Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial Personnel Growth
Published: 2007-09-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Army expects significant personnel growth, more than 50 percent in some cases, at 18 domestic bases through 2011 because of the effect of implementing base realignment and closure (BRAC), overseas force rebasing, and force modularity actions. This growth creates the need for additional support infrastructure at these bases and in nearby communities. Military construction costs of over $17 billion are expected for new personnel, and communities will incur infrastructure costs as well. GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. It addresses (1) the challenges and associated risks the Army faces in providing for timely infrastructure support at its gaining installations and (2) how communities are planning and funding for infrastructure to support incoming personnel and their families. GAO analyzed personnel restationing numbers, discussed planning efforts with Army and community officials, and visited nine of the larger gaining bases and nearby communities.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army has developed plans to accommodate the growth of about 154,000 personnel at its domestic bases, but it faces several complex implementation challenges that risk late provision of needed infrastructure to adequately support incoming personnel. First, Army plans continue to evolve, and Army headquarters and each of the nine gaining bases we visited were relying on different numbers of personnel movements and were not fully aware of the causes for the variances. For example, Fort Benning officials expected more than 6,000 additional soldiers and military students than Army headquarters planned. Because consistency in the relocation numbers is important for properly determining not only base infrastructure support needs but those of nearby communities as well, inconsistent numbers could lead to an improperly sized facilities' infrastructure. Second, the Army faces challenges in synchronizing personnel movements with planned newly constructed on-base infrastructure improvements. Any significant delays in implementing planned actions could place the Army at risk of not meeting BRAC statutory deadlines. Third, competing priorities could lead the Army to redirect resources planned for needed infrastructure improvements and operations to such priorities as current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as has happened in the past. However, such redirection of resources could undermine the Army's ability to complete infrastructure improvements in time to support personnel movements and to meet planned timelines. Fourth, the Army Corps of Engineers, the primary construction agent for the Army, must manage an unprecedented volume of construction, implement a new construction strategy designed to save construction costs and time, and complete infrastructure improvements within available resources and planned timelines. The Army recognizes these challenges and is refining its implementation plans to overcome these challenges. While communities surrounding growth bases GAO visited have generally proactively planned for anticipated growth, they have been hindered in fully identifying additional infrastructure requirements and associated costs by the evolving nature of the Army's plans and different interpretations of the plans. For example, while Army officials at Fort Benning, Georgia, project an influx of about 10,000 school-age children, the Department of Defense's (DOD) November 2006 figures project only about 600. At the time of our review, these disparities remained unresolved. Communities surrounding growth bases have their own unique infrastructure improvement needs, such as schools, housing, or transportation, based on (1) the number of personnel to actually move to the nearby base, (2) the community's current capacity in its area(s) of need, and (3) the community's own capacity to finance additional infrastructure requirements and the availability of federal or state assistance to finance these needs. Some communities had already sought federal and state assistance to help finance construction efforts at the time of GAO's review even though the evolving nature of the Army's planning prevented the communities from having reasonable assurance that they knew the full scope of their infrastructure requirements.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Army is implementing extensive worldwide transformation initiatives  to enhance U.S. national security while conducting operations in  Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. These initiatives are expected to lead to  significantly increased military and civilian populations on certain  domestic installations by 2011. Because of the combined effect of  implementing base realignment and closure (BRAC); overseas force  redeployments back to the United States under the Global Defense  Posture Realignment, known as overseas rebasing; and a major Army force  reorganization, known as force modularity, the Army expects to relocate  over 150,000 personnel and increase 18 base populations by about  136,000. Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that military  construction costs will exceed $17 billion through fiscal year 2011 at these  18 bases, and surrounding communities will likely incur costs to provide  adequate schools, transportation, and other infrastructure improvements.  These figures do not include personnel increases and added infrastructure  costs as a result of Army actions to increase its active end strength  authorization by 65,000 soldiers. Furthermore, family members and non- mission-related defense contractors, whose numbers are not included in  the relocation figures cited above, will also relocate to areas surrounding  these bases, thus fueling increased civilian infrastructure needs.  Compounding the challenges of moving so many personnel is the statutory  requirement to complete BRAC closures and realignments by September  15, 2011. The Army expects to continue modularity-related moves beyond  2011. Senior Army officials consider appropriate infrastructure support as  integral to maintaining operational readiness and quality of life for  soldiers, DOD civilians, and their families.
This report is one in a series that addresses emerging issues associated  with the implementation of the BRAC 2005 round, overseas rebasing, and  force modularity initiatives. Because of the broad implications these  initiatives have on the infrastructure support at the Army’s domestic  installations and surrounding communities and widespread congressional  interest in this subject, we prepared this report under the authority of the  Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. We are  reporting the results to you in order to facilitate your oversight of the  Army’s efforts to address infrastructure needs as a result of the expected  growth. Our objectives were to (1) identify the challenges and risks the  Army faces in providing adequate infrastructure when needed at its major  gaining bases and (2) describe surrounding communities’ plans and  funding for needed infrastructure to support incoming personnel and their  families.
To achieve our objectives, we analyzed data on the expected number and  timing of military and civilian personnel arrivals and departures at gaining  installations and military construction plans and funding to support these  moves. We also discussed implementation, funding, and personnel  movement plans with officials from various Army organizations, including  the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, the  Installation Management Command and its four regional offices, the Office  of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, and the Army Corps  of Engineers. We also discussed implementation challenges with  installation officials at nine domestic bases expecting significant personnel  growth and with local leaders in communities surrounding these bases. To  address the surrounding communities’ plans for needed schools, housing,  transportation, and other infrastructure, we reviewed documents on  community growth impacts and actions to address these impacts and data  on financial grants provided by DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment  (OEA) to communities surrounding the growth bases. We also met with  community leaders and discussed their plans to meet DOD-prompted  needs and with OEA officials to identify their interagency community  impact assistance efforts with other federal agencies, such as the  Departments of Transportation and Education.
