Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Actions Are Needed to Increase Integration and Efficiencies of DOD's ISR Enterprise
Published: 2011-06-03T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The success of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems in collecting, processing, and disseminating intelligence information has fueled demand for ISR support, and the Department of Defense (DOD) has significantly increased its investments in ISR capabilities since combat operations began in 2001. In fiscal year 2010, intelligence community spending --including for ISR--exceeded $80 billion. Section 21 of Public Law 111-139 mandated that GAO identify programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives with duplicative goals and activities. This report examines the extent to which: (1) DOD manages and oversees the full scope and cost of the ISR enterprise; (2) DOD has sought to identify and minimize the potential for any unnecessary duplication in program, planning, and operations for ISR; and (3) DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap addresses key congressionally directed management elements and guidance.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]) has the authority to oversee DOD's ISR enterprise; however, the broad scope and complex funding arrangements of DOD's ISR enterprise make it difficult to manage and oversee. The scope of the ISR enterprise and capabilities include many different kinds of activities conducted by multiple agencies. As a result, ISR activities may be funded through any of several sources, including the Military Intelligence Program, the National Intelligence Program, overseas contingency operations funding, and military service funds. To manage DOD's large ISR enterprise, the USD(I) serves as DOD's senior intelligence official, responsible for providing strategic, budget, and policy oversight over DOD's ISR enterprise. However, the USD(I) does not have full visibility into several budget sources that fund DOD's ISR enterprise, such as national intelligence capabilities, dual use assets, urgent operational needs, and military personnel expenses related to ISR. The USD(I)'s inability to gain full visibility and clarity into all of DOD's ISR financial resources hinders efforts to develop an investment strategy for ISR and to achieve efficiencies. DOD has developed general guidance in directives and other documents emphasizing the need to identify efficiencies and eliminate duplication or redundancies in its capabilities, which provides a foundation for further action. In August 2010, the Secretary of Defense directed that the department begin a series of efficiency initiatives to reduce duplication, overhead, and excess. However, the scope of the review pertaining to ISR was limited to analysis activities and excluded activities associated with collecting ISR data--one of the largest areas of growth in ISR spending. Additionally, two ISR efficiency initiatives are in the early stages of development and do not have implementation goals and timelines. Without goals and timelines, it will be difficult to determine whether these initiatives will make progress in achieving efficiencies. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 required DOD to develop a roadmap to guide the development and integration of DOD ISR capabilities over a 15-year period and report to Congress on the contents of the roadmap, such as goals and an investment strategy to prioritize resources. DOD responded to both of these requirements by issuing an ISR roadmap. GAO's review of DOD's 2007 and 2010 ISR roadmaps found that DOD has made progress in addressing the issues that Congress directed to be included, but the 2007 and 2010 roadmaps did not address certain management elements identified by Congress. In 2008, Congress restated the 2004 requirements and provided additional guidance to the USD(I). However, the 2010 roadmap still does not represent an integrated investment strategy across the department because it does not clearly address capability gaps or priorities across the enterprise and still lacks investment information. Until DOD develops an integrated ISR investment strategy, the defense and intelligence communities may continue to make independent decisions and use resources that are not necessarily based on strategic priorities.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD compile and aggregate complete ISR funding data, establish implementation goals and timelines for its efficiency efforts, and give priority to examining efficiency in ISR collection activities. DOD agreed or partially agreed with these GAO recommendations. GAO also suggests that Congress consider holding DOD accountable to address required elements of the ISR roadmap.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems have proved  critical to the combatant commanders to plan and execute military  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan by providing them timely and accurate  information on adversaries’ capabilities and vulnerabilities. The success of  ISR systems in collecting, processing, and disseminating useful  intelligence information has fueled growing demand for more ISR support,  and the Department of Defense (DOD) has increased its investments in  ISR capabilities significantly since 2002. In fiscal year 2010, intelligence  spending across the national and military intelligence communities— which includes ISR—exceeded $80 billion. As demand for ISR has  increased and DOD has moved quickly to develop and acquire new ISR  capabilities, integrating and managing DOD’s ISR enterprise has become  more complex and challenging. In September 2010, the Deputy Secretary  of Defense acknowledged that the growth of intelligence organizations  within DOD has not been centrally directed or managed and there is a high  probability that inefficiencies exist. In January 2011, Congress expressed  the need to continue with oversight over certain ISR efforts given the  growth and demand of ISR.
Since 2004, Congress and we have reported on the need for greater  integration and efficiencies across DOD’s ISR enterprise. In the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Congress required DOD  to develop a fully integrated ISR roadmap and coordinate activities across  the military services, defense agencies, and combatant commands. In 2008,  a congressional committee provided additional guidance stating the need  for an ISR investment strategy. We have also reported that ISR activities  are not integrated and efficient; effectiveness may be compromised by  lack of full visibility into operational use of ISR assets; and agencies could  better collaborate in the acquisition of new capabilities. Although DOD has  designated the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD) to  manage ISR investments as a departmentwide portfolio, the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has been  designated to lead the task force responsible for oversight of issues related  to the management and acquisition of unmanned aircraft systems that  collect ISR data. We have concluded that DOD has not articulated a clear  vision of the ISR enterprise and a unified investment approach to manage  the enterprise. A new statutory requirement mandates that GAO identify  federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives with duplicative goals  and activities within departments and governmentwide. Under that  mandate, this review examines the extent to which: (1) DOD manages and  oversees the full scope and cost of the ISR enterprise; (2) DOD identified  and minimized the potential for any unnecessary duplication in program,  planning, and operations for ISR; and (3) DOD’s ISR Integration Roadmap  addresses key management elements required by law or directed by  congressional committees.
