Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa
Published: 2010-07-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: When the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) became fully operational in 2008, it inherited well over 100 activities, missions, programs, and exercises from other Department of Defense (DOD) organizations. AFRICOM initially conducted these inherited activities with little change. However, as AFRICOM has matured, it has begun planning and prioritizing activities with its four military service components, special operations command, and task force. Some activities represent a shift from traditional warfighting, requiring collaboration with the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and other interagency partners. GAO's prior work has identified critical steps and practices that help agencies to achieve success. For this report, GAO was asked to assess AFRICOM in five areas with respect to activity planning and implementation. To do so, GAO analyzed DOD and AFRICOM guidance; observed portions of AFRICOM activities; interviewed officials in Europe and Africa; and obtained perspectives from interagency officials, including those at 22 U.S. embassies in Africa.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: AFRICOM has made progress in developing strategies and engaging interagency partners, and could advance DOD's effort to strengthen the capacity of partner nations in Africa. However, AFRICOM still faces challenges in five areas related to activity planning and implementation. Overcoming these challenges would help AFRICOM with future planning, foster stability and security through improved relationships with African nations, and maximize its effect on the continent. (1) Strategic Planning. AFRICOM has created overarching strategies and led planning meetings, but many specific plans to guide activities have not yet been finalized. For example, AFRICOM has developed a theater strategy and campaign plan but has not completed detailed plans to support its objectives. Also, some priorities of its military service components, special operations command, and task force overlap or differ from each other and from AFRICOM's priorities. Completing plans will help AFRICOM determine whether priorities are aligned across the command and ensure that efforts are appropriate, complementary, and comprehensive. (2) Measuring Effects. AFRICOM is generally not measuring long-term effects of activities. While some capacity-building activities appear to support its mission, federal officials expressed concern that others--such as sponsoring a news Web site in an African region sensitive to the military's presence--may have unintended effects. Without assessing activities, AFRICOM lacks information to evaluate their effectiveness, make informed future planning decisions, and allocate resources. (3) Applying Funds. Some AFRICOM staff have difficulty applying funding sources to activities. DOD has stated that security assistance efforts are constrained by a patchwork of authorities. Limited understanding of various funding sources for activities has resulted in some delayed activities, funds potentially not being used effectively, and African participants being excluded from some activities. (4) Interagency Collaboration. AFRICOM has been coordinating with partners from other federal agencies. As of June 2010, AFRICOM had embedded 27 interagency officials in its headquarters and had 17 offices at U.S. embassies in Africa. However, the command has not fully integrated interagency perspectives early in activity planning or leveraged some embedded interagency staff for their expertise. (5) Building Expertise. AFRICOM staff have made some cultural missteps because they do not fully understand local African customs and may unintentionally burden embassies that must respond to AFRICOM's requests for assistance with activities. Without greater knowledge of these issues, AFRICOM may continue to face difficulties maximizing resources with embassy personnel and building relations with African nations.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that AFRICOM complete its strategic plans, conduct long-term activity assessments, fully integrate interagency personnel into activity planning, and develop training to build staff expertise. DOD agreed with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) created its newest combatant  command, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), to provide a more strategic,  holistic approach to U.S. military activities in Africa. Upon becoming fully  operational in fall 2008, AFRICOM inherited well over 100 activities,  missions, programs, and exercises from other DOD commands that had  been managing activities on the African continent. These activities ranged  from efforts to fight HIV/AIDS in African militaries to assisting African  partners in combating terrorism. AFRICOM’s initial approach was to  continue to conduct these inherited activities with little change. However,  as the command has matured, AFRICOM—with its four military service  components (Army Africa, Naval Forces Africa, Marine Corps Africa, Air  Force Africa), special operations command, and Horn of Africa task  force—has begun planning and prioritizing activities. According to  AFRICOM’s mission statement, its activities will focus on conducting  sustained security engagement and collaborating with other U.S.  government and international partners to promote a stable and secure  African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy. Because some of  AFRICOM’s activities represent a shift from traditional warfighting  activities, AFRICOM’s efforts to plan and implement its activities have  required increased collaboration with other federal partners such as the  Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID).
This report is part of a series of studies on DOD’s efforts in Africa since  the establishment of AFRICOM, which have been requested by the  Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the House  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. In April 2010, we issued  a report on the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, AFRICOM’s  task force that it inherited from U.S. Central Command at Camp  Lemonnier, Djibouti. We recommended, and DOD generally agreed, that  the department determine whether AFRICOM should retain the task force,  and if so, whether changes were needed to the task force’s mission,  structure, and resources to best support AFRICOM’s mission.  Furthermore, we have previously reported and testified on challenges that  AFRICOM has faced since its establishment with regard to its presence on  the continent. We made recommendations to help AFRICOM address the  challenges it faced with respect to communicating its mission, integrating  personnel from other federal agencies (“interagency personnel”) into the  command, and determining the total costs for establishing a permanent  headquarters and offices in Africa. Furthermore, our prior work has noted  that critical steps and practices that help agencies to achieve success  include (1) strategic planning; (2) measuring performance; (3) aligning  resources to support goals; (4) involving stakeholders; and (5) building  expertise. In response to your request, this report assesses AFRICOM in  each of these five areas with respect to activity planning and  implementation.
To conduct our work, we reviewed a wide range of DOD and command  documentation, including DOD strategies and guidance; AFRICOM’s  theater strategy, theater campaign plan, and posture statements; and  AFRICOM components’ priorities and draft strategic plans, when available.  We also reviewed non-DOD documents to determine how AFRICOM’s  strategies compared or aligned with the strategies of other federal  partners, including the fiscal years 2007–2012 Department of State/USAID  Joint Strategic Plan; the USAID Strategic Framework for Africa; and  fiscal year 2008, fiscal year 2009, and fiscal year 2010 mission strategic  plans of 12 U.S. embassies in Africa. We interviewed DOD officials at  many offices including AFRICOM headquarters, its military service  component commands, and special operations command; its Horn of  Africa task force headquarters; the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the  Joint Staff; and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. We also  interviewed officials at State, USAID, and the Coast Guard to obtain other  federal agencies’ perspectives on AFRICOM’s processes for planning and  implementing activities, including the command’s considerations of  interagency perspectives, and we interviewed officials associated with  nongovernmental organizations. We met with U.S. embassy officials in  Uganda, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, and we contacted 20 additional embassies  involved with AFRICOM activities and geographically dispersed  throughout Africa. In addition, we met with some African government and  military officials to obtain their viewpoints on AFRICOM’s activities.
We selected two AFRICOM activities to observe in depth—(1) the Africa  Partnership Station, a maritime safety and security activity, and (2)  Natural Fire 10, a military training exercise associated with AFRICOM’s  pandemic preparedness and response activity. We chose these two  activities based on several factors including their addressing of different  theater security objectives, leadership by different military service  components, considerable involvement of interagency and international  partners, size of the activities, and distinct geographic locations. Detailed  descriptions of these activities can be found in appendixes I and II. We  supplemented our examination of these activities with information on  additional activities highlighted by officials at AFRICOM, its components,  DOD, State, and USAID during our review.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2009 to July 2010, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. Appendix III provides a more detailed  description of our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: When AFRICOM was designated fully operational on September 30, 2008,  it consolidated the responsibility for DOD activities in Africa that had  previously been shared by the U.S. Central, European, and Pacific  Commands. AFRICOM’s area of responsibility includes the countries on  the African continent, with the exception of Egypt, as well as its island  nations. The command’s mission is to work in concert with other U.S.  government agencies and international partners to conduct sustained  security engagement through military-to-military programs, military- sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote  a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.  According to AFRICOM, it received about $340 million in funding in fiscal  year 2009.
In addition to AFRICOM’s headquarters, the command is supported by  military service component commands, a special operations command,  and a Horn of Africa task force (see fig. 1). AFRICOM’s Navy Forces and  Marine Corps components were designated fully operational on October 1,  2008, and its Air Force, Army, and special operations command  components on October 1, 2009. The task force was transferred to  AFRICOM on October 1, 2008. All components have begun carrying out  activities under AFRICOM.
As of June 2010, AFRICOM reported that the command and its  components had about 4,400 assigned personnel and forces. About 2,400  of these personnel were based at locations in Europe, and about 2,000  personnel—about 400 staff and about 1,600 forces—were assigned to the  command’s Horn of Africa task force at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.  AFRICOM also stated that there could be between 3,500 to about 5,000  rotational forces deployed during a major exercise.
When AFRICOM was established, it inherited the activities previously  conducted by its predecessors. Many of these activities reflect DOD’s shift  toward building the security capacity of partner states, a mission area  noted in the department’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. Building  security capacity furthers the U.S. objective of securing a peaceful and  cooperative international order and includes such activities as bilateral  and multilateral training and exercises, foreign military sales and  financing, officer exchange programs, educational opportunities at  professional military schools, technical exchanges, and efforts to assist  foreign security forces in building competency and capacity. In particular,  AFRICOM’s inherited activities to build partner capacity, some of which  involve coordination with State, range from efforts to train African  soldiers in conducting peacekeeping operations to assisting African  nations in combating terrorism, and they include one of the largest U.S.  military activities in Africa, Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara.  The areas of responsibility and examples of activities transferred to  AFRICOM from the U.S. Central, European, and Pacific Commands are  presented in figure 2.
AFRICOM emphasizes that it works in concert with interagency partners,  such as USAID, to ensure that its plans and activities directly support U.S.  foreign policy objectives. On the African continent, DOD focuses on  defense, State plans and implements foreign diplomacy, and USAID leads  foreign development, including efforts to support economic growth and  humanitarian assistance. DOD issued Joint Publication 3-08 in March 2006  to provide guidance to facilitate coordination between DOD and  interagency organizations. The publication acknowledged that the various  U.S. government agencies’ differing, and sometimes conflicting, goals,  policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques make unity of effort  a challenge, but noted that close coordination and cooperation can help  overcome challenges. The 2008 National Defense Strategy identified  AFRICOM as an example of DOD’s efforts toward collaborating with other  U.S. government departments and agencies and working to achieve a  whole-of-government approach. Additionally, the 2010 Quadrennial  Defense Review identified the need to continue improving DOD’s  cooperation with other U.S. agencies. In particular, the report stated that  DOD will work with the leadership of civilian agencies to support those  agencies’ growth and their overseas operations so that the appropriate  military and civilian resources are put forth to meet the demands of  current contingencies. In our February 2009 report on AFRICOM, we  noted that after DOD declared AFRICOM fully operational, concerns about  AFRICOM’s mission and activities persisted among various stakeholders.  Concerns included areas such as humanitarian assistance and other  noncombat activities that involve non-DOD agencies and organizations.  The concerns centered on the view that AFRICOM could blur traditional  boundaries between diplomacy, development, and defense. In some cases,  the apprehensions stemmed from DOD having more resources than other  agencies and thus it could dominate U.S. activities and relationships in  Africa. Among African nations, we found that there was some concern that  AFRICOM would be used as an opportunity to increase the number of U.S.  troops and military bases in Africa.
