Amphibious Combat Vehicle: Some Acquisition Activities Demonstrate Best Practices; Attainment of Amphibious Capability to be Determined
Published: 2015-10-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Marine Corps' ACV is intended to transport Marines from ship to shore and provide armored protection on land. It is to potentially replace all or a portion of the decades old AAV fleet, and is expected to eventually offer increased amphibious capability and high water speed.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision that GAO annually review and report on the ACV program until 2018. This report provides an updated discussion of (1) how the ACV program's efforts compare to acquisition best practices and examines (2) how the increments of ACV will achieve amphibious capability.
To conduct this work, GAO reviewed program documentation and other materials for the ACV acquisition and Navy surface connector programs. GAO identified acquisition and analysis of alternatives best practices based on its prior body of work and DOD guidance. GAO also interviewed program and agency officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Most of the current activities of the U.S. Marine Corps' Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) program have demonstrated the use of best practices, but plans for an accelerated acquisition schedule pose potential risks. As the program approaches the start of engineering and manufacturing development, it is seeking to rely on mature technologies that have been demonstrated to work in their intended environment as well as fostering competition—a critical tool for achieving the best return on the government's investment. Further, GAO analyzed the ACV analysis of alternatives that the Marine Corps produced for the initial portion of the ACV development, finding that overall it met best practices by, for example, ensuring that the analysis of alternatives process was impartial. However, the Marine Corps is pursuing an accelerated program schedule that presents some risks, including plans to hold the preliminary design review after the start of development—a deviation from best practices which could postpone the attainment of information about whether the design performs as expected. Moreover, GAO believes that the level of planned concurrency—conducting development testing and production at the same time—could leave the program at greater risk of discovering deficiencies after some systems have already been built, potentially requiring costly modifications. Agency officials stated that mature technologies reduce risk and that, while some concurrency is planned, all required testing will be completed prior to the production decision. While some aspects of this acquisition do suggest lower levels of risk, these deviations could potentially increase program risk. GAO will continue to monitor this risk as the program moves forward.
The ACV program relies heavily on future plans to increase ACV amphibious capability gradually, in three planned increments known as ACV 1.1, 1.2, and 2.0, but exactly how this capability will be attained has not yet been determined.
ACV 1.1 – Although this increment is expected to have some amphibious capability, according to program documents, it is expected to rely on surface connector craft—vessels that enable the transportation of military assets from ship to shore. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy officials regularly coordinate ACV 1.1 plans to operate with the surface connector fleet through coordination mechanisms such as the Surface Connector Council.
ACV 1.2 – This increment is expected to have greater amphibious capability, including the ability to self-deploy from ships. Based on demonstrations from related programs to date, program officials believe it will reach that capability, but indicated that plans for 1.2 are expected to depend on the success of ACV 1.1 development.
ACV 2.0 – This increment represents a future decision point when the Marine Corps plans to determine how to replace the Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) fleet. The Marine Corps is currently exploring technologies that may enable high water speed—a significant increase from the amphibious goals identified for ACV 1.1. Therefore, how it will achieve the amphibious capability envisioned for ACV 2.0 is undetermined.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is not making recommendations in this report. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it believes its efforts are aligned with best practices and that GAO's report appears to underestimate ACV 1.1's planned technical maturity. GAO found that some program plans do not align with best practices and that while some aspects of the acquisition do suggest lower levels of risk, these deviations could potentially increase program risk. GAO will continue to monitor these risks as the program moves forward.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since 1972, the primary platform for transporting Marines from ship to  shore under hostile and hazardous conditions has been the Assault  Amphibious Vehicle (AAV). In 2011, acquisition of a proposed  replacement vehicle—the United States Marine Corps’ (USMC)  Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)—was canceled following the  expenditure of $3.7 billion from fiscal year 1995 through 2011 due to  concerns regarding the program’s affordability. Also in 2011, USMC  subsequently began the acquisition process for the Amphibious Combat  Vehicle (ACV), a potential replacement vehicle for all or a portion of the  AAV fleet. The ACV is intended to transport Marines from ship to shore  and provide armored protection once on land. The ACV acquisition  approach calls for ACV development in three increments with increasing  amphibious capability, ACV 1.1, 1.2 and 2.0., with ACV 1.1 scheduled to  start development in November 2015.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a  provision for us to annually review and report to the congressional  defense committees on the ACV program until 2018.  Previous reports in  2014 and 2015 described the efforts to initiate the ACV program and how  its incremental acquisition approach compares to acquisition  management best practices. This report provides an updated discussion  of (1) how the ACV program’s efforts compare to acquisition best  practices, and examines (2) how the increments of ACV are to achieve  amphibious capability. This report also includes updates to the analysis of  alternatives (AOA) best practices identified in prior GAO work.These  updated best practices supersede those AOA best practices published in  prior reports.
