Cruise Vessels: Most Required Security and Safety Measures Have Been Implemented, but Concerns Remain About Crime Reporting
Published: 2013-12-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 2011, almost 11 million passengers took a cruise from a U.S. port. Media reports about passenger personal safety while aboard cruise vessels--including those related to the January 2012 grounding of the cruise vessel Costa Concordia off the coast of Italy, which resulted in 32 deaths--combined with the increasing number of passengers taking cruises has raised questions about passenger safety and security. With the enactment of the CVSSA in 2010, cruise vessels that visit U.S. ports were required to meet certain security and safety requirements, such as having rail heights of at least 42 inches and reporting allegations of certain crimes to the FBI. GAO was asked to review cruise vessel safety as well as security issues--related to keeping passengers safe from crime.
GAO reviewed (1) the extent to which the cruise vessel industry and federal agencies have implemented the CVSSA, and (2) any actions taken following the Costa Concordia accident to enhance the safety of cruise vessels visiting U.S. ports.
GAO reviewed the CVSSA and related agency and industry documents, and interviewed officials from the Coast Guard, FBI, CLIA, five cruise lines which accounted for over 80 percent of North American cruise vessel passengers in 2012, and two crime victim advocacy groups. The cruise lines were selected based on several factors including their volume of North American passengers. Crime victim advocacy groups were selected based on their knowledge about cruise ship crime issues. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The cruise industry and federal agencies have implemented 11 of 15 Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act (CVSSA) provisions, but implementation of 4 provisions requires the development of regulations and policy, and is underway. Officials from all five cruise lines GAO met with said most required measures were in place when the CVSSA was enacted. According to U.S. Coast Guard officials, a notice of proposed rulemaking is in development to address 3 of the 4 remaining provisions. The 3 provisions relate to technologies to (1) detect a person going overboard, (2) maintain a video surveillance system to assist in documenting crimes on the vessel, and (3) transmit communications and warnings from the ship to anyone in surrounding waters. A policy linked to the fourth provision on the certification of trainers who provide the CVSSA course on crime scene preservation to cruise line personnel, is, as of December 2013, undergoing review at the Department of Transportation. With respect to CVSSA crime-reporting requirements, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Coast Guard have implemented these provisions as required. Accordingly, the agencies publish on a website information on reported crimes that are no longer under investigation. However, GAO identified some limitations in the usefulness of the publicly reported data. Specifically, (1) allegations for which investigations are not opened are never published; (2) the data are not timely--due to the length of the criminal justice process--and thus, crime data may be posted months or years after the alleged crime occurred and (3) the data reported are not put into context, such as a city's crime rate, to provide the public with the information needed to compare rates and make decisions. However, some cruise lines are making efforts to improve reported crime data. In August 2013, several cruise lines began voluntarily disclosing alleged crime data on their websites. Also, in July 2013, legislation was introduced to amend the CVSSA that would revise and expand crime-reporting requirements, among other items. As of November 2013, however, these actions were either new or pending. Thus, GAO could not assess whether, or to what extent, the voluntary reporting or potential legislation might provide more useful data than current requirements.
Following the Costa Concordia accident, the cruise industry, an international maritime organization, and the Coast Guard took actions to improve passenger safety. The Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)--which represents over 98 percent of cruise lines in the United States--identified 10 safety-related policies in 2012 that were adopted by all member cruise lines by July 2013. These policies include improvements to vessel passage planning and life jacket stowage, among other things. The International Maritime Organization (IMO)--a United Nations agency responsible for maritime matters--has also adopted a regulation, effective January 2015, requiring passengers to participate in a safety and evacuation exercise (muster drill) prior to or immediately upon departure--rather than within 24 hours of departure. CLIA member cruise lines adopted a similar muster policy weeks after the Costa Concordia accident. The Coast Guard is monitoring IMO's consideration of additional regulations. The agency has also started witnessing predeparture muster drills and has reported no major concerns. In addition, the Coast Guard has worked with the cruise industry for several years to plan and hold disaster exercises, including one in April 2013 to practice a mass rescue from a cruise vessel.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The popularity of cruise vessels as a vacation option continues to grow.  Since 1980, the cruise industry has had an average annual passenger  growth rate of 7.6 percent, and in 2011, over 16 million passengers  traveled aboard cruise vessels worldwide. About 10.9 million of these  passengers traveled from U.S. ports. Media reports about passenger  personal safety while aboard cruise vessels, combined with the  increasing number of cruise vessel passengers and the January 2012  Costa Concordia cruise vessel grounding off the coast of Italy, which  claimed 32 lives, raised questions about personal security and passenger  safety when aboard cruise vessels. According to the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI), from 2005 through 2010, sexual assaults and physical  assaults on cruise vessels were the leading cruise vessel crimes  investigated and reported by the FBI. However, the public was often not  aware of these crimes because the federal government did not require  information about them to be published. Moreover, cruise vessels  carrying U.S. passengers often travel to foreign ports before returning to  the United States, a fact that can introduce the possible involvement of  law enforcement from a variety of foreign countries—in addition to the  federal and local law enforcement agencies that may be involved if a  crime occurs during a voyage. The involvement or potential involvement  of foreign governments can add to the confusion of crime victims as they  attempt to navigate various justice systems.
The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act (CVSSA), enacted in July  2010, requires cruise lines operating ships that visit U.S. ports and the  federal government to take certain actions related to these issues. For  example, the CVSSA requires the cruise lines to report allegations of  certain crimes to the FBI and the United States Coast Guard as well as to  ensure that passengers have key information available to them—such as  U.S. embassy contact information for all of the countries on the cruise  vessel itinerary—and to implement specific personal security measures  onboard such as ensuring that all stateroom doors have peepholes,  among other things. The CVSSA also requires that the Coast Guard  maintain a website that provides a numerical accounting of certain crimes  that have been reported by cruise lines, but are no longer under FBI  investigation. The CVSSA places much of the responsibility for  implementing the law with the Coast Guard and FBI. The Coast Guard is  the federal agency responsible for a wide array of maritime safety and  security activities, including those involving cruise vessels and their  landside facilities, while the FBI is responsible for investigating certain  cruise vessel crimes, among other responsibilities.
