Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation
Published: 2009-03-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The United States has invested more than $6.2 billion in the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Afghan National Police (ANP). The Department of Defense's (Defense) Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), with the Department of State (State), leads U.S. efforts to enhance MOI and ANP organizational structures, leadership abilities, and pay systems. This report assesses the status of U.S. efforts to help Afghanistan (1) restructure MOI and ANP, (2) retrain ANP units, (3) screen MOI and ANP personnel, and (4) enhance MOI and ANP pay systems. GAO reviewed Defense, State, and United Nations (UN) data and met with officials in the United States and Afghanistan.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: U.S. agencies and Afghanistan have achieved their goals of restructuring and reducing a top-heavy and oversized MOI and ANP officer corps, modifying police wages, and planning a reorganization of MOI headquarters. These efforts are intended to help ensure that the MOI and ANP are directed by professional staff that can manage a national police force. U.S. agencies and MOI cut the officer corps from about 17,800 to about 9,000, reduced the percentage of high-ranking officers, and increased pay for all ranks. MOI is scheduled to implement a U.S.-supported headquarters reorganization. CSTC-A has begun retraining ANP units through its Focused District Development (FDD) program, which is intended to address district-level corruption that impeded previous efforts to retrain individual police. FDD is achieving promising results, according to Defense status reports. In February 2009, Defense assessed 19 percent of FDD-retrained units as capable of conducting missions, 25 percent as capable of doing so with outside support, 31 percent as capable of partially doing so with outside support, and 25 percent as not capable. However, a lack of military personnel is constraining CSTC-A's plans to expand FDD and similar programs into the rest of Afghanistan by the end of 2010. Defense has identified a shortage of about 1,500 military personnel needed to expand FDD and similar police development programs. CSTC-A has previously obtained military personnel for ANP training by redirecting personnel from its Afghan army training program. However, the army program's demand for personnel is likely to increase as the Afghan army grows from 80,000 to 134,000 personnel. MOI and ANP officers were screened by Defense and State, but the full extent of the screening is unclear because State did not systematically compile records of its efforts. The screening effort was intended to improve the professionalism and integrity of the officer corps through testing by CSTC-A and background checks by State. At least 9,797 (55 percent) of the nearly 17,800 officers who took the tests passed, according to CSTC-A. State was unable to provide us with statistics concerning the results of background checks because it did not systematically compile its records. U.S.-supported pay system efforts are intended to validate MOI and ANP personnel rosters and ensure that wages are distributed reliably. Despite progress, these efforts face challenges that include limited ANP cooperation and a shortage of banks. U.S. contractors have validated almost 47,400 MOI and ANP personnel but have been unable to validate almost 29,400 personnel--who were paid in part by $230 million in U.S. contributions to a UN trust fund--because of a lack of cooperation from some ANP commanders. As of January 2009, 97 percent of all reported MOI and ANP personnel had enrolled in an electronic payroll system and 58 percent had enrolled to have their salaries deposited directly into their bank accounts. However, growth of the direct deposit system may be constrained because almost 40 percent of ANP personnel lack ready access to banks.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Afghan National Police  The Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Afghan National Police  (ANP) face a wide range of problems that include a history of corruption,  (ANP) face a wide range of problems that include a history of corruption,  weak pay systems, and attacks by insurgents. Afghanistan is a very poor  weak pay systems, and attacks by insurgents. Afghanistan is a very poor  and underdeveloped country that needs professional and competent police  and underdeveloped country that needs professional and competent police  to help defeat security threats to its homeland, including widespread  to help defeat security threats to its homeland, including widespread  narcotics trafficking as well as a growing insurgency. The MOI and ANP  narcotics trafficking as well as a growing insurgency. The MOI and ANP  have a combined authorized personnel level of 82,000. The United States  have a combined authorized personnel level of 82,000. The United States  has invested more than $6.2 billion since 2002 to help professionalize the  has invested more than $6.2 billion since 2002 to help professionalize the  MOI and ANP, including $230 million for police wages contributed to the  MOI and ANP, including $230 million for police wages contributed to the  United Nations (UN) Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).  United Nations (UN) Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).  U.S. efforts to help reform the MOI and ANP are led by the Department of  U.S. efforts to help reform the MOI and ANP are led by the Department of  Defense’s (Defense) Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan  Defense’s (Defense) Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan  (CSTC-A) in conjunction with the Department of State (State).  (CSTC-A) in conjunction with the Department of State (State).
This report assesses U.S. government efforts to help the government of  This report assesses U.S. government efforts to help the government of  Afghanistan (1) restructure the MOI and ANP, (2) retrain selected ANP  Afghanistan (1) restructure the MOI and ANP, (2) retrain selected ANP  units, (3) screen MOI and ANP personnel, and (4) enhance MOI and ANP  units, (3) screen MOI and ANP personnel, and (4) enhance MOI and ANP  identification and pay systems.  identification and pay systems.
