Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European Sites
Published: 2009-08-06T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) estimated in 2008 that the potential costs of fielding ballistic missile defenses in Europe would be more than $4 billion through 2015. Planned ballistic missile defenses in Europe are intended to defend the United States, its deployed forces, and its allies against ballistic missile attacks from the Middle East. They are expected to include a missile interceptor site in Poland, a radar site in the Czech Republic, and a mobile radar system in a still-to-be-determined European location. GAO was asked to evaluate the Department of Defense's (DOD) plans for missile defense sites in Europe and address to what extent DOD has (1) planned for the sites' implementation and (2) estimated military construction and long-term operations and support costs. Accordingly, GAO reviewed key legislation; examined policy and guidance from MDA, the Army, the Air Force, and the Army Corps of Engineers; analyzed budget documents and cost estimates; and visited sites in Poland and the Czech Republic.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD has begun planning for the construction and implementation of the European missile defense sites, including coordinating with international partners and U.S. stakeholders; however, several challenges affecting DOD's implementation of ballistic missile defenses in Europe remain. First, neither Poland nor the Czech Republic has ratified key bilateral agreements with the United States, limiting DOD's ability to finalize key details of the sites, such as how security will be provided. Second, DOD's efforts to establish the roles and responsibilities of key U.S. stakeholders for the European sites remain incomplete because MDA and the services have not yet made important determinations, such as establishing the criteria that must be met before the transfer of the European missile defense sites from MDA to the Army and Air Force. Since 2002, MDA has been directed by DOD to begin planning for the transfer of missile defense elements, including the direction to coordinate with the services on resources and personnel needed to provide an effective transition of responsibility. Without clear definitions of the roles that MDA and the services will be responsible for and agreement on criteria for transfer, DOD will continue to face uncertainties in determining how the European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site will be sustained over the long term. DOD's cost estimates for military construction and operations and support have limitations and do not provide Congress complete information on the true costs of ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Key principles for cost estimating state that complete cost estimates are important in preparing budget submissions and for assessing the long-term affordability of a program. Further, according to DOD military construction regulations, the Army Corps of Engineers typically certifies that key construction design milestones have been met and verifies military construction cost estimates before the estimates are submitted as budget requests. However, DOD's original military construction estimates in the fiscal year 2009 budget did not include all costs, primarily because MDA submitted the estimates before accomplishing key design milestones and without a review by the Army Corps of Engineers. Consequently, DOD's projected military construction costs for the interceptor and radar sites could potentially increase from DOD's original $837 million estimate to over $1 billion. DOD operations and support cost estimates are also incomplete because they do not include projected costs for base operations that will be managed by the Army and Air Force. Key cost factors that will affect these estimates, such as how security will be provided at the sites, remain undefined. In addition, MDA and the services have not yet agreed on how the operations and support costs for the interceptor and radar sites will be funded over the long term. As a result, Congress does not have accurate information on the full investment required for ballistic missile defenses in Europe.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) was created in 2002 in order to  develop ballistic missile defenses comprising land-, air-, and sea-based  elements—such as missiles and radars—working together as an integrated  system and intended to intercept ballistic missiles in all phases of flight.  MDA has spent almost $56 billion since 2002 on developing and fielding an  initial ballistic missile defense capability and is on course to spend about  $50 billion more over the next 5 years. As part of this system, MDA plans  to field a missile interceptor site in Poland designed to intercept incoming  ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East, a radar site in the Czech  Republic capable of tracking incoming missiles and guiding interceptors to  their targets, and a mobile radar system to be strategically placed in a still- to-be-determined European location to provide additional warning of  potential ballistic missile threats. While MDA has taken the lead in  developing the sites thus far, the Army has been designated the lead  military service to operate and support the European Interceptor Site in  Poland and the mobile radar system, and the Air Force has been  designated lead military service for the European Midcourse Radar Site in  the Czech Republic. MDA estimated in 2008 that the potential costs of the  planned ballistic missile defenses in Europe through 2013 would be more  than $4 billion—approximately $837 million for military construction;   $612 million for operations and support at the sites; and $2.6 billion for  development, testing, and procurement costs.   Although the Department of Defense (DOD) is moving forward with  planning and site analysis for the ballistic missile defense sites in Europe,  the new administration indicated in 2009 that it is reviewing U.S. national  policy on missile defense and has not yet stated its plans for the future of  ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Some critics of the proposed ballistic  missile defenses in Europe argue that testing of the system to date has  been insufficient to verify that it will function as intended. In light of those  concerns, Congress has placed limitations on the use of funds for the  acquisition or deployment of missiles at a European site until the  Secretary of Defense certifies that the proposed interceptors have  demonstrated a high probability of working in an operationally effective  manner and the ability to accomplish the mission. Further, the  deployment of the ballistic missile defense sites in Europe has been the  subject of debate in the parliaments of both Poland and the Czech  Republic, and the Russian government has adamantly protested U.S. plans  in those countries. However, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization  (NATO) has indicated its support for ballistic missile defenses in Europe  and is pursuing ways to link its own missile defense efforts with those of  the United States.
We have previously reported on a number of challenges facing DOD as it  develops and fields ballistic missile defenses. For instance, we recently  testified that to meet President Bush’s goal of putting in place an initial set  of ballistic missile defense capabilities beginning in 2004, the Secretary of  Defense granted MDA a significant amount of funding and decision- making flexibility, exempting the agency from many traditional DOD  requirements for weapon system development, acquisition, and oversight.  Although this exemption allowed MDA to quickly develop an initial  ballistic missile defense capability, this approach has also resulted in  several management challenges. For example, MDA has not yet provided  baselines necessary to measure its progress on cost, schedule, and testing.  Further, some of MDA’s production and fielding decisions have gotten  ahead of its testing schedule, raising concerns about system efficacy.  Finally, DOD’s plans for long-term operations and support are incomplete,  making the transition and transfer of the ballistic missile defense elements  from MDA to the services difficult.
In requesting this review, you expressed interest in the completeness of  DOD’s plans for the ballistic missile defense sites in Europe, including  questions about whether MDA’s initial $4 billion estimate for the planned  European capabilities includes the full costs associated with construction  and operations and support of the sites. In this context, you asked GAO to  evaluate DOD’s plans for the ballistic missile defense sites in Europe and  address to what extent DOD has (1) planned for the initial implementation  of ballistic missile defenses in Europe, to include coordination with key  international partners and U.S. stakeholders, and (2) estimated total  military construction and long-term operations and support costs for  ballistic missile defenses in Europe.