In addition to the issue of personal security of passengers, the January  2012 grounding of the cruise vessel Costa Concordia off the coast of Italy  raised questions about vessel management and the procedures for  safeguarding passengers in emergency situations. For example, although  international maritime law requires all passengers to be evacuated within  30 minutes of an order to abandon a vessel, the Italian government  reported that the evacuation of the Costa Concordia took over 6 hours.  The accident resulted in the death of 32 passengers. The Italian  government investigated the accident and reported in May 2013 on  numerous lapses in emergency procedures and management, including  problems with vessel evacuation, voyage planning, and emergency  communication.
You requested that we review the implementation of the CVSSA as well  as any safety actions taken by federal government agencies and the  cruise industry following the Costa Concordia accident. This report  examines the following questions:
To what extent have the cruise industry and federal agencies taken  actions to implement the requirements of the CVSSA?
What actions, if any, have federal agencies and the cruise industry  taken to enhance the safety of cruise vessels visiting U.S. ports as a  result of the Costa Concordia accident?
To address both objectives, we conducted visits to four cruise vessel  ports, which we selected in large part because of their high cruise traffic  and passenger embarkation volume, among other things—Los Angeles,  California; Miami, Florida; Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and Seattle,  Washington. To understand how the Coast Guard checks for CVSSA  compliance and other safety issues on cruise vessels, we accompanied  Coast Guard officials on cruise vessel exams in the Port of Los Angeles  and Port Everglades, the port for Fort Lauderdale. During these visits, we  interviewed security and safety officials from five cruise lines to  understand how they implemented the provisions of the CVSSA and what  safety changes they have implemented as a result of the Costa  Concordia accident. Additionally, we interviewed Coast Guard officials in  the field and in headquarters on their role in implementing the CVSSA,  any challenges encountered during implementation, and any actions  taken following the Costa Concordia accident. We also interviewed  officials from the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)—which  currently represents over 98 percent of the cruise industry operating in  the United States—for their perspective on the impact of the CVSSA and  to discuss the safety changes they have implemented among their  members as a result of the Costa Concordia accident. Finally, during our  visits to cruise vessel ports, we also interviewed FBI and local law  enforcement agency officials to discuss their role in handling crime  aboard cruise vessels. The information we obtained from personnel at the  ports and the cruise lines cannot be generalized across all U.S. ports and  the cruise industry—although CLIA does represent a substantial portion  of the industry—but the information provided us with a perspective on the  implementation of the CVSSA as well as any changes resulting from the  Costa Concordia accident.
To address the first objective, we reviewed relevant documents,  guidance, and policy from federal agencies, such as the Coast Guard’s  policy letter on CVSSA implementation procedures. Additionally, we  reviewed the provisions in the CVSSA and assessed the extent to which  federal agencies and cruise lines were implementing those provisions.  We also analyzed alleged and published cruise vessel crime data  obtained from the FBI. Specifically, we analyzed all CVSSA crimes  reported to the FBI from January 2008 through September 2013 (pre- and  post-CVSSA implementation) as well as analyzed for the same time  period the number of closed cases that appeared on the Coast Guard’s  public website. To determine the reliability of these data, we interviewed  FBI and cruise line officials familiar with the data regarding their  procedures for obtaining, analyzing, and reporting cruise vessel crime  data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our  purposes. While the publication of the CVSSA crime data is consistent  with the law, these data have some limitations. These limitations were  identified through our independent analysis, as well as through comments  from officials at the FBI, CLIA, the cruise lines we met with, and a crime  victim advocacy groups. We discuss these limitations later in this report.
We interviewed Coast Guard officials as well as representatives of two  victim advocacy groups and two academic researchers who have written  extensively on cruise vessel crime for their perspectives on the  implementation of the CVSSA. The interest groups and researchers were  selected based on their knowledge about cruise vessel crime—either  advocating for victims or researching cruise crime trends. We also  interviewed officials from the the Department of Transportation’s Maritime  Administration (MARAD)—which works to improve and strengthen the  U.S. marine transportation system—to determine its role in implementing  the CVSSA and discuss any challenges MARAD had encountered.
To address the second objective, we reviewed relevant documents and  policies from CLIA and the selected cruise lines, including the safety  measures that CLIA introduced after the Costa Concordia accident. We  also reviewed documents from the International Maritime Organization  (IMO)—a United Nations agency that specializes in maritime issues—as  well as the Costa Concordia marine casualty investigation report issued  by the Italian government in 2013. We interviewed Department of State  and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) officials to understand  their agencies’ roles in relation to cruise vessel safety and the Costa  Concordia accident. During our port visits, we also interviewed officials  from two classification societies to better understand their roles in  ensuring cruise vessel safety.rescue exercise, conducted by the Coast Guard, which involved  numerous cruise line personnel, federal agency personnel, and local  authorities in the Bahamas. The exercise was part of a series of mass  rescue operation–based exercises designed to educate and prepare   We also witnessed a cruise vessel mass  participants for a potential catastrophic event—similar to the Costa  Concordia accident—involving a mass rescue operation at sea.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2013 to December  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Many Stakeholders Involved in Cruise Vessel Safety and Security Regulation
paragraphs: International, national, state, and local requirements regulate maritime  safety and security. At the international level, IMO is responsible for  developing an international maritime regulatory framework. IMO member  states (nations) have adopted the International Convention for the Safety  of Life at Sea (SOLAS), which is designed to help ensure maritime  security and safety worldwide. Among other things, SOLAS provides that  companies and vessels should comply with the requirements of the  International Safety Management Code (ISM Code), which was adopted  by IMO in 1993. Federal laws, regulations, and guidance direct federal  agencies and vessel operators within U.S. ports and waters, and state  and local requirements may also further direct activities of vessel  operators within their jurisdictions.
