Southeast Asia: Better Human Rights Reviews and Strategic Planning Needed for U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces
Published: 2005-07-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The executive branch has bolstered assistance to the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand to contribute to U.S. foreign policy and security goals. To further human rights goals, Congress restricts certain security assistance funds from being provided to any units of foreign security forces when credible evidence exists that units have committed gross violations of human rights. GAO (1) describes the nature and extent of U.S. assistance to foreign security forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, (2) assesses the controls used to achieve compliance with human rights restrictions on U.S. funding to foreign security forces in these countries, and (3) assesses the U.S. government's national security assistance strategy.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The United States allocated about $265.7 million in assistance from fiscal years 2001 to 2004 to equip and train security forces in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. U.S. law restricts the provision of funds to units of foreign security forces when the Department of State has credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights. Agency guidance extends these restrictions to individuals of foreign security forces and requires posts to establish procedures to vet candidates for U.S. sponsored training for possible violations. However, we found no evidence that U.S. officials vetted an estimated 6,900 foreign security trainees--about 4,000 Indonesian, 1,200 Filipino, and 1,700 Thai police--trained by Justice with State law enforcement assistance between fiscal years 2001 through 2004. These candidates included a total of 32 Indonesian individuals trained over time from a notorious special-forces police unit previously prohibited under State policy from receiving U.S. training funds because of the unit's prior human rights abuses. We found better evidence of vetting in training programs managed by DOD. State issued new guidance in February 2005 intended to improve the human rights vetting process and establish a database of human rights abuse allegations. State has not produced a clear and coherent national security assistance strategy that meets objectives that Congress urged State to address in 2000 legislation. As a result, State and Congress may be deprived of the information needed to make future decisions about these programs. State's 2003 strategy met only two of nine objectives in the law. Among other shortfalls, the strategy did not identify how programs would be combined at the country level to achieve objectives or be coordinated with other U.S. government agencies. Several State and DOD planning documents, while not collectively providing a complete national security assistance strategy, address some of the legislation's objectives.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The executive branch has considered Southeast Asia as the “second front”  in the war on terrorism and has thus bolstered security assistance to  Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand to help deal with this threat. This  assistance contributes to several U.S. foreign policy and security goals,  such as supporting the global war on terror, promoting stronger bilateral  relationships, strengthening self-defense capabilities, and promoting  greater respect for democracy and human rights. However, to further  human rights goals, Congress restricts certain security assistance funds  from being provided to any units of foreign security forces when credible  evidence exists that units have committed gross violations of human  rights.
To address congressional concerns about the coordination, planning, and  impact of security assistance programs, Congress passed the Security  Assistance Act of 2000. The Act encourages the Department of State  (State), in consultation with other agencies, to establish an annual  multiyear plan identifying overarching security assistance objectives, the  way programs will be combined at the country level to achieve objectives,  and the coordination of security assistance programs with other U.S.  government agencies.
This report, completed under the Comptroller General’s Authority is being  addressed to you because of your committee’s interest and jurisdiction.  The report (1) describes the nature and extent of U.S. assistance to foreign  security forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand; (2) assesses the  management controls used to achieve U.S. agency compliance with the  human rights restrictions on funding provided to foreign security forces in  the three countries; and (3) assesses the U.S. government’s national  security assistance strategy.
To address these objectives, we reviewed pertinent State, Defense, and  Justice planning, funding, and evaluation documents, and related policies  and procedures. We focused on State, DOD, and Justice programs or  activities providing assistance to foreign security forces in the absence of  an agreed-upon definition of security assistance within the U.S.  government. We also interviewed senior program officials from the  Departments of Defense (DOD), State, and Justice in Washington, D.C.;  Manila, the Philippines; Jakarta, Indonesia; and Bangkok, Thailand. We  discussed these programs with officials of foreign governments and  nongovernmental organizations. In addition, we interviewed DOD officials  at the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) in Honolulu, Hawaii. We reviewed  relevant statutes and implementing guidelines, including the Foreign  Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), as amended, the Arms Export Control  Act (P.L. 90-629), as amended, the Security Assistance Act of 2000, the fiscal  years 2001 to 2004 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and the  Department of Defense Appropriations Acts, and the DOD Security  Assistance Management Manual. To assess how the U.S. government  provides funding in compliance with human rights restrictions, we  inspected program files maintained at the U.S. embassies in Bangkok,  Jakarta, and Manila. We conducted this review from July 2004 to June 2005  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: As a foreign policy tool, the U.S. government provides assistance to  security forces (military and police) in more than 150 countries around the  world, including Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. State provides  assistance to foreign security forces through at least six programs and  activities. Appendix II provides additional details on these programs.
Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) is used to train foreign security forces in  anti-terrorism and terrorism response tactics.
Economic Support Fund (ESF) is used primarily for economic  assistance to promote political or economic stability; however, some  ESF is allocated for training foreign security forces.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is used to provide grants and loans for  the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training by  foreign governments. This assistance is aimed at improving defense  capabilities and fostering stronger military relationships between the  United States and recipient nations.
International Military Education and Training (IMET) is used to train  and educate foreign military forces and related civilian personnel.  Expanded-IMET (E-IMET), a variant of the regular IMET program,  focuses on democracy, the rule of law, and human rights training and  education.
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) is used  primarily to support counter-narcotics, intelligence, border patrol, and  interdiction activities.
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) supports multilateral peacekeeping  and regional stability operations that are not funded through the United  Nations.
DOD provides a mix of appropriated and nonappropriated assistance to  foreign security forces through at least four programs or activities.  Appendix III provides additional details on these programs.
Excess Defense Articles (EDA) are nonappropriated assistance in the  form of excess U.S. defense articles drawn from DOD stocks. The  President is authorized to transfer, with limitations, defense articles  declared as excess by the military departments to foreign governments  in support of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives.
Drawdown is nonappropriated assistance that the President is  authorized to draw down from the stocks of any U.S. government  agency for emergencies, disasters, counternarcotics, refugee assistance,  peacekeeping, anti-terrorist activities, and nonproliferation.
Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) is a  DOD program used to provide funding to foreign military and related  civilian officials to attend U.S. military education institutions and  selected regional centers for nonlethal training.
Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) permits U.S. special  operations forces to train with foreign military forces, provided that the  training primarily benefits U.S. forces. The host nation’s security forces  also derive a benefit.
The Department of Justice provides assistance to foreign security forces  through at least two Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Federal  Bureau of Investigation (FBI) training activities in foreign countries. DEA  trains law enforcement officials and police to carry out special counter- narcotics operations. The FBI also trains law enforcement officials and  police in these countries.
