Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security
Published: 2007-02-07T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plays a key role in leading and coordinating--with stakeholders in the federal, state, local, and private sectors--the nation's homeland security efforts. GAO has conducted numerous reviews of DHS management functions as well as programs including transportation and border security, immigration enforcement and service delivery, and disaster preparation and response. This testimony addresses: (1) why GAO designated DHS's implementation and transformation as a high-risk area, (2) management challenges facing DHS, (3) programmatic challenges facing DHS, and (4) actions DHS should take to strengthen its implementation and transformation efforts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO designated implementing and transforming DHS as high risk in 2003 because DHS had to transform 22 agencies--several with existing program and management challenges--into one department, and failure to effectively address its challenges could have serious consequences for our homeland security. Despite some progress, this transformation remains high risk. Managing the transformation of an organization of the size and complexity of DHS requires comprehensive planning and integration of key management functions. DHS has made some progress in these areas, but much additional work is required to help ensure success. While DHS has developed a strategic plan, the plan does not link resource requirements to goals and objectives, and its creation did not involve key stakeholders to ensure resource investments target the highest priorities. DHS has also issued guidance and plans to assist management integration on a function by function basis, but lacks a comprehensive management integration strategy with overall goals, a timeline, and a dedicated team to support its integration efforts. The latest independent audit of DHS's financial statements revealed 10 material internal control weaknesses and confirmed that DHS's financial management systems still do not conform to federal requirements. DHS has also not institutionalized an effective strategic framework for information management, and its human capital--the centerpiece of its transformation efforts--and acquisition systems will require continued attention to ensure that DHS allocates its resources efficiently and effectively. Since GAO's January 2005 high-risk update, DHS has taken actions to strengthen program activities. However, DHS continues to face programmatic and partnering challenges. To help ensure that its missions are achieved, DHS must overcome continued challenges related to cargo, transportation, and border security; systematic visitor tracking; efforts to combat the employment of illegal aliens; and outdated Coast Guard asset capabilities. Further, DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency need to continue to develop clearly defined leadership roles and responsibilities; necessary disaster response capabilities; accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse; and the ability to conduct advanced contracting for goods and services necessary for emergency response. DHS has not produced a final corrective action plan specifying how it will address its existing management challenges. Such a plan should define the root causes of known problems, identify effective solutions, have management support, and provide for substantially completing corrective measures in the near term. It should also include performance metrics and milestones, as well as mechanisms to monitor progress. It will also be important for DHS to become more transparent and minimize recurring delays in providing access to information on its programs and operations so that Congress, GAO, and others can independently assess its efforts.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee to address  management and programmatic challenges facing the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS). I have spoken extensively about the fiscal crisis  our nation faces with the coming retirement of the baby boom generation  and the related growth in entitlement spending. The current financial  condition in the United States is worse than is widely understood and is  not sustainable. Meeting the long-term fiscal challenge will require   (1) significant entitlement reform to change the path of those programs;  (2) reprioritizing, restructuring and constraining other spending programs;  and (3) additional revenues--such as through a reformed tax system. These  efforts will require bipartisan cooperation and compromise.
Irrespective of our fiscal situation, it is important for federal  departments—including DHS—to operate as efficiently and effectively as  possible in carrying out their missions. At the same time, we also face new  and uncertain threats to our security, both overseas and at home, that  require continued attention. Without this focus, the consequences can be  catastrophic. We designated the implementation and transformation of  DHS as a high-risk area in 2003 and continued that designation in our 2005  update. In my testimony today, I will explain why we have decided to  maintain this area on our 2007 high risk list. I will focus on four areas:    why we originally designated DHS’s implementation and  transformation as a high-risk area,    specific management challenges that DHS continues to face,    examples of the program challenges that DHS faces, and    actions DHS should take to strengthen its implementation and  transformation efforts.
My comments today are based on our wide-ranging work on DHS since the  2005 high-risk update, as well as our institutional knowledge of homeland  security and various government organizational and management issues.  We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. A listing of GAO reports related to the  transformation, management, and program challenges discussed in this  statement are contained in Appendix 1.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In an effort to strengthen homeland security following the September 11,  2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, President Bush issued the  National Strategy for Homeland Security in July 2002 and signed  legislation creating DHS in November 2002. The strategy set forth the  overall objectives, mission areas, and initiatives to prevent terrorist  attacks within the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to  terrorism; and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from  attacks that may occur.
DHS, which began operations in March 2003, represented a fusion of   22 federal agencies to coordinate and centralize the leadership of many  homeland security activities under a single department. Although the  National Strategy for Homeland Security identified that many other federal  departments (and other nonfederal stakeholders) are involved in  homeland security activities, DHS has the dominant role in implementing  the strategy. The strategy identified 6 mission areas and 43 initiatives. DHS  was designated as the lead federal agency for 37 of the 43 initiatives, and  has activities under way in 40 of the 43 initiatives.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created DHS, represented a  historic moment of almost unprecedented action by the federal  government to fundamentally transform how the nation thinks of  homeland security, including how it protects itself from terrorism. Also  significant was the fact that many of the 22 departments brought together  under DHS were not focused on homeland security missions prior to  September 11, 2001. Rarely in the country’s past had such a large and  complex reorganization of government occurred or been developed with  such a singular and urgent purpose. The creation of DHS represented a  unique opportunity to transform a disparate group of agencies with  multiple missions, values, and cultures into a strong and effective cabinet  department whose goals are to, among other things, protect U.S. borders  and infrastructure, improve intelligence and information sharing, and  prevent and respond to potential terrorist attacks. Together with this  unique opportunity, however, came a significant risk to the nation that  could occur if the department’s implementation and transformation efforts  were not successful.