For both objectives, we reviewed key legislation related to ballistic missile  defenses in Europe, DOD policy and guidance on military construction and  estimating costs, and DOD’s overall approach for preparing to support  ballistic missile defense. To determine to what extent DOD has planned  for the initial implementation of ballistic missile defenses in Europe, we  conducted site visits in Poland and the Czech Republic; met with DOD,  State Department, and host nation officials to discuss the efforts under  way to plan for the sites; and examined key documents, including  agreements with the host nations, memorandums of agreement between  key U.S. stakeholders, and MDA, Army, Air Force, and Army Corps of  Engineers documents for planning and site preparation. We evaluated the  collaboration efforts among the agencies to determine whether DOD,  Army, Air Force, and State Department officials followed key practices  that can help agencies enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts. To  determine the extent to which DOD has estimated total costs for ballistic  missile defenses in Europe, we examined budget documents, including  DOD’s fiscal year 2009 Future Years Defense Program (including budget  data for fiscal years 2008-2013), MDA’s fiscal year 2009 military  construction cost estimates, MDA’s fiscal year 2010 budget submission,  and the Army’s projected military construction cost estimates, and  reviewed key principles for developing accurate and reliable cost  estimates. We also discussed the cost estimates with MDA, the Army, the  Air Force, and the Army Corps of Engineers-Headquarters and Europe  District to determine the completeness of the military construction and  operations and support costs. We discussed the results of our analyses on  these objectives with DOD and State Department officials. Our scope and  methodology is discussed in more detail in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2008 to August 2009 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: When MDA was given the mission to develop a global integrated Ballistic  Missile Defense System (BMDS), DOD’s intention was for MDA to develop  missile defense elements, such as the proposed interceptor and radar sites  in Europe, and then transfer the elements to the lead services designated  to operate and support them. We have previously reported that the  transition process may, for some missile defense elements, end at a point  that DOD calls transfer—which is the reassignment of the MDA program  office responsibilities to a service. According to MDA and Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics  officials, not all BMDS elements will ultimately transfer; the decision to  transfer them will be made on a case-by-case basis and the conditions  under which this may happen will be identified in agreements between  MDA and the services for each element.
In September 2008, we reported that DOD has taken some initial steps to  plan for long-term operations and support of ballistic missile defense  elements, but planning efforts to date are incomplete because of  difficulties in transitioning and transferring responsibilities from MDA to  the services and in establishing operations and support cost estimates. We  noted that DOD has established limited operations and support cost  estimates for ballistic missile defense elements in its Future Years Defense  Program, DOD’s 6-year spending plan; however, the estimates do not fully  reflect the total life cycle cost of the BMDS. As a result, we reported that  the operations and support costs that had been developed were not  transparent to DOD senior leadership and congressional decision makers  and recommended that DOD establish a standard process for long-term  support planning for the BMDS and a requirement to estimate BMDS  operations and support costs.
section_title: DOD Has Made Progress in Planning for Ballistic Missile Defenses in Europe with International Partners and Key U.S. Stakeholders, but Challenges Remain
paragraphs: DOD has begun planning for the construction and implementation of the  European missile defense sites; however, challenges affecting DOD’s  implementation of ballistic missile defenses in Europe remain. First,  neither Poland nor the Czech Republic has ratified key bilateral  agreements with the United States, limiting DOD’s ability to finalize key  details of the sites, such as how security will be provided. Second, DOD’s  efforts to establish the roles and responsibilities of key U.S. stakeholders  for the European sites remain incomplete. Without clear definitions of the  roles that MDA and the services will be responsible for and agreement on  criteria for transfer, DOD will continue to face uncertainties in  determining how the European Interceptor Site and the European  Midcourse Radar Site will be sustained over the long term.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Made Progress in Planning for European Missile Defenses
paragraphs: DOD has made progress in planning for the construction, implementation,  and operations and support for the European missile defense sites. In  2002, the President signed National Security Presidential Directive 23 that  called for missile defense capabilities to protect the United States, its  deployed forces, and its allies. As part of that direction, MDA considered  several European sites where it could base a missile defense capability to  provide additional U.S. protection and could provide a regional defense for  its European allies against a missile launch from Iran. DOD approached  both Poland and the Czech Republic about basing elements of its proposed  European missile defense system, and MDA briefed the President about  the potential capability in 2003. Both U.S. and Polish officials told us that  Poland was a likely host site because many of the trajectories from Iran  went through Poland. In May 2006, the Czech government sent a formal  letter to the United States to request that the United States consider  placing missile defense assets in the Czech Republic. DOD has completed  site selection and begun site design for the European Interceptor Site in  Poland and the European Midcourse Radar Site in the Czech Republic.
subsections: section_title: European Interceptor Site
paragraphs: The proposed European Interceptor Site is located outside of Slupsk,  Poland, near the Baltic Sea. The site is planned to consist of 10 two-stage,  silo-based interceptors—modified versions of the three-stage interceptors  located at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg, California. The site is  designed to protect the U.S. homeland and U.S. allies from incoming  ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East. The initial MDA estimate  indicated that the site would be operational by 2013, and the Army is the  lead service that will be tasked with operating and supporting the  interceptor site once it becomes operational. Site analysis is under way at  the European Interceptor Site, but no physical site preparation or  construction has begun. The photograph in figure 1 was taken at the site in  February 2009 and shows the area where the planned interceptor field will  be located.
