Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Federal Actions Needed to Ensure Safety and Expand Their Potential Uses within the National Airspace System
Published: 2008-05-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Government and private-sector interest is growing in unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for use in a variety of missions such as U.S. border protection, hurricane research, law enforcement, and real estate photography. However, UASs can fly only after the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) conducts a case-by-case safety analysis. GAO's research questions included (1) What are the current and potential uses and benefits of UASs? (2) What challenges exist in operating UASs safely and routinely in the national airspace system? and (3) What is the federal government's response to these challenges? To address these questions, GAO reviewed the literature, interviewed agency officials and aviation stakeholders, and surveyed 23 UAS experts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: UASs are currently being used by federal agencies for border security, science research, and other purposes. Local governments see potential uses in law enforcement or firefighting and the private sector sees potential uses, such as real estate photography. An industry survey states that UAS production could increase in the future to meet such government and private-sector uses. Experts predict that UASs could perform some manned aircraft missions with less noise and fewer emissions. UASs pose technological, regulatory, workload, and coordination challenges that affect their ability to operate safely and routinely in the national airspace system. UASs cannot meet aviation safety requirements, such as seeing and avoiding other aircraft. UASs lack security protection--a potential challenge if UASs proliferate as expected after obtaining routine airspace access. The lack of FAA regulations for UASs limits their operation to case-by-case approvals by FAA. Anticipated increases in requests to operate UASs could pose a workload challenge for FAA. Coordinating multiple efforts to address these challenges is yet another challenge. FAA and the Department of Defense (DOD) are addressing technological challenges. DHS has not addressed the national security implications of routine UAS access to the airspace. FAA estimates that completing UAS safety regulations will take 10 or more years, but has not yet issued its program plan to communicate the steps and time frames required for providing routine UAS access. FAA is working to allow small UASs to have airspace access and has designated specific airspace for UAS testing. It plans to use data from this testing and from DOD to develop regulations, but has not yet analyzed data that it has already collected. To address its workload challenge, FAA is using more automation. Aviation stakeholders and experts suggested that an overarching entity could help coordinate and expedite federal, academic, and private-sector efforts. In 2003, Congress created a similar entity in FAA to coordinate planning for the next generation air transportation system among multiple federal agencies and the private sector.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Government and private-sector interest in unmanned aircraft systems  (UAS) is growing, due in large part to the U.S. military’s expanded  development and use of these systems in Iraq and Afghanistan. The  absence of a pilot on board the aircraft allows unmanned aircraft to  perform a variety of missions not generally considered favorable for  manned aircraft. Some unmanned aircraft can remain aloft for 30 hours or  more, because there is no need for them to land to change pilots.  Unmanned aircraft can also perform dangerous missions without risking  loss of life.
The federal government has used UASs for a number of years for various  purposes, such as collecting scientific data, assisting with border security,  and gathering weather data from inside hurricanes. Federal agencies are  planning to increase their use of UASs and state and local governments  envision using UASs to aid in law enforcement or firefighting. Potential  commercial uses are also possible, for example, in real estate photography  or pipeline inspection. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is  responsible for ensuring that UASs operate safely in the national airspace  system and is working to develop a regulatory framework to address the  unique characteristics of UASs.  For example, current regulations do not  indicate how, in the absence of an on-board pilot, UASs should detect,  sense, and avoid other aircraft to avoid collisions. FAA’s long-range goal is  to permit, to the greatest extent possible, routine government and  commercial UAS operations in the national airspace system while ensuring  safety. Presently, because of safety concerns, FAA authorizes civil  government and military UAS operations in the national airspace system  on a limited basis after conducting a case-by-case safety review.  Regulations do not currently permit commercial UAS operations.
You asked us to assess efforts to safely integrate UASs into the national  airspace system and the potential impact of those UASs after such  integration occurs. To meet this objective, we developed the following  research questions: (1) What are the current and potential uses and  benefits of UASs? (2) What challenges exist in operating UASs safely and  routinely in the national airspace system? (3) What is the federal  government’s response to these challenges? and (4) Assuming that UASs  have routine access to the national airspace system, how might they  impact the system and the environment?
To address these questions, we reviewed the literature, FAA and  Department of Defense (DOD) documents, and aviation trade association  reports. We also interviewed officials from DOD, the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA) about their operations and plans to operate UASs  in the national airspace system. We interviewed officials in associations  that represent UAS manufacturers and users of the national airspace  system. To determine the expected growth of UASs, we obtained industry  forecasts. Additionally, we administered a Web-based survey to 23 UAS  experts, selected with the assistance of the National Academies, to obtain  their opinions of the steps that FAA could take to accelerate UAS  integration in the national airspace system and the impact that UASs might  have on the system and the environment after integration occurs. We  conducted this performance audit from October 2006 to May 2008, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. (See app. I for additional information on our  scope and methods.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: FAA defines an unmanned aircraft as one that is operated without the  possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft. In  the past, these aircraft were sometimes called “unmanned aerial vehicles,”  “remotely piloted vehicles,” or “unmanned aircraft.” FAA and the  international community have adopted the term “unmanned aircraft  system” to designate them as aircraft and to recognize that a UAS includes  not only the airframe, but also the associated elements—the control  station and communications links—as shown in figure 1.
The capabilities of UASs differ from manned aircraft in several ways. A  UAS can operate for far longer periods than an onboard pilot could safely  operate an aircraft. Future scenarios envision UASs remaining aloft for  weeks or even months using fuel cell technology or airborne refueling  operations. UASs may fly at slower speeds than most manned aircraft;  some operate at low altitude (between buildings) while others fly well  above piloted aircraft altitudes. Some UASs can fly autonomously based  on pre-programmed data or flight paths, while others fly based on  commands from pilot-operated ground stations. UASs also vary widely in  size, shape, and capabilities. Some UASs, such as the Global Hawk, have a  wingspan as large as that of a Boeing 737. Others, because they do not  need the power or physical size to carry a pilot, can be small and light  enough to be launched by hand, as is the case for the SkySeer UAS shown  in figure 2.
DOD has pioneered UAS applications for wartime use and, in 2007, was  the major user of UASs, primarily for ongoing conflicts in Iraq and  Afghanistan. While many of DOD’s UAS operations currently take place  outside the United States, DOD needs access to the national airspace  system for UASs to, among other things, transit from their home bases for  training in restricted military airspace or for transit to overseas  deployment locations. DOD officials stated that the need for military UAS  access to the national airspace system is under review, and also noted that  increased access would also allow their UASs to be more easily used to aid  in fighting wildfires.
Several federal agencies have roles related to UASs. FAA is responsible for  ensuring UASs are safely integrated into the national airspace system’s air  traffic control procedures, airport operations, and infrastructure, and with  existing commercial, military, and general aviation users of the system.   When UASs operate in that system, they must meet the safety  requirements of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, parts 61  and 91. FAA approves, on a case-by-case basis, applications from  government agencies and private-sector entities for authority to operate  UASs in the national airspace system. Federal, state, and local government  agencies must apply for Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COA),  while private-sector entities must apply for special airworthiness  certificates. In either case, FAA examines the facts and circumstances of  proposed UAS operations to ensure that the prospective operator has  acceptably mitigated safety risks. Special airworthiness certificates are the  only means through which private-sector entities can operate UASs in the  national airspace system. Because special airworthiness certificates do not  allow commercial operations, there is currently no means for authorizing  commercial UAS operations.
NASA has conducted UAS research in the past. NASA led the 9-year  Environmental Research Aircraft and Sensor Technology Program that  focused on UAS technology for high altitude, long-endurance aircraft  engines, sensors, and integrated vehicles. NASA also played a key role in a  partnership with other federal agencies and industry called “Access-5.”
Access-5 incorporated the efforts of the UAV National Industry Team,  known as UNITE, formed by six private-sector aerospace firms, as well as  FAA, DOD, and other industry participants. The Access-5 partnership  sought to achieve routine operations for high-level, long-endurance UASs  in the national airspace system. NASA contributed about 75 percent of the  funding for this effort and the partnership had laid out plans through 2010.  Although the partnership ended in fiscal year 2006 when NASA cancelled  its funding, the project claimed a number of accomplishments, including  creating productive and cohesive working relationships among key  stakeholders and recommendations to advance the introduction of UASs  into the national airspace system.
