Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS List of Priority Assets Needs to Be Validated and Reported to Congress
Published: 2013-03-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In October 2012, Hurricane Sandy caused widespread damage across multiple states and affected millions of people. Threats to critical infrastructure are not limited to natural disasters, as demonstrated by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Originally developed by DHS in 2006, and consistent with the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the NCIPP identifies and prioritizes nationally significant critical infrastructure each year. However, Members of Congress and some state officials have raised questions about changes DHS has made to its approach for creating the list and the impact of these changes.
GAO was asked to review DHS management of the program. GAO assessed the extent to which DHS has (1) changed its criteria for developing the list, identified the impact, if any, of these changes, and validated its approach, (2) worked with states and SSAs to develop the list, and (3) reported to Congress on the NCIPP. GAO, among other things, reviewed laws, DHS policies and procedures; analyzed the lists from 2007 through 2012; and interviewed DHS, SSA, and state homeland security officials selected based on their involvement with the program and geographic diversity. The interviews are not generalizable but provide insights.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made several changes to its criteria for including assets on the National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program (NCIPP) list of the nation's highest-priority infrastructure, but has not identified the impact of these changes or validated its approach. In 2009, DHS changed the criteria to make the list entirely consequence based--that is, based on the effect of an event on public health and safety, and economic, psychological, and government mission impacts. Subsequent changes introduced specialized criteria for some sectors and assets. For example, infrastructure that has received a specific, credible threat, but otherwise does not meet NCIPP criteria, may be included on the list. DHS's changes to the NCIPP criteria have changed the composition of the NCIPP list, which has had an impact on users of the list, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency. However, DHS has not reviewed the impact of changes on users nor validated its approach to developing the list. While the change to an entirely consequence-based list created a common approach to identify infrastructure and align the program with applicable laws and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, recent criteria changes to accommodate certain sectors and assets represent a departure from this common approach, which could hinder DHS's ability to compare infrastructure across sectors. Program officials noted they would like to validate the NCIPP, but they have not yet submitted a proposal to DHS management. An independent peer review--a best practice in risk management--would better position DHS to reasonably assure that the NCIPP list identifies the nation's highest-priority infrastructure.
To develop the list, DHS has consulted with both states and sector specific agencies (SSA)--federal agencies responsible for protection and resiliency efforts among individual critical infrastructure sectors, such as energy, transportation, and dams. Since changing the NCIPP criteria in 2009, DHS has taken proactive steps to help states nominate assets to the list. These steps include providing on-site assistance, minimizing changes to the criteria, conducting outreach to encourage participation in an NCIPP working group (which includes SSAs), and providing explanations of why nominated assets do not make the list. DHS recognizes that states, in particular, face challenges--such as resource and budgetary constraints--associated with nominating assets, and has taken actions to address these challenges and reduce the burden on states.
GAO could not verify that DHS is meeting statutory requirements to report annually to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives on the NCIPP list. DHS officials prepared documents that generally contained information consistent with statutory reporting requirements, but they were uncertain whether they had been delivered to the committees because they do not have records to verify they were delivered. An approach to verify the delivery of the required reports, such as documenting or recording the transactions, would better position DHS to ensure that it is in compliance with its statutory reporting requirements and that it provides the committees with the information needed to perform oversight of the program.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DHS commission an external peer review and develop an approach to verify that the annual reports are provided to the requisite committees of Congress. DHS concurred with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In October 2012, the remnants of Hurricane Sandy caused widespread  damage across multiple states and affected millions of people. Damage  included flooding in the nation’s financial center that affected major  transportation systems and caused widespread and prolonged power  outages. The damage and resulting chaos disrupted government and  business functions alike, producing cascading effects far beyond the  location of these events. Threats against critical infrastructure are not  limited to natural disasters, as demonstrated by the terrorist attacks of  September 11, 2001, and the 2005 suicide bombings in London, where  terrorists disrupted the city’s transportation system, which resulted in a  breakdown of its mobile telecommunication infrastructure. In March 2007,  we reported that our nation’s critical infrastructure—assets and systems,  whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their  incapacity or destruction would have a negative or debilitating impact on  national security, national economic security, national public health or  safety, or any combination of those matters—continue to be vulnerable to  a wide variety of threats. Because the private sector owns the vast  majority of the nation’s critical infrastructure—banking and financial  institutions, commercial facilities, and energy production and transmission  facilities, among others—it is vital that the public and private sectors work  together to identify, prioritize, and protect these assets and systems.
In 2006, in accordance with section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of  2002, as amended, and other authorities and directives, the Department  of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the National Infrastructure Protection  Plan (NIPP), which provides the overarching approach for integrating the  nation’s critical infrastructure protection and resiliency activities into a  single national effort. The NIPP sets forth a risk management framework  and details the roles and responsibilities of DHS and other federal, state,  regional, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners implementing  the NIPP, and emphasizes the importance of collaboration and partnering   For example, the NIPP outlines the  with and among the various partners.roles and responsibilities of sector-specific agencies (SSA)—the various  federal departments and agencies that are responsible for critical  infrastructure protection and resiliency activities—in 18 sectors, such as  the chemical, dams, energy, and transportation sectors.the SSAs and their sectors.
Consistent with the NIPP, provisions of the Implementing  Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11  Commission Act) amended title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002  by requiring the Secretary of DHS to establish and maintain a national  database of systems and assets determined to be vital and the loss,  interruption, incapacity, or destruction of which would have a negative or  debilitating effect on the economic security, public health, or safety of the  United States, any state, or any local government, as otherwise  determined appropriate for inclusion by the Secretary. 9/11 Commission Act required the Secretary of DHS to establish and  maintain a single prioritized list of systems and assets included in the  national database that the Secretary determines would, if destroyed or  disrupted, cause national or regional catastrophic effects. The 9/11  Commission Act also required that DHS report annually to the Committee  on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the  Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives on,  among other things, any significant challenges in compiling the database  or list and, if appropriate, the extent to which the database or list has  been used to allocate federal funds to prevent, reduce, mitigate, or  respond to acts of terrorism.
See 6 U.S.C. § 124l(a)(1).
Originally developed in 2006, the National Critical Infrastructure  Prioritization Program (NCIPP) uses a tiered approach to identify  nationally significant critical infrastructure each year based on the  consequences associated with the disruption or destruction of those  critical infrastructure. Within DHS, the Office of Infrastructure Protection  in the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) is  responsible for infrastructure protection and resilience. The Infrastructure  Analysis and Strategy Division (IASD), within the Office of Infrastructure  Protection, manages the NCIPP. IASD coordinates a voluntary effort  with states and other partners to identify, prioritize, and categorize high- priority critical infrastructure as either level 1 or level 2 based on the  consequences to the nation in terms of four factors—fatalities, economic  loss, mass evacuation length, and degradation of national security.  According to the NIPP, the list identifies nationally significant critical  infrastructure that DHS can use to enhance decision making, including  implementing Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)  homeland security grant programs and federal incident management  planning and response efforts.
In recent years, Members of Congress and some state officials have  raised questions as to whether and why DHS has changed its approach  for assigning assets to the list, with some assets either dropping off the  list or being assigned to a new risk level. In addition, they have raised  questions about the effect changes to the program may have had on  states and SSAs that work with DHS to develop the list, as well as those  that use the list. Given the importance of the NCIPP list to various  aspects of DHS’s critical infrastructure protection and resiliency efforts,  you asked that we examine DHS’s management of the program.  Specifically, we assessed the extent to which DHS has  changed its criteria for developing the NCIPP list; identified the  impact, if any, of these changes; and validated its approach; worked with states and SSAs to develop the NCIPP list; and  reported to Congress on the NCIPP.
