Arctic Capabilities: DOD Addressed Many Specified Reporting Elements in Its 2011 Arctic Report but Should Take Steps to Meet Near- and Long-term Needs
Published: 2012-01-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The gradual retreat of polar sea ice, combined with an expected increase in human activityshipping traffic, oil and gas exploration, and tourism in the Arctic regioncould eventually increase the need for a U.S. military and homeland security presence in the Arctic. As a result, the Department of Defense (DOD) must begin preparing to access, operate, and protect national interests there. House Report 111-491 directed DOD to prepare a report on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage, and specified five reporting elements that should be addressed. House Report 112-78 directed GAO to review DODs report. GAO assessed the extent to which 1) DODs Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage (Arctic Report) addressed the specified reporting elements and 2) DOD has efforts under way to identify and prioritize the capabilities needed to meet national security objectives in the Arctic. GAO analyzed DODs Arctic Report and related documents and interviewed DOD and U.S. Coast Guard officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DODs Arctic Report, submitted May 31, 2011, addressed three and partially addressed two of the elements specified in the House Report.
While DOD has undertaken some efforts to assess the capabilities needed to meet national security objectives in the Arctic, it is unclear whether DOD will be in a position to provide needed capabilities in a timely and efficient manner because it lacks a risk-based investment strategy for addressing near-term needs and a collaborative forum with the Coast Guard for addressing long-term capability needs. DODs Arctic Report acknowledges that it has some near-term gaps in key capabilities needed to communicate, navigate, and maintain awareness of activity in the region. However, DOD has not yet evaluated, selected, or implemented alternatives for prioritizing and addressing near-term Arctic capability needs. In addition, DOD and the Coast Guard have established a working group to identify potential collaborative efforts to enhance U.S. Arctic capabilities. This working group is focused on identifying potential near-term investments but not longer-term needs, and it is currently expected to be dissolved in January 2012. Uncertainty involving the rate of Arctic climate change necessitates careful planning to ensure efficient use of resources in developing Arctic needs such as basing infrastructure and icebreakers, which require long lead times to develop and are expensive to build and maintain. Without taking steps to meet near- and long-term Arctic capability needs, DOD risks making premature Arctic investments, being late in obtaining needed capabilities, or missing opportunities to minimize costs by collaborating on investments with the Coast Guard.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD develop a risk-based investment strategy and timeline for developing Arctic capabilities needed in the near-term; and establish a forum with the Coast Guard to identify collaborative Arctic capability investments over the long-term. DOD and the Department of Homeland Security generally agreed with GAOs recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The gradual retreat of polar sea ice in the Arctic region, combined with an  expected increase in human activity—shipping traffic, oil and gas  exploration, and tourism—could eventually increase the need for a U.S.  military and homeland security presence in the Arctic. In recognition of  increasing strategic interest in the Arctic, the United States has developed  national level policies that guide the actions of the Department of Defense  (DOD), the U.S. Coast Guard, and other stakeholders in the region.  These policies indicate that the United States has an enduring interest in  working collaboratively with other nations to address the emerging  challenges arising from the impacts of climate change and globalization in  the Arctic, and they identify Arctic national security needs including  protecting the environment, managing resources, and supporting  scientific research.
Over the years, we have completed a number of reviews related to the  challenges of developing capabilities for operating in the Arctic. For  example, we have reported on the difficulties DOD and other agencies  face in achieving maritime domain awareness. We testified on the  challenges of translating climate data into information that officials need  to make decisions.
We also reported on the Coast Guard’s coordination  with stakeholders on Arctic policy and efforts to identify Arctic  requirements and capability gaps.included at the end of this report.
A list of these related products is  In light of continuing concerns, the House Armed Services Committee  directed DOD to provide a report to the congressional defense  committees on its Arctic operations in the House Report accompanying a  proposed bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2011 (H.R. 5136). elements in the report, including an assessment of (1) the strategic  national security objectives and restrictions in the Arctic region; (2)  mission capabilities required to support the strategic national security  objectives and a timeline to obtain such capabilities; (3) an amended  unified command plan that addresses opportunities of obtaining continuity  of effort in the Arctic Ocean by a single combatant commander; (4) the  basing infrastructure required to support Arctic strategic objectives,  including the need for a deep-water port in the Arctic; and (5) the status of  and need for icebreakers to determine whether icebreakers provide  important or required mission capabilities to support Arctic strategic  national security objectives and an assessment of the minimum and  optimal number of icebreakers that may be needed. DOD submitted its  Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage  (Arctic Report) on May 31, 2011.
H. R. Rep. No. 111-491, at 337 (2010). letter and appendix II provide our response to the direction in the house  report and include an assessment of the degree to which DOD addressed  each of the five specified reporting elements in its report provided to the  defense committees.
