Recovery Act: GSA's Courthouse Projects Illustrate Opportunities to Improve Management Practices and Analyze Environmental Outcomes
Published: 2015-02-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Recovery Act provided GSA with $5.55 billion—over three times the agency's 2009 funding for new construction and renovations—to invest in federal buildings and U.S. courthouses. This amount included $4.5 billion to convert federal buildings and U.S. courthouses into green buildings that would reduce energy and water use, among other goals.
GAO was asked to review GSA's use of Recovery Act funds as they related to courthouses. This report examines (1) how GSA determined which courthouse projects to fund under the Recovery Act, (2) how GSA's management of selected Recovery Act projects aligned with successful practices and whether these projects disrupted judiciary operations, and (3) how GSA set environmental goals for courthouses and whether selected projects met those goals. GAO reviewed relevant laws and agency documents, collected cost and schedule data on courthouse projects, and analyzed environmental outcomes for 10 projects. GAO selected these 10 Recovery Act courthouse projects, based on project size, type, and location, and interviewed GSA officials and judiciary tenants about GSA's management and coordination.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The General Services Administration (GSA) developed eight selection criteria for utilizing its $4.5 billion in high-performing green (green) building funds—or more than 80 percent of its total $5.5-billion budget—under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). GSA used almost $800 million of its $4.5-billion green building funds on 15 full or partial modernization projects and the remaining funds were used on federal buildings or limited scope projects. For example, at the Hipolito F. Garcia Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse in San Antonio, Texas, GSA installed solar panels and a solar water heater on the roof, installed a green roof on the interior courtyard, and replaced the building's lighting. In addition, as of May 2014, GSA used $257 million of the $750 million in Recovery Act funds dedicated to federal buildings and U.S. courthouses to construct or acquire seven courthouses.
GSA management of selected Recovery Act courthouse projects did not always align with seven successful practices that GAO developed for managing large-scale investments. GAO's more in-depth review of 10 courthouses showed that while GSA generally provided top leadership support and sufficient funding, its management of these Recovery Act projects did not always align with the remaining five practices. For example, judiciary tenants at 3 of the 10 courthouses said that GSA management did not actively engage with judiciary stakeholders during construction. In one case, judiciary officials at the Federico Degetau Federal Building and Clemente Ruiz Nazario Courthouse in Puerto Rico said they were not consulted on the project's phased schedule approach that required the closure of all public restrooms in the operating courthouse for a year, except for one restroom on the seventh floor of the adjoining federal building. For the projects GAO reviewed, when GSA did not incorporate the successful practices, GAO found that projects were more likely to experience schedule delays, cost increases, or lack of tenant support. GAO found that most judiciary tenants were satisfied with the completed projects, although tenants at 4 courthouses said the projects disrupted court operations.
GSA set environmental goals by establishing minimum performance criteria (MPC) to guide how it designed green courthouse Recovery Act projects; however, environmental outcomes are not yet known. The MPC included dozens of environmental requirements for projects in areas such as energy, water, and material use. While some Recovery Act projects have been completed for several years and GSA has the necessary data to evaluate projects, GSA officials have not developed a schedule for analyzing building performance against the MPC. GAO evaluated the extent to which the selected courthouses with a year or more of operational data contributed toward the energy and water- reduction goals that GSA used to develop the MPC. GAO found that as of fiscal year 2014, 2 of the 5 courthouses with available data are contributing toward energy reduction goals, and all 4 courthouses with available data are contributing toward water reduction goals. Without evaluating the performance of courthouse projects against the MPC, GSA lacks important information that could guide the agency's future investments in green infrastructure.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that GSA (1) examine incorporating successful management practices into its capital investment process and (2) analyze and apply environmental outcomes for green Recovery Act projects. GSA agreed with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act)  provided the General Services Administration (GSA) with $5.55 billion for  the Federal Buildings Fund—over three times the agency’s 2009 funding  for new construction and renovations—to invest in federal buildings and  U.S. courthouses, create and preserve jobs, and promote economic  recovery. GSA was directed to use at least $4.5 billion, or 80 percent of  its total $5.5 billion budget, to convert its buildings and courthouses to  high-performance green (green) buildings by improving energy and water  efficiency, among other environmental goals. Of the remaining Recovery  Act funds, not less than $750 million was to be used by GSA for federal  buildings and U.S. courthouses, and not less than $300 million for border  stations and land ports of entry. The Recovery Act required GSA to  obligate not less than $5 billion of the funds by September 30, 2010, and  the remainder of the funds by September 30, 2011.
Given GSA’s significant increase in funding from the Recovery Act, you  asked us to review GSA’s use of Recovery Act funds at U.S. courthouses.  This report examines (1) how GSA determined which courthouse projects  to fund under the Recovery Act, (2) how GSA’s management of selected  Recovery Act projects aligns with successful management practices and  whether these projects disrupted judiciary operations, and (3) how GSA  established environmental performance goals for courthouses funded by  the Recovery Act and whether selected projects met those goals.
This report examines Recovery Act projects in GSA buildings with a  judicial presence. We use the term courthouse throughout the report to  refer to these buildings. To identify how GSA determined which U.S.  courthouse projects would receive Recovery Act funds, we reviewed  GSA’s Recovery Act planning documents, project selection criteria, and  relevant legislation and guidance—including the Energy Independence  and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) and related federal statutes and  executive orders—related to its $4.5 billion in green building Recovery Act  funds and its $750 million in Recovery Act funds for federal buildings and  U.S courthouses. We also worked with GSA and the Administrative Office  of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) to identify which Recovery Act projects had  any judicial presence. We excluded border stations and land ports of  entry from our analysis because none of these buildings has a judicial  presence. GSA categorized green buildings as full or partial  modernizations, limited scope projects, or small projects.
To assess how GSA’s management of selected Recovery Act projects  aligned with successful management practices and whether these  projects disrupted judicial operations, we applied seven successful  management practices for large scale investments that we identified in  prior GAO work. While the successful practices were originally  developed for information technology (IT) investments, IT stakeholders  agreed that these practices have broader applicability. We also shared  these successful practices with GSA officials who oversaw the Recovery  Act program and asked how GSA addressed each practice; GSA officials  did not identify any concerns with applying these successful practices to  Recovery Act projects. These practices are also consistent with the  leading practices we set forth in our capital decision-making guide. We  selected 10 courthouses, from GSA’s 22 new construction or full or partial  courthouse modernization projects, for examination with regard to how  GSA implemented the management practices. We selected projects that  ranged in size, Recovery Act-funding amount, geographic location, and  project type. In general, we selected projects that had the largest scope  and funding because larger projects increased the likelihood that tenants  were aware of the Recovery Act-funded work and would be able to  describe how, if at all, GSA coordinated with them. We interviewed the  judicial tenants that resided in the selected courthouse buildings during  construction or would reside in them once construction was completed to  obtain their views about how their experiences aligned with the successful  practices mentioned above and whether projects disrupted court  operations. In addition to interviewing judicial tenants, after interviews, we  sent a structured questionnaire to tenants at each courthouse to verify  responses captured during initial interviews and to collect additional  information specific to the seven successful practices. Our findings from  our review of the 10 selected courthouse projects cannot be used to  make generalizations about all of GSA’s Recovery Act projects. We also  examined GSA’s cost and schedule data for all 22 courthouses that were  either full or partial modernization projects or new construction to identify  how, if at all, project costs or schedules changed from 2009 through  2014. We discussed with GSA staff how these data were collected and  maintained and determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for our  purposes.
