Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key to the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program's Success
Published: 2003-06-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) is developing a new unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) that can suppress enemy air defenses and conduct other air-to-ground attacks, particularly against heavily defended targets. Because it may perform these missions at a relatively low cost, the UCAV could be used to replace some of DOD's aging tactical aircraft fleet. A key to UCAV's success will lie in DOD's ability to match users' needs, or requirements, with the developer's resources (technology and design knowledge, money, and time) when product development begins. Our work shows that doing so can prevent rework and save both time and money. Therefore, we assessed DOD's ability to make this match. GAO conducted its work on the basis of the Comptroller General's authority and addresses the report to the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Committee on Armed Services because of its interest and jurisdiction in the program.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The UCAV program's original performance objectives posed manageable challenges to build an affordable, highly survivable, and lethal weapon system. The Air Force, however, added requirements for electronic attack and increased flying range after DOD accelerated the program's product development schedule by 3 years. These changes widened the gap between the customer's requirements and the developer's resources, specifically time, reducing the probability that the program would deliver production aircraft on cost, on schedule, and with anticipated performance capabilities. DOD has recently decided to adopt a new joint service approach to UCAV development that provides more time to close the requirements--resource gap before product development starts. It appears DOD may add new content because it is proposing to build a new prototype that would be a larger air vehicle, capable of flying and carrying out combat missions for longer periods of time. To reduce technical risk, DOD anticipates delaying the start of product development for several years in order to address new requirements. As a gap between resources and requirements widened in 2002, risks projected for the start of product development with UCAV's 15 technologies, processes and system attributes increased significantly. The new joint plan brings the risks back down. This action also allows competition back into the UCAV development effort. DOD will still face challenges in controlling joint, multimission requirements and ensuring that both services continue to provide funds for the program while also funding other large aircraft investments. If these challenges are not met, the gap between requirements and resources could resurface. DOD's role will continue to be instrumental in helping to negotiate requirements, assure resources are in place, and make difficult program trade-offs.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the initial stages of developing a  new unmanned air vehicle capable of suppressing enemy air defenses  and carrying out other types of air-to-ground attacks, particularly against  heavily defended targets. Because of its potential to perform these  missions at a relatively low cost, this new air vehicle could foster efforts  to replace DOD’s aging tactical aircraft fleet.
The air vehicle is being developed under the Unmanned Combat Air  Vehicle (UCAV) program. This is an advanced technology demonstration  program, still in a pre-acquisition phase, with two demonstrator UCAVs  being flown to assess technologies and capabilities. Launch of a formal  product development program was expected to occur next fiscal year  but has since been delayed. We conducted our work on the basis of the  Comptroller General’s authority and have addressed the report to you  because your expressed interest in the program as a committee of  jurisdiction.
The start of product development—signified by a Milestone B decision— represents the point at which program managers make a commitment to  DOD and the Congress that the UCAV will perform as required and be  delivered on time and within estimated costs. Our work has shown  that programs are more likely to succeed if program managers are  able to achieve a match between user needs, which eventually become  requirements, and resources (technology, design and production  knowledge, money, and time) at the start of product development.  Conversely, if they do not match requirements with resources, cost  overruns and schedule delays are likely to occur, reducing DOD’s buying  power in other areas.
Consequently, this report analyzes requirements and schedule changes  made during pre-acquisition and their effects on DOD’s ability to achieve  this match. The report also assesses a recent decision to expand the  program—both in terms of the military services that will be involved with  it and in terms of the design and capability of the air vehicle—and that  decision’s effect on DOD’s ability to match requirements to resources.
Our report focuses on the UCAV program managed by the Air Force and  the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). DARPA  has also been working with the Navy on a UCAV, but until recently its  transition to the product development phase was further off in the future.  We did not assess the Navy’s effort except to the extent that it was  included in the recently established joint program.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD has been successfully using unmanned air vehicles such as the  Global Hawk and Predator to gather intelligence and perform surveillance  and reconnaissance missions for military purposes. Beginning in the  mid-1990s, DOD began to conceive of a different type of unmanned air  vehicle—the unmanned combat air vehicle or UCAV—which would be  capable of performing dangerous, lethal combat missions, including  suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). Unlike other unmanned air  vehicles, UCAVs would carry weapons as well as electronic jammers to  confuse enemy radars. DOD also envisioned that the air vehicle would  operate more autonomously than other unmanned air vehicles, requiring  little or no human input from ground stations to complete their missions  or change flight paths. In addition, UCAVs would be stealthy and capable  of flying in groups or with manned aircraft.