We conducted our work from March 2006 through July 2007 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Business plans  intended to direct the implementation of the BRAC recommendations  affecting the gaining bases were in draft at the time of our review. In  addition, other information the Army provided us was preliminary and  subject to change. Nonetheless, Army officials told us that the information  constituted their current plans at the time of our review and should be  considered an approximation of projected personnel movement and  funding.  Similarly, because surrounding communities’ plans depend on  the Army’s plans, community planning information is also considered  preliminary and subject to change. Although we found some discrepancies  in the Army’s information, we concluded that, overall, it was sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of this report. A more detailed description of our  scope and methodology is included in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: BRAC, overseas rebasing, and Army modularity are all expected to  generate significant personnel movements among numerous bases within  the United States and from certain overseas locations back to the United  States. Four primary organizations—the Army’s Office of the Assistant  Chief of Staff for Installation Management, the Army Corps of Engineers,  OEA, and the President’s Economic Adjustment Committee—are  responsible for planning, managing construction, and assisting local  communities affected by these moves.
subsections: section_title: Three Major Initiatives Are to Generate Significant Personnel Movements
paragraphs: First, DOD has undergone four BRAC rounds since 1988 and is  implementing its fifth round, known as BRAC 2005, which was authorized  by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2002. The BRAC Commission recommendations were accepted by the  President and Congress and became effective on November 9, 2005. In  accordance with BRAC statutory authority, DOD must complete closures  and realignments by September 15, 2011. BRAC 2005’s key goals were to  (1) transform DOD by more closely aligning its infrastructure with defense  strategy, (2) enhance joint operations, and (3) reduce excess  infrastructure and produce savings. Traditionally, DOD relied on BRAC  primarily to reduce excess property and save money since property that  has been disposed of is no longer maintained by DOD. Conversely, due in  part to the addition of the transformation and joint operations goals to  BRAC 2005, this round led to more than twice the number of actions in all  previous rounds combined, 837 distinct actions in all. These BRAC actions  incorporate many of the more than 50,000 Army personnel expected to  return from overseas locations to the United States as part of DOD’s  overseas rebasing initiative discussed below.
Second, in August 2004, the President announced plans for sweeping  changes to the number and locations of DOD’s overseas-based facilities.  Known as the Global Defense Posture Realignment, DOD plans to realign  its overseas basing structure over a 6- to 8-year period from the legacy  Cold War posture to one that would more effectively support current allies  and strategies and address emerging threats. Under the overseas rebasing  effort, the 50,000 Army personnel plus another 20,000 other defense  personnel and about 100,000 family members are to relocate from  overseas locations—primarily in Europe and Korea—to bases in the  United States. Although some of these personnel have already relocated,  many were still overseas at the time of our review. Army plans call for  overseas relocations to the United States to be completed prior to  September 15, 2011.
Third, similar to BRAC and overseas rebasing actions, implementation of  Army force modularity will add to the personnel growth at some bases.  The Army’s modular transformation has been referred to as the largest  Army reorganization in 50 years and affects the active Army, Army  National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve. The foundation for the modular  force is the creation of brigade combat teams that while somewhat smaller  than existing brigades, are expected to be more agile and deployable and  better able to meet combatant commander requirements. Successful  implementation of this initiative requires the movement of personnel  across various units, new facilities and equipment, a different mix of skills  and occupational specialties, and significant changes in doctrine and  training. The Army began the modularity initiative in 2004 and expects to  finish most associated reorganizations by 2011, but expects that some  reorganizations will occur after 2011.
As a result of the three initiatives and certain other restationing moves, the  Army expects a net gain of about 154,000 personnel at its domestic gaining  bases from fiscal years 2006 through fiscal year 2011. These gains include  active and reserve soldiers, military students and trainees, civilians, and  mission contractors but do not include family members and non-mission- related contractors. Our analysis of March 2007 Army data on personnel  restationing actions indicates that 18 domestic installations, as shown in  table 1, are likely to experience a net gain of at least 2,000 military and  civilian personnel for fiscal years 2006 through 2011 because of BRAC  2005, overseas rebasing, modularity, and other miscellaneous restationing  actions. Personnel gains at individual locations are projected to range  from 7 percent to 111 percent.
As also shown in table 1, while the overall net gain in personnel at these  installations averages 31 percent, Forts Belvoir, Bliss, Lee, and Riley are  expected to experience a 53 percent or more growth rate. The expected  personnel net gains at these 18 installations account for nearly 90 percent  of the total expected personnel net gains across all Army domestic  installations through 2011. Figure 1 shows the locations of the 18  installations.
Accommodating the expected large increase of personnel at these 18 Army  locations over the next several years requires the expenditure of  significant military construction funds for required facilities. Although the  Army also will have procurement, operations and maintenance, and other  associated cost increases at these bases because of the personnel  increases, the scope of this report focuses on military construction  funding. Our analysis of DOD data, as shown in table 2, indicates that DOD  is planning to spend over $17 billion to construct facilities at these  locations through the fiscal year 2011 time frame.
Also shown in table 2, the overwhelming majority, over 80 percent, of the  planned construction expenditures at these Army installations are  attributable to BRAC, overseas rebasing, and modularity actions.  Moreover, as shown in the table, other military services or defense  agencies and activities are planning to expend about $4.6 billion for  constructing BRAC facilities they expect to use at these Army  installations. For example, several defense agencies are expecting to  spend more than $2.6 billion in facility construction at Fort Belvoir,  Virginia, while the Air Force plans to spend in excess of $600 million for  facilities to house medical training personnel and students at Fort Sam  Houston, Texas.
section_title: Four Organizations Are Primarily Responsible for Managing These Personnel Moves and Assisting Communities
paragraphs: The following four organizations are to manage personnel moves  associated with BRAC, overseas rebasing, or Army modularity and to  assist local communities affected by the movements:    The Army’s Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation  Management provides policy guidance and program management on all  matters relating to the management and funding of Army installations  worldwide and to ensure the availability of installation services and  facilities. To accomplish its mission, the office coordinates with other key  Army headquarters organizations, including the Office of the Deputy Chief  of Staff for Operations and Plans and the Army Budget Office, to respond  to operational requirements and resource availability in providing for  installation infrastructure. To assist in this role, the Installation  Management Command provides needed installation services and  facilities, including construction, family care, food management,  environmental programs, well-being, logistics, public works, and  installation funding to support readiness and mission execution.
The Army Corps of Engineers is the Army’s construction agent and is  charged with contracting for infrastructure construction for the Army. The  Corps also manages the construction process, including supervision and  inspection as facilities construction progresses. It also functions as the  construction agent for selected Air Force construction projects and fulfills  a role as an agent for a civil works construction program involving flood  control, water supply, hydroelectric power generation, navigation,  recreation, wetlands regulation, and resource protection.
OEA is a field activity within the Office of the Secretary of Defense that  assists states and communities by providing technical and financial  assistance in planning and carrying out adjustment strategies in response  to defense actions. Much of that assistance in the past had been directed  toward communities that lost military and civilian personnel because of  the closure or major realignment of a base. Conversely, because the 2005  BRAC round, overseas rebasing, and Army modularity have created  significant growth at many bases, OEA has assisted affected communities  with growth planning.
