DOD Civilian Personnel: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Help Ensure Viability of DOD's Civilian Industrial Workforce
Published: 2003-04-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Between 1987 and 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) downsized the civilian workforce in 27 key industrial facilities by about 56 percent. Many of the remaining 72,000 workers are nearing retirement. In recent years GAO has identified shortcomings in DOD's strategic planning and was asked to determine (1) whether DOD has implemented our prior recommendation to develop and implement a depot maintenance strategic plan, (2) the extent to which the services have developed and implemented comprehensive strategic workforce plans, and (3) what challenges adversely affect DOD's workforce planning.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD has not implemented our October 2001 recommendation to develop and implement a DOD depot strategic plan that would delineate workloads to be accomplished in each of the services' depots. The DOD depot system has been a key part of the department's plan to support military systems in the past, but the increased use of the private sector to perform this work has decreased the role of these activities. While title 10 of the U.S. code requires DOD to retain core capability and also requires that at least 50 percent of depot maintenance funds be spent for public-sector performance, questions remain about the future role of DOD depots. Absent a DOD depot strategic plan, the services have in varying degrees, laid out a framework for strategic depot planning, but this planning is not comprehensive. Questions also remain about the future of arsenals and ammunition plants. GAO reviewed workforce planning efforts for 22 maintenance depots, 3 arsenals, and 2 ammunition plants, which employed about 72,000 civilian workers in fiscal year 2002. The services have not developed and implemented strategic workforce plans to position the civilian workforce in DOD industrial activities to meet future requirements. While workforce planning is done for each of the industrial activities, generally it is short-term rather than strategic. Further, workforce planning is lacking in other areas that the Office of Personnel Management guidance and high-performing organizations identify as key to successful workforce planning. Service workforce planning efforts (1) usually do not assess the competencies; (2) do not develop comprehensive retention plans; and (3) sometimes do not develop performance measures and evaluate workforce plans. Several challenges adversely affect DOD's workforce planning for the viability of its civilian depot workforce. First, given the aging depot workforce and the retirement eligibility of over 40 percent of the workforce over the next 5 to 7 years, the services may have difficulty maintaining the depots' viability. Second, the services are having difficulty implementing multiskilling--an industry and government best practice for improving the flexibility and productivity of the workforce--even though this technique could help depot planners do more with fewer employees. Finally, increased training funding and innovation in the training program will be essential for revitalizing the aging depot workforce.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The manufacture and support of military weapons involves a vast array  of industrial capability some of which is in the private sector and some  of which is in the public sector. The part in the public sector centers  around 27 key Department of Defense (DOD) industrial facilities, including  22 maintenance depots, 3 arsenals, and 2 government-owned and-operated  ammunition manufacturing plants. The civilian workforce in these  activities was reduced by about 56 percent between 1987 and 2002—from  about 163,000 to about 72,000 employees. The workforce reduction  occurred as a result of downsizing initiatives, the increased use of the  private sector for logistics support activities, and other factors. Because  seniority was a major factor in determining which workers would be  retained and little new hiring has occurred in most of these activities, the  result of downsizing is that more than 7,000 civilian employees, or about  12 percent of the remaining workforce, are currently eligible to retire and  about 43 percent will be eligible to retire by 2009. This has created a  human capital management challenge for DOD. In addition, DOD’s  challenge is exacerbated by the war on terrorism and other critical  military operations while it also is undertaking significant transformation  initiatives and addressing initiatives to further streamline its operations,  including responding to further downsizing mandates.
In recent years, we have emphasized the importance of strategic  planning in DOD for establishing and achieving key mission objectives.  We have also identified specific deficiencies in DOD’s planning for depot  maintenance operations. For example, in October 2001, we reported that  DOD had no overall plan that tied investments in depot maintenance  facilities and equipment with future workloads and, in turn, with human  capital needs. At that time we recommended that DOD, among other  actions, develop a strategic—or long-term—plan for depot maintenance  that addressed human capital needs and the specific actions necessary to  meet them.
This report looks specifically at the strategic workforce planning for the  27 previously mentioned DOD industrial facilities. Concerned about DOD’s  apparent lack of a plan for its depot workforce and the potential  implications of these deficiencies, you asked that we determine    whether DOD has implemented our prior recommendation to develop and  implement strategic plans for depot maintenance;  the extent to which the services have developed and implemented  strategic workforce plans to position the civilian depot workforce to meet  future requirements; and    what challenges adversely affect DOD’s workforce planning for the  long-term viability of its civilian depot workforce.
As part of our work, we reviewed DOD’s and the services’ existing  strategic and other workforce plans for these activities. We visited  18 maintenance depots, three arsenals, and two ammunition  manufacturing plants and obtained data from 4 additional maintenance  depots we did not visit.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: DOD Industrial Activities
paragraphs: DOD owns and operates industrial activities that support the military  mission by repairing; rebuilding; overhauling; and upgrading components,  ammunitions, or end items to return them to a like-new condition or  by manufacturing new systems components or ammunitions. As of  January 2003, and as shown in figure 1, DOD industrial activities included  twenty-two maintenance depots11 in the Navy (three aviation depots,  four shipyards, and four warfare centers—two associated with ship  systems and two associated with engineering analyses and command and  control), 5 in the Army, 4 in the Air Force, and 2 in the Marine Corps;  three Army arsenals that have a manufacturing mission; and  two Army ammunition manufacturing plants that are government-owned  and -operated.
These activities, which are a part of the combined public and private  sector industrial base and are largely staffed by DOD civilians, are  described in appendix II. This appendix also describes the type of work  performed at the activities and the number of DOD civilians employed in  each. The activities generally require extensive shop facilities and  specialized equipment and employ a range of personnel from highly  skilled technicians and engineers to laborers. Figure 2 shows a collection  of maintenance or manufacturing activities performed in some of the  27 industrial activities. In fiscal year 2002, these activities employed about  72,000 civilian employees—about 10 percent of DOD’s civilian workforce.  About 1,200 military personnel are also employed in these activities, with  over half the military assigned to the Pearl Harbor Shipyard and  Intermediate Maintenance Activity, which in 1998 consolidated its depot  and intermediate maintenance work into one activity, bringing together  the largely military workforce employed in the intermediate activity with  the largely civilian population employed in the shipyard. In the other DOD  industrial activities, military personnel are largely in managerial or  supervisory positions. Of the approximately 72,000 civilian employees, the  Army employs about 14,200; the Navy, about 35,500; the Marine Corps,  about 1,300; and the Air Force, about 21,100. Various factors (such as the  downsizing of the U.S. military force structure; increased use of the private  sector for performing support activities; and changes in repair processes,  increasing equipment’s time in the field) have resulted in significant  reductions in the number of personnel working in these facilities. For  example, the number of personnel assigned to DOD maintenance depots  was reduced by about 60 percent between 1987 and 2001—from about  156,000 to about 64,500 workers, while the total amount of maintenance  work was cut in half during that period.
section_title: The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
paragraphs: Improved strategic planning has been a key goal of the federal government  in recent years, with the Government Performance and Results Act of  1993 providing guidance on strategic planning for government activities.  Strategic plans are intended to be the starting point for each agency’s  performance measurement efforts. Each plan is to cover a period of  5 years and must include a comprehensive mission statement, which  discusses, among other things, the agency’s major functions and  operations, a set of outcome-related goals and objectives, and a  description of how the agency intends to achieve these goals and  objectives. We previously reported that high-performing organizations  begin their strategic planning by defining what they want to accomplish  and what kind of organization they want to be. Similarly, agencies  establish their missions, visions for the future, core values, goals and  objectives, and strategies.
section_title: Strategic Workforce Planning
paragraphs: High-performing public organizations have found that strategic planning  and management can address human capital, or workforce, shortfalls.  Strategic workforce planning—planning that focuses on developing  long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining an  organization’s people and for aligning human capital approaches that  are clearly linked to achieving programmatic goals—is a key part of  human capital management. In short, according to a National Academy of  Public Administration guide on building successful organizations, strategic  workforce planning is a systematic process for identifying the human  capital required to meet organizational goals and developing the  strategies to meet these requirements. To help meet organizational goals,  organizations use workforce planninggetting the right people with the  right skills in the right jobs at the right time—that is explicitly linked to the  agency’s overall mission and goals.
While many organizations have developed models for workforce planning,  putting aside variations in terminology, the models generally include the  following steps.
Set strategic direction, including the identification of organizational vision  and objectives at that point in the future on which planning will be based.  This direction should also include human capital goals.  Identify workforce skills and competencies needed to achieve the  objectives. Analyze the present workforce to determine what skills and  competencies are present. Compare the present workforce skills and  competencies to those needed in the future. This step is sometimes  referred to as “gap analysis.”
Develop an action plan to transition from the present workforce to the  future workforce. The action plan should address recruiting, hiring,  training, succession, and retention.  Implement the action plan by developing well-defined objectives, specific  measurable workforce goals, and timetables and milestones; conducting  recruiting and training; and putting retention strategies into practice.
Establish performance measures; periodically evaluate the workforce  action plans, review the mission and objectives to ensure they remain  valid; and make adjustments as required by changes in mission, objectives,  and workforce skills and competencies.
Strategic workforce planning is an iterative process, as demonstrated by  the OPM’s workforce planning model in figure 3.
As a guide to help agencies in their human capital management efforts,  the OPM issued the Human Capital Assessment and Accountability  Framework in November 2002. This document provides standards for  success that include, among other things: (1) strategic alignment,  (2) workforce planning and deployment, and (3) suggested performance  indicators. Criteria provided in other workforce planning models we  reviewed are compatible with the more recent OPM framework.
section_title: DOD Lacks Strategic Planning to Guide Future Planning for Industrial Activities
paragraphs: Although we have previously recommended the development and  implementation of a strategic plan for depot maintenance, DOD does  not yet have a strategic plan to guide the future development of depot  maintenance activities, and questions continue about core capabilities  and future work. While the DOD depot system has been a key part of the  department’s plan to support military systems, the increased use of the  private sector to perform work previously performed by DOD employees  has decreased the role of the services’ depots and raised questions  regarding their future. Title 10 of the U.S. Code provides direction  regarding the role that DOD depots should play in supporting the fighting  forces and in how depot work should be allocated between the public  and private sectors. However, while some action has been taken to begin  formulating a depot strategic plan, DOD does not yet have a strategic plan  for its depot maintenance activities, and it is uncertain when it will be  completed. Absent a comprehensive DOD plan, the services have in  varying degrees initiated a strategic depot planning effort. Generally,  however, the service versions do not identify what work will be performed  in the service depots in the future, and it is uncertain whether these  activities will continue to be viable as the systems they support age and  are phased out of the inventory.
subsections: section_title: Legislation Provides Direction Regarding the Continued Performance of Depot Maintenance in DOD Activities
paragraphs: Although legislation requires the continued performance of some key  industrial activities—core capabilities—in government-owned facilities  and by government personnel and specifies that not more than 50 percent  of funds spent for depot maintenance may be spent for work performed  by the private sector, DOD has in recent years increasingly relied on the  private sector for the performance of various logistics activities, including  depot maintenance. In the past, the department requested repeal of  legislative provisions that influenced the continued use of DOD facilities  and personnel performing depot maintenance activities and recently again  considered proposing the repeal in order to gain flexibility for its business  decisions. However, the identification and acquisition of future core  capabilities are key to strategic depot planning.
