director and an intelligence  network manager, 8 full-time criminal intelligence analysts, and 10 part- time intelligence intake analysts. The Missouri Gaming Commission has  also dedicated a full-time intelligence analyst to the center.  Investigators  are assigned to cases out of the Highway Patrol’s Division of Drug and  Crime Control as needed. The center also provides local law enforcement  the opportunity to assign analysts and officers to it for internships. The  center works closely with the JTTFs and FIGs in the state and, according  to officials, is close to completing its secure room for two FBI special  agents currently working in the center. The center also works with the  Business Executives for National Security, which has representation from  the majority of the private corporations within the state as well as  individuals interested in assisting homeland security, and has a 13-member  oversight board that is composed of state, local, and federal  representatives.
The Missouri Information Analysis Center collects and disseminates  information involving all crimes, all threats, and all hazards. The  information can be tips, leads, law enforcement reports, and open source  reports as well as information provided from the federal level. DHS and  DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion center  include HSIN, HSIN-Secret, JRIES, RISSNet, RDEx, and LEO, as well as  the Midwest HIDTA Safety Net. Analysts conduct numerous services,  including, but not limited to, responding to intelligence and criminal  activity inquiries from local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies  and prosecuting attorneys; performing various analyses to evaluate  patterns of criminal activity; compiling and disseminating intelligence  booklets containing data on subjects in question for criminal activity to  case investigation officers and prosecutors; developing reports, threat  assessments, bulletins, summaries, and other publications on relevant  criminal activity trends; serving as liaison for the statewide intelligence  database; providing strategic analytical services, development, and  training at the state level to support the Midwest HIDTA; maintaining close  liaison with the Midwest HIDTA; and developing various standardized  statistical reports involving criminal and terrorist threat assessments.
section_title: Montana
paragraphs: The Montana All-Threat Intelligence Center (MATIC) developed from the  intelligence unit of the Montana Department of Justice, Division of  Criminal Investigation. After the attacks of September 11, the unit  relocated to a Department of Military Affairs facility and colocated with  the JTTF. The unit opened its fusion center incarnation, MATIC, in the  spring of 2003 with the mission to collect, store, analyze, and disseminate  information on crimes, both real and suspected, to the law enforcement  community and government officials concerning dangerous drugs, fraud,  organized crime, terrorism and other criminal activity for the purposes of  decision making, public safety, and proactive law enforcement. The center  has an all-crimes scope of operations.
MATIC, administered by the Division of Criminal Investigation, is a joint  venture of the division and the Department of Corrections, Department of  Military Affairs, and the Rocky Mountain Information Network. There are  eight full-time employees, five of whom are Division of Criminal  Investigation employees. The Department of Corrections, Department of  Military Affairs, and the Rocky Mountain Information Network each  provide one full-time employee. The FBI has assigned one analyst to  MATIC, and all MATIC analysts are also considered assigned to the JTTF.
DHS and DOJ systems and networks accessible to MATIC analysts include  HSIN, LEO, NCIC, and FBI classified systems located in the JTTF, as well  as the RISS/Rocky Mountain Information Network, FinCEN, and  INTERPOL. MATIC analysts provide case support to all Montana law  enforcement and assist investigators in identifying evidence, suspects, and  trends in their investigation. Each analyst assigned to MATIC has one or  more portfolios for which he or she is responsible; the portfolios include  drugs, outlaw motorcycle gangs, corrections, general crime, left wing, right  wing, northern border, critical infrastructure, and international terrorism.  Analysts review new organizations active within the state, ongoing or  potential criminal activity, trends or activity around the country that could  affect Montana, and trends or activity in Montana that could affect other  parts of the United States or Canada. MATIC produces a daily brief for  Montana that covers three topic areas—international terrorism/border  issues, domestic terrorism, and general crime—and is disseminated on  RISS and on the MATIC Web portal. MATIC also responds to specific  requests for information, manages the critical infrastructure program,  conducts training sessions for law enforcement, and maintains a Web  portal to assist in the secure sharing of information among law  enforcement. About 180 local, state, tribal, and federal agencies access  MATIC information on its Web portal.
section_title: Nebraska
paragraphs: The Nebraska State Patrol is in the planning stage of establishing the  Nebraska Fusion Center. The Nebraska State Patrol is setting up the  command structure for the center, has reorganized and placed staff into  positions, and, according to an official, is awaiting DHS funding to hire a  consultant to help develop a blueprint for the center. The official also  noted that funding will allow purchase of software necessary to fuse their  intelligence databases together. The center’s timeline has the center  scheduled to open in the fall of 2007. The fusion center is to be all-crimes,  all-hazards, including terrorism. Nebraska State Patrol officials said that  the center will collect as much intelligence information as it can, whether  related to crime, drugs, threats, terrorism, or other hazards, and then  combine it and share it with the necessary agencies. The fusion center will  be the lead intelligence-sharing component in the state and provide a  seamless flow of information to assess potential risks to the state.
The fusion center is planning to initially invite FBI, DEA, and ICE at the  federal level; the Nebraska Emergency Management Agency, Department  of Health and Human Services, and Department of Roads at the state level;  and the Omaha Police Department, the TEW in the Omaha area, and the  Lincoln Police Department at the local level. The center also plans to  partner with key elements of the private sector since the center plans to  develop infrastructure protection plans. The officials expect that many  information systems will be in place, including LEO and RISS/Mid-States  Organized Crime Information Center, and the center is planning to  disseminate an intelligence update either daily or weekly.
section_title: Nevada
paragraphs: The Nevada Department of Public Safety is in the planning stages of  establishing the Nevada Analytical and Information Center. The center is  planning to have an all-crimes and all-threats focus, which would include  major crimes (such as burglary rings, fraud, rape, or homicides) and  terrorism. The state fusion center will look at crimes at the state level and  will share information with federal and local law enforcement agencies to  identify crime trends and patterns.  The center will also have an all- hazards mission and plans to include fire departments and public health  entities as stakeholders.
The center will be responsible for 15 of the 17 counties in the state,  excluding Clark and Washoe Counties, which will be covered by separate  centers operated by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and the  Washoe County Sheriff’s Office.
section_title: New Hampshire
paragraphs: The New Hampshire Department of Safety Division of State Police is in the  early stages of establishing the New Hampshire Fusion Center. They are in  the process of developing the fusion center as a separate entity from  several existing intelligence units within the state. For example, after the  events of September 11 the State Police created a terrorism intelligence  unit, in addition to a criminal intelligence unit that focuses on narcotics  and organized crime. The fusion center is planning to open in 2008.