section_title: AFRICOM Has Created Some Overarching Strategic Guidance, but Activities Are Being Implemented While Many Plans Remain Unfinished
paragraphs: AFRICOM has created overarching strategic guidance and has led activity  planning meetings with its stakeholders such as State. However, activities  are being implemented as the detailed supporting plans for conducting  many activities have not yet been finalized. Moreover, AFRICOM has  postponed time frames for completing several of these supporting plans by  about 2 years. Without supporting plans, AFRICOM cannot ensure that the  activities of its components are appropriate, comprehensive,  complementary, and supportive of its mission.
subsections: section_title: AFRICOM Has Developed Some Overarching Strategies and Led Planning Meetings
paragraphs: AFRICOM has published command-level overarching strategic guidance  and has led activity planning meetings with its components and  interagency partners. Strategic plans are the starting point and  underpinning for a system of program goal-setting and performance  measurement in the federal government. DOD strategic planning guidance,  issued in 2008, requires each geographic combatant command to produce  a theater campaign plan and specific posture requirements for its given  area of responsibility. In September 2008, AFRICOM published its theater  strategy, a 10-year strategy describing the strategic environment in which  the command operates. In May 2009, the Secretary of Defense approved  AFRICOM’s theater campaign plan, a 5-year plan that describes the  command’s theater strategic objectives, establishes priorities to guide the  command’s activities, and provides guidance to the command’s staff and  components. In its theater campaign plan, AFRICOM outlined priority  countries that are of strategic importance, and it identified its theater  strategic objectives, such as defeating the al-Qaeda terrorist organization  and associated networks in Africa; ensuring that capacity exists to  respond to crises; improving security-sector governance and stability; and  protecting populations from deadly contagions. AFRICOM officials said  that they worked with State and USAID officials to incorporate their  perspectives into the theater campaign plan. However, AFRICOM officials  observed that the Africa strategies for State and USAID have different  timelines from those of AFRICOM, thus posing a challenge for alignment  among the command and its interagency partners. For example,  AFRICOM’s theater campaign plan covers fiscal years 2010 through 2014,  whereas the State/USAID strategic plan spans fiscal years 2007 through  2012.
In addition to developing its theater strategy and campaign plan,  AFRICOM has also led activity planning meetings for future activities. The  command has held annual Theater Security Cooperation Conferences,  which include officials from AFRICOM, its components, U.S. embassies,  and other federal agencies. At these meetings, AFRICOM proposes  activities to conduct for the following fiscal year, and it engages with other  federal agency officials to coordinate and implement activities.  Additionally, for individual activities, AFRICOM may hold multiple  planning meetings prior to implementation. For example, for AFRICOM’s  Natural Fire 10 pandemic preparedness and response activity, four phases  of planning occurred during the year prior to the exercise. These phases  included: concept development, in which potential focuses for the  exercise were discussed; initial planning, in which the final focus of the  exercise and its location were determined; main planning, in which key  partners determined the activities that would make up the exercise; and  final planning. Similarly, in July 2009, we observed the main planning  conference for activities of the Africa Partnership Station’s USS Gunston  Hall, which was deployed from March through May 2010. This conference  built upon the progress of the initial planning conference, and it was  followed by a final planning conference to identify specific details for the  activity. During our observation of the main planning conference, we  noted that AFRICOM’s Navy component engaged DOD, interagency, and  African partners in the coordination of Africa Partnership Station events.
section_title: Many Plans Remain Unfinished, Hindering Activity Planning
paragraphs: Although AFRICOM has developed overarching strategic guidance and led  planning meetings, it lacks specific supporting plans on conducting  activities, which hinders planning and implementation efforts. As we  previously reported, an agency should cascade its goals and objectives  throughout the organization and should align performance measures with  the objectives from the executive level down to the operational levels.  While AFRICOM’s theater campaign plan identifies strategic objectives, it  does not include detailed information on how to plan, implement, or  evaluate specific activities. Rather, the theater campaign plan states that  AFRICOM is to create specific supporting plans—(1) component support  plans, (2) regional engagement plans, and (3) country work plans—with  more detailed information. However, AFRICOM has not yet approved its  military service components, special operations command, and task force  support plans for use in guiding their activities. Furthermore, the  command has not completed its five regional engagement plans or country  work plans for Africa (see fig. 3).
In reviewing AFRICOM’s theater campaign plan, we found that it provides  overarching guidance but does not include specific information such as  detailed activity information and the amount of effort focused on specific countries or regions. Rather, AFRICOM’s theater campaign plan sta specific supporting plans will provide this information. To examine how  another combatant command approaches planning, we compared  AFRICOM’s theater campaign plan to that of the U.S. Southern Comm a more mature DOD geographic combatant command that operates in t Americas and Caribbean, which, like AFRICOM, also has a focus on  building partner capacity and collaborating with interagency partne While this comparison was not meant to conclude that one comb command’s approach is superior to the other, our analysis did find  differences between the two plans. For example, we noted that  AFRICOM’s theater campaign plan identifies only one activity—the  African Partners Enlisted Development program—and calls for the  establishment of regional engagement plans to focus on activities and  programs. In contrast, Southern Command’s theater campaign p includes detailed information on dozens of its activities, and no supporting regional engagement plans are required. Additionally, although  AFRICOM’s theater campaign plan identifies priority countries or for each of its theater strategic objectives, it calls for supporting regiona engagement plans and country work plans to provide additional  information on regional and country information. In contrast, Southern  Command’s theater campaign plan specifically details the percentage of  engagement effort that will be directed toward each region and count essence, it appears that both Southern Command and AFRICOM requ that similar types of information on regional efforts and activities be  incorporated into plans. The difference is that AFRICOM ’s approach  requires the completion of supporting plans while Southern Command  provides this information in its theater campaign plan.
AFRICOM’s specific supporting plans—its components’ support pl regional engagement plans—have not yet been completed. AFRICOM’s  theater campaign plan required that component support plans be  completed by each AFRICOM component no later than December 1, 2009 to address activities for fiscal years 2010 through 2012. According to  AFRICOM, as of June 2010, four of the six component support plans had  nder  been developed and were ready to present to the AFRICOM comma ped in  for approval. The Navy’s supporting plan, for example, was develo November 2009, but had not yet been signed out by the AFRICOM  commander. AFRICOM’s theater campaign plan also requires the  development of five regional engagement plans—North, East, Central,  West, and South—to provide more detailed regional, country, and  ,  programmatic guidance. Specifically, AFRICOM’s theater campaign plan  states that both it and the regional engagement plans provide the  command’s prioritization of time, effort, and resources for all steady-state  activities that the command executes. The theater campaign plan states  that regional engagement plans should contain three elements: (1) regio planning guidance, which highlights key objectives for each region t hat  must nest within the theater security objectives outlined in the theate campaign plans; (2) a 2-year calendar that depicts planned security  cooperation engagement activities, month by month, and country by  country, for the region; and (3) country work plans, which should be  developed for each critical partner identified in the theater campaign  The country work plans should include a detailed list of activities and  events designed to make progress toward objectives for each region  within a particular country, and they are required to be aligned with U.S.  embassy Mission Strategic and Resource Plans to ensure unity of effort.  At the time we completed our audit  work, the regional engagement plans  had not been approved by the command, and the country plans were still  in the process of being developed.  plan.
Furthermore, AFRICOM has postponed time frames for completing sever of its supporting plans. For example, completion of the regional  engagement plans has been repeatedly delayed throughout our review— postponed by about 2 years—from February 2009 to October 2009 to May ad  2010 to the first quarter of fiscal year 2011. While AFRICOM officials h previously told us that component support plans would be completed by  December 2009, officials later stated that they expect the plans to be  completed within 60 days of the regional engagement plans. DOD officials  told us that AFRICOM held a planners’ conference in April 2010 and tha draft plans, such as country work plans, were discussed at this meetin obtain the components’ input. Moreover, in the absence of plans, DO stated that AFRICOM holds weekly meetings with the components to  discuss activities. However, by conducting activities without h specific plans in place to guide activity planning and implementation,  A FRICOM risks not fully supporting its mission or objectives.
section_title: AFRICOM’s Components Identify Differing Priorities
paragraphs: Without having approved component support plans and regional  engagement plans, AFRICOM and its components cannot be sure that they  are conducting activities that align with the command’s priorities.  Currently, each of the military service components has established priority  countries/areas in Africa, but in some cases they overlap or differ from  each other and also differ from the priority countries that AFRICOM has  identified. Air Force component officials told us, for example, that they  used AFRICOM’s designation of priority countries to inform their initial  identification of priority countries, but they also considered where U.S.  Europe Command’s Air Force component had prior engagements or  existing relationships with Africans. These officials told us that they  recently updated their priority countries based on their own objectives.  The officials explained that, because the Air Force component has  different objectives than AFRICOM’s other military service components  and because certain African countries have varying levels of Air Force  capabilities, their designated priority countries would not necessarily  coincide with those of other military service components. Marine Corps  component officials said that their designated priority countries reinforce  AFRICOM’s designated “willing and capable” African nations; however,  our analysis shows that the priority countries identified by AFRICOM and  those identified by its Marine Corps component also do not fully align.  Additionally, activities currently conducted by the military service  components may overlap with AFRICOM’s Combined Joint Task Force– Horn of Africa’s operating area.
AFRICOM stated that in the absence of completed supporting plans, it has  taken some steps to coordinate activities among its components, including  the use of an information database to manage individual activities.  AFRICOM stated that use of the database helps ensure a unified effort  among the components. While component officials we spoke with said  that the database can help them determine whether another AFRICOM  component is planning an activity within a similar time frame or with the  same African country, they noted that use of the database is preliminary  within AFRICOM and that not all component activities may be included in  the database. Air Force component officials said that they currently lack  visibility and coordination with the other components for the full range of  activities, and as a result, they may be unaware of some activities being  planned or conducted by other AFRICOM components. Similarly, officials  from AFRICOM’s Army component stated that perhaps the greatest  challenge to creating positive conditions in Africa is ensuring that U.S.  defense efforts remain synchronized; if plans are not coordinated, their  efforts could have unintended consequences, such as the potential for  Africans to perceive the U.S. military as trying to influence public opinion  in a region sensitive to the military’s presence. Until AFRICOM completes  specific plans to guide its activity-planning efforts and determines whether  priorities are appropriately aligned across the command, it cannot ensure  that the efforts of its components are appropriate, complementary, and  comprehensive.
section_title: AFRICOM Has Not Made Decisions Regarding Its Horn of Africa Task Force, Which Impedes Planning
paragraphs: AFRICOM has yet to make critical decisions about the future of its Horn of  Africa task force, including what changes, if any, are needed for the task  force or its activities to best support the command. In April 2010, we  reported that AFRICOM had not decided whether changes are needed to  the task force’s mission, structure, and resources to best support the  command’s mission of sustained security engagement in Africa.  Moreover, AFRICOM has stated that, as the capabilities of its military  service components become mature, the command will determine the best  course of action for transferring task force activities to the other  components as necessary to ensure sustained security engagement with  African countries within the task force’s operating area. Some military  service component officials said that coordination with the task force can  be difficult. For example, Air Force component officials said that it has  been challenging to coordinate with the task force because it is unclear  how the task force’s roles, responsibilities, and efforts align with those of  AFRICOM and the Air Force component.
