Military Readiness: Army and Marine Corps Reporting Provides Additional Data, but Actions Needed to Improve Consistency
Published: 2011-06-03T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: To obtain visibility of the capabilities of its military forces, the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed an enterprise of interconnected readiness reporting systems. In 2010, to better meet the information needs of their leaders, the Army and Marine Corps implemented new reporting requirements. House and Senate Reports, which accompanied proposed bills for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, directed GAO to review recent readiness reporting changes. GAO assessed the extent that 1) current readiness reporting policies have affected the content of readiness information provided to decision makers, 2) the services have consistently implemented their new policies, and 3) changes to the Army, Marine Corps, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) systems have affected the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) enterprise. GAO analyzed DOD, Army, and Marine Corps policies, readiness data, service readiness reporting systems, and spoke to headquarters officials and reporting units.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Current Army and Marine Corps guidance has generally improved the quantity and objectivity of readiness information available to decision makers. As in the past, Army Regulation 220-1 and Marine Corps Order 3000.13 direct units to report on two types of missions--the core missions for which units were designed as well as any other missions they may be assigned, but recent changes to the guidance also added new requirements. Units must now provide objective, personnel and equipment data to supplement commanders' assessments of their units' assigned mission capabilities. The updated service guidance also provides additional criteria, which are intended to help unit commanders consistently assess their units' mission capabilities. The new data and additional mission assessment criteria improve the objectivity and consistency of readiness information provided to decision makers. However, to clearly identify units that recently returned from deployment, the Army regulation now requires units to uniformly report a specific service directed readiness level rather than assess and report the unit's actual readiness level. As a result, decision makers lack a complete picture of the readiness of some units that could be called upon to respond to contingencies. While the Army and Marine Corps have taken steps to implement the revised readiness reporting guidance, units are inconsistently reporting readiness in some areas. GAO site visits to 33 Army and 20 Marine Corps units revealed that units were using inconsistent reporting time frames, and GAO data analysis showed that 49 percent of Marine Corps reports submitted between May 2010 and January 2011 were late. Furthermore, units are reporting equipment and personnel numbers differently, and some units are not linking their two types of mission assessments, in accordance with current guidance. The federal standards for internal control state management must continually assess and evaluate its internal controls to assure that the control activities being used are effective and updated when necessary. However, Marine Corps and Army quality assurance reviews have not identified all the inconsistencies and system mechanisms are not preventing the submission of inconsistent data. Until internal controls improve, decision makers will continue to rely on readiness information that is based on inconsistent reporting. While the DRRS Concept of Operations calls for a family of systems to exchange information seamlessly under an enterprise framework, DOD and the services have focused their efforts on the needs of different users and have not reached agreement on key steps to achieve interoperability. Consequently progress has been incremental. In 2009, GAO issued a report highlighting the challenges facing DRRS and recommended that DOD use GAO's report and an independent program risk assessment to redirect the program's approach, structure, and oversight. As of April 2011, the risk assessment had not been done and it is now scheduled to begin in the fall of this year. Until this assessment is complete, OSD will continue to lack the information it needs to reach consensus with the services and make any adjustments needed to achieve interoperability.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Army develop an alternative means to show which units recently returned from deployment and that both services improve internal controls to enhance readiness reporting. DOD did not concur, citing the availability of other readiness data and actions taken on internal controls. GAO disagrees that the data DOD cites provides sufficient visibility; therefore, additional actions are needed.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In an era of persistent conflict and global uncertainty, the President,  Congress, and military and civilian leaders within the Department of  Defense (DOD) need visibility over the readiness of DOD’s forces. Over  the years, the services, Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense  (OSD) have relied on readiness information from a variety of systems to  help them guide, prepare, and deploy forces for regular as well as  nontraditional assigned missions. In the 1990s, readiness reporting  systems captured unit commanders’ assessments of their unit’s  capabilities to execute the unit’s regular missions. These assessments  were supported by underlying data that compared on-hand personnel and  equipment levels to required levels, data concerning the material condition  of on-hand equipment, and assessments of unit training.
In 1999, Congress directed DOD to create a comprehensive readiness  reporting system to measure in an objective, accurate, and timely manner  the capability of the armed forces to carry out the National Security  Strategy prescribed by the President, the defense planning guidance  provided by the Secretary of Defense, and the National Military Strategy  prescribed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In response, DOD  is developing a family of interconnected information systems that build  upon existing processes and readiness assessment tools to establish a  capabilities-based, readiness reporting system—referred to as the Defense  Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) Enterprise. DRRS-Army and DRRS- Marine Corps are two of the interconnected information systems within  the enterprise. These two systems provide service leaders with the  detailed information necessary to execute their Title 10 responsibilities to  man, train, and equip their forces, and are also used to provide information  to department and congressional leaders through the OSD DRRS-Strategic  system and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Global Status of  Resource and Training System. To better meet the information needs of  their service leaders, in 2010 the Army and Marine Corps implemented  new readiness reporting guidance. Among other things, the changes in  guidance affected the ways units reported their capabilities to perform  assigned missions.
House Report 111-491 and Senate Report 111-201, which accompanied  proposed bills for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2011, directed GAO to review the readiness reporting changes of the Army  and Marine Corps. Accordingly, we assessed (1) the extent to which  current readiness reporting requirements have affected the content of  readiness information provided to various decision makers within and  outside the DOD, (2) the extent to which Army and Marine Corps have  consistently implemented their current readiness reporting guidance, and  (3) how system developments for the DRRS-Strategic, DRRS-Army, and  DRRS-Marine Corps have affected the enterprise.