The New Hampshire Fusion Center will focus on all crimes and all  hazards. The state chose to adopt an all-crimes focus both because  terrorism is funded by and associated with many other crimes (such as  drug trafficking, credit card fraud, and identity theft).  The New Hampshire  State Police intelligence unit has a full-time member assigned to it and  coordinates with the FBI JTTF.  Also, the State Police sustain  interoperability with the FBI because four of its members have FBI  clearances. The fusion center will be housed within the New Hampshire  Department of Safety, which includes the State Police, the Division of  Motor Vehicles, and the Bureau of Emergency Communication (911), and  the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. The fusion  center has access to LEO and RISS systems.
section_title: New Jersey
paragraphs: The Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC) was established in  January 2005 and moved into its current facility in October 2006. ROIC is a  24-hour a day all-crimes, all-hazards, all-threats, all-the-time watch  command and analysis center. The New Jersey State Police is the  executive agency of ROIC and administers the general personnel, policy,  and management functions. The center’s mission is to collect, analyze, and  disseminate intelligence to participating law enforcement entities; evaluate  intelligence for reliability and validity; provide intelligence support to  tactical and strategic planning; evaluate intelligence in the Statewide  Intelligence Management System; and disseminate terrorism-related  activity and information to the FBI, among others. ROIC is also the home  of the State Emergency Operations Center, the State Office of Emergency  Management, and the State Police Emergency Management Section  Offices.
ROIC has personnel assigned (including 13 analysts) from the FBI, DHS,  ATF, ICE, FAMS, and the U.S. Coast Guard, in addition to personnel from  the State Police, New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and  Preparedness, and the Department of Transportation. ROIC is seeking  representation from the departments of Corrections, Parole, Health and  Senior Services; Environmental Protection; and Military and Veteran  Affairs. ROIC is overseen by a Governance Committee, chaired by the  director of ROIC, that consists of representatives from state and federal  entities and law enforcement associations who meet quarterly to discuss  ROIC policies and other related matters. ROIC is seeking to develop  additional relationships with private sector organizations—such as the  American Society of Industrial Security, the Princeton Area Security  Group, the Bankers and Brokers Group, and the All Hazards Consortium— to further the mission of the intelligence analysis element of ROIC.
ROIC consists of three components: (1) an analysis component,  responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence  information entered into the Statewide Intelligence Management System  by local, county, state, and federal law enforcement; (2) the operations  component, which will control the actions of State Police operational and  support personnel and serve as a liaison to federal agencies, other state  entities, and county or municipal agencies on operational matters; and  (3) a call center component, which will provide the center with situational  awareness intelligence about emergency situations.
DHS and DOJ systems and networks to which ROIC has access include  LEO, HSIN, HSIN-Secret, and ACS, as well as SIPRNet. ROIC is scheduled  to have HSDN installed in late September 2007.  ROIC disseminates officer  safety information, bulletins, and any other information deemed to be of  value to the law enforcement or homeland security community. The State  Police provide operational support to the law enforcement community on  canine support for bomb and drug detection, bomb technicians, medevac  helicopter support, and marine services.
section_title: New Mexico
paragraphs: The New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center (NMASIC) will serve as  New Mexico’s primary intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination  point for all homeland security intelligence matters, which will include  intelligence support for counterterrorism operations, intelligence support  for counter-human smuggling operations, critical infrastructure threat  assessments, intelligence training, and terrorism and counterterrorism  awareness training. According to officials in the New Mexico Governor’s  Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, NMASIC was  established to provide the Governor and State Homeland Security Advisor  with the capability to receive information and intelligence from a number  of sources and fuse that information and intelligence together to create a  common intelligence and threat picture, upon which they, and other senior  officials, can make long-term policy decisions.  NMASIC was also  established to provide tactical intelligence support to local, tribal, and  state agencies in New Mexico.
NMASIC will accomplish this mission by developing and sustaining five  key projects and programs: a statewide integrated intelligence program, a  statewide information sharing environment, intelligence product  development and production management, collection requirements and  collection management, and a state law enforcement operational  component.
NMASIC’s analytical functions will include a collection management  analyst, an international terrorism/Islamic extremist analyst, a single-issue  extremist analyst, a militia/white supremacists analyst, a border security  analyst, and a critical infrastructure analyst. Once fully staffed, NMASIC  will provide tactical and strategic intelligence support to agencies in New  Mexico. Participating agencies and disciplines include the Governor's  Office of Homeland Security, Department of Public Safety/New Mexico  State Police, local law enforcement, local fire departments, local  emergency management, Pueblo Public Safety Organizations, FPS, TSA,  DHS I&A, Department of Energy, Department of State, the FBI, HIDTA, the  U.S. Attorney’s Office, and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.
section_title: New York
paragraphs: In addition to the state fusion center—the New York State Intelligence  Center (NYSIC)—there are other local area centers in New York, including  those operated by the New York City Police Department Intelligence  Division and Rockland County.
subsections: section_title: New York State Intelligence Center
paragraphs: The New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC) was established in  August 2003 as a multijurisdictional intelligence and investigative center  composed of representatives from state, federal, and local law  enforcement, criminal justice, and intelligence agencies. Its mission is to  advance the effectiveness and efficiency of New York State law  enforcement operations and services by acting as a centralized and  comprehensive criminal intelligence resource. NYSIC, which is led by the  New York State Police, operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. NYSIC  combines the duties of an intelligence center and fusion center to enhance  collaboration among New York state law enforcement agencies and law  enforcement agencies nationwide. Using an all-crimes approach, the  NYSIC collects, analyzes, evaluates, and disseminates information and  intelligence to identify emerging patterns and trends, investigate current  criminal activities, and prevent future criminal acts.
NYSIC opened the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) in May 2004, and this  component is responsible for intelligence and information sharing in all  areas outside New York City. The mission of NYSIC-CTC is to provide law  enforcement agencies throughout New York state with timely and useful  intelligence to assist in the prevention, detection, and deterrence of  terrorism. NYSIC-CTC provides a centralized contact point for the  reporting of suspicious activity from both civilians and law enforcement.  NYSIC-CTC vets information and directs it to the appropriate federal,  state, or local law enforcement agency for investigation.
