Afghanistan: Improvements Needed to Strengthen Management of U.S. Civilian Presence
Published: 2012-02-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In March 2009, the President called for an expanded U.S. civilian presence under Chief of Mission authority to build the capacity of the Afghan government to provide security, essential services, and economic development. In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) deploys civilians under combatant commander authority to Afghanistan to support both combat and capacity-building missions. DOD established the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) in 2009 to create a cadre of civilians trained, cleared, and equipped to respond urgently to expeditionary requirements. As the military draws down, U.S. civilians will remain crucial to achieving the goal of transferring lead security responsibility to the Afghan government in 2014.
For this report, GAO (1) examined the expansion of the U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan, (2) evaluated DODs implementation of its CEW policy, and (3) determined the extent to which U.S. agencies had provided required Afghanistan-specific training to their personnel before deployment. GAO analyzed staffing data and training requirements, and interviewed cognizant officials from the Department of State (State), other U.S. agencies with personnel under Chief of Mission authority in Afghanistan, and DOD.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority and the Department of Defense (DOD) have reported expanding their civilian presence in Afghanistan and took steps to improve their ability to track that presence. Since January 2009, U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority more than tripled their civilian presence from 320 to 1,142. However, although State could report total Chief of Mission numbers by agency, in mid-2011 GAO identified discrepancies in States data system used to capture more-detailed staffing information such as location and position type. State began taking steps in the fall of 2011 to improve the reliability of its data system. Also, DOD reported expanding its overall civilian presence from 394 civilians in January 2009 to 2,929 in December 2011 to help assist U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. The extent to which DODs data is reliable is unknown due to omissions and double counting, among other things. In a 2009 report, GAO noted similar data issues and recommended DOD improve data concerning deployed civilians. DOD concurred with the recommendation and expects the issues will be addressed by a new tracking system to be completed in fiscal year 2012.
DOD has taken preliminary steps to implement its Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) policy, including establishing a program office; however, nearly 3 years after DODs directive established the CEW, the program has not been fully developed and implemented. Specifically, DOD components have not identified and designated the number and types of positions that should constitute the CEW because guidance for making such determinations has not been provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Officials stated that once key assumptions regarding the size and composition of the CEW have been finalized, implementing guidance will be issued. Until guidance that instructs the components on how to identify and designate the number and types of positions that will constitute the CEW is developed, DOD may not be able to (1) make the CEW a significant portion of the civilian workforce as called for in DODs fiscal year 2009 Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan, (2) meet readiness goals for the CEW as required in DODs Strategic Management Plan for fiscal years 2012-2013, and (3) position itself to respond to future missions.
U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority and DOD provided Afghanistan-specific, predeployment training to their civilians, but DOD faced challenges. State offered predeployment training courses to address its requirements for Chief of Mission personnel and designated a centralized point of contact to help ensure that no personnel were deployed without taking required training, including the Foreign Affairs Counter Threat course. While predeployment training requirements were established for Afghanistan by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commander, DOD relied on its various components to provide the training to its civilians. In some cases, DOD components offered duplicate training courses and did not address all theater requirements in their training because DOD did not have a process for identifying and synchronizing requirements and coordinating efforts to implement them, as called for in the Strategic Plan for the Next Generation of Training for the Department of Defense. Absent this process, DOD could not ensure that its civilians were fully prepared for deployment to Afghanistan and that training resources were used efficiently.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAOs recommendations to DOD include developing key assumptions and identifying the number and types of positions that should constitute the CEW, and establishing a process to identify and synchronize training requirements. DOD concurred with GAOs recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In March 2009, the President called for an expanded U.S. civilian  presence to build the capacity of the Afghan government to provide  security, essential services, and economic development with limited  international support. In this expansion, U.S. agencies were to deploy  civilian experts under the authority of the Chief of Mission beyond the  U.S. Embassy in Kabul to the provinces and districts to create more of an  impact on Afghan lives by building the capacity of local government  institutions. Housed with military personnel, these field-deployed civilians  were to coordinate with their military and Afghan counterparts to integrate  their capacity-building activities into the larger counterinsurgency  campaign. Additionally, the Department of Defense (DOD) has deployed  civilians to Afghanistan under the authority of U.S. Central Command to  support combat operations through equipment maintenance, logistical  support, and intelligence gathering and analysis. Some DOD civilians also  deploy to build the capacity of Afghan security institutions such as the  Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior. DOD established the Civilian  Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) by directive in January 2009 to serve as  a source for such deployable civilians.
