Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better Integration
Published: 2005-01-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 1992, the Congress has provided more than $7 billion for threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union (FSU). These programs have played a key role in addressing the threats of weapons of mass destruction and are currently expanding beyond the FSU. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 mandated that GAO assess (1) Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy (DOE) strategies guiding their threat reduction and nonproliferation programs and (2) efforts to coordinate DOD, DOE, and Department of State threat reduction and nonproliferation programs that share similar missions.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO found that there is no overall strategy that integrates the threat reduction and nonproliferation programs of the DOD, DOE, and others. DOD and DOE have strategies governing their respective programs, which generally contain the elements of a strategy as established by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. These strategies include a mission statement and goals, identify external factors that could affect meeting these goals, establish metrics to evaluate the performance of the programs, provide cost estimates, and cover a period of at least 5 years. Given the involvement of multiple agencies, and the expansion of the threat reduction and nonproliferation programs beyond the FSU, integration of agencies' strategies is important. The agencies' implementation of very similar programs has not always been well coordinated. While the majority of programs in DOD and DOE are distinct, GAO found three program areas that perform similar functions in the FSU. GAO found that the coordination of programs enhancing security at Russian nuclear warhead sites improved after the National Security Council (NSC) staff issued guidance. Specifically, the guidance delineates agencies' roles, interactions, and ways to resolve disputes. The biological weapons scientist employment programs in DOD, DOE, and State are well coordinated and also have NSC staff guidance addressing roles, interactions, and disputes. By contrast, there is no governmentwide guidance delineating the roles and responsibilities of agencies managing border security programs. According to DOD and DOE officials managing these programs, agencies' roles are not well delineated and coordination could be improved.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since 1992, the Congress has provided more than $7 billion for threat  reduction and nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union (FSU).  These programs encompass a range of projects, including removing  nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; securing nuclear  materials and warheads in Russia; and paying former weapons of mass  destruction (WMD) scientists to engage in peaceful research. The National  Security Council (NSC) staff has the principal role in coordinating the  many U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs that are  implemented primarily through the Departments of Defense (DOD) and  Energy (DOE), although the Departments of State, Commerce, and  Homeland Security implement related programs. DOD and DOE threat  reduction and nonproliferation programs have played a key role in  addressing the threats posed by WMD in the FSU; these efforts have  expanded in size and scope beyond the FSU states. For example, the  United States recently provided assistance to dismantle WMD  infrastructure in Libya, and DOE recently announced a new program to  provide employment opportunities for Iraqi weapons scientists.  Furthermore, in November 2003, the Congress authorized DOD to allow the  Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to spend up to $50 million  annually of its existing funding to address proliferation threats outside the  FSU. A bill pending in the Senate would allow DOD increased flexibility to  undertake nonproliferation projects outside of the FSU.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 mandated  that we assess the current management of DOD and DOE threat reduction  and nonproliferation programs. We agreed to approach this assessment in  two phases. First, this report assesses (1) DOD and DOE strategies guiding  their respective threat reduction and nonproliferation programs and how  they are integrated with those of other agencies and (2) efforts to  coordinate the implementation of DOD, DOE, and State threat reduction  and nonproliferation programs that share similar missions, goals, and  activities. We included State in assessing the coordination of threat  reduction and nonproliferation programs because it shares responsibility in  coordinating two programs. In the second phase, we plan to issue  individual reports on DOD and DOE internal controls for their threat  reduction and nonproliferation programs. A list of our prior reports  concerning DOD and DOE threat reduction and nonproliferation programs  is included at the end of this report.
To assess DOD and DOE strategies guiding their respective threat  reduction and nonproliferation programs, we assessed the agencies’  strategic plans against criteria established by the Government Performance  and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). We also relied on our previous reviews of  the CTR program in DOD and nonproliferation programs in DOE.  Furthermore, we met with officials at DOD, DOE, and State and reviewed  documents to determine if a plan exists that integrates the implementation  strategies of DOD, DOE, and other agencies. To assess efforts to coordinate  DOD, DOE, and State threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, we  reviewed agency documents and interviewed agency officials. DOD  officials included the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Technology  Security Policy and Counterproliferation and other senior leaders. DOE  officials included the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear  Nonproliferation and other senior leaders. We spoke with State  Department officials in the Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to  Europe and Eurasia and the Bureau of Nonproliferation. Although NSC  officials did not respond to our requests to meet, we were able to meet our  audit objectives by obtaining records and having discussions with DOD,  DOE, and State officials regarding the role of the NSC staff and the extent  of its participation in coordinating programs. Additionally, we provided a  draft of this report to NSC staff to obtain their comments. We performed  our review in Washington, D.C., from February 2004 to November 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia inherited the world’s  largest arsenal of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. As Russia  adopted economic reforms and moved toward an open society, its economy  and central controls deteriorated, thereby making it difficult to maintain  security at its weapons sites. Recognizing these difficulties, the Congress  began authorizing funds in 1992 for programs to help destroy Russian  weapons and improve WMD security. More recently, the events of  September 11, 2001, have increased U.S. concerns that terrorists might  obtain WMD materials or weapons at poorly secured sites. While DOD and  DOE implement most of the U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation  programs, the Departments of State, Commerce, and Homeland Security  implement related programs.
