Darfur Crisis: Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges
Published: 2006-11-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 2003, violent conflict in Darfur, Sudan broke out between rebel groups, government troops, and government-supported Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed. The conflict has displaced about 2 million Darfurians and has so affected over 1.9 million others that they require assistance. Since October 2003, the U.S. government has provided humanitarian assistance in Darfur and supported African Union Mission in Sudan's (AMIS) efforts to fulfill a peace support mandate. This report reviews (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to Darfur and the challenges that have been encountered and (2) African Union efforts to fulfill its mandate and challenges that have affected these efforts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The United States has been the largest donor of humanitarian aid to Darfur, obligating nearly $1 billion from October 2003 through September 2006. Although more than 68 percent of this assistance consisted of food aid, U.S. assistance has also supported other needs, such as water and sanitation, shelter, and health care. Since 2003, humanitarian organizations have made significant progress in increasing the number of people in Darfur receiving aid. In addition, malnutrition and mortality rates in Darfur dropped, a trend that U.S. and other officials attribute in part to humanitarian assistance efforts. However, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the entities providing U.S. humanitarian assistance have encountered several challenges that have hampered delivery of, or accountability for, humanitarian services in Darfur. These challenges include continued insecurity in Darfur; Sudanese government restrictions on access to communities in need; the timing of funding; and an incapacity to ensure monitoring of, and reporting on, U.S.-funded programs. AMIS has taken several positive actions in Darfur to pursue its mandate, although some actions have been incomplete or inconsistent. For example, to monitor compliance with a 2004 cease-fire agreement--one mandate component--AMIS investigated alleged cease-fire violations and identified numerous violations; however, the resulting reports were not consistently reviewed at higher levels or made fully publicly available to identify those violating the agreement. The U.S. government, via private contractors, provided about $280 million from June 2004 through September 2006 tobuild and maintain 32 camps for AMIS forces in Darfur, according to the Department of State. Numerous challenges have been identified by African Union or U.S. officials, among others, as negatively affecting AMIS's efforts in Darfur. These challenges include inadequacies in AMIS's organization, management, and capacity, such as inconsistent interpretation of the AMIS mandate; its relatively small forces; limited or poorly allocated resources; and a lack of intelligence regarding, and cooperation from, the parties to the conflict. A transition from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation is being considered, although the Sudanese government has rejected such a transition. A possible NATO-assisted review of AMIS operations has not been conducted. Meanwhile, insecurity and violence continue in Darfur.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In 2003, violent conflict broke out in the Darfur region of western Sudan  when rebel groups, believing that the region was marginalized by the  Sudanese government, led attacks against the government. In response, the  government armed and supported local Arab tribal militias, commonly  known as the Janjaweed, to defeat the rebels. Attacks on the civilian  population by these militias, sometimes in conjunction with the Sudanese  armed forces, have resulted in the deaths of many thousands. These attacks  have also displaced approximately 1.85 million people within Darfur— internally displaced persons (IDP)—most of whom now live in camps in  Darfur and have affected an additional 1.91 million Darfur residents  (affected residents) so that they now require humanitarian assistance. In  addition, the attacks have forced about 220,000 Darfur refugees to take  shelter in Chad.
Since fiscal year 2004, the United States has provided humanitarian  assistance to Darfur through various implementing partners—international  nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and United Nations (UN)  agencies—with funding from the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID) and the Department of State (State). Over the same  period, the U.S. government, through State contracts with two private  sector firms, provided funding for building and maintaining 32 camps  throughout Darfur for African Union forces involved in monitoring a 2004  cease-fire agreement. Since May 2004, the African Union Mission in Sudan  (AMIS) has deployed more than 7,000 personnel (comprising military  observers, protection force troops, and civilian police) throughout Darfur  on a peace support mission to respond to a three-part mandate: (1) monitor  compliance with the cease-fire agreement, which was signed in April 2004  by the three parties to the conflict; (2) assist in “confidence building”; and  (3) contribute to improving the region’s security environment. AMIS’s  mandate will expire on December 31, 2006, and a UN peacekeeping mission  is currently under consideration. Meanwhile, a peace agreement signed by  the government of Sudan and one rebel group in May 2006 gives AMIS new  responsibilities, such as verifying disarmament of the Janjaweed and  monitoring demilitarized zones around IDP camps.
We were asked to review and assess, among other things, U.S. assistance in  Darfur aimed at promoting health, peace, and security in Sudan. This report  examines (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to help relieve the  crisis in Darfur, (2) challenges that USAID and its implementing partners  have encountered, (3) the African Union’s efforts to fulfill its peace support  mandate in Darfur, and (4) factors affecting the implementation of this  mandate.
To answer our first two objectives, we reviewed all USAID Darfur grants  and cooperative agreements with UN agencies and NGOs for fiscal years  2004 to 2005 and the first 8 months of fiscal year 2006; UN humanitarian  information profiles for Darfur; and international standards for  humanitarian assistance. To answer our third and fourth objectives, we  reviewed State contracts, task orders, and expenditure information as well  as documents prepared by the African Union, State, and a key U.S.  contractor. For all four objectives, we discussed U.S. assistance with  appropriate Sudanese, USAID, State, and Department of Defense (DOD)  officials and advocacy groups in Washington, D.C., as well as UN officials in  New York, NY. Further, we interviewed appropriate U.S., European Union,  Sudanese, UN, NGO, African Union, and contractor officials in Khartoum,  Sudan, and in the northern and southern Darfur states. We also visited  seven IDP camps and discussed events in Darfur with IDPs, including the  leaders of those communities. Although we reviewed data on U.S.  humanitarian assistance to Darfur refugees in Chad, we did not assess this  assistance in detail. Finally, we visited eight African Union camps within  North and South Darfur and met with officials at African Union  headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. (See app. I for a detailed discussion  of our scope and methodology.) We conducted our work from September  2005 to November 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Sudan is the largest country in Africa (see fig. 1), and its population,  estimated at about 40 million, is one of the continent’s most diverse.  Sudan’s population comprises two distinct major cultures, Arab and black  African, with hundreds of ethnic and tribal subdivisions and language  groups. More than half of Sudan’s population lives in the northern states,  which make up most of Sudan and include the majority of the urban  centers; most residents of this area are Arabic-speaking Muslims. Residents  of the southern region, which has a predominantly rural, subsistence  economy, practice mainly indigenous traditional beliefs, although some are  Christian. The South contains many tribal groups and many more  languages than are used in the North. Darfur is another distinct region of  Sudan, located in the west, and was an independent sultanate for most of  the period between 1600 and 1916, when the British captured it and  incorporated it into the Sudanese state. Darfur’s population is  predominantly Muslim.
subsections: section_title: Sudan’s North-South War
paragraphs: For most of its existence since gaining independence from Britain and  Egypt in 1956, Sudan has endured civil war rooted in cultural and religious  divides. The North, which has traditionally controlled the country, has  sought to unify it along the lines of Arabism and Islam, whereas non- Muslims and other groups in the South have sought, among other things,  greater autonomy. After 17 years of war, from 1955 to 1972, the government  signed a peace agreement that granted the South a measure of autonomy.  However, civil war began again in 1983, when the President of Sudan  declared Arabic the South’s official language, transferred control of  Southern armed forces to the central government, and, later that year,  announced that traditional Islamic punishments drawn from Shari’a  (Islamic law) would be incorporated into the penal code. The South’s  rebellion was orchestrated by the Sudan People’s Liberation  Movement/Army (SPLM/A). In 1989, the conflict intensified when an  Islamic army faction, led by General Omar Hassan al-Bashir, led a coup of  the government and installed the National Islamic Front.
In 2001 President Bush named former Senator John Danforth as his  Presidential Envoy for Peace in Sudan, assigning him to explore a U.S. role  in ending the civil war and enhance the delivery of humanitarian aid to  Sudan’s affected population. On January 9, 2005, the Sudanese government  and the SPLM/A signed a set of agreements called the Comprehensive  Peace Agreement, providing for a new constitution and new arrangements  for power sharing, wealth sharing, and security applicable throughout  Sudan. On July 9, 2005, Bashir assumed the presidency under the new  arrangements, with the SPLM/A Chairman assuming the office of First Vice  President. In 2011, Southern Sudan will hold a vote to determine whether to  become independent. To assist in implementing the peace agreement, the  UN Security Council established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which  currently has a force of more than 7,000.
section_title: Conflict in Darfur
paragraphs: While the North-South agreement was nearing completion, a rebellion  broke out in Darfur, located in western Sudan with an estimated preconflict  population of about 6 million (see fig. 2).
The South’s success motivated rebel groups in Darfur to fight for a similar  outcome. In early 2003, Darfur rebels attacked Sudanese police stations  and the airport in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur (see fig. 3 for an  interactive timeline of key events associated with Darfur and app. II for a  related description of events). In El Fasher, the rebel groups destroyed  numerous military aircraft, killed several Sudanese soldiers, and kidnapped  a Sudanese general. After the government armed and supported local tribal  and Arab militias—the Janjaweed—fighting between the rebel groups and  the Sudan military and Janjaweed intensified during late 2003. The  principal rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and  the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), represent agrarian farmers who  are black African Muslims. The SLM/A has recently split into two  factions—one faction, with the larger military force, led by Minni Minawi  and the other led by Abdulwahid El Nour.
In addition to disrupting the lives of almost 4 million Darfurians, Janjaweed  and Sudanese government attacks in Darfur have resulted in many  thousands of deaths. The Agreement on Humanitarian Ceasefire was  signed by the Sudanese government, the SLM/A and the JEM on April 8,  2004, in N’Djamena, Chad. In signing the agreement, the parties agreed to  accept an automatically renewable cessation of hostilities; to refrain from  any military action and any reconnaissance operations; to refrain from any  act of violence or any other abuse on civilian populations; to ensure  humanitarian access; and to establish a Ceasefire Commission to monitor  the agreement, along with a Joint Commission to which the Ceasefire  Commission would report. The African Union was to monitor cease-fire  compliance. Peace negotiations continued under African Union auspices  with Chadian participation, and additional interim agreements were also  reached. However, after a relatively calm 2005, cease-fire violations and  violent incidents reportedly began to increase in the final months of that  year and into 2006.
On May 5, 2006, the government of Sudan and the Minawi faction of the  SLM/A signed the Darfur Peace Agreement, establishing agreements in key  areas such as power sharing, wealth sharing, and security arrangements.
Power sharing. The Darfur Peace Agreement creates the position of  Senior Assistant to the President—the fourth-highest position in the  Sudanese government—appointed by the President from a list of  nominees provided by the rebel movements. The Senior Assistant to the  President will also serve as Chairperson of the newly created  Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, which is responsible for the  implementation of the agreement and coordination among the three  states of Darfur. Further, a referendum will be held by July 2010 to allow  Darfurians to decide whether to establish Darfur as a unitary region  with a single government or to retain the existing three regions.
Wealth sharing. The Darfur Peace Agreement creates a Darfur  Reconstruction and Development Fund to collect and disburse funds for  the resettlement, rehabilitation, and reintegration of internally and  externally displaced persons. The government of Sudan will contribute  $300 million to the fund in 2006 and at least $200 million annually in 2007  and 2008. Further, the government of Sudan will place $30 million in a  fund for monetary compensation for those negatively affected by the  conflict in Darfur.
Security arrangements. The Darfur Peace Agreement calls for the  verifiable disarmament of the Janjaweed by the Sudanese government  by mid-October 2006. This disarmament must be verified by the  African Union before rebel groups undertake their own disarmament  and demobilization. Demilitarized zones are to be established around  IDP camps and humanitarian assistance corridors, into which rebel  forces and the Sudanese military cannot enter, and buffer zones are to  be established in the areas of the most intense conflict. Rebel group  forces will be integrated into the Sudanese military and police: 4,000  former combatants will be integrated into the armed forces; 1,000  former combatants will be integrated into the police; and 3,000 will be  supported through education and training programs.
The UN estimates that displaced and affected persons are located in more  than 300 locations, including camps and other gatherings, with populations  up to 90,000 people. Figure 4 shows the camp dispersion and estimated  population at many of the camps throughout Darfur, as of October 2005.
section_title: African Union Mission in Sudan
paragraphs: Since 2004, the African Union has been responsible for peace support  operations in Darfur through AMIS. Subsequent to its establishment of an  African Union observer mission in Darfur in May 2004, the African Union  Peace and Security Council established a specific mandate for AMIS in  October 2004 (see app. III for a discussion of the evolution of AMIS).  AMIS’s mandate has three components:  To monitor and observe compliance with the April 2004 humanitarian  cease-fire agreement and all such agreements in the future;  To assist in the process of confidence building; and  To contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian  relief and, beyond that, the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes,  in order to assist in increasing the level of compliance of all parties with  the April 2004 cease-fire agreement and to contribute to the  improvement of the security situation throughout Darfur.
Regarding the first component of the mandate, per the terms of the cease- fire agreement, related agreements, and African Union Peace and Security  Council guidance, military observers were to investigate and report on  allegations of ceasefire violations, with a protection force presence as  needed. Final investigation reports, prepared by the Ceasefire Commission  headquartered in El Fasher, Darfur, were to be submitted to the Joint  Commission. The Joint Commission was mandated to make consensus- based decisions on matters brought before it by the Ceasefire Commission.  According to a senior African Union official, the Joint Commission was to  submit Ceasefire Commission reports to African Union headquarters in  Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for appropriate action. (Fig. 5 illustrates the  established process for investigating, and reporting on, cease-fire  agreement violations.)