To determine how GSA established environmental performance goals for  the courthouse projects it funded and the extent to which selected  projects met those goals, we reviewed agency and regulatory documents  describing GSA’s performance goals for Recovery Act projects and  examined GSA’s data on energy and water usage. Specifically, we  compared GSA’s energy and water usage data for the selected buildings  from fiscal years 2003 and 2007, respectively, to fiscal year 2014 to  determine whether expected reductions in energy and water consumption  were achieved. We used 2003 energy data and 2007 water data because  those were the baseline years for federally required energy and water  reductions. We did not complete this analysis for courthouses that were  still under construction for any part of fiscal year 2014. We reviewed  documentation related to these data and interviewed knowledgeable GSA  staff about the quality of the data and determined the data to be  sufficiently reliable for our purposes. See appendix I for more information  about our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2014 to February  2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: As the federal government’s landlord, GSA is responsible for, among  other things, designing, building, and maintaining its portfolio of  approximately 9,000 federally owned or leased buildings and  courthouses. According to the AOUSC, 424 of these buildings have a  judicial presence ranging from small court spaces that provide judicial  services on a part-time basis to large courthouse buildings in major urban  areas.
To address the Recovery Act’s obligation deadlines, environmental  requirements, and large influx of funding, GSA adapted its capital  investment process to include a newly created national program  management office (PMO) in April 2009 to oversee its Recovery Act  program. GSA established the PMO, which included construction and  acquisition subject-matter experts, to help regional teams deliver  Recovery Act projects on time and in accordance with GSA’s policies and  Recovery Act requirements. The PMO provided additional support and  oversight to GSA’s capital investment process. The PMO grouped GSA’s  11 regions into three Recovery Act zones. GSA officials stated that the  objectives of the zone structure were to create and foster the sharing of  ideas and resources and to provide project oversight. GSA zone and  regional recovery executive officials were responsible for, among other  things, monitoring and reviewing the performance of Recovery Act  projects and managing risks at the regional level.
GSA selected 259 federal buildings and U.S. courthouses for its  Recovery Act program, in addition to a number of small projects. As  shown in table 1, these Recovery Act projects fall into two main  categories: (1) conversions to green buildings, and (2) new construction  or renovations.
The Recovery Act directed GSA to use the majority of its funding—$4.5  billion—to convert its federal buildings and courthouses to green  buildings, as defined in section 401 of EISA. Among other things, a  green building must, throughout the life cycle of the building, as compared  with similar buildings, accomplish the following:  reduce energy, water, and material resource use;  improve indoor environmental quality, including reducing indoor  pollution, improving heating and cooling, and improving lighting and  acoustic environments that affect occupant health and productivity;  reduce negative impacts on the environment, including air and water  pollution and waste generation; and  consider indoor and outdoor effects of the building on human health  and the environment, including improvements in worker productivity,  and other factors, considered appropriate by specified green-building  officials.
GSA’s portfolio of buildings is also subject to federal energy and water  conservation requirements and goals established in federal statutes and  executive orders. For example, the National Energy Conservation Policy  Act, as amended by EISA and the Energy Policy Act of 2005,  established energy-efficiency performance standards. EISA amendments  require, for example, that agencies—including GSA—apply conservation  measures that annually reduce energy consumption resulting in a 30  percent reduction by fiscal year 2015 compared to a fiscal year 2003  baseline to applicable facilities across an agency’s entire portfolio.  Similarly, Executive Order 13423 requires federal agencies to reduce  their water consumption by 16 percent by the end of fiscal year 2015  compared to a fiscal year 2007 baseline.
section_title: GSA Worked to Select Green Projects and New Courthouses That Reflected Recovery Act Priorities
subsections: section_title: GSA Selected Green Projects to Achieve Environmental Goals and Obligate Funds Quickly
paragraphs: According to GSA officials, the agency obligated its $4.5 billion in  Recovery Act funds to green projects that would help convert federal  buildings and courthouses into green buildings and that could be  obligated quickly. To reflect these priorities, GSA developed selection  criteria for full and partial modernization projects (for both federal   The first three criteria  buildings and courthouses) presented in table 2.were unique to Recovery Act projects and given the highest priority. The  remaining five criteria are those GSA typically uses to select capital  investment projects.
GSA convened an interdisciplinary team of approximately 20 GSA subject  matter experts, including some who would eventually sit on the newly  created PMO, to select Recovery Act projects according to the criteria.  According to agency officials, GSA’s criteria served as a reference for  initial project rankings, and the PMO made some modifications to those  rankings to arrive at a final project list, to ensure, for example, that each  of GSA’s 11 regions received funding. Once the PMO and initial list of  selected projects were created, officials from the PMO would recommend  new projects as funds became available due to, for example, cost savings  on other projects. In total, GSA used about $800 million of its $4.5 billion  green building funds toward 15 full or partial courthouse modernization  projects (an average of about $53 million each).
EISA’s broad definition of green building attributes provided GSA  flexibility in carrying out its first selection criteria, targeting projects that  would help transform buildings into green buildings. For example, each of  the full or partial modernization courthouse projects we reviewed  contained green infrastructure components aimed at reducing energy and  water use, such as energy-efficient lighting and upgraded mechanical  systems or water-efficient bathroom fixtures. In our review of eight full or  partial modernization courthouses, we also found instances at each  courthouse where GSA utilized EISA’s broad definition of a green building  to incorporate other goals, such as improving indoor environmental  quality, fire protection and life safety systems, or building layout.  According to GSA officials, each of these projects—which were designed  under the supervision of GSA regional officials—were reviewed by GSA’s  PMO and legal department to make sure projects supported the goals of  EISA. The following examples illustrate how GSA used a portion of its  green Recovery Act funds for green infrastructure and other broader  uses:
At the Hipolito F. Garcia Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse in San  Antonio, Texas, GSA installed solar panels and a solar water heater  on the roof (fig. 1), a green roof on the interior courtyard, energy- efficient lighting, water-efficient plumbing throughout the building, and  a new heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system, among other  upgrades.
At the Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse in New York City, New  York, GSA used $64 million to pay for construction cost increases of  the full modernization project. According to GSA officials, costs  increased due to unforeseen building conditions that required  additional work, funding to remediate asbestos from the historic  building, and the higher-than-expected cost of construction in  Manhattan at the time.
