Army Planning: Comprehensive Risk Assessment Needed for Planned Changes to the Army's Force Structure
Published: 2016-04-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Army plans to reduce its end strength to 980,000 active and reserve soldiers by fiscal year 2018, a reduction of nearly 12 percent since fiscal year 2011. According to the Army, this reduction will require reductions of both combat and supporting units. Army leaders reported that reducing the Army to such levels creates significant but manageable risk to executing the U.S. military strategy and that further reductions would result in unacceptable risk.
The Senate report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision that GAO examine the factors that the Army considers and uses when it determines the size and structure of its forces. This report (1) describes the Army's priorities and planned force structure reductions and (2) evaluates the extent to which the Army comprehensively assessed mission risk associated with its planned combat and enabler force structure. GAO examined the Army's force development regulations and process, DOD and Army guidance, and Army analysis and conclusions; and interviewed DOD and Army officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army prioritized retaining combat units, such as brigade combat teams (BCT) and combat aviation brigades, when planning to reduce its end strength to 980,000 soldiers, and as a result plans to eliminate proportionately more positions from its support (or “enabler”) units, such as military police and transportation units. The Army's force planning process seeks to link strategy to force structure given available resources through quantitative and qualitative analyses. The Army completed analyses showing that it could reduce its BCTs from 73 in fiscal year 2011 to a minimum of 52 in fiscal year 2017; however, the Army plans to retain 56 BCTs. Moreover, by redesigning its combat units, the Army plans to retain 170 combat battalions (units that fight the enemy)—3 fewer battalions than in fiscal year 2011. Given the focus on retaining combat units, and senior Army leaders' assessment that shortfalls in combat units are more challenging to resolve than shortfalls in enabler units, the Army plans to reduce proportionately more positions from its enabler units than from its combat units.
GAO found that the Army performed considerable analysis of its force structure requirements, but did not assess mission risk for its enabler units.
Combat Forces: The Army's analysis of BCT requirements entailed an assessment of mission risk—risk resulting from units being unable to meet the missions specified in Department of Defense (DOD) planning guidance. The mission risk assessment used current Army deployment practices and assumed that sufficient enabler forces would be available to sustain combat units over a multi-year scenario. The result of this analysis, and a similar analysis of the Army's aviation brigades, showed that the Army's proposed combat force structure would be sufficient to meet most mission demands.
Enabler Forces: The Army's analysis of its enabler units entailed an assessment of risk to the force—how frequently and for how long units need to deploy to meet as many demands as possible. Army officials said this analysis is useful because it enables the Army to identify the units it would use the most. However, the analysis overstated the availability of the Army's enabler units because it assumed they could deploy more frequently and for longer duration than DOD's policies allow. The Army did not identify enabler unit shortfalls, or the risk those shortfalls pose to meeting mission requirements.
According to Army guidance, the Army's planning process should assess mission risk for both combat and enabler units. The Army did not complete this type of assessment for its enabler units during its most recent force planning process because the Army assessed the risk operational demands pose to the health of the Army's force, not mission risk. Without a mission risk assessment for both the Army's planned combat and enabler force structure, the Army has an incomplete understanding of mission risk and is not well-positioned to develop mitigation strategies. Furthermore, as currently implemented, its process does not include analyses needed for the Army to routinely prepare a mission risk assessment for both its combat and enabler force structure. Without expanding its force planning process to routinely require a mission risk assessment for the Army's combat and enabler force structure as part of future planning processes, the Army will not be well-positioned to comprehensively assess risk and develop mitigation strategies.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Army complete a mission risk assessment of its planned enabler force structure, and revise its process to routinely require a mission risk assessment for its combat and enabler force structure. The Army agreed with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In 2011, the Secretary of Defense announced a series of initiatives  intended to reduce costs across the Department of Defense (DOD) and  the military services, including cuts of $29.5 billion from planned Army  spending from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016. Additionally, in  2011, Congress passed the Budget Control Act of 2011, which, among  other things, sets limits for national defense spending through fiscal year  2021. In response to these spending limits the Army announced it would  reduce its planned end strength from a high of about 1.11 million soldiers  in fiscal year 2011 to 1.045 million soldiers by fiscal year 2016. In June  2014, DOD stated that the Army would further reduce its end strength to  980,000 soldiers by fiscal year 2018, a level at which the Army stated that  it could execute the National Defense Strategy, but at significant risk.  The Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff reiterated this  point in March 2015 in congressional testimony, and stated that further  reductions would make that strategy unexecutable.
