Transportation Security: Action Needed to Strengthen TSA's Security Threat Assessment Process
Published: 2013-07-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: TSA implements programs that, for example, ensure individuals with unescorted access to secure areas of the nation's critical transportation infrastructure do not pose a security threat. Key to these programs are security threat assessments that screen individuals for links to terrorism, criminal history, and immigration status. TSA's Adjudication Center serves as the primary operational component in this process. GAO was asked to examine the performance and staffing strategy of the center. This report addresses the extent to which 1) TSA has measured performance for the center and what the data show; 2) TSA offices have coordinated to meet security threat assessment workload; and 3) TSA addressed potential risks posed by using a mix of government employees and contractors to adjudicate security threat assessments. GAO analyzed TSA data describing the center's performance since October 2010; reviewed documentation, including staffing plans; and interviewed TSA officials about data measurement and staffing practices.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Adjudication Center performance data show mixed results, and the center's performance measurement practices have limitations. The Adjudication Center relies on contractors to adjudicate security threat assessments and uses three primary measures to evaluate their performance--timeliness for completing adjudication, adjudication accuracy, and caseload status. GAO found that the Adjudication Center contractor met its timeliness and accuracy measures, but faced challenges in meeting its caseload measure. The Adjudication Center's timeliness and accuracy measures did not capture key data. According to TSA officials, the Adjudication Center's accuracy rate is based on a review of all cases where adjudicators had disqualified an applicant. However, this calculation generally does not include the accuracy rate for those applicants adjudicators had approved--which account for roughly 90 percent of the Adjudication Center's caseload. In this way, the accuracy rate provides a limited assessment of adjudicator performance. By developing an accuracy rate that includes data on both incorrectly disqualified and incorrectly approved applicants, TSA can better identify and addresses performance issues among its workforce.
Two TSA offices that share responsibility for implementing security threat assessments--the Program Management Division in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the Adjudication Center in the Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service--can improve coordination on workforce planning. While the offices share information on workload completion, they do not have a process in place to ensure that information in the Adjudication Center's staffing plan--which the Adjudication Center periodically updates to reflect caseload projections and associated staffing needs--reflects the mutual understanding of both offices. For example, program managers in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis reported to GAO that they were unfamiliar with the staffing plan and they disagreed with workload projections in the plan. Establishing a mechanism for the offices to share and reconcile information in the plan can help better support the Adjudication Center's workforce planning.
TSA has been delayed in addressing risks posed by using contractors to adjudicate security threat assessments. In October 2011 TSA's Balanced Workforce Strategy Working Group completed its assessment for the Adjudication Center and determined that an excessive risk exists by allowing contractors to make security threat assessment approvals without sufficient federal oversight. The Working Group recommended that TSA convert to an all government workforce. According to a May 2012 implementation plan, TSA planned to convert this workforce by the end of calendar year 2013. However, delays have rendered the timelines and cost information in its plan outdated and TSA has not updated the plan or determined a revised implementation schedule. Completing this review and updating the plan would help TSA and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) decision makers by providing a roadmap for moving forward. Finally, providing this plan to DHS for review will be important to help ensure TSA can begin its conversion and mitigate identified risks of using contract adjudicators to conduct security threat assessments.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that TSA, among other things: direct the Adjudication Center to calculate an accuracy rate that includes adjudicator performance for cases where applicants were both approved and disqualified; share adjudicator staffing plans among key program offices; and update its Adjudication Center workforce conversion plan and provide it to DHS for review and approval. DHS concurred with our recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Securing the nation’s transportation systems and facilities requires  balancing security to address potential threats while facilitating the  legitimate flow of people and goods that are critical to the U.S. economy  and international commerce. Within the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for  managing vetting and credentialing programs to ensure that individuals  that transport hazardous materials or have unescorted access to secure  or restricted areas of transportation facilities at maritime ports and TSA- regulated airports do not pose a security threat. Key to these programs  are background checks—known as security threat assessments—which  are TSA reviews of applicant information and searches of government  databases to determine whether the applicant has known ties to terrorism  and whether the applicant may be otherwise precluded from obtaining an  endorsement, credential, access and/or privilege (hereafter called a  credential) based on, among other factors, their immigration status and  criminal history.
Multiple TSA offices coordinate in implementing security threat  assessments, with TSA’s Adjudication Center serving as the primary  operational component by reviewing derogatory applicant background  information to determine if applicants are eligible to obtain credentials for  12 TSA programs, including the Transportation Worker Identification  Credential (TWIC) program for maritime workers, Hazardous Materials  Endorsement (HME) program for commercially licensed drivers, and the  Aviation Worker program. These efforts are intended to reduce the  probability of a successful terrorist or other criminal attack on the nation’s  transportation systems, which include approximately 360 seaports and  450 TSA-regulated airports.
As we have previously reported, TSA’s Adjudication Center has faced  recurring challenges in meeting its security threat assessment  performance requirements and has attributed these challenges in part to  its reliance on a contractor workforce. For example, in December 2011,  we reported that insufficient federal staffing had hampered the  Adjudication Center’s ability to meet its workload requirements and  ensure necessary oversight of the credential decision-making process. In  particular, TSA attributed Adjudication Center backlogs to turnover among  its contractor workforce. At the time, TSA reported that it had initiated but  not yet completed an assessment through the DHS Balanced Workforce  Strategy (BWS) to determine if (1) the Adjudication Center’s reliance on  a largely contractor workforce to conduct security threat assessment  adjudication was appropriate, or if the work is an inherently governmental  function requiring a government workforce and (2) if there would be a  cost savings resulting from conversion of the contract positions to  government personnel positions. According to the Federal Acquisition  Regulation, inherently governmental functions include activities that  require either the exercise of discretion in applying government authority,  or value judgments in making decisions for the government, and therefore  should be performed by government employees, not contractors. Further,  federal procurement policy explains that a function is not appropriately  performed by a contractor where the contractor’s involvement is or would  be so extensive, or the contractor’s work product so close to a final  agency product, as to effectively preempt the federal officials’ decision- making process, discretion or authority. Thus, determining whether TSA  is using an appropriate Adjudication Center workforce, and addressing  the potential risks associated with its use of contractors, is important for  TSA to ensure it effectively implements security threat assessments.
You requested that we review the performance and staffing capacity of  the Adjudication Center. This report addresses the following questions:
To what extent has TSA measured performance for the Adjudication  Center, and what do these data show?