To assess the extent to which DOD’s Arctic Report addressed the five  specified reporting elements, two GAO analysts independently reviewed  and compared the Arctic Report with the direction in the House Report.  We considered the reporting element to be addressed when the Arctic  Report explicitly addressed all parts of the element. We considered the  reporting element partially addressed when the Arctic Report addressed  at least one or more parts of the element, but not all parts of the element.  We considered the reporting element not addressed when the Arctic  Report did not explicitly address any part of the element. To assess the  extent to which DOD has efforts under way to identify and prioritize the  capabilities needed to meet national security objectives in the Arctic, we  reviewed documentation related to DOD’s Arctic operations, such as the  U.S. Navy’s November 2009 Arctic Roadmap, the February 2010  Quadrennial Defense Review, the U.S. European Command’s April 2011  Arctic Strategic Assessment, the U.S. Coast Guard’s July 2011 High  Latitude Study, and the Navy’s September 2011 Arctic Capabilities  Based Assessment. We interviewed officials from the Office of the  Secretary of Defense; Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;  U.S. Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense  Command; U.S. European Command; U.S. Pacific Command; U.S.  Transportation Command; and U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine  Corps Arctic offices. We also interviewed Coast Guard officials to  determine their contribution to and collaboration with DOD on the Arctic  Report.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 to January 2012 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for a more  detailed description of our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Diminishing Ice Opens Potential for Increased Human Activity in the Arctic
paragraphs: Scientific research and projections of the changes taking place in the  Arctic vary, but there is a general consensus that Arctic sea ice is  diminishing. As recently as September 2011, scientists at the U.S.  National Snow and Ice Data Center reported that the annual Arctic  minimum sea ice extent for 2011 was the second lowest in the satellite  record, and 938,000 square miles below the 1979 to 2000 average  annual minimum (see fig. 1). Much of the Arctic Ocean remains ice- covered for a majority of the year, but some scientists have projected that  the Arctic will be ice-diminished for periods of time in the summer by as  soon as 2040.
These environmental changes in the Arctic are making maritime transit  more feasible and are increasing the likelihood of further expansion in  human activity including tourism, oil and gas extraction, commercial  shipping, and fishing in the region. For example, in 2011, northern trans- shipping routes opened during the summer months, which permitted  more than 40 vessels to transit between June and October 2011. The  Northern Sea Route opened by mid-August, and appeared to remain  open through September, while the Northwest Passage opened for  periods in the summer for the fifth year in a row. See figure 2 for locations  of these shipping routes. Despite these changes, however, several  enduring characteristics still provide challenges to surface navigation in  the Arctic, including large amounts of winter ice and increased movement  of ice from spring to fall. Increased movement of sea ice makes its  location less predictable, a situation that is likely to increase the risk for  ships to become trapped or damaged by ice impacts.Report states that scientists currently project transpolar routes will not be  reliably open until around 2040 and then only for a limited period during  the summer and early fall. DOD’s report assessed that most national  security missions will likely be limited to those months.
section_title: National Policies Guide DOD and Other Stakeholders’ Operations in the Arctic
paragraphs: Key strategy and policy documents detail the United States’ national  security objectives and guide DOD’s and other stakeholders’ operations  in the Arctic. The 2009 National Security Presidential Directive  66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25, Arctic Region Policy,  establishes U.S. policy with respect to the Arctic region and tasks senior  officials, including the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security,  with its implementation. This directive identifies specific U.S. national  security and homeland security interests in the Arctic, including missile  defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for  strategic sealift, maritime presence and security operations; and ensuring  freedom of navigation and overflight. Additionally, the 2010 National  Security Strategy identifies four enduring national interests that are  relevant to the Arctic and states that the U.S. has broad and  fundamental interests in the Arctic. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense  Review also provides top-level DOD policy guidance on the Arctic,  highlighting the need for DOD to work collaboratively with interagency  partners such as the Coast Guard to address gaps in Arctic  communications, domain awareness, search and rescue, and  environmental observation and forecasting. Finally, since the Arctic region  is primarily a maritime domain, existing U.S. guidance relating to maritime  areas continues to apply, such as the September 2005 National Strategy  for Maritime Security and National Security Presidential Directive  41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13, the Maritime Security  Policy.
section_title: Multiple Federal Stakeholders Have Arctic Responsibilities
paragraphs: DOD is responsible in the Arctic and elsewhere for securing the United  States from direct attack; securing strategic access and retaining global  freedom of action; strengthening existing and emerging alliances and  partnerships; and establishing favorable security conditions. Additionally,  the Navy has developed an Arctic Roadmap which lists Navy action  items, objectives, and desired effects for the Arctic region from fiscal  years 2010 to 2014. Focus areas include training, communications,  operational investments, and environmental protection.
Since the Arctic is primarily a maritime domain, the Coast Guard plays a  significant role in Arctic policy implementation and enforcement. The  Coast Guard is a multimission, maritime military service within the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that has responsibilities  including maritime safety, security, environmental protection, and national  defense, among other missions. Therefore, as more navigable ocean  water emerges in the Arctic and human activity increases, the Coast  Guard will face expanding responsibilities in the region. For DOD facilities  and Coast Guard assets in the Arctic and Alaska, see figure 2.
Other federal stakeholders include:
The National Science Foundation, which is responsible for funding  U.S. Arctic research—including research on the causes and impacts  of climate change––and providing associated logistics and  infrastructure support to conduct this research. The National Science  Foundation and the Coast Guard also coordinate on the use of the  Coast Guard’s icebreakers for scientific research.
