Ballistic Missile Defense: DOD Needs to Address Planning and Implementation Challenges for Future Capabilities in Europe
Published: 2011-01-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In September 2009, the President announced a revised approach for ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Europe. The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is designed to defend against existing and near-term ballistic missile threats and build up defenses over four phases as threats mature and new BMD technologies become available. Although the approach will include capabilities such as radars and landand sea-based BMD assets, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not yet established EPAA life-cycle costs. EPAA is DOD's first implementation of its new, regional approach to BMD. GAO was asked to evaluate DOD's plans for implementing EPAA. GAO reviewed the extent to which: (1) DOD has developed guidance and addressed management of cost and schedule for EPAA, and (2) DOD planning for EPAA is informed by operational performance data. GAO reviewed key legislation, policy and guidance, and initial plans for implementation and asset allocation.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD has initiated multiple simultaneous efforts to implement EPAA but faces three key management challenges--the lack of clear guidance, life-cycle cost estimates, and a fully integrated schedule--which may result in inefficient planning and execution, limited oversight, and increased cost and performance risks. Since the September 2009 announcement of EPAA, stakeholders throughout DOD--including U.S. European Command, the Missile Defense Agency, and the military services--as well as the State Department, have taken steps to implement this policy, including considering options for the deployment of assets, requesting forces, preparing for testing, and analyzing infrastructure needs. However, effective planning requires clear guidance regarding desired end states and key BMD stakeholders, including the combatant commands and military services, believe that such guidance is not yet in place for EPAA. Further, key principles for preparing cost estimates state that complete and credible estimates are important to support preparation of budget submissions over the short-term as well as to assess long-term affordability. DOD has not developed EPAA life-cycle cost estimates because it considers EPAA an adaptive approach that will change over time. However, best practices for cost estimating include methods for developing valid cost estimates even with such uncertainties. These estimates could serve as a basis for DOD to assess its goal of fielding affordable and cost-effective ballistic missile defenses as well as determine if corrective actions are needed. Finally, the EPAA phase schedule is not fully integrated with acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities that will need to be synchronized. As a result, DOD is at risk of incurring schedule slips, decreased performance, and increased cost as it implements the phases of EPAA. DOD also faces planning challenges for EPAA because DOD has not yet established key operational performance metrics that would provide the combatant commands with needed visibility into the operational capabilities and limitations of the BMD system they intend to employ. DOD is incorporating some combatant commands' requirements into BMD testing, in part, by having U.S. European Command participate in the test design process. However, the system's desired performance is not yet defined using operationally relevant quantifiable metrics, such as how long and how well it can defend. The combatant commands are attempting to define operational performance metrics to enable credible assessment of operational performance gaps. However, these metrics have yet to be finalized and implemented. Without a more complete understanding of BMD operational capabilities and limitations, the combatant commands face potential risk in EPAA operational planning.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD provide guidance on EPAA end states; develop EPAA life-cycle cost estimates; and integrate its phase schedule with acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities. GAO also recommends that DOD adopt operational performance metrics and include them in the BMD test program. DOD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: On September 17, 2009, the President announced a revised approach for  ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Europe, with significant implications for  the Department of Defense’s (DOD) BMD program. In response to this  guidance, DOD cancelled the previously-planned European missile  defense program—a fixed interceptor site in Poland and a fixed radar site  in the Czech Republic—intended to defend against future long-range  Iranian ballistic missiles. Instead, DOD now will deploy in phases  increasingly capable elements and interceptors in Europe to defend  against the growing ballistic missile threat. This “European Phased  Adaptive Approach” (EPAA) to BMD is designed to defend against existing  and near-term threats posed by short- and medium-range ballistic missiles,  as well as build up defenses against longer-range ballistic missile threats  over time as those threats mature. The Administration stated that the new  approach will augment current protection of the U.S. homeland against  long-range ballistic missile threats and will use more flexible and  survivable systems to provide for the defense of U.S. deployed forces, their  families, and our allies in Europe sooner and more comprehensively than  the previous approach.
The President’s announcement, further elaborated upon several months  later in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, lays out the most  comprehensive shift in U.S. BMD policy since 2002 when the Secretary of  Defense created the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the President  directed fielding of an initial set of missile defense capabilities by 2004. To  assist Congress in its review of this policy shift and its implications, we  were asked to assess DOD’s efforts to implement the phased adaptive  approach for BMD in Europe. In December 2010, we issued a  correspondence on acquisition management and near-term development  risks related to EPAA. For this report, we assessed:   (1) the extent to which DOD has developed guidance and addressed  management of cost and schedule in the planning and implementation of  EPAA, and (2) the extent to which DOD planning for EPAA is informed by  operational performance data.
To address these objectives, we reviewed key legislation related to  ballistic missile defenses in Europe and DOD’s overall approach for  planning, implementing, and preparing to support BMD. To review the  extent to which DOD has developed guidance and addressed management  of EPAA cost and schedule, we interviewed DOD and State Department  officials and reviewed documents and briefs that specifically described  DOD efforts to plan for and implement EPAA and assessed their  implications for managing EPAA cost and schedule. To review the extent  to which DOD planning for EPAA is informed by operational performance  data, we interviewed DOD officials and reviewed DOD documents on  policy and guidance needed for military planning. To address these  objectives, we also conducted site visits and interviewed officials from the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. European Command and its  components, as well as officials from U.S. Strategic Command, U.S.  Northern Command, the Ballistic Missile Defense System Operational Test  Agency, and various Navy, Army, and MDA offices.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2009 to January  2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our  scope and methodology are discussed in more detail in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD revised its approach to BMD in Europe as part of the department’s  comprehensive review of BMD strategy and policy, which culminated in  the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review. In that report, DOD  set out to match U.S. BMD strategies, policies, and capabilities to the  requirements of current and future threats and to inform DOD planning,  programming, budgeting, and oversight. Judging that the current and  planned defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles will protect the  United States against such threats from North Korea and Iran for the  foreseeable future, DOD is refocusing its resources to defend deployed  forces and allies against regional threats. Each region will have a phased  adaptive approach to BMD tailored to the threats and circumstances  unique to that region, with a principal focus on Europe, East Asia, and the  Middle East. DOD’s goal is to enable a flexible, scalable response to BMD  threats around the world by incorporating new technologies quickly and  cost-effectively and concentrating on the use of mobile and relocatable  BMD assets instead of fixed assets. In addition, DOD expressed a  commitment to testing new assets before fielding to allow assessment  under realistic operational conditions. Finally, DOD is emphasizing  working with regional allies to strengthen BMD and its deterrent value.
The European Phased Adaptive Approach to BMD is the first  implementation of this revised strategy and policy. EPAA currently  consists of four phases of increasing capability that spans to 2020. Table 1  summarizes DOD’s proposed time frames and capabilities for the four  phases of EPAA. For a further description of the various BMD assets that  may be part of EPAA, see appendix II.
A number of stakeholders within DOD play a role in the developing,  building, fielding, and governing of BMD. MDA is responsible for the  acquisition of the elements that comprise the integrated Ballistic Missile  Defense System (BMDS). MDA continues to be exempted from DOD’s  traditional joint requirements determination, acquisition, and associated  oversight processes and retains its expanded responsibility and authority  to define BMD technical requirements, change goals and plans, and  allocate resources. Although not required to build elements to meet  specific operational requirements as it would be under traditional DOD  processes, MDA is required to work closely with the combatant commands  when developing BMD capabilities. DOD reported in the Ballistic Missile  Defense Review that it would maintain its existing policy of developing,  building, fielding, and governing BMD as it had prior to the EPAA  announcement. Table 2 identifies some of the key DOD stakeholders that  are involved in the implementation of EPAA.
In previous reports on BMD, we have identified challenges associated with  MDA’s BMD efforts and DOD’s broader approach to BMD planning,  implementation, and oversight. For instance, we concluded in a February  2010 report that although MDA had shown progress in demonstrating  increased performance, its cost estimates could not be thoroughly  assessed and some planned capability could not be verified due to target  shortfalls and modeling limitations. In addition, in September 2009, we  reported that DOD had not identified its requirements for BMD elements  and interceptors and had not fully established units to operate the  elements before making them available for use. For additional GAO  reports on BMD, see the Related GAO Products section.
section_title: DOD has Initiated Efforts to Implement EPAA but Faces Key Management Challenges Due to Incomplete Guidance and the Lack of Life- Cycle Cost Estimates and an Integrated Schedule
paragraphs: DOD has initiated multiple simultaneous efforts to implement EPAA,  including considering options for the deployment of assets, requesting  forces, preparing for testing, analyzing infrastructure needs, and gaining  North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support for BMD in Europe.  DOD manages its BMD efforts by individual program elements and  considers EPAA a flexible approach, not a program. However, the  department faces three key management challenges—lack of clear  guidance, life-cycle cost estimates, and a fully integrated schedule—that  may result in inefficient planning and execution, increased cost and  performance risks, and limited oversight of EPAA. First, DOD has not yet  established clear guidance to help direct and align its EPAA efforts.  Without such guidance, DOD faces uncertainty in planning and  implementing this revised approach. Second, DOD has not yet developed  EPAA life-cycle cost estimates and has indicated that it is unlikely to do so  because EPAA is considered a policy designed to maximize flexibility. As a  result, DOD does not have a basis from which to assess EPAA’s  affordability and cost-effectiveness and is missing a tool with which to  monitor implementation progress. Finally, the EPAA phase schedule is not  fully integrated with acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities.  As a result, DOD does not have the information it needs to assess whether  the EPAA schedule is realistic and achievable, identify potential problems,  or analyze how changes will impact the execution of this effort, and  therefore is exposed to increased schedule, performance, and cost risks.  Without addressing these three management challenges, DOD will likely  face difficulties in planning for and implementing EPAA, potentially  resulting in significant cost increases.