At the Birch Bayh Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse in  Indianapolis, Indiana, GSA used a portion of its green funds to  complete structural renovations in bathrooms to increase accessibility  for people with disabilities. The project also included lead paint and  asbestos removal, new carbon monoxide sensors, and fire alarm  sprinkler systems.
At the George C. Young Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse in  Orlando, Florida, GSA regional officials told us they requested and  received $12.5 million in additional Recovery Act green project funds  to move an elevator pavilion to the building’s exterior and improve the  building’s layout (fig. 1).
To minimize the execution risk and expedite the execution timing of  Recovery Act projects, GSA generally selected projects that had already  completed design work. GSA officials said that they used Recovery Act  funding to quickly begin or expand construction on these projects, while  also identifying ways to incorporate energy savings or environmental  improvements into their design. To guide the design process and ensure  that these projects contained green elements, GSA established minimum  performance criteria (MPC), which we will discuss in greater detail later.  Additionally, GSA funded cost escalation for some ongoing modernization  projects—that is, projects that needed additional funding to start or  complete construction.
GSA estimated the return on investment or cost effectiveness of its  Recovery Act investments based on a calculation of each investment’s  simple payback period. Pursuant to Department of Energy regulations, as  a rough measure of cost effectiveness, federal agencies may calculate a  simple payback period for projects that demonstrate payback periods  significantly shorter than the useful life of such projects. The simple  payback period estimates the amount of time it takes to recover the cost  of an initial investment, through future energy and water cost savings. An  energy or water conservation technology is likely to be cost-effective if its  estimated payback period is less than the useful life of that system. In  accordance with the National Institute of Building Sciences’ Whole  Building Design Guide, GSA can calculate cost effectiveness for all  project components within a building as a whole, rather than individually.  This process allows the benefits of some technologies to exceed the cost  recovery time frames if they are offset by technologies with shorter cost- recovery time frames, up to an average of 40 years. Table 3 shows  simple payback period estimates for selected energy- and water-saving  technologies installed at the Hipolito F. Garcia Federal Building and U.S.  Courthouse in San Antonio. According to GSA’s analysis shown below,  project components that recover costs quickly, such as high-efficiency  chillers and low-flow plumbing fixtures have been combined with  components that take longer to recover costs, such as solar water  heaters, for a simple payback period below 40 years.
section_title: GSA Generally Selected New Construction Projects That Helped It Build or Acquire New Courthouses
paragraphs: In addition to $4.5 billion in green funds, the Recovery Act provided GSA  with $750 million for federal buildings and U.S. courthouses. While GSA  generally selected projects that helped it build or acquire new  courthouses, other eligible uses included repairs and alternations to  existing buildings, building security enhancements, and building  operations and maintenance.
As of May 2014, GSA had used $257 million of its $750 million-general- purpose funds for seven courthouses and the remainder on federal  buildings that did not have a judiciary presence. As shown in table 4, this  included construction of a new courthouse, escalation funds for three new  courthouses, and the acquisition of three new courthouses GSA originally  planned to lease. GSA funded the new courthouse in Austin because it  was a high-priority project for the judiciary; funded the escalation costs for  three projects that needed additional funding to start or complete  construction; and purchased three new courthouses that it had intended  to lease because it considered ownership more cost efficient in the long  term.
section_title: GSA’s Project Management Has Not Always Aligned with Successful Practices and Had Mixed Effects on Judicial Operations
subsections: section_title: GSA’s Project Management Did Not Always Align with Successful Practices
paragraphs: We found that GSA management incorporated the seven successful  practices for managing large-scale investments to varying degrees at 10  courthouse projects that we reviewed in greater detail. These seven  practices, which we identified in our prior work, are listed in table 5. We  found that GSA adhered to two practices by demonstrating support from  top leadership and generally providing sufficient funding, but GSA  experienced mixed results implementing the remaining five practices.
Of the 10 courthouses we reviewed, we found that, in general, Recovery  Act projects were more likely to be completed on time, on budget, or  receive support from judicial tenants when GSA effectively incorporated  the management practices. By contrast, when these practices were not  fully incorporated, projects were more likely to experience problems and  did not always meet tenants’ needs. For example, in a few instances,  GSA had to modify projects or replace technologies—actions that can  increase costs, delay projects, or increase tenant disruptions. By not  incorporating these seven successful practices at each of the 10  courthouses we reviewed, GSA increased the risks that Recovery Act  projects were not planned and constructed in the most efficient manner  and that impacts to tenants were not minimized. Since GSA’s process for  other construction projects is similar to how the agency managed the  Recovery Act process, these successful practices may have application  beyond managing Recovery Act projects.
subsections: section_title: Practice: Project Staff Involve Stakeholders in the Development of Requirements
paragraphs: We found that GSA management did not consistently involve the judiciary  in the planning stages of Recovery Act projects and, consequently, found  instances where projects did not meet judicial tenants’ needs. Judicial  tenants at 2 of the 8 courthouses that responded to our structured  questionnaire on this issue said they were involved in scoping Recovery  Act projects. Alternatively, 5 respondents that provided a definitive  response to our question told us GSA did not involve them in scoping  projects or identifying how new building technologies or modifications  funded under the Recovery Act would affect them. GSA officials noted  that they established protocols to ensure that tenants were included as  active members of the project team, however, according to GSA officials,  they did not always solicit input when developing the scope of projects— which happened prior to construction—because these were building  upgrades that were expected to minimally affect tenants. We found,  however, instances where projects did affect judiciary tenants. For  example, judicial tenants at the Richard H. Poff Federal Building in  Roanoke, Virginia, told us they were not asked about upgrades to lighting  and the installation of glass for the windows that later presented safety  and operational concerns. Judicial tenants at the building said that the  new energy efficient lighting—which automatically turned off when  occupancy sensors could not detect movement—turned off in the  probation area of the operating courthouse that was accessible to the  public, causing safety concerns for those who entered the area. However,  according to GSA officials, there was an onsite example of the window  treatment for more than a year that tenants were encouraged to review.   At the Federal Building and U.S. Custom House in Denver, Colorado,  judiciary tenants told us they were not included in scoping the project and  identifying new building technologies, and as a result, they told us that the  contractors installed energy efficient lights bulbs in historical fixtures that  were above the allotted wattage and that the bulbs had to be replaced.
section_title: Practice: Project Staff Actively Engage with Stakeholders
paragraphs: GSA management developed mechanisms to actively engage judiciary  tenants on Recovery Act projects throughout the construction process,  but judiciary tenants at some of the selected buildings reported significant  challenges. According to GSA officials, GSA developed a communication  template for Recovery Act projects—outlining each project’s scope,  schedule, budget, and point of contact—that it shared with judiciary  tenants. GSA and Judiciary tenants at all of the 10 courthouses we  reviewed also said that GSA held regular meetings with the tenants or  provided them with project updates. However, judiciary tenants at 3 of the  10 courthouses told us that GSA did not solicit their input. For example, at  the Federico Degetau Federal Building and Clemente Ruiz Nazario U.S.  Courthouse in San Juan, Puerto Rico, judiciary tenants said that GSA  limited their involvement during construction, and as a result, their input  was not obtained on the project’s phased schedule approach that  required the closure of all public restrooms in the operating courthouse for  a year, except for one restroom on the seventh floor of the adjoining  federal building. According to a district judge who sits at the courthouse,  trials were delayed from resuming after recesses because it took  attendees so long to return.