To what extent have TSA offices coordinated to ensure that the  Adjudication Center effectively meets an evolving security threat  assessment workload?
To what extent has TSA addressed potential risks posed by using a  mix of government employees and contractors to adjudicate security  threat assessments?
To determine the extent to which TSA has measured performance for the  Adjudication Center, and what these data show, we focused our review  on Adjudication Center performance in processing cases for the TWIC,  HME, and Aviation Worker programs. We selected and obtained  Adjudication Center performance in processing cases for these three  programs because TSA reported these programs accounted for  approximately 95 percent of its security threat assessment caseload.  Therefore, we considered Adjudication Center performance in processing  the caseload for these three programs to generally reflect the  performance of the Adjudication Center as a whole. We analyzed  pertinent laws and regulations related to TSA’s security threat  assessments and program requirements for the TWIC, HME, and Aviation  Worker programs, including provisions enacted through the Uniting and  Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to  Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, the  Aviation and Transportation Security Act, and the Maritime  Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002. We also reviewed TSA  program documentation that included performance standards and  requirements for the Adjudication Center and its contractor, such as  Standard Operating Procedures for Case Management and contract  documentation which included performance standards and requirements  for the Adjudication Center and its contractor, such as the Adjudication  Center’s Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan and Evaluation and  Performance Reports. Through our review, we determined TSA used  three key performance metrics to measure the performance of the  Adjudication Center in processing security threat assessments: (1)  timeliness for completing initial adjudication of a case, (2) caseload size,  and (3) adjudication accuracy. We obtained and analyzed performance  data for these programs and measures for the period of October 2010  through January 2013 because this time period covers the operations of  the Adjudication Center’s current contractor. We assessed the reliability  of these data by reviewing TSA’s data management practices and  questioning knowledgeable officials about the data and the systems that  produced the data. On the basis of our assessments, we determined that  some of the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report,  but that other data were not. In particular, we found that TSA’s Aviation  Worker caseload size data had been unreliable since April 2012—so as  we describe later in this report, we did not include data after that time in  our analysis. We evaluated Adjudication Center performance  measurement practices against criteria outlined in Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government. Finally, we interviewed officials from  various TSA offices with responsibilities for implementing aspects of  security threat assessments or measuring performance of the  Adjudication Center. These included officials from the Office of Law  Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (OLE/FAMS) Adjudication  Center and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA), including the (1)  Technology Infrastructure Modernization (TIM) program, (2) Program  Management Division which is responsible for managing TSA’s maritime,  surface, and aviation credentialing programs, which include the TWIC,  HME, and Aviation Worker programs, and (3) Office of Technology, which  is responsible for managing TSA’s case management systems. In  addition, we interviewed officials with the American Association of Airport  Executives, to obtain information about their role as a vendor in TSA’s  Designated Aviation Channeler program, which TSA uses to transmit  Aviation Worker case information with TSA-regulated airport authorities.
To determine the extent to which TSA offices have coordinated to ensure  that the Adjudication Center meets evolving security threat assessment  workload demand, we reviewed and compared staffing related  information in TSA documents, including the Adjudication Center’s  October 2012 staffing plan which details staffing levels and workload  projections for current and future year needs, as well as Adjudication  Center workload and performance reports and project management  reports. We interviewed TSA officials, including OIA officials responsible  for implementing maritime, surface, and aviation security programs and,  OLE/FAMS Adjudication Center officials responsible for workforce  planning and operations at the Adjudication Center. We evaluated TSA’s  reported collaboration practices in relation to those identified in Standards  for Internal Controls in the Federal Government and the Government  Performance and Results Act, as amended.
To determine the extent to which TSA has addressed potential risks  posed by using a mix of government employees and contractors to  adjudicate security threat assessments, we reviewed DHS and TSA  documents detailing the results of the Adjudication Center BWS  assessment, including DHS and TSA plans and memorandums for  addressing risks identified in the BWS Assessment. We analyzed DHS  BWS guidance detailing the roles and responsibilities of the DHS BWS  Program Management Office (BW PMO) and department components for  implementing the BWS, and compared TSA actions against this  guidance. We also interviewed DHS and TSA officials responsible for  implementing the BWS, including officials from the DHS Office of the  Chief Human Capital Officer, and the Executive Director and staff of the  DHS BWPMO, which is responsible for developing, implementing, and  overseeing department implementation of the BWS. We also interviewed  TSA officials responsible for implementing the BWS for the Adjudication  Center, including officials from the Office of Acquisition, which serves as  the lead for the effort, the Office of Human Capital, the Office of the Chief  Counsel, and from OLE/FAMS, the Business Management Office and the  Adjudication Center.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to July 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: TSA Security Threat Assessments and Responsible Offices
paragraphs: TSA is responsible for administering background checks—known as  security threat assessments—for maritime, surface, and aviation  transportation security programs that have vetted approximately 15  million applicants since 2003, according to TSA officials. Security threat  assessments are designed to ensure that only eligible individuals are  granted TSA-related credentials, such as a TWIC. Specifically, security  threat assessments focus on identifying threats posed by individuals  seeking to obtain an endorsement, credential, access, and/or privilege  for, among other purposes, unescorted access to secure or restricted  areas of transportation facilities at maritime ports and TSA-regulated  airports, and for commercial drivers transporting hazardous materials.  Implementing these programs is a shared responsibility among multiple  TSA offices, including the OIA Program Management Division which  manages the programs, and the Adjudication Center within OLE/FAMS,  which serves as the primary operational component for conducting  security threat assessments for 12 of TSA’s 17 aviation, maritime, and  surface transportation credentialing programs—with the TWIC, HME and  Aviation Worker programs accounting for a reported 95 percent of the  Adjudication Center’s workload. (See appendix I for a TSA organization  chart showing TSA offices responsible for implementing transportation  security threat assessment programs.)
The security threat assessment process includes reviewing information to  determine if applicants are disqualified to possess a credential based on  criminal offenses, immigration status, or a link to terrorism. The security  threat assessment involves two key components:
Automated watchlist and related vetting: The initial automated  vetting process is conducted to determine whether any derogatory  information is associated with the name and fingerprints submitted by  an applicant during the enrollment process. Among the checks  conducted by TSA, one is against criminal history records maintained  by or available through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  These records contain information from federal, state and local  sources in the FBI’s National Crime Information Center database and  the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification  System/Interstate Identification Index, which maintain criminal records  and related fingerprint submissions. A check is also conducted  against the Terrorist Screening Database, which is the federal  government’s consolidated terrorist watchlist and from which the  Selectee and No-Fly lists, among others, are compiled. To  determine an applicant’s immigration/citizenship status, applicant  information is checked against the Systematic Alien Verification for  Entitlements system. If the applicant is a U.S.-born citizen with no  related derogatory information, the system can approve the  individual’s application for a credential with no further review of the  applicant or human intervention.
