Homeland Defense: Preliminary Observations on How Overseas and Domestic Missions Impact DOD Forces
Published: 2003-04-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The way in which the federal government views the defense of the United States has dramatically changed since September 11, 2001. Consequently, the Department of Defense (DOD) is adjusting its Cold War strategic focus (of defending against massed combat forces) to better encompass defense against the asymmetric threats that small terrorist cells represent to U.S. territory. GAO was asked to review DOD's participation in domestic missions. This testimony represents our preliminary work in response to the request. It addresses (1) the primary differences in military and nonmilitary missions; (2) how DOD evaluates requests for nonmilitary missions; (3) how the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act impacts DOD's nonmilitary missions; (4) whether current management organizations, plans, and forces are adequate to support DOD's domestic missions; and (5) the impact of overseas and domestic missions on military personnel tempo. GAO is making no recommendations in this testimony.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD's military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration, discretion to accept or reject, and capabilities normally employed. DOD evaluates nonmilitary mission requests on the basis of legality, lethality, risk to DOD forces, the cost, the appropriateness of the mission, and the impact on military readiness. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the direct use of federal military troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where authorized by the Constitution or Acts of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized the use of the military in certain situations such as to assist with drug interdiction or assist with terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. It is too early to assess the adequacy of DOD's new management organizations or plans but some forces may not be tailored for their domestic missions. DOD established an Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and U.S. Northern Command plan and execute domestic missions. U.S. Northern Command's plan for domestic military missions was developed before DOD officials had agreed on the nature of the threat. Forces are not adequately tailored for some domestic missions, and readiness could erode because of it. For example, Air Force fighter units deployed since September 11, 2001 to perform combat air patrols are unable to also perform required combat training. Overseas and domestic missions are stressing U.S. forces as measured in personnel tempo data. In September 2001, about 1,600 Air Force personnel had spent 220 to 365 days away from their homes over the previous year, but by December 2002 almost 22,100 Air Force personnel had been away that long. The Army reported similar increases. To prevent erosion in combat capabilities, DOD issued orders, known as stop loss, to involuntarily retain critical personnel.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today the demands being  placed on the Department of Defense (DOD) in the post September 11,  2001, environment. DOD’s primary mission is to deter aggression abroad  and fight to win if deterrence fails. It does this by undertaking major  combat operations on a global basis. However, the federal government  view of the defense of U.S. territory has dramatically changed since  September 11, 2001. In this regard, DOD is adjusting its Cold War strategic  focus of defending against massed combat forces attacking allied nations  or U.S. territory to encompass the asymmetric threats that small terrorist  cells represent.
You asked us to review DOD’s participation in domestic military missions.  We will issue a final report on this issue later this spring. My testimony  today is based on the preliminary work that we have completed to date on  your request. I will address (1) the primary differences in military and  nonmilitary missions; (2) how DOD evaluates requests for nonmilitary  missions; (3) how the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act impacts DOD’s  nonmilitary missions; (4) whether current management organizations,  plans, and forces are adequate to support DOD’s domestic missions; and  (5) the impact of overseas and domestic missions on military personnel  tempo. To determine the differences in DOD’s missions and how DOD  evaluates mission requests, we reviewed appropriate guidance and  directives specifying mission types, and discussed these issues with  knowledgeable officials. To identify legal constraints on DOD’s  nonmilitary missions, we reviewed the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act and  related laws. To determine the adequacy of organizations, plans, and  forces, we reviewed DOD reorganizations, visited the new U.S. Northern  Command, reviewed campaign plans and related documents, and  compared the types of missions performed by forces with their primary  missions. Finally, to determine the impact of domestic or overseas  missions on personnel tempo, we obtained personnel tempo databases  from DOD for the period October 2000 through December 2002 (the most  recent data available) and analyzed the data. We conducted this work from  July 2002 through April 2003 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Military and Nonmilitary Missions Differ
paragraphs: Military missions differ from nonmilitary missions on a variety of factors,  as shown in table 1.