section_title: Practice: Project Staff Have the Necessary Knowledge and Skills
paragraphs: GSA provided training to help ensure that Recovery Act staff had the  necessary knowledge and skills, but some projects still encountered legal  or operational challenges. GSA also created the PMO—which included  additional regional oversight, subject matter experts, and advisors—to  reinforce the knowledge and skills of project staff. Judiciary tenants at 4 of  the 9 courthouses that responded reported that GSA staff was  knowledgeable on Recovery Act projects, but 5 expressed concerns  about the knowledge and skills of GSA project staff. In addition, the GSA  Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported that GSA project management  violated a number of contracting requirements applicable to Recovery Act  projects. For example, the GSA OIG reported in 2010 that GSA project  staff incorrectly executed a procurement approach, referred to as the  construction manager as contractor, for a federal courthouse in Austin,  Texas. The GSA OIG concluded that the Recovery Act award was not  competitive, as required under the Federal Acquisition Regulation. In  addition, in April 2011, the GSA OIG testified before the House  Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure that as a result of GSA’s  oversight, a construction contract for the Richard H. Poff Federal Building  lacked adequate price competition and cost benefit analysis prior to  awarding the construction contract.agency used a new contracting method that staff were unfamiliar with,  and as a result, project staff did not always follow federal protocols. Since  the OIG reported its Recovery Act findings, GSA has increased training  for staff on these methods and project managers cannot use contracting  methods for which they have not received training, according to GSA  officials.
According to GSA officials, the  Judiciary officials also reported instances where GSA’s project managers  lacked the knowledge and skills, including the knowledge to effectively  operate the newly installed building systems, inconveniencing judiciary  tenants at 3 of the 10 courthouse projects we reviewed. For example,  judiciary officials at 2 courthouses reported that GSA had difficulty with  new automation systems and, as a result, temperatures varied drastically  across rooms. GSA officials told us that building managers receive  training on systems; however, the officials acknowledged that it may take  building managers about a year to become proficient on new systems.
section_title: Practice: Project Staff Prioritize Requirements
paragraphs: We found that GSA’s project managers were not consistently able to  prioritize requirements on Recovery Act projects due, in part, to GSA  management’s effort to ensure compliance with relevant laws and  overlapping responsibility for Recovery Act projects. As a result, project  managers might have had limited opportunities to set priorities, and  projects could have been delayed due to additional review. Prior to the  Recovery Act, changes to projects were typically performed by project  staff in conjunction with regional managers and GSA’s legal department.  However, in 2012, during the Recovery Act, the GSA OIG reported that  project managers had, in some cases, approved invalid change orders.As a result, GSA subsequently required project managers to submit  change orders to the PMO and regional executives for approval and  review, in addition to the legal department. When asked, four project  managers said they did not find the additional oversight burdensome.  However, two project managers told us the additional review had led to  some project delays and restricted a project manager’s autonomy and  expertise. GSA officials told us that this change was a necessary  safeguard against invalid change orders.
section_title: Practice: Project Staff are Consistent and Stable
paragraphs: For some Recovery Act projects, GSA management encountered  challenges ensuring that project staff were stable and consistent  throughout Recovery Act projects leading to instances of tenant confusion  and project delays. Judiciary tenants we interviewed at 5 of the 10  courthouses reported that they consistently dealt with the same GSA staff  during the project. At these projects, judiciary tenants generally stated  that they were more satisfied with GSA’s project management. These  projects were also more likely than other selected projects to be  completed on time or early. In anticipation that staff turnover may occur,  GSA created a guide for project managers that outlined, among other  things, project managers responsibilities in the event that they moved  from one project to another. In practice, GSA PMO officials told us that  the regions were responsible for managing attrition within their projects.  Five of the 10 Recovery Act projects we reviewed experienced turnover  with the project manager; judiciary tenants at four of these courthouses  told us that the turnover either delayed the project or resulted in additional  coordination challenges. In some cases, staff turnover occurred multiple  times throughout the project. For example, at the Richard H. Poff Federal  Building, judiciary officials reported having three project managers over  the course of a 3-year project, and judiciary tenants reported being  dissatisfied with GSA’s management. GSA officials told us that they have  since developed continuity and succession plans to reduce the impact of  staff turnover on construction projects.
section_title: Practice: Senior Department and Agency Executives Support the Projects
paragraphs: GSA consistently demonstrated support from top leadership for Recovery  Act projects. In the early stages of the Recovery Act program, GSA hired  a consulting firm to identify the best governance structure for GSA to  manage Recovery Act projects. According to GSA officials, they sought  out a system that would identify and elevate problems early. Based on the  consulting firm’s recommendation, GSA created the PMO, which included  the zone structure and oversight. According to GSA officials, given the  success of the PMO (including the zone structure), GSA has retained its  Recovery Act management structure since 2010 and has applied it to  other capital investment projects, which are currently managed, with the  exception of the PMO and zone structure, similar to Recovery Act  projects. GSA officials said that keeping the three zones with additional  oversight improves the agency’s efficiency managing all capital  investment projects.
section_title: Practice: Projects Receive Sufficient Funding
paragraphs: In the spend plan submitted to Congress , GSA generally allocated  enough Recovery Act funding to complete 9 of the 10 Recovery Act  projects we reviewed, though 5 required some additional funds beyond  the Recovery Act. We could not assess the sufficiency of funding at the  Federico Degetau Federal Building and Clemente Ruiz Nazario U.S.  Courthouse in Puerto Rico because the project has not been completed.  However, GSA officials said that it is unlikely that the project’s original  scope can be completed with the project’s remaining Recovery Act funds.  Of the 5 projects that required additional funds, GSA supplemented its  Recovery Act funding with a total of $11 million from its repair and  alteration funds; this accounted for less than 2 percent of the these  project’s total costs. For example, according to GSA data, the full  modernization project at the Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalanianaole Federal  Building and U.S. Courthouse in Honolulu, Hawaii cost more than $123  million including about $5 million in non-Recovery Act funds.
