Defense Logistics: Improved Data and Information Sharing Could Aid in DOD's Management of Ammunition Categorized for Disposal
Published: 2015-07-21T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD manages conventional ammunition that ranges from small arms cartridges to rockets, mortars, artillery shells, and tactical missiles. When a military service determines such ammunition is beyond its needs, obsolete, or unserviceable, it is offered to the other services and if not taken, transferred to the Army, which manages the CAD stockpile and takes actions to demilitarize and dispose of the ammunition in the stockpile. According to data provided by DOD officials, as of February 2015, the stockpile was about 529,373 tons. DOD estimates that from fiscal year 2016 to fiscal year 2020 it will add an additional 582,789 tons of conventional ammunition to this CAD stockpile.
Section 352 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision that GAO review and report on the management of DOD's CAD stockpile.
This report assesses, among other things, the extent to which DOD has adequately maintained and shared information on excess, obsolete, and unserviceable ammunition for the military services. GAO reviewed applicable guidance and the military service ammunition databases; visited an Army depot that conducts ammunition demilitarization; and interviewed appropriate DOD officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains information on its excess, obsolete, and unserviceable conventional ammunition for the military services and shares this information on a limited basis with other government agencies, but its management of its conventional ammunition awaiting demilitarization and disposal (CAD) stockpile can be strengthened in two areas.
The Army uses its Logistics Modernization Program database to maintain consolidated information on ammunition in the CAD stockpile, but GAO found that records for some items do not include complete data on weight. Specifically, of 36,355 records in the database, 2,829 did not have assigned weights as of February 2015. Internal control standards state that an entity should have controls to ensure that all transactions are complete and accurately recorded. DOD officials stated they are trying to correct current records with missing data; however, the number of records without weight data has increased. For example, as of February 2015, the number of records with missing data had increased by more than 600 since 2012. Since DOD uses weight in determining, among other things, cost estimates for demilitarization projects and what ammunition to demilitarize, missing weight data can negatively impact its efforts to destroy the most ammunition possible with the resources available.
The military services have access to information on the CAD stockpile maintained in the Army's database and can search it for useable ammunition that could fill their requirements, but other government agencies do not and DOD does not have a systematic means for sharing such information. Federal internal control standards state that management should ensure there are adequate means of communicating with, and obtaining information from, external stakeholders. DOD officials told GAO that there have been instances of transfers of ammunition to other government agencies, but these have been done informally and on a limited basis. Without a systematic means for regularly sharing information on useable ammunition beyond DOD's needs, both DOD and other agencies may be missing opportunities to reduce costs related to demilitarization and ammunition procurement.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends DOD develop a plan to identify and record missing weight data and develop a systematic means to share information on the stockpile with other government agencies. DOD agreed with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) manages conventional ammunition  that includes items ranging from small arms cartridges to rockets,  mortars, and artillery to tactical missiles. According to data provided by  DOD officials, as of February 2015, the stockpile of conventional  ammunition awaiting demilitarization and disposal (CAD stockpile) was  approximately 529,373 tons. DOD estimates that from fiscal year 2016 to  fiscal year 2020 it will add an additional 582,789 tons of conventional  ammunition to the CAD stockpile, making the proper management of the  disposal of such large quantities of explosive materiel critical. DOD  disposes of the materiel by burning it, detonating it with other explosives,  or using a number of closed disposal technologies that control or clean  the discharge waste from the demilitarization process. All the military  services—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps—use  conventional ammunition and the Army is DOD’s Single Manager for  Conventional Ammunition (SMCA). In this role, the Army is responsible  for centrally managing the demilitarization and disposal of conventional  ammunition in the CAD stockpile.
Section 352 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision that  GAO review and report on the management of DOD’s CAD stockpile.   For this report, we (1) assess the extent to which DOD has adequately  maintained and shared information on the quantity, condition, and  location of excess, obsolete, and unserviceable conventional ammunition  for each military service; (2) examine challenges, if any, DOD has  identified in managing the current and anticipated CAD stockpile, and if  so, actions taken to address those challenges; and (3) describe DOD’s  average costs of storing and maintaining items in the CAD stockpile and  the average costs of the demilitarization and disposal of items in the  stockpile.
We also describe DOD policies and procedures governing the  demilitarization of excess, obsolete, and unserviceable conventional  ammunition and discuss the extent to which they are consistent with DOD  guidance for developing policies and procedures (see app. I).
To assess the extent to which DOD has adequately maintained and  shared information on the quantity, condition, and location of excess,  obsolete, and unserviceable conventional ammunition for each military  service, we reviewed DOD’s inventory data on excess, obsolete, and  unserviceable conventional ammunition held in the CAD stockpile as of  February 2015 to determine how complete and accurate the data are. In  addition, we interviewed officials from each military service to determine  how they managed unserviceable ammunition and serviceable  ammunition that is beyond the services’ needs. We also determined the  extent to which the information in the services’ ammunition inventory  systems is useful for their purposes. We interviewed SMCA and service  officials to learn how information on excess, obsolete, and unserviceable  ammunition is shared. After initial discussions with DOD officials, we  determined that the department uses weight rather than the value of  ammunition in quantifying the amount of its CAD stockpile and we  conducted our assessment based on the same criteria. Further, we  conducted a data reliability assessment of the military services’ data in  their respective information management systems for ammunition—Air  Force Combat Ammunition System, the Navy’s Ordnance Information  System, the Marine Corps’ Ordnance Information System – Marine  Corps, and the Army’s Logistics Modernization Program—by reviewing  the services’ responses to questionnaires on the internal controls applied  to their systems, using Standards for Internal Control in Federal  Government as criteria, and found that the data were sufficiently reliable  for determining whether DOD adequately maintained information on the  quantity, condition, and location of excess, obsolete, and unserviceable  conventional ammunition in its accounts and for our reporting purposes.Also, we interviewed service officials in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and  Marine Corps to learn how ammunition is managed once the decision is  made to demilitarize and transfer it to the CAD stockpile. We also  interviewed officials on the visibility, accessibility, accuracy, and  usefulness of the data on the CAD stockpile.
To examine challenges, if any, DOD has identified in managing the  current and anticipated CAD stockpile, and if so, actions taken to address  those challenges, we reviewed DOD reports on the management of the  current CAD stockpile to identify any problem areas and DOD’s plans to  address these problems. We visited the Army’s McAlester Army  Ammunition Plant in Oklahoma to examine the management of its  ammunition demilitarization operations, to include storage practices and a  variety of methods to demilitarize the ammunition. We selected McAlester  Army Ammunition Plant to visit because a large portion of the CAD  stockpile is stored there and it uses several methods to demilitarize  ammunition. We also contacted and obtained the same information from  the other six depots on the management of their ammunition  demilitarization operations.in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to identify challenges, if  any, they face in managing the stockpile and discuss the actions they  have taken to address these challenges.