With the exception of the task force, each of AFRICOM’s component  commands is located in Europe and does not have assigned forces (see fig.  1). To conduct their activities, forces for AFRICOM’s military service  component activities are requested through a formal Joint Staff process.  Force planning currently occurs within the Joint Staff 2 years prior to the  designated fiscal year; forces needed for emergent requirements must  typically be requested 120 days in advance. AFRICOM officials told us that  the command must request forces and equipment for its military service  components to carry out any type of activity in Africa—whether it be a  large-scale operation or additional personnel needed to travel to the  continent to plan a future program. Moreover, they said that AFRICOM  does not always receive the forces or equipment it requests for an activity  because DOD may have higher-priority needs. From AFRICOM’s and some  military service components’ perspective, having to formally request  forces for all activities may affect AFRICOM’s effectiveness if there are  greater DOD priorities. Furthermore, the special operations command  component stated that, without assigned forces, it cannot act as a crisis- response force, which is the role of special operations commands in other  combatant commands. AFRICOM has occasionally used Combined Joint  Task Force–Horn of Africa personnel with appropriate skill sets outside of  its operating area and area-of-interest countries, such as in Liberia and  Swaziland, and these forces could potentially be leveraged for other  activities. Completing an evaluation of the task force in a thorough yet  expeditious manner and clearly articulating any needed changes to the  task force’s mission, structure, and resources will aid in AFRICOM’s  efforts to plan and prioritize the many activities it inherited upon its  establishment and ensure that personnel and resources are applied most  effectively to enhance U.S. military efforts in Africa.
section_title: AFRICOM Is Generally Not Measuring the Long- Term Effects of Its Activities to Determine Whether They Fully Align with the Command’s Mission
paragraphs: It is unclear whether all of the activities that AFRICOM has inherited or is  planning fully align with its mission of sustained security engagement in  Africa because, in addition to unfinished strategic plans, AFRICOM is  generally not measuring the long-term effects of its activities. Our prior  work has highlighted the importance of developing mechanisms to  monitor, evaluate, and report on results, and we have previously reported  that U.S. agencies cannot be fully assured that they have effectively  allocated resources without establishing an assessment process. In  addition, according to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government, U.S. agencies should monitor and assess the quality of  performance over time. The lack of clear, measurable goals makes it  difficult for program managers and staff to establish linkages between  their day-to-day efforts and the agency’s achievement of its intended  mission. The Government Performance and Results Act also emphasizes  that agencies should measure performance toward the achievement of  goals. Moreover, AFRICOM’s theater campaign plan requires assessments  of theater security cooperation activities.
AFRICOM has developed a tool to measure progress in meeting its  strategic objectives. The tool measures objective factors (e.g., number of  identified al-Qaeda members in a country), subjective factors (e.g.,  likelihood of an imminent terrorist attack), and perceptive factors (e.g.,  the level of protection against terrorism Africans expect their governments  can provide). However, AFRICOM officials told us that this tool is used  primarily for strategic planning purposes and not for follow-up on  individual activities.
Moreover, beyond AFRICOM, our prior work has shown that DOD and  State have conducted little monitoring and evaluation of certain security  assistance programs. Specifically, DOD and State have not carried out  systematic program monitoring of funds for projects that, among other  things, train and equip partner nations’ militaries to conduct  counterterrorism operations. Instead, reporting has generally consisted  of anecdotal information, although DOD has taken initial steps to establish  systematic program monitoring. For example, DOD has hired a contractor  to identify current project roles, data sources, and ongoing assessment  activities in order to develop a framework for assessing projects. However,  DOD officials stated that they had not consistently monitored these  security assistance projects, and State officials were not involved with or  aware of a formal evaluation process. Our review of 58 proposals for  security assistance projects in African countries from fiscal years 2007 to  2009 revealed that only 15, or 26 percent, of the proposals included a  description of how the activities would be monitored over time. In  addition, only 10 of the project proposals, or 17 percent, included  information related to program objectives or anticipated outcomes.
subsections: section_title: Some Activities Appear to Support AFRICOM’s Mission, but Others May Have Unintended Consequences
paragraphs: While some activities appear to support AFRICOM’s mission, others may  have unintended consequences—which underscores the importance of  consistently measuring the long-term effects of the full range of the  command’s activities. AFRICOM has stated that a primary purpose of its  activities is to build partner capacity. The two activities we reviewed in  depth appear to support this mission. First, the Africa Partnership Station  initiative builds maritime security capabilities of African partners through  ship- and land-based training events focused on areas such as maritime  domain awareness, leadership, navigation, maritime law enforcement,  search and rescue, civil engineering, and logistics (see app. I). Second, the  command’s Natural Fire 10 exercise brought together participants from  Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda to build partner capacity  in responding to a pandemic influenza outbreak (see app. II). Moreover,  State and U.S. embassy officials said that peacekeeping and military-to- military training activities help support embassy goals and U.S. foreign  policy objectives in African nations. For example, the U.S. embassy in  Algeria stated that AFRICOM’s activities directly support the embassy’s  objectives of counterterrorism cooperation and engaging with and  modernizing the Algerian military. In addition, a senior official at the U.S.  embassy in Mozambique told us that AFRICOM supports the embassy’s  goals pertaining to maritime security and professionalizing Mozambique’s  military.
However, based on concerns raised by interagency officials, other  activities may not fully align with U.S. foreign policy goals or they may not  reflect the most effective use of resources. For example, State officials  expressed concern over AFRICOM’s sponsorship of a news Web site about  the Maghreb, citing the potential for Africans to perceive the U.S. military  as trying to influence public opinion. State had previously told us that  countries in the Maghreb are very sensitive to foreign military presence,  and if a program is marketed as a U.S. military activity or operation, it may  not be well received among these nations. AFRICOM officials said that  they had inherited this activity from U.S. European Command and that  they have been working closely with State in its implementation.  Moreover, DOD officials observed that, with respect to the Maghreb news  Web site sponsorship, the intent of the activity is to influence African  public sentiment—the same effect for which some State officials have  expressed concern. They said that State supports this as a foreign policy  goal in Africa, and senior State officials have endorsed the Maghreb news  Web site sponsorship activity. Similarly, some officials questioned whether  the U.S. military should conduct a musical caravan activity in Senegal,  which is intended to promote peace by having local artists provide free  concerts throughout the country. State officials noted that the activity has  overwhelmed embassy staff, who had to spend significant time ensuring  that AFRICOM’s effort was appropriately aligned with embassy goals.  AFRICOM officials acknowledged that there have been some concerns  with this activity and that it is being reviewed by both the command and  State. However, AFRICOM noted that all activities within a country are  reviewed and approved by the U.S. embassy before they are executed.
However, at the U.S. embassy level, officials also expressed concern about  some of AFRICOM’s activities. For example, according to one U.S.  embassy, AFRICOM’s sociocultural research and advisory teams, which  comprise one to five social scientists who conduct research and provide  cultural advice to AFRICOM, seem to duplicate other interagency efforts.  AFRICOM officials told us that they use the information provided by the  teams to help guide operations in Africa and obtain perspectives on  cultural sensitivities among the local populations. However, the embassy  expressed concern about the U.S. military performing this type of research  itself instead of coordinating with interagency partners to gain  sociocultural information. Moreover, an internal State memo emphasized  the need for close coordination among AFRICOM’s research teams and  U.S. embassies. In March 2010, the Secretary of State issued guidance to  U.S. embassies in Africa on AFRICOM’s sociocultural research and  advisory activities, stating that AFRICOM’s research teams will share their  findings with embassy staff and other government counterparts. Finally,  State and USAID officials we contacted at one U.S. embassy expressed  concern that some of the activities that AFRICOM’s Horn of Africa task  force had previously proposed, such as building schools for an African  nation, did not appear to fit into a larger strategic framework, and said that  they did not believe the task force was monitoring its activities as needed  to enable it to demonstrate a link between activities and mission. The  embassy officials cited a past example where the task force had proposed  drilling a well without considering how its placement could cause conflict  in clan relationships or affect pastoral routes. While concerns raised about  specific AFRICOM activities may or may not be valid, without conducting  long-term assessments of activities, AFRICOM lacks the information  needed to evaluate the effects of the full range of its activities, to be able  to respond to critics if need be, and to make informed future planning  decisions.
section_title: AFRICOM Generally Does Not Measure the Long- Term Effects of Its Activities
paragraphs: AFRICOM appears to perform some follow-up on activities shortly after  their completion, but the command is generally not measuring the effects  of activities over the long term. AFRICOM officials we met with while  observing the command’s Natural Fire 10 pandemic preparedness and  response activity in Uganda told us that the command planned to produce  an “after action” report after the activity, but they acknowledged that  AFRICOM needs to develop a method to perform longer-term assessments  on activities. With respect to the Natural Fire engineering projects, for  example, the officials said that AFRICOM does not know whether projects  such as reconstructing a school will have a sustainable effect on the  community. AFRICOM’s Humanitarian Assistance Branch has developed  an assessment tool for Natural Fire that relates to the command’s security  objectives, but an official told us that AFRICOM is still determining exactly  what will be assessed with respect to the activity. AFRICOM also envisions  continuing its work on pandemic response by engaging bilaterally with  each of the countries involved in the 2009 Natural Fire exercise.
DOD, State, and officials we contacted at several U.S. embassies in Africa  also stated that, from their perspectives, AFRICOM is not measuring the  long-term effects of its activities in Africa. State officials told us, for  example, that AFRICOM’s Military Information Support Teams, which are  intended to support State and U.S. embassies by augmenting or  broadening existing public-diplomacy efforts, are not assessing the effect  of their efforts. In addition, while the Africa Partnership Station activity  has been viewed as a successful African partner training platform,  concerns were raised that it may have taken on too many training  activities—which range from maritime domain awareness to maritime law  enforcement to civil engineering to humanitarian assistance efforts. With  the potential for its mission to become amorphous or lose its  effectiveness, it was suggested that the Africa Partnership Station might be  more effective if it targeted its resources toward fewer activities.
In our April 2010 report on AFRICOM’s Horn of Africa task force, we  noted that the task force performs some short-term follow-up on activities,  but AFRICOM officials said that the task force has not historically been  focused on performing long-term assessments on activities to determine  whether the activities are having their intended effects or whether  modifications to activities need to be made. In response to our report, the  task force acknowledged that it needed to improve its ability to evaluate  the effectiveness of its activities. The task force stated that it had taken  steps to incorporate measures of performance and effects in its planning  process so that it can determine whether its activities are achieving  foreign policy goals. The command’s sociocultural research and advisory  team in the area is also being used to help assess task force activities, and  the task force is beginning to follow-up on past activities, such as medical  clinics, to determine their effects over time. We commend the task force  for these efforts, which could serve as models for implementing long-term  activity assessments across AFRICOM.