The President’s Economic Adjustment Committee was established under  Executive Order 12788 and comprises 22 federal agencies that are to  facilitate the organization, planning, and execution of community-based  defense adjustment strategies. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  (Installations and Environment) chairs the committee, and the Secretaries  of Labor and Commerce serve as Vice Chairmen. The Committee Chair has  testified that the committee will likely conduct team visits to better  understand local community adjustment challenges and to more capably  address potential needs for federal assistance.
section_title: The Army Has Developed Plans but Faces Complex Implementation Challenges
paragraphs: The Army has developed plans to accommodate growth of about 154,000  personnel at its domestic bases as a result of BRAC 2005, overseas  rebasing, and force modularity actions, but it faces several complex  challenges to the implementation of those plans and risks late provision of  needed infrastructure to adequately support arriving personnel. First,  Army plans are still evolving, and officials at the gaining bases we visited  did not agree with Army headquarters on personnel movements at their  bases.  Second, the synchronization of personnel movements across  installations with the planned infrastructure construction is difficult  because any unforeseen delays or disruptions in providing for necessary  facilities can adversely affect synchronization plans. Third, competing  resource demands could lead to redirection of resources that would have  been used for infrastructure improvements to other priorities, as has  happened in the past. Fourth, the Army Corps of Engineers may be at risk  of not finishing all needed infrastructure projects within new cost and  timeline goals because of the unprecedented volume of required  construction.
subsections: section_title: Expected Personnel Movement Numbers Differ between Army Headquarters and Some Gaining Bases
paragraphs: Expected personnel movement numbers differ between Army  headquarters and the bases where these people will move, thus affecting  whether adequate infrastructure will be in place when personnel arrive. As  of March 2007, the nine gaining bases we visited were expecting different  numbers of personnel arrivals and departures than those generated by the  Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. Table 3  provides examples of these variances at six of these bases, five of which  are planning for more personnel movement than Army headquarters’ plans  while one base expects slightly less. While the other three bases we  visited had personnel movement numbers that also differed from the  Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans’ numbers, the data were  not as easily comparable as those presented in table 3.
The examples in table 3 are not necessarily representative of all Army  growth locations and all categories of arriving personnel, but they  nonetheless could lead to unnecessary infrastructure improvements on  some bases and inadequate improvements on others. Army headquarters  officials explained that they program military construction funds based on  their numbers while base-level officials and surrounding communities rely  more on the base-level numbers for planning purposes. While we  recognize that the numbers of personnel moving to Army growth  installations will fluctuate, officials could fully explain the reasons for  discrepancies as large as those shown in table 3, and inconsistent numbers  can lead to under- or overbuilding by the base and the surrounding  communities.
Expected personnel movements also can vary based on doctrinal changes  that consequently lead to changes in operational unit sizes and  organizational structures. For example, BRAC 2005 recommended the  creation of certain Army training centers of excellence that consequently  require consolidation of some training staff and facilities in certain  locations. One such planned center of excellence—the Army Maneuver  Center at Fort Benning, Georgia—is to be created through the  consolidation of the Armor School and Center (currently located at Fort  Knox, Kentucky) with the Infantry School and Center at Fort Benning.  This consolidation is expected to lead to personnel movements from Fort  Knox to Fort Benning. However, because the organizational framework for  the centers of excellence had not been fully defined at the time of our  review and was therefore still evolving, Army’s headquarters and Training  and Doctrine Command officials still had not reached agreement on the  number of people to be assigned to each center. Thus, gaining base  officials, such as those at Fort Benning, could not fully plan for incoming  personnel movements based on the center’s personnel numbers and  associated personnel reductions until the final personnel numbers were  approved. Table 4 shows the wide disparity in the proposed personnel  reduction numbers and those ultimately approved by the Vice Chief of  Staff for the Army in March 2007.
Military planners and base operations and community officials require  accurate personnel arrival information to ensure that they can effectively  plan for and fund infrastructure improvements to provide adequate  facilities for the new arrivals. To the extent that personnel numbers are  inaccurate, the Army and the surrounding community could either plan for  too much or too little space to meet infrastructure requirements.
section_title: Army Faces Challenges in Synchronizing Personnel Restationing Plans with Planned Construction of Facilities
paragraphs: Synchronizing personnel movements with the completion of infrastructure  needed to accommodate newly arriving personnel at gaining bases  presents difficult challenges that must be overcome to ensure that  facilities are ready when relocated personnel arrive. These challenges  include developing plans to account for (1) the complexities inherent in  coordinating the expected large number of individual movements  prompted by BRAC, overseas rebasing, and modularity and (2) the need to  manage interdependent BRAC actions affecting individual bases.  Moreover, delays in constructing needed infrastructure, for reasons such  as environmental assessments on gaining bases, can force delays in  carrying out the personnel movements. Given the compressed time frames  for completing construction of facilities and subsequently relocating  personnel, any significant delays of BRAC actions could place the Army at  risk of not completing personnel moves at some locations and not meeting  the September 15, 2011, statutory deadline.
The Army faces a key challenge stemming from the sheer number of  synchronized actions that must take place to successfully complete certain  personnel movements. In congressional testimony, the Assistant Secretary  of the Army (Installations and Environment) stated that the Army has to  complete more than 1,300 discrete actions to successfully implement  BRAC recommendations. For example, 14 separate BRAC  recommendations involving 59 separate DOD organizations impact Fort  Belvoir, Virginia, which is expected to gain nearly 24,000 personnel by  September 15, 2011.  Among the personnel moving to Fort Belvoir will be  about 15,000 expected to arrive as late as August 2011 as the result of the  closure of the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C., to  staff a newly constructed hospital, the collocation of various defense  agencies and activities from leased space off base, and several National  Geospatial-Intelligence Agency moves. These moves all depend on the  completion of new construction at Fort Belvoir, much of which is  expected to be completed only shortly before or at the same time as the  relocations. For example, current plans call for construction to be  complete in September 2011 for the collocation of about 9,000 personnel  from various defense agencies and activities at the base. However, at the  time of our review, the Army had not made a final decision whether to  obtain General Services Administration land it owns near rail and transit  stations in Springfield, Virginia, where the Army would move these  personnel. If this process delays these moves, it could jeopardize meeting  the statutory deadline.
The Army also has to overcome the challenge to planned synchronization  from the interdependence of various BRAC recommendations. For  example, the BRAC recommendation to close Fort Monmouth, New  Jersey, includes the planned relocation of some personnel into renovated  facilities at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. However, the  designated receiving facilities at Aberdeen cannot be renovated until the  military organization currently occupying those facilities—the Ordnance  Center and School—relocates. The school, however, cannot relocate—an  action associated with another BRAC recommendation—until new space  is provided at Fort Lee, Virginia. According to Army officials, the  Ordnance Center and School is expected to move to Fort Lee in July 2009,  and some personnel from Fort Monmouth are expected to move into the  renovated space at Aberdeen in June 2011. Any delay could jeopardize  these moves and meeting the September 15, 2011, deadline.
