Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges and Efforts to Secure Control Systems
Published: 2004-03-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Computerized control systems perform vital functions across many of our nation's critical infrastructures. For example, in natural gas distribution, they can monitor and control the pressure and flow of gas through pipelines. In October 1997, the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection emphasized the increasing vulnerability of control systems to cyber attacks. At the request of the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, this testimony will discuss GAO's March 2004 report on potential cyber vulnerabilities, focusing on (1) significant cybersecurity risks associated with control systems (2) potential and reported cyber attacks against these systems (3) key challenges to securing control systems, and (4) efforts to strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In addition to general cyber threats, which have been steadily increasing, several factors have contributed to the escalation of the risks of cyber attacks against control systems. These include the adoption of standardized technologies with known vulnerabilities and the increased connectivity of control systems to other systems. Control systems can be vulnerable to a variety of attacks, examples of which have already occurred. Successful attacks on control systems could have devastating consequences, such as endangering public health and safety. Securing control systems poses significant challenges, including limited specialized security technologies and lack of economic justification. The government, academia, and private industry have initiated efforts to strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems. The President's National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace establishes a role for DHS to coordinate with these entities to improve the cybersecurity of control systems. While some coordination is occurring, DHS's coordination of these efforts could accelerate the development and implementation of more secure systems. Without effective coordination of these efforts, there is a risk of delaying the development and implementation of more secure systems to manage our critical infrastructures.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Computerized control systems  perform vital functions across  many of our nation’s critical  infrastructures. For example, in  natural gas distribution, they can  monitor and control the pressure  and flow of gas through pipelines.   In October 1997, the President’s  Commission on Critical  Infrastructure Protection  emphasized the increasing  vulnerability of control systems to  cyber attacks. At the request of the  House Committee on Government  Reform, Subcommittee on  Technology, Information Policy,  Intergovernmental Relations and  the Census, this testimony will  discuss GAO’s March 2004 report  on potential cyber vulnerabilities,  focusing on (1) significant  cybersecurity risks associated with  control systems (2) potential and  reported cyber attacks against  these systems (3) key challenges to  securing control systems, and  (4) efforts to strengthen the  cybersecurity of control systems.
In addition to general cyber threats, which have been steadily increasing,  several factors have contributed to the escalation of the risks of cyber  attacks against control systems. These include the adoption of standardized  technologies with known vulnerabilities and the increased connectivity of  control systems to other systems. Typical control system components are  illustrated in the graphic below. Control systems can be vulnerable to a  variety of attacks, examples of which have already occurred. Successful  attacks on control systems could have devastating consequences, such as  endangering public health and safety.
Securing control systems poses significant challenges, including limited  specialized security technologies and lack of economic justification. The  government, academia, and private industry have initiated efforts to  strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems. The President’s National  Strategy to Secure Cyberspace establishes a role for DHS to coordinate with  these entities to improve the cybersecurity of control systems. While some  coordination is occurring, DHS’s coordination of these efforts could  accelerate the development and implementation of more secure systems.  Without effective coordination of these efforts, there is a risk of delaying the  development and implementation of more secure systems to manage our  critical infrastructures. interface (HMI)
Communications network can be the Internet, a public switched  telephone network, a wireless network, or a hardwired network. stations. www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-628T.
To view the full product, including the scope  and methodology, click on the link above.  For more information, contact Robert F.  Dacey at (202) 512-3317 or daceyr@gao.gov.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:  I am pleased to be here today to participate in the Subcommittee’s hearing  on the cyber vulnerabilities in industrial control systems. Control  systems—which include supervisory control and data acquisition  (SCADA) systems and distributed control systems—perform vital  functions across many of our nation’s critical infrastructures, including  electric power generation, transmission, and distribution; oil and gas  refining and pipelines; water treatment and distribution; chemical  production and processing; railroads and mass transit; and manufacturing.  In October 1997, the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure  Protection highlighted the risk of cyber attacks as a specific point of  vulnerability in our critical infrastructures, stating that “the widespread  and increasing use of SCADA systems for control of energy systems  provides increasing ability to cause serious damage and disruption by  cyber means.”
In my testimony today I will discuss the results of our recent report, which  is being released today.  As you requested, this report identifies  (1) significant cybersecurity risks associated with control systems,  (2) potential and reported cyber attacks against these systems, (3) key  challenges to securing control systems, and (4) efforts to strengthen the  cybersecurity of control systems.