subsections: section_title: DOD and the State Department Have Taken Multiple Steps to Implement EPAA
paragraphs: Since the September 2009 announcement of EPAA, stakeholders  throughout DOD—including U.S. European Command (EUCOM), MDA,  and the military services—as well as the State Department, have taken  steps to implement this policy, including considering options for the  deployment of assets, requesting forces, preparing for testing, analyzing  infrastructure needs, and gaining NATO support for BMD in Europe. For  example, EUCOM initiated EPAA planning efforts and submitted an  official request for some of the BMD assets it determined are needed for  Phase 1, including the personnel to operate them. EUCOM, with the  assistance of its service components, has been developing an operation  plan for EPAA. DOD officials told us that this plan, covering Phase 1, is  expected to be approved in the spring of 2011. EUCOM officials told us  that their efforts have been informed by the command’s close  collaboration with MDA, which has provided it with information on the  capabilities of BMD assets the command intends to employ in its  operational plan. In order to facilitate the information exchange, MDA has  located representatives at EUCOM headquarters. EUCOM has also been  working with MDA to develop test designs for the BMD system that may  be fielded in EUCOM’s area of responsibility. In particular, EUCOM  designed notional EPAA architectures that will be used in testing. The  results of these tests are intended to provide the command with greater  visibility into the performance of the BMD system it will be responsible for  employing.
MDA has also taken a number of steps to implement EPAA. As we  reported in December 2010, MDA has made progress in acquisition  planning for EPAA, including integrating and aligning its test planning  efforts with EPAA phases through its semiannual Ballistic Missile Defense  System Integrated Master Test Plan. MDA has collaborated with the  combatant commands and members of the testing community to develop  an Integrated Master Test Plan to support planning and execution of all  BMD testing for the phased adaptive approach. Additionally, according to  MDA, its Global Deployment Program Office has been actively engaged in  an effort to align the acquisition activities of EPAA with the EPAA efforts  of other stakeholders, such as the State Department, host country embassy  personnel, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,  EUCOM, the Joint Staff, and the military services.
Officials from the military services and EUCOM’s service components told  us they are also pursuing activities to support EPAA planning, as the  following examples illustrate.
The Navy has established the Ballistic Missile Defense Enterprise, which is  an effort aimed at coordinating all Navy BMD activities to support EPAA  as well as other BMD missions.
The Army Corps of Engineers is working with MDA and the Navy on the  preliminary stages of a technical analysis related to Aegis Ashore site  options.
U.S. Naval Forces Europe is analyzing its Aegis BMD ship presence  options and requirements as well as planning for Aegis Ashore.
U.S. Army Europe is conducting resource planning for potential basing  concepts and manning requirements of Army BMD assets that may be  allocated for EPAA, such as the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense  (THAAD) element and the AN/TPY-2 radar.
U.S. Air Forces in Europe is drafting a concept of operations that, when  approved by the EUCOM Commander, will establish the command and  control relationships for conducting BMD operations for EPAA. Similar  efforts are in progress within NATO.
The State Department, in coordination with DOD, has also made  significant progress in achieving NATO support for BMD in Europe. NATO  recently adopted the territorial missile defense mission—to protect its  populations and territories in Europe against ballistic missile attack—but  now must undertake the challenging task of reaching agreement on how to  implement this new mission. Poland and Romania have agreed to host U.S.  BMD assets although the U.S. has not yet found a host nation for a critical  sensor planned for deployment in 2011. Finally, NATO members may  provide BMD assets to assist in the defense of Europe. However, the U.S.  currently is the only NATO member with BMD assets designed to provide  territorial defense. See appendix IV for more details of NATO support for  BMD in Europe.
section_title: DOD’s Guidance for EPAA Is Not Yet Complete
paragraphs: DOD has initiated many efforts to implement EPAA, but the department  has not yet established clear guidance to help direct and align its efforts.  According to DOD, effective planning requires clear guidance on desired  end states. In the context of BMD, this could include information such as  the purpose and duration of the mission and areas to be defended, as well  as priorities within a region and between regions. While senior DOD  officials stated that the President’s EPAA announcement and the Ballistic  Missile Defense Review provide sufficient guidance to begin planning and  implementation, a recent DOD study recommended planning guidance be  further refined. Further, key BMD stakeholders, including those from the  Joint Staff, combatant commands, and military services believe that  additional guidance is needed for EPAA.
Senior DOD officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Policy, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics, the Joint Staff, and MDA told us it was their  view that the President’s announcement and the Ballistic Missile Defense  Review provide sufficient guidance to enable the Joint Staff, combatant  commands, and services to begin planning and implementing EPAA. The  officials also noted that some additional guidance would be forthcoming  through the regular updating of DOD’s high-level policy and planning  documents. According to these officials, EPAA is a policy framework for  the evolutionary development and fielding of missile defenses in Europe to  defend against ballistic missile threats. They further indicated that the  EPAA framework does not establish or dictate a specific architecture or  force structure requirement. Additionally, the officials stated that the Joint  Staff and the combatant commands are responsible for translating the  overarching policy into specific requirements to allow military forces to  execute the policy. Moreover, the senior officials also stated that the  specific requirements for EPAA, including architecture, would be  developed by the combatant commands and Joint Staff in consultation  with the Office of the Secretary of Defense using standard DOD planning  processes and that any policy gaps that may emerge would be addressed  as plans are iterated through the normal planning process.
DOD examined the need for policy guidance in the Global Force  Management Development Project, a study to clarify and more fully assess  the scope and implications of the decision to adopt EPAA and the phased  adaptive approach in general. This effort was led by the Joint Staff and  included participation from U.S. Strategic Command, EUCOM, U.S. Pacific  Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Joint  Forces Command, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,  and technical assistance from MDA. The study was tasked with developing  the plan and facts to be used to allocate limited BMD assets among the  combatant commands as regional situations and national strategies  require. The classified study was unable to fully address this task but  concluded, among other things, that DOD needed to refine its BMD  planning guidance, identifying 14 BMD-related general planning guidance  questions that DOD needed to answer. According to Joint Staff officials,  the study’s findings were briefed to and endorsed by several senior DOD  boards, including the Missile Defense Executive Board in May 2010.  Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary for Defense for Policy told  us that it takes time to fully develop all of the strategic planning and  investment guidance necessary to implement a significant policy shift like  EPAA. Further, the officials added that some of the guidance questions  identified in the study could not be addressed immediately because they  had to be sequenced with other events. They gave the example that some  of the guidance would rely on decisions made by NATO, which has only  recently adopted the territorial missile defense mission.
Consistent with the study’s findings, officials from the Joint Staff,  combatant commands, and services told us that DOD needed to provide  more clarity on desired EPAA end states to ensure that they were  appropriately executing their responsibilities. For example, Army officials  told us that the Army’s primary concern with EPAA was the lack of clear  guidance on end states and said that the Army could not be certain that it  was appropriately preparing to support EPAA assets without knowing  what assets would be deployed when, where, and for how long. In  addition, the Navy created a new organization to help coordinate the  service’s BMD efforts and also developed its own set of EPAA facts and  assumptions so that it could support EPAA requirements. However, Navy  officials told us that although they coordinate with other BMD  stakeholders regularly, they did not know if everyone was operating under  the same end-state assumptions, including assumptions about force  allocation and deployment deadlines. Combatant command officials also  told us that existing guidance did not provide clarity on desired end states,  including prioritization of regions to be defended. By contrast, other BMD  policy decisions, such as the 2002 decision to deploy BMD and the later  decision to deploy an AN/TPY-2 radar to Israel, were based on clear and  formal policy guidance, according to Joint Staff officials. The officials told  us that the lack of clear guidance for EPAA was leading different  organizations to make different assumptions about desired end states and  that this was resulting in inefficient planning and execution.
