ATF: Thefts of Explosives from State and Local Government Storage Facilities Are Few but May Be Underreported
Published: 2005-10-03T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: More than 5.5 billion pounds of explosives are used each year in the United States by private sector companies and government entities. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has authority to regulate explosives and to license privately owned explosives storage facilities. After the July 2004 theft of several hundred pounds of explosives from a state and local government storage facility, concerns arose about vulnerability to theft. GAO analyzed (1) the extent of explosives thefts from state and local government facilities, (2) ATF's authority to regulate and oversee state and local government explosives storage facilities, (3) the information ATF collects about state and local government storage facilities, and (4) security oversight measures in place at selected state and local government storage facilities.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Judging from available ATF data, there have been few thefts of explosives from state and local government storage facilities. From January 2002 to February 2005, ATF received only 9 reports of thefts or missing explosives from state and local facilities, compared with a total of 205 explosives thefts reported nationwide during this same period. During the course of our audit, we found evidence of 5 thefts from state and local government facilities, 1 of which did not appear in ATF's national database on thefts and missing explosives. Thus, the actual number of thefts occurring at state and local storage facilities could be higher than that identified by ATF data. ATF has no authority to oversee or inspect all state and local government explosives storage facilities. State and local government agencies are not required to obtain a license from ATF to use and store explosives, and only licensees--such as private sector explosives storage facilities--are subject to mandatory oversight. As a result, ATF has no means to ensure that state and local government facilities are in compliance with federal regulations. While ATF does not collect nationwide information about state and local government explosives storage facilities, information about some of these facilities is collected--for example, when facility operators voluntarily request an ATF inspection. Since January 2002, ATF has conducted 77 voluntary inspections at state and local storage facilities and found no systemic violations. By comparison, all licensed private sector facilities must submit a variety of information about their facility--including location and security measures in place--to ATF during the licensing process. ATF also collects information about these facilities during mandatory inspections. At the 18 state and local government storage facilities we visited, a variety of security measures were in place, including locked gates, fencing, patrols, and in some cases, electronic surveillance. All the facilities' officials told GAO that they conducted routine inventories. But most were not required to be licensed or inspected by state or local regulatory agencies. We identified several instances of possible noncompliance with federal regulations, related primarily to storage safety issues rather than security.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: More than 5.5 billion pounds of explosives are used each year in the  United States. These explosives are used by both public sector entities  (such as state and local government agencies) and private sector  companies for a variety of purposes—including mining, construction,  avalanche control, and law enforcement. Under current federal explosives  laws and regulations, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and  Explosives (ATF) is responsible for licensing and regulating explosives  manufacturers, importers, dealers, and users. ATF’s authority to regulate  explosives stems originally from the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970  and was expanded further by enactment of the Safe Explosives Act in  2002. It is primarily through its licensing authority that ATF oversees and  inspects privately owned explosives facilities to ensure they comply with  explosives storage laws and regulations. With regard to government- owned explosives storage facilities, state and local agencies are also  subject to federal explosives storage laws and regulations, but exempt  from the ATF licensing requirements.
In July 2004, several hundred pounds of explosives were stolen from law  enforcement storage magazines at a city/county storage facility in  California. The thieves were subsequently arrested and the explosives  were recovered. Out of concern that state and local government  explosives storage facilities could be vulnerable to theft, you asked us to  provide information regarding the security oversight of these facilities. For  this report, we focused on the following questions:  1.  What is the extent of explosives thefts from state and local  government facilities and how does this compare with the total  number of explosives thefts reported nationwide?  2.  What authority does ATF have to regulate and oversee state and  local government explosives storage facilities and how does this  compare with its authority over private sector storage facilities?  3.  What information does ATF collect regarding the locations and  types and amounts of explosives stored at state and local  government explosives storage facilities and how does this  compare with information collected about private sector storage  facilities?  4.  What security oversight measures are in place at selected state and  local government storage facilities to ensure the safe and secure  storage of explosives?
To address these questions, we obtained information from U.S.  government agencies, law enforcement associations, industry groups, and  other experts on explosives. More specifically, to obtain the perspectives  of U.S. government agencies on their efforts to regulate and oversee state  and local government explosives storage facilities, and to obtain  information on the numbers of explosives thefts and law enforcement  bomb squads, we contacted officials from the Department of Justice  (DOJ), ATF, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). To obtain  other public sector and private sector perspectives on the security  oversight of explosives storage facilities, we contacted associations  representing state and local law enforcement agencies and the explosives  industry. To determine what selected states and localities are doing to  provide oversight of explosives storage in state and local government  sector facilities, we met with officials at 14 state and local government  entities (13 law enforcement bomb squads and one public university) in  four states—Colorado, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas—and  observed their explosives storage facilities. We selected these four states  to obtain a geographic spread (west, northeast, southeast, and southwest)  across the country, based on (1) the number of explosives licensees and  reported explosives thefts, (2) the number of law enforcement bomb  squads, and (3) the location of universities with mining programs. Our  criteria for identifying the type of security oversight measures in place  included existing federal explosives storage laws and regulations and  security guidelines issued by the explosives industry. Because we selected  and visited a limited nonprobability sample of 14 state and local entities in  the four states, the information discussed in this report cannot be  generalized to all state and local government agencies that store  explosives. Additional detail on our scope and methodology is provided in  appendix I.
