Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Department of Homeland Security's Visa Security Program
Published: 2005-07-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required that the Department of Homeland Security's on-site personnel in Saudi Arabia review all visa applications. The act also authorized the expansion of the Visa Security Program to other embassies and consulates to provide expert advice and training to consular officers, among other things. Given the congressional interest in effective implementation of the Visa Security Program, we assessed (1) the Visa Security Officers' activities in Saudi Arabia, and (2) DHS's plans to expand its Visa Security Program to other consular posts overseas.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Visa Security Officers (VSO) assigned to Saudi Arabia review all visa applications prior to final adjudication by consular officers, and assist consular officers with interviews and fraud prevention; however, no comprehensive data exists to demonstrate the VSOs' impact. According to State Department consular officers, the deputy chief of mission, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials in Saudi Arabia, the VSOs in Riyadh and Jeddah strengthen visa security because of their law enforcement and immigration experience, as well as their ability to access and use information from law enforcement databases not immediately available, by law, to consular officers. Furthermore, the requirement to review all visa applications in Saudi Arabia limits the VSOs' ability to provide additional training and other services to consular officers, such as assisting with interviews. Moreover, security concerns in Saudi Arabia limit staffing levels at these posts. DHS has not developed a strategic plan outlining the Visa Security Program's mission, activities, program goals, and intended results for operations in Saudi Arabia or the planned expansion posts. Chiefs of mission at the five posts chosen for expansion in fiscal year 2005 delayed approving DHS's requests for the assignment of VSOs until DHS answered specific questions regarding the program's goals and objectives, staffing requirements, and plans to coordinate with existing staff and law enforcement and border security programs at post. DHS's development of a strategic plan may address outstanding questions from chiefs of mission and other embassy officials and help DHS expand the program.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks highlighted vulnerabilities that  existed in the visa process, particularly the lack of emphasis placed on  using interviews and application reviews as antiterrorism tools. In October  2002, we reported that the visa process should be strengthened and that  increased priority should be given to national security. On November 25,  2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The act  provides, among other things, for the assignment of Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) employees to U.S. embassies and consulates to  provide expert advice and training to consular officers regarding visa  security, among other things. In particular, the act mandated that DHS  personnel, referred to as Visa Security Officers (VSO), in Saudi Arabia  review all visa applications prior to final adjudication by Department of  State (State) consular officers. By September 2003, VSOs had assumed  their responsibilities at U.S. posts in Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. DHS  plans to expand the Visa Security Program to additional posts throughout  fiscal years 2005 and 2006. Congress appropriated $10 million for the  program in fiscal year 2005, and DHS requested $15 million for fiscal year  2006.
Due to the congressional interest in effective implementation of the Visa  Security Program, we assessed (1) the Visa Security Officers’ activities in  Saudi Arabia, and (2) DHS’s plans to expand the program to other consular  posts overseas. To assess DHS operations in Saudi Arabia, we reviewed  documentation on and observed visa operations at the U.S. Embassy in  Riyadh and the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah. In Saudi Arabia and Washington,  D.C., we interviewed DHS officials who manage the Visa Security Program,  as well as State consular officials. To assess DHS’s plans for expansion of  the Visa Security Program, we visited two of the five posts to which DHS  plans to expand the program and interviewed consular and embassy  officials, including the chiefs and deputy chiefs of mission, at these  locations to discuss the posts’ plans for the VSOs. We also spoke with the  consuls general from the other three posts initially chosen for expansion in  fiscal year 2005. In addition to our review of the DHS Visa Security  Program, we will report later this year on (State) changes to the visa  process since our 2002 report. We conducted our evaluation from August  2004 to June 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) and gave it responsibility for visa policy. Section  428 of the act also authorized DHS to immediately assign personnel to  Saudi Arabia to review all visa applications prior to final adjudication, as  well as the future assignment of officers to other locations overseas to  review visa applications. In August 2003, DHS created the Office of  International Enforcement within the Border and Transportation Security  Directorate, to implement these requirements. In the same month, four  temporary DHS officers were deployed to Saudi Arabia to begin reviewing  all visa applications. In September 2003, DHS and State signed a  Memorandum of Understanding to govern the implementation of section  428. This agreement broadly defines the DHS officers’ responsibilities in  reviewing visa applications, indicating, in particular, that they will   provide expert advice to consular officers regarding specific security  threats relating to visa adjudication, specifically by gathering and  reviewing intelligence relevant to visa adjudication and providing  training to consular officers on terrorist threats and detecting applicant  fraud;  review applications on their own initiative or at the request of consular  officers, and provide input on or recommend security advisory opinion  requests; and  conduct investigations on consular matters under the jurisdiction of the  Secretary of Homeland Security.
