DOE Contracting: Better Performance Measures and Management Needed to Address Delays in Awarding Contracts
Published: 2006-06-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Energy (DOE), the largest civilian contracting agency in the federal government, spends over 90 percent of its annual budget on contracts to operate its facilities and carry out its diverse missions. Federal law and regulations outline the steps DOE must follow in planning and carrying out the contract award process and emphasize the importance of awarding contracts in a timely manner. Several of DOE's recent contracts have taken much longer than anticipated to award. GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which DOE has experienced delays in awarding contracts and factors contributing to delays, (2) the impacts of any such delays, and (3) the extent to which DOE has taken steps to address the delays.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Delays in awarding DOE contracts occurred in most of the 31 contracts that GAO reviewed. In fiscal years 2002 through 2005, DOE awarded 131 contracts valued at $5 million or greater; the 31 of these contracts GAO reviewed were affiliated with DOE's three largest component organizations and represented about 73 percent of the dollars awarded. None of the 24 contracts awarded competitively was awarded by the date planned in DOE's schedule, with 23 of the contracts awarded between several weeks and 4-1/2 years later than the planned date. Of the 7 contracts awarded without competition, 6 were awarded on time or nearly so, with the remaining contract awarded 2 months late. Delays in awarding contracts occurred, in part, because DOE had to modify its approach after beginning the contract award process. At least some of the delays were avoidable, such as when DOE reworked contract awards to correct errors. Delays in awarding contracts could increase costs both to DOE and companies competing for DOE work. Because the department does not track its costs for awarding contracts, it was not feasible to quantify the impact of these delays. Companies competing for DOE's work may also face increased costs when contract awards are delayed, such as the costs associated with ensuring that key personnel identified in proposals continue to be available. Increased costs and delays may affect the willingness of companies to compete for future DOE work, although the actual impact is unknown. Until recently, DOE had not been addressing delays in awarding contracts because incomplete performance data indicated that most of the contracts were awarded in a timely manner. In late 2005, DOE began several efforts to improve its contract award process, including implementing improved measures of contract award timeliness and restructuring the Office of Environmental Management to strengthen management of the contracting process. However, two concerns could limit the effectiveness of these efforts: (1) the efforts do not encompass all of DOE's contract awards and (2) DOE does not have a systematic method of identifying and disseminating lessons learned and best practices from past or current contract awards.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Energy (DOE), the largest civilian contracting agency in  the federal government, spends over 90 percent of its annual budget on  contracts to operate its laboratories, production facilities, and  environmental restoration sites. In fiscal year 2005, DOE spent  approximately $22.9 billion on contracts for mission-related activities such  as maintaining the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile, cleaning up  radioactive and hazardous wastes, and conducting complex scientific  research; and for mission-support activities such as purchase of computer  equipment and maintenance and repair of buildings. Almost 90 percent of  these fiscal year 2005 contracting dollars—or about 80 percent of DOE’s  entire budget—were directed to DOE’s “facility management contractors”  that carry out most of the department’s mission-related activities.
For over a decade, GAO, DOE’s Office of Inspector General, and others  have criticized DOE’s contracting practices, particularly for inadequate  management and oversight, and for failure to hold its contractors  accountable for results. The poor performance of DOE’s contractors has  led to schedule delays and cost increases on many of the department’s  major projects. Since 1990, such problems have led us to designate DOE  contract management—defined broadly to include both contract  administration and management of major projects—as a high-risk area for  fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.
DOE’s contracting activities are governed by federal law and regulations,  including the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the Department of Energy  Acquisition Regulation. These regulations and related DOE guidance  outline the steps that should be followed in planning and carrying out the  process of awarding its contracts. Furthermore, federal law generally  requires that federal agencies use full and open competition in selecting a  contractor, as part of the process for ensuring the best value to the  government. However, there are certain exceptions to this requirement,  such as an urgent need to obtain the goods or services, when DOE may  award a contract without full and open competition.
Awarding competitive contracts includes a series of required steps that  generally involve planning the contract award process, soliciting proposals  from private companies and/or public organizations, and evaluating those  proposals to select the company that will provide the goods or services at  the best value to the government. Planning the contract award process  generally involves identifying needed goods or services and the best  approach for obtaining them. DOE guidance generally requires a formal  written plan for carrying out this process for contracts valued at $5 million  or greater. The plan must describe the overall strategy for obtaining the  goods or services, including the planned approach for soliciting and  evaluating proposals. Key decisions outlined in the plan include whether to  target the solicitation to small businesses and what factors to consider in  evaluating proposals submitted by companies.
Although federal regulations do not specify how long the contract award  process should take, the regulations state that the purpose of planning the  contract award process is to ensure that the government obtains the  needed goods or services in the most effective, economical, and timely  manner. Therefore, written plans for carrying out the award process must  include milestones for completing the steps in the process, such as when  the agency plans to solicit and evaluate proposals and make the award.  Developing and adhering to these schedules can help ensure that the  department conducts the process efficiently and can help companies make  informed business decisions regarding the allocation of their resources and  whether to compete for a contract.
In addition to specifying how the contract award process should be carried  out, the laws and regulations that govern contracting with the federal  government are designed to ensure that federal contracts are awarded  fairly. On occasion, companies that bid on government contracts may  believe that a contract has been or is about to be awarded improperly.  These companies may attempt to informally resolve concerns with the  contracting officer, file a protest with the federal agency awarding the  contract, or file a formal bid protest with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims  or GAO. In deciding bid protests, the essential issue is whether the agency  making the award has complied with federal laws and regulations that  govern contracting.
Several of DOE’s recent contract awards have taken much longer than  anticipated and have been subject to bid protests. In this context, you  asked us to review how DOE plans for and carries out its contract awards.  This report discusses (1) the extent to which DOE adhered to its planned  dates for awarding contracts and the factors contributing to any delays, (2)  the impacts of any delays in awarding contracts, and (3) the extent to  which DOE has taken steps to address delays in its contract award process.
To determine DOE’s timeliness in awarding its contracts and the factors  contributing to delays, we analyzed file documents from a nonprobability  sample of contracts valued at $5 million or greater that DOE awarded  during fiscal years 2002 through 2005. To obtain this sample, we selected  contracts for goods and services that were awarded by DOE’s three largest  component organizations—the Offices of Environmental Management and  Science and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)—and  from field locations with high levels of contracting activity. The contracts  sampled from these field locations comprised about 73 percent of total  contracting dollars for new awards of $5 million or greater during fiscal  years 2002 through 2005. To determine whether the contract awards had  been delayed, we compared the planned award date specified in DOE’s  schedule for awarding the contract with the date the contract was actually  awarded. Federal regulations stress the importance of timeliness in  awarding contracts, but do not establish specific timeliness standards or  measures. Therefore, we used adherence to the milestones established in  the written plan as a consistent measure of timeliness and one indicator of  how well the contract award process was being managed. To determine the  overall length of time for a contract award, we generally compared the date  the written plan for the contract award was approved with the date that the  contract was awarded. For the contracts included in our sample for review,  we also obtained and analyzed information on bid protests filed with GAO.