Current U.S. strategy calls for provinces and districts to be transitioned to  greater Afghan government control as local capacity improves and   The U.S. civilian expansion in Afghanistan and the  conditions allow.deployment of those civilians into the field is crucial to these capacity- building efforts, particularly as the United States, along with its North  Atlantic Treaty Organization partners, has committed to fully transferring  lead security responsibility to the Afghan government by the end of 2014.  Furthermore, a recent report from the Special Inspector General for  Afghanistan Reconstruction found that the cost of sustaining the U.S.  civilian presence would likely rise as the U.S. military presence decreases.
Because of broad congressional interest in Afghanistan, we performed our  work under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States to  conduct work on his own initiative. In this report, we examine issues related  to the management of U.S. agency civilian personnel deployed to  Afghanistan under both Chief of Mission and DOD authority. Specifically,  we (1) examined the expansion of the U.S. civilian presence in  Afghanistan, (2) evaluated DOD’s implementation of its CEW policy, and  (3) determined the extent to which U.S. agencies had provided required  Afghanistan-specific training to their personnel before deployment.
For our first objective, to examine the expansion of the U.S. civilian  presence in Afghanistan, we obtained and analyzed staffing data from the  Department of State (State) and DOD regarding staffing requirements  and fill rates for all civilian positions under Chief of Mission authority and  key positions under combatant commander authority deployed in-country  following the President’s March 2009 call to enhance support of Afghan  national and subnational government institutions. To determine the  reliability of the staffing data, we reviewed available documentation  pertaining to the data systems and procedures used to develop staffing  data, examined the data for outliers and missing observations, and  conducted follow-up interviews to discuss questions that arose in our  analysis of the data. Furthermore, we compared State data against  staffing data obtained from other agencies under Chief of Mission  authority, including the U.S. Agency for International Development  (USAID), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the  Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and the Treasury. We found  State’s staffing data to be sufficiently reliable to provide an indication of  the positions filled at the level of the agency but not sufficiently reliable to  report on more-detailed staffing information, such as position type. For  DOD, we compared program requirements and staffing data for the  Ministry of Defense Advisors program and Afghanistan Pakistan Hands  program with documentation obtained from the program office. Because  DOD staffing data were based on daily submissions from combatant  commands, we could not validate its accuracy; however, DOD officials  identified the data as sufficiently reliable to illustrate the increase in  DOD’s overall civilian presence, and we agree.
For our second objective, to evaluate the implementation of DOD’s CEW  policy, we reviewed relevant documents to identify the structure of the  CEW, DOD’s plans for implementing the policy, and how the CEW related  to departmentwide programs and goals. In addition, we interviewed officials  from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the CEW program office, the  military services, and U.S. Central Command to further understand the  current status of efforts to fully implement the CEW, the department’s plans  for the CEW of the future, and how the CEW was currently supporting the  department’s needs for deployable civilians.
For our third objective, to determine the extent to which U.S. agencies  had provided required Afghanistan-specific and Foreign Affairs Counter  Threat (FACT) training to their personnel before deployment, we first  identified Chief of Mission and DOD training requirements. For personnel  under Chief of Mission authority, we compared training requirements with  waiver logs, State Foreign Service Institute attendance rosters, available  staffing data, and State Diplomatic Security’s FACT Tracker to determine  whether civilians deploying through the Chief of Mission had received the  required training. For DOD, we compared the Office of the Secretary of  Defense and U.S. Central Command training requirements with training  curricula contained in regulations, training websites, course schedules,  and course handbooks offered by DOD organizations that deploy civilians  to Afghanistan. In addition, we interviewed relevant officials from  agencies under Chief of Mission Authority and DOD. Finally, we observed  scenario-based training administered to Chief of Mission and DOD  personnel held at the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center in Indiana.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2010 to February 2012 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. (See app. I for a more  complete description of our scope and methodology.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The United States and its international partners from over 40 nations  have been engaged in efforts to secure, stabilize, and rebuild Afghanistan  since 2001. U.S. civilians have been a vital part of the U.S. strategy. To  implement the U.S. strategy, the U.S. Mission Afghanistan committed in  April 2009 to expand its civilian personnel both in Kabul and in the field.  U.S. government civilians in Afghanistan generally fall under either the  authority of the Chief of Mission (i.e., the U.S. Ambassador) or under  DOD’s combatant commander authority. The Chief of Mission has  authority over almost every U.S. executive branch employee there,  except those under the command of a U.S. military commander or those  on the staff of an international organization. Although typically stationed  at the U.S. Embassy and consulates, U.S. Chief of Mission personnel in  Afghanistan can also be deployed at a variety of military facilities outside  of Kabul. These field-deployed civilians rely on the military for security,  mobility, food, and lodging but remain under Chief of Mission authority.  The Chief of Mission presence in Afghanistan consists of personnel from  several agencies performing a variety of activities, some of which are  described in table 1.