NYSIC has 18 agencies represented in the facility, with over 80 people in  the center. Federal entities with personnel in NYSIC include the FBI (three  intelligence analysts and one special agent); DEA (one intelligence  analyst); the U.S Attorney’s Office (one part-time intelligence research  specialist); DHS I &A (one senior intelligence analyst); ICE (one senior  special agent); CBP (one special agent expected); and the Social Security  Administration (one special agent). The New York State Police provides  the majority of NYSIC’s personnel, with 44 investigators and 20 analysts  assigned. In addition, the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles,  Division of Parole, Department of Correctional Services, Department of  Insurance, Office of Homeland Security, and National Guard have  provided personnel and services to NYSIC. Among the local entities  providing personnel, liaison, and services to NYSIC are the New York City  Police Department, New York City Metropolitan Transit Authority Police  Department, Rensselaer County Sheriff’s Office, and the Town of Colonie  Police Department. The Executive Committee on Counter Terrorism,  consisting of state police executives, the Director of the State Office of  Homeland Security, commissioners of various state agencies,  representatives from police chiefs and sheriffs, and the Office of the  Governor, serves as an Advisory Board to NYSIC.
NYSIC collects information including tips from law enforcement, the  private sectors, and the public via crime and terrorism tip hotlines. NYSIC  also receives reports from federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement  entities. Federal information includes threat assessments, CBP reporting,  and DHS daily reporting. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks  accessible to the fusion center include HSIN (Unclassified and Secret),  HSDN, FPS portal, LEO, as well as FinCEN and Treasury Enforcement  Communications System. Some NYSIC personnel—CTC personnel with  Top Secret clearances—have full access to FBI systems (e.g., ACS, IDW,  and Guardian). Reporting from state, local, and tribal agencies includes  investigative and intelligence submissions, suspicious incidents, public  safety and public health information, and infrastructure information.  NYSIC also collects information from open sources. The types of services  performed and products disseminated include counterterrorism and  criminal intelligence analysis and reporting, situational awareness  reporting, situation reports on emerging incidents, investigative support,  and outreach and training. NYSIC conducts critical infrastructure and  outreach and awareness in conjunction with New York Office of  Homeland Security.
section_title: NYPD Intelligence Division
paragraphs: The NYPD Intelligence Division opened its Intelligence Center in March  2002. The center has both an all-crimes and counterterrorism focus, for  example, focusing on traditional crimes (e.g., guns, gangs, and drugs) as  well as having one group of intelligence analysts who analyze information  for ties to terrorism. Analysts look at global trends and patterns for  applicability to New York City. Personnel have access to among others, all  FBI systems, LEO, and HSIN.
section_title: Rockland County Intelligence Center
paragraphs: The Rockland County Intelligence Center has been in existence since 1995.  However, according to its director, the center changed focus after  September 2001. The mission of the center is to provide intelligence to law  enforcement agencies based upon the collection, evaluation, and analysis  of information that can identify criminal activity. The center takes an all- crimes approach and is involved in any crime that occurs within the  county.
The center is composed of sworn officers from Rockland County law  enforcement agencies who are assigned specialized desks, such as street  gangs, burglary/robbery, terrorism, and traditional organized crime. In  addition, the FBI assigned a special agent on a full-time basis to the center.  DHS and DOJ networks and systems to which the center has access  include HSIN and LEO, as well as HIDTA and RISS/Mid-Atlantic Great  Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network.
section_title: North Carolina
paragraphs: The North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAAC)  opened in May 2006 and is overseen by the North Carolina State Bureau of  Investigation’s (SBI) Intelligence and Technical Services Section within  the state Department of Justice. The mission of ISAAC is to serve as the  focal point for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism and  criminal information relating to threats and attacks within North Carolina.  ISAAC will enhance and facilitate the collection of information from local,  state, and federal resources and analyze that information so that it will  benefit homeland security and criminal interdiction programs at all levels.  Specifically, ISAAC develops and evaluates information about persons or  organizations engaged in criminal activity, including homeland security,  gang activity, and drug activity.
ISAAC partners include the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the FBI, SBI, the State  Highway Patrol, National Guard, Association of Chiefs of Police, Sheriff’s  Association, Division of Public Health, Department of Agriculture,  Department of Corrections, Alcohol Law Enforcement, Emergency  Management, and the Governor’s Crime Commission. Partners take what  ISAAC refers to as “a global approach to a state response.” The ISAAC  team consists of investigators and analysts from SBI, the Raleigh Police  Department, Wake County Sheriff’s Office, State Highway Patrol, state  Alcohol Law Enforcement, National Guard, U.S. Attorney’s Office, and the  FBI. Specifically, the FBI assigned a full-time analyst and a part-time  special agent to ISAAC. ISAAC investigators actively investigate leads and  tips and work jointly with the JTTFs throughout the state.  DHS I&A has  conducted a needs assessment of the ISAAC. However, at the time of our  review, it had not yet placed an intelligence officer in the center.
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion  center include HSIN, LEO, as well as FinCEN, Regional Organized Crime  Information Center, RISSNET, EPIC, INTERPOL, as well as a variety of  state information. The FBI analyst has access to FBI classified systems,  and the FBI has cleared all sworn and analytical personnel assigned to the  fusion center. ISAAC produces a variety of products, including an open  source report; Suspicious Activity Reports; and a monthly information  bulletin with articles of interest, a special events calendar, tips and leads  summary, and products and services of ISAAC. ISAAC also supports  special events, maintains a tips and leads database, and conducts  community outreach. For instance, ISAAC has developed relationships  with several Muslim organizations.
section_title: North Dakota
paragraphs: The North Dakota Fusion Center was established in September 2003 with  support from the North Dakota Division of Homeland Security and the  North Dakota National Guard. In January 2004, the North Dakota Bureau  of Criminal Investigation and the North Dakota Highway Patrol assigned a  special agent and a captain, respectively, to the center. The fusion center  takes an all-crimes and all-hazards approach to terrorism. As such, it  collects and disseminates all-hazard and all-crime information with  possible links to terrorism. The fusion center is staffed with personnel  from the Bureau of Criminal Investigation, North Dakota Division of  Homeland Security, North Dakota National Guard, and North Dakota  Highway Patrol. The fusion center consists of law enforcement,  intelligence analysts (both domestic and international), operations and  planning, and critical infrastructure personnel and is divided into three  sections—law enforcement, operations, and intelligence—that work  together.  While there are no FBI personnel assigned to the center, fusion  center law enforcement personnel are JTTF members.
