Littoral Combat Ship: Knowledge of Survivability and Lethality Capabilities Needed Prior to Making Major Funding Decisions
Published: 2015-12-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: GAO has reported extensively on LCS—an over $34 billion Navy program (in 2010 dollars) consisting of two different ships and interchangeable mission packages. In February 2014, the Secretary of Defense, citing survivability concerns, directed the Navy to assess design alternatives for a possible LCS replacement.
House and Senate reports for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision for GAO to analyze LCS survivability. Based on congressional interest, GAO also examined lethality. This report examines (1) the extent to which LCS survivability and lethality requirements are aligned with the ship's threat environments and if they have changed, (2 and 3) and if LCS meets its current requirements. GAO also (4) assessed recent decisions pertaining to the Navy's plans to address the Secretary of Defense's concerns. GAO analyzed relevant documents and interviewed Navy officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The lethality and survivability of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is still largely unproven, 6 years after delivery of the lead ships. LCS was designed with reduced requirements as compared to other surface combatants, and the Navy has since lowered several survivability and lethality requirements and removed several design features—making the ship both less survivable in its expected threat environments and less lethal than initially planned. The Navy is compensating for this by redefining how it plans to operate the ships.
In 2014, the Navy conducted its first operational test of an early increment of the surface warfare mission package on a Freedom variant LCS, demonstrating that LCS could meet an interim lethality requirement. The Navy declared LCS operationally effective. However, the Navy's test report stated that the ship did not meet some key requirements. Further, the Department of Defense's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation has stated that there is insufficient data to provide statistical confidence that LCS can meet its lethality requirements in future testing or operations, and further testing is needed to demonstrate both variants can meet requirements in varied threat environments.
The Navy also has not yet demonstrated that LCS will achieve its survivability requirements, and does not plan to complete survivability assessments until 2018—after more than 24 ships are either in the fleet or under construction. The Navy has identified unknowns related to the use of aluminum and the hull of the Independence variant, and plans to conduct testing in these areas in 2015 and 2016. However, the Navy does not plan to fully determine how the Independence variant will react to an underwater explosion. This variant also sustained some damage in a trial in rough sea conditions, but the Navy is still assessing the cause and severity of the damage and GAO has not been provided with a copy of the test results. Results from air defense and cybersecurity testing also indicate concerns, but specific details are classified.
In February 2014 the former Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to assess options for a small surface combatant with more survivability and combat capability than LCS. The Navy conducted a study and recommended modifying the LCS to add additional survivability and lethality features. After approving the Navy's recommendation, the former Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to submit a new acquisition strategy for a modified LCS for his approval. He also directed the Navy to assess the cost and feasibility of backfitting lethality and survivability enhancements on current LCS. Nevertheless, the Navy has established a new frigate program office to manage this program, and the Navy has requested $1.4 billion for three LCS in the fiscal year 2016 President's budget, even though it is clear that the current ships fall short of identified survivability and lethality needs. GAO has an ongoing review of the Navy's small surface combatant study and future plans for the LCS program.
This report is a public version of a classified report issued in July 2015. Throughout this report, GAO has indicated where information has been omitted or redacted due to security considerations. All information in this report reflects information current as of July 2015 to be consistent with the timeframe of the classified report.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO suggests Congress delay funding for fiscal year 2016 LCS until the Navy submits a completed rough water trials report, acquisition strategy, and backfit plan; and consider not fully funding some or all LCS procurement pending analysis of these documents and the final survivability assessments. GAO also recommends several actions for DOD. The department concurred with two recommendations and partially concurred with two others, but did not concur with soliciting an independent technical assessment of the Independence variant. GAO continues to believe that such an independent assessment is warranted.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In February 2014, citing concerns about the survivability and lethality of  the Department of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the former  Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to establish a task force to  assess design and concept alternatives for a future LCS replacement.  The objective was to identify a ship that was more survivable—that is,  able to avoid, withstand, or recover from damage—and more lethal—able  to destroy enemy targets. The Navy currently has 24 LCSs (known as  seaframes) delivered or under contract with two different shipyards  constructing two different ship design variations. The Navy had planned  to buy another 28 ships, for a total of 52, as well as 64 mission packages  (the reconfigurable combinations of sensors, weapons, and aircraft that  provide most of the combat capability that are being procured in three  warfare areas). These quantities would make LCS a significant portion of  the Navy’s surface combatant fleet, at a planned cost of at least $34  billion in 2010 dollars.
The former Secretary directed the Navy to not contract for more than 32  ships, pending decisions about the potential LCS replacement, but did not  comment on any changes to mission package quantities. The Navy’s task  force studied concepts for a modified LCS, new ship designs, and a  modified existing ship design. The Navy recommended procuring a  modified version of each variant of the LCS seaframe which will have  additional weapons and survivability features. The former Secretary of  Defense approved the Navy’s recommendation in December 2014, and  the Navy recently announced that these modified ships will be re- designated as frigates. Procurement of these ships is planned to begin in  2019, and the former Secretary of Defense also directed the Navy to  report on the cost and feasibility of back-fitting the existing LCSs with  some of the changes planned for the modified LCS.
We have reported extensively on concerns with the combat capabilities of  the LCS, including survivability and lethality testing issues that had been  demonstrated to date, and identified changes the Navy has made to its  descriptions of LCS over time to reflect decreased expectations of LCS  combat capability. House and Senate Armed Services committee reports  for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 contained  a provision that we evaluate the survivability testing of LCS, and based  on discussions with Armed Services committee staff we were also asked  to include an examination of LCS’s combat capability, which includes  lethality. This report examines the extent to which LCS: (1) survivability  and lethality requirements are aligned with threat environments that the  ship is likely to face and to what degree, if any, these requirements have  changed over time; (2) meets its current lethality requirements; and (3)  meets its current survivability requirements. We also (4) assessed recent  decisions pertaining to upcoming changes to the program in light of the  former Secretary of Defense’s concerns about the lethality and  survivability of LCS.
This report is an unclassified version of a classified report that was issued  in July 2015. Throughout this report, we indicated where information has  been omitted or redacted due to security considerations. The information  in this report is current as of July 2015 to be consistent with the timeframe  of the classified report.