The Congress established DOD’s CTR program in 1992 to reduce the WMD  threat posed to the United States from weapons remaining in the FSU. The  program was designed to assist the FSU in securing and destroying WMD  and its means of delivery. Initial CTR assistance was provided to Ukraine,  Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia, which had inherited the majority of the  Soviet Union’s WMD. The program helped Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and  Belarus remove nuclear weapons from their soil, eliminating the potential  emergence of three additional nuclear states. CTR also facilitated Russia’s  efforts to reduce its massive nuclear weapons arsenal and address its arms  control commitments. In fiscal year 2004, CTR had 22 projects (see app. I).  One of the newest CTR projects—the WMD Proliferation Prevention  Initiative—is designed to strengthen the ability of non-Russian FSU states  to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related  materials. For example, DOD is providing equipment and training to  Uzbekistan to enhance its ability to monitor its borders for illegal transport  of radioactive material. Additionally, the CTR program has expanded  outside of the FSU, as DOD will use CTR funds to help Albania eliminate its  chemical weapons stockpile. Furthermore, a bill introduced in the Senate  in November 2004 would grant DOD additional flexibility to expand the  CTR program outside the FSU. DOD implements the CTR program through  the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), which receives policy  guidance from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
In 1993, DOE began implementing programs funded by DOD, to help secure  weapons-usable nuclear materials in the FSU. DOE also received funding in  1994 from State to employ former Soviet weapons scientists and engineers  in cooperative research projects with U.S. laboratories and industry to  deter their employment by rogue states. In 1996, with the growth of these  programs, funding shifted directly to DOE. These programs remained  focused on the FSU and were spread throughout DOE. In October 1999,  DOE’s nonproliferation programs were consolidated within the National  Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Since that time, NNSA’s  nonproliferation mission has been implemented by the Office of Defense  Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN), which seeks to detect, prevent, and  reverse WMD proliferation. This mission has now expanded to address  proliferation threats in more than 70 countries to prevent the spread of  WMD. For example, DNN is initiating a new program to provide  employment opportunities to Iraqi scientists, technicians, and engineers. In  fiscal year 2004, DOE had 19 projects addressing nonproliferation threats  worldwide (see app. I). The threat reduction and nonproliferation  programs have evolved from a $400 million DOD program in 1992 to  approximately $1.8 billion in programs at DOD and DOE in 2004.
The State Department also manages its own nonproliferation programs and  coordinates U.S. assistance to the FSU. In 1992, the Freedom Support Act  established the Office of the Coordinator within the State Department to  coordinate U.S. assistance to the FSU. The coordinator’s responsibilities  include resolving program and policy disputes among U.S. government  agencies regarding their programs in the FSU. In 1994, State and DOD  established the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow to  fund peaceful research carried out by otherwise underpaid weapons  scientists. The center supplements the income of scientists, purchases  equipment for scientific research, and supports programs to help scientists  identify and develop commercially viable research projects. In 1996, the  Congress established State’s Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining,  and Related Programs Account to fund programs addressing the spread of  WMD. For example, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund supports  projects to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and  related materials.
NSC staff coordinates U.S. policy for threat reduction and nonproliferation  programs and conducted reviews of these programs that validated the need  to maintain them in 2001 and 2002. The Proliferation Strategy Policy  Coordinating Committee, chaired by the Special Assistant to the President  and Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and  Homeland Defense, sets general policy for U.S. nonproliferation programs.  NSC staff establishes guidelines but does not implement programs or  control their budgets.
section_title: DOD and DOE Strategic Plans for Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs Are Not Integrated and Do Not Address U.S. Programs Worldwide
paragraphs: DOD and DOE prepare their own individual strategies to implement their  respective threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, but there is no  governmentwide strategy that integrates them with one another or with  those of other agencies that implement threat reduction and  nonproliferation programs. We found that DOD and DOE strategies to  address security issues for their authorized agency missions generally meet  selected criteria for strategic planning established by GPRA. Recognizing  the importance of coordinating U.S. efforts, using resources effectively, and  enhancing agencies’ abilities to anticipate growing nonproliferation  concerns, the Congress, GAO, and others have required or recommended  integrated planning among DOD, DOE, and other agencies’ threat reduction  and nonproliferation programs. NSC staff and State created plans in  response to the above requirements and recommendations, but these plans  either focus solely on one agency or on one geographic location.  Furthermore, these programs are expanding beyond the FSU and may  potentially involve the response of multiple U.S. agencies.