We interviewed SMCA officials and officials  To describe DOD’s average costs of storing and maintaining items in the  CAD stockpile and the average costs of the demilitarization and disposal  of items in the stockpile, we obtained fiscal year 2015 cost estimates for  storing and demilitarizing ammunition from the Army Materiel Command’s  Joint Munitions Command, and interviewed officials about what factors  were used to develop these cost estimates. We also reviewed a 2013  DOD report on the cost of demilitarizing conventional ammunition to  determine the factors that drive demilitarization costs. Additionally, we  interviewed Army officials on the process they use to make  demilitarization decisions.
To describe DOD’s policies and procedures governing the demilitarization  of excess, obsolete, and unserviceable conventional ammunition and  discuss the extent to which they are consistent with DOD guidance for  developing policies and procedures, we interviewed officials in the Army,  Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and at the demilitarization depots to  obtain their opinions on the effectiveness and usefulness of DOD policies  and procedures governing the demilitarization of conventional  ammunition. We also compared the requirements in DOD Instruction  5025.01, DOD Issuances Program, with the policies and procedures  governing the demilitarization of conventional ammunition and determined  whether they followed guidance on how such documents should be  developed, the type of information that should be included, and how often  they should be updated. We provide further details on our scope and  methodology in appendix II.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2014 to July 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: DOD Management of Excess, Obsolete, and Unserviceable Conventional Ammunition
paragraphs: Each military service—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine  Corps—is responsible for assessing and making decisions regarding the  ammunition in its inventory. The Army, as the Single Manager for  Conventional Ammunition (SMCA), is responsible for centrally managing  the demilitarization of all conventional ammunition including non-SMCA- managed items, for which capability, technology, and facilities exist to  complete demilitarization and disposal. The services determine if the  conventional ammunition in their accounts is unserviceable or above their  needs, and if so, transfer the ammunition to installations as specified by  the SMCA. However, before proceeding with demilitarization, any  serviceable conventional ammunition that is beyond a service’s needs is  to be offered to the other services through an annual cross-leveling  process. The services are to screen all conventional ammunition  inventories that are beyond their needs by the other military services.  Once the screening is complete, the service can transfer ammunition to  the demilitarization account as DOD excess, except when safety issues  require immediate disposal. As shown in figure 1, once it has been  determined that the conventional ammunition is unserviceable or DOD  excess, the services deliver the ammunition to one of the seven  demilitarization depots in the United States and the ammunition is  incorporated into the CAD stockpile. Appendix III provides a map of the  seven demilitarization depots and an explanation of the demilitarization  methods used by the Army.
section_title: Structure for DOD Ammunition Demilitarization Process
paragraphs: Multiple DOD entities have responsibilities related to managing and  overseeing conventional ammunition, with the Army having a prominent  role. The Secretary of the Army serves as DOD’s SMCA and is  responsible for centrally managing all aspects of the life cycle  management of conventional ammunition, from research and  development through demilitarization and disposal. The Program  Executive Office for Ammunition has been designated the SMCA  Executor and is responsible for executing all the functions of the SMCA.
The Program Executive Office for Ammunition works with Joint Munitions  Command and the Aviation and Missile Command to manage the  demilitarization of conventional ammunition at seven Army depots and  several commercial firms. The Program Executive Office for Ammunition  budgets and funds the demilitarization and disposal of all munitions in the  CAD stockpile. In addition, for ammunition, such as Bullpup rockets, that  has no demilitarization process, the Program Executive Office for  Ammunition plans, programs, budgets, and funds a joint-service research  and development program to develop the necessary capability,  technology, and facilities to demilitarize the ammunition. Within the  Army Materiel Command, Army Aviation and Missile Command is  responsible for the demilitarization of missiles and components, and the  Joint Munitions Command is responsible for demilitarization of all  remaining conventional ammunition. Army Aviation and Missile Command  develops and implements the annual missile demilitarization operating  plan, and Joint Munitions Command does the same for the CAD  stockpile. Furthermore, Joint Munitions Command provides logistics and  sustainment support to the Program Executive Office for Ammunition and  the Army Aviation and Missile Command. Joint Munitions Command also  oversees the storage of the CAD stockpile, maintains the CAD stockpile  database, and arranges the transportation of conventional ammunition to  the demilitarization site when necessary.
section_title: Annual Stratification and Cross-Leveling Process
paragraphs: The military departments have a process for collecting and sharing data  on conventional ammunition through inventory stratification reports that  they are required to prepare at least annually. They use these reports to  identify inventory owned by one department that may be available to meet  the needs of another department, as well as to identify both inventory  deficiencies and excesses. DOD Manual 4140.01 Volumes 6 and 10  direct the military departments to assess the ability of the ammunition  inventory to meet their needs by stratifying their inventories into various  categories and requires them to prepare a report at least annually for  internal purposes that lists the current inventory levels of all ammunition.  The annual internal report divides the inventory into the categories of  requirement-related munitions stock, economic retention munitions stock,  contingency retention munitions stock, and potential reutilization and  disposal stock. The manual also directs the departments to develop an  external report identifying inventory in the same categories for each  ammunition listed. The military departments are to use these reports,  among other things, to identify opportunities for redistributing ammunition  to meet unfilled needs in other military departments. The reports are then  distributed to the other military departments to provide visibility. In  addition, the Office of the Executive Director for Conventional  Ammunition, which facilitates this process, compares the data in the  inventory reports with data on planned procurements of ammunition. After  the departments share their annual reports on ammunition inventory,  including which ammunition could be reutilized; department officials  participate in the Quad Services Review and review all the other  departments’ stratification reports to identify potential cross-leveling  opportunities and request logistics data for items of interest.
