Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans
Published: 2003-06-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) uses contractors to provide a wide variety of services for U.S. military forces deployed overseas. We were asked to examine three related issues: (1) the extent of contractor support for deployed forces and why DOD uses contractors; (2) the extent to which such contractors are considered in DOD planning, including whether DOD has backup plans to maintain essential services to deployed forces in case contractors can no longer provide the services; and (3) the adequacy of DOD's guidance and oversight mechanisms in managing overseas contractors efficiently.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While DOD and the military services cannot quantify the totality of support that contractors provide to deployed forces around the world, DOD relies on contractors to supply a wide variety of services. These services range from maintaining advanced weapon systems and setting up and operating communications networks to providing gate and perimeter security, interpreting foreign languages, and preparing meals and doing laundry for the troops. DOD uses contractor services for a number of reasons. In some areas, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, there are limits on the number of U.S. military personnel who can be deployed in the region; contract workers pick up the slack in the tasks that remain to be done. Elsewhere, the military does not have sufficient personnel with the highly technical or specialized skills needed in-place (e.g., technicians to repair sophisticated equipment or weapons). Finally, DOD uses contractors to conserve scarce skills, to ensure that they will be available for future deployments. Despite requirements established in DOD guidance (Instruction 3020.37), DOD and the services have not identified those contractors that provide mission essential services and where appropriate developed backup plans to ensure that essential contractor-provided services will continue if the contractor for any reason becomes unavailable. Service officials told us that, in the past, contractors have usually been able to fulfill their contractual obligations and, if they were unable to do so, officials could replace them with other contractor staff or military personnel. However, we found that this may not always be the case. DOD's agencywide and servicewide guidance and policies for using and overseeing contractors that support deployed U.S. forces overseas are inconsistent and sometimes incomplete. Of the four services, only the Army has developed substantial guidance for dealing with contractors. DOD's acquisition regulations do not require any specific contract in deployment locations for contract workers. Of 183 contractor employees planning to deploy with an Army division to Iraq, for example, some did not have deployment clauses in their contracts. This omission can lead to increased contract costs as well as delays in getting contractors into the field. At the sites that we visited in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Persian Gulf, we found that general oversight of contractors appeared to be sufficient but that broader oversight issues existed. These include inadequate training for staff responsible for overseeing contractors and limited awareness by many field commanders of all the contractor activities taking place in their area of operations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The U.S. military has long used contractors to provide supplies and  services to deployed U.S. forces, and more recently contractors have been  involved in every major military operation since the 1991 Gulf War,  including the recent war in Iraq. Although the Department of Defense  (DOD) considers contractors to be part of the total force, neither DOD nor  the services know the totality of contractor support being provided to  deployed forces.  However, military officials believe that the use of  contractors for support to these forces has increased significantly since  the 1991 Gulf War. Factors that have contributed to this increase include  reductions in the size of the military, an increase in the numbers of  operations and missions undertaken, and increasingly sophisticated  weapons systems. You asked us to assess (1) the extent of contractor  support to deployed U.S. forces and why DOD uses contractors; (2) the  extent to which such contractors are considered in DOD planning,  including whether DOD has backup plans to maintain essential services to  deployed forces in case contractors can no longer provide them; and   (3) the adequacy of guidance and oversight mechanisms in place to  manage contractors effectively.
As agreed with your staff, we focused our efforts in the Balkans and  Southwest Asia because the contractors in those theaters provide a broad  range of contractor support activities. We examined a wide range of  contracts in order to assess the diversity of contractor support and met  with officials at all levels of command to gain a comprehensive  understanding of the contracting and contract management and oversight  processes. We did not, however, compare the cost of contractors versus  the cost of military personnel or make policy judgments on whether the  use of contractors is desirable. We conducted our review from August  2002 through April 2003 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. We discuss our scope and methodology in  more detail in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the early 1990s, DOD has used contractors to meet many of its  logistical and operational support needs during combat operations,  peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian assistance missions, ranging  from Somalia and Haiti to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Today,  contractors are used to support deployed forces at a number of locations  around the world as figure 1 shows.
A wide array of DOD and non-DOD agencies can award contracts to  support deployed forces. Such contracts have been awarded by the  individual services, DOD agencies, and other federal agencies. These  contracts typically fall into three broad categories—theater support,  external support, and systems support. Theater support contracts are  normally awarded by contracting agencies associated with the regional  combatant command, for example, U.S. Central Command or service  component commands like U.S. Army-Europe or by contracting offices at  deployed locations such as Bosnia and Kosovo. Contracts can be for  recurring services—such as equipment rental or repair, minor  construction, security, and intelligence services—or for the one time  delivery of goods and services at the deployed location. External theater  contracts are awarded by commands external to the combatant command  or component commands, such as the Defense Logistics Agency, the U.S.  Army Corps of Engineers, and the Air Force Civil Engineer Support  Agency. Under external support contracts, contractors are generally  expected to provide services at the deployed location. The Army’s  Logistics Civil Augmentation Program contract is an example of an  external theater contact. Finally, system contracts provide logistics  support to maintain and operate weapons and other systems. Systems may  be new or long-standing ones, and often the contracts are intended to  support units at their home stations. These types of contracts are most  often awarded by the commands responsible for building and buying the  weapons or other systems. Within a service or agency, numerous  contracting officers, with varying degrees of knowledge about the needs of  contractors and the military in deployed locations, can award contracts  that support deployed forces.
Depending on the type of service being provided under a contract,  contractor employees may be U.S. citizens, host country nationals, or  third country nationals. Contracts to support weapons systems, for  example, usually require U.S. citizens, while contractors that provide food  and housing services frequently hire local nationals or third country  nationals.
section_title: DOD Uses Contractors for a Wide Range of Services Because of Force Size Limitations and a Lack of Military Capability and Capacity
paragraphs: Contractors provide the military with a wide variety of services from food,  laundry, and recreation services to maintenance of the military’s most  sophisticated weapons systems. DOD uses contractors during  deployments because limits are placed on the number of U.S. military  personnel assigned to a region, required skills may not be available in the  service, or the services want to husband scarce skills to ensure that they  are available for other contingencies.
subsections: section_title: Contractors Provide a Full Spectrum of Services to DOD’s Deployed Forces
paragraphs: Contractors provide a wide range of services at deployed locations. The  scope of contractor support often depends on the nature of the  deployment. For example, in a relatively stable environment such as the  Balkans, contractors provide base operations support services such as  food, laundry, recreational, construction and maintenance, road  maintenance, waste management, fire-fighting, power generation, and  water production and distribution services. Contractors also provide  logistics support such as parts and equipment distribution, ammunition  accountability and control, and port support activities as well as support  to weapons systems and tactical vehicles. In a less secure environment, as  was the case shortly after U.S. forces deployed to Afghanistan, contractors  principally provided support to weapons systems such as the Apache  helicopter and chemical and biological detection equipment. Table 1  illustrates some types of contractor support provided at selected deployed  locations. We were completing our work as the 2003 war with Iraq began  and so were unable to fully ascertain the extent of contractor support to  U.S. forces inside Iraq.
section_title: DOD Uses Contractors Because of Limits on Force Size and a Lack of Military Capability and Capacity
paragraphs: Limits on the number of military personnel allowed in an area, called  “force caps”, lead DOD to use contractors to provide support to its  deployed forces. In some countries or regions the size of the force is  limited due to law, executive direction, or agreements with host countries  or other allies. For example, DOD has limited U.S. troops to 15 percent of  the North Atlantic Treaty Organization force in Kosovo while the  Philippine government limited the number of U.S. troops participating in a  recent deployment to 660. Since contractors are not included in most force  caps, as force levels have been reduced in the Balkans, the Army has  substituted contractors for soldiers to meet requirements that were  originally met by soldiers. In Bosnia, for example, the Army replaced  soldiers at the gate and base perimeter with contracted security guards. In  Kosovo, the Army replaced its firefighters with contracted firefighters as  the number of troops authorized to be in Kosovo decreased. By using  contractors the military maximizes its combat forces in an area.
