Force Structure: Army Lacks Units Needed for Extended Contingency Operations
Published: 2001-02-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The National Military Strategy calls for U.S. forces to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. Accordingly, the Army calculates its force structure requirements on the basis of this scenario. The strategy also calls for the Army to support operations in a series of concurrent contingencies and assumes that forces thus engaged will be withdrawn and redeployed if war occurs. The Army's difficulty in supporting contingency operations without repeatedly calling on some types of units has raised questions about whether forces structured to meet the two-war scenario can also support multiple peacetime contingency operations. GAO reviewed the Army's force planning process, known as Total Army Analysis 2007, to determine whether the Army's planned force structure will meet its contingency requirements.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO found that the Army's force structure generally provides the number and types of units required to simultaneously carry out seven illustrative contingency operations requiring Army participation. However, it does not contain the number and types of units needed to meet the needs of five simultaneous contingencies lasting for more than six months and requiring force rotations. If Army forces continue to be called on to engage in such contingencies for long periods of time, it would seem prudent to have a force structure that is able to meet such needs.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The National Military Strategy calls for U.S. forces to fight and win two  nearly simultaneous major theater wars. Accordingly, the Army calculates  its force structure requirements on the basis of this scenario. The strategy  also calls for the Army to support operations in a series of concurrent  contingencies and assumes that forces thus engaged will be withdrawn and  re-deployed if war occurs. The Army’s difficulties in supporting  contingency operations without repeatedly calling on certain types of units  have raised questions about whether forces structured to meet the two-war  scenario are also adequate to support multiple peacetime contingency  operations. In past years, the Army has not defined force requirements for  contingency operations, leaving the matter somewhat open to conjecture.  However, during the most recent iteration of its force planning process,  known as Total Army Analysis 2007, the Army for the first time separately  identified the forces necessary to support seven simultaneous illustrative  contingency operations that would require its participation. These seven  operations are based on the types of contingencies in which the United  States has recently been engaged, such as noncombatant evacuation  operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.
As agreed with your office, as part of our ongoing review of Total Army  Analysis 2007, we conducted a comparative analysis of the Army’s newly  identified contingency requirements and its planned force structure. We  undertook this analysis because the Army, while quantifying the  requirements for the illustrative contingencies, had not analyzed whether  its planned force structure in 2007 would be adequate to meet these needs.  This report addresses (1) whether a force structure based on the two-war  scenario would provide adequate forces to simultaneously conduct the  seven illustrative contingency operations, (2) whether the force structure  would be able to sustain these contingency operations if they lasted longer  than 6 months and required rotational forces, and (3) what actions the  Army might consider to mitigate the risks associated with any identified  shortages.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 requires us to  assess annually, through 2001, the Army’s plans to allocate its end strength  to meet the force structure requirements of its combat and support forces.  This is the fifth in a series of reports to respond to this mandate and the  first of two reports resulting from our review of Total Army Analysis 2007.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Total Army Analysis is a biennial analytical process the Army uses to  determine the numbers and types of support units it would need to support  combat units in two simultaneous major theater wars and the  infrastructure it would need to augment and support these units. The  process also allocates the most recent authorized personnel level (end  strength) among these requirements. The most recent iteration—Total  Army Analysis 2007—was completed in late 1999. It showed the number  and type of units required in the Army’s force structure in fiscal year 2007  and allocated the Army’s current authorized military end strength of  1,035,000 among these requirements.
Total Army Analysis 2007 for the first time determined the numbers and  types of units needed for contingency operations separately from its  normal analysis of forces needed for two major theater wars. Starting with  the Defense guidance, which identifies a number of typical contingency  operations in which U.S. forces could be engaged, the Army identified  seven operations that would require Army participation and that, according  to the guidance, could occur simultaneously. On the basis of the missions  to be accomplished, the Army then used expert panels of representatives  from headquarters, major commands, and regional commanders in chief to  determine the types and numbers of units required for engaging in these  contingencies. It used the panels to arrive at these requirements because  many of the factors the Army uses to model force requirements for war in  Total Army Analysis do not apply to contingency operations. For example,  contingencies related to peacekeeping or humanitarian tasks would not  require facing a traditional “opposing force” threat. Accordingly, the panel  identified the specific tasks to be accomplished and their associated  workload, the unit types with the requisite skills to perform those tasks,  and the numbers and types of support units needed to support the units  carrying out the operation. The force structure requirements identified by  this process were unconstrained. In other words, participants identified the  logical Army unit types required to carry out the designated missions. This  selection of force requirements was made irrespective of whether (1) the  unit types currently existed within the Army force structure or (2) there  were sufficient unit types to successfully carry out the Army’s designated  mission.
