Asylum: Additional Actions Needed to Assess and Address Fraud Risks
Published: 2015-12-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Each year, tens of thousands of aliens in the United States apply for asylum, which provides refuge to those who have been persecuted or fear persecution on protected grounds. Asylum officers in DHS's USCIS and immigration judges in DOJ's EOIR adjudicate asylum applications.
GAO was asked to review the status of the asylum system. This report addresses (1) what DHS and DOJ data indicate about trends in asylum claims, (2) the extent to which DHS and DOJ have designed mechanisms to prevent and detect asylum fraud, and (3) the extent to which DHS and DOJ designed and implemented processes to address any asylum fraud that has been identified. GAO analyzed DHS and DOJ data on asylum applications for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, reviewed DHS and DOJ policies and procedures related to asylum fraud, and interviewed DHS and DOJ officials in Washington, D.C., Falls Church, VA, and in asylum offices and immigration courts across the country selected on the basis of application data and other factors.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The total number of asylum applications, including both principal applicants and their eligible dependents, filed in fiscal year 2014 (108,152) is more than double the number filed in fiscal year 2010 (47,118). As of September 2015, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has a backlog of 106,121 principal applicants, of which 64,254 have exceeded required time frames for adjudication. USCIS plans to hire additional staff to address the backlog.
USCIS and the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) have limited capabilities to detect asylum fraud. First, while both USCIS and EOIR have mechanisms to investigate fraud in individual applications, neither agency has assessed fraud risks across the asylum process, in accordance with leading practices for managing fraud risks. Various cases of fraud illustrate risks that may affect the integrity of the asylum system. For example, an investigation in New York resulted in charges against 30 defendants as of March 2014 for their alleged participation in immigration fraud schemes; 829 applicants associated with the attorneys and preparers charged in the case received asylum from USCIS, and 3,709 received asylum from EOIR. Without regular assessments of fraud risks, USCIS and EOIR lack reasonable assurance that they have implemented controls to mitigate those risks. Second, USCIS's capability to identify patterns of fraud across asylum applications is hindered because USCIS relies on a paper-based system for asylum applications and does not electronically capture some key information that could be used to detect fraud, such as the applicant's written statement. Asylum officers and USCIS Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) Directorate immigration officers told GAO that they can identify potential fraud by analyzing trends across asylum applications; however, they must rely on labor-intensive methods to do so. Identifying and implementing additional fraud detection tools could enable USCIS to detect fraud more effectively while using resources more efficiently. Third, FDNS has not established clear fraud detection responsibilities for its immigration officers in asylum offices; FDNS officers we spoke with at all eight asylum offices told GAO they have limited guidance with respect to fraud. FDNS standard operating procedures for fraud detection are intended to apply across USCIS, and therefore do not reflect the unique features of the asylum system. Developing asylum-specific guidance for fraud detection, in accordance with federal internal control standards, would better position FDNS officers to understand their roles and responsibilities in the asylum process.
To address identified instances of asylum fraud, USCIS can, in some cases, terminate an individual's asylum status. USCIS terminated the asylum status of 374 people from fiscal years 2010 through 2014 for fraud. In August 2015, USCIS adopted a target of 180 days for conducting initial reviews, in which the asylum office reviews evidence and decides whether to begin termination proceedings, when the asylee has applied for adjustment to lawful permanent resident status; however, this goal applies only to a subset of asylees and pertains to initial reviews. Further, asylees with pending termination reviews may be eligible to receive certain federal benefits. Developing timeliness goals for all pending termination reviews would help USCIS better identify the staffing resources needed to address the terminations workload.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DHS and DOJ conduct regular fraud risk assessments and that DHS, among other things, implement tools for detecting fraud patterns, develop asylum-specific guidance for fraud detection roles and responsibilities, and implement timeliness goals for pending termination reviews. DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: U.S. immigration law provides that aliens within the United States may be  granted humanitarian protection, in the form of asylum, if they  demonstrate that they are unable or unwilling to return to their home  country because of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future  persecution based on their race, religion, nationality, membership in a  particular social group, or political opinion.  According to the Office of the  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, because of the  experience of seeking asylum, and the often traumatic events  precipitating an individual’s flight from his or her home country, asylum  seekers may experience psychological illness; trauma; depression;  anxiety; aggression; and other physical, psychological, and emotional  consequences. Asylum decisions can have serious consequences.  Granting asylum to an applicant with a genuine claim protects the asylee  from being returned to a country where he or she has been or could in the  future be persecuted. On the other hand, granting asylum to an  individual with a fraudulent claim jeopardizes the integrity of the asylum  system by enabling the individual to remain in the United States, apply for  certain federal benefits, and pursue a path to citizenship. Given the  potential consequences of asylum decisions, it is important that the  asylum system is not misused. This protects the integrity of the legal  immigration process and avoids the potentially serious consequences that  could result if an applicant is wrongfully returned to his or her country of  persecution or if an applicant whose asylum claim is fraudulent or who  poses a threat to the United States is permitted to stay.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of  Justice (DOJ) share responsibility for the U.S. asylum system.  Specifically, asylum officers within DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and  Immigration Services (USCIS) adjudicate affirmative applications—that is,  claims filed with USCIS  at the initiative of the alien.  An affirmative asylum  applicant may be in the United States lawfully or unlawfully, and must file  for asylum directly with USCIS  within 1 year of his or her most recent  arrival in the country unless he or she can demonstrate changed or  extraordinary circumstances. Within USCIS, the Fraud Detection and  National Security Directorate (FDNS) is responsible for determining  whether individuals filing for asylum pose a threat to national security or  public safety or are engaging in asylum fraud. If USCIS  determines that  the applicant is ineligible for asylum and does not otherwise have lawful  immigration status in the United States, asylum officers are to issue a  Notice to Appear before DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review  (EOIR) for adjudication in removal proceedings. EOIR’s immigration  judges adjudicate both affirmative asylum claims referred by USCIS and  defensive applications for asylum, which are asylum claims first made  during removal proceedings as a defense against removal from the  United States. DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s  (ICE) Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) trial attorneys are  responsible for representing the U.S. government in immigration court  proceedings, including asylum hearings, before EOIR. ICE’s Homeland  Security Investigations (HSI) is responsible for conducting criminal  investigations regarding immigration-related document and benefit fraud,  including asylum fraud referred by USCIS, OPLA, and EOIR.
The nature of the asylum system puts asylum officers and immigration  judges in the position of adjudicating or ruling on asylum applications with  what may be imperfect information. Specifically, U.S. asylum law states  that testimonial information alone, without corroboration, may be sufficient  for asylum applicants to meet the burden of proof for establishing asylum  eligibility. In part, this is because applicants may not be able to present  documents, such as passports or birth certificates, if they fled their  countries of persecution without them; may have come from countries  where documentary evidence was not available; or may have fled with  fraudulent documents to hide their true identity or to otherwise facilitate  escape from harm. As such, asylum officers and immigration judges must  make decisions, at times, with little or no documentation to support or  refute an applicant’s claim. These factors create a challenging  environment in which adjudicators must attempt to reach the best  decisions they can with the information available.
In 2008, we reported on USCIS’s asylum adjudication process. Among  other things, we found that USCIS had designed quality assurance  mechanisms to help ensure the integrity of asylum adjudications, but that  some of the mechanisms could be improved. For example, we found that  USCIS  did not consistently solicit asylum officers’ input on their training  needs, local quality assurance reviews did not consistently take place in  some asylum offices, and time constraints affected asylum officers’  adjudications. We recommended that USCIS, among other things, solicit  information from officers on their training needs, develop a plan to  implement local quality reviews in all offices, and determine how much  time is needed to adjudicate an asylum claim in a manner consistent with  procedures and training. USCIS concurred and took action to implement  these recommendations, such as implementing a training needs  assessment, developing and implementing a program to review a sample  of asylum officers’ decisions in all offices, and revising asylum officers’  performance measures to focus on quality rather than productivity  standards.
The report of the Senate Appropriations Committee accompanying the  DHS Appropriations Act, 2015, included a provision, and Congress  requested, that we review the status of the asylum system.  This report  (1) describes what DHS and DOJ data indicate about trends in the  characteristics of asylum claims, (2) evaluates the extent to which DHS  and DOJ have designed mechanisms to prevent and detect fraud in the  asylum system, and (3) evaluates the extent to which DHS and DOJ have  designed and implemented processes to address any fraud that has been  identified in the asylum system.
To describe trends in the characteristics of asylum claims, we analyzed  summary and record-level data from USCIS’s Refugee, Asylum, and  Parole System (RAPS) on asylum applications, adjudications, and grants  by asylum offices nationwide for fiscal years 2010 through 2014. To  assess the reliability of the RAPS data, we reviewed USCIS  documents  about the design of RAPS, completed data entry and duplicate record  checks, and discussed the reliability of the data with USCIS officials. We  also analyzed two reports issued by EOIR’s Office of Planning, Analysis,  and Statistics from fiscal years 2010 through 2014—Asylum Statistics and  Statistics Yearbook. These reports contain data about the characteristics  of asylum applications adjudicated through the immigration courts in the  period of our analysis. To assess the reliability of the data in EOIR’s  reports, we reviewed documentation on EOIR’s case management  system and spoke with officials about how EOIR collects and monitors  data. In fiscal year 2013, EOIR changed the methodology it used to  compile its statistics in the reports; thus, data from previous fiscal year  reports are not comparable with those reported in fiscal years 2013 and  2014 reports. As a result, we relied on the fiscal years 2013 and 2014  reports for our analyses. We determined that the USCIS and EOIR data  about the characteristics of asylum claims were sufficiently reliable for our  purposes.
To evaluate the extent to which DHS and DOJ have mechanisms in place  to prevent and detect fraud in the asylum system, we compared USCIS  and EOIR’s asylum-related policies and procedures with, among other  things, standards in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government and leading practices in GAO’s Framework for Managing  Fraud Risks in Federal Programs (the Fraud Framework). Regarding  USCIS,  we reviewed USCIS  Asylum Division’s Affirmative Asylum  Procedures Manual, FDNS’s Fraud Detection Standard Operating  Procedures, and other USCIS policy documents. We reviewed past  USCIS  efforts to examine fraud in the USCIS asylum system and spoke  with USCIS  Office of Policy and Strategy officials who manage these  efforts. We analyzed data from FDNS’s case management system about  the number of benefit fraud cases associated with asylum applications  that were opened from fiscal year 2010 through 2014 and the number of  those cases in which FDNS found fraud. To assess the reliability of these  data, we reviewed policies about how data are entered into the system  and interviewed FDNS immigration officers and headquarters officials and  observed FDNS immigration officers using the system. We discuss our  findings about the reliability of these data later in this report. In addition,  we reviewed Asylum Division workforce planning efforts against principles  in Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning and  interviewed Asylum Division officials about attrition among asylum  officers. We reviewed asylum officer attrition data from fiscal year 2010  through 2014, which USCIS compiled manually at our request. We  discuss our findings about the reliability of these data later in this report.  We also reviewed USCIS  quality assurance policy documents and spoke  with Asylum Division and Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations  Directorate (RAIO) officials about quality assurance mechanisms in the  asylum program. Furthermore, we analyzed USCIS asylum officer basic  training materials, as well as training materials for FDNS immigration  officers, and interviewed Asylum Division and RAIO headquarters officials  about how asylum officers are trained to detect and prevent fraud. In  particular, we reviewed USCIS Asylum Division quarterly training reports  for fiscal year 2014 to analyze the weekly training activities in each  asylum office for each week of the reporting quarter. We compared RAIO  and Asylum Division training materials with material in GAO’s Guide for  Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal  Government.
To further evaluate the extent to which DHS and DOJ have designed  mechanisms to prevent and detect asylum fraud, we visited five of the  eight asylum offices—Newark, New Jersey; New  York, New York; Los  Angeles, California; Houston, Texas; and Arlington, Virginia. We selected  these offices for site visits based on a variety of factors, including their  number of asylum officers, the number of asylum applications they  receive, and geographic proximity to EOIR immigration courts. During our  site visits, we also visited immigration courts in New York, Los Angeles,  Houston, and Arlington and observed asylum hearings in New York, Los  Angeles, Houston, and Arlington. In addition, we interviewed  approximately 11 ICE OPLA attorneys and 10 ICE HSI  investigators in  the New York, Los Angeles, Houston, and Arlington offices. In each  asylum office, we observed asylum interviews and spoke with supervisory  asylum officers, asylum officers, training officers, and FDNS immigration  officers to obtain their perspectives on asylum fraud and the associated  risks. We also conducted telephone interviews with asylum officers,  training officers, and FDNS immigration officers in the remaining three  asylum offices—Miami, Chicago, and San Francisco. Across the eight  asylum offices, we spoke with 35 supervisory asylum officers, 37 asylum  officers, 24 FDNS immigration officers (including four supervisors), and  12 training officers. We spoke with supervisory asylum officers, asylum  officers, and FDNS immigration officers in all eight asylum offices about  the tools and systems that they use to identify and detect asylum fraud  and the roles of asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers in asylum  fraud detection. We also spoke with training officers in each of the eight  asylum offices about how they develop and present training. Although the  results of our visits and telephone interviews cannot be generalized to  officers in all asylum offices or to all immigration courts, they provided  first-hand observations on asylum adjudication practices and insights  regarding policies and procedures to detect asylum fraud.
Regarding EOIR, we reviewed EOIR’s Fraud and Abuse Prevention  Program guidance and policy documentation, including the regulation that  established EOIR’s antifraud officer position. We also reviewed the  Immigration Judge Benchbook, which includes tools, templates, and legal  resources for immigration judges to use in their adjudications. We  analyzed EOIR’s fraud-related training materials for immigration judges  and spoke with the antifraud officer about the fraud detection and  prevention activities associated with this role. In addition, we analyzed  EOIR Fraud Abuse Prevention Program case files to determine the  number of complaints received, number of case files opened, and number  of asylum-related case files opened from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal  year 2014 to evaluate their fraud detection activities. We also reviewed 35  EOIR Fraud Abuse Prevention Program case files, which EOIR identified  as being all cases associated with asylum fraud.  While observing  immigration court proceedings in New York City, Houston, and Arlington,  including asylum cases, we spoke with court administrators and  immigration judges about asylum fraud.