Section 2464 of title 10 requires the Secretary of Defense to identify and  maintain a core logistics capability. Under that provision, the core logistics  capability is to be owned and operated by the government to ensure the  existence of a ready and controlled source of technical competence and  resources so that the military can effectively and timely respond to  mobilization, national defense emergencies, and contingencies. The core  capabilities are to include those necessary to maintain and repair the  weapon systems and military equipment that the Secretary, in consultation  with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, identifies as necessary to  meet the nation’s military needs. Furthermore, the Secretary is to identify  the workloads required to maintain those core capabilities and to require  their performance in government facilities. Finally, the Secretary is to  assign these facilities sufficient workloads to ensure peacetime cost  efficiency, technical competencies, surge capacity, and reconstitution  capabilities to support military strategic and contingency plans.  Nonetheless, the concept of core capabilities is not precise and has been  controversial. We have previously reported that the department’s  implementation of the core statute is not comprehensive and that the  policy and implementing procedures and practices provide little assurance  that core maintenance capabilities are being developed as needed to  support future national defense emergencies and contingencies. In  response to our report, DOD has revised its core policy to improve the  department’s guidance to the military services regarding how core  capability requirements should be developed. Although this guidance has  been issued, questions remain about the guidance and the services are not  accomplishing key analyses to identify essential core capabilities.
In addition, 10 U.S.C. 2466 specifies that no more than 50 percent of the  funds made available for depot maintenance may be spent for private  sector performance, unless the requirement is waived for a particular  fiscal year. This sets aside 50 percent of the funding for public-sector  performance of these workloads. In recent years, our mandated reviews  of the allocation of depot maintenance work between the public and  private sector with regard to the 50 percent funding rule have found  that increasing amounts of the service’s depot work was going to the  private sector. For example, during fiscal 2001 and 2002, the Air Force  exceeded the 50 percent limit and waived the requirement; we could not  determine with precision whether the Army was in compliance with the  50 percent provision.
Because DOD implemented an acquisition policy that called on the private  sector for life-cycle logistics support of its weapons systems, during the  1990s most new weapon system programs called for using private-sector  maintenance providers, with depot repair of few new programs going to  military depots. With some increased visibility and awareness of the 50-50  and core provisions, DOD has recognized the need to revitalize the depots.  DOD guidance supports the use of public-private partnerships. In some of  these partnerships, private-sector logistics providers subcontract with  military depots for some depot maintenance work. We recently reported  that public-private partnerships comprise only about 2 percent of DOD’s  depot maintenance work, and while the department plans to significantly  increase the use of such partnerships, there are some challenges that  must be overcome if the department’s planned expansion of partnerships  is to be realized. It is uncertain the extent to which public-private depot  maintenance partnerships will result in contractor personnel replacing  DOD civilian personnel in depots. However, because the 50-50 guidance  provides that the funds for some depot partnerships are not counted when  applying the 50 percent limitation, partnership work could be a vehicle for  transferring significant amounts of maintenance to the private sector  without exceeding the 50 percent limitation.
DOD recently considered proposing changes to title 10 depot  maintenance provisions. A legislative proposal that was associated  with the department’s transformation agenda suggested repealing six  sections that impose limitations on the management of depot-level  maintenance and repair by requiring certain amounts of work to be  performed in public depots. According to the proposed repeal, these  limitations reduce the flexibility necessary for the department to make  proper and efficient business decisions in determining the source for  depot-level maintenance and repair. Although DOD decided not to submit  this proposed repeal at this time, similar language could be proposed in  the future.
section_title: DOD Still Has No Strategic Depot Maintenance Plan and the Future of the Depots Is Uncertain
paragraphs: We previously recognized the importance of the depot maintenance  mission, noted that it is unclear what future role is planned for the military  depots in supporting DOD’s military mission, and recommended that the  department develop a strategic plan for the military depots. However,  while DOD has initiated some action toward developing a depot strategic  plan, the department still has no depot strategic plan and the future of  these activities is uncertain.
Thus, DOD continues to manage its depots on an ad hoc basis  without clearly defining their role for the future and the capabilities  that are required to assure the continued performance of that role. The  implications for the future are uncertain. In short, as we have reported,  the future capability for performing work in the military depot  maintenance facilities is questionable because no overall plan exists that  ties investments in depot maintenance facilities and plant equipment with  future workloads and, in turn, with human capital needs. Furthermore,  no other department plan provides required direction to shape the future  of these facilities and their workforce. Without strategic planning that  identifies which capabilities these activities will need to provide in the  future, there is no assurance they will be able to support future readiness  requirements as they have in the past. For example, DOD’s latest logistics  strategic plan, which was developed in August 1999, neither mentioned  maintenance nor the large infrastructure and cadre of personnel required  to operate and support the DOD maintenance depots. This occurred even  though maintenance is an important logistics activity that is essential for  keeping complex weapon systems ready to perform even though about  half the department’s depot maintenance work is currently performed in  military depots.
Under the Government Performance and Results Act, federal agencies  are required to develop strategic plans that include mission statements,  strategic goals and objectives, and describe how the agencies intend to  achieve their goals and objectives through their activities, human capital,  information, and other resources. Depot officials said it is difficult to  develop a depot strategic plan with so many uncertainties about how the  military depots will be used in the future. This is particularly true in  light of the support initiatives implemented in recent years to contract  out to the private sector most logistics support activities, including depot  maintenance, for new and upgraded systems and also in light of the base  realignment and closure process that is planned for 2005. These initiatives  indicate that the role of military depots could be further reduced in the  future. But how much it will be reduced is not clear. However, as long as  title 10 requirements remain, DOD will be limited in the extent to which it  can reduce the amount of work performed in DOD depot repair activities.
section_title: Absent DOD Direction, the Military Services’ Efforts to Develop Strategic Plans Vary, but Generally Are Weak in Defining Future Work
paragraphs: Without benefit of a departmentwide strategic depot plan that clarifies the  future role of military depots, the military services to varying degrees have  provided a prospective for future depot management, with that of the Air  Force and the Navy shipyards being the most mature. However, by and  large, the vision provided is based on short-term workload projections— 1 to 2 years beyond the current year—and does not provide the strategic  long-term look that is needed to guide future workforce decision making.
subsections: section_title: Army
paragraphs: The Army does not have a current strategic depot plan, and its outdated  plan was not comprehensive. According to Army planners, although the  Army had a Depot Maintenance Enterprise Strategic Plan, the plan was  suspended pending reassessment of depot capabilities and requirements  as part of an ongoing study of depot proliferation. Further, while the  suspended plan was intended to provide mission and vision statements, it  was generally oriented toward improving depot business operations and  it was not a comprehensive plan that provided a basis for guiding future  depot planning.
Although not specifically addressed in the plan, in recent years, work  assigned to the Army depots has greatly declined as have the workforces  assigned to the depots. We reported in November of 1998, however, that  the Army did not have a sound basis for identifying the number of  positions to be eliminated from its depots. This was particularly the  case in determining the number of direct labor personnel needed to  support depot workload requirements. To address this problem, the  Army implemented the Army Workload and Performance System to  correlate workload and funding requirements with the depot workforce.  Nonetheless, this system does not provide the visibility of new systems,  modernization programs, and upgrades that will have depot work that  could be assigned to the depots.
Depot planners said they have little assurance that new systems will be  brought in, as the older systems they currently work on are phased out  of the inventory. Recently, ownership of Army depots has shifted to  subordinate commands of the Army Materiel Command that are  responsible for the sustainment of Army systems. It was hoped that this  change would increase the commands’ use of the depots and better  integrate depot work into the overall command mission performance,  but it is too soon to know if this will be successful. The subordinate  commands such as the Tank-automotive and Armaments Command  and Aviation and Missile Command, which are responsible for making  decisions about how support work will be allocated between the public  and private sectors, were also responsible for decisions that moved  responsibility for much of the work that used to be performed by the  depots to the private sector. These actions were based on new acquisition  guidance encouraging the use of contractor support.
The Army’s suspended depot strategic plan identified five issues, one of  which relates to depot workforce planning by keying in on the capability  of the depot workforce to meet future requirements. The plan’s goal for  this strategic issue was “to ensure a sustainable, multi-skilled workforce  that is capable of meeting future depot maintenance requirements;” and  the plan identified implementation objectives and measurable criteria.  Nonetheless, as previously noted, it is unclear what the depots’ future  work will be. Therefore, as older systems are phased out of the inventory,  it is unclear what, if any, new work will be phased in. This was not  addressed in the suspended plan.
The arsenals and manufacturing ammunition plants have strategic plans  or draft plans providing a mission, vision statements, and goals for the  organizations. However, it is unclear whether the extent that the vision  these activities have for themselves is the same as the one that Army  headquarters and the parent commands have for these organizations.  Neither the Army nor most of the parent commands have officially  published strategic plans that identify the vision and objectives for these  activities. Most arsenals’ workload and corresponding workforce have  been declining for years. The arsenals generally project workload and  corresponding workforce requirements primarily by consulting customers  and prospective customers regarding their future workload for the  arsenals. Arsenal officials said that this methodology provides a  reasonable workload projection for only 2 years. Further, some of the  work that is done in the arsenals is not the type of manufacturing work the  arsenals used to perform. For example, instead of manufacturing large  artillery systems, more than 40 percent of workload performed in the  Rock Island arsenal is manufacturing and assembling tool kits—ranging  from carrying-case sized sets to fully equipped maintenance shelters.  A recent Rand study proposed privatizing the arsenals, but it is unclear to  what extent the Army will pursue this strategy in the future.
The ammunition plants have a fluctuating workload, sometimes increasing  and sometimes declining. The work at two government-owned and  government-operated ammunition plants has declined in the past years,  but it is now increasing. The McAlester, Oklahoma, ammunition plant, for  example, will hire more than 200 new employees in fiscal year 2003,  primarily because the bomb production workload has increased.  According to ammunition plant managers, they are generally aware of  their workload from less than 1 year to 2 years in advance.
section_title: Navy
paragraphs: The Navy does not have an overall strategic plan that covers all  Navy depot maintenance activities, but the naval shipyard and aviation  communities each have strategic planning efforts.
The Navy’s plan for shipyards, called the Naval Shipyard Business Plan for  Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005, has the essential elements of a strategic plan. It  is aligned to the Naval Sea Systems Command’s corporate strategy. The  plan communicates the purpose and direction for naval shipyards and  focuses on ship maintenance, workload performance, and associated  improvement initiatives, including making investments in training, skills,  and facilities necessary through 2005. It includes workload information  from fiscal year 2001 to 2010. The plan has a strategic workforce goal for  the naval shipyard workforce to have the skills and flexibility required to  meet the demands of the future workload and business environment.
The naval shipyard plan describes the relationship of the naval shipyards,  which comprise the public sector’s share of the ship industrial base, to  the overall industrial basethe total force. According to the plan, the  shipyards must have a workforce that is capable of doing all the work.  However, Navy officials said that, in reality, with regard to the ship  repair business, the public sector and private sector personnel are  complementary and personnel from both sectors are now used to support  work that is primarily the responsibility of a shipyard from the other  sector. This strategic planning approach would appear to drive workforce  planning that is also complementary, but the shipyard business plan does  not discuss private sector shipyard personnel.