Contingency operations encompass a full range of joint military operations  beyond peacetime engagement activities (short of theatre warfare) and  include such operations as shows of force, interventions, limited strikes,  noncombatant evacuation operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian  assistance, and disaster relief. According to Army officials, all of these  operations, except humanitarian assistance and noncombatant  evacuations, could and in fact have lasted more than 6 months and have  required force rotations.
Throughout this report, we use the terms “unit” and “unit type.” Depending  on its purpose and mission, a unit may vary significantly in size, from a  5-member linguistics team to a heavy armor or mechanized division of  more than 16,000 personnel. Unit type refers to a specific type of team,  company, battalion, or other organizational element comprised of one or  more units.
section_title: Planned Army Force Structure Would Support Most Requirements of Illustrative Contingency Operations
paragraphs: The Army has determined that 709 units of 248 different unit types,  comprising about 76,000 troops, would be required to support seven  simultaneous contingencies requiring Army participation. Our comparison  of the Army’s planned force structure for fiscal year 2007 (based on the  two-war scenario) with these contingency force requirements showed that  the Army would have most of the unit types and units required to carry out  these illustrative contingency operations simultaneously, provided that U.S.  forces were not also engaged in a major theater war.
Table 1 identifies the seven illustrative contingencies in which the Army  would likely participate and the number of units and personnel required for  each operation as determined by the Army’s panel of experts. Appendix I  shows the types of forces that are most heavily used in such operations.  Appendix II shows the total number of units and personnel needed to  support the contingencies, by branch of service.
To determine whether the Army’s planned force structure for two major  theater wars would be sufficient to support these seven concurrent  contingency operations, we compared the results of Total Army Analysis  2007 with the contingency operations requirements shown in table 1. Our  initial comparison showed that, collectively, the active Army, the Army  Reserve, and the National Guard would have sufficient unit types, as  determined by Total Army Analysis 2007, to meet the requirements of all  but 52 of the 248 required unit types. The Army would have insufficient  numbers of units for 13 of the 52 unit types. Examples of these unit types  include Special Operations Aviation battalions, Psychological  Dissemination battalions, and Aerial Reconnaissance battalions. The  remaining 39 specific unit types needed for contingencies would not exist  in the Army’s planned force structure for fiscal year 2007. Examples of  these unit types include Heavy Helicopter company, Animal Surgical  detachment, Linguist team, Quartermaster Mortuary Affairs team, and  Forward Support company. In total, the personnel end strength associated  with the missing units would be about 23,000.
Army officials pointed out that other existing units possess the same or  similar capabilities as those identified as contingency requirements and  could be used to cover some of these shortfalls. For example, the Army  believes a Psychological Operations tactical company would be a suitable  substitute for a Regional Support company. Both units provide support for  operations such as the preparation and dissemination of leaflets and  posters. Additionally, while the force structure will not contain the specific  heavy helicopter company called for, it will contain other companies of a  different unit type equipped with the same helicopter. At our request, the  Army identified comparable units that could substitute for those  experiencing shortfalls. In total, the Army identified substitutes for 5 of the  13 unit types with shortages and for 31 of the 39 unit types that are not  planned for through 2007. We analyzed these substitutions and concluded  that they were reasonable and would at least partially compensate for the  shortfalls.
