Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters
Published: 2007-03-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 stipulates major changes to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to improve the agency's preparedness for and response to catastrophic disasters. For example, the act establishes a new mission for and new leadership positions within FEMA. As GAO has reported, DHS faces continued challenges, including clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems to provide effective response while also protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse. This testimony discusses the extent to which DHS has taken steps to overcome these challenges This testimony summarizes earlier GAO work on: (1) leadership, response capabilities, and accountability controls; (2) organizational changes provided for in the Post-Katrina Reform Act; and (3) disaster management issues for continued Congressional attention.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO reported in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina that DHS needs to more effectively coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. GAO analysis showed improvements were needed in leadership roles and responsibilities, development of necessary disaster capabilities, and accountability systems that balance the need for fast, flexible response with the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. To facilitate rapid and effective decision making, legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all government levels must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood. Improved capabilities were needed for catastrophic disasters--particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3) evacuations; (4) search and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6) mass care and sheltering. Effectively implementing the provisions of the Post-Katrina Reform Act will address many of these issues, and FEMA has initiated reviews and some actions in each of these areas. But their operational impact in a major disaster has not yet been tested. As a result of its body of work, GAO's recommendations included that DHS (1) rigorously re-test, train, and exercise its recent clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of leadership; (2) direct that more robust and detailed operational implementation plans support the National Response Plan (NRP); (3) provide guidance and direction for all planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a lead in monitoring federal agencies' efforts to prepare to meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness Goal; and (5) use a risk management approach in making its investment decisions. We also recommended that Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take action to prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is warning. In his oversight letter to Congress, the Comptroller General suggested that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to prepare for, respond to, recover, and rebuild from catastrophic events. Congress may wish to consider several specific areas for immediate oversight. These include (1) evaluating development and implementation of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for an influenza pandemic; (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants to enhance those capabilities; (3) examining regional and multi-state planning and preparation; (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises; and (5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on disaster preparation  and response. The goal of disaster preparedness and response is easy to  state but difficult to achieve and can be stated as follows:  To prevent where possible, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to  disasters of any size or cause with well-planned, well-coordinated,  and effective actions that minimize the loss of life and property and  set the stage for a quick recovery.
Achieving this goal for major disasters, and catastrophic disasters in  particular, is difficult because success requires effective pre- and post- disaster coordination and cooperation among different levels of  government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.  Individuals can also contribute to success through such things as knowing  evacuation routes, complying with evacuation orders, and having a family  and individual disaster preparation plan and supplies.
GAO has identified disaster preparedness and response as a major  challenge for the 21st century. In 2005, GAO issued a special report  examining the federal government’s long-term fiscal outlook, the nation’s  ability to respond to emerging forces reshaping American society, and the  future role of the federal government. Among the issues discussed was  homeland security. In our report we identified the following illustrative  challenges and questions for examining emergency preparedness and  response:    What is an acceptable, achievable (within budget constraints) level of  risk? The nation can never be completely safe; total security is an  unachievable goal. Therefore, the issue becomes what is an acceptable  level of risk to guide homeland security strategies and investments,  particularly federal funding. What criteria should be used to target  federal and state funding for homeland security in order to maximize  results and mitigate risk within available resource levels?
What should be the role of federal, state, and local governments in  identifying risks—from nature or man—in individual states and  localities and establishing standards for the equipment, skills, and  capacities that first responders need?
Are existing incentives sufficient to support private sector protection  of critical infrastructure the private sector owns, and what changes  might be necessary?
What is the most viable way to approach homeland security results  management and accountability? What are the appropriate goals and  who is accountable for the many components of homeland security  when many partners and functions and disciplines are involved? How  can these actors be held accountable and by whom? What costs should  be borne by federal, state, and local governments or the private sector  in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters large and  small—whether the acts of nature or the deliberate or accidental acts  of man?
To what extent and how should the federal government encourage and  foster a role for regional or multistate entities in emergency planning  and response?
These issues are enormously complex and challenging for all levels of  government. It is important to view preparedness for and response to  major disasters as a national system with linked responsibilities and  capabilities. This is because effective preparedness for and response to  major disasters requires the coordinated planning and actions of multiple  actors from multiple first responder disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of  government as well as nongovernmental entities. Parochialism must be put  aside and cooperation must prevail before and after an emergency event.  The experience of Hurricane Katrina illustrated why it is important to  tackle these difficult issues.
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post- Katrina Reform Act) requires major changes designed to increase the  effectiveness of preparedness and response. The act has established new  leadership positions and position requirements within the Federal  Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), establishes new missions for  FEMA, requires the transfer of preparedness functions to it, and requires  the FEMA Administrator to undertake a broad range of activities before  and after disasters occur. However, as the Comptroller General testified  last month on DHS’s high-risk status and specifically disaster  preparedness and response, DHS must overcome continued challenges,  including those related to clearly defining leadership roles and  responsibilities, developing necessary disaster response capabilities, and  establishing accountability systems to provide effective services while  protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse.
My testimony today (1) summarizes our key findings regarding leadership,  response capabilities, and accountability controls; (2) discusses the  organizational changes provided for the in the Post-Katrina Reform Act;  and (3) highlights several disaster management issues for continued  congressional attention. My comments today are based on our Hurricane  Katrina work on disaster and emergency management and our review of  recent emergency management reform legislative changes. We conducted  our audit work in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Appendix I contains a selected list of GAO reports  related to my statement.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Several federal legislative and executive provisions support preparation  for and response to emergency situations. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster  Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) primarily  establishes the programs and processes for the federal government to  provide major disaster and emergency assistance to state, local, and tribal  governments, individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations.  FEMA, within DHS, has responsibility for administering the provisions of  the Stafford Act.
