Defense Management: Actions Needed to Ensure National Guard and Reserve Headquarters Are Sized to be Efficient
Published: 2013-11-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD has sought to reduce costs by assessing headquarters and overhead functions. Both the Army and Air Force have two reserve components--a National Guard and Reserve--that have at least 75 headquarters located throughout the United States, its territories, and overseas that manage subordinate units or perform overhead functions. These headquarters have a mix of full-time and part-time personnel. GAO was asked to review issues related to reserve-component headquarters. This report (1) discusses trends in funded positions at reservecomponent headquarters and (2) evaluates the extent to which DOD has established and implemented processes to efficiently size its reservecomponent headquarters. To do so, GAO reviewed statutes and DOD guidance, analyzed personnel data and headquarters assessments, and interviewed DOD and state officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, the total number of funded positions--both full-time support and part-time--at the Department of Defense's (DOD) 75 Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve (Reserves) component headquarters grew from about 30,200 to 31,900 positions (about 6 percent overall). Some organizations grew more markedly, among them the National Guard Bureau (17 percent); Army National Guard Directorate (44 percent); Air National Guard Readiness Center (21 percent); and the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve (45 percent). DOD officials attribute growth to the conversion of contractor workload into civilian positions and increased missions assigned at certain headquarters. Over the same period, staff levels at the National Guard's 54 state Joint Force headquarters remained flat and the Air Force Reserve shrank by 4 percent.
DOD has processes in place that are intended to ensure that the number of funded positions at its reserve-component headquarters are set at the minimum level needed to accomplish their mission, but it has not consistently followed those processes at 68 of the 75 headquarters that GAO reviewed. As a result, DOD is unable to determine whether National Guard and Reserve headquarters are sized to be efficient. The National Guard has begun evaluating some personnel requirements, but its efforts do not fully address the management issues GAO identified:
The National Guard Bureau, which may continue to grow to accommodate its Chief's placement on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is determining its own requirements without external validation. This is inconsistent with Joint Staff, Army, and Air Force processes, which generally involve an external review. In addition, Congress's ability to oversee the bureau's size is limited because DOD's annual report on its Major DOD Headquarters Activities does not include data on the bureau and its more than 600 staff.
The National Guard has not fully assessed its 54 state headquarters--which contain nearly 21,900 funded positions--since the 1980s. GAO's prior work shows that agencies can reduce costs by consolidating and centralizing functions and eliminating unneeded duplication. The National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard Directorate, and Air National Guard Readiness Center each assess a portion of the state headquarters, but there is no process to assess the headquarters' personnel requirements in their entirety and ongoing efforts do not provide a holistic review.
The Army and Air Force have not fully reassessed 13 of the 20 reserve component headquarters for which they are responsible. The Army has a reassessment backlog, and the Air Force does not require periodic reassessments and reassesses its headquarters on an ad hoc basis. Some headquarters with significant growth are among those that have not been reassessed, including the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve and the Air National Guard Readiness Center. In contrast, 5 of the 7 reassessed organizations subsequently reduced their staff levels such as the Air Force Reserve's three numbered air forces, which have shrunk by more than a third since 2009. The Army and Air Force agree their headquarters should be reassessed, but they have not scheduled reassessments across their reserve components.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD externally validate the National Guard Bureaus personnel requirements and include the bureau in its annual report to Congress; reassess requirements for the 54 state Joint Force headquarters; and develop schedules for reassessing headquarters overseen by the Army and Air Force. DOD concurred with recommendations to report data to Congress and establish schedules for reassessing headquarters and partially concurred with recommendations to externally validate the bureaus personnel requirements and assess requirements for the state Joint Force headquarters. GAO continues to believe these recommendations are valid as discussed in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In anticipation of constrained resources, the Department of Defense  (DOD) has undertaken a series of efficiency initiatives since 2010 that are  intended, among other things, to reduce excess overhead costs, eliminate  unneeded headquarters, and reduce headquarters staff size. In early  2013, the Secretary of Defense announced the Strategic Choices and  Management Review, which builds on prior efforts and is intended to  assess the potential effect of further reductions, shape the budget, and  provide the foundation for the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. In July  2013, the Secretary of Defense announced plans to reduce the budgets  and personnel of some major headquarters by 20 percent over a 5-year  period. However, the DOD-led efforts to date have not focused on  reserve-component organizations. The Army and Air Force each have  two reserve components—a National Guard and Reserve—and each has  numerous headquarters organizations that manage and oversee  subordinate units, or perform administrative or overhead functions.
We have issued several reports recently on defense headquarters and on  the department’s ability to determine the right size and mix of personnel it  needs to perform various functions. For example, in May 2013 we found  that authorized military and civilian positions at the geographic combatant  commands—excluding U.S. Central Command—increased by about 50  percent from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2012. We also  determined that DOD’s process for sizing its geographic combatant  commands exhibits several weaknesses, including the absence of a  comprehensive, periodic review of the size and structure of these  commands and inconsistent use of personnel-management systems to  identify and track assigned personnel. DOD concurred with our  recommendation that it improve its visibility over its headquarters  personnel, but did not concur with our recommendation that it conduct  comprehensive and periodic reviews of the geographic combatant  commands’ size. In another May 2013 report, to improve DOD’s  understanding and management of its total workforce, we recommended  that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness to revise DOD’s policies and procedures for  determining the appropriate workforce mix and the identification of critical  functions. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation stating that it  justifies its workforce size on the basis of workload, rather than  competency or skill gaps. In 2012, we found that DOD’s reporting to  support congressional oversight of its Major DOD Headquarters Activities  did not include all major headquarters. In 2010 and 2011, we reported  that DOD had experienced challenges in determining the number of  funded positions for certain Army and Air Force headquarters due to flaws  with developing, maintaining, and implementing their manpower  processes. DOD generally concurred with the findings and  recommendations in these reports.
In response to your request, we examined whether opportunities exist to  improve the efficiency of DOD’s reserve-component headquarters while  meeting defense strategy needs. Specifically, this report (1) discusses  trends in funded positions at reserve-component headquarters and (2)  evaluates the extent to which DOD has established and implemented  processes to size its reserve-component headquarters and provide  information for congressional oversight. Also at your request, appendix II  provides information on DOD’s efforts to study the potential merger of  reserve-component headquarters.
To address our objectives, we reviewed data on funded positions for  military and civilian personnel at the Army’s and Air Force’s reserve- component headquarters for fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013.  We selected these years because Army officials stated that the Army  Reserve component headquarters structure has remained relatively  constant since 2009. We did not review contractor positions as part of this  review because officials from three of the four components told us that  they were unable to determine the number of contractor positions at the  reserve-component headquarters we identified. To identify component  headquarters, we reviewed DOD and military-service guidance;  organization charts; and interviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense,  National Guard, Army Reserve, and Air Force Reserve officials. We  focused our review on Army or Air Force reserve-component  headquarters that are (1) nondeployable and (2) perform many of the  management headquarters functions identified by DOD in its major  headquarters instruction. We then provided DOD, Joint Staff, National  Guard, and Reserve officials with an opportunity to comment on our final  list of 75 headquarters and these officials agreed the headquarters we  identified met these criteria, while noting that they were not all designated  as Major DOD Headquarters Activities. To identify trends in funded  positions for the Army, we analyzed funded positions as documented on  the Army’s personnel requirements documents referred to as tables of  distribution and allowance. For the Air Force, we analyzed funded  positions documented on its headquarters’ unit manpower documents. To  evaluate DOD’s processes for determining headquarters personnel  requirements and provide information to Congress, we reviewed DOD  and military-service guidance, DOD reports, and manpower assessments  for reserve-component headquarters between fiscal year 2009 and fiscal  year 2013. We also interviewed knowledgeable officials. For more  information on the scope and methodology for this review, see appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2012 to November 2013,  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The National Guard has two elements—the Army National Guard and the  Air National Guard—that mostly consist of part-time forces responsible for  both federal and state missions. The Army Reserve and Air Force  Reserve (Reserves) also largely consist of part-time forces and are  responsible for only federal missions. In addition to these part-time forces,  both the National Guard and the Reserves use full-time personnel for  duties that can include pay processing, personnel actions, preparing and  monitoring training schedules, and other tasks that cannot be effectively  executed through the use of part-time personnel. These full-time  positions—which DOD calls full-time support—in general are more  expensive than part-time personnel because they are paid as full-time  employees and receive greater compensation and benefits such as  retirement, health-care, and education.
