Joint Strike Fighter: Strong Risk Management Essential as Program Enters Most Challenging Phase
Published: 2009-05-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is the Department of Defense's (DOD's) most costly acquisition, seeking to simultaneously develop, produce, and field three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The total expected U.S. investment is now more than $300 billion to develop and procure 2,456 aircraft over the next 25 years. GAO's most recent report in March of this year discussed increased development costs and schedule estimates, plans to accelerate procurement, manufacturing performance and delays, and development test strategy. A recurring theme in GAO's work has been concern about what GAO believes is undue concurrency of development, test, and production activities and the heightened risks it poses to achieving good cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. This testimony discusses: (1) current JSF cost and schedule estimates; (2) engine development; (3) manufacturing performance; (4) contracting issues for procurement of aircraft; (5) and test plans. This statement draws from GAO's March 2009 report, updated to the extent possible with new budget data and a recently revised procurement profile directed by the Secretary of Defense.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: JSF development will cost more and take longer to complete than reported to the Congress in April 2008, primarily because of contract cost overruns and extended time needed to complete flight testing. DOD is also significantly increasing annual procurement rates and plans to buy some aircraft sooner than reported last year. Total development costs are projected to increase between $2.4 billion and $7.4 billion and the schedule for completing system development extended from 1 to 3 years. The department has not asked for funding for the alternate engine program in the budgets since 2007 arguing that an alternate engine is not needed as a hedge against the failure of the main engine program and that the savings from competition would be small. Nonetheless, the Congress has added funding each year since then to sustain its development. Our prior analysis indicates that competitive pressures could yield enough savings to offset the costs of competition over the JSF program's life. To date, the two contractors have spent over $8 billion on engine development--over $6 billion with the main engine contractor and over $2 billion with the second source contractor. Manufacturing of development test aircraft is taking more time, money, and effort than planned, but officials believe that they can still deliver the 9 remaining test aircraft by early 2010. The contractor has not yet demonstrated mature manufacturing processes, or an ability to produce at currently planned rates. It has taken steps to improve manufacturing; however, given the manufacturing challenges, DOD's plan to increase procurement in the near term adds considerable risk and will be difficult to achieve. DOD is procuring a substantial number of JSF aircraft using cost reimbursement contracts. Cost reimbursement contracts place most of the risk on the buyer--DOD in this case--who is liable to pay more than budgeted should labor, material, or other incurred costs be more than expected when the contract was signed. JSF flight testing is still in its infancy and continues to experience flight testing delays. Nonetheless, DOD is making substantial investments before flight testing proves that the JSF will perform as expected. DOD may procure 273 aircraft costing an estimated $42 billion before completing flight testing.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am very pleased to be here today to discuss the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter  (JSF) program. The JSF is the Department of Defense’s (DOD) most costly  acquisition program, seeking to simultaneously develop, produce, and field  three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight  international partners. The JSF is critical to our nation’s plans for  recapitalizing the tactical air forces and will require a long-term  commitment to very large annual funding outlays. The total expected U.S.  investment is now more than $300 billion to develop and procure 2,456  aircraft over the next 25 years.  The JSF program is entering its most  challenging phase as it plans to deliver test assets, significantly step up  flight testing, begin verifying mission system capabilities, mature  manufacturing processes, and quickly ramp up production of operational  aircraft.
GAO has issued 5 annual reports on the JSF. Our most recent report in  March of this year discussed increased development costs and schedule,  plans to accelerate procurement, manufacturing performance and delays,  and the development test strategy. A recurring theme in our work has been  concern about what we believe is undue concurrency of development,  test, and production activities and the heightened risk it poses to achieving  good cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. The department  acknowledges the substantial concurrency and risk, but approves of it,  hoping to replace aging legacy aircraft with this fifth generation strike  aircraft as quickly and efficiently as possible. The department believes that  the program is well managed, has the proper amount of oversight, and is  well positioned to manage heightened risks and successfully accomplish  this mission.
