Federal Courthouses: Improved Collaboration Needed to Meet Demands of a Complex Security Environment
Published: 2011-09-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Safe and accessible federal courthouses are critical to the U.S. judicial process. The Federal Protective Service (FPS), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals Service), within the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), and the General Services Administration (GSA) are the federal stakeholders with roles related to courthouse security. As requested, this report addresses (1) attributes that influence courthouse security considerations and (2) the extent to which stakeholders have collaborated in implementing their responsibilities and using risk management. GAO analyzed laws and documents, such as security assessments; reviewed GAO's work on key practices for collaboration and facility protection; visited 11 courthouse facilities, selected based on geographic dispersion, age, size, and other criteria; and interviewed agency and judiciary officials. While the results from site visits cannot be generalized, they provided examples of courthouse security activities.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Various attributes influence security considerations for the nation's 424 federal courthouses, which range from small court spaces to large buildings in major urban areas. According to DOJ data, threats against the courts have increased between fiscal years 2004 and 2010--from approximately 600 to more than 1,400. The Interagency Security Committee--an interagency group that develops standards for federal facility security--has assigned courthouses the highest security level because they are prominent symbols of U.S. power. Federal stakeholders have taken steps to strengthen their collaboration, such as establishing agency liaisons, but have faced challenges in implementing assigned responsibilities and using risk assessment tools. (1) A 1997 memorandum of agreement (MOA) outlines each stakeholder's roles and responsibilities and identifies areas requiring stakeholder coordination. However, at 5 of the 11 courthouses GAO visited, FPS and the Marshals Service were either performing duplicative efforts (e.g., both monitoring the courthouse lobby) or performing security roles that were inconsistent with their responsibilities. The judiciary and other stakeholders stated that having the Marshals Service and FPS both provide security services has resulted in two lines of authority for implementing and overseeing security services. Updating the MOA that identifies roles and responsibilities could strengthen the multiagency courthouse security framework by better incorporating accountability for federal agencies' collaborative efforts. (2) In 2008, Congress authorized a pilot program, whereby the Marshals Service would assume FPS's responsibilities to provide perimeter security at 7 courthouses. In October 2010, the judiciary recommended that the pilot be expanded. AOUSC noted general consensus among various stakeholders in support of the pilot and estimated the costs of expanding it, but AOUSC did not obtain FPS's views on assessing the pilot results or on how the expansion may affect FPS's mission. Additional analysis on the costs and benefits of this approach and the inclusion of all stakeholder perspectives could better position Congress and federal stakeholders to evaluate expansion options. (3) The Marshals Service has not always completed court security facility surveys (a type of risk assessment), as required by Marshals Service guidance. At 9 of the courthouses GAO visited, the Marshals Service had not conducted these surveys, but Marshals Service officials at some courthouses told us that they assessed security needs as part of their budget development process. However, these assessments are less comprehensive than the court security facility surveys required by Marshals Service guidance. FPS has faced difficulties completing its risk assessments, known as facility security assessments, and recently halted an effort to implement a new system for completing them. Furthermore, GAO found that the Marshals Service and FPS did not consistently share the full results of their risk assessments with each other and key stakeholders. Sharing risk assessment information could better equip federal stakeholders to assess courthouses' security needs and make informed decisions.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends DHS and DOJ update the MOA to, among other things, clarify stakeholders' roles and responsibilities and ensure the completion and sharing of risk assessments; and further assess costs and benefits of the perimeter pilot program, in terms of enhanced security, and include all stakeholders' views, should steps be taken to expand the program. DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2004, potential threats and incidents against court  personnel and those involved in the judicial process have more than  doubled. Additionally, the January 2010 shooting at the U.S. Courthouse  in Las Vegas, Nevada, and the discovery in March 2010 of an improvised  explosive device outside the Thomas S. Foley U.S. Courthouse in  Spokane, Washington, have brought attention to the issue of federal  courthouse security. Federal courthouses—totaling 424 nationwide,  according to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC)—run  the gamut from small court spaces in post offices that house courts on a  part-time basis to large buildings in major urban areas, and each presents  a slightly different mix of security risks and vulnerabilities. Effective  protection for courthouses is critical to help create a safe and accessible  environment—one in which judicial matters and activities can be  conducted without the threat of intimidation or harm to those participating  in the judicial process.
Federal courthouse security is a collaborative effort involving various  federal stakeholders from executive branch agencies and the judiciary.
This collaborative effort is formalized by a 1997 memorandum of  agreement (MOA) between the Department of Justice (DOJ), General  Services Administration (GSA), and AOUSC that designates roles and  responsibilities for each of these entities in protecting federal courthouses  and sets forth the federal framework for securing courthouses. The MOA  was reaffirmed in 2004 to acknowledge the transfer of the Federal  Protective Service (FPS) from GSA to the Department of Homeland  Security (DHS). Within the executive branch, GSA manages federal  facilities, including courthouses, and is responsible for federal courthouse  design, construction, and maintenance. The U.S. Marshals Service  (Marshals Service or Marshals), a component of DOJ, has primary  responsibility for protecting federal judicial facilities and personnel. FPS is  responsible for enforcing federal laws and providing building entry and  perimeter security at GSA-owned or GSA-leased facilities (referred to as  GSA-controlled), including facilities housing federal courts. Within the  judiciary, the Judicial Conference of the United States (Judicial  Conference)—chaired by the Chief Justice of the United States—is the  principle policy-making body for administering the federal court system,  and its security committee sets security policies for federal judges and  courts. The Judicial Conference’s policies are implemented by AOUSC.
You asked us to review federal efforts to protect courthouses. This report  addresses the following questions: (1) What attributes influence security  considerations for federal courthouses? (2) To what extent have federal  stakeholders collaborated in implementing their roles and responsibilities  and in using risk management?
To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant laws and obtained and  analyzed documents from the federal stakeholders responsible for  courthouse security, such as memoranda of agreement, facility security  guidance, and risk assessments. We interviewed officials from the  Marshals Service; FPS; GSA; and the judiciary, particularly AOUSC  officials, federal judges, and other court officials, to obtain information on  the security environment and the federal stakeholders’ efforts to secure  courthouses. We also visited 11 federal courthouse facilities to gain  firsthand knowledge and understanding of efforts to protect them, as well  as to document security risks and vulnerabilities. We selected these  facilities based on a mix of criteria, including geographic dispersion, urban  versus rural locations, age, size, and proximity to international borders.  During the site visits, we interviewed officials from the Marshals Service,  FPS, and GSA, as well as judges and other court officials to obtain  information and their views on courthouse security efforts at those 11  courthouses. We also toured the 11 courthouses to observe courthouse  protective measures, and we relied on officials to bring security issues to  our attention at the individual courthouses. Therefore, we could not  always determine whether these issues were present at other  courthouses unless officials brought them to our attention. Although  information obtained from these site visits cannot be generalized to all  federal courthouses, they provided us with insights into federal agencies’  practices to secure courthouses and challenges agencies face in their  security efforts. We assessed federal stakeholders’ efforts to secure  courthouses against key practices we have identified for federal  collaboration and facility protection. (Appendix I contains additional  information on our scope and methodology.)