Adjudication Center review: A manual, second level review is  conducted as part of an individual’s security threat assessment if (1)  the automated vetting uncovers any derogatory information, such as a  criminal offense or (2) the applicant has identified himself or herself  to be a non-U.S.-born citizen or national. As such, not all applicants  will be subjected to a second-level review. The Adjudication Center  plays an integral role in the security threat assessment process by  adjudicating cases for which an initial automated check finds potential  links to criminal history or immigration eligibility issues. Adjudication  Center staff review the program applicant’s enrollment file to  determine if derogatory or other information may be potentially  disqualifying. The applicant’s files are processed from credentialing  program enrollment centers through two-web enabled case  management systems, called the Screening Gateway and  Consolidated Screening Gateway. Adjudication Center staff use the  Screening Gateways as their tool for gathering, viewing, and  synthesizing the information needed to conduct security threat  assessments.
Since its establishment in 2005, the Adjudication Center has relied  primarily upon contractor staff to complete its security threat assessment  workload, and a smaller number of federal government staff to conduct  oversight and other functions. Contractor staff performs initial  adjudication of cases, and may either approve applications if they  determine an applicant is eligible to obtain a credential or refer the  application to a federal (that is, TSA) adjudicator for further review if they  determine the applicant to be ineligible. Federal staff review cases of  potential ineligibility, issue Preliminary Determination of Ineligibility letters  to applicants, and conduct redress actions, among other things. As of  May 2013, TSA reported that about two-thirds (37 of 55) of Adjudication  Center staff were contractors.
Figure 1 shows the TSA credentialing process for the TWIC, HME, and  Aviation Worker programs from enrollment through credential issuance,  and the functions of the Adjudication Center’s TSA and contract staff in  the security threat assessment process.
Federal agencies face a complicated set of decisions in finding the right  mix of government and contractor personnel to conduct their missions.  While contractors, when properly used, can play an important role in  helping agencies accomplish their missions, our prior work has shown  that agencies face challenges with increased reliance on contractors to  perform core agency missions. Consistent with Office of Management  and Budget procurement policy, agencies should provide a greater  degree of scrutiny when contracting for professional and management  support, program evaluation, and other services that can affect the  government’s decision-making authority—functions that may be  considered as being closely associated with inherently governmental  functions. Contractors can provide services that closely support  inherently governmental functions, but agencies must provide greater  scrutiny and enhanced management oversight to ensure that the  contractors’ work does not limit the authority, accountability, and  responsibilities of government employees.
The DHS BWS refers to the department’s effort to identify the appropriate  balance of federal and contractor employees required to support critical  agency functions. Consistent with our recommendations and in  accordance with the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 DHS adopted  the BWS in August 2010 to undertake risk analyses that are to enable the  department to achieve the appropriate mix of Federal employees and  contractors to accomplish its mission while minimizing mission risk that  may result from an over-reliance on contractors. DHS uses an  automated tool to help components—such as TSA—perform the  necessary analysis to categorize work as appropriate for use of a  contractor, inherently governmental, or closely associated with an  inherently governmental function. The assessment tool is intended to  facilitate an assessment of mission risk, level of contractor oversight  needed, risk mitigation strategies, and cost analysis. Based on  component responses, the tool is to provide a recommended sourcing  decision on whether the work is appropriate for federal or contractor  performance, or both. For example, should the BWS assessment find that  a function is inherently governmental, the component would recommend  the function be insourced to government employees, whereas a  determination that the function was closely associated with an inherently  governmental function would require the agency to either insource the  function (also known as federalizing), or strengthen oversight of the  contractor workforce.
section_title: Adjudication Center Contractor Related Performance Challenges
paragraphs: In December 2011, we reported that the Adjudication Center had faced  recurring challenges in meeting its security threat assessment workload  requirements and largely attributed these challenges to its reliance on a  contractor workforce. Specifically, the Adjudication Center had  experienced recurring backlogs in completing its caseload, and  Adjudication Center officials attributed these backlogs to staffing  limitations caused by contractor turnover. Officials at the time reported  that the challenge was that the Adjudication Center had used three  different contractors since establishing the Adjudication Center in 2005,  and on each occasion the contract adjudicator turnover had led to  backlogs as adjudicators were hired and trained. TSA reported that it did  not consider the risks of acquiring contractor support services to provide  adjudication services before awarding its first contract in 2005. Rather,  TSA reported that it chose to use contract adjudicators when the  Adjudication Center was created because, at the time, it considered them  to be the most readily available workforce and effective way to augment  federal staff with skilled resources. TSA reported that the agency had  initiated an assessment in March 2011 through the DHS BWS process to  determine whether the adjudication functions were appropriate to be  performed by a contractor workforce, whether the work was inherently  governmental and whether there would be cost savings resulting from  conversion of the contract positions to government positions. We  recommended TSA develop a workforce staffing plan with timelines  articulating how the Adjudication Center will effectively and efficiently  meet its current and emerging workload requirements, and incorporate  the results of TSA’s study examining the appropriateness and costs and  benefits of using contractors. TSA concurred with our recommendation  and reported that it had begun taking steps to implement it.
section_title: Adjudication Center Performance Data Show Mixed Results, Accuracy Measures Are Limited, and Performance Measurement Practices Are Not Fully Documented
paragraphs: TSA has evaluated the Adjudication Center largely based on contractor  performance in meeting established metrics and data shows mixed  performance since 2011; however the Adjudication Center’s performance  measures and practices are limited. We found that the Adjudication  Center contractor met two of its three performance measures—for  timeliness and accuracy—but did not do so for its caseload size  measure. Further, these measures and practices were limited. For  example, the Adjudication center’s methodology for calculating contractor  adjudicator accuracy was limited because it did not include key  information. Moreover, the Adjudication Center has not documented key  elements of its performance measurement practices.
subsections: section_title: Two Performance Measures Showed Mixed Results
paragraphs: TSA has used performance data for three primary metrics to measure the  performance of the Adjudication Center in conducting security threat  assessments for the TWIC, HME, and Aviation Worker programs. The  three metrics are timeliness for completing initial adjudication, caseload  size, and adjudication accuracy. According to TSA Adjudication Center  officials, these performance measures were established to evaluate the  performance-based contract for adjudication services at the Adjudication  Center.
