Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented
Published: 2008-06-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The safety and economic security of the United States depends on the secure use of the world's seaports and waterways. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13 (HSPD-13, also referred to as National Security Presidential Directive-41) directs the coordination of U.S. maritime security policy through the creation of a National Strategy for Maritime Security and supporting implementation plans. GAO was asked to evaluate this strategy and its eight supporting plans. This report discusses: (1) the extent to which the strategy and its supporting plans contain desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy, and (2) the reported status of the implementation of these plans. To conduct this work, GAO evaluated the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its supporting plans against the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that GAO identified in February 2004, reviewed HSPD-13 and supporting plans, and reviewed documents on the status of the plans' implementation.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Of the six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that GAO identified in 2004, the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its eight supporting implementation plans address four and partially address the remaining two. Documents provided by the Maritime Security Working Group--an interagency body responsible for monitoring and assessing the implementation of the maritime strategy--indicate that the implementation status of the eight supporting plans varies. For example, as of November 2007, implementation of one plan had been completed, while another has reached the assessment phase (e.g., lessons learned and best practices), and a third has reached the execution phase (e.g., exercises and operations). The other five plans remain primarily in the planning phase. The working group is monitoring the implementation of 76 actions across the plans, and reported 6 of these are completed and 70 are ongoing.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: More than 6 years after the September 11, 2001, attacks, the risk of a  terrorist attack in the maritime domain remains a major concern to the  United States. Over 95 percent of U.S. international trade is transported  by water, thus, the safety and economic security of the United States  depends in large part on the secure use of the world’s seaports and  waterways. A successful attack on a major seaport could potentially result  in a dramatic slowdown in the international supply chain with impacts in  the billions of dollars. Therefore, the United States and its trading  partners, have a common interest to facilitate maritime commerce and to  protect against maritime-related terrorist, criminal, or other hostile acts.
The federal government has been active in seeking to enhance maritime  security through legislation, presidential directives, and international  agreements. As a result, the federal government has implemented  numerous programs and initiatives to help secure our nation’s maritime  infrastructure, harbors, seaports, and international waterways. One of  these efforts, and the focus of this report, is Homeland Security  Presidential Directive-13 (HSPD-13), which directs the coordination of  maritime security policy through the creation of a National Strategy for  Maritime Security and supporting implementation plans. Issued in  December 2004, HSPD-13 aims to establish U.S. policy and implementation  actions to further reduce the vulnerability of the maritime domain. These  efforts are monitored by the Maritime Security Working Group, an  interagency group tasked with monitoring the implementation of the  supporting plans. The working group reports to the Maritime Security  Policy Coordination Committee, which is the primary forum for  coordinating U.S. national maritime strategy. Both the Maritime Security  Policy Coordination Committee and the Maritime Security Working Group  are co-chaired by representatives of the National Security Council and the  Homeland Security Council.
In 2004, we developed a set of six desirable characteristics for national  strategies. Those six characteristics are:  (1) Statement of purpose, scope, and methodology: addresses why the  strategy was produced, the scope of its coverage, and the process by  which it was developed.  (2) Problem definition and risk assessment: addresses the particular  national problems and threats the strategy is directed towards.  (3) Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance  measures: addresses what the strategy is trying to achieve and the  steps to achieve those results, as well as the priorities, milestones, and  performance measures to gauge results.  (4) Resources, investments, and risk management: addresses what the  strategy will cost, the sources and types of resources and investments  needed, and where resources and investments should be targeted by  balancing risk reductions and costs.  (5) Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination: addresses  which organizations will be implementing the strategy, what their roles  will be compared to others, and mechanisms for them to coordinate  their efforts.  (6) Integration and implementation: addresses how a national strategy  relates to other strategies’ goals, objectives, and activities, and to  subordinate levels of government and their plans to implement the  strategy.
We believe these characteristics can assist responsible parties in further  developing and implementing national strategies, as well as enhance their  usefulness in resource and policy decisions and to better assure  accountability. We have used these characteristics to assess the  completeness of seven national strategies related to homeland security  and combating terrorism.