To identify how LCS survivability and lethality requirements are aligned  with the expected threat environment and the extent to which they have  changed over time, we analyzed the LCS capability development  documents (CDD) which dictate the performance requirements for the  seaframe and mission packages. LCS has two CDDs—one from 2004  that applies only to the two lead ships (LCS 1 and LCS 2) called the Flight  0 CDD, and one from 2010 that applies to all subsequent ships, called the  Flight 0+ CDD. We compared both CDDs to identify areas, if any, where  LCS requirements have changed. We also analyzed the two LCS  warfighting concepts of operations (dated 2007 and 2011) and spoke with  a cognizant Navy official about the pending third revision of this  document. In addition, we reviewed relevant Navy policies stipulating  general survivability and shock requirements for ships. To assess the  extent to which LCS meets its current survivability and lethality  requirements, we analyzed Navy and Director, Operational Test and  Evaluation (DOT&E) test reports for developmental and operational test  events and reviewed the 2013 LCS test and evaluation master plan. We  also observed one day of the Total Ship Survivability Trial conducted on  LCS 3 in October 2014. For our lethality objective, we assessed only the  lethality of the core seaframe and the surface warfare (SUW) mission  package. We reviewed the Navy’s Required Operational Capabilities and  Projected Operating Environment for LCS Class Ships instruction, and  also analyzed contractor-developed total ship vulnerability assessment  reports and integrated survivability assessment reports, which were  developed in the preliminary design phase of the program and were  contract-required deliverables for both variants. To assess the recent  decisions pertaining to upcoming changes to the LCS program, we  analyzed available Navy documentation related to the future acquisition of  a modified LCS. For each objective, we also interviewed relevant Navy  and DOT&E officials. A more detailed description of our scope and  methodology is presented in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2014 to July 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The LCS consists of two distinct parts: (1) a seaframe, which is  essentially the ship itself, and (2) a mission package, which is an  interchangeable set of sensors, weapons, aircraft, surface craft, and  subsurface vehicles carried on and deployed from the seaframe to  perform three different primary missions: mine countermeasures (MCM),  SUW, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). LCS was initially developed to  provide a lower-cost surface combatant with a smaller crew than other  ships and modest combat capabilities in focused areas, compared to  higher cost multi-mission surface combatants like destroyers. LCS is  envisioned to operate in both littoral waters and the deep ocean in all  theaters of operation. Early in the program, the Navy decided to forgo a  number of traditional ship requirements in order to help reduce the costs  and the weight and size of LCS, which in turn made the ship less robust  in terms of weaponry and survivability than other surface combatants.  Those decisions were validated by the Department of Defense’s (DOD)  Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
Both LCS variants initially leveraged commercial ship designs, and were  modified in accordance with established sets of technical criteria, called  rules, that were developed by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS).  ABS is a not-for-profit ship classification society that provides  independent technical assessments to ensure vessels are built in  accordance with the applicable rules, and can also conduct periodic  surveying of in-service ships. ABS was under contract with the Navy to  provide technical expertise on the LCS program and to develop rules  used in the design of LCS, but this contract ended in June 2012.
subsections: section_title: LCS Acquisition
paragraphs: The Navy awarded contracts to two contractor teams that developed  designs for the LCS seaframe reflecting different solutions to the same  set of requirements. The Navy is procuring two distinct variants: a steel  monohull design with an aluminum superstructure called the Freedom  variant, and an all-aluminum trimaran design called the Independence  variant. The Freedom variant has odd hull numbers and is being built at  Marinette Marine in Marinette, Wisconsin. The Independence variant has  even hull numbers and is being built at Austal USA in Mobile, Alabama.
The Navy has contracted for 24 seaframes with equal numbers of both  variants and has taken delivery of four to date. Twenty seaframes are  currently covered under block buy contracts and the Navy anticipates  funding construction of seaframes through 2016, with deliveries  continuing until 2020. The Navy plans to contract for two additional ships  in fiscal year 2016 and plans to award further contracts for three LCS  seaframes in both 2017 and 2018—though the Navy’s acquisition  strategy for these years is still in development. Table 1 shows the status  of the LCS seaframe procurement.
The Navy requested $1.4 billion for three LCS seaframes in its fiscal year  2016 budget request. The Navy’s plans to begin development and  procurement of the new modified LCS are not yet known, although the  Navy has stated that its goal is to begin procurement of the lead ships in  2019.
Each LCS will be capable of carrying an SUW, ASW, or MCM mission  package, as required by the circumstances. The mission packages are  being developed in increments; the Navy plans to develop four SUW  increments, four MCM increments, and one ASW increment. The  mission packages will provide the bulk of the combat capability or lethality  for the ship. The Navy has 10 mission packages in its inventory and  currently plans to buy 64 mission packages. According to Navy officials,  the recent decision to develop a modified LCS has not changed the  current end quantity of mission package purchases.
section_title: Survivability
paragraphs: Survivability is the ability of a ship to avoid, withstand, or recover from  damage. It consists of three elements: susceptibility, vulnerability, and  recoverability.
Susceptibility is the degree to which a ship can be targeted and  engaged by threat weapons. Some ways of improving a ship’s  susceptibility include avoiding or defeating a threat by using a  combination of tactics, signature reduction, countermeasures, and  self-defense systems. LCS uses speed, maneuverability, modern  defensive weapons, organic systems (e.g., 57mm gun), and sensors  to counter surface, air, and underwater threats.
Vulnerability is a measure of a ship’s ability to withstand initial  damage effects from threat weapons and to continue to perform its  primary warfare mission areas. LCS design uses three different  vulnerability scenarios that, dependent on the severity of the damage,  allow it to exit the battle area under its own power; and continue to perform its primary mission;  conduct an orderly abandon ship.
Recoverability is a measure of a ship’s ability to take emergency  action to contain and control damage, prevent loss of a damaged  ship, minimize personnel casualties, and restore and sustain primary  mission capabilities. The LCS seaframe provides most of the  survivability features for the crew, including damage control and  safety systems. For example, LCS has three redundant firefighting  systems.
The Navy specified LCS survivability to be greater than that of auxiliary  ships, which have a comparably low survivability level, but less than that  of frigates and amphibious assault ships—as shown in table 2. According  to Navy officials, the Navy designed LCS to what they refer to as a Level  1+ standard, meaning it had additional features beyond those of other  Level 1 ships, including  tailored survivability requirements for underwater shock and  limited fragmentation and bullet armor; and  improved ability to withstand flooding after a damage event.
section_title: Lethality
paragraphs: Lethality is ability of a weapon system—in this case LCS—to damage or  destroy threats, including an enemy ship, aircraft, or missile. Lethality  enables survivability because if LCS is able to sink or damage an  approaching enemy vessel before it attacks, that enemy vessel may be  unable to fire at LCS. The LCS CDD defines requirements related to  lethality and identifies specific threats that LCS is expected to be able to  destroy and the range at which it should do so. The seaframes provide  sensors and communications systems needed for ship operations and  self-defense weapons for both the SUW mission and defense against  enemy aircraft and missiles, called anti-air warfare. The SUW mission  package augments the ship’s lethality by adding two 30mm gun mounts  and an armed helicopter. Eventually, a surface-to-surface missile is  planned to be added to the third increment of this mission package. Table  3 depicts the combat system equipment carried on the seaframes and the  weapon systems that are added with the mission packages.
LCS was designed to be able to address the threat of small boats. Figure  1 depicts examples of two types of small boats.
section_title: Test Events
paragraphs: The Navy uses several types of testing to evaluate the weapon systems it  develops, as required by DOD acquisition policy and statute.  Developmental testing is typically sponsored by the program office, is  often conducted in conjunction with the contractors, and is used to assess  whether the system design is satisfactory and meets technical  specifications. Developmental test events, such as combat system ship  qualification trials, allow the Navy to verify and validate combat and  weapon system performance. Technical evaluation is a testing activity  used to assess the readiness of the system for operational testing.  Operational testing includes live-fire testing, and is used to determine that  the system can effectively execute its mission in an operational  environment when operated by typical sailors against relevant threats.  Operational testing is required by statute.
