2010 Census: Efforts to Build an Accurate Address List Are Making Progress, but Face Software and Other Challenges
Published: 2009-10-21T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The decennial census is a constitutionally mandated activity that produces data used to apportion congressional seats, redraw congressional districts, and help allocate billions of dollars in federal assistance. A complete and accurate master address file (MAF), along with precise maps--the U.S. Census Bureau's (Bureau) mapping system is called Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing (TIGER)--are the building blocks of a successful census. If the Bureau's address list and maps are inaccurate, people can be missed, counted more than once, or included in the wrong location. This testimony discusses the Bureau's readiness for the 2010 Census and covers: (1) the Bureau's progress in building an accurate address list; and (2) an update of the Bureau's information technology (IT) system used to extract information from its MAF/TIGER? database. Our review included observations at 20 early opening local census offices in hard-to-count areas. The testimony is based on previously issued and ongoing work.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Bureau has taken, and continues to take measures to build an accurate MAF and to update its maps. From an operational perspective, the Local Update of Census Addresses (LUCA) and address canvassing generally proceeded as planned, and GAO did not observe any significant flaws or operational setbacks. Group quarters validation got underway in late September as planned. A group quarters is a place where people live or stay that is normally owned or managed by an entity or organization providing housing and/or services for the residents (such as a boarding school, correctional facility, health care facility, military quarters, residence hall, or dormitory). LUCA made use of local knowledge to enhance MAF accuracy. Between November 2007 and March 2008, over 8,000 state, local, and tribal governments participated in the program. However, LUCA submissions generated a relatively small percentage of additions to the MAF. For example, of approximately 36 million possible additions to the MAF that localities submitted, 2.4 million (7 percent) were not already in the MAF. The other submissions were duplicate addresses, non-existent, or non-residential. Address canvassing (an operation where temporary workers go door to door to verify and update address data) finished ahead of schedule, but was over budget. Based on initial Bureau data, the preliminary figure on the actual cost of address canvassing is $88 million higher than the original estimate of $356 million, an overrun of 25 percent. The testing and improvements the Bureau made to the reliability of the hand held computers prior to the start of address canvassing played a key role in the pace of the operation, but other factors were important as well, including the prompt resolution of technical problems and lower than expected employee turnover. The Bureau's address list at the start of address canvassing consisted of 141.8 million housing units. Listers added around 17 million addresses and marked about 21 million for deletion. All told, listers identified about 4.5 million duplicate addresses, 1.2 million nonresidential addresses, and about 690,000 addresses that were uninhabitable structures. The overall quality of the address file will not be known until later in the census when the Bureau completes various assessments. While the Bureau has made some improvements to its management of MAF/TIGER? IT such as finalizing five of eight test plans, GAO continues to be concerned about the lack of finalized test plans, incomplete metrics to gauge progress, and an aggressive testing and implementation schedule going forward. Given the importance of MAF/TIGER? to an accurate census, it is critical that the Bureau ensure this system is thoroughly tested.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to report on the U.S. Census Bureau’s  (Bureau) progress in building a complete and accurate address list. As you  know, a complete and accurate address list, along with precise maps, are  the fundamental building blocks of a successful census. An accurate  address list is critical because it both identifies all households that are to  receive a census questionnaire and serves as the control mechanism for  following up with households that fail to respond to the initial mailout  questionnaire. Precise maps are critical for counting the population in  their proper locations—the basis of congressional reapportionment and  redistricting. If the Bureau’s address list and maps are inaccurate, people  can be missed, counted more than once, or included in the wrong location.  The Bureau’s database of the nation’s approximately 140 million addresses  is called the Master Address File (MAF); and the Bureau’s mapping system  is the Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing  (TIGER®) database.
On its face, it would appear that building an accurate address list would be  a relatively straightforward task given the obvious nature of many  dwellings and the availability of postal addresses. However, people do not  always reside in conventional housing units, and in fact can reside in  “hidden” housing units such as converted attics and basements, as well as  cars, boats, trailers, labor camps, and other less traditional locations.  Although these types of dwellings have always existed, the large number  of foreclosures the nation has recently experienced, as well as the natural  disasters that have hit the Gulf Coast and other regions, have likely  increased the number of people doubling-up, living in motels, tent cities,  and other types of less conventional housing. The Bureau has found that  such individuals are at greater risk of being missed in the census.  Moreover, in addition to housing units (which include single family homes,  apartments, and mobile homes), many other people reside in prisons,  dormitories, nursing homes, and similar group living arrangements known  as “group quarters.”