We conducted our work from February through August 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: ATF is the chief enforcer of explosives laws and regulations in the United  States and is responsible for licensing and regulating explosives  manufacturers, importers, dealers, and users. ATF is also responsible for  regulating most, but not all, explosives storage facilities. ATF’s regulatory  authority over explosives stems from the Organized Crime Control Act of  1970. This statute imposed controls over the importation, manufacture,  distribution, and storage of explosives, and was the basis for giving ATF  enforcement responsibilities for these controls. The Safe Explosives Act  expanded ATF’s authority to generally require licenses for persons who  purchase or receive explosives and background checks on licensees and  their employees who handle explosives.
Under federal explosives regulations, a license is required for persons who  manufacture, import, or deal in explosives and, with some exceptions, for  persons who intend to acquire explosives for use. No license is required  solely to operate an explosives storage facility. However, all persons who  store explosive materials (including state and local agencies) must  conform with applicable ATF storage regulations, irrespective of whether  they are required to obtain an explosives license for other purposes. State  and local agencies are not required to obtain an explosives license to use  and store explosives. Similarly, federal government agencies, the U.S.  military, and other federally owned or operated establishments are exempt  from compliance with both the licensing and the storage regulations.  According to ATF data, as of February 2005 there were 12,028 federal  explosives licensees in the United States. Roughly 7,500 of these had some  kind of explosives storage facility, consisting of 22,791 permanent or  mobile storage magazines.
ATF storage regulations include requirements relating to the safety and  security of explosives storage magazines—that is, any building or  structure (other than an explosives manufacturing building) used for  storage of explosive materials. Regarding safety, the storage regulations  include requirements related to location, construction, capacity,  housekeeping, interior lighting, and magazine repairs, as well as a  requirement that the local fire safety authority be notified of the location  of each storage magazine. Regarding security, the ATF storage regulations  include the following requirements:    Explosives handling. All explosive materials must be kept in locked  magazines unless they are in the process of manufacture, being  physically handled in the operating process of a licensee or user, being  used, or being transported to a place of storage or use. Explosives are  not to be left unattended when in portable storage magazines.
Magazine construction. Storage magazines must be theft-resistant and  must meet specific requirements dealing with such things as mobility,  exterior construction, door hinges and hasps, and locks.
Magazine inspection. Storage magazines must be inspected at least  every 7 days. This inspection need not be an inventory, but it must be  sufficient to determine if there has been an unauthorized entry or  attempted entry into the magazines, or unauthorized removal of the  magazine contents.
Magazine inventory. Within the magazine, containers of explosive  materials are to be stored so that marks are visible. Stocks of explosive  materials are to be stored so they can be easily counted and checked.
Notwithstanding the security requirements described above, ATF storage  regulations do not require explosives storage facilities to have any of the  following physical security features—fences, restricted property access,  exterior lighting, alarm systems, or electronic surveillance. Also, while  ATF licensing regulations require explosives licensees to conduct a  physical inventory at least annually, there is no similar inventory  requirement in the storage regulations applicable to other persons who  store explosives.
section_title: Limited Data Indicate That Few Thefts May Have Occurred at State and Local Government Storage Facilities, but the Exact Number Is Uncertain
paragraphs: According to ATF data, the number of reported state and local government  thefts is relatively small when compared with the total number of thefts  that have occurred nationwide. For example, during a recent 3-year period  (January 2002—February 2005), 9 thefts involving state and local  government storage facilities were reported. Of these, 5 involved state and  local law enforcement agencies (1 was later determined to be the possible  result of training explosives that had been mistakenly discarded), 3 others  involved state government entities (all universities), and the remaining  incident took place at a county highway department. Two of the 9  incidents occurred in California (including last year’s theft that was  mentioned previously), and no other state reported more than one  incident. By comparison, during this same period, ATF received reports of  205 explosives thefts nationwide from all sources. Three states— California, Texas, and Pennsylvania—accounted for about one-quarter  (53) of the total reported thefts nationwide. According to ATF officials,  this may be due to the larger numbers of explosives licensees and storage  magazines located in these three states.
The amounts of explosives reported stolen or missing from state and local  government facilities in each reported incident of theft are also relatively  small when compared with the total amounts of stolen and missing  explosives nationwide. For example, during a recent 10-month period for  which data were available (March 2003 through December 2003), there  were a total of 76 theft incidents nationwide reported to ATF, amounting  to a loss of about 3,600 pounds of high explosives, 3,100 pounds of blasting  agents, 1,400 detonators, and 2,400 feet of detonating cord and safety fuse.  By comparison, over an entire 10-year period (January 1995—December  2004), ATF received only 14 reports of theft from state and local law  enforcement storage magazines. In 10 of these incidents, less than 50  pounds of explosives was reported stolen or missing; while in 3 of the  incidents, more than 50 pounds was stolen or missing. In 6 of these 14  cases, ATF data indicate that most or all of the explosives were recovered;  in the other 8 cases, none of the explosives have been recovered.