The potential of these weapons has garnered high interest from both  Congress and DOD. In the fiscal year 2001 Defense Authorization Act,  Congress set a goal that by 2010, one-third of DOD’s deep strike force be  unmanned in order to perform this dangerous mission. In addition to  the potential for saving lives on risky missions, the UCAV could provide  mission capability at less cost than manned aircraft. Program officials  initially aimed for the UCAV’s acquisition cost to be one-third of the joint  strike fighter and operations and support costs to be at least 75 percent  lower. Because of the promise of unmanned air vehicles, the Office of  Secretary of Defense has established a joint-service unmanned air vehicles  task force to help promote the development and fielding of these systems,  including making sure that there is multiservice cooperation. This task  force is responsible for outlining the future of DOD’s unmanned  air vehicles.
In the late 1990s, DARPA and the Air Force began pre-acquisition efforts  to conduct advanced technology demonstrations to show the technical  feasibility of using UCAVs to penetrate deeply into enemy territory to  attack enemy targets. Boeing Corporation was selected in 1999 to  develop and demonstrate two demonstrator UCAVs—designated X-45A.  (See fig. 1.)
The DARPA-Air Force UCAV original plan also called for building and  demonstrating two prototypes during the pre-acquisition phase, called  X-45B, that are larger and incorporate low observable technology.  (See fig. 2.) These air vehicles were expected to be more representative  of the operational air vehicle that the Air Force planned to field. Initially,  the Air Combat Command, which establishes mission and performance  requirements, determined that the X-45B should be focused on performing  SEAD missions within the air superiority mission area. This decision  was made to address the limited inventory of current assets in the air  superiority mission area and to counter the challenges and deficiencies  associated with conducting SEAD missions.
As of February 2003, 55 of 160 planned demonstrations have been  completed. Most of the demonstrations designed to validate the basic  flight characteristics of the air vehicle have been completed. Only a small  number of the demonstrations needed to validate the ability of a single air  vehicle to perform a preemptive destruction mission have been completed.  The more demanding demonstrations—those designed to demonstrate  technologies and software for highly autonomous, multivehicle operations  (with both manned aircraft and unmanned air vehicles), and the more  difficult aspects of the SEAD mission against mobile targets—have not  begun.
section_title: Importance of Matching Resources with Requirements before Product Development
paragraphs: The product development decision that DOD is approaching for its  UCAV program represents a commitment by the product developer to  deliver a product at established cost, schedule, and performance targets  and identifies the amount of resources that will be necessary to do so.  Our studies of leading companies have shown that when requirements  and resources were matched before product development was started,  the more likely the development was able to meet performance, cost, and  schedule objectives. When this took place later, programs encountered  problems such as increased cost, schedule delays, and  performance shortfalls.
A key to achieving this match is to ensure that the developer has the  resources—technology, design and production knowledge, money, and  time—needed to design, test, manufacture, and deliver the product. It is  not unusual for a customer to initially want a high-performing product that  does not cost much or take too long to develop. But such an expectation  may exceed the developer’s technology or engineering expertise,  or it may  be more costly and time-consuming to create than the customer is willing  to accept. Therefore, a process of negotiations and trade-offs is usually  necessary to match customer requirements and developer resources  before firming requirements and committing to product development.  Our work has shown that successful programs will not commit to product  development until needed technologies are ready to satisfy product  requirements. In other words, technology development is separated from  product development. If technology is not sufficiently mature at the  beginning of a product development program, the program may need to  spend more time and money than anticipated to bring the technology to  the point to which it can meet the intended product’s performance  requirements.
Testing is perhaps the main instrument used to gauge technology maturity.  Testing new technologies before they enter into a product development  program, as DOD is doing now by demonstrating the two X-45A  demonstrators, enables organizations to discover and correct problems  before a considerable investment is made in the program. By contrast,  problems found late in development may require more time, money, and  effort to fix because they may require more extensive retrofitting and  redesign as well as retesting. These problems are further exacerbated  when the product development schedule requires a number of activities to  be done concurrently. The need to address one problem can slow down  other work on the weapon system.