In preparing our report, we analyzed research studies and reports, as well  as prior GAO reports and testimonies on critical infrastructure protection  (CIP), information security, and national preparedness, among others. We  analyzed documents from and met with private-sector and federal officials  who had expertise in control systems and their security. Our work was  performed from July 2003 to March 2004 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Cyberspace Introduces Risks for Control Systems
paragraphs: Dramatic increases in computer interconnectivity, especially in the use of  the Internet, continue to revolutionize the way our government, our  nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct business. The  benefits have been enormous. Vast amounts of information are now  literally at our fingertips, facilitating research on virtually every topic  imaginable; financial and other business transactions can be executed  almost instantaneously, often 24 hours a day, and electronic mail, Internet  Web sites, and computer bulletin boards allow us to communicate quickly  and easily with an unlimited number of individuals and groups.
However, this widespread interconnectivity poses significant risks to the  government’s and our nation’s computer systems and, more important, to  the critical operations and infrastructures they support. For example,  telecommunications, power distribution systems, water supplies, public  health services, national defense (including the military’s warfighting  capability), law enforcement, government services, and emergency  services all depend on the security of their computer operations. If they  are not properly controlled, the speed and accessibility that create the  enormous benefits of the computer age may allow individuals and  organizations to eavesdrop on or interfere with these operations from  remote locations for mischievous or malicious purposes, including fraud  or sabotage. Table 1 summarizes the key threats to our nation’s  infrastructures, as observed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
Government officials remain concerned about attacks from individuals  and groups with malicious intent, such as crime, terrorism, foreign  intelligence gathering, and acts of war. According to the FBI, terrorists,  transnational criminals, and intelligence services are quickly becoming  aware of and using information exploitation tools such as computer  viruses, Trojan horses, worms, logic bombs, and eavesdropping sniffers  that can destroy, intercept, degrade the integrity of, or deny access to  data. In addition, the disgruntled organization insider is a significant  threat, because these individuals often have knowledge about the  organization and its system that allows them to gain unrestricted access  and inflict damage or steal assets without knowing a great deal about  computer intrusions. As larger amounts of money and more sensitive  economic and commercial information are exchanged electronically, and  as the nation’s defense and intelligence communities increasingly rely on  standardized information technology (IT), the likelihood increases that  information attacks will threaten vital national interests.
As the number of individuals with computer skills has increased, more  intrusion or “hacking” tools have become readily available and relatively  easy to use. A hacker can download tools from the Internet and literally  “point and click” to start an attack. Experts agree that there has been a  steady advance in the level of sophistication and effectiveness of attack  technology. Intruders quickly develop attacks to exploit vulnerabilities  that have been discovered in products, use these attacks to compromise  computers, and share them with other attackers. In addition, they can  combine these attacks with other forms of technology to develop  programs that automatically scan networks for vulnerable systems, attack  them, compromise them, and use them to spread the attack even further.
From 1995 through 2003, the CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC)  reported 12,946 security vulnerabilities that resulted from software flaws.  Figure 1 illustrates the dramatic growth in security vulnerabilities over  these years. The growing number of known vulnerabilities increases the  potential for attacks by the hacker community. Attacks can be launched  against specific targets or widely distributed through viruses and worms.
Along with these increasing vulnerabilities, the number of computer  security incidents reported to CERT/CC has also risen dramatically—from  9,859 in 1999 to 82,094 in 2002 and to 137,529 in 2003. And these are only  the reported attacks. The Director of the CERT Centers has estimated that  as much as 80 percent of actual security incidents goes unreported, in  most cases because (1) there were no indications of penetration or attack,  (2) the organization was unable to recognize that its systems had been  penetrated, or (3) the organization was reluctant to report. Figure 2 shows  the number of incidents that were reported to the CERT/CC from 1995  through 2003.