Additionally, in September 2013, the Army announced in its Army  Structure Memorandum for fiscal years 2015 through 2019, that it would  decrease the number of its brigade combat teams (BCT) from 73 to 60.  The Army also announced it would eliminate 12,000 positions from units  that Army officials said provide long-term sustainment for the Army’s  combat units. In October 2015, the Army stated that it would further  reduce its end strength by reducing the number of its BCTs to 56 and by  redesigning other units in its force structure so that they required fewer  soldiers. The Army also announced plans to inactivate two BCTs in the  Army National Guard and convert two active component BCTs to smaller  battalion-sized task forces.
In light of the significant changes to the Army’s force structure, Congress  established the National Commission on the Future of the Army in the  Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization  Act for Fiscal Year 2015. The commission was directed to evaluate the  size and force mix of the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army  Reserve and make recommendations where appropriate. The  Commission was also directed to study the Army’s planned transfer of  Apache helicopters from the Army National Guard to the Regular Army as  part of the Army’s aviation restructuring initiative. The Commission’s final  report, published in January 2016, determined that an Army with 980,000  soldiers (450,000 in the active component, 335,000 in the Army National  Guard, and 195,000 in the Army Reserve), is the minimum sufficient force  needed to meet the U.S.’s national security objectives and the challenges  of the future strategic environment.
Congress has included multiple provisions for GAO to review Army force  structure decisions. The Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a  provision for us to assess the Army’s Aviation Restructuring Initiative as  well as any proposals submitted by the Chief of the National Guard  Bureau that could serve as an alternative to the Army’s initiative. In April  2015 we reviewed the Army’s analysis of its combat aviation force  structure proposal and the National Guard Bureau’s alternative proposal.  We found that the Army and the National Guard Bureau agreed on some  assumptions and not others, that both proposals met most projected  mission demands, and that the Army’s cost estimates were reliable for the  purposes for which they were used. However, we also found that  additional sensitivity analysis could have been useful for decisionmakers  and that the Army’s cost estimates were of limited value for projecting the  actual implementation or annual costs of the Army’s proposal.  Additionally, Senate Report 113-176, accompanying a bill for the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, included a provision for  GAO to examine how the Army determines the size and structure for its  forces and the factors it considers when doing so. In this report, we (1)  describe the Army’s priorities and planned changes to its force structure  when making end strength reductions and (2) evaluate the extent to  which the Army comprehensively assessed mission risk associated with  its planned combat and enabler force structure.
To describe the Army’s priorities and planned changes to its force  structure when making end strength reductions, we reviewed the Army  Structure Memorandum for fiscal years 2018 through 2022, which  documents the service’s most recent force structure decisions. We also  analyzed statutes pertaining to the Army’s end strength for fiscal years  2011 through 2015, and documentation associated with the Army’s Total  Army Analysis (TAA) process during fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year  2015 such as briefing slides, guidance, and relevant studies. We  reviewed regulations and studies completed by Headquarters,  Department of the Army, concerning the generating force units and  positions allocated to its transients, trainees, holdees, and students  accounts. We reviewed relevant documentation about the  methodologies used for the studies and interviewed officials responsible  for conducting them. We did not seek to independently replicate the  results of the Army’s study as that was beyond the scope of this  engagement. Additionally, we interviewed officials from the Office of Cost  Assessment and Program Evaluation within DOD as well as Army officials  from Headquarters, Department of the Army; U.S. Army Reserve  Command and the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve; U.S. Army  National Guard Directorate; U.S. Army Forces Command; U.S. Army  Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) (the Army Capabilities  Integration Center at Fort Eustis, Virginia, and the TRADOC Analysis  Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas); and the Center for Army Analysis  to obtain their perspectives on the Army’s processes and planned force  structure.