Another key synchronization challenge is the need to complete required  environmental assessments, conduct any needed environmental cleanup,  and undertake endangered species protection before construction  commences. For example, construction of the new Maneuver Center of  Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, could be delayed because the  installation is required to account for endangered species protection  actions in its construction plans. While the Army initially expected to  complete the relevant environmental impact statement by the end of fiscal  year 2007, it has revised its expected completion date by about 3 months.  Base officials said that this delay will not affect current construction  schedules. However, if any further delays materialize, both needed  construction and arrival of Armor School and Center personnel from Fort  Knox could be delayed. Army officials also told us that other regulatory  environmental requirements must be complied with, including certain  studies, consultations, and permitting, before various construction  projects can commence and any delays could undermine the  synchronization schedule of construction and personnel movements that  must be completed before the deadline.
Synchronization difficulties have already arisen in the Army’s BRAC 2005  plans, and the Army consequently delayed scheduled personnel  movements in at least the following three instances because facilities were  not expected to be ready at the gaining bases when needed:       Fort Benning, Georgia: Officials delayed the start-up of the Maneuver  Center of Excellence by a year or more from their initial plans for it to  begin operations in fiscal year 2009.
Fort Bliss, Texas: The 1st Armored Division’s planned move from Germany  was moved from fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010 to fiscal years 2010 and  2011. Similarly, a 1st Armored Division brigade relocation has been  rescheduled from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2008.
Fort Sill, Oklahoma: The Net Fires Center of Excellence is to begin  operations in fiscal years 2009 instead of fiscal year 2008 as originally  planned.
To the extent that delays occur as implementation proceeds, the Army  faces an increased risk that it may not complete all closures and  realignments by the statutory deadline.
The Army is now emphasizing the need to have adequate permanent  facilities in place when personnel arrive because utilizing temporary  facilities, often referred to as relocatables, adds to the facilities’ cost in the  long term as permanent facilities are to eventually replace the  relocatables. Army officials have told us that because of congressional  concerns regarding the possible use of temporary facilities to meet  requirements for 2005 BRAC round and overseas rebasing actions, they do  not plan to use relocatable facilities for these moves, even though they  would serve as an interim measure for providing needed infrastructure.  Nonetheless, in the recent past the Army has relied on temporary facilities  to accommodate troops for operational reasons when no permanent  facilities were available, as evidenced by the Army’s modularity initiative  and facilities construction in Iraq and Afghanistan. Army data indicate that  more than 7 million square feet of relocatables have been used to  accommodate modular force conversions at a cost of nearly $1 billion  since 2004 at domestic bases. Figures 2 and 3 show relocatables in place at  Fort Bliss to accommodate the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division in 2006.
section_title: Competing Priorities Could Lead to Redirection of Funding from Infrastructure to Other Priorities
paragraphs: Competing priorities could lead to the redirection of funds planned for  infrastructure construction or improvement to other priorities and  consequently lead to delays in preparing facilities for newly arriving  personnel at gaining bases. In September 2006, the Chief of Staff of the  Army negotiated directly with the Office of Management and Budget for an  increase in the Army’s total fiscal year 2008 budget rather than the usual  practice of providing its budget request to the Secretary of Defense. The  Army Chief of Staff took this step because he perceived a shortfall of  nearly $25 billion in the Army’s fiscal year 2008 budget. However, as a  result of the negotiations, the Army received $7 billion more than that  originally supported by the Secretary of Defense, but still $18 billion less  than the amount the Chief of Staff believed was required to fund all  priorities.
The Army projects the cost of BRAC implementation to be about           $17.6 billion of which military construction is projected to account for  about $13.1 billion. The Army plans to fund the $17.6 billion from a variety  of sources. First, to help finance portions of the Army’s BRAC 2005  implementation costs, DOD will provide BRAC funding of almost               $7 billion. Second, DOD also will provide funding for overseas rebasing,  which will supply the Army with about $2.6 billion to fund these  redeployment actions to the United States. Together, these amounts will  provide the Army about $9.5 billion. Thus, the Army will need about  another $8.1 billion to finance BRAC 2005 implementation of about       $17.6 billion. To address the shortfall, at the time of our review, the Army  planned to rely heavily on funding programmed for certain projects  outside the BRAC account―the Military Construction Army  Account―through 2011 and to move these targeted projects further into  the future.
While the Army has identified sources for the funds to implement BRAC  2005, competing priorities could prompt future redirection of funds away  from BRAC or other construction. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan;  support for new weapons systems, including the Future Combat System;  costs to implement modularity; plans to increase the Army’s active force  structure by 65,000 personnel; and other initiatives all will compete for  funds with BRAC 2005 and other infrastructure construction priorities.  Moreover, cost growth in any of these priorities could increase the  pressure to redirect funds. For example, in March 2007, we reported that  the Army’s projected cost for the Future Combat System had increased by  almost 80 percent from $91.4 billion to $163.7 billion. We also reported  that the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s independent estimates of the  acquisition cost of the system were higher and ranged from $203 billion to  $234 billion.
As we have previously reported, concerns have remained regarding the  adequacy of funding allocated to maintain DOD infrastructure and support  other installation operating needs. Furthermore, underfunding, including  the deterioration of facilities and its negative effects on the quality of life  for those living and working at affected installations and on their ability to  accomplish their mission activities, further affects military operations.  This has been particularly prevalent in the Army and in 2004 was  exacerbated because varying amounts were redirected from facilities  accounts to help pay for the Global War on Terrorism. At the end of fiscal  year 2004, Army installations received additional funds to help offset these  shortfalls, but the timing made it difficult for the installations to execute  these funds. Our visits to various gaining bases revealed that the adequacy  of operations and maintenance funds to operate bases continues to be an  issue. The Army has had to take steps in each of the last 3 years, affecting  facilities accounts, to help fund the war. We are continuing to conduct  work in this area and have recently initiated a review looking at the  sustainment and operation of DOD facilities.
Because of expected budgetary pressures and competing priorities, and to  limit short-term construction costs, the Army plans to delay construction  of certain quality of life facilities at some gaining installations. Quality of  life facilities include child development and youth centers, physical fitness  centers, chapels, on-post shopping and convenience areas, and athletic  fields. BRAC recommendations do not require specific construction  projects, and thus the Army has chosen to defer some quality of life  facilities beyond 2011. Specifically, at the nine Army growth installations  we visited, the BRAC requirement for quality of life facilities has an  estimated value of about $739 million. However, if only certain quality of  life facilities are included, then the requirement drops to about               $472 million. Nonetheless, the Army planned to fund only about $76  million using BRAC funds and about another $122 million using military  construction funds through 2011. As a consequence, for example, at Fort  Carson, Colorado, officials requested that two child care centers be  constructed before most incoming personnel arrived in 2009. However, the  Army has budgeted funding for the two centers in 2011. Moreover, the  Army has not budgeted for any quality of life projects at Forts Belvoir and  Lee, Virginia, through 2011 despite installation requirements for these  facilities.
