National Airspace System: Regional Airport Planning Could Help Address Congestion If Plans Were Integrated with FAA and Airport Decision Making
Published: 2009-12-23T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) predicts that the national airspace system will become increasingly congested over time, imposing costs of delay on passengers and regions. While transforming the current air-traffic control system to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) may provide additional en route capacity, many airports will still face constraints at their runways and terminals. In light of these forecasts, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to evaluate regional airport planning in metropolitan regions with congested airports. GAO (1) identified which airports are currently or will be significantly congested and the potential benefits of regional airport planning, (2) assessed how regions with congested airports use regional airport planning in decision making, and (3) identified factors that hinder or aid in the development and implementation of regional airport plans. GAO reviewed studies; interviewed FAA, airport, and other aviation and transportation officials; and conducted case studies in selected regions.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: A number of airports are or will be significantly capacity constrained and thus congested within the next 16 years. However, many of them face environmental and other obstacles to developing additional airport capacity. In 2007, FAA identified 14 airports (in 10 metropolitan regions) that will be significantly capacity constrained by 2025, even assuming all currently planned improvements occur (see figure). Planned improvements include airport construction projects and implementation of NextGen technologies. Without these improvements, FAA predicts that 27 airports will be congested. According to the FAA assessment and other studies, regional airport planning may identify additional solutions, such as the increased use of alternate airports or other modes of travel, to help relieve airport congestion. From 1999 through 2008, 9 of the 10 metropolitan regions with airports forecast to be significantly capacity constrained by 2025 have received a total of $20 million in FAA funding for regional airport planning. Of those regions, 6 have developed or will develop regional airport system plans (RASP), which we found largely followed FAA's guidance for airport system planning. The remaining 4 regions have engaged in less comprehensive planning. FAA does not formally review RASPs, and they have been used selectively by FAA and airports in decision making for the planning and funding of individual airport projects. A few airport sponsors have pursued select strategies outlined in plans, while one airport sponsor rejected the RASP for its decision making. Because regional airport planning is advisory, competing interests can derail development and implementation. Metropolitan planning organizations generally develop RASPs but have no authority over airport development. That authority rests with airports, which are not required to incorporate planning recommendations into their capital plans, and with FAA, which makes funding decisions on the basis of national priorities. In addition, airport, community, and airline interests may conflict in a region. For example, Philadelphia International does not support planning efforts that may divert traffic from its airport to alternate regional airports. By contrast, aligned interests and FAA involvement may aid regional planning and implementation, as has occurred in the Boston region.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Constrained capacity at some U.S. airports reduces the efficiency of the  national airspace system and results in congestion and flight delays  throughout the country. A recent study found that congestion is  concentrated in major metropolitan areas, such as Atlanta, Chicago,  Miami, New York, Philadelphia, and San Francisco, and that the situation  is worsening over time. In 2008, nearly one-in-four arriving flights was  delayed more than 15 minutes at major U.S. airports, and, in the especially  congested New York region, one-in-three flights was delayed. Flight  delays inconvenience passengers as well as impose economic costs on  passengers, airlines, airports, and the economy. Delays at one airport can  also impact other airports, causing a ripple effect across the national  airspace system. Congestion also has negative impacts on the  environment, such as increased emissions from aircraft. GAO has  previously reported that long-term solutions to alleviating congestion and  delay should address underlying capacity constraints at airports. The  federal government, through the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),  provided almost $3.5 billion in 2008 for airport planning and development  through Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants. Also, airports collect  almost another $3 billion in passenger facility charges annually that can be  used for projects, including those aimed at increasing capacity in the  national airspace system. FAA’s Operational Evolution Partnership (OEP)  program aims at increasing capacity and improving efficiency at the  nation’s busiest airports through the construction of new airfield  infrastructure, such as new or extended runways and new taxiways. FAA  is also planning to increase system capacity through technological  improvements, such as those currently being planned and implemented in  the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) program. In  addition, some regions are looking at ways to optimize existing and new  regional airport capacity, including the use of alternate regional airports,  and the potential use of alternative modes to move passengers, such as  high-speed rail.
Because of your interest in better meeting the nation’s transportation  needs, you asked us to describe the role that regional airport planning  could play in better managing airport capacity in heavily congested  regions of the country. To address this issue, we (1) identified which  airports are already significantly congested or are projected to be  significantly congested and potential benefits that regional airport  planning might offer, (2) assessed the extent to which regions with  significantly congested airports engage in regional airport planning to help  relieve congestion and how this planning has been used in decision  making, and (3) identified factors that hinder or aid in the development  and implementation of regional airport plans.
To address these objectives, we relied primarily on FAA guidance on  airport system planning, FAA’s assessment of airport capacity needs, our  in-depth analysis of selected regions with congested airports, and our past  studies. FAA has provided guidance to states and metropolitan areas on  the development of airport system plans, noting that such plans should  guide airport development needed in a specific area to establish a viable,  balanced, and integrated system of public use airports. We considered  airports that are currently congested or are forecast to be significantly  congested using FAA’s 2007 report—Capacity Needs in the National  Airspace System, 2007–2025 (FACT 2)—which identified airports that  will need additional capacity whether or not currently planned  improvements are carried out. The FACT 2 report made forecasts for  airports in 2015 and 2025, and, while this type of long-term modeling  naturally faces uncertainties, we used FACT 2 to identify regions for our  in-depth analysis because it forecast long-term capacity needs and  included analyses of both demand and capacity. Because the FACT 2  report forecast future demand before 2007, the report may overstate the  likely growth of demand, given the subsequent economic downturn. On  the other hand, the analyses used fairly conservative measures to  determine which airports would be the most capacity constrained and, as  a result, may understate the number of airports that will be congested. For  a complete discussion of the methodology used by FACT 2 and its  implications, see appendix II. We identified regions for more detailed  analysis after considering (1) existing and predicted aviation congestion  based on FAA’s FACT 2 report; (2) whether regions had sought funding  from FAA for regional airport planning, and the amount of the funding  provided by FAA; (3) whether regional airport planning has occurred or is  occurring in a region; and (4) whether regions were served by a single  major commercial service airport or multiple airports and the extent to  which multiple airports in a region were governed by the same sponsor.
Our analysis of selected regions forecast to have significantly congested  airports included Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, San Diego, and San  Francisco. We also assessed regional airport planning in Boston, although  this region was not among those with airports that are forecast to be  significantly capacity constrained by FACT 2, if planned improvements  occur. FAA officials and experts have pointed to this region as having  undertaken successful regional airport planning. Each of the regions we  selected has received funding from FAA for regional airport planning, and  regional airport planning has been undertaken in each region. Three of the  regions are served by multiple airports—sometimes under the same  sponsor—while Philadelphia and San Diego are in regions with one major  airport. In the five regions we selected, we interviewed regional planning,  airport, FAA, and state officials about the nature of the regional airport  system; participants in such planning; the extent that regions have  undertaken regional airport planning and how these plans may have been  used; and factors that aided or hindered planning or implementation. We  also examined FAA guidance on airport system planning; interviewed FAA  planning and forecasting officials; and interviewed industry experts,  academics, planners, and trade association representatives. We also  utilized our prior work on the NextGen program, on the airspace redesign  project in New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia, and on metropolitan  planning organizations (MPO). We also reviewed relevant studies,  including ongoing research being developed for the Airport Cooperative  Research Program of the Transportation Research Board and studies by  the Massachusetts Institute of Technology regarding the role of regional  airport planning in addressing airport congestion. Appendix I contains a  more detailed description of our objectives, scope, and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2008 to December  2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: FAA’s mission is to provide a safe and efficient airspace system. As part of  this mission, the agency uses airport system planning to better understand  the interrelationship of airports at the national, state, and regional levels.  FAA guidance states that the overall goals of airport system planning are  to ensure that the air transportation needs of a state or metropolitan area  are adequately served by its airports, and that planning results in products  that can be used by the planning organization, airports, and FAA to  determine future airport development needs.
There are several types and levels of planning involving individual airports  or airport systems, including the National Plan of Integrated Airport  Systems (NPIAS), state and regional system plans, and airport-level plans.  The NPIAS identifies over 3,400 airports as being nationally significant to  the national airspace system, including all of the nation’s commercial  service and reliever airports and some general aviation airports. Most  states periodically develop state airport system plans to inventory airports  using a set of criteria developed by FAA. While not required, some regions  choose to carry out regional airport planning—which may include the  development of regional airport system plans (RASP) or other regional  airport plans—to identify critical regional airport issues and to integrate  aviation with other modes in a region’s transportation system. At the  airport level, two types of plans support airport improvements at  individual airports, the airport layout plan (ALP), which is required for  federal funding, and the airport master plan. Figure 1 provides additional  information about these plans and illustrates the role of each in the FAA  in the FAA  funding process for airport improvement projects in the AIP.  funding process for airport improvement projects in the AIP.
Airports in the NPIAS become eligible to apply for FAA’s AIP grants,  which provided almost $3.5 billion for capital projects in fiscal year 2008.  AIP funding is available for eligible projects, which include projects such  as airfield construction or equipment purchases, terminal or terminal  access improvements, land acquisition, noise compatibility projects, and  regional airport planning. AIP grants generally consist of two types— entitlement funds that are apportioned to airports or states by formula  each year based upon statutory criteria, and discretionary funds that FAA  approves based on a project's priority. To ensure that the highest priorityprojects nationally are funded, discretionary funds are awarded using a  national priority rating system that awards points on a variety of factors including airport size; the purpose of the project (e.g., capacity related,  planning, environmental, and safety); and the type of project (e.g., termi improvement and equipment purchase). Airports apply directly to FAA  through FAA regional offices for AIP discretionary funding, an   projects are scored using the national priority rating system. Furthermore, the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (AAIA)— which established the current AIP—provided FAA with the authority to  give priority to airport improvement projects that are consistent with  integrated airport system plans, such as RASPs. In the guidance provided by FAA for airport system planning, airport sponsors are also encourage d  to use findings and recommendations from regional airport plannin develop plans to serve as a guideline for the allocation of funding.
While no specific amount is currently set aside for system planning in the AIP program, approximately 2 percent of funds made available annually  for AIP grants since 1970 have been used for these purposes. Most of this funding is used for planning at the state or airport level, but some re gions  have also applied for and received AIP funding for regional airport  planning. This funding has been used for a variety of planning efforts by  states, airport sponsors, and regional planning bodies—primarily MPOs— and includes the development of RASPs. Other regional airport planning  funded with AIP grants includes special studies to analyze or address new  or unique issues, such as compatible land uses around airports, zoning  implementation, or airport ground access.
There are a number of stakeholders with interests in the airport planning  process. They include FAA, states, and airports and may also include  MPOs, airlines, and local communities. The FAA’s Office of Airport  Planning and Programming provides guidance about airport system  planning, while FAA regional offices administer grants and provide  technical support to airports and others developing airport plans at the  airport, regional, and state levels. The range of involvement by a particular  stakeholder group varies by the type of plan under development, among  other things. Thus, FAA, airports, and sometimes airlines are typically  most involved in the development of ALPs and airport master plans and  the resulting capital plans. States work with airports—notably, general  aviation or reliever airports, not typically major commercial airports—to  identify airports and improvements for inclusion in state airport system  plans. MPOs may work with airport sponsors, local jurisdictions, state  authorities, and FAA when developing RASPs or carrying out other  regional airport planning. FAA accepts plans developed by states or MPOs  and reviews and approves ALPs. In addition to federal and state aviation  officials, other stakeholders in the process include the following:     Airport sponsors: Airport sponsors can be any one of a number of  different types of public entities, such as cities, counties, airport  authorities, ports, intermodal agencies, or private owners.