To address our first objective, we reviewed applicable laws, regulations,  and directives as well as Office of Infrastructure Protection policies and  procedures for developing and managing the NCIPP list, and assessed  the impact of changes on how the list is used. We also obtained and  assessed Office of Infrastructure Protection data on the program by  identifying and analyzing the distribution of high-priority assets included  on the finalized NCIPP lists by sector and state from fiscal years 2007  through 2012. We used our analysis to select 8 of 18 sectors—the  banking and finance, defense industrial base, chemical, energy,  transportation systems, agriculture and food, government facilities, and  dams sectors. We selected these sectors to obtain a mix of sectors that  experienced the largest and smallest percentage change in the  distribution of assets on the NCIPP list between fiscal years 2009 and  2011 because of program changes that DHS made during this period.  The information from our analysis of these sectors is not generalizable to  the universe of all sectors. However, it provides valuable insights into  yearly changes in the distribution of assets on the NCIPP list among a  diverse group of sectors. We then compared the results of our analysis  with various criteria, including the NIPP; DHS guidelines shared with state  and federal partners on the processes and methodologies used to identify  assets to be included on the NCIPP list; and Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government. We interviewed IASD officials in  Washington, D.C., responsible for administering the NCIPP program. We  also conducted a sensitivity analysis with the FEMA Urban Area Security  Initiative (UASI) grant risk formula—which uses NCIPP data, among other  information—to determine how, if at all, the changes to the list could  affect allocations for this grant. We discussed the sources of the data and  quality assurance procedures with Office of Infrastructure Protection and  FEMA officials and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to  provide a general overview of the program; we reported on data  limitations in prior work and have noted them in this report, where  applicable.
To address our second objective, we interviewed 10 SSA officials in  Washington, D.C., representing the 8 selected sectors to determine  whether DHS worked with these SSAs to develop the list, and if so, the  extent to which consultations occurred. Specifically, DHS was the SSA for  4 of the sectors—the chemical, dams, government facilities, and  transportation systems sectors. The Departments of Energy, Defense,  and the Treasury were the SSAs for 3 sectors—the energy, defense  industrial base, and banking and finance sectors, respectively. Two  SSAs, the Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug  Administration, share responsibility for the agriculture and food sector. In  addition, we contacted officials representing homeland security offices in  15 states to obtain their views on DHS efforts to work with them to  develop the NCIPP list. We selected these states because they contained  a range in the number of assets on the NCIPP list. We also selected the  15 states based on their distribution in each of the 9 Protective Security  Advisor (PSA) regions—the Office of Infrastructure Protection’s field office  designations for managing its PSA program—and selected at least 1  state in each of the 9 regions. As of December 2012, DHS has deployed  91 PSAs in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, and the nation’s capital region to,  among other things, conduct outreach with state and local partners and  asset owners and operators who participate in DHS’s voluntary critical  infrastructure protection and resiliency efforts. Furthermore, we spoke  with 9 of the 91 PSAs—at least 1 from each PSA region consistent with  our state selection criteria—to discuss their contributions to the NCIPP  list, how they use the list to prioritize their activities, and actions NCIPP  management has taken to solicit feedback regarding the program. The  information from our interviews with SSA officials, state homeland  security officials, and PSAs are not generalizable to the universe of state  and federal infrastructure partners. However, they provide valuable  insights into the Office of Infrastructure Protection efforts to develop and  manage its NCIPP list.
To address our third objective, we reviewed the statutory requirement that  DHS report annually to the Committee on Homeland Security and  Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland  Security of the House of Representatives on the national asset database  and prioritized critical infrastructure list. We reviewed documents on the  national asset database and prioritized critical infrastructure list that were  intended to meet statutory reporting requirements to determine if these  efforts were consistent with relevant statutory provisions and Standards  for Internal Control in the Federal Government. We also interviewed  Office of Infrastructure Protection officials to discuss efforts to report to  Congress. Appendix II discusses our objectives, scope, and methodology  in greater detail.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 to March 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, DHS has  responsibility for the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure.  Within DHS, the Office of Infrastructure Protection is responsible for  critical infrastructure protection and resilience and leads the coordinated  national effort to mitigate risk to the nation’s critical infrastructure, which includes working with public and private sector infrastructure partners.The Office of Infrastructure Protection also has the overall responsibility  for coordinating implementation of the NIPP across the 18 critical  infrastructure sectors; overseeing the development of Sector-Specific  Plans; providing training and planning guidance to SSAs and asset  owners and operators on protective measures to assist in enhancing the  security of infrastructure within their control; and helping state, local,  tribal, territorial, and private sector partners develop the capabilities to  mitigate vulnerabilities and identifiable risks to their assets.
Within the Office of Infrastructure Protection, IASD manages the NCIPP.  According to DHS, the main goals of the NCIPP are to (1) identify the  infrastructure that if disrupted or destroyed could significantly affect the  nation’s public health and safety, economic, or national security; (2)  increase the accuracy of infrastructure prioritization efforts used to inform  DHS resource allocation decisions; and (3) focus planning, foster  coordination, and support preparedness efforts for incident management,  response, and restoration activities among federal, state, and private  sector partners. Critical infrastructure identified through the program  includes several thousand level 1 or level 2 assets and systems. The  levels are used to enhance decision making related to infrastructure  protection and can include a range of businesses or assets in a local  geographic area, such as refineries, water treatment plants, or  commercial facilities, as well as the information and data systems that  ensure their continued operation.
Consistent with the generally voluntary critical infrastructure protection  approach identified in the NIPP, according to DHS, the success of the  NCIPP relies upon the voluntary contributions and cooperation of public  and private sector partners from the infrastructure protection community.  To compile the NCIPP list, consistent with statutory requirements, IASD  conducts a voluntary annual data call to solicit nominations to the list from  state homeland security and federal partners. To submit nominations,  partners are to develop realistic scenarios for infrastructure that meet  specific criteria developed by IASD. Consistent with the consequence  categories identified in the NIPP risk management framework, NCIPP  nominations are to meet minimum specified consequence thresholds  outlined in the annual data call for at least two of the following four  categories: fatalities, economic loss, mass evacuation length, and  degradation of national security. After nominations are submitted,  according to DHS guidance, IASD conducts a multiphase adjudication  process intended to give state and federal partners the opportunity to  review IASD’s preliminary decisions and submit additional information to  support nominations that were not initially accepted, before IASD finalizes  the NCIPP list.
subsections: section_title: Uses of the NCIPP List
paragraphs: The NCIPP list is used to establish risk management priorities. According  to the NIPP, prioritizing risk management efforts provides the basis for  understanding potential risk mitigation benefits that are used to inform   The NCIPP list, which identifies  planning and resource decisions.nationally significant critical infrastructure based on consequences,  informs the NIPP risk management prioritization process. The NIPP risk  management prioritization process involves analyzing risk assessment  results to determine which critical infrastructure faces the highest risk so  that management priorities can be established. The NCIPP list is also  used to, among other things:
Allocate Homeland Security Grants. Within DHS, FEMA uses the  number of assets included on the NCIPP list, among other data, in its  risk formula for allocating State Homeland Security Program (SHSP)  and UASI grant funds. The SHSP and UASI provide funding to states  and cities, respectively, to support a range of preparedness activities  to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of  terrorism and other catastrophic events. While the number of critical  infrastructure a state or city has on the NCIPP list is used to  determine the allocation of SHSP and UASI grant funds, there is no  requirement that states or cities use these grant funds to enhance  protection of these assets. For fiscal year 2012, FEMA allocated $294  million in SHSP funding to all 50 states, the District of Columbia,  Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands,  and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Additionally, in fiscal year 2012, FEMA  allocated approximately $490 million in UASI funding to the nation’s  31 highest-risk cities.