A reason that BMD stakeholders throughout DOD may be seeking further  planning guidance is that there is a lack of clarity on both the relative  priority of EPAA to other BMD missions around the world and the extent  to which BMD assets will be deployed forward. Although the Ballistic  Missile Defense Review presents the phased adaptive approach as  pertaining to all geographic combatant commands, EPAA was a  presidential policy decision, implying a certain priority for European BMD  needs. However, this priority has not yet been formally codified through a  presidential directive or memorandum. Additionally, statements by senior  DOD officials have detailed potential EPAA plans that, if carried out,  would consume a significant portion of DOD’s BMD assets, depending on  the amount of physical presence required. For example, depending on  interpretation of existing guidance for EPAA, Aegis BMD ships could be  tasked with maintaining a continuous physical forward presence; only  needing to be available to surge into the theater in response to heightened  threat situations; or be available for a mixture of forward presence and  surge capability. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review also discusses the  need to have a strategic approach to regional BMD and tailor the  requirements to the unique and varied needs of each region, including  Europe. DOD is undertaking several studies related to regional BMD led  by the Joint Staff and U.S. Strategic Command that should help to better  define force allocation and quantity needs for both surge and forward  presence BMD forces. Additionally, senior officials from the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and MDA said that  there is a draft presidential directive that will help clarify EPAA policy.  However, DOD has not yet issued formal guidance clarifying the EPAA  mission, including its relative priority among the regions identified for the  phased adaptive approach. DOD officials told us that combatant  commands responded to the EPAA announcement and the uncertainty  about priorities with a surge of requests for BMD forces to ensure that  their requirements would be met. Without establishing guidance to more  fully align understanding throughout the department on what the desired  end states are for EPAA, including its relative priority to other regional  BMD architecture requirements, the department faces uncertainty in  planning and implementing this revised approach.
section_title: DOD Has Not Established EPAA Life-Cycle Cost Estimates
paragraphs: DOD has not established life-cycle cost estimates for EPAA and therefore  is missing an important management tool for preparing budgets,  monitoring progress and assessing long-term affordability of its revised  approach to BMD in Europe. DOD has stated two main reasons for not  establishing life-cycle cost estimates for EPAA. First, DOD officials told us  that DOD does not intend to prepare separate life-cycle cost estimates for  EPAA because DOD views it as an approach, not a program, and so  funding is provided through the individual BMD elements that make up  EPAA. However, in introducing the revised approach to BMD, the  department emphasized that it would be fiscally sustainable and  affordable. Additionally, in referring to EPAA in prepared testimony before  Congress, the MDA Director stated that DOD was “committed to fully  funding this program.” Although DOD reported that the acquisition cost  estimates and annual BMD budget request for individual elements include  EPAA costs, we found that such information does not include full life- cycle costs. Further, this budgeting method is fragmented and so does  not provide decision makers with a transparent and holistic view of EPAA  costs. Second, DOD has emphasized that the inherent flexibility of EPAA  makes developing life-cycle cost estimates for the approach difficult.  However, without life-cycle cost estimates DOD may not be able to  determine whether its revised approach to BMD in Europe is fiscally  sustainable and affordable.
We have found that key principles for managing major investments such as  EPAA include that an organization should understand the financial  commitment involved and ensure appropriate transparency and  accountability. Further, according to the GAO cost estimating guide, a  credible cost estimate is required in order to assess a program’s  affordability and cost-effectiveness and to serve as a basis for a budget.  The guide identifies 12 steps necessary for developing credible cost  estimates. Following these steps ensures that realistic cost estimates are  developed and presented to management, enabling them to make informed  decisions about whether the program is affordable within the portfolio  plan. Providing decision makers with a program’s updated cost estimate  helps them monitor the implementation of the program and ensure that  adequate funding is available to execute the program according to plan.  Finally, credible cost estimates serve as a basis for a program’s budget and  validate that a program’s strategy has an adequate budget for its planned  resources.
Part of the challenge in determining EPAA life-cycle costs results from  uncertainty about what elements and interceptors will be included in  EPAA. According to the GAO cost estimating guide, the final accuracy of  cost estimates depends on how well a program is defined. In order to  develop credible estimates, an organization needs detailed technical,  program, and schedule descriptions from which all life-cycle cost  estimates can be derived. Some of these details would include system  architecture, deployment details, operational concepts, personnel  requirements, and logistics support. DOD’s phased schedule for EPAA is  comprised of multiple elements and interceptors to provide ever- improving integrated BMD capability, but many aspects of the approach  have not yet been determined. For example, DOD has thus far committed  to using two Aegis Ashore facilities and at least one AN/TPY-2 radar.  Additionally, each EPAA phase could have as many as three Aegis BMD  ship patrol areas, but DOD has not yet committed to a specific number of  ships or SM-3 interceptors for each phase. As we reported in December  2010, DOD also has not yet committed to the specific type or number of  the other elements and interceptors that will be part of the EPAA phases.  Figure 1 summarizes the current status of DOD’s BMD assets that may be  part of EPAA.
Despite the current lack of detail on the implementation of EPAA policy,  best practices for cost estimating include methods by which to develop  valid cost estimates when a program’s details are limited and thus still  provide markers for measuring progress and assessing affordability. The  cost guide makes special mention of spiral development efforts that, like  EPAA, do not have clearly defined final requirements. In such cases, valid  cost estimates can be developed as long as they clearly state the  requirements that have been included and account for those that have  been excluded. The Congressional Budget Office and the Institute for  Defense Analysis have completed such analyses for the previous approach  to BMD in Europe and the Institute for Defense Analysis also completed a  cost estimate for EPAA. As the types and quantities of elements and  interceptors needed for EPAA become better defined over time, cost  estimates should be updated to ensure that managers understand the  impact of any changes.
DOD has also emphasized that the inherent flexibility of EPAA makes  developing life-cycle cost estimates for the approach difficult. According  to senior DOD officials, the department could develop a life-cycle cost  estimate for the phased adaptive approach but they were unsure of the  relevancy of characterizing unique costs for EPAA. The officials said that  DOD places significant emphasis on flexibility in its new approach to  regional BMD, calling EPAA flexible by nature. The officials also stated  that DOD’s focus on using mobile and relocatable BMD assets for EPAA  and in other regions means that the mix of elements and interceptors in  each region could be adjusted to adapt to changes in threat. The result of  this flexibility, according to the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, is that  the actual life-cycle cost of the missile defense system is difficult to  determine because there is no final configuration for the system. However,  an organization can develop estimates for a range of possible scenarios. A  cost estimating best practice in developing technical baselines includes  defining deployment details for various scenarios, such as peacetime,  contingency, and war. By presenting a range of scenarios, decision makers  can better understand the short-term and long-term cost implications of  different options and better evaluate their choices. While we recognize  that life-cycle cost estimates will have increased levels of uncertainty for  the later phases compared to the near-term phases, the level of flexibility  inherent in EPAA needed to respond to changes in threat or technology  over the four phases of this approach is bounded and cost estimating  practices are adaptive enough to allow for the development of valid cost  estimates. Table 3 describes our assessment of DOD’s rationales for EPAA  flexibility, factors limiting flexibility or the need for it, and their impact on  DOD’s ability to develop life-cycle cost estimates for EPAA.
There may be occasions when DOD, in response to more rapid than  projected quantitative and qualitative developments in the existing threat  or the emergence of new missile threats from an unexpected location, will  need to adjust to those threats. Good life-cycle cost estimates are equipped  to deal with such unforeseen circumstances because they clearly list the  facts and assumptions on which they are based. In such circumstances, a  life-cycle cost estimate would provide additional information to decision  makers in DOD and Congress as they evaluate their options. Until DOD  develops EPAA life-cycle cost estimates—which could potentially be part  of a larger phased adaptive approach life-cycle cost estimate—the  department will not have an accurate basis from which to determine the  financial sustainability and affordability of the revised approach to BMD in  Europe and is missing a tool with which to monitor its implementation.
section_title: DOD’s EPAA Phase Schedule Does Not Fully Integrate Key Acquisition, Infrastructure, and Personnel Activities
paragraphs: DOD established the EPAA phase schedule without fully integrating it with  key acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities and, as a result, the  department does not have an important management tool with which to  assess whether the EPAA schedule is realistic and achievable, identify  potential problems, or analyze how changes will impact the execution of  this effort. As a result, the program may be exposed to schedule,  performance, and cost risks. Implementing EPAA will require the  synchronization of numerous efforts, including acquisition, infrastructure,  and personnel activities. For example, DOD must develop and produce the  BMD elements and interceptors for EPAA and must be able to integrate  them into a system. The performance of a fielded BMD architecture,  including the size of the area defended, is dependent on several factors,  including the types and numbers of elements and interceptors fielded, the  extent to which fielded elements are linked together operationally, and the  geographic location of the elements (see fig. 2). Further, DOD must also  have the appropriate infrastructure in place—such as needed power,  water, roads, facilities, and security—in time to support not only the EPAA  elements and interceptors it intends to field as part of EPAA but also the  personnel necessary to operate and maintain them. DOD must also have  these trained personnel available in time to carry out those duties. The  department is working to implement EPAA, but EPAA timelines may not  match the time needed to integrate and execute the necessary acquisition,  infrastructure, and personnel activities.
Our past work shows that a program’s success depends on the quality of  its schedule. If it is well-integrated, a schedule clearly shows the  relationships between program activities, activity resource requirements  and durations, and any constraints that affect their start or completion.  The schedule shows when major events are expected as well as the  completion dates for all activities leading up to them, which can help  determine if the schedule is realistic and achievable. When fully laid out, a  detailed schedule can be used to identify where problems are or could  potentially be. Moreover, as changes occur within a program, a well- integrated schedule will aid in analyzing how they affect the program. For  these reasons, an integrated schedule is key in managing program  performance and is necessary for determining what work remains and the  expected cost to complete it.