Several other agencies stationed overseas have roles in the visa  adjudication process. For example, the State Department Diplomatic  Security Bureau’s regional security officers assist the consular section by  investigating passport and visa fraud detected through the consular  officers’ reviews of visa applications and supporting documents. In  addition, officials from the Federal Bureau of Investigation overseas can  assist consular officers when questions about an applicant’s potential  criminal history arise during adjudication. DHS’s Bureaus of Citizenship  and Immigration Services and Customs and Border Protection have  responsibility for some immigration and border security programs  overseas. For example, consular officers may seek advice from these  officials on issues such as DHS procedures at U.S. ports of entry.
In October 2003, DHS designated its Bureau of Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (ICE) to handle the operational and policy-making  responsibilities outlined in section 428 (e) and (i). Subsequently, ICE  created an office to oversee the Visa Security Program. Since the  assignment of VSOs to Saudi Arabia in 2003 until May 2005, DHS has spent  about $4 million for Visa Security Program operations at headquarters and  overseas, of which approximately $2 million was spent on operations in  Saudi Arabia. Figure 1 provides a timeline for the establishment and  implementation of the visa security program.
In August 2004, the DHS Office of Inspector General reported on the  planning and implementation of the VSOs’ activities in Saudi Arabia. The  report was based on observations beginning in July 2003, at which time  DHS was in the early stages of designing the Visa Security Program. (DHS  officers did not arrive in Saudi Arabia until August 31, 2003.) According to  the Inspector General, DHS operations at the time of the review were not  as efficient or effective as they could be due to the use of temporary  officers in Saudi Arabia, a lack of specialized training and foreign language  proficiency, and the lack of a clear plan for the VSOs. The Inspector  General recommended that DHS hire permanent officers, develop a visa  security training program, and establish criteria for selecting VSOs.  According to the Inspector General’s office, DHS has taken steps to  implement these recommendations, but as of July 8, 2005, six remain open.
section_title: Several Factors Have Limited the Impact of Visa Security Operations in Saudi Arabia
paragraphs: According to embassy officials in Saudi Arabia and DHS officials, the VSOs  enhance homeland security through their review of visa applications at  posts in Saudi Arabia. However, several factors have hindered the program,  including a lack of comprehensive data on the VSOs’ activities and results  in Riyadh and Jeddah to demonstrate the program’s overall impact at these  posts.
subsections: section_title: VSOs Provide Additional Law Enforcement Capability to the Visa Process in Saudi Arabia
paragraphs: VSOs in Saudi Arabia provide an additional law enforcement capability to  the visa adjudication process. VSOs have access to and experience using  important law enforcement information not readily available to consular  officers. Moreover, VSOs’ border security and immigration experience can  assist consular officers during the visa process.
subsections: section_title: VSOs Provide Additional Review to Visa Adjudication Process
paragraphs: According to State Department consular officers, the deputy chief of  mission, and DHS officials, VSOs in Saudi Arabia enhance the security of  the visa adjudication process at these consular posts. In particular, the  consular sections in Riyadh and Jeddah have incorporated the VSOs’  review of all visa applications into the adjudication process (see fig. 2).  After consular officers interview an applicant and review the relevant  supporting documentation, they make a preliminary determination about  whether to issue or refuse the visa or refer the case to Washington for  additional security clearances. Consular officers may consult with VSOs  during this initial determination. According to the VSOs, within 24 hours of  this initial determination by consular officers, they review the application  and inspect the applicant’s documentation for evidence of fraud or  misrepresentation, indicators of potential national security risks, criminal  activity, and potential illegal immigration risks. VSOs may also query the  applicant’s information against a number of law enforcement, immigration,  and other databases, which may contain more detail than the consular  officers’ name check results. Based on these reviews, the VSOs will either  affirm or oppose the consular officer’s original decision, and the consular  officer then decides to issue or deny the visa. If the consular section chief  and the VSOs disagree on a case, it is sent to DHS, where the Secretary of  Homeland Security, in consultation with State officials, will render a final  determination. According to a consular official in Saudi Arabia at the time  of our visit in February 2005, no case has ever been sent back to  Washington for such a decision.