One of the Bureau’s long-standing challenges has been reducing the  differential impact of errors in the census. Minorities, renters, and  children, for example, are more likely to be missed by the census while  more affluent groups, such as people with vacation homes, are more likely  to be enumerated more than once. Because the success of the census,  including reducing the differential undercount, rests, in large part, on the  quality of the Bureau’s address list and maps, the Bureau goes to great  lengths over the course of the decade to ensure the accuracy of  MAF/TIGER using multiple operations that include partnerships with the  U.S. Postal Service and other federal agencies; state, local, and tribal  governments; and local planning organizations. In all, the Bureau’s  operational plan includes 11 operations that contribute to the accuracy of  the address list.
Nevertheless, because of the diversity and complexity of living  arrangements in our nation, compiling an accurate address file is no easy  task. During the 2000 Census, for example, Bureau evaluations estimated  that of the 116 million housing units in the final census count, about 2.3  million housing units were incorrectly included in the census and about  2.7 million housing units were missed.
As requested, my testimony will describe the Bureau’s progress in building  an accurate address file for the 2010 Census, paying particular attention to  the Bureau’s preliminary results of three MAF-building operations that can  help locate hidden housing units and other traditionally hard-to-count  populations: the Local Update of Census Addresses (LUCA) program, the  Address Canvassing operation, and Group Quarters Validation (an initial  phase of a multistep effort to ensure these types of dwellings are properly  located and counted). The Bureau has completed LUCA and Address  Canvassing, while Group Quarters Validation just got underway a few  weeks ago (each of these operations are described in greater detail later in  my statement). I will also provide an update on the information technology  (IT) system the Bureau will use to update and extract information from its  MAF/TIGER database. In our prior work, we noted that the system faced  challenges because of an aggressive testing schedule.
My remarks also include observations that could help inform the design of  the next decennial census. Rigorous planning and perhaps even a  fundamental reexamination of the census might be required because the  current approach to the national enumeration may no longer be financially  sustainable. Indeed, the cost of conducting the census has, on average,  doubled each decade since 1970 in constant 2010 dollars. If that rate of  cost escalation continues into 2020, the nation could be looking at a $30  billion census.
My testimony today is based on our ongoing and completed reviews of the  Bureau’s efforts to build an accurate address file and maps, as well as our  reviews of the Bureau’s testing and implementation of selected IT systems.  We completed our review of the Local Update of Census Addresses and  the Address Canvassing operation in October and our findings are  included in this testimony. Our review of the Group Quarters Validation  operation began in September and is ongoing.
To evaluate the preliminary results of address building operations, we  reviewed and analyzed scheduling, budget, design, operational and testing  plans for the 2010 Address Canvassing operation and interviewed  cognizant Bureau officials at headquarters and early opening local census  offices. In addition, our reviews of the Bureau’s efforts to build an  accurate address file included on-site observations at a number of  locations across the country. For example, for address canvassing, we  conducted 38 observations of address listers and crew leaders as they  went door to door and interviewed local census office managers in 20  urban, suburban, and rural census offices. We selected these early opening  local census offices because they were located in hard to count areas as  determined by data from the 2000 Census. To make these selections, we  also used other factors such as their percentage of rural population to  obtain diversity in urban/rural populations and proximity to hurricane- affected areas. The locations chosen for observations were not a random  selection, and thus results may not be generalizable nationwide. We  collected data on the Bureau’s preliminary results of its MAF building  activities during interviews and follow-up meetings with the Bureau.  Based on our limited examination of this information thus far, we consider  these data sufficiently reliable for providing current information on MAF  building activities for this testimony. Finally, in order to provide an update  on the IT system, we relied on previously published GAO work.