The proposed European Midcourse Radar Site is located at the Brdy  military training area, approximately 90 kilometers southwest of Prague,  Czech Republic. This land-based X-band radar will provide ballistic missile  tracking data to the European Interceptor Site as well as the greater  BMDS. The radar proposed for deployment to the Czech Republic is  currently located at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The radar will  undergo an upgrade before its installation in the Czech Republic. The Air  Force is the lead service that will be tasked with operating and supporting  the radar site once it becomes operational, which MDA initially estimated  would occur in 2013. Site analysis is under way at the European Midcourse  Radar Site, but no physical site preparation or construction has begun.
section_title: Mobile Forward-Based Radar
paragraphs: As part of ballistic missile defenses in Europe, DOD is considering the  placement of an AN/TPY-2 mobile forward-based radar at another site in  Europe in addition to the European Interceptor Site and the European  Midcourse Radar Site. The transportable, land-based X-band radar is being  considered in order to provide additional warning of ballistic missile  launches from a location that is closer to Iran. The site for this radar has  not yet been proposed, and at this time, negotiations with potential host  nations have not been authorized.
section_title: DOD Has Begun Negotiations and Planning with International Partners and U.S. Stakeholders
paragraphs: The State Department and DOD have negotiated the key bilateral Ballistic  Missile Defense Agreements necessary to move forward on the European  interceptor and radar sites. In 2008, the United States, Poland, and the  Czech Republic signed bilateral Ballistic Missile Defense Agreements that  formally approved the basing of the European Interceptor Site and the  European Midcourse Radar Site, and both agreements are now waiting for  ratification by the Polish and Czech parliaments. The Ballistic Missile  Defense Agreements are the first of several necessary agreements  expected to govern the fielding of ballistic missile defenses in each  country. The Ballistic Missile Defense Agreements establish the rights and  obligations of the United States, Poland, and the Czech Republic specific  to each site and provide general guidelines on personnel, construction,  and land use, among other things.
A second key set of agreements, supplementary arrangements to the  NATO Status of Forces Agreement, are expected to govern ballistic missile  defense at both sites. The overall NATO Status of Forces Agreement was  created soon after the NATO alliance was established in 1949 and sets the  general status of forces for member nations as they operate in each others’  territories. The supplementary Status of Forces Agreement adds mission- specific matters addressed only broadly in the NATO Status of Forces  Agreement, such as the legal status of U.S. civilian and military personnel  working at each site. The Czech Republic and the United States have  negotiated a supplementary Status of Forces Agreement, and it is now  waiting for ratification by the Czech parliament. However, the  supplementary Status of Forces Agreement with Poland had not been  completely negotiated as of June 2009. After the Ballistic Missile Defense  Agreements and supplementary Status of Forces Agreements are ratified  by each host nation’s parliament, implementing arrangements will be  negotiated. The implementing arrangements will serve as the executing  documents for both of these agreements and address the day-to-day  working relationship between the countries on a range of issues, including  security.
NATO’s overall role in European ballistic missile defense is still under  consideration. Although NATO has not been party to the bilateral  negotiations between DOD and the host nations, DOD and NATO have  worked together to begin addressing interoperability of the U.S. BMDS  and NATO’s Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense system.  NATO has also taken recent steps to show support for the European  Interceptor Site and European Midcourse Radar Site. For example,  NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration recognized that ballistic  missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to NATO, and recognized  that the European missile defense sites would provide a “substantial  contribution” to NATO’s protection. NATO stated that it is exploring ways  to link U.S. missile defense assets with current NATO missile defense  efforts.
DOD has also made progress in coordinating with key U.S. stakeholders  and by establishing the Army Corps of Engineers-Europe District as the  construction agent for both sites. DOD has established lead services for  both the interceptors and the radar and the Army and Air Force have  identified which command will be specifically tasked to lead each ballistic  missile element. The Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command has  been assigned as the lead command for the European Interceptor Site and  the Air Force Space Command is the lead command for the European  Midcourse Radar Site. As lead services, both the Army and Air Force have  conducted planning sessions and negotiation of roles and relationships  with MDA. For example, MDA and the Army and Air Force are establishing  roles and responsibilities for the long-term operations and support of the  European sites through negotiation of Overarching Memorandums of  Agreement and ballistic missile defense element–specific annexes to the  overarching agreements. However, with the exception of the Overarching  Memorandum of Agreement between MDA and the Army, completed in  January 2009, these agreements are not yet complete.
In addition, the Army Corps of Engineers-Europe District is the  construction agent for both the European Interceptor Site and the  European Midcourse Radar Site. As such, the Corps is responsible for  issuing and commissioning site preparation and construction contracts for  the sites. The Corps will manage the contracts to ensure that the sites are  developed and constructed to meet MDA and service facility requirements.  However, no contracts can be issued or site preparation commissioned  until the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreements and supplementary Status  of Forces Agreements with the host nations are signed and ratified. For  the Czech Republic, construction may begin after ratification of  agreements between the United States and the Czech Republic; however,  for Poland, construction may begin only after ratification of the  agreements by both countries. MDA officials told us that since Poland and  the Czech Republic did not ratify their respective agreements by spring  2009, both sites will experience construction delays based on target  construction completion dates of the first quarter of fiscal year 2013 for  the radar site and the second quarter of fiscal year 2013 for the interceptor  site.
section_title: Delayed Ratification of Key Agreements with Host Nations and Incomplete Agreements between MDA and the Services Present Challenges to DOD’s Planning and Implementation of Ballistic Missile Defenses in Europe
paragraphs: While DOD has made progress with key international partners and U.S.  stakeholders on the planning and implementation of missile defenses in  Europe, several challenges affect DOD’s ability to carry out its plans for  the ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Neither Poland nor the Czech  Republic has ratified either its overall Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement  or a supplementary Status of Forces Agreement. The lack of ratified  agreements limits DOD’s ability to negotiate specific details, such as  security, that are expected to be formalized in implementing arrangements  to each overall agreement. Table 1 shows the status of these key  documents.
U.S. and Polish officials also told us that the ratification process in Poland  is on hold until the supplementary Status of Forces Agreement is  negotiated and the new administration establishes its policy toward  ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Additionally, U.S. officials indicated  that the ratification process is also on hold in the Czech Republic pending  the new administration’s policy. While DOD’s $7.8 billion fiscal year 2010  budget proposal for missile defense reflects an increased emphasis on  bolstering near-term capabilities to respond to specific theater threats, as  opposed to an overall long-term global ballistic missile defense capability,  DOD officials have stated that the European missile defense capability in  particular will be reevaluated as part of DOD’s Quadrennial Defense  Review, which is expected to be completed in early 2010.
In the interim, the lack of negotiated and ratified agreements affects many  aspects of DOD’s ability to plan for the sites, ranging from the services’  ability to plan for the numbers of personnel that will be required to the  types of support infrastructure that will be needed for the personnel. For  example, the exact numbers of security personnel needed at each site will  not be finalized until the implementing arrangements are complete and  decisions are made regarding the extent to which the Polish and Czech  governments will contribute security personnel to the sites. In addition,  U.S. European Command is leading meetings, working groups, and  consultations on land use considerations in Poland, but the specific topics  included in the land use implementing arrangement cannot be finalized  until Poland and the United States have agreed on the contents of the  bilateral supplementary Status of Forces Agreement.
