Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas
Published: 2008-04-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 2002, destroying the terrorist threat and closing the terrorist safe haven have been key national security goals. The United States has provided Pakistan, a key ally in the war on terror, more than $10.5 billion for military, economic, and development activities. Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which border Afghanistan, are vast unpoliced regions attractive to extremists and terrorists seeking a safe haven. GAO was asked to assess (1) the progress in meeting these national security goals for Pakistan's FATA, and (2) the status of U.S. efforts to develop a comprehensive plan for the FATA. To address these objectives, GAO compared national security goals against assessments conducted by U.S. agencies and reviewed available plans.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy terrorist threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan's FATA. Since 2002, the United States relied principally on the Pakistan military to address U.S. national security goals. Of the approximately $5.8 billion the United States provided for efforts in the FATA and border region from 2002 through 2007, about 96 percent reimbursed Pakistan for military operations there. According to the Department of State, Pakistan deployed 120,000 military and paramilitary forces in the FATA and helped kill and capture hundreds of suspected al Qaeda operatives; these efforts cost the lives of approximately 1,400 members of Pakistan's security forces. However, GAO found broad agreement, as documented in the National Intelligence Estimate, State, and embassy documents, as well as Defense officials in Pakistan, that al Qaeda had regenerated its ability to attack the United States and had succeeded in establishing a safe haven in Pakistan's FATA. No comprehensive plan for meeting U.S. national security goals in the FATA has been developed, as stipulated by the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), called for by an independent commission (2004), and mandated by congressional legislation (2007). Furthermore, Congress created the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in 2004 specifically to develop comprehensive plans to combat terrorism. However, neither the National Security Council (NSC), NCTC, nor other executive branch departments have developed a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of national power--diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support--called for by the various national security strategies and Congress. As a result, since 2002, the U.S. embassy in Pakistan has had no Washington-supported, comprehensive plan to combat terrorism and close the terrorist safe haven in the FATA. In 2006, the embassy, in conjunction with Defense, State, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and in cooperation with the government of Pakistan, began an effort to focus more attention on other key elements of national power, such as development assistance and public diplomacy, to address U.S. goals in the FATA. However, this does not yet constitute a comprehensive plan.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were planned from an Afghan safe haven, and  many of the terrorists who attacked the United States used Pakistan as the  main route to travel from Afghanistan to the United States. Since the 9/11  attacks in 2001, the administration and Congress have repeatedly stated  that destroying terrorist threats and closing terrorist safe havens are the  nation’s critical national security goals. As such, the United States has  provided Pakistan, which has become a key U.S. ally in the global war on  terror, with more than $10.5 billion for military, economic, and  development activities in support of these goals. The 9/11 Commission, an  independent, bipartisan commission created by congressional legislation  in late 2002, concluded in 2004 that it is hard to overstate the importance  of Pakistan in the struggle against Islamist terrorism. The commission  found that the country’s vast unpoliced regions have made it attractive to  extremists seeking a safe haven and have reportedly provided a base for  terrorist operations against U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan.  Following the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, al Qaeda and Taliban  fighters are believed to have retreated across the Afghan border and into  Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in an effort to re- establish a terrorist safe haven.
Because of the challenges the United States faces in Pakistan in meeting  its goals to destroy the terrorist threats and close the terrorist safe haven,  we were asked to assess (1) U.S. progress in meeting its national security  goals in Pakistan’s FATA region, and (2) the status of U.S. efforts to  develop a comprehensive plan for the FATA.
This report is the first in a series of reports we plan to issue in response to  your interest in U.S. support of the Pakistani government’s efforts in the  FATA region bordering Afghanistan. We plan to issue an interim product  on the use and oversight of Coalition Support Funds (CSF) in May 2008  and a report on CSF in the summer of 2008, followed by a broader report  covering security, political, and development assistance activities  undertaken by the United States to meet U.S. national security goals in the  FATA.