The council determined that AMIS would, in the framework of its mandate,  “protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the  immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood  that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the  government of Sudan.” The council also determined that AMIS would  have, in addition to military observers and protection force troops, civilian  police, to monitor the actions of Sudanese police and interact with IDPs  and civilians, as well as appropriate civilian personnel. The AMIS force  authorized and deployed in Darfur to execute its mandate has grown  incrementally over time from several hundred personnel in 2004 to 7,271  personnel (military observers, protection force troops, and civilian police)  deployed as of April 30, 2006. Numerous studies by the African Union, the  UN, and others reviewing the performance of AMIS have been conducted  that discuss the operations of this effort undertaken by the newly created  African Union (see the bibliography for a listing of these reviews).
The May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement establishes several new  responsibilities for AMIS, such as verifying the eventual disarmament of  the Janjaweed by the Sudanese government. The 2006 agreement also  designates AMIS as responsible for actions such as designing and running  awareness programs in Darfur to ensure that local communities and others  understand, among other things, the AMIS mandate; patrolling and  monitoring demilitarized zones around IDP camps; patrolling buffer zones  established in areas of the most intense conflict; and developing and  monitoring implementation of a plan for the regulation of nomadic  migration along historic migration routes.
section_title: U.S. and UN Policy Responses to the Darfur Conflict
paragraphs: The U.S. government has been active in addressing the Darfur conflict.  After the conflict began, senior State officials traveled to Sudan on a half- dozen occasions, stressing the need to end the violence. On July 22, 2004,  the U.S. House and the Senate each passed separate resolutions citing  events in Darfur as acts of genocide. Further, on September 9, 2004, in  testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the U.S.  Secretary of State announced that “genocide” had been committed in  Darfur, and noted that the Sudanese government had supported the  Janjaweed, directly and indirectly, as they carried out a “scorched earth”  policy toward the rebels and the African civilian population in Darfur. In a  press release the same day, President Bush stated that genocide was  occurring and requested the UN to investigate events in Darfur, as the  Secretary of State had also done. On October 13, 2006, President Bush  signed into law the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, which  imposes sanctions against persons responsible for genocide, war crimes,  and crimes against humanity; supports measures for the protection of  civilians and humanitarian operations; and supports peace efforts in  Darfur.
Although the UN has not identified the events in Darfur as genocide, it has  repeatedly expressed concern over the continuing violence. In July 2004,  the UN, with the government of Sudan, issued a communiqué emphasizing  a commitment to facilitating humanitarian assistance to the region and  establishing a commitment by the Sudanese government to disarm the  Janjaweed. In September 2004, the UN Security Council adopted a  resolution stating that the UN Secretary-General should “rapidly establish  an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate  reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights  law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of  genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations  with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable.” In  January 2005, the UN issued a report stating that “the Government of Sudan  and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international  human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under  international law.” The report concluded that a policy of genocide had not  been pursued but noted that “the crimes against humanity and war crimes  that have been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous  than genocide.”
The UN Security Council has also adopted resolutions establishing a travel  ban and asset freeze for those determined to impede the peace process or  violate human rights and referring the situation in Darfur to the  prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and calling on the  government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict to cooperate with  the court. Further, in creating UNMIS to support implementation of the  Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the council requested the UN Secretary- General to report to the council on options for the mission to reinforce the  effort to foster peace in Darfur through appropriate assistance to AMIS.
section_title: International Response to Darfur Humanitarian Crisis
paragraphs: Large-scale international humanitarian response to the displacement in  Darfur did not begin until fiscal year 2004. In October 2003, USAID’s Office  of Food for Peace began to contribute food aid to the UN World Food  Program for distribution in Darfur and USAID set an internal goal of  meeting at least 50 percent of Sudan’s food aid needs as assessed by the  World Food Program. In addition, USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster  Assistance established a Disaster Assistance Response Team in Darfur to  respond to the humanitarian needs of the population affected by the  conflict once the cease-fire agreement was signed. The United States was  the largest donor of humanitarian assistance for Darfur in fiscal years 2004  to 2006, providing approximately 47 percent of all humanitarian assistance  to the region (the UN has reported $1.9 billion in total pledges and  obligations of assistance from all donors). The European Union and the  United Kingdom provided the largest amounts of assistance pledged or  obligated by other international donors. Figure 6 shows the percentages of  total humanitarian assistance pledged or obligated for Darfur by  international donors.
section_title: United States Primarily Contributed Food Aid; Meanwhile, Assistance Provision Grew and Other Conditions Improved
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2004 through 2006, the United States provided almost   $1 billion for food and other humanitarian aid in Darfur. More than 68  percent of the U.S. obligations as of September 30, 2006, supplied food aid  in the form of commodities provided to the UN World Food Program and  the International Committee of the Red Cross. In addition, the United  States provided assistance to meet a range of nonfood needs, such as  health care and water. During this period, humanitarian access and  coverage for IDPs and affected residents of Darfur improved significantly.  In addition, IDP malnutrition and mortality rates decreased over time, a  trend that U.S., UN, and other officials attribute in part to humanitarian  assistance.
subsections: section_title: United States Provided Nearly $1 Billion in Assistance, Partly through Supplemental Appropriations
paragraphs: U.S. obligations for food and other humanitarian aid in Darfur totaled  approximately $996 million in fiscal years 2004 through 2006 (see fig. 7).  From 2004 to 2005, obligations for food and nonfood assistance increased  from about $186 million to $444 million, or by 58 percent. In fiscal year  2006, obligations decreased to about $366 million, or by 18 percent. Funds  provided in supplemental appropriations accounted for about $71 million— 16 percent of the total—in 2005 and $205 million—56 percent of the  total—in 2006.
section_title: U.S. Assistance Focused on Food Aid
paragraphs: For fiscal years 2004 through 2006, USAID provided $681 million (over 68  percent) as food aid for Darfur—approximately $113 million in 2004, $324  million in 2005, and $243 million in 2006 (see table 1).
As table 1 shows, after rising from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2005, U.S.  food aid funding for Darfur decreased from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year  2006 by approximately 25 percent and the quantity of food provided  decreased by almost 13 percent. The UN World Food Program planned  assistance to Sudan also fell by more than 16 percent between calendar  years 2005 and 2006, while the food aid component of planned assistance  decreased by 29 percent. According to World Food Program and USAID  officials, in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, USAID supplied at least half of the  2005 and 2006 food aid assistance requested for Sudan by the UN World  Food Program. A World Food Program official in Washington, D.C., stated  that the U.S. government provided essential food aid contributions in fiscal  year 2006 and that the reduction in the level of U.S. funding did not  negatively impact the food situation in Darfur.
USAID Food for Peace obligated aid for Darfur for fiscal years 2004  through 2006, primarily for commodities intended to meet minimum  nutritional requirements, to the UN World Food Program and the  International Committee of the Red Cross.
Obligations to the UN World Food Program. As table 1 shows, USAID  Food for Peace obligated $658.6 million for commodities, including  transportation and other shipping costs, to the World Food Program to  address emergency food needs in Darfur in fiscal years 2004 through  2006. According to a USAID official, this assistance included  commodities previously allocated for assistance to southern Sudan,  which Food for Peace and the World Food Program reallocated to  respond to the emergency situation in Darfur before the official  emergency program began. World Food Program officials said that U.S.  food aid funding allowed the program to preposition food in various  storage facilities in Darfur, enabling the program to avoid costly air  drops. World Food Program officials indicated that prepositioning food  helps avoid shortfalls during rainy seasons resulting from the typical 6- month time lag between confirmation and distribution of food aid  donations.
Obligations to the Red Cross. USAID Food for Peace obligated $22.8  million for commodities to the International Committee of the Red  Cross. This assistance was intended particularly for rural village  residents who had not been displaced by the ongoing conflict and whose  needs had not been addressed by other agencies in the region.
During our field work in Darfur, we visited World Food Program  warehouses outside Nyala, in South Darfur, built to expedite the  distribution of food aid during the rainy season; we observed local staff  repackaging U.S. wheat from bags that were damaged in transit to the  storage facility in Nyala (see fig. 8).
Additionally, we witnessed NGOs distributing rations in Zam Zam IDP  camp (although the funds and commodities are transferred to the UN  World Food Program, NGOs operating in Darfur distribute the rations in  IDP camps), where U.S.-provided sorghum, vegetable oil, lentils, and wheat  were distributed as part of the monthly rations (see fig. 9).
section_title: U.S. Assistance Addressed Range of Other Needs
paragraphs: In addition to providing food aid, as of September 30, 2006, the United  States had obligated approximately $315 million for other humanitarian  assistance in a range of sectors, including shelter, water and sanitation,  health care, and nutrition. This assistance was provided through USAID’s  Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Office of Transition Initiatives as  well as State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration. The U.S.  government has provided nonfood assistance to the affected residents of  Darfur through 31 NGOs and 10 UN agencies, which implement programs  and activities to aid the people of Darfur (see app. IV for a list of NGOs and  UN agencies that received U.S. nonfood assistance funding for fiscal years  2004 to 2006). Of this assistance, the largest amounts have been obligated  for health care, water and sanitation, logistics, protection, and food  security/agriculture (see fig. 10).
Health. The United States obligated $57.4 million for the health sector,  supporting activities such as medical clinics, immunizations, and maternal  health care. We visited five NGO-operated health clinics in Darfur IDP  camps. These clinics, which served between 110 to 1,200 IDPs per day,  provided basic medical examinations, referring serious illnesses to  Sudanese hospitals. The clinics also provided vaccinations, reproductive  health services for pregnant women, and medical services for victims of  gender-based violence (see fig. 11).
Water and sanitation. The United States provided about $53.5 million for  water and sanitation activities, which consisted of building and  rehabilitating wells, installing hand pumps and latrines, and conducting  hygiene programs. According to NGO officials, the Kalma camp water  facilities we visited served approximately 45,000 IDPs and dispensed  approximately 18 liters of chlorinated water per person per day (above the  Sphere standard of 15 liters) to provide for IDPs’ personal needs and to  allow them to water their animals. According to NGO officials, in Abu  Shouk camp, a water tank and hand pumps provided 13.5 liters of water per  person per day (see fig. 12).
Protection and income-generation activities. The United States provided  about $28.6 million for protection activities and $9.1 million for income- generation activities, which USAID and NGO officials indicated helped  protect women and girls by minimizing their exposure to violence. We  observed women building fuel-efficient stoves, which, by requiring less  wood, are intended to reduce the frequency of women’s wood-collecting  forays outside the camp and, thus, their vulnerability to attacks (see fig.  13). We also observed IDPs preparing goods that could be sold—including  making baskets and other goods, preparing fresh pasta, and sewing  garments—to provide sources of income that would reduce their need to  go outside the camps to earn money. Literacy and educational training was  also provided to IDPs in camps in conjunction with income-generation and  protection activities.
section_title: Provision of Assistance Grew and Health Indicators Improved, but Risk Remains
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2004, when the United States and other international  donors began providing humanitarian assistance, the numbers of  humanitarian organizations and staff have grown, and the amount of  humanitarian assistance and the coverage for IDPs and affected residents  have increased. Also, since 2004, malnutrition and mortality rates among  IDPs and affected residents have diminished.
Increased presence of humanitarian organizations. According to UN  and NGO officials, U.S. assistance contributed to growth in the number  of humanitarian organizations and staff in Darfur. UN humanitarian  profiles show that from April 2004 to July 2006, the number of  international and national humanitarian aid workers in Darfur expanded  from 202 to about 13,500 staff of 84 NGOs and 13 UN agencies. NGO  and UN officials in Darfur indicated that the U.S. contribution was  essential to their operations, in some cases making up the totality of  their budget, and that they would be unable to provide services inside  and outside the camps without U.S. funding.
Increase coverage for affected residents and IDPs. Each aid sector in  Darfur provided humanitarian assistance to increasing numbers of  affected residents or IDPs between April 2004 and July 2006 (see fig. 14).  The total affected population receiving assistance such as food, water,  and health care increased, although substantial numbers of affected  persons did not receive assistance, especially in inaccessible areas,  owing to continued security concerns. In addition, after August 2005, the  percentage of the targeted population receiving such assistance began  to decrease, according to the UN, as continued conflict and insecurity in  Darfur limited access to, and distribution of, humanitarian aid.
NGOs and UN agencies reported that assistance provided only to IDPs also  expanded. For example, the number of IDPs receiving sanitation  assistance increased more than sixtyfold, from about 21,000 IDPs in April  2004 to more than 1.4 million IDPs in July 2006.
Reduced malnutrition and mortality rates. Since 2004, malnutrition  rates recorded in Darfur have decreased significantly. A UN World Food  Program survey in Darfur showed that malnutrition rates were  significantly lower in 2005 than in 2004. In addition, although nutrition  among IDPs in Darfur remains precarious, UN nutritional reports show  improvement since 2004 and attribute the improvement partly to  external assistance and large-scale food aid. According to UN  Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessments, the prevalence of  global acute malnutrition in Darfur was reported at 11.9 percent in  March of 2006, a significant decrease from the 21.8 percent reported in  October 2004.
