Southwest Border Security: Data Are Limited and Concerns Vary about Spillover Crime along the Southwest Border
Published: 2013-02-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Drug-related homicides have dramatically increased in recent years in Mexico along the nearly 2,000-mile border it shares with the United States. U.S. federal, state, and local officials have stated that the prospect of crime, including violence, spilling over from Mexico into the southwestern United States is a concern. GAO was asked to review crime rates and assess information on spillover crime along the border. Specifically, this report addresses: (1) What information do reported crime rates in southwest border communities provide on spillover crime and what do they show? (2) What efforts, if any, have federal, state, and select local law enforcement agencies made to track spillover crime along the southwest border? (3) What concerns, if any, do these agencies have about spillover crime? (4) What steps, if any, have these agencies taken to address spillover crime?
GAO analyzed crime data from all of the 24 southwest border counties from 2004 through 2011 and federal documentation, such as threat assessments and DHS's plans for addressing violence along the southwest border. GAO interviewed officials from DHS and DOJ and their components. GAO also interviewed officials from 37 state and local law enforcement agencies responsible for investigating and tracking crime in the border counties in the four southwest border states (Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas). While the results of the interviews are not generalizable, they provided insights. GAO is not making any recommendations. DHS provided comments, which highlighted border-related crime initiatives recognized by GAO.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, the government's centralized repository for crime data, provides the only available standardized way to track crime levels in border counties over time. However, UCR data lack information on whether reported offenses are attributable to spillover crime, and have other limitations, such as underreporting to police. Also, UCR data cannot be used to identify links with crimes often associated with spillover from Mexico, such as cartel-related drug trafficking. Cognizant of these limitations, GAO's analysis of data for southwest border counties with sufficiently complete data show that, generally, both violent and property crimes were lower in 2011 than in 2004. For example, the violent crime rate in three states' border counties was lower by at least 26 percent in 2011 than in 2004 and in one other state lower by 8 percent in 2011 than in 2005.
Law enforcement agencies have few efforts to track spillover crime. No common federal government definition of such crime exists, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ) components, including those with a definition, either do not collect data to track spillover crime, or do not maintain such data that can be readily retrieved and analyzed. However, several components collect violent incident data that could serve as indirect indicators of spillover crime. For example, GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data show that, generally, assaults on agents between southwest border ports of entry were about 25 percent lower in 2012 than in 2006. State and local law enforcement agencies, except for one state agency, do not track what might be considered to be spillover crime because they lack a common definition and do not systematically collect these crime data in a way that can be used to analyze trends. Officials from 22 of 37 state and local agencies told GAO that they have limited resources to collect additional data. Since April 2012, DHS and the Texas Department of Public Safety have coled an effort to propose definitions and metrics for border-related crime by March 2013.
Law enforcement agencies have varying concerns regarding the extent to which violent crime from Mexico spills into southwest border communities. While DHS and DOJ threat assessments indicate that violent infighting between drug cartels has remained largely in Mexico, DHS assessments also show that aggressive tactics used by traffickers to evade capture demonstrate an increasing threat to U.S. law enforcement. Also, officials in 31 of the 37 state and local agencies stated that they have not observed violent crime from Mexico regularly spilling into their counties; nonetheless, officials in 33 of the 37 agencies were at least somewhat concerned, for example, for the safety of their personnel or residents.
Law enforcement agencies have undertaken initiatives to target border-related crime, including one effort to address violent crime spilling over from Mexico. For example, in October 2008, DHS developed a contingency plan for the possibility that a significant southwest border violence escalation may exceed DHS assets' ability to respond. In addition, officials from all state and local law enforcement agencies that GAO spoke with said their agencies had undertaken some efforts, either individually or in partnership with others, to combat criminal activities often associated with spillover crime, such as drug and human smuggling.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The U.S. government has identified Mexican drug cartels—whose  trafficking of drugs, cash, and firearms engenders violence—as an  organized crime threat to the United States. Drug cartel-related violence,  including kidnappings and homicides, has dramatically increased in  recent years in Mexico. Based on data compiled by the Trans-Border  Institute at the University of San Diego, homicides related to organized  crime increased by 523 percent from 2006 (1,152) through 2011 (7,178)  in the six Mexican states that share the nearly 2,000-mile border with the  United States. As an extension of its counternarcotics policy, and in  response to the possibility that violence in Mexico may spread, or spill  over, to the United States, the U.S. government has been supporting  Mexico’s campaign against Mexican drug cartels by implementing  bilateral security initiatives, enhancing border security programs, and  introducing initiatives to reduce the movement of drugs, money, and  weapons to and from Mexico.
Stakeholders view the term “spillover” differently. Depending on the  stakeholder, the term “spillover” might refer only to Mexican drug cartel- related violence or be defined as a broader concept of spillover crime,  which includes both violent and nonviolent activities. Examples of such  activities include rape or murder committed in connection with cross- border or drug cartel activity; keeping smuggled aliens in stash houses  and ransoming them back to Mexico; smuggling of firearms, drugs, and  people; vandalism such as littering on smuggling routes; and destroying  private property, such as cutting fences and killing cattle. In addition,  stakeholders have varying perspectives on the existence and effects of  crime spilling over from Mexico into communities along the southwest  border. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet  Napolitano testified in 2009 that increases in drug cartel-related violence  in the United States were far below Mexican levels and were limited to  acts of violence between cartel members and assaults on U.S. Customs  and Border Protection’s (CBP) Border Patrol agents. In 2011, she stated  that while the United States must continue to guard against spillover  effects of drug cartel-related violence in Mexico, border communities were  among the safest in America. On the other hand, some members of  Congress and officials from state governments and state and local law  enforcement agencies have publicly asserted that drug cartel-related  violent crime is spilling over from Mexico into the United States,  endangering the lives and property of Americans living in U.S. southwest  border communities. Federal law does not specifically require the  collection of data on spillover crime, but legislation has been introduced in  Congress that would require federal agencies to report on incidents of  cross-border violence or on their ability to track and quantify the level of  cross-border violence occurring along the southwest border.
You asked us to review crime rates and assess information on spillover  crime from Mexico in communities along the U.S.-Mexico border. This  report addresses the following questions: (1) What information do  reported crime rates in southwest border communities provide on  spillover crime and what do they show? (2) What efforts, if any, have  federal, state, and select local law enforcement agencies made to track  spillover crime along the southwest border? (3) What concerns, if any, do  these agencies have about spillover crime? (4) What steps, if any, have  these agencies taken to address spillover crime?
To describe crime rates, we analyzed Summary Reporting System (SRS)  data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime  Reporting (UCR) Program—the government’s centralized repository for  crime data—from January 2004 through December 2011 for the four  southwest border states (Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas).  We selected January 2004 as the initial date because it provided us with  data for more than 2 years prior to December 2006, when Mexican  President Felipe Calderón took office and began a major military  offensive against Mexican drug cartels. We also analyzed UCR’s National  Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) data, available from January  2007 through December 2010, for the single southwest border law  enforcement agency reporting such data—the sheriff’s office in Yuma  County, Arizona. To assess the reliability of the UCR data, we conducted  analyses to test for irregularities in the data, reviewed FBI documentation  on how the data can and cannot be used and on the FBI’s procedures for  ensuring UCR data quality, and interviewed FBI officials knowledgeable  about the data. On the basis of this assessment, we excluded some  counties from our analysis because they did not report complete crime  data to the FBI. We concluded that the data for the remaining counties  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. In addition, to  determine what other data are systematically collected in southwest  border counties, we interviewed officials from the state and local law  enforcement agencies that are responsible for investigating and tracking  crime occurring in their jurisdictions. At the state level, we conducted  interviews with officials from the California Highway Patrol, and the  Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas Departments of Public Safety. At the  local level, we interviewed officials representing 21 of the 24 sheriffs’  offices in southwest border counties and 12 large municipal police  departments in the border counties. We selected departments from each  of four states, and we selected large departments because on the basis  of our review of the UCR SRS data, in general, large departments had  more reported crimes than did smaller departments. A list of the 24  southwest border counties can be found in appendix I. In total, we  interviewed officials from 37 state and law enforcement agencies on the  southwest border.
