Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces
Published: 2007-07-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to develop Iraqi security forces. The Department of Defense (DOD) recently requested an additional $2 billion to continue this effort. Components of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), including the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), are responsible for implementing the U.S. program to train and equip Iraqi forces. This report (1) examines the property accountability procedures DOD and MNF-I applied to the U.S. train-and-equip program for Iraq and (2) assesses whether DOD and MNF-I can account for the U.S.-funded equipment issued to the Iraqi security forces. To accomplish these objectives, GAO reviewed MNSTC-I property books as of January 2007 and interviewed current and former officials from DOD and MNF-I.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program for Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside traditional security assistance programs, providing DOD a large degree of flexibility in managing the program, according to DOD officials. These officials stated that since the funding did not go through traditional security assistance programs, the DOD accountability requirements normally applicable to these programs did not apply. Further, MNF-I does not currently have orders that comprehensively specify accountability procedures for equipment distributed to the Iraqi forces. DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for Iraqi forces' receipt of U.S.-funded equipment. Two factors led to this lapse in accountability. First, MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment distributed to Iraqi forces before December 2005. At that time, MNSTC-I established a property book system to track issuance of equipment to the Iraqi forces and attempted to recover past records. GAO found a discrepancy of at least 190,000 weapons between data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander and the property books. Former MNSTC-I officials stated that this lapse was due to insufficient staff and the lack of a fully operational distribution network, among other reasons. Second, since the beginning of the program, MNSTC-I has not consistently collected supporting records confirming the dates the equipment was received, the quantities of equipment delivered, or the Iraqi units receiving the items. Since June 2006, the command has placed greater emphasis on collecting the supporting documents. However, GAO's review of the January 2007 property books found continuing problems with missing and incomplete records. Further, the property books consist of extensive electronic spreadsheets, which are an inefficient management tool given the large amount of data and limited personnel to maintain the system.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to develop  the Iraqi security forces, including at least $2.8 billion to purchase and  transport equipment to Iraqi forces. DOD recently requested an additional  $2 billion to continue these efforts. In the fall of 2003, the Coalition  Provisional Authority and the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) shared  responsibility for the U.S. program to train and equip the Iraqi security  forces, composed of both military and police forces. After the collapse of  many Iraqi forces in the spring of 2004, the United States restructured the  multinational force and increased resources to develop Iraqi forces. The  train-and-equip program for Iraq operates under the authority of the  Department of Defense (DOD) and is implemented by MNF-I’s major  subordinate commands, including the Multinational Security Transition  Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I).
This report (1) examines the property accountability procedures DOD and  MNF-I applied to the U.S. train-and-equip program for Iraq and (2)  assesses whether DOD and MNF-I can account for the U.S.-funded  equipment issued to Iraqi security forces. Our work focused on  accountability requirements for the transportation and distribution of U.S.- provided equipment; we did not review any requirements relevant to the  procurement of this equipment.
To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed documentation and  interviewed current and former officials from DOD, MNF-I and U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM). We also analyzed MNSTC-I property book  records as of January 2007. We performed our work from March 2006  through July 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. A detailed description of our scope and methodology is  included in appendix I of this report. Because of broad-based  congressional interest in this issue, we performed our work under the  authority of the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct  reviews on his own initiative. The work performed for this review has also  contributed to several related GAO products on Iraq.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to develop  the Iraqi security forces, first under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction  Fund (IRRF) and later through the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF). DOD  has apportioned about $2.8 billion in ISFF funds to purchase and transport  equipment to Iraqi military and police forces. DOD does not report IRRF  funds for Iraqi forces’ equipment and transportation as a separate line  item. DOD has requested an additional $2 billion to develop Iraqi security  forces in the fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror budget requests.
The United States restructured the multinational force and increased  resources to train and equip the Iraqi forces after they collapsed during an  insurgent uprising in the spring of 2004. This collapse ensued when MNF-I  transferred security responsibilities to the Iraqi forces before they were  properly trained and equipped to battle insurgents. Iraqi security forces  include the Iraqi Army, Navy, and Air Force under the Ministry of Defense  and the Iraqi Police, National Police, and Border Enforcement under the  Ministry of Interior.
