Nuclear Waste: Action Needed to Improve Accountability and Management of DOE's Major Cleanup Projects
Published: 2008-09-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Energy (DOE) spends billions of dollars annually to clean up nuclear wastes at sites that produced nuclear weapons. Cleanup projects decontaminate and demolish buildings, remove and dispose of contaminated soil, treat contaminated groundwater, and stabilize and dispose of solid and liquid radioactive wastes. Ten of these projects meet or nearly meet DOE's definition of major: costs exceeding $1 billion in the near term--usually a 5-year window of the project's total estimated life cycle. GAO was asked to determine the (1) extent to which the cost and schedule for DOE's major cleanup projects have changed and key reasons for changes, and (2) factors that may hinder DOE's ability to effectively manage these projects. GAO met with project directors and reviewed project documents for 10 major cleanup projects: 9 above the near-term $1 billion threshold, and 1 estimated to cost between $900 million and $1 billion over the near term.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Nine of the 10 cleanup projects GAO reviewed had life cycle baseline cost increases, from a low of $139 million for one project to a high of nearly $9 billion for another, and life cycle baseline schedule delays from 2 to 15 years. These changes occurred primarily because the baselines we reviewed included schedule assumptions that were not linked to technical or budget realities, and the scope of work included other assumptions that did not prove true. Specifically, the schedules for 8 of the 10 projects were established in response to DOE's 2002 effort to complete cleanup work, which in some cases moved up project completion dates by 15 years or more. For example, to meet the 2012 accelerated completion date for its solid waste disposition project, DOE's Idaho National Laboratory assumed it would process waste at a rate that was more than 50 percent higher than the rate demonstrated at the time it established the baseline. When the laboratory could not meet that processing rate, DOE revised its baseline, adding 4 years and about $450 million to the project. Also, most of the 10 projects had cost increases and schedule delays because the previous baselines (1) had not fully foreseen the type and extent of cleanup needed, (2) assumed that construction projects needed to carry out the cleanup work would be completed on time, or (3) had not expected substantial additional work scope. DOE has not effectively used management tools--including independent project baseline reviews, performance information systems, guidance, and performance goals--to help oversee major cleanup projects' scope of work, costs, and schedule. For example, DOE's independent reviews meant to provide reasonable assurance that a project's work can be completed within the baseline's stated cost and schedule, have not done so for 4 of 10 projects. For one project, the baseline was significantly modified as little as 7 months after it had been revised and validated by the independent review, while other projects have experienced life cycle cost increases of as much as $9 billion and delays of up to 10 years, within 1 to 2 years after these reviews. In addition, although DOE uses several types of reporting methods for overseeing cleanup projects, these methods do not always provide managers with the information needed to effectively oversee the projects or keep Congress informed on the projects' status. For example, sites' proposals for changes to projects' cost and schedule baselines do not always identify possible root causes, and DOE does not systematically analyze the proposals for common problems across its projects. Therefore, DOE may be missing opportunities to improve management across projects. In addition, guidance for key management and oversight functions are spread across many different types of documents and are unclear and contradictory. As a result, project managers do not consistently implement this guidance, which may lead, for example, to problems in effectively managing risks across projects. Finally, DOE recently changed its goals for "successful" cleanup projects, reducing the amount of work and raising the allowable cost increases against the near-term baseline. DOE has initiated several actions to improve project management, but it is too early to determine whether these efforts will be effective.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Energy (DOE) spends billions of dollars annually to  clean up nuclear wastes at sites across the nation that produced nuclear  weapons. Cleanup projects decontaminate and demolish buildings, remove  and dispose of contaminated soil, treat contaminated groundwater, and  stabilize and dispose of solid and liquid radioactive wastes, among other  things. DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (EM) currently  oversees more than 80 of these cleanup projects, primarily at government- owned, contractor-operated sites throughout the nation. Some of these  highly complex projects have completion dates beyond 2050. Ten of these  projects meet or nearly meet DOE’s definition of “major”: projects whose  costs exceed $1 billion in the near-term—usually a 5-year window of the  project’s total estimated life cycle., These 10 projects have combined  estimated near-term costs of almost $19 billion and combined life cycle  costs estimated to range between $115 billion and $143 billion, and they  account for almost half of EM’s $5.5 billion fiscal year 2009 budget  request. These 10 projects are described in detail in appendix II and  include the remediation, decontamination, and decommissioning, or the  stabilization and disposition of:    solid waste at Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho;    nuclear facilities at the East Tennessee Technology Park, Oak Ridge    nuclear materials at the Savannah River Site, South Carolina;  radioactive liquid tank waste at the Savannah River Site, South Carolina;   soil and water at Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico;    nuclear materials at the Hanford Site, Washington;    solid waste at the Hanford Site, Washington;    soil and water at the Hanford Site, Washington;    nuclear facilities at the River Corridor Closure Project, Hanford Site,  radioactive liquid tank waste at the Office of River Protection, Hanford  Site, Washington.
DOE established Order 413 in 2000 to provide project management  guidance for construction projects—projects that build large complexes  often housing unique equipment and technologies that process waste or  other radioactive material—and nuclear waste cleanup projects., In 2005  and 2007, EM, in conjunction with DOE’s Office of Engineering and  Construction Management (OECM), issued further guidance to better  tailor the order’s requirements to the cleanup projects. This guidance lays  out protocols directing DOE project managers to establish a life cycle  baseline for cleanup projects that includes three key parts: (1) prior year  actual costs; (2) a near-term estimate of the scope of the cleanup work  (the cleanup activities needed to achieve project goals), cost, and schedule  of the cleanup activities (the near-term is generally for 5 years, or the  duration of the contract, whichever is longer); and (3) out-year estimates  through project completion for those projects that extend beyond the near  term. The near-term and out-year estimates also identify the amount of  contingency monies that could be needed to cover potential project risks.
Major cleanup projects take years to complete, and often involve unique  challenges and a high degree of complexity; therefore, it is critically  important that EM develop and implement a rigorous, disciplined  approach for developing and managing the baselines. Such an approach  includes planning and managing work activities, cost, and schedule to  achieve project goals in a stable, controlled manner over the near term and  the entire life of the project. DOE has taken several steps to establish such  an approach, including the following:    EM must formally approve changes to the near-term and life cycle  baseline.
Project managers must provide formal and informal reports to DOE  headquarters staff, including data entries into databases and quarterly  performance reports. These reports contain, among other things, earned  value management (EVM) data—a measure of progress against a cost and  schedule baseline. Widely used in industry, earned value data makes it  possible for managers and others to determine how a project has been  performing and to predict future performance trends. Furthermore, both  the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and DOE Order 413 require  the use of EVM data, and GAO has developed best practices on how to use  the data.
As stipulated in DOE Order 413, OECM must independently review project  baselines at critical project stages; OECM conducts these reviews largely  with the help of external technical experts. Specifically, for cleanup  projects that cost $100 million or more, OECM must review a project’s  proposed baseline to provide reasonable assurance that the project can be  successfully executed. OECM also examines technical scope, cost,  schedule, and avoidance and mitigation plans for possible cost and  schedule overruns, as well as proposed project management.
Overall, we and others have reported over the past two decades that  project management weaknesses have impaired DOE’s major projects. In  1990, we designated DOE’s contract management (which includes project  management) as a high-risk area for fraud, waste, abuse, and  mismanagement. In addition, in 1999, the National Academies’ National  Research Council developed recommendations to address weaknesses in  DOE’s project management. Recently, in 2007, we reported that DOE had  improved its approach to project management but that performance on  DOE’s projects had not substantially improved. Also in 2007, the National  Academy of Public Administration reported specifically on EM’s  management of nuclear waste and complimented EM on its improvements  in project management, but also raised questions about EM’s ability to  follow through on them. Furthermore, reviews by DOE’s Office of  Inspector General, the Department of Defense’s Army Corps of Engineers  (Army Corps), and the National Research Council, among others, have  advised DOE on how to better manage its major projects.
In this context, you asked us to determine the (1) extent to which the cost  and schedule for DOE’s major cleanup projects have changed and the key  reasons for these changes, and (2) factors that may hinder DOE’s ability to  effectively manage these cleanup projects.
To determine the extent to which DOE cleanup projects are experiencing  cost or schedule changes and key reasons contributing to these changes,  we spoke with DOE project directors and reviewed project management  documents for 10 of EM’s major cleanup projects—9 projects above the  near-term $1 billion threshold, and 1 estimated to cost between $900  million and $1 billion over the near term. For our analysis, we examined  the life cycle baseline reported as of the most recent contract awards or  major contract modifications—which occurred between 2004 and 2007— and compared these baselines with the updated baselines at the time of  our review (dollar amounts used in calculating cost increases are in fiscal  year constant 2008 dollars). We conducted site visits and analyzed project  documentation, such as project plans, independent reviews, contractor  performance data, plans to avoid or mitigate project risks, and documents  prepared to guide and control formal changes to the baseline. We also  identified factors that may hinder DOE’s ability to effectively manage  projects in accordance with approved life cycle baselines primarily  through a review of project documents and interviews with project  officials. Because we and others have previously expressed concern about  the data reliability of a key DOE project management tracking database— the Project Assessment and Reporting System—we did not develop  conclusions or findings based on information generated through that  system. Instead, we collected information directly from project site  offices and contractors. In addition, we spoke with officials from EM and  OECM in Washington, D.C. We provided an interim briefing to the  Subcommittee on the status of our work on April 3, 2008.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2007 to September 2008  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains a detailed  description of our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOE oversees and implements its major cleanup projects through  agreements with contractors who operate the nuclear weapons research  and production sites and the cleanup projects at those sites. Some of EM’s  cleanup projects are located at DOE sites administered by the National  Nuclear Security Administration, a separately organized agency within  DOE.