Today, I will discuss (1) current JSF cost and schedule estimates;   (2) issues concerning the alternate engine program; (3) manufacturing  performance; (4) contracting issues for procurement of production  aircraft; and (5) development test plans. This statement draws primarily  from our March 2009 report, updated to the extent possible with new  budget data and a recently revised procurement profile directed by the  Secretary of Defense. Information about the alternate engine program  comes largely from our testimony in 2008. This work was conducted in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: More Money and Time Will Be Needed to Complete JSF Development, While DOD Plans to Accelerate Procurement
paragraphs: JSF development will cost more and take longer to complete than reported  to the Congress in April 2008, primarily because of contract cost overruns  and extended time needed to complete flight testing. DOD is also  significantly increasing annual procurement rates and plans to buy some  aircraft sooner than reported last year. The new plan will require  increased annual procurement funding over the next 6 years, but officials  did not assess its net effect on total program costs through completion of  JSF acquisition.
Total development costs are projected to increase between $2.4 billion and  $7.4 billion and the schedule for completing system development to be  extended from 1 to 3 years, according to estimates made in late 2008—one  by the JSF Program Office and one by a joint team of Office of the  Secretary of Defense (OSD), Air Force, and Navy officials. Cost overruns  on both the aircraft and engine contracts, delays in manufacturing test  aircraft, and a need for a longer, more robust flight test program were the  primary cost drivers. The joint team’s estimate is higher than the program  office’s because it included costs for the alternate engine program directed  by the Congress and used more conservative assumptions based on  current and legacy aircraft experiences. Table 1 compares these two  estimates with the official program of record which was reported to the  Congress in April 2008.
Although annual budgets and procurement quantities for fiscal year 2011  and out are still being reviewed by defense officials and are not available  to us, we expect the JSF program to continue its rapid increase in annual  procurement quantities and to buy some aircraft sooner than reported to  the Congress in April 2008. At that time, DOD planned to ramp up  procurement to reach a maximum of 130 aircraft per year by fiscal year  2015 (U.S. quantities only) and sustain this rate for 8 years. Procurement  budget requirements for that plan were projected to be over $12 billion per  year during peak production. The new fiscal year 2010 procurement  budget requests funding of $6.8 billion for 30 JSF aircraft, a unit cost of  $227 million. This budget is substantially lower than both the program  office’s and the joint team’s estimates for 2010, in terms of unit costs and  overall procurement funding.
Last month, the Secretary of Defense announced plans to procure 513 JSF  aircraft during the 6-year period, fiscal years 2010 through 2015. This total  includes procuring 28 more aircraft during this period than previously  planned. This plan does not increase the total aircraft to be procured  through completion of the JSF program but would buy these 28 aircraft in  earlier years than previously scheduled. By accelerating procurement,  DOD hopes to recapitalize tactical air forces sooner and mitigate projected  future fighter shortfalls. The additional aircraft represent a scaling back of  the proposed JSF procurement plans that we reported on in March 2009.
The joint team’s estimate included $420 million for the alternate engine program. DOD’s   2010 budget request did not include this  funding.
At that time, DOD was proposing to accelerate procurement by 169  aircraft during these same years. That proposal would have required from  $22 billion to $33 billion more in total procurement funding over that  period, according to the respective estimates of the program office and  joint estimating team. We have not yet been provided budgets and annual  procurement quantities for fiscal years 2011 and out under the Secretary’s  revised plan that would establish the increased funding requirements for  the new accelerated plan compared to annual procurement funding  requirements under the April 2008 program of record. Appendixes 1 and 2  provide an historical track of cost and schedule estimates.
section_title: DOD’s Proposal to Cancel the Alternate Engine Program May Bypass Long-term Merits
paragraphs: DOD and the Congress have had a continuing debate for several years on  the merits of an alternate engine program to provide a second source and  competition for engine procurement and life cycle support. The alternate  engine program was part of the original JSF acquisition strategy. The  department first proposed canceling the alternate engine program in the  2007 budget and has not asked for funding in the budgets since then. The  administration does not believe an alternate engine is needed as a hedge  against the failure of the main engine program and believes savings from  competition would be small. The Congress has added funding each year  since 2007 to sustain the alternate engine development, including $465  million for fiscal year 2009. To date, the two contractors have spent over  $8 billion on engines development—over $6 billion with the main engine  contractor and over $2 billion with the second source contractor.