AFRICOM’s limited long-term evaluation of activities to date may result, in  part, from the differences in agency cultures among DOD, State, and  USAID. Officials from State and USAID told us that their agencies are  focused on monitoring and on long-term results, while they viewed DOD  as having a tendency to take a short-term approach focused on immediate  implementation or results. Similarly, nonprofit-organization officials said  that, from their perspective, the U.S. military tends to view development  activities on a onetime basis and is not focused on monitoring or  measuring the effects of an activity after completion. They voiced concern  that AFRICOM will not know whether its activities are effective or be in a  position to evaluate the quality of the services its activities may be  providing.
Long-term evaluation can be difficult to achieve but remains nonetheless  important for AFRICOM in meeting its mission in Africa. While some  activities may promote temporary benefits for the participants, their short- term nature or unintended long-term effects could potentially promote  unfavorable views of the U.S. military among partner nations. We  previously reported, for example, that AFRICOM’s Horn of Africa task  force had built a well for a local African community, but it did not teach  the community how to maintain it. AFRICOM officials stated that they  recognize the difficulties associated with measuring long-term effects of  activities, particularly the ability to link an action to a desired effect. For  example, AFRICOM Navy component officials told us that it is difficult to  measure the Africa Partnership Station’s return on investment because  changes in Africa can be incremental and thus it can be difficult to  determine whether the activity caused the change or whether the effects  will persist over time. The Navy has been working with the Center for  Naval Analyses to assess the Africa Partnership Station. Center for Naval  Analyses officials told us that their work has shown that Africa  Partnership Station training has been successful in changing African  participants’ attitudes toward maritime safety and security activities but  that it has been more difficult to show changes in the behavior of  participating African nations. Despite the challenges associated with  measuring long-term effects, implementing such assessments for all of its  activities can help AFRICOM make successful future planning decisions  and allocate resources to maximize its effect in Africa.
section_title: Some AFRICOM Staff Face Difficulties in Applying Multiple Funding Resources to Activities
paragraphs: Some AFRICOM staff face difficulties in applying funding to activities,  which can pose challenges in implementing activities and impede long- term planning efforts. AFRICOM stated that it had access to 15 different  funding sources to fund its activities in fiscal year 2009. In addition,  AFRICOM reported that it influences other State and USAID funding  sources—such as funds for State’s Global Peacekeeping and Operations  Initiative and International Military Education and Training, and USAID’s  Pandemic Response Program—but that these funding sources are not  managed by the command. We consistently heard from officials at  AFRICOM and its components that applying funding to activities was not  well understood by staff and that they lacked expertise to effectively carry  out this task. For example, Army component officials told us that activities  must be designed to meet specific criteria in order to be granted funds and  that their staff do not have the skills required to understand the  complexities of funding. Similarly, Navy and Air Force component officials  said that staff spend substantial amounts of time trying to determine  which funding sources can be appropriately applied to which activities.  Many different funding sources may be required for small segments of an  activity, such as transportation or lodging for participants.
Determining which specific funding sources should be used for various  activities has sometimes resulted in problems with activities. Officials  cited instances in which limited understanding resulted in African nations  having their invitations to AFRICOM-sponsored activities rescinded or in  activities having to be canceled. In two recent instances, an official said  that AFRICOM essentially disinvited two-thirds of the intended  participants for activities at the last minute because it was discovered that  certain funding sources could not be used to support the participants. This  caused much embarrassment and frustration for the Africans who had  planned to attend the activities. Marine Corps component officials said  that difficulties in identifying the appropriate funding source prevented  them from responding to African requests for activities, causing the  cancellation of some peacekeeping exercises. AFRICOM’s Navy  component has also struggled with the application of multiple funding  sources to the Africa Partnership Station activity, an official explained,  occasionally resulting in delayed submissions of funding packages to U.S.  embassies for approval. Table 1 shows eight different funding sources  required for theater security cooperation activities associated with the  Africa Partnership Station’s 2009 USS Nashville deployment.
According to AFRICOM’s Navy component, funding a large activity like the  Africa Partnership Station on a 1-year planning horizon has hindered the  ability to conduct persistent training efforts. Officials said that funding  sources, such as the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund, are only  available for a year and must be applied only to new initiatives. Similarly,  Global War on Terrorism funds, now known as Overseas Contingency  Operations funds, are supplemental appropriations, which officials said do  not provide permanency for the activity. Our prior work has encouraged  DOD to include known or likely project costs of ongoing operations  related to the war on terrorism in DOD’s base budget requests. Navy  component officials told us that Africa Partnership Station may get its own  funding line for fiscal years 2011 through 2015. If approved by the  President, Navy component officials believe the dedicated budget line  would help facilitate funding the activity, although AFRICOM added that  the Africa Partnership Station will still require several funding sources to  support the activity.
In its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD stated that U.S. security  assistance efforts are constrained by a complex patchwork of authorities  and unwieldy processes. Several AFRICOM and component officials we  contacted agreed, with some stating that funding challenges hampered  their ability to sustain relationships in Africa. AFRICOM stated that the  limitations of current funding sources create a continuing challenge for  the command, noting that some funding sources were not designed for the  types of activities AFRICOM carries out and thus do not adequately  support AFRICOM’s mission of sustained security engagement. Army  component officials said that funding sources available for activities tend  to be short term and must be used in a finite time frame, which limits long- term planning capabilities and the ability to have a sustained presence in  Africa. AFRICOM’s special operations command officials said that the lack  of sustainable funding sources has created a short-term, unsustainable  approach to the command’s activities, describing their efforts as sporadic  connections with African countries with which they should have enduring  relationships. Marine Corps component officials described having to ask  AFRICOM for funds for activities that fall outside of funding cycles, noting  the need for streamlined funding for effective sustained engagement in  Africa.
Our prior work on security assistance activities also found that the long- term effect of some projects may be at risk because it is uncertain whether  funds will be available to sustain the military capabilities that the projects  are intended to build. There are limits on the use of U.S. government  funds for sustainment of certain security assistance projects, and most  participating countries have relatively low incomes and may be unwilling  or unable to provide the necessary resources to sustain the projects.  Moreover, officials told us that the process for submitting proposals for  security assistance projects is lengthy, requiring them to begin writing the  next fiscal year’s plans before the last year’s are processed, and that the  time frames for receiving and applying the funding from the various  funding sources needed for the project do not necessarily align with one  another. For example, AFRICOM might apply resources from one funding  source to deliver a maritime vessel to an African country, but the  resources that must be obtained from another funding source to train the  recipients on how to use the vessel may fall within a different time frame.
DOD guidance emphasizes the need for proper training and staffing to  increase effectiveness in budgeting. AFRICOM component officials told  us that guidance or training on applying funding sources to activities  would be helpful. When we asked about funding expertise within  AFRICOM, Air Force component officials said that it is difficult to find  assistance at AFRICOM because officials must first be able to identify the  appropriate funding source in order to ask the correct AFRICOM staff  member about that source. From their perspective, no individual at  AFRICOM or its Air Force component command has comprehensive  knowledge of all available funding sources for activities. AFRICOM  officials said they provide the components guidance on the Combatant  Commander Initiative Fund and noted that AFRICOM does not provide the  actual funding to the components for many sources they use to fund  activities. Additionally, they said that the command is researching funding  sources available for activities, which they believe will help AFRICOM  better define which sources can be applied to which activities.
Our April 2010 report on AFRICOM’s Horn of Africa task force found  similar issues among the task force’s budget staff. According to task force  officials, budget staff must master a steep learning curve to understand the  provisions associated with these funding sources because the task force  comptroller and deputy comptroller are not financial specialists, generally  do not work on military comptroller issues full time, and have short tour  lengths. This steep learning curve can result in delays in conducting  activities, as task force staff described spending extra time and resources  understanding how to apply funding to activities. Moreover, AFRICOM  stated that command staffing and tour lengths contribute to the difficulties  in learning and maintaining knowledge of funding for task force activities.  For example, task force staff had intended to continue providing training  for senior enlisted Ethiopian military members through one type of  funding source, but they later found that the source did not allow for  training of foreign military members. Consequently, the staff had to revise  their program from one of training officers to one of providing feedback to  Ethiopian instructors. While eventually task force staff may correctly  identify funding sources for their activities, their limited skills in applying  funding may result in difficulties in implementing activities. We  recommended that AFRICOM take actions to ensure that its task force  budget personnel have the expertise and knowledge necessary to make  timely and accurate funding decisions for activities. DOD concurred with  our recommendation and cited some actions it had taken or planned— such as conducting on-the-job training and lengthening some tours for  personnel—to augment critical skills among task force personnel. We  believe the steps DOD outlined, if implemented in a timely and  comprehensive manner, could help increase understanding and expertise  associated with applying funding sources to activities within AFRICOM’s  Horn of Africa task force. However, DOD’s comments were limited to  AFRICOM’s task force personnel and do not address the lack of  understanding of funding sources throughout the command. Without a  greater understanding of how to apply funding to activities, AFRICOM will  likely continue to face difficulties in implementing activities—including  the potential that activities may be delayed, funds may not be effectively  used, and African partner nations may be excluded from participating—as  well as institutionalizing knowledge within the command.
section_title: AFRICOM Has Made Efforts to Collaborate with Interagency Partners but Is Not Fully Engaging Them in Activity Planning Processes
paragraphs: AFRICOM has made efforts to integrate interagency personnel into its  command and collaborate with other federal agencies on activities, but it  is not fully engaging interagency partners in planning processes.
subsections: section_title: AFRICOM Has Integrated Interagency Personnel into the Command
paragraphs: According to DOD and AFRICOM officials, integrating personnel from  other U.S. government agencies into the command is essential to achieving  AFRICOM’s mission because it will help AFRICOM develop plans and  activities that are more compatible with those agencies. AFRICOM was  established with two deputy commanders—a military commander that  oversees military operations and a civilian commander for civil-military  activities. The civilian commander directs the command’s activities related  to areas such as health, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and  peace support operations. According to AFRICOM, this deputy  commander—who is currently a State ambassador-level official—also  directs outreach, strategic communication, and AFRICOM’s partner- building functions.
As of June 2010, AFRICOM reported that it embedded 27 interagency  partners into its headquarters staff, which represents about 2 percent of  the total headquarters staff. These officials have been placed in several  directorates throughout the command. The interagency staff came from  several federal agencies, including the Departments of Energy, Homeland  Security, Justice, State, and Treasury; USAID; the Office of the Director of  National Intelligence; and the National Security Agency. The command  also plans to integrate five foreign policy advisors from State later this  year, according to officials at AFRICOM and State. Moreover, DOD has  signed memorandums of understanding with nine federal agencies to  outline conditions on sending interagency partners to AFRICOM. These  memorandums cover such topics as the financial reimbursement between  DOD and the federal agencies for participating employees, the length of  time the interagency partner may reside at AFRICOM, and logistical  provisions (housing, office space, etc.). Table 2 compares the reported  number of interagency personnel at AFRICOM at the time it reached  unified command status with that of June 2010.