EM’s major cleanup projects involve efforts to clean up sites where  nuclear weapons were produced and production waste stored. EM’s  cleanup projects handle a wide array of waste types and levels of  radioactivity and hazardous constituents, and can involve multiple  activities to, among other things, retrieve, characterize, treat, package,  store, transport, and dispose of the waste, as well as disassemble, treat,  package, store, transport, and dispose of the contaminated containers or  processing lines/equipment used for weapons production or for storing or  treating the waste. Multiple EM cleanup projects can occur at a single  DOE site responsible for a multitude of other noncleanup-related  activities. The cleanup projects are organized generally around similar  waste types and activities. For example, the soil and water remediation  activities at each site are organized under one umbrella, as are the nuclear  facility decontamination and decommissioning projects, and the  radioactive liquid tank waste projects, among others. EM generally  manages these similar work activities, grouped into a category known as a  Project Baseline Summary, through numerical designations; for example,  all activities for soil and water remediation are grouped under Project  Baseline Summary 30. (See app. II for additional information on the 10  DOE major cleanup projects reviewed.)
subsections: section_title: Funding for and Costs of DOE’s Major Cleanup Projects
paragraphs: Unlike construction projects, which are funded on a line item basis,  cleanup projects receive funding through operating funds designated for  each DOE site. In 2003, EM began applying project management principles  contained in DOE Order 413 to these cleanup projects in order to apply  more discipline and rigor in planning and expending these project funds,  among other things.
A cleanup project can cost several billion dollars and its life cycle can span  several decades. EM divides the life cycle baselines for its major cleanup  projects into three distinct parts––prior year costs, near term (usually a 5- year period), and out year (through project completion). Life cycle costs  for each project range from a low of almost $1.7 billion to over $44 billion,  and some projects might not be completed until after 2050. (See app. III  for detailed information on the life cycle baseline costs for the 10 projects  we reviewed.)
EM applies different approaches to managing these wastes, depending on  the type and extent of contamination and the state or federal regulatory  guidelines and milestones it needs to comply with. DOE has agreements  with state and federal regulators to clean up sites, and the agreements lay  out a framework for determining the cleanup standards to be met.  Furthermore, because all projects have a certain degree of uncertainty,  such as not fully knowing the condition of buried waste containers, EM  needs to plan for this uncertainty and identify ways to prevent serious  disruption to projects should problems arise. To address this uncertainty,  DOE Order 413 requires project managers to identify contingency funds  that may be needed to cover potential cost increases stemming from a  variety of project risks, including technical complexities, regulatory issues,  and funding shortfalls. Although EM project managers build contingency  funding into their near-term and out-year estimates, EM management does  not generally include funding in its budget requests to cover contingency  for cleanup projects until after it is actually needed to address a problem;  therefore, EM contingency for cleanup projects has been referred to as  “unfunded contingency.”
section_title: Earned Value Management for Tracking Work Progress
paragraphs: To be effective, program managers need information on program  deliverables and on the progress made in meeting them. One method that  can help program managers track this progress is EVM data. These data  include, for example, detailed information on budgeted costs and actual  costs for work scheduled and work performed, as well as forecasted costs  at project completion. Among other things, EVM data can be used to  compare (1) budgeted costs to actual costs and (2) the value of work  accomplished during a given period with the value of work scheduled for  that period. By using the value of work completed as a basis for estimating  the cost and time to complete a project, EVM data should alert program  managers to potential problems sooner than expenditures alone can.
As a key management tool, EVM has evolved from an industrial  engineering concept to a government and industry best practice to better  oversee programs. Both OMB and DOE Order 413 require the use of EVM.  OMB Circular A-11, part 7, requires the use of an integrated EVM system  across an entire program to measure how well the government and its  contractors are meeting a program’s approved cost, schedule, and  performance goals. The American National Standards Institute and the  Electronic Industries Alliance have jointly established a national standard  for EVM systems. Recognizing the benefits of having these national  standards, OMB states in its 2006 Capital Programming Guide that major  acquisitions that require product development are to require that  contractors use an EVM system that meets the American National  Standards Institute guidelines. In addition, DOE Order 413 requires that  projects with total cleanup costs of $50 million or more use an EVM  system that complies with industry standards and is certified by DOE’s  OECM to comply with these standards.
GAO also has developed EVM best practices that, when followed, can help  project managers consistently develop and analyze EVM data to gain a  complete and accurate understanding of project status. Among other  things, our guidance on EVM states that (1) EVM data should not have data  errors and anomalies that may skew and distort the EVM analysis, and (2)  information such as staffing levels and the root causes of and corrective  actions for cost and schedule variances should be reported through the  EVM system.
section_title: Major Cleanup Projects Experienced Billions of Dollars in Additional Costs and Schedule Delays, Primarily because Initial Baselines Were Overly Optimistic
paragraphs: Nearly all the cleanup projects we reviewed have had cost increases and  schedule delays in the life cycle baseline, as much as $9 billion for one  project, and schedule delays of as much as 15 years for two projects.  These cost increases and schedule delays occurred primarily because the  previous baselines for these projects had schedule assumptions that were  not linked to technical or budget realities, and other assumptions also  proved to be overly optimistic.
subsections: section_title: Major Cleanup Projects’ Costs Have Increased by Billions and Schedules Have Been Delayed by As Much As 15 Years
paragraphs: The estimated costs of the 9 of the 10 DOE major cleanup projects we  reviewed have significantly exceeded original estimates, as table 1 shows.
As the table shows, estimated costs increased from a minimum of $139  million for one project to more than $9 billion for another project. The  smallest dollar and percentage increase—$139 million, or 9 percent— occurred at Los Alamos’ soil and water remediation project, which is  focused on cleaning up known or suspected chemical and radiological  contamination in addition to treating soil and groundwater that was  contaminated by this waste. This project, however, is expected to further  increase its life cycle cost estimate. The largest dollar increase among the  10 major projects—more than $9 billion—was for Hanford’s radioactive  liquid tank waste project, which is expected to remove, treat, and dispose  of more than 56 million gallons of high-level radioactive waste in 177  underground storage tanks. In fact, the other radioactive liquid tank waste  project, at Savannah River, registered the second largest dollar increase— almost $7 billion. However, the largest percentage increase—about 64  percent—occurred at Oak Ridge’s nuclear facilities decontamination and  decommissioning project.
Table 2 shows that 8 of the 10 projects we reviewed experienced delays in  scheduled project completion, ranging from 2 years to 15 years.
As table 2 shows, the shortest delay is at Hanford’s nuclear material  stabilization and disposition project, while the longest delays—15 years—  also are at Hanford: the soil and water remediation and the solid waste  stabilization and disposition projects.
section_title: Overly Optimistic Baselines Contributed to Significant Changes in Projects’ Life Cycle
paragraphs: The changes in schedule and costs occurred primarily for two reasons.  First, initial project baselines were built on accelerated schedules that  were not always linked to technical capabilities or available budgets,  although EM has begun to tie its new baselines to anticipated funding.  Second, the initial baselines included other assumptions that did not hold  true, including conditions on the ground at the sites, expected completion  dates for related construction projects, and activities that would be  included in projects’ scopes of work.
subsections: section_title: Baseline Schedules Were Not Linked to Technical or Funding Realities
paragraphs: The initial baselines for 8 of the 10 major projects we reviewed contained  schedules that were influenced by an EM-wide effort to accelerate the  office’s cleanup work. In 2002, EM management worked with its sites and  regulators to create new, earlier milestones for completing key cleanup  projects and for closing entire sites to reduce the public health and  environmental risks posed by the waste at these sites. Before this effort,  some of the major cleanup projects were not estimated to complete work  until the 2030s and 2040s. Under the accelerated schedules, four projects’  completion dates were moved up by 15 years or more, as was the case for  the radioactive liquid tank waste stabilization and disposition project at  the Hanford site; its completion date was moved from 2048 to 2028. The  baselines containing the accelerated schedules—those generally created  between 2003 and 2006—tied their work scope and funding assumptions  to the completion dates and not necessarily to available cleanup  technologies. For example:    Solid waste stabilization and disposition project at Idaho. To meet its  accelerated completion date of 2012—down from 2018—DOE’s Idaho  National Laboratory assumed its Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Plant  could process nuclear waste at a rate of about 8,500 cubic meters per  year—more than 50 percent faster than the rate of about 5,400 cubic  meters per year demonstrated when DOE established the baseline. At the  time, because the plant had only recently begun operating, project staff  lacked confidence that they could meet the processing rate. Moreover, the  independent team reviewing the baseline reported that the rate was  optimistically high. Nevertheless, DOE proceeded with the initial baseline,  increasing the amount of unfunded contingency in its baseline and  attempting to meet the optimistic rate by providing the contractor with  performance incentives. Still, the processing rate has fallen short of  baseline assumptions—it is currently roughly 6,000 cubic meters per year.  To reflect this more realistic rate, DOE subsequently revised its baseline,  adding 4 years to the project schedule and increasing costs by about $450  million.
Radioactive liquid tank waste stabilization and disposition project at  Savannah River. This project, in part, combines high-level radioactive  waste stored in tanks at the Savannah River Site with melted glass and  places it in canisters ultimately to be sent to a federal repository for  disposal. DOE directed that the project’s completion date be accelerated,  from 2035 in its early planning documents to 2019 in the initial baseline. In  order to make that date, according to project officials, they included some  assumptions in the initial baseline they knew at the time would be difficult  to realize. Specifically, they assumed that the project’s waste processing  facility could produce canisters consisting of up to 49 percent high-level  waste—with the remaining space filled with melted glass—when at the  time it had not been able to produce a canister containing more than 42  percent high-level waste with an existing technology while remaining  within the acceptance criteria for the federal repository. Those criteria  dictate specific characteristics, including durability and leachability for the  glass-waste mixtures in the canisters. DOE has since adjusted these  assumptions—the current waste processing plan assumes the canisters  will contain 34 percent to 38 percent high-level waste using the existing  technology—contributing to the overall cost increase and schedule delay  for this project.