To address our objectives, we reviewed relevant national security  strategies, the 9/11 Commission Report, key congressional legislation,  and related documentation from the Departments of Defense (Defense)  and State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development  (USAID), and discussed these issues with relevant department officials in  Washington, D.C. We also interviewed Defense officials operating out of  the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters in Tampa, Florida.  We requested meetings with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the  National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the National Security  Council (NSC); however, only the CIA agreed to meet with us. To  determine progress in meeting national security objectives, we compared  the national security goals stated in strategic documents with unclassified  assessments conducted by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI),  State, and U.S. officials operating in Pakistan. To determine if  comprehensive plans were developed and contained the elements  recommended by national security documents, legislation, and GAO, we  requested all plans addressing U.S. efforts in the FATA from the CIA,  Defense, NCTC, NSC, State, USAID, and the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan.  CIA, NCTC, and NSC did not provide any plans. We reviewed all plans  provided by Defense, State, and USAID, as of April 17, 2008. We also met  with members of the International Crisis Group in Washington, including  the director of their office in Pakistan. In addition, we conducted field  work in Pakistan, where we met with officials from the U.S. embassy and  Pakistan’s Ministries of Defense and Interior, as well as international  donors from Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. We  visited Peshawar, near the FATA, to conduct discussions with the U.S.  consulate, Pakistan’s 11th Army Corps, the Frontier Corps, the FATA  Secretariat and Development Authority, and a Pakistani nongovernmental  organization with experience working in the FATA. We determined the  amount of U.S. funding to Pakistan by analyzing Defense, State, and  USAID budget documents covering the period from fiscal years 2002  through 2007 and by verifying the amounts used for the FATA and the  border regions through discussions with agency officials. This analysis  does not include funding for covert activities in Pakistan.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 through April 2008 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The FATA is mountainous and shares a 373-mile border with Afghanistan  known as the Durand Line (see fig. 1). The FATA, which has a population  of 3.1 million people, is one of Pakistan’s poorest regions, with high  poverty, high unemployment, and an underdeveloped infrastructure. Most  of the population depends on subsistence agriculture. The FATA’s per  capita income is $250 per year, which is half of the national per capita  income; about 60 percent of the population lives below the national  poverty line. Per capita public development expenditure is reportedly one- third of the national average. Social development indicators are also poor.  The overall literacy rate is 17 percent, compared with 56 percent  nationally, with male literacy at 29 percent and female literacy at 3  percent. The FATA has just 41 hospitals for its population of 3.1 million,  and a doctor to population ratio of 1 to 6,762.
The FATA is governed by an administrative system and a judicial system  different from the rest of Pakistan—the Frontier Crimes Regulations  (FCR) of 1901, codified under British rule. Because Pakistan retained the  colonial administrative and legal structures of the British, as codified in  the FCR, the FATA populations are legally separate from and unequal to  other Pakistani citizens. Examples of these differences under the FCR  follow:    FATA residents do not have access to national political parties, and  political parties are forbidden from extending their activities into the  agencies of FATA.
The FATA is under the direct executive authority of the President of  Pakistan. Laws framed by the National Assembly of Pakistan do not apply  in the FATA unless so ordered by the President, who is empowered to  issue regulations for the tribal areas.
FATA residents do not have the right to legal representation, to present  material evidence, or to cross-examine witnesses in Pakistan’s judicial  system. Those convicted are denied the right of appeal in Pakistan’s  courts.
The President’s representatives to the FATA, who are called political  agents, can punish an entire tribe for crimes committed on the tribe’s  territory by issuing fines, making arrests, implementing property seizures,  and establishing blockades.