The train-and-equip program for Iraq operates under DOD authority and is  implemented by MNF-I’s major subordinate commands, including MNSTC- I and Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) (see fig. 1). This differs from  traditional security assistance programs, which operate under State  Department authority and are managed in country by the DOD under the  direction and supervision of the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission.
MNSTC-I was established in June 2004 to assist in the development,  organization, training, equipping, and sustainment of Iraqi security forces.  MNC-I is responsible for the tactical command and control of MNF-I  operations in Iraq. MNC-I’s major subordinate commands were  responsible for distributing equipment to some Iraqi security forces in  2003 and 2004.
section_title: DOD and MNF-I Have Not Specified Which DOD Equipment Accountability Procedures Apply to the Train-and-Equip Program for Iraq
paragraphs: As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD equipment  accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program for  Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq under IRRF  and ISFF but outside traditional security assistance programs, which,  according to DOD officials, allowed DOD a large degree of flexibility in  managing the program. DOD defines accountability as the obligation  imposed by law, lawful order or regulation accepted by an organization or  person for keeping accurate records, to ensure control of property,  documents or funds, with or without physical possession. DOD officials  stated that, since the funding did not go through traditional security  assistance programs, the DOD accountability requirements normally  applicable to these programs—including the registration of small arms  transferred to foreign governments—did not apply. Further, MNF-I does  not currently have an order or orders comprehensively specifying  accountability procedures for equipment distributed to Iraqi military  forces under the Ministry of Defense, according to MNSTC-I officials.
According to DOD officials, because Iraq train-and-equip program funding  did not go through traditional security assistance programs, the equipment  procured with these funds was not subject to DOD accountability  regulations that normally apply in the case of these programs. For  traditional security assistance programs, DOD regulations specify  accountability procedures for storing, protecting, transporting, and  registering small arms and other sensitive items transferred to foreign  governments. For example, the Security Assistance Management Manual,  which provides guidance for traditional security assistance programs,  states that the U.S. government’s responsibility for equipment intended for  transfer to a foreign government under the Foreign Military Sales program  does not cease until the recipient government’s official representative  assumes final control over the items. Other regulations referenced by the  Security Assistance Management Manual prescribe minimum standards  and criteria for the physical security of sensitive conventional arms and  require the registration of small arms transferred outside DOD control.
During our review, DOD officials expressed differing opinions about  whether DOD regulations applied to the train-and-equip program for Iraq.  For example, we heard conflicting views on whether MNF-I must follow  the DOD regulation that requires participants to provide small arms serial  numbers to a DOD-maintained registry. Although DOD has not specified  whether this regulation applies, MNSTC-I began to consolidate weapons’  serial numbers in an electronic format in July 2006 and provide them to  the DOD-maintained registry, according to MNSTC-I officials.
Moreover, MNF-I issued two orders in 2004 to its subordinate commands  directing steps to account for all equipment distributed to Iraqi security  forces, including military and police. Although these orders are no longer  in effect and have not been replaced, they directed coalition forces  responsible for issuing equipment to the Iraqi security forces to record the  serial numbers of all sensitive items such as weapons and radios, enter  relevant information onto a Department of the Army hand receipt, and  obtain signatures from the Iraqi security official receiving the items,  among other tasks. Army regulations state that hand receipts maintain  accountability by documenting the unit or individual that is directly  responsible for a specific item. According to a former MNSTC-I official,  hand receipts are critical to maintaining property accountability. However,  the orders did not require the consolidation of all records for equipment  distributed by the coalition to the Iraqi security forces.
According to officials in the MNSTC-I Office of the Staff Judge Advocate,  although these orders were valid when they were issued in 2004, they are  no longer in effect. In addition, these orders have not been replaced with a  comprehensive order or orders that address the equipment distributed to  Iraqi security forces, according to MNSTC-I officials. For forces under the  Ministry of Interior, MNF-I issued two new orders in December 2005 to  address the problem of limited records for equipment distributed to  Ministry of Interior forces. Among other guidance, the orders established  accountability procedures for equipment MNC-I and MNSTC-I distribute to  Ministry of Interior forces, such as Iraqi police and national police. In  addition, MNF-I issued other orders related to some types of equipment.  However, according to MNSTC-I officials, MNF-I has not issued an order  or orders that address the accountability of all equipment distributed by  coalition forces to Iraqi military forces under the Ministry of Defense.
section_title: MNF-I Cannot Fully Account for Iraqi Forces’ Receipt of Equipment
paragraphs: Two factors led to DOD’s lack of full accountability for the equipment  issued to Iraqi security forces (see fig. 2). First, until December 2005,  MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment  distributed to Iraqi security forces. Second, MNSTC-I has not consistently  collected supporting documents that confirm the dates the equipment was  received, the quantities of equipment delivered, or the Iraqi units receiving  the equipment.