To conduct this work, we reviewed program documentation and other  materials for the ACV 1.1 acquisition, including the acquisition strategy,  technology readiness assessment and 2014 ACV AOA, as well as  program documentation from Navy surface connector programs. We  identified acquisition best practices based on our extensive body of work  in that area and Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, and used this  information to analyze the proposed ACV acquisition approach and  acquisition activities to date. We updated and refined the GAO-identified  AOA best practices by soliciting comments on those best practices from a  group of internal and external experts and vetting these comments with  GAO experts. The resulting changes include the consolidation of some  best practices, reducing the number from 24 to 22, and the establishment  of four characteristics that identify a high-quality, reliable AOA process.  Appendix I contains additional information on these best practices. We  also reviewed our previous work on the ACV and EFV programs. In  addition, we interviewed program and agency officials from the USMC’s  Advanced Amphibious Assault program office and Combat, Development,  and Integration Division, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost  Assessment and Program Evaluation, the Naval Sea Systems Command,  and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,  Development, and Acquisition. Appendix II contains additional details  about our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2015 to October 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The AAV is a tracked (non-wheeled) vehicle with the capability to self- deploy—or launch from ships (see figure 1). The AAV has a water speed  of approximately six knots, and is usually deployed from within sight of  the shore, a factor that poses survivability risks in certain threat  environments. According to USMC officials, the AAV has become  increasingly difficult to maintain and sustain. As weapons technology and  the nature of threats have evolved over the past four decades, the AAV is  viewed as having limitations in water speed, land mobility, lethality,  protection, and network capability. According to DOD, the need to  modernize USMC’s ability to move personnel and equipment from ship to  shore is essential. In the last 15 years, USMC has undertaken a number  of efforts to do this.
EFV: USMC began development of the EFV in 2000. The EFV was to  travel at higher water speeds—around 20 knots—which would have  allowed transporting ships to launch the EFV further from shore than the  AAVs it was to replace. However, following a 2007 breach of a statutory  cost threshold, that program was restructured and subsequently, in 2011,  canceled by DOD due to affordability concerns.
ACV: In 2011, the USMC completed initial acquisition documentation  providing the performance requirements for a new replacement  amphibious vehicle called the ACV. The ACV was expected to be self- deploying with a water speed of 8 to 12 knots which would permit  deployment beyond the visual range of the shore, but would not achieve  high water speed. It was also expected to provide for sustained  operations on shore with improved troop protection. However, USMC  leadership then requested an affordability analysis be completed that  would explore the technical feasibility of integrating high water speed into  ACV development. According to DOD officials, the analysis indicated that  achieving high water speed was technically possible but required  unacceptable tradeoffs as the program attempted to balance vehicle  weight, capabilities, and cost. Meanwhile, the USMC retained a  requirement to provide protected land mobility in response to the threat of  improvised explosive devices—a requirement the AAV could not meet  due to its underbody design. In 2014 we reported that, according to  program officials, the program office was in the process of revising its  ACV acquisition approach based on this affordability analysis.
ACV 1.1, 1.2 and 2.0: In 2014, the USMC revised its ACV acquisition  approach, adopting a plan to develop the ACV in three increments:
The first increment of ACV development—ACV 1.1—is planned to be  a wheeled vehicle that would provide improved protected land mobility  and limited amphibious capability. The ACV 1.1 is expected to be part  of an amphibious assault through the use of surface connector craft to  travel from ship to shore. Surface connectors are vessels that enable  the transportation of military assets, including personnel, material, and  equipment, from a sea base or ship to the shore. ACV 1.1, a  successor to the previously suspended Marine Personnel Carrier  program, is using prototypes, demonstration testing, and other study  results from that program. DOD officials estimated that, in comparing  the past Marine Personnel Carrier program and the ACV 1.1 as  currently envisioned, the two are about 98 percent the same. Troop  capacity—nine for the Marine Personnel Carrier and a threshold, or  minimum, of 10 for the ACV 1.1—is the main difference between the  two. Figure 2 provides a notional drawing of the ACV 1.1.
The second increment—ACV 1.2—adds two variants of the vehicle for  other uses and aims to improve amphibious capability. Program  officials anticipate that it will demonstrate amphibious capability that  matches the AAV, including the ability to self-deploy and swim to  shore. According to DOD officials, ACV 1.2 will be based on the  results of ACV 1.1 testing and it is anticipated that some 1.1s will be  upgraded with ACV 1.2 modifications.
The third effort, referred to as ACV 2.0, focuses on technology  exploration to attain high water speed—a critical capability, according  to DOD officials. These technology exploration efforts are seeking  design options that may enable high water speed capability without  accruing unacceptable trade-offs in other capabilities, cost or  schedule. According to officials, ACV 2.0 is a conceptual placeholder  for a future decision point when the Marine Corps plans to determine  how to replace the AAV fleet, which is expected to occur in the mid- 2020s. High water speed capability may ultimately be achieved  through an amphibious vehicle or a surface connector craft.
subsections: section_title: Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework
paragraphs: Our prior work on best practices has found that successful programs take  steps to gather knowledge that confirms that their technologies are  mature, their designs are stable, and their production processes are in  control. The knowledge-based acquisition framework involves achieving  the right knowledge at the right time, enabling leadership to make  informed decisions about when and how best to move into various  acquisition phases. Successful product developers ensure a high level of  knowledge is achieved at key junctures in development, characterized as  knowledge points. Knowledge Point 1 falls early in the acquisition process  and coincides with a program’s acquisition’s decision to begin  development, referred to as Milestone B. At this knowledge point, best  practices are to ensure a match between resources and requirements.  Achieving a high level of technology maturity and preliminary system  design backed by robust systems engineering is an important indicator of  whether this match has been made. This means that the technologies  needed to meet essential product requirements have been demonstrated  to work in their intended environment. In addition, the developer has  completed a preliminary design of the product that shows the design is  feasible. Figure 3 identifies the ACV 1.1 acquisition’s status within the  DOD acquisition process.