In response to the draft, Defense noted that the FCR is a culturally  acceptable recognition of the tribal structure of the FATA, where the  population is ethnically different from the majority of Pakistan’s citizens,  and precludes forced assimilation. Further, Defense noted that removing  the FCR without a replacement mechanism that is accepted by the  indigenous population has the potential to create a vacuum that could  result in negative consequences. A recent announcement by Pakistani  Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani regarding the repeal of the FCR drew  mixed reactions from tribesmen and political leaders, some of whom  called for amendments to the FCR, rather than its repeal.
section_title: The U.S. Government Has Not Met National Security Goals in Pakistan’s FATA
paragraphs: The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy the  terrorist threat and close the safe haven in the FATA, despite more than  $10.5 billion in U.S. support to Pakistan since 2002. Various national  security strategies have called for the use of all elements of national  power, such as diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance,  economic, and law enforcement support, to meet these goals; however, the  United States has relied principally on supporting the Pakistani military to  meet these goals. According to Defense and State, the Pakistani  government deployed up to 120,000 military and paramilitary forces to  combat terrorism in the FATA. Despite this effort, the 2007 NIE, State and  embassy documents, and Defense and State officials, including those  operating in Pakistan, have concluded that al Qaeda has regenerated its  ability to attack the United States and succeeded in establishing a safe  haven in Pakistan’s FATA.
subsections: section_title: Although State Has Reported Some Progress in Pakistan’s FATA, Other Sources Indicate Resurgence of an al Qaeda Threat and the Establishment of a Terrorist Safe Haven in the FATA
paragraphs: On October 1, 2007, State provided Congress with a report in response to a  requirement in the Implementation of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007  (9/11 Commission Act). The report stated that it had determined that  Pakistan was (1) committed to eliminating from Pakistani territory any  organization, such as the Taliban, al Qaeda, or any successor engaged in  military, insurgent, or terrorist activities in Afghanistan; (2) undertaking a  comprehensive military, legal, economic, and political campaign to  achieve the goal described; and (3) making demonstrated, significant, and  sustained progress toward eliminating support or safe havens for  terrorists. Notwithstanding State’s report to Congress, we found broad  agreement that al Qaeda had established a safe haven in the FATA and  reconstituted its attack capability. In particular, the unclassified versions  of the 2007 NIE and 2008 Annual Threat Assessment state that al Qaeda  has regenerated its attack capability and secured a safe haven in  Pakistan’s FATA. These conclusions are supported by a broad array of  sources, including Defense, State, and senior U.S. embassy officials in  Pakistan.
The NIE and other sources have found that al Qaeda has established a safe  haven in Pakistan. The DNI’s 2008 assessment stated that the safe haven in  Pakistan provides al Qaeda with many of the same advantages it had when  it was based across the border in Afghanistan. According to the  assessment, the safe haven in the FATA serves as a staging area for al  Qaeda’s attacks in support of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Further, it serves  as a location for training new terrorist operatives for attacks in Pakistan,  the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the United States. U.S. government  officials in Washington and Pakistan also acknowledge that al Qaeda has  established a safe haven near Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan. For  example, State’s April 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism states that  Pakistan remains a major source of Islamic extremism and a safe haven  for some top terrorist leaders, including those of al Qaeda.
The NIE, The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland, also found that al  Qaeda had effectively found replacements for many of its senior  operational planners over the years. The NIE stated that, in the past 2  years, al Qaeda’s central leadership regenerated the core operational  capabilities needed to conduct attacks against the United States. It also  found that al Qaeda’s central leadership, based in the border area of  Pakistan, is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the United  States.
The 2008 DNI Annual Threat Assessment and other sources have  concluded that the resurgence of al Qaeda terrorists on the border  between Pakistan and Afghanistan now pose a preeminent threat to U.S.  national security. The assessment also examines the impact of not meeting  the national security goals. It states that al Qaeda is now using the  Pakistani safe haven to put the last element necessary to launch another  attack against America into place, including the identification, training,  and positioning of Western operatives for an attack. It stated that al Qaeda  is most likely using the FATA to plot terrorist attacks against political,  economic, and infrastructure targets in America “designed to produce  mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic  aftershocks, and/or fear among the population.”