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Philippines and Indonesia  became central to the U.S. government’s antiterrorism efforts in Southeast  Asia due to their strategic importance, Muslim populations, and insurgency  movements that use terrorist tactics. The U.S. government has been  concerned with radical Islamist groups in Southeast Asia, particularly  those in Indonesia, the Philippines, and other countries that are known to  have ties to the Al Qaeda terrorist network. For more than a decade, Al  Qaeda has penetrated the region by establishing local cells, training  Southeast Asians in its camps in Afghanistan, and by financing and  cooperating with indigenous radical Islamist groups. According to the  Congressional Research Service, Indonesia and the southern Philippines  have been particularly vulnerable to anti-American Islamic terrorist groups.  A spate of violence in Thailand’s Muslim provinces in early 2004 intensified  the focus on Islamic extremism in southern Thailand. The violence has  forced Thai authorities to publicly re-evaluate the threat of a Muslim  separatist insurgency with financial and operational ties to international  Islamic terrorist groups.
According to the State Department’s 2004 Country Reports on Human  Rights Practices, the three countries we reviewed face several human  rights challenges.
The Philippines. According to State’s human rights report for the  Philippines, the government generally respected the human rights of its  citizens. However, some elements of the country’s security forces were  responsible for arbitrary, unlawful and, in some cases, extrajudicial  killings, disappearances, and torture, and arbitrary arrest and detention.
Indonesia. State’s human rights report for Indonesia stated that the  Indonesian government made progress in its transition from three  decades of repressive and authoritarian rule to a more pluralistic and  representative democracy. The government’s human rights record  remained poor, however, and it continued to commit serious abuses. For  example, the report stated that “ecurity force members murdered,  tortured, raped, beat, and arbitrarily detained civilians and members of  separatist movements, especially in Aceh and to a lesser extent in  Papua. Some police officers occasionally used excessive and sometimes  deadly force in arresting suspects and in attempting to obtain  information or a confession. Retired and active duty military officers  known to have committed serious human rights violations occupied or  were promoted to senior positions in the Government and the  (military).”
Thailand. According to State’s human rights report, the government of  Thailand generally respected the rights of its citizens, but there were  significant problems in some areas. For example, separatist violence in  southern Thailand resulted in the deaths of more than 180 persons at the  hands of security forces. In addition, no progress was reported in  investigations into the extrajudicial killings of approximately 1,300  suspected drug traffickers during the Thai government's 3-month “War  on Drugs” campaign from February through April 2003. However, the  Thai government maintains that the deaths were the result of disputes  between those involved in the drug trade.
section_title: Assistance to Train and Equip Security Forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand Provided through Three Agencies under at Least 12 Programs
paragraphs: U.S. assistance to security forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, and  Thailand was provided through at least 12 programs and activities managed  by State, DOD, and Justice. This assistance comprises a mix of  appropriated funds used for procuring training and equipment, as well as  nonappropriated assistance such as transfers of excess military equipment  taken from U.S. stocks. The Philippines was the largest beneficiary of this  assistance from fiscal years 2001 to 2004. U.S. assistance to security forces  in the Philippines largely supported the Philippines Defense Reform—a  comprehensive defense assessment to develop a multi-year defense  strategy, enhance mobility, and build defense capacity. Restrictions on  Indonesia prohibited it from receiving military equipment; however,  Indonesia received funding to train its security forces. U.S. assistance to  Thailand is used for procuring equipment and training for such activities as  counter narcotics and antiterrorism.
subsections: section_title: State, DOD, and Justice Provide Assistance to Security Forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand
paragraphs: State, DOD, and Justice allocated a total of approximately $265.7 million to  train and equip security forces in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia  in fiscal years 2001 to 2004. This amounted to $179.6 million for the  Philippines, $47.5 million for Indonesia, and $38.6 million for Thailand.  Figure 1 shows a comparison of U.S. assistance for each of the three  countries and illustrates that the United States provided the Philippines  with significantly more assistance than Indonesia and Thailand.
State allocated most of the assistance, $212.9 million (80.2 percent), while  DOD allocated $52.2 million (19.6 percent), and Justice allocated $518,000  (less than 1 percent). Figure 2 shows a comparison of assistance by agency,  illustrating that State allocated most of the assistance to train and equip  security forces in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia.
This assistance was provided through at least 12 programs and was used  for procuring a variety of equipment, training, and services within each  country. Figure 3 shows a comparison of U.S. assistance by program for  each of the three countries. The FMF allocation for the Philippines  represented the largest single program across all three countries.
State, DOD, and Justice assistance to train and equip security forces in the  Philippines in fiscal years 2001 to 2004 totaled about $179.6 million and  helped support the Philippines Defense Reform-- a comprehensive defense  assessment to develop a multi-year defense strategy, enhance mobility, and  build defense capacity. Table 1 shows the U.S. agency, program or activity,  allocations, and some examples of how the assistance was used.
State, DOD, and Justice allocated a total of about $47.5 million in  assistance to train Indonesian security forces in fiscal years 2001 to 2004;  however, various congressional funding restrictions limited Indonesia’s  eligibility for U.S. military assistance and training over this period. State  provided $43.3 million (91 percent of the country total), including $23.2  million (49 percent) of the country total in police training through the  Economic Support Fund. DOD provided military training through its  Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP).  Indonesia is the single largest recipient of this assistance worldwide. Table  2 shows the U.S. agency, program or activity, allocations, and some  examples of how the assistance was used.
State, DOD, and Justice allocated a total of about $38.6 million in  assistance for Thai security forces to procure a variety of defense articles,  services, and training supporting activities such as counter narcotics,  military training, antiterrorism, and force modernization. The largest share  of the money was used for training law enforcement officials in counter  narcotics operations and for providing the Thai military with advanced  training. Table 3 shows the U.S. agency, program or activity, allocations,  and some examples of how assistance was used.
section_title: Weak Management Controls on U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces Allowed Violations of State’s Policy on Human Rights Restrictions to Occur
paragraphs: We found no evidence that the three posts we visited vetted an estimated  6,935 law enforcement officials trained with State assistance between fiscal  years 2001 and 2004. The trainees included 32 Indonesian police from a  notorious special-forces police unit that was prohibited from receiving U.S.  training funds under State policy because of the unit’s prior human rights  abuses. We found better evidence of vetting in DOD-implemented training  programs. For example, in the Philippines, we randomly sampled 107 DOD  trainee files and estimated that 87 percent of the trainee files contained  some evidence of vetting, while 13 percent contained no evidence of  vetting. We also found evidence of vetting for all 35 DOD trainee files that  we randomly sampled in the other two countries, although these results are  not projectable. Vetting did not occur because of weaknesses in some  agencies’ management controls. First, State and Justice headquarters units  did not assign clear roles and responsibilities for vetting foreign security  forces, nor did they clearly communicate these responsibilities to all  employees involved in the process, especially to law enforcement officials  at posts. Second, prior to 2004, two of the three posts did not establish  written policies and procedures for all of the offices involved in the vetting  process, or specify the documentation and records retention requirements  for these units. Third, neither State headquarters nor the three posts  established systems to periodically monitor compliance with vetting  requirements.
subsections: section_title: Laws and State Policy Restrict U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces
paragraphs: Each of the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts since 1998 has  included a provision, commonly referred to as the “Leahy Amendment,”  that restricts the provision of assistance appropriated in these acts to any  foreign security unit for which State has determined there is credible  evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights,  unless certain conditions have been met. DOD’s appropriations acts have  contained a similar restriction on DOD-funded training since fiscal year  1999.