Further, we conducted site visits to five southwest border counties: Pima  and Santa Cruz Counties in Arizona, and Cameron, Hidalgo, and Webb  Counties in Texas. We selected these counties because they represent  diverse urban and rural environments and contain geographic features,  such as rivers and mountains, which could affect the levels and types of  crime they experience. As part of our visits, in addition to interviewing  state and local law enforcement agencies, we met with federal officials,  such as CBP agents and officers operating between and at the ports of  entry along the southwest border. The information we obtained from  these visits is not generalizable to all southwest border counties, but it  provides insights on the perspectives that law enforcement  representatives have on crime occurring in southwest border  communities.
To describe efforts agencies have taken to track spillover crime, we  collected information, such as crime reports and documentation on  categories of data collected, from and conducted interviews with the state  and local law enforcement agencies identified above, as well as with  federal agencies that have responsibilities for combating drug cartel– related activities along the southwest border. For example, these federal  agencies include components and intelligence offices from DHS, such as  CBP and DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis; Department of Justice  (DOJ), such as Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the FBI; and  interagency task forces, such as the Border Enforcement Security Task  Force. We asked agencies about their efforts to track spillover crime, any  challenges they encountered in doing so, and whether they collected or  tracked other data they considered related to spillover crime and violence  on the southwest border. Specifically, we analyzed CBP data on the  number of assaults on Border Patrol agents in southwest border patrol  sectors from fiscal years 2006 through 2012, and the number of assaults  on Office of Field Operations personnel at southwest border ports of entry  for fiscal years 2011 and 2012, the date ranges for which these data were  available. To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed relevant  documentation, such as procedures for collecting data consistently, and  interviewed officials responsible for the data. On the basis of our efforts,  we determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our  report.
To identify concerns about spillover crime, we reviewed threat  assessments for the southwest border developed by federal agencies,  such as DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis. In addition, we  included questions in our interviews with the officials from 37 state and  local law enforcement agencies about their concerns regarding the  existence and potential effects of crime from Mexico spilling into their  communities. In addition, to obtain the perspectives of local businesses in  southwest border counties about what concerns, if any, they may have  about spillover crime, we interviewed officials from Chambers of  Commerce in four of the five counties we visited—Cameron, Hidalgo,  Santa Cruz, and Webb Counties. are not generalizeable to all local businesses or Chambers of Commerce  on the southwest border, they provide perspectives about the effects that  violence in Mexico might have had on the businesses in their  communities.
We did not interview officials from a Chamber of Commerce in Pima County because  the county’s major city, Tucson, is not located directly on the border with Mexico.
To describe steps that agencies have taken to address spillover crime,  we reviewed agency protocols and contingency plans, such as the DHS  Operations Plan for Southwest Border Violence, from and conducted  interviews with federal, state, and local agencies and task forces  identified above. Additional details on our scope and methodology are  contained in appendix II.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 through  February 2013, in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Federal Border Security and Counternarcotics Efforts
paragraphs: The federal government has taken a number of steps to combat threats  posed by drug cartels, including potential crime and violence directed  against U.S. citizens and government interests. For example, in 2008, the  U.S. government began a program—known as the Mérida Initiative—to  provide Mexico and the countries of Central America with financial and  technical assistance for counterdrug efforts, among others. In March  2009, as a response to the violence in Mexico, DHS announced a new  southwest border initiative to guard against violent crime spillover into the  United States by increasing the deployment of personnel and technology  along the southwest border. In addition, in June 2009, the Office of  National Drug Control Policy issued the National Southwest Border  Counternarcotics Strategy with the goal to substantially reduce the flow of  illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across  the southwest border.disrupting and dismantling drug-trafficking organizations along the   To accomplish this goal, the strategy listed  southwest border as one of its key objectives. In August 2010, President  Barack Obama signed an emergency supplemental appropriation for  border security, which included $600 million in supplemental funds for  enhanced border protection and law enforcement activities. The  President also separately authorized the temporary deployment of up to  an additional 1,200 National Guard troops to the border to assist law  enforcement agencies in their efforts to target illicit networks’ trafficking in  people, drugs, illegal weapons, and money, and the violence associated  with these illegal activities. Moreover, in May 2011, DHS Secretary  Napolitano stated that CBP, in partnership with independent third-party  stakeholders, had begun the process of developing an index to  comprehensively and systematically measure security along the  southwest border and quality of life in the region. As we reported in May  2012, this index—the Border Condition Index—is being developed, and  accordingly, it is too early to determine how it will be used to provide  oversight of border security efforts.
section_title: Federal, State, and Local Responsibilities
paragraphs: At the federal level, five agencies in two departments are responsible for  securing the border and combating drug cartel–related activities along the  southwest border. These agencies enforce federal laws related to, among  other things, immigration, drugs, weapons, and organized crime.  Additionally, they collect data related to their criminal investigations and  operations to support prosecutions. Specifically, they track violations of  federal criminal statutes relevant to their responsibilities, including the  number of pending and closed cases, arrests, convictions, indictments,  seizures, and forfeitures. Table 1 presents information on these law  enforcement agencies and their responsibilities.
In addition to enforcing laws, a number of agencies have intelligence  components and oversee interagency task forces responsible for  collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information related to threats  from the drug cartels. These components include DHS’s Office of  Intelligence and Analysis and intelligence offices within CBP and U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), as well as DOJ’s DEA, and  the FBI. These entities produce various intelligence products, such as  threat assessments, related to Mexican drug cartel-related activities in  support of law enforcement operations. Also, the Office of National Drug  Control Policy, in the Executive Office of the President, is responsible for  coordinating the national drug control effort, and designates areas within  the United Sates that are significant centers of illegal drug production,  manufacturing, importation, or distribution as High Intensity Drug  Trafficking Areas. Law enforcement agencies in these designated areas  collect and share intelligence and coordinate interagency task forces to  target drug-trafficking operations.
At the state and local levels, sheriffs’ offices and municipal police  departments are responsible for investigating and tracking crime  occurring in their jurisdictions, based on the laws of their respective  states. If the investigation determines that the criminal violation falls under  federal purview, such as an immigration violation, the local law  enforcement agency may refer the case to the appropriate federal agency  and might not track such cases in its records. The Departments of Public  Safety in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, and the state Department of  Justice in California, are responsible for overseeing the process for  collecting, validating, and publishing crime data from local agencies.  These agencies voluntarily submit crime data to the FBI, which is  responsible for publishing and archiving national crime statistics.
section_title: The UCR Program
paragraphs: The FBI oversees the UCR Program, the federal government’s  centralized repository for crime data. The UCR Program provides a  nationwide view of crime, and is based on the voluntary submission of a  variety of statistics by city, county, and state law enforcement agencies.  Begun in 1930, the UCR Program established a system to collect  summary data, known as SRS data, and now contains 8 types of violent  and property crimes, referred to as Part I offenses, that are reported to  law enforcement agencies. Violent crimes are composed of murder and  nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated  assault. Property crimes are composed of burglary, larceny-theft, motor  vehicle theft, and arson. If multiple offenses are reported for an individual  crime incident, only the highest-level offense is recorded. Offense data  submitted to the FBI by local law enforcement agencies show the  aggregate counts for reported crimes and arrests for the 8 Part I offenses  and aggregate counts on arrests made for 21 other offenses, such as  embezzlement, prostitution, and drug abuse violations. These UCR data  can be used to measure fluctuations in the type and volume of crime for  specific offenses in a particular jurisdiction for which they have been  collected.
The FBI reported that 18,233 law enforcement agencies in the United  States, representing 97.8 percent of the U.S. population, submitted UCR  data in 2011. As of November 2012, law enforcement agencies in 46  states and the District of Columbia were submitting UCR data through a  state UCR Program, or a district system in the case of the District of  Columbia. In the remaining 4 states, local law enforcement agencies  submit UCR data directly to the FBI. State programs are to conform to  national UCR Program standards, definitions, and quality control  procedures in order for their data to be submitted to the FBI. The FBI is to  help state UCR Programs meet these requirements by, among other  actions, reviewing and editing data submitted by individual agencies and  providing technical assistance on reporting procedures.