DNI’s 2008 assessment found that al Qaeda and other Pakistan-based  militants now also pose a threat to Pakistan. The assessment found an  unparalleled increase in suicide attacks against Pakistan’s military and  civilians over the past year, with total casualties in 2007 exceeding all such  attacks in the preceding 5 years. These attacks were ordered by Pakistan- based militants, many of whom are allied with al Qaeda. It found that the  terrorist assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto could  encourage terrorists to strike the Pakistani establishment anywhere in the  country. The assessment concluded that radical elements now have the  potential to undermine Pakistan itself.
section_title: The United States Has Relied Primarily on the Pakistani Military to Accomplish Its Goals in Pakistan’s FATA, with Little Focus on Economic Development and Improving Governance
paragraphs: Since 2002, the United States has relied principally on the Pakistani  military to address U.S. national security goals in the FATA. There have  been limited efforts, however, to address other underlying causes of  terrorism in the FATA, such as providing development assistance or  addressing the FATA’s political needs. For example, although the FATA  has some of the worst development indicators in Pakistan and is ruled  under colonial administrative and legal structures dating from 1901, the  United States has devoted little funding to address these issues in the  FATA.
From fiscal years 2002 to 2007, the United States has provided Pakistan  with more than $10.5 billion in funds and assistance. Approximately $5.8  billion of this amount has been directed at efforts to combat terrorism in  Pakistan’s FATA and the border region. As figure 2 shows, about 96  percent of this amount was used to reimburse the Pakistani government  through CSF for military operations in support of Operation Enduring  Freedom in Afghanistan, most significantly against terrorists in Pakistan’s  FATA and border region. We identified only two nonmilitary activities that  occured in the FATA and border region: State’s Border Security Program,  which received about $187 million, and USAID development activities,  which amounted to about $40 million.
According to a State Department report, Pakistan’s military forces have  had some tactical successes in the FATA. The Pakistani government  stationed military and paramilitary forces along the border with  Afghanistan, and security operations in the FATA disrupted terrorist  activity by targeting and raiding al Qaeda and other militant safe havens.  According to State, Pakistan has helped kill or capture hundreds of  suspected terrorists, including al Qaeda operatives and Taliban leaders. In  addition, Pakistani military operations have resulted in the deaths of  approximately 1,400 members of its security forces.
section_title: Key Government Stakeholders Recognize That a More Comprehensive Approach Is Needed
paragraphs: Defense, State, U.S. embassy, and Pakistani government officials recognize  that relying primarily on the Pakistani military has not succeeded in  neutralizing al Qaeda and preventing the establishment of a safe haven in  the FATA. State’s April 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism states that,  despite having Pakistani troops in the FATA and sustaining hundreds of  casualties, the government of Pakistan has been unable to exert control  over the area. The report concluded that Pakistan has now recognized that  military operations alone will not restore security and stability to the  FATA. Similarly, U.S. embassy officials in Pakistan stated that Taliban and  al Qaeda elements have created a safe haven in the FATA and have used it  to plan and launch attacks on Afghan, Pakistani, U.S., and coalition forces  in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The embassy further noted that al Qaeda and  the Taliban continue to recruit, train, and operate in the FATA.
According to senior embassy officials, U.S. reliance on Pakistan’s military  stemmed from the lack of a comprehensive plan to guide embassy efforts  and the sense that the Pakistani military was the most capable institution  in Pakistan to quickly undertake operations against al Qaeda immediately  after the attacks of 9/11. Senior embassy officials stated that this may have  led to an “over-reliance” on the Pakistani military to achieve U.S. national  security objectives in Pakistan.
section_title: No Comprehensive Plan for Guiding U.S. Efforts in the FATA Has Been Developed, as Called for by the Administration and Congress
paragraphs: Despite the recognition of U.S. government officials, including the U.S.  President and Congress, that a comprehensive plan employing all elements  of national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, development  assistance, economic, and law enforcement support—was needed to  combat terrorism and close the terrorist safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA  region, a comprehensive plan to meet U.S. national security goals in the  region was never developed. Recognizing in 2006 that military efforts  alone would not succeed in the FATA, the embassy, with Defense, State,  and USAID support, and in conjunction with the Pakistani government in  power at that time, began an effort to focus more attention on the other  key elements of national power, such as development and public  diplomacy, to address U.S. national security goals in the FATA. However,  this effort has not been formally approved by U.S. government  stakeholders who would play a key role in the funding and implementation  of such an effort, and support from the recently elected Pakistani  government is uncertain.