Furthermore, several mortality surveys have concluded that mortality  rates in Darfur decreased from 2004 to 2005. For example, surveys  conducted by the World Health Organization and Médecins Sans  Frontières (also known as Doctors Without Borders) reported mortality  rates ranging between 1.5 to 9.5 deaths per 10,000 people per day in  2004. In September 2005, the UN World Food Program reported that the  crude mortality rate in Darfur had dropped below the emergency  threshold of 1 death per 10,000 persons per day, as defined by Sphere.  Humanitarian assistance provided for Darfur by the United States and  other international donors has been cited as contributing to improved  mortality rates in Darfur. Experts and NGO, UN, and U.S. officials noted  that other factors, such as reduced violence, can also contribute to a  decrease in mortality rates.
Despite the efforts of the humanitarian organizations to increase the  numbers of people receiving humanitarian assistance, as well as provide  assistance to help reduce malnutrition and mortality rates, the situation in  Darfur remains precarious. Continued insecurity restricts humanitarian  organizations’ access to IDPs and affected residents of Darfur. In addition,  NGO and UN officials indicated that mortality and malnutrition rates would  likely rise above emergency levels if necessary funding were not continued.
section_title: Numerous Challenges Have Hampered U.S. Assistance Efforts and Oversight
paragraphs: Since the beginning of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, entities delivering  U.S. humanitarian assistance to affected residents and IDPs have faced  numerous challenges. Continued insecurity in the region has limited the  ability of NGOs and UN agencies to access parts of Darfur and reach all  affected residents and IDPs. In addition, the Sudanese government and  rebel groups have placed restrictions and requirements on NGOs that have  severely limited the NGO staffs’ ability to travel to and in Darfur and to  provide services to affected residents and IDPs. Further, the late timing of  U.S. funding in 2006 initially limited the operations of NGOs and UN  agencies and threatened to force some reduction in services in Darfur.  Meanwhile, the large size of Darfur and the large quantity of U.S.  humanitarian assistance have challenged USAID’s ability to ensure  accountability for the assistance provided. In addition, targeting of  humanitarian assistance for IDPs is complicated by the difficulty of  counting and managing the numbers of people who receive assistance and  their use of the goods provided.
subsections: section_title: Insecurity in Darfur Has Limited Mobility and Access of Humanitarian Staff
paragraphs: The frequent violence and continued conflict within all three Darfur states  have negatively impacted the ability of NGOs and UN agencies to provide  humanitarian assistance within Darfur. Attacks on, and harassment of,  humanitarian staff, as well as banditry and theft of humanitarian convoys,  have increased throughout Darfur since the beginning of the humanitarian  response; and according to the UN, violence, sexual abuse, and  displacement have dramatically increased since May 2006.
NGO, UN, and U.S. personnel have been injured, abducted, and killed in  attacks against the humanitarian community, and humanitarian staff have  regularly reported harassment from Sudanese government officials.  According to UN and USAID reports, UN and NGO humanitarian staff were  attacked and harassed with increasing frequency in 2005, and NGO staff  members were attacked and abducted. In several instances, drivers and  other humanitarian staff were abducted or killed during attacks on  humanitarian aid convoys. USAID reported more than 200 incidents of  harassment, arrest, or attack against UN, NGO, or AMIS personnel in 2005.  USAID and the UN also reported that increasing violence had resulted in  the deaths of nine humanitarian staff in July 2006—more than the number  of staff killed in the past 2 years. Further, in August 2006, the UN reported  that attacks against humanitarian staff were at a record high.
In addition, banditry and looting of NGO convoys occur with regularity,  according to UN and USAID reports. USAID reported and some UN  officials confirmed the theft of vehicles, cash, food, and other humanitarian  aid. However, many NGO and UN officials told us that the banditry has  mainly resulted in the theft of communications equipment and cash, rather  than the humanitarian aid in the convoy. A World Food Program official  estimated that less than 1 percent of total food aid in Darfur was lost to  banditry, but that the incidents typically resulted in the theft of petty cash,  fuel, or the trucks carrying the World Food Program supplies.
Furthermore, humanitarian access to affected residents and IDPs has been  curtailed as a result of continued conflict, especially in rural areas. USAID,  NGO, and UN officials in Darfur stated that the lack of security has forced  humanitarian organizations to limit access to insecure areas. For example,  in response to continued attacks and insecurity in West Darfur, in January  2006, the UN Department of Security and Safety announced the withdrawal  of UN staff from most of West Darfur for 2 months, and USAID also  removed its staff from West Darfur. (Although UN access was restricted,  some NGOs did not evacuate the area and were able to continue  operations.) According to USAID, the situation dramatically curtailed the  ability of organizations to access the affected residents and IDP population  in the area and to implement life-saving programs in West Darfur.  Additionally, the UN reported that, as a result of significant insecurity in  North Darfur, approximately 460,000 Darfurians were cut off from  emergency food aid in July 2006, and in August 2006, 355,000 Darfurians  remained blocked from receiving food aid. According to the UN, as of  August 2006, humanitarian aid organizations’ access to IDPs and affected  residents in Darfur was at its lowest levels since 2003, and areas of  inaccessibility were expanding. Meanwhile, an estimated 50,000 people  were displaced between June and August 2006.
section_title: Sudan Government and Rebel Groups Have Restricted NGO and UN Staff Movements
paragraphs: The government of Sudan and, to a lesser extent, the rebel groups have  hindered the humanitarian community from accessing affected residents  and IDPs in Darfur. According to UN and NGO officials and USAID, as well  as UN reports, the government of Sudan has restricted access to Darfur for  NGOs and UN agencies since the initial international humanitarian  response by delaying or denying visas and travel permits. NGO officials  noted that issuance of visas for staff is often delayed or denied without  explanation. In addition, according to NGO officials, although the  government of Sudan requires NGO officials to purchase travel permits for  all travel within Darfur, government police and other authorities do not  always accept the permits and often deny access to NGO staff. According  to USAID officials, in September 2006, the government of Sudan restricted  movement of U.S. government personnel to within 25 miles of the  presidential palace in Khartoum, which has forced USAID to remove all  personnel from Darfur. This travel ban remained in place as of October 20,  2006. Rebel groups also place requirements on NGOs that delay  transportation of humanitarian aid or services into rebel-controlled areas.  For example, NGO and UN officials stated that they must contact  numerous rebel leaders to safely transport humanitarian aid into a rebel- controlled area.
Sudanese government officials in Darfur deny NGO and UN officials  allegations that the government restricts access and travel in Darfur and  insist that the government attempts to help NGOs and UN agencies provide  assistance to the people of Darfur. However, USAID, NGO and UN officials  indicated that although the Sudanese government has an official policy of  cooperation with humanitarian assistance in Darfur, the government’s  actions have severely limited humanitarian assistance within the region.
section_title: Timing of 2006 U.S. Funding Impacted Humanitarian Operations in Darfur
paragraphs: Delayed provision of more than half of U.S. humanitarian aid for 2006  limited NGO and UN agency partners’ ability to supply needed food  assistance and negatively affected their ability to plan for nonfood  assistance. The initial U.S. appropriation for fiscal year 2006 supplied  approximately 44 percent of the total U.S. humanitarian aid funding for  Darfur in fiscal year 2006. With the passage of the supplemental  appropriation on June 15, 2006—9 months into the fiscal year—total U.S.  food and nonfood assistance for 2006 reached the intended levels,  including meeting at least half of the World Food Program’s appeal for  Sudan. However, because NGOs and UN agencies in Darfur did not receive  the funds until late in the fiscal year, they were forced to reduce food  rations and temporarily interrupt some humanitarian aid services.
Impact on food assistance. The provision of approximately 56 percent  of 2006 U.S. food aid funding late in the fiscal year made it difficult for  the UN World Food Program to distribute supplies throughout Darfur in  a timely fashion. In particular, because of the 6-month lag between  confirmation and distribution of donations, the delay made it difficult  for the program to preposition food prior to the rainy season, according  to a World Food Program official. Owing in part to this delay, the  program announced in April 2006 that, beginning in May, it would  reduce rations in Darfur to half the minimum daily requirement (from  2,100 calories to as few as 1,050 calories per day) to extend limited food  stocks. In response, the Sudanese government donated sorghum, and  the President of the United States directed USAID to ship emergency  food stockpiles to Darfur, raising the rations to 84 percent (1,770  kilocalories) of the daily requirement for Darfurians receiving food aid.  In June, the cereal component of the ration was fully restored. However,  as of October 2006, the World Food Program continued to face gaps in  food aid, and, according to program officials, it planned to maintain the  84 percent ration through the end of the calendar year.
According to a World Food Program official in Khartoum, if the current  level of funding had been available earlier in the year, the ration cuts  could have been avoided entirely. A USAID official told us that, although  the reduction in 2006 U.S. funding did not significantly decrease the  food aid contribution for Darfur, the delay of $137 million (56 percent)  of the 2006 U.S. food aid funding until late in the fiscal year negatively  affected the food situation in Darfur earlier in the year. This outcome  aligns with previous GAO findings that lack of sufficient, timely  donations contributed to food aid shortfalls in other emergency  situations.
Impact on nonfood assistance. The delay of U.S. nonfood humanitarian  assistance, as well as a reduction in funding from other international  donors, led NGO and UN officials to anticipate a negative impact on  nonfood humanitarian operations in Darfur. In February 2006, these  officials told us that the initial U.S. funding for the year had been less  than planned for and needed to ensure continued levels of assistance to  Darfur’s affected residents and IDPs. As a result of the funding delays,  the NGO officials said, their organizations would be forced to make cuts  in the services and programs they provided or to reduce their  humanitarian aid staff in Darfur. For example, one NGO official  indicated that the reduction in funding had forced the organization to  downsize its health program and to transfer responsibility for the clinics  to the Sudanese government. Several NGO and UN officials also  indicated that without additional funds, key indicators such as the  malnutrition and mortality rates, which had improved in 2005, would  likely rise again above emergency levels. USAID officials told us in  October 2006 that after receiving the supplemental funding, USAID’s  partners had been able to restore humanitarian programs in Darfur to  their previous levels and coverage.
section_title: Oversight of Assistance Was Limited by Reduced Staff and Incomplete Reporting
paragraphs: USAID’s ability to provide oversight and measure the impact of U.S.  humanitarian assistance in Darfur has been limited by reductions in its staff  who could directly monitor U.S. assistance or ensure that implementing  partners fulfilled reporting requirements.
From April 2004 to July 2006, as NGO and UN humanitarian staff in Darfur  significantly increased—from 202 to 13,500—USAID’s staff in Darfur  decreased. During the first 2 years of the conflict, USAID staff ranged  between 10 and 20 personnel; within the last 9 months, that number has  been reduced to 6 to 8 USAID personnel. USAID officials believe that the  remaining number of USAID personnel is adequate to oversee the  implementation of U.S. humanitarian assistance and USAID grant  agreements, among other responsibilities. USAID officials indicated that  other, external factors, such as UN and U.S. Embassy security requirements  and restrictions imposed by the government of Sudan, limit the number of  staff in Darfur. In addition, USAID officials indicated that they visited  camps and communicated with NGO and UN agency officials regularly to  discuss operations and difficulties and to assist in delivering humanitarian  assistance. However, USAID officials told us that owing to limited time and  staff in Darfur, security restrictions throughout the region, the size of  Darfur, and the scale of U.S. assistance provided, they could not monitor  compliance with all of the grant agreement indicators at locations in Darfur  that were targeted for assistance.
Furthermore, required NGO reporting has been incomplete. As a result,  USAID lacks information to evaluate NGO operations, monitor their  performance, and measure the impact of the assistance provided.  According to USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance  Guidelines for Proposals and Reporting, NGOs must submit proposals  outlining the indicators and outcomes expected from the humanitarian  activities and services provided for with U.S. funds. Each grant agreement  also specifies that 90 days after the agreement’s expiration, the NGO must  submit a final report that includes the cumulative achievements and a  comparison of actual accomplishments against the goals, objectives,  indicators, and targets established for the agreement. Examples of  indicators used by NGOs in proposals include, for example, the crude  mortality rate in the target population or the number of latrines  constructed. However, we found that 6 of 15 final reports that NGOs were  required to submit by June 1, 2006, had not been submitted to USAID.  Moreover, most of the reports that NGOs submitted did not include all  required information.
USAID’s Darfur Program Manager stated that because officials maintain  constant communication with NGOs and conduct evaluations of activities  in Darfur, the agency is aware of implementing partners’ accomplishments,  or lack thereof, in Darfur, despite the incompleteness of most NGO reports.  However, the reports and indicators are essential in monitoring and  evaluating humanitarian operations, given that USAID staff are often  constrained by limited access due to insecurity and violence throughout  Darfur. In response to our observations USAID acknowledged the  importance of obtaining required reports and has taken efforts to ensure  reporting compliance from its NGO partners. As a result, USAID reported  that in July 2006 it received all quarterly reports from current NGO  partners.
section_title: Difficulties Existed in Ensuring that U.S. Assistance Was Used as Intended
paragraphs: Challenges in accurately counting the populations of IDP camps have made  it difficult for NGOs and UN agencies to ensure that all U.S. humanitarian  assistance was provided to the intended recipients. In addition, some IDPs  used humanitarian assistance for purposes other than those for which it  was intended.