To meet the needs of the law enforcement community for more detailed  crime data, the FBI introduced NIBRS in 1988 with the intent that local  law enforcement agencies will transition from the SRS to NIBRS at their  own pace. NIBRS collects data on more types of offenses than the  traditional SRS and includes details on individual incidents, such as  information on offenders, victims, property, and whether multiple offenses  are reported in an individual crime incident. NIBRS collects offense and  arrest data on 46 specific crimes grouped in 22 offense categories, which  include 8 Part I offenses and other offenses, such as extortion and  kidnapping. In addition, NIBRS collects arrest data for 10 other crimes,  such as trespassing and driving under the influence. The data can be  used to examine linkages among offenses, offenders, victims, property,  and arrestees. Tables that list offenses collected for the UCR SRS and  the NIBRS programs and summarize the main differences between the  two crime data systems can be found in appendix III.
NIBRS allows local law enforcement agencies to report a wider range of  offenses and arrests. However, the FBI reported that, as of 2011, 7,819  law enforcement agencies, representing 28 percent of the U.S.  population, contributed NIBRS data to the UCR Program. According to  senior FBI officials, because of the voluntary nature of the UCR Program,  implementation of the NIBRS occurs at the pace commensurate with the  resources, abilities, and limitations of the contributing law enforcement  agency. Since participation in the program is limited, the FBI converts  NIBRS data submitted by law enforcement agencies to the format for the  SRS data system.
section_title: Best Available Data Cannot Be Used to Make Insights about Spillover Crime but Show a General Decline in Reported Crime Rates in Counties with Sufficiently Complete Data along the Southwest Border
paragraphs: UCR SRS data provide the best available information on crime levels and  crime trends in southwest border counties. Our interviews with officials  from 33 of the 36 local law enforcement agencies in the southwest border  counties determined that SRS data are the only crime data that those  agencies collect in a systematic way—that is, in an automated form that  can be readily retrieved and analyzed. Our analysis determined that the  remaining 3 local law enforcement agencies also systematically collect  SRS data, but we do not know if they also systematically collect other  crime data because these agencies were not available to participate in  our interviews. The sheriff’s office in Yuma County, Arizona, is the only  southwest border law enforcement agency that collects NIBRS data.
The UCR data cannot be used to draw conclusions about the extent to  which crimes are attributable to spillover from Mexico. The SRS does not  collect data on all types of crimes committed in the United States that  have been associated with Mexican drug-trafficking organizations, such  as particular types of kidnappings or home invasions. Further, the SRS  does not collect enough information, such as a motivation for committing  a crime, to identify a link between violent or property crime rates and  crimes associated with spillover from Mexico, such as drug trafficking.  Because of its summary nature, the SRS does not provide data about  individual crime incidents, including details on offenses, arrests,  victim/offender relationships, or whether multiple offenses occurred in an  individual crime incident. In addition, UCR data might also underreport the  actual amount of crime that has occurred, since not all crimes are  reported to law enforcement. For example, law enforcement officials with  whom we spoke stated that individuals who may have been assaulted or  robbed in the course of drug trafficking and other illicit activities are  hesitant to report their involvement to the police. Moreover, senior FBI  officials stated that NIBRS data, although more comprehensive than SRS  data, also might not include sufficient detail to provide information on  spillover crime even if they were more widely available.
Cognizant of these limitations, we analyzed SRS crime data to calculate  violent and property crime rates for both border and nonborder counties in  the four southwest border states: Arizona, California, New Mexico, and  Texas. Our analyses of SRS data for border and nonborder counties  showed that in all four states, both violent and property crime rates per  100,000 population were generally lower in 2011 than in 2004. Figure 1  shows the changes in crime rates from 2004 through 2011 for southwest  border and nonborder counties. (Detailed data for fig.1 can be found in  app. IV.)
Mouse over the state or county names to find out more information about border crime statistics.
With respect to violent crimes, as shown in figure 1,
The violent crime rate was lower in border counties than nonborder  counties for three of the four southwest border states. Comparing all  border counties combined with all nonborder counties combined  within each state, the violent crime rate in California and Texas border  counties was lower than in nonborder counties each year from 2004  through 2011, and lower in New Mexico border counties each year  from 2005 through 2011. In contrast, the violent crime rate in Arizona  border counties was higher than in nonborder counties from 2004 to  2011.
The violent crime rate declined over time in both border and  nonborder counties across all southwest border states. Comparing  2011 with 2004, the violent crime rate in border counties in 2011 was  lower by 33 percent in Arizona, 26 percent in California, and 30  percent in Texas. In nonborder counties, the decrease was 22  percent, 25 percent, and 24 percent, respectively. The violent crime  rate in border counties in New Mexico was lower by 8 percent in 2011  than in 2005, and in nonborder counties the decrease was 19 percent.
With two exceptions, the violent crime rate was lower over time in  large border counties across the southwest border states. The violent  crime rate in 2011 was lower than in 2004 in 10 of 12 large border  counties in Arizona, California, and Texas with sufficiently complete  data for analysis. The violent crime rate in Dona Ana County, New  Mexico, was lower in 2011 than in 2005. Additionally, across all 7  small border counties with sufficiently complete data for analysis, the  total number of violent crimes for these counties in 2011 was also  lower than in 2004.
With respect to property crimes, as shown in figure 1,
The property crime rate in border counties was either lower or similar  to the rate in nonborder counties in three of the four southwest border  states. Comparing all border counties combined with all nonborder  counties combined within each state, the property crime rate in  California border counties was lower than the rate in nonborder  counties each year from 2009 through 2011. Each year from 2004  through 2008, the crime rate in California border and nonborder  counties was similar. The rate in Texas border counties was similar to  the rate in nonborder counties each year from 2004 through 2011.  The rate in New Mexico border counties was lower than in nonborder  counties in all years, 2005 through 2011.
The property crime rate declined over time in both border and  nonborder counties in three of the four southwest border states.  Comparing 2011 with 2004, the property crime rate in border counties  in 2011 was lower by 35 percent in California and 28 percent in  Texas. In nonborder counties, the decrease was 23 percent and 22  percent, respectively. The property crime rate in border counties in  New Mexico was lower by 7 percent in 2011 than in 2005, and in  nonborder counties the decrease was 18 percent.
The property crime rate was lower over time in large border counties  across the southwest border states. The property crime rate in 2011  was lower than in 2004 in all 11 large border counties in Arizona,  California, and Texas with sufficiently complete data for analysis. The  property crime rate in Dona Ana County, New Mexico, was lower in  2011 than in 2005. Additionally, across all 7 small border counties  with sufficiently complete data for analysis, the total number of  property crimes for these counties in 2011 was also lower than in  2004.