The naval aviation community published its Depot Maintenance Strategic  Plan in December 2002. This document is not a complete plan, but it  provides the framework for general doctrinal policies and principles that  will provide the future direction of naval aviation maintenance. It defines  four strategic goals for the depot system: (1) maximize the ability to  favorably impact war fighter readiness and safety, (2) reduce the war  fighters’ total cost of ownership, (3) fully integrate depot maintenance into  total life-cycle logistics management, and (4) become the knowledge base  for naval aviation depot maintenance. The plan does not identify the  workload and a workforce capability expected to be required at individual  depots but does reveal that airframe work and modification work will  be reduced and component rework and in-service engineering and  logistics support work increased. The plan indicates that public-private  partnerships will be pursued and are expected to be a significant share  of the Navy depot maintenance business. According to Naval Aviation  Systems Command officials, the strategic plan is the first of several  documents that will be produced, with a depot business plan and  comprehensive depot human resources plan to follow. The plan also noted  that changes in title 10 legislation could be needed to implement the plan.
Strategic planning for the naval warfare centers is done for an entire  center and includes the depot maintenance function. Depot maintenance  is not the primary function of the centers but is integrated within several  departments’ operations and is not centrally managed. For example, depot  maintenance at the Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Division supports  engineering efforts within three departments and is not centrally managed;  rather each department manages the depot operations. Strategic planning  does not specifically address depot operations but includes workforce  goals for the center, which includes depot workers.
The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command has depot operations  located at two centers but depot maintenance is not the primary function  of the centers. Each center has a strategic plan that includes depot  operations. Depot operations are managed at the division levels in the  centers, which provide engineering support for various systems. The  divisions have strategic plans that include workforce goals, which include  depot workers. The two centers’ depot operations are not structured like  other Navy depots and shipyards, where certain types of repairs are  directed. Instead, they compete with other depots and repair activities  for work.
section_title: Marine Corps
paragraphs: The Marine Corps does not yet have an approved strategic plan to guide  actions to hire, develop, and retain the depot workforce of the future.  However, efforts are under way to improve strategic planning at the  Headquarters and at the Materiel Command, which is responsible for  identifying depot maintenance requirements and the amounts and types of  workload for the depots.
Headquarters Marine Corps has a draft plan, Depot Level Maintenance  Strategic Plan, that contains mission and vision statements and  three related goals for improving the support of weapon systems and  equipment at the depot level. This draft plan does not identify the Marine  Corps organizations or offices responsible for implementing or monitoring  the plan. According to a Headquarters Marine Corps official, no schedule  has been established for the plan to be reviewed, approved, and issued.
The Materiel Command’s draft strategic plan for fiscal years 2003 through  2008 contains mission and vision statements and six goals to improve  materiel life cycle management of weapon systems and equipment at the  depot level, but it is not depot specific. Command officials said that the  plan, when finalized, would have metrics to evaluate implementation but  is on hold pending decisions regarding the reorganization of the Materiel  Command. As of February 2003, the command had no schedule for  finalizing the plan. Logistics Bases, a subordinate command of Materiel  Command, which owns the depots, published its first strategic plan  about 2 years ago. Its current plan is not depot specific and is mostly  business-process oriented, with only one of its six broad goals focused on  workforce issues. Although the plan has mission and vision statements,  Logistics Bases officials acknowledged that planning efforts do not yet  address all the elements of workforce planning suggested by OPM and  GAO because the command did not yet have the data it needed (such  as attrition rates, retirement trends, and skill gaps) for these analyses.  Officials of Logistics Bases also said the command has recently contracted  for data collection and analysis on depot workforce and equipment  activities that would provide a baseline for future strategic planning.  Further, officials said they plan to use metrics to implement the plan and  evaluate the results.
section_title: Air Force
paragraphs: The Air Force is the most progressive in its depot maintenance strategic  planning. In August 2002, the Air Force issued a Depot Maintenance  Strategy and a Depot Maintenance Master Plan covering fiscal years  2004-2020. These plans provide a roadmap designed to ensure the  continuing viability of Air Force’s three military depots to meet the war- fighter mission needs. However, the plans did not include the Aerospace  Maintenance and Regeneration Center. The plans are intended to posture  the Air Force’s three other depots to support both new weapons systems  and new technologies entering the inventory, as well as its aging systems.  They have a workforce component, which calls for new and younger  workers to be acquired and trained prior to the loss of the highly skilled  workers who are nearing retirement to leverage their knowledge and  skills. In addition, the Air Force plans call for an increased capital  investment of approximately $150 million per year over the next 6 fiscal  years, starting in fiscal year 2004, to modernize the Air Force depots.
However, key financial elements of the strategy and plan have changed  somewhat since the issuance of the strategic and master plans. Most  significantly, future capital investment plans, operational improvements,  and workforce enhancements are still evolving and uncertain. For  example, according to our analysis, funds for replacing and modernizing  equipment used to accomplish current workloads are less than projected;  funding amounts and sources for acquiring new capabilities to be provided  by weapon system acquisition programs and the private sector are  lagging and uncertain; and funding is not sufficient to implement  initiatives to improve depot operations and financial systems and for  workforce enhancements.
section_title: Services’ Efforts to Develop Industrial Workforce Plans Vary and Generally Lack Some Key Planning Elements
paragraphs: Strategic workforce planning is intended to focus on developing, by its  definition, long-term human capital strategies that are linked to achieving  key programmatic goals. Strategic workforce planning requires a strategic  plan, and as previously discussed, DOD still has not developed a depot  strategic plan. Thus, the services generally do not perform strategic  workforce planning that is tied to meaningful long-term visions, objectives,  and strategic goals for their services’ military roles and missions. However,  in varying degrees, each of the services performs short-term depot  workforce planning that is tied to the budget preparation process. The  services’ existing short-term workforce plans usually do not assess the  workforce competencies needed to address future skill gaps, do not  have comprehensive retention plans, and sometimes lack performance  measures to evaluate the plansall areas identified as key to successful  workforce planning.
subsections: section_title: Service Depot Workforce Planning Is Largely Short-Term
paragraphs: Each of the services performs short-term workforce planning that is tied  to the budget process. While largely not strategic in nature, the services  perform most aspects of workforce planning, which in varying degrees  address some elements of workforce planning identified by the OPM and  high-performance organizations. Appendix III provides a synopsis of the  services’ short-term depot workforce planning efforts.
subsections: section_title: Army
paragraphs: The Army Materiel Command and its subordinate commands are  responsible for determining the work for the Army’s five maintenance  depots. Semiannually, they hold workload conferences to review, analyze,  document, and assign work to the depots. Once workload is assigned,  the depots determine the number of employees needed to support the  workload, including (1) direct labor workers who charge time to finite  job taskings; (2) indirect workers, such as shop supervisors and parts  expediters, whose time supports the overall depot maintenance process  rather than finite jobs; and (3) general and administrative overhead  personnel such as production managers, technical specialists, financial  managers, personnel officers, logisticians, contracting officers, computer  programmers, and computer operators. Determining personnel  requirements is an iterative process that begins with the depots and  subordinate commands. The commands use the Army Workload and  Performance System to identify projected workload and the future  staffing requirements based on year-to-year workload changes, known  organizational adjustments, efficiencies such as the Quadrennial Defense  Review, and most efficient organization studies. After agreement is  reached, the proposed staffing levels, which are included in the  consolidated depot budgets, are forwarded for review up the chain of  command. These commands can revise the levels initially requested  based on past performance and other evolving workload and staffing  information. Once the staffing levels are approved, the depots establish  plans and take actions to size and reshape the workforce to support  workload. These actions, in keeping with workforce planning, include  identifying what skills may be lacking to support the workload and  developing hiring plans to recruit new workers; training plans for new and  existing workers to develop and enhance critically needed skills; or, if  staffing levels are low, measures to accomplish the assigned workload  such as increased use of overtime. These plans could also include  reducing the number of depot workers, if the projected work does not  support the number of workers.
Although each of the three arsenals determine their future workload and  estimate future workforce requirements somewhat differently, the  arsenals generally accomplish the task by (1) examining the currently  funded work, (2) requesting customers and prospective customers to  predict their workload for the arsenals for the next 2 to 3 years and  estimating the labor hours and skills to provide the predicted  products, (3) examining historical trends such as unexpected orders  received, (4) discussing workload with their parent organizations, and  (5) developing their workload and workforce requirements. The projected  workload and workforce requirements are reviewed and approved at the  parent organizations using a predictive staffing model to validate the  arsenals’ computations. Most arsenals estimate the workload and  workforce requirements for 2 to 3 years in advance, and officials said their  estimates for this time period are generally fairly accurate. The Watervliet  Arsenal in New York estimates its workload for 6 years in advance, but  officials acknowledged that estimates beyond 3 years are subject to  change. However, they believe estimates are generally reliable.
The Army’s two ammunition manufacturing plants’ workload generally  comes from their parent organization—the Joint Munitions Command  (formerly Operations Support Command)based on customer orders.
The orders may come from other services or from commercial  organizations, but the orders are placed through the parent organization.  A predictive staffing model is used to determine the workforce  requirements. Firm orders are usually placed no more than 1 year in  advance, and the plants’ workloads are generally known from less than  1 year to 2 years in advance.
section_title: Naval Aviation Depots
paragraphs: The Naval Air Systems Command distributes the annual and future  (2 years) industrial-based workload to the three naval aviation depots.  Once the depots receive the workload, they use historical workload data  and staffing models to determine the civilian manpower requirements  needed to accomplish the assigned workload. The staffing models break  the total workload into the number of workers needed in each shop and  the related trade skills required. These models include historical factors  such as direct labor personnel, leave, and overtime percentages. The  depots then develop the workforce requirements for the aircraft, engines,  and component programs. Once the requirements are developed, the  depots also prepare plans that include the specific skills, numbers, and  types of workers needed in each production shop. These plans are used to  establish hiring, training, and recruitment efforts at the depots. After the  depots establish the workforce requirements, they are forwarded for  review and approval to the Naval Air Systems Command.
section_title: Naval Shipyards
paragraphs: The Naval Sea Systems Command distributes the workload to the four  shipyards that determine the workforce requirements to accomplish the  planned work. The Naval Sea Systems Command provides the shipyards  with depot maintenance workload for at least 6 years. The shipyards’  workload is predetermined from legislation, the availability of ships,  depot-level maintenance requirements, and the budget. The primary tool  the Naval Sea Systems Command and shipyards use to forecast workloads  and workforces for budgeting and planning purposes is the Workload  and Resource Report, which includes data on the current year and  2 subsequent years. Each shipyard is provided its assigned workload  schedules so they can develop their workload and resource reports for the  workforces of each production shop. As part of the shipyards’ processes  for determining the workforce and skills to efficiently execute the  workload, each shipyard uses a resource allocation process. The resource  allocation process determines the right number of workers with the right  skills to efficiently execute the workload. Also, the shipyards’ production  shops implement hiring and training plans and skills assessments to  support critical skills that are determined to be necessary for  successful execution of ship maintenance. After the shipyards’ workforce  requirements are determined, they are forwarded for approval to the Naval  Sea Systems Command and included in the command’s budget.