DOD guidance indicates that this cross-leveling process should be used  to offset individual procurements of the military departments in  coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics. For example, the Executive Director for  Conventional Ammunition reported in September 2014 that DOD avoids  an average of $72 million annually in procurement costs by using the  redistribution process regarding each service’s inventory holdings that  exceed their needs. During the fiscal year 2014 redistribution process,  the services transferred approximately 5 million items among each other,  of which approximately 3 million were small-caliber items such as  ammunition for rifles or pistols, about 2 million were for larger-caliber  weapons such as mortars, and about 383,000 were a mixture of other  types of ammunition. According to the Office of the Executive Director for  Convention Ammunition’s Fiscal Year 2014 Cross-leveling End of Year  Report, the potential acquisition cost avoidance achieved in the 2014  cross-leveling process totaled about $104.2 million. DOD guidance  requires that at the end of the annual cross-leveling process, any  remaining unclaimed potential reutilization and disposal stock should  either be claimed by another military department, recategorized, or  designated for disposal, whether through the Defense Logistics Agency  Disposition Services Account, or the CAD stockpile, as appropriate.
section_title: GAO’s Prior Work on Ammunition Inventory
paragraphs: We last reported on DOD’s management of conventional ammunition in  March 2014. We found that the Army’s annual stratification report, which shows the status of ammunition inventory at a given point in time, did not  include information on all usable ammunition items because it did not  include missiles managed by the Army Aviation and Missile Command.  Since the Army’s missiles were not included in the annual stratification  report, they were not considered during the cross-leveling process.  Further, we found that items above the services’ needs in a prior year that  had been placed into the CAD stockpile were not considered in the cross- leveling process. We made recommendations to improve data sharing  among the services, and DOD concurred with all of these  recommendations. Among our recommendations was to include missiles  managed by the Army Aviation and Missile Command in the annual  stratification report, and DOD stated that starting with the March 2014  annual stratification meeting the Army would provide missile information  for the cross-leveling process. As a result, 100 Javelin missiles were  identified for transfer from the Army to the Marine Corps in fiscal year  2015, potentially saving the Marine Corps an estimated $3 million.  Further, we recommended the Army include information on ammunition  that in a previous year was unclaimed by another service and had been  categorized for disposal. In response, DOD officials stated that all of the  military services have visibility into the Army system that tracks  ammunition categorized for disposal and they would direct the military  services to consider such ammunition in the cross-leveling process. In  2015, the Navy and the Air Force identified materiel worth about  $488,000 in the CAD stockpile from prior years they could use.
section_title: DOD Maintains Information on Conventional Ammunition, but Some Data Are Incomplete and Information on Excess Is Not Always Shared with Other Government Agencies
subsections: section_title: Incomplete and Inaccurate Data on Excess, Obsolete, and Unserviceable Ammunition Hampers DOD’s Ability to Precisely Determine Its Estimated Demilitarization Needs
paragraphs: The services maintain information on their conventional ammunition;  however, some inventory records for ammunition in the CAD stockpile  have incorrect or incomplete information on its condition and weight. As  discussed earlier, each service has its own inventory information system  to maintain its conventional ammunition inventory, which includes any  unserviceable ammunition or ammunition above its needs in its custody.  Consolidated information from the military services on the ammunition in  the CAD stockpile is maintained in the Army’s Logistics Modernization  Program (LMP). DOD Instruction 5160.68 directs the services to provide  the SMCA with data on ammunition transferred for demilitarization and  disposal operations.
LMP has information on the location and quantity of all items in the CAD  stockpile, but some records have incomplete or incorrect data on  condition and weight. Further, according to DOD officials, each item has a  condition code assigned to it by the service when placed into the CAD  stockpile, and the condition code is not updated while the item is in the   Service officials stated that when they are considering pulling  stockpile.an item from the stockpile to fill a current need, they generally inspect the  condition of the item to determine whether the condition code of the item  is still accurate and the item is useable. At times, the services have found  particular items with a condition code indicating the materiel was  serviceable, but the item’s shelf life had expired, while other ammunition  had performance issues that made it unacceptable.
Further, we found that DOD does not have the weight data for a number  of items in the CAD stockpile. Federal Government state that an entity should have controls to ensure  that all transactions are complete and accurately recorded. In our review  of data in the LMP database from 2012 to February 2015 the number of  records without assigned weight increased from 2,223 (out of 34,511  records) to 2,829 (out of 36,355 records), which shows the problem is  growing. Although some of the records that are missing weight data have  very few items in storage, there are several items with significant  quantities, such as 3.8 million of chaff countermeasures, 125,000 of 75  millimeter projectiles, and 109,000 of 155 millimeter ammunition.
LMP lists the gross weight of an individual item (shell, missile, or cartridge), however,  officials involved in the demilitarization of conventional ammunition use pro-weight, which  includes the weight of the item plus its packaging. Pro-weight is used because the  demilitarization process has to recycle, or otherwise dispose of all packaging material and  containers in addition to destroying the ammunition. The CAD stockpile weights are  described in short tons, which is equal to 2,000 lbs.
DOD uses weight data as a metric in managing the demilitarization of  conventional ammunition. More specifically, SMCA officials use weight for  (1) developing cost estimates for demilitarization projects; (2) determining  what conventional ammunition should be demilitarized; (3) reporting the  size of the CAD stockpile to the military services, the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, and Congress; (4) forecasting the amount of  conventional ammunition to be transferred into the CAD stockpile in the  future; and (5) reporting on what ammunition has been demilitarized.
The absence of weight data for some of the items in the CAD stockpile  understates the size and composition of the CAD stockpile, thereby  affecting DOD’s estimations of its demilitarization needs. According to  DOD officials, the reasons for the missing data in the CAD stockpile are  related to the types of items transferred into the stockpile, such as older  ammunition stocks that do not have complete weight data, nonstandard  ammunition, foreign ammunition used for testing, components removed  from larger weapons, and ammunition with records that migrated from  legacy data systems. DOD officials stated they are trying to correct  current records with missing or inaccurate data, particularly weight. In  some cases, such as older stocks, the only solution is to locate and  physically weigh the ammunition item(s). DOD officials have not weighed  the items because they said it would be costly and labor intensive.  However, since the items without weight data are not factored into DOD’s  demilitarization determination, DOD is not positioned to optimally  demilitarize the most ammunition possible with the given resources  available. Further, as discussed above, the number of records without  weight data has increased over the years, which indicates that SMCA  continues to accept materiel into the CAD stockpile without weight data.
section_title: Each of the Services Has Visibility of Serviceable Ammunition in the CAD Stockpile, but Information on Excess Is Not Widely Shared with Other Government Agencies
paragraphs: Officials from all the military services said they have access to LMP and  they have used LMP to search the CAD stockpile for materiel they could  use, but information on DOD excess is not widely shared with other  government agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security,  which also uses ammunition for purposes such as training exercises.  Specifically, the military services have achieved benefits such as cost  avoidances from access to the information in LMP on the CAD stockpile.  For example, an Air Force need for 280,000 rounds of 40 millimeter  ammunition was met by the remanufacture of Navy 40 millimeter shells  drawn from the CAD stockpile, which according to Joint Munitions  Command officials saved an estimated $30 million. Also, the Marine  Corps identified the need for signal flares at security check points in Iraq  and Afghanistan, so they pulled 95,594 flares out of the CAD stockpile,  which according to Marine Corps officials saved the service an estimated  $3.8 million. When the services have been able to fulfill needs by  drawing ammunition from the CAD stockpile, financial benefits have  arisen both in reduced demilitarization costs over time and reduced new  procurements.