Prioritize Voluntary Critical Infrastructure Protection Programs. The  Office of Infrastructure Protection’s Protective Security Coordination  Division (PSCD) uses the NCIPP list and other inputs to prioritize its  efforts to work with critical infrastructure owners and operators and  state and local responders to (1) assess vulnerabilities,  interdependencies, capabilities, and incident consequences, and (2)  develop, implement, and provide national coordination for protective  programs. Related to these efforts, PSCD has deployed the  aforementioned PSAs in 50 states and Puerto Rico to locations based  on population density and major concentrations of critical  infrastructure. PSAs use the NCIPP list to prioritize outreach to level 1  and level 2 assets in their area of jurisdiction for participation in DHS’s  voluntary security survey and vulnerability assessment programs,  such as the Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection and Site   PSAs are also often called upon by state  Assistance Visit programs.homeland security advisers to assist them in nominating assets to the  NCIPP list.
Inform Incident Management Planning and Response Efforts. DHS  uses information collected during the NCIPP process and the NCIPP  list to inform and prioritize incident management planning and  response efforts. When an incident occurs, DHS officials pull  information from a variety of sources, including the database of assets  nominated to and accepted on the NCIPP list, to identify critical  infrastructure in the affected area. IASD then prioritizes this  information in an infrastructure of concern list to guide incident  response efforts. The infrastructure of concern list includes any critical  infrastructure affected by the event, which may include level 1 or level  2 assets.DHS components, including FEMA and PSAs, who use it on the  ground to guide local incident response efforts.
section_title: DHS Has Made Changes to NCIPP List Criteria, but Has Not Identified the Impact of These Changes or Validated Its Approach
paragraphs: DHS has made several changes to its criteria for including assets on the  NCIPP list. These changes initially focused on introducing criteria to make  the lists entirely consequence based, with subsequent changes intended  to introduce specialized criteria for some sectors and assets. DHS’s  changes to the NCIPP criteria have changed the composition of the  NCIPP list, which has had an impact on users of the list. However, DHS  does not have a process to identify the impact of these changes on users  nor has it validated its approach for developing the list.
subsections: section_title: DHS Made Several Changes to the List Criteria and Format
paragraphs: DHS’s initial approach for developing the NCIPP list differed by asset  level. According to the Homeland Security Act, as amended, DHS is  required to establish and maintain a prioritized list of systems and assets  that the Secretary determines would, if destroyed or disrupted, cause  national or regional catastrophic effects. The criteria for level 1 assets  focused on consequences—the effects of an adverse event. The criteria  for level 2 assets focused generally on capacity—the number of people  that use an asset or output generated by an asset, such as the number of  people that occupy a commercial office building, the daily ridership of a  mass transit system, or the number of people served by a water utility.  DHS officials told us that the level 1 consequence-based criteria and  thresholds were initially established at the beginning of the program at the  discretion of the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, who  sought to identify infrastructure that the destruction of which could be  expected to cause impacts similar to those caused by the attacks of   In contrast, the initial level 2  September 11 and Hurricane Katrina.criteria were generally capacity based in order to identify the most critical  assets within each of the 18 sectors. However, the capacity-based criteria  often differed by sector, making it difficult to compare criticality across  sectors and therefore identify the highest-priority critical infrastructure on  a national level.
In 2009, DHS changed the level 2 criteria to make the NCIPP list entirely  consequence based, a change that brought its approach more into line  with statutory requirements and, consistent with the NIPP risk  management framework, allowed for comparison across sectors. The  new level 2 criteria match the level 1 consequence-based criteria— fatalities, economic loss, mass evacuation length, or national security  impacts—but with lower threshold levels than those used to identify level   To be included on the NCIPP list, an asset must meet at least  1 assets.two of the four consequence thresholds, and is included on the list as  either level 1 or level 2 depending on which consequence thresholds it  meets. As figure 1 shows, the level 1 thresholds are higher than level 2  thresholds and therefore represent the most nationally critical assets.
According to officials and agency documents, DHS changed the level 2  criteria to be consequence based for several reasons. First, NCIPP  program officials stated that they changed the criteria to align the list with  statutory requirements. Specifically, DHS interpreted the statute’s  requirement that it identify assets that “would, if destroyed or disrupted,  cause national or regional catastrophic effects,” as a call for  consequence-based criteria.of assets prioritized using capacity-based criteria demonstrated that the  initial level 2 criteria were not sufficient to fully identify assets capable of  causing catastrophic events. Second, program officials stated that they  changed the criteria to allow for comparisons across sectors, which is  consistent with the NIPP. The NIPP states that using a common approach  with consistent assumptions and metrics increases the ability to make  comparisons across sectors, different geographic regions, or different  types of events. Third, DHS also changed the criteria to improve the utility  of the list. According to the NCIPP guidance, prior to 2009, assets  designated as level 2 on the list experienced instability—assets being  added and removed from year to year—which frustrated efforts to use the  list for risk management planning and engagement, while assets  designated as level 1 on the list—which had always been consequence  based—remained relatively stable year to year.
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious viral disease of cloven-hoofed  animals such as cattle, swine, and sheep. Infected animals develop a fever and blisters on  their tongue and lips, and between their hooves. Many animals recover from a FMD  infection, but the disease leaves them debilitated and causes losses in meat and milk  production. FMD does not have human health implications. According to the U.S.  Department of Agriculture, a 2001 outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom resulted in the  slaughter of millions of animals and economic losses conservatively estimated at $14.7  billion. See GAO, Homeland Security: Actions Needed to Improve Response to Potential  Terrorist Attacks and Natural Disasters Affecting Food and Agriculture, GAO-11-652  (Washington D.C.: Aug. 19, 2011).
DHS is currently reevaluating the agriculture and food sector-specific  criteria because, according to officials, the specialized criteria created a  great deal of inconsistency in the agriculture and food assets and  systems included on the NCIPP list year to year.
In 2010, DHS also made adjustments to the NCIPP criteria to account for  high-risk assets that may not always meet the consequence criteria by  introducing the Catastrophic Economic Impacts Project and the Threats to  Infrastructure Initiative. Under the Catastrophic Economic Impacts  Project, infrastructure that meets only the level 1 consequence threshold  for economic impact, but no other criteria, is added to the list as a level 2  asset. DHS officials explained that the project was added to account for  instances when economic impact may be the primary impact. For  example, the officials noted that a collapse of the U.S. financial system  would likely not cause a large number of prompt fatalities or evacuations,  but would cause catastrophic national impacts nonetheless. Meanwhile,  the Threats to Infrastructure Initiative allows infrastructure that has  received a specific, credible threat from a malicious actor, but otherwise  would not meet NCIPP list criteria, to be added to the list as a level 2  asset. Unlike the other NCIPP criteria, the Threats to Infrastructure  Initiative focuses on the threat to infrastructure rather than the  consequences that may result from a specific event, which could  complicate comparisons across assets and sectors. DHS officials told us  that infrastructure with specific and credible threats were always included  on the NCIPP list, but were historically added based on information from  the intelligence community. The addition of the initiative allowed states  to nominate critical infrastructure under the same scenario based on state  and local intelligence information, such as that collected by fusion  centers. According to DHS officials, they adjudicate Threats to  Infrastructure Initiative nominations by determining whether the threat to  an asset is specific and credible. As of fiscal year 2012, approximately  60 assets and systems have been added to the NCIPP list as a result of  these new criteria.