In some cases, DOD lacks the internal resources to meet all the  requirements necessary to support deployed forces. The military services  do not always have the people with specific skill sets to meet the mission.  Army National Guard members deployed to Bosnia told us that they used  contractors to maintain their Apache and Blackhawk helicopters because  the Guard has no intermediate maintenance capability. In addition,  recently fielded systems and systems still under development may have  unique technical requirements for which the services have not had time to  develop training courses and train service personnel. For example, when  the Army’s 4th Infantry Division deployed in support of the recent war in  Iraq, about one-third of the 183 contractor employees that deployed with  the division deployed to support the high tech digital command and  control systems still in development. Similarly, when the Air Force  deployed the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, it required contractor  support because the vehicle is still in development and the Air Force has  not trained service members to maintain the Predator’s data link system.
In addition, some weapons systems, such as the Marine Corp’s new truck,  were designed to be at least partially contractor supported from the  beginning, or the services made the decision to use contractor support  because the limited number of assets made contractor support cost  effective in DOD’s judgment. For example, the Army’s Guardrail  surveillance aircraft is entirely supported by contractors because,  according to Army officials, it was not cost effective to develop an organic  maintenance capability for this aircraft.
The increasing reliance on the private sector to handle certain functions  and capabilities has further reduced or eliminated the military’s ability to  meet certain requirements internally. For example, at Air Force bases in  the United States contractors now integrate base telephone networks with  local telephone systems. Since the Air Force eliminated this internal  capability to integrate the base telephone network with the local  telephone networks, it no longer has the military personnel qualified to  perform this task at deployed locations. Also, the use of commercial off- the-shelf equipment results in an increased use of contractors. For  example, the Air Force and the Navy use commercial communications  systems at deployed locations in Southwest Asia and support this  equipment with contractors. According to one Navy official with whom we  spoke, the Navy uses contractors because it does not train its personnel to  maintain commercial systems.
In other cases, required skills are limited, and there is a need to conserve  high-demand, low-density units for future operations. Air Force officials  in Southwest Asia told us that they use contractors to maintain the  generators that provide power to the bases there because the Air Force  has a limited number of qualified maintenance personnel, and their  frequent deployment was having a negative impact on retention.
section_title: Impact of Contractors on Training
paragraphs: While most commanders believed that replacing service members with  contractors in deployed locations had no negative impact on the training  of military members, some believed that service members who did not  deploy with their units were missing valuable training opportunities. We  found opinions varied depending on the skill or military occupation that  was being replaced. For example, commanders told us that food service  personnel and communications personnel would not benefit from  deploying to Bosnia and Kosovo at this time because these locations no  longer replicate field conditions, rather they more closely resemble bases  in Germany or the United States. Other commanders told us that they  believed that logistics personnel as well as vehicle maintenance personnel  were missing the opportunity to work in high volume situations in a more  intense environment.
At some locations, contractor employees who work with military  personnel are providing training although such training may not be a  requirement of the contract. Contractors are training soldiers on systems  they ordinarily would not be exposed to, such as specially modified high  mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (Humvees) in Bosnia and  commercial power generators in Kuwait. They also train soldiers to  operate and maintain the newest technologies, such as computers and  communications systems supporting intelligence operations in Southwest  Asia. Training is comprised of not only hands-on experience but often  structured training classes as well.
section_title: DOD and the Services Have Not Identified Essential Services Provided by Contracts or Developed Plans for Their Continuation Should Contractors Not Be Available
paragraphs: Contractors provide DOD with a wide variety of services at deployed  locations, and while DOD uses contractors as part of the total force mix  and recognizes the need to continue essential contractor services during  crises, it has not included them in operational and strategic planning. DOD  policy requires its components to annually review all contractor services,  including new and existing contracts to determine which services will be  essential during crisis situations. Where there is a reasonable doubt about  the continuation of essential services during crisis situations by the  contractor, the cognizant component commander is required to prepare a  contingency plan for obtaining the essential service from alternate  sources. However, we found that the required contract reviews were not  done, and there was little in the way of backup plans. Many commanders  assumed that other contractors or military units would be available to  provide the essential service if the original contractors were no longer  available. However, the commanders had no way of knowing if these  assets would actually be available when needed. Additionally, DOD has  not integrated its contractor workforce into its human capital strategy.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Directed the Identification of Contractor-Provided Essential Services That Need to Continue During Crises
paragraphs: As early as 1988, DOD noted the lack of a central policy or an oversight  mechanism for the identification and management of essential contractor  services. A DOD Inspector General report, issued in November 1988,  noted that DOD components could not ensure that the emergency  essential services performed by contractors would continue during a crisis  or hostile situation. The report also stated that there was “no central  oversight of contracts for emergency essential services, no legal basis to  compel contractors to perform, and no means to enforce contractual  terms.” The report recommended that all commands identify   (1) “war-stopper” services that should be performed exclusively by  military personnel and (2) those services that could be contracted out, if a  contingency plan existed, to ensure continued performance if a contractor  does not perform. DOD concurred with the reports findings and  recommendations and drafted a directive to address them. This effort led  to the issuance of DOD Instruction 3020.37, in November 1990, which  addresses the continuation of essential contractor services during crisis  situations.
In 1991, the Department of Defense Inspector General reported on this  issue again. The Inspector General reported that generally “contingency  plans did not exist to ensure continued performance of essential services  if a contractor defaulted during a crisis situation.” The Inspector General’s  report also stated that there was no central policy or oversight for the  identification and management of essential services until DOD Instruction  3020.37 was issued. The Inspector General’s report noted that none of the  major or subordinate commands that they visited could provide them with  data concerning all contracts vital to combat or crisis operations. The  report concluded that although DOD’s instruction provided the needed  central policy that promotes the continuation of emergency essential  services during crises and hostile situations, the instruction needed  revision to provide additional assurances such as the identification of   war-stopper services and an annual reporting system identifying the  numbers of emergency essential contracts and their attendant personnel.  DOD concurred with the report findings but believed that since DOD  Instruction 3020.37 had just been issued, the services and agencies should  be given time to implement it.
subsections: section_title: DOD Instruction 3020.37 Requires Component Heads to Take Action
paragraphs: DOD Instruction 3020.37 assigns responsibilities and prescribes  procedures to implement DOD policy to assure that components   (1) develop and implement plans and procedures that are intended to  provide reasonable assurance of the continuation of essential services  during crisis situations and (2) prepare a contingency plan for obtaining  the essential service from alternate sources where there is a reasonable  doubt about the continuation of that service. Responsibility for ensuring  that all contractor services are reviewed annually, to include new and  existing contracts, to determine which services will be essential during  crisis situations rests with the heads of DOD components. They must also  conduct an annual assessment of the unexpected or early loss of essential  contractor services on the effectiveness of support to mobilizing and  deployed forces. The results of these assessments are to be included in the  affected contingency or operations plans.
Planning procedures for component activities using essential contractor  services are specified in DOD Instruction 3020.37. The component is to  identify services that are mission essential and designate them in the  contract statement of work. Where a reasonable assurance of continuation  of essential contractor services cannot be attained, the component activity  commander is to do one of three things. The first is to obtain military,  DOD civilian, or host nation personnel to perform the services concerned,  and, in consultation with legal and contracting personnel, determine the  proper course of action to transition from the contractor-provided  services. The second is to prepare a contingency plan for obtaining the  essential services from other sources if the contractor does not perform in  a crisis. The third option for the commander is to accept the risk attendant  with a disruption of the service during a crisis situation. Figure 2 shows  the essential planning process required by DOD Instruction 3020.37.