The Naval Sea Systems Command also has two warfare centers. Depot  operations at both centers receive annual projected workload allocations  from their prospective customers. The centers use the annual budget  workload forecasts and knowledge of program’s future plans to determine  the civilian workforce requirements. Also, civilian workforce requirements  are based on workforce demographics such as attrition and retirements.  The workload allocations combined with changes in the civilian workforce  demographics provide hiring and training requirements for the centers.  The civilian workforce requirements for the depot operations are  forwarded through the centers for approval and review up the chain  of command.
section_title: Space and Naval Warfare Systems Centers
paragraphs: The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command has two depot  maintenance activities that are not structured like the other naval depots  and shipyards, where certain types of repairs are directed. Rather, these  centers compete with other depots and repair activities for their workload.  The depot operations’ workforce allocations are directly dependent on the  annual workloads they solicit and maintain from customers such as the  Naval Inventory Control Point, other services, and naval commands. Depot  operations at the centers receive annual workload information from their  perspective customers, which are used to develop civilian workforce  requirements. Hiring and training plans are developed according to the  annual civilian depot workforce requirements. The centers’ depot  workforce requirements are forwarded through the centers for approval  and review up the chain of command.
section_title: Marine Corps
paragraphs: The Logistics Bases, a subordinate command of the Marine Corps Materiel  Command, is responsible for identifying depot maintenance requirements  and workloading at the Marine Corps’ two maintenance depots. Annually,  once depot maintenance requirements and related funding are identified,  the two centers begin the process for determining the total number of  workers to support the workload—including direct labor and indirect  labor workers. The centers send their staffing requests back up the chain  of command for review and approval. Revisions to staffing requests can  occur as a result of the centers past performance, other evolving workload  information, and staffing information. Once the centers have an approved  staffing level, they establish plans and take actions to size and reshape the  workforce to support workload. Such actions include, among others,  identifying skills needed to support the workload; developing hiring plans  to recruit new workers and training plans for new and existing workers  to develop and enhance critically needed skills; or if staffing levels are  reduced, identifying measures to accomplish the assigned workload such  as increased use of overtime; or, if necessary, reducing the number of  depot workers.
section_title: Air Force
paragraphs: In early 2000, the Air Force Materiel Command, which has management  and oversight responsibility for the four Air Force maintenance depots,  developed and institutionalized workforce shaping processes to assist  depot managers in planning and achieving their overall workforce  objective. That objective is to obtain by fiscal year 2005 a trained,  flexible workforce of sufficient size with the appropriate mix of skills  and expertise to accomplish the depot mission. A key aspect of the  command’s workforce planning process is the development of accession  or hiring/appointment data. The command requires the depots to provide  annual accession data in order to determine the number of potential  vacancies by job series that each center is likely to experience in the  current and the next 5 fiscal years. The command, in turn, applies a  probability loss model to produce out-year accession numbers using  attrition and retirement rates and other loss data, such as separations  and deaths, for each depot by occupational job series. The final accession  numbers basically become the depots “hiring plan.”
According to depot officials at each center we visited, change in the  mission workloads is just one of many factors used in computing future  accession requirements. They further stated that as a general rule,  projected accessions are based primarily on current workloads and  attrition rates rather than on future workload estimates. According to  these officials, because the Air Force depot maintenance strategic plan  does not identify new work to be performed in the depots, they cannot  predict with a high level of confidence what their expected workload  volumes will be more than 2 or 3 years out. Depot officials told us that  their projected accession numbers beyond 2 or 3 years are their best  guess. In addition, the depots annually conduct a bottoms-up workforce  review to ensure that their civilian workforce is the right size and aligned  to meet identified workload requirements. If properly done, the workforce  planning process provides management with the needed data to make  sound workforce decisions from implementing effective recruitment and  retention programs, to developing valuable training programs, and to  arranging for successful accession management.
section_title: Some Depot Workforce Planning Efforts Lack Competency Assessments, Comprehensive Retention Plans, and Evaluative Performance Measures
paragraphs: Depot workforce planning, as done by the services’ depots, generally  does not address elements of three steps identified by OPM and  high-performing organizations as key to effective workforce planning:  (1) the assessment of competencies needed to address skill gaps;  (2) the development of comprehensive retention plans; and (3) the  implementation of performance measures to evaluate the success of the  workforce plans. Table 1 provides an assessment of the status of service  depots’ short-term workforce planning efforts in nine key areas of the  five steps in strategic workforce planning. (See also appendix III.)
Although one Naval Undersea Warfare Center and the Air Force’s  Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center assessed competencies,  most depots have not assessed the competencies—a set of behaviors that  encompass skill, knowledge, abilities, and personal attributes that are  critical to successful work accomplishment; competencies can identify  where gaps exist in the skills of the current depot workforce relative to  those needed in the future.
As shown in table 1, most depot officials did not usually separately assess  competencies for depot workers, relying instead on job skills, series, or  classifications. Workforce planning models, however, suggest that the  assessment of competencies provides more than is discussed in position  descriptions. A survey of several top-performing organizations suggests  that a better approach is to conduct an actual assessment of employees’  competency levels. An actual assessment will provide much more useful  information for determining the number of those available and capable of  fulfilling future functional requirements. It can also give good information  as to what recruitment, training, and other strategies will be needed to  address workforce gaps and surpluses.
Workforce planning models point out the need for identifying  competencies. For example, the required competencies identified for  GAO analysts include, among others, thinking critically, improving  professional competence, achieving results, collaborating with others,  and facilitating and implementing change. According to the state of  Washington’s Workforce Planning Guide, competencies provide  management and staff with a common understanding of the skills and  behaviors that are important to the organization and the accomplishment  of its mission.
Although most depots did not assess competencies separately for their  depot workers, a couple of depots did competency assessments, with one  depot doing competency assessments for its entire workforce and one  doing an assessment for only a segment of its workforce. The Naval  Undersea Warfare Center identified the following competencies in its  assessment: innovative thinking, situational leadership, managing a diverse  workforce, conflict management, interpersonal/team skills, technical  competence, problem solving, and oral and written communications.  According to warfare center personnel, these attributes are critical to the  successful achievement of its mission and goals.
Additionally, the Air Force’s Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration  Center developed a supervisor’s needs assessment that identified  supervisor competencies. They included integrity, communication,  listening, empowering others, accepting responsibility, planning, being  a team player, dependability, consistency, fairness, and effective  prioritization. These competencies resulted in the development of a  core-training curriculum for supervisors.
subsections: section_title: Services Lack Comprehensive Retention Plans
paragraphs: Although all of the services had some retention strategies to ensure  continuity of leadership and for keeping high performing and highly skilled  personnel, none have comprehensive retention plans to further enhance  these strategies.
According to OPM, an important principle behind maintaining a quality  workforce is employee retention. A critical analysis of workforce trends  is essential to determine what factors most affect retention. Current  workforce research has identified the following factors as being critical  to enhancing the retention necessary for the construction of a high  performance organization: diversity, career development and  advancement, work life balance, recognition, employee benefits,  and performance. Furthermore, OPM’s 5-Step Workforce Planning  Model states that a comprehensive retention plan should     determine those employees who are critical to accomplishment of    develop a means to provide constant feedback between these critical  employees, and supervisors/managers to determine what they want and  need to become long-term assets of the organization, and    develop a means of providing incentives and/or working conditions  designed to retain valued employees.
Most activities we evaluated had developed a means of providing  incentives designed to retain valued employees. However, only the Air  Force identified a separate list of occupations critical to accomplishment  of organizational goals, with most depots reporting that every employee  was critical. Overall, the Naval Undersea Warfare Center and Navy  shipyards were further along in developing their retention plans.
The Naval Undersea Warfare Center at Keyport, Washington, developed  a personnel retention program that includes its depot workforce,  concentrating on (1) work and job design, (2) career progression,  (3) awards and compensation, and (4) quality of life. The center  developed the retention program to make the center a great place to  work. For example, the center has reinstituted new hire briefings,  developed an employee handbook, and initiated an improvement award  program to provide incentives to employees to submit new ideas for  process improvement.
The Navy’s shipyard retention strategies focus on bonuses, helper-to- worker programs, recognition programs, employment development and  career opportunities, and leadership training. For example, the shipyards’  helper-to-worker programs include, among other things, academics and  trade theory training. Also, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard has used retention  incentives to pay up to 25 percent of salary to retain approximately  30 employees who possessed engineering and technical knowledge that  was critical to the shipyard’s success. Meanwhile, an Air Force depot lost  8 of 12 workers in a shop because the highly skilled software engineers  were disgruntled over not being able to get higher pay, even though their  skills were critical, required years to acquire, and were and are not  widely available.
section_title: Some Service Depots Lacked Performance Measures for Evaluating Workforce Plans
paragraphs: Although workforce planning models emphasize the need for establishing  performance measures to provide a basis for evaluating workforce  planning effectiveness, the workforce plans of some service depots did not  have this element.
The Government Performance and Results Act stresses the need for  establishing and using performance measures. Additionally, OPM’s 5-Step  Workforce Planning Model as well as some state and federal agencies  stress the importance of measuring the effectiveness of workforce  action plans as an element of effective workforce planning. Measuring  performance allows organizations to track the progress they are making  toward their goals and gives managers crucial information on which  to base their organizational and management decisions. Leading  organizations recognize that performance measures can create powerful  incentives to influence organizational and individual behavior. According  to the workforce planning guide of one high performance organization,  leaders should regularly review performance measurement information,  assess what is working and not working, and make needed adjustments to  the plan and strategies.
The Air Force depots and the naval shipyard communities did establish  measures for evaluating the effectiveness of their workforce planning  efforts. In April 2001, the Air Force Materiel Command issued a command  wide Human Resources Strategic Plan that addressed critical workforce  issues for depot maintenance workers as well as all other materiel  command personnel. The plan contained, among other things,  performance measures and milestones for each human-resource enabling  task. For example, it identified various performance measures for the  task “Develop and Implement Methods to Attract and Recruit High-quality  Employees.” They included, among others, determining whether  milestones had been completed on time and whether appropriate  actions had been taken after analysis of data from new employees’  entrance surveys.
The Naval Sea Systems Command also developed performance measures  for evaluating the effectiveness of workforce plans for Navy shipyard  personnel. Performance measures for the Navy’s shipyards include, among  others, measuring the success of the hiring process by comparing actual to  planned hires. Also, shipyards track the average age to determine whether  the effect of workforce plans is lowering the average age of the overall  shipyards’ workforce. Furthermore, evaluations of shipyards’ training  plans include post training evaluations and review of the budgeted training  funds expended.
Some Army depots and arsenals and one naval depot have not established  performance measures for evaluating the effectiveness of workforce  plans. Army and Navy officials said they did not develop such performance  measures because their focus was on various business metrics that  assessed the cost, schedule, and performance of their depot operations.  However, while those metrics provide details about depot operations and  worker productivity, they provide little insight into the progress being  made toward achieving workforce goals and objectives.