To determine the extent to which DOE has taken steps to address any  delays, we interviewed officials at DOE headquarters and six of the field  locations that were involved in contract awards. In addition, we reviewed  agency policies and guidance on its contract award process, as well as  documentation on any efforts to improve the process. A more detailed  description of our scope and methodology is presented in appendix I. We  performed our work between July 2005 and June 2006 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOE has numerous sites and facilities around the country where the  department carries out its missions, including developing, maintaining, and  securing the nation’s nuclear weapons capability; cleaning up the nuclear  and hazardous wastes resulting from more than 50 years of weapons  production; and conducting basic energy and scientific research, such as  mapping the human genome. DOE relies on contractors to operate its  facilities and accomplish its missions. This mission work is carried out  under the direction of NNSA and DOE’s program offices, including the  Offices of Environmental Management and Science.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation provides the basic guidelines that all  federal agencies must follow in planning for and carrying out the process  for awarding contracts. DOE, like most federal agencies, has supplemental  regulations that it has set forth in the Department of Energy Acquisition  Regulation to recognize requirements unique to the department, such as  maintaining nuclear safety and security. Furthermore, in the mid-1990s,  DOE’s Office of Procurement and Assistance Management developed the  DOE Acquisition Guide that provides further information on contract  award planning activities, including meeting federal requirements for  competition, establishing evaluation criteria, and selecting the appropriate  contract type.
In planning and carrying out competition and award of contracts, there are  three main phases, and each phase generally includes several steps.
Planning. This phase involves identifying the mission need for the  contract, alternatives for obtaining the goods or services, estimated  costs, and any program or technical risks. Federal regulations state that  the agency should use an integrated team approach—involving all  personnel responsible for significant aspects of the contract award  process—to developing the plan and associated milestone schedule. The  plan should also identify the appropriate contract type for the work,  considering the alternatives and risks. In addition, a selection official is  designated, and an evaluation board is formed to carry out the contract  award process.
Developing the solicitation. Generally, the evaluation board, with input  from technical and other advisors, develops a statement of work for the  contract and criteria that will be used to evaluate proposals submitted  by companies. During this phase, DOE may also do market research to  determine if sources capable of meeting the agency’s needs exist.  Finally, DOE issues the request for proposals that describes the work to  be done, provides instructions to companies on how and when to submit  their proposals, and describes the criteria that will be used to evaluate  the proposals and select a contractor.
Evaluating proposals and awarding the contract. Once proposals are  received, the evaluation board evaluates the proposals against the  established criteria. Evaluation criteria may differ for each contract, but  generally include factors such as a company’s proposed technical  approach; past performance on DOE, other federal agency, and  commercial contracts; the proposed cost; and the qualifications of the  key personnel identified in the proposal. During this phase, DOE may  determine that it is necessary to hold discussions with individual  companies about issues raised during the evaluation of their proposals.  Based on a written report of the evaluation board that outlines the  strengths and weaknesses of each proposal, the selection official should  select a proposal that represents the best value for the government. The  DOE contracting officer, who has generally provided contracting  support to the evaluation team, then awards the contract.
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 provides statutory authority for  GAO to decide cases involving bid protests. GAO’s bid protest decisions  address specific allegations raised by unsuccessful companies claiming  that particular contracting actions were contrary to federal laws and  regulations. A bid protest may be filed by an “interested party,” defined as  an actual or prospective bidder or offeror with a direct economic interest in  the contract. Unless the protest is dismissed at the outset because it is  procedurally or substantively defective, such as if the protest was not filed  in a timely manner, the contracting agency is required to file a report with  GAO responding to the protest. GAO will consider the facts and legal issues  raised and is required to resolve the protest not later than 100 days from the  date the protest was filed, either by sustaining the protest and  recommending that the agency take corrective action, or by denying or  dismissing the protest.
DOE’s Office of Procurement and Assistance Management and NNSA’s  Office of Acquisition and Supply Management establish policies and  guidance for awarding contracts according to federal and departmental  regulations. Officials from DOE’s programs, such as NNSA and the Offices  of Environmental Management and Science, usually manage the contract  planning and award process since they are most knowledgeable about the  work needed and are ultimately responsible for managing the work and  overseeing the contracts. Other organizations within DOE work with the  program officials to plan and carry out the contract award process by  providing contracting, legal, and technical advice and assistance. DOE’s  Offices of General Counsel and Procurement and Assistance Management  review, evaluate, and approve key documents during the entire process,  such as the initial plan for the contract award process and the request for  proposals.
section_title: Delays Occurred in Most of the Contract Awards We Reviewed
paragraphs: Most of DOE’s 31 contract awards that we reviewed experienced delays  when comparing the planned and actual award dates for the contracts. The  24 contracts awarded with competition faced delays of months to years; of  the 7 contracts awarded without competition, 6 were awarded on time or  nearly so. Delays occurred throughout the contract award process due to  factors such as time spent repeating steps of the process to resolve a  company’s formal protest, or because of unanticipated complications that  affected DOE’s ability to adhere to the planned schedule.
subsections: section_title: DOE Experienced Delays of Months to Years in Awarding Its Contracts
paragraphs: For the 31 contracts we reviewed, most were awarded months to years  after the planned award date. To determine whether contract awards were  delayed, we compared the planned award date with the date DOE actually  made the award. None of the 24 competitive contracts we reviewed was  awarded according to DOE’s planned schedule, and nearly all were delayed  by months or years. Only 1 of these competitive contract awards was made  within 1 month of the planned award date. The remaining awards  experienced more lengthy delays of from 2 months to over 2 years. In  contrast, delays were less prevalent among the noncompetitive contract  awards included in our sample. Six of these 7 contracts were awarded on  time or within 1 month of the planned award date. The other contract was  awarded 2 months late. (See fig. 1.)