To evaluate the extent to which DHS and DOJ have designed and  implemented processes to address any fraud that has been identified in  the asylum system, we analyzed ICE HSI  data on the number of asylum  fraud-related indictments, criminal arrests, convictions, and administrative  arrests as well as the number of asylum fraud cases initiated by HSI from  fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014. We also analyzed USCIS  RAPS data to identify the number of individuals who have had their  asylum status terminated because of fraud during this time period and  any trends in asylum terminations because of fraud over those years. We  used ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations data to analyze the  outcomes for individuals whose asylum status was terminated for fraud  from fiscal years 2010 through 2014. We assessed the reliability of these  data by reviewing documentation about how data were collected;  interviewing knowledgeable agency officials about the data; and  conducting electronic testing for missing data, outliers, and obvious  errors. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of analyzing the number of asylum terminations because of  fraud and the outcome of those terminations. We reviewed USCIS policy  documents related to asylum terminations, as well as certain U.S. Circuit  Court of Appeals decisions that were identified by Asylum Division  officials as influencing how USCIS pursues asylum terminations because  of fraud. We interviewed officials at five HSI locations—New York, New  York; Washington, D.C.; Houston, Texas; Los Angeles, California; and  Fairfax, Virginia— about how they receive asylum fraud referrals and how  they investigate allegations of asylum fraud. We also interviewed EOIR  officials about mechanisms to address identified asylum fraud in the  immigration courts and how those mechanisms are used. We interviewed  officials in the eight USCIS  asylum offices, as well as Asylum Division  officials, to determine how USCIS  handles cases with identified fraud,  including cases in which fraud is identified after asylum has been granted,  and how USCIS  tracks, monitors, and adjudicates cases in which an  individual’s asylum status is pending termination for identified fraud. We  compared USCIS and EOIR mechanisms to address identified asylum  fraud and the frequency of their use with our Fraud Framework to assess  their likely effectiveness as a fraud deterrent.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2014 to November  2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides  additional information on our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Asylum Eligibility Requirements
paragraphs: To adjudicate asylum claims, USCIS asylum officers and EOIR  immigration judges determine an applicant’s eligibility for asylum by  assessing whether the applicant has credibly established that he or she is  a refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration  and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. An applicant is eligible for asylum  if he or she (1) applies from within the United States; (2) suffered past  persecution, or has a well-founded fear of future persecution, based on  race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or  political opinion; and (3) is not statutorily barred from applying for or being  granted asylum. Among other things, the REAL ID Act of 2005 was a  legislative effort to provide consistent standards for adjudicating asylum  applications and to limit fraud.  Consistent with the REAL ID Act, the  burden is on the applicant to establish past persecution or a well-founded  fear of persecution, and asylum officers and immigration judges have the  discretion to require documentary support for asylum claims.  To  determine whether an applicant is credible, the act requires that asylum  officers and immigration judges consider the totality of the applicant’s  circumstances and all relevant factors and states that a determination of  the applicant’s credibility may be based on any relevant factor.  Such  factors could include, among others, the applicant’s demeanor, candor, or  responsiveness in the asylum interview or immigration court hearing, or  any inaccuracies or falsehoods discovered in the applicant’s written or  oral statements, whether or not an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or  falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim. However, an  asylum officer or immigration judge may determine that an applicant is  credible, considering the totality of the circumstances, even if there are  inaccuracies, contradictions, or evidence of potential fraud. For example,  an applicant may have lied to a U.S. consular officer in order to obtain a  visa to travel to the United States when fleeing his or her home country,  and still have a credible asylum claim.
section_title: Overview of the Affirmative and Defensive Asylum Application Processes
paragraphs: To apply for affirmative asylum, an applicant submits a Form I-589,  Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, to USCIS. An  applicant may include his or her spouse and unmarried children under the  age of 21 who are physically present in the United States as dependent  asylum applicants. The applicant mails paper copies of the application  and supporting documentation to a USCIS Service Center, which verifies  that the application is complete, creates a hard-copy file, and enters  information about the applicant, including biographic information as well  as attorney and preparer information submitted with the application, into  RAPS. Subsequently, using the applicant’s biographic data, RAPS  initiates automated checks against other U.S. government databases  containing criminal history information, immigration violation records, and  address information, among other things. RAPS also schedules an  appointment to fingerprint and photograph the applicant. The Service  Center sends the applicant file to one of USCIS’s eight asylum offices  based on the applicant’s residential address and the asylum office then  schedules the applicant’s interview with an asylum officer. In adjudicating  asylum applications, USCIS policy requires asylum officers to review the  applicant’s hard-copy file; research country of origin information; verify  that an applicant has completed fingerprinting requirements; and  document the results of background, identity, and security checks, some  of which are repeated in the asylum office to identify any relevant  information that may have changed after the initial automated checks.  Asylum officers are to use the information obtained through this process  to (1) determine who is included in the application; (2) confirm the  applicant’s immigration status, asylum filing date, and date, place, and  manner of entry into the United States; (3) become familiar with the  asylum claim and the applicant’s background and supporting  documentation; (4) identify issues that could affect eligibility, such as  criminal history, national security concerns, participation in human rights  abuses, or adverse credibility or fraud indicators; and (5) identify issues  that must be discussed in an interview with the applicant to determine  asylum eligibility.
During the interview, which is to be conducted in a nonadversarial  manner, the asylum officer asks questions to assess the applicant’s  eligibility for asylum and determine whether his or her claim is credible.   If the asylum officer identifies inaccuracies, inconsistencies, or fraud in  the asylum application, the applicant must be given an opportunity to  explain such issues during the interview, according to the USCIS  Affirmative Asylum Procedures Manual. An independent interpreter  monitor listens to each affirmative asylum interview to ensure that the  applicant’s interpreter is correctly interpreting and to notify the  interviewing officer of any discrepancies in interpretation. After the  interview, the asylum officer considers the totality of the circumstances  surrounding the applicant’s claim and prepares a written decision. The  decision is reviewed by a supervisor, who is to check for quality,  accuracy, and legal sufficiency. After a supervisor has concurred with the  decision, the decision notice is delivered in hard copy to the applicant.
If USCIS  grants asylum to the applicant, the asylee is eligible to apply for  adjustment to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status after 1 year.  If  USCIS  does not grant asylum and the applicant is present in the United  States lawfully through other means, USCIS is to issue a Notice of Intent  to Deny stating the reason(s) for asylum ineligibility and provide an  opportunity for the applicant to respond. Whether or not asylum is  granted, the applicant can continue living in the United States under his or  her otherwise valid status. If USCIS  does not grant asylum and the  applicant is present in the United States unlawfully, USCIS is to refer the  application to EOIR, together with a Notice to Appear, which requires that  the applicant appear before an EOIR immigration judge for adjudication of  the asylum claim in removal proceedings. Figure 1 provides an overview  of the USCIS  affirmative asylum process.
EOIR follows the same procedures for defensive asylum applications and  affirmative asylum referrals from USCIS. For affirmative asylum referrals,  the immigration judge reviews the case de novo, meaning that the judge  evaluates the applicant’s affirmative asylum application anew and is not  bound by an asylum officer’s previous determination. EOIR asylum  hearings are adversarial proceedings in which asylum applicants appear  in removal proceedings for adjudication of the asylum claim, and may  apply for other forms of relief or protection as a defense against removal  from the United States. First, the judge conducts an initial hearing  (referred to as a master calendar hearing) to, among other things, ensure  that the applicant understands the court proceedings and schedule a  hearing to specifically address the asylum application (referred to as a  merits hearing). Second, during the merits hearing, the judge hears  testimony from the applicant and any other witnesses, oversees cross- examinations, and reviews evidence. ICE trial attorneys represent DHS in  these proceedings. An asylum applicant may self-represent or may be  represented by an attorney at no cost to the U.S. government. The judge  may question the applicant or other witnesses. Judges render oral and, in  some cases, written decisions after the immigration court proceedings  end. If the judge determines that the applicant is eligible for asylum, the  asylee can remain in the United States indefinitely unless asylum status is  subsequently terminated. A grant of asylum from an immigration judge  confers the same benefits as a grant of asylum from a USCIS  asylum  officer. If the judge determines that the applicant is ineligible for asylum,  and is removable, the judge may order the applicant to be removed from  the United States, unless the applicant seeks (and receives) another form  of relief from removal. Judges’ decisions are final unless appealed to the  Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Figure 2 provides an overview of the  DOJ affirmative and defensive asylum process.
section_title: Eligibility for Federal Benefits
paragraphs: Asylees, or individuals who have been granted asylum, are considered  qualified aliens for the purpose of eligibility for federal, and state or local,  public benefits. Subject to certain statutory criteria, asylees may be  eligible for a number of federal means-tested public benefits including  Supplemental Security Income, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance  Program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and Medicaid. In  addition, asylees may also be eligible for federal student financial aid,  among other benefits. Asylees are authorized for employment in the  United States as a result of their asylum status and can receive an  Employment Authorization Document (EAD) issued by USCIS.  In  addition, asylum applicants can receive an EAD after their applications  have been pending, including in both the USCIS and EOIR adjudicative  process, for 180 days, not including any delays requested or caused by  the applicant such as requesting to reschedule or failing to appear at the  asylum interview or, where applicable, the time between issuance of a  request for evidence and receipt of the applicant’s response. Within 2  years of receiving asylum status, asylees can request derivative asylum  status for their spouses and unmarried children under age 21, a provision  that allows family members to join the asylee in the United States.
section_title: Fraud and Asylum
paragraphs: Immigration benefit fraud involves the willful misrepresentation of material  fact for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit, such as asylum  status, without lawful entitlement. Immigration benefit fraud is often  facilitated by document fraud and identity fraud. Document fraud includes  forging, counterfeiting, altering, or falsely making any document, or using,  possessing, obtaining, accepting, or receiving such falsified documents in  order to satisfy any requirement of, or to obtain a benefit under, the INA.   Identity fraud refers to the fraudulent use of others’ valid documents.  Fraud can occur in the affirmative and defensive asylum processes in a  number of ways. For example, an applicant may file fraudulent supporting  documents with his or her affirmative asylum application in an attempt to  bolster the facts of a claim. Or, an applicant may submit a fraudulent  address in order to file for asylum within the jurisdiction of an asylum  office or immigration court perceived to be more likely to grant asylum  than another office or court. Further, an attorney, preparer, or interpreter  can, in exchange for fees from the applicant, prepare and file fraudulent  documents, written statements, or supporting details about an applicant’s  asylum claim, with or without the applicant’s knowledge or involvement.  For the purposes of this report, we define asylum fraud as the willful  misrepresentation of material fact(s), such as making false statements,  submitting forged or falsified documents, or conspiring to do so, in  support of an asylum claim.
It is possible to terminate an individual’s asylum status under certain  circumstances, including where there is a showing of fraud in the  application such that the individual was not eligible for asylum at the time  it was granted. By regulation, USCIS may only terminate asylum  granted by USCIS; however, EOIR may terminate asylum granted by  either USCIS or EOIR. For cases granted by USCIS, except in the Ninth  Circuit, USCIS issues the asylee a Notice of Intent to Terminate and  conducts an interview in which the individual may present evidence of his  or her asylum eligibility. If termination is warranted, USCIS then  provides written notice to the individual of termination of his or her asylum  status and is to initiate removal proceedings for the individual in  immigration court, as appropriate. While in removal proceedings, the  individual may reapply for asylum before an immigration judge. The  judge is not required to accept the determination of fraud made by USCIS  and determines the respondent’s eligibility for asylum anew.  For cases  granted by an immigration judge, the BIA, or by USCIS  in the Ninth  Circuit, ICE OPLA may petition the immigration court to re-open a case in  which an individual has been granted asylum and request the termination  of the individual’s asylum status because of fraud. In such a case, ICE  OPLA must prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that there was fraud  in the asylum application that would have rendered the asylee ineligible  for asylum at the time it was granted. The immigration judge has  jurisdiction to conduct an asylum termination hearing as part of the  removal proceeding, and if asylum status is terminated, the individual  may be subject to removal from the United States.
section_title: GAO’s Fraud Framework
paragraphs: Our Fraud Framework is a comprehensive set of leading practices that  serves as a guide for program managers to use when developing efforts  to combat fraud in a strategic, risk-based manner. The framework  describes leading practices for establishing an organizational structure  and culture that are conducive to fraud risk management, designing and  implementing controls to prevent and detect potential fraud, and  monitoring and evaluating to provide assurances to managers that they  are effectively preventing, detecting, and responding to potential fraud.  Managers may perceive a conflict between their priorities to fulfill the  program’s mission, such as efficiently disbursing funds or providing  services to beneficiaries, and taking actions to safeguard taxpayer dollars  from improper use. However, the purpose of proactively managing fraud  risks is to facilitate, not hinder, the program’s mission and strategic goals  by ensuring that taxpayer dollars and government services serve their  intended purposes. Figure 3 illustrates our Fraud Framework.
The Fraud Framework includes control activities that help agencies  prevent, detect, and respond to fraud risks as well as structures and  environmental factors that influence or help managers achieve their  objectives to mitigate fraud risks. The framework consists of four  components for effectively managing fraud risks: commit, assess, design  and implement, and evaluate and adapt. Leading practices for each of  these components include the following:
Commit: create an organizational culture to combat fraud at all levels  of the agency, and designate an entity within the program office to  lead fraud risk management activities;
Assess: assess the likelihood and impact of fraud risks and determine  risk tolerance and examine the suitability of existing controls and  prioritize residual risks;
Design and implement: develop, document, and communicate an  antifraud strategy, focusing on preventive control activities; and
Evaluate and adapt: collect and analyze data from reporting  mechanisms and instances of detected fraud for real-time monitoring  of fraud trends, and use the results of monitoring, evaluations, and  investigations to improve fraud prevention, detection, and response.
section_title: The Number of Asylum Applications Filed per Fiscal Year Has Increased Every Year from 2010 to 2014
subsections: section_title: The Number of Asylum Applications Filed in Fiscal Year 2014 Is More than Double the Total Filed in Fiscal Year 2010
paragraphs: The total number of asylum applications (principal applicants and their  eligible dependents), including affirmative and defensive applications,  increased from 47,118 in fiscal year 2010 to 108,152 in fiscal year 2014,  an increase of 130 percent. During this time, affirmative asylum  applications filed directly with USCIS increased by a total of 131  percent. Defensive asylum applications filed with EOIR increased 125   percent. Table 1 shows the number of affirmative and defensive asylum  applications filed each year for fiscal years 2010 through 2014.
The number of principal affirmative applications and their eligible  dependents has increased each year from fiscal years 2010 through  2014. The number of principal affirmative applications filed has increased  from 28,108 in fiscal year 2010 to 56,959 in fiscal year 2014, a 103  percent increase. The portion of affirmative asylum applicants noted as  dependents increased from 6,266 in fiscal year 2010 to 22,526 in fiscal  year 2014, a 259 percent increase. Table 2 shows the number of principal  and dependent affirmative asylum applications filed each year for fiscal  years 2010 through 2014.
Asylum applications (including principal applicants and their eligible  dependents) filed with EOIR—affirmative applications referred from  USCIS  and defensive applications—increased from 32,830 in fiscal year  2010 to 41,920 in fiscal year 2014, an increase of 28 percent. Table 3  shows the number of affirmative and defensive asylum cases EOIR  received from fiscal years 2010 through 2014. The number of affirmative  applications USCIS referred to EOIR increased from 20,086 in fiscal year  2010 to 25,907 in fiscal year 2012, and decreased from fiscal year 2012  to fiscal year 2014. Asylum Division officials attribute the decrease in  affirmative asylum cases referred to EOIR to the increased number of  credible fear and reasonable fear cases USCIS has received, which has  caused USCIS to divert resources away from affirmative asylum cases  and adjudicate fewer affirmative asylum cases overall. The number of  credible fear and reasonable fear cases increased from 11,019 in fiscal  year 2010 to 60,085 in fiscal year 2014, an increase of 445 percent.
section_title: Asylum Applicant Characteristics Vary By Country of Nationality and Location
subsections: section_title: Country of Nationality
paragraphs: From fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014, China accounted for the  largest number of affirmative asylum applicants (26 percent), followed by  Mexico (13 percent) and Egypt (6 percent). Figure 4 shows the top 10  countries for affirmative asylum applications filed with USCIS.
From fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014, China accounted for the  largest number of asylum applicants filing with EOIR (20 percent),  followed by Mexico (20 percent) and El Salvador (9 percent). Figure 5  shows the top 10 countries for asylum applicants filing with EOIR.
USCIS  has eight asylum offices across the United States and, as of April  2015, 353 asylum officers who are responsible for adjudicating affirmative  asylum claims. The number of affirmative asylum applications filed per  USCIS  office varied widely. From fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the  New York and Los Angeles asylum offices accounted for 45 percent of all  affirmative asylum applications filed. The number of affirmative asylum  applications filed in Newark and Los Angeles has grown more than in any  other asylum office during this time, with a total increase of 8,352 and  9,070 applications. Figure 6 shows affirmative asylum applications  received by each USCIS asylum office from fiscal year 2010 through  fiscal year 2014.
section_title: USCIS Has a Backlog of More than 100,000 Principal Affirmative Asylum Applications, Most of Which Have Exceeded Required Time Frames for Adjudication
paragraphs: Final administrative adjudication of an asylum application, not including  administrative appeals, is to be completed within 180 days after filing,  absent exceptional circumstances and not including any delays requested  or caused by the applicant, or, where applicable, the amount of time  between issuance of a request for evidence and the receipt of the  applicant’s response. USCIS’s backlog of principal affirmative asylum  applications as of September 2015 was 106,121. Of those pending cases,  64,254 (61 percent) have exceeded the 180-day requirement. In addition,  the number of affirmative asylum cases that were adjudicated in more  than 180 days has increased from fiscal years 2010 through 2014. Figure  7 shows the number of affirmative asylum applications adjudicated from  fiscal years 2010 through 2014 where USCIS’s adjudication exceeded  180 days.
According to Asylum Division officials, several factors have affected  USCIS’s  ability to adjudicate affirmative asylum applications in a timely  manner. For example, officials stated that they have diverted resources to  address the growth in credible fear and reasonable fear cases, which  increased by over 400 percent from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year  2014. In addition, these officials stated that they had prioritized  applications from unaccompanied alien children based on the time  sensitivity of such cases. Asylum Division officials said that this  diversion of resources and prioritization of these claims contributed to the  increasing backlog of affirmative asylum applications. Asylum Division  officials stated that the increasing number of affirmative applications in  recent years has also had significant implications for the workload of  USCIS’s  asylum offices, and that USCIS plans to hire additional staff to  help address the current level of applications and the increasing backlog.
section_title: DHS and DOJ Have Limited Capabilities to Detect and Prevent Asylum Fraud
subsections: section_title: DHS and DOJ Have Established Dedicated Antifraud Entities
paragraphs: Both DHS and DOJ have established dedicated antifraud entities, a  leading practice for managing fraud risks. Our Fraud Framework states  that a leading practice for managing fraud risks is to establish a dedicated  entity to design and oversee fraud risk management activities. Within  DHS, USCIS  created FDNS in 2004 to help ensure immigration benefits  are not granted to individuals who pose a threat to national security or  public safety or who seek to defraud the immigration system. As of fiscal  year 2015, USCIS has deployed 35 FDNS immigration officers and 4  supervisory immigration officers working across all eight asylum offices.  FDNS immigration officers working in asylum offices are tasked with  conducting background checks to resolve national security “hits” and  fraud concerns, which arise when asylum officers conduct required  background checks of asylum applicants; addressing fraud-related leads  provided by asylum officers and other sources; and liaising with law  enforcement entities, such as HSI, to provide logistical support in law  enforcement and national security matters.