According to the National Security Agency (NSA), foreign governments  already have or are developing computer attack capabilities, and potential  adversaries are developing a body of knowledge about U.S. systems and  methods to attack these systems. The National Infrastructure Protection  Center (NIPC) reported in January 2002 that a computer belonging to an  individual who had indirect links to Osama bin Laden contained computer  programs that indicated that the individual was interested in the structural  engineering of dams and other water-retaining structures. The NIPC report  also stated that U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies had  received indications that Al Qaeda members had sought information about  control systems from multiple Web sites, specifically on water supply and  wastewater management practices in the United States and abroad.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, warnings of the potential  for terrorist cyber attacks against our critical infrastructures have  increased. For example, in his February 2002 statement for the Senate  Select Committee on Intelligence, the Director of Central Intelligence  discussed the possibility of a cyber warfare attack by terrorists. He stated  that the September 11 attacks demonstrated the nation’s dependence on  critical infrastructure systems that rely on electronic and computer  networks. Further, he noted that attacks of this nature would become an  increasingly viable option for terrorists as they and other foreign  adversaries become more familiar with these targets and the technologies  required to attack them. James Woolsey, a former Director of Central  Intelligence, shares this concern, and on October 29, 2003, in a speech  before several hundred security experts, he warned that the nation should  be prepared for continued terrorist attacks on our critical infrastructures.  Moreover, a group of concerned scientists warned President Bush in a  letter that “the critical infrastructure of the United States, including  electrical power, finance, telecommunications, health care, transportation,  water, defense and the Internet, is highly vulnerable to cyber attack. Fast  and resolute mitigating action is needed to avoid national disaster.”  According to a study by a computer security organization, during the  second half of 2003, critical infrastructure industries such as power,  energy, and financial services experienced high attack rates. Further, a  study that surveyed over 170 security professionals and other executives  concluded that, across industries, respondents believe that a large-scale  cyber attack in the United States will be launched against their industry by  mid-2006.
section_title: What Are Control Systems?
paragraphs: Control systems are computer-based systems that are used within many  infrastructures and industries to monitor and control sensitive processes  and physical functions. Typically, control systems collect sensor  measurements and operational data from the field, process and display  this information, and relay control commands to local or remote  equipment. In the electric power industry, control systems can manage  and control the generation, transmission, and distribution of electric  power— for example, by opening and closing circuit breakers and setting  thresholds for preventive shutdowns. Employing integrated control  systems, the oil and gas industry can control the refining operations at a  plant site, remotely monitor the pressure and flow of gas pipelines, and  control the flow and pathways of gas transmission. Water utilities can  remotely monitor well levels and control the wells’ pumps; monitor flows,  tank levels, or pressure in storage tanks; monitor water quality  characteristics—such as pH, turbidity, and chlorine residual; and control  the addition of chemicals. Control systems also are used in manufacturing  and chemical processing. Control systems perform functions that vary  from simple to complex; they can be used simply to monitor processes— for example, the environmental conditions in a small office building—or to  manage most activities in a municipal water system or even a nuclear  power plant.
In certain industries, such as chemical and power generation, safety  systems are typically implemented in order to mitigate a potentially  disastrous event if control and other systems should fail. In addition, to  guard against both physical attack and system failure, organizations may  establish backup control centers that include uninterruptible power  supplies and backup generators.
There are two primary types of control systems. Distributed Control  Systems (DCS) typically are used within a single processing or generating  plant or over a small geographic area. Supervisory Control and Data  Acquisition (SCADA) systems typically are used for large, geographically  dispersed distribution operations. For example, a utility company may use  a DCS to generate power and a SCADA system to distribute it. Figure 3  illustrates the typical components of a control system.
A control system typically is made up of a “master” or central supervisory  control and monitoring station consisting of one or more human-machine  interfaces where an operator can view status information about the  remote/local sites and issue commands directly to the system. Typically,  this station is located at a main site, along with application servers and an  engineering workstation that is used to configure and troubleshoot the  other components of the control system. The supervisory control and  monitoring station typically is connected to local controller stations  through a hard-wired network or to a remote controller station through a  communications network—which could be the Internet, a public switched  telephone network, or a cable or wireless (e.g., radio, microwave, or   Wi-Fi) network. Each controller station has a remote terminal unit (RTU),  a programmable logic controller (PLC), or some other controller that  communicates with the supervisory control and monitoring station.
The control system also includes sensors and control equipment that  connect directly with the working components of the infrastructure—for  example, pipelines, water towers, or power lines. The sensor takes  readings from the infrastructure equipment—such as water or pressure  levels, electrical voltage or current—and sends a message to the  controller. The controller may be programmed to determine a course of  action and send a message to the control equipment instructing it what to  do—for example, to turn off a valve or dispense a chemical. If the  controller is not programmed to determine a course of action, the  controller communicates with the supervisory control and monitoring  station and relays instructions back to the control equipment. The control  system also can be programmed to issue alarms to the operator when  certain conditions are detected. Handheld devices, such as personal digital  assistants, can be used to locally monitor controller stations. Experts  report that technologies in controller stations are becoming more  intelligent and automated and are able to communicate with the  supervisory central monitoring and control station less frequently, thus  requiring less human intervention.
section_title: Control Systems Are at Increasing Risk
paragraphs: Historically, security concerns about control have been related primarily  to protecting them against physical attack and preventing the misuse of  refining and processing sites or distribution and holding facilities.  However, more recently, there has been a growing recognition that control  systems are now vulnerable to cyber attacks from numerous sources,  including hostile governments, terrorist groups, disgruntled employees,  and other malicious intruders.
