U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges
Published: 2003-09-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, focused attention on the need to improve public diplomacy efforts to cultivate a better public opinion of the United States abroad. However, recent opinion research indicates that many foreign publics, especially in countries with significant Muslim populations, view the United States unfavorably. GAO examined changes in the State Department's (State) public diplomacy efforts since September 11, whether State has an overall strategy for its public diplomacy programs, how it measures their effectiveness, and challenges it faces in implementing these programs.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since September 11, State expanded its public diplomacy efforts in Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. It significantly increased program funding and the number of Foreign Service officers in South Asia and the Near East. It also launched new initiatives targeting broader, younger audiences--particularly in predominantly Muslim countries--and plans to continue them in the future. After September 11, State acknowledged the lack of, and the need for, a comprehensive strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities. Such a strategy is still in the development stage. The absence of an integrated strategy could impede State's ability to direct its multifaceted efforts toward concrete and measurable progress. Furthermore, an interagency public diplomacy strategy has not been completed that would help State and other federal agencies convey consistent messages and achieve mutually reinforcing benefits overseas. State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals. Its overseas performance measurement efforts focus on anecdotal evidence and program outputs, rather than indicate progress in changing foreign publics' understanding and opinions of the United States. State's efforts face significant challenges, including insufficient time and staff to conduct public diplomacy tasks. Public affairs officers responding to our survey said that burdensome administrative and budgetary processes divert their attention from public diplomacy programs. In addition, about 21 percent of Foreign Service officers in language-designated public diplomacy positions overseas lack sufficient foreign language skills. We also found that about 58 percent of public affairs officers responding to our survey believe the amount of time to attend public diplomacy training is inadequate.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, focused attention on the need  to improve U.S. public diplomacy efforts designed to promote better  appreciation of the United States abroad and greater receptivity to its  policies among foreign publics. Opinion research indicates that publics in  many foreign countries have unfavorable views of the United States, and  dislike for U.S. foreign policy poses a particularly difficult diplomatic  challenge. This is especially the case in countries with significant Muslim  populations. The approximately $1 billion nonmilitary budget for U.S.  public diplomacy is almost evenly divided between the State Department  (State) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, which oversees the  activities of U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting overseas. This  report focuses on the State Department’s public diplomacy efforts. A  related report assesses those of the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
This report examines (1) changes in State’s public diplomacy resources and  programs since September 11, particularly in countries with significant  Muslim populations; (2) whether State has an overall strategy for its public  diplomacy programs; (3) how State measures their effectiveness; and (4)  what other significant challenges State faces in executing these programs.
To address all of our objectives, we administered a survey to the heads of  public affairs sections at U.S. embassies worldwide covering such issues as  guidance from various State Department offices; sufficiency of budgetary,  staff, and other resources; and ability to adequately measure performance.  The response rate to our survey was 76 percent. To grasp the range of  State’s key public diplomacy programs and how programs and resources  have changed since September 11, we reviewed State budget requests,  annual reports, and other program documentation. We also met with  officials in State’s Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and  Public Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau  of Public Affairs, the Office of International Information Programs, and  regional bureaus. To assess whether State has an overall strategy for its  public diplomacy programs, we reviewed relevant planning, program, and  other documentation. We also met with cognizant State officials and a  number of academics specializing in public diplomacy and international  affairs issues and private sector officials from U.S. public relations and  opinion research firms with international operations. To assess how State  measures the effectiveness of its public diplomacy programs and to  understand private sector methods for gauging the success of persuasive  techniques, we met with officials in State’s Office of Strategic and  Performance Planning and the academic and private sector officials  mentioned above. To gain a firsthand view of the challenges faced in  executing public diplomacy programs overseas, we analyzed program  documentation and met with U.S. embassy officers, host-country  government officials, and private sector and nongovernmental organization  representatives in the United Kingdom, Morocco, and Egypt. For further  information on our overall scope and methodology, see appendix I. For  further information on the development and results of our survey, see  appendix II.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: State’s overall public diplomacy goal is to inform, engage, and influence  global audiences. This goal is aimed at reaching out beyond foreign  governments to promote better appreciation of the United States abroad,  greater receptivity to U.S. policies among foreign publics, and sustained  access and influence in important sectors of foreign societies. Public  diplomacy is carried out through a wide range of programs that employ  person-to-person contacts; print, broadcast, and electronic media; and  other means. Traditionally, U.S. public diplomacy focused on foreign  elites—current and future overseas opinion leaders, agenda-setters, and  decision makers. However, the dramatic growth in global mass  communications and other trends have forced a rethinking of this  approach, and State has begun to consider techniques for communicating  with broader foreign audiences.
State’s public diplomacy budget totaled an estimated $594 million in fiscal  year 2003. About 41 percent, or $245 million, is slated for the International  Visitor, Fulbright, and other educational and cultural exchange programs.  Roughly 38 percent, or about $226 million, of State’s public diplomacy  budget goes to its regional bureaus, primarily to cover the salaries,  expenses, and activities of public diplomacy officers posted at U.S.  embassies. State embassy officers engage in information dissemination,  media relations, cultural affairs, and other efforts. Around 12 percent, or  about $71 million, funds speaker programs, publications, and other  activities. The remaining 9 percent, or $51 million, funds programs related  to public diplomacy, such as programs carried out by the National  Endowment for Democracy. Figure 1 shows the key uses of public  diplomacy resources.
The U.S. government public diplomacy community primarily consists of the  White House, State, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the Department  of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Although it is not a central  player in public diplomacy, the U.S. Agency for International Development  (USAID) also plays a role. The Secretary of State serves as a member of the  Broadcasting Board of Governors—an arrangement that is intended to  strengthen coordination efforts between State and the Board. The U.S.  Advisory Commission for Public Diplomacy, a bipartisan panel created by  Congress and appointed by the President, provides advice on U.S.  government public diplomacy activities. Figure 2 illustrates State’s  organizational structure for public diplomacy.
State’s Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is  responsible for the overall leadership and coordination of State’s public  diplomacy efforts. The Undersecretary coordinates the efforts of the  Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of Public Affairs,  and the Office of International Information Programs. Public diplomacy  personnel are also located in State’s regional and functional bureaus and at  overseas posts, but these individuals report to the management of their  own respective organizational entities and not to the Undersecretary.    Foreign Service officers in the public affairs sections of U.S. embassies  have primary responsibility for executing many of the specific programs.  While the Undersecretary does not manage the staffing process for public  diplomacy personnel stationed overseas, she has authority over all  program resources for both domestic and overseas public diplomacy  activities. However, all Foreign Service officers posted overseas, including  those in the public affairs sections of U.S. embassies, report ultimately to  the Chiefs-of-Mission in their respective host countries. Figure 3 depicts  the structure of a typical public diplomacy section at a large U.S. embassy  overseas.
subsections: section_title: Public Opinion of the United States in Many Muslim- majority Countries Has Worsened
paragraphs: Favorable public opinion of the United States has declined worldwide in  recent years, according to a number of opinion research firms. A study  conducted by The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press in  2002 found that negative opinion of the United States was most prevalent in  the Muslim countries of the Middle East and in central Asia, even in those  whose governments have close ties to the United States. For example, in  Egypt, only 6 percent of those surveyed had a favorable view of the United  States. The study also showed that, between 1999 and 2002, favorable  opinions of the United States declined from 52 percent to 30 percent in  Turkey and from 23 percent to 10 percent in Pakistan. Another study  released by the Pew Research Center in March 2003 showed that public  opinion of the United States further declined among its allies due to  antiwar sentiment and disapproval of the administration’s international  policies. For example, public opinion of the United States in Turkey  further decreased from 30 percent to 12 percent during the Iraq campaign.  And the Pew Center’s recent report, released in June 2003, concluded that  opinion of the United States in Muslim-majority countries has remained  negative, with negative feelings increasing dramatically in several cases.  While favorable opinion of the United States in Turkey and Pakistan  increased a few points in spring 2003, the report showed a dramatic  decrease in favorable opinion in Morocco, Jordan, the Palestinian  Authority, and many other countries over the past few years.