The enforcement of safety and security requirements for all maritime  vessels is governed by two different systems: flag state control and port  state control. A flag state that signed on to the SOLAS Convention has  responsibility for verifying that vessels flying its flag meet international  safety and security standards and that the flag state’s standards are at  least as stringent as those included in the convention’s ISM Code. A port  state is the country where a port is located. Port state control is the  process by which a nation exercises its authority over foreign-flagged  vessels operating in waters subject to the port state’s jurisdiction. Port  state control is generally intended to ensure that these visiting vessels  comply with the various international and domestic requirements  established to help ensure the safety of the visited port, its environment,  and its personnel. Figure 1 shows the regulatory oversight regime  affecting cruise vessels; however, there are many additional international  and domestic stakeholders with roles contributing to the security and  safety of cruise vessels. For a list of key stakeholders and their activities,  see appendix I.
The Coast Guard administers the U.S. port state control program for  foreign-flagged cruise vessels that enter U.S. waters or a U.S. port, to   The Coast  enforce maritime safety and security in the United States.Guard exercises this enforcement through port state control activities,  which include initial, annual, and periodic examinations of foreign flag  cruise vessels. These exams allow the Coast Guard to examine vessels  at various times:  Initial exams: Conducted on vessels with potential U.S. itineraries,  these exams include concept reviews during the very earliest stages  of design, preconstruction plan reviews by Coast Guard naval  architects and fire protection engineers, and mid-construction  inspections at the shipbuilder’s yard by Coast Guard marine  inspectors.
Annual inspection: The Coast Guard inspects each cruise vessel  visiting the United States at least twice a year. The first inspection, an  annual inspection, focuses on the vessel’s fire protection, lifesaving,  and emergency systems as well as any modifications to the vessel  that would affect its structural fire protection and means of escape.
Periodic inspection: The second Coast Guard inspection, a periodic  inspection, focuses on the performance of the officers and crew, with  specific attention paid to their training and knowledge of the vessel’s  emergency procedures, fire fighting, lifesaving systems, and  performance during drills.
From January 2008 through March 2013, the Coast Guard performed  1,208 cruise vessel examinations (71 initial, 673 annual, and 464  periodic) and identified 1,802 deficiencies. Nearly half of these  deficiencies were related to fire-fighting systems. For example, according  to the Coast Guard’s Cruise Ship National Center of Expertise, the most  common deficiency identified in 2012 was the improper operation of fire  screen doors. In 2011, the most commonly identified deficiency was the  improper stowage of combustibles. According to Coast Guard officials,  most deficiencies are corrected on the spot or within the time frames  allowed by the Coast Guard. Moreover, officials reported that the Coast  Guard rarely detains cruise vessels based on substandard compliance— for example, from January 2008 through March 2013, they have detained  seven cruise vessels as a result of their 1,208 cruise vessel  examinations. Four of the seven cruise vessels made corrections and  were released from detention the same day, while the others took 2, 3,  and 8 days to make corrections.
As part of its regulatory role, the Coast Guard also maintains data on  marine casualties (accidents) that occur upon the navigable waters of the  United States and its territories or possessions, or whenever an accident  involves a U.S. vessel. Coast Guard regulations require that certain types  of accidents be reported to the Coast Guard—including accidents that  result in the loss of main propulsion or primary steering, or that materially  and adversely affect the vessel’s seaworthiness, among other things. Our analysis of Coast Guard data shows that from January 2008 through  March 2013, there were 256 marine casualties that involved cruise  vessels: 128 of these were classified as failures of equipment or material;  64 were classified as accidents that caused damage to the environment  (mostly discharge of oil); and 64 were classified in a variety of other  categories—such as fire, loss of electrical power, or collision.
section_title: Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act Added to Regulatory Framework
paragraphs: 46 C.F.R. pt. 4.
section_title: Costa Concordia Accident Identified Numerous Potential Safety Shortcomings
paragraphs: On January 13, 2012, an Italian-flagged cruise vessel, the Costa  Concordia, ran aground with over 4,000 passengers and crew onboard off  the coast of Giglio Island, Italy. The vessel was so badly damaged that  five contiguous watertight compartments—which housed machinery and  equipment vital for the propulsion and steering of the vessel—rapidly  flooded. The vessel then lost propulsion and suffered intermittent power  outages, as the emergency backup systems could not handle an  emergency on such a scale. The accident resulted in 32 deaths, including  2 U.S. citizens.
The Costa Concordia accident triggered an investigation led by the Italian  government to ascertain the reasons that the vessel went aground. In  May 2013, the Italian government issued its findings and  recommendations. The investigation found that the root cause of the  accident rested with the vessel’s master for transiting too close to the  coastline. According to the investigation, the accident was compounded  because of poor emergency management by the master, some staff deck  officers, and the vessel’s hotel director. However, the report also offered  additional recommendations, including improvements in bridge resource  management, emergency power generation, and search and rescue  operations, among other things.
section_title: Cruise Industry and Federal Agencies Have Implemented Most CVSSA Provisions, and Additional Crime- Reporting Efforts Are Under Way
paragraphs: In 2011, the Coast Guard issued guidance on most of the provisions in  the CVSSA, and the cruise lines had already implemented most of the  safety measures required by the law. However, as of December 2013, the  Coast Guard and MARAD were in the process of developing and  publicizing new regulations before moving forward with the  implementation of the remaining provisions related to items such as new  technology and training certifications required or authorized by the  CVSSA. Provisions regarding the publication of information on crimes on  cruise vessels have been fully implemented by the FBI and Coast Guard  in accordance with the law. Even so, efforts are under way that could  address remaining concerns related to the thoroughness, timeliness, and  context of reported crime data.
subsections: section_title: The Coast Guard Issued CVSSA Guidance, and Cruise Lines Have Implemented Most CVSSA Requirements
paragraphs: The Coast Guard issued guidance for 11 of the 15 CVSSA provisions in  June 2011. The Coast Guard guidance was issued in the form of  internal Coast Guard policy letters with the main purpose of providing  instructions to Coast Guard port state control officers regarding CVSSA  requirements. Guidance was provided in the following 11 areas: (1) rail  heights; (2) peepholes in passenger stateroom doors, (3) security latches  and time-sensitive keys for stateroom doors, (4) safety information  provided to passengers, (5) medical licensing and proper equipment to  perform sexual assault exams, (6) patient access to information and  communications in the event of sexual assault, (7) confidentiality of  sexual assault examination and support information, (8) crew access to  passenger staterooms, (9) logbook and reporting requirements for  CVSSA crimes, (10) availability of crime data on the Coast Guard’s  website and the link on cruise lines’ webpages to the Coast Guard’s  website, and (11) training standards and curricula—which resulted in  the development of the required course on crime scene preservation.