MPOs: MPOs may lead or participate in regional airport planning, but  their primary role is carrying out regional surface transportation  planning in urbanized areas, including the development of long-range  and short-range transportation plans. To receive federal surface  transportation funding, any project in an urbanized area must emerge  from the relevant MPO and state department of transportation planning  process.
Airlines: Airlines play a key role in the functioning of airport systems,  since they make decisions about which airports to serve and how  frequently to provide service. Airlines may consider a number of  factors in making these decisions, such as the location of regional  business, economic indicators, the travel patterns of area residents, the  cost of establishing service at particular airports, the effects on their  service network, and the service provided by competing carriers.
FAA guidance on airport system planning identifies eight key elements of  the planning process, including inventorying the airport system,  identifying air transportation needs, considering alternative airport  systems, and preparing an implementation plan (see table 1). The guidance  states that the end result should be “the establishment of a viable,  balanced, and integrated system of airports to meet current and future  demand.” FAA does not approve airport master plans, state airport system  plans, or RASPs. For those plans developed with FAA funding, however,  FAA is involved in developing the scope of work covered under the grant,  reviewing draft documents, approving aviation forecasts, and then  accepting the final plan.
When considering alternative airport systems (the fifth of the eight  elements), regional planners may identify alternate, underutilized airports  in a region as having the potential to relieve pressure on congested  airports. FAA’s airport system planning guidance states that the  development of such alternate airports should only be undertaken when a  full assessment has been done of various market factors. The guidance  states that it is important to understand the nature of demand within a  region, including factors that would divert demand to other airports, and  any potential political, economic, or institutional barriers to developing an  airport system. It also recommends that planners assess the ability of the  airport to offer adequate service—in terms of convenience, schedules, and  fares—and the effect on airlines, noting that the development of alternate  airports should enhance airline profitability and be compatible with their  route systems.
In addition to the development of RASPs, other types of regional airport  planning, including special studies whose scope of work does not fully  correspond with the elements described in the airport system planning  guidance, may be undertaken with AIP grants, according to FAA’s airport  system planning guidance. Special studies can include but are not limited  to work in such areas as air service, air cargo operations, environmental or  drainage inventories, surface access, economic impact, obstruction  analysis or photogrammetry, general aviation security, and pavement  management.
FAA’s airport system planning guidance states that MPOs can receive FAA  support to conduct regional airport planning in areas that include large- or  medium-hub airports (1) when such agencies have the interest in and  capabilities to conduct such planning and (2) when regional FAA, state  aviation, and local airport officials determine that MPOs should have a  role. The guidance continues that the regional airport planning carried out  by MPOs should complement—rather than guide—the planning done by  FAA, states, and individual airports. According to the guidance, MPO-led  regional airport planning may enhance the integration of the entire  regional transportation system by promoting aviation enhancement and  preservation, identifying critical regional aviation issues, and acting as the  contact point for regional surface access, air quality, and land-use planning  studies. MPOs can also act as a catalyst in implementing system planning  recommendations—which may involve several stakeholders—by resolving  local conflicts, promoting airport development funding priorities, and  proposing the distribution of grants among eligible projects. The guidance  states that an MPO’s ability to implement regional airport planning  recommendations is limited to the extent that it can influence airport  development through persuasion; leadership; or nonaviation incentives,  such as surface transportation improvements that may improve airport  access. This stands in contrast to state aviation agencies, which can  implement system planning recommendations using legislative and  funding mechanisms, including AIP funds, whereas MPOs do not receive  AIP funds, other than for planning purposes.
section_title: Many Airports Are or Will Become Significantly Congested in Coming Years and Regional Airport Planning Has the Potential to Identify Solutions
subsections: section_title: FAA Has Identified 14 Airports That May Become Significantly Congested by 2025, Even If Planned Improvements Occur, and 27 Airports If They Do Not Occur
paragraphs: FAA’s FACT 2 report forecast that 14 airports will be significantly capacity  constrained—and thus potentially congested—by 2025, even if currently  planned improvements are carried out. According to FAA, some airports  are already significantly capacity constrained, and increased demand is  expected to increase delays going forward. Six of these 14 airports will be  significantly capacity constrained as early as 2015, according to the report.  (See fig. 2.)
The FACT 2 study was designed to produce a conservative list of  congested airports, according to FAA officials, and identified those  airports that will have the greatest need for future additional capacity.  FAA officials noted that airports not designated as capacity constrained by  the study may also have capacity issues in the future and may need  capacity-enhancing projects. (See app. II for a discussion of the FACT 2  report and implications of its design.) The demand forecasts included in  FACT 2, however, were conducted before 2007 and do not take into  account the reduction in demand resulting from the recent economic  downturn. As a result, potential capacity constraints may occur on a  different timeline than previously forecast.
The improvements considered in the 2025 and 2015 forecasts include those  in FAA’s OEP, such as new or extended runways, changes or  improvements in air-traffic control procedures and technology, and  airspace redesign. Some NextGen improvements, such as reduced  separation requirements for arrivals and departures, were included in the  2025 analysis for the 35 airports included in the OEP program and Oakland  International Airport.
If planned improvements do not occur, the FACT 2 report predicted that  the number of airports that will be significantly capacity constrained will  increase to 27 by 2025. Likewise, 18 airports were predicted to need  additional capacity by 2015, if planned improvements do not occur. Figure  3 shows the airports predicted by FACT 2 to face significant capacity  challenges in 2015 and 2025, if planned improvements do not occur.
The NextGen program is intended to transform the nation’s navigation  system into a satellite-based system, but faces challenges to  implementation for both airlines and FAA. Benefits from the program are  expected to include increased safety with a reduction in the number of  runway incursions; greater design flexibility with the reduction of  separation requirements between runways, which may allow for new  runways or improved airport layouts; better use of existing capacity with  reduced separation standards for aircraft and improved access to airports  with mountainous terrain or other obstacles; and reduced environmental  impacts since aircraft will be able to descend using the shortest routes at  minimum power settings. As we have previously reported, FAA has made  some progress in implementing the NextGen program, but still faces some  challenges. For example, aircraft operators must purchase equipment to  implement NextGen capabilities, but some airlines have been reluctant to  do so until FAA specifies requirements, addresses funding concerns, and  demonstrates benefits. FAA must also determine that new technologies  will operate in a real-life environment with a desired level of confidence  and approve their use as well as issue rules for the use of procedures  before midterm implementation can occur. Finally, the transformation to  NextGen will also depend on the ability of airports to handle greater  capacity. Since runways and airspace issues are not the only causes of  congestion, improved efficiency in these areas—which may result from  implementation of NextGen improvements—may exacerbate capacity  constraints involving taxiways, terminal gates, or parking areas.
There are 4 airports that were already considered capacity constrained  under the FACT 2 methodology, including 2 in the New York/New Jersey  region—Newark Liberty International (Newark) and LaGuardia  (LaGuardia)—as well as Chicago’s O’Hare International (O’Hare) and Fort  Lauderdale/Hollywood International in Southern Florida. In the New York  region, FAA has set limitations on the number of takeoffs and landings  during peak operating hours at Newark, John F. Kennedy International  Airport (JFK), and LaGuardia, to minimize congestion and reduce flight  delays. However, these airports are still routinely found to be among the  most congested in the country and are on FAA’s list of airports needing  additional capacity by both 2015 and 2025. Improvements at O’Hare and  Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International will take them off the list of  significantly congested airports by 2015, according to the FACT 2 report.
All 14 of the airports forecast by FAA as needing additional capacity by  2025 or 2015 are located in major metropolitan areas with at least 1 large- hub airport. Nine of the airports forecast to be congested are in regions  with more than 1 large- or medium-hub airport. Each of the airports  identified as potentially capacity constrained in 2015 is also included on  the list for 2025. For the purposes of our review, we focused on the 10  metropolitan regions that include the 14 airports forecast by the FACT 2  report to be significantly capacity constrained by 2025, assuming planned  improvements occur. (See table 2.)
section_title: Many Regions Face Obstacles to Developing New Airport Capacity
paragraphs: Developing new airport capacity can be costly, complex, and time- consuming. Historically, airports, metropolitan regions, and FAA have  looked to airport expansion and facility improvements—such as the  construction of new runways—to provide new capacity, but increasingly  airport expansion faces obstacles, especially in congested regions.  Through the cooperative efforts of the aviation industry, airports, and  FAA, 20 airfield projects have opened since 2000 at 18 OEP airports,  including new runways at O’Hare, Seattle-Tacoma International, and  Washington Dulles International in 2008. However, projects involving  new runways often take a decade or more to complete because of legal  and other obstacles. In addition, the last major new commercial service  airport in the United States was opened in Denver in 1995 and is 1 of only  2 new major airports built in over 40 years. That said, proposals for a new  airport in Peotone, Illinois, in the Chicago region and for a new airport to  supplement Las Vegas McCarran International Airport are currently in the  early stages of FAA environmental review.
Going forward, the development of new infrastructure—including the  construction or extension of runways as well as new airports—faces many  challenges. FACT 2 points out that expanding airport capacity is unlikely  in some locations. According to ongoing research being developed for the  Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP), adverse community  reaction to aircraft noise and pollutant emissions at and near major  airports continues to impede the development of new airport  infrastructure, and this resistance is unlikely to decrease. Another study  noted that lawsuits are filed in opposition to virtually every expansion of a  major airport, generally challenging the right of airport officials to override  local zoning rules or increase noise or air pollution. According to this  study, while such legal challenges are usually unsuccessful, projects often  take longer than originally anticipated. We have also previously reported  that new runway construction from initial planning to completion takes a  median of 10 years, but delays can add an additional 4 years to the median  time. While we found that the level of challenges that airports faced  varied, in part depending on the proximity of the airport to a major city  and the amount of community opposition to the runway, some common  themes emerged in our 2002 survey of airports that had built or planned to  build runways between 1991 and 2010. Challenges identified by those  airports included reaching stakeholder agreement on the purpose and  need for the new runway, completing required environmental reviews,  reaching agreement on how to mitigate the impact of noise and other  issues, and designing and constructing the runways in light of weather and  site preparation issues. The conversion of former or joint-use military  airfields for civilian use is an alternate approach to providing new or  additional capacity, but this approach has also faced obstacles similar to  those posed with the construction of new facilities. Voters recently  rejected the proposed conversion of military airfields at Miramar and El  Toro, current and former Marine Corps air stations, respectively.