These early baselines also were not tied to expected funding. According to  several senior EM officials, before April 2007, project directors were  instructed to create cost baselines to meet the accelerated schedules and  their regulatory milestones without regard for the likely funding the  projects could expect to receive. Consequently, the funding assumptions  in the projects’ baselines were higher than the amount of funding DOE  requested each year. According to a senior EM budget official, these  shortfalls required project managers to continually adjust cost and  schedule baselines as projects moved work activities into the out years to  accommodate the lower funding levels. For example, according to site  officials at Oak Ridge, when DOE did not request the full amount of  funding in the nuclear facility’s decontamination and decommission  project’s initial baseline, the project could not complete all the work as  planned. Project managers responded by pushing work activities into the  out years, which contributed, in part, to the project’s overall cost increase  and schedule delay. Similarly, as noted in a recent DOE internal audit,  according to Los Alamos officials, funding has not been sufficient to meet  the site’s regulatory commitments, and has been a concern since 2003,  when the site manager said he was concerned that appropriate resources  had not been identified to conduct the necessary environmental  restoration activities.
According to EM managers, they have implemented changes to the way  baselines are created that address these problems. In April 2007, EM  changed its policy for creating project baselines. Instead of tying baselines  to the accelerated schedules and regulatory commitments with  unconstrained funding, EM limited funding for its sites, directing that all  future baselines be based on expected budget numbers generated for each  site.
For three of the projects we reviewed, this change in direction resulted in  deferral of work and schedule delays because the new funding levels  represented significant reductions in what projects were planning on  receiving, and these projects were low on EM’s priority list. For example,  Hanford’s solid waste stabilization and disposition project’s funding was  reduced to the point where it will receive minimal funding for the next 4  years in order to allow full funding of Hanford’s decontamination and  decommissioning project at River Corridor, a higher priority. During this  period, to comply with the funding levels provided, the project will  maintain minimum activities to safeguard materials and will not advance  its waste processing goals. As a result, according to project officials, life  cycle costs for this project increased in some part to reflect a longer  schedule and the additional costs of having to hire and train new workers  in the future to complete a job that already was underway.
Not all sites have implemented these changes, however. EM’s direction to  all sites to create their baselines tied to the funding profile outlined in the  June 2007 policy memo has not been applied to two of the major cleanup  projects. The Hanford radioactive liquid tank waste stabilization and  disposition project—the most expensive cleanup project—and the Los  Alamos soil and water remediation project have not aligned their baselines  with the funding targets. The Hanford project’s baseline was validated just  before the policy change took place and, for the period between 2009 and  2030, the baseline contains about $2.6 billion more than the funding  targets. Similarly, EM approved the baseline for the Los Alamos project  even though it was not aligned with the funding targets. The baseline  identifies a projected funding shortfall each year through 2012 that peaks  at a cumulative $236 million in 2010. This shortfall does not include an  additional $947 million in unfunded contingency. At the same time EM  approved the baseline, it directed project managers at the site to change  the baseline to bring its costs in line with the targets.
Another likely contributing factor to the cleanup projects’ cost increases  and extended schedules is DOE’s practice of not including contingency  funding in its annual budget requests for EM’s cleanup projects.  Specifically, EM has requested enough funding for its cleanup projects to  ensure a 50 percent likelihood of completing the projects within the total  estimated project costs. However, the requested amount generally has not  included contingency funding, which project managers may have to use in  order to complete a project on time by addressing risks that materialize  during cleanup. For example, in 2007, the radioactive liquid tank waste  project at Hanford had an unexpected spill of 85 gallons of radioactive  material from one of its storage tanks; this spill required shutting down  waste retrieval operations for 11 months in order to clean up the spill.  Even though the retrieval operations represent a small percentage of the  overall work scope ongoing at the project, the accident added at least $8  million to the retrieval cost for that one tank. Furthermore, in accordance  with EM policy, projects are expected to account for the costs of such  potential risks by increasing the amount of unfunded contingency in their  near-term and life cycle baselines. Because funding for that contingency is  not included in the budget request, however, increasing the amount of  contingency funding in the near-term baseline is largely a paperwork  exercise that has no active impact on preventing or solving problems or  anticipating actions that could offset demonstrated slow progress.
According to a December 2007 report by the National Academy of Public  Administration, EM’s practice of not funding contingency for its cleanup  projects has meant that EM has not had additional funding available to  address emergency problems when they arise and therefore has either  taken money from another project or extended the schedule of the work  into future fiscal years to manage them. Furthermore, according to EM  officials, by providing enough funding for its projects to ensure that they  have a 50 percent chance of meeting their project cost and schedule  baselines, EM recognizes that 5 of the 10 major projects are likely to miss  their cost and schedule goals. In contrast, DOE funds its construction  projects at a level that reflects a greater probability of success—80  percent—an amount that reflects the industry standard for such projects.  According to senior EM officials, EM does not fund contingency for its  cleanup projects because allotting enough funds to cover the costs of risks  that may not materialize would constrain the amount of work EM could  perform for the money it receives each year. However, in accordance with  a recommendation from the National Academy of Public Administration,  EM is evaluating its practice of not including contingency funding in its  budget requests for cleanup projects.
section_title: Baselines Included Assumptions about the Scope of Work and Technical Challenges That Did Not Hold True
paragraphs: For most of the projects we reviewed, EM included assumptions in its  baselines that (1) did not represent the conditions at some of the major  projects, (2) did not sufficiently anticipate delays in the completion of  related construction projects, and (3) the scope of work activities to be  accomplished would not increase. Correcting these assumptions often led  to changes in the scope of work, higher costs, and extended schedules.
First, for four of the projects we reviewed—Oak Ridge’s nuclear facility  decontamination and decommissioning project, Idaho’s solid waste  stabilization and disposition project, and Savannah River and Hanford’s  radioactive liquid tank waste stabilization and disposition projects—site  conditions were worse than project staff originally estimated, leading to  significant changes to the life cycle baseline. For example, at the Oak  Ridge project, because a 1940s-era building was far more contaminated  and deteriorated than first estimated, DOE changed its cleanup plan and  implemented a more extensive—and therefore more expensive—approach  to tearing down the building. After a worker fell through a weakened floor,  the contractor had to first reinforce the building’s structure so that  contaminated equipment could be removed safely. Primarily because  project officials did not accurately anticipate the site conditions or the  types of work activities necessary to safely conduct the work—despite  multiple estimates generated by the contractor, DOE, and the Army  Corps—this project’s costs increased by $1.2 billion and significant  amounts of work were delayed, extending the completion date by 9 years,  to 2017.
Similarly, the initial baseline for the radioactive liquid tank waste  stabilization and disposition project at Hanford assumed that 99 percent of  the waste contained in the 177 storage tanks could be removed by using  only one type of technology to retrieve the tank waste. However, DOE  subsequently determined that almost half of the tanks contained a  hardened layer of waste that could not be removed with the chosen  technology and therefore a second technology was needed to remove this  waste. Correcting the optimistic assumptions—adding the second  technology and re-estimating the costs of retrieving waste from the tanks  based on field experience gained––increased the baseline by more than $2  billion.
Second, delays in completing related construction projects directly  contributed to schedule delays––and corresponding cost increases—for  four of the cleanup projects we reviewed. Three of these projects are at  the Hanford site in Richland, Washington. The initial baselines for these  projects included assumptions that the major construction project there— the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP)—would be ready to begin operations in  2011. In 2006, DOE extended the WTP construction completion date by 5  years, resulting in schedule extensions for three cleanup projects. The  major cleanup project that will run the WTP—the radioactive liquid tank  waste stabilization and disposition project—had to increase its life cycle  cost estimate by about $4.8 billion and extend its schedule by 10 years in  order to safely maintain the waste storage tanks while the treatment plant  is being built and to operate the plant for additional years, among other  things. Similarly, in response to the WTP delay, the schedules for the solid  waste stabilization and disposition project and the soil and water  remediation project were extended by 15 years—increasing costs by more  than $4 billion combined. These projects cannot complete their missions  until the WTP has finished processing all of the liquid waste in the storage  tanks. According to the currently approved baselines, the liquid tank waste  project will complete its operations in 2042, and activities under the latter  two projects are not expected to be completed until 2050. However, as  we recently reported, DOE has acknowledged that the start of waste  treatment operations will be delayed by at least 8 years (from 2011 to  2019), not 5 years, which will likely affect further these projects’ costs and  schedules.
Third, for three of the projects we reviewed, increases in work scope—the  activities required to complete the project—contributed to cost increases  and schedule delays. For example, a major contributor to the more than $3  billion cost increase and at least 9-year schedule delay at the nuclear  materials stabilization and disposition project at Savannah River was  DOE’s approval of a new initiative in 2006 that added additional amounts  of nuclear materials for the project’s facilities to disposition, including  materials from other DOE sites. Those facilities were originally scheduled  to complete their mission in 2007—the new scope extended the mission  until 2019. Similarly, Savannah River’s other major cleanup project— radioactive liquid tank waste stabilization and disposition—also had  significant scope added. Under a law passed in 2004, DOE determined  that the salt waste in its tanks is not high-level waste and therefore can be  disposed of at the site instead of in a geologic repository. The law required  DOE to consult with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission when making  this determination. According to DOE, this consultation and the resulting  changes to the cleanup process added significant scope to the project,  causing DOE to lengthen the estimated time to close the 49 tanks at the  site.