We conducted this performance audit from January 2010 to September  2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Security at the nation’s 424 federal courthouses is overseen by FPS, the  Marshals Service, GSA, and AOUSC. Federal statutes and interagency  agreements define these stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities for the  protection and security of federal courthouses and persons within  courthouses. FPS is the primary federal agency responsible for patrolling  and protecting the perimeter of GSA-controlled facilities, including  facilities housing federal court functions, and for enforcing federal laws  and regulations in those facilities. Specifically, FPS has the authority to  enforce federal laws and regulations aimed at protecting federally owned  and leased properties and the persons on such property. FPS conducts  its mission by providing security services through two types of activities:  (1) physical security activities, such as conducting risk assessments of  facilities and recommending risk-based countermeasures aimed at  preventing incidents at facilities; and (2) law enforcement activities, such  as responding to incidents, conducting criminal investigations, and  exercising arrest authority. FPS charges customer agencies, such as the  judiciary and Marshals Service, fees for the security services FPS  provides. FPS charges federal agencies three fees: (1) a basic security  fee, (2) a building-specific administrative fee, and (3) a security work  authorization administrative fee. All customer agencies in GSA-controlled  properties pay the basic annual security fee. Customer agencies in  facilities for which FPS recommends specific countermeasures pay the  building-specific administrative fee, along with the cost of the  countermeasures. Customer agencies that request additional  countermeasures pay the security work authorization administrative fee,  along with the cost of the countermeasures.
The Marshals Service, by law, has primary responsibility for the security  of the federal judiciary, in either primary courthouses—where judicial and  judicial-related space comprise at least 75 percent of the building—or  multitenant facilities—including the safe conduct of court proceedings and  the security of federal judges and court personnel. The Marshals Service  is divided into 94 districts (with one U.S. Marshal for each district) to  correspond with the 94 federal judicial districts. Security of federal  courthouses is administered by the Marshals Service’s Judicial Security  Division, whose mission is to ensure the safe and secure conduct of  judicial proceedings and provide protection for federal judges, U.S.  Attorneys, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, jurors, and other members of the  federal court family. The Office of Courthouse Management has  responsibility for, among other things, physical security and construction  of all Marshals Service office, support, and special-purpose space. The  Marshals Service receives both direct appropriations and funding  transferred from the judiciary for its courthouse security activities. Judicial  Services has oversight for programs funded by the AOUSC court security  appropriation. This funding provides for the Court Security Officer (CSO)  program, security equipment, and systems for space occupied by the  judiciary and for Marshals Service employees.
As the federal government’s landlord, GSA designs, builds, manages,  and safeguards federal buildings, including courthouses. Under the  Homeland Security Act of 2002, FPS was transferred to DHS along with  FPS’s responsibility to perform law enforcement and related security  functions for GSA buildings. However, GSA retained some  responsibilities related to courthouse security. GSA continues to provide  proposed plans for new construction and renovation of court space and  for the installation of additional security systems and other security  measures, such as fencing, lighting, and locks on doors. In response to a  recommendation we made in 2005 and to enhance coordination with  FPS, GSA established in 2006 the Building Security and Policy Division  within the Public Buildings Service, where FPS once resided, to manage  its security policy and implementation efforts, including its dealings with  FPS. Additionally, GSA’s Center for Courthouse Programs is responsible  for nationwide policy formulation and general management of new federal  courthouse construction and the modernization of existing courthouses.
In the judicial branch, both the Judicial Conference, which is the  judiciary’s principal policy-making body concerned with the administration  of the U.S. courts, and AOUSC, which is the central administrative  support entity for the judicial branch, play a role in courthouse security.  The Judicial Conference’s Committee on Judicial Security coordinates  security issues involving the federal courts. For example, the committee  monitors the protection of court facilities and proceedings, judicial officers,  and court staff at federal court facilities and other locations, and makes  policy recommendations to the Judicial Conference. Appropriations for  security can be funded directly to the courts or transferred to the Marshals  Service, which is responsible for administering judicial security consistent  with the standards or guidelines agreed to by the Director of AOUSC and  the Director of the Marshals Service. This represents a collaborative effort  between the federal judiciary and DOJ to assist in securing the judicial  process. Additionally, at the district level, federal judges have  responsibilities in securing courthouses. For example, the court has the  authority to, among other things, issue rules or orders regulating,  restricting, or prohibiting items within or near the perimeter of any facility  that has a courthouse.
We have previously identified key practices both for enhancing  collaboration among federal agencies and for facility protection.
Regarding collaboration, we have identified a number of factors, such as  leadership and trust and agreeing on roles and responsibilities, which are  key to facilitating an effective collaborative relationship. We have used  these practices in our prior work to evaluate collaboration between FPS  and tenants in federal facilities and the Transportation Security  Administration’s efforts to secure commercial airports, for example. We  have also identified facility protection key practices from the collective  practices of federal agencies and the private sector to provide a  framework for guiding agencies’ protection efforts and addressing  challenges. We have used the key practices to evaluate, for example, the  efforts of FPS in protecting federal facilities, the Smithsonian Institution in  protecting its museums, and the National Park Service in protecting  national icons such as the Statue of Liberty.
section_title: Federal Courthouses Have Several Attributes That Influence Security Considerations
subsections: section_title: Courthouses Are Symbolic Targets and Are the Hub of Judicial Business
paragraphs: Courthouses—which house judicial proceedings and which many view as  symbols of democracy and openness—have faced increasing security  risks. DOJ data on potential threats against court personnel and  individuals involved in the judicial process show a steady rise in recent  years, adding to the concern of securing federal courthouses. (See  figure 1.)
AOUSC recognizes the symbolic nature of courthouses, and has stated  that access to the courts is a core value in the American system of  government and that courthouses are important symbols of the federal  government in communities across the country. The Interagency Security  Committee (ISC) ranks U.S. circuit, district, and bankruptcy courthouses  as “very high”—the highest security level—because they are prominent  symbols of U.S. power or authority. According to ISC, symbolic targets  are attractive to foreign terrorists, as well as domestic antigovernment  radicals. For example, case-related or antigovernment protests and  demonstrations can occur outside courthouses, increasing possible  security risks to the courthouses. Among our site visits, a court official at  one location stated that, in one instance in March 2003, protesters  outside the courthouse who were trying to avoid arrest broke a window  and entered the official’s office, potentially putting the official and others  at risk.
With the increased number of potential threats against courthouses in  recent years, the Marshals Service reports that threats from extremist  groups exist, particularly at courthouses in certain locations. For example,  at one courthouse we visited, FPS officials expressed concern about the  presence of antigovernment persons and groups within the district. In part  to better protect the courthouse from any person or group that may attack  the courthouse, an area of raised terrain followed by an excavated area  lined with rock which is not visible from a distance, was constructed  between the courthouse and the road. Figure 2 illustrates the antivehicle  barriers constructed to protect the courthouse.
In addition to the symbolism of courthouses, the wide variety of civil and  criminal cases that come before the federal judiciary include some that  can pose increased security risks to federal courthouses, such as those  involving domestic and international terrorism, domestic and international  organized crime, extremist groups, gangs, and drug trafficking. At  courthouses with these types of cases, federal stakeholders have  implemented additional security measures. For example at one  courthouse we visited, the Marshals Service stated that they implemented  countermeasures to increase security in preparation for a major terrorist  trial. These countermeasures included closing streets near the  courthouse during the trial, erecting additional barriers, and having a  uniformed guard presence 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
section_title: Locations of Courthouses Can Heighten Security Concerns
paragraphs: The location of courthouses can contribute to security issues. In  particular, court officials at one courthouse located near the Southwest  border told us that they deal with a large number of immigration cases  and cases that involve drug trafficking organizations. According to these  officials, they can also have hundreds of defendants who have not  previously been involved in U.S. court proceedings, making it difficult to  obtain information on them. One judge at the courthouse noted that the  Marshals Service took additional security measures, such as additional  training and increased CSO presence as the judge entered and left the  courthouse parking garage, to protect him after the Marshals Service  received information from an informant that a drug-trafficking organization  had threatened violence against the judge  Further, according to the  judiciary, criminal cases related to immigration offenses jumped nearly   60 percent from about 17,000 in 2006 to about 27,000 in 2010, and the  number of defendants in those cases rose by about 55 percent over the  same period to about 28,000 defendants. According to the AOUSC, the  growth in immigration cases is mostly from filings addressing improper  reentry by aliens and involving fraud and misuse of visa or entry permits  in the five federal judicial districts located along the U.S. Southwest  border. The Marshals Service noted that defendants can be violent or  have extensive criminal histories.