section_title: Early ACV Acquisition Activities Demonstrate Best Practices
paragraphs: Our review of the available documents that have been prepared to inform  the November 2015 decision to begin system development of ACV 1.1— including the acquisition strategy and an updated 2014 AOA—found that  most of the ACV program’s acquisition activities to date reflect the use of  best practices. The incremental approach to achieving full capability itself  is consistent with best practices. The ACV 1.1 acquisition strategy  minimizes program risk by using mature technology, competition, and  fixed-price type-contracts when possible. In addition, our analysis of the  2014 AOA found that overall it met best practices. Going forward,  however, some elements of the acquisition approach, for example, the  program’s plan to hold a preliminary design review (PDR)—a technical  review assessing the system design—after beginning development, do  not align with best practices and could increase program risk. While some  aspects of this acquisition do suggest lower levels of risk, these  deviations could potentially increase program risk. GAO will continue to  monitor this risk as the program moves forward.
subsections: section_title: Aspects of the ACV 1.1 Acquisition Strategy Demonstrate Efforts to Minimize Risk
paragraphs: The ACV 1.1 acquisition strategy prepared to inform the upcoming start of  engineering and manufacturing development minimizes program risk by  following best practices, such as using mature technology, competition,  and fixed-price-type contracts when possible.
Technology maturity. The ACV program plans to utilize mature  technology in ACV 1.1 development. According to acquisition best  practices, demonstrating a high level of maturity before allowing new  technologies into product development programs puts programs in a  better position to succeed. To support a decision to begin development,  a technology readiness assessment (TRA) was performed to assess the  maturity of critical technologies to be integrated into the program. DOD  defines critical technology elements as new or novel technology that a  platform or system depends on to achieve successful development or  production or to successfully meet a system operational threshold  requirement. In a TRA, identified critical technologies are assessed  against a technological readiness level (TRL) scale of 1 to 9. Specifically,  a rating of TRL 1 demonstrates “basic principles observed and reported,”  and TRL 9 demonstrates “actual system proven through successful  mission operations.” Overall, the completed ACV 1.1 TRA assessed the  program at TRL 7, indicating demonstration in an operational  environment. This assessment was based on the non-developmental  nature of the vehicles, the use of mature technology for modifications,  and tests and demonstrations of prototype vehicles done under the  Marine Personnel Carrier program.
Demonstration in a relevant environment is TRL 6. Demonstration in an operational  environment is TRL 7. identified adapting the Remote Weapon Station to the marine  environment as a principal program risk because using the system under  different operational conditions may have a significant impact on system  reliability. While the program has identified additional risk mitigation  strategies—including planned component testing during development and  development of preventative maintenance procedures—this technology  could entail a somewhat higher level of risk than the TRL level suggests  and may require additional attention as development begins.
Competition. According to our prior work, competition is a critical tool for  achieving the best return on the government’s investment. The ACV  acquisition approach has fostered competition in the acquisition process,  both through competitive prototyping that took place prior to the start of  development and with competition that continues through development  until production. Specifically, before the Marine Personnel Carrier  program was suspended, the government awarded a contract to test  critical sub-systems including the engine, transmission, suspension and  hydraulic hardware systems. The government also awarded four  contracts for system-level prototypes demonstrating the swim capability,  personnel carry capability, and survivability of each company’s vehicle.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics—the ACV Milestone Decision Authority—has certified to the  congressional defense committees that the ACV program had met the  competitive prototyping requirement based on the work done under the  Marine Personnel Carrier program. In addition, after development begins,  the program plans to award ACV 1.1 development contracts to two  vendors, maintaining competition until they select one vendor at the start  of production.
Contract strategy. When development begins, the ACV program plans  to award hybrid contracts to each of the to-be-selected developers.  According to program plans, each contract is to utilize three different  pricing structures for different activities: fixed-price-incentive for ACV 1.1  vehicle development, firm-fixed-price for the delivery incentive to deliver  test vehicles early, and cost-plus-fixed-fee for test support and  advanced capability improvements and studies. According to the Federal  Acquisition Regulation, it is usually to the Government’s advantage for the  contractor to assume substantial cost responsibility and an appropriate  share of the cost risk; therefore, fixed-price incentive contracts are  preferred when contract costs and performance requirements are  reasonably certain. Manufacturing the development vehicles is the  largest anticipated portion of ACV development contract costs. According  to the ACV 1.1 acquisition strategy, a fixed-price-incentive contract is  considered the most appropriate contract type to utilize for the vehicle’s  development because the vehicles themselves are non-developmental in  nature but there is some risk related to the integration of selected  systems, such as the Remote Weapon Station, and other modifications  required to meet USMC requirements. Meanwhile, the strategy states that  the delivery incentive is to be a firm-fixed-price, as the fee is a set dollar  amount based on how early the vehicles are delivered and is not subject  to adjustment based on the vendor’s costs.
Under cost-reimbursement contract types, such as a cost-plus-fixed-fee  contract, the government bears the risk of increases in the cost of  performance. Cost-reimbursement contract types are suitable when  uncertainties in requirements or contract performance do not permit the  use of fixed-price contract types. A cost-plus-fixed-fee structure is  planned for test support before and after the start of production, vehicle  transportation and other test-related activities. According to program  officials, the scope and nature of these activities are difficult to predict,  making the cost-plus-fixed-fee structure appropriate. Officials also stated  that the cost-plus-fixed-fee activities are expected to comprise about 11  percent of the total contract value.