Performance measures are an important element of workforce planning.  Without establishing and using performance measures, managers will  likely not be able either to evaluate the progress made toward the  attainment of workforce planning goals relative to recruiting, hiring,  training, retention, and succession or to measure the workforce’s  contribution toward achieving programmatic goals.
section_title: A Number of Challenges Inhibit Effective Strategic Workforce Planning
paragraphs: The services’ depots face a number of challenges that adversely affect  DOD’s strategic workforce planning for the viability of its civilian  workforce. First, the services may have difficulty maintaining the depots’  long-term viability by replacing up to 31,000 skilled depot workers, if these  workers retire when they are eligible by 2009. Second, the services are  having difficulty implementing multiskilling—having one worker capable  of performing more than one skill, or trade, in the depot—which has been  shown to improve worker efficiency and productivity and could help the  depots do more with less. The Navy and the Air Force have attempted  to implement multiskilling but are having difficulty because additional  compensation or other financial incentives have not been approved or  are not available. Lastly, the need for increased training funding and  innovation for workers who replace the large number of potential retirees  will also pose a challenge. The Air Force is already facing unfunded  training costs for its depot workers.
subsections: section_title: Difficulty Maintaining Depot Viability if Large Numbers of Eligible Skilled Workers Retire
paragraphs: As a result of depot downsizing, the DOD civilian depot workforce has  about 31,000 personnel eligible to retire over the next 5 to 7 years. This  creates a challenge for the depots in retaining their viability, assisting  service readiness, and revitalizing their workforces.
Table 2 provides age and retirement eligibility information for the  27 DOD industrial facilities. The average age ranges from 44 in the  McAlester, Oklahoma, ammunition plant and 45 in three naval shipyards  (where officials have actively worked to lower the average age), to 52 in  the San Diego Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center and the Air  Force’s Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center. In Army  maintenance depots, where the average age is 49, depot officials said it is  difficult to bring down the average age because there are not many new  hires and some of those hired tend to be older employees.
As table 2 shows, about 7,600 employees in these activities—about  12 percent of the total workforce—were eligible to retire in fiscal year  2002. However, depot officials told us they cannot hire replacement  workers until the vacancies occur. Given that years of experience are  required to get the average worker to a journeyman level, these officials  are concerned about the impact on depot operations of trying to replace  large numbers of workers during a short time period. This situation will be  aggravated during the next few years as the number of workers eligible to  retire increases significantly. For example, the percent eligible to retire by  fiscal year 2007 ranges from a low of 22 in one Army depot and 24 in one  naval aviation depot to a high of 65 percent at one Air Force depot and  58 at one Army depot. In 2009, 77 percent of the workers will be eligible  to retire at one Air Force depot, 72 percent at one Army depot, and  64 percent in one Marine Corps depot.
Air Force officials said they expect to hire 13,000 depot workers by  September 2009 to replace retiring workers. They expect to encounter  difficulties during that process, similar to those they experienced when  they hired approximately 4,500 workers during the last 2 years (primarily  as a result of Base Realignment and Closures and transfers). Those  difficulties included the following:    engineering positions were particularly difficult to fill, and the use of  pay incentives to increase salary levels of engineers and other hard-to-fill  positions was essential;    some qualified and desirable potential employees went elsewhere because  the hiring process took too long;    new hires were not “shop ready” when they come in the door and needed    more supervisors are needed to manage the new workers.
According to officials at the Air Force’s Directorate of Maintenance,  Ogden Air Logistics Center, workers in one software engineering shop  became discouraged at not getting additional pay and 8 out of 12 quit and  went to work for a local contractor. Unable to fill these highly skilled  positions or otherwise get the work accomplished in the depot, the depot  hired the contractor to do the work formerly done in the depot at a  considerably higher cost than was incurred when the work was done in  the depot.
Army officials noted that a higher average age does not necessarily equate  to high retirement eligibility. For example, workers at the Corpus Christi  depot have an average age of 49, but the number of workers eligible to  retire by 2009 is 27 percent—the lowest of any depot. According to  Corpus Christi depot officials, during the mid-1980s they hired about  1,700 workers in their mid-30s, many of which were ex-military.  Additionally, Army officials noted that many depot workers continue to  work after they are eligible to retire. Nonetheless, Army depot officials  recognize that with about 52 percent of the depot workforce eligible to  retire by 2009, it will be difficult to maintain a viable, trained workforce  if the retirement eligible employees choose to retire over a short period  of time.
We analyzed Army retirement eligibility data for the Army depot  workforce and observed that some work centers could lose a majority  of their staff within the next 5 years. Depot officials acknowledged that  some work centers are at risk if all or most of the workers leave during a  short period of time and that realignments, or job transfers, are needed to  make sure a large number of retirement eligible employees are not  assigned to any one area. However, the depots have limited plans to deal  with this situation. They said they cannot hire replacement workers until  after an employee retires. Additionally, transfers to balance retirement  eligible employees could be unwelcomed by personnel and could have an  adverse impact on shop productivity, as workers require time to gain skills  in new areas. It will be a major challenge to balance such concerns about  current operational impacts and increased training now against longer  term concerns about retirement eligibility over the next 5 to 7 years.  However, the depots are generally not making such analyses  and trade-offs.
According to Marine Corps depot officials, attrition rates are low and the  centers have hired few new permanent employees. However, the percent  of employees eligible to retire will increase from 43 and 47 percent in 2007  to 56 and 64 percent in 2009. Officials said it would be difficult to bring  on such large numbers of new workers if these retirement-eligible  personnel do retire about the same time. However, the centers’ workload  has declined significantly in the past. Systems that used to comprise the  bulk of the centers’ work are phasing out of the inventory, and questions  remain about whether replacement systems will be maintained in the  Marine Corps depots or the private sector. Officials acknowledged that it  is difficult to plan for the revitalization of the center workforce without  knowing what work will be available for them to do.
An aging workforce has some advantagesparticularly when the  workload is relatively stable over time. Officials pointed out that as  DOD was downsizing its depot workforce and doing no new hiring, there  were fewer demands for training programs. About half of the depots  have apprenticeship programs, which are the most comprehensive and  expensive type of training for industrial workers. Some of these programs  have been re-established in the past few years. Nonetheless, according to  depot officials, it would be unaffordable to hire enough apprentices to  replace the large numbers of workers who will be eligible to retire over the  next 5 to 7 years.
section_title: Difficulty Implementing Multiskilling Even Though It Could Improve Worker Efficiency and Productivity
paragraphs: The services are having difficulty implementing or are not trying to  implement multiskillinga private-sector initiative designed to improve  the flexibility, efficiency, and productivity of workers. Multiskilling is the  process of training maintenance employees in specific skills that cross the  traditional trade or craft lines and then ensuring the work is performed. It  involves reviewing work processes to identify situations where efficiency  and productivity can be enhanced by training workers in one skill area or  occupational series to perform some tasks in another occupational series.  A major advantage of multiskilling is that particular jobs that require more  than one craftnot necessarily more than one individualcan be  performed by fewer personnel. It can reduce the time it takes to perform  jobs involving multiple skill requirements by eliminating the time a depot  worker must wait for another worker to arrive and perform a task that the  first worker is not trained to do. For example, an aviation mechanic  trained in certain electrical tasks can reduce the times an electrician must  be called when doing aircraft repair.
In a 1998 review of Army industrial facilities we pointed out inefficiencies  in the depots and arsenals and stated that improved systems and  procedures for shifting maintenance workers between different  organizational units and skill areas would offer better opportunities to  effectively use limited numbers of maintenance personnel. Depot  officials had noted that prior practices made it difficult to transfer workers  between organizational units and skill areas to adjust for unanticipated  work stoppages caused by changes in work priorities, parts shortages,  technical problems, or temporary labor imbalances. We pointed out that  multiskilled workers offered added flexibility and could allow depot  managers to use a limited number of workers more cost effectively. We  recommended that the Secretary of the Army encourage depot managers  to pursue worker agreements to facilitate multiskilling in industrial  facilities. Although the Army has not been successful in implementing  multiskilling, this initiative remains a goal Army depot planners would like  to pursue.
In recent years, the naval aviation community has done the most to begin  using multiskilling as a depot improvement initiative, but full project  implementation has been delayed because they have not been given  permission to allow an additional pay grade for workers having more than  one skill. Although the Air Force first tried multiskilling in 1993 and its  current depot improvement initiative calls for determining cost effective  ways to implement multiskilling, the Air Force’s multiskilling initiative is  also floundering. In addition, although service, depot, and other officials  attribute improved workforce flexibility and cost-effectiveness to  multiskilling, Army depots and Marine Corps centers and Navy shipyards  are not implementing it.
subsections: section_title: Naval Aviation Multiskill Efforts Are Delayed
paragraphs: The naval aviation community has attempted to implement multiskilling  since 1999. Although its current request to pilot a multiskilling  demonstration project to use a certain compensation system had not been  approved as of March 2003, the community is implementing the pilot with  an alternative compensation approach.
As a result of an extensive business process reengineering project  completed in 2002, the Naval Air Systems Command identified  multiskilling as a solution to achieve a more flexible workforce. The  program is intended to provide a more flexible, multitraded, trained  workforce that could react more quickly to fluctuating workloads because  managers can reassign employees based on workload demands. According  to naval aviation managers, a multiskilled worker could be particularly  cost-effective when depot workers go to the weapon system in the field  rather than bringing the weapon to the depot. For example, a worker  trained as both a pneudraulic systems mechanic and an aircraft engine  mechanic could be sent to an operational location to accomplish the work  that previously required workers trained in each of these skills. As a result,  cost reductions should occur in field team assignments, which comprise  an increasing share of Navy aviation depots’ work.
The naval aviation community’s current multiskilling initiative used a  business case analysis to justify a demonstration project that would  provide training for workers who are at the journeyman level in one skill,  such as a sheet metal mechanic, to attain journeyman status in a second  trade, such as an aircraft mechanic. The project called for compensating  the workers involved by increasing their pay by an additional wage grade.  According to Naval Air Systems Command officials, the economic analysis  indicated savings could be achieved even though the workers would  receive increased compensation. Increased throughput is expected to  result in efficiencies of up to 20 percent due to redirected travel savings  and increases in volume efficiencies. This same business case analysis  indicated that during a single year one depot could potentially accomplish  519 additional maintenance tasks for the same amount of budget.  According to depot planners, private sector workers receive increased  compensation under similar circumstances, and union officials believe  government workers should also.
However, OPM’s Job Grading Standards do not contemplate providing  compensation for an additional grade for two equal trades. OPM’s job  grading standards state that pay is based on the highest level of work  performed, regardless of how many different trades an employee is  required to perform. According to Naval Air Systems Command officials,  OPM’s standard inhibits their ability to pursue multiskilling initiatives and  achieve reengineering efficiencies.
The Naval Air Systems Command sought permission to go to OPM  to request a demonstration project with additional compensation in  September 2000; but Headquarters, Department of the Navy disapproved  the request. Based on the results of the 2002 business case analysis,  which showed that the multiskill concept would increase readiness by  providing a more flexible and well-trained workforce, in September 2002  the naval aviation community again sought approval for the proposed  demonstration project, including increased compensation.