Figure 3 illustrates the timing of the match between a customer’s  requirements and a product developer’s resources for successful and  problematic programs we have reviewed.
section_title: Gap between UCAV Resources and Requirements Was Increased in 2002
paragraphs: During 2002, significant requirements were added to the UCAV program  after the schedule was accelerated by 3 years. This step put the program at  considerable risk because it increased the gap between requirements and  resources. The program added two new requirements—one for electronic  attack capability and one for increased flying range—while reducing a  critical resource, time, to mature key UCAV technologies. As a result, the  Air Force and DARPA anticipated that most of the 15 key technologies,  system attributes, or processes supporting the aircraft’s basic capabilities  would move from all low risk to mostly medium risk of achieving desired  functionality by the time a product development decision was reached;  one would be at high risk.
subsections: section_title: UCAV Requirements Increased During 2002
paragraphs: The UCAV program’s original requirements were difficult to meet because  they posed significant but manageable technical challenges to building  an air vehicle that is, at once, affordable throughout its life cycle, highly  survivable, and lethal. In the last year, both air vehicle and mission  equipment requirements were increased. The original requirements called  for a UCAV that would have   a low life-cycle cost, survivable design;  a mission control station that can fly single or multiple UCAVs at  one time;  a secure command, control, and communications network;  completely autonomous vehicle operation from takeoff to landing;    off-board and on-board sensors with which to locate targets; and    human involvement in targeting, weapons delivery, and target  damage assessment.
Once these requirements were established, the UCAV contractor identified  15 technologies, processes, and system attributes the UCAV would have  to possess to meet those requirements. These elements became a way to  gauge the level of knowledge (in terms of risk) that the contractors had.  Right now, technologies that support some of these capabilities, such as  autonomous operation, are not yet mature. We used their risk assessments  and criteria for the 15 technologies, processes, and system attributes to  determine current system integration risk as well as technology risk. We  believe technology readiness levels would have provided a more precise  gauge of technology maturity, but program officials did not provide them.  Currently, 10 technologies, processes, and system attributes are  considered to be medium risk by the Air Force and DARPA. Medium risk  means that there is a 30 to 70 percent probability of achieving the desired  functionality for the initial operational UCAV. Moreover, 5 are currently  considered to be high risk, that is, there is less than 30 percent probability  of achieving their functionality. Table 1 provides the current risk level of  the 15 UCAV technologies, processes, and system attributes for original  UCAV objectives.
Originally, the UCAV program was tasked with providing an air vehicle  that would perform both preemptive and reactive SEAD missions  against fixed and mobile targets that are extremely demanding from  both a mission and capability perspective. The reactive mission is more  demanding than the preemptive mission because the UCAV will have less  time to find and engage mobile targets. When DOD decided to accelerate  delivery of the initial UCAVs, the program was relieved of meeting the  requirement for reactive SEAD, making for a better balance between  requirements and available resources. However, requirements were  subsequently added that increased the challenge of matching requirements  with resources. These requirements include an electronic attack mission  and increased combat range and endurance.
Electronic attack: DOD’s electronic attack mission is currently  performed by the Navy’s aging EA-6B Prowler aircraft. Electronic  attack confuses enemy radars with electronic jammers. In 2001, the  Navy conducted an analysis of alternatives for replacing the Prowler.
Air Combat Command planners determined that the UCAV could fill  portions of this role quickly and added the requirement to the program.  As currently structured, the program does not plan to demonstrate  electronic attack technologies on UCAV demonstrator or prototype  vehicles before product development begins. According to program  officials, the biggest additional challenge associated with this change  is the integration of existing electronic attack technologies into a  low observable air vehicle. Program officials are also concerned that  downsizing and repackaging current electronic warfare technology  to fit into a smaller space, with sufficient cooling and power, and  incorporating antennas and other apertures into the low observable  signature of the UCAV may pose additional challenges. Program  officials also stated that the addition of electronic attack adds  uncertainty to overall program costs. It may reduce the number of  initial UCAVs planned for initial production because additional work  will be required to integrate this capability into air vehicles, given the  current schedule and funding.