Comparing UCR SRS and NIBRS data for the Yuma County sheriff’s  office, we found comparable decreases in violent crimes. Specifically, we  found that the total number of violent crimes reported through NIBRS was  32 percent lower in 2010 than in 2007, when the office began reporting  NIBRS data. The number of violent crimes reported in the SRS format  was 33 percent lower in 2010 than in 2007. (Additional detail on our  analysis results is presented in app. V.) Local law enforcement officials  with whom we spoke provided a range of factors that they thought  contributed to declining violent and property crime rates, including  increased law enforcement presence, either federal, local or a  combination of both, and new infrastructure, such as a border fence.
section_title: Few Law Enforcement Agencies Track Spillover Crime along the Southwest Border
subsections: section_title: Federal Law Enforcement Agencies
paragraphs: Federal law enforcement agencies have few efforts under way to track  what might be considered to be spillover crime, including violence, for  several reasons. First, while several federal components established a  definition of spillover crime, there is no common government definition of  such crime. For example, in 2009, the DEA reported that U.S. intelligence  and law enforcement agencies agreed to define spillover violence as  deliberate, planned attacks by drug cartels on U.S. assets, including  people and institutions. This definition does not include trafficker-on- trafficker violence. On the other hand, according to officials from DHS’s  Office of Intelligence and Analysis, also in 2009, in partnership with other  intelligence agencies, DHS developed definitions of spillover violence that  include violence in the United States directed by Mexican drug cartels  and violence committed by cartel members or their associates against  each other. Second, DHS and DOJ components, including those that  have a formal definition of spillover crime, either do not collect data for the  purposes of tracking spillover crime, or do not maintain such data in an  automated format that can be readily retrieved and analyzed. However,  officials from Arizona and Rio Grande Valley Border Enforcement  Security Task Forcesmultiagency teams led by DHS’s ICE to combat  cross-border criminal activitystated that while data are not tracked  systematically, teams maintain information on violent activities related to  drug and human smuggling they identify during the course of their  investigations. Teams use this information, which includes home  invasions, assaults on individuals during illegal border crossings, and  robberies of drug traffickers, to inform their assessments of violent trends  along the U.S.-Mexico border. In addition, the Executive Committee for  Southwest Border Intelligence and Information Sharing, cochaired by the  DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis and Texas Department of Public  Safety, has been working since April 2012 to propose new terms and  definitions for various facets of border-related crime and violence and  identify new metrics and indicators to measure such crime. The  committee plans to complete this effort in March 2013.
CBP reported that while it does not specifically define spillover crime, it  does collect and maintain automated, retrievable data on assaults against  Border Patrol agents and officers at ports of entry. CBP recognizes that  these data do not directly measure the extent of spillover crime but may  serve as an indirect indicator of such crime. With respect to Border Patrol  agents, CBP maintains data on physical assaults, assaults with a vehicle,  assaults with weapons, assaults with rocks, and assaults with instruments  other than rocks. CBP data show that the total number of assaults against  Border Patrol agents in southwest border sectors in fiscal year 2012 (549)  was about 25 percent lower than in fiscal year 2006 (729). Generally,  assaults increased from 2006 (729) through 2008 (1,085), decreased  slightly from 2008 (1,085) through 2010 (1,049), and decreased sharply  from 2010 (1,049) through 2012 (549). (See fig 2.)
In each fiscal year from 2006 through 2011, there were more rockings— defined as thrown rocks, for example by drug or human smugglers, at  Border Patrol agents with the intent of threatening or inflicting physical  harm—than all other assaults combined in Border Patrol sectors along  the southwest border. In 2012, when the number of rockings was at a 7- year low, there were 51 fewer rockings than all other assaults. While the  total number of assaults for all sectors combined in 2012 is smaller than  in 2006, certain southwest border sectors show an increase in the  number of all assaults other than rockings in 2012 from 2006. For  example, the Tucson sector experienced 91 such assaults in 2012  compared with 76 in 2006, and the Rio Grande Valley sector experienced  77 such assaults compared with 41 in 2006. (Additional analysis of  assault trends for fiscal years 2006 through 2012 by Border Patrol sector  is presented in appendix VI.) CBP officials cited several factors that could  affect a change in the number of assaults against Border Patrol agents,  including changes in the level of illegal activity crossing the border, as  well as changes in Border Patrol presence along the border. Also, CBP  officials reported that from September 2004 through November 2012, 3  out of 22 Border Patrol agent deaths on the southwest border had a  nexus to cross-border crime, while the remaining deaths mostly resulted  from vehicular accidents or health issues.
With respect to officers at ports of entry, CBP maintains data on physical  assaults, assaults with a vehicle, and assaults with a weapon. For the 2  fiscal years that CBP has reliable data, the data show that assaults  against officers at southwest border ports of entry declined from 37  assaults in fiscal year 2011 to 26 assaults in fiscal year 2012.
In addition, the FBI reported that its Latin American Southwest Border  Threat Section—created to focus on issues specifically related to drug  cartels—began in fiscal year 2010 to classify incidents of violent crime  with links to Mexico, including kidnappings of American citizens and non- terrorism-related hostage taking occurring in or having a substantial  nexus to Mexico or Central and South America. According to the FBI,  under the new classifications, from October 2009 through September  2012, it investigated and closed five cases involving kidnappings of  American citizens and five cases involving non-terrorism-related hostage  taking. None of these cases occurred in the United States. FBI officials  cautioned that drug cartel related crimes, such as kidnappings and home  invasions, are highly underreported and are not captured in national crime  statistics.
section_title: State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies
paragraphs: Only 1 of the 37 state and local law enforcement agencies that we  interviewedthe Texas Department of Public Safetystated that it tracks  spillover crime. There are several reasons spillover crime is not more  widely measured and tracked across these agencies. First, there is no  common definition of spillover crime shared by the border law  enforcement communities, and our interviews with border sheriffs and  police officials indicated that their opinions on what types of incidents  constitute spillover crime vary. For example, the Texas Border Sheriff’s  Coalition defined spillover crime as any action on one side of the border  that is the result of violence or the threat of violence that causes a  reaction on the other side of the border, such as a law enforcement  response, or an economic or social impact. The Luna County, New  Mexico, sheriff’s office defined spillover crime as occurring when a person  is injured by any means by an act along the border that has a direct  nexus to Mexican drug-trafficking organizations. The Cochise County,  Arizona, sheriff’s office defined spillover crime as any crime associated  with cross-border trafficking. Officials from 27 out of 37 state and local law  enforcement agencies stated that it would be at least somewhat useful to  have a common definition of spillover crime, because it would establish  types of activities that constitute spillover crime and allow agencies to  track such crime, among other uses. However, officials from 22 of those  27 agencies also stated that accomplishing such a task might be  challenging. The reasons cited included differences of opinion among  border counties about what incidents represent spillover crime and  differences in the missions and priorities of federal, state, and local law  enforcement agencies. As discussed previously in this report, the Texas  Department of Public Safety and the DHS Office of Intelligence and  Analysis are leading an effort by select state and local law enforcement  agencies to propose new terms and definitions and identify metrics for  various facets of border-related crime and violence by March 2013.
Second, no state or local law enforcement agency we interviewed in our  review systematically collects data on what might be considered to be  spillover crime in a way that can be used to analyze trends. Officials from  the Texas Department of Public Safety, the single agency that said it  tracks spillover crime, stated that the department collects data on crimes  it considers to be related to spillover, such as murders, kidnappings, and  shootings related to activities of the Mexican drug cartels. The  department manages six intelligence centers along the border that,  according to officials, rely on a variety of sources, including incident  reports from sheriffs’ offices, news reports, and intelligence information  from interagency task forces, to assess which incidents can be clearly  linked to Mexico and determined to be spillover crime. However, officials  stated that spillover incidents reported by the department cannot be used  to analyze trends over time because they are not collected systematically  and may be incomplete. For example, the incident reports can vary by  sheriff’s office in terms of what is reported and how incidents are  characterized. For example, we found in our interviews with Texas border  sheriffs’ offices that each office may have different ways of capturing  information on incidents and may consider different incidents to be related  to spillover crime.
While the Texas Department of Public safety is the only state or local law  enforcement agency we interviewed that reported collecting data  specifically on spillover crime, 6 out of 37 law enforcement agencies we  spoke with stated that they collect information on cross-border and drug- related activities, which could be elements of spillover crime. Specifically,
Officials from 3 sheriffs’ offices in Arizona and Texas and 1 police  department in California stated their agencies collect information on  incidents that involve aliens without lawful immigration status to track  cross-border activity. However, the officials noted that the data are too  general to determine whether a specific crime incident is attributable  to spillover from Mexico.
Officials from the Laredo, Texas, Police Department stated that since  2003, the department has tracked incidents of drug smuggling, human  smuggling, and the types of weapons seized. According to officials,  while the data contribute to intelligence necessary to determine  whether a crime is cartel-related, the data do not contain sufficient  detail to determine whether a specific crime incident is attributable to  spillover from Mexico.