You asked us to evaluate the National Strategy for Maritime Security and  its eight supporting implementation plans. This report presents the results  of our efforts to address the following questions:    To what extent does the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its  supporting implementation plans contain the elements identified as  desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy?
What is the reported implementation status of these plans?
To answer our first question, we analyzed the National Strategy for  Maritime Security to determine whether it contained the desirable  characteristics for an effective national strategy. If a characteristic or an  element of a characteristic was missing from the national strategy, then we  reviewed the eight supporting implementation plans for evidence of the  characteristic in a majority of these plans. We also reviewed the plans to  determine if they provided more detail on the characteristics examined  than could be found in the national strategy, for example, what component  or agency will implement a specific recommendation. If a characteristic or  an element of a characteristic was missing from the national strategy, our  methodology required that the characteristic or element be present in at  least five of the supporting plans for the characteristic to be considered  “addressed.” An assessment of partially addressed meant that the  characteristic or element be present in at least one of the supporting plans.  To answer our second question, we relied on documents provided by the  Maritime Security Working Group that detailed the status of actions taken  to implement the supporting plans and the overall status of the  implementation of the plans. We also interviewed officials from key  agencies and the co-chair of the Maritime Security Working Group. We did  not independently evaluate any of the actions monitored for the  implementation of these plans. We conducted this performance audit from  July 2007 to June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I  includes more detailed information on our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, federal agencies have  implemented numerous measures designed to improve maritime security.
Moreover, legislation has been enacted to provide a framework for  protecting the nation’s seaports and waterways from terrorist attack  through a wide range of security requirements and programs. Federal  agency measures include, for example, the U.S. Coast Guard working with  foreign countries to ensure that their seaports have adequate security  measures in place. Also, under the Container Security Initiative, U.S.  Customs and Border Protection stations officers overseas to work with  foreign officials to identify and inspect high-risk cargo en route to the  United States.
The Maritime Security Working Group was created in May 2004 to increase  coordination among U.S. government maritime security policy  stakeholders and to develop an overarching policy that would serve to  enhance maritime security and defense, and strengthen antiterrorism  efforts in the global maritime environment. As a result of the working  group’s efforts, on December 21, 2004, the President issued HSPD-13  directing the coordination of U.S. government maritime security programs  and initiatives to achieve a comprehensive and cohesive national effort  involving appropriate federal, state, local, and private sector entities.  HSPD-13 established the Maritime Security Policy Coordination  Committee  as the primary forum to coordinate U.S. policy, guidelines,  and implementation actions to protect U.S. maritime interests and  enhance U.S. national security and homeland security.
The Maritime Security Working Group, working on behalf of the Maritime  Security Policy Coordination Committee, is currently responsible for  monitoring and assessing implementation of actions related to the  supporting plans. HSPD-13 required the Secretaries of Defense and  Homeland Security to lead a joint effort to draft a National Strategy for  Maritime Security. The strategy was issued in September 2005.  Additionally, HSPD-13 directed relevant federal departments and agencies  to develop eight supporting implementation plans to address the specific  threats and challenges in the maritime environment. These supporting  plans, the lead departments for their implementation, and their completion  dates are shown below.
National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, DOD and DHS  (October 2005);    Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan, DOD and DHS (July 2005);    Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan, DOD and DHS (October  2006);  International Outreach and Coordination Strategy, State (November 2005);    Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan, DHS (April 2006);    Maritime Transportation System Security Recommendations, DHS  (October 2005);    Maritime Commerce Security Plan, DHS (October 2005); and    Domestic Outreach Plan, DHS (October 2005).
Figure 1 depicts a DHS assessment of how maritime security legislation  and the National Strategy for Maritime Security’s eight supporting  implementation plans relate to the stages of the international supply chain.  Also included is one other strategy—the Strategy to Enhance International  Supply Chain Security—that overlaps with some of the supporting plans.