To implement these legislative restrictions, in June 1999 and February 2003,  State directed all posts involved in providing security assistance to foreign  security forces to have procedures in place to ensure compliance with the  restrictions. Between 1999 and 2004, DOD and State issued specific  instructions to the posts on implementing these restrictions for DOD- managed training programs. While the provisions restrict funding to “any  unit of the security forces of a foreign country,” State policy applies the  restrictions to individual members of security forces, as well. State and  DOD guidance reflects this policy.
Vetting candidates for human rights concerns commonly would include the  following steps, according to post officials, State headquarters officials,  and State guidance. First, the office at the post sponsoring the training  reviews biographical and service information provided by the host  government to determine if the individual or unit has been involved in gross  violations of human rights. Second, the sponsoring office forwards the  name to the political affairs office at the post for its independent review.  The political affairs office or sponsoring office also circulates the  candidate’s name to other relevant offices within the post. As part of this  second step, the human rights officer or a foreign service national assigned  to the political office typically searches newspaper articles or the Internet  for evidence of the candidate’s involvement in gross violations of human  rights. The political office may also consult human rights nongovernmental  organizations in-country or national commissions on human rights for any  information they have on the candidate. Other offices at the post to whom  the candidate’s name is sent are expected to review any information they  have and report the results of their search to the political office. Finally, the  post sends the candidate’s name to State headquarters to be distributed to  relevant bureaus for final review and approval.
section_title: Foreign Security Officials Not Always Vetted for Possible Human Rights Violations
paragraphs: At the three posts we visited, we found lapses in human rights vetting for  foreign security forces, particularly in law enforcement training programs.  Table 4 shows the estimated number of law enforcement personnel that  U.S. officials estimated had received training but for whom no vetting had  occurred. U.S. officials based these estimates on the sizes of the groups  trained in each country for particular programs.
In addition, table 5 shows the results of a sample of trainee names that we  reviewed at each post to identify evidence of human rights vetting.
The Philippines. We found no evidence that any of the estimated 1,175  Filipino police forces receiving training under Justice’s International  Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP) in fiscal  year 2004 were vetted for evidence of gross violations of human rights. A  post official said that a foreign service national in his office responsible for  ICITAP performed some vetting on these candidates, but could not  document the important step of coordinating with the political affairs  office as required by State guidance until late 2004. In addition, we  reviewed 107 randomly selected trainee files from an estimated total of 787  trainees in the DOD-implemented programs and found some evidence of  vetting in most instances (93 files). The remaining 14 files contained no  evidence that vetting had occurred.
Indonesia. We found no evidence that an estimated 4,000 Indonesian law  enforcement officials who received training under Justice’s ICITAP were  vetted for possible human rights violations prior to October 2004. These  trainees include 32 police from a notorious unit ineligible for such training  under the ICITAP, according to State officials. In addition, our review of 10  randomly selected DOD trainee files from an estimated total of 353 trainees  showed some evidence of vetting in all instances. Files for DOD- implemented training generally included evidence that the Political Affairs  Office was included in the vetting process, indicating a more inclusive and  independent post-wide review. Post officials said that they had  implemented new post-wide procedures in late 2004 to improve the vetting  process, and now vet candidates for all post programs in accordance with  earlier State guidance.
Thailand. We found no evidence that the approximately 1,760 Thai law  enforcement officials who received training under the Foreign Operations  Appropriations Act-funded law enforcement training programs were vetted  for possible human rights violations. In contrast, our review of 25 randomly  selected DOD trainee files from an estimated total of 795 trainees in the  DOD-implemented programs showed some evidence of vetting. For  example, DOD training files generally included an initialed and dated  checklist returned from the Political Affairs Office, indicating the status of  the post-wide review.
However, the DOD official in Thailand responsible for IMET training said  that his office did not submit names of individuals to receive in-country  IMET training to the country team for vetting because officials were not  aware of this responsibility. According to 1999 DOD guidelines, all  individuals and units scheduled for in-country DOD-implemented training  should be vetted. Officials and post estimates indicated that about half of  the 795 trainees were trained in-country between fiscal years 2001 and  2004. In technical comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the  post is now vetting all in-country military training, but provided no  evidence to support this.
section_title: Agencies Do Not Have Controls in Place to Help Ensure Compliance with Human Rights Funding Restrictions
paragraphs: Lapses in vetting occurred because the agencies did not assign clear roles  and responsibilities for vetting foreign officials; departments and posts  lacked clear and consistent vetting procedures; and State and posts did not  establish a system to monitor compliance with these procedures. GAO’s  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government prescribes  basic standards for management controls in the federal government.  Internal control is an integral part of an organization’s management that  provides reasonable assurance that an entity achieves (1) effectiveness and  efficiency of operations, (2) reliability of financial reporting, and (3)  compliance with applicable laws and regulations.As a result, U.S.  agencies did not always vet foreign security forces for derogatory human  rights information before providing them with U.S.-funded training  opportunities.
subsections: section_title: Vetting Process Lacks Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: Neither State headquarters nor the three posts we visited had clear roles  and responsibilities established for vetting foreign security forces receiving  State funding from fiscal years 2001 and 2004 or for monitoring posts’ or  State headquarters’ compliance with vetting procedures. As a result,  officials at the posts we visited expressed confusion over their vetting roles  and responsibilities, especially those related to law enforcement training  programs.
According to GAO’s internal control standards, an organization should  establish a positive control environment, including an organizational  structure and clearly defined roles and responsibilities conducive to sound  management controls. However, State guidance did not establish a single  bureau to be responsible for implementing the vetting process or for  monitoring posts’ compliance with vetting procedures. This was an  important omission because four State bureaus are involved in either  establishing policy or managing State-funded training programs: Bureau of  Political-Military Affairs; Bureau of International Narcotics and Law  Enforcement; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; and the  Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs.
section_title: State Lacks Clear Policies and Procedures for Vetting Foreign Security Forces
paragraphs: State lacked clear policies and procedures for human rights vetting in  several areas: (1) only the Manila post established postwide procedures, as  required, prior to 2004; (2) State established no documentation and record  retention requirements regarding vetting documents; (3) the posts did not  conduct a comprehensive review of all candidates for assistance through a  central focal point, such as the political affairs office, before 2004; (4) State  headquarters did not specify whether posts needed to submit candidates’  names to State headquarters for additional review and approval. According  to GAO’s internal control standards, policies and procedures help enforce  management directives and are integral to achieving effective results.