According to AOUSC, courthouses can play a significant role in urban  redevelopment efforts. Because of this, courthouses can be located in areas  with higher crime rates, increasing risks at those buildings. For example, at  one courthouse we visited, Marshals Service officials told us they had  concerns about the neighborhood in which the courthouse was located  because of crime, building disrepair, and suspicious activity occurring on  properties near the courthouse. Officials noted that after receiving a report on  a suspicious individual who could potentially be a threat to the courthouse, a  CSO identified the person of interest moving barrels into a house adjacent to  the courthouse. Marshals Service officials were concerned the barrels  contained hazardous or explosive materials and coordinated with local law  enforcement to investigate. Although the barrels were found to contain  harmless materials, Marshals Service officials remained concerned about  potential future security risks and worked with local authorities to require the  landlord to maintain the house and yard or have the house demolished,  which addressed the Marshals Service’s concerns.
section_title: Building Design and Age, Including Historic Designations, Contribute to Security Concerns
paragraphs: Security has become an important element considered by federal  stakeholders in the design and construction of new courthouses. In addition  to the life-safety and health concerns common in all buildings, federal  courthouses must adhere to numerous specific design guidelines for  aesthetics, security, interior circulation, barrier-free access, and mechanical  and electrical systems, among other things. According to courthouse design  documents, federal stakeholders should consider security measures from the  beginning of the design process for new courthouses by, for example,  integrating security considerations with other building system controls, such  as for fire safety and air circulation. Specifically, the U.S. Courts Design  Guide notes that courthouse security is complex because of court operations  and movement patterns for different groups of individuals within courthouses,  such as prisoners, judges, court personnel, and the public, require varying  degrees of security. The guide notes that optimal security is a fine balance  between architectural solutions, allocation of security personnel, and  installation of security systems and equipment.
Although courthouse design has evolved in the last 20 years to address  modern security needs, the infrastructure of the nation’s 424 courthouses  varies widely. According to GSA, 146 courthouses—about one-third —are  historic facilities. Under the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA),  as amended, federal agencies are to use historic properties to the  maximum extent feasible, and when making infrastructure changes or  rehabilitating a property, to retain and preserve the historic character of  the property. At one courthouse—considered a historic facility under  NHPA—Marshals Service officials told us they identified the judge’s  parking lot as a potential security vulnerability because the area has one  opening for entry or exit which could allow for an attack on a judge, and  that a new guard post should be constructed to help mitigate that  vulnerability. The security committee for the courthouse approved the  project, but could not begin the project until a consultant from the state  Architectural Board approved the design. Marshals Service officials told  us that the process took a long time, in part, because the guard post had  to be designed to blend with, and not detract from, the historic façade and  not interfere with the original gate to the courthouse. According to the  officials, the project was scheduled to be completed 4 years after it was  initially approved at an additional cost of approximately $20,000.
Furthermore, historic or aging buildings may not be able to support, or  may make it more difficult to implement, recommended physical security  enhancements such as barriers or setbacks from the street. For  example, in order to reduce the risk of a car bomb exploding close to the  two historic courthouses we visited, the Marshals Service had restricted  street parking and only allowed the Marshals Service or other court  personnel to park alongside the building. Making security changes to an  historic or aging building itself can also be challenging. For example,  Marshals Service officials at one historic courthouse stated that judges,  prisoners, and the public currently use the same hallways. Marshals  Service officials stated that there is a need for a dedicated judges’  elevator and secured prisoner hallways to move prisoners through  separate areas. The U.S. Courts Design Guide notes that an essential  element of security design is the physical separation of public, restricted,  and secure circulation systems and that trial participants should not meet  until they are in the courtroom during formal court proceedings.
Marshals Service officials stated that the most effective way to address  this vulnerability would be to add another elevator to the building solely  for transporting prisoners, but doing so would be difficult given the  building’s age and historic designation. A Marshals Service official stated  that retrofitting the building with more substantial permanent barriers  would be difficult and expensive in order to comply with NHPA.
section_title: Courthouses Often House Other Federal Tenants, Requiring Additional Security Coordination
paragraphs: Of the nation’s 424 federal courthouses, AOUSC reports that 201 share a  building with other federal agencies which, together, occupy more than   25 percent of the building. According to AOUSC, the other 223  courthouses are considered primary courthouses, meaning court space  comprises at least 75 percent of the building. AOUSC officials stated  that they designate facilities as primary courthouses for the purpose of  security management. Officials from sites we visited told us it is generally  the chief judges who make security related decisions, and the judiciary  pays for enhancements. In the case of the 201 courthouses located in  multitenant facilities, courthouses operate along with the other agencies  in the building (e.g., the Internal Revenue Service, Department of Health  and Human Services, Department of Agriculture) and face additional  challenges not encountered by primary courthouses, since they must  coordinate their security operations with the other federal tenants.
section_title: Clarification of Roles and Responsibilities and Improved Risk Management Could Strengthen Collaboration in Securing Courthouses
paragraphs: Federal stakeholders, including FPS and the Marshals Service, have  taken steps to strengthen their collaboration for securing courthouses.  However, stakeholders have faced challenges related to fragmented  implementation of roles and responsibilities, the use or participation in  existing collaboration mechanisms, and lack of clarity regarding GSA’s  roles and responsibilities for courthouse security. Further, while federal  stakeholders have taken steps to assess risks facing federal courthouses,  they have not completed risk assessments as required by their own  guidance and consistent with key practices for facility security.
subsections: section_title: Stakeholders Have Taken Steps to Improve Courthouse Security, but Face Challenges Implementing Their Roles and Responsibilities
subsections: section_title: Interagency Agreements and Mechanisms for Identifying and Coordinating Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: Various interagency agreements designate courthouse security roles and  responsibilities for federal stakeholders, including FPS, the Marshals  Service, GSA, and the judiciary. Our work on effective interagency  collaboration has shown that collaborating agencies should work together  to define and agree on their respective roles and responsibilities,  including how the collaborative effort should be led. This allows  agencies to clarify who will do what, organize their joint and individual  efforts, and facilitate decision making. One mechanism for doing so is an  interagency agreement. The key interagency agreement for courthouse  security is a 1997 MOA between the Marshals Service, GSA, and  AOUSC. The MOA designates specific roles and responsibilities for each  of these entities with regard to protecting federal courthouses and sets  forth the federal framework for securing courthouses. This MOA was  reaffirmed in 2004 to acknowledge the transfer of FPS from GSA to DHS,  with DHS assuming those responsibilities in the MOA that FPS formerly  performed under GSA. Table 1 summarizes each federal stakeholder’s  primary security responsibilities, as designated in the MOA.