Longer range and endurance: According to program officials, Air Force  leadership would like to have a larger UCAV with longer range and  greater endurance than that currently being designed in the X-45B to  perform strategic lethal strike and nonlethal intelligence, surveillance,  and reconnaissance missions. However, increasing UCAV’s range  forced the program to abandon a key design concept expected to lower  operating and support costs significantly over that of a manned  aircraft—one of the program’s original critical requirements. The initial  UCAV concept was a design that allowed the wings to be detached  from the air vehicle and stored in a crate for up to 10 years, a concept  which was expected to contribute to a greater than 75 percent  reduction in operation and support costs. When needed, the UCAV  could be shipped to the theater of operations, assembled, and readied  for use. Adding range and endurance required redesigning the air  vehicle with fixed or permanently attached wings, in order that the  inside of the wings could be used as fuel tanks. This would allow the  UCAV to carry more fuel and give it the ability to fly farther. Since the  wings would no longer be detachable, the long-term storage approach  had to be abandoned.
section_title: Schedule Compression Created Greater Technical and Cost Risks
paragraphs: The schedule for the UCAV program has changed several times during the  pre-acquisition phase. In 2000, the Air Force anticipated that product  development would start in 2007 and initial deliveries would begin in 2011.  After several schedule changes, the Air Force set product development in  2004 and initial delivery of aircraft in 2007. (See table 2.) The net effect of  the changes was a 3-year reduction in time to mature technologies before  product development. This reduction created the potential for costly and  time-consuming rework in product development since the Air Force would  still be in the process of maturing technologies as it undertook other  product development activities. Moreover, the concurrency that comes  with the schedule changes would have left little room for error.
Under the original schedule, the UCAV program would essentially have  3 more years prior to the beginning of product development to test and  mature technologies. As a result, all 15 of the technologies, processes,  and system attributes would be at low risk by the launch of product  development indicating a match between requirements and resources.  By contrast, under the late 2002 schedule, the program would not have  enough time to mature technologies to a low risk prior to the launch of  product development in 2004. In fact, most technologies, processes,  and system attributes would still be either medium or high risk by the  time product development was launched indicating that requirements  exceeded resources.
The overlap of technology development and product development,  introduced by the acceleration of product development, also raised risks  for the UCAV program. The late 2002 schedule allowed less time for  discovering and correcting problems that may have arisen during  technology demonstrations prior to product development launch.  Importantly, all of the air vehicle military utility demonstrations would  have been completed after the beginning of product development. Under  the original schedule most of these demonstrations would have been  completed prior to the start of product development.
Increasing the overlap of technology development and product  development added risk to the program. Problems found during  those demonstrations might have to be fixed during product  development—problems made more likely given the lower maturity  level of the key technologies. Figure 4 shows that the concurrency  between technology development and product development increased  by approximately 18 months under the late 2002 schedule—from a  6-month approximate overlap to a 24-month approximate overlap. Also,  this acceleration increased the program risk for the start of product  development from all low to mostly medium risk for the 15 technologies,  processes, and system attributes being tracked.
As figure 4 indicates, the UCAV technology and product development  phases had been shortened from a plan with little concurrency between  technology and product development to a plan with significant  concurrency between the two. The push to deliver the product sooner  compressed the time in which technologies will be matured and integrated  into the UCAV weapon system. The resulting approximate 24-month  overlap between technology and product development caused by  accelerating the beginning of UCAV’s product development program had  the potential to create “late cycle churn,” or the scramble to fix significant  problems discovered late. We have found that when problems are  uncovered late in product development, more time and money is required  to rework what is already finished.
section_title: Recent DOD Decision to Restructure Program Can Reduce Risks
paragraphs: The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently restructured the UCAV  program to a joint program structure to meet the needs of the Navy as  well as the Air Force. The Office of the Secretary of Defense cancelled  plans to build the X-45B prototypes and now anticipates that the joint  UCAV program will focus on a family of vehicles derived from the larger  Boeing X-45C and Northrop Grumman X-47B prototypes designs. The  details of the program are still being decided, but it appears likely that  while content will increase, the start of product development will be  delayed. This approach represents a substantial improvement over the  late 2002 plan in that it lowers risks significantly. However, keeping  requirements and resources in balance and funding intact until product  development starts will be a challenge.