The way forward for the JSF engine acquisition strategy entails one of  many critical choices facing DOD today, and underscores the importance  of decisions facing the program. As we noted in past testimonies before  this committee, the acquisition strategy for the JSF engine must weigh  expected costs against potential rewards. In each of the past 2 years we  have testified before this committee on the merits of a competitive engine  program for the Joint Strike Fighter. While we did not update our analysis  we believe it is still relevant and the same conclusions can be drawn. We  reported in 2008 that to continue the JSF alternate engine program, an  additional investment of about $3.5 billion to $4.5 billion in development  and production-related costs, may be required to ensure competition. Our  earlier cost analysis suggests that a savings of 9 to 11 percent would  recoup that investment. As we reported last year, a competitive strategy  has the potential for savings equal to or exceeding that amount across the  life cycle of the engine. Prior experience indicates that it is reasonable to  assume that competition on the JSF engine program could yield savings of  at least that much. As a result, we remain confident that competitive  pressures could yield enough savings to offset the costs of competition  over the JSF program’s life. However, we recognize that this ultimately  will depend on the final approach for the competition, the number of  aircraft actually purchased, and the ratio of engines awarded to each  contractor.
Results from past competitions provide evidence of potential financial and  nonfinancial savings that can be derived from engine programs. One  relevant case study to consider is the “Great Engine War” of the 1980s— the competition between Pratt & Whitney and General Electric to supply  military engines for the F-16 and other fighter aircraft programs. At that  time, all engines for the F-14 and F-15 aircraft were being produced on a  sole-source basis by Pratt & Whitney, which was criticized for increased  procurement and maintenance costs, along with a general lack of  responsiveness to government concerns about those programs. For  example, safety issues with the single-engine F-16 aircraft were seen as  having greater consequences than safety issues with the twin-engine F-14  or F-15 aircraft. To address concerns, the Air Force began to fund the  development and testing of an alternate engine to be produced by General  Electric; the Air Force also supported the advent of an improved  derivative of the Pratt & Whitney engine. Beginning in 1983, the Air Force  initiated a competition that Air Force documentation suggests resulted in  significant cost savings in the program. In the first 4 years of the  competition, when actual costs are compared to the program’s baseline  estimate, results included (1) nearly 30 percent cumulative savings for  acquisition costs, (2) roughly 16 percent cumulative savings for operations  and support costs; and (3) total savings of about 21 percent in overall life  cycle costs.
The Great Engine War was able to generate significant benefits because  competition incentivized contractors to improve designs and reduce costs  during production and sustainment. Competitive pressure continues today  as the F-15 and F-16 aircraft are still being sold internationally. While other  defense competitions resulted in some level of benefits, especially with  regard to contractor responsiveness, they did not see the same levels of  success absent continued competitive pressures.
Similar competition for the JSF engines may also provide benefits that do  not result in immediate financial savings, but could result in reduced costs  or other positive outcomes over time. Our prior work, along with studies  by DOD and others, indicate there are a number of nonfinancial benefits  that may result from competition, including better performance, increased  reliability, and improved contractor responsiveness. In addition, the   long-term effects of the JSF engine program on the global industrial base  go far beyond the two competing contractors.
DOD and others have performed studies and have widespread  concurrence as to these other benefits, including better engine  performance, increased reliability, and improved contractor  responsiveness. In fact, in 1998 and 2002, DOD program management  advisory groups assessed the JSF alternate engine program and found the  potential for significant benefits in these and other areas. Table 2  summarizes the benefits determined by those groups.
While the benefits highlighted may be more difficult to quantify, they are  no less important, and ultimately were strongly considered in  recommending continuation of the alternate engine program. These  studies concluded that the program would maintain the industrial base for  fighter engine technology, enhance readiness, instill contractor incentives  for better performance, ensure an operational alternative if the current  engine developed problems, and enhance international participation.