Zogby International released a poll in April 2002 that concluded that Arabs  and Muslims generally hold a favorable view of American movies,  television, science, technology, and education but have generally  unfavorable views of the United States when it comes to its policy toward  Muslim countries and Palestinians. U.S. policy toward Muslim countries  was given single-digit favorable ratings by Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, Kuwait,  Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. Public opinion of U.S. policy toward the  Palestinians in the same countries ranked even lower overall.
section_title: State Has Expanded Its Efforts in Muslim- majority Countries Since September 11
paragraphs: Since September 11, State has expanded its efforts in Muslim-majority  countries that are considered strategically important in the war on  terrorism. State significantly increased the program funding and number of  Foreign Service officers in its bureaus of South Asian and Near Eastern  Affairs. State has also launched a number of new initiatives targeting  broader, younger audiences—particularly in predominantly Muslim  countries—and plans to continue these initiatives in the future. These  initiatives include expanding exchange programs targeting citizens of  Muslim countries, informing foreign publics about U.S. policies in the war  on terrorism, and demonstrating that Americans and Muslims share certain  values.
subsections: section_title: State Increased Resources in Muslim-majority Countries
paragraphs: State has increased its public diplomacy resources overall since September  11, with the largest relative overseas increases going to Muslim-majority  countries. In the two fiscal years since September 11, State’s public  diplomacy resources increased from $544 million in fiscal year 2001 to $594  million in fiscal year 2003, or about 9 percent in real terms. During the same  period, the number of authorized Foreign Service officers involved in  public diplomacy overseas also increased, from 484 to 539, or  approximately 11 percent. While State’s bureau of Europe and Eurasia still  receives the largest overall share of overseas public diplomacy resources,  the largest percentage increases in such resources since September 11  occurred in State’s bureaus of South Asian and Near Eastern Affairs, where  many countries have significant Muslim populations. Public diplomacy  funding increased in South Asia from $24 million to $39 million and in the  Near East from $39 million to $62 million, or by 63 and 58 percent,  respectively. During the same period, authorized American Foreign Service  officers in South Asia increased from 27 to 31 and in the Near East from 45  to 57, or by 15 percent and 27 percent, respectively. Table 1 shows the  increases in public diplomacy resources by region from fiscal year 2001  through 2003.
In 2002, State redirected 5 percent of its exchange resources to better  support the war on terrorism and to strengthen U.S. engagement with  Muslim countries. In 2003, State has continued to emphasize exchanges  with Muslim countries through its Partnership for Learning Program— designed to target young and diverse audiences through academic and  professional exchanges such as the Fulbright, International Visitor, and  Citizen Exchange programs. State has also carried out increased exchanges  through its Middle East Partnership Initiative, which includes computer  and English language training for women newly employed by the Afghan  government and a program to assist women from Arab countries and  elsewhere in observing and discussing the U.S. electoral process.
State’s Office of International Information Programs has also developed  new initiatives to support the war on terrorism. It expanded its interactive  Web site in Arabic, Persian, and other languages to inform broad audiences  about U.S. policy initiatives, including the war on terrorism. It launched a  new Web site to provide information on changes in U.S. visa policies and  immigration procedures after September 11, including those that  predominantly affect citizens of Muslim-majority countries. It employed  staff to monitor Arab television and news reports for misinformation and  hostile propaganda targeted at the United States and to counter that  information by presenting the facts through various media. In addition, it  developed several products to support the war on terror including the  following:   a print and electronic pamphlet titled The Network of Terrorism,  distributed in 36 languages via hard copy, the Web, and media  throughout the world, which documented the direct link between the  September 11 perpetrators and al Qaeda;   a publication titled Iraq: From Fear to Freedom to inform foreign  audiences of the administration’s policies toward Iraq;   a print and electronic pamphlet titled Voices for Freedom in which Iraq- born professionals describe the brutality of Saddam Hussein’s regime  and their hopes for Iraq’s future;  an Arabic youth magazine; and   an 18-minute documentary dubbed in eight languages titled Rebuilding  Afghanistan, which depicts U.S. and allied efforts in the reconstruction  of Afghanistan.
section_title: Media Campaign Highlights Shared Values
paragraphs: In 2002, State’s Bureau of Public Affairs launched a campaign called Shared  Values to stimulate dialogue and increase understanding between  Americans and people from predominantly Muslim countries. State  developed a series of five short-form minidocumentaries to demonstrate  that the United States is an open society and not at war with Islam, and that  Americans and Muslims share certain values and beliefs. These  minidocumentaries were dubbed in Arabic, Bahasa, Urdu, and French.  State aired them via paid media for about 5 weeks during the holy month of  Ramadan in Indonesia, Pakistan, Kuwait, and Malaysia. Several  countriesEgypt, Morocco, and Lebanondid not allow State to air the  documentaries because they viewed them as U.S. government propaganda.  However, State also aired the documentaries on Pan Arab media, which  consists of satellite broadcasts that reach audiences in a number of Arab  countries, including Egypt and Lebanon. State estimates that the program  reached approximately 288 million people in the Middle East, South Asia,  and East Asia.
To complement the paid media campaign, State disseminated print and  electronic pamphlets and other materials on the theme of Muslim life in  America; sent speakers to Kuwait, Lebanon, and Jordan to promote  additional interest in the Shared Values initiative; and held a satellite town  hall meeting between Americans and Indonesians. State also worked with  the Council of Muslim Americans for Understanding to create an  interactive Web site, in multiple languages, called “Open Dialogue.” The site  is intended to create a forum for dialogue between Muslim Americans and  other Muslims of the world.
section_title: Plans for Future Programs in Muslim Countries Under Way
paragraphs: State’s Public Affairs Bureau will continue its Shared Values program by  conducting additional research, developing media products, and  conducting public relations efforts in the Muslim world. State plans to  work with private voluntary organizations, USAID, U.S. businesses, and  international journalists and broadcasters to develop print, video, and  other television stories to inform large audiences about U.S.-led initiatives  in developing countries. For example, in Egypt, where State did not air the  minidocumentaries, it worked with local Egyptian TV and the Egyptian  government to air three stories of USAID projects in the country. State  plans to continue partnerships with USAID and other entities to  demonstrate American generosity to audiences in Muslim-majority  countries and the rest of the world.
State has developed other plans and programs for the future that  emphasize a broader and younger audience in predominantly Muslim  countries. State’s plans include exchange programs for high school  students with significant Muslim populations and expanded English  teaching programs to communicate American values to audiences  overseas. State plans to make more information available in Farsi and  South Asian languages. It also plans to dedicate 15 percent of its Speaker  Program budget to an “Impact Series” that will focus on key themes, one of  the first being “Outreach to the Muslim World.” In addition, State is working  with the Smithsonian Institution to develop 15 multimedia exhibits called  “American Corners,” which will provide access to reference materials on  the United States in selected Muslim-majority countries.
section_title: State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs
paragraphs: The growth in programs to the Muslim world marks State’s recognition of  the need to increase diplomatic channels to this population. However, State  lacks a comprehensive and commonly understood public diplomacy  strategy to guide implementation of these programs. The absence of an  integrated strategy could impede State’s ability to direct its multifaceted  efforts toward concrete and measurable progress. Furthermore, there is no  interagency public diplomacy strategy to guide State’s and all federal  agencies’ communication efforts. This limits the government’s ability to  convey consistent messages to overseas audiences and thus achieve  mutually reinforcing benefits.
subsections: section_title: State Does Not Have an Integrated Public Diplomacy Strategy
paragraphs: After September 11, State acknowledged the lack of, and need for, a  strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities and  directs them toward common objectives. However, the strategy is still in  the development stage. The Acting Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy  and Public Affairs told us that she is creating a new office of strategic  planning to lead this effort. She said it was too early to predict when such a  strategy might be completed. She also noted that, when the new  Undersecretary is appointed, the direction of the strategy could change.
