Transportation Security R&amp;D: TSA and DHS Are Researching and Developing Technologies, but Need to Improve R&amp;D Management
Published: 2004-09-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Conducting research and development (R&D) on technologies for detecting, preventing, and mitigating terrorist threats is vital to enhancing the security of the nation's transportation system. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress enacted legislation to strengthen homeland security, in part by enhancing R&D. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are the two federal agencies with primary responsibility for transportation security. GAO was asked to assess the transportation security R&D projects that TSA, DHS, and other agencies have funded and assess how TSA and DHS are managing their transportation security R&D programs according to applicable laws and best practices.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: For fiscal years 2003 and 2004, TSA and DHS funded over 200 R&D projects designed to develop technologies for enhancing security in most modes of transportation. In fiscal year 2003, TSA spent 81 percent of its $21 million transportation security R&D budget for aviation projects, and DHS spent about half of its $26 million for projects related to more than one mode of transportation. In fiscal year 2004, TSA continued to budget most of its $159 million for aviation, and DHS also budgeted most of its $88 million for aviation. According to the National Research Council, federal R&D programs should include some basic research, but TSA and DHS do not appear to be funding any basic research for transportation security. TSA and DHS have not estimated deployment dates for the vast majority of their R&D projects. Other federal agencies, such as the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, also funded some transportation security R&D projects. Several members of an expert panel on transportation security and technology that GAO convened believed the distribution of R&D projects by transportation mode was reasonable, while others believed that aviation has been overemphasized at the expense of maritime and land modes. TSA and DHS have made some progress in managing their transportation security R&D programs according to applicable laws and R&D best practices, but neither agency has fully complied with the laws or implemented the best practices. For example, neither agency has prepared a strategic plan for R&D that contains measurable objectives. In addition, although TSA has completed threat assessments for all modes, it has not completed vulnerability and criticality assessments. DHS also has not completed risk assessments of the infrastructure sectors. Furthermore, both TSA and DHS lack complete, consolidated data for managing their R&D projects. Finally, although TSA and DHS have made some efforts to coordinate R&D with other federal agencies, their outreach to consider the concerns of the transportation industry has been limited.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Researching and developing technologies to detect, prevent, and mitigate  terrorist threats is vital to enhancing the security of the nation’s  transportation system. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,  Congress enacted legislation to strengthen homeland security, in part by  enhancing research and development (R&D) for transportation security—  especially for aviation. The recent bombings of the rail system in Madrid,  Spain, have heightened concern about the security of all modes of  transportation in the United States, and concern is growing in Congress  about whether the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) and the  Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to counter terrorist  threats to the nation’s transportation systems are proceeding fast enough  and are focused on the appropriate technologies.
To enhance the nation’s transportation security, including its R&D  capabilities, in November 2001, Congress enacted the Aviation and  Transportation Security Act, which created TSA within the Department of  Transportation (DOT) and made TSA responsible for security in all modes  of transportation (aviation, highway, maritime, pipeline, rail, and transit).  The Homeland Security Act of 2002, passed a year later, established DHS;  transferred TSA and many other federal agencies to DHS; and made DHS  responsible for homeland security, including transportation security. The  act specified, however, that TSA would remain a distinct entity within DHS  until November 25, 2004. Both laws authorized funding for homeland and  transportation security R&D and established requirements for its  management, including requirements for planning and coordination, but  neither law includes deadlines for implementing these requirements. As  you requested, we are reporting on the transportation security R&D projects that TSA, DHS, and other  agencies funded in fiscal year 2003 and have budgeted for in fiscal year  2004; the status of these projects; and experts’ views on the  reasonableness of the distribution of these projects by mode and the extent to which TSA and DHS are managing their transportation  security R&D programs according to applicable laws and best practices  recommended by the National Academy of Sciences and the National  Research Council.
In addition, we are reporting on some new and emerging technologies for  screening passengers, baggage, and cargo (see app. II). For this review, we  considered transportation security R&D to encompass the research,  development, testing, and evaluation of technologies to protect the nation’s  transportation system from terrorist attacks or major crimes. The  transportation system consists largely of (1) infrastructure, such as  airports, seaports, border crossings, rail stations, transit stations,  highways, bridges, tunnels, and pipelines, and (2) vehicles, such as aircraft,  ships, ferry boats, trucks, buses, automobiles, and trains. We refer to the  key modes of transportation as aviation, highways, maritime, pipeline, rail  (passenger and freight), and transit (buses and subways). Because TSA and  DHS each has its own R&D portfolio, we discuss the two agencies’  transportation security-related R&D programs separately in this report.  When we discuss TSA’s R&D portfolio, we include projects funded by TSA’s  Office of Security Technologies, Office of Maritime and Land Security, and  Office of Aviation Operations. Our discussion of DHS’s transportation  security R&D portfolio includes projects funded by DHS’s Science and  Technology Directorate, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border  Protection, and U.S. Secret Service. help evaluate the reasonableness of the distribution of transportation  security R&D funding by mode and the challenges that TSA and DHS are  facing in managing their programs, we convened a panel of transportation  security and technology experts on March 2, 2004. At our request, the  National Research Council selected the experts, who were affiliated with  state transportation departments, universities, national laboratories,  private industry, and other organizations and were knowledgeable about  transportation security technologies.
We conducted our review at TSA, DHS, and DOT in Washington, D.C.; at  TSA’s Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City, New Jersey; and  at the Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Laboratories in Los Alamos,  New Mexico, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Appendix I contains detailed  information about our scope and methodology, and appendix III lists the  transportation security and technology experts who assisted us in our  review. We conducted our review from July 2003 through September 2004  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: transportation systems can be used as weapons themselves as was done on  September 11, 2001.
As we indicated in our June 2003 report on transportation security  challenges, transportation experts, state and local governments, and  industry representatives generally believe that investing in transportation  security R&D is the federal government’s responsibility. After the  September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress enacted legislation that  resulted in changes in the federal organization and funding for  transportation security R&D. In November 2001, the Aviation and  Transportation Security Act created TSA within DOT and transferred the  Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) aviation security R&D program to  TSA. The act also required TSA to meet a December 31, 2002, deadline for  deploying explosives detection systems to screen all checked baggage. One  year later, the Homeland Security Act created DHS and transferred TSA  from DOT to DHS. This legislation also transferred to DHS several other  agencies that conducted transportation security R&D, including the U.S.  Customs Service (now part of U.S. Customs and Border Protection) and the  U.S. Secret Service from the Department of the Treasury and the U.S. Coast  Guard from DOT. In addition, the Homeland Security Act extended the  deadline for deploying new checked baggage screening equipment for  certain airports to December 31, 2003, and transferred certain chemical and  biological research programs that have potential transportation security  applications from the Department of Defense and DOE to DHS. Although  TSA and DHS have their own research facilities, most of their  transportation security R&D is conducted by contractors. Figure 1  identifies major events in the establishment of TSA and DHS.
Under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, TSA is required to secure all modes of transportation; coordinate transportation security countermeasures with other federal accelerate the research, development, testing, and evaluation of  explosives detection technology for checked baggage and of new  technology to screen for threats in carry-on items and other items being  loaded onto aircraft, including cargo, and on persons.
TSA’s Office of Security Technologies is responsible for the research,  development, testing, and deployment of security technology  countermeasures employed to protect the transportation system against  criminal and terrorist threats. It organizes its R&D projects according to  the different approaches through which threats can reach a target, such as  on a person; in carry-on items, vehicles, checked baggage, or cargo; or  through access points at airports or at marine ports. The Office of Security  Technologies operates the Transportation Security Laboratory, located in  Atlantic City, New Jersey, which conducts transportation security R&D and  tests products submitted by potential vendors for compliance with TSA  standards.
Although FAA’s aviation security R&D program was moved to TSA and TSA  has since initiated R&D related to other modes of transportation, several  DOT administrations conducted transportation security R&D before TSA  was created and continue to do so. However, security is not the primary  focus of DOT’s R&D programs.