Another potential benefit of having an alternate engine program, and one  also supported by the program advisory groups, is to reduce the risk that a  single point systemic failure in the engine design could substantially affect  the fighter aircraft fleet. This point is underscored by recent failures of the  Pratt & Whitney test program. In August 2007, an engine running at a test  facility experienced failures in the low pressure turbine blade and bearing,  which resulted in a suspension of all engine test activity. In February 2008,  during follow-on testing to prove the root cause of these failures, a blade  failure occurred in another engine, resulting in delays to both the Air  Force and Marine Corps variant flight test programs.
section_title: Continued Manufacturing Inefficiencies Will Make it Difficult for the Program to Meet Its Production Schedule
paragraphs: Manufacturing of JSF development test aircraft is taking more time,  money, and effort than planned. Officials believe that they can work  through these problems and deliver the 9 remaining test aircraft by early  2010; however, by that time, DOD may have already ordered as many as 58  production aircraft. Manufacturing inefficiencies and parts shortages  continue to delay the completion and delivery of development test aircraft  needed for flight testing. The contractor has not yet demonstrated mature  manufacturing processes, or an ability to produce aircraft consistently at  currently planned annual rates. It has taken steps to improve  manufacturing processes, the supplier base, and schedule management;  however, given the manufacturing challenges, we believe that DOD’s plan  to accelerate procurement in the near term adds considerable risk and will  be difficult to achieve.
The prime contractor has restructured the JSF manufacturing schedule  several times, each time lengthening the schedule to deliver aircraft to the  test program. Delays and manufacturing inefficiencies are prime causes of  contract cost overruns. The contractor has delivered four development  flight test aircraft and projects delivering the remaining nine aircraft in  2009 and early 2010. Problems and delays are largely the residual effects  from the late release of engineering drawings, design changes, delays in  establishing a supplier base, and parts shortages, which continue to cause  delays and force inefficient production line work-arounds where  unfinished work is completed out of station. Data provided by the  Defense Contract Management Agency and the JSF Program Office show  continuing critical parts shortages, out-of-station work, and quality issues.  The total projected labor hours to manufacture test aircraft increased by  40 percent just in the past year, as illustrated in figure 1.
Performance data for two major cost areas—wing assembly and mate and  delivery—indicate even more substantial growth. Figure 2 compares the  increased budgeted hours in the 2008 schedule to 2007 estimates. The 2007  schedule assumed a steeper drop in labor hours as more units are  produced and manufacturing and worker knowledge increases. The new  schedule, based upon actual performance, projects a less steep decline in  labor hours, indicating slower learning and lesser gains in worker  efficiency. As of June 2008, the planned hours for these two major stations  increased by about 90 percent over the June 2007 schedule, which itself  had shown an increase from the 2006 schedule. The overlap in the work  schedule between manufacturing the wing and mating (connecting) it to  the aircraft fuselage has been a major concern for several years because it  causes inefficient out-of-station work. The contractor continues to address  this concern, but the new schedule indicates that this problem will  continue at least through 2009.
The prime contractor has taken significant steps to improve schedule  management, manufacturing efficiency, and supplier base. Our review  found that the prime contractor has good schedule management tools and  integrated processes in place. The one area not meeting commercial best  practices was the absence of schedule risk analysis that would provide  better insight into areas of risk and uncertainty in the schedule. DOD  agreed with our March 2009 recommendation and will direct the  contractor to perform periodic schedule risk analyses. The prime  contractor is also implementing changes designed to address the  manufacturing inefficiencies and parts shortages discussed earlier. These  include (1) increasing oversight of key subcontractors that are having  problems, (2) securing long-term raw material purchase price agreements  for both the prime and key subcontractors, and (3) implementing better  manufacturing line processes. On this latter point, according to program  officials, the prime contractor has taken specific steps to improve wing  manufacturing performance—noted above as one of the most troublesome  workstations. Defense Contract Management Agency officials noted that  the contractor produced the second short take off and landing aircraft  variant with less work performed out of station than for the first such  aircraft. Also, program office and contractor officials report some  alleviation of parts shortages and improvements in quality, but also believe  that the effects from previous design delays, parts shortages, and labor  inefficiencies will continue to persist over the near term.