DOD also has reduced its demilitarization costs by transferring some  excess ammunition to other government agencies as opposed to  demilitarizing the ammunition, but has made such transfers only on a  limited basis. For example, in fiscal year 2014 DOD provided 38 million  rounds of small arms ammunition to the Federal Bureau of Investigation  and 7.5 million rounds of small arms ammunition to the U.S. Marshals  Service. Officials stated that the Joint Munitions Command and Army  Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (G-4) used informal methods to  communicate with other government agencies on available excess  ammunition. Recognizing that there are benefits to such transfers, the  Office of the Executive Director for Conventional Ammunition, in its Fiscal  Year 2014 Cross-Leveling End of Year Report, included remarks  indicating efforts should be made to include other government agencies in  the cross-leveling process.
Communicating with other government agencies on available excess  ammunition could help reduce the CAD stockpile. Section 346 of Ike  Skelton National Defense Authorization Act, as amended, requires,  among other things, that serviceable small arms ammunition and  ammunition components in excess of military needs not be demilitarized,  destroyed, or disposed of unless in excess of commercial demands or  certified as unserviceable or unsafe by the Secretary of Defense. Before  offering the excess serviceable small arms ammunition for commercial  sale, however, this provision outlines a preference that DOD offer the  small arms ammunition and ammunition components for purchase or  transfer to other Federal government agencies and departments, or for  sale to state and local law enforcement, firefighting, homeland security,  and emergency management agencies as permitted by law. According  to officials, DOD does not have a formal process for offering the excess  small arms ammunition and components to other government agencies.
This manual references 10 U.S.C. § 2576a, under which DOD is permitted to transfer  (sell or donate) ammunition to federal or state agencies where the Secretary of Defense  determines that the ammunition is “(A) suitable for use by the agencies in law enforcement  activities, including counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities; and (B) excess to the  needs of the Department of Defense.” The ammunition must also be part of the existing  stock of DOD, accepted by the recipient agency on an as-is, where-is basis, transferred  without the expenditure of any funds available to DOD for the procurement of defense  equipment, and transferred such that all costs incurred subsequent to the transfer of the  property are borne or reimbursed by the recipient agency. Finally, there is a stated  preference for those applications indicating that the transferred property will be used in  counter-drug or counter-terrorism activities of the recipient agency. training and qualification requirements. However, due to budget  constraints the Department of Homeland Security reduced the number of  training classes. If DOD guidance outlining a systematic process to  share information on excess ammunition had been in place, the  Department of Homeland Security could have possibly been aware of and  obtained selected ammunition needed for training classes. Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management  should ensure there are adequate means of communicating with, and  obtaining information from, external stakeholders that may have a  significant impact on the agency achieving its goals. Transfers of  ammunition to other government agencies, subject to certain  requirements, could support DOD’s goal of reducing its CAD stockpile in  a manner consistent with section 346 of the Ike Skelton National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 as amended. Without establishing  a systematic means to communicate with and provide other government  agencies with information on available excess serviceable ammunition,  government agencies could be spending their funds to procure  ammunition that DOD has awaiting demilitarization and could provide to  them. In addition, without such a means, DOD could miss opportunities to  reduce its overall demilitarization and maintenance costs by transferring  such ammunition to other government agencies.
section_title: DOD Has Identified and Taken Actions to Address Challenges in Managing the Demilitarization of Ammunition
paragraphs: DOD has identified a number of challenges in managing the  demilitarization of conventional ammunition, and has taken actions to  address them. These challenges include compliance with environmental  regulations; treaties regarding certain types of ammunition; services’  forecasts of excess, obsolete, and unserviceable ammunition; and annual  funding.
DOD officials stated they have identified the following challenges and are  taking actions to address these challenges:
Environmental Regulation Compliance: SMCA officials stated they  must follow environmental laws in demilitarizing conventional  ammunition and their compliance is governed by environmental  permits that cover the design and operation of facilities that deal with  waste management, noise, air, water, and land emissions. Many  munitions are harmful to human health and the environment, and  demilitarizing large quantities of ammunition requires the rigorous  control and processing of toxic substances. Some of the  demilitarization processes generate additional environmental hazards,  such as air pollutants and waste water. Figure 2 shows the release of  air pollutants from the open burning of munitions. Other  demilitarization processes, such as open detonation, generate noise  pollution affecting the local community. According to SMCA officials,  open burn and open detonation are the primary and cheapest  methods to demilitarize conventional ammunition; further, some  munitions can only be demilitarized by this process. All seven  depots that demilitarize conventional ammunition have the capability  to demilitarize ammunition through open burn/open detonation.  However, officials stated there are environmental concerns with open  burn/open detonation that may force DOD to use alternate and more  costly methods of disposal, like closed disposal technology, in the  future. For example, officials at one demilitarization facility noted that  they generally operated their open detonation demolition ranges at  less than 50 percent of capacity (weight of explosive charge) due to  air and noise pollution concerns.
According to DOD officials, DOD works to ensure compliance with  various environmental regulations by applying for and maintaining  permits issued by federal and state agencies that regulate its  demilitarization operations. Officials indicated that these permits are  granted by federal and state agencies and specify which pollutants  can be released and in what quantities, as well as describe in detail  how each process controls pollutants and meets applicable standards.  If environmental regulations change, DOD officials indicated they may  need to renew their permits; if the permits are revised, DOD may be  required to fund capital investments in equipment and processes to  conform to the requirements of any new permits. SMCA officials  stated they address these challenges by including in each annual  demilitarization plan sufficient work for each depot to exercise existing  environmental permits so the permits do not lapse. Also, they recycle  or remanufacture, when possible, materiel that otherwise would be  destroyed. Finally, the officials indicated that they contract with private  companies to conduct some of the demilitarization work as well.
Treaty Compliance: The U.S. government is considering two treaties  that, if ratified, would significantly impact U.S. demilitarization  operations. One treaty is the Convention on Cluster Munitions and  the other is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,  Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their  Destruction. DOD has an inventory of 471,726 tons of cluster  munitions and 23,436 tons of anti-personnel landmines that will have  to be disposed of if the United States ratifies the two treaties.   Specifically, the conventions require the destruction of the respective  cluster munitions and landmines inventories, and to comply, DOD  officials stated that they would be forced to prioritize disposal of these  weapons without concern to maximizing the reduction of the CAD  stockpile.