The Homeland Security Act brought 22 separate federal agencies under  DHS’s umbrella and provided a framework for organizing DHS into five  directorates, giving the Science and Technology Directorate responsibility  for DHS’s research, development, testing, and evaluation activities and the  Border and Transportation Security Directorate responsibility for security  along the nation’s borders and in all modes of transportation. The act also  requires TSA to remain a distinct entity within the Border and  Transportation Security Directorate until November 25, 2004.  Consequently, TSA’s R&D program office—the Office of Security  Technologies—currently operates outside of DHS’s Science and  Technology Directorate.
Under the Homeland Security Act, DHS’s Information Analysis and  Infrastructure Protection Directorate is required to prepare risk  assessments of the nation’s key resources and critical infrastructure,which includes transportation. In addition, the Homeland Security Act  requires the Science and Technology Directorate to coordinate with the appropriate executive branch agencies in  developing and carrying out the science and technology agenda of the  department to reduce duplication and identify unmet needs; accelerate the prototyping and development of technologies to address  homeland security vulnerabilities; and coordinate and integrate all research, development, demonstration,  testing, and evaluation activities of the department. engaging industry, academia, government, and other sectors in R&D,  rapid prototyping, and technology transfer.
The Office of Systems Engineering and Development takes  technologies developed by the Office of Research and Development or  HSARPA and prepares deployment strategies to transfer technologies to  federal, state, and/or local government users.
section_title: TSA, DHS, and Others Are Funding Transportation Security R&D Projects and Experts Had Mixed Views about Some Projects
paragraphs: As the primary federal agencies responsible for enhancing the security of  all modes of transportation, in fiscal year 2003, TSA spent about $21 million  and DHS spent about $26 million on transportation security R&D projects;  for fiscal year 2004, TSA and DHS have budgeted about $159 million and  $88 million, respectively. In addition, DOT spent about $8 million on  transportation security R&D projects in fiscal year 2003 and has budgeted  about $31 million for fiscal year 2004. NASA did not fund any  transportation security R&D projects in fiscal year 2003 but has budgeted  about $18 million for aviation security R&D projects during fiscal year  2004. TSA and DHS were not able to estimate deployment dates for the vast  majority of projects that they funded in fiscal years 2003 and 2004.  Although TSA and DHS have not decided what additional projects they will  fund in fiscal year 2005 and beyond, the President’s fiscal year 2005 budget  requests $154 million for TSA’s R&D program and about $1 billion for the  Science and Technology Directorate, which includes some transportation  security R&D. Overall, members of our panel of transportation security  and technology experts had mixed views about the reasonableness of the  distribution of transportation security R&D projects by mode and raised  questions about the types of projects that were funded and not funded by  TSA and DHS.
subsections: section_title: TSA Has Used a Majority of Its R&D Funding for Aviation Security
paragraphs: Overall, TSA increased its funding for transportation security R&D from  $21 million in fiscal year 2003 to $159 million in fiscal year 2004, as shown  in table 2. Although TSA is responsible for addressing the security needs of  all modes of transportation, in fiscal year 2003, TSA spent about $17  million, or about 81 percent, of its R&D funding for projects related to  aviation security. For fiscal year 2004, TSA has budgeted about $126 million  on aviation security, or about 79 percent of its R&D budget. This increase  reflects, in part, a $55 million appropriation for R&D related to air cargo  screening. According to TSA, it has spent the majority of its R&D funding  on aviation security because aviation was the greatest concern following  the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and because Congress directed  TSA to use R&D funding to enhance aviation security. In fiscal year 2004,  TSA increased its budget for multimodal R&D projects from about $4  million in fiscal year 2003 to about $22 million. This increase is due, in part,  to a $5.6 million increase for the Manhattan II project and about $6.4  million for development of a walk-through trace portal for detecting  explosives on aviation, maritime, and rail passengers. In fiscal year 2004,  TSA also increased its budget for rail security R&D projects from $169,000  in fiscal year 2003 to about $1.1 million. This increase reflects the $1.1  million that was budgeted for the Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot (TRIP).TSA also increased maritime security R&D funding from zero in fiscal year  2003 to about $9 million in fiscal year 2004; this increase is due, in part, to  $3.6 million for a project to develop equipment to screen vehicles on  ferries. Finally, TSA did not spend any money for highway, pipeline, or  transit R&D projects. Several members of our panel of transportation  security and technology experts commented that R&D for rail and transit  security warrants additional funding. Congress is considering legislation to  increase funding for these as well as other modes of transportation in fiscal  year 2005. For example, the Rail Security Act, S. 2273, which has been  passed by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and  Transportation, would authorize $50 million in each of fiscal years 2005 and  2006 for an R&D program for improving freight and intercity passenger rail  security. computed tomography explosives detection system that is smaller and  lighter than systems currently deployed in airport lobbies. The new  system is intended to replace the systems currently placed in airport  lobbies, including both larger, heavier explosives detection systems and  explosives trace detection equipment. The smaller size of the system  creates opportunities for TSA to transfer screening operations to other  locations, such as airport check-in counters. TSA expects to certify this  equipment later this year. TSA is also working with a contractor to  integrate technologies, such as quadrupole resonance, with its  existing explosives detection systems to improve processing speed and  detection capability and to reduce false alarm rates and human  resource requirements.
Aviation Checkpoint: To address the limitations of its current metal  detectors for screening passengers and of X-ray machines for screening  carry-on baggage, TSA, in fiscal year 2003, obligated about $1 million  and has budgeted $18 million for fiscal year 2004. For example, during  the summer of 2004, TSA installed and began testing explosives trace  detection portals at four airports and had scheduled to test the portal at  a fifth airport in the near future. Passengers who enter a checkpoint lane  with a trace portal machine will proceed through the metal detector  while their carry-on baggage is being screened by X-ray. Each passenger  will then be asked to step into the trace portal and to stand still for a few  seconds while several quick puffs of air are released, as shown in figure  2. The portal will analyze the air for traces of explosives as the  passenger walks through, and a computerized voice will tell the  passenger when to exit the portal.
To help focus its screening resources on the highest risk passengers, in  fiscal years 2003 and 2004, TSA worked to develop the Computer  Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II). CAPPS II is  intended to identify terrorists and other high-risk individuals before  they board commercial airplanes. Originally, TSA intended to conduct a  risk assessment of each passenger using national security information,  commercial databases, and information provided by the passenger  during the reservation process—specifically, the passenger’s name,  date of birth, home address, and home telephone number. In our  February 2004 report on CAPPS II, we found that TSA was behind  schedule in testing and developing initial increments of CAPPS II and  had not yet completely addressed other issues, including concerns  about privacy and the accuracy of the data used for CAPPS II. In  August 2004, a DHS official said that DHS was revising the program  with an emphasis on fully protecting passengers’ privacy and civil  liberties.
Aviation Cargo: To enhance the security of the nation’s air cargo  system, TSA obligated about $700,000 in fiscal year 2003 for cargo  security R&D and has budgeted about $53 million for fiscal year 2004.  For example, as part of its Air Cargo Strategic Plan, TSA plans to  develop a prescreening system to identify high-risk cargo and to work  with the appropriate stakeholders to ensure that all such cargo is  inspected. To complete its inspection of high-risk cargo, TSA has a  number of R&D projects, one of which is a project budgeted at $19.5  million for fiscal year 2004 to research and develop equipment for the  detection of threats in containerized air cargo and mail. Under this  project, TSA is considering funding several technologies, including high­ power computed tomography and X-ray combined with pulsed fast  neutron analysis.