To determine the extent to which the current readiness reporting guidance  has affected the content of information provided to various decision  makers, we analyzed Army, Marine Corps, Joint Staff, and OSD guidance  as well as laws requiring readiness reports from DOD. We also discussed  the guidance with officials from the OSD, the Office of the Assistant  Secretary of the Army, Headquarters Marine Corps, the office of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff, as well as other Army and Marine Corps service officials.  Finally, we compared the information that was provided to key decision  makers prior to the changes in reporting requirements to the information  that is currently provided. To determine the extent to which the Army and  Marine Corps have consistently implemented their current readiness  reporting guidance we analyzed readiness reporting data from both Army  and Marine Corps units. Specifically, we compared the reporting  requirements of the respective services to the information units were  reporting. We assessed the reliability of the DRRS data and determined the  data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of assessing the  consistency of the implementation of the current readiness reporting  policies, and discuss our findings in the report. To gain a better  understanding of the readiness reporting process and how the readiness  reporting guidance is being implemented we judgmentally selected Army  and Marine Corps locations where we could meet with a variety of  different types of reporting units. Specifically, we visited 5 Army locations,  where we met with key officials from 33 Army units, and 2 Marine Corps  installations where we met with key officials from 20 Marine Corps units.  We visited a wide variety of units to see if factors such as unit type, size,  location, component, or placement within the deployment cycle were  affecting the units’ reports and implementation of the new guidance.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2010 to June 2011, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides a more detailed  description of our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Family of Readiness Reporting Systems
paragraphs: DOD established the Defense Readiness Reporting System in response to  the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  1999. Later, DRRS evolved into the DRRS Information Technology  Enterprise Environment (enterprise). The enterprise represents a family of  service and OSD computer information systems and selected databases. It  is intended to capture DOD readiness data from multiple sources and  provide relevant elements of these data to decision makers. Specifically,  the enterprise will report assessments of both capabilities and of training  and resources. The DRRS-Army, DRRS-Marine Corps, and DRRS-Navy  systems currently provide information and data within and outside of the  enterprise. This report focuses on the DRRS-Army and DRRS-Marine  Corps systems and the relationship of those systems to the DRRS-Strategic  system.
To provide governance of the family of reporting systems that make up the  enterprise, the Under Secretary of Defense – Personnel & Readiness  established a three-tier structure. This three-tier structure is to enhance  communication between the development community, represented by the  DRRS Implementation Office and system contractors, and the user  community (which includes the Joint Staff, military services, and  combatant commands).
Representatives from the office of the Under Secretary of Defense –  Personnel & Readiness and the Joint Staff currently serve as co-chairs of  all three governance tiers.
Tier One: This involves the DRRS Battle Staff, which is comprised of  colonels, Navy captains, and similar-graded civilians. It tracks DRRS  development and identifies issues with the system.
Tier Two: This level involves the DRRS General and Flag Officer  Steering Committee, which discusses issues raised by the Battle Staff  (Tier One). Members are one-star generals or admirals, or civilian  equivalent.
Tier Three: The DRRS Executive Committee is chartered to review and  approve proposals and plans to establish policy, processes, and system  requirements for DRRS, including approving software development  milestones required to reach objectives. This committee is composed  of 3-star military officers and their civilian counterparts. It is chaired by  the Director of the Joint Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense –  Personnel & Readiness.
section_title: Two Types of Mission Assessments
paragraphs: DOD units assess their readiness for their core and assigned missions  using two different types of mission assessments. OSD requires that units  assess their readiness using capability measures. The Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff requires that units assess their readiness using  resource and training metrics. In September 2006, the Army designated its  readiness reporting system as DRRS-Army and the Marine Corps units  began reporting in DRRS-Marine Corps in May 2010. Both are part of the  family of information systems that make up the DRRS enterprise. Both  systems collect unit assessments that address the statutory reporting  requirements of OSD and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The  systems are also designed to meet the services’ reporting requirements, as  well as to collect other services-specific information from reporting units.
The first type of unit assessment is commonly referred to as a capability  assessment. For these assessments commanders use Yes, Qualified Yes, or  No categories to rate their units’ capabilities to perform a core or assigned  mission. The three categories are discussed below:    Yes or Y—the unit or organization can accomplish its tasks or missions  under specified conditions.
Qualified Yes or Q—the organization is expected to accomplish the  task to standard under most conditions, but this performance has not  been observed or demonstrated in training or operations; although data  may not support a “yes” the commander believes the organization can  accomplish the rated task or mission to prescribed standards under  most conditions.
No or N—the organization is unable to accomplish the task to standard  at the time of the assessment.
The second type of unit assessment, which is based on resources and  training metrics, is commonly referred to as a C-rating. Specifically, C- ratings are based on personnel, equipment and supplies on hand,  equipment readiness/serviceability, and training measures, and range from  C-1 through C-5, as described below.
C-1—unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake its  full core mission.
C-2—unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake  most of its core mission.
C-3—unit possesses required resources and is trained to undertake many,  but not all, portions of its core mission.
C-4—unit requires additional resources or training to undertake core  mission.