According to EM, most of the cost increases and schedule delays  experienced by the major cleanup projects were the direct result of  unrealized aggressive planning assumptions. EM has since recognized that  project baselines must be based on realistic technical and regulatory  assumptions and be planned on the basis of realistic out year budget  profiles. However, it appears that the practice of incorporating optimistic  assumptions into project baselines has not yet been eliminated. As we  recently reported, some of the underlying assumptions in the baseline for  the Hanford radioactive liquid tank waste project may be overly  optimistic. For example, DOE assumes that the tanks will remain viable  throughout what has become a protracted waste treatment process, with  some tanks expected to remain in service more than 60 years longer than  originally anticipated. This extended operation raises the risk of tank  failure and leaks to the environment. The baseline also assumes that  emptying single-shell tanks will proceed significantly faster than it has to  date. Hanford project management officials have since acknowledged that  the ambitious retrieval schedule might not be achievable and are adjusting  their planning estimates.
section_title: DOE Has Not Effectively Used Available Management Tools to Help Control Major Cleanup Projects’ Scope of Work, Costs, and Schedule
paragraphs: While DOE has several mechanisms in place to help manage cleanup  projects, including independent reviews, performance information  systems, guidance, and performance goals, it has not always used them to  effectively manage major cleanup projects’ scopes, costs, and schedules.
subsections: section_title: DOE’s Baseline Reviews Highlight Problems but Have Not Succeeded in Ensuring Work Can Be Accomplished within Stated Cost and Schedule
paragraphs: OECM’s independent reviews of the baselines, meant, among other things,  to provide reasonable assurance that the project’s work activities can be  accomplished within the stated cost and schedule, have not done so for  four of the projects we reviewed. Instead, these baselines were  significantly modified shortly after approval. As a result, the usefulness of  the independent baseline reviews is questionable when significant baseline  changes occur very shortly after the reviews are completed, as the  following discussion illustrates.
The advanced mixed waste treatment project under Idaho’s solid waste  stabilization and disposition project. OECM’s 2006 independent review  accurately noted that the project baseline submitted for validation for the  treatment plant included an unrealistic rate for processing waste—more  than 50 percent faster than the rate demonstrated at the time the baseline  was established. In response, project officials proposed correcting the  problem primarily by increasing the amount of unfunded contingency in  the baseline, a move that reflected common practice within EM, and  OECM officials approved this action and validated the baseline. As the  panel predicted, the project’s actual processing rate after its baseline was  validated was slower than expected. Within 7 months of OECM’s  validation of the near-term baseline, project officials proposed modifying  it. DOE had to defer the activities that the contractor was not able to  accomplish in the near term, extending the project life cycle by about 4  years and increasing costs by about $450 million. We believe that DOE’s  approval of increasing unfunded contingency as a corrective action for an  unrealistic processing rate was ineffective. Although DOE also attempted  to increase the processing rates through contractor performance  incentives, we believe DOE should have revised the baseline using a more  realistic processing rate to calculate baseline cost and schedule before  validating it.
Oak Ridge’s nuclear facility decontamination and decommissioning  project. Significant cost increases began 2 years before OECM’s  independent validation of the project in 2006, and have continued to  increase. Specifically, life cycle costs for the project were estimated at $1.8  billion in 2004—the beginning of the project’s previous near-term  baseline—with expected project completion by fiscal year 2008. By August  2006, when OECM completed its review of the baseline and issued its  validation recommendation, life cycle costs for the project had grown to  about $2.2 billion and project completion was extended by about 1 year.  However, roughly 1 year after OECM validated the baseline, EM revised it  again, adding about $800 million in costs and delaying project completion  by an additional 8 years. EM justified the change because, among other  things, it wanted to adjust the baseline to conform to new funding targets  as directed by DOE in June 2007 and to account for other changes it  needed to make in its approach to decontaminating the building.
Los Alamos soil and water remediation project. In March 2008, EM  approved an independent review of this project and the associated  baseline although it expected that the baseline would change. According  to the EM memorandum approving the baseline, changes in EM’s priorities  and funding plans were likely to necessitate changes to the Los Alamos  project’s baseline, and the project was directed to submit a baseline  change that would align the baseline with funding targets. OECM officials  also acknowledged that their independent review of the baseline was  based on assumptions that would likely not prove to be true. Specifically,  OECM’s review assumed that the project would receive the full funding  needed even though DOE’s funding targets at the time were below the  funding levels needed to comply with the state cleanup agreement. As a  result, project officials expect that the estimated life cycle costs of nearly  $1.7 billion will increase substantially during 2008 but could not tell us the  extent of the cost and schedule change until they receive DOE’s new  funding commitments for the project.
Hanford’s radioactive liquid tank waste stabilization and disposition  project. The most significant cost increase—more than $9 billion— occurred about 2 years after DOE’s initial independent review and  approval of this project. The project’s baseline was first approved in 2004,  with life cycle costs expected to be about $22 billion and completion  scheduled for 2032. However, in 2006, life cycle costs increased to about  $31 billion—not including an additional $8.6 billion in unfunded  contingency—and the completion date was extended by 10 years, to 2042.  Project officials expect the baseline will require another update and  independent review in 2009 to reflect anticipated changes as a result of the  project’s new contractor and because of changes resulting from ongoing  negotiations with state regulators over regulatory agreement milestones.
In addition to changes to the baselines soon after the independent reviews,  DOE has recently relaxed standards used for conducting these reviews. In  2003, DOE issued standard operating procedures for conducting  independent reviews—primarily of construction projects. These  procedures stated that baselines should be considered, once approved, as  set in concrete. The EM-OECM 2005 protocol—and its 2007 update—for  cleanup projects replaced the standard operating procedures and directed  OECM to validate only the near-term baseline for cleanup projects while  reviewing the life cycle estimate “for reasonableness.” In this way, EM and  OECM sought to acknowledge what they believe are the greater  uncertainties present in the out-years of a cleanup project compared with  a typical construction project. However, within a year of the 2007  protocol, OECM had changed its approach for EM cleanup projects from  validating baselines to “certifying” them, which is a more limited statement  of assurance than validation. Specifically, according to OECM officials,  certification means that the near-term baselines are reasonable if near- term baseline costs are funded as outlined in the baseline and contingency  funds are provided as needed. The change is intended to reflect OECM’s  belief that, because funding for cleanup projects is more uncertain than  for construction projects, the same confidence level cannot, nor should, be  applied to reviews of EM cleanup project baselines as it is applied to  construction projects. Since EM headquarters does not consistently  provide contingency funds for its cleanup projects, and half of the major  projects have significant contingencies in their near-term baselines, the  most likely result for projects experiencing problems is to extend  schedules and increase life cycle costs. In commenting on a draft of this  report, OECM stated it intends to go back to validating near-term baselines  for cleanup projects, assuming, in part, that funding becomes more stable  and EM gains greater experience managing near-term baselines.
section_title: DOE Lacks Reliable and Consistent Performance Information
paragraphs: DOE managers depend on data about the performance of EM’s major  cleanup projects to make informed decisions about how best to handle  unexpected events and manage shifting priorities. DOE site and  headquarters staff generate a number of regular reports to update senior  managers on the status of these projects, both to justify making significant  changes to project baselines and to request funding from Congress.  Although these reports provide valuable information to managers on the  progress of work at cleanup sites around the country, they do not  consistently provide the key information needed to make fully informed  management decisions about EM’s major cleanup projects. Specifically,  (1) proposals for baseline changes do not consistently identify reasons for  proposed changes or possible root causes that contributed to problems,  (2) use of EVM data does not consistently conform to industry standards  or GAO’s best practices, (3) quarterly reports do not always describe the  impact of contractor performance on near-term or life cycle costs and  schedules, and (4) reports to Congress on the status of and changes to  major cleanup projects are limited to a small snapshot in time and do not  provide information necessary for effective oversight.
subsections: section_title: EM Baseline Change Reports Do Not Consistently Include Needed Information
paragraphs: When a project reaches a point at which it is likely to miss the goals in its  baseline, project managers are required to propose changes to the  project’s cost, schedule, or scope baseline, a process that is akin to hitting  the reset button. EM project managers request such a change by, among  other things, documenting certain information in a Baseline Change  Proposal report, including current approved costs and new proposed  costs, proposed project start and end dates, and a justification for the  changes. For the key change proposals we reviewed for the major cleanup  projects, the information provided describing the changes and their  impacts varied widely, with some projects providing little to no  explanatory information about what led to the change and others  explaining the causes of the changes in detail. For example, a change  proposal for Hanford’s nuclear material stabilization and disposition  project simply described the project’s scope of work and did not provide  any explanation for why the project’s schedule was being delayed by 3  years, while a proposal from Savannah River’s radioactive liquid tank  waste stabilization and disposition project included information on the  causes for its cost and schedule changes, as well as the specific cost and  schedule impacts of each cause. However, the change proposals we  reviewed generally did not address the root causes that resulted in the  changes to the baseline. For example, the Savannah River change proposal  explained that almost $500 million of the total proposed cost increase was  due to revising the strategy for finishing the project. However, the  proposal did not explain why this strategy needed revision. In investigating  the reason for this proposed revision, we determined that a robust strategy  for finishing the project was not included in the original baseline because  the project was directed to meet a completion date of 2025 and could not  do so if it included the thorough closure strategy. Without including this  kind of information in the proposals, it would be difficult for EM managers  to effectively identify the true causes of the baseline changes, take steps to  address them, and transfer any lessons learned to other projects.