In its July 2004 report, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon  the United States expressed concerns about checked baggage, checkpoint,  and cargo security.The commission recommended that TSA and  Congress give priority attention to improving the ability of screening  checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers. The commission also  stated that TSA should (1) expedite the installation of advanced in-line  baggage screening equipment; (2) require that every passenger aircraft  carrying cargo deploy at least one hardened container to carry any suspect  cargo; and (3) intensify its efforts to identify, track, and appropriately  screen potentially dangerous cargo in both aviation and maritime modes.
subsections: section_title: Maritime and Land Security R&D Projects Funded by TSA
paragraphs: In addition to its R&D projects to enhance aviation security, in fiscal years  2003 and 2004, TSA spent or budgeted R&D funds for projects to improve  security for maritime and land transportation, including the following:
The Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot will assess the feasibility of using  emerging technologies to screen passengers and their checked baggage  and carry-on items for explosives at rail stations and aboard trains. In  May 2004, TSA completed a 30-day test to screen Amtrak and commuter  rail passengers for explosives at a Maryland train station by having them  walk through a trace detection portal that TSA is also considering for  use at airports. According to TSA officials, the test provided useful  information about customer-screening wait times, the effectiveness of  screening equipment in a non-climate-controlled environment, and the  cost and impact of using the technology for Amtrak and commuter rail  operations. In addition, in June and July 2004, TSA tested the screening  of Amtrak passengers’ checked baggage for explosives at a Washington,  D.C., train station, and in July 2004, TSA tested the screening of  passengers and their carry-on items for explosives on a Connecticut  commuter rail train while the train was in motion.
The Transportation Worker Identification Credential is intended to  establish a uniform, nationwide standard for the secure identification of  as many as 12 million public- and private-sector workers who require  unescorted physical or cyber access to secure areas at airports and  other transportation facilities, such as seaports and railroad terminals.  TSA was not able to provide funding information for the program for  fiscal years 2003 and 2004. As we have previously reported, airport and  seaport officials have expressed concern about how much the program  would cost and who would pay to implement it. We have recently  completed a separate review that looked at pilot tests of the program at  maritime ports and expect to issue a report to the House Transportation  and Infrastructure Committee by September 30, 2004.
The Conveyance Tracking Program is investigating the capability of  technologies that are or are nearly available for the secure tracking of  hazardous materials shipments by rail and truck. TSA budgeted about $1  million for this program for fiscal year 2004.
Operation Safe Commerce is designed to improve container supply  chain security by testing practices and commercially available  technologies in an operational environment, including technologies for  tracking and tracing containers, nonintrustive detection of threats, and  sealing containers. In June 2003, TSA awarded grants to the ports of Los  Angeles and Long Beach, California; Seattle and Tacoma, Washington;  and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. TSA was not able to  provide funding information for the program for fiscal years 2003 and  2004.
section_title: TSA Spent or Budgeted Most of Its R&D Funding for Projects That Are Beyond the Basic Research Phase
paragraphs: For our review, we classified R&D projects according to the following four  phases:
Basic research includes all scientific efforts and experimentation  directed toward increasing knowledge and understanding in those fields  of physical, engineering, environmental, social, and life sciences related  to long-term national needs.
Applied research includes all efforts directed toward the solution of  specific problems with a view toward developing and evaluating the  feasibility of proposed solutions.
Advanced development includes all efforts directed toward projects that  have moved into the development of hardware for field experiments and  tests.
Operational testing includes the evaluation of integrated technologies  in a realistic operating environment to assess the performance or cost  reduction potential of advanced technology. although it typically entails higher risks, it also offers higher payoffs than  R&D in later phases. Thus far, TSA has focused its R&D efforts on making  improvements to deployed technologies and testing and evaluating near­ term technologies, and a senior TSA official acknowledged that the agency  needs to do more basic research.
Although many of TSA’s projects are in later phases of development, the  agency has not estimated deployment dates for 133 of the 146 projects that  it funded in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. According to TSA officials,  deployment dates are not always predictable because deployment is  dependent on factors such as the manufacturing capacity of the private  sector or the availability of funds for purchasing and installing equipment.  However, we generally believe that R&D program managers should  estimate deployment dates for projects that are beyond the basic research  phase because deployment dates can serve as goals that the managers can  use to plan, budget, and track the progress of projects. For the 13 projects  for which TSA had estimated deployment dates, deployment is scheduled  for fiscal years 2004 through 2014. Nine of the 13 projects are scheduled for  deployment in fiscal years 2005 or 2006, including the Phoenix project,  which is intended to enhance existing checked baggage screening systems  and develop new screening technologies. One of the remaining 4 projects,  the Manhattan II project, is scheduled for deployment from fiscal years  2009 through 2014.
section_title: Transferring R&D Funds to Other Programs Delayed TSA’s Progress on Some R&D Projects
paragraphs: Progress on some R&D projects was delayed in fiscal year 2003 when TSA  transferred about $61 million, more than half of its $110 million R&D  appropriation, to operational needs, such as personnel cost for screeners.  As a result, TSA delayed several key R&D projects related to checked  baggage screening, checkpoint screening, and air cargo security. For  example, TSA delayed the development of a device to detect weapons,  liquid explosives, and flammables in containers found in carry-on baggage  or passengers’ effects, as well as the development and testing of a walk­ through portal for detecting traces of explosives on passengers. According  to a TSA official, the agency does not plan to transfer R&D funds to other  programs in fiscal year 2004.
section_title: DHS Spent the Majority of Its Fiscal Year 2003 and Budgeted the Majority of Its Fiscal Year 2004 Transportation Security R&D Funding for Multimodal and Aviation Projects
paragraphs: Overall, DHS increased its funding for transportation security R&D from  about $26 million in fiscal year 2003 to about $88 million in fiscal year 2004,  as shown in table 3. The President’s fiscal year 2005 budget request  includes about $1 billion for the Science and Technology Directorate, which includes some transportation security R&D.
In fiscal year 2003, DHS spent $12.6 million, or almost half, of its $26 million  transportation security R&D budget for projects related to multiple modes  of transportation. For fiscal year 2004, DHS increased its budget for  multimodal projects to $20 million; this increase reflects the costs of  funding pilot programs with the Port Authority of New York and New  Jersey to test radiation and nuclear detection devices. For fiscal year 2004,  DHS budgeted almost $63 million, or 72 percent of its $88 million, on  aviation projects, compared with almost $4 million spent in fiscal year  2003. This increase provides about $60 million in fiscal year 2004 funds to  develop technical countermeasures to minimize the threat posed to  commercial aircraft by shoulder-fired missiles, also known as man-portable  air defense systems (MANPADS). Figure 4 shows a MANPADS that could  be used to attack a commercial aircraft.
DHS decreased its budget for transit security R&D projects from $5 million  in fiscal year 2004 to $0 in fiscal year 2004; this decrease reflects the  completion of a project to test chemical detectors in subway stations. DHS  also increased its budget for highway security R&D projects from $1  million in fiscal year 2003 to $3 million in fiscal year 2004. This increase  funds a project to research and develop technology for detecting truck  bombs. Figure 5 shows an example of a truck bomb detection system. and, according to a senior DHS official, intends to do more basic research  in fiscal year 2006 and beyond.
Of the 56 projects that DHS funded in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, DHS has  deployed technologies related to 7, has estimated deployment dates for 11,  and has not estimated deployment dates for the remaining 38. Estimated  deployment dates for the 11 projects range from fiscal years 2004 to 2007.
section_title: DOT and NASA Funded Some Transportation Security R&D Projects
paragraphs: In addition to the transportation security R&D projects funded by TSA and  DHS, DOT and NASA funded some such projects. In fiscal year 2003, DOT  spent about $8 million and has budgeted about $31 million for fiscal year  2004 on transportation security R&D, as shown in table 4. For example, in  fiscal year 2003, DOT spent about $2 million to develop and field-test a  system to track trailers containing hazardous materials when they are not  attached to a tractor; for fiscal year 2004, it budgeted $20 million to develop  a secure information network to share air traffic control information with  DHS and others.