section_title: Use of Cost Contracts for Production Aircraft Elevates the Government’s Financial Risk
paragraphs: DOD is procuring a substantial number of JSF aircraft using cost  reimbursement contracts. Cost reimbursement contracts place most of the  program’s financial risk on the buyer—DOD in this case—who is liable to  pay more than budgeted should labor, material, or other incurred costs be  more than expected when the contract was signed. Subsequent cost  increases, such as the growth in manufacturing labor hours discussed  above, are mostly passed on to the Government. Thus far, DOD has  procured the first three production lots using cost reimbursement  contracts—a total of 28 aircraft and an estimated $6.7 billion to date. JSF  officials expect to also procure the fourth lot using cost reimbursement  and to transition to fixed-price contracts when appropriate, possibly  between lots 5 and 7 (fiscal years 2011 to 2013). It is unclear exactly how  and when this will happen, but the expectation is to transition to fixed  pricing once the air vehicle has a mature design, has been demonstrated in  flight tests, and is producible at established cost targets. Under the April  2008 program of record, DOD was planning to procure as many as 275  aircraft costing an estimated $41.6 billion through fiscal year 2013 using  cost reimbursement contracts. The plan to accelerate procurement of 28  aircraft would likely add to the quantities purchased on such contracts.
Cost reimbursement contracts provide for payment of allowable incurred  costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract. According to the Federal  Acquisition Regulation, cost reimbursement contracts are suitable for use  only when uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit  costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed- price contract. Cost reimbursement contracts for weapon production are  considered appropriate when the program lacks sufficient knowledge  about system design, manufacturing processes, and testing results to  establish firm prices and delivery dates. In contrast, a fixed-price contract  provides for a pre-established price, places more of the risk and  responsibility for costs on the contractor, and provides more incentive for  efficient and economical performance.
Procuring large numbers of production aircraft using cost reimbursement  contracts reflects that the JSF design, production processes, and costs for  labor and material is not yet sufficiently mature and that pricing  information is not exact enough for the contractor to assume the risk  under a fixed-price contract. We see it as a consequence of the substantial  concurrency of development, test, and production built into the JSF  schedule. Significant overlap of these activities means that DOD is  procuring considerable quantities of operational aircraft while  development test aircraft are still on the manufacturing line and where  much testing remains to prove aircraft performance and suitability.  Establishing a clear and accountable path to ensure that the contractor  assumes more of the risk is prudent. Accordingly, we recommended in  March 2009 that DOD report to the congressional defense committees by  October 2009 explaining costs and risks associated with cost  reimbursement contracts for production, the strategy for managing and  mitigating risks, and plans for transitioning to fixed price contracts for  production. DOD concurred.
The former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition agreed  with our concerns about significant concurrency and the need to  transition to a fixed price environment. In an April 2009 memo, as the  Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, she discussed her  views on the concurrency of production and development testing as  driving risks to the development program. She recommended that the JSF  joint program office closely examine manufacturing processes and work  to convert cost reimbursement contracts to fixed-price as soon as  practical.
section_title: JSF’s Test Plan Is Improved but Flight Test Program Is Still in Its Infancy
paragraphs: After reducing test resources and activities to save money in 2007, the JSF  Program Office developed a new test plan in the spring of 2008 that  extended the development period by 1 year, better aligned test resources  and availability dates, and lessened the overlap between development and  operational testing. While improved, the new plan is still aggressive and  has little room for error discovery, rework, and recovery from downtime  should test assets be grounded or otherwise unavailable. The sheer  complexity of the JSF program—with 22.9 million lines of software code,  three variants, and multi-mission development— suggests that the aircraft  will encounter many unforeseen problems during flight testing requiring  additional time in the schedule for rework. Given the complexity of the  program, the joint estimating team noted that an additional 2 years beyond  the recent 1 year extension may be needed to complete development.
The test plan relies heavily on a series of advanced and robust simulation  labs and a flying test bed to verify aircraft and subsystem performance.  Figure 3 shows that 83 percent of the aircraft’s capabilities are to be  verified through labs, the flying test bed, and subject-matter analysis, while  only 17 percent of test points are to be verified through flight testing.  Program officials argue that their heavy investment in simulation labs will  allow early risk reduction, thereby reducing the need for additional flight  testing, controlling costs, and meeting the key milestones of the program’s  aggressive test plan. However, while the JSF program’s simulation labs  appear more prolific, integrated, and capable than the labs used in past  aircraft programs, their ability to substitute for flight testing has not yet  been demonstrated.