According to officials from MDA, the Navy, the Army, the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and EUCOM, a principle  challenge for implementing EPAA is meeting its schedule. DOD  established the EPAA phase schedule based on a top-level evaluation of  the implementation activities that could impact or be impacted by that  schedule and, as a result, DOD may face challenges executing it. EPAA is a  policy framework and not a fully developed architecture or program,  according to senior DOD officials responsible for developing the policy.  Further, the schedule for EPAA was largely based on the alignment of the  changes in the threat to availability of new technology, including the  various SM-3 interceptor variants. These officials said that they relied  upon acquisition feasibility and affordability information for various  options that was provided by MDA and that the Joint Staff represented  service and combatant command concerns during the development of the  phased schedule. However, they also stated that the military services and  combatant commands began examining the specific implementation  requirements of EPAA after the policy’s announcement.
subsections: section_title: Phases Not Yet Integrated with Supporting Acquisition Activities
paragraphs: EPAA’s phases are not yet integrated with key acquisition activities and so  are exposed to risk of schedule slips, decreased performance, and  increased cost. As we reported in December 2010, EPAA policy calls for  DOD to deliver BMD capabilities on a timeline that requires concurrency  among technology, design, testing, and other development activities; this  concurrency introduces risk of increased costs, schedule delay, or  performance shortfalls that must be addressed. A sound acquisition has  firm requirements, mature technologies, and a strategy that provides  sufficient time for design activities before the decision is made to start  development and demonstration or to transition to production. As we  reported, it is questionable whether DOD’s approach allows sufficient time  for these activities. Schedules for the individual elements are highly  optimistic in technology development, testing, production, and integration,  leaving little room for potential delays.
Additionally, DOD has not formally or fully aligned acquisition  programming to support EPAA or set acquisition decision points for each  phase, including production decisions. An integrated schedule defines  major decision points at which to review demonstrated progress and  follow-on plans. It establishes exit and entrance criteria to show that  components are ready to move from one developmental step to the next,  and that the component fits within the context of the bigger system to  which it contributes. While individual BMD elements have a schedule,  DOD has not developed an integrated schedule for EPAA that aligns the  necessary acquisition activities. As a result, decisions about production of  individual elements, risks associated with individual elements and  interceptors, overall BMD system interoperability and integration, and  assessment of the integrated system do not appear to be fully linked to the  phases. Additionally, the Missile Defense Executive Board, which is  responsible for overseeing missile defense portfolio developments, has  thus far focused program reviews solely at the element level, not the  broader EPAA level. According to DOD, the department is developing an  integrated acquisition schedule for EPAA. Without such a schedule, DOD  acquisition managers, stakeholders, and Congress lack an integrated  EPAA-level view of BMD development. Table 4 summarizes some  development risks for the individual BMD assets as well as the integrated  system that may be exacerbated by the EPAA schedule compression.
Furthermore, the EPAA phase schedule is not yet integrated with key  infrastructure activities and therefore is also exposed to risk of schedule  slips, decreased performance, and increased cost. BMD assets, such as the  AN/TPY-2 radar and Aegis Ashore, require infrastructure to support and  secure the assets. Designing, funding, and building military infrastructure  can take years. Officials from MDA, the Navy, EUCOM, U.S. Naval Forces  Europe, and the Army Corps of Engineers stated that having the  necessary infrastructure in place to support the scheduled 2015  operational date for the first Aegis Ashore could be challenging. There  were some early design questions about how relocatable Aegis Ashore was  supposed to be, which had direct implications for infrastructure  requirements. According to officials from MDA and the U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers, initial design options included a modular construction option  that allowed for placement or removal of Aegis Ashore from a site within  120 days. Infrastructure needs for the initial modular design option would  have been minimal. Nevertheless, DOD decided not to pursue the initial  modular design because of technical challenges that may have impacted  performance and driven up the Aegis Ashore development and acquisition  costs, as well as potentially increasing costs for operating and sustaining  the element. However, there was disagreement among the officials to  whom we spoke about the impact of pursuing a new design on  infrastructure needs—ranging from no change to requiring significant  additional infrastructure.
Although DOD is beginning to narrow its design approach for Aegis  Ashore, DOD is operating under a compressed schedule to meet the 2015  operational date for Phase 2. Construction, and therefore funding, for all  of the necessary Phase 2 Aegis Ashore facilities and associated  infrastructure needs to begin in fiscal year 2013, according to officials  from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Navy, and U.S. Naval Forces  Europe. However, MDA reported to us and a senior DOD official testified  to Congress that Aegis Ashore site construction will take approximately   1 year. According to officials from the Navy and U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers, Aegis Ashore infrastructure costs remain unknown because the  designs have not yet been finalized for the system itself or the supporting  infrastructure. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers officials said that they are  working closely with the Navy and MDA to reach basic agreement on the  design of the infrastructure in March 2011, which is in time for MDA to  budget for the needed facilities in fiscal year 2013. However, Army Corps  of Engineers officials said that the Romania Aegis Ashore site design and  construction estimate will not be as mature as those of typical military  construction projects, which may expose the Aegis Ashore construction  site to increased risk of design modifications, increased costs, and  possible delays. As we have previously reported, DOD underestimated its  BMD support infrastructure requirements and military construction costs  for the prior plan for BMD in Europe when it did not follow the traditional  military construction requirements. Army Corps of Engineers officials  noted that DOD is accepting this extra risk with Aegis Ashore, because  waiting for a more complete design for Aegis Ashore in Romania would  result in missing the 2015 deadline.
According to DOD, it is longstanding DOD policy to make best efforts to conclude a  binding international agreement documenting the host nation’s permission for the presence  of DOD personnel and equipment in its territory as well as adequate status protections for  such personnel.
According to the State Department, an agreement enters into force when the parties  consent to be bound by the agreement, at which point the parties are legally obligated to  comply with the agreement’s provisions.  Depending on the form of the agreement and the  parties’ domestic requirements, entry into force may require any number of events,  including signature, ratification, exchange of notes, or some combination of these. ratification process for the Aegis Ashore facilities in Romania and  Poland—to be completed as part of Phases 2 and 3 respectively—are in  progress and, though they do not anticipate any significant delays, they  also cannot predict when negotiations and ratification will be complete or  when agreements will enter into force. For example, the U.S. government  ran into unexpected delays in host nation agreement ratification when it  was attempting to implement the previous approach to BMD in Europe.  According to DOD, its schedule assumption in 2007 was that both Poland  and the Czech Republic would complete the necessary ratification of host  nation agreements by the end of fiscal year 2008. However, as we  previously reported, delays in the ratification of key host nation  agreements presented challenges to DOD’s planning and implementation  of its prior approach to BMD in Europe. In that report, we also noted that  the ratification votes were delayed, in part, because of a desire on the part  of both the Polish and Czech parliaments to wait for an indication from the  current U.S. administration on its policy toward ballistic missile defenses  in Europe. In the end, neither Poland nor the Czech Republic ratified the  necessary agreements before September 2009 when the U.S. decided to  take a new approach to BMD in Europe. Similar delays in host nation  agreement ratification for Aegis Ashore could also impact EPAA and result  in schedule slips, decreased performance, or increased cost. Additionally,  the U.S. must also reach agreement with nations to host other land-based  BMD assets that may be part of EPAA. For example, DOD’s plans for  EPAA Phase 1 include an AN/TPY-2 radar intended to provide early  warning data to engage short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats  and provide additional tracking information for homeland defense.  According to a senior Joint Staff official, the AN/TPY-2 will significantly  increase the capability of Aegis BMD that is also intended to be part of  Phase 1. However, the U.S. has not reached agreement with a country to  host the AN/TPY-2. If such an agreement is not reached soon, there may  not be enough time to construct the necessary facilities for the AN/TPY-2  and deploy it by the end of 2011, thereby diminishing DOD’s expected  EPAA Phase 1 performance.
section_title: Phases Not Yet Integrated with Supporting Personnel Needs
paragraphs: The EPAA timeline is not yet integrated with key activities to ensure  personnel needs are met. The military services are responsible for  organizing and training personnel, a process that typically takes years  once requirements are identified. DOD generally requires that major  weapon systems be fielded with a full complement of organized and  trained personnel. As we previously reported, DOD has in the past put  BMD elements into operational use before first ensuring that the military  services had created units and trained service members to operate them  and, as a result, combatant commanders sometimes lacked certainty that  the forces could operate the elements as expected. DOD concurred with  our recommendation that it require, in the absence of an immediate threat  or crisis, that operational units be established with the organizations,  personnel, and training needed to perform all of their BMD responsibilities  before first making elements available for operational use.