AFRICOM has had difficulty obtaining interagency officials to work at the  command at the numbers desired. In February 2009, we reported that the  command initially expected to fill 52 positions with personnel from other  government agencies. However, according to DOD and AFRICOM  officials, this initial goal was notional and was not based on an analysis of  specific skill sets needed to accomplish AFRICOM’s mission. During our  current review, command officials told us that there is no target number  for interagency personnel, but rather that AFRICOM is trying to determine  where in its command organization it could benefit from employing  interagency personnel or where interagency partners would prefer to  provide personnel. Command officials said that it would be helpful to have  additional interagency staff at AFRICOM, but they understand that staffing  limitations, resource imbalances, and lack of career progression incentives  for embedded staff from other federal agencies may limit the number of  personnel who can be brought in from these agencies.
section_title: AFRICOM Has Coordinated with Other Federal Agencies, but Is Not Fully Engaging Federal Partners in Activity Planning Processes
paragraphs: AFRICOM has coordinated with other federal agencies. For example,  AFRICOM met with representatives from 16 agencies to gain interagency  input into its theater campaign plan. We spoke with officials from State,  USAID, and the Coast Guard who stated that they provided input into  several additional strategy documents, including DOD’s Guidance for  Employment of the Force and AFRICOM’s posture statement, as well as  participated in activity planning meetings. State officials stated that  AFRICOM has made improvements in taking their feedback and creating  an environment that is conducive to cooperation across agencies.  Similarly, USAID officials told us that AFRICOM has improved its  coordination with their agency at the USAID headquarters level.  Additionally, AFRICOM has created memorandums of understanding with  some U.S. embassies, such as between AFRICOM’s Horn of Africa task  force and the U.S. embassy in Kenya. This memorandum outlines  procedures for conducting activities, actions to be taken by task force  personnel in Kenya, and communication policies between the task force  and the embassy, among other topics.
While AFRICOM has made efforts to work with interagency partners, it is  not fully engaging federal partners in activity planning processes in two  areas. Our prior work has recommended, and the department generally  agreed, that DOD provide specific implementation guidance to combatant  commanders on the mechanisms that are needed to facilitate and  encourage interagency participation in the development of military plans,  develop a process to share planning information with interagency  representatives early in the planning process, and develop an approach to  overcome differences in planning culture, training, and capacities among  the affected agencies. Some interagency officials have stated that  AFRICOM (1) is not always involving other federal agencies in the  formative stages of activity planning, and (2) does not fully leverage  expertise of interagency personnel embedded at AFRICOM.
subsections: section_title: AFRICOM Does Not Always Involve Interagency Partners in Formative Planning Stages
paragraphs: While AFRICOM has made progress in coordinating with other federal  agencies since its establishment, interagency partners may not be included  in the formative stages of activity planning. DOD’s 2010 Quadrennial  Defense Review states that the department will continue to advocate for  an improved interagency strategic planning process. However, several  federal agency officials said that AFRICOM tends to plan activities first  and then engage partners, rather than including interagency perspectives  during the initial planning efforts.
Several interagency officials stated that AFRICOM has tended to develop  initial activity plans before integrating interagency perspectives. Some U.S.  embassy officials described AFRICOM’s annual activity planning meetings,  the Theater Security Cooperation Conferences, as useful for bringing  together AFRICOM and federal partners to plan for future AFRICOM  activities; however, they noted that past meetings have been limited in  their effectiveness because AFRICOM set the agenda without interagency  input, which they viewed as restricting their role. Additionally, officials  said that AFRICOM gave presentations of its planned exercises during one  of its annual activity planning conferences, but there was not meaningful  discussion with interagency partners on the most appropriate activities to  conduct. One official described the embassies’ role at the conference as  telling AFRICOM which proposed activities the embassies could not  accommodate due to limited resources. Some federal officials suggested  that interagency collaboration could be improved at AFRICOM’s annual  activity planning conferences if State took a lead role, although limited  State resources would make this unlikely. In general, both State and  AFRICOM told us that funding shortages prevent some State officials from  participating at AFRICOM planning events. Nonetheless, some State  officials noted that AFRICOM could better align its activities with U.S.  foreign policy goals and reduce the potential to burden U.S. embassy staff  in carrying out activities if AFRICOM would involve interagency partners  earlier in the planning process. From its perspective, AFRICOM said that  State has had significant influence in its planning processes, noting that  State’s deputy chiefs of mission, as well as USAID mission directors, were  provided time to present information on their respective countries at the  November 2009 Theater Security Cooperation Conference and that State  officials are involved in other AFRICOM activity planning events  throughout the year.
Following AFRICOM’s most recent Theater Security Cooperation  Conference, federal officials stated that the command’s integration of  interagency perspectives had improved from previous conferences. The  officials commented that AFRICOM officials appeared genuinely  interested in learning about foreign policy and political issues in African  countries from U.S. embassy officials and that the emphasis of many  command presentations appeared to convey AFRICOM’s role as  supporting U.S. embassies and furthering U.S. foreign policy goals.
During our observations of an Africa Partnership Station planning  conference in July 2009, AFRICOM and its Navy component officials  acknowledged that they needed to improve communications among  AFRICOM, its Navy component, and the U.S. embassies; since that time,  we found that AFRICOM has taken some steps to address the problems. At  that conference, an official at the U.S. embassy in Ghana stated that details  of a previous USS Nashville port visit were not provided to the embassy  prior to the ship’s arrival. Rather, when the ship arrived and the Navy  component prepared to provide training, it was discovered that the  proposed training did not meet the needs of the Ghanaian Navy. As a  result, the U.S. embassy was required to work with AFRICOM’s Navy  component to quickly put together a new training plan so that the  Ghanaian Navy could receive more relevant training. According to a State  official, AFRICOM should work on communicating the Africa Partnership  Station’s mission in advance of its deployment because it is too late to  conduct strategic communications once a ship is already in port. In  response to concerns raised at the conference, AFRICOM has  implemented a pilot program to help embassy public affairs offices  generate public awareness of maritime security issues regarding 2010  Africa Partnership Station activities. As of February 2010, funding for the  program had been provided to U.S. embassies in Gabon, Ghana, Senegal,  and Mozambique.
Conversely, our observation of the Natural Fire 10 pandemic preparedness  and response exercise in Uganda illustrated that early and continuous  interagency involvement can lead to a successful outcome. Prior to the  initial planning for Natural Fire 10, DOD and USAID signed an interagency  agreement to streamline collaboration in enhancing African military  capacity to respond to an influenza pandemic. When AFRICOM began  planning Natural Fire 10, it included USAID in the initial discussions to  consider the feasibility of focusing a portion of the exercise on pandemic  planning and response, as outlined in the interagency agreement. USAID  also funded civilian participation in that portion of the exercise. In  addition, State and U.S. embassy officials were included at all Natural Fire  10 planning conferences prior to the exercise. Furthermore, an embedded  USAID official at AFRICOM told us that the pandemic focus of that portion  of the Natural Fire 10 exercise was unique because it was designed more  like a USAID activity than a DOD activity, having a longer-term focus to  allow AFRICOM to sustain and expand the program over time. By working  with interagency partners throughout the planning process, AFRICOM was  able to sponsor an activity that was well received by its interagency  partners.
Interagency personnel embedded into AFRICOM’s organization may not  be fully leveraged for their expertise, which can make it more difficult for  some interagency personnel to contribute to the command’s work. Our  prior work has noted that having a strategy for defining organizational  roles and responsibilities and coordination mechanisms can help national  security agencies clarify who will lead or participate in activities, organize  their joint and individual efforts, and facilitate decision making. Although  AFRICOM has included information on interagency collaboration in its  theater campaign plan and created an interagency board to facilitate  collaboration, an embedded interagency official stated that AFRICOM  employs a hierarchal rather than collaborative approach to decision  making. The command’s Army component echoed this sentiment, stating  that coordination and development of strategies is less collaborative than  on specific activities. This approach differs markedly from USAID and  State’s planning approaches, which officials described as focusing on  brainstorming with all relevant personnel or on the long-term results of the  activities. Additionally, an embedded official from another federal agency  told us that while AFRICOM officials bring some issues to interagency  personnel at the command to obtain their perspectives, more often  interagency staff must insert themselves into relevant meetings to affect  decision making. For example, a USAID official formerly embedded at  AFRICOM said that USAID embedded officials have to ask how they can  help the command, even though he believed that the military officials  should be asking how AFRICOM can provide support to USAID, as the  command has stated that it is in a supporting role to USAID on  development activities. Furthermore, some embedded interagency  personnel said that coordination is problematic when activity planning  takes place directly at AFRICOM’s military service component commands  and not at AFRICOM headquarters, as there are few embedded  interagency staff members in the military service components. State  echoed this remark, noting that from its perspective, planning and  decision making at the command’s military service components is separate  from that at AFRICOM headquarters, which creates difficulties for  coordination with interagency partners. As a result, many activities could  have undergone substantial planning at the component level before  interagency perspectives are sought.
Moreover, some interagency personnel embedded at AFRICOM have said  that they may not be fully leveraged for their expertise. AFRICOM officials  told us that it is a challenge to determine where in the command to include  the interagency personnel. For example, an official from the  Transportation Security Administration decided on his own which  directorate in which to work when he joined the command because  AFRICOM had not identified a directorate for him. Another embedded  interagency staff member stated that AFRICOM initially placed him in a  directorate unrelated to his skill set, and he initiated a transfer to another  directorate that would better enable him to share his expertise. In  addition, Coast Guard officials stated that AFRICOM does not fully  understand the roles and responsibilities of the Coast Guard and what  knowledge and expertise it could provide the command. The officials cited  an example of AFRICOM’s Navy component performing law enforcement  training instead of allowing the Coast Guard to take the lead on providing  this training to African forces.
Difficulties in leveraging interagency partners are not unique to AFRICOM.  As we have previously reported, organizational differences—including  differences in agencies’ structures, planning processes, and funding  sources—can hinder interagency collaboration, potentially wasting scarce  funds and limiting the effectiveness of federal efforts. Notwithstanding  these difficulties, interagency collaboration can be successful—for  example, observers have cited the U.S. Southern Command as having  mature interagency planning processes and coordinating mechanisms.  Southern Command has also identified civilian federal agencies as leads  for each of its theater security objectives, furthering the early involvement  of interagency partners. A senior State official said that AFRICOM’s  understanding of the roles of interagency partners might be improved if  additional staff from other federal agencies were embedded at the  command. However, several embedded interagency staff said that there is  little incentive to take a position at AFRICOM because it will not enhance  one’s career position upon return to the original agency after the rotation.  Additionally, staffing shortages at other federal agencies reduce agencies’  abilities to send additional staff to AFRICOM. In February 2009, we  reported that State officials told us that they would not likely be able to  provide active employees to fill the positions requested by AFRICOM  because they were already facing a 25 percent shortfall in mid-level  personnel—although AFRICOM and State officials said that five State  foreign policy advisors are expected to arrive at the command later this  year. Despite challenges, AFRICOM has made some efforts that could  improve interagency collaboration within the command, such as  expanding its interagency orientation process and including opportunities  for interagency input into daily command meetings. In addition, AFRICOM  said that its Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs, a senior  State official, is in charge of outreach for the command and sometimes  chairs command staff meetings.