In part because the IDP camps’ large size makes it difficult to control  who receives assistance, some assistance has been distributed to  recipients other than those targeted. For example, UN humanitarian  profiles show that between December 2004 and October 2005, IDPs in  Kalma camp, the largest camp in Darfur, were estimated at between  103,000 and 163,000. The World Food Program distributed food aid for  IDPs based on these estimates. Prior to October 2005, several efforts to  count the actual number of IDPs in Kalma camp were determined to be  invalid because of problems with the counts and an inability to stop non- IDPs from participating. An October 2005 count was completed by more  than 400 staff from six NGOs, with help from USAID staff, and with  assistance from Sudanese government troops—who surrounded the  camp to stop non-IDPs from entering—and AMIS civilian police, who  provided security inside the camp. On October 4, 2005, a count of 87,000  was declared accurate, approximately 70,000 IDPs less than the  previous estimate. According to a USAID official, residents from the  nearby state capital of Nyala had previously received improper food  distributions at the camp. According to USAID, without accurate counts  of camp populations, the humanitarian community struggles to  distribute food aid appropriately to the populations with the greatest  need.
Not all resources and assistance are being used as intended, although  USAID and NGO officials indicated that this is typical of any emergency  situation, especially one of this size and duration. For example, in Abu  Shouk camp, we observed IDPs using treated drinking water to make  bricks, either for their own shelters or for sale on the market. According  to a UN official, IDPs in the camp used approximately 30 percent of  available water in the camp to make bricks and, as a result, 8 of the 30  water pumps in Abu Shouk dried up.
section_title: African Union Has Taken Actions to Meet Mandate, but Some Actions Have Been Incomplete or Inconsistent
paragraphs: Although the African Union’s peace support operation has reportedly  contributed to a reduction of large-scale violence in Darfur, AMIS’s actions  to fulfill its mandate in Darfur have been taken in an incomplete or  inconsistent manner. To monitor compliance with the cease-fire agreement,  the first component of its mandate, AMIS military observers in Darfur have  actively investigated alleged cease-fire agreement violations. However, the  resulting reports have not been reviewed according to established  procedure or widely publicized to identify parties who have violated the  agreement. To build confidence and to improve security, the second and  third components of its mandate, AMIS troops have taken actions such as  conducting patrols and escorting IDP women who leave camps to forage  for firewood. In addition, AMIS troops have intervened to stop impending  violence against civilians and provided escorts for NGO convoys in some  instances, although AMIS has not intervened in other instances. Further,  the AMIS civilian police are working with Sudanese police to improve law  enforcement, but the civilian police have encountered difficulties with the  Sudanese authorities. To support AMIS’s efforts to meet its mandate, the  U.S. government provided about $280 million from June 2004 through  September 2006, according to State, primarily to build and maintain the 32  camps that house AMIS forces throughout Darfur.
subsections: section_title: AMIS Is Seen as Having Made Important Contribution
paragraphs: AMIS is viewed by many as having made an important contribution in  Darfur. U.S. and other officials cite AMIS as responsible for decreasing  large-scale violence simply by the deterrent effect of its presence in the  region. State officials have emphasized that AMIS participants have a  strong desire to be effective and make the AMIS initiative work and that the  presence of AMIS’s patrols has had a positive impact. Further, a senior UN  official told us that AMIS “jumped into Darfur” with few resources in a  genuine attempt to “put out this fire” and that AMIS’s presence has had a  notable impact. Further, State and UN officials noted that AMIS forces  were deployed to Darfur quickly in comparison with other international  peacekeeping missions.
section_title: AMIS Has Taken Actions to Meet Mandate, but Some Actions Have Been Incomplete or Inconsistent
paragraphs: AMIS has taken a number of positive actions in Darfur in response to its  mandate to (1) monitor compliance with the cease-fire agreement, (2)  assist in confidence building, and (3) contribute to improving security.  However, some of these actions have been executed in an incomplete or  inconsistent manner, limiting the extent to which AMIS has been able to  fulfill its mandate.
subsections: section_title: AMIS Has Monitored Cease-fire Compliance, but Monitoring Has Been Incomplete
paragraphs: To address the first component of its mandate, AMIS military observers in  Darfur investigated and identified a number of violations of the 2004 cease- fire agreement. However, the Joint Commission has not consistently  reviewed the resulting Ceasefire Commission investigation reports.  Further, the publicly available record of recent cease-fire violation  investigations is incomplete, making it impossible to establish how many  total cease-fire violations have been identified by the Ceasefire  Commission since its creation in 2004 and which parties have been  responsible for recent cease-fire agreement violations.
Ceasefire Commission reports provide specific information regarding  violations. The commission found that all three parties to the conflict had  committed violations, many of which occurred in South Darfur. Of the 80  allegations of cease-fire agreement violations that we reviewed, the  Ceasefire Commission was unable to make a determination in 30 instances,  often because an outside party (such as the Janjaweed) had allegedly  committed the violation. These cases involved acts such as the killing of  numerous civilians at a time and attacks on villages. In several cases, the  Sudanese government was accused of fighting alongside the Janjaweed. In  three of the cases we reviewed, the Ceasefire Commission determined that  no violation had occurred. For the remaining 47 allegations of cease-fire  agreement violations, the Ceasefire Commission found 54 violations.
Sudanese government. The commission found that the Sudanese  government had committed 27 cease-fire agreement violations. Among  these violations, 9 involved civilian deaths; 10 involved village attacks; 7  involved attacks, harassment, or intimidation of civilians; and 7 involved  Sudanese troop movements into new territory without proper  notification to the Ceasefire Commission.
SLM/A. The commission found that the SLM/A had committed 25 cease- fire agreement violations. Among these violations, six involved attacks  on Sudanese facilities (e.g., military camps, police stations, convoys);  seven involved abductions of civilians, local political representatives, or  Sudanese government personnel; two involved village attacks; and two  involved civilian deaths.
JEM. The commission found that the JEM had committed two cease-fire  agreement violations, both of which involved attacks on Sudanese  facilities.
The Ceasefire Commission’s recommendations in the reports vary from  general to specific. General recommendations include urging the parties to  the conflict to adhere to the cease-fire agreement; reminding them that they  are required to give the commission prior notice of any administrative  troop movements; and requesting party leaders to educate their members  about the provisions of the agreement. More specific recommendations  include those recommending that the Sudanese government disarm,  neutralize, or restrain the Janjaweed and that SLM/A stop looting, or return  looted goods, and release those whom it had abducted. In reports issued  after November 2004, the Ceasefire Commission frequently appealed to the  Joint Commission to become more involved in various aspects of the  monitoring process.
However, although the reports provide detailed information regarding  parties that violated the cease-fire agreement and the nature of the  violations, African Union and U.S. officials told us that the Joint  Commission had not met regularly, had been ineffective in reviewing  reports, and had no means of forcing the violating parties to take action  based on report results. Further, although the Joint Commission has  condemned cease-fire violations by the parties to the conflict and asked all  parties to end all attacks, a DOD official noted that officials at African  Union headquarters were not pushing the Joint Commission to review or  approve Ceasefire Commission reports.
African Union and U.S. officials emphasized that because the reports are  available on the African Union’s Web site and publicly identify violators of  the cease-fire agreement, the reports pressure the parties to the conflict to  improve compliance with the agreement. The officials viewed this  transparency and resulting pressure as a central benefit of the reports.  However, we found that the public record of investigated cease-fire  violations is incomplete, making it impossible to establish the total number  of alleged or confirmed violations and to identify all responsible parties.  For example, we were unable to open 37 of the 116 Ceasefire Commission  reports listed as available on the African Union’s Web site. Further, we were  unable to locate any reports subsequent to September 2005 to validate  other claims regarding violations. For example, no Ceasefire Commission  reports are publicly available to substantiate or refute a January 2006  report, which was prepared by the Chairperson of the African Union  Commission and submitted to the Peace and Security Council, stating that  cease-fire violations had escalated since October 2005 and that some of the  most serious violations had occurred since that time.
section_title: Confidence-Building and Security-Improvement Efforts Have Been Sporadic
paragraphs: To fulfill the second and third components of the mandate, AMIS forces  have provided patrols and escorts for IDPs, NGOs, and U.S. contractor  staff; intervened to prevent violence; and collaborated with Sudanese  government police. However, in some instances, AMIS patrols and escorts  have not been able to prevent attacks or to provide needed services; AMIS  forces have not intervened consistently to prevent violence; and AMIS  civilian police have had difficult relations with the Sudanese police.
AMIS Has Provided Patrols and Escorts but Has Not Prevented All  Attacks or Provided All Needed Protection To build confidence among affected residents and IDPs and create a more  secure environment, AMIS troops have taken actions such as conducting  patrols and providing escorts for vulnerable groups. However, AMIS  escorts and the escorted groups have sometimes encountered violent  attacks, and AMIS has had insufficient resources to provide all needed  escort services.
Patrols. AMIS officials at several AMIS camps we visited told us that  AMIS military observers or civilian police try to conduct about two  patrols each day, for example, to make AMIS’s presence known and to  interact positively with local communities, collect information, or  investigate an alleged cease-fire agreement violation. We accompanied  one confidence-building patrol near the North Darfur town of  Kabkabiya; AMIS military observers interviewed local residents and a  community leader to identify any problems that required AMIS  attention. (See fig. 15.)
Escorts. To further build confidence and improve security, AMIS troops  have also provided escorts for groups of women foraging for firewood  outside IDP camps. According to African Union and U.S. officials, the  presence of AMIS troops has prevented these groups from being  attacked. We accompanied an AMIS escort of a group of women as they  walked more than 9 miles outside the town of Kass in South Darfur to  find firewood for the next several days. Escorted by AMIS protection  force troops and civilian police, as well as Sudanese government police,  the 79 women went about their activities freely and without incident  (see fig. 16). AMIS officials also told us that they have escorted NGO  convoys to prevent theft and banditry.
However, in several instances, AMIS troops or those being escorted have  been threatened or killed. For example, several people were killed in rebel  attacks on convoys, including four Nigerian soldiers and two local  contractor staff in October 2005. In July 2006, 32 AMIS soldiers escorting  a fuel convoy in North Darfur were abducted by one SLM/A faction;  although the soldiers were eventually released, two fuel tanker drivers, the  fuel tankers, and four AMIS vehicles were not released at that time.  According to a senior U.S. contracting official working in Darfur, the  drivers and tankers were released in October 2006, and the vehicles have  not been returned. According to a December 2005 African Union-led  assessment of AMIS (with participation from the UN, European Union, and  United States), such incidents “undermine the Mission’s credibility in the  eyes of civilians and embolden those who may target AMIS.” Further, a  UN official emphasized that AMIS’s ability to provide services such as  firewood escorts is limited and that AMIS cannot begin to cover all  instances where such escorts would be useful.
AMIS Has Intervened to Prevent Violence in Some Cases but Not in  Others AMIS troops have also intervened to protect civilians under imminent  threat of violence, as directed by the African Union mandate. For example,  according to the December 2005 assessment of AMIS, AMIS troops were  deployed to Zalingei in West Darfur to prevent retaliation against IDPs  when there was heightened tension following the kidnapping of civilians by  the SLM/A. Another AMIS deployment to Muhajariya halted a Sudanese  military advance on the town that could have resulted in the substantial  displacement of IDPs. In addition, following attacks on the town of Labado  in South Darfur in late 2004, a deployment of AMIS troops in January 2005  deterred further attacks and led to the return of many town residents, who  began to repair their homes and rebuild their lives.
However, in other instances, AMIS has not intervened to prevent violence.  For example, according to UN and U.S. documentation, AMIS did not  maintain a regular presence around Mershing and its surroundings in South  Darfur despite concerns about security in the area and repeated requests  from the international community for a continuous AMIS presence.  Ultimately, armed militia attacks resulted in the death of several IDPs and  subsequent displacement in early 2006. In addition, an NGO official told  us that AMIS was slow in responding to requests for assistance from NGOs  caught in a battle between SLM/A and Sudanese government forces in the  Jebel Marra area; however, AMIS did help evacuate NGO staff from the area  24 hours after the conflict began. According to an AMIS commander,  although AMIS has taken preemptive action to stop attacks or skirmishes,  the territory is too large for AMIS to be able prevent such violence overall.
AMIS Has Collaborated with Sudanese Police, but Relations Have  Been Difficult  AMIS has worked with the Sudanese police to improve security, but some  of its relations with the Sudanese police have been problematic. AMIS  civilian police officers reported to us that they were working to ensure that  the Sudanese police are acting on cases provided by the AMIS civilian  police. AMIS civilian police also noted that, where appropriate, they have  encouraged the use of village councils to resolve disputes, rather than  referring every case to the Sudanese authorities.
However, some AMIS civilian police officers reported that relations with  the Sudanese police had at times been difficult. AMIS civilian police  officers told us that Sudanese police had been slow to act on cases  provided by AMIS, that these cases often do not result in convictions or  adequate punishment, and that it can be difficult to obtain information  from the Sudanese police regarding the status of referred cases. In  addition, AMIS civilian police mentioned that Sudanese police have at  times perpetrated violent acts against citizens of Darfur and AMIS police.  Moreover, the civilian police have had difficulty gaining access to some  areas that are controlled by rebel groups and lack an official Sudanese  police presence.