To evaluate the extent to which the Army comprehensively assessed  mission risk associated with its planned force structure, we compared the  Army’s risk management guidance to GAO’s risk management framework  to determine if the Army’s guidance aligned with leading practices. After  our evaluation of the Army’s risk management guidance, we focused our  review on the Army’s risk assessments because the remaining steps in  the Army’s risk management framework are predicated on the Army  completing a risk assessment. We compared documentation of the  Army’s risk assessments, including briefing slides and published reports,  to its risk management guidance and force development regulations to  determine the extent to which these assessments followed the Army’s risk  assessment standards and met force development objectives. We also  interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Policy; the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; the Joint  Staff; Headquarters, Department of the Army; the Center for Army  Analysis, and the TRADOC Analysis Center to understand how the Army  applies its risk guidance to force development and how it assessed risk in  making its most recent force structure decisions.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2015 to April 2016 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: National Defense Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance
paragraphs: The National Defense Strategy is the foundation for DOD’s direction to  the military services on planning their respective force structures. This  strategy calls for the U.S. armed forces to be able to simultaneously  defend the homeland; conduct sustained, distributed counterterrorist  operations; and deter aggression and assure allies in multiple regions  through forward presence and engagement. If deterrence fails, U.S.  forces should be able to defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale  multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of—or impose  unacceptable costs on—a second aggressor in another region. According  to the Army’s force development regulation, the Army seeks to develop a  balanced and affordable force structure that can meet the requirements of  the National Military Strategy and defense planning guidance tasks.
The Defense Planning Guidance operationalizes the National Defense  Strategy and provides guidance to the services on their use of approved  scenarios, among other things, which serve as their starting point for  making force structure decisions and assessing risk. These classified  scenarios are used to illustrate the missions articulated in the National  Defense Strategy, including the need to defeat one regional adversary  while deterring a second adversary in another region, homeland defense,  and forward presence. Drawing from the scenarios approved in the  Defense Planning Guidance for 2017 through 2021, the Army derived a  set of planning scenarios, arrayed across a timeline, that reflect these  missions.
section_title: Army End Strength
paragraphs: Congress authorizes the number of personnel the Army is able to have in  its active, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve components  respectively. The Secretary of the Army—in consultation with the Director  of the Army National Guard and the Chief of the Army Reserve— approves how the Army will allocate that end strength within each of the  Army’s components. Between fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2018, the  Army’s planned end strength is projected to decline by 132,000 positions  (12 percent), from about 1.11 million soldiers in fiscal year 2011 to  980,000 soldiers in fiscal year 2018, as shown in figure 1. By fiscal year  2018, the individual components expect to be at the following projected  end strengths: active (450,000), Army National Guard (335,000), and  Army Reserve (195,000). As a result, the reserve component—which  includes both the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve—will  make up 54 percent of the Army’s planned end strength starting in fiscal  year 2018; a proportion that is comparable to the size and allocation of  Army forces across its components prior to the September 11, 2001,  terrorist attacks.
section_title: Army Force Development and Total Army Analysis Processes
paragraphs: The Army implements its force development processes to make decisions  about how to allocate end strength that has been authorized for each of  its components, among other things. Taking into account resource  constraints, the five-phase process entails determining organizational and  materiel requirements and translating those requirements into a planned  force structure of units and associated personnel, as illustrated in figure 2.  During the fourth phase—the determination of organizational  authorizations—the Army undertakes its annual Total Army Analysis  (TAA) process, during which it determines how it will allocate its end  strength among its units and manage risk.
The TAA process is envisioned to help the Army allocate its end strength  among its enabler units—those units that deploy to support combat  forces—after initial decisions about the size of combat forces, other types  of Army formations, and key enablers are made. The Army’s TAA  regulation states that the Army will use force guidance, such as the  defense planning guidance, to identify the combat unit structure that will  be used as an input to TAA’s analysis of the Army’s enabler unit  requirements. The Army also uses the results from its most recently  concluded TAA as the starting point for the next TAA. For example, Army  officials stated that the planned force structure documented in its October  2015 Army Structure Memorandum was an input for the Army’s ongoing  TAA, examining force structure for fiscal years 2019 through 2023. The  Army Structure Memorandum documents the force structure approved by  the Secretary of the Army for resourcing and is an output of the Army’s  TAA process. Army officials said that the Army concluded the quantitative  analysis phase for this TAA in December 2015 and they expect that the  Army will complete the qualitative analysis phase by June 2016.