In addition to reviewing applications, the VSOs may conduct secondary  interviews with some visa applicants based either on findings from their  application reviews or a consular officer’s request. For example, DHS  officials in Riyadh reported that the VSOs, in cooperation with intelligence  officials at post, interviewed an applicant who had ties to an organization  of national security concern to the U.S. government. This individual was  denied a visa after the interview based upon the VSO’s determination of the  potential threat the individual posed to the United States. We also observed  the VSOs conduct a secondary interview with an applicant they had  identified as a concern through their physical review of the visa  application.
section_title: VSOs Have Access to Law Enforcement Information Not Readily Available to Consular Officers
paragraphs: VSOs have access to and experience using immigration and law  enforcement databases not readily available to consular officers, who are  not classified as criminal justice, or law enforcement, personnel. Consular  officers rely on information contained in the Consular Lookout and  Support System (CLASS) to adjudicate a visa. As law enforcement agents,  the VSOs can access detailed criminal history records and immigration  information not included in CLASS. For example, the VSOs have access to  criminal history records contained in the National Crime Information  Center’s Interstate Identification Index, which cannot be directly accessed  by consular officers. The VSOs also use databases containing information  on employers and businesses, hotel reservation information, and sponsors  of applicants seeking temporary work visas. They can use these databases  to verify, for instance, an applicant’s claim to be working for a particular  business. Consular officials at headquarters and in the field believe this  data would be useful to them in the adjudication process, particularly at the  other posts worldwide that do not have VSOs. Indeed, consular officials in  Washington indicated that they are working with DHS to gain access to  these databases.
In Riyadh, we observed a VSO assist a consular officer review a potential  “hit” in CLASS for an applicant in Riyadh. The applicant claimed that,  during a trip to the United States, border inspectors refused him entry to  the country even though he had a valid visa. At the consular officer’s  request, we observed the VSO search a database and inform the consular  officer that the applicant at the window had been placed on the “No-Fly”  list—information that was not specified in CLASS—since the issuance of  the initial visa and was therefore ineligible for another visa. In addition, the  VSOs in Riyadh conduct searches on applicants’ names prior to their  interviews with consular officers and provide more detailed information on  potential matches obtained from these searches of law enforcement  databases. Consular officers indicated that this practice helps them tailor  their questioning of applicants.
Furthermore, the VSOs in Saudi Arabia interact with consular officers on a  real-time basis. We observed consular officers ask the VSOs for assistance  during interviews, for example, to clarify questions pertaining to potential  criminal hits in CLASS. By contrast, in other embassies, consular officers  must request additional information from other DHS overseas offices or  from Washington.
section_title: VSOs Provide Law Enforcement and Fraud Detection Knowledge and Training
paragraphs: According to DHS, the VSOs’ law enforcement experience and training and  knowledge of immigration law enables them to more effectively identify  applicants who are potential threats to U.S. national security, as well as  identify potentially fraudulent documents submitted by applicants. Since  the Inspector General’s report in 2004, DHS has developed criteria for  selecting VSOs, which includes certain levels of law enforcement and  counterterrorism experience, as well as knowledge of immigration law and  experience working overseas. In addition, VSOs have experience and  training in detecting fraudulent documents. The Memorandum of  Understanding between State and DHS states that VSOs at consular posts  will provide antifraud training to consular officers, among other things.  This training is particularly useful given that State does not have full-time  fraud prevention officers at all of its consular posts overseas, with  antifraud duties often performed by junior officers on a part-time basis.  Indeed, at all but one of the posts that have or plan to have VSOs, consular  officers served as part-time fraud prevention officers in addition to their  other duties in the consular section. Therefore, the VSOs’ experience in this  area can be valuable to consular sections.
section_title: Impact of the Visa Security Program in Saudi Arabia Limited by Several Factors
paragraphs: The deputy chief of mission, consular officers, and VSOs in Saudi Arabia  indicated that the VSOs have positively impacted visa operations; however,  several issues raise concerns about the role and impact of these officers.  These include (1) the use of temporary duty employees, which can limit the  impact of the VSOs in Saudi Arabia; (2) the lack of Arabic language  proficient officers; (3) the requirement that the officers review all visa  applications, which limits their time to perform other valuable tasks; and  (4) the lack of measurable data on the VSOs’ activities, which would  demonstrate their impact on the visa process.