To address these objectives, we reviewed a wide range of Defense and  To address these objectives, we reviewed a wide range of Defense and  State documents and briefings concerning U.S. efforts to reform the MOI  State documents and briefings concerning U.S. efforts to reform the MOI  and ANP, including Defense’s National Campaign Plan for Afghanistan,  and ANP, including Defense’s National Campaign Plan for Afghanistan,  CSTC-A’s monthly assessments of the capabilities of ANP districts  CSTC-A’s monthly assessments of the capabilities of ANP districts  participating in a focused development effort, and weekly situation reports  participating in a focused development effort, and weekly situation reports  prepared by State-contracted police mentors. We also reviewed  prepared by State-contracted police mentors. We also reviewed  documents concerning ANP reform efforts supported by LOTFA and by  documents concerning ANP reform efforts supported by LOTFA and by  the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA). To supplement our  the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA). To supplement our  review of these materials, we traveled to Afghanistan, where we discussed  review of these materials, we traveled to Afghanistan, where we discussed  MOI and ANP reform efforts with CSTC-A, State, Drug Enforcement  MOI and ANP reform efforts with CSTC-A, State, Drug Enforcement  Administration (DEA), LOTFA, MOI, and ANP officials. We also visited  Administration (DEA), LOTFA, MOI, and ANP officials. We also visited  ANP training facilities and an ANP base in Afghanistan’s Chapahar district,  ANP training facilities and an ANP base in Afghanistan’s Chapahar district,  where we met with State contractor personnel. In addition, we spoke in  where we met with State contractor personnel. In addition, we spoke in  the United States with officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of  the United States with officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of  the Secretary of Defense, Defense’s Central Command (CENTCOM), State,  DEA, and UNAMA. See appendix I for a complete description of our scope  and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to March 2009  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Afghanistan is a very poor and underdeveloped country that has suffered  from instability and war for three decades. The United States and its allies  removed the ruling Taliban regime following the September 11, 2001,  terrorist attacks on the United States. The new Afghan government  inherited a country with limited capacity to govern and a poorly developed  infrastructure. About 70 percent of the population is illiterate. According  to Transparency International, Afghanistan is the world’s fifth most  corrupt country. Its police do not respect human rights, according to the  Fund for Peace. The MOI and ANP have a history of corruption, and much  of Afghanistan lacks a functioning judicial sector.
The United States and other international partners agreed in 2006 to  establish a professional Afghan police service committed to the rule of  law, shortly after the United States assumed the lead in reforming the MOI  and ANP. U.S. goals for the MOI include ensuring that it is competent and  efficient, provides strong and effective leadership, and has the  organizational structures needed to reform, manage, and sustain the  police. U.S. goals for the ANP include ensuring that it is fully constituted,  professional, and functional; trained and equipped to uphold the rule of  law; and able to effectively meet Afghan security needs, including  controlling movement across Afghanistan’s borders. In 2006, the United  States, Afghanistan, and other international partners outlined goals for the  ANP in the Afghanistan Compact. The stated goals of the compact include  the establishment of, by the end of 2010, a professional and functional  ANP that can meet the security needs of the country effectively and be  increasingly fiscally sustainable. The United States views an effective  Afghan police force as critical to extending rule of law in Afghanistan and  improving Afghan security.
U.S. efforts to help Afghanistan reform the MOI and ANP are directed by  Defense through CSTC-A, which is also charged with training the Afghan  National Army. State provides policy guidance for CSTC-A’s police  program and oversees civilian contractors to implement police training. To  date, the United States has provided about $6.2 billion to train and equip  the ANP.
To achieve U.S. goals, CSTC-A has set objectives for institutional,  organizational, and individual reform:  Institutional reform is intended to ensure that MOI is run by a professional  and adequately trained staff that can manage and sustain a national police  force.
Organizational reform is aimed at ensuring ANP units have sufficient  capacity to maintain domestic order and are responsive to the local  population’s needs.
Individual reform seeks to ensure that the MOI and ANP consist of trained,  competent, and credible individuals dedicated to public service who are  accountable and transparent in their actions.
The United States works with several international partners in supporting  reform, including the following organizations:    The European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) is intended  to bring together European national efforts to support police reform in  Afghanistan.
LOTFA was established by the United Nations Development Program in  May 2002 and provides funds for ANP salaries. As of November 2008,  LOTFA had received about $653.4 million from 20 international donors,  including the United States.
UNAMA assists in leading international efforts to rebuild the country.
The MOI and ANP have a total authorized force level of about 82,000. The  ANP consists of six components. As shown in figure 2, the largest of these  is the Afghan Uniformed Police, which serve as local police and perform  routine policing duties in Afghanistan’s 365 police districts. These districts  are organized into five regional zones (North, East, West, South, and  Central) and a sixth zone for the capital city of Kabul. According to State  and Defense, the zone commanders report to the Chief of the Afghan  Uniformed Police, who reports to the Deputy Minister of Interior for  Security. (See apps. II and III for further information on the structure of  the MOI and ANP.)
Ministry of Interior Headquarters (5,943)
Afghan Border Police (17,676)
Afghan Uniformed Police (44,801)
Afghan police and other security forces are facing increasing attacks by  insurgent forces. As shown in figure 3, attacks on Afghan security forces  (including the ANP and the Afghan National Army) increased sixfold from  October 2003 to October 2008, according to DOD. The number of attacks  rose nearly threefold in 1 year, from 97 attacks in October 2007 to 289 in  October 2008.