C-5—unit is undergoing directed resource action and is not prepared to  undertake its core mission.
section_title: Sources, Users of Readiness Information
paragraphs: DOD units report their readiness on a monthly basis if they execute  missions in support of the combatant commanders and service-assigned  missions. For the Army, approximately 6,000 units—including active-duty  and reserve component units not on active duty—report into the DRRS- Army database. Reporting units range in size from small detachments of     4 soldiers to larger combat units such as 5,000 soldier brigade combat  teams. For the Marine Corps, approximately 350 units—including combat,  combat support, and combat service support units—report their readiness  into the DRRS-Marine Corps database. Marine Corps reporting units range  in size from approximately 50 to 1,600 Marines. The number of reporting  units can vary each month due to the creation and dissolution of units and  the requirement for units to submit multiple reports in a month if  significant changes occur.
Once reported, the readiness information and data inform a wide range of  decision makers as identified in laws, directives, and guidance, including a  DOD directive, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, Secretary  of Defense Memorandums, and service regulations and messages. Users of  readiness data include Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman  of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders, the Secretaries of  the military departments, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. On  a quarterly basis, readiness reporting data from all services and combatant  commands are combined to create the Joint Forces Readiness Report and  the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress. In addition, decision makers  can use the readiness data to support operation and campaign plans,  determine the readiness of units to respond to unexpected contingencies,  or analyze the top resource shortfalls affecting the units.
section_title: Army and Marine Corps Requirements for Readiness Reporting Have Generally Increased the Quantity and Objectivity of Information Available to Decision Makers
subsections: section_title: Revised Army and Marine Corps Guidance Requires New Objective Measure of Readiness
paragraphs: The current Army and Marine Corps readiness reporting requirements  generally have increased the quantity and objectivity of readiness  information provided to decision makers. The updated version of Army  Regulation 220-1, implemented in April 2010, directs units to provide  information concerning their assigned missions, in addition to what was  previously required. Specifically, it requires that units report objective  personnel and equipment data to support the commander’s overall  subjective assessment of the unit’s capability to perform its assigned  mission, referred to as an A-level. Previously, Army guidance required only  the commanders’ subjective assessment of their unit’s capabilities without  any supporting personnel or equipment data, which at that time was called  a percent-effective rating.
In July 2010, the Marine Corps also revised its guidance for reporting unit  readiness for assigned missions. The service’s percent-effective rating was  preserved in name, but the updated guidance, Marine Corps Order 3000.13,  directed commanders to report their readiness for assigned missions using  the same types of personnel, equipment, and training measurements they  use to assess their core missions. The previous rating method, which was  similar to the Army’s, relied on a commander’s subjective assessment and  required no specific data to be reported. The Marine Corps’ new Order  also directs commanders to correlate their unit core and assigned  resources with their capability assessments, as shown in table 1 below.  For example, the Order requires that commanders who rate their units as  C-3 also assess their unit capabilities as “No” indicating that the unit is not  able to accomplish its regular mission at this time. Marine Corps officials  told us that the Marine Corps only deploys units rated C-1 or C-2. Marine  Corps officials stated that the alignment of the core resource and training  mission assessment (C-ratings) do not match perfectly with the three-tier  capability assessments (Yes, Qualified Yes, and No ratings), but the  relationship provides additional, helpful information for decision makers.
While the Army and Marine Corps updated their readiness reporting  guidance in 2010 to include more objective assigned mission ratings, the  services’ guidance retained many of the previous reporting requirements  for core missions, such as the requirements to report personnel and  equipment information, training assessments, commander comments that  provide additional information about their unit’s reported resources, and  installation readiness reports. Reporting time frames also remained  unchanged and are shown in table 2.
Army and Marine Corps leaders are regularly briefed on the additional  assigned mission metrics the services are now requiring their units to  report—personnel and equipment metrics in the case of the Army and  personnel, equipment, and training metrics in the case of the Marine  Corps. These additional assigned mission readiness metrics are available  to decision makers outside of the services and have been included in  service briefings to congressional committees. In addition, the information  that is presented in two of the key readiness reports currently required by  law—the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress and the Joint Forces  Readiness Review—has been affected by the services’ updated guidance  which provided additional criteria to help unit commanders better align  their two types of readiness assessments.
section_title: Reporting Requirements Vary during the Three Phases of the Army Force Generation Cycle
paragraphs: The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model is a rotational readiness  model that is used to synchronize planning and resourcing to generate  trained and ready forces. In ARFORGEN, active and reserve component  units complete a monthly Unit Status Report indicating their current  readiness levels for their core mission and, if directed, their assigned  mission. Active and reserve component units entering the “Available”  phase may deploy to conduct operational missions or may continue  training while remaining available for contingency missions. Once units  have completed their time in the available phase, the unit enters the  “RESET” phase. Active units will spend 6 months in the RESET phase or  approximately 16 percent of their overall ARFORGEN cycle time. Units  then move into the “Train/Ready” phase where there are no prescribed  time lengths because the ARFORGEN cycle is driven by the unit’s total  length of time deployed.