DOD has also directed regional combatant commanders to identify  contractors providing mission essential services and develop plans to  mitigate their possible loss. In late 2002, the Joint Staff modified the  logistics supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan to require the  development of a mitigation plan that details transitioning to other support  should commercial deliveries and/or support become compromised. This  was partly in response to problems with fuel deliveries in Afghanistan  during Operation Enduring Freedom. Also, Joint Staff guidance for the  development of operational plans by the regional combatant commanders  requires that those plans identify mission essential services provided by  contractors and identify the existence of any contingency plans to ensure  these services continue.
section_title: Essential Contractor Services Have Not Been Identified
paragraphs: As noted earlier, DOD Instruction 3020.37 was issued in response to a 1988  DOD Inspector General report, and in 1991 DOD stated that the  components should be given time to implement it. However, as of April  2003, 12 years later, we found little evidence that the DOD components are  implementing the DOD Instruction. The heads of DOD components are  required by the instruction to ensure that the instruction’s policies and  procedures are implemented by relevant subordinate organizations.  However, none of the services are conducting the annual review to  identify mission essential services that are being provided by contractors.  Service and combatant command officials we spoke with were generally  unaware of the requirement to review contracts annually and identify  essential services. None of the regional combatant commands, service  component commanders, or installations visited during our review had an  ongoing process for reviewing contracts as required by DOD Instruction  3020.37. Without identifying mission essential contracts, commanders do  not know what essential services could be at risk during operations.  Furthermore, the commanders cannot determine when backup plans are  needed, nor can they assess the risk they would have to accept with the  loss of contractor services. One Air Force official indicated that our visit  had prompted a review of their contracts to identify those that provided  essential services and that he became aware of this requirement only when  we asked about their compliance with the instruction.
Additionally, DOD has limited knowledge of the extent to which DOD  Instruction 3020.37 is being implemented. The instruction states that an  office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense will “periodically  monitor implementation of this instruction.” However, we found no  evidence that the required monitoring had ever taken place. In discussion  with the office that has primary responsibility for the instruction (located  in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness) we were told that the monitoring process is informal and that  since DOD components have not advised the office of any significant  problems in implementing the instruction (as required by the instruction)  it is assumed that it is being implemented.
section_title: Backup Planning Is Not Being Done
paragraphs: We found little in the way of backup plans to replace mission essential  contractor services during crises if necessary. This is not surprising since a  prerequisite to developing a backup plan is the identification of those  contracts that provide essential services. Many of the people we talked to  assumed that the personnel needed to continue essential services would  be provided, either by other contractors or organic military capability and  did not see a need for a formal backup plan. The only written backup plan  that we found was for maintenance of the Air Force’s C21J executive  aircraft. According to the plan, if contractors are unavailable, Air Force  personnel will provide maintenance. However, according to Air Force  officials, no one in the Air Force is trained to maintain this aircraft.
Our review of unclassified portions of operations plans addressing  logistics support revealed no backup planning. For example, in our review  of the logistics portion of the operations plan for the war in Iraq, which  addresses contracting, we found that there were no backup plans should  contractors become unavailable to provide essential services. The plan  provides guidance on certain aspects of contracting, such as the creation  of a joint contracting cell, but there is no language pertaining to backup  plans. In addition, our review of operations plans for the Balkans did not  identify any reference to plans for the mitigation of the loss of contractor  support.
section_title: Lack of Backup Plans May Be Shortsighted
paragraphs: In response to our questions about a lack of backup plans, many DOD  officials noted that contractors have always supported U.S. forces in  deployed locations and the officials expect that to continue. While most  of the contractor personnel we spoke with in the Persian Gulf indicated  that they would remain in the event of war with Iraq, they cannot be  ordered to remain in a hostile environment or replace other contractors  that choose not to deploy. DOD can initiate legal action against a  contractor for nonperformance, but the mission requirement the  contractor was responsible for remains.
Assuming that existing contractor employees will be available to perform  essential services may not always be realistic. Reasons for the loss of  contractor support can extend beyond contractors refusing to deploy to or  remain in the deployed location. Contractors could be killed (seven  contractor employees were killed in the 1991 Gulf War) or incapacitated  by hostile action, accident, or other unforeseen events. Furthermore, there  is no guarantee that a contractor will be willing to deploy to replace the  original contractor.
Should contractors become unavailable, many of the people we talked to  assumed that the personnel needed to continue essential services would  be provided either by other contractors or organic military capability, or  they would do without the service. However, these assumptions have not  been vetted, and key questions remain.
The ability to replace existing contractor services with a new contractor  can be dependent on the support being provided. Assumptions that  military resources will be available may not recognize that multiple  commands may be relying on the same unit as backup and that these units  therefore may not be available, or organic capability may not exist. As we  noted earlier the lack of organic capability is one reason that DOD uses  contractors. The Air Force’s lack of in-house maintenance capability for its  C21J aircraft mentioned earlier and the Army’s total dependence on  contractor support for all its fixed wing aircraft are examples of the lack  of organic capability. For some contracts, comparably skilled contractor  personnel may not be available from other companies. For example, we  were told at one location that only certain contractors have access to  proprietary technical and backup data from the manufacturers of specific  aircraft or systems. Additionally, the contracted services required for  military operations may also be needed by others. For example, shortages  of qualified linguists to support Operation Enduring Freedom in  Afghanistan delayed interrogations and signals exploitation. Among the  reasons given for the shortage were the competing demands of other  government agencies for the same skills.
If the decision to do without the essential service is made, the risk  associated with this decision must be examined and determined to be  acceptable, particularly in light of the reliance on contractors. Without  contractor support certain missions would be at risk. For example, Task  Force Eagle in Bosnia relies on contracted linguistic and intelligence  analyst services. We were told that if the contracted services were lost, it  would mean an immediate critical loss would occur for the military  because DOD does not have service personnel with these skills. Another  example is biological detection equipment used by the Army deployed in  Afghanistan in October 2001. The equipment is operated by Army  personnel but is entirely dependent upon contractor support for  maintenance in the field. The loss of this contractor support would  adversely affect the Army’s ability to detect biological threats at deployed  locations.
section_title: Contractors Are Not Included in DOD’s Human Capital Strategic Plan
paragraphs: “The total force policy is one fundamental premise upon which our military force structure  is built. It was institutionalized in 1973 and … as policy matured, military retirees, DOD  personnel, contractor personnel, and host-nation support personnel were brought under its  umbrella to reflect the value of their contributions to our military capability.”
Furthermore, DOD policy states “the DOD Components shall rely on the  most effective mix of the Total Force, cost and other factors considered,  including active, reserve, civilian, host-nation, and contract resources  necessary to fulfill assigned peacetime and wartime missions.”
While DOD policy may consider contractors as part of the total force, its  human capital strategy does not. As we recently reported, DOD has not  integrated the contractor workforce into its overall human capital  strategic plans. The civilian plan notes that contractors are part of the  unique mix of DOD resources, but the plan does not discuss how DOD will  shape its future workforce in a total force context that includes  contractors. This situation is in contrast to what studies on human capital  planning at DOD have noted. For example, the Defense Science Board’s  2000 report on Human Resources Strategy states that DOD needs to  undertake deliberate and integrated force shaping of the civilian and  military forces, address human capital challenges from a total force  perspective, and base decisions to convert functions from military to  civilians or contractors on an integrated human resources plan. In  addition, the National Academy of Public Administration noted that as  more work is privatized and more traditionally military tasks require  support of civilian or contractor personnel, a more unified approach to  force planning and management will be necessary; serious shortfalls in any  one of the force elements (military, civilian, or contractor) will damage  mission accomplishment.