In addition to identifying specific roles and responsibilities for each federal  stakeholder in protecting federal courthouses, the MOA recognizes areas  in which the Marshals Service, FPS, and AOUSC stakeholders are to  coordinate their security efforts. For example, the Marshals Service is to  coordinate its activities to control access to space housing judicial  personnel with FPS, and is to report to FPS and cooperate in FPS  investigations of crimes committed in GSA-controlled facilities housing  federal courts. FPS is to coordinate occupant emergency plans with the  judiciary and Marshals Service and provide review of any Marshals  Service proposed plans for new construction or renovation projects to  determine facility perimeter security needs. Further, AOUSC is to provide  the Marshals Service with space acquisition requests for the judiciary to  ensure security systems are included in plans.
In recent years, federal stakeholders have taken various actions to  strengthen their collaborative efforts to secure courthouses. For example,  at the headquarters level, FPS established a position in 2007 to liaise  between FPS and the Marshals Service on court security issues. This  liaison serves as the focal point for FPS and the Marshals Service to raise  and resolve issues with each other. According to Marshals Service and  FPS officials, the liaison has helped to strengthen coordination and  communication between the two agencies on court security. Also, at the  headquarters level, the Judicial Conference’s security committee meets  twice a year with the Marshals Service Director and usually several  additional times per year, as needed, with Marshals Service executive  staff to, among other things, discuss threats to courthouse security. GSA  also sponsors events three or four times a year where all federal tenants  discuss portfoliowide issues—one of which is security. According to GSA  officials, FPS, the Marshals Service, the judiciary, and other stakeholders,  such as the U.S. Attorney’s Office, are invited to attend. ISC also holds  quarterly meetings, which include representatives from FPS, the Marshals  Service, judiciary, and GSA. According to GSA officials, they use these  meetings to coordinate and address court security issues.
At the courthouse level, federal stakeholders have established  committees for coordinating their security activities. These committees  include Court Security Committees (CSC) and Facility Security  Committees (FSC). According to the 1997 MOA, the Marshals Service is  to establish a CSC in each judicial district comprised of representatives  from the Marshals Service, clerk of the court, the U.S. Attorney, chief  judge, FPS, and GSA, as appropriate. FSCs typically exist at multitenant  facilities, where the courts are one of various federal tenants. FSCs  consist of a representative from each of the tenant agencies in the facility,  and are responsible for addressing security issues at their respective  facility and approving the implementation of security countermeasures.  Depending on the district or individual courthouse, there can be either a  CSC, an FSC, or both. In addition to these committees, coordination  occurs at individual courthouses, as stakeholders implement their security  roles and responsibilities. For example, officials told us that they typically  coordinate on an as needed basis with each other on cases or  demonstrations that draw large crowds.
Although federal stakeholders have defined their courthouse security  roles and responsibilities and taken steps to strengthen their coordination,  various challenges have affected stakeholders’ efforts to secure  courthouses. Specifically, we identified three main challenges federal  stakeholders face in securing courthouses: (1) fragmentation in  stakeholders’ efforts to implement their security roles and responsibilities;  (2) limitations in the use of or participation in existing collaboration  mechanisms; and (3) lack of clarity on GSA’s roles and responsibilities for  courthouse security. Our prior work on interagency collaboration has  shown that when multiple agencies are working to address aspects of the  same problem, there is a risk that overlap or fragmentation among  programs can waste scarce funds, confuse and frustrate program  customers or stakeholders, and limit overall program effectiveness.
Federal stakeholders’ efforts to implement their security roles and  responsibilities at courthouses have been subject to fragmentation, as  shown by stakeholders’ dissatisfaction with the dual approach to security  and, at select courthouses, duplication in security efforts or stakeholders’  performance of security roles inconsistent with their responsibilities  identified under the MOA. First, according to AOUSC and other  stakeholders, the federal government’s approach to courthouse security  in which the Marshals Service and FPS both provide security services  has resulted in a bifurcated security environment with two lines of  authority for implementation and oversight of security services.  Additionally, the chair of the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial  Security has stated that the current approach to court security has  resulted in two separate lines of authority, or chains of command, which  in his view, diminishes the effective command and control over all  components of the security program. Further, a key GSA management  official involved with courthouse security told us that having one clear line  of authority for courthouse security would have the advantage of reducing  coordination challenges between FPS and the Marshals Service. FPS  officials also told us that having multiple agencies responsible for  courthouse security can be problematic because of overlapping  jurisdiction, and that there is a need for clear lines of authority.
Second, officials at 5 of the 11 courthouses we visited brought to our  attention examples of fragmentation—either duplication of command and  control or stakeholders’ performance of security roles inconsistent with  responsibilities identified under the MOA. With regard to duplication, at  one courthouse we visited, for example, both FPS and the Marshals  Service had cameras pointed at the courthouse lobby. Marshals Service,  FPS, and judiciary officials told us they considered this redundant.  Marshals Service officials said that they installed cameras in the  courthouse lobby because of past experience in which FPS cameras  broke and took months to repair or replace, creating security  vulnerabilities. At two other courthouses we visited, FPS and Marshals  Service stakeholders each had their own staffed control rooms to monitor  their cameras and alarms, and in some cases, each other’s cameras. At  one of these courthouses, the Marshals Service reported that having two  control rooms was redundant. Further, at two other courthouses,  stakeholders noted that the Marshals Service was performing duties  ascribed to FPS in the 1997 MOA without written agreements  documenting these changes, as specified below:    FPS and Marshals Service officials from one of the courthouses we  visited told us that while FPS conducted perimeter security for the  facility, the Marshals Service provided security at one checkpoint—a  delivery ramp—which FPS did not staff. Neither Marshals Service nor  FPS officials identified a specific reason why the Marshals Service  performed these exterior perimeter security activities rather than FPS.  A Marshals Service official told us this situation was of concern to  them because the Marshals Service had to move staff from another  courthouse in the area to provide staff for the delivery ramp, which the  Marshals Service viewed as being a higher priority than security  needs at the other courthouse. However, this movement of staff  resulted in the other courthouse having fewer staff than the authorized  staffing level, and a Marshals Service security review identified this as  a critical concern. The officials told us they were in the process of  developing an MOA to address this issue.    Marshals Service officials at another courthouse we visited monitored  FPS’s five cameras at the courthouse, and the perimeter security  functions FPS performed were occasional patrols around the exterior  of the courthouse. Marshals Service officials told us that it did not  make sense for FPS to have responsibility for the perimeter cameras  because there was no regular FPS presence at the building and that  the Marshals Service could monitor, repair, and replace those  cameras more quickly as a result. Both FPS and Marshals Service  officials told us that they had proposed that the Marshals Service take  over responsibility for all perimeter cameras, but FPS headquarters  denied this request.
FPS headquarters officials stated that the Marshals Service carries out  the same types of duties as FPS at selected courthouses, but the officials  did not provide a rationale or guidelines for when this arrangement would  be appropriate. In situations like these, if a transfer of responsibilities is  agreed to by FPS and the Marshals Service, having a local MOA outlining  these responsibilities could help ensure greater accountability, clarity, and  transparency. In discussing the prospect of developing a local MOA  outlining FPS and Marshals Service responsibilities, Marshals Service  officials at one courthouse brought to our attention that another district,  which was not one of our visited locations, had an MOA addressing these  responsibilities. This local MOA outlined changes in responsibilities for  perimeter security. Specifically, the Marshals Service agreed to be  responsible for perimeter security at this federal building and courthouse,  and FPS agreed to reimburse the Marshals Service for security services.