As a result of changes to reporting guidance, Army units are reporting C-5  and T-5 as directed rather than their actual training or actual overall  mission assessment while in the RESET phase. Under the regulation, unit  commanders report their personnel, equipment status, and equipment  readiness during all three phases of the ARFORGEN cycle. Commanders  also report their actual unit training metric and actual overall core mission  assessments (C-rating) during the Train/Ready and Available phases of the  cycle. However, during the RESET phase Army Regulation 220-1 directs  unit commanders to report their overall mission status as C-5 (when a unit  is undergoing directed resource action and is not prepared to undertake its  core mission) regardless of the units’ actual core mission capabilities.  According to Army officials, this change in guidance is intended to provide  a means to show which units are currently in RESET, i.e., by having them  all report C-5. According to both Army and Joint Staff officials, current  business rules within the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s readiness  reporting system do not allow units to report a C-5 unless one of the four  measured areas—personnel, equipment status, equipment readiness, and  training—is rated as a 5; the Army has directed its RESET units to report  training as a 5 so they will be able to report overall status as C-5. In  contrast, under the 2006 version of Army Regulation 220-1 commanders  reported their unit training metric and overall core mission assessments  during all phases of the deployment cycle. As units comply with the  Army’s direction to report C-5 and T-5 during RESET, decision makers  lose visibility over the unit’s actual training and overall readiness status.
Under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, the Secretary of Defense is required to  submit a quarterly report to Congress detailing overall military readiness.  For units that received a mission assessment rating of C-3 or below for any  month during the quarter covered by the report, the report is to include,  among other things, information about the resource area or areas  (personnel, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment condition, or  training) that adversely affected the unit’s readiness rating during that  quarter. In addition, according to the Army Force Generation Regulation  with regard to readiness reporting requirements, in order to manage the  total force in ARFORGEN, the Army must achieve situational awareness of  its forces’ readiness status in all force-generation phases, including the  RESET phase, to be able to manage its total force. According to the  regulation units in the RESET phase provide the Army with strategic  flexibility because those units retain their capability to perform civil  support operations or respond to combatant commander requirements. As  a result of the Army’s 2010 regulation, decision makers in DOD and  Congress do not have a complete picture of units’ actual training and  overall readiness status in RESET to determine which units have retained  their capability to conduct non-wartime-related missions or respond to  combatant commander requirements.
section_title: Army and Marine Corps Units Have Implemented Revised Guidance for Readiness Reporting, but Some Reporting Is Inconsistent
paragraphs: While the Army and Marine Corps have taken steps to implement the  revised readiness reporting guidance, we identified several areas where  units were inconsistently reporting readiness. The services are not  consistent in selecting and meeting time frames to report readiness, Army  units vary in identifying their status in ARFORGEN, some units are not  linking their resource and training mission assessments with their  capability assessments, and units vary in how they report resources and  capabilities.
subsections: section_title: Reporting Time Frames Are Inconsistent
paragraphs: We found that Army and Marine Corps units are using different time  frames when reporting their readiness data. The Marine Corps’ readiness  reporting order requires that units submit reports at least every 30 days,  but it does not require a specific reporting date for its units. From the  implementation of DRRS-Marine Corps in May 2010 through January 2011,  Marine Corps units submitted a total of 2,838 unit readiness reports.  However, 1,395 of these reports (approximately 49 percent) were  submitted late (more than 31 days since the last report). Figure 2 shows  the breakdown of the 2,838 reports and 1,395 late reports by month.
Figure 3 shows additional details on the range of the 1,395 late reports. It  shows that 784 (approximately 56 percent) of the reports were 1 to 4 days  late, while 80 (approximately 6 percent) of the reports were more than     30 days late.
The Army’s readiness reporting regulation directs units to report their  readiness on the 15th of each month. While units are permitted to pull  their personnel, equipment, and training data anytime between the 1st and  the 15th of the month, Army Regulation 220-1 requires the units to project  these data elements to the 15th of the month. According to Army officials,  approximately 97 percent of Army units adhere to this policy requirement  of reporting on the 15th. However, during our visits with Army units, we  found that not all units were projecting their data to the 15th of the month;  rather, units began collecting data on different dates and also submitted  their reports for review by their higher headquarters on different dates:    Some units stated they prepare their unit status reports the month prior  to the official reporting date. For example, one readiness reporting  official told us he prepared and briefed to the commander his January  unit status report—officially due on January 15, 2011—on December  14, 2010. The official added that his unit needed to report early so his  unit’s data could be incorporated into his higher command’s readiness  report.
Other units stated that they are required to report sometime within the  first week of the month.
We also found units that stated they create a cut-off date for extracting  personnel and equipment data for the unit status reports. For example,  if the 12th is the last day to pull data and a soldier becomes  nondeployable on the 13th, that information will not be updated until  the following month’s unit status report.
Conversely, officers at other units we visited stated that they project  data for their unit status reports to the 15th of each month, which is the  required procedure according to Army Readiness Division officials and  Army regulation.
Army officials stated that the majority of units are accessing the  authoritative data sources within 15 days of the reporting date, as required  in Army Regulation 220-1. As the length of time between reports grows, it  increases the potential that unit readiness could change and decision  makers do not have access to timely, updated information.
section_title: Army Units Are Not Consistently Reporting Force Generation Status
paragraphs: During our Army unit visits, we found that units were inconsistently  reporting their status in the Army’s three-phase ARFORGEN cycle. Army  Regulation 220-1 directs units to report their Army force generation phase  (i.e., RESET, Train/Ready, or Available) and expeditionary force-type  designation (i.e., contingency, deployment, or ready expeditionary forces).  Officials at some of the units we visited said they filled in these fields in  their monthly readiness report. However, many units told us they did not  know how these force generation fields in DRRS-Army were determined.  Some units stated the force generation fields rolled over from previous  reports. Other units stated their higher command populated these fields.  Additionally, we spoke with one unit that stated it was not part of the  ARFORGEN cycle and did not report its force generation phase and  expeditionary force-type designation, but a review of DRRS-Army  indicated that the unit actually reported Train/Ready and deployment  expeditionary force. Army Readiness Branch officials told us that lower- level units may not understand or may not receive information on their  force-type designations, and they said there has been informal discussion  on whether there could be a tool to autopopulate this information into  DRRS-Army. As a result of unclear guidance on the force generation data  fields, these specific data may not be consistent among units or  dependable for decision makers.