Installation officials we spoke with were confident that their bases could  accommodate the new personnel even without all required quality of life  facilities and believed that the surrounding communities would be able to  accommodate some base personnel’s child care and other quality of life  needs. Meanwhile, military family advocates believe that not funding  quality of life facilities could jeopardize military readiness by distracting  deployed soldiers who may be concerned that their families are not being  taken care of.
section_title: Army Corps of Engineers Is at Risk of Not Meeting Construction Costs and Timing Goals
paragraphs: To meet the expected large volume and costs of facilities construction  associated with BRAC and the concurrent implementation of overseas  rebasing and modularity, most of which must be completed by the end of  fiscal year 2011, the Army Corps of Engineers has developed a strategy,  known as military construction transformation, intended to reduce   (1) construction costs by 15 percent and (2) construction time by 30  percent. Through its transformation strategy, the Corps intends to change  how it executes construction projects by  standardizing facility designs and processes, expanding the use of manufactured building solutions,    executing military construction as a continuous building program and not  just a collection of individual projects, and    emphasizing commercial rather than government building standards and  base master planning.
The Army approved the strategy on February 1, 2006, and the  established  eight centers to simplify the contracting and construction processes for  certain types of facilities as a step in its goal to reduce construction costs  and time. By 2008, the Corps expects that each center will establish  baseline requirements for common facilities to reduce construction costs  and time frames on the theory that contractors can build to the same  design faster and cheaper once they have experience with the design. The  Fort Worth, Texas, district is to standardize enlisted barracks’  construction; the Savannah, Georgia, district is to standardize brigade  operations complexes; and the Louisville, Kentucky, district is to  standardize operational readiness training complexes. A further cost- saving element of the strategy is to reduce the cost of support facilities,  such as utility connections, paved parking and walkways, storm drains,  information technology connections, and antiterrorism and force  protection measures. According to officials, these costs usually range from  25 to 30 percent of the construction cost when government construction  standards are used.
In addition to common designs, the strategy encourages contractors to use  manufactured buildings with flexibility to use any of five construction  types rather than requiring only noncombustible, concrete and steel type I  or II construction. Corps officials said that this approach provides not  only greater flexibility in the design and construction of military projects  but also flexibility to respond to fluctuating material prices. They also  noted that using materials other than concrete and steel makes it easier to  renovate, reuse, and reconfigure a facility when appropriate. These  officials believe that the changes would not significantly reduce the useful  life of facilities.
Recognizing that its construction strategy constitutes a critical operational  change, the Army Corps of Engineers is testing its new approach on  projects at five locations. A Corps official told us that 11 projects awarded  at the pilot locations during fiscal year 2006 all were bid under the price  set by the Corps thus achieving up to a 17 percent savings. Further, these  projects were all awarded without scope reductions. Corps officials also  told us that the contractors for these projects are expected to complete  them in from 440 to 540 days as compared with the normal completion  time of about 720 days. In addition, we were told that the Corps hopes to  have completed the pilot testing and developed regional contracts for the  standardized facility types so that they can be used in the fiscal year 2008  military construction program. According to Corps officials, these  contracts will help streamline the construction process because a task  order can be issued against an already existing contract when needed.  Despite the early positive results, however, Corps officials acknowledge  that their strategy has not been tested in high-demand conditions, such as  those that will occur because of the much larger construction budgets and  extensive construction plans during fiscal years 2008 through 2010.
With respect to implementing this transformational construction strategy,  building materials cost and labor wage rates that exceed rates used in the  construction budget process could lead to unexpectedly costly building  projects. In recent years, the actual rate of construction inflation has  exceeded the federal government’s inflation rate, which the Corps is  required to use in budgeting for its construction projects. While this  variance, which was as high as 6.1 percentage points in fiscal year 2004,  has diminished over time, the actual rate of construction inflation  continues to exceed the Corps’ budgeted rate. Because the Corps uses  government inflation rates to develop its cost estimates and budget for  construction in any given year, any variance in actual inflation from those  rates has an impact on the cost of construction projects. Army Corps of  Engineers officials told us that to the extent that the actual rate of inflation  continues to exceed the budgeted rate as implementation proceeds and  construction material costs are higher than anticipated, they would either  have to redirect funding from other sources to provide for construction  projects or resort to a reduction in the scope of some construction  projects. We note, however, that this trend may not necessarily continue  into the future, depending on the economics surrounding the construction  industry.
Finally, the Corps is expected to manage an unprecedented volume of  construction through 2011, with some regions expecting to far exceed  their normal construction capacity. For example, the Fort Worth, Texas,  district is to manage about $2.5 billion in construction work at Fort Bliss.  Corps officials said that this amount would place them at their maximum  capacity of about $400 million in construction work annually managed by  that district, and they must also manage $2 billion in construction in the  San Antonio, Texas, area. Similarly, at Fort Benning, Georgia, the Corps’  military construction budget will increase from about $50 million per year  to more than $300 million annually over the next 3 years. These costs do  not include the costs of the Corps’ civil works program, which would  include construction programs such as recovering from the impacts of  Hurricane Katrina. Corps headquarters officials have said that they will  bring in assistance from other Corps districts, hire outside help if specific  districts are unable to meet the demand without such help, or both thus  potentially adding additional cost to the projects.
section_title: Communities Have Efforts Under Way to Address Anticipated Army Growth, but Planning and Funding Challenges Remain
paragraphs: Communities surrounding growing Army installations have acted to  address school, housing, transportation, and other infrastructure needs,  but each community’s actions are unique because demands vary by  location. These communities are in the process of identifying and  obtaining funding sources to finance these additional infrastructure  requirements, and they have several ways to finance these needs, including  seeking federal assistance. Nonetheless, given the evolving nature of the  Army’s growth projections, these communities have generally been  hindered in their ability to identify all of the costs for implementing  infrastructure expansion. DOD’s OEA is assisting communities with their  growth planning efforts, but OEA does not provide funding for facilities’  construction projects.
subsections: section_title: Communities Have Generally Been Proactive in Planning and Implementing Actions for Growth
paragraphs: Communities we visited have been planning for a significant anticipated  increase in DOD personnel and family members from BRAC, overseas  rebasing, and modularity implementation. These communities’ schools,  housing, transportation, and other infrastructure needs depend on the  number of new personnel to be assigned to their local bases. However, the  Army’s plans for relocating its personnel and families were evolving at the  time of our review. Consequently, communities cannot fully determine  their requirements because of changing Army plans, although some  communities had begun planning anyway. Some went further and  undertook new construction even before the Army had decided which  bases would grow and by how much. For example, some communities in  the Forts Benning, Bliss, and Riley areas expanded medical facilities in  anticipation of DOD and community growth unrelated to DOD. Similarly,  through a pre-BRAC 2005 partnership between Fort Bliss and the City of  El Paso, an inland desalination plant is under construction on the  installation that is to be operated by the City of El Paso. Community  officials also told us that they are increasing the capacity and accreditation  of child care facilities to help accommodate relocating families’ needs.