While the sample of contract awards reviewed did not allow us to generalize to all of DOE’s  contract awards, they represent about 73 percent of the department’s total contracting  dollars for awards of $5 million or greater during fiscal years 2002 through 2005. Further  information on our scope and methodology is presented in appendix I. eliminate parts of the process in which delays typically occurred on the  competitively awarded contracts we reviewed. For example, for a  noncompetitively awarded contract, DOE would not need to evaluate  multiple proposals because it had already identified a company with the  qualifications and experience necessary to perform the work. DOE  generally awarded the seven contracts we reviewed without competition  because of an urgent need to obtain the goods and services and to ensure  that the contractors could start work quickly. This is consistent with one of  the exceptions to the requirement for full and open competition allowed by  federal regulations. Nevertheless, since federal regulations generally  require that agencies use full and open competition, the contracts awarded  competitively better reflect the timeliness of DOE’s overall contract award  process.
The schedules for the contract awards we reviewed showed that DOE  planned to take from about 1 month to up to 2 years to award its contracts.  Variation in the length of the planned schedule may depend on several  characteristics of the contract award process, such as whether or not the  contract was awarded competitively or noncompetitively, the dollar value  of the award, or the complexity of the work. DOE officials indicated that  facility management contracts tend to be more complex and, therefore, can  take longer and could be more prone to delay, but we found some facility  management contract awards were less delayed than some smaller dollar  value, more straightforward contract awards. For example, the $4.8 billion  facility management contract to operate the Idaho National Laboratory  took just over 1 year to award and was delayed about 4 months, while a $5  million administrative support services contract at the Savannah River site  took almost 2 years to award and was awarded 1-1/2 years later than the  planned award date.
section_title: Delays Occurred Because DOE Had to Modify Its Approach after Beginning the Contract Award Process
paragraphs: Delays in awarding contracts occurred when DOE modified its approach  after the start of the contract award process. DOE frequently had to modify  its approach to take corrective action in response to bid protests, or  because DOE took more time than planned to evaluate proposals, hold  discussions with companies that had submitted proposals, or obtain  headquarters approval for key documents.
Taking corrective action due to bid protests. One cause of delay for DOE’s  contract awards was the time the department spent reworking portions of  the process in response to companies that filed bid protests with GAO.  Companies generally filed protests because they believed that DOE had  violated federal acquisition regulations in carrying out the contract award  process, most typically in evaluating or soliciting proposals. Rework in  response to a bid protest was initiated in one of two ways: (1) GAO found  fundamental flaws in the contract award process, sustained the company’s  protest, and recommended that DOE take corrective action or (2) DOE  initiated corrective action after conducting an assessment of the validity of  the company’s protest, without waiting for a formal GAO decision. In either  case, rework can include canceling or revising the solicitation, reevaluating  proposals, or accepting proposals from firms that were previously  excluded from the competition.
Rework resulting from corrective action can significantly delay the  contract award. For the 31 contracts we reviewed, 10 resulted in bid  protests filed with GAO. Protests on 8 of these were denied or dismissed by  GAO, or withdrawn by the protestor. DOE agreed to take corrective action  on the remaining 2, once as a result of a protest being sustained by GAO,  and once before GAO issued a decision. Delays due to such corrective  action added up to 2 years to the contract award process. For example, a  contract worth $1.6 billion to clean up the River Corridor area at DOE’s  Hanford, Washington, site was delayed more than 1-1/2 years while DOE  took corrective action in response to a bid protest. GAO sustained a bid  protest on the initial award because DOE failed to properly apply its  criteria for evaluating the cost proposals. In response, DOE revised and  reissued the solicitation, evaluated new proposals, and selected a new  contractor about 2-1/2 years after the initial planned award date. In  another example, a NNSA contract award for administrative support  services was delayed almost 2 years when NNSA took corrective action in  response to a bid protest. Corrective action involved revising and reissuing  the solicitation. However, the NNSA evaluation board then had difficulties  completing cost evaluations of the revised proposals, adding more time to  the process, and finally awarded contracts to all three companies almost 2  years later than the planned award date.
Evaluating proposals. DOE generally estimated between 1 and 6 months to  review and evaluate proposals for its competitive contract awards.  However, for the 24 competitively awarded contracts we reviewed, it took  on average 5 months longer than planned for this part of the process,  accounting for over half of the overall delay in carrying out the process. For  example, DOE was planning to award multiple contracts to provide  environmental remediation and deactivation of facilities across the DOE  complex. DOE estimated that it would receive about 20 proposals and  allowed about 3 months for evaluating the proposals and selecting the  contractors. The department actually received more than 100 proposals  and was delayed over 9 months, in part, due to the amount of additional  time required to review the larger than expected number of proposals. In  another example, the Savannah River Operations Office allowed about 8  weeks to evaluate proposals for an administrative support services  contract at the site. However, the evaluation board encountered several  difficulties during the evaluation process, including concerns about the  wide range of the cost estimates in the proposals. These concerns  necessitated a more detailed cost evaluation, resulting in the evaluation  taking 5 months longer than planned.
Holding discussions with companies submitting proposals. For eight of  the contracts we reviewed, DOE had to modify its approach to holding  discussions. In some cases, the planned schedule did not include any time  for discussions and, in other cases, the time DOE took to discuss proposals  with the companies submitting them exceeded the time estimated in the  plan. For these contracts, actual time to discuss proposals exceeded the  planned time by an average of 3 months. For example, two contracts for  conceptual design of a waste processing facility at the Savannah River site  were awarded 4 months late because DOE initially intended to make the  contract awards without discussions and, therefore, did not plan time in  the original schedule for this part of the process. However, after the  contracting process was under way, the department decided it was  necessary to conduct discussions on the proposals because none of the  companies had provided all of the cost and pricing data necessary to fully  evaluate the proposals. Similarly, a contract for medical services for the  Hanford site was delayed more than 5 months, in part because the  department held discussions with companies concerning their cost  proposals and technical approach but did not plan for this activity in the  schedule.
Obtaining headquarters approval of key documents. Awarding of DOE  contracts was also delayed due to obtaining headquarters approval of key  documents. In five contract awards we reviewed, delays in obtaining the  required review and approval from DOE headquarters officials caused an  average 5-month delay in contract award. For example, for a contract to  manage and operate DOE’s Berkeley National Laboratory, DOE allowed 1  month for headquarters review and approval of the draft solicitation.  However, headquarters review and approval took 5 months, partly due to  the complexities of competing a contract that had been in place for  decades. As a result, the contract award was 4 months late. In another  example, the Oak Ridge Operations Office allowed 1 month for  headquarters review and approval of a solicitation for a contract for  medical isotope production. However, headquarters review and  concurrence took about 1 year longer than anticipated because of  additional requests for information from the Congress on DOE’s strategy  for going forward with the work under this contract. Overall, the contract  award was delayed nearly 2 years due to this lengthy review and the need  for extensive discussions during the evaluation phase with companies that  had submitted proposals.