To determine the full scope and cost of DOD’s ISR enterprise we assessed  DOD’s ISR funding and budget elements reported in the Military  Intelligence Program, analyzed DOD’s ISR spending plans in the Future  Years Defense Program, and conducted discussions with DOD, military  service, and intelligence agency officials regarding ISR funding and  capabilities. To determine the extent to which DOD manages and oversees  the full scope and cost of this enterprise, we reviewed DOD directives  regarding the capability portfolio management, the role of the USD(I), and  the Military Intelligence Program and compared information found in DOD  strategy and briefing documents along with relevant meetings and  discussions with USD(I), military service, and intelligence agency officials  against the directives. We met with three of DOD’s combat support  agencies—the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency—to obtain  information on how they use Military Intelligence Program funds and their  role in DOD’s ISR enterprise. We discussed national intelligence funding  and efforts to assess duplication, fragmentation, and overlap in the  National Intelligence Program with an official in the Office of the Director  of National Intelligence (ODNI). ODNI also provided us classified  information on the extent to which the National Intelligence Program  budget funds each of the combat support agencies, excluding the National  Reconnaissance Office. We also determined that the data contained in  both the Future Years Defense Program and Military Intelligence Program  along with data received from the military services were reliable for our  purposes by conducting a data reliability assessment. To evaluate the  extent to which DOD has identified and minimized the potential for  unnecessary duplication, we assessed the progress of DOD efforts to  identify and implement efficiencies. We reviewed directives and budget  guidance documents to assess to what extent the need to eliminate  unnecessary duplication and fragmentation was emphasized as a priority.  We evaluated DOD’s guidance to determine to what extent it incorporated  best practices we previously identified, such as developing performance  metrics, timelines, and goals for implementation of efficiency efforts. We  evaluated the extent to which DOD took actions to resolve instances of  fragmentation and duplication they identified by reviewing ISR capability  assessments and recent ISR efficiency initiatives. Finally, to assess the  extent to which DOD’s ISR Integration Roadmap addresses management  elements required by law or directed by congressional committees, two of  our analysts independently evaluated the 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap  against key elements of congressionally directed actions. We also  compared the 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap to the 2007 ISR Integration  Roadmap to determine what progress DOD has made in addressing these  elements.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2010 through June  2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. More detailed information  on our scope and methodology is provided in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: GAO has conducted various assessments related to DOD’s ISR enterprise  including efforts assessing (1) unmanned aircraft system development,  acquisition, and operations; (2) how new ISR requirements are generated;  (3) the intelligence information processing, exploitation, and  dissemination processes; and (4) other intelligence-related topics. DOD’s  ISR enterprise consists of multiple intelligence organizations that  individually plan for, acquire, and operate manned and unmanned  airborne, space-borne, maritime, and ground-based ISR systems. The  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics  oversees the space and unmanned aircraft systems acquisition programs.  In addition to the intelligence branches of the military services, there are  four major intelligence agencies within DOD: the Defense Intelligence  Agency; the National Security Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence  Agency; and the National Reconnaissance Office. The Defense Intelligence  Agency is charged with providing all-source intelligence data to policy  makers and U.S. armed forces around the world and provides defense  human intelligence. The National Security Agency is responsible for  signals intelligence and information assurance and has collection sites  throughout the world. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency  prepares the geospatial data, including maps and computerized databases,  that are used by ISR systems necessary for targeting for precision-guided  weapons. The National Reconnaissance Office develops and operates  reconnaissance satellites. As figure 1 shows, DOD’s ISR enterprise is  related to other elements of the U.S. national intelligence community.
Spending on most ISR programs is divided between the defense  intelligence budget, known as the Military Intelligence Program—totaling  $27 billion in fiscal year 2010—and the national intelligence budget, known  as the National Intelligence Program—totaling $53.1 billion in fiscal year  2010. The Military Intelligence Program encompasses DOD-wide  intelligence programs and most intelligence programs supporting the  operating units of the military services. The USD(I) is responsible for  compiling and developing the Military Intelligence budget and issuing  detailed procedures governing the Military Intelligence Program process  and timelines associated with budget development. The agencies, services,  and offices that are included in the Military Intelligence Program are: the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military departments, the U.S.  Special Operations Command, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance  Office, the National Security Agency, the Defense Threat Reduction  Agency, the Defense Information Systems Agency, and the Defense  Security Service. Each office, agency, and service designates a manager  who is charged with responding to guidance from the USD(I) and  managing programs and functions within the budget, among other things.  The USD(I) guides and oversees the development of the Military  Intelligence Program in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense  (Comptroller), Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff, and the Director of the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Office of  Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation.
The national intelligence community, which primarily provides support to  national decision makers, also supports DOD ISR activities. The line  between military intelligence activities and national strategic intelligence  activities has blurred as DOD’s tactical ISR supports strategic decisions  and national intelligence collection informs military operations. The  National Intelligence Program, which funds national intelligence activities,  also funds a portion of DOD’s ISR activities to support military operations.  The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is responsible for compiling  and reviewing the annual National Intelligence Program budget.
To encourage integration of DOD’s ISR enterprise, in 2003 Congress  required the USD(I) to develop a comprehensive plan, known as the ISR  Integration Roadmap, to guide the development and integration of ISR  capabilities. The law also required the USD(I) to report back to  congressional committees on this effort. In response to this requirement,  DOD issued an ISR Integration Roadmap in May 2005 and updated it in  January 2007. However, we reported that this 2007 roadmap still did not  meet all the management elements the USD(I) was required to address. In  2008, the House Committee on Armed Services restated the need for the  USD(I) to address these requirements and provided the USD(I) with  additional guidance for the roadmap. The USD(I) issued an updated  roadmap in March 2010.