subsections: section_title: Presidential Powers for Implementing National Security Strategies and Developing a Comprehensive Plan
paragraphs: The President of the United States has primary responsibility to ensure  that his national security strategy is carried out effectively. The President  has the authority to task executive branch departments to develop  comprehensive plans that use all elements of U.S. power—diplomatic,  military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law  enforcement support—toward meeting U.S. national security goals. As a  result, the President can task key national security agencies, such as  Defense, State, USAID, the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice,  the Treasury, and intelligence agencies, to develop a comprehensive,  integrated strategy and to use their combined capabilities to combat  terrorism, as called for in the national security strategies. The President  can also use the NSC and the NCTC to assist in developing,  coordinating, and monitoring these plans.
section_title: Despite Executive, Congressional, and Independent Calls for Comprehensive Plans to Combat Terrorism and Close Terrorist Safe Havens, Such Plans Were Never Developed
paragraphs: As table 1 shows, the need for the development of comprehensive plans  employing all elements of national power—diplomatic, military,  intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement  support—to combat terrorism and close terrorist safe havens has been  recognized by the President’s national security strategies (2003), the  independent 9/11 Commission (2004), and by Congress in repeated  legislation (2004 and 2007). As it became clearer that al Qaeda had  retreated from Afghanistan into Pakistan and was creating a safe haven in  the FATA, Congress increased its demands on the U.S. administration to  develop comprehensive plans to help Pakistan combat terrorism and close  the FATA safe haven.
Despite recommendations by the President’s own national security  strategy, by the independent 9/11 Commission, as well as legislative  mandates from Congress, a comprehensive plan to destroy the terrorist  threat or close the safe haven in the FATA was never developed. Even  after the creation of the NCTC, an organization specifically intended to  develop, implement, and monitor multidepartment plans to combat  terrorism, the embassy has yet to receive any such plan to combat  terrorism in Pakistan’s FATA. In addition, the administration did not  report to Congress on its plans for assisting Pakistan in (1) combating  terrorism and (2) closing terrorist safe havens, as required by both the  2004 and 2007 legislation.
As a result, the embassy has lacked a Washington-approved,  comprehensive plan that combines the capabilities of Defense, State,  USAID, intelligence agencies, and other U.S. departments to combat  terrorism in the FATA. According to senior embassy officials in Islamabad,  the embassy had not received a comprehensive plan from the CIA,  Defense, State, the NCTC, the NSC, the White House, or any other  executive department. Further, these officials stated that they had not  received any strategic guidance on designing, implementing, funding, and  monitoring a comprehensive effort that would use all elements of national  power to combat terrorism in Pakistan. According to senior embassy  officials, given the strategic threat to America, the United States should  have a comprehensive strategy to defeat terrorists that uses all elements of  national power.
Defense, State, the DNI, USAID, and the government of Pakistan recognize  that a comprehensive approach is needed to meet U.S. national security  goals in Pakistan. For example, in its 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism,  State indicated that Pakistan recognized that military operations alone  would not restore stability to the FATA; instead, a comprehensive strategy  was needed that also included economic, social development, political,  and administrative efforts to enhance security in the region. The U.S.  Embassy in Pakistan also concluded that, while force is a necessary  component of an overall strategy to combat terrorism in the FATA, it is not  sufficient as the sole component. Similarly, the DNI stated that Pakistan  now recognizes it must take a more comprehensive approach to defeating  terrorism and that an intensified and sustained effort that combines  administrative, economic, educational, legal, and social reforms to defeat  the terrorist threat is required.