Other agencies and organizations have roles or interests relating to UASs.  For example, DHS’s TSA has authority to regulate security of all  transportation modes, including non-military UASs, to ensure that  appropriate security safeguards are in place. GSA has the responsibility for  maintaining an inventory of all federally-owned or -leased aircraft, as  reported by federal agencies. Additionally, a number of associations,  representing private-sector aviation industries, such as airframe and  components manufacturers, and users of the national airspace system,  have interest in UASs progressing toward routine access to the system. We  refer to officials of these associations as stakeholders in this report.
section_title: Federal Agencies Have Used UASs in Many Ways and Expanded Government and Commercial Use Is Possible in the Future
paragraphs: Several federal agencies are using UASs of varying sizes for missions  ranging from forest fire monitoring to border security.  These agencies  are  interested in expanded use of UASs and state and local governments  would also like to begin using UASs for law enforcement or firefighting.  UASs also could eventually have commercial applications.
subsections: section_title: Federal Agencies Are Benefiting from Using UASs
paragraphs: Federal agencies use UASs for many purposes. NASA, for example, uses  UASs as platforms for gathering scientific research data and has partnered  with other government agencies to demonstrate and use UASs’ unique  capabilities. At its Wallops Island, Virginia, Flight Facility, NASA operates  a small fleet of Aerosonde® UASs on a lease-to-fly basis for researchers.  NASA also operates a modified Predator B UAS from its Dryden Flight  Research Center, in California, and used it to aid firefighting efforts in  southern California in 2007. During 2005, the Department of Commerce’s  National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)  partnered with NASA and industry to use a UAS to fill data gaps in several  areas, including climate research, weather and water resources  forecasting, ecosystem monitoring and management, and coastal mapping.  During 2007, NOAA partnered with NASA to use an Aerosonde® UAS to  gather data from Hurricane Noel and reported receiving valuable low- altitude data that could aid future weather forecasts and potentially  reduce property damage and save lives.
Several other federal agencies have benefited from using UASs. DHS’s  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses Predator B UASs to help  conduct surveillance along portions of the U.S. border with Mexico. (See  fig. 3.) CBP credits its UAS operations as helping its agents make over  4,000 arrests and seize nearly 20,000 pounds of illegal drugs between  September 2005 and March 2008. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,  UASs searched for survivors in an otherwise inaccessible area of  Mississippi. Additionally, in 2004, the U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S.  Forest Service used a UAS to study renewed volcanic activity at Mount St.  Helens, Washington. The UAS proved useful in this study because it could  operate above the extreme heat and toxic gases and solids emitted by the  volcano.
section_title: Interest Exists in Expanding UAS Operations to Obtain More Benefits
paragraphs: Recent events have contributed to increasing interest in expanding UAS  operations. The nation’s industrial base has expanded to support current  overseas conflicts. Moreover, personnel returning from duty in war  theaters provide a growing number of trained UAS operators. Advances in  computer technology, software development, light weight materials, global  navigation, advanced data links, sophisticated sensors, and component  miniaturization also contribute to the heightened interest in using UASs in  civilian roles.
In addition, the military’s use of UASs has raised the visibility of the  possible benefits of using UASs in non-military applications. For example,  the military recently demonstrated how operators can use UASs as  communications platforms to bridge rugged terrain as shown in figure 4.  Disaster recovery officials could use UASs in a similar manner to help  establish and maintain communications when the infrastructure is  disabled or overloaded. The latter was an issue in the hours immediately  following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
An industry forecast anticipates that federal agencies will continue to be  the main users of large UASs for much of the coming decade. CBP is  expanding its fleet of Predator B UASs. The agency received its fourth  aircraft in February 2008 and expects to acquire two more during fiscal  year 2008. CBP also plans to expand its UAS operations along the southern  U.S. border, and in the spring of 2008, begin operations along the northern  U.S. border, and then eventually expand operations to the Great Lakes and  Caribbean. CBP’s Air and Marine Operations Center in Riverside,  California, will eventually control most of the agency’s UASs via satellite  link. DHS’s Coast Guard is evaluating various UAS designs for future use  in maritime border protection, law and treaty enforcement, and search and  rescue.
Expanded UAS use for scientific applications is also possible. According  to NOAA, UASs have the potential to continue to fill critical observation  gaps in climate change research, weather and water resources forecasting,  ecosystem monitoring and management, and coastal mapping. NOAA also  anticipates further use of UASs for hurricane observation. Figure 5  illustrates how a high-altitude UAS might obtain hurricane data. The  National Academies recently recommended that NASA should increasingly  factor UAS technology into the nation’s strategic plan for Earth science. In  2007, NASA acquired two Global Hawk UASs from the Air Force for  potential use in long endurance missions monitoring polar ice melt or for  gathering data on hurricane development 2,500 miles off the U.S. Atlantic  coast.
State and local agencies and commercial users envision using smaller UAS  models. To facilitate more rapid resolution of emergency situations, an  official with the International Association of Chiefs of Police envisions  police and firefighting units having small, hand-deployed UASs available to  assist at crime scenes and wildfire locations. According to FAA, as of  January 2008, about a dozen law enforcement agencies had contacted the  agency to discuss potential use of UASs. An industry forecast of UAS  growth from 2008 to 2017 predicts that interest among local law  enforcement agencies in operating UASs could increase late in the forecast  period.
In the private sector, some entrepreneurs have become interested in  obtaining authorization to use small UASs to provide real estate  photography services. Small UASs could also help companies survey  pipeline or transportation infrastructure. However, an industry forecast  noted that, for commercial applications, manned aircraft continue to be  less costly than UASs. Consequently, demand for commercial applications  will be limited in the near term. While the forecast indicates that civil and  commercial UAS markets will eventually emerge, the forecast notes that,  for the next several years, a more likely scenario would be for a UAS  leasing industry to emerge to serve the needs of businesses that do not  want to invest in UAS ownership.
UASs also could provide benefits to manned aviation. Efforts to move  toward routine access for UASs could produce technological  improvements in areas such as materials, fuel cells, antennae, and laser  communications, which could also benefit manned aviation, according to  one study of UAS impact. Some experts we surveyed had similar  observations, noting that advancements in see and avoid technology could  lead to reduced aircraft separation requirements and, in turn, to increased  airspace capacity. Five experts indicated that technological improvements  could benefit the airspace, and four indicated that such improvements  could benefit airports. Additionally, five experts predicted that UASs  could provide a variety of benefits by assuming some of the missions  currently performed by manned aircraft or surface vehicles. These experts  predicted that UASs might perform these missions in less congested  airspace or with engines that burn less fuel or produce less air pollution.
Some experts view the routine use of UASs in the national airspace system  as a revolutionary change in aviation. According to one study, the state of  UASs today resembles the early days of manned aviation where innovation  and entrepreneurial spirit spawned a new market and permanently  changed the transportation landscape. The UAS industry is poised to meet  the potential demand for UASs. A 2004 study, prepared for JPDO, reported  that 49 UAS manufacturers operated in the United States. According to a  2007 industry estimate, UAS development and components manufacturing  involved over 400 companies in the United States. An industry forecast for  UASs indicates that, over the coming decade, the United States will  account for 73 percent of the world’s research and development  investment for UAS technology. The aforementioned 2004 JPDO report  notes that the emergence of a civil UAS industry could provide a number  of economic, social, and national security benefits, such as extending U.S.  aerospace leadership in the global UAS market; sustaining, and perhaps  increasing, employment in the U.S. aerospace industry; contributing to  expanding the U.S. economy by increasing domestic productivity and  aerospace exports; and creating the potential for a UAS civil reserve fleet  for use in major national and international emergencies.
section_title: Routine Access to the National Airspace System Poses Technological, Regulatory, Workload, and Coordination Challenges
paragraphs: Routine UAS access to the national airspace system poses a variety of  technological, regulatory, workload, and coordination challenges.  Technological challenges include developing a capability for UASs to  detect, sense, and avoid other aircraft; addressing communications and  physical security vulnerabilities; improving UAS reliability; and improving  human factors considerations in UAS design. A lack of regulations for  UASs limits their operations and leads to a lack of airspace for UAS testing  and evaluation and a lack of data that would aid in setting standards.  Increased workload would stem from FAA’s expectation of increased  demand for UAS operations in the national airspace system without a  regulatory framework in place. In addition, coordination of efforts is  lacking among diverse federal agencies as well as academia and the  private sector in moving UASs toward meeting the safety requirements of  the national airspace system.
subsections: section_title: Several Technological Issues Must Be Addressed before UASs Can Routinely Access the National Airspace System
paragraphs: FAA requires UASs to meet the national airspace system’s safety  requirements before they routinely access the system. However, UASs do  not currently have the capability to detect, sense, and avoid other aircraft  and airborne objects in a manner similar to manned aircraft. UASs also  have communications and physical security vulnerabilities. Moreover,  some UASs have demonstrated reliability problems and lack human- machine interface considerations in their design.
subsections: section_title: UASs Cannot Detect, Sense, and Avoid Other Aircraft in a Manner Similar to Manned Aircraft
paragraphs: Although research, development, and testing of sense and avoid  technologies has been ongoing for several years, no suitable technology  has been identified that would provide UASs with the capability to meet  the detect, sense, and avoid requirements of the national airspace system.  These requirements call for a person operating an aircraft to maintain  vigilance so as to see and avoid other aircraft. Without a pilot on board to  scan the sky, UASs do not have an on-board capability to directly “see”  other aircraft. Consequently, the UAS must possess the capability to sense  and avoid the object using on-board equipment, or do so with assistance of  a human on the ground or in a chase aircraft, or by using other means,  such as radar. Many UASs, particularly smaller models, will likely operate  at altitudes below 18,000 feet, sharing airspace with other objects, such as  gliders. Sensing and avoiding these other objects represents a particular  challenge for UASs, since the other objects normally do not transmit an  electronic signal to identify themselves and FAA cannot mandate that all  aircraft or objects possess this capability so that UASs can operate safely.  Many small UAS models do not have equipment to detect such signals and,  in some cases, are too small to carry such equipment. The Aircraft Owners  and Pilots Association, in a 2006 survey of its membership, found that  UASs’ inability to see and avoid manned aircraft is a priority concern.  Additionally, the experts we surveyed suggested, more frequently than any  other alternative, conducting further work on detect, sense, and avoid  technology as an interim step to facilitate UAS integration into the national  airspace system while FAA develops a regulatory structure for routine  UAS operations.