Service Forecasts: SMCA officials said that DOD’s demilitarization  budget request frequently does not match actual funding needs. The  request is based upon the estimated disposal costs required to reduce  the existing CAD stockpile, as well as costs for disposing of  ammunition the services forecast they will submit for disposal. Each of  the services is required to submit a 5-year forecast on the amount of  ammunition they expect to turn in for demilitarization each year.  However, program officials indicate the services’ forecasts are  generally inaccurate, which can make demilitarization planning  challenging. In 2010, the Army Audit Agency found that Army officials  had significantly understated the forecasted annual additions the  services would transfer to the CAD stockpile from 2005 to March  2009, and these estimates were based on the projections furnished by  the services. The Army Audit Agency recommended the Joint  Conventional Ammunition Policies and Procedures 7 (Demilitarization  and Disposal) be revised to help the military services develop better  forecasts for additions to the stockpile. In their 2013 follow-up report,  the Army Audit Agency found that the Joint Conventional Ammunition  Policies and Procedures 7 (Demilitarization and Disposal) had been  revised in 2011; however, the forecast additions for fiscal year 2012  were still inaccurate. SMCA officials told us that they still received  inaccurate forecast information from the services. The SMCA officials  stated they have no control over the ammunition the services actually  transfer year to year, and they accept all excess, obsolete, and  unserviceable conventional ammunition into the CAD stockpile, even  if it exceeds forecasts. DOD officials stated they do not have options  to address any problems caused by unplanned additions to the CAD  stockpile, although DOD recalculates the demilitarization plan to  include the additional ammunition when appropriate.
Annual Funding: SMCA officials stated that the Army requests less  funding than needed to meet its critical requirement each year, which  could result in the CAD stockpile growing if the amount of ammunition  demilitarized is less than the amount of ammunition transferred from  the services during the year. The critical requirement is the funding  necessary to demilitarize 3 percent of the existing stockpile and the  full amount of ammunition the services plan to add to the CAD  stockpile during the year. In December 2013, Army Audit Agency  reported the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (G-4) estimated  the critical funding level for the demilitarization of conventional  ammunition at approximately $185 million. Further, the report stated  that the conventional ammunition demilitarization program is  considered a lower priority when compared to other needs. The  Department of the Army’s budget request for conventional  ammunitions demilitarization in fiscal year 2015 was $114 million and  for fiscal year 2016 it was $113 million. Officials stated that the  amount of funding has caused them to be reluctant to initiate projects  that increase demilitarization capacity or efficiency, since these  capabilities may not be utilized in the future due to funding shortfalls.  Furthermore, officials state they lack Research, Development, Test,  and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding to develop demilitarization  processes for the disposal of some materiel in the CAD stockpile that  cannot be demilitarized using current processes, but they expect  these funds will be increased in fiscal year 2017. SMCA addresses  the funding challenge each year by developing an annual  demilitarization plan to dispose of as much of the CAD stockpile as it  can based on the amount of funding they receive.
section_title: DOD’s Average Cost to Store, Maintain, and Dispose of Excess, Obsolete, and Unserviceable Conventional Ammunition
paragraphs: DOD officials have estimated the average cost to store, maintain, and  dispose of excess, obsolete, and unserviceable conventional ammunition.  DOD officials stated that in fiscal year 2015, it costs on average about  $42 per ton to store conventional ammunition. This number was  determined using the estimated cost to perform annual inventory counts,  surveillance inspections of ammunition, and housekeeping movement of  stocks to manage the storage space. Additionally, DOD officials stated  that in fiscal year 2015, it costs on average about $2,000 per ton to  demilitarize conventional ammunition. This cost is driven by the  quantities and the complexity of the items being demilitarized. DOD has  not conducted a formal analysis comparing the costs of storing excess,  obsolete, and unserviceable conventional ammunition with the costs of its  demilitarization and disposal. Based on our review of key DOD  conventional ammunition demilitarization guidance, there is no  requirement to conduct a cost comparison. DOD officials told us that  since there is a large difference in the cost to store and the cost to  demilitarize ammunition based on their estimates, they believe there is no  need to conduct a formal analysis. Further, DOD officials stated their  mission is to demilitarize all conventional ammunition in the CAD  stockpile and the annual decisions on what to demilitarize are based on  achieving that goal. For information on how SMCA officials determine  what conventional ammunition to demilitarize, see appendix IV.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Efficient management of the CAD stockpile and DOD’s demilitarization  effort is important to ensure that as much hazardous material is disposed  of as possible using the resources available. In order to meet its goals,  the department needs accurate data, which requires complete and  accurate documentation of the items transferred into the stockpile each  year by the services, as well as ammunition already in the stockpile.  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that an  entity should have controls to ensure that all transactions are complete  and accurately recorded. DOD does maintain data on conventional  ammunition in the stockpile and uses it to manage demilitarization efforts,  but officials have not fully maintained accurate and complete weight data  on some ammunition items, which factors into their decision making about  what to demilitarize in a given year. Without complete and accurate data,  DOD is not well positioned to make the best demilitarization decisions  and to use demilitarization resources as efficiently as possible.  Furthermore, efficient management of the CAD stockpile is not solely a  matter of demilitarization, since some materiel in it potentially could be  transferred to other agencies, in keeping with DOD regulations and  statutory requirements. Such transfers could allow DOD to reduce  demilitarization costs and the size of the CAD stockpile while also  reducing the need for other government agencies to procure new stocks  of ammunition. While at times transfers have led to cost savings, there  has not been a formal means to regularly communicate with external  stakeholders about the availability of excess ammunition in the stockpile,  which is necessary to meet DOD’s goals. Without a systematic means to  communicate information on excess ammunition to other government  agencies, DOD will miss opportunities to reduce the CAD stockpile and  demilitarization costs through transfers.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the efficiency of DOD’s conventional demilitarization efforts,  including systematically collecting and maintaining key information about  the items in its CAD stockpile and sharing information on excess items  with other government agencies, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to take the following two  actions.
To improve the completeness and accuracy of information on the  weight of items in the CAD stockpile—the key measure used by DOD  to manage the conventional ammunition demilitarization operation— establish a plan to (1) identify and record, to the extent possible, the  missing or inaccurate weight information for existing ammunition  records in the CAD stockpile and (2) ensure that all items transferred  to the CAD stockpile, including for example components removed  from larger weapons and nonstandard ammunition, have the  appropriate weight data.
To improve the visibility and awareness of serviceable excess  ammunition in the CAD stockpile that could potentially be transferred  to other government agencies, develop a systematic means to make  information available to other government agencies on excess  ammunition that could be used to meet their needs.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its  written comments, reproduced in appendix V, DOD concurred with both of  the recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments on the  draft report, which we incorporated as appropriate.