We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and  perform the audits to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
In summary, the Bureau has, and continues to take extraordinary  measures to build an accurate address list and update its maps. Further,  from an operational perspective, LUCA and address canvassing generally  proceeded as planned (and in fact, address canvassing finished ahead of  schedule), and we did not observe any significant flaws or major  operational setbacks. Group Quarters Validation got underway in late  September as planned. Importantly, however, the overall quality of the  address file will not be known until later on in the census when the Bureau  completes various assessments. Identifying valid housing units, especially  hidden housing units and other nontraditional housing stock, is an  inherently complex task. While the Bureau has made some improvements  to its management of MAF/TIGER IT, we continue to be concerned about  the lack of finalized test plans, incomplete metrics to gauge progress, and  an aggressive testing and implementation schedule going forward.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: As you know, Mr. Chairman, the decennial census is a constitutionally  mandated enterprise critical to our nation. Census data are used to  apportion seats and redraw congressional districts, and to help allocate  over $400 billion in federal aid to state and local governments each year.
We added the 2010 Census to our list of high-risk areas in March 2008,  because improvements were needed in the Bureau’s management of IT  systems, the reliability of handheld computers (HHC) that were designed  in part to collect data for address canvassing, and the quality of the  Bureau’s cost estimates. Compounding the risk was that the Bureau  canceled a full dress rehearsal of the census that was scheduled in 2008, in  part, because of performance problems with the HHCs during the address  canvassing portion of the dress rehearsal, which included freeze-ups and  unreliable data transmissions. In response to our findings and  recommendations, the Bureau has strengthened its risk management  efforts, including the development of a high-risk improvement plan that  described the Bureau’s strategy for managing risk and key actions to  address our concerns. Overall, since March 2008, the Bureau has made  commendable progress in getting the census back on track, but still faces  a number of challenges moving forward.
One of the Bureau’s long-standing challenges has been building an  accurate address file, especially locating unconventional and hidden  housing units, such as converted basements and attics. For example, as  shown in figure 1, what appears to be a single-family house could contain  an apartment, as suggested by its two doorbells. The Bureau has trained  address listers to look for extra mailboxes, utility meters, and other signs  of hidden housing units, and has developed training guides for 2010 to help  enumerators locate hidden housing. Nonetheless, decisions on what is a  habitable dwelling are often difficult to make—what is habitable to one  worker may seem uninhabitable to another.
If the address lister thought the house in figure 1 was a single family home,  but a second family was living in the basement, the second family is at  greater risk of being missed by the census. Conversely, if the lister thought  a second family could be residing in the home, when in fact it was a single  family house, two questionnaires would be mailed to the home and costly  nonresponse follow-up visits could ensue in an effort to obtain a response  from a phantom housing unit.
section_title: LUCA Submissions Generated a Small Percentage of Additions to the MAF
paragraphs: Under the LUCA program, the Bureau partners with state, local, and tribal  governments, tapping into their knowledge of local populations and  housing conditions in order to secure a more complete count. Between  November 2007 and March 2008, over 8,000 state, local, and tribal  governments provided approximately 42 million addresses for potential  addition, deletion, or other actions. Of those submissions, approximately  36 million were processed as potential address additions to the MAF—or  what the Bureau considers “adds.”
According to Bureau officials, one reason LUCA is important is because  local government officials may be better positioned than the Bureau to  identify unconventional and hidden housing units due to their knowledge  of particular neighborhoods, or because of their access to administrative  records in their jurisdictions. For example, local governments may have  alternate sources of address information (such as utility bills, tax records,  information from housing or zoning officials, or 911 emergency systems).  In addition, according to Bureau officials, providing local governments  with opportunities to actively participate in the development of the MAF  can enhance local governments’ understanding of the census and  encourage them to support subsequent operations.
The preliminary results of address canvassing show that the Bureau added  relatively few of the address updates submitted for inclusion in the MAF  through LUCA. Of approximately 36 million addresses submitted, about  27.7 million were already in the MAF. Around 8.3 million updates were not  in the MAF and needed to be field-verified during address canvassing. Of  these, about 5.5 million were not added to the MAF because they did not  exist, were a duplicate address, or were nonresidential. Address  canvassing confirmed the existence of around 2.4 million addresses  submitted by LUCA participants that were not already in the MAF (or  about 7 percent of the 36 million proposed additions).