In our discussions with regional and airport officials, we found that  environmental constraints, including land-use issues or community  concerns about airport noise or the redesign of airspace around congested  airports; physical constraints; and local legal constraints are also obstacles  to the development of new capacity through airport or runway expansion.  Environmental issues have been a constraint on development in the San  Francisco region at San Francisco International Airport (SFO) and at  Oakland International Airport, for example, where the construction of new  runways would involve extensive filling in the San Francisco Bay. A  proposal to build a new runway at SFO was dropped due to environmental  issues and cost constraints. As conceived, the project would have been the  largest construction project in the bay for over 50 years and would have  involved dredging and filling up to 2 square miles of the bay. (Fig. 4 shows  the 2000 proposal for construction at SFO.) More recent planning has not  included runway construction, focusing instead on a terminal development  program and other alternatives. Noise concerns have also been a limiting  factor for many airports. Proposals for runway expansion in Philadelphia  led to a lawsuit filed by surrounding communities seeking to block the  development, for example. Likewise, officials at SFO pointed to  encroaching neighborhoods as state land-use policies encourage the  development of previously industrial areas. Efforts to redesign the  airspace around the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia region also led to  community opposition, with several surrounding communities filing  lawsuits that, thus far, have been resolved in favor of FAA. Physical  constraints on expansion or new construction can also be obstacles. For  example, San Diego International has one runway, sits on only 661 acres,  and the surrounding terrain limits the slope for departing aircraft,  particularly heavier aircraft. The San Diego County Regional Airport  Authority is developing a proposal to reconfigure the airport’s terminals,  given the lack of room for a new runway. Finally, legal agreements or  requirements hamper the use of existing capacity at some airports,  including those in the Los Angeles region—in Orange County and Long  Beach. Westchester County Airport in White Plains, New York, also has  legal limits on airport operations, according to an air service demand  study. Other airports have community agreements limiting capacity or  growth. For example, Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) has  imposed a cap of 78.9 million annual passengers on its operations as part  of a settlement agreement with surrounding communities, according to  regional officials. Likewise, according to an airport official, Bob Hope  Airport is prevented from expanding the footprint of its existing terminal  until 2012 by an agreement with the City of Burbank. The airport also  recently sought FAA approval to make a voluntary nighttime curfew  permanent. This application was denied by FAA, however, based in part  on concerns that the curfew would result in congestion and delay in the  region and potentially have ripple effects throughout the national airspace  system.
section_title: Regional Airport Planning Has the Potential to Identify Solutions for Congestion
paragraphs: Regional airport planning can identify solutions for airports and regions  seeking to determine how best to manage available capacity and address  the challenges posed by congestion. A 2003 study for the Office of the  Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy at the Department of  Transportation looked at the potential for alternative airports to meet  regional capacity needs and found that the use of these airports can make  more efficient use of existing resources and better use of limited funds for  airport development. According to the report, to make better use of  alternate airports, regional airport planning should focus on both airport  development and access issues. The study concluded that as metropolitan  areas grow and become more congested and complex, FAA needs to  promote regional airport planning. Likewise, according to ongoing  research being developed for the ACRP, there are important opportunities  to improve aviation system capacity and airport operations by embracing  more collaborative and cooperative regional airport planning. The  research has found that proactively seeking ways to use commercial  airport capacity more efficiently will be important to maintaining the  viability of air travel while accommodating forecast growth in demand for  air travel. According to the research, airport managers and governing  bodies will need to embrace the concept of capacity sharing with other  airports in their market areas to maintain this viability and accommodate  demand and will also need to look at other potential approaches. Such  approaches may include the expansion of high-speed rail in some  corridors or the use of demand-management strategies, such as peak  pricing or restrictions on the use of congested airports by smaller  aircraft.
FAA’s FACT 2 report and its 2009–2013 FAA Flight Plan also noted the  potential for regional airport planning to identify options to relieve  congestion. The FACT 2 report identified regional options that could help  meet the future capacity needs of the nation’s airports, among them,  continuing to study regional traffic and development alternatives and  planning for high-density corridors and multiple modes, including high- speed rail. Likewise, one of the initiatives in the Flight Plan is the use of  AIP funding to reduce capacity constraints and provide greater access to  alternate airports in the metropolitan areas and corridors where  congestion at primary airports creates delays throughout the national  airspace system. Finally, FAA’s NextGen program identifies regional  airports as having potential to provide additional capacity in 15  metropolitan areas, including Atlanta, Charlotte, Chicago, Houston, Las  Vegas, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, New York, Philadelphia, Phoenix, San  Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, South Florida, and Washington/Baltimore.
section_title: Most Regions with Significantly Congested Airports Have Engaged in Regional Airport Planning, but Regional Airport Plans Have Been Used Selectively for FAA or Airport Decision Making
subsections: section_title: Nearly All Regions Forecast to Have Significantly Congested Airports Have Received FAA Funding for Regional Airport Planning
paragraphs: Nine of the 10 regions forecast by FAA to have one or more significantly  congested airports in 2025 received FAA funding from 1999 through 2008  in support of regional airport planning (see table 3). In all, FAA provided  $34 million in AIP grants for metropolitan system planning during this  period, and the 9 aforementioned regions received $20 million of the total.  According to FAA’s AIP Handbook, metropolitan areas are eligible for  funding under FAA’s AIP program if airport problems in the region require  a higher level of effort to address them than would be provided as part of a  statewide analysis. Such regional problems typically arise in association  with large- or medium-hub airports, according to the handbook. Each of  the 10 regions forecast to be significantly capacity constrained by 2025 had  at least one airport categorized as a large hub in 2008.
section_title: Six Regions with Airports Forecast to Be Congested Have Prepared RASPs
paragraphs: Since 1999, 6 of the 10 regions with airports that are forecast to be  congested by 2025 have developed or are developing RASPs, including Los  Angeles, Philadelphia, Phoenix, San Diego, San Francisco, and South  Florida. Each of these regions has received one or more FAA grants for  regional planning since 1999. The majority of these plans were developed  or are being developed under the leadership of the local MPO, although in  San Diego and Florida the airport sponsor and the state department of  transportation, respectively, assumed leadership roles. Five regions have  completed RASPs since 2000, and 2 are in development. Table 4 provides  information about the RASPs developed or being developed in the 6  regions. Based on our review, the completed RASPs largely reflect the  elements laid out for system planning by FAA and generally contain  information about the airport system, forecast information, and a  discussion of transportation needs, among other elements. In addition,  most of the completed RASPs contained recommendations or strategies  regarding the role of regional airports and potential airport improvements.
Each of the regions that have completed or are completing RASPs also  considered alternative modes of transportation as a means to alleviating  airport congestion. FAA guidance for airport system planning discusses  alternative modes of transportation, but does so only in the context of  improving airport access. The MPO in the Los Angeles region has modeled  the potential impacts of high-speed rail. According to ongoing research  being developed for the ACRP, this modeling work demonstrated that  development of a high-speed rail system would likely result both in the  increased use of alternate regional airports—which would be linked to  metropolitan centers by the new rail lines—for passenger service and  cargo and in air-rail substitution by some passengers as they chose to take  the train in lieu of flying. Likewise, San Diego has used its regional  airport planning process to identify intermodal solutions. The airport  sponsor worked with the region’s MPO to develop a new plan for Sa n  Diego International Airport, which includes considerations of an  intermodal facility at the airport. The new RASP is also being developed  in  concert with an air-rail study being undertaken by the MPO, which aims to  explore improved access to alternative regional airports and the po diversion of passengers to high-speed rail.
section_title: The Extent of Regional Airport Planning in Other Regions Has Varied
paragraphs: We found that the extent of regional airport planning undertaken in the  four regions forecast to have significantly congested airports that have not  developed RASPs—Atlanta, Chicago, Las Vegas, and New York—varied  and was focused on individual airports. The regional airport planning that  was undertaken in these regions was typically not led by regional planners  in MPOs. Airport sponsors (in the Atlanta, Las Vegas, and New York  regions) or state authorities (in Chicago) led efforts, with planning limited  to the airports under their direct authority. All of these regions except  Chicago have received funding from FAA for regional airport planning,  with amounts ranging from nearly $3 million for JFK in the New York  region—where the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port  Authority) carries out planning for its 5 airports—to $200,000 each in  Atlanta and Las Vegas. Table 5 provides information about the range of  regional airport planning in regions with airports forecast to be  significantly congested that have not prepared RASPs, the leadership of  these activities, and funding received from FAA.
section_title: FAA and Airports Have Used These Plans Selectively in Decision Making
paragraphs: While regional airport planning has been undertaken in each of the regions  forecast to have significantly congested airports, FAA has used the results  of this planning selectively when working with airports or making funding  decisions. In each of the five potentially congested regions we visited, FAA  regional officials stated that they may look at RASPs or other regional  airport plans when reviewing projects at individual airports. FAA regions,  however, do not carry out a systematic review of RASPs to ensure that  they meet the guidance for airport system planning, and none of the FAA  regions we spoke with regularly used them in decision making when  funding airport improvements, despite the potential identified by FAA and  others for RASPs to identify potential options to alleviate congestion. For  example, FAA officials in the Western-Pacific Region stated that capital  investment decisions are made on the basis of airport master plans or  airport layout plans. The officials noted that RASPs can serve as a  tiebreaker among projects, but that funding decisions are made using  national-level priorities. FAA officials in the Eastern Region also stated  that they did not refer to RASPs when selecting projects for AIP funding,  although they would assume that regional forecasts and airport roles  would be reflected in airport master plans. As in the Western-Pacific  Region, we were told that RASPs might be used to resolve tiebreakers for  competing projects.
Airport officials in the regions we selected told us that no RASP to date  had been adopted into the airport-level capital improvement plans— airport layout or airport master plans—that guide decision making. For  example, airport officials in Philadelphia stated that regional airport  planning, including the RASP, has little influence on decisions made by the  City of Philadelphia or by Philadelphia International Airport. Officials at  other airports, however, said that these plans may be considered during  airport-level planning. In the Los Angeles region, airport officials at John  Wayne Airport in Orange County, for example, stated that while they may  consider the RASP when making decisions about airport improvements, it  is not the primary driver for these decisions because, in their view,  regional and airport priorities necessarily differ. By contrast, the airport  sponsor of LAX has pursued suggestions or strategies from RASPs when  making decisions regarding airport improvements or capacity. Los Angeles  World Airports, which operates LAX, as well as airports in Ontario and  Van Nuys, based internal strategic planning for LA/Palmdale Regional  Airport on the distribution of passenger traffic among regional airports  developed by the region’s MPO. Los Angeles World Airports also for a time  pursued a decentralization strategy similar to that suggested in the  RASP—attempting to develop LA/Palmdale Regional Airport—although  the airport sponsor focused on serving local passengers, rather than  passengers that might travel to the airport from elsewhere in the region.  Finally, Los Angeles World Airports is supporting the development of a  high-speed rail line that would divert passenger traffic by either improving  access to alternate regional airports or carrying passengers on busy  regional corridors, which was also included in the RASP.
Airport officials at San Diego International Airport and SFO—both in  regions with significantly congested regions currently developing RASPs— anticipate using the RASPs for their airport-level planning. The San Diego  RASP is being developed by the airport sponsor itself, and future airport  plans at San Diego International are expected to reflect findings from the  RASP, according to airport officials, although there is no assurance that  the RASP would be considered by other airports in the region. Likewise, in  San Francisco, SFO airport officials are supporting ongoing regional  airport planning and stated that they expected to consider findings  included in the RASP when developing airport plans.
While not included in our in-depth analysis of selected regions, state  department of transportation officials in Florida explained that RASPs in  the state are closely tied to airport decision making, given the link  between these plans—which are developed as part of the state’s airport  planning process—and the state’s airport improvement program. Airport  capital plans reflect state priorities to be eligible for these state funds.  RASPs are developed by committees made up of airport sponsors and  MPOs. The state department of transportation facilitates and supports  these committees, and the resulting regional plans are incorporated into  the state’s aviation system plan, thus becoming state priorities. The  priorities reflected in the RASPs, however, are not linked to the decision  making done by FAA for AIP funding, according to a state official.