In 2009, DHS also changed the format of the NCIPP list by expanding the  type of infrastructure that could be nominated to the list to include clusters  and systems of critical infrastructure in an effort to characterize the  relationship among some infrastructure, such as dependencies and  interdependencies, which was consistent with the statute and NIPP.  According to the NCIPP guidance, clusters or systems of critical  infrastructure are made up of two or more associated or interconnected  assets or nodes that can be disrupted through a single event, resulting in  regional or national consequences that meet the NCIPP criteria  thresholds. An asset is a single facility with a fixed location that functions  as a single entity (although it can contain multiple buildings or structures)  and meets the NCIPP criteria by itself. A node is a single facility, similar to  an asset, that does not meet the NCIPP criteria individually but does meet  the criteria when grouped with other nodes or assets in a cluster or  system. Figure 2 provides an illustration of an asset, a node, a cluster,  and a system.
Because nodes do not meet the NCIPP criteria on their own, they are not  included on the NCIPP list, but are identified on a separate list that is  associated with the NCIPP list. For example, a group of nodes or assets  making up a cluster would be listed on the NCIPP list under the name of  the cluster, such as the ABC Cluster, but one would have to consult the  associated list of nodes to identify the specific facilities that make up the  listed cluster. The concept of clusters and systems is consistent with the  statute and NIPP risk management framework. The law states that the  prioritized list of critical infrastructure shall contain both systems and  assets included in the national asset database, and the NIPP states that  to the extent possible, risk assessments should assess the dependencies  and interdependencies associated with each identified asset, system, or  network. According to DHS, they recognized a need to identify clusters of  critical infrastructure in 2008 after Hurricanes Gustav and Ike damaged a  group of refineries that resulted in a nationally significant supply  disruption of certain petrochemicals used across a wide range of  industries.
section_title: DHS Has Not Identified the Impact of Changes in Criteria on List Users or Validated Its Approach for Developing the List
paragraphs: The changes DHS made to the NCIPP criteria in 2009 and 2010 changed  the number of assets on and the composition of the NCIPP list. The total  number of assets, clusters, and systems on the NCIPP list decreased  from more than 3,000 in fiscal year 2009 to fewer than 2,000 in fiscal year  2011. The introduction of clusters and systems resulted in a separate  list of thousands of nodes associated with the NCIPP list. Specifically,  more than 2,500 additional facilities were included on the first nodes list in  fiscal year 2011, and almost 4,000 facilities were included on the nodes  list for fiscal year 2012. Figure 3 shows the relative changes in the  number of assets, clusters, and systems on the NCIPP list and  associated nodes list for fiscal years 2007 through 2012.
Additionally, the criteria changes also resulted in a change in the  distribution of assets, clusters, or systems included on the NCIPP list by  sector. Figure 4 shows that, among other sectors, the distribution of  assets in the agriculture and food and defense industrial base sectors  experienced large increases as a percentage distribution of the list from  fiscal years 2009 to 2011, while for the same period, the energy and  transportation sectors experienced large decreases. It also shows that the  distribution of assets in the agriculture and food sector continued to  increase as a percentage distribution of the list from fiscal years 2011 to  2012, while for the same period, the chemical sector experienced a large  decrease.
Our analysis shows that changes to the NCIPP list can have an impact on  users of the list, specifically, FEMA’s allocation of UASI grant funds and  PSAs’ ability to prioritize outreach and conduct site visits for its protection  programs. Our analysis of the FEMA risk formula shows that a change in  the number of NCIPP-listed assets located in a city has an impact on a  city’s relative risk score. Our analysis also shows that current UASI grant  allocations are strongly associated with a city’s current relative risk   Therefore, a change in the number of NCIPP-listed assets  score.located in a city can have an impact on the level of grant funding it  receives.approximately $490 million in UASI grant funds to the 31 cities with the  highest relative risk scores out of 102 eligible cities nationwide. Our  analysis of FEMA’s risk formula showed that, at the minimum, if the  number of level 2 assets is increased or decreased by as few as two for  each city, it would change the relative risk score for 5 of the 31 cities that  received fiscal year 2012 UASI grant funding. Such a change could result  in increased or decreased grant funding allocations for the affected cities.  The changes in the relative risk scores tend to affect cities in the middle  to the bottom of the top 31 list because there is generally a larger gap  between the relative risk scores of those cities at the top of the list than  those in the middle to bottom of the list. However, even a small change in  grant funding could have an impact on a city, especially if that city does  not traditionally receive other federal assistance as compared with cities  with higher risk scores.
For example, in fiscal year 2012, FEMA allocated  We previously reported that changes to the NCIPP list have presented  challenges to managing DHS programs, particularly the voluntary security  survey and assessment programs managed by PSCD. In May 2012, we  reported that PSCD was unable to track the extent to which it conducted  security surveys and vulnerability assessments on NCIPP level 1 and  level 2 assets because of (1) inconsistencies between the databases  used to identify the high-priority assets and to identify surveys and  assessments completed, and (2) the change in the format and  organization of the NCIPP list that converted some assets previously  listed as level 1 or level 2 into a cluster or system.fiscal year 2012 NCIPP list, DHS has begun to assign unique numerical  identifiers to each NCIPP asset, cluster, and system, which officials told  us has helped DHS track how many security surveys and vulnerability  assessments it conducts on high-priority assets. The officials also told us  that they anticipate fewer challenges associated with the list since the   Beginning with the  number of assets, clusters, and systems on the NCIPP list has remained  relatively stable from fiscal years 2011 to 2012. However, as discussed  earlier, the number of nodes associated with the NCIPP list has increased  substantially, growing from more than 2,500 in fiscal year 2011 to almost  4,000 in fiscal year 2012, which could further challenge PSA’s ability to  conduct outreach and prioritize site visits to critical infrastructure for its  protection programs.
PSCD officials in Washington, D.C. further told us that they do not have  criteria establishing how PSAs should assess an NCIPP cluster or system  that may contain many different nodes. The number of nodes in an  NCIPP cluster or system can vary from two to several dozen and may be  geographically dispersed. For example, one PSA told us that nodes in the  same cluster may not have the same owner and could be part of a  multistate system. Another PSA said that because several nodes in a  system may not be the same (i.e., different types of facilities, different  facility owners, or located in different areas), he generally conducts an  assessment of each node in order to consider an assessment of a system  complete. He explained that the facilities would have to be identical in  order to conduct a single assessment for separate nodes, which he noted  is rarely the case. Because it is difficult to prioritize which nodes within  clusters or systems may be the most important for conducting  assessments, the increase in the number of nodes associated with the  NCIPP list could have the effect of complicating PSA efforts to conduct  outreach to and assessments on the nation’s highest-priority  infrastructure. PSCD officials told us they view this as a challenge, but  they do not characterize it as a significant challenge. Further, they stated  that while the treatment of nodes within NCIPP clusters or systems has  not been specifically addressed in current program policies or guidance,  they do not believe that this challenge has affected their ability to  effectively prioritize facilities to receive security surveys and  assessments. In January 2013, a PSCD official told us that PSCD is  considering new guidance that would clarify how PSAs should approach  nodes when conducting outreach or prioritizing visits for voluntary  protection programs.