Requirements and cost estimates. Additional key documents have  been prepared, or are underway, in accordance with DOD policy. The  ACV 1.1 Capabilities Development Document, providing the set of  requirements for development, is tailored specifically for ACV 1.1. In  accordance with DOD policy, the ACV 1.1 Capabilities Development  Document was validated prior to the release of the ACV 1.1 request for  proposal in March 2015. In addition, best practices and DOD policy also  call for the development of an independent cost estimate prior to the start  of development. According to agency officials, the independent cost  estimate is underway and will be prepared for the Milestone B decision.  The acquisition strategy identifies no funding shortfalls for the program as  of the fiscal year 2016 President’s budget submission.
section_title: 2014 ACV Analysis of Alternatives Met Best Practices
paragraphs: Our assessment of the 2014 AOA found that overall it met best practices  for AOAs and is, therefore, considered reliable. An AOA is a key first step  in the acquisition process intended to assess alternative solutions for  addressing a validated need. AOAs are done or updated to support key  acquisition decision points. The USMC completed an AOA update for  ACV 1.1 in late 2014 to support the release of the ACV 1.1 request for  proposal. Over the years, other AOAs have been completed for related  acquisitions, including the EFV, the Marine Personnel Carrier and the  previous version of the ACV considered in 2012. These previous AOAs  and other supporting studies comprise a body of work that has informed  the most recent ACV AOA update as well as the ACV 1.1 acquisition as a  whole.
AOAs can vary in quality, which can affect how they help position a  program for success. We have previously identified best practices for the  development of AOAs. Considered in the context of the related AOA  body of work, the ACV AOA met 15 of the 22 AOA best practices,  including ensuring that the AOA process was impartial and developing an  AOA process plan, among others. Further, four of the remaining best  practices were substantially met, two were partially met, and one was  minimally met. For example, best practices call for the documentation of  all assumptions and constraints used in the analysis. We found that the  2014 AOA does not include a full list of assumptions and constraints and  any assumptions or constraints from previous analysis, if relevant, were  not updated or referenced in the new analysis. As a result, it could be  difficult for decision makers to make comparisons and trade-offs between  alternatives. Appendices I and II provide more information on the  methodology used in this analysis and appendix III provides the results of  our AOA analysis in greater detail. DOD’s Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation staff also reviewed the 2014 AOA and found that it was  sufficient. However, they identified a few areas of caution, including  recommending additional testing of land mobility to further verify USMC  assertions that the wheeled ACV 1.1 would have the same mobility in soft  soil as tracked vehicles.
section_title: Accelerated Schedule Presents Program Risks
paragraphs: According to USMC officials, the ACV program is pursuing an aggressive  schedule in order to obtain ACV 1.1 initial operational capability in fiscal  year 2020. The program is scheduled to hold its PDR after development  starts, a deviation from best practices. In addition, according to program  officials, as a result of the aggressive acquisition schedule, the program  plans on a higher level of concurrency between development testing and  production than would take place under a more typical acquisition  schedule. This aggressive schedule may likely have congressional  decision makers approve funds to begin production based on little to no  evidence from the testing of delivered ACV 1.1 prototypes. Some factors  may mitigate the risk posed by this acceleration, for example, program  officials have stated that all required testing will take place prior to the  start of production. However, further attention may be warranted in our  future reviews of the program’s schedule.
The ACV 1.1 program is planning to hold its PDR about 90 days after  development begins and to combine its PDR and the critical design  review (CDR) into one event. Best practices recommend that the PDR is  held before development begins in order to increase the knowledge  available to the agency when development starts, for example, increasing  confidence that the design will meet the requirements established in the  Capabilities Development Document. The absence of a PDR introduces  some risk by postponing the attainment of knowledge until after  development begins and reducing scheduled time to address any design  issues that may arise. In addition, it is a best practice to demonstrate  design stability at the system-level CDR, completing at least 90 percent of  engineering drawings at that time. Combining the PDR and CDR may  limit the time available to the program to address any issues identified  and ensure that sufficient knowledge is attained prior to the program  moving forward. For example, in a 2006 report, we found that the EFV  program’s CDR was held almost immediately after the start of  development—similar to the approach for ACV 1.1—and before the  system integration work had been completed. Testing of the early  prototypes continued for three years into system development, well after  the tests could inform the CDR decision. Best practices call for system  integration work to be conducted before the CDR is held. According to  DOD officials, the ACV 1.1 PDR will be held after Milestone B because  contracts are not planned to be awarded prior to that time. In addition,  DOD officials stated that the technological maturity of ACV 1.1 reduces  risk and permits both the waiver of the PDR requirement and the  consolidation of the reviews. While the use of mature technology could  suggest a reduced risk from this deferral, we believe that contracts could  have been awarded earlier in the acquisition process in order to facilitate  a PDR prior to development start.
The current ACV 1.1 program schedule demonstrates concurrency  between testing and production that could represent increased program  risk. According to agency officials, approximately one year of  development testing will take place prior to the program’s production  decision in order to assess production readiness. Another ten months of  testing will continue after the start of production. The intent of  developmental testing is to demonstrate the maturity of a design and to  discover and fix design and performance problems before a system  enters production. According to agency officials, the adoption of an  accelerated fielding schedule is behind the level of overlap between  developmental testing and production. They stated that they plan to have  completed all development testing and operational assessment required  to support the production decision by the time that decision is made. DOD  policy allows some degree of concurrency between initial production and  developmental testing and, according to our prior work, some  concurrency may be necessary when rapidly fielding urgently needed  warfighter capabilities. However, our past work has also shown that  beginning production before demonstrating that a design is mature and  that a system will work as intended increases the risk of discovering  deficiencies during production that could require substantial design  changes and costly modifications to systems already built. A detailed test  plan will not become available until Milestone B as is expected for  acquisition programs. When such a plan is available, we will further  assess the risk presented by this approach.