The Navy has used a combination of developmental and operational  testing and modeling and simulation to demonstrate the survivability and  lethality of LCS. DOD granted the LCS program a waiver to relieve the  Navy of the requirement to do full-scale survivability testing. Such waivers  are common in shipbuilding, as it is unrealistic to use a production ship  and a live test to assess certain types of damage—for example, how fire  spreads throughout the ship. DOT&E—the agency responsible for  approving test plans—approved a modified live fire test and evaluation  plan that takes advantage of testing on similar components and utilizes  historical combat data. In place of live testing, the Navy has used a  number of surrogate tests and modeling and simulation to try to retire risk  in these areas. Surrogate testing uses decommissioned ships (where  available) or representative portions of ship structure, and subjects them  to damage similar to what might be caused by threat weapons. These  tests help inform and validate the results of computer-based modeling  and simulation. The Navy also conducts test events to demonstrate the  effectiveness of the ship’s weapon systems and sensors, and it has a test  plan to demonstrate the effectiveness of each mission package increment  on each seaframe variant.
section_title: Our Prior Recommendations
paragraphs: We have reported extensively on the risks of proceeding with LCS  procurements without the requisite knowledge provided through adequate  testing. In 2013 and 2014, we concluded that the Navy continued to make  further investment decisions in the seaframes and mission packages with  an absence of key information. In these reports, we identified that until  the Navy completes operational testing, the Navy could invest  approximately $34 billion (in 2010 dollars) for up to 52 seaframes and 64  mission packages that may not provide a militarily useful capability. We  also found in 2013 and 2014 that unknowns persist with the  Independence variant given that it had not completed the same testing as  the Freedom variant. We recommended that the Navy re-evaluate its  business case for LCS and conduct a number of operational test events  on both variants prior to making a decision to contract for more ships,  including the following:
Deploying to a forward overseas location. The Freedom variant has  deployed overseas twice; the Independence variant has not yet  deployed.
Completing rough water, ship shock, and total ship survivability  testing. Both variants have now completed rough water trials; the  Freedom variant completed total ship survivability testing in 2014, but  the Independence variant has not yet conducted this testing. Neither  ship will complete full-ship shock trials until 2016.
Completing initial operational testing and evaluation of the SUW  mission package on the Freedom variant and the MCM mission  package on the Independence variant. The Navy completed  operational testing of the SUW mission package on the Freedom  variant, but has not completed operational testing of the MCM mission  package on the Independence variant.
DOD largely disagreed with these recommendations, citing the business  imperative of not slowing down production of the seaframes. We believe  that while the pricing of the seaframes is important, there is greater risk in  awarding additional contracts before key knowledge is gained about the  capabilities and operational concepts of the LCS.
We also recommended in 2013 that the Navy report to Congress on  the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two seaframe  variants. We recommended that the Navy present to Congress a  comparison of the capabilities of the two variants in performing each  mission because we had found that the officers in the fleets—the end  users of the ships—said that they believed there were advantages  and disadvantages to the two designs. Congress directed the Navy in  the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 to provide  additional information on some of the risk areas we identified.
The Navy provided Congress with a report in May 2014 assessing the  expected survivability attributes and the concept of operations for the  ships, but in terms of comparing the two variants the Navy essentially  suggested that since the two variants are built to the same requirements  they perform the same way. The Navy did not present a more detailed  comparison that would address our recommendation. We believe that  completing this type of analysis would still be valuable to understanding  differences in performance between the seaframes.
section_title: Survivability and Lethality Requirements Less Than Other Combatants, and Have Been Reduced over Time
paragraphs: The Navy designed LCS with survivability and lethality capabilities that  are not aligned with the projected operational environment in which the  ship will operate, and over time it has lessened or removed some  survivability and lethality requirements. The Navy’s original operational  concept envisioned LCS as requiring less survivability and lethality  features than other surface combatants, which would in turn make LCS  less costly than other surface combatants. Over time the Navy has further  reduced some survivability and lethality requirements, making LCS less  survivable and lethal than it was initially envisioned. And, in response, the  Navy continues to refine its operational concepts for LCS. Specific details  about changes to these requirements were redacted from this report  because they are classified.
The Flight 0+ CDD defines the survivability capabilities required after the  ship takes a hit, rather than stating specific design requirements as is the  case in the earlier Flight 0 CDD. There are three specific design  features that would enhance LCS’s survivability that are identified in the  Flight 0 CDD, but not in the Flight 0+ CDD. Officials from Office of the  Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), who are the resource sponsors for  the LCS program, stated that these changes were made early on to save  cost, and in one instance weight onboard the ship. Specific differences in  survivability requirements between the 2004 Flight 0 and the 2010 Flight  0+ CDDs and details about changes to LCS requirements were redacted  from this report because they are classified.
Since 2004, the Navy has also reduced some LCS lethality requirements.  Our analysis shows that the poor performance of some systems might  have contributed to this decision. Additional details on these changes are  classified.
To compensate for any gaps in the ship’s survivability and lethality  capabilities, the Navy continues to redefine the concept of operations  (CONOPS) for LCS. We reported in 2013 that the Navy had made a  number of changes to descriptions of how the LCS might be employed  and the capabilities it would bring to the warfighter. We found that  documentation developed early on in the program had very optimistic  assumptions of where and how LCS could be used, as compared with  more current sources, but these assumptions have been lessened over  time. By redefining LCS CONOPS, the Navy can help ensure that LCS  will be in harm’s way less frequently, which could compensate for the  ship’s susceptibility and vulnerability without more costly materiel  changes to the ship. While pragmatic, this approach can limit the ship’s  utility in the full scope of potential operations and can require more  capable ships to be tasked to defend LCS instead of performing other  missions. LCS was originally planned to free up more costly ships to  perform more complicated missions; partnering LCS with ships providing  defensive protection limits the Navy’s ability to achieve these efficiencies.
Additional details on these CONOPS changes are classified.
section_title: Recent SUW Testing Inadequate to Determine If LCS Meets Its Requirements
paragraphs: On April 17, 2014, the Navy completed operational testing of the LCS’s  SUW mission package, employing an Increment 2 mission package  onboard USS Fort Worth (LCS 3). During this test, the ship and its  embarked helicopter demonstrated that it could meet the interim  requirement for this increment. In prior live SUW test events, LCS did not  demonstrate that it could kill all the required targets. Specific details about  test events and results were redacted from this report because they are  classified.
While the April 2014 test proved successful, further testing is needed to  demonstrate that both variants of LCS can meet all its SUW  requirements—incremental and threshold—and in all the threat  environments in which the ships will operate. This is due to the following  considerations:
LCS did not demonstrate it could meet all its requirements in these
Testing only demonstrated that LCS could meet its requirements in  one operational test event and is inadequate to provide statistical  confidence in the ship’s performance; the test environment was not  operationally stressing and the crew got extensive training and  practice;
Only one of the two variants were tested; and
Meeting threshold capability will require missile integration.