It is unclear the extent to which these delays in awarding contracts were  avoidable. At times, delays in the process appeared to be outside DOE’s  control and, therefore, more difficult to anticipate and manage, such as  difficulty obtaining funding or to address concerns raised by the Congress  or other stakeholders. For example, a $562 million contract for facilities  and services to stabilize the department’s depleted uranium hexafluoride  inventory at Portsmouth and Paducah was delayed after the Office of  Management and Budget, late in the process, raised concerns about the  need to build facilities at both locations. Dealing with this issue contributed  to the delay of the contract award. While external factors such as this can  impact the planned schedule, some delays are clearly avoidable, such as  when DOE had to take corrective action in response to bid protests  because the department failed to follow its contract award process. In such  cases, better management and oversight of the contract award process  would provide opportunities for improvement. According to the Director of  DOE’s Office of Procurement and Assistance Management, DOE cannot  plan for all possible events when developing a schedule for a contract  award process and must respond to changing circumstances and  incorporate additional steps into the award process when necessary.
section_title: Delays in Awarding Contracts Could Increase Costs to the Government and Industry and Affect Future Competition
paragraphs: Delays in awarding contracts could increase costs both to DOE and the  companies that are competing for the potential contracts and could also  affect whether companies are willing to compete for DOE contracts in the  future. Specifically, awarding a contract months or years after the date  anticipated in the contract award schedule could increase the overall costs  to the government. DOE staff involved in a contract award may include  officials from the program offices, such as the Offices of Environmental  Management or Science; contracting and legal specialists; and nuclear  safety and regulatory experts. Both salary and travel costs associated with  keeping these integrated teams together for the duration of the contract  award process can be significant. However, these costs cannot be readily  quantified since the department does not accumulate or track the costs  associated with individual contract awards. Nevertheless, DOE officials  acknowledge that there may be additional costs associated with contract  awards that are delayed. The added time and resources spent on delayed  contract awards may impact the department’s ability to meet its  management and oversight responsibilities, including planning for and  carrying out other contract awards.
According to DOE officials, prolonged delays in awarding contracts could  also increase costs for companies that are submitting proposals.  Companies competing for DOE contracts invest considerable time and  resources in developing their proposals. However, since companies  generally consider their proposal costs to be proprietary information, we  could not quantify those costs. For DOE’s contracts, once companies  submit proposals, DOE generally requires the companies to ensure that key  personnel identified in the proposals continue to be available until the  award decision has been made. If a contract award is delayed, companies  may have to keep key personnel available for months or even years, which  could increase their costs and/or represent a possible lost opportunity to  the companies since those key personnel may not be available for other  work. For example, our review of file documents found that several small  businesses competing for a contract to provide infrastructure services at  DOE’s Paducah, Kentucky, site expressed frustration over the costs of  keeping key personnel available while DOE took nearly 1 year after the  planned award date to complete the process and award the contract.
The length of time and increased costs to carry out a contract award may  also discourage some companies from competing for DOE work, thus  potentially affecting the extent of competition in the future. Ensuring  adequate competition for contracts can help obtain the best value for the  government. According to DOE officials who oversee the contracting  process, they have not seen a decline in the number of companies willing to  compete for DOE’s contracts, but the officials agree that this is a potential  concern, and it has been a concern in the past. For example, a January 2001  report that analyzed the contractor base for DOE’s environmental cleanup  work stated that the number of companies that were both willing and able  to compete for major remediation contracts had declined over the past  several years. The report concluded, among other things, that promoting  competition among a large number of qualified companies was crucial to  getting the best value for the government and accomplishing the  environmental cleanup mission. Therefore, anything that could reduce the  pool of potential companies competing for DOE’s work, such as an  inefficient contract award process, would not be in the department’s best  interest of fostering full and open competition for its work.
section_title: Efforts to Address the Causes of Delays Are in Early Stages, but Concerns Remain about the Potential Effectiveness of DOE’s Planned Actions
paragraphs: When we began our review in July 2005, DOE officials generally were not  addressing delays in awarding contracts because DOE’s data was showing  that its contracts were being awarded in a timely manner. However, since  late 2005, DOE has been implementing three main efforts to improve its  contracting, partly in response to criticism by GAO and others. These  efforts include (1) an initiative to address the DOE contracting weaknesses  that led GAO to designate the area as high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, or  mismanagement; (2) a plan to restructure DOE’s Office of Environmental  Management to focus more attention on the contract award process; and  (3) steps by NNSA and DOE’s Office of Procurement and Assistance  Management to improve performance measures on the timeliness of  contract awards. While these improvement efforts appear to be  constructive and may also help to address delays in awarding contracts, we  have two remaining concerns related to the timeliness of DOE’s contract  awards. First, the efforts do not reflect a comprehensive approach within  the department to improve the timeliness of contract awards. Second, even  if DOE uses improved performance data to identify the causes of delays in  awarding its contracts, the department does not have a systematic method  to develop and disseminate best practices and lessons learned.
subsections: section_title: DOE Was Not Addressing Delays Because Incomplete Performance Data Indicated Contracts Were Awarded in a Timely Manner
paragraphs: When we began our work in July 2005, DOE officials generally were not  taking steps to address the causes of delays in awarding contracts. One of  the main reasons for this was that DOE’s performance data was generally  showing its contracts were being awarded in a timely manner. Although our  analysis uncovered delays in most of the 31 contract awards valued at $5  million or greater from fiscal years 2002 through 2005 that we reviewed,  DOE’s performance data for the same period showed that most of its  contract awards were timely. For example, the data for fiscal years 2003  and 2004 showed that, respectively, 88 and 86 percent of the contract  awards were timely. According to DOE’s performance measures, a timely  award meant that DOE had awarded the contracts within 150 days after  receiving proposals from companies. An official from the Office of  Procurement and Assistance Management who manages the performance  data said that the department used 150 days as a timeliness standard  because it represented a realistic yet challenging time frame for awarding  the contracts.