In addition, DOD estimates that, since 2001, over 41,000 civilians have  deployed worldwidedisaster relief, and stability operations, including ongoing operations in  Afghanistan. DOD civilians in Afghanistan serve under the authority of the  combatant commander responsible for operations in that area of the  world—the U.S. Central Command—and support a wide range of DOD  missions. These missions include combat support missions that have  traditionally been performed by military personnel such as equipment  maintenance, logistical support, and intelligence gathering and analysis;  noncombat support missions such as administrative positions within the   to support combat operations, contingencies,  joint task force headquarters; and capacity-building missions parallel to  the Chief of Mission effort to improve Afghan security institutions.
To integrate the U.S. civilian expansion into the broader counterinsurgency  and stabilization campaign outside of Kabul, the U.S. Mission Afghanistan,  U.S. Forces—Afghanistan, and the International Security Assistance  Force have established a framework for civilian-military activities. The U.S.  and International Security Assistance Force civilian-military effort includes  the use of provincial reconstruction teams and district support teams.  Provincial reconstruction teams are combined civilian and military groups  responsible for integrating the activities of all military and civilian elements  in an assigned province. This integration includes harnessing both civilian  and military resources to perform security, governance, and development  activities to implement the U.S. counterinsurgency and stabilization  strategy as well as to monitor and report on progress. District support  teams are combined civilian and military groups responsible for integrating  the security, governance, and development activities of all civilian and  military elements in an assigned district.
To enhance civilian-military coordination, the U.S. Mission Afghanistan  has established a parallel civilian structure within each relevant military  installation (i.e., regional command down to district support teams), with  senior civilian representatives and civilian team leads managing and  supervising Mission personnel at each level, as well as coordinating with  their military and local Afghan government counterparts. Together, the  senior civilians and military commanders at each level coordinate to  perform stability, capacity-building, and development operations in their  area of responsibility. Mission contingents at the field facilities typically  contain State, USAID, and/or USDA personnel. U.S. Drug Enforcement  Administration agents also deploy to some military facilities in the field but  primarily conduct counternarcotics activities with U.S. military and Afghan  counternarcotics forces.
U.S. Mission Afghanistan develops requests for Chief of Mission civilian  positions in Afghanistan, and State Headquarters approves these  requests after consulting with other agencies. In addition, representatives  from State, other U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority, and  U.S. Embassy Kabul participate in periodic interagency staffing reviews.  During these staffing reviews, participants use strategic “lines of effort” to  classify and prioritize all Chief of Mission positions in Afghanistan  according to their priority and feasibility of staffing. Strategic lines of effort  for Afghanistan comprise management operations, agriculture, public  diplomacy, rule of law, economic growth, counternarcotics, infrastructure,  border management, stabilization, governance, threat finance, and  bilateral relationship. Approved requirements and their staffing progress  are discussed among State, other agencies under Chief of Mission  authority such as USAID and USDA, and U.S. Embassy Kabul at  biweekly teleconferences. Agencies under Chief of Mission authority rely  on both temporary, external hires and permanent employees to staff  civilian requirements in Afghanistan. In particular, agencies are relying on  special hiring authorities to meet their staffing needs. Figure 1 illustrates  how State, USAID, and USDA recruit and identify candidates for positions  in Afghanistan.