These issues are discussed below.
subsections: section_title: LCS Did Not Demonstrate It Could Meet All Interim SUW Requirements
paragraphs: Recent operational testing has revealed that a Freedom variant LCS was  not able to meet all its interim lethality requirements. Specific details of  these shortcomings were redacted because the information is classified.
section_title: SUW Testing Inadequate to Provide Statistical Confidence in Performance
paragraphs: DOT&E officials told us that the amount of live testing done to date on the  LCS SUW mission package is insufficient to provide statistical confidence  that LCS can consistently demonstrate this level of performance. The  DOD acquisition instruction states that scientific test and analysis  techniques—which DOT&E states includes statistically based  measures—should be employed in a test program and provide required  data to characterize system behavior. The amount of testing to date is  consistent with the approved test plan, but DOT&E stated that the tests  were constrained due to the Navy not providing the funding and  resources to allow for further testing. Due to the limited number of live  operational test runs, DOT&E believes the existing evidence is not  sufficient, nor does it predict LCS’s performance in varied environments  (e.g., bad weather) or provide sufficient confidence that LCS could repeat  this performance in other tests. So, while there is no requirement in the  test plan to achieve statistical confidence, as DOT&E states the sparse  data available do not allow a strong statement about LCS’s ability to meet  requirements in other operational scenarios.
As an illustration of this point, the same ship and crew attempted the  same operational test event one week prior to the successful run and  were unsuccessful before the test event was cancelled due to range  restrictions. As such, DOT&E has not yet made its determination that LCS  is operationally effective in performing the SUW mission because of a  stated lack of available data to support such an assessment. The Navy’s  operational test organization has made its determination about  effectiveness, which is documented in its final report. Further information  about their assessment is classified.
Further, while operational testing did demonstrate that LCS could defeat  the interim requirement number of Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC),  range safety considerations made this testing less operationally stressing  than a real-world encounter. Additional information about these issues  was redacted because it contained classified information.
section_title: Operational Testing Limited to Freedom Variant; None to Date on the Independence Variant
paragraphs: This operational testing of SUW was conducted using only a Freedom  variant LCS. While the guns are the same on the two variants and in the  mission package, the gunfire control systems, sensors, consoles, and  some enabling software are all different, as are the gun placements and  ship handling characteristics. As such, testing on a Freedom variant  cannot be used to predict performance of the SUW mission package on  an Independence variant. The Navy will not operationally test the initial  SUW mission package on the Independence variant until September  2015. As shown in table 4, most of the SUW operational testing on this  variant is in the future and program officials told us that the Navy is still  gaining an understanding of the effectiveness of the 57mm gun weapon  system on the Independence variant. For example, DOT&E told us that in  a developmental test in January 2015 the LCS 2 had difficulty achieving a  hit on a stationary target with the 57mm gun.
Additional details about Independence variant testing were redacted  because they contained classified information.
section_title: LCS Will Not Demonstrate It Can Meet Full Threshold SUW Performance until a Missile Is Integrated
paragraphs: LCS will not demonstrate threshold lethality requirements outlined in the  CDD until 2017, at the earliest, after the Navy installs and tests the SUW  mission package with the Longbow-Hellfire missiles. Since Longbow- Hellfire has not yet been integrated with LCS, the actual performance of  the missile on LCS remains unknown. In November 2013, the missile  contractor demonstrated that a Longbow-Hellfire missile could be  modified to fire vertically from a ship rather than horizontally from a  helicopter, and the Navy continues to conduct testing with DOT&E  including 2014 testing examining the lethality of Longbow-Hellfire against  small boats, though this testing did not use moving sea-based targets.
A key challenge in integrating the missile with LCS is managing its weight  and accompanying equipment on the ship, given the weight and center of  gravity challenges on which we have previously reported. Further,  software integration with the combat management system will be  required. An analysis of the capability of this missile was redacted  because it contained classified content.
section_title: The Navy Does Not Yet Fully Understand the Extent to Which LCS Will Meet Current Survivability Requirements
paragraphs: While the Navy has conducted a variety of surrogate tests and  simulations, it has not yet demonstrated whether LCS meets its  survivability requirements. As a result, significant unknowns remain  regarding the vulnerability, susceptibility, and recoverability of LCS.  According to current plans, the Navy will not have completed its test plan  to demonstrate the survivability of LCS until approximately 2018, at which  point it plans to have more than 24 ships either in the fleet or under  construction. The Navy has not fully demonstrated the vulnerability of  the seaframes, the susceptibility of the ship to air threats and computer  penetrations, or how the crew will respond to damage. If future  survivability concerns are identified, the Navy may have to again revise  the LCS warfighting CONOPS to compensate for these issues. This could  also have implications on the proposed modified LCS, since they plan to  leverage the LCS designs. The main risks pertain to the following issues:
Vulnerability of the ships due to the use of aluminum and a novel hullform on the Independence variant that has not been fully tested;
Air warfare capability;
Cybersecurity; and
Recoverability of the ships not fully demonstrated.
These issues are discussed below.
subsections: section_title: Navy Does Not Fully Understand LCS Vulnerability, and Some Knowledge Gaps Will Remain Unresolved on the Independence Variant
paragraphs: The two LCS variants are new ship designs, and the Independence  variant uses an aluminum alloy and a trimaran hullform that is unlike other  ships in the Navy’s inventory. Therefore, the Navy needed to gather  information to characterize how these ships would react to various types  of damage. The Navy conducted modeling and simulation activities and  surrogate testing, including the following:
Weapons effects tests conducted on two decommissioned Finnish  aluminum mono-hulled fast-attack craft;
Fire tests on representative LCS bulkheads and fire insulation;
Underwater explosion testing of representative panels of ship
Testing of stress loading on representative Independence variant
Penetration tests of representative Independence variant structures;
Furnace testing of Independence class types of aluminum to  determine response of aluminum to heat and stress loading.
Further, the Navy is using computer models and simulations to predict  how LCS might react to damage. Subject matter experts in weapons  effects, damage control, fire dynamics, and other fields will then analyze  the model predictions of primary and secondary damage caused by  various weapons. These experts will update and expand on the model  predictions to determine how cascading damage and crew response to  such damage affect mission capability. Their interpretation of the  modeling and simulation results, coupled with lessons learned from other  testing and real world events, forms the basis of the assessment of  whether the LCS meets its survivability requirements.