At the time of our review, base commanders’ representatives and affected  communities’ officials at locations we visited were regularly collaborating  to manage community growth. In addition to housing, schools, and  transportation needs, community officials were planning new water and  sewage systems projects to accommodate growth. For example, the  community bordering Fort Sill has identified $14.7 million in water and  sewer projects and is seeking state and federal financial assistance to  finance the projects. State-level or regional task forces have also been  formed in some states to assist communities surrounding bases in  managing the growth. Communities surrounding Army installations in  Georgia, Texas, Kansas, Maryland, and Virginia have organized such task  forces to help identify and address off-base infrastructure needs from a  regional viewpoint. Members of these planning groups include elected or  appointed representatives from the state, local, and county levels and  representatives from local businesses, school districts, and the private  sector.
Local officials in some of the communities we visited also said that the  arrival of defense personnel and family members is expected to occur later  than initially projected, thus giving them more time to plan for and  complete new construction. At the same time, some communities’ officials  were concerned that Army plans could change and that their nearby bases  might not grow as much as first thought, but they would not find out until  after new construction had been started or completed.
section_title: Communities Have Developed Plans and Taken Other Actions to Improve Schools, Housing, and Transportation
paragraphs: The communities we visited have been actively planning and have initiated  a number of actions to accommodate the anticipated increased need for  schools, housing, and transportation. Some communities have taken steps  to address school needs by funding school construction requirements,  while others are seeking federal assistance. To help accommodate  increased housing demands, communities have constructed or developed  plans for constructing additional housing units. Some communities already  have transportation projects under way or planned, while other  communities have identified needed projects but lack the funding to make  these road expansions and are seeking state and federal assistance.
section_title: Community Plans and Actions for Accommodating Anticipated Increase in Student Enrollments
paragraphs: Some school systems in communities surrounding gaining Army  installations plan to expand their facilities to accommodate the anticipated  increase in school enrollments, although such planning is hampered by  evolving Army base growth plans. While the Office of the Secretary of  Defense estimates that Army actions will lead to the transfer of about  50,000 school children into school districts surrounding gaining  installations, fluctuating Army numbers hamper communities’ planning.
For example, Fort Benning officials projected that student enrollment  would increase by about 10,000 through fiscal year 2011 as compared to a  November 2006 DOD report that estimates 600. A number of reasons  accounted for the variances, including differences in the scope (e.g.,  defense personnel versus defense and nondefense personnel) of the  projected arrivals and assumptions underlying the projections for family  dependents related to those arriving personnel. At the time of our review,  these disparities remained unresolved. There are a number of installations,  in addition to Fort Benning, for which base projections differ from those  generated by the Army. Forts Benning and Riley officials told us that they  have been in direct contact with the units that will be moving to the bases  and consequently believe that their own estimates more accurately reflect  impending growth than those by Army headquarters. As a result, Forts  Benning and Riley officials are relying on their own estimates and  communicating them to local officials for use in their school construction  planning.
Financing school construction is a key challenge confronting officials in  communities surrounding growth bases, and these officials have adopted a  variety of strategies. For example, Forts Bliss and Riley area school  systems have passed bonds to expand their schools’ capacity. The  community surrounding Fort Bliss approved bonds totaling over            $600 million for school construction intended to serve an increased  student population of about 14,900. In addition, one community  surrounding Fort Riley passed a $33 million school bond to finance a new  1,100-student middle school, a new 400-student elementary school, and the  expansion of existing elementary schools. Another school system near  Fort Riley decided to keep a school open that was to close. In addition to  bonds, some school systems are seeking federal assistance. For example,  local officials in the community adjacent to Fort Benning estimate that  they need about $321 million to support incoming students and are seeking  federal assistance. Moreover, the school systems near Forts Benning,  Bliss, Carson, Lee, Riley, and Sill have formed the Seven Rivers National  Coalition and were subsequently joined by the school systems near the  Aberdeen Proving Ground; Forts Bragg, Knox, Leonard Wood, and Meade;  and the Redstone Arsenal. The coalition has petitioned for construction  funding from DOD, the Department of Education, and Congress and  believes that it needs about $2 billion to support incoming students.  However, DOD’s position has been to provide planning assistance through  OEA to communities affected in prior BRAC rounds but not construction  financing. Similarly, the Department of Education indicated that no  funding is available.
In addition to construction funds, school districts will also need additional  operating funds to run the new schools. Congress provided $7 million in  fiscal year 2006 to help operate school systems affected by DOD transfers,  and DOD distributed the money to 26 school systems in 14 states. School  systems having a 20 percent enrollment of military or DOD civilian  dependent children are eligible for this assistance if this population has  increased or decreased by 5 percent, or by 250 students, and the increase  or decrease is the result of DOD transfers. For fiscal year 2007, Congress  provided $8 million.
subsections: section_title: Community Plans and Actions for Accommodating Increased Housing Demands
paragraphs: To accommodate the anticipated demand for housing in communities  surrounding gaining bases, residential developers and community planners  are planning and constructing new housing. For example, officials from  the communities surrounding Fort Riley, a multicounty area with fewer  than 150,000 people, project that they will need from 8,000 to 9,000  additional housing units to accommodate the increase in personnel and  family members relocating to the area. These off-base housing units are in  addition to the 400 new on-base homes being added to the existing base  inventory of 3,114. Developers in the communities surrounding Fort Riley  had also already started construction or had construction plans for about  6,000 new units.
Also, the Department of Agriculture’s housing loan program dedicated     $25 million in fiscal year 2006 for loan assistance to personnel relocating  to the Fort Riley area. Under this program, approved lenders provide  qualifying low- and middle-income rural residents with home financing  options, including no-down-payment loans to create homeownership  opportunities. In December 2005, the department opened an office at Fort  Riley to assist these potential homebuyers with off-post housing needs.  The department also plans to establish a similar partnership at Fort  Leavenworth, Kansas, and to provide similar assistance to potential  homebuyers relocating there.