The effort to develop the Traffic Alert and Collision and Avoidance System  (TCAS), used widely in manned aircraft to help prevent collisions,  demonstrates the challenge of developing a detect, sense, and avoid  capability for UASs. Although FAA, airlines, and several private-sector  companies developed TCAS over a 13-year period, at a cost of more than  $500 million, FAA officials point out that the designers did not intend for  TCAS to act as the sole means of avoiding collisions and that the on board  pilot still has the responsibility for seeing and avoiding other aircraft. FAA  officials also point out that TCAS computes collision avoidance solutions  based on characteristics of manned aircraft, and does not incorporate  UASs’ slower turn and climb rates in developing conflict solutions.  Consequently, FAA officials and stakeholders we interviewed believe that  developing the detect, sense, and avoid technology that UASs would need  to operate routinely in the national airspace system poses an even greater  challenge than TCAS did. FAA officials believe that an acceptable detect,  sense, and avoid system for UASs could cost up to $2 billion to complete  and is still many years away.
section_title: UASs Have Communications, Command, Control, and Physical Security Vulnerabilities
paragraphs: Ensuring uninterrupted command and control for a UAS is important  because without it, the UAS could collide with another aircraft or, if it  crashes to the earth, cause injury or property damage. The lack of  protected radio frequency spectrum for UAS operations heightens the  possibility that an operator could lose command and control of the UAS.  Unlike manned aircraft, which use dedicated, protected radio frequencies,  UASs currently use unprotected radio spectrum and, like any other  wireless technology, remain vulnerable to unintentional or intentional  interference. This remains a key security vulnerability for UASs, because  in contrast to a manned aircraft where the pilot has direct, physical  control of the aircraft, interruption of radio frequency, such as by  jamming, can sever the UASs’ only means of control. One of the experts  we surveyed listed providing security and protected spectrum among the  critical UAS integration technologies.
To address the potential interruption of command and control, UASs  generally have pre-programmed maneuvers to follow if the command and  control link becomes interrupted (called a “lost-link scenario”) and a  means for safe return to the ground if operators cannot reestablish the  communications link before the UAS runs out of fuel. However, these  procedures are not standardized across all types of UASs and, therefore,  remain unpredictable to air traffic controllers. Predictability of UAS  performance under a lost link scenario is particularly important for air  traffic controllers who have responsibility for ensuring safe separation of  aircraft in their airspace.
Ensuring continuity of UAS command and control also depends on the  physical security provided to UASs. Presently, UAS operations in the  national airspace are limited and take place under closely controlled  conditions. However, this could change if UASs have routine access to the  national airspace. One study identifies security as a significant issue that  could be exacerbated with the proliferation of UASs. TSA notes that in  2004, terrorists flew a UAS over northern Israel. One stakeholder  questioned how we could prevent this from happening in the United  States. UASs have the capability to deliver nuclear, biological, or chemical  payloads, and can be launched undetected from virtually any site. In  response to the events of September 11, 2001, entry doors to passenger  airplane cockpits were hardened to prevent unauthorized entry. However,  no similar security requirements exist to prevent unauthorized access to  UAS ground control stations—the UAS equivalent of the cockpit. Security  is a latent issue that could impede UAS developments even after all the  other challenges have been addressed, according to one study.
section_title: UASs Have Shown a Lack of Reliability
paragraphs: Although DOD has obtained benefits from its UAS operations overseas,  the agency notes in its Unmanned Systems Roadmap that UAS reliability  is a key factor in integrating UASs into the national airspace system. Our  analysis of information that DOD provided on 199 military UAS accidents,  of varying degrees of severity, that occurred over 4½ years during  operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, indicates that reliability  continues to be a challenge. About 65 percent of the accidents resulted  from materiel issues, such as failures of UAS components.
Studies indicate that a number of factors could contribute to UAS  reliability problems. Many UASs have been designed primarily as  expendable or experimental vehicles, where factors such as cost, weight,  function, and performance outweigh reliability concerns, according to a  2004 study. The Congressional Research Service reported in 2006 that the  lack of reliability stems from the fact that UAS technology is still evolving,  and, consequently, less redundancy is built into the operating system of  UASs than of manned aircraft, and until redundant systems are perfected,  accident rates are expected to remain high. Reliability issues also stem  from the nature of the components used in some UASs. A DOD report  notes that there has been a tendency to design UASs at low cost using  readily available materials that were not intended for use in an aviation  environment. For example, one UAS used by DOD was equipped with a  wooden propeller that could disintegrate in the rain. A composite or  metal propeller could cost two to three times more than a wooden  propeller.
section_title: Human Factors Deficiencies in UAS Design Have Caused Accidents
paragraphs: UAS developers have not yet fully incorporated human factors engineering  in their products. Such engineering incorporates what is known about  people, their abilities, characteristics, and limitations in the design of the  equipment they use, the environments in which they function, and the jobs  they perform. According to researchers and agency officials we  interviewed, technology in its early developmental stages typically lacks  human factors considerations. Researchers noted that UASs, similar to any  new technology, have been designed by engineers who focused on getting  the technology to work, without considering human factors, such as ease  of use by non-engineers. FAA officials noted that UASs today are at a  similar stage as personal computers in their early years before newer,  more user-friendly operating systems became standard. Studies indicate  that human factors issues have contributed to military UAS accidents and  DOD has indicated the need for further work in this area. Our analysis of  DOD’s data on UAS accidents during Operation Enduring Freedom and  Operation Iraqi Freedom showed that 17 percent were due to human  factors issues.
Several human factors issues have yet to be resolved. For example, the  number of UASs that a single ground-based pilot can safely operate  remains undetermined, as some future scenarios envision a single pilot  operating several UASs simultaneously. Other unresolved issues include  how pilots or air traffic controllers respond to the lag in communication of  information from the UAS, the skill set and medical qualifications required  for UAS pilots, and UAS pilot training requirements.
The variety of ground control station designs across UASs is another  human factors concern. For example, pilots of the Predator B UAS control  the aircraft by using a stick and pedals, similar to the actions of pilots of  manned aircraft. In contrast, pilots of the Global Hawk UAS use a  keyboard and mouse to control the aircraft. Differences in UAS missions  could require some variation among control station designs, but the extent  to which regulations should require commonalities across all ground  control stations awaits further research.
The transition from one crew to another while UASs are airborne serves as  another human factors issue needing resolution. Because UASs have the  capability of extended flight, one crew can hand off control to another  during a mission. Several military UAS accidents have occurred during  these handoffs, according to a 2005 research study. The National  Transportation Safety Board cited a similar issue in its report on the April  26, 2006, crash of CBP’s Predator B UAS. According to the report, the pilot  inadvertently cut off the UAS’s fuel supply when he switched from a  malfunctioning console to a functioning one. When the switch was made,  a lever on the second console remained in a position that would cut off the  fuel supply if an operator used the console to control the aircraft.  Although procedures required that the controls on the two consoles be  matched prior to making such a switch, this procedure was not followed.  CBP reports that it has taken action to address this issue and has also  addressed nearly all of the board’s other recommendations stemming from  this accident.
A remote pilot’s lack of situational awareness serves as another human  factors-related challenge for the safe operation of UASs. For example, FAA  officials have noted that situational awareness remains a key factor for  operators to detect and appropriately respond to turbulence. A pilot on  board an aircraft can physically sense and assess the severity of  turbulence being encountered, whereas a remote pilot cannot. A UAS  could break apart and become a hazard to other aircraft or to persons or  property on the ground if the pilot has no indication of turbulence or its  severity. Even if a remote pilot had an awareness of the turbulence, the  level of risk that the pilot might accept needs further study. Because a  pilot does not risk his own safety when operating a UAS, the pilot may  operate the UAS in situations unsuitable for the aircraft, such as flying  through turbulence strong enough to destroy the UAS’s airframe.