The proposed prototypes will be larger than the X-45A or X-45B and thus  more capable of supporting requirements for greater combat range and  endurance. Also, both the proposed X-45C and X-47B prototypes will have  a larger wing area, allowing them to carry increased payload and internal  fuel. Just as the X-45B would have been more capable than the X-45A, the  X-45C is projected to be more capable than the X-45B as shown in Table 3  below. We did not obtain specific data on the X-47B prototype.
Further, by adopting a design that increases internal space on the air  vehicle, DOD could more readily incorporate electronic attack equipment  and other sensors and avionics. In addition, the plan would reintroduce  competition into the UCAV program by assessing two different designs.  This competition would increase DOD’s ability to pursue the best technical  solution. On the other hand, acquisition cost for the larger air vehicles are  expected to increase as will operating and support costs due to the  abandonment of the storage-in-the-box concept. Also, meeting the  Navy’s need for carrier-based operations could place additional demands  on the air vehicle design. Figures 5 and 6 show illustrations of Boeing and  Northrop Grumman proposed joint UCAV designs.
In addition, more time will be added under the joint program to conduct  demonstrations by delaying the start of product development by several  years. Some of this added time—up to a year—will be needed to develop  and deliver the new prototypes. As shown in figure 7, delaying the  beginning of product development could reduce technical risks since DOD  would have more time to test prototypes.
However, these delays may postpone initial operational capability  beyond what DOD and the Congress originally anticipated, which  was at the end of the decade. But recognizing this upfront to put the  program on a sounder footing may be preferable to proposing a  higher risk approach—like the 2002 plan—that is more susceptible  to unplanned delays.
Drawing on the experience of the UCAV to date as well as other programs,  DOD will face challenges in keeping the requirements for the new joint  design balanced with available resources. One challenge relates to  requirements. As mentioned above, more demands could be made of the  air vehicle to meet the needs of both the Air Force and the Navy. Prior to  the new joint approach, the Navy’s top mission for the UCAV has been  conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. When  considering the Air Force’s missions of reactive and preemptive SEAD and  electronic attack, it is foreseeable that the program will face pressures to  meet multiple missions. One approach to meeting this challenge is to delay  the start of product development until resources—such as technology  maturity—are available to meet all requirements. This would delay the  program significantly and could raise funding issues. Alternatively,  adhering to an evolutionary acquisition approach and developing the  different mission capabilities in sequence could meet the challenge, so  that the initial capability can be fielded sooner.
Another challenge relates to funding. Past and present programs have  been susceptible to such funding issues. Moreover, other programs  that dwarf the UCAV program—such as the F-22 and the Joint Strike  Fighter—will be competing for investment funds at the same time.
We have found in earlier work that although the Office of the Secretary  of Defense provides some funding for advanced technology development  efforts, the military services and defense agencies are ultimately  responsible for financing the acquisition and support of equipment or  items that result from the efforts. At times, however, the military services  have not wanted to fund the transition process. This action either slowed  down the acquisition process or resulted in no additional procurements.  Specifically, military services have not wanted to fund technologies  focusing on meeting joint requirements because those technologies do  not directly affect their individual missions, and there are specific projects  that they would prefer to fund. At the same time, Office of the Secretary  of Defense officials told us that they lack a mechanism for ensuring that  decisions on whether to acquire items with proven military utility are  made at the joint level, and not merely by the gaining organizations, and  that these acquisitions receive the proper priority.
The UCAV has already experienced some funding challenges. Recently,  during preparations for the fiscal year 2004 budget cycle, the Air Force  budget proposal eliminated all UCAV funding beyond that needed to finish  work on two prototypes already on contract. The Air Force based this  action on its belief that the X-45B UCAV was too small for the role the  Air Force believed was most needed.