We also found instances where Recovery Act funds were reallocated  among projects to ensure adequate funding. For example, GSA officials  told us they requested and received an additional $12.5 million to fund a  new entry pavilion tower at the George C. Federal Building and U.S.  Courthouse in Orlando, a plan that included moving the entrance of the  Courthouse to the back of the building and adding a stairwell compliant  with today’s fire safety code. However, we also found that GSA reduced  the scope of 3 projects we reviewed. Specifically, GSA project managers  at 3 projects told us that they were required to remove items from the  project’s scope to address unforeseen building conditions while keeping  project costs within budget. In each case, judicial tenants expressed  frustration about the elements GSA chose to remove. For example,  judiciary officials at Federico Degetau Federal Building and Clemente  Ruiz Nazario U.S. Courthouse in Puerto Rico said that unforeseen  building conditions forced GSA to cut improvements to the building’s  entryway, which was one of the few elements of the almost $85 million  project that the public would see. GSA officials said that they hope to  complete the entry improvements in the future as part of a separate  project.
section_title: Costs or Schedules Changed for a Majority of Courthouse Construction and Modernizations
paragraphs: According to GSA cost and schedule data for new construction and full or  partial modernization courthouse projects, GSA completed 8 of the 22  Recovery Act projects on time and on budget. One of the on-time, on- budget projects was the Birch Bayh Federal Building and U.S Courthouse  in Indianapolis. GSA project managers and judiciary tenants attributed the  timely completion to, among other things, good working relationships  between GSA and the judiciary. However, 14 of the 22 projects  experienced schedule delays or cost overruns. For example, according to  GSA officials, the Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalanianaole Federal Building and  U.S. Courthouse’s full modernization in Honolulu was completed more  than 6 months after originally planned. GSA officials attributed the delay  to unforeseen conditions in a federally owned building that had been held  by GSA since it was built, including the need for asbestos removal, new  electrical wiring, and plumbing issues. GSA also requested an additional  $10 million in Recovery Act funds for the Federal Building and U.S.  Custom House in Denver to, among other things, increase the project’s  scope and address unforeseen building conditions (e.g., asbestos  removal). As a result, the project was delayed about 6 months. For one  project in San Juan, Puerto Rico, GSA has encountered substantial  ongoing management challenges leading to both cost overruns and  schedule delays from the original planned completion date of December  25, 2014. According to GSA officials, the project will likely require  additional funding beyond its Recovery Act funds, and GSA has yet to  determine a new completion date.
However, GSA’s data on costs and schedules do not always provide a  complete picture about improvements that were or were not made. In at  least one instance, advantageous economic conditions allowed GSA to  increase a project’s scope while staying within budget. According to GSA  officials, in these instances GSA project managers could request to use  extra funds for additional green upgrades or GSA could obligate the funds  to other projects. For example, GSA officials expected the Hipolito F.  Garcia Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse in San Antonio to cost  about $50 million. When the awarded bid came in at $31 million, GSA  officials commissioned a green-performance study to identify additional  environmental improvements that could be made. As a result of the study,  the project included $16 million in green upgrades and was GSA’s first  LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) Platinum  project.the project to stay within costs. As previously discussed, GSA reduced  the scope at three projects we reviewed because of unexpected  courthouse conditions. For example, solar panels were removed from the  original project plans for the Richard H. Poff Federal Building in Roanoke.  According to GSA officials, they excluded the solar panels in the final  project to use the funds instead for asbestos abatement and electrical  work. Similarly, at the Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalanianaole Federal Building  and U.S. Courthouse in Hawaii, GSA eliminated outdoor building  improvements, including landscaping and exterior façade work, among   Nonetheless, 3 of our 10 selected projects removed items from  other building upgrades to keep projects within budget. According to GSA  officials, over the course of the Recovery Act, savings and project needs  fluctuated and GSA needed to account for that in its spend plan. As a  result, if there were savings, GSA would look for additional opportunities  to fund projects, and if there were a shortage of funds, project’s scope  would have to be cut.
section_title: Most Judiciary Tenants Were Satisfied with Completed Recovery Act Projects, but Some Reported Disruptions and Coordination Challenges
paragraphs: Judiciary tenants at 6 of 10 of the courthouses we studied said that  Recovery Act projects did not disrupt court operations. The judiciary  tenants attributed this, in part, to good working relationships between  GSA and the judiciary. For example, judiciary tenants at 2 courthouses,  where tenants remained in the building, told us that although scheduling  could be challenging, judicial staff and GSA coordinated in a manner that  did not negatively affect operations throughout the entire project.  Conversely, judiciary tenants at 4 courthouses reported disruptions and  told us that the impacts ranged from moderate to significant. Judiciary  tenants described moderate disruptions to include such things as  requiring judges to move offices and modify schedules; significant  disruptions were said to be such things as unexpected trial delays  resulting from the Recovery Act projects. For example, the Richard H.  Poff Federal Building was closed for about a week when contractors had  to unexpectedly remove the brick façade on the west side of the building  for structural and safety reasons. The need to remove the façade—which  may have been caused by construction on the building—happened  suddenly and, as a result, operations were shut down before employees  had time to make alternative work arrangements.
While few Recovery Act projects we reviewed affected court operations,  judiciary officials at 8 of 10 courthouses cited challenges coordinating with  GSA to complete Recovery Act projects and judicial tenants at 4 of these  courthouses described working with GSA as very or extremely  challenging. Judicial tenants attributed difficult working relationships to  factors mentioned previously including GSA’s project management  turnover and judiciary tenants’ not having provided input on the scope of  projects, as well as remote management, tenants remaining in the  building during construction, or changes to contractor schedules, among  other things. For example, judicial tenants at the Federal Building and  U.S. Custom House in Denver told us that while GSA originally planned to  complete work in the evening and on weekends, once project delays  occurred, work was performed during the day contrary to the judiciary’s  understanding of how the construction would occur and, according to  judicial stakeholders, was more disruptive.
While coordination challenges existed at selected projects, judiciary  tenants at 7 of the 9 courthouses we reviewed where the Recovery Act  projects were completed told us they were pleased with GSA’s new  construction or modernizations. Judicial tenants highlighted  improvements to, among other things, the look and operation of  bathrooms, attractiveness of green roofs, temperature regulation, lighting,  security, and overall aesthetic appearances. For example, as shown in  figure 2, GSA performed a full modernization at the Birch Bayh Federal  Building and U.S. Courthouse in Indianapolis including a new heating,  ventilation, and air conditioning system; a green roof on the interior  courtyard; an improved lobby appearance; lighting and plumbing  upgrades; window replacements; and updated juror bathrooms that were  accessible to people with disabilities. According to one of the judges,  since the renovations, two disabled jurors have served who would have  been dismissed from jury duty because of the non-accessible bathrooms  prior to the Recovery Act project. Similarly, judicial tenants in Orlando  highlighted the improvements to the George C. Young Federal Building  and U.S. Courthouse stating that the project, among other things,  improved security and air quality. Conversely, judicial tenants at 2 of the 9  completed courthouses were dissatisfied with the completed projects,  attributing part of their dissatisfaction to additional safety or security  needs, project delays, and the overall inconvenience of the projects  compared to the benefits achieved.
section_title: GSA Established Performance Criteria for Green Projects but Has Not Evaluated Outcomes against the Criteria
subsections: section_title: GSA Established Performance Criteria for Green Projects
paragraphs: As previously mentioned, GSA established minimum performance criteria  (MPC) to guide Recovery Act investments in green buildings and to  measure outcomes. While the MPC are specific to projects funded by  the Recovery Act, GSA designed them to address federal environmental  requirements that GSA must achieve collectively across its portfolio of  buildings. Further, according to GSA officials, the MPC are now applied  to all new capital projects. We previously reported that the MPC generally  support key federal energy and water conservation requirements and  goals, and align with most of the elements of a green building, as  established by EISA. The following are examples of the MPC that GSA  established for its Recovery Act projects (app. II provides a complete  listing of the MPC):  Install advanced meters to more accurately measure a building’s real- time electricity, natural gas, steam, and water use.