DOD relies on an established process for filling civilian positions in  Afghanistan. According to DOD officials, the department establishes  civilian requirements and fills positions through an integrated military and  civilian planning process. Civilian requirements begin at the Joint Task  Force level, with commanders identifying military and civilian personnel  needed to complete a mission. The commander specifies unit and  individual needs in request for forces and joint manning documents, and  sends these documents to the corresponding combatant commanders for  validation and position designation. When the joint manning document is  approved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff record and designate the service  responsible for filling positions. At that time, individual positions are  designated as military or civilian, or acceptable for either to fill. Once all  positions are validated and categorized, the request is sent to the Joint  Force Coordinator within the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A list of  individual position requirements is then sent to the services for staffing.  Once the staffing source is identified, the requesting commander  becomes responsible for tracking which positions have been filled.
To enable the department to readily identify civilians to deploy in support  of its missions, including those in Afghanistan, DOD established the CEW  program in January 2009 within the Office of the Deputy Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy—which is under the  purview of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness. that are organized, ready, trained, cleared, and equipped in a manner that  enhances their availability to mobilize and respond urgently to  expeditionary requirements now and in the future.
The CEW is dedicated to creating a cadre of DOD civilians  As we previously reported, DOD’s use of civilian personnel to support  military operations has long raised questions about its policies on  compensation and medical benefits for such civilians.
Department of Defense Directive 1404.10, DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (Jan.  23, 2009). related to deployed civilians increased as executive agencies began  deploying civilians to support efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2009, we  issued a report that addressed issues related to whether agencies that  deployed civilians had (1) comparable policies concerning compensation,  (2) comparable policies concerning medical care, and (3) policies and  procedures for identifying and tracking deployed civilians. The report  contained 18 recommendations made to nine agencies concerning  policies related to deployed civilians, including a recommendation to both  the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to improve their  capability to identify and track deployed civilians. We reported that this  capability was critical, so that agencies could notify deployed civilians  about emerging health concerns that might affect them.
Some law enforcement and other personnel with specialized training can be waived  from this course. civilians must complete. For example, some DOD personnel must  complete language and culture training beyond the normal requirement.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Reported Expanding Their Civilian Presence in Afghanistan and Took Steps to Improve Their Ability to Track That Presence
paragraphs: Since January 2009, U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority more  than tripled their civilian presence and expanded outside Kabul in  response to the President’s 2009 announcement. DOD both created new  programs to build the security capacity of the Afghan government and  reported expanding its overall civilian presence. U.S. agencies during the  course of our review acknowledged data reliability problems with staffing  data and have efforts under way to improve the reliability of that data.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Chief of Mission Presence in Afghanistan More Than Tripled Since 2009
paragraphs: According to State, from January 2009 through December 2011, the Chief  of Mission civilian presence more than tripled from 320 to 1,142 civilians,  an increase of 257 percent. Overall Chief of Mission staffing requirements  also grew during this period from 531 to 1,261 positions, and, as of  December 2011, about 91 percent (1,142 of 1,261) of those positions  were filled. As of October 2011, State officials did not foresee further  expansion of the U.S. civilian presence and planned to change their focus  to reconfiguring staffing resources as needed within the existing  presence. Figure 2 illustrates the increased U.S. Chief of Mission  presence in Afghanistan since January 2009.
Of the nine executive branch agencies under Chief of Mission authority,  as of December 2011 State, USAID, Department of Justice, and USDA  had filled most of the Chief of Mission position requirements, as illustrated  in table 2.
Additionally, the Chief of Mission presence expanded outside Kabul—a  response to the President’s call for greater U.S. civilian expertise at  provincial and district levels. From January 2009 through December  2011, field position requirements grew by approximately 260 percent  (from 147 to 529), and over 85 percent of those requirements were filled.  These positions are assigned to locations throughout Afghanistan,  including at military facilities such as provincial reconstruction and district  support teams and at State’s regional consulates.