Besides using these federal resources, states affected by a catastrophic  disaster can also turn to other states for assistance in obtaining surge  capacity—the ability to draw on additional resources, such as personnel  and equipment, needed to respond to and recover from the incident. One  way of sharing personnel and equipment across state lines is through the  use of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, an interstate  compact that provides a legal and administrative framework for managing  such emergency requests. The compact includes all 50 states and the  District of Columbia. We have ongoing work examining how the  Emergency Management Assistance Compact has been used in disasters  and how its effectiveness could be enhanced and expect to report within a  few months.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required the newly established DHS to  develop a comprehensive National Incident Management System (NIMS).  NIMS is intended to provide a consistent framework for incident  management at all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause, size, or  complexity of the situation and to define the roles and responsibilities of  federal, state, and local governments, and various first responder  disciplines at each level during an emergency event. It also prescribes  interoperable communications systems and preparedness before an  incident happens, including planning, training, and exercises. The act  required DHS to consolidate existing federal government emergency  response plans into a single, integrated and coordinated national response  plan. DHS issued the National Response Plan (NRP), intended to be an all- discipline, all-hazards plan establishing a single, comprehensive  framework for the management of domestic incidents where federal  involvement is necessary. The NRP, operating within the framework of  NIMS, provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy and  operational direction for domestic incident management. The NRP also  includes a Catastrophic Incident Annex, which describes an accelerated,  proactive national response to catastrophic incidents.
Developing the capabilities needed for large-scale disasters is part of an  overall national preparedness effort that should integrate and define what  needs to be done and where, how it should be done, and how well it  should be done—that is, according to what standards. The principal  national documents designed to address each of these are, respectively,  the National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System,  and the National Preparedness Goal. The interim National Preparedness  Goal, required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, is  particularly important for determining what capabilities are needed,  especially for a catastrophic disaster. All states and urban areas are to  align existing preparedness strategies within the National Preparedness  Goal’s eight national priorities. The December 2005 draft National  Preparedness Goal defines both the 37 major capabilities that first  responders should possess to prevent, protect from, respond to, and  recover from a wide range of incidents and the most critical tasks  associated with these capabilities. An inability to effectively perform these  critical tasks would, by definition, have a detrimental affect on effective  protection, prevention, response, and recovery capabilities. A final  National Preparedness Goal is expected to be released soon.
As the subcommittee is aware, beginning in February 2006, reports by the  House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and  Response to Hurricane Katrina, the Senate Homeland Security and  Governmental Affairs Committee, the White House Homeland Security  Council, the DHS Inspector General, and DHS and FEMA all identified a  variety of failures and some strengths in the preparations for, response to,  and initial recovery from Hurricane Katrina. Collectively, these reports,  along with GAO’s various reports and testimonies, offered a number of  specific recommendations for improving the nation’s ability to effectively  prepare for and respond to catastrophic disasters. Table 1 contains the  resulting reports and a brief description of their findings.
section_title: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve Emergency Management
paragraphs: After FEMA became part of DHS in March 2003, its responsibilities were  over time dispersed and redefined. FEMA continues to evolve within DHS  as it implements the changes required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act,  whose details are discussed later. Hurricane Katrina severely tested  disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and revealed  weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding to, and  recovering from any catastrophic disaster. Based on work done during the  aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, we previously reported that DHS needs to  more effectively coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery  efforts, particularly for catastrophic disasters in which the response  capabilities of state and local governments are almost immediately  overwhelmed. Our analysis showed the need for (1) clearly defined and  understood leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the development of  the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that  effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need  to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.
subsections: section_title: Leadership Is Critical to Prepare for, Respond to, and Recover from Catastrophic Disasters
paragraphs: In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic  disaster, the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of  authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, effectively  communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and effective  decision making. Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve  leadership at all levels of government to better respond to a catastrophic  disaster. For example, there were problems with roles and responsibilities  under the NRP and ambiguities about both what constituted an incident of  national significance to trigger the NRP and what constituted a  catastrophic incident to trigger the proactive response of the NRP’s  Catastrophic Incident Annex. On May 25, 2006, DHS released changes to  the NRP regarding leadership issues, such as which situations require  secretarial leadership; the process for declaring incidents of national  significance; and the scope of the NRP and its Catastrophic Incident  Annex. The revised NRP clearly states that the Secretary of Homeland  Security, who reports directly to the President, is responsible for declaring  and managing incidents of national significance, including catastrophic  ones. At the time of Katrina, the supplement to the catastrophic incident  annex, which provides more detail on implementing the annex, was still in  draft. Subsequent to Katrina, DHS published the final supplement to the  Catastrophic Incident Annex, dated August 2006.
The White House Homeland Security Council report included   44 recommendations that were intended for quick implementation, of  which 18 were focused on improving and clarifying the legal authorities,  roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority. DHS has provided limited  information on the status of its implementation of the White House  recommendations, although it has reported actions taken on some issues  raised in the White House Homeland Security Council report and in other  reports. For example, DHS has pre-designated Principal Federal Officials  and Federal Coordinating Officers for regions and states at risk of  hurricanes and described their respective roles in coordinating disaster  response—which was a source of some confusion in the federal response  to Hurricane Katrina. However, the changes may not have fully resolved  the leadership issues regarding the roles of the principal federal officer  and federal coordinating officer. While the Secretary of Homeland Security  may avoid conflicts by appointing a single individual to serve in both  positions in nonterrorist incidents, confusion may persist if the Secretary  of Homeland Security does not exercise this discretion to do so.  Furthermore, this discretion does not exist for terrorist incidents, and the  revised NRP does not specifically provide a rationale for this limitation.