As a result of these substitutions, the force structure deficiencies we  initially identified were reduced to 61 units comprising 16 unit types and a  total of about 2,500 personnel (about 3 percent of the total requirement).  Army officials stated that these remaining shortfalls could be surmounted,  since many of the skills required could be obtained in other ways. They  pointed out, for example, that individuals in other units possessing the  requisite skills could be detailed to meet contingency requirements. In the  case of linguists, Army officials believe that they could meet these unfilled  requirements through civilian contracts (see app. III for the specific  shortfalls that would remain after the Army’s substitutions).
section_title: Sustained Deployments Would Pose Greater Challenges
paragraphs: Although the Army’s force structure could provide the 76,000 troops  needed to support the seven illustrative contingencies, sustaining these  operations beyond 6 months would pose greater challenges because force  rotations would be needed. Under current policy, the Army limits unit  deployments in contingency operations to no more than 6 months. If an  operation lasts more than 6 months, new units and personnel are expected  to rotate in as the deployed units return to their home station. This rotation  policy applies to all three Army components—active duty, Army Reserve,  and National Guard.
According to Army officials, five of the seven illustrative contingency  scenarios (all but humanitarian assistance and noncombatant evacuation  operations), involving a total of about 61,000 troops, could last more than 6 months. Historical experiences related to counterdrug activities and  various types of peacekeeping operations support this assertion. The Army  contends that in order to adhere to its deployment policy, it needs to  maintain a 3-to-1 pool of troops available for these missions. Should these  five contingency operations occur simultaneously, 61,000 troops would be  deployed, another 61,000 would be in training to prepare for deployment,  and 61,000 recently deployed troops would be in the so-called  “reconstitution” phase, retraining for their normal wartime mission. In  effect, this policy requires the Army to maintain a ready pool of 183,000  troops to carry out the five contingency operations.
Our analysis indicates that the Army’s planned force structure for 2007  does not have enough units to support the five illustrative contingency  operations over an extended period. For example, only 99 (about  40 percent) of the Army’s active unit types have sufficient numbers of units  to sustain 6-month force rotations. Collectively, the active Army, the  National Guard, and the Army Reserve have enough units to support the  rotational requirements of only 181 unit types, or about 73 percent of the  248 unit types required for the 5 operations. The shortfall of 67 unit types  includes about 360 units with a total authorized strength of about 26,000.  Military Intelligence would be the branch most affected, accounting for  about half of the unit shortfall and about one-quarter of the personnel  shortfall. The Psychological Operations, Medical, Signal, and Aviation  branches would also be affected significantly (app. IV lists the branches  that would be unable to sustain long-term rotations).
The Army’s ability to adhere to its rotation policy in sustaining contingency  operations depends heavily on National Guard and Army Reserve  participation because most of the Army’s total force resides in those two  components. For example, of the 6,892 units the Army planned in its latest  force structure analysis, only 2,455 (about one-third) were active Army. As  shown in figure 1, the National Guard and the Reserve each account for  32 percent of the total number of units.
The percentage of units in the reserve components is important because  the Army faces certain challenges in deploying these units during  peacetime. As we reported in April 1998, peacetime restrictions on the use  of reserve components affect the Army’s ability to deploy them to a  contingency operation. Thus, even if the Army’s force structure  collectively has sufficient required units, the Army may be restricted from  deploying some of those units to a contingency. During recent  contingencies, the Army has drawn heavily on volunteers to help reduce  deployments of active units. However, if not enough reserve personnel  volunteer for active duty, the Army cannot deploy reserve units unless the  President exercises the Presidential Selected Reserve Call Up Authority  and calls them to active duty. Further, reserve personnel cannot be required  to serve on active duty for more than 270 days and may only be called up  once for a given operation.
section_title: Various Actions Might Be Taken to Mitigate Risks
paragraphs: Prior to our analysis, Army officials had not compared contingency  requirements with the planned force structure for 2007 and thus were not  aware of the shortfalls we identified. Therefore, they had neither assessed  the criticality of such shortfalls nor developed mitigation plans. Such  analysis and plans are important because critical shortages, if left  unaddressed, could have adverse effects. Over the past several years,  personnel in units that have been heavily demanded by contingencies but in  short supply have had to deploy repeatedly and have exceeded Army  standards for time spent away from home stations. Concerns that frequent  and extensive deployments might adversely affect the services’ ability to  recruit and retain personnel led the Army to establish a 6-month ceiling on  the length of deployments. We believe that past experience supports the  Army’s hypothetical scenario of five simultaneous contingencies, given the  fact that counterdrug activities and various peace operations have in fact  occurred simultaneously and have extended far beyond 6 months.