In addition, EM does not centrally gather and systematically analyze the  narrative information in the baseline change proposals. We recognize that  such information is not easily analyzed to identify common causes across  projects. However, without such analysis, EM senior managers are  potentially hindered in addressing problems collectively. One EM project  management official agreed that having the ability to analyze the  information in the change proposals across projects would be beneficial,  but that his office had not yet made it a priority to collect this information  because it was still addressing reliability issues with the data in the change  proposals.
EM has made some effort to identify root causes of its project  management problems. It recently participated in a DOE-wide effort to  identify root causes of project and contract management problems in  response to GAO’s inclusion of DOE’s contract management on its high- risk list. However, DOE’s analysis was focused more on construction  projects than EM cleanup projects. The report notes that the emphasis of  the effort was on the capital line item—construction—projects, but that  several of the issues identified also are applicable to other projects,  including EM cleanup projects. According to one project participant from  OECM, the participants discussed how some of the issues raised related to  cleanup projects but they did not examine those projects as extensively as  the construction projects. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOE  explained that its analysis was based more on data from construction  projects than EM cleanup projects because more data exist documenting  DOE’s past project management deficiencies for construction projects  since those projects have a longer history of a structured, disciplined  management process.
section_title: Use of Earned Value Data Does Not Always Conform to Industry Standards or GAO- Identified Best Practices
paragraphs: At three of the major cleanup projects––nuclear facilities cleanup at the  Hanford Site’s river corridor cleanup project, solid waste stabilization and  disposition at Idaho National Laboratory, and soil and water remediation  at Los Alamos National Laboratory––we found several instances in which  the use of EVM data did not conform to industry standards or our best  practices. As a result, EM and site project managers using the data may  be less able to make informed decisions to effectively manage these  projects.
Data anomalies. For all three projects, the EVM systems we assessed  contained data errors or anomalies that could potentially distort the  analysis of EVM data. Anomalies included, for example, reporting negative  actual costs or reporting costs that are not tied to work scheduled or  performed. The Los Alamos EVM data contained both types of these  anomalies, which may have distorted the results of data analyses by as  much as $34 million, preventing managers from understanding the true  status of project performance. According to project officials, the  anomalies occurred primarily because Los Alamos had initially assigned  costs to a general account, and waited up to several months before  assigning these costs to the correct specific work activities. In another  case, in a significant number of instances the contractor at Hanford’s river  corridor closure project reported costs incurred for work activities  performed that had not been scheduled to start until future years, skewing  the reported performance results. The contractor explained that these  data anomalies occurred because it had performed work sooner than  originally expected—and therefore the work was not incorporated into the  project’s EVM planned schedule in the periods for which it was actually  performed. Project officials at the site stated that they believe the EVM  information, as reported, correctly represents the project’s status. As such,  the summary-level EVM data seem to depict a favorable schedule  performance in April 2008; however, our independent analysis of this data  shows that when we removed the value of the work that was started and  completed ahead of schedule, the remainder of the originally scheduled  work was actually behind schedule in April 2008, and trends indicated that  the variance was worsening.
Data on the availability of staff to perform future work was not always  developed. For one of the projects we reviewed, the EVM system lacked  important information on staffing, contrary to GAO-identified best  practices. DOE officials at Los Alamos’ soil and water remediation project  told us they plan to begin asking for staffing information from the  contractor, and contractor officials stated they are setting up a staffing  report within their EVM system. Without this information, project  managers lack important information necessary for ensuring that they  have, or will have, an adequate number and type of staff to perform the  upcoming scheduled work.
Reliability of earned value systems is questionable. OECM has certified  that the earned value system used to report performance for only one of  the three systems we assessed meets the required industry standards.  The EVM system used by the contractor operating the advanced mixed  waste treatment project—a significant portion of the solid waste  stabilization and disposition project at the Idaho National Laboratory—has  not been reviewed by OECM to determine whether it is compliant with  industry standards, and contractor officials stated they believed their  system does not meet the standards. In addition, OECM was in the process  of reviewing the system used by the contractor responsible for the soil and  water remediation project at Los Alamos National Laboratory at the time  of our review. As a result, these projects lack the necessary assurances  that the EVM data were free of errors and anomalies that could skew and  distort the EVM analyses.
Once a system is certified as meeting the standards, regular surveillance is  needed in order to ensure its continued compliance. Surveillance allows  managers to focus on how well a contractor is using its EVM system to  manage cost, schedule, and technical performance, and is important  because it monitors problems with performance and the EVM data. If  these kinds of problems go undetected, EVM data may be distorted and  not meaningful for decision making. OECM’s surveillance program is  under development: it recently hired one staff person to lead its  surveillance efforts, and is developing a guide to better define its  surveillance protocol. DOE also requires its sites to perform surveillance  of EVM monthly contractor performance data, which includes developing  EVM surveillance plans and conducting random EVM surveillance.
Furthermore, EM managers do not appear to consistently gather or  analyze EVM data to maximize the data’s benefits for project management.  GAO best practices recommend that EVM system reports include thorough  narrative explanations of any root causes of, or proposed corrective  actions, for reported cost and schedule variances shown in the data. For  the soil and water remediation project at Los Alamos, for example, EM did  not require that this information be reported by its contractor. As a result,  EM project managers at Los Alamos have not always received the  information necessary for ensuring that effective corrective actions are  implemented to prevent additional changes to the cost and schedule  baselines. According to contractor officials, they reported information on  root causes and corrective actions to EM routinely before fiscal year 2008,  but DOE asked them to stop providing it. According to the project director  for the soil and water remediation project at Los Alamos, the Los Alamos  Site Office Assistant Manager had directed the contractor to not provide  the variance reports as part of its project status reviews because the  contractor’s explanation of these variance reports during scheduled  meetings was taking several hours to review and wanted instead to use the  available time to focus more on risk management and other project issues.  However, according to this site official, the site office’s direction was not  intended to discontinue all variance analysis reporting. Although the  contractor discontinued including the variance analyses reports in its  project status reviews, the project director stated that DOE continues to  obtain information from the contractor by other means, such as cost  performance reports and weekly contractor meetings at which DOE and  the contractor discuss the root causes of variances that resulted in risks to  meeting milestone compliance agreements. However, contractor cost  performance reports we reviewed did not provide any narrative  information on causes or corrective actions. Furthermore, the weekly  contractor meetings discuss only certain root causes of the variances that  resulted in risks to milestone compliance agreements and therefore are  neither comprehensive nor documented. Because verbal information can  easily be forgotten, lost, or misinterpreted, among other things, we believe  that a written report would be a best practice.
In addition, EM projects report their EVM data to headquarters managers  at the project summary level, which can mask problems occurring in the  project that more detailed reporting could reveal. At Idaho, in early 2008,  EVM data showed the solid waste stabilization and disposition project was  performing ahead of schedule and under cost, although major problems  had occurred at the advanced mixed waste treatment project––the primary  subproject. Without EVM reports that contain more specific detail, project  managers at headquarters may not recognize that a problem is occurring  until it becomes large enough to recognize at the summary project level of  reporting. In addition, greater detailed information provided to managers  earlier in the project potentially could allow for early intervention.
Beyond more detailed reports, some project managers in the field and at  headquarters have not always systematically reviewed or independently  analyzed the EVM data they received, which also would help improve their  understanding, as well as mitigate potential problems occurring within a  project. At one site we visited, the DOE official receiving the data said he  did not analyze the information before entering it into the EM  headquarters database. In turn, headquarters EM project managers told us  they also do not analyze the EVM data the projects report. One oversight  official indicated he would prefer to analyze the information he receives  from the projects but he did not have the time required to do so. A senior  EM project management official told us that he recognizes this deficiency  and is working to address it: EM intends to pilot a new software package  that will allow managers to analyze EVM data. According to EM, the  software will enable EM managers to drill down into the EVM data  received from the contractors, thus improving their oversight capabilities.  In addition, according to EM project management officials, EM has  insufficient federal staff to conduct oversight, which is being addressed as  part of an ongoing effort to improve project management.  In commenting  on a draft of this report, EM stated it also intends to provide additional  EVM training for its analysts.
section_title: Quarterly Reports Do Not Present a Comprehensive Picture of Performance against Near-Term or Life Cycle Commitments
paragraphs: In accordance with Order 413, EM senior managers, including the  Assistant Secretary, receive quarterly updates on the status of the major  cleanup projects. Two key reports are the quarterly project reviews (QPR),  generated by EM project managers, and a quarterly project status report  created by OECM. These reports contain contractor performance data and  information about new or ongoing issues that need addressing at the sites,  but do not always describe how contractor performance affects  performance against the near-term or life cycle baselines. Without this  information, managers cannot develop a comprehensive assessment of  progress against agreed-upon goals.
The QPRs and OECM quarterly reports we reviewed largely use EVM data  to assess project performance, but these data only reflect performance  against the current contract period. Current contract period start and end  dates do not line up with the start and end dates of the near-term baselines  for any of the major cleanup projects we reviewed, and contract goals  have not always been tied to what would be necessary to meet near-term  baseline goals. For example, we found the EVM data for Idaho’s solid  waste stabilization and disposition project—including the advanced mixed  waste treatment subproject—that was reported in the QPRs and OECM  quarterly reports from early 2008 did not line up with the near-term  baseline because the advanced mixed waste treatment project’s contract  period was not the same as the near-term baseline period, which ends in  2012. EVM data for this project are reported as a combination of work  done by two contractors: disposal of low-level and mixed-low-level waste,  among other things, by the major site contractor, whose contract runs  through 2012, and the advanced mixed waste treatment project operations  contractor, who, in early 2008, was operating under a contract extension  that expired in April 2008, 4 years shy of the end of the near-term baseline.  In addition, according to project officials, the goal of processing 15,500  cubic meters of waste contained in that contract extension was not based  on what was necessary to meet the near-term baseline goal of processing  65,000 cubic meters of waste by 2012, which was DOE’s commitment at  the time of the extension. Since the advanced mixed waste treatment  project’s activities make up about 75 percent of the cost baseline for the  overall project, EVM data for this project as reported in the QPRs and  OECM quarterly reports were not an accurate indicator of how the project  was performing against the approved near-term baseline. DOE has further  extended the advanced mixed waste treatment project contract through  September 2009, and project officials explained the current extension is  better linked to the current baseline, meaning EVM data reported should  represent a better indication of performance against that baseline.