The North Dakota Fusion Center provides training and terrorism  investigative support; conducts critical infrastructure assessments; and  disseminates products including a monthly newsletter to law enforcement  and homeland security stakeholders, and summaries to military  stakeholders. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to  the fusion center include HSIN, HSIN-Secret, and FBI’s ACS, as well as  RISS, RISS ATIX, INTERPOL, FinCEN, and INFRAGARD. The fusion  center is located in a secure National Guard facility.
section_title: Ohio
paragraphs: After the September 11 attacks, Ohio established the Ohio Strategic Task  Force, a working group of state cabinet-level positions, to develop a  strategic plan that included the formation of a fusion center. In January  2005, the Ohio Homeland Security Division’s Strategic Analysis and  Information Center (SAIC) began initial operations with a base group  composed of state National Guard, State Highway Patrol, Emergency  Management, and Homeland Security personnel.  According to an SAIC  official, legislation subsequently widened the foundation and basis for the  center.  In December 2005, SAIC moved to its second phase of  development and implemented a work-week-style operation, acquired  personnel, conducted additional training in intelligence analysis, and  bought additional software to handle information acquisition. SAIC’s third  phase of development is projected to begin in the fall/winter of 2007 and  will include an evening second shift.  SAIC maintains a 10-hour-a-day, 5- day-a-week schedule with 24-hour radio and telephone coverage through  the Highway Patrol. The center serves as a secure one-stop shop that  collects, filters, analyzes, and disseminates terrorism-related information.  SAIC has a counterterrorism and all-crimes scope of operations.
The center has seven full-time employees with a number of agencies  represented on a part-time rotational basis. State entities represented  include the Department of Agriculture, Attorney General’s Office, Bureau  of Criminal Identification and Investigation, Emergency Medical Services,  Environmental Protection Agency, Fire Marshal, Department of Health,  Highway Patrol, Homeland Security, National Guard, Department of Public  Safety, Department of Transportation, the Ohio Association of Chiefs of  Police, and the Fire Chief’s Association. There are also a number of city  and county agencies represented on a part-time basis. The FBI has  assigned a full-time analyst and a special agent to the center. DHS has  assigned a full-time intelligence analyst to the center. Other federal  partners in SAIC include ATF, TSA, U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S.  Attorney’s Office.
SAIC’s Investigation Unit is composed of law enforcement personnel from  multiple agencies and includes commissioned officers from local, state,  and federal agencies as well as intelligence analysts. The unit’s primary  mission is the detection of persons engaged in terrorist activities. This unit  receives information from law enforcement agencies, crime reports, and  field interrogation contacts as well as direct reports from both the public  and law enforcement via a telephone tip line and Internet Web  applications. DHS and DOJ systems and networks accessible to SAIC  include HSIN and LEO. SAIC has HSDN installed in its secure room, but  the system is not currently operational pending certification of the secure  space. The FBI’s classified systems are accessible by the FBI analyst  assigned to SAIC, and preparations are underway to build a secure room  to house FBINet. The Investigation Unit conducts preliminary  investigations of information and either processes the complaint, lead, or  tip internally or forwards the complaint, lead, or tip to the JTTF or law  enforcement agency with primary jurisdiction.
section_title: Oklahoma
paragraphs: The Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation, in collaboration with other  state and local entities, is in the early stages of developing the Oklahoma  Information Fusion Center. Specifically, it has obtained funding,  developed an implementation plan, and identified 10 positions for which it  will be hiring. The official opening of the center is expected in early 2008.
There were two primary reasons for the establishment of the center. First  was to help in the prevention of future attacks, and second was to serve as  a hub to facilitate information and intelligence sharing with law  enforcement officers in the field. The purpose of the fusion center will be  to screen the information, determine whether it is pertinent to Oklahoma,  and consolidate the information. As such, the proposed mission statement  for the center is to serve as the focal point for the collection, assessment,  analysis, and dissemination of terrorism intelligence and other criminal  activity information relating to Oklahoma. The scope of operations for the  center will be both all-crimes and all-hazards.
The Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation is to act as the host agency  for the fusion center, serving as the focal point for all fusion center  activities, housing the fusion center within its headquarters, and providing  most of the center’s analysts and agents. The fusion center will include  nine Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation analysts. In addition, the  center plans to include analysts from the Oklahoma Office of Homeland  Security, the FBI FIG, and the Oklahoma National Guard. There are also  six Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation agents who will play a support  role to the center.
The Oklahoma Information Fusion Center will collect information on all  crimes in accordance with 28 CFR, part 23. Fusion center personnel are  expected to perform intelligence analysis on all investigative reports and  informational reports provided to the center. Personnel can provide  investigative support through the use of intelligence products such as  charts, timelines, intelligence summary reports, and many other products.  Center personnel also have direct access to numerous databases that can  be used to support investigative activities as well as intelligence  investigations. DHS and DOJ systems to which the fusion center has  access include LEO, HSIN, as well as RISSNet, FinCEN, and VICAP.
section_title: Oregon
paragraphs: Oregon’s Terrorism Intelligence and Threat Assessment Network (TITAN)  Fusion Center opened in June 2007. Its primary mission is information  sharing and coordination of terrorism intelligence among Oregon’s 220 law  enforcement entities. In addition, the coordination and passing of  terrorism-related information to the FBI is a primary function for the  center. The center will also support an all-crimes approach to identifying  terrorism-related activity, including criminal activities in areas such as  money laundering, counterfeiting and piracy, and human and weapons  smuggling.
The center is administered by the Oregon Department of Justice and has  representatives from the FBI, ATF, Internal Revenue Service, the Oregon  HIDTA program, Oregon State Police, and the Oregon Military  Department.  TITAN Fusion Center is located in the same building as an  FBI’s resident agency.
The Terrorism Intelligence and Threat Assessment Network is Oregon’s  terrorism liaison officer program. This program began in May 2004 and has  since grown to include 53 members who represent 35 agencies. The  primary mission of the program is information sharing between the fusion  center and first responders. The fusion center is the clearinghouse and  information hub within the state. Intelligence is collected, collated,  analyzed, and then disseminated as briefings, intelligence, and officer  safety bulletins and alerts.
section_title: Pennsylvania
paragraphs: The Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center (PaCIC) was established in  July of 2003 to serve as the primary conduit through which law  enforcement officers in Pennsylvania can submit information and receive  actionable intelligence for the benefit of their decision makers. PaCIC,  which is a component of the Pennsylvania State Police, is an all-crimes  analysis center. However, the center is planning to diversify and focus on  all hazards in the future. According to its director, PaCIC is a developed  criminal intelligence center. However, in terms of a fusion center, it is still  in the early stages of development.