The ANP has suffered significant casualties in recent years. According to  Defense, at least 3,400 police have been wounded or killed in action since  January 2007. In June 2008, a Defense official testified that ANP combat  losses during 2007 were roughly three times more than those of the Afghan  National Army. Defense data indicate that the ANP suffered between 19  and 101 fatalities per month over a recent 23-month period (see fig. 4)—an  average of 56 police killed in action per month.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Have Helped Restructure the MOI and ANP Officer Corps and Plan the Future Reorganization of MOI Headquarters
paragraphs: U.S. agencies have helped Afghanistan restructure the MOI and ANP  officer corps, modify ANP pay rates, and plan a reorganization of MOI  headquarters. CSTC-A has also acted to better coordinate international  mentoring of MOI officials. These efforts were intended to help ensure that  the MOI and ANP are directed by professional staff that can successfully  manage and sustain a national police force in Afghanistan. The officer  corps reform program reduced the oversized MOI-ANP officer corps from  about 17,800 to about 9,000 personnel, reformed the ANP’s top-heavy rank  structure, and increased police pay. In a separate effort, CSTC-A and MOI  worked together to develop a plan for increasing MOI’s efficiency by  restructuring the ministry and reducing its staff. In addition, CSTC-A and  other international partners have adopted a plan to address problems  affecting their efforts to build MOI staff capacity through mentoring.
subsections: section_title: Goal of MOI-ANP Restructuring Programs Is to Promote Institutional and Organizational Reform
paragraphs: U.S.-supported efforts to restructure the MOI and ANP are intended to  promote institutional and organizational reform and to help ensure that  the MOI and ANP are directed by professional staff that can successfully  manage and sustain a national police force in Afghanistan. The programs  have been aimed at addressing problems concerning the size and pay  structure of the MOI and ANP officer corps, MOI’s organization and  capacity, and mentoring of MOI officials.
According to U.S. officials, the MOI-ANP officer corps was top heavy. It  consisted of nearly 18,000 individuals, including more than 3,000 generals and  colonels. ANP personnel were also paid less than Afghan National Army  personnel, creating recruitment and retention challenges for the ANP.
MOI headquarters suffers from numerous organizational deficiencies,  according to U.S. officials. The U.S. Embassy concluded in 2007 that MOI  suffered from corruption, limited control over provincial police structures,  and low institutional capacity at all levels. CSTC-A reported in 2008 that  MOI lacked a clear organizational structure, basic management functions,  and an overall strategy for policing. CSTC-A also reported that MOI’s  departments did not have clearly defined missions and did not  communicate and coordinate with one another. State has reported that  MOI lacks a culture of accountability and transparency. According to State  police contactors, MOI’s organization has contributed to pervasive  violations of its chain of command and to a lack of accountability in ANP  districts and provincial commands. MOI’s lack of clearly defined lines of  authority and areas of responsibility weakens its ability to combat fraud  through effective internal controls.
To help address MOI’s weak institutional capacity, the United States and  other international partners initiated efforts to mentor individual MOI  officials but did not coordinate these efforts. CSTC-A reported in 2008 that  international partners provided more than one mentor to some officials— despite a limited number of available mentors—while providing none to  others. For example, one MOI commander had four mentors from two  different countries at a time when four senior-level MOI officials had none.  CSTC-A also found that donors had not always aligned mentor skills with  the needs of MOI officials and had not established a single communication  chain to share information and coordinate mentor activities.
section_title: MOI and ANP Officer Corps and Pay Restructured
paragraphs: The United States and MOI have restructured and reduced the rank  structure of the MOI and ANP officer corps while increasing police pay  scales. The rank reform program cut the total number of officer positions  from about 17,800 to about 9,000 and reduced the number of the highest  ranking officers (generals and colonels) by nearly 85 percent. A board of  MOI officials selected officers for retention with help from CSTC-A and  U.S. Embassy officials. The rank reform program significantly altered the  structure of the officer corps, as shown in figure 5.
The reduction in the MOI and ANP officer corps was accompanied by  substantial increases in ANP pay, as shown in table 2. The new pay rates  are on a par with those of the Afghan National Army.
section_title: The MOI Has Approved U.S.-Supported Plan to Restructure MOI Headquarters
paragraphs: In 2008, CSTC-A, MOI, and international partner officials developed a plan  for restructuring MOI headquarters. Their goals in developing the plan  included increasing efficiency, streamlining organization, improving  coordination, creating conditions to mitigate corruption, and reducing  headquarters staff by 25 percent.
The plan’s implementation was delayed by political resistance within MOI,  according to CSTC-A. MOI was originally to have begun implementing the  restructuring plan in September 2008. However, CSTC-A informed us that  some MOI departments were concerned that they would lose power and  personnel as a result of restructuring. The plan’s implementation was  further delayed by the removal of the former Minister of Interior,  according to CSTC-A. The plan was approved in late December 2008 by the  new Minister of Interior and implementation is scheduled to begin in  March 2009. As approved, the restructuring plan provides for a 7 percent  reduction in staff, rather than the 25 percent reduction goal originally set  by CSTC-A, MOI, and the international partners.
section_title: International Partners Have Approved Plan to Better Coordinate MOI Mentoring
paragraphs: CSTC-A and other international partners have agreed on a plan to better  coordinate U.S. and international efforts to mentor MOI officials. CSTC-A  and other international partners sought to define mentor roles and  required skill sets, outline the international partners best suited to support  mentoring requirements, establish a personnel management process to  facilitate mentor assignments, and identify information and reporting  requirements for mentors. The goal of their effort was to reach an  agreement to support an integrated mentor program within MOI’s  headquarters. In the final plan, which was approved in January 2009,  CSTC-A and other international partners agreed to provide an  organizational framework to manage the mentoring program, agree on the  allocation of mentors according to rationally derived priorities, and  optimize the match between mentors’ skill sets and position requirements.