As table 1 shows, the Army National Guard is authorized approximately  358,000 soldiers, and the Army Reserve approximately 205,000 soldiers,  which collectively constitute about 50 percent of the Army’s total  authorized end strength. Likewise, the Air National Guard has  approximately 105,000 military personnel, and the Air Force Reserve has  approximately 71,000 military personnel, which collectively are about 35  percent of the Air Force’s authorized end strength.
Each state’s National Guard forces have a dual role as both a state and  federal force, while the Reserves are strictly a federal force. Although the  National Guard has a dual role, the federal government provides funding  for National Guard personnel when they are conducting training and other  federal missions. In fiscal year 2013, federal funding for National Guard  personnel totaled about $11.1 billion. In addition, the federal government  provides about 90 percent of the funding for National Guard installation  base-operation and maintenance costs. The National Guard’s dual state  and federal role means that state Governors have command and control  over National Guard units when they are not performing federal missions  or other federal service.
subsections: section_title: National Guard Headquarters
paragraphs: The National Guard and Reserves maintain a number of nondeployable  headquarters that are responsible for managing and overseeing  subordinate units. Of the 75 headquarters we identified, 57 reside within  the National Guard. The National Guard’s headquarters include the  National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard Directorate, Air National  Guard Readiness Center, and the National Guard’s 54 Joint Force  headquarters—which DOD refers to as Joint Force Headquarters-State— located in each state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin  Islands, and Guam. In addition, appendixes III and IV provide detailed  information on the locations, missions and responsibilities of these  headquarters. Figure 1 shows the organizational structure of the National  Guard.
The National Guard Bureau is managed by the Chief of the National  Guard Bureau—a 4-star General who was placed on the Joint Chiefs of  Staff in 2011. Reporting to the Chief are two Lieutenant Generals who  manage the Army National Guard Directorate and the Air National Guard  Readiness Center, respectively. When not activated for federal missions,  each state’s National Guard’s forces are commanded by the Adjutants  General who also command the states’ Joint Force headquarters. The  state Joint Force headquarters each consist of a Joint staff element, Army  staff element, and Air staff element. Each of these elements is subject to  different processes for reassessing and validating personnel  requirements. These headquarters are responsible for coordinating the  planning, training, and execution of National Guard homeland defense,  civil support, and other domestic emergency missions within the United  States. They also manage the National Guard’s readiness and prepare  National Guard units for federal mobilization. The Army National Guard  provides a balance of maneuver (combat), maneuver support, and  maneuver sustainment capabilities. The Air National Guard provides a  broad range of ready combat and combat-support capabilities such as  tactical airlift and special operations.
section_title: Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve Headquarters
paragraphs: The Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve maintain 18 nondeployable  headquarters that manage or oversee subordinate units. The Army  Reserve provides maneuver support and maneuver sustainment  capabilities as well as individual soldiers through the Individual Ready  Reserve and Individual Mobilization Augmentation programs. We  identified 13 nondeployable Army Reserve headquarters that include the  Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve, U.S. Army Reserve Command, 4  regional support commands, and 7 functional commands. See  appendixes V through VII for detailed information on the locations,  missions, and responsibilities of these headquarters. The Office of the  Chief of the Army Reserve and the U.S. Army Reserve Command are  commanded by the same Lieutenant General who, by law, also sits on  the Army Staff. Reporting to the Chief are 11 General officers who  command support and functional commands, ensure the readiness of  personnel, and maintain reserve installations within the United States, as  shown in figure 2.
The Air Force Reserve provides a broad range of combat and combat- support capabilities. We identified five nondeployable headquarters that  include Headquarters, Air Force Reserve; Air Force Reserve Command;  and the 4th, 10th, and 22nd Air Forces. See appendixes VIII and IX for  detailed information on the locations, missions and responsibilities of  these headquarters. Headquarters, Air Force Reserve, and Air Force  Reserve Command are commanded by the same Lieutenant General  who, by law, also sits on the Air Staff. Reporting to the Chief are three  General officers who help to ensure the readiness of Air Force Reserve  forces, as shown in figure 3.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army, and the Air Force have processes to  size and structure headquarters organizations. In general, these  processes seek to provide the minimum number of personnel needed to  accomplish missions and performance objectives. Additionally, Congress  requires DOD to report personnel data for its Major DOD Headquarters  Activities to support congressional oversight of these headquarters.  These headquarters are listed in a DOD instruction. Prior to 2008,  Congress placed a cap on the number of personnel that could be  assigned to such headquarters; however, Congress removed this cap in  2008.
section_title: The Number of Military and Civilian Personnel Positions at Reserve-Component Headquarters Has Increased
paragraphs: Our analysis found that the overall number of funded military and civilian  positions at the Army’s and Air Force’s reserve-component headquarters  has steadily increased since fiscal year 2009, primarily due to DOD’s  reassignment of workload from contractors to full-time federal civilians  and increased mission requirements. These increases have come amid  broader DOD efforts since 2010 to constrain or reduce headquarters.
subsections: section_title: Funded Positions at Reserve-Component Headquarters Have Grown Overall since 2009
paragraphs: Between fiscal year 2009 and 2013, the total number of positions funded  for the 75 reserve-component headquarters we identified grew from about  30,200 to about 31,900—an increase of nearly 6 percent, as shown in  figure 4. Overall, the National Guard increased by about 1,350 funded  positions (5 percent) and the Reserves by about 330 funded positions (7  percent). The National Guard’s growth was driven by increases in the  Army National Guard Directorate, which grew by about 750 funded  positions over the period (about 44 percent). The National Guard Bureau,  Air National Guard Readiness Center, and 54 state Joint Force  headquarters increased about 17 percent, 21 percent, and 1 percent,  respectively. The number of funded positions also increased at the Army  Reserve’s headquarters, which grew by about 15 percent, but decreased  at the Air Force Reserve’s headquarters by about 4 percent over the  same period.
Of the nearly 1,700 positions DOD added to these headquarters,  approximately 37 percent (more than 620 positions) were for full-time  support positions. The percentage of funded positions that were allocated  for full-time personnel varied by headquarters. For example, nearly 100  percent of the positions funded for the National Guard Bureau, Air  National Guard Readiness Center, Army National Guard Directorate,  U.S. Army Reserve Command, and Headquarters, Air Force Reserve,  were for full-time support in fiscal year 2013. In contrast, approximately  45 percent of funded positions at the state Joint Force headquarters and  33 percent of funded positions at the Army Reserve’s functional  commands were for full-time positions in fiscal year 2013. Appendixes III  through IX provide more-detailed analysis of positions funded at the  headquarters we identified.
Our analysis shows that the National Guard has consistently allocated a  greater percentage of its funded military and civilian positions to its  headquarters than the other reserve components. Specifically, funded  positions at the Army National Guard headquarters we identified equaled  6 percent of its estimated military and civilian funded positions in fiscal  year 2013 (about 22,800 of its 389,350 estimated civilian and military  funded positions). This contrasts with the other reserve components we  examined, which have 2 to 3 percent of their military and civilian funded  positions in nondeployable headquarters. National Guard officials said  that the Army National Guard has allocated more funded positions to its  headquarters for several reasons, including the National Guard’s need to  prepare for and execute homeland defense and civil support missions,  recruit its own personnel, and maintain a U.S. Property and Fiscal office  in each state.
section_title: Reassignment of Contractor Workload to Civilian Positions and New Missions Have Driven Growth in Funded Positions
paragraphs: National Guard and Reserve officials told us that there are two main  drivers of growth since 2009 in funded positions at reserve-component  headquarters—DOD’s 2010 effort to reduce its reliance on contractors by  reassigning their workload to federal civilian positions, referred to as “in- sourcing,” and expanded mission requirements. In April 2009, the  Secretary of Defense announced his intention to reduce DOD’s reliance  on contractors and increase the number of civilian positions. Reserve  component officials said that DOD’s in-sourcing effort was a significant  driver of growth in civilian positions. For example, Army National Guard  officials said that DOD’s in-sourcing effort contributed to an increase in  over 700 civilian positions at the Army National Guard Directorate.  Likewise, Air National Guard officials said that DOD’s in-sourcing effort  caused the Air National Guard Readiness Center to add 180 funded  positions.