PaCIC is staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. PaCIC’s 32-member staff  includes Pennsylvania State Police intelligence analysts, research analysts,  officers, and an information technology specialist. PaCIC also contains a  watch-center component of enlisted supervisors designed to maintain  situational awareness.  A representative of the state Department of  Corrections works in the center on a part-time basis and provides direct  access to corrections intelligence. There are currently no federal entities  represented in PaCIC. However, DHS representation is being planned with  the eventual expansion into an all-crimes and all-hazards fusion center.  FBI security modifications to the center are under way, and FBI  representation is anticipated by November 2007. PaCIC has access to  HSIN and disseminates products including daily reports, strategic  assessments, intelligence alerts, information briefs, and threat  assessments. The center also operates a drug tip line and a terrorism tip  line.
section_title: Rhode Island
paragraphs: The Rhode Island Fusion Center was established in March 2006 and is a  component of the Rhode Island State Police. In establishing the center, the  state recognized the importance of the fusion center concept for state and  local information sharing. The fusion center is colocated with an FBI field  office and thus focuses primarily on counterterrorism. However, the  center also serves as a resource for the local police agencies in the state.
The fusion center has three personnel—one investigator and two analysts.  The FBI is the fusion center’s only federal partner, although the director  said that he works with ICE on a regular basis. The fusion center works  closely with the JTTF, to which there are also State Police officers  assigned. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the  fusion center include HSIN, LEO, FPS portal, and FBI’s ACS system and  Guardian. The FBI also facilitates all of the center’s security clearances  and provides the center’s facility, which is colocated with the JTTF, free of  charge.
section_title: South Carolina
paragraphs: In South Carolina, the Chief of the State Law Enforcement Division is the  state Director of Homeland Security and the state representative to DHS.  In July 2004, the Chief of the Division approved the development of a  fusion center and the South Carolina Information Exchange (SCIEx) was  established in March 2005. SCIEx has an all-crimes scope of operations  and has devoted its resources to combating all nature of criminal activity.  Its mission is to prevent and deter acts of terrorism and criminal activity,  and to promote homeland security and public safety through intelligence  fusion and information sharing with all sectors of South Carolina society.  SCIEx also handles reports of suspicious activity and includes a  component that deals with “situations as they develop,” including a  response to emergent hazards. Further, SCIEx goals focus on providing  real-time response and timely assistance to local law enforcement  agencies, developing actionable intelligence and analysis to predict and  prevent homeland security threats, and using intelligence-led policing and  other products to facilitate the prevention and interdiction of criminal and  terrorist activities.
SCIEx’s 14-person staff includes agents and analysts from the State Law  Enforcement Division; the National Guard; Department of Heath and  Environmental Control; Department of Corrections; Department of  Probation, Pardon, and Parole; and the FBI, which assigned one FIG  analyst. DHS I&A has conducted a needs assessment of SCIEx. However,  at the time of our review, it had not yet placed an intelligence analyst in  the center. The center is organized into an 8/5 watch (with a 24/7 on-call  duty roster); a collection, analysis, and production unit; AMBER alert and  missing persons coordinators; and liaisons to JTTF and Project SeaHawk.
SCIEx analysts collect information from a variety of sources including  federal intelligence and law enforcement agency reports, incident reports,  and other first responder reports and graphics to produce daily bulletins,  targeted advisories, and intelligence assessments. DHS and DOJ  information systems or networks accessible to the fusion center include  HSIN/JRIES, LEO, EPIC, and VICAP, as well as RISSNET, Interpol, and  FinCEN. HSIN-Secret is available to personnel if they travel to the  Emergency Operations Center, which is located in a different facility than  SCIEx. Additionally, the FBI funded the development of a secure room at  SCIEx, and once the room is completed, SCIEx will also gain access to FBI  systems. SCIEx also uses a variety of analytical tools such as Geographic  Information System and crime mapping to enhance its analytic products.
section_title: South Dakota
paragraphs: The South Dakota Fusion Center was established in June 2006 with the  mission to protect the citizens by ensuring the resiliency of critical  infrastructure operations throughout South Dakota by enhancing and  coordinating counterterrorism intelligence and other investigative support  efforts among private sector and local, state, tribal, and federal  stakeholders. The principal role of the fusion center is to compile, analyze,  and disseminate criminal and terrorist information and intelligence and  other information to support efforts to anticipate, identify, prevent, and/or  monitor criminal and terrorist activity. The center has an all-hazards and  all-crimes scope of operations and focuses on all criminal activity, not just  those with a nexus to terrorism. The all-hazards focus comes from the  center’s coordination with the state Office of Emergency Management.
The center is staffed by the South Dakota Office of Homeland Security and  the South Dakota Highway Patrol and receives oversight from the State  Homeland Security Senior Advisory Committee. The center has one full- time staff person and two part-time personnel from the Office of  Homeland Security. There were no federal entities represented in the  fusion center. However, officials said that they coordinate with the local  JTTF, the HIDTA, and other drug and fugitive task forces.
The fusion center gathers information about all-hazard, all-crimes  incidents and disseminates it to first responders, surrounding states, and  the federal government. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks  accessible to the fusion center include HSIN, LEO, as well as RISS/Mid- States Organized Crime Information Center, ICEFISHX, and Law  Enforcement Intelligence Network, which are operated by fusion centers  in Minnesota and Iowa.
section_title: Tennessee
paragraphs: The state center for Tennessee, the Tennessee Regional Information  Center (TRIC), opened in May 2007, with the mission to lead a team effort  of local, state, and federal law enforcement in cooperation with the  citizens of the state of Tennessee for the timely receipt, analysis, and  dissemination of terrorism and criminal activity information relating to  Tennessee. TRIC provides a central location for the collection and analysis  of classified, law enforcement sensitive, and open source information;  provides a continuous flow of information and intelligence to the law  enforcement community; and provides assistance to law enforcement  agencies in criminal investigation matters. TRIC has an all-crimes scope of  operations that includes crimes such as traditional organized crime,  narcotics, gangs, fugitives, missing children, sex offenders, and  Medicaid/Medicare fraud. TRIC also has a terrorism/national security  focus that includes international and domestic terrorism, foreign  counterintelligence, and other national security issues (such as Avian Flu).