Although many experts and aviation stakeholders believe that the  technical issues discussed above represent difficult challenges for UAS  integration into the national airspace system, others do not. For example,  DOD’s Unmanned Systems Roadmap asserts that the technology for  detecting and maneuvering to avoid objects does not present a major  obstacle. Some experts responding to our survey expressed similar  opinions. For example, one noted that technology needed to safely  integrate UASs into the national airspace system exists today and that  implementation should be the focus. Another said that FAA is too slow in  adopting new technology and that sense and avoid techniques are  available today that, when used in combination with a qualified pilot at the  ground station’s controls, would be sufficient to allow free access for  larger UASs. However, FAA expects to continue its current practice of  allowing UAS access to the national airspace system on a case-by-case  basis, after a safety review, until technology, research, and regulations  mature.
section_title: A Lack of Regulations Limits UAS Operations
paragraphs: The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations prescribes rules governing the  operation of most aircraft in the national airspace system. However, these  regulations were developed for manned aircraft. Minimum performance  standards for UAS detect, sense, and avoid and communications,  command, and control capabilities, as well as regulations that incorporate  these minimum standards, do not exist. Moreover, existing regulations  may need changes or additions to address the unique characteristics of  UASs. For example, because UASs do not need to be large or powerful  enough to carry a pilot, they can be much smaller than any aircraft that  today routinely operates in the national airspace system. Existing  regulations were developed for aircraft large enough to carry a human.
The lack of a regulatory framework has limited the amount of UAS  operations in the national airspace system, which has, in turn, contributed  to a lack of operational data on UASs and a lack of airspace in which  developers can test and evaluate their products. An industry forecast  indicates that growth in a civil UAS market is not likely until regulations  exist that allow UASs to operate routinely. The forecast assumes that such  regulations would be in place by 2012, but notes that few civil-use UASs  would be produced in the near term, with numbers increasing towards  2017.  (See fig. 6.)
Studies indicate that the lack of regulations can affect liability risk of UAS  operations, which can increase insurance costs. For example, without  airworthiness standards, insurers would be even more concerned about  the liability hazard of UASs crashing in a dense urban environment. The  lack of regulations to govern access to airspace has also posed challenges  for developers of civil UASs. Officials of associations representing UAS  developers told us of difficulties in finding airspace in which to test and  evaluate UASs. One of these officials noted that some manufacturers have  their own test ranges, and some have access to restricted military  airspace, but other UAS developers have not had this access. Additionally,  because UAS operations in the national airspace have been limited,  operational data is scarce. Having data on UAS operations is an important  element in developing regulations.
Because UASs have never routinely operated in the national airspace  system, the level of public acceptance is unknown. One researcher  observed that as UASs expand into the non-defense sector, there will  inevitably be public debate over the need for and motives behind such  proliferation. One expert we surveyed commented that some individuals  may raise privacy concerns about a small aircraft that is “spying” on them,  whether operated by law enforcement officials or by private organizations,  and raised the question of what federal agency would have the  responsibility for addressing these privacy concerns. On the other hand, a  study for JPDO noted that if UASs were increasingly used to produce  public benefits in large-scale emergency response efforts, public  acceptance could grow as the public notes the benefits that UASs can  provide.
section_title: Coordinating with Other Countries’ Efforts to Integrate UASs Is a Key Task
paragraphs: As other countries work toward integrating UASs in their respective  airspaces, FAA faces a challenge to work with the international  community in developing harmonized standards and operational  procedures so that UASs can seamlessly cross international borders and  U.S. manufacturers can sell their products in the global marketplace.  International bodies such as the European Organization for Civil Aviation  Equipment (EUROCAE), and the European Organization for the Safety of  Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL), as well as individual countries face  challenges similar to those that the United States faces in integrating UASs  into their respective airspaces.
EUROCAE formed a working group—WG-73—in 2006 to focus on UAS  issues. The working group completed its first product in January 2007—a  preliminary inventory of airworthiness certification and operational  approval items that need to be addressed. The working group also plans to  develop a work plan that lays out work packages and timelines; a concept  for UAS airworthiness certification and operational approval that will  provide recommendations and a framework for safe UAS operations in  non-segregated airspace; requirements for command, control, and  communications, as well as for sense and avoid systems; and a catalog of  UAS-air traffic management incompatibility issues that need to be  addressed.
EUROCONTROL has established a UAS Air Traffic Management Activity  and is hosting workshops to seek feedback, suggestions, and advice from a  broad range of aviation stakeholders on its approach to UAS integration  into European airspace. The second workshop is scheduled for May 2008  and is open to all interested civil and military stakeholders, including air  navigation service providers, UAS operators and manufacturers,  regulators, as well as associations and professional bodies. EURCONTROL  has also established an Operational Air Traffic Task Force that has  developed high-level specifications for military UASs operating outside  segregated airspace in a form suitable for European states to incorporate  into their national regulations. The specifications state that UAS  operations should not increase the risk to other airspace users, that air  traffic management procedures should mirror those applicable to manned  aircraft, and that the provision of air traffic services to UASs should be  transparent to air traffic controllers.
Table 1 illustrates the variety of individual country efforts to integrate  UASs into their respective airspaces. With the variety of ongoing efforts  around the world, FAA and other countries face a challenge in  harmonizing UAS standards and procedures.
section_title: FAA Faces Increased Workload to Process COA and Special Airworthiness Certificate Applications for UAS Operations
paragraphs: FAA could face a workload challenge in conducting an increasing number  of case-by-case safety reviews for proposed UAS operations in the national  airspace system. FAA is already having difficulty in meeting its 60-calendar  day goal for processing COAs, used for government requests to operate  UASs. From December 2006 through January 2008, FAA’s COA processing  time averaged 66 calendar days. FAA anticipates a substantial increase in  requests for COAs, as well as for special airworthiness certificates, used  by private-sector entities proposing UAS operations in the national  airspace system, by 2010. (See figs. 7 and 8.) Increased demand could  result in even longer processing times for COAs.
A lack of knowledge of the number of federally-owned or -leased UASs  adds uncertainty to FAA’s expected future workload. The number of COAs  does not provide a count of federally-owned or -leased UASs because each  COA reflects an authorization to operate a UAS, not the number of UASs  owned or leased by an agency. According to FAA, an agency could have  multiple copies of the same type of UAS whose operation is approved in a  COA. Moreover, having multiple UASs of the same type could drive  additional workload for FAA if the agency requests authorization to  operate its UASs under different operating scenarios, each of which would  require a separate COA. An agency could also have only one UAS, but  more than one COA, if the agency required and received approval for the  UAS to operate under different sets of conditions. GSA has responsibility  for maintaining the inventory of federally-owned and -leased aircraft, but  its regulations on reporting these aircraft have not been updated to require  federal agencies to report UASs.
section_title: Coordination among Federal Agencies and Others Is Lacking
paragraphs: Coordinating the efforts of numerous federal agencies, academic  institutions, and private-sector entities that have UAS expertise or a stake  in routine access to the national airspace system is a challenge. As  discussed above, several federal agencies are involved to varying degrees  in UAS issues. Additionally, academic institutions have UAS expertise to  contribute and UAS manufacturers have a stake in supplying the demand  for UASs that routine access could create. FAA and experts referenced the  Access-5 program that, in the past, served as an overarching coordinating  body and provided a useful community forum. While some experts believe  that Access-5’s focus on high-altitude, long-endurance UASs is no longer  appropriate, the program’s institutional arrangements demonstrated how  federal government and the private-sector resources could be combined to  focus on a common goal.