The other driver of growth in funded positions identified by reserve- component officials was expanded mission requirements. Army Reserve  officials noted that the 7th Civil Support Command’s increase of 71  funded positions from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2011 was the result  of the Army closing a second Army activity and adding missions at the  command. In a second instance, Army Reserve officials attributed growth  at the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve to the addition of new  functions such as the Employer Partnership Office. National Guard  officials attributed the increase of over 250 funded positions at the state  Joint Force headquarters to mission growth resulting from the  establishment of civil-support capabilities such as implementation of the  Homeland Response Forces beginning in fiscal year 2011. National  Guard officials also said that the National Guard Bureau may grow in the  future as a result of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau’s placement  on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2011.
section_title: Processes Intended to Efficiently Size and Oversee Reserve- Component Headquarters Have Not Been Consistently Applied
paragraphs: Although DOD has processes in place that generally seek to provide the  minimum number of personnel needed to accomplish missions and  performance objectives, these processes have not been consistently  applied at 68 of the 75 headquarters we identified. For instance, the  National Guard Bureau has been determining its own personnel  requirements with no external review and validation since 2010 and has  been growing steadily since 2009. In addition, DOD has not included data  on the National Guard Bureau in its required Defense Manpower  Requirements Report to Congress. In fiscal year 2013, the National  Guard had about 21,900 funded positions at its 54 state Joint Force  headquarters, but the processes for determining personnel requirements  for these headquarters are fragmented among the National Guard  Bureau’s Joint staff, the Army National Guard, and the Air National  Guard. Finally, the Army and Air Force have not determined personnel  requirements or fully reassessed within required time frames the  personnel requirements at 13 of the 20 headquarters. Consequently,  DOD lacks assurance that the Army’s and Air Force’s reserve-component  headquarters are being staffed with the minimum personnel needed to  perform their assigned missions.
subsections: section_title: DOD Processes for Overseeing Headquarters Emphasize Periodic External Review to Validate Personnel Requirements
paragraphs: Department of Defense Directive 1100.4, Guidance for Manpower Management (Feb.  12, 2005).
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 1001.01a (Oct. 1, 2010). Department of  the Army, Manpower Management, Regulation 570-4 (Feb. 8, 2006).
GAO, Human Capital: A Model of Strategic Human Capital, GAO-02-373SP  (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002). applicable to reserve-component headquarters organizations are  discussed in table 2.
Under an informal agreement with the Joint Staff, the National Guard  Bureau has been determining its own personnel requirements without  validation by a higher-level command or external organization. Since  2010, the number of funded positions at the bureau increased by 17  percent and could grow further, according to National Guard Bureau  officials. The DOD directive governing the National Guard Bureau  provides that the National Guard Bureau’s personnel requirements should  be managed in the same manner as other joint activities to the greatest  extent possible. Joint activities are generally subject to the Joint Staff’s  Joint Manpower and Personnel Program. According to officials, this  program includes review, approval, and documentation of a headquarters’  personnel requirements by an external organization.
According to Joint Staff and National Guard officials, in 2010, the Joint  Staff and the National Guard Bureau reached an informal agreement that  the bureau would maintain control for determining and validating its own  personnel requirements. However, this agreement is inconsistent with the  Joint Staff’s regular personnel requirements reassessment process and  differs from the military-service practices. National Guard Bureau and  Joint Staff officials gave three reasons for this agreement. First, Joint  Staff officials said that this agreement was reached because the bureau  wanted to maintain control over its personnel requirements. Second, the  National Guard Bureau is too dissimilar from other joint activities—such  as the combatant commands—for which the Joint Staff is responsible.  Third, the Joint Staff lacks the resources to assume responsibility for  validating the bureau’s personnel requirements.
Recognizing that recent developments warrant a re-evaluation of the  National Guard Bureau’s personnel requirements, the National Guard  Bureau started two efforts intended to enable it to define its personnel  requirements. The National Guard Bureau has started an initiative called  “Project Muster” to realign its headquarters processes to support the new  roles and responsibilities of the Chief and Vice Chief of the National  Guard Bureau and determine the personnel requirements needed to  execute these responsibilities following the Chief’s placement on the Joint  Chiefs of Staff. Officials responsible for the study said that it may show  that the bureau will need to grow beyond its current size. In part because  one of Project Muster’s baseline assumptions is that the bureau’s current  manpower will be retained to meet preexisting requirements.
In July 2013, while our review was underway, the Vice Chief for the  National Guard Bureau asked that the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis  Agency—with assistance from the Air Force Personnel Center—conduct  an advisory analysis of positions at the National Guard Bureau to include  its joint staff and the Office of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.  According to the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency official  responsible for the analysis, an advisory analysis entails a strategic look  at a headquarters’ organizational structure. It is different from a personnel  requirements study, which would assess individual workload, validate  missions, and map processes. The Vice Chief’s request for an analysis  was accepted by the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency in August  2013 and is currently scheduled for calendar year 2014.
section_title: DOD Does Not List the National Guard Bureau as a Major DOD Headquarters Activity, and Its Personnel Data Have Not Been Reported to Support Congressional Oversight
paragraphs: Although both of these efforts are significant attempts to determine the  bureau’s personnel requirements, neither of them will establish a process  to periodically validate and reassess those requirements. Additionally,  National Guard Bureau officials said that the Chief of the National Guard  Bureau will continue to be the final authority on what requirements are  approved for the bureau. By creating a system whereby an external  organization is not independently assessing the National Guard Bureau’s  personnel requirements the bureau has removed an independent check  that could help ensure that the bureau is staffed with the appropriate  number of personnel needed to execute its assigned missions and  workload.  .  Our analysis of DOD’s reserve-component headquarters found that  DOD’s list of its Major DOD Headquarters Activities did not include the  National Guard Bureau, even though the bureau meets the headquarters  criteria specified in DOD’s instruction and is now commanded by a 4-star  General who sits on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. DOD uses an instruction  issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Director for  Administration and Management that establishes the definitions and  criteria that should be used to identify DOD’s Major DOD Headquarters  Activities. This instruction also contains an enclosure that lists DOD’s  Major DOD Headquarters Activities and this list is the basis for reporting  required personnel data to Congress. In this instruction, DOD defines  major DOD headquarters activities as those headquarters (and the direct  support integral to their operation) whose primary mission is to manage or  command the programs and operations of DOD, the DOD components,  and their major military units, organizations, or agencies. In practice, DOD  includes those headquarters that are commanded by a General or  Admiral, or Lieutenant General or Vice Admiral or their equivalents. The  National Guard Bureau meets both these criteria. In 2012, we reported  that some other organizations that fit the definition of Major DOD  Headquarters Activities were not included in DOD’s instruction. We  recommended at that time that DOD revise its instruction to include all of  its Major DOD Headquarters Activities. Our review found that DOD has  not updated its list to include the National Guard Bureau or the  headquarters we identified in our 2012 report.
DOD officials said that the National Guard Bureau was not included in its  list of major DOD headquarters activities in the past because the National  Guard Bureau had previously been a subactivity of the Army and Air  Force; the National Guard Bureau has a National Guard mission that  relates to the states, which is unusual for DOD’s headquarters; and  officials did not focus on the National Guard Bureau being a headquarters  that drives the department’s active-duty or Reserve missions. Officials  from the Office of the Director of Administration and Management and the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs agreed that the  National Guard Bureau (including both the Office of the Chief and the  Joint staff element) should be considered a major DOD headquarters  activity and listed in DOD’s instruction; however, at the time of our review  these officials did not have a schedule for further updating the instruction  or the list of major DOD headquarters activities.