However, DOE’s performance data did not provide a complete picture of  the department’s timeliness in awarding its contracts for two reasons. First,  the data for those years did not include all of the contract award process.  Instead, the performance data DOE used measured only the timeliness in  carrying out the final stage of the process (the evaluation phase), from the  point at which DOE received the proposals through contract award.  Consequently, the performance data excluded the earlier steps of the  process, from planning the contract award through the process of soliciting  proposals from interested companies. For the 24 competitively awarded  contracts valued at $5 million or greater we reviewed, the excluded steps  accounted for over half of the total time that DOE typically spent awarding  its contracts. As a result, some of DOE’s contract awards may appear  timely, when, in fact, DOE awarded the contracts weeks or months after  the planned award date. For example, in fiscal year 2003, DOE awarded a  contract for laundry services at the Hanford site in Washington about 2  months after its planned award date. However, DOE considered the  contract award to have been timely because the department was able to  award the contract within 150 days of receiving proposals.
Officials from the Office of Procurement and Assistance Management said  DOE’s timeliness data are intended to measure the performance of  contracting staff. Therefore, the officials said that the timeliness measure  includes only the evaluation phase of the contract award process because  that is the aspect of the process that would more likely be under the direct  control of the contracting staff. Prior to the evaluation phase, officials said  that contracting staff generally rely on program staff to develop key  information, such as a description of the work to be carried out under the  contract. Furthermore, according to DOE’s guidance, program office staff  are generally responsible for planning the contract award process.  However, we found that DOE’s contracting staff were generally involved  throughout the entire contract award process as part of an integrated team  approach. Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent contracting staff have  direct control over any phase of the process.
Second, DOE’s performance data were incomplete because data on DOE’s  facility management contracts were excluded. For example, in fiscal year  2005, DOE competitively awarded seven facility management contracts  valued at a total of about $10.4 billion. However, DOE excluded the data on  these facility management contracts from its performance measures for  timeliness. DOE officials from the Office of Procurement and Assistance  Management said they excluded the facility management contracts from  the department’s performance data because those contracts are  particularly complicated to award. Unlike the contracts included in the  performance measures for timeliness, the department could not determine  an appropriate timeliness standard for the facility management contracts.  As a result of excluding the facility management contracts, the  performance data for fiscal year 2005 did not reflect the department’s  timeliness in awarding about 97 percent of the nearly $11 billion in  contracts that the department awarded that year.
In contrast to DOE’s approach, we measured the department’s timeliness in  awarding its contracts by comparing the planned award dates with the  dates DOE actually awarded the contracts. We used the planned award  date as the standard for determining whether contracts were awarded in a  timely manner, rather than comparing the time it took DOE to award the  contract after proposals were received with a fixed standard, such as 150  days. A fixed standard is arbitrary because the actual time needed to carry  out a contract award process can differ greatly for legitimate reasons,  depending on the circumstances of each individual contract award.  Furthermore, in doing so, we included the facility management contracts  because those contracts can represent a significant portion of the total  value of DOE’s contract awards.
section_title: DOE Recently Began Three Main Efforts to Improve Its Process for Awarding Contracts
paragraphs: Since late 2005, DOE has initiated three new efforts to improve its  contracting processes. DOE is implementing these actions as part of its  continuing efforts to improve its contracting processes and, in part,  because of long-standing criticisms by GAO and others. Since 1990, GAO  has designated DOE’s contract management, including project  management, as an area at high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and  mismanagement. Our reviews have uncovered weaknesses in DOE’s  management and oversight of its contracts which, in some cases, have  undermined DOE’s ability to carry out its missions or dramatically  increased its costs. More recently, criticisms have included the frequency  of delays in awarding contracts and the need for reforms. For example, in  congressional testimony in November 2005 and March 2006, the Assistant  Secretary for Environmental Management cited the need for improvements  in the department’s contract award practices. Furthermore, conferences on  DOE environmental cleanup issues held in February and October 2005 and  attended by DOE and contractor officials included presentations calling for  a reevaluation of DOE’s contract award process.
DOE’s recent efforts to improve its contracting include the following:  Initiative to address DOE’s high-risk contracting practices. In  November 2005, DOE drafted a plan aimed at improving the  department’s contract and project management, including management  of the contract award process. DOE developed the plan in response to  an effort by the Office of Management and Budget that requires agencies  to address areas identified by GAO as high risk for fraud, waste, abuse,  or mismanagement. Actions included in the plan to improve the contract  award process include conducting better oversight of the planning  process, maximizing competition for contracts, and ensuring that  contracts allow DOE to properly hold contractors accountable for their  performance. To date, DOE has developed performance measures and  targets for the focus areas in its action plan, as well as target dates for  implementing the plan. As part of this initiative, in February 2006, DOE  began to increase the frequency of training for new evaluation boards  and selection officials and to provide this training at the beginning of the  planning process. Although this plan does not specifically address the  timeliness of contract awards, the overall effort to improve contracting  and project management could help identify and address underlying  causes for delays in awarding contracts.
Initiative to restructure DOE’s Office of Environmental Management.
Also in late 2005, the Assistant Secretary for Environmental  Management announced plans to restructure the headquarters-based  administrative functions within his program office. According to  officials in the Office of Environmental Management, the reorganization  is aimed, in part, at improving contract and project management by  bringing these functions together under a new Deputy Assistant  Secretary for Acquisition and Project Management. As the  reorganization is implemented, the Office of Environmental  Management, at the request of a congressional subcommittee, has also  commissioned the National Academy of Public Administration to  undertake a general management review of the program, including  reviewing the program office’s policies and processes for awarding  contracts and providing advice on improving their effectiveness. As the  study progresses, DOE will receive interim reports and  recommendations on how to implement the reorganization and increase  its effectiveness, which may also result in improving the timeliness of  contract awards.
Initiative to improve performance data on contract timeliness. NNSA  and DOE are implementing separate efforts to help them track contract  awards against the planned dates for carrying out the process. NNSA’s  effort is focused on a recently implemented data system that will help its  contracting staff track ongoing contract awards against a detailed  schedule of milestones. The requirement to input a detailed milestone  schedule at the beginning of the contract award process applies to all of  NNSA’s contracts, regardless of their dollar value. As staff carry out the  process, the system will record the dates on which key steps were  completed and document any delays from the schedule. The system also  allows the contracting officials to generate reports on the status of  ongoing contract awards, as well as analyze data on existing contract  awards for evidence of systemic delays or other problems. As of April  2006, the data system was operational, and NNSA contracting officials  have started using this milestone information to manage ongoing  contract awards.
Similarly, in March 2006, DOE’s Office of Procurement and Assistance  Management began implementing plans to track the timeliness of DOE’s  facility management or other high-visibility contracts against a detailed  milestone schedule. According to the Director of the Office of  Procurement and Assistance Management, representatives from his  office, as well as other department officials responsible for awarding  facility management contracts, will work to develop a realistic, but  challenging, milestone schedule for carrying out the award process.