Congress also raised concerns in 2006 that FEMA’s performance problems  during the response to Hurricane Katrina may have stemmed from its  organizational placement and its budgetary relationship within DHS. In  May 2006, we noted that organizational changes alone, while potentially  important, were not likely to adequately address the underlying systemic  conditions that resulted in FEMA’s performance problems. We noted that  a number of factors other than organizational placement may be more  important to FEMA’s success in responding to and recovering from future  disasters, including catastrophic ones. Conditions underlying FEMA’s  performance during Hurricane Katrina involved the experience and  training of DHS or FEMA leadership; the clarity of FEMA’s mission and  related responsibilities and authorities to achieve mission performance  expectations; the adequacy of it human, financial, and technological  resources; and the effectiveness of planning, exercises, and related  partnerships. The Post-Katrina Reform Act includes provisions that  address each of these issues.
section_title: Enhanced Capabilities for Catastrophic Response and Recovery Are Needed
paragraphs: Numerous reports and our own work suggest that the substantial  resources and capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal  governments and nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to  meet the immediate challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of  damage and the number of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  Developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters should be  part of an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate  and define what needs to be done and where, how it should be done, and  how well it should be done—that is, according to what standards. The  principal national documents designed to address each of these are,  respectively, the National Response Plan, the National Incident  Management System, and the National Preparedness Goal. The nation’s  experience with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforces some of the  questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the context of a  catastrophic disaster—particularly in the areas of (1) situational  assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications,   (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care   and sheltering.
Capabilities are built upon the appropriate combination of people, skills,  processes, and assets. Ensuring that needed capabilities are available  requires effective planning and coordination in conjunction with training  and exercises in which the capabilities are realistically tested and  problems identified and subsequently addressed in partnership with other  federal, state, and local stakeholders. In recent work on FEMA  management of day-to-day operations, we found that although shifting  resources caused by its transition to DHS created challenges for FEMA,  the agency’s management of existing resources compounded these  problems. FEMA lacks some of the basic management tools that help an  agency respond to changing circumstances. Most notably, FEMA lacks a  strategic workforce plan and related human capital strategies—such as  succession planning or a coordinated training effort. Such tools are  integral to managing resources, as they enable an agency to define staffing  levels, identify the critical skills needed to achieve its mission, and  eliminate or mitigate gaps between current and future skills and  competencies. FEMA officials have said they are beginning to address  these and other basic organizational management issues. To this end,  FEMA has commissioned studies of 18 areas, whose final reports and  recommendations are due later this spring.
In identifying available capabilities, FEMA needs to identify and assess the  capabilities that exist across the federal government and outside the  federal government. For example, in a recent report on housing assistance,  we found that the National Response Plan’s annex covering temporary  shelter and housing (Emergency Support Function--6) clearly described  the overall responsibilities of the two primary responsible agencies— FEMA and the Red Cross. However, the responsibilities described for the  support agencies—the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Housing and  Urban Development (HUD), and Veterans Affairs—did not, and still do  not, fully reflect their capabilities. Further, these support agencies had not,  at the time of our work, developed fact sheets describing their roles and  responsibilities, notification and activation procedures, and agency- specific authorities, as called for by ESF-6 operating procedures. We  recommended that the support agencies propose revisions to the NRP that  fully reflect each respective support agency’s capabilities for providing  temporary housing under ESF-6, develop the needed fact sheets, and  develop operational plans that provide details on how their respective  agencies will meet their temporary housing responsibilities. The  Departments of Defense, HUD, Treasury, and the Veterans Administration,  and Agriculture, concurred with our recommendations. The Red Cross did  not comment on our report or recommendations. As part of a housing task  force, FEMA is currently exploring ways of incorporating housing  assistance offered by private sector organizations.
Further, recent GAO work found that actions are needed to clarify the  responsibilities and increase preparedness for evacuations, especially for  those transportation-disadvantaged populations. We found that state and  local governments are generally not well prepared to evacuate  transportation-disadvantaged populations (ie. planning, training, and  conducting exercises), but some states and localities have begun to  address challenges and barriers. For example, in June 2006 DHS reported  that only about 10 percent of the state and about 12 percent of the urban  area emergency plans it reviewed adequately addressed evacuating these  populations. Steps being taken by some such governments include  collaboration with social service and transportation providers and  transportation planning organizations—some of which are Department of  Transportation (DOT) grantees and stakeholders—to determine  transportation needs and develop agreements for emergency use of drivers  and vehicles. The federal government provides evacuation assistance to  state and local governments, but gaps in this assistance have hindered  many of these governments’ ability to sufficiently prepare for evacuations.  This includes the lack of any specific requirement to plan, train, and  conduct exercises for the evacuation of transportation-disadvantaged  populations as well as gaps in the usefulness of DHS’s guidance. We  recommended that DHS should clarify federal agencies’ roles and  responsibilities for providing evacuation assistance when state and local  governments are overwhelmed. DHS should require state and local  evacuation preparedness for transportation-disadvantaged populations  and improve information to assist these governments. DOT should  encourage its grant recipients to share information to assist in evacuation  preparedness for these populations. DOT and DHS agreed to consider our  recommendations, and DHS stated it has partly implemented some of  them.
Finally, the use of a risk management methodology—integrating  systematic concern for risk into the normal cycle of agency decision  making and implementation—should be central to assessing the risk for  catastrophic disasters, guiding the development of national capabilities  and the expertise that can be used to respond effectively to catastrophic  disasters. As I stated in my testimony to this subcommittee on applying  risk management principles to guide federal investments, risk  management should be viewed strategically, that is, with a view that goes  beyond assessing what the risks are, to the integration of risk into annual  budget and program review cycles.
section_title: Balance Needed between Quick Provision of Assistance and Ensuring Accountability to Protect against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
paragraphs: Controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources are  used appropriately. Nevertheless, during a catastrophic disaster, decision  makers struggle with the tension between implementing controls and  accountability mechanisms and the demand for rapid response and  recovery assistance. On one hand, our work uncovered many examples  where quick action could not occur due to procedures that required  extensive, time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of vital  supplies and other assistance. On the other hand, we also found examples  where FEMA’s processes assisting disaster victims left the federal  government vulnerable to fraud and the abuse of expedited assistance  payments.
We estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about $600 million  to $1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to  applicants who used invalid information to apply for expedited cash  assistance. DHS and FEMA have reported a number of actions that are to  be in effect for the 2007 hurricane season so that federal recovery  programs will have more capacity to rapidly handle a catastrophic incident  but also provide accountability. Examples include significantly increasing  the quantity of prepositioned supplies, such as food, ice, and water;  placing global positioning systems on supply trucks to track their location  and better manage the delivery of supplies; creating an enhanced phone  system for victim assistance applications that can handle up to 200,000  calls per day; and improving computer systems and processes for verifying  the eligibility of those applying for assistance. Effective implementation of  these and other planned improvements will be critical to achieving their  intended outcomes.
Finally, catastrophic disasters not only require a different magnitude of  capabilities and resources for effective response, they may also require  more flexible policies and operating procedures. In a catastrophe,  streamlining, simplifying, and expediting decision making should quickly  replace “business as usual” and unquestioned adherence to long-standing  policies and operating procedures used in normal situations for providing  relief to disaster victims. At the same time, controls and accountability  mechanisms must be sufficient to provide the documentation needed for  expense reimbursement and reasonable assurance that resources have  been used legally and for the purposes intended. The federal government  also will be a major partner in the longer-term recovery and rebuilding of  communities along the Gulf Coast. Among the areas requiring federal  attention are (1) assessing the environmental hazards created by the  storms; (2) rebuilding and strengthening the levees; (3) providing  assistance to school districts that have enrolled large numbers of evacuee  children; and (4) building the capacity to address demand in multiple  victims assistance programs such as financial assistance or loans for  repair and replacement of housing and the rebuilding of businesses.
section_title: GAO Recommendations Stress Changes in Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability
paragraphs: In line with a recommendation we made following Hurricane Andrew, the  nation's most destructive hurricane prior to Katrina, we recommended  that Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take actions to  prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is warning. We  also recommended that DHS (1) rigorously retest, train, and exercise its  recent clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for  all levels of leadership, implementing changes needed to remedy identified  coordination problems; (2) direct that the NRP base plan and its  supporting Catastrophic Incident Annex be supported by more robust and  detailed operational implementation plans; (3) provide guidance and  direction for federal, state, and local planning, training, and exercises to  ensure such activities fully support preparedness, response, and recovery  responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a lead in  monitoring federal agencies’ efforts to prepare to meet their  responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness  Goal; and (5) use a risk management approach in deciding whether and  how to invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic  disaster.
As I mentioned earlier, DHS has made revisions to the NRP and released  the final Supplement to the Catastrophic Incident Annex—both designed  to further clarify federal roles and responsibilities and relationships among  federal, state and local governments and responders. However, these  revisions have not been tested in a major disaster. FEMA and DHS have  also announced a number of actions intended to improve readiness and  response based on our work and the work of congressional committees  and the Administration. DHS is also currently reorganizing FEMA as  required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act. However, there is little  information available on the extent to which these changes are operational  and they also have not yet been tested in a major disaster.
Originally, in its desire to provide assistance quickly following Hurricane  Katrina, DHS was unable to keep up with the magnitude of needs to  confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster assistance, or ensure that  there were provisions in contracts for response and recovery services to  ensure fair and reasonable prices in all cases. We recommended that DHS  create accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and  flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. We  also recommended that DHS provide guidance on advance procurement  practices (precontracting) and procedures for those federal agencies with  roles and responsibilities under the NRP. These federal agencies could  then better manage disaster-related procurement and establish an  assessment process to monitor agencies’ continuous planning efforts for  their disaster-related procurement needs and the maintenance of  capabilities. For example, we identified a number of emergency response  practices in the public and private sectors that provide insight into how  the federal government can better manage its disaster-related  procurements. These practices include developing knowledge of  contractor capabilities and prices, and establishing vendor relationships  prior to the disaster and establishing a scalable operations plan to adjust  the level of capacity to match the response with the need.
section_title: Post-Katrina Reform Act Changes
paragraphs: The Post-Katrina Reform Act responded to the findings and  recommendations in the various reports examining the preparation for and  response to Hurricane Katrina. Most of the Act's provisions become  effective as of March 31, 2007, while others became effective upon the  Act's enactment on October 4, 2006. While keeping FEMA within DHS, the  act enhances FEMA's responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. Under  the act, for example, FEMA’s mission is to reduce the loss of life and  property and protect the nation from all hazards, including natural  disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters. To accomplish  this mission, FEMA is to lead and support the nation in a risk-based,  comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness,  protection, response, recovery, and mitigation. Under the Act, the FEMA  Administrator reports directly to the Secretary of DHS; FEMA is now a  distinct entity within DHS; and the Secretary of DHS can no longer  substantially or significantly reduce the authorities, responsibilities, or  functions of FEMA or the capability to perform them unless authorized by  subsequent legislation. FEMA will absorb the functions of DHS’s  Preparedness Directorate (with some exceptions). The statute establishes  10 regional offices with specified responsibilities. The statute also  establishes a National Integration Center responsible for the ongoing  management and maintenance of the NIMS and NRP. The Post-Katrina  Reform Act also includes provisions for other areas, such as evacuation  plans and exercises and addressing the needs of individuals with  disabilities, In addition, the act includes several provisions to strengthen  the management and capability of FEMA’s workforce. For example, the  statute calls for a strategic human capital plan to shape and improve  FEMA’s workforce, authorizes recruitment and retention bonuses, and  establishes a Surge Capacity Force. Most of the organizational changes  become effective as of March 31, 2007. Others, such as the increase in  organizational autonomy for FEMA and establishment of the National  Integration Center, became effective upon enactment of the Post-Katrina  Reform Act on October 4, 2006.
subsections: section_title: DHS Reports Planned Changes Consistent with the Legislation
paragraphs: On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice of implementation  of the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization requirements and additional  organizational changes made under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. All  of the changes, according to DHS, will become effective on March 31,  2007.  According to DHS, the department completed a thorough  assessment of FEMA’s internal structure to incorporate lessons learned  from Hurricane Katrina and integrate systematically new and existing  assets and responsibilities within FEMA. The department’s core structural  conclusions are described in the letter.