DOD’s aggressive EPAA schedule runs the risk of deploying assets without  the full complement of trained personnel needed to carry out the mission,  which could lead to issues with operational performance. For example,  Navy officials told us that they will likely have to extend sailors’ rotations  beyond the standard deployment length to meet possible EPAA ship  requirements for Phase 1, thus placing a strain on the force and possibly  affecting performance. The Navy is already dealing with manning issues  that may affect BMD asset capabilities. In 2010, separate reports by the  Navy found Aegis radar manpower and performance in decline. The  reports stressed that the Navy’s Aegis crews are already overextended and  they lack sufficient numbers of qualified people to meet its radar  maintenance requirements. Additional requirements for Aegis presence  because of EPAA could contribute further to this problem. Reducing  EPAA deployments to address these concerns would result in a decrease  in expected capability.
Moreover, DOD has yet to make key decisions that will affect its personnel  needs and so does not yet know how these needs will affect the EPAA  schedule. For example, Navy officials told us that they lack some crucial  information such as the required Aegis ship presence for the early phases  of EPAA or the design of Aegis Ashore for later phases. This hinders their  ability to fully plan and develop the necessary organizations, personnel,  and training requirements. Navy officials said that the Navy expects to  keep training requirements for the personnel operating the Aegis Ashore  weapon system very similar to the training needed for the Aegis weapon  system on the ship, thus simplifying training requirements. However, Navy  officials said that some support infrastructure jobs unique to Aegis Ashore  are difficult to assess, and training for these will have to be developed as  Aegis Ashore designs mature. The Navy has not yet been able to establish  training requirements for maintaining the land-based vertical launch  system that is part of Aegis Ashore, for instance, because design has not  been finalized. Further, Navy officials told us that the personnel required  for Aegis Ashore could differ significantly if it is required to operate at full  readiness at all times or if it is required to operate at some lower level of  readiness. A requirement for maintaining high readiness could increase  personnel costs and challenge the service’s ability to provide sufficient  personnel. Also, Army officials told us that they need more guidance on  what Army systems will be part of EPAA and when these systems will  need to be operational. DOD is working to clarify many of its EPAA needs  and doing so will help inform personnel needs and allow the services to  prepare the necessary organizations and training for personnel. We have  already mentioned several of these efforts, such as EUCOM’s operational  plan expected to be completed in spring 2011, the plan by the Navy, MDA,  and Army Corps of Engineers to reach agreement on Aegis Ashore  facilities needs in March 2011, and the U.S. Strategic Command-led force  allocation study that will inform DOD’s decisions on force distribution.  However, service processes to ensure that the full complement of trained  personnel is in place will take time. Without an integrated schedule, DOD  is missing a management tool with which to assess the effects of emerging  personnel needs on the execution of the phased adaptive approach in  Europe.
section_title: Although Combatant Commands’ Involvement in BMD Testing Has Increased, Limited Visibility of BMD Operational Capabilities and Limitations Creates Challenges in Integrating BMD into Operational Plans
paragraphs: DOD has not yet established key performance metrics that would provide  the combatant commands with needed visibility into the operational  capabilities and limitations of the BMD system they intend to employ,  creating potential challenges for EUCOM as it integrates BMD into its  operational plans. DOD has already incorporated some combatant  commands’ testing needs into BMD testing; however, as of January 2011,  the combatant commands’ more detailed, operationally-relevant,  quantifiable metrics had not yet been incorporated into DOD’s BMD  testing plans. Lack of such metrics inhibits EUCOM’s understanding of the  operational capabilities and limitations of the integrated BMD system they  would have to employ. As a result, the combatant commands will lack key  information they need to plan for the phased adaptive approach and so  may face challenges in integrating BMD into operational plans. The  combatant commands recognize this issue and are currently attempting to  establish these metrics; however, they have yet to be finalized and  implemented.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Taken Steps to Increase Combatant Commands’ Visibility into BMD Performance
paragraphs: Following the establishment of MDA in 2002, initial BMD system designs  did not formally consider combatant command requirements because of  MDA’s exemption from DOD’s requirements process; however, DOD has  since taken multiple steps to increase combatant commands’ visibility into  BMD operational performance. According to U.S. Strategic Command,  MDA initially achieved the rapid deployment of BMD capabilities because  it was unconstrained by operational requirements. Moreover, its testing  did not focus on verification of operational BMD system performance  against combatant command requirements. The BMD development and  assessment process presented challenges for the combatant commands  because MDA’s criteria for declaring a BMD element technically capable of  performing some tasks did not always allow the combatant commands to  thoroughly assess how the element could be operationally employed. For  example, after DOD fielded the AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan in 2006, the  combatant commands realized they did not have a good understanding of  the operational capabilities and limitations of the radar that would allow  them to fully employ it.
In response to these problems, U.S. Strategic Command, in its role as  warfighter advocate for missile defense, began efforts to incorporate  combatant command needs into BMD testing and evaluation in order to  assess the operational utility of the elements being fielded. In 2008, U.S.  Strategic Command published the Force Preparation Campaign Plan,  which laid out a framework designed to help manage risk to the  combatant commands’ operations by identifying the information  combatant commands need about BMD operational capabilities and  limitations. For instance, the plan describes the need for designing BMD  tests around combatant command operational plans and testing against  validated scenarios and threats, since the integrated BMD system level  performance is heavily threat, environment, and scenario-dependent. U.S.  Strategic Command stressed that combatant commands need this  information to develop flexible operational plans and assess BMD  capabilities for supporting a command’s missions.
MDA has also taken steps to revise its testing program to incorporate  combatant command needs, but testing continues to be driven by  collection of data points needed to verify the models and simulations used  to characterize BMD performance. MDA has integrated many combatant  command testing needs into the Integrated Master Test Plan. For instance,  MDA has added three Operational Test periods, each aligned with the first  three phases of the phased adaptive approach, which, according to U.S.  Strategic Command officials, allow the combatant commands to use the  BMD system configuration unique to the particular phase for training and  operational system evaluation. These ground tests are based on  combatant command-developed architectures and the relevant validated  threats. EUCOM has been involved in the test design process, including  providing input regarding where BMD assets should be located for EPAA.  According to EUCOM officials, the test designs were then vetted through  EUCOM intelligence and operations experts. Officials also said that the  results of the tests will be used by the command to inform its EPAA  planning.
section_title: Combatant Commands Lack Visibility into Key Operational Capabilities and Limitations of the BMD System That Is Important for EPAA Operational Planning
paragraphs: Although combatant commands are increasingly involved in BMD testing,  they have expressed the need for additional metrics that can be used to  assess the durability (how long it can defend) and effectiveness (how well  it can defend) of the BMD system, which are important for planning the  phased adaptive approach. For instance, one of MDA’s metrics for  effectiveness is based on a “one-on-one” engagement between a given  element or group of elements and a single threat missile. According to  DOD officials, it therefore has limited applicability to a more realistic  operational scenario where combatant commanders employ an integrated  BMD system against multiple threat missiles.
The combatant commands have concluded that they need to understand  BMD system effectiveness and durability in quantitative terms so that, as  they prepare their operational plans, they understand BMD’s contribution  to the overall mission and appropriately balance it with other options.  BMD is part of the defensive capabilities, and in combat operations, it  alone cannot achieve or maintain effective defense against an adversary  ballistic missile attack. DOD planning doctrine emphasizes that integrated  and interoperable military forces improve the ability to not only defend  against a ballistic missile attack with defensive counterair, such as BMD,  but also ensure that offensive counterair can strike potential ballistic  missile threats.
As more ballistic defense assets are deployed into the EUCOM area of  responsibility, creating a more complex BMD system, insight into the  capabilities and limitations of the system and its overall contribution to  EUCOM’s operational plans will become more important. The balance  between offensive and defensive options, and therefore the need for a  clear understanding of the operational capabilities of the BMD system, is  further complicated for EPAA since it requires coordination between two  geographic combatant commands—EUCCOM and U.S Central  Command—given where the threats may originate. A threat originating  from the Middle East, which is primarily U.S. Central Command’s area of  responsibility, could be directed at Europe, which is in EUCOM’s area of  responsibility. Therefore, these two commands must work together to  balance BMD with other options. Without metrics to credibly quantify  BMD system performance, EUCOM, and other combatant commands will  not be able to thoroughly analyze performance gaps. Moreover, without  the full understanding of their BMD system capabilities and limitations,  they will be limited in their ability to develop comprehensive plans that  integrate defensive and offensive options.
The combatant commands, led by U.S. Strategic Command, created a  process in 2006 to provide them with additional understanding of the  operational utility of the BMD system but this process does not provide  the specific performance information the combatant commands seek.  Specifically, this BMD assessment process was initially intended to  enhance visibility into BMD element capabilities by using subjective  assessment criteria expressed in terms of yes or no judgments rather than  quantified performance parameters. For example, the effectiveness  criteria for the AN/TPY-2 radar includes whether that sensor possesses the  ability to detect, classify, track and discriminate ballistic missile threats  targeting U.S. defended areas. Thus, rather than assessing the extent to  which a capability can perform a certain mission-essential function, the  assessment focuses on whether or not a BMD component can perform a  certain task. When the combatant commands first implemented this  process, they concluded they would need to later introduce quantifiable  mission-essential performance goals that would enable more complete  operational assessments of BMD system capability in relation to their  operational needs.