Army officials said that they have modified the TAA process substantially  since the Army last issued its regulation and that an updated regulation  that will cover TAA is pending final approval. Last updated in 1995, the  Army’s TAA regulation describes the objectives and procedures of the  TAA process, which includes documenting the Army’s total planned force  structure and any unresourced unit requirements. Army officials said  that the Army no longer documents unresourced unit requirements  because senior leadership at the time the Army stopped tracking these  requirements determined that it was not useful for force planning  purposes. Additionally, the Army has expanded the inputs to its TAA  process beyond those specified in its regulation to include other  segments of its force structure and some enabler units that were not  eligible for reduction or reallocation. For example, the Army has identified  a minimum number of positions for its generating force—which includes  units that enable the Army to train and safeguard the health of its  soldiers—and during recent TAAs did not evaluate some types of enabler  units for reduction or reallocation that were considered to be in high  demand (such as its Patriot Battalions) and units that are considered to  be critical to early phases of a major contingency (such as those that  provide port opening capabilities).
section_title: The Army Prioritized Retaining Combat Units and Plans to Reduce a Greater Proportion of Enabler Units to Make End Strength Reductions
paragraphs: The Army prioritized retaining combat units, as well as other segments of  its force structure, when planning to reduce its end strength to 980,000  soldiers and as a result will take proportionately more position reductions  from its enabler units.
subsections: section_title: Army Prioritized Retaining Combat Units
paragraphs: are responsible for fighting enemy forces in a  contested environment and include the  Army’s Brigade Combat Teams (Armored,  Infantry, and Stryker) and combat aviation  brigades.  to the Army’s combat units when they are  deployed. They often provide critical support  in early deployment (such as port opening),  as well as for long-term sustainment (such as  those that transport supplies or establish  bases from which combat units can operate).  Combat units are dependent on enabler units  for long-term sustainment in theater and the  Army generally deploys both types of units to  meet operational demands.
The Army prioritized retaining combat units and incorporated other  considerations when planning to reduce its end strength to 980,000  soldiers. Army officials said that the Army used its force planning process  to evaluate how it can best implement planned end strength reductions.  This process—which is intended to link strategy to force structure  requirements given available resources—included robust modeling and  incorporated senior leaders’ professional military judgement. The Army  incorporated its priorities at the beginning of this process, which  influenced the planned force structure that the Secretary of the Army  ultimately approved. Foremost, the Army sought to retain as many  combat units as possible so that it could better meet the missions  specified in DOD’s defense planning guidance and the Army’s classified  scenarios as well as to account for near-term uncertainty. Additionally, the  Army determined it needed to maintain a minimum number of positions in  its generating force and its transients, trainees, holdees, and students  accounts, based on separate analyses. Lastly, the Army sought to  minimize the disruption to Army National Guard capabilities and reserve  component unit readiness that resulted from reductions.
Generating Force: Army organizations whose  primary mission is to generate and sustain the  operating force, including the Army’s Training  and Doctrine Command—which oversees the  Army’s recruiting, training, and capability  development efforts—and Army Medical  Command—which provides health and medical  care for Army personnel.  Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students:  Active component soldiers not assigned to units  are counted as part of the Army’s end strength,  separately from its operating force and  generating force. Soldiers in these accounts  include soldiers in training, cadets attending  military academies, injured soldiers, or soldiers  en route to a new permanent duty station.
Retaining combat units. According to Army officials responsible for TAA,  Army leaders determined that it was important that the Army retain as  many combat units as possible when assessing how to implement end  strength reductions. In 2013, the Secretary of Defense announced the  conclusion of the department-wide Strategic Choices and Management  Review. As part of this review, DOD examined ways to obtain cost  savings by altering the Army’s future force structure. According to Army  officials, the Secretary of Defense’s review had, at one point, considered  whether the Army could reduce its end strength to 855,000, which would  correspond with a force structure of 36 BCTs, including 18 in the regular  Army and 18 in the reserve component. Army leaders, reacting to what  they considered to be unacceptable reductions, commissioned analyses  to determine the end strength and number of BCTs the Army needed to  execute the missions specified in defense planning guidance. The  analysis determined that the Army should retain a minimum of 52 BCTs,  including 30 in the active component, in order to best meet the missions  specified in defense planning guidance. Ultimately, Army senior leaders  decided to retain 56 BCTs based in part on these analyses as well as  their assessment of global events and the potential for increased demand  for BCTs.
In retaining 56 BCTs in its force structure, the Army took additional steps  to redesign its force, reflecting its priority to retain combat capacity.  Specifically, the Army plans to eliminate 17 BCTs from its force structure  relative to its fiscal year 2011 force (a 23 percent reduction in the number  of BCTs). However, because the Army decided to redesign its BCTs by  increasing its composition from a two maneuver battalion to three  battalion formation, the Army estimates that it will be able to retain 170  maneuver battalions in its force structure—a net reduction of 3 battalions  compared to fiscal year 2011 (less than 2 percent), as shown in table 1.