Further, the limited and misunderstood role of AMIS’s civilian police  frustrated IDPs and NGO staff, who expressed the view that these police  provided limited useful services. IDPs and NGOs told us that they did not  understand why civilian police did not get involved when problems arose.  Their frustration was heightened by the fact that civilian police have visible  stations adjacent to IDP camps. AMIS and UN officials also noted that  because the civilian police are unarmed, they require AMIS protection  force escorts, which are not always available.
section_title: U.S. and Other External Donors Have Supported African Union’s Efforts to Fulfill Its Mandate
paragraphs: The United States has supported AMIS primarily by funding the  construction and maintenance of AMIS camps in Darfur by a contractor,  PAE Government Services, Inc. (PAE). Other international donors have  provided funding or goods and services to support AMIS’s peacekeeping  operations.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Government Has Funded AMIS Camps
paragraphs: To support AMIS’s efforts to carry out its mandate, the U.S. government  expended about $240 million from June 2004 to August 2006 and obligated  another $40 million in September of 2006, primarily to build and maintain  the 32 camps that house AMIS forces throughout Darfur, according to a  State official who tracks this funding. African Union and U.S. officials told  us that camp sites were chosen to be near population centers and known  conflict areas. State contracted with PAE to build and maintain the camps  as well as to maintain AMIS vehicles and communication equipment (see  fig. 17). PAE is also maintaining armored personnel carriers provided by  Canada; the Canadian government has provided State with more than $20  million for fiscal year 2006 for this purpose. Finally, PAE is responsible for  hiring, housing, and compensating U.S. military observers (referred to by  State officials in Darfur as “U.S. representatives” owing to their range of  contributions to AMIS beyond observing activities). Although 16 U.S.  military observers are authorized, only 11 were on the ground in Darfur  during our February 2006 visit.
Construction of the 32 camps, between June 2004 and December 2005,  involved a number of challenges. According to a senior PAE official in  Darfur, key costs associated with building the camps included supplying  generators and, particularly as construction was beginning, transporting  supplies and equipment via aircraft. Construction of the camps, which  together can house 9,300 people, was complicated by the difficulty of  finding international staff willing to come to Darfur and local staff  possessing adequate skills. In addition, the remote locations of camp sites,  combined with the inadequate condition of roads throughout the region,  made it difficult to transport building supplies to the sites; PAE officials  told us that in some cases, supplies were transported across insecure areas  via donkeys. Further, the various augmentations of AMIS over time  (including the introduction of the civilian police component) had to be  incorporated into preexisting building plans. Moreover, the relatively small  size of some of the land parcels provided by the government of Sudan made  it difficult for PAE to, for example, construct sufficient perimeter  protection around camps. Other sites provided by the government are in  vulnerable locations; for instance, PAE officials identified one camp that  was built in a natural “bowl,” making protection problematic, although  steps were recently taken to relocate portions of this camp.
According to PAE and State officials, PAE’s current costs for maintaining  the camps, as well as AMIS communications equipment and vehicles, are  about $7.8 million per month. PAE faces additional challenges in  maintaining AMIS facilities, with the provision of water a key difficulty.  According to a PAE situation report dated May 5, 2006, there are significant  concerns regarding the provision of an uninterrupted supply of water to  several AMIS camps. In some cases, unprotected water bore holes have  been sabotaged. In the past, PAE also experienced the theft of jet fuel. A  PAE official noted that other environmental challenges to maintaining the  camps include heat, ultraviolet rays, and sand.
section_title: Other International Donors Have Provided Cash, Goods, and Services
paragraphs: The European Union, also a key AMIS donor, has provided about $200  million as direct budget support for AMIS operational costs such as per  diem and food, according to a State official. Many other donor  contributions have been “in kind”—that is, goods and services rather than  direct funding. For example, the Canadian government loaned AMIS 25  helicopters and 105 armored personnel carriers; the British government  provided vehicles and ground fuel; the Dutch government provided  communications equipment; and the Norwegian government is building  civilian police stations near IDP camps. Further, since October 2004, the  UN has provided assistance to AMIS via a technical assistance cell working  in Addis Ababa and funded by the UN Mission in Sudan. According to an  official in the cell, it has provided services such as technical support  (including an August 2005 UN-led exercise to prepare AMIS for troop  deployments and identify areas where capacity building was required) and  training (such as arranging training for military observers and bringing a  financial officer to African Union headquarters for 3 months to assist with  financial management). NATO has also provided training for AMIS  personnel and has assisted with troop rotation efforts.
section_title: Numerous Factors Have Complicated AMIS Efforts
paragraphs: Numerous factors have been identified by AMIS and U.S. government  officials, among others, as contributing to AMIS’s difficulties in meeting its  mandate. These factors include inadequacies in management, organization,  and capacity; a relatively small force; resources that have been constrained  or inefficiently allocated; and a lack of information regarding, and  cooperation from, parties to the conflict. As AMIS has faced operational  and other challenges, the UN has approved a UN peacekeeping operation in  Darfur when AMIS’s mandate expires; however, as of October 2006, the  Sudanese government had rejected the proposal. In June 2006, following a  NATO offer, the African Union formally requested assistance from NATO  in, among other things, identifying lessons learned from AMIS operations;  however, according to a State official, African Union headquarters had  taken no further action to pursue this review as of August 2006. Meanwhile,  instability and violence have continued in Darfur.
subsections: section_title: Inadequacies in Management, Organization, and Capacity Have Hampered AMIS Deployment
paragraphs: AMIS has reportedly experienced numerous difficulties in its management,  organization, and capacity that have limited its ability to carry out its  mandate.
subsections: section_title: Inadequate and Inconsistent Management
paragraphs: Regarding AMIS management, U.S., UN, and other sources have commonly  expressed the view that AMIS’s command and control has been inadequate  and confused. A UN-led assessment of AMIS in August 2005 stated, “The  evolution of the mission has been such that it has depended on individual  components conducting their own planning rather than tackling problems  from a mission perspective. This has led to considerable disparity between  components, duplication of effort, and the potential for planning at cross  purposes.” A State official emphasized that AMIS has had no clear lines of  authority between Addis Ababa, El Fasher, and the field and that a lack of  coordination has made a rapid response to crisis situations problematic. A  Refugees International study reported that “AMIS has suffered from  language and cultural barriers between officers from various countries,  confusion in procedures, limited future planning, and ineffective  communications systems. Much of this stems from lack of peacekeeping  experience.” The Brookings Institution–University of Bern study also  stated that AMIS command and control had been slow and cumbersome  and that “he unwieldy bureaucracy at African Union headquarters  hampered all aspects of deployment; there is no institutional expertise for  peace operations yet in the .”
Moreover, AMIS leadership has demonstrated inconsistency in interpreting  the AMIS mandate, creating confusion among AMIS troops and civilians  and limiting its protection of civilians within its capabilities. AMIS  leadership’s willingness to take certain actions to meet the mandate—for  example, to protect civilians—has varied throughout Darfur, as already  noted. State officials have observed that AMIS’s willingness to actively  protect Darfur residents to the extent provided for in the mandate has been  “uneven.” A U.S. official we met with in Sudan noted that in some cases, the  degree to which AMIS’s mandate was robustly interpreted seemed to  depend on leadership personalities.
section_title: Lack of Coordination
paragraphs: According to the December 2005 African Union-led assessment of AMIS,  “military and police mission components are not operating in a sufficiently  joint and coordinated manner.” The Brookings Institution--University of  Bern study noted a similar problem, stating that the civilian police “rely on  the AMIS protection force for their movements, but they are not currently  integrated into military planning structures.” Many parties, including U.S.  and UN officials, have called for the creation of a joint operations center  that would serve as the focal point for the coordination and integration of  AMIS military and civilian police operations; however, such a unit has not  yet been created. On the other hand, a joint logistics operations center has  been established to improve the logistical coordination of the AMIS  components.
section_title: Limited Capacity
paragraphs: African Union, U.S., and other sources have identified problems with the  capacity and experience of African Union and AMIS as a key factor  negatively affecting AMIS performance. According to the Brookings  Institution–University of Bern study, “For many commanders, this African  Union mission is their first operational experience.” Troops are also  viewed as having limited experience. For example, according to a Human  Rights Watch report, “ troop–contributing countries have  sometimes struggled to identify and deploy properly trained staff officers,  particularly those with appropriate language skills…. Most troop- contributing countries have previously contributed to UN missions that  were often western-led operations, thus leaving the  troops  with limited operational experience above the tactical level.” An African  Union official and a U.S. official noted separately that, although AMIS has  training standards, little is done to verify that AMIS troops arriving in  Darfur have received appropriate training. Further, according to the  Brookings Institution–University of Bern study, the quality of AMIS police  is not adequate, with limited screening prior to deployment to Darfur.
section_title: Small Size of AMIS Force Has Limited Its Ability to Patrol and Protect
paragraphs: The AMIS force, with its 7,271 personnel, has been characterized as a  relatively small contingent that cannot effectively monitor and patrol all of  Darfur, an area almost the size of France with a punishing environment  (however, some regions in Darfur, such as the far north, are largely  unpopulated ). According to State officials, the small size of the  force has limited AMIS’s ability to patrol such a large, difficult region and  sufficiently interact with residents and other parties in Darfur. Further,  according to a Refugees International report, “AMIS doesn’t have enough  troops to sufficiently protect itself, let alone protect displaced civilians and  humanitarian organizations.” In addition, an International Crisis Group  document stated in July 2005 that as many as 15,000 troops were needed in  Darfur to protect villages and IDPs, provide security for humanitarian  operations, and neutralize militias. The December 2005 African Union-Led  Joint Assessment of AMIS reported that the absence of an authorized  battalion had a significant operational impact and overstretched existing  personnel.
section_title: Constrained and Inefficiently Allocated Resources Have Restricted AMIS Operations
paragraphs: African Union and other parties have stated that AMIS does not have  sufficient resources, including equipment and translators, to conduct the  activities necessary to fulfill its mandate. A senior African Union official  told us that AMIS’s reliance on outside donors has resulted in a lack of  control for the mission because basic operational elements, such as  facilities, logistics, and funding rest in the hands of other parties. According  to January 2006 African Union documentation, the African Union has not  been able to provide critical resources, such as vehicles and  communications equipment, in a timely fashion; as a result, AMIS has  functioned with about half of the needed logistical capacity. U.S. officials  have countered that the African Union has at times been slow to respond to  offers of assistance or to prioritize resource needs. During some periods,  donor support for AMIS has been less than what the African Union had  expected, with African Union documentation stating that a lack of funds  has been a major constraint.
According to African Union officials, a lack of resources such as vehicles  and long-range communications equipment has complicated AMIS  operations. For example, one AMIS commander told us that AMIS has  inadequate transportation equipment and communications equipment, as  well as a lack of night vision equipment. AMIS officials whom we  interviewed expressed their concern that the lack of adequate  communications equipment limited their ability to interact with different  camps in the region. Further, an AMIS civilian police official noted that the  civilian police often receive less equipment than the military component of  AMIS, which has resulted in situations such as the need to rely on military  colleagues’ equipment to communicate with their civilian police  colleagues. One AMIS commander also noted that AMIS required more  printers, computers, and photocopiers. However, a DOD official noted that  until AMIS makes the most efficient use of its current resources, such as  vehicles and communications equipment, it is unclear whether more  resources are needed. Further, the December 2005 African Union–led  report on AMIS notes that, where civilian police matters are concerned,  equipment is both insufficient and incorrectly distributed.
A lack of translators who can facilitate discussions between AMIS and the  residents of Darfur has also been repeatedly cited as a central problem  hindering AMIS’s ability to monitor compliance with the cease-fire  agreement or build confidence. According to an official from the African  Union’s Darfur Integrated Task Force, AMIS needs about 200 interpreters;  however, as of February 2006, AMIS had only about 70 interpreters. The  lack of interpreters has been attributed to the difficulty in finding people  who speak both Arabic and English. One U.S. military observer told us that  many uneducated people in Darfur speak only their tribal language, further  complicating AMIS’s ability to ensure effective communication. In addition,  we were told that at times, AMIS patrols used representatives of the parties  to the conflict as translators, which meant that AMIS officials could not  verify that translators were conducting the interview in an objective  fashion, asking the required questions, or reporting responses accurately.  In one example provided by an AMIS civilian police official in El Daein in  South Darfur, an SLM/A translator stated that a woman had said she was  “helped” in a particular instance, when in fact she had stated that she had  been violently attacked. Someone within the investigative team was able to  discern that this mistake had been made and communicate it to the rest of  the team. IDPs also voiced frustration over the lack of civilian police  translators able to communicate with IDPs and respond to IDPs reporting  violence in the camps.
section_title: AMIS Has Had Limited Information on, and Cooperation from, Parties to the Conflict
paragraphs: Several analyses of AMIS have commented on its lack of capacity to collect  needed intelligence regarding the situation in Darfur. The International  Crisis Group has noted that “AMIS does not have an intelligence apparatus  or collection capacity and does not actively analyze or disseminate  intelligence.” The Brookings Institution–University of Bern study further  stressed that “ood intelligence is vital in Darfur, yet AMIS’s capacity to  gather, analyze and act on information has been very weak.” According to  a former U.S. military observer to AMIS, “The African Union does not  understand the importance of having an ‘intelligence cell’ and of having  good information on the command structure, for example, of the  Janjaweed.” The December 2005 African Union-led assessment of AMIS  emphasized, “If AMIS operations are to be effective, the use of intelligence  is essential,” and further noted that the lack of intelligence collection,  analysis, and dissemination seriously reduces the effectiveness and focus  of operations.
The effectiveness of AMIS is directly related to the level of cooperation it receives from the  parties to the conflict. Thus far, that cooperation has been extremely inconsistent. The   government continues to create bureaucratic obstacles to AMIS’s ability to  operate freely. These include curfews, early airport closings, and long delays in issuing  permits and visas. AMIS has not, as they should have, protested against these restrictions on  movements, notably the curfew. The government’s use of white vehicles and aircraft (which  resemble AMIS) in military operations is also inconsistent with its commitments to support  the  Mission…. The  and JEM bear an equal responsibility for  accepting and supporting the presence of AMIS. Ongoing obstruction of   activities by the rebels has included obstruction of movement, threatening patrols,  harassment, theft of equipment, and even abduction of personnel.
