Marine Corps Asia Pacific Realignment: DOD Should Resolve Capability Deficiencies and Infrastructure Risks and Revise Cost Estimates
Published: 2017-04-05T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: For two decades, DOD has planned to realign its presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The Marine Corps has plans to consolidate bases in Okinawa, relocating 4,100 Marines to Guam, 2,700 to Hawaii, 800 to the continental United States, and a rotational presence of 1,300 to Australia.
The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, included a provision that GAO study the realignment initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region. This report assesses the extent to which DOD has (1) coordinated its efforts and resolved selected identified capability deficiencies related to the relocation of Marines, (2) developed infrastructure plans and schedules and completed risk planning for its infrastructure that will support the relocation, and (3) developed reliable cost estimates for infrastructure for the relocation of Marines to Guam and Hawaii and the rotational presence in Australia. GAO reviewed relevant policies and plans; analyzed cost documents; interviewed DOD officials; and visited U.S. military installations in the Asia-Pacific region.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) has coordinated the relocation of Marines from Okinawa to other locations in the Asia-Pacific region through developing a synchronization plan and organizing working groups. However, DOD has not resolved selected identified capability deficiencies related to the relocation of Marine units; training needs in the region; the reduction in runway length at the Futenma Replacement Facility in Okinawa; and challenges for operating in Australia. DOD guidance indicates that mission requirements—which would include the capabilities needed to fulfill the mission—largely determine land and facility support requirements. If DOD does not resolve the selected identified capability deficiencies in its infrastructure plans, DOD may be unable to maintain its capabilities or face much higher costs to do so.
DOD has taken steps to develop infrastructure plans and schedules for its relocation efforts, but it did not develop a reliable schedule for the Marine relocation to Guam and has not completed its risk planning for infrastructure in Guam. DOD developed plans that will support construction efforts in Guam and Japan, and developed some initial infrastructure plans for Hawaii and Australia. However, GAO found the Marines Corps' integrated master schedule for Guam did not fully meet the comprehensive, well-constructed, and credible characteristics for a reliable schedule. For example, the schedule does not include resources needed for nonconstruction activities, such as information technology and design activities. Additionally, the Marine Corps has not completed its risk-management plan for infrastructure construction in Guam. Specifically, the Marine Corps has not identified its strategy to address construction risks including labor shortages and endangered-species protection. If DOD does not have a reliable schedule or has not completed risk planning for Guam, it may not have complete information to identify and address risks that may result in cost overruns and schedule delays.
DOD has made progress in developing cost estimates for Guam, but its estimates partially met GAO best practices for reliable cost estimates for the relocations to Guam and Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia. For cost estimates related to Guam military construction activities, DOD included ground rules and assumptions, but did not include some elements of a reliable cost estimate, such as a risk analysis. Additionally, DOD developed cost estimates for nonmilitary construction activities that provide a high-level planning overview of the requirements, but they did not incorporate several other best practices, including a unifying Work Breakdown Structure that defines in detail the work necessary to accomplish a program's objectives. For Hawaii and Australia, the cost estimates are not considered reliable because they did not include all life-cycle costs or a Work Breakdown Structure. If DOD does not revise the cost estimates for these locations, decision makers in DOD and Congress will not have reliable cost information to inform funding decisions and to help them determine the viability of relocation of Marines to Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD resolve capability deficiencies in the four selected identified areas, update its schedule for Guam infrastructure, complete a risk-management plan for Guam infrastructure, and revise its three cost estimates. DOD concurred with two recommendations, partially concurred with six, and did not concur with one. GAO continues to believe its recommendations are valid, as discussed in this report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Attempts to realign the Department of Defense’s (DOD) presence in the  Asia-Pacific region have been ongoing for two decades, with a particular  focus on the movement of Marines from Okinawa, Japan, to other  regional locations. Japan serves as the United States’ most significant  forward-operating location in the Asia-Pacific region, accommodating  approximately 55,000 U.S. military personnel, 42,000 dependents, and  9,400 DOD civilian employees, as of the second quarter of fiscal year  2016. The majority of this presence resides in Okinawa, an island  prefecture south of the Japanese mainland that represents less than 1  percent of Japan’s entire land mass. Although it is small compared to the  entirety of Japan’s land mass, Okinawa’s U.S. bases house  approximately 29,000 military personnel (including about 18,000 Marine  Corps personnel) on any given day. To balance the importance of this  forward presence to both the United States and Japan with the stated  need to reduce the impact on the Okinawa community, in April 2012 the  U.S. and Japanese governments adjusted the realignment plans.  Specifically, in an effort to reach this balance and realign its presence in  the Asia-Pacific region, the Marine Corps plans to consolidate bases in  southern Okinawa and relocate 4,100 Marines to Guam, 2,700 to Hawaii,  800 to the continental United States, and 1,300 (on a rotational basis) to  Australia.
This report is one of a series of reports on DOD’s Asia-Pacific  realignment. In May 2011, we reported on U.S. defense posture in Asia,  highlighting the need for additional cost information and methods for  evaluating posture in that region. We recommended, among other  things, that DOD develop annual cost estimates for posture in the U.S.  Pacific Command’s area of responsibility. In part in response to our  report, since early 2012 DOD has reported its cost estimates for new or  ongoing posture initiatives in the annual U.S. Global Defense Posture  Report to Congress. In June 2013, we reported that DOD did not include  detailed information on requirements for several key cost components  needed for its cost estimate for Guam, had not developed an integrated  master plan for the relocation, and had not identified sustainment needs  and costs for U.S. forces on Okinawa and Guam. We recommended,  among other things, that DOD update its cost estimate to include seven  cost components, develop an integrated master plan for the relocation of  Marines, and identify sustainment requirements for affected facilities until  relocation initiatives are complete. DOD generally agreed with our  recommendations, and as of August 2016 had implemented two of the six  recommendations. However, work remains regarding the development of  cost estimates and updates to the relocation planning efforts as  discussed later in the report. The Related GAO Products page at the end  of this report provides a listing of our related work.
The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated  Appropriations Act, 2016, included a provision that we study matters  related to the various realignment initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region.  This report assesses the extent to which DOD has (1) coordinated its  efforts and resolved selected identified capability deficiencies related to  the relocation of Marines from Okinawa, (2) developed infrastructure  plans and schedules for its relocation efforts and completed risk planning  for its infrastructure that will support the relocation, and (3) developed  reliable cost estimates for infrastructure for the relocation to Guam and  Hawaii and for the rotational presence in Australia.
This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we are issuing  concurrently. DOD deemed some of the information in the sensitive  report as For Official Use Only, which must be protected from public  disclosure. Therefore, this report omits For Official Use Only information  and data on some of the Navy and Marine Corps plans and programs  associated with the realignment effort, deployment and allies’  considerations, and estimates of future actions and political concerns  associated with Marine Corps forward stationing. Although the information  provided in this report is more limited in scope, it addresses the same  objectives as the sensitive report. Also, the methodology used for both  reports is the same.
For all objectives, the scope of our review was actions taken since we last  reviewed Marine Corps realignment initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region in  June 2013. We reviewed relevant policies and procedures, and we  collected information by interviewing and communicating with officials  from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Office of  the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Air Force, the Army,  the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the State Department. We also  conducted site visits in Hawaii, Japan, and Guam. In Hawaii, we met with  Pacific Command and its service components. In Japan, we met with U.S.  Forces–Japan and the services, Marine Corps Installation Command  Pacific, III  Marine Expeditionary Force, the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, and  the U.S. Consulate on Okinawa, and observed infrastructure conditions in  Okinawa and Iwakuni. In Guam, we met with DOD and government of  Guam officials and observed infrastructure conditions and the buildup of  Marine Corps Base Guam. Additionally,  we interviewed DOD officials and  officials from the U.S. Embassy in Australia. We also met with DOD’s  construction agents, specifically the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and  the Naval Facilities Engineering Command.
To determine the extent to which DOD has coordinated efforts and  resolved selected identified capability deficiencies related to the  relocation of Marines from Okinawa, we reviewed DOD documentation  and interviewed knowledgeable officials. Specifically, we reviewed  documentation such as the Marine Corps’ Asia-Pacific Realignment  Synchronization Matrix  and capability documents such as training  requirement documentation. We also interviewed senior DOD officials to  identify any capability deficiencies that could cause units to not be fully  prepared for their missions, and we reviewed related documentation to  support DOD’s identification of those selected capabilities. We compared  DOD’s decision-making process for plans to resolve the identified  capability deficiencies to DOD Unified Facilities Criteria regarding use of  mission needs to largely determine land and facility support  requirements.
To determine the extent that DOD has developed plans and completed  risk planning for its infrastructure, we reviewed DOD guidance related to  the development of installation plans, integrated master schedules, and  risk planning. We identified current infrastructure plans and integrated  master schedules. Specifically, we reviewed the Guam integrated master  schedule and compared that schedule’s content to the key practices in  GAO’s Schedule Assessment Guide to assess whether the schedule  captures the basic elements needed to implement a program and to  determine the extent to which projects were properly sequenced. We  also reviewed documentation and conducted interviews with DOD officials  to determine any identified risks with DOD’s plans and schedules as well  as actions DOD has taken to address those risks. We compared DOD’s  risk planning efforts outlined in that documentation to DOD guidance on  addressing risk, such as guidance that identifies the characteristics  needed in a risk-management plan and guidance on how DOD plans for  infrastructure sustainment in base master plans.
To determine the extent to which DOD has developed reliable cost  estimates for infrastructure, we reviewed DOD’s cost estimates and  analyses and interviewed DOD officials about costs and funding sources  related to infrastructure in Guam, Australia, and Hawaii. We compared  those estimates and analyses to the best practices included in GAO’s  Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. According to GAO’s Cost  Estimating and Assessment Guide, a cost estimate is considered reliable  if it is comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible.  Appendix I provides a more-detailed description of our scope and  methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2016 to April 2017 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the  evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: History and Status of Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan
paragraphs: The U.S.–Japan alliance dates back to the U.S. occupation of Japan after  its defeat in World War II. The alliance is supported by the 1960 Treaty of  Mutual Cooperation and Security and a related Status of Forces  Agreement. As a result of the treaty, the Status of Forces Agreement,  and related agreements, U.S. forces are able to use nearly 90  installations throughout mainland Japan and Okinawa for the purpose of  contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international  peace and security in the region.
One issue that remains at the forefront of the alliance is the realignment  of U.S. forces in Japan. Efforts to realign U.S. forces in Japan date back  to 1995. We have previously reported that discontent among the people  of Okinawa regarding the U.S. military presence led to efforts in the  1990s to consolidate, realign, and reduce U.S. facilities and areas and  adjust the operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa to reduce the  impact on local communities. However, as we had reported, realignment  efforts did not make much progress until the end of 2002, when the  United States and Japan launched a series of realignment initiatives  called the Defense Policy Review Initiative  (DPRI). Under DPRI, both  countries were seeking to reduce the U.S. footprint in Okinawa, enhance  interoperability  and communication, and better position U.S. forces to  respond to a changing security environment. The major realignment  initiatives under DPRI were outlined in the U.S.–Japan Roadmap for  Realignment Implementation (2006 Roadmap) and subsequently  adjusted, most recently through a joint statement issued in April 2012.  There are four initiatives under DPRI that are specific to the realignment  of Marine Corps forces in the Pacific:  1. Constructing and moving forces to the Futenma Replacement Facility,  2. Relocating Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam, Hawaii, the  continental United States, and Australia,  3. Consolidating installations on Okinawa, and  4. Moving  Marines to Iwakuni.
subsections: section_title: Constructing and Moving Forces to the Futenma Replacement Facility
paragraphs: As envisioned by the 2006 Roadmap, the U.S. government would return  to Japan the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa once the  government of Japan constructed a fully operational replacement facility  (Futenma Replacement Facility), including a runway, in a northern, less- populated area of the island. This facility was originally projected to be  completed by 2014, but delays have slowed its progress. According to the officials, as of June 2016, 9 of 184 projects have been constructed at the  planned site of the realignment—Camp Schwab. Figure 1 shows the  planned location of the runway at Camp Schwab and how high landfill  material must rise to build the runway.