The Department of State, which is responsible for formulating and  implementing U.S. policy on international issues concerning the  Arctic, leading the domestic interagency Arctic Policy Group, and  leading U.S. participation in the Arctic Council.
The Department of the Interior, which is responsible for oversight and  regulation of resource development in U.S. Arctic regions. The  department also coordinates with the Coast Guard on safety  compliance inspections of offshore energy facilities and in the event of  a major oil spill.
The Department of Transportation and its component agency, the  Maritime Administration, which works on marine transportation and  shipping issues in the Arctic and elsewhere, among other things.
The Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric  Administration, which provides information on Arctic oceanic and  atmospheric conditions and issues weather and ice forecasts, among  other responsibilities.
section_title: DOD’s Arctic Report Addressed or Partially Addressed All Five Specified Reporting Elements
paragraphs: DOD’s May 2011 Arctic Report either addressed or partially addressed all  of the elements specified in the House Report. Specifically, our analysis  showed that, of the five reporting elements, DOD addressed three and  partially addressed two. The elements not fully addressed were to have  included a timeline to obtain needed Arctic capabilities and an  assessment of the minimum and optimal number of icebreakers that may  be needed to support Arctic strategic national security objectives.  According to DOD officials, these elements were not fully addressed for a  number of reasons such as DOD’s assessment that Arctic operations are  a challenge but not yet an urgency; the report’s being written prior to  initiating the formal DOD capabilities development process, making it  difficult to provide a timeline for obtaining Arctic capabilities; and DOD’s  assessment that its need for icebreakers is currently limited to one  mission per year. Furthermore, DOD’s Arctic Report notes that significant  uncertainty remains about the extent, rate, and impact of climate change  in the Arctic and the pace at which human activity will increase, making it  challenging for DOD to plan for possible future conditions in the region  and to mobilize public or political support for investments in U.S. Arctic  capabilities or infrastructure. Figure 3 below summarizes our assessment  of the extent to which DOD’s Arctic Report included each of the specified  reporting elements and the reasons DOD officials provided for any  elements that were not fully addressed. Appendix II includes our detailed  evaluation of each of the specified reporting elements.
section_title: DOD Has Identified Arctic Capability Gaps, but Lacks a Comprehensive Approach to Addressing Arctic Capabilities
paragraphs: DOD has several efforts under way to assess the capabilities needed to  support U.S. strategic objectives in the Arctic. However, it has not yet  developed a comprehensive approach to addressing Arctic capabilities  that would include steps such as developing a risk-based investment  strategy and timeline to address near-term needs and establishing a  collaborative forum with the Coast Guard to identify long-term Arctic  investments.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Efforts Under Way to Assess Near-term Arctic Capability Gaps but Lacks a Risk-Based Investment Strategy to Address These Gaps
paragraphs: While DOD’s Arctic Report assessed a relatively low level of threat in the  Arctic region, it noted three capability gaps that have the potential to  hamper Arctic operations. These gaps include (1) limited  communications, such as degraded high-frequency radio signals in  latitudes above 70°N because of magnetic and solar phenomena; (2)  degraded global positioning system performance that could affect  missions that require precision navigation, such as search and rescue;  and (3) limited awareness across all domains in the Arctic because of  distances, limited presence, and the harsh environment. Other key  challenges identified include: shortfalls in ice and weather reporting and  forecasting; limitations in command, control, communications, computers,  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance because of a lack of assets  and harsh environmental conditions; limited inventory of ice-capable  vessels; and limited shore-based infrastructure. According to DOD’s  Arctic Report, capabilities will need to be reassessed as conditions  change, and gaps will need to be addressed to be prepared to operate in  a more accessible Arctic. Other stakeholders have also assessed Arctic  capability gaps. Examples of these efforts include the following:
U.S. Northern Command initiated a commander’s estimate for the  Arctic in December 2010 that, according to officials, will establish the  commander’s intent and missions in the Arctic and identify capability  shortfalls. In addition, Northern Command identified two Arctic-specific  capability gaps (communications and maritime domain awareness) in  its fiscal years 2013 through 2017 integrated priority list, which defines  the combatant command’s highest-priority capability gaps for the  near-term, including shortfalls that may adversely affect missions.
U.S. European Command completed an Arctic Strategic Assessment  in April 2011 that, among other things, identified Arctic capability gaps  in the areas of environmental protection, maritime domain awareness,  cooperative development of environmental awareness technology,  sharing of environmental data, and lessons learned on infrastructure  development. In addition, it recommended that the command conduct  a more detailed mission analysis for potential Arctic missions,  complete a detailed capability estimate for Arctic operations, and work  in conjunction with Northern Command and the Departments of the  Navy and Air Force to conduct a comprehensive capabilities-based  assessment for the Arctic.