Officials from the San Diego office of the California Highway Patrol  stated that in 2012 their field office began tracking how often they  respond to calls from CBP’s Office of Field Operations to investigate  incidents at the port of entry. However, the officials noted that the data  could not be a measure for spillover crime because the incident may  not always result in a crime or an arrest and may not be related to  cartel activity or involve Mexican nationals.
Officials from 27 out of 37 state and local law enforcement agencies  stated that it would be at least somewhat useful to collect spillover crime  data. Some of the reasons given were that the data would enhance  intelligence, identify trends, and assist the agencies in making decisions  about deploying resources. In addition, some officials said that data on  spillover crime could help agencies apply for grants. However, the  majority also expressed concerns about the burden of collecting  additional information. Specifically, officials from 22 out of 37 state and  local agencies stated that they have limited technological, financial, and  human resources to collect additional data.
section_title: Law Enforcement Agencies Have Varying Concerns about Potential Effects of Violent Crime in Mexico on Border Communities
subsections: section_title: Federal Concerns
paragraphs: Officials from all of the DHS and DOJ components we interviewed stated  that while they do not believe that spillover violence has been a significant  problem, they expressed concerns about the potential for it to occur in the  future because drug cartels employ increasingly violent methods to  interact with rivals and law enforcement agencies in Mexico. Threat  assessments conducted by DHS and DOJ during fiscal years 2006  through 2012 do not indicate that violence from Mexico spilled over the  southwest border. For example, the assessments indicate that violent  infighting among rival Mexican cartels has remained largely in Mexico,  and crimes such as kidnappings and home invasion robberies directed  against drug traffickers have remained largely isolated instances in U.S.  border communities. However, DHS threat assessments have reported  that the threat facing U.S. law enforcement personnel from drug- trafficking organizations has been increasing, as evidenced by more  aggressive tactics used by drug-trafficking organizations and smugglers  to confront or evade law enforcement. Examples of such tactics include  ramming or impeding police vehicles, fleeing at high speeds, and carrying  weapons.
section_title: State and Local Concerns
paragraphs: Officials from 37 state and local law enforcement agencies and four  Chambers of Commerce we interviewed expressed varying concerns  regarding the extent to which violent crime from Mexico spills into and  potentially affects their border communities. Officials in 31 of the 37 state  and local law enforcement agencies stated that they have not observed  violent crime from Mexico regularly spilling into their counties;  nonetheless, officials from 33 of the 37 agencies said they are at least  somewhat concerned about the potential for spillover crime to occur.  Officials noted that there is always potential for the high levels of violence  in Mexico, such as organized murders and kidnappings for ransom, to  spread to their border towns. A senior DEA official in the El Paso, Texas,  region testified in March 2009 that the southwest border is the principal  arrival zone for most illicit drugs smuggled into the United States and is  also the predominant staging area for the drugs’ distribution throughout  the country.
Further, state and local law enforcement officials expressed concerns  about safety threats to law enforcement officers and residents who might  encounter drug and human smugglers transiting through border  communities, and according to some officials, smugglers are increasingly  aggressive in evading capture and likely to be armed. For example, a  New Mexico sheriff stated that while there have not been any serious  injuries, drug smugglers ram police vehicles to stop a pursuit or speed  through residential neighborhoods to avoid capture. In addition, armed  cartel members on the Mexican border sometimes engage in gunfights  with rival smugglers returning from the United States. According to the  sheriff, such activities could result in vehicular accidents or shootings at  U.S. law enforcement officers. An Arizona sheriff stated that most of the  violence the office sees involves trafficker-on-trafficker violence. For  example, a crew of smugglers might steal drug or human cargo from  other smugglers to sell it themselves. In addition to the potential for  violence during the event, there is also a potential for violence because of  retaliation for the stolen goods. Officials in a California police department  stated that auto thefts have increased, and officials believe that an  increasing proportion of these thefts are related to cartel activity as cars  are stolen to transport drug loads to the final destination after being  transported over the border. Examples of some crimes that local officials  attributed to spillover from Mexico include the following:
A border sheriff in Arizona stated that a rancher was most likely  murdered in 2010 by a smuggler.
Officials in a Texas police department stated that they investigated a  murder in 2010 that they attributed to spillover crime. Investigators in  the case determined that the victim was a cartel member and the  perpetrator was from a rival cartel in Mexico and had crossed the  border to assassinate the rival cartel member.
Officials in a California police department stated that a vehicle in  Mexico was engaged in a gunfight with the Mexican police and the  vehicle crossed the border into the United States.
A sheriff in a border county in Texas stated that the property crime  rates in his county had increased in 2008 because over a series of  months, a group of smugglers from Mexico were burglarizing houses  on their way back to Mexico. They were eventually arrested and  prosecuted.
According to state and local law enforcement officials, many crimes  associated with drug-trafficking threats are unreported, since in many  instances, both the perpetrators and the victims may be involved in  criminal activity, and the victim may not be in this country legally. Further,  the sheriff of a rural county in Texas stated that while statistics indicate  that there is little crime in his county, it may be because there are very  few law enforcement officials or residents to confront or resist smugglers  moving through the county, not because criminal activity is not  occurring. Similarly, a sheriff from another rural county in Texas stated  that he believes that an enhanced law enforcement presence in the Rio  Grande Valley may force illicit activity toward his county because it is less  populated than other counties and smugglers are less likely to be  confronted there. Moreover, according to some local law enforcement  officials, the levels of violent crime in Mexico can have effects on the  border communities that are not captured in the crime statistics. The 2011  Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center threat assessment stated  that the southwest border violence, such as kidnappings and home  invasions carried out by Mexican criminal organizations, and gang-related  violence, present the most substantial threat to public safety in Arizona.
While 33 of 37 law enforcement agencies expressed some concern about  spillover crime, officials from 11 of the 37 agencies stated that they do not  treat spillover crime differently than they would any other crime. In  addition, an Arizona sheriff and a police official from the same county  stated that they are not more concerned about spillover crime because  their county has not experienced any incidents of kidnappings or  extortion, which could be indicators that crime has spilled over from  Mexico.
In addition to concerns about crime and violence potentially spilling over  from Mexico, local law enforcement officials provided a number of  examples of how the violence in Mexico affects local communities:
U.S. citizens that cross the border daily, such as for school or  employment are vulnerable to extortion or recruitment by cartels. For  example, police officials in a California border city stated that cartel  members in Mexico have come into the United States to recruit gang  members, and a sheriff in a county in New Mexico stated that in his  county, 400 or more U.S. citizens live in Mexico but attend school in  the United States. The students may be recruited or coerced to  smuggle drugs into the United States on their way to school.
A Texas sheriff stated that a local college was forced to close after  bullets from a gunfight originating in Mexico hit the college dorm  building.
Cartels may target public officials and law enforcement for corruption.  Specifically, we were told of cases from local law enforcement in both  New Mexico and Arizona in which public officials had been corrupted  by a Mexican cartel.
Sheriff and police department officials in counties in Texas, Arizona,  and New Mexico stated that cartel members may reside with their  families in U.S. border communities because they are considered to  be safe havens. An officer in one police department stated a concern  that there is a potential for violent altercations in the United States  between cartel members living in their community that represent rival  Mexican cartels.