In those areas that have not developed RASPs, regional airport planning  has contributed to some decision making. In the New York region, for  example, FAA led efforts to carry out a regional demand study looking at  current traffic at regional airports—both the primary and smaller regional  airports—as well as surveying passengers to determine where they came  from in the region and if alternate airports might be closer than the three  congested primary airports. The study also identified the development  needs for regional airports. Based in part on the study’s forecasts, the Port  Authority acquired Stewart International Airport north of the city in 2007.  The newly acquired Stewart International Airport is seen by the Port  Authority to have the potential to ease some congestion pressure on other  Port Authority airports—without removing passengers from the Port  Authority system—if airlines can be attracted to provide service to serve  the local population. By contrast, the Port Authority has not included the  other potential alternate airports identified in the demand study— Westchester County and Long Island MacArthur Airport—in regional  airport planning currently being undertaken by the Regional Plan  Association, which is a nonprofit, civic group that has received funding  from the Port Authority to develop an airport system plan. These alternate  airports are outside the Port Authority system, and Regional Plan  Association officials stated that non-Port Authority airports would be  invited to participate in finalizing the regional plan if draft  recommendations included them. Figure 5 illustrates, as of 2005, the  service areas for the main airports in the New York-New Jersey region and  shows the location of six other airports in the region, including Stewart  International. (BDL) (BDL) (BDL) (SWF) (SWF) (SWF) (HPN) (HPN) (HPN)
Newark Liberty Newark Liberty Newark Liberty (LGA) (LGA) (LGA)
Lon Iland Lon Iland Lon Iland (EWR) (EWR) (EWR) (ISP) (ISP) (ISP)
John F. Kennedy John F. Kennedy John F. Kennedy (JFK) (JFK) (JFK)
Philadelphia Philadelphia Philadelphia International International International (TTN) (TTN) (TTN) (PHL) (PHL) (PHL)
Atlantic City Atlantic City Atlantic City International International International (ACY) (ACY) (ACY)
section_title: In the Boston Region, Which Is Not Forecast to Be Significantly Congested, Regional Airport Planning Was Tied to Airport Decision Making
paragraphs: FAA officials and others pointed to the regional airport planning in the  Boston region as being a role model effort. Officials with Massport, the  sponsor of Logan International Airport (Logan) in Boston, and planning  officials began to seek regional solutions in the 1990s after it was  determined that Logan, the region’s primary commercial facility, would be  unable to fully accommodate growing regional demand and that there  were no options to construct a new primary airport. Regional airport  planning has included a series of demand studies and a RASP that  concentrated on finding and implementing a mix of solutions. The  resulting plans recommend improvements at Logan; the increased use of  underutilized airports in the region and improvements at these airports; as  well as the expanded use of other modes of travel, notably high-speed rail  in the Northeast Corridor.
FAA played an important role in the Boston region by supporting regional  airport planning and incorporating the regional approach into its decision  making for airport capital improvement projects. The regional airport  planning in the Boston region was led by local airports and facilitated by  the FAA regional office, which provided funding for studies as well as  taking a leading role in the most recent demand study and the  development of the 2006 RASP. FAA’s involvement in the regional airport  planning was credited to the interest of the agency’s regional staff.  Massport officials explained that regional airports would have been  reluctant to participate in a project headed by Massport, and the  involvement of the Massachusetts Aeronautics Division and FAA helped  convene stakeholders and get people to participate in the process. FAA  also worked with regional airports to develop capital plans to identify  needed airport improvements that were consistent with the RASP,  according to regional FAA and Massport officials.
The Boston region does not have an airport among those forecast to be  significantly congested in FAA’s FACT 2 report, assuming planned  improvements occur, and FAA and Massport officials give some credit to  the implementation of regional airport planning in reducing congestion.
Officials at Massport point to improvements at Logan—which included a  new runway, new taxiways, reductions in minimum spacing between  aircraft, and issuance of peak period pricing mechanisms—as well as to  the regional airport planning as being important to addressing the capacity  challenges that faced the airport. Furthermore, the region was significantly  less congested following the September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist attacks,  with passenger levels at Logan dropping 18 percent from 2000 to 2002,  although this traffic has largely returned. Following the 9/11 attacks, there  was an increase in passengers using Amtrak to travel to New York City,  demonstrating the potential for high-speed rail to complement air service  and potentially reduce airport congestion.
The realization of the goals of regional airport planning in the Boston  region was greatly aided by the decision of Southwest Airlines to initiate  service at T.F. Green Airport near Providence, Rhode Island, in 1996, and  at Manchester-Boston Regional Airport in Manchester, New Hampshire, in  1998, and airline officials pointed to regional airport planning as a factor  facilitating these decisions. Southwest officials stated that the regional  demand study pointed to potential demand near these airports and helped  to pique their interest, in addition to their own analysis, in exploring  expanded service in the New England region. Furthermore, airport  improvements at T.F. Green Airport and Manchester-Boston Regional  Airport allowed for the expansion. The airline debuted service at one gate  at T.F. Green. Due to the strong demand, the airline requested that the  airport construct a terminal expansion, which allowed Southwest to  expand to four gates over the next couple of years. According to airline  officials, both of these alternate regional airports met the airline’s  expectations.
section_title: Since Regional Airport Planning Is Advisory, Competing Interests Can Derail Development and Implementation, While Aligned Interests Can Aid Implementation
subsections: section_title: The Advisory Nature of RASPs and Other Regional Airport Plans and Competing Interests Are Factors That Hinder Planning and Implementation
paragraphs: The MPOs that conduct regional airport planning have no authority over  which airport improvement projects are priorities in their regions and, as a  result, the RASPs they produce have little direct influence over airport  capital investment and other decisions. Because MPOs do have authority  over surface transportation projects—only projects prioritized by MPOs  are eligible to receive federal funding from the Federal Transportation  Administration (FTA) and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)— MPOs can directly influence surface projects that affect airport access, but  cannot directly affect the capacity of these airports. None of the airports  we met with during the course of our review are required to consider or  incorporate the recommendations of RASPs into their ALPs or airport  master plans. In most of the 6 regions that have developed or are  developing RASPs, airport officials—such as those at LAX and SFO— stated that they would consider the region’s perspective in an informal  fashion, even though recommendations included in RASPs are not binding.  Other airports we interviewed were more guarded about their  consideration of regional airport planning conducted by MPOs. Airport  officials at John Wayne Airport in the Los Angeles region stated that the  region’s RASP is not a primary driver of airport decision making, in part  because regional planning priorities are likely to differ from those of the  airport, particularly regarding mitigation strategies for surrounding  communities. Airport officials at Philadelphia International stated that the  airport does its own planning without input from regional planners,  although the airport is active in the development of regional airport  plans. As a result, regional priorities may not be reflected in the decision- making documents that guide capital improvements at airports. Ongoing  research being developed for the ACRP similarly notes that while regional  airport planning could fill the gap between airport- and national-level  planning, most regional airport planning conducted to date has not been  influential due in part to the fact that airport sponsors retain authority  over planning and development decisions.
According to FAA, it is also not required to consider MPO-developed  RASPs, even when these plans are funded with FAA grants. FAA officials  stated that the inclusion or absence of a project in a RASP had little  influence whether the agency approved AIP grants for an individual  airport project, serving in some cases as a tiebreaker but not guiding  project prioritization. FAA considers AIP grants for capital improvements  on an airport-by-airport basis, based on national criteria. Airports justify  improvement projects individually using forecasts from their own service  areas, and the national criteria that FAA uses does not consider how  improvements exist in a regional context, except during the environmental  review process.
As we have previously discussed, FAA regional offices have some latitude  in determining which projects to fund, and FAA’s funding and support of  regional airport planning itself may vary within the agency and by project.  Thus, while FAA guidance and headquarters staff encourage regional  airport planning, two MPOs in regions with significantly congested  airports have had difficultly in obtaining funding for regional airport  planning in recent years. For example, in the Philadelphia region, an MPO  official told us they sought funds to assess capacity and demand across the  airports in its region with a demand study similar to the ones completed  with FAA funding in Boston and New York. FAA officials told us that  they rejected the study for Philadelphia because it would have included a  significant marketing component—which is ineligible for AIP funding— and it might not be good timing for the MPO to conduct capacity analysis  at the same time as the environmental impact statement for proposed  improvements at Philadelphia International is under way. An MPO official  told us that regional planners hoped to use the results of the study to  develop recommendations and prioritize improvement projects in their  region—as had been done with the FAA-supported demand study and  related RASP in the Boston region. Additionally, FAA officials told us that  AIP funding to the MPO had declined in recent years, but that FAA did not  view other recent MPO proposals as useful. FAA has not provided funds  for regional airport planning in Los Angeles since 2005, although the MPO  has developed a RASP in the meantime without FAA funding. According to  FAA regional officials, the regional airport planning carried out by the  MPO offered impractical solutions—notably, a proposal to construct  magnetic levitation (maglev) train lines to regional airports—that were not  financially feasible. MPO officials in Los Angeles pointed to other aspects  of RASPs developed by the MPO every 4 years, such as the forecasting and  consideration of alternate regional airports, as evidence of its value, and  expressed frustration that technical support from FAA was difficult to  obtain.
For MPOs that want to carry out continuous planning, the lack of  consistent funding may limit their ability to maintain staff and conduct  planning on an ongoing basis. FAA’s guidance on airport system planning  points to the importance of continuous planning, but FAA’s AIP funding  process is not structured to prioritize it. This is in contrast to the MPO-led  surface transportation planning process, which according to FTA and  FHWA guidance was developed to ensure continuous planning, among  other things. Rather, projects are evaluated on a case-by-case basis for AIP  funding, which favors projects with discrete products, although the AIP  handbook notes that funding is available for continuous planning, which  may include continuing surveillance and coordination of the airport  system, periodic plan reevaluation, special studies, and the updating of  RASPs. The MPOs in two of the regions with potentially significantly  congested airports maintain aviation planning staff to carry out regional  airport planning on an ongoing basis. In each of these regions, the MPOs  received AIP grant funding from FAA for regional airport planning for a  number of years, but this funding has been curtailed in recent years. In Los  Angeles, the MPO has received no AIP funding since 2005 and has  continued to carry out regional airport planning using its own resources.  While it received AIP funding in recent years, the MPO in Philadelphia  limited the scope of its regional airport planning to special studies—rather  than continuous system planning—according to regional planning  officials, as the result of reduced FAA support for continuous system  planning. According to ongoing research being developed for the ACRP,  these two regions are among a handful of MPOs nationwide that employ  aviation specialists—staff that could be involved in the type of monitoring  involved in continuous planning.
The advisory nature of regional airport planning and its lack of a  connection to capital investment decisions are not the only hindrances to  regional airport planning and implementation. We also found that a  number of competing interests can derail a plan and prevent  implementation. When the individual interests of airports, communities,  and airlines are not aligned, for example, they can hinder regional airport  planning and implementation. Furthermore, the lack of funding for  planning can also be a hindrance. Additional hindrances include the  following:   Airport interests. A major hindrance to regional airport planning and  implementation are the differing interests of airports in a region that may  conflict with an integrated regional approach. Airport interests may  include maximizing revenue generation and protecting markets—including  high-value business or long-haul markets. As a consequence, regional  airport planning may be more difficult to undertake and implement in  locations where airports see themselves to be in direct competition with  other airports in their region, particularly if they perceive that such  planning may divert traffic or resources to competing airports. Airport  officials in Philadelphia told us that they do not want to support federal  efforts, including regional airport planning, that could lead to losing or  diverting flights from their airport to other airports in the region, for  example, because the City of Philadelphia—which owns Philadelphia  International—does not want to lose revenue generated at its airport to  other airports. In other regions, we found that distrust between some  airports has limited the range of solutions considered in RASPs. For  example, the MPO and Los Angeles World Airports airport officials told us  that other airport sponsors in the region—including those for airports in  Long Beach, Burbank, and Orange County—have viewed regional airport  planning suspiciously, notably the planning undertaken by the now- defunct Southern California Regional Airport Authority. This authority  theoretically had the ability to force airports to accept more traffic.  Regional airport planning carried out by the MPO, however, does not  include such authority, and since 2001 RASPs have been developed that  respect the physical constraints and legal restrictions at individual airports  in the region.