From August 31, 2003, through June 2005, DHS assigned temporary duty  VSOs to Saudi Arabia for tours that varied in length between about 2 and  15 months, for an average assignment of about 7 months. According to  the deputy chief of mission in Saudi Arabia, the use of temporary VSOs  led to a lack of continuity in visa security operations, and, as a result,  the VSOs initially were not able to significantly impact the visa process  at post. The constant turnover of officers can hinder the development of  institutional knowledge and overall visa security efforts. However, the  deputy chief of mission indicated that each subsequent temporary  officer improved operations in Saudi Arabia and enhanced security of  the visa adjudication process. DHS acknowledged that the reliance on  temporary detailed staff is not ideal for the continuity of operations and  the ongoing development of the Visa Security Program. DHS officials  believe that they have addressed the situation as DHS has hired and  trained four permanent employees who were deployed to Saudi Arabia  in June 2005, and will be assigned for a 12-month tour.
Most of the VSOs stationed in Saudi Arabia since 2003 have not been  proficient Arabic speakers and, according to DHS, two of the four new  permanent staff assigned to Saudi Arabia speak Arabic. Additionally,  consuls general at three of the locations chosen for expansion told us  language proficiency would be beneficial at their posts, particularly for  interviewing applicants and reviewing applications and documents. The  ability to speak the host country language is a qualification for VSOs, as  agreed to in the Memorandum of Understanding with State. DHS  acknowledged the utility of language capability, but noted that law  enforcement skills and expertise outweigh the limitations of a lack of  language proficiency. According to DHS, if language training is deemed  necessary, such courses would be offered in addition to the standard  VSO training, which includes courses on interviewing, detection of  deception, and national security law, as well as regional and country  briefings.
The Memorandum of Understanding between State and DHS states that  VSOs would provide training to consular officers on detecting  applicants who pose a threat to homeland security and fraudulent  documents; however, the requirement that VSOs review all visa  applications in Saudi Arabia limits the amount of time that they can  spend on training and other valuable services. We observed that VSOs in  Riyadh and Jeddah must spend a significant amount of time reviewing  all visa applications, including those of low-risk applicants or  individuals who do not pose a threat to national security, as well as  those that have preliminarily been refused by consular officers. For  example, according to DHS officials, lower priority applications may  include those from elderly applicants and very young children.  Furthermore, the requirement has resulted in extremely long work  hours for the VSOs. For example, to return applications to consular  officers within 24 hours of the initial decision, the three VSOs in Riyadh  and one VSO in Jeddah were each working 7 days per week at the time  of our visit. Moreover, the VSOs spend considerable time—as much as 2  hours each day, according to one officer in Jeddah—reviewing  applications that are preliminarily refused by consular officers or from  low-risk applicants. A Visa Security Program official noted that this  mandate is only for visa security operations in Saudi Arabia and not  other posts to which DHS plans to assign VSOs. At posts outside of  Saudi Arabia, DHS proposed the use of site-specific criteria to focus the  review of applications based on several factors, including the number of  applications at the post and post-specific threat assessments. VSOs,  DHS and State officials, and the deputy chief of mission all agreed that  the mandate to review all applications was forcing the VSOs to spend  time on lower priority tasks, limiting their ability to perform other  activities, such as providing training or conducting additional secondary  interviews of applicants. Consular officers also agreed that they would  benefit from additional training and other interaction with the VSOs.  According to DHS, if its VSOs were granted more flexibility to determine  the extent of their review and were not required to review all  applications, they could prioritize visa application reviews—a process  which they plan to implement at other posts. DHS acknowledged that  adding additional officers to the posts in Saudi Arabia could allow VSOs  time to perform other tasks, but DHS would still need to prioritize these  resources to address training and other activities in Saudi Arabia.  However, security concerns at the U.S. embassy and consulate have  limited the number of personnel DHS, as well as other U.S. agencies, can  assign to these posts.
DHS has not maintained measurable data to fully demonstrate the  impact of VSOs on the visa process. The VSOs that were stationed in  Riyadh during our visit estimated that, based on their review of visa  applications, they had recommended that visas be refused after the  preliminary decision to issue a visa by consular officers in about 15  cases between October 2004 and February 2005. In addition, the DHS  officials in Saudi Arabia and in Washington, D.C., were able to provide  anecdotal examples of assistance provided to the consular officers.  However, DHS has not developed a system to fully track the results of  visa security activities in Saudi Arabia. For example, DHS could not  provide data to demonstrate the number of cases for which they have  recommended refusal.
section_title: DHS’s Plans for Expansion of the Visa Security Program Delayed
paragraphs: DHS plans to expand the Visa Security Program to five additional posts in  fiscal year 2005; however, the assignments of VSOs were delayed at four of  the five selected expansion posts. DHS attributed the delay to resistance by  State, as well as funding problems. State and chiefs of mission attributed  the delays to various questions about the program, including the criteria  used by DHS to select expansion posts and the reasoning for the number of  VSOs requested for the posts. A strategic plan to guide operations and  expansion of the Visa Security Program could have answered some of these  questions and potentially prevented some delays in expanding the program  to additional posts, but DHS has not prepared such a plan.