In October 1997, the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure  Protection discussed the potential damaging effects on the electric power  and oil and gas industries of successful attacks on control systems.  Moreover, in 2002, the National Research Council identified “the potential  for attack on control systems” as requiring “urgent attention.” In the first  half of that year, security experts reported that 70 percent of energy and  power companies experienced at least one severe cyber attack. In  February 2003, the President clearly demonstrated concern about “the  threat of organized cyber attacks capable of causing debilitating disruption  to our Nation’s critical infrastructures, economy, or national security,”  noting that “disruption of these systems can have significant consequences  for public health and safety” and emphasizing that the protection of  control systems has become “a national priority.”
Several factors have contributed to the escalation of risk to control  systems, including (1) the adoption of standardized technologies with  known vulnerabilities, (2) the connectivity of control systems to other  networks, (3) insecure remote connections, and (4) the widespread  availability of technical information about control systems.
subsections: section_title: Control Systems Are Adopting Standardized Technologies with Known Vulnerabilities
paragraphs: In the past, proprietary hardware, software, and network protocols made  it difficult to understand how control systems operated—and therefore  how to hack into them. Today, however, to reduce costs and improve  performance, organizations have been transitioning from proprietary  systems to less expensive, standardized technologies such as Microsoft’s  Windows, Unix-like operating systems, and the common networking  protocols used by the Internet. These widely-used, standardized  technologies have commonly known vulnerabilities, and sophisticated and  effective exploitation tools are widely available and relatively easy to use.  As a consequence, both the number of people with the knowledge to wage  attacks and the number of systems subject to attack have increased. Also,  common communication protocols and the emerging use of extensible  markup language (commonly referred to as XML) can make it easier for a  hacker to interpret the content of communications among the components  of a control system.
section_title: Control Systems Are Connected to Other Networks
paragraphs: Enterprises often integrate their control systems with their enterprise  networks. This increased connectivity has significant advantages,  including providing decision makers with access to real-time information  and allowing engineers to monitor and control the process control system  from different points on the enterprise network. In addition, the enterprise  networks are often connected to the networks of strategic partners and to  the Internet. Furthermore, control systems are increasingly using wide  area networks and the Internet to transmit data to their remote or local  stations and individual devices. This convergence of control networks  with public and enterprise networks potentially creates further security  vulnerabilities in control systems. Unless appropriate security controls are  deployed in both the enterprise network and the control system network,  breaches in enterprise security can affect the operation of control systems.
section_title: Insecure Connections Exacerbate Vulnerabilities
paragraphs: Vulnerabilities in control systems are exacerbated by insecure  connections. Organizations often leave access links—such as dial-up  modems to equipment and control information—open for remote  diagnostics, maintenance, and examination of system status. If such links  are not protected with authentication or encryption, the risk increases that  hackers could use these insecure connections to break into remotely  controlled systems. Also, control systems often use wireless  communications systems, which are especially vulnerable to attack, or  leased lines that pass through commercial telecommunications facilities.  Without encryption to protect data as it flows through these insecure  connections or authentication mechanisms to limit access, there is little to  protect the integrity of the information being transmitted.
section_title: Information about Infrastructures and Control Systems Is Publicly Available
paragraphs: Public information about infrastructures and control systems is readily  available to potential hackers and intruders. The availability of this  infrastructure and vulnerability data was demonstrated last year by a  George Mason University graduate student who, in his dissertation,  reportedly mapped every business and industrial sector in the American  economy to the fiber-optic network that connects them, using material  that was available publicly on the Internet—and not classified.
In the electric power industry, open sources of information—such as  product data and educational videotapes from engineering associations— can be used to understand the basics of the electrical grid. Other publicly  available information—including filings of the Federal Energy Regulatory  Commission (FERC), industry publications, maps, and material available  on the Internet—is sufficient to allow someone to identify the most heavily  loaded transmission lines and the most critical substations in the power  grid. Many of the electric utility officials who were interviewed for the  National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee’s Information  Assurance Task Force’s Electric Power Risk Assessment expressed  concern over the amount of information about their infrastructure that is  readily available to the public.
In addition, significant information on control systems is publicly  available—including design and maintenance documents, technical  standards for the interconnection of control systems and RTUs, and  standards for communication among control devices—all of which could  assist hackers in understanding the systems and how to attack them.  Moreover, there are numerous former employees, vendors, support  contractors, and other end users of the same equipment worldwide who  have inside knowledge about the operation of control systems.