DHS does not have a process for identifying the impact of changes to the  list on its users and has not reviewed the impact of these changes on  users. However, program officials told us that they work closely with the  primary users of the list to understand how the data are used. According  to officials, they recognize that changes to the NCIPP list may have an  impact on users of the list, but they consider these impacts to be minor.  For example, one program official told us that the changes in the number  of level 1 and level 2 assets rarely have a significant effect on the amount  of grant funding allocated to states or cities, because of the additional  inputs considered in the FEMA risk formula that determine the grant  allocations. However, as previously demonstrated through our analysis,  even small changes to the NCIPP list counts can have an impact on UASI  grant allocations when accounting for all of the additional inputs  considered in FEMA’s risk formula. The officials also recognized that  changes from the fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2011 NCIPP lists, which  significantly reduced the number of assets on the list, required PSCD to  reset its performance metrics for conducting its voluntary security survey  and assessment programs. However, officials told us that the assets on  the NCIPP list have remained relatively stable since fiscal year 2011;  therefore, the officials believe that changes to the list would have a minor  impact on PSAs’ outreach activities. While our analysis shows that the  number of assets on the NCIPP list remained fairly constant from fiscal  year 2011 to 2012, it also shows that the number of nodes on the  associated nodes list continued to grow and almost doubled during this  time. As discussed, the increase in nodes may complicate PSA efforts to  conduct outreach to and assessments on the nation’s highest-priority  infrastructure. Additionally, the officials told us that, internally, changes to  the NCIPP list do not have an impact on DHS’s ability to identify and  prioritize critical infrastructure during an incident because the list is just  one of many information sources they consult when developing an event- specific infrastructure of concern list to guide incident response efforts.
While the change to an entirely consequence-based list created a  common approach to identify infrastructure and align the program with the  statute and NIPP, recent and planned criteria changes to accommodate  certain sectors and assets represent a departure from this common  approach, which could hinder DHS’s ability to compare infrastructure  across sectors. For example, the agriculture and food sector has criteria  that are different from those of all other sectors. Furthermore, DHS has  not validated its approach to developing the list to ensure that it  accurately reflects the nation’s highest-priority critical infrastructure.
The NIPP calls for risk assessments—such as NCIPP efforts—to be  complete, reproducible, documented, and defensible to produce results  that can contribute to cross-sector risk comparisons for supporting  investment, planning, and resource prioritization decisions. Table 1  provides a description of these core criteria for risk assessments.
DHS could not provide documentation explaining how the threshold levels  were established, such as the methodology for developing the NCIPP  criteria or the analysis used to support the criteria, because, according to  agency officials, the agency undertook an information technology change  in the spring of 2012 that resulted in the loss of agency e-mails and  program documentation. Nevertheless, as previously noted, officials told  us the criteria and thresholds were established at the discretion of the  Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection. Program officials noted  that they review the list on an annual basis but that the list has not been  independently verified and validated by an external peer review. These  officials believe a peer review would enable DHS to determine whether its  efforts to develop the NCIPP list are based on analytically sound  methodology and whether it has appropriate procedures in place to  ensure that the NCIPP list is defensible and reproducible.
We have previously reported that peer reviews are a best practice in risk  management and that independent expert review panels can provide  objective reviews of complex issues. An independent peer review to  validate the NCIPP criteria and list development process would better  position DHS to reasonably assure that, consistent with the NIPP risk  management framework, federal and state partners that use the NCIPP  list have sound information when making risk management and resource  allocation decisions. According to the NIPP, having sound information for  making those decisions is critical for focusing attention on those  protection and resiliency activities that bring the greatest return on  investment.
In August 2012, NCIPP program officials told us they would like to  establish a peer review to validate the program because officials believe  the list has stabilized and now consider the program to be in a  “maintenance phase.” In December 2012, the program director told us  that IASD drafted and submitted a proposal to the Assistant Secretary for  Infrastructure Protection in November 2012 that proposed different  approaches for reviewing the NCIPP, including a peer review of the  criteria used to decide which assets and systems should be placed on the  list and the process for doing so. At that time, DHS officials said that they  could not provide a copy of the draft proposal because it had not been  approved by management. As of January 2013, IASD told us that the  proposal had not been submitted to the Assistant Secretary for  Infrastructure Protection as originally discussed, that it was unclear when  the proposal would be submitted, and that it remained uncertain whether  a peer review would be approved.
The National Research Council of the National Academies has also  recommended that DHS improve its risk analyses for infrastructure  protection by validating the models and submitting them to external peer  review. According to the council, periodic reviews and evaluations of  risk model outputs are important for transparency with respect to decision  makers. These reviews should involve specialists in modeling and in the  problems that are being addressed and should address the structure of  the model, the types and certainty of the data, and how the model is  intended to be used. Peer reviews can also identify areas for  improvement. As we have previously reported, independent peer reviews  cannot ensure the success of a model, but they can increase the  probability of success by improving the technical quality of projects and  the credibility of the decision-making process. Thus, an independent  peer review would better position DHS to provide reasonable assurance  that the NCIPP criteria and list development process is reproducible and  defensible given the recent and planned changes, and that critical  infrastructure protection efforts are being prioritized on the nation’s  highest-priority infrastructure as intended by the NIPP risk management  framework.
section_title: DHS Has Taken Actions to Improve Its Consultation with States and SSAs to Address Challenges Developing the NCIPP List
paragraphs: DHS has taken various actions to work with states and SSAs, consistent  with statutory requirements and the NIPP, to identify and prioritize critical  infrastructure. However, officials representing selected states and SSAs  have mixed views about their experiences adjusting to DHS’s changes to  the NCIPP. DHS recognizes that states, in particular, face challenges— such as resource and budgetary constraints—associated with nominating  assets to the NCIPP list, and has taken actions to address these  challenges and reduce the burden on states.
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Taken Various Actions to Work with States and SSAs on Developing the List
paragraphs: In recent years, DHS has taken actions to improve its outreach to states  and SSAs to obtain their input on changes to the NCIPP. In 2009, DHS’s  outreach to states and SSAs consisted of issuing a memorandum to  obtain input on the proposed change to consequence-based criteria.  Since 2009, DHS has taken various actions to address state nomination  challenges and to reduce the burden on states. For example, in 2009,  DHS revised its list development process to be more transparent and  provided states with additional resources and tools for developing their  NCIPP nominations. Specifically, once states submit their NCIPP  nominations, DHS is to make preliminary adjudication determinations  based upon the NCIPP criteria, then provide its preliminary adjudication  results (whether a nomination was accepted or not) and why the decision  was made. Next, DHS is to allow states an opportunity to request  reconsideration of the nomination for which they could provide additional  documentation clarifying the eligibility of the infrastructure. Figure 5  shows the revised NCIPP list development process, including the  nomination, adjudication, and reconsideration phases.