DHS will transfer the following DHS offices and divisions to FEMA:    United States Fire Administration,    Office of Grants and Training,    Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Division,    Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program,    Office of National Capital Region Coordination, and,    Office of State and Local Government Coordination.
DHS officials say that they will carefully manage all financial,  organizational, and personnel actions necessary to transfer these  organizations by March 31, 2007. They also said they will establish several  other organizational elements, such as a logistics management division, a  disaster assistance division, and a disaster operations division. In addition,  FEMA will expand its regional office structure with each region in part by  establishing a Regional Advisory Council and at least one Regional Strike  Team. With the recent appointment of the director for region III, FEMA  officials noted that for the first time in recent memory there will be no  acting regional directors and all 10 FEMA regional offices will be headed  by experienced professionals, according to FEMA officials.
Further, FEMA will include a new national preparedness directorate  intended to consolidate FEMA’s strategic preparedness assets from  existing FEMA programs and certain legacy Preparedness Directorate  programs. The National Preparedness Directorate will contain functions  related to preparedness doctrine, policy, and contingency planning. It also  will include DHS’s exercise coordination and evaluation program,  emergency management training, and hazard mitigation associated with  the chemical stockpile and radiological emergency preparedness  programs.
section_title: Effective Implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act’s Provisions Should Respond to Many Concerns
paragraphs: Effective implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act’s organizational  changes and related roles and responsibilities, in addition to those changes  already undertaken by DHS, should address many of our emergency  management observations and recommendations. As noted earlier, our  analysis in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina showed the need for   (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and responsibilities;  (2) the development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and   (3) accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and  flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.
The statute appears to strengthen leadership roles and responsibilities. For  example, the statute clarifies that the FEMA Administrator is to act as the  principal emergency management adviser to the President, the Homeland  Security Council, and the Secretary of DHS and to provide  recommendations directly to Congress after informing the Secretary of  DHS. The incident management responsibilities and roles of the National  Integration Center are now clear. The Secretary of DHS must ensure that  the NRP provides for a clear chain of command to lead and coordinate the  federal response to any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man- made disaster. The law also establishes qualifications that appointees must  meet. For example, the FEMA Administrator must have a demonstrated  ability in and knowledge of emergency management and homeland  security and 5 years of executive leadership and management experience.
Many provisions are designed to enhance preparedness and response. For  example, the statute requires the President to establish a national  preparedness goal and national preparedness system. The national  preparedness system includes a broad range of preparedness activities,  including utilizing target capabilities and preparedness priorities, training  and exercises, comprehensive assessment systems, and reporting  requirements. To illustrate, the FEMA Administrator is to carry out a  national training program to implement, and a national exercise program  to test and evaluate the National Preparedness Goal, NIMS, NRP, and  other related plans and strategies.
In addition, FEMA is to partner with nonfederal entities to build a national  emergency management system. States must develop plans that include  catastrophic incident annexes modeled after the NRP annex in order to be  eligible for FEMA emergency preparedness grants. The state annexes must  be developed in consultation with local officials, including regional  commissions. FEMA regional administrators are to foster the development  of mutual aid agreements between states. FEMA must enter into a  memorandum of understanding with certain non-federal entities to  collaborate on developing standards for deployment capabilities, including  credentialing of personnel and typing of resources, must be developed. In  addition, FEMA must implement several other capabilities, such as   (1) developing a logistics system providing real-time visibility of items at  each point throughout the logistics system, (2) establishing a  prepositioned equipment program, and (3) establishing emergency support  and response teams.
section_title: FEMA Taking Steps to Address Logistics Problems
paragraphs: In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA’s performance in the logistics  area came under harsh criticism; within days, FEMA became overwhelmed  and essentially asked the military to take over much of the logistics  mission. In the Post-Katrina Reform Act, Congress required FEMA to  make its logistics system more flexible and responsive. Since the  legislation, FEMA has been working to address its provisions, but it is too  early to evaluate these efforts. We recently examined FEMA logistics  issues, taking a broad approach, identifying five areas necessary for an  effective logistics system. Below, we describe these five areas along with  FEMA’s ongoing actions to address each.
Requirements: FEMA does not yet have operational plans in place  to address disaster scenarios, nor does it have detailed information  on states’ capabilities and resources. As a result, FEMA does not  have information from these sources to define what and how much  it needs to stock. However, FEMA is developing a concept of  operations to underpin its logistics program and told us that it is  working to develop detailed plans and the associated stockage  requirements. However, until FEMA has solid requirements based  on detailed plans, the agency will be unable to assess its true  preparedness.
Inventory management: FEMA’s system accounts for the location,  quantity, and types of supplies, but the ability to track supplies in- transit is limited. FEMA has several efforts under way to improve  transportation and tracking of supplies and equipment, such as  expanding its new system for in-transit visibility from the two test  regions to all FEMA regions.
Facilities: FEMA maintains nine logistics centers and dozens of  smaller storage facilities across the country.  However, it has little  assurance that these are the right number of facilities located in the  right places. FEMA officials told us they are in the process of  determining the number of storage facilities it needs and where they  should be located.
Distribution: Problems persist with FEMA’s distribution system,  including poor transportation planning, unreliable contractors, and  lack of distribution sites. FEMA officials described initiatives under  way that should mitigate some of the problems with contractors,  and has been working with Department of Defense and Department  of Transportation to improve the access to transportation when  needed.
People: Human capital issues are pervasive in FEMA, including the  logistics area. The agency has a small core of permanent staff,  supplemented with contract and temporary disaster assistance staff.  However, FEMA’s recent retirements and losses of staff, and its  difficulty in hiring permanent staff and contractors, have created  staffing shortfalls and a lack of capability. According to a January  2007 study commissioned by FEMA, there are significant shortfalls  in staffing and skill sets of full-time employees, particularly in the  planning, advanced contracting, and relationship management skills  needed to fulfill the disaster logistics mission. FEMA has recently  hired a logistics coordinator and is making a concerted effort to hire  qualified staff for the entire agency, including logistics.