Coast Guard officials stated that the guidance was necessary to help  clarify some aspects of the CVSSA, especially in those areas that are  outside the Coast Guard’s normal area of expertise. For example, the  guidance provides specific questions for inspectors to ask medical  personnel to verify that adequate training, equipment, and medicine are in  place in the event of a sexual assault.
Officials from all five of the cruise lines we spoke with, as well as CLIA,  told us that there were minor issues with implementing these 11 CVSSA  requirements and that most of the safety and security measures required  by the law were already in place when the CVSSA was enacted, in July  2010. For example, each of the cruise line officials we met with told us  that their vessels already were in compliance with most CVSSA  provisions including having peepholes in stateroom doors, using certified  medical personnel for sexual assault exams, and carrying rape kits  onboard. As a result, according to all of the cruise lines we spoke with,  meeting the CVSSA deadline for most of the requirements was not  difficult. In the case where a modification was needed to meet a CVSSA  requirement, the cruise lines we spoke with described the modification as  minor. For example, officials from CLIA stated that, for the most part, the  rail heights on their members’ vessels already met the 42-inch height  specified in the CVSSA. In one case, officials from a cruise line identified  isolated locations where the rail height was below the requirement—such  as around entrance gangways and by lifeboat stations—and thus they  took steps to modify the railing height to meet the new standard. CLIA  officials also reported that developing security information guides for  passenger staterooms required a moderate amount of effort for the cruise  lines because of the variations in their vessels’ itineraries, which required  cruise lines to collect and update information for all of their vessels’ ports  of call. Additionally, officials from one cruise line we spoke with discussed  going beyond what the CVSSA requires. For example, this cruise line told  us it was involved in discussions with officials from a victim advocacy  group to evaluate and enhance the cruise line’s procedures for preventing  sexual assault and responding to sexual assault allegations. Additionally,  this cruise line also told us it uses strict criteria to credential its  professional staff to meet at least the minimum guidelines of the  American College of Emergency Physicians and uses outside vendor  software to help ensure credentials are kept up to date. Furthermore,  these officials stated that an electronic medical record system is being  introduced to improve the documentation and accessibility of health care  information for guests and crew.
section_title: The Coast Guard and MARAD Are in the Process of Developing Regulations and Policy for Four CVSSA Provisions
paragraphs: There are four CVSSA provisions that require the development of  regulations and policy for enforcement, and these are in development by  the Coast Guard and MARAD. These provisions are (1) man overboard  technology, which detects and alerts the crew to a person falling  overboard; (2) video recording requirements, which are to assist in  documenting crimes on the vessel and in providing evidence for the  prosecution of such crimes; (3) acoustical hailing and warning devices,  which provide communication capability around a vessel operating in  high-risk waters; and (4) certification of training providers that teach the  CVSSA training course on crime prevention, detection, evidence  preservation, and reporting. The Coast Guard is responsible for  developing regulations for the first three provisions, while MARAD is  responsible for developing policy for the training certification provision.
subsections: section_title: Coast Guard CVSSA Provisions
paragraphs: The Coast Guard issued a Request for Information (RFI) in May 2011 to  obtain the public’s input on the CVSSA requirements on man overboard  technology and video recording because they involved complex  technology and the CVSSA language was not specific enough, according  to Coast Guard officials, for them to use it to verify compliance on cruise  vessels. In response to its RFI, the Coast Guard received comments from  nine entities: CLIA, two cruise victim advocacy groups, five companies  stating that they had effective technology in these areas, and one private  citizen. In addition to the RFI responses, officials that we interviewed from  CLIA, cruise lines, and cruise victim advocacy groups also provided  insights on some of the challenges associated with two of the technology  provisions of the CVSSA. Comments from the RFI as well as additional  information provided to us from interested stakeholders are discussed in  tables 1 and 2:  The Coast Guard’s RFI did not solicit feedback on the final provision, on  acoustical hailing; however, Coast Guard officials told us that this  provision would still be part of the final regulation as the technology  already exists for acoustical hailing and warning devices. The term “high- risk waters” used in the provision was problematic to some cruise victim  advocacy groups, according to Coast Guard officials, as they perceived  the definition to be different from the Coast Guard’s definition. For  example, Coast Guard officials said that some cruise victim advocacy  groups believe that those places that may be high-risk terrorism targets  near land should be considered high-risk waters (e.g., New York Harbor  and waterways). However, Coast Guard officials told us they have a long- standing definition of high-risk waters, and that they are typically waters  where terrorism, piracy, and armed robbery occur (i.e., the waters off the  Horn of Africa, etc.). Therefore, Coast Guard officials said that they felt it  was necessary to include this provision in the proposed rule to allow for  public comments because it was not clear from the law how the provision  should be implemented.
In July 2013, Coast Guard officials told us that they had drafted a Notice  of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that will encompass these three  provisions of the CVSSA. They added that the regulation will likely be  performance based—focusing on what must be achieved—rather than  prescriptive. Coast Guard officials noted that the NPRM is currently going  through final agency review. According to the website of the Office of  Management and Budget (OMB), which is the final reviewer in the  rulemaking process, the NPRM will be issued in June 2014. There is no  timetable for when the final regulation will be issued.