Timeliness. The Adjudication Center contractor met timeliness standards  for completing initial adjudication of its TWIC, HME, and Aviation Worker  caseloads (see figure 1 for a description of this process). TSA requires  that its contract adjudicator workforce complete initial adjudication of 95  percent of cases within 7 calendar days of the case entering TSA’s  Screening Gateway case management systems for TWIC, HME, and  Aviation Worker cases. According to TSA data, from August 2011 to  January 2013, the adjudicator workforce met this standard for TWIC,  HME, and Aviation Worker cases.
While the Adjudication Center’s timeliness measure shows the  Adjudication Center’s contractor met TSA’s standard for completing initial  adjudication, the measure does not show the extent to which the agency  has communicated its adjudication decision to the applicant in a timely  manner—key statutory and TSA policy requirements for its credentialing  programs—and TSA officials reported they did not maintain such  documentation. For example, as specified in statute, TSA shall review an  initial TWIC application and provide a response to the applicant, as  appropriate, within 30 days of receiving the initial application. Moreover,  officials with the OIA Program Management Division and Adjudication  Center reported that TSA had established internal requirements for the  agency to meet 30 day and 14 day applicant response times for HME and  Aviation Worker applicants. Officials from the OIA Program Management  Division reported tracking this measure through weekly Adjudication  Center performance reports and identifying and addressing those cases  that do not meet applicant response time standards. However, officials  reported that they did not maintain documentation showing the extent to  which TSA had responded to applicants within their applicant response  timeframe requirements. Officials reported that maintaining such  performance data would be of use, but noted it was rare that they did not  meet their initial adjudication standards and respond to applicants on or  within established applicant response time requirements. Officials noted  that functional limitations in TSA’s Screening Gateway reporting system  limits their ability to efficiently run reports showing the extent to which  TSA responds to applicants within required timeframes. A senior OIA  Program Management Division official reported it was her understanding  that the division would have to obtain the capability to automatically run  applicant response time reports from TSA’s Technology Infrastructure  Modernization program, known as TIM. However, we reviewed TIM  program documentation and did not find this data management capability  requirement in TIM planning documents. We raised this issue with TSA  TIM program officials, and in response to our inquiry, in May 2013, the  TIM program added documentation of this requirement to its plans and  reported that the capability would be available to the Adjudication Center  beginning in March 2014 for TWIC program cases, and by 2016 for  surface and aviation program cases.
Caseload size. The Adjudication Center generally did not meet its  contract caseload performance standards and experienced backlogs for  its TWIC and HME program caseloads the majority of the time between  October 2010 and January 2013. According to TSA contractor evaluation  and performance reports, the Adjudication Center requires its contract  workforce to maintain a total number of new TWIC, HME, and Aviation  Workers cases at or below 1,500 cases—and Adjudication Center  officials told us that a caseload above this threshold was considered a  backlog. Adjudication Center data we reviewed for the period of October  2010 through January 2013 showed that the Adjudication Center had a  backlog of HME cases approximately 60 percent of the time and TWIC  cases approximately 61 percent of the time. In addition, the Adjudication  Center had a backlog of Aviation Worker cases approximately 15 percent  of the time from October 2010 through March 2012. Moreover, many of  these backlogs were far higher than the Adjudication Center’s 1,500  caseload standard. For example, the Adjudication Center had a backlog  of more than 4,000 HME cases roughly 16 percent of the time (20 of 122  weeks) during this period. Figure 2 shows Adjudication Center caseload  levels for TWIC, HME, and Aviation Worker cases from October 2010  through January 2013.
According to Adjudication Center officials and TSA documentation we  reviewed, technical issues and a lack of sufficiently trained contract  adjudicators contributed to the workload backlogs at the Adjudication  Center. First, the Adjudication Center operations manager reported that  technical problems with its case reporting systems had contributed to  both challenges in assessing workload backlogs and, in some cases,  growth in the backlog itself. For example, the Screening Gateway  systems, which the Adjudication Center relies on for processing applicant  cases and communicating results to TSA enrollment centers, has  experienced periodic technical errors that have delayed the Adjudication  Center’s ability to process new cases. According to TSA evaluation and  performance reports we reviewed, between February 2012 and August  2012, TSA was unable to evaluate contractor performance in meeting its  workload on several occasions, including approximately 3 months,  because of technical problems with its case management systems.  Adjudication Center officials reported that TSA’s Office of Technology  was pursuing a solution to the technical errors with a solution expected by  May 2012; however, as of May 2013 this had not been corrected. They  also reported that TSA plans to replace this system with a more functional  system through its TIM program, but as noted earlier, according to TSA’s  schedule for the program and TSA officials, this system is not scheduled  to be fully operational until 2016. In addition, since April 2012 TSA has  experienced technical problems related to the Designated Aviation  Channeler program that TSA uses to process Aviation Worker program  cases into the Screening Gateway systems. According to TSA officials,  technical problems with one of its vendors were delaying processing of  cases and returning previously adjudicated cases into the Adjudication  Center’s new caseload queue and not distinguishing between the two  sets of cases. This was delaying processing time and Adjudication Center  management was unable to determine the true extent of its new  caseload. TSA officials responsible for managing the Designated Aviation  Channeler program reported that they had been in discussions with the  vendor since April 2012 to address the technical processing issues, and  as of May 2013, the vendor was in the process of implementing corrective  actions.