After several years of planning to move approximately 8,000 Marines  from Okinawa to Guam, DOD revised its plan in April 2012 to, among  other things, relocate 4,100 Marines to Guam, 2,700 to Hawaii, and 800  to the continental United States, as shown below in figure 2. Additionally,  the plan includes establishing up to a 2,500-person rotational Marine  Corps presence in Australia, 1,300 of whom would come from Okinawa— a move that, according to DOD officials, stems from a November 2011  announcement between the United States and Australia.
DOD expects relocation to Guam to occur between fiscal years 2022 and  2026. To provide additional training opportunities for Pacific Command’s  service components, DOD is planning to construct training ranges on the  nearby Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI),  specifically the islands of Tinian and Pagan. However, no forces are  expected to relocate to CNMI. DOD estimates that the total cost to  relocate Marines to Guam and training on CNMI  will be $8.7 billion in  fiscal year 2012 dollars, with approximately $3.1 billion being provided by  Japan.
DOD expects relocation to Hawaii to occur between 2027 and 2031.  According to DOD documentation, its baseline rough order-of-magnitude  cost estimates for development on Hawaii range from approximately $1.3  billion to $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2012 dollars, although actual costs will  vary depending upon the mix of units and the facilities needed.
For the relocation to the continental United States, the Marine Corps  currently has no plans, time frames, or cost estimates. According to  Marine Corps officials, the decision to relocate 800 Marines to the  continental United States was made because there was a need to further  reduce the Marine Corps presence on Okinawa. Additionally,  senior  officials at Marine Corps Headquarters and Marine Corps Pacific  Command stated there was no strategic need to move the Marines to the  continental United States, and they assume that this move may never  happen—for example, they said that if the global Marine Corps presence  continues to downsize, then perhaps the positions for the 800 Marines  slated to move to the continental United States may be eliminated from  the global Marine Corps presence.
Additionally,  in November 2011, the U.S. and Australian governments  announced the intent to establish a rotational presence of up to a 2,500  person Marine Air-Ground Task Force in Darwin, Australia—1,300 of  which would come from Okinawa, according to DOD. Rotations would  occur from approximately April through September or October, during  Australia’s dry season. To date the Marine Corps has held five 6-month  rotations, ranging from a 200 Marine infantry company rotation in 2012 to  a 1,250 Marine infantry battalion rotation in 2016.
section_title: Consolidating Installations on Okinawa
paragraphs: The April 2012 statement noted that the United States is committed to  returning lands on Okinawa to Japan as designated Marine Corps forces  are relocated and as facilities become available for units and other tenant  activities relocating to other locations on Okinawa. Figure 3 depicts U.S.  installations on Okinawa and identifies which installations have been  designated to be partially or fully returned to Japan or are staying as part  of the U.S. presence, according to the April 2012 statement.
On the basis of the 2006 Roadmap, the Marine Corps would relocate its  tanker aircraft and facilities from Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to  Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, as well as develop a training capability  at Kanoya Air Base. Additionally,  a Navy carrier wing currently located at  Naval Air Station Atsugi (about 35 miles southwest of Tokyo, Japan)  would relocate to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni. The relocation to  Iwakuni is expected to be completed in 2019, with the Marine Corps  tanker aircraft unit having already relocated in 2014.
section_title: DOD Roles and Responsibilities for the Asia-Pacific Relocation
paragraphs: Within DOD, several offices have roles in the relocation of Marines from  Okinawa to Guam and Hawaii, the establishment of a rotational Marine  presence in Australia, and the realignment of Marines within Okinawa and  Iwakuni. These offices are located throughout the United States and  Pacific Command’s area of responsibility. Figure 4 identifies DOD offices  with roles and responsibilities related to the Asia-Pacific relocation, along  with their locations.
section_title: DOD Has Coordinated Its Efforts for Relocating Marines from Okinawa but Has Not Fully Resolved Selected Identified Capability Deficiencies
paragraphs: DOD has coordinated its efforts to relocate Marines from Okinawa by  developing a high-level synchronization plan that combines the various  programs related to relocating Marines from Okinawa and organizing  various working groups to increase coordination among stakeholders.  However, DOD officials have not fully resolved selected identified  capability deficiencies associated with the planned relocation to Guam  and Hawaii and establishment of a rotational presence in Australia.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Coordinated Its Efforts to Relocate Marines from Okinawa by Developing a High-Level Synchronization Plan and Organizing Working Groups
paragraphs: The Marine Corps has coordinated its efforts to relocate Marines from  Okinawa by developing a high-level synchronization plan that combines  the programs related to relocating Marines in one document.  Headquarters Marine Corps officials described the synchronization plan  as an overarching tool for simultaneously scheduling the various  relocation initiatives and graphically depicting how these relocations are  interconnected and affected by both unit movements and facilities  construction. In June 2013, we reported that this synchronization plan  was in development, with the goal of establishing the appropriate  sequencing of events needed to complete all relocation initiatives. In  January 2015, the Marine Corps completed the synchronization plan,  which contains information pertaining to the Futenma Replacement  Facility, Guam, the Joint Training Range Complex in CNMI,  Hawaii,  Australia, Okinawa consolidation, and Iwakuni. Subsequently, in June  2016 the Marine Corps updated the synchronization plan to incorporate  its latest time frames. Figure 5 shows how major milestones and actions  may interface with each other, up to 2030.
In addition, DOD has coordinated relocation initiatives through organizing  various working groups that bring together representatives from the  respective stakeholders involved in the relocation efforts. For example,  U.S. Forces–Japan participates in several working groups called Alliance  Transformation Ad-Hoc Working Groups and subcommittees that address  DPRI. One group works on Okinawa initiatives, which includes all topics  related to Okinawa Consolidation and the Futenma Replacement Facility.  Another group addresses progress in mainland Japan with Marine Corps  Air Station Iwakuni and Kanoya Air Base. Pacific Command officials said  they also participate in several working groups such as the Joint Facilities  Working Group and the DPRI Planning Group. The officials stated that  the Joint Facilities Working Group is led by Pacific Command and  consists of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and representatives  from each of the services, including Naval Facilities Engineering  Command, and their Australian counterparts. They added that this group  plans facilities and is working on resolving cost estimate differences for  Australia. The DPRI Planning Group includes participants from Marine  Corps offices including Marine Corps Plans, Policies and Operations;  Marine Corps Installations Command; Marine Corps Forces Pacific;  Marine Corps Activity Guam; and III  Marine Expeditionary Force. The  group is responsible for developing and submitting all requirements for  the future Marine Corps Base Guam.
section_title: DOD Has Not Fully Resolved Selected Identified Capability Deficiencies Associated with the Planned Relocation
paragraphs: DOD has not yet fully resolved selected identified capability deficiencies  related to the relocation of Marines from Okinawa, which may cause units  to be unprepared or not fully prepared for their missions. Specifically,  DOD has not fully resolved the operational challenges related to moving  Marine units to Guam; limited training facilities in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and  CNMI;  the runway length at the Futenma Replacement Facility; and  challenges for operating in Australia. According to DOD’s Unified  Facilities Criteria 2-100-01, in the context of developing installation  master plans, mission requirements—which would include the capabilities  needed to fulfill the mission—largely determine land and facility support  requirements. This DOD guidance states that data on current and proposed mission requirements will be used to establish limitations and  conditions that directly affect the installation’s ability to execute mission  support. However, DOD began planning facility requirements before  resolving selected identified capability deficiencies that can affect the  missions of the relocating units, and it has not yet resolved needed  capabilities for the Marine Corps units that will be relocated as part of the  realignment in the Asia-Pacific region.
subsections: section_title: Operational Challenges Related to Moving Marine Corps Forces
paragraphs: DOD has not resolved operational challenges associated with the  movement of Marine Corps units before beginning to develop facility  requirements. Officials with III  Marine Expeditionary Force stated that  they began working on capability planning in January 2013, after being  given the facilities plan for Guam. As a result of working on capability  planning after facility planning, III  Marine Expeditionary Force officials  identified several capability concerns regarding the relocation. For  example, III  Marine Expeditionary Force officials stated they would like  the Guam relocation to occur within an 18-month time frame to help  ensure that forces move together based on capabilities. According to  officials from III  Marine Expeditionary Force, it makes more sense to  move a maintenance battalion at the same time it moves the units the  battalion supports rather than move that battalion based on facility  completion dates; otherwise, the supported units would remain in  Okinawa for some time without maintenance capability. Marine Corps and  Pacific Command officials stated that, based on the capability concerns  regarding the relocation expressed by III  Marine Expeditionary Force, in  the summers of 2015 and 2016 Marine Corps Forces Pacific conducted  simulated wartime scenarios to assess these capability concerns. As a  result of the simulated wartime scenarios, the Marine Corps and Pacific  Command officials stated that some of III  Marine Expeditionary Force’s  concerns were validated and proposed solutions are currently being  analyzed. However, the analysis on how to move forces has not yet been  resolved, and the officials said that decisions need to be made about  force structure and positioning of forces to affect facility planning  adjustments. According to DOD’s Unified Facilities Criteria 2-100-01,  mission requirements will be used to largely determine land and facility  support requirements. Instead, DOD has focused on facility planning  before capability planning. By considering options to resolve this  capability deficiency, such as striking the balance between moving forces  together based on capabilities with not leaving facilities vacant, DOD  could help ensure that mission requirements are being met and are not  hindered during the relocation.
section_title: Limited Training Facilities in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and CNMI
paragraphs: DOD has not fully resolved some identified Marine Corps training  capability deficiencies in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and CNMI.  As a result, it may  take additional time, effort, and resources to resolve these deficiencies  and it is uncertain whether the Marine Corps units will be able to complete  necessary training in these locations.