However, the Navy still lacks robust knowledge in several vulnerability  areas, largely related to how fire will affect the aluminum structure of both  variants, and how underwater explosions will affect the aluminum  trimaran Independence variant. The Navy does not plan to complete its  validation and accreditation of the models used to simulate damage until  2017, and its technical experts will not complete their analysis and issue  their final survivability assessment reports until approximately 2018. Navy  officials stated that until that time its technical warrant holders cannot  certify that the two variants meet their survivability requirements and that  no further modifications to the design or operational CONOPS are  necessary. Navy officials further stated that these reports are typically not  finalized until several years after delivery, and cited examples of recent  shipbuilding programs including CVN 78, DDG 1000, LPD 17, and LHA 6.  However, the lead LCS seaframes were delivered in 2008 and 2009  respectively, meaning that the Navy does not expect to finalize these  reports until approximately a decade after delivery. Additional test  activities and simulations still remain to be done before the Navy can  better characterize the ships’ vulnerability, and the Navy does not plan to  fully assess some potential vulnerabilities with the trimaran hull.
subsections: section_title: Knowledge of the Vulnerability of Aluminum Incomplete
paragraphs: The Navy still lacks knowledge of how aluminum will react to fire and  some blast events, which it does not expect to better understand until it  completes a live-fire test event in late 2015. The Freedom variant design  has an aluminum deckhouse mated to a steel hull, while the  Independence variant is entirely made of aluminum with no steel  structure. Historically, many Navy ships have been made largely out of  steel, though several classes—recent examples include the CG 47  Ticonderoga class cruisers and the FFG 7 Oliver Hazard Perry class  frigates—have utilized an aluminum deckhouse. The lower density of  aluminum provides advantages in that it is lighter than steel, which helps  LCS achieve its high speed requirement. However, aluminum is also  known to lose stiffness more quickly than steel at elevated temperatures  in a fire, and the Navy has identified that this phenomenon needs further  study on LCS. The Independence variant uses an alloy of aluminum that  has not been used in prior Navy ship construction, so accumulated Navy  knowledge about how the aluminum on older ships reacts to damage  cannot be applied wholesale to the Independence variant. In addition,  both variants—though more so the Independence variant—use extruded  aluminum planks—complex shapes that are formed by pushing heated  aluminum through a die using a hydraulic press. While extrusions have  industrial advantages, the Navy has no experience with the damage  responses from extruded planks. One shipyard identified this as a  knowledge gap in a 2004 report to the Navy, stating that the computer  models it used to simulate damage did not account for the use of this type  of structure. The Navy plans to conduct live-fire testing on a full-scale  mock-up of a section of an Independence variant deckhouse in late 2015  to help provide additional data to mitigate some of these knowledge gaps.  This mock-up is called the Multi-Compartment Surrogate, and the Navy  plans to test it with internal blasts, fragmentation, and fire.
section_title: Vulnerability of the Independence Variant Hull to Underwater Shocks Is Unknown
paragraphs: The Navy has knowledge gaps related to the underwater shock  vulnerability of the trimaran shape of the Independence variant, in part  because of a lack of experience with the hullform in other Navy ships.  Specifically, technical experts from the Naval Sea Systems Command  have stated that they do not fully understand how the hull would react to  whipping caused by an underwater explosion. Underwater explosions  create a shock wave and a highly compressed gas bubble that expands  and contracts. This can cause a type of vertical or horizontal flexing of the  ship called a whipping force. The severity of this whipping force and the  resulting damage is a function of the size of the explosion and the  distance from the hull, among other factors, and not all shocks lead to a  whipping response. If the whipping is significant enough, this vibration  could cause catastrophic damage and may cause a ship to break apart.  Naval Sea Systems Command technical experts have identified a lack of  experimental data on the whipping response of a trimaran hullform. These  technical experts stated that there is currently no algorithm in existence to  model how this hull type would perform, and stated that there is no plan to  invest in such an algorithm or a physical hull model for testing since the  LCS CDD has no explicit requirement for LCS to survive a whipping  response, though it does have an underwater shock requirement.  DOT&E has stated that a case could be made that there is an inherent  whipping requirement because LCS is supposed to be able to support an  orderly evacuation after a mine or torpedo encounter, which would not be  possible if the ship were to break apart.
The Navy’s existing model has successfully been used to predict the  whipping response of other conventional Navy hullforms and is thus being  used for LCS modeling. While Naval Sea Systems Command technical  experts state that this model contains the requisite physics to model the  whipping of a trimaran hullform, they also point out that it has not been  validated for this type of analysis and that there is no test data to correlate  the results, which is why DOT&E believes a whipping surrogate test is  needed. Further, the Navy has not yet conducted a Full Ship Shock Trial  on both ships. This test—where both variants will be subject to an  underwater explosion and assessed for damage—is planned for 2016.  This trial should provide some test data on how the Independence variant  responds to a shock event. Though this test will not induce severe  whipping motions, the Navy plans to use the data to compare the results  with its model predictions.
section_title: Ship’s Performance in Rough Seas Not Fully Understood, with Both Variants Suffering Damage in Trial
paragraphs: The vulnerability of the ship’s hulls to various sea conditions also remains  unknown. Due to the dynamic nature of waves, the Navy cannot rely on  modeling and simulation alone to provide an accurate assessment of a  ship’s performance in rough seas. The Navy conducts seakeeping and  structural loads trials to determine with instrumentation how ships will  respond to different sea conditions. Seakeeping trials are used to  evaluate the way a ship behaves in various sea conditions, while  structural loads trials are used to evaluate the effect of waves on the  ship’s structure to determine if it is adequate to withstand damage. These  tests are planned and executed by the Naval Surface Warfare Center  Carderock Division’s Ship Systems Engineering Station in Philadelphia.
The Freedom variant has deployed twice and as a result sailed across the  Pacific Ocean. In addition, in March 2015 this variant completed a  seakeeping and structural load trial in rough water to define its  performance characteristics. The Navy started this testing in 2011 on LCS  1, but it was suspended when a hull crack and water leak were found.  The Navy has not yet provided an analysis report or details from this  event or the subsequent 2015 test, which Navy officials state is still being  written.
For the Independence variant, the Navy conducted a seakeeping and  structural loads trial event on LCS 2 in January-February 2014. In this trial  the ship was subject to rough water conditions up to and including sea  state 6, defined as having average waves of 8-11 feet and winds of 22-27  knots. This test event—dubbed Phase 2—was following up on earlier  Phase 1 testing in lower sea states that was conducted in March 2011  and May 2012. According to the Navy, neither the final test report for the  Phase 1 seakeeping trials, nor the final test report for the Phase 2  seakeeping and structural loads trial for this variant, have been finalized,  despite these trials occurring several years ago.
According to LCS program officials, the ship tested in the Phase 2 trials  sustained damage during the testing. The Navy has not yet provided us  with the analysis reports, stating that the report is still undergoing  revisions. Consequently, we are unable to assess the significance or  cause of this damage. DOT&E has reported that this testing resulted in  weld cracking to structural stanchions in the mission package bay and  has resulted in weight limitations to the launch, handling, and recovery  equipment for the mission packages on both LCS 2 and LCS 4—although  they have also not seen the test reports. Officials from the LCS program  office initially told us that part of the reason for the delay in generating  these reports is due to a disagreement between the program office and  the technical study team from the Naval Surface Warfare as to the cause  of the damage, citing that they do not believe the ship was adequately  inspected prior to the trial. The Navy later stated in its technical  comments that there was not a disagreement, and that the Navy and the  technical team agree that the damage identified after the trial resulted  from quality control issues during construction, but cannot confirm that the  damage occurred during the trial itself because no pre-trial inspection was  conducted. As such, the current value of the data obtained as part of the  rough water trial on the Independence variant is in question. The program  office has not sought additional assistance from an independent technical  authority such as a ship classification society to help analyze the data and  determine the vulnerability of the Independence hullform. Classification  societies are often used to assess damage to in-service ships; a similar  analysis was conducted by ABS after USS Port Royal hit a coral reef in  order to provide an independent review of the damage the ship sustained.
section_title: Air Defense and Cybersecurity Issues
paragraphs: Our classified report discussed issues with the air defense and  cybersecurity of LCS. Additional information about the performance of  LCS in air warfare testing and results from cybersecurity testing has been  redacted because it contained classified information.