Security experts have stated that an individual with very little knowledge  of control systems could gain unauthorized access to a control system  using a port scanning tool and a factory manual that can be easily found  on the Internet and that contains the system’s default password. As noted  in the following discussion, many times these default passwords are never  changed.
section_title: Cyber Threats to Control Systems
paragraphs: There is a general consensus—and increasing concern—among  government officials and experts on control systems about potential cyber  threats to the control systems that govern our critical infrastructures. As  components of control systems increasingly make vital decisions that  were once made by humans, the potential effect of a cyber attack becomes  more devastating. Cyber threats could come from numerous sources  ranging from hostile governments and terrorist groups to disgruntled  employees and other malicious intruders. Based on interviews and  discussions with representatives from throughout the electric power  industry, the Information Assurance Task Force of the National Security  Telecommunications Advisory Committee concluded that an organization  with sufficient resources, such as a foreign intelligence service or a well- supported terrorist group, could conduct a structured attack on the  electric power grid electronically, with a high degree of anonymity, and  without having to set foot in the target nation.
In July 2002, NIPC reported that the potential for compound cyber and  physical attacks, referred to as “swarming attacks,” was an emerging  threat to the critical infrastructure of the United States. As NIPC reports,  the effects of a swarming attack include slowing or complicating the  response to a physical attack. For instance, a cyber attack that disabled  the water supply or the electrical system, in conjunction with a physical  attack, could deny emergency services the necessary resources to manage  the consequences of the physical attack—such as controlling fires,  coordinating response, and generating light.
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),  cyber attacks on energy production and distribution systems—including  electric, oil, gas, and water treatment, as well as on chemical plants  containing potentially hazardous substances—could endanger public  health and safety, damage the environment, and have serious financial  implications such as loss of production, generation, or distribution by  public utilities; compromise of proprietary information; or liability issues.  When backups for damaged components are not readily available (e.g.,  extra-high-voltage transformers for the electric power grid), such damage  could have a long-lasting effect. I will now discuss potential and reported  cyber attacks on control systems, as well as challenges to securing them.
subsections: section_title: Control Systems Can Be Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks
paragraphs: Entities or individuals with malicious intent might take one or more of the  following actions to successfully attack control systems: disrupt the operation of control systems by delaying or blocking the flow  of information through control networks, thereby denying availability of  the networks to control system operators; make unauthorized changes to programmed instructions in PLCs, RTUs, or  DCS controllers, change alarm thresholds, or issue unauthorized  commands to control equipment that could potentially result in damage to  equipment (if tolerances are exceeded), premature shutdown of processes  (such as prematurely shutting down transmission lines), or even disabling  control equipment;  send false information to control system operators either to disguise  unauthorized changes or to initiate inappropriate actions by system  operators; modify the control system software, producing unpredictable results; and  interfere with the operation of safety systems.
In addition, in control systems that cover a wide geographic area, the  remote sites often are not staffed and may not be physically monitored. If  such remote systems were to be physically breached, attackers could  establish a cyber connection to the control network.
Department of Energy (DOE) and industry researchers have speculated on  how the following potential attack scenario could affect control systems in  the electricity sector. Using war dialers to find modems connected to the  programmable circuit breakers of the electric power control system,  hackers could crack passwords that control access to the circuit breakers  and could change the control settings to cause local power outages and  even damage equipment. A hacker could lower settings from, for example,  500 amperes to 200 on some circuit breakers; normal power usage would  then activate, or “trip,” the circuit breakers, taking those lines out of  service and diverting power to neighboring lines. If, at the same time, the  hacker raised the settings on these neighboring lines to 900 amperes,  circuit breakers would fail to trip at these high settings, and the diverted  power would overload the lines and cause significant damage to  transformers and other critical equipment. The damaged equipment would  require major repairs that could result in lengthy outages.
Control system researchers at DOE’s national laboratories have developed  systems that demonstrate the feasibility of a cyber attack on a control  system at an electric power substation where high-voltage electricity is  transformed for local use. Using tools that are readily available on the  Internet, they are able to modify output data from field sensors and take  control of the PLC directly in order to change settings and create new  output. These techniques could enable a hacker to cause an outage, thus  incapacitating the substation.
Experts in the water industry consider control systems to be among the  primary vulnerabilities of drinking water systems. A technologist from the  water distribution sector has demonstrated how an intruder could hack  into the communications channel between the control center of a water  distribution pump station and its remote units, located at water storage  and pumping facilities, to either block messages or send false commands  to the remote units. Moreover, experts are concerned that terrorists could,  for example, trigger a cyber attack to release harmful amounts of water  treatment chemicals, such as chlorine, into the public’s drinking water.
section_title: Cyber Attacks on Control Systems Have Been Reported
paragraphs: Experts in control systems have verified numerous incidents that have  affected control systems. Reported attacks include the following:  In 1994, the computer system of the Salt River Project, a major water and  electricity provider in Phoenix, Arizona, was breached.
In March 1997, a teenager in Worcester, Massachusetts, remotely disabled  part of the public switching network, disrupting telephone service for 600  residents and the fire department and causing a malfunction at the local  airport.
In the spring of 2000, a former employee of an Australian company that  develops manufacturing software applied for a job with the local  government, but was rejected. Over a 2-month period, the disgruntled  rejected employee reportedly used a radio transmitter on as many as 46  occasions to remotely hack into the controls of a sewage treatment system  and ultimately release about 264,000 gallons of raw sewage into nearby  rivers and parks.
In the spring of 2001, hackers mounted an attack on systems that were  part of a development network at the California Independent System  Operator, a facility that is integral to the movement of electricity  throughout the state.
In August 2003, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission confirmed that in  January 2003, the Microsoft SQL Server worm—otherwise known as  Slammer—infected a private computer network at the Davis-Besse nuclear  power plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio, disabling a safety monitoring system for  nearly 5 hours. In addition, the plant’s process computer failed, and it took  about 6 hours for it to become available again. Slammer reportedly also  affected communications on the control networks of at least five other  utilities by propagating so quickly that control system traffic was blocked.
In addition, in 1997, the Department of Defense (DOD) undertook the first  systematic exercise to determine the nation’s and DOD’s vulnerability to  cyberwar. During a 2-week military exercise known as Eligible Receiver,  staff from NSA used widely available tools to show how to penetrate the  control systems that are associated with providers of electric power to  DOD installations. Other assessments of control systems at DOD  installations have demonstrated vulnerabilities and identified risks in the  installations’ network and operations.
section_title: Securing Control Systems Poses Significant Challenges
paragraphs: The control systems community faces several challenges to securing  control systems against cyber threats. These challenges include (1) the  limitations of current security technologies in securing control systems,  (2) the perception that securing control systems may not be economically  justifiable, and (3) the conflicting priorities within organizations regarding  the security of control systems.
subsections: section_title: Lack of Specialized Security Technologies for Control Systems
paragraphs: According to industry experts, existing security technologies, as well as  strong user authentication and patch management practices, are generally  not implemented in control systems because control systems usually have  limited processing capabilities, operate in real time, and are typically not  designed with cybersecurity in mind.
Existing security technologies such as authorization, authentication,  encryption, intrusion detection, and filtering of network traffic and  communications, require more bandwidth, processing power, and memory  than control system components typically have. Controller stations are  generally designed to do specific tasks, and they often use low-cost,  resource-constrained microprocessors. In fact, some control system  devices still use the Intel 8088 processor, which was introduced in 1978.  Consequently, it is difficult to install current security technologies without  seriously degrading the performance of the control system.
For example, complex passwords and other strong password practices are  not always used to prevent unauthorized access to control systems, in part  because this could hinder a rapid response to safety procedures during an  emergency. As a result, according to experts, weak passwords that are  easy to guess, shared, and infrequently changed are reportedly common in  control systems, including the use of default passwords or even no  password at all.
In addition, although modern control systems are based on standard  operating systems, they are typically customized to support control system  applications. Consequently, vendor-provided software patches may be  either incompatible with the customized version of the operating system  or difficult to implement without compromising service by shutting down  “always-on” systems or affecting interdependent operations. Another  constraint on deploying patches is that support agreements with control  system vendors often require the vendor’s approval before the user can  install patches. If a patch is installed in violation of the support agreement,  the vendor will not take responsibility for potential impacts on the  operations of the system. Moreover, because a control system vendor  often requires that it be the sole provider of patches, if the vendor delays  in providing patches, systems remain vulnerable without recourse.
Information security organizations have noted that a gap exists between  currently available security technologies and the need for additional  research and development to secure control systems. Research and  development in a wide range of areas could lead to more effective  technologies. For example, although technologies such as robust firewalls  and strong authentication can be employed to better segment control  systems from external networks, research and development could help to  address the application of security technologies to the control systems  themselves. Other areas that have been noted for possible research and  development include identifying the types of security technologies needed  for different control system applications, determining acceptable  performance trade-offs, and recognizing attack patterns for use in  intrusion detection systems.