In addition, we spoke with Chamber of Commerce officials in one Arizona  and three Texas border counties, and they all stated that they have not  seen spillover violence from Mexico, but that violence in Mexico has  nonetheless negatively affected businesses in their border communities.  Specifically, they said that violence in Mexico has resulted in a perception  that border communities are not safe and this has hindered economic  growth and tourism. For example, an official from a Chamber of  Commerce in one Texas county stated that local universities and  hospitals have difficulty recruiting students and staff. Additionally,  Chamber of Commerce officials in all three Texas counties said that  violence in Mexico and more delays and stricter searches at the border  have impeded Mexican consumers’ ability to more easily cross the border  and purchase goods and services from the local U.S. businesses.
section_title: Law Enforcement Agencies Have Initiatives that Target Border-related Crime, Including a Federal Contingency Plan to Address Violent Crime Spilling Over from Mexico
paragraphs: At the federal level, officials from DOJ and DHS and their components  stated that they have undertaken a number of efforts, both individually  and through interagency partnerships, related to drug smuggling and  cartel activity with a focus on the southwest border; however, all but one  of these efforts do not specifically target spillover crime. For example, the  FBI created a Latin American Southwest Border Threat Section to focus  on issues specifically related to drug cartels. Also, DHS issued Border  Violence Protocols in 2006 that set out the steps that CBP and Mexican  government personnel are to follow when reporting incidents of border  violence, and further updated them in 2011 to enhance coordination  between the U.S. and Mexican agencies. Moreover, interagency task  forces provide a forum for federal, state, and local law enforcement  agencies to, among other things, share information and conduct  coordinated enforcement activities to combat drug smuggling and cartel  activity. Additional details on these and other efforts are contained in  appendix VII.
DHS developed the Operations Plan for Southwest Border Violence in  October 2008 to address the possibility that spillover crime, such as a  significant violent and spontaneous event that results in unintended  cascading effects spilling over the border, may exceed DHS’s assets to  respond in those locations. This contingency plan describes the various  roles and responsibilities that DHS components are to undertake to  coordinate an agency-wide response to a variety of potential threats of  violence that could arise along the southwest border, such as credible  threats against U.S. facilities or personnel. Although the plan is to be  updated annually, senior officials at DHS’s Office of Operations  Coordination and Planningthe office responsible for coordinating and  facilitating development of the plan among the DHS componentsstated  that the plan has not been revised or updated in the 4 years since it was  finalized. According to these officials, DHS components have undertaken related planning efforts, such as establishing local-level  coordination mechanisms to increase coordination and information  sharing along the southwest border. In addition, officials at DHS’s Office  of Operations Coordination and Planning stated that they do not plan to  update the Operations Plan for Southwest Border Violence at this time  because DHS has shifted to a more strategic approach to planning that  will provide the framework for all of DHS’s planning efforts. The officials  could not provide additional details on what the new strategic approach  would entail because it is still in the early stages of development. To  complete its framework, DHS is awaiting approval of planning guidance  that it submitted to the President in June 2012. DHS developed the  planning guidance pursuant to Presidential Policy Directive 8, a directive  that called for DHS to develop an integrated set of guidance, programs,  and processes to enable the nation to meet its national preparedness  goals. DHS’s Office of Operations Coordination and Planning intends to  develop DHS’s strategic framework in accordance with the new planning  guidance and expects to complete the framework by October 2014. The  officials said they will then decide whether to update the Southwest  Border Violence Operations Plan so it follows the new planning guidance  or replace the operations plan with other plans developed under the  strategic framework.
At the state and local levels, officials from all law enforcement agencies  that we spoke with stated that their agencies had undertaken some  efforts, either individually or in partnership with other agencies, to combat  criminal activities often associated with spillover crime, such as drug and  human smuggling. Generally, these efforts aim to increase state and local  law enforcement agencies’ capacity to combat criminal activities  associated with spillover crime, such as forming units that focus on such  crime, participating in federal grant programs, coordinating enforcement  activities, and facilitating information sharing. Specific examples of state  and local law enforcement efforts are contained in appendix VII.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of our report to, DHS, DOJ, and the Office of National  Drug Control Policy for their review and comment. DHS provided written  comments, which are reprinted in full in appendix VIII. In its comments,  DHS stated that it was pleased with our discussion of the initiatives that  law enforcement agencies have undertaken to target border-related  crime, including a DHS contingency plan for responding to a significant  southwest border violence escalation and interagency task forces that  combat drug smuggling and cartel activity. In addition, DHS reiterated its  commitment to working with many partners across the federal  government, public and private sectors, and internationally, to mitigate  spillover crime along the southwest border. DOJ and the Office of  National Drug Control Policy did not provide official written comments. All  three agencies provided technical comments which we have incorporated  where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of National Drug  Control Policy and other interested parties. In addition, the report is  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. Key contributors to this report are acknowledged in  appendix IX.
section_title: Appendix I: Southwest Border Counties by State
paragraphs: There are 24 U.S. counties that share a border with Mexico. These  counties are arranged below by state, in an alphabetical order.
subsections: section_title: Arizona
section_title: California
section_title: New Mexico
section_title: Texas
section_title: Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report addresses the following questions: (1) What information do  reported crime rates in southwest border communities provide on  spillover crime and what do they show? (2) What efforts, if any, have  federal, state, and select local law enforcement agencies made to track  spillover crime along the southwest border? (3) What concerns, if any, do  these agencies have about spillover crime? (4) What steps, if any, have  these agencies taken to address spillover crime?
To address the first question, we analyzed Summary Reporting System  (SRS) data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform  Crime Reporting (UCR) Program—the government’s centralized  repository for crime data—from January 2004 through December 2011 for  the four southwest border states (Arizona, California, New Mexico, and  Texas). We selected January 2004 as the initial date because it provided  us with data for more than 2 years prior to December 2006, when  Mexican President Felipe Calderón took office and began a major military  offensive against Mexican drug cartels. We also analyzed UCR’s National  Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) data, available from January  2007 through December 2010, for the single southwest border law  enforcement agency reporting such data—the sheriff’s office in Yuma  County, Arizona. To assess the reliability of the UCR data, we conducted  analyses to test for irregularities in the data, reviewed FBI documentation  on how the data can and cannot be used and on the FBI’s procedures for  ensuring UCR data quality, and interviewed FBI officials knowledgeable  about the data. On the basis of this assessment, we excluded some  counties from our analysis because they did not report complete crime  data to the FBI. We concluded that the data for the remaining counties  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. In addition, we  reviewed crime reports and documentation on crime databases published  by the FBI, state agencies, and local law enforcement agencies in the  four southwest border states. To further determine the types of data that  are systematically collected, how these data are recorded and used in  southwest border counties, and what information these data provide on  spillover crime, we reviewed guidance documents and research reports  developed by federal agencies, such as the Department of Justice (DOJ)  and Congressional Research Service. Also, we interviewed  knowledgeable officials from a total of 37 state and local agencies on the  southwest border that are responsible for investigating and tracking crime  occurring in their jurisdictions. At the state level, we conducted interviews  with officials from the California Highway Patrol and the Arizona, New  Mexico, and Texas Departments of Public Safety.  At the local level, we  interviewed officials representing 21 of 24 sheriffs’ offices in southwest  border counties (4 in Arizona, 2 in California, 3 in New Mexico, and 12 in  Texas), and 12 large municipal police departments in these border  counties (4 in Arizona, 3 in California, 1 in New Mexico, and 4 in Texas).
We selected departments from each of four states, and we selected large  departments because according to our review of the UCRSRS data, in  general, large departments had more reported crimes than did smaller  departments. A list of the 24 southwest border counties can be found in  appendix I.
Moreover, to obtain information on spillover crime and efforts by law  enforcement agencies along the U.S.-Mexico border to combat such  crime, we conducted site visits to five southwest border counties in  Arizona and Texas. These visits were to (1) Tucson, Pima County,  Arizona; (2) Nogales, Santa Cruz County, Arizona; (3) Brownsville,  Cameron County, Texas; (4) McAllen, Hidalgo County, Texas; and (5)  Laredo, Webb County, Texas. We selected these locations because they  represent diverse rural and urban environments, as well as have a range  of border geographic features, such as rivers, mountains, agricultural  deltas, and deserts that may pose different challenges for crossing the  U.S. border from Mexico. These factors might have an effect on the levels  and types of crime occurring in southwest border communities. As part of  our visits, we met with federal officials, such as U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) agents and officers operating between and at the ports  of entry along the southwest border, state law enforcement officials from  the Arizona Department of Public Safety, and local law enforcement  officials, such as sheriffs in Santa Cruz and Hidalgo Counties and officials  in the Tucson and Nogales Police Departments. The information we  obtained from these visits is not generalizable to all southwest border  counties. However, the information provides valuable insights into the  types of crime information that are available to law enforcement agencies  and perspectives on crime occurring in southwest border communities.