Maintain minimum number of positions in generating force units and the  trainees, transients, holdees, and students accounts. According to Army  officials responsible for TAA, the Army needs to maintain a minimum  number of positions in the Army’s generating force (in order to provide  medical support and training to Army personnel) and its trainees,  transients, holdees, and students accounts (in order to account for  personnel that are not assigned to units). Specifically, the Army tasked  the two largest organizations in its generating force (U.S. Army Medical  Command and TRADOC) with evaluating their position requirements and  concluded that the Army needs a minimum of 87,400 active component  soldiers in the generating force for an end strength of 980,000 soldiers.  Additionally, Army officials said that based on a review of historical levels,  the Army assumed that 58,500 regular Army positions (13 percent of a  450,000 active component force) would be filled by trainees, transients,  holdees, and students.
Minimize the disruption to Army National Guard capabilities and reserve  component unit readiness resulting from reductions. According to Army  officials, the Army sought to minimize disruption to Army National Guard  capabilities needed for state missions and reserve component unit  readiness when implementing end strength reductions by relying on the  components to develop recommendations for making those reductions.  Army officials also told us that the reserve components have better  visibility into their ability to recruit personnel into specific positions, or the  potential impact that reductions would have on the Army National Guard’s  domestic missions. The Army plans to eliminate approximately 34,000  positions from its reserve component—of which nearly 27,000 will be from  its non-combat formations. Army National Guard and Army Reserve  officials agreed with the Army’s assessment and said that they have  developed their own processes for assessing where they can best reduce  or reallocate positions within their respective components and still meet  Army mission requirements.
section_title: The Army Plans to Reduce a Greater Proportion of Enabler Units
paragraphs: Given the focus on retaining combat units and the constraints senior  leaders placed on changing the Army’s generating force; its trainees,  transients, holdees, and students accounts; and its reserve components,  the Army will take proportionately more positions from its enabler units  than from its combat units as it reduces end strength to 980,000 soldiers.  Specifically, in fiscal year 2011 enabler unit positions constituted 42  percent of the Army’s planned end strength (470,000 positions), but the  Army intends for 44 percent of its reductions (58,000 positions) to come  from its enablers. In contrast, the Army’s combat units constitute 29  percent of the Army’s end strength (319,000 positions), but will account  for 22 percent of the planned reductions (29,000 positions). When  evaluating enabler unit requirements, the Army focused its attention on  those capabilities that were less utilized across a 13-year timeline  covered by the Army’s planning scenarios. The Army did not consider  reductions for capabilities it determined were critical, such as its Patriot  and field artillery units, and reduced the size of or eliminated enabler units  that were judged less critical, such as military police, transportation,  chemical, and explosive ordnance disposal units.
Determining the appropriate amount of enabler capacity has been a  persistent problem for the Army. We issued several reports during the  2000s reviewing Army plans and efforts to redesign its combat force, an  effort known as “modularity.” In those reports, we found that the Army  persistently experienced shortfalls for both key enabler equipment and  personnel as it restructured its combat units into brigade combat teams.  Between 2005 and 2008 we made 20 recommendations addressing the  Army’s challenges in creating a results-oriented plan as it transformed its  force, developing realistic cost estimates, and completing a  comprehensive assessment of the force as it was being implemented.  For example, in 2006, we made 2 recommendations that the Army  develop a plan to identify authorized and projected personnel and  equipment levels and that it assess the risks associated with any  shortfalls. The Army generally agreed with both recommendations but  ultimately did not implement them. In our 2014 report, we found that the  Army’s report to Congress assessing its implementation of modularity did  not fully identify the risks of enabler shortfalls or report its mitigation  strategies for those risks.