Industry experts have identified challenges in migrating system  components to newer technologies while maintaining uninterrupted  operations. Upgrading all the components of a control system can be a  lengthy process, and the enhanced security features of newly installed  technologies—such as their ability to interpret encrypted messages—may  not be able to be fully utilized until all devices in the system have been  replaced and the upgrade is complete.
section_title: Securing Control Systems May Not Be Perceived as Economically Justifiable
paragraphs: Experts and industry representatives have indicated that organizations  may be reluctant to spend more money to secure control systems.  Hardening the security of control systems would require industries to  expend more resources, including acquiring more personnel, providing  training for personnel, and potentially prematurely replacing current  systems, which typically have a lifespan of about 20 years.
Several vendors suggested that since there have been no reports of  significant disruptions caused by cyber attacks on U.S. control systems,  industry representatives believe the threat of such an attack is low. While  incidents have occurred, to date there is no formalized process for  collecting and analyzing information about control systems incidents, thus  further contributing to the skepticism of control systems vendors. We have  previously recommended that the government work with the private  sector to improve the quality and quantity of information being shared  among industries and government about attacks on the nation’s critical  infrastructures.
Until industry users of control systems have a business case to justify why  additional security is needed, there may be little market incentive for the  private sector to develop and implement more secure control systems. We  have previously reported that consideration of further federal government  efforts is needed to provide appropriate incentives for nonfederal entities  to enhance their efforts to implement CIP—including protection of control  systems. Without appropriate consideration of public policy tools, such as  regulation, grants, and tax incentives, private-sector participation in  sector-related CIP efforts may not reach its full potential.
section_title: Organizational Priorities Conflict
paragraphs: Finally, several experts and industry representatives indicated that the  responsibility for securing control systems typically includes two separate  groups: (1) IT security personnel and (2) control system engineers and  operators. IT security personnel tend to focus on securing enterprise  systems, while control system engineers and operators tend to be more  concerned with the reliable performance of their control systems. These  experts indicate that, as a result, those two groups do not always fully  understand each other’s requirements and so may not effectively  collaborate to implement secure control systems.
These conflicting priorities may perpetuate a lack of awareness of IT  security strategies that could be deployed to mitigate the vulnerabilities of  control systems without affecting their performance. Although research  and development will be necessary to develop technologies to secure  individual control system devices, existing IT security technologies and  approaches could be implemented as part of a secure enterprise  architecture to protect the perimeters of, and access to, control system  networks. Existing IT security technologies include firewalls, intrusion- detection systems, encryption, authentication, and authorization.  Approaches to IT security include segmenting control system networks  and testing continuity plans to ensure safe and continued operation.
To reduce the vulnerabilities of its control system, officials from one  company formed a team composed of IT staff, process control engineers,  and manufacturing employees. This team worked collaboratively to  research vulnerabilities and to test fixes and workarounds.
section_title: Efforts to Strengthen the Cybersecurity of Control Systems Under Way, but Lack Adequate Coordination
paragraphs: Government, academia, and private industry have independently initiated  multiple efforts and programs focused on some of the key areas that  should be addressed to strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems.  Our March 2004 report includes a detailed discussion of many initiatives.  The key areas—and illustrative examples of ongoing efforts in these  areas—include the following:
Research and development of new security technologies to protect  control systems. Both federal and nonfederal entities have initiated  efforts to develop encryption methods for securing communications on  control system networks and field devices. Moreover, DOE is planning to  establish a National SCADA Test Bed to test control system vulnerabilities.   However, funding constraints have delayed the implementation of the  initial phases of these plans.
Development of requirements and standards for control system  security. Several entities are working to develop standards that increase  the security of control systems. The North American Electric Reliability  Council (NERC) is preparing to draft a standard that will include security  requirements for control systems. In addition, the Process Controls  Security Requirements Forum (PCSRF), established by NIST and NSA, is  working to define a common set of information security requirements for  control systems. However, according to NIST officials, reductions to fiscal  year 2004 appropriations will delay these efforts.
Increased awareness of security and sharing of information about  the implementation of more secure architectures and existing  security technologies. To promote awareness of control system  vulnerabilities, DOE has created security programs, trained teams to  conduct security reviews, and developed cybersecurity courses. The  Instrumentation Systems and Automation Society has reported on the  known state of the art of cybersecurity technologies as they are applied to  the control systems environment, to clearly define what technologies can  currently be deployed.