Another factor contributing to growth in the workload backlog according to  TSA Adjudication Center management officials and a contractor  performance report we reviewed has been the lack of trained adjudicators  provided by the contractor. According to a senior Adjudication Center  official, the contractor lacked a sufficient number of staff who had been  certified as self approvers, and this had required the Center’s limited  federal staff to assume additional responsibilities and reduced the  Center’s progress in meeting its caseload. Adjudication Center officials  reported that they were working with the contractor to address this issue.  We discuss the Adjudication Center’s contractor-related staffing issues,  and actions to address them, in more detail later in this report.
section_title: The Adjudication Center’s Contractor Met TSA’s Accuracy Rate, but the Rate Does not Include Key Information
paragraphs: For its third key performance measure, TSA requires its contract  adjudicators to maintain an average accuracy rate of at least 95 percent.  According to Adjudication Center data, from August 2011 to December  2012, the Adjudication Center’s contract workforce met TSA’s accuracy  standard for the TWIC, HME, and Aviation Worker programs. However,  the accuracy rate is not a complete representation of Adjudicator contract  accuracy because it does not include evaluation of a key population of  cases. According to Adjudication Center officials, the Adjudication  Center’s average accuracy rate is generally based on error rates  identified from a daily review of all cases where adjudicators found an  applicant was disqualified, but reviewers found an applicant should not  have been (i.e., incorrectly disqualified). However, according to officials,  this calculation generally does not include those cases where  adjudicators had approved applicants, but reviewers found they should  have been disqualified (i.e., incorrectly approved). For example,  according to our analysis of TSA data, approvals comprised over 90  percent of the Adjudication Center’s TWIC and HME caseload from  August 2011 to January 2013—and TSA reviewed roughly 7 percent of  these approvals. In this way, the average accuracy rate TSA uses to  evaluate the performance of its contractor is incomplete and limited  because it does not include the extent contract adjudicators incorrectly  approved applicants.
The Adjudication Center official responsible for reporting the accuracy  rate told us that the accuracy rate of the contract workforce includes only  those cases that were incorrectly found to have disqualifying factors  because that is how the contract evaluation standards were established.  The official noted that the Adjudication Center processes included a  review of all trainee adjudicators approved cases and a separate quality  assurance review process to spot check approved cases to identify  errors among all adjudicators who are certified to approve cases without  further review. However, the official reported that these performance  measurement practices were not documented and that a lack of staffing  capacity had limited the extent to which the Adjudication Center  conducted the quality assurance spot checks—with the Center meeting  only about two-thirds of its 10 percent goal for the number of cases  selected for spot checking. Nonetheless, the results of this quality  assurance review are not factored into the rate TSA uses to measure  contractor accuracy performance and award funds to its contractor.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government specifies the  need to comprehensively identify risks and consider all significant  interactions. Once risks have been identified, they should be analyzed for  possible effect. Moreover, internal control and all transactions and other  significant events need to be clearly documented, and the documentation  should be readily available for review. The overall accuracy rate  calculated by the Adjudication Center is generally limited to incorrectly  disqualified cases and does not include incorrectly approved cases. In  this way, TSA does not have a representative assessment of the  Adjudication Center’s average accuracy rate. If error rates for approved  cases were included in its evaluation, the Adjudication Center’s reported  average accuracy rate may ultimately be higher or lower than it has  reported—but it will remain unclear until the Adjudication Center captures  this information in its accuracy rate. Determining the performance of the  workforce in adjudicating security threat assessments for this population  is important for overseeing adjudicator performance and identifying cases  where the Adjudication Center is incorrectly approving applicants. By  developing and documenting an accuracy rate measure that includes  data on both types of incorrectly adjudicated cases (approved and  disqualified), the Adjudication Center can determine an accuracy rate that  comprehensively captures accuracy performance and enables  Adjudication Center management to more effectively identify and address  performance issues among its workforce.
section_title: The Adjudication Center’s Manual Performance Management Process is not Documented
paragraphs: Since beginning operations in 2005, Adjudication Center management  officials told us that they have used a complex, manual process to track  the performance data of its contract adjudicator workforce. In particular,  because of functional limitations of TSA’s Screening Gateway systems,  officials reported that the Adjudication Center lacks an automated process  for tracking adjudicator performance of the estimated 7,500 to 10,000  security threat assessment cases that adjudicators process each week.  As a result, Adjudication Center management has used a cumbersome,  manual process to track case production and performance of its contract  adjudicator workforce. For example, each week, one adjudication center  official is responsible for reviewing contractor reported caseload  information, compiling spreadsheets summarizing contractor  performance, verifying and reconciling the information with the contractor,  and preparing weekly summary reports for distribution to TSA  credentialing program stakeholders. Adjudication Center management  told us that it has used these reports to measure Adjudication Center  performance and support oversight of its contract adjudicator workforce.
The manual process exists because, according to Adjudication Center  officials, TSA’s Screening Gateway case management systems were not  designed to meet the functional requirements of the Adjudication Center  for tracking contractor operational performance, and TSA has been  unsuccessful to date in developing a technical solution to do so. TSA  officials recognized that the system did not meet the needs of the  Adjudication Center and reported that the agency’s TIM program would  replace the Screening Gateway systems and enable the adjudication  center to automate its case tracking and performance requirements.  However, as noted earlier, TSA officials reported that this new system is  not scheduled to be fully operational until 2016.
In the meantime, however, Adjudication Center management officials  reported that they had not documented the manual process currently in  use. Adjudication Center management officials told us that they had  placed some information on an internal web sharing system in the past,  but that this information was neither thorough nor updated to reflect the  case management reporting system that the Adjudication Center has  used since 2010—when TSA began its most recent contract for  Adjudication Center staff. According to Adjudication Center officials, time  constraints in meeting the Adjudication Center’s workload of security  threat assessments had been a factor that had prevented the Operations  Manager from updating or developing new documentation of the  procedures in recent years. Further, given the complexity of the process  and that two officials were familiar it, a senior Adjudication Center  management official said that documenting this process would be of value  should the two officials be unavailable.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government specifies the  need for appropriate documentation of transactions and internal control.
Internal control and all transactions and other significant events need to  be clearly documented, and the documentation should be readily  available for review. The documentation should be included in  directives, policies, or manuals to help ensure operations are carried out  as intended. Documenting the Adjudication Center’s case reporting  performance measurement practices is important to allow someone  unfamiliar with this process to assume responsibilities in the event of  attrition by the Adjudication Center managers. This is particularly  important considering the complexity of the Adjudication Center’s case  performance reporting process and TSA’s need to ensure effective  performance and operational continuity in its security threat assessments.
section_title: TSA Offices Can Strengthen Coordination to Ensure Effective Adjudication Center Workload Planning
paragraphs: Implementing credentialing-related programs is a shared responsibility  between the Program Management Division in TSA’s OIA and the  Adjudication Center in OLE/FAMS. Officials from these offices reported  taking various actions to ensure its offices coordinate information related  to security threat assessment adjudication workload planning and  performance. These include:  Sharing weekly Adjudication Center performance reports: These  reports include information for the TWIC, Aviation Worker, and HME  programs such as the number of cases the Adjudication Center receives  for each of these programs during the prior week, the number of cases  ready for adjudication, and the number of applicants who have sought  redress based on initial determinations of ineligibility. The three program  managers for TSA’s maritime, aviation, and surface credentialing  programs reported that they rely on these reports to ensure the program  offices are meeting workload demands for the various credentialing  programs TSA supported, and to identify and develop strategies to  address performance challenges.