While the ATF theft data indicate that thefts from state and local facilities  make up only a small part of the overall thefts nationwide, these reports  may be understated by an unknown amount. There are two federal  reporting requirements relating to the theft of explosives. One is specific  to all federal explosives licensees (and permittees) and requires any  licensee to report any theft or loss of explosives to ATF within 24 hours of  discovery. The second reporting requirement generally requires any other  “person” who has knowledge of the theft or loss of any explosive materials  from his stock to report to ATF within 24 hours. Although the term  “person” as defined in law and regulation does not specifically include  state and local government agencies, ATF has historically interpreted this  requirement as applying to nonlicensed state and local government  explosives storage facilities. With respect to the second reporting  requirement, according to ATF, the legislative history of the Organized  Crime Control Act of 1970 indicates that Congress believed visibility over  all incidents  of stolen explosives was necessary to  effectively enforce any federal explosives regulatory statute—primarily  because of the special problems presented by stolen explosive materials  and the persons possessing them.
While ATF has interpreted the theft reporting requirement as applying to  state and local government explosives storage facilities, ATF officials  acknowledged that state and local government entities could be unsure as  to their coverage under the theft reporting requirements. As a result, some  state and local government entities may not know they are required to  report such incidents to ATF, and this lack of information could impair  ATF’s ability to monitor these incidents and take appropriate investigative  action. Indeed, during our site visits and other state and local contacts, we  identified five state and local government entities that had previously  experienced an incident of theft or reported missing explosives—two  involving local law enforcement agencies, two involving state universities,  and one involving a state department of transportation. However, one of  these five incidents did not appear in ATF’s nationwide database of  reported thefts and missing explosives. Based on these findings, the actual  number of thefts occurring at state and local government storage facilities  nationwide could be more than the number identified by ATF data.
section_title: ATF Authority to Oversee State and Local Government Explosives Storage Facilities Is Limited, as Is ATF’s Capacity to Absorb Additional Oversight Responsibilities
paragraphs: With certain exceptions (such as for federal agencies), federal explosives  law requires all persons who store explosives to conform to applicable  regulations. However, there is no ATF oversight mechanism in place to  ensure that state and local government facilities have complied with the  regulations. With respect to private sector entities, ATF’s authority to  oversee explosives storage facilities is primarily a function of its licensing  process. However, the licensing requirements described in the law and  regulations above do not apply to the transportation, shipment, receipt, or  importation of explosive materials to any state or its political subdivision  (such as a city or county). That is, government entities, such as state and  local law enforcement agencies, are not required to obtain a federal  license to use and store explosives. In addition, ATF does not have  specific statutory authority to conduct regulatory inspections at state and  local explosives storage facilities. As a result, these facilities are not  subject to mandatory oversight under ATF’s licensing authority or any  ATF regulatory inspection authority apart from the licensing process.
ATF may inspect state and local government storage facilities under  certain circumstances—for example, if the operator of the facility  voluntarily requests ATF to conduct an inspection. Since January 2002,  ATF has conducted 77 voluntary inspections at state and local storage  facilities—34 inspections at facilities that ATF shares with state and local  agencies and 43 inspections at other state and local facilities. These  inspections basically involve checking for compliance with federal storage  regulations, including verifying proper construction of the storage  magazine and verifying that the amount of explosives stored is consistent  with the approved table of distances. In addition to conducting voluntary  inspections, ATF also conducts inspections of state and local explosives  storage magazines that are shared by ATF and a state or local agency. ATF  currently shares space in 52 storage magazines, including 33 that are  owned or leased by state and local agencies. Shared magazines are subject  to mandatory inspections by ATF, and the inspection procedures are  basically the same as those described above for voluntary inspections.  According to ATF officials, no significant or systemic safety or security  problems have been found during inspections of state and local storage  magazines. However, regarding those state and local government facilities  that ATF does not inspect, ATF officials acknowledged they had no way of  knowing the extent to which these facilities are complying with federal  storage regulations.
By comparison with state and local government entities, private sector  licensees are subject to mandatory ATF oversight and inspection. Under  provisions of the Safe Explosives Act, ATF is generally required to  physically inspect a license applicant’s storage facility prior to issuing a  federal explosives license—which effectively means at least one  inspection every 3 years. This inspection is intended to verify that the  applicant’s storage facility complies with federal regulations regarding  safety and security, and the inspection requirement applies to original  license applications, as well as renewals (with certain exceptions). In  addition, the regulations allow ATF to inspect licensees at any time during  business hours, for the purpose of inspecting or examining any records or  documents required to be maintained and any explosive materials kept or  stored at the premises.
ATF officials stated that if the agency were to be required to conduct  mandatory inspections of state and local government storage facilities,  they would likely need additional resources to conduct these inspections  because they are already challenged to keep up with inspections that are  mandated as part of the explosives licensing requirements. One factor that  affects ATF’s ability to meet inspection goals is that inspectors have to  conduct inspections of licensed firearms dealers, manufacturers, and  importers, as well as explosives licensees. As noted above, ATF must  physically inspect explosives licensees at least once every 3 years—or  about one-third (4,000) of the roughly 12,000 licensees each year.  According to ATF officials, because license applications and renewals are  not evenly distributed over this 3-year cycle, some years there may  actually be more or less than 4,000 inspections per year. ATF currently has  723 field inspectors, 620 of whom regularly conduct explosives and  firearms inspections (the others are in supervisory or administrative  positions). About 20 percent of the inspection time is spent on explosives  inspections; the remainder is spent on firearms.