Navy headquarters has not yet approved the request, but aviation  depot officials are going forward with the project using an alternative  compensation approach. They have established a compensation award  at each site, not to exceed a $2,500 annual award. Five different skill  combinations have been proposed for the Cherry Point Depot and two for  the Jacksonville depot. One combination has begun at the North Island  depot. According to naval aviation officials, workers are reluctant to  participate because while in training they would not have the opportunity  for overtime pay. Officials believe that getting an additional grade would  be sufficient to increase the willingness of depot workers to participate—a  goal that is likely critical to getting the program to sufficient numbers to  make it cost-effective.
section_title: Air Force Multiskilling Program Is Older but Declining
paragraphs: Although the Air Force’s current depot maintenance improvement effort  calls for determining cost effective ways to implement multiskilling,  officials are generally supportive of it as a workload tool; however, the  Air Force’s multiskilling program is declining in size. In 1993, the Air Force  Materiel Command prototyped a multiskilling concept using aircraft  mechanics at the Oklahoma City depot. The program involved training  and certifying mechanics in multiple skills (aircraft, sheet metal, and  electrical) that were capable of performing a series of tasks involving  general airframe, structural, and electrical maintenance. By 1997, the  program had over 100 participants. However, since then, depot officials  told us the program has lost its popularity and currently consists of only  49 participants. Officials said that due to production requirements, many  of the skilled workers participating in the original project are now working  in their primary skill and new hires show little interest because there are  no financial incentives.
At the Warner Robins depot, officials designated a specific occupation job  series, 8801, as multiskilling to provide workers with greater job flexibility  and a better career path. As of September 2001, 148 workers were  functioning in this job series. Multiskilled workers primarily performed  tasks in two occupations, such as aircraft mechanic and electrical  mechanic or aircraft mechanic and sheet metal mechanic. According to  depot officials, they used this occupational job series as a hiring tool to  attract younger, multiskilled workers at the entry level. However, workers  did not receive any additional salary.
As a part of its depot maintenance improvement efforts, the Air Force has  refocused on multiskilling. Officials conducted a business case analysis to  determine the feasibility of various opportunities for using multiskilling at  the depots. After several months of data gathering and analysis, officials  said they were not able to provide a strong business case for developing a  standardized approach or expanding the use of multiskilling at the depots.  We found that, except in very limited cases, the depots are not doing true  multiskilling today. Rather, the depots are doing something similar called  multicrafting that does not involve the combination of two or more skills  at the journeyman skill level. Despite the results of the business case  analysis, officials from Headquarters, Air Force Materiel Command, and  the depots were generally supportive of multiskilling as a tool to deal with  fluctuating homogenous workloads and to facilitate movement of  employees as workload demands fluctuate.
section_title: Multiskilling Is Cited as Improving Flexibility and Cost-Effectiveness of Depot and Other Workforces
paragraphs: Service, depot, and other organization officials cite the multiskilling  concept as a way to provide a more flexible, productive workforce that  can react more quickly to fluctuating workloads, a key issue in trying to  improve the cost-effectiveness of maintenance operations as well as meet  readiness needs.
According to officials of the Naval Air Systems Command, the extensive  business case analysis they conducted indicated that multiskilling will  provide a trained workforce, more flexible for increased readiness, and  more capable of being able to be reassigned on demand to better support  fluctuating workloads. The officials also indicated that a multiskilling  program could also better support readiness by serving as an incentive to  skilled, near-retirement workers to stay and provide on-the-job training for  younger workers. In addition, depot officials reported, on the basis of the  economic analysis that savings would be achieved even though workers  would receive increased compensation.
Various organizations such as the Tennessee Valley Authority are  exempt from OPM’s job grading standards and are allowed to establish  a classification system that is more flexible and better fits their  environment. Among the flexibilities the Tennessee Valley Authority  has implemented is a multiskilled work force that receives additional  compensation for additional skills and work. The Tennessee Valley  Authority’s program will involve about 1,400 current employees as well  as new hires. According to Authority officials, multiskilling is improving  the flexibility and efficiency of the workforce. As North America’s  largest public power company, the Tennessee Valley Authority developed  its union agreements on multiskilling in fiscal year 2000 and fully  implemented its pilot program by the end of fiscal year 2001, with the  program expected to be fully implemented by 2005. The plan is to review  all preventive maintenance activities and reassign them to utilize multiskill  employees. Authority officials said that the multiskilling training program  is resulting in a more efficient way to accomplish their work and to obtain  and maintain a versatile group of employees. They reported that increases  in productivity and efficiency were expected to reduce restaffing after  attrition by about 15 percent.
Private sector industrial activities have also implemented multiskilling.  According to Naval Air Systems Command and Air Force officials, they  did benchmarking in the private sector before they began trying to put  together their own multiskilling programs. Navy depot officials also noted  that they see increased usage of this concept when they do private sector  wage grade comparability studies.
section_title: Need for Increased Funding and Innovation Driven by Increased Training Requirements
paragraphs: Based on the potential retirement of about 31,000 depot workers out of the  approximately 72,000 workers in the workforce eligible to retire by 2009,  training requirements will increase significantly for new hires, and  innovation will be required to develop more cost-effective training  alternatives. For over 10 years, most depots had training costs much  smaller than would normally be required for industrial activities since  depot downsizing resulted in hiring few new employees. However,  because the Air Force currently has a significant deficit in funding training  for new hires and refresher training, depot officials raised concerns over  their ability to fund future training requirements needed for workforce  revitalization. Furthermore, as the depots face the challenge of developing  and implementing plans to address skill imbalances occurring due to  attrition and retirement over the next 5 to 7 years, the need for increased  funding will likely drive the need to find new funding sources and to  develop innovative training programs that cost less.
The Air Force is already challenged by unfunded training costs. Air Force  workers who had received little training for years were required to take  “back-to-basics training.” This came about after accidents occurred at two  depots and additional training requirements evolved from the personnel  changes resulting from closing two Air Force depots and transferring  their work to other locations. However, although training requirements  increased, training budgets have not kept pace. For example, when Air  Force Materiel Command depot managers requested $10 million in 2001 to  train first-line supervisors, the Command did not approve any of that  funding. And when managers requested $11.5 million for budget years 2002  to 2007 to provide added training for new workers, the Command only  funded a portion of that request. Lacking sufficient training dollars to fund  their requirements, Air Force depot managers have been seeking ways to  partner with state government programs. Partnering with the states to  develop training programs and curriculum for co-op students at high  schools, vocational technical colleges, and universities was a cost-effective  strategy that enabled depots to hire certified and credentialed workers to  replace retirees. For example, the Warner Robins and Oklahoma City  depots are working primarily with the states of Georgia and Oklahoma to  establish training programs with local community colleges and high  schools so that new hires will be trained and certified as Federal Aviation  Association Aircraft and Power Plant license holders. Each of the Air  Force depots is developing courses to groom the next generation of  leaders and managers. But according to depot planners, much more needs  to be done and where the funding is to come from is unclear. This is  particularly true as the Air Force plans for the potential retirement of 43 to  52 percent of its depot workforce over the next 5 to 7 years.
The other service depots are also experiencing challenges in funding  training as they begin to hire new employees after years of downsizing.  About half of the depots provide new industrial workers with training  through apprentice programs. The Air Force and one Marine Corps  center are using cooperative education programs, because they believe  apprenticeship programs, which take 3 to 4 years to qualify workers for  becoming journeymen-level workers, are too expensive. The Army  Materiel Command estimated that $7.9 million was needed to sustain  79 apprentices already in the program and to add 50 additional apprentices  for fiscal year 2002, or about $55,000 for each apprentice. However, the  Command did not receive this level of funding, which caused the  Command to transfer the costs to the depots as a cost of their operations.  Army Materiel Command reported that it has requested additional funding  for the apprentice program to support an average of 184 apprentices each  year for the 7-year period, fiscal years 2003 through 2009. Army depot  officials said that the program was too small in number to significantly  impact future worker needs. In addition, without the Army directly  funding the program costs; customers pay for depot services will increase,  which could lead to a loss of customer support. Two of the five Army  maintenance depots decided that no additional apprentices will be  accepted into the apprenticeship program unless the program can be  directly funded.
In confronting the human capital challenge of revitalizing the depot  workforce, the services have the opportunity to develop innovative  training programs that cost less and to identify new funding sources for  training. According to Navy and Air Force officials, centralized training  programs and centralized funding could be considered cost-effective  ways to support depot revitalization. Officials also noted that centralized  training programs would help ensure consistency in the quality of training  provided to depot workers. Also, centralized funding would be another  source of funding and would provide centralized oversight and  accountability over how the funds are disbursed.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Continued shortfalls in DOD’s strategic planning process, including the  lack of a DOD depot strategic plan and a strategic plan for arsenals and  ammunition facilities have created questions regarding the future of the  72,000 civilians in the depot maintenance, arsenal, and ammunition  manufacturing plant workforce and their ability to support future military  operations. Without a strategic perspective that complements the  department’s overall mission and objectives, the services do not have  the long-term visibility they need to ensure the continued performance  of these important support missions. When this is coupled with DOD’s  adoption of increased contracting of work to the private sector, the future  role of these industrial facilities and their workforce is clearly in doubt.  The situation is compounded by questions regarding DOD’s  implementation of the core maintenance statute, which is an essential  feature in defining the depot workforce of the future. While in some  cases the services have made a start at defining future objectives for the  industrial facilities that are centered around the development of  public-private partnerships, it is unclear how these partnerships should  be folded into future industrial facilities planning. Further, without a  departmental approach that has been approved by the Congress,  future depot planning will continue to be fragmented, inconclusive, and  inefficient. Since we have previously recommended that DOD develop a  depot strategic plan, we are not repeating that recommendation in this  report. However, we continue to believe a depot strategic plan is needed  and we will continue to follow DOD’s progress toward implementing one.
The absence of strategic guidance regarding the future of the DOD  industrial facilities has generally prevented the development of  comprehensive strategic workforce plans that are required for effectively  managing DOD’s 72,000 civilian industrial facilities workers to meet the  challenges of the future. For example, without having long-term strategies  for acquiring, developing, and retaining their workforce that are clearly  linked to achieving programmatic goals, the services continued to  downsize these activities without a vision for what capabilities would be  required in the future. The result of downsizing is that the remaining depot  maintenance workforce averages 47 years of age and has skill imbalances.  With workload in some activities continuing to decline and with  uncertainties about new work for the future, officials in depots, arsenals,  and ammunition plants are uncertain whether they should plan to replace  retiring workers and about what skills will be needed in the future.  Furthermore, the industrial planners, in their short-term planning,  have followed some but not all of the steps identified by OPM and high  performing organizations, with the naval shipyard community and  Air Force more comprehensive in their workforce planning approaches.  However, the planners, have not, in general, identified competencies,  developed comprehensive retention plans, or evaluated the performance  of workforce planning efforts and taken corrective actionsall best  practices that could help depots more effectively meet current and  future challenges.