To address the effort of developing quantifiable mission-essential  performance goals, the combatant commands, led by U.S. Strategic  Command, are currently attempting to introduce quantifiable operational  performance metrics into the testing program through an effort called  “Assess-to.” The combatant commands are defining metrics to measure  BMD system effectiveness (how well it can defend) and durability (how  long it can defend) against threats projected by the intelligence and  operational communities. More specifically, as defined in a draft Assess-to  criteria document, the metric used to measure effectiveness of a BMD  system is expressed mathematically as the ratio of threats defeated to total  threats launched. As such, this metric is designed to allow assessment of  BMD system effectiveness against multiple ballistic missile threats.  Durability, on the other hand, is defined as the length of time that an  established BMD system can provide and sustain defensive capability at a  specific level of protection against projected threats.
U.S. Strategic Command officials agree that developing Assess-to criteria  would help to quantify BMD system capabilities and limitations and  thereby provide better data to the combatant commands as they develop  their operational plans. The combatant commands have articulated the  need for BMD system effectiveness and durability metrics since 2008 and  developed a draft Assess-to document that describes them, but there are  two main barriers that have prevented DOD from adopting Assess-to. First,  various DOD officials stated that MDA is reluctant to have Assess-to  metrics established due to concerns that these types of metrics could  effectively turn into requirements to which MDA will be held accountable.  As stated previously, MDA is exempt from formal acquisition requirements  and the BMD elements it developed were not built to operational  requirements. U.S. Strategic Command officials and documents describing  Assess-to are sensitive to this concern and characterize Assess-to criteria  in terms of communicating testing needs to MDA as well as goals to “build  towards” rather than strict requirements. Second, an additional obstacle to  Assess-to implementation is that current limitations in system-level  modeling may limit DOD’s ability to test against the identified metrics.  Assess-to metrics are geared towards system-level assessment, and  currently ground tests—the primary venue for such assessments—rely on  models and simulations, many of which continue to lack operational  realism. Although MDA is working to validate models and simulations,  they currently have technical limitations associated with their ability to  represent system-wide operationally realistic scenarios. However, MDA  officials told us that, while there are challenges associated with coming to  agreement on how to quantify BMD effectiveness and durability, MDA  believes that it is possible to do so. While various DOD officials told us  that MDA and U.S. Strategic Command are collaborating to develop  solutions to these issues, until quantifiable operational metrics for BMD  system-level assessment are in place, the combatant commands will lack  key information they need to plan for the phased adaptive approach and  so may face operational risks should a conflict arise.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD’s revised approach to BMD in Europe reflects the Administration’s  desire to focus on threats currently facing the United States and allies  while maintaining the flexibility to adapt the approach as threats change  and new missile defense technologies become available. Since the  September 2009 announcement of EPAA, DOD has taken steps to  implement this policy, including considering options for the deployment of  assets, requesting forces, preparing for testing, analyzing infrastructure  needs, and gaining NATO support for BMD in Europe. However, this  approach creates significant planning and implementation challenges  that—if left unaddressed—could result in significant management issues  and unforeseen costs. First, as a result of the lack of guidance on EPAA’s  desired end states, including its priority compared to other BMD missions,  the department faces uncertainty in planning and implementing its revised  approach, particularly in how it will allocate limited assets among multiple  geographic regions. Second, without cost estimates for the life cycle of  EPAA, DOD will be unable to judge whether it is meeting its goal that  EPAA be fiscally sustainable and affordable. The department will also  have difficulty in monitoring the implementation of the program and  ensuring that adequate funding is available to execute the program  according to plan if it does not develop life-cycle cost estimates. Third,  DOD does not have an EPAA schedule that integrates key acquisition,  infrastructure, and personnel activities. As a result, the department does  not have the information it needs to assess whether the EPAA schedule is  realistic and achievable, identify potential problems, or analyze how  changes will impact the execution of this effort, and therefore is exposed  to increased schedule, performance, and cost risks. Finally, without  incorporating operationally quantifiable metrics—such as how long the  system can defend (durability) and how well the system can defend  (effectiveness)—into its test program, DOD will not be able to fully  understand the capabilities and limitations of the BMD system and  EUCOM will not have the most relevant performance data it needs to  thoroughly assess the extent to which BMD capabilities support its  mission objectives and judge how to best plan for and employ BMD assets.  Unless the department addresses these challenges, DOD will likely face  implementation risks that ultimately may increase the cost for this  approach in Europe and potentially beyond as it expands this BMD  approach to other regions of the world.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four  actions:    Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide guidance on EPAA that describes desired  EPAA end states in response to concerns raised by key stakeholders.
Direct the Missile Defense Executive Board to oversee and coordinate the  life-cycle cost estimates that would provide for the management and  oversight of EPAA and allow the department to assess whether its  plans for EPAA are affordable and determine if corrective actions are  needed, and    an integrated EPAA schedule to include acquisition, infrastructure, and  personnel activities that would help identify EPAA implementation  risks that need to be considered.
Direct U.S. Strategic Command, in coordination with the Missile Defense  Agency, to adopt BMD operational performance metrics for durability and  effectiveness and include these metrics into the BMD test programs.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with two of  our recommendations and partially concurred with two others. The  department’s comments are reprinted in appendix V. DOD and the State  Department also provided technical comments, which we have  incorporated as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to provide guidance on  EPAA that describes desired end states in response to concerns raised by  key stakeholders. In its comments, DOD stated that it recognizes the need  to provide policy guidance on the decision to pursue the EPAA. The  department also noted that it has taken steps to provide guidance in the  2012 Guidance for the Employment of the Force and that this would  provide detailed guidance to the Joint Staff, combatant commanders and  other DOD components on end states, strategic assumptions and  contingency planning, including for EPAA. However, since this guidance  has not yet been approved by the Secretary of Defense, we cannot  determine if the concerns raised by key stakeholders will be addressed.  Additionally, since EPAA is a flexible approach, DOD will need to continue  to refine its guidance over time.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Missile  Defense Executive Board oversee and coordinate the development of life- cycle cost estimates that would provide for the management and oversight  of EPAA and allow the department to assess whether its plans for EPAA  are affordable and determine if corrective actions are needed. In its  comments, DOD stated that EPAA is an approach, not an acquisition  program, and that it is designed to be flexible and match resources to the  combatant commander’s requirements. The department believes a more  effective approach is to prepare BMDS program element-specific life-cycle  cost estimates and use them to inform the management of ongoing  acquisition programs and senior-level oversight of the phased adaptive  approach as BMDS systems are applied to the defense of Europe. We  recognize that life-cycle cost estimates for individual elements will provide  decision makers with information on DOD’s BMD efforts; however, we  believe that DOD should also develop life-cycle cost estimates for its  overall EPAA effort and that doing so will not impede flexibility. Without  cost estimates for the life cycle of EPAA, DOD will be unable to judge  whether EPAA is affordable and sustainable. The department will also  have difficulty in monitoring the implementation of EPAA and ensuring  that adequate funding is available to execute the program according to  plan.
In its response to our third recommendation, DOD concurred that the  Missile Defense Executive Board oversee and coordinate the development  of an integrated EPAA schedule to include acquisition, infrastructure, and  personnel activities that would help identify EPAA implementation risks  that need to be considered. DOD stated that MDA includes the anticipated  phased adaptive approach requirements into the broader BMDS  acquisition program and uses an integrated BMDS schedule for the  emerging EPAA requirements, ensuring they are included in appropriate  detail and timing within the BMD element-level schedules. DOD further  indicated that MDA has a strict process to manage and integrate the  acquisition of discrete BMDS elements which make up the capability to be  delivered in each of the EPAA phases. While the department has an  integrated BMDS acquisition schedule comprised of element-level  acquisition schedules, we found that the schedules for the individual  elements are highly optimistic. Additionally, DOD has not developed an  integrated schedule specifically for EPAA so that EPAA-related acquisition  activities as well as EPAA-related infrastructure and personnel activities  can be synchronized directly within that schedule. As a result, we continue  to believe that the department does not have an important management  tool with which to assess whether the EPAA schedule is realistic and  achievable, identify potential problems, or analyze how changes will  impact the execution of this effort.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to adopt BMD operational  performance metrics for durability and effectiveness and include these  metrics into the BMD test programs. In its comments, DOD stated that it  recognizes the inherent value of measurable BMDS performance metrics  and that, once provided with the warfighter’s operationally defined  metrics, DOD will crosswalk these metrics to the BMD System  specification values assessed to be achievable, and determine whether the  specifications meet the operational requirements. Taking such actions  would meet the intent of our recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Secretary of State; the Director, Missile Defense Agency; the Chairman,  Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and the  Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: During our review of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) plans for  implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), we  reviewed relevant documentation and met with representatives from  numerous agencies and offices. To assess the extent to which DOD has  provided guidance for the force structure requirements, identified costs,  and established an integrated schedule for EPAA we reviewed relevant  documentation and spoke with cognizant DOD, State Department, and  North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officials. The documents we  reviewed relating to guidance for force structure requirements included  the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, the President’s announcement  from September 2009, and testimony from senior DOD officials. We also  reviewed U.S. Strategic Command’s 2010 Military Utility Assessment and  2009 Prioritized Capabilities List. We spoke to senior-level officials from  the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA),  and the Joint Staff about the presence or absence of a firm architecture for  EPAA, any guidance that would be provided to the services, and how force  structure for EPAA would be determined. Officials from U.S. Strategic  Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Northern Command  informed us about the typical processes for determining ballistic missile  defense (BMD) force structure. We spoke to service representatives from  the Army and Navy, including the Army Space and Missile Defense  Command and the Naval Air and Missile Defense Command, about the  kind of guidance they will need to prepare cost and force structure  estimates for EPAA. We also reviewed intelligence documents and threat  assessments and met with intelligence officials from the Office of the  Director of National Intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the  National Air and Space Intelligence Center to become familiar with the  threats that EPAA is intended to defeat and the type of force structure that  might be required to accomplish this mission. To determine the extent to  which DOD has identified the costs of EPAA, we reviewed the budget  requests for some of the elements DOD stated would be part of EPAA and  also met with representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense  (Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation). In evaluating whether DOD  has an integrated schedule that considers the factors that may impact  EPAA, we relied on policy documents such as the 2010 Ballistic Missile  Defense Review and the statements made by the President and the  Secretary of Defense about the timelines for EPAA. We reviewed MDA’s  Integrated Master Test Plan and the President’s budget requests and  justifications for BMD elements. We also met with service representatives  to discuss the kinds of schedules they typically follow when preparing  infrastructure, training personnel, and preparing force structure to be  fielded. For example, the Army Corps of Engineers provided information  related to the efforts involved with constructing facilities in foreign  countries and the types of challenges they face with such construction.  Further, State Department officials provided us with information about the  activities and schedule involved in establishing government-to-government  agreements for hosting U.S. BMD assets. We also spoke with NATO  representatives about that organization’s schedule for adopting the  territorial missile defense mission and the process of making assets  interoperable with U.S. missile defense assets. We also relied on our  recent work dealing with the acquisition risks related to the EPAA  schedule, contained in GAO-11-179R.