Moreover, under the current ACV 1.1 program schedule, Congress may  likely be called upon to provide production funding for ACV 1.1 production  based on little to no evidence from the testing of delivered ACV 1.1  prototypes. The program is scheduled to make a production decision, and  select one vendor, in fiscal year 2018. Under the normal budget process,  Congress would be provided the request for funding that production with  the President’s budget in February 2017, around the same time that the  prototype ACV 1.1 vehicles are scheduled to be delivered. In the event  that the development testing schedule experiences delays and key tests  are postponed until after the planned production decision, the program  may face increased risk.
section_title: Incremental Development of Future Amphibious Capability Is Key to Current ACV Strategy
paragraphs: The success of the ACV acquisition strategy depends upon the  attainment of improved amphibious capabilities over time. The first  increment, ACV 1.1, is not expected to have ship to shore amphibious  capability and thus is planned to use Navy surface connectors to travel  from ship to shore. The USMC and the Navy have coordinated the  planned operation of ACV 1.1 with surface connectors to ensure  compatibility and availability. The ACV acquisition intends to rely heavily  upon realizing a fully amphibious ACV 1.2, providing AAV-equivalent  water mobility and the ability to self-deploy. However, the exact nature of  ACV 1.2 and 2.0 is unknown at this time. Achieving the planned  capabilities of future ACV increments is highly dependent upon ACV 1.1  attaining its planned amphibious capability.
subsections: section_title: ACV 1.1 Expects to Rely on Surface Connector Craft for All Ship to Shore Transportation
paragraphs: While ACV 1.1 is expected to have shore to shore amphibious capability,  which would enable the vehicle to cross rivers and inland waterways, the  vehicle is also expected to rely on Navy surface connector craft for ship to  shore transportation. Connectors have become increasingly important as  USMC vehicles have grown in weight. According to USMC analysis,  about 86 percent of USMC expeditionary force assets are too heavy or  over-sized for air transport, and need to be transported by surface  connectors.
The ACV 1.1 requirements include transportability by currently available  and planned Navy surface connectors. Because several surface  connectors can transport the ACV 1.1, the selection of specific surface  connectors is planned to be based on an evaluation of mission needs and  connector capabilities. Some current and planned Navy surface  connectors that could transport ACV 1.1 are described below. Appendix  IV provides additional information on the key capabilities of these  connectors.
Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC). The LCAC is a high speed  hovercraft that supports rapid movement from ship to shore, such as  during an amphibious assault. The LCAC is one of the primary  connectors that provide ship to shore transportation of equipment,  personnel, and vehicles. The LCAC, which can access about 70 percent  of the world’s beaches, is optimized towards major combat operations  and forcible entry. The Navy currently has a fleet of 72 LCACs which  have received upgrades as a result of a service life extension program  effort. The Navy also plans to provide additional LCAC maintenance until  replacement craft are acquired.
Ship to Shore Connector (SSC). The Navy plans to replace each LCAC  with an SSC. The SSC, similar in design to the LCAC, is planned to  maintain or improve upon LCAC capabilities with an increased payload  capacity, a longer service life, and the ability to operate in more harsh  marine environments. SSC is planned to reach initial operational  capability of 6 craft in 2020 and full operational capability in 2027.
Landing Craft Utility (LCU). The LCU is a utility connector that supports  ship to shore movement in amphibious assaults and also participates in a  variety of other missions. The LCU has a large range and payload  capacity, but operates at a slower speed compared to the LCAC.  According to Navy officials, the LCU can access about 17 percent of the  world’s beaches, and stops at the waters’ edge in order to unload its  cargo.
Surface Connector (X) Replacement (SC(X)R). According to Navy  officials, the aging LCU craft are planned to be replaced by SC(X)R craft  in order to maintain a total of 32 LCUs and SC(X)Rs. According to the  Surface Connector Council, the SC(X)R is likely to be larger and show  improvements in materials, propulsion, maintainability, and habitability.  Production for the SC(X)R is planned to begin in 2018.
Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF). The EPF, formerly known as the  Joint High Speed Vessel, is a commercial-based catamaran that provides  heavy-lift, high-speed sealift mobility. The EPF uses a ramp system to  allow vehicles to off-load at shipping ports or where developed  infrastructure is unavailable (referred to as austere ports). The EPF is  planned to reach full operational capability in the year 2019.
Figure 4 illustrates three examples of how various surface connectors  could be used to transport ACV 1.1 from ship to shore. For example,  ACVs could be loaded onto an Expeditionary Transfer Dock (ESD) and  then on to LCACs or SSCs while the ESD maneuvers towards the shore.  The LCACs or SSCs would then launch from the ESD and transport the  ACVs to shore. The ACV could also be off-loaded at an advanced base  —such as an island located within the operational area—and then loaded  onto a EPF for transport to a developed or austere port. Finally, the ACVs  could be directly loaded from ships on to a LCU or SC(X)R and taken to  shore. This graphic includes selected examples only, and does not  represent all possible transportation options.
section_title: Navy Officials Have Taken Actions to Mitigate Potential SSC Risks
paragraphs: SSC acquisition risks may have consequences for employment of ACV  1.1. The Navy has identified that it requires a combined fleet of at least 72  operational LCACs and SSCs to support ship to shore transportation  demands. However, the Navy previously anticipated a lack of available  connectors from the year 2015 through 2024, with a maximum ‘gap,’ or  shortage, of 15 craft in 2019. Navy officials said that this ‘connector gap’  has been mitigated with the extension of the LCAC service life extension  program and acceleration of the SSC acquisition.