In short, FEMA is taking many actions to transition its logistics program to  be more proactive, flexible, and responsive. While these and other  initiatives hold promise for improving FEMA’s logistics capabilities, it will  be years before they are fully implemented and operational.
section_title: Post-Katrina Reform Act Provisions Also Respond to Accountability Issues
paragraphs: Statutory changes establish more controls and accountability mechanisms.  For example, the Post-Katrina Reform Act requires FEMA to develop and  implement a contracting system that maximizes the use of advance  contracting to the extent practical and cost-effective. The Secretary of  DHS is required to promulgate regulations designed to limit the excessive  use of subcontractors and subcontracting tiers. The Secretary of DHS is  also required to promulgate regulations that limit certain noncompetitive  contracts to 150 days, unless exceptional circumstances apply. Oversight  funding is specified. FEMA may dedicate up to one percent of funding for  agency mission assignments as oversight funds.  The FEMA Administrator  must develop and maintain internal management controls of FEMA  disaster assistance programs and develop and implement a training  program to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of federal funds in response to  or recovery from a disaster. Verification measures must be developed to  identify eligible recipients of disaster relief assistance.
section_title: Several Disaster Management Issues Should Have Continued Congressional Attention
paragraphs: In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the congressional  leadership suggesting areas for congressional oversight. He suggested  that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight was preparing  for, responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic  events. Recent events—notably Hurricane Katrina and the threat of an  influenza pandemic—have illustrated the importance of ensuring a  strategic and integrated approach to catastrophic disaster management.  Disaster preparation and response that is well planned and coordinated  can save lives and mitigate damage, and an effectively functioning  insurance market can substantially reduce the government’s exposure to  post-catastrophe payouts. Lessons learned from past national emergencies  provide an opportunity for Congress to look at actions that could mitigate  the effects of potential catastrophic events. Similarly, the Comptroller  General suggested that Congress could also consider how the federal  government can work with other nations, other levels of government, and  nonprofit and private sector organizations, such as the Red Cross and  private insurers, to help ensure the nation is well prepared and recovers  effectively. Given the billions of dollars dedicated to preparing for,  responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic  disasters, congressional oversight is critical.
A comprehensive and in-depth oversight agenda would require long-term  efforts. Congress might consider starting with several specific areas for  immediate oversight, such as (1) evaluating development and  implementation of the National Preparedness System, including  preparedness for an influenza pandemic, (2) assessing state and local  capabilities and the use of federal grants in building and sustaining those  capabilities, (3) examining regional and multi-state planning and  preparation, (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises, and   (5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance.
subsections: section_title: The National Preparedness System Is Key to Developing Disaster Capabilities
paragraphs: More immediate congressional attention might focus on evaluating the  construction and effectiveness of the National Preparedness System,  which is mandated under the Post-Katrina Reform Act. Under Homeland  Security Presidential Directive-8, issued in December 2003, DHS was to  coordinate the development of a national domestic all-hazards  preparedness goal “to establish measurable readiness priorities and targets  that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist  attacks and large scale natural or accidental disasters with the resources  required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them.” The goal was  also to include readiness metrics and standards for preparedness  assessments and strategies and a system for assessing the nation’s overall  preparedness to respond to major events.
To implement the directive, DHS developed the National Preparedness  Goal using 15 emergency event scenarios, 12 of which were terrorist  related, with the remaining 3 addressing a major hurricane, major  earthquake, and an influenza pandemic. According to DHS’s National  Preparedness Guidance, the planning scenarios are intended to illustrate  the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic emergency events for  which the nation needs to be prepared and to form the basis for identifying  the capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of large scale  emergency events. The scenarios focused on the consequences that first  responders would have to address. Some state and local officials and  experts have questioned whether the scenarios were appropriate inputs  for preparedness planning, particularly in terms of their plausibility and  the emphasis on terrorist scenarios.
Using the scenarios, and in consultation with federal, state, and local  emergency response stakeholders, DHS developed a list of over   1,600 discrete tasks, of which 300 were identified as critical. DHS then  identified 36 target capabilities to provide guidance to federal, state, and  local first responders on the capabilities they need to develop and  maintain. That list has since been refined, and DHS released a revised draft  list of 37 capabilities in December 2005. Because no single jurisdiction or  agency would be expected to perform every task, possession of a target  capability could involve enhancing and maintaining local resources,  ensuring access to regional and federal resources, or some combination of  the two. However, DHS is still in the process of developing goals,  requirements, and metrics for these capabilities and the National  Preparedness Goal in light of the Hurricane Katrina experience.
Several key components of the National Preparedness System defined in  the Post-Katrina Reform Act—the National Preparedness Goal, target  capabilities and preparedness priorities, and comprehensive assessment  systems—should be closely examined. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, DHS  had established seven priorities for enhancing national first responder  preparedness, including, for example, implementing the NRP and NIMS;  strengthening capabilities in information sharing and collaboration; and  strengthening capabilities in medical surge and mass prophylaxis. Those  seven priorities were incorporated into DHS’s fiscal year 2006 homeland  security grant program (HSGP) guidance, which added an eighth priority  that emphasized emergency operations and catastrophic planning.