Mission areas designated as high risk have national significance, while  other areas designated as high risk represent management functions that  are important for agency performance and accountability. The identified  areas can have a qualitative risk that may be detrimental to public health  or safety, national security, and economic growth, or a fiscal risk due to  the size of the program in question. Examples of high-risk areas include  federal governmentwide problems, like human capital management; large  programs, like Social Security, Medicaid, and Medicare; and more narrow  issues, such as contracting at a specific agency. The DHS transformation is  unique in that it involves reorganization, management, and program  challenges simultaneously.
section_title: DHS’s Transformation
paragraphs: We first designated DHS’s transformation as high risk in January 2003  based on three factors. First, DHS faced enormous challenges in  implementing an effective transformation process, developing  partnerships, and building needed management capacity because it had to  effectively combine 22 agencies with an estimated 170,000 employees into  one department. Second, DHS faced a broad array of operational and  management challenges that it inherited from its component legacy  agencies. For example, many of the major components that were merged  into the department, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service,  the Transportation Security Administration, the Customs Service, the  Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Coast Guard, brought  with them existing challenges in areas such as strategic human capital,  information technology, and financial management. Finally, DHS’s  national security mission was of such importance that the failure to  effectively address its management challenges and program risks could  have serious consequences on our intergovernmental system, our citizens’  health and safety, and our economy.
Our prior work on mergers and acquisitions, undertaken before the  creation of DHS, found that successful transformations of large  organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than  DHS, can take 5 to 7 years to achieve. On the basis of the need for more  progress in its transformation efforts, DHS’s implementation and  transformation stayed on our high-risk update for 2005. Further, in  November of 2006, we provided the congressional leadership a listing of  government programs, functions, and activities that warrant further  congressional oversight. Among the issues included were DHS integration  and transformation efforts.
section_title: DHS Must Address Key Management Challenges
paragraphs: Managing the transformation of an organization of the size and complexity  of DHS requires comprehensive planning, integration of key management  functions across the department, and partnering with stakeholders across  the public and private sectors. DHS has made some progress in each of  these areas, but much additional work is required to help ensure  sustainable success. Apart from these integration efforts, however, a  successful transformation will also require DHS to follow through on its  initial actions of building capacity to improve the management of its  financial and information technology systems, as well as its human capital  and acquisition efforts.
subsections: section_title: DHS Transformation and Integration
paragraphs: Thorough planning is important for DHS to successfully transform and  integrate the management functions of 22 disparate agencies into a  common framework that supports the organization as a whole. Our past  work has identified progress DHS has made in its planning efforts. For  example, the DHS strategic plan addresses five of six Government  Performance and Results Act required elements and takes into account its  non-homeland security missions, such as responding to natural disasters.  Furthermore, several DHS components have developed their own strategic  plans or strategic plans for missions within their areas of responsibility.  For example, U.S. Immigration and Custom’s Enforcement (ICE) has  produced an interim strategic plan that identifies its goals and objectives,  and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) developed a border  patrol strategy and an anti terrorism trade strategic plan. However,  deficiencies in DHS’s planning efforts remain. A DHS-wide transformation  strategy should include a strategic plan that identifies specific budgetary,  human capital, and other resources needed to achieve stated goals. The  strategy should also involve key stakeholders to help ensure that resource  investments target the highest priorities. DHS’s existing strategic plan  lacks these linkages, and DHS has not effectively involved stakeholders in  the development of the plan. DHS has also not completed other important  planning-related activities. For example, some of DHS’s components have  not developed adequate outcome-based performance measures or  comprehensive plans to monitor, assess, and independently evaluate the  effectiveness of their plans and performance.
Integrating core management functions like financial, information  technology, human capital, and procurement is also important if DHS is to  transform itself into a cohesive, high-performing organization. However,  DHS lacks a comprehensive management integration strategy with overall  goals, a timeline, and a dedicated team to support its management  integration efforts. In 2005, we recommended that DHS establish  implementation goals and a timeline for its management integration efforts  as part of a comprehensive integration strategy, a key practice to help  ensure success for a merger or transformation. Although DHS has issued  guidance and plans to assist management integration on a function by  function basis, it has not developed a plan that clearly identifies the  critical links that should occur across these functions, the necessary  timing to make these links occur, how these interrelationships will occur,  and who will drive and manage them. In addition, although DHS had  established a Business Transformation Office that reported to the Under  Secretary for Management to help monitor and look for interdependencies  among the individual functional management integration efforts, that  office was not responsible for leading and managing the coordination and  integration itself. In addition to the Business Transformation Office, we  have suggested that Congress should continue to monitor whether it needs  to provide additional leadership authorities to the DHS Under Secretary  for Management or create a Chief Operating Officer/Chief Management  Officer position which could help elevate, integrate, and institutionalize  DHS’s management initiatives.
Finally, DHS cannot successfully achieve its homeland security mission  without working with other entities that share responsibility for securing  the homeland. Partnering for progress with other governmental agencies  and private sector entities is central to achieving its missions. Since 2005,  DHS has continued to form necessary partnerships and has undertaken a  number of coordination efforts with private sector entities. These include,  for example, partnering with (1) airlines to improve aviation passenger  and cargo screening, (2) the maritime shipping industry to facilitate  containerized cargo inspection, (3) financial institutions to follow the  money trail in immigration and customs investigations, and (4) the  chemical industry to enhance critical infrastructure protection at such  facilities. In addition, FEMA has worked with other federal, state, and  local entities to improve planning for disaster response and recovery.  However, partnering challenges continue as DHS seeks to form more  effective partnerships to leverage resources and more effectively carry out  its homeland security responsibilities. For example, because DHS has only  limited authority to address security at chemical facilities, it must continue  to work with the chemical industry to ensure that it is assessing  vulnerabilities and implementing security measures. Also, while TSA has  taken steps to collaborate with federal and private sector stakeholders in  the implementation of its Secure Flight program, these stakeholders stated  that TSA has not provided them with the information they would need to  support TSA’s efforts as they move forward with the program.