Bureau officials have indicated that they began shipping out detailed  feedback to eligible LUCA participants on October 8, 2009, that includes  information on which addresses were accepted. On November 1, 2009, the  Office of Management and Budget is scheduled to open the LUCA appeals  office that will enable LUCA participants who disagree with the Bureau’s  feedback to challenge the Bureau’s decisions. This appeals process allows  governments to provide evidence of the existence of addresses that the  Bureau missed. If the government’s appeal is sustained, then Bureau will  include those addresses in later enumeration activities, and enumerate  them if they are located in the field.
The LUCA program is labor intensive for both localities and the Bureau  because it involves data reviews, on-site verification, quality control  procedures, and other activities, but produced marginal returns. While  these were unique additions to the MAF that may not have been identified  in any other MAF-building operation, they were costly additions  nonetheless. As a result, as the Bureau prepares for the 2020 Census, it will  be important for it to explore options that help improve the efficiency of  LUCA, especially by reducing the number of duplicate and nonexistent  addresses submitted by localities.
section_title: The Bureau Generally Completed Address Canvassing Ahead of Schedule but Went Over Budget
paragraphs: The Bureau conducted address canvassing from March to July 2009.  During that time, about 135,000 address listers went door to door across  the country, comparing the housing units they saw on the ground to what  was listed in the database of their HHCs. Depending on what they  observed, listers could add, delete, or update the location of housing units.
Although the projected length of the field operation ranged from 9 to 14  weeks, most early opening local census offices completed the effort in less  than 10 weeks. Moreover, the few areas that did not finish early were  delayed by unusual circumstances such as access issues created by  flooding. The testing and improvements the Bureau made to the reliability  of the HHCs prior to the start of address canvassing, including a final field  test that was added to the Bureau’s preparations in December 2008, played  a key role in the pace of the operation; but other factors, once address  canvassing was launched, were important as well, including the (1)  prompt resolution of problems with the HHCs as they occurred and (2)  lower than expected employee turnover.
With respect to the prompt resolution of problems, the December 2008  field test indicated that the more significant problems affecting the HHCs  had been resolved. However, various glitches continued to affect the HHCs  in the first month of address canvassing. For example, we were informed  by listers or crew leaders in 14 early opening local census offices that they  had encountered problems with transmissions, freeze-ups, and other  problems. Moreover, in 10 early opening local census offices we visited,  listers said they had problems using the Global Positioning System  function on their HHCs to precisely locate housing units. When such  problems occurred, listers called their crew leaders and/or the Bureau’s  help desk to resolve the problems. When the issues were more systemic in  nature, such as a software issue, the Bureau was able to quickly fix them  using software patches.
Moreover, to obtain an early warning of trouble, the Bureau monitored key  indicators of the performance of the HHCs, such as the number of  successful and failed HHC transmissions. This approach proved useful as  Bureau quality control field staff were alerted to the existence of a  software problem when they noticed that the devices were taking a long  time to close out completed assignment areas.
The Bureau also took steps to address procedural issues. For example, in  the course of our field observations, we noticed that in several locations  listers were not always adhering to training for identifying hidden housing  units. Specifically, listers were instructed to knock on every door and ask,  “Are there any additional places in this building where people live or could  live?” However, we found that listers did not always ask this question. On  April 28, 2009, we discussed this issue with senior Bureau officials. The  Bureau, in turn, transmitted a message to its field staff emphasizing the  importance of following training and querying residents if possible.
Lower than expected attrition rates and listers’ availability to work more  hours than expected also contributed to the Bureau’s ability to complete  the Address Canvassing operation ahead of schedule. For example, the  Bureau had planned for 25 percent of new hires to quit before, during, or  soon after training; however, the national average was 16 percent. Bureau  officials said that not having to replace listers with inexperienced staff  accelerated the pace of the operation. Additionally, the Bureau assumed  that employees would be available 18.5 hours a week. Instead, they  averaged 22.3 hours a week.
The Bureau’s address list at the start of address canvassing consisted of  141.8 million housing units. Listers added around 17 million addresses and  marked about 21 million for deletion because, for example, the address did  not exist. All told, listers identified about 4.5 million duplicate addresses,  1.2 million nonresidential addresses, and about 690,000 addresses that  were uninhabitable structures. Importantly, these preliminary results  represent actions taken during the production phase of address canvassing  and do not reflect actual changes made to the Bureau’s master address list  as the actions are first subject to a quality control check and then  processed by the Bureau’s Geography Division.