In September 2007, DOJ established an EOIR antifraud officer through  regulation. The regulation states that the antifraud officer is to (1) serve  as a point of contact relating to concerns about fraud, particularly with  respect to fraudulent applications or documents affecting multiple removal  proceedings, applications for relief from removal, appeals, or other  proceedings before EOIR; (2) coordinate with DHS and DOJ investigative  authorities with respect to the identification of and response to fraud; and  (3) notify EOIR’s Disciplinary Counsel and other appropriate authorities  as to instances of fraud, misrepresentation, or abuse related to an  attorney or accredited representative. The activities of the antifraud  officer (also known as the Fraud Prevention Counsel) and supporting staff  collectively are referred to as the Fraud and Abuse Prevention Program.  According to EOIR’s Fraud Prevention Program fact sheet, the goal of the  program is to protect the integrity of EOIR and other immigration  proceedings by promoting efforts to deter fraud and provide a systematic  response to identifying and referring instances of suspected fraud and  abuse. In practice, according to the Fraud Prevention Counsel, they  collect data and review records of proceedings in response to reports of  suspected fraud. In addition, through the program, EOIR coordinates with  law enforcement agencies to refer appropriate matters for investigation  and assist in fraud investigations and prosecutions. Further, the program  provides training for EOIR staff, including immigration judges, and  distributes a monthly newsletter about fraud related activity. Table 4  shows the total number of complaints received, the number of case files  opened, and the number of asylum-related case files opened from fiscal  year 2010 through fiscal year 2014. EOIR’s Fraud and Abuse Prevention  Program tracks the number of complaints it receives about potential  fraud, but does not create a formal case file if the complaint or request for  assistance can be closed quickly with minimal investment of staff time. As  a result, not every complaint has a corresponding file.
section_title: USCIS Has Not Assessed Fraud Risks across Affirmative Asylum Claims
paragraphs: USCIS  has not assessed fraud risks across the affirmative asylum  application process. The Fraud Framework states that it is a leading  practice for agencies to create an organizational culture to combat fraud  at all levels and designate an entity to lead fraud risk management  activities, such as planning regular fraud risk assessments to determine a  fraud risk profile for their program.  There is no universally accepted  approach for conducting fraud risk assessments, since circumstances  among programs vary; however, assessing fraud risks generally involves  five actions: identifying inherent fraud risks affecting the program,  assessing the likelihood and impact of those fraud risks, determining  fraud risk tolerance, examining the suitability of existing fraud controls  and prioritizing residual fraud risks, and documenting the program’s fraud  risk profile. Depending on the nature of the program, the frequency with  which antifraud entities update the assessment can range from 1 to 5  years.
USCIS  officials stated that USCIS has not conducted an enterprise-wide  fraud risk assessment, as the agency has implemented individual  activities that demonstrate that it is conducting risk assessments.  According to USCIS officials, such activities include the prescreening of  asylum applications by FDNS immigration officers in advance of asylum  interviews, security and background checks of applicants, information  sharing agreements between the United States and other countries to  access records related to persons of interest, fraud training for asylum  officers, and mechanisms for the referral of cases to FDNS and to other  investigative entities. Investigations of fraud are usually conducted after  fraud has occurred and asylum may or may not have been granted. While  these efforts can help USCIS detect and investigate potential fraud in  individual asylum applications, they do not position USCIS to assess  fraud risks across the affirmative asylum application process. The  mentioned mechanisms are all tools with which to support a fraud risk  assessment; however, an enterprise-wide fraud risk assessment would  provide further information on the inherent risks across all applications.  For example, asylum officers face fraud risks because they must make  decisions, at times, with little or no documentation to support or refute an  applicant’s claim. As noted in the Fraud Framework, fraud risk  management activities such as a fraud risk assessment may be  incorporated into or aligned with internal activities and strategic objectives  already in place, and information on fraud trends and lessons learned can  be used to improve the design and implementation of fraud risk  management activities. Further, regular fraud risk assessments will help  identify fraud vulnerabilities before any actual fraud occurs, and allow  management to take steps to strengthen controls for fraud. Various cases  of asylum fraud demonstrate ways in which applicants and preparers  have sought to exploit the asylum system and help illustrate fraud risks in  the affirmative asylum application process, especially risks associated  with attorney and preparer fraud. For example,
As of March 2014, a joint fraud investigation led by the U.S. Attorney’s  Office for the Southern District of New York, the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI), the New York City Police Department, and USCIS,  known as Operation Fiction Writer, resulted in charges against 30  defendants, including 8 attorneys, for their alleged participation in  immigration fraud schemes in New York City. According to  discussions with USCIS  officials and a FBI press release, allegations  regarding these defendants generally involved the preparation of  fraudulent asylum applications that often followed one of three fact  patterns: (1) forced abortions performed pursuant to China’s family  planning policy; (2) persecution based on the applicant’s belief in  Christianity; or (3) political or ideological persecution, typically for  membership in China’s Democratic Party or followers of Falun Gong.  Attorneys and preparers charged in Operation Fiction Writer filed  5,773 affirmative asylum applications with USCIS, and USCIS  granted  asylum to 829 of those affirmative asylum applicants. According to  EOIR data, 3,709 individuals who were connected to attorneys and  preparers convicted in Operation Fiction Writer were granted asylum  in immigration court; this includes both affirmative asylum claims  referred from USCIS as well as defensive asylum claims.
An asylum fraud investigation prompted in 2009 and led by the Los  Angeles asylum office resulted in the indictment and subsequent  conviction of two immigration consultants. The indictment alleged that  the two consultants charged approximately $6,500 to prepare and file  applications on behalf of Chinese nationals seeking asylum in the  United States. These applications falsely claimed that the applicants  had fled China because of persecution for their Christian beliefs. HSI  investigators have linked the consultants to more than 800 asylum  applications filed since 2000.
In 2002, we reported that the legacy Immigration and Naturalization  Service (INS) did not know the extent of immigration benefit fraud.  In  response, INS initiated the Benefit Fraud Assessment program in 2002 to  measure the integrity of specific nonimmigrant and immigrant applications  by conducting administrative inquiries on randomly selected cases, but  later discontinued the effort because of competing priorities after the  terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. USCIS reinitiated the Benefit  Fraud Assessment program through FDNS in 2005 and, in November  2009, FDNS drafted a Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessment  (BFCA) on asylum for internal USCIS discussion. The assessment was  intended to study the scope and types of fraud associated with the Form  I-589, determine the relative utility of a number of fraud detection  methods, and assess the extent to which asylum officers were using the  fraud detection measures that were part of the adjudication process at the  time. However, FDNS did not release the report to external parties  because of questions about the validity and soundness of the  methodology used in the BFCA. In 2010, USCIS’s Office of Policy and  Strategy assumed responsibility for future BFCAs. USCIS contracted for a  review of the BFCA on asylum, and in September 2012, the contractor  reported that USCIS should not release the BFCA and made  recommendations to improve future studies. For example, the contractor  reported that the assessment process was not well planned and had  methodological problems and issues with clarity.
As of September 2015, officials from the Office of Policy and Strategy  stated that USCIS is renaming the BFCA as the Immigration Benefit  Fraud Assessment (IBFA). USCIS officials stated that under the new  IBFA program, they plan to design rigorous research methods to provide  fraud rates for selected benefit types. Office of Policy and Strategy  officials did not provide a timeframe regarding the completion of future  IBFA studies, and stated that USCIS has no plans to conduct an IBFA on  asylum because they are still working to develop a framework for  selecting which immigration benefits to study in the future. Office of Policy  and Strategy officials said that the IBFA is not a fraud risk assessment  and that their efforts will not be used to assess the risk of fraud in benefit  types but will, instead, estimate the fraud rate of a given benefit. USCIS  officials stated that they do not view the IBFA as a fraud risk assessment  and that asylum is more difficult to study than other immigration benefits  because asylum claims are generally based on testimonial evidence,  making it more difficult to prove fraud than with other claims, and involve  confidentiality restrictions.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that  entities should comprehensively identify risks at both the entity-wide and  activity levels. A risk assessment will help to determine how risks should  be managed through the identification and analysis of relevant risks  associated with achieving agency objectives.  Because USCIS must  balance its mission to protect those with genuine asylum claims with the  need to prevent ineligible individuals from fraudulently obtaining asylum,  USCIS  could benefit from assessing fraud risks across its asylum  adjudication process, particularly to assess the fraud risk tolerance of the  asylum system—a leading practice for assessing fraud risks. The Fraud  Framework states that managers who effectively assess fraud risks  attempt to fully consider the specific fraud risks the agency or program  faces, analyze the potential likelihood and impact of fraud schemes, and  document prioritized fraud risks. The aforementioned examples of fraud  investigations further illustrate the need for preventive measures of fraud  detection within the asylum program. In addition, risk tolerance reflects  management’s willingness to accept a higher level of fraud risk based on  the circumstances and objectives of the program. For example, to protect  genuine asylum applicants who may be unable to provide documents  supporting their applications, asylum law states that testimonial  information alone can be sufficient for asylum applicants to meet the  burden of proof for establishing asylum eligibility.
According to USCIS training materials for new asylum officers, asylum  officers are to interview applicants in a nonadversarial manner and  assume a cooperative approach as the applicant seeks to establish his or  her eligibility. USCIS instructs asylum officers, when assessing whether  an applicant has provided sufficient detail about his or her claim, to  account for the amount of time that has elapsed since the events  occurred; the possible effects of trauma; the applicant’s background,  education, and culture; and any other factors that might impair the  applicant’s memory. The Asylum Division Branch Chief said that while  this cooperative approach aims to protect genuine asylees, it can also  create favorable circumstances for ineligible individuals who seek to file  fraudulent claims, and asylum officers in seven of the eight asylum offices  we spoke with told us that they have granted asylum in cases in which  they suspected fraud. For example, three asylum offices said that it was  difficult to prove fraud existed in the asylum application. Although there  are individual efforts in place to detect fraud, an enterprise-wide  assessment of fraud risk could better inform asylum officers when  adjudicating cases, and influence training materials regarding such  subjects as country conditions. Without regularly assessing fraud risks  and determining the fraud risk tolerance of the USCIS asylum  adjudication process, USCIS does not have complete information on the  inherent fraud risks that may affect the integrity of the affirmative asylum  application process and therefore does not have reasonable assurance  that it has implemented controls to mitigate those risks. Moreover, given  the growth in affirmative asylum applications in recent years, and the  USCIS  pending caseload of over 100,000 affirmative asylum cases to  adjudicate, assessing program-wide fraud risks could help USCIS target  its fraud prevention efforts to those areas that are of highest risk in  accordance with its fraud risk tolerance.
section_title: EOIR Has Not Assessed Fraud Risks across Asylum Applications in the Immigration Courts
paragraphs: EOIR has not assessed the fraud risks associated with asylum  applications across immigration courts. EOIR’s immigration judges serve  as the sole adjudicators for all defensive asylum claims made in the  immigration courts and affirmative asylum applications referred by  USCIS’s  asylum officers. Asylum fraud-related cases mentioned below  have demonstrated that EOIR faces fraud risks in these claims. The  Fraud Framework states that it is a leading practice for agencies to create  an organizational culture to combat fraud at all levels and designate an  entity to lead fraud risk management activities, such as planning regular  fraud risk assessments to determine a fraud risk profile for their  program. EOIR officials told us that the Fraud and Abuse Prevention  Program has not assessed fraud risks across asylum applications in the  immigration courts because it lacks financial and human resources.  EOIR’s Fraud and Abuse Prevention Program is composed of one full- time fraud prevention counsel, who serves as the antifraud officer  pursuant to EOIR’s regulations, one part-time attorney, and several  student interns. Therefore, according to EOIR’s antifraud officer, the  Fraud and Abuse Prevention Program has primarily served as an in- house referral system for EOIR employees. EOIR officials also stated that  it would be difficult to conduct a fraud risk assessment across immigration  courts because fraud is difficult to measure.
EOIR has efforts in place to assess fraud identified and referred to the  Fraud and Abuse Prevention Program, such as reviewing fraud referrals  once received, reviewing records of proceedings, and making referrals to  law enforcement entities for investigation. However, recent asylum fraud  cases identified in the program’s case files illustrate the presence of fraud  risks across asylum applications in immigration courts. For example,  according to EOIR data, immigration judges granted asylum to 3,709  individuals who were connected to attorneys and preparers convicted in  Operation Fiction Writer. In addition, almost 20 percent (30 of 153) of  EOIR’s Fraud and Abuse Prevention Case files opened in fiscal year  2010 through fiscal year 2014 were related to asylum fraud. Further, 17 of  the 30 case files we reviewed contained multiple types of immigration  fraud, including document fraud and benefit fraud, as well as potential  fraud in connection with the unauthorized practice of law.  As discussed  above and in appendix II, the Fraud Framework states that it is a leading  practice for agencies to plan regular fraud risk assessments and  determine a fraud risk profile for their programs.  Managers who  effectively assess fraud risks attempt to fully consider the specific fraud  risks the agency or program faces, analyze the potential likelihood and  impact of fraud schemes, and document prioritized fraud risks. The Fraud  Framework states that it is a leading practice for an agency to designate  an antifraud entity as a repository of knowledge for fraud risk, and to tailor  its fraud risk assessments process to the program in question. Factors  such as size, resources, maturity of the program, and experience in  managing fraud risks can influence how an agency plans its fraud risk  assessment. Although quantitative techniques are generally more precise  than qualitative methods, when resource constraints, expertise, or other  circumstances prohibit the use of statistical analysis for assessing fraud  risks, other quantitative or qualitative techniques can still be informative.  For example, the Fraud Framework discusses the use of risk scoring to  quantify the likelihood and effect of particular fraud risks. Our analysis of  the Fraud and Abuse Prevention case files indicate that there are multiple  types of fraud that could be assessed through a fraud risk assessment  such as benefit fraud, marriage fraud, and fraud in connection with the  unauthorized practice of law.
We recognize that it can be difficult to measure or assess fraud risks and  that EOIR has limited resources for assessing and addressing such risks.  However, as noted in the framework, fraud risk management activities  such as a fraud risk assessment may be incorporated into or aligned with  internal activities and strategic objectives already in place, and  information on fraud trends and lessons learned can be used to improve  the design and implementation of fraud risk management activities.  Proactive fraud risk management would also mitigate the risk for fraud so  that it is less likely to occur. Without regularly identifying and assessing  fraud risks and determining the fraud risk tolerance in immigration courts,  EOIR does not have complete information on the inherent fraud risks that  may affect the integrity of the defensive asylum process and therefore  does not have reasonable assurance that it has implemented controls to  mitigate those risks.