Comparing the Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrixthe position requirements reported by individual agencies, we found that  the data in the Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix were sufficiently  reliable for identifying high-level staffing information such as total number  of positions filled by each agency under Chief of Mission authority.  According to State officials, the high-level staffing data identified in the  Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix are updated weekly using data  from U.S. agencies and are also validated through periodic  teleconferences, including staff from State headquarters, other agencies,  and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.
section_title: State Took Steps to Enhance Its Ability to Track Its Civilian Presence
paragraphs: The 2010 Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy  emphasizes the need to match civilian personnel’s expertise to specific  mission requirements on the ground. Furthermore, according to federal  internal control standards, program managers need operational data to  determine whether they are meeting the goals of their agencies’ strategic  and annual performance plans and accounting for the effective and  efficient use of resources.Orientation and In-Processing (responsible for ensuring that interagency  personnel meet all administrative, medical, and training requirements  before deploying to Afghanistan) began using a data system called the  Afghanistan Civilian Personnel Tracking System (ACPTS) in February  2011 to track Chief of Mission personnel’s locations and movements  (e.g., movement from Kabul to a district support team) and to identify  position-specific information (e.g., location, position title, appointment type  or grade, vacancy status, and the strategic line of effort to which a  position belongs). State officials noted that they planned to use this  information to optimize the U.S. presence in the next interagency staffing  exercise, when they might need to be prepared to reconfigure the existing  presence. However, when we examined this data system in March and  July 2011, we found discrepancies that called into question the system’s  reliability. For example, the ACPTS data we received were insufficiently  reliable to determine which strategic line of effort contained the greatest  staffing shortfall—crucial information for an interagency staffing exercise.
U.S. Embassy Kabul and State’s Office of  Over 60 percent of the ACPTS records for July 2011 (648 of 1,192) were  missing data in at least 1 of 10 data fields. Our analysis revealed, for  example, that 36 percent of the appointment grade fields and 30 percent  of the line-of-effort fields were missing. We also found discrepancies  between the ACPTS and Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix with  regard to the overall position requirements and the number of positions  filled. Table 3 lists the discrepancies we identified in State, USAID, and  USDA totals.
Our discussions with State, USAID, and USDA officials revealed  additional discrepancies in the ACPTS data, including duplicate entries,  position titles that did not match official position documentation, and  inaccurate arrival dates and appointment grade information.
In June 2011, State officials acknowledged that these challenges  prevented ACPTS from being used effectively to aggregate detailed,  position-specific information regarding the overall U.S. civilian presence in  Afghanistan. Although we could not verify the accuracy of the ACPTS  system, during the course of our review and after several discussions with  us regarding data reliability, in the fall of 2011 State began taking steps to  improve the reliability of the ACPTS database. For example, according to  State officials, the Office of Orientation and In-Processing recently  completed a review of the ACPTS system that included correcting  inaccuracies, revising data fields to better reflect actual information being  entered, and deleting unnecessary data fields. State has also established  standard operating procedures for updating the ACPTS system. For  example, according to State officials, the U.S. Embassy’s Arrivals and  Departure Unit will be responsible for completing the ACPTS records of  newly deployed staff once they arrive in-country, and the Interagency  Provincial Affairs Office will be responsible for updating their location  information if their duty station changes in the field. Furthermore, in  October 2011, U.S. Embassy Kabul issued a new policy for Mission  staffing and accountability that established a notification and reporting  system to conduct accountability checks of Chief of Mission staff and also  outlined the responsibilities of supervisors and individuals in ensuring  staffing accountability and tracking. According to State officials, Embassy  Kabul conducts monthly data calls with all agencies present in Kabul in  accordance with this policy, and the collected data is reconciled with  ACPTS data.
section_title: DOD Reported Expanding Its Civilian Presence in Afghanistan
paragraphs: According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Personnel Status Report,  DOD increased its overall civilian presence in Afghanistan by  approximately 643 percent from January 2009 through December 2011.  While officials acknowledged that some inaccuracies existed in the data  provided by this report, they believed that the data fairly depict the  increase in the overall DOD civilian presence in Afghanistan. As shown in  figure 3, DOD reported its civilian presence in Afghanistan grew from 394  civilians in January 2009 to 2,929 in December 2011.