In a previous assessment of the SSC program, we found that the Navy  recognizes three SSC technologies as potential risk areas, for which the  Navy recommended further testing. According to officials, since that  report, the Navy has completed additional testing for software, drivetrain  components, and engine endurance to further develop and reduce the  risk of these technologies. Navy officials said the SSC program plans to  continue testing these technologies and remains on-schedule. However,  the SSC program entered production in 2015, more than 2 years before  the estimated delivery of the test vehicle. This concurrency of  development and production creates a potential risk of schedule overruns  if deficiencies in the design are not discovered until late in testing and  retrofits are required for previously produced craft. Navy officials said that  the LCAC service life could be further extended with additional  sustainment funding in the event of SSC acquisition delays.
section_title: USMC and Navy Coordinated ACV and Surface Connector Plans with Various Mechanisms
paragraphs: The USMC and Navy regularly coordinate on the ACV 1.1 to facilitate the  future use of the surface connector fleet through the Joint Capabilities  Integration Development System (JCIDS), the Surface Connector  Council, and other communication.
JCIDS. The JCIDS process is a DOD-wide process to identify and assess  capability needs and their associated performance criteria. The  Capabilities Development Document for the ACV 1.1 was developed as  part of the JCIDS process. The document, among other things, identified  key systems attributes, key performance parameters, and design  requirements for the ACV 1.1 with input from the USMC, the Navy, and  others. For example, it included design requirements that allow the SSC  to transport two ACVs, and ensure that ACVs can be transported by other  connector craft as well.
Surface Connector Council and working group. The Surface  Connector Council serves as a mechanism through which the USMC and  Navy coordinate activities related to surface connectors that are used for  amphibious shipping. The council has two co-chairs: the Director of the  Navy’s Expeditionary Warfare Division and the Director of the USMC  Capabilities Development Directorate who is also the Deputy  Commandant for Combat Development and Integration. The council  membership is drawn from several offices from both the Navy and the  USMC. The Council is required to meet at least biannually but, according  to Navy officials, in practice the Council generally meets quarterly. At  these meetings, the Council has previously discussed ACV program risks,  such as connector availability and the scarcity of space on connectors,  and associated risk mitigation strategies, according to Navy officials. The  Surface Connector Council also has a working level forum, known as the  Surface Connector Roundtable, which meets on a monthly basis  according to Navy officials.
Informal discussions. In addition to coordination through JCIDS and the  Surface Connector Council, officials said that informal discussions  between USMC and Navy officials occur frequently to coordinate the ACV  and connector programs.
section_title: Future Amphibious Capability to be Determined
paragraphs: The exact nature of the ACV’s future amphibious capability is not yet  known. USMC officials are confident that the ACV 1.1 would not only  meet its minimum requirements for shore to shore swim capability, but  may exceed those requirements and be able to swim from ship to shore.  Based on tests and demonstrations to date, program officials also  expressed confidence that ACV 1.2 will build on the ACV 1.1 capabilities  and have the ability to self-deploy from ships. However, according to  DOD officials, the capabilities of the ACV 1.2 are dependent upon the  success of ACV 1.1 development. If the ACV 1.1 does not demonstrate  the expected amphibious capabilities, then more development than  currently anticipated may be required for ACV 1.2 to achieve ship to  shore amphibious capability and greater effort may be needed to retro-fit  ACV 1.1 vehicles to achieve the same capabilities. However, if ACV 1.1  demonstrates greater than expected amphibious capability, then the  progression towards achieving the plans for the ACV 1.2 may be easier.  Program documentation and analysis to date have been done to develop  the ACV 1.1 strategy and plans and to support ACV 1.1 decisions.  According to DOD officials, the USMC has not yet determined whether  the development of ACV 1.2 will be done through improvements within  the same program or as a separate program from ACV 1.1. DOD officials  stated that the development of ACV 1.1 and 1.2 amphibious capabilities is  also expected to impact the nature of ACV 2.0. According to DOD  officials, with the ACV 2.0 decision, the ACV program expects to achieve  high water speed, a long-standing goal and a significant increase from the  current amphibious goals identified for ACV 1.1.
The current USMC amphibious strategy plans for an evolving mix of  ACVs and upgraded and legacy AAVs that are to maintain the needed  combination of capabilities at any one time. According to USMC officials,  over time, the ACV program plans to replace portions of the AAV fleet  with ACV increments as they become available. This USMC strategy, and  the analysis that supports it, is based on the assumption that ACV 1.2 will  reach a desired level of amphibious capability and that ACV 1.1 vehicles  can be upgraded to that level. If, however, those or other key capabilities  cannot be achieved, revisiting the USMC’s strategy prior to making  production decisions for ACV 1.1, particularly addressing changes to its  overall amphibious strategy and potentially updating its analysis of  alternatives, will be important. In addition, when and how the USMC will  achieve the amphibious capability envisioned for ACV 2.0 remains to be  determined, according to DOD officials. We will continue to monitor these  issues along with the program’s performance against best practices as it  progresses toward the Milestone C production decision currently planned  for the second quarter of fiscal year 2018.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We are not making any recommendations in this report. DOD provided  written comments on a draft of this report. The comments are reprinted in  appendix V.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it believes its  efforts on this program are aligned with our best practices and that our  report appears to underestimate ACV 1.1’s planned technical maturity  and associated risks. DOD stated that the vehicle is beyond the traditional  PDR and CDR level of maturity and conducting a combined PDR and  CDR is appropriate for the level of risk identified by the Program  Manager. As we stated in this report, the program’s plan to hold a PDR  after beginning development does not align with best practices and  combining the PDR and CDR may limit the time available to the program  to address any issues identified and ensure that sufficient knowledge is  attained prior to the program moving forward. Further, as we stated  earlier, while some aspects of this acquisition do suggest lower levels of  risk, these deviations could potentially increase program risk—risks that  we will continue to monitor as the program moves forward.