subsections: section_title: DHS’s Expansion of the Visa Security Program in Fiscal Year 2005
paragraphs: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized the assignment of DHS  officers to each diplomatic post where visas are issued to provide expert  advice and training to consular officers and review visa applications. In  2003, a DHS working group established criteria for ranking potential posts  for the program’s expansion. The site selection criteria considered the  following primary factors:  risk of terrorism in a country based on State’s threat assessments and  intelligence of terrorist activity;  visa denial rates; and  issuance of visas to multiple nationalities at a post.
In addition, a Visa Security Program official indicated that DHS also  considered intelligence reports and the host nation circumstances,  including government cooperation, corruption, immigration controls, and  identification document controls, when selecting potential expansion  posts. DHS conducted site assessments, in coordination with State, at six  consular posts in October and November 2003 and April 2004 to further  evaluate the potential for establishing the Visa Security Program at these  posts. According to DHS, delays in expanding the program were due, in  part, to the fact that funding was not reprogrammed for visa security  operations until December 2004.
DHS selected five posts to expand the Visa Security Program and in June  2004 submitted requests for the assignment of 21 VSO positions to five  posts. One post approved the NSDD-38 request in July 2004. Another post  approved the assignment of VSOs in March of 2005, and two posts  approved the requests in June 2005. As of June 2005, one post has still not  approved the NSDD-38 request. Four posts have approved the assignment  of VSOs at their respective posts, but DHS had not yet assigned VSOs to any  of the expansion posts.
section_title: Questions Raised by Embassy Officials Contributed to Delays of DHS Expansion
paragraphs: Embassy officials raised questions and concerns regarding the plans to  expand the Visa Security Program, which contributed to the delays in the  approval of the NSDD-38 requests. State’s Office of Rightsizing the U.S.  Overseas Presence supported the posts’ questions of DHS’s plans for  expansion of the Visa Security Program.
subsections: section_title: Questions Raised about the Site Selection Criteria Used to Select Expansion Posts
paragraphs: Embassy officials at the expansion posts expressed concerns with the site  selection process and the criteria DHS used to select the posts, which  contributed to the delays in approving DHS’s requests for VSOs. Based on  DHS’s quantitative evaluation criteria used to select expansion posts, visa  issuing posts were ranked to identify priority posts for the deployment of  VSOs. However, of the 5 posts selected for expansion of the Visa Security  Program, 2 of the posts ranked outside of the top 10 posts identified by  DHS’s evaluation. Moreover, embassy officials at one of these expansion  posts that did not rank in the initial top 10 believe that DHS’s selection  criteria does not justify the assignment of VSOs to their post. In particular  the consular chief stated that the post had a relatively low application  volume and a low refusal rate—two criteria that DHS used to select the  fiscal year 2005 expansion posts. DHS stated that this particular post was  chosen based on other qualitative data, consultation with law enforcement  and intelligence officials, and practical considerations for expansion of the  program. These additional factors were not included in the methodology  DHS developed to identify priority posts for expansion of the Visa Security  Program. Embassy officials at 2 posts chosen for expansion were unaware  of the criteria used to select the expansion posts; however, DHS stated that  they had explained their criteria.
Embassy officials also questioned the reasoning behind the number of  VSOs that DHS requested for assignment to the selected expansion posts.  In June 2004, DHS originally requested the assignment of 21 VSO positions  to 5 posts. According to DHS, the request for the number of VSOs at each  post was based on the assessment of several factors including the  workload at post. However, chiefs of mission and consular officials also  told us that they were unclear about the number of VSOs required for visa  security operations and requested for assignment. DHS officials stated that  they had explained their rationale fully. As of June 2005, four posts had  approved the assignment of 13 VSO positions. Table 1 shows the number of  VSO positions requested compared to the number of VSO positions  approved by chiefs of mission.
DHS received approval for 8 fewer VSO positions than it requested, and  received the full complement of staff requested at one expansion post. This  gap in approving the assignment of VSOs indicates that DHS either  overestimated the staff it needed to conduct activities at each post or will  not have enough staff at each post to effectively impact the visa  adjudication process at these locations.