Convening monthly program management review meetings: These  meetings are used to share information relating to changes that may  impact the Adjudication Center’s workload. As part of these meetings,  the Adjudication Center contractor provides a monthly report which  provides details pertaining to contractor staffing levels and changes,  training status, contractor accuracy rates, and challenges in need of  resolution.
Developing spend plans: Adjudication Center and the OIA Program  Management Division officials meet to develop a spend plan to support  the credentialing programs’ annual budgets and discuss population  projections for the programs that would affect Adjudication Center  workload. For example, the Aviation Worker program manager reported  that the workload had increased by about 5 percent annually, and that  this information was used to inform the Adjudication Center’s spend plan.
Notwithstanding these actions, opportunities exist for the Adjudication  Center and OIA Program Division to strengthen their coordination. While  officials with the two offices coordinate on a routine basis to share  information on workload completion, they do not have a process in place  to ensure that information in the Adjudication Center’s staffing plan—such  as caseload projections and associated staffing needs—reflects the  mutual understanding of both Adjudication Center and credentialing  program management officials. For instance, Adjudication Center  management officials have periodically updated a staffing plan that they  use to guide Adjudication Center workforce planning. However, an  Adjudication Center program management official reported that while the  staffing plan had been shared with credentialing program managers in the  past, it had not been shared in recent years. He reported that a prior plan  had been shared with the OIA Program Management Division to  communicate staffing needs, and said that sharing the updated versions  of the staffing plan with the Program Management Division may be  valuable for guiding decisions on workforce planning.
OIA Program Management Division officials reported that they were  unfamiliar with the Adjudication Center’s staffing plan and questioned  workload projections in the Adjudication center’s current staffing plan. For  example, the current Adjudication Center staffing plan cites an anticipated  regulation that will address the security threat assessment process and  that according to the plan would double the Adjudication Center’s security  threat assessment workload from 500,000 to 1 million per year by the end  of fiscal year 2014, and triple the workload by the end of fiscal year  2015. In October 2012, we shared this staffing plan with the OIA  Program Management Division Manager responsible for Aviation  programs and that official questioned the accuracy of the aviation worker  workload increase projections in the staffing plan. The official said that  TSA had yet to issue this regulation and that the timeline for doing so  would take longer than officials had initially planned. Thus, the projected  workload increases in the Adjudication Center’s staffing plan would not be  realized, and the plan would need to be revised. However, as of March  2013, the Adjudication Center’s staffing plan had not been updated.
According to key collaboration practices that we have identified, federal  agencies engaged in collaborative efforts need to create the means to  monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas for  improvement. Reporting on these activities can help key decision  makers within the agencies, as well as clients and stakeholders, obtain  feedback for improving both policy and operational effectiveness. Such  reporting mechanisms can then be used to modify plans. Moreover, a  focus on results, as envisioned by the Government Performance and  Results Act, as amended, implies that federal programs contributing to  the same or similar results should collaborate to ensure that goals are  consistent and, as appropriate, program efforts are mutually reinforcing.
In this way, ensuring these components have access to respective  workforce planning documents by establishing a mechanism for OIA  Program Management Division and Adjudication Center officials to share  and reconcile information included in the Adjudication Center’s staffing  plan updates, such as timelines for anticipated workload growth, will help  ensure TSA is using accurate workload projections to guide the  Adjudication Center’s workforce planning.
section_title: TSA Has Made Limited Progress in Addressing Risks Posed by Using Contract Employees to Adjudicate Security Threat Assessments
subsections: section_title: TSA Assessment Identified Risks in the Adjudication Center’s Use of Contractors
paragraphs: Between January 2011 and September 2011, TSA conducted and  completed its DHS required BWS assessment for the Adjudication Center  contract and determined that the adjudicator position represented work  that is “closely associated with inherently governmental functions” and  that an excessive risk exists by allowing contractors to make security  credential approvals without sufficient federal oversight. According to the  assessment, the adjudicator functions performed by the contractor are  critical to TSA’s accomplishment of the security threat assessment  process to ensure terrorist and other security threats are identified and  prevented from gaining credentialed access to critical U.S. transportation  system infrastructure. The assessment found that TSA was reliant upon  contractors for making decisions regarding criminal history and  immigration status for a majority of applicants and if contractors were to  continue performing the adjudicator function, the government would need  to provide continuous and substantive oversight of them to ensure  successful performance. However, the assessment found that the  Adjudication Center did not have an effective oversight process in place  to do so—noting that the federal government staffing at the Adjudication  Center is not sufficient to adequately oversee contractor case processing  for quality control, as contract staff have independent decision making  ability on the majority of cases. Further, the assessment noted that the  Adjudication Center’s use of a mixed contractor and government  workforce was inefficient. For example, according to the assessment, for  every contractor work hour, a federal government employee must check  that work and this had led federal government staff to work more than  2,500 overtime and compensation hours over the preceding year—an  inefficient and duplicative process that would not be necessary if the  workforce were all federal government officers.
In light of these factors, in October 2011, TSA’s BWS Departmental  Working Group determined that the adjudicator function was closely  associated with inherently governmental functions and recommended  TSA end the Adjudication Center’s reliance on a contract workforce and  convert to an all federal employee workforce. The working group  reported that doing so was designed to improve the Adjudication Center’s  security threat assessment processing by having a better oversight  process, streamlining overall operations, reducing training requirements,  and better managing resources.
section_title: TSA Has Been Delayed in Implementing Workforce Conversion
paragraphs: TSA has been delayed in implementing the proposed workforce  conversion at the Adjudication Center. According to TSA’s May 2012  Adjudication Center conversion plan, TSA offices were to take several  actions before the Adjudication Center may begin implementing its  conversion plan and hiring a new federal employee workforce; however,  these steps have generally not been implemented. For instance, as of  May 2013, responsible stakeholders in TSA’s BWS effort, including the  Office of Human Capital and OLE/FAMS, reportedly had not approved the  plan—necessary steps before the plan can proceed to TSA leadership,  and ultimately, DHS for review. According to the conversion plan, TSA  proposed to convert to a government adjudicator workforce by hiring TSA  employees during fiscal years 2013 and 2014—with the hiring to be  completed by the end of calendar year 2013. However, as of May 2013,  TSA had not begun hiring its new federal workforce and TSA officials  reported that the agency had not determined new timelines to do so.