section_title: Expansion of New Approach to Training Afghan Police Constrained by Shortage of Military Personnel
paragraphs: CSTC-A has begun retraining ANP through its Focused District  Development (FDD) program, which is intended to build professional and  fully capable police units. FDD is achieving promising results in most  participating districts, according to Defense status reports. In February  2009, Defense assessed 19 percent of units retrained through the FDD  program as capable of conducting primary operational missions, 25  percent as capable of conducting primary operational missions with  international support, 31 percent as capable of partially conducting  primary operational missions with international support, and 25 percent as  not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions. However, a  shortage of military personnel is constraining CSTC-A’s plans to expand  FDD and similar programs into the rest of Afghanistan by the end of 2010.  Defense has identified a shortage of about 1,500 military personnel to  expand FDD and similar police development programs. CSTC-A has  previously obtained military personnel for the FDD program and ANP  training by redirecting such personnel from resources intended for its  Afghan National Army training program. However, the Afghan army  program’s demand for military personnel is likely to grow due to the  recent decision by the United States, Afghanistan, and international  partners to increase the Afghan army from 80,000 to 134,000 individuals.
subsections: section_title: Goal and Structure of Focused District Development Program
paragraphs: The goal of the FDD program is to enhance ANP organizational and  individual capability by training all uniformed police in a district as a unit.  According to State and Defense officials, corruption and local loyalties  hampered past efforts to train individuals. Under the previous approach,  the effects of individual training were diluted when trainees returned to  corrupt police stations staffed by poorly trained personnel with little  loyalty to the central government. We reported in 2005 that some returning  trainees had been forced by their commanders to give their new  equipment to more senior police and to help extort money from truck  drivers and travelers. In 2008, State reported that the effects of previous  police training had been diluted when newly trained police were  reinserted to an unreformed environment.
The FDD program differs from previous efforts to train ANP because it  focuses on retraining entire districts and not individuals. In implementing  the FDD program in a district, CSTC-A assesses the district’s organization,  training, facilities, and judicial infrastructure before removing the police  unit from the district for 8 weeks of full-time training. During the training  program, the unit receives basic training for all untrained recruits,  advanced training for recruits with previous training, and management and  leadership training for officers.
An embedded police mentor team accompanies the unit when it returns to  its home district. According to CSTC-A officials, a standard police mentor  team includes two civilian police mentors, four military support personnel,  and six military security personnel (see fig. 7). While State provides the  civilian police mentors, CSTC-A is responsible for providing the 10 military  support and security personnel. According to CSTC-A, the police mentor  team provides the unit with continued on-the-job training following its  return to its home district and assesses the unit’s progress toward  becoming capable of independently performing basic law and order  operations.
section_title: Initial FDD Program Efforts Report Positive Results
paragraphs: The FDD program has shown positive initial results, according to Defense.  In February 2009, Defense assessed 19 percent of the units retrained  through the FDD program as capable of conducting primary operational  missions, 25 percent as capable of conducting primary operational  missions with international support, 31 percent as capable of partially  conducting primary operational missions with international support, an 25 percent as not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions. In contrast, in April 2008 all of the districts enrolled in FDD were only  partially capable of independent action.
Police mentor teams are required to send monthly capability assessment  forms to CSTC-A as part of CSTC-A’s effort to monitor and assess the FDD  program. The assessments rank the units on a variety of competencies,  including personnel actions and pay reform, equipment accountability,  maintenance, formal training, crime-handling procedures, and use of for Mentor teams also address disciplinary issues and observe units for signs  of drug use. According to Defense, in 2007, 29 FDD participants were  identified as drug users, removed from the program, and released from the  police force.  ce.
section_title: Existing Personnel Constraints Are Impeding Timely Expansion of FDD Program
paragraphs: CSTC-A currently lacks the military support and security personnel  resources to expand FDD into the rest of Afghanistan. Senior CSTC-A  personnel informed us that Defense has not provided CSTC-A with  dedicated personnel designated to serve as police mentors. As a result,  CSTC-A redirected to the police program personnel that would have been  used to mentor Afghan National Army units. CSTC-A staff informed us that  they redirected the personnel because the police training program used  prior to FDD was not succeeding at a time when the Afghan army training  program was making progress.
CSTC-A intends to retrain the uniformed police in all districts in  Afghanistan using FDD and other similar district-level reform programs.  To do so, CSTC-A estimates it would need a total of 399 police mentor  teams—365 district teams and 34 provincial level teams. CSTC-A informed  us that its preference is to complete FDD using a 3-year planning model  that would have 250 police mentor teams fielded by the end of December  2009 and the remaining 149 teams fielded in districts by October 2010. This  schedule, however, would not allow Defense to complete FDD training  and mentoring in time to meet the Afghanistan Compact’s goal of  achieving a fully functional and professional Afghan National Police by the  end of 2010. Defense has reported that it would need about 1,500  additional military personnel to expand FDD and similar police  development programs.