State officials told us that such a strategy is particularly important because  State’s public diplomacy operation is fragmented among the various  organizational entities within the agency. Public affairs officers who  responded to our survey indicated that the lack of a strategy has hindered  their ability to effectively execute public diplomacy efforts overseas. More  than 66 percent of public affairs officers in one region reported that the  quality of strategic guidance from the Office of the Undersecretary in the  last year and a half was generally insufficient or very insufficient. More  than 40 percent in another region reported the same. We encountered  similar complaints during our overseas fieldwork. For example, in  Morocco, the former public affairs officer stated that so little information  had been provided from Washington on State’s post-September 11 public  diplomacy strategy that he had to rely on newspaper articles and  guesswork to formulate his in-country public diplomacy plans.
subsections: section_title: Private Sector Public Relations Tools Could Be Relevant to State’s Needs
paragraphs: Private sector public relations efforts and political campaigns use  sophisticated strategies to integrate complex communication efforts,  involving multiple players. Although State’s public diplomacy efforts  extend beyond the activities of public relations firms, many of the strategic  tools that such firms employ are relevant to State’s situation.
We held a roundtable discussion with some of the largest public relations  firms in the United States to identify the key strategic components of their  efforts. According to these executives, initial strategic decisions involve  establishing the scope and nature of the problem, identifying the target  audience, determining the core messages, and defining both success and  failure. Subsequent steps include conducting research to validate the initial  decisions, testing the core messages, carrying out prelaunch activities, and  developing information materials. Each of these elements contains  numerous other steps. Only when these steps are completed may the  tactical program be implemented. Further, the program must be  implemented while continuously measuring progress and adjusting tactics  accordingly. Figure 4 illustrates the elements of a typical public relations  strategy.
The private sector officials emphasized the importance of synchronizing  these activities in a systematic way so that the efforts are mutually  reinforcing in advancing the campaign’s overall objectives. They pointed  out that, without a carefully integrated plan, the various elements are at  risk of canceling one another out and possibly even damaging the overall  campaign.
A report by the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy and one  issued in 2002 by the United Kingdom-based Foreign Policy Center  emphasized the importance of employing communications consultants,  pollsters, and media specialists to provide relevant expertise to State on  media trends, market trends, production techniques, and emerging  technologies. A report published by the Council on Foreign Relations also  recommended increased private sector involvement, including the creation  of an independent, not-for-profit, Corporation for Public Diplomacy. The  officials who participated in our roundtable indicated a high level of  interest in State’s public diplomacy efforts and conveyed their willingness  to assist State in developing its strategy.
section_title: Interagency Public Diplomacy Strategy Has Not Been Established
paragraphs: To date, an interagency public diplomacy strategy that sets forth the  messages and means for governmentwide communication efforts to  overseas audiences has not been implemented. Because of their differing  roles and missions, the White House, State, and other public diplomacy  players often focus on different audiences and use varying means to  communicate with them. The idea of an interagency strategy would be to  consider the foreign publics in key countries and regions, the relevant U.S.  national interests there, what U.S. government communication channels  are available, and how to optimize their use in conveying desired themes  and messages.
The lack of an interagency strategy complicates the task of conveying  consistent messages and thus achieving mutually reinforcing benefits.
State officials told us that, without such a strategy, the risk of making  communication mistakes that are damaging to U.S. public diplomacy  efforts is high. They also said that the lack of a strategy diminishes the  efficiency and effectiveness of governmentwide public diplomacy efforts.  Reports by the Defense Science Board Task Force, the Council on Foreign  Relations, and Wilton Parkan executive agency of the British Foreign  and Commonwealth Office, as well as reports by the Advisory Commission  on Public Diplomacy and National Defense University, concluded that a  sophisticated interagency communications strategy is needed to  synchronize agencies’ target audience assessments, messages, and  capabilities.
Our overseas fieldwork in Egypt and Morocco underlined the importance  of interagency coordination. Embassy officers there told us that only a very  small percentage of the population was aware of the magnitude of U.S.  assistance being provided to their countries. Egypt is the second largest  recipient of U.S. assistance in the world, with assistance totaling more than  an estimated $1.9 billion in 2003. Assistance to Morocco totaled more than  an estimated $13 million in 2003. USAID and embassy officials in both  countries are currently testing new approaches and cooperating more  closely to better publicize USAID’s efforts; however, they noted that the  idea of USAID taking a more aggressive role in promoting its work was not  necessarily universally supported within USAID.
Most interagency communication coordination efforts have been ad hoc in  recent years. Immediately after September 11, the White House, State  Department, Department of Defense, and other agencies coordinated  various public diplomacy efforts on a day-to-day basis, and the White  House established a number of interim coordination mechanisms. One  such mechanism was the joint operation of the Coalition Information  Centers in Washington, London, and Islamabad, set up during the early  stages of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan in 2001. The centers were  designed to provide a rapid response capability for correcting inaccurate  news stories, proactively dealing with news items likely to generate  negative responses overseas, and optimizing reporting of news favorable to  U.S. efforts.
More recently, the White House established a more permanent  coordination mechanism. On January 21, 2003, the President issued an  executive order forming the White House Office of Global  Communications. The office is intended to coordinate strategic  communications from the U.S. government to overseas audiences. The  President also established a Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating  Committee, co-chaired by the State Department and the National Security  Council and to work closely with the Office of Global Communications, to  ensure interagency coordination in disseminating the American message  across the globe. It is the committee’s long-term objective to develop a  National Communications Strategy. One high-level State official told us that  the war in Iraq had delayed efforts to develop the strategy, and that it would  not be in place until September 2003 at the earliest.
section_title: State Lacks Measurable Indicators of Progress Toward Public Diplomacy Goals
paragraphs: State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress  toward its public diplomacy goals. Its overseas performance measurement  efforts focus on anecdotal evidence and program outputs, rather than  gauging progress toward changing foreign publics’ understanding and  attitudes about the United States. Public affairs officers responding to our  survey reported that their missions had insufficient staff to conduct  systematic program evaluations. In addition, limited availability and use of  polling data hamper State’s ability to track progress. Although it is difficult  to establish direct links between public diplomacy programs and results,  other U.S. government agencies and the private sector have some best  practices for assessing information dissemination campaigns, including the  need to define success and how it should be measured.
subsections: section_title: State’s Current Performance Plan Does Not Include Measurable Indicators of Progress
paragraphs: State’s current performance plan does not feature measurable indicators of  progress toward public diplomacy goals. State’s agencywide fiscal year  2003 performance plan includes a wide range of public diplomacy activities  that are used to address various strategic goals, but the plan directly  addresses only one type of public diplomacy activity—educational and  cultural exchanges—as a specific strategic and performance goal in and of  itself. The performance indicator that State cites for this goal does not  address the ultimate outcomes that are desired for these programs. For  example, State reported that 94 percent of exchange program participants  viewed their experiences as valuable, based on “highly successful or  valuable” ratings in program evaluations. While it is useful to know that  participants’ experiences were favorable, this information does not  demonstrate progress toward the more fundamental objective of achieving  changes in understanding and attitudes about the United States.