Although NASA did not fund any transportation security R&D in fiscal year  2003, it has budgeted about $18 million for fiscal year 2004 for aviation  security R&D projects. For example, NASA budgeted about $5 million for  technologies and methods to provide accurate information so that pilots  can avoid protected airspace, continually verify identity, and prevent  unauthorized persons from gaining access to flight controls.
section_title: Experts Had Mixed Views on the Reasonableness of Distribution of Transportation Security R&D Projects, and Some Experts Questioned Decisions to Fund Some Projects
paragraphs: Members of our panel of transportation security and technology experts  had mixed views on whether the distribution of transportation security  R&D projects by mode was reasonable and raised questions about whether  some projects should be funded. According to several panelists, the  distribution of transportation security R&D projects by mode and program  area was reasonable. However, several other panelists said that aviation  has been overemphasized at the expense of maritime and land modes; two  panelists felt that R&D is focused too heavily on threats that were  prominent in the 1970s and 1980s, such as airplane hijackings and  bombings; and one panelist said that the selection of projects seemed to be  inappropriately based on the most recent terrorist event or perceived  threat. While the panelists had different and sometimes conflicting views  about the reasonableness of the distribution of projects, many of them said  that project selections should be based on current risk assessments. As  explained in the next section of this report, TSA and DHS plan to select  their R&D projects on the basis of risk assessments, which have not yet  been completed for all modes of transportation.
When asked whether they thought there were any transportation security  R&D projects in the agencies’ portfolios that did not merit funding, the  panelists identified several funded by TSA that they believed did not qualify  as R&D projects. For example, one panelist did not agree with funding  projects that were designed to enhance existing technologies, such as a  $30,000 project to test a prototype of a new, handheld ion mobility  spectrometry explosives trace detector. According to this panelist, at least  two very good ion mobility spectrometry handheld units can be purchased  off the shelf. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS said that TSA  funded this project because the vendor demonstrated a promising  technology. explosives might be concealed in containers. A ground-based system  to scan trucks carrying cargo bound for passenger aircraft, ships, and  highways could also be tested.
A multifunctional portal that tests for metals, explosives, narcotics, and  chemicals in near real time could help to address the limitations of  current checkpoint screening equipment.
A standard piece of luggage for testing deployed explosives detection  systems could be developed to ensure that the systems maintain  acceptable performance capabilities.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS addressed several  technologies and projects, including neutron inspection technology, a  multifunctional portal project, and a project to develop a standard piece of  luggage for testing explosives detection systems. Specifically, DHS said  that TSA is looking at pulsed fast neutron analysis, a technology that uses  X-ray images in conjunction with neutron interrogation and substance  identification. According to DHS, TSA considers the development of a  multifunctional portal critical because it creates opportunities for fusing or  integrating technologies—a long-standing transportation goal. Finally, DHS  said that a standard piece of luggage had been developed to validate the  performance of two different explosives detection systems to ensure that  the systems are performing to their certification levels. Moreover, DHS  noted in its comments that TSA has two advisory committees—the  National Academy of Sciences and the Security Advisory Panel—whose  members have expertise in various modes of transportation.
section_title: TSA and DHS Have Made Some Progress in Managing Their R&D Programs but Have Not Yet Fully Completed Their Efforts
paragraphs: TSA and DHS have made some progress in managing their transportation  security R&D programs according to applicable laws and R&D best  practices, but their efforts are incomplete in the following areas: preparing strategic plans that contain goals and measurable objectives, preparing and using risk assessments to select and prioritize their R&D maintaining a comprehensive database of R&D projects, coordinating their R&D programs with those of other government reaching out to transportation stakeholders to help identify R&D needs, accelerating R&D.
The Homeland Security Act also authorizes DHS to solicit R&D proposals  for security technologies from outside entities and requires DHS to  integrate the department’s R&D programs. Although the laws do not  contain deadlines for TSA and DHS to complete these requirements, it is  difficult to determine, until the agencies do, whether they are making R&D  investments cost-effectively and addressing the highest transportation  risks. In commenting on their progress in managing TSA’s R&D program,  TSA officials said that the agency was focusing initially on hiring new  airport screeners and meeting statutory requirements to install new  screening equipment. They further noted that a substantial transfer of R&D  funds in fiscal year 2003 delayed certain projects. DHS officials said that  the department is a start-up organization. Table 5 shows the progress TSA  and DHS have made in complying with statutory requirements and best  practices for managing their R&D programs.
subsections: section_title: Strategic Plans for TSA’s and DHS’s R&D Programs Do Not Yet Contain Measurable Objectives
paragraphs: The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to prepare a strategic plan that  identifies goals and includes annual measurable objectives for coordinating  the federal government’s civilian efforts in developing countermeasures to  terrorist threats. Similarly, R&D best practices identified by the National  Academy of Sciences indicate that research programs should be described  in strategic and performance plans and evaluated in performance reports.  TSA has prepared strategic plans for both the agencyand its R&D program  that contain performance goals, such as deterring foreign and domestic  terrorists and other individuals from causing harm or disrupting the  nation’s transportation system. Although we reported in January 2003 that  TSA had established an initial set of 32 performance measures, none of  them are contained in TSA’s strategic plans or directly pertain to R&D.
DHS has prepared a strategic plan for the department, but the plan's broad  objective—to develop technology and capabilities to detect and prevent  terrorist attacks—is not supported by more specific R&D performance  goals and measures in any program area, including transportation. A DHS  official said that the department is preparing a separate strategic plan for  its R&D program that will include more specific goals and measurable  objectives. Another DHS official said that the plan will include input from  the leaders of the Science and Technology Directorate’s functional areas,  one of which is transportation. DHS has indicated that the Science and  Technology Directorate’s strategic planning process includes (1)  determining strategic goals for the next 5 years, threats, and vulnerabilities  and (2) developing a list of prioritized projects for fiscal years 2005 through  2010. In a May 2004 report on DHS’s use of the DOE national laboratories  for research on technologies for detecting and responding to nuclear,  biological, and chemical threats, we recommended that DHS complete a  strategic plan for R&D. Until TSA and DHS prepare R&D strategic plans  with goals and measurable objectives, Congress and other stakeholders do  not have a reliable means of assessing TSA’s and DHS’s progress toward  achieving their R&D goals.
section_title: TSA and DHS Plan to Use Risk Assessments to Prioritize and Select Their R&D Programs, but Many Assessments Have Not Been Completed
paragraphs: The Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires TSA to use risk  management principles in making R&D funding decisions. The Homeland  Security Act requires DHS to establish R&D priorities for detecting,  preventing, protecting against, and responding to terrorist attacks and to  prepare comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of the nation’s  key resources and critical infrastructure sectors, one of which is  transportation.In addition, under the Homeland Security Act, DHS’s  Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate is  responsible for receiving and analyzing information from multiple sources,  including local, state, and federal government agencies and private sector  entities, and integrating the information, analyses, and vulnerability  assessments to identify protective priorities.
We have consistently advocated using a risk management approach in  responding to national security and terrorism challenges. In the context of  homeland security, risk management is a systematic and analytical process  of (1) considering the likelihood that a terrorist threat will endanger an  asset, individual, or function and (2) reducing the risk and mitigating the  consequences of an attack. In our work on homeland security issues, we  have identified threat, vulnerability, and criticality assessments as key  elements of a risk management approach. These elements are defined as  follows:
A  threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the  basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and past activities. This  assessment represents a systematic approach to identifying potential  threats before they materialize and is based on threat information  gathered from both the intelligence and the law enforcement  communities.
A  vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be exploited  by identified threats and suggests options to address those weaknesses.
A  criticality assessment evaluates and prioritizes assets and functions  in terms of specific criteria, such as their importance to public safety  and the economy. The assessment provides a basis for identifying which  structures or processes are relatively more important to protect from  attack.
To select and prioritize their R&D projects, TSA and DHS have established  processes that include risk management principles. According to TSA  officials, TSA has completed threat assessments for all modes of  transportation but has yet to complete vulnerability and criticality  assessments. A DHS official told us that the department has started to  conduct risk assessments of critical infrastructure sectors but does not  plan to start its assessment of the transportation sector until 2005. Without  complete risk assessments, Congress and other stakeholders are limited in  their ability to assess whether the millions of dollars that are being invested  in transportation security R&D projects are being spent cost-effectively and  to address the highest transportation security risks.