The preliminary analysis of addresses flagged for add and delete shows  that the results of the operation (prior to quality control) were generally  consistent with the results of address canvassing for the 2008 dress  rehearsal. Table 1 compares the add and delete actions for the two  operations.
section_title: Address Canvassing Costs Exceeded Budget Because of Unanticipated Workload and Hiring
paragraphs: According to the Bureau’s preliminary analysis, the estimated cost for  address canvassing field operations was $444 million, or $88 million (25  percent) more than its initial budget of $356 million. As shown in table 2,  according to the Bureau, the cost overruns were because of several  factors.
One such factor was that the address canvassing cost estimate was not  comprehensive, which resulted in a cost increase of $41 million. The  Bureau underestimated the initial address canvassing workload and the  fiscal year 2009 budget by 11 million addresses. Further, the additional 11  million addresses increased the Bureau’s quality control workload, where  the Bureau verifies certain actions taken to correct the address list.  Specifically, the Bureau did not fully anticipate the impact these additional  addresses would have on the quality control workload, and therefore did  not revise its cost estimate accordingly. Moreover, under the Bureau’s  procedures, addresses that failed quality control would need to be  recanvassed, but the Bureau’s cost model did not account for the extra  cost of recanvassing addresses. As a result, the Bureau underestimated its  quality control workload by 26 million addresses which resulted in $34  million in additional costs, according to the Bureau.
Bringing aboard more staff than was needed also contributed to the cost  overruns. For example, according to the Bureau’s preliminary analysis,  training additional staff accounted for about $7 million in additional costs.  Bureau officials attributed the additional training cost to inviting  additional candidates to initial training due to past experience and  anticipated no show and drop out rates, even though (1) the Bureau’s  staffing plans already accounted for the possibility of high turnover and  (2) the additional employees were not included in the cost estimate or  budget.
The largest census field operation will be next summer’s nonresponse  follow-up, when the Bureau is to go door to door in an effort to collect  data from households that did not mail back their census questionnaire.  Based on the expected mail response rate, the Bureau estimates that over  570,000 enumerators will need to be hired for that operation. To better  manage the risk of staffing difficulties while simultaneously controlling  costs, several potential lessons learned for 2010 can be drawn from the  Bureau’s experience during address canvassing. For example, we found  that the staffing authorization and guidance provided to some local census  managers were unclear and did not specify that there was already a  cushion in the hiring plans for local census offices to account for potential  turnover. Also, basing the number of people invited to initial training on  factors likely to affect worker hiring and retention, such as the local  unemployment rate, could help the Bureau better manage costs.
According to Bureau officials, they are reviewing the results from address  canvassing to determine whether they need to revisit the staffing strategy  for nonresponse follow-up and have already made some changes. For  example, in recruiting candidates, when a local census office reaches 90  percent of its qualified applicant goal, it is to stop blanket recruiting and  instead focus its efforts on areas that need more help, such as tribal lands.  However, in hiring candidates, the officials pointed out that they are  cautious not to underestimate resource needs for nonresponse follow-up  based on address canvassing results because they face different  operational challenges in that operation than for address canvassing. For  example, for nonresponse follow-up, the Bureau needs to hire  enumerators who can work in the evenings when people are more likely to  be at home and who can effectively deal with reluctant respondents,  whereas with address canvassing, there was less interaction with  households and the operation could be completed during the day.
Problems with accurately estimating the cost of address canvassing are  indicative of long-standing weaknesses in the Bureau’s ability to develop  credible and accurate cost estimates for the 2010 Census. Accurate cost  estimates are essential to a successful census because they help ensure  that the Bureau has adequate funds and that Congress, the administration,  and the Bureau itself can have reliable information on which to base  decisions. However, in our past work, we noted that the Bureau’s estimate  lacked detailed documentation on data sources and significant  assumptions, and was not comprehensive because it did not include all  costs. Following best practices from our Cost Estimating and  Assessment Guide, such as defining necessary resources and tasks, could  have helped the Bureau recognize the need to update address canvassing  workload and other operational assumptions, resulting in a more reliable  cost estimate.