In fall 2009, the command conducted an assessment of the embedded  interagency process to analyze successes and identify lessons learned,  including recommendations on how to integrate interagency personnel  into command planning and operations. AFRICOM identified five key  observations based on its assessment: (1) embedded staff want to ensure  they can accomplish their own objectives and not merely perform duties  that a DOD employee could perform; (2) interagency personnel arrive at  AFRICOM with the expectation that they will help achieve not only  command goals and objectives but also U.S. government goals, yet they  feel that DOD employees do not expect embedded personnel to develop  new programs; (3) embedded interagency personnel need to understand  the function, operation, and role of a military command and how it differs  from other federal government agencies; (4) the military planning process  is more structured than the planning approaches of other government  agencies; and (5) embedded personnel experience an overwhelming  adjustment to military culture. The assessment identified several  recommendations and suggestions, such as developing a training and  orientation program for embedded interagency personnel. In July 2010,  AFRICOM stated that it had established an interagency command  collaborative forum to assess, prioritize, and implement the  recommendations from the study. Fully leveraging its embedded  interagency partners can help AFRICOM contribute to a unified U.S.  government approach to activity planning and implementation in Africa.
section_title: AFRICOM Faces Challenges in Building Personnel Expertise to Work in Africa
paragraphs: AFRICOM emphasizes the importance of collaborating with its interagency  partners and building cultural awareness; however, the command has  sometimes experienced difficulty implementing activities because some  personnel have limited knowledge about working with U.S. embassies and  about cultural issues in Africa. The training or guidance available to  augment personnel expertise in these areas is limited.
subsections: section_title: Some AFRICOM Personnel Have Limited Knowledge of Working with U.S. Embassies and of African Culture
paragraphs: Some AFRICOM personnel have limited knowledge of working with U.S.  embassies and of African culture, which can decrease the effectiveness of  implementing activities.
subsections: section_title: Working with U.S. Embassies
paragraphs: AFRICOM emphasizes that it works closely with the U.S. embassies and  chiefs of mission to ensure that its activities are consistent with U.S.  foreign policy and contribute to unity of effort among the interagency.  While many U.S. embassies told us that the command has made efforts to  coordinate with them, some AFRICOM staff’s knowledge of how to work  with U.S. embassies is limited. USAID officials told us that while  AFRICOM has made improvements coordinating with their agency at the  headquarters level, most USAID planning efforts occur at U.S. embassies  in country and that AFRICOM has not fully integrated its staff into the  planning process at the country level. Moreover, in our prior work on  AFRICOM’s Horn of Africa task force, we reported that task force  personnel did not always understand embassy procedures for interacting  with African partner nations. For example, task force personnel would, at  times, approach the Djiboutian government ministries directly with  concepts for activities rather than follow the established procedure of  having the U.S. embassy in Djibouti initiate the contact. Additionally, in  our prior work on the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership activity,  we noted that disagreements about whether State should have authority  over DOD personnel temporarily assigned to conduct activities affected  implementation of DOD’s activities in Niger and Chad. In commenting on  that report, DOD stated that it believed sufficient guidance existed that  defined the authorities of DOD’s combatant commander and State’s chief  of mission but noted that issuing joint guidance reflecting the implications  of the shift to a greater DOD emphasis and support in shape and deter  operations would be helpful to both the combatant commander and chief  of mission in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership region. A  senior State official formerly stationed at AFRICOM told us that command  and control responsibilities in Africa are improving but that issues still  exist. He cited a recent example in which the U.S. ambassador to Liberia  maintained that the embassy should have authority over DOD personnel  carrying out security sector reform activities in the country, while  AFRICOM argued that it needed shared authority over these personnel. A  shared authority agreement was eventually reached for DOD personnel  who would reside in Liberia on a semipermanent basis.
Some AFRICOM personnel’s limited knowledge of working with U.S.  embassy staff can impose burdens on embassies because, as officials  stated throughout our review, the embassies are short-staffed. The  Department of State Inspector General released a report in August 2009  stating, in part, that the embassies in Africa are understaffed and that the  U.S. military is filling a void created by a lack of embassy resources for  traditional development and public diplomacy. AFRICOM’s requests for  information and assistance with activities take embassy staff away from  their assigned duties to focus on command priorities. For example, a U.S.  embassy official in Uganda stated that AFRICOM personnel arrived in  country with the expectations that the embassy would take care of basic  cultural and logistical issues for them.
AFRICOM is trying to increase its presence in U.S. embassies and send  planning teams prior to activity implementation in order to alleviate the  burden it has placed on U.S. embassies. According to command officials,  AFRICOM inherited 12 offices at U.S. embassies in Africa, and as of June  2010, it had added 5 additional offices, bringing its total U.S. embassy  presence to 17. Command officials told us that they plan to have a total of  28 offices in U.S. embassies, which would give AFRICOM a presence in  just over half of the 53 countries in its area of responsibility. Additionally,  at an Africa Partnership Station planning conference, we observed Navy  component officials request guidance from and offer suggestions on how  to ease the administrative burden the activity may place on U.S. embassy  personnel. AFRICOM has also begun to send reservists to African  countries to help with coordination prior to an Africa Partnership Station  ship visit. By providing more assistance to the embassies, AFRICOM can  potentially ease the burden placed on them as command staff work to  increase their understanding of engaging with the embassies and partner  nations.
section_title: African Cultural Awareness
paragraphs: Cultural awareness is a core competency for AFRICOM, but the limited  knowledge of some AFRICOM and its military service component staff on  Africa cultural issues occasionally leads to difficulties in building  relationships with African nations. For example, as we reported in our  prior work on AFRICOM’s Horn of Africa task force, task force personnel  did not always understand cultural issues, such as the time required to  conduct activities in African villages or local religious customs. In one  case, the task force distributed used clothing to local Djibouti villagers  during Ramadan, which offended the Muslim population. In another case,  according to a U.S. embassy official, AFRICOM’s task force provided 3  days notice that it would conduct a medical clinic in a remote village in  Djibouti. However, because the villagers are nomads, it was difficult to get  participants with that short amount of notice. Moreover, a Ghanaian  military participant involved with the Africa Partnership Station said that  AFRICOM’s tendency to generalize its programs across Africa is not  effective, as each country is different and requires an individualized  approach.
A better understanding of African cultural issues would likely help  AFRICOM improve relationships with African nations. For example, as we  previously reported, a U.S. embassy official in Tanzania said that  AFRICOM’s task force team members had become proficient in Swahili,  thus helping them to develop relationships. Getting to know the language,  culture, and the people in the region, the embassy official said, has  contributed to the success in developing a Tanzanian-American  partnership in a region where extremists are known to operate. In  addition, an internal State memo described AFRICOM’s sociocultural  research and advisory teams as intending to provide personnel with the  necessary background to work more effectively on the ground and to  interact in a more respectful and collaborative manner with local  populations. While a U.S. embassy had voiced concern about the teams  appearing to duplicate interagency efforts, the State memo stressed the  need for coordination with embassy and USAID personnel, including the  sharing of information obtained in the field. In general, more widespread  and robust understanding of African culture could help personnel avoid  potentially unfavorable views of AFRICOM among the Africans and risk  straining relations between African nations and the U.S. government.
section_title: Limited Training and Guidance Is Provided to AFRICOM Personnel
paragraphs: We found that AFRICOM personnel and forces deploying for activities  receive some training on working with interagency partners and on  African cultural awareness—and that efforts are under way to increase  training for some personnel—but our review of training presentations  indicated that they were insufficient to adequately build the skills of its  staff. Moreover, AFRICOM does not monitor training or require that it be  completed. We have previously reported that collaborative approaches to  national security require a well-trained workforce with the skills and  experience to integrate the government’s diverse capabilities and  resources, and that increased training opportunities and strategic  workforce planning efforts could facilitate federal agencies’ ability to fully  participate in interagency collaboration activities.
AFRICOM officials told us that current training for personnel includes  Web courses, seminars led by DOD’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies,  and guest-speaker programs. In addition, there are theater entry training  requirements for personnel deploying to Africa such as medical and  cultural awareness Web-based training. Officials said, however, that while  training is encouraged, it is not required, and that the command does not  currently monitor the completion of training courses. We requested to  review training presentations provided to incoming AFRICOM staff. Our  review of the 10 training presentations that were provided to us by the  command found that they did not contain cultural awareness information.  However, AFRICOM stated that there are 2 hours on Africa cultural  awareness provided to new command staff during the first day of training,  though we were not given documentation of this training. Additionally, our  review found that 7 of the 10 training presentations that we were provided  did not contain interagency information. The remaining 3 presentations  provided an overview of AFRICOM partners, including international  government organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other  federal government agencies; identified the interagency partners at the  command; and provided more detailed information on one specific federal  agency. While these training presentations offered some suggestions for  planning and cooperative opportunities with other federal agencies, we  found that they were brief and lacked specific guidance on how to involve  interagency partners. Furthermore, because the presentations are  provided during the beginning of tours, when personnel are also learning  about their new assignments and daily operations, it is unlikely that they  provide for comprehensive, effective training.
AFRICOM issued joint training guidance in December 2009 that included  as a training goal the need to work with other federal agencies, but the  guidance lacks specific actions to reach this goal as well as measures to  evaluate progress and effects. Moreover, the guidance states that  AFRICOM will develop predeployment guidance for personnel, but we  noted that no time frames were provided for when the guidance will be  issued. In our prior work on AFRICOM’s Horn of Africa task force, we  reported that the task force’s training on working with U.S. embassies was  not shared with all staff, and cultural awareness training was limited. We  recommended, and DOD agreed, that AFRICOM develop comprehensive  training guidance or a program that augments assigned personnel’s  understanding of African cultural awareness and working with interagency  partners. Since our report, AFRICOM has taken some steps to increase  training opportunities for task force personnel. For example, we reviewed  an extensive briefing on East African culture that the task force said is  now being provided to all incoming task force personnel. In addition, the  task force stated that its sociocultural research and advisory teams  provide some task force personnel with cultural and political training  when needed, including training for some personnel prior to deployment.  Finally, the task force said that online training on cultural awareness is  now available to all task force personnel, and that it intends to make this  training mandatory in the future.