In the absence of completed risk assessments, TSA and DHS officials are  using available threat intelligence, expert judgment, congressional  mandates, mission needs, and information about past terrorist incidents to  select and prioritize their R&D projects. TSA and DHS officials said that  they obtain threat intelligence from the government’s intelligence  community to help make R&D decisions. TSA officials said that TSA’s Chief  Technology Officer receives daily intelligence briefings, and that the agency  is using threat information to select R&D projects but is not yet using  formal threat assessments to make those R&D decisions. In addition, DHS’s  Inspector General reported in March 2004 that although many Science and  Technology officials agreed on the importance of maintaining a  relationship with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection  Directorate, staff below them were not actively involved in obtaining  terrorist threat information from this directorate and using the information  to help select new homeland security technologies.
In May 2004, TSA prepared terrorist threat assessments for all modes of  transportation. In addition, in June 2004, a TSA official said that TSA is in  the process of preparing vulnerability and criticality assessments for all  modes of transportation. For example, in 2003, TSA supported the  government’s strategy to reduce the threat that shoulder-fired missiles pose  to commercial aircraft by conducting vulnerability assessments at all major  airports to identify major launch sites around the airports using  information from local agencies and FAA. In addition to these assessments,  officials in DHS’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection  Directorate said they were working in a pilot phase toward preparing  national comparative risk assessments with critical vulnerabilities that  would allow comparisons to be made across different infrastructure  sectors, such as transportation. The officials said the pilot program would  focus on other infrastructure sectors, such as chemical and nuclear plants,  before addressing the transportation sector, which they expected to work  on in fiscal year 2005. However, they did not know when risk assessments  would be completed for all modes of transportation.
TSA has agreed with a recommendation in our past work that it should  apply a risk management approach to strengthen security in aviation and in  other modes of transportation. TSA indicated that it is developing four  tools, including software, that will help assess threats, criticalities, and  vulnerabilities, and that it plans to create risk assessment models for all  modes of transportation during fiscal year 2004.
In its July 2004 report, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon  the United States also pointed out the importance of risk management and  recommended that the government identify and evaluate the transportation  assets that need to be protected; set risk-based priorities for defending  them; select the most practical and cost-effective ways of doing so; and  then develop a plan, a budget, and funding to implement the effort. The  plan should assign roles and missions to the relevant federal, state, and  local authorities and to private stakeholders. We agree with the  commission’s recommendations and are making similar recommendations.
section_title: TSA and DHS Do Not Have Adequate Databases to Effectively Manage Their R&D Portfolios
paragraphs: R&D best practices identified by the National Research Council indicate  that a research program should maintain a complete database of projects to  help prioritize and justify program expenditures. Similarly, we have stated  that an R&D program should use a management information system that  readily provides information to track the performance of projects. TSA’s  and DHS’s R&D managers were not able to provide us with complete  information on all projects in their R&D portfolios. For example, for the  146 projects that it funded in 2003 and 2004, TSA was not able to provide  information on anticipated deployment dates for 91 percent, the current  phase of development for 49 percent, and the amounts obligated and  budgeted for 8 percent—including 3 TSA projects, CAPPS II, the  Transportation Worker Identification Credential, and Operation Safe  Commerce, that were appropriated tens of millions of dollars in both fiscal  years 2003 and 2004. For the 56 projects that it funded in 2003 and 2004,  DHS was not able to provide information on anticipated deployment dates  for 68 percent, the current phase of development for 14 percent, and the  amounts obligated and budgeted for 9 percent. Although TSA’s and DHS’s  databases contain some information, it is scattered among several  computer files and paper documents and cannot be easily retrieved or  analyzed. Consequently, additional staff time is needed to prepare  documents from different reports, and compiling the information could  result in errors and omissions. Without accurate, complete, and timely  information, TSA and DHS managers are limited in their ability to  effectively monitor their R&D programs and ensure that R&D funds are  being used to address the highest priority transportation security risks. In  commenting on a draft of this report, DHS said that TSA had recently  developed a database that will allow it to track milestones, funding, and  deployment information for individual projects.
section_title: Coordination with Other Federal Agencies and Outreach to Transportation Industry Associations Has Been Limited
paragraphs: The Aviation and Transportation Security Act and the Homeland Security  Act require DHS to coordinate its R&D efforts with those of other  government agencies. Similarly, R&D best practices indicate that R&D  organizations should coordinate to help fill research gaps and leverage  resources. In addition, R&D best practices indicate that TSA and DHS  should reach out to stakeholders, such as the transportation industry, to  identify their security R&D needs. However, TSA’s and DHS’s efforts to  coordinate with other federal agencies on transportation security R&D and  reach out to transportation industry associations on the industry’s security  R&D needs have been limited.
The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to coordinate with other  executive agencies in developing and carrying out the Science and  Technology Directorate’s agenda to reduce duplication and identify unmet  needs. In addition, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act gives TSA  responsibility for coordinating terrorism countermeasures with  “departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the United States  Government.” For TSA and DHS to select the best technologies to  enhance transportation security, it is important that they have a clear  understanding of the R&D projects currently being conducted, both  internally and externally. TSA and DHS have coordinated with each other  on some of their transportation security R&D programs, such as efforts to  counter the threat posed to commercial aircraft by MANPADS; develop  technologies for detecting chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear  programs; and develop explosives detection systems. However, TSA and  DHS did not coordinate their R&D portfolios in fiscal year 2003. A DHS  official said that the department reviewed TSA’s fiscal year 2004 R&D  portfolio. The official said that it was not DHS’s intention to change TSA’s  R&D portfolio but to learn what TSA was doing and to leverage resources.
R&D best practices also emphasize the importance of coordinating R&D in  the transportation security field. A 2002 Transportation Research Board  study on the role of science and technology in transportation concluded  that while TSA should have its own analysis and research capability, it  should also have the ability to draw on the “rich and varied R&D  capabilities within the transportation sector, as well as those of the federal  government and the science and technology community at large.”  Furthermore, the report said that if TSA views the R&D activities of DOT’s  modal agencies from a broader systems perspective, it can help fill  research gaps, monitor the progress of these activities, and observe where  additional investments might yield large benefits. A member of our  transportation security and technology panel suggested that TSA and DHS  could be more effective if they systematized and formalized their R&D  coordination efforts at the highest levels and included other organizations,  such as DOT and the Transportation Research Board of the National  Research Council.
subsections: section_title: Coordinating with DOT
paragraphs: Coordination is limited between TSA and DOT and between DHS and DOT,  which continues to conduct some transportation security R&D. Although  DOT modal administration officials said that limited communication was  occurring between DOT and TSA and between DOT and DHS about  ongoing DOT R&D projects, none of these officials said that TSA or DHS  had provided any input about which R&D projects they should conduct or  had asked the modal administrations for input on which transportation  security R&D projects TSA and DHS should conduct. An official from one  modal administration said that TSA should consult DOT agencies about  their R&D plans because, in some cases, they have expertise about the  various transportation modes and are more aware than TSA of the R&D  needs and concerns of the transportation industry. For example, a Federal  Highway Administration (FHWA) R&D official told us that FHWA has  conducted extensive research on tracking freight movement and has  mapped out the movement of freight across transportation modes. This  official said these efforts could help improve freight security. Other DOT  R&D officials expressed similar views about their R&D programs and said  they need to coordinate their security R&D programs with TSA and DHS to  leverage resources and knowledge and to avoid duplication. An official  from one DOT modal administration (the Federal Railroad Administration)  said that although TSA and DHS had no formal input into the agency’s R&D  plans, all of the security-related R&D projects it had conducted since 2001  were at the request of TSA or DHS. DOT R&D officials also said that the  DOT modal administrations should continue to conduct some security  R&D because they have research personnel who are experts in various  transportation modes and could help TSA and DHS with their security R&D  efforts.
section_title: Coordinating with NASA and Other Federal Agencies
paragraphs: Because we found during the course of our review that NASA was also  conducting some transportation security R&D, we asked NASA officials  about the extent of coordination between NASA and TSA and between  NASA and DHS. NASA officials said that they have effective coordination  with TSA on the transportation security R&D they conduct. They said that  TSA and NASA coordinated on identifying the types of R&D projects that  NASA should undertake to best help meet TSA’s needs. NASA officials also  said that at DHS's request, NASA provided input to the Science and  Technology Directorate during the directorate’s strategic planning process.  In addition, NASA officials said that they are working with TSA on a  memorandum of agreement for their R&D programs.