While State plans to improve its public diplomacy measures in 2004, its  plans still lack some important elements. For example, State cites the  intended use of independent surveys and polls to determine the success of  its programs, but it does not define what would constitute success, nor  does it specify what the surveys would measure or the frequency of  measurement. In other cases, State cites targets that are too vague to  measure. For example, its plans for evaluating international information  programs include the target, “evidence shows that information provided  has reached the intended user.” State officials acknowledged that these  indicators and targets were not measurable and stated they are working to  develop more quantitative indicators that can be measured. State also plans  to measure public diplomacy performance on a global basis rather than by  geographic region, as called for by the Office of Management and Budget.
section_title: Overseas Performance Measurement Efforts Emphasize Anecdotes and Program Activity
paragraphs: While performance measurement efforts at individual overseas posts vary  greatly, many focus on anecdotes or the amount of program activity in their  host country. For instance, posts might report on foreign press coverage of  conferences and speakers sponsored by U.S. embassies; on favorable  articles written by foreign journalists after they complete tours in the  United States; or on the activities of other former exchange program  participants. State has developed a database for posts to record anecdotal  evidence of results in specific instances. However, posts are not required to  follow up on exchange program participants on a systematic or periodic  basis. Other posts simply count the number of public diplomacy activities  that take place in their host country. For example, some posts tally the  number of speeches given by the ambassador or the number of news  articles placed in the host-country media. While such measures shed light  on the level of public diplomacy activity, they reveal little in the way of  overall program effectiveness.
section_title: Overseas Posts Not Required to Report Whether Performance Targets Are Met
paragraphs: Notwithstanding the relative usefulness of individual posts’ performance  measurement efforts, there are currently no reporting requirements in  place to determine whether posts’ performance targets are actually met. At  one overseas post we visited, the post had identified polling data showing  that only 22 percent of the host-country’s citizens had a favorable view of  the United States. The post used that figure as a baseline with yearly  percentage increases set as targets. However, the former public affairs  officer at the post told us that he did not attempt to determine or report on  whether the post had actually achieved these targets because there was no  requirement to do so. Officials at the other two overseas posts we visited  also cited the lack of any formal reporting requirement for following up on  whether they met their annual performance targets. Officials in State’s  Office of Strategic and Performance Planning said that such a requirement  is currently under consideration.
section_title: Insufficient Data and Resources Hinder Performance Measurement
paragraphs: Public affairs officers at U.S. embassies generally do not conduct  systematic program evaluations. Moreover, they noted that measuring the  impact of public diplomacy programs is difficult because the full effects of  such programs may not be known for years. For example, tracking the  activities of former exchange program participants over the course of many  years is a labor-intensive effort. About 79 percent of the respondents to our  survey reported that staffing at their missions was insufficient to conduct  systematic program evaluations. Many officers also reported that staffing  at posts was insufficient to carry out the long-range monitoring required to  adequately measure program effectiveness. Some officers said that this is  especially problematic at smaller posts, where public diplomacy sections  may consist of very few Foreign Service officers.
Even if sufficient staffing were available, State would still have difficulty  conducting long-range tracking of exchange participants because it lacks a  database with comprehensive information on its various exchange program  alumni. Although State’s records are better for more recent exchange  participants, its ability to locate individuals who participated prior to 1996  is limited. State had planned to begin building a new worldwide alumni  database with comprehensive data, but Bureau of Educational and Cultural  Affairs officials told us that State had received insufficient funds to do so.
State officials told us that the new database would require about $600,000  in additional funding. State is currently considering less costly  alternatives that involve using its existing information systems. For  example, State has hired contractors to review the paper archives of  exchange programs and convert alumni data to electronic form. However,  bureau officials said they lack the funds to conduct the type of outreach  necessary to verify and update alumni addresses and other information.  They estimated that such an outreach effort would require approximately  $3.4 million in additional funding. State is requesting two new positions to  assist in the administration of alumni activities.
State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs surveys exchange  program participants on their program experiences, their activities  afterwards, and their impressions of the programs’ effects on them. The  bureau uses these and other data to evaluate specific exchange programs  every 5 to 7 years on a rotating basis. The bureau has also recently initiated  an effort to ask individuals who have completed exchange programs to  recall specific attitudes and knowledge before the programs and how those  had changed as a result of the programs. However, for most of its exchange  programs, State does not systematically conduct pre- and post-program  surveys that directly test and compare participant attitudes and knowledge  before and after participation. Evaluation experts in the Bureau of  Educational and Cultural Affairs acknowledged that conducting such  surveys would provide more meaningful data on the effectiveness of  exchange programs, but bureau officials estimated that such an approach  would require approximately $2.2 million annually to pretest all alumni  about their attitudes. It would also require two additional staff persons or  hiring an evaluation firm to help with the data collection and analysis.
section_title: Limited Polling Data Make Progress Assessments Difficult
paragraphs: A number of public affairs officers suggested that expanded use of  overseas opinion research would provide a useful basis for measuring  public diplomacy progress. Private sector officials from public relations  and opinion research firms and the Ad Council agreed. Common public  relations firm measurement techniques include surveys and polling to  develop baseline data, immediate follow-up research, and additional  tracking polls over a period of time to identify long-term changes. Reports  by the Council on Foreign Relations, Wilton Park,and the Defense  Science Board Task Force also emphasized the need for increased use of  foreign opinion research for public diplomacy efforts. The officials who  attended our roundtable noted that incorporating performance  measurement so pervasively into a campaign is costly. However, this cost is  considered essential to the campaign’s success. The officials estimated  that, based on their experience with similar information campaigns, of  State’s roughly $500 million to $600 million public diplomacy budget, $30  million to $50 million should be spent on opinion research and  performance measurement. State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research  currently spends about $3.5 million annually on overseas opinion research.
The director of the Office of Research in State’s Bureau of Intelligence and  Research said that, with additional funding, State could more regularly  monitor foreign opinion overseas. Although State conducts overseas  opinion research on foreign perceptions of the United States and its foreign  policy in all but a handful of countries, it does not have sufficient funds to  conduct more than one or two surveys in each country per year. The  director told us that, in certain high priority countries, he would like to  conduct monthly surveys to track fast-changing circumstances. Focus  group studies in high priority countries would also be helpful in providing  more in-depth analyses of attitudes. The official estimated that increased  polling and focus groups in high priority countries would require an  estimated $1.5 million in additional annual funding. State could also employ  advanced “data mining” technology that would combine data collected in  State’s research with that of other surveys to detect patterns that would  help researchers tie trends and shifts in opinion to specific events and  efforts. The official estimated that such technology would require a one- time investment of roughly $1 million and an ongoing annual cost of about  $75,000. State could also explore using the Internet to conduct overseas  surveys, as a complement to conventional polling efforts. The official said  that this project could be launched for as little as $200,000.