DOD and DHS established the Capabilities Assessment Working  Group (working group) in May 2011 to identify shared Arctic capability  gaps as well as opportunities and approaches to overcome them, to  include making recommendations for near-term investments. The  working group was directed by its Terms of Reference to focus on four  primary capability areas when identifying potential collaborative efforts  to enhance Arctic capabilities, including near-term investments. Those  capability areas include maritime domain awareness,  communications, infrastructure, and presence. The working group  was also directed to identify overlaps and redundancies in established  and emerging DOD and DHS Arctic requirements. As the advocate for  Arctic capabilities, Northern Command was assigned lead  responsibility for DOD in the working group, while the Coast Guard  was assigned lead responsibility for DHS. The establishment of the  working group—which, among other things, is to identify opportunities  for bi-departmental action to close Arctic capability gaps and issue  recommendations for near-term investments—helps to ensure that  collaboration between the Coast Guard and DOD is taking place to  identify near-term capabilities needed to support current planning and  operations. Although the working group is developing a paper with its  recommendations, officials indicated that additional assessments  would be required to address those recommendations.
U.S. Navy completed its first Arctic capabilities-based assessment in  September 2011 and is developing a second capabilities-based  assessment focused on observing, mapping, and environmental  prediction capabilities in the Arctic, which officials expect to be  completed in the spring of 2012. The Navy’s first Arctic capabilities- based assessment identified three critical capability gaps as the  highest priorities, including the capabilities to provide environmental  information; maneuver safely on the sea surface; and conduct  training, exercise, and education. This assessment recommended  several near-term actions to address these gaps.
DOD’s Arctic Report states that the development of Arctic capabilities  requires a deliberate risk-based investment strategy, but DOD has not  developed such a strategy. Although DOD and its components have  identified current Arctic capability gaps, the department may not be taking  appropriate steps to best ensure its future preparedness because DOD  lacks a risk-based investment strategy and a timeline for addressing near- term capability needs. According to DOD officials, there had been no  Arctic-related submissions to its formal capabilities development process  as of September 2011; this process could take two or more years to be  approved, followed by additional time for actual capability development.
GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic, Risk- Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness, GAO-11-621 (Washington,  D.C.: June 20, 2011). those that would minimize DOD investments by leveraging capabilities of  interagency and international partners or they could also include  submissions to DOD’s formal capabilities development process. Another  alternative could include accepting the risk of potentially being late to  develop these needed capabilities in order to provide limited fiscal  resources to other priorities.
Given that the opening in the Arctic presents a wide range of challenges  for DOD, a risk-based investment strategy and timeline can help DOD  develop the capabilities needed to meet national security interests in the  region. Without a risk-based investment strategy and timeline for  prioritizing and addressing near-term Arctic capability gaps and  challenges, which is periodically updated to reflect evolving needs, DOD  could be slow to develop needed capabilities, potentially facing  operational risk and higher costs if the need arises to execute plans  rapidly. Conversely, DOD could move too early, making premature Arctic  investments that take resources from other, more pressing needs or  producing capabilities that could be outdated before they are used.
section_title: DOD and DHS Have Established a Collaborative Forum to Identify Potential Near- term Investments but Not Long-term Needs
paragraphs: While DOD and DHS have established the working group to identify  shared near-term Arctic capability gaps, this collaborative forum is not  intended to address long-term Arctic capability gaps or identify  opportunities for joint investments over the longer-term. DOD  acknowledged the importance of collaboration with the Coast Guard over  the long-term in its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which states that  the department must work with the Coast Guard and DHS to develop  Arctic capabilities to support both current and future planning and  operations. According to DOD and Coast Guard officials, although the  working group is primarily focused on near-term investments, it has  discussed some mid- to long-term capability needs. However, DOD and  Coast Guard officials stated that after the completion of the working  group’s paper, expected in January 2012, the working group will have  completed the tasks detailed in the Terms of Reference and will be  dissolved. Consequently, no forum will exist to further address any mid- to  long-term capability needs.
Although we have previously reported that there are several existing  interagency organizations working on Arctic issues, these organizations  do not specifically address Arctic capability needs. These organizations  include the Interagency Policy Committee on the Arctic, the Arctic Policy  Group, and the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee, among  others. DOD and DHS also have long-standing memorandums of  agreement related to coordination between DOD and the Coast Guard in  both maritime homeland security and maritime homeland defense. The  objectives of these interagency organizations range from developing  coordinated research policy for the Arctic region to tracking  implementation of national Arctic policy to identifying implementation  gaps, but do not specifically address capability gaps in the Arctic.  According to DOD and Coast Guard officials we spoke with, only the  working group is focused specifically on addressing Arctic capabilities.  After the working group completes its tasks in January 2012, there will be  no DOD and Coast Guard organization focused specifically on reducing  overlap and redundancies or collaborating to address Arctic capability  gaps in support of future planning and operations, as is directed by the  2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.