Iwakuni—DOD has not fully resolved training requirements needed  for the Marine Corps units that relocated from Okinawa to Marine  Corps Air Station Iwakuni. According to officials from U.S. Forces– Japan, there are no training locations near Iwakuni that are sufficient  for relocated Marine Corps units’ training needs, resulting in the units  returning to Okinawa for training and spending additional money for  fuel and equipment maintenance. Kanoya Air Base is currently the  only location that is being considered for training, but it is not sufficient  for the relocated units’ needs because there are training requirements  that cannot be satisfied at Kanoya Air Base, according to U.S.  Forces–Japan and Marine Corps officials. DOD has formed a working  group to consider training in mainland Japan for Iwakuni units, but  planning has stalled because DOD has not identified other training  areas. Although, according to officials from U.S. Forces–Japan, the  government of Japan is ultimately generally responsible for building  training locations, DOD’s identification of other training areas could be  presented to the government of Japan to help resolve this issue, in  particular given that DOD may ultimately be responsible for sustaining  whatever training facility the government of Japan builds. DOD could  also continue to raise the concern about the training deficiency in  normal bilateral channels such as the Security Consultative  Committee. With respect to training capacity, as indicated by Unified  Facilities Criteria 2-100-01, DOD has identified limitations and  conditions that affect the Iwakuni installation’s ability to execute  mission support. However, it has not identified other training areas  that would support mission requirements. Marine Corps officials  stated that, as of October 2016, the bilateral arrangement with Japan  was modified to allow for alternative training areas other than Kanoya  Air Base. However, Marine Corps officials did not provide evidence  that any further locations have been identified. In February 2017,  officials from U.S. Forces–Japan said that bilateral consensus was  reached on an agreement to establish a working group to study other  possible locations beyond Kanoya for training. Without identifying  training areas for its units based in Iwakuni, DOD risks having spent  significant resources in expanding the Marine Corps Air Station  Iwakuni while still spending additional time and money sending units  back to Okinawa.
Hawaii—DOD has not resolved the training needs of the approximately 2,700 additional Marines that are planned to relocate to Hawaii beginning in 2027. The addition of the Marines will likely cause additional strain on already stressed training ranges in Hawaii. As of April 2016, Marine Corps officials have not identified a timeline for when they plan to develop training plans, stating that planning for Hawaii is not yet a priority. However, citing a March 2014 Hawaiian islands training study, Marine Corps officials noted that installations in Hawaii lack sufficient range capabilities to fully support training of units already stationed there. Because the sites are not sufficient, the officials stated that about 90 percent of the Marine Corps training occurs on Army training ranges in Hawaii. However, there are capacity issues with those sites because the Marine Corps has to share the space with the Army. According to the March 2014 study, the limited ranges in Hawaii have historically been used at a close-to- capacity level. Furthermore, infrastructure planning takes years to complete in advance of allocating resources for particular needs in a budget. Without infrastructure planning to support mission requirements, as identified in the Unified Facilities Criteria 2-100-01, the Marine Corps risks not having the necessary infrastructure to fulfill its needed capabilities. It is important to resolve this capability deficiency now because these training issues will become exacerbated as additional Marines begin to relocate to Hawaii. CNMI—DOD has not fully resolved the training requirements in the region of CNMI,  and may have to spend more time and resources to identify other, potentially more costly, locations for training. According to DOD’s study on training requirements in CNMI, there are 42 unfilled training requirements throughout Pacific Command’s area of responsibility. DOD officials stated that training ranges in CNMI would solve all of the unfulfilled live-fire and unit-level training deficiencies in the Asia-Pacific region. Pacific Command officials described the potential training capabilities in CNMI  as a crucial initiative. However, as of the time of our review, the environmental impact statement recommending training ranges in CNMI has not been finalized, and instead it is being revised. The draft  environmental impact statement received 27,000 comments  expressing concerns about the plans regarding training facilities in  CNMI.  Many of these comments expressed concerns about potential  impacts on water, wastewater, and public health. In order to address  the multitude of comments, the Department of the Navy stated it is  conducting a revised study. While some DOD officials offered  hypothetical alternatives for training in CNMI,  such as training in  foreign countries, they have not yet conducted any specific planning  and stated that there are no Pacific-based alternatives to consider on  U.S. territories. Rather, DOD officials stated that fulfillment of any of  the 42 unfilled training requirements through the training ranges in  CNMI  would be an improvement, and they could plan for alternatives  once they determine if any requirements will remain unfulfilled. Until  the training issue is resolved, DOD may have to spend more time and  resources to identify other, potentially more costly, locations for  training Marines relocated to Guam.
section_title: Reduction in Runway Length at the Futenma Replacement Facility
paragraphs: DOD has not fully resolved the capability deficiency of the planned  runway at Camp Schwab, which will replace the 9,000-foot runway at  Marine Corps Air Station Futenma but will be shorter. Mission operations  at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma support operations involving a  variety of fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and tilt-rotor aircraft. Marine Corps Air  Station Futenma also supports the use of a runway if needed for a United  Nations contingency, such as disaster response, for which U.S. Forces– Japan is a key partner. The proposed runway at Camp Schwab will not  adequately support these same mission requirements, according to  Marine Corps officials. Instead, there will be two 5,900-foot V-shaped  runways that, according to Marine Corps officials, will be too short for  certain aircraft. As we reported in March 1998 and is still the case based  on our discussions with Marine Corps officials, the loss of Marine Corps  Air Station Futenma’s runway equates to the loss of an emergency  landing strip for fixed-wing aircraft in the area and the loss of the United  Nations use of a runway. According to an official from the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the office has not yet developed a  plan for other alternate runways in Okinawa because it is not a priority.  Although it does not yet have a plan for other alternate runways in  Okinawa, DOD did take an initial step in April 2014 when it sent a letter to  the government of Japan seeking approval for bilateral site surveys for  locations that could support contingency operations. While a good first  step, this letter did not specifically focus on other alternatives in  Okinawa—only 1 of the 12 options was located in Okinawa, and some  suggested alternatives were located over 1,500 miles away. Moreover,  not all of the site surveys have been completed, and Marine Corps and  U.S. Forces–Japan officials we spoke with stated that the need remained  for alternate runways to be identified.
As indicated by Unified Facilities Criteria 2-100-01, DOD has identified  limitations and conditions that affect Camp Schwab’s installation’s ability  to execute mission support with respect to the runway. Although Marine  Corps and Pacific Command officials said the government of Japan is  ultimately responsible for replacing the lost requirements by providing a  longer runway elsewhere, DOD could be identifying other runways in  Okinawa that would support mission requirements, which it could present  to the government of Japan to help resolve this issue. By planning to  construct a runway at Camp Schwab that does not have the needed  capabilities, and until the site surveys are completed and an alternate  runway is selected to replace those needed capabilities, DOD risks not  supporting needed mission requirements and the issue remains  unresolved.
section_title: Challenges for Operating in Australia
paragraphs: DOD has not resolved challenges related to the rotation of Marines to  Australia, including seasonal changes (i.e., where to operate in the rainy  season) and equipment downtime that will likely affect capabilities and  increase costs (see fig. 6).
DOD has not resolved where Marine units will be stationed during the  rainy season (November to April) because, according to Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Marine Corps officials, it is still  early in the planning process and those plans are not yet a priority.  Flooding during the rainy season is a significant issue in the Darwin area,  as seen in figure 7. Presently, some of the rotational force is returning to  Okinawa, but they will need to find a new location as the Marine Corps  presence on Okinawa is reduced. DOD officials are considering multiple  options for the Marines’ location during the rainy season, but no decisions  have been made, and the options being considered will take years to  implement. Without infrastructure planning to support mission  requirements, as identified in the Unified Facilities Criteria 2-100-01, the  Marine Corps risks not having the necessary infrastructure to fulfill its  needed capabilities. By not resolving this capability deficiency now, DOD  does not know what the financial or operational consequences will be for  this decision, and decision makers in DOD and Congress cannot plan  accordingly to help ensure sufficient funding is in place to support the  operational and facility requirements of that location.
Moreover, DOD has not resolved what to do about the government of  Australia’s biosecurity requirements that affect equipment downtime.  According to officials at Pacific Command, the biosecurity requirements  could result in some Marine Corps equipment being nonoperational for  approximately 2 months out of the 6-month rotation. DOD documentation  discusses Australian biosecurity requirements regarding weeds, pests,  and diseases. According to government of Australia and DOD officials,  equipment that enters Australia is subject to inspection and cleaning due  to the country’s biosecurity requirements. Marine Corps officials stated  that, during the approximately 2 months it generally takes to break down,  clean, and reassemble the Marine Corps equipment, the equipment is not  functional and this hinders capability and training. Officials with the Office  of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy stated that the biosecurity  requirements are a risk to the Marine Corps units’ capability. Marine  Corps officials stated that leaving a set of equipment in Australia is one  option being considered to ease these requirements. However, according  to a senior Pacific Command official and officials with III  Marine  Expeditionary Force, this is an expensive option and also requires a  location for the equipment to be stored. Pacific Command and Marine  Corps officials stated that the Marine Corps has identified an additional  equipment set that could be left in Australia to minimize biosecurity  inspection requirements, but challenges remain to fund and source this  equipment. Unified Facilities Criteria 2-100-01 identifies that DOD should  plan its infrastructure needs to support mission requirements. By not  resolving the selected identified capability deficiencies associated with  equipment downtime prior to operating in Australia, the Marine Corps  risks not having the equipment needed to conduct its mission since,  depending on the course of action, it could take years to allocate  resources to mitigate this issue.
As of December 2016, DOD has not resolved selected identified  capability deficiencies in the four areas noted above. According to Office  of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Marine Corps officials,  some of these deficiencies have not been resolved because it is still early  in the planning process. Even though the relocation of Marines from  Okinawa to other locations is years away, this does not preclude DOD  from taking action to resolve selected capability deficiencies in the  identified four areas. It is important to resolve these identified capability  deficiencies in the near term because it can take many years to plan,  allocate resources, and develop facilities. If DOD does not resolve the  identified capability deficiencies in these four areas, the Marine Corps  may be unable to maintain its capabilities or face much higher costs to do  so.
section_title: DOD Has Taken Steps to Develop Infrastructure Plans and Schedules for Its Relocation but Did Not Develop a Reliable Schedule for Guam and Has Not Completed Risk Planning in Guam and Okinawa
paragraphs: DOD has taken steps to develop infrastructure plans and schedules for  the proposed locations for the relocation of Marines from Okinawa;  however, we found that the Marine Corps’ schedule for Guam did not  meet the characteristics of a reliable schedule identified in the GAO  Schedule Assessment Guide. With respect to risk planning, the Navy  plans to establish an office to address coordination and communication of  risks associated with its infrastructure planning in CNMI,  but the Marine  Corps has not completed risk planning for its construction efforts in  Guam, and the Navy has completed limited planning for sustainment of  infrastructure in Okinawa.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Taken Steps to Develop Its Infrastructure Plans for Guam, CNMI, Japan, Hawaii, and the Rotational Presence in Australia
paragraphs: DOD has taken steps to develop infrastructure plans for relocations to  Guam, CNMI,  Japan, Hawaii, and the rotational presence of Marines in  Australia. In Guam, CNMI, and Japan, DOD developed plans that  identified alternatives for its infrastructure in each location, such as the  development of base configuration and environmental analyses.  Moreover, DOD has developed plans for infrastructure requirements that  will support the planned relocation to Hawaii and rotational presence of  Marines in Australia.
subsections: section_title: Guam
paragraphs: DOD has developed plans that outline the base configuration and  environmental impacts of the infrastructure that will support the relocation  of Marines to Guam. In June 2014, the Navy developed a master plan,  which is a plan that outlines the infrastructure configuration, requirements,  and construction sequence, for the relocation to Guam. In July 2015, the  Navy conducted an analysis that outlined the environmental impacts of  the relocation to Guam, issuing a final supplemental environmental  impact statement, which changed the location of military family housing in  Guam from the location identified in the master plan, specifically from the  Naval Base Guam Telecommunications Site Finegayan to Andersen Air  Force Base. DOD officials told us they expect this alternative to be  cheaper than the initial proposal since DOD will be constructing military  family housing using existing utilities. In addition, DOD officials stated  that this alternative would reduce the impact on endangered species and  thus the need for environmental mitigation and the costs associated with  it.