Moreover, Congress has placed restrictions on DOD’s ability to fund  procurement, site activation, military construction, and deployment of a  missile defense system at the sites until the agreements have been ratified.  Both the 2008 and 2009 National Defense Authorization Acts prohibit DOD  from funding such activities at the radar site until the Czech parliament  ratifies and the Prime Minister approves the missile defense and  supplementary status of forces agreements. However, in Poland such  activities can begin only after ratification and approval of agreements by  both countries. Once DOD is able to begin, construction of both European  sites is expected to take approximately 3 years to complete. Completion of  the sites’ weapon systems installation, integration, and testing will  continue after completion of construction.
Finally, DOD’s efforts to finalize roles and responsibilities for the  European sites remain incomplete because MDA and the services have not  yet made important determinations, such as establishing the criteria that  must be met before the transfer of specific European missile defense sites  to the services. MDA has been directed by DOD since 2002 to begin  planning for the transfer of missile defense elements, including the  direction to coordinate with the services on resources and personnel  needed to deliver an effective transition of responsibility. In addition, our  prior work assessing interagency collaboration has shown that agreed- upon roles and responsibilities that clarify who will do what, organize joint  and individual efforts, and facilitate decision making are important to  agencies’ abilities to enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts. While  the Army was designated lead service for the European Interceptor Site in  October 2006 and the Air Force was designated lead service for the  European Midcourse Radar Site in August 2007, the specific  responsibilities related to these roles remain undefined. MDA and the  services have begun to establish these roles and responsibilities through  Overarching Memorandums of Agreement, with the purpose to outline the  general delineation of responsibilities for the ballistic missile defense  development and ongoing operations and support, as each element  transitions and transfers from MDA to the services. While the Army and  MDA completed their Overarching Memorandum of Agreement in January  2009, negotiations between the Air Force and MDA on their Overarching  Memorandum of Agreement are ongoing.
In addition, the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement are expected to  include element-specific annexes for each of the ballistic missile defense  elements, including the European Midcourse Radar Site and the Ground- Based Midcourse Defense, which will include details on the European  Interceptor Site. The annexes are expected to specifically state the criteria  that must be met by MDA before the elements transfer to the Army and the  Air Force and detail specific roles and responsibilities for each  organization. Further, the annexes will indicate the extent to which MDA  will retain control of a missile defense element’s materiel development and  the services will assume control of the remaining supporting  responsibilities, such as doctrine, organization, training, leader  development, personnel, and facilities. However, MDA and the Army and  Air Force are still negotiating the annexes for the Ground-Based  Midcourse Defense and the European Midcourse Radar Site and it is  unclear when these annexes will be complete. As a result, the roles and  responsibilities specific to the European sites remain undefined because  MDA and the services have not yet agreed to the terms of transfer that are  to be established in these annexes. Table 2 shows the status of the  Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and element-specific annexes  being negotiated between MDA and the Army and Air Force.
Until specific roles and responsibilities for the sites are established and  key criteria that will guide the transfer of the elements from MDA to the  Army and Air Force are defined, uncertainty will persist in how the  European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site will be  sustained over the long term. The delay in ratification creates an  opportunity for DOD and MDA to address some of the planning challenges  DOD faces for the European sites.
section_title: DOD’s Military Construction and Operations and Support Cost Estimates for Ballistic Missile Defenses in Europe Have Limitations and Do Not Provide Congress Complete Information
paragraphs: DOD’s initial cost estimates for total military construction and operations  and support costs for ballistic missile defenses in Europe had significant  limitations. First, DOD’s fiscal year 2009 military construction estimates  did not fully account for all costs at the European Interceptor Site and the  European Midcourse Radar Site and consequently could increase  significantly. Second, DOD’s operations and support cost estimates are not  complete and it is unclear how these costs will be funded over the  elements’ life cycles. Without full information on total military  construction and operations and support costs for the European missile  defense sites, DOD and congressional decision makers do not have a  sound basis on which to evaluate the investment required to implement  plans for ballistic missile defenses in Europe.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Fiscal Year 2009 Military Construction Cost Estimates Do Not Include All Costs
paragraphs: DOD’s initial military construction cost estimates for ballistic missile  defenses in Europe have significant limitations and restrict Congress’s  ability to evaluate the investment required to implement plans for ballistic  missile defenses in Europe. Key principles for cost estimating state that  complete cost estimates are important in preparing budget submissions  and for assessing the long-term affordability of a program. However,  DOD’s fiscal year 2009 estimates, the first military construction estimates  for ballistic missile defenses in Europe, did not fully account for all costs  at the sites. MDA initially submitted military construction cost estimates  for the European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site  to Congress in February 2008 for inclusion in DOD’s fiscal year 2009  budget. MDA projected that a total of $837.5 million would be required to  complete site preparation and construction activities at the sites—  $661.4 million for the interceptor site in Poland and $176.1 million for the  radar site in the Czech Republic. However, the initial estimates did not  include all costs primarily because MDA developed and submitted the  military construction estimate to Congress before key site design work  had been completed and without an Army Corps of Engineers review of  the estimate. MDA stated that its approach was based on initial  congressional authorization to field ballistic missile defense capabilities  with research, development, testing, and evaluation funds; however, the  fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act required that MDA  begin using military construction funds for ballistic missile defense site  construction for the fiscal year 2009 budget.
Military construction regulations stipulate that a military construction  program should reach the 35 percent design phase, a key construction  design milestone, and that the Army Corps of Engineers should review the  military construction estimates before they are submitted to Congress.