Despite an improved test plan, JSF flight testing is still in its infancy. Only  about 2 percent of its development flight testing had been completed as of  November 2008. Figure 4 shows the expected ramp up in flight testing with  most effort occurring in fiscal years 2010 through 2012. Past programs  have shown that many problems are not discovered until flight testing. As  such, the program is likely to experience considerable cost growth in the  future as it steps up its flight testing, discovers new problems, and makes  the necessary technical and design corrections.
While the program has been able to complete key ground tests and  demonstrate basic aircraft flying capabilities, it continues to experience  flight testing delays. Most notably, flight testing of full short takeoff and  vertical landing capabilities has further been delayed.  Flight testing of the  carrier variant has also been delayed.  Program officials do not believe  either of the delays will affect planned initial operational capability dates.  In 2009 and early fiscal year 2010, the program plans to begin flight testing  6 development test aircraft, including the first 2 aircraft dedicated to  mission system testing. A fully integrated, mission-capable aircraft is not  expected to enter flight testing until 2012.
Despite the nascency of the flight test program and subsequent flight  testing delays, DOD is investing heavily in procuring JSF aircraft.  Procuring aircraft before testing successfully demonstrates that the design  is mature and that the weapon system will work as intended increases the  likelihood of expensive design changes becoming necessary when  production is underway.  Also, systems already built and fielded may later  require substantial modifications, further adding to costs. The uncertain  environment as testing progresses is one reason why the prime contractor  and DOD are using cost-reimbursable contracts until rather late in  procurement. Table 3 depicts planned investments—in both dollars and  aircraft—prior to the completion of development flight testing. DOD may  procure 273 aircraft at a total estimated cost of $41.9 billion before  development flight testing is completed. Table 3 also shows the expected  contract types.
section_title: Concluding Remarks
paragraphs: The JSF program is entering its most challenging phase, a crossroads of a  sort. Looking forward, the contractor plans to complete work  expeditiously to deliver the test assets, significantly step up flight testing,  begin verifying mission system capabilities, mature manufacturing  processes, and quickly ramp up production of operational aircraft.  Challenges are many— continuing cost and schedule pressures; complex,  extensive, and unproven software requirements; and a nascent, very  aggressive test program with diminished flight test assets.
While the program must move forward, we continue to believe that the  program’s concurrent development and production of the aircraft is  extremely risky. By committing to procure large quantities of the aircraft  before testing is complete and manufacturing processes are mature, DOD  has significantly increased the risk of further compromising its return on  investment—as well as delaying the delivery of critical capabilities to the  warfighter. Furthermore, the program’s plan to procure large quantities of  the aircraft using cost-reimbursement contracts—where uncertainties in  contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated with sufficient  accuracy to use a fixed-price contract—places additional financial risk on  the government. Until the contractor demonstrates that it can produce  aircraft in a timely and efficient manner, DOD cannot fully understand  future funding requirements. DOD needs to ensure that the prime  contractor can meet expected development and production expectations.  At a minimum, the contractor needs to develop a detailed plan  demonstrating how it can successfully meet program development and  production goals in the near future within cost and schedule parameters.  As such, in our March 2009 report, we recommended that Secretary of  Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology  and Logistics to report to congressional defense committees explaining  the risks associated with using cost-reimbursable contracts as compared  to fixed price contracts for JSF’s production quantities, the program’s  strategy for managing those risks, and plans for transitioning to fixed-price  contracts for production. DOD agreed with our recommendation. With an  improved contracting framework and a more reasoned look to the future,  the JSF program can more effectively meet DOD and warfighter needs in a  constrained budget environment.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  answer any questions you may have at this time.
For further information about this statement, please contact Michael J.  Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this  statement are Ridge Bowman, Bruce Fairbairn, Matt Lea, and Charlie  Shivers.
section_title: Appendix I: Changes in JSF Cost, Quantity, and Delivery Estimates
paragraphs: development start) (2004 Replan)
Cost Estimates (then-year dollars in billions)
Unit Cost Estimates (then-year dollars in millions)
Military construction costs have not been fully established and the reporting basis changed over time  in these DOD reports.
section_title: Appendix II: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Schedule
paragraphs: Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing  Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing  * Aircraft flown in conventional mode.  The first test to demonstrated full short takeoff and vertical  landing capabilities is scheduled for September 2009.
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