Having complete information about such headquarters activities is  important for oversight because Congress has established reporting  requirements that it can use to oversee the size of specific kinds of DOD’s  headquarters, such as the National Guard Bureau. DOD is required to  provide Congress with an annual Defense Manpower Requirements  Report on a variety of personnel issues, including the number of military  and civilian personnel assigned to major DOD headquarters activities in  the previous year, and estimates of such numbers for the current and  subsequent year. Prior to 2008, DOD was subject to a statutory cap on  the total number of personnel that could be assigned to Major DOD  Headquarters Activities. The National Defense Authorization Act for  Fiscal Year 2008 repealed this cap, but required DOD to continue to  report certain information about the size and composition of the staff  assigned to Major DOD Headquarters Activities. When fulfilling its  reporting requirement, DOD uses the definitions and criteria in its  instruction to identify DOD’s Major DOD Headquarters Activities and lists  these headquarters in an enclosure. This list is the basis for reporting  required personnel data to Congress, and because the bureau was not  included in DOD’s list, its personnel data were not reported to Congress.  Unless DOD revises its instruction to include the National Guard Bureau  in its list of major DOD headquarters activities and reports the bureau’s  personnel requirements data, Congress will continue to have limited  information available to support oversight of this expanding headquarters  activity.
section_title: DOD Lacks Assurance That the National Guard’s State Joint Force Headquarters Are Sized to Be Efficient
paragraphs: The National Guard has not fully reassessed the personnel requirements  of the 54 state Joint Force headquarters or their predecessor  organizations—which collectively contain nearly 21,900 funded  positions—since the 1980s despite changes in their organization and  assigned missions. Our prior work has shown that cost savings may be  achieved by consolidating and centralizing overlapping functions and  eliminating unnecessary overlap and duplication. The state Joint Force  headquarters consist of a Joint staff element, Army staff element, and Air  staff element each of which is subject to different processes for  reassessing and validating personnel requirements. Additionally, these  headquarters have personnel that are assigned as the personal staff and  special staff of the Adjutant General. The National Guard Bureau, Army  National Guard Directorate, and Air National Guard Readiness Center  share responsibility for overseeing personnel requirements at the state  Joint Force headquarters and there is not a process in place that enables  the holistic assessment of personnel requirements at these headquarters.  In the absence of a process that provides a holistic assessment of the  state Joint Force Headquarters, National Guard officials noted that they  have begun two efforts that are intended to assess personnel  requirements at the state Joint Force headquarters: (1) a National Guard  Bureau study evaluating personnel requirements for the Joint staff  element at these headquarters and (2) an Army National Guard  Directorate evaluation of functions—some of which include both Army  National Guard and Air National Guard personnel—within these  headquarters. We found that these efforts are limited and do not  constitute a process that holistically assesses these headquarters’  personnel requirements. Without implementing a process to holistically  assess personnel requirements for all three staff elements at these  headquarters’, DOD lacks assurance that they are sized and structured to  be efficient.
National Guard officials said that they have not reassessed the personnel  requirements for the National Guard’s 54 state Joint Force headquarters  since the 1980s, even though there have been changes in the  organization of these headquarters, including the missions assigned to  them. The Army and the Air Force determined the personnel  requirements for the Army and Air staff elements at the state Joint Force  headquarters’ predecessor headquarters in 1982 on the basis of the  number of personnel authorized for the state or territory as well as its  population.
The Army staff and Air staff elements are filled with Army National Guard  and Air National Guard personnel respectively. The Joint staff element  and the Adjutant General’s staff can be comprised of personnel from the  Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, or both. Responsibility for  overseeing personnel requirements of these staff elements is shared by  the National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard Directorate, and Air  National Guard Readiness Center, which have separate processes for  determining, validating, and reassessing requirements for their respective  staff elements, as shown in table 3.
We have previously found that government can reduce costs and improve  operations through the elimination of unnecessary fragmentation, overlap,  and duplication. Additionally, our 2012 report examining DOD’s  headquarters and support organizations found that there may be  additional opportunities for DOD to achieve cost savings by consolidating  and centralizing overlapping functions and services. In our 2012 report,  we recommended that DOD continue to examine opportunities to  centralize administrative and command support services, functions, or  programs.
National Guard officials noted that they have two ongoing efforts that are  intended to assess personnel requirements at the state Joint Force  headquarters; however, we found that these efforts were limited and were  not based on a process that holistically assessed personnel requirements  for all three staff elements at these headquarters.
First, as previously discussed, the National Guard Bureau has begun a  two-phased study reassessing the personnel requirements for these  headquarters’ Joint staff element; however, National Guard Bureau  officials stated that the study would not examine the Army staff element or  Air staff element portion of the state Joint Force headquarters. National  Guard Bureau officials determined that on average each Joint staff  element would need 30 personnel to perform core functions during the  first phase of the study, which was completed January 2012. However,  National Guard officials noted that the ultimate size and structure of the  joint staff element will vary by state and should correlate with the state’s  assigned missions and personnel. The second phase of the study is  intended to develop a joint manpower document that would document the  state headquarters’ ultimate size and structure. National Guard Bureau  officials expect to complete this phase by fiscal year 2015.
Second, in addition to the National Guard Bureau’s study, Army National  Guard Directorate officials said that the absence of a holistic assessment  of the state Joint Force headquarters contributed to their completing  assessments of 17 functions, some of which are performed at these  headquarters and are staffed with both Army National Guard and Air  National Guard personnel. Army National Guard officials identified five  offices within the Adjutant General’s personal staff that typically have both  Army National Guard and Air National Guard personnel: the Chaplain’s  Office, the Human Resources Office, the Office of the Judge Advocate  General, the Public Affairs Office, and the Office of the Inspector General.  Army National Guard officials said they are not required to collaborate  with the Air National Guard when determining personnel requirements for  these functions—although individual analysts may choose to do so at  their discretion—and assessments only examine Army personnel  requirements. Army National Guard officials also said that a recently  completed study of the Chaplain’s office and an ongoing study of the  Human Resources office had minimal collaboration with the Air National  Guard. Further, Army National Guard officials noted that even if the Air  National Guard were to be more heavily involved in the Army National  Guard’s studies, there is not a process in place to estimate the workload  for functions that have both Air National Guard and Army National Guard  personnel.
Three different organizations are responsible for assessing personnel  requirements at the state Joint Force headquarters, and there is no  process in place that provides a holistic assessment. As a result, the state  Joint Force headquarters may be missing opportunities to consolidate or  centralize overlapping functions and services and may be allowing  personnel gaps or overlaps to develop or persist. For example, our review  of the personnel requirements documents for the 54 state Joint Force  headquarters shows that a number of similar positions are approved for  both the Army staff element and the Air staff element within the same  state. In one state’s Joint Force headquarters, the Army staff element  allocated positions for five Judge Advocate Generals, two Public Affairs  officials, and one Chaplain, while the Air Staff element allocated positions  for two Judge Advocate Generals, one Public Affairs official, and two  Chaplains. In a second state Joint Force headquarters, we found that the  Army staff element allocated positions for three Judge Advocate  Generals, three Public Affairs officials, and two Chaplains, while the Air  staff element allocated positions for one Judge Advocate General, two  Public Affairs officials, and one Chaplain. However, it is not clear whether  these positions are all justified because the National Guard Bureau has  not completed a holistic assessment of all the staff elements at these  headquarters.
While the National Guard Bureau’s and the Army National Guard’s efforts  are important steps in determining personnel requirements at the state  Joint Force headquarters, they are limited because the National Guard  has not established a process for holistically assessing all three elements  at these headquarters. Further, the Army National Guard and Air National  Guard are not required to collaborate when determining personnel  requirements, do not use a formal process to estimate workload for joint  functions in their entirety, and do not have a means for ensuring these  functions are staffed to be efficient. As a result, these studies are unlikely  to ensure that the state Joint Force headquarters avoid gaps or overlaps  in positions and have the minimum personnel required to perform their  assigned missions.
section_title: The Army and Air Force Have Not Consistently Implemented Processes for Reassessing Personnel Requirements of Reserve- Component Headquarters
paragraphs: The Army and Air Force have not consistently implemented processes for  ensuring their reserve-component headquarters have the minimum  number of personnel, thereby hindering their ability to determine whether  these headquarters have been sized to be efficient. Our analysis shows  that 13 of the 20 Army and Air Force reserve-component headquarters  have not been fully reassessed. Our analysis shows that 5 of the 7  organizations that have been reassessed shrank from fiscal year 2009  through fiscal year 2013. In contrast, several of the headquarters that  showed significant growth were among those that have not been  reassessed including the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve and Air  National Guard Readiness Center. As we previously noted, our work in  the area of strategic human-capital management has shown that  reassessing resource requirements—including personnel—enables  organizations to achieve their missions and match resources to their  needs. Table 4 shows the status of personnel requirement assessments  at the Army and Air Force reserve-component headquarters we identified.