Although numerous entities are responsible for security in the maritime  domain within the United States, the federal government has primary  responsibility and shares this role with numerous other stakeholders in  the state, local, and private sectors. For example, DHS—with its  component agency, the U.S. Coast Guard, acting as executive agent—has  the lead role in maritime homeland security; DOD leads efforts to further  integrate maritime intelligence and increase maritime domain awareness;  and State is responsible for taking steps to inform U.S. missions abroad on  maritime security initiatives and concerns, as necessary. Also, the  Departments of Commerce, Energy, and Transportation, among others,  have responsibilities for various aspects of maritime security.
We have reported on performance in the maritime security mission,  particularly by DHS, for several years. In our 2007 review of DHS’s  progress in management and mission areas, we reported that DHS had  made substantial progress in maritime security in that it had generally  achieved 17 out of 23 performance expectations. Specifically, we  reported that DHS had developed national and regional plans for DHS’s  maritime security and response and a national plan for recovery, and it  had ensured the completion of vulnerability assessments and security  plans for port facilities and vessels. DHS had also developed programs for  collecting information on incoming ships and was working with the  private sector to improve and validate supply chain security. Additionally,  we reported that DHS (1) had improved security efforts by establishing  committees to share information with local port stakeholders, (2) was  taking actions to establish interagency operations centers to monitor port  activities, (3) was developing port-level plans to prevent and respond to  terrorist attacks, (4) was testing such plans through exercises, and (5) was  assessing security at foreign seaports. We further reported that DHS had  strengthened the security of cargo containers through enhancements to its  system for identifying high-risk cargo and expanding partnerships with  other countries to screen containers before they are shipped to the United  States. However, we also reported that DHS faced challenges in  implementing certain maritime security responsibilities including, for  example, a program to control access to seaports’ secure areas and to  screen incoming cargo for radiation.
In October 2007, we updated our findings when we testified on DHS’s  overall maritime security efforts as they related to the Security and  Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006. We also reported on other  challenges faced by DHS in its cargo security efforts, such as CBP’s  requirement to test and implement a new program to screen 100 percent of  all incoming containers overseas. As part of our body of work on the  performance of maritime security missions, we have made  recommendations to DHS including that it develop strategic plans, better  plan the use of its human capital, establish performance measures, and  otherwise improve program operations. DHS has generally concurred with  our recommendations and is making progress towards implementing  them. A list of related GAO products is included at the end of this report.
section_title: The National Strategy for Maritime Security and Its Eight Supporting Implementation Plans Address or Partially Address All of the Desirable Characteristics of a National Strategy
paragraphs: Of the six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that  GAO identified in 2004, the National Strategy for Maritime Security and  its eight supporting implementation plans together address four and  partially address two. The four characteristics that are addressed include:  (1) purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition and risk  assessment; (3) organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination;  and (4) integration and implementation. The two characteristics that are  partially addressed are: (1) goals, objectives, activities, and performance  measures; and (2) resources, investments, and risk management.  Specifically, the elements of these characteristics that are not addressed  are those concerning performance measures, and resources and  investments. What follows is our assessment of the National Strategy for  Maritime Security and its supporting plans as compared to the six  desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. These  characteristics and the results of our assessment are shown in table 1.
subsections: section_title: National Strategy and Implementation Plans Together Address Four of the Desirable Characteristics of a National Strategy
paragraphs: Our analysis shows that the National Strategy for Maritime Security and  its supporting implementation plans together address four of the desirable  characteristics of an effective national strategy. In general, these  characteristics communicate why a strategy was produced, specify the  threats that a strategy addresses, identify the organizations responsible for  implementing a strategy and how they will coordinate their efforts, and tie  a strategy to other strategies and plans, and subordinate levels of  government. The extent to which each of these four desirable  characteristics is addressed in the National Strategy for Maritime  Security and its supporting plans is discussed in the following sections.