Formal training is important because it would help institutionalize  practices in the command. Officials from AFRICOM’s Army, Marine Corps,  and Air Force components and task force all voiced a preference for more  cultural training and capabilities, with Army officials noting that staff do  not have sufficient understanding of the size, diversity, and unique  problems confronting the different regions of Africa. In addition, during  our observation of Natural Fire 10, an Air Force official told us that his  team received no training on Ugandan culture prior to its deployment. An  AFRICOM official told us it would be beneficial to have increased  sociocultural training at the command’s headquarters as well as a database  to monitor training completion. AFRICOM’s Air Force component officials  told us that they have begun working with the Air Force Cultural Language  Center to develop a Web-based, African cultural awareness training for Air  Force personnel deploying on AFRICOM activities, but officials noted that  AFRICOM had not provided any cultural awareness training to the Air  Force. Several officials from other federal agencies suggested possible  courses that might be cost-effective or easy for AFRICOM to implement,  such as a State online course focused on working with U.S. embassies,  curricula at the Foreign Service Institute that prepare U.S. embassy  personnel, or training similar to that provided to Peace Corps volunteers.  State also recommended that AFRICOM develop best practices for  working more effectively and efficiently with other agencies to ensure that  any lessons learned are institutionalized within the command. In June  2010, AFRICOM held a symposium to discuss how to augment language,  regional expertise, and cultural competence capabilities. The command  identified some options under consideration to improve capabilities,  including possibly establishing an office to develop training initiatives,  holding an annual symposium, and developing a newsletter with articles  by personnel about their deployment experiences. These considerations  reflect the command’s recognition that it needs to improve its personnel’s  expertise. However, until AFRICOM develops, requires, and monitors  training for all of its personnel on working with interagency partners and  understanding African cultural issues, it continues to risk being unable to  fully leverage resources with U.S. embassy personnel, build relationships  with African nations, and effectively carry out activities.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Building the capacity of partner nations to secure and defend themselves  has become a key focus of DOD, and AFRICOM’s focus on supporting  security and stability in Africa has the potential to advance this effort.  Despite initial concerns among stakeholders about the potential U.S.  militarization of foreign policy or increasing the U.S. military footprint on  the continent, AFRICOM has made progress in developing overarching  strategies and trying to engage interagency partners. Moreover, since our  April 2010 report on AFRICOM’s task force, efforts have been made to  begin to evaluate some task force activities in the Horn of Africa.  However, AFRICOM still faces challenges that could limit its effectiveness.  Until the command completes supporting plans to guide activity planning  and implementation and begins consistently conducting long-term  assessments of activities, it cannot ensure that the actions it is taking on  the continent best support DOD and U.S. foreign policy objectives. On a  broader level, without plans and assessments, AFRICOM lacks the critical  information it needs to make successful future planning decisions and to  allocate resources to maximize its effect in Africa. Moreover, while many  U.S. embassies and federal partners now believe that AFRICOM has the  potential to make positive contributions in Africa, until the command  more fully incorporates interagency partners into its activity planning  process, AFRICOM continues to risk the perception—or worse, the  possibility—of conducting activities that may counter U.S. foreign policy  interests or lead to unintended consequences. Finally, assigning more than  4,000 personnel and forces to AFRICOM and its components illustrates  DOD’s commitment to conducting activities in Africa. Developing a well- trained workforce that understands the complexities associated with  working on the continent can advance the department’s efforts to foster  stability and security through improved relationships with African nations.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To more effectively plan, prioritize, and implement activities in a  collaborative interagency environment that aligns with both the  command’s mission of sustained security engagement and U.S. foreign  policy goals; make effective use of resources in a fiscally constrained  environment; and take steps to institutionalize its processes and  procedures, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Commander, AFRICOM, to take the following five actions:    Synchronize activities among AFRICOM’s components by expediting the  completion of its regional engagement plans, country work plans, and  component support plans; and develop a process whereby plans are  reviewed on a recurring basis to ensure that efforts across the command  are complementary, comprehensive, and supportive of AFRICOM’s  mission.
Conduct long-term assessments of the full range of its activities to  determine whether the activities are having their intended effects and  supporting AFRICOM’s mission.
Take actions to ensure that budget staff within its military service  components, special operations command, task force, and Offices of  Security Cooperation within U.S. embassies in Africa have the expertise  and knowledge necessary to make timely and accurate funding decisions  for activities. These actions could include some combination of training,  staffing changes, and/or comprehensive guidance on applying funding  sources to activities.
Fully integrate interagency personnel and partners into the formative  stages of the command’s activity planning processes to better leverage  interagency expertise.
In consultation with State and USAID, develop a comprehensive training  program, with a means to monitor completion, for staff and forces  involved in AFRICOM activities on    working with interagency partners and U.S. embassies on activities and    cultural issues related to Africa.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all  of our recommendations and cited some actions that it was taking to  address the issues we identified in this report. DOD’s comments are  reprinted in appendix IV. Technical comments were provided separately  from DOD, State, and the U.S. Coast Guard and incorporated as  appropriate. USAID chose not to provide any comments.
DOD concurred with our first recommendation that AFRICOM  synchronize activities among AFRICOM’s components by expediting the  completion of its supporting plans and developing a process whereby  plans are reviewed on a recurring basis. In its response, the department  stated that, in the absence of supporting plans, AFRICOM conducts weekly  meetings at which its components and the Horn of Africa task force  discuss the status of current activities and future events. The department  added that AFRICOM uses an information database to manage events  conducted by the command and its components. We noted these efforts in  our report, and we agree that it is a good practice for AFRICOM to  coordinate with its components through weekly meetings and an  information database. However, as our report states, component officials  have noted that within AFRICOM the use of the database is preliminary,  that the database may not include all component activities, and that  coordinating defense efforts in Africa remains a challenge. Furthermore,  DOD stated in its response that regional engagement plans and component  support plans are in the final stages of review and approval by AFRICOM’s  leadership, and will be used by the staff and components to guide and  synchronize activities even though the plans have not been formally  approved. The department added that country work plans are being  developed for the command’s critical partners as identified in the theater  campaign plan. However, the department’s response did not include a  specific time frame for completion of AFRICOM’s plans. Such a time frame  is critical, given that AFRICOM has repeatedly postponed the completion  of several of its supporting plans. Until AFRICOM finalizes and approves  its plans, AFRICOM risks conducting activities that do not fully support its  mission and may hinder a unity of effort among its components.
DOD also concurred with our second recommendation that AFRICOM  conduct long-term assessments of the full range of its activities. The  department stated that its Horn of Africa task force is now required to  report on the effectiveness of its activities—which we note in our report.  Moreover, the department stated that all AFRICOM operations and  planning orders now include tasks to staff and components to develop  metrics and indicators and to conduct assessments; however, we were not  provided copies of these documents during our review. If these actions are  implemented in a comprehensive manner such that they require long-term  evaluation of all AFRICOM activities, they have the potential to provide  the command with valuable information on whether its activities are  having their intended effects or whether modifications are needed.  Completing thorough long-term assessments of its activities will aid in the  command’s efforts to make successful future planning decisions and  allocate resources to maximize its effect in Africa.
DOD also concurred with our third recommendation that AFRICOM take  actions to ensure that its components’ and Offices of Security  Cooperation’s budget personnel have the appropriate expertise and  knowledge to make timely and accurate funding decisions for activities.  DOD fully agreed with us regarding with the need to improve the use of  security cooperation tools through training, staff changes, and better  guidance. DOD further stated that while AFRICOM has Title 10 authorities  to conduct traditional military activities and operations, the activities that  are most important to the department in Africa center around building  institutional and operational security capacity and that most of the  authorities and funding for these activities belong to State Department  programs under Title 22 authorities. In our report, we acknowledge  AFRICOM’s reports of having access to several funding sources, as well as  influence over some State and USAID funding sources, and that many  different funding sources may be required for an activity. We also note in  our report that DOD, in its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, stated that  U.S. security assistance efforts are constrained by a complex patchwork of  authorities. We maintain that, given the challenges associated with  applying various funding sources to activities in Africa, AFRICOM should  identify and complete specific actions—such as training, staffing changes,  and/or comprehensive guidance—to increase understanding among its  budget staff and institutionalize knowledge throughout the command.
DOD also concurred with our fourth recommendation that AFRICOM fully  integrate interagency personnel and partners into the formative stages of  the command’s activity planning processes to better leverage interagency  expertise. The department noted that AFRICOM is unique in that, in  addition to a military deputy commander, it has a Deputy Commander for  Civil-Military Activities—a senior Foreign Service Officer of ambassadorial  level who helps ensure that policy/program development and  implementation include interagency partners and are consistent with U.S.  foreign policy. In our report, we highlighted the civilian deputy as a  positive example of AFRICOM’s efforts to integrate interagency personnel  into the command. DOD also noted that it continues to pursue qualified  interagency representatives to work in management and staff positions at  AFRICOM, will work with its partners to prepare personnel for assignment  in a military organization, and encourages interagency partners to fill  vacant positions and reward their detailees for taking assignments at  AFRICOM. Our review highlights some efforts AFRICOM has taken to  integrate its interagency partners into command planning and  operations—such as developing a training and orientation program for  embedded interagency personnel. We also state in our report that staffing  shortages at other federal agencies reduce those agencies’ ability to send  additional staff to AFRICOM. DOD’s response does not indicate how  AFRICOM intends to better integrate interagency personnel into the  formative stages of activity planning, which would help AFRICOM better  leverage interagency expertise and promote a U.S. government unity of  effort in Africa.
Finally, DOD concurred with our fifth recommendation that AFRICOM  develop a comprehensive training program on working with interagency  partners and African cultural issues. DOD noted that AFRICOM has  developed cultural awareness training for all incoming headquarters  personnel, which is mandatory and tracked. We include in our report that  AFRICOM told us it allots 2 hours to Africa cultural awareness during the  first day of training for new command staff. However, since presentations  are given at the beginning of tours, when personnel are also learning about  their new assignments and daily operations, we believe that it is unlikely  that this constitutes comprehensive, effective training. The department  also stated that AFRICOM’s Horn of Africa task force personnel receive  Web-based and in-country training as part of newcomers’ orientation. As  we note in our report, we reviewed the task force’s briefing on East  African culture and found it to be extensive and a positive step toward  training personnel. Furthermore, DOD stated that key personnel attend  training for working with embassies; however, the department did not  identify which personnel attend the training and what opportunities are  available for those who do not attend it. Additionally, DOD did not address  how AFRICOM would mandate staff participation in any training it  develops. Until AFRICOM provides training or guidance to its staff on  working with interagency partners and cultural issues in Africa, the  command risks being unable to fully leverage resources with U.S. embassy  personnel, build relationships with African nations, and effectively carry  out activities.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Secretary of Homeland Security; the Secretary of State; and the  Administrator, United States Agency for International Development. The  report will also be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-3489 or at pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Africa Partnership Station
paragraphs: Led by Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) Navy component, the mission of  the Africa Partnership Station is to build maritime safety and security  capabilities with African nations. Training is typically conducted aboard a  ship, moving between ports to offer training at sea and ashore with African  partners. Africa Partnership Station training events focus on a broad range  of areas, including maritime domain awareness, leadership, navigation,  maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, civil engineering, and  logistics. Crew members also participate in humanitarian assistance  efforts focusing on health care, education, and other projects in local  communities, which may involve participation by other federal agencies  including the Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID). AFRICOM’s Navy component  coordinates with other AFRICOM components to conduct Africa  Partnership Station activities, including the Marine Corps component and  the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa; interagency partners such  as the U.S. Coast Guard, State, and USAID; and participants from over 22  countries from Europe, Africa, and South America. Figure 7 shows a few  of the Africa Partnership Station activities.