DOD disagreed with our March 2003 recommendation that it develop a  departmentwide human capital strategic plan that integrates both military  and civilian workforces and takes into account contractor roles. In  disagreeing, DOD said that it presently has both a military and civilian  plan; the use of contractors is just another tool to accomplish the mission,  not a separate workforce, with separate needs, to manage. The intent of  our recommendation is that strategic planning for the civilian workforce  be undertaken in the context of the total force—civilian, military, and  contractors—because the three workforces are expected to perform their  responsibilities in a seamless manner to accomplish DOD’s mission. We  continue to believe that strategic planning in a total force context is  especially important because the trend toward greater reliance on  contractors requires a critical mass of civilian and military personnel with  the expertise necessary to protect the government’s interest and ensure  effective oversight of contractors’ work. Integrated planning could also  facilitate achieving a goal in the Quadrennial Defense Review to focus  DOD’s resources (personnel) in those areas that directly contribute to war  fighting and to rely on the private sector for non-core functions.
section_title: Guidance and Contract Language and Oversight Vary within DOD and the Services
paragraphs: Guidance at the DOD, combatant-command, and service levels regarding  the use of contractors to support deployed forces varies widely as do the  mechanisms for managing these contractors, creating challenges that may  hinder a commander’s ability to oversee and manage contractors  efficiently. There is no DOD-wide guidance that establishes baseline  polices to help ensure the efficient use of contractors that support  deployed forces. The Joint Staff has developed general guidance for  regional combatant commanders. At the service level, only the Army has  developed comprehensive guidance to help commanders manage deployed  contractors effectively. Furthermore, there is little or no visibility of  contractors or contracts at the regional combatant or service component  command level. As a result, contractors have arrived at deployed locations  unbeknownst to the ground commander and without the government  support they needed to do their jobs. Moreover, ground commanders have  little visibility over the totality of contractors that provide services at their  installations, causing concerns regarding safety and security.
subsections: section_title: Guidance on the Use of Contractors to Support Deployed Forces Varies Widely
paragraphs: Guidance for issues that impact all the components originates at the DOD  level. Typically, DOD will issue a directive—a broad policy document  containing what is required to initiate, govern, or regulate actions or  conduct by DOD components. This directive establishes a baseline policy  that applies across the combatant commands, services, and DOD agencies.  DOD may also issue an instruction—which implements the policy, or  prescribes the manner or a specific plan or action for carrying out the  policy, operating a program or activity, and assigning responsibilities. For  example:    DOD Directive 2000.12 establishes DOD’s antiterrorism and force  protection policy.
DOD Instruction 2000.16 establishes specific force protection standards  pursuant to the policy established by DOD Directive 2000.12.  In the case of contractor support for deployed forces, we found no DOD- wide guidance that establishes any baseline policy regarding the use of  contractors to support deployed forces or the government’s obligations to  these contractors. However, there are varying degrees of guidance at the  joint and service level to instruct commanders on the use of contractors.
The Joint Staff has developed guidance for regional combatant  commanders. Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of  Joint Operations, “Chapter V, Contractors in the Theater” sets forth  doctrine on the use of contractors and provides a framework for  addressing contractor support issues. The Joint Publication describes the  regional combatant commander’s general responsibilities, including  integration of contractors as part of the force as reflected in the   Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data, logistics plans, and operation  plans;    compliance with international, U.S., and host nation laws and  determination of restrictions imposed by international agreements on the  status of contractors;    establishment of theater-specific requirements and policies for contractors  and communication of those requirements to the contractors; and    establishment of procedures to integrate and monitor contracting  activities.
No single document informs the combatant commander of his  responsibilities with regards to contractors. Rather, there is a variety of  guidance that applies to contractors and appears in joint or DOD  publications. For example, in addition to Joint Publication 4-0, the  following DOD documents address contractors at deployed locations:    DOD Directive 2000.12 and DOD Instruction 2000.16, define the   anti-terrorism and force protection responsibilities of the military. These  include force protection responsibilities to contractors as well as  requirements placed on contractors who deploy.
Joint Publication 3-11, includes a requirement that mission-essential  contractors be provided with chemical and biological survival equipment  and training.
DOD Directive 4500.54 requires all non-DOD personnel traveling under  DOD sponsorship to obtain country clearance. While the directive does  not specify contractors, it does apply to them, further complicating the  ability of a commander to become aware of this responsibility.
Joint Publication 4-0 only applies to combatant commanders involved in  joint operations. However, at the regional combatant commands we  visited, contracting, logistics, and planning officials were not  implementing the Joint Publication.
At the service level, only the Army has developed comprehensive guidance  to help commanders manage contractors effectively. As the primary user  of contractors while deployed, the Army has taken the lead in formulating  policies and doctrine addressing the use of contractors in deployed  locations. Army regulations, field manuals, and pamphlets provide a wide  array of guidance on the use of contractors. The following are examples:    Army Regulation 715-9—Contractors Accompanying the Force—  provides policies, procedures, and responsibilities for managing and using  contracted U.S. citizens who are deployed to support Army requirements.    Army Field Manual 3-100.21—Contractors on the Battlefield —addresses  the use of contractors as an added resource for the commander to  consider when planning support for an operation. Its purpose is to define  the role of contractors, describe their relationships to the combatant  commanders and the Army service component commanders, and explain  their mission of augmenting operations and weapons systems support. It is  also a guide for Army contracting personnel and contractors in  implementing planning decisions and understanding how contractors will  be managed and supported by the military forces they augment.
Army Pamphlet 715-16—Contractor Deployment Guide—informs  contractor employees, contracting officers, and field commanders of the  current policies and procedures that may affect the deployment of  contractors. The guide focuses on the issues surrounding a U.S. citizen  contractor employee who is deploying from the United States to a theater  of operation overseas.
These documents provide comprehensive and detailed direction to  commanders, contracting personnel, and contractors on what their roles  and responsibilities are and how they should meet them. Officials we  spoke with at various levels of the Army were generally aware of the  Army’s guidance. For example, in Kosovo we received a briefing from the  commander of the Area Support Group that included the applicable Army  guidance on the use of contractors in deployed locations. Additionally, the  Army Materiel Command has established a Web site that contains links to  primary and secondary documents that provide guidance on the use of  contractors on the battlefield.
The other services make less use of contractors to support deployed  forces. Nevertheless, their contractors provide many of the same services  as the Army’s contractors, often under similar austere conditions at the  same locations and therefore have similar force protection and support  requirements as Army contractors. For example, both Air Force and Army  contractors work at bases in Kuwait and do not have significant  differences in terms of their living and working conditions or the types of  threats they face. Also, it is not uncommon to find Air Force contractors  deployed in support of the other services, as is the case in Bosnia where  Air Force contractors maintain the Army’s Apache and Blackhawk  helicopters.
However, the other services have not developed the same level of  guidance as the Army to guide commanders and contracting personnel on  how to meet those requirements. Like the Army, the Air Force uses  contractors for base operations support (including security, trash removal,  and construction services) in deployed locations. Contractors also provide  many essential services to Air Force units deployed to Bosnia and  Southwest Asia. In Southwest Asia contractors provide support for base  communications systems, systems that generate the tactical air picture for  the Combined Air Operations Center, and maintenance support for both  the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle and the data links it uses to transmit  information. In 2001, the Air Force issued a policy memorandum  addressing the use of contractors in deployed locations. The purpose of  the memorandum is to provide consistent and uniform guidance on the  use of U.S. contractor personnel to augment the support of Air Force  operations in wartime and contingency operations. For example, the  memorandum states as follows:    Any determination regarding commercial support must consider the  essential services that must be maintained and the risks associated due to  contractor non-performance.
Contractors may be provided force protection and support services such  as housing and medical support commensurate to those provided to DOD  civilians, if the contract requires it.
Contractors should not be provided uniforms or weapons.
However, the Air Force has not developed the guidance to instruct its  personnel on how to implement this policy. For example, the Air Force  does not have a comparable document to the Army’s Contractor  Deployment Guide, to instruct contracting personnel or contractor  employees on deployment requirements such as training, medical  screening, and logistical support.
The Navy and the Marine Corps have also not developed much guidance  on dealing with contractors in deployed locations. The Marine Corps has  issued an order addressing the use of contractors, which is limited to a  statement that contractor personnel should not normally be deployed  forward of the port of debarkation and that contractor logistics support  requirements be identified and included in all planning scenarios. This  guidance only addresses contractor support for ground equipment, ground  weapons systems, munitions, and information systems. As with the Air  Force memorandum, the Marine Corps does not have the guidance in  place to instruct personnel on how to implement this order.
The Navy does not have any guidance related to contractor support of  deployed forces. Navy officials stressed that because most Navy  contractors are deployed to ships, many of the issues related to force  protection and levels of support do not exist. Nevertheless, some  contractors do support the Navy ashore and therefore may operate in an  environment similar to contractors supporting the Army. In fact, of the  seven contractors killed in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, three were working  for the Navy. Furthermore, we learned that there have been issues with the  support of contractors deployed on ships. For example, officials at the  Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command told us they were not  sure if the Navy was authorized to provide medical treatment to their  contractors deployed on ships.
subsections: section_title: Some Guidance Is Contradictory and Causes Confusion for Military Commanders
paragraphs: The differences in the DOD and service guidance can lead to sometimes  contradictory requirements, complicating the ability of commanders to  implement that guidance. For example, guidance related to providing force  protection to contractor personnel varies significantly. Joint guidance  states that force protection is the responsibility of the contractor; Army  guidance places that responsibility with the commander; and Air Force  guidance treats force protection as a contractual matter, specifically, as  follows:    Joint Publication 4-0 “Chapter V,” states “Force protection responsibility  for DOD contractor employees is a contractor responsibility, unless valid  contract terms place that responsibility with another party.”