To assess the extent to which the combatant commands are involved with  testing for EPAA-related assets and understand the capabilities and  limitations of the BMD system, we reviewed the Integrated Master Test  Plan as well as U.S. Strategic Command’s 2010 Military Utility Assessment,  and the Force Preparation Campaign Plan. We also spoke to officials at  U.S. Northern Command and U.S. European Command about their  understanding and confidence in the BMD system as a whole and the  individual assets that comprise it. Officials from these same commands  provided information about efforts to establish “Assess-to” criteria for  durability and effectiveness of the BMD system. We met with officials from  the office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation and the  Ballistic Missile Defense System Operational Test Agency to discuss the  status of models and simulations for the BMD system and elements.
To understand DOD’s and the State Department’s plans for cooperation  and coordination with NATO, friends, and allies in implementing EPAA,  we conducted site visits to numerous installations both in the U.S. and in  Europe. We met with State Department officials to discuss their ongoing  efforts to negotiate agreements with countries that may host U.S. BMD  assets and received updates on the progress of negotiations. We  interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Policy to discuss DOD’s role in negotiating these agreements. We also met  with MDA officials to discuss the efforts to make EPAA interoperable with  the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense system of NATO. We  also attended the Nimble Titan 2010 wargame in Suffolk, Va., where we  talked to the representatives of foreign governments and militaries and  learned about the efforts already under way that may affect the  collaboration and coordination amongst allies, as well as points of conflict  that could hinder cooperation. In Europe, officials with the U.S. mission to  NATO informed us of the process whereby NATO would decide whether  or not to adopt the territorial BMD mission, the likelihood of such an  adoption, and next steps following adoption of the mission. We also met  with the European representatives from U.S. Naval Forces Europe and  U.S. Air Forces in Europe to discuss their perspective on the efforts and  challenges to cooperating with NATO and foreign allies on BMD.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2009 to January  2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Potential BMDS Elements for EPAA
paragraphs: A system that (1) provides a forward deployed capability  to search, detect, and track ballistic missiles of all ranges  and transmit track data to the BMDS and (2) employs its  own sensors and interceptors or exploits off-board  sensors to protect deployed forces, large regions, and  population centers. The element is based on a  modification to existing Navy Aegis ships to provide these  capabilities. The interceptors include the Standard  Missile-3 (SM-3), designed to defend against short- to  intermediate-range ballistic missile threats in the  midcourse and ascent phases, and a modified Standard  Missile-2 (SM-2) designed to defend against short-range  threats in the terminal phase.
A networked computer and communications element  developed by MDA to integrate the BMDS by providing  deliberate planning, situational awareness, sensor  management, and battle management capabilities.
A transportable, land-based radar, similar in design to the  THAAD radar, which provides advance warning of ballistic  missile launches to the BMDS from forward-based  locations.
The THAAD element employs the THAAD Interceptor and  the Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance - Model  2 (AN/TPY-2) (THAAD Mode) to engage ballistic targets  in the late mid-course and terminal phases of their  trajectory. THAAD can act as a surveillance sensor,  providing sensor data to cue other elements of the BMDS.
PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
PAC-3 provides simultaneous air and missile defense  capabilities as the Lower Tier element in defense of U.S.  deployed forces and allies against short-range ballistic  missiles.
Land-based element designed by MDA to provide  capability to detect, track, and intercept threats. Aegis  Ashore will leverage the Aegis BMD capability and deploy  it at shore-based sites in Europe starting in 2015. DOD  intends for it to employ the SM-3 for exoatmospheric  defense against short- to medium- and some  intermediate-range ballistic missile threats in the later  stages of flight. Use of the SM-3 at shore-based sites will  broaden the BMDS use of the SM-3 from its current sea- based applications and DOD plans for Aegis Ashore to  employ SM-3 IIB in Phase 4 against intercontinental  ballistic missiles.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle-based sensor in development  designed to acquire and track large ballistic missile raid  sizes. The sensor is also intended to provide tracking  data of high enough quality to be used for launch-on- remote and early intercept engagements.
Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS)
Space-based sensor system, in early development,  designed to provide end-to-end intercept quality tracking  of ballistic missile threats.
section_title: Appendix III: BMD Architecture Performance: Impact of Quantities, Integration, and Location on Defended Areas
paragraphs: The ize of the re defended  depend on the cabilitie nd  ner of the BMD element  deployed. In thi notionl case, the  defended re of two BMD-cable  hip dditive.
Integrting BMD element into   tem cn increase their cability,  inclding expnding the defended  re. In thi notionl case, the  defended re of the same two  BMD-cable hipastly  expnded when integrted with   enor.
The geogrphic loction of the BMD  elementn impct their  performnce. In thi notionl case,  the defended re of the same  integrted element from option 2 iastly expnded y chnging the  loction of the enor.
section_title: Appendix IV: U.S. Progress in Achieving NATO Support for BMD in Europe
paragraphs: Since the President’s announcement of EPAA in September 2009, the U.S.  has made significant progress in advancing cooperative efforts with NATO  allies on BMD in Europe. Increasing international cooperation on BMD is a  major focus of the Administration’s new approach to BMD. According to  the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, a benefit of EPAA is that it offers  increased opportunities for allied participation and burden sharing. The  U.S. intends to make EPAA its national contribution to a future NATO  BMD capability and is therefore not asking NATO for financial support for  EPAA assets. However, the U.S. is seeking allied participation and burden  sharing for EPAA that may be demonstrated in various ways. According to  DOD and the State Department, burden sharing may come in the form of  support for EPAA, including adoption of a NATO territorial BMD mission;  expansion of NATO’s command and control system for territorial missile  defense; bilateral agreements for hosting U.S. BMD assets; and  contributions of allied BMD assets toward an expanded NATO BMD  system capability.
NATO’s adoption of the territorial BMD mission at the Lisbon Summit in  November 2010 fulfilled a major U.S. goal. NATO’s prior BMD mission was  limited to the protection of deployed troops and so was focused on  defending smaller areas. The shift to a territorial defense mission means  that NATO’s BMD efforts will now focus on protecting much larger  geographic areas, including population centers and countries.  Additionally, DOD and State Department officials noted that the  agreement at Lisbon will help facilitate cooperation with NATO allies on  hosting U.S. BMD assets and provides justification for allies to pursue  additional BMD efforts. NATO allies had expressed their support for EPAA  prior to the Lisbon Summit. At the December 2009 NATO Foreign  Ministers Meeting in Brussels, NATO welcomed the U.S. adoption of EPAA  and declared that this approach would further strengthen European  missile defense work in NATO. Further, the NATO Secretary General  stated in October 2010 that building a missile defense for Europe was  important, because missiles are increasingly posing a threat to European  populations, territory, and deployed forces.
Although the political endorsement at Lisbon was a significant  accomplishment, the U.S. and its NATO allies must now overcome the  difficult task of reaching consensus on how to carry out this new BMD  mission, including prioritizing what areas to defend and establishing  command and control relationships. According to DOD, State Department,  and NATO officials, reaching agreement on these issues will be a challenge  facing NATO’s new territorial missile defense mission. DOD and State  Department officials told us that reaching such an agreement on a bilateral  basis can be extremely challenging and time-consuming and that reaching  consensus with all 28 NATO member nations is therefore expected to be  even more challenging and time-consuming.