The FDD program faces the likely possibility of increasing competition for  these personnel from CSTC-A’s program to fully train the Afghan National  Army. In the past, FDD and other ANP training programs have relied on  U.S. military personnel that had been intended for use for Afghan army  training programs. However, the demand for personnel for use in Afghan  army training programs is likely to increase because Afghanistan, the  United States, and other international partners have agreed to increase the  Afghan army from 80,000 to 134,000 personnel.
In November 2008, CSTC-A officials stated they may propose that Defense  use U.S. combat units, provincial reconstruction teams, and international  forces to help address the shortage of personnel. The officials later  informed us that six FDD police mentor teams had been staffed using  personnel provided by international forces. However, according to  Defense officials in headquarters, Defense has not altered its guidance to  CSTC-A for staffing the FDD program.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Screened MOI and ANP Officers but Did Not Systematically Compile Records of Background Checks
paragraphs: MOI and ANP officers were screened by Defense and State as part of a  rank reform program intended to promote institutional and organizational  reform, but State did not systematically compile records of background  checks conducted as part of the screening effort. The screening effort  included testing by CSTC-A of MOI and ANP personnel on police  practices. At least 55 percent of the almost 17,800 officers tested passed,  according to data provided by CSTC-A. The screening effort also included  background checks based on information from State and UNAMA.  However, U.S. officials were unable to provide us with detailed  information concerning the number of individuals whose backgrounds had  been checked and the results of those checks. ANP recruits are endorsed  by local elders and officials and, according to CSTC-A, screened by MOI.  Members of certain small elite units receive additional screening by U.S.  agencies or high-ranking MOI officials.
subsections: section_title: Screening Intended to Promote MOI and ANP Institutional and Organizational Reform
paragraphs: Efforts to screen MOI and ANP personnel are intended to promote  institutional and organizational reform. The goals of U.S.-supported  screening efforts are to help ensure that (1) MOI is run by a professional  and adequately trained staff that can manage and sustain a national police  force and (2) ANP units, under MOI control, have the capacity to maintain  domestic order while remaining responsive to the needs of the local  population. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul reported in 2007 that the  effectiveness of the police had been seriously impeded by “corrupt and/or  incompetent” MOI and ANP leadership. The State and Defense inspectors  general reported in 2006 that then-current ANP screening efforts were  ineffective and that verifying the suitability of police candidates in  Afghanistan is difficult because of (1) the strength of Afghan ethnic and  tribal ties and (2) the lack of reliable personnel and criminal records in  Afghanistan.
section_title: MOI and ANP Officers Were Tested in Connection with Rank Reform
paragraphs: According to CSTC-A, nearly 17,800 MOI and ANP officers took tests on  human rights and policing values that were required for consideration in  the reformed MOI and ANP officer corps. At least 9,797 (55 percent) of  these officers passed. Higher-ranking officers below the rank of general  passed the tests at higher rates than lower-ranking officers (see table 3).
section_title: State Checked Backgrounds of MOI and ANP Officers but Did Not Systematically Compile Records
paragraphs: MOI and ANP officers were also subject to background checks as part of  the rank reform process. The background checks were based on  information from State and UNAMA. State officials informed us that the  Department of State screened officers for rank reform by using its  procedures for vetting foreign security personnel in connection with U.S.  law. In doing so, it made use of background checks conducted at the  State Department in Washington, D.C. State officials in Washington said  that the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan provided them with lists of names  and associated biographical information. The officials then used the  information to search both a governmentwide database containing  sensitive information and various nongovernment databases. UNAMA  officials informed us that background checks concerning more than 18,000  names were based in part on information collected locally by UNAMA.  According to a UNAMA official, UNAMA found no detailed information for  “more than 10,000” names and varying degrees of information about the  remaining names.
State has not systematically compiled records of the background checks.  A U.S. Embassy official informed us that the embassy did not maintain a  database of the officers that had been checked. State officials in  Washington, D.C., informed us that they had retained copies of the  embassy’s requests and their responses but had not systematically  compiled the information contained in them.
Because they had not systematically compiled their records of the  background checks, State officials could not provide us with the number  of officers whose backgrounds they had checked or with detailed  information concerning the results of the background checks. A U.S.
Embassy official provided us with a partial list of embassy screening  requests. The list indicates that the embassy had asked State to check the  backgrounds of 2,514 unidentified individuals in late 2007. State officials in  Washington, D.C., told us they may have screened as many as 4,000 names  during the rank reform program. One State official in Washington, D.C.,  estimated he found derogatory information about fewer than two dozen  individuals. The officials in Washington, D.C., said their screening efforts  were hampered by the frequent lack of adequate data about an individual’s  identity and date of birth. (Many Afghans use a single name, according to  U.S. officials, and birth records are often lacking.)
The U.S. Embassy provided us with documents indicating that UNAMA  found negative information—including assertions of involvement in drug  trafficking, corruption, and assaults—on 939 (38 percent) of 2,464 officers  it reviewed during late 2007. A UNAMA official informed us that UNAMA  had raised concerns about human rights abuses, ties to insurgent groups,  corruption, and involvement in drug trafficking in “several hundred” cases.  He stated MOI may have selected some officers despite negative UNAMA  information because of factional influence, patronage, or possible  corruption.
section_title: ANP Recruits Screened by Local Authorities and MOI, While Elite Units Receive Additional Screening
paragraphs: ANP enlisted recruits are endorsed in groups by village elders or local  government officials and vetted by local police chiefs. According to CSTC- A, the recruits are also screened by MOI’s medical, intelligence, and  criminal investigative departments, under MOI procedures established in  2004 and in “full implementation” as of December 2008.