According to Army Manpower Analysis Agency officials, most Army  reserve-component headquarters have not had their personnel  requirements fully reassessed because the U.S. Army Manpower  Analysis Agency has a backlog of reassessments needing review and  approval. The U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency validates the  headquarters’ reassessment of their requirements. The Army’s  manpower-management regulation requires that Army headquarters be  reassessed not less than every 5 years and optimally every 3 years.  Army officials said that a reassessment should generally include a review  of the entire headquarters; however, there are some instances where  commanders conduct a partial assessment—for example of a single  function or type of position. Army officials said that the manpower  analysis agency has prioritized its review and approval of personnel  requirements reassessments and worked with the Army Reserve to  establish a schedule through fiscal year 2016 for reassessing some  headquarters; however, we found that several of the headquarters  included in our review that had not recently been reassessed were not  included in this schedule. Once the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis  Agency validates an assessment, it is submitted to the Office of the Army  Operations and Plans for approval. If an Army headquarters does not  have a validated personnel requirements document, its personnel  requirements could be removed from its personnel requirements  document during periodic force-structure reviews and excluded from the  Army’s annual budget request.
Air Force officials told us that one Air Force reserve-component  headquarters we identified did not have its personnel-requirements  assessed because such a periodic reassessment is not currently required  in the Air Force’s guidance. Specifically, the guidance only requires  headquarters embedded in its operational wings be reassessed at least  every 2 years. In contrast, reassessments for the Air Force’s reserve- component headquarters are done on an ad hoc basis. In 2011 and 2012,  the Air Force Reserve reassessed five of its headquarters as part of its  efforts to streamline its operations, not due to any requirement in  guidance. Following this reassessment, the Air Force Reserve shrank  the three numbered Air Force headquarters by more than one-third, and  Headquarters, Air Force Reserve, by more than 10 percent. Another  headquarters that was reassessed, the Air Force Reserve Command,  grew in size by about 7 percent. According to Air Force officials, changes  in headquarters personnel requirements are typically driven by changes  in force structure, made in response to efficiency initiatives, or initiated by  the headquarters’ commanding officer. Air Force officials said that it  would be beneficial to apply a reassessment standard to all of the Air  Force’s reserve-component headquarters, but the Air Force has not taken  steps to initiate such reviews or revise the guidance to require them in the  future. Unless the Army and Air Force periodically reassess their reserve- component headquarters, they will lack assurance that these  headquarters are sized with the minimal staff required and structured  appropriately.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Amid DOD’s recent efforts to trim budgets by finding efficiencies and  reducing overhead, some reserve-component headquarters have grown.  While some of this growth is due to reducing reliance on contractors and  expanding missions, DOD does not know whether its reserve-component  headquarters are sized with the appropriate personnel needed to  accomplish their missions today and in the future. Human-capital  practices suggest that the size and structure of organizations need to be  reassessed periodically. In total, 68 of 75 the reserve-component  headquarters we reviewed have not been recently reassessed. Until  these organizations are assessed, the Army and Air Force will lack  assurance that they are sized and structured appropriately. Additionally,  until DOD externally validates the National Guard Bureau’s personnel  requirements, holistically assesses personnel requirements for its 54  state Joint Force headquarters, and schedules reassessments for reserve  component headquarters it will lack assurance that these headquarters  are appropriately sized to accomplish their assigned mission.
The National Guard Bureau—whose Chief was recently placed on the  Joint Chiefs of Staff—has grown about 17 percent since 2010 and is  anticipating further growth related to its elevated role. However, the  oversight process currently in place allows the National Guard Bureau to  determine its personnel requirements without validation by a higher-level  command or external organization. Furthermore, reports used to support  congressional oversight have not included information on the bureau.  Unless the bureau’s personnel requirements are validated by an external  organization and related information is included in DOD’s report to  Congress, both DOD and Congress will lack assurance that the bureau’s  size and structure is appropriate for its mission.
For the 54 state Joint Force headquarters, fragmented review processes  across the National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard, and Air National  Guard have created an environment where similar and possibly  overlapping positions have been approved for the three interconnected  staff elements in each state. Their requirements have not been  reassessed since the 1980s, and ongoing studies by the National Guard  are too limited in scope to provide a comprehensive reassessment. As a  result, no organization has examined the multiple staff elements at these  headquarters for potential personnel gaps or overlaps that could hinder  their ability to perform their missions or could waste resources.
Finally, for those headquarters overseen by the Army and Air Force— specifically 13 Army Reserve headquarters, 5 Air Force Reserve  headquarters, the Army National Guard Directorate, and the Air National  Guard Readiness Center—DOD has processes in place that if  consistently implemented could help ensure that these headquarters are  sized and structured appropriately. The Army and Air Force have not  reassessed 13 of these 20 headquarters, and of the seven headquarters  that were recently reassessed five shrank, some markedly. Until the Army  and the Air Force reassess the remaining headquarters that they oversee  DOD will lack assurance that these headquarters are sized and structured  appropriately.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To facilitate oversight of the size of DOD’s reserve-component  headquarters and ensure that they have the minimum personnel needed  to complete their assigned missions, we are making the following six  recommendations.
To independently validate the personnel requirements for the National  Guard Bureau, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Chief of the National Guard Bureau to implement the Joint Chief of Staff’s  Joint Manpower and Personnel Process and have its personnel  requirements periodically validated by a DOD organization external to the  National Guard Bureau.
To provide Congress the data it requires to oversee DOD’s Major DOD  Headquarters Activities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  include the National Guard Bureau among its list of Major DOD  Headquarters Activities and report personnel associated with the National  Guard Bureau in the Defense Manpower Requirements Report.
To minimize the potential for gaps or overlaps at the National Guard’s  state Joint Force headquarters, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to: develop a process for the Army National Guard and Air National  Guard to collaborate when determining personnel requirements for  joint functions at these headquarters and assess and validate all personnel requirements at the state Joint  Force headquarters to include the Army staff element and Air staff  element.
To ensure that Army Reserve headquarters and the Army National Guard  Directorate are properly sized to meet their assigned missions, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Army to ensure that these headquarters are reassessed and have their  personnel requirements validated within required time frames by including  them in the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency’s schedule for  reassessment and validation.
To ensure that Air Force Reserve headquarters and the Air National  Guard Readiness Center are properly sized to meet their assigned  missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Secretary of the Air Force to modify the Air Force’s guidance to require  that these headquarters have their personnel requirements reassessed  on a recurring basis, and establish and implement a schedule for  reassessing personnel requirements for its reserve-component  headquarters.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense for review  and comment. In response, we received written comments which are  reprinted in appendix XI. DOD concurred with three of our  recommendations and partially concurred with the remaining three  recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments which we  incorporated into the report as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation that the Secretary  of Defense require the Chief of the National Guard Bureau have its  personnel requirements periodically validated by a DOD organization  external to the National Guard Bureau. DOD stated that while the  department agrees that external validation is appropriate, it is DOD’s view  that the appropriate means for obtaining this external validation is by  establishing a vetting process that includes representatives from the  Army, Air Force, and the National Guard Bureau. DOD therefore  suggested that we modify our recommendation to reflect this. We believe  DOD retains the flexibility to develop a vetting process that includes  representatives from the organizations identified above so long as this  process follows the guidelines described in DOD guidance and  requirements are periodically validated by an organization external to the  bureau. As a result we did not modify our recommendation as DOD  suggested.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  include the National Guard Bureau among its list of Major DOD  Headquarters Activities and report personnel associated with the National  Guard Bureau in its Defense Manpower Requirements Report. In its  response to our recommendations DOD provided several technical  comments that we addressed in the body of our report.
The department also partially concurred with our recommendations that  the Chief, National Guard Bureau modify the scope of its ongoing  manpower study to reassess personnel requirements at the state Joint  Force headquarters and validate these requirements including those for  the Army and Air staff elements. In DOD’s response, the department  detailed ongoing efforts to validate personnel requirements and stated  that revising the scope of the National Guard Bureau’s study would  eliminate the ability of the Army National Guard and Air National Guard to  identify their own personnel requirements. The department further stated  that when shared functions are being studied, coordination should be  increased between the staff elements to ensure that the correct workload  is captured, requirements are not duplicated, and process efficiencies are  maximized. However, we found minimal coordination on studies  examining the five functions that the National Guard identified as being  staffed with both Army National Guard and Air National Guard personnel.  For example, Army National Guard officials told us that a study of the  Chaplain’s office was completed with minimal Air National Guard  participation and only captures the Army National Guard’s personnel  requirements. Similarly, Army National Guard officials said that the Air  National Guard has been minimally involved in an ongoing evaluation of  the Human Resources Office.  We agree that closer coordination is  warranted and have revised our recommendation to emphasize this while  retaining the recommendation that the National Guard Bureau review and  validate all personnel requirements at the state Joint Force headquarters  including the Army staff element and Air staff element.