In April 2015, the Navy released a draft environmental impact statement  to the public that identified its preferred alternative for live-fire training  ranges on Tinian and Pagan, two islands that are a part of a chain that  make up CNMI.  The draft environmental impact statement received  more than 27,000 comments from the people and government of CNMI.  DOD officials stated that the people and the government of CNMI had  expressed concerns over the potential effect on public infrastructure on  Tinian and cultural sites on Pagan. According to Navy officials, they have  tentative plans to release a revised draft environmental impact statement  in November 2017 that takes into account the concerns raised by the  people and the government of CNMI,  with the final environmental impact  statement expected in April 2019. However, DOD officials added that this  date could change if DOD determines it needs to conduct additional  studies.
section_title: Japan
paragraphs: DOD has taken steps to complete infrastructure plans in Japan, including  developing bilateral plans and master plans for the infrastructure related  to the Marine realignment. In April 2013, the United States and the  government of Japan released a bilateral plan for the consolidation of  infrastructure in Okinawa related to the Marine realignment, which  identified the land areas that DOD plans to return to Okinawa, general  time frames for those returns, and the sequence of steps that will need to  occur to facilitate those returns. According to Marine Corps officials,  they had plans to update the bilateral plan with additional details before  the end of 2016, including potential updates to dates for land returns in  Okinawa. Officials with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Policy stated that U.S. Forces–Japan began talks with the government of  Japan in late 2016 about revising the bilateral plan, but as of January  2017 there was no combined work product or documentation. In  preparing for the various Asia-Pacific realignment activities, DOD has  also developed master plans that identified its development strategy to  meet Okinawa consolidation objectives.
section_title: Hawaii and Australia
paragraphs: DOD has developed some initial infrastructure requirement plans for both  Hawaii and Australia. DOD officials told us that they prioritized planning  for Guam over planning for Hawaii or Australia, as DOD is using money  from the government of Japan for the relocation to Guam. In preparation  for future master plans and environmental analyses, DOD has developed  some initial infrastructure assessments for the relocation of Marines to Hawaii and for expanded rotations to Australia. In December 2014, the  Navy completed a siting plan for Hawaii, which provided an analysis of  opportunities for future growth of existing installations and new  construction on DOD-owned land in Hawaii that would support a Marine  relocation. Marine Corps officials plan to use the Hawaii siting plan as a  starting point for the development of future infrastructure plans.  Additionally,  DOD has completed two infrastructure studies that identify  Marine Corps’ requirements for housing and for aircraft support for an  expansion of Marine rotations in Darwin, Australia. Moreover, DOD  officials told us that they began developing a master plan for the  infrastructure that will support Marine rotations to Australia.
section_title: The Marine Corps Has Begun Developing Schedules for Its Infrastructure in Japan and Guam, but Its Schedule for Infrastructure in Guam Is Not Reliable
paragraphs: The Marine Corps has taken steps to develop integrated master  schedules—schedules used for planning, executing, and tracking the  status of a program—for the realignment efforts in Japan and relocation  to Guam. The Marine Corps is developing master schedules for its  realignment activities in Okinawa; hence, we did not evaluate the  reliability of these schedules. We also did not assess the reliability of the  integrated master schedule for Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni because  most of the construction projects for this base had already begun. In  reviewing the Marine Corps’ integrated master schedule for Guam from  July 2016, we found that the schedule does not meet all of the  characteristics of a reliable schedule—comprehensive, well-constructed,  credible, and controlled—identified as best practices in the GAO  Schedule Assessment Guide. A reliable schedule allows program  management to decide between possible sequences of activities,  determine the flexibility of the schedule according to available resources,  predict the consequences of managerial action or inaction in events, and  allocate contingency plans to mitigate risk. Further, the success of a  program depends in part on having an integrated and reliable master  schedule that defines when and how long work will occur and how each  activity is related to the others.
Our analysis found that the Marine Corps’ integrated master schedule is  not reliable as it did not substantially or fully meet all four of the GAO  Schedule Assessment Guide’s characteristics for a reliable schedule. If  any of the characteristics are not met, minimally met, or partially met, then  the schedule cannot be considered reliable. We found the integrated  master schedule substantially met one of the four characteristics for a  reliable schedule, partially met two characteristics, and minimally met one  characteristic; see table 1, below.
According to Marine Corps officials, the integrated master schedule is an  enterprise-level summary of resource and duration information from  lower-level project schedules. Officials stated that contractors identify  resources for construction activities in project schedules that the Marine  Corps uses to update the integrated master schedule. However, a lower- level construction schedule examined was not fully resource loaded; in  addition, the integrated master schedule includes a majority of activities  unrelated to construction efforts, such as information technology and  design activities. According to the GAO Schedule Assessment Guide, a  schedule should reflect all resources necessary to complete the program  to help ensure the program can use the schedule to make important  management decisions, such as the reallocation of resources between  projects. Because the reliability of an integrated schedule depends in  part on the reliability of its subordinate schedules, schedule quality  weaknesses—including lack of resource information—in these schedules  will transfer to an integrated master schedule derived from them. If the  integrated master schedule is unreliable and includes, for example,  unjustified date constraints and inaccurate critical paths to key  milestones, DOD may not have reliable information on potential sources  of delays to support the relocation of Marines to Guam. Further, DOD  may not have a reliable schedule to assess progress, identify potential  problems, and promote accountability for the relocation to Guam.
section_title: DOD Has Taken Steps to Conduct Risk Planning for Infrastructure in CNMI but Has Not Completed Its Risk Planning in Guam and Okinawa
paragraphs: The Navy has taken steps to conduct risk planning for infrastructure in  CNMI  by establishing an office to help coordinate and communicate its  infrastructure efforts. However, the Marine Corps has not completed risk  planning for the construction of infrastructure in Guam through the  completion of a risk-management plan, and the Navy has completed  limited planning for sustainment of infrastructure in Okinawa in its master  plan. Infrastructure risk planning for each location—CNMI,  Guam, and  Okinawa—is unique and at different stages, thus necessitating different  actions and approaches by DOD.
subsections: section_title: Establishment of an Office to Plan for Risks to Infrastructure in CNMI
paragraphs: In October 2016, the Navy began establishing an office to plan for risks to  proposed infrastructure in CNMI,  specifically related to plans for live-fire  training ranges on the islands of Tinian and Pagan. The Navy, which  oversees the environmental analyses that will precede infrastructure  construction in CNMI, released a draft environmental impact statement in  April 2015 that discussed potential alternatives for the configuration of the  live-fire training. However, the Navy is revising that draft environmental  impact statement, due to concerns from the people and government of  CNMI  regarding the effects of the ranges on Tinian and Pagan. According  to DOD officials, the concerns include the potential effects on public  infrastructure in Tinian and cultural sites on Pagan. In May 2016, the  Navy proposed establishing an office located on the island of Saipan in  CNMI  to facilitate coordination and communication between DOD and the  people and government of CNMI, so that it can help address risks related  to environmental impact, land acquisition, and cultural sensitivities. In  October 2016, Navy officials told us they hired an individual to supervise  the office in Saipan and that they have identified a physical office space.  Further, Navy officials stated that they plan to hire additional staff for the  office in Saipan to assist with coordination and communication with the  people and government of CNMI.
section_title: Limited Risk Planning for Identified Construction Risks in Guam
paragraphs: Marine Corps officials have conducted limited risk planning and have not  completed a risk-management plan that identifies a strategy to address  construction risks that may affect the cost and schedule for infrastructure  in Guam. Specifically, DOD has identified risks, including construction  labor shortages, explosive ordnance detection, cultural artifact discovery  and preservation, and endangered-species protection, which can affect  the cost or the schedule for each of the various individual projects on the  island. DOD manages these risks on a project-by-project basis; however,  DOD officials acknowledged that construction risks may become  challenging to address as the Marine Corps begins to manage more  ongoing construction projects. As of July 2016, the Marine Corps had four  construction projects under way, but it will be initiating significantly more  construction projects beginning in fiscal year 2018. Specifically, the  Marine Corps identified that it will have 15 active construction projects in fiscal year 2018 and will increase the number of construction projects  each year until fiscal year 2021 when the Marine Corps will peak at 43  active construction projects. Further, Marine Corps officials have not  completed a risk-management plan that identifies a strategy for  collectively addressing construction risks on Guam. A risk-management  plan is a document that outlines the service’s approach to identify,  analyze, handle, and monitor risks across a program. Therefore, while the  Marine Corps manages risks on a project-by-project basis, the Marine  Corps has not identified its strategy for the collective impact of risks to  infrastructure resulting from an increase in construction projects.
The following are examples of construction risks that may affect the  relocation of Marines to Guam:
Construction labor shortage: DOD officials identified that there is a  risk of a construction labor shortage that may affect their ability to  meet the labor demand necessary for the increase in construction  projects. Specifically, the Navy expects that construction contractors  will need to supplement their labor workforce with 2,800 foreign  laborers to meet the demand for labor during the peak of construction.  According to Navy and government of Guam officials, construction  contractors on Guam have experienced challenges in getting  approvals for H-2B visas to fill skilled labor gaps. According to data  from the Guam Department of Labor, U.S. Citizenship and  Immigration Services approved approximately 4 percent of H-2B visa  applications for Guam between January and September 2016.  According to government of Guam officials, the approval percentage  for H-2B visas is significantly lower than the percentage in fiscal years  2014 and 2015, when the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  approved over 98 percent of H-2B visa applications for Guam. Navy  officials stated that challenges in getting approval for foreign labor  applications will in turn affect DOD’s ability to meet the construction  labor demand for the increase in projects in fiscal year 2018.
Explosive-ordnance detection: According to DOD officials, there is  a risk of cost overruns or schedule delays related to the process for  the detection of explosive ordnance on construction worksites. Navy  officials stated that they account for cost and schedule implications  related to the detection of explosive ordnance when the Navy solicits  bids for projects from contractors; however, DOD officials told us that  they frequently discover anomalies, such as tin cans or scrap metal,  when detecting for explosive ordnance. In one instance, Navy officials  stated that they had to modify the contract for a utilities project that  resulted in a $4.9 million cost increase and a 10-month schedule  delay because the contractor detected more anomalies that DOD had  to address than predicted in the initial contract.
In May 2016, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations issued an  exemption to aspects of the Navy’s guidance on the detection of  explosive ordnance in an attempt to ease standards that resulted in  cost overruns and schedule delays in Guam. Under the exemption,  civilian construction labor does not need to evacuate a site during the  detection process for explosive ordnance in certain circumstances.  DOD officials stated that the exemption reduced some of the cost and  schedule risks related to detecting explosive ordnance, but the current  process for the detection of explosive ordnance may still affect the  cost and schedule for a project. Figure 8 illustrates an example of the  detection and removal of explosive ordnance at a utilities project in  Guam.
Cultural-artifact discovery and preservation: DOD discovery and  preservation of cultural artifacts following the initiation of a project can  affect that project’s cost and schedule. According to DOD officials,  they plan for potential costs and time needed for artifact discovery and  preservation in the construction contracts for particular projects, but  there may be additional costs or schedule delays after they discover  artifacts on construction sites. For example, the Marine Corps has  plans to build a live-fire training range on the northwest end of Guam  that may require the discovery and preservation of artifacts on 21  sites that, according to the Navy, are eligible for listing on the National  Register of Historic Places, which may result in additional costs or  schedule delays. Navy officials noted that they have taken steps to  streamline the documentation of its artifact discovery and preservation  process in preparation for each site, but they expect challenges in  meeting cultural-artifact discovery and preservation requirements.  Figure 9 shows examples of artifacts discovered during construction  at various DOD sites in Guam.