The U.S. and its NATO allies have already taken steps to address the  political challenges inherent in multilateral BMD operations by beginning  to explore and outline potential command and control relationships. One  venue in which the U.S. and its allies have been examining BMD command  and control challenges is the biennial U.S. Strategic Command-led  wargame called Nimble Titan. In 2010, this wargame involved notional  ballistic missile attack scenarios occurring a decade in the future against  fictional adversaries. Nimble Titan 2010 participants came from around the  world including representatives from many NATO member nations, such  as Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom and  observers from Belgium, Italy, Romania, Turkey, NATO, and Russia. One  of the outcomes of the Nimble Titan 2010 wargame was the development  of a document that described notional command and control relationships  and established a framework for coalition BMD concept of operations.  Additionally, the U.S. has participated in a Dutch-led BMD exercise that,  according to EUCOM officials, is also helping them to understand and  overcome command and control challenges. EUCOM officials also told us  that their command has begun drafting a concept of operations as well.  However, they emphasized that NATO agreement on a final command and  control concept of operations would remain a challenge and require  significant effort.
At Lisbon, NATO also agreed to expand its missile defense command,  control, and communications program to incorporate the territorial missile  defense mission, thereby fulfilling another burden sharing goal established  by the U.S. The NATO system, called Active Layered Theater Ballistic  Missile Defense (ALTBMD) is currently designed to link allies’ missile  defense assets together to protect deployed forces. Prior to the Lisbon  Summit, NATO commissioned technical studies that concluded it was  feasible to expand ALTBMD capabilities to include the territorial missile  defense mission. As a result of the agreement reached at Lisbon, NATO  plans to modify ALTBMD to be the command and control backbone into  which allied BMD assets will link and through which NATO will conduct  territorial BMD planning, tasking, engagement coordination, and share  situation assessment. MDA and ALTBMD program officials estimated that  an expanded ALTBMD for territorial defense would be operational and  interoperable with the U.S. command and control system, C2BMC, by  2018. NATO and DOD officials stated that they do not see major technical  challenges in meeting the 2018 operational target date for the territorial  missile defense mission and interoperability with C2BMC. However, GAO  did not assess the technical feasibility, cost, and schedule of ALTBMD,  including interoperability with C2BMC. According to NATO, expanding  ALTBMD capabilities to include the territorial missile defense mission  would cost less than €200 million or around $260 million over 10 years, to  be paid for through NATO common funding. The Secretary of Defense and  NATO Secretary General stated that, as such, expansion of ALTBMD to  include the territorial missile defense mission is not a significant financial  burden to the alliance.
Section 223 (a) of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011,  Pub. L. No. 111-383 (2011) restricts the obligation or expenditure of funds for Fiscal Year  2011 and beyond for site activation, construction, or deployment of missile defense  interceptors on European land as part of the phased adaptive approach to missile defense  in Europe until certain conditions are met, including host nation signing and ratification of  basing agreements and status of forces agreements authorizing deployment of such  interceptors. Section 223(c) allows the Secretary of Defense to waive the restrictions seven  days after the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees written  certification that the waiver is in the urgent national security interests of the United States.
The supplemental Status of Forces Agreements supplement the multilateral NATO Status  of Forces Agreement, originally signed on June 19, 1951. establishing an Aegis Ashore facility. This revised agreement is now  awaiting Polish parliamentary ratification. The U.S. has not yet reached  agreement with a nation to host the AN/TPY-2 radar, which is a significant  component of the first phase of EPAA and scheduled to be in place by the  2011 time frame. Although State Department officials expressed  confidence that the U.S. could reach agreement with the yet to be  determined host country for AN/TPY-2 in 2011, they also acknowledged  that the U.S does not have control over how long it will take to reach  bilateral agreements with foreign countries or how long it will take foreign  countries to bring those agreements into force. Additionally, since the U.S.  has not yet identified where other potential EPAA BMD assets will be  based, it is unknown what kind of bilateral agreements will be necessary  with future BMD asset host countries.
A way in which NATO allies can share the burden in providing territorial  missile defense of NATO is by contributing their national BMD assets;  however, the U.S. is thus far the only NATO member nation developing  BMD assets designed to provide territorial defense. BMD capabilities  currently envisioned for a NATO territorial defense mission include point  defenses using assets such as Patriot and area defenses such as THAAD  and Aegis BMD. BMD assets that provide point defenses are designed to  protect a relatively small area, such as an airport or port, primarily against  short-range ballistic missiles whereas area defense BMD assets are  designed to protect much larger swaths of territory and usually against  medium-range or greater ballistic missiles. Territorial defense is thereby  provided much more efficiently by area defenses than point defenses. For  example, in a 1999 report to Congress, DOD reported the same territorial  area could be protected by either 6 THAAD batteries or more than 100  Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) batteries. The report concluded  that the Patriot option was impractical for territorial defense. Further, a  senior DOD official testified that territorial defense of Europe cannot be  done using point defenses and requires area defenses. Several NATO  member nations have BMD point defense assets and, should they choose  to contribute them to the NATO mission, these could be used to defend  strategic assets primarily against short-range ballistic missiles.
Additionally, several NATO allies could also contribute sensors to the  BMD mission that, if compatible and appropriately interoperable, could  provide early warning data to tracking data that enhances the capability of  area defense assets. However, the U.S. remains the only NATO member  nation with BMD assets designed to provide area defense needed for the  NATO territorial BMD mission.
Although NATO has adopted the territorial defense mission, the current  fiscal situation of many NATO allies makes it less likely that they will start  expensive new BMD development programs for area defense. Many NATO  countries are trying to cut down on government spending due to current  instability in the European economy, which could cause decreases in  defense expenditures. In a June 2010 speech, the NATO Secretary General  recognized the major defense cuts being made across NATO nations due  to the current fiscal climate and asked allies not to make drastic defense  budget cuts that would compromise NATO’s collective security missions.  The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense have also expressed their  concern about defense budget cuts in NATO nations and the potential  impact on NATO. Additionally, NATO and DOD officials stated that  European countries are not likely to begin developing new area defense  BMD programs in the near future.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Marie Mak, Assistant Director;  Nicolaas Cornelisse, Analyst-In-Charge; David Best; Cristina Chaplain,  Laurie Choi; Tana Davis; Gregory Marchand; Wiktor Niewiadomski; Karen  Richey; Matthew Spiers; Amie Steele; Alyssa Weir; Erik Wilkins-McKee;  Gwyneth Woolwine; and Edwin Yuen made key contributions to this  report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach Acquisitions Face  Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability Challenges.  GAO-11-179R. Washington, D.C.: December 21, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Program Instability Affects  Reliability of Earned Value Management Data. GAO-10-676. Washington,  D.C.: July 14, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-10-388SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and  Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities.  GAO-09-856. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2009.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and  Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European  Sites. GAO-09-771. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2009.
Defense Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When  Considering Changes to Missile Defense Agency’s Roles and Missions.  GAO-09-466T. Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense  Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned.  GAO-09-338. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2009.
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost  Estimates for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense.  GAO-08-1068. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2008.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve the Process for  Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities.  GAO-08-740. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but  Program Is Short of Meeting Goals. GAO-08-448. Washington, D.C.:   March 14, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency’s Flexibility Reduces  Transparency of Program Cost. GAO-07-799T. Washington, D.C.: April 30,  2007.
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Information for Supporting  Future Key Decisions for Boost and Ascent Phase Elements. GAO-07-430.  Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Needs a Better Balance between  Flexibility and Accountability. GAO-07-727T. Washington, D.C.: April 11,  2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates  Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost. GAO-07-387. Washington, D.C.:  March 15, 2007.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning  and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense. GAO-06-473.  Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability  but Falls Short of Original Goals. GAO-06-327. Washington, D.C.: March  15, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for  Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System.  GAO-05-817. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly  Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment  Approach. GAO-05-962R. Washington, D.C.: August 4, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly  Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment  Approach. GAO-05-540. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in  2004. GAO-05-243. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve  Transparency of DOD’s Projected Resource Needs. GAO-04-514.  Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and  Accountability. GAO-04-409. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing  Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed. GAO-04-254.  Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2004.
Missile Defense: Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing System for  Intercepting Long-Range Missiles. GAO-03-600. Washington, D.C.: August  21, 2003.
Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and  Surveillance System Need to Be Considered. GAO-03-597. Washington,  D.C.: May 23, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but  Risks Remain. GAO-03-441. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Decision Making Needed to Reduce  Risks in Developing Airborne Laser. GAO-02-631. Washington, D.C.: July  12, 2002.
Missile Defense: Review of Results and Limitations of an Early National  Missile Defense Flight Test. GAO-02-124. Washington, D.C.: February 28,  2002.
Missile Defense: Cost Increases Call for Analysis of How Many New  Patriot Missiles to Buy. GAO/NSIAD-00-153. Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2000.
Missile Defense: Schedule for Navy Theater Wide Program Should Be  Revised to Reduce Risk. GAO/NSIAD-00-121. Washington, D.C.: May 31,  2000.