In the fiscal year 2007 HSGP program guidance, DHS set two overarching  priorities. DHS has focused the bulk of its available grant dollars on risk- based investment. In addition, the department has prioritized regional  coordination and investment strategies that institutionalize regional  security strategy integration. In addition to the two overarching priorities,  the guidance also identified several others. These include (1) measuring  progress in achieving the National Preparedness Goal, (2) integrating and  synchronizing preparedness programs and activities, (3) developing and  sustaining a statewide critical infrastructure/key resource protection  program, (4) enabling information/intelligence fusion, (5) enhancing  statewide communications interoperability, (6) strengthening preventative  radiological/nuclear detection capabilities, and (7) enhancing catastrophic  planning to address nationwide plan review results. Under the guidance,  all fiscal year 2007 HSGP applicants will be required to submit an  investment justification that provides background information, strategic  objectives and priorities addressed, their funding/implementation plan,  and the impact that each proposed investment (project) is anticipated to  have.
subsections: section_title: The Particular Challenge of Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic
paragraphs: The possibility of an influenza pandemic is a real and significant threat to  the nation. There is widespread agreement that it is not a question of if but  when such a pandemic will occur. The issues associated with the  preparation for and response to a pandemic flu are similar to those for any  other type of disaster: clear leadership roles and responsibilities,  authority, and coordination; risk management; realistic planning, training,  and exercises; assessing and building the capacity needed to effectively  respond and recover; effective information sharing and communication;  and accountability for the effective use of resources.
However, a pandemic poses some unique challenges. Hurricanes,  earthquakes, explosions, or bioterrorist incidents occur within a short  period of time, perhaps a period of minutes, although such events can  have long-term effects, as we have seen in the Gulf region following  Hurricane Katrina. The immediate effects of such disasters are likely to  affect specific locations or areas within the nation; the immediate damage  is not nationwide. In contrast, an influenza pandemic is likely to continue  in waves of 6 to 8 weeks for a number of weeks or months and affect wide  areas of the nation, perhaps the entire nation. Depending upon the severity  of the pandemic, the number of deaths could be from 200,000 to 2 million.  Seasonal influenza in the United States results in about 36,000 deaths  annually. Successfully addressing the pandemic is also likely to require  international coordination of detection and response.
The Department of Health and Human Services estimates that during a  severe pandemic, absenteeism may reach as much as 40 percent in an  affected community because individuals are ill, caring for family members,  or fear infection. Such absenteeism could affect our nation’s economy, as  businesses and governments face the challenge of continuing to provide  essential services with reduced numbers of healthy workers. In addition,  our nation’s ability to respond effectively to hurricanes or other major  disasters during a pandemic may also be diminished as first responders,  health care workers, and others are infected or otherwise unable to  perform their normal duties. Thus, the consequences of a pandemic are  potentially widespread and effective planning and response for such a  disaster will require particularly close cooperation among all levels of  government, the private sector, individuals within the United States, as  well as international cooperation.
We have engagements under way examining such issues as barriers to  implementing the Department of Health and Human Services’ National  Pandemic Influenza Plan, the national strategy and framework for  pandemic influenza, the Department of Defense and Department of  Agriculture’s preparedness efforts and plans, public health and hospital  preparedness, and U.S. efforts to improve global disease surveillance. We  expect most of these reports to be issued by late summer 2007.
section_title: Our Knowledge of State and Local Efforts to Improve Their Capabilities Is Limited
paragraphs: Possible congressional oversight in the short term also might focus on  state and local capabilities. As I testified before this subcommittee last  month on applying risk management principles to guide federal  investments, over the past 4 years DHS has provided about $14 billion in  federal funding to states, localities, and territories through its HSGP  grants. Remarkably, however, we know little about how states and  localities finance their efforts in this area, have used their federal funds,  and are assessing the effectiveness with which they spend those funds.
Essentially, all levels of government are still struggling to define and act on  the answers to basic, but hardly simple, questions about emergency  preparedness and response: What is important (that is, what are our  priorities)? How do we know what is important (e.g., risk assessments,  performance standards)? How do we measure, attain, and sustain success?  On what basis do we make necessary trade-offs, given finite resources?
There are no simple, easy answers to these questions. The data available  for answering them are incomplete and imperfect. We have better  information and a better sense of what needs to be done for some types of  major emergency events than for others. For some natural disasters, such  as regional wildfires and flooding, there is more experience and therefore  a better basis on which to assess preparation and response efforts and  identify gaps that need to be addressed. California has experience with  earthquakes; Florida, with hurricanes. However, no one in the nation has  experience with such potential catastrophes as a dirty bomb detonated in  a major city. Although both the AIDS epidemic and SARS provide some  related experience, there have been no recent pandemics that rapidly  spread to thousands of people across the nation.
A new feature in the fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant  guidance for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants was that  eligible recipients must provide an “investment justification” with their  grant application. States were to use this justification to outline the  implementation approaches for specific investments that will be used to  achieve the initiatives outlined in their state Program and Capability  Enhancement Plan. These plans were multiyear global program  management plans for the entire state homeland security program that  look beyond federal homeland security grant programs and funding. The  justifications must justify all funding requested through the DHS homeland  security grant program. In the guidance DHS noted that it would use a  peer review process to evaluate grant applications on the basis of the  effectiveness of a state’s plan to address the priorities it has outlined and  thereby reduce its overall risk.
For fiscal year 2006, DHS implemented a competitive process to evaluate  the anticipated effectiveness of proposed homeland security investments.  For fiscal year 2007, DHS will continue to use the risk and effectiveness  assessments to inform final funding decisions, although changes have been  made to make the grant allocation process more transparent and more  easily understood. DHS officials have said that they cannot yet assess how  effective the actual investments from grant funds are in enhancing  preparedness and mitigating risk because they do not yet have the metrics  to do so.
section_title: Regional and Multistate Planning and Preparation Should Be Robust
paragraphs: Through its grant guidance, DHS has encouraged regional and multistate  planning and preparation. Planning and assistance have largely been  focused on single jurisdictions and their immediately adjacent neighbors.  However, well-documented problems with the abilities of first responders  from multiple jurisdictions to communicate at the site of an incident and  the potential for large-scale natural and terrorist disasters have generated  a debate on the extent to which first responders should be focusing their  planning and preparation on a regional and multigovernmental basis.
As I mentioned earlier, an overarching national priority for the National  Preparedness Goal is embracing regional approaches to building,  sustaining, and sharing capabilities at all levels of government. All HSGP  applications are to reflect regional coordination and show an investment  strategy that institutionalizes regional security strategy integration.  However, it is not known to what extent regional and multi-state planning  has progressed and is effective.