DOD also provided technical comments that were incorporated, where  appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Secretary of the Navy; and  the Commandant of the Marine Corps. This report also is available at no  charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions on the matters covered in  this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or makm@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to  this report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Best Practices for the Analysis of Alternatives Process
subsections: section_title: Background and Introduction
paragraphs: Many guides have described an approach to analyses of alternatives  (AOAs); however, there is no single set of practices for the AOA process  that has been broadly recognized by both the government and private- sector entities. GAO has identified 22 best practices for an AOA process  by (1) compiling and reviewing commonly mentioned AOA policies and  guidance used by different government and private-sector entities and (2)  incorporating experts’ comments on a draft set of practices to develop a  final set of practices.
These practices can be applied to a wide range of activities in which an  alternative must be selected from a set of possible options, as well as to a  broad range of capability areas, projects, and programs. These practices  can provide a framework to help ensure that entities consistently and  reliably select the project alternative that best meets mission needs. The  guidance below is meant as an overview of the key principles that lead to  a successful AOA process and not as a “how to” guide with detailed  instructions for each best practice identified.
The 22 best practices that GAO identified are grouped into the following  five phases:  1.  Initialize the AOA process: includes best practices that are applied  before starting the process of identifying, analyzing, and selecting  alternatives. This includes determining the mission need and  functional requirements, developing the study time frame, creating a  study plan, and determining who conducts the analysis.      2.  Identify alternatives: includes best practices that help ensure the  alternatives to be analyzed are sufficient, diverse, and viable.    3.  Analyze alternatives: includes best practices that compare the  alternatives to be analyzed. The best practices in this category help  ensure that the team conducting the analysis uses a standard,  quantitative process to assess the alternatives.     4.  Document and review the AOA process: includes best practices  that would be applied throughout the AOA process, such as  documenting all steps taken to initialize, identify, and analyze  alternatives and to select a preferred alternative in a single document.  5.  Select a preferred alternative: includes a best practice that is  applied by the decision maker to compare alternatives and to select a  preferred alternative.
The five phases address different themes of analysis necessary to  complete the AOA process and comprise the beginning of the AOA  process (defining the mission needs and functional requirements) through  the final step of the AOA process (select a preferred alternative).
There are three key entities that are involved in the AOA process: the  customer, the decision maker, and the AOA team. The customer refers to  the program office, service, or agency that identifies a mission need (e.g.  a credible gap between current capabilities and those required to meet  the goals articulated in the strategic plan). The decision maker is the  person or entity that signs off on the final decision and analysis  documented by the AOA report. The decision maker refers to the program  manager (or alternate authority figure identified early in the AOA process)  who will select the preferred alternative based on the established  selection criteria. The AOA team is the group of subject matter experts  who are involved in the day-to-day work of the AOA process and work to  develop the analysis that is the foundation of the AOA process.
Conforming to the 22 best practices helps ensure that the preferred  alternative selected is the one that best meets the agency’s mission  needs. Not conforming to the best practices may lead to an unreliable  AOA, and the customer will not have assurance that the preferred  alternative best meets the mission needs. Table 1 shows the 22 best  practices and the five phases.
Some best practices included in a phase can take place concurrently and  do not have to follow the order presented in table 1. The phases should  occur in sequence to prevent bias from entering the analysis and adding  risk that the AOA team will analyze alternatives that have not been  defined. However, the document and review phase can be done at any  stage throughout the AOA process. For example, best practice 5 (define  selection criteria) can be done at the same time as best practice 6 (weight  selection criteria). On the other hand, best practice 20 (ensure AOA  process is impartial) can be done at the end of every step or every phase  to ensure the impartiality of the AOA as it progresses. The best practices  represent an overall process that results in a reliable AOA that can be  easily and clearly traced, replicated, and updated. Figure 5 shows the  AOA process and how the steps in each phase are interrelated.
section_title: Review the AOA Process
paragraphs: An important best practice is an independent review of the AOA process.  It is important that the AOA process and its results be validated by an  organization independent of the program office and the project’s chain of  command, to ensure that a high-quality AOA is developed, presented,  and defended to management. This process verifies that the AOA  adequately reflects the program’s mission needs and provides a  reasonable assessment of the cost and benefits associated with the  alternatives.
One reason to independently validate the AOA process is that  independent reviewers typically rely less on assumptions alone and,  therefore, tend to provide more realistic analyses. Moreover, independent  reviewers are less likely to automatically accept unproven assumptions  associated with anticipated savings. That is, they bring more objectivity to  their analyses, resulting in a reality check of the AOA process that  reduces the odds that management will invest in an unreasonable  alternative.