Army Field Manual 3-100.21 states, “Protecting contractors and their  employees on the battlefield is the commander’s responsibility. When  contractors perform in potentially hostile or hazardous areas, the  supported military forces must assure the protection of their operations  and employees. The responsibility for assuring that contractors receive  adequate force protection starts with the combatant commander, extends  downward, and includes the contractor.”
The Air Force policy memorandum states, “The Air Force may provide or  make available, under terms and conditions as specified in the contract,  force protection … commensurate with those provided to DOD civilian  personnel to the extent authorized by U.S. and host nation law.”
As a result, the combatant commander does not have a uniform set of  requirements he can incorporate into his planning process but instead has  to work with requirements that vary according to the services and the  individual contracts. In fact, an official on the Joint Staff told us that the  combatant commanders have requested DOD-wide guidance on the use of  contractors to support deployed forces to establish a baseline that applies  to all the services.
Many of the issues discussed in the balance of this report, such as the lack  of standard contract language related to deploying contractors, the lack of  visibility over contractors, and adequate support to deployed contractors  stem in part from the varying guidance at the DOD and service levels.  According to DOD officials, DOD is in the initial phase of developing a  directive that will establish DOD policy with regard to managing  contractors in deployed locations as well as a handbook providing greater  detail. The officials expect this guidance to be issued by the end of 2003.  DOD officials involved stated this guidance would bring together all DOD  policies that apply to contractors who support deployed forces and clarify  DOD policy on issues such as force protection and training. These officials  indicated that the DOD directive and handbook would be based on the  Army guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed forces.
section_title: Contracts for Support of Deployed Forces Often Do Not Include the Language to Ensure Efficient Deployments or Implement Policy
paragraphs: There is no standard contract language applicable DOD-wide (such as in  the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement) related to the  deployment and support of contractors that support deployed forces.  Contracting officers therefore may not address potential requirements  related to deployments or may use whatever deployment language they  believe to be appropriate, which may not address the necessary  deployment requirements. The Defense Acquisition Deskbook Supplement  entitled Contractor Support in the Theater of Operations includes  suggested clauses for contracts in support of deployed forces. However,  these clauses are not mandatory and did not appear to be widely known by  contracting officers. As a result, there is no common baseline of contract  language specifically addressing deployment that is required for contracts  that may support deployed forces and no assurance that all of these  contracts will properly address deployment requirements.
The degree to which individual contracts adequately address deployment  requirements varies widely. System support contracts are often written  before the need to deploy is identified, and the contracting officer may not  have considered the possibility of deployment. Also, some weapons  systems are being deployed before they are fully developed, and  deployment language was not included in the development contracts.  Some of the system support contracts we looked at did not include  language clearly specifying that contractors may need to deploy to hostile  and austere locations to provide support to deployed forces, as in the  following examples:    The contract for an Army communications system needed to be modified  when the system was relocated from Saudi Arabia to Kuwait (and would  need to be modified again if the system were brought into Iraq) because  the contract did not contain provisions for deployment to other locations.    The Air Force Predator unmanned aerial vehicle contract did not envision  deployment since the Predator was developed as an advanced technology  concept demonstration project.
An engineering support contract for the Navy did not contain a specific  deployment clause but only stated that the contractor must support the  Navy ashore or afloat.
The Army’s Combined Arms Support Command found a similar situation  when it reviewed system support contracts for the 4th Infantry Division.  The 4th Infantry Division is the Army’s first digitized division and serves as  the test bed for the latest command and control systems, many of which  are still under development. The Combined Arms Support Command  study reviewed 89 contracts that supported the division. The command  determined that 44 of the 89 contracts would likely require that contractor  personnel be deployed and found that 21 of the 44 either had no  deployment language or vague deployment language. However, this did  not impede the division’s deployment for Operation Iraqi Freedom.  According to Army officials, 183 contractor employees prepared to deploy  in support of the 4th Infantry Division’s deployment, including some  whose contracts were noted in the 4th Infantry Division study as having  had either no deployment language or vague deployment language. To  ensure that problems do not arise when units deploy, the Army has taken  steps to address some of the issues identified in the study. Specifically, in  2002, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and  Technology issued the following memorandums:    A January 2002 memorandum stating that development contracts  providing support contractor personnel shall contain appropriate  deployment guidance if they have any likelihood of being deployed outside  of the United States.
A June 2002 memorandum stating that Program Executive Officers and  Program Managers should strive to develop systems that do not require  contractor support in forward deployed locations.  Military officials we spoke with told us that the lack of specific  deployment language in contracts could increase the time it would take to  get contractor support to deployed forces as well as the cost of that  support. For example, the contract for support of the Army’s  prepositioned equipment in Qatar did not include language that provided  for a potential deployment to Kuwait. As a result, when the need arose to  move the equipment to Kuwait, the contract needed to be modified. (The  cost of the modification was $53 million although it is not clear what  amount, if any, the government could have saved had deployment  language already been included in the contract.)
Contacts may also lack language to enforce policies pertaining to  contractors in deployed locations. For example, Army policy requires that  contractors follow all general orders and force protection policies of the  local commander. However, these requirements were not always written  into the contract documents and thus may not be enforceable. In such  situations, commanders may not have the ability to control contractor  activities in accordance with general orders. For example, judge advocate  officials in Bosnia expressed their concern that the base commander was  not authorized to prevent contractor personnel from entering a local  mosque in a high threat environment. These officials suggested that  commanders should always be able to control contractor activities where  matters of force protection are concerned. Several officials indicated that  many of these issues could be addressed if DOD implemented a policy that  required all contracts that support deployed forces to include language  that applies the general orders and force protection policies of the local  commanders to contractor employees.
section_title: Oversight of Individual Contracts at the Deployed Locations We Visited Appeared to Be Generally Sufficient
paragraphs: DOD has established specific policies on how contracts, including those  that support deployed forces, should be administered and managed.  Oversight of contracts ultimately rests with the contracting officer who  has the responsibility for ensuring that contractors meet the requirements  set forth in the contract. However, most contracting officers are not  located at the deployed locations. As a result, contracting officers appoint  monitors who represent the contracting officer at the deployed location  and are responsible for monitoring contractor performance. How  contracts and contractors are monitored at a deployed location is largely a  function of the size and scope of the contract. Contracting officers for  large scale and high value contracts such as the Air Force Contract  Augmentation Program, the Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program,  and the Balkan Support Contract have opted to have personnel from the  Defense Contract Management Agency oversee contractor performance.  These onsite teams include administrative contracting officers who direct  the contractor to perform work and quality assurance specialists who  ensure that the contractors perform work to the standards written in the  contracts. For smaller contracts, contracting officers usually appoint  contracting officer’s representatives or contracting officer’s technical  representatives to monitor contractor performance at deployed locations.  These individuals are not normally contracting specialists and serve as  contracting officer’s representatives as an additional duty. They cannot  direct the contractor by making commitments or changes that affect price,  quality, quantity, delivery, or other terms and conditions of the contract.  Instead, they act as the eyes and ears of the contracting officer and serve  as the liaison between the contractor and the contracting officer.
At the locations we visited, we found that oversight personnel were  generally in place and procedures had been established to monitor  contractor performance, but some issues were identified. The officials we  spoke with expressed their satisfaction with contractor performance and  with the level of oversight provided for the contracts under their purview.  However, officials mentioned several areas where improvements to the  oversight process could be made. One area involved training of  contracting officer’s representatives. While the contracting officer’s  representatives we spoke with appeared to be providing appropriate  contract oversight, some stated that training before they assumed these  positions would have better prepared them to effectively oversee  contractor performance. The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation  Supplement requires that they be qualified by training and experience  commensurate with the responsibilities to be delegated to them. However,  not all contracting officer’s representatives were receiving this training.  For example, most of the contracting officer’s representatives we met with  in Southwest Asia did not receive prior training. As a result, they had to  learn on the job, taking several weeks before they could efficiently  execute their responsibilities, which could lead to gaps in contractor  oversight.