First, until December 2005, no centralized set of records for equipment  distributed to Iraqi security forces existed. MNSTC-I did not consistently  collect equipment distribution records as required in the property  accountability orders for several reasons. The lack of a fully operational  network to distribute the equipment, including national and regional level  distribution centers, hampered MNSTC-I’s ability to collect and maintain  appropriate equipment accountability records. According to former  MNSTC-I officials, a fully operational distribution network was not  established until mid-2005, over 1 year after MNF-I began distributing large  quantities of equipment to the Iraqi security forces. In addition, staffing  weaknesses hindered the development of property accountability  procedures, according to former MNSTC-I and other officials. For  example, according to the former MNSTC-I commander, several months  passed after MNSTC-I’s establishment before the command received the  needed number of staff. As a result, MNSTC-I did not have the personnel  necessary to record information on individual items distributed to Iraqi  forces. Further, according to MNSTC-I officials, the need to rapidly equip  Iraqi forces conducting operations in a combat environment limited  MNSTC-I’s ability to fully implement accountability procedures.
Our analysis of MNSTC-I’s property book system indicates that MNSTC-I  does not have complete records confirming Iraqi forces’ receipt of the  equipment, particularly for Iraqi military forces. MNSTC-I established  separate property books for equipment issued to Iraq’s security  ministries—the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior—beginning in  late 2005. At that time, they also attempted to recover past records.  MNSTC-I officials acknowledge that the property books did not contain  records for all of the equipment distributed and that existing records were  incomplete or lacked supporting documentation. We identified  discrepancies between data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander  and MNSTC-I property book records (see fig. 3).
Although the former MNSTC-I commander reported that about 185,000  AK-47 rifles, 170,000 pistols, 215,000 items of body armor, and 140,000  helmets were issued to Iraqi security forces as of September 2005, the  MNSTC-I property books contain records for only about 75,000 AK-47  rifles, 90,000 pistols, 80,000 items of body armor, and 25,000 helmets.  Thus, DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for about 110,000 AK-47 rifles,  80,000 pistols, 135,000 items of body armor, and 115,000 helmets reported  as issued to Iraqi forces as of September 22, 2005. Our analysis of the  MNSTC-I property book records found that DOD and MNF-I cannot fully  account for at least 190,000 weapons reported as issued to Iraqi forces as  of September 22, 2005.
The second factor leading to the lapse in accountability is MNSTC-I’s  inability to consistently collect supporting documents that confirm when  the equipment was received, the quantities of equipment delivered, and the  Iraqi units receiving the equipment. We requested and received a sample of  documents confirming equipment received by Iraqi units during specific  weeks in February, April, July, and November 2006. Due to the limited  number of these records, we cannot generalize the information across all  of MNSTC-I records. Our preliminary review of this sample found that in  the period prior to June 2006, MNSTC-I provided only a few supporting  documents confirming that Iraqi units had received the equipment. For the  period after June 2006, we found that MNSTC-I possessed more supporting  documents. According to MNSTC-I officials who rotated in country in June  2006, the command began to place greater emphasis on collecting  documentation of Iraqi receipt of equipment. However, MNSTC-I officials  also stated that security constraints make it difficult for them to travel  within Iraq and collect hard copies of all documentation. They depend  instead on warehouse staff to send the receipts via scanner, fax or  computer.