However, MDA, asserting that it had statutory authority enacted by  Congress to field initial ballistic missile defense capabilities with research,  development, testing, and evaluation funds, developed and submitted its  fiscal year 2009 military construction estimates without following  traditional military construction requirements. MDA officials told us that  MDA, in an effort to meet budget and construction timelines, developed  and submitted its initial military construction estimates to Congress  without completing key site design work. Army Corps of Engineers  officials—although not involved in the development of the initial fiscal  year 2009 military construction estimates—reaffirmed that the initial  estimates were done without completing key site design work and that  MDA based its estimates on assumptions and previous design experience  from Fort Greely and other overseas operations, such as Shariki, Japan,  rather than design data from the European sites, and did not have  complete and accurate information about the sites when it submitted its  estimates to Congress for the 2009 budget. For example, the initial figures  overestimated the availability of local resources at both sites, such as local  power supply, water and wastewater treatment facilities, and emergency  support services. Army Corps of Engineers officials said that the Corps did  not have the opportunity to provide input to or independently review  MDA’s initial military construction estimates before they were submitted,  as would typically be required under DOD military construction  regulations. MDA’s initial military construction estimates were submitted  in February 2008, but the Corps did not begin providing input to the design  for the European Midcourse Radar Site and the European Interceptor Site  until after it was issued design directives for the sites in September and  October 2008, respectively. An Army Corps of Engineers official told us  that the Corps has since made significant input to MDA’s military  construction estimates and has worked with MDA to refine the cost  estimates based on updated data. However, an Army Corps of Engineers  official stated that had the Corps been involved in the early planning and  development of the military construction cost estimates for the sites, given  its experience and prior work in Eastern Europe, the Corps may have been  able to influence the initial military construction estimates. According to  this official, the Corps would have likely recommended that more studies  of the sites be performed, and subsequently, more actual data from the site  studies would have been used to influence the estimates before they were  submitted to Congress for the fiscal year 2009 budget.
Additionally, DOD’s initial military construction estimates for the  interceptor and radar sites do not include Army and Air Force base  operating support costs, such as military personnel housing. The Army, as  the lead service designated to operate the European Interceptor Site, has  begun planning for base operating support facilities and estimates that it  will need $88 million in military construction funds to build the facilities  that it requires for the Army personnel who are expected to be at the site.  However, the Army’s estimated facility and personnel requirements are  based on assumptions that may change. For example, the estimate  assumes that Poland, the host nation, will contribute military personnel  for security at the interceptor site, even though the United States and  Poland have not yet agreed on Poland’s security personnel contribution.  The implementing arrangements to be negotiated between the United  States and Poland will determine the number of security personnel that  Poland will contribute to the site, and this, in turn, will drive the Army’s  personnel and facility requirements at the site. Until these implementing  arrangements are negotiated and Army personnel determinations are  finalized, Army base support construction estimates for the interceptor  site will be based on assumed host nation contributions for security and  the total Army military construction requirements at the European  Interceptor Site will not be confirmed.
Conversely, the Air Force, as the lead service for the European Midcourse  Radar Site, has not yet developed any military construction estimates for  base support facilities at the site. Air Force officials have acknowledged  that the Air Force will require, at a minimum, dining facilities; some form  of military housing; and morale, welfare, and recreation services at the  radar site to support Air Force personnel, but the Air Force has not yet  determined its total base support facility requirements because Air Force  personnel requirements are not finalized. The Air Force is anticipating that  the Czech Republic will contribute personnel to assist the United States in  providing security at the site, but it is unclear how many personnel the  Czech government will provide. The implementing arrangements that will  be negotiated between the United States and the Czech Republic are  expected to determine the number of security personnel that the Czech  Republic will contribute to the site, which will drive the Air Force’s  personnel and facility requirements at the site. Accordingly, the total Air  Force military construction requirements at the European Midcourse  Radar Site will not be confirmed until the implementing arrangements are  negotiated and the Air Force personnel concept is finalized. Until that  point, a DOD official stated that any Air Force base support construction  estimates for the radar site will be based on assumed host nation  contributions for security. As a result, DOD’s current military construction  cost estimates for base support facilities at the European missile defense  sites should be considered preliminary.
Another military construction cost that has not been included in the initial  estimates is the cost to protect the European Midcourse Radar Site against  a possible high-altitude electromagnetic pulse event. The Air Force  believes that protection of the radar against a high-altitude  electromagnetic pulse event is important to ensuring survivability of the  site and has included it as part of its required criteria for transfer.  However, Air Force officials told us that MDA is not planning to protect  the site against this type of event and has not accounted for those costs in  its military construction estimates for the site. MDA and the Air Force  have not reached agreement on whether the site will include these  protective measures and, if so, who will pay for them. Air Force officials  told us that the costs to protect the site could increase the total military  construction cost for the radar mission facilities by 10 to 20 percent if the  protective steps are included in the design phase and construction of the  radar. If the protective action is done after the radar site has been  constructed, the cost could be much higher.
Further, MDA did not account for foreign currency fluctuations in its  estimates. Unfavorable currency exchange rate fluctuations could increase  the total cost of construction as military construction funds will be  obligated in U.S. dollars and site preparation and construction contracts  will be awarded in euros. Although it is possible that currency fluctuations  could occur in DOD’s favor, an Army Corps of Engineers official estimated  that an additional 20 percent of the total military construction cost  estimate should be set aside for possible currency fluctuations. Without  accounting for possible changes in the exchange rate, DOD risks  exceeding its budgeted military construction funds if currency rates  fluctuate unfavorably.
As a result of the above limitations, DOD’s projected military construction  costs for the European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse  Radar Site are expected to increase significantly from DOD’s original  $837.5 million estimate in the fiscal year 2009 budget. In May 2009, an  Army Corps of Engineers official told us that after analyzing design data,  the Corps recommended that MDA increase its military construction  estimates for the European sites to almost $1.2 billion—$803 million for  the European Interceptor Site and $369 million for the European  Midcourse Radar Site. Whether MDA will accept this recommendation and  the extent to which total military construction cost estimates at the  European sites will increase remains unclear. Despite the expected  increase in projected military construction costs, MDA has not provided  Congress updated military construction estimates since the initial  estimates were submitted for the fiscal year 2009 budget in February 2008.
Without complete information on the total military construction costs for  the European missile defense sites, DOD and congressional decision  makers do not have a sound basis on which to evaluate the investment  required to implement plans for ballistic missile defenses in Europe or the  extent to which those plans could divert resources from other national  security priorities.