In addition, as noted in our framework, fraud risk assessments can  provide partners and stakeholders with information that can also assist in  their operations and efforts. Managers who effectively manage fraud risks  collaborate and communicate with internal and external stakeholders to  share information on fraud risks, emerging fraud schemes, and lessons  learned related to fraud control activities. ICE OPLA attorneys are  responsible for presenting evidence of and proving fraud in immigration  court, and ICE HSI investigates cases of asylum fraud that are referred  from the immigration courts. EOIR officials said that its Office of Planning  Analysis and Statistics has previously provided data for OPLA attorneys  to assist in court proceedings and investigations when requested. ICE  OPLA attorneys we interviewed at all four of the field offices we visited  told us that if asylum fraud is detected, it is difficult to prove in immigration  court. Attorneys at two of the offices we visited stated that, in their  experience, proving fraud requires an immense amount of time and  evidence. ICE OPLA attorneys in one location stated that, as a result of  factors such as these, there is no incentive for them to litigate asylum  fraud cases. An EOIR fraud risk assessment could help ICE OPLA, for  example, better educate OPLA attorneys about fraud risks as they  represent the government in immigration court proceedings. Moreover,  managers can use the fraud risk assessment process to determine the  extent to which controls may no longer be relevant or cost-effective. Thus,  a fraud risk assessment would help EOIR ensure that it is targeting its  limited fraud prevention resources effectively.
section_title: USCIS Does Not Have Complete or Readily Available Data on FDNS’s Efforts to Combat Asylum Fraud
paragraphs: Within USCIS,  FDNS does not have complete or readily available data on  fraud referrals and requests for assistance from asylum officers and on its  asylum fraud-related investigations and the outcomes of those  investigations. First, with regard to data on fraud referrals and requests  for assistance from asylum officers, such data are not consistently  entered into the FDNS Data System (FDNS-DS), which is USCIS’s  agency-wide database for maintaining data and information on all FDNS  activities, including activities associated with asylum fraud investigations.  According to training materials for new asylum officers, if an asylum  officer has questions about a potential fraud indicator while adjudicating  an affirmative asylum claim, he or she can submit a request for  assistance to the FDNS immigration officers in his or her asylum office.  For example, FDNS may be able to provide additional information about  an asylum applicant by conducting searches of databases that asylum  officers cannot access. In addition, FDNS immigration officers can  conduct document reviews and analyses of the application to determine  whether fraud may exist. According to USCIS training materials for new  asylum officers, each asylum office may have a different process for  requesting assistance from FDNS. According to the training materials, as  well as FDNS immigration officers we spoke with in asylum offices,  officers typically deliver their responses to a request for assistance  informally, such as by orally communicating the results of their reviews to  asylum officers without supporting documentation. FDNS’s fraud  detection standard operating procedures state that requests for  assistance are to be entered into FDNS-DS. However, according to  FDNS officials in headquarters and field offices, these requests are not  consistently entered into FDNS-DS. Additionally, while the requests may  be tracked at the office level within individual asylum offices, they are not  otherwise tracked across individual offices by either the Asylum Division  or FDNS.
Moreover, according to the training materials for new asylum officers, in  cases where a fraud indicator cannot be quickly resolved by FDNS, such  as a suspicion of fraud or a complicated case needing more research by  FDNS, the asylum officer is to complete a Fraud Referral Sheet. After  receiving a referral, FDNS is to determine whether the referral has  sufficient information to warrant further investigation. According to  FDNS’s fraud detection standard operating procedures, FDNS  immigration officers are to enter all fraud referrals, including those that  they will decline, into FDNS-DS to accurately record the number of  referrals received, track their processing, and support quality assurance.  However, in practice, FDNS headquarters officials stated that officers  typically enter referrals into FDNS-DS as “leads” only if they warrant  additional investigation. While some FDNS immigration officers track  referrals at the asylum office level, not all referrals are entered into the  agency-wide FDNS-DS. As a result, FDNS-DS does not have complete  data on the number of fraud referrals or requests for assistance in each  asylum office or across asylum offices, making it difficult to determine the  extent to which asylum officers request assistance from FDNS on fraud- related questions or suspicions in adjudicating asylum applications.
Second, FDNS does not have readily available data on the number of  asylum fraud cases it investigates, the number of asylum fraud cases in  which FDNS immigration officers find asylum fraud, or the number of  asylum fraud cases that FDNS refers to HSI for further investigation.  According to FDNS’s fraud detection standard operating procedures, if  FDNS immigration officers determine that a referral warrants additional  investigation, they are to enter that referral into FDNS-DS as a fraud lead.  If, after conducting research and analyzing the information associated  with a lead, the immigration officer determines that a reasonable  suspicion of fraud is articulated and actionable, the lead is elevated to a  case. FDNS immigration officers may also enter a referral into the  database directly as a case if a reasonable suspicion of fraud is  articulated and actionable. According to FDNS officials, FDNS data entry  rules require that all immigration forms associated with an individual  under investigation be included with the individual’s FDNS-DS case. Not  every immigration form associated with an individual or case is the basis  for fraud in that case and a case may include multiple immigration forms.  For example, if FDNS opened a case about an individual who was  legitimately granted asylum, but who later committed marriage fraud, the  FDNS-DS case record would include both the legitimate asylum  application and the fraudulent marriage-based benefit application.  Furthermore, according to FDNS officials, when an immigration officer  first enters a case into FDNS-DS, he or she is to categorize the type of  fraud that is the subject of the case. For example, the officer would  categorize an asylum fraud case as “benefit fraud—asylum” in FDNS-DS.  However, FDNS officials stated that, because of the limitations of FDNS- DS, each case record can only reflect one type of fraud at a time,  although the system does have the capacity to record and report updates  if, for example, the type of fraud associated with a record is changed.   FDNS officials stated that a case that begins as an asylum fraud  investigation might ultimately result in a fraud finding or referral to HSI  based on another type of fraud, such as marriage fraud. FDNS officials  stated that if asylum fraud is not the most egregious type of benefit fraud  in a particular investigation, the investigation may not be categorized as  asylum fraud in FDNS-DS.
Because of the limitations of FDNS-DS, FDNS headquarters officials  stated that the number of FDNS-DS records categorized as “benefit  fraud—asylum” may not accurately represent the number of asylum fraud  investigations completed by FDNS or the number of asylum fraud cases  FDNS referred to HSI. FDNS headquarters officials stated that making  such a determination would require a manual review of each case record  in FDNS-DS categorized as “benefit fraud—asylum” or associated with an  I-589, the asylum application. Both of these data fields indicate that the  case record could be, but is not necessarily, related to an investigation of  asylum fraud. Without this manual review, a process that would be  extremely labor-intensive, FDNS cannot determine which immigration  forms or benefit types are the subject of an investigation or of a referral  from FDNS to HSI. According to FDNS data from FDNS-DS, in fiscal year  2014, FDNS opened 336 cases in which the individual implicated was  associated with an asylum application, either as the applicant or as an  attorney, preparer, or interpreter assisting the applicant, and FDNS found  fraud in 210 of those cases. However, FDNS cannot readily determine  how many of those cases involved asylum fraud without manually  reviewing each individual case.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that  agencies must have relevant, reliable, and timely information to determine  whether their operations are performing as expected. Without complete  data on the number of requests for assistance from asylum officers to  FDNS, the number of referrals that asylum officers submit to FDNS, and  the number of FDNS investigations that result in a finding of asylum fraud,  USCIS  officials cannot determine how often the fraud referral process is  used or how often it results in a finding of asylum fraud. Complete data on  these matters would also help support a fraud risk assessment, as  previously discussed, by giving USCIS additional information about fraud  schemes and trends from fraud detection activities so that officials can  ensure that fraud detection activities are appropriately tailored to the  agency’s risk profile.
section_title: USCIS Has Limited Capability to Detect Fraud in Affirmative Asylum Applications
subsections: section_title: USCIS’s Capability to Identify Patterns of Fraud across Asylum Applications is Limited
paragraphs: USCIS  uses various tools to attempt to identify fraud in specific  affirmative asylum applications. USCIS uses some of these tools, such as  biometric identity verification and biographic and biometric background  and security checks, on all asylum applications. These tools help asylum  officers identify fraud by confirming the applicant’s identity and identifying  prior criminal convictions, among other things. Further, the Asylum  Division and FDNS have some additional tools available that officers can  use to address cases with indicators of fraud; however, our analysis of  HSI  and USCIS data indicates that some of these tools are of limited  utility and use. Specifically, USCIS guidance for FDNS immigration  officers discusses the use of two fraud detection tools for verifying  applicants’ claims and supporting documents—the ICE HSI  Forensic  Laboratory and overseas verification. HSI’s Forensic Laboratory  specializes in determining the authenticity of documents and identifying  the presence of alterations within those documents. In particular, the  Forensic Laboratory specializes in verifying travel and identity documents,  such as passports, visas, driver’s licenses, and identification cards.  However, according to Forensic Laboratory guidance for document  submission issued in 2010, the Forensic Laboratory prioritizes matters of  national security, criminal violations, cases involving people who have  been detained, and cases involving multiple incidents related to organized  fraudulent activity. According to Forensic Laboratory officials, the  Forensic Laboratory may accept non-priority requests on a case-by-case  basis. Asylum applications, which are not criminal cases and usually  involve nondetained applicants, therefore generally do not fit within the  laboratory’s priorities, according to USCIS and ICE officials. Furthermore,  both FDNS and Forensic Laboratory officials stated that the Forensic  Laboratory generally cannot verify some types of documents commonly  submitted as support for asylum claims, such as foreign police reports  and medical records. Forensic Laboratory officials told us that these  documents are difficult to authenticate because the laboratory does not  have genuine exemplar documents for comparison purposes and  because the documents are typically not standardized and do not have  security features that can be verified by forensic examination. According  to HSI  and Asylum Division officials, neither the Forensic Laboratory nor  the Asylum Division tracks submissions to the Forensic Laboratory  specific to asylum applications; however, according to HSI data, USCIS  submitted 60 cases to the Forensic Laboratory in fiscal year 2014 across  all immigration benefits. Asylum officers we interviewed in all eight asylum  offices said that they rarely use the Forensic Laboratory, in part because  of untimely and inconclusive responses.
Asylum officers may also submit documents for overseas verification,  either by USCIS officers overseas or, in areas where USCIS does not  have an overseas presence, by State Department consular officers.  Overseas verification refers to the verification of events, education, or  work experience that occurred in a foreign country or the authentication of  a document or information that originated overseas. From fiscal years  2010 through 2014, asylum offices submitted 111 requests to either  USCIS  officers or State Department consular officers for overseas  verification. Asylum officers we interviewed in all eight asylum offices  stated that they rarely use overseas verification, in part because they do  not receive responses to their requests in a timely manner. In addition,  asylum confidentiality restrictions limit the extent to which asylum officers  can verify information overseas; USCIS and State Department personnel  generally cannot share information contained in or pertaining to an  asylum application outside the U.S. government in a manner that would  disclose the fact that the individual applied for asylum in the United  States. Furthermore, asylum officers told us that the outcome of asylum  adjudications rarely hinges on the authenticity of a single document, so  document verification may not change the outcome of a case.
Further, USCIS’s tools for detecting patterns of fraud across affirmative  asylum applications are limited because USCIS relies on a paper-based  system for asylum applications. After the applicant submits a paper Form  I-589 to USCIS,  Service Center personnel input certain biographic  information, such as the applicant’s name, date of birth, and nationality,  from the paper application into the RAPS database. Asylum office  personnel use RAPS to track the application’s status and facilitate  interview scheduling. In some cases, FDNS immigration officers can use  information from RAPS for fraud detection by creating reports of cases  with certain biographic characteristics, thereby identifying cases for  potential review. However, RAPS does not have the capability to detect  fraud trends because, while it captures biographic data about an asylum  applicant, it does not capture other key information that could be used to  detect fraud. Such information could include the applicant’s written  statement, the reason for the applicant’s claim, or the name of the  applicant’s interpreter. Asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers told  us that they can identify potential fraud by manually analyzing trends  across asylum applications they review. Because of USCIS’s reliance on  paper asylum applications, asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers  use ad hoc, labor-intensive methods to detect such trends among asylum  cases. For example, FDNS immigration officers at three of the eight  asylum offices stated that they photocopy asylum applications and  maintain hard-copy case files for analysis. In our 2008 report on the  asylum adjudication process, we surveyed asylum officers across all  asylum offices and found that 61 percent of asylum officers stated that  scanning all I-589s and using software to identify boilerplate language  and trends was “greatly needed,” and 16 percent said it was “moderately  needed.”
According to the FDNS Branch Chief for USCIS’s RAIO Directorate,  automated analytic capabilities for asylum applications, such as tools to  detect fraud indicators, would lead to significant increases in efficiencies  for fraud detection and investigation. For example, since 2014, FDNS has  been reviewing the asylum applications associated with Operation Fiction  Writer. FDNS does not have automated analytic tools to review  information. Rather, FDNS immigration officers must manually review  hundreds of asylum applications, requiring large investments of time and  resources. In our interviews with asylum officers, officers in all eight  asylum offices stated that they would benefit from greater access to  analytic tools. According to the FDNS Branch Chief for RAIO, an  automated analytic capability for asylum applications is a “critical need”  for fraud detection.
As we previously reported, in 2005, USCIS embarked on its multiyear  Transformation Program to transform its paper-based immigration  benefits process to a system with electronic application filing,  adjudication, and case management. The main component of the  program is the USCIS  Electronic Immigration System (ELIS), which is to  provide case management for adjudication of immigration benefits.  However, USCIS  has faced longstanding challenges in implementing its  Transformation Program, which raise questions about the extent to which  its eventual deployment will position USCIS to collect and maintain more  readily-available data. In May 2015, we reported that USCIS expects the  Transformation Program will cost up to $3.1 billion and be fully deployed  no later than March 2019, which is an increase of approximately $1  billion, and a delay of more than 4 years from its initial July 2011  baseline. USCIS’s most recent Life Cycle Cost Estimate for the  Transformation Program states that USCIS will not complete deploying  functional capabilities for USCIS’s humanitarian mission, which includes  asylum, until September 2018. Officials from USCIS’s Transformation  Program told us that, as of June 2015, they have not yet developed  business requirements for asylum adjudication in USCIS ELIS or  determined how USCIS ELIS implementation will affect asylum  adjudications because they are currently focused on developing and  deploying USCIS ELIS for other immigration benefits.
Because USCIS has not yet developed business requirements for asylum  in USCIS ELIS, it is too early to assess how the information contained in  USCIS  ELIS could facilitate USCIS’s asylum fraud detection efforts.  Additionally, as we reported in May 2015, USCIS’s ability to effectively  monitor USCIS  ELIS program performance and make informed decisions  about its implementation has been limited because department-level  governance and oversight bodies were not using reliable program  information to inform their program evaluations.  The Fraud Framework  states that it is a leading practice for agencies to use data analytics to  identify and monitor trends that may indicate fraud and use information to  improve fraud risk management activities, such as addressing control  vulnerabilities and improving training.  Identifying and implementing  additional fraud detection tools, such as automated analytic software,  could enable FDNS and asylum officers to detect fraud more readily while  using limited resources more efficiently. Without such tools, FDNS  immigration officers are not well positioned to identify cases associated  with particular asylum fraud rings or aid in the investigation and  prosecution of the attorneys, preparers, and interpreters who perpetrate  asylum fraud.
section_title: FDNS Prescreens Asylum Applications in Some, but Not All, Asylum Offices
paragraphs: Some asylum offices have strengthened their capability to detect and  prevent fraud by using FDNS immigration officers to prescreen affirmative  asylum applications; however, the use of this practice varies across  asylum offices. Prescreening applications, that is, reviewing the  application for potential fraud indicators in advance of the asylum  interview, allows FDNS to identify fraud trends and detect patterns that  may not be evident in a small sample of asylum applications. Asylum  officers we spoke with in all eight asylum offices stated that they face time  constraints in adjudicating asylum applications. For example, asylum  officers we spoke with in three asylum offices stated that they have  limited time to review the details of the applications that they are  adjudicating in advance of the applicant interview. Additionally, each  asylum officer adjudicates approximately eight affirmative asylum  applications per week. Therefore, an individual officer might not see  patterns of fraud in single applications that would be visible if he or she  were reviewing the entire universe of applications in each asylum office.  For example, asylum officers or supervisors we spoke with in six of eight  asylum offices stated that FDNS prescreening was, or would be, helpful in  identifying fraud indicators or fraud trends.
USCIS  training materials state that it is important to identify indicators of  fraud before the applicant’s interview so that asylum officers can ask  appropriate questions during the interview. Before an interview, asylum  officers can consult with their supervisors or FDNS about indicators of  potential fraud in an application; however, they are not required to do so.  As previously discussed, consistent with the REAL ID Act of 2005,  credible testimony from the asylum applicant may be sufficient, without  corroboration, for the applicant to receive asylum.  Asylum officers are to  raise discrepancies, inconsistencies, or identified fraud in the asylum  application during the interview, and upon completion of the interview, the  applicant or the applicant’s representative must have an opportunity to  respond to the evidence presented. When FDNS does not prescreen  applications, the asylum officer is responsible for identifying potential  fraud in the application prior to the interview and using that information  during the interview to assess the applicant’s credibility unless he or she  temporarily pauses the interview to seek support from supervisors or  FDNS. After an interview, the asylum officer may call applicants back to  answer additional questions before a decision is rendered or conduct a  full reinterview with applicants. However, in two asylum offices,  supervisory asylum officers we spoke with stated that they prefer not to  reinterview applicants because doing so adds to their adjudication  backlog. Supervisory asylum officers we spoke with in three asylum  offices stated that they conduct reinterviews when needed or in particular  circumstances. In three offices where FDNS prescreens asylum  applications for indicators of fraud, FDNS immigration officers we spoke  with stated that FDNS provides information to the asylum officer about the  nature of the potential fraud in the application in advance of the applicant  interview. This allows the asylum officer to ask relevant questions during  the interview; gives the applicant the opportunity to provide an  explanation for any discrepancies, inconsistencies, or identified fraud in  the file; and ensures that the asylum officer is in the strongest position to  assess the credibility of the applicant. According to FDNS immigration  officers we spoke with in two asylum offices, prescreening also allows  FDNS to identify applications that are affiliated with attorneys, preparers,  or interpreters under FDNS investigation.