State’s June 1999 and 2003 guidance directed all posts to establish  procedures to implement the human rights restrictions for all Foreign  Operations Appropriations Act-funded aid to security forces and DOD- funded training. According to our internal control standards, policies and  procedures help enforce management directives and are integral to  achieving effective results. However, only Embassy Manila established  written procedures for human rights vetting as required prior to 2004.  Guidance issued in 1999 directed that posts report their procedures to the  Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor by a certain date, but a  Bureau official believed that posts had not done so. Nonetheless, prior to  2004, two of the three posts did not establish written policies and  procedures for the vetting process. Two of the three posts we visited— Manila and Jakarta—established new written procedures for human rights  vetting in the fall 2004; the Bangkok post had not yet established written  procedures at the time of our visit in March 2005. In contrast, DOD and  State issued more detailed supplemental guidance to DOD officials at posts  for DOD-funded training, including criteria to apply in screening candidates  and checklists to track vetting processes.
State’s 1999 and 2003 guidance also did not specify documentation and  record retention requirements for the documents used at posts or  headquarters in the human rights vetting process for Foreign Operations  Appropriations Act-funded assistance. As a result, the Jakarta post was  unable to provide us with any documentation of post vetting conducted for  ICITAP between fiscal years 2001 and 2004. By contrast, documentation for  vetting candidates for DOD-implemented training generally was more  complete, and included check-lists, approving signatures, and biographical  information on nominees in separate folders. DOD documentation was  generally better because DOD had established criteria and procedures for  screening candidates in the programs it manages. These procedures  include a records retention requirement of at least 10 years for specific  programs.
State’s guidance to the posts also stated that each post should designate an  embassy point of contact, such as political counselor, to coordinate a  comprehensive review of candidates for assistance by relevant members of  the country team. However, we found that such coordination had not  occurred before 2004 for Foreign Operations Appropriations Act-funded  law enforcement training. For example, post officials in Manila and Jakarta  stated that designated embassy points of contact began receiving names of  candidates for law enforcement training only in early 2004.
We found that the three posts did not consistently cable names of all  candidates for Foreign Operations Appropriations Act-funded training to  State headquarters for vetting by bureaus because State had not yet written  this procedure into guidance. Officials at State headquarters said this  procedure was required. During our efforts to clarify whether this was a  requirement, we asked State officials to identify the written guidance  specifically requiring posts to cable candidate names back to Washington  for further vetting. However, these officials could not identify any specific  language prior to February 2005 when State headquarters issued new  instructions to the posts. Officials at the Embassy in Jakarta said they were  not aware of this procedure, did not cable names of candidates for Foreign  Operations Appropriations Act-funded training back to State headquarters,  and wrote to State criticizing this as a burdensome new procedure in 2005.
section_title: Monitoring System Not Established to Assess Posts’ Compliance with State Policies
paragraphs: We found that no headquarters office within State currently is charged with  the responsibility of monitoring the posts’ compliance with State’s human  rights vetting procedures. However, our internal control standards state  that an organization should continually monitor as part of ongoing  operations to assess the quality of performance over time.
State and post officials are uncertain which office has the overall  responsibility for monitoring human rights vetting activities. Some officials  said that the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor had this  responsibility, while others cited the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs or  the Bureau for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Officials in each bureau were  unaware of which office had this responsibility. We found that State’s  guidance to the posts between 1997 through 2005 contained no provision  that accorded this role and responsibility to any office. State provided no  evidence that any unit at State headquarters was fulfilling this function.
Without a monitoring system in place, State could not identify instances  where a post was not complying with required procedures or instances  where confusion about requirements existed.
In Indonesia, 32 members from a brigade associated with prior human  rights abuses were trained on six separate occasions under ICITAP  between July 2002 and March 2003. However, in testimony to the House  International Relations Committee in March 2003, then-Deputy Assistant  Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs said that no such  brigade members “currently participate in the ICITAP police program,”  at the time when such individuals were participating in this training.  State sought to correct this situation by issuing written guidance to the  post in November 2003.
No one at State headquarters was aware that the three posts did not  consistently cable names of all candidates for Foreign Operations  Appropriations Act-funded training to State headquarters for vetting by  bureaus, although officials at headquarters said this was required. In  reviewing cable traffic related to human rights vetting from the three  posts, we found that the Jakarta Embassy had not cabled State  headquarters with names of any candidates for further vetting.
section_title: State Issued New Guidance to Improve Vetting Practices in February 2005
paragraphs: State issued new guidance in February 2005 intended to improve the  efficiency of the human rights vetting process. State announced that it had  established a new human rights database, the Abuse Case Evaluation  System (ACES), to be a clearinghouse for information on alleged human  rights abuses. According to the guidance, data will come from sources  currently used for human rights vetting, such as post reporting, press,  nongovernmental organizations, national human rights commissions, and  other sources. Users at posts and at State headquarters will be able to enter  a comment on allegations, and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,  and Labor will check information for completeness and accuracy. As ACES  becomes populated with data, it could become an important tool for posts  and State to make human rights vetting more efficient and effective, as well  as to facilitate human rights monitoring and reporting in general, according  to the guidance. The guidance stated that posts will enter incidents of  alleged human rights abuses into ACES whenever they occur or are  reported to post. This step will replace the requirement that posts report  alleged abuses via cable and keep track of allegations at post. Finally, the  guidance established some roles and responsibilities for offices at main  State, particularly when differences arise over credibility of evidence or the  response to such evidence.
However, this new system does not address all the deficiencies that we  found at the three posts and adds an additional resource concern. For  example, the guidance does not assign a monitoring role to any main State  office or procedures to ensure posts’ compliance with vetting procedures.  In addition, because ACES will be a classified system, foreign national  employees at posts will not be allowed access to it. Foreign nationals  currently play an important role in entering and maintaining the available  human rights vetting data at posts but would not be allowed to do so using  the ACES database. Consequently, the new system might require cleared  U.S. post officials to assume database duties that could not be conducted  by foreign nationals. To date, State guidance has not addressed the  potential for either shifting responsibilities from foreign to U.S. employees  at posts or adding more U.S. personnel for this task.
section_title: U.S. Government Lacks an Integrated National Security Assistance Strategy Covering All U.S. Training and Assistance Provided to Foreign Security Forces
paragraphs: The U.S. government lacks a clear and coherent multiyear national security  assistance strategy, making it difficult to assess progress in achieving  stated U.S. foreign policy goals, such as stemming terrorism, promoting  regional stability, and demonstrating respect for human rights. State’s  National Security Assistance Strategy, provided to Congress in May 2003,  meets two of nine objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000. The  strategy does not, however, identify how resources will be allocated to  accomplish objectives, how programs will be combined at the country level  to achieve objectives, or how security assistance programs will be  coordinated with other U.S. government agencies. In addition, the strategy  fails to discuss performance measures that are necessary to track the  achievement of goals and objectives. State and DOD have produced a  variety of other national, regional, and country-level strategic planning  documents, but these documents do not collectively satisfy the act’s  objectives.
subsections: section_title: State’s National Security Assistance Strategy Addresses Two of Nine Objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000
paragraphs: State’s National Security Assistance Strategy meets two objectives of the  Security Assistance Act of 2000; it is consistent with the U.S. National  Security Strategyand identifies overarching security assistance objectives  (see table 6). State’s strategy, however, does not cover the other seven  objectives of the act.