Endangered-species protection: According to the Navy, DOD has  experienced schedule delays as it has waited for the Fish and Wildlife  Service to complete biological opinions that outline protection  strategies for endangered species located in construction areas. For  example, DOD experienced delays on two construction projects due  to the discovery of endangered orchid and butterfly species on site,  which, according to the Navy, has caused delays in awarding the  contracts for both construction projects.
The Marine Corps has not completed its risk-management plan for Guam  infrastructure. In October 2015, the Marine Corps began developing its  risk-management plan, defining roles and responsibilities for risk planning  efforts in Guam. Based on our review of the draft risk-management  plan—which has been included in the Guam program management  plan—we found that the Marine Corps has not identified a strategy within  its risk-management plan to address the four risks identified above for  infrastructure in Guam, among other construction risks. Officials from the  Marine Corps stated that risk is consistently assessed at multiple levels  and managed through biweekly coordination meetings with all  stakeholders. However, while risks may be assessed on a project-by- project basis, Marine Corps officials have not completed in the draft risk- management plan a strategy to collectively address construction risks on  Guam. Officials from Pacific Command expect the identification of specific  risks, assessments, and mitigations to be included in a risk assessment  tool to be purchased for the Guam program. DOD guidance notes that  risk management is integral to effective program management.  Moreover, the guidance indicates that a risk-management plan should be  developed early in a program’s formulation and notes that the plan should  document an integrated approach for managing risks.
Any schedule delays to the construction of infrastructure in Guam may  have broader effects on other locations involved in the Asia-Pacific  realignment. For example, DOD may need to support infrastructure in  Okinawa for a longer period and at additional costs if risks are not  planned for adequately. Without a risk-management plan that identifies  the Marine Corps’ strategy for addressing risks to the infrastructure  buildup in Guam, DOD may not have complete information to address  risks to the design and construction of its infrastructure that may result in  cost overruns and schedule delays related to the relocation of Marines.
section_title: Limited Risk Planning for Sustainment of Infrastructure in Okinawa Related to the Realignment
paragraphs: DOD has completed limited risk planning for the sustainment of  infrastructure in Okinawa by developing a master plan. However, DOD  did not identify its short- or long-term sustainment needs for the Marine  Corps’ infrastructure in its master plan. Figure 10 shows the infrastructure  DOD identified that will require sustainment while it waits on various  relocation activities to take place.
In June 2013, we found that DOD had not developed master plans that  included sustainment plans for the majority of the infrastructure on  Okinawa it would need while waiting on other, related Asia-Pacific  realignment activities to take place. Therefore, we recommended that  DOD update its master plans to include sustainment requirements and  costs for its infrastructure on Okinawa, including short-term and long-term  sustainment needs to account for uncertainty regarding the time needed  to complete realignment activities. In December 2015, the Navy  developed a master plan for the Marine Corps infrastructure on Okinawa.  However, the Navy did not identify in the master plan short- or long-term  needs to account for uncertainty regarding the time needed to complete  related realignment activities as we recommended. Not identifying in the  master plan short- or long-term sustainment needs puts DOD at risk of  not having the information necessary to make informed decisions about  maintaining its infrastructure at an acceptable level to carry out its  mission. DOD guidance on real property management requires DOD  components to develop master plans for installations that outline their  annual construction plans for at least a 10-year period and to update the  master plan at least every 5 years. Furthermore, the guidance requires  that DOD components include a specific, annual listing of major repair  and sustainment projects. In addition, Unified Facilities Criteria guidance  regarding installation master planning indicates that installation planning  and programming staff must capture facility requirements and propose  solutions to meet those requirements from the options available.  Therefore, we continue to believe that fully implementing our June 2013  recommendation to update Okinawa installation master plans to include  short- or long-term sustainment needs is important to aid DOD in  obtaining sufficient information to make prudent investment decisions for  infrastructure sustainment in Okinawa.
section_title: DOD Has Made Progress in Developing Its Infrastructure Cost Estimates for Guam, Hawaii, and Australia but Its Estimates Partially Met Best Practices for a Reliable Cost Estimate
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Made Progress in Developing Its Cost Estimates for Guam but Partially Met Best Practices for a Reliable Cost Estimate
paragraphs: DOD improved its cost estimates for Guam since our June 2013 report by  adding a documented technical baseline description and clear  documentation of ground rules and assumptions for its military  construction cost estimates, and including life-cycle costs for its  nonmilitary construction cost estimates. However, we found that DOD’s  updated cost estimates partially met the best practices for a reliable cost  estimate. According to GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide:  Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, a  cost estimate is considered reliable if it fully or substantially meets the  best practices of all four characteristics: comprehensive, well- documented, accurate, and credible (see fig. 11). In addition, Office of  Management and Budget guidance from July 2016 containing best  practices states that credible cost estimates are vital for sound  management decision making and for any program to succeed.
To assess DOD’s cost estimates for infrastructure in Guam, we compared  DOD’s cost estimates for both military construction and nonmilitary  construction activities to the best practices of the four characteristics of a  reliable cost estimate. We assessed each best practice as not met,  minimally met, partially met, substantially met, or fully met. We found that  the cost estimates for military construction activities in Guam substantially  met best practices for the comprehensive, well-documented, and  accurate characteristics but minimally met best practices for the credible  characteristic. In addition, we found that the cost estimates for nonmilitary  construction activities in Guam partially met best practices for the  comprehensive and accurate characteristics, and minimally met best  practices for the well-documented and credible characteristics. Appendix  IV includes our detailed assessment of DOD’s military construction and  nonmilitary construction cost estimates for Guam regarding each of the  best practices for the four characteristics for reliable cost estimates,  including the reasons best practices were not fully met. Table 2 provides  a summary of our assessment, for each of the four characteristics, of  DOD’s military construction and nonmilitary construction cost estimates  for Guam.
DOD officials acknowledged that their cost estimates for Guam did not  include all best practices for reliable cost estimates. For example, officials  stated that they did not include a unifying Work Breakdown Structure for  the estimates for nonmilitary construction because they do not complete a  Work Breakdown Structure at the programming stage. However,  according to the GAO cost estimating guide, the Work Breakdown  Structure should be set up when the program is established and should  become successively detailed over time, as it provides a basic framework  for estimating costs, determining where risks may occur, and measuring  program status. Further, officials stated that they did not resource the  level of effort to conduct a risk or sensitivity analysis for the estimates for  military and nonmilitary construction because it is not warranted. The  GAO cost estimating guide states that a risk analysis and a sensitivity  analysis are part of every high-quality cost estimate, as a risk analysis  captures the cumulative effect of additional risk and a sensitivity analysis  helps mitigate uncertainty by explaining how changes to key assumptions  and inputs affect the estimate. In addition, officials stated that an  independent cost estimate was performed for the estimates for  nonmilitary construction. However, we reviewed DOD’s documentation  and found that what they identified as an independent cost estimate was  actually a review of a cost summary. The GAO cost estimating guide  states that an independent cost estimate should be completed as it  provides an independent view of expected program costs that tests the  estimate for reasonableness.
Without a revision of cost estimates for Guam to include all of the best  practices established by GAO’s cost estimating guide, including a Work  Breakdown Structure, risk and sensitivity analyses, and an independent  cost estimate, decision makers in DOD and Congress will not have  reliable cost information to inform their funding decisions regarding  infrastructure for the Marine Corps relocation to Guam.
section_title: DOD Partially Met Best Practices for Comprehensiveness in Its Cost Estimates for Infrastructure in Hawaii and Australia
paragraphs: DOD partially met the comprehensive characteristic for a reliable cost  estimate for its planned infrastructure for Hawaii and Australia by  documenting ground rules and assumptions associated with the military  construction costs. However, DOD did not include other best practices  established by the GAO cost estimating guide for the comprehensive  characteristic, such as having all life-cycle costs or a Work Breakdown  Structure in its cost estimates. Since the efforts for Hawaii and Australia  are still early in the planning process, we did not evaluate the DOD cost  estimates for infrastructure in Hawaii and Australia against the best  practices for the other three characteristics of a reliable cost estimate.
Table 3 provides a summary of our assessment of DOD’s cost estimates.  Appendix V includes our detailed assessment of DOD’s cost estimates for  Hawaii and Australia, including the reasons that DOD’s cost estimates  partially met GAO’s comprehensive characteristic.
According to the GAO cost estimating guide, in order for a cost estimate  to be considered comprehensive, it should include government and  contractor costs over the full life cycle of the program and the estimate  should be based on a product-oriented Work Breakdown Structure that  allows a program to track cost and schedule by defined deliverables,  among other best practices. In addition, DOD guidance on economic  analysis for decision making indicates that, as part of assessing the costs  and benefits of alternatives, an economic analysis should include  comprehensive estimates of the expected costs and benefits that are  incident to achieving the stated objectives of the project.
DOD officials acknowledged that their cost estimates for Hawaii and  Australia did not include all best practices, such as a life-cycle cost  estimate and a Work Breakdown Structure, for the comprehensive  characteristic because the planning for Hawaii and Australia is still in the  early stages and the cost estimates will become more detailed as the  planning progresses. A DOD official stated that DOD does not plan to  develop a life-cycle cost estimate for Hawaii until at least fiscal year 2018  because DOD is focused on completing the Marine relocation to Guam  before beginning detailed planning for Hawaii. Based on best practices in  the GAO cost estimating guide, the life-cycle cost estimate for the  relocation to Hawaii should be examined and understood early in the  planning process regardless of other projects, as a life-cycle cost  estimate enhances early decision making and enables planning studies to  be evaluated on a total-cost basis. According to the GAO cost estimating  guide, a life-cycle cost estimate can support budgetary decisions, key  decision points, and investment decisions. Without fully accounting for  life-cycle costs, management will have difficulty successfully planning  program resource requirements and making informed decisions. In  addition, the GAO cost estimating guide states that the Work Breakdown  Structure should initially be set up when the program is established and  should become successively detailed over time, as it provides a basic  framework for estimating costs, determining where risks may occur, and  measuring program status. Without a Work Breakdown Structure, the  program lacks a framework to develop a schedule and cost plan that can  easily track resources spent and completion of activities and tasks.
Without a revision of cost estimates for Hawaii and Australia to include all  of the best practices established by GAO’s cost estimating guide for the  comprehensive characteristic, decision makers in DOD and Congress will  not have reliable cost information to inform their funding decisions  regarding infrastructure for Hawaii and Australia and to help them  determine the viability of the relocation of Marines to Hawaii and the  establishment of a rotational presence in Australia.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The ability of DOD to coordinate its multiple relocation efforts and  maintain the operational capabilities of its forces is important to the  success of the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region. DOD has  developed a high-level synchronization plan and organized working  groups that coordinate the relocation of Marines to Okinawa, but DOD  has not fully resolved selected identified capability deficiencies associated  with the relocation of Marines. If DOD officials do not resolve the selected  identified capability deficiencies, they may be challenged in maintaining  operational capabilities and could face higher costs in order to do so. It is  important to resolve these selected identified capability deficiencies in the  near term because it can take many years to plan, allocate resources,  and develop facilities.
