Combating Terrorism: Guidance for State Department's Antiterrorism Assistance Program Is Limited and State Does Not Systematically Assess Outcomes
Published: 2008-06-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of State's (State) Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program's objectives are to provide partner nations with counterterrorism training and equipment, improve bilateral ties, and increase respect for human rights. State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) provides policy guidance and its Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism, Assistance (DS/T/ATA), manages program operations. GAO assessed (1) State's guidance for determining ATA priorities, (2) how State coordinates ATA with other counterterrorism programs, (3) the extent State established ATA program goals and measures, and (4) State's reporting on U.S. counterterrorism assistance. This statement is based on a February 2008, GAO report titled Combating Terrorism: State Department's Antiterrorism Program Needs Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes, GAO-08-336 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 29, 2008).
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: S/CT provides minimal guidance to help prioritize ATA program recipients, and S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically align ATA assistance with U.S. assessments of foreign partner counterterrorism needs. S/CT provided policy guidance to DS/T/ATA through quarterly meetings and a tiered list of priority countries, but the list did not provide guidance on country counterterrorism-related program goals, objectives, or training priorities. S/CT and DS/T/ATA also did not consistently use country-specific needs assessments and program reviews to plan assistance. S/CT had established mechanisms to coordinate the ATA program with other U.S. international efforts to combat terrorism. S/CT held interagency meetings with officials from the Department of State, Defense, Justice, and Treasury and other agencies as well as ambassador-level regional strategic coordinating meetings. GAO did not find any significant duplication or overlap among the various U.S. international counterterrorism efforts. State had made progress in establishing goals and intended outcomes for the ATA program, but S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically assess the outcomes and, as a result, could not determine the effectiveness of program assistance. For example, although sustainability is a principal focus, S/CT and DS/T/ATA had not set clear measures of sustainability or integrated sustainability into program planning. State reporting on U.S. counterterrorism assistance abroad was incomplete and inaccurate. S/CT had not provided a congressionally mandated annual report to Congress on U.S. government-wide assistance related to combating international terrorism since 1996. After 1996, S/CT has only submitted to Congress annual reports on the ATA program, such as the number of students trained and courses offered. Moreover, these reports contained inaccurate program information. Additionally, the reports lacked comprehensive information of the results on program assistance that would be useful to Congress.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here to discuss the results of GAO’s examination of the  Department of State’s (State) antiterrorism assistance (ATA) program.  Our work focused primarily on the time period from fiscal year 2001 to  fiscal year 2007, although we included more recent data where available.
State’s ATA program has assumed an increasingly important role in U.S.  counterterrorism efforts, and is a key mechanism in State’s efforts to help  foreign nations improve their ability to combat terrorism. ATA’s  legislatively mandated objectives are to (1) enhance the antiterrorism  skills of friendly countries by providing counterterrorism training and  equipment; (2) improve bilateral ties with partner nations by offering  assistance; and (3) increase respect for human rights by sharing modern,  humane and effective antiterrorism techniques with foreign civil  authorities. Funding for ATA has increased over fourfold in recent years— from $38 million in fiscal year 2001 to almost $171 million in fiscal year  2007. Over the period, State provided counterterrorism assistance to  nearly 100 countries. Much of this assistance is equipment and  counterterrorism training provided in the country by trainers on  temporary duty, as well as six programs, which use permanent, in-country  training facilities.
Within State, the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) is charged with  the overall supervision (including policy oversight of resources) and  coordination of the U.S. government’s counterterrorism activities. The  broadly mandated role of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of  Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/T/ATA), includes implementing security  programs to protect diplomatic personnel and advise chiefs of mission on  security matters.