According to the Director, revised DOE guidance will recommend that  planning for a new facility management contract should begin no later  than 2 years prior to the expiration of an existing contract. Once the  milestone schedule has been established, his office will then track the  contract award process to compare planned and actual key dates and  provide monthly updates to the Deputy Secretary. As of April 2006, DOE  had established schedules for the current and upcoming facility  management contract awards, began monitoring the progress against  those schedules, and began submitting monthly status reports to the  Deputy Secretary.
DOE’s efforts to improve its contracting are generally in the early stages of  being planned or implemented, and not all of the efforts specifically  address the timeliness of contract awards. Nevertheless, we believe these  initiatives are a constructive step towards addressing long-standing  weaknesses in the department’s contracting and improving its contract  awards. As the department addresses the weaknesses and takes steps to  improve its contracting, improved efficiency and effectiveness could also  result in fewer delays in awarding contracts. However, as discussed below,  we are concerned that the efforts may fall short in two main respects,  which could limit the department’s effectiveness in improving the  timeliness of contract awards.
section_title: Lack of a Comprehensive Approach to Improvement Efforts and Inconsistent Practices for Communicating Lessons Learned May Limit the Effectiveness of DOE’s Efforts
paragraphs: Standards for a well-functioning contract award process come from federal  acquisition regulations and GAO’s framework for assessing the process at  federal agencies. The framework integrates the views of federal  government and industry experts on the characteristics and practices of a  well-functioning contract award and management process, and it draws  upon decades of experience within GAO in analyzing contracts and  contracting organizations. Among the standards for a well-functioning  contract award process set forth by the framework and regulations are that  federal agencies should use knowledge from prior contract awards to  assess the effectiveness of the contracting process and, in the interest of  continuous improvement, have a systematic means for instituting best  practices and lessons learned. DOE’s improvement initiatives, as they apply  to the timeliness of contract awards, appear to fall short in both respects.
First, DOE has not ensured that the efforts to develop better data on the  timeliness of contract awards will include all of the department’s contract  awards that require a written plan and schedule. While DOE and NNSA’s  efforts to develop better timeliness data will include all of the department’s  facility management contracts, as well as NNSA’s other contract awards,  the rest of DOE’s contracts may not be included. This could be a  considerable portion of DOE’s contracts valued at $5 million or greater. For  example, of the contracts that the department awarded in fiscal years 2002  through 2005, nearly one-quarter of the total contract value, or $3.9 billion,  may not have been included in DOE’s improvement efforts. These contracts  may be excluded because they were neither facility management contracts,  other DOE high-visibility contracts, nor contracts awarded by NNSA. The  Director of DOE’s Office of Procurement and Assistance Management said  that the tracking against milestone schedules includes only contracts that  represent significant risk or are critical to carrying out DOE’s programs or  missions. For example, the contracts that are currently being tracked  include facility management contracts, other large cleanup contracts, and  contracts that may also be of particular interest to headquarters, such as  those for guard services. The Director added that it is not the intent of this  effort to monitor the progress of all ongoing contract awards of $5 million  or greater, and that he would expect contracting officers in the field  locations to be accountable for contracts within their approval authority.  Nevertheless, we believe that efforts to develop better timeliness data  should include all contracts valued at $5 million or greater because DOE  guidance generally requires written plans and schedules for these  contracts.
Second, the department has neither had a systematic approach for  instituting best practices or lessons learned in its contract award process,  nor is it clear that the department’s efforts will result in a more systematic  approach in the future. As DOE develops better data on the timeliness of its  contract awards and analyzes the data to identify and address systemic  problems or underlying causes of delays, the department will be developing  useful information that could help ensure that future contract awards  benefit from the best practices or lessons learned. Moreover, federal  regulations require agencies to have a process for ensuring that lessons  learned are developed and used in planning future contract awards.
Based on federal regulations and GAO’s framework, standards for a well- functioning contract award process would include a systematic approach  for identifying and communicating lessons learned and best practices. Such  an approach would include activities such as routinely evaluating  performance data across a broad range of contracts to identify the extent  to which the contract award process went well or encountered problems.  In doing so, DOE would then look for trends or systemic problems and  investigate the underlying causes. A systematic approach would also  include a mechanism to ensure this information is readily available, in  order to help officials who plan and carry out contract awards do so more  efficiently.
We did find some examples in which best practices and lessons learned  were identified and in some cases shared within the department, but we did  not find a systematic approach for doing so. For example, in a recent DOE  evaluation of the problems that occurred in awarding contracts for  environmental cleanup and infrastructure services at its facilities in  Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky, DOE’s review confirmed that  poor planning and management of the process caused delays of 6 months  to 1 year in awarding the contracts. Some of the factors mentioned were  lack of timely management direction in key areas, a lengthy headquarters  review and approval process, and unrealistic schedules for the awards.  However, DOE concluded that the factors leading to the delays were not  typical for DOE’s contracts and did not represent a systemic problem.  Therefore, DOE did not communicate the information as a systemic  problem. In contrast, our analysis of 31 contracts valued at $5 million or  greater indicated that these types of causes for delays were commonplace.
In addition, best practices or lessons learned have been communicated at  training sessions and presentations to staff carrying out contract awards,  such as those offered by DOE’s Office of General Counsel. According to the  DOE attorney who has led a number of them, the sessions are generally  aimed at helping staff carry out the contract award process effectively and  in accordance with federal regulations and DOE guidance. This may  increase the department’s ability to avoid successful bid protests. Best  practices or lessons learned have also been shared at annual procurement  directors’ conferences held for officials who oversee the contract award  process, with the most recent conference in October 2005 covering topics  such as proper documentation of decisions made during the contract  award process.