TSA and DHS officials said that coordination with other agencies and R&D  organizations is occurring at the project level and that some coordination is  based on personal relationships. In discussing DHS’s coordination with  other agencies in July 2004, a DHS official said that DHS relies heavily on  the Office of Science and Technology Policy, a component of the Executive  Office of the President, to coordinate R&D. He also noted that the  department was only a year old, and that as it matured, DHS would know  more about the R&D activities of other agencies.
section_title: Coordinating with the DOE National Laboratories
paragraphs: In creating DHS, Congress intended that DHS draw on the scientific  expertise of the DOE national laboratories, which make up the world’s  largest system of laboratories for advanced research in support of national  energy and defense needs. The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to  establish an Office of National Laboratories to coordinate its R&D with that  of DOE’s national laboratories. DHS has established this office, and in  February 2003, DHS and DOE entered into an agreement allowing DOE to  accept and perform work for DHS on an equal basis with other laboratory  work. DHS and TSA are sponsoring transportation security-related R&D at  several national laboratories, including Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos,  Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, and the Idaho National Engineering and  Environmental Laboratory. Overall, laboratory officials told us they have an  adequate level of communication and coordination with TSA and DHS  about their ongoing R&D projects, but some officials believe TSA and DHS  could use the laboratories more as resources for transportation security  R&D and would like more information about TSA’s research needs.
section_title: Reaching Out to the Transportation Industry
paragraphs: In a 2001 report, the Transportation Research Board recommended that  research be closely connected to its stakeholders, such as transportation  providers, to help ensure relevance and program support. According to  the report, stakeholders are more likely to use the research results if they  are involved in the process from the beginning. However, most  transportation industry association officials we interviewed said that TSA  and DHS have not reached out to them to obtain information on their  security R&D needs. Consequently, the transportation industry’s security  R&D needs may not be adequately reflected in TSA’s and DHS’s R&D  portfolios.
An air cargo association official said that TSA contacted them to  participate in an air cargo security working group of the Aviation Security  Advisory Committee, a TSA-sponsored advisory group, where they were  able to discuss the air cargo industry’s security R&D needs. Some  transportation association officials said that TSA and DHS should contact  them to obtain input on their research priorities to determine whether the  proposed technologies would be useful, avoid duplication of research that  they are sponsoring, and leverage resources. Officials from another  aviation association commented that, in contrast to their relationship with  TSA, they had an effective relationship with FAA. The official noted that  information-sharing and communication occurred more frequently with  FAA, partly because FAA management recognized the importance of  obtaining input from the users of FAA’s services, whereas TSA and DHS  have not. An official from a state highway association said that although  TSA and DHS officials have participated in transportation research projects  that the Transportation Research Board is conducting for the association,  TSA and DHS have not directly contacted the association about its security  R&D needs. A TSA official said that TSA reaches out to aviation  associations and other organizations on R&D but has not formalized this  process.
section_title: TSA and DHS Have Made Efforts to Reach Out to Technology Providers, but Some Potential Providers Have Expressed Concern about the Process
paragraphs: The Homeland Security Act authorizes DHS to solicit proposals to address  vulnerabilities and award grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts  with public or private entities, including businesses, federally funded R&D  centers, and universities.TSA and DHS have taken some actions to use  this authority, but some potential technology providers believe that more  information and communication are needed.
One way that TSA and DHS have reached out to the private sector is  through their membership in the Technical Support Working Group  (TSWG), a joint program of the Departments of State and Defense that  identifies, prioritizes, and coordinates interagency R&D requirements to  combat terrorism. TSA and DHS have used TSWG to issue broad agency  announcements, which request proposals from private and/or public  entities for projects that address specific R&D needs. These solicitations  have generated substantial numbers of responses. For example, TSWG  received more than 3,340 responses to a broad agency announcement that  it issued for DHS in May 2003 soliciting proposals for multiple homeland  security R&D projects, including a system for screening rail passengers and  baggage. A DHS official said that as DHS matures, it intends to rely less on  TSWG and more on the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects  Agency (HSARPA), DHS’s external funding arm.
TSA and DHS have also reached out to the private sector by linking their  Web sites to the Federal Business Opportunities Web site, which informs  potential technology providers about opportunities for conducting  homeland security R&D projects. In addition, TSA’s Web site invites  potential technology providers and others to submit their ideas about  innovative security technologies that could contribute to TSA’s work on  aircraft hardening, baggage and cargo screening, credentialing, physical  security, and electronic surveillance. According to TSA, it has evaluated  over 1,000 proposals submitted in response to this invitation. However,  representatives of several private companies told us of difficulties they had  experienced in trying to communicate with TSA, navigate its Web site,  obtain information about its R&D program, and understand its current  transportation security R&D priorities. For example, a company official  told us that his company was forced into guessing about TSA’s long-term  R&D strategy, and that manufacturers do not want to make a large  investment in developing new technologies without knowing whether TSA  will embrace those technologies. This company official suggested that TSA  should communicate its R&D goals promptly to vendors. Similarly, some  private company representatives told us that they did not have sufficient  information about DHS’s transportation security R&D priorities and  requirements to adequately respond to solicitations. In commenting on a  draft of this report, DHS noted that TSA recently established a working  group to update and improve the current Web site’s discussion of  technology ideas, products, and services to make it more user-friendly and  plans to implement the improvements early next year.
HSARPA has also conducted various forms of outreach with potential  technology providers. In September 2003, for example, it conducted a  bidders’ conference to discuss the release of a solicitation on detection  systems for biological and chemical countermeasures. In addition, in  November 2003, HSARPA conducted a best practices workshop that  allowed potential technology providers to comment on how DHS could  best keep industry informed about its priorities, make industry aware of  agency solicitations, and manage the relationship between industry and the  agency. The industry participants also stressed the importance of  communication between them and DHS. In addition, some participants  suggested that DHS issue early drafts of solicitations to allow industry to  gain a better understanding of DHS’s needs. Following the workshop, in  January 2004, DHS issued a draft solicitation, for technologies to detect  radiological and nuclear materials, for industry comment before issuing the  final version.
TSA and DHS have used universities to conduct some of their R&D. For  example, in June 2004, TSA indicated that it had 24 grants with colleges and  universities. In addition, the Homeland Security Act requires DHS to  establish university-based centers for homeland security. According to  DHS, the centers will conduct multidisciplinary research on homeland  security. In November 2003, DHS announced that it had selected the  University of Southern California as its first Homeland Security Center of  Excellence.DHS will provide $12 million over 3 years for the university to  conduct a risk analysis on the economic consequences of terrorist threats  and events. The study will address both the targets and means of terrorism,  with an emphasis on protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure, such as  transportation systems.
section_title: TSA and DHS Have Taken Steps to Accelerate Congressionally Mandated Transportation Security Technologies
paragraphs: Under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, TSA is required to  accelerate the research, development, testing, and evaluation of, among  other things, explosives detection technology for checked baggage and  new screening technology for carry-on items and other items being loaded  onto aircraft, including cargo, and for threats carried on persons. The  Homeland Security Act requires DHS’s HSARPA to accelerate the  prototyping and development of technologies that “would address  homeland security vulnerabilities.”Although the Homeland Security Act  authorized a $500 million acceleration fund in fiscal year 2003, a DHS  official said that no funds were specifically appropriated for that purpose.