A number of challenges confront DOD’s workforce planning for the  revitalization of this industrial workforce, about 12 percent of which are  eligible to retire in fiscal year 2002 and about 43 percent of which will be  eligible to retire by 2009. First, workforce planning efforts, which are  generally focused on the short-term, do not address the potential loss of  a third to over 40 percent of the depot workforce over a short period of  time, a challenge that could threaten the depots’ viability. Only the Air  Force has taken action to ensure the continued viability of its depots in  2007 and beyond. Secondly, the current occupational series may not be  the best to most efficiently perform required maintenance operations.  Multiskilling, which has been successfully implemented in the private  sector and in some government activities, has flexibilities unavailable to  most government activities. However, depot activities trying to implement  the flexibilities have been confronted by rules that do not allow providing  an additional grade for performing work in additional skill areas. While  the naval aviation community is trying an approach that would use a  bonus rather than additional pay, naval aviation officials believe the  additional flexibilities are still needed. We also believe that if it proves to  be cost-effective, the full option of providing an additional grade would  help ensure the greatest potential for success. Finally, with the large  number of workers eligible to retire by 2009, training requirements and  funding for training will increase significantly for new hires. Further, the  need for increased funding for training will likely drive the need to find  new funding sources and to develop cost-effective training programs. A  centralized DOD depot training program could be a very practicable way  to introduce more innovative and cost-effective approaches to producing  and funding the required training to support depot revitalization, if the  department intends to continue using the depots as an important part of its  industrial base.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the management and direction of DOD’s strategic planning for  maintenance depots, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel  Readiness to    complete the revisions to DOD’s core policy and develop a schedule  for the services to complete the computation of core requirements;  require the service secretaries and the Commandant of the Marine Corps  to develop revised core capabilities to provide a baseline for defining  workloads that should be performed in government facilities by  government personnel; and  require the service secretaries and the Commandant of the Marine Corps  to develop, or complete the development of, and implement strategic plans  that are linked to the services’ mission and objectives and the Office of the  Secretary of Defense’s depot strategic plan when it is developed and that  delineate industrial workloads to be accomplished in each service’s  depots, other service’s depots, by contractors at their own sites and at  government sites and using partnerships and identify the workforce  requirements to support the performance of this work.
To improve the management and strategic direction of DOD’s strategic  planning for arsenals and ammunition plants, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense require the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to develop a strategic plan that  provides guidance and a schedule for identifying long-term capabilities to  be provided by the private sector, those to be provided in government- owned and -operated plants; and those to be provided in government- owned and contractor-operated plants.
To improve the quality and comprehensiveness of the services’ workforce  planning efforts, we recommend that the Secretaries of the services and  the Commandant of the Marine Corps develop strategic workforce plans  that include improvements in areas identified in this report as being  deficient, such as assessing workforce competencies required for the  current and future workforce; implementing action plans that include  comprehensive retention plans; and establishing performance metrics to  use in evaluating workforce planning efforts and a mechanism for  performing assessments of prior workforce planning efforts. The strategic  workforce plans should be linked to DOD’s strategic plan for depot  maintenance and the strategic plan for arsenals and ammunition plants  when they are developed.
To improve DOD’s strategic workforce planning to ensure the viability of  its depot maintenance workforce, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense require the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness, in coordination with the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, to coordinate the implementation of  an initiative to    provide guidance for developing workforce revitalization strategies and  strategic plans to address expected depot attrition over the next 5 to 7  years;    provide options for incorporating multiskilling into depot workforce  planning initiatives; and  implement a working group to explore options for innovative and cost- effective training and to explore appropriate funding alternatives, to  include centralized funding, to revitalize the depot workforce.
Given the difficulties the Department of Defense is having implementing  multiskilling and its potential for improving the flexibility and productivity  of the department’s maintenance workforce, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense require the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel  and Readiness to implement a demonstration project that would give the  military depots the flexibility to provide additional compensation for  multiskilled depot workers when the services have demonstrated by a  cost-benefit analysis the benefits of such a program.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: The Department of Defense reviewed a draft of this report and provided  oral comments from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness. The department concurred with seven of our  nine recommendations dealing with the need for completion of the  identification of core depot maintenance requirements and capabilities  and for improved strategic planning and workforce planning for depots,  arsenals, and ammunition plants. The department did not concur with our  recommendation to implement a working group to explore (1) options  for innovative and cost-effective training and (2) appropriate funding  alternatives to help revitalize the depot workforce. Also, the department  did not concur with our recommendation to implement a demonstration  project for multiskilling.
The department’s comments noted that the importance of human capital  strategic planning was clearly recognized in the Quadrennial Defense  Review, is the first item on the President’s Management Agenda, and is a  top priority for the department. Further, in early 2003, the department  published its FY 2003 Year of Execution Plan as an Annex to the integrated  DOD Civilian Human Resources Strategic Plan, and focuses on seven goals  to direct and improve all aspects of human capital strategic planning. We  recognize that the high-level strategic planning efforts undertaken by the  department are a necessary first step, but we also believe that much more  needs to be done to assure that successively lower levels of organizations  and activities accomplish complementary human capital planning that  addresses specific issues that may be of concern for a given subset of the  department’s population, such as for the workers in the department’s  industrial activities.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that the department complete  revisions to DOD’s core policy and our recommendation to develop  revised core capabilities that provide a baseline for defining workloads  that should be performed in government facilities by government  personnel. Officials noted that the department is finalizing required  changes to its revised methodology and, upon completion, will task  the military services with computing their depot maintenance core  requirements. Regarding our recommendation, to develop depot strategic  plans that are linked to the services’ mission and objectives and to the  Office of the Secretary of Defense’s depot strategic plan when it is  completed, DOD officials concurred, noting that in some cases it may be  more practical to include these plans as part of a logistics or systems  command strategic plan. DOD agreed with our recommendation to  develop a strategic plan that provides guidance and a schedule for  identifying long-term capabilities for arsenals and ammunition plants.  DOD also agreed with our recommendation to improve the quality and  comprehensiveness of the services’ workforce planning efforts. DOD  partially concurred with our recommendation to provide guidance for  developing workforce revitalization strategies and strategic plans to  address expected depot attrition over the next 5 to 7 years. Officials  said that the department developed the DOD Civilian Human Resources  Strategic Plan2002-2008 to ensure a DOD-wide civilian workforce  capable of responding rapidly, efficiently, and effectively to mission  requirements. However, they agreed that a near-term strategic plan is  needed at the depot level. We do not believe that the human resources  strategic plan cited in DOD’s response provides the required guidance for  developing workforce revitalization strategies and strategic plans and  supporting the other issues we noted in our recommendation because it is  at a higher level and does not address issues that need to be dealt with for  this work force group, such as how to provide affordable technical  training for large numbers of blue-collar workers. Additionally, to be  useful in supporting revitalization of the depot workforce, a depot  strategic plan should address long-term as well as near-term requirements.
Regarding our recommendation that the department develop options  for incorporating multiskilling into depot workforce planning initiatives,  the department concurred, stating that its proposed National Security  Personnel System will provide personnel flexibilities designed to address  multiskilling requirements. However, the National Security Personnel  System is a proposed change to the current personnel system that DOD  has requested the Congress to consider as a part of a large and diverse  DOD transformation legislative proposal. Because the Congress has not  yet acted on the department’s transformation proposal, we believe that it  is premature to assume that Congress will approve this new personnel  system. We continue to believe that whether or not the new personnel  system is approved, the depots need options for incorporating  multiskilling into depot workforce planning initiatives.
DOD nonconcurred with our recommendation to implement a working  group to explore (1) options for innovative and cost-effective training and  (2) appropriate funding alternatives to help revitalize the depot workforce.  The department stated that a working group is not necessary to explore  options already offered by new authorities and flexibilities in the proposed  National Security Personnel System. Because the proposed new personnel  system has not yet been considered by the Congress, we believe that is  premature to assume that it will be implemented, and we continue to  believe that a working group’s exploration of options would benefit depot  workforce revitalization.
DOD also nonconcurred with our recommendation regarding the  implementation of a demonstration project that would give the military  depots the flexibility to provide additional compensation for multiskilled  depot workers when the services have demonstrated by a cost-benefit  analysis the benefits of such a program. Again, the department’s  response assumes the flexibilities and authorities expected from the  proposed National Security Personnel System will cover the problems  multiskilling is intended to address. As with our comments on the prior  recommendations, we believe that this response is premature and that  independent action should be taken to implement the recommendation.
The department provided technical comments that have been  incorporated when appropriate.
We are providing copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the  Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will  make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will  be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions regarding this report, please contact me  on (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov or Julia Denman at (202) 512-4290  or denmanj@gao.gov. Major contributors to this report are listed in  appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Office of the Secretary of Defense  has implemented our prior recommendation to develop and implement  a strategic plan for depot maintenance, we interviewed officials and  reviewed the Government Performance and Results Act to identify  guidance on developing strategic plans and various laws providing  guidance on the role of DOD depots.
To determine the extent to which the services have developed and  implemented strategic workforce plans to position the civilian depot  workforce to meet future requirements, we interviewed officials and  obtained and reviewed    DOD’s Civilian Human Resources Strategic Plan 2002-2008 and the  services’ strategic plans for depot maintenance where available to  identify human capital goals, visions, and objectives and    services’ and depots’ workforce plans (including recruiting/hiring plans,  training plans, succession plans, and retention plans) to determine  whether they had a strategic/long-term perspective or a short-term focus  that was oriented toward the budget process.
In analyzing the extent to which these workforce plans positioned the  civilian depot workforce to meet future mission requirements, we  compared the elements of the depots’ workforce plans to applicable  workforce planning documents and guidance issued by the OPM, the  GAO, the National Academy of Public Administration, and other federal  and state government agencies. Based on our analyses, we identified  efforts underway that addressed aspects of these elements.
Additionally, we analyzed the services’    civilian depot workforce skills and competency assessments to determine  whether they had identified the skills and competencies needed to address  current and future workforce requirements,    civilian depot workforce retention plans to determine whether they had  the factors identified by current research as being critical to enhancing the  retention necessary for the construction of a high-performance  organization, and    assessments of workforce plans to determine whether they included  performance measures that evaluated the effectiveness of their workforce  plans.
Moreover, because OPM had identified the elements that should be  included in a comprehensive retention plan, we compared those elements  to those found in the services’ retention plans. We did not do this type of  comparison for the services’ recruiting/hiring, training, and succession  plans because OPM did not identify comprehensive plans for these  elements of workforce plans.
To determine what challenges adversely affect DOD’s strategic planning  for the viability of its civilian depot workforce, we interviewed officials  and obtained, reviewed, and analyzed documentation to identify the types  of challenges that might impact planning for the viability of the civilian  depot workforce. In doing so, we also determined    civilian depot workforce retirement eligibility and whether the services  will have difficulties replacing an aging workforce if large numbers of  eligible retirees retire over the next 5 to 7 years,   the total weighted average age based on the civilian staffing at each  industrial facility,    whether the services are having difficulties implementing the multiskilling  concept to improve worker efficiency and productivity, and    whether increased funding will be needed to address increased training  requirements.