To address the second question, we collected information, such as crime  reports and documentation on categories of data collected, from and  conducted interviews with state and local law enforcement agencies  identified above, as well as federal agencies and interagency task forces  that have responsibilities for combating drug cartel–related activities  along the southwest border. Federal agencies include Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) and DOJ headquarters and field offices,  including DHS’s CBP, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),  Office of Policy, Office of Operations Coordination and Planning, and  intelligence offices, such as the Office of Intelligence and Analysis; as  well as DOJ’s FBI; Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); and Bureau  of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Interagency task forces— that is, partnerships of federal, state, and local law enforcement  counterparts—include Arizona’s High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, El  Paso Intelligence Center, and Border Enforcement Security Task Forces  in Arizona and Texas. State and local agencies include those identified  above, as well as Arizona’s Alliance for Countering Transnational  Threats, the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center, and members  of the Texas Border Sheriff’s Coalition. We asked agencies about their  efforts to track spillover crime, any challenges they encountered in doing  so, and whether they collected or tracked other data they considered  related to spillover crime and violence on the southwest border.  Specifically, we analyzed CBP data on the number of assaults on Border  Patrol agents in southwest border patrol sectors from fiscal years 2006  through 2012, and the number of assaults on Office of Field Operations  personnel at southwest border ports of entry for fiscal years 2011 and  2012, the date ranges for which these data were available. To assess the  reliability of the CBP data on assaults and other crimes against agents  and personnel, we reviewed relevant documentation, such as procedures  for collecting data consistently, and interviewed CBP staff responsible for  the data. On the basis of our efforts, we determined the data to be  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report.
To address the third question, we analyzed threat assessments by federal  agencies, covering the time period from 2004 through 2012, to determine  the extent to which these agencies identified Mexican drug cartel–related  threats facing southwest border communities and law enforcement agents  in those communities. Specifically, we analyzed 4 DHS Office of  Intelligence and Analysis assessments that focused on violence along the  entire southwest border covering the time period from 2006 through 2011.  In addition, we analyzed the total of 12 Border Patrol threat assessments  and Operational Requirements-Based Budgeting Process documents  containing threat information for the Laredo, Tucson, and Rio Grande  Valley sectors: 1 assessment in sample fiscal years 2004, 2007, 2009,  and 2012 per each sector to discern any trends in crime and violence  along the southwest border over time. We selected the three Border  Patrol sectors to correspond to the locations of our site visits. We  selected these particular years because they approximate release dates  of the DHS Intelligence and Analysis assessments to help identify  potential similarities or differences in trends. To obtain additional context  on potential threats facing southwest border communities, we reviewed  several other assessments, such as National Drug Intelligence Center  assessment (2011) and an Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center  assessment (2011), and other documentation, such as congressional  reports and testimonies. To obtain perspectives on a range of concerns  regarding the existence and potential effects of spillover crime, in addition  to interviews with the officials from 37 state and local law enforcement  agencies and federal officials identified above, we interviewed officials  from Chambers of Commerce in four of the five counties we visited— Cameron, Hidalgo, Santa Cruz, and Webb Counties. While the results of  these interviews are not generalizeable to all local businesses or  Chambers of Commerce on the southwest border, they provide  perspectives about the effects that violence in Mexico might have had on  the businesses in their communities.
To address the fourth question, we reviewed and analyzed information,  such as fact sheets and contingency plans, from and conducted  interviews with all of the federal, state, and local agencies and task forces  previously discussed.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 through  February 2013, in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix III: Comparison of UCR SRS with NIBRS
paragraphs: Appendix III provides information about differences between the UCR  SRS and NIBRS. As shown in table 2, the SRS collects aggregate  offense information for Part I offenses, and arrest information for Part I  and Part II offenses. NIBRS collects offense information on each  occurrence of crimes listed under Group A offenses and arrest  information for Group A and Group B offenses.
Table 3 summarizes the main differences between the two crime data  systems.
section_title: Appendix IV: UCR Data Tables for Southwest Border Counties, 2004-2011
subsections: section_title: a. Violent crime rates per 100,000 for all border counties combined by state, 2004-2011 2008 State 2007 2004 2005 2006 Arizona 508.2 641.3 623.4 572.4 490.8
paragraphs: The FBI provided GAO with the 2011 SRS data when it publicly released these data in November  2012. According to the FBI, law enforcement agencies were able to revise these data until the end of  the calendar year 2012.
section_title: b. Violent crime rates per 100,000 for all nonborder counties combined by state, 2004-2011 State 2008 2007 2006 2004 2005 Arizona 435.6 471.7 495.0 469.0 524.4
paragraphs: The FBI provided GAO with the 2011 SRS data when it publicly released these data in November  2012. According to the FBI, law enforcement agencies were able to revise these data until the end of  the calendar year 2012.
section_title: c. Violent crime rates per 100,000 for large counties (population of 25,000 or more) by state, 2004-2011 State County 2004 2007 2005 2006 2008 2009 Arizona
paragraphs: Local law enforcement agencies in the county did not submit complete data to the FBI.
section_title: c. Violent crime rates per 100,000 for large counties (population of 25,000 or more) by state, 2004-2011 State 2007 2005 2009 2006 2004 2008
paragraphs: Local law enforcement agencies in the county did not submit complete data to the FBI.
The FBI provided GAO with the 2011 SRS data when it publicly released these data in November  2012. According to the FBI, law enforcement agencies were able to revise these data until the end of  the calendar year 2012.
section_title: d. Number of reported violent crimes for small counties (population under 25,000) by state, 2004-2011 State 2009 County 2008 2007 2004 2005 2006
paragraphs: Local law enforcement agencies in the county did not submit complete data to the FBI.
Local law enforcement agencies in the county did not submit complete data to the FBI.
section_title: e. Property crime rates per 100,000 for all border counties combined by state, 2004-2011 State 2006 2008 2004 2005 2007 Arizona Local law enforcement agencies did not submit complete data to the FBI.
paragraphs: The FBI provided GAO with the 2011 SRS data when it publicly released these data in November  2012. According to the FBI, law enforcement agencies were able to revise these data until the end of  the calendar year 2012.
section_title: f. Property crime rates per 100,000 for all nonborder counties combined by state, 2004-2011 State 2008 2007 2006 2004 2005 Arizona Not computed because comparable data for border counties not available.
paragraphs: The FBI provided GAO with the 2011 SRS data when it publicly released these data in November  2012. According to the FBI, law enforcement agencies were able to revise these data until the end of  the calendar year 2012.
section_title: g. Property crime rates per 100,000 for large counties (population of 25,000 or more) by state, 2004-2011 State County 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 Arizona
paragraphs: Local law enforcement agencies in the county did not submit complete data to the FBI.
Local law enforcement agencies in the county did not submit complete data to the FBI.
section_title: g. Property crime rates per 100,000 for large counties (population of 25,000 or more) by state, 2004-2011 State 2007 2004 2006 2008 2009 2005 Local law enforcement agencies in the county did not submit complete data to the FBI.
paragraphs: The FBI provided GAO with the 2011 SRS data when it publicly released these data in November  2012. According to the FBI, law enforcement agencies were able to revise these data until the end of  the calendar year 2012.
section_title: h. Number of reported property crimes for small counties (population under 25,000) by state, 2004-2011 State County 2004 2009 2006 2007 2008 2005 New Mexico
paragraphs: Local law enforcement agencies in the county did not submit complete data to the FBI.