To that end, we established four characteristics that identify a high- quality, reliable AOA process. These characteristics would evaluate if the  AOA process is well-documented, comprehensive, unbiased, and  credible.    “Well-documented” means that the AOA process is thoroughly  described in a single document, including all source data, clearly  detailed methodologies, calculations and results, and that selection  criteria are explained.    “Comprehensive” means that the AOA process ensures that the  mission need is defined in a way to allow for a robust set of  alternatives, that no alternatives are omitted and that each alternative  is examined thoroughly for the project’s entire life-cycle.    “Unbiased” means that the AOA process does not have a  predisposition toward one alternative over another; it is based on  traceable and verifiable information.    “Credible” means that the AOA process thoroughly discusses the  limitations of the analyses resulting from the uncertainty that  surrounds both the data and the assumptions for each alternative.
Table 2 shows the four characteristics and their relevant AOA best  practices.
section_title: Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine how the ACV program’s efforts compare with best  practices, we reviewed program documentation and other materials for  the ACV acquisition, including the acquisition strategy, technology  readiness assessment, and the Capabilities Development Document. We  identified acquisition best practices based on our extensive body of work  in that area and Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, and used this  information to analyze the proposed ACV acquisition approach and  acquisition activities to date. We also reviewed our previous work on the  ACV and EFV programs. In addition, we interviewed program and agency  officials from the USMC’s Advanced Amphibious Assault program office  and Combat Development and Integration, Analysis Directorate, the  Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development,  and Acquisition, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost  Assessment and Program Evaluation.
To determine the extent to which the 2014 ACV Analysis of Alternatives  (AOA) demonstrated the use of best practices, we worked with USMC  officials to identify the body of analyses that informed the 2014 AOA.  Different pieces of each report or analysis in the full body of work were  relevant to different best practices. Because the 2014 ACV AOA is part of  a larger body of related work that informs this analysis, we then worked  with GAO specialists to discuss the 22 AOA best practices and categorize  each as either “individual” or “combined.” Best practices labeled  “individual” have been assessed based on only the 2014 ACV Analysis of  Alternatives final report. Best practices noted as “combined” were  assessed referring to the full body of work that, according to USMC  officials, has informed the analysis of alternatives process. We then  compared the 22 best practices to the 2014 AOA or the full body of AOA  analysis, as determined above. We used a five-point scoring system to  determine the extent to which the AOA conforms to best practices. To  score each AOA process, (1) two GAO analysts separately examined the  AOA documentation received from the agency and then agreed on a  score for each of the 22 best practices, then (2) a GAO AOA specialist  independent of the engagement team reviewed the AOA documentation  and the scores assigned by the analysts for accuracy and cross-checked  the scores in all the analyses for consistency. We first used this scoring  system to determine how well the AOA conformed to each best practice.  We then used the average of the scores for the best practices in each of  four characteristics—well-documented, comprehensive, unbiased, and  credible—to determine an overall score for each characteristic. We sent  our draft analysis to DOD for review. They provided technical comments  and additional documentation that we incorporated to ensure our analysis  included all available information. We then used the same methodology  and scoring process explained above to revise the analysis based on  their technical comments and any additional evidence received. If the  average score for each characteristic was “met” or “substantially met,” we  concluded that the AOA process conformed to best practices and  therefore could be considered reliable.
To determine how the increments of ACV are to achieve amphibious  capability, we reviewed program documentation from the ACV acquisition,  including the acquisition strategy and the Concept of Employment, as well  as program documentation for Navy surface connector programs,  including the Ship to Shore Connector Capabilities Development  Document and the Surface Connector Council charter. We also  interviewed USMC officials from the Combat Development and  Integration, Capabilities Development Directorate and Seabasing  Integration Division, as well as U.S. Navy officials from the Naval Sea  Systems Command.
To update and refine the AOA best practices identified in prior GAO work,  we solicited comments from a set of over 900 internal and external  experts on how to improve the previous set of best practices. All  comments and changes were vetted during three vetting sessions with  internal GAO experts. The resulting changes include the consolidation of  some best practices, reducing the number from 24 to 22, and the  establishment of four characteristics that identify a high-quality, reliable  AOA process.
section_title: Appendix III: Amphibious Combat Vehicle 2014 Analysis of Alternatives Compared with Best Practices
paragraphs: Overall, the DOD’s ACV analysis of alternatives (AOA) met the best  practices we identified. Table 3 below describes our analysis of DOD’s  AOA compared with best practices.
Table 4 provides the average score of the best practices under each  characteristic. See appendix I for an explanation of how individual best  practices are grouped under each characteristic. Because the overall  assessment ratings for each of the four characteristics are substantially  met or met, we concluded that the AOA process conformed to best  practices and can be considered reliable.
section_title: Appendix IV: Additional Information on Selected Surface Connectors and Key Capabilities
subsections: section_title: Current Quantity or Planned Quantity 72
paragraphs: Operating Sea State  with Significant Wave  Height (SWH)  2 (1.0 SWH)  3 (4.1 SWH)
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Key contributors to this report were Bruce H. Thomas, Assistant  Director; Betsy Gregory-Hosler, analyst-in-charge; Zachary Sivo;  Marie Ahearn; Brian Bothwell; Jennifer Echard; Kristine  Hassinger; Katherine Lenane; Jennifer Leotta; David Richards;  Karen Richey; Robert S. Swierczek; Hai Tran; and Ozzy Trevino.