Led by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and the Tennessee  Department of Safety/Office of Homeland Security, TRIC’s 31-person staff  includes analysts from these two entities, as well as the Department of  Corrections, the National Guard, and the FBI FIG. Other partner agencies  include the Highway Patrol, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, HIDTA,  the U.S. Attorney’s Office, ATF, and the Regional Organized Crime  Information Center, as well as a growing connectivity to the state’s local  law enforcement agencies. TRIC provides support to all agencies within  the state, reviews and analyzes data for crime trend patterns and criminal  activity with a potential nexus to terrorism, disseminates information  through regular bulletins and special advisories, develops threat  assessments and executive news briefs, performs requests for information  as needed, and produces suspicious incident report analysis. The public  can provide tips and information to TRIC through its Web site and via a  toll-free telephone number. DHS and DOJ information systems or  networks accessible to TRIC include HSIN and LEO, as well as RISS and  the Regional Organized Crime Information Center. Fusion center  operations work in concert with other ongoing Tennessee Bureau of  Investigation programs, including AMBER Alerts, sex offender registry,  and the aviation unit.
section_title: Texas
paragraphs: In addition to the statewide Texas Fusion Center, there are regional fusion  centers including the North Central Texas Fusion Center.
subsections: section_title: Texas Fusion Center
paragraphs: After September 11, Governor Rick Perry created a task force to study  homeland security matters, and the task force identified communication  and coordination as predominant themes. Subsequently, the Texas  Legislature passed a bill that created a communications center to serve as  the focal point for planning, coordinating, and integrating government  communications regarding the state’s homeland defense strategy. This  center, then known as the Texas Security Alert and Analysis Center,  opened in July 2003. The center functioned as a call center to allow the  public and law enforcement to report suspicious activities. In July 2005,  the center was expanded and renamed the Texas Fusion Center, which  acts as a tactical intelligence center for law enforcement that is open 24  hours a day, 7 days a week and helps coordinate multi-agency border  control activities. The fusion center has an all-crimes and all-hazards  scope of operations in order to disrupt organizations that are using  criminal activities to further terrorist activities. The center gathers  information from the public and law enforcement, analyzes it, and  provides it to JTTFs. The fusion center also focuses on border security,  narcoterrorism, and criminal gangs. The all-hazards scope of operations  was adopted in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The center  works in conjunction with, and is located in, the State Operation Center, in  order to create an all-hazards response capability.
The Texas Fusion Center has dual oversight by the Criminal Law  Enforcement Division and the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security at  the Texas Department of Public Safety. It is staffed by Department of  Public Safety officers and analysts. The FBI assigned a part-time analyst to  the center.
The Texas Fusion Center is the central facility for collecting, analyzing,  and disseminating intelligence information related to terrorist activities.  The center is designed to handle and respond to telephone inquiries from  law enforcement and the general public, in addition to having access to  several information systems. The Texas Fusion Center monitors HSIN,  LEO, and JRIES and has access to FBI systems, though only through the  part-time analyst assigned to the center. The center also uses a variety of  state systems and databases, including the Texas Data Exchange, which is  a comprehensive information-sharing portal that allows criminal justice  agencies to exchange jail and records management systems data, and  provides system access to a variety of state databases.
section_title: North Central Texas Fusion Center
paragraphs: The North Central Texas Fusion Center (NTFC) became operational in  February 2006, after a 2½-year planning process. The planners recognized  the fusion center needed a different mission from those already being  conducted by the North Texas HIDTA and FBI FIG, so NTFC adopted an  all-crimes and all-hazards scope of operations. Specifically, NTFC works  to prevent or minimize the impacts of natural, intentional, and accidental  hazards/disasters through information sharing across jurisdictions and  across disciplines. The center also supports emergency response, field  personnel, and investigations.
Stakeholders include those in homeland security, law enforcement, public  health, fire, emergency management, and state and federal government  such as the Texas Fusion Center, Texas National Guard, and DHS. DHS  I&A has assigned an intelligence analyst to the center.
The center provides intelligence support to regional task forces, State of  Texas initiatives, and local police department homicide and criminal  investigations and also assesses regional threats. Users from 42 regional  jurisdictions and agencies covering five major disciplines, including law  enforcement, health, fire, emergency management, and intelligence,  receive bulletins and alert information. Reports and alerts are also  distributed via e-mail to the stakeholders. Most of the reports are all- hazard and all-discipline focused and look at trends, observations, and  predictive elements primarily in support of prevention and preparedness.  DHS and DOJ systems and networks accessible to NTFC include HSIN,  LEO, and HSDN, in addition to a variety of other state and open source  information databases.
section_title: Utah
paragraphs: The Utah Fusion Center is in the planning stage and is transitioning from  an intelligence center—the Utah Criminal Intelligence Center—which was  established prior to the 2002 Winter Olympics. Led by the Utah  Department of Public Safety, the fusion center is in the process of  developing operations guidelines and memorandums of understanding and  consulting with DHS’s Office of Grants and Training. The Utah Fusion  Center will adopt an all-crimes and all-hazards scope of operations to  move beyond law enforcement and broaden the center’s focus to include  homeland security and public safety.
The fusion center was established to enhance the ability to share  information across disciplines beyond law enforcement and levels of  government. The fusion center, as was the criminal intelligence center, is  colocated with the local FBI JTTF and will employ criminal researchers  and investigators. The center works closely with the FBI JTTF and the  local DHS representative, partnerships that were developed with the  establishment of the precursor intelligence center in 2002. The FBI  provides Top Secret clearances, and most of the staff members have had  Top Secret security clearances since the 2002 Winter Olympics. DHS and  DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion center  include HSIN, LEO, FBI classified systems, as well as RISS/Rocky  Mountain Information Network.
section_title: Vermont
paragraphs: The Vermont Fusion Center, which is managed by the Vermont State  Police, was established in August 2005 in order to further the national  homeland security mission in response to the terrorist attacks on  September 11. The fusion center, which is colocated with ICE’s Law  Enforcement Support Center (LESC), is a partnership of the Vermont  Department of Homeland Security, Vermont State Police Criminal  Intelligence Unit, ICE, Vermont National Guard Counter Drug Program,  and the U.S. Coast Guard. Each entity provides personnel to the center.
The fusion center serves as Vermont’s clearinghouse to analyze and assess  information received from law enforcement and disseminate information  from a single location. The goals of the Vermont Fusion Center include  providing timely, accurate, and actionable information to the state,  national, and international law enforcement communities; identifying  parallel investigations, reducing duplication, and increasing officer safety  (deconfliction); and providing strategic analysis, to include crime mapping  for all types of criminal activity, particularly related to illegal narcotics,  money laundering crimes, identity theft, crimes that support terrorism, and  other major crimes. The center has an all-crimes scope of operations  reflecting the multiple sectors, including public safety and law  enforcement, that have come together to form the fusion center.