Local law enforcement agencies in the county did not submit complete data to the FBI.
section_title: Appendix V: Results from Analyzing UCR SRS and NIBRS Crime Data
paragraphs: We analyzed UCR SRS crime data in the four southwest border states:  Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas. This appendix presents the  results of our analyses of SRS crime data broken out by violent and  property crimes for southwest border counties, separately and combined  within each state, for the period 2004 through 2011. We also present the  results of analyses of violent and property crime data for nonborder  counties, combined within each state, and compare the nonborder county  crime rates per 100,000 population with border county crime rates. We  also analyzed available NIBRS data, covering the period 2007 through  2010, for the Yuma County, Arizona, sheriff’s office. The office is the  single southwest border law enforcement agency that collects NIBRS  data.
subsections: section_title: Violent Crime along the Southwest Border Reported through the UCR SRS
paragraphs: All border and nonborder counties. We analyzed SRS violent crime  data for all 4 border counties in Arizona, both border counties in  California, all 3 border counties in New Mexico, and all 15 border counties  in Texas. We also analyzed these data for all 11 nonborder counties in  Arizona, all 56 nonborder counties in California, 29 of 30 nonborder  counties in New Mexico, and all 239 nonborder counties in Texas. The  violent crime rate for the New Mexico border counties was lower in 2011  than in 2005, but the rate in New Mexico’s border counties decreased  less than in its nonborder counties. For the border counties in each of  the other states, we found that the violent crime rate was lower in 2011  than in 2004, and the rate in the border counties decreased more than in  the nonborder counties. Specifically, as shown in figure 3,
The violent crime rate in Arizona’s border counties was higher than in  Arizona’s nonborder counties in each year from 2004 through 2011.
However, the crime rate decreased in both, with the rate in border  counties being 33 percent lower in 2011 than 2004, and the rate in  nonborder counties being 22 percent lower.
The violent crime rate in California’s border counties was lower than in  California’s nonborder counties in each year from 2004 through 2011.  For border counties, the rate was 26 percent lower in 2011 than in  2004. The violent crime rate in California’s nonborder counties  generally decreased and was 25 percent lower in 2011 than in 2004.
The violent crime rate in New Mexico’s border counties was lower  than in New Mexico’s nonborder counties in each year from 2005  through 2011. The decrease in crime rate in border counties (8  percent) was smaller than the decrease in nonborder counties (19  percent).
The violent crime rate in Texas’s border counties was lower than in  Texas’s nonborder counties in each year from 2004 to 2011. For  border counties, the rate was 30 percent lower in 2011 than in 2004,  while the rate for nonborder counties was 24 percent lower.
Large border counties. We analyzed SRS violent crime data for all 13  large southwest border counties—that is, counties with populations of  25,000 or more—that submitted sufficiently complete data to the FBI to  enable us to calculate the violent crime rate.
Of these, in 10 of the 12 large border Arizona, California, and Texas  counties, the rate was lower in 2011 than in 2004. In 2 large border  counties in Texas, the violent crime rate increased (see fig. 1).  Specifically, (1) in Maverick County, Texas, the violent crime rate  increased by 6 percent; and (2) in Val Verde County, Texas, the violent  crime rate increased by 41 percent, largely because of an increase in  aggravated assaults. Although lower in 2011 than in 2004, the violent  crime rate in Cochise County, Arizona, increased 20 percent from 2010 to  2011, principally because of an increase in aggravated assaults. The  violent crime rate in Dona Ana County, New Mexico, was lower in 2011  than in 2005. However, the rate increased 5 percent between 2010 and  2011, largely because of increases in robberies and aggravated assaults.  Comparing UCR SRS and NIBRS data for the Yuma County sheriff’s  office—the single southwest border law enforcement agency that reports  NIBRS data—we found comparable decreases in violent crimes.  Specifically, we found that the total number of violent crimes reported  through NIBRS was 32 percent lower in 2010 than in 2007, when the  office began reporting NIBRS data. The number of violent crimes reported  in the SRS format was 33 percent lower in 2010 than in 2007. Overall, the  total number of violent crime offenses reported by the Yuma County  sheriff’s office through NIBRS was about 1 percent higher than those  reported through the SRS.
Small border counties. The southwest border has 9 small counties— that is, counties with populations of less than 25,000. The average  combined population of these 9 counties from 2004 through 2011 was  about 46,000. Our analysis of SRS violent crime data for 7 of the 9  counties with sufficiently complete data shows that the total number of  reported violent crimes in these small counties decreased by 55 percent,  that is, from a total of 93 violent crimes in 2004 to 42 in 2011 (see fig. 4).
All border and nonborder counties. We analyzed SRS property crime  data for both border counties in California, all 3 border counties in New  Mexico, and all 15 border counties in Texas. We also analyzed the data  for the nonborder counties in California, New Mexico, and Texas. For the  border counties in California and Texas, we found that the reported  property crime rate in 2011 was lower than in 2004, and the rate in the  border counties decreased more than in the nonborder counties. The rate  for New Mexico border counties was lower in 2011 than in 2005, but the  rate in New Mexico’s border counties decreased less than in its  nonborder counties. Specifically, as shown in figure 5,
Each year from 2009 through 2011, the property crime rate in  California’s border counties was lower than the rate in California’s  nonborder counties; and each year from 2004 to 2008, the rate in  border and nonborder counties was similar. For border counties, the  rate was 35 percent lower in 2011 than in 2004. The property crime  rate in California’s nonborder counties decreased each year and was  23 percent lower in 2011 than in 2004.
The property crime rate in New Mexico’s border counties was lower  than in New Mexico’s nonborder counties in each year from 2005 to  2011. The decrease in crime rate in border counties (7 percent) was  smaller than the decrease in nonborder counties (18 percent).
The property crime rate in Texas’s border counties was similar to the  rate in nonborder counties in nearly all years. However, the crime rate  decreased in both, with the rate in border counties being 28 percent  lower in 2011 than 2004, and the rate in nonborder counties being 22  percent lower.
Large border counties. We analyzed SRS property crime data for the 12  large southwest border counties that submitted sufficiently complete data  to the FBI to enable us to calculate the reported property crime rate. Of  these, in all 11 large border counties in Arizona, California, and Texas,  the SRS data showed that the crime rate was lower in 2011 than in 2004,  although there was variability in the rate in some counties, such as  Cochise County, Arizona, and Val Verde County, Texas, over the years  (see fig. 1). The reported property crime rate in Dona Ana County, New  Mexico, was lower in 2011 than in 2005. Comparing UCR SRS and  NIBRS data for the Yuma County sheriff’s office, we found that both  showed a decrease in property crimes. Specifically, the total number of  property crimes reported through NIBRS was 27 percent lower in 2010  than in 2007, when the office began reporting NIBRS data. The number of  property crimes reported in the SRS format was 33 percent lower in 2010  than in 2007. Overall, the total number of property crime offenses  reported through NIBRS was about 24 percent higher than those reported  through in the SRS format.
Small border counties. Our analysis of SRS data for 7 of 9 counties with  sufficiently complete data shows that the total number of reported  property crimes in these small counties decreased by about 29 percent,  that is, from a total of 701 crimes in 2004 to 497 in 2011 (see fig. 6).
We excluded Hidalgo County, New Mexico, and Presidio County, Texas, because SRS  property crime data local law enforcement agencies submitted to the FBI were incomplete.
The average combined total population for the 7 counties from 2004 through 2011 was about 36,000.
section_title: Appendix VI: Assaults against Border Patrol Agents by Border Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 2006-2012
paragraphs: Analysis of assault trends for fiscal years 2006 through 2012 by Border  Patrol sector is presented in figure 7 and source data for the analysis are  presented in table 4.
Move mouse over the sector name to learn more about the sector.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Patrol has divided geographic responsibility for border  security operations along the southwest border among nine sectors, each of which has a  headquarters with management personnel.
section_title: Appendix VII: Select Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Efforts along the Southwest Border
paragraphs: Select efforts by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to  address crime along the southwest border are presented in tables 5 and  6.
section_title: Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff  Acknowledgments Error! No text of specified style in document.
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Rebecca Gambler, Director;  Cindy Ayers, Assistant Director; Evi Rezmovic, Assistant Director; David  Alexander; Hiwotte Amare; Eric Hauswirth; Margaret McKenna; Erin  O’Brien; Yanina G. Samuels; and Julia Vieweg made significant  contributions to the work.