Stakeholders and experts we surveyed believe that coordination and focus  are lacking among the diverse entities working on UAS issues, and  expressed concerns that the potential public and economic benefits of  UASs could be delayed while FAA develops the safety regulations required  to enable routine UASs operations in the national airspace system. They  noted the numerous potential uses in public safety, law enforcement,  weather forecasting, and national security, discussed previously, stating  that these benefits will be delayed until standards are developed. Some  also noted that economic benefits realized through industry growth and  productivity gains in the commercial sector would also be delayed.  Additionally, some experts believe that, at the current pace of progress,  the United States would lose its leadership position and manufacturers  would move to other countries where the regulatory climate is more  receptive. However, as previously noted, an industry forecast indicates  that the United States will account for about two-thirds of the worldwide  UAS research and development in the coming decade.
section_title: Fully Addressing UAS Challenges Involves Several Agencies and Could Take a Decade or Longer
paragraphs: FAA and other agencies have roles in addressing technological, regulatory,  and workload challenges, but no entity is in charge of coordinating these  efforts. FAA and DOD are addressing some technological challenges, but  TSA has not addressed the security implications of routine UAS  operations. FAA is establishing a regulatory framework, but routine UAS  access to the national airspace may not occur for over a decade. FAA is  mitigating its expected increased workload by automating some of its COA  processing steps. GSA is updating its federal aircraft reporting  requirements to include UASs. Experts and stakeholders believe that an  overarching entity could add focus to these diverse efforts and facilitate  routine UAS access to the national airspace system.
subsections: section_title: Federal Agencies Are Addressing Some Technological Issues
paragraphs: FAA is addressing technological issues by sponsoring research and taking  steps to address UAS vulnerabilities in communications, command, and  control. DOD is taking steps toward improving UAS reliability and the  extent of human factors consideration in UAS design. An FAA-sponsored  federal advisory committee is developing technical standards for FAA to  use in developing UAS regulations. Although TSA issued an advisory  circular in 2004 on UAS security concerns, it has not addressed the  security implications of routine UAS access in the national airspace  system.
subsections: section_title: FAA Is Sponsoring Research on Detect, Sense, and Avoid Technologies and Other Topics
paragraphs: FAA has budgeted $4.7 million for fiscal years 2007 through 2009 for  further UAS research on topics such as detect, sense, and avoid; command  and control; and system safety management. NASA, FAA, and others have  conducted tests to determine the capabilities of and potential  improvements to detect, sense, and avoid technology. For example, in  2003, NASA installed radar on a manned aircraft that was equipped for  optional control from the ground. The tests indicated that the radar  detected intruding aircraft earlier than the onboard pilot, but also revealed  the need for further work on the onboard sensing equipment to ensure  adequate response time for the remote pilot. In another example, FAA and  the Air Force Research Laboratory collaborated to execute flight tests for  sense and avoid technology between October 2006 and January 2007.  According to a summary of the lessons learned from these tests, the  results showed some promise, but indicated that much work and  technology maturation would need to occur before the tested system  could be deemed ready for operational use.
section_title: FAA Has Begun to Address Radio Frequency Spectrum Allocation for UASs to Ensure Uninterrupted Communications, Command, and Control
paragraphs: Addressing the challenge of radio frequency allocation for UAS operations  is moving forward, but may not be completed for several years. The  International Telecommunication Union allocates radio frequency  spectrum and deliberates such issues at periodic World  Radiocommunication Conferences, the most recent of which was held in  the fall of 2007. To obtain spectrum allocation for UASs, FAA has  participated with the Department of Commerce in a national preparation  process to place spectrum allocation decisions on the conference’s future  agenda. At the 2007 conference, delegates agreed to discuss at the next  conference, in 2011, the spectrum requirements and possible regulatory  actions, including spectrum allocations, needed to support the safe  operation of UASs. The Department of Commerce and the Federal  Communications Commission would jointly implement and manage the  spectrum allocation decisions made at the 2011 conference, as these  agencies manage, respectively, federal and non-federal use of frequency  spectrum.
section_title: DOD Is Working to Improve UAS Reliability and Incorporate Human Factors in UAS Design
paragraphs: DOD is urging manufacturers to increase UAS reliability while keeping  costs low by using such practices as standard systems engineering,  ensuring that replacement parts are readily available, and using redundant,  fail-safe designs. DOD also notes in its Unmanned Systems Roadmap that,  although UASs suffer accidents at one to two orders of magnitude greater  than the rate incurred by manned military aircraft, accident rates have  declined as operational experience increased. For some UASs, the  accident rates have become similar to or lower than that of the manned    F-16 fighter jet, according to the roadmap. According to a study by The  MITRE Corporation, General Atomics designed the Predator B UAS with  reliability in mind, and the Altair UAS, which is a modified version of the  Predator, has, among other things, triple redundant avionics to increase  reliability.
The Army has made some progress in limiting the variety of ground  control station designs for unmanned aircraft—a human factors concern— by developing its “One System®,” which involves a single ground control  station capable of operating a variety of UASs. Further increasing  standardization and interoperability across all unmanned systems is a  continuing DOD goal.
section_title: A Federal Advisory Body Is Developing Technical Standards
paragraphs: The Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), a federal  advisory committee sponsored by FAA, is establishing minimum  performance standards for FAA to use in developing UAS regulations.  RTCA established Special Committee 203 in October 2004 to develop such  standards for UAS detect, sense, and avoid and for UAS communications,  command, and control. Individuals from academia and the private sector  serve on the committee without government compensation along with  FAA, NASA, and DOD officials.
Special Committee 203 has begun assessing the technological and  regulatory landscape as it pertains to UASs to determine the scope of its  task. The committee published guidance materials to provide a framework  for its standards development effort and to help UAS designers,  manufacturers, installers, service providers, and users understand the  breadth of operational concepts and systems being considered for  integration into the national airspace system. The committee anticipates  that the guidance will be further refined and validated as the standards  development process moves along.
According to a committee co-chair, the committee did not realize, at the  outset, that developing technical standards for UASs would be a project of  unprecedented complexity and scope for RTCA. RTCA’s projects have  been narrower in scope in the past, he said. Although the committee  officials had previously estimated that the standards would be completed  by 2011 or 2012, the completion date is now between 2017 and 2019. The  additional time has been added to apply a data-driven, systems engineering  approach that will require the collaborative efforts of FAA, DOD, and  MITRE’s Center for Advanced Aviation System Development.
RTCA anticipates that reliability and human factors requirements will be  integrated into its minimum performance standards. The guidance  materials note that UASs must meet the same reliability as manned  aircraft, and that reliability is an important component of safety; flight  control systems; certification requirements for detect, sense, and avoid  avionics; and for command and control systems such as the UAS’s  autopilot. According to RTCA officials, human factors will be an  overarching consideration in standards development.
section_title: Security Implications of Routine UAS Access to the National Airspace System Have Not Been Addressed
paragraphs: Although UASs remain vulnerable to many of the same security risks as  manned aircraft, little attention has been afforded to UAS security. In 2004,  TSA issued an advisory that described possible terrorist interest in using  UASs as weapons. The advisory noted the potential for UASs to carry  explosives or disperse chemical or biological weapons. However, the  advisory noted that there was no credible evidence to suggest that  terrorist organizations plan to use UASs in the United States and advised  operators to stay alert for UASs with unusual or unauthorized  modifications or persons observed loitering in the vicinity of UAS  operations, loading unusual cargo into a UAS, appearing to be under  stress, showing identification that appeared to be altered, or asking  detailed questions about UAS capabilities. In 2007, the agency advised  model aircraft clubs to fly their aircraft only at chartered club facilities or  at administered sites and to notify local authorities of scheduled flying  events.
TSA considers these actions appropriate to address the security threat  posed by UASs.  According to TSA, the agency uses a threat based, risk  management approach to prioritize risk, threats, and vulnerabilities in  order to appropriately apply resources and implement security  enhancements.  TSA informed us that the agency continues to monitor  threat information regarding UASs and has processes in place to act  quickly to mitigate and respond to any identified vulnerabilities. While  these actions may be appropriate for the low tempo of today’s UAS  operations, growth forecasts indicate that UASs could proliferate in the  national airspace in the future. Such a proliferation could increase the risk  of UASs being used by terrorists for attacks in the United States. A lack of  analysis of security issues, while FAA develops the regulatory framework,  could lead to further delays in allowing UASs routine access to the  national airspace system.
section_title: FAA Is Establishing a Regulatory Framework, but Routine UAS Access to the National Airspace May Not Occur for a Decade or More
paragraphs: FAA has established a UAS program office and is reviewing the body of  manned aviation regulations to determine the modifications needed to  address UASs, but these modifications may not be completed until 2020.  As an interim step, FAA has begun an effort to provide increased access to  the national airspace system for small UASs. FAA is taking steps to  develop data to use in developing standards, but has been slow to analyze  the data that it has already collected. FAA is also coordinating with other  countries to harmonize regulations.
subsections: section_title: FAA Has Created an Unmanned Aircraft Program Office to Ensure That UASs Operate Safely
paragraphs: In February 2006, FAA created the Unmanned Aircraft Program Office  (UAPO) to develop policies and regulations to ensure that UASs operate  safely in the national airspace system. With 19 staff, UAPO serves as FAA’s  focal point to coordinate efforts to address UAS technical and regulatory  challenges and for outreach to other government agencies, the private  sector, and other countries and international bodies working on UASs  integration challenges. UAPO is developing a program plan to inform the  aviation community of FAA’s perspective on all that needs to be  accomplished and the time frames required to create a regulatory  framework that will ensure UAS safety and allow UASs to have routine  access to the national airspace system. Although officials informed us that  this plan was in progress in December 2006, as of March 2008 the plan was  awaiting final approval for release. Issuing the program plan could provide  industry and potential UAS users with a framework that describes FAA’s  vision and plans for integrating UASs into the national airspace system.