These civilians serve in a variety of roles that support both DOD’s combat  mission and its capacity-building efforts. However, it is difficult to specify  the number of civilians within DOD’s overall civilian presence that  supported the capacity-building efforts because these civilians frequently  fill positions that support both combat support and capacity-building  missions. For example, civilians that deploy with the U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers support multiple projects involving both Afghan National  Security Forces and U.S. military forces, making it difficult to identify the  number of civilians that support capacity-building efforts.
In addition, DOD established two programs to respond to the  department’s mission to build the capacity of the Afghan government. The  first program—Ministry of Defense Advisors, created in fiscal year 2010— operates under the authority of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  and deploys senior DOD civilians for up to 2 years to serve as advisors to  officials in the Afghan government’s Ministries of Defense and Interior to  exchange knowledge concerning defense-related issues. The Ministry of  Defense Advisor program was designed to forge long-term relationships  that strengthen Afghanistan’s security institutions.program—Afghanistan Pakistan Hands, created in fiscal year 2009— operates under the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and deploys DOD  civilians for 5 years to serve as experts on Afghanistan and Pakistan to  support the counterinsurgency strategy. Specifically, these civilians  engage directly with host country officials to enhance government,  interagency, and multinational cooperation and fill related positions  outside the region. As of December 2011, these programs had identified  requirements for 156 civilian positions, and 106 of these positions were  filled. At the time of our review, officials were unclear as to whether the  requirements for these two programs would stabilize, increase, or  decrease. In table 4, we show the extent to which each of these programs  had filled the required positions.
Although DOD has aggregate staffing data for deployed civilians within a  country or geographical region, its current data system for tracking  deployed civilians may not provide sufficiently reliable information to  characterize the specific location and identity of deployed civilians within  a country. DOD uses the Joint Personnel Status Report to track the  number and location of military, civilian, and contractor personnel  deployed worldwide. This report is manually created each day by the  combatant commands to include the number and location of personnel  within their area of responsibility. However, Joint Chiefs of Staff officials  told us that the system contains inaccuracies. For example, the officials  noted previous reports have omitted and double counted some personnel,  as well as listed some personnel in the wrong locations. The officials  stated they could not quantify the magnitude of these inaccuracies due to  the system’s reliance on manual updates from the individual combatant  commands and limited demographic data. We reported in 2009 that DOD  issued guidance and established procedures for identifying and tracking  deployed civilians in 2006 but concluded in 2008 that its guidance and  procedures were not being consistently implemented across the  department. In 2009, we found that these policies were still not being fully  implemented and recommended that DOD establish mechanisms to  ensure that these policies were implemented. In response to this  recommendation, DOD stated that it would work with the Defense  Manpower Data Center to develop a tracking system for deployed  civilians and hoped to have the system completed by September 2009.
At the time of our review, Joint Staff officials stated that in conjunction  with the Defense Manpower Data Center, they had completed  development and were fielding this automated tracking system that would  access information from service specific personnel databases in  conjunction with Common Access Card usage in theater to establish and  record the specific location of employees. According to DOD officials, this new system will provide DOD with an automated system to track the  number, identity, and location of deployed civilians. As we reported in  both 2005 and 2009, this type of information is critical for identifying  potential exposures or other incidents related to a civilian’s deployment.  DOD officials stated that, once operational within a combatant  commander’s area of responsibility, this system will automatically create a  report that fulfills Joint Personnel Status reporting requirements for  identifying the number and location of military, civilian, and contractor  personnel deployed globally. However, according to Joint Chiefs of Staff  officials, this system will not be ready to support these reporting  requirements within the Central Command area of responsibility until the  middle of fiscal year 2012.
section_title: DOD Took Preliminary Steps to Implement CEW Policy but Did Not Identify the Number and Types of Positions That Should Constitute the CEW
paragraphs: The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is  responsible for overseeing implementation of the 2009 CEW directive,  including developing policy and implementing procedural guidance for the  CEW. To implement the policies in this directive, the heads of the DOD  components are to identify and designate positions as emergency- essential, non-combat essential, and capability-based volunteers as part  of the CEW. Emergency-essential positions are those that support the  success of combat operations or the availability of combat-essential  systems. Non-combat essential positions support the expeditionary  requirements in other than combat or combat support situations.  Capability-based volunteers are employees who may be asked to  volunteer for deployment, to remain