section_title: Units Are Not Consistent in Linking Resources and Training Assessments with Capability Assessments
paragraphs: Army and Marine Corps units are not consistently linking their two types  of mission assessments, i.e., their resource and training mission  assessments (the C-levels) with their capability assessments (Yes,  Qualified Yes, and No), in accordance with service guidance. These  assessments are linked because units should take into account their  resource levels in assessing their capabilities. Army Regulation 220-1  states that it would be inconsistent and illogical for a unit to report C-4  (meaning it needs additional resources or training) while concurrently  reporting “Yes” or “Qualified Yes” for its capability assessments.  Furthermore, if commanders report both C-4 and Yes, the Army  Regulation directs them to provide an explanatory comment. We reviewed  a sample of reports from units reporting both C-4 and Yes, and in some  cases they included commander comments but in other cases they did not  include comments. Figure 4, below, identifies the percentage of Army  units reporting C-4, by month, that reported Yes.
Marine Corps Order 3000.13 also directs units to correlate their C-levels  with Yes, Qualified Yes, and No assessments. Between May 2010, when  Marine Corps units began reporting in DRRS-Marine Corps, and January  2011, the percentage of units that did not comply with the requirement to  correlate C-level assessments with capability assessments ranged from     24 percent to 33 percent. Officials within the Marine Corps Readiness  Branch stated that a partial explanation for the noncompliance may be  misunderstandings among unit commanders. Figure 5 shows the  percentage of units that did not correctly correlate their two types of  readiness assessments.
section_title: Units Are Inconsistent in Reporting Resources and Capability Assessments
paragraphs: We also found inconsistencies in how units report data about their  resources, including the availability of personnel and equipment, and  assessments about their capability. For example, Army units we visited  interpreted the readiness regulation differently and therefore  inconsistently reported personnel data. Some units reported the actual  personnel on hand, whereas other units reported what was included in  their official manning document even if that document differed from the  actual personnel on hand. Additionally, Marine Corps Readiness Branch  officials told us that while equipment numbers are automatically  populated into DRRS-Marine Corps, some units have adjusted the  equipment data so that it does not match the authoritative data source.  They stated that only combat logistics battalions (Marine Expeditionary  Unit) and combat logistic companies may adjust the equipment data, but  they added that other units have improperly adjusted the equipment data  as well. These inconsistencies in reporting resources could affect a unit’s  personnel, equipment, and ultimately C-level ratings; as such, decision  makers may not receive an accurate reflection of a unit’s readiness.
Moreover, we found inconsistencies in capability assessments, specifically  in the “qualified” assessments. For example, officials from the Marine  Corps Readiness Branch told us that a qualified assessment means that the  unit has trained for the mission but has not been certified, whereas  officials at some Marine Corps units told us that qualified meant that the  unit has not yet trained in the mission but should be able to do the  mission. Officials from the DRRS Implementation Office agreed that  “qualified” assessments are not consistent within or among the services,  but said the inconsistency is acceptable because commanders are  expected to include comments explaining the qualified rating. We found  that most commanders are meeting that expectation. After reviewing a  random sample of commanders’ comments from all Marine Corps units  that reported a Qualified Yes in January 2011, we estimate that 94 percent  included an explanation of the qualified rating.
section_title: Internal Controls Are Not Preventing Readiness Reporting Inconsistencies
paragraphs: According to federal standards for internal control, management must  continually assess and evaluate its internal controls to assure that the  control activities being used are effective and updated when necessary.  Also, managers need to compare actual performance to planned or  expected results and analyze significant differences. While the Army and  Marine Corps conduct quality assurance reviews, the reviews are not  identifying all the inconsistencies in their units’ reporting methods and in  the reported data. For example, some Army installations have offices that  review readiness reports on a monthly basis, and higher-level commands  from both services review the reports from their subordinates. However,  officials from the Army Readiness Division and Marine Corps Readiness  Branch acknowledged that the quality assurance reviews are incomplete  and have not prevented inconsistent data from being reported. Also, the  Army has a management control evaluation checklist that commanders  can use to review their readiness reports, but Army Readiness Division  officials said the use of this checklist is not required, and some officials we  spoke with said the checklist is not used.
Furthermore, neither the Army nor Marine Corps have comprehensive  mechanisms in place to prevent the submission of data that fail to comply  with the reporting requirements. Army Readiness Division officials said  these mechanisms could be added to the DRRS-Army system in the future,  but this is currently not a top priority. The Army officials said there are  some warnings in the system, such as one that asks commanders to  explain if they choose both C-4 and Yes. Marine Corps Readiness Branch  officials also said they have warning flags in their system, but these  warnings do not prevent submission of inconsistent unit status reports.  Without further clarifying guidance, effective quality assurance reviews, or  system mechanisms to prevent the submission of inconsistent information,  the services cannot be assured that they are providing decision makers  within and outside of DOD with timely and consistent readiness reporting  data.