The center provides major criminal case assistance, such as fugitive  tracking, phone searches, liaison with federal and Canadian agencies,  analytical reports, and utilization of federal capabilities such as cellular  telephone triangulation, mail covers, passport information, and border  lookouts. The center also disseminates notifications, alerts, indicators, and  warnings to Vermont law enforcement. DHS and DOJ information systems  or networks accessible to the fusion center include HSIN, Student and  Exchange Visitor Information System, U.S. Visitor and Immigration Status  Indicator Technology System, National Security Entry-Exit Registration  System, FPS portal, U.S. Coast Guard Homeport, LEO, VICAP, EPIC,  NCIC, as well as RISS/New England Police Information Network, NLETS,  INTERPOL, HIDTA, FinCEN, and Treasury Enforcement Communications  System. The center also has access to a number of state and commercial  systems and databases, and to the Canadian Border Information / Intel  Center.
section_title: Virginia
paragraphs: The Virginia Fusion Center was established in February 2005 after being  mandated by legislation and moved into a new facility in November 2005.  Operated by the Virginia State Police, in cooperation with the Virginia  Department of Emergency Management, the primary mission of the center  is to fuse together resources from local, state, and federal agencies and  private industries to facilitate information collection, analysis, and sharing  in order to deter and prevent criminal and terrorist attacks. The secondary  mission of the center is, in support of the Virginia Emergency Operations  Center (with which it is colocated), to centralize information and  resources to provide coordinated and effective response in the event of an  attack. The center has an all-hazards and counterterrorism scope of  operations.
The Virginia Fusion Center has partnerships established with state, local,  and federal law enforcement agencies, including ATF and the U.S. Secret  Service; DHS’s Homeland Security Operation Center; FBI JTTFs in the  state of Virginia; the private sector; Fire and Emergency Medical Services;  the military, including the Army and the U.S. Coast Guard; the National  Capitol Regional Intelligence Center; other state intelligence centers; as  well as the public. There are over 20 people in the center—17 analysts, 5  special agents, and other management and administrative personnel. The  analysts are primarily from the Virginia State Police and the Department of  Emergency Management. The National Guard has also assigned an analyst.  DHS has detailed one intelligence analyst, and the FBI has assigned one  reports officer to the center. The DHS Protective Security Advisor has a  desk in the center as well. Several center employees are detailed to other  organizations; for example, the Virginia State Police have five agents  assigned to JTTFs in the state.
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion  center include HSIN, HSIN-Intel, HSDN, LEO, and JRIES, as well as the  RISS/Regional Organized Crime Information Center. The FBI reports  officer in the center can access FBI classified systems. The fusion center  shares all-hazards information and intelligence, tactical information, raw  information, and finished intelligence products with a variety of clients.  These products include daily terrorism intelligence briefings that could be  produced at Law Enforcement Sensitive, For Official Use Only, and open  source levels and are e-mailed to all law enforcement and military contacts  and posted to a bulletin; intelligence bulletins that describe emerging  trends or upcoming events; threat assessments for events; and information  reports on pertinent information that has not been fully analyzed. Virginia  Fusion Center analysts also produce special projects or reports, provide  case support, follow up on calls, and respond to requests for information.  The center has established a variety of performance measures, including  quarterly surveys disseminated to its users and activity reports (e.g., daily,  weekly, quarterly, and yearly). All  personnel also have core  responsibilities and competencies.
section_title: Washington
paragraphs: The Washington Joint Analytical Center (WAJAC) started as a small  project in 2003 to facilitate information sharing within the state and with  the federal government and has gradually evolved. WAJAC, which is a joint  effort between the Washington State Patrol and the FBI, has an all-crimes,  all-hazards, and counterterrorism scope of operations to support the state  and local law enforcement community. This approach allows WAJAC  intelligence analysts and investigators the ability to fully evaluate  information for trends, emerging crime problems, and their possible  connections to terrorism. WAJAC has recently included an all-hazards  focus and has started looking at natural disasters and public health  epidemics.
WAJAC personnel include representatives from the Washington State  Patrol, King County Sheriff’s Office, Bellevue Police Department, Seattle  Police Department, the Washington Military Department (National Guard),  ICE, and TSA. There are no FBI personnel assigned directly to WAJAC;  however, WAJAC is colocated in an FBI field office and WAJAC analysts  work side by side with the FIG in the field office. DHS I&A has conducted  a needs assessment of WAJAC, and, according to DHS, had assigned an  intelligence analyst to the center.
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion  center include HSIN, LEO, ICE and TSA systems; all FBI systems; as well  as access to systems of each partner agency in WAJAC. WAJAC personnel  receive all of their clearances, at the Top Secret level through the FBI.  WAJAC produces a variety of weekly intelligence briefings, bulletins, and  assessments in conjunction with the FIG. These products are e-mailed to  law enforcement agencies, other government agencies, private sector  security officers, and military units.
section_title: West Virginia
paragraphs: The Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety’s Homeland Security  Division is in the planning stage of establishing the West Virginia Fusion  Center. The planning team for the development of the fusion center  consists of multiple agencies and stakeholders with leadership from the  Homeland Security Advisor. The West Virginia Fusion Center is to operate  under the direct control of the Homeland Security Advisor and the State  Administrative Agency. A governance committee, to be chaired by the  State Administrative Agency with representatives from the Northern and  Southern Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils, state police, National Guard,  health care, higher education, the private sector, and the interoperability  coordinator will be responsible for providing guidance and policy. At the  time of our review, the West Virginia Fusion Center was beginning its  phased opening and bringing in personnel from the National Guard and the  state police.