section_title: Financial Management and Internal Controls
paragraphs: DHS has made limited improvements in addressing financial management  and internal control weaknesses and continues to face significant  challenges in these areas. For example, since its creation, DHS has been  unable to obtain an unqualified or “clean” audit opinion on its financial  statements. The independent auditor’s report cited 10 material  weaknesses—i.e., significant deficiencies in DHS’s internal controls— showing no decrease from fiscal year 2005. These weaknesses included  financial management oversight, financial reporting, financial systems  security, and budgetary accounting. Furthermore, the report found two  other reportable conditions and instances of non-compliance with eight  laws and regulations, including the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity  Act of 1982, the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996,  and the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002. While  there continue to be material weaknesses in its financial management  systems, DHS has made some progress in this area. For example, the  independent auditor’s fiscal year 2006 report noted that DHS had made  improvements at the component level to improve financial reporting  during fiscal year 2006, although many challenges were remaining. Also,  DHS and its components have reported developing corrective action plans  to address the specific material internal control weaknesses identified.
In addition to the independent audits, we have done work to assess DHS’s  financial management and internal controls. For example, in 2004, we  reviewed DHS’s progress in addressing financial management weaknesses  and integrating its financial systems. Specifically, we identified  weaknesses in the financial management systems DHS inherited from the  22 component agencies, assessed DHS progress in addressing these  weaknesses, identified plans DHS had to integrate its financial  management systems, and reviewed whether the planned systems DHS  was developing would meet the requirements of relevant financial  management improvement legislation. On the basis of our work, we  recommended that DHS (1) give sustained attention to addressing  previously reported material weaknesses, reportable conditions, and  observations and recommendations; (2) complete development of  corrective action plans for all material weaknesses, reportable conditions,  and observations and recommendations; (3) ensure that internal control  weaknesses are addressed at the component level if they were combined  or reclassified at the departmentwide level; and (4) maintain a tracking  system of all auditor-identified and management-identified control  weaknesses. These recommendations are still relevant today.
section_title: Information Technology
paragraphs: A departmentwide information technology (IT) governance framework— including controls (disciplines) aimed at effectively managing IT-related  people, processes, and tools—is vital to DHS’s transformation efforts.  These controls and disciplines include    having and using an enterprise architecture, or corporate blueprint, as  an authoritative frame of reference to guide and constrain IT  investments;    defining and following a corporate process for informed decision  making by senior leadership about competing IT investment options;    applying system and software development and acquisition discipline  and rigor when defining, designing, developing, testing, deploying, and  maintaining systems;    establishing a comprehensive information security program to protect  its information and systems;    having sufficient people with the right knowledge, skills, and abilities  to execute each of these areas now and in the future; and    centralizing leadership for extending these disciplines throughout the  organization with an empowered Chief Information Officer.
In early 2006, we testified on DHS’s progress regarding its IT management  controls. At the time, we reported that DHS had made efforts during the  previous 3 to 4 years, to establish and implement IT management controls  and disciplines, but progress in these key areas had been uneven, and  more remained to be accomplished. Specifically, DHS had made  improvements in its enterprise architecture by establishing  departmentwide technology standards. It had also developed and initiated  the implementation of a plan to introduce a shared services orientation to  the architecture, particularly for information services, such as data centers  and e-mail. In addition, to strengthen IT investment management, DHS  established an acquisition project performance reporting system, aligned  its investment management cycle and associated milestones with the  department’s annual budget preparation process, and linked investment  management systems to standardize and make consistent the financial  data used to make investment decisions. Further, to develop more  effective information security management, DHS completed a  comprehensive inventory of its major information systems and  implemented a departmentwide tool that incorporates the guidance  required to adequately complete security certification and accreditation  for all systems. We have ongoing work that will update the status of DHS’s  IT management controls.
Despite these efforts, DHS must do more before each of these  management controls and capabilities is fully mature and institutionalized.  For example, our reviews of key nonfinancial systems shows that DHS has  not consistently employed reliable cost-estimating practices, effective  requirements development and test management, meaningful performance  measurement, strategic workforce management, and proactive risk  management, among other recognized program management best  practices. In addition, DHS has not fully implemented a comprehensive  information security program; and goals related to consolidating networks  and e-mail systems, for example, remain to be fully accomplished. More  work also remains in deploying and operating IT systems and  infrastructure in support of DHS’s core mission operations. For example,  although a system to identify and screen visitors entering the country has  been deployed and is operating, a related exit capability largely is not. In  addition, the Automated Commercial Environment program has not yet  demonstrated that it can accurately measure progress against its  commitments because the data it uses are not consistently reliable. DHS  must also ensure that the Chief Information Officer is sufficiently  empowered to extend management discipline and implement common IT  solutions across the department. Until DHS fully establishes and  consistently implements the full range of IT management disciplines  embodied in its framework and related federal guidance and best  practices, it will be challenged in its ability to effectively manage and  deliver programs.