In addition to fragmentation of roles and responsibilities, federal  stakeholders have not always used or participated in existing  collaboration mechanisms, particularly security committees. We have  previously reported that information sharing and coordination among  organizations is crucial to addressing threats, and having a process in  place to obtain and share information can help agencies better  understand risk and more effectively determine what preventative  measures should be implemented. CSCs and FSCs are intended to  provide a means for federal stakeholders to discuss and coordinate their  court security activities at the local level. CSCs are also responsible for  addressing security countermeasures recommended by the Marshals  Service or FPS, and FSCs are responsible for addressing security  countermeasures recommended by FPS. At 4 of the 11 courthouses we  visited, officials noted one of the federal agencies on the CSCs or FSCs  did not regularly participate in meetings. Specifically, at 3 of the  courthouses, FPS did not regularly participate in CSC meetings, though  FPS was designated as a member of the committees and was  responsible for perimeter security at these courthouses. FPS officials told  us they had not been notified about CSC meetings and, as a result, did  not participate in the meetings. In 1 courthouse, GSA did not regularly  participate in CSC meetings, though GSA was designated as a member  of the committee. In these locations GSA officials told us that they  believed that issues discussed at the CSC meetings did not apply to them  and, thus, did not attend. Without attending these meetings, agencies  may be missing opportunities to share information and coordinate with  stakeholders so that security risks are better understood and addressed.  Information sharing and coordination are key practices in facility  protection that we have identified, and these committees are intended to  serve this purpose in the courthouse security area.
DOJ’s Office of Inspector General (IG) also found participation problems  related to the security committees. In November 2010, the IG reported  that among six judicial districts visited, one did not have a CSC and  another was not holding regular meetings. The Chief Judge in the latter  district stated that the CSC was generally not holding meetings due to  poor communication between the Marshals Service and the judiciary. The  DOJ IG recommended that the Marshals Service ensure all its district  offices assign a principal coordinator to the district security committee and  encourage the local judiciary to lead regular meetings. The Marshals  Service concurred with the recommendation and stated they would  emphasize the requirement and noted that existing policy directs the  Marshals Service to serve as principal coordinator for CSC meetings and  for Marshals Service judicial security inspectors to attend and participate  in CSCs.
In August 2010 we identified lack of participation and other challenges  associated with FSCs, which raised questions about their effectiveness  as a collaboration mechanism. We reported that FSCs have operated  since 1995 without procedures that outline how they should operate or  make decisions or that establish accountability. Further, we identified  instances in which tenant agency representatives to the FSC generally  did not have any security knowledge or experience but were expected to  make security decisions for their respective agencies. We also reported  that many FSC tenant agency representatives did not have the authority  to commit their respective organizations to fund security  countermeasures. This issue was brought to our attention at two of the  courthouses we visited. In one location, the chair of the FSC said that  FPS made a request for various security enhancements to the building,  which were the first infrastructure enhancements in at least 12 years.  However, none of the tenants had the authority to approve the increased  costs. Additionally, court officials at another location we visited said the  FSC works through a vote system, and each tenant agency gets the  opportunity to hear the issue and to voice their vote. However, the  officials said that tenant agencies could not commit to financial decisions  at that level. ISC developed procedures for FSCs to use when presented  with security issues that affect the entire facility. These standards, which  are being tested for a 1 year period, note that FSC members may or may  not have the authority to obligate their respective organizations to a  financial commitment, and FSC members are responsible for seeking  guidance from their respective funding authority.
According to Marshals Service, GSA, and FPS officials, GSA’s  courthouse security responsibilities have not been clearly defined since  the transfer of FPS to DHS in 2003. The 1997 MOA identifies individual  stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities, as well as areas requiring  collaboration, in securing federal courthouses, and was signed by DOJ,  GSA (of which FPS was a part), and AOUSC. However, the 2004  reaffirmation was signed by DOJ, DHS, and AOUSC; GSA was not a  signatory, and according to GSA officials, they were not invited by the  other agencies to participate in the reaffirmation. The 2004 reaffirmation  updated the 1997 MOA by acknowledging the transfer of FPS from GSA  to DHS; it did not make any other modifications to the MOA. However, the  reaffirmation did not clearly articulate which security responsibilities  GSA—which has responsibility for managing all federal courthouses— retained and which specific responsibilities were transferred to DHS. GSA  officials told us that this lack of clarity leads to confusion about which  stakeholder is ultimately responsible for taking action. GSA officials told  us that there have been instances in which they are consulted about  security issues for which they do not have responsibility or they are  excluded from security discussions where they have responsibilities. For  example, the officials noted it is not uncommon for a U.S. Marshal or chief  judge who is unfamiliar with the court security framework to approach  GSA and expect them to take action to address security concerns, even  though it may be FPS’s responsibility. Further, GSA officials noted  instances in which GSA has security responsibilities, such as installing  bollards, barriers, and other physical changes to the building, but GSA  was not always included in the security decisions. Lack of clarity in these  types of situations can cause confusion, lead to implementation delays,  and lengthen the amount of time needed to address vulnerabilities,  according to GSA officials. Further, Marshals Service officials told us that  there is a lack of clarity about GSA’s roles and responsibilities, including  the extent of GSA’s participation in CSCs and FSCs. These officials also  told us that updating the MOA would help address this issue and noted  that there have been preliminary discussions between the stakeholders  about doing so.
GSA headquarters officials also told us that they should have been a  signatory to the reaffirmation because in addition to their security  responsibilities, GSA is the landlord for all federal facilities that house  judicial personnel. In June 2005 we reported on GSA’s role in facility  protection since September 11, 2001. Prior to the creation of DHS, we  reported that if DHS was given the responsibility for securing facilities, the  role of integrating security with other real-property functions would be an  important consideration. We later noted that it would be critical that GSA  be well-equipped to engage in security related matters given that it is still  the owner and landlord of federal facilities. According to GSA, permanent  security enhancements, such as installing bollards and altering buildings  to improve circulation patterns, are GSA’s responsibility and cannot be  implemented without GSA’s involvement. Also in 2005, we recommended  that GSA should establish a mechanism—such as a chief security officer  position or formal point of contact—that could serve in a liaison role to  address the challenges GSA faces related to security in buildings it owns  and leases, and enable GSA to define its overall role in security given the  transfer of FPS to DHS so it would be better equipped to address security  related matters related to its federal building portfolio. GSA subsequently  established such a position.
Furthermore, related to GSA’s role, GSA and DHS have yet to complete a  revised agreement of their own on security fees and protection  responsibilities for all GSA buildings, including courthouses. DHS and  GSA signed an MOA in 2006 that outlines the roles, responsibilities, and  operational relationships between DHS and GSA, but progress has been  slow in updating the document. DHS and GSA are renegotiating the 2006  MOA to, among other things, address communication and information- sharing issues and address service concerns by tenants. However, DHS  and GSA have been working to update the MOA for more than 3 years. A  number of issues remain to be worked out, including outlining what the  basic security fee covers and the sharing of security assessments; GSA  and DHS have a goal of completing the MOA by the end of fiscal year  2011.
These three challenges—fragmentation in implementation of roles and  responsibilities, limitations in the use of existing collaboration  mechanisms, and lack of clarity about GSA’s security roles and  responsibilities—have affected stakeholders’ efforts to secure  courthouses. It is difficult to directly link these challenges to specific  security vulnerabilities, but further clarifying roles and responsibilities at  the national and local levels, including GSA’s security roles and  participation in security committees, could help strengthen accountability,  transparency, and coordination on courthouse security efforts among  federal stakeholders. It could also help provide opportunities for federal  stakeholders to identify and address any potential gaps or unnecessary  overlaps in their security efforts and activities. In so doing, federal  stakeholders may be better equipped to address security vulnerabilities  that may arise.