In addition, although the QPRs we reviewed include data on current life  cycle cost and schedule estimates, they do not always include information  about changes to the schedule or scope, nor do they explicitly mention  when a change to the baseline has been proposed. Instead, the QPRs  generally present information on life cycle cost increases and provide  comparisons to original baselines. QPRs also contain a schedule for each  project detailing key milestones and expected end dates. However, when a  change to a project completion date is made, the schedule shown in the  QPR in most cases does not preserve the original completion date as a  point of comparison. Similarly, there does not appear to be any  mechanism in the QPR to present a change in a project’s scope of work,  for example, a move of some work activities from the near term into the  out years. As a result, the reports tell only that life cycle costs have  increased, but corresponding changes to schedule and scope are not  apparent. Furthermore, there is no clear place in a QPR for a project  manager to mention that a baseline change proposal has been submitted to  headquarters if the results of that proposal are not yet presented in the life  cycle cost or schedule information in the report. Including mentions of  pending change proposals may help ensure senior managers clearly  understand the true state of a project’s performance.
A key performance indicator used in OECM’s quarterly reports also may  create the impression that a project is performing well overall when it is in  fact encountering problems. As directed in the 2007 protocol for cleanup  projects, OECM uses a traffic light indicator—red-yellow-green—as an at- a-glance way to highlight developing problems for DOE managers. This  indicator is intended to represent expected performance against the  approved near-term baseline and is based largely on EVM data. However,  since projects encountering problems tend to manage those problems by  moving work scope into the out years, the effects of problems occurring  today show up as increases to out-year cost and schedule estimates and  not as increases or delays in a near-term baseline. Therefore, a project  rated “green” by OECM may simultaneously be experiencing increases in  overall life cycle costs and delays in project completion. OECM officials  agreed that it would be beneficial to present projected impacts of current  performance on life cycle estimates wherever practical in its reports.
section_title: EM Does Not Report Information about Significant Changes to Near-Term and Life Cycle Baselines to Congress
paragraphs: DOE’s reports to Congress do not include key information that would aid  oversight efforts, including the extent of and reasons for significant  changes to near-term and life cycle baseline estimates, and the status of  estimated life cycle costs. DOE’s annual budget request to Congress for  fiscal year 2009 for EM included funding requests for each site and each  project, as well as the funding appropriated in fiscal years 2007 and 2008.
The budget request also contains, among other things, descriptive  information about the sites and projects, including EM’s major cleanup  projects, and about cleanup goals, regulatory frameworks, and key  uncertainties. However, the request did not provide any project-specific  life cycle costs or completion dates. In the previous three budget  requests, EM had provided life cycle costs and planned completion dates  for each project. Without this information, Congress cannot know what  progress each project has made and the extent of work still needed,  cannot understand how the project may be changing and has changed over  time, and cannot know whether the project experienced problems since  the previous budget request and the reasons for these problems. The  absence of this information makes it more challenging to effectively  oversee the department and its major cleanup projects.
DOE has not been directed to provide such information about its major  cleanup projects to Congress. In contrast, Congress has required the  Department of Defense to report annually on its major defense acquisition  programs—those costing $2 billion or more and typically consisting of a  weapons system, such as Navy ships or fighter planes—or report quarterly  when programs are experiencing significant cost increases or schedule  delays. Congress established the reporting requirement to improve  oversight of these defense programs by providing visibility and  accountability for any growth in cost that may occur. Known as Selected  Acquisition Reports, each annual report includes information on full life  cycle program costs, unit costs—the cost per plane or ship—and the  history of those costs. A quarterly report also includes reasons for any  change in unit cost or program schedule since the previous report,  information about major contracts under the program and reasons for any  cost or schedule variances, and program highlights. In addition, the  Department of Defense includes development and procurement schedules,  with estimated costs through program completion, in its annual budget  justification submissions to Congress.
section_title: DOE Guidance for Management and Oversight Functions Is Unclear and Not Implemented Uniformly across Sites
paragraphs: EM’s key policies for managing its cleanup projects—including developing  project baselines, managing risk, and planning for contingency funding— are not consolidated but spread across various guidance documents and  memos and provide contradictory and confusing information. Although  Order 413 serves as the overarching policy document for project  management, according to EM, the order contains requirements that are  unnecessary or expensive and awkward to implement for cleanup  projects. EM thus has issued numerous memos outlining the way in which  its project managers should implement the order. See table 3 for a list of  key memos we identified that contribute to project management guidance  and policy for EM cleanup projects.
As the table shows, rather than having a consolidated source for guidance,  EM project managers must consult multiple sources to determine how to  correctly create a baseline or calculate contingency funding for a project.  Furthermore, some of EM’s guidance includes vague language and various  exceptions to rules, which are likely to contribute to a project manager’s  difficulty in determining how to implement EM policy. For example,  according to the April 2007 protocol for cleanup projects, once a contract  is awarded and a detailed near-term baseline is developed, a follow-up  independent review will be required if the baseline (1) exceeds the  previously validated near-term baseline costs by 15 percent or more, (2)  increases the schedule by a year, or (3) modifies scope significantly. The  first two conditions for requiring a follow-up review are tied to fairly  precise numbers—15 percent and 1 year—although there could be some  question as to whether these numbers are to be applied to the original or  reset baseline calculations, especially for projects that have been extended  multiple times. However, the protocol provides no parameters for  determining when the third condition, a “significant” scope modification,  has occurred.
In addition, agency officials were not able to provide us with formal  documentation of a significant shift in policy. As explained earlier, OECM  recently shifted from validation to certification of the cleanup projects’  near-term baselines. In response to our request for documentation of the  switch to certification, OECM provided us with an e-mail from an OECM  official to a DOE Inspector General auditor that defined certification and  explained the reasons for the change. According to this e-mail, the change  was made to acknowledge OECM’s belief that EM cleanup projects should  not be reviewed under the same standard as construction projects. The  OECM official also directed us to DOE’s fiscal year 2009 budget request for  an explanation of the new approach. While the budget request includes a  description of baseline certification, it neither mentions that the  certification is a departure from the previous policy, nor does the request  serve as an adequate means of communicating a significant policy change.
Furthermore, different guidance documents appear to be in conflict with  one another. Specifically, EM’s 2006 memo outlining its policy on  contingency funding explained that DOE’s risks associated with  implementing a project are covered through contingency that is part of the  “unfunded” portion of the baseline; that is, its funding is not requested or  budgeted in advance of when it may be needed. However, a 2008 EM  memo primarily concerned with explaining a new process for entering  baseline changes into a database contains a description of the elements of  a near-term baseline that includes a line for “other funded contingency,”  which has been interpreted by some EM officials as including DOE  contingency. If, according to the 2008 memo, some DOE contingency  should be funded—requested in advance—that memo directly contradicts  the guidance provided in the 2006 memo. However, although the 2008  memo states it is updating the baseline change process, it does not  specifically state that it replaces any part of the 2006 memo.
In part because of this confusion, project managers at cleanup sites have  been implementing EM’s contingency policy differently. According to EM  officials, recent independent reviews have alerted senior EM officials to  this inconsistent implementation of the policy guidance. The review teams  found that the project managers were using a variety of methodologies to  calculate the contingency for their projects. As a result, according to one  EM official with expertise in contingency, managers were likely  underestimating the amount of contingency needed for their projects. To  address this problem, EM senior managers directed the creation of a  contingency implementation guide to provide a definitive interpretation of  existing EM policy on contingency, and this guide is expected to be issued  in September 2008.
Furthermore, at least one of DOE’s policies—on independent reviews of  cost estimates—is not being implemented at all. According to Order 413  and the April 2007 protocol, an independent cost estimate—a top-to- bottom, independent estimate that serves to cross-check a cost estimate  developed by project officials—should be developed as part of the OECM  review process for major projects when “complexity, risk, cost, or other  factors create a significant cost exposure for the Department.” We believe  that a review of a major cleanup project, given its level of expected  spending over the near term, would meet the criteria for requiring an  independent cost estimate. According to an OECM official, OECM has not  performed an independent cost estimate for any of EM’s major cleanup  projects, primarily because OECM lacks the resources required to perform  this type of rigorous estimate for the projects. Instead, OECM has taken a  less rigorous and less expensive approach in its reviews—examining cost  estimates generated by the projects but not producing a separate estimate  for comparison.
According to DOE officials, it is addressing some of these guidance issues.  By the end of September 2008, officials told us, DOE plans to replace its  manual directing implementation of Order 413 with a series of 16 guides.  The guides are expected to cover a range of project management issues,  including risk management and contingency funding, with one guide  providing direction on the management of EM cleanup projects. In  addition to the guides, as part of an EM-wide effort to improve project  performance, EM has issued 18 recommended priority actions that contain  additional EM-specific requirements for cleanup projects. It is unclear  whether the guides and priority actions are expected to supplant all other  guidance, or whether they will adequately address the challenge project  managers face in determining the most up-to-date, comprehensive  guidance to be followed.
section_title: DOE Recently Changed Expectations for Cleanup Projects’ Performance
paragraphs: According to EM senior managers, EM cleanup projects are significantly  different from DOE’s construction projects in a number of ways. That is, it  is harder in many instances to clearly define up-front requirements for  cleanup projects, and there are more unknowns, especially since some of  these projects are the first of their kind, with undefined scopes of work  and significant risks scheduled many years into the future. Because of  these differences and because it has said changing budget priorities may  affect funding over time, DOE recently changed its performance goal—the  amount of work to be accomplished and the cost margin for  accomplishing that work—for EM cleanup projects to reflect a much  larger margin of error than the performance goal set for construction  projects.