In 2008, DOD began an effort to manage ISR capabilities across the entire  department, rather than by military service or individual program. Under  this capability portfolio management concept, DOD intended to improve  the interoperability of future capabilities, minimize capability  redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability effectiveness. The  USD(I) was designated as the civilian lead office for the portfolio of ISR  activities, which is known as the Battlespace Awareness Portfolio. As the  portfolio manager for ISR investments, the role and authorities of the  USD(I) are limited to two primarily advisory functions: (1) reviewing and  participating in service and DOD agency budget deliberations on proposed  ISR capability investments, and (2) recommending alterations in service or  agency spending to the Secretary of Defense as part of the established  DOD budget review process. Also in 2008, the Secretary of Defense  established the ISR Task Force to increase ISR capacity in Iraq and  Afghanistan, as well as improve operational integration and efficiency of  ISR assets across the services and defense agencies. The ISR Task Force’s  primary focus was on regional capabilities and capabilities that could be  delivered more quickly than in the standard DOD acquisition cycle. The  task force is currently assisting the USD(I) and the services in deciding  how to integrate into the long-term base budget more than 500 ISR  capabilities that were developed to meet urgent operational requirements  in Iraq and Afghanistan.
We have previously reported on DOD’s challenges in improving the  integration of ISR efforts, including difficulties in processing and sharing  information that is already collected and developing new capabilities. We  reported in 2010 that DOD’s efforts to make intelligence data accessible  across the defense intelligence community have been hampered by not  having integration of service programs and a concept of operations for  intelligence sharing. The services have each pursued their own versions  of a common data processing system to share information, the Distributed  Common Ground/Surface System, which was initiated in 1998. Although  the services can share limited intelligence data, their progress toward full  information sharing has been uneven. Moreover, as we reported in March  2011, although DOD created the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED)  Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to lead and coordinate all of DOD’s  counter-IED efforts, which include some ISR capabilities, many of the  organizations engaged in the counter-IED defeat effort, such as the Army,  Marine Corps, and Navy, continued to develop, maintain, and expand their  own IED-defeat capabilities. Even though urgent operational needs  include ISR capabilities, the USD(I) does not have a direct role in  determining urgent operational needs.
section_title: The Complexity of DOD’s ISR Enterprise Funding Presents Challenges for Managing and Overseeing the Scope and Cost
paragraphs: The USD(I) has the authority to exercise oversight responsibility over  DOD’s ISR’s enterprise; however the broad scope and complex funding  arrangements of DOD’s ISR enterprise make it difficult to manage and  oversee. The scope of the ISR enterprise and capabilities include many  different kinds of activities—from collection of information through  dissemination of analysis compiled from multiple sources—conducted by  multiple agencies. As a result, ISR activities may be funded through any of  several sources, including the Military Intelligence Program, the National  Intelligence Program, overseas contingency operations funding, and  service appropriations, or by a combination of these sources. To manage  DOD’s large ISR enterprise, the USD(I) serves as DOD’s senior intelligence  official, responsible for providing strategic, budget, and policy oversight  over DOD’s ISR enterprise. However, the USD(I) does not have full  visibility into several budget sources that fund DOD’s ISR enterprise, such  as national intelligence capabilities, capabilities used for ISR and non-ISR  purposes, urgent operational needs, and military personnel expenses  related to ISR. Figure 2 illustrates that the USD(I) does not have full  visibility into many capabilities included in DOD’s ISR enterprise. The  USD(I)’s inability to gain full visibility into all of DOD’s ISR financial  resources may hinder efforts to develop an investment strategy for ISR, to  consider tradeoffs across military services and programs, and to address  potential duplication, fragmentation, and overlap.
DOD’s ISR enterprise comprises many organizations and offices from both  the defense intelligence community and the national intelligence  community, which represents a challenge for DOD in integrating  capabilities across the ISR enterprise. DOD relies on both its own ISR  assets and national ISR assets to provide comprehensive intelligence in  support of its joint warfighting force. DOD organizations are involved in  providing intelligence information using their respective or joint ISR assets  to both the defense and national intelligence communities. Determining  the scope of the ISR enterprise precisely is difficult because the  intelligence agencies and military services include different activities in  discussing their ISR missions and priorities.
Within DOD’s ISR enterprise, multiple organizations conduct strategic  planning, budgeting, and data processing and analysis across intelligence  disciplines in accordance with their own priorities. Within the Office of the  Secretary of the Defense, the USD(I), and the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics have responsibilities for aspects  of ISR that may overlap. Specifically, DOD has designated the USD(I) to  manage ISR investments as a departmentwide portfolio. However, as the  ISR portfolio manager, the USD(I) has only advisory authority and cannot  direct the services or agencies to make changes in their investment plans.  Moreover, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics has been designated responsible for heading a task force related  to the management and acquisition of unmanned aircraft systems that  collect ISR data and are part of the ISR portfolio. The services and defense  agencies also conduct ISR activities. The military services each have their  own ISR plans and roadmaps that focus on their respective ISR activities  and are not integrated with other services’ plans. For example, the Air  Force maintains its own ISR plan and metrics separate from DOD’s ISR  Integration Roadmap and the other service roadmaps, and the other  services have developed several roadmaps outlining ISR priorities and  capability gaps.