section_title: Human Capital Systems
paragraphs: DHS has made some progress in transforming its human capital systems,  but more work remains. Some of the most pressing human capital  challenges at DHS include (1) successfully completing its ongoing  transformation, (2) forging a unified results-oriented culture across the  department (line of sight), (3) linking daily operations to strategic  outcomes, (4) rewarding individuals based on individual, team, unit, and  organizational results, (5) obtaining, developing, providing incentives to,  and retaining needed talent, and (6) most importantly, leadership both at  the top, to include a chief operating officer (COO) or chief management  officer (CMO). A strategic workforce plan is integral to defining the level  of staffing, identifying the critical skills needed to mission achievement,  and eliminating gaps to prepare the agency for future needs. In 2005, we  reported that DHS had initiated strategic human capital planning efforts  and published proposed regulations for a modern human capital  management system. We also reported that DHS’s leadership was  committed to the human capital system design process and had formed  teams to implement the resulting regulations. Since our report, DHS has  finalized its human capital regulations, and although certain labor  management provisions are the subject of litigation, it is vital that DHS  implement its human capital system effectively because strategic human  capital management is the centerpiece of any transformation effort.  Further, since our 2005 update, DHS has taken some actions to integrate  the legacy agency workforces that make up its components. For example,  it standardized pay grades for criminal investigators at ICE and developed  promotion criteria for investigators and CBP officers that equally  recognize the value of the experience brought to ICE and CBP by  employees of each legacy agency. DHS also made progress in establishing  human capital capabilities for the US-VISIT program, which should help  ensure that it has sufficient staff with the necessary skills and abilities to  implement the program effectively. CBP also developed training plans that  link its officer training to CBP strategic goals.
Despite these efforts, however, DHS must still (1) create a clearer  crosswalk between departmental training goals and objectives and DHS’s  broader organizational and human capital goals, (2) develop appropriate  training performance measures and targets for goals and strategies  identified in its departmentwide strategic training plan, and (3) address  our earlier recommendations that its new human capital system be linked  to its strategic plan. We have also made recommendations to specific  program offices and organizational entities to help ensure that human  capital resources are provided to improve the effectiveness of  management capabilities, and that human capital plans are developed that  clearly describe how these components will recruit, train, and retain staff  to meet their growing demands as they expand and implement new  program elements. We are completing an updated review of DHS’s human  capital efforts and plan to report on our results soon. This report will  discuss information on selected human capital issues at DHS: attrition  rates at DHS; senior-level vacancies at DHS; DHS’s use of human capital  flexibilities, the Intergovernmental Personnel Act, and personal services  contracts; and DHS’s compliance with the Vacancies Reform Act.
section_title: Acquisition Management
paragraphs: DHS continues to face challenges in creating an effective, integrated  acquisition organization. Since its inception in March 2003, DHS has made  progress in implementing a strategic sourcing program to increase the  effectiveness of its buying power and in creating a small business program.  These programs have promoted an environment in which there is a  collaborative effort toward the common goal of an efficient, unified  organization. Strategic sourcing allows DHS components to formulate  purchasing strategies to leverage buying power and increase savings for a  variety of products like office supplies, boats, energy, and weapons, while  its small business program works to ensure small businesses can compete  effectively for the agency’s contract dollars. However, DHS’s progress  toward creating a unified acquisition organization has been hampered by  policy decisions. In March 2005, we reported that an October 2004  management directive, Acquisition Line of Business Integration and  Management, while emphasizing the need for a unified, integrated  acquisition organization, relies on a system of dual accountability between  the chief procurement officer and the heads of the departments to make  this happen. This situation has created ambiguity about who is  accountable for acquisition decisions. We also found that the various  acquisition organizations within DHS are still operating in a disparate  manner, with oversight of acquisition activities left primarily up to each  individual component. Specifically, we reported that (1) there were  components exempted from the unified acquisition organization, (2) the  chief procurement officer had insufficient staff for departmentwide  oversight, and (3) staffing shortages led the office of procurement  operations to rely extensively on outside agencies for contracting  support. In March 2005, we recommended that, among other things, the  Secretary of Homeland Security provide the Office of the Chief  Procurement Officer with sufficient resources and enforcement authority  to enable effective departmentwide oversight of acquisition policies and  procedures, and to revise the October 2004 management directive to  eliminate reference to the Coast Guard and Secret Service as being exempt  from complying with the directive. Unless DHS addresses these  challenges, it is at risk of continuing to exist as a fragmented acquisition  organization. Because some of DHS’s components have major, complex  acquisition programs—for example, the Coast Guard’s Deepwater program  (designed to replace or upgrade its cutters and aircraft) and CBP’s Secure  Border Initiative—DHS needs to improve the oversight of contractors and  should adhere to a rigorous management review process.
section_title: Programmatic Challenges Facing DHS
paragraphs: DHS continues to face challenges, many of which were inherited from its  component legacy agencies, in carrying out its programmatic activities.  These challenges include enhancing transportation security, strengthening  the management of U.S. Coast Guard acquisitions and meeting the Coast  Guard’s new homeland security missions, improving the regulation of  commercial trade while ensuring protection against the entry of illegal  goods and dangerous visitors at U.S. borders and ports of entry, and  improving enforcement of immigration laws, including worksite  immigration laws, and the provision of immigration services. DHS must  also effectively coordinate the mitigation and response to all hazards,  including natural disaster planning, response, and recovery. DHS has  taken actions to address these challenges, for example, by strengthening  passenger and baggage screening, increasing the oversight of Coast Guard  acquisitions, more thoroughly screening visitors and cargo, dedicating  more resources to immigration enforcement, becoming more efficient in  the delivery of immigration services, and conducting better planning for  disaster preparation. However, challenges remain in each of these major  mission areas.