Install on-site renewable energy systems (e.g., solar panels, wind,  geothermal, and solar thermal/hot water systems to meet at least 30  percent of the hot water demand).
Use occupancy sensors on lighting to conserve energy in areas of the  building that are unoccupied.
Reduce energy usage by 30 percent based on GSA’s modeled results  of expected performance.
Reduce indoor potable water use by at least 20 percent based on  GSA’s model results for expected performance.
Recycle or reuse at least 50 percent of construction and demolition  waste generated on a project.
While the MPC guided the scoping decisions for Recovery Act projects,  GSA did not require all projects to meet all the MPC. Specifically, GSA  regional officials were required to consider the MPC relevant to each  project’s scope. For example, meeting the MPC for reducing water  consumption by 20 percent would only apply to projects with significant  plumbing upgrades.
Design standards identified in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106  Stat. 2776, Uniform Plumbing Code (2006), and International Plumbing Code (2006). and the storm-water collection tanks capture up to 10,000 gallons of  excess rainwater to be used later for flushing toilets.
GSA officials said that not all the MPC could be addressed in some  projects. For example, although the MPC directed GSA project managers  to include on-site renewable energy systems—including solar panels,  solar water heaters, or both—when scoping projects, project managers  did not incorporate this MPC at 4 of the 10 courthouses in our review.
According to GSA officials, renewable energy systems were not installed  because they were not cost-effective, were not feasible, or were not  within the scope of the original project. For example, GSA determined  that solar renewable-energy systems would not be cost-effective at the  Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse because the building’s orientation  provided insufficient exposure to sunlight. Although solar panels might  have been cost-effective at the George C. Young Federal Building and  U.S. Courthouse, GSA provided a waiver for structural reasons, including  minimal surface area on the roof for solar panels and insufficient ability of  the roof to support the additional weight in hurricane wind conditions.
section_title: GSA Has Gathered Data and Reported Some Environmental Outcomes but Not against the MPC
paragraphs: GSA has reported the environmental performance of some technologies  and buildings that received funding under the Recovery Act. For example,  GSA created the Green Proving Ground program to evaluate how specific  technologies, including some installed at Recovery Act projects, have  contributed to energy savings. As of the end of fiscal year 2014, GSA had  completed and reported results for 15 technologies and plans to report  results for 9 more technologies in fiscal year 2016. GSA also analyzed  energy usage data for 59 federal buildings—all of which received  Recovery Act funds—and reported that collectively the buildings, on  average, were using 5.5 percent less energy during the winter of fiscal  year 2014 compared to the winter of fiscal year 2008 (the year prior to the  Recovery Act). According to GSA, the results were particularly notable  because GSA performed this analysis for buildings located in states that  had harsh winters in fiscal year 2014. GSA also created the Green  Building Upgrade Information Life-cycle Database (gBUILD) to capture  Recovery Act project information, including each building’s baseline  performance, expected performance, and actual performance achieved  from some green building conversions. GSA plans to use the database to  analyze and report building performance results. Since the Recovery  Act, gBUILD has been expanded to include all of GSA’s buildings with  large green infrastructure projects.
GSA has not yet evaluated the environmental performance of its  Recovery Act projects against the MPC. According to GSA officials, while  the agency is currently considering how it might measure building  performance against the MPC, the agency has not developed a schedule  or plan to analyze results. GSA officials told us they continually monitor  building performance, but need at least one year of operational data to  accurately compare completed projects against the MPC. However,  according to our analysis of GSA’s cost and schedule data, 18 of GSA’s  22 new construction or modernization courthouses have been operational  for at least a year and 5 projects have been operational for more than 3  years. GSA officials cited further limitations to their ability to report  outcomes of Recovery Act projects. For example, GSA officials said that  establishing a representative baseline year against which to measure the  MPC is challenging because a number of factors outside of the Recovery  Act project—including, for example, building occupancy rates and  variability in weather patterns—can influence energy and water  consumption. In 2013, a GSA OIG report said that the agency also faces  challenges collecting accurate and relevant data to report building  performance outcomes—including energy and water use, among other  variables.
Without evaluating building performance against the MPC, GSA is limited  in its knowledge of whether projects have achieved expected outcomes.  We have previously reported that agencies need to understand outcomes  of their investments to determine which investments provide the greatest  value. investing in government facilities would improve a buildings’  environmental performance and provide a significant return on  investment. Understanding projects’ outcomes should help inform GSA’s  efforts to prioritize future infrastructure investments and could help  educate building tenants about improved building performance and  demonstrate to the taxpayers that GSA’s investments have provided  value.
For example, see GAO, RESULTS-ORIENTED GOVERNMENT: GPRA Has  Established a Solid Foundation for Achieving Greater Results, GAO-04-38 (Washington,  D.C.: Mar. 10, 2004).
section_title: Some Projects Are Contributing to Federal Environmental Goals but It Remains Unclear If They Meet the MPC
paragraphs: Since GSA has not measured the progress of its Recovery Act projects  toward meeting the MPC, we analyzed GSA’s energy and water usage  data for the full or partial courthouse- modernization projects we reviewed  against federal portfolio-wide goals upon which some of the MPC were  based. We limited our analysis to the 5 full or partial courthouse  modernization projects that had completed construction and were  operational for at least 1 year. We excluded 2 new courthouses from our  analysis because there is no baseline or historical data against which we  could compare their performance. We also did not include 3 courthouses  that were still under construction during fiscal year 2014, the most recent  year for which we have utilities’ data. In its Recovery Act-program plan,  GSA stated that its full and partial building- modernization and new- construction Recovery Act projects would be designed to achieve select  federal goals. Although the federal goals apply to agency-wide energy  and water reductions, GSA tracks individual buildings against the  federally mandated baseline.