Even the limited polling that State does conduct is not fully utilized by  public affairs officers overseas. About 46 percent of our survey  respondents reported that they rarely, if ever, receive such data. Thus, they  may not always be aware of changes in foreign audiences’ attitudes toward  the United States. The Broadcasting Board of Governors also conducts  audience research efforts in a number of foreign countries that could be  useful to public affairs officers. However, in regions of the world where the  Board broadcasts its programs, more than 91 percent of our survey  respondents reported that they rarely, if ever, receive such data. State  officials told us that they provide both the State polling data and the  broadcasting audience research data to the public diplomacy office  directors in State’s regional bureaus. However, it is up to each regional  bureau to review the data and ensure that it reaches the appropriate public  affairs officers overseas. State officials told us that some regional bureaus  are probably more diligent in doing so than others, and that some public  affairs officers may not even be aware that such data are available to them.  State plans to emphasize the availability of such data in new public training  courses it is developing at the Foreign Service Institute.
section_title: Other U.S. Government Agencies and the Private Sector Offer Strategies for Assessing Performance
paragraphs: A recent GAO report on strategies for assessing U.S. government  information dissemination efforts recognized that establishing a causal link  between agency actions and the ultimate impact of such programs is  difficult. However, the report points out that by systematically identifying  the incremental outcomes expected at each step, U.S. government agencies  were able to construct a logical framework, or logic model, that  demonstrated how achieving short and intermediate outcome goals could  lead to a certain level of assurance that expected results would be realized.  For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention constructed a  logic model to gauge the reinforcing effects of media and community-based  campaigns to reduce tobacco use. Short and intermediate outcome goals  included changes in knowledge and attitudes about tobacco use, adherence  to and enforcement of no-smoking regulations, reduced smoking initiation  among young people, and increased smoking cessation among adults.  Long-term outcomes included decreased smoking, reduced exposure to  environmental tobacco smoke, and reduced tobacco-related mortality. In  State’s case, short-term outcomes for public diplomacy programs could  include target audience knowledge and awareness of U.S. principles,  beliefs, and policies. Intermediate outcomes could include positive changes  in attitude toward specific U.S. policies. Long-term outcomes could include  implementation of U.S. foreign policy issues prompted by U.S. public  diplomacy programs such as educational and cultural exchanges.
The private sector officials with whom we met agreed with our assessment  of the difficulty in establishing direct causal links between public  diplomacy programs and results. However, they noted that establishing  convincing correlations is a reasonable expectation. For example, to  measure the effectiveness of a campaign to promote the use of seat belts,  the Ad Council conducted precampaign attitudinal surveys to gauge  awareness and understanding of the importance of wearing seat belts and  then administered weekly surveys during the campaign to track the  progression of attitude shifts. It also counted the number of Web site hits  and 1-800 telephone calls that occurred in response to the campaign. Ad  Council officials told us that they ultimately established correlations  between these measures and Department of Transportation statistics on  seat belt deaths. Ad Council and other private sector officials said that, to  establish such correlations, effectiveness measures must be incorporated  into every aspect of a program from its outset. The officials emphasized  that before a program is even launched, evaluators should establish a  definition for success; identify priorities; and determine what should be  measured, how it should be measured, and how frequently.
Although State’s public diplomacy efforts extend beyond information  dissemination, many of the logic model concepts would still be applicable  to State’s situation. Such an approach could be particularly useful in  evaluating the combined effect of State’s wide-ranging public diplomacy  activities. Our report noted that for comprehensive initiatives that combine  various approaches to achieving a goal, a logic model can help articulate  how those approaches are intended to assist and supplement one another.  Evaluations of performance can then assess the effects of an integrated set  of efforts. The lack of an integrated system for measuring public diplomacy  performance hinders State’s ability to correct its course of action or to  direct resources toward activities that offer a greater likelihood of success.  Officials in State’s Educational and Cultural Affairs bureau told us that they  are currently in the process of developing a performance measurement  system for the bureau’s exchange programs that includes the components  identified in our report.
section_title: State Faces Other Significant Challenges
paragraphs: State’s public diplomacy efforts face some additional significant  challenges. Among them are insufficient time and staffing resources to  conduct public diplomacy tasks. Public affairs officers also reported that  burdensome administrative and budgetary processes often divert their  attention from public diplomacy programs. A significant number of Foreign  Service officers involved in public diplomacy efforts overseas lack  sufficient foreign language skills. In addition, many public affairs officers  reported that the amount of time available to attend public diplomacy  training is inadequate.
subsections: section_title: Insufficient Time and Staff
paragraphs: More than 40 percent of the public affairs officers we surveyed reported  that the amount of time they had to devote exclusively to executing public  diplomacy tasks was insufficient. During our overseas fieldwork, officers  told us that, while they manage to attend U.S. and other foreign embassy  receptions and functions within their host country capitals, it was  particularly difficult to find time to travel outside the capitals to interact  with ordinary citizens. Some officers said they were too busy and there was  not enough staff to take such trips. More than 50 percent of those  responding to our survey reported that the number of Foreign Service  officers available to perform public diplomacy duties was inadequate.  Although State increased the actual number of Americans in public  diplomacy positions overseas from 414 in fiscal year 2000 to 448 in fiscal  year 2002, State still had a shortfall of public diplomacy staff in 2002, based  on the projected needs identified in State’s latest overseas staffing model.  In 2002, State’s overseas staffing model projected the need for 512 staff in  these positions; however, 64 of these positions, or 13 percent, were not  filled.
We reported in 2002 that as part of its Diplomatic Readiness Initiative,  State has launched an aggressive recruiting program to rebuild the  department’s total workforce. Under this initiative, State requested 1,158  new employees above attrition over the 3-year period for fiscal years 2002  through 2004. However, it does not have numerical targets for specific skill  requirements such as language proficiency or regional expertise. Although  State officials are optimistic that enough new hires are being brought in to  address the overall staffing shortage, there are no assurances that the  recruiting efforts will result in the right people with the right skills needed  to meet specific critical shortfalls.
section_title: Burdensome Administrative and Budgetary Processes
paragraphs: Officers responding to our survey, those with whom we met overseas, and  numerous other State officials also pointed to the amount of extra time  public diplomacy practitioners are required to spend on administrative,  budgetary, and personnel matters due to the unique nature of the program.  They indicated that these processes had been a particular problem for  embassy public affairs sections since the former USIA merged with State in  1999. At that time, USIA’s administrative personnel who were familiar with  the administrative requirements of public diplomacy activities became part  of State’s administrative operations in Washington and at embassies  overseas and were no longer dedicated solely to public diplomacy  activities. Public affairs officers said that State’s administrative processes  were often too slow and inflexible to handle the logistics and timing  required to set up media and cultural events and other program activities.  Because these activities are so different from those conducted in the  course of traditional government-to-government diplomacy, State  management officers are often unfamiliar with them.
For example, embassy public affairs section officials in one country told us  that the planned filming of USAID projects was held up because embassy  procedures did not allow making advance cash payments to the television  crew. Instead, the embassy preferred either making electronic fund  transfers in dollars or issuing checks. The officials noted that, unlike in the  United States, businesses in the developing world usually demand cash  payments in advance because they do not have sufficient working capital to  provide services and then wait for payment. Also, the businesses often do  not have bank accounts that can accept electronic fund transfers in dollars.  In this case, getting the television crew paid and working required the head  of the public affairs section to become personally involved in persuading  the embassy administrative section to act.
Public affairs officers told us that this example is typical and that having to  continually intervene in resolving routine administrative issues leaves them  less time to actually conduct public diplomacy efforts. State officials told  us they recognized the problem and had designated certain administrative  personnel at some embassies to work with public affairs sections to reduce  the time spent by those sections on administrative matters. However, the  officials said there were still insufficient numbers of such designated  personnel.
section_title: Shortfalls in Foreign Language Skills
paragraphs: Insufficient foreign language skills pose another problem for many officers.  As of December 31, 2002, 21 percent of the 332 Foreign Service officers  filling “language-designated” public diplomacy positions overseas did not  meet the foreign language speaking requirements of their positions. The  highest percentages not meeting the requirements were in the Near East,  where 30 percent of the officers did not meet the requirement. Although  State had no language-designated positions for South Asia, it had eight  language-preferred positions, none of which were filled by officers who  had reading or speaking capability in those languages. It is important to  note that most of the foreign languages required in these two regions are  considered difficult to master, such as Arabic and Urdu. In contrast, 85  percent of the officers filling French language-designated positions and 97  percent of those filling Spanish language-designated ones met the  requirements. Officers’ opinions on the quality of the foreign language  training they received also varied greatly by region. For example, 67  percent of the officers in one region reported that the quality of language  training was either generally or very sufficient, while 67 percent in another  region reported that training quality was generally or very insufficient.