Community interests. Some local community interests, such as those  focused on noise or environmental concerns, may impede or limit regional  airport planning and implementation. As the result of community pressure,  two airports in the Los Angeles region—John Wayne Airport in Orange  County and Long Beach Airport—have legal agreements and requirements,  respectively, that allow them to limit the capacity of their facilities, for  example. MPO officials in the region told us that airport sponsors at these  airports primarily participated in regional airport planning to ensure that  existing limits on capacity or expansion were respected. These airports  are forecast to need additional capacity by 2025, given that they are not  expected to meet passenger demand. Other airports in the region are also  working to respond to community pressure to limit growth or operations,  and such agreements may further restrict the available airport capacity  under certain conditions in the region. For example, the airport sponsor of  LAX has agreed to limit the number of operations at the airport in  response to community concerns about noise, air quality, and the quality  of life in surrounding communities. In addition, the airport sponsor at Bob  Hope Airport in Burbank applied to FAA to make a voluntary nighttime  curfew permanent, which had the potential to put pressure on nearby  airports, such as LAX, or airports in Ontario and Van Nuys. While FAA  denied the application, even voluntary agreements of this type reduce the  regional options for meeting passenger demand for air travel.
Airline interests. Airlines act independently of both airports and  communities, and their independence may complicate efforts to plan  regionally. Airlines make decisions about which airports to serve and the  level of services they will offer according to their business and network  plans, and such decisions may not align with airport and MPO plans. Most  notably, in a congested region, planning officials might suggest that traffic  migrate to lesser-used alternate airports, as they have in Los Angeles.  However, this suggestion may conflict with the business plans of airlines  that already serve primary airports in a region. Such airlines generally  want to focus their traffic in a city at one major airport, both for cost and  revenue reasons. In addition, while MPOs may want to develop capacity  in the system, this development may not align with the objectives of  airlines. Individual airlines may prefer to sell limited capacity at a premium  price or limit the ability of other airlines to provide competing service.  FAA guidance on airport system planning points to the importance of  understanding airline business models when suggesting the use of  alternate regional airports. Regional planning and airport officials in  several of the regions we visited noted that they concentrated on  attracting new entrants to the market or airlines whose business plans  included serving alternate airports—primarily low-cost carriers—for  service at these airports. The use of demand management strategies that  provide incentives for airlines to serve alternate regional airports—or a  disincentive to serving congested, primary airports—could serve to align  the interests of airlines and airports or regional planners as well,  according to some airport officials.
Airport sponsors and MPOs in our selected regions indicated that they had  little influence over airline service levels and locations, which made it  difficult to align divergent and sometimes competing interests. Regional  planners with whom we met also indicated that they found it difficult to  engage airlines in their regional airport planning. For example, MPO  officials in Philadelphia reported that airline representatives had attended  only one planning meeting. Likewise, in San Diego, an airline  representative was included on the advisory committee, but airlines were  not participating in regional planning. According to airline representatives,  airlines are typically not involved in regional planning, although they may  participate in airport-level planning, given their interest in controlling  costs. An additional complicating factor is a difference in airport or  regional planning and airline planning. Whereas airports use 5- to 10-year  forecasts to develop master plans for capacity investments and RASPs  may be updated every 2 to 5 years, airlines’ assets are largely mobile and  can move from one market to another with relative ease.
Legal restrictions. Current airport revenue rules generally do not allow  airports to price their services regionally; therefore, using pricing to even  supply and demand among various airports is not possible. Airfield  revenues may not exceed the aggregate costs to the airport sponsor of  providing airfield services and airfield assets currently in use, with certain  exceptions. The fees that airports typically charge airlines to operate at  individual airports—including rental charges and landing fees—are based  on the historical costs of operating the facility according to FAA.  Improving alternate airports can make them more expensive, since the  costs for such improvements become part of the rate base charged to  airlines. For example, in the Los Angeles region, fees for airlines at the  more-congested LAX are less than at less-congested airports in the region,  such as Ontario International, in part due to previous improvements at the  smaller airport. Furthermore, airport-airline lease agreements, which,  according to officials, can prohibit some airport sponsors from  transferring funds from one airport to another, even if they have the same  sponsor, also can limit the options available for regional airport planning.  As a result, it may be challenging to adjust these fees in a regional context  to provide financial incentives to airlines to serve less-congested airports,  if these airports have higher operating costs.
section_title: Regional Airport Planning Is Aided by Several Factors, and Implementation Only Occurs When Interests Are Aligned
paragraphs: From our in-depth analysis, we identified a number of factors that aided  regions in the development and implementation of regional airport  planning. In general, we found that when stakeholders were supportive of  regional airport planning, the plans resulting from these efforts were more  likely to be used. More specifically, the factors that helped align these  various stakeholders include the following:   Legal considerations. Legal considerations served to facilitate planning  in two of our selected regions. After residents of San Diego County  rejected a proposal to develop a second airport, a law was passed that  required the county’s airport authority to develop a RASP by June 30,  2011. The law requires the airport authority—which operates San Diego  International—to prepare and adopt a plan that identifies workable  strategies to improve the performance of the regional airport system. In  the San Francisco region, a state agency, the Bay Conservation and  Development Commission, controls the permitting process for  development within 100 feet of the shoreline of San Francisco Bay. Both  SFO and Oakland International airports sit on land adjacent to the bay and  therefore are subject to the commission’s review and permitting process,  depending upon the type of development projects these airports propose.  The commission has stated that it would deny projects—including the  construction of new runways—that would affect the bay, unless the  airports exhaust all reasonable alternatives to providing capacity. In  practice, the region’s RASP development process has become the venue to  explore such alternatives.
Constraints on infrastructure. A number of constraints to airport  construction—geographic, environmental, and political—spur regional  airport planning. In Boston, for example, Logan is largely locked into its  existing footprint, given its waterfront location and surrounding  community. Officials in several of our selected regions mentioned similar  constraints as reasons for participating in regional airport planning. In San  Francisco, filling the bay to build capacity would be extremely costly and  may be unlikely, given environmental concerns. Likewise, terrain  surrounding San Diego International and the airport’s small footprint limit  expansion opportunities. Each of these regions is using regional airport  planning to help identify additional options for providing transportation  capacity.
MPO and FAA interest and involvement. Regional airport planning  was more likely to occur when a MPO or FAA took an active interest in  advancing regional airport planning. In several of the regions we visited,  for example, MPOs had aviation planners that carried out system planning.  Such planners in Philadelphia have engaged in a variety of regional airport  planning, including the development of a RASP and prioritizing airport  projects for state funding. MPO officials are also active in Los Angeles at  the Southern California Association of Governments. Over the course of  many years, this MPO has developed several RASPs, and FAA has  provided funding for some of this planning. The MPO also has created and  maintained a sophisticated modeling tool, allowing it to do airport choice  modeling for the entire region. Ongoing efforts to create and update  RASPs under way in San Diego and San Francisco are being undertaken  jointly by MPO and airport officials.
While some FAA and airport officials questioned the regional airport  planning expertise of MPOs, MPOs regularly prepare surface  transportation plans and this experience may aid them in developing  RASPs. MPOs are required to develop long-range (20 year) transportation  plans and short-range (4 year) Transportation Improvement Programs  (TIP) that identify strategies for operating, managing, enhancing,  maintaining, and financing a metropolitan area’s transportation system,  among other things, and the elements suggested for RASPs are similar to  those included in these plans. For example, the surface transportation  plans prepared by MPOs monitor existing conditions, carry out  forecasting, and identify current and future transportation needs and  potential improvement strategies. FAA guidance for airport system  planning also includes an inventory of the current aviation system,  forecasting, an identification of air transportation needs, and the  consideration of alternative airport systems. In a survey conducted of  MPOs nationwide for a prior GAO report, nearly 19 percent of MPOs  reported that they engaged in regional airport planning—sometimes as a  result of state requirements. We found that 17 (41 percent) of the 41  largest MPOs that responded to the survey—those with populations with  over 1 million people—indicated that they engaged in regional airport  planning. Of these 41 MPOs, 39 have a large- or medium-hub airport  within their jurisdictions.
Airports noted that outside groups, such as MPOs; nonprofit groups; or  FAA can be useful in establishing regional airport planning since they can  mitigate some of the suspicion that might be present if airports,  particularly dominant ones, lead the planning. According to ongoing  research being developed for the ACRP, MPOs can offer airport managers  truly regional perspectives on planning, data, and analyses on travel  behavior and demand in a geographically broad area and a neutral “table”  at which airport managers and other key stakeholders can sit to work  through coordination options and opportunities. Establishing a neutral  table was especially helpful in the Boston region where FAA took an  active role in helping to formulate a RASP and then to implement the  recommendations. FAA regional officials helped develop the region’s 2006  RASP by facilitating meetings among potentially reluctant stakeholders  and leading an assessment of regional demand, among other tasks. FAA  regional office then worked actively with airports in the region to integrate  RASP recommendations into their capital plans and reviewed these plans  against the RASP when making grant decisions.
Political benefit. In several of the regions we visited, airports supported  regional airport planning to obtain political acceptance for airport  improvement projects. Given sensitive environmental considerations, SFO  and Regional Airport Planning Committee officials told us that they  worked together on the RASP because any significant capital  improvements would need the support of the regional body. Even when  regional airport planning is undertaken without the leadership of a MPO,  there can be political benefits. In the New York region, the Port Authority  is funding a project by the Regional Plan Association to look at ways to  build capacity within the Port Authority system. As part of this effort,  Regional Plan Association officials told us they planned to poll the region’s  residents before and after their planning process regarding delay and the  public’s support for potential solutions. They anticipate that polling  demonstrating greater public awareness of the problems posed by delays  will build support for potential solutions, including less-popular options  such as runway construction or other improvements at the three major  airports in the region.