In 2008 Congress authorized the Marshals Service, in consultation with  the AOUSC, to implement a Perimeter Pilot Security Program for the  Marshals Service to assume FPS’s responsibilities to provide perimeter  security at selected courthouses participating in the program. The  purpose of the pilot program was to determine the feasibility of the  Marshals Service providing perimeter security services at selected  primary courthouses—federal facilities in which judiciary and judiciary  related offices occupy at least 75 percent of rentable space. According to  Marshals Service officials, the pilot program’s goal was to eliminate  duplication and system incompatibilities, streamline guard services and  post orders, and provide clearer accountability for court security.
Beginning in January 2009, the Marshals Service began providing  perimeter security at seven courthouses. Prior to initiation of the pilot  program, the Marshals Service and FPS signed an MOA in 2008 defining  the conditions of the pilot program and noting that the Marshals Service  would conduct periodic reviews of the status and effectiveness of the  program and share written status reports with FPS. At these courthouses  the Marshals Service conducted on-site assessments to inspect the  existing perimeter security systems and equipment to determine if they  could be used “as is” or needed to be repaired, modified, or replaced to  meet its standards. It also assessed the security guard requirements and  proposed a plan that it thought would provide optimal security coverage.  The Marshals Service assumed control of physical security of each  courthouse in the pilot program with the understanding that it would be  responsible for inspecting, adjusting, repairing, and replacing all FPS- owned surveillance cameras and associated equipment.
In October 2010, the judiciary issued its final evaluation report to  Congress on the implementation and operation of the pilot program,  recommending that the pilot program be expanded to all primary  courthouses. The report noted that the general consensus of opinions  expressed by judges, court officials, and district Marshals Service was in  support of the pilot program. Specifically, the report noted that program  participants had positive views about Marshals Service’s consolidation of  command and control over all aspects of physical security at the pilot  sites, which they believed resulted in improved protection for both people  and buildings. Participants stated that the benefits of the program  included, among other things, improved quality of security services,  security coverage, communication, stewardship and monitoring of  security equipment, as well as unified command and control over  courthouse physical security. Additionally, in November 2009, the  Marshals Service conducted a survey at 5 of the 7 courthouses  participating in the pilot program. Representatives at 4 of these  courthouses stated that the pilot program was effective and supported the  concept for wider implementation. Subsequent to completing this  survey, Marshals Service officials at the fifth courthouse told us they  endorse the program. Among the 11 courthouses we visited, 2 were  participating in the pilot program. Marshals Service and court officials we  spoke with at both courthouses generally expressed satisfaction with the  pilot program.
The judiciary and Marshals Service conducted their evaluation of the pilot  program by collecting information from the chief district judge, the district  U.S. Marshal, and other court and Marshals Service staff at the seven  courthouses participating in the program. The Marshals Service also  inspected, adjusted, repaired, or replaced all FPS-owned security  equipment, and at some sites additional equipment was added to  enhance security. Further, AOUSC estimated additional costs that  would occur if the pilot program was expanded to other primary  courthouses, based on various options. In particular, the report estimated  additional annual costs ranging from more than $1.5 million for expanding  the program to selected, large courthouses (i.e., primary courthouses with  11 to 20 judges each) and extra large courthouses (primary courthouses  with 21 or more judges each) to about $200 million for expanding the  program to all primary courthouses. According to AOUSC, the initial pilot  program was implemented in a cost-neutral manner, but stated that cost  neutrality would not be possible if the Marshals Service were to assume  responsibility at primary courthouses nationwide.
Although AOUSC has recommended expansion of the pilot program on  the basis of its evaluation, additional analysis of the benefits and costs of  this approach could better position the federal stakeholders and Congress  to consider and determine whether to expand the pilot. Pilot programs  can be one way to identify innovative efforts to improve performance, as  they allow for experiences to be rigorously evaluated, shared  systematically with others, and for new procedures to be adjusted, as  appropriate, before they receive wider application. Key practices in  assessing the results of pilot programs include a range of standards, such  as having a clearly articulated methodology, a strategy for comparing  results with other efforts, and a cost-effectiveness analysis to ensure that  the program produces sufficient benefits in relation to its costs.  Additionally, having a process in place to obtain and share information  can help agencies more effectively make decisions and would be  consistent with key practices in facility protection that we have identified.  Expanding the pilot program and shifting to an approach for all primary  courthouses in which the Marshals Service would be solely responsible  for building security would fundamentally alter how courthouse security is  managed, as FPS has significant courthouse security responsibilities.  FPS management officials told us that AOUSC and the Marshals Service  did not consult with them in evaluating the pilot, nor would AOUSC  provide FPS with a copy of the completed evaluation when it was  requested. These FPS officials also raised concerns that FPS’s views  were not discussed in the evaluation, including the protection of other  federal tenants in these courthouses. They noted that FPS continues to  have statutory responsibilities for providing security to those tenants not  involved with court business. The officials also noted that the Marshals  Service did not provide the required quarterly statistics on security  incidents in a majority of regions where pilot program facilities were  located. Furthermore, GSA officials told us that, as the building owner,  they should have been involved in discussions on any expansion of the  pilot program. Additionally, FPS and GSA are in the process of  renegotiating the basic security fee structure all tenants pay to FPS. By  further assessing possible costs for expanding the pilot program and  consulting with other stakeholders, such as GSA and FPS, the Marshals  Service and federal stakeholders could consider additional information to  help them better evaluate whether to expand the program and  communicate this information to Congress.
section_title: FPS and the Marshals Service Have Risk Management Tools, but Significant Improvement Is Needed in This Area
subsections: section_title: FPS and the Marshals Service Have Developed Tools for Assessing Risks to Courthouses
paragraphs: Both the Marshals Service and FPS have developed tools, particularly  risk assessments, to help identify security vulnerabilities and manage risk.  The Marshals Service is required to conduct an annual security survey in  each judicial district and develop security plans for every judicial facility.  FPS is supposed to conduct facility security assessments (FSA) to  identify security vulnerabilities and make recommendations. FSAs are to  be conducted on a regular schedule, and during this process FPS is  required to conduct an on-site physical security analysis. FPS  assessments generally focus on building systems and perimeter and  entry issues (e.g., emergency power systems; heating, air conditioning,  and air intake systems; bollards and barriers, and building setbacks),  while Marshals Service assessments generally focus on security issues  within the court portions of the building and are supposed to include  detailed information on courtrooms, judge’s chambers and clerks offices,  and prisoner movement. We have previously reported that allocating  resources using risk management is a facility protection key practice.  More specifically, risk management involves a systematic and analytical  process to consider the likelihood that a threat will endanger an asset  (structure, individual, or function) and identify, evaluate, select, and  implement actions that reduce the risk or mitigate the consequences of an  event. Although applying risk management principles to facility protection  can take various forms, our past work showed that most risk management  approaches generally involve identifying potential threats, assessing  vulnerabilities, identifying the assets that are most critical to protect in  terms of mission and significance, and evaluating mitigation alternatives  for their likely effect on risk and their cost. As such, using risk  assessments for decision making serves as the backbone to a  comprehensive facility protection program.
The Marshals Service and FPS have not always conducted risk  assessments of courthouses, as required by their respective guidance  and directives. With regard to the Marshals Service, in 9 of the 11  courthouses we visited, the Marshals Service had not conducted risk  assessments—what the Marshals refer to as court security facility  surveys—for their judicial facilities. Marshals Service officials at 6  courthouses told us they assess security needs as part of the budget  process. According to Marshals Service officials, each courthouse  conducts an annual nationwide budget call to determine each court’s  current and future requirements for CSOs. Although the budget process  requires information about projected guard, security systems, and  equipment needs, the Marshals Service Judicial Security Directive  requires each court to have a completed court security facility survey  based on a specific format outlined in the policy. This format is more  comprehensive and includes detailed questions on the types of weapons  guards carry, the agency responsible for overall building security, and  who monitors cameras—information which goes beyond what is required  as part of the budget formulation process.