Both TSA and DHS have taken steps to address congressionally mandated  requirements to accelerate security technologies, but they are operating  without goals and measurable objectives. As a result, it is difficult to  determine what progress the agencies have made toward accelerating R&D  projects. Although TSA does not yet have goals and objectives for  measuring acceleration, the agency has funded the Phoenix project, among  others, to accelerate baggage screening technologies in the near term. For  fiscal year 2004, DHS budgeted $75 million for accelerating technologies  through its Rapid Prototyping Program. For example, DHS, in coordination  with TSWG, issued a broad agency announcement in May 2003 to support  the development of technologies that can be rapidly prototyped and  deployed to the field. Furthermore, in January 2004, DHS issued a broad  agency announcement to rapidly develop detection systems for  radiological and nuclear countermeasures.
section_title: DHS Plans to Integrate the Department’s R&D Programs
paragraphs: Although the Homeland Security Act requires TSA to remain a distinct  entity until at least November 2004, another provision of the Homeland  Security Act requires DHS to integrate all of the department’s R&D  activities. Until that integration occurs, TSA and other DHS components  that conduct transportation security R&D are operating separately.  However, DHS has made some efforts to promote R&D coordination within  the department, such as holding meetings with the different components to  discuss R&D activities and preparing inventories of the DHS components’  R&D capabilities and ongoing projects. DHS officials said they are  preparing a plan to meet a directive from the Secretary of Homeland  Security to integrate the department’s R&D activities by 2005.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The nation’s transportation systems, many of which are open and  accessible, are highly vulnerable to terrorist attack. Whether new  technologies can be researched, developed, and deployed to reduce the  vulnerability of these systems depends largely on how effectively DHS and  TSA manage their transportation security R&D programs. The National  Research Council has stated that effectively managing federal R&D  programs should include consistently funding basic research because it  offers opportunities for significant improvements in capabilities. However,  project information provided by TSA and DHS did not show that any of the  transportation security R&D projects that they funded in fiscal year 2003  and budgeted for in fiscal year 2004 were in the basic research phase. While  TSA and DHS recognize the importance of basic research, they are focusing  their efforts on the near-term development and deployment of  technologies.
Although DHS is working toward complying with legal requirements and  implementing best practices for managing its R&D program, it is operating  without a strategic plan for its R&D program. Furthermore, although TSA  and DHS officials have said that they plan to use risk assessments to select  and prioritize R&D projects, TSA has not completed vulnerability and  criticality assessments, which are key components of risk assessments, for  all modes of transportation. In addition, DHS has not yet completed risk  assessments of the infrastructure sectors, such as transportation. As a  result, Congress does not have reasonable assurance that the hundreds of  millions of dollars that are being invested in transportation security R&D  are being spent cost-effectively to address the highest priority  transportation security risks. In addition, the National Commission on  Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States recommended that the  government identify and evaluate the transportation assets that need to be  protected; set risk-based priorities for defending them; select the most  practical and cost-effective ways of doing so; and then develop a plan, a  budget, and funding to implement the effort.
TSA and DHS also do not have adequate databases to monitor and manage  their spending of the hundreds of millions of dollars that Congress has  appropriated for R&D. As DHS integrates its R&D programs, including  TSA’s, it will be important for the department to have accurate, complete,  current, and readily accessible project information that it can use to  effectively monitor and manage its R&D portfolios.
The limited evidence of coordination between TSA and DHS that we found,  as well as between each of these agencies and other agencies such as DOT,  does not provide assurance that R&D resources are being leveraged,  research gaps are being identified and addressed, and duplication is being  avoided. In our June 2003 report on transportation security challenges, we  recommended that DHS and DOT use a mechanism such as a memorandum  of agreement to clearly delineate their respective roles and responsibilities.  DHS and DOT disagreed with this recommendation because they believed  that their roles and responsibilities were already clear. However, we  continue to believe that DHS’s and DOT’s roles and responsibilities for  transportation security, including their respective security R&D programs,  should be clarified because the Aviation and Transportation Security Act  gives TSA responsibility for securing all modes of transportation but does  not eliminate the DOT modal administrations’ existing statutory  responsibilities for the security of different modes of transportation.
Finally, because most transportation industry associations told us that TSA  and DHS have not contacted them about their security R&D needs, the  security R&D needs of transportation providers may not have been  adequately considered.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To support efforts by TSA and DHS to maximize the advantages offered by  basic research, help select and prioritize R&D projects, better monitor and  manage their R&D portfolios, enhance coordination with one another and  with other organizations that conduct transportation security R&D, and  improve their outreach to transportation, we are making five  recommendations. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of  Homeland Security and the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for  the Transportation Security Administration ensure that their transportation security R&D portfolios contain  projects in all phases of R&D, including basic research; complete (1) strategic plans containing measurable objectives for TSA’s  and DHS’s transportation security R&D programs and (2) risk  assessments—threat, vulnerability, and criticality—for all modes of  transportation, and use the results of the risk assessments to help select  and prioritize R&D projects; develop a database that will provide accurate, complete, current, and  readily accessible project information for monitoring and managing  their R&D portfolios; develop a process with DOT to coordinate transportation security R&D,  such as a memorandum of agreement identifying roles and  responsibilities and designating agency liaisons, and share information  on the agreed-upon roles and responsibilities with transportation  stakeholders; and develop a vehicle to communicate with the transportation industry to  ensure that its R&D security needs have been identified and considered. points. DOT also provided comments on the draft report, which we have  incorporated into the report as appropriate.
DHS generally concurred with the report’s findings and commented that  the recommendations are key to a successful R&D program and that the  department would continue to evaluate its R&D processes in light of the  report’s findings and recommendations. However, DHS believed that the  report did not sufficiently recognize recent changes that have taken place,  particularly at TSA. According to DHS, TSA has made great strides in  defining R&D projects and linking them to mission needs and identified  gaps. In response to these and other technical comments that DHS  provided, we revised the report as appropriate.
DHS also provided additional perspectives on our recommendations:
Recommendation: TSA and DHS should ensure that their  transportation security R&D portfolios contain projects in all phases  of R&D, including basic research. DHS said that TSA’s Transportation  Security Laboratory currently conducts basic research and that TSA’s  human factors program, Manhattan II project, and air cargo security  projects include basic research. However, information provided by TSA  in July 2004 in response to our request for data on projects, including  their current phase of research, identified no projects in the basic  research phase. This information from TSA covered the agency’s R&D  work on human factors, Manhattan II, and air cargo security. In addition,  a senior TSA official said that the agency needed to do more basic  research. In light of this information from TSA, we did not change our  recommendation.
Recommendation: TSA and DHS should (1) complete strategic plans  containing measurable objectives for TSA’s and DHS’s transportation  security R&D programs and (2) complete risk assessments for all  modes of transportation, and use the results of the risk assessments to  help select and prioritize R&D projects. DHS said that in 2004, it  finalized its strategic plan, which defined missions and goals for all of  the agencies under it, including TSA. DHS also said that the strategic  plan being developed by TSA’s Office of Security Technology would  include measurable goals and milestones for R&D projects. However,  DHS’s strategic plan does not specifically address transportation  security R&D and neither TSA nor DHS has completed an R&D strategic  plan containing measurable objectives. Therefore, we did not revise this  recommendation.
Recommendation: TSA and DHS should develop a database that will  provide accurate, complete, current, and readily accessible project  information for monitoring and managing their R&D portfolios. DHS  said that TSA had developed a system to track R&D projects’ goals and  milestones, acquisition, funding, testing, and deployment information.  While such a project tracking system could address our  recommendation, TSA struggled as recently as of August 2004 to provide  us with basic information on many of its R&D projects and, in the end,  was unable to do so for a significant number. Therefore, we retained this  recommendation.