All cruise line officials we spoke with reported that one of their key  frustrations with the implementation of the CVSSA was not having timely  information related to these three technology areas of the CVSSA. They  expressed concern with how long it has taken to develop the regulations  as well as concern about the lack of interim communication from the  Coast Guard on the status of the rulemaking process. Cruise line officials  stated that this affects their business, and that they want to be in full  compliance with the law. Coast Guard officials commented that the time  they have taken to develop the proposed rule was to ensure that they  were adequately addressing CVSSA requirements and incorporating all  viewpoints, while MARAD officials said that the time they took was to  determine the best approach for implementation. Furthermore, Coast  Guard officials told us that once a rulemaking process is under way,  federal agencies generally do not discuss it with outside parties to avoid  concerns regarding ex parte communications. According to Coast Guard  officials, engaging with outside parties to update them on the process, as  cruise line officials wished had been done, could hinder transparency,  unless the agency gave all parties and the public the same opportunity to  comment and provide information.
While the Coast Guard is drafting its NPRM to address these three  outstanding CVSSA provisions, in July 2013, legislation was introduced  that would amend the video recording requirements of the CVSSA,  among other items. The proposed bills detail requirements for  placement of video surveillance equipment on cruise vessels, access to  video records, and video retention standards, among other items. As of  December 2013, the two bills have been referred to the Senate  Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and the House  Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure’s Subcommittee on  Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, respectively, and have not  been voted on. It is unclear what effect these bills may have on the  impending regulation from the Coast Guard if they become law.
section_title: MARAD CVSSA Provision
paragraphs: For the fourth CVSSA provision, MARAD issued a notice of proposed  new policy in the Federal Register in May 2013 for certifying providers of  the CVSSA training course on crime prevention, detection, evidence   While the CVSSA did not mandate that  preservation, and reporting.MARAD develop a training provider certification—the language of the  CVSSA states that MARAD “may” develop a certification—MARAD  officials stated that they were intent on pursuing certification because  there were requests from both the Coast Guard and CLIA to provide  clarity on the certification portion of the CVSSA. MARAD proposed a  voluntary certification program for training providers to assure the general  public that passenger cruise vessel security and safety personnel have  received training that is in strict compliance with the CVSSA-mandated  model training course. According to MARAD, certification would serve to  assist the cruise industry in identifying and obtaining qualified training  services. Training providers seeking to be certified by MARAD would be  required to submit training plans and supporting information for review. If  the training provider’s plans meet the CVSSA model course criteria, the  agency would offer its certification subject to the training provider entering  into an agreement that, in addition to other terms, would subject the  organization to program audits. Four comments were received on the  proposed policy from CLIA, ICV, the American Association for Justice,  and a practicing maritime attorney. Their comments on the proposed  policy are summarized in table 3. MARAD is reviewing the comments,  and officials said that it will promulgate a final policy as soon as  practicable.
section_title: The FBI and the Coast Guard Have Fully Implemented CVSSA Crime Data Reporting Requirements
paragraphs: The FBI and the Coast Guard have fully implemented the CVSSA  provisions regarding crime data reporting. Specifically, the FBI is  responsible for implementing two main areas of the CVSSA: reviewing  safety guides that the cruise lines prepare and reporting CVSSA crime  data (regarding crimes that occur onboard cruise ships) to the Coast  Guard which publishes it on a public website. FBI officials reported that  they provide data for cases no longer under investigation, as stated in the  CVSSA. The CVSSA identifies eight crimes that, if within the FBI’s  jurisdiction, cruise lines must report to the FBI. These crimes are  homicide, suspicious death, missing U.S. national, kidnapping, assault  with serious bodily injury, firing or tampering with the vessel, theft of  money or property in excess of $10,000, and certain sexual assault  offenses. The CVSSA then requires the Coast Guard to publish on its  website a statistical compilation of all allegations of CVSSA crimes  reported to the FBI that are no longer under FBI investigation. The data  are to be updated at least quarterly, aggregated by cruise line, and each  type of crime is to be identified including whether it was committed by a  passenger or a crew member. Figure 2 explains the FBI’s general  process for receiving a CVSSA-related crime report and, if appropriate,  opening and closing its investigation of a CVSSA-related crime.
When an alleged crime occurs aboard a cruise vessel, according to cruise  line officials, the security officer onboard the vessel typically receives  notification of the alleged crime. If the alleged crime is believed to be a  CVSSA-related crime, the security officer is usually required to notify the  vessel owner, since under the CVSSA it is the owner’s responsibility to  report any CVSSA crime to the FBI and the Coast Guard as soon as  possible. FBI officials stated that initial reports of crimes can come in  varying forms, but generally for CVSSA crimes, they are notified within 24  hours by telephone. FBI officials also stated that, in most instances, they  are relying on cruise vessel personnel to preserve the crime scene  aboard the vessel since the FBI cannot typically get to a cruise vessel  until it arrives in a United States port. To help address these  circumstances, the FBI has provided the cruise lines with a standard form  for detailing initial information about the alleged crime that includes a  description of the incident; the names of victims, witnesses, and suspects;  any statements made by those involved; and any evidence preserved  (rape kits, video recordings, photos, etc.). The cruise lines are to send  this form to the FBI and Coast Guard as soon as possible after the crime  is reported. The FBI considers the information as it determines what  further actions need to be taken.
According to a cruise victim advocate group’s official, this “pre-opening”  phase has been a stated source of concern for the group because of the  following issues:
Law enforcement response: At sea, unlike on land, generally, a  crime victim cannot call 911 to reach an independent local law  enforcement authority. Instead, it is the responsibility of the cruise  line’s security personnel to respond. This can be disconcerting to the  victim of a crime, particularly if the alleged perpetrator is a cruise line  employee. An ICV official stated that the group realizes that it is the  cruise line’s responsibility to respond initially, but the ICV believes that  victims should be given immediate access to a private phone and  contact information to call the FBI directly, and other support  organizations.