Similar to our findings, a November 2010 DOJ IG report found that  although court security facility surveys are required annually and the  results are to be used to develop or update judicial security plans, these  plans were not always updated as required, and in one instance had not  been updated since 1983. The DOJ IG found that Marshals Service  officials were not completing court security facility surveys in three of the  six districts it examined. The DOJ IG recommended that the Marshals  Service ensure all district offices regularly update their plans and ensure  that court security facility surveys are performed at each district and  judicial security plans are updated as required. The Marshals Service  agreed with the recommendation and noted it will emphasize the  requirements to ensure it is a component of the district audit program and  the annual district self assessment.
FPS has also faced difficulties in preparing FSAs. For example, we have  previously reported that FPS’s assessments are vulnerable to subjectivity  because they lack a vigorous risk assessment methodology, and  inspectors’ compliance with policies and procedures in conducting  assessments is inconsistent. FPS initially tried to address these issues  by implementing a new risk management program that was to incorporate  a less subjective and time-consuming assessment tool. However the  program, known as the Risk Assessment Management Program,  experienced considerable delays, and FPS recently halted  implementation.
Moreover, federal stakeholders have experienced disagreements about  the sharing of completed security surveys and FSAs. We have reported  that information sharing among organizations is crucial to producing  comprehensive and practical approaches and solutions to address  terrorist threats directed at federal facilities. Our work showed that by  having a process in place to obtain and share information on potential  threats to federal facilities, agencies can better understand the risk they  face and more effectively determine what preventive measures should be  implemented. At the two courthouses where the Marshals Service had  completed risk assessments, the Marshals Service did not provide other  stakeholders, including FPS, with a copy. Further, prior to fiscal year 2010  FPS officials told us that they shared the executive summaries of their  FSAs, rather than the full FSAs, with other members of security  committees because the FSAs were law-enforcement sensitive. At the  courthouses we visited, FPS completed the FSA at each courthouse prior  to fiscal year 2010. Marshals Service, GSA, and court officials told us that  they did not consistently receive full FSAs from FPS at the courthouses  we visited. For example, at five courthouses we visited, court officials  stated that they did not receive executive summaries or full FSAs from  FPS. At three courthouses we visited, Marshals Service officials told us  that they also did not receive copies of FPS’s full FSAs. In those cases  when officials received copies of the executive summaries, they noted  that the information contained in them was inadequate to inform security  decision making. For example, one official told us that the executive  summaries did not contain sufficient evidence on which to base decisions.  Moreover, we have previously found that GSA officials at all levels cite  limitations with the executive summaries of FPS’s FSAs saying, for  example, that the summaries do not contain enough contextual  information on threats and vulnerabilities to support countermeasure  recommendations and to justify the expenses that would be incurred by  installing additional countermeasures.
According to FPS officials, they began providing full versions of the  assessments completed in fiscal year 2010 and after to security  committee members, and they plan to document FPS’s commitment to  share full FSAs specifically with GSA in the update to the DHS and GSA  2006 MOA, which DHS and GSA plan to complete by the end of fiscal  year 2011. GSA officials stated they have received some full FSAs from  FPS among those completed. While these are positive steps, FPS has  completed a small number of FSAs since fiscal year 2010 in part because  of challenges faced by FPS in moving toward a new risk assessment and  management system. For example, in July 2011 we reported that FPS’s  Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP) tool, which FPS  was to launch in 2009 as a web-based risk assessment and guard  management system, was behind schedule, over budget, and could not  be used to complete FSAs. Among other things, we recommended that  FPS develop interim solutions for completing FSAs. FPS concurred with  this recommendation and reported that it is revalidating RAMP  requirements with its stakeholders to strengthen future RAMP  investments and assessing alternative programs.
Given the current challenges faced by the Marshals Service and FPS in  conducting and sharing risk assessments, federal stakeholders lack the  information needed to comprehensively assess and understand security  risks both to individual courthouses and across the entire portfolio of  courthouses. Without a comprehensive picture of risks, federal  stakeholders face difficulties in prioritizing risks in light of available  resources and in determining appropriate measures to mitigate those  risks. We have reported that the capability to gauge risk across a portfolio  of facilities and make resource allocation decisions accordingly  represents an advanced use of risk management. The ability to compare  risks across buildings is important because it could allow stakeholders to  comprehensively identify and prioritize risks and countermeasure  recommendations at a national level and direct resources toward  alleviating them. One possible mechanism for addressing these  challenges could be for FPS and the Marshals Service to conduct joint  security assessments, according to one FPS regional director. We have  previously reported that in situations where agencies conduct similar but  fragmented functions and provide results to the same recipients, agencies  coordinating and integrating their efforts have the potential to achieve  greater efficiencies. By ensuring that security surveys and assessments  are completed and shared, FPS and the Marshals Service could  strengthen their efforts to identify security vulnerabilities at courthouses,  determine measures to help address or mitigate those vulnerabilities, and  communicate information on vulnerabilities and security needs to relevant  stakeholders, as appropriate.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Given the nature of judicial business and increased potential threats to  federal courts, securing courthouses requires collaboration and  coordination among the various federal stakeholders responsible for  security and tenant agencies present in facilities that house federal  courts. Federal stakeholders have taken action to define and implement  their roles and responsibilities for securing courthouses and to mitigate  threats and vulnerabilities. However, updating the MOA that identifies  these roles and responsibilities to better incorporate accountability for  federal agencies’ collaborative efforts could strengthen the multiagency  courthouse security framework. In particular, clarifying stakeholder roles  and responsibilities, participation in security committees, and the  parameters under which deviating from roles and responsibilities is  agreeable to the stakeholders and would benefit from location-specific  agreements, would strengthen the MOA. Furthermore, clarifying GSA’s  role in the current security framework and instilling greater accountability  for security committee participation could be addressed in an MOA  update. In addition to these areas of collaboration, risk assessments that  are to be conducted by the Marshals Service and FPS are the primary  tools for identifying and addressing security vulnerabilities at courthouses.  As such, updating the MOA to help ensure that these assessments,  referred to by the Marshals Service as court security facility surveys and  by FPS as FSAs, are completed in a timely manner and the results  shared with the other federal agencies responsible for courthouse  security, could better equip federal stakeholders to assess courthouses’  security needs and gaps and make informed decisions.
The pilot program, whereby the Marshals Service has assumed  responsibility for security at a limited number of primary courthouses,  explores a fundamental change in how courthouse security is managed.  Although AOUSC has recommended expanding this program to other  primary courthouses, additional information on the costs and views of  other stakeholders, such as FPS and GSA, on expansion of the program  could better position the federal stakeholders and Congress to evaluate  expansion options.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making two recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland  Security and the Attorney General. Recognizing that there are several  stakeholders involved in courthouse security, we are addressing these  recommendations to the Secretary and Attorney General because their  departments have primary responsibility for courthouse security.  However, as indicated below, implementation of these recommendations  includes consultation and agreement with the judiciary and GSA.