Furthermore, the property books consist of extensive electronic  spreadsheets—the January 2007 property book records for the Ministry of  Defense contained 227 columns and 5,342 rows. Staff identify erroneous  entries through periodic manual checks and report errors to the property  book officer, according to MNSTC-I officials. Although MNSTC-I issued a  draft Standard Operating Procedures handbook to help assigned  personnel input data accurately and produce relevant reports, these  procedures require multiple steps and could lead to the unintentional  inclusion of incorrect data in calculations and reports, making them prone  to error. MNSTC-I officials acknowledged they have identified numerous  mistakes due to incorrect manual entries, which required them to find the  original documentation to reverify the data and correct the entries.  MNSTC-I officials also have acknowledged that the spreadsheet system is  an inefficient management tool given the large size of the program, large  amount of data, and limited number of personnel available to maintain the  system. MNSTC-I plans to move the property book records from a  spreadsheet system to a database management system by summer 2007.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Complete and accurate records are an essential component of a property  accountability system for equipment issued to Iraqi security forces.  However, DOD and MNF-I cannot ensure that Iraqi security forces  received the equipment as intended. DOD’s and MNF-I’s lack of clear and  consistent guidance contributed to partial data collection in the field.  Further, insufficient staffing, the lack of a fully developed network to  distribute the equipment, and inadequate technology have hampered  record keeping and data collection. Given DOD’s request for an additional  $2 billion to develop Iraqi security forces, improving accountability  procedures can help ensure that the equipment purchased with these  funds reaches the intended recipients. In addition, adequate accountability  procedures can help MNF-I identify Iraqi forces’ legitimate equipment  needs, thereby supporting the effective development of these forces.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that U.S. funded equipment reaches the Iraqi security  forces as intended, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the  following two actions:    Determine which DOD accountability procedures apply or should apply to  the program.
After defining the required accountability procedures, ensure that  sufficient staff, functioning distribution networks, standard operating  procedures, and proper technology are available to meet the new  requirements.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Defense for review  and comment. We received written comments from the DOD that are  reprinted in appendix II.
DOD concurred with both of our recommendations and indicated that they  are currently reviewing policies and procedures for equipment  accountability to ensure that proper accountability is in place for the Iraqi  train-and-equip program. DOD also indicated that it is important to ensure  that proper staffing, financial management, property distribution,  information management and communications systems are in working  order.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees. We will also make copies available to others on request. In  addition, this report is available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report (1) examines the property accountability procedures that the  Department of Defense (DOD) and Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) may  have applied to the U.S. train-and-equip program for Iraq and (2) assesses  whether DOD and MNF-I can account for the U.S.-funded equipment  issued to Iraqi security forces. Our work focused on the accountability  requirements for the transportation and distribution of U.S.-funded  equipment and did not review any requirements relevant to the  procurement of this equipment. We performed our work from March 2006  through July 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
To examine the laws and regulations that govern property accountability,  we reviewed the relevant legislation that has appropriated funds to train  and equip Iraqi security forces, pertinent DOD regulations, and applicable  U.S. military orders. We interviewed officials from the Department of State  and DOD, including the office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for  Logistics and Materiel Readiness; Defense Security and Cooperation  Agency; the Defense Logistics Agency; Tank-automotive and Armaments  Command; and Defense Reconstruction and Support Office. We also  interviewed current and former officials from MNF-I, including  Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), and  Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I).
We reviewed MNF-I’s accountability procedures for the U.S.-funded  equipment it has issued to the Iraqi security forces, and we reviewed  documentation from and interviewed current and former officials with the  U.S. Central Command, MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and MNC-I in Baghdad, Iraq;  Tampa, Florida; Washington, D.C.; and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. To  provide our analysis on the amount of equipment reported by MNF-I as  issued to the Iraqi security forces, we interviewed key officials to gain an  understanding of the MNSTC-I property book data and information  reported by the former MNSTC-I commander. To assess the reliability of  the former MNSTC-I commander’s data, we compared the data to  classified information and interviewed former MNSTC-I officials about  their procedures for collecting the data. Although we could not fully  determine the reliability and accuracy of these data, we determined that  they were sufficiently reliable to make broad comparisons against the  MNSTC-I property books and to assess major discrepancies between the  two reports. In assessing the documents supporting the January 2007  MNSTC-I property books, we were limited by MNSTC-I’s inability to scan  large amounts of these supporting paper documents and provide them to  us electronically. We obtained a sample by requesting supporting  documents for 1 week in each of the following months—February, April,  July, and November of 2006 (a month in every quarter)—to develop a  judgmental sample.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Judy A. McCloskey (Assistant  Director), Nanette J. Barton, Lynn Cothern, Martin De Alteriis, Mattias  Fenton, Mary Moutsos, and Jason Pogacnik made significant contributions  to this report. David Bruno, Monica Brym, and Brent Helt also provided  assistance.