U.S. and UN officials emphasized an instance where the government of  Sudan detained the 105 Canadian armored personnel carriers at the border  and released them only after intense external pressure. A U.S. embassy  official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, noted that Dutch communications  equipment had been in Khartoum customs for months, demonstrating how  the Sudanese government can obstruct, rather than facilitate, AMIS  operations.
In addition, all parties to the conflict—the Sudanese government, the  SLM/A, and the JEM—have been cited several times for violating the 2004  cease-fire agreement. Representatives of these parties to Ceasefire  Commission investigations, particularly the Sudanese government,  routinely file objections to final report conclusions. According to an  International Crisis Group report, “AMIS was born out of the N’djamena  agreement , which lacked a true  enforcement mechanism and was based on the assumption of compliance  and goodwill by the parties. International pressure on those parties to  respect their commitments has been ineffective, thus undermining the   mission.”
section_title: UN and NATO Offers of Assistance Have Not Been Acted On; Meanwhile, Violence in Darfur Continues
paragraphs: While AMIS has faced challenges in Darfur, the UN and NATO have offered  to assist the African Union in, respectively, supplying a peacekeeping force  when AMIS’s mandate expires at the end of December 2006 and identifying  lessons learned from AMIS operations. The U.S. government and other  parties have supported the proposed transition of AMIS responsibilities to  a UN peacekeeping operation. In January 2006, the African Union’s Peace  and Security Council officially declared its approval, in principle, for the  transition of AMIS to a UN operation. In March, the council reaffirmed  this position, and in May it declared that “concrete steps should be taken to  effect the transition from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation.” The UN  Security Council subsequently adopted a resolution endorsing this African  Union decision to transition AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation and  emphasizing that a UN operation would have, to the extent possible, a  strong African participation and character. In August 2006, the UN  Security Council adopted a resolution expanding UNMIS’s mandate and  calling for an UNMIS deployment to Darfur.
According to a State official, a UN operation would be expected to build on  AMIS efforts. Some portion of troops already participating in AMIS would  be “bluehatted”—that is, could transition to UNMIS. According to a State  official, under this scenario, the UN mission would have a unified  command for the entire operation, with separate commanders for UNMIS  efforts in southern Sudan and Darfur. According to the Department of State  fiscal year 2007 budget request and a State official, this UN effort in Sudan  would cost the U.S. government about $442 million in fiscal year 2007; a  State official roughly estimated that the Darfur portion of this operation  would cost the United States between $160 million and $180 million for the  year.
As of October 2006, the Sudanese government had refused a transition to a  UN force in Darfur. However, in October the Sudanese president expressed  support for a September offer by the UN Secretary-General to provide  assistance to AMIS. The UN assistance package consists of equipment and  personnel dedicated to supporting AMIS in the following ways: logistical  and material support, military staff support, advisory support to civilian  police, and other staff support in the areas of assistance in implementing  the Darfur Peace Agreement, public information, mine action, and  humanitarian coordination.
In addition, in June 2006, following an offer by NATO, the Chairperson of  the African Union Commission requested that NATO provide, among other  things, assistance in reviewing AMIS operations in Darfur to identify  “lessons learned,” which could help the African Union better execute any  future peace support efforts. However, a State official reported that,  although the Chairperson of the African Union Commission formally  accepted NATO’s offer of this assistance, as of August 2006, the African  Union headquarters had taken no further action to pursue the review.  Such reviews are typically conducted after peacekeeping operations are  completed; for example, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation’s  Best Practices Section undertakes such reviews following UN  peacekeeping efforts.
Meanwhile, instability and violence continued in Darfur, furthering calls for  UN involvement. According to a report prepared by the Chairperson of the  African Union Commission, as of May 2006, “the region has continued to  witness persistent insecurity, with ceasefire violations, banditry activities,  hijacking of vehicles, attacks on villages and killing of unarmed civilians by  the various parties, particularly the janjaweed.” One NGO reported 200  sexual assaults around Kalma camp in South Darfur within 5 weeks during  the summer of 2006 and the African Union reported that two AMIS soldiers  were killed in mid-August. In August 2006, the environment in Darfur  remained insecure, with attacks and displacement continuing and, during  some periods, worsening over time. State has noted that the Sudanese  government offensive that began in August 2006 against parties that did not  sign the Darfur Peace Agreement has directly impacted the ability of AMIS  to conduct operations, the African Union’s ability to implement the  agreement, and the delivery of humanitarian aid. A senior State official  reported that “Darfur is on the verge of a dangerous downward spiral. The  parties are rearming and repositioning to renew their fighting.” The level of  acceptance of the peace agreement overall in Darfur is uncertain, owing to  a general lack of information throughout the population regarding the  terms of the agreement as well as concern over the fact that the smaller  SLM/A faction and the JEM declined to sign the deal. UN officials have  warned that continued militia attacks on IDPs are affecting implementation  of the peace agreement and emphasized that successful implementation of  the agreement is key to peace in Darfur, in the Sudan, and in the wider  region. In September 2006, an African Union Peace and Security Council  communiqué noted that “the security situation remains volatile and  continues to deteriorate even further in some parts of Darfur, consequently  worsening the humanitarian and human rights situation, and the current  build-up of forces by all the parties poses further risks and challenges to  the peace efforts.” On September 19, 2006, the U.S. President named former  USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios as a Presidential Special Envoy to  lead U.S. efforts to resolve outstanding disputes in Darfur.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: As the primary donor of humanitarian assistance for Darfur, the United  States has provided essential aid for the people of Darfur and improved the  health and livelihood of IDPs and affected residents. Without U.S.  assistance, the humanitarian organizations responding to the crisis would  likely have been incapable of providing coverage to many of the affected  population. The U.S. contribution to building and maintaining all AMIS  facilities has also been essential, along with other donor assistance, to  AMIS’s ability to pursue its mandate. As insecurity continues in Darfur,  such support may be required well into the future.
At the same time, delayed humanitarian assistance has hindered NGO and  UN operations, jeopardizing these USAID partners’ ability to provide  services to affected and IDP communities needed to maintain improved  levels of health. Further, continued resistance and lack of cooperation from  the government of Sudan, as well as continued insecurity and conflict  within Darfur, have made it nearly impossible for humanitarian  organizations to provide consistent and complete coverage to the affected  residents and IDPs throughout Darfur. Although USAID has taken steps to  ensure more complete reporting, the limitations in its oversight of U.S.  assistance have made it difficult to accurately determine the impact of U.S.  humanitarian assistance. The fact that the violence in Darfur has not  abated, and has even worsened in some instances, indicates the region’s  need for continued assistance.
Although AMIS is seen as having contributed, through its presence in  Darfur, to decreasing large-scale violence, its fulfillment of its mandate has  been limited by the incompleteness or inconsistency of some of its  actions—such as efforts to protect civilians—in addition to numerous  operational challenges. Some of these challenges—for example, AMIS’s  small size, its resources constraints, and the lack of cooperation from the  parties to the conflict—have remained beyond its control. However, other  challenges, such as AMIS’s inadequate management, organization, and  capacity, may stem from the African Union’s lack of experience with peace  support efforts. At the same time, the ongoing and increasing violence in  Darfur, as well as AMIS’s added responsibilities under the May 2006 peace  agreement, make it likely that the challenges AMIS has faced will intensify.  The proffered NATO assistance in reviewing AMIS operations---a typical  “lessons learned” activity following a peacekeeping initiative—could  provide a useful critical analysis of these challenges and their root causes.  The resulting insights could assist the African Union in strengthening  AMIS, if its mandate is renewed, as well as in planning and executing any  future peace support efforts. Absent a stronger AMIS or intervention by  another international party such as the UN, the conflict in Darfur could  continue indefinitely to disrupt and destroy the lives of Darfurians.
section_title: Recommendation
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of State encourage the Chairperson of  the African Union Commission to ensure that an appropriate body, such as  NATO, provide assistance for an assessment of AMIS operations to identify  the key challenges AMIS has faced and the reasons for those challenges.  Such a “lessons learned” assessment would provide information necessary  to allow (1) the African Union to strengthen its future peace support  planning and operations and (2) the donor community to support future  African Union peace support efforts in a manner that could minimize  difficulties such as those encountered by AMIS.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and Defense  as well as USAID. We received written comments from the Department of  State and USAID. The Department of State supported our recommendation  and noted that the report presents a balanced and accurate picture of the  situation in Darfur. The department also suggested that the report provide  additional details or characterizations regarding certain, primarily AMIS,  issues. For example, State suggested that the report should (1) emphasize  the speed with which AMIS forces were deployed to Darfur and (2) note  that the Sudanese government's offensive against parties that did not sign  the Darfur Peace Agreement has directly impacted the ability of AMIS to  conduct operations. We incorporated such information into the report as  appropriate. See appendix V for a reproduction of State's letter and our  response. USAID commented that in general, it found the report to be a  comprehensive assessment of USAID’s involvement in Darfur but said that  we should include additional information in our discussions of areas such  as the number of USAID staff working in Darfur and the variety of efforts  used by the agency to monitor grants. Specifically, USAID stated that our  reference to reduced staff in Darfur was incomplete and felt that our  discussion of incomplete reporting did not highlight other monitoring  efforts, such as site visits and meetings with NGOs. We made adjustments  as appropriate. See appendix VI for a reproduction of USAID’s letter and  our response. DOD provided no comments on the draft report.
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the  date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of U.S. Foreign  Assistance and USAID Administrator, relevant congressional committees,  and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others  upon request. In addition, the report will be available on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3149 or at gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. Other contacts and major contributors are listed in  appendix VII.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report examines (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to help  relieve the crisis in Darfur, (2) challenges that the U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID) and its implementing partners have  encountered, (3) the African Union’s efforts to fulfill its peace support  mandate in Darfur, and (4) factors affecting the implementation of this  mandate.
We collected data on international contributions (in dollar amounts) for  Darfur provided by the UN Resource Tracking Service from September  2003 through June 2006. The amounts provided by the UN contain both  amounts committed and amounts pledged for Darfur by international  donors. We did not include pledges and commitments from international  donors that support the refugees located in Chad, because we did not  review U.S. obligations to refugees in Chad. We made this decision because  (1) security restrictions and conflict in the area prevented us from  observing U.S.-funded activities in Chad and (2) the support for refugees in  Chad was small in comparison with assistance provided to Darfur. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of  broadly comparing the United States’ contributions with those of other  international donors. We noted several limitations in the data, notably, that  the data include verbal pledges that were self-reported to the UN Resource  Tracking System by the donors. According to a UN official, the data may  exceed other, similar UN data on donor contributions, because they include  verbal pledges that have not been formally submitted to and verified by UN  sources. Furthermore, we were unable to determine the reliability of  financial records and the dollar amounts reportedly pledged by donors.
To review U.S. funding of humanitarian assistance—our first objective—we  collected and reviewed U.S. obligations data for assistance for Darfur from  USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Office of Transition  Initiatives, and Office of Food for Peace, as well as The Department of  State (State) Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. To assess the  reliability of these data, we interviewed State and USAID officials regarding  their methods for managing and tracking the obligation data, and we  compared these data with the amounts listed in State’s and USAID’s  agreements with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and UN agencies.  According to a USAID official, expenditure data for the Office of Foreign  Disaster Assistance are not tracked in the office’s reporting system, but the  data are reconciled on a daily basis and include any amounts that may have  been de-obligated. A USAID Food for Peace official also indicated that the  office’s tracking system is also reconciled on a regular basis. Therefore, we  concluded that the data we collected on obligations from each agency are  sufficiently reliable for the purpose of reviewing U.S. humanitarian  assistance for Darfur from October 1, 2003, through September 30, 2006.
To review the activities and programs undertaken with U.S. humanitarian  assistance, we reviewed USAID grant agreements. We interviewed USAID  and State officials in Washington, D.C., as well as UN officials located in  New York who were involved in humanitarian assistance for Darfur. In  February 2006, we traveled to Khartoum and Darfur, Sudan, to examine the  activities supported by U.S. humanitarian assistance. In Khartoum we met  with U.S. implementing partners from NGOs and UN agencies, as well as an  official from the government of Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In  addition, we visited seven camps for internally displaced persons (IDP)— Abu Shouk, Al Salaam, El Serif, Kalma, Kass, Otash, and Zam Zam—located  in North and South Darfur to observe activities and programs implemented  with U.S. funds. We observed a variety of programs and activities  supported by U.S. assistance, including food distribution, medical clinics,  clean water and sanitation facilities, income-generation activities,  provision of shelter materials, and nutritional feeding centers. We spoke  with officials from the NGOs and UN agencies implementing these  activities programs in Darfur. We also spoke with IDPs in the camps to  obtain their perspectives on the provision of humanitarian assistance in the  camps. Restrictions placed on our travel by the State Regional Security  Officer in Khartoum because of security concerns limited the area in which  we traveled and observed NGO and UN operations in Darfur.