Foreign Service officers posted at the overseas embassies we visited and  other State officials told us that having fluency in a host country’s language  is important for effectively conducting public diplomacy. The foreign  government officials with whom we met in Egypt, Morocco, and the United  Kingdom agreed. They noted that, even in countries where English is  widely understood, speaking the host country’s language demonstrates  respect for its people and its culture. In Morocco, officers in the public  affairs and other sections of the embassy told us that, because their ability  to speak Arabic was poor, they conducted most embassy business in  French. French is widely used in that country, especially in business and  government. However, embassy officers told us that speaking Arabic would  provide superior entrée to the Moroccan public. The ability to speak  country-specific forms of Arabic and other more obscure dialects would  generate even more goodwill, especially outside the major cities.
Some Foreign Affairs officers pointed to State’s policy of limiting most  overseas tours to 2 or 3 years as a factor that contributes to insufficient  language skills. They also said this policy makes it more difficult to  cultivate personal relationships that in some countries take a long time to  develop. They noted that the diplomatic corps of some other countries with  major overseas diplomatic presences allow longer overseas tours and that  their diplomats demonstrate superior foreign language skills as a result.  Officers at the embassies we visited also noted that, because public  diplomacy efforts should and often do involve political and economic  officers and others outside the public affairs section, it is important that  they be proficient in host country languages as well. A number of officers in  these other sections told us that language proficiency was a problem for  them as well. State officials told us that they are aware of this concern but  that they rely on tools other than lengthened tours of duty to foster  language skills, such as offering pay incentives to officers who are  proficient in foreign languages used in certain countries. Also, they said  officers who have the required language proficiency have a competitive  advantage over those who do not in bidding for overseas positions.
According to the department, the largest and most significant factor  limiting its ability to fill language-designated positions is its long-standing  staffing shortfall. As mentioned above, State’s Diplomatic Readiness  Initiative is designed to replenish the ranks. Other planned actions include  bolstering efforts to recruit job candidates with target language skills,  sending language training supervisors to posts to determine ways to  improve training offerings, and developing a new "language continuum"  plan to guide efforts to meet the need for higher levels of competency in all  languages, especially those critical to national security concerns.
section_title: Little Time for Training
paragraphs: Time to attend public diplomacy training presents another challenge. About  58 percent of the officers responding to our survey reported that the  amount of time available for such training is inadequate. In September  2003, State plans to launch a new public diplomacy training program,  increasing the current 3 weeks of available public diplomacy training to 19.  It has also added public diplomacy components to its training curriculum  for certain officers outside the public diplomacy cone, including economic  and political officers, ambassadors, and deputy chiefs of mission.  Nonetheless, officers told us that unless a significant “float” of Foreign  Service officer staffing is established for training, it would be difficult for  officers to attend the training. They noted that many of their posts had  positions that were vacant for some time before they began their tour  there. Under these circumstances, there was tremendous pressure to begin  their tours as soon as possible, leaving little or no time for training. State is  expecting staffing increases resulting from the Diplomatic Readiness  Initiative to enable it to create a "training float" that will allow staff  sufficient time to receive training in foreign languages and other key skills.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Since the war on terrorism began, the need for a positive American  message to the world has never been more important. Opinion research  reveals that many foreign publics, especially those in Muslim-majority  countries, have highly unfavorable perceptions of the United States, and  State has sought to enhance its public diplomacy efforts in these countries.  But the absence of an integrated and commonly understood strategy for  State’s public diplomacy efforts makes it difficult for State to direct its  diverse efforts in a systematic manner to achieve measurable results. The  methods and techniques of private sector public relations campaigns merit  consideration in developing and implementing such a strategy. Also,  because State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring  progress toward its public diplomacy goals, its ability to correct its course  of action or to direct resources toward activities that offer a greater  likelihood of success is limited. While the difficulty of measuring State’s  long-term influence on audiences overseas should not be underestimated,  private sector public relations firms and other U.S. government agencies  provide some reasonable examples of where to begin. Shortfalls in staffing,  burdensome administrative and budgeting processes, Foreign Service  officers with insufficient foreign language proficiency, and insufficient time  for public diplomacy training pose additional challenges for State.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the planning, coordination, execution, and assessment of U.S.  public diplomacy efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of State  develop and widely disseminate throughout the department a strategy  that considers the techniques of private sector public relations firms in  integrating all of State’s public diplomacy efforts and directing them  toward achieving common and measurable objectives;  consider ways to collaborate with the private sector to employ best  practices for measuring efforts to inform and influence target audiences,  including expanded use of opinion research and better use of existing  research;  designate more administrative positions to overseas public affairs  sections to reduce the administrative burden;  strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service officers in foreign languages;   program adequate time for public diplomacy training into State’s  assignment process.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: State provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app. IV).  State generally concurred with the report’s observations and conclusions.  State said that it intends to implement our recommendations and that it has  already begun taking measures to do so in some areas.
While State agreed with our recommendation to consider ways to employ  private sector best practices for measuring the effectiveness of its public  diplomacy efforts, it said that the report did not adequately describe the  Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs’ efforts to gauge the  effectiveness of exchange programs. We have incorporated additional  information on these efforts into the report.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested members of  Congress, the Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the Broadcasting  Board of Governors. We also will make copies available to others upon  request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4128. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are  listed in appendix V.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To obtain information on all of our objectives, especially those related to  public diplomacy effectiveness measures and critical public diplomacy  challenges, we administered a survey to the heads of public affairs sections  at U.S. embassies worldwide. The response rate to our survey was 76  percent. See appendix II for further details on the development and results  of our survey.
To examine the range of the State Department’s (State) key public  diplomacy programs and how programs and resources have changed since  September 11, we reviewed State budget requests, annual reports, and  other program documentation. We also met with officials in State’s Office  of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Bureau  of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of Public Affairs, the Office  of International Information Programs, and regional bureaus in  Washington, D.C.
To assess whether State has an overall strategy for its public diplomacy  programs and how it measures the effectiveness of these programs, we  reviewed relevant planning, program, and other documentation; analyzed  survey results; and met with cognizant State, academic, and private sector  officials.
We reviewed State’s efforts to develop its own strategy and its  involvement in developing an interagency public diplomacy strategy.
We reviewed State’s current agencywide strategic and performance  plans, its agencywide plans for 2004, and the performance plans of  selected functional and regional bureaus and overseas missions.
We analyzed State’s performance measurement methods that were  identified in the results of our survey of public affairs officers at U.S.  embassies.
We met with officials in State’s Office of Strategic and Performance  Planning and Bureau for Intelligence and Research and with other State  officials involved in strategic and performance planning for public  diplomacy efforts in Washington, D.C.
We discussed private sector methods for evaluating the effectiveness of  persuasive techniques with representatives of the Public Diplomacy  Institute at George Washington University, School of Media and Public  Affairs; Ketchum; and Weber Shandwick Worldwide, in Washington,  D.C.; and the Ad Council, in New York City. We also hosted roundtable  discussions in Washington, D.C., with high-level officials from some of  the largest public relations and opinion research firms in the United  States. The firms represented at these discussions included APCO  Worldwide; Fleishman-Hillard, Inc.; Greenberg Quinlan Rosner  Research, Inc.; Hill and Knowlton, Inc.; Ketchum; The Pew Research  Center for the People and the Press; Porter Novelli International; Weber  Shandwick Worldwide; and Zogby International. We also received  information from Gallup International.
To identify the critical challenges faced in executing public diplomacy  programs, we reviewed relevant program and other documentation,  analyzed survey results, met with State officials domestically and overseas,  interviewed foreign government and nongovernmental organization  officials, and met with a number of other outside observers of U.S. public  diplomacy issues.