DHS negotiated the final number of positions with chiefs of mission at  several posts to help expedite the NSDD-38 requests. For example, DHS  and embassy officials at one post agreed to reduce the number of positions  requested from 5 to 3; subsequently, the NSDD-38 request was approved in  March 2005. The deputy chief of mission and consul general at another  embassy noted that DHS’s request for four VSOs appeared excessive,  considering the low volume of visas that are processed at that post, which  conducts about 30 to 40 applicant interviews daily, and that there are only  four consular officers stationed at the post. Therefore, the embassy  approved two VSOs in June 2005. The post that has not approved DHS’s  request as of June 2005 proposed that DHS assign not four but one VSO for  a 6-month assignment. According to the chief of mission, during this time,  the VSO could demonstrate how the program would benefit the post, as  well as the need for the additional positions DHS requested. DHS officials,  however, believe that one officer would not be sufficient to meet the threat  to visa security at the post.
section_title: Office of Rightsizing the U.S. Overseas Presence Supports Questions of DHS’s Expansion Plans
paragraphs: As we have previously reported, questions related to (1) security of  facilities and employees, (2) mission priorities and requirements, and (3)  cost of operations should be addressed when determining the appropriate  number of staff that should be assigned to a U.S. embassy. In August 2004,  State’s Office of Rightsizing the U.S. Overseas Presence, which manages  the NSDD-38 process for the U.S. government, issued interim guidance to  chiefs of mission regarding factors to consider when approving DHS’s  requests for VSOs. A Rightsizing Office official stated that this guidance is  consistent with guidance that is applicable to all agencies that submit  NSDD-38 requests. Specifically, the cable advised the five chiefs of mission  at posts selected for VSO expansion to delay approving the DHS positions  until State or the post had received sufficient responses to several  outstanding issues, including  criteria for selecting the expansion posts;  agreement on administrative support services, such as building  maintenance, utilities, supplies, and equipment, among others;  the extent to which the VSOs will have regional responsibilities at other   the roles and responsibilities of the VSOs in relation to State’s consular  fraud investigators and regional security officers at post, as well as any  other agencies at post; and  the criteria that will be used to measure the effectiveness of the visa  security operations.
In 2004 and 2005, DHS provided responses, through State’s Bureau of  Consular Affairs, to the questions raised by the chiefs of mission at four of  the expansion posts. According to DHS, the responses were sufficient to  answer the concerns raised by the chiefs of mission. We reviewed the  responses to the posts, and identified a number of issues that had not been  fully addressed. For example, the documentation did not specify the  criteria that DHS will use to demonstrate the effectiveness of its officers.  Nevertheless, the chiefs of mission at three posts approved NSDD-38  requests in March and June 2005.
section_title: DHS Lacks a Strategic Plan to Guide Operations and Expansion of the Visa Security Program
paragraphs: In 2003, DHS and State agreed in a Memorandum of Understanding that  DHS would identify those diplomatic and consular posts where DHS  considered the presence of its personnel necessary to perform visa security  functions and would subsequently assign VSOs to those posts. DHS plans  to expand the Visa Security Program to five additional consular posts  throughout fiscal year 2005. Furthermore, DHS plans to expand the Visa  Security Program beyond the posts initially selected for expansion,  conducted a site assessment in May 2005 for a sixth expansion location,  and plans to continue deployment of VSOs to attain worldwide coverage of  the program. According to DHS, the Secretary of Homeland Security has  suggested a pace of five new posts per year.
Although DHS plans to expand the Visa Security Program in fiscal year  2005 and beyond, it does not a have a strategic plan that defines mission  priorities and long-term goals and identifies the outcomes expected at each  post to guide operations of the program. We have identified the  development of a strategic plan as an essential component of measuring  progress and holding agencies accountable for achieving results. The  development of an overall strategic plan for the Visa Security Program  prior to the expansion of the program may have addressed the questions  initially raised by State and embassy officials that led to the delay of the  assignment of VSOs. Moreover, a strategic plan would provide a framework  for DHS to address broader questions regarding the selection criteria for  expansion, the roles and responsibilities of VSOs, and the cost of  establishing the program at posts. In addition, a strategic plan would guide  rightsizing analyses to determine the appropriate number of VSOs at each  post. Officials from DHS and State, as well as consular officials we  contacted overseas, all agreed that the development of such a plan would  be useful to guide visa security operations in Saudi Arabia and other posts.  It would also be useful to inform the Congress, as well as State and other  agencies who participate in the visa process at consular posts overseas.