subsections: section_title: DOD and DOE Strategies for Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs Generally Meet Criteria Established by the Government Performance and Results Act
paragraphs: DOD and DOE each have strategic plans governing their respective threat  reduction and nonproliferation programs. We found that each agency’s  strategic plan generally meets the selected GPRA criteria for strategic  planning. See table 1 for a listing of the selected GPRA criteria.  Additionally, we found that DOD and DOE have their own methods to  prioritize their respective activities and programs. Furthermore, DOD and  DOE threat reduction and nonproliferation programs undergo periodic  internal and external reviews to improve program management.
The CTR Policy Office, in conjunction with DTRA, produces and updates a  strategy for the CTR program. We found that this strategy generally  contains the elements of a strategic plan developed using GPRA criteria.  Additionally, all CTR projects develop detailed plans that also contain these  elements. Figure 1 depicts DOD offices that are involved in strategic  planning for the CTR programs.
In accordance with GPRA, the CTR program’s mission statement is  comprehensive and concise: that is, to prevent the proliferation of WMD  and related materials, technologies, and expertise from FSU states— including providing for the safe destruction of Soviet-era WMD, associated  delivery systems, and related infrastructure. The CTR program’s strategy  also includes the following specific goals: (1) dismantle FSU WMD and  associated infrastructure, (2) consolidate and secure FSU WMD and  related technology and materials, (3) increase transparency and encourage  higher standards of conduct, and (4) support defense and military  cooperation with the objective of preventing proliferation. These goals  provide clear direction to the activities and desired outcomes of the CTR  program.
The CTR strategy also cites external factors that could affect the program,  describes how performance will be measured, and states budget  requirements. For example, the level of Russian cooperation is cited as an  external factor that will affect the successful implementation of the  program. The strategy provides metrics by which performance of the  program can be measured, such as the number of missiles destroyed. DOD  and DOE performance metrics are shown in appendix II. In accordance  with GPRA criteria, the CTR plans include cost estimates and cover a  period of 5 years. For example, the overall CTR funding request for fiscal  year 2005 is $409 million, and the 5-year plan calls for an additional $1.5  billion between fiscal years 2006 and 2009.
The CTR program has five program areas, with several projects under each  program area. Each project has a plan that details its broad mission,  specific objectives, external factors that could affect the achievement of  these objectives, metrics that are used to evaluate the performance of the  project, and cost estimates. For example, the mission of the Automated  Inventory Control and Management System project, under the nuclear  weapons safety and security program area, is to enhance Russia’s  capability to account for and track the strategic and tactical nuclear  weapons scheduled for dismantlement. Specific objectives include  installing hardware and software at 18 sites within Russia and providing  initial training and data entry. External factors cited for this program  include whether Russia will grant sufficient access to the sites and improve  the equipment storage conditions. The project uses milestone dates, which  range from the procurement of the software to the final certification of the  system at all sites, as one method to measure its performance. The project  is estimated to cost $50.2 million.
Additionally, according to agency officials, DOD has not had to prioritize  CTR projects on the basis of available funds. The CTR program generally  receives the funding requested for its projects. DOD develops its budget  request for the CTR program on the basis of funding needed to continue  existing programs and implement new programs. As a result, projects have  not competed for funding.
Furthermore, the CTR program has undergone internal performance  reviews in order to improve management practices. In 2003, the CTR Policy  Office conducted a 6-month, project-by-project review of the program that  changed the scope of several CTR projects to ensure that program  activities met threat reduction goals. The review also resulted in a decision  to stop funding activities that did not contribute directly to threat reduction  goals. For example, the CTR program no longer funds the restoration of the  environment surrounding missile sites but continues to fund the  elimination of the nuclear missiles and silos.
The CTR program also has undergone several external reviews to identify  areas needing improvement. For example, in 1996, we recommended that  no funds should be obligated for constructing a chemical weapons  destruction facility in Russia until reliable cost estimates were completed.  (See prior GAO reports listed at the end of this report.) The DOD Inspector  General also recommended that the CTR program adopt numerous  controls to improve program management. For example, the DOD  Inspector General recommended amendments to CTR program  implementing agreements with Russia to ensure that Russia provides its  weapons systems and their components scheduled for destruction, that it  grants access rights to DOD, and that it is penalized for failure to use DOD  assistance. As a result of this recommendation, DOD required Russia to  sign an agreement specifying that all of Russia’s declared nerve agents  could be destroyed at a facility under construction by the CTR program.  However, DOD did not include a penalty for noncompliance.
subsections: section_title: Department of Energy Nonproliferation Planning
paragraphs: DNN produces a broad strategy for DOE’s nonproliferation programs, and  DNN’s six program offices prepare strategic plans for their projects.  Collectively, these plans generally contain the elements of a strategic plan  developed using GPRA criteria. Figure 2 depicts DOE offices that are  involved in strategic planning for DOE’s nonproliferation programs.
In accordance with GPRA, DNN’s strategic plan clearly states its mission— which is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons- usable and radiological materials, technologies, and expertise. This plan  also describes broad goals for its nonproliferation mission. For example,  one of its goals is to secure nuclear and radiological materials at potentially  vulnerable sites overseas. DNN’s plan identifies external factors that could  affect its program goals, such as delays in its program to employ weapons  scientists due to lengthy Russian government clearance procedures.
Although DNN’s strategic plan does not list performance measures for each  of its nonproliferation projects, DNN maintains a database of goals and  performance metrics for each of its six program areas. For example, to  measure performance in preventing the migration of WMD expertise, DNN  tracks the annual number of former Soviet weapons scientists, engineers,  and technicians engaged by its programs. Appendix II contains  performance metrics for DOE’s nonproliferation. In accordance with GPRA  criteria, DNN plans include cost estimates and cover a period of 5 years.  For example, DNN is requesting $1.3 billion for fiscal year 2005 and is  projected to request an additional $5.7 billion between fiscal years 2006 and  2009.
In the past, DNN generally received requested funding for its  nonproliferation programs, but as the scope of these programs expanded,  DNN began to prioritize projects within program areas, according to  agency officials. In fiscal year 2004, DOE first applied several criteria, such  as risk, availability of funding, and legal obligations, to prioritize projects.  The criteria were used to identify activities with the greatest proliferation  risk, on which DOE focused its resources. For example, in fiscal year 2004,  Russia provided access to more nuclear warhead storage sites than  originally planned. DOE diverted funds from lower priority activities, such  as converting weapons-grade uranium to uranium that cannot be used in  weapons, in order to fund security enhancements at the new nuclear  warhead storage sites.
DNN’s nonproliferation programs have undergone internal and external  reviews to identify areas needing improvement. The NNSA Under Secretary  biannually reviews each program’s budget, accomplishments, and any  other concerns. DOE also uses the results of external audits to identify  areas needing improvement. For example, audits conducted by the DOE  Inspector General have recommended improvements to NNSA’s process for  matching program requirements with budgetary resources and managing  the program to eliminate weapons-grade uranium in research reactors. In  addition, we have conducted numerous reviews of various aspects of  DOE’s nonproliferation programs. For example, in 2001, we found  duplication between DOE’s two programs to employ former weapons  scientists in Russia and recommended consolidating the programs. In  response, DOE merged the programs into a new program, the Russian  Transition Initiatives.
section_title: The Congress and Others Have Called for a Governmentwide Plan, but None Has Been Developed to Address U.S. Programs Worldwide
paragraphs: Since the mid-1990s, the Congress and others have called for the executive  branch to develop governmentwide plans to govern threat reduction and  nonproliferation programs. The Congress found that although U.S.  nonproliferation efforts in the FSU have achieved important results in  securing WMD materials, technology, and knowledge, the effectiveness of  these efforts has suffered from a lack of coordination within and among  agencies. Recognizing the importance of integrated planning of threat  reduction and nonproliferation programs, the Congress required the  executive branch to develop three plans. To comply with the requirements  of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, as  amended, the President submitted a plan and an annual report on the  implementation of the plan covering all agency efforts to secure nuclear  weapons, material, and expertise in the FSU. This plan addressed the  specific requirements of the legislation, including identifying the goals and  objectives of the programs and strategies for terminating U.S. contributions  to the programs.
The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 requires (1) the  State Department to provide the appropriate congressional committees  with a 3-year international arms control and nonproliferation strategy and  (2) the President to provide the Congress with a plan detailing coordination  of nonproliferation programs. State submitted the 3-year international  arms control and nonproliferation strategy to the Congress in August 2003.  The strategy focuses on the State Department’s programs and activities,  discusses broad U.S. arms control and nonproliferation goals, and  describes State’s efforts under way to achieve these goals. For the  coordination plan, the Congress required the establishment of an  interagency committee consisting of representatives of the Departments of  Defense, Energy, State, Commerce, Homeland Security, and the Attorney  General and other officials that the President deems necessary. This  committee will exercise responsibility for coordinating all U.S. threat  reduction efforts and enhance the U.S. government’s ability to anticipate  growing nonproliferation areas of concern. This committee is required to  submit a coordination plan in May 2005.
In past work, we found that the development of a governmentwide strategy  could strengthen the coordination of threat reduction and nonproliferation  programs. The strategy should identify overall goals, time frames for  meeting those goals, and ways to set priorities for allocating resources  governmentwide to address all U.S. nonproliferation concerns.
The executive branch also called for the development of a governmentwide  plan for U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. Specifically,  the President’s National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction  of 2002 calls on the Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee,  chaired by NSC staff, to prepare a 5-year governmentwide plan by March  2003. To achieve greater efficiency through program coordination, the  strategy stated that this governmentwide plan should include all threat  reduction and nonproliferation programs in the FSU that are funded wholly  or in part by the U.S. government. As of November 2004, the plan had yet to  be developed.
In addition, independent panels have also called for the development of  governmentwide plans. In 1998, the Congress established the Commission  to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the  Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Deutch Commission),  which recommended coordinated and consistent governmentwide  strategies to address nonproliferation threats to the United States. In 2001,  the Baker-Cutler Commission, established by the Secretary of Energy,  recommended the development of a national strategic plan to secure all  Russian nuclear weapons-useable material and prevent WMD expertise  from leaving Russia. No reports have been developed that address either  commission’s recommendations. Table 2 is a listing of the various calls for  governmentwide plans and their status.
None of the existing plans in table 2 integrates agencies’ plans with one  another or addresses U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs  worldwide. For example, the plan developed as a result of the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 did not address programs to  secure and eliminate chemical weapons in Russia or the infrastructure  used to develop chemical and biological weapons throughout the FSU.
Similarly, the 2003 arms control plan that State prepared addressed U.S.  arms controls efforts, but the plan is limited to a description of DOE’s  programs for addressing these goals.
section_title: NSC Staff Guidance Delineating Agencies’ Roles, Information Sharing, and Dispute Resolution Results in Improved Program Coordination
paragraphs: On the basis of our review of NSC staff guidance and discussions with DOD  and DOE officials, we found that coordination among programs that share  similar missions, goals, and activities is improved when each agency’s roles  and responsibilities are delineated, information sharing is formalized, and  procedures for resolving interagency disputes are clear. While the majority  of programs in DOD and DOE are distinct, three program areas perform  similar functions in the FSU: (1) improving the security of sites where  Russian nuclear warheads are stored, (2) employing former biological  weapons scientists, and (3) enhancing the ability of countries to secure  their borders against the smuggling of WMD materials. The warhead  security programs implemented by DOD and DOE were not well  coordinated in the past, but NSC staff guidance that describes each  agency’s role, formalizes meetings, and establishes a dispute resolution  process has improved coordination, according to agency officials. DOD,  DOE, and State officials in the biological weapons scientists programs  understand each agency’s roles and responsibilities, meet monthly, and  follow dispute resolution procedures as described in governmentwide  guidance for this program area. By contrast, there is no governmentwide  guidance delineating the roles and responsibilities of agencies managing  border security programs. As a result, DOD and DOE officials managing  border security programs stated that agencies’ roles are not defined,  information sharing is infrequent, and there are no procedures to resolve  differences among agencies.
subsections: section_title: Most DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs Are Distinct
paragraphs: We found that most threat reduction and nonproliferation projects in DOD  and DOE have distinct missions, goals, and activities. DOD’s CTR program  has few projects that are similar to those in DOE and State. Figure 3 folds  DOD’s projects into broader program areas and distinguishes those distinct  program areas from those that are similar. First, DOD has several projects  in the FSU to destroy strategic weapons systems such as bombers, missiles,  and submarines. Second, DOD funds the safe and secure transport of the  Russian nuclear warheads scheduled for elimination. Third, DOD is  constructing a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye to help  eliminate Russia’s declared stockpile of nerve agents. Fourth, DOD is  assisting in the elimination of WMD infrastructure by, for example,  dismantling biological weapons facilities in Kazakhstan. Finally, the CTR  program engages in projects that facilitate contact between U.S. and FSU  defense and military personnel. Program events include conferences,  seminars, and combined military exercises designed to strengthen defense  partnerships between the United States and FSU states.
We also found that most DOE projects have distinct missions, goals, and  activities addressing the proliferation threat posed by nuclear and  radiological materials (see fig. 3). First, fissile materials disposition  projects eliminate weapons-grade nuclear materials. For example, DOE has  a project to eliminate surplus Russian plutonium by turning it into fuel for  use in civilian nuclear power plants. Second, DOE is assisting Russia by  shutting down three nuclear power plants that produce plutonium and  replacing them with power plants fueled by coal. Third, DOE conducts  nonproliferation research and development, such as developing  technologies used to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions.  Fourth, DOE consolidates and secures radioactive materials that could be  used in dirty bombs. Finally, DOE’s highly enriched uranium transparency  project monitors the conversion of material from Russian nuclear  warheads into fuel for civilian nuclear power plants.
We found three program areas where both DOD and DOE have projects  that perform similar activities in the FSU. First, both agencies have projects  to improve the security of sites where Russian nuclear warheads are  stored, such as installing fences and security systems. Second, both  agencies have projects to employ former biological weapons scientists to  prevent the proliferation of their expertise to states and terrorist  organizations. Third, both agencies have projects to enhance the ability of  countries to secure their borders against the smuggling of WMD materials.  The State Department has its own programs to employ biological former  biological weapons scientists and secure borders against the trafficking of  WMD materials and plays a role in coordinating U.S. efforts in these areas.  See appendix III for more information regarding DOD, DOE, and State’s  projects in these areas.
section_title: Warhead Security Program Coordination Has Improved
paragraphs: We have previously reported that DOD and DOE were pursuing different  approaches to securing nuclear warhead sites in Russia. DOD and DOE  had plans to upgrade some of the same storage sites, and DOD had already  purchased equipment to upgrade security at some of those sites.  Additionally, DOD and DOE used different vendors to purchase different  equipment to perform the same function, which could have resulted in  extra training and maintenance costs. As a result of our work, DOD and  DOE coordinated their efforts to avoid duplication by identifying the  agency with the best access to and cooperation of the Russians to install  the security upgrades. Furthermore, we recommended that an integrated  plan be developed for these programs on issues such as resolving  equipment standardization concerns.
During the course of our audit work, NSC staff issued common policy  guidance for DOD and DOE programs that help Russia secure its nuclear  warheads. The policy guidance prohibited assistance to operational sites  due to concerns that U.S. assistance may enhance Russia’s military  capability. Additionally, NSC staff established interagency procedures for  coordinating warhead security assistance activities through a working  group that reviews all requests for assistance, with neither DOD nor DOE  being allowed to implement a project without the group’s approval. In the  case of a dispute, an agency can escalate the request for assistance to a  higher level interagency group. According to both DOD and DOE officials,  the guidelines and procedures implemented since our report have  improved coordination, such as holding interagency meetings. In  commenting on a draft of this report, DOE stated that DOD and DOE  include representatives from the other agency on each other’s bilateral  forums with the Russians. Other working group participants acknowledged  that coordination concerns have been reduced but stated that information  sharing should be improved, especially about issues escalated above the  working group level.
section_title: Biological Weapons Scientist Employment Programs Have Elements of Well Coordinated Programs
paragraphs: We found that the coordination of biological weapons scientist  employment programs is characterized by clearly delineated roles and  responsibilities, regular interaction, and dispute resolution procedures. In  September 2002, NSC staff issued guidelines governing the coordination of  the biological weapons scientist employment programs, which addressed  these three elements. These guidelines state the roles of each agency,  formalize information sharing, and include procedures for resolving  disputes. Additionally, the guidelines describe oversight requirements and  other factors to be considered when implementing these programs.
Agency officials managing the biological weapons scientist employment  programs did not report any difficulties pertaining to coordination or to the  activities of other agencies. These officials stated that the NSC staff  guidelines are valuable in ensuring that activities are undertaken by the  appropriate agency and agencies’ programs work toward common U.S.  objectives. These guidelines established the Nonproliferation Interagency  Roundtable, which ensures that all agencies are aware of each other’s  activities in employing biological weapons scientists in the FSU and that  the agencies avoid duplication of efforts. Proposals for new projects are  reviewed and voted on monthly by the Nonproliferation Interagency  Roundtable. If disagreements arise after the voting process has occurred,  agencies may escalate the decision to a group chaired by NSC staff.  Officials we spoke with stated that coordination has worked successfully.  DOD, DOE, and State officials all cited the NSC staff guidelines when  discussing their programs with us and confirmed that these guidelines were  applied governmentwide.
section_title: Border Security Programs Lack Elements of Well Coordinated Programs
paragraphs: There is no governmentwide guidance for border security programs that  delineates agencies’ roles and responsibilities, establishes regular  information sharing, and defines procedures for resolving interagency  disputes, according to DOD and DOE officials. Although the State  Department prepared a strategic plan that identifies and describes border  security programs and interagency coordination mechanisms in Eurasia,  the plan does not clearly establish the departments’ roles or how  information is shared. The plan also acknowledges that NSC staff will  provide policy oversight and guidance to implement the border security  programs, but DOD and DOE officials with whom we met were unaware of  such guidance.
The primary coordination mechanism for all border security programs is an  interagency working group chaired by the State Department’s  Nonproliferation Bureau. According to DOD and DOE officials, the group  does not have regularly scheduled meetings. DOE officials stated they  would prefer to meet more often to facilitate coordination of their  programs and reduce the amount of informal coordination, such as  telephone conversations and e-mails, which they believe is less efficient.  State Department officials acknowledged that coordination of these  programs could be better, but stated that they lack the authority to resolve  conflicts over coordination.
In the absence of guidance for coordination, agency officials question the  other agencies’ roles and responsibilities. For example, both State and  DOD officials acknowledged that their border security programs conduct  similar activities, such as training border security guards and providing  equipment for detecting illicit trafficking of WMD. Furthermore, State  Department officials questioned whether some aspects of DOD’s  International Counterproliferation Program were targeting countries that  may no longer require the type of assistance being provided. For example,  DOD’s program provided basic level WMD courses to officials from  Bulgaria, which is beyond the need for basic level training, according to a  State Department official.
In May 2002, we reported problems with the coordination of border  security programs. We found that portal monitors provided through the  State Department’s border security program did not meet the standards  established by DOE. Since our report, the State Department has  transferred responsibility of operation and maintenance of the monitors to  DOE, and State is no longer funding the installation of portal monitors.  According to State and DOE officials, the specific problems we highlighted  have since been resolved, such as the coordination of agencies’ border  security activities. We have follow-up work under way regarding this issue.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD and DOE develop their own strategic plans, prioritize their own  program activities, and measure their own program performance. While  this approach helps keep the departments on track to meet their own  objectives, it does not provide governmentwide guidance for U.S. threat  reduction and nonproliferation programs, which would include goals, time  frames for meeting those goals, and mechanisms for establishing priorities  across the various departments involved in program implementation. In  light of the U.S. government’s elimination of nuclear infrastructure in Libya,  recent agreement to eliminate chemical weapons in Albania, and the  growing likelihood of other efforts expanding outside the FSU, overall  strategic guidance becomes increasingly important given the involvement  of multiple agencies. While NSC staff has provided guidance to agencies  implementing programs to secure Russian warheads and employ former  Soviet biological weapons scientists, there is no governmentwide strategy  for agencies implementing threat reduction and nonproliferation programs  worldwide. The requirement in the Fiscal Year 2003 Foreign Relations  Authorization Act for a Presidential report detailing the coordination of  nonproliferation programs provides an opportunity for the administration  to review its broad array of threat reduction and nonproliferation programs  to ensure that the programs and capabilities of the various departments  address all proliferation threats worldwide. As part of this effort, DOD and  DOE can draw upon lessons learned from programs in the FSU.
In addition, while the majority of threat reduction and nonproliferation  programs do not address similar missions, it is still important for policy  makers and program managers at DOD and DOE to (1) understand how  their efforts contribute to broader U.S. goals and (2) have formal  mechanisms for sharing information and lessons learned that cut across  programmatic boundaries. In those areas where more than one department  is addressing a similar mission, interagency coordination is important to  avoid duplication and collectively meet common goals. We found that  interagency coordination of threat reduction and nonproliferation  programs appears to work best when there is clear guidance from NSC  staff regarding the roles of the various departments, regularized agency  interactions, and resolution of interagency disputes, as is the case with the  projects to employ biological weapons scientists and secure warhead sites.  However, we found that coordination is limited among the border security  projects where there is no NSC staff guidance.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, in consultation  with other agencies involved in threat reduction and nonproliferation  programs, develop an integrated plan for all U.S. threat reduction and  nonproliferation programs to ensure that the programs are effectively  coordinated and address all threats. The results of this review should be  reported to the Congress as part of the President’s response to section 1339  of the Fiscal Year 2003 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which requires  the President to submit a report after each presidential inauguration on  threat reduction and nonproliferation objectives and how executive branch  efforts will be coordinated.
We also recommend that the Assistant to the President for National  Security Affairs, through the NSC staff, lead the development of a plan  guiding the implementation and coordination of threat reduction and  nonproliferation programs addressing border security as they have done  with the programs addressing the employment of biological weapons  scientists. This plan should identify U.S. government goals and objectives,  designate departments’ roles and responsibilities, and establish procedures  to resolve policy and program disputes.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: DOE and DOD provided comments on a draft of this report, which are  reproduced in appendixes IV and V. DOE agreed with the report and the  corresponding recommendations. DOD concurred with the need for better  integrated nonproliferation and threat reduction programs, but did not  specify whether it agreed with the need for an integrated plan. DOD  concurred with the need for NSC staff guidance governing border security  programs. State Department and the NSC staff did not comment on this  report. DOE, DOD, and State provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess DOD and DOE’s strategies to implement their respective threat  reduction and nonproliferation programs, we obtained agencies’ strategic  plans, project/program planning documents, budget documents, and  annual reports. To assess attempts to integrate these strategies, we  consulted relevant public laws and met with experts at the Nuclear Threat  Initiative, a global initiative that seeks to raise public awareness of WMD  threats and carries out threat reduction work; the Center for  Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies,  a nongovernmental organization in the United States that provides research  and training on nonproliferation issues; and the U.S. – Russia Corporate  Partnerships Advancing Nonproliferation and National Security, a  congressional bipartisan study group. To assess DOD and DOE strategies to  implement their threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, we  compared them against select criteria contained in GPRA and reviewed our  prior work relating to performance metrics and program assessment. We  also interviewed DOD and DOE officials, including the Deputy  Undersecretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and  Counterproliferation, the Director and Deputy Director of DTRA’s CTR  program, and senior leadership from the CTR program office. The DOE  officials we interviewed include the Deputy Administrator for Defense  Nuclear Nonproliferation and senior officials from the Initiatives for  Proliferation Prevention Program. In addition, we spoke with officials from  the DOD and DOE Inspector’s General office, the Office of Management  and Budget, the Congressional Research Service, and the intelligence  community.
To assess efforts to coordinate DOD, DOE, and State programs with similar  missions, we obtained documents from these agencies regarding their  threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. We also reviewed NSC  staff guidance on biological weapons scientists’ employment and warhead  security programs. We also reviewed DOD, DOE, and State documents  regarding their border security programs. Finally, we relied on our previous  reviews of the CTR program and several nonproliferation programs within  DOE and the State Department. We also interviewed numerous officials,  including the Director and Deputy Director of DTRA’s CTR program, the  Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy for CTR programs, and the  Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and  Counterproliferation. DOE officials include the Deputy Administrator for  Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, the Assistant Deputy Administrator of  the Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation, and other  senior officials from the other DNN program areas. At the State  Department, we interviewed the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe  and Eurasia and met with officials from the Bureau of Nonproliferation. We  also met with the managers of programs addressing border security,  weapons security, and employment of biological weapons scientists. NSC  officials did not respond to our requests to meet. However, we discussed  the role of the NSC staff and the extent of its participation in coordinating  programs with DOD, DOE, and State officials.
We also relied on related prior GAO reports. We performed our review in  Washington, D.C., from February 2004 to November 2004 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees; the National Security Council; and the Secretaries of Defense,  Energy, and State. We will also make copies available to others upon  request. In addition, the report will be available on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you have questions regarding this report, please contact Mr. Christoff at  (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov or Mr. Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or  aloisee@gao.gov. GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in  appendix VI.
section_title: DOD and DOE Metrics Used to Assess the Performance of Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs
paragraphs: DOD and DOE assess the performance of their threat reduction and  nonproliferation programs. They establish goals and assess progress  toward meeting these goals using performance metrics. Table 5 lists these  DOD and DOE goals and metrics.
section_title: DOD, DOE, and State Department Projects Addressing Similar Missions
paragraphs: DOD and DOE and State have projects in three areas that address similar  missions in the FSU. These areas are the employment of former biological  weapons scientists to prevent the proliferation of their expertise,  improvement of security at sites where Russian nuclear warheads are  stored, and the enhancement of countries’ ability to secure their borders  against the smuggling of WMD materials. Tables 6, 7, and 8 show the  different projects, funding and countries served for all three agencies and  areas.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Energy
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition, Hynek Kalkus, Wyatt R. Hundrup, Nanette J. Ryen, William  Lanouette, Dorian L. Herring, Stacy Edwards, Lynn Cothern, Etana Finkler,  Judy Pagano, and Ernie Jackson made significant contributions to this  report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Russian Nuclear Submarines: U.S. Participation in the Arctic Military  Environmental Cooperation Program Needs Better Justification.   GAO-04-924. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2004.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce  the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors.   GAO-04-807. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Effort to Close Russia’s Plutonium  Production Reactors Faces Challenges, and Final Shutdown Is Uncertain.  GAO-04-662. Washington D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance Efforts to  Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening. GAO-03-638.  Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to  Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-03-482.  Washington, D.C.:  March 24, 2003.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Observations on U.S. Threat Reduction  and Nonproliferation Programs in Russia. GAO-03-526T. Washington,  D.C.:  March 5, 2003.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat  Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning.   GAO-02-426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department Oversight of Science  Centers Program. GAO-01-582. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2001.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in  Russia’s Nuclear Cities Face Challenges. GAO-01-429. Washington, D.C.:  May 3, 2001.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material  Improving; Further Enhancements Needed. GAO-01-312. Washington,  D.C.: February 28, 2001.
Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers  Benefits, Poses New Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-138. Washington, D.C.:  April 28,  2000.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Limited Progress in Improving Nuclear  Material Security in Russia and the Newly Independent States.  GAO/RCED/NSIAD-00-82. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2000.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May  Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned. GAO/NSIAD-99-76. Washington,  D.C.:  April 13, 1999.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former  Soviet Union: An Update. GAO/NSIAD-95-165. Washington, D.C.: June 17,  1995.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former  Soviet Union. GAO/NSIAD-95-7. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 1994.