We analyzed impediments to public diplomacy efforts that were  identified in the results of our survey of public affairs officers at U.S.  embassies.
We analyzed data on State’s foreign language designated public  diplomacy positions worldwide and compared them with data on the  numbers of officers actually meeting the designated language  requirements.
We analyzed projected staffing needs identified in State’s overseas  staffing model and compared them with data on the number of positions  actually filled.
We met with officials in State’s Office of the Undersecretary for Public  Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural  Affairs, the Bureau of Public Affairs, the Office of International  Information Programs, and regional bureaus in Washington, D.C.
We met with U.S. embassy officers, host-country government officials,  and private sector and nongovernmental organization representatives in  the United Kingdom, Morocco, and Egypt to gain a firsthand view of  public diplomacy challenges faced overseas. These countries were  selected based on congressional interest as well as their respective  geopolitical situations, strategic significance to the United States, and  roles in the war against terrorism. They were also selected to provide an  appropriate mix with respect to the scale of in-country U.S. public  diplomacy operations, the size of U.S. foreign assistance efforts, the  types of public diplomacy challenges faced, and the methods used in  conducting public diplomacy.
We consulted with representatives of the Advisory Commission on  Public Diplomacy, the Council on Foreign Relations, and a number of  retired public diplomacy practitioners.
We conducted our work from May 2002 through May 2003 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Survey Development and Results
paragraphs: To assess the State Department’s public diplomacy performance  measurement efforts and identify critical challenges faced in executing  public diplomacy activities, we conducted a survey of the heads of public  affairs sections at U.S. embassies and certain U.S. missions to international  organizations and major U.S. consulates around the world. The survey was  conducted using a Web-based instrument from March 5 to May 29, 2003.
The questionnaire was developed from October through December 2002 by  social science survey specialists and other individuals knowledgeable  about public diplomacy issues. We also obtained a series of comments and  feedback from key State Department staff in December 2002 and January  2003. The questionnaire was then pretested in December 2002 and January  2003 with five current and former State Department officials who had  served as heads of public affairs sections at U.S. embassies overseas to  ensure that the questionnaire was clear and unambiguous, independent,  and unbiased.
We developed our list of the study population based on information from  the Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs,  particularly concerning which missions to international organizations and  major consulates should be included in the survey. In all, we sent the  survey to the 156 individuals we identified as our study population and  received completed surveys from 118 of these, for a 76 percent response  rate. Members of the survey population were sent an initial notification of  the survey prior to the release of the survey on the Web and an initial  survey invitation when the survey was released.  These were followed by  two reminder E-mails. The survey population was also offered the  opportunity to download a copy of the questionnaire to fill in by hand and  return via fax. Individuals who had not responded after these measures  received calls from the project staff to explain the importance of the study  and encourage them to respond. An exception to this protocol was made  for respondents serving in the Near East during the Iraq conflict. Follow-up  phone calls were not made to those serving in countries in the region of the  conflict. Data for this study were entered directly into the Web instrument  by the respondents and converted into a database for analysis.
In appendix III, we present the results of the closed-ended questions to our  survey.
section_title: Questionnaire for State Department Public Affairs Officers
paragraphs: side of the screen to read all the information on a page.
The United States General Accounting Office (GAO), an agency of  Congress, has been asked by the Chairman and the Ranking Member  of the House International Relations Committee to examine U.S.
Public Diplomacy programs. This request was prompted by the  terrorist attacks of September 11th and the question of what can be  done to improve America's image, and understanding of America's  policies, around the world. As part of this work, we are surveying  Department of State Public Affairs Officers (PAO). This survey  focuses on elements that impact the effectiveness of U.S. public  diplomacy and possible solutions to challenges that may be  identified.
We believe that you can make an important contribution to this study,  and ask you to respond to this questionnaire so that we may provide  the most complete information to Congress. The questionnaire should  take about 30 minutes to complete. GAO is using procedures for this  survey to prevent the disclosure of individually identifiable data.
This survey will ask you about your experiences as a PAO from the  beginning of fiscal year 2002 through the present. If you have not  been serving as a PAO for that entire period, just answer for the part  of the time period that you were a PAO. Keep in mind the full range  of products and programs you handle as a PAO, including visitors  programs, press releases, cultural affairs and others. If there are  questions that are not relevant to your experience or that you don't  feel qualified to answer, please answer 'Not applicable' or 'No basis  to judge'.
If you have any questions about the content of the survey please  Phone: (202) 512-6149, 7:30 am-4:30 pm (EST)  e-mail: clarkl@gao.gov Phone: (202) 512-8980, 7:30 am-4:30 pm (EST)  e-mail: courtsm@gao.gov or if you encounter any technical questions or problems logging in  Phone: (202) 512-2625, 8:30 am-6:30 pm (EST)  e-mail: wolfordm@gao.gov 1.
To what extent, if at all, do you believe that public diplomacy efforts in your  current host country are promoting U.S. interests in each of the following ways?    (Check only one answer for each item listed below.)
17.0% 46.6%  28.0% 3.4% audiences of U.S.
16.1% 57.6%  18.6% 0  1e. Improving the U.S.
22.9% 52.5%  15.3%  1.7%  1f.  If you have any additional comments on this topic, please use this space to  N indicates the number of officials that responded to the question.   2.
For each of the following country-specific factors or circumstances, please rate how much  of an impediment it was, if at all, to achieving U.S. public diplomacy objectives in your  current host country since October 1, 2001. If the situation is not present in your host  country, please check "Not applicable to country." (Check only one answer for each item listed below.)
2a. A low level of  2b. A high level of  2c. A high level of  2d. A high level of  2f. Low level of  2g. Limited use of  N=117 2h. The presence of  current U.S.  current U.S.  2m.  If you checked other factors, please list and describe them here.
N=33 Public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interests of the United States  through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign audiences. On the  following pages, five sets of factors are listed that may have an impact on  conducting U.S. public diplomacy. Focusing on the time between October 1, 2001  and today, please rate in the following questions (3 through 7) the extent and the  sufficiency or insufficiency of these factors for helping to achieve public  diplomacy objectives in your host country.
3.
Interagency coordination: To what extent, if at all, does your Public  Affairs Office coordinate with each of the following?   (Check only one answer for each item listed below.) 3a.  The USAID office   3d.  If you checked other entities, please list and describe them here. N=86   Q4: Structural and Organizational Factors  4.
Structural and organizational factors: How sufficient or insufficient were the  following organizational factors for achieving public diplomacy objectives?    (Check only one answer for each item listed below.)
4a. The degree of  4b. The degree of  4c. The degree to  4e.  If you checked an additional organizational factor, please list and describe it here. N=22  4f.  Additional comments. N=28  Q5: State Communication and Guidance  State Department communication and guidance factors: How sufficient or insufficient  5. were the following communication and guidance factors for achieving public diplomacy  objectives?   (Check only one answer for each item listed below.)
5a.  The quality of  5b.  The frequency of  5c.  The quality of  5e.  The quality of  N=117 5f.  The frequency of  5g.  The quality of  5i.  The quality of  5j.  The frequency of  5l. If you checked an additional guidance factor, please list and describe it here. N=16 .
Q6: Internal Resources and Processes  6.
Internal resources and processes: How sufficient or insufficient were the following  internal resources and processes in the Public Affairs Office?   (Check only one answer for each item listed below.) 6a. The amount of time  6b. The amount of  6c. The availability of  6d. The speed of  6e. The flexibility of  6f. The quality of  N=117 6g. The number of  6h. The number of  6j.  If you checked an additional internal factor, please describe it here. N=25  6k.  Additional comments. N=35   7.