Before 2008, a major cleanup project was measured against the same goal  as a construction project: achieve at least 100 percent of the scope of work  in its baseline with less than a 10 percent cost increase over the life of the  project. However, EM’s current cleanup project performance goal applies  only to the near-term baseline, and the projects now are considered to be  successful if they achieve at least 80 percent of the scope of work in their  near-term baselines with less than a 25 percent cost increase. The new  performance goal permits up to 20 percent of the scope of work to be  deferred from the near term to out years, which creates a substantially  greater risk that life cycle costs will continue to increase and that  completion dates will be delayed. As a result, for example, under this goal  the four major projects each expected to cost more than $2 billion in the  near term could increase their costs by $500 million each over that period  and be considered successful. Furthermore, because a directed change— defined as a change caused by DOE policy, or regulatory or statutory  actions—already exempts projects from meeting the performance goals,  creating a less stringent goal for EM cleanup projects further waters down  the impact of having a performance goal in the first place. By lowering  expectations for adhering to near-term baselines, DOE inadvertently may  be creating an environment in which large increases to project costs  become not only more common, but accepted and tolerated.
section_title: DOE Is Undertaking Efforts to Implement Project Management Improvements
paragraphs: EM is undertaking a number of efforts to improve its project performance  and address long-standing problems. One such effort is EM’s “Best-in- Class” Project Management Initiative through which EM leadership has  committed to improving project performance. Under the initiative, EM  contracted with the Army Corps to assess the current status of project  management at EM headquarters and its offices. Using the Army Corps’  analysis, EM identified a set of challenges it faced in executing its mission,  which resulted in the creation of the 18 priority actions for it to undertake  to address the challenges and implement its initiative. Those priority  actions include, among others, completing DOE’s project management  guide, which is expected to bring all project management guidance  documents under one umbrella document; establishing standard reporting  formats for project updates produced by project managers, including  QPRs; implementing new project management software packages,  including those for EVM analysis; and better integrating its project and  contract management activities. EM has developed a set of implementing  steps and a summary of expected benefits for each priority action.  According to EM, 10 of the priority actions are being implemented in fiscal  year 2008, and 5 of those are scheduled to be completed by the end of that  fiscal year. It appears that execution of the priority actions would create  new tools and potentially enhance existing ones in EM’s effort to improve  its cleanup projects’ performance. According to EM, full implementation  of the priority actions will address many EM project management  problems and deficiencies. However, since the actions are still being  implemented, it is too soon to determine their effectiveness.
In addition, EM officials acknowledged that the actions they are  implementing to improve the management of EM’s overall cleanup efforts,  including their Best-in-Class initiative and actions being taken in response  to the 2007 National Academy of Public Administration report have not  been formally documented into a specific, corrective action plan that  includes performance metrics and completion milestones. These officials  agreed that such a comprehensive plan would demonstrate a more  integrated and transparent commitment to improving the management of  EM’s cleanup projects.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Cleaning up the nuclear weapons complex is a technically challenging and  risky business. Even as DOE works to gain control of and better manage  its major nuclear waste cleanup projects, cost increases and project delays  continue to mount. Specifically, life cycle costs for EM’s major cleanup  projects have increased by cumulative $25 billion over the past few years  and schedules have been extended by a combined total of more than 75  years, primarily because DOE had to adjust the optimistic baselines it  created to accommodate the realities it has encountered at its cleanup  projects.
Given the cost and complexity of the major nuclear cleanup projects, it is  critically important that DOE fully use the tools it has developed— independent reviews, performance information systems, guidance, and  performance goals—to better ensure that projects stay within established  parameters for scope of work, costs, and schedule. Independent baseline  reviews to ensure that the work promised can be completed on time and  for the estimated cost appear to be a useful planning tool, but the  significant changes that have occurred within years or even months of the  baseline reviews and validations indicate that implementation of these  reviews has fallen short. Furthermore, EM’s site proposals for changes to  cost and schedule baselines, quarterly performance reports, earned value  data analysis and reports, and reports to Congress do not consistently  provide accurate and comprehensive information on the status of projects,  which undermines managers’ and Congress’s ability to effectively oversee  projects and make timely decisions, such as targeting resources to  particular projects or renegotiating cleanup milestones and other contract  conditions. These problems are compounded by the lack of  comprehensive and clear guidance for DOE project managers so that they  consistently implement DOE management policies across the projects and  EM’s recently relaxed performance goals establishing the acceptable  baseline change parameters for major cleanup projects. Although DOE has  identified a number of improvements it intends to make to its project  management approach, it is still in the early stages of implementing these  improvements, making it too soon to assess the effort’s full effect, and it  has not yet formally documented all the improvements in a comprehensive  corrective action plan.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: So that DOE can better manage its major cleanup projects and more fully  inform Congress on the status of these projects, we recommend that the  Secretary of Energy direct the Assistant Secretary for Environmental  Management to take the following five actions:  Include in its budget request to Congress life cycle baseline cost estimate  information for each cleanup project, including prior year costs, estimated  near-term costs, and estimated out-year costs.
Develop an approach to regularly inform Congress of progress and  significant changes in order to improve EM’s accountability for managing  the near-term baseline and tracking life cycle costs. Similar to the  Department of Defense’s Selected Acquisition Reports, which include  annual information on full life cycle program costs, among other things,  EM’s report, at a minimum should compare estimated near-term and life  cycle scope, cost, and schedules with the original and subsequently  updated baselines, and provide a summary analysis of root causes for any  significant baseline changes.
Expand the content of EM performance reports to describe the  implications of current performance for the project’s overall life cycle  baseline, including the near-term baseline cost and out-year cost estimate,  using, when appropriate, valid earned value data that conform to industry  standards and GAO-identified best practices.
Consolidate, clarify, and update its guidance for managing cleanup  projects to reflect (1) current policy regarding independent baseline  reviews and (2) the results of DOE’s determination of the appropriate  means for calculating and budgeting for contingency so that project  managers can consistently apply it across nuclear waste cleanup sites.
Consolidate all planned and ongoing program improvements, including  those stemming from the Secretary’s contract and project management  root cause analysis corrective action plan, the Best-in-Class initiative, and  the 2007 National Academy of Public Administration report, into a  comprehensive corrective action plan that includes performance metrics  and completion milestones.
Because independent baseline reviews have not always provided  reasonable assurance of the stability of projects’ near-term baselines or  the reasonableness of the life cycle baselines, we recommend that the  Secretary of Energy direct the Director of the Office of Management to  take the following action:    Assess the Office of Engineering and Construction Management’s current  approach and process for conducting baseline reviews of EM cleanup  projects to identify and implement improvements that will better provide  reasonable assurance that project work scope can be completed within  the baselines’ stated cost and schedule.  Consider including in the  assessment process an analysis of past lessons learned and reasons for  baseline changes, and an assessment of project affordability when  conducting baseline reviews.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOE for its review and comment.  DOE agreed with our recommendations but provided some suggested  changes to them, which we incorporated as appropriate.
In addition, DOE provided some specific comments on our draft report.  First, DOE stated that the report should provide a more balanced and  accurate portrayal of EM’s cleanup projects by including descriptions of  ongoing initiatives, a number of which EM launched in recognition of the  need for improvement, as well as providing better context of the  challenges and constraints the department’s cleanup program faces. The  draft report included a brief description of EM’s ongoing initiatives,  including its Best-in-Class effort, and acknowledged many of the key  challenges DOE faces while illustrating the factors contributing to changes  in scope, cost, and schedule for its cleanup projects. We also  acknowledged DOE’s ongoing initiatives and progress in a 2007 report on  project management. In addition, DOE cited its successes in the cleanup  of Rocky Flats and Fernald as evidence of its project management  accomplishments. We commend DOE on its past performance in  successfully cleaning up these sites, which has resulted in some lessons  learned that DOE can apply to other cleanup efforts, as we reported in  2006. Nevertheless, we found in this review that DOE has not always  effectively used its management tools to help oversee the scopes of work,  costs, and schedules for its present major cleanup projects.
Second, DOE stated that our draft report appears to confuse the term  “baseline.” It noted that there is only one project baseline—the near-term  baseline approved by EM senior management—for which DOE should be  held accountable. Our use of the term “baseline” in this report conforms to  EM’s guidance documents indicating a project’s “lifecycle baseline” is  composed of its prior year, near-term, and out-year costs. In addition, we  disagree with DOE’s assertion that it should be held accountable only for a  project’s near-term baseline. As we state in this report, since projects  encountering problems have tended to manage those problems by moving  work scope into the out years, the effects of problems occurring today  show up as increases to out-year cost and schedule estimates and not as  increases or delays in a near-term baseline.  Therefore, if DOE’s  performance is measured solely on the basis of the near-term baseline,  potentially significant cost and schedule increases would not be accounted  for or transparent.