Army officials told us that, based on senior leaders’ professional military  judgment, concentrating reductions in enabler units is more acceptable  than further reducing the Army’s combat units because combat unit  shortfalls are more challenging to resolve than enabler unit shortfalls.  Prior Army analysis showed that it would take a minimum of 32 months to  build an Armored BCT and Army officials said that the Army cannot  contract for combat capabilities in the event of a shortfall in BCTs. In  contrast, officials said that some types of enabler units could be built in as  few as 9 months. Additionally, a senior Army leader stated that the Army  has successfully contracted for enabler capabilities during recent  conflicts.
section_title: The Army Did Not Comprehensively Assess Mission Risk Associated with Its Planned Force Structure
paragraphs: The Army did not comprehensively assess mission risk (risk to the  missions in DOD’s defense planning guidance) associated with its  planned force structure because it did not assess mission risk for its  enabler units. As a result, the Army was not well positioned to develop  and evaluate mitigation strategies for unit shortfalls.
subsections: section_title: Army Assessed Mission Risk for Its Combat Forces
paragraphs: In assessing its requirements for aviation brigades and BCTs, the Army  determined where combat units in its planned force structure would be  unable to meet mission requirements given current Army practices in  deploying forces to meet mission demands. Notably, the analysis  assumed that sufficient enabler capability would be available. Using the  Army’s scenarios derived from defense planning guidance, the Army  estimated how well different numbers of each type of unit would meet  projected demands over time, which allowed it to compare how different  aviation and BCT force structures would perform. As we reported in 2015,  the Army analyzed the risk of its aviation brigades to meeting  requirements based on the timing, scope and scale of missed demands,  and made key decisions to reshape its aviation force structure based in  part on this mission risk analysis.
Risk Within the Context of Force  Development   Mission risk: mission risk is the ability of the  Army to meet the demands of the National  Defense Strategy as operationalized in DOD’s  defense planning guidance. Generally,  mission risk can be measured by sufficiency  (the ability of supply to meet demand) and  effectiveness (the availability of the best unit  to accomplish a mission).  Risk to the force: risk to the health of the  force caused by issues such as increased  frequency of deployment with less time at  home, or early and extended deployments. It  is related but not equivalent to mission risk  because it can impact morale and unit  effectiveness.
The Army used the same type of analysis to compare different quantities  of BCTs. The Army analyzed how many, and what types, of BCTs would  be needed to meet the mission demands of certain scenarios within the  defense planning guidance. The Army’s analysis focused on four different  BCT levels, including a high of 60 BCTs at 1.045 million soldiers and the  low Army officials said was considered by the Strategic Choices and  Management Review of 36 BCTs at 855,000 soldiers. As it did when  analyzing aviation requirements the Army assessed the timing, scope and  scale of missed demands, given current DOD policies and practices  governing the length and frequency of military deployments. The Army  also assessed how it could mitigate risk to a major combat operation  through strategies such as by changing the deployment schedule, or by  temporarily reassigning units away from other non-contingency missions  in near-east Asia, the Middle East, or elsewhere. According to Army  officials, the Army’s analysis enabled senior leaders to assess risks and  tradeoffs for this portion of the force in meeting these demands. The  Army did not complete a risk to force assessment for its combat units  because officials prioritized retention of these combat units and as a  result the Army’s analysis was intended to determine the number and  types of these units needed to meet mission requirements.
section_title: Army Assessed Risk to the Force for Enabler Units, but Did Not Assess Mission Risk
paragraphs: In contrast to the mission risk assessment the Army conducted for its  combat units (risk to the Army’s ability to meet the missions in DOD’s  defense planning guidance), the Army assessed risk to the force for its  enabler units in its most recent TAA (risk to the health of the Army’s  enabler units). Assessing risk to the force entails determining how  frequently and for how long individual types of enabler units would need  to deploy to meet the maximum amount of demands possible, given the  previously identified combat force structure, and does not entail  identifying missed mission demands or documenting unresourced unit  requirements. The Army then determined the length of time at home for  each type of enabler assessed, and compared the result with that for the  Army as a whole, in order to determine the level of stress (“risk”) on that  type of unit. The Army’s analysis necessitates making key assumptions  about how enablers would be used, some of which contrasted from  current DOD deployment practices. For example, the Army assumed  active component enabler units could be deployed indefinitely, which may  overstate their availability unless the Secretary of Defense authorizes  indefinite operational deployment. Similarly, the Army assumed that it  could deploy its reserve component enabler units more frequently than  DOD’s current policy allows.