FDNS immigration officers we interviewed in five of the eight asylum  offices stated that they prescreen some affirmative asylum applications;  one asylum office prescreens all applications; and two asylum offices do  not prescreen applications. FDNS officials stated that staffing and  resource constraints, coupled with the increase in affirmative asylum  applications in recent years, have made it difficult for FDNS to prescreen  all asylum applications. For example, in January 2015, immigration  officers in one asylum office that does not prescreen asylum applications  developed a plan to begin prescreening, but were unable to implement  the plan because of a lack of administrative resources. In the five offices  that prescreen some applications, officers may select applications for  prescreening at random or based on certain characteristics such as the  applicant’s country of origin. Immigration officers set their own  prescreening priorities in most of these offices. In both offices that do not  prescreen affirmative asylum applications, FDNS officials stated that  prescreening would be helpful and is an effective system for identifying  fraud patterns but that resource constraints and national security priorities  have limited their ability to prescreen asylum applications. However, the  asylum office that prescreens all asylum applications is also the office that  received the most affirmative asylum applications from fiscal years 2010  to 2014, and from fiscal years 2010 to 2013, this office was staffed with  two full-time FDNS immigration officers, which is equal to or less than the  staffing of all other FDNS immigration officers in asylum offices in that  time period. This office was able to prescreen all asylum applications  even though it had similar staffing resources and a higher volume of  asylum applications than any other asylum office. Moreover, the head of  the Asylum Division stated that FDNS prescreening is helpful to asylum  officers and that he would like FDNS to prescreen all asylum applications  prior to the interview. The FDNS Branch Chief for RAIO also stated that  she supported more robust prescreening of affirmative asylum  applications and noted that the process would need to be tailored to the  specific needs and resource levels for each office.
According to the Fraud Framework, designing and implementing specific  control activities to prevent and detect fraud is a leading practice for  managers. Additionally, the framework states that preventive control  activities generally offer the most cost-effective investment of resources  and that, while targeted controls, such as prescreening, may be more  costly than agencywide controls, such as general fraud detection  responsibilities, targeted controls may lower the cost of identifying each  instance of fraud because they are more effective than controls that are  not targeted. Although prescreening asylum cases may require additional  time from FDNS immigration officers, it could ultimately help save time  and resources by helping FDNS officers build large-scale asylum fraud  investigations and detect new fraud patterns in a timely manner.  Moreover, prescreening could help save resources by identifying  indicators of fraud before the asylum interview. This would allow asylum  officers to ask relevant questions during the interview and reduce the  need for time-consuming reinterviews, in which the asylum office requests  that an applicant return for a second interview to address issues not  covered in the initial interview. Requiring that FDNS immigration officers  prescreen all affirmative asylum applications for indicators of fraud, to the  extent that it is cost-effective and feasible, would allow FDNS to better  detect any such indicators at the point where that information is most  useful for preventing asylum fraud.
section_title: FDNS Has Not Established Clear Responsibilities for Fraud Detection in Asylum Offices
paragraphs: FDNS has not established clear responsibilities related to fraud detection  for its immigration officers in asylum offices, and FDNS fraud detection  activities vary widely by asylum office. In March 2011, FDNS issued  standard operating procedures for fraud detection, which describe the  procedures that FDNS immigration officers are to follow when  investigating referrals related to immigration benefit fraud, as well as the  process for referring immigration benefit fraud cases to HSI or other  government or law enforcement agencies. These standard operating  procedures are intended to guide fraud detection in all USCIS  adjudications, including those at Service Centers and Field Offices, in  addition to asylum offices. However, the standard operating procedures  do not provide further details or guidance on the roles and responsibilities  of FDNS immigration officers working in asylum offices. According to  RAIO officials, FDNS immigration officers working in asylum offices face  unique fraud detection challenges and the standard operating procedures  state that immigration officers working in asylum offices must be sensitive  to the unique legal requirements and issues involved with asylee  processing, such as confidentiality requirements. FDNS immigration  officers we spoke with in all eight asylum offices stated that they have  limited guidance about their roles and responsibilities with respect to  fraud detection, and officers at seven of the eight offices stated that the  limited guidance creates challenges for them in addressing asylum  fraud.
Further, some of the processes outlined in the standard operating  procedures differ from the processes we observed FDNS immigration  officers following during our site visits to asylum offices. For example, the  procedures state that FDNS will refer single-scheme cases—that is,  individual cases of fraud—to HSI when they involve an attorney,  interpreter, or preparer. FDNS immigration officers we spoke with at  seven of eight asylum offices told us that they generally do not submit  single-scheme cases to HSI. HSI officials we spoke with confirmed that  they rarely accept single-scheme asylum fraud cases for investigation  because single-scheme cases are difficult to prosecute, and the penalties  for individual instances of fraud are low. In addition, FDNS immigration  officers at three asylum offices expressed confusion about whether they  were permitted to conduct site visits for asylum fraud investigations,  which the standard operating procedures list as one of the duties of an  immigration officer. Site visits allow FDNS immigration officers to verify  information presented in an asylum application, such as an applicant’s  home address. According to FDNS officials, immigration officers may  have been confused because they were not permitted to conduct site  visits in the past because of limited resources and concerns about officer  safety. However, in September 2015, FDNS headquarters officials stated  that officers are permitted to conduct site visits, as appropriate for case- specific needs, and the additional FDNS officers hired in 2014 helped  address prior resource constraints. Further, the standard operating  procedures do not discuss prescreening asylum cases in advance of the  asylum interview; however, as we previously stated, we found that  immigration officers at six of the eight asylum offices were prescreening  at least some asylum applications.
Additionally, FDNS’s fraud detection activities varied widely across the  eight asylum offices. For example, one asylum office we visited was  responsible for submitting 87 of the 111 total overseas verification  requests submitted by asylum offices from fiscal years 2010 through  2014. FDNS immigration officers at this office told us that they regularly  prescreened asylum cases for potential fraud indicators, tracked potential  fraud indicators in internal spreadsheets, submitted fraud referrals to HSI,  and testified about asylum fraud in immigration court at the request of ICE  OPLA trial attorneys. In another asylum office we visited, FDNS  immigration officers we spoke with told us that they devote “very little  time” to fraud detection and investigation because they focus on national  security priorities. Immigration officers at this office did not submit any  overseas verification requests from fiscal years 2010 through 2014, nor  do they regularly prescreen applications. Asylum officers from one asylum  office we spoke with said they report identified fraud trends to FDNS  immigration officers in their office, but FDNS does not take action on the  referrals or disseminate fraud trends or feedback regarding fraud  referrals. In another asylum office, asylum officers said that fraud referrals  and fraud trends are discussed informally between individual asylum and  FDNS officers.
USCIS  issued guidance in December 2014 detailing FDNS’s priorities for  immigration officers in the field for fiscal year 2015. The guidance states  that FDNS will develop, implement, and monitor policies and programs  that enhance USCIS’s ability to detect and resolve fraud issues.  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that a  good internal control environment requires that the agency’s  organizational structure clearly define key areas of authority and  responsibility and establish appropriate lines of reporting.  Furthermore,  the Fraud Framework states that effective managers of fraud risks  establish roles and responsibilities for fraud detection activities and  describe the fraud risk management activities intended to prevent, detect,  and respond to fraud as part of an overall antifraud strategy. According  to FDNS officials, FDNS did not think it was necessary to issue asylum- specific guidance for some fraud detection activities, such as site visits,  because the number of immigration officers assigned to asylum was so  small in the past that immigration officers had very little time for fraud  detection activities. However, between fiscal years 2014 and 2015, the  number of FDNS immigration officers working in asylum offices more than  doubled, from 18 to 39. This increase in staffing levels will allow FDNS  immigration officers to devote more time to detecting asylum fraud,  according to FDNS headquarters officials. Developing asylum-specific  guidance on the fraud detection roles and responsibilities of FDNS  immigration officers working in asylum offices would better position those  officers to understand their fraud detection roles and responsibilities, tools  that are available to them in carrying out those roles and responsibilities,  and features that are unique to the asylum system.
section_title: USCIS Provides Limited Fraud Training for Asylum Officers and Does Not Have a Mechanism for Conducting Ongoing Training Needs Assessments
subsections: section_title: USCIS Provides Limited Fraud Training for Asylum Officers
paragraphs: USCIS  training for asylum officers includes basic training for new asylum  officers and weekly training for all asylum officers; however, these  trainings include limited information on fraud as compared to other topics.  The training program for asylum officers is comprised of three main  components. First, new asylum officers participate in 3 weeks of self- paced RAIO Directorate and Asylum Division distance training in their  respective asylum offices. Distance training consists of webinars and  video teleconference presentations, and asylum officers are expected to  read the training materials and complete exercises and quizzes in  preparation for residential training. Second, asylum officers participate in  a 6-week residential basic training program, which includes 3 weeks of  RAIO Directorate training and 3 weeks of Asylum Division training. Both  courses include classroom instruction, practical exercises, and mock  interviews on a variety of topics, such as national security, case law,  children’s claims, gender-related claims, human trafficking, and  interviewing. At the end of the residential training courses, new asylum  officers must pass final exams about the course with a score of at least  70 percent. Third, USCIS policy requires asylum offices to allocate 4  hours per week for formal or informal training for asylum officers and  supervisory asylum officers. The training can range from classroom  instruction by the asylum office’s Training Officer to individual study time  that asylum officers can use to study case law, research country  conditions affecting prospective asylees, and read new USCIS  procedures and guidance. The Asylum Division requires Training Officers  to track the date and topic of each weekly training session and report that  information to Asylum Division headquarters on a quarterly basis.
Regarding the distance training and residential training for new officers,  USCIS’s  training materials include some information related to identifying  and addressing potential fraud. Specifically, the RAIO distance training  includes a webinar about fraud, and during the RAIO residential training  sessions, asylum officers receive classroom instruction on various topics  such as interviewing, evidence, and gender-related claims. Asylum  officers also participate in mock interviews.  In addition, the Asylum  Division residential training includes in-class instruction on the topics  mentioned above, as well as on fraud-related issues. Asylum officers  participate in practical exercises and mock interviews related to various  topics. Specifically, during the Asylum Division residential training  session, new asylum officers receive four hours of fraud training delivered  via PowerPoint slide presentations taught by various FDNS officials.  During this session, asylum officers also complete practical exercises  related to the fraud referral sheet. According to USCIS officials, although  each instructor has his or her own set of slides and may present the  information in different formats or use different asylum case examples,  the content of these slides does not vary among FDNS instructors and  the instructors teach a core set of principles in each class. We analyzed  the RAIO distance training webinar regarding fraud, as well as two  presentations that USCIS provided to us as examples of those used  during the Asylum Division’s training session. We found that the slides  contained information on fraud indicators and the fraud referral process  and, in particular, one PowerPoint presentation defined fraud, listed types  of asylum fraud, highlighted the FDNS fraud referral sheet, and provided  examples of prior fraud investigations.
While the distance and residential training sessions include materials  related to asylum fraud, these materials do not include the same level of  detail, depth, or breadth as the written training modules for other RAIO  and Asylum Division training sessions. These materials serve as  reference materials for asylum officers after they begin to adjudicate  cases. In particular, RAIO’s written training modules on other topics, such  as the modules on human trafficking and gender-related claims, provide  more robust discussions of each topic, contain links to relevant laws, and  include suggested supplemental reading materials. For example, the  human trafficking module and Asylum Division supplement contains lists  of suggested interview questions, a sample memo that asylum officers  can use to document human trafficking concerns, and a sample asylum  decision. The gender-related claims module contains substantive  definitions of eight types of gender-based harm, proposed interview  considerations and sample questions, and an extensive legal analysis of  such claims. The materials used for RAIO and Asylum Division training on  fraud provide useful information on how fraud is defined and how to make  referrals of suspected fraud to FDNS; however, these materials do not  include extensive definitions of fraud, a sample memo, a sample decision,  or sample interview questions. For example, our review of RAIO and  Asylum Division training materials showed that these materials do not  explain how asylum officers are to interview applicants when they suspect  fraud or document fraud when writing asylum decisions. Moreover,  supervisory asylum officers and asylum officers at six of the eight asylum  offices we spoke with stated that they need additional fraud training. In  particular, asylum officers in three offices cited a need for training on  interviewing applicants in cases where they suspect fraud, and officers  we spoke with at two offices cited a need for training on how to document  and substantiate fraud in asylum decisions.
Prior to 2012, USCIS had a written fraud training module. USCIS  redeveloped its asylum officer training in 2012 and, since that time,  neither the RAIO Directorate nor Asylum Division distance or residential  basic training course have been guided by a written module on asylum  fraud. Other USCIS materials refer asylum officers to the pre-2012 written  fraud training module, which is no longer in place. For example, the  Affirmative Asylum Procedures Manual refers asylum officers to the basic  training materials for further guidance and instruction on various subjects,  including how to address fraudulent evidence in an asylum application.  Further, five of the RAIO training modules on other topics—such as the  modules covering the affirmative asylum process and procedures,  decision making, and evidence—refer asylum officers to the pre-2012  fraud module for more details on how to address and detect fraud in  asylum applications. In September 2015, Asylum Division officials told us  that they were working to finalize an updated fraud training module, but  stated that the module required additional review before being finalized.  Officials were unable to provide a time frame for finalizing the module.  Officials previously attributed these delays to vacancies in the senior  FDNS positions overseeing RAIO and the Asylum Division who would  need to approve the updated module. As of March 2015, those positions  have been filled. In technical comments that USCIS provided to us on a  draft of this report, USCIS stated that it expected to finalize the written  training module by March 2016 and provide this training to asylum officers  by September 2016. While these plans are a positive step, it is too soon  to tell the extent to which the finalized module will address the limitations  we and asylum officers identified.
Regarding ongoing training for asylum officers, according to Asylum  Division officials, USCIS complements its basic training program by  providing weekly training sessions on a variety of topics, including fraud  issues. However, our analysis of quarterly Training Officer reports for all  eight asylum offices in fiscal year 2014 found that 8 of 408 training  sessions were reported as being dedicated to fraud, and four of the eight  asylum offices did not report providing dedicated specific fraud training in  fiscal year 2014. According to Asylum Division officials, many of the  weekly training sessions in fiscal year 2014 focused on credible and  reasonable fear because of the increased number of those cases.  According to our analysis of the training reports, the most common use of  weekly training time was staff meetings or cancellations of formal training  for the week, and the second most common use was information on  country conditions. According to Asylum Division officials, training on  country conditions can provide asylum officers with information they can  use to detect fraud in interviews; however, these trainings are not directly  focused on identifying fraud. Weekly training topics also included security  checks, immigration and asylum law, and USCIS policy changes. Three  asylum offices we spoke with said that weekly training was not helpful for  asylum adjudications. In one office, for example, officers stated that the  weekly training was not helpful for identifying fraud, and was a burden at  times because of their adjudication workload.
The Fraud Framework states that it is a leading practice for agencies to  design and implement specific controls to prevent and detect fraud, which  include fraud awareness initiatives such as training. Increasing  managers’ and employees’ awareness of potential fraud schemes  through training and education can serve a preventive purpose by helping  to create a culture of integrity and fraud deterrence. Providing asylum  officers with additional training on asylum fraud, including finalizing the  fraud training module and asylum division supplement for new asylum  officers, would better position to USCIS to ensure that asylum officers  have the training and skills needed to detect and address fraud indicators.
section_title: USCIS Does Not Have a Mechanism for Regularly Assessing Asylum Officer Training Needs
paragraphs: USCIS  has taken steps to assess training needs among asylum officers;  however, USCIS has not conducted an agencywide training needs  assessment for asylum officers since 2010. In 2008, we recommended  that the Chief of the Asylum Division develop a framework for soliciting  information in a structured and consistent manner on asylum officers’ and  supervisors’ respective training needs. In response to our  recommendation, USCIS delivered an online training needs assessment  to asylum officers and supervisors in July 2010 and committed to creating  a training agenda by soliciting and evaluating training needs and priorities  annually thereafter. However, USCIS has not conducted regular training  needs assessments since 2010. In 2012, as part of an effort to redesign  its training programs, RAIO hired an independent contractor to identify  critical skills for RAIO officers, develop strategies to deliver training  content, and support the development of new officer exams.  However,  the exercise was a one-time effort, not an ongoing mechanism. As of April  2015, RAIO and Asylum Division officials stated that they collect feedback  from new asylum officers immediately following each basic training  course using an online survey collection tool. Asylum officers are  encouraged to fill out a questionnaire related to the course and the  instructor after each basic training module. At the conclusion of distance  and residential training, RAIO officials compile the feedback and discuss  ways to improve future sessions. However, both Asylum Division and  RAIO officials stated that they review survey results as they are collected  after each session rather than tracking trends across multiple classes of  participants. Furthermore, asylum officers cannot use this feedback  mechanism once they return to their asylum offices and begin  adjudicating cases. According to RAIO officials, in June 2015, RAIO  began developing a new post-training survey to assess the effectiveness  of basic training for new officers. As of September 2015, the survey  instrument is in draft form and undergoing internal review. RAIO officials  said they plan to survey participants from the calendar year 2015 basic  training program, and may include participants who attended basic  training prior to 2015. However, RAIO officials stated that, like the online  surveys following basic training modules, this survey will be limited to new  asylum officers.