Military missions involve coordinated military actions, such as campaigns,  engagements, or strikes, by one or more of the services’ combat forces.  Operations Desert Storm in 1991 and Iraqi Freedom in 2003 are examples  of overseas military missions, and Operation Noble Eagle is a domestic  military mission started on September 11, 2001, and continuing today. In  the latter mission, the President directed the Commander, North American  Aerospace Defense Command, to order combat air patrols to identify and  intercept suspect aircraft operating in the United States. Since these are  military missions, DOD is the lead federal agency and is prepared to apply  its combat power if needed.
section_title: DOD Evaluates Requests for Assistance from Civil Authorities Against Established Criteria
paragraphs: Requests for nonmilitary missions are evaluated against criteria contained  in DOD’s Directive, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities. These  requests generally seek DOD support to help alleviate suffering, recover  from disasters or assist indirectly with law enforcement. DOD’s directive  specifies that requests for nonmilitary support be evaluated against the  following criteria:  legality (compliance with laws),  lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces),  risk (safety of DOD forces),    cost (who pays, impact on the DOD budget),    appropriateness (whether the requested mission is in the interest of DOD  to conduct), and  readiness (impact on DOD’s ability to perform its primary mission).
According to DOD, in fiscal years 2001 and 2002, it supported over 230  nonmilitary missions in a variety of settings, such as assisting in fighting  wildfires, recovering from tropical storms, providing post-September 11,  2001, assistance to New York City and Virginia, providing support for the  presidential inauguration, and for other purposes. According to DOD,  during this same period, the Department rejected a handful of missions  based on the above criteria.
section_title: The Posse Comitatus Act Restricts DOD’s Role in Civilian Law Enforcement
paragraphs: The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of the Army and Air Force  “to execute the laws” of the United States except where authorized by the  Constitution or Acts of Congress. Federal courts have interpreted “to  execute the laws” to mean the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of  federal military troops in an active role of direct civilian law  enforcement. Direct involvement in law enforcement includes search,  seizure, and arrest. The act does not apply to military operations at home  or abroad. Further, it does not apply to National Guard personnel when  under the direct command of states’ governors.
Congress has expressly authorized the use of the military in certain  situations. For example, DOD can use its personnel and equipment to:    assist with drug interdiction and other law enforcement functions   (10 U.S.C. §§371-378 (excluding §375));    protect civil rights or property, or suppress insurrection (the Civil  Disturbance Statutes; 10 U.S.C. §§331-334);    assist the U.S. Secret Service (18 U.S.C. §3056 Notes);    protect nuclear materials and assist with solving crimes involving nuclear  materials (18 U.S.C. §831);    assist with terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction   (10 U.S.C. §382); and    assist with the execution of quarantine and certain health laws   (42 U.S.C. §§97-98).
The President identified as a major homeland security initiative a review  of the legal authority for military assistance in domestic security, which  would include the Posse Comitatus Act. The President maintained that the  “threat of catastrophic terrorism requires a thorough review of the laws  permitting the military to act within the United States in order to  determine whether domestic preparedness and response efforts would  benefit from greater involvement of military personnel and, if so, how.”
In addition to this review, the Congress directed DOD to review and report  on the legal implications of members of the Armed Forces operating on  United States territory and the potential legal impediments affecting  DOD’s role in supporting homeland security. In March, 2003, the  Commander of U.S. Northern Command has stated, “We believe the [Posse  Comitatus] Act, as amended, provides the authority we need to do our job,  and no modification is needed at this time.” At the time of our review,  neither the President’s nor the congressionally directed legal reviews had  been completed.
section_title: The Adequacy of New Management Organizations, Plans, and Forces for Domestic Missions
paragraphs: It is too early to assess the adequacy of DOD’s new management  organizations or its plans, although forces may not be fully tailored to the  current domestic missions. DOD has established new organizations for  domestic missions at the policy and operational levels, and written a new  campaign plan for the defense of the United States. At the same time, DOD  has used existing forces for these missions since September 11, 2001.  However, at the time of our review, the organizations were not yet fully  operational; plans had been developed before issuance of a  counterterrorism threat assessment and before DOD officials had reached  agreement on the nature of the threat; and force capabilities were not well  matched to their domestic missions, potentially leading to an erosion of  military readiness.
subsections: section_title: New DOD Organizations to Address Military Domestic Missions Are Not Yet Fully Operational
paragraphs: Two new organizations—the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  for Homeland Defense and U.S. Northern Command—together provide  long-term policy direction, planning, and execution capability but are not  yet fully operational, because they have only recently been established and  are not fully staffed. Because these organizations had only recently been  activated and were still being staffed and structured, we did not evaluate  the adequacy of these organizations for their missions.