Jurisdiction: Cruise vessels generally sail through multiple local and  foreign jurisdictions during a cruise. A cruise victim advocate group  official stated that this can result in a victim feeling confused in dealing  with the different legal systems. Depending on where the reported  crime occurs, there can be several foreign ports that the cruise line  may visit before arriving back in the United States. Each of these  foreign jurisdictions may investigate the crime if it so chooses.
Evidence integrity: Cruise vessel personnel preserve crime scene  evidence until law enforcement personnel board the vessel to begin  reviewing the allegations, generally upon the vessel arriving at a U.S.  port. For cruise victim advocates, this raises questions about evidence  preservation, conflict of interest, the feasibility of conducting an  investigation days after a crime may have occurred, and the potential  contamination of a crime scene if other jurisdictions investigate prior  to the vessel arriving back in the United States.
In response to these concerns, FBI officials stated that they believe it is  important to have cruise line security officials begin some evidence  preservation work. They added that this is important given that there is no  law enforcement agency onboard and that the FBI interviews and  evidence collection are generally conducted when the cruise vessel has  arrived in a U.S. port. To help support this effort, the FBI has provided  CLIA with information on how to preserve crime scenes. FBI officials in  all field offices we visited told us they have never been concerned about  the information they received or the integrity of an investigation as a result  of the security officer being a cruise line employee. Most cruise line  officials mentioned that the circumstances of an international cruise— where no independent law enforcement agency is available in  international waters—may make it necessary for their security personnel  to begin preserving evidence and collecting information while the vessel  is still at sea to assist law enforcement personnel. FBI officials in one port  city noted that they had seen an improvement in evidence preservation  since the CVSSA came into law.
subsections: section_title: FBI Investigation—Active Investigation Period
paragraphs: Upon boarding the vessel, the FBI can more readily gather evidence,  interview witnesses, and survey the crime scene. If the alleged crime  meets the standard for opening an investigation, the FBI will open an  investigation and certain statistics about the case are to be published on  the Coast Guard’s website when the case is closed. Whether the FBI  opens an investigation depends on a number of factors related to the  facts and circumstances of each case. However, for a crime allegation to  eventually appear on the Coast Guard’s public website, under the law, an  investigation would have to have been officially opened by the FBI.
section_title: FBI Investigation—Cases No Longer under Investigation, or “Closed” Cases
paragraphs: According to FBI officials, an open case may no longer be under  investigation if (1) the case has reached a final disposition in court (e.g., a  verdict was rendered and appeals have concluded); (2) the statute of  limitations has run out; and (3) at some point following the opening of an  official investigation, the U.S. Attorney declines prosecution. Once a case  is closed, FBI provides statistics on these closed cases to the Coast  Guard for posting on the website.
However, there is a difference between the number of reported cases and  the number of closed cases. Table 4 identifies alleged CVSSA crimes  reported to the FBI by year, and table 5 identifies closed CVSSA cases  published on the Coast Guard’s public website by year. As tables 4 and 5  demonstrate, there were 287 alleged CVSSA crimes reported to the FBI  during this nearly 4-year time period and 81 CVSSA crimes that were  published on the website as closed.
section_title: Efforts Are Under Way to Provide Additional Data in Crime Reporting
paragraphs: While the FBI reporting of CVSSA crime data is consistent with the law,  these data have some limitations. For example, the crime data currently  reported are limited in that (1) allegations for which investigations are not  opened are not reported, (2) the data reported are not timely, and (3) the  data reported are not put into context that would provide the public with  the magnitude of crime on vessels, as discussed below.
Allegations for which investigations are not opened are never  published: As shown in tables 4 and 5, there are more than three  times the number of alleged crimes reported to the FBI by the cruise  lines than the CVSSA requires the FBI to post publicly. The data in  table 4 on alleged crimes are not available publicly. According to a  cruise victim advocate we interviewed, and to some members of  Congress, there are questions about whether the public is adequately  informed about the numbers of alleged CVSSA crimes on cruise lines.  An official from a cruise victim advocacy group we interviewed stated  that without complete data on the crimes that have occurred on cruise  vessels, the public may not have the necessary information to make  informed decisions about cruise travel. However, information on  allegations of crime also may not accurately reflect crime on cruise  vessels, as some allegations may be unfounded.
Data reported are not timely: There can be a lag between the time  an alleged crime is reported to the FBI and the time a case is closed.  According to an FBI official, the crime data that are posted on Coast  Guard’s website represent incidents that may have occurred months  or years in the past. Depending on the progression of a case, this may  be due to the length of the investigation, criminal trial, or any appeals.  As a result, crimes published on the public website often do not align  with the quarter, and sometimes the year, in which the crime  occurred. An official from a cruise victim advocacy group we  interviewed commented that the significant time lapse from when a  crime allegedly occurs to when it is ultimately reported on the public  website results in the public getting less valuable information about  crimes that may have occurred onboard cruise vessels.
Data reported without any context for comparison: According to a  CLIA official, appropriate context is needed when presenting the  CVSSA crime data figures so that the public can determine how  cruise vessel crime rates compare with land-based crime rates. The  FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) collects crime statistics from over  18,000 city, university and college, county, state and tribal, and  federal law enforcement agencies. In an effort to provide more detail  on the comparative prevalence of cruise crimes, one cruise line and  CLIA have included data that compare cruise line crime rates for  homicide, rape, and assault with serious bodily injury with similar land- based crime rate statistics from the UCR for homicide, forcible rape,  and aggravated assault. As we discuss below, while the UCR  comparison has some limitations, CLIA officials commented that  providing this comparison would provide potential cruise passengers  with more transparent and comprehensive crime statistics. In addition  to using rates to compare the prevalence of cruise vessel crime with  the prevalence of land-based crime, presenting cruise crime data in a  rate-based format may also be useful in comparing crime statistics  among cruise lines.