Because of the broad scope of ISR and the multiple agencies involved,  DOD’s ISR enterprise is funded through several budgetary sources,  including both DOD and non-DOD organizations. These multiple sources  of funding complicate the USD(I)’s role as the office that develops and  oversees DOD’s ISR enterprise, according to DOD officials. In particular,  USD(I) officials noted that the USD(I) does not have complete information  on ISR funding by these organizations and that it is difficult to manage  planning for ISR funding. As figures 2 and 3 show, the Military Intelligence  Program, the National Intelligence Program, and military service budgets  are the various sources of funding. Moreover, some ISR programs are  funded through combinations of these funding sources. For example, the  USD(I) does not have full visibility into space acquisitions, urgent  warfighter needs, and unmanned aircraft systems acquisitions and does  not routinely collect data regarding funding information. In fiscal year  2010, DOD’s ISR enterprise was funded by the entire Military Intelligence  Program budget totaling $27 billion, along with a portion of the National  Intelligence Program budget of $53.1 billion. In 2008, we reported that  DOD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) work  together to coordinate funding for programs that support both military and  national intelligence missions, but determining how costs for joint ISR  programs will be shared can be difficult.
According to DOD Directive 5143.01, the USD(I) is responsible for  developing, coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of DOD  policy, strategy, and guidance related to ISR. This directive also provides  the USD(I) with the authority to obtain reports and information as  necessary to carry out assigned responsibilities and functions. The USD(I)  also has responsibility for ensuring that policies and programs related to  the acquisition of ISR capabilities are designed and managed to improve  performance and efficiency. GAO’s Internal Control Standards state that  managers, such as the USD(I), need accurate and complete financial data  to determine the effective and efficient use of resources. However, the  complexity of DOD’s ISR enterprise may make the USD(I)’s management  and oversight responsibilities difficult to fulfill because it is not receiving  complete information and does not have full visibility over DOD’s entire  ISR enterprise.
The USD(I)’s lack of full visibility into the full scope of ISR capabilities,  programs, and budget sources, makes it difficult for the USD(I) to receive,  collect, and aggregate reports and information necessary to carry out its  oversight responsibilities. We identified four areas for which the USD(I)  does not have complete information on ISR spending: (1) military assets  that are used for both ISR and non-ISR missions—that is, dual use assets;  (2) DOD’s urgent ISR warfighter capabilities; (3) budget items funded from  multiple sources; and (4) military personnel funding related to ISR  missions and capabilities.
Dual use assets—DOD officials stated that certain assets fulfill both  non-ISR and ISR missions. Such assets are funded primarily through  appropriations for the military services and may not always be  reported to the USD(I) as Military Intelligence Program capabilities,  which limits the USD(I)’s oversight of such capabilities and ability to  make trade-offs or shift resources across the department. According to  the USD(I), specific examples of dual use capabilities include the Air  Force’s airborne ISR Reaper program, the Navy’s P-3 Orion land-based  maritime patrol aircraft, and DOD’s biometrics program.
Urgent ISR warfighter capabilities—As we reported in March  2011, GAO estimated that between fiscal years 2005 and 2010 DOD  spent $6.25 billion on urgent ISR capabilities sponsored by the ISR  Task Force, as well as a portion of the $19.45 billion sponsored by the  JIEDDO to field new ISR capabilities. However, we also reported that  DOD cannot readily identify all of its urgent needs efforts or associated  costs, including spending on ISR, because it has limited visibility into  the totality of urgent needs submitted by warfighters.
Capabilities funded from multiple sources—DOD officials have  also cited capabilities funded from multiple sources as a cause of  delays in tracking and reporting ISR data. For example, many ISR  capabilities are funded jointly by the Military Intelligence Program and  National Intelligence Program. In addition, capabilities that have both  ISR and non-ISR uses receive funding from different appropriations.  For example, capabilities with both ISR and non-ISR uses can be  supported by services’ operation and maintenance and personnel  funding. In 2010, according to a DOD financial regulation the Under  Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Director of the Cost  Assessment and Program Evaluation Office are to work with the  USD(I) to create and maintain whole, distinct budget items within each  component of the intelligence community. The military services and  defense agencies are required to show measurable and steady progress  towards completing this effort. On the basis of information we  received from the military services, the services reported making  varying progress in developing whole Military Intelligence Program  budget items for some of its ISR capabilities. The services estimated  that this effort will be completed sometime after 2012 and they have  cited challenges in creating whole budget elements. For example, a  Navy official said that it is very difficult to determine individual  Military Intelligence Program and non–Military Intelligence budget  portions for some capabilities at the program level.
Military intelligence personnel funding related to ISR—DOD,  military, and intelligence officials cited challenges in identifying exact  costs associated with military personnel conducting ISR activities. In a  change from previous years, DOD’s fiscal year 2012 Military  Intelligence Program budget submission did not include military  personnel costs. According to a USD(I) official, military personnel  funding was removed from the Military Intelligence Program because:  (1) military personnel expenses are not reported in the National  Intelligence Program; and (2) the USD(I) does not have oversight  authority for military personnel funding. Some of the military services  cited military personnel costs as an example of a budget item that is  split between ISR and non-ISR programs. For example, the Air Force  estimates that it has approximately 200 budget items that contain at  least some funding for military intelligence personnel. Additionally,  Army officials reported that military personnel funding accounts for  approximately 62 percent of their budget items that are funded from  multiple sources.
Without accurate and complete financial resource data, the USD(I) may  not be able to fulfill its responsibility to develop, coordinate, and oversee  the implementation of DOD’s ISR enterprise policy, strategy, and programs  and manage the Battlespace Awareness capability portfolio from an  informed perspective. Until the USD(I) gains more clarity over DOD’s ISR  funding, DOD efforts to integrate ISR, recommend tradeoffs within the  Battlespace Awareness capability portfolio, determine the effective use of  ISR resources, and address potential fragmentation, overlap, and  duplication will continue to be impeded.
section_title: DOD Has Established Initiatives and Processes to Achieve Efficiencies, but Additional Steps Could Improve Accountability
paragraphs: DOD has developed general guidance in directives, a manual, and  memorandums emphasizing the need to identify and eliminate duplication  or redundancies in its capabilities, which provides a foundation for further  action. ISR activities are explicitly included as an area for possible  efficiency improvements. However, current ISR efficiency studies have  limited scope, initiatives are in the early stages of development, and  implementation plans, including resource requirements, have not been  fully developed.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Emphasized the Importance of Efficiency in ISR Activities through Broad Guidance, but Efficiency Initiatives Have Limitations
paragraphs: DOD’s broad guidance highlights the need for the services and defense  agencies to work together to eliminate duplication in ISR activities. DOD’s  directive Functions of the DOD and Its Major Components instructs the  services to coordinate with each other in eliminating duplication, to equip  forces that can work closely with each other, and to assist other  components by providing intelligence. Similarly, DOD’s Capability  Portfolio Management directive charges portfolio managers with  identifying resource mismatches, including redundancies, and providing  recommendations on integrating capabilities. In addition, DOD’s  requirements process guidance instructs the services and defense agencies  to identify overlaps and redundancies when proposing the development of  new capabilities and to assess areas of overlap and unnecessary  duplication that could be eliminated to provide resources to address  capability gaps.
In response to the emphasis on efficiencies, DOD, as a departmental  official indicated, has recently completed one efficiency study and is  developing two tools to help identify efficiencies and promote integration  in its ISR enterprise; however, these efforts have limited scope or are in  the early stages of development. Further, it is not clear whether the tools  will result in improved efficiencies because DOD has not established  implementation goals or timelines with which to establish accountability,  measure progress, and build momentum. As we have previously reported,  successful management efforts use implementation goals and timelines to  identify performance shortfalls and gaps, suggest midcourse corrections,  and build momentum by demonstrating progress.
In August 2010, the Secretary of Defense directed that the department  begin a series of efficiency initiatives to reduce duplication, overhead, and  excess. The ISR portion of the review focused on streamlining  organizations that primarily analyze intelligence information. The review  group’s assessment recommended cost savings of approximately $29  million in intelligence personnel costs for fiscal year 2012 by consolidating  some intelligence centers and streamlining certain intelligence  organizations. However, the scope of the review was limited to ISR  analysis activities and excluded ISR activities associated with collecting  ISR data, which represents one of the largest areas of growth in ISR  spending. ISR officials were unsure whether or when ISR collection  activities would be studied for efficiencies.
Two other DOD efforts are intended to address impediments to integration  of the ISR enterprise management that we reported in March 2008. In our  assessment of DOD’s 2007 ISR Integration Roadmap, we noted that DOD  had improved its ability to look across its ISR enterprise by compiling a  useful catalog of capabilities. We have previously identified a set of  desirable characteristics for defense strategies such as the ISR Integration  Roadmap, which are intended to enhance their usefulness in resource and  policy decisions and to better assure accountability. These characteristics  include laying out goals and objectives, suggesting actions for addressing  those objectives, allocating resources, identifying roles and  responsibilities, and integrating relevant parties. However, we reported  that the 2007 Roadmap did not provide (1) a clear vision of a future  integrated ISR enterprise that identifies what ISR capabilities are needed  to achieve to DOD’s strategic goals, or (2) a framework for evaluating  trade-offs among competing ISR capability needs and assessing how ISR  investments contribute towards achieving goals. Further, we reported that  the department did not have complete information on ISR capabilities in  use or being developed to help identify tradeoffs among potential future  investments. We recommended that DOD develop an integrated  architecture and complete information to use in understanding how  changing investment levels in ISR would affect progress and achieving  goals and, in comments on that report, DOD agreed with our  recommendation and stated that plans of action should be finalized by  2008.
In 2010, USD(I) officials proposed development of a comprehensive  architecture for DOD’s entire ISR enterprise, to be called the Defense  Intelligence Mission Area Enterprise Architecture. This architecture is  intended to provide a standardized methodology for identifying and  addressing efficiencies in the ISR portfolio and support objective  investment decision making. However, this initiative is in the earliest  phases of development, and its concept and implementation plans  including resource requirements have not been fully developed. The  absence of implementation goals and timelines will make it difficult to  determine whether this initiative will make progress in achieving  efficiencies.
In 2008, we also recommended that the Joint Staff collaborate with the  USD(I) to develop a comprehensive source of information on all existing  and developmental ISR capabilities throughout the ISR enterprise so that  the military services and defense agencies can determine whether existing  systems or those in development could fill their capability gaps. Based on  this recommendation, in 2010, the Joint Staff, in collaboration with the  USD(I) and the services, began an initiative to develop a comprehensive  source of information on all existing and developmental ISR capabilities  for use in conducting ISR-related assessments. According to Joint Staff  officials, this decision support tool is designed to use measurable data to  enable assessment of the relative utility and operating costs of different  ISR capabilities and has the potential to identify overlap and duplication  and inform trade-off decisions. Currently this tool includes information on  airborne ISR capabilities. The USD(I) is currently collaborating with the  Joint Staff to enhance the decision support tool to address operational  requirements across ISR domains. However, it is not clear whether funding  will be available to implement plans to maintain and expand the  experimental tool to include all ISR capabilities and, with funding  uncertain, goals and a timeline for completion have not been established.
section_title: DOD Has Developed an ISR Integration Roadmap but Has Only Partially Addressed Management Elements Required by Legislation or Identified by Congressional Committees
paragraphs: The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 required  DOD to develop an ISR Integration Roadmap to guide the development  and integration of DOD ISR capabilities over a 15-year period, and to  report to Congress on the content of the roadmap, including specific  management elements that DOD should address. In response to both of  these requirements, DOD issued an ISR Integration Roadmap. In addition  to other matters, DOD was required to include: (1) fundamental goals, (2)  an overview of ISR integration activities, and (3) an investment strategy.  The House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services provided  further guidance in a 2008 committee report, after which DOD issued an  updated roadmap in 2010. Our review of DOD’s 2007 and 2010 ISR  roadmaps found that DOD has made progress in addressing the issues that  Congress directed to be included, but neither roadmap included all the  specified elements or addressed the important issue of how to invest  future resources among competing priorities. As illustrated in figure 4,  DOD’s 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap addressed two more required  elements than did the 2007 roadmap. However, the 2010 roadmap does not  represent an integrated investment strategy across the department or  contain key elements of an integrated enterprise architecture, such as  metrics to help evaluate trade-offs between alternatives and assess  progress in addressing capability shortfalls. Further, unlike the 2007  roadmap that catalogued military and national ISR capabilities across the  enterprise, the 2010 roadmap is organized by separate intelligence  disciplines, such as signals intelligence and imagery intelligence, and is not  integrated, making it more difficult to examine potential investments and  trade-offs departmentwide.
The 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap addresses four and partially addresses  one of seven management elements set forth in the 2004 National Defense  Authorization Act. Specifically, the 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap includes  information on:    A 15-year time period—The 2010 ISR Roadmap includes investment  strategies for each type of intelligence activity and addresses planned  capabilities through at least 2025.
A description of fundamental goals—The 2010 ISR roadmap  outlines broad national defense, ISR, and military goals along with  missions supported by various intelligence disciplines, and contains  fundamental goals such as (1) stewardship of funding, (2) serving  fundamental requirements, and (3) leveraging technology effects.
A description of ISR Integration activities—The 2010 ISR  roadmap provides an overview of ISR integration activities across  DOD such as the structure and membership of the ISR Task Force, the  ISR Integration Council, and the Battlespace Awareness Functional  Capabilities Board among others.
A description of the role of intelligence in homeland security— The 2010 ISR roadmap contains a section outlining how intelligence  can enhance DOD’s role in fulfilling its homeland security  responsibilities.
Counterintelligence integration—The 2010 ISR roadmap partially  addresses counterintelligence integration as it generally describes  DOD’s counterintelligence mission, but it does not specifically address  how it will be integrated among DOD agencies and the armed forces.
The 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap does not address two of the seven  management elements in the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act that  were also restated in the 2008 House of Representatives Committee on  Armed Services report. Specifically, the 2010 Integration Roadmap does  not do the following:    Describe an investment strategy—The 2010 roadmap contains  general strategies for individual intelligence disciplines, discusses  current and future capabilities, identifies supported mission sets for  each discipline, and describes long-term actions and challenges. For  certain intelligence disciplines, the 2010 roadmap also generally  illustrates future needs for certain capabilities. However, it does not  contain a comprehensive investment strategy for the ISR enterprise.  For example, it does not clearly represent what ISR capabilities are  required to achieve strategic goals, and it does not allow DOD decision  makers to assess current capabilities across different goals because it  is structured according to individual intelligence disciplines.  Additionally, the roadmap does not provide estimated costs associated  with these capability needs and does not prioritize ISR capabilities.
Discuss improving the structure of funding and  appropriations—The 2010 roadmap does not discuss how annual  funding authorizations and appropriations can be optimally structured  to best support the development of a fully integrated DOD ISR  architecture. DOD included a section in the roadmap entitled “Funding  an Integrated ISR Architecture,” which provides an overview of the  Military Intelligence Program, the National Intelligence Program, and  the Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio, but does not include  information on how annual appropriations can be best structured for  ISR.
The 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap also does not address the additional  guidance included in the 2008 House Committee on Armed Services  report. Specifically, the 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap does not address  the appropriate mix of national overhead systems and manned and  unmanned airborne platforms to achieve strategic goals and does not  include an analysis of future ISR demand. Certain intelligence discipline  sections generally describe the types of overhead capabilities needed in  the future; however, these capabilities are not prioritized across the entire  ISR enterprise.
DOD officials acknowledged that the 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap has  some limitations that DOD is planning to address in a later version. For  example, because the investment strategy section is organized by  intelligence area it does not address capabilities that collect multiple types  of intelligence data. The USD(I) also highlighted that recent agreements  between the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the USD(I) have  resulted in the creation of the Consolidated Intelligence Guidance, which  is designed to synchronize activities and investments between the DNI and  DOD. They stated that this guidance is specifically goal-based and is  effective for managing the shorter-term Future Years Defense Program  budget. DOD officials also acknowledged that the organization of future  iterations of the ISR roadmap by missions instead of intelligence discipline  may better illustrate integration and interoperability of capabilities across  the department. They stated that the roadmap is a living document and the  intent is for future versions to create linkages between the existing DOD  strategic guidance and the longer-term investment strategies. USD(I)  officials stated that it is developing a useful set of metrics for the next  iteration of the roadmap.
Requirements of the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act, additional  guidance provided by the House Committee on Armed Services, and our  prior work have all emphasized that the roadmap should include a clearly  defined investment strategy. Without a unified investment approach,  senior DOD leaders do not have a management tool for conducting a  comprehensive assessment of what investments are required to achieve  ISR strategic goals, and they cannot be well-positioned to prioritize ISR  investments and make resource allocation and trade-off decisions when  faced with competing needs. Furthermore, until DOD develops an  integrated ISR investment strategy, the defense and intelligence  communities may continue to use resources that are not necessarily based  on strategic priorities, which could lead to gaps in some areas of  intelligence operations and redundancies in others.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: With demand for ISR growing and DOD planning to make additional  investments in ISR capabilities, the challenges the department faces in  integrating ISR capabilities, managing and conducting oversight of ISR  funding, and addressing efficiency efforts will likely be exacerbated by  expected budget pressures. Fragmented authority for ISR operations  among multiple agencies with different, and sometimes competing,  priorities hampers DOD’s progress in planning for new capabilities and  targeting investments to joint priorities. The USD(I) could be better  positioned to facilitate integration and provide oversight of ISR activities if  it had more visibility into current capabilities and clarity into the total  amount that is being spent on ISR activities funded through multiple  sources. More complete information would also be useful to the USD(I) in  developing an integrated ISR roadmap, including an investment strategy.
DOD’s recent emphasis on efficiencies has extended to its ISR enterprise,  and it has initiated efforts to identify areas of overlap and duplication.  However, limitations in the scope of its current efficiency efforts and  undefined goals and timelines to implement its newer efforts reduce the  likelihood that all possible efficiencies will be identified and action taken  to achieve them. For example, more work remains for DOD to identify  efficiencies across the entire ISR enterprise, such as exploring efficiencies  in ISR collection activities. Efficiency efforts in the earliest phases of  development and implementation could be tools to inform decisions about  trade-offs between competing priorities and may be helpful in identifying  opportunities for increased efficiencies and cost savings. If designed and  implemented properly, these tools could result in cost savings across the  ISR enterprise by reducing the likelihood of developing unnecessarily  duplicative capabilities. However, without plans for completion and  timelines to build momentum, DOD will not have the ability to monitor  progress and take corrective actions, if necessary, to ensure that potential  savings are realized.
DOD’s 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap does not provide enough detailed  information on integrated goals and priorities for the ISR enterprise to  enable development of a long-term investment strategy. Without a detailed  investment strategy, DOD and the military services may not have a  common understanding of how activities should be prioritized to meet  goals. Until DOD addresses challenges related to managing funding,  integrating ISR capabilities, and minimizing inefficiencies in its ISR  enterprise, the department risks investing in lower-priority and even  duplicative capabilities while leaving critical capability gaps unfilled.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve management of DOD’s ISR enterprise and increase its ability  to achieve efficiencies, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  direct the USD(I) to take the following three actions:    Collect and aggregate complete financial data—including information  on dual-use assets, urgent operational needs, capability funding from  multiple sources, and military personnel funding—to inform resource  and investment decisions.
Establish goals and timelines to ensure progress and accountability for  design and implementation of its defense intelligence enterprise  architecture, including clarifying how the department plans to use the  architecture and tools it is developing to achieve efficiencies.
Expand the scope of current efficiency efforts to include ISR  collection activities.
To identify efficiencies in ISR capability development, we recommend that  the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  and the USD(I) to collaborate in developing decision support tool(s), such  as the Joint Staff’s decision support tool, and to establish implementation  goals and timelines for completion of such efforts.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: To ensure that future versions of the ISR Integration Roadmap meet all of  the elements of an integrated ISR roadmap identified in the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 as well as the 2008 House  of Representatives Committee on Armed Services report, Congress should  consider establishing additional accountability in legislation, such as  conditioning a portion of ISR funding on completion of all congressionally  directed management elements, including the development of an  integrated ISR investment strategy.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially  concurred with all our recommendations and stated that there are ongoing  activities to address our recommendations. DOD did not agree with the  matter we raised for congressional consideration. DOD’s comments are  reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. In addition, DOD provided  technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report as  appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense direct the USD(I) to collect and aggregate complete financial data  to inform resource and investment decisions. In its written response, DOD  stated that the USD(I) is working to collect, aggregate, and expand access  to complete battlespace awareness portfolio financial data to include  information on dual use assets, urgent operational needs, and multiple- source funding through a variety of means and to extend its visibility over  DOD’s ISR enterprise. DOD described its process for receiving complete  information regarding dual use assets and urgent operational needs and  discussed how it works to aggregate Military Intelligence Program data.  DOD also stated that the USD(I) maintains visibility and access to  programs of interest that are non–Military Intelligence Program–funded  through access to DOD’s Office of Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation’s financial data warehouse. While increasing the USD(I)’s  visibility into ISR programs is a positive step, we believe that formally  aggregating complete intelligence-related financial data would give a  better overall picture of DOD’s current ISR spending and ensure that DOD  considers its entire ISR enterprise when making future resource and  investment decisions.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  direct the USD(I) to establish goals and timelines to ensure progress and  accountability for implementing its defense intelligence enterprise  architecture. In its written comments, DOD described current efforts to  develop tools—such as the Defense Intelligence Information Enterprise,  the Distributed Common Ground System, and the Joint Intelligence  Operations Center for Information Technology demonstration—that  provide a common framework for some ISR activities and stated that goals  and timelines for implementing these efforts will be displayed in the next  ISR Integration Roadmap. However, DOD’s comments did not address  how the department plans to integrate these separate efforts into defense  intelligence architecture that would facilitate analysis of gaps and  redundancies and inform future investments. Our recommendation that  DOD establish goals and timelines for implementation was intended to  improve management accountability for the completion of an integrated  defense intelligence architecture, including clarifying how the tools it  mentioned will contribute to the architecture, as well as planning how the  department will use the architecture and tools to achieve efficiencies. We  have revised the recommendation language to clarify its intent.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense direct the USD(I) to expand the scope of the current efficiency  efforts to include ISR collection activities. In its written comments, DOD  stated that the Secretary of Defense’s current efficiency initiatives include  an effort to identify, track, and determine the future disposition of multiple  intelligence organizations that were established to provide ISR support to  ongoing combat operations. We agree and acknowledge in the report that  current efficiency initiatives are focused on organizations that conduct  analysis. The department also noted that the USD(I) is collaborating with  the ODNI and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology  and Logistics to further ensure ISR collection investments are fully  integrated in the acquisition processes of the department and intelligence  community. While these efforts are positive, we maintain that formally  expanding the scope of current efforts to include identification of  efficiencies in ISR collection activities would help ensure that these efforts  receive continued management priority.
DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary  of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the USD(I)  to collaborate in developing decision support tool(s), such as the Joint  Staff’s emergent decision support tool, and to establish implementation  goals and timelines for completion of such efforts. DOD responded that it  is exploring different portfolio management tools and will consider goals  and timelines when the efficacy of such tools is verified. We agree that  assessing options is an important part of developing the most effective and  efficient decision support tool. However, DOD did not explain in its  comments how it would consider the efficacy of the tools it plans to  assess, or when it expects to choose and begin implementation of such a  tool. Establishing goals and timelines for assessing the efficacy of decision  support tools and taking actions to implement the selected tool could help  ensure that these efforts will be fully implemented in a timely manner.
DOD disagreed with our suggestion that Congress consider establishing  additional accountability measures in legislation, such as conditioning  funding, to encourage the department to address all the management  elements Congress required in its 2004 legislation calling for an integrated  ISR roadmap. In its written comments, DOD interpreted our matter as  proposing the withholding of funds for ISR activities, and DOD stated that  withholding funds for ISR would be counterproductive. However, we did  not suggest withholding funding; rather we proposed that Congress  consider using the conditioning of funding as a tool to provide an incentive  for compliance with legislative requirements that have been in place since  2004—specifically, establishing fundamental ISR goals and an integrated  ISR investment strategy. Since 2004, none of the ISR roadmap updates  DOD has issued has fully addressed these congressionally required  elements. We believe that given the substantial resources allocated to  DOD’s ISR enterprise, completion of an integrated ISR roadmap that  includes an investment strategy could help DOD and congressional  decision makers ensure that DOD is effectively using its ISR resources.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of  Defense. This report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site,  http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this  report, please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or by e-mail at  dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact information for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  GAO staff who have made major contributions to this report are listed in  appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To describe the challenges, if any, that the department is facing in  managing costs, developing strategic plans, and identifying unnecessary  fragmentation, overlap, and duplication for the intelligence, surveillance,  and reconnaissance (ISR) enterprise, we reviewed and analyzed  documents related to the enterprise and discussed the enterprise with  cognizant Department of Defense (DOD) officials.
To determine the full s DOD’s ISR funding and program elements reported in the Military  Intelligence Program for Fiscal Years 2010, 2011, and 2012, conducted an  analysis of DOD’s ISR spending in the Future Years Defense Program, and  discussed with DOD, military service, and intelligence agency officials  their ISR funding and capabilities. Specifically, we interviewed cognizant  Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD) and military service  officials to determine the content of DOD’s ISR enterprise, the extent to  which intelligence-related costs are tracked and visible, and the resourcing  challenges inherent in a complex enterprise. To determine the extent to  which DOD manages the scope and cost of the ISR enterprise, we  compared information obtained in these interviews against criteria  documents in DOD directives related to the Military Intelligence Program  and the USD(I). We reached out to DOD’s combat support agencies— including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency—as part of this  effort and received high-level information regarding how they use their  Military Intelligence Program funds. We also conducted a high-level  discussion with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence related  to processes used to identify duplication, overlap, and fragmentation  within the National Intelligence Program.  cope and cost of DOD’s ISR enterprise, we assessed  To evaluate to what extent DOD has identified and minimized the potential  for unnecessary duplication, we assessed the progress of DOD efforts to  identify unnecessary fragmentation and overlap and reviewed strategic  guidance, and directives for their relative emphasis and priority on  unnecessary fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. We assessed to what  extent DOD was addressing fragmentation and duplication in strategy  documents by reviewing key strategies such as 2010 Quadrennial Defense  Review and the Defense Intelligence Strategy. We also reviewed guidance  related to DOD’s recent efficiency initiatives including memorandums and  directives. We evaluated DOD’s guidance to determine whether it  incorporated best practices on measures of accountability needed to  ensure specific initiatives are fully implemented. We also asked DOD,  military service, and intelligence officials to provide examples of  unnecessary duplication and any actions taken to resolve them.
Finally, to assess the extent to which DOD’s ISR Integration Roadm addresses congressional requirements, two analysts independently  evaluated the ISR Integration Roadmap against elements identified in the  2004 National Defense Authorization Act and the House Report fr Committee on Armed Services that accompanied the 2009 National  Defense Authorization Act. We determined that an  if the 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap contained that element; however we  did not assess the overall quality of the section(s) that addressed that  element. We also compared the 2007 roadmap against these criteria show any relative differences between the two roadmap versions. We  conducted interviews with knowledgeable DOD, military service, and intelligence officials to obtain information on the process to prepare the 2010 Integration Roadmap and plans for future versions of the roadmap.
In addressing all of these objectives, we received briefings on DOD’s ISR  enterprise and its initiatives to reduce fragmentation, overlap, and  duplication in the enterprise, and we analyzed key documents related to  these initiatives. We interviewed and received presentations from e the following commands and agencies about the ISR enterprise’s sco cost, strategic plans, and initiatives to reduce fragmentation, overlap, and pe,  ers  duplication: the USD(I); the Joint Staff; the ISR Task Force; headquart e  of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps; Defense Intelligenc Agency; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; National Security  Agency; and Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2010 through June  2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant  Director; Ashley Alley; Robert Breitbeil; Gina Flacco; David Keefer; Brian  Mazanec; Gregory Marchand; Timothy Persons; Amie Steele; and Cheryl  Weissman made key contributions to this report.