The Security Assistance Act of 2000 was designed to address previous  shortcomings in security assistance planning by providing Congress with  a clear and coherent multiyear plan for security assistance programs, on a  country-by-country basis. The act urged State to submit to Congress a plan,  prepared in consultation with other agencies, that identified overarching  security assistance objectives, the role specific programs would play in  achieving them, and resource allocations for each country. Further, the  Security Assistance Act of 2002 required State to brief Congress on its  plans and progress in formulating and implementing the strategy, and to  provide a description on the actions taken to include such programs as  IMET, FMF, and EDA, as well as other assistance programs to foreign  security forces in the strategy.
In response to the acts of 2000 and 2002, State prepared a 16-page  PowerPoint document entitled, “National Security Assistance Strategy  Briefing” and used it to brief selected congressional committees in May  2003 (see app. III for the briefing). State officials in the Bureau of Political- Military Affairs said that the briefing constitutes State’s current National  Security Assistance Strategy and that, through negotiations with  congressional committee staff, State was exempted from annually updating  the strategy, as urged in the law. We reviewed the briefing to determine the  extent to which the strategy addresses the nine objectives of the acts and  found the following.
The strategy is not a multiyear plan since it was prepared only once and  does not discuss outyear program plans.
The strategy was not prepared in coordination with the Office of the  Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A State official  reported that the briefing was given together with representatives from  DSCA and OSD and provided us with OSD’s six-page briefing on “DOD  Security Cooperation.” However, in reviewing State’s strategy, we did  not find evidence that it was coordinated with OSD or the Joint Chiefs of  Staff.
Despite congressional direction, the strategy was not prepared in  consultation with other appropriate agencies. The briefing indicates that  the coordination process begins at the country level, includes DOD  priorities, occurs through State roundtables and an excess defense  articles coordinating committee, and through “day-to-day coordination.”  However, State does not further detail whether it coordinates with other  appropriate agencies that provide assistance to foreign security forces,  such as Justice.
The strategy does not discuss specific security assistance objectives for  each program on a country-by-country basis. Key countries such as  Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand (among others) are identified  but the strategy does not identify which programs and security  assistance tools are being implemented in those countries.
The strategy does not discuss the resources needed or used for the  various programs and how they will be combined at the country level to  achieve objectives. The outline accompanying the briefing asserts that  State’s bureau and mission performance plans discuss how military  assistance tools contribute to achieving U.S. foreign policy goals at the  regional and country level, respectively. However, the strategy does not  incorporate key activity and resource information from these  documents;  Although the strategy lists key countries, it does not address how the  various programs are to be combined within each country to achieve  objectives. As mentioned, we identified at least 12 programs that  provide assistance to foreign security forces in Indonesia, the  Philippines, and Thailand. However, the strategy does not discuss how  programs funded by State’s Bureau of International Narcotics Control  and Law Enforcement in Thailand, for example, are combined with  DOD’s in-country counternarcotics activities.
Finally, the strategy does not detail how security assistance programs  will be coordinated with other U.S. government assistance programs  managed by DOD and other agencies. Specifically, it does not identify all  other forms of assistance provided to foreign security forces under at  least three different funding sources—State, Defense, and Justice. State  officials said they are aware of related programs funded by DOD and  Justice that provide assistance to foreign security forces, but that they  do not consider those programs “security assistance” and would not  include them in a National Security Assistance Strategy.
In addition, the strategy fails to discuss the performance measures that  can be used to assess progress towards achieving goals. Our prior work has  emphasized that agencies should link strategic planning to performance  measures, and that performance measures can better inform—or justify— how resources should be allocated to accomplish program objectives.  Officials in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand acknowledged that it is  difficult to generate quantitative performance measures for some security  assistance programs, but highlighted several qualitative measures, or “big  wins” in the region that help illustrate the effectiveness of U.S. security  assistance programs. For example, a senior U.S. official in Thailand stated  that Thai security forces are very supportive of the U.S. government’s war  on terrorism and of reducing the demand for drugs. In the Philippines, U.S.  government officials highlighted the positive impact U.S. government  security assistance programs have had on the Philippine Defense Reform  effort.
Although not reflected in State’s strategy, some efforts have been made to  develop more quantifiable measures. For example, State’s Bureau for  International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs includes quantitative  measures for programs in its official interagency or intergovernmental  agreements with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Also, the Office  of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Program Assessment Rating Tool  (PART) uses performance measures to evaluate some of State’s programs  that provide assistance to foreign security forces (and other federal  government programs). As part of the executive budget formulation  process, PART evaluators assess programs by applying 25 questions under  four broad topics: (1) program purpose and design, (2) strategic planning,  (3) program management, and (4) program results (i.e., whether a program  is meeting its long-term and annual goals). The 2004 PART reviews of  State’s ATA program and Security Assistance Programs to the Western  Hemisphere were rated as “effective” and “moderately effective,”  respectively. However, we found that the latter review has limitations  because it identifies multiple programs, but rates them as one unit of  analysis. We reported in January 2004 that inherent challenges exist in  assigning a single rating to programs that have multiple purposes and goals.  In addition, the report cited that PART has merit but remains “a work in  progress that needs considerable revisions to be an objective, evidence- based assessment tool.”
DOD’s unified commands operate a Theater Security Cooperation  Management Information System (TSCMIS) to track training and other  activities with foreign security forces in their regional areas of  responsibility. Officials can use the system to assess the effect of DOD  events on country-level goals and objectives. U.S. Pacific Command  (PACOM) officials reported that TSCMIS captures and stores key program  data, but due to resource constraints, they are uncertain whether  information is consistently entered into the system or maintained. In  addition, the assessments are conducted by activity managers and country  directors and are therefore not independent reviews of programs.
section_title: Related State and DOD Documents Address Selected Objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000
paragraphs: State and DOD annually develop various country, regional, and national  strategy and planning documents that address some objectives of the  Security Assistance Act of 2000. Figure 4 illustrates how these documents  relate to each other. Appendix IV contains a detailed analysis of how other  State and DOD planning documents address objectives of the act. Although  none of these documents constitute a single, multiyear national security  assistance strategy that covers all agency programs, we found that they  offer the potential for developing the comprehensive assistance strategy  called for in the act.
We found that some State planning documents address certain objectives  of the act. For example, State develops annual Mission Performance Plans  (MPP) for each of its overseas posts. The 2006 MPPs for Indonesia, the  Philippines, and Thailand address some objectives of the Security  Assistance Act because they contain information on some programs that  provide assistance to foreign security forces, are generally consistent with  the National Security Strategy of the United States, and are prepared in  consultation with appropriate agencies at each post. State also prepares  annual regional level Bureau Performance Plans (BPPs) that are consistent  with the National Security Strategy of the United States, and to some  extent, address how combining resources and programs will achieve  regional objectives.