Recommendation: TSA should develop a process with DOT to  coordinate transportation security R&D, such as a memorandum of  agreement identifying roles and responsibilities, and share this  information with transportation stakeholders. DHS said that TSA is  already working with DOT to avoid duplicative R&D efforts. In addition,  DHS said that TSA would assess the benefits associated with a  memorandum of agreement with DOT to determine whether one should  be initiated. We continue to believe that a memorandum of agreement  between TSA and DHS is the proper vehicle for coordinating R&D—not  only to avoid duplication, but also to leverage resources and identify  unmet needs. Furthermore, DOT concurred with our finding that there  is room for significant improvement in coordination between DOT and  TSA and between DOT and DHS. DOT also agreed with our  recommendation that a memorandum of agreement with DHS is the  appropriate vehicle for improving the coordination of transportation  security R&D.
Recommendation: TSA and DHS should develop a vehicle to  communicate with the transportation industry to ensure that their  R&D needs have been identified and considered. DHS said that TSA  does and will continue to communicate with the transportation industry.  Although DHS noted some actions that TSA is taking to reach out to the  transportation industry, as we reported, most transportation industry  officials we interviewed said that TSA and DHS had not reached out to  them to obtain information about their transportation security R&D  needs. Therefore, we did not change this recommendation.
DHS, this conclusion is contradicted by evidence contained in our report,  namely, that the report underscores the difficulties of integrating multiple  new agencies missions, resources, and approaches. However, we believe  that the report’s evidence of incomplete strategic planning and risk  assessment, inadequate information management, and insufficient  coordination supports the conclusion. Given that DHS generally concurred  with all of the recommendations, which address these issues, and said they  were key to a successful R&D program, we believe that implementing them  will strengthen TSA’s and DHS’s ability to provide Congress with  reasonable assurance that the hundreds of millions of dollars that are being  invested in transportation security R&D are being invested cost-effectively  to address the highest priority transportation security risks.
In its comments on the draft report, DOT said that its efforts to coordinate  research planning with DHS and TSA support our finding that there is room  for significant improvement. According to DOT, it offers substantial  transportation expertise that could provide critical input for identifying and  prioritizing the transportation security R&D agenda. DOT also said that it is  anxious to work with DHS and TSA to create a mutually beneficial working  environment that taps its transportation experience and expertise while the  department benefits from DHS’s security expertise. DOT believes that  through effective interagency coordination, it could work with DHS and  TSA to ensure that important research needs are met in areas such as  critical transportation infrastructure protection, as well as in responding  to, and recovering from, a terrorist attack on the transportation system.  Finally, DOT said that coordinating R&D activities represents an area that  could benefit by being included in an annex to an overall memorandum of  agreement between DOT and DHS such as we recommended. DOT said it  fully supports the completion of a comprehensive memorandum of  agreement with DHS and is working to bring one to fruition. available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at  no charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. If you have any  questions about this report, please contact me on (202) 512-2834 or at  siggerudk@gao.gov.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of this report were to review (1) the transportation security  research and development (R&D) projects that the Transportation Security  Administration (TSA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and  other agencies funded in fiscal year 2003 and have budgeted for in fiscal  year 2004; the status of these projects; and the reasonableness of the  distribution of these projects by mode and (2) the extent to which TSA and  DHS are managing their transportation security R&D programs according  to applicable laws and best practices recommended by the National  Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council. related technologies were discussed. To help evaluate the reasonableness  of the R&D projects that TSA, DHS, and DOT have funded in terms of the  modes of transportation and program areas addressed, we convened a  meeting of transportation security and technology experts. At our request,  the National Research Council selected the experts, who were affiliated  with state transportation departments, universities, national laboratories,  private industry, and other organizations and were knowledgeable about  transportation security technologies. request, the transportation security and technology experts also provided  comments on TSA’s and DHS’s management of their R&D programs.
We conducted our review in Washington, D.C.; Arlington, Virginia; Atlantic  City, New Jersey; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and Los Alamos, New Mexico,  from July 2003 through September 2004 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Industry Is Independently Developing New and Emerging Transportation Security Technologies
paragraphs: According to a TSA official, private industry and universities are  researching and developing several new and emerging technologies that  are applicable to transportation security, in some cases without any  funding from TSA or DHS. The official said that TSA has focused most of its  R&D on making improvements to deployed technologies and testing and  evaluating near-term technologies. However, the official stated that TSA  needs to start devoting more funding to researching and developing long­ term, high-risk, but potentially high-payoff technologies. Examples of new  and emerging technologies include the following:
Terahertz imaging uses terahertz radiation to create images of  concealed objects or to reveal their chemical composition. The rays can  be directed at a person or an object from a source, with reflected rays  captured by a detection device. The Homeland Security Research  Corporation (a private research organization) reports that terahertz  imaging will be an excellent tool for screening baggage. Terahertz  imaging has been used in the laboratory to detect explosives on people  through several layers of clothing. TSA is considering funding the  development of this technology for detecting explosives in  containerized air cargo.
Nuclear resonance fluorescence imaging uses a high-intensity light  source to identify the atomic composition of a target object. Nuclear  resonance fluorescence imaging has the potential to detect explosives  and nuclear materials in baggage, trucks, and cargo containers.  According to a TSA official, TSA may fund R&D on this technology in  the future.
Microsensors are miniature devices that convert information about the  environment into an electrical form that can be read by instruments.  There are many types of microsensors, some of which have the potential  to detect explosives. In fiscal year 2003, TSA funded R&D at two  national laboratories and NASA on several different types of  microsensors. A TSA official said that several universities are currently  doing work on other types of microsensors that have potential to meet  TSA’s needs, but that TSA did not fund any of this work in 2004.
Automated detection algorithms are computer software that processes  data obtained by detection systems and automatically indicates the  presence of an explosive or weapon. Although TSA has funded the  development of such software for its currently deployed computed  tomography explosives detection systems, it has not yet funded the  development of such software to process images produced by emerging  detection technologies, such as X-ray backscatter and millimeter wave.A TSA official believes that incorporating automated detection  algorithms could substantially reduce the operational cost of future  detection systems by reducing the need for screeners. According to this  official, TSA may fund the development of these algorithms in the  future.
Raman spectroscopy uses laser light to determine the chemical  composition of an object and can be used to screen passengers, carry-on  and checked baggage, cargo, and boarding passes for explosives.
Nuclear magnetic resonance directs radio waves at an object that has  been placed in a magnetic field to determine the presence of explosives.  Nuclear magnetic resonance can be used to screen liquids in containers  in carry-on and checked baggage for explosives.
section_title: GAO’s Panel of Transportation Security and Technology Experts
subsections: section_title: Affiliation
section_title: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Homeland  Security’s letter dated August 31, 2004.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.
We agree with DHS that aviation security is currently the primary focus  of TSA’s R&D projects, and that many aviation projects provide data  that are useful for other transportation security programs. Because  these topics were discussed in the draft report, we made no change.
2.
DHS provided comments on three projects that members of our panel  of transportation security experts suggested should be considered for  future funding. We added this information to the report.
3.
DHS said that the report should indicate that TSA has two advisory  committees—the National Academy of Sciences and the Security  Advisory Panel—that contain experts from various modes of  transportation. We added this information to the report.
4.
DHS commented on a project that one of our panelist believed should  not be funded (a $30,000 project to test a prototype of a new, handheld  ion mobility spectrometry explosives trace detector) because it could  be purchased off the shelf. According to DHS, TSA funded this project  because the vendor demonstrated a promising technology. We added  this comment to our report.
5.
We continue to believe that DHS’s and TSA’s R&D strategic plans should  contain measurable objectives. Similarly, the National Academy of  Science indicated that research programs should be described in  strategic and performance plans. Therefore, we made no changes to the  report in response to this comment.
6.
DHS noted that TSA recently established a working group to update  and improve the current Web site that addresses technology ideas,  products, and services to make it more user-friendly. TSA plans to  implement the improvements early next year. We added this  information to the report.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individuals named above, other key contributors to this  report were Dennis Amari, Carol Anderson-Guthrie, Nancy Boardman,  Gerald Dillingham, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, David Goldstein, Brandon Haller,  Bob Homan, Dave Hooper, Andrew Huddleston, Michael Mgebroff, Claire  van der Lee, and Don Watson.
section_title: GAO’s Mission
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subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
section_title: Congressional Relations
section_title: Public Affairs