The Senate confirmed the President’s nominee to be Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Homeland Defense in February 2003, but this office was not  fully operational at the time of our review, with approximately one-third of  the staff positions filled. The new Assistant Secretary is to provide overall  supervision for domestic missions.
U.S. Northern Command was established by the President in an April 2002  revision to the Unified Command Plan and was activated in October 2002.  However, the command is not planned to be fully operational until  October 2003. As of last week, only about 46 percent of the command’s  positions had been filled. During our trip to U.S. Northern Command, we  found that a key challenge that the command is grappling with is the need  to conduct its ongoing missions while staffing the command’s positions.  The activation of the command marks the first time that there has been a  unity of command for military activities within the continental United  States. Prior to U.S. Northern Command’s activation, U.S. Joint Forces  Command provided for military actions to defend U.S. territory from land-  and sea-based threats. The North American Aerospace Defense Command  defended the United States from airborne threats (and still does). The  Commander of U.S. Northern Command is also the Commander of the  North American Aerospace Defense Command providing the new unity of  command for the three missions.
section_title: The Nature of the Threat Was Still Under Discussion When the Campaign Plan Was Written
paragraphs: DOD’s planning process requires the Department and the services to staff,  train, and equip forces for their military missions as outlined in campaign  plans and deliberate plans developed by the combatant commanders,  including the Commander of U.S. Northern Command. U.S. Northern  Command’s campaign plan was completed in October 2002 and is  classified. However, I can note, that although it may reflect current  intelligence from DOD and other intelligence community sources, it was  completed before the January 2003 issuance of the Federal Bureau of  Investigation’s counterterrorism threat assessment, so it may not take all  threats into account. Moreover, an official in the Office of the Secretary of  Defense acknowledged that DOD officials continue to debate the nature of  the threat to U.S. territory, thus DOD itself has not yet reached internal  agreement on the nature of the threat facing the United States.
section_title: DOD’s Forces Are Not Tailored to Conduct Long- Term Military Missions Domestically
paragraphs: Based on our review, DOD’s forces are not tailored for some of the  missions that they have been performing since September 11, 2001, and  the result could be eventual erosion of military readiness. To respond to  the terrorist attacks of that day, the President identified the need to  protect U.S. cities from air attack, and in response, DOD deployed 338 Air  force and about 20 Navy aircraft within 24 hours of the attacks. Air Force  fighter aircraft flew continuously from September 11, 2001, through March  2002, and intermittently thereafter. These combat patrols continue today.  While these forces may obtain some training benefit from actually  conducting the mission, the benefit is limited by the narrow scope of  maneuvers performed during these missions. Specifically, Air Force and  Air National Guard fighter units performing domestic combat air patrols  are inhibited from executing the full range of difficult, tactical maneuvers  with the frequency that the Air Force requires to prepare for their combat  missions. In one Air National Guard wing that we reviewed, the average  pilot could not meet their training requirements in 9 out of 13 months  between September 2001 and September 2002. Consequently, such units  may need to resume training after domestic combat air patrols end or they  are reassigned, to ensure their readiness for combat operations, their  primary missions. Similarly, DOD identified the need to enhance  installation security, and it subsequently deployed active, reserve, and  National Guard military police units for the mission. However, these units  were designed for a different mission, and received limited training benefit  from the domestic mission. For example, officials at a military police  internment and resettlement battalion told us that while the battalion can  provide installation security, its primary mission is to operate enemy  prisoner of war camps. Instead, for nearly a year, the battalion carried out  a domestic installation security mission, which while important, prevented  the battalion from completing required training for its primary overseas  combat mission. As a result, the battalion’s military readiness may become  eroded, which could mean accepting an increased risk to the battalion if it  deploys or resuming training before it deploys again.
section_title: Increased Overseas and Domestic Missions Add to High Army and Air Force Personnel Tempo
paragraphs: Current overseas and domestic missions are stressing U.S. forces as  measured in personnel tempo data. DOD believes that if servicemembers  spend too much time away from home, a risk exists that they will leave the  service and military readiness may ultimately suffer.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 requires that  DOD formally track and manage for the number of days that each member  of the armed forces is deployed and established two thresholds— servicemembers deployed more than 182 or 220 days away from home out  of the preceding 365 days. The National Defense Authorization Act for  Fiscal Year 2001 established a third threshold, which requires that  servicemembers who are deployed for 401 or more days out of the  preceding 730-day (2-year) period receive a $100 high deployment per  diem allowance. Between September 2001 and December 2002, personnel  tempo increased dramatically for Army and Air Force personnel due to  ongoing missions or commitments around the world and their increasing  support of Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom.