While RTCA is developing minimum performance standards for UASs,  FAA has begun to review the existing body of regulations for manned  aviation to determine what regulations need to be modified or whether  new regulations are needed to address the unique characteristics of UASs.  Some of the rules for manned aircraft may not apply to UASs. For  example, the rule requiring that oxygen be on board for passenger use on  all aircraft operating above 14,000 feet would not apply to a UAS. On the  other hand, new standards may be needed. For example, while FAA has  developed standards for manned airframe stress, no similar standard  exists for UASs. UASs may require unique standards because, as  mentioned previously in this report, a remote pilot cannot physically  experience and judge the severity of turbulence that could potentially  harm the airframe and cause an accident.
However, UASs may not receive routine access to the national airspace  system until 2020. FAA’s final step in developing UAS regulations must  wait until the 2017 to 2019 time frame, after RTCA’s Special Committee  203 develops minimum technical standards for UASs. FAA would then  conduct a rulemaking to adopt the committee’s standards, which would  require an additional year, according to an FAA official.
As an interim effort to increase UAS access to the national airspace  system, FAA began an effort in 2007 to establish regulations to  incrementally allow small UASs to operate in the national airspace system,  under low-risk conditions without undergoing the case-by-case approval  process that is currently required. FAA has established a plan to publish a  notice of proposed rulemaking by July 2009 and a final rule by 2010 or  2011. Although FAA has not reached any final decisions, FAA may limit  these regulations to UASs weighing less than 30 pounds, operating within  line of sight, and traveling at speeds less than 40 knots, according to an  FAA official. FAA is considering using a nontraditional certification  approach that would allow applicants to register small UASs using a Web- based tool. FAA anticipates that, following the rulemaking, it will obtain  data and experience with UAS operations that could lead to further  gradual expansion of small UAS access to the national airspace system.
Allowing incremental access of certain UASs that pose low risks is  consistent with pending legislation and local government agencies and  potential commercial operators have expressed much interest in operating  small UASs. However, FAA recognizes that some small UASs may never  have routine access to the national airspace system because their small  size limits their ability to carry detect, sense, and avoid equipment.  Additionally, FAA notes that, like all UASs, small UASs will require secure  radio frequency spectrum for command and control, and this issue has not  yet been resolved.
section_title: FAA Seeks Data on UAS Operations, but Progress Is Slow
paragraphs: The absence of a comprehensive database on UAS safety and reliability  that could inform the standards and regulations development process  hinders FAA’s efforts to establish a regulatory framework for UASs. FAA  has been working to leverage DOD’s decades of experience with UASs.  Collaboration between FAA and DOD could provide mutual benefits. DOD  plans to spend over $7 billion in research, development, test, and  evaluation funds for UASs between fiscal years 2007 and 2013. Data from  these efforts could facilitate FAA’s development of a regulatory  framework to allow UASs to have routine access to the national airspace  system. DOD would benefit from this access by being able to operate its  UASs in the national airspace, without first obtaining a COA, as UASs  transit from home bases to training areas or to overseas deployment. To  this end, FAA and DOD finalized a memorandum of agreement in  September 2007 that provides a formal mechanism for FAA to request, and  DOD to provide, data on UAS operations to support safety studies.  Through the memorandum, FAA will share the results of its studies with  DOD and vice versa. FAA also participates with DOD on a joint integrated  product team that is focusing on obtaining military UAS access to the  national airspace system. According to DOD’s Unmanned Systems  Roadmap, the team’s activities include modeling and simulation,  technology development, acquisition, demonstrations, and flight tests.
While DOD’s extensive experience with UAS operations and its  accumulated data represent potentially rich sources of information on  UAS operations, regulators should use such information with the  understanding that it comes from a wartime operating environment. FAA  and DOD officials acknowledge that military experience and operational  data on UASs are not always directly transferable to operations in the  national airspace system. The military’s use of UASs is focused on  mitigating the danger to troops. Safety and reliability risks that may be  appropriate in a war zone to protect troops may not be acceptable in the  national airspace system.
FAA’s efforts to develop and analyze UAS operations data are a good start,  but FAA has not yet analyzed the data that it has already collected. The  COA requires the applicant to provide FAA with a variety of operational  data, such as the number of flights conducted, the pilot duty time per  flight, equipment malfunctions, and information on any accidents. FAA has  been archiving this information as it is received, but has not analyzed it  because of resource constraints, according to a UAPO official. Analyzing  this data could add to the information available for developing standards.
As a vehicle for collecting data on UAS operations and to address the  challenge that UAS developers have had in finding airspace for testing and  evaluating their products, FAA has established a UAS test center at New  Mexico State University in Las Cruces, New Mexico. FAA expects that  UAS operations at the test center, which opened in the spring of 2008, will  provide FAA with some of the data needed to develop standards and  regulations for allowing routine UAS access to the national airspace  system.  The university will operate the 12,000 square mile test center,  where UASs can operate at altitudes up to 18,000 feet. (See fig. 9.) The  university has several years of experience in demonstrating, testing, and  evaluating UAS technologies. The New Mexico environment has the  advantage of a very low population density and a low volume of air traffic,  and the test center is located over mostly undeveloped government-owned  land. FAA will provide oversight of the test center operation by way of  announced and unannounced visits, according to an FAA official.
section_title: FAA Is Coordinating with Other Countries to Harmonize Regulations
paragraphs: To address the challenge of coordinating U.S. efforts with those of other  countries, FAA is working with international aviation bodies and  maintaining contact with other countries as they also work to overcome  the challenges of integrating UASs into their respective airspaces. For  example, the manager of FAA’s UAPO serves as a vice chairman of  EUROCAE’s WG-73, and FAA has established a collaborative effort with  EUROCONTROL to leverage mutual expertise and resources. FAA told us  that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has formed a  study group to identify changes needed in global standards and practices  to address UAS issues. FAA has also established a memorandum of  cooperation with the Netherlands’ Civil Aviation Authority to work on  UAS technology, hazards, and risks. FAA plans to contribute, subject to  appropriations, $1 million during fiscal years 2007 through 2011, to provide  the Netherlands with data and expertise, while the Netherlands plans to  contribute €160,000 ($251,279). FAA has received briefings on Japan’s use  of UASs for pesticide spraying and has collaborated with several countries  to address UAS issues with ICAO.
FAA’s efforts to work with the international community could facilitate  mutual sharing of experiences and substantially increase the amount of  information available to all countries. One stakeholder suggested Israel as  a potential source of data, as that country has had extensive experience  with UAS operations. An Israel Space Agency official, noting the growing  importance of UASs in that country, stated that the numbers of unmanned  aircraft in the Israel Air Force will outnumber manned aircraft within 20  years. The official also stated that in a recent conflict, Israel’s UASs  compiled more flying hours than manned aircraft.
section_title: FAA Is Mitigating Anticipated Workload Increase by Automating Some COA Processing Steps, and GSA Is Working to Develop an Inventory of Federal UASs
paragraphs: FAA has taken some actions to mitigate the workload challenge stemming  from an anticipated increase in requests for COAs to operate UASs in the  national airspace system. During the spring of 2007, FAA began to  introduce more automation into its COA review process for UASs and has  plans for increasing automation. For example, FAA established a Web- based COA application, which became mandatory for applicants’ use on  July 1, 2007. FAA officials believe that the Web-based process allows  applicants to more easily determine the application’s requirements,  thereby eliminating rework and repeated reviews before FAA accepts the  application. FAA also expects that the September 2007 memorandum of  agreement with DOD will reduce the number of COA applications because  it allows DOD to conduct certain operations with UASs weighing 20  pounds or less over military installations and in other specified airspace  without obtaining a COA. Additionally, FAA is working to identify  characteristics of routine COA applications, which FAA estimates  constitute up to 80 percent of total COA applications, enabling agency staff  to focus limited resources on non routine cases. Focusing less attention on  routine cases is consistent with comments from three of our experts who  noted the need for an expedited process for obtaining COAs and special  airworthiness certificates. FAA officials also stated that because  applicants are becoming more familiar with COA requirements, a higher  percentage of applications do not need additional work and review.
Knowledge of the number of federally-owned or -leased UASs could help  FAA to plan for future workload. Forecasters indicate that UASs operated  by federal agencies could be a major component of UAS growth in the  immediate future. Although the current number of federally-owned or  -leased UASs is unknown, GSA is taking steps to obtain this information.  In response to our requests for data on the number of federally-owned or  -leased UASs, GSA sent letters to federal agencies in February 2008,  clarifying that FAA defines a UAS as an aircraft and requesting agencies to  report their UASs by March 31, 2008. GSA is also in the process of revising  regulations to require federal agencies to include owned or leased UASs in  their aircraft inventory reports. GSA expects to have its regulation updated  by February 2009. GSA anticipates that the first public reporting of UASs  will be in the fiscal year 2008 Federal Aviation Report, due by March 31,  2009. This report could add a degree of certainty to FAA’s future workload  requirements.
section_title: Experts and Stakeholders Believe an Overarching Entity Could Facilitate Efforts to Achieve Routine UAS Access to the National Airspace System
paragraphs: In addition to FAA, DOD, TSA, and GSA, other federal agencies, academia,  and the private sector also have UAS expertise or a stake in obtaining  routine UAS access to the national airspace system. For example, RTCA  notes that developing standards will require collaboration with DOD’s  joint integrated product team and technical expertise from staff in  MITRE’s Center for Advanced Aviation System Development. DOD seeks  expanded access to the national airspace and, as previously discussed, has  extensive experience with operating its own UASs. Beyond DOD and FAA,  other entities also have UAS expertise or a stake in achieving routine UAS  access to the national airspace system. For example, DHS’s CBP and Coast  Guard need UAS access to the national airspace system to perform their  missions. Several academic institutions have been involved in developing  UAS technology in areas such as vehicle design and detect, sense, and  avoid capability. Additionally, the private sector has a stake in being ready  to respond to the anticipated market that could emerge when FAA makes  routine access available to most UASs. Although FAA’s UAPO serves as a  focal point within FAA, the office has no authority over other agencies’  efforts.