subsections: section_title: The Bureau Needs to Improve Its Policies for Fingerprinting Temporary Employees
paragraphs: To better screen its workforce of hundreds of thousands of temporary  census workers, the Bureau plans to fingerprint its temporary workforce  for the first time in the 2010 Census. In past censuses, temporary workers  were subject to a name background check that was completed at the time  of recruitment. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will provide the  results of a name background check when temporary workers are first  recruited. At the end of the workers’ first day of training, Bureau  employees who have received around 2 hours of fingerprinting instruction  are to capture two sets of fingerprints on ink fingerprint cards from each  temporary worker. The cards are then sent to the Bureau’s National  Processing Center in Jeffersonville, Indiana, to be scanned and  electronically submitted to the FBI. If the results show a criminal record  that makes an employee unsuitable for employment, the Bureau is to  either terminate the person immediately or place the individual in  nonworking status until the matter is resolved. If the first set of prints are  unclassifiable, the National Processing Center is to send the FBI the  second set of prints.
Fingerprinting during address canvassing was problematic. Of the over  162,000 employees hired for the operation, 22 percent—or approximately  35,700 workers—had unclassifiable prints that the FBI could not process.  The FBI determined that the unclassifiable prints were generally the result  of errors that occurred when the prints were first made. Factors affecting  the quality of the prints included difficulty in first learning how to  effectively capture the prints and the adequacy of the Bureau’s training.  Further, the workspace and environment for taking fingerprints was  unpredictable, and factors such as the height of the workspace on which  the prints were taken could affect the legibility of the prints.
Consistent with FBI guidance, the Bureau relied on the results of the name  background check for the nearly 36,000 employees with unclassifiable  prints. Of the prints that could be processed, fingerprint results identified  approximately 1,800 temporary workers (1.1 percent of total hires) with  criminal records that name check alone failed to identify. Of the 1,800  workers with criminal records, approximately 750 (42 percent) were  terminated or were further reviewed because the Bureau determined their  criminal records—which included crimes such as rape, manslaughter, and  child abuse—disqualified them from census employment.
Projecting these percentages to the 35,700 temporary employees with  unclassifiable prints, it is possible that more than 200 temporary census  employees might have had criminal records that would have made them  ineligible for census employment. Importantly, this is a projection, and the  number of individuals with criminal backgrounds that were hired for  address canvassing, if any, is not known.
Applying these same percentages to the approximately 600,000 people the  Bureau plans to fingerprint for nonresponse follow-up, unless the  problems with fingerprinting are addressed, approximately 785 employees  with unclassifiable prints could have disqualifying criminal records but  still end up working for the Bureau.
Aside from public safety concerns, there are cost issues as well. The FBI  charged the Bureau $17.25 per person for each background check,  whether or not the fingerprints were classifiable.
The Bureau has taken steps to improve image quality for fingerprints  captured in future operations by refining instruction manuals and  providing remediation training on proper procedures. In addition, the  Bureau is considering activating a feature on the National Processing  Center’s scanners that can check the legibility of the image and thus  prevent poor quality prints from reaching the FBI. These are steps in the  right direction. As a further contingency, it might also be important for the  Bureau to develop a policy for refingerprinting employees to the extent  that both cards cannot be read.
section_title: The Bureau Used Enhanced Training and Guidance for Canvassing Hurricane Affected Areas
paragraphs: The scale of the destruction in those areas affected by Hurricanes Katrina,  Rita, and Ike made address canvassing in parts of Mississippi, Louisiana,  and Texas especially challenging (see fig. 2). Hurricane Katrina alone  destroyed or made uninhabitable an estimated 300,000 homes.  Recognizing the difficulties associated with address canvassing in these  areas because of shifting and hidden populations and changes to the  housing stock, the Bureau, partly in response to recommendations made  in our June 2007 report, developed supplemental training materials for  natural disaster areas to help listers identify addresses where people are,  or may be, living when census questionnaires are distributed. For example,  the materials noted the various situations listers might encounter, such as  people living in trailers, homes marked for demolition, converted buses  and recreational vehicles, and nonresidential space such as storage areas  above restaurants. The training material also described the clues that  could alert listers to the presence of nontraditional places where people  are living and provided a script they should follow when interviewing  residents on the possible presence of hidden housing units.