A theater campaign plan encompasses the activities of a supported geographic  combatant commander, which accomplish strategic or operational objectives within a  theater of war or theater of operations, and translates national or theater strategy into  operational concepts and those concepts into unified action. priorities, such as identifying a need for icebreakers. However, the  officials stated that the Arctic Estimate does not identify how DOD would  acquire those icebreakers or how it would coordinate with the Coast  Guard—the operator of the nation’s icebreakers—to reconstruct existing  or build new icebreakers. The Coast Guard has a more immediate need  to develop Arctic capabilities such as icebreakers and has taken steps to  address some long-term capability gaps. Meanwhile, given that it could  take approximately 10 years to develop icebreakers, the process for DOD  and the Coast Guard to identify and procure new icebreakers would have  to begin within the next year to ensure that U.S. heavy icebreaking  capabilities are maintained beyond 2020.
Our prior work has shown that collaboration with partners can help avoid  wasting scarce resources and increase effectiveness of efforts. Without  specific plans for a collaborative forum between DOD and the Coast  Guard to address long-term Arctic capability gaps and to identify  opportunities for joint investments over the longer-term, DOD may miss  opportunities to leverage resources with the Coast Guard to enhance  future Arctic capabilities.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: At this time, significant DOD investments in Arctic capabilities may not be  needed, but that does not preclude taking steps to anticipate and prepare  for Arctic operations in the future. Addressing near-term gaps is essential  for DOD to have the key enabling capabilities it needs to communicate,  navigate, and maintain awareness of activity in the region. An investment  strategy that identifies and prioritizes near-term Arctic capability needs  and identifies a timeline to address them would be useful for decision  makers in planning and budgeting. Without taking deliberate steps to  analyze risks in the Arctic and prioritize related resource and operational  requirements, DOD could later find itself faced with urgent needs,  resulting in higher costs that could have been avoided.
In addition, unless DOD and DHS continue to collaborate to identify  opportunities for interagency action to close Arctic capability gaps, DOD  could miss out on opportunities to work with the Coast Guard to leverage  resources for shared needs. DOD may choose to create a new  collaborative forum or incorporate this collaboration into an existing forum  or process. Given the different missions and associated timelines of DOD  and the Coast Guard for developing Arctic capabilities, it is important that  the two agencies work together to avoid fragmented efforts and reduce  unaffordable overlap and redundancies while addressing Arctic capability  gaps in support of future planning and operations.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To more effectively leverage federal investments in Arctic capabilities in a  resource-constrained environment and ensure needed capabilities are  developed in a timely way, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense,  in consultation with the Secretary of the Department of Homeland  Security, take the following two actions: develop a risk-based investment strategy that: 1) identifies and  prioritizes near-term Arctic capability needs, 2) develops a timeline for  addressing them, and 3) is updated as appropriate; and establish a collaborative forum with the Coast Guard to fully leverage  federal investments and help avoid overlap and redundancies in  addressing long-term Arctic capability needs.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DHS concurred with both of  our recommendations. For its part, DOD partially concurred with both of  our recommendations. It generally agreed that the department needed to  take action to address the issues we raised but indicated it is already  taking initial steps to address them. DOD and DHS’s comments are  reprinted in appendices VI and VII, respectively. Technical comments  were provided separately and incorporated as appropriate.
With respect to DOD’s comments on our first recommendation, DOD  stated that its existing processes—including prioritizing Arctic capability  needs through the Commander’s annual integrated priority lists; balancing  those needs against other requirements through the annual planning,  programming, budgeting, and execution system process; and addressing  Service requirements through program objective memorandum  submissions—enable DOD to balance the risk of being late-to-need with  the opportunity cost of making premature Arctic investments. However,  DOD’s response did not address how it would develop a risk-based  investment strategy. As stated in our report, DOD has considered some  elements of such a risk-based investment strategy by setting strategic  goals and objectives, determining constraints, and assessing risks (such  as Northern Command’s inclusion of two Arctic-specific capability needs  in its fiscal years 2013 through 2017 integrated priority list). However,  DOD has not yet conducted the remaining three phases of a risk-based  investment strategy: evaluating alternatives for addressing these risks,  selecting the appropriate alternatives, and implementing the alternatives  and monitoring the progress made and results achieved. We believe that  considering potential alternative solutions, such as leveraging the  capabilities of interagency or international partners, could help minimize  DOD’s investment in Arctic capabilities. DOD’s Arctic Report also  emphasized the need for a risk-based investment strategy, noting that  “the long lead time associated with capability development, particularly  the procurement of space-based assets and ships, requires a deliberate  risk-based investment strategy” and noted that “additional capability  analysis will be required.” By developing a risk-based investment strategy  to prioritize near-term investment needs and a timeline for addressing  them, DOD can be better prepared in its planning and budgeting  decisions.
With respect to our second recommendation, both DOD and DHS cited  the importance of collaboration to develop Arctic capabilities and  identified some existing forums that include Arctic issues, such as the  annual Navy and Coast Guard staff talks and the joint DOD-DHS  Capabilities Development Working Group. Our report also identified  additional existing interagency organizations working on Arctic issues,  and we agree that these forums can help avoid overlap and redundancies  in addressing long-term Arctic capability needs. However, these forums  do not specifically focus on Arctic capability needs, and no DOD and  Coast Guard forum will be focused on reducing overlap and redundancies  or collaborating to address Arctic capability gaps following the dissolution  of the Arctic Capabilities Assessment Working Group in January 2012.  We continue to believe that focusing specifically on long-term Arctic  capability needs will enable DOD and the Coast Guard to better leverage  resources for shared needs.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the  Department of Homeland Security. In addition, the report is available at  no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact me  at pendletonj@gao.gov or (202) 512-3489. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix VIII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of our work were to determine the extent to which (1) the  Department of Defense (DOD) report on the Arctic addresses the  reporting elements specified in House Report 111-491 and (2) DOD has  efforts under way to identify and prioritize the capabilities needed to meet  national security objectives in the Arctic. To gather information for both  objectives we reviewed various DOD and Coast Guard documentation.  We interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense;  Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; U.S. Northern  Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command; U.S.  European Command; U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Transportation  Command; and U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Arctic  offices. We also interviewed Coast Guard officials to determine their  contribution to DOD’s efforts to identify and prioritize capabilities.
To address the extent to which DOD’s report on the Arctic addresses the  reporting elements specified in House Report 111-491, we evaluated the  DOD Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest  Passage (Arctic Report) issued in May 2011. We determined that the  extent to which DOD addressed each specified element would be rated  as either “addressed,” “partially addressed,” or “not addressed.” These  categories were defined as follows:
Addressed: An element is addressed when the Arctic Report explicitly  addresses all parts of the element.
Partially addressed: An element is partially addressed when the Arctic  Report addresses at least one or more parts of the element, but not all  parts of the element.
Not addressed: An element is not addressed when the Arctic Report  did not explicitly address any part of the element.
Specifically, two GAO analysts independently reviewed and compared the  Arctic Report with the direction in the House Report; assessed whether  each element was addressed, partially addressed, or not addressed; and  recorded their assessment and the basis for the assessment. The final  assessment reflected the analysts’ consensus based on the individual  assessments. In addition, we interviewed DOD officials involved in  preparing the Arctic Report to discuss their interpretation of the direction  in the House Report and the DOD report’s findings. To provide context,  our assessment also reflected our review of relevant DOD and Coast  Guard documents, as well as issues raised in recent GAO reports that  specifically relate to some of the specified reporting elements.
To address the extent to which DOD has efforts under way to identify and  prioritize the capabilities needed to meet national security objectives in  the Arctic, we reviewed documentation related to DOD’s Arctic  operations, such as the U.S. Navy’s November 2009 Arctic Roadmap, the  February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the U.S. European  Command’s April 2011 Arctic Strategic Assessment, the U.S. Coast  Guard’s July 2011 High Latitude Study, and the Navy’s September 2011  Arctic Capabilities Based Assessment. We also interviewed officials from  various DOD and Coast Guard offices.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 to January 2012 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Extent to which DOD’s Arctic Report Addressed Specified Reporting Elements
paragraphs: Reporting Requirement  H. R. Rep. No. 111-491, which  accompanied a proposed bill for  the National Defense Authorization  Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (H.R.  5136), directed DOD to submit a  report on Arctic Operations and the  Northwest Passage. This report is  to include, among other things, an  assessment of the strategic  national security objectives and  restrictions in the Arctic region.
Detailed Assessment of This Element  We determined that the Department of Defense (DOD) addressed this  element because the Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the  Northwest Passage (Arctic Report) includes an assessment of U.S.  strategic national security objectives and restrictions in the Arctic.  Specifically, the report states that DOD reviewed national-level policy  guidance and concluded that the overarching strategic national security  objective for the Arctic is a stable and secure region where U.S. national  interests are safeguarded and the U.S. homeland is protected (see fig. 4  for descriptions of the policy guidance documents DOD reviewed). The  report further identifies two DOD strategic objectives to achieve the  desired end-state for the Arctic: (1) prevent and deter conflict and (2)  prepare to respond to a wide range of challenges and contingencies. In  addition, the report identifies and examines restrictions in the Arctic. For  example, the report states that uncertainty about the extent, impact, and  rate of climate change in the Arctic will make it challenging to plan for  possible future conditions in the region and to mobilize public or political  support for investments in U.S. Arctic capabilities or infrastructure.
Related Findings from Previous GAO Reports  In 2010, we reported on the difficulties associated with developing  capabilities needed to understand the extent, rate, and impact of climate  change. Specifically, we found that while agencies have taken steps to plan  for some continued climate observations via satellite data in the near-term,  they lack a strategy for the long-term provision of such data. For example,  we reported that DOD has not established plans to restore the full set of  capabilities intended for the National Polar-orbiting Operational  Environmental Satellite System over the life of the program. We noted that  without a comprehensive long-term strategy for continuing environmental  measurements over the coming decades and a means for implementing it,  agencies will continue to independently pursue their immediate priorities on  an ad-hoc basis, the economic benefits of a coordinated approach to  investments in earth observation may be lost, and our nation’s ability to  understand climate change may be limited.
section_title: Appendix II: Extent to which DOD’s Arctic Report Addressed Specified Reporting Elements
paragraphs: Reporting Requirement  H. R. Rep. No. 111-491, which  accompanied a proposed bill for  the National Defense Authorization  Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (H.R.  5136), directed DOD to submit a  report on Arctic Operations and the  Northwest Passage. This report is  to include, among other things, an  assessment on mission capabilities  required to support the strategic  national security objectives and a  timeline to obtain such capabilities.
Our Assessment:        Partially Addressed  Based on our assessment, we  determined that DOD partially  addressed this reporting element.
Detailed Assessment of This Element  We determined that DOD partially addressed this element because the  Arctic Report includes a capability gap assessment in relation to Arctic  mission areas but does not provide a timeline to obtain such capabilities.  Specifically, the report identifies potential Arctic capability gaps over the  near- (2010-2020), mid- (2020-2030), and far-term (beyond 2030) that  may affect DOD’s ability to accomplish four of nine mission areas in the  region, including maritime domain awareness, maritime security, search  and rescue, and sea control. The report notes that three capability gaps  in particular have the potential to hamper Arctic operations across all  time frames: (1) insufficient communications architecture, (2) degraded  Global Positioning System performance, and (3) extremely limited  domain awareness. Other key challenges identified include: shortfalls in  ice and weather reporting and forecasting; limitations in command,  control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and  reconnaissance; and limited shore-based infrastructure and inventory of  ice-capable vessels. Although DOD states in the report that capabilities  will need to be reassessed as conditions change and gaps addressed in  order to be prepared to operate in a more accessible Arctic, it does not  provide a timeline for addressing capability gaps or challenges identified.   Related Findings from Previous GAO Reports  We previously reported on the challenges DOD and Coast Guard face in  achieving maritime domain awareness, a capability gap identified in  DOD’s Arctic Report. For example, in 2011 we found that DOD lacks a  strategic, risk-based approach to manage its maritime domain awareness  efforts and to address high priority capability gaps. To improve DOD’s  ability to manage the implementation of maritime domain awareness  across DOD, we recommended that DOD develop and implement a  departmentwide strategy that: identifies objectives and roles and  responsibilities for achieving maritime domain awareness; aligns efforts  and objectives with DOD’s process for determining requirements and  allocating resources; identifies capability resourcing responsibilities; and  includes performance measures. We also recommended that DOD, in  collaboration with other stakeholders such as the Coast Guard, perform a  comprehensive risk-based analysis to prioritize and address DOD’s  critical maritime capability gaps and guide future investments. DOD  concurred with our recommendations and identified actions it is taking— or plans to take—to address them. We also reported in 2010 that the  Coast Guard faces challenges in achieving Arctic domain awareness,  including inadequate Arctic Ocean and weather data, lack of  communication infrastructure, limited intelligence information, and lack of  a physical presence in the Arctic.minimal assets and infrastructure for Arctic missions and diminishing fleet  expertise for operating in Arctic-type conditions.
section_title: Appendix II: Extent to which DOD’s Arctic Report Addressed Specified Reporting Elements
paragraphs: Reporting Requirement  H. R. Rep. No. 111-491, which  accompanied a proposed bill for  the National Defense Authorization  Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (H.R.  5136), directed DOD to submit a  report on Arctic Operations and the  Northwest Passage. This report is  to include, among other things, an  assessment of an amended unified  command plan that addresses  opportunities of obtaining continuity  of effort in the Arctic Ocean by a  single combatant commander.
Our Assessment:        Addressed  Based on our assessment, we  determined that DOD addressed  this reporting element.
Detailed Assessment of This Element  We determined that DOD addressed this element because the Arctic  Report includes an assessment of the revised April 2011 Unified  Command Plan that addresses the impact of aligning the Arctic Ocean  under a single combatant commander. The April 2011 Unified Command  Plan shifted areas of responsibility boundaries in the Arctic region. As a  result of this realignment, responsibility for the Arctic region is now  shared between U.S. Northern and U.S. European Commands— previously, under the 2008 Unified Command Plan, the two commands  and U.S. Pacific Command shared responsibility for the region, as shown  in figure 5. In addition, the April 2011 Unified Command Plan assigned  Northern Command responsibility for advocating for Arctic capabilities.  The Arctic Report states that having two combatant commands  responsible for a portion of the Arctic Ocean aligned with adjacent land  boundaries is an arrangement best suited to achieve continuity of effort  with key regional partners and that aligning the entire Arctic Ocean under  a single combatant command would disrupt progress in theater security  cooperation achieved over decades of dialogue and confidence building  by Northern and European Commands with regional stakeholders. The  report also notes that although having multiple combatant commands  with responsibility in the Arctic Ocean makes coordination more  challenging, having too few would leave out key stakeholders, diminish  long-standing relationships, and potentially alienate important partners.
Detailed Assessment of This Element  We determined that DOD addressed this element because the Arctic  Report assesses the existing Arctic infrastructure to be adequate to meet  near- (2010-2020) to mid-term (2020-2030) U.S. national security needs,  noting that DOD does not currently anticipate a need for the construction  of additional bases or a deep-draft port in Alaska before 2020.  Specifically, the Arctic Report examines the defense infrastructure such  as bases, ports, and airfields needed to support DOD strategic objectives  for the Arctic, and it discusses the environmental challenges and higher  costs associated with construction and maintenance of Arctic  infrastructure. It concludes that with the low potential for armed conflict in  the region, existing DOD posture is adequate to meet U.S. defense  needs through 2030. In addition, the report states that DOD does not  currently anticipate a need for the construction of a deep-draft port in  Alaska before 2020. The report does not address the basing  infrastructure required to support long-term U.S. national security needs.  The report notes that given the long lead times for construction of major  infrastructure in the region, DOD will periodically reevaluate this  assessment as activity in the region gradually increases and the  combatant commanders update their regional plans on a regular basis.  The report also states that one area for future assessment might be the  need for a co-located airport and port facility suitable for deployment of  undersea search and rescue assets but does not provide a timeline for  completing such an assessment.   Related Findings from Previous GAO Reports  Our prior work has identified the high costs associated with operating and  maintaining installations outside the contiguous United States. In  February 2011, we reported that DOD’s posture-planning guidance does  not require the combatant commands to compile and report  comprehensive cost data associated with posture requirements or to  analyze the costs and benefits of posture alternatives when considering  changes to posture.posture-planning process will continue to lack critical information that  could be used by decision makers as they deliberate posture  requirements and potential opportunities to obtain greater cost  efficiencies may not be identified. We recommended that DOD revise its  posture-planning guidance to require combatant commands to include  the costs associated with initiatives that would alter future posture, and  that DOD provide guidance on how the combatant commands should  analyze the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action when  considering proposed changes to posture. DOD agreed with our  recommendations and identified corrective actions, but additional steps  are needed to fully address the recommendations. These findings  underscore the importance of DOD and Northern Command identifying  and analyzing the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action  associated with future defense posture in the Arctic.
section_title: Appendix II: Extent to which DOD’s Arctic Report Addressed Specified Reporting Elements
paragraphs: Reporting Requirement  H. R. Rep. No. 111-491, which  accompanied a proposed bill for  the National Defense Authorization  Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (H.R.  5136), directed DOD to submit a  report on Arctic Operations and the  Northwest Passage. This report is  to include, among other things, an  assessment of the status of and  need for icebreakers to determine  whether icebreakers provide  important or required mission  capabilities to support Arctic  strategic national security  objectives, and an assessment of  the minimum and optimal number  of icebreakers that may be needed.
Our Assessment:        Partially Addressed  Based on our assessment, we  determined that DOD partially  addressed this reporting element.
section_title: Appendix IV: Policy Guidance on the Arctic Identified in DOD’s Arctic Report
section_title: Appendix V: Arctic Responsibilities under the Unified Command Plan: 2008 and 2011
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Suzanne Wren (Assistant Director), Susan Ditto, Nicole Harms,  Timothy Persons, Steven Putansu, Frank Rusco, Jodie Sandel, Amie  Steele, and Esther Toledo.
Stephen L. Caldwell (Director), Dawn Hoff (Assistant Director), and  Elizabeth Kowalewski contributed expertise on the Department of  Homeland Security and Coast Guard.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Coast Guard: Observations on Arctic Requirements, Icebreakers, and  Coordination with Stakeholders. GAO-12-254T. Washington, D.C.:  December 1, 2011.
Climate Change Adaptation: Federal Efforts to Provide Information Could  Help Government Decision Making. GAO-12-238T. Washington, D.C.:  November 16, 2011.
Coast Guard: Action Needed as Approved Deepwater Program Remains  Unachievable. GAO-12-101T. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2011.
Polar Satellites: Agencies Need to Address Potential Gaps in Weather  and Climate Data Coverage. GAO-11-945T. Washington, D.C.:  September 23, 2011.
Climate engineering: Technical status, future directions, and potential  responses. GAO-11-71. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011.
Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Planning and  Coordination for Maritime Operations. GAO-11-661. Washington, D.C.:  June 23, 2011.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic,  Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness.  GAO-11-621. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2011.
Defense Management: Perspectives on the Involvement of the  Combatant Commands in the Development of Joint Requirements.  GAO-11-527R. Washington, D.C.: May 20, 2011.
Coast Guard: Observations on Acquisition Management and Efforts to  Reassess the Deepwater Program. GAO-11-535T. Washington, D.C.:  April 13, 2011.
Defense Management: Additional Cost Information and Stakeholder Input  Needed to Assess Military Posture in Europe. GAO-11-131. Washington,  D.C.: February 3, 2011.
Coast Guard: Efforts to Identify Arctic Requirements Are Ongoing, but  More Communication about Agency Planning Efforts Would Be  Beneficial. GAO-10-870. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2010.
Environmental Satellites: Strategy Needed to Sustain Critical Climate and  Space Weather Measurements. GAO-10-456. Washington, D.C.: April 27,  2010.
Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of  National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information  Sharing. GAO-09-904SP. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Requirements Determination Process Has  Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities. GAO-08-1060.  Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2008.
Coast Guard: Condition of Some Aids-to-Navigation and Domestic  Icebreaking Vessels Has Declined; Effect on Mission Performance  Appears Mixed. GAO-06-979. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2006.
Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance  and Results Act. GAO/GGD-96-118. Washington, D.C.: June 1996.