Experts and stakeholders suggested that an overarching body might  facilitate progress toward integrating UASs into the national airspace  system. DOD, as the major user of UASs, is taking such an approach. DOD  has recognized the need for coordination of UAS activities within its own  sphere of influence, as each service has recognized the value of UASs for  its respective missions. Consequently, DOD established an Unmanned  Aircraft Systems Task Force to coordinate critical issues related to UAS  acquisition and management within DOD. According to DOD, the task  force will establish new teams or lead or coordinate existing Army, Navy,  and Air Force teams to enhance operations, enable interdependencies, and  streamline acquisitions. FAA is participating in a joint integrated product  team that is part of this task force, and DOD has invited DHS to join the  task force.
The European Defense Agency has also recognized the challenge of  channeling diverse entities, as well as multiple nation-states, toward the  common goal of UAS access to non-segregated airspace. In January 2008,  the agency announced that it had awarded a contract to a consortium of  defense and aerospace companies to develop a detailed roadmap for  integrating, by 2015, UASs into European airspace. The project is intended  to help European stakeholders such as airworthiness authorities, air  traffic management bodies, procurement agencies, industry, and research  institutes to develop a joint agenda for common European UAS activities.  The consortium held its first workshop in February 2008 and has since  prepared a roadmap outline based on the needs and requirements  expressed by the stakeholders. The consortium has also identified as a  baseline, key actions to be undertaken and key topics for further  investigation. The consortium has invited stakeholders to discuss this  common baseline at a second workshop, scheduled for May 2008.
Congress addressed a similar coordination challenge in 2003 when it  passed legislation to create JPDO to plan for and coordinate a  transformation of the nation’s current air traffic control system to the next  generation air transportation system (NextGen) by 2025. NextGen involves  a complex mix of precision satellite navigation; digital, networked  communications; an integrated weather system; layered, adaptive security;  and more.
NextGen’s coordination and planning challenges are similar to those posed  by UASs. For example, as required for UAS integration, the expertise and  technology required for NextGen resides in several federal agencies,  academia, and the private sector. DOD has expertise in “network centric”  systems, originally developed for the battlefield, which are being  considered as a framework to provide all users of the national airspace  system with a common view of that system. JPDO’s responsibilities  include coordinating goals, priorities, and research activities of several  partner agencies, including DOD, FAA, the Department of Commerce,  DHS, and NASA with aviation and aeronautical firms. Congress directed  JPDO to prepare an integrated plan that would include, among other  things, a national vision statement and a multiagency research and  development roadmap for creating NextGen. The legislation called for the  roadmap to identify obstacles, the research and development necessary to  overcome them, and the roles of each agency, corporations, and  universities.
section_title: Impact of Routine UAS Operations Is Unknown
paragraphs: The impact of routine UAS operations on the national airspace system and  the environment depends on a number of factors and remains generally  speculative. UAS impact will depend on factors such as the number of  UASs purchased for civil uses and the altitudes and geographic locations  where they are used. Stakeholders whom we interviewed provided a  variety of perspectives on UASs’ potential impact. One official told us that  UASs that use airports will impact air traffic control, while the impact of  small UASs that do not need to use airports is less clear. Officials also  noted that the level of risk depends on factors such as the UAS’s weight  and horsepower. For example, a small, 2- or 3-pound UAS would pose little  risk to aircraft or people on the ground, but UASs weighing more than      20 pounds could do significant damage to an aircraft. Officials also noted  that a UAS used over a sparsely populated area would have less impact  than UAS operations over densely populated areas.
Predictions of the impact of UASs on the national airspace system are  speculative because there are few data upon which to base predictions.  Predictions become even more speculative in view of RTCA’s recent  estimate that minimum standards for UASs—a prerequisite for routine  UAS access to the national airspace system—will require about another 10  years to complete. One study notes that more needs to be known about the  needs and capabilities of future UASs as well as the potential market, but  concluded that their operations could have a significant and potentially  disruptive impact on aviation by affecting capacity and introducing more  complexity. In 2007, RTCA’s Special Committee 203 reported similar  concerns, indicating that UASs will create some unique challenges  because they operate differently from typical manned aircraft. While  manned aircraft generally go from one location to another, UASs may  hover or circle in one location for a significant time. Additionally, UAS  speed, maneuverability, climb rate and other performance characteristics  may differ substantially from those of conventional aircraft. The  committee believes that these characteristics could affect air traffic flow,  air traffic controller workload, and departure and arrival procedures,  among other things. Similarly, FAA officials noted that UASs pose airport  safety and capacity questions that require further analysis.
Most of the experts stated that the impact of UAS’s would be at least as  significant as that of additional manned aircraft on airspace, airports, and  air traffic control. For example, they predicted that, as with manned  aircraft, UASs would add to the number of aircraft and, therefore, affect  airspace and airport capacity and add to the workload of air traffic  controllers. However, the experts also predicted that UASs could have a  beneficial impact on the environment. The experts predicted that UASs  could assume some missions currently performed by manned aircraft, but  could perform these missions using engines that burn less fuel or produce  less air pollution.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: Although ensuring that UASs operate safely in the national airspace  system is a new and complex challenge for FAA, the national airspace  system should be prepared to accommodate them. Understanding the  issues, trends, and influences of UASs will be critical in strategically  planning for the future airspace system. FAA is making progress in  addressing the challenges. Establishing a UAS test center to provide UAS  developers with airspace in which to test, evaluate, and refine their  aircraft designs, and initiating efforts to increase airspace access for small  UASs are significant steps. Moving forward, issuing FAA’s long-awaited  program plan should benefit the aviation community by communicating  FAA’s strategy of how it plans to address the interactive complexities and  unique properties of UASs and how it plans to leverage the resources of  multiple entities that have expertise and experience in this area. FAA’s  efforts to accumulate and analyze data will be important to facilitate the  regulatory development process. However, analyzing the data that it  already has collected from recent UAS operations would further support  decisions on the new regulations. FAA’s new estimate that the regulatory  framework is not likely to be completed until sometime near 2020—about  8 years later than the date assumed by the industry forecast cited in this  report—could further delay the time frame when civil-use UAS production  begins to increase. While TSA’s risk assessment of UASs may be  appropriate for today’s UAS environment, a national airspace system that  allows routine UAS access for all government and private UASs will  require increased safeguards to protect against security vulnerabilities like  those exposed in the events of September 11, 2001. Proactively assessing  and addressing these issues will help ensure that the benefits of UASs are  not further delayed pending resolution of security challenges. Additionally,  it will be important for GSA to follow through and ensure that federal  agencies report all of their owned or leased UASs, so that FAA has a more  accurate basis for workload planning. It remains to be seen whether  Europe will be successful in integrating UASs into its airspace by 2015,  which is considerably sooner than the 2020 time frame expected in the  United States. An overarching entity, modeled after JPDO and set up to  coordinate federal, academic, and private-sector entities, could facilitate  progress in moving toward UASs having routine access to our national  airspace system.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: To coordinate and focus the efforts of federal agencies and harness the  capabilities of the private sector so that the nation may obtain further  benefits from UASs as soon as possible, Congress should consider creating  an overarching body within FAA, as it did when it established JPDO, to  coordinate federal, academic, and private-sector efforts in meeting the  safety challenges of allowing routine UAS access to the national airspace  system.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To obtain further benefits from UASs, we are recommending that the  Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to expedite  efforts to ensure that UASs have routine access to the national airspace  system by taking the following two actions:  1.  Finalize and issue a UAS program plan to address the future of UASs.  2.  Analyze the data FAA collects on UAS operations under its COAs and  establish a process to analyze DOD data on its UAS research,  development, and operations.