DOD also produces annual country and regional planning documents that  address some objectives of the Security Assistance Act. For example,  DOD’s annual country-specific security assistance plans for the Philippines,  Indonesia, and Thailand meet some objectives of the act because they are  consistent with the National Security Strategy of the United States, include  some discussion of DOD-implemented assistance to foreign security forces  and how the assistance will be combined and contribute to achieving  certain “end states.” Similarly, DOD’s Theater Security Cooperation Plans  (TSCP) are prepared by DOD’s unified commands and include regional  security assistance and other activities for the current year, plus the next 2  fiscal years. PACOM’s fiscal year 2004 TSCP addresses selected objectives  of the act. It is consistent with the U.S. National Security Strategy, is  coordinated with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and  includes discussion of certain security cooperation activities.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State observed that our report does  not include information about the Global Affairs Dashboard pilot project,  which State said has the potential to become a useful tool for security  assistance strategic planning. We were not informed in the course of our  review of the Global Dashboard, which has yet to be developed and  deployed.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: U.S. agencies do not have adequate assurance that U.S. training funds are  being used to train and equip only foreign security forces with good human  rights backgrounds. Because they have weak internal controls, the  agencies inconsistently apply human rights vetting requirements. Improved  internal controls would provide greater assurance that all individuals are  properly vetted for human rights issues before receiving U.S. assistance.  State has not produced a clear and coherent national security assistance  strategy meeting the objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000. As a  result, it may be difficult for Congress to assess the contributions that U.S.  security assistance programs make to broader U.S. foreign policy  objectives and to have assurance that the programs’ objectives are being  met. Without an integrated strategy for U.S. security assistance that, at a  minimum, addresses the nine elements of the Security Assistance Act of  2000, the potential exists for uncoordinated approaches, duplication of  efforts, or gaps in coverage. As a result, State and Congress will be  deprived of an important source of information for making future resource  allocations and program decisions. Since a number of related State and  DOD strategic planning processes are already in place, the agencies could  use the plans produced under these related processes as the basis for  producing a new strategy that fully meets the objectives of the Security  Assistance Act of 2000.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help provide assurance that foreign candidates of U.S. security  assistance programs comply with existing legislative restrictions and State  policies on human rights, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in  consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Justice take the following  three actions to strengthen management controls by issuing new  consolidated guidance for vetting foreign security units. As part of these  new controls, posts and headquarters units should establish  the roles and responsibilities of posts and headquarters units for vetting  foreign candidates for human rights consideration;  written policies and procedures covering all entities involved in the  vetting process at posts, including documentation and record retention  policies specifying what documentation is needed and where and how  long vetting files should be maintained; and   monitoring mechanisms and a central focal point to verify that these  procedures are being carried out properly.
To help provide both State and Congress with the information needed on  how U.S. security assistance programs help support U.S. foreign policy and  security objectives, we recommend that the Secretary of State take the  following actions using existing plans and strategies within State and DOD  as the basis for developing an integrated strategic plan for all U.S.  government assistance programs that provide training, equipment, or  technical assistance to foreign security forces (military and police). This  multiyear plan should be periodically reported to Congress in response to  the Security Assistance Act of 2000, which urged the Secretary of State to  develop a multiyear security assistance plan. In addition, the strategy  should  be coordinated with the Departments of Defense and Justice and any  other agencies providing assistance to foreign security forces;   identify all federal agency programs providing assistance to foreign  security forces, regardless of their funding source;  describe all related resource allocations used to support program goals,   incorporate quantitative and qualitative performance measures  designed to determine the extent to which country programs contribute  to broader U.S. foreign policy and security objectives.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and State  and to the Attorney General for their review and comment. We received  written responses from the Secretaries of Defense and State that are  reprinted in appendixes V and VI. The Secretaries of Defense and State and  the Attorney General also provided us with technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate.
The Secretary of Defense concurred with our report in principle. However,  in technical comments on a draft of this report, DOD asserted that our  report states that DOD assistance programs in Indonesia and Thailand are  “100 percent compliant” with human rights vetting requirements. We  disagree with DOD’s comment because our report did not conclude that  DOD programs in Indonesia and Thailand were “100 percent compliant.”  Instead, our draft report stated that all 35 of the limited sample of trainee  files we reviewed in these two countries showed some evidence of human  rights vetting. The small sample size of the DOD-sponsored trainees  relative to the much larger sample of law enforcement trainees precluded  us from projecting our findings to the entire universe of DOD-sponsored  trainees. Furthermore, DOD later acknowledged in its comments on the  draft report that in-country trainees in Thailand—about half of the 795  trainees for fiscal years 2001 to 2004—were not vetted during the period we  reviewed.
The Secretary of State acknowledged the need for continued improvement  on human rights vetting procedures but stated that it is operating its  assistance programs in full compliance with the law. State commented that  any vetting of individuals is done as a matter of State policy and practice,  not as a matter of law. We agree with State’s comment. However, in  reviewing State’s application of its policy on human rights vetting of  individuals, we found significant weaknesses that resulted in an estimated  6,900 individuals receiving U.S. training assistance without any evidence  that they had first been vetted for gross violations of human rights.  Therefore, we recommended in our report that State strengthen its  management controls on vetting to meet its stated policy goal of not  providing U.S. assistance to suspected gross human rights violators.
State also commented that it has fully complied with congressional intent  regarding a national security assistance strategy. State disagreed with our  finding that the national security assistance strategy met only two of nine  objectives of the law. It said that our findings are based on incomplete  information because many of the objectives were met and discussed in a  May 2003 oral briefing with selected Congressional staff, and that the  absence of further requests for a briefing on the national security  assistance strategy or additional requirements relieved it of further  obligations. We disagree with State’s comments. The documents, which  State identified as representing a national security assistance strategy, met  only two of nine objectives that the law urged State to address in crafting  this strategy. The briefing was a good first step, but a detailed written plan  is needed for wider distribution, and for providing documentation for  tracking progress in moving forward.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, and the Secretaries of Defense, Justice, and State. We will also  make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will  be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-8979 or at christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To identify the nature and extent of U.S. assistance to foreign security  forces in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, we met with officials of  the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice in Washington, D.C.,  responsible for administering various aspects of U.S. assistance programs  to foreign security forces. We also met with U.S. Pacific Command officials  in Honolulu, Hawaii; and U.S. Embassy and foreign government officials in  Manila, the Philippines; Jakarta, Indonesia; and Bangkok, Thailand. We also  obtained the statutory authorizations for these programs from program  officials and from our independent legal searches. We obtained data on the  nature and extent of the activities funded by these programs in Indonesia,  the Philippines, and Thailand from program officials and State and DOD  Web sites. We reviewed the reliability of funding data provided by State and  DOD by comparing it with similar data obtained from other sources to  check for completeness, consistency, and reasonableness. We also  interviewed program officials responsible for managing the data to assess  how it was developed and maintained. We found the data sufficiently  reliable for representing the nature and extent of program funding.