In addition to revising the adjudication process, DHS took several actions  intended to improve the nomination process in recent years. First,  according to DHS’s 2011 data call guidance, DHS provided on-site  assistance from subject matter experts to assist states with identifying  infrastructure and disseminated a lessons learned document providing  examples of successful nominations to help states improve justifications  for nominations. Second, DHS has taken action to be more proactive in  engaging states and SSAs in ongoing dialogue on proposed criteria  changes and improving the NCIPP process and resulting list. For  example, in 2010, DHS hosted the Food and Agriculture Criticality  Working Group established through the Food and Agriculture Sector  Government Coordinating Council—consisting of over 100 participants  (including DHS, states, and SSAs)—to discuss the aforementioned  modification of the criteria to make it more applicable to the agriculture  and food sector. As discussed earlier, DHS and its state and SSA  partners are currently reevaluating the agriculture and food sector-specific  criteria, and the SSAs held a meeting in December 2012 to discuss  updating and adding additional criteria. In addition, in July 2011, DHS  established a working group composed of state and SSA officials to solicit  feedback on the nomination process and recommend actions to improve  the quality of the NCIPP list in preparation for the 2013 data call. DHS  officials told us that much of the feedback received from states and SSAs  centered on DHS improving communication and guidance throughout the  data call—for example, updating the guidance with additional information  on criteria. DHS also planned long-term studies, such as requesting input  from partners on modifying criteria thresholds. DHS officials told us that  they conducted extensive outreach to states and SSAs to encourage  participation in the NCIPP working group including extending the  submission deadlines multiple times, funding an on-site meeting with the  partners, and hosting webinars and conference calls. However, according  to DHS officials, DHS has since disbanded the working group because of  lack of state and SSA participation and DHS budget constraints.
section_title: Officials Representing Selected SSAs and States Have Mixed Views on the NCIPP Nomination Process
paragraphs: Despite DHS’s outreach efforts, homeland security officials representing  selected states and SSAs have mixed views on the NCIPP nomination  process because of program changes, such as the aforementioned  change to consequence-based criteria. Overall, the SSA officials we  interviewed had more positive views of the NCIPP nomination process  than the state officials we interviewed.
SSA officials representing five of the eight sectors we interviewed told us  that they believe it is very easy or moderately easy to nominate assets to  the NCIPP list. However, officials representing three sectors said that  they believe it is moderately difficult or very difficult to nominate assets to  the list because of various factors. For example, one SSA official told us  that the diversity and complexity of the sector’s assets makes it difficult to  determine which assets meet the NCIPP criteria. Also, one SSA official  stated that the online tool that the SSA uses to nominate assets to the  NCIPP list requires detailed information, such as latitude and longitude  coordinates, that may not be available for assets with unique  characteristics.
By contrast, most state officials we contacted reported that it is difficult to  nominate assets to the NCIPP list using the consequence-based criteria,  and two officials said that they are considering whether to continue to  participate in the NCIPP process. Homeland security officials  representing 13 of the 15 states told us that they believe that the  nomination process is moderately difficult or very difficult, while officials  representing 2 states told us that they believe the nomination process is  neither easy nor difficult. For the 13 states where officials told us that they  believe the nomination process is moderately difficult or very difficult,  officials representing 5 states told us that not having the capability and  resources to develop scenarios to support consequence-based criteria  (such as conducting economic analysis) are the major factors contributing  to the time-consuming and difficult process of submitting nominations  when the criteria changed. Officials from 2 states told us that their states  no longer plan to nominate infrastructure to the NCIPP list because of the  time and effort required to make nominations.
section_title: DHS Is Working to Address Challenges Facing States
paragraphs: DHS officials told us that they recognize that some states are facing  challenges participating in the NCIPP program (as we previously  identified in our discussions with state officials) and, according to officials,  they are working to help them address some of these challenges. For  example, DHS officials said that they recognized that the change to  consequence-based criteria was difficult because it required states to  invest considerable resources to make nominations. However, they also  believe that other factors may influence states’ willingness to participate,  such as (1) some state officials may believe that all critical infrastructure  has been captured for the state and sector, (2) some state officials may  believe that the benefits of participating—such as access to grant  funding—have diminished and there is no longer an incentive to  participate, and (3) the NCIPP data call process is voluntary and state  partners do not have to participate if they do not wish.
DHS has taken several steps to minimize the burden on state partners.  First, DHS is conducting a more limited annual data call wherein all  assets identified on the previous list are generally carried forward onto the  subsequent list and states are asked to provide nominations of (1) critical  infrastructure not accepted during the previous data call or (2) critical  infrastructure not previously nominated but that partners believe merits  consideration. In fiscal year 2013, 13 state or territorial partners  participated in the data call. DHS officials question whether, given current  budget constraints facing state and federal partners, there is a need to  conduct an annual data call. In our past work, we have reported that, with  our nation facing serious, long-term fiscal challenges, a reevaluation of  federal agencies’ operations has never been more important than it is   Consistent with our past work, DHS officials told us that they  today.considered whether the costs of conducting an annual data call outweigh  the benefits, since only minor updates are being made to the NCIPP list.  In addition, one state official observed that, in a resource-constrained  environment, states can no longer afford to conduct the NCIPP data call  because it diverts resources from critical infrastructure protection  partnership and coordination activities that could increase state and  regional resilience, such as states maintaining their own list of high- priority critical infrastructure. In response, according to DHS officials, DHS  is working to minimize major changes to the consequence-based NCIPP  criteria, and thus, does not anticipate making any major changes to the  NCIPP criteria that would cause a burden on state resources. Finally,  DHS officials also told us that they have begun to take additional actions  to enhance state participation, including developing and organizing a  webinar with PSAs and state officials as they execute the data call. DHS  is also working collaboratively with the State, Local, Tribal and Territorial  Government Coordinating Council to develop a guide to assist states with  their efforts to identify and prioritize their critical infrastructure.
section_title: DHS Could Not Verify That It Met Requirements to Report to Congress on the NCIPP
paragraphs: DHS has prepared documents describing the national asset database  and the prioritized critical infrastructure list; however, DHS could not verify  that it has delivered these documents for purposes of meeting its  statutory requirement to report this information to the congressional  committees specified in the law. Pursuant to the 9/11 Commission Act,  which amended title II of the Homeland Security Act, DHS is required to  report annually to the Committee on Homeland Security and  Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland  Security of the House of Representatives on, among other things, any  significant challenges in compiling the database or list and, if appropriate,  the extent to which the database or list has been used to allocate federal  funds to prevent, reduce, mitigate, or respond to acts of terrorism.Although DHS was able to compile documents on the database and list  for fiscal years 2008 through 2011 that generally contain the information  on which DHS is to report, officials from DHS and the Office of  Infrastructure Protection told us they were uncertain whether the  documents were delivered to the requisite congressional committees  because they do not have records to indicate that the documents were  delivered. According to a DHS official, the DHS document tracking  system includes notes on the intended delivery of the fiscal year 2008  and 2010 documents and a note regarding delivery of the fiscal year 2009  document, but the system does not contain a record to verify that the  documents were delivered, i.e., that the transactions actually occurred.  Staff from both committees could not find evidence of the documents.  One staff member also conducted a search of congressional archives for  the 109th, 110th, and 111th Congresses and found no records of  receiving the statutorily required reports from DHS.
We reviewed the DHS documents intended to fulfill the statutory reporting  requirements for fiscal years 2008 through 2011 and found that they  generally contain information consistent with the statutory requirements.  For example, the documents generally included an overview of the  NCIPP list development process and changes, if any, from the previous  year; challenges compiling the list; and how the list is used. Table 2  shows key elements of each document and how they match up with the  statutory requirements.