DOD also concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to ensure that Army Reserve’s  headquarters and the Army National Guard Directorate have their  personnel requirements validated within required time frames by including  them in the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency’s schedule for  reassessment and validation. In its response to our recommendations,  DOD noted it has several ongoing efforts that are intended to assess  Army Reserve full-time support requirements, and institutional and  operational headquarters.  DOD also noted that the draft report was not  specific as to whether this recommendation is intended to be applicable to  the Army National Guard. We clarified our recommendation in response  to DOD’s comments to specify that the Army Reserve’s headquarters and  Army National Guard Directorate be included in the U.S. Army Manpower  Analysis Agency’s schedule for reassessment and validation.
DOD agreed with our last recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Secretary of the Air Force to modify the Air Force’s guidance to  require that these headquarters have their personnel requirements  reassessed on a recurring basis, and establish and implement a schedule  for reassessing personnel requirements for its reserve-component  headquarters. In its response to our recommendations, DOD noted that  the Air Force agreed to modify its guidance to require that reserve  component headquarters have their personnel requirements reassessed  on a recurring basis. Additionally, the Air Force intends to establish and  implement a schedule for reassessing personnel requirements at these  headquarters. If implemented, these steps would satisfy the intent of our  recommendation.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate  congressional committees and the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of  the Army; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the  Chief, National Guard Bureau; the Chief, Army Reserve; and the Chief,  Air Force Reserve. This report is also available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please  contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made  contributions to this report are listed in appendix XII.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To conduct this work and address our objectives, we reviewed data on  funded positions at the Army’s and Air Force’s reserve-component  headquarters from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013. We selected  these years because senior officials stated that the current reserve- component headquarters structure has remained relatively constant over  this period of time. We did not review contractor positions as part of this  review because officials told us that they were unable to determine the  number of contractor positions at the reserve-component headquarters  we identified. On the basis of a review of Department of Defense (DOD)  and service guidance, organization charts, and discussions with officials,  we focused our review on 75 headquarters within the Army National  Guard, Air National Guard, Army Reserve, and Air Force Reserve. We  limited our review to nondeployable headquarters that perform many of  the functions DOD identified as being characteristics of management  headquarters. For the Army, these headquarters had their personnel  requirements documented on tables of distribution and allowance, and we  collaborated with Army National Guard and Army Reserve officials when  developing our list. For the Air Force, we interviewed Air National Guard  and Air Force Reserve officials to identify headquarters units that met our  criteria. We then provided DOD, Joint Staff, National Guard, and Reserve  officials with an opportunity to comment on our final list of 75  headquarters and these officials agreed the headquarters we identified  met these criteria, but noted that they were not all Major DOD  Headquarters Activities.
For all of the headquarters we identified, we limited our assessment of  personnel requirements to positions that: were assigned to the  headquarters, included military personnel or civilians, were funded by the  federal government, and did not complete work in support of more than  one component (for example, recruiting positions were excluded because  the Army Reserve and the active-duty Army share recruiting resources).  To ensure the reliability of the personnel data, we interviewed  knowledgeable officials about the data and internal controls on the  systems that contain them. We also analyzed the data in order to identify  outliers or invalid data and removed these data from our dataset where  appropriate. Finally, we shared our analysis with knowledgeable agency  officials and asked them to verify its accuracy. On the basis of these  steps we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this audit.
To evaluate the extent to which DOD established and implemented  processes to efficiently size its reserve-component headquarters and  provide information for congressional oversight we took the following  steps:  1.  We evaluated the Joint Staff’s implementation of its process for  assessing personnel requirements at the National Guard Bureau by  reviewing relevant guidance and documentation and interviewing  officials from the Joint Staff and the National Guard Bureau. Where  available, we analyzed manpower assessments and manpower  documents for the National Guard Bureau from fiscal year 2009  through fiscal year 2013 and evaluated whether they met standards.  We also compared the steps taken to assess the National Guard  Bureau’s personnel requirements with Army and Air Force guidance  and practices.  2.  We assessed DOD’s efforts to identify Army and Air Force reserve  component major DOD headquarters activities and report personnel  data for these headquarters by reviewing DOD guidance on major  DOD headquarters activities; reviewing documentation and  interviewing officials to identify reserve-component headquarters with  those characteristics; and comparing identified headquarters’  functions to characteristics of Major DOD Headquarters Activities  identified in DOD’s guidance. We assessed section 194 of Title 10 of  the United States Code to determine whether the statutory cap  identified in that section applies to the headquarters we identified. We  also reviewed the Defense Manpower Requirements Report for fiscal  year 2012 and fiscal year 2013 to determine which headquarters  were included in reports to Congress. Where we identified  discrepancies, we spoke with DOD and service officials to identify the  cause of these discrepancies. Finally, we assessed the National  Guard Bureau’s ongoing study (Project Muster) seeking to establish  baseline requirements for the National Guard Bureau by collecting  relevant documentation and interviewing knowledgeable staff from the  National Guard Bureau.  3.  We evaluated the National Guard Bureau’s implementation of its  process for assessing personnel requirements at the 54 state Joint  Force headquarters by reviewing relevant guidance and  documentation and interviewing officials from the Joint Staff and the  National Guard Bureau. We analyzed manpower assessments and  manpower documents from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013  for the state Joint Force headquarters and evaluated whether they  met standards established in guidance. We also conducted site visits  to the state Joint Force headquarters for Delaware, Georgia, New  Jersey, and Texas to determine whether manpower documents and  assessments accurately documented these headquarters’  requirements given assigned personnel, missions, and workload. We  selected these headquarters to obtain perspectives from state officials  from states of varying size and with different numbers of National  Guard, Army Reserve, and Air Force Reserve personnel. Finally, we  assessed the National Guard Bureau’s ongoing state Joint Force  headquarters requirements study seeking to establish baseline  personnel requirements for these headquarters’ Joint staff element by  collecting relevant documentation and interviewing knowledgeable  staff from the National Guard Bureau.
We evaluated the Army’s and Air Force’s implementation of their  processes for assessing personnel requirements at service-specific  headquarters by reviewing relevant guidance and documentation and  interviewing officials from numerous Army and Air Force offices including  the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency, the Air Force Personnel  Center, and Air Force Reserve Command. We then analyzed manpower  assessments for each of the 20 service-specific headquarters we  identified for fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013 to determine (1)  when the headquarters was most recently reassessed, (2) the scope of  the assessment, and (3) whether they met requirements established in  guidance for recurring reassessment and validation of headquarters’  personnel requirements. One analyst analyzed the assessments and a  second analyst reviewed the analyst’s work. Any disagreements in the  determination were resolved through discussion. We also visited the  headquarters listed in table 5 to determine whether manpower documents  and assessments accurately documented these headquarters’ personnel  requirements given assigned personnel, missions, and workload.
To discuss whether DOD has studied merging the Army’s and Air Force’s  reserve components to improve efficiency, we conducted a literature  search, analyzed past studies, reviewed our prior work, and reviewed  white papers by DOD and subject-matter experts examining mergers and  the factors organizations use when evaluating the merits of a merger. We  reviewed statutes as well as DOD and military-service guidance  describing the organization and function of the Army's and Air Force’s  reserve-component headquarters to understand their missions and how  they are organized. To obtain perspectives on the implications of a  merger, we interviewed officials from numerous offices including the  Office of the Secretary of Defense; the National Guard Bureau; the  Department of the Army; the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve; the  Department of the Air Force; and the Office of the Chief, Air Force  Reserve. We also reviewed documentation and met with officials from  four state Joint Force headquarters and select headquarters in the Army  Reserve and Air Force Reserve. We interviewed officials and, where  appropriate, obtained documentation at the organizations listed in table 6.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2012 to November 2013,  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Summary of Efforts to Study Merger of the Army’s and Air Force’s Reserve Components
paragraphs: Department of Defense (DOD), special commissions, and some  nondefense organizations have studied the concept of merging the Air  Force’s and the Army’s reserve components. DOD considered merging  some reserve components after World War II, during the Vietnam era,  and during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, the  Congressional Budget Office examined the costs and benefits of merging  multiple components. Additionally, the 2005 Base Closure and  Realignment Commission recommended that National Guard and  Reserve units share facilities. Finally, DOD has taken steps, short of  merging its reserve components, to address concerns about access to  the federal reserves to assist the National Guard in domestic duties such  as responding to floods or hurricanes.
subsections: section_title: Department of Defense Studies
paragraphs: Department of Defense, Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National  Security (June 1948). its report, which criticized the Secretary’s plan for its negative effect  on morale, and because it did not address issues related to reserve- component recruiting, retention, and equipment. The report also noted  opposition from Army and reserve-component advisory boards. The  Secretary of Defense did not implement the proposed approach. The  Secretary’s second plan proposed merging all of the Army’s Guard  and Reserve units under the management of the National Guard at  the federal level. Under this plan, the Army Reserve’s units would  have been eliminated and Army Reservists would be organized,  trained, and equipped as individuals and not as units. Like the  Secretary’s first plan, this proposal was not implemented due to  congressional opposition.
Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. While large  numbers of reservists were being deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq, and  elsewhere, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 2005 created a 13-member, independent Commission  on the National Guard and Reserves. Congress chartered the  commission to assess a variety of issues related to the reserve  components of the U.S. military and to make recommendations on  those issues. The commission’s stated mission was to ensure that the  National Guard and reserves are organized, trained, equipped,  compensated, and supported to best meet the needs of U.S. national  security. The commission issued three reports between 2006 and  2008 studying, among other things, the roles and missions of the  National Guard and other reserve components. The commission’s  third report focused on the organizational and structural changes  required to support an operational reserve force. A former staff  member for the commission stated that the commission studied the  feasibility and advisability of merging the National Guard with the  Army Reserve and the Air Force Reserve, but it ultimately concluded  that doing so would not better enable the reserve component to  execute its missions, and the process would be extremely difficult— both politically and logistically—as well as costly to implement. The  commission ultimately focused its report on (1) changes that could be  made to remove cultural barriers that hamper the effective use of the  reserve components, (2) changes to the categories used to manage  the reserve components, (3) changes to the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, and (4) changes within the reserve components and their  headquarters. The commission made several recommendations  across these areas; however, it did not recommend significant  changes to the structure.
section_title: Studies by Nondefense Organizations
paragraphs: GAO, Federal Land Management: Observations on a Possible Move of the Forest  Service into the Department of the Interior, GAO-09-223 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11,  2009). dual state and federal status of the current Army National Guard. In  its report, the Congressional Budget Office noted that laws and court  rulings had removed many impediments to the President’s power to  call up National Guard units, potentially making the federal reserves  redundant. In addition, according to the Congressional Budget Office,  many capabilities currently in the Army Reserve—such as helicopter  transport units and medical units—might be useful to Governors  during domestic crises. At the time, the Congressional Budget Office  estimated that by eliminating duplicative administrative organizations  and eliminating approximately 43,000 personnel from the Reserve,  the Army could save over $500 million annually. It is unclear,  however, whether similar cost savings could still be realized.
2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission. For the 2005 Base  Realignment and Closure round, the Base Closure and Realignment  Commission approved 44 recommendations that pertain to the  reserve components which primarily directed the Army National Guard  and the Army Reserve to create 125 Armed Forces Reserve Centers  capable of accommodating both National Guard and Reserve units.  According to DOD, these Armed Forces Reserve Centers should  significantly reduce operating costs; however, we reported in 2013  that DOD officials estimated the total cost to implement the 44  recommendations was about $3 billion, and it is unclear whether the  consolidations will result in cost savings over the long term.
section_title: Efforts to Improve Access to Federal Reserves and Federal Response to Domestic Incidents
paragraphs: In June 1993, following Hurricane Andrew, we noted that a large  percentage of the type of DOD capabilities that are needed in disasters— such as engineers, military police, supply and transportation personnel,  and chaplains—reside in DOD’s reserve components, particularly in the  Army Reserve. At that time, and again in May 2006, in our report on the  military’s response to Hurricane Katrina, we reported that the Reservists  who responded to the disaster—all of whom were volunteers—constituted  a relatively small portion of the response when compared to National  Guard and active component forces because, while states were able to  mobilize National Guard forces, no similar provisions existed to  specifically mobilize Reserve forces for disaster response.
Since Hurricane Katrina, two key steps have been taken to address  DOD’s response to domestic incidents: (1) implementation of a command  construct whereby a single military officer exercises authority over both  federal military forces and state National Guard forces; and (2)  implementation of new mobilization authorities.
Dual-Status Commanders. The National Defense Authorization Act for  Fiscal Year 2012 provided that a dual-status commander—military  officers with authority over both federal military forces and state  National Guard forces—should be the usual and customary command  and control arrangement in situations when the armed forces and  National Guard are employed simultaneously in support of civil  authorities, including missions involving major disasters and  emergencies. When an officer is appointed as a dual-status  commander, he or she serves on federal active duty, sometimes  referred to as Title 10 status, as well as on duty in or with the National  Guard of a state, sometimes referred to as Title 32 status. Dual- status commanders exercise command on behalf of both the federal  and the state chains of command and serve as the link between these  two chains of command. According to DOD officials, dual-status  commanders are intended to provide unity of effort, ensuring  coordination of National Guard and federal military resources in  response to domestic emergencies, natural disasters, or designated  planned events. According to DOD officials, dual-status commanders  have been used for select planned events since 2004 and helped  coordinate response to Hurricane Sandy in 2012, wildfires in  Colorado, and the bombing at the Boston Marathon in 2013.
Mobilization Authorities. DOD officials said that following Hurricane  Katrina it was clear to them that the military needed to be empowered  to respond more quickly to disasters. Ultimately, Congress approved  new authorities in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal  Year 2012, one of which provided DOD with greater access to the  federal reserve during domestic incidents. Section 12304a of Title 10  of the United States Code states that when a Governor requests  federal assistance in responding to a major disaster or emergency the  Secretary of Defense may mobilize any individual or unit of the federal  reserves involuntarily for up to 120 days to respond to the Governor’s  request. The military services were using interim implementation  guidance for these authorities at the time of our review and were  waiting for DOD to finalize its guidance in September 2013.  Additionally, DOD officials told us that Hurricane Sandy is the only  domestic disaster thus far to use the new mobilization authorities  under section 12304a. Since DOD is still developing its process for  implementing these new authorities and has had limited experience  using them it is too early to know whether they will better enable the  states to access federal capabilities when responding to domestic  disasters.
section_title: Appendix III: Profile for the National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard Directorate, and Air National Guard Readiness Center
paragraphs: Appendix III: Profile for the National Guard  Bureau, Army National Guard Directorate, and  Air National Guard Readiness Center In addition to having full-time civilian and Active Guard and Reserve personnel, the Army National  Guard Directorate has a group of personnel that are categorized as “Active Duty for Operational  Support”. Active Duty for Operational Support is an authorized voluntary tour of active duty that is  performed at the request of an organizational or operational commander, or as a result of  reimbursable funding, among other things. The purpose of this category is to provide the necessary  skilled manpower assets to support existing or emerging requirements.
We included subordinate headquarters in the National Guard Bureau’s list of capabilities because  these headquarters are under the management of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
section_title: Appendix IV: Profile for the National Guard State Joint Force Headquarters
paragraphs: Appendix IV: Profile for the National Guard  State Joint Force Headquarters These data reflect funded civilian and military positions. Some DOD personnel, referred to as “dual- status technicians,” are required, as a condition of employment, to be a drilling member of the  National Guard or Reserves and thereby fill both a full-time civilian position and a part-time military  position. Additionally, some DOD personnel, referred to as “Active Guard and Reserve,” occupy both  a full-time military position as well as a part-time military position. Consequently, in our calculations,  we included them in both the Active Guard and Reserve and the part-time Guardsmen categories.  DOD Directive 5105.83, National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State (NG-JFHQs-State) (Jan. 5,  2011).
section_title: Appendix V: Profile for the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve and U.S. Army Reserve Command
paragraphs: Appendix V: Profile for the Office of the Chief  of the Army Reserve and U.S. Army Reserve  Command These data reflect funded civilian and military positions. Some DOD personnel, referred to as “dual- status technicians,” are required, as a condition of employment, to be a drilling member of the  National Guard or Reserves and thereby fill both a full-time civilian position and a part-time military  position. Additionally, some DOD personnel, referred to as “Active Guard and Reserve,” occupy both  a full-time military position as well as a part-time military position. Consequently, in our calculations,  we included them in both the Active Guard and Reserve and the part-time reservist categories.