We have previously reported on the need for plans to combat terrorism to  include elements that would enhance interagency cooperation and  improve effectiveness. Specifically, in large-scale interagency efforts  where collaboration is essential, we have found that agencies should   (1) define and articulate a common outcome; (2) establish mutually  reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identify and address funding needs by  leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and responsibilities; (5) establish  compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across  agency boundaries; (6) develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and  report on results; (7) reinforce agency accountability for collaborative  efforts through agency plans and reports; and (8) reinforce individual  accountability for collaborative efforts through performance management  systems.
section_title: Pakistan and the U.S. Embassy are Encouraging More Focus on Other Key Elements of National Power to Achieve U.S. Goals in the FATA
paragraphs: In March 2006, the President of Pakistan requested that President Bush  support Pakistan’s effort to support a more comprehensive approach to  combating terrorism in the FATA. As a result, the U.S. Embassy in  Pakistan began coordinating efforts by Defense, State, and USAID to  develop department-specific efforts to support Pakistan’s Sustainable  Development Plan for the FATA. Pakistan’s Sustainable Development Plan  is a 9 year, $2 billion effort to provide economic development, extend the  influence of the Pakistani government, and establish security in the FATA.  To assist this effort, Defense undertook a counterinsurgency assessment  in the FATA and began developing its Security Development Plan. At the  same time, USAID provided technical assistance to the Pakistani  government to help formalize its Sustainable Development Plan, as well as  to plan USAID-development activities in the FATA.
This approach, if approved by the administration and key U.S. government  agency stakeholders, would constitute the U.S. government’s first attempt  to focus more attention on other key elements of national power to  address U.S. counterterrorism goals in the FATA. These elements include  development assistance and public diplomacy, as well as  counterinsurgency training, which have not been part of the previous  military approach. This new approach also calls for greater levels of direct  U.S. planning, implementation, coordination, and oversight. However, this  new approach does not yet constitute a comprehensive plan, and all of the  agencies’ individual efforts have not been fully approved in Washington.  Furthermore, funding shortfalls exist, and support by the recently elected  government of Pakistan is uncertain.
If fully approved, the United States would provide an estimated $956  million between fiscal years 2008 through 2011 for development, security,  capacity building, and infrastructure in support of the Pakistani  government. This approach represents the first effort by the U.S. embassy  to directly plan, implement, coordinate, and monitor a multidepartment  effort to combat terrorism in the FATA. According to officials with the  U.S. embassy, the Pakistani government, and international donors, this  comprehensive approach is critical to addressing the terrorist threat in the  FATA and represents a significant departure from the past.
As of September 2007, the embassy planned to spend $187.6 million on this  initial effort using fiscal year 2007 funds. The funding has been directed to  four areas:    Development: The $99 million development effort would be led by USAID  and would include capacity building for the FATA institutions needed to  plan, manage, and monitor development projects; efforts to build  community and government relations; funding for health and education  services; and efforts to increase employment and economic growth.
Security: The $54.1 million Defense and State security effort would  include training for military and paramilitary units in the FATA—including  the Frontier Corps, special operations forces, and air crews—and for  providing night vision goggles, radios, and other equipment.
Infrastructure: The $32.5 million the U.S. embassy has designated for  infrastructure improvements related to both its security and development  efforts would be used for road construction, the Frontier Corps training  center, and border surveillance outposts.
Public diplomacy: $2 million in funding was allotted for public diplomacy  programs.
According to the embassy, the success of this new effort in the FATA will  depend on close coordination among an array of institutions within the  U.S. and Pakistani governments. The new effort also will involve partner  agencies and allies, including the United Kingdom, Japan, and Europe; the  Asian Development Bank; nongovernmental organizations; and the  Pakistani private sector, civil society, and the tribes of the FATA.
We plan to monitor the status and progress of the U.S. government in  developing this effort and provide an assessment in a subsequent report  covering security, political, and development activities undertaken by the  United States to meet U.S. national security goals in the FATA.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: Combating terrorism is the United States’ top national security priority at  home and abroad. Since 9/11, U.S. national security strategies have  consistently called for using all elements of national power to combat  terrorism, including diplomatic, military, intelligence, development  assistance, economic, and law enforcement support. Because the use of  the various elements of national power falls under the authority of  numerous U.S. government agencies, the development of a comprehensive  plan is needed to ensure that the full capacity of the U.S. government is  focused on meeting U.S. national security goals.