Airport benefit. When airport objectives complement each other— whether to increase, decrease, or maintain current flight levels—regional  airport planning recommendations may be reflected in airport  improvement decisions. In regions where a capacity-constrained primary  airport wants to specialize in particular types of flights or service, for  example, other airports in the region may benefit if they are interested in  expanding other types of flights or services. Furthermore, we found that if  a region’s primary airport or airports are engaged in regional airport  planning, their involvement may engender momentum for planning and  result in additional financial resources or other support. In Boston, which  is a region generally seen as successful at regional airport planning, FAA  officials told us that their efforts to shift traffic away from Logan was  aided by Massport’s interest in reducing the number of smaller feeder  flights that were consuming an increasing amount of the airport’s runway  capacity. Its interest in making capacity available for international and  long-haul flights rather than short-haul flights coincided with the interests  of regional airports in New Hampshire and Rhode Island that wanted to  expand service. Officials at SFO also expressed enthusiasm for renewed  regional airport planning in their region. An airport official told us that  such an effort might allow SFO to focus on a more-targeted segment of the  aviation market, notably long-haul and international flights, while allowing  alternate airports to expand shorter-haul domestic flights. SFO, together  with the region’s other primary airports, has provided financial support to  the regional planning process. In each of these cases, the region’s primary  airport or airports took an active role in regional airport planning, by  acting as participants as well as by contributing financial resources to  sustain the efforts.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The national airspace system is plagued by congestion and delay, with  nearly one-in-four arriving flights delayed at major airports, even though a  majority of the nation’s airports still have adequate capacity. FAA and  others forecast that more airports and regions will be congested in the  future, even if planned infrastructure and technological improvements  occur. However, many regions that contain congested airports also have  alternate airports that may be able to provide some congestion relief as  well as other options, including using other modes of transportation such  as high-speed rail. Regional airport planning can identify solutions to help  relieve aviation congestion—that airport-level planning cannot.
RASPs should include the range of elements identified by FAA for airport  system planning to help establish a viable system of airports. While FAA  reviews RASPs and other regional system plans to determine if they are  eligible for FAA funding, in those cases where RASPs have been  completed, FAA does not necessarily review the plans for conformance  with FAA guidance or standards. Without a review process, FAA may not  have confidence that RASPs are of a sufficient quality to guide decision  making or to ensure that they are integrated with local airport-level plans,  state airport system plans, and the NPIAS. Nor is there an incentive for  FAA to work with regions to help ensure that RASPs meet certain  standards, both in terms of content and quality.
Except in the Boston region, the recommendations made in RASPs that we  reviewed have not been systematically integrated into airport capital plans  that currently guide airport decision making and FAA funding. Rather,  both airport sponsors and FAA can choose to ignore RASPs, or to use  them selectively, even though the federal government has contributed  millions of dollars for their development. Congress, however, in creating  the current AIP in 1982 indicated that FAA may give priority to projects  that are consistent with integrated airport system plans, such as RASPs.  If RASPs are ignored, the time, effort, and resources that MPOs, airports,  and other regional bodies expend on these efforts—as well as FAA’s grant  support—are not filling the gap between airport- and national-level  planning efforts or ensuring that funding is used most efficiently to  manage capacity within regions with large- or medium-hub airports.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that federal AIP funds are employed to their maximum benefit  and to improve the level of regional- and airport-level coordination, we  recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator  of FAA to take the following two actions:   1.  Develop an FAA review process for regional airport system plans to  ensure that they meet FAA standards and airport system planning  guidance as well as provide technical support for regional planners  undertaking such planning.  2.  Use its existing statutory authority to give priority to funding airport  projects that are consistent with RASPs.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOT for its review and comment.   DOT provided technical comments in an e-mail message on December 11,  2009, which we incorporated into this report as appropriate.  In reviewing  the draft’s second recommendation to require that the RASPs are  integrated with airport-level plans so that they are consistent and tied to  FAA funding decisions, DOT officials indicated that they did not believe  they had the authority to require airports to incorporate RASP  recommendations unless airports concurred.  As a result, to create  incentives for airports to work with MPOs and other regional  organizations, we modified the second recommendation for FAA to use its  existing statutory authority to give airport projects that are consistent with  RASPs greater priority for AIP funding.  DOT generally agreed to consider  our recommendations.
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents  of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested  congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation and the Acting  Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. The report is also  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Staff members making key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To identify regions with potentially congested airports, we used the  Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) 2007 report entitled Capacity  Needs in the National Airspace System, 2007–2025 (FACT 2). Using  both demand and capacity forecasts, this report identifies airports that it  predicts will face significant capacity constraints by 2015 and 2025. To  obtain clarification on the methodology employed, we met with officials at  both FAA and The MITRE Corporation to discuss the study’s design and  findings and reviewed both published reports and unpublished work— including the scores received by airports in the four assessments used to  measure demand and capacity—supporting the FACT 2 study. Appendix II  provides more information about the methodology used in the FACT 2  report and its implications.
To evaluate the challenges facing regions with potentially congested  airports, the extent of regional airport planning being undertaken, and the  factors that have aided or hindered planning and the implementation of  regional airport plans, we carried out an in-depth analysis of selected  regions. We identified regions for this analysis using the following four  criteria: (1) existing and predicted aviation congestion based on FAA’s  FACT 2 study, (2) whether regions had sought funding from FAA to carry  out regional airport planning and the extent of the funding provided by  FAA, (3) whether regional airport planning had occurred, and (4) whether  regions were served by a single airport or multiple airports and the extent  to which multiple airports in a region were governed by the same sponsor.  Our assessment of regions with congested airports included Los Angeles,  New York, Philadelphia, San Diego, and San Francisco. We also assessed  regional airport planning activities in Boston, although this region is not  among those with airports that FACT 2 forecast to be significantly  capacity constrained. FAA officials and experts pointed to the Boston  region as having undertaken successful regional airport planning. Each of  the regions we selected received funding from FAA for regional airport  planning from 1999 to 2008, and regional airport planning has been  undertaken in each region. Three of the regions are served by multiple  airports—sometimes under the same sponsor—while Philadelphia and San  Diego are in regions with one major airport. For each of the regions we  selected, we reviewed regional airport planning documents and  interviewed officials at FAA airport district offices, airports officials or  sponsors, state aviation departments, and metropolitan planning  organizations (MPO). These interviews addressed the following topics:     The nature of the regional airport system, including challenges  involving capacity constraints or congestion and local constraints.
Participants or stakeholders in the regional airport planning process.
The extent that regional airport plans are used by airports, MPOs,  states, and others to guide airport decision making and FAA airport  funding decisions.
The inclusion of intermodal access and other ground transportation in  regional airport plans.
Factors that aid or hinder regional airport planning or the  implementation of regional airport plans.
We interviewed FAA officials in the Office of Airport Planning and  Programming to collect information about the types of plans involved in  aviation planning; the nature and extent of regional airport planning in  congested regions; the history of such regional planning; the roles of  various stakeholders, including FAA; and the outcomes associated with  regional airport planning to date. We also reviewed FAA’s advisory  circular on the airport system planning process and related documents  from FAA to summarize the guidance that FAA provides to airport system  planners, including those in metropolitan areas.
To analyze FAA funding for regional airport planning, we obtained grant  data from FAA for metropolitan system planning in the agency’s airport  improvement program (AIP) from fiscal years 1999 to 2008. These grants  were awarded primarily to MPOs, but one state and several airport  sponsors also received grants. To assess the reliability of these data, we  reviewed the quality control procedures applied to the data by the  Department of Transportation and subsequently determined that the data  were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
To gain an understanding of the congested aviation regions and the  potential impact of regional airport planning, we spoke with industry  experts, including those in academia; airline industry representatives; and  regional planners. We interviewed academics at the Massachusetts  Institute of Technology and the University of California at Berkeley  regarding work that they had undertaken on regional airport systems. We  discussed airport system planning and congestion with the Air Transport  Association, the National Association of State Aviation Officials, the ENO  Transportation Foundation, and Airport Councils International. To discuss  the results of regional airport planning in the Boston region, we  interviewed officials with Southwest Airlines. We met with government  officials and industry experts at a Transportation Research Board  conference on aviation system planning. We also reviewed various reports  and studies, including research on airport systems, congested regions,  intermodal issues, and planning and on the use of alternative airports  published by authors at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the  University of California at Berkeley, GRA Incorporated, and the Airport  Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) of the Transportation Research  Board, among others. Finally, we reviewed previous GAO reports,  including our prior work on aviation infrastructure, the Next Generation  Air Transportation System (NextGen) program, MPOs, and high-speed rail.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2008 to December  2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: FACT 2 Study’s Methodology for Analyzing Future Airport and Metropolitan Capacity Needs
paragraphs: The purpose of the FAA FACT 2 study is to analyze the extent to which  airports and metropolitan areas in the United States will face aviation  capacity constraints in the future. The study developed forecasts of  expected operations (takeoffs and landings), demand, and the capacity to  handle traffic at 56 airports and certain associated metropolitan areas. By  comparing, for each of three time frames (2007, 2015, and 2025) an  airport’s expected demand with its projected capacity, the study then  measured, in four different ways, the extent to which each airport may  experience congestion and delay. The study used specific thresholds to  designate whether an airport would be capacity constrained according to  each of the four capacity assessments. To be so designated, an airport  must be found to be capacity constrained across all four assessments for a  given time frame. According to FAA and MITRE officials with whom we  spoke, the study was designed to identify which airports would be the  most capacity constrained. Because of the focus of the study, some  airports that are also likely to face some degree of capacity problems are  not among those identified as capacity challenged in the study.
subsections: section_title: FACT 2 Study Identified Future Capacity-Constrained Airports That Exceeded Specified Thresholds for All Four of the Study’s Capacity Assessments
paragraphs: Using demand and capacity forecasts—each of which is evaluated in two  different ways—the FACT 2 study produced four assessments of the  extent of capacity challenges at each airport in 2015 and 2025.
subsections: section_title: Demand Forecasts
paragraphs: The FACT 2 study used two different forecasts of future demand, both of  which use economic, demographic, and airline industry information (such  as expected fares and the degree of competition) to assess the expected  level of future aviations operations at each airport. Both forecasts are also  generally “unconstrained,” meaning they predict the extent to which  demand will grow at an airport regardless of whether that airport would  actually be able to handle all of the traffic. Key aspects of the forecasts are  summarized as follows:     Terminal Area Forecasts (TAF): Produced by FAA each year, TAF  forecasts project expected operations demand on an airport-by-airport  basis, with separate forecasts for air carrier, commuter and air taxi,  military, and general aviation operations.
Future Air Traffic Estimator (FATE) forecasts: Produced by MITRE,  FATE forecasts project origin to destination traffic between  metropolitan areas within the United States. This model then analyses  how flights are likely to be scheduled by airlines to meet that demand,  based on projections about which airports within a city, flight routes,  and types of aircraft will be used for each flight segment. The results  are then restated on an airport-by-airport operations basis, and  supplemented by the number of projected international and general  aviation operations at each airport.
section_title: Airport Capacity
paragraphs: FACT 2 used two methods to evaluate airport capacity which then fed into  the following two models of capacity constraint: the annual service  volume (ASV) and national airspace system (NAS) modeling. Both models  assessed existing capacity and for the 2015 and 2025 forecasts took into  account planned additions or improvements to runways, technologies, and  air traffic procedures. For the 35 Operational Evolution Partnership (OEP)  airports and for Oakland International Airport, the 2025 analysis also took  into account some elements of the expected improvements offered by  NextGen implementation.
ASV: The ASV is the level of capacity—expressed in the number of  operations during a year—at each airport that, if fully utilized, would  be expected to be associated with a given level of average delay. A FAA  model established the ASV level by examining existing data on the  relationship between the level of operations and extent of delay across  a set of runway configurations in varied weather conditions at each  airport. The model took into account the expected capacity-enhancing  improvements and simulated, based on past experience, an ASV level  that would be associated with a 7-minute average queuing delay at each  airport.