Were the Army to decide that mitigating actions are needed, it could  consider several alternatives. It could determine whether other type units  have similar capabilities, contractors or host nation personnel could be  employed, or auxiliary support could be obtained from other military  services. Should these not be viable alternatives, the Army could also  allocate end strength to new units in critical shortage areas. However, it is  important to note that a decision to create new units would mean that other  needs might go unaddressed, and that any decision to address these  shortfalls would need to recognize the opportunity costs of not addressing  others. For example, some currently existing units are not authorized all  the personnel they require, while other units needed for the two-war  scenario exist only on paper and are entirely without authorized personnel.
Another concern Army officials raised about creating new units is whether  current Defense guidance allows the Army to create new units if the units  are not needed for the two-war scenario. Current guidance states that the  services need to be prepared for a full spectrum of conflict, including both  major theater wars and contingency operations. However, it does not  explicitly say whether units needed exclusively for contingency operations  but not major wars can be added and authorized personnel. Army force  planning officials said that their interpretation of the guidance is that they  can only authorize personnel for units needed for a two-war scenario and  not units needed exclusively for contingencies. In support of their  interpretation, the officials pointed out that the Office of the Secretary of  Defense (OSD) had allowed the Army to authorize personnel for units  needed exclusively for peace operations in only two cases. These involved  17,000 positions for units required for operations in the Sinai to satisfy the  1979 Middle East Peace Treaty and for a rapid reaction force for  peacekeeping operations in Europe to satisfy Article 5 of the North Atlantic  Treaty Organization Treaty. The rationale for these two exceptions is that  these activities, which arise from treaty commitments, would need to  continue even if a war arose and, as a result, units engaged in them could  not be redeployed to a war effort.
Notwithstanding the fact that OSD had permitted only these two  exceptions to date, OSD officials said that guidance may be sufficiently  broad to permit the Army to allocate personnel to other units needed for  contingencies but not for major wars, if it chose to do so. Nevertheless,  Army officials emphasized that they would need to have this issue clarified,  were they to conclude that authorizing personnel for such units is the best  option. In our opinion, the guidance is not explicit on this point, and a  clarification may be in order.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Army’s force structure, which is based on a two-war scenario,  generally provides the number and types of units required to  simultaneously carry out seven illustrative contingency operations  requiring Army participation. However, it does not contain the number and  types of units needed to meet the needs of five simultaneous contingencies  lasting more than 6 months and requiring force rotations. If Army forces  continue to be called on to engage in such contingencies for extended  periods of time, as has been the case in recent years, it would seem prudent  to have a force structure that is able to meet such needs. Unless the  shortfalls we have identified are dealt with, the Army may continue to have  to call on some units repeatedly and to deploy others well beyond its 6-month standard.