section_title: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The purpose, scope, and methodology characteristic is addressed in the  National Strategy for Maritime Security and its eight supporting  implementation plans. Specifically, while the purpose and scope are  addressed in both the national strategy and the supporting plans, the  strategy alone does not describe the methodology used in its development.  However, five of the eight supporting plans do contain information on the  methodology for how the plans were developed, and the Domestic  Outreach Plan documents that eight working groups of maritime security  stakeholders developed the eight plans supporting the national strategy— providing additional insight into the methodological development of the  plans. For example, the Maritime Security Policy Coordination Committee  is cited in the Maritime Domain Awareness and Maritime Commerce  Security plans as having the responsibility for developing the supporting  plans. This characteristic is important because if a national strategy does  not contain a complete description of the purpose, scope, and  methodology, this could reduce the document’s usefulness to the  organizations responsible for implementing the strategy, as well as  organizations seeking to exercise oversight, such as the Congress.  Although the purpose and scope are described generally in the national  strategy, they are more specifically described in the supporting plans. For  example, the strategy states that its purpose is “to better integrate and  synchronize the existing Department-level strategies and ensure their  effective and efficient implementation,” while the Commerce Security  Plan’s purpose is to “promote international supply chain security.” The  strategy’s introduction defines the scope of the maritime domain as well as  the scope of maritime security that the supporting plans are to address.  Supporting plans define the scope further. For example, the scope for the  Maritime Transportation Security System Recommendations plan  describes its scope as the systems that comprise transportation security:  component security, interface security, information security, and network  security.
section_title: Problem Definition and Risk Assessment
paragraphs: The problem definition and risk assessment characteristic is addressed in  the strategy and is discussed with varying levels of detail in six of the  supporting plans. This characteristic identifies the particular national  problem and threats to which a strategy is directed. Without necessarily  prescribing a detailed solution, better problem definition and risk  assessment provide greater latitude to responsible parties to develop  innovative approaches that are tailored to the needs of specific regions or  sectors and can be implemented as a practical matter given fiscal, human  capital, and other limitations. The introduction to the national strategy  identifies the problem stating that the oceans support commerce and are a  source of food, resources, and recreation for the United States, and that  they also act as a barrier and a conduit for threats to our nation. All of the  supporting plans with the exception of the Domestic Outreach Plan  further define the problem relative to their own purpose. For example, the  problem cited in the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain  Awareness is that “today’s complex and ambiguous threats place an even  greater premium on knowledge and a shared understanding of the  maritime domain.”
In regard to risk assessment, one section of the national strategy identifies  five threats to maritime security and discusses them with references to  intelligence assessments and other national strategies. For example,  citing the National Security Strategy of the United States, the National  Strategy for Maritime Security states that terrorists have indicated a  strong desire to use weapons of mass destruction which, when coupled  with technology dispersion and the fact that some nations are unable to  account for their stockpiles of these weapons or materials, increases the  possibility that a terrorist attack involving such weapons could occur. It  also states that terrorists can develop effective attack capabilities against  maritime targets relatively quickly. The International Outreach and  Coordination Strategy and the Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain  Awareness also discuss the threats to maritime security in a manner  similar to the National Strategy for Maritime Security. Other plans, such  as those for Maritime Commerce Security and the Maritime Transportation  System Security , mention threats more generally, citing, for example, the  type of threat—nuclear, chemical, biological—as in the commerce plan, or  the source of the threat—terrorism—as in the transportation system plan.