section_title: Appendix VI: Profile for the Army Reserve Regional Support Commands
paragraphs: Appendix VI: Profile for the Army Reserve  Regional Support Commands These data reflect funded civilian and military positions. Some DOD personnel, referred to as “dual- status technicians,” are required, as a condition of employment, to be a drilling member of the  National Guard or Reserves and thereby fill both a full-time civilian position and a part-time military  position. Additionally, some DOD personnel, referred to as “Active Guard and Reserve,” occupy both  a full-time military position as well as a part-time military position. Consequently, in our calculations,  we included them in both the Active Guard and Reserve and the part-time Reservist categories.
section_title: Appendix VII: Profile for the U.S. Army Reserve Functional Commands
paragraphs: Appendix VII: Profile for the U.S. Army Reserve  Functional Commands These data reflect funded civilian and military positions. Some DOD personnel, referred to as “dual- status technicians,” are required, as a condition of employment, to be a drilling member of the  National Guard or Reserves and thereby fill both a full-time civilian position and a part-time military  position. Additionally, some DOD personnel, referred to as “Active Guard and Reserve,” occupy both  a full-time military position as well as a part-time military position. Consequently, in our calculations,  we included them in both the Active Guard and Reserve and the part-time reservist categories.
section_title: Appendix VIII: Profile for Air Force Reserve Command and Headquarters, Air Force Reserve
paragraphs: Appendix VIII: Profile for Air Force Reserve  Command and Headquarters, Air Force  Reserve These data reflect funded civilian and military positions. Some DOD personnel, referred to as “dual- status technicians,” are required, as a condition of employment, to be a drilling member of the  National Guard or Reserves and thereby fill both a full-time civilian position and a part-time military  position. Additionally, some DOD personnel, referred to as “Active Guard and Reserve,” occupy both  a full-time military position as well as a part-time military position. Consequently, in our calculations,  we included them in both the Active Guard and Reserve and the part-time reservist categories.
section_title: Appendix IX: Profile for the Air Force Reserve Numbered Air Forces
paragraphs: Appendix IX: Profile for the Air Force Reserve  Numbered Air Forces These data reflect funded civilian and military positions. Some DOD personnel, referred to as “dual- status technicians,” are required, as a condition of employment, to be a drilling member of the  National Guard or Reserves and thereby fill both a full-time civilian position and a part-time military  position. Additionally, some DOD personnel, referred to as “Active Guard and Reserve,” occupy both  a full-time military position as well as a part-time military position. Consequently, in our calculations,  we included them in both the Active Guard and Reserve and the part-time reservist categories.
section_title: Appendix X: Content for Interactive Figures in Background Section
subsections: section_title: Component Army National Guard and Air National Guard
paragraphs: Headquarters type  National Guard Bureau
A joint activity of the Department of Defense (DOD).
Participate with the Army and the Air Force staffs in the formulation,  development, and coordination of all programs, policies, concepts, and  plans pertaining to the National Guard;
Administer programs.
Assist in the organization, maintenance, and operation of National  Guard units.  Focal point at the strategic level for National Guard matters that are not  under the authority of the military service.
Air National Guard  Air National Guard  Readiness Center  Office of the Chief of  the Army Reserve
Channel of communications between DOD and the states.  Located in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin  Islands, and Guam.  Comprised of a Joint staff, Army staff, and Air staff.  The Adjutant General’s federal responsibilities include the following:  Establishing temporary joint task force command elements ready to provide  command and control for domestic operations.   Accepting mutually agreed-upon federal liaison elements.   Designating officers eligible to serve in dual-status and ensure that these  officers facilitate unity of effort between state and federal military forces.   Ensures homeland defense– and civil support–unique equipment is  available for use should the unit owning the equipment deploy.  Advises the Governors and collaborates with DOD leadership.  Assists the Chief, National Guard Bureau, in carrying out the functions of  the National Guard Bureau as they relate to the Army National Guard.  The Director, Army National Guard, under the supervision and control of the  Chief, National Guard Bureau, performs those administrative and  operational functions of the Chief pertaining to the Army National Guard and  the Army National Guard of the United States.  Assists the Chief, National Guard Bureau, in carrying out the functions of  the National Guard Bureau as they relate to the Air National Guard.  The Director, Air National Guard, under the supervision and control of the  Chief, National Guard Bureau, performs those administrative and  operational functions of the Chief pertaining to the Air National Guard and  the Air National Guard of the United States.  Serves as the Headquarters Army principal staff organization to organize  and equip Army Reserve Forces. Provides direct support to the Chief of  Staff of the Army in the execution of his function and Title X responsibilities,  and commands the U.S. Army Reserve Command.  Responsible, subject to certain exceptions, for justification and execution of  certain Army Reserve budgets, and is the director and functional manager  of those appropriations; directing and managing the Army Reserve’s  appropriations; managing the Army Reserve’s full-time support program;  and submitting annual reports to the Secretary of Defense.
section_title: Regional Support Commands
paragraphs: Provides command, control, and support to Army Reserve forces assigned.  Organizes, trains, and prepares Army Reserve units for mobilization and  commitment to wartime theater of operations. Ensures wartime readiness of  Army Reserve forces.  Provides administrative and logistical support to all Army Reserve units and  commands within their geographic area of responsibility. Manages all  Operation and Maintenance, Personnel, Military Construction, and other  appropriations for which requirements are justified as allocated by the U.S.  Army Reserve Command and the Office of Chief, Army Reserve.  Supervises all area maintenance support activities and equipment- concentration sites within its area of responsibility. Provides facility support  to all Army Reserve units within its area of responsibility.  The Command Group of these commands is responsible for the following:  Providing direction, guidance, and regional base-operations support to  supported units within the region. The base-operations support is provided  in functional areas of personnel, logistics, force integration, programming  and budgeting, finance and accounting, information management,  emergency services, public works, historian, inspector general, religious,  medical, legal, safety, public affairs, internal review, and management  controls.  Managing and executing appropriations as authorized by U.S. Army  Reserve Command and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation  Management for base-operations support.  Implementing policies and intent of the U.S. Army Reserve Command  commanding general.  Representing the Army Reserve before military and civilian organizations  and agencies at various levels of command and government to include  speaking engagements.   Assisting with local community relations and representing the U.S. Army  Reserve Command to foreign dignitaries on various occasions.
Functional Commands  Maintain and provide training and, in certain cases, generate specific  Headquarters, Air  Force Reserve  capabilities.   Deploy subordinate units in support of federal missions.  Provides direct support to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force in the execution  of his or her function and Title X responsibilities, and commands the U.S.  Air Force Reserve Command.  Subject to certain exceptions, justify and execute the budgets for Air Force  Reserve. Manages the full-time support program. Provides an annual report  to the Secretary of Defense on the state of the Air Force Reserve and its  ability to meet its missions.  Provides citizen airmen to defend the United States and to protect its  interests through air and space power.  Organizes, trains, and equips combat-ready forces. Directs operation of the  three numbered Air Forces and provides all required major command–level  support for all Air Force Reserve units and personnel. Maintains overall  supervision of Air Force Reserve matters supporting Air Force war plans,  programming documents, and mobilization actions. Retains administrative  control over all Air Force Reserve units except for forces attached to the  Commander, Air Force Forces.
section_title: Numbered Air Forces Command assigned units. Ensure assigned units maintain operational
paragraphs: readiness according to Air Force standards to include combat readiness,  medical readiness, and inspection readiness. Provide assistance to, and  operational readiness assessment of, assigned units through Operational  Readiness Exercises and other discretionary events when warranted.  Supervise and assist assigned units in planning for deployment and  redeployment actions, major events, and contingencies. Advocate for  assigned units. Implement plans, policies, and programs as developed and  directed by Headquarters, Air Force Reserve Command.  Communicate with Lead Major Command on matters relating to training,  inspection, operational mission coordination, and logistical support.  Assist units to implement command operational readiness and compliance  processes.   Manage resources across units.
section_title: Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix XII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Suzanne K. Wren, Assistant  Director; Timothy J. Carr; Joanna Chan; Susan C. Ditto; Michael J.  Hanson; Tobin J. McMurdie; Anna Maria Ortiz; Michael D. Silver; Amie M.  Steele; Karen N. Willems; Michael A. Willems; Alex Winograd; and Delia  P. Zee made key contributions to this report.