In July 2004, DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reported that  ATF’s inspections program was being affected by staffing shortages. The  OIG noted that in response to passage of the Safe Explosives Act, ATF had  to divert resources from firearms inspections to conduct explosives  inspections required under the act. The OIG report further stated that ATF  had calculated (and reported to Congress) that it needed almost 1,800  inspectors—including 540 just for explosives inspections—to manage its  existing inspection workload at that time. To help ATF carry out its  explosives responsibilities, the conferees on the DOJ appropriations act  for fiscal year 2005 directed funding increases in fiscal year 2005 for the  hiring of an additional 31 explosives inspectors, for purposes of explosives  investigations and regulatory compliance. In addition, the House  Committee on Appropriations has recommended additional funding in  ATF’s fiscal year 2006 appropriation, for the hiring of another 50  explosives inspectors. Despite these increases, giving ATF additional  responsibility to oversee state and local government storage facilities  could further tax the agency’s inspection resources. According to ATF  officials, because of the legislative mandate to physically inspect  explosives licensees, the effect of additional state and local government  explosives responsibilities (without similar increases in inspector  resources) could be to reduce the number of firearms inspections that  ATF could conduct.
section_title: ATF Does Not Collect Nationwide Information about State and Local Government Storage Facilities, but Does So for Licensed Private Sector Facilities
paragraphs: According to ATF officials, ATF does not collect nationwide information  on the number and location of state and local government explosives  storage facilities, nor does the agency know the types and amounts of  explosives being stored in these facilities. With respect to private sector  licensees, ATF collects descriptive information concerning explosive  storage facilities as part of the licensing process. However, state and local  government explosive storage facilities are not required to obtain a license  from ATF, and ATF does not have specific statutory authority to conduct  regulatory inspections of such facilities. As a result, no systematic  information about these facilities is collected. For those state and local  government facilities that ATF does inspect—either voluntary inspections  of state and local magazines or mandatory inspections of shared  magazines—some information is collected by ATF. During these  inspections, ATF collects information about the location of the storage  magazines, the types and amounts of explosives stored, and whether the  magazines are in compliance with federal storage regulations. According  to ATF officials, the information obtained from these inspections—along  with the results from inspections of licensees—are maintained in ATF’s N- Spect nationwide inspection database. While mandatory annual  inspections are required by ATF at each of the 33 state and local  magazines where ATF shares storage space, there have been only 77  voluntary inspections of state and local storage magazines since January  2002. ATF also has some ability to monitor state and local storage facilities  at locations where ATF maintains its own storage magazine. ATF  headquarters and field offices currently have 118 storage magazines  colocated at facilities with state and local storage magazines. For these  facilities, ATF collects information about the location of the facility and  the inspection status of any state and local magazines on site. Of the 77  voluntary inspections discussed above, 34 were at these colocated  facilities.
By comparison, ATF collects a variety of information about private sector  explosives storage facilities, primarily under its authority to issue  explosives licenses. For example, ATF license application forms require  applicants for an explosives license to submit information about their  storage capabilities. Specific information applicants are required to submit  to ATF includes the type of storage magazine, the location of the  magazine, the type of security in place, the capacity of the magazine, and  the class of explosives that will be stored. ATF also collects information  about private sector storage facilities during mandatory licensee  inspections. As noted previously, prior to issuing or renewing an  explosives license, ATF must generally verify by on-site inspection that the  applicant has a storage facility that meets the standards of public safety  and security against theft as prescribed in the regulations. Thereafter, ATF  may also inspect a licensee at any time during business hours—including  inspection of storage magazines, examination of explosives inventory and  sales records, and verification of compliance with ATF administrative  rules. Because state and local government storage facilities are exempt  from the licensing process described above, they are not required to  submit licensing-related information about their storage facility to ATF  and they are not subject to licensing-related mandatory ATF inspections.  In addition, ATF does not have specific statutory authority to perform  regulatory oversight inspections of such facilities apart from the licensing  process. As a result, ATF is unable to collect complete nationwide  information about where these facilities are or the types and amount of  explosives they store.
During the course of our audit work, we compiled data on state and local  law enforcement bomb squads that would be likely to use and store  explosives. At the 13 state and local law enforcement bomb squads we  visited, we identified 16 storage facilities and 30 storage magazines. At  these locations, the number of storage facilities ranged from 1 to 2, and the  number of storage magazines ranged from 1 to 4. According to FBI data,  there are currently 452 state and local law enforcement bomb squads  nationwide. The total number of state and local government storage  facilities and magazines nationwide, however, encompasses other entities  in addition to law enforcement bomb squads—including other law  enforcement agencies, public universities, and departments of  transportation. The precise number of storage facilities and magazines at  these locations is currently unknown. And because of the limited nature of  our fieldwork, we cannot generalize about the extent of security and  oversight these entities may have at their own explosives storage facilities.
section_title: Security Measures Varied at State and Local Explosives Storage Facilities We Visited
paragraphs: We found that security oversight measures varied at the 14 selected state  and local government entities we visited. These 14 entities maintained a  total of 18 storage facilities. With regard to physical security, 13 of the 18  storage facilities restricted vehicle access to the storage area. Six of the 18  storage facilities also had a barrier immediately surrounding the storage  containers preventing human access. Official personnel at all 18 facilities  said they patrolled or inspected the storage facility on a regular basis.  Regarding electronic security, 4 of the 18 facilities had either an alarm or  video monitoring system in place. Inventory and other oversight activities  at all 14 of the state and local entities included regular, periodic  inventories of the contents of their explosives storage facilities. In  addition, a federal, state, or local government authority had performed  inspections for 9 of the 14 entities. State government agencies in Colorado  and Pennsylvania required 5 state and local entities we visited in these  states to obtain licenses to operate their explosives storage facilities.  However, 2 of these 5 entities did not have the required licenses in place at  the time of our visit. Two of the 14 entities had experienced prior thefts or  losses from their storage facilities, and we observed storage practices at  four facilities that may not be in compliance with federal regulations.
The following sections describe our observations of the explosives storage  magazines and types of security measures in place at the 18 state and local  storage facilities we visited. Our criteria for identifying the type of security  measures in place included existing federal explosives storage laws and  regulations (27 C.F.R., Part 555, Subpart K) and security guidelines issued  by the explosives industry (the Institute of Makers of Explosives). Most of  these security measures are not currently required under federal storage  regulations (perimeter fencing, for example). However, we are presenting  this information in order to demonstrate the wide range of security  measures actually in place at the time of our visits.
subsections: section_title: Explosives Storage Facilities Varied with Regard to Users and Size
paragraphs: As shown in table 1, the 14 state and local government entities we visited  included 11 city or county bomb squads (including police departments and  sheriffs’ offices), 2 state bomb squads, and one public university. Four of  the 14 state and local entities had two separate storage areas  encompassing a total of 18 explosives storage facilities among the 14  entities. As further shown in table 1, 17 of these explosives storage  facilities were located on state, city, county, or police property. These  included 3 that were located on state property (such as state law  enforcement or state university), 7 that were located at police training  facilities, and 7 that were located on city or county government-owned  property (such as correctional or water facilities). For example, one local  entity we visited in Texas had a storage facility located on the grounds of a  city-owned nature preserve.
Also, 11 of the 18 explosives storage facilities we visited contained  multiple magazines for the storage of explosives. As a result, the 18  facilities housed a total of 34 magazines divided into various types as  shown in table 1. A Pennsylvania storage facility had 4 magazines, which  was the largest number among the facilities we visited. Figures 1 through 3  depict different types of explosives storage magazines.
All of the 18 facilities contained a variety of high explosives, including C-4  plastic explosive, TNT, binary explosives, and detonators. Officials from  13 of the state and local entities provided us with estimates of the  quantities of explosives they were storing, and they reported amounts  ranging from 10 to 1,000 pounds, with the majority of the entities (9)  indicating they had 200 pounds or less.
section_title: Different Types of Physical Security Measures at Explosives Storage Facilities
paragraphs: At the 18 storage facilities we visited, we looked for the presence of  exterior and interior fencing, other barriers to restrict vehicle or  pedestrian access, and security personnel. Federal explosives storage  regulations do not require any of these physical security attributes; rather,  the regulations generally require theft-resistant magazine construction  (including locks) and weekly inspections of magazines. As shown in table  2, 13 of the 18 storage facilities restricted vehicle access to the facility  grounds by way of a locked security gate or by virtue of being an indoor  facility. Five of the 13 facilities restricted vehicle access after normal  working hours (nights or nights and weekends). Officials at 7 other  facilities said that vehicle access to the facilities was restricted at all times,  including the indoor facility in Pennsylvania that was located in the  basement of a municipal building. While these outdoor facilities had  barriers to vehicle access via roadway, not all of the facilities were  completely surrounded by fencing or some other perimeter barrier, nor do  federal storage regulations require them to have such a barrier or fencing.
Also, as shown in table 2, 6 of 18 storage facilities had an interior barrier  immediately surrounding their storage magazines to prevent direct access  by persons on foot. At each of these 6 facilities, the barriers consisted of a  chain-link fence with a locked gate barring entry by unauthorized  personnel (figure 4 reflects one of these facilities). At 1 other facility (the  indoor facility in Pennsylvania), the storage magazines were in the  basement of the municipal building, and multiple locked doors were used  to prevent access by unauthorized personnel. Conversely, at 1 facility in  Texas, the storage magazine could be reached on foot or by vehicle at any  time because it did not have fencing or vehicle barriers to deter  unauthorized access.
Officials at all of the 18 storage facilities detailed in table 2 told us that  official personnel patrolled or inspected the storage facility on a regular  basis. For example, bomb squad officers said they regularly visited the  facilities to check on their condition, in addition to visiting the facilities to  retrieve or place explosive materials in them. In addition to bomb squad  personnel, officials at 14 of the 18 facilities said that police officers from  local police departments patrolled the facilities to check for any obvious  signs of problems such as forced entry. However, these police patrols  typically did not include actual entry into the storage magazines to inspect  the explosives themselves.
As further shown in table 2, officials at 9 of the 18 storage facilities we  visited said that state or local government employees maintained a 24-hour  presence at the facilities. Four of these storage facilities were located on  the grounds of police training centers, where either trainees or facility  personnel were present at all times. Two storage facilities–one each in  Tennessee and Texas—were on the grounds of jail facilities where local  correctional personnel worked 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Two other  storage facilities were located on the grounds of city/county water or  sewage treatment plants, and 1 storage facility was located in the  basement of a municipal building. One additional facility in Pennsylvania  was located on the grounds of the police academy, but we were unable to  determine whether there was 24-hour, on-site presence at that facility.
section_title: Some Explosives Storage Facilities Had Electronic Security Measures
paragraphs: At the 18 storage facilities we visited, we looked for the presence of a  monitored alarm or video surveillance system. Although no electronic  security is required under federal regulations, 4 of the 18 explosives  storage facilities had either an alarm or a video monitoring system in  place. Specifically, one entity in Texas had 2 facilities with monitored  alarm systems in place, and two entities in Pennsylvania and Tennessee  had video monitoring of their explosives storage facilities. The Texas  entity had alarm systems in place at 2 of its storage facilities. At 1 facility,  two small detonator magazines—while not alarmed themselves—were  located inside a building protected by an alarm system. At a second  facility, the door to an underground storage magazine was alarmed.  Regarding the 2 facilities with video monitoring, the Tennessee facility— which was located on the grounds of a local correctional facility—took  advantage of a video surveillance system already in place to monitor  prisoners. The Pennsylvania facility with video monitoring was located  inside a municipal building and was part of that building’s overall video  security system.
The remaining 14 of the 18 storage facilities did not have video or alarm  systems in place at the time of our visit. Officials at 4 facilities told us they  had alarm systems planned (funding not yet approved), and officials at 3  facilities said they had alarm systems pending (funding approved and  awaiting installation). Officials at 2 facilities also told us they planned to  install video monitoring. For example, 1 facility in Pennsylvania had its  video monitoring system destroyed by lightning and was planning to  replace it. However, the local government authority had yet to approve  funding for the replacement.
Several officials commented on the feasibility of installing alarm or video  monitoring systems at explosives storage facilities. At 4 of the state and  local entities we visited, officials noted that these storage facilities are  often located in remote areas without easy access to sources of electricity.  The officials added that this lack of necessary electrical infrastructure  could be a cost-prohibitive barrier if they were required to install some  form of electronic monitoring at explosives storage facilities. Regarding  the possibility of new storage regulations that would require an electronic  security system at explosives storage magazines, officials at 9 state and  local entities told us they would not object to such a requirement as long  as it did not create an undue financial burden.
section_title: Inventory and Other Oversight Activities Varied at Explosives Storage Facilities
paragraphs: At the 14 state and local entities we visited, we looked for the presence of  internal inventory procedures, internal or external inspections, and  licensing of the storage facility by state or local government agencies .  Under federal regulations, only explosives licensees are required to  perform periodic inventories and are subject to periodic ATF regulatory  inspections of their storage facilities; other persons who store explosives  are not. As shown in table 3, officials at all 14 of the entities we visited told  us they performed periodic inventories of the contents of their explosives  storage facilities. Typically, during these inventories, officials said they  count all the explosives in the storage facility and reconcile them with  inventory records maintained either manually or in a computerized  database.
In addition, 9 of the 14 state and local entities said they had received  inspections of their storage facilities, and ATF had conducted the  inspections in all but 1 of these 9 cases. Regarding this 1 case in  Pennsylvania, officials said a state government authority regularly  performed these inspections. With regard to the ATF inspections, state or  local operators of the selected facilities voluntarily requested these  inspections in all but 1 case (as discussed further below).
Of the 9 selected state and local entities that received inspections by a  regulatory authority, 6 entities told us they received them on a periodic  basis, with another 3 entities having received a onetime inspection (all by  ATF). A Pennsylvania entity that said it received annual inspections from  ATF was unique among those we visited because it had also received a  onetime inspection from a local government authority. This entity was the  only one we visited to have any type of inspection, either onetime or  periodic, from a local government authority. Last, a Colorado entity,  another of the 5 receiving periodic inspections, said it was being inspected  on a recurring basis by both ATF and a state government authority—it was  the only entity we visited that fell into this category.
Also as shown in table 3, 5 of the 14 state and local entities we visited told  us they were required to obtain a license from state regulatory authorities  to operate their explosives storage facilities. One entity in Colorado had a  license to store explosives issued by the state, and this entity had also  obtained a federal explosives license issued by ATF. Officials at this  location told us that the state required them to obtain the federal license  before applying for its mandatory state license. Indeed, according to ATF  officials, state or local government facilities may apply for a federal  explosives license if it is required by their state regulatory agency.  However, once such a license is issued, these state and local government  facilities must then comply with all the same explosives laws and  regulations that are applicable to licensed private sector facilities.
Officials at the 14 state and local entities we visited commented on the  feasibility of mandatory ATF oversight of their explosives storage facility.  Officials at 13 state and local entities said they did not object to the  possibility of federal licensing or inspection of their explosives storage  facilities. Six state and local entities also said that they already have close  contacts with ATF and would not be concerned about additional ATF  oversight of their storage facilities. Officials at 3 state and local entities  noted that additional federal oversight was not a concern, as long as they  were not held to a higher standard of security and safety than ATF  requires of private industry.
section_title: Some Entities Had Experienced Explosives Thefts or Reported Losses
paragraphs: Two of the 14 state and local entities we visited had previously had a theft  or loss of explosives from one of their storage facilities. At a storage  facility in Texas, officials told us that criminals had once used a cutting  torch to illegally gain entry to an explosives storage magazine. Some  explosives were stolen, but the suspected thieves were later apprehended  and the materials were recovered. At another storage facility in Colorado,  officials said that an unauthorized individual had obtained keys to an  explosives storage magazine and taken some of the material. As with the  previous case, several individuals were apprehended and the materials  were recovered. One of these incidents (the theft of explosives in Texas)  did not appear in ATF’s nationwide database of reported thefts and  missing explosives.
The law enforcement community has recently taken action to address the  issue of thefts and security at law enforcement explosives storage  facilities. In April 2005, the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory  Board—which represents more than 450 accredited law enforcement  bomb squads nationwide—initiated a program to increase security  awareness at its members’ explosives storage facilities. In a letter to its  membership, the advisory board encouraged all bomb squad commanders  to increase diligence regarding explosives storage security. The advisory  board also recommended that all bomb squads request a voluntary ATF  inspection, ensure they maintain an accurate explosives inventory, and  assess the adequacy of security measures in place at their respective  explosive storage facilities to determine whether additional measures  might be required—such as video monitoring, fencing, and alarms. This is  a voluntary program, and it is too soon to tell what effect, if any, it will  have towards enhancing the security at state and local law enforcement  storage facilities and reducing the potential for thefts.
section_title: Possible Noncompliance With Regulations at Some Storage Facilities
paragraphs: At 4 of the 14 state and local entities we visited, we observed various  storage practices that may not be in compliance with federal explosives  regulations. These circumstances appeared to be related to storage safety  issues, rather than storage security. For example, one explosives storage  facility was located in the basement of a municipal building and utilized  small type 3 temporary magazines (known as day-boxes) for permanent  storage of high explosives and detonators. ATF regulations state that these  magazines should be used only for temporary storage of explosives and  may not be left unattended. At another storage facility, a high explosives  storage magazine housed a small detonator (or “cap”) magazine in its  interior, although ATF regulations generally require detonators to be kept  separate from other explosive materials. Another storage facility  contained several boxes of unmarked, 1970s-era plastic explosives  (specifically C-4), possession of which is generally restricted under federal  explosives law when the material in question does not contain a detection  agent. Finally, an official at one storage facility acknowledged that  because of the weight of explosives currently being stored, their storage  magazine was in violation of ATF regulations concerning allowable  distances from other inhabited structures.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The overall number of state and local government explosives storage  facilities, the types of explosives being stored, and the number of storage  magazines associated with these facilities are currently unknown. Further,  because ATF does not oversee state and local government storage  facilities as part of the federal licensing process and ATF does not have  any other statutory authority to conduct regulatory inspections of these  facilities, ATF’s ability to monitor the potential vulnerability of these  facilities to theft or assess the extent to which these facilities are in  compliance with federal explosives storage regulations is limited.  Nevertheless, current federal explosives law as enacted by Congress does  not provide ATF with specific authority to conduct regulatory oversight  with respect to public sector facilities. And although we did observe  possible noncompliance with the storage regulations at some of the state  and local entities we visited, none of these circumstances appeared to  make the facilities more vulnerable to theft.
According to ATF’s interpretation of federal explosives laws and  regulations, state and local government agencies—including law  enforcement bomb squads and public universities—are required to report  incidents of theft or missing explosives to ATF within 24 hours of an  occurrence. However, during the course of our audit work, we identified  five incidents involving theft or missing explosives at state and local  government facilities, one of which had not been reported to ATF.  Because this reporting requirement applies to any “person” who has  knowledge of a theft from his stock and the definition of “person” does not  specifically include state and local government agencies, ATF officials  acknowledged that these entities may be unsure as to whether they are  required to report under this requirement. On the basis of our limited site  visit observations and discussions with state, local, and ATF officials, we  did not identify a specific threat or vulnerability to theft among state and  local government explosive storage facilities. However, if state and local  government entities are unsure about whether they are required to report  thefts and missing explosives, ATF’s ability to monitor these incidents and  take appropriate investigative action may be compromised by a potential  lack of information.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To allow ATF to better monitor and respond to incidents of missing or  stolen explosives, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the  ATF Director to clarify the explosives incident reporting regulations to  ensure that all persons and entities who store explosives, including state  and local government agencies, understand their obligation to report all  thefts or missing explosives to ATF within 24 hours of an occurrence.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: On September 9, 2005, we provided a draft of this report to the Attorney  General for review and comment.
On September 26, 2005, DOJ advised us that the department had no formal  agency comments and further advised us that DOJ agreed with our  recommendation and would take steps to implement it. ATF provided  technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report, as  appropriate.
Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further  distribution of this report until 30 days after the date of the report. At that  time, we will send copies of this report to the House Committee on  Government Reform; House Committee on the Judiciary; House  Committee on Homeland Security; Senate Committee on the Judiciary;  Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; the  Attorney General; the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,  Firearms and Explosives; appropriate state and local government officials;  and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others  upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on  GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-8777 or EkstrandL@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report were William Crocker,  Assistant Director; David Alexander; Amy Bernstein; Philip Caramia;  Geoffrey Hamilton; and Michael Harmond.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In reviewing the security of state and local government explosives storage  facilities, we focused on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and  Explosives’ (ATF) role in overseeing and regulating these facilities,  including the extent to which ATF’s licensing operations address state and  local government facilities and what authority ATF has to enforce federal  explosives law and regulations at state and local government facilities. In  addition, we reviewed the extent to which ATF collects information about  state and local government facilities, including locations and types and  amount of explosives stored. To determine what states and localities are  doing to ensure the safe and secure storage of explosives, we visited state  and local explosives storage facilities. We also contacted other state and  local government and explosives industry officials.
subsections: section_title: Interviews and Other Contacts
paragraphs: To obtain the perspectives of U.S. government agencies on their efforts to  regulate and oversee state and local government explosives storage  facilities, we met with ATF headquarters officials—specifically individuals  from ATF’s Office of Enforcement Programs and Services, Office of Field  Operations, Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information, and Office of  the Chief Counsel. We also met with or obtained information from officials  with the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General, as  well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Bomb Data Center.
To determine what selected states and localities were doing to ensure the  safe and secure storage of explosives in state and local government  facilities, we met with state and local officials in Colorado, Pennsylvania,  Tennessee, and Texas—specifically 13 state and local bomb squads and 1  public university. In these four states, we also contacted other state  government agencies, including transportation and environmental  protection agencies and fire marshals. We also contacted other public  university officials in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah.
To obtain additional perspectives of law enforcement and explosives  industry experts on the safety and security of explosives storage facilities,  we contacted representatives from the National Bomb Squad Commanders  Advisory Board, the International Association of Bomb Technicians and  Investigators, the Institute of Makers of Explosives, the International  Association of Chiefs of Police, and the National Sheriffs’ Association.
section_title: State and Local Site Visits
paragraphs: To find out what selected states and localities are doing to ensure the safe  and secure storage of explosives in state and local government facilities,  we visited 14 state and local government entities that stored explosives, as  shown in table 4 below. During these site visits, we met with state and  local officials and physically observed their explosives storage facilities  and storage magazines.
We chose law enforcement bomb squads as the primary focus of our site  visits because (1) we concluded that state and local bomb squads would  be the most likely state and local government agencies to have a need for  explosives storage facilities and (2) there was no other source of  nationwide information on the number and location of state and local  government explosives storage facilities. We selected our state and local  site visits based on the following criteria:  In selecting which states to visit, we chose those states most likely to  have significant state and local government and private sector  explosives activities. The state selection criteria included (1) the  number of federally licensed private sector explosives companies, (2)  the number of reported explosives thefts, and (3) the number of law  enforcement bomb squads. Using these criteria, we then selected a  geographic mix of states—specifically one state in the northeast United  States, one in the southeast, one in the southwest, and one in the west.
Within each state, we selected state and local bomb squads for our site  visits. These were chosen to represent a mix based on the type of  agency, size of jurisdiction, and geographic location. We selected two  state law enforcement agencies, one county sheriff, nine city police  departments, and one city fire department. These included three  jurisdictions with populations over 1 million, five with populations  between 100,000 and 1 million, three with populations below 100,000,  and two with statewide jurisdictions.
We also selected one non-law enforcement explosives storage facility  operated by a state university. This facility was selected as typical of  the various state universities with mining-engineering programs and  because it had a significant amount of explosives (over 100 pounds) in  its storage facility.
During our site visits, we used a semistructured interview guide to conduct  interviews with state and local officials and determine the level of security  at their explosives storage facilities. Our criteria for identifying the types  of security measures in place included existing federal storage laws and  regulations (27 C.F.R., Part 555, Subpart K) and security guidelines issued  in 2005 by the explosives industry (the Institute of Makers of Explosives).  Not all of the security criteria we used are currently requirements under  federal storage regulations (perimeter fencing, for example). We used  these additional criteria to demonstrate the wide range of security  measures actually in place at the time of our visits to these facilities. Also,  while we were not conducting a compliance audit, during our site visits we  observed each storage magazine and noted any instances where  explosives appeared not to be stored in compliance with federal  regulations.
We are not disclosing the names or other identifying information relating  to the individual state and local entities we visited to ensure that security- related information is not unintentionally disclosed. Because our review  was limited to a nonprobability sample of 14 state and local entities in the  four states, the information discussed in this report is illustrative and  cannot be generalized to all state and local government entities nationwide  that store explosives.
section_title: ATF and FBI Data
paragraphs: ATF provided data related to explosives licensing and inspections, as well  as relevant law, regulations, and procedures dealing with the storage of  explosives. We also obtained data from ATF’s Arson and Explosives  National Repository related to incidents of theft and missing explosives  reported to ATF. FBI provided us with a nationwide list of accredited  bomb squads—including number, location, and name of agency. In  addition, FBI provided policies and guidance related to the bomb squad  training and accreditation process.
The information we obtained from ATF (data on explosives licensees,  explosives inspections, and explosives thefts) and FBI (data on the  number and location of bomb squads) was used to provide background  context on the number of private sector and state and local government  explosives storage facilities and to assist us in selecting locations for our  site visits. We interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data,  and as a result, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for  the purposes of this report. We also obtained data from ATF on incidents  of explosive thefts and missing explosives at state and local government  storage facilities. On the basis of our site visits and other audit work, we  determined that these incidents may be underreported, as discussed  earlier in this report.