TSA officials attributed the agency’s delays in implementing the  Adjudication Center conversion plan to its prioritization on implementing  agency reorganization efforts. According to a senior TSA official,  implementing the BWS assessment was delayed because TSA was  undergoing a large reorganization and agency resources were prioritized  to that effort. With this reorganization completed in January 2013, the  official reported that implementing the conversion plan would become a  greater priority.
section_title: TSA Has Not Updated and Approved the Conversion Plan and Key Plan Elements are Unclear
paragraphs: TSA’s delay in acting on the recommendations of Adjudication Center  conversion has rendered the implementation timelines and key hiring  level and cost information in its May 2012 conversion plan outdated or  unclear and TSA has not updated the plan to reflect these changes. In  particular, TSA’s plan to convert to an all-federal Adjudication Center  workforce has not been updated although information in this plan, such as  the timeline for hiring federal employees and cost information, is no  longer valid or is unclear. For example:
The implementation schedule in TSA’s plan is no longer valid.
TSA officials responsible for managing the conversion effort  acknowledged that the timelines for implementing its plan had been  delayed, and that TSA would not complete its workforce conversion  by the end of calendar year 2013 as proposed in its plan. TSA officials  reported that determining a revised schedule for the Adjudication  Center conversion was dependent on various factors, such as when  responsible TSA offices completed their respective reviews, and when  OLE/FAMS approved the plan and sent it to TSA leadership for  review. TSA officials reported that TSA did not have timelines for  when this would occur.
Implementing the in-sourcing plan may present a cost saving  opportunity to TSA, but TSA is unclear on extent of those  savings. According to an August 2012 OLE/FAMS memorandum,  converting from contractor to federal employees at the Adjudication  Center would save the federal government over $5.4 million in fiscal  years 2013 and 2014. However, TSA’s May 2012 conversion plan  reports that the conversion plan would result in approximately $1  million in savings, rather than the $5.4 million cited in an August 2012  OLE/FAMS memorandum. According to the May 2012 plan, TSA used  the DHS Modular Cost Table to determine the potential cost savings  from converting to a federal employee workforce at the Adjudication  Center. TSA budget officials reported that they could not determine  why the cost savings estimates varied between the May 2012  conversion plan and the August 2012 memorandum. The officials  reported that the cost savings estimate was still speculative and that  TSA would need to revisit its calculations. As of May 2013, TSA had  provided no further information.
TSA officials involved in the BWS Adjudication Center conversion noted  that the delays in implementing the plan may pose challenges for TSA.  For example, TSA’s contract for the Adjudication Center is a  performance-based contract, with 1 option year remaining that would  begin in February 2014 and run to January 2015. The official reported  that continuing the contract would delay TSA from potential cost savings,  while the cost to TSA continuing the contract increases 3 percent per  option year. Officials reported that if they did not begin hiring new  federal employees by August 2013, they would need to begin the process  to recompete the Adjudication Center staffing contract to ensure  continuity of operations in the case that TSA does not implement its  conversion plan.
According to DHS BWS guidance, the more important the function, the  more important it is to have internal capability to maintain control of the  department’s mission and operations. TSA’s BWS assessment found that  (1) TSA lacked sufficient internal capacity to control its use of contractors  in Adjudication Center mission and operations, (2) TSA’s reliance on a  contractor workforce carried excessive risk, (3) the adjudicator functions  were closely associated with inherently governmental functions, and (4)  that the positions should be insourced.
This assessment was made almost 2 years ago. While senior TSA  Adjudication Center management officials support implementation of the  plan, collectively, TSA has not mitigated the risks and operational  inefficiencies identified in the DHS BWS assessment. Moreover, TSA has  not completed its internal review of the conversion plan, including  determining a revised implementation schedule as well hiring target levels  and cost information. Completing this review, determining this  information, and updating the conversion plan to ensure the plan reflects  current conditions and an estimation of cost savings will help TSA and  DHS decision makers by providing a roadmap for moving forward. Finally,  implementing TSA’s Adjudication Center workforce conversion will be  important to ensure TSA has sufficient and appropriate adjudication  personnel to make the decisions that may deny or allow individuals  unescorted access to the nation’s critical transportation infrastructure.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: TSA’s Adjudication Center plays a critical role by conducting security  threat assessments to ensure individuals posing security threats are  identified and are not granted TSA-related credentials for, among other  things, unescorted access to secure areas of the nation’s transportation  systems. However, the Adjudication Center has faced challenges in  fulfilling this role. First, while the Adjudication Center uses three key  measures to evaluate the performance of the Adjudication Center’s  contract workforce, it has not documented its methods and two of its  measures are limited. For example, TSA’s timeliness measure does not  capture the extent to which the agency has communicated its adjudication  decision to the applicant in a timely manner—a key TSA requirement for  its credentialing programs—and TSA officials reported they did not  maintain such documentation. Ensuring that the TIM program provides  the capability for Adjudication Center officials to efficiently prepare and  document applicant response time reports would help ensure TSA meets  standards and decisionmakers identify and address performance  challenges. In addition, the Adjudication Center’s accuracy rate generally  does not include cases in which contract adjudicators incorrectly  approved an applicant—and these constitute roughly 90 percent of the  Adjudication center’s caseload. Developing, documenting and  implementing an accuracy rate that includes this information will provide  TSA with a more complete assessment of the performance of its  workforce—regardless of whether the members of that workforce are  contractors or TSA employees.
Second, because of functional limitations in its case reporting systems,  Adjudication Center management uses an undocumented, manual,  process to track adjudicator performance. Documenting the Adjudication  Center’s case reporting performance measurement practices is important  to ensure continuity of operations in the event of attrition by the two  Adjudication Center officials familiar with this process. Third, the  Adjudication Center relies on its staffing plan to guide its workload  planning decisions but has not shared updated versions of this plan with  the credentialing program offices that it serves. Establishing a mechanism  for the Adjudication Center to share and reconcile information included in  the staffing plan updates, such as timelines for anticipated workload  growth, would help improve internal coordination and support the  Adjudication Center’s workload planning efforts.