MDA was appropriated $151.1 million in military construction funds for  fiscal year 2009—$42.6 million for the European Interceptor Site and  $108.5 million for the European Midcourse Radar Site. However, MDA will  likely be unable to obligate any of these appropriated funds in fiscal year  2009 for site activation or military construction activities at the interceptor  and radar sites as key bilateral agreements have not been ratified by the  Polish and Czech parliaments. Moreover, the future of the sites is pending  the outcome of the ongoing DOD review of plans for ballistic missile  defense. According to MDA officials, MDA plans to request DOD and  congressional authority to reprogram $50 million to $80 million of the   $151 million to use for planning and design efforts at the European missile  defense sites, but as of June 2009, no formal action had been taken.  However, MDA plans to retain the residual military construction funds— an estimated $70 million to $100 million—to preserve DOD’s options for  potential construction at those sites as the schedule for construction is  determined.
section_title: DOD’s Operations and Support Cost Estimates for Ballistic Missile Defenses in Europe Are Not Complete, and It Is Unclear How These Costs Will Be Funded over the Long Term
paragraphs: DOD’s operations and support cost estimates for ballistic missile defenses  in Europe are not complete because they do not include operations and  support costs for base operations managed by the Army and Air Force.  While MDA has estimated the operations and support costs it will need for  the interceptors and radar—an estimated $612 million in the 2008-2013  Future Years Defense Program—this estimate does not include funds that  the services may require to provide basing and support of the sites, such as  facilities support, housing costs, and administration. Additionally, MDA  and the Army and Air Force have not yet determined the full extent of  these operations and support costs. Although MDA and the Army and Air  Force have initiated the development of total operations and support cost  estimates for the interceptor and radar sites, these estimates are not yet  complete as key cost factors that will affect those estimates remain  undefined. For example, the total number and distribution of U.S. military  personnel, civilian contractors, and host nation-contributed military  personnel that will be required to operate, support, and secure the sites  will drive total operations and support costs, but has not yet been  determined. These determinations depend on the number of personnel  that Poland and the Czech Republic will contribute for security at the  sites, to be negotiated as part of the implementing arrangements. Without  complete information on the true costs of operating and supporting the  European sites, the usefulness of information regarding those sites in  DOD’s Future Years Defense Program for congressional decision makers  will be limited.
Moreover, MDA and the Army and Air Force have not yet agreed on how  the operations and support costs for the European Interceptor Site and the  European Midcourse Radar Site will be funded over the elements’ life  cycles or who will pay for these costs. As we have previously reported,  operations and support costs are typically over 70 percent of a system’s  total lifetime cost. Therefore, the future costs to operate and support the  European sites over their lifetimes could reach billions of dollars. In  September 2008, we reported that MDA and the services had not yet  agreed on which organization(s) will be responsible for funding operations  and support costs for the European Interceptor Site and the European  Midcourse Radar Site after fiscal year 2013 and over the elements’ life  cycles. Although MDA and the Army have agreed on the overarching  terms and conditions for the transition and transfer of elements from MDA  to the Army, this agreement does not provide specific details on how  operations and support costs will be funded following transfer of the  European Interceptor Site. For the European Midcourse Radar Site, the  Air Force and MDA are drafting an agreement that will establish, among  other things, which organization(s) will have funding responsibilities for  the radar, but it is unclear when this agreement will be complete.
As part of DOD’s ballistic missile defense life cycle management process  established in September 2008, DOD intends to pay for ballistic missile  defense costs, including operations and support costs, other than those  already agreed to be paid by the services, through defensewide accounts.  In theory, these defensewide accounts would allow all ballistic missile  defense costs to be clearly identified and would alleviate the pressure on  the services’ budgets to fund operations and support for ballistic missile  defense programs. However, MDA and the services have not yet  determined the amount and duration of funding for the individual ballistic  missile defense elements, such as the European Interceptor Site and the  European Midcourse Radar Site, that will come from the defensewide  accounts and there are disagreements about what costs should be covered  by these accounts. For example, according to Air Force officials, the Air  Force position is that the defensewide accounts should cover all costs for  the radar over its life cycle, whereas MDA officials told us that all Army  and Air Force base operating support requirements related to the missile  defense sites in Europe should be paid for by the services. Until MDA and  the Army and Air Force determine which organization(s) will be  responsible for funding European missile defense operations over the life  cycles of those elements, these costs will not be reflected in the Future  Years Defense Program. As a result, DOD and congressional decision  makers will have difficulty assessing the affordability of the plans for  missile defenses in Europe over time and uncertainty will persist regarding  how these elements will be supported over the long term.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD has made progress in planning for the implementation of the  proposed ballistic missile defense sites in Europe. However, the future of  the sites is currently unclear and largely depends on the outcome of DOD’s  ongoing review of the ballistic missile defense program. This has, in turn,  limited the willingness of Poland and the Czech Republic to complete and  ratify necessary agreements with the United States. The delays in  ratification of key agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic,  however, create an opportunity to consider how MDA and the Army and  Air Force should collaborate in the implementation of ballistic missile  defenses in Europe and the future operations of the European Interceptor  Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site. An opportunity now exists to  more clearly define roles and responsibilities for the sites as well as  establish key criteria that will guide the transition and transfer of the  elements from MDA to the Army and Air Force. Planning for transition and  transfer of the ballistic missile defense elements from MDA to the military  services has been a persistent challenge that has hindered DOD’s ability to  plan for the long-term support of the system. Without agreement on how  the elements will transfer and clear definitions of the roles that MDA and  the services will be responsible for, DOD will continue to face difficulties  in determining how the European Interceptor Site and the European  Midcourse Radar Site will be sustained in the near and long term.
These sites will require a significant investment, but DOD has not yet  provided Congress with an updated estimate of the costs for European  ballistic missile defenses, restricting its ability to prepare for and weigh  the trade-offs of a proposal that will likely cost billions of dollars over the  long term. To date, MDA has not assessed the full costs of the sites, to  include not only mission-related costs incurred by MDA over the long  term, but also some base operating support costs that may be borne by the  services. Given the program’s limited information on costs to date,  potential increases in military construction costs, and other uncertainty  surrounding future costs, such as the extent of host nation contributions  to security, as the new administration considers its position on missile  defenses full information on the true cost of the European missile defense  sites is increasingly important for decision makers as they evaluate policy  options. It is therefore critical that congressional decision makers are  regularly provided complete cost information with which to evaluate  budget requests in the near term and future to determine whether fielding  plans are affordable over the long term. Until DOD develops accurate,  realistic, and complete cost estimates for military construction and  operations and support for ballistic missile defenses in Europe, the  credibility of its budget submissions will continue to be a concern.  Moreover, until MDA and the Army and Air Force reach agreement on how  missile defense operations and support costs for the European Interceptor  Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site will be funded over the long  term, DOD risks that the services may not be financially prepared to  operate and support these elements.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five  actions:    To improve planning for the long-term support of the ballistic missile  defense sites in Europe, direct MDA, the Army, and the Air Force to  finalize the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and element- specific annexes that detail the specific roles and responsibilities for  the European sites and define the criteria that must be met before the  transfer of those sites from MDA to the Army and Air Force.