DOD concurred with our first recommendation that the Secretary of the  Army establish a plan to (1) identify and record, to the extent possible, the  missing or inaccurate weight information for existing ammunition records  in the CAD stockpile and (2) ensure that all items transferred to the CAD  stockpile, including for example components removed from larger  weapons and nonstandard ammunition, have the appropriate weight data.  DOD stated that Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics would ensure that the Secretary of the Army is  tasked to identify and record, to the extent practicable, weight data for the  existing CAD stockpile and for items transferred to the CAD stockpile in  the future. In response to our second recommendation that the Secretary  of the Army develop a systematic means to make information available to  other government agencies on excess ammunition that could be used to  meet their needs, DOD stated that Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics would ensure that the  Secretary of the Army is tasked to develop a systematic means to make  information available to other government agencies on excess  ammunition.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, the  Navy, and the Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In  addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-5257 or merrittz@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff members who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Guidance on Managing Demilitarization Operations
subsections: section_title: Officials Stated Current Policies and Procedures Are Sufficient to Manage Demilitarization Operations
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) has policies and procedures that help  govern the demilitarization of excess, obsolete, and unserviceable  conventional ammunition and DOD officials involved in the  demilitarization of conventional ammunition stated they believe the  policies and guidance issued are effective to govern demilitarization.  Additionally, depots have used the policies and guidance to develop their  own implementing guidance and standard operating procedures for use at  their locations. For example, Tooele Army Depot developed a letter of  instruction for the inspection and disposal of inert material and Crane  Army Ammunition Plant has developed several standard operating  procedures to govern the base’s demilitarization processes. The table  below provides an overview of key DOD policies on demilitarization.
section_title: DOD’s Directives, Instructions, Manuals, and Charter on the Demilitarization of Conventional Ammunition Conform with DOD Instruction on Issuances
paragraphs: DOD Instruction 5025.01, DOD Issuances Program, establishes guidance  for directives, instructions, manuals, and charters such as frequency of  updates, length, purpose, and appropriate approval level. The guidance  documents we reviewed in the table above conform to the requirements  under DOD Instruction 5025.01:
DOD Instruction 5025.01 provides that directives, instructions, and  manuals (issuances) published before March 25, 2012 should be  updated or cancelled within 10 years of their publication date, and that  those published or changed after that date will be processed for  cancellation by the Directives Division on the 10-year anniversary of  their original publication dates, unless an extension is approved. That  said, even for those issuances not required to be cancelled within 10  years, an issuance is not considered current when it is not within 10  years of its publication date. The directives, instructions and manuals  we reviewed in the table above conformed to this requirement. For  example, DOD Directive 5160.65, Single Manager for Conventional  Ammunition (SMCA) was published on August 1, 2008. Therefore, it is  not required to be updated or cancelled until August 2018.
DOD Instruction 5025.01 provides that directives should not be more  than 10 pages in length (including enclosures, with no procedures,  and with the exception of charters); instructions not more than 50  pages (including enclosures) or they should be divided into volumes;  and manuals should be divided into two or more volumes if more than  100 pages are required. The directives, instructions, and manuals we  reviewed in the table above were within the established parameters.  For example, DOD Instruction 5160.68 is 21 pages, which is within  the required maximum limit of 50 pages for instructions not divided  into multiple volumes.
DOD Instruction 5025.01 requires that DOD directives exclusively  establish policy, assign responsibility, and delegate authority to the  DOD Components. Directives will not contain procedures. DOD  instructions either implement policy or establish policy and assign  responsibilities, and may provide general procedures for carrying out  or implementing those policies. DOD manuals provide detailed  procedures for implementing policy established in instructions and  directives. The directives, instructions, and manuals we reviewed in  the table above established and implemented policy as required. For  example, DOD Instruction 5160.68 assigns responsibilities and  mission functions for conventional ammunition management to the  Secretary of the Army, the military services, and USSOCOM.
DOD Instruction 5025.01 states that, generally, directives are to be  signed by the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense.  Depending on the nature of the instruction, instructions must be  signed by the component head in the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, his or her Principal Deputy, or Office of the Secretary of  Defense Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed official. Manuals  must be signed by an individual in one of these positions, as  authorized by their chartering directives. The directives, instructions,  and manuals we reviewed in the table above were signed by the  appropriate officials. For example, DOD Directive 5160.65 was  appropriately signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
DOD Instruction 5025.01 states that charters must define the scope of  functional responsibility and identify all delegated authorities for the  chartered organization. The SMCA charter defines responsibility and  authorities, for example, by delegating to the Deputy Commanding  General for Army Materiel Command the role of Executive Director for  Conventional Ammunition and provides authorities as needed to  execute the SMCA mission.
section_title: Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has  adequately maintained and shared information on the quantity, value,  condition, and location of excess, obsolete, and unserviceable  conventional ammunition for each military service, we reviewed DOD’s  inventory data on excess, obsolete, and unserviceable conventional  ammunition held in the conventional ammunition awaiting demilitarization  and disposal (CAD) stockpile as of February 2015 to determine how  complete and accurate the data are. The scope of the audit was limited  to the materiel in the CAD stockpile and ammunition in the services’  inventory that was unserviceable or in excess of the services’ needs. We  interviewed Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force officials to  determine how they manage unserviceable ammunition and serviceable  ammunition that is beyond the services’ needs. We also determined the  extent to which the information in the services’ ammunition inventory  systems is useful for their purposes. We interviewed Single Manager for  Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) and service officials to learn how  information on excess, obsolete, and unserviceable ammunition is  shared.  After initial discussions with DOD officials, we determined that  the department does not consider the value of ammunition in the  management of its CAD stockpile so we did not review the value of the  conventional ammunition. Further, we conducted a data reliability  assessment of the Air Force Combat Ammunition System, the Navy’s  Ordnance Information System, the Marine Corp’s Ordnance Information  System – Marine Corps, and the Army’s Logistics Modernization Program  by reviewing the services’ responses to questionnaires on the internal  controls they use to manage their systems. We applied Standards for  Internal Control in Federal Government as our criteria, and found that the  data was sufficiently reliable for determining whether DOD adequately  maintained information on the quantity, value, condition, and location of  excess, obsolete, and unserviceable conventional ammunition in its  accounts and for our reporting purposes. The questions we sent the  services solicited information on the controls they had implemented in  their ammunition information systems. The questions seek to determine if  there were controls that restricted access to the information system to  prevent unauthorized access or inappropriate use and that there were  data quality controls that ensured completeness, accuracy, authorization,  and validity of all transactions. We interviewed service officials in the  Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to learn how ammunition is  managed once the decision is made to demilitarize and transfer it to the  CAD stockpile. We also interviewed officials on the visibility, accessibility,  accuracy, and usefulness of the data on the CAD stockpile and determine  if they have identified problems regarding the reliability of the data. Lastly,  we reviewed policies and legislation to determine what guidance was  provided on communicating excess conventional ammunition to other  government agencies, and we interviewed SMCA officials about the  extent to which they communicate the availability of excess ammunition to  other government agencies and the challenges involved with making  conventional ammunition available to government entities outside of  DOD.