The Africa Partnership Station activity began under U.S. European  Command and was transferred to AFRICOM upon reaching full  operational capacity. As of May 2010, there have been 14 Africa  Partnership Station deployments, including a deployment of vessels from  the Netherlands and Belgium. Table 3 identifies Africa Partnership Station  ships, deployment dates, and countries visited.
In July 2009, we observed the main planning conference for the USS  Gunston Hall, which was scheduled to conduct Africa Partnership Station  activities from February through May 2010. After an initial diversion to  Haiti for disaster relief support, the USS Gunston Hall arrived in West and  Central Africa in March 2010. The Africa Partnership Station deployment  used a “hub” approach, such that the USS Gunston Hall conducted  operations out of ports in two countries—Ghana and Senegal. Members  from various African nations were brought to these two hubs to receive  training. Specific Africa Partnership Station activities on the USS Gunston  Hall included maritime workshops and seminars on small boat operations,  maritime law enforcement boarding, maritime domain awareness, and  fisheries management and maritime meteorology. Additional activities  included a maritime safety and security forum with key maritime  stakeholders; military-to-military training led by AFRICOM’s Marine Corps  component; a strategic communications forum; medical outreach to local  clinics conducted by a 20-person medical team, which reported seeing  over 3,000 patients; several performances by the U.S. Sixth Fleet’s five  piece brass band; delivery of humanitarian assistance supplies; and several  construction/refurbishing projects at local schools and clinics.
section_title: Appendix II: Natural Fire 10
paragraphs: Natural Fire 10 was an exercise led by U.S. Africa Command’s (AFRICOM)  Army component to train U.S. forces and build the capacity of East  African forces to provide humanitarian aid and disaster response. Natural  Fire began under U.S. Central Command and was transferred to AFRICOM  upon its establishment. Prior to 2009, three previous Natural Fire exercises  had been carried out. Natural Fire 10, which was conducted in October  2009 at various sites in Uganda, focused on disaster response to an  outbreak of pandemic influenza. AFRICOM officials told us that Natural  Fire 10 included approximately 550 U.S. personnel and 650 participants  from five East African countries: Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and  Uganda.
The exercise consisted of three parts:    Field exercises: a 7-day military-to-military activity which included  exercising forces on convoy and humanitarian civic assistance operations;  weapons handling and helicopter familiarization; weapons fire; hand-to- hand combat; crowd and riot control; and entry control point and vehicle  checkpoints.
Tabletop: focused on strengthening the capacity of five East African  militaries to prepare and respond to a potential pandemic outbreak in their  countries. The exercise consisted of 2 days of academic sessions, during  which officials from various organizations gave presentations about  pandemic preparedness and response. The academic sessions were  followed by 2 days of pandemic scenarios for which participants were  divided into three groups—civil authorities, military, and international  community—to develop and act out their responses.
Humanitarian civic assistance: included medical assistance events,  dental assistance events, and engineering projects such as a school and  hospital reconstruction.
In addition to the efforts by AFRICOM’s Army component, other  components also contributed to Natural Fire 10. Specifically, the Navy  component oversaw construction of the camp hosting the field exercise  and led humanitarian civic assistance engineering projects. The Air Force  component led the medical programs. The Marine Corps component  supported weapons training during the field exercise. AFRICOM’s Horn of  Africa task force oversaw photography and public affairs. Additionally,  interagency partners and international organizations were involved in the  tabletop portion of the exercise. For example, the U.S. Agency for  International Development partnered with AFRICOM in developing the  pandemic influenza focus for the tabletop activity, and international  organizations such as the United Nations, World Health Organization, and  International Red Cross led academic training sessions.
section_title: Appendix III: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In conducting our work, we reviewed a wide range of Department of  Defense (DOD) and command guidance and other guidance including  DOD strategies; U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) theater strategy,  theater campaign plan, and 2009 and 2010 posture statements; and  AFRICOM’s military service component and task force’s priorities, draft  strategic plans (if available), and engagement plans. We met with  AFRICOM officials in Stuttgart, Germany, in June 2009 and held follow-up  meetings in December 2009. We also met with officials at the European  headquarters of AFRICOM’s military service components (Army Africa,  Naval Forces Africa, Air Force Africa, and Marine Corps Africa) and  special operations command in June and July 2009. In July 2009 we also  observed the main planning conference for the Africa Partnership Station,  a maritime safety and security activity led by Navy Africa and sponsored  by AFRICOM. We traveled to Uganda, Ethiopia, and Djibouti in October  2009 to observe U.S. military operations, interview officials at the  Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, and meet with U.S. embassy  officials. We chose to visit Uganda to observe the AFRICOM-sponsored,  U.S. Army Africa–led Natural Fire 10 exercise, AFRICOM’s largest exercise  in Africa for 2009; Ethiopia, due to its proximity to Djibouti and large  amount of task force civil-affairs team activity proposals; and Djibouti, due  to the location of the task force at Camp Lemonnier. As part of our review  of AFRICOM’s task force, in January 2010 we observed and obtained  documentation from an academic training and mission rehearsal exercise  for incoming task force staff in Suffolk, Virginia. Additionally, we  interviewed DOD officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint  Staff, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
We also reviewed non-DOD documents to determine how AFRICOM’s  strategies compared or aligned with the strategies of other government  partners, including the fiscal years 2007–2012 Department of State /U.S.  Agency for International Development Joint Strategic Plan; USAID  Strategic Framework for Africa; and fiscal year 2008, fiscal year 2009, and  fiscal year 2010 mission strategic plans of 12 U.S. embassies in Africa. We  interviewed officials at the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency  for International Development (USAID), and the Coast Guard to obtain  other federal agencies’ perspectives on AFRICOM’s process of planning  and implementing activities, including the command’s considerations of  interagency perspectives. We spoke with officials from State and USAID  due to their relationship with DOD in supporting U.S. foreign policy  objectives, and we met with officials from the Coast Guard due to their  relationship with AFRICOM in its maritime activities. We met with U.S.  embassy officials in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, and we contacted 20  additional embassies throughout Africa: Algeria, Botswana, Burundi,  Chad, Comoros/Madagascar, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea,  Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritius/Seychelles, Morocco, Mozambique,  Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, and Yemen. We  chose to contact these specific embassies based on several factors  including that they were in countries that coordinate with AFRICOM’s task  force; their involvement with the two activities we observed in detail,  Africa Partnership Station and Natural Fire 10 (see below); and their  geographical dispersion to ensure that various regions were represented  across Africa. When multiple countries met our criteria, we gave  preference to U.S. embassies located in countries that were identified by  DOD officials or in documents as important countries for AFRICOM. In  addition, we met with an organization that represents U.S.-based  international nongovernmental organizations that conduct work in Africa,  as well as some African government and African military officials, to  obtain their viewpoints on AFRICOM’s activities.
We observed two AFRICOM activities in depth to complement our broader  review of the command’s activities at the interagency and command levels.  These two activities were: Africa Partnership Station (a maritime safety  and security activity) and Natural Fire 10 (part of AFRICOM’s pandemic  preparedness and response initiative). In choosing which of AFRICOM’s  over 100 activities to review as illustrative examples, we first narrowed the  activities to 30 main activities that support AFRICOM in achieving its  theater strategic objectives, as identified by AFRICOM officials. We then  chose to review the Africa Partnership Station and Natural Fire 10  activities due to factors such as their addressing of different theater  security objectives, timeliness to our review, leadership by different  military service components, considerable involvement of interagency and  international partners, size of the activities, and distinct geographic  locations. To review the Africa Partnership Station, we observed the  activity’s main planning conference in New York, New York, in July 2009;  reviewed documentation including reports and assessments; and spoke to  officials at DOD, AFRICOM, U.S. Navy Africa, Coast Guard, State, and  USAID, as well as nongovernmental organizations and African military  officials. To review Natural Fire 10, we observed the Natural Fire 10  exercise in Uganda in October 2009; reviewed documentation including  guidance, plans, reports, and assessments; and spoke to officials at DOD,  AFRICOM, U.S. Army Africa, State, and USAID, as well as African military  officials, about the activity. These two activities serve as examples, and  information about them is not meant to be generalized to all AFRICOM  activities. We supplemented our examination of the Africa Partnership  Station and Natural Fire 10 with information on additional activities  highlighted by AFRICOM, AFRICOM’s military service components and  task force, DOD, State, and USAID officials during our review, as well as  by two GAO reports that addressed AFRICOM activities: one that  examined the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, Operation  Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara, and one that partially reviewed the Global Peace  Operations Initiative and Africa Contingency Operations Training and  Assistance activities.
Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara is designed to strengthen the ability of  regional governments to police large expanses of remote terrain in the Trans-Sahara.
Management portal; Force Allocation Decision Framework; Chairman,  Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 7401.01E on the Combatant Commander’s  Initiative Fund; and AFRICOM training presentations. We spoke with  officials at AFRICOM, its military service components, special operations  command, and task force about their respective strategic planning efforts.  To examine AFRICOM’s assessment of activities, we reviewed a  presentation of AFRICOM’s strategic assessment tool as well as activity  assessment requirements in the command’s theater campaign plan and the  task force’s draft regional engagement plan. We spoke with officials at  DOD, AFRICOM, AFRICOM’s components, U.S. embassies, and other  federal agencies to assess whether the command’s activities support  AFRICOM’s mission and reflect the most effective use of resources. In  examining funding for activities, we reviewed AFRICOM’s funding sources  as well as the available funding for the Africa Partnership Station and  Natural Fire 10 activities. We also reviewed a GAO report that examined  the use of funds under the programs authorized in Sections 1206 and 1207  of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. AFRICOM  provided data on the funding amounts for its activities in fiscal year 2009,  which were drawn from the Standard Army Finance Information System.  We assessed the reliability of the finance information system through  interviews with personnel responsible for maintaining and overseeing  these data systems. Additionally, we assessed the quality control measures  in place to ensure that the data are reliable for reporting purposes. We  found the funding amount data reported by AFRICOM to be sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of this review. To review efforts at interagency  collaboration and building expertise, we examined agreements between  AFRICOM and interagency partners, training guidance, and training  programs. We spoke with interagency partners embedded at AFRICOM, at  U.S. embassies in Africa, and at other federal agency offices.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2009 through July 2010 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Marie Mak, Assistant Director;  Kathryn Bolduc; Alissa Czyz; Robert Heilman; Lonnie McAllister; James  Michels; Steven Putansu; Jodie Sandel; Erin Smith; and Cheryl Weissman  made major contributions to this report.