To provide for military construction cost estimates for ballistic missile  defenses in Europe that are based on the best available data, direct  MDA, in coordination with the Army and Air Force, to provide  Congress annually, in alignment with the budget, updated military  construction cost estimates for the European Interceptor Site and the  European Midcourse Radar Site that reflect the data gathered from all  site design efforts since project initiation; have been independently  reviewed and verified by the Army Corps of Engineers; account for all  military construction costs for the sites, including Army and Air Force  base support facility requirements, recognizing that certain  assumptions about host nation contributions will have to be made; and  include costs for possible currency fluctuations.
To provide for more complete military construction estimates for  future ballistic missile defense sites, such as the still-to-be-determined  European site for the mobile radar system, direct MDA to follow  military construction regulations by utilizing the Army Corps of  Engineers to complete required site design and analysis and verify  military construction cost estimates before submitting cost estimates  to Congress.
To improve fiscal stewardship of DOD resources for ballistic missile  defense, direct MDA and the Army and Air Force, in time for the fiscal  year 2011 budget submission, to  complete life cycle operations and support cost estimates  for the European Interceptor Site and the European  Midcourse Radar Site and  clearly define who is responsible for funding these  operations and support costs over the elements’ life cycles.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with three  and partially concurred with two of our recommended actions. The  department’s comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided  technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that MDA, the Army, and the  Air Force finalize the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and  element-specific annexes that detail the specific roles and responsibilities  for the European sites and define the criteria that must be met before the  transfer of those sites from MDA to the Army and Air Force. In its  comments, DOD stated that the element-specific Army annexes are in  coordination for estimated completion in calendar year 2009 and the Air  Force Overarching Memorandum of Agreement is expected to be signed  by the end of calendar year 2009. We believe these are positive steps. As  noted in our report, we believe that an opportunity exists for DOD to  clearly define roles and responsibilities for the sites as well as establish  key criteria that will guide the transition and transfer of the elements from  MDA to the Army and Air Force. Since the element-specific annexes are  expected to specifically state the criteria that must be met by MDA before  the elements transfer to the Army and the Air Force and detail specific  roles and responsibilities for each organization, it is important for DOD to  meet its estimated dates to finalize the Army annexes and complete the  MDA-Air Force Overarching Memorandum of Agreement, and further, to  negotiate Air Force element-specific annexes to ensure that the crucial  details that will guide the long-term support of the European sites are  clearly defined. Until MDA and the Army and Air Force reach agreement  on how these elements will transfer, DOD will continue to face difficulties  in determining how the European Interceptor Site and the European  Midcourse Radar Site will be sustained in the near and long term.
DOD concurred with both of our recommendations to improve military  construction cost estimates for ballistic missile defense sites. DOD  concurred with our recommendation that MDA provide Congress annually  updated military construction cost estimates for the European Interceptor  Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site. DOD stated that the BMDS  Life Cycle Management Process and the associated BMDS Portfolio  provide an opportunity for MDA, the Army, and the Air Force to integrate  military construction cost estimates. DOD noted that the BMDS military  construction projects and associated estimates will continue to be  coordinated with the Army Corps of Engineers for certification,  independent cost estimating, and reviews for scope completeness and  technical sufficiency. Furthermore, DOD stated that Army and Air Force  base support facility requirements will be planned, programmed,  budgeted, and executed by the services and will not be included in MDA’s  BMDS Portfolio. Rather, DOD stated that the budgets for these sites will  be collated and provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense from  the coordinated requirements submitted by MDA, the Army, and the Air  Force. However, until the BMDS Life Cycle Management Process and the  BMDS Portfolio are fully implemented, it is unclear whether they will  facilitate improved military construction estimates for the European sites.
Further, DOD did not set a date by which it would annually provide  Congress updated military construction estimates for the sites. Our report  explains the importance of providing complete BMDS military  construction cost information to congressional and DOD decision makers  on a regular basis, which is the impetus for this recommendation. Also,  DOD concurred with our recommendation that for future ballistic missile  defense sites, MDA follow military construction regulations by utilizing the  Army Corps of Engineers to complete required site design and analysis  and verify military construction estimates before submitting cost estimates  to Congress. In its comments, DOD stated that it is MDA’s policy to follow  appropriate regulations in execution of design and construction of BMDS  sites and that MDA recognizes the Army Corps of Engineers as the DOD  military construction agent for these projects, will follow military  construction policy, and will remain responsive to DOD direction in  deploying BMDS assets.