subsections: section_title: Transportation Security
paragraphs: Despite progress in this area, DHS continues to face challenges in  effectively executing transportation security efforts. We have  recommended that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)  more fully integrate a risk management approach—including assessments  of threat, vulnerability, and criticality—in prioritizing security efforts  within and across all transportation modes; strengthen stakeholder  coordination; and implement needed technological upgrades to secure  commercial airports. DHS has made progress in all of these areas,  particularly in aviation, but must expand its security focus more towards  surface modes of transportation and continue to seek best practices and  coordinated security efforts with the international community. DHS and  TSA have taken numerous actions to strengthen commercial aviation  security, including strengthening passenger and baggage screening,  improving aspects of air cargo security, and strengthening the security of  international flights and passengers bound for the United States. For  example, TSA increased efforts to measure the effectiveness of airport  screening systems through covert testing and other means and has worked  to enhance passenger and baggage screener training. TSA also improved  its processes for identifying and responding to threats onboard  commercial aircraft and has modified airport screening procedures based  on risk. Despite this progress, however, TSA continues to face challenges  in implementing a program to match domestic airline passenger  information against terrorist watch lists, fielding needed technologies to  screen airline passengers for explosives, and strengthening aspects of  passenger rail security. In addition, TSA has not developed a strategy, as  required, for securing the various modes of transportation. As a result, rail  and other surface transportation stakeholders are unclear regarding what  TSA’s role will ultimately be in establishing and enforcing security  requirements within their transportation modes. We have recommended  that TSA more fully integrate risk-based decision making within aviation  and across all transportation modes, strengthen passenger prescreening,  and enhance rail security efforts. We have also recommended that TSA  work to develop sustained and effective partnerships with other  government agencies, the private sector, and international partners to  coordinate security efforts and seek potential best practices, among other  efforts.
section_title: Coast Guard Acquisitions and Non-Homeland Security Missions
paragraphs: The Coast Guard needs to improve the management of its acquisitions and  continue to enhance its security mission while meeting other mission  responsibilities. We recommended that the Coast Guard improve its  management of the Deepwater program by strengthening key management  and oversight activities, implementing procedures to better ensure  contractor accountability, and controlling future costs by promoting  competition. In April 2006, we reported the Coast Guard had made some  progress in addressing these recommendations. For example, the Coast  Guard has addressed our recommendation to ensure better contractor  accountability by providing for better input from U.S. Coast Guard  performance monitors. However, even with these improvements, some  Deepwater assets have recently experienced major setbacks due to design  concerns in two classes of replacement cutters. Further, other Coast  Guard acquisition programs—such as the Rescue 21 emergency distress  and communications system—have experienced major cost increases,  schedule delays, and performance shortfalls.
The Coast Guard has made progress in balancing its homeland security  and traditional missions. The Coast Guard is unlike many other DHS  components because it has substantial missions not related to homeland  security. These missions include maritime navigation, icebreaking,  protecting the marine environment, marine safety, and search and rescue  for mariners in distress. Furthermore, unpredictable natural disasters,  such as Hurricane Katrina, can place intense demands on all Coast Guard  resources. The Coast Guard must continue executing these traditional  missions and balance those responsibilities with its homeland security  obligations, which have increased significantly since September 11.
section_title: Border Security and the Regulation of Trade
paragraphs: DHS has made some progress but still faces an array of challenges in  securing the border while improving the regulation of commercial trade.  Since 2005, DHS agencies have made some progress in implementing our  recommendations to refine the screening of foreign visitors to the United  States, target potentially dangerous cargo, and provide the personnel  necessary to effectively fulfill border security and trade agency missions.  As of January 2006, DHS had a pre-entry screening capability in place in  overseas visa issuance offices, and an entry identification capability at   115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154 land ports of entry. Furthermore, the  Secretary of Homeland Security has made risk management at ports and  all critical infrastructure facilities a key priority for DHS. In addition, DHS  developed performance goals and measures for its trade processing  system and implemented a testing and certification process for its officers  to provide better assurance of effective cargo examination targeting  practices. However, efforts to assess and mitigate risks of DHS’s and the  Department of State’s implementation of the Visa Waiver Program remain  incomplete, increasing the risk that the program could be exploited by  someone who intends harm to the United States. Further, many of DHS’s  border-related performance goals and measures are not fully defined or  adequately aligned with one another, and some performance targets are  not realistic. For example, CBP has not yet put key controls in place to  provide reasonable assurance that its screening system is effective at  targeting oceangoing cargo containers with the highest risk of containing  smuggled weapons of mass destruction, nor has it found a way to  incorporate inspection results back into the targeting system. Other trade  and visitor screening systems have weaknesses that must be overcome to  better ensure border and trade security. For example, deficiencies in the  identification of counterfeit documentation at land border crossings into  the United States create vulnerabilities that terrorists or others involved in  criminal activity could exploit. We also reported that DHS’s Container  Security Initiative to target and inspect high-risk cargo containers at  foreign ports before they leave for the United States has not achieved key  goals because of staffing imbalances, the lack of minimum technical  requirements for inspection equipment used at foreign ports, and  insufficient performance measures to assess the effectiveness of targeting  and inspection activities.