Army officials told us that assessing risk to the force for its enablers is  useful because the Army can identify the units it would use the most and  those that it would use least. Based on its analyses of the frequency and  length of deployments for each type of enabler unit assessed, the Army  developed and prioritized options to mitigate risk to the enabler force.  These options included adding structure to more utilized units and taking  reductions from or divesting less-utilized enabler units. For example, the  Army’s analyses showed that one type of engineer unit spent far less time  at home than the Army’s other units during a contingency, and so the  Army added an additional engineer unit to its structure to mitigate this  stress. In contrast, the Army determined that it had excess support  maintenance companies in its force structure and decided to eliminate 6  of these units.
Additionally, the Army analyzed its enabler units to identify which units  would be needed during the first 75 days of a conflict. Army officials used  war plans to identify the minimum number of each type of enabler unit  that would be needed to execute the war plan and then compared that  requirement to the number of those units that would be available to meet  those requirements. Army officials told us that assessing early  deployment requirements is useful because the Army can assess whether  it needs to move units from its reserve component to its active component  in order to ensure that early deployment requirements can be met.
Assessing risk to the force and early deployment requirements does not  identify potential mission shortfalls in the enabler inventory, however, and  these shortfalls could lead to missed mission demands. When the Army  has conducted mission risk assessments for its enabler units outside of  TAA it has been able to identify and mitigate risk. In May 2014, the  TRADOC Analysis Center completed mission risk assessments for  certain types of artillery units, air and missile defense, and truck units,  among other units. These analyses showed that some types of units were  unable to meet projected mission demands and provided information  needed for the Army to develop mitigation strategies. For example, the  Army’s assessment of artillery units identified unmitigated mission risk  and determined that these units could meet only about 88 percent of  demands during a major contingency. To address this risk, Army officials  said that they recommended a change to the Army’s deployment  practices for these units to allow one type of unit to be substituted for  another. This change would enable these units to meet approximately 94  percent of mission demands during a major contingency. Similarly, in  another example, the Army’s assessment of its truck units found that  planned reductions could limit the Army’s ability to transport troops  around the battlefield, among other risks. The Army intends to add 4  medium truck companies to its force structure by the end of fiscal year  2019 in part to address this risk.
In its January 2016 report, the National Commission on the Future of the  Army identified enabler capabilities that in its view needed further risk  assessment and risk mitigation. As previously discussed, Army leaders  decided to reduce enabler units they judged less critical, such as military  police, transportation, chemical, and explosive ordnance disposal units, in  part to preserve the Army’s combat force structure. However, the National  Commission on the Future of the Army identified some of these same  units as having shortfalls—including units that provide transportation,  military police, and chemical capabilities. The Commission recommended  that the Army complete a risk assessment and assess plans and  associated costs of reducing or eliminating these shortfalls.
section_title: TAA Does Not Routinely Assess Mission Risk for Both Combat and Enabler Force Structure
paragraphs: Army guidance indicates that the Army’s TAA process should assess  mission risk for its combat and enabler force structure, but the Army did  not complete a mission risk assessment during its most recent TAA. In  addition, its TAA process is not being implemented in a manner that  would routinely prepare such an assessment. According to the Army’s  force development regulation, the Army’s TAA process is intended to  determine the requirements for both the Army’s combat and enabler force  structure to meet the missions specified in defense planning guidance,  document unresourced requirements, and analyze risk given resource  constraints. When assessing risk, the Army’s risk management  guidance states that the Army should identify conditions that create the  potential for harmful events and analyze how such conditions could cause  mission failure. Within this context, Army officials told us that the TAA  process should assess mission risk by assessing how the Army’s combat  and enabler force structure could lead to a failure to meet the missions  specified in defense planning guidance. According to the Army’s risk  management guidance, once the Army identifies mission risk, it then  should analyze and prioritize strategies to mitigate identified risk.
In the near term, although the Army’s guidance and risk management  framework indicate the Army should complete a mission risk assessment  for its combat and enabler force structure, the Army did not do so during  its most recent TAA for its enabler units, instead assessing the risk to the  force and early deployment requirements for these units. Army officials  stated that they did not complete this assessment because the Army  assessed how ongoing demands affected the health of the Army’s force  and not the mission risk associated with shortfalls. However, our review  found that the Army’s guidance does not require that the Army complete  an assessment of the risk to force.
Army officials are currently revising the Army regulation that documents  its force development processes, but the draft does not currently include  a requirement that the TAA process assess mission risk for the Army’s  combat and enabler force structure. Without an assessment of the  mission risk associated with the planned enabler force structure  documented in the Army’s October 2015 Army Structure Memorandum,  the Army has an incomplete understanding of the risks that may arise  from the potential shortfalls in its enabler inventory. Accordingly, the Army  is not well positioned to develop strategies to mitigate these risks. Army  officials told us the next opportunity to complete this mission risk  assessment and develop mitigation strategies would be as part of its  ongoing TAA for fiscal years 2019 through 2023.