To examine the results of the humanitarian assistance activities, we  reviewed the 15 final reports submitted by NGOs to USAID’s Office of  Foreign Disaster Assistance. We reviewed the original NGO proposals to  identify the indictors used to identify performance, and we also reviewed  USAID guidance for reporting. We compared the indicators included in the  original proposals to the reported indicators in each final report and  identified the indicators that were absent from the final reports. We  interviewed USAID officials to identify USAID’s efforts to monitor and  evaluate NGO and UN activities in Darfur as well as efforts to motivate  NGOs to submit final reports. We also reviewed the Office of Food for  Peace performance review questionnaires submitted by implementing  partners providing food aid for Darfur. In addition, we spoke with an  official from the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives to discuss an  ongoing program review. We also reviewed UN Humanitarian Profile  reports that provide an overview of humanitarian assistance from April  2004 to July 2006. These reports were also used to identify the IDP and  affected resident population in Darfur, by month. According to UN officials  and the profiles, NGOs and UN agencies operating throughout Darfur  submitted the information from the reports to the UN on a monthly basis  until January 2006, and now submit it quarterly. Although the data  contained in the reports are self-reported, UN officials indicated that they  confirm data to the extent possible and update the data each month.  Furthermore, the UN Humanitarian Profiles are the only source of  information regarding the total number of IDPs and affected residents in  Darfur and the number of IDPs receiving assistance in each sector. We  determined that the population data and the data regarding the population  receiving assistance were reliable for the purposes of presenting a general  overview of assistance in Darfur.
To determine the obstacles and challenges facing NGOs and UN agencies— our second objective—we reviewed UN and USAID reports and cables  discussing humanitarian operations and problems in Darfur. We  interviewed USAID, UN, and NGO officials in Darfur to discuss the  challenges they face in implementing assistance program and activities in  Darfur. We also met with officials from the Sudan government  Humanitarian Assistance Committee to discuss the obstacles and concerns  of NGOs and UN officials operating in Darfur and obtain the perspective  and input of the Sudan government regarding these issues.
In order to identify African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) efforts and the  operational challenges AMIS has faced—our third and fourth objectives— as well as resources available to AMIS to pursue its mandate, we used  numerous African Union sources. We reviewed African Union Peace and  Security Council communiqués, as well as reports prepared by the  Chairperson of the African Union Commission that were submitted to the  council. We also reviewed African Union-led reviews of AMIS, conducted in  March and December 2005, as well as a UN-led assessment of AMIS  performance conducted in August of that year. In February 2006, we met  with AMIS leadership (military and civilian police) at AMIS headquarters in  El Fasher and the following AMIS group sites in North and South Darfur— Zam Zam, Kabkabiya, Sarif Umra, Um Kadada, Nyala, Kass and El Daein— where we discussed the AMIS mandate and AMIS activities at each  location. We also discussed AMIS efforts with the U.S. representative to the  African Union-led Ceasefire Commission, as well as U.S. representatives  (military observers) in four locations. We were unable to travel to AMIS  sites in West Darfur owing to security concerns. At African Union  headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, we met with senior African Union  officials, including the Commissioner for the African Union’s Peace and  Security Council and the head of the Darfur Integrated Task Force in  February 2006. To assess reports prepared by the AMIS Ceasefire  Commission, we analyzed the contents of all publicly available reports  from the African Union’s Web site, www.africa- union.org/DARFUR/CFC.htm.
We also discussed the African Union’s initiative in Darfur and external  donor efforts with officials from the Departments of State (in Washington,  D.C.; Khartoum and El Fasher, Sudan; and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) and  Defense (DOD). At State headquarters in Washington, we discussed the  situation in Darfur and AMIS efforts with the following bureaus and offices:  Administration, African Affairs; International Organization Affairs;  Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Population, Refugees, and  Migration; and War Crimes Issues. At DOD, we met with the staff from the  Office of the Secretary of Defense. Further, we reviewed UN Security  Council resolutions, UN reports that addressed the situation in Darfur, and  a UN August 2005 report that assessed AMIS operations. We met with  officials from the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New  York. We also met with European Union and UN officials at African Union  headquarters in Addis Ababa. In addition, we met with officials from, and  reviewed reports prepared by, expert and advocacy groups such as the  International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, and Refugees  International. Finally, we met with Sudanese government officials in  Khartoum and Washington, D.C.
To review the U.S. government’s support for AMIS, we discussed this  support with officials from the African Union and Departments of State and  Defense. To identify contractor activities, we reviewed the contract  documentation defining the terms for tasks performed by PAE Government  Services, Inc., (PAE) in Darfur. Further, we reviewed PAE weekly situation  reports, describing events related to camp construction and maintenance  and submitted to State, and met with officials from PAE in Washington,  D.C., and North and South Darfur. We also discussed PAE’s efforts with an  official who was working on contract in Darfur as State’s Contracting  Officer’s Technical Representative. PAE and State officials accompanied us  on our visit to AMIS camps, providing tours of each AMIS site, as well as to  the logistics operating base in El Fasher and the forward operating base in  Nyala, explaining the process for constructing and maintaining AMIS  facilities. We determined that data obtained from PAE were sufficiently  reliable for inclusion in our report. To identify the amount of U.S. funding  that has been provided to construct and maintain AMIS camps, we spoke  with State officials from the African Affairs and Administration bureaus. In  particular, we had detailed discussions with a key official from the African  Affairs Bureau who provided information on funding, provided by fiscal  year, and the funding source. The official prepared a calculation of U.S.  funding for PAE efforts independently. All figures addressing State funding  to support AMIS provided in the report are attributed to this State official  and were not independently verified. However, after discussions with  multiple State officials knowledgeable about State support for PAE who  cited the State official as a key source within State for this information,  combined with a review of State’s information by PAE officials, we have  determined that the funding information provided is sufficiently reliable for  inclusion in our report with appropriate attribution. We discussed oversight  regarding this funding with State officials in Darfur and Washington.
We conducted our work from September 2005 to November 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Timeline of Darfur Events
paragraphs: In early 2003, Darfur rebels attacked Sudanese police stations and the  airport in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. In El Fasher, the rebels  destroyed numerous military aircraft, killed numerous soldiers, and  kidnapped a Sudanese general. In response, the government armed and  supported local tribal and other militias (the Janjaweed). Fighting between  the rebel groups and the Sudan military and other armed militia intensified  during late 2003. The principal rebel groups are the Sudan Liberation  Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).
In April 2004, there was limited humanitarian presence in Darfur, with only  202 humanitarian staff working in the region. In addition, some of the  nongovernmental organizations (NGO) operating in Darfur provided only  limited humanitarian assistance, since their primary focus was on  development assistance.
On December 21, 2004, Save the Children-UK announced that it was  discontinuing humanitarian operations in Darfur following two incidents in  October and December that resulted in the deaths of four staff members.  Save the Children had operated in Darfur for 20 years.
At the end of 2004, total pledges and commitments for Darfur from  international donors in 2004 totaled more than $890 million. The United  States committed or pledged more than $271 million (31 percent).
The population of Darfur estimated to be affected by the violence, both  internally displaced persons (IDP) and affected residents, rose to more than  3.2 million people, 1.9 million of whom are IDPs.
The number of humanitarian aid workers in Darfur grew to a total of 13,715  workers from 13 UN agencies and 82 NGOs.
Total pledges and commitments for Darfur in 2005, from all donors, totaled  almost $675 million. The United States committed or pledged nearly $365  million (54 percent).
Following an escalation of violence in the Jebel Mara area of West Darfur, on  January 25, 2006, GOAL, an international NGO, evacuated all staff in the  region and abandoned operations. During the evacuation of staff, a  helicopter crash resulted in the death of one GOAL aid worker.
On April 28, the UN WFP announced that shortages in funds would force  WFP to begin reducing the daily food rations for the people of Darfur in May.  WFP indicated that the reduced rations would extend limited food stocks  during the “hunger season,” when needs are greatest. Owing to contributions  by the U.S. and Sudanese governments, the rations were only cut to 84  percent of the daily requirement.
As of June 2006, international pledges and commitments for Darfur in 2006  totaled almost $331 million. According to the UN, this amount was  approximately $320 million less than the required funding for 2006. The  United States committed almost $240 million (72 percent).
On May 25, 2004, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council issued a  communiqué stressing the need for the three parties to the conflict—the  government of Sudan, the SLM/A, and the JEM—to implement the April 2004  Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. Further, the Peace and Security Council  authorized the initial deployment of an African Union Observer Mission to  support the work of the newly created Ceasefire Commission.
On October 20, 2004, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council issued  a communiqué that established an AMIS presence in Darfur of 3,320  personnel. These personnel were to include 2,341 military personnel, among  them 450 observers, and up to 815 civilian police as well as appropriate  civilian personnel. Further, AMIS was given a specific mandate to monitor  and observe compliance with the ceasefire agreement, assist in the process  of confidence building, and contribute to a secure environment for the  delivery of humanitarian relief. This was the first time the council called for a  civilian police presence.
On April 28, 2005, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council issued a  communiqué praising AMIS efforts and noting improvements where the  mission was deployed in Darfur but concluding that the current force was  overstretched. The communiqué increased AMIS’s strength to a total of  6,171 military personnel, with an appropriate civilian component, including  up to 1,560 civilian police personnel, for a total force of at least 7,731.
From August 2005 on, 35 AMIS personnel were abducted; 4 Nigerian  protection force soldiers were killed; and vehicles, communications  equipment, weapons, and ammunition were lost. According to an African  Union assessment of AMIS, these attacks on AMIS undermined the  mission’s credibility in the eyes of civilians and emboldened those who might  target AMIS. In July 2006, 32 AMIS personnel were abducted.
On March 10, 2006, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council  confirmed its January 2006 expression of support for a transition of AMIS to  a UN operation. The council requested that the African Union Commission  vigorously pursue its efforts toward reaching, as quickly as possible, the  authorized AMIS strength of 7,731.
On April 30, 2006, AMIS deployment reached 7,271 (755 military observers,  5,086 protection force troops, and 1,430 civilian police). In addition, another  155 personnel were serving as air crew or interpreters or in other roles. Of  total AMIS deployment, 312 were women. Protection force troops came from  Rwanda, Nigeria, Senegal, Gambia, and South Africa. AMIS deployment  was below the authorized level of about 7,731, primarily because an  expected contingent of South African troops was never deployed.
On September 20, the African Union Peace and Security Council extended  the mandate of AMIS from September 30, 2006 to December 31, 2006.
The initial cease-fire agreement between the parties to the conflict (the  Sudanese government and SLM/A) and mediated by the government of  Chad, is signed; the agreed collapsed by December of 2003.
On April 8, 2004 the three parties to the conflict signed the “Agreement on  Humanitarian Ceasefire on the Conflict in Darfur” in N’djamena, Chad. The  parties agreed to, among other things, refrain from any act of violence or any  other abuse on civilian populations. The parties further agreed to establish a  cease-fire commission to, among other things, plan, verify, and ensure  implementation of the cease-fire agreement provisions.
On November 9, 2004, the three parties to the conflict signed two protocols  in Abuja, Nigeria. (1) “Protocol Between the Government of the Sudan  (GOS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and  Equality Movement (JEM) on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation  in Darfur” commits the parties to, among other things, guarantee unimpeded  and unrestricted access for humanitarian workers and assistance to reach all  needy people throughout Darfur and take all steps required to prevent all  attacks against civilians by any party or group, including the Janjaweed. The  protocol also requests the UN to expand the number of human rights  monitors in Darfur. (2) “Protocol Between the Government of the Sudan  (GOS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and  Equality Movement (JEM) on the Enhancement of the Security Situation in  Darfur in Accordance with the N’djamena Agreement” commits the parties to,  among other things, recommit themselves to ensuring an effective cease-fire  by refraining from all hostilities and military actions, submit to the cease-fire  commission all information needed to carry out its mandate, and release all  persons detained in relation to the hostilities in Darfur. The Sudanese  government also agreed to implement its stated commitment to neutralize  and disarm the Janjaweed.
On July 5, 2005, the three parties to the conflict signed the “Declaration of  Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur.” This  declaration established 17 principles to guide future deliberations and  constituted the basis for a settlement of the Darfur conflict. These principles  address issues such as    respect for the diversity of the Sudanese people,  democracy, political pluralism, rule of law, independence of the judiciary,  and freedom of the media;  effective representation in all government institutions by the citizens of  Sudan, including those from Darfur;  equitable distribution of national wealth;  provision of humanitarian assistance;  return to places of origin for IDPs;  rehabilitation/reconstruction of Darfur; and  broad security arrangements.
On May 5, 2006, the Sudanese government and the SLM/A faction with the  largest military force signed the Darfur Peace Agreement. This agreement  has provisions on   power sharing (including the creation of the Senior Assistant to the  President, the fourth-highest position in the Sudanese government,  appointed by the President from a list of nominees provided by the rebel  movements);   wealth sharing (including the creation of a Darfur reconstruction and  development fund that will receive $700 million in funds from the Sudanese  government between 2006 and 2008); and  security arrangements (including a requirement for verifiable disarmament  of the Janjaweed militia by the Sudanese government).
The smaller SLM/A faction and JEM did not sign the agreement.
In 2003 and 2004, USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)  deployed field staff to Sudan to assess the extent of the Darfur crisis. In April  2004, responding to the growing humanitarian emergency, USAID/OFDA  mobilized a Disaster Assistance Response Team. USAID continued a  phased deployment of humanitarian personnel as official access and  improved security allowed for its increased presence in Darfur.
Secretary Powell visited Sudan, the first U.S. Secretary of State to do so in  26 years. Powell met with Sudan’s President Omar Al-Bashir, emphasizing  the need to dismantle the Janjaweed to restore security to the region and  enable IDPs to return home. The government of Sudan agreed to this  objective as well as to removing restrictions on humanitarian aid and  participating in a political resolution of the Darfur crisis facilitated by the  African Union.