DOD has taken steps to develop its infrastructure plans for the relocation  of Marines from Okinawa, such as the development of plans that  identified alternatives for its infrastructure in Guam, CNMI,  and Japan and  the initial infrastructure plans for Hawaii and Australia. However, the  Marine Corps’ infrastructure schedule for Guam does not meet GAO’s  best practices for a reliable schedule. Without a reliable integrated master  schedule, DOD may not have reasonable assurance of the reliability of  information on current progress as well as potential sources of delays for  the design and construction of infrastructure to support the relocation of  Marines to Guam. Furthermore, DOD does not have a reliable schedule  to assess progress and identify potential problems for the relocation to  Guam. In addition, the Marine Corps has not completed its risk- management plan for Guam that documents its strategy for how it will  address known construction risks, among other risks that may be present.  Without a risk-management plan that identifies the Marine Corps’ strategy  for addressing risks to the infrastructure buildup in Guam, DOD will not  have the information necessary to address risks for its infrastructure  design and construction that will likely result in cost overruns and  schedule delays related to the relocation. Moreover, DOD has taken  steps to implement our June 2013 recommendation to update Okinawa  installation master plans, but it has not identified short- or long-term  sustainment needs for facilities in Okinawa. By fully implementing our  June 2013 recommendation to include short- or long-term sustainment  needs, DOD would be better positioned to mitigate infrastructure  sustainment risks in Okinawa and could better ensure that facilities are  adequate to carry out its mission until related realignment activities are  completed. DOD would also limit its risk of experiencing cost overruns  resulting from having to sustain facilities longer than expected because of  delays or uncertainties related to other Asia-Pacific relocation activities  that officials project will need to occur before consolidating infrastructure.
DOD has made overall progress in developing its cost estimates for  Guam since June 2013, but its estimates partially met best practices for  reliable cost estimates for infrastructure in Guam, Hawaii, and Australia.  Specifically, the cost estimates for Guam do not include a unifying Work  Breakdown Structure, risk and sensitivity analyses, and an independent  cost estimate. The cost estimates for Hawaii and Australia do not include  a life-cycle cost estimate or a Work Breakdown Structure. Without a  revision of current cost estimates for Guam, Hawaii, and Australia to fully  address all of the best practices established by GAO’s cost estimating  guide, decision makers in DOD and Congress will not have reliable cost  information to inform their funding decisions and to help them determine  the viability  of these options for the relocation and the establishment of a  rotational presence.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following nine  actions.
To improve the Department of Defense’s ability to maintain its capability  in the Asia-Pacific region, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability  deficiencies associated with the relocation in four areas:  the movement of Marine Corps units by, for example, reconsidering  when units should move to Guam to minimize leaving facilities vacant;  training needs in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and CNMI  by, for example,  identifying other suitable training areas;  reduction in runway length at the Futenma Replacement Facility by,  for example, selecting other runways that would support mission  requirements; and challenges in Australia regarding seasonal changes and biosecurity  requirements that affect equipment downtime by, for example,  deciding on a location for the wet season and identifying a solution for  biosecurity requirements.
To provide DOD with reliable information on potential sources of delays  for the design and construction of infrastructure in Guam, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to update the  Marine Corps’ integrated master schedule for Guam so that it meets the  comprehensive, well-constructed, and credible characteristics for a  reliable schedule. For example, the update to the schedule should include  resources for nonconstruction activities.
To provide DOD and Congress with sufficient information to mitigate risks  for infrastructure construction and sustainment, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to complete a Risk  Management Plan for Guam, and include, at a minimum, plans to  address: (1) construction labor shortages, (2) explosive--ordnance  detection, (3) cultural-artifact discovery and preservation, and (4)  protection of endangered species.
To provide DOD and Congress with more-reliable information to inform  funding decisions associated with the relocation of Marines to Guam, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities  to revise the cost estimates for Guam to address all best practices  established by GAO’s cost estimating guide. Specifically, the revisions to  the cost estimates should include: a unifying Work Breakdown Structure,  risk and sensitivity analyses, and an independent cost estimate.
To provide DOD and Congress with more-reliable information to inform  funding decisions associated with the relocation of Marines to Hawaii and  the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to  revise the DOD cost estimates for Hawaii to address all best practices  for the comprehensive characteristic established by the GAO cost  estimating guide, specifically to capture entire life-cycle costs and  develop a Work Breakdown Structure and  revise the DOD cost estimates for Australia to address all best  practices for the comprehensive characteristic established by the  GAO cost estimating guide, specifically to capture entire life-cycle  costs and develop a Work Breakdown Structure.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to DOD and  the Department of State. In written comments, DOD concurred with two  recommendations, partially concurred with six recommendations, and  nonconcurred with one recommendation. After receiving a draft of the  sensitive report in December 2016, DOD provided additional information  and documentation in January and February 2017 based on new  developments in the bilateral negotiations between the governments of  the United States and Australia, actions taken by DOD during our review  in response to our draft report, and roles and responsibilities in the Asia- Pacific region. As a result of our review of the documentation provided  and discussions with officials, we revised some of our findings to reflect  this additional information, and we revised the wording of some of our  recommendations. Specifically, in discussions in January 2017, DOD  officials raised concerns about the stakeholders to whom we directed our  recommendations, noting that multiple stakeholders have roles in the  relocation. We agree there are multiple stakeholders and modified some  recommendations to allow the Secretary of Defense to direct the  appropriate entities to implement the recommendations, rather than  identify the specific stakeholders. Additionally,  we removed one finding  and its related recommendation regarding challenges reaching an  agreement between the United States and Australia relating to the  mission of the Marine Corps units in Australia, given new documentation  provided by DOD and updates in the bilateral negotiations. DOD’s  comments on this report are summarized below and reprinted in their  entirety in appendix VI. In e-mail, the audit liaison from the Department of  State indicated that the department did not have formal comments. DOD  and the Department of State also both provided technical comments,  which we incorporated as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our first four recommendations that the  Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected  identified capability deficiencies associated with the movement of Marine  Corps units; training needs in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and CNMI; reduction in  runway length at the Futenma Replacement Facility; and challenges in  Australia regarding seasonal changes and biosecurity requirements. In its  letter, DOD stated that the Marine Corps has already addressed, where  applicable, the selected identified capability deficiencies. We disagree  that the Marine Corps has addressed these capability deficiencies, given  the ongoing concerns as noted in our report. Moreover, in January 2017,  both the Marine Corps and Pacific Command provided additional  documents to us stating that the four selected identified capability  deficiencies were not yet resolved, and we address the specific points in  the following paragraphs related to each recommendation.
With regard to our first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability  deficiencies associated with the movement of Marine Corps units, DOD  stated that the Marine Corps’ plans for movement of units from Okinawa  to Guam has considered many factors, including, among others, the  capabilities required to support Pacific Command and the logistical  requirements associated with the movement of forces. In its response,  DOD stated it disagrees with our assessment that adequate planning with  regard to minimizing operational downtime of III  Marine Expeditionary  Force during the movement to Guam has not been done. Rather, DOD  stated that both the Marine Corps and Pacific Command have done  extensive planning and analysis to determine how best to posture, move,  and support forces from III  Marine Expeditionary Force. In its response,  DOD further noted Pacific Command’s explanation that the existing plan  cannot be considered fixed and final because of the requirement to adapt  to changing conditions. DOD also noted that those conditions do not  materially impact the infrastructure required. DOD added that the pace at  which this movement is executed will continue to take into account the  rate at which the required infrastructure is developed. Moreover, DOD’s  response stated that the Marine Corps is already working to ensure that  its plan is continually refined to balance fiscal and construction realities  with operational risk, capability requirements, and readiness.
Although DOD has taken initial steps to consider how to move Marine  Corps units from Okinawa to Guam, we continue to believe it has not yet  fully resolved this capability deficiency. We agree that DOD has taken  some steps to analyze capability deficiencies regarding the movement of  Marine Corps units, and we stated in our report that Marine Corps Forces  Pacific conducted simulated wartime scenarios to assess the capability  concerns that had been expressed by III  Marine Corps Forces. However,  as we also stated in our report, DOD has not completed its analysis or  reached any decisions on how to move the forces. Further, as we stated,  DOD anticipates that it will soon be rapidly increasing the number of  construction projects in Guam, increasing from 4 projects as of July 2016  to 15 projects in fiscal year 2018. Those projects, which are already in the  planning and development stage, will be affected if DOD has not made  decisions on the movement of forces. Further, any changes could result  in costly adjustments to the construction if decisions are made too late or  could result in vacant facilities if the movement of units needs to be  adjusted. DOD has not provided us evidence that, if plans are adapted to  changing conditions, the effect on infrastructure will be minimal; in  contrast, we have historically found that infrastructure changes can be  costly to the department. Moreover, in January 2017, Marine Corps and  Pacific Command officials continued to express concerns that decisions  with regard to force structure and positioning of forces will ultimately  affect facility planning adjustments. As a result, until DOD resolves how to  move units from Okinawa to Guam, it risks hindering its mission  requirements during the relocation.
With regard to our second recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability  deficiencies associated with training needs in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and CNMI,  DOD stated that it has already conducted an extensive analysis of  training needs. Specifically concerning training requirements for CNMI,  DOD stated that Pacific Command identified 42 combatant command– level training deficiencies to be fulfilled through the development of  training ranges in Pacific Command’s area of responsibility. DOD added  that, due to the complexity and scale of these training deficiencies, CNMI  emerged as the only viable location on U.S. territory to address these  deficiencies. DOD further stated it disagrees that a study to reexamine  these and other potential training locations in the event that DOD is not  able to meet all of its identified training requirements in CNMI is  warranted or worthwhile years prior to the development of new training  ranges in the CNMI.
With respect to the department’s assertion that DOD has already  conducted an extensive analysis of training needs for the Marine Corps  and the joint force in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and CNMI,  we disagree. The  assertion is contrary to evidence provided to us in documents and  discussions we held with DOD officials. In particular, in February 2017,  officials from U.S. Forces–Japan said that bilateral agreement was  reached to establish a working group to study other possible locations  beyond Kanoya Air Base for training, thus indicating that identification of  other training locations near Iwakuni has not yet been resolved. With  respect to Hawaii, in April 2016, Marine Corps officials told us they had  not identified a timeline for when they plan to develop training plans, and  in January 2017 Marine Corps officials added that there is significant work  to be done to fully determine training requirements and conduct planning  to meet those requirements. With respect to CNMI, in January 2017 both  Pacific Command and the Marine Corps stated that DOD has not fully  resolved the challenges associated with training areas. As noted in our  report, the department received more than 27,000 comments in response  to the draft environmental impact statement, and to address the multitude  of comments the Department of the Navy stated it is developing a revised  draft environmental impact statement. However, the Marine Corps  synchronization matrix, as of June 2016, still showed construction  scheduled to begin in Tinian as soon as 2017. We continue to believe that  DOD should take actions to resolve capability deficiencies associated  with training needs in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and CNMI; otherwise, it may take  additional time, effort, and resources to resolve these deficiencies and it  is uncertain whether the Marine Corps units will be able to complete  necessary training in these locations.
With regard to our third recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability  deficiencies associated with the reduction in runway length at the  Futenma Replacement Facility, DOD stated that it disagreed that the  length of the runway planned at the Futenma Replacement Facility is a  capability deficiency for the Marine Corps. DOD stated that, at the time of  its agreement with Japan, it understood that the Futenma Replacement  Facility would not possess a long runway and that the Marine Corps  drove the final requirements to support the capabilities required for their  missions at the Futenma Replacement Facility.