While energy use has declined at 4 of the 5 full or partial modernization  courthouses projects we reviewed, only two projects reduced energy  enough to meet federal targets. In addition, it is unclear whether these  projects meet GSA’s energy reduction goals as outlined in the MPC.  Federal agencies were required to reduce their energy use per gross  square foot of their building portfolio space by at least 27 percent by fiscal  year 2014 and 30 percent by fiscal year 2015, compared with a fiscal year  2003 baseline. We evaluated whether the five courthouses were  contributing toward the federal goal by either meeting or exceeding the 27  percent reduction that was expected by fiscal year 2014. Energy usage at  the Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse, however, increased in fiscal  year 2014 as compared to fiscal year 2003. According to GSA officials,  the increased energy usage at the Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse  may be attributed to newly installed systems—including air conditioning  and ventilation, lighting, elevator systems, and fire alarm and sprinkler  systems—that were previously either dormant, non-existent, or partially  functioning. Officials also said that changes in occupancy rates and  weather from year to year could explain some variability in each building’s  energy use. See Table 6 for a comparison of results from fiscal year 2003  to fiscal year 2014.
For water usage, we reviewed four full or partial modernization projects  and found that, in 2014, all of them contributed toward federal water  conservation goals, as shown in table 7. Across their building portfolio,  federal agencies were required to achieve at least a 14 percent reduction  in water use by fiscal year 2014 and a 16 percent reduction by fiscal year  2015 compared with a fiscal year 2007 baseline.exceeded the fiscal year 2014 and 2015 goals.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Recovery Act provided GSA with an unprecedented opportunity to  enhance the energy and environmental performance of aging federal  buildings. With this opportunity comes a responsibility to manage projects  effectively and demonstrate positive outcomes from these targeted  infrastructure investments. GSA’s management of the 10 Recovery Act  courthouse projects we reviewed generally aligned with two successful  practices for large-scale investments, but did not always align with five  other practices. As a result of lessons learned from the Recovery Act  projects, GSA reformed some aspects of its project management that did  not fully align with those practices but has not addressed other areas. By  not fully aligning management of federal buildings with successful  practices, GSA may have missed opportunities to more effectively  manage projects and develop successful working relationships with  building tenants—including better meeting cost and schedule estimates  and minimizing inconveniences to tenants. Furthermore, since GSA’s  management of other construction projects is similar to how the agency  managed Recovery Act projects, going forward, GSA would be better  positioned to manage those projects more efficiently and with minimal  disruption to tenants if it ensured that the successful practices for large- scale investments were incorporated to the fullest extent appropriate.
While GSA used the vast majority of its $4.5 billion in Recovery Act funds  to modernize buildings and install green technologies, building  performance and outcomes remain unclear. GSA’s limited understanding  of building performance and outcomes is particularly a concern regarding  its full and partial modernization projects, which have each received an  investment of more than $70 million dollars, on average. As GSA  continues to invest in large-scale projects to convert federal facilities to  high-performance green buildings and improve the overall condition of its  portfolio, it is important that the agency improve how it manages future  construction projects and make investment decisions based on a strategy  that is informed by observed and measurable outcomes from its Recovery  Act projects.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: We recommend that the GSA Administrator take the following two  actions:  1.  GSA should examine incorporating successful management  practices—such as consistently involving tenants at various stages of  the project—into its capital investment process to ensure that projects  are managed efficiently and that tenant disruptions are minimized.  2.  To ensure that GSA’s green Recovery Act projects meet relevant  requirements, GSA should analyze environmental outcomes against  relevant requirements for each of its full and partial-modernization  Recovery Act projects and apply any lessons to future projects.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the General Services Administration  (GSA) and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) for  review and comment. GSA agreed with our recommendations and said  that it has policies and procedures in place to address them. GSA also  provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate.  GSA’s comments are reprinted in appendix III. Judiciary officials from the  Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalanianaole Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse  in Hawaii reiterated the importance of GSA’s actively engaging  stakeholders and having an on-site project manager throughout large  construction projects. The judiciary also provided technical comments that  were incorporated, as appropriate.
As agreed with our offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days. At that  time, we will send copies to the Administrator of GSA and the Director of  the AOUSC. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report examines how the General Services Administration (GSA)  used funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009  (Recovery Act) in buildings that included a judicial presence. We used  the term courthouses throughout the report to refer to GSA-operated  buildings with a federal judicial presence. This report examines (1) how  GSA determined which courthouse projects to fund under the Recovery  Act; (2) how GSA’s management of selected Recovery Act courthouse  projects aligned with successful practices and whether these projects  disrupted judiciary operations, and (3) how, if at all, GSA established  environmental performance goals for courthouses funded by the  Recovery Act and whether the selected projects met those goals.
To identify how GSA determined which courthouses would receive  Recovery Act funds, we reviewed GSA’s Recovery Act-planning  documents; project selection criteria; prior GAO reports; and relevant  legislation and guidance, including the Energy Independence and  Security Act of 2007 (EISA), related federal statutes, and executive  orders related to GSA’s $4.5 billion in high-performance green (green)  Recovery Act funds and its $750 million in funds for federal buildings and  U.S. courthouses. We excluded border stations and land ports of entry  from our analysis, for which GSA was appropriated $300 million, because  none of these facilities have a court presence. To understand how GSA  identified allowable technologies within green Recovery Act projects, we  summarized portions of EISA that provided information on how to  determine if environmental technologies are cost-effective and include  environmental characteristics of a green building, respectively. GSA  categorized green buildings as full or partial modernizations, limited  scope projects, or small projects. We worked with GSA and the  Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) to identify and  summarize which Recovery Act projects had any judicial presence and  how much funding each project received. We provided examples of  specific Recovery Act projects from the ten courthouses we reviewed  (see below for more information).
To understand how GSA’s management of Recovery Act projects aligned  with successful practices and whether projects disrupted judiciary  operations, we identified seven successful management practices for  large scale investments developed in prior GAO work. While the  successful practices were developed for Information Technology (IT)  investments, IT stakeholders agreed that these practices have broader  applicability, including construction management. We also shared these  leading practices with GSA officials who oversaw the Recovery Act  program to ask how GSA addressed each practice and incorporated any  comments as appropriate; GSA officials did not identify any concerns with  applying these successful practices to Recovery Act projects. These  practices are also consistent with the leading practices we set forth in our  capital decision-making guide.omitted two practices from our analysis. Specifically, we omitted two  practices: (1) end users participated in testing of system functionality prior  to formal end user acceptance testing and (2) program officials  maintained regular communication with the prime contractor. We  excluded testing system functionality because, for the majority of  Recovery Act work, judiciary tenants would not have expertise to test  building systems such as mechanical or plumbing upgrades. We  eliminated the practice that calls on officials to maintain regular  communication with the prime contractor because this practice was  outside the scope of our audit. The GSA OIG has performed a vast body  of work looking at contracting issues for Recovery Act projects and, to  avoid duplication, we omitted contracting issues from the scope of our  audit.