Recruits in certain elite units receive additional screening, according to  U.S. officials. These units’ authorized personnel levels constitute about 7  percent of all authorized MOI and ANP personnel.
The 56 members of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police’s Special  Investigative Unit (SIU) are given periodic polygraph exams, tested for  drugs, and screened for human rights violations and drug-related offences,  according to U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials. DEA  officials stated that in 2008 DEA repolygraphed 21 SIU members and  eliminated 7 based on the results. DEA noted this one-third failure rate is  greater than that of SIUs in other countries.
The 185 members of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police’s National  Interdiction Unit are initially tested for drug use and screened for human  rights violations and drug-related offenses, according to DEA officials.
The commanding general of the Afghan National Civil Order Police  informed us that he personally interviews all applicants for his force. In  our meeting with him in Kabul, the general stated he had dismissed 120  recruits MOI had sent to him due to allegations of drug use and other  abuses.
section_title: Efforts to Enhance MOI and ANP Pay Systems Face Challenges of Limited Cooperation and Lack of a Nationwide Bank System
paragraphs: U.S.-supported pay system efforts are intended to (1) validate the status of  reported MOI and ANP personnel rosters and (2) help ensure that MOI and  ANP wages are distributed reliably and fairly. Despite some progress,  these efforts face challenges that include limited ANP cooperation and a  shortage of commercial banks. Although U.S. contractor personnel have  validated the status of almost 47,400 current MOI and ANP personnel, they  have been unable to validate the status of almost 29,400 additional  personnel—paid in part by U.S. contributions to LOTFA—because of a  lack of cooperation from certain ANP commanders. As of January 2009,  about 97 percent of reported MOI and ANP personnel had enrolled in a  new U.S.-supported electronic payroll system, and 58 percent had enrolled  in a new electronic funds transfer system to have salaries deposited  directly into their bank accounts. However, nearly 40 percent of personnel  may have difficulties using this system because they are not located within  15 miles of a commercial bank.
subsections: section_title: Goal of Pay System Projects Is to Promote Individual Reform
paragraphs: U.S.-supported pay system reform efforts are intended to promote  individual reform. Unverified personnel lists and weak pay distribution  systems are closely linked to corruption in the ANP, according to U.S.  agencies. Corrupt pay practices jeopardize U.S. funds provided by State  and Defense to LOTFA in support of MOI and ANP wages. The United  States has contributed $230 million to LOTFA as of November 2008, which  constitutes more than one-third of the $653 million received by LOTFA.
The number of actual MOI and ANP personnel is unclear. While LOTFA  data indicate that 78,541 personnel were on MOI and ANP payrolls as of  January 12, 2009, CSTC-A informed us that MOI does not have an accurate  personnel manning roster or tracking system. The inspectors general of  State and Defense stated in 2006 that reports of the number of police were  inflated and that ANP salaries were being delivered to police stations  based on the number of police listed on the rolls. Further, the U.S.  Embassy in Kabul reported in 2007 that police chiefs had inflated  personnel rosters by creating “ghost policemen”—allowing chiefs to  obtain illegal payments. In 2008, we reported that a 2007 Defense census of  ANP in several provinces could not confirm the existence of about 20  percent of uniformed police and more than 10 percent of border police  listed on MOI’s payroll records.
Weak pay distribution systems have also fostered corruption. The U.S.  Embassy reported in 2007 that MOI’s use of “trusted agents” to deliver  payrolls allowed district chiefs and other officials to take cuts from  patrolmen’s pay. The embassy also noted that problems remain in  regularly and routinely providing pay to outlying districts and closing off  opportunities for corruption. In 2006, the State and Defense inspectors  general concluded that MOI’s “completely broken” pay disbursement  system was one cause of the systematic corruption associated with the  police. They also found that senior police officials routinely skimmed the  salaries of junior police.
More examples of problems with ANP pay distribution processes can be  found in the weekly reports of U.S. civilian police mentors. During a 2- month period in 2008, the mentors reported a variety of financial  irregularities and fraud, including the following:    Police in several districts reported that they had not been paid.
Some individuals continued to receive officers’ wages after having been  demoted to noncommissioned officers.
A district commander had lied about the number of ANP personnel in his  district to obtain additional funds. He then used some of these funds to  hire civilian friends to “help out” at the station.
A finance officer reported concerns that district chiefs were forcing their  men to pay the chiefs part of their wages.
An ANP acting provincial financial chief reported that several district  police chiefs had threatened to kill him if he continued to work with the  international community on pay matters.
Another ANP provincial financial chief was removed for allegedly  conspiring to embezzle funds intended for the families of ANP personnel  who had been killed.
section_title: Effort to Validate Police Databases Challenged by Lack of Full ANP Cooperation
paragraphs: State and MOI have attempted to validate the status of more than 103,000  applicants for police identification cards by positively identifying all  police, building a computerized police database, and issuing identification  cards for use in paying police salaries. The identification card program  began in 2003. State contractor personnel informed us that the validation  process is being executed by joint contractor-MOI validation teams that  were created because ANP regional zone commanders did not respond to  requests to validate the status of applicants in their zones. State informed  us in November 2008 that nearly 47,400 MOI and ANP personnel had  received identification cards after the validation teams confirmed these  applicants had not retired, been killed, or otherwise left the MOI or ANP  (see figure 9). MOI and State contractor validation teams also determined  that another 26,700 applicants had retired, been killed, or had otherwise  left the MOI or ANP, including about 14,200 who had received  identification cards before they retired, were killed, or otherwise left the  ANP. State informed us that the validation process had been completed in  two regional zones in early October 2008.
However, according to State, these teams have been unable to validate the  extent to which another 29,372 applicants—about 37 percent of the total  reported MOI and ANP workforce of 78,541—are active and eligible to  receive identification cards. State informed us that three ANP zone  commanders are not cooperating with efforts to validate the status of  these applicants and that plans to complete the validation process have  been put on hold until MOI persuades the commanders to cooperate.
According to CSTC-A and State contractor personnel, the identification  cards will eventually be used to identify MOI and ANP personnel for pay  purposes. We were informed by contractor personnel that each card has a  bar code with specific information concerning each individual’s salary  group, name, and service number. The card also contains a fingerprint and  a digital photograph that can be scanned into a facial recognition program  (see fig. 10).
Data collected from individuals are processed by MOI personnel and  stored in servers located at MOI headquarters (see figs. 11 and 12).  According to State contractor personnel, the cards use a variety of optical  features to discourage counterfeiters.
section_title: Shortage of Banks Impedes Progress in Expanding Direct Deposit Pay System
paragraphs: According to Defense and State, the goal of the new electronic payroll and  funds transfer systems is to reduce corruption in pay distribution by  establishing fair and reliable pay processes. LOTFA and CSTC-A officials  stated the electronic payroll system is intended to replace slow, paper- based processes with an automated system that creates a monthly payroll  for police and allows MOI to track individual payments. LOTFA has  sponsored training programs to familiarize MOI personnel with the new  payroll system (see fig. 13). As shown in figure 14, LOTFA data indicate  that 97 percent (76,343) of 78,451 reported MOI and ANP personnel were  enrolled in the electronic payroll system as of January 2009.
The electronic funds transfer system is intended to help reduce MOI’s use  of corruption-prone salary distribution methods by depositing wages  directly into the bank accounts of individual MOI and ANP personnel. As  of May 2008, LOTFA’s stated goal was to enroll 80 percent of MOI and ANP  personnel by September 2008. However, as of January 2009, only 58  percent (about 45,200) of 78,451 reported MOI and ANP personnel were  enrolled in the system, according to LOTFA (see fig. 15).
CSTC-A and LOTFA attributed the lack of greater enrollment in the  electronic funds transfer system to the absence of a nationwide Afghan  banking system. According to CSTC-A and LOTFA data, only about 61  percent (47,900) of reported MOI and ANP personnel live and work within  25 kilometers (about 15 miles) of a commercial bank. In November 2008,  CSTC-A informed us that the expansion of the electronic funds transfer  program was being limited primarily by the impact of security concerns on  efforts to open new banks, as well as by the slow installation of automated  teller machines, a lack of reliable power at remote locations, and ANP  officials who have not yet embraced the program. CSTC-A officials are  exploring the possibility of using cell-phone companies in lieu of  commercial banks to provide direct access to wages.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: While Defense and State have worked with Afghanistan and other  international partners to initiate and support reform programs that have  the potential to help resolve some of the most significant challenges facing  the development of a fully professional MOI and ANP, the agencies have  not overcome persistent obstacles that will affect the success of the  programs. These obstacles include a lack of dedicated personnel for use in  creating new mentor teams to support focused development of police  districts. Without dedicated personnel resources, the FDD program’s  ability to achieve its goals is in jeopardy because it must compete with an  expanding Afghan National Army training program. In addition, the  Departments of Defense and State have not overcome the resistance of  ANP regional commanders who are not cooperating with efforts to  validate almost 29,400 names registered to receive ANP identification  cards. The United States, Afghanistan, and the international community  need a validated database of ANP personnel to help ensure that  contributions to LOTFA to pay the wages of Afghan police are not being  used to pay nonexistent or inactive personnel.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that the FDD program can achieve its goals, we  recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State undertake a  coordinated effort to provide dedicated personnel to support the creation  of additional police mentor teams needed to expand and complete the  FDD program.
To help ensure that the United States does not fund the salaries of  unverified ANP personnel, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense  and State consider provisioning future U.S. contributions to LOFTA to  reflect the extent to which U.S. agencies have validated the status of MOI  and ANP personnel.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: The Departments of State, Defense, and Justice provided written  comments on a draft of this report (see apps. V, VI, and VII). In addition,  Defense provided technical suggestions, which we have incorporated as  appropriate.
Defense concurred with our recommendation that Defense and State  identify and provide dedicated personnel to support the creation of  additional police mentor teams needed to expand and complete the  Focused District Development program. Defense stated it is considering  possible solutions to the shortfall of police mentor teams. The agency  added that it plans to deploy about 17,000 additional forces to Afghanistan  and to use some of these forces on police mentoring missions. State noted  our recommendation and informed us that it is prepared to recruit  additional civilian police mentors for new police mentor teams.
State concurred with our recommendation that State and Defense consider  provisioning future U.S. contributions to LOFTA to reflect the extent to which  U.S. agencies have validated the status of MOI and ANP personnel. State  added that U.S. contributions to LOTFA should reflect the extent to which  MOI and ANP personnel have been validated. Defense did not concur with  this recommendation. It asserted that the recommendation would unduly  penalize MOI by significantly reducing police pay and that CSTC-A is working  with MOI to identify and validate all personnel on the payroll. We disagree  with Defense’s comment on our recommendation. Given that the ANP  identification card program has been under way for more than 5 years, we  believe it is not too soon for Defense to work with State to consider whether  to link future U.S. contributions to LOTFA to the number of verified ANP  personnel. Our recommendation, if implemented, could help encourage  uncooperative ANP commanders to cooperate with U.S.-backed verification  efforts and help ensure that only legitimate ANP personnel receive wages  subsidized by the United States.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees and to the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice. The  report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in appendix VIII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report assesses U.S. government efforts to help the government of  Afghanistan (1) restructure the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Afghan  National Police (ANP), (2) retrain selected ANP units, (3) screen MOI and  ANP personnel, and (4) enhance MOI and ANP identification and pay  systems.
To assess the status of U.S. efforts to restructure the MOI and ANP, we  reviewed the Department of Defense’s (Defense) Afghan National  Campaign Plan, a draft joint mentor coordination plan prepared by  Defense’s Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)  and the European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan, and CSTC-A’s MOI  Development Plan. We also reviewed briefings from CSTC-A on the MOI  restructuring program and the mentoring program. In addition, we  reviewed Department of State (State) documents, including situation  reports from State contractors in Afghanistan. We supplemented this  information by meeting with officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),  the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and State’s bureaus of  International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and South Central  Asian Affairs. In Kabul, we met with CSTC-A officials tasked with MOI  reform, including officials who were mentoring MOI personnel, as well as  MOI officials. We also observed a weekly MOI restructuring task team  group that was attended by representatives of CSTC-A and the  international community.
To assess the status of U.S. efforts to retrain selected ANP units, we  reviewed numerous monthly capability assessments for the district police  units included in the Focused District Development (FDD) program’s first  round. We also reviewed weekly situation reports submitted over several  months by State-contracted civilian police mentors in Afghanistan. In  addition, we reviewed numerous CSTC-A, OSD, and State briefings that  outlined the program’s goals, objectives, implementation plans, and overall  status. In addition, we met with agency officials to discuss the progress  made and the challenges faced by the FDD program. In Washington, D.C.,  we met with JCS, OSD, and State officials. We also spoke with officials at  the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida. In  Kabul, we met with officials from CSTC-A tasked with implementing the  FDD program, and visited the CSTC-A Central Training Facility near Kabul  and the Jalalabad FDD regional training center. In the Chapahar district,  we visited an ANP operating base to see a police unit that had been  reinserted into its district after FDD training.
To assess the status of U.S. efforts to screen MOI and ANP personnel, we  reviewed documents and briefings obtained from State, the U.S. embassy  in Afghanistan, OSD, CSTC-A, and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). In addition, we met with U.S. and other officials to discuss the  screening processes for MOI and ANP personnel. In Washington, D.C., we  met with officials from Defense, State, and DEA. We also spoke with  CENTCOM officials located in Tampa, Florida. In Kabul, we met with State  officials at the U.S. Embassy. We also met with DEA officials to discuss  screening issues pertaining to the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanist In addition, we spoke with officials at the United Nations Assistance  Mission to Afghanistan. an.
To assess the status of U.S. efforts to enhance MOI and ANP identification  and pay systems, we reviewed data and documents from the United  Nations Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), CSTC-A, and  State-contracted mentors in Afghanistan. We also met with State  contractor, CSTC-A, LOTFA, and U.S. Embassy personnel in Kabul. To  determine the reliability of the data we collected concerning the  identification card and electronic pay systems programs, we compared  data collected from multiple sources to assess their consistency and  obtained written descriptions from LOTFA and State contractor personnel  concerning the processes they used to compile and check the data. We  concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our  review.
Any information on foreign law in this report is not a product of original  analysis but was instead derived from interviews and secondary sour ces.
section_title: Appendix II: Structure of the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police
paragraphs: Responsible for the enforcement of the rule  of law.
Assigned to police districts and provincial  and regional commands; duties include  patrols, crime prevention, traffic duties, and  general policing.
Provides broad law enforcement capability  at international borders and entry points.
Specialized police force trained and  equipped to counter civil unrest and  lawlessness.
Leads investigations of national interest,  those with international links, and those  concerned with organized and white-collar  crime.
Law enforcement agency charged with  reducing narcotics production and  distribution in Afghanistan.
Leads police and law enforcement efforts to  defeat terrorism and insurgency.
section_title: Appendix III: Organizational Chart for the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police
subsections: section_title: Minister of Interior
section_title: Appendix IV: MOI and ANP Nonofficer Pay Rates before and after Pay Reform
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Justice
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of State
paragraphs: The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of State’s letter dated  March 3, 2009.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comment
paragraphs: 1.  As noted in our report, we use the term “screening” to include both the  testing and background checks that were undertaken to accomplish  the goals of the rank reform effort.
section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Hynek Kalkus (Assistant  Director), Pierre Toureille, Christopher Banks, Lucia DeMaio, Mattias  Fenton, Cindy Gilbert, Mark Dowling, Lynn Cothern, and Jena Sinkfield  ma de key contributions to this report.