While we agree that the shorter runway is not a deficiency for the Marine  Corps, it is a deficiency that is ultimately connected with infrastructure  plans for the Marine Corps in the context of relocation—specifically,  infrastructure plans associated with Marine Corps relocation from Marine  Corps Air Station Futenma. As such, we directed our recommendation to  the Secretary of Defense to direct the appropriate entities for whom the  shorter runway is a deficiency. As we wrote in our report, the shorter  runway equates to the loss of an emergency landing strip for fixed-wing  aircraft in the area and the loss of the United Nations use of a runway.  These capability deficiencies affect the Air Force and U.S. Forces–Japan  and have not yet been resolved. Additionally,  as we stated in our report,  senior officials from U.S. Forces–Japan said that, given the large  Japanese investment into the Futenma Replacement Facility, it may be  likely that the United States becomes pressured by the government of  Japan to return Marine Corps Air Station Futenma even if the  replacement runway deficiency is not resolved. If this return were to occur  without a replacement runway identified, DOD mission capabilities could  be hindered. Until this deficiency is resolved, DOD may be unable to  maintain all mission capabilities or face higher costs to do so.
With regard to our fourth recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability  deficiencies associated with challenges in Australia regarding seasonal  changes and biosecurity requirements that affect equipment downtime,  DOD stated that these factors are not capability deficiencies but rather  real-world constraints around which DOD and Australia are working to  develop the most bilaterally beneficial annual program possible. DOD  also stated that the Marine Corps continues to coordinate closely with the  Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry to develop  best practices to train Marines as assistant inspectors to minimize the  cost, in time and money, to conduct biosecurity inspections.
We agree that the department likely understood these issues when it first  began planning for the rotational presence to Australia, but knowing about  these issues does not negate the fact that DOD has not yet determined  how it plans to resolve them. These issues remain relevant to the Marine  Corps, as it will need to determine where to place up 2,500 Marines when  some units can no longer return to Okinawa and how to reduce readiness  risks when its equipment is unusable due to biosecurity screening  requirements. As we noted in our report, DOD officials are considering  multiple options for the wet season, but no decisions have been made,  and Marine Corps officials have identified constraints for each option  being considered. Moreover, as stated in our report, in January 2017  Pacific Command and Marine Corps officials stated that challenges  remain to fund and source a dedicated equipment set. Initial force flow  has already begun, and the cost-sharing arrangement between the  governments of the United States and Australia was signed in January  2017, which will likely allow for construction decisions to be made in the  near term. DOD has the opportunity now—before force flow increases  and DOD spends additional effort and resources—to make prudent  decisions to avoid needing to make costly corrections later. As a result,  we continue to believe that DOD should take actions to resolve these  challenges in Australia in order to help ensure that its plans are fully  developed and resources are identified so that DOD and Congress can  make prudent and informed funding decisions to resolve these  challenges.
DOD concurred with our fifth recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense direct the appropriate entities to update the Marine Corps’  integrated master schedule for Guam so that it meets the comprehensive,  well-constructed, and credible characteristics for a reliable schedule. In its  response, DOD stated that, in September 2016, it began updating its  integrated master schedule based on our review to conform to the GAO  Schedule Assessment Guide and plans to adopt the best practices of  assigning resources and establishing activity durations to ensure the  schedule is comprehensive. Also, DOD plans to continue to work to verify  that the schedule can be traced horizontally and vertically and conduct a  schedule risk analysis. If fully implemented, we believe that DOD’s  proposed actions will better provide DOD with reliable information on  potential sources of delays for the design and construction of  infrastructure in Guam.
DOD concurred with our sixth recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense direct the appropriate entities to complete a risk-management  plan for Guam, and include, at a minimum, plans to address: (1)  construction labor shortages, (2) explosive-ordnance detection, (3)  cultural-artifact discovery and preservation, and (4) protection of  endangered species. In its response, DOD cited actions it has previously  taken and plans to mitigate risks for infrastructure construction and  sustainment, such as coordinating with the U.S. Citizenship and  Immigration Services to address foreign-worker visas, approving an  explosive-safety exemption for construction projects in Guam and CNMI,  and developing a monitoring and mitigation tracking plan to ensure Navy  compliance and execution of environmental requirements. These past  and planned actions, as well as DOD’s concurrence with our  recommendation, should better address risks to the design and  construction of its infrastructure and, in turn, reduce the potential for cost  overruns and schedule delays.
DOD nonconcurred with our seventh recommendation that the Secretary  of Defense direct the appropriate entities to revise the cost estimates for  Guam to address all best practices established by GAO’s cost estimating  guide. In its response, DOD stated that the department does not accept  the assertion that GAO’s best practices are universally applicable to a  wide range of activities that includes military construction, acquisition, or  basing. DOD stated that the Guam program was developed and  communicated to Congress consistently with statute and the department’s  long-standing supporting policies. Specifically, DOD noted that DOD  Financial Management Regulation, Volume 2B, Chapter 6, requires  inclusion of a form for each project submitted with the budget request,  containing certain information. According to DOD, per this guidance, a  contractor develops a detailed Work Breakdown Structure when the  construction contract is awarded, which is much later in the project  execution timeline than our expectations. DOD further stated that it is  unrealistic for DOD to develop detailed Work Breakdown Structures for  over 100 independent construction projects prior to any construction  project getting under way. Moreover, DOD states that it provides sufficient  information to support military construction decisions, and in cases where  Congress desires additional information on a particular project, it routinely  requests and receives that information.
We continue to believe that our cost estimating guide provides a  consistent methodology that is based on best practices and that can be  used across the federal government—including DOD—for developing,  managing, and evaluating capital program cost estimates. Moreover, as  noted in our report, there is no Work Breakdown Structure to tie the cost  estimates and schedule together. A Work Breakdown Structure is the  cornerstone of every program because it defines in detail the work  necessary to accomplish a program’s objectives, and it provides a  consistent framework for planning and assigning responsibility for the  work. Further, we do not state that DOD should develop detailed Work  Breakdown Structures for over 100 independent construction projects.  Rather, we state that DOD should have a unifying Work Breakdown  Structure to align the Guam Rainbow Chart—DOD’s program- management tool that summarizes detailed program inputs—to the  schedule or the cost estimate. Per GAO’s cost estimating guide, a Work  Breakdown Structure should be initially set up when the program is  established and becomes successively detailed over time as more  information becomes known about the program. In its response, DOD did  not dispute our findings and related recommendation that the revisions to  the Guam cost estimates should include risk and sensitivity analyses and  an independent cost estimate; we believe these revisions remain relevant  as well. We continue to believe that, without a revision of cost estimates  for Guam to include the best practices established by GAO’s cost  estimating guide, decision makers in DOD and Congress will not have  reliable cost information to inform their funding decisions regarding  infrastructure for the Marine Corps relocation to Guam.
Finally, DOD partially concurred with our eighth and ninth  recommendations that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate  entities to revise the DOD cost estimates for Hawaii and Australia to  address all best practices for the comprehensive characteristic  established by the GAO cost estimating guide, specifically to capture  entire life-cycle costs and develop a Work Breakdown Structure. In its  response, the department agreed that good cost estimating practices are  prudent for good decision making but did not agree that it should expend  effort to update its cost estimates for the Hawaii and Australia programs  due to reasons of timing, in the case of Hawaii, and international  agreements, in the case of Australia. Specifically, DOD stated that, for  Hawaii, high-level cost estimates are sufficient at this early planning stage  and a detailed Work Breakdown Structure is not needed. Moreover, in its  response, DOD stated that it disagrees with what constitutes the program  life cycle. DOD stated it believes that the program is complete when  forces move and occupy the new facilities. Regarding Australia cost  estimates, DOD stated in its response that the costs borne by DOD under  this program will be subject to international agreement rather than the  GAO cost estimating guide.
Per GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, we are not  recommending a Work Breakdown Structure for specific construction  projects, but rather a Work Breakdown Structure that combines all of the  different projects involved in the overall program. We continue to believe  that DOD should develop a Work Breakdown Structure that lays out the  costs at a high level so that DOD can easily see and track  accomplishments. Then, as the program continues, DOD can add detail  to those areas of the Work Breakdown Structure when they are further  defined. Additionally,  life-cycle costing enhances decision making,  especially in early planning and concept formulation of acquisition. While  DOD notes that it incorporates best practices for minimizing facility  maintenance and sustainment costs into its construction costs, a full life- cycle cost estimate is important in budgetary decisions, key decision  points, milestone reviews, and investment decisions. Without considering  operations and support throughout the entire life cycle, DOD is not  considering all possible costs of what the facilities will cost over time. With  regard to Australia’s cost estimate, costs could still be identified in a Work  Breakdown Structure and then later assigned to either the United States  or Australia. We continue to believe that revising cost estimates for  Hawaii and Australia to include all of the best practices established by  GAO’s cost estimating guide for the comprehensive characteristic will  better enable decision makers in DOD and Congress to make informed  funding decisions and determine the viability of the relocation of Marines  to Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy,  and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Department  of State. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of our review were to examine the extent to which the  Department of Defense (DOD) has (1) coordinated its efforts and  resolved selected identified capability deficiencies related to the  relocation of Marines from Okinawa, (2) developed infrastructure plans  and schedules for its relocation efforts and completed risk planning for its  infrastructure that will support the relocation, and (3) developed reliable  cost estimates for infrastructure for the relocation to Guam and Hawaii  and for the rotational presence in Australia.
This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we are issuing  concurrently. DOD deemed some of the information in the sensitive  report as For Official Use Only, which must be protected from public  disclosure. Therefore, this report omits For Official Use Only information  and data on some of the Navy and Marine Corps plans and programs  associated with the realignment effort, deployment and allies’  considerations, and estimates of future actions and political concerns  associated with Marine Corps forward stationing. Although the information  provided in this report is more limited in scope, it addresses the same  objectives as the sensitive report. Also, the methodology used for both  reports is the same.
For all objectives, we scoped our review to actions taken since GAO last  reviewed Marine Corps realignment initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region in  June 2013. We reviewed relevant policies and procedures, and collected  information by interviewing and communicating with officials from the  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Air Force, the Army, the Navy,  the Marine Corps, and the State Department. We also conducted site  visits in the following areas: Hawaii, where we met with Pacific Command  and its service components; Japan, where we met with U.S. Forces– Japan and the services, Marine Corps Installation Command Pacific, III  Marine Expeditionary Force, the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, and the U.S.  Consulate on Okinawa, and observed infrastructure conditions in  Okinawa and Iwakuni; and Guam, where we met with DOD and  government of Guam officials, and observed infrastructure conditions and the buildup of Marine Corps Base Guam. Additionally,  we interviewed  DOD officials and officials from the U.S. Embassy in Australia. We also  met with DOD’s construction agents, specifically the U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command.
To determine the extent to which DOD has coordinated efforts and  resolved selected identified capability deficiencies related to the  relocation of Marines from Okinawa, we reviewed DOD documentation  and interviewed knowledgeable officials. Specifically, we reviewed  documentation such as the Marine Corps’ Asia-Pacific Realignment  Synchronization Matrix;  capability documents such as bilateral  agreements between the United States and Japan or Australia as well as  training requirement documentation; and other documentation including  program management plans for the various locations supporting the  relocation. We reviewed capability deficiencies that were identified by  DOD through interviews. We compared DOD’s decision-making process  for plans to resolve the identified capabilities to DOD Unified Facilities  Criteria regarding identifying  mission needs to determine land and facility  support requirements.