In contrast to the rural environment at Fort Riley, Fort Bliss is near El  Paso, Texas, with a metropolitan population of about 750,000. El Paso  community officials told us that they are not as concerned about housing  because they believe that their market is large enough to absorb the influx  of new personnel. At the same time, according to an Army official, a  recently completed draft housing market analysis for Fort Bliss identified  an additional on-base housing requirement of about 3,370 to be paid for  using housing privatization funding if this requirement is approved and  funding is provided.
section_title: Community Plans and Actions for Accommodating Increased Traffic and Insufficient Road Capacity
paragraphs: Restationing of defense personnel at some gaining bases is likely to  prompt new transportation infrastructure construction in communities  surrounding the bases. Some state and local governments had already  begun planning for or started construction projects at the time of our  review. For instance, according to community officials, projects already  started or planned to be started are expected to cost (1) $60 million in the  Fort Riley area, (2) $45 million in the Fort Carson area, and                        (3) $150 million in the Fort Bliss area. Also, Fort Sill community  representatives said that they have identified road expansion projects  totaling approximately $25 million, and because of limited local funding,  they are seeking state and federal financing assistance. At the same time,  community officials at Forts Lee and Sam Houston told us that their  respective state departments of transportation are examining plans for  road expansion projects near these installations.
Transportation needs and funding will also be a concern in large  metropolitan areas surrounding gaining installations because of both rapid  growth being experienced apart from DOD-prompted growth and the  influx of personnel onto gaining bases. For example, at Fort Belvoir,  Virginia, personnel increases are expected to exceed 20,000 and this  anticipated growth will further burden an already congested northern  Virginia transportation system. A working group that includes  representatives from the Army, the Virginia Department of Transportation,  Fairfax County, and the Federal Highway Administration has been  established to review the transportation impacts of the Fort Belvoir  realignment. A preliminary list of transportation projects around Fort  Belvoir totaling about $663 million has been identified as necessary to help  accommodate the expected increase in traffic. Although representatives  from the local, state, and federal governments recognize that  transportation system improvements are needed, no funding sources or  commitments had been identified at the time of our review for projects  totaling approximately $458 million of the total of $663 million. To help  facilitate some of these specific road construction projects surrounding  Fort Belvoir, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for  Fiscal Year 2007 included a provision allowing the Army to enter into a  special agreement with the State of Virginia for certain land conveyance  and road construction around Fort Belvoir. The Defense Access Road  Program is a potential source for helping to pay for public highway  improvements. Recent developments could affect proposed  transportation projects and the timing of the move to Fort Belvoir  because, at the time of our review, the Army was making a decision  whether to obtain land owned by the General Services Administration near  rail and transit stations in the Springfield, Virginia, area where it would  move approximately 9,000 personnel.
section_title: The Office of Economic Adjustment Is Assisting Communities
paragraphs: In prior BRAC rounds, OEA, part of the Office of the Deputy Under  Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), has provided  technical and financial planning assistance but not construction funds to  communities through its grants.  According to an OEA official, in the prior  four BRAC rounds, OEA assisted over 100 communities. In our January  2005 report on the status of the prior BRAC rounds, we reported that OEA,  the Department of Labor, the Economic Development Administration  within the Department of Commerce, and the Federal Aviation  Administration provided nearly $2 billion in assistance through fiscal year  2004 to communities and individuals for base reuse planning, airport  planning, job training, infrastructure improvements, and community  economic development, and these agencies are slated to perform similar  roles for the 2005 BRAC round.
DOD sponsored a BRAC conference in May 2006 attended by state, local,  and federal agencies and BRAC-affected communities to discuss BRAC  impacts, including growth. The conference provided an opportunity for  communities to discuss issues with officials from OEA and other federal  entities that are part of the President’s Economic Adjustment Committee,  which helps communities plan for and prepare for growth. In assisting  communities with their growth plans, during fiscal year 2006, OEA  awarded growth-related grants totaling approximately $3.2 million to  seven communities surrounding Army installations, and as of April 30,  2007, has awarded 11 fiscal year 2007 Army growth-related grants totaling  approximately $8.8 million to 10 communities surrounding Army  installations and to the State of Kansas. Table 5 provides a listing of these  OEA Army growth-related grants by fiscal year and amount.
We are continuing to examine the combined effect of BRAC, overseas  rebasing, and Army modularity on communities surrounding military  installations as a result of language in the House Committee on  Appropriations report accompanying the Department of Defense  Appropriations Act  2007. We expect to provide the results of that work in  the spring of 2008.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Continuing Army operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the war on terror  and evolving BRAC 2005, overseas rebasing, and force modularity plans  have resulted in fluctuating and uncertain personnel restationing plans.  Knowing how many Army personnel and dependents will move to a given  base and their arrival dates is fundamental to the base’s and surrounding  community’s abilities to plan for and provide adequate on- and off-base  schools, housing, transportation, and other infrastructure. However, as of  March 2007, several of the Army’s largest gaining bases and Army  headquarters-level offices had yet to agree as to the number of arriving and  departing personnel because officials were unaware of the specific causes  of the variances in their estimates. For their part, communities  surrounding gaining bases generally relied on their local base officials for  personnel arrival and departure numbers, which in effect, can be  translated into the communities’ off-base infrastructure requirements.  However, without knowing whether the local base or Army headquarters- level officials’ plans have accurate information about growth plans, these  communities are not well positioned to plan for and provide adequate  schools, housing, transportation, and other infrastructure.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better facilitate infrastructure planning, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to (1) determine  why there are differences between headquarters and gaining bases with  respect to the number of arriving and departing personnel and (2) ensure  that Army headquarters and base officials are collaborating to agree on  Army personnel movement plans so that base commanders and  surrounding communities can effectively plan for expected growth. This  collaboration to reach agreement should continue as expected personnel  movement actions are revised over time.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with  both of our recommendations. With regard to the first recommendation,  DOD concurred with our findings but said that the Army had determined  the cause of differences between the headquarters and gaining bases’  numbers of arriving and departing personnel. As a result, the Army said  that in January 2007 it had taken corrective action by establishing the  Army Stationing Installation Plan (ASIP) as the single, unified source of  installation planning population data to be used Army-wide. However, the  information in our report was based on March 2007 ASIP data, which  continued to show that all of the nine installations we visited were using  different numbers than headquarters was using.
With regard to the second recommendation, DOD also concurred with our  findings but said that the Army had already taken corrective action  without the need of direction from the Secretary of Defense. The Army  stated that in May 2007 it issued guidance that allowed installations to plan  for anticipated unit moves that may not be reflected in the ASIP and to  discuss these plans with local communities as long as they are  appropriately qualified as predecisional and subject to change. Army  officials also stated that in June 2007, they would ensure that installations  forward all population issues, stationing issues, or both to Department of  the Army headquarters for resolution. Following receipt of DOD’s  comments on our draft report in late August 2007, we contacted several of  the bases we visited during our review and found that there were still  some significant, long-standing problems with the variances in the data  being used by the installations and headquarters. In some cases the  magnitude of the differences has been reduced, but there are still several  cases in which the differences exceed 1,000 personnel. For example, we  were told that Fort Bliss still expects more than 1,000 military personnel  than are currently projected by headquarters. To the Army’s credit, most  of the officials we spoke with at the installation level said the data were  improving, with one location reporting that its data were very close to that  of the headquarters. However, officials at six of the seven installations we  contacted still said that they had serious concerns with the headquarters  data.