To ensure that appropriate UAS security controls are in place when civil- use UASs have routine access to the national airspace system, we are  recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the TSA  Administrator to examine the security implications of future, non-military  UAS operations in the national airspace system and take any actions  deemed appropriate.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOT, DHS, DOD, GSA, NASA, and the  Department of Commerce.  DOT agreed to consider our recommendations  as it moves forward in addressing UASs and DHS agreed with our  recommendation to it.  GSA commented that, although our report  contained no recommendations to the agency, it will continue to work  with federal agencies to ensure that FAA has accurate information on the  number of federally-owned or –leased UASs.  DOT commented that the  report would benefit from additional information on the impact of UASs  on airports.  We revised the report to include DOT’s concern that the  impact of UASs on safety and capacity at airports requires further study.   DOT, DOD, and DHS provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate.  NASA and the Department of Commerce had  no comments.
We are sending electronic copies of this report to FAA, DHS, DOD, GSA,  NASA, the Department of Commerce, and interested congressional  committees. We also will make electronic copies available to others upon  request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report  are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methods
paragraphs: Our objective was to assess the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA)  efforts to ensure that unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are safely  integrated into the national airspace system and the potential impact of  UASs on the national airspace system and the environment after  integration occurs. To meet this objective, we developed the following  research questions: (1) What are the current and potential uses and  benefits of UASs? (2) What challenges exist in operating UASs safely and  routinely in the national airspace system? (3) What is the federal  government’s response to these challenges? and (4) Assuming that UASs  have routine access to the national airspace system, how might they  impact the system and the environment?
To address these questions, we surveyed the literature and also obtained  and reviewed documents and interviewed officials of government,  academic, and private-sector entities involved with UAS issues. We  discussed current and future use of UASs with officials at FAA,  Department of Defense (DOD), National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). We  interviewed leaders of the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics’  (RTCA) Special Committee 203, which is developing UAS standards, and  met with officials from a federally-funded research and development  center. We discussed potential use of UASs for cargo transport with the  United Parcel Service and Federal Express. We also discussed our  questions with officials of associations of UAS manufacturers and users of  the national airspace system, specifically, the Air Transport Association;  Aerospace Industries Association; Association for Unmanned Vehicle  Systems International; Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association; Air Line  Pilots Association, International; American Institute of Aeronautics and  Astronautics; ASTM International, originally known as the American  Society for Testing and Materials; Palm Bay Police Department; and Los  Angeles Sheriff Department. We discussed UAS operations with officials  and observed UAS operations at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and met with  DHS’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials in Arizona to  discuss UAS use in border protection. Additionally, we obtained industry  forecasts of UAS growth and interviewed a senior analyst involved in  preparing Teal Group Corporation’s UAS market profile and forecast. We  also observed a demonstration of unmanned systems at Webster Field, St.  Inigoes, Maryland.
To obtain additional information on the challenges that must be overcome  before UASs can safely and routinely operate in the national airspace  system, we leveraged information that was originally obtained and  analyzed for a related GAO engagement. For that engagement, we  contacted the Army Combat Readiness Center, Naval Safety Center, and  Air Force Safety Center to obtain data on each service’s UAS accidents  from October 2001 to April or May 2006, depending on when the services  queried their databases. The services provided data on class A, B, C, and D  accidents. Using the descriptive information that the services provided for  each accident, we determined whether human, materiel, environmental, or  undetermined factors caused the accident and categorized each  accordingly. We used the definitions of human, materiel, and  environmental factors provided in Army Regulation 385-40, Accident  Reporting and Records. We classified accidents as “undetermined” when  descriptive information did not fall within one of the first three categories  of factors. We discussed the results of our analysis with DOD officials and  incorporated their comments as appropriate.
To obtain additional information on the federal response to the challenge  of integrating UASs into the national airspace system and the impact that  UASs might have on the system after they have routine access, we  reviewed agency documents and interviewed officials of the General  Services Administration and the Department of Commerce’s National  Telecommunications and Information Administration. We also obtained  information from DHS’s Transportation Security Administration.
Additionally, we surveyed 23 UAS experts, whose names were identified  with the assistance of the National Academies. We asked the experts to  provide, in narrative format, their views on the interim regulatory,  technological, research, or other efforts that could be undertaken for  UASs to operate, if not routinely, then to the maximum extent possible in  the national airspace system while FAA develops the regulatory structure  to enable all UASs to have routine access to the system. We also asked the  experts to provide their predictions on how small and large UASs might  impact the national airspace, airports, air traffic control, noise, and air  quality, using a 7-point scale from large adverse impact to large beneficial  impact, and asked that they explain their answers. Appendix II discusses  how we developed and conducted the survey. The complete survey  instrument appears as appendix III.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2006 to May 2008, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Survey Methods
paragraphs: We administered a Web-based survey to gather the professional views of  experts on the impact of UASs on the national airspace system and the  actions needed to move toward safe and routine UAS operations. The  structured survey questions ensured that all individuals had the  opportunity to provide information in response to the same questions and  enabled us to quantify the results.
We contracted with the National Academies to identify experts to  participate in our survey. Using criteria to ensure adequate representation  across the criteria that we had specified, the National Academies  identified 26 experts. The criteria ensured that we achieved: balance in terms of the type of expertise (i.e., aircraft and avionics  manufacturing officials, association representatives, engineers, academics,  foreign civil aviation authorities, and researchers involved in aviation  safety);   balance of knowledge across relevant content areas (i.e., aviation  regulations and safety, UAS technology, next generation air transportation  system planning, airport operations, human factors, and international  issues); and   balance in representation of relevant organizations (i.e., academia,  business, government, and professional organizations).
The survey responses represent the professional views of the experts.  Their expertise can be derived from formal education, professional  experience, or both. The experts were identified by the National  Academies as individuals who are recognized by others who work in the  same subject matter area as having knowledge that is greater in scope or  depth than that of most people working in the area.  The experts included  researchers, consultants, vice presidents, directors, and professors who  were associated with private sector firms, associations, or academic  institutions involved with UASs.  Some of the experts were retired federal  officials.
We recognize that it is likely that no one individual possessed complete  knowledge in each of the content areas addressed in the survey. However,  through our selection criteria, we attempted to identify a set of individuals  who, when their responses were considered in the aggregate, could be  viewed as representing the breadth of knowledge in each of the areas  addressed in the survey.
We identified the information to collect in our surveys based on our  congressional request, Internet and literature searches, professional  conferences we attended, background interviews, and through discussions  with external expert advisors. A social science survey specialist  collaborated with staff with subject matter expertise on the development  of the surveys.
We pretested the survey to ensure that the questions appropriately  addressed the topics, were clearly stated, easy to comprehend, unbiased,  and did not place undue burden on respondents. We also evaluated the  usability of the Web-based survey. Based on the pretest results, we made  necessary changes to the survey prior to implementation.
We administered the Web-based survey during August and September  2007. We used email to inform the respondents of the survey  administration, and provided them with the Web link for the survey and  their log-in name and password. In the email message, we informed  respondents that our report will not contain individual survey responses;  instead, it may present the aggregated results of all participants. To  maximize the response rate, we sent follow up email reminders and  followed up by telephone as necessary to encourage survey participation.
The survey was sent to 26 experts; three did not respond, giving the survey  a response rate of 89 percent.
The narrative responses in question 1 and the explanations for the closed- ended items in questions 2 and 3 were analyzed and coded into categories.  A reviewer checked the resulting categories and coded responses and,  where interpretations differed, agreement was reached between the initial  coder and the reviewer. The coded results were tallied and provide the  basis for our survey findings for these items. Because we did not report on  aggregate responses to question 4, we did not perform content analysis on  this question.
The number of responses reported for the closed-ended questions may  vary by question because a number of experts responded “Don’t know” or  “No basis to judge,” or did not answer specific questions.
The survey was administered via the Web and is reproduced as a graphic  image in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix III: Survey of Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems
paragraphs: Welcome to the U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO) Survey of  Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). GAO is conducting this survey as  a part of our study on the future of UASs in the national airspace system which  was requested by the Aviation Subcommittee of the House Committee on  Transportation and Infrastructure. The purpose of the survey is to collect  information on the impact of UASs on the national airspace sytem and the actions  needed to move toward safe and routine UAS operations.
To begin, you will need the user name and password from the e-mail message we  sent you. In addition, please click here to download important information that will  help you complete the questionnaire.
The questionnaire will be available on the web for one week. During this time, you  may log into the questionnaire to enter and edit information as often as you like. It  will take between 30 and 45 minutes to complete the questionnaire.
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If you have questions, please contact: Ed Menoche (menochee@gao.gov) at 202- 512-3420 or Teresa Spisak (spisakt@gao.gov) at 202-512-3952.
Click on the button below to start this questionnaire.
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Teresa Spisak, Assistant Director;  Edmond Menoche, Senior Analyst; Colin Fallon; Jim Geibel; Evan Gilman;  David Hooper; Jamie Khanna; Patty Lentini; Josh Ormond; Manhav  Panwar; and Larry Thomas made significant contributions to this report.