First, we recommend that the Secretary and Attorney General instruct the  Director of FPS, and the Director of the Marshals Service, respectively, to  jointly lead an effort, in consultation and agreement with the judiciary and  GSA, to update the MOA on courthouse security to address the  challenges discussed in this report. Specifically, in this update to the MOA  stakeholders should:  (1)  clarify federal stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities including,  but not limited to, the conditions under which stakeholders may  assume each other’s responsibilities and whether such  agreements should be documented; and define GSA’s  responsibilities and determine whether GSA should be included  as a signatory to the updated MOA;  (2)  outline how they will ensure greater participation of relevant  stakeholders in court or facility security committees; and  (3)  specify how they will complete required risk assessments for  courthouses, referred to by the Marshals Service as court  security facility surveys and by FPS as FSAs, and ensure that  the results of those assessments are shared with relevant  stakeholders, as appropriate.
Second, to the extent that steps are taken to expand the perimeter pilot  program, we recommend that the Secretary and Attorney General instruct  the Director of FPS, and the Director of the Marshals Service,  respectively, to work collaboratively, in consultation and agreement with  the judiciary and GSA, to further assess costs and benefits, in terms of  enhanced security, of expanding the pilot program to other primary  courthouses, and assess all stakeholders’ views about the pilot program.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOJ, DHS, AOUSC, and GSA for  their review and comment. In an email from DOJ’s Acting Assistant  Director for the Audit Liaison Group dated September 15, 2011, DOJ  indicated that the Marshals Service concurred with the recommendations  and would not be providing written comments. We received written  comments from DHS, AOUSC, and GSA, which are reproduced in full in  appendixes II, III, and IV, respectively. DHS also provided technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
DHS concurred with our recommendations. With regard to the first  recommendation, that FPS and the Marshals Service jointly lead an effort  to update the MOA on courthouse security, DHS stated that it agrees that  the current MOA should be reviewed and revised.  DHS noted that it is  committed to working collaboratively with all parties to further determine  the conditions under which stakeholders may assume multiple and  overlapping responsibilities. With regard to the second recommendation  that FPS and the Marshals Service work collaboratively to further assess  costs and benefits of expanding the pilot program, DHS agreed that  continued collaboration and further review of pilot program results would  enhance security at federal courts. DHS also noted that it did not agree  with any suggested expansion of the pilot program to include additional  facilities.  We did not recommend or suggest that the pilot project should  be expanded in this report. Rather, this report notes that further  assessment of the costs and benefits of the project and further  consultation with stakeholders could provide additional information to help  better evaluate whether to expand the program.
During the comment period, AOUSC requested that we clarify the  judiciary’s role related to the recommendations. Specifically, AOUSC  requested that the recommendations explicitly state that the Marshals  Service and FPS should seek the judiciary’s agreement when  implementing them. We concluded that this change would help to clarify  the recommendations, and we modified the recommendations to state  that the Marshals Service and FPS should seek the agreement of both  the judiciary and GSA as key stakeholders in implementing our  recommended actions. In its written comments, AOUSC expressed  appreciation for our recognition of the judiciary’s role in courthouse  security.
GSA expressed similar concerns, during the comment period, about the  first recommendation that the Marshals Service and FPS jointly lead an  effort, in direct consultation with other federal stakeholders, to update the  MOA on courthouse security. We informed GSA of our clarifications to the  recommendations that the Marshals Service and FPS should seek  agreement with the judiciary and GSA in implementing the  recommendations. In its written comments, GSA requested that we revise  the first recommendation to ensure that all stakeholders be involved in  updating the MOA and that all stakeholders be included as signatories.   We did not make further modifications to the recommendations in  response to GSA’s written comments for two reasons.  First, the  recommendation calls for the Marshals Service and FPS to jointly lead an  effort to update the MOA on courthouse security in direct consultation and  agreement with other federal stakeholders, specifically the judiciary and  GSA.  As such, we believe that this recommendation already ensures that  stakeholders, including the judiciary and GSA, would be involved in the  effort to update the MOA.  Second, in our view, having the judiciary,  Marshals Service, FPS, and GSA reach agreement on GSA’s role, as a  part of updating the MOA, would be a more cooperative approach to  resolving this issue and would reflect key practices in interagency  collaboration that call for federal agencies to work together to define and  agree on their respective roles and responsibilities, including how the  collaborative effort should be led. The recommendation states that the  Marshals Service and FPS would need to seek GSA’s consultation and  agreement on whether GSA should be a signatory.
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If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-6670 or goldsteinm@gao.gov, or  William Jenkins at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in  appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To identify the attributes of federal courthouses contributing to concerns  about their security, we examined U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals  Service) and Federal Protective Service (FPS) documentation of  courthouse security challenges and vulnerabilities, such as security  assessments and surveys of federal courthouses. We also visited 11  federal courthouses in 10 U.S. locations. We selected these courthouses  based on a mix of criteria that included (1) geographic location, including  courthouses in various U.S. Court regions, near U.S. borders, and in  cities of different sizes; (2) age of courthouses, including historic  courthouses; (3) size of courthouses; and (4) tenancy in facilities with  courthouses, including courthouses located in multitenant and primary  courthouse facilities; and (5) courthouses participating in the perimeter  security pilot program. At each courthouse, we toured the facility and  observed security gaps or vulnerabilities as well as countermeasures. We  also obtained federal officials’ information and views on the courthouses’  security vulnerabilities by interviewing officials from the Marshals Service,  FPS, the General Services Administration (GSA), and the courts,  including court clerks and federal judges. The information we obtained  from observing security activities at these locations and interviewing  officials cannot be generalized across all federal courthouses in the  United States. However, because we selected these courthouses based  on a variety of factors, they provided us with an overview of security at  federal courthouses, examples of security vulnerabilities, and challenges  in protecting courthouses.
To assess the extent to which federal stakeholders have collaborated and  used risk management practices to protect federal courthouses, we  examined relevant statutes; and documentation from the Marshals  Service, FPS, GSA, and the judiciary, including plans, reports, guidance,  security assessments, and surveys. In particular, we reviewed federal  laws that set forth roles and responsibilities for protecting federal  courthouses. Additionally, we reviewed documents such as memoranda  of agreement and agency-specific guidance, such as Marshals Service  and FPS memorandums and security directives. We observed federal  stakeholders’ implementation of these roles and responsibilities at the 11  federal courthouses we visited, and obtained views from Marshals  Service, FPS, GSA, and judiciary officials at these locations and  headquarters. At two courthouses, FPS regional officials with  responsibility for protection of other courthouses in their regions provided  us with examples of security arrangements at those other courthouses.  We relied on officials to bring security issues to our attention at the  individual courthouses. Therefore, we could not always determine  whether these issues were present at other courthouses unless officials  brought them to our attention. Further, we analyzed federal stakeholders’  processes for conducting security assessments and surveys at federal  courthouses and for coordinating courthouse security decision making  and activities examining documentation of these processes and  interviewing federal stakeholders at headquarters and our site visit  locations. The information we obtained from our site visits cannot be  generalized across all U.S. federal courthouses, but because we selected  the courthouses based on a mix of criteria, they provided us with  examples of federal stakeholders’ implementation of courthouse security  activities. We compared federal stakeholders’ efforts to secure  courthouses to criteria in our prior work on effective interagency  collaboration and results-oriented government, key practices for facility  protection, and key practices for assessing pilot programs. We also  compared the implementation of federal stakeholders’ security roles and  responsibilities with those designated in the 1997 courthouse security  MOA as reaffirmed in 2004.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2010 to September  2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the General Services Administration
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contacts named above, Rebecca Gambler, Assistant  Director; David Sausville, Assistant Director; Aaron Kaminsky, analyst-in- charge; R. Rochelle Burns; Andy Clinton; Ray Griffith; Brian Hartman;  Delwen Jones; Susan Michal-Smith; and Sara Ann Moessbauer made  significant contributions to this report.