In July 2013, CLIA officials stated that certain cruise lines would begin  reporting additional crime data on their websites. According to CLIA, in  August 2013, six cruise lines—which account for over 90 percent of the  North American cruise passengers—began to voluntarily report on their  respective websites the number of alleged CVSSA crimes that had been  reported onboard their cruise vessels. Officials from one of these cruise lines stated that they were volunteering to report this information to be  more transparent about alleged crimes reported on their vessels. The  data presented on their respective websites provide more information  than they are required to report to the FBI—as the cruise line website  information includes all alleged CVSSA crimes that have been reported  regardless of FBI jurisdiction, even if the allegation of a crime is later  determined to be unfounded.
However, methodological factors may limit the usefulness of these data  for consumers. For example, there are some limitations associated with  the UCR data comparisons that one cruise line and CLIA are making, in  that, only certain CVSSA crimes—violent crimes—can be reasonably  compared with the UCR crimes because of definitional differences and  the lack of comparison crimes identified in the UCR. In addition, some  factors that explain the relatively low rate of alleged cruise vessel crimes  compared with UCR land-based crime rates include the fact that  passengers are in a confined cruise vessel environment where all  persons and items brought onboard are screened, camera surveillance is  ubiquitous, security personnel are present, and the demographic profile of  the passengers on cruise vessels does not necessarily compare well with  the profile of a major U.S. city (average income, for example). As a result,  the differences presented by these two environments make the  comparison between a cruise vessel environment and a land-based  community challenging. A CLIA official commented that despite these  limitations, the UCR is still viewed as the only national data set of  reported crimes that can be used to make crime comparisons. According  to a criminal justice researcher familiar with the cruise industry data, the  UCR is being used as a comparison baseline in part because of the lack  of an alternative baseline for comparing crime data, and while there may   While the  be some limitations, the comparative analysis is appropriate.presentation of the data on the cruise lines’ and CLIA’s websites may  have limitations, the methodology for comparison generally appears  sound and this voluntary crime data reporting is more comprehensive  than what CVSSA currently requires.
S.1340, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 2800,113th Cong. (2013). their investigative status, would be publicly posted, quarterly, on a new  website maintained by the Department of Transportation. Under the  proposed legislation, the allegation data would identify whether each  crime was committed (or allegedly committed) by a passenger or crew  member and whether it was against a minor. The bills also propose that  cruise lines report CVSSA-type crimes within the FBI’s jurisdiction to the  FBI and the nearest U.S. consulate within 4 hours of the crime occurring,  among other items. In July 2013, these bills were referred to the Senate  Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and the House  Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure’s Subcommittee on  Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, respectively.
The efforts of both the cruise lines and Congress could improve the  completeness, timeliness, and context for crime data on cruise vessels.  However, as previously stated, the cruise lines are publishing their  information voluntarily, and it is unknown if they will continue to do so.  Also, there are some consistency issues in how the data are reported,  with one cruise company reporting its data in aggregate—combining the  crime data of all of its North American subsidiary cruise lines into a single  data set for reporting—while other cruise companies report crime data by  individual company or by subsidiary cruise line. In addition, the cruise  lines currently do not report crime in a rate-based format, which would  allow for easier comparison among cruise lines. If enacted into the law,  the proposed amendments to the CVSSA, introduced in July 2013, could  also improve the timeliness, relevance, and transparency of cruise vessel  crime data available to the public. As of November 2013, however, the  cruise lines’ voluntary reporting had just begun and the CVSSA bills  remained in committee, and thus we cannot assess whether, or to what  extent, these efforts may address the data limitations.
section_title: The Cruise Industry Made Changes after the Costa Concordia Accident and Potential International Regulations Remain under Consideration
paragraphs: The cruise industry responded to the Costa Concordia accident by  reviewing safety practices and implementing changes across the industry  and potential international regulatory actions are under consideration at  the IMO. The Coast Guard began witnessing passenger musters in  February 2012, soon after the Costa Concordia accident, and has participated in a mass rescue exercise involving a cruise vessel.
subsections: section_title: The Cruise Industry Adopted Safety-Related Policies Identified following the Costa Concordia Accident
paragraphs: In response to the Costa Concordia accident, CLIA initiated an  operational safety review and member cruise lines adopted 10 safety- related policies. According to CLIA’s Operational Safety Review  Executive Summary, the review was guided by cruise industry members  with the advice and input of an independent panel of safety experts.  Suggested policies were discussed and developed within CLIA’s  Operational Safety Review’s Task Force, made up of senior industry  executives from CLIA’s member lines with responsibility for maritime  safety, and approved by the chief executive officers (CEO) of member  lines. The resulting 10 policies relate to various safety enhancements,  such as improvements to passenger musters, vessel passage planning,  and life jacket stowage. CLIA announced these policies throughout 2012,  as shown in figure 3.
As a condition of CLIA membership, CEOs of all member cruise lines had  to attest in writing that their companies had adopted the 10 policies and  had included them in their companies’ safety management systems  (SMS), according to CLIA officials. These officials said they expected  cruise lines to implement most of the policies upon the dates of their  announcement. Officials noted that they received written attestations  from member cruise line CEOs at different times following the  announcements; however, all had provided them as of July 2013. As a  matter of international regulation, once a policy has been included in a  company’s SMS, the policy is subject to routine external audits. These  audits are conducted by vessels’ flag states (or classification societies  acting on their behalf), which are responsible for ensuring that a vessel’s  SMS is in compliance with the ISM Code and that the company operates  the vessel in accordance with the SMS, among other things. Almost all  cruise vessels visiting U.S. ports are registered (flagged) in other  countries, and are therefore subject to SMS compliance audits by their  flag states. When foreign-flagged cruise vessels visit U.S. ports, their  SMSs are also subject to verification by the Coast Guard in its role as a  port state control authority. Coast Guard officials said their port state  control boarding officers review the validity of the certificates issued by a  vessel’s flag state and also perform spot checks of a vessel’s compliance  with its SMS, and noted that their review of a vessel’s SMS is less in- depth than a flag state’s review. Officials also explained that the Coast  Guard may check items in a vessel’s SMS that go beyond domestic or  international regulations—such as the 10 CLIA policies shown in figure  3—but said that any deficiencies found would merely be subject to  correction rather than vessel detention because such items are self  imposed rather than part of any regulation. However, Coast Guard  officials noted that a series of such deficiencies might indicate a lack of  implementation of the SMS which could result in more serious actions by  Coast Guard.