Furthermore, as a key stakeholder in the Visa Security Program, State  should be consulted in the strategic planning process and, therefore, the  concerns and questions raised by State’s Office of Rightsizing the U.S.  Overseas Presence and chiefs of mission should be addressed by DHS.  Moreover, without a strategic plan that serves as a roadmap for expansion,  DHS may continue to experience delays in the approval of NSDD-38  requests at future expansion posts.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The placement of VSOs overseas has the potential to improve the security  of the visa process at U.S. embassies and consulates. However, the  congressional mandate requiring the VSOs in Saudi Arabia to review all  applications prior to adjudication limits them from engaging in other  counterterrorism activities, such as providing additional training to  consular officers on fraud prevention and interview techniques. Moreover,  DHS has not incorporated key features of strong program management  essential to measuring program results and holding staff accountable for  achieving results into its oversight of the Visa Security Program. Before  DHS expands this program to other consular posts, it needs a plan outlining  its goals and objectives to allow the department to measure program  performance and determine the overall value of its visa security operations  worldwide. Such a plan needs to address questions from the chiefs of  mission who must approve the assignment of VSOs to U.S. embassies or  consulates. Addressing these questions would help facilitate negotiations  of the expansion of the Visa Security Program.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that the Visa Security Program, and its expansion to other  locations worldwide, is managed effectively, we recommend that the  Secretary of Homeland Security:  develop a strategic plan, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to  guide visa security operations in Saudi Arabia and in other embassies  and consulates overseas. This plan should incorporate the key elements  of strategic planning, including a mission statement, program goals and  objectives, approaches to achieving those goals, a connection between  the long-term and short-term goals, and a description of how the  effectiveness of the program will be evaluated. In addition, DHS should  include or develop supporting documents that provide more specific  information on the criteria used to select the locations for expansion,  justification for the number of VSOs at each post, the roles and  responsibilities of the VSOs in relation to other agencies located at post,  and the resources needed to establish the Visa Security Program  overseas.   develop performance data that can be used to assess the results of the  Visa Security Program at each post.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: Congress may wish to consider amending current legislation, which  requires that VSOs in Saudi Arabia review all visa applications prior to  adjudication, to provide DHS the flexibility to determine the extent to  which VSOs review applications, based upon the development of a risk- assessment tool. This flexibility will allow them to engage in other  activities that will provide additional benefit to consular officers and the  visa process.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DHS and State provided written comments on a draft of this report (see  apps. II and III).
DHS stated it was taking actions to implement performance measurements  and a strategic plan for the Visa Security Program, as described in our  recommendations. DHS indicated that it is expanding the tracking and  measurement of performance data to better reflect program results. In  addition, DHS stated it is developing a strategic plan that will integrate the  key elements described in our recommendation; however, DHS stated that  it was unlikely that such a plan would have aided in the approval of the  NSDD-38 requests at the five expansion posts. We believe that a strategic  plan would allow DHS to better address questions about the program and  would be useful in guiding visa security operations in Saudi Arabia and  other consular posts. Regarding the matter for congressional consideration  to provide DHS with the flexibility to determine the review of visa  applications in Saudi Arabia, DHS agreed that it needed to expand some of  the VSOs’ activities in Saudi Arabia, such as providing additional training,  which we found were not being provided because of the volume of work  that resulted from fulfilling the legislative requirement. DHS noted that a  legislative change should maintain DHS’s authority and discretion in  determining the scope of the VSOs’ review. DHS also provided additional  details on the Visa Security Program, its plans to improve operations, and  its interaction with State regarding program expansion. These comments  are reprinted in appendix II, along with our analysis. DHS also provided  technical comments, which we incorporated into the report, as  appropriate.
State agreed with our conclusions, stating that the report is an accurate  description of the implementation of the Visa Security Program. In  addition, State agreed with our matter for congressional consideration.  State noted that the ability of the VSOs in Saudi Arabia to access law  enforcement and other databases not available to consular officers  highlights the importance of shared, interoperable databases worldwide.  With regard to the program’s expansion outside Saudi Arabia, State also  noted that chiefs of mission and its Rightsizing Office are obligated to  ensure that staffing overseas for all agencies is at the proper level and  consistent with available space and resources. State’s comments are  reprinted in appendix III.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of State and  Homeland Security, and to other interested Members of Congress. We will  also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report  will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512- 4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in  appendix IV.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the Visa Security Officers’ activities in Saudi Arabia, we reviewed  the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which authorized DHS to create the  Visa Security Program. In addition, we reviewed the subsequent September  2003 Memorandum of Understanding between State and DHS regarding the  implementation of the requirements set forth in section 428 of the  Homeland Security Act. We also reviewed a prior report from August 2004  on DHS’s implementation of section 428 requirements, conducted by the  DHS Office of Inspector General, and spoke with the Inspector General  officials who conducted that review. We interviewed officials from DHS  who manage the Visa Security Program in Washington, D.C., as well as  officials from State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Office of  Rightsizing the U.S. Overseas Presence. Moreover, we observed the VSOs’  activities in Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and interviewed the VSOs, as  well as consular officials and the chief of mission, regarding the impact of  the Visa Security Program at these posts.