Another area for improvement involved familiarization of commanders  with using contractors. Several of the contracting officials we met with in  the Balkans and Southwest Asia stated there was a lack of training or  education for commanders and senior personnel on the use of contractors;  particularly with regards to the directing of contractor activities and the  roles of the contract monitors such as the Defense Contract Management  Agency and contracting officer’s representatives, as illustrated in the  following examples:    An Air Force commander sent a contractor from Kuwait to Afghanistan  without going through the appropriate contracting officer. The contractor  was ultimately recalled to Kuwait because the contract contained no  provision for support in Afghanistan.
A Special Operations Command official told us commanders were  unfamiliar with the Defense Contract Management Agency and believed  that the agency represented the contractor and not the military.
An Army official told us that commanders sometimes do not know that  they are responsible for requesting and nominating a contracting officer’s  representative for contracts supporting their command.
Some efforts are being made to address this issue. For example, U.S.  Army, Europe includes contract familiarization during mission rehearsal  exercises for Balkan deployments.
We also found that the frequent rotation of personnel into and out of a  theater of operation (particularly in Southwest Asia) resulted in a loss of  continuity in the oversight process as incoming oversight personnel had to  familiarize themselves with their new responsibilities. We previously  reported on the impact of frequent rotations in and out of the theater. In  response to a recommendation made in our 2000 report, the Defense  Contract Management Agency changed its rotation policy. According to  officials whom we met with in the Balkans and Southwest Asia, the  Defense Contract Management Agency now staggers the rotation of its  contract administration officials at deployed locations such as the Balkans  and Southwest Asia to improve continuity and oversight. However, the  issue of personnel rotation and the impact on contractor oversight  remains for other officials. For example, the program manager of a major  Army contract in Qatar indicated that it would be beneficial if Army  personnel overseeing the contract were deployed for a longer period of  time in order to develop a more durable relationship. In addition, Air  Force officials in Qatar indicated they were planning on increasing the  number of longer-term deployments for key leadership positions, including  contracting positions, to help alleviate some of their continuity issues.
Some commands have established policies and procedures to provide  additional tools to help manage contractors more efficiently, as in the  following example:    U.S. Army, Europe established a joint acquisition review board during  contingency operations. This board validates requirements for all  proposed expenditures over $2,500. The board also determines if the  requirement is best met using contractor support, host nation support, or  troop labor. The policy stipulates that U.S. Army, Europe headquarters  must review expenditures over $50,000.
U.S. Army, Europe has established standards for facilities and support to  soldiers in contingency operations. These standards specify the level of  quality of life support (i.e. type of housing, size of chapels, provision of  recreational facilities, and other amenities) based on the number of U.S.  troops at the deployed location. Variations from these standards have to  be approved by the U.S. Army, Europe deputy commanding general.  Officials told us these standards helped to limit the growth of contractor  services.
section_title: Lack of Visibility Overall Contractor Support Hampers Broader Oversight
paragraphs: Limited awareness by service and combatant command officials of all  contractor activity supporting their operations can hamper their oversight  and management responsibilities with regards to contractors supporting  deployed forces. This limited awareness is due to the fact that the decision  to use contractors to provide support to a deployed location can be made  by any number of requiring activities both within and outside of the area of  operations. As discussed earlier, contracts to support deployed forces can  be awarded by many organizations within DOD or by other federal  agencies. Figure 3 illustrates the broad array of contractor services being  provided in Bosnia and the government agency that awarded each  contract. Bosnia is one of the few places we visited where contract  information is collected centrally, giving the commander visibility over  much of the contracting activity. Commanders at other locations we  visited did not have this information readily available to them.
Because the decision to use contractors is not coordinated at the regional  combatant commands or the component commands other than in Bosnia,  no one knows the totality of contractor support being provided to  deployed forces in an area of operation.
Despite the lack of visibility and involvement in decisions to use  contractors, commanders are responsible for all the people in their area of  responsibility, including contractor personnel. This lack of visibility over  contractor personnel inhibits their ability to resolve issues associated with  contractor support. Contractor visibility is needed to ensure that the  overall contractor presence in a theater is synchronized with the combat  forces being supported and that adjustments can be made to contractor  support when necessary. Additionally, in order to provide operational  support and force protection to participating contractors, DOD needs to  maintain visibility of all contracts and contractor employees. When  commanders lack visibility, problems can arise. For example, one  contractor told us when his employees arrived in Afghanistan, shortly after  the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the base commander had  not been informed that they were arriving and could not provide the  facilities they needed to maintain the biological identification equipment  that they were contracted to maintain. Also, the lack of visibility may  inhibit a commander’s understanding of the impact of certain force  protection decisions. For example, if there is an increased threat at a base  and security is increased, third country nationals may be barred from  entering the base. Third country nationals often provide services  important to the quality of life of deployed soldiers, such as preparing and  serving food and providing sanitation services. Without visibility over the  totality of contractor support to his command, the commander may not  know which support services rely heavily on third country nationals and is  therefore less able to identify and mitigate the effects of losing that  support.
Limited visibility of all contractor activity can create a variety of problems  for ground commanders. Commanders may not be aware of the total  number of contractor personnel on their installations at any point in time  or what they are doing there. In Southwest Asia this situation is further  complicated by the fact that many of the contractor employees are third  country nationals, which can increase security concerns. While many  officials at sites we visited indicated that they maintain accountability for  their contractors by tightly controlling the process by which contractors  receive their identification badges, we found problems remained. As  illustrated in the following examples:  In Kosovo, we found that badges were issued at multiple locations and  provided access to multiple bases. This situation means a contractor  employee could receive a badge at one site and come onto a different base  without the base commander knowing who they were or why they were  there.
Temporary badges (for visits of 30 days or less) at Eagle base in Bosnia  have no pictures. The lack of photos means that anyone could use the  badge to gain access to the base.
The contracting officer’s representative for a forward base in Kuwait told  us that contractor personnel have simply shown up without any advance  notification and that he had to track down other officials to determine why  the contractors were there.  Commanders may also be responsible for providing contractor employees  with certain benefits and entitlements included in their contracts. The  commanders’ ability to meet these requirements (including providing  chemical and biological protective gear, military escorts, billeting, and  medical support) is hindered by their lack of visibility over the totality of  contractor presence on their base. In addition, commanders may not be  able to account for all their contractor personnel in the event of an attack  on a base. Similarly, should issues such as those concerning “Gulf War  Syndrome” arise, DOD may be unable to determine if contractor  personnel were in a location where they might have been exposed to  potentially harmful substances. As a result, DOD may have no way to  verify the claims of contractor personnel of health effects resulting from  such exposure.
We also found that, at some bases, commanders do not have copies of all  the contracts in effect on their base, as the following examples illustrate:    U.S. Army Pacific Command officials told us it took several weeks for  them to obtain the applicable contract terms to resolve questions  regarding medical care for contractor employees in the Philippines  because no one in the command had a copy of the contract.  In the Balkans, some contractors and federal agencies refused to provide  copies of their contracts to the task force officials.
We first reported this problem in May 2002. At that time we  recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct all components to  forward to the executive agent for operations in a geographical area, such  as the Balkans, a copy of all existing and future contracts and contract  modifications. DOD concurred with this recommendation and agreed to  modify its Financial Management Regulation to require that a biannual  report outlining the contracts be provided to the area executive agent.  The biannual report was limited, however, to contracts that used  contingency appropriations for funding and did not include contracts that  use a service’s base program funds. However, Balkans operations are no  longer being funded using contingency funds and would therefore not be  included under the new financial management regulation. As of April 15,  2003, the change to the Financial Management Regulation had not been  implemented. In addition, as we reported in May 2002, lack of visibility  over contracts hinders DOD’s ability to compare contracts and identify  potential duplication of services or ensure that contractors are only  receiving those services to which they are entitled.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Risk is inherent when relying on contractors to support deployed forces.  DOD recognized this risk when it issued DOD Instruction 3020.37, which  requires the services to determine which contracts provide essential  services and either develop plans for continued provision of those services  during crises or assume the risk of not having the essential service.  However, neither DOD nor the services have taken steps to ensure  compliance with this instruction. While most contractors would likely  deploy or remain in a deployed location if needed, there are many other  reasons contractors may not be available to provide essential services.  Without a clear understanding of the potential consequences of not having  the essential service available, the risks associated with the mission  increase.