Assessing the criticality of the shortfalls we have identified is a logical first  step for the Army to take. If it decides that certain mitigating actions are  needed, the Army could pursue a variety of means to supplement its  capability in critical shortage areas. However, if it becomes necessary to  authorize personnel for units needed only for contingencies and not for the  two-war scenario, a clarification or change in the Defense guidance may be  needed to permit the Army clearer direction with respect to its authority to  take such action.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of the Army assess the criticality of the  shortfalls we have identified with respect to the Army’s ability to carry out  simultaneous contingency operations lasting more than 6 months. If it is  determined that the risks associated with certain shortages require  mitigating actions, we further recommend that the Secretary explore the  range of options we have outlined. If the Secretary determines that the  Army needs to authorize personnel for some units needed only for  contingencies but not for the two-war scenario, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense either clarify whether authorizing personnel for such  units is permitted under current Defense guidance or amend the guidance  to permit this action.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense  concurred with our recommendations. It stated that the Army’s analysis of  the criticality of contingency operations shortfalls will be based on  information derived from upcoming war games, since that information will  be more current than that used for Total Army Analysis 2007. Additionally,  Defense said that future Defense guidance will allow the services to make  certain contingency operations force requirements additive to the major  theater war force requirements. However, it said that prioritization of  available resources will determine whether particular force requirements  will be funded. We believe these actions by Defense and the Army, once  implemented, will allow the Army to include in its force structure those  units that it believes are critical to sustaining deployments to contingency  operations over an extended period of time. Defense’s comments are  reprinted in appendix V.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine whether the Army’s force structure would provide adequate  forces to conduct seven illustrative contingency operations, we met with  Defense and Army officials responsible for force planning and obtained  pertinent documents concerning the Army’s force planning process and the  numbers and types of units required to support the contingencies. We also  obtained information concerning the Army’s planned force for 2007. To  determine whether there would be any shortfalls, we then compared the  types and numbers of units the Army stated would be required to support  the seven contingencies with the types and numbers of units the Army  plans to have in its force structure in 2007. We determined the number of  personnel required and personnel shortfalls by applying the Army’s standard required strength for each unit type. After identifying the initial  shortfalls, we asked the Army to review the list to determine whether there  were other units in its force structure that were substantially capable of  performing the required tasks. We compared the substitutions the Army  provided and concluded that they were reasonable and would at least  partially compensate for the shortfalls. We then incorporated those  substitutions into our analysis.
We performed a similar comparison to determine whether the force  structure would be able to sustain longer-term deployments. We compared  the needs of the five illustrative scenarios that Army officials believe could  last more than 6 months with the planned force structure. We accepted the  Army’s criterion that it needs to maintain a 3-to-1 pool of troops to adhere  to its 6-month deployment ceiling. Our analysis, which was based on unit  comparisons, included the substitutions the Army had previously identified  for unit types experiencing shortfalls. We did not assess Defense’s selection  of these contingencies or the likelihood that they may occur  simultaneously.
To identify various actions the Army might take to mitigate the shortages  we identified, we gave Army force planning officials the results of our  analysis and discussed possible mitigating actions. During these  discussions, we became aware of varying interpretations of Defense  guidance and whether it would permit the Army to authorize personnel for  units needed exclusively for contingency operations. We discussed these  varying interpretations with both Army and OSD officials. We also analyzed  relevant Defense guidance provisions to understand the merits of  individual interpretations.
We conducted our review from March through November 2000 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld,  Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army. We will also make  copies available to others upon request.
Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions  concerning this report. GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments to this  report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Forces Most Heavily Used for Contingency Operations
paragraphs: The Army’s force structure requirements for the seven illustrative  contingency operations include units from nearly all the Army’s 26  branches. However, support units are used more heavily in such operations  than combat units. Table 2 shows the units and personnel most heavily  used for each of the seven contingencies by Army branch.
section_title: Force Structure Requirements for Seven Contingencies by Branch
paragraphs: Table 3 shows the number of units and personnel needed to meet the  requirements of the seven contingencies.
section_title: Analysis of Fiscal Year 2007 Force Structure Shortages for Contingency Scenarios After Substitutions
paragraphs: The following table lists those unit types for which there will be insufficient  units in the Army's force structure to meet the simultaneous demands of  seven illustrative contingency scenarios in 2007. The shortages shown are  those that would remain even after the Army substituted units with similar  capabilities wherever possible.
section_title: Analysis of Fiscal Year 2007 Army Unit Shortages Related to Extended Contingency Operations
paragraphs: The following table lists Army branches with insufficient units to sustain  deployments to illustrative contingencies lasting over 6 months. The  analysis assumes concurrent operations related to counterdrug activities,  maritime intercept operations, peace enforcement operations, and  peacekeeping operations, each of which could be expected to continue  more than 6 months. The analysis also assumes that humanitarian  assistance and noncombatant evacuation operations would occur  concurrently, though not for an extended period.
section_title: Comments From the Department of Defense
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, James Mahaffey, Leo Jessup,  Ron Leporati, and Tim Stone made key contributions to this report.
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