NAS–Wide Modeling: While the ASV method establishes the level of  demand that would be associated with an average level of delay, NAS  modeling estimates the extent of delay that will result from a specific  level of traffic, given an amount of capacity. The NAS modeling begins  with “benchmark” airport capacity measures, which were established  for most of the FACT 2 airports in an earlier study based on the most  commonly used airfield configuration in three weather conditions,  information on weight classes of fleet at the airport, and other  operational factors. Future capacities were then estimated based on  any planned airport improvements at the airport and in ATC  procedures and on NextGen improvements.
section_title: Designation of Capacity- Constrained Airports
paragraphs: The key findings of the FACT 2 study are that assuming all capacity  improvements—including those associated with NextGen for 2025—are  taken into account, 6 airports will be capacity constrained in 2015 and 14  (an additional 8) will be capacity constrained in 2025. For an airport to be  designated as capacity constrained in 1 of the study’s forecast years, the  airport had to be designated as capacity constrained in each of the  following four assessments:    ASV with TAF forecasts: The ASV was compared with the TAF demand  forecasts to obtain a ratio of forecasted demand to ASV. A threshold at  80 percent was used in designating airports as capacity constrained,  meaning that forecasted demand was 80 percent or higher than the  ASV.
ASV with FATE forecasts: The ASV was also compared with the FATE  demand forecasts to obtain a ratio of forecasted demand to ASV. A  threshold at 80 percent was again used in designating airports as  capacity constrained, meaning that forecasted demand was 80 percent  or higher than the ASV. For example, for the Dallas–Forth Worth  International (DFW) airport, the 2007 ASV ratio was 0.78 with the TAF  demand forecast and 0.81 with the FATE forecast, indicating that the  airport was just edging toward having a capacity problem at that time,  according to the ASV assessments. For the 2025 forecasts at DFW, the  ratios are 1.09 and 1.15 under TAF and FATE, respectively, indicating  that according to the ASV assessments, DFW will become substantially  more delayed by 2025.
NAS with TAF forecasts: This NAS assessment uses a “network  queuing” model that simulates how traffic flows across the NAS, given  the level of demand on routes and the extent of capacity at airports.  This analysis measures the following for each airport: (1) average  scheduled arrival delay, (2) arrival queue delay, (3) percentage of  scheduled arrival delay caused by local conditions, and (4) departure  queue delay. An advantage of the NAS method is that by analyzing the  relationship between operations and capacity across the network,  rather than on an airport-by-airport basis, the model can take into  account how circumstances at one airport influence delay experienced  at other airports. Moreover, this analysis enables the contributory  causes of measured delay at any given airport to be identified; that is, it  distinguishes among delay caused by conditions at the given airport, at  other airports, and in the airspace.
Using this model, two different triggers can cause an airport to be  designated as capacity constrained. First, the capacity-constrained  designation is triggered if the airport’s scheduled arrival delay is at  least 12 minutes and, if in either weather condition examined, either  (1) the arrival queue delay exceeds 12 minutes or (2) local conditions  causes more than 50 percent of scheduled arrival delay. Using the  secondary factors to supplement the scheduled arrival delay criteria  allows capacity-constrained airports to be limited to those that  experience delay caused by local factors. Second, an airport can also  be designated as capacity constrained if the airport’s departure queue  delay—which is considered to be fully caused by local factors—is at  least 12 minutes.
NAS with FATE forecasts: The second NAS assessment uses the NAS- wide modeling approach with the FATE demand forecasts. Instead of  rerunning the NAS model with FATE forecasts, outputs from the  NAS/TAF runs are used and the differences between the FATE demand  forecasts and the TAF forecast are examined to calibrate how model  outputs would likely have been different under FATE demand  forecasts. This assessment measures only average scheduled arrival  delay. Under this model, an airport is designated as capacity  constrained if the airport’s average scheduled arrival delay is at least 12  minutes.
section_title: FACT 2 Study Also Identified Metropolitan Areas That Will Face Capacity Constraints
paragraphs: In addition to identifying airports that would be capacity constrained in  the future, the FACT 2 study also identified metropolitan areas that are  likely to have significant aviation capacity shortfalls. The study looked at  Metropolitan Statistical Areas—geographic areas defined by the Office of  Management and Budget—or combinations of such areas in the case of  some larger metropolitan areas, and analyzed the expected aviation  demand and capacity at the relevant airport or airports within those areas.  For determining which metropolitan areas should be designated as  capacity constrained, FACT 2 only examined those metropolitan areas that  either contained a large- or medium-hub airport or at least two small-hub  airports that the FACT 2 airport analysis had identified as capacity  constrained. A metropolitan area could be designated in FACT 2 as  capacity constrained for any of the following three reasons:    The metropolitan area contained a large-hub airport that the study  deemed capacity constrained and there were no other secondary  airports serving the metropolitan area.
The metropolitan area contained at least two large hubs, both of which  were identified to be capacity constrained.
The study conducted an analysis of demand and capacity across the  airports in each area. It used projected airport benchmark capacities  and, using historical weather conditions, converted these hourly  capacities into an annualized average expected capacity level for each  airport in each forecast year. For each of the demand forecasts (TAF  and FATE), capacity and demand across the relevant airports were  summed for each forecast year. If the resulting ratio of metropolitan  area demand (for either TAF or FATE) to metropolitan area capacity  exceeded 0.8, then the metropolitan area was considered to be capacity  constrained in that year.
section_title: FAA’s Methodology Was Designed to Identify the Most Seriously Congested Airports and May Understate Future Congestion Problems
paragraphs: Long-term forecasts of airport demand and capacity, such as those  undertaken in FACT 2, naturally face uncertainties. FACT 2 looked almost  20 years into the future. A number of conditions could change over the  course of those years and affect the accuracy of the forecasts, including  unexpected changes in regional economic growth patterns, demographic  movements, new airline industry business models, and the  macroeconomy. New industries may also unexpectedly influence business  and societal patterns. Since the time that FACT 2 was conducted,  macroeconomic conditions have already changed considerably. In  particular, because TAF and FATE demand forecasts were conducted  prior to the current economic downturn, they are likely considerably  higher than demand forecasts would be if they were to be conducted  today.
The results of the FACT 2 study are not only impacted by forecasting  uncertainties, but also the study’s purpose and design. According to  officials from FAA and MITRE with whom we spoke, the FACT 2 study  was intended to identify airports that will be highly capacity  constrained—not just airports that may have some congestion and delay  problems. In fact, the published study findings present only a list of  airports that were found to be highly capacity constrained and do not  report the underlying scores on the four assessments. For our work, we  not only examined the published FACT 2 study, but also airports’ scores  on the four assessments, and we also met several times with FAA and  MITRE officials to gain a further understanding of the model design. We  found that the objective of identifying “the worst of the worst” capacity- constrained airports was critical in structuring several elements of the  FACT 2 study. These model elements are discussed more fully in the  following text:     Meeting all four congestion thresholds: The FACT 2 study identified  airports as either being congested or not, rather than presenting  airports’ degree of capacity constraints along a continuum.  Furthermore, it required that an airport be designated as congested on  all four assessments to be designated as capacity constrained. These  model design elements have two implications. First, there is not a full  presentation of the range of capacity constraint—the published report  only states whether an airport was determined to be capacity  constrained or not. But the underlying scores are of a continuous  nature, and some airports were close to the trigger level on some  criteria. Moreover, if an airport did not meet the threshold for a  designation of a capacity problem on both of the NAS assessments, the  ASV assessment may not have been completed, since ASV levels were  only reestablished for later years if they were needed for the analysis.  In short, the study’s capacity-constrained designation criteria obscure  the more continuous nature of the data when designating which  airports are on or off the list, and a complete assessment across all four  criteria was not completed in all cases. Second, because underlying  scores for the assessments are not provided in the final study, the  results also do not show how much greater capacity problems are  likely to be at some of the airports than at others that do receive a  capacity-constrained designation. For example, the findings for the  Newark and Philadelphia Airports indicate that congestion and delay  will be substantially more problematic in those locations, even when  compared with many other of the designated capacity-constrained  airports.
Seven-minute average delay threshold: The ASV assessments used a 7- minute average delay threshold for determining available airport  capacity, rather than the 4-minute delay that, according to FAA and  MITRE officials, is more commonly used to measure delay-prone  airports within ASV studies. A lower average delay threshold would  have resulted in more airports meeting the capacity-constrained  threshold, according to the two ASV criteria.
Planned improvements: The FACT 2 findings, which are predicated on  the assumption that planned improvements will be completed in a  timely manner, may understate future capacity problems if  improvements fall behind schedule. The two sets of 2025 findings (i.e.,  with and without improvements) show that the planned improvements  are critical for addressing capacity problems at airports. In particular,  many more airports would be predicted to have significant capacity  challenges under the FACT 2 analysis were it not for the greater  capacity offered by the planned improvements. We have previously  reported that some airport improvement projects have faced or may  face delay in either funding or implementation. If the planned  improvements underlying the FACT 2 study face similar delay, then the  study may understate future capacity problems. Similarly, we have  reported that NextGen improvements face challenges that may affect  timely implementation, including some airlines’ reluctance to invest in  the necessary equipment, and the need for FAA to validate and certify  new technologies and issue certain rules before midterm  implementation can occur. In addition, airport officials with whom we  spoke expressed concerns that benefits from NextGen technological  gains might not be fully realized if FAA does not change air traffic  management standards (such as lowering ceiling requirements for  certain types of approaches) to match the new technology. FACT 2  acknowledged that more research on these types of air traffic  management improvements is required.
Unaccounted for constraints: Certain constraints or local  considerations that may limit either the growth at individual airports or  traffic distribution among airports within a region were not accounted  for in the FACT 2 analyses. For example, the study’s unconstrained  demand estimates did not take into account legal restrictions at two  airports in the Los Angeles area on the number of flights that can  operate or the number of passengers that can be accommodated. Thus,  FACT 2 may overestimate the operations at these airports and  underestimate traffic growth at other airports in the region. FAA  officials told us that they did not take these constraints into  consideration since FACT 2 was measuring unconstrained demand.  Furthermore, they expressed the opinion that the constraints could be  changed if there was an interest in doing so locally. Regional officials  noted that the current settlement at John Wayne Airport in Orange  County expires in 2015. At that point, the county and community may  negotiate changes to the current agreement, according to airport  officials. This could mean that the FACT 2 demand forecasts for other  airports in the region—most notably Los Angeles International Airport  (LAX), which came close to being designated as a capacity-constrained  airport in 2025—may underestimate future growth.
Unaccounted for capacity constraints: The FACT 2 study also did not  consider some potential capacity limitations. As noted in the study,  when given an opportunity to comment on the FACT 2 methodology,  some airport sponsors noted that an airport’s taxiways and terminal  gates as well as airspace—rather than runways—can sometimes limit  the number of operations that can be handled at an airport. The FACT 2  study, however, focused only on runways as the limiting capacity  factor. MITRE officials told us that further analysis of these elements of  capacity limitations are being examined currently.
Assumed aircraft upgauging: Both demand forecasts, but particularly  the FATE forecast, used in FACT 2 assumed some level of upgauging in  aircraft size, meaning the average number of seats per aircraft is  assumed to rise over the projection time frame. Some aviation experts  with whom we spoke, however, do not believe much upgauging will  occur in the coming years. If the upgauge assumptions overstate the  extent to which seats per aircraft actually rise, the level of congestion  in FACT 2 could be understated because more operations than  indicated in the demand forecasts would be needed to accommodate  the projected passenger base. Nevertheless, FAA officials discussed  the analysis that underlies the upgauge modeling for FATE and noted  that the FATE forecasted upgauge is driven by past experience in how  airlines have chosen to serve routes as demand has risen. Moreover,  they pointed out that certain fleet types that are likely to be phased out  in the next decade are likely to be replaced with somewhat larger  aircraft.
section_title: FACT 2 Study’s Planned Improvements
paragraphs: According to the FACT 2 report, the analysis includes planned  improvements affecting runway capacity for two future planning periods,  2015 and 2025. The planned improvements include the following:     New or extended runways: New or extended runways were included  as planned improvements. The OEP v8.0 and airport-specific planning  documents were used to incorporate the runway improvements in  either the 2015 or 2025 planning period.