section_title: OSD and the Services Continue to Develop Their Respective Systems in the Enterprise
paragraphs: The DRRS Concept of Operations calls for a family of systems to be  developed and operated under a single framework to share information  requirements and data elements seamlessly across the enterprise.  Specifically, since we last reported on DRRS in September 2009, DOD and  the services have continued to take steps to develop their respective  systems—DRRS-Army, DRRS-Marine Corps, and DRRS-Strategic. Because  the developers have focused on the needs of different system users, and  have yet to reach agreement on key elements, progress in achieving  interoperability among the three individual systems and across the  enterprise has been incremental. In our 2009 report we noted that a  number of issues including unclear requirements were affecting system  development and the system’s ability to display service readiness data.  On August 2, 2010 DOD issued a memorandum signed by the Deputy  Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3, Space and Spectrum), Deputy Under  Secretary of Defense for Readiness, and the Director, Joint Staff, that  addresses DRRS standards and technical interface specifications for  interoperability. It directed the services to submit plans for implementing  the interoperability and technical standards within 60 days of the date of  the memo and stated that the services should convert to those standards,  in most cases, within 6 months of the signature date of the memorandum.  As of April 1, 2011, the Army and Marine Corps have submitted their plans  to OSD but have not fully implemented their plans. The Army and Marine  Corps project they will achieve implementation in October 2012 and July  2012, respectively. However, OSD and the services have not reached  consensus on various issues, including the type of information, specific  steps, or time frames for successfully implementing the standards and  plans to increase the interoperability of the enterprise system.
Our September 2009 report stated that a lack of oversight was also  hindering system development and integration. In commenting on our  report, OSD commented that the DRRS Executive Committee governance  process would continue to provide sustained functional oversight of the  DRRS program. Since our report was issued, the DRRS Executive  Committee has met twice. As of April 2011, the services’ plans for  implementing the system interoperability and technical standards  memorandum have not been briefed to the DRRS Executive Committee.  However, the General Officers Steering Committee, the second level of the  DRRS governance structure, is scheduled to be briefed in April 2011. In  our report, we also recommended that DOD conduct an independent  program risk assessment of DRRS, and use the findings in our report and  the risk assessment to decide how to redirect the program structure,  approach, funding, management, and oversight. The Enterprise Planning  and Investment Business Transformation Agency was planning to begin its  risk assessment in April 2011. However, as we were finishing this review  the risk assessment was postponed and is currently scheduled to begin in  the fall of 2011. Until this assessment is completed and presented to the  DRRS Executive Committee for any actions, OSD will not have the  information needed to reach consensus with the services and make any  adjustments needed to achieve interoperability.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Army and Marine Corps unit readiness information has become  increasingly important as DOD has deployed units, or parts of units, to  provide combat commanders with needed capabilities. Recent changes to  Army and Marine Corps readiness reporting guidance have improved both  the quantity and the objectivity of assigned mission capability data  available to Congress and DOD decision makers. However, some readiness  data are currently being reported in an inconsistent manner that  diminishes its value to decision makers. Furthermore, Army units are  reporting T-5 and C-5 as directed rather than their actual training or actual  overall mission assessment. Without actual training and the overall  readiness status of Army units throughout the entire force generation  cycle, decision makers in DOD and Congress may have limited information  to determine which Army units have the capabilities to respond to  unexpected missions or combatant commander requirements. Moreover,  without additional clarity in guidance, effective quality assurance reviews,  or system mechanisms to prevent the submission of inconsistent  information, the Army and Marine Corps cannot be assured they are  providing decision makers within and outside of DOD with timely and  consistent readiness data.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To increase the visibility over the capabilities of units in RESET, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army  in consultation with other system developers within the enterprise to:    Develop an alternative means of indicating which units are in RESET  without using C-5 as a means to flag units in RESET.
To increase the timeliness and consistency of readiness information and  thus enhance the usefulness of this information to decision makers, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army  and Commandant of the Marine Corps to:    Provide additional internal controls, which could include clarifying  policy guidance, increasing quality assurance reviews, or putting  system technical checks in place to prevent submission of data that  does not comply with service readiness reporting requirements.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD did not concur with  our recommendations. Specifically, DOD did not concur with our  recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Army to develop an alternative means of indicating which units are in  RESET without using C-5 as a means to flag units in RESET. In its  comments, DOD stated that the use of the “C-5” flag is appropriate and  consistent as the readiness indicator for units in RESET. Further, DOD  stated that the Army is fully aware of the readiness needs for those units in  RESET, and both the Army and DOD enterprise have the information  required to understand the needs and capabilities of those forces.
Specifically, DOD also noted that the DRRS enterprise provides visibility  into the capabilities of a unit at any phase of the force rotation cycle,  including reset. Even if an Army unit is reporting a C-5 assessment, DOD  stated that DRRS provides an assessment of the remaining unit capabilities  through the mission essential task list construct.
We recognize that different types of information beyond C-ratings are  reflected in the DRRS enterprise including mission essential task  assessments. As we noted in the report, DRRS is intended to capture  readiness data from multiple sources and to report relevant data to a range  of decision makers within DOD and the Congress. Specifically the  enterprise reports assessments of both capabilities (as captured in mission  essential task ratings) and training and resources (as captured in C-ratings,  and the associated personnel, equipment, and training ratings). Decision  makers use readiness data, including C-ratings, to support operation plans,  determine the readiness of units to respond to unexpected contingencies,  or analyze resource needs. However, as a result of the Army policy’s  change, units in RESET no longer report their actual C-level or their actual  level of training but rather are directed to report an overall C-5 rating and  a T-5 in training. Without actual C-ratings decision makers do not have  complete information and now must rely solely on the units’ subjective  mission essential task assessments as the means for evaluating their core  mission capabilities.