Fourth, TSA’s 2011 BWS assessment for the Adjudication Center found  that the adjudicator function is closely associated with inherently  governmental functions and recommended that TSA insource its  Adjudication Center workforce to mitigate the risks that contractors were  making security credential approvals without sufficient federal oversight.  Taking additional steps to end its use of contract adjudicators and convert  to an all-federal employee adjudicator workforce would help TSA mitigate  such risks, but it has been delayed in doing so. Completing its internal  review and updating and documenting the conversion plan to ensure the  plan reflects current condition conditions, including timelines for hiring,  planned hiring numbers, and cost information would help TSA and DHS  decision makers by providing a roadmap for moving forward. Finally,  providing this plan to TSA and DHS leadership for review are important  steps to help ensure TSA addresses the risks identified in the 2011 BWS  assessment and has an appropriate workforce to make the decisions that  may ultimately deny or allow individuals credentials for unescorted access  to the nation’s critical transportation infrastructure.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the TSA  Administrator to take the following 5 actions:
To ensure that the Adjudication Center accuracy rate effectively  captures the center’s accuracy in completing security threat  assessments, the Adjudication Center should develop an accuracy  rate measure that includes accuracy data for cases where  adjudicators both approved and disqualified applicants, document this  methodology, and implement the process.
To ensure continuity of case reporting, the Adjudication Center should  document its case reporting performance management processes.
To ensure workforce planning is based on accurate workload  projections, establish a mechanism for TSA’s OIA Program  Management Division and OLE/FAMS Adjudication Center to share  and reconcile information included in the Adjudication Center’s  staffing plan updates, such as timelines for anticipated workload  growth.
To advance efforts to address risks identified in the Adjudication update and document its Adjudication Center insourcing  conversion plan to reflect revised schedule timeframes, cost and  hiring level information, and  review the updated Adjudication Center insourcing conversion  plan, and provide it to TSA and DHS leadership for review and  implementation approval.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS,  in written comments received July 2, 2013, concurred with all five of the  recommendations in the report and identified actions taken, planned, or  under way to implement the recommendations. Written comments are  summarized below, and official DHS comments are reproduced in  appendix II. In addition, DHS provided written technical comments, which  we incorporated into the report, as appropriate.
In commenting on the draft report, DHS described efforts underway or  planned to address our recommendations. DHS also noted that the  Adjudication Center’s caseload performance measure of keeping  backlogs below 1,500 cases is a self-imposed standard that TSA  established to provide the best possible customer service to applicants.  We agree that the Adjudication Center’s caseload performance  measurement was developed by TSA. Regardless of source, however,  TSA’s caseload standard is a contractual requirement and our analysis of  TSA data found that the Adjudication Center contractor generally did not  meet this requirement between October 2010 and January 2013. In  addressing our recommendations, DHS concurred with our first  recommendation that TSA should develop an accuracy rate that includes  accuracy data for both cases where an applicant is approved and cases  where an applicant is disqualified, document this methodology, and  implement the process. DHS stated that TSA OIA will modify its current  quality control process to include both approved and disqualified cases  that will more accurately reflect the adjudications performed.   Furthermore, DHS reported that it will develop, document, and formalize  an accuracy rate measure that includes review of approved and  disqualified cases. Such actions will ensure that the Adjudication Center’s  accuracy rate measure provides a more comprehensive assessment of  adjudicator performance.
DHS also concurred with our second recommendation that TSA should  document the Adjudication Center’s case reporting performance  management processes. DHS stated that while TSA anticipates that the  current manual process will be phased out and replaced by an automated  process as the TIM program is implemented, TSA OIA will document the  current manual performance management process. DHS stated that  documenting the process will confirm the Adjudication Center’s  performance is accurately tracked and will also ensure continuity in the  event of personnel turnover. These actions, if implemented effectively,  should address the intent of our recommendation.
Regarding our third recommendation that OIA’s Program Management  Division and the OLE/FAMS Adjudication Center should establish a  mechanism to share and reconcile information included in the  Adjudication Center’s staffing plan updates, such as timelines for  anticipated workload growth, DHS concurred. DHS reported that the OIA  Program Management Division and the OLE/FAMS Adjudication Center  were already working to resolve the issues and had begun coordination to  ensure security threat assessment workload estimates and the staffing  plan are updated. DHS stated that TSA will formalize a quarterly review  process between the Program Management Division and the Adjudication  Center to meet and discuss these issues.
DHS concurred with our fourth recommendation to update and document  the Adjudication Center’s insourcing conversion plan to reflect revised  schedule timeframes and cost and hiring level information. In its  comments, DHS stated that OIA is working with the DHS Office of the  Chief Human Capital Officer to address any potential issues posed by  using a mix of government employees and contractors. Furthermore,  DHS reported that TSA will update its insourcing conversion plan to  reflect current timelines, costs, and hiring levels. Such actions should  improve TSA’s ongoing insourcing efforts. Lastly, DHS concurred with our  fifth recommendation that TSA review the updated Adjudication Center  insourcing conversion plan and provide it to TSA and DHS leadership for  review and implementation approval. DHS stated that OIA has already  begun updating the insourcing conversion plan and intends to provide it  for review and approval. We will continue to monitor DHS’s efforts.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan on no further distribution of this report until 30 days after  its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant Secretary for the  Transportation Security Administration, and appropriate congressional  committees. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-7141 or groverj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices   of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. Key contributors to this report are acknowledged in  appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: TSA Organizational Chart with Key Offices with Responsibility for Implementing Security Threat Assessments
paragraphs: Figure 3 shows that responsibility for carrying out programs related to  issuing credentials for transportation workers is divided among multiple  Transportation Security Administration (TSA) offices. In particular, the  TSA Office of Intelligence and Analysis manages transportation security  credentialing programs—including the three largest programs: the  Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program for  maritime workers; the Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME) program  for truckers seeking a commercial driver’s license endorsement to carry  hazardous materials; and the Aviation Worker program. Within the Office  of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service, the Adjudication Center  is responsible for providing security threat assessment adjudication  services to meet the workload needs of TSA programs.
Figure 3 TSA Organization Chart Showing Key Offices Responsible for Managing and Implementing Transportation Security  Threat Assessment Programs, as of May 2013.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact names above, David Bruno (Assistant Director),  Jason Berman (Analyst-in-Charge), Carl Barden, Melissa Bogar, Jennifer  Dougherty, Eric Hauswirth, Richard Hung, Thomas Lombardi, Stephen M.  Lord, Steve Morris, Jessica Orr, Minette Richardson, Katherine Trimble,  and Jonathan Tumin made key contributions to this report.