New or revised air-traffic control procedures: If a new or revised air- traffic control procedure was listed in the OEP v8.0 or defined by the  FACT 2 analysis as consistent with a NextGen concept, it was modeled  as an improvement in this study. NextGen concepts were applied only  to the 35 OEP airports and Oakland International and then only in the  2025 planning scenario, given that NextGen is still in the early planning  stages. NextGen concepts for en route or oceanic operations or  changes to operations on the airport surface were not included.
Airspace redesign: Improvements derived from the redesign of the  airspace surrounding an airport were included in the 2015 or 2025  scenario on the basis of the best information available. The redesign  itself was not performed as part of this analysis.
Other assumptions: The FACT 2 analysis assumed existing  environmental restrictions that impact runway capacity, such as noise  abatement procedures, would continue through the FACT planning  periods. Planned taxiway, terminal, or ground access improvements  were not included in this analysis because they were outside the scope  of the models used.
section_title: Appendix III: Regional Airport Planning Nationwide and in our Selected Regions
subsections: section_title: Regional Airport Planning Nationwide
paragraphs: FAA has provided over $34 million in funding to metropolitan regions or  others carrying out metropolitan system planning in fiscal years 1999 to  2008. (See table 6.) These grant funds went to a range of efforts, including  developing or updating regional airport system plans (RASP). The majority  of these projects were sponsored by local MPOs or other regional planning  bodies, although the state of Virginia also received a grant. Funding was  also provided to several airports sponsors, including the Port Authority of  New York and New Jersey; Clark County in Las Vegas; the Palm Beach  County Board of Commissioners in South Florida; the Louisiana Airport  Authority in the New Orleans region; and the San Diego County Regional  Airport Authority, which operates San Diego International Airport.
In a survey conducted of 381 MPOs across the country for a prior report,  we found that fewer than 20 percent of the 324 MPOs responding indicated  they had responsibility for conducting all or a portion of a region’s aviation  planning. Among the larger MPOs responding to a question about their  involvement in aviation planning—41 of the 42 planning organizations  serving areas with populations greater than 1 million—17 engaged in  aviation planning activities, accounting for 41 percent of these MPOs.  Ten  MPOs indicated that they were required by state law to engage in regional  aviation planning, 2 of which had populations over 1 million. (See table 7.)
section_title: Regional Summaries
subsections: section_title: Boston Region
paragraphs: There are three commercial service airports operated by separate  sponsors in the Boston region. Boston Logan International is a large-hub  airport, and in 2008, 73 percent of flights to this facility arrived on time. A  medium-hub airport, T.F. Green, near Providence, Rhode Island, and a  small-hub airport, Manchester-Boston Regional in Manchester, New  Hampshire, also provide commercial service to the region’s residents.  FAA’s FACT 2 report did not forecast that any of the airports in the Boston  region would become significantly capacity constrained by 2025, assuming  planned improvements occur at Boston Logan and T.F. Green.
FAA officials in New England have taken an active role in trying to assist  the region’s airports in planning for future capacity needs. Officials at  Massport, which operates Boston Logan, told us that they realized that the  airport would not be able to meet the region’s capacity needs. After an  attempt to develop a second major airport in Massachusetts failed, they  worked with FAA and other airports in the region to decentralize the  region’s air traffic. This allowed Boston Logan an opportunity to specialize  in international and long-haul routes over short-haul trips. Prior to the  arrival of Southwest Airlines, regional demand studies demonstrated that  there were markets that could be served from Boston’s alternate airports.  Southwest Airlines officials told us that the demand forecasts piqued their  interest in the alternate airports in the region, and that the airline has been  pleased with how customers responded to its entry into Boston’s alternate  airports. Prior to the emergence of T.F. Green and Manchester-Boston  Regional, many residents drove from areas near these airports to travel  from Boston Logan. Expanded service options have allowed some  residents of the region to be served closer to where their trips originate.
section_title: Los Angeles Region
paragraphs: Los Angeles World Airports operates two commercial-service airports in  the Los Angeles region: LAX is a large-hub airport, and Ontario  International is a medium-hub airport. In 2008, 77 percent of flights to LAX  arrived on time. There are two other medium-hub airports in the region  operated by separate sponsors—John Wayne Airport in Orange County  and Bob Hope Airport in Burbank. There is also a small-hub airport in  Long Beach and a nonhub airport in Van Nuys, which is owned and  operated by Los Angeles World Airports. FACT 2 predicted that both John  Wayne and Long Beach airports will become significantly capacity  constrained by 2015.
The capacity challenges faced by the Los Angeles region are compounded  by flight and operations restrictions at several airports in the region. The  airports in Orange County and Long Beach have legal agreements or  requirements that limit their ability to increase traffic levels and thereby  relieve regional congestion. Likewise, the sponsor of Bob Hope Airport  has entered into a voluntary agreement that prevents the development of  new gates or the expansion of the footprint of the terminal until 2012,  according to airport officials. LAX, for its part, has also agreed to a limit on  the number of annual passengers at its facility under a settlement  agreement with the surrounding community, according to regional  planners. Los Angeles World Airports officials told us that while they  previously attempted to promote the development of alternate facilities,  such as LA/Palmdale Regional, the focus of their agency has shifted back  to LAX, given the recent downturn and the backlog of maintenance at this  facility. Several of the airports in the region are proposed to also serve as  high-speed rail stops, including Ontario International and LA/Palmdale  Regional. Such ground access improvements may help these airports play  a greater role in delivering capacity for the region in the future.
section_title: New York Region
paragraphs: The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority) operates  Newark Liberty International (Newark), John F. Kennedy International  (JFK), and LaGuardia. These large-hub airports are consistently amongst  the most delayed in the nation. In 2008, 62 to 68 percent of the flights to  these facilities arrived on time (i.e., within 15 minutes of their scheduled  arrival time). Stewart International, an airport 1 1/2 hours of the city by  car, was recently acquired by the Port Authority and is a small-hub airport.  Long Island Macarthur Airport in Ronkonkoma is a small-hub airport that  operates outside of the Port Authority system. FAA’s FACT 2 report  reported that LaGuardia and Newark were already significantly capacity  constrained in 2007, and that JFK would become so in 2025.
The Port Authority is an intermodal organization that is exempt from some  of the revenue-sharing prohibitions affecting other regions. Airports in the  Port Authority system are part of a larger portfolio of transportation assets  operated by the Port Authority, such as major bridges and tunnels.  According to the Port Authority, because it was grandfathered under  federal law prohibiting the use of airport revenues off airport property, the  Port Authority is able to cross-subsidize transportation modes. The  airports in the Port Authority’s system provide some of the revenue for  other modes that operate at a loss, according to Port Authority officials.  The region recently completed a regional air service demand study, and  Port Authority officials told us that the forecasts developed for the study  were essential for demonstrating the benefits of acquiring the lease for  Stewart International. Port Authority officials told us that while they  expected the facility to generate revenue eventually, it is now operating at  a loss. At the request of FAA, the Port Authority is presently preparing  updates to the airport layout plans for airports in its system. FAA officials  told us that the last airport master plans the Port Authority prepared date  back to 1970. According to Port Authority officials, planning for the  airports happens in an ad hoc fashion, given intermodal competition  within the agency. The local MPO, the New York Metropolitan  Transportation Commission, does not play a role in regional airport  planning beyond surface access. A nonprofit, the Regional Plan  Association, has recently begun regional airport planning with Port  Authority financing, which will focus on the airports under Port Authority  sponsorship. Ground access is a significant consideration for the future  development of Stewart International, and the Port Authority is  cosponsoring a rail study with the New York Metropolitan Transportation  Authority to evaluate access improvements to the airport.
section_title: Philadelphia Region
paragraphs: There is one large-hub airport in the Philadelphia region—Philadelphia  International—and one small-hub airport—Atlantic City International—to  the southeast in New Jersey. In 2008, 73 percent of flights to Philadelphia  International arrived on time. Philadelphia International is owned by the  City of Philadelphia, while Atlanta City International is jointly owned by  the South Jersey Transportation Authority and FAA. FACT 2 forecast that  Philadelphia International would become significantly capacity  constrained by 2015.
Philadelphia International is presently pursuing a capital enhancement  project to add an additional runway and expand another. The project is  contentious, particularly with residents of Tinicum Township and  Delaware County where environmental impacts, including emissions and  noise, might increase. Atlantic City International provides some residents  of the region with an alternate to the more congested Philadelphia  International. The local MPO, the Delaware Valley Regional Planning  Commission, is active in regional airport planning, focusing in recent years  on planning for general aviation airports. MPO officials expressed an  interest in continuing regional airport planning as well as undertaking a  regional demand study similar to the ones completed in the Boston and  New York regions.
section_title: San Diego Region
paragraphs: The San Diego region has one large-hub airport, San Diego International.  In 2008, 78 percent of flights to this airport arrived on time. FACT 2  forecast that San Diego International would be significantly capacity  constrained by 2025.
The primary airport in San Diego is run by the San Diego County Regional  Airport Authority, which was previously involved in a major site-selection  effort to build a new airport for the region. This effort was rejected by  voters in 2006, however, and airport officials are now planning under the  assumption that San Diego International will be the only major airport in  the region. With this in mind, the airport sponsor is considering how it  could maximize San Diego International’s capacity within its existing  footprint. In addition, a state law passed in 2007 mandates that the airport  authority prepare a RASP for the region by June 30, 2011. While the airport  authority is working on the airside components of the study, the MPO is  working on a multimodal transportation plan.
section_title: San Francisco Bay Area
paragraphs: The San Francisco Bay Area has three major airports with different  sponsors. San Francisco International (SFO) is a large-hub airport, and in  2008, 69 percent of flights arrived on time. Both Oakland International and  Norman Y. Mineta in San Jose are medium-hub airports. FACT 2 forecast  that both SFO and Oakland International will be significantly capacity  constrained by 2025.
SFO and Oakland International are located on land adjacent to San  Francisco Bay and face significant obstacles to the construction of new  runways as a result. The Regional Airport Planning Committee, which  includes the Metropolitan Transportation Commission—the region’s  MPO—will play a significant role in identifying potential alternate  solutions for the region, and is currently leading efforts to develop a new  RASP. This effort is being funded by FAA, the MPO, and airports in the  region. SFO officials told us that they have committed themselves to  studying nonconstruction ways to relieve congestion, and that they are not  averse to having domestic, short-haul traffic shift to Oakland International  or Norman Y. Mineta in San Jose or in instituting demand management  strategies such as peak pricing to relieve congestion. SFO officials also  stated that they are also considering improvements that may come from  NextGen and other technological improvements.
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Paul Aussendorf (Assistant  Director), Amy Abramowitz, Lauren Calhoun, Delwen Jones, Paul  Kazemersky, Molly Laster, Monica McCallum, Sara Ann Moessbauer, and  Josh Ormond made key contributions to this report.