Implementation of effective security management programs,  including policies and guidance that consider control system  security. Both federal and nonfederal entities have developed guidance to  mitigate the security vulnerabilities of control systems. DOE’s 21 Steps to  Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks provides guidance for  improving the security of control systems and establishing underlying  management processes and policies to help organizations improve the  security of control system networks.
In previous reports, we have recommended the development of a  comprehensive and coordinated national plan to facilitate the federal  government’s CIP efforts. This plan should clearly delineate the roles and  responsibilities of federal and nonfederal CIP entities, define interim  objectives and milestones, set time frames for achieving objectives, and  establish performance measures.
The President in his homeland security strategies and Congress in enacting  the Homeland Security Act designated DHS as responsible for developing  a comprehensive national infrastructure plan. The plan is expected to  inform DHS on budgeting and planning for CIP activities and on how to  use policy instruments to coordinate among government and private  entities to raise the security of our national infrastructures to appropriate  levels. According to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD 7),  issued December 17, 2003, DHS is to develop this formalized plan by  December 2004.
In February 2003, the President’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace  established a role for DHS to coordinate with other government agencies  and the private sector to improve the cybersecurity of control systems.  DHS’s assigned role includes: ensuring that there is broad awareness of the vulnerabilities in control  systems and the consequences of exploiting these vulnerabilities, developing best practices and new technologies to strengthen the security  of control systems, and  identifying the nation’s most critical control system sites and developing a  prioritized plan for ensuring cyber security at those sites.
In addition, the President’s strategy recommends that DHS work with the  private sector to promote voluntary standards efforts and the creation of  security policy for control systems.
DHS recently began to focus on the range of activities that are under way  among the numerous entities that are working to address these areas. In  October 2003, DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate initiated a study  to determine the current state of security of control systems. In December  2003, DHS established the Control Systems Section within the Protective  Security Division of its Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection  (IAIP) Directorate. The objectives of this section are to identify computer- controlled systems that are vital to infrastructure functions, evaluate the  potential threats to these systems, and develop strategies that mitigate the  consequences of attacks. In addition, IAIP’s National Cyber Security  Division (NCSD) is planning to develop a methodology for conducting  cyber assessments across all critical infrastructures, including control  systems. The objectives of this effort include defining specific goals for the  assessments and, based on their results, developing sector-specific  recommendations to mitigate vulnerabilities. NCSD also plans to examine  processes, technology, and available policy, procedures, and guidance.  Because these efforts have only recently been initiated, DHS  acknowledges that it has not yet developed a strategy for implementing  the functions mentioned above.
As I previously mentioned, many government and nongovernment entities  are spearheading various initiatives to address the challenge of  implementing cybersecurity for the vital systems that operate our nation’s  critical infrastructures. While some coordination is occurring, both federal  and nonfederal control systems experts have expressed their concern that  these efforts are not being adequately coordinated among government  agencies, the private sector, and standards-setting bodies. DHS’s  coordination of these efforts could accelerate the development and  implementation of more secure systems to manage our critical  infrastructures. In contrast, insufficient coordination could contribute to delays in the general acceptance of security requirements and the  adoption of successful practices for control systems,  failure to address gaps in the research and development of technologies to  better secure control systems,  impediments to standards-creating efforts across industries that could lead  to less expensive technological solutions, and  reduced opportunities for efficiency that could be gained by leveraging  ongoing work.
In summary, it is clear that the systems that monitor and control the  sensitive processes and physical functions of the nation’s critical  infrastructures are at increasing risk from threats of cyber attacks.  Securing these systems poses significant challenges. Numerous federal  agencies, critical infrastructure sectors, and standards-creating bodies are  leading various initiatives to address these challenges. DHS’s  implementation of our recommendation—with which the department  concurred—to develop and implement a strategy for better coordinating  the cybersecurity of our critical infrastructures’ control systems among  government and private sector entities can accelerate progress in securing  these critical systems. Additionally, implementing existing IT technologies  and security approaches can strengthen the security of control systems.   These approaches include establishing an effective security management  program, building successive layers of defense mechanisms at strategic  access points to the control system network, and developing and testing  continuity plans to ensure safe operation in the event of a power outage or  cyber attack.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer  any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at  this time.
If you should have any questions about this statement, please contact me  at (202) 512-3317 or Elizabeth Johnston, Assistant Director, at (202) 512- 6345.  We can also be reached by e-mail at daceyr@gao.gov and  johnstone@gao.gov, respectively.
Other individuals who made key contributors to this testimony include  Shannin Addison, Joanne Fiorino, Alison Jacobs, Anjalique Lawrence, and  Tracy Pierson.