However, several DOE officials that were responsible for contract awards  said that these best practices or lessons learned were not consistently  available or may have come too late in the planning for the contract award  to be very beneficial. The officials added that there was no centralized  source within DOE for best practices, but they could obtain lessons learned  by contacting others within the department who had recently awarded  contracts. For example, an official from the Office of Environmental  Management said that, in planning the contract award process for DOE’s  Savannah River site near Aiken, South Carolina, she traveled to DOE’s  offices in Idaho Falls to meet with officials there who had just awarded  contracts for environmental cleanup at the site, and management and  operation of the Idaho National Laboratory. While she said the meetings  were beneficial and she obtained lessons learned documents, she saw this  process as the only way to obtain best practices or lessons learned from  those contract awards. As another example, this same DOE official  conducted a recent contract award process, and said she would have  benefited from early training on how to properly document decisions made  while evaluating the proposals that were submitted. She added that the  training was not made readily available, and it was not mandatory. After  submitting draft documents for headquarters review, she eventually  received helpful information on how to improve the documentation, but  this would have been more beneficial earlier in the process.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOE relies on contractors to carry out its environmental cleanup, scientific  research, nuclear weapons management, and other missions vital to  national health, safety, and security. Our analysis of the contracts we  reviewed showed that DOE experienced delays in awarding many of these  contracts to carry out its critical missions. It is unclear the extent to which  these delays may have been avoidable with better oversight or  management, but at least some of the delays were avoidable, such as when  DOE had to rework parts of the contract award process to correct errors.  While DOE eventually awarded these contracts, a contract award process  that takes too long runs the risk of undermining the department’s efforts to  obtain needed goods or services at the best value for the government. As  DOE goes forward with its efforts to improve its contract award process, it  will be important to ensure that performance measures address the  timeliness of all of the department’s contract awards that require written  plans and schedules, and that lessons learned and best practices are  consistently shared with DOE staff that will plan for and carry out future  contract awards. Improving the department’s performance in awarding  contracts is an important part of ensuring that DOE’s contracts provide the  best value to the government.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that DOE’s contract award process for contracts that  require a written plan and schedule is efficient and effective and that DOE  is obtaining the best value for the government, we recommend that the  Secretary of Energy take the following two actions:  Ensure that performance measures for the timeliness of the  department’s contract awards include the entire contract award process  from planning to contract award and include all of the department’s  contracts that require a written plan and schedule.
Establish a more systematic way of identifying lessons learned from  past and current contract awards and sharing those lessons and best  practices with the staff involved in planning and managing the  department’s efforts to award its contracts.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of the report to DOE for review and comment. In  written comments, the Director of the Office of Management generally  agreed with our recommendations, but questioned whether we intended  the recommendations to apply to all of the department’s contracts. We  modified the wording to clarify that our recommendations apply only to  those contracts that require a written plan and schedule. In addition, DOE  raised concerns about our nonprobability sample, our characterization of  contract awards as delayed, and our view that DOE’s existing performance  measures were incomplete.
Regarding our sampling methodology, DOE said that the results of our  nonprobability sample should not be used to reach overall conclusions  about DOE’s contracting practices because the 31 contracts we reviewed  represented less than 1 percent of the 5,000 contracts DOE awarded during  fiscal years 2002 through 2005 and were not representative of the entire  group of contracts. However, we believe DOE has mischaracterized our  scope and methodology. First, we did not derive the sample of 31 contracts  from the 5,000 total contracts that DOE awarded during the period. Instead,  we focused our efforts on the 131 contracts awarded by DOE that were  valued at $5 million or greater because such contracts generally required a  written plan, including estimated dates. The 31 contracts we reviewed  represented about 73 percent of the total dollar value of those 131 contract  awards valued at $5 million or greater during the period and about 24  percent of the total number of these larger contract awards. Furthermore,  our report clearly states that the results of a nonprobability sample cannot  be used to make inferences about a population, and we did not draw  conclusions about DOE’s overall contracting processes based on the  sample results.
DOE also took exception to our characterization of contract awards as  delayed and our use of the department’s originally planned award date as  an indication of timeliness. DOE said that the milestone schedule  developed in the written plan is an internal planning tool that may change  over time, and the department cannot factor in a schedule contingency for  every possible event. However, as we reported, federal regulations state  that the purpose of planning the contract award process is to ensure that  the government obtains the needed goods and services in the most  effective, economical, and timely manner. The regulations stress the  importance of timeliness in awarding contracts and require that written  plans for carrying out the contract award process include milestones for  completing the steps in the process. Adherence to the milestones  established in the written plan provides a consistent measure of timeliness  and is one indicator of how well the contract award process is being  managed. In addition, our report clearly states that some of the contracts  DOE awarded later than planned were subject to external events and  complications beyond DOE’s immediate control and recognizes that DOE’s  milestone schedule cannot anticipate all possible events. Even so, we  continue to believe that better management and oversight of the contract  award process, including tracking actual against planned dates in the  milestone schedule, could have prevented lengthy delays in awarding some  of the contracts we reviewed.
In an attachment to its letter, DOE also disagreed with our conclusions that  the department’s performance measures for timeliness in awarding  contracts were incomplete and, as a result, the department was not  addressing delays in awarding contracts. As we reported, DOE has stated  that its timeliness measures were intended to evaluate the performance of  contracting staff and thus included only the parts of the contract award  process under their direct control. DOE also said the department had been  addressing delays in awarding contracts through its lessons learned  process. We continue to believe that DOE’s performance measures for  timeliness in awarding contracts could be improved by being more  comprehensive. DOE’s performance measures included only the evaluation  phase of the contract award process and excluded the facility management  contracts, which represent a significant percentage of DOE’s overall  contracting dollars. We also believe that DOE was generally not addressing  these delays before our review began. The three initiatives DOE started in  late 2005—to address GAO’s high-risk designation for DOE’s contract  management, to restructure the Office of Environmental Management, and  to improve performance data on contract timeliness—were the main  efforts the department identified as steps to address delays in awarding  contracts.
DOE also provided technical comments in an attachment to the letter,  which we have incorporated and summarized as appropriate. DOE’s  comments on our draft report are included in appendix II.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary  of Energy. We will also make copies available to others on request. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions on this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In response to a congressional request, we determined (1) the extent to  which the Department of Energy (DOE) adhered to its planned dates for  awarding contracts and the factors contributing to any delays, (2) the  impacts of any delays in awarding contracts, and (3) the extent to which  DOE has taken steps to address delays in its contract award process. To  conduct our work, we analyzed contracts valued at $5 million or greater  from multiple DOE locations and interviewed contracting and program  officials at DOE headquarters and field locations. We also reviewed federal  laws and regulations on contracting, agency policies and guidance, GAO  guidance on bid protests, and standards for assessing DOE’s management  and oversight of its contract award process.
To determine the extent to which DOE adhered to its planned dates for  awarding contracts, we analyzed 31 contracts from seven DOE locations  that (1) were affiliated with the department’s three largest component  organizations—the Office of Environmental Management, Office of  Science, and the National Nuclear Security Administration—and (2) had  awarded a large share of the department’s contracts valued at $5 million or  greater in fiscal years 2002 through 2005, including facility management  contracts. We focused on the three largest component organizations  because they comprised over 80 percent of DOE’s annual budget and  because they were affiliated with about two-thirds of the locations  departmentwide that had awarded contracts in the four fiscal years we  reviewed. We considered the four most recent fiscal years, 2002 through  2005, in the scope of our study to help ensure that the results reflected  DOE’s recent activity, while increasing the number of contracts that could  potentially be selected for analysis.