To assess DHS’s plans to expand the Visa Security Program to consular  posts outside Saudi Arabia, we reviewed documentation on the  department’s requests to establish new positions at 5 additional posts and  spoke with DHS officials regarding the planned expansion. In addition, we  reviewed DHS’s criteria for selecting VSOs and the criteria and  methodology for selecting expansion posts. We also compared DHS’s  management strategy for the Visa Security Program and its expansion with  criteria from the Government Performance and Results Act and associated  GAO reports on performance-based, strategic planning. In addition, we  visited two of the five posts to which DHS plans to expand the Visa Security  Program and interviewed consular and embassy officials, including the  chiefs and deputy chiefs of mission, at these locations to discuss these  posts’ plans for the VSOs. We also spoke with officials from other law  enforcement agencies at post who work with the consular section. Further,  we spoke with the consuls general from the other three posts initially  chosen for expansion in fiscal year 2005 to discuss the status of DHS plans  to expand to these locations. We conducted our evaluation from August  2004 to June 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Homeland  Security’s letter dated July 15, 2005.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. We revised the highlights page to reflect that no comprehensive data  exists to demonstrate the impact of the VSOs in Saudi Arabia. 2. We requested documentation from DHS on the visa application reviews  conducted by VSOs in Saudi Arabia. DHS provided weekly operational  reports that contained descriptive examples of the reviews of visa  applications and the outcomes of those reviews. DHS did not provide  systematic data on the operations of the VSOs, and VSOs in Saudi  Arabia stated that they did not have a system in place to track the  activities of the program. The steps DHS describes appear to be  positive steps to incorporate performance measurement into the Visa  Security Program, and to implement a workload tracking database. We  believe these actions should allow DHS to better demonstrate program  results and are consistent with our recommendation. 3. We revise the report to clarify that VSOs may recommend a refusal after  a preliminary determination to issue the visa by a consular officer. We  agree that there might be additional cases where VSOs may influence  the decision of consular officers. We believe it is important to measure  other outcomes that demonstrate the impact of the Visa Security  Program. Furthermore, we believe that it is not difficult to track  additional data, and such performance measures should be  incorporated into the tracking system for VSO activities. 4. We do not agree that the statement was an error in syntax. We believe  that performance measurement is an integral part of effective program  management, and the lack of comprehensive data on program impact  has hindered the Visa Security Program. Performance data could be  used to demonstrate the effectiveness of operations in Saudi Arabia, as  well as to illustrate the benefits of the program when presenting the  benefits of the program to interested parties, including chiefs of  mission at future expansion posts and the Congress.
5.
In August 2004, the DHS Office of Inspector General found that the  continued use of temporary officers to fill VSO positions was not  conducive to developing an effective or efficient long-term visa security  operation. In addition, in February 2005, the deputy chief of mission in  Saudi Arabia told us that the use of temporary VSOs led to a lack of  continuity in operations, and that the VSOs initially were not able to  significantly impact the visa process at post. Our report recognized that  DHS assigned permanent officers to Saudi Arabia in June 2005. 6. We revised the figure to reflect that VSOs also conduct investigative  research on visa applicants in addition to conducting name checks. 7. Our report noted that, in addition to the quantitative data used as  preliminary selection criteria, DHS stated it used qualitative data and  other practical considerations in choosing the posts. DHS did not  provide this qualitative data nor the additional considerations used to  select expansion posts to GAO, and thus we were unable to assess the  additional criteria. We made an assessment based on the information  and data provided by DHS. 8. We believe that the development of a strategic plan would assist DHS  by providing stakeholders, such as State and chiefs of mission, with  information regarding the mission, goals and operations of the Visa  Security Program. A strategic plan may have helped to address the  questions raised by State and embassy officials that led to the delays in  the approvals of the NSDD-38 requests. In addition, we believe that a  strategic plan would expedite the approval of future NSDD-38 requests  for assignment of VSOs to consular posts. State officials support this  view. DHS is taking positive steps by working towards the development  of a strategic plan as we recommend.
section_title: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition, John Brummet, Daniel Chen, Katie Hartsburg, Jeff Miller, Mary  Moutsos, Joseph Carney, and Etana Finkler made key contributions to this  report.