The Navy will not be able to fully demonstrate LCS anti-air warfare  capability until it completes two future activities: modeling in a high-fidelity  computer simulation called the Probability of Raid Annihilation (PRA)  Testbed, and live-fire testing onboard the Self Defense Test Ship. DOT&E  also requires “lead ship testing” which was going to occur on LCS 5 and 6  but has now been postponed to LCS 7 and 8. The Navy needs to  complete the testbed simulations and live-fire events to characterize  LCS’s susceptibility to representative anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM)  threats.
PRA Testbed: LCS anti-air warfare performance will be modeled  through the PRA Testbed—a rigorous modeling and simulation  environment using representative LCS combat system suite and  weapons configurations. The Navy plans to use this PRA Testbed to  conduct a full course of ASCM self-defense assessments, including  simulations that would be costly or difficult to test with live targets.  This testing was planned to occur in fiscal year 2016 for the  Independence variant and fiscal year 2018 for the Freedom variant,  but according to DOT&E officials it has slipped to 2017-2018 for the  Independence variant and 2018-2019 for the Freedom variant.
Self Defense Test Ship: The Navy also plans to conduct live end-to- end testing against both LCS variants and also against the unmanned  Self Defense Test Ship. This ship is remote controlled so it can be  subjected to live-fire testing, and will be equipped with the same  combat system equipment found on the two LCS variants. According  to test plans, the Navy envisioned conducting Self-Defense Test Ship  tests using Independence class equipment between fiscal year 2015  and 2016 and Freedom class equipment in fiscal year 2016. This  testing has slipped to fiscal year 2016 for the Independence variant  and 2017 for the Freedom variant.
section_title: Recoverability of Ship Partially Demonstrated in Testing to Date
paragraphs: In 2014, the program office completed the Total Ship Survivability Trial  onboard LCS 3, a Freedom variant ship. This test is an at-sea event with  the ship’s crew in which damage from threat weapons is simulated. The  test allows the Navy to collect information on how well the crew is able to  use the installed fire fighting and damage control systems to control  damage and reconstitute the ship. The Navy plans to conduct this same  test event on the Independence variant in fiscal year 2015.
Program officials told us they were generally satisfied with the results of  the test; we have not yet had the opportunity to review the final report, as  it is still being finalized. This test is important as LCS’s small crew may  limit the crew’s damage control efforts following an attack if the damage  were severe enough or if it took a long time to combat. According to  DOT&E, the test highlighted the existence of significant vulnerabilities in  the Freedom class design and that much of the ship’s mission capability  was lost because of damage caused by the initial weapons effects or from  the ensuing fire that happened before the crew could respond. LCS  documentation does not identify how many crew members would have to  be lost to degrade the crew’s response capability. Further discussion on  this topic is classified and is not included in this report.
DOT&E also stated that LCS does not have sufficient redundancy to  recover the lost capability. For example, LCS has limited redundancy in  its power supply systems, and DOT&E officials told us that the ship does  not have the ability to employ auxiliary casualty power systems like the  crews can employ on other Navy ships to recover in the event of major  damage. According to Naval Sea Systems Command documentation, a  casualty power system allows the ship’s crew to make temporary power  connections to limited equipment if the installed power connections are  damaged, allowing this equipment to keep using the installed shipboard  power generation systems. Such a system can facilitate keeping the ship  afloat, extinguishing shipboard fires, propelling the ship out of a danger  area, or in maintaining communications and a limited self-defense  capability. LCS relies instead on separated and redundant battery backup  power supplies and the ship build specifications indicate no casualty  power equipment on board. A battery backup power may not enable the  ship to operate as long as harnessing the ship’s main power generators  would allow. Navy officials stated that modern Navy ship designs  including DDG 1000 and LPD 17 do not use a casualty power system.
section_title: Compressed Time Frame for Incorporating Major Program Changes
paragraphs: The Navy is currently planning significant changes to the LCS program  under a compressed time frame, which provides little opportunity for  incorporating knowledge from the results of its survivability and lethality  assessments. The Navy completed its Small Surface Combatant Study  and just recently provided it to us. The Navy used analysis from this study  to decide to modify the two LCS variants to be more survivable and lethal.  In December 2014, the former Secretary of Defense announced that he  approved the Navy’s recommendation. The former Secretary of Defense  further directed the Navy to provide his office by May 1, 2015: (1) an  acquisition strategy to support the design and procurement of the new  small surface combatant no later than fiscal year 2019 and sooner if  possible; and (2) an assessment of the cost and feasibility of back-fitting  the existing LCS with enhanced survivability and lethality systems. In  addition, he also required the Navy to submit to the Office of the  Secretary of Defense a service cost position and a plan to control overall  program costs. The Secretary of Defense assumed a total quantity of 52  LCS and small surface combatants, but left the decision on the final  number and mix of ships to the discretion of the Navy. However,  according to Navy documentation, the Navy is notionally planning on 20  modified LCS—the costs of which have not been fully determined.
The House report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal  Year 2015 includes a provision that we analyze the Small Surface  Combatant Study and the Navy’s plans moving forward; we just began  this work after receiving the Navy’s study, and we plan on issuing a  separate report on these issues. As part of this review we will also assess  the acquisition strategy and cost and feasibility assessments recently  submitted to the Secretary of Defense. According to statements by senior  Navy officials, the modified LCS will be redesignated as a frigate. An  initial fact sheet issued by the Navy shows that these ships will still be  able to carry either the SUW or ASW mission packages, but the Navy will  add additional combat capability by including a towed multifunction sonar  array, an over-the-horizon missile, and 25mm guns to the seaframes. The  Navy is continuing to refine its plans, but initial information, including a  recent DOT&E report, indicates that the improvements will largely focus  on improving lethality. However, DOT&E stated that the improvements to  the ships would not be sufficient to overcome the vulnerability features of  LCS.
According to the Navy, modifying the LCS allows it to support the current  industrial base with no break in production schedule. There are 20  seaframes currently under contract with the shipyards—10 at each  shipyard—in various stages of construction in addition to any other  planned work at the shipyards. According to the current schedule, the  shipyards will be building LCSs already under contract until approximately  2019, and the Navy plans to award additional contracts before  transitioning to the frigate. Further, Navy documentation identifies multi- month delays to almost all of the seaframes currently under construction  at both shipyards. These late deliveries may prolong the time required for  the shipyards to complete work under the existing LCS contracts,  meaning that any future delays associated with the introduction of the  modified LCS may not impact the workload in the shipyards.
As shown in figure 2, the Navy’s proposed acquisition schedule will result  in the Navy making key program decisions without the benefit of  knowledge gained through ongoing survivability and lethality  assessments.