While we agree, as DOD suggests in its comments, that mission essential  task assessments are a valuable piece of readiness information, they are  not totally independent. To illustrate, the Army and Marine Corps have  both recently provided their units with guidance that clarifies the  important complementary nature of C-ratings and mission essential task  assessments. Specifically, they are correlated because a unit should take  into account its resource levels in assessing its ability to perform mission  essential tasks. Furthermore, our report shows, that units do not always  properly rate their ability to perform mission essential tasks. For example,  on a monthly basis since January 2009, approximately 15 percent of C-4  reporting units had mission essential task ratings that were, according to  Army guidance, inconsistent and illogical when compared to their  resource (C-level) ratings. Until Army units in RESET report their actual  C-ratings, decision makers will not have complete information on the  readiness status of units nor will they be able to compare mission essential  task ratings to actual C-ratings to see whether the ratings are logical and  consistent. For these reasons, we do not agree with DOD’s view that using  C-5 as a means of indicating which units are in RESET rather than  requiring units to report their actual readiness status is an appropriate and  consistent readiness indicator. We therefore continue to believe the  Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to develop an  alternative means of indicating which units are in RESET without using C- 5 as a means to flag units in RESET.
DOD also did not concur with our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the  Marine Corps to provide additional internal controls, which could include  clarifying policy guidance, increasing quality assurance reviews, or putting  system technical checks in place to prevent submission of data that does  not comply with service readiness reporting requirements. DOD stated  that internal controls are adequate. Specifically, it noted that the Army is  currently updating its unit status reporting process and software  applications, and that these changes will serve to strengthen compliance,  promote consistency, and ensure uniformity of the system. It also noted  that the Marine Corps is completing a plan to modify policy and implement  procedures for improving compliance with readiness reporting ratings,  timelines, and data. During the course of our review, we briefed the results  of our findings to the services, and we are aware that they are in various  stages of taking action. We have not had the opportunity to evaluate the  services’ efforts; however, we believe the description provided by DOD  reflects the types of internal controls covered under our  recommendations.
DOD also noted that it did not agree with the report’s statement in the  summary that the DRRS program does not have sufficient information to  achieve interoperability among the services and OSD. DOD stated that the  statement does not represent the routine and informed decisions that are  made across OSD and the services. It further stated that a September 2010  technology assessment found that DRRS-Strategic had no critical  technology roadblocks to system integration and that the system currently  consumes data from the service unique systems while continuously  working to improve transfer methods. DOD noted that DRRS-Navy, DRRS- Army, and DRRS-Marine Corps will be able to transfer data even more  efficiently and effectively within the next 18 months. As stated in our  report, we specifically recognize that DRRS has evolved into an enterprise  which represents a family of service and OSD computer information  systems and databases. We further note that the enterprise is intended to  capture readiness data from multiple sources and that DRRS-Army, DRRS- Marine Corps and DRRS- Navy systems currently provide information and  data to a number of other systems within and outside of the enterprise. In  a September 2009 report, we identified a number of challenges facing  DRRS and concluded that an independent assessment was needed to  assess the program’s risk. We recommended that DOD conduct this  assessment and use the results to redirect the program’s approach,  structure, and oversight. DOD concurred with our recommendation and  stated that the assessment would be conducted by the middle of fiscal year  2010. Because of our prior work and the fact that this assessment has not  yet been done, we did not, as part of the work reflected in this current  report, perform a technical review of the current state of interoperability.  Rather, as stated in the report, we addressed the steps DOD and the  services have continued to take to develop their respective systems since  we last reported in September 2009. Based on our work, we found that  OSD and the services have not reached consensus on various issues,  including the type of information, specific steps, or timeframes for  successfully implementing interoperability and technical standards and  plans to increase the interoperability of the enterprise system. Given that  the DRRS Concept of Operations calls for a family of systems to be  developed and operated under a single framework to share information  requirements and data elements seamlessly across the enterprise,  achieving consensus on standards and other aspects needed to achieve  interoperability is critical. Because a risk assessment includes assessing  system vulnerabilities and identifying mitigation solutions, we continue to  believe it would produce information that could assist DOD in reaching  consensus with the services and in making any adjustments needed to  achieve interoperability.
The full text of DOD’s written comments is reprinted in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and the  Commandant of the Marine Corps. The report will also be available at no  charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact me at  pickups@gao.gov or (202) 512-9619. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which current readiness reporting requirements  have affected the content of readiness information provided to various  decision makers within and outside of the Department of Defense (DOD),  we interviewed officials from the Department of Army–Readiness Division  and Headquarters Marine Corps Readiness Branch. We analyzed Army and  Marine Corps 2010 readiness reporting guidance, Army Regulation 220-1  and Marine Corps Order 3000.13, and compared the updated guidance to  the previous versions of relevant Army and Marine Corps readiness  reporting guidance. Further, we compared the changes in the services’  guidance with DOD Directive 7730.65 and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff Instruction 3401.02A to determine if the service guidance aligned  with DOD and Joint Chiefs of Staff readiness reporting requirements. We  also reviewed related readiness reporting documents, such as Army and  Marine Corps readiness briefings to DOD and Congress. To assess the  extent to which the readiness information available to DOD (Office of the  Secretary of Defense (OSD), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the  services) and the Congress has changed since 2009, we compared the  currently available information to the information that was previously  provided through the statutorily required reports (Quarterly Readiness  Report to Congress and Joint Forces Readiness Report). We also  interviewed officials responsible for submitting and overseeing readiness  reports to determine how available information has changed.