To examine challenges, if any, DOD has identified in managing the  current and anticipated CAD stockpile, and if so, actions taken to address  those challenges, we reviewed DOD reports on the management of the  current CAD stockpile to identify any problem areas and DOD’s plans to  address these problems. We visited McAlester Army Ammunition Plant  and examined the management of its ammunition demilitarization  operation to include storage practices and a variety of methods to destroy  the ammunition. We selected McAlester Army Ammunition Plant to visit  because a large portion of the CAD stockpile was stored there, and it  used several methods to demilitarize ammunition. We also contacted the  other six depots that store and demilitarize ammunition and requested the  same information on the management of their respective ammunition  demilitarization operations.in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to identify challenges  they face in managing the stockpile and discuss the actions they have  taken to address the challenges.
We interviewed SMCA officials and officials  To describe DOD’s average costs of storing and maintaining items in the  CAD stockpile and the average costs of the disposal of items in the  stockpile, we obtained fiscal year 2015 cost estimates for storing and  demilitarizing ammunition from the Army Materiel Command’s Joint  Munitions Command, and interviewed officials about what factors were  used to develop these cost estimates. We also reviewed a 2013 DOD  report on the cost of demilitarizing conventional ammunition to determine  the factors that drive demilitarization costs. Additionally, we interviewed  Army officials on the process they use to make demilitarization decisions.
To describe DOD’s policies and procedures governing the demilitarization  of excess, obsolete, and unserviceable conventional ammunition and  discuss the extent to which they are consistent with DOD guidance for  developing policies and procedures, we obtained policies, procedures,  and guidance on demilitarization. We determined that these policies,  procedures, and guidance would be considered adequate if they  conformed to DOD guidance on directives and instructions. Therefore, we  compared the requirements in DOD Instruction 5025.01, with the  guidance governing demilitarization of conventional ammunition and  determined whether DOD followed this instruction on how guidance  documents should be developed and how often they should be updated.To determine the extent to which DOD policies and procedures on  demilitarization of conventional ammunition are effective, we interviewed  officials in the Army and contacted the demilitarization depots to obtain  their opinions on the effectiveness and usefulness of DOD policies and  procedures governing the demilitarization of conventional ammunition.
We visited or contacted the following offices during our review. Unless  otherwise specified, these organizations are located in or near  Washington, D.C.
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
U.S. Special Operations Command, Tampa, Florida
Defense Logistics Agency
Program Executive Office for Ammunition, Dover, New Jersey
Office of the Executive Director for Conventional Ammunition, Dover,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics  and Technology)
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for  Logistics (G-4)
U.S. Army Materiel Command, Huntsville, Alabama
U. S. Army Joint Munitions Command, Rock Island, Illinois
U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, Huntsville, Alabama
McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, McAlester, Oklahoma
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Director for Material  Readiness & Logistics (N4)
Naval Supply Systems Command, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania
U. S. Marine Corps Headquarters
U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia
U.S. Air Force Headquarters
U.S. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center Readiness, Ogden,  We conducted this performance audit from August 2014 to July 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix III: Army Depot Locations and Demilitarization Capabilities
paragraphs: The Army has seven demilitarization locations that store 98 percent of the  conventional ammunition awaiting demilitarization and disposal (CAD)  Stockpile. Figure 3 below shows these seven demilitarization locations,  the amount of the CAD stockpile at those locations, and the  demilitarization capabilities at each location.
subsections: section_title: Key Terms Associated with the Demilitarization Processes
paragraphs: 1. Autoclave - Autoclave capability removes and reclaims main charge  cast explosives (such as TNT) from projectiles and bombs. Munitions are  prepared for the autoclave by disassembly or cutting to expose the main  explosive charge. They are placed in the autoclave and the vessel is  heated using steam. As the munitions body heats up, the explosive melts  and flows to the bottom of the autoclave for collection in heated kettles.  2. Hot Water Washout - Washout capability removes and reclaims main  cast explosive charges from projectiles, bombs, and mines. Munitions are  prepared for washout by disassembly to expose the main explosive  charge. Munitions are placed over a washout tank where low-pressure  hot water is injected into the cavity to wash out the explosives into a  recovery tank.  3. Cryofracture - Cryofracture involves the cooling of the munitions in a  liquid nitrogen bath, followed by fracture of the embrittled item(s) in a  hydraulic press and the subsequent thermal treatment of the fractured  munitions debris in order to destroy the explosives and decontaminate  any residual metal parts.  4. Hydrolysis – Hydrolysis uses a sodium hydroxide solution to dissolve  the aluminum casing and expose the energetic materials contained  within. The sodium hydroxide solution then reacts with the energetic  materials, breaking them down and rendering them inert.  5. Improved Munitions Convention Download – Joint Munitions Command  officials describe this as a process developed to demilitarize artillery  projectiles that contain submunitions, which are small bombs. The base  plate of the projectile is removed to access the submunitions and they are  removed for disposition on the open detonation range. The metal parts  including the projectile body and base plate are often reused in the  manufacture of new rounds.  6. Incineration - Incineration provides an environmentally acceptable  means to destroy munitions not suitable for other demilitarization methods  and reclaim the metal scrap for sale. Small munitions and/or components  are fed on conveyor(s) into the incinerator where they burn or detonate.  Metal residues are discharged and collected for salvage.  7. INERT – According to Joint Munitions Command officials, INERT is the  shredding, cutting, or mutilation of munitions items, components, or  packaging that do not contain energetic materials.  8. Open Burn/Open Detonation - Open burn and open detonation are the  intentional combustion or detonation of explosives or munitions, without  control or containment of the reaction, and are the preferred method for  cost-effective demilitarization of many items. Open burn and open  detonation techniques were the primary means used to demilitarize  munitions for several decades.  9. Slurry Emissions Manufacturing Facility – According to Joint Munitions  Command officials this facility combines energetic material recovered  from munitions items with other commercial ingredients to produce  blasting charges the mining industry uses.  10. Steamout - Steamout is similar to hot water washout in that both  processes essentially melt out energetic fillers in large-caliber projectiles,  bombs, and other munitions. With the steamout process, items are placed  on an inclined cradle, and steam is jetted in to melt out the fill. The molten  slurry is collected and sent to corrugate cooling pans. The pans are held  in a vented and heated hood until the water is all evaporated and the  explosive solidifies. The solidified explosive is broken into chunks, boxed,  and then according to Joint Munitions Command officials, used as donor  material for open detonation projects.  11. White Phosphorus Plant - The White Phosphorus-Phosphoric Acid  Conversion Plant provides an environmentally acceptable means to  demilitarize munitions containing white phosphorus by converting it into  phosphoric acid. The munitions are punched to expose the white  phosphorus and quickly burned. Smoke from the burning munitions is  pulled through a closed loop ducting system into the wet scrubber in the  acid plant system for conversion to phosphoric acid. The phosphoric acid  is collected and packaged for sale. Metal parts are discharged and  collected for salvage.