There are no DOD-wide policies on the use of contractors to support  deployed forces. As a result there is little common understanding among  the services as to the government’s responsibility to contractors and  contractor personnel in the event of hostilities. This lack of understanding  can cause confusion at the deployed location and makes managing  contractors more difficult because commanders often have contractors  from several services at their location with different requirements,  understandings, and obligations.
No standard contract language exists for inclusion in contracts that may  involve contractors deploying to support the force. Therefore, we found  that contracts have varying and sometimes inconsistent language  addressing deployment requirements. For example, some contracts do not  contain any language related to the potential requirement to deploy while  others include only vague references to deployment. The lack of specific  language can require adjustments to the contract when deployment  requirements are identified. The need to negotiate contract adjustments in  the face of an immediate deployment can result in increased costs to the  government and may delay contractor support.
The lack of contract training for commanders, senior personnel, and some  contracting officer’s representatives can adversely affect the effectiveness  of the use of contractors in deployed locations. Without training, many  commanders, senior military personnel, and contracting officer’s  representatives are not aware of their roles and responsibilities in dealing  with contractors.
Most commanders at the locations we visited had only limited visibility  and limited understanding of the extent and types of services being  provided by contractors. The lack of visibility over the types and numbers  of contractors limits the contract oversight that can be provided and  hampers the commander’s ability to maintain accountability of  contractors. Without this visibility there is no assurance that commanders  understand the full extent of their operational support, life support, and  force protection responsibilities to contractors, and there is no way to  assure that contractors do not receive services they are not entitled to  receive. Additionally, without this visibility commanders cannot develop a  complete picture of the extent to which they are reliant on contractors to  perform their missions and build this reliance into their risk assessments.  Moreover, while DOD agreed to provide executive agents with a biannual  report outlining the contracts in use in a geographical location, it is not  clear that these reports, which are required for contracts funded with  contingency funds only, will provide sufficient information regarding the  services that contractors are providing to deployed forces and the support  and force protection obligations of the government to those contractors to  improve commanders’ visibility and understanding of contractor services  at their locations.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To promote better planning, guidance, and oversight regarding the use of  contractors to support deployed forces, we recommend that the Secretary  of Defense take the following actions:    Direct the heads of DOD components to comply with DOD instruction  3020.37 by completing the first review of contracts to identify those  providing mission essential services. This review should be completed by  the end of calendar year 2004.
Direct the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to  develop procedures to monitor the implementation of DOD Instruction  3020.37.
Develop DOD-wide guidance and doctrine on how to manage contractors  that support deployed forces. The guidance should (a) establish baseline  policies for the use of contractors to support deployed forces,   (b) delineate the roles and responsibilities of commanders regarding the  management and oversight of contractors that support deployed forces,  and (c) integrate other guidance and doctrine that may affect DOD  responsibilities to contractors in deployed locations into a single  document to assure that commanders are aware of all applicable policies.  Additionally, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  service secretaries to develop procedures to assure implementation of the  DOD guidance.
Develop and require the use of standardized deployment language in  contracts that support or may support deployed forces. The Defense  Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement should be amended to require  standard clauses in such contracts that are awarded by DOD and to  address deployment in orders placed by DOD under other agencies’  contracts. This language should address the need to deploy into and  around the theater, required training, entitlements, force protection, and  other deployment related issues.
Develop training courses for commanding officers and other senior  leaders who are deploying to locations with contractor support.  Such  training could provide information on the roles and responsibilities of the  Defense Contract Management Agency and the contracting officer’s  representative and the role of the commander in the contracting process  and the limits of the commanders’ authority. Also, contracting officers  should ensure that those individuals selected as contracting officer’s  representatives complete one of the established contracting officer’s  representative training courses before they assume their duties.
To improve the commander’s visibility over, and understanding of, the  extent and types of services being provided by contractors, the Secretary  of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to  implement the changes to the department’s Financial Management  Regulations previously agreed to with these modifications: (a) the  Financial Management Regulations should specify that the biannual report  include a synopsis of the services being provided and a list of contractor  entitlements; (b) the report should include all contracts that directly  support U.S. contingency operations including those funded by the  services base program accounts; and (c) the changes should be finalized  by January 1, 2004.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed fully with three  of our recommendations and agreed in part with three others.  The  department’s comments are reprinted in appendix II.
DOD agreed with our recommendations that it develop (1) procedures to  monitor the implementation of DOD Instruction 3020.37, (2) DOD-wide  guidance and doctrine on how to manage contractors that support  deployed forces, and (3) standardized deployment language for contracts  that support or may support deployed forces.
Although DOD agreed with our recommendation regarding the need for  the heads of DOD components to complete the first review of contracts to  identify those providing mission essential services, it expressed concerns  that the components might not be able to complete this review by the end  of calendar year 2003. We amended out recommendation to incorporate  this concern by extending the recommended completion date to the end of  calendar year 2004. We believe a completion date is important to provide  some sense of urgency. DOD also stated that the effort needed to obtain  information on contracts currently in place may outweigh possible  benefits and suggested alternative methods for conducting this review,  including the possibility of only reviewing new contracts. However, DOD  Instruction 3020.37 requires a review of all contracts, and we continue to  believe that a review that fails to include all contracts would not  adequately address the issues that the instruction was designed to   resolve—identifying essential services provided by contractors to  deployed forces and ensuring the continuation of those services should  contractors not be available.
DOD also agreed with our recommendation that appropriate training  should be developed for commanding officers and other senior leaders  who are deploying to locations with contractor support.  However, DOD  stated that while Web-based training may be the appropriate medium for  such training, in some cases, alternative methods could be more  beneficial.  We accepted DOD’s suggestion and amended the  recommendation accordingly.
DOD agreed with our recommendation concerning changes to the  department’s Financial Management Regulations.  However, DOD  questioned the utility of a part of this recommendation that called for the  biannual report to include a list of contractor entitlements as well as all  contracts that directly support U.S. contingency operations, including  those funded by the services’ base program accounts.  DOD stated that the  costs of making these changes to the system and collecting additional  information could outweigh the perceived benefits.  Further, DOD stated  that the lack of collecting this information has not jeopardized the  operation of any DOD mission in recent memory.  DOD stated that other,  less burdensome ways to ensure combatant commanders have all the  necessary information for contractors that are supporting them need to be  fully explored before pursuing more burdensome means, such as a costly  centralized database.  DOD said it would review this issue with the  military departments to determine if obtaining the recommended  information would be cost effective.