section_title: Organizational Roles, Responsibilities, and Coordination
paragraphs: Collectively, the national strategy and its eight supporting implementation  plans address the organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination  characteristic. Though the level of specificity regarding roles,  responsibilities, and coordination varies in the national strategy, all of the  supporting plans address this characteristic with some detail. The  inclusion of this characteristic in a national strategy helps agencies and  other stakeholders to coordinate their efforts. It also helps clarify specific  roles, particularly where there is overlap, and thus can enhance both  implementation and accountability. Regarding organizational roles and  responsibilities, the national strategy indicates that the public and private  sectors share responsibility for the protection of critical infrastructure and  key resources, with DHS in the lead role. However, the strategy does not  identify the more specific roles of DHS components such as Customs and  Border Protection or the Coast Guard in the protection of critical  infrastructure or key assets. The supporting plans, however, are more  explicit about roles and responsibilities. For example, specific agencies  and components such as the Coast Guard and CBP within DHS are  identified in the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness. In  another case, while the national strategy references the National Incident  Management System and the National Response Plan under the strategic  objective to Minimize Damage and Expedite Recovery, it does not identify  which agency is to coordinate and lead such a recovery. However, these  roles and responsibilities are discussed in greater detail in the Maritime  Infrastructure Recovery Plan. For example, it identifies the capabilities or  types of assets the Army Corps of Engineers and the Department of  Transportation will provide to aid in recovery. Additionally, the National  Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness identifies the Maritime  Security Policy Coordination Committee as having overall coordination  responsibility for that plan. Other plans such as the Maritime Commerce  Security Plan and Maritime Transportation System Security  Recommendations, respectively, cite coordination responsibilities for  specific recommendations or actions. For example, the Maritime  Commerce Security Plan directs DHS to coordinate with DOD in the  development of technology to secure containerized cargo, and the  Maritime Transportation Security System Recommendations plan directs  DHS to coordinate improvements to international maritime regulation.
section_title: Integration and Implementation
paragraphs: The integration and implementation characteristic is addressed in the  national strategy and all but one of the supporting plans by noting, for  example, that the terrorist threats cited in the national strategy are also  considered in the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy to  Secure Cyberspace. This characteristic builds on the aforementioned  organizational roles and responsibilities—and thus can further clarify the  relationships between various implementing parties. With regard to  integration, the National Strategy for Maritime Security states that it is  guided by the goals of the National Security Strategy and National  Strategy for Homeland Security and draws upon other national strategies  to counter terrorism, protect critical infrastructure, and combat weapons  of mass destruction, among other strategies. The supporting plans provide  more details on the integration characteristic by, for example, discussing  how a particular plan supports or is supported by another supporting plan.  For example, the Maritime Commerce Security Plan states that its  development was closely coordinated with that of the Maritime  Infrastructure Recovery Plan and the Maritime Transportation Security  System Recommendations plan. Furthermore, the Maritime Infrastructure  Recovery Plan discusses the integration of the plan with other national  and local area maritime security plans.
With regard to implementation, the National Strategy for Maritime  Security cites the eight supporting plans as the means to implement the  strategy and seven of the eight supporting plans provide amplifying detail  and specificity on implementation issues, often citing their own  implementation in terms of the implementation of other supporting plans.  Three plans also state how their implementation is related to other plans.  For example, the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness  states that its implementation directly supports, and is supported by, the  Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan and that the Maritime  Domain Awareness plan is an enabler of the Maritime Operational Threat  Response plan.
section_title: National Strategy and Implementation Plans Together Partially Address the Remaining Two Desirable Characteristics of a National Strategy
paragraphs: The strategy and supporting plans only partially address the remaining two  desirable characteristics: (1) goals, objectives, activities, and performance  measures; and (2) resources, investments, and risk management. These  characteristics are partially addressed because they do not identify the  performance measures needed to gauge the implementation of the strategy  and its supporting plans, and the resources and investments needed to  successfully implement and carry out the strategy. These two  characteristics are discussed below.
section_title: Goals, Objectives, Activities, and Performance Measures
paragraphs: The goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures characteristic  is only partially addressed in the national strategy, and the supporting  plans also do not include information to address all elements of this  characteristic, such as performance measures to gauge the progress made  implementing the strategy and plans. This characteristic provides for a  clear identification of priorities, milestones, and performance measures,  without which implementing parties may find it difficult to achieve results  in specific time frames. This also enables more effective oversight and  accountability. While the national strategy does not specifically use the  term “goals” in its description, it does provide a list of principles that serve  as the equivalent of goals and a hierarchy of objectives and subordinate  objectives. For example, the stated principles of the maritime security  strategy are to (1) preserve freedom of the seas, (2) facilitate and defend  commerce to ensure the uninterrupted flow of shipping, and (3) facilitate  the movement of desirable goods and people across our borders while  screening out dangerous people and material. The strategy also outlines  the steps for achieving these with subordinate objectives such as to  protect maritime-related population centers and critical infrastructures.  Furthermore, the strategy includes five strategic actions—such as to  embed security into commercial practices—intended to achieve further  coordination of maritime security efforts. Each of the supporting plans  provides more focused goals and objectives. For example, the goal of the  Maritime Commerce Security Plan is to improve the security of the  maritime supply chain, and one of the goals of the National Plan to  Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness is to enhance transparency in the  maritime domain.
However, performance measures are lacking in both the national strategy  and all but one of the supporting plans. The only supporting plan that  mentions performance measures is the Maritime Commerce Security Plan  which lists potential or possible performance measures. For example, the  Maritime Commerce Security Plan states, “Customs and Border Protection  performs validations of the foreign security procedures of Customs-Trade  Partnership Against Terrorism participants. This could act as a measure of  effectiveness in implementing procedures to secure cargo.” Additionally,  in our previous work, we have reported that performance measures are in  place for some individual maritime security programs. For example, we  reported that CBP has established performance metrics for its Automated  Targeting System and uses performance measures to gauge the  effectiveness of its Container Security Initiative program. We have also  made recommendations for the development of performance measures for  other maritime security programs, such as emergency response  capabilities. DHS generally concurred with these recommendations and  is working to implement them.
section_title: Resources, Investments, and Risk Management
paragraphs: The resources, investments, and risk management characteristic is also  only partially addressed in the national strategy and supporting  implementation plans because not all of the elements of this characteristic  are addressed. Specifically, while the strategic actions of the maritime  security strategy discussed earlier in this report constitute an approach to  minimize risk and invest resources to achieve maritime security, the  strategy lacks information on resource requirements. Six of the eight  supporting plans also discuss risk management; for example, there is a  distinct recommendation to incorporate risk management in maritime  security in the Maritime Transportation Security System  Recommendations plan. However, the supporting plans, like the national  strategy, mostly lack information on the sources and types of resources  needed.
The national strategy addresses investments and risk management in a  general way. For example, the strategic action to “Embed Security into  Commercial Practices” discusses the need to conduct vulnerability  assessments to identify defenses that require improvement and procedures  that are used to identify terrorist threats in cargo containers, but the  strategy does not contain an investment strategy for implementing this  strategic action nor does it determine how costs will be borne among the  involved parties. With the exception of the National Plan to Achieve  Maritime Domain Awareness, none of the other seven supporting plans  address the resources issue and three do not address investments. In a  November 2007 briefing regarding the status of the implementation of the  national plan, the working group identified resources and investments as  challenges in implementing the strategy. This briefing also included  recommendations to address the resource issue. For example, it suggested  that the Maritime Security Policy Coordination Committee evaluate the  feasibility of developing an interagency priorities and investment strategy.  Without guidance on resources, investments, and risk management,  implementing parties may find it difficult to allocate resources and  investments according to priorities and constraints, track costs and  performance, and shift investments and resources as appropriate.  Although this information was not included in the strategy or its  supporting plans, DHS’s latest Future Years Homeland Security Program  (FYHSP), a 5-year resource plan to support the mission, priorities, and  goals of the department within projected funding, provides some details  on how much DHS expects to spend to implement its maritime security  responsibilities. Within the goal to protect our nation from dangerous  people and goods, the FYHSP discusses several maritime security  programs that are part of the National Strategy for Maritime Security or  it supporting plans. Among these are the Container Security Initiative to  screen cargo containers for weapons before the cargo is shipped to the  United States, the C-TPAT program which works with the private sector to  improve the security standards for supply chain and container security,  and research into the development of technology to improve container  security.
section_title: Maritime Security Working Group Reports that the Implementation of Supporting Plans Varies
paragraphs: Documents provided to us by the Maritime Security Working Group  indicate that the implementation of the supporting plans varies and the  working group reported one plan had been completed, another has  reached the assessment phase, a third has reached the execution phase,  and the other five plans remain primarily in the planning phase. The  working group identified 76 actions across the various supporting plans  and has monitored the implementation status of these actions. The  working group reported that, as of November 2007, six of these actions  were completed and 70 were ongoing. The types of actions it monitored  included issuing guidance, developing plans and coordination procedures,  assigning personnel and forming working groups, as well as technology  development and partnering with the private sector.
The process by which the working group monitors the implementation of  the actions associated with the supporting plans is demonstrated in figure  2. According to the working group co-chair, the working group identified a  list of actions to be carried out to implement the supporting plans. The  working group then provided this list to the departments which in turn  delegated further actions to their components (right side of the figure).  The status of these actions was communicated back to the working group  and up to the committee through the departments (left side of the figure).  A DHS official who is a working group member said that sometimes  components communicate directly to the working group.
Table 2 contains a brief description of each implementation plan and  examples of actions the working group is monitoring as reported by the  working group in November 2007. The working group has also reported on  whether each plan was in the guidance, planning, execution, or  assessment and evaluation phase. Overall, the working group reported that  the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness has reached the  execution phase, which includes training exercises and operations; the  Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan has reached the assessment  phase, where lessons learned are assessed and best practices are  developed; and implementation of the Domestic Outreach Plan has been  completed. The other five plans remain primarily in the planning phase  where strategic planning, requirements and capabilities, operational, and  tactical planning occur. For example, actions that the working group is  monitoring for the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan—which the  working group reports is in the planning phase—include the assignment of  risk management personnel, the incorporation of recovery management  procedures, and the identification of private sector subject matter experts  essential to recovery execution.
Though we did not verify the accuracy of what the working group reported  regarding the status of the 76 actions it had been monitoring, in August  2007 we reported that DHS had made substantial progress with regard to  maritime security. We reported that DHS had generally achieved 17 out of  23 performance expectations. Specifically, we reported that DHS had  generally achieved many planning goals, but had not achieved  performance expectations related to the development of technology. For  example, we reported that DHS had not developed a long-range vessel  tracking system to provide more information on vessels approaching or  already in U.S. waters. We have ongoing work reviewing the progress the  Coast Guard has made in implementing its vessel tracking system.
In its November 2007 briefing to Maritime Security Policy Coordination  Committee, the working group cited three challenges to implementing the  National Strategy for Maritime Security and its supporting plans: (1) the  need to align the implementing actions in overlapping national strategies,  (2) the lack of dedicated interagency resources to effectively coordinate  actions in supporting plans, and (3) the differences in the prioritization of  actions by responsible components and agencies. The working group  briefing also included recommendations to the Maritime Security Policy  Coordination Committee to address these challenges. For example, to  address the first challenge, it recommended an analysis of uncoordinated  strategies with maritime components to identify gap-closing strategies. In  response to the second challenge, the working group recommended that  additional analysis of the maritime security strategy’s implementation and  coordination be conducted. The working group also identified the need to  prioritize task recommendations and develop an implementation plan  which integrates tasks into the individual plans. The working group  suggested addressing the third obstacle by evaluating the feasibility of  developing interagency priorities or an investment strategy for efforts that  are mutually supportive of implementing the National Strategy for  Maritime Security. According to the working group briefing, this would  require the incorporation of a standardized mechanism for future updates  and the need to ensure that the strategy’s oversight roles and  responsibilities are clarified, understood, and embraced by all parties.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense,  Homeland Security, and State for comment. The departments had no  official comments on the draft, but provided technical comments which  we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees and subcommittees. We will make copies available upon  request. In addition, this report will be available at no cost on the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report or wish to  discuss the matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-9610 or  caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: Our first objective was to assess the extent to which the National Strategy  for Maritime Security and its supporting implementation plans contain  the elements identified as desirable characteristics of an effective national  strategy. To answer this question, we first analyzed the National Strategy  for Maritime Security and determined whether it contains the desirable  characteristics for an effective national strategy that we identified in  February 2004. We also analyzed the unclassified versions of the strategy’s  eight supporting implementation plans to determine if they provided  evidence of the characteristics contained within or missing from the  national strategy. If a characteristic or an element of a characteristic was  missing from the national strategy, our methodology required that the  characteristic or element be present in at least five of the supporting plans  for the characteristic to be considered “addressed.” An assessment of  “partially addressed” meant that the characteristic or element was present  in at least one of the supporting plans. In our past work, we did not assess  supporting plans as part of our evaluation of the national strategies.  However, we believe it is proper to include the eight supporting plans in  our analysis of the National Strategy for Maritime Security because  Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13 (HSPD-13) directed that this  strategy and its supporting plans be produced together. Two analysts  independently reviewed the strategy and each of the supporting plans to  determine whether the National Strategy for Maritime Security  addressed each of the characteristics of an effective national strategy. Any  differences between each analyst’s determinations were resolved through  discussion and a comparison of evidence.