section_title: Appendix IV: DOD Processes to Determine the Ammunition to Demilitarize
paragraphs: To determine what conventional ammunition should be demilitarized,  Joint Munitions Command officials stated they use a database tool called  the Demilitarization Optimizer. To develop an annual demilitarization  plan, the optimizer produces an initial list of projects, in tons, that will  result in demilitarizing the most ammunition possible based on factors  entered into the optimizer. Officials stated they use the optimizer as a  starting point in developing the annual demilitarization plan; they make  adjustments to the optimizer output to maintain demilitarization capability  at the depots and to balance the work load over the years. For the  demilitarization of missiles, Army Aviation and Missile Command officials  stated they do not use the optimizer because they prepare their plan  using the number of missiles; however, they consider many of the same  factors in determining what missiles to demilitarize in a given year.
subsections: section_title: Process to Determine What Non-Missile Ammunition to Demilitarize
paragraphs: The optimizer is a database tool used to determine the ammunition, with  the exception of missiles, that will be demilitarized, given certain  parameters (e.g., inventory, depot capability and capacity, funding,  transportation costs, and any mandatory workload requirements). The  optimizer has been used by Joint Munitions Command since 1999 as a  tool to assist in demilitarization program planning, provide justification to  answer questions received from Congress as well as Army headquarters,  and provide the most economic allocation of resources among the  government depots. Further, the optimizer provides Joint Munitions  Command with an auditable trail of decision making and an ability to  provide a quick response to “what if” questions. The optimizer database  uses several data points to determine what items should be demilitarized:  1.  Demilitarization inventory and forecasted additions to the CAD  stockpile – the amount of ammunition currently in the CAD stockpile  and the estimated amount of ammunition that the services determine  they will add to the stockpile that year.  2.  Depot capability, capacity, and costs of carrying out demilitarization –  depot capability is the type of demilitarization work the depot has the  ability to conduct. For example, most of the depots have the capability  to conduct demilitarization through open burn and open detonation.  Depot capacity is the amount of work that the depot has the ability to  conduct by demilitarization capability. For example, Letterkenny  Munitions Center has the capacity to demilitarize 3,500 tons of  ammunition each year by open burn and 1,250 tons by open  detonation. The cost of carrying out demilitarization is an estimate,  prepared by the depot, of the cost to demilitarizing specific  ammunition using a particular demilitarization capability. Data on  storage costs is not entered into the optimizer for cost calculations.  3.  Funding – the amount of funding available for demilitarization based  on the current fiscal year budget allocation.  4.  Packing, crating, handling, and transportation – the cost of moving  ammunition to the appropriate demilitarization location.  5.  Mandatory workloads – any directives or management initiatives that  would change the priority of demilitarization work that must be  conducted. For example, if the United States signed the Convention  on Cluster Munitions, DOD would be required to demilitarize all cluster  munitions within 8 years. This information would be entered into the  optimizer to ensure the treaty requirement would be met.
Joint Munitions Command officials cautioned that there are some inherent  uncertainties in the optimizer process that affect the outcome. One of the  uncertainties is the incoming workload. While Joint Munitions Command  has an estimate of how much inventory will be generated each year for  demilitarization, the estimates are not perfect and leave uncertainty in the  quantity of items that will be turned over for demilitarization and the time  at which those items will enter the CAD stockpile. Joint Munitions  Command officials stated that the optimizer provides a good starting point  for decision-making, based on the specific parameters described above,  but they do not assign demilitarization projects based solely on the  optimizer output.
Officials stated that the optimizer produces a list of projects, based on  tons, that would be most economical to demilitarize for that given year.  However, adjustments are made to balance complex, expensive  demilitarization projects with simple, inexpensive demilitarization projects.  Since the optimizer attempts to maximize the amount of conventional  ammunition demilitarized, it tends to recommend a number of inexpensive  projects. This results in pushing the expensive demilitarization projects  into the future, which may increase future demilitarization costs.  Therefore, to maintain a balance between future demilitarization funding  needs and the current funding provided for demilitarization, officials  replace some of the inexpensive projects the optimizer recommends with  expensive projects.
Additionally, officials make adjustments to the optimizer results to ensure  each depot is provided sufficient work to maintain demilitarization  capabilities. Officials are concerned that if they do not provide some work  to each of the depots, the depots would lose their demilitarization  capability because some processes require specialized skills or training  and retaining those personnel would be impossible if demilitarization was  curtailed for a significant amount of time. The loss of trained personnel  would create a significant deficit in training and delay the restart of any  future demilitarization operations. Further, officials are concerned they  risk losing their environmental permits if demilitarization operations were  stopped at an installation for a significant amount of time. For fiscal year  2015, the Joint Munitions Command and Program Executive Office for  Ammunition officials stated they planned a demilitarization program of  about $71 million, which would destroy about 67,640 tons of ammunition.
section_title: Process for Determining Missile Demilitarization
paragraphs: Demilitarization officials at the Aviation and Missile Command stated they  use similar factors in determining what missiles to demilitarize, including  the location of the missiles, the capabilities and capacity of the depots,  the estimated cost to demilitarize, and the funding available. Officials  stated the Aviation and Missile Command does not use the optimizer tool,  but instead the demilitarization officials coordinate with Product Manager  Demilitarization to develop an annual missile demilitarization execution  plan. In addition to the factors listed above, officials also consider the  safety inspections that have been conducted on each missile and push  any potentially unsafe-to-store items to the top of the demilitarization list.  While Aviation and Missile Command demilitarization officials do not  currently use an optimizer tool, they stated that they are considering  whether an optimizer database would be feasible for use with missiles.  For fiscal year 2015, the Aviation and Missile Command and Program  Executive Office Ammunition officials stated they planned a  demilitarization program of about $43 million, which would destroy about  141,598 missiles and components.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Carleen Bennett (Assistant  Director), George Bustamante, Lindsey Cross, Chaneé Gaskin, Kevin  Keith, Carol Petersen, Michael Silver, Amie Steele, Alexander Welsh, Erik  Wilkins-McKee, and Michael Willems made key contributions to this  report.