To determine the extent that DOD has developed plans and schedules for  its relocation efforts and completed risk planning for its infrastructure, we  reviewed DOD guidance related to the development of installation plans,  integrated master schedules, and risk planning. We identified current  infrastructure plans and integrated master schedules. Specifically, we  assessed the Guam integrated master schedule to determine whether  this schedule reflects best practices needed to implement a program as  well as the extent to which projects and activities were properly  sequenced. GAO schedule specialists reviewed the Guam schedule and  compared it with best practices in GAO’s Schedule Assessment Guide to  determine the extent to which it reflects 10 key schedule estimating  practices that are fundamental to having a reliable schedule. These  practices address whether the schedule (1) captured all activities, (2)  sequenced all activities, (3) assigned resources to all activities, (4)  established the duration of all activities, (5) can be traced horizontally and  vertically, (6) established a valid critical path, (7) identified reasonable  total float between activities, (8) identified a level of confidence using a  schedule risk analysis, (9) was updated using progress and logic to  determine dates, and (10) maintained a baseline schedule. To do so, we  independently assessed the program’s integrated master schedule  compared to these 10 best practices and determined an assessment  rating for each best practice. Then we determined an overall assessment  rating for the 4 characteristics of a reliable schedule based on averages  of the 10 best practices. When the program office made updates to the  integrated master schedule, we conducted our review again to reflect  those updates. We also received two detailed construction project  schedules and assessed them for resource assignments. In addition, we  interviewed cognizant program officials to discuss their use of best  practices in creating the program’s current schedule to better understand  how the schedule was constructed and maintained. Moreover, we  reviewed documentation and conducted interviews with DOD officials to  determine any identified risks to the schedule and actions DOD has taken  to address those risks. We compared DOD’s risk-planning efforts outlined  in that documentation to DOD guidance on addressing risk, such as  guidance that identifies the characteristics needed in a risk-management  plan and guidance on how DOD plans for infrastructure sustainment in  base master plans.
To determine the extent to which DOD has developed reliable cost  estimates for infrastructure for the relocation to Guam and Hawaii and for  the rotational presence in Australia, we reviewed DOD’s cost estimates  and analyses and interviewed DOD and Department of State officials  about costs and funding sources related to infrastructure in locations  considered for relocation. GAO cost estimation specialists compared  those estimates and analyses to the best practices included in GAO’s  Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. We also reviewed the Office of  Management and Budget’s Capital Programming Guide, and DOD’s  guidance on Economic Analysis for Decision-making, which support our  best practices for developing reliable cost estimates. Specifically, GAO’s  Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide identifies best practices that  represent work across the federal government and are the basis for a  high-quality, reliable cost estimate. A cost estimate created using best  practices exhibits four broad characteristics: accurate, well-documented,  credible, and comprehensive. In assessing program cost estimates for  Guam, GAO cost estimation specialists evaluated the Marine Corps  program office estimating methodologies, assumptions, and results to  determine whether the official cost estimates were comprehensive,  accurate, well-documented, and credible. As the basis of our assessment,  we used our GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide on estimating  program schedules and costs, which was developed based on extensive  research of cost estimating best practices. Our Cost Estimating and  Assessment Guide considers an estimate to be accurate if it is not overly  conservative, is based on an assessment of the most likely costs, and is  adjusted properly for inflation; comprehensive if its level of detail ensures  that all pertinent costs are included and no costs are double-counted or  omitted; well-documented if the estimate can be easily repeated or  updated and can be traced to original sources through auditing; and  credible if the estimate has been cross-checked with an independent cost  estimate and a level of uncertainty associated with the estimate has been  identified and quantified. We also interviewed the Marine Corps program  office’s cost estimating team to obtain a detailed understanding of the  cost models provided, and met with Marine Corps headquarters, Marine  Corps Forces Pacific Command, and Naval Facilities Engineering  Command Pacific to understand their methodology, data, and approach in  developing their independent cost estimate (if applicable). In doing so, we  interviewed cognizant program officials, including the Program Manager  and cost analysis team, regarding their respective roles, responsibilities,  and actual efforts in developing and reviewing the cost estimate.
In assessing program cost estimates for Hawaii and Australia, GAO cost  estimation specialists conducted a limited assessment focused on the  comprehensive characteristic because the estimates developed and  provided by DOD are early in the program life cycle (e.g., they are Rough  Order of Magnitude  estimates), and as such the information is immature  and inadequate to support a full analysis. Therefore, we chose to review  only the comprehensive characteristic because, according to GAO’s Cost  Estimating and Assessment Guide, if the cost estimate is not  comprehensive then it cannot fully meet the well-documented, accurate,  or credible best practice characteristics. For instance, if the cost estimate  is missing some cost elements, then the documentation will be  incomplete, the estimate will be inaccurate, and the result will not be  credible due to the potential underestimating of costs and the lack of a full  risk and uncertainty analysis.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2016 to April 2017 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Defense Policy Review Initiative
paragraphs: The Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) is a bilateral force-posture  realignment program between the U.S. and Japanese governments. Led  by the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, DPRI consists of a  package of 19 interrelated and interdependent initiatives for Japan and  Guam with touch points to other areas in the U.S. Pacific Command area  of responsibility, such as Tinian in the Commonwealth of the Northern  Mariana Islands. According to the Department of Defense (DOD),  implementation of 17 of the 19 DPRI initiatives is managed by  subcommittees, panels, and working groups established and operating  under the auspices of the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee. The other two  initiatives—the Guam Master Plan and Missile Defense initiative—are  managed on the U.S. side by the Joint Guam Program Office and the  Missile Defense Agency, respectively. See table 4 for a list of the 19  initiatives and a short summary describing each effort.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Assessment of the Marine Corps’ Integrated Master Schedule for Guam
paragraphs: This appendix summarizes our assessment of the integrated master  schedule for Guam compared to GAO’s Schedule Assessment Guide. We  found the integrated master schedule is not reliable because it did not  meet the characteristics of a reliable schedule identified in the guide.  Specifically, there are 10 best practices associated with a reliable  schedule that are summarized in 4 characteristics: comprehensive, well- constructed, credible, and controlled.
For this analysis, we had five assessment categories: not met (provided  no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion), minimally met (provided  evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion), partially met  (provided evidence that satisfies about half of the criterion), substantially  met (provided evidence that satisfies a large portion of the criterion), and  fully met (provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire criterion).  We determined an assessment rating for each of the 10 best practices,  and then determined an overall assessment rating for each characteristic  based on the ratings for the best practices within each characteristic in  table 5. A schedule is considered reliable if the overall assessment  ratings for each of the four characteristics are substantially or fully met.  GAO shared this analysis with Department of Defense officials. Table 5  only includes the reasons why best practices were not met, minimally  met, or partially met.
section_title: Appendix IV: Assessment Tables of DOD’s Realignment Cost Estimates for Guam Compared to Characteristics for Reliable Cost Estimates
paragraphs: For this analysis, GAO cost estimating specialists assessed the  realignment cost estimates for military construction and nonmilitary  construction in Guam against the best practices for each of the four  characteristics—comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and  credible—for reliable cost estimates, and also provided an overall  assessment for each characteristic. This analysis has five assessment  categories for the best practices and the characteristics: not met  (provided no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion), minimally met  (provided evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion), partially  met (provided evidence that satisfies about half of the criterion),  substantially met (provided evidence that satisfies a large portion of the  criterion), and fully met (provided complete evidence that satisfies the  entire criterion). A cost estimate is considered reliable if the overall  assessment ratings for each of the four characteristics are fully or  substantially met. Tables 6 and 7 include our detailed assessment of the  Department of Defense’s (DOD) military construction and nonmilitary  construction cost estimates for Guam, respectively, regarding each of the  best practices for the four characteristics for reliable cost estimates. GAO  shared this analysis with DOD officials. Tables 6 and 7 only include the  reasons why best practices were not met, minimally met, or partially met.
section_title: Appendix V: Assessment of DOD’s Realignment Cost Estimates for Hawaii and Australia
paragraphs: For this analysis, GAO cost estimation specialists assessed the  realignment cost estimates for Hawaii and Australia against the best  practices of the comprehensive characteristic for reliable cost estimates  and provided an overall assessment for the characteristic. This analysis  has five assessment categories for the characteristic: not met (provided  no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion), minimally met (provided  evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion), partially met  (provided evidence that satisfies about half of the criterion), substantially  met (provided evidence that satisfies a large portion of the criterion), and  fully met (provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire criterion). A  cost estimate is considered comprehensive if the assessment rating is  fully or substantially met. Table 8, below, includes our detailed  assessment of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) cost estimates for  Hawaii and Australia, including the reasons that DOD’s cost estimates  partially met GAO’s comprehensive characteristic.
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Laura Durland (Assistant  Director), Emily Biskup, Scott Bruckner, Juana Collymore, Jennifer  Echard, Jason Lee, Jennifer Leotta, Amie Lesser, Carol Petersen,  Richard Powelson, Karen Richey, Jodie Sandel, Nancy Santucci, Michael  Shaughnessy, Amber Sinclair, and Erik Wilkins-McKee made key  contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Management: Further Analysis Needed to Identify Guam’s  Public Infrastructure Requirements and Costs for DOD’s Realignment  Plan. GAO-14-82. Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2013.
Defense Management: More Reliable Cost Estimates and Further  Planning Needed to Inform the Marine Corps Realignment Initiatives in  the Pacific. GAO-13-360. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2013.
Force Structure: Improved Cost Information and Analysis Needed to  Guide Overseas Military Posture Decisions. GAO-12-711. Washington,  D.C.: June 6, 2012.
Military Buildup on Guam: Costs and Challenges in Meeting Construction  Timelines. GAO-11-459R. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2011.
Defense Management: Comprehensive Cost Information and Analysis of  Alternatives Needed to Assess Military Posture in Asia. GAO-11-316.  Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2011.
Defense Infrastructure: The Navy Needs Better Documentation to  Support Its Proposed Military Treatment Facilities on Guam.  GAO-11-206. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2011.
Defense Infrastructure: Guam Needs Timely Information from DOD to  Meet Challenges in Planning and Financing Off-Base Projects and  Programs to Support a Larger Military Presence. GAO-10-90R.  Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2009.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Provide Updated Labor  Requirements to Help Guam Adequately Develop Its Labor Force for the  Military Buildup. GAO-10-72. Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2009.
Defense Infrastructure: Planning Challenges Could Increase Risks for  DOD in Providing Utility Services When Needed to Support the Military  Buildup on Guam. GAO-09-653. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2009.
Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help Guam  Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth. GAO-09-500R.  Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2009.
Defense Infrastructure: Opportunity to Improve the Timeliness of Future  Overseas Planning Reports and Factors Affecting the Master Planning  Effort for the Military Buildup on Guam. GAO-08-1005. Washington, D.C.:  September 17, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help  Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth.  GAO-08-665. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Planning Efforts for the Proposed Military Buildup  on Guam Are in Their Initial Stages, with Many Challenges Yet to Be  Addressed. GAO-08-722T. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD  Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military  Buildup on Guam. GAO-07-1015. Washington, D.C.: September 12,  2007.