During this review, we visited and obtained information from the Office of  the Secretary of Defense and the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps  headquarters, all in the Washington, D.C., area; Headquarters, Army  Materiel Command in Alexandria, Virginia; and 5 subordinate Army  commands—the Army Aviation and Missile Command, Huntsville,  Alabama; Communications-Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, New  Jersey; the Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren,  Michigan; Operations Support Command (now the Joint Munitions  Command), Rock Island, Illinois; and the Soldier and Biological Chemical  Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Additionally, we visited  the following depots and activities:    Army: Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Alabama; Corpus Christi Army  Depot, Corpus Christi, Texas; Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg,  Pennsylvania; Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas; Tobyhanna Army  Depot, Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania; Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island,  Illinois; Watervliet Arsenal, Watervliet, New York; Pine Bluff Arsenal,  Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Crane Army Ammunition Activity, Crane, Indiana;  and McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, McAlester, Oklahoma.
Air Force: Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force  Base, Ohio; Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center, Tucson,  Arizona; Directorate of Maintenance, Ogden, Utah; Directorate of  Maintenance, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Directorate of Maintenance,  Warner Robins, Georgia; and the Joint Depot Maintenance and Activities  Group, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.
Navy: Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland; Naval  Aviation Depot, Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Aviation Depot,  Jacksonville, Florida; and Naval Aviation Depot North Island, San Diego,  California;    Navy: Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.; Norfolk Naval  Shipyard, Portsmouth, Virginia; Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth,  New Hampshire; and Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton,  Washington.
Navy: Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, Charleston, South  Carolina.
Marine Corps: Marine Corps Materiel Command, Albany, Georgia; Marine  Corps Logistics Bases Albany, Georgia; Marine Corps Logistics Bases  Barstow, California; Marine Corps Maintenance Center, Albany, Georgia;  and the Marine Corps Maintenance Center, Barstow, California.
Additionally, we received written responses to audit questions from the  following activities: Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate  Maintenance Facility, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Space and Naval Warfare  Systems Center San Diego, California; Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane  Division, Crane, Indiana; and Naval Undersea Warfare Center Keyport  Division, Keyport, Washington.
We conducted our review from October 2001 to March 2003 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Fiscal Year 2002 Services’ Depots
paragraphs: The depot performs maintenance on heavy and light-tracked combat vehicles  and components and is the designated center of technical excellence for the  M1 Abrams tank.   As the Army’s only aviation facility, the depot overhauls and repairs DOD  rotary wing aircraft and components, such as the AH-64 Apache, CH-47  Chinook, and the UH-60 Blackhawk.   This depot provides repair and overhaul support for air defense and tactical  missiles such as the Patriot, Hawk, Avenger, Multiple Launch Rocket System,  and Sidewinder.
For combat and tactical systems, the depot supports systems such as the  Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Multiple Launch Rocket System, and vehicles for the  Patriot and Hawk missiles.   From handheld radios to satellite communication, the depot provides repair  and overhaul support for hundreds of communications and electronic systems.
The arsenal is primarily a metal manufacturing facility with foundry, forging,  machining, finishing, and fabricating capabilities. It produces tank and artillery  components such as gun mounts and recoil mechanisms, spare parts, and  other equipment. It also fabricates and/or assembles tool sets ranging from  carrying case-sized sets to fully equipped shelters.   This arsenal is a metal manufacturing facility whose capabilities include  forging, casting, machining, heat-treating, plating, and fabrication. Its primary  products are cannons—such as the large gun tubes for tanks and howitzers— and mortars.   The facility produces, renovates, and stores smoke, riot control, and  incendiary ammunitions such as red and white phosphorus. Also, it  manufactures and refurbishes chemical and biological defense equipment.
The plant produces, renovates, stores, and demilitarizes conventional  ammunition. Its products include the Navy’s 5-inch projectile, bombs, missile  warheads, pyrotechnic munitions, and plastic explosives.   The plant produces, renovates, stores, and demilitarizes conventional and  missile ammunition. Its products include bombs—ranging from 500 to 5,000  pounds, missile warheads, rockets, and plastic explosives.
The depot performs standard depot-level maintenance and periodic  maintenance, modifications, and in-service repairs for crash and battle  damages for helicopters and engines. The depot performs maintenance on  aircraft such as the AV-8, H-53, and H-46. It also repairs such components as  jet fuel starters and auxiliary power units.  The depot serves as a production center concentrating on repair and  modification of patrol aircraft, fighter aircraft, attack aircraft, electronic  countermeasures, engines, and associated components. The depot performs  maintenance on aircraft such as the P-3, F-14 and SH-60. Also, the depot  repairs components such as electro-optics, electronic warfare, and  antisubmarine warfare systems.  The depot serves as the production center concentrating on repair and  modification of miscellaneous aircraft and associated components. The depot  performs maintenance on the following aircraft systems: E-2 Hawkeye, C-2  Greyhound, and F/A 18 Hornet. It also provides engineering, logistics, and  calibration services.
This shipyard is the East Coast’s largest facility for surface ship, aircraft  carrier, and submarine overhauls, maintenance and modernization. It also  repairs, overhauls, dry docks, converts, modernizes, and inactivates ships.  Also, the shipyard can perform any technical, fabrication, manufacturing, and  engineering work required by its customers on site or through rapid- deployment of special teams to ships and facilities anywhere in the world.  This shipyard is the largest ship repair facility between the West Coast and  Far East, and it is responsible for ship maintenance, modernization, and  nuclear ship recycling. Also, the shipyard provides such services as reactor  plant servicing, nuclear propulsion plant work, and ship maintenance training.  The shipyard performs nuclear submarine overhauls, refuelings,  modernizations, and repairs. Also, it provides nuclear maintenance  engineering and planning for the Los Angeles class submarines.  The shipyard overhauls and repairs all types and sizes of Navy ships. Also,  the shipyard provides other services such as nuclear propulsion work, reactor  compartment disposal, nuclear-powered ship recycling, and emergent fleet  support.
The overall center provides acquisition, engineering, logistics, and  maintenance for the fleet’s weapons and electronic systems, ordnance, and  associated equipment components. The majority of its depot maintenance is  in electronic warfare systems, engineering and industrial base support,  electronic module test and repair, microwave components, and radar systems.  The overall center provides test and evaluation, in-service engineering,  maintenance and repair, fleet support, and industrial base support for  designated systems. The largest depot workload is the torpedo program. Also,  the depot operates and maintains shops that accomplish mechanical,  electrical and electronic production, and assembly of complex undersea  warfare equipment.
Depot operations, managed at the division level, provide engineering analysis  and design, hardware/software development, and integration. Also the depot  operations include repair, fabrication, installation, and logistics products and  services to DOD and federal government sponsors.  The depot operation at the center provides engineering, management, life  cycle support, test, restoration, assessments, and prototype modeling. The  depot operations also include facilities that enable it to serve as a designated  overall point and repair facility for reparables (i.e., assemblies, modules, and  printed circuit boards drawn from various types of equipment).
The depot has multicommodity capability to support overhauls, repairs, and  upgrades for weapons systems such as the Amphibious Assault Vehicle,  M1A1 Tank, M198 Howitzer, AN TPS 63 Radar, small arms, and  communications-electronics equipment.  The depot has multicommodity capability to support overhauls, repairs, and  upgrades for weapons systems such as the Amphibious Assault Vehicle,  M1A1 Tank, M198 Howitzer, AN TPS 63 Radar, small arms, and  communications-electronics equipment.
The center provides for the storage, regeneration, reclamation, and disposal  of aircraft and related aerospace items such as tooling, pylons, and engines.
It provides worldwide engineering and logistics management for the F-16 and  maintains the C-130 aircraft. The center produces more than 250 aircraft and  16,800 avionics and structural components annually. In addition, the center is  responsible for logistical support of the nation’s fleet of strategic  intercontinental ballistic missiles, including the Minuteman and Peacekeeper  missiles. It also overhauls and repairs landing gear, wheels and brakes, rocket  motors, photonic equipment, avionics, hydraulics, and software.   The center is the worldwide manager for a wide range of aircraft, engines,  missile, and commodity items, aided by some of the most sophisticated  technical repair and manufacturing processes in the world. The center  manages an inventory of 2,267 aircraft, which include the B-1, B-2, B-52,  KC-10, C/KC-135, E-3, and about 25 other contractor logistics support aircraft.  This activity is the cargo/transport technology repair center for the Air Force. It  has worldwide management and engineering responsibilities for the repair,  modification, and overhaul of the C-130, C-141, C-5, as well as F-15, U-2,  all Air Force helicopters, and all special operations aircraft and their avionics  systems.
section_title: Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots’ Short-Term Workforce Plans
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Carleen Bennett, Johnetta Gatlin-Brown, Thomas W. Gilliam,  M. Jane Hunt, Steve Hunter, Jeanett Reid, Jose Watkins, and  Bobby Worrell made significant contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Depot Maintenance: Public-Private Partnerships Have Increased  but Long-Term Growth and Results Are Uncertain. GAO-03-423.  Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2003.
Human Capital: Building on the Current Momentum to Address  High-Risk Issues. GAO-03-637T. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2003.
DOD Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Strengthen Civilian Human  Capital Strategic Planning and Integration with Military Personnel and  Sourcing Decisions. GAO-03-475. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2003.
High-Risk Series: Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-03-120.  Washington, D.C.: January 2003.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-03-119. Washington, D.C.:  January 2003.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of  Defense. GAO-03-98. Washington, D.C.: January 2003.
Human Capital: Effective Use of Flexibilities Can Assist Agencies  in Managing Their Workforces. GAO-03-2. Washington, D.C.:  December 6, 2002.
Military Personnel: Oversight Process Needed to Help Maintain  Momentum of DOD’s Strategic Human Capital Planning. GAO-03-237.  Washington, D.C.: December 5, 2002.
Depot Maintenance: Change in Reporting Practices and Requirements  Could Enhance Congressional Oversight. GAO-03-16. Washington, D.C.:  October 18, 2002.
HUD Human Capital Management: Comprehensive Strategic Workforce  Planning Needed. GAO-02-839. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002.
Managing for Results: Using Strategic Human Capital Management  to Drive Transformational Change. GAO-02-940T. Washington, D.C.:  July 15, 2002.
Exposure Draft: A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management.  GAO-02-373SP. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2002.
Foreign Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to Correct  Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls. GAO-02-375. Washington, D.C.:  January 31, 2002.
Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Overcome Capability Gaps in the  Public Depot System. GAO-02-105. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.
Human Capital: Implementing an Effective Workforce Strategy Would  Help EPA to Achieve Its Strategic Goals. GAO-01-812. Washington, D.C.:  July 31, 2001.
Defense Logistics: Strategic Planning Weaknesses Leave Economy,  Efficiency, and Effectiveness of Future Support Systems at Risk.  GAO-02-106. Washington, D.C.: October 11, 2000.
Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders.  GAO/OCG-00-14G. Washington, D.C.: September 2000 Version 1.
Human Capital: Managing Human Capital in the 21st Century.   GAO/T-GGD-00-77. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2000.
Human Capital: Strategic Approach Should Guide DOD Civilian  Workforce Management. GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-00-120. Washington, D.C.:  March 9, 2000.
Army Industrial Facilities: Workforce Requirements and Related Issues  Affecting Depots and Arsenals. GAO/NSIAD-99-31. Washington, D.C.:  November 30, 1998.
Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD Shifting More Workload for  New Weapon Systems to the Private Sector. GAO/NSIAD-98-8.  Washington, D.C.: March 31, 1998.