Today, I will discuss (1) State’s guidance for determining country  recipients and types of counterterrorism assistance to provide; (2) how  State coordinates ATA with other U.S. government counterterrorism  programs; (3) the extent to which State establishes clear ATA goals, and  measures sustainability of program outcomes; and (4) State’s reporting on  U.S. international counterterrorism assistance. Over the course of our  work, we reviewed and analyzed State planning, funding, and reporting  documents concerning ATA. We interviewed officials from State’s offices  in Washington, D.C., including ATA program managers responsible for  each of the six in-country programs—Afghanistan, Colombia, Indonesia,  Kenya, Pakistan, and the Philippines—and visited four of the six in- country programs. In these countries, we reviewed country-specific  program documents, and interviewed ATA in-country program managers,  course instructors, and other contractors; U.S. embassy officials  responsible for managing counterterrorism assistance and activities; and  partner nation government officials. We also observed various types of  ATA training and equipment that were provided to partner nation security  units.
We conducted our work for the ATA report from November 2006 through  January 2008 and, for purposes of this statement, we updated certain data  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Congress authorized State’s ATA program in 1983 through the Foreign  Assistance Act. According to the legislation the purpose of ATA is “(1) to  enhance the antiterrorism skills of friendly countries by providing training  and equipment to deter and counter terrorism; (2) to strengthen the  bilateral ties of the United States with friendly governments by offering  concrete assistance in this area of great mutual concern; and (3) to  increase respect for human rights by sharing with foreign civil authorities  modern, humane, and effective antiterrorism techniques.”
subsections: section_title: ATA Program Assistance
paragraphs: ATA offers a wide range of counterterrorism assistance to partner nations,  but most assistance consists of (1) training courses on tactical and  strategic counterterrorism issues and (2) grants of counterterrorism  equipment, such as small arms, bomb detection equipment, vehicles, and  computers. ATA curricula and training focus on enhancing critical  counterterrorism capabilities, which cover issues such as crisis  management and response, cyberterrorism, dignitary protection, and  related areas. According to DS/T/ATA, all its courses emphasize law  enforcement under the rule of law and sound human rights practices.
section_title: ATA Program Funding
paragraphs: ATA is State’s largest counterterrorism program, and receives  appropriations under the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and  Related Programs account. Fiscal year 2002 appropriations for ATA  increased to about $158 million—over six times the level of funding  appropriated in fiscal year 2000. Appropriations have fluctuated since  fiscal year 2002, but increased to almost $171 million in fiscal year 2007.  From fiscal years 2002 to 2007, program assistance for the top 10  recipients of ATA allocations ranged from about $11 million to about  $78 million. The top 10 recipients represented about 57 percent of ATA  funding allocated for training and training-related activities over the 6-year  period. ATA funding for the other 89 partner nations that received  assistance during this period ranged from $9,000 to about $10.7 million.
section_title: ATA Program Management
paragraphs: The Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the head of S/CT, is statutorily  charged with the overall supervision (including policy oversight of  resources) and coordination of the U.S. government’s counterterrorism  activities. The broadly mandated role of the Assistant Secretary for  Diplomatic Security, the head of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security,  includes implementing security programs to protect diplomatic personnel  and advise chiefs of mission on security matters. Specific roles and  responsibilities for S/CT and DS/T/ATA regarding ATA are described in a  1991 internal policy guidance memorandum, the Omnibus Diplomatic  Security Act of 1986, and incorporated into State’s Foreign Affairs  Manual.
S/CT is responsible for leading the initial assessment of a partner nation’s  counterterrorism needs, and DS/T/ATA is responsible for developing  annual, country-specific plans. Under current program operations,  DS/T/ATA conducts an initial assessment of a new participant nation’s  counterterrorism capabilities, and conducts subsequent assessments— referred to as program reviews—every 2 to 3 years thereafter. In general,  the needs assessments include input from the embassy teams, but the  assessments themselves are conducted by technical experts contracted by  DS/T/ATA. According to DS/T/ATA, the purpose of the needs assessment  and program review process is to determine the forms of assistance for a  partner nation to detect, deter, deny, and defeat terrorism; and to evaluate  program effectiveness.
section_title: State’s Implementation of ATA Lacks Guidance and Use of Country Needs Assessments
paragraphs: S/CT provides minimal policy guidance to DS/T/ATA to help determine  assistance priorities and ensure that it supports broader U.S. policy goals.  In addition, S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically use country- specific needs assessments and program reviews to plan what types of  assistance to provide partner nations in accordance with State policy  guidance. The assessments we reviewed had weaknesses and  inconsistencies.
subsections: section_title: S/CT Provides a Tiered Country List, but Little Additional Policy Guidance
paragraphs: According to State officials, S/CT places countries on a tiered list in one of  four priority categories based on criteria that address several factors,  including country-specific threats and the level and depth of diplomatic  and political engagement in a country. State officials indicated that other  factors also may be considered in determining whether and where a  country is placed on the list, such as the presence of a U.S. military base or  a planned international sporting or cultural event with U.S. participation.
Since 2006, S/CT has reviewed and discussed the tiered list—including  changes, additions, or deletions—with DS/T/ATA during quarterly  meetings. In addition to the quarterly meetings, an S/CT official told us  that they had established a series of regional roundtable discussions in  2006 between S/CT regional subject experts and DS/T/ATA counterparts.  According to the S/CT official, the roundtables were intended as a means  of identifying priority countries and their counterterrorism needs for  purposes of developing budget requests.
S/CT provides little guidance to DS/T/ATA beyond the tiered list, although  the 1991 State policy guidance memorandum states that S/CT’s written  policy guidance for the program should include suggested country training  priorities. While S/CT provides some additional guidance to DS/T/ATA  during quarterly meetings and on other occasions, DS/T/ATA officials in  headquarters and the field stated they received little or no guidance from  S/CT beyond the tiered list. As a result, neither S/CT nor DS/T/ATA could  ensure that program assistance provided to specific countries supports  broader U.S. antiterrorism policy goals.
Other factors beyond S/CT’s tiered list of countries, such as unforeseen  events or new governmental initiatives, also influence which countries  receive program assistance. We found that 10 countries on the tiered list  did not receive ATA assistance in fiscal year 2007, while 13 countries not  on the tiered list received approximately $3.2 million. S/CT and DS/T/ATA  officials stated that assistance does not always align with the tiered list  because U.S. foreign policy objectives sometimes cause State, in  consultation with the President’s National Security Council, to provide  assistance to a non-tiered-list country.
section_title: S/CT and DS/T/ATA Did Not Systematically Align Program Assistance with Counterterrorism Needs
paragraphs: According to the 1991 State policy guidance memorandum and DS/T/ATA  standard operations procedures, ATA country-specific needs assessments  and program reviews are intended to guide program management and  planning. However, S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically use the  assessments to determine what types of assistance to provide to partner  nations or develop ATA country-specific plans. Although the 1991 State  policy memorandum states that S/CT should lead the assessment efforts, a  senior S/CT official stated that S/CT lacks the capacity to do so. As a  result, DS/T/ATA has led interagency assessment teams in recent years,  but the assessments and recommendations for types of assistance to be  provided may not fully reflect S/CT policy guidance concerning overall  U.S. counterterrorism priorities.
section_title: DS/T/ATA Did Not Consistently Use Country Needs Assessments
paragraphs: DS/T/ATA officials responsible for five of the top six recipients of ATA  support—Colombia, Kenya, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines—did  not consistently use ATA country needs assessments and program reviews  in making program decisions or to create annual country assistance plans.  In some instances, DS/T/ATA officials responsible for in-country programs  had not seen the latest assessments for their respective countries, and  some said that the assessments they had reviewed were either not useful  or that they were used for informational purposes only.
The Regional Security Officer, Deputy Regional Security Officer, and  DS/T/ATA Program Manager for Kenya had not seen any of the  assessments that had been conducted for the country since 2000. Although  the in-country program manager for Kenya was familiar with the  assessments from her work in a previous position with DS/T/ATA, she  stated that in general, the assessments were not very useful for  determining what type of assistance to provide. She said that the initial  needs assessment for Kenya failed to adequately consider local needs and  capacity.
The Regional Security Officer and Assistant Regional Security Officer for  Indonesia stated they had not seen the latest assessment for the country.  The DS/T/ATA program manager for Indonesia said that he recalled using  one of the assessments as a “frame of reference” in making program and  resource decisions. The in-country program manager also recalled seeing  one of the assessments, but stated that he did not find the assessment  useful given the changing terrorist landscape; therefore, he did not share it  with his staff.
The DS/T/ATA Program Manager for Pakistan stated that decisions on the  types of assistance to provide in Pakistan were based primarily on the  knowledge and experience of in-country staff regarding partner nation  needs, rather than the needs assessments or program reviews. He added  that he did not find the assessments useful, as the issues identified in the  latest (2004) assessment for the country were outdated.
section_title: Needs Assessments Generally Lacked Prioritized Recommendations and Were Inconsistent
paragraphs: We reviewed 12 of the 21 ATA country-specific needs assessments and  program reviews that, according to ATA annual reports, DS/T/ATA  conducted between 2000 and 2007 for five of the six in-country programs.  The assessments and reviews generally included a range of  recommendations for counterterrorism assistance, but did not prioritize  assistance to be provided or include specific timeframes for  implementation. Consequently, the assessments did not consistently  provide a basis for targeting program assistance to the areas of a partner  nation’s greatest counterterrorism assistance need. Only two of the  assessments—a 2000 needs assessment for Indonesia and a 2003  assessment for Kenya—prioritized the recommendations, although a 2004  assessment for Pakistan and a 2005 assessment for the Philippines listed  one or two recommendations as priority ATA efforts. In addition, the  information included in the assessments was not consistent and varied in  linking recommendations to capabilities. Of the 12 assessments we  reviewed:    Nine included narrative on a range of counterterrorism capabilities, such  as border security and explosives detection, but the number of capabilities  assessed ranged from 5 to 25.
Only four of the assessments that assessed more than one capability  linked recommendations provided to the relevant capabilities.
Six included capability ratings, but the types of ratings used varied. For  example, a 2003 assessment for Colombia rated eight capabilities from 1  through 5, but the 2004 assessment rated 24 capabilities, using poor, low,  fair, or good.
Two used a format that DS/T/ATA began implementing in 2001. The  assessments following the new format generally included consistent types  of information and clearly linked recommendations provided to an  assessment of 25 counterterrorism capabilities. However, they did not  prioritize recommendations or include specific timeframes for  implementing the recommendations.
section_title: Country Assistance Plans Were Not Used or Were Not Linked to Needs Assessments
paragraphs: Although the 1991 State policy memorandum states that DS/T/ATA should  create annual country assistance plans that specify training objectives and  assistance to be provided based upon the needs assessments and program  reviews, we found that S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically use the  assessments to create annual plans for the five in-country programs.  DS/T/ATA officials we interviewed regarding the five in-country programs  stated that in lieu of relying on the assessments or country assistance  plans, program and resource decisions were primarily made by DS/T/ATA  officials in the field based on their knowledge and experience regarding  partner nation needs. Some DS/T/ATA officials said they did not find the  country assistance plans useful. The program manager for Pakistan stated  that he used the country assistance plan as a guide, but found that it did  not respond to changing needs in the country. The ATA program manager  for Kenya said that he had not seen a country assistance plan for that  country.
We requested ATA country assistance plans conducted during fiscal years  2000-2006 for the five in-country programs included in our review, but  S/CT and DS/T/ATA only provided three plans completed for three of the  five countries. Of these, we found that the plans did not link planned  activities to recommendations provided in the needs assessments and  program reviews. For example, the plan for the Philippines included a  brief reference to a 2005 needs assessment, but the plan did not identify  which recommendations from the 2005 assessment were intended to be  addressed by current or planned efforts.
section_title: S/CT Has Established Various Mechanisms to Coordinate Program Assistance
paragraphs: S/CT has mechanisms to coordinate the ATA program with other U.S.  government international counterterrorism training assistance and to help  avoid duplication of efforts. S/CT chairs biweekly interagency working  group meetings of the Counterterrorism Security Group’s Training  Assistance Subgroup to provide a forum for high-level information  sharing and discussion among U.S. agencies implementing international  counterterrorism efforts. S/CT also established the Regional Strategic  Initiative in 2006 to coordinate regional counterterrorism efforts and  strategy. S/CT described the Regional Strategic Initiative as a series of  regionally based, interagency meetings hosted by U.S. embassies to  identify key regional counterterrorism issues and develop a strategic  approach to addressing them, among other goals.
In the four countries we visited, we did not find any significant duplication  or overlap among U.S. agencies’ country-specific training programs aimed  at combating terrorism. Officials we met with in each of these countries  noted that they participated in various embassy working group meetings,  such as Counterterrorism Working Group and Law Enforcement Working  Group meetings, during which relevant agencies shared information  regarding operations and activities at post. DS/T/ATA officials also  coordinated ATA with other counterterrorism efforts through daily  informal communication among cognizant officials in the countries we  visited.
section_title: State Had Made Progress in Establishing ATA Goals, but S/CT and DS/T/ATA Did Not Assess Sustainability
paragraphs: In response to concerns that ATA lacked elements of adequate strategic  planning and performance measurement, State took action to define goals  and measures related to the program’s mandated objectives. S/CT and  DS/T/ATA, however, did not systematically assess sustainability—that is,  the extent to which assistance has enabled partner nations to achieve and  maintain advanced counterterrorism capabilities. S/CT and DS/T/ATA  lacked clear measures and processes for assessing sustainability, and  program managers did not consistently include sustainability in ATA  planning.
subsections: section_title: State Recently Established ATA Goals and Measures, and Emphasizes Sustaining Partner Nations’ Counterterrorism Capabilities
paragraphs: State did not have measurable performance goals and outcomes related to  the mandated objectives for ATA prior to fiscal year 2003, but has recently  made some progress to address the deficiency, which had been noted in  reports by State’s Office of Inspector General. Similarly, State developed  specific goals and measures for each of the program’s mandated objectives  in response to a 2003 Office of Management and Budget assessment.
Since fiscal year 2006, State planning documents, including department  and bureau-level performance plans, have stated that enabling partner  nations to achieve advanced and sustainable counterterrorism capabilities  is a key outcome. S/CT and DS/T/ATA officials further confirmed that  sustainability is the principal intended outcome and focus of program  assistance. In support of these efforts, DS/T/ATA appointed a Sustainment  Manager in November 2006 to, among other things, coordinate with other  DS/T/ATA divisions to develop recommendations and plans to assist  partner nations in developing sustainable counterterrorism capabilities.
section_title: S/CT and DS/T/ATA Did Not Assess Sustainability of Capabilities
paragraphs: Despite progress towards establishing goals and intended outcomes, State  had not developed clear measures and a process for assessing  sustainability and had not integrated the concept into program planning.  The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires agencies  in charge of U.S. government programs and activities to identify goals and  report on the degree to which goals are met. S/CT and DS/T/ATA officials  noted the difficulty in developing direct quantitative measures of ATA  outcomes related to partner nations’ counterterrorism capabilities. Our  past work also has stressed the importance of establishing program goals,  objectives, priorities, milestones, and measures to use in monitoring  performance and assessing outcomes as critical elements of program  management and effective resource allocation.
We found that the measure for ATA’s principal intended program outcome  of sustainability is not clear. In its fiscal year 2007 Joint Performance  Summary, State reported results and future year targets for the number of  countries that had achieved an advanced, sustainable level of  counterterrorism capability. According to the document, partner nations  that achieve a sustainable level of counterterrorism would graduate from  the program and no longer receive program assistance. However, program  officials in S/CT and DS/T/ATA directly responsible for overseeing ATA  were not aware that the Joint Performance Summary listed numerical  targets and past results for the number of partner nations that had  achieved sustainability, and could not provide an explanation of how State  assessed the results. DS/T/ATA’s Sustainment Manager also could not  explain how State established and assessed the numerical targets in the  reports. The Sustainment Manager further noted that, to his knowledge,  S/CT and DS/T/ATA had not yet developed systematic measures of  sustainability.
DS/T/ATA’s mechanism for evaluating partner nation capabilities did not  include guidance or specific measures to assess sustainability. According  to program guidance and DS/T/ATA officials, needs assessments and  program reviews are intended to establish a baseline of a partner nation’s  counterterrorism capabilities and quantify progress through subsequent  reviews. DS/T/ATA officials also asserted that the process is intended to  measure the results of program assistance. However, the process did not  explicitly address sustainability, and provided no specific information or  instruction regarding how reviewers are to assess sustainability. Moreover,  the process focused on assessing a partner nation’s overall  counterterrorism capabilities, but did not specifically measure the results  of program assistance.
DS/T/ATA had not systematically integrated sustainability into country- specific assistance plans, and we found a lack of consensus among  program officials about how to address the issue. In-country program  managers, embassy officials, instructors, and partner nation officials we  interviewed held disparate views on how to define sustainability across all  ATA participant countries, and many were not aware that sustainability  was the intended outcome. Several program officials stated that  graduating a country and withdrawing or significantly reducing program  assistance could result in a rapid decline in the partner nation’s  counterterrorism capabilities, and could undermine other program  objectives, such as improving bilateral relations. Further, although State  has listed sustainability in State-level planning documents since 2006, S/CT  and DS/T/ATA had not issued guidance on incorporating sustainability into  country-specific planning, and none of the country assistance plans we  reviewed consistently addressed the outcome. As a result, the plans did  not include measurable annual objectives targeted at enabling the partner  nation to achieve sustainability. For example, Colombia’s assistance plan  listed transferring responsibility for the antikidnapping training to the  Colombian government and described planned activities to achieve that  goal. However, the plan did not include measurable objectives to  determine whether activities achieved intended results.
section_title: State Reporting on U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance Abroad Has Been Incomplete and Inaccurate
paragraphs: Since 1996, State has not complied with a congressional mandate to  report to Congress on U.S. international counterterrorism assistance.  Additionally, State’s annual reports on ATA contained inaccurate data  regarding basic program information, did not provide systematic  assessments of program results, and lacked other information necessary to  evaluate program effectiveness.
subsections: section_title: S/CT Has Not Prepared a Mandated Report
paragraphs: In 1985, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act requiring the  Secretary of State to report on all assistance related to international  terrorism provided by the U.S. government during the preceding fiscal  year. Since 1996, State has submitted ATA annual reports rather than the  broader report required by the statute.
A S/CT official noted confusion within State over what the statute required  and he asserted that the ATA annual report, which is prepared by  DS/T/ATA, and State’s annual “Patterns of Global Terrorism” report were  sufficiently responsive to congressional needs. He further noted that, in his  view, it would be extremely difficult for State to compile and report on all  U.S. government terrorism assistance activities, especially given the  significant growth of agencies’ programs since 2001. Officials in State’s  Bureau of Legislative Affairs indicated that, to their knowledge, they had  never received an inquiry from congressional staff about the missing  reports.
section_title: ATA Annual Reports Contain Inaccuracies
paragraphs: Recent ATA annual reports have contained inaccurate data relating to  basic program information on numbers of students trained and courses  offered. For example,    Afghanistan. According to annual reports for fiscal years 2002 to 2005, 15  Afghan students were trained as part of a single training event over the  4-year period. DS/T/ATA subsequently provided us data for fiscal year  2005, which corrected the participation total in that year from 15  participants in 1 training event to 1,516 participants in 12 training events.
Pakistan. According to the fiscal year 2005 ATA annual report, ATA  delivered 17 courses to 335 participants in Pakistan. Supporting tables in  the same report listed 13 courses provided to 283 participants, and a  summary report provided to us by DS/T/ATA reported 13 courses provided  to 250 course participants.
DS/T/ATA officials acknowledged the discrepancies and noted that similar  inaccuracies could be presumed for prior years and for other partner  nations. The officials indicated that inaccuracies and omissions in reports  of the training participants and events were due to a lack of internal  policies and procedures for recording and reporting program data. In the  absence of documented policies and procedures, staff developed various  individual processes for collecting the information that resulted in flawed  data reporting. Additionally, DS/T/ATA officials told us that its inadequate  information management system and a lack of consistent data collection  procedures also contributed to inaccurate reporting.
section_title: ATA Annual Reports Lack Performance and Other Useful Program Information
paragraphs: We reviewed ATA annual reports for fiscal years 1997 through 2005, and  found that the reports varied widely in terms of content, scope, and  format. Moreover, the annual reports did not contain systematic  assessments of program performance or consistent information on  program activity, such as number and type of courses delivered, types of  equipment provided, and budget activity associated with program  operations. In general, the reports contained varying levels of detail on  program activity, and provided only anecdotal examples of program  successes, from a variety of sources, including U.S. embassy officials, ATA  instructors, and partner nation officials. DS/T/ATA program officials  charged with compiling the annual reports for the past 3 fiscal years noted  that DS/T/ATA did not have guidance on the scope, content, or format for  the reports.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Although ATA plays a central role in State’s broader effort to fight  international terrorism, deficiencies in how the program is guided,  managed, implemented, and assessed could limit the program’s  effectiveness. Specifically, minimal guidance from S/CT makes it difficult  to determine the extent to which program assistance directly supports  broader U.S. counterterrorism policy goals. Additionally, deficiencies with  DS/T/ATA’s needs assessments and program reviews may limit their utility  as a tool for planning assistance and prioritizing among several partner  nations’ counterterrorism needs. As a result, the assessments and reviews  are not systematically linked to resource allocation decisions, which may  limit the program’s ability to improve partner nation’s counterterrorism  capabilities.
Although State has made some progress in attempting to evaluate and  quantitatively measure program performance, ATA still lacks a clearly  defined, systematic assessment and reporting of outcomes, which makes it  difficult to determine the overall effectiveness of the program. This  deficiency, along with State’s noncompliance with mandated reporting  requirements, has resulted in Congress having limited and incomplete  information on U.S. international counterterrorism assistance and ATA  efforts. Such information is necessary to determine the most effective  types of assistance the U.S. government can provide to partner nations in  support of the U.S. national security goal of countering terrorism abroad.
In our February 2008 report, we suggested that Congress should  reconsider the requirement that the Secretary of State provide an annual  report on the nature and amount of U.S. government counterterrorism  assistance provided abroad, given the broad changes in the scope and  nature of U.S. counterterrorism assistance abroad in conjunction with the  fact that the report has not been submitted since 1996.
We also recommended that the Secretary of State take the following four  actions:  1.  Revisit and revise internal guidance (the 1991 State policy  memorandum and Foreign Affairs Manual, in particular) to ensure that  the roles and responsibilities for S/CT and DS/T/ATA are still relevant  and better enable State to determine which countries should receive  assistance and what type, and allocate limited ATA resources.  2.  Ensure that needs assessments and program reviews are both useful  and linked to ATA resource decisions and development of country- specific assistance plans.  3.  Establish clearer measures of sustainability, and refocus the process  for assessing the sustainability of partner nations’ counterterrorism  capabilities. The revised evaluation process should include not only an  overall assessment of partner nation counterterrorism capabilities, but  also provide guidance for assessing the specific outcomes of ATA.  4.  Comply with the congressional mandate to report to Congress on U.S.  international counterterrorism assistance.
In commenting on our report, State agreed overall with our principal  findings and recommendations to improve its ATA program guidance, the  needs assessment and program review process, and its assessments of  ATA program outcomes. State noted that the report highlighted the  difficulties in assessing the benefits of developing and improving long-term  antiterrorism and law enforcement relationships with foreign  governments. State also outlined a number of ongoing and planned  initiatives to address our recommendations. As noted in our report, we  will follow up with State to ensure that these initiatives have been  completed, as planned.
Although State supported the matter we suggested for congressional  consideration, it did not specifically address our recommendation that it  comply with the congressional mandate to report on U.S. counterterrorism  assistance.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my  prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
section_title: Contact and Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Charles Michael  Johnson, Jr. (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Albert H. Huntington,  III, Assistant Director; Matthew E. Helm; Elisabeth R. Helmer; and Emily  Rachman made key contributions in preparing this statement.
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