To assess the extent to which the three posts included in our review  complied with human rights vetting requirements from 2001 to 2004, we  reviewed program policy and procedures issued by State and DOD officials  in Washington, D.C., and at the three posts, and how these procedures were  implemented at each post. We also interviewed relevant officials in  Washington, PACOM, and the three posts, and discussed vetting  requirements and processes. At each post, we asked the relevant post  officials to identify the total number of foreign security officials trained  under all programs provided under the Foreign Operations Appropriations  Act and DOD appropriations act subject to the Leahy restrictions from 2001  to 2004. We then randomly selected and reviewed program files for those  officials. We reviewed the files for compliance with human rights vetting  requirements as set forth in legislation and State policy guidance. To  conduct the file review, we used a data collection instrument to  systematically capture whether key steps in the post’s human rights vetting  process occurred, such as whether the political affairs office at each post  was involved.
We were able to estimate that 87 percent of files for DOD trainees in the  Philippines had some documentation subject to a sampling error of plus or  minus 10 percent. The 95 percent confidence interval surrounding this  estimate ranges from 80 percent to 92 percent. However, due to small  sample sizes for the other agencies in the other countries, we were unable  to make other reliable estimates about the percentage of files for which  some vetting occurred. The small sample sizes occurred because, after we  had drawn our sample, U.S. officials told us that no files existed for several  large groups of trainees, including approximately 4,000 trainees under the  ICITAP program in Indonesia and 1,439 trainees from the Narcotics Affairs  Section in Thailand. In addition, after we had drawn our sample, we were  told about other groups of trainees that had not been vetted. As a result,  our estimates for the numbers of trainees for which no vetting occurred are  based on officials' estimates of the numbers of trainees that had taken the  training that should have been vetted, not the file review we conducted. To  assess the reliability of the estimates on trainees that had not received  training, we interviewed officials, and compared the estimates they  provided with other available information. While we found that some of the  components in the estimates were less precise than others, we determined  that these estimates were sufficiently reliable to indicate that many  thousands of trainees had not been vetted.
In addition, to obtain a general understanding of the human rights situation  in each country, we also met with State human rights officers, national  commissions on human rights in each country, as well as representatives of  nongovernmental organizations involved with human rights issues.  Specifically, in the Philippines we met with Task Force Detainees; in  Indonesia, we met with The Commission for Involuntary Disappearance  and Victims of Violence, Voice of Human Rights in Indonesia, and the  National Forum for the Commission on Human Rights in Papua; and in  Thailand we met with Forum Asia and Human Rights Watch. In addition,  we met with nongovernmental organizations in Washington, D.C., to  understand the general human rights situation on countries included in our  review: Amnesty International, East Timor Action Network, Human Rights  Watch, and the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights.
To assess the U.S. government’s national security assistance strategy, we  met with State, DOD, and Justice officials in Washington, D.C., responsible  for managing and administering U.S. assistance to foreign security forces.  We also met with U.S. Pacific Command officials in Honolulu, Hawaii; and  U.S. Embassy officials in Manila, the Philippines; Jakarta, Indonesia; and  Bangkok, Thailand. We analyzed key planning documents from State and  DOD to determine the extent to which they addressed the nine strategic  objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000, that urged State to  develop a multiyear National Security Assistance Strategy. As part of this  assessment, we analyzed State’s Strategic Plan, Mission Performance Plans  for each post we visited, and the Bureau Performance Plan for the Bureau  of East Asia and Pacific Affairs. We also assessed PACOM’s Theater  Security Cooperation Plan, reviewed three other unified command’s  theater security cooperation plans, and assessed security assistance plans  for the three countries included in our review. To address the extent to  which State and DOD have performance measures for programs that train  and equip foreign security forces, we interviewed agency officials,  reviewed OMB’s 2004 and 2005 Performance Assessment Rating Tool  assessments, DOD’s Theater Security Cooperation Management  Information System, and Justice’s Letters of Agreement with other agencies  and with the three countries included in our review.
We conducted this review from June 2004 to June 2005 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Descriptions of Assistance Programs to Foreign Security Forces
paragraphs: We use the term “allocations” to describe the broad mix of appropriated  and nonappropriated assistance being provided to foreign security forces  in these three countries.  State and DOD appropriations accounted for 83  percent of the total; nonappropriated assistance in the form of Excess  Defense Articles and drawdowns from DOD stocks accounted for 13  percent of the total; and DOD and Justice expenditures accounted for 4  percent of the total.  Expenditures data were used for the DOD’s JCET  program and Justice’s DEA and FBI training activities because separate  appropriations and country allocation data does not exist.
section_title: State Department National Security Assistance Strategy Briefing
section_title: Other State and DOD Documents Address Some Objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Comments from the Department of State
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State letter dated  July 12, 2005.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. State commented that the Leahy provisions apply only to units, not  individuals, of foreign security forces, and said that applying human  rights restrictions at the individual level is a matter of policy. State also  asserted that it takes additional measures to avoid the provision of U.S.  assistance to individuals suspected of gross human rights violations,  whether inside or outside the security unit setting. However, our work  showed that State’s policy is not being effectively implemented. We  found that an estimated 6,900 individuals received U.S. training  assistance without any evidence that they had first been vetted for  gross violations of human rights. Therefore, we recommended in the  report that State strengthen its management controls to meet its stated  policy goal of not providing U.S. assistance to suspected gross human  rights violators.  2. State said that U.S. embassies in the Philippines, Indonesia, and  Thailand reviewed their human rights vetting procedures and brought  them into compliance with Department guidance. We agree that  embassies in Manila and Jakarta wrote their human rights vetting  procedures during the course of our review to bring them into  compliance with State guidance. However, Embassy Bangkok does not  have written procedures and is not in compliance with State guidelines.  More importantly, State lacks a system for monitoring compliance with  its guidelines. As discussed in our report, we found that no  headquarters office within State is currently charged with the  responsibility of monitoring the posts’ compliance with State’s human  rights vetting procedures and recommended that such a monitoring  mechanism be established to verify that these procedures are being  carried out properly. Such a system would help eliminate the major  gaps in vetting we found at the three posts we visited.