Asylum Division officials stated that they collect information on training  needs through monthly calls with Training Officers in each asylum office,  as well as a recently implemented Quality Workplace Initiative to allow  asylum officers to provide feedback within asylum offices on any topic or  issue. However, the Asylum Division does not request information on  training needs from the officers themselves on a regular basis and has  not formally analyzed officer training needs over time. Further, the Asylum  Division does not specifically solicit feedback on training needs through  the Quality Workplace Initiative. Asylum Division officials stated that they  previously collected feedback from new officers several months after they  returned from basic training, but they discontinued this practice because  of low response rates and a lack of resources. Asylum Division officials  stated that it is difficult to devote resources to assessing the training  needs of existing asylum officers when much of the Asylum Division’s  training resources are devoted to training newly hired asylum officers.  GAO’s Guide for Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the  Federal Government states that evaluating training can aid decision  makers in managing scarce resources and provide agencies information  to systematically track the cost and delivery of training and assess the  benefits of these efforts. Further, Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government states that effective management of an  organization’s workforce includes relevant training and that management  must continually assess and evaluate its internal control activities to  ensure that the control activities being used are effective and updated  when necessary.
During our interviews with asylum officers and RAIO and Asylum Division  officials, the perspectives regarding the effectiveness of the training  program varied. Both RAIO and Asylum Division officials said that the  asylum officer basic training was sufficient and thoroughly prepared  officers to adjudicate cases; however, officers we spoke with in six of  eight asylum offices stated that the basic training was insufficient.  Specifically, asylum officer perspectives on the sufficiency of their training  on credibility differed from those of RAIO and Asylum Division officials.  According to Asylum Division officials, training on credibility provides  information to asylum officers on how, for example, they can ask  questions during interviews to determine whether an applicant’s claim is  credible. Suspected contradictions in an applicant’s testimony may  indicate credibility concerns or fraud. Therefore, officials stated that  ongoing training related to credibility is crucial for new officers. However,  asylum officers we spoke with in seven of the eight asylum offices stated  that USCIS’s  credibility training is insufficient for asylum officers. Both  RAIO and Asylum Division basic training includes modules on credibility;  however, as of June 2015, the Asylum Division’s credibility training  materials were under revision. Although the draft credibility training  materials we analyzed discussed legal standards of credibility and case  law analysis, the lesson plan contained blank sections, and unlike other  RAIO and Asylum Division training materials, did not include sample  decisions, or memos asylum officers can use to document such concerns.  According to our analysis of the weekly training reports, 11 of 408 training  sessions were reported as being dedicated to credibility determinations.
The Guide for Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal  Government states that agencies should be able to evaluate training and  development programs and demonstrate how these efforts help develop  employees and improve the agencies’ performance. Additionally,  because the evaluation of training and development programs can aid  decision makers in managing scarce resources, our guide notes the  importance of agencies’ need for developing evaluation processes that  systematically track the cost and delivery of training and development  efforts and assess the benefits of these efforts. USCIS does not have  mechanisms in place to allow asylum officers to provide feedback about  training needs after they begin adjudicating cases, making it difficult for  Asylum Division headquarters officials to regularly obtain perspectives  from asylum officers and supervisory officers about asylum officer  training. In addition, asylum officers at one asylum office we spoke with  said that a training feedback loop would improve training for asylum  officers by allowing them to make suggestions for future training. Asylum  officers within that office said they have made training requests to  supervisors in the past, but did not see any follow-up or improvements as  a result of their suggestions. Developing and implementing a mechanism  to regularly collect feedback from asylum officers and supervisory asylum  officers on their training needs would provide USCIS with insights to help  the agency better evaluate its training program, and enhance the training  courses based on asylum officer feedback.
section_title: USCIS Does Not Have Readily Available Data on Asylum Officer Attrition
paragraphs: According to the Chief of the Asylum Division and other senior division  officials, it has been difficult for USCIS to retain asylum officers because  of the challenging nature of the position and the variety of other career  opportunities available to asylum officers; however, USCIS does not  systematically collect or analyze attrition data for asylum officers—a key  component of strategic workforce planning. Asylum Division officials told  us they use DHS’s staffing database, the Table of Organization Position  System (TOPS), to track net asylum officer staffing changes for each  fiscal year. However, these officials stated that this database does not  capture comprehensive asylum officer attrition rates. For example,  Asylum Division officials stated that TOPS does not track total hiring for  each position type within the division and does not record departures from  the asylum officer position when officers transfer within USCIS. Asylum  Division officials also stated that they collect information monthly from  each asylum office on all personnel changes, including new hires,  transfers, and departures. However, Asylum Division officials told us that  they do not collect these data in a systematic manner and rely on asylum  offices to manually collect and report them to headquarters. In April 2015,  we requested asylum officer attrition data from the Asylum Division for  fiscal years 2010 through 2014. At the conclusion of our audit work, in  September 2015, the Asylum Division provided updated attrition data that  officials stated were reliable. These data differed significantly from the  initial data provided in August 2015. Asylum Division officials stated that  they had compiled these data by manually reviewing all personnel  changes in the Asylum Division for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, a  process that was labor-intensive and required several weeks to complete.
Asylum officers and supervisory asylum officers we interviewed stated  that, from their perspectives, attrition is high among asylum officers and  this poses several challenges in effectively adjudicating asylum  applications. For example, they stated that attrition has increased time  pressures on each officer as asylum officers resign or transfer out of the  Asylum Division. Officers we interviewed at all eight asylum offices told us  that they face pressure from time constraints, which affects their ability to  devote time to detecting fraud in asylum applications. In addition,  according to senior Asylum Division officials, attrition requires USCIS to  hire new, inexperienced officers who are not as knowledgeable about  how to detect asylum fraud as more experienced officers. Supervisory  asylum officers we spoke with told us that fraud detection is a skill honed  through experience, and that newer asylum officers hired as a result of  increased attrition are less skilled at being able to detect fraud in asylum  applications. Asylum Division officials told us that they have faced  challenges because of attrition and are working to reduce attrition among  asylum officers. For example, Asylum Division officials told us that they  created a new “senior asylum officer” position in 2014 to provide greater  opportunity for advancement and have worked to support staff through  training and mentoring programs. However, without reliable attrition data,  it is difficult for USCIS  to assess the effectiveness of these efforts in  retaining staff.
Key Principles of Effective Strategic Workforce Planning states that  federal agencies should develop a strategic workforce plan that  incorporates management, employee, and stakeholder input, and  identifies critical skills and competencies needed to achieve  programmatic goals. Further, the strategic workforce plan should  address gaps in the number of staff, ensure that administrative and  educational requirements are supporting workforce planning strategies,  and monitor and evaluate progress toward programmatic goals. Without  reliable, readily-available attrition data, USCIS does not have the  information needed to develop an effective workforce planning strategy to  determine the number of staff needed to address the increase in  affirmative asylum applications and the applications backlog.
section_title: USCIS Could Enhance Its Quality Assurance Processes by Examining for Indicators of Fraud
paragraphs: USCIS  has implemented some quality assurance procedures for asylum  decisions that are designed to ensure asylum officers’ decisions are  legally sufficient. However, USCIS’s random quality assurance reviews of  asylum cases do not include examination of potential indicators of fraud in  the case file. USCIS  has a three-tiered framework for conducting quality  reviews of asylum decisions.
First, the Asylum Division requires a supervisory asylum officer to  review every case file to assess whether the asylum officer’s decision  is supported by law and the asylum officer followed proper  procedures. For fiscal year 2014, USCIS also released new guidelines  for asylum officer performance evaluation, which specify that  supervisory asylum officers are to evaluate and provide feedback on  whether asylum officers appropriately referred fraud indicators to  FDNS and submitted fraudulent documents to the Forensic  Laboratory or for overseas verification.
Second, the Asylum Division’s Quality Assurance Branch requires that  asylum offices submit certain types of cases to Asylum Division  headquarters for review. According to Quality Assurance Branch  officials, these reviews focus on sensitive asylum cases, such as  cases involving complex issues of law or cases that could result in  particularly negative outcomes if the applicant is improperly denied  asylum, such as cases involving a juvenile. For example, as of July  2015, the Quality Assurance Branch requires asylum offices to submit  to headquarters all cases for which the principal applicant is under 18  years of age and the officer had decided not to grant asylum.  Our  review of Quality Assurance Branch data found that, from fiscal years  2010 through 2014, the Quality Assurance Branch reviewed 5,696  applications. The most common type of application reviewed (3,213)  involved juvenile applicants. The next most common reviews were of  applications granted by an asylum officer for applicants from a country  contiguous to the United States (Canada or Mexico) that relate to  “novel” legal issues or criminal activity by the applicant in the United  States or abroad (829 cases), applications that USCIS determined are  likely to be publicized (425), and applications involving potential  national security or terrorism risks (414).
Third, each asylum office has a Training Officer, who, in addition to  developing weekly training for asylum officers, also plays a quality  assurance role. However, the extent of this function varies from office  to office. Training Officers in six of the eight asylum offices stated that  they generally review cases that are required to be submitted for  headquarters review. None of the Training Officers we interviewed  conducted random reviews of asylum applications and none reviewed  applications for indicators of fraud, according to our interviews and  observations.
In 2008, we reported that although the Asylum Division had a quality  review framework to ensure the quality and consistency of asylum  decisions, local quality assurance reviews did not always occur.  We  recommended that USCIS develop a plan to more fully implement its  quality review framework to, among other things, ensure that a sample of  decisions was reviewed for quality and consistency. DHS concurred with  the recommendation and, in response, in April 2009, the Asylum Division  developed a program plan for reviewing a sample of asylum officers’  decisions and subsequently piloted the materials it developed for  implementing the program. Over a 2-year period in 2012 and 2013, the  RAIO Directorate reviewed a sample of decisions from each of the eight  offices. Since that time, USCIS  has not reviewed further samples of  asylum decisions because it is still implementing the action items that  resulted from the previous review and because RAIO plans to study  credible fear in its next review. RAIO officials told us they tentatively plan  to conduct another review of a random sample of affirmative asylum  cases in 2017.
However, USCIS’s  random quality assurance reviews of asylum  applications do not include examination for fraud or fraud indicators.  RAIO’s 2012-2013 random review of asylum decisions did not include  fraud because, according to RAIO officials, asylum officers should have  referred any cases with fraud indicators to FDNS. The Asylum Division’s  reviews of specific types of asylum applications are not random and do  not include a review for fraud indicators. Asylum Division officials told us  that they do not conduct random reviews of all asylum cases because  they have already implemented 100 percent supervisory review of asylum  decisions in the field. Furthermore, the Asylum Division’s review does not  include a review for fraud indicators because, according to Asylum  Division officials, fraud is not a component of legal sufficiency in asylum  decisions. The Fraud Framework states that ongoing monitoring and  periodic evaluation provide assurances to managers that they are  achieving the objectives of fraud prevention, detection, and response. For  instance, monitoring and evaluation activities can support managers’  decisions about allocating resources and can help managers to  demonstrate their commitment to effectively managing fraud risks.  Although supervisory review is an important step in fraud detection and  quality assurance, it does not position USCIS to ensure quality and  consistency across supervisors and asylum offices, does not provide  insight into quality concerns across the Asylum Division, and does not  allow USCIS  to evaluate whether supervisors are reviewing cases for  fraud appropriately. Given USCIS’s plans to conduct future random  reviews of asylum applications, including an examination of possible fraud  indicators in such reviews would help strengthen USCIS’s oversight of  officers’ adjudication of asylum applications and supervisory asylum  officers’ reviews of the officers’ adjudications. Random reviews for fraud  would also help USCIS evaluate how effectively supervisory asylum  officers are implementing the new fiscal year 2014 performance  evaluation guidelines for addressing fraud.
section_title: DHS and DOJ Have Implemented Mechanisms to Address Identified Fraud, but Use of These Mechanisms Has Been Limited
subsections: section_title: DHS and DOJ Rarely Pursue Criminal Penalties or Discipline Attorneys for Fraud Criminal Penalties
paragraphs: Law enforcement agencies can pursue criminal charges against  individuals who commit asylum fraud; however, according to an official  from the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, individual asylees who  commit asylum fraud may be subject to removal proceedings, but are not  generally criminally prosecuted. Under the terms of a memorandum of  agreement between USCIS and ICE, HSI has the right of first refusal to  investigate all FDNS fraud referrals. However, FDNS immigration officers  we interviewed in six of eight asylum offices reported that HSI rarely  accepts asylum fraud referrals from FDNS, or that HSI accepts asylum  fraud referrals and then does not pursue them or closes them without  further investigation. In four of the eight asylum offices, FDNS  immigration officers referred 0 or 1 asylum fraud cases to HSI from fiscal  years 2010 to 2014. In one asylum office, FDNS immigration officers  reported that HSI had not accepted a referral from FDNS in the previous  2 years, and that the U.S. Attorney’s Office, which is responsible for  prosecuting asylum fraud cases, does not generally accept asylum fraud  referrals. The understanding of these FDNS officers was that the U.S.
Attorney’s Office in that district prefers to have at least 100 asylum  applicants connected to an asylum fraud case before the office will  consider prosecution. According to FDNS officials, fraud cases  associated with 100 or more asylum applicants provide for sentencing  enhancements, which is one of the factors that influence the willingness  of HSI  and U.S. Attorney’s Offices to accept a case. In another asylum  office, FDNS immigration officers reported that HSI had not accepted an  asylum fraud case for investigation since 2010. From fiscal years 2010 to  2014, FDNS immigration officers working in asylum offices referred 40  cases to HSI;  however, as discussed above, FDNS cannot determine  how many of these cases involved asylum fraud. In fiscal year 2014, HSI  initiated 37 asylum fraud investigations, which resulted in 7 criminal  arrests, 6 indictments, and 4 convictions.