To facilitate CLIA’s operational safety review following the Costa  Concordia accident, each member cruise line was to conduct a review of  its own safety practices and procedures and collaborate to share best  practices. The reviews conducted by the five cruise lines we interviewed  varied in scope and outcomes. For example, according to a document  provided by one company, it conducted a safety review that examined  nine areas of its cruise operations—such as emergency management and  damage control—and officials said this review resulted in over 500  recommendations. Another cruise line provided documentation showing  that its review, conducted by an outside entity, focused on six objectives  that in many cases relate to the human aspect of safety and emergency  response—such as leadership involvement, teamwork and training, and  safety culture—and the review resulted in 26 observations for further  consideration. Representatives of the five cruise lines we spoke with  identified some examples of changes they have made, or are making,  after reviewing their safety procedures following the Costa Concordia  accident. They include the following:
One cruise line, as part of its quality assurance processes, reported  that it has its most qualified captains visit vessels and observe staff to  determine whether they are fostering an open atmosphere on the  bridge. These captains are to ensure that senior bridge officers are  making their thoughts and intentions known, and that junior bridge  officers challenge senior officers if they are unclear about orders or  have concerns. This emphasis on bridge team management aligns  with the new CLIA “Passage Planning” policy where, among other  things, bridge team members are encouraged to raise operational  concerns without fear of retribution.
Another cruise line reported that it changed the duty of managing the  vessel mustering process from the captain of the vessel to the hotel  director, to alleviate extra burden on the captain during an emergency.  It also changed its mustering policy, so if a passenger refuses to  muster prior to departure, then that passenger is not allowed to travel.
Another cruise line reported that it sent its officers to receive testing to  assess how they will react during the stress of an emergency; the  suitability of their leadership style; and human factors such as  approachability, reliability, and acceptance of change. CLIA officials  also said testing of crew to assess how they will react during the  stress of an emergency was a topic of in-depth discussion during its  operational safety review following the Costa Concordia accident.
Representatives from all five cruise lines we spoke with said they have  included, or plan to include, the safety-related changes they have made  as a result of their internal reviews into their SMSs.
section_title: International Safety Measures Are Under Consideration and the Coast Guard Has Taken Some Initial Actions
subsections: section_title: IMO Adopted Muster Regulation and Is Considering Other Potential Measures
paragraphs: IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)—a key IMO committee charged  with addressing all matters related to the safety of shipping—has adopted  one regulation, issued 18 interim safety recommendations, and is  considering additional safety-related measures that it may take following  the Costa Concordia accident. Specifically, MSC adopted a regulation in  June 2013 to be effective on January 1, 2015, which requires that newly  embarked passengers muster prior to or immediately upon departure,  instead of within 24 hours, as stated in current regulations. According to  a Coast Guard official, in the case of the Costa Concordia accident, the  passengers that had embarked at the previous port had not yet  participated in a muster drill before the accident occurred.
IMO’s MSC has also issued 18 interim safety recommendations for  passenger vessel companies to implement on a voluntary basis. Many  of these recommendations closely align with the 10 CLIA policies  discussed above. For example, as with CLIA’s policy, IMO recommends  that companies record the nationality of persons onboard for purposes of  coordination during emergencies. However, in some cases the IMO  recommendations offer additional guidance. For example, in addition to  recommending that passenger vessels carry additional life jackets in  public spaces (similar to CLIA’s policy), IMO recommends that companies  consider providing life jackets that are similarly designed and can be  donned in a similar manner to avoid confusion. Following the release of  the Costa Concordia safety technical accident investigation report in May  2013, the MSC working group responsible for developing these 18 interim  recommendations expressed the view that, in the future, a decision will  need to be made on their final status.
Following the Costa Concordia accident, the MSC created a long-term  action plan to facilitate the consideration of measures resulting from the  accident. According to a MSC report, MSC uses the action plan to  document proposals from IMO member governments and international  organizations. The action plan is not publicly available; however, a Coast  Guard official present at the June 2013 MSC meeting said the plan  contains about 20 items and can be viewed as a list of issues—similar to  the list of 18 interim safety recommendations—on which the MSC may  take further action.including the development of international regulations. Figure 4  summarizes the main actions of IMO following the Costa Concordia  accident.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland  Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of Transportation,  the National Transportation Safety Board, and the Department of State for  review and comment. The Department of Homeland Security, Department  of Justice, and Department of State provided technical comments, which  we incorporated as appropriate.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its  issue date. At that time we will send copies of this report to the Secretary  of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Secretary of  Transportation, the Chairman of the National Transportation Safety  Board, the Secretary of State, appropriate congressional committees, and  other interested parties. This report will also be available at no charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Key Stakeholders with Maritime Safety and Security Activities
paragraphs: This appendix provides information on the international and domestic  organizations that play a role in the safety and security of cruise vessels.  The non-U.S. stakeholders are diverse; have wide-ranging roles and  responsibilities; and include international organizations, governments of  nations where cruise vessels make stops or are registered, and private  organizations that help ensure the safe operation of vessels. See table 6  for a list of some of the relevant international and domestic stakeholders  involved in implementation of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act  of 2010 (CVSSA) and cruise vessel safety and security issues.
section_title: Appendix II: Provisions in the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act
paragraphs: This appendix provides summary information on the provisions of the  Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act, including time frames for  implementation.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Stephen L. Caldwell, (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director;  Jeff Jensen; Daniel Klabunde; and Michelle R. Su made significant  contributions to this report. In addition, David Alexander, Michele Fejfar,  and Stan Kostyla assisted with design and methodology; Tracey King  provided legal support; Jessica Orr provided assistance in report  preparation; and Eric Hauswirth developed the report’s graphics.