PAE, a U.S. company, via a contract with the U.S. Department of State and  with assistance from another U.S. contractor, began building camps for AMIS  troops in Darfur. PAE initially constructed five camps (in El Fasher, Nyala, El  Geneina, Tine, and Kabkabiya) for AMIS troops. Significant challenges were  identified in building these camps, such as transporting materials to building  sites and providing water to AMIS personnel. PAE eventually built a total of  32 AMIS camps.
On July 22, 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate  unanimously passed separate resolutions [H.Con.Res. 467, 108th Cong.  (2004); S.Con.Res. 133, 108th Cong. (2004)] declaring the crisis in Darfur to  be genocide, based on articles of the Convention on the Prevention and  Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. These resolutions declare  that the government of Sudan has violated the Convention and call upon the  member states of the United Nations to undertake measures to prevent  genocide in Darfur from escalating further. The resolutions also commend  the administration’s efforts in seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict and  in providing humanitarian assistance and urge it to continue to lead an  international effort to stop the genocide in Darfur.
On September 9, 2004, Powell testifies before Senate Foreign Relations  Committee and declares atrocities in Darfur to be genocide, based on  evidence collected by the Department of State. Further, he states that the  government of Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible and that the United  States, as a contracting party to the Genocide Convention, will demand that  the UN initiate a full investigation. President Bush made similar statements  that day.
On May 9, 2006, addressing the UN Security Council Ministerial on Sudan,  Secretary of State Rice reaffirmed the administration's declaration that the  violence in Darfur constitutes genocide. Additionally, Secretary Rice stated  that the Darfur Peace Agreement is an opportunity to end the crisis in the  region and allow people to return to their homes, emphasizing a role for UN  troops to implement the peace agreement. Secretary Rice also stated that  the United States had provided nearly all of the support that the WFP's  mission in Darfur had received.
On October 13, 2006, President Bush signed into law the Darfur Peace and  Accountability Act of 2006 which imposes sanctions against persons  responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; supports  measures for the protection of civilians and humanitarian operations; and  supports peace efforts in Darfur.
On December 5, 2003, the UN Under-Secretary-General in charge of the UN  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs stated, “The humanitarian  situation in Darfur has quickly become one of the worst in the world.”
On July 3, 2004, the government of Sudan and the UN signed a joint  communiqué in which the Sudanese government pledged to remove  obstacles to humanitarian assistance in Darfur and committed to disarming  the Janjaweed and other armed outlaw groups.
The UN Security Council called for the Sudanese government to fulfill its  commitment to facilitate humanitarian relief in Darfur and remove restrictions  that might hinder humanitarian aid to Darfur. In addition, the council called for  the government to disarm the Janjaweed militias and bring perpetrators of  human rights and international humanitarian law violations and other  atrocities to justice.
On January 25, 2005, the International Commission of Inquiry, established by  the UN, issued a report stating that the government of Sudan has not  pursued a policy of genocide. However, the commission reported that the  Sudanese government and the Janjaweed, have committed international  offences such as crimes against humanity and war crimes that may be no  less serious and heinous than genocide.
On March 24, 2005, the UN Security Council established the UN Mission in  Sudan (UNMIS) after determining that the situation in Darfur continued to  threaten international peace and security. UNMIS was mandated to support  implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; to facilitate and  coordinate the voluntary return of refugees and IDPs and humanitarian  assistance; to contribute to international efforts to protect and promote  human rights in Sudan; and to coordinate international efforts to protect  civilians. The council also called on all Sudanese parties to take immediate  steps to achieve a peaceful settlement to the Darfur conflict and take all  necessary action to prevent further violations of human rights and  international humanitarian law.
On March 31, 2005, the UN Security Council referred the situation in Darfur  to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, taking note of the  International Commission of Inquiry report on violations of international law  and human rights in Darfur.
On March 24, 2006, the UN Security Council called for preparatory planning  for a transition of AMIS to a UN operation. The plan was to include options for  reinforcing the Darfur peace effort through additional appropriate transitional  assistance to AMIS, including assistance in logistics, mobility and  communications.
On August 31, 2006, the UN Security Council commended the efforts of the  African Union for the successful deployment of AMIS but reaffirmed its  concern that ongoing violence in Darfur might further negatively affect the  rest of the Sudan as well as the region. The UN Security Council expanded  UNMIS’s mandate and determined that UNMIS should deploy to Darfur. As of  October 2006, the Sudanese government had refused a transition to a UN  force in Darfur.
section_title: Evolution of AMIS
paragraphs: The African Union mission in Sudan (AMIS) evolved as the African Union  has authorized the incremental deployment of thousands of personnel to  carry out its responsibilities in Darfur. In May 2004, after three parties  signed the April 2004 humanitarian cease-fire agreement, the African  Union’s Peace and Security Council authorized an observer mission to  Darfur. This mission began operations in June 2004 with 60 military  observers and 300 protection force soldiers as well as observers from the  Sudanese parties. In July, the Peace and Security Council called for a  comprehensive plan to enhance the effectiveness of the mission, including  the possibility of transforming the mission into a full-fledged peacekeeping  mission to ensure the effective implementation of the cease-fire  agreement. In October 2004, in conjunction with the issuance of an African  Union report that discussed the status of the mission and described the  situation in Darfur, the council decided to enhance AMIS to a total of 3,320  personnel, including 2,341 military personnel (military observers and  protection force troops), among them 450 observers; up to 815 civilian  police personnel (the first time that a civilian police component was  formally established); and appropriate civilian personnel.
The African Union Peace and Security Council provided AMIS II with the  following specific mandate for its peace support efforts: (1) to monitor and  observe compliance with the 2004 humanitarian cease-fire agreement; (2)  to assist in the process of confidence building; and (3) to contribute to a  secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and, beyond  that, the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes, and to contribute to  the improvement of the security situation throughout Darfur. In working to  meet this mandate, the council decided that AMIS II would, among other  tasks, “protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in  the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood  that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the  government of Sudan.”
In early 2005, the African Union decided to augment AMIS once again. In  April 2005, the Peace and Security Council authorized increasing the size of  AMIS to 6,171 military personnel, in addition to an appropriate civilian  component, including up to 1,560 civilian police personnel (for a total of  more than 7,700). This further expansion is referred to as AMIS II-E. These  AMIS personnel operate throughout eight sectors in Darfur that have been  established to help organize AMIS efforts. A Darfur Integrated Task Force  was established at African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to  assist with planning, force generation, procurement and logistics, and  administrative support and to interact with AMIS donors.
The African Union did not call for an AMIS civilian police presence until  AMIS operations were well under way. The civilian police component was  added to AMIS in October 2004 to, according to a senior UN official, further  the “rule of law” by working with Sudanese police. The European Union  was a strong proponent of a civilian police component, and European  Union officials told us that the civilian police gave European Union  member states the opportunity to play a direct role in AMIS by providing  police staff. Specifically, the role of the civilian police is, among other  things, to establish and maintain contact with the Sudanese police, observe  and report on Sudanese police service delivery, and monitor the security of  IDPs.
As of April 30, 2006, AMIS had 7,271 personnel in Darfur (755 military  observers, 5,086 soldiers/protection force, and 1,430 civilian police).  According to a UN official, AMIS deployed its troops much faster than the  UN could have done (although UN efforts have higher standards regarding  aspects of deployment such as required troop skills and equipment). The  majority of AMIS soldiers have come from Rwanda and Nigeria, with  additional troops from Senegal, Gambia, and South Africa. Military  observers from more than 20 countries (numerous African countries and  the United States, the European Union, and the three parties to the  conflict) and civilian police are participating in AMIS. The total number of  the AMIS force deployed in Darfur is far less than the authorized AMIS size  of more than 7,700—according to African Union sources, primarily because  expected South African troops were never fully deployed to Darfur.
In January 2006, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council officially  declared its approval, in principle, for the transition of AMIS to a UN  operation. In March, the council reaffirmed this position, and in May it  declared that “concrete steps should be taken to effect the transition from  AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation.” The UN Security Council  subsequently adopted a resolution commending AMIS’s role in reducing  large-scale, organized violence in Darfur; endorsing this African Union  decision to transition AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation; and stressing  that a UN operation would have, to the extent possible, a strong African  participation and character. In August 2006, the UN Security Council  adopted a resolution expanding UNMIS’s mandate and calling for an  UNMIS deployment to Darfur. The mandate of AMIS expires on   December 31, 2006.
section_title: NGOs and UN Agencies Receiving U.S. Nonfood Assistance Funding during Fiscal Years 2004–2006
paragraphs: Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development Community, Habitat, Finance Development Alternatives, Inc.
Harvard School of Public Health International Committee of the Red Cross United Methodist Committee on Relief United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
United Nations Department of Safety and Security United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children's Fund United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Continued From Previous Page)
section_title: Comments from the Department of State
paragraphs: Following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter dated  October 2, 2006.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. We have added the U.S. contribution of training and equipping  Rwandan and Nigerian battalions through the African Contingency  Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program to footnote 65. 2. We have added State’s perspective regarding the quick deployment of  AMIS troops, as well as a similar view expressed by a senior UN official  working in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 3. The report’s discussion of rebel group control over humanitarian  access reflects the views of UN and NGO officials. Further, the report  cites banditry and looting, as well as more violent acts, such as attacks  and the killing of humanitarian workers. 4. Owing to scope and time limitations, our review of specific AMIS  operations did not cover the period subsequent to the signing of the  Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006. However, we have added State’s  point regarding Sudanese government actions against parties that did  not sign the agreement. 5. As noted above, our review did not assess AMIS operations subsequent  to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006, although we  have identified instances of violence against the AMIS civilian police  since that time, such as (1) the burning of a civilian police station and  three vehicles by IDPs in Hassahisa IDP camp at Zalengei and (2) the  killing of a civilian police language assistant and the attack of eight  civilian police officers by IDPs in Kalma IDP camp at Nyala. Such  incidents appear contrary to the portrayal of the relationship between  the civilian police and IDPs provided here by State. 6. The report states that the improvements in mortality in Darfur have  been attributed, in part, to the humanitarian assistance provide by the  United States. 7. We have added this point to footnote 5.
section_title: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
paragraphs: Following are GAO’s comments on USAID’s letter dated October 17, 2006.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. The current number of USAID staff in Darfur has been reduced from as  many as 20 people to the current number of 6 staff in Darfur, although  the crisis in Darfur has resulted in increased number of IDPs and  affected residents that require assistance and a greater number of  NGOs and UN agencies operating in Darfur. We understand that USAID  does not always have control over staffing decisions and is sometimes  limited by staff ceilings set by State. However, we believe that in the  absence of complete reporting by NGOs, a reduction in USAID staff,  complicated by the current inability of these staff to work in Darfur,  affects USAID’s ability to provide comprehensive oversight of U.S.- funded humanitarian assistance in Darfur. 2. We determined that 6 of the 15 required final reports were not  submitted by USAID partners and that most of the reports did not  provide all required information. The lack of required reporting  prevented USAID from fully monitoring NGO performance and  measuring the impact of U.S. humanitarian assistance to Darfur.  However, we report additional USAID monitoring and evaluation  efforts, such as regular communication with NGOs, performed by  USAID in Darfur. In addition, we note that such efforts can be limited  by issues identified in our report such as travel restrictions imposed by  the Sudanese government and continuing insecurity throughout the  region. We also have added information to the report noting recent  USAID efforts to collect reports from its implementing partners that  reportedly resulted in 100 percent compliance with quarterly reporting  requirements in July 2006. USAID’s recent emphasis on collecting  required reports may improve its ability to conduct oversight of U.S.- funded humanitarian operations in Darfur.
3.
In late October, we identified a UN humanitarian profile for July 1, 2006,  that had become available to the public. This document stated that the  number of IDPs stood at 1.85 million as of July 1, 2006.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the person named above, Emil Friberg, (Assistant Director),  Martin De Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Leslie Holen, Theresa Lo, Reid Lowe,  Grace Lui, John F. Miller, and Chhandasi Pandya made key contributions to  this report.
section_title: Bibliography
subsections: section_title: Published Reviews of AMIS Operations
paragraphs: -Led Joint Assessment Mission 10 – 20 December 2005.
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), MAPEX Exercise AMIS  Renaissance After Action Review, August 2005.
The  Assessment Mission to Darfur, Sudan 10-22 March  2005:  Report of the Joint Assessment Team.
Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Imperatives for Immediate Change, The  African Union  Mission in Sudan,” January 2006 (available at  http://hrw.org/reports/2006/sudan0106).
International Crisis Group, “The ’s Mission in Darfur:  Bridging the Gaps,” Africa Briefing No. 28, July  2005 (available at  http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3547).
International Crisis Group, “The /  Partnership in Darfur: Not Yet a Winning Combination,” Africa Report No.  99, October 2005 (available at  http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3766).
Sally Chin and Jonathan Morgenstein, “No Power to Protect:  The African  Union Mission in Sudan,” Refugees International, November 2005  (available at  http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/publication/detail/7222).
William G. O’Neill and Violette Cassis, “Protecting Two Million Internally  Displaced:  The Successes and Shortcomings of the African Union in  Darfur,” Occasional Paper, The Brookings Institution–University of Bern  Project on Internal Displacement, November 2005 (available at  http://www.brookings.edu/comm/news/200511_au_darfur.htm).