For example, the Navy plans to determine its acquisition strategy for the  new small surface combatant by May 2015, exercise options to begin  upgrading current LCS ships in fiscal year 2017, and buy the lead small  surface combatant (modified LCS) by 2019. According to this schedule,  the Navy will need to begin estimating and planning the 2019 budget in  2017. However, as previously mentioned, at that time, the Navy will not  yet have completed plans to fully demonstrate the survivability of both  variants or completed testing to demonstrate that both variants meet  threshold lethality requirements. Unknowns about the Independence  variant are particularly significant, as that ship has conducted less  operational testing to date than the Freedom variant and has not yet  deployed overseas. Nevertheless, the Navy still plans to proceed with  equal numbers of each variant, as reflected in its 2010 block buy  decision.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The actual lethality and survivability performance of LCS is still largely  unproven through realistic testing, 6 years after delivery of the lead ships,  with 2 additional ships delivered and 20 more ships under construction  and/or under contract. The LCS program was intended to be lower in cost  than more capable multi-mission surface combatants, and the Navy  limited requirements for susceptibility and vulnerability to help achieve  that end. Since the program was initially authorized and funded, costs  have increased and the Navy has further reduced the ship’s lethality and  survivability requirements. While current plans to protect LCS with more  capable ships in higher-threat environments may be a more cost effective  solution to addressing capability limitations, these changes also reflect an  ever-shrinking set of situations in which LCS can operate without placing  added demands on the larger combatants. Further, although the Navy  has a significant lack of knowledge of the Independence variant’s lethality  and survivability capabilities with no plans to seek additional analysis from  an independent technical authority to resolve questions on its rough water  trial report, it continues with plans to buy equal numbers of both variants.
The Navy is quickly embarking on an effort to redesign the LCS to  address lethality and survivability concerns. This effort comprises a major  program change. Direction from the former Secretary of Defense to  develop an acquisition strategy for the new small surface combatant— and to assess back-fitting some systems on the current LCS—by May  2015 with the first ship procured in 2019 leaves little time to develop  important knowledge about current limitations of the ships in these areas.  Consequently, the Navy risks leaving some limitations unaddressed, and  potentially inefficiently modifying these designs while testing continues.  The Secretary of Defense conveyed a sense of urgency by setting this  time frame of May 2015, only 5 months after he approved the Navy’s  recommendation. The Navy has cited maintaining the industrial base and  avoiding a production break as an imperative for its decision-making. Yet,  current work in the shipyards will continue through at least 2019. Each  shipyard currently has 10 LCS in various stages of construction—some  having not even started construction—and most are experiencing  schedule delays. The expedited time frame puts the Navy at risk for  making decisions uninformed by more complete knowledge about not  only the current LCS, but also about precisely what systems will be  selected for the modified LCS. Importantly, the Navy will not have  completed the survivability assessments for the two variants until 2018.  Until that time, the Navy cannot be assured that it fully understands the  survivability of the two ships or what capabilities might need to be  augmented. Making premature decisions may exacerbate the situation  the Navy is in today—with an inventory of ships and systems that do not  perform as initially envisioned.
At the same time, Congress is being asked to fund three LCS in fiscal  year 2016—ships that DOD has acknowledged do not meet its needs. At  this point, Congress must consider this funding request before the Navy  has completed its new acquisition strategy or assessed the feasibility of  backfitting certain upgrades onto the existing ships.
While we are making recommendations in this report, we also believe that  the recommendations we have made in prior reports with regard to the  LCS program still stand as reasonable actions that the Navy should take  to improve the program.
section_title: Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: To ensure that the Navy has provided a clear direction for the future of  the program before committing funding to construct additional ships,  Congress should consider the following options:  1.  In the near term, restrict funding for construction of the three LCS  seaframes requested in fiscal year 2016 until the Navy submits to  Congress and GAO:  a.  An acquisition strategy for the modified LCS that has been  approved by the Secretary of Defense;  b.  The Navy’s plans to backfit the existing LCS and an analysis  of the cost and engineering feasibility and risks of doing so;  and  c.  A completed rough water trial report for both variants.  2.  Not funding some or all of the Navy’s request in fiscal year 2016  for the three LCS seaframes given the Navy’s lack of knowledge  of the ships’ survivability and lethality capability.  3.  Further, given the uncertainties over the long term about the ship’s  survivability and lethality and proposed changes to future ships,  consider not fully funding the Navy’s request for future LCS ships  beyond fiscal year 2016, pending the completion and analysis of  the final survivability assessments for both variants due in 2018.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that the Navy has a sound acquisition approach moving  forward, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense:  1.  Ensure that the commitment to buy 20 modified LCS remains an  affordable priority given other acquisition needs;  2.  Ensure that the Navy’s acquisition strategy for the modified LCS  does not place industrial base concerns ahead of demonstrating  the ship’s lethality, survivability, and affordability; and  3.  Require the Navy to solicit an independent technical assessment  from an organization like a ship classification society on the  survivability of the Independence variant seaframe and its ability  to meet its applicable requirements.
To ensure that the program has requirements that are testable and  measurable and to improve realism of LCS operational testing, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Navy to:  1.  Investigate resourcing and conducting more operationally  stressing SUW mission package testing onboard LCS, to include  testing in a clutter environment and diverse weather and tactical  scenarios to help ensure that the ships can operate effectively in  their intended environment.
In the classified version of this report, we make a separate  recommendation to the Secretary of the Navy related to defining a  currently vague SUW requirement that we redacted because it contained  classified information.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its  written comments, which are reprinted in appendix II of this report, DOD  concurred with two of our recommendations, partially concurred with two  others, and did not concur with one recommendation.
Regarding our first two recommendations, the department agreed that the  Secretary of Defense would ensure that the Navy has a sound acquisition  strategy moving forward procuring modified LCS and stated that the  Secretary will ensure that industrial base concerns are balanced against  cost, schedule and fleet requirements. Our draft report initially stated that  the Navy was planning to buy 19 modified LCS based on our reading of  the documentation available to us at that time. We have since updated  our draft to reflect 20 modified LCS as recommended by the Navy. In  addition, although DOD’s response is consistent with the intent of our  recommendations, the department indicates that it will conduct its review  of the Navy’s approach in advance of preparing the fiscal year 2017  budget. Given that fiscal year 2017 budget will be submitted in only a few  months, we are concerned that the Secretary might not have adequate  information prior to making funding decisions for the modified LCS. For  example, final survivability assessments for both variants will not be  issued until 2018—after acquisition decisions for the modified LCS are  planned. We will continue to monitor this issue as part of our ongoing  work on the Navy’s small surface combatant.
DOD did not concur with our recommendation to solicit an independent  technical assessment of the survivability of the Independence variant  from an organization such as a ship classification society, stating that  such an organization could not provide an independent look and would  not have the technical competence to perform a threat weapon-based  assessment of the survivability of any Navy ship. The intent of our  recommendation was for the Navy to solicit an independent assessment  of the structural damage sustained by LCS 2 during rough water trials— but not necessarily to assess the ability of the ship to sustain damage  from weapons. With that in mind, we suggested a ship classification  society as one option, but it is not the only option. The Navy could  contract with an independent naval architecture firm or create an internal  independent review board to assess the damage and identify a path  forward. We believe that ship classification societies would be a viable  option because they are not currently involved with the LCS program or  other Navy surface combatant acquisition programs. DOD stated that  soliciting such an evaluation by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)— a ship classification society—would not be an independent look because  both LCS seaframe variants were originally designed, built, and classed  to ABS standards. However, we note that the relationship between ABS  and the Navy ended in 2012. In addition, there are 11 other classification  societies that are members of the International Association of  Classification Societies. This Association states that classification  societies are independent, self-regulating, and externally audited and  have no commercial ownership in ship construction. Classification  societies inspect and assess the structure of ships to ensure safety and  adherence to standards, including after a ship sustains damage. Since  LCS 2 sustained damage and given the disagreements between the LCS  program office and its technical authority as to the cause of this damage,  we continue to believe that soliciting an independent third party is a  reasonable recommendation.