DOD partially concurred with our two recommendations to improve fiscal  stewardship of DOD’s operations and support resources. DOD partially  concurred with our recommendation that MDA and the Army and Air  Force complete life cycle operations and support cost estimates for the  European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site in time  for the fiscal year 2011 budget submission. In its comments, DOD stated  that MDA will not be able to complete these cost estimates before the  fiscal year 2011 budget submission, but that MDA will include available  information on life cycle operations and support cost estimates in the  fiscal year 2012 submission. DOD noted that information needed to  complete a life cycle cost analysis will not be available until host nation  ratifications are signed, site design is complete, and administration policy  is set. While we understand the limitations that DOD faces in developing  complete operations and support cost estimates before all of the details of  the sites have been finalized, we continue to believe that it is crucially  important for congressional decision makers to have the most up-to-date  information on the long-term costs of the sites in order to assess the  affordability of the proposed ballistic missile defenses in Europe. We  continue to believe the recommendation is valid for MDA, the Army, and  the Air Force to provide estimates of all known operations and support  costs for the sites in the 2011 budget. DOD also partially concurred with  our recommendation that MDA and the Army and Air Force clearly define  who is responsible for funding operations and support costs over the  elements’ life cycles in time for the fiscal year 2011 budget submission.  DOD noted that MDA will continue to work with the Army and Air Force  to define responsibility for future operations and support cost funding, and  reiterated that the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement between the  lead services and MDA, which define responsibility for life cycle costs,  have not yet been finalized. Determining responsibility for the long-term  operations and support costs of the BMDS elements has been a persistent  challenge for DOD and until MDA and the Army and Air Force determine  which organization(s) will be responsible for funding European missile  defense operations over the life cycles of those elements, these costs will  not be fully reflected in DOD’s Future Years Defense Program and DOD  risks that the services may not be financially prepared to operate and  support these elements.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Director, Missile Defense Agency; the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and other interested parties. The  report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has  planned for the initial implementation of ballistic missile defenses in  Europe, including coordination with key international partners and U.S.  stakeholders, we conducted site visits, reviewed key documentation, and  interviewed relevant DOD, State Department, and host nation officials.  During this review, we focused on the European Interceptor Site in  Poland, the European Midcourse Radar Site in the Czech Republic, and the  planned mobile forward-based radar to be fielded in a still-to-be- determined location. We conducted site visits and toured the base located  outside of Slupsk, Poland, that is the proposed European Interceptor Site  and the Brdy military training area, which is the proposed location of the  European Radar Site. We met with DOD, State Department, and host  nation officials to discuss the efforts under way to plan for the sites and  examined key documents, including ballistic missile defense agreements  with the host nations, memorandums of agreement between key U.S.  stakeholders, and Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Army, Air Force, and  Army Corps of Engineers documents for planning and site preparation.  Using GAO key principles for management, we evaluated the collaboration  efforts among the agencies to determine whether DOD, Army, Air Force,  and State Department officials followed key practices that can help  agencies enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts to determine what  aspects of planning may be missing that would hinder the implementation  of ballistic missile defenses in Europe. For both objectives, we reviewed  key legislation related to ballistic missile defenses in Europe and DOD’s  overall approach for preparing to support ballistic missile defense.
During our review of the ballistic missile defenses in Europe, GAO  contacted agency officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the  State Department; the Joint Staff; U.S. Strategic Command; U.S. Northern  Command; U.S. European Command; U.S. Army Europe; U.S. Air Force  Europe; MDA; the Department of the Army; Army Space and Missile  Defense Command; the Department of the Air Force; Air Force Space  Command; U.S. Embassy Warsaw; U.S. Embassy Prague; the U.S. Mission  to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the European Interceptor Site in  Poland; and the European Midcourse Radar Site in the Czech Republic.
To assess whether DOD has estimated the total costs, including military  construction and long-term support costs for the ballistic missile defenses  in Europe, we examined budget documents, including DOD’s fiscal year  2009 Future Years Defense Program (including budget data for fiscal years  2008-2013), MDA’s fiscal year 2009 military construction cost estimates,  and the Army’s military construction cost estimates. We reviewed DOD  policies related to estimating military construction costs and key  principles for cost estimating as well as our best practices for developing  and managing capital program costs. We interviewed DOD officials to  determine how the cost estimates were developed. We discussed the  status of military construction cost estimates with officials from MDA, the  Army, and the Army Corps of Engineers-Europe District. We also  interviewed Air Force officials to determine whether military construction  cost estimates had been developed for the radar site. In addition, to  determine whether DOD has estimated long-term operations and support  costs for ballistic missile defenses in Europe, we assessed key documents,  such as the Ballistic Missile Defense Life Cycle Management Process  memo and the Army’s Ballistic Missile Defense System Overarching  Memorandum of Agreement with MDA, to determine the extent to which  MDA and the Army have agreed to fund operations and support costs for  ballistic missile defenses in Europe and confirmed our understanding with  MDA and the Army. We interviewed Air Force officials to determine  whether long-term operations and support cost estimates had been  developed and the extent to which MDA and the Air Force have agreed to  fund operations and support costs for ballistic missile defenses in Europe.  We discussed our findings with officials from the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; MDA; the  Army; and the Air Force.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2008 to August 2009 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Marie A. Mak, Assistant Director;  Pat L Bohan; Tara Copp Connolly; Susan C. Ditto; and Kasea L. Hamar  made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When  Considering Changes to Missile Defense Agency’s Roles and Missions.  GAO-09-466T. Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense  Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned.  GAO-09-338. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2009.
GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for  Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs. GAO-09-3SP.  Washington, D.C.: March 2009.
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost  Estimates for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense.   GAO-08-1068. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2008.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve the Process for  Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities.   GAO-08-740. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but  Program Is Short of Meeting Goals. GAO-08-448. Washington, D.C.:   March 14, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency’s Flexibility Reduces  Transparency of Program Cost. GAO-07-799T. Washington, D.C.: April 30,  2007.
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Information for Supporting  Future Key Decisions for Boost and Ascent Phase Elements. GAO-07-430.  Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Needs a Better Balance between  Flexibility and Accountability. GAO-07-727T. Washington, D.C.: April 11,  2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates  Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost. GAO-07-387. Washington, D.C.:  March 15, 2007.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning  and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense. GAO-06-473.  Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability  but Falls Short of Original Goals. GAO-06-327. Washington, D.C.:   March 15, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for  Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System.  GAO-05-817. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly  Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment  Approach. GAO-05-962R. Washington, D.C.: August 4, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly  Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment  Approach. GAO-05-540. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in  2004. GAO-05-243. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve  Transparency of DOD’s Projected Resource Needs. GAO-04-514.  Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and  Accountability. GAO-04-409. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing  Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed. GAO-04-254.  Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2004.
Missile Defense: Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing System   for Intercepting Long-Range Missiles. GAO-03-600. Washington, D.C.:   August 21, 2003.
Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and  Surveillance System Need to Be Considered. GAO-03-597. Washington,  D.C.: May 23, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but  Risks Remain. GAO-03-441. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Decision Making Needed to Reduce  Risks in Developing Airborne Laser. GAO-02-631. Washington, D.C.:   July 12, 2002.
Missile Defense: Review of Results and Limitations of an Early National  Missile Defense Flight Test. GAO-02-124. Washington, D.C.: February 28,  2002.
Missile Defense: Cost Increases Call for Analysis of How Many New  Patriot Missiles to Buy. GAO/NSIAD-00-153. Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2000.
Missile Defense: Schedule for Navy Theater Wide Program Should Be  Revised to Reduce Risk. GAO/NSIAD-00-121. Washington, D.C.: May 31,  2000.