We believe that such a plan would help to ensure coordination,  integration, and implementation of U.S. efforts to close the terrorist safe  haven in the FATA. A comprehensive plan to combat terrorism in the  FATA that establishes goals, objectives, priorities, outcomes, and  milestones, including specific performance measures, would allow an  assessment of progress and help ensure accountability of U.S. efforts. As  such, we believe that the administration should develop a comprehensive  plan using the full capabilities provided by Defense, State, USAID, and  other U.S. agencies and stakeholders to further assist Pakistan in  combating terrorism.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the National Security Advisor and the Director of the  NCTC, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the  Administrator of USAID, the intelligence community, and other executive  departments as deemed appropriate, implement the congressional  mandate to develop a comprehensive plan using all elements of national  power to combat the terrorist threat and close their safe haven in  Pakistan’s FATA region.
The comprehensive plan should also include key components called for in  the Intelligence Reform Act, the Implementing Recommendations of the  9/11 Commission Act of 2007, and components that we have previously  reported as being needed to improve the effectiveness of plans involving  multidepartmental efforts to combat terrorism. The plan should (1) place  someone directly in charge of this multidepartment effort to improve  accountability; (2) articulate a clear strategy to implement the national  security goal to destroy terrorists and close the safe haven in the FATA;   (3) clarify roles and responsibilities of each department for implementing  the goal; (4) provide guidance on setting funding priorities and providing  resources to meet these national security goals; and (5) require a  monitoring system and provide periodic reports to Congress on the  progress and impediments to meeting national security goals in Pakistan.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: State, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Defense,  and USAID provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are  reproduced in appendixes I, II, III, and IV.
State and ODNI did not comment on our recommendation, while Defense  and USAID concurred with our recommendation. In general, they all  commented on their individual planning efforts and interagency meetings  to coordinate these efforts that began in 2006. This, however, was not the  focus of our review; our report assessed whether a comprehensive plan  had been developed that incorporated all elements of national power. We  plan to conduct a detailed assessment of the individual agency efforts  from 2002 to the present as part of our broader engagement efforts and  look forward to working closely with ODNI, Defense, State, USAID, and  other agencies in assessing their plans and efforts to meet national  security goals in Pakistan.
State’s comments assert that embassy and U.S. government efforts to date  have resulted in a comprehensive strategy. We disagree and note in our  report that, while the initiatives begun by Defense, State, and USAID are  being coordinated by the embassy, they have not been fully approved or  integrated into a formal, comprehensive plan. While we acknowledge that  this effort is a step in the right direction toward implementing the 2003  national security strategy, the recommendations by the 9/11 Commission,  and Congress, it is unclear whether the new approach will include all of  the key elements of national power, such as intelligence, economic, and  law enforcement support.
ODNI’s comments stated that they agreed with our finding that the United  States had not met its national security goals in Pakistan’s FATA and that  countering the growth of terrorist safe havens requires all elements of  national power. They disagreed, however, that the United States lacks  plans to combat terrorism in the area. Our report does not state that the  U.S. lacks individual plans; rather, we found that there was no  comprehensive plan that integrated the combined capabilities of Defense,  State, USAID, the intelligence community, and others to meet U.S. national  security goals in Pakistan.
We also received technical comments from Defense and USAID, which we  have incorporated throughout the report where appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested  congressional committees, to the National Security Advisor of the NSC,  the Director of the NCTC, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the  Administrator of USAID. We will also make copies of this report available  to others upon request. We will also make copies available at no charge on  the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this  report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact:
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Hynek Kalkus, Assistant  Director; Edward J. George; Claude Adrien; David Hancock; Lynn Cothern;  Karen Deans; Mark Dowling; and Jena Sinkfield made key contributions to  this report.