Nevertheless, absent an approach to verify the delivery of the statutorily  required reports on the database and list to the requisite committees of  Congress, DHS cannot ensure that it has provided the committees with  necessary information in a timely manner. The Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government calls for compliance with applicable  laws and regulations and for the accurate, timely, and appropriate  documentation of the transactions. An approach to verify the timely  delivery of required reports to the requisite committees of Congress, such  as documenting or recording the transactions, would better position DHS  to ensure that it is in compliance with its statutory reporting requirements,  thereby providing the committees information needed to perform  oversight.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DHS efforts to identify and prioritize infrastructure continue to evolve, and  the department has taken important actions to focus its prioritization  approach on consequences, consistent with statutory requirements and  the NIPP risk management framework. However, in recent years, DHS  introduced new criteria for select sectors and non-consequence-based  criteria to account for some assets, which could hinder DHS’s ability to  compare assets across sectors in order to identify the nation’s highest- priority critical infrastructure. Given the magnitude of the changes DHS  has made to the criteria for including infrastructure on the list, validation of  the NCIPP list development approach could provide DHS managers and  infrastructure protection partners more reasonable assurance that the list  captures the highest-priority infrastructure that, if destroyed or disrupted,  could cause national or regional catastrophic effects. NCIPP program  officials told us they would like to have the NCIPP reviewed to validate  the criteria used to decide which assets and systems should be placed on  the list, but they have not yet submitted a proposal for this review to the  Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection. An independent, external  peer review would better position DHS to provide reasonable assurance  that its approach is reproducible and defensible, and that infrastructure  protection efforts are being prioritized on the nation’s highest-priority  critical infrastructure as intended by the NIPP risk management  framework. Finally, it is unclear if DHS has met statutory annual reporting  requirements regarding the NCIPP lists because DHS is unable to verify  the delivery of these required reports. As a result, DHS cannot ensure  that it is fulfilling its statutory reporting obligations and may not be  providing the requisite congressional committees with the information  needed to effectively oversee the program, particularly with regard to the  allocation of scarce federal resources.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better ensure that DHS’s approach to identify and prioritize critical  infrastructure is consistent with the NIPP risk management framework  and that DHS is positioned to provide reasonable assurance that  protection and resiliency efforts and investments are focused on the  nation’s highest-priority critical infrastructure, we recommend that the  Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, Department of  Homeland Security, take the following action:  commission an independent, external peer review of the program with  clear project objectives for completing this effort.
To ensure that DHS is in compliance with its statutory reporting  requirements and provides decision makers with the information  necessary to perform program oversight, we recommend that the  Secretary of Homeland Security, take the following action: develop an approach, such as documenting or recording the  transaction, to verify the delivery of the statutorily required annual  reports on the database and list to the requisite congressional  committees.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security  for review and comment. In its written comments reproduced in Appendix  III, DHS agreed with both of our recommendations.
With regard to our first recommendation that DHS commission an  independent, external peer review of the program with clear project  objectives for completing this effort, DHS stated that a peer review would  enable DHS to determine whether the NCIPP list is based on analytically  sound methodology and whether appropriate procedures are in place to  ensure that the list is defensible and reproducible. Specifically, DHS  stated that it plans to commission and complete an independent peer  review of the NCIPP process by the end of the fourth quarter of fiscal year  2014. If fully implemented, to include a review by independent experts to  validate the criteria and process DHS uses to decide which assets and  systems should be placed on the NCIPP list as we described in this  report, DHS’s planned efforts will address the intent of this  recommendation.
With regard to our second recommendation that DHS develop an  approach, such as documenting or recording the transaction, to verify the  delivery of the statutorily required annual reports on the database and list  to the requisite congressional committees, DHS stated that it has a  system in place to track the development and approval of congressional  reports, but DHS confirmed that it does not currently have a standard  procedure for verifying that the congressional reports are delivered. DHS  stated that its Office of Legislative Affairs will develop and implement a  standard operating procedure for tracking the delivery of annual reports  on the database and the list. DHS did not provide an estimated  completion date for this effort. If fully implemented, DHS’s planned efforts  will address the intent of this recommendation.
DHS also provided technical comments which we incorporated, as  appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Under Secretary of the National Programs Protection  Directorate, selected congressional committees, and other interested  parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on GAO’s website  at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this  report, please contact Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-8777 or  caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Critical Infrastructure Sectors
paragraphs: This appendix provides information on the 18 critical infrastructure sectors  and the federal agencies responsible for sector security. The National  Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) outlines the roles and  responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its  partners—including other federal agencies. Within the NIPP framework,  DHS is responsible for leading and coordinating the overall national effort  to enhance protection via 18 critical infrastructure sectors. Homeland  Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7 and the NIPP assign responsibility  for critical infrastructure sectors to sector-specific agencies (SSA). On  February 12, 2013, the President issued Presidential Policy  Directive/PPD-21 that, among other things, reduced the number of critical  infrastructure sectors from 18 to 16. As an SSA, DHS has direct  responsibility for leading, integrating, and coordinating efforts of sector  partners to protect 11 of the 18 critical infrastructure sectors. The  remaining sectors are coordinated by eight other federal agencies. Table  3 lists the SSAs and their sectors as they existed before any  reorganization of the critical infrastructure sectors affected by the  issuance of PPD-21.
section_title: Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To address our first objective—determine the extent to which DHS  changed its criteria for developing the National Critical Infrastructure  Prioritization Program (NCIPP) list, identified the impact, if any, of these  changes, and validated its approach—we reviewed the Implementing  Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11  Commission Act), which, by amending title II of the Homeland Security  Act of 2002, required the Secretary of DHS to establish and maintain a  national database of systems and assets determined to be vital and the  loss, interruption, incapacity, or destruction of which would have a  negative or debilitating effect on the economic security, public health, or  safety of the United States, any state, or any local government, or as  otherwise determined appropriate for inclusion by the Secretary. In  addition, the 9/11 Commission Act required the Secretary of DHS to  establish and maintain a single prioritized list of systems and assets  included in the national database that the Secretary determines would, if  destroyed or disrupted, cause national or regional catastrophic effects.
We also reviewed DHS guidelines issued to states and SSAs from 2007  through 2012 that included details on the NCIPP list development  process, to determine how DHS’s criteria and process for developing the  list changed year to year. We then obtained and analyzed the NCIPP lists  finalized for fiscal years 2007 through 2012 to determine the total number  of high-priority assets by state and the change in distribution of high- priority assets by sector year to year. We used our analysis to select 8 of the 18 sectors—the banking and finance, defense industrial base,  chemical, energy, transportation systems, agriculture and food,  government facilities, and dams sectors. We chose these sectors to  obtain a mix of sectors that (1) experienced the largest and smallest  percentage change in the distribution of assets on the NCIPP list between  fiscal years 2009 and 2011 because of program changes DHS made  during this period, and (2) have an SSA located within or outside DHS.  The information from our analysis of these sectors is not generalizable to  the universe of all sectors. However, it provides valuable insights into  yearly changes in the distribution of assets on the NCIPP list among a  diverse group of sectors. On February 12, 2013, the President issued  Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21 that, among other things, reduced  the number of critical infrastructure sectors from 18 to 16. To assess the  reliability of the data, we reviewed existing documentation about DHS’s  data system, which houses the data application used to create the NCIPP  list, and spoke with knowledgeable agency officials responsible for  maintaining the system and data application. While we determined that  the data were sufficiently reliable to provide a general overview of the  program, we included data limitations from our previous work in this  report, where appropriate. We also interviewed officials in the  Infrastructure Analysis and Strategy Division (IASD), which is part of the  Office of Infrastructure Protection in DHS’s National Protection and  Program Directorate, who are responsible for managing the NCIPP to  identify DHS’s rationale for changing the criteria.