Additional steps taken by the city of New Orleans also helped the Bureau  overcome the challenge of canvassing neighborhoods devastated by  Hurricane Katrina. As depicted in figure 3 below, city officials replaced the  street signs even in abandoned neighborhoods. This assisted listers in  locating the blocks they were assigned to canvass and expedited the  canvassing process in these deserted blocks.
To further ensure a quality count in the hurricane-affected areas, the  Bureau plans to hand-deliver an estimated 1.2 million questionnaires (and  simultaneously update the address list) to housing units in much of  southeast Louisiana and south Mississippi that appear inhabitable, even if  they do not appear on the address list updated by listers during address  canvassing. Finally, the Bureau stated that it must count people where  they are living on Census Day and emphasized that if a housing unit gets  rebuilt and people move back before Census Day, then that is where those  people will be counted. However, if they are living someplace else, then  they will be counted where they are living on Census Day.
section_title: Validating the Group Quarters Address List Is Important for Reducing Potential Duplicates and Other Errors
paragraphs: To help ensure group quarters are accurately included in the census, the  Bureau is conducting an operation called Group Quarters Validation, an  effort that is to run during September and October 2009, and has a  workload of around 2 million addresses in both the United States and  Puerto Rico. During this operation, census workers are to visit each  group quarter and interview its manager or administrator using a short  questionnaire. The goal is to determine the status of the address as a group  quarter, housing unit, transitory location, nonresidential, vacant, or delete.  If the dwelling is in fact a group quarter, it must then be determined what  category it fits under (e.g., boarding school, correctional facility, health  care facility, military quarters, residence hall or dormitory, etc.), and  confirm its correct geographic location. The actual enumeration of group  quarters is scheduled to begin April 1, 2010.
According to the 2005-2007 American Community Survey 3-year estimates,  more than 8.1 million people, or approximately 2.7 percent of the  population, live in group quarter facilities. Group quarters with the largest  populations include college and university housing (2.3 million), adult  correctional facilities (2.1 million), and nursing facilities (1.8 million). The  Bureau drew from a number of sources to build its list of group quarters  addresses including data from the 2000 Census, LUCA submissions,  internet based research, and group quarters located during address  canvassing.
During the 2000 Census, the Bureau did not always accurately enumerate  group quarters. For example, in our prior work, we found that the  population count of Morehead, Kentucky, increased by more than 1,600  when it was later found that a large number of students from Morehead  State University’s dormitories were erroneously excluded from the city’s  population when the Bureau incorrectly identified the dormitories as being  outside city limits and in an unincorporated area of Rowan County.  Similarly, North Carolina’s population count was reduced by 2,828 people,  largely because the Bureau had to delete duplicate data on almost 2,700  students in 26 dormitories at the University of North Carolina at Chapel  Hill. Precision is critical because, in some cases, small differences in  population totals could potentially impact apportionment and/or  redistricting decisions.
The Bureau developed and tested new group quarters procedures in 2004  and 2006 that were designed to address the difficulties the Bureau had in  trying to identify and count this population during the 2000 Census. For  example, the Bureau integrated its housing unit and group quarters  address lists in an effort to reduce the potential for duplicate counting as  group quarters would sometimes appear on both address lists. Moreover,  the Bureau has refined its definition of the various types of group quarters  to make it easier to accurately categorize them. The operation began on  September 28, as planned, in all 151 early opening local census offices and  was 95 percent complete as of October 16, 2009. We have begun  observations and will report our findings at a later date.
section_title: It Will Be Important for the Bureau to Determine Return on Investment for Each MAF-Building Activity
paragraphs: With the cost of enumerating each housing unit continuing to grow, it will  be important for the Bureau to determine which of its multiple MAF- building operations provide the best return on investment in terms of  contributing to accuracy and coverage. According to the Bureau, it is  planning to launch over 70 evaluations and assessments of critical 2010  Census operations and processes, many of which are focused on  improving the quality of the MAF. For example, the Bureau plans to study  options for targeted address canvassing as an alternative to canvassing  every block in the country. The Bureau considered two major criteria for  determining which studies to include in their evaluation program—the  possibility for significant cost savings in 2020 and/or the possibility of  significant quality gains in 2020. As the Bureau makes plans for the 2020  Census, these and other studies could prove useful in helping the Bureau  streamline and consolidate operations, with an eye toward controlling  costs and improving accuracy.