In fiscal years 2002 through 2005, the department awarded over 130  contracts valued at $5 million or greater, for a total value of about $16.3  billion. From seven DOE locations, we selected a nonprobability sample of  31 of these contracts, accounting for about $11.9 billion, or 73 percent, of  the $16.3 billion (see table 1). Contracts in our sample ranged in value  from about $5.5 million to $4.8 billion, and they included 7 of the 8 facility  management contracts that the department competitively awarded during  the four fiscal years we studied. In selecting our sample, we analyzed DOE  contract award data to identify locations that had awarded a large share of  the department’s contracts in fiscal years 2002 through 2005. To verify the  completeness and accuracy of contract award data, we interviewed  knowledgeable DOE officials at the locations we visited (six of the seven  field locations from which we selected contracts). On the basis of our  checks, we determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for  identifying DOE locations with a large share of contracts.
To determine whether DOE adhered to its planned dates for awarding the  contracts in our nonprobability sample, we used contract file documents,  obtained from the seven locations, to identify and then compare the  planned and actual contract award dates. We considered contracts to be  delayed if the actual award date was later than the planned award date. In  most cases, we identified the planned award date in DOE’s schedule for  completing key steps of the contract award process that DOE included in  its formal written plan for awarding the contract. Because DOE guidance  generally requires a plan and schedule when awarding contracts valued at  $5 million or greater, the schedules in the written plan generally provided a  consistent source for the planned award date. However, for 9 of the 31  contracts in our sample, we had to obtain the planned award date from  another source because the associated plan and/or schedule was missing  from the contract file. In these cases, we obtained the planned award date  from references in other required file documents, such as the document  used to justify noncompetitive awards or presentations by officials  involved in awarding the contract. Similarly, for nearly all of the 31  contracts in our sample, we identified the actual award date from the  award date written on the signed contract. However, for 2 of the 31  contracts, the signed contract was not available in the contract file, and we  instead obtained the award date from the data system DOE uses to track its  contract awards.
In addition to determining whether the 31 contracts in our nonprobability  sample were awarded by the planned date, we used contract file  documents to calculate how long it took DOE to make the awards. We did  so by calculating the elapsed time from the date DOE initiated the contract  award process to the date it awarded the contract. For 23 contracts, we  used the date of the formal written plan for carrying out the contract award  process as the date DOE initiated the process. Although some planning  steps typically preceded the preparation of the written plan,  documentation of the steps was generally not consistently available in the  contract files we reviewed. In contrast, the formal written plan was a  required and more consistently available source. However, for 8 of the 31  contracts in our sample, we had to obtain the initiation date of the contract  award process from a source other than the date of the written plan  because the plan was undated or missing from the contract file. In these  cases, we used contract file documents prepared during the early steps of  the contract award process, such as correspondence from DOE officials  approving the start of the process.
Furthermore, we identified some of the reasons for delays DOE  experienced in awarding contracts in our sample, in part, by contacting  DOE officials involved in awarding the contract. We also reviewed contract  file documents, such as meeting records and the descriptions of the  contract award process included in key documents generated during the  contract award process. When contract file documents were used to  determine the causes of delays, two analysts involved in this study  independently reviewed the documents to verify that the causes were  reasonably identified.
To further identify causes for delays, we analyzed documentation from bid  protests filed with GAO in fiscal years 2002 through 2005, in addition to the  bid protest guidance issued by GAO’s Office of General Counsel. We  analyzed this documentation because it could potentially describe  problems encountered by DOE during the contract award process. In  correcting any problems, DOE may have repeated steps in the process,  eventually delaying the contract award. When bid protest documents were  used to determine whether (1) the contract award being protested was also  in our sample of contracts that we analyzed for delays or (2) corrective  action was agreed to by DOE or recommended by GAO as a result of the  protest, two analysts involved in this study independently reviewed the  documents to verify that the causes were reasonably identified.
To determine overall impacts of any delays in awarding DOE’s contracts, as  well as the extent to which the department has taken steps to address the  delays, we interviewed headquarters contracting officials from the Office  of Procurement and Assistance Management, as well as contracting and  program officials from the department’s three largest DOE component  organizations, and officials from the Office of Engineering and  Construction Management, who oversee planning and management of  capital projects. Also, we interviewed contracting and program officials at  six of the seven field locations from which we selected contracts for our  nonprobability sample as follows: Albuquerque Service Center (NNSA), New Mexico;  Idaho Operations Office (EM and Nuclear Energy), Idaho;  Oak Ridge Operations Office (EM, Science, NNSA), Tennessee;  Portsmouth and Paducah Project Office (EM), Lexington, Kentucky;  Richland Operations Office (EM), Washington; and  Savannah River Operations Office (EM and NNSA), South Carolina.
Furthermore, for contracts in our sample, we analyzed file documents for  evidence of adverse impacts upon companies competing for the work  resulting from any delays in carrying out the contract award process. We  examined transcripts from some debriefing sessions that DOE held with  companies after awarding the contract, as well as other documents, such as  correspondence from companies or their representatives. To further  understand the impacts of delays, we also examined documents related to  DOE’s contract award for environmental cleanup of its Paducah, Kentucky,  site, even though this contract was not part of our sample. DOE’s Office of  Procurement and Assistance Management provided us with its analysis of  lessons learned and the factors that delayed this contract award. We  reviewed the contract file documents to better understand the context of  this analysis. However, we excluded the contract from our sample because  DOE awarded it in fiscal year 2006 and, therefore, it did not fit our selection  criteria. As a result, we did not include the contract in calculations or  figures showing the extent of delays in awarding DOE contracts.
In addition, we reviewed federal and DOE regulations that govern  contracting, DOE policy and guidance on contracting, and documents on  the department’s assessment of its performance in carrying out its contract  awards. We also reviewed GAO’s Framework for Assessing the  Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies for determining the  effectiveness of DOE’s management and oversight of the contract award  process.
We conducted our work from July 2005 to June 2006 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Energy
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Bill Swick, Assistant Director;  Carole Blackwell, Nora Boretti, Kevin Jackson, Greg Marchand, Alison  O’Neill, Jeff Rueckhaus, and Gretchen Snoey made key contributions to  this report.