Furthermore, the Army is required to complete TAA every year and as  currently implemented its TAA process does not include the modeling and  analyses needed to routinely prepare a mission risk assessment for its  combat and enabler force structure. Army officials told us that they  recognize a need to expand TAA to include mission risk assessments for  a set of the Army’s enabler units, consider potential strategies to mitigate  this risk, and implement such strategies; but have not revised TAA to  include these elements. Without expanding the TAA process to routinely  require a mission risk assessment for the Army’s combat and enabler  force structure as part of future iterations of TAA, the Army will continue  to not be well positioned to identify mission risk and develop mitigation  strategies when making future force structure decisions.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Facing end strength reductions, the Army made a decision to retain  combat capabilities to provide maximum warfighting capability and  flexibility. However, the Army’s planned force structure is based on an  incomplete assessment of mission risk across its combat and enabler  force structure because it did not assess this type of risk for its enabler  units. As a result the Army did not comprehensively assess whether its  force structure will be able to meet the missions specified in defense  planning guidance and, in the absence of that risk assessment, was not  well positioned to assess mitigation options when making recent force  structure decisions. The Army has an opportunity to more fully assess its  recommended force structure’s ability to meet mission demands, identify  capability shortfalls, and develop mitigation strategies to address  identified shortfalls before it implements its planned force structure.
Unless the Army completes this type of assessment, it will lack  reasonable assurance that it has identified and mitigated risk that will  prevent it from executing the missions specified in defense planning  guidance. Additionally, by completing a mission risk assessment for its  planned force before completing its ongoing TAA for fiscal years 2019  through 2023, the Army will be better positioned to identify improvements  to its TAA process so that it can complete such assessments on a  recurring basis moving forward. Unless the Army changes its approach to  routinely complete this type of risk assessment as part of its TAA process,  it may not be able to identify and mitigate risk associated with changes to  its force structure in the future.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To identify and mitigate risk associated with the Army’s planned force  structure and improve future decision making, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to take the  following two actions:  1.  Conduct a mission risk assessment of the Army’s planned enabler  force structure and assess mitigation strategies for identified mission  risk before Total Army Analysis for Fiscal Years 2019 through 2023 is  concluded and implement those mitigation strategies as needed.  2.  Expand the Army’s Total Army Analysis process to routinely require a  mission risk assessment for the Army’s combat and enabler force  structure and an assessment of mitigation strategies for identified risk  prior to finalizing future force structure decisions.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with both of  our recommendations and identified the steps it plans to take to address  them. DOD’s comments are printed in their entirety in appendix I. DOD  also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report  as appropriate.
In response to our first recommendation that the Army conduct a mission  risk assessment and assess mitigation strategies for its planned enabler  force structure before Total Army Analysis for Fiscal Years 2019 through  2023 is concluded, the Army stated that it recognizes the need to conduct  these types of assessments and that it has modified its Total Army  Analysis process to include them. As we stated in our report, at the time  of our review the Army had not yet incorporated these assessments into  its TAA process. Should the Army complete these assessments prior to  finalizing its ongoing TAA, it would be better positioned to identify and  mitigate the risk associated with its planned enabler force structure and it  will have taken the steps needed to satisfy our recommendation.
With respect to our second recommendation that the Army expand its  TAA process to routinely require a mission risk assessment and an  assessment of mitigation strategies for its combat and enabler force  structure, the Army stated that it recognizes the need to routinely conduct  these types of assessments. The Army stated that it intends to formalize  inclusion of these types of assessments in its process by publishing a  Department of the Army pamphlet that is currently under development.  Should the Army modify its guidance to require these assessments, and  implement its TAA process in accordance with its revised guidance, the  Army would be better positioned to identify mission risk and develop  mitigation strategies when making force structure decisions.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army. In  addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or Pendletonj@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Kevin O’Neill, Assistant Director;  Tracy Barnes; Katherine Blair; Erin Butkowski; Martin De Alteriis; Amie  Lesser; Ricardo A. Marquez; Erik Wilkins-McKee; and Alex Winograd  made key contributions to this report.