To assess the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps units have  consistently implemented their current readiness reporting guidance, we  first reviewed the data within each service’s respective readiness reporting  systems and compared the data with system criteria—Army Regulation  220-1 and Marine Corps Order 3000.13. Specifically, within the Army  Readiness Management System (the data output tool for DRRS-Army) and  the Marine Corps Readiness Management Output Tool (the data output  tool for DRRS-Marine Corps), we conducted queries of all reporting units  from January 2009 through January 2011. To further assess inconsistencies  between resource and training mission assessments (the C-levels) and  their capability assessments (Yes, Qualified Yes, and No), we selected  random samples of units from subsets of the Army and Marine Corps units  with potential inconsistencies. Specifically, we selected a random sample  of Army units that reported C-4 and Yes, and a random sample of Marine  Corps units that reported a Qualified Yes in January 2011. The sample size  and total population of units for each sample is classified. For each  selected unit we reviewed commander comments contained in the  assessment reports and determined whether these comments addressed  the inconsistencies in the assessments. Based on these reviews, we  generated estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals that allow us to  generalize the results to the subsets of Army and Marine Corps units with  potential inconsistencies. We chose January 2009 as the baseline for our  queries because the Army began implementing significant changes in  December 2009. Because the Marine Corps did not begin using DRRS- Marine Corps until May 2010, our queries of Marine Corps unit data only  provided output from May 2010 through January 2011. When we reviewed  samples of data, we took a statistical random sample and determined our  estimates to a 95 percent confidence interval.
We assessed the reliability of the DRRS data presented in this report.  Specifically, the Army and Marine Corps provided information based on  data reliability assessment questions we provided, which included  information on an overview of the data, data collection processes and  procedures, data quality controls, and overall perceptions of data quality.  We received documentation about how the systems are structured; a data  dictionary that includes data element definitions, descriptions, codes, and  values; written procedures in place to ensure that the appropriate  information is collected for each category of unit readiness; and specific  guidelines on the correct classification of readiness data taken into  specific categories. Additionally, we interviewed the Army Readiness  Division and Marine Corps Readiness Branch to obtain further  clarification on data reliability. We interviewed relevant officials at  reporting units to discuss how the data were collected and reported into  the system. We also analyzed system data for selected data fields. After  assessing the data, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable  for the purposes of assessing the consistency of the implementation of the  current readiness reporting guidance, and we discuss our findings in the  report.
We met with officials from several installations and units to complement  our data analysis. In choosing which of the Army’s over 6,000 reporting  units and which of the Marine Corps’ approximately 350 reporting units to  review, we made a nonprobability selection of installations that have a  variety of different unit levels in order to better maximize our coverage of  units. For the Army, we chose to visit 3 of 68 reporting installations. We  then reviewed the 10 largest installations and compiled data on the  number of units present, components represented, and Army Force  Generation phases represented at each identified installation. We also  chose to visit 1 of 6 reporting Army National Guard installations. We also  met with officials from Army National Guard units located in Washington,  D.C. because the units were close to our office and the visits did not  require any travel costs. For the Marine Corps, we selected all reporting  Marine Corps installations and ranked them by number of units present at  each installation and components represented. We chose to visit 2 of 15  Marine Corps installations. Within each installation, our criteria for  identifying units from which to obtain information included command  level, component type, force generation status, core-level and core-mission  task assessment, and assigned-level and assigned-mission task assessment.  Table 3 shows the units we met with and their locations. During our unit  visits, to gain a better understanding of the readiness reporting process  and how the readiness reporting changes are being implemented, we  interviewed the officials responsible for inputting the unit’s readiness  information into DRRS-Army and DRRS-Marine Corps as well as the  officials who are responsible for making the mission assessments and  verifying the information. These unit visits serve as examples, and  information about them is not meant to be generalized to all readiness  reporting processes and procedures.
To assess how system developments for the Defense Readiness Reporting  Systems, DRRS-Army, DRRS-Marine Corps, and DRRS-Strategic, affected  the enterprise, we interviewed officials from the DRRS Implementation  Office who are responsible for the system development of the enterprise  and DRRS-Strategic. We also interviewed officials from the Joint Staff who  are responsible for assisting the Chairman in executing his statutory  readiness reporting responsibilities. Members of the Joint Staff co-chair  the DRRS governance structure at all levels. We also interviewed Army  and Marine Corps officials who are responsible for their service- specific  readiness reporting systems that are part of the enterprise. Finally, we  interviewed officials from the Enterprise Planning and Investment  Business Transformation Agency, which is conducting the DRRS-Strategic  risk assessment. Further, we reviewed the 2010 DOD memorandum for  DRRS Standards and Technical Interface Specifications for  Interoperability, the 2009 DRRS Concept of Operations, and the DRRS  Interim Implementation guidance 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, and 4.0. We also reviewed  Army and Marine Corps memoranda and plans implementing the  requirements in the 2010 DOD memorandum for DRRS Standards and  Technical Interface Specifications for Interoperability.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2010 to June 2011, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Michael Ferren (Assistant Director), Jim Ashley, Randy De Leon,  Nicole Harms, Richard Powelson, Terry Richardson, Jodie Sandel, Amie  Steele, and Nicole Volchko.