ICE headquarters officials stated that criminal investigations for asylum  fraud are more likely to be brought against attorneys, preparers, and  interpreters who perpetrate large-scale asylum fraud than against  individuals. For example, in April 2014, an immigration consultant who  was linked by HSI  to more than 800 asylum applications filed since 2000  in the Los Angeles Asylum Office was sentenced to 4.5 years in federal  prison after pleading guilty to conspiracy, immigration document fraud,  and aggravated identity theft. HSI began investigating this individual’s  business in 2009. HSI agents in all four of the locations we visited stated  that they face challenges in investigating asylum fraud cases, such as  competing priorities, confidentiality restrictions, and low interest from the  U.S. Attorney’s Offices that prosecute these immigration-related criminal  cases. The FBI has also pursued asylum fraud investigations such as  Operation Fiction Writer; according to FDNS officials, the asylum office  sent repeated referrals to HSI about the asylum fraud ring associated with  Operation Fiction Writer from 2005 to 2009. In 2009, HSI requested that  the asylum office stop sending it information about Operation Fiction  Writer, at which time the asylum office began working with the FBI to  pursue the case. As of March 2014, 30 individuals had been charged in  connection with Operation Fiction Writer. According to HSI field office  officials, asylum fraud prosecutions are time and labor-intensive and  typically do not result in lengthy prison sentences; as a result, both HSI  and the U.S. Attorney’s Office tend to focus on large-scale asylum fraud  rings, such as those involving attorneys, preparers, and interpreters,  rather than individual applicants. Because HSI does not prioritize  investigations of single instances of asylum fraud, FDNS immigration  officers we interviewed in seven of the eight asylum offices stated that  they generally do not submit single-scope cases, in which only one  individual is implicated in the fraudulent activity, to HSI.
subsections: section_title: Attorney Discipline and Disbarment
paragraphs: EOIR’s Disciplinary Counsel can pursue a variety of penalties against  attorneys who perpetrate asylum fraud in immigration courts.  However,  as of June 2015, the EOIR Disciplinary Counsel has not taken action to  publicly discipline any attorney for having committed immigration fraud  who had not already been disbarred by his or her state bar authority.  EOIR’s Disciplinary Counsel has jurisdiction over the regulation of  practitioners, who are private immigration attorneys, and other accredited  representatives authorized to practice before the BIA and the immigration  courts. The Disciplinary Counsel investigates complaints about  practitioners who may be engaging in criminal, unethical, or  unprofessional conduct or in frivolous behavior before EOIR and takes  disciplinary action, as appropriate. The Disciplinary Counsel works closely  with EOIR’s Fraud and Abuse Prevention Program, although the  Disciplinary Counsel seeks to impose disciplinary sanctions against  practitioners, while the Fraud and Abuse Prevention Program can refer  cases to ICE HSI  or other law enforcement agencies for criminal  investigation. The Disciplinary Counsel may choose to resolve potential  disciplinary issues prior to issuance of a Notice of Intent to Discipline by  taking certain confidential actions against a practitioner. Such confidential  discipline includes warning letters or informal admonitions for low-level  misconduct or for first-time offenders. According to EOIR’s Disciplinary  Counsel, confidential discipline is intended to educate the lawyer about  what he or she did wrong and how to improve conduct in the future.  Public discipline imposed by the BIA includes a range of disciplinary  actions, such as public censure, suspension, or disbarment. Disbarment,  in which an attorney is prohibited from practicing law before EOIR’s  immigration courts and the BIA, is the most severe disciplinary sanction  that the BIA can impose. According to the Disciplinary Counsel, to date,  the Disciplinary Counsel has not prosecuted any original jurisdiction  cases to the point of disbarment, which means that the Disciplinary  Counsel has not requested disbarment for any attorneys who engaged in  asylum fraud and who were not already disbarred by their state bar or a  federal court. Disciplinary Counsel officials stated that they have not  initiated any original jurisdiction disbarments against attorneys in part  because of a lack of administrative resources to pursue such cases. The  Disciplinary Counsel has completed reciprocal disciplinary cases, in  which attorneys who may have engaged in fraud and have already been  suspended or disbarred by their state bar or by a federal court, or who  have been convicted of a crime, are also disbarred by EOIR. An attorney  who has been disbarred by a state bar or a federal court is permitted to  practice before the immigration courts until EOIR takes the proper  reciprocal action.
section_title: Circuit Court Rulings and Agency Priorities Play a Role in Recent Decreases in Asylum Terminations due to Fraud
paragraphs: Asylum terminations due to fraud are not common and have decreased in  recent years. USCIS data indicate that USCIS terminated the asylum  status of 374 individuals for fraud from fiscal years 2010 through 2014. In  the same time period, USCIS granted asylum to 76,122 individuals. The  number of USCIS  asylum terminations for fraud has decreased in recent  years, from 103 in fiscal year 2010 to 34 in fiscal year 2014. If a final  order by an immigration judge or the BIA specifically finds that the  individual knowingly filed a “frivolous” asylum application and the  individual initially received a warning regarding the consequences of filing  a frivolous application, then he or she will be barred from receiving future  immigration benefits.
Asylum Division officials attributed the decrease in asylum terminations  due to fraud from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2014 to several factors.  First, according to Asylum Division officials, USCIS made several policy  changes in order to comply with two decisions of the United States Court  of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In Robleto-Pastora v. Holder, the court  noted the BIA’s conclusion that asylees who adjust to LPR status no  longer qualify as asylees and held, among other things, that an alien who  has previously adjusted to LPR status retains that status unless he or she  receives a final order of removal.  Accordingly, a former asylee who had  already adjusted to LPR would no longer have asylum status to  terminate. According to Asylum Division officials, USCIS changed its  policy nationwide in June 2012 and no longer pursues termination of  asylum status for fraud after someone has adjusted to LPR.
In June 2012, USCIS developed a process, called Post Adjustment  Eligibility Review, for addressing suspected fraud with respect to former  asylees who have already adjusted to LPR. Under the Post Adjustment  Eligibility Review process, an FDNS immigration officer reviews adverse  information about the individual, documents a summary of findings, and  forwards the file to an asylum officer. An asylum officer then reviews the  evidence to determine whether sufficient evidence of fraud exists, and, if  a preponderance of the evidence supports the finding of fraud, forwards  the case to ICE OPLA, which reviews the case and determines whether  the individual should be placed in removal proceedings.
Additionally, in Nijjar v. Holder (August 2012), the Ninth Circuit held that  only the Attorney General has the authority to terminate asylum status  because Congress did not confer authority to terminate asylum on  DHS. On the basis of this ruling, USCIS does not have the authority to  terminate an individual’s asylum status in the Ninth Circuit, which includes  the Los Angeles and San Francisco asylum offices. Subsequently, in  August 2012, the BIA noted that no other circuits currently share the Ninth  Circuit’s position that DHS lacks authority to terminate asylum, and the  case before it arose within the Second Circuit; as a result, it would “only  apply Nijjar within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit.”  Therefore,  Asylum Division officials stated that USCIS applied the Nijjar ruling only in  the asylum offices located within the Ninth Circuit—San Francisco and  Los Angeles. Asylum Division officials stated that these two decisions in  the Ninth Circuit resulted in a decrease in the number of terminations  conducted by USCIS because, prior to these decisions, USCIS would  pursue termination of the asylum status of individuals who had adjusted  to LPR nationwide and was able to terminate asylum status in the Ninth  Circuit.
Second, Asylum Division officials stated that increases in the number of  affirmative asylum, credible fear, and reasonable fear applications in  recent years have strained resources in the Asylum Division, the  immigration courts, and ICE OPLA. Terminations are time and labor- intensive, according to Asylum Division officials, and there are fewer  resources available to pursue them than in the past because of the  increased asylum caseload. In seven of the eight asylum offices, asylum  officers we spoke with stated that terminations are not a priority.
Third, Asylum Division officials stated that individuals who lose their  asylum status because of fraud generally would not fit within the  Secretary of Homeland Security’s enforcement priorities, making the  likelihood very low that they would be removed from the United States  after their asylum status has been terminated. DHS’s enforcement and  removal priorities focus on the removal of aliens who pose a threat to  national security, border security, and public safety.
On the basis of our analysis of USCIS, EOIR, and ICE Enforcement and  Removal Operations data, we found that 14 of the 374 people who had  their asylum status terminated for fraud from fiscal years 2010 through  2014 were indicated as having been removed from the country by ICE  Enforcement and Removal Operations as of March 2015; 4 were granted  voluntary departure; and 20 had been ordered removed by an  immigration judge, but ICE had not yet removed them.
section_title: USCIS Has Not Tracked Asylum Cases Pending Termination Due to Fraud and Has Limited Goals for Terminations
paragraphs: USCIS  has taken some steps to address asylum cases pending  termination due to fraud but has not tracked these cases or established  goals for completing termination cases. The Asylum Division receives  information about potential asylum fraud from a variety of sources,  including USCIS offices that adjudicate asylees’ applications for other  immigration benefits such as adjustment to LPR and naturalization, and  information arising from criminal investigations into attorneys, preparers,  and interpreters suspected of engaging in asylum fraud. After receiving  such information, the asylum office with jurisdiction over the asylee’s  place of residence reviews the case to assess whether to pursue  potentially terminating the individual’s asylum status, and, if a  preponderance of the evidence supports a finding of fraud, sends the  asylee a Notice of Intent to Terminate and schedules a termination  interview. However, the Asylum Division does not begin to track cases  pending potential termination until the asylum office issues a Notice of  Intent to Terminate. The implementation of asylum office procedures for  addressing terminations across asylum offices varies. For example, in  one office, asylum officers maintain hard copies of the files pending  termination in a particular area of the office’s file room. In another office,  asylum officers maintained a spreadsheet of pending termination cases.  In other offices, there is an asylum officer responsible for handling  terminations, typically on a part-time basis. However, the Asylum Division  does not track the number of cases that are pending review for potential  termination across asylum offices, making it difficult for USCIS to know  how many of such cases exist and are pending review. The Fraud  Framework states that it is important for agencies to ensure that the  response to fraud is prompt and consistently applied. Moreover, the  Fraud Framework states that monitoring response activities helps ensure  that the response to identified fraud is prompt and consistently applied.  Monitoring fraud response activities, such as tracking asylum cases  pending termination due to fraud, could help the Asylum Division ensure  that cases pending termination due to fraud are managed promptly and  consistently. Asylum Division officials told us that they have identified a  need for greater tracking of cases pending termination review to better  address requests for the asylees’ files from other USCIS offices. In May  2015, Asylum Division officials requested a modification to RAPS that  would give asylum officers the capability to record that a case is pending  review for termination. As of September 2015, Asylum Division officials  stated that this modification would be released in November 2015.
In addition, the Asylum Division has limited goals or metrics for reviewing  termination cases, such as goals or metrics for the completion of  terminations. According to USCIS officials, USCIS faces progressively  higher burdens of proof to address potential asylum fraud as the asylee  receives additional immigration benefits, which requires more time and  resources. In August 2015, the Asylum Division adopted a new target of  180 days for conducting initial termination reviews that applies solely for  cases with pending applications for adjustment to LPR.  This goal is a  positive step, but it addresses the subset of pending terminations for  individuals with pending applications for adjustment to LPR and it applies  only to initial termination reviews rather than termination completions.
Furthermore, asylees who have not applied for adjustment to LPR may be  eligible to receive certain federal benefits, such as Supplemental Security  Income, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Temporary  Assistance for Needy Families, and Medicaid; the new 180-day target will  not apply to these individuals unless and until they apply to adjust to LPR.  Asylum Division officials stated that they periodically review the number of  terminations pending review in each asylum office to assess staffing  needs, and asylum offices may also choose to prioritize certain  termination reviews, as needed. However, Asylum Division officials stated  that the division has not adopted goals or metrics for the completion of  terminations because termination proceedings are extremely labor- intensive and asylum offices have limited resources to allocate to  terminations. Asylum Division officials also stated that terminations are  not a priority for their officers given increases in their adjudicative case  load of affirmative asylum, credible fear, and reasonable fear cases as  well as the prioritization of certain time sensitive cases, such as those  involving unaccompanied minors.
According to the Fraud Framework, the likelihood that individuals who  engage in fraud will be identified and punished serves to deter others  from engaging in fraudulent behavior. Timely reviews of potential asylum  terminations can also help the Asylum Division use its resources more  effectively because, according to Asylum Division and FDNS officials,  USCIS  faces progressively higher burdens to address potential asylum  fraud as the asylee receives additional immigration benefits. USCIS’s new  180-day target for conducting initial termination review for cases with  pending applications to adjust to LPR is a positive step; however,  developing and implementing timeliness goals for all pending termination  reviews of asylees granted affirmative asylum would help USCIS to better  identify the staffing resources needed to address the terminations  workload and better utilize existing resources to address potential fraud  before asylees adjust to LPR or receive other immigration or federal  benefits.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The U.S. asylum process is designed to protect those who legitimately  fled persecution, affording them the opportunity to prove their eligibility  and credibility. Adjudicating asylum cases is a challenging undertaking  because asylum officers do not always have the means to determine  which claims are authentic and which are fraudulent. With potentially  serious consequences for asylum applicants if they are incorrectly denied  asylum balanced against the importance of maintaining the integrity of the  asylum system, asylum officers and immigration judges must make the  best decisions they can within the constraints they face.
Both DHS and DOJ have established dedicated antifraud entities—an  important leading practice for managing fraud risks—but these agencies  have limited capability to detect and prevent asylum fraud and both  agencies’ efforts to date have focused on case-by-case fraud detection  rather than more strategic, risk-based approaches. DHS and DOJ could  be better positioned to assess and address fraud risks across their  asylum processes. Specifically, regularly assessing fraud risks across  asylum claims would help provide DHS and DOJ with reasonable  assurance that their fraud prevention controls are effective and  appropriately targeted to their fraud risks. Further, developing and  implementing a mechanism to collect more complete and reliable data on  FDNS’s fraud detection activities, including the number of referrals that  asylum officers submit to FDNS and the number of FDNS investigations  that result in a finding of asylum fraud, would help USCIS  officials  determine how often FDNS officers have identified and pursued fraud  indicators. In addition, identifying and implementing tools for identifying  fraud patterns in asylum applications, such as automated analytic  software and prescreening, would better position FDNS immigration  officers to identify cases associated with particular asylum fraud rings and  aid in the investigation and prosecution of the attorneys, preparers, and  interpreters who perpetrate asylum fraud. Moreover, developing asylum- specific guidance on the fraud detection roles and responsibilities of  FDNS immigration officers working in asylum offices would help those  officers better use the tools that are available to them. By providing  additional fraud training for asylum officers and regularly assessing  asylum officer training needs, USCIS could better ensure that asylum  officers have the training and skills needed to detect and address fraud  indicators in the asylum applications they adjudicate. Additionally,  including an examination of possible fraud indicators in future USCIS  random reviews of asylum decisions would help strengthen USCIS’s  oversight of officers’ adjudication of asylum applications and supervisory  asylum officers’ reviews of the those adjudications. Last, developing and  implementing timeliness goals for all pending termination reviews of  asylees granted affirmative asylum would help USCIS better utilize  existing resources by addressing potential fraud before asylees adjust to  LPR or receive other immigration or federal benefits.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To provide reasonable assurance that EOIR’s fraud prevention controls  are adequate, we recommend that the Attorney General direct EOIR to  conduct regular fraud risk assessments across asylum claims in the  immigration courts.
To provide reasonable assurance that USCIS’s fraud prevention  controls are adequate and effectively implemented, and ensure that  asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers have the capacity to  detect and prevent fraud, we recommend that the Secretary of  Homeland Security direct USCIS to take the following ten actions:  conduct regular fraud risk assessments across the affirmative asylum  application process; develop and implement a mechanism to collect reliable data, such as the number of referrals to FDNS from asylum officers, about FDNS’s efforts to combat asylum fraud; identify and implement tools that asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers can use to detect potential fraud patterns across affirmative asylum applications; require FDNS immigration officers to prescreen all asylum  applications for indicators of fraud to the extent that it is cost-effective and feasible; develop asylum-specific guidance on the fraud detection roles and responsibilities of FDNS immigration officers working in asylum  offices; develop and deliver additional training for asylum officers on asylum  fraud; develop and implement a mechanism to regularly collect and incorporate feedback on training needs from asylum officers and  supervisory asylum officers; develop and implement a method to collect reliable data on asylum  officer attrition; include a review of potential fraud indicators in future random quality assurance reviews of asylum applications; and develop and implement timeliness goals for all pending termination  reviews of affirmative asylum cases.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOJ and DHS for their review and  comment. DOJ did not provide official written comments to include in this  report. However, in an e-mail received on November 12, 2015, a DOJ  audit liaison official told us that DOJ concurred with our recommendation  that the Executive Office for Immigration Review conduct regular fraud  risk assessments across asylum claims in the immigration courts. DHS  provided formal, written comments, which are summarized below and  reproduced in full in appendix III.  DOJ and DHS provided technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
DHS concurred with our ten recommendations and described actions  under way or planned to address them. With regard to our first  recommendation that USCIS conduct regular fraud risk assessments,  DHS indicated that the Asylum Division and RAIO FDNS plan to develop  an assessment tool and implementation plan for completing regular fraud  risk assessments of the affirmative asylum process, with the first  assessment to be completed no later than the end of fiscal year 2017.
With regard to our second recommendation that USCIS develop and  implement a mechanism to collect reliable data on FDNS’s efforts to  combat fraud, DHS noted that FDNS plans to update user guidance and  training materials and conduct training to clarify FDNS-DS data entry  rules for asylum fraud referrals, leads, and cases and plans to complete  these efforts by the end of fiscal year 2016.
With regard to our third and fourth recommendations that USCIS identify  and implement tools to detect fraud patterns across applications and  require FDNS immigration officers to pre-screen all asylum applications  for indicators of fraud, DHS noted that USCIS recently approved a fiscal  year 2016 budget request for such tools and stated that the Asylum  Division and FDNS are coordinating with the Office of Information  Technology to develop requirements and identify tools for acquisition. As  part of this acquisition process, the Asylum Division and RAIO FDNS are  also discussing the acquisition of software that would aid FDNS  immigration officers in prescreening all asylum cases. DHS also stated  that the Chiefs of the Asylum Division plan to issue a joint memorandum  and companion guidance for asylum offices that will establish the  framework for a national prescreening program.
Regarding our fifth recommendation that USCIS develop asylum-specific  guidance on roles and responsibilities for FDNS immigration officers  working in asylum offices, DHS stated that USCIS plans to issue a  memorandum to clarify its guidance on the fraud-related roles and  responsibilities of FDNS officers working in asylum offices by the end of  fiscal year 2016.
Regarding our sixth recommendation that DHS develop and deliver  additional fraud training for asylum officers, DHS stated that the Asylum  Division is in the process of finalizing an updated lesson plan about fraud  in asylum claims to be ready for asylum officer training by the end of  March 2016. DHS also stated that it would provide this training to its  asylum officers by the end of fiscal year 2016. In commenting on our draft  report, DHS also stated that the draft did not reflect all of the fraud  training currently provided to new asylum officers. In response to this  comment, we clarified our discussion of USCIS’s existing fraud training  for new officers. Specifically, we added additional details about the fraud- related training sessions USCIS delivers as part of RAIO and Asylum  Division basic trainings.
Regarding our seventh recommendation that USCIS develop and  implement a mechanism to regularly collect and incorporate feedback on  training needs from asylum officers and supervisory asylum officers, DHS  stated that USCIS is in the process of preparing a division survey to be  delivered to officers and supervisors to gather feedback on training needs  in fiscal year 2016, and stated that officers and supervisors will be  surveyed on training no less than once every 2 years.
With regard to our eighth recommendation that DHS develop and  implement a mechanism to collect reliable data on asylum officer attrition,  DHS stated that, beginning in September 2015, the Asylum Division has  expanded the scope and frequency of its tracking of asylum officer  attrition data. DHS stated that, moving forward, the Asylum Division plans  to update its data on asylum officer transfers, promotions, moves to other  USCIS  offices, moves to outside employment, and departures from the  labor force on a biweekly basis and confirm the accuracy of those data  through regular validation. Based on this information, DHS requested that  we consider this recommendation closed. While these are positive steps  toward addressing our recommendation, USCIS needs to demonstrate  that it has implemented its plans to update and validate its asylum officer  attrition data to fully address the intent of our recommendation.
Regarding our ninth recommendation that USCIS review for potential  fraud indicators in future random quality assurance reviews of asylum  applications, DHS stated that, in October 2015, the Asylum Division  added a fraud-specific question to the Asylum Division quality assurance  review checklist. DHS stated that this change will ensure asylum cases  selected for Asylum Division quality assurance will be reviewed for fraud  indicators to determine whether those indicators were properly identified,  analyzed, and processed. Based on this information, DHS asked us to  consider this recommendation closed. While DHS has taken positive  initial steps toward addressing this recommendation, to fully address the  intent of our recommendation, DHS needs to demonstrate the extent to  which this change allows them to review for fraud indicators in a random  sample of all asylum cases, rather than in only the specific categories of  cases that the Asylum Division headquarters currently reviews. As we  note in our report, the Asylum Division does not currently conduct random  reviews of all asylum cases.
Regarding our tenth recommendation that DHS develop and implement  timeliness goals for pending termination reviews, DHS stated that the  Asylum Division plans to revise its case management system, RAPS, to  improve tracking of termination processing. The Asylum Division then  plans to analyze the resulting data to develop timeliness goals for  termination cases by the end of fiscal year 2016 and plans to implement  those goals during fiscal year 2017. These and other actions that DHS  indicated are planned or under way should help address the intent of our  recommendations if implemented effectively. DHS also noted that judicial  constraints imposed by Nijjar v. Holder (9th Cir. 2012) have foreclosed  DHS’s ability to terminate asylum status for fraud in the Ninth Circuit, and  stated that a legislative change would be necessary to restore USCIS’s  authority to terminate asylum status in the first instance.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Attorney General of the United States, appropriate  congressional committees, and other interested parties. In addition, the  report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff that made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to (1) describe what Department of Homeland  Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ) data indicate about  trends in the characteristics of asylum claims, (2) evaluate the extent to  which DHS and DOJ have designed mechanisms to prevent and detect  fraud in the asylum system, and (3) evaluate the extent to which DHS and  DOJ have designed and implemented processes to address any fraud  that has been identified in the asylum system.
To describe trends in the characteristics of asylum claims, we analyzed  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Refugee, Asylum,  and Parole System (RAPS) data on asylum applications, adjudications,  and grants by asylum offices nationwide for fiscal years 2010 through  2014. In addition, we analyzed record-level data from RAPS for asylum  applications adjudicated from fiscal years 2010 through fiscal year 2014.  To assess the reliability of the RAPS data, we reviewed USCIS  documents about the design of the RAPS system, completed data entry  and duplicate record checks, and discussed the reliability of the data with  USCIS  officials. We also analyzed two reports issued by the Executive  Office for Immigration Review’s (EOIR) Office of Planning, Analysis, and  Statistics from fiscal year 2010 through 2014—Asylum Statistics and  Statistics Yearbook. These reports contain data about the characteristics  of asylum applications adjudicated through the immigration courts in the  period of our analysis. To assess the reliability of the data in EOIR’s  reports, we reviewed EOIR documentation about the management of  EOIR cases and appeals and spoke with officials about how EOIR  collects and monitors data. The EOIR Office of Planning, Analysis, and  Statistics changed the methodology it used to compile EOIR statistics in  the reports issued in fiscal year 2013, and data from previous fiscal years  are not comparable with those reported in fiscal year 2013 and 2014  reports. As a result, we relied on the fiscal years 2013 and 2014 reports  for our analyses. We determined that the USCIS and EOIR data about  the characteristics of asylum claims were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report.
To evaluate the extent to which DHS and DOJ have designed  mechanisms to prevent and detect fraud in the asylum system, we  identified the antifraud entities responsible for detecting and preventing  asylum fraud within USCIS and EOIR and reviewed their asylum fraud  data, policies and practices. We analyzed data from the Fraud Detection  and National Security Directorate’s (FDNS) case management system,  FDNS Data System (FDNS-DS), about the number of benefit fraud cases  associated with asylum applications that were opened from fiscal years  2010 to 2014 and the number of those cases in which FDNS found fraud.  To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed policies about how  data are entered into FDNS-DS, such as the Fraud Detection Standard  Operating Procedures and the FDNS Basic Training presentation that  FDNS uses to introduce FDNS-DS to staff. We interviewed FDNS  immigration officers and headquarters officials about their use of FDNS- DS and observed FDNS immigration officers using FDNS-DS. We  discuss our findings about the reliability of the FDNS-DS data in this  report. We also analyzed the extent to which the data captured in RAPS  can be used to identify and detect asylum fraud. We compared FDNS  immigration officers’ reported use of the FDNS-DS system and FDNS-DS  data capabilities with procedures in the Fraud Detection Standard  Operating Procedures and standards in Standards for Internal Control in  the Federal Government.
To assess USCIS policies and procedures to prevent and detect fraud in  the USCIS  affirmative asylum process, we reviewed USCIS Asylum  Division policy documents such as the Affirmative Asylum Procedures  Manual, FDNS policy documents such as the Fraud Detection Standard  Operating Procedures and FDNS Field Priorities FY15, and guidance  such as the 2015 memorandum of agreement between FDNS and the  Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate (RAIO)  regarding the governance structure for FDNS. We reviewed Asylum  Division workforce planning efforts to address asylum fraud and  interviewed Asylum Division officials about attrition among asylum  officers. We reviewed the Asylum Division Staffing Allocation Models,  which officials stated were used to support Asylum Division workforce  planning efforts, for fiscal years 2012 through 2014, the most recent years  available, as well as the Staffing Allocation Model for fiscal year 2015. We  also reviewed staffing levels for Asylum Offices, including asylum officer  staffing and FDNS immigration officer staffing, from fiscal year 2010 to  2014 and compared actual staffing levels with estimates in the Staffing  Allocation Models. We reviewed asylum officer attrition data, which  USCIS  compiled manually at our request. We compared Asylum Division  workforce planning efforts with principles in GAO’s Key Principles for  Effective Strategic Workforce Planning to assess how USCIS workforce  planning efforts align with the key principles.  We also reviewed USCIS  quality assurance policy documents such as the Quality Sampling  Reference Guide and the Quality Handbook and spoke with Asylum  Division and RAIO officials about the extent to which these reference  materials are used in asylum quality assurance. We reviewed documents  associated with the random quality assurance reviews that RAIO  conducted in each asylum office in 2012 and 2013, including the  checklists used to evaluate asylum adjudications and the quality  assurance results. We evaluated the extent to which these quality  assurance reviews included reviews for fraud. We reviewed performance  evaluation documents for asylum office staff, including asylum officers  and supervisory officers, and examined the extent to which fraud  detection efforts are reflected in staff performance evaluations, including  the extent to which supervisory asylum officers evaluate the fraud  detection efforts of asylum officers. We spoke with Asylum Division  headquarters officials about ongoing Asylum Division headquarters  quality assurance reviews of certain asylum adjudications. We reviewed  past USCIS  efforts to examine fraud in the USCIS asylum system and  spoke with officials in the USCIS  Office of Policy and Strategy about past  efforts and plans for future efforts to examine asylum fraud. We compared  these policy documents and their role in preventing and detecting asylum  fraud with standards in GAO’s A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in  Federal Programs (Fraud Framework) and Standards for Internal Control  in the Federal Government. To learn about FDNS policies and  procedures to detect and prevent asylum fraud, we reviewed FDNS  guidance such as the Fraud Detection Standard Operating Procedures  and training materials for FDNS immigration officers about asylum fraud  as well as training materials for asylum officers about how to refer  potential fraud to FDNS. We reviewed the extent to which asylum officers  and FDNS immigration officers used other fraud detection tools such as  overseas verifications and HSI’s Forensic Laboratory. We compared  USCIS  efforts to prevent and detect fraud with leading practices in GAO’s  Framework for Effective Fraud Risk Management. We reviewed USCIS  asylum officer basic training materials from RAIO and the Asylum  Division, as well as training materials for FDNS immigration officers. We  reviewed USCIS  Asylum Division quarterly training reports for fiscal year  2014 and used them to analyze the weekly training activities in each  asylum office for each week of the reporting quarter. We compared RAIO  and Asylum Division training materials with material in GAO’s Guide for  Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal Government.
We visited five of the eight asylum offices — Newark, New Jersey; New  York, New York; Los Angeles, California; Houston, Texas; and Arlington,  Virginia. We selected these offices for site visits based on a variety of  factors, including their number of asylum officers, the number of asylum  applications they receive, and geographic proximity to EOIR immigration  courts. During our site visits, we visited immigration courts and observed  asylum hearings in New York, Los Angeles, Houston, and Arlington. In  addition, we interviewed approximately 11 ICE OPLA attorneys and 10  ICE HSI investigators in the New York, Los Angeles, Houston, and  Arlington offices. In each asylum office, we observed asylum interviews  and spoke with supervisory asylum officers, asylum officers, training  officers, and FDNS immigration officers to obtain their perspectives on  asylum fraud and the risk of asylum fraud. Although the results of our  visits cannot be generalized to officers in all asylum offices or to all  immigration courts, they provided first-hand observations on asylum  adjudication practices and insights regarding policies and procedures to  detect asylum fraud.
We conducted in-person interviews during our site visits and telephone  interviews with supervisory asylum officers, asylum officers, training  officers, and FDNS immigration officers in the remaining three asylum  offices –Miami, Florida; Chicago, Illinois; and San Francisco, California.  Across the eight asylum offices, we spoke with 35 supervisory asylum  officers, 37 asylum officers, 24 FDNS immigration officers (including four  supervisors), and 12 training officers. We spoke with supervisory asylum  officers, asylum officers, and FDNS immigration officers in all eight  asylum offices about the tools and systems that they use to identify and  detect asylum fraud and the roles of asylum officers and FDNS  immigration officers in asylum fraud detection. We spoke with Asylum  Division and RAIO headquarters officials about how asylum officers are  trained to detect and prevent fraud, and how training needs are assessed.  We also spoke with training officers in each of the eight asylum offices  about how they develop and present training, as well as evaluate training  needs. We spoke with Asylum Division and RAIO Performance  Management and Planning officials about quality assurance mechanisms  in the asylum program, such as 100 percent supervisory review of asylum  officer decisions, and about the extent to which fraud detection and  prevention is part of the Asylum Division quality assurance process.
The EOIR antifraud officer and the EOIR Fraud and Abuse Prevention  Program are responsible for detecting and preventing asylum fraud within  the immigration courts. We analyzed EOIR Fraud Abuse Prevention  Program case files to determine the number of complaints received,  number of case files opened, and number of asylum-related case files  opened from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014. We also reviewed  35 EOIR case files, which EOIR identified as being all cases associated  with asylum fraud. During this review, EOIR classified two of these files  as unauthorized practice of law rather than asylum fraud, and opted not to  include a case file re-opened in fiscal year 2012 due to a prior case  closure in fiscal year 2008.Two other case files were outside of the fiscal  year 2010 through fiscal year 2014, which was the time period of our  review. We reviewed EOIR’s Fraud and Abuse Prevention Program  guidance and policy documentation, including the regulation that  established EOIR’s antifraud officer position. We also reviewed the  Immigration Judge Benchbook, which includes tools, templates, and legal  resources for immigration judges to use in their adjudications. We  analyzed EOIR’s fraud-related training materials for immigration judges,  and spoke with the antifraud officer about the fraud detection and  prevention activities associated with her role. While observing immigration  court proceedings in New York City, Los Angeles, Houston, and Arlington,  including asylum cases, we spoke with court administrators and  immigration judges about asylum fraud.
To evaluate the extent to which DHS and DOJ have designed and  implemented processes to address any fraud that has been identified in  the asylum system, we analyzed Immigration and Customs Enforcement  (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) data on the number of  asylum fraud indictments, criminal arrests, convictions, and administrative  arrests as well as the number of asylum fraud cases initiated by HSI from  fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014. We also analyzed USCIS  RAPS data to identify the number of individuals who have had their  asylum status terminated because of fraud from fiscal years 2010 through  2014 and any trends in asylum terminations because of fraud over those  years. We used ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations data to  analyze the outcomes for individuals whose asylum status was  terminated for fraud from fiscal years 2010 through 2014. We assessed  the reliability of these data by reviewing documentation about how data  were collected; interviewing knowledgeable agency officials about the  data; and conducting electronic testing for missing data, outliers, and  obvious errors. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable  for the purposes of analyzing the number of asylum terminations due to  fraud and the outcome of those terminations. We reviewed USCIS policy  documents related to asylum terminations, such as the Affirmative  Asylum Procedures Manual, which details termination policy and  procedures that are to be followed for asylum terminations. We also  reviewed U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decisions that were identified by  Asylum Division officials as influencing how USCIS pursues asylum  terminations due to fraud and USCIS policy documents related to asylum  termination, such as the Post Adjustment Eligibility Review memo, that  reflect USCIS policy changes made as a result of circuit court decisions.  We visited five HSI  locations – New York, New York; Washington, D.C.;  Houston, Texas; Los Angeles, California; and Fairfax, Virginia –-and  interviewed officials about how they receive asylum fraud referrals and  how they investigate allegations of asylum fraud. We interviewed officials  from EOIR about mechanisms to address identified asylum fraud in the  immigration courts and how those mechanisms are used, including  disciplinary measures available to EOIR for attorneys and other  practitioners who commit asylum fraud, and how frequently they are used.  We interviewed officials in the eight USCIS asylum offices as well as  Asylum Division officials to determine how USCIS  handles cases with  identified fraud, including cases in which fraud is identified after asylum  has been granted, and how USCIS tracks, monitors, and adjudicates  cases in which an individual’s asylum status is pending termination for  identified fraud. We compared USCIS and EOIR mechanisms to address  identified asylum fraud and the frequency of their use with mechanisms in  GAO’s Fraud Framework to assess their likely effectiveness as a fraud  deterrent.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2014 to November  2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Fraud Risk Assessment Process
paragraphs: GAO’s A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs  notes that managers who effectively assess fraud risks attempt to fully  consider the specific fraud risks the agency or program faces, analyze the  potential likelihood and impact of fraud schemes, and then ultimately  document prioritized fraud risks. Moreover, managers can use the fraud  risk assessment process to determine the extent to which controls may  no longer be relevant or cost-effective. There is no universally accepted  approach for conducting fraud risk assessments, since circumstances  vary among programs; however, assessing fraud risks generally involves  five actions, as noted in figure 8.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet, Assistant  Director; Ashley Vaughan Davis; David Alexander; Dominick Dale, Imoni  Hampton; Grant Mallie; Mara McMillen; Linda Miller; Jan Montgomery;  Jon Najmi; and Mary Pitts made significant contributions to this report.