Our second objective was to determine the reported status of the  implementation of these plans. To describe the reported status of the  implementation actions, we reviewed spreadsheets and briefing charts  detailing the actions taken to implement the supporting plans that were  obtained from representatives of DHS, DOD, and State who, in turn, had  received them from the Maritime Security Working Group. We also  conducted interviews with officials representing lead implementation  agencies including DHS, DOD, and State, and the co-chair of the Maritime  Security Working Group. These officials provided us with the same  information on the actions taken to implement the supporting plans that  we had received from the Maritime Security Working Group. We did not  independently evaluate any of the actions reported for the implementation  of these plans; however, we have published numerous reports regarding  selected maritime security programs and initiatives that are included in the  National Strategy for Maritime Security and its supporting plans. A list of  related GAO products is included at the end of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to June 2008 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: The report was prepared under the direction of Dawn Hoff, Assistant  Director. Other individuals making key contributions to this report include  Pille Anvelt, Nancy Briggs, Steve Calvo, Tony DeFrank, Wayne Ekblad,  Geoff Hamilton, Stan Kostyla, April Thompson, and Adam Vogt.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.  Bound Cargo Containers. GAO-08-533T. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2008.
Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has  Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges  Remain in Verifying Security Practices. GAO-08-240. Washington, D.C.:  Apr. 25, 2008.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, Recent  Performance, and Related Challenges. GAO-08-494T. Washington, D.C.:  Mar. 6, 2008.
Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct  Facility Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program’s Staffing,  Practices and Data. GAO-08-12. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2008.
Supply Chain Security: Examination of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign  Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance  Measures Are Needed. GAO-08-187. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2008.
Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in  Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity  Tankers. GAO-08-141. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2007.
Transportation Security: TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the  Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, but  Challenges Remain. GAO-08-133T. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2007.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One  Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation  of Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-454. Washington, D.C.:  Aug. 17, 2007.
Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. GAO-07-804R.  Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare  for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address  Related Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-835T. Washington,  D.C.: May 15, 2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing  the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-833T. Washington, D.C.:  May 10, 2007.
Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port  Act. GAO-07-754T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2007.
International Trade: Persistent Weaknesses in the In-Bond Cargo System  Impede Customs and Border Protection’s Ability to Address Revenue,  Trade, and Security Concerns. GAO-07-561. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17,  2007.
Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in  Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28,  2007.
Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on  a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification. GAO-07- 316. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2007.
Maritime Security: Information Sharing Efforts Are Improving. GAO-06- 933T. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006.
Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of  Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T.  Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying  Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns  Remain. GAO-06-389. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2006.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and  Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical  Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005.
Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved.  GAO-05-466T. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and  Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2005.
Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment  Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection  Efforts. GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information  Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention.  GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2005.
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in  Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign  Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005.
Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced  Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of Improved Security. GAO-05-404.  Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2005.
Homeland Security: Agency Plans, Implementation, and Challenges  Regarding the National Strategy for Homeland Security. GAO-05-33.  Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005.
Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport  Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.: Jan.14,  2005.
Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime  Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.: Dec.  10, 2004.
Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective  Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.: Sep.  30, 2004.
Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and  Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System.  GAO-04-868. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004.
Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New  Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838.  Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting  Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington,  D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target  Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington,  D.C.: Dec. 16, 2003.
Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime  Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T.  Washington, D.C.: Sep. 9, 2003.
Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be  Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 27, 2003.
Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland  Security in Balancing Its Border Security and Trade Facilitation  Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003.