State further commented that the State-run International Law  Enforcement Academies and Philippines ATA programs have been fully  incorporated in human rights vetting procedures since 1999. However,  this comment is not relevant to our main finding that we found no  evidence that about 6,900 foreign security forces were vetted for human  rights concerns before receiving U.S. law enforcement training under  ICITAP.  3. State acknowledged the need for continued improvement, especially  concerning better oversight of the implementation of posts’  procedures. It noted that some oversight is provided through the  periodic Inspector General inspections. State said that it purposely  allows the posts flexibility in deciding vetting guidelines. We contacted  the State Inspector General and found that their periodic post  inspections have not included assessments of State’s human rights  vetting process at any of the three posts. We found that State had  conducted an inspection at only one post--Embassy Bangkok--between  fiscal years 2001 through 2004.  4. We disagree with State’s comments that (1) central oversight of posts’  compliance with vetting requirements in a single office is not needed,  and (2) its new database system will mitigate the need for  centralization in one bureau. As stated in our report, no office within  State is charged with the overall responsibility of monitoring posts’  compliance with human rights vetting requirements, which has led to  lapses in the vetting process across all three posts. Currently, four  different bureaus within State share some responsibility for  implementing these requirements. This has resulted in confusion in the  field and gaps in implementing departmental vetting policies. State’s  guidance issued to the posts between 1997 through 2005 did not assign  this role and responsibility to any one office. A central focal point  would help identify instances where a post was not complying with  required procedures or instances where confusion about requirements  existed. The new database, alone, will not solve the vetting problems  we identified or replace the need for designating an office with the  express responsibility of monitoring how posts implement their human  rights vetting requirements. 5. We disagree with State’s statement that our decision to include a full  range of programs and activities supporting foreign military and police  forces within the scope of our review undermined our assessment of  State’s compliance with the Security Assistance Act. As officials with  State’s Bureau of Legal Affairs repeatedly stated, there is no statutory  definition of “security assistance,” or even a commonly agreed-upon  definition within the federal government. In the absence of a legal  definition, and for the purposes of our report, we defined security  assistance as U.S. government assistance to train and equip foreign  security forces (military and police). Although State officials indicated  that it traditionally considers security assistance to include FMF, IMET,  EDA, and PKO programs, the Security Assistance Act of 2002 states  that FMF, IMET and EDA as well as other similar training programs  to foreign security forces shall be included in State’s briefing on the  strategy. It will be difficult for State to craft a comprehensive security  assistance strategy, as called for in our report, without including at least  the 12 related programs and activities described in our report. 6. We disagree that the absence of further requests for a briefing on the  national security assistance strategy somehow changed the intention of  the Security Assistance Act of 2000 to have an annual report to  Congress. The Security Assistance Act of 2000 urged State to provide an  annual strategy while the 2002 act mandated a status briefing on the  development of that strategy. We understand that State fulfilled its  requirement to brief the committees on the progress of the strategy, as  called for in the 2002 act, but we disagree that a lack of request for  additional briefings altered the intention of the 2000 act, which urged  State to provide an annual National Security Assistance Strategy to  Congress.  7. The briefing was a good first step, but a detailed written plan is needed  for wider distribution, and for providing documentation for tracking  progress in moving forward.  8. We agree with State’s observation that our report does not include  information about the Global Affairs Dashboard pilot project, which  State said has the potential to become a useful tool for security  assistance strategic planning. Although we were not informed in the  course of our review of the Global Dashboard, which has yet to be  developed and deployed, we support all State efforts to develop better  strategic planning tools for U.S. security assistance programs. We have  revised the report to reflect this new information. 9. We have made changes in the body of the report to reflect State’s  comment that the draft incorrectly referred to IMET and FMF as DOD  programs, when they are Foreign Operations Appropriations Act- funded programs.  10. The draft report already reflected the distinction between State policy  and the law. 11. We have updated the report to reflect State’s comment.  12. We agree with State’s comment that Embassy Manila had written  procedures for human rights vetting prior to 2004 and made changes in  the report to reflect this comment. However, we disagree with State’s  comment that Embassy Manila provided us with all relevant documents  during our visit in March 2005, including an October 2000 cable  outlining post human rights vetting procedures. In fact, the post  provided us only with the procedures in effect since late 2004.  13. We have revised the graphic to reflect State’s comment that no EDA  articles were transferred to Indonesia.  14. We have revised the graphic to correct the value for CTFP.  15. State commented that ATA allocations should be $7.8 million, rather  than $1.9 million, for the Philippines; $19.1 million, rather than $14.8  million, for Indonesia; and   $4.2 million, rather than zero, for Thailand.  In subsequent discussions with State officials, they said that these  figures represent “either obligations or expenditures,” and not  allocations, as we requested. We could not verify the numbers that they  provided through agency comments and State was not able to provide  us with corrected values for the allocations. As a result, we made no  changes to the report and reported the available ATA country  allocations as presented in State’s Congressional Budget Justifications. 16. We revised our report language to reflect State’s comment. 17. State misinterpreted our generic description of the human rights  vetting process, which was not intended to imply that all State officials  share a common understanding of vetting policies and procedures.  During our fieldwork at the three posts, we found major gaps in the  implementation of State’s vetting procedures.  18. We have changed the report to reflect State’s comment that it is the  responsibility of the initiating office in Jakarta, not the political section,  to obtain clearances from all other sections.  19. State asserts that some of the 300 ATA in-country trainees in Thailand  who were not vetted were not members of the security forces and thus  should be excluded from the table. However, we carefully separated  out non-security forces from our review before assessing compliance  with human rights vetting procedures. Our numbers were based on our  file review in Embassy Bangkok and discussion with the ATA Program  Director. This analysis showed that of 708 ATA trainees between 2001  and 2004; 144 were security forces sent to the United States, 321 were  security forces trained in Thailand, but not vetted; and 243 were non- security forces trained in Thailand for whom vetting was not required. 20. We disagree with State’s comment that the number of Indonesian  trainees from 2001 through 2004 is 705. We revised the incorrect figure  (210) in our report to reflect the number (297) provided by the post in  its “DS/ATA Indonesia Summary Sheet.”  21. We disagree with State’s comment that we may be implying a  relationship between the ATA program and all security assistance  programs to the western hemisphere, based on our discussion of PART  ratings in our draft report. We did not intend to imply a relationship  between the two programs. As stated in our draft report, the 2004 PART  conducted two separate reviews. One review was for the ATA program,  which it rated as “effective.” The other review was for all security  assistance programs to the Western Hemisphere, which were rated as  “moderately effective.” 22. State contends that the National Security Assistance Strategy is a  multiyear plan because the Bureau Performance Plans are multiyear  documents. The Bureau Performance Plans are different documents  and serve a different purpose as indicated in our report. We  acknowledge in the report that the Bureau Performance Plans are  consistent with the National Security Strategy of the United States, and  to some extent address how combining resources and programs will  achieve regional goals as called for in the act. However, the Bureau  Performance Plans do not constitute a National Security Assistance  Strategy. 23. State said that it coordinated development of the National Security  Assistance Strategy with the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of  Staff, and other appropriate agencies. We acknowledge that State’s  annual roundtables and other communications are useful in developing  and “fine-tuning” security assistance goals and objectives. However, we  did not find anyone in those offices who participated in developing the  National Security Assistance Strategy —the briefing slides, outline, and  oral presentation. One State official earlier had said that DOD officials  were involved only in presenting a briefing on EDA as part of State’s  Strategy briefing and a separate briefing on DOD’s security cooperation  efforts.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Stephen M. Lord, Assistant  Director; Jeffrey D. Phillips; Ann M. Ulrich; Jonathan Ban; Matthew Helm;  Lynn Cothern; Mary Moutsos; and Sidney Schwartz made key contributions  to this report.