Because disconnects still exist, we believe that our recommendations  remain valid and that the Secretary of Defense should act upon both of our  recommendations.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional  committees; the Secretaries of Defense and the Army; and the Director,  Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to  others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge  on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-4523 or at leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the challenges and associated risks the Army faces in  providing for timely infrastructure support at its major gaining bases  because of the combined effects of implementing the 2005 round of base  realignment and closures (BRAC), overseas rebasing, and Army force  modularity actions, we analyzed infrastructure-related planning  documentation and discussed planning and related funding efforts with  officials from various Army headquarters-level offices, four regional  Installation Management Command offices, and nine installations. We  visited Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Riley, Kansas;  Fort Meade, Maryland; Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Fort Bliss and Fort Sam  Houston, Texas; and Fort Belvoir and Fort Lee, Virginia, because  preliminary data indicated large influxes of military and civilian personnel  through fiscal year 2011 at these nine installations.
Because Army implementation plans were evolving as we conducted our  work, we periodically updated the information we collected as the Army  refined its plans. In examining the plans and identifying challenges that  could place the Army at risk of not providing the necessary infrastructure  to accommodate incoming personnel in a timely manner, we focused our  efforts on key elements of the planning process, including planned  personnel restationing actions and synchronization of multiple actions  affecting particular installations, infrastructure requirements to include  quality of life facilities, and military construction plans and expected costs.  At the installation level, we collected and analyzed data on the estimated  number of personnel arrivals and departures by fiscal year, along with  installation-developed military construction requirements. We also  analyzed installation-developed requirements for quality of life facilities at  the nine Army growth bases we visited and compared these requirements  to Army funding plans for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. We also met with  Army Corps of Engineers’ officials and discussed the challenges they face  in providing an unprecedented volume of military construction across the  country at gaining installations within allotted costs and time frames.  Although we did not validate military construction requirements, the Army  Audit Agency was validating the requirements at the time of our review for  selected Army BRAC 2005 military construction projects. We also sought  views from officials from the installations we visited as to the challenges  they faced in planning for and funding their personnel growth  requirements and their ability to fully fund continuing base operations and  support and maintenance activities as the installations expand. At the  Army headquarters level, we collected personnel restationing movement  data and discussed overall infrastructure implementation plans for the  expected growth installations. We further discussed the Army’s efforts to  fully fund necessary infrastructure in the face of recognized overall  funding challenges across the Army’s programs.
To determine how communities surrounding the Army’s gaining bases  were planning for and funding the necessary infrastructure to support  incoming personnel and their families, we contacted community leaders  during our installation visits and discussed their relationships with  installation officials and steps they were taking to address community  infrastructure issues as a result of expected increased defense-driven  personnel growth and non-Department of Defense (DOD) growth in their  communities. While we focused most of our efforts on such areas as the  availability of housing, schools, and transportation to accommodate the  expected growth, we also learned of other areas of concern, including the  adequacy of utilities. We collected and analyzed available relevant  community planning documents relating to growth impacts and specific  strategies and actions for addressing these impacts. Because the federal  government has a role in providing financial, technical, and other  assistance to communities affected by defense actions, we discussed with  community officials to what extent they were seeking federal assistance in  addressing growth issues. We further discussed community growth issues  with officials from the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA), an  organization within DOD that provides technical assistance and financial  assistance in the form of grants to eligible communities affected by  defense actions.  We also attended the May 2006 DOD-sponsored BRAC  conference to learn about the ramifications of DOD growth on  communities and the federal support and assistance available to these  communities. We further collected and analyzed OEA grant data already  provided to affected growth communities and discussed in general with  OEA officials the activities of other federal agencies that are included in  the President’s Economic Adjustment Committee, a committee of 22  federal agencies that have varying roles in providing assistance to  communities adversely affected by defense activities. We did not conduct  work at those other federal agencies.
In addition to representatives of the nine domestic Army gaining  installations we visited and nearby community leaders, we contacted the  following organizations during our review:    Office of the Secretary of Defense    Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and  Environment), BRAC Office, Arlington, Virginia    Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Military  Community and Family Policy, Arlington, Virginia     OEA, Arlington, Virginia    Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, Arlington, Virginia    Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Arlington, Virginia  Installation Management Command Headquarters, Arlington, Virginia  Installation Management Command, Northeast Region, Hampton,  Virginia  Installation Management Command, Northwest Region, Rock Island,  Illinois  Installation Management Command, Southeast Region, Atlanta,  Georgia  Installation Management Command, Southwest Region, San Antonio,  Texas    Army Corps of Engineers Headquarters, Washington, D.C.    Training and Doctrine Command, Hampton, Virginia    Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, Newport  Our analysis was complicated by the evolving nature of the Army’s  infrastructure implementation plans, which continued to change  throughout our review. Business plans intended to direct the  implementation of the BRAC recommendations affecting the gaining bases  were in draft at the time of our review. Army officials said that the  information they provided to us and that we present in our report  represented their current plans at the time of our review and should be  considered an approximation of their projected restationing and funding  actions because these plans are subject to change. Consequently, civilian  planning for providing infrastructure was subject to change based on  changes in the Army’s plans. Although we found some discrepancies in the  Army’s data, we concluded that, overall, they were sufficiently reliable for  the purposes of this report. We conducted our review from March 2006  through July 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Barry W. Holman, Director  (retired); James R. Reifsnyder, Assistant Director; Nelsie S. Alcocer;   Grace A. Coleman; Nancy T. Lively; Richard W. Meeks; David F. Nielson;  and Roger L. Tomlinson made major contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor  Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve  Centers. GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.:  September 13, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the  2005 Round. GAO-07-1230R. Washington D.C.: September 06, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers  Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and  Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2007.
Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate  Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely  Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641.  Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat System Risks Underscore the  Importance of Oversight. GAO-07-672T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental  Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property.  GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007.
Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting  Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD’s Global Posture  Restructuring. GAO-06-852. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2006.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD’s Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans  Continue to Evolve. GAO-06-913R. Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2006.
Force Structure: Capabilities and Cost of Army Modular Force Remain  Uncertain. GAO-06-548T. Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006.
Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of  Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force. GAO-05-926.  Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2005.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and  Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785.  Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005.
Defense Infrastructure: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future  Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure  Overseas. GAO-05-680R. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2005.
Defense Infrastructure: Issues Need to Be Addressed in Managing and  Funding Base Operations and Facilities Support. GAO-05-556.  Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and  Closures. GAO-05-138. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2005.