section_title: Completing Testing for MAF/TIGER System Will Be a Challenge
paragraphs: Automation and IT systems will play a critical role in the ability of  MAF/TIGER to extract address lists, maps, and provide other geographic  support services. In our prior work, however, we have called on the  Bureau to strengthen its testing of the MAF/TIGER system. In March 2009,  for example, we reported and testified that while the MAF/TIGER program  had partially completed testing activities, test plans and schedules were  incomplete and the program’s ability to track progress was unclear.
Specifically, while the Bureau had partially completed testing for certain  MAF/TIGER products (e.g., database extracts) related to address  canvassing, subsequent test plans and schedules did not cover all of the  remaining products needed to support the 2010 Census. Further, Bureau  officials stated that although they were estimating the number of products  needed, the exact number would not be known until the requirements for  all of the 2010 Census operations were determined. As such, without  knowing the total number of products and when the products would be  needed, the Bureau risked not being able to effectively measure the  progress of MAF/TIGER testing activities. This in turn increased the risk  that there may not be sufficient time and resources to adequately test the  system and that the system may not perform as intended. At that time we  recommended that the MAF/TIGER program establish the number of  products required and establish testing plans and schedules for 2010  operations.
In response to our recommendations, the Bureau has taken several steps  to improve its MAF/TIGER testing activities, but substantial work remains  to be completed. For example, the MAF/TIGER program has established  the number of products and when the products are needed for key  operations. Furthermore, the program finalized five of eight test plans for  2010 operations, of which the testing activities for one test plan (address  canvassing) have been completed; three are under way; and one has not  yet started. Lastly, the program’s test metrics for MAF/TIGER have  recently been revised; however, only two of five finalized test plans  include detailed metrics. While these activities demonstrate progress made  in testing the MAF/TIGER system, the lack of finalized test plans and  metrics still presents a risk that there may not be sufficient time and  resources to adequately test the system and that the system may not  perform as intended.
Given the importance of MAF/TIGER to establishing where to count U.S.  residents, it is critical that the Bureau ensure this system is thoroughly  tested. Bureau officials have repeatedly stated that the limited amount of  time remaining will make completing all testing activities challenging.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: The Bureau recognizes the critical importance of an accurate address list  and maps, and continues to put forth tremendous effort to help ensure  MAF/TIGER is complete and accurate. That said, the nation’s housing  inventory is large, complex, and diverse, with people residing in a range of  different circumstances, both conventional and unconventional. The  operations we included in this review generally have proceeded as  planned, or are proceeding as planned. Nevertheless, accurately locating  each and every dwelling in the nation is an inherently challenging  endeavor, and the overall quality of the Bureau’s address list will not be  known until the Bureau completes various assessments later in the census.  Moreover, while the Bureau has improved its management of MAF/TIGER  IT systems, we continue to be concerned about the lack of finalized test  plans, incomplete metrics to gauge progress, and an aggressive testing and  implementation schedule going forward. Given the importance of  MAF/TIGER to an accurate census, it is critical that the Bureau ensure this  system is thoroughly tested.
On October 15, 2009, we provided the Bureau with a statement of facts for  our ongoing audit work pertaining to this testimony, and on October 16,  2009, the Bureau forwarded written comments. The Bureau made some  suggestions where additional context or clarification was needed and,  where appropriate, we made those changes.
Mr. Chairman and members of this Subcommittee, this concludes my  statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you might  have at this time.
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this statement, please  contact Robert N. Goldenkoff at (202) 512-2757 or by e-mail at  goldenkoffr@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this testimony include  Assistant Director Signora May, Peter Beck, Steven Berke, Virginia  Chanley, Benjamin Crawford, Jeffrey DeMarco, Dewi Djunaidy, Vijay  D’Souza, Elizabeth Fan, Amy Higgins, Richard Hung, Kirsten Lauber,  Andrea Levine, Naomi Mosser, Catharine Myrick, Lisa Pearson, David  Reed, Jessica Thomsen, Jonathan Ticehurst, Kate Wulff, and Timothy  Wexler.
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