To keep the UCAV program on track, the Office of the Secretary of  Defense stepped in to resolve requirements and funding challenges and  maintained a strong oversight over it. While the Office of the Secretary  of Defense increased the challenge by accelerating the delivery date for  the first UCAVs, it allowed the Air Force to defer the reactive SEAD  requirement and fended off more radical changes to the UCAV’s missions.  In addition, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has taken the lead in  brokering the agreement on the joint program proposal, adding  development time to the proposal and working out a joint effort that could  result in a single design for the Air Force and Navy. Sustaining the role  played by the Office of the Secretary of Defense is likely to be important to  meeting future challenges the UCAV may face.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: UCAVs offer a potential for DOD to carry out dangerous missions without  putting lives at stake and to find cost-effective ways of replacing DOD’s  aging tactical aircraft fleet. However, up until recently, pre-acquisition  decisions had collectively increased requirements and reduced resources,  putting the program in a riskier position to succeed. The decision to create  a joint program could make for a better program if the gap between  resources and requirements can be closed. The joint program faces a  challenge in managing the demands of multimission requirements with  the desire to field an initial capability in a reasonable time. Accepting  increased requirements and accelerating fielding at the same time, as was  previously done, will hinder the ability of the joint UCAV program to  succeed. The program also faces the challenge of sustaining funding  support from both services at a time when it is competing against other  large aircraft investments. Regardless of which direction the new program  takes, the role played by the Office of the Secretary of Defense will  continue to be instrumental in helping to negotiate requirements, to assure  the right resources are provided, and to make further difficult tradeoff  decisions throughout the program.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend the Secretary of Defense develop an acquisition approach  for the joint UCAV program that enables requirements and resources to  be balanced at the start of product development. This approach should  provide mechanisms for brokering the demands of multiple missions, for  ensuring that the product developer maintains a voice in assessing the  resource implications of requirements, and for preserving the integrity of  evolutionary acquisition. Reinstating the use of technology readiness  levels may be very valuable in facilitating necessary tradeoffs.
We also recommend that the Secretary formalize the management role  performed by his office and the attendant authority to perform that role;  ensure that the services are fully involved in the process; and work to  develop an efficient approach to transitioning the UCAV from DOD’s  technology development environment to the services’ acquisition  environment so the needs of the war fighter can be met more quickly.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report.  The comments appear in appendix I. DOD provided separate  technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  develop an acquisition approach for the joint UCAV program that  enables requirements and resources to be balanced at the start of product  development. It has directed the formation of a Joint Systems Management  Office to define near-term requirements and to conduct robust operational  assessments.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary  formalize a management role performed by his office and the attendant  authority to perform that role; ensure that the services are fully involved  in the process; and work to develop an efficient services’ acquisition  environment so the needs of the war fighter can be met more quickly.  DOD noted that the Secretary is organizing the management function as he  deems suitable. DOD did state that the department’s UAV Planning Task  Force would continue to provide oversight over all DOD UCAV program  activities. We believe this is important because it was this organization  that was instrumental in refocusing the DOD UCAV effort into a joint  program that we believe will significantly improve the probability of  successfully fielding UCAVs.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To achieve our objectives we examined Air Force UCAV program  solicitations and agreements, the demonstration master plan, trade  studies, technology demonstration plans and results, status of critical  technologies, plans to further enhance maturity of critical technologies,  and plans to move UCAV to the Air Force for product development. We  interviewed DARPA and Air Force program managers and technical  support officials at DARPA program offices in Arlington, Virginia, and the  Air Force’s Research Lab and Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright  Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, to document current development  efforts and the maturity status of critical technologies and other attributes.
To determine options that may be available to UCAV program managers in  making changes to requirements or resources, we examined the program’s  risk assessments of its 15 technologies, processes, and system attributes to  identify risk associated with beginning product development at different  points in time. We interviewed Air Force Air Combat Command officials  at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, concerning UCAV requirements, and  air staff officials in Arlington, Virginia, concerning program objectives  and resources. We also interviewed a number of officials from the  Office of Secretary of Defense having responsibility for UCAV oversight  and funding.
We conducted our work from February 2002 through May 2003 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy, the Director of the Office of  Management and Budget and other congressional defense committees. We  will also provide copies to others on request. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-2811 if you or your staff has any questions  concerning this report. Key contributors to this report were Mike Sullivan,  Jerry Clark, Matt Lea, Kris Keener, Travis Masters, Cristina Chaplain, Lily  Chin, Bob Swierczek, and Maria-Alaina Rambus.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense