Polar Satellites: Agencies Need to Address Potential Gaps in Weather and Climate Data Coverage
Published: 2011-09-23T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Environmental satellites provide critical data used in weather forecasting and measuring variations in climate over time. In February 2010, the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy disbanded the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)--a tri-agency satellite acquisition that had encountered continuing cost, schedule, and management problems--and instructed the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) to undertake separate acquisitions. Both agencies have begun planning their respective programs--the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) and the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS)--including creating program offices and transitioning contracts. GAO was asked to summarize the status of ongoing work assessing (1) NOAA's and DOD's plans for their separate acquisitions and (2) the key risks in transitioning from NPOESS to these new programs. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on the work supporting previous reports, attended monthly program management meetings, reviewed documentation on both programs, and interviewed agency officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In May 2010, GAO reported on the transition from NPOESS to two separate programs, and recommended that both NOAA and DOD expedite decisions on the cost, schedule, and capabilities of their respective programs. Since that time, both agencies have made progress on their programs, but neither has finalized its plans or fully implemented the recommendations. NOAA is currently focusing on the October 2011 launch of the NPOESS Preparatory Project satellite--a demonstration satellite that the agency now plans to use operationally in order to minimize potential gaps in coverage. In addition, NOAA has transferred contracts for satellite sensors from the NPOESS program to the JPSS program. However, NOAA officials stated that the agency slowed down the development of the first JPSS satellite due to budget constraints, causing a delay in the launch date. As a result, NOAA is facing a potential gap in satellite data continuity. Such a delay could significantly impact the nation's ability to obtain advanced warning of extreme weather events such as hurricanes. Meanwhile, DOD began planning for its satellite program. Department officials reported that DWSS is to consist of two satellites with three sensors: an imager, microwave imager/sounder, and a space environment sensor. The first satellite is to be launched no earlier than 2018. The department has not, however, finalized the cost, schedule, and functionality of the program. It expects to do so in early 2012. Until both NOAA and DOD develop and finalize credible plans for their respective programs, it will not be clear what the programs will deliver, when, and at what cost. In its prior report, GAO also recommended that NOAA and DOD establish plans to mitigate key risks in transitioning from NPOESS to the successor programs, including ensuring effective oversight of JPSS program management, and addressing cost and schedule implications from contract and program changes. Both agencies have taken steps to mitigate these risks, but more remains to be done. For example, NOAA could not provide firm time frames for completing its management control plan or addressing residual contracting issues. Moving forward, it will be important for the agencies to continue efforts to mitigate these risks in order to ensure the success of their respective programs.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on efforts to  disband and replace the National Polar-orbiting Operational  Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). NPOESS was planned to be  a state-of-the-art, environment-monitoring satellite system that would  replace two existing polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems.  Managed jointly by the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and  Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense  (DOD)/U.S. Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA), the program was considered critical to the  nation’s weather forecasting and climate monitoring needs through the  year 2026. However, to address continuing cost, schedule, management,  and technical challenges, the White House’s Office of Science and  Technology Policy decided in February 2010 to disband the NPOESS  acquisition and, instead, to have NOAA and DOD undertake separate  acquisitions. As requested, this statement summarizes ongoing work we  are doing for your full committee to assess the status of NOAA’s and  DOD’s plans for separate acquisitions and key risks in transitioning from  NPOESS to these new programs.
In preparing this testimony, we relied on the work supporting our previous  reports and on observations from our ongoing work. To obtain updated  information, we attended NOAA’s monthly program management council  meetings, reviewed briefings for both programs, and interviewed officials  from NOAA, NASA, and DOD. All of our work for the prior reports and this  testimony was performed in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the 1960s, the United States has used satellites to observe the  earth and its land, oceans, atmosphere, and space environments.  Satellites provide a global perspective of the environment and allow  observations in areas that may be otherwise unreachable or unsuitable  for measurements. Used in combination with ground, sea, and airborne  observing systems, satellites have become an indispensable part of  measuring and forecasting weather and climate. For example, satellites  provide the graphical images used to identify current weather patterns, as  well as the data that go into numerical weather prediction models. These  models are used to forecast weather 1 to 2 weeks in advance and to  issue warnings about severe weather, including the path and intensity of  hurricanes. Satellite data are also used to warn infrastructure owners  when increased solar activity is expected to affect key assets, including  communication satellites or the electric power grid. When collected over  time, satellite data can also be used to observe climate change—the  trends and changes in the earth’s climate. These data are used to monitor  and project seasonal, annual, and decadal changes in the earth’s  temperature, vegetation coverage, and ozone coverage.
subsections: section_title: The NPOESS Program: Inception, Challenges, and Divergence
paragraphs: Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate  operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar- orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, which is  managed by NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program  (DMSP), which is managed by the Air Force. Two operational DMSP  satellites and one operational POES satellite are currently in orbit and are  positioned so that they cross the equator in the early morning,  midmorning, and early afternoon. In addition, the government relies on a  European satellite, called the Meteorological Operational satellite, for data  in the midmorning orbit. Together, they ensure that, for any region of the  earth, the data provided to users are generally no more than 6 hours old.
With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs  would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994  Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the  two satellite programs into a single satellite program—NPOESS—capable  of satisfying both civilian and military requirements. To manage this  program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency Integrated  Program Office, with NOAA responsible for overall program management  for the converged system and for satellite operations, the Air Force  responsible for acquisition, and NASA responsible for facilitating the  development and incorporation of new technologies into the converged  system.
When its primary contract was awarded in August 2002, NPOESS was  estimated to cost about $7 billion through 2026 and was considered  critical to the United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data  required for weather forecasting and global climate monitoring. To reduce  the risk involved in developing new technologies and to maintain climate  data continuity, the program planned to launch a demonstration satellite,  called the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) in May 2006. NPP was to  demonstrate selected instruments that would later be included on the  NPOESS satellites. The first NPOESS satellite was to be available for  launch in March 2008.
However, in the years after the program was initiated, NPOESS  encountered significant technical challenges in sensor development,  program cost growth, and schedule delays. By November 2005, we  estimated that the program’s cost had grown to $10 billion, and the  schedule for the first launch was delayed by almost 2 years. These issues  led to a 2006 restructuring of the program, which reduced the program’s  functionality by decreasing the number of planned satellites, orbits, and  instruments. The restructuring also led agency executives to decide to  mitigate potential data gaps by using NPP as an operational satellite.  Even after the restructuring, however, the program continued to  encounter technical issues in developing two sensors, significant tri- agency management challenges, schedule delays, and further cost  increases. To help address these issues, in recent years we have made a  series of recommendations to, among other things, improve executive- level oversight and develop realistic time frames for revising cost and  schedule baselines.
Faced with costs that were expected to exceed $14 billion and launch  schedules that were delayed by over 5 years, in August 2009, the  Executive Office of the President formed a task force, led by the Office of  Science and Technology Policy, to investigate the management and  acquisition options that would improve the NPOESS program. As a result  of this review, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy  announced in February 2010 that NOAA and DOD would no longer jointly  procure the NPOESS satellite system; instead, each agency would plan  and acquire its own satellite system. Specifically, NOAA is responsible  for the afternoon orbit and the observations planned for the first and third  NPOESS satellites. DOD is responsible for the early-morning orbit and  the observations planned for the second and fourth NPOESS satellites.  The partnership with the European satellite agencies for the midmorning  orbit is to continue as planned.
section_title: Prior GAO Work Evaluated Preliminary Plans for Separate NOAA and DOD Satellite Programs and Recommended Actions to Solidify Plans and Address Risks
paragraphs: In May 2010, we reported on NOAA’s and DOD’s preliminary plans for  initiating new environmental satellite programs and highlighted key  transition risks facing the agencies. At that time, NOAA had developed  preliminary plans for its new satellite acquisition program—called the  Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS). Specifically, NOAA planned to  acquire two satellites (called JPSS-1 and JPSS-2) for launch in 2015 and  2018. NOAA also planned technical changes to the satellites, including  using a smaller spacecraft than the one planned for NPOESS and  removing sensors that were planned for the NPOESS satellites in the  afternoon orbit.
In addition, NOAA planned to transfer the management of the satellite  acquisition from the NPOESS program office to NASA’s Goddard Space  Flight Center so that it could be co-located at a space system acquisition  center, as advocated by an independent review team. NOAA developed a  team to lead the transition from NPOESS to JPSS and planned to begin  transitioning in July 2010 and complete a transition plan—including cost  and schedule estimates—by the end of September 2010. NOAA  estimated that the JPSS program would cost approximately $11.9 billion  to complete through 2024. It also anticipated funding of about $1 billion  in fiscal year 2011 to set up the new program office and handle the costs  associated with transitioning contracts from the Air Force to NASA while  continuing to develop NPP and the first JPSS satellite.
DOD was at an earlier stage in its planning process at the time of our  June 2010 testimony, in part because it had more time before the first  satellite in the morning orbit was needed. DOD officials were developing  plans—including costs, schedules, and functionality—for their new  program, called the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS). At that  time, DOD expected to make final decisions on the spacecraft, sensors,  procurement strategy, and staffing in August 2010, and to begin the  program immediately.
In our report, we noted that both agencies faced key risks in transitioning  from NPOESS to their separate programs. These risks included the loss  of key staff and capabilities, delays in negotiating contract changes and  establishing new program offices, the loss of support for the other  agency’s requirements, and insufficient oversight of new program  management. We reported that until these risks were effectively  mitigated, it was likely that the satellite programs’ costs would continue to  grow and launch dates would continue to be delayed. We also noted that  further delays could lead to gaps in the continuity of critical satellite data.
We made recommendations to ensure that the transition from NPOESS  to its successor programs was efficiently and effectively managed.  Among other things, we recommended that the Secretaries of Defense  and Commerce direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs to  expedite decisions on the expected cost, schedule, and capabilities of  their planned programs and to direct their respective follow-on programs  to develop plans to address the key transition risks we identified. As  discussed below, the agencies have not yet fully implemented these  recommendations.
section_title: NOAA and DOD Have Made Progress, but Decisions are Needed to Address Potential Gaps in Weather and Climate Data
paragraphs: Over the last year, NOAA and NASA have worked to establish the JPSS  program, to keep the NPP satellite’s development on track, and to begin  developing plans for the JPSS satellite. However, of the funding made  available to NOAA in its fiscal year 2011 appropriations, JPSS was  allocated $471.9 million—far less than the $1 billion identified in the  President’s budget to establish a program and stay on track with satellite  deliverables. As a result, the JPSS program office decided to focus on  developing NPP and the satellite’s ground system so that it could remain  on track for an October 2011 launch. The program slowed development  efforts on the first JPSS satellite and halted work on the second JPSS  satellite. Table 1 shows the status of key components of NPP and JPSS-1.
Although we recommended in May 2010 that NOAA expedite decisions  on the cost, schedule, and capabilities of JPSS, NOAA has not yet done  so. According to NOAA officials, uncertainty surrounding the agency’s  fiscal year 2011 budget has made it difficult to establish a program  baseline. However, NOAA has developed a requirements document and  is obtaining an independent cost estimate. The agency expects to have a  complete program baseline in place by February 2012. Until this baseline  is in place, it is not clear what functionality will be delivered by when and  at what cost. Given the critical development activities planned for 2012, it  is imperative that NOAA move expeditiously to establish a credible  program baseline.
subsections: section_title: NOAA Faces A Potential Gap in Satellite Data Continuity and Is Considering Options to Minimize That Gap
paragraphs: NOAA is facing a potential gap in satellite data continuity. When NPOESS  was first disbanded, program officials anticipated launching the JPSS  satellites in 2015 and 2018 (while acknowledging that these dates could  change as the program’s plans were firmed up). Over the past year, as  program officials made critical decisions to defer work on JPSS in order to  keep NPP on track, the launch dates for JPSS-1 and JPSS-2 have  changed. Program officials currently estimate that the satellites will launch  in late 2016 and 2021.
There are two key scenarios that could lead to a gap in satellite data in  the afternoon orbit between the end of life of the NPP satellite and the  availability of the first JPSS satellite. Under the first scenario, NPP  sensors may not last until JPSS-1 is launched. The NASA Inspector  General reported that NASA is concerned that selected NPP sensors may  last only 3 years because of workmanship issues. The second scenario  for a satellite data gap involves further delays in the JPSS-1 launch date.  This could occur due to shortfalls in program funding or technical issues  in the development of the satellite. Figure 1 depicts possible gaps.
According to NOAA, a data gap would lead to less accurate and timely  weather prediction models used to support weather forecasting, and  advanced warning of extreme events—such as hurricanes, storm surges,  and floods—would be diminished. The agency reported that this could  place lives, property, and critical infrastructure in danger. In addition,  NOAA estimated that the time it takes to respond to emergency search  and rescue beacons could double.
Given the potential for a gap in satellite data, NOAA officials are  considering whether to remove functionality from JPSS-1 in order to allow  it to be developed—and launched—more quickly. For example, program  officials are considering increasing the time it takes for data processing  centers to receive the data, removing the ground systems’ ability to  process some data, and removing sensors.
section_title: DOD Is Planning for DWSS; Critical Milestones Lie Ahead
paragraphs: DOD has developed draft plans for its DWSS program. The DWSS  satellites will take over the morning orbit after the remaining DMSP  satellites reach the end of their respective lives. The DWSS program  will be comprised of two satellites—the first expected to be launched no  earlier than 2018. Each will have three sensors: a Visible/Infrared  Imager/Radiometer Suite, a Space Environment Monitor, and a  microwave imager/sounder. DOD plans to formally review system  requirements in December 2011 and to conduct a preliminary design  review by September 2012. In addition, DOD plans to develop a  requirements document and obtain an independent cost estimate during  fiscal year 2012.
Although we recommended in May 2010 that DOD expedite decisions on  the cost, schedule, and capabilities of DWSS, DOD has not yet finalized  the functionality that will be provided by the DWSS program, or developed  a cost and schedule baseline. For example, DOD has not yet decided  what microwave sounder will be developed for DWSS, and whether it will  merely meet legacy requirements or provide the full scope of functionality  originally planned for NPOESS. Until DOD defines the scope of its  program, including the capabilities each satellite will provide, both military  and civilian users will be unable to prepare for DWSS satellite data and  any data shortfalls.
section_title: NOAA and DOD Continue to Face Key Transition Risks
paragraphs: Over a year ago, we identified key transition risks facing NOAA and DOD,  including the need to support the other agency’s requirements, ensure  effective oversight of new program management, manage cost and  schedule implications from contract and other program changes, and  ensure the availability of key staff and capabilities, and we recommended  that the agencies move to mitigate these risks. Today, the agencies  continue to face key risks in transitioning from NPOESS to their new  programs. These risk areas are discussed below.    Supporting the other agency’s requirements: As a joint program,  NPOESS was expected to fulfill many military, civilian, and research  requirements for environmental data. However, because the  requirements of NOAA and DOD are different, the agencies may  develop programs that meet their own needs but not the other’s.  Because both NOAA and DOD have not decided on the final  functionality of their respective programs, each could choose to  remove functionality that is important to the other agency and its  users. This has started to occur. NOAA has already made decisions  to remove a transmission capability that is important to the Navy.  Other functions that are currently under consideration (such as  delaying receipt of the data or removing ground processing functions)  could also affect military operations. Agency officials reported that  they formed a joint working group in July 2011 to discuss and mitigate  these issues, but it is too soon to determine what progress has been  made, if any. If the agencies cannot find a way to build an effective  partnership that facilitates both efficient and effective decision-making  on data continuity needs, the needs of both agencies—and their  users—may not be adequately incorporated into the new programs.    Oversight of new program management: Under its new JPSS  program, NOAA plans to transfer parts of the NPOESS program to  NASA, but it has not yet defined how it will oversee NASA’s efforts.  We have reported that NASA has consistently underestimated time  and cost and has not adequately managed risk factors such as  contractor performance. Because of such issues, we listed NASA’s  acquisition management as a high-risk area in 1990, and it remains a  high-risk area today. NOAA officials reported that they are  developing a management control plan with NASA and intend to  perform an independent review of this plan when it is completed. This  plan has now been in development for about 18 months, and neither  NOAA nor NASA could provide a firm time frame for its completion.  Without strong NOAA oversight of NASA’s management of program  components, JPSS may continue to face the same cost, schedule,  and contract management challenges as the NPOESS program.    Cost and schedule implications resulting from contract and program  changes: NASA has transferred the sensor development and common  ground systems contracts from the NPOESS contract. However,  NOAA has been in negotiations for at least 6 months with the  NPOESS contractor regarding intellectual property rights for  components of JPSS. The agency could not provide a time frame for  when it expects this issue to be resolved. Until these issues are  resolved, the full cost and schedule implications of contract and  program changes will be unknown.    Ensuring key staff and capabilities: The NPOESS program office was  composed of NOAA, NASA, Air Force, and contractor staff with  knowledge and experience in the status, risks, and lessons learned  from the NPOESS program. This knowledge would be important to  both programs after the transition period. According to NOAA and  NASA officials, the JPSS program office is now fully staffed. On the  other hand, the DOD program has only staffed approximately 80 out  of 155 positions in its program office. In addition, NOAA officials  acknowledged that they had estimated that a contractor workforce of  approximately 1,600 would work on JPSS activities; however, only  819 are on board due to budget constraints. Unless DOD is proactive  in ensuring that its program office is fully staffed and NOAA  contractors are able to fill all necessary positions, the new programs  may not be able to complete work as scheduled and satellite launches  could be delayed.
In summary, the NPOESS program was disbanded in the hope that separate  DOD and NOAA programs could prove more successful than the joint  program, that costs and schedules might finally begin to stabilize, and that  the continuity of satellite data critical to both military and civilian missions  would be assured. However, over 18 months later, NOAA and DOD are still  scrambling to establish their respective programs and to develop baseline  cost and schedule estimates for those programs. As a result, it still is not  clear what the programs will deliver, when, and at what cost.
In addition, the agencies continue to face a number of transition risks,  including the continued need to support each other’s requirements and  residual contracting issues. As NOAA makes difficult decisions on  whether to remove promised JPSS functionality in order to mitigate a  satellite data gap, it will be important to prioritize the functionality and to  work with DOD to ensure that critical requirements are still met. Timely  decisions on cost, schedule, and capabilities are needed to allow both  acquisitions to move forward and to ensure that painful gaps in satellite  data can be minimized. Until both NOAA and DOD can develop and  finalize credible plans for their respective programs, and mitigate or  minimize the risks, neither agency’s users can plan for how to address  this gap.
Chairman Broun, Chairman Harris, Ranking Member Miller, Ranking  Member Edwards, and Members of the Subcommittees, this completes  my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions  that you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony, please  contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov.  Other key contributors include Colleen Phillips (Assistant Director), Kate  Agatone, Franklin Jackson, Fatima Jahan, and Lee McCracken.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.