Our limited regional work indicated there are challenges in planning. Our  early work addressing the Office of National Capital Region Coordination  (ONCRC) and National Capital Region (NCR) strategic planning reported  that the ONCRC and the NCR faced interrelated challenges in managing  federal funds in a way that maximizes the increase in first responder  capacities and preparedness while minimizing inefficiency and  unnecessary duplication of expenditures. One of these challenges  included a coordinated regionwide plan for establishing first responder  performance goals, needs, and priorities, and assessing the benefits of  expenditures in enhancing first responder capabilities. In subsequent work  on National Capital Region strategic planning, we highlighted areas that  needed strengthening in the Region’s planning, specifically improving the  substance of the strategic plan to guide decision makers. For example,  additional information could have been provided regarding the type,  nature, scope, or timing of planned goals, objectives, and initiatives;  performance expectations and measures; designation of priority initiatives  to meet regional risk and needed capabilities; lead organizations for  initiative implementation; resources and investments; and operational  commitment.
section_title: Exercises Must Be Carefully Planned and Deployed and Capture Lessons Learned
paragraphs: Our work examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane  Katrina highlighted the importance of realistic exercises to test and refine  assumptions, capabilities, and operational procedures; build on the  strengths; and shore up the limitations revealed by objective assessments  of the exercises. The Post-Katrina Reform Act mandates a national  exercise program, and training and exercises are also included as a  component of the National Preparedness System. With almost any skill  and capability, experience and practice enhance proficiency. For first  responders, exercises—especially of the type or magnitude of events for  which there is little actual experience—are essential for developing skills  and identifying what works well and what needs further improvement.
Major emergency incidents, particularly catastrophic ones, by definition  require the coordinated actions of personnel from many first responder  disciplines and all levels of government, nonprofit organizations, and the  private sector. It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of effective  interdisciplinary, intergovernmental planning, training, and exercises in  developing the coordination and skills needed for effective response.
For exercises to be effective in identifying both strengths and areas  needing attention, it is important that they be realistic, designed to test and  stress the system, involve all key persons who would be involved in  responding to an actual event, and be followed by honest and realistic  assessments that result in action plans that are implemented. In addition  to relevant first responders, exercise participants should include,  depending upon the scope and nature of the exercise, mayors, governors,  and state and local emergency managers who would be responsible for  such things as determining if and when to declare a mandatory evacuation  or ask for federal assistance.
section_title: DHS Has Provided Limited Transparency for Its Management or Operational Decisions
paragraphs: Congressional oversight in the short term might include DHS’s policies  regarding oversight assistance. The Comptroller General has testified that  DHS has not been transparent in its efforts to strengthen its management  areas and mission functions. While much of its sensitive work needs to be  guarded from improper disclosure, DHS has not been receptive toward  oversight. Delays in providing Congress and us with access to various  documents and officials have impeded our work.
We need to be able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that  DHS has implemented many of our past recommendations or has taken  other corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However,  DHS has not made its management or operational decisions transparent  enough so that Congress can be sure it is effectively, efficiently, and  economically using the billions of dollars in funding it receives annually,  and is providing the levels of security called for in numerous legislative  requirements and presidential directives.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has awarded billions of  dollars in grants and assistance to state and local governments to assist in  strengthening emergency management capabilities. DHS has developed  several key policy documents, including the NRP, NIMS, and the National  Preparedness Goal to guide federal, state, and local efforts. The aftermath  of the 2005 hurricane season resulted in a reassessment of the federal role  in preparing for and responding to catastrophic events. The studies and  reports of the past year—by Congress, the White House Homeland  Security Council, the DHS IG, DHS and FEMA, GAO, and others—have  provided a number of insights into the strengths and limitations of the  nation’s capacity to respond to catastrophic disasters and resulted in a  number of recommendations for strengthening that capacity. Collectively,  these studies and reports paint a complex mosaic of the challenges that  the nation—federal, state, local, and tribal governments; nongovernmental  entities; the private sector; and individual citizens—faces in preparing for,  responding to, and recovering from catastrophic disasters. The Post- Katrina Reform Act directs many organizational, mission, and policy  changes to respond to these findings and challenges.
Assessing, developing, attaining, and sustaining needed emergency  preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities is a difficult task that  requires sustained leadership, the coordinated efforts of many  stakeholders from a variety of first responder disciplines, levels of  government, and nongovernmental entities. There is a no “silver bullet,” no  easy formula. It is also a task that is never done, but requires continuing  commitment and leadership and trade-offs because circumstances change  and we will never have the funds to do everything we might like to do.
That concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond to any  questions you and subcommittee members may have.
section_title: Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this statement, please contact William O.  Jenkins Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on   (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.
In addition to the contact named above the following individuals from  GAO’s Homeland Security and Justice Team also made major contributors  to this testimony: Sharon Caudle, Assistant Director; John Vocino, Analyst- in-Charge; and Richard Ascarate, Communications Analyst.  The following  individuals from GAO’s Defense Capabilities and Management Team also  made major contributors to this testimony: John Pendelton, Director; Ann  Borseth, Assistant Director.
section_title: Appendix I: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of  Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-07-88. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing  the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-452T. Washington, D.C.:  February 7, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is the Key to  Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO-07-418T.  Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2007  Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide  Federal Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to  Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations. GAO-07-139.  Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007.
Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify  Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations. GAO-07-44.  Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006.
Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-235R.  Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and  Abuse. GAO-07-252T. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the  Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions  Needed to Reduce Such Problems in Future. GAO-06-1013. Washington,  D.C.: September 27, 2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and  Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,  D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and  Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for  the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes. GAO-06-834. Washington, D.C.:  September 6, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red  Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO-06-712.  Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and  Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement. GAO-06-746T.  Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.:  March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges  Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,  D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All- Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.:  July 11, 2005.
Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better  Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies.   GAO-05-577. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005.
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