The vision for the fusion center is to prevent, deter, and disrupt terrorism  and criminal activity, enabling a safe and secure environment for the  citizens of West Virginia. The fusion center will adopt an all-crimes, all- hazards, and counterterrorism scope of operations but plans to tailor each  depending on the stakeholders in the center. For example, the West  Virginia Public Broadcasting System will be represented in the fusion  center to help gather and manage information. However, if there is an  evacuation event, it will also disseminate the information directly to the  public as public service announcements through television and radio  stations.
section_title: Wisconsin
paragraphs: There are two fusion centers in Wisconsin: the Wisconsin Statewide  Intelligence Center (WSIC) and the Milwaukee-based Southeastern  Terrorism Alert Center (STAC).
subsections: section_title: Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center
paragraphs: Led by the Wisconsin Department of Justice Division of Criminal  Investigation, the Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center (WSIC) became  operational in March 2006 as the central information and intelligence-  gathering entity for the state of Wisconsin and acts as the clearinghouse  for information and intelligence coming from local and county agencies.  WSIC’s mission includes managing intelligence gathering efforts and  passing information to appropriate agencies and the JTTF; interfacing with  the Emergency Operations Center and Joint Operations Center during  critical incidents or as requested; producing general weekly law  enforcement bulletins and daily intelligence briefings for the Governor,  top law enforcement officials, and partner agency heads, among others;  supporting the Division of Criminal Investigation technology assets in the  field; and providing statewide major case support and analytical services.  Though counterterrorism is the primary concern of WSIC, the center  operates with an all-crimes, all-hazards, all-events approach directed by  the state Homeland Security Council, which wanted the center to be the  intelligence voice for the state and to help the state in a comprehensive  way.
WSIC is staffed by eight full-time personnel, five of whom are Division of  Criminal Investigation personnel. There are also two National Guard  analysts, a special investigator from the Wisconsin Department of Natural  Resources, and one FBI analyst at the center. DHS I&A has conducted a  needs assessment of WSIC. However, at the time of our review it had not  yet placed an intelligence analyst in the center. WSIC also supports the  STAC by providing three Division of Criminal Investigation personnel to  the center. WSIC is overseen by a Governance Board made up of federal,  state, and local representatives.
WSIC analysts provide short- or long-term assistance to agencies by using  analytical tools and systems to clarify and visualize case investigations,  tailoring the analytical support to the requesting agency’s needs. WSIC  analysts work in a variety of areas and initiatives, including  counterterrorism and domestic security, gang intelligence, identity theft,  and the Highway Drug Interdiction Program with the Wisconsin State  Patrol. DHS and DOJ networks and systems accessible to WSIC include  HSIN, LEO, and NCIC, as well as RISSNET and a statewide law  enforcement network that enables law enforcement officers to submit  intelligence or requests for assistance to WSIC, and it provides law  enforcement with WSIC bulletins and alerts, staff contact information,  officer safety information, and resource links. WSIC provides a variety of  products and services that include weekly law enforcement bulletins for  every agency in the state containing sections on domestic and  international terrorism, cold case investigations, missing persons, officer  safety, and items of interest to law enforcement. Additionally, WSIC  prepares a daily Command Staff Intelligence Briefing for the Governor, the  Attorney General, the Adjutant General, and top law enforcement officials  across the state that is primarily focused on issues within the previous  24 hours. WSIC also broadcasts statewide Alert Bulletins when it receives  time-sensitive information, handles major criminal case analytical support,  provides assistance on electronic surveillance, and conducts training  events across the state and region.
section_title: Southeastern Wisconsin Terrorism Alert Center
paragraphs: The Southeastern Wisconsin Terrorism Alert Center (STAC) is a  counterterrorism, all-crimes, all-hazards intelligence organization made up  of law enforcement, fire service, homeland security, military, DOJ, FBI,  emergency management, and health department members. STAC officials  said they were exposed to the TEW concept from Los Angeles and saw a  need for establishing a TEW in their urban area in 2005 to improve  information sharing. STAC was built on the TEW foundation as a satellite  of WSIC. STAC began operating when its analysts were hired in October  2006. However, the officials said that they are still getting the physical  location established and are in the final stages of reconstruction and  establishing the facility.
The mission of STAC is to protect the citizens, critical infrastructure, and  key resources of southeastern Wisconsin by promoting intelligence-led  policing, supporting criminal investigative efforts, and enhancing the  domestic preparedness of first responders, all levels of government, and  its partners in the private sector.
STAC staff will eventually include 10 full- and part-time officers,  detectives, and analysts from the Milwaukee Police Department, Office of  the Sheriff of Milwaukee County, one DCI analyst, and one Milwaukee Fire  Department analyst. The FBI has assigned a full-time intelligence analyst  and a part-time special agent. A governance board provides oversight for  the center. STAC is in the process of developing a TLO program, which is a  network of police, fire department, public health, and private sector  partners that collect and share information related to terrorism threats.  STAC TLO coordinators will be responsible for analyzing available sources  of terrorist threat information and preparing versions for distribution to  the first responder agencies within their regions.
STAC has also conducted some initial critical infrastructure assessments  and published alerts, threat assessments, and intelligence information  bulletins with information for first responders about local threats,  terrorism trends, and counterterrorism training  and offers training  information for critical incident preparation. DHS and DOJ systems or  networks accessible to STAC include LEO, HSIN, and RISS. STAC does  not have classified FBI systems in its facility. However, the FBI analyst at  STAC has access to them. The FBI also provides STAC personnel with  their security clearances, most at the Secret level, and one at the Top  Secret level.
section_title: Wyoming
paragraphs: Wyoming does not have and is not planning to establish a physical fusion  center. However, the Office of Homeland Security is working with  Colorado officials to develop a plan for Wyoming to become an “adjunct”  to CIAC. The officials stated that Wyoming, which has a population of only  around 400,000 people and operates its law enforcement agencies with a  total of only 1,600 officers, does not have the threat or the necessity for a  full-fledged fusion center, much less the funding or personnel to support  such a center. In addition, the Wyoming Office of Homeland Security is  supported by the FBI’s JTTF in Wyoming that provides assistance such as  helping with analytical review of information.
Wyoming officials said that they have taken several steps to facilitate the  development of a partnership with Colorado’s CIAC, including putting in  place a technical system to augment the communications capability of  Wyoming’s law enforcement agencies to transmit intelligence and  information with CIAC. Wyoming officials intend to develop  memorandums of understanding with CIAC to cover a regional area  including both Colorado and Wyoming. In addition, Wyoming will furnish  personnel for CIAC. The officials characterized the development of the  partnership as between the planning and early stages of development and  said that Wyoming and CIAC will have their partnership operational  approximately in the fall of 2007. However, a Wyoming official noted that  the state’s fiscal year 2007 funding did not designate any funding to  continue with the fusion initiative. The official said that the fusion center  initiative is critical to efforts to thwart terrorism, and the state intends to  continue its partnership with CIAC and attempt to obtain future grant  funding.
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Susan H. Quinlan, Assistant  Director; Michael Blinde; Katherine Davis; George Erhart; Jill Evancho;  Mary Catherine Hult; Julian King; Tom Lombardi; and Jay Smale made key  contributions to this report.