section_title: Enforcement of Immigration Laws
paragraphs: DHS has taken some actions to improve enforcement of immigration laws,  including worksite immigration laws, but the number of resources devoted  to enforcing immigration laws is limited given that there are an estimated  12 million illegal aliens residing in the United States. DHS has  strengthened some aspects of immigration enforcement, including  allocating more investigative work years to immigration functions than the  Immigration and Naturalization Service did prior to the creation of DHS.  Nevertheless, effective enforcement will require more attention to efficient  resource use and updating outmoded management systems. In April 2006,  ICE announced an interior enforcement strategy to bring criminal charges  against employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers. ICE has also  reported increases in the number of criminal arrests and indictments for  these violations since fiscal year 2004. In addition, ICE has plans to shift  responsibility for identifying incarcerated criminal aliens eligible for  removal from the United States from the Office of Investigations to its  Office of Detention and Removal, freeing those investigative resources for  other immigration and customs investigations. ICE has also begun to  introduce principles of risk management into the allocation of its  investigative resources. However, enforcement of immigration  enforcement laws needs to be strengthened and significant management  challenges remain. DHS’s ability to locate and remove millions of aliens  who entered the country illegally or overstayed the terms of their visas is  questionable, and implementing an effective worksite enforcement  program remains an elusive goal. ICE’s Office of Investigations has not  conducted a comprehensive risk assessment of the customs and  immigration systems to determine the greatest risks for exploitation by  criminals and terrorists. This office also lacks outcome-based performance  goals that relate to its objective of preventing the exploitation of systemic  vulnerabilities in customs and immigration systems, and it does not have  sufficient systems in place to help ensure systematic monitoring and  communication of vulnerabilities discovered during its investigations.  Moreover, the current employment verification process used to identify  workers ineligible for employment in the United States has not  fundamentally changed since its establishment in 1986, and ongoing  weaknesses have undermined its effectiveness. We have recommended  that DHS take actions to help address these weaknesses and to strengthen  the current process by issuing final regulations on changes to the  employment verification process which will reduce the number of  documents suitable for proving eligibility to work in the United States.  Some other countries require foreign workers to present work  authorization documents at the time of hire and require employers to  review these documents and report workers’ information to government  agencies for collecting taxes and social insurance contributions, and  conducting worksite enforcement actions.
section_title: Provision of Immigration Services
paragraphs: Although DHS has made progress in reducing its backlog of immigration  benefit applications, improvements are still needed in the provision of  immigration services, particularly by strengthening internal controls to  prevent fraud and inaccuracy. Since 2005, DHS has enhanced the  efficiency of certain immigration services. For example, U.S. Citizenship  and Immigration Services (USCIS) estimated that it had reduced its  backlog of immigration benefits applications from a peak of 3.8 million  cases to 1.2 million cases from January 2004 to June 2005. USCIS has also  established a focal point for immigration fraud, outlined a fraud control  strategy that relies on the use of automation to detect fraud, and is  performing fraud assessments to identify the extent and nature of fraud  for certain benefits. However, DHS still faces significant challenges in its  ability to effectively provide immigration services while at the same time  protecting the immigration system from fraud and mismanagement. USCIS  may have adjudicated tens of thousands of naturalization applications  without alien files, and adjudicators were not required to record whether  the alien file was available when they adjudicated the application. Without  these files, DHS may not be able to take enforcement action against an  applicant and could also approve an application for an ineligible applicant.  In addition, USCIS has not implemented important aspects of our internal  control standards or fraud control best practices identified by leading  audit organizations. Such best practices would include (1) a  comprehensive risk management approach, (2) mechanisms for ongoing  monitoring during the course of normal activities, (3) clear  communication agencywide regarding how to balance production-related  goals with fraud-prevention activities, and (4) performance goals for fraud  prevention.
section_title: Disaster Preparedness and Response
paragraphs: We have reported that DHS needs to more effectively coordinate disaster  preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. Since FEMA became part  of DHS in March 2003, its responsibilities have been dispersed and its role  has continued to evolve. Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster  management at the federal, state, and local levels and revealed  weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding to, and  recovering from any catastrophic disaster. Our analysis showed the need  for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and  responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster capabilities;  and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast  and flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.  In September 2006, we recommended that Congress give federal agencies  explicit authority to take actions to prepare for all types of catastrophic  disasters when there is warning. We also recommended that DHS   (1) rigorously re-test, train, and exercise its recent clarification of the  roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of leadership,  implementing changes needed to remedy identified coordination  problems; (2) direct that the National Response Plan (NRP) base plan and  its supporting Catastrophic Incident Annex be supported by more robust  and detailed operational implementation plans; (3) provide guidance and  direction for federal, state, and local planning, training, and exercises to  ensure such activities fully support preparedness, response, and recovery  responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a lead in  monitoring federal agencies’ efforts to prepare to meet their  responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness  Goal; and (5) use a risk management approach in deciding whether and  how to invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic  disaster.
DHS has made revisions to the NRP and released its Supplement to the  Catastrophic Incident Annex—both designed to further clarify federal  roles and responsibilities and relationships among federal, state and local  governments and responders. However, these revisions have not been  tested. DHS has also announced a number of actions intended to improve  readiness and response based on our work and the work of congressional  committees and the Administration. For example, DHS is currently  reorganizing FEMA as required by the fiscal year 2007 DHS appropriations  act. DHS has also announced a number of other actions to improve  readiness and response. However, there is little information available on  the extent to which these changes are operational. Finally, in its desire to  provide assistance quickly following Hurricane Katrina, DHS was unable  to keep up with the magnitude of needs to confirm the eligibility of victims  for disaster assistance, or ensure that there were provisions in contracts  for response and recovery services to ensure fair and reasonable prices in  all cases. We recommended that DHS create accountability systems that  effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need  to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. We also recommended that DHS  provide guidance on advance procurement practices (pre-contracting) and  procedures for those federal agencies with roles and responsibilities under  the NRP so that these agencies can better manage disaster-related  procurement, and establish an assessment process to monitor agencies’  continuous planning efforts for their disaster-related procurement needs  and the maintenance of capabilities. For example, we identified a number  of emergency response practices in the public and private sectors that  provide insight into how the federal government can better manage its  disaster-related procurements. These include both developing knowledge  of contractor capabilities and prices and establishing vendor relationships  prior to the disaster and establishing a scalable operations plan to adjust  the level of capacity to match the response with the need.
section_title: Actions Needed to Strengthen DHS’s Transformation and Integration Efforts
paragraphs: To be removed from our high-risk list, agencies need to develop a  corrective action plan that defines the root causes of identified problems,  identifies effective solutions to those problems, and provides for  substantially completing corrective measures in the near term. Such a plan  should include performance measures, metrics and milestones to measure  their progress. Agencies should also demonstrate significant progress in  addressing the problems identified in their corrective action plan. This  should include a program to monitor and independently validate progress.  Finally, agencies, in particular top leadership, must demonstrate a  commitment to sustain initial improvements. This would include a strong  commitment to address the risk(s) that put the program or function on the  high-risk list and provide for the allocation of sufficient people and  resources (capacity) to resolve the risk(s) and ensure that improvements  are sustainable over the long term.