Of the nine practices we identified, we  We interviewed GSA project staff and judicial tenants—who resided in  buildings during construction or would reside once construction was  completed—at 10 selected courthouses that received Recovery Act funds  to see how their experiences aligned with the successful practices  mentioned above and whether projects affected court operations. In  addition to interviewing judicial tenants, after interviews, we sent a  structured questionnaire to tenants at each courthouse to verify  responses captured during initial interviews and collect additional  information specific to the seven successful practices. For example, while  we asked interviewees in meetings whether projects affected judiciary  operations, in the follow-up questionnaire, we ask tenants to rate the  impact on 4-point scale–response options included no impact, minimal  impact, moderate impact, and severe impact. All judiciary tenants  returned the questionnaire, although not every tenant responded to every  question.
We selected 10 courthouses from among GSA’s 22 large courthouse  projects (including 7 new construction projects and 15 full or partial  modernization projects). We selected these 10 courthouses—listed in  table 1 below—based on the following criteria: (1) project type (new  construction or full or partial modernization); (2) project cost (generally  selecting among the most expensive projects); (3) project substantial  completion date (selecting both completed and ongoing projects); (4)  geographic location (selecting projects across GSA’s regions and zones);  (5) percentage occupancy by judicial tenants (selecting projects where  the judiciary ranged from minor to major tenant); (6) Leadership in Energy  and Environmental Design (LEED) certification level (selecting projects  that ranged with respect to the number of factors incorporated into the  project); and (7) relevant GSA Office of Inspector General (OIG) findings  (selecting both projects that had and had not been reviewed by the OIG).  We limited our selection from among the large courthouse projects  because there was greater risk in spending large amounts of funds under  the tight timeframes of the Recovery Act (compared to smaller projects)  and because the larger projects would likely be more visible to the  tenants and under construction for a longer period of time, resulting in  potential obvious benefits or inconveniences to courthouse tenants. Of  the 10 courthouse projects we selected, 2 were new construction  projects, 6 were full modernization projects, and 2 were partial  modernization projects.
We conducted semi-structured interviews with GSA and judiciary tenants  at 6 courthouses in-person. We interviewed stakeholders from the  remaining 4 courthouses over the phone. During the interviews we asked  about experiences working together (i.e., GSA and judiciary tenants),  whether projects affected court operations, and projects’ goals. We  followed-up with judiciary tenants to make sure we had accurately  captured their assessments of GSA’s management. Observations with  GSA and judiciary tenants at these selected courthouses cannot be used  to make generalizations about the views of all GSA project managers or  tenants of Recovery Act projects.
To identify how, if at all, costs and schedules changed for selected  Recovery Act projects, we collected GSA’s data on costs and schedules  for all 22 courthouses that were either new construction or full and partial  modernizations for years 2009 through 2014. To assess changes in  project costs, we compared GSA’s original request to Congress against  the final project cost. To assess changes in project schedules, we  compared GSA’s planned completion date with the contractor when the  project was awarded to GSA’s substantial completion date. We also  interviewed GSA project managers to identify how costs or schedules  changed and any mitigating factors. We did not evaluate GSA’s cost- estimating process for this report. GSA provided us data as of May 2014.  To assess the reliability of GSA’s data we reviewed documentation  related to this data source from our prior reports, and agencies’ websites,  and asked knowledgeable government officials to provide written  responses to our questions about the quality of the data. We determined  that the data were sufficiently reliable to provide general trends on GSA’s  costs and schedules for Recovery Act projects. Since we only evaluated  22 Recovery Act projects, generalizations should not be made to all  projects. Rather, we provide illustrative examples for why costs and  scheduled may have changed.
To determine how GSA set environmental performance goals for the  projects it funded and the extent to which selected projects met their  goals, we reviewed agency and regulatory documents and summarized  GSA’s minimum performance criteria (MPC) for Recovery Act projects  and identified outcomes for select projects. We described how GSA  developed building-specific MPC that would also help the agency achieve  broader federal environmental goals and requirements, including energy  and water reduction requirements, as outlined in various statutes. While  GSA is required to meet federal-energy and water-reduction requirements  across its entire portfolio of buildings, it also tracks individual buildings  against this baseline. To evaluate whether the selection of buildings we  reviewed are contributing toward meeting federal energy and water  reduction goals, we analyzed GSA’s data on energy usage for 5 of the 10  courthouses we reviewed, and we analyzed GSA’s data on water usage  for 4 of the 10 courthouses we reviewed. We did not assess results for  the 2 new courthouses because the buildings were not yet constructed in  the federally-required baseline comparison years. We also did not assess  results for 3 courthouse modernizations that were under construction for  part of fiscal year 2014 because we wanted to compare a full year of  operational utilities data. We omitted the Hipolito F. Garcia Federal  Building and U.S. Courthouse from our analysis of water reductions  because of concerns we had regarding the reliability of its water use data.  GSA’s MPC for energy and water reductions are developed with a  performance-based approach requiring, for example, that buildings  achieve a percentage reduction compared to a baseline. We compared  building-specific energy and water-use data from fiscal year 2014 to each  building’s energy and water use data during the baseline comparison  years specified in the agency-wide federal energy and water reduction  goals GSA must achieve. Specifically, with respect to energy and water  usage, EISA amendments to the National Energy Conservation Policy Act  of 2007 require GSA to reduce energy consumption per gross square foot  of the buildings it manages by 30 percent by fiscal year 2015 compared  with fiscal year 2003, and must reduce water consumption per gross  square foot of the buildings it manages by 16 percent by fiscal year 2015  compared with fiscal year 2007, pursuant to Executive Order 13423.
To evaluate project outcomes, we calculated energy and water use  reductions based on historic utility use data for electric, steam, gas, and  oil (none of the courthouses in our selection used coal), and water  utilities, provided by GSA. We converted all energy utilities to British  Thermal Units and calculated the energy use intensity—British Thermal  Units per gross square foot—to compare across our selection of  courthouses. Similarly, we calculated the water use intensity—gallons per  gross square foot— to compare across our selection of courthouses that  had been in operation for the full fiscal year 2014. Our analysis has some  limitations, however. Comparing energy or water reductions based on two  endpoints can produce misleading results if the baseline or final years do  not represent a typical year of the assessed building. For example, many  variables can affect the results, making it difficult to attribute results to  installed building systems or technologies. Some of the reductions can be  attributed to the many green infrastructure enhancements made on the  building; other reductions could be explained by a change in building  occupancy rates or abnormal seasonal effects in the baseline or final  years of measurement that would influence demand for energy. We  assessed the reliability of the program data we used by reviewing GSA  documentation on GSA’s Energy Usage Analysis System (EUAS), and  questioning knowledgeable GSA officials about the quality of the data and  controls in place to ensure data accuracy. We determined the data were  sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2014 to February  2015, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: GSA’s Minimum Performance Criteria for Recovery Act Projects
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. General Services Administration
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Mark Goldstein, (202) 512-2834, or goldsteinm@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Keith Cunningham, Assistant  Director; Allie Cleaver, Geoffrey Hamilton; John Healey; Delwen Jones;  Terence Lam; Joshua Ormond; Melissa Swearingen; and Elizabeth Wood  made key contributions to this report.