Third, DOE stated that one of our recommendations—to consolidate,  clarify, and update its guidance for managing cleanup projects to reflect  the results of DOE’s determination of the appropriate means for  calculating and budgeting for project contingency—could be more  specific, and it outlined three contingency options.  These options include  (1) increasing the amount of contingency funding for cleanup projects to  an 80 percent confidence level, the level budgeted for construction  projects; (2) creating a general contingency fund available for project  managers at DOE headquarters to dispense as needed to manage project  risks; and (3) continuing with the current approach of not including  contingency funding for cleanup projects in its budget requests—funding  cleanup projects at the 50 percent confidence level—and changing its  recently established performance goal. We recognize that managing  project contingency is an important issue, and in fact note in our report  that DOE’s current approach is a likely contributing factor to cost  increases and schedule delays for EM’s major cleanup projects. While we  did not specifically assess these three options in our report, DOE should  continue to study the lessons learned from managing and budgeting  contingency and select the option that would provide contingency funds in  an expedient manner to better mitigate the impacts of cleanup project  changes while minimizing the amount of unused contingency funding left  over at the end of the fiscal year.
Finally, as part of the explanation of its third option for funding project  contingency, DOE stated that GAO has agreed to its recently established  performance goal—to accomplish at least 80 percent of the scope of work  in the near-term baselines with less than a 25 percent cost increase. GAO  has not agreed to this goal. As we state in this report, we are concerned  with DOE’s new goal given that it is lower than the previous goal for  cleanup projects and that DOE may inadvertently be creating an  environment in which large increases to project costs become not only  more common, but accepted and tolerated.
DOE also provided detailed technical comments, which we have  incorporated into our report as appropriate.  DOE’s comments are  reproduced in appendix IV.
We are sending copies of the report to interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of the Office of  Management and Budget. We will make copies available to others on  request. In addition, the report will also be available at no charge on the  GAO web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of  this report. Other staff contributing to the report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the cost, schedule, and scope baseline  estimates for the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental  Management’s (EM) cleanup projects have changed and the key reasons  for these changes, we identified 10 major cleanup projects at 5 DOE sites.  We first identified 9 major cleanup projects with current near-term cost  estimates (usually a 5-year period) above $1 billion, the DOE threshold for  major cleanup projects. In addition, to include those projects that could  potentially become major projects because of cost growth, we reduced the  threshold to $900 million and identified another project, the Richland  nuclear material stabilization and disposition project, which is estimated  to cost between $900 million and $1 billion over the near term. We focused  on these 10 major cleanup projects because of their significant cost–– combined estimated near-term costs of about $19 billion and combined life  cycle costs estimated at more than $100 billion—and because they account  for almost half of EM’s $5.5 billion fiscal year 2009 budget request. (See  app. II for information on these projects.)
To identify the factors that may hinder DOE’s ability to effectively manage  these cleanup projects, we spoke with DOE project directors and  contractor officials and reviewed project management documents for the  10 major cleanup projects we had identified. We conducted site visits to  Idaho National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Oak Ridge  Reservation, Savannah River, and Hanford, and analyzed project  documentation—contracts, policy directives and memoranda, project  management plans, DOE’s Office of Inspector General reports,  independent reviews, project execution plans, risk management plans,  quarterly project reviews, monthly project status reports, earned value  management (EVM) surveillance plans, and project control documents  prepared to guide and control formal changes to the baselines. For our  analysis of projects’ scope, cost, and schedule data, we examined the  initial baselines reported as of the most recent contract award or major  contract modification (which occurred between 2004 and 2007) and  compared these baselines with the updated baselines at the time of our  review. Initial cost baselines are the estimated life cycle costs at the  beginning of the new contract period for operation of the DOE site or  associated projects or the major contract modification or extension, which  typically coincided with the beginning of the projects’ current or previous  near-term baseline. We also calculated the percentages of cost increases  on the basis of constant 2008 dollars to make them comparable across  projects and to show real increases in cost while excluding increases due  to inflation. In addition, because EM now is reporting its life cycle cost and  schedule estimates as ranges, we included these ranges in the report.  However, because the upper ends of these ranges include unfunded  contingency and EM does not include funding in its budget requests for  this contingency, we report cost increases and schedule delays based on  the lower ends of the ranges.
We also analyzed contractor performance data to determine whether DOE  major cleanup projects are consistently developing and analyzing accurate  earned value data according to industry standards and best practices. We  gathered and analyzed data produced by the EVM system used for one  project at each of the following sites: Idaho National Laboratory, Los  Alamos National Laboratory, and Hanford. Often, EVM systems differ  depending on how the contractor chooses to implement the EVM  approach. Because of these differences, we gathered and analyzed  information on each EVM system on a case-by-case basis, according to the  structure, reporting format, content, and level of detail, among other  things, unique to each EVM system. We also considered the best practices  developed by GAO for estimating and managing project costs to analyze  the contractor EVM data.
In addition, we spoke with DOE officials from EM and the Office of  Engineering and Construction Management in Washington, D.C., and with  representatives from LMI Government Consulting, which conducts  external independent reviews of the projects for DOE, to obtain their  perspective on how these projects are managed.
Because we and others previously have expressed concern about the data  reliability of a key DOE project management tracking database—the  Project Assessment and Reporting System—we did not develop  conclusions or findings based on information generated through that  system. Instead, we collected information directly from project site  offices and the contractors.
We provided an interim briefing to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water  Development, House Committee on Appropriations, on the status of our  work on April 3, 2008.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2007 to September 2008  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Information on the 10 Department of Energy Major Cleanup Projects Reviewed
subsections: section_title: Solid Waste Stabilization and Disposition, Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho (PBS 13)
paragraphs: This project will characterize, treat, and ship approximately 64,000 cubic meters of  transuranic waste that will ultimately be stored in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New  Mexico. Transuranic waste is radioactive waste containing more than 100 nanocuries of  alpha-emitting transuranic isotopes per gram of waste with half-lives greater than 20  years, except for high-level radioactive waste. The transuranic waste that must be handled  remotely through protective shielding, because it emits penetrating radiation, will be  treated at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. The project also will treat and  dispose of a mixed low-level waste backlog and handle on-site low-level waste for  disposal at the complex.
The project will decontaminate and decommission approximately 500 facilities and  remediate 160 sites in the East Tennessee Technology Park. This project includes the  park’s two major buildings—the K-25 and K-27 gaseous process buildings—and requires  the contractor to remove processing equipment and excess materials stored in the  buildings, demolish building structures, and dispose of all associated wastes.
The project will stabilize and dispose of enriched uranium materials and current and  projected inventories of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel in H-Area facilities. It also will  stabilize and dispose of highly enriched uranium solutions, miscellaneous fuels, plutonium  residues, enriched uranium residues, and other materials DOE identifies that remain from  the production of nuclear weapons. The project also will deactivate F-Area and H-Area  facilities; and dispose of special nuclear materials in the K-Area Complex.
The project will remove, treat, and dispose of 49 underground storage tanks holding a  total of 37 million gallons of highly contaminated legacy waste This effort includes  pretreating radioactive waste such as sludge and salt waste, vitrifying sludge and high- level waste at the Savannah River Site’s Defense Waste Processing Facility, and treating  and disposing of low-level saltstone waste.
The project will identify, investigate, and remediate, when necessary, areas with known or  suspected chemical and radiological contamination attributable to past Laboratory  operations. It will investigate and clean up (as needed) approximately 860 solid waste  management units and areas of concern remaining from the original 2,129 sites spread  over approximately 39 square miles. The protection of surface water and groundwater  resources that may be impacted by these management units and past Laboratory  operations also are within the scope of this project.
The project will stabilize, package, and ship (to the Savannah River Site) nuclear materials  and fuels used for the production of plutonium nitrates, oxides, and metal from 1950  through 1989 and now stored primarily in vaults in several facilities. The project will then  clean and demolish the facilities.
Solid Waste Stabilization and Disposition,  Hanford, Washington (PBS 13C)
The project will treat and store spent nuclear fuel, transuranic waste, mixed low-level  waste, and low-level waste generated at the Hanford site and other DOE and Department  of Defense facilities. It eventually will transfer and ship spent nuclear fuel elements and  1,936 cesium and strontium capsules to the proposed geologic repository in Nevada. The  project also will operate, among other things, the (1) Waste Receiving and Processing  Facility to process transuranic waste and low-level waste and (2) Central Waste Complex  to store low-level and mixed-low-level waste and transuranic waste pending final  disposition.
The project will remediate contaminated groundwater. This effort involves characterizing  the movement of radionuclides and chemicals (carbon tetrachloride, chromium,  technetium-99, strontium, and uranium plumes); assessing the soil and groundwater  characterization results; groundwater and risk assessment modeling; and operation of  groundwater remediation systems among other related actions.
Also known as the River Corridor Closure Project, this project will remediate 761  contaminated waste sites at the Hanford site near Richland, Washington, and  decontaminate, decommission and demolish 379 surplus facilities that are adjacent to the  Columbia River. This project also will dispose of material in the Environmental Restoration  Disposal Facility.
The project will retrieve, stabilize, treat, and dispose of 53 million gallons of radioactive  mixed waste stored in 177 underground tanks at the Hanford site. The project also  involves testing and implementing supplemental waste treatment methods; operating the  Waste Treatment Plant; providing interim storage of immobilized waste planned for  disposal in an offsite repository; receiving and disposing of immobilized low-activity waste  on-site in near-surface disposal facilities; and closing tanks and tank farm facilities.
section_title: Appendix III: Current Life Cycle Baselines for 10 DOE Cleanup Projects
subsections: section_title: Prior years’ costs
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Rudy Chatlos, Jennifer Echard,  James Espinoza, Daniel Feehan (Assistant Director), Mike Gallo, Diane  Lund, Mehrzad Nadji, Omari Norman, Brian Octeau, Christopher Pacheco,  Leslie Pollock, Karen Richey, and Carol Herrnstadt Shulman made key  contributions to this report.