In the spring of 2006, DHS provided us a draft corrective action plan for  addressing its transformation challenges. This plan addressed major  management areas we had previously identified as key to DHS’s  transformation—management integration through the DHS management  directorate and financial, information, acquisition, and human capital  management. The plan identified an overall goal to develop and implement  key department wide processes and systems to support DHS’s  transformation into a department capable of planning, operating, and  managing as one effective department.
In the short term, the plan sought to produce significant improvements  over the next 7 years that further DHS’s ability to operate as one  department. Although the plan listed accomplishments and general goals  for the management functions, it did not contain (1) objectives linked to  those goals that are clear, concise, and measurable; (2) specific actions to  implement those objectives; (3) information linking sufficient people and  resources to implement the plan; or (4) an evaluation program to monitor  and independently validate progress toward meeting the goals and  measuring the effectiveness of the plan.
In addition to developing an effective corrective action plan, agencies  must show that significant progress has taken place in improving  performance in the areas identified in its corrective action plan. While our  work has noted progress at DHS, for us to remove the DHS  implementation and transformation and from our high-risk list, we need to  be able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that DHS has  implemented many of our past recommendations, or has taken other  corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However, DHS  has not made its management or operational decisions transparent enough  so that Congress can be sure it is effectively, efficiently, and economically  using the billions of dollars in funding it receives annually, and is providing  the levels of security called for in numerous legislative requirements and  presidential directives. Our work for Congress assessing DHS’s operations  has been significantly hampered by long delays in granting us access to  program documents and officials, or by questioning our access to  information needed to conduct our reviews. We are troubled by the impact  that DHS’s processes and internal reviews have had on our ability to  assess departmental programs and operations. Given the problems we  have experienced in obtaining access to DHS information, it will be  difficult for us to sustain the level of oversight that Congress has directed  and that is needed to effectively oversee the department, including the  level of oversight needed to assess DHS’s progress in addressing the  existing transformation, integration, and programmatic challenges  identified in this statement.
Finally, to be removed from our high-risk list, any progress that occurs  must be sustainable over the long term. DHS’s leaders need to make and  demonstrate a commitment to implementing a transformed organization.  The Secretary has stated such a commitment, most prominently as part of  his “second stage review” in the summer of 2005, and more recently in  remarks made at George Washington University’s Homeland Security  Policy Institute. However, appropriate follow-up is required to assure that  transformation plans are effectively implemented and sustained, to include  the allocation of adequate resources to support transformation efforts. In  this regard, we were pleased when DHS established a Business  Transformation Office, but we believe that the office’s effectiveness was  limited because the department did not give it the authority and  responsibility needed to be successful. We understand that this office has  recently been eliminated. Further, department leaders can show their  commitment to transforming DHS by acting on recommendations made by  the Congress, study groups, and accountability organizations such as its  Office of the IG and GAO. Although we have also seen some progress in  this area, it is not enough for us to conclude that DHS is committed to and  capable of quickly incorporating corrective actions into its operations.  Therefore, until DHS produces an acceptable corrective action plan,  demonstrates progress reforming its key management functions, and  dedicates the resources necessary to sustain this progress, it will likely  remain on our high-risk list.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this completes my prepared  statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you or other  members of the committee may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For information about this testimony, please contact Norman Rabkin,  Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at   (202) 512-8777, or rabkinn@gao.gov. Other individuals making key  contributions to this testimony include Cathleen Berrick, Paul Jones,  Christopher Conrad, Anthony DeFrank, Nancy Briggs, and Aaron Stern.
section_title: Appendix I: Related GAO Products
subsections: section_title: Implementing and Transforming the Department of Homeland Security
subsections: section_title: Implementation and Transformation
paragraphs: High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January 31,  2007.
Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-235R.  Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS Is Addressing Security at Chemical Facilities,  but Additional Authority Is Needed. GAO-06-899T. Washington, D.C.: June  21, 2006.
Homeland Security: Guidance and Standards Are Needed for Measuring  the Effectiveness of Agencies’ Facility Protection Efforts. GAO-06-612.  Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS Needs to Improve Ethics-Related Management  Controls for the Science and Technology Directorate. GAO-06-206.  Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2005.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland Security  Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities.   GAO-05-434. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
Homeland Security: Overview of Department of Homeland Security  Management Challenges. GAO-05-573T. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2005.
Results-Oriented Government: Improvements to DHS’s Planning Process  Would Enhance Usefulness and Accountability. GAO-05-300. Washington,  D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Department of Homeland Security: A Comprehensive and Sustained  Approach Needed to Achieve Management Integration. GAO-05-139.  Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005.
Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to Coordinate Federal  Agencies’ Facility Protection Efforts and Promote Key Practices.   GAO-05-49. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2004.
Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons  Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal  Agencies. GAO-03-293SP. Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2002.
Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High  Risks. GAO/OGC-00-12. Washington, D.C.: August 2000.
section_title: Financial Management and Internal Controls
paragraphs: Financial Management Systems: DHS Has an Opportunity to  Incorporate Best Practices in Modernization Efforts. GAO-06-553T.  Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006.
Financial Management: Department of Homeland Security Faces  Significant Financial Management Challenges. GAO-04-774. Washington,  D.C.: July 19, 2004.
section_title: Information Technology
paragraphs: Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated  Commercial Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing  Management Challenges and New Risks. GAO-06-580. May 31, 2006.
Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More  Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical  Infrastructure Information. GAO-06-383. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2006.
Homeland Security: Progress Continues, but Challenges Remain on  Department’s Management of Information Technology. GAO-06-598T.  Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006.
Information Technology: Management Improvements Needed on  Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Infrastructure Modernization  Program. GAO-05-805. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2005.
Information Technology: Federal Agencies Face Challenges in  Implementing Initiatives to Improve Public Health Infrastructure.   GAO-05-308. Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005.
Information Technology: Customs Automated Commercial Environment  Program Progressing, but Need for Management Improvements  Continues. GAO-05-267. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2005.
section_title: Human Capital Systems
paragraphs: Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks  of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-854. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006.
Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions  in the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs  Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection. GAO-06-751R.  Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006.
Homeland Security: Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Operating,  but Management Improvements Are Still Needed. GAO-06-318T.  Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2006.
Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training  Important for Successful Transformation. GAO-05-888. Washington, D.C.:  September 23, 2005.
section_title: Acquisition Management
paragraphs: Homeland Security: Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition  Organization. GAO-06-1012T. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006.
Homeland Security: Success and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Create  an Effective Acquisition Organization. GAO-05-179. Washington, D.C.:  March 29, 2005.
Homeland Security: Further Action Needed to Promote Successful Use of  Special DHS Acquisition Authority. GAO-05-136. Washington, D.C.:  December 15, 2004.
section_title: Transportation Security
paragraphs: Transportation Security Administration: Oversight of Explosive  Detection Systems Maintenance Contracts Can Be Strengthened.   GAO-06-795. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2006.
Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening  Procedures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-869. Washington, D.C.: Jul. 28,  2006.
Rail Transit: Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA’s State  Safety Oversight Program. GAO-06-821. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2006.
Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the  Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program.   GAO-06-864T. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked  Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T. Washington,  D.C.: April 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using Private- Sector Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains. GAO-06-166.  Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006.
Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely  Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s  Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2006.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from  Improved Planning and Controls. GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.:  November 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air  Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2005.
Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to  Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-05-851. Washington, D.C.:  September 9, 2005.
Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training  Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed.   GAO-05-781. Washington, D.C.: September 6. 2005.
Aviation Safety: Oversight of Foreign Code-Share Safety Program Should  Be Strengthened. GAO-05-930. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2005.
Homeland Security: Agency Resources Address Violations of Restricted  Airspace, but Management Improvements Are Needed. GAO-05-928T.  Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2005.
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way,  but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed.   GAO-05-356. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the  Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365.  Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.
section_title: Coast Guard Acquisitions and Non-Homeland Security Missions
paragraphs: United States Coast Guard: Improvements Needed in Management and  Oversight of Rescue System Acquisition. GAO-06-623. Washington, D.C.:  May 31, 2006.
Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and Program  Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring is Warranted.  GAO-06-546. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2006.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and  Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical  Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and  Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2005.
Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced  Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of Improved Security. GA0-05-404.  Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2005.
Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and  Management Concerns Remain. GAO-05-161. Washington, D.C.: January  31, 2005.
Contract Management: Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program Needs  Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight.   GAO-04-380. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004.
section_title: Border Security and the Regulation of Trade
paragraphs: Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and  Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-248.  Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006.
Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks  of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-854. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006.
Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated  Commercial Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing  Management Challenges and New Risks. GAO-06-580. Washington, D.C.:  May 31, 2006.
Border Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border  Surveillance Technology Program. GAO-06-295. Washington, D.C.:  February 22, 2006.
Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key  Border Security Program Need to Be Implemented. GAO-06-296.  Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2006.
Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from  Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing. GAO-05-859.  Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2005.
Border Security: Opportunities to Increase Coordination of Air and  Marine Assets. GAO-05-543. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 2005.
Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of  Department of Homeland Security’s Visa Security Program. GAO-05-801.  Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005.
Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest  Differences in Sector Performance. GAO-05-435. Washington, D.C.: July  22, 2005.
section_title: Enforcement of Immigration Laws
paragraphs: Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment  Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts. GAO-06-895T.  Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2006.
Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions  in the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs  Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection. GAO-06-751R.  Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006.
Homeland Security: Contract Management and Oversight for Visitor and  Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Strengthened. GAO-06-404.  Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2006.
Homeland Security: Better Management Practices Could Enhance DHS’s  Ability to Allocate Investigative Resources. GAO-06-462T. Washington,  D.C.: March 28, 2006.
Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment  Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts. GAO-05-813. Washington,  D.C.: August 31, 2005.
section_title: Provision of Immigration Services
paragraphs: Immigration Benefits: Additional Efforts Needed to Help Ensure Alien  Files Are Located when Needed. GAO-07-85. Washington, D.C.: October 27,  2006.
Immigration Benefits: Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy  Could Enhance DHS’s Ability to Control Benefit Fraud. GAO-06-259.  Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2006.
Immigration Benefits: Improvements Needed to Address Backlogs and  Ensure Quality of Adjudications. GAO-06-20. Washington, D.C.:  November 21, 2005.
Immigration Services: Better Contracting Practices Needed at Call  Centers. GAO-05-526. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.
section_title: Disaster Preparedness and Response
paragraphs: Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and  Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,  D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and  Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for  the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes. GAO-06-834. Washington, D.C.:  September 6, 2006.
Disaster Preparedness: Limitations in Federal Evacuation Assistance  for Health Facilities Should be Addressed. GAO-06-826. Washington, D.C.:  July 20, 2006.
Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:  FEMA’s Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant  Fraud and Abuse. GAO-06-655. Washington, D.C.: June16, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are Needed  to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International  Assistance. GAO-06-460. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006.
Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better  Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies.   GAO-05-577. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005.
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