DOD concurred with our classified recommendation related to defining a  currently vague requirement and seeking Joint Requirements Oversight  Council validation before operational testing of the remaining SUW  mission package increments.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation related to funding  more operationally stressing operational tests to include clutter and  diverse weather and tactical scenarios. DOD stated that it will provide  sufficient test resources, but stated that it does not believe that testing  “every aspect” of weather and tactics is necessary. We agree that it is not  necessary to test every type of weather and tactical situation, and urge  DOD to ensure that testing identified by DOT&E is completed as  necessary to fully demonstrate the performance parameters that are  included in LCS test plans.
The Navy also separately provided over 80 technical comments on our  draft report. We reconciled the Navy’s technical comments with evidence  we had from discussions with, and documentation from, officials from the  Navy, DOT&E, and the Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation  Force. We requested additional documentation to support some of the  Navy’s comments. We incorporated the Navy’s comments as appropriate,  such as to provide additional context in the report, but in some cases the  Navy suggested changes or deletions that were not supported by the  preponderance of evidence or that were based on a difference of opinion  and not supported by fact. In those instances, we did not make the  suggested changes. In all, we incorporated many of the Navy’s comments  and, in doing so, found that the message of our report remained the  same.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and  other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at 202-512-4841 or mackinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of the report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: Although this report is dated December 2015, our findings are current as  of July 2015 to be consistent with a classified report issued in July 2015.
To identify the extent to which Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) survivability  and lethality requirements have changed over time, if at all, we analyzed  the LCS capability development documents (CDD) which dictate the  performance requirements for the ship and mission packages. We  analyzed both the Flight 0 CDD dated 2004 and the updated Flight 0+  revision dated 2010, and compared both of these CDDs to identify areas,  if any, where LCS requirements might have changed. We also reviewed  the Navy’s Required Operational Capabilities and Projected Operating  Environment for LCS Class Ships instruction, which stipulates where LCS  was to be employed. We analyzed the LCS build specifications for both  variants for Flight 0 and Flight 0+. To determine the extent to which the  warfighting concept of operations (CONOPS) continues to evolve, we  analyzed the two LCS warfighting concept of operations (2007 and 2011)  and spoke with an official from the Navy’s Fleet Forces Command  responsible for developing the third revision of the LCS warfighting  CONOPS. We attended a portion of the LCS wargame conducted in  March 2014. We also analyzed the CDDs for other Navy surface ships to  make comparisons with LCS requirements. We reviewed relevant Navy  policies stipulating general survivability and shock requirements for ships,  and interviewed Navy officials including from the Program Executive  Office for LCS for both the seaframes and the mission packages, and  obtained written responses from the Office of the Chief of Naval  Operations LCS branch. We also interviewed relevant DOT&E officials.
To assess the extent to which LCS meets its current survivability  requirements, we analyzed Navy and DOT&E test reports for both  developmental and operational test events on LCS and reviewed the LCS  test and evaluation master plan and the Navy’s Capstone Enterprise Air  Warfare Ship Self-Defense test and evaluation master plan. We analyzed  the LCS build specifications for both variants for Flight 0 and Flight 0+  ships, and reviewed relevant sections of the American Bureau of  Shipping’s Rules for Building and Classing Naval Vessels, which are the  technical rules that were used to guide development of the LCS designs.  We also analyzed the USS Independence Capabilities and Limitations  document (2010) and the USS Freedom Combat System Employment  Guide, as well as contractor-developed Vulnerability Analysis Reports  and Detail Design Integrated Survivability Assessment Reports, and Navy  instructions stipulating ship survivability requirements, including  OPNAVINST 9070.1, 9070.1A, and OPNAVINST 9072.2A. We reviewed  the Total Ship Survivability Trial test plan and also observed a portion of  this test conducted on USS Fort Worth. We reviewed various DOT&E  documents, including the Early Fielding Report for LCS, and operational  test results from anti-air warfare weapons on other ships. We also  analyzed the Navy’s USS Independence Seakeeping and Structural  Loads Trial Phase II report. We interviewed relevant Navy officials,  including from the Program Executive Office LCS for both the seaframes  and the mission packages; and Navy technical experts from the Naval  Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division and the Naval Research Lab  including technical warrant holders responsible for ship vulnerability and  shock tolerances. We obtained written responses from the Program  Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems. We also discussed  survivability and crew training issues with LCS Squadron One, Navy Fleet  Forces Command, and Navy Surface Forces Pacific officials.
To assess the extent to which LCS meets its current lethality  requirements, we limited our assessment to the lethality of core seaframe  and the SUW mission package because the MCM and ASW mission  bring no or little offensive capability packages and both rely on the core  seaframe systems for self-defense. The ASW mission package will carry  a helicopter that can drop torpedoes, but this system is a well  characterized capability that is currently used in the fleet, so we did not  assess the effectiveness of this system. Further, the Navy has yet to field  a production representative ASW mission package to evaluate. To assess  LCS’s performance, we analyzed Navy Commander, Operational Test  and Evaluation Force reports including the SUW initial operational test  and evaluation report, and Navy Surface Warfare Center Corona Division  test analysis reports from LCS developmental test events and DOT&E  reports. We reviewed the LCS Live Fire Test and Evaluation Management  Plan, and the Navy’s 57mm and 30mm ammunition Live Fire Test and  Evaluation Management Plans. We also analyzed the USS Independence  Capabilities and Limitations document (2010) and the USS Freedom  Combat System Employment Guide. We reviewed the Navy’s Damage  Control Book for LCS 3 and the LCS 1 Repair Party Manual. We also  interviewed relevant Navy officials, including from the Program Executive  Offices for LCS for both the seaframes and the mission packages; the  Naval Surface Warfare Center Corona Division; and Navy Commander of  Operational Test and Evaluation Force. We also interviewed relevant  DOT&E officials. We obtained written responses from the Office of the  Chief of Naval Operations LCS branch and from the Program Executive  Office Integrated Warfare Systems. We also reviewed the LCS 2 Special  Trial report.
To assess the recent decisions pertaining to upcoming changes to the  program in response to the Secretary of Defense’s concerns with LCS  lethality and survivability, we analyzed available Navy documentation on  the proposed modified LCS. We also met with the small surface  combatant study team. We were not provided with a copy of the study  team’s report in time to include an analysis of that document in this report.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2014 to July 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Diana Moldafsky (Assistant  Director), Greg Campbell, Laurier Fish, Laura Greifner, Kristine  Hassinger, C. James Madar, Kenneth Patton, John Rastler, Amie Steele,  Roxanna Sun, and Hai Tran made key contributions to this report.