We do not believe this recommendation would be costly or burdensome to  implement.  As noted in the report, the Under Secretary of Defense  (Comptroller) has already agreed to amend DOD’s Financial Management  Regulations to require that the components provide a biannual report  outlining the existing and future contracts and contract modifications to  the executive agent for operations in a geographic area, including a  synopsis of services being provided. We believe that since the components  will already be asked to provide the biannual reports, asking them to  provide additional information summarizing contractor entitlements  specified under those contracts would not substantially increase the effort  required to generate these reports. This additional information would  facilitate DOD’s efforts to ensure that contractors receive only the services  from the government to which they are contractually entitled. While DOD  expressed concern about developing a costly centralized database to  generate these reports, our recommendation contained no guidance on  how the reports should be generated and makes no mention of a  centralized database. We agree that DOD should look for the most cost- effective way to implement the recommendation. We also continue to  believe that the biannual report should include information from contracts  that directly support U.S. contingency operations but are funded from the  services’ base program accounts. As noted in the report, this would  include contracts supporting operations in the Balkans. We do not believe  that these contracts should be excluded from the report. While we did not  find evidence that any DOD missions were jeopardized by not having  information summarizing contractor services and entitlements, our  recommendation was based on concerns raised by field commanders  about oversight of contractors and the appropriate provisioning of support  to contractors. As noted in the report, several commanders in the field told  us their limited visibility of the extent and types of services being provided  by contractors created challenges for them. We continue to believe that  without a more thorough understanding of contractor support,  commanders will continue to face difficulties in identifying potential  duplication of services or ensuring that contractors are only receiving  those services to which they are entitled. Therefore, we still believe the  recommendation in its entirety has merit.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairman and the Ranking  Minority Member, Subcommittee on Readiness, House Committee on  Armed Services; other interested congressional committees; the Secretary  of Defense; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will  also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report will  be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me on   (757) 552-8111 or by E-mail at curtinn@gao.gov. Major contributors to this  report were Steven Sternlieb, Carole Coffey, James Reid, James Reynolds,  and Adam Vodraska.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To identify the types of services contractors provide to deployed U.S.  forces we met with officials at the Department of Defense (DOD) who  have responsibility for identifying contractor needs, issuing contracts,  managing contracts once they are executed, and utilizing contractors to  fulfill their missions. Because there was no consolidated list of contractors  supporting deployed forces we asked DOD officials at the commands and  installations we visited to identify their contractor support. These  commands included the Central, European, and Pacific Commands and  most of their service components and major installations in Bosnia,  Kosovo, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. We focused our efforts in the Balkans  and Southwest Asia because they provide a broad range of contractor  support activities. We were completing our work as the 2003 war with Iraq  began and so were unable to fully ascertain the extent of contractor  support to U.S. forces inside Iraq. The scope of our review included  system and theater support contracts. We also met with officials of  selected contracting commands in the Air Force, Army, and Navy and at  defense agencies including the Defense Logistics Agency. These officials  included contracting officers and, where applicable, their representatives  at deployed locations. We examined a wide range of contracts in order to  assess the diversity of contractor support. While visiting deployed  locations we met with representatives of the different DOD components  and contractors stationed there to determine what contractor services are  used to accomplish their missions.
To assess why DOD uses contractors to support deployed forces, we  reviewed DOD studies and publications and interviewed DOD and  contractor officials. We met with unit commanders during our visits to  deployed locations to discuss the effects using contractors had on military  training. We did not, however, compare the cost of contractors versus  military personnel; make policy judgments as to whether the use of  contractors is desirable; or look at issues related to government liability to  contractors.
To assess DOD’s efforts to identify those contractors that provide mission  essential services and to maintain essential services if contractors are  unable to do so, we reviewed applicable DOD Inspector General reports as  well as DOD and its components’ policies, regulations, and instructions for  ensuring the continuation of essential services. In particular, we reviewed  DOD Instruction 3020.37, which sets forth the policies and procedures for  identifying mission essential services and the steps necessary to assure the  continuation of such services. We held discussions with command,  service, and installation officials on the extent to which the required  review of contracts to identify mission essential services had been  conducted and on their backup planning should contractors not be able to  perform such services for any reason. We also met with officials of the  office responsible for monitoring implementation to ascertain what efforts  they have undertaken. We reviewed the pertinent unclassified sections,  related to contractor support, of operations plans for Iraq and the Balkans.  We also discussed with deployed contractor employees their opinions of  the extent of their responsibilities to continue to support military forces in  crisis situations.
To assess the adequacy of guidance and oversight mechanisms in place to  effectively manage contractors who support deployed forces we reviewed  DOD’s and its components’ policies, regulations, and instructions that  relate to the use of contractors that support deployed forces. We met with  officials at all levels of command to gain an understanding of contracting  and the contract management and oversight processes. At the locations we  visited, we asked officials their opinions of the effectiveness of existing  policy in helping them manage their contractor force and asked them for  suggested areas of improvement. We also reviewed and discussed with  them local policies and procedures for managing their contractors. We met  with DOD’s contract management officials as well as other military  members to obtain their opinions of the quality of contractor-provided  services and the quality of contract oversight. We also met with contractor  representatives to discuss contract oversight and contract management  from their perspective. Finally, we reviewed contracts that support  deployed forces to assess the existence and adequacy of deployment  language.
The DOD organizations we visited or contacted in the United States were  Office of the Secretary of Defense    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics, Washington, D.C.
Civilian Personnel Management Service, Arlington, Va.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff    J-4 Logistics, Washington, D.C.
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology),  Falls Church, Va.
Office of the Judge Advocate General, Rosslyn, Va.    Army Contracting Agency, Falls Church, Va.    U.S. Army Forces Command, Headquarters, Ft McPherson, Ga.    3rd Army Headquarters, Ft McPherson, Ga.    4th Infantry Division, Ft. Hood Tex.    Corps of Engineers, Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Programs Center, Winchester, Va.
Combined Arms Support Command, Ft. Lee, Va.    Communications-Electronics Command, Ft. Monmouth, N.J.    Training and Doctrine Command, Ft, Monroe, Va.    Operations Support Command, Rock Island, Ill.
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, Program Office, Rock Island, Ill.
Army Materiel Command, Alexandria, Va.    Network Enterprise Technology Command, Ft. Huachuca, Ariz.
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.    Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md.
Naval Air Technical Data and Engineering Service Command, San  Diego, Calif.
Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.    Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, San Diego, Calif.
Department of the Air Force    Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Rosslyn,  Va.
Air Force Materiel Command, Dayton, Ohio    F-117 Special Projects Office, Dayton, Ohio    Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency, Tilden Air Force Base, Fla.
Defense Logistics Agency, Ft. Belvoir, Va.
Defense Energy Support Center, Ft. Belvoir, Va.
Defense Contract Management Agency, Alexandria, Va.    Defense Contract Audit Agency, Ft. Belvoir, Va.
The geographic combatant commands and component commands we  visited or contacted were    U.S. Army Forces Central Command    U.S. Naval Forces Central Command    U.S. Central Command Air Forces    U.S. Marine Forces Central Command   U.S. Army, Europe    U.S. Air Forces in Europe    U.S. Pacific Command    U.S. Army Pacific    Pacific Air Forces    Special Operations Command Pacific    U.S. Marine Forces Pacific     U.S. Pacific Fleet    Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet    Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet    Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet The overseas activities and contractors we visited, by country, were    Naval Support Activity    Naval Regional Contracting Center    USS Cardinal, MHC 60   Eagle Base, U.S. Army    Task Force Eagle, Area Support Group Eagle    Defense Contract Management Agency   Defense Contract Audit Agency, Wiesbaden    Defense Contract Management Agency, Stuttgart    Defense Energy Support Center, Wiesbaden    Defense Logistics Agency, Wiesbaden    Army Materiel Command Europe, Heidelberg Serbia and Montenegro  Province of Kosovo    Camp Bondsteel, U.S. Army    Task Force Falcon, Area Support Group Falcon    Defense Contract Management Agency    Army Materiel Command   TRW    Kellogg, Brown & Root Services    Premiere Technology Group    Engineering and Professional Services, Incorporated   Camp Monteith, U.S. Army    Camp Doha, U.S. Army    U.S. Army Kuwait    Army Corps of Engineers    Army Materiel Command    Defense Contract Management Agency    Coalition Forces Land Component Command   KGL    Raytheon Aerospace    British Link Kuwait    CSA   Ahmed Al Jaber Air Base, U.S Air Force    Ahmed Al Jaber Air Base, Contractors    RMS    Dyncorp    Vinnell   ITT    Mutual Telecommunications Services    Ali Al Salem Air Base, U.S. Air Force    Ali Al Salem Air Base, Contractors    Dyncorp    L3 Communications    TRW    General Atomics    Litton Integrated Systems    Anteon    RMS   U.S. Embassy, Doha, Qatar    Camp As Sayliyah, U.S. Army    U.S. Army Forces Central Command-Qatar    U.S. Army Materiel Command    Defense Contracting Audit Agency   Camp As Sayliyah, Contractors    Al Udeid Air Base, U.S. Air Force    379th Air Expeditionary Wing    Air Force Civil Augmentation Program, Program Office    Al Udeid Air Base, Contractors  We conducted our review between August 2002 and April 2003 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense