Border Security: CBP Aims to Prevent High-Risk Travelers from Boarding U.S.-Bound Flights, but Needs to Evaluate Program Performance
Published: 2017-01-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DHS seeks to identify and interdict international air travelers who are potential security threats to the United States, such as foreign fighters and potential terrorists, human traffickers, and otherwise inadmissible persons, at the earliest possible point in time. In fiscal year 2015, CBP processed more than 104 million U.S.-bound air travelers. CBP operates various predeparture programs domestically and overseas that are designed to identify and interdict high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights.
GAO was asked to review CBP's predeparture programs. This report addresses (1) how CBP identifies high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights; (2) the results of CBP's predeparture programs and the extent to which CBP has measures to assess program performance; and (3) how CBP plans to expand its predeparture programs. GAO reviewed CBP policies and procedures and fiscal year 2015 data across these programs. GAO also visited nine foreign and one domestic airport, selected based on location and traveler volume, among other factors. Information from these visits was not generalizable but provided valuable insights into program operations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) analyzes traveler data and threat information to identify high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights. CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC), the primary entity responsible for these analyses, conducts traveler data matching which assesses whether travelers are high-risk by matching their information against U.S. government databases and lists, and rules-based targeting, which enables CBP to identify unknown high-risk individuals. CBP operates multiple predeparture programs that use the results of NTC's analyses to help identify and interdict high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights. CBP officers inspect all U.S. bound travelers on precleared flights at the 15 Preclearance locations and, if deemed inadmissible, a traveler will not be permitted to board the aircraft. CBP also operates nine Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) and two Joint Security Program (JSP) locations as well as three Regional Carrier Liaison Groups (RCLG) that allow CBP to work with foreign government and air carrier officials to identify and interdict high-risk travelers. Through these programs, CBP may recommend that air carriers not permit such travelers to board U.S.-bound flights.
CBP data show that it identified and interdicted over 22,000 high-risk air travelers in fiscal year 2015 through its predeparture programs. CBP officers at Preclearance locations determined that 10,648 of the approximately 16 million air travelers seeking admission to the United States through such locations were inadmissible. Similarly, CBP, through its IAP, JSP, and RCLG locations, made 11,589 no-board recommendations to air carriers for the approximately 88 million air travelers bound for the United States from such locations. While CBP's predeparture programs have helped identify and interdict high-risk travelers, CBP has not fully evaluated the overall effectiveness of these programs using performance measures and baselines. CBP tracks some data, such as the number of travelers deemed inadmissible, but has not set baselines to determine if predeparture programs are achieving goals, consistent with best practices for performance measurement. By developing and implementing a system of performance measures and baselines, CBP would be better positioned to assess if the programs are achieving their goals.
CBP plans to expand its predeparture programs where possible, though several factors limit its ability to expand to all priority locations. In May 2015—after soliciting interest among foreign airport authorities and scoring interested airports using risk and other factors—CBP stated it would begin Preclearance expansion negotiations with 10 priority airports in 9 countries. As of November 2016, CBP had not completed the process required to begin operations in any locations prioritized for expansion, but had reached agreement with one location at which Preclearance operations could begin as early as 2019. According to senior CBP officials, Preclearance expansions are lengthy and complex processes because host governments and airports must be willing to allow for a Preclearance location, and CBP's Preclearance expansion strategy relies on partnering with airports that are willing to pay for the majority of operational costs.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that CBP develop and implement a system of performance measures and baselines to evaluate the effectiveness of its predeparture programs and assess whether the programs are achieving their stated goals. CBP concurred with the recommendation and identified planned actions to address the recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) seeks to identify and  interdict international air travelers who are potential security threats to the  United States at the earliest possible point in the travel lifecycle to make  the nation’s physical borders the last, not the first, line of defense. DHS’s  U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the federal agency with  primary responsibility for securing U.S. borders and processes all  travelers on U.S.-bound flights. In fiscal year 2015, CBP processed more  than 104 million U.S.-bound air travelers. CBP’s efforts start before air  travelers enter a foreign port of embarkation—including when an  individual applies for U.S. travel documents, or reserves, books, or  purchases an airline ticket—and continue during travel up until officers  from CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) determine whether to admit  travelers into the United States at U.S. ports of entry (POE). CBP  implements multiple air predeparture programs designed to interdict high- risk individuals, such as foreign fighters and potential terrorists, human  traffickers, drug smugglers, and otherwise inadmissible persons, before  they board U.S.-bound aircraft. CBP officers assigned to these programs  query traveler data against government databases (referred to as vetting),  conduct in-person interviews of travelers at foreign airports (referred to as  interviewing), and conduct full examinations of travelers and their  belongings at foreign airports to determine admissibility to the United  States (referred to as inspecting), as appropriate. U.S.-bound travelers  are vetted, interviewed, or inspected prior to boarding flights, although not  all U.S.-bound travelers undergo all three processes. In fiscal year 2015,  CBP data indicate that more than 8,100 known or suspected terrorists, or  individuals with connections to known or suspected terrorists, attempted  to apply for travel to the United States or board U.S.-bound flights. CBP  has plans underway to expand the presence of its predeparture programs  overseas.
Recent events have highlighted the increased threat of one group of high- risk individuals, namely foreign fighters—individuals who leave home,  travel abroad to terrorist safe havens, and join or assist violent extremist  groups. In February 2016, the Director of National Intelligence reported  that more than 36,500 foreign fighters—including more than 6,600 from  Western countries—had traveled to Syria to train with, support, or join  extremist groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  Moreover, according to the Director of National Intelligence, the  November 2015 attacks in Paris, France, which killed 130 people, were  conducted, in part, by European foreign fighters returning from Syria.  Furthermore, airport and air travel security remains a pressing current  issue, as evidenced by the October 2015 bombing of a Russian airliner in  the Sinai, Egypt, which killed all 224 passengers onboard, as well as the  March 2016 airport attack in Brussels, Belgium, which killed 32 people.
You asked us to review CBP’s air predeparture programs and CBP’s  plans to expand them. This report addresses the following questions: (1)  How does CBP identify high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-bound  flights? (2) What have been the results of CBP’s air predeparture  programs, and to what extent does CBP have measures to assess the  programs’ performance? (3) How does CBP plan to expand its air  predeparture programs?
This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued in  September of 2016. CBP deemed some of the information in that report  as sensitive security information and law enforcement sensitive, both of  which must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report  omits sensitive information about CBP’s efforts to target and interdict  high-risk passengers prior to departing for the United States. Although the  information provided in this report is more limited in scope, it addresses  the same questions as the sensitive report. Also, the overall methodology  used for both reports is the same.
To determine how CBP identifies high-risk travelers before they board  U.S.-bound flights, we reviewed documentation related to CBP’s efforts to  identify high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights, such as  CBP’s 2015 predeparture targeting standard operating procedures and  guidance on targeting effort development and implementation. We also  reviewed applicable federal statutes, regulations, and DHS privacy  documents related to CBP’s predeparture targeting efforts. In addition, we  reviewed documentation on CBP’s processes for developing,  implementing, and reviewing its targeting efforts. We interviewed senior  CBP officials responsible for leading CBP’s targeting efforts at the  National Targeting Center (NTC) to better understand the process by  which NTC develops, implements, and oversees the targeting process  and observed the predeparture targeting process. We also interviewed  and received documentation from DHS’s Office of General Counsel  regarding its oversight of CBP’s targeting and identification efforts.
To determine the results of CBP’s air predeparture programs, we  reviewed CBP documents, policies, and procedures regarding the  management and operations of CBP’s predeparture programs, including  standard operating procedures and strategic planning documents. We  also interviewed CBP headquarters officials responsible for managing  CBP’s predeparture programs. To evaluate the extent to which CBP has  measures in place to evaluate these programs’ performance, we  assessed CBP’s efforts to measure and track program performance  against requirements for performance measurement in the Government  Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) and the GPRA  Modernization Act of 2010, as well as best practices on performance  management and best practices on program evaluation. Moreover, we  gathered fiscal year 2015 data—the most recent complete data  available—on the results of CBP’s predeparture programs. Due to  technology updates related to CBP’s efforts to collect data on  predeparture program vetting, interviewing, and inspection, we used fiscal  year 2015 data. We also collected and analyzed available CBP data  from fiscal year 2015 on the number of travelers matched to the Terrorist  Screening Database (TSDB) and its subset No Fly List, as well as  previously unknown individuals identified by CBP as high-risk. We  assessed the reliability of these data by, for example, reviewing  documentation from and meeting with relevant CBP officials responsible  for processing and handling the data, as well as by reviewing the data for  inconsistencies. We found that these data were sufficiently reliable to  provide descriptive information on the result of CBP’s identification and  targeting efforts and for presenting descriptive statistics on CBP’s efforts  to prevent high-risk individuals from traveling to the United States.
We also conducted site visits at nine foreign airports and one domestic  airport from May 2015 through September 2015 to observe the specific  techniques used by CBP officers to prevent high-risk individuals from  boarding U.S.-bound flights. To help ensure that our site visits included  observations across all of CBP’s predeparture programs within our scope  and across geographic regions, we selected these locations based on  factors such as program type; geographic location; and CBP data on  overall traveler volume and numbers of high-risk travelers, among other  things. Moreover, during the site visits at foreign locations, we met with  CBP, Department of State, and other U.S. government officials;  representatives from host country government agencies; airport authority  representatives; and airline representatives to discuss and observe how  CBP implements the predeparture programs. Our visits to these locations  do not provide a representative sample of these programs, but provide  illustrative examples and insight into the processes and daily operations  of these programs. We also met with and received documentation from  CBP predeparture officials located in the three U.S. POEs that coordinate  with airlines at foreign airports to prevent individuals who may pose a  security threat, have fraudulent documents, or are otherwise likely to be  inadmissible from boarding flights to the United States.
To determine how CBP plans to expand its air predeparture programs, we  reviewed and analyzed CBP documentation, including guidance for  prospective applicant airports, cost estimates for potential expansion  locations, and CBP’s expansion evaluation report and supporting  materials. We also analyzed CBP’s January 2016 predeparture “white  paper,” which outlines CBP’s goals for its programs and discusses its  strategy for expanding these programs and capabilities. We also  reviewed relevant laws concerning expansion, particularly those related to  funding and CBP staffing requirements. We interviewed a non- generalizable sample of private sector representatives from air carrier  associations, airlines, and airport authorities regarding CBP’s planned  expansion of the predeparture programs. We selected these stakeholders  through analysis of Department of Transportation data on air carrier  volume, consultation with airline industry representatives, and input from  an internal GAO expert on the airline industry. The information we  obtained from our private sector interviews cannot be generalized, but  offers insight into the role and participation of private sector stakeholders  into CBP’s expansion efforts. We interviewed CBP, Department of State,  Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and Department of  Transportation officials on predeparture expansion, including factors  affecting expansion, insights into the negotiation process, the different  roles of federal stakeholders involved in the process, and the status of  these efforts.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2016 to January 2017  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: According to CBP documentation, throughout the travel process, OFO’s  NTC analyzes traveler information and uses it to provide CBP officers at  CBP’s predeparture locations with relevant and timely information about  an individual. According to CBP documentation, these efforts provide  CBP officers stationed overseas and within the United States the ability to  address risks or prevent the movement of identified threats toward the  United States at the earliest possible point in the travel process. CBP’s  predeparture programs use the results of NTC’s efforts to identify and  interdict high-risk individuals destined for the United States while they are  still overseas. Specifically, CBP operates three air predeparture programs  that are responsible for all U.S.-bound air travelers—Preclearance; the  Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) and Joint Security Program (JSP);  and the regional carrier liaison groups (RCLG). In fiscal year 2015, CBP’s  predeparture programs consisted of more than 670 CBP officers at 29  locations worldwide as outlined in figure 1 below.
Preclearance. Preclearance locations operate at foreign airports and  serve as U.S. POEs. Preclearance operations began in 1952 in Toronto  to facilitate trade and travel between the United States and Canada. As of  April 2016, CBP operates 15 air Preclearance locations in six countries.  Through the Preclearance program, uniformed CBP officers at a foreign  airport exercise U.S. legal authorities to inspect travelers and luggage  and make admissibility determinations prior to an individual boarding a  plane to the United States. According to CBP officials, an inspection at a  Preclearance location is the same inspection an individual would undergo  at a domestic POE, and officers conducting Preclearance inspections  exercise the same authority as officers at domestic POEs to approve or  deny admission into the United States. As a result, travelers arriving at  domestic air POEs from Preclearance locations do not have to be re- inspected upon entry or if they are connecting to a domestic flight. In  fiscal year 2015, CBP had about 600 staff located in Preclearance  facilities around the world.
Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) and Joint Security Program  (JSP). IAP and JSP operate at foreign airports. According to CBP  officials, under this program, unarmed, plain clothes CBP officers posted  at foreign airports partner with air carriers and host country government  officials to help prevent terrorists and other high-risk individuals from  boarding U.S.-bound flights by vetting and interviewing them before  travel. According to CBP program documentation, CBP established IAP  in 2004 to prevent terrorists, high-risk, and improperly documented  travelers from boarding airlines destined to the United States. Building on  the IAP concept, CBP established JSP in 2009 to partner with host  country law enforcement officials to identify high-risk travelers. CBP  officers at IAP and JSP locations have the ability to question travelers and  review their travel documents. They are to act in an advisory manner to  the air carriers and host governments and do not have authority to deny  boarding to individuals on U.S.-bound flights or fully inspect travelers or  their belongings. IAP and JSP officers are authorized by CBP to make  recommendations to airlines as to whether to board or deny boarding  (known as a no-board recommendation) to selected travelers based on  their likely admissibility status upon arrival to the United States. The final  decision to board travelers, however, lies with the carriers.
Regional Carrier Liaison Groups (RCLG). RCLGs are located and  operate at domestic airports. CBP established RCLGs in 2006 to assist  air carriers with questions regarding U.S. admissibility requirements and  travel document authenticity. RCLGs are located in New York, Miami, and  Honolulu. According to CBP officials, RCLGs are responsible for  coordinating with air carriers on all actionable referrals from NTC on U.S.  bound travelers departing from an airport without an IAP, JSP, or  Preclearance presence. Each RCLG is assigned responsibility for  travelers departing out of a specific geographic location. Similar to IAP and JSP, CBP officers in RCLGs also make no-board recommendations  as appropriate to air carriers. CBP officers at RCLGs do not have  authority to make admissibility determinations about U.S.-bound air  travelers, and the final decision to board or not board a traveler lies with  the carrier.
section_title: CBP Analyzes Traveler Data and Threat Information to Identify High-Risk Travelers before They Board U.S.-Bound Flights
subsections: section_title: CBP Has Processes in Place to Identify High-Risk Travelers before They Board U.S.-Bound Flights
paragraphs: CBP electronically vets all travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights  and continues to do so until they land at a U.S. port of entry. Through  these vetting efforts, CBP seeks to identify high-risk travelers from the  millions of individuals who travel to the United States each year. CBP’s  vetting and targeting efforts are primarily conducted by NTC and entail (1)  traveler data matching and analysis, (2) rules-based targeting, and (3)  recurrent vetting.
subsections: section_title: Traveler Data Matching and Analysis
paragraphs: CBP’s primary method of identifying high-risk individuals is through the  comparison of travelers’ information (such as name, date of birth, and  gender) against records extracted from U.S. government databases,  including the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)—the U.S.  government’s consolidated terrorist watch list. Traveler data matching  focuses on identifying known high-risk individuals—that is, individuals  who may be inadmissible to the United States under U.S. immigration law  or who may otherwise pose a threat to homeland or national security.  According to senior NTC officials, CBP devotes significant resources to  traveler data matching and analysis. CBP’s primary tool for vetting and  targeting travelers is the Automated Targeting System (ATS), which is a  computer based-enforcement and support system that compares traveler  information against intelligence and law enforcement data to identify high- risk travelers. Traveler data matching occurs throughout the travel  process and, upon a positive or possible match, CBP officers can select  these individuals for further vetting, interviewing, and inspection.
section_title: Rules-Based Targeting
paragraphs: CBP’s rules-based targeting efforts seek to identify unknown high-risk  travelers—that is, travelers for whom U.S. government entities do not  have available derogatory information directly linking them to terrorist  activities or any other actions that would make them potentially  inadmissible to the United States but who may present a threat and thus  warrant additional scrutiny. According to NTC officials responsible for the  rules-based targeting program, unknown high-risk travelers pose the  greatest threat to the United States because their information is not  contained in lists of known high-risk individuals and are therefore more  difficult to detect. CBP identifies unknown high-risk individuals by  comparing their information against a set of targeting rules based on  intelligence, law enforcement, and other information. NTC officials stated  that these rules have identified potential foreign fighters or other high-risk  travelers. Within CBP, the NTC develops, modifies, and implements the  targeting rules in ATS. On the basis of our interviews and reviews of CBP  documentation, we found that when designing or implementing any new  rules, NTC, in coordination with other partners at CBP, engages in a  multiple-step assessment and review process to ensure that the proposed  rule will meet its intended purpose and not impose an unjustifiable impact  on legitimate travelers. Rules-based targeting evaluates travelers during  the travel process and in some cases in advance of the travel process. If  a traveler is a rule “hit”, this individual can be selected for further vetting,  interviewing, and inspection.
section_title: Recurrent Vetting
paragraphs: CBP supports its traveler data matching and rules-based targeting efforts  through the use of recurrent vetting. NTC’s vetting, targeting, and traveler  data matching activities in ATS run 24 hours a day and seven days a  week and automatically scan through updated traveler information, when  available. This process, known as recurrent vetting, is to ensure that new  information that affects a traveler’s admissibility is identified in near real  time. Recurrent vetting occurs throughout the travel process and  continues until a traveler arrives at a domestic port of entry. For example,  after checking into a foreign airport, a traveler may have his or her U.S.  visa revoked for a security or immigration-related violation. Due to  recurrent vetting, CBP would be alerted to this through ATS and could  take action as appropriate.
section_title: CBP Sends Lists of Identified High-Risk Travelers to Predeparture Program Locations and Coordinates Its Targeting Efforts with TSA
paragraphs: Information on individuals who the NTC identifies through traveler data  matching or rules-based targeting, including recurrent vetting, is compiled  automatically through ATS into a daily high-priority list, or traveler referral  list. CBP officers at the NTC review the traveler referral list for accuracy  and to remove, if possible, any automatically generated matches  determined to not be potential high-risk individuals. After this review,  CBP officers at the NTC use ATS to send the traveler referral list to  officers at each Preclearance, IAP, JSP, and RCLG location, as shown in  figure 2. According to CBP officials responsible for managing CBP’s  predeparture programs, these traveler referral lists represent their daily,  high-priority requirements. According to CBP officials, officers at each of  these locations are required to assess each individual on the traveler  referral list and verify travel and identity documents, as appropriate. CBP  officers stationed overseas and at RCLGs communicate with the NTC  regarding the authenticity and completeness of traveler documents and  may send additional information to have the NTC verify that the  documents are legitimate.
Additionally, NTC coordinates its traveler data matching and rules-based  targeting for international air travelers with TSA’s Secure Flight  Program. In April 2014, NTC and TSA developed an electronic common  operating picture, which displays a master CBP and TSA traveler referral  list of high-risk travelers in both the NTC and TSA operations center.  According to CBP and TSA officials responsible for these programs, joint  display of high-risk traveler information permits both TSA and CBP to  identify and resolve discrepancies in vetting travelers, coordinate their  efforts, and functions as a security redundancy. In addition, NTC officials  stated that CBP and TSA’s coordination efforts have allowed them to  identify more high-risk travelers than they would have if they had been  working separately.
section_title: CBP Has Processes in Place to Oversee and Review Predeparture Targeting Efforts
paragraphs: According to officials from NTC and DHS’s Offices of General Counsel,  Privacy, and Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, CBP has internal and  external processes in place to ensure that its vetting and targeting  efforts—particularly the use of targeting rules—are relevant, manageable,  and in compliance with privacy requirements. These officials reported  that CBP reviews the targeting rules on a periodic basis to assess  whether the rules remain relevant in light of evolving threats. In addition,  CBP also conducts constant rule maintenance and development as  needed in response to new or changing threats. According to CBP  documentation, DHS’s Offices of General Counsel, Privacy, and Civil  Rights and Civil Liberties also review the targeting rules on a periodic  basis to ensure that the rules do not excessively affect the traveling  public. According to NTC officials, to date there have been no  disagreements about the validity or utility of the rules between NTC and  the external review groups.
section_title: CBP’s Air Predeparture Programs Interdict High-Risk Air Travelers, but CBP Has Not Fully Assessed the Programs’ Performance
subsections: section_title: CBP Identifies and Interdicts High-Risk Travelers before They Board U.S.-Bound Flights
paragraphs: Through its predeparture programs—Preclearance, IAP and JSP, and  RCLGs—CBP identifies and interdicts high-risk travelers before they  board U.S.-bound flights. Specifically, CBP data indicate that CBP’s  predeparture programs identified and ultimately interdicted approximately  22,000 high-risk air travelers in fiscal year 2015.
Preclearance. In fiscal year 2015, CBP officers at Preclearance locations  determined that 10,648 air travelers were inadmissible out of the  approximately 16 million air travelers seeking admission to the United  States through a Preclearance location (see fig. 3). In addition to requiring  that all travelers undergo a primary inspection, CBP officers in these  locations also referred almost 290,000 individuals for secondary  inspection. Because all precleared travelers are inspected at a foreign  airport, CBP officials told us that Preclearance presents the best  opportunity to prevent high-risk individuals from boarding a flight to the  United States because the opportunity to conduct a secondary inspection  or interview could result in information linking a person to terrorism or a  crime that may render them inadmissible to the United States. CBP  officers at the three Preclearance locations we visited—Montreal and  Toronto, Canada, and Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates—noted that  being able to conduct an inspection on travelers has allowed them to  identify high-risk individuals. During our site visits to Preclearance  locations, CBP officers stated that they conduct their own targeting  activities, in addition to coordinated targeting activities with NTC.
IAP and JSP. CBP officers at IAP and JSP locations made 3,925 no- board recommendations in fiscal year 2015 for the approximately 29  million air travelers bound for the United States from such locations (see  fig. 4). During this same time period, CBP data indicated 1,154 confirmed  encounters with individuals on the TSDB, including 106 on the No-Fly  List. According to CBP officials, IAP and JSP officers receive the  majority of their daily targets from the NTC and they work closely with the  NTC to address high-risk targets and identify trends in high-risk travel.
According to our observations and in-person discussions with IAP and  JSP officials, on a daily basis, IAP and JSP officers resolve NTC targets,  observe travelers, and issue no-board recommendations to carriers  regarding persons scheduled to travel on U.S.-bound flights who will likely  not be admitted into the United States upon arrival. IAP and JSP officers  also conduct their own targeting initiatives and have access to the host  airports’ sterile and boarding areas to question travelers and review their  travel documents. According to CBP officials and IAP and JSP officers  (and supported by our in-person observations), air carriers almost always  follow IAP and JSP no-board recommendations.
RCLG. CBP officers working at the three RCLGs made 7,664 no-board  recommendations in fiscal year 2015 for the approximately 59 million  travelers bound for the United States from locations within the RCLGs’  spheres of responsibility (see fig. 5). During this time period, CBP data  indicate that RCLGs also reported 1,634 confirmed encounters with  individuals in the TSDB, including 119 on the No-Fly List. On the basis of  our site visit to the New York RCLG, as well as phone interviews with the  Miami, Florida, and Honolulu, Hawaii, RCLGs, we found that RCLG  officers regularly resolve NTC targets, respond to questions from air  carriers, conduct research on long-term targeting initiatives, and issue no- board recommendations. According to CBP officials, in the event that  RCLGs issue a no-board recommendation, airlines generally follow it.  CBP officials from all three RCLGs could not recall any examples over the  last 5 years of an airline not following a no-board recommendation from  an RCLG location.
section_title: CBP’s Predeparture Programs Provide Additional Travel and Security-Related Benefits
paragraphs: In addition to preventing high-risk or other inadmissible travelers from  boarding U.S.-bound flights, CBP’s predeparture programs have resulted  in other benefits by, for example, (1) assisting air carriers, (2) enhancing  coordination with host country law enforcement agencies, (3) gathering  additional information on travelers to improve U.S. targeting activities, or  (4) facilitating travel.
subsections: section_title: Assisting Air Carriers
paragraphs: CBP’s predeparture programs provide regular assistance to air carriers  on relevant U.S. admissibility requirements and U.S. travel documents.  During our site visits, we observed that IAP and JSP officers regularly  interacted with air carriers, and provided a point of contact at foreign  airports for air carriers and airport security employees who may have  difficulties assessing the validity of travel documents or understanding  U.S. immigration requirements. For example, during our site visit to one  IAP location in Europe, officers reported keeping a separate telephone  line for air carriers to use when requesting assistance regarding  document validity. In addition, several airline representatives we spoke  with reported that CBP officers from IAP and JSP locations have provided  helpful training to staff. Further, according to RCLG officials we spoke  with, the relationships that the RCLGs have established with air carriers  allows RCLG officers to provide them with early information on potential  traveler admissibility determinations, which ultimately help the air carrier  avoid the costs associated with transporting inadmissible travelers back  to their point of departure as well as fines that could be imposed.
section_title: Improving Coordination with Host Country Law Enforcement Agencies
paragraphs: According to CBP documentation, one of the key advantages of its  predeparture programs is the ability to improve coordination overseas  between CBP and host country law enforcement agencies. As part of  their daily duties, IAP and JSP officers are responsible for establishing  positive working relationships with numerous foreign entities, including  airlines and their security organizations, foreign border control authorities,  and other law enforcement agencies. For example, during our site visits  to the two JSP locations, host government law enforcement and security  representatives emphasized that their coordination with and training from  CBP was invaluable, and that it allowed them to better identify and target  high-risk individuals. Host government officials told us that the expanded  targeting efforts in their countries due to CBP’s presence at JSP locations  also have a strong impact on regional security. Moreover, according to  CBP officials, information sharing through the JSP program has led to  enhanced coordination and targeting efforts to include taking action  against international drug, currency, and human smugglers, and known or  possible suspected terrorists. Similarly, during our site visits to three IAP  locations in Europe, foreign law enforcement officials we spoke with told  us that information sharing generally occurs informally between IAP  officers and host government officials rather than through formal channels  due to host country privacy concerns about formal information sharing  arrangements with other governments.
section_title: Gathering Information to Improve NTC Targeting Efforts
paragraphs: According to senior CBP officials, all of CBP’s predeparture programs  provide key information that helps to improve NTC’s targeting efforts and  also supports larger U.S. government information gathering efforts on  high-risk individuals and threats to the United States (see fig. 6). For  example, according to CBP data, in fiscal year 2015, CBP’s predeparture  programs allowed CBP to identify thousands of previously unknown high- risk individuals and of these, CBP nominated more than 1,500 for  inclusion in the TSDB.
According to senior CBP officials, CBP officers stationed overseas in  Preclearance, IAP, or JSP locations have the opportunity to collect  information about travelers, their travel history, and any other pertinent  information while engaging with these individuals in conversation as part  of interviewing or inspecting them. Officials told us that the information  collected can be maintained and used for future targeting efforts if these  individuals travel to the United States again.
section_title: Travel Facilitation
paragraphs: Air carrier and airport authority representatives, foreign government  officials, and CBP officials we interviewed reported that CBP predeparture  operations help to facilitate travel into the United States. For example,  CBP officials, as well as air carrier and airport authority representatives  told us that Preclearance operations ensure that all individuals aboard a  given plane have already been inspected and have been cleared for entry  into the United States. As a result, officials told us that this provides  airports with more domestic airport arrival gate options by allowing  international flights to arrive at domestic terminals that may not otherwise  be equipped to properly inspect international travelers. IAP and JSP also  provide travel facilitation benefits, according to IAP and JSP officers we  spoke with. For example, IAP and JSP officers assist U.S. citizens and  lawful permanent residents who have lost, stolen, or expired  documentation. Although U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents  can generally not be denied entry to the United States under U.S.  immigration law, air carriers will typically deny boarding to travelers  without proper documentation because the air carrier cannot verify  documentation and the legal status of the individual as admissible to the  United States. According to IAP and JSP officers, having a physical  presence at the airport enables them to reconcile an individual’s identity  by accessing CBP databases and recommending to the air carriers that  they board the traveler. Further, U.S. embassy officials we interviewed in  Europe stated that IAP officers routinely assist embassy staff in verifying  travelers’ identities and, because of their access to CBP databases, IAP  officers are able to facilitate travel for U.S. citizens and lawful permanent  residents even when the embassy is closed. For example, embassy  officials in Western Europe reported that IAP officers were instrumental in  facilitating the travel of the parents of the American students who  thwarted a terrorist attack on the Thalys train from Amsterdam to Paris in  July 2015. Not all of the families had the required travel documentation for  entry into France, and IAP officers worked with the Western European  government and air carriers to ensure their arrival and departure.
section_title: CBP Has Not Evaluated Overall Effectiveness of Air Predeparture Programs
paragraphs: CBP has not evaluated the effectiveness of its predeparture programs as  a whole, including implementing a system of performance measures and  baselines to assess whether the programs are achieving their stated  goals. In a January 2016 white paper, CBP states that its strategic goal  for its predeparture programs is to achieve comprehensive and highest  level coverage at all high-risk air transit points to the United States with a  focus on using the programs to push the U.S. borders outward to  intercept and address potential threats at the earliest possible  opportunity. Other program-specific documentation that we reviewed  articulates similar, high-level predeparture program objectives, which are  primarily focused on enhancing national security, counterterrorism, and  travel facilitation. CBP has taken some initial steps to measure the  performance of its air predeparture programs by collecting data on  program activities. For example, CBP tracks a variety of data on the  activities across Preclearance, IAP, JSP, and RCLG locations, including  data on the numbers of travelers issued no-board recommendations or  deemed inadmissible; invalid travel documents seized; and No-Fly List  and TSDB encounters. According to CBP officials, on occasion, CBP has  used these data, among other inputs, to support adjustments to its  operations, including closing two IAP former locations where CBP  determined that high-risk traveler volume did not merit having a location.  On the basis of our analysis of CBP documentation and interviews with  program officials, CBP has not assessed the performance of these  programs on a regular basis, in part because it has not established  baselines for these measures. Therefore, CBP does not have anything  against which to compare the data to determine whether the programs  are achieving stated goals. Solely tracking increases or decreases in  program data, such as traveler volume or the number of invalid travel  documents seized, does not allow CBP to fully evaluate its predeparture  programs as such changes in the data may not be an indicator of  program success or increased efficacy.
CBP officials told us that they have collected a large quantity of data and  statistics regarding the actions of their predeparture programs and have  done so since program inception for all programs. However, due to  changes in operational focus, technology updates, and the use of  separate data systems at predeparture program locations, CBP has not  collected consistent data across all of its predeparture programs. As a  result, CBP does not have baseline data on which to measure program  performance. However, CBP officials stated that they now have updated  and uniform data collection systems that are consistent across all  predeparture programs. As a result, CBP officials stated that they should  be able to identify performance baselines from fiscal year 2015 onward.  According to senior CBP officials, some of the results of CBP’s  predeparture programs are not easily measured. For example, some  benefits, such as coordination and information sharing with host  governments, are invaluable but difficult to measure. Officials also noted  that relying on data alone may not always present the most accurate  picture of the true impact of predeparture programs because changes to  the travel process or other factors may impact the predeparture programs  in ways that are not fully captured by the data. However, on the basis of  our analysis of CBP’s documentation, including official hearing  statements, and interviews with predeparture program officials, CBP uses  these data as indicators of the programs’ success.
According to GAO’s Program Evaluation Guide, which articulates best  practices for program evaluation, a program evaluation is a systematic  study using research methods to collect and analyze data to assess how  well a program is working and why. Program evaluation is closely  related to performance measurement and analyzes performance  measures to assess the achievement of performance objectives or goals.  Evaluations answer specific questions about program performance and  may focus on assessing program operations or results. Evaluation can  play a key role in strategic planning and in program management,  providing feedback on both program design and execution. Moreover, in  accordance with GPRA, as updated by the GPRA Modernization Act of  2010, performance measurement is the ongoing monitoring and reporting  of program accomplishments, particularly towards pre-established goals,  and agencies are to establish performance measures to assess progress  towards goals. Agencies can use performance measurement to make  various types of management decisions to improve programs and results,  such as developing strategies and allocating resources, and identify  problems and take corrective action. Developing and implementing a  system of performance measures and baselines for each program would  help ensure that these programs are achieving their intended goals. By  using data from fiscal year 2015, for example, to develop initial baselines,  CBP could better measure program performance towards meeting stated  goals.
section_title: CBP Plans to Expand its Predeparture Programs, but Several Factors Limit Its Ability to Expand to All Priority Locations CBP Aims to Expand Its Predeparture Programs to Additional Overseas Locations
paragraphs: CBP has plans underway to expand its predeparture programs,  particularly Preclearance operations. According to CBP, Preclearance  expansion is a significant homeland security priority. CBP has reported  that it aims to preclear 33 percent of all U.S.-bound air travelers by 2024.  Accordingly, in September 2014, CBP invited foreign airport authorities  interested in having the United States expand Preclearance operations to  their location to submit letters of interest. CBP received 25 letters of  interest from foreign airport authorities. Of the 25 airports, CBP selected  18 to rank, prioritize, and score for potential new air Preclearance  locations. CBP, in conjunction with TSA and considering input from  Department of State, conducted technical site visits and evaluations of  these airports. In particular, CBP and TSA assessed these airports based  on a variety of factors related to national security, travel facilitation, and  feasibility of operations, among other things. In May 2015, DHS  announced plans to enter into formal negotiations to expand  Preclearance to 10 airports in 9 countries. According to CBP  Preclearance officials, all 10 priority airports are valuable in supporting  CBP’s predeparture mission.
Opening a new Preclearance location requires the entry into force of an  international agreement between the United States and a foreign  government and requires the resolution of various diplomatic issues such  as the extent of the law enforcement capability of CBP officers within the  host country to include the carriage of service weapons, CBP officer  immunity or legal status within the host country, and other complex  issues. After reaching an agreement with the host country, expansion  timelines may change due to competitive pressures, facility readiness,  and other factors, according to CBP Preclearance officials. The Director  of Preclearance noted that, in accordance with the Trade Facilitation and  Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, CBP will provide any requisite  information and certifications to the appropriate Congressional  committees before entering an agreement into force with the government  of a foreign country to establish Preclearance operations. In May 2016,  CBP again invited interested airport authorities to submit a letter of  interest to participate in the Preclearance program by August 1, 2016.
CBP officials told us that they also aim to expand IAP or JSP operations  to other airports where CBP has determined there is a potential threat to  the United States but Preclearance may not always be feasible.  According to CBP officials, host countries and airport authorities must  express interest in the program, coordinate with CBP so that CBP may  determine if airports are suitable for participating in the program, and host  countries must agree to bilateral arrangements before CBP will expand  the program.
subsections: section_title: Host Government and Foreign Airport Willingness, among Other Factors, Affect CBP’s Ability to Expand Air Predeparture Programs to Other High Priority Locations
paragraphs: Because CBP depends on the willingness of host country governments  and airport authorities to establish overseas predeparture program  locations, there are challenges to expanding Preclearance, IAP, and JSP.  For example, not all of the airports that responded to CBP’s expansion  solicitation may be able to secure the necessary support of their  governments to enter into negotiations with the United States for  Preclearance operations. Multiple senior CBP Preclearance officials  stated that the willingness and readiness of the host government and  airport authority are key factors impacting the timeline of expansion. As a  result, CBP’s negotiation and planning efforts are furthest along with two  countries that currently have willing governments and airport authorities,  according to CBP officials. However, CBP did not select these two  locations solely based on their score among the 10 priority locations that  CBP selected for potential expansion. CBP officials stated that expanding  to these locations does not preclude CBP from establishing Preclearance  operations at some of the other airports where the benefits to the United  States might be greater, as long as these other eight locations can meet  CBP’s requirements. According to CBP’s Preclearance evaluation report,  some high-priority airports that are interested in Preclearance may face  challenges in meeting such requirements. For example, airports that  provide service to the United States on multiple U.S. air carriers, such as  London Heathrow, will need to ensure that all U.S. carriers have access  to Preclearance services by, for example, reconfiguring terminals,  according to CBP Preclearance officials. Further, airport authorities and  host country governments in many locations are not interested and do not  support establishing a CBP Preclearance operation.
Moreover, CBP plans to expand Preclearance to locations where airport  authorities agree to reimburse CBP for certain costs. For the first 14  Preclearance locations, CBP assumed all of the costs of Preclearance  operations—including officer pay, travel costs, and other operational  costs. Beginning with Abu Dhabi, CBP determined that its model for new  Preclearance locations would include a requirement for costs to be  shared with the host airport authority. CBP’s expenses for Preclearance  inspections in Abu Dhabi are reimbursed to about 85 percent of all  expenses. According to CBP officials, under this model, CBP is able to  extend its borders without having to pay the full costs of operations.  Airport authority officials we spoke with in Canada stated that they valued  having CBP Preclearance operations at their facilities, but noted that high  up-front development and implementation costs could be potential  impediments for other airport authorities. Because of the cost-sharing  model CBP has implemented, not all airport authorities may be willing or  able to accept Preclearance operations in their facilities.
According to CBP officials and documentation, airport authorities’ and  host countries’ willingness to participate also affects CBP’s efforts to  expand IAP and JSP operations, particularly concerns related to  sovereignty, such as CBP officer presence in the country and airport.  These officials also raised concerns about airside access, such as access  to areas within the airport, freedom of movement, and ability to interview  travelers. These officials stated that JSP and IAP expansion efforts are  also impacted by officer safety and security concerns, particularly in  potential expansion locations in Central and South America as well as the  Middle East and Southeast Asia.
section_title: CBP is Taking Some Steps to Address Staffing and Funding Needs as it Seeks to Expand its Predeparture Programs
paragraphs: CBP is taking some steps to address staffing and funding needed for the  expansion of its predeparture programs, but because CBP’s efforts are  still in the early stages and negotiations with host governments about  planned expansion locations have not yet been finalized, it is too soon to  determine whether CBP’s efforts will fully address its needs.
subsections: section_title: Staffing
paragraphs: According to CBP’s Assistant Commissioner for Human Resources  Management, staffing is one of the most prominent challenges the  agency faces. CBP data indicate that, as of February 2016, OFO was  more than 800 officers below its congressionally authorized staffing level,  which includes all POEs—OFO had 23,775 officer positions authorized  and 22,937 officers on-board. In addition, according to CBP hiring and  attrition data, as of February 2016, about one percent of initial applicants  for a CBP OFO officer qualify. This means that CBP needs approximately  78,000 new applicants in fiscal year 2016 to meet its current officer gap.  Further, in April 2016, CBP officials testified that OFO’s staffing model  estimates that the agency will need to hire an additional 2,107 officers  through fiscal year 2017 to account for growing volumes of trade and  travel. CBP’s stakeholders, including several air carriers and air carrier  associations we met with, also raised concerns about the impact of  expanding Preclearance operations on domestic POEs because CBP  plans to initially staff new locations with officers from domestic POEs.
CBP’s Office of Human Resources Management has taken several steps  to address the agency’s broader staffing gaps. In addition, in April 2016,  CBP officials testified that CBP has begun initiatives aimed at decreasing  the amount of time it takes for an applicant to complete the hiring  process, increased the number of recruiting events, and coordinated with  the Department of Defense to recruit qualified veterans and individuals  separating from military service. Further, senior Preclearance officials  stated that when staffing Preclearance locations for start-up operations,  CBP selects temporary duty staff from various ports so as not to deplete  the capacity of any one domestic POE. IAP and JSP also use temporary  duty staff from multiple POEs for start-up and to augment core staff  during seasonal peak travel. Further, a senior Preclearance official stated  that new Preclearance locations will not be operational until sometime in  fiscal year 2017 at the earliest and that, similar to the process in Abu  Dhabi, CBP will initially staff a new operation with a smaller number of  temporary duty officers and then gradually increase the number of  permanent staff at these locations. Moreover, according to a CBP budget  official, since the costs of new Preclearance positions will be mostly  reimbursed by the foreign airport authorities, CBP will be able to backfill  positions at domestic POEs that were vacated as a result of moving staff  to Preclearance locations.
In addition, CBP has reported that implementing additional Preclearance  locations will reduce wait times at domestic air POEs and lead to more  efficient inspections. Specifically, CBP’s 2016 white paper notes that  Preclearance operations will reduce wait times at some of the busiest air  POEs in the United States. In addition, CBP officials also stated that  Preclearance operations have led to increased airport traveler processing  capacity. However, according to CBP officials responsible for data  collection and analysis across OFO programs, CBP does not have  generalizable data or analyses on the effect of Preclearance expansion  on domestic wait times, so they could not provide us with data to  corroborate this statement. Further, according to CBP officials and an  airline official we met with, reductions in wait times may be short-term  because airlines and airports may add new international routes in place of  precleared flights. On the basis of our review of CBP documentation, we  could not determine the extent to which there is a causal relationship  between Preclearance operations and long-term, reduced wait times at  domestic POEs. As of May 2016, CBP officials stated that they are in the  process of surveying all U.S. airports to gain insights on the full extent of  the impact of Preclearance operations, particularly traveler wait times and  processing capacity.
CBP has also taken steps to model anticipated Preclearance, IAP, and  JSP expansion staffing needs. However, CBP’s estimates are preliminary  and senior officials noted that CBP will be in a better position to determine  staffing needs once CBP is further along in the negotiation process with  host governments. According to CBP officials, the total staff required for  each new predeparture location depends on the negotiated CBP  presence at each location, which has not been finalized. As a result, it is  too early in CBP’s efforts to accurately estimate staffing needs of  expanding CBP’s air predeparture programs, and to determine if CBP’S  current and planned actions will address staffing needs.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: CBP has taken some steps to identify and address funding needs for the  expansion of its predeparture programs, though it is too soon for us to  determine if these actions will fully address CBP’s funding needs. As  previously mentioned, CBP plans to expand Preclearance to locations  where airport authorities agree to reimburse CBP for certain costs.  Specifically, CBP intends to require the host airport authority to reimburse  CBP for all of the agricultural and immigration inspection-related costs  associated with Preclearance operations. Further, CBP officials stated  that new Preclearance locations will generally be expected to provide the  facilities and equipment necessary for Preclearance operations.  Moreover, Preclearance officials stated that they are planning to use  authority provided to CBP under the Trade Facilitation and Trade  Enforcement Act of 2015, enacted in February 2016, to collect  Preclearance payments for start-up costs in advance of opening new  Preclearance facilities, and to collect reimbursement in advance of  incurring the costs for the provision of certain activities, such as  immigration or agricultural inspection activities. By using these two  strategies, Preclearance officials stated that they should be able to secure  airport authority funding for almost all activities associated with the  planning and operations of future Preclearance locations. Although CBP  prefers that the airport authority pay the majority of Preclearance costs,  CBP officials stated that its expansion decisions are not solely driven by  the costs CBP would have to incur to set up and maintain a Preclearance  location. These officials stated that CBP would still consider expanding  Preclearance to a desirable location even if the country or airport  authority did not support the reimbursement model; however, CBP’s  current expansion plans and white paper strategy indicate that they are  primarily pursuing the reimbursement model. In contrast to Preclearance,  CBP officials stated that CBP will continue to fund all of the costs  associated with additional JSP and IAP locations. Officials told us that  CBP has developed cost estimates for several potential JSP locations.
Further, CBP has taken steps to model anticipated Preclearance and IAP  and JSP expansion costs. CBP has incorporated Preclearance staffing  estimates into a cost model, which includes costs for salaries, benefits,  relocation, and office space. According to CBP budget officials, the total  cost incurred by CBP depends on the total number of officers stationed at  each location, which has not been finalized. Similarly, funding required for  IAP and JSP locations is also dependent on the number of staff at each  location. As a result, it is too early in CBP’s efforts to accurately estimate  the cost of expanding CBP’s predeparture programs, and to determine if  CBP’S current and planned actions will address funding needs.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Through its predeparture programs, CBP seeks to prevent high-risk  individuals from boarding U.S.-bound flights—a key aspect of the  agency’s mission to secure the U.S. border. In support of this mission,  CBP has implemented a layered security approach aimed at identifying  and preventing the travel to the United States of such individuals as early  in the travel process as possible. CBP’s approach uses information from  across the government and leverages CBP officer’s physical presence at  predeparture program locations around the world. As a result of CBP’s  efforts to vet, interview, and inspect travelers, CBP interdicts thousands of  high-risk travelers each year. Moreover, CBP’s predeparture programs  have provided additional benefits that improve global safety and security  and facilitate lawful travel. However, CBP has not evaluated the  effectiveness of its predeparture programs as a whole, including using a  system of performance measures and baselines by which to assess  whether the programs are achieving their stated goals. By developing and  implementing a system of performance measures and baselines to  evaluate the effectiveness of its predeparture programs, CBP will be  better positioned to measure predeparture program performance and to  determine what these data indicate about whether the programs are  achieving their stated goals.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better ensure the effectiveness of CBP’s predeparture programs, we  recommend that the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border  Protection develop and implement a system of performance measures  and baselines to evaluate the effectiveness of CBP’s predeparture  programs and assess whether the programs are achieving their stated  goals.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland  Security, State, and Transportation for their review and comment. The  Department of Transportation indicated that it did not have any comments  on the draft report via e-mail. The Department of State provided technical  comments via e-mail, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS  provided written comments, which are noted below and reproduced in full  in appendix I, and technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate.
DHS concurred with our recommendation and described the actions it  plans to take in response. Specifically, DHS stated that it plans to create  a working group to develop and implement a system of performance  measures and establish baselines to evaluate the effectiveness of CBP’s  predeparture programs and to assess whether the programs are  achieving their stated goals. If implemented effectively, these planned  actions should address the intent of our recommendation.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Key contributors to this  report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or GamblerR@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet (Assistant  Director), Chuck Bausell, Jose Cardenas, Eric Hauswirth, Paul Hobart,  Susan Hsu, Richard Hung, Benjamin Licht, Thomas Lombardi, Sara  Margraf, Michael Silver, and Martin Wilson made key contributions to this  report.