In addition, to address the first objective, we reviewed our prior reports as  well as DHS Inspector General reports on protection and resiliency  prioritization efforts and spoke with program officials who use the list from  DHS’s Protective Security Coordination Division (PSCD), the Federal  Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Federal Bureau of  Investigation to determine how they use the NCIPP list and the impact  changes to the NCIPP list have had, if any, on their ability to use the list  during fiscal years 2007 through 2012. In addition to interviewing  program officials from PSCD headquarters, we also conducted interviews  with nine of DHS’s protective security advisors (PSA)—one from each of  the nine PSA regions—to discuss their contributions to the NCIPP list,  how they use the list to prioritize their activities, and actions NCIPP  management has taken to solicit their feedback regarding the program.The results from our interviews are not generalizable to the universe of  PSAs but provide specific examples of how PSAs use the list and insights  on the effect changes have had on their activities.
Although the FEMA UASI grant formula is the same as the FEMA State Homeland  Security Program (SHSP), we focused our sensitivity analysis on the UASI grant because  this grant is allocated to only a subset of the nation’s 100 most populous urban areas— referred to as metropolitan statistical areas (MSA)—each year, whereas by law, each  state and territory are required to receive a minimum allocation of the SHSP funds each  year. For ease of reporting, we will refer to UASI grant recipients as cities rather than  MSAs. for these 31 cities. We then re-ran the risk formula using these revised  NCIPP level 2 infrastructure counts, while holding all other data inputs  constant, which resulted in a change to the relative risk score rankings for  5 of the top 31 cities. We also performed additional statistical analysis of  the FEMA risk formula and data that showed UASI grant allocations are  strongly associated with a city’s current risk score, even when accounting  for the influence of the previous year’s grant allocations. Based on our  prior work with the FEMA UASI grant risk formula and interviews with  FEMA officials about its data sources and quality assurance procedures,  we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  this report. Last, we met with IASD officials to discuss actions they have  taken to identify the impact of changes, if any, on users of the list, and  compared these actions with applicable criteria in the NIPP and  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government to determine if  they were consistent.
Regarding our second objective—to determine the extent to which DHS  worked with states and SSAs to develop the NCIPP list—we reviewed  relevant provisions of the 9/11 Commission Act and the guidelines DHS  issued to state homeland security advisers and SSAs to solicit  nominations of high-priority infrastructure for inclusion on the NCIPP list.
We also conducted interviews with officials from 10 SSAs and 15 state  homeland security offices to obtain federal and state perspectives on  DHS’s change to consequence-based criteria and coordination of the  NCIPP program, as well as their views on nominating to and using the  list. The SSA officials we interviewed represented the 8 sectors selected  during our analysis for the first objective. Specifically, DHS was the SSA  for 4 of the sectors—the chemical, dams, government facilities, and  transportation systems sectors. The Departments of Energy, Defense,  and the Treasury were the SSAs for 3 sectors—the energy, defense  industrial base, and banking and finance sectors, respectively. Two  SSAs, the Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug  Administration, share responsibility for the agriculture and food sector.  The state homeland security officials we interviewed represented 15  states—California, Georgia, Illinois, Hawaii, Oklahoma, Maine,  Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Texas, Virginia,  Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. We selected these states  because they contained a range in the number of assets on the NCIPP   The  list and represented at least 1 state from each of 9 PSA regions.sector and state interviews are not generalizable to the universe of  infrastructure sectors and states contributing to the NCIPP list. However,  our selection combined with DHS policy guidance, further informed us  about DHS efforts to manage the NCIPP program across a spectrum of  states and partners nationwide. Finally, we interviewed IASD officials to  discuss actions DHS had taken to consult with state and federal partners  (as identified in program guidelines and based on our interviews with  states and SSAs), and compared their responses with applicable criteria  in the NIPP, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,  and relevant statutory provisions.
With regard to our third objective—determine the extent to which DHS  reported to the requisite committees of Congress on the NCIPP—we  reviewed the statutory requirement that DHS report annually to the  Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and  the House Committee on Homeland Security on the national asset  database and prioritized critical infrastructure list. We also spoke to staff  members representing both committees to determine if the committees  received the statutorily required reports. Last, we interviewed DHS  officials to discuss efforts to provide these reports to the committees and  obtained and reviewed documents on the national asset database and  prioritized critical infrastructure list that were intended to meet statutory  reporting requirements to determine if these efforts were consistent with  relevant statutory provisions and Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 to March 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, John F. Mortin, Assistant  Director, and Andrew M. Curry, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this  assignment. Chuck Bausell, Mona Nichols-Blake, Aryn Ehlow, Katherine  M. Davis, Michele C. Fejfar, Eric D. Hauswirth, Mitchell B. Karpman,  Thomas F. Lombardi, and Janay Sam made significant contributions to  the work.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Critical Infrastructure Protection: Preliminary Observations on DHS Efforts  to Assess Chemical Security Risk and Gather Feedback on Facility  Outreach. GAO-13-421T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2013.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: An Implementation Strategy Could  Advance DHS’s Coordination of Resilience Efforts across Ports and Other  Infrastructure. GAO-13-11. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2012.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Summary of DHS Actions to Better  Manage Its Chemical Security Program. GAO-12-1044T. Washington,  D.C.: September 20, 2012.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Is Taking Action to Better Manage  Its Chemical Security Program, but It Is Too Early to Assess Results.  GAO-12-567T. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2012.
Critical Infrastructure: DHS Needs to Refocus Its Efforts to Lead the  Government Facilities Sector. GAO-12-852. Washington, D.C.: August  13, 2012.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Is Taking Action to Better Manage  Its Chemical Security Program, but It Is Too Early to Assess Results.  GAO-12-515T. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2012.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Could Better Manage Security  Surveys and Vulnerability Assessments. GAO-12-378. Washington, D.C.:  May 31, 2012.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Has Taken Action Designed to  Identify and Address Overlaps and Gaps in Critical Infrastructure Security  Activities. GAO-11-537R. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2011.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Efforts to Assess and Promote  Resiliency Are Evolving but Program Management Could Be  Strengthened. GAO-10-772. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2010.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Update to National Infrastructure  Protection Plan Includes Increased Emphasis on Risk Management and  Resilience. GAO-10-296. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2010.
The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Critical Infrastructure  Protection Cost-Benefit Report. GAO-09-654R. Washington, D.C.: June  26, 2009.
Information Technology: Federal Laws, Regulations, and Mandatory  Standards to Securing Private Sector Information Technology Systems  and Data in Critical Infrastructure Sectors. GAO-08-1075R. Washington,  D.C.: September 16, 2008.
Risk Management: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management Principles  in Homeland Security. GAO-08-904T. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2008.
Critical Infrastructure: Sector Plans Complete and Sector Councils  Evolving. GAO-07-1075T. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2007.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Plans and Sector Councils  Continue to Evolve. GAO-07-706R. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2007.
Critical Infrastructure: Challenges Remain in Protecting Key Sectors.  GAO-07-626T. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2007.
Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the  Vulnerabilities Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed  to Further Mitigate Security Risks. GAO-07-375. Washington, D.C.:  January 24, 2007.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Progress Coordinating Government and  Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors’ Characteristics. GAO-07-39.  Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2006.
Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More  Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical  Infrastructure Information. GAO-06-383. Washington, D.C.: April 17,  2006.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and  Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure.  GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.