Training resources: How sufficient or insufficient were the following training resources for  achieving public diplomacy objectives?   (Check only one answer for each item listed below.)
7b. The quality of  7c. The amount of  7e. The quality of  7f. The amount of  experience N=117  7j.  If you checked other training factors, please list and describe them here. N=17   7k.  Additional comments. N=36   8.
Considering your answers to questions 3 through 7, which three factors do you  believe were the most effective elements supporting public diplomacy efforts in  your current host country?
To see a list of the topics and numbers click here. (Please enter the item number and letter (e.g. 3b) and your reasons for each.) 8a. Enter question number of factor supporting public  diplomacy effectively.
Most frequently mentioned: 4b   8b. Reason: N=117  8c. Enter question number of factor supporting public  diplomacy effectively.
Most frequently mentioned: 4b   8d. Reason: N=115 8e. Enter question number of factor supporting public  diplomacy effectively.
Most frequently mentioned: 6b   8f. Reason: N=112  9.
Considering your answers to questions 3 through 7, which three factors do you believe  were the greatest impediments to public diplomacy efforts in your current host country?
To see a list of the topics and numbers click here. (Please enter the item number and your reasons for each.) 9a. Enter question number of impediment   Most frequently mentioned: 6a  9b. Reason: N=116 9c. Enter question number of impediment.
Most frequently mentioned: 6b   9d. Reason: N=114 9e. Enter question number of impediment.
Most frequently mentioned: 6h  9f. Reason: N=107 10.
If you indicated that any of the factors in questions 3 through 7 were impediments to public  diplomacy efforts, what approaches do you think would be useful for overcoming these  impediments?   (Please use the space below the factor to describe the approach.) 10a. Interagency coordination (See Q3) N=31 10b. Structural and organizational factors (See Q4) N=46  10c. State Department communication and guidance factors (See Q5) N=56  10d. Internal resources (See Q6) N= 83    10e. Training (See Q7) N=60    10f. Impediments not listed above and approaches for overcoming them N=18  11.
Since October 1, 2001, to what extent, if at all, were you consulted regarding the  substance or implementation of policy initiatives affecting your host country prior to their  release by the following offices?   (Check only one answer for each item listed below.) 11c. The Office of    11f. If you checked other offices, please list and describe them here. N=26  12.
Does your FY 2004 Mission Performance Plan include the strategic goal of "mutual  (Check only one answer.) 1.  2.
No (Click here to skip to question 13.)
3.
Not applicable (Click here to skip to question  13.) 12a. Please list the performance goals included under the strategic goal of "mutual  understanding" included in your Mission Performance Plan.   12b. Describe the plan for determining whether the targets listed under these  performance goals have been met.   12c. In your opinion, which of the indicators listed in your Mission Performance  Plan are the best indicators for measuring the effectiveness of public diplomacy  efforts? (Please briefly describe them.)
13.
Does your FY 2004 Mission Performance Plan include public diplomacy as a  strategy and/or tactic for meeting your Mission's other strategic goals? N=112   (Check only one answer.) 1.  2.
No (Click here to skip to question 15.)
3.
Not applicable (Click here to skip to question 15.)
14.
How will public diplomacy performance be measured when evaluating these  strategies and/or tactics? (Please describe briefly.)
N=87   The next series of questions are about performance measures used by the State  Department.
15.
In your opinion, to what extent, if at all, do State's performance measures for public  diplomacy activities accurately reflect the effectiveness of public diplomacy efforts in  (Check only one answer.) 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  15a. In your opinion, are there better performance measures that could be used?  (Check only one answer.) 1.  2.
No (Click here to skip to question 16.)
3.
No basis to judge (Click here to skip to  question 16.) 15b. Please briefly describe the better performance measures. N=49  16.
Does your office administer systematic public diplomacy program evaluations such as  questionnaires to participants about programs and exchanges? N= 111  (Check only one answer.) 1.  2.  3.  16a. Does your office have sufficient staff to conduct systematic program evaluations?  (Check only one answer.) 1.  2.  3.
Not applicable  16b. Please briefly describe how performance measures are used in program  17.
Is the information obtained from the performance measures a factor in resource  (Check only one answer.) 1.  2.
No (Click here to skip to question 18 )
3.
No basis to judge (Click here to skip to question 18 )
17a. Please briefly describe how they are used. N=50 18.
The State Department uses polling by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research  (INR) to assess opinions of foreign audiences and audience research conducted by  the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) to identify and assess media  outreach.
The following questions ask you to describe the frequency, timeliness, and  usefulness of this polling and audience research for your public diplomacy efforts  since October 1, 2001.
How often does your office receive the following types of information?   (Check only one answer for each factor listed below.) 17.2%  6.0%  6.0%   18d.  If you checked an additional source, please list and describe it here. N=29 19.
How timely is the information received from the following sources?   (Please check one box for each factor.)
19a.  INR polling data  20.
In your opinion, how useful to public diplomacy is the information received  from the following sources?   (Check only one answer for each factor listed below.)
20a.  INR polling data  (please specify)   20d  If you checked an additional source please list and describe it here. N=25    20e.  Additional Comments N=21   21.
In your opinion, how accurately does INR polling data measure the effectiveness of public  diplomacy programs and activities in your host country? N=114  (Check only one answer.) 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.
22.
In your opinion, how accurately does BBG audience research measure the effectiveness of  public diplomacy programs and activities in your host country? N=115   (Check only one answer.) 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  23.  How could polling or audience research be a more effective tool for your public  diplomacy efforts? N=67   24.
Are U.S. government-sponsored international broadcasting programs received  in your host country? Such programs include Voice of America Radio/TV,  WorldNet Television, Radio/TV Marti, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,  Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Afghanistan, and Radio Sawa. N=116 (Check only one answer.) 1.  80.2%  Yes  2.  12.9%  No (Click here to skip to question 26.) 3.
6.9%  Not applicable (Click here to skip to question 26.)
25.
In your opinion, how effective or ineffective are the following broadcasting  elements in terms of helping to achieve public diplomacy goals?   (Please check only one answer for each item listed below.)
N=92 26.
In your opinion, how effective is U.S. government-sponsored international  broadcasting in achieving U.S. public diplomacy objectives in your host country  (promoting U.S. national interests through understanding, informing, and influencing  foreign audiences)? N=109 (Check only one answer.) 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  26a. Additional comments about broadcasting.
N=66 27.
How many years in total have you served in the Public Diplomacy cone (include time  served in the former USIA)? (Please enter 1 if one year or less and enter only numbers.)
28.
How many years have you served as a Foreign Service Officer? (Please enter 1 if one  year or less and enter only numbers.) N=116 29.
How many months have you been the Public Affairs Officer at your current post?  (Please enter only numbers.) N=116 30. If you have any comments about other public diplomacy issues, please provide them  31.
If we need to ask you a few follow-up questions may we contact you?   (Check only one answer.) N=114 1.  2.  3.
0%   No response  When the Survey is Complete  32. When you have completed this survey, please check the "Completed" box  below.
Clicking "Completed" is equivalent to "mailing" your survey -- it lets us know that you are  finished, and that you want us to use your answers. It also lets us know not to send you any  follow-up messages reminding you to complete your survey. N=118  (Check only one answer.) 1.  2.
Thank you for your participation.
Click on the Submit button below to exit the survey, then close the browser windows associated  with this survey by clicking on the small "X" in the upper right hand corner of your screen.
section_title: Comments from the State Department
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, key contributors to this report  included Rick Barrett, Lyric Clark, Janey Cohen, Michael Courts, Rebecca  Gambler, Edward Kennedy, Heather Von Behren, and Monica Wolford.
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subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
section_title: Public Affairs