DOD data that we obtained indicated tempo is high and increasing. For  example, as shown in figure 1, in September 2001, over 6,600 Army  personnel (including active, reserve, and National Guard personnel) had  exceeded a desired threshold, spending 182 to 219 days away from home  during the previous 365 days. By December 2002, that number had risen to  over 13,000. During the same period, the number spending 220 to 365 days  away, had risen from about 800 to over 18,000.
The Air Force reported similar trends. As shown in figure 2, in September  2001, about 2,100 Air Force servicemembers were away from home for 182  to 219 days, but that had risen to about 8,300 by December 2002. Also, as  with the Army, Air Force servicemembers away 220 to 365 days had risen  from about 1,600 to over 22,100.
The number of Air Force active, Air Force reserve, and Air National Guard  Air Force personnel exceeding the third personnel tempo threshold of 401  or more days away from home in the preceding 730-day period also  increased during the latter period of 2002, starting at about 3,700  personnel in September 2002 and rising to more than 8,100  servicemembers in December 2002. Of those, about one-half of these  personnel were Air National Guard personnel, some of whom were tasked  with conducting air sovereignty alert missions in the continental United  States. In September 2002, 1,900 had spent more than 401 days away from  home over a 2-year period. By December 2002, the number of Air National  Guard personnel spending more than 401 days away from home had  increased to about 3,900. Exceeding the threshold on a sustained basis can  indicate an inadequacy in the force structure or the mix of forces.
DOD has recognized the potential for retention problems stemming from  the current high personnel tempo but has balanced that against immediate  critical skill needs to support ongoing operations. Therefore, to prevent  servicemembers with key skills from leaving the services, DOD issued  orders to prevent degradation in combat capabilities, an action known as  stop loss authority. DOD took these actions because it recognized that  individuals with certain key skills—such as personnel in Army military  police and Air Force fighter units—were needed, in some cases, to  perform the increasing number of military domestic missions. These  orders affected personnel with designated individual job skills or in some  cases all of the individuals in specific types of units that were critical for  overseas combat and military domestic missions.
Officials from the four services who manage the implementation of these  orders cautioned that they are short-term tools designed to maintain unit- level military readiness for overseas combat and military domestic  missions. Moreover, the officials added that the orders are not to be used  as a long-term solution to address mismatches or shortfalls in capabilities  and requirements, or as a substitute for the routine recruiting, induction,  and training of new servicemembers.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  answer any questions that you or members of the subcommittee may have.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments  For future questions about this statement, please contact Raymond J.  Decker at (202) 512-6020. Individuals making key contributions to this  statement include Brian J. Lepore, Deborah Colantonio, Richard K. Geiger,  Kevin L. O’Neill, William J. Rigazio, Susan K. Woodward, and Michael C.  Zola.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to  Terrorism. GAO-03-519T. Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2003.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of  Homeland Security.GAO-03-102. Washington, D.C.: January 2003.
Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership.  GAO-03-260. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to  Success.GAO-02-1013T. Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002.
Reserve Forces: DOD Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations between  Reservists and Their Employers. GAO-02-608. Washington, D.C.: June 13,  2002.
Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but  Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide  Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related  Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal  Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and  National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001.
Military Personnel: Full Extent of Support to Civil Authorities Unknown  but Unlikely to Adversely Impact Retention. GAO-01-9. Washington, D.C.:  January 26, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied  Capabilities: Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination.  GAO-01-14. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources.  GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and  Biological Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.: October 20,  1999.
Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk  Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163.  Washington, D.C.: September 7, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve  Counterterrorism Operations. GAO/NSIAD-99-135. Washington, D.C.:   May 13, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat  Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues.   GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize  and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.:  April 9, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs  Requires Better Management and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39.  Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1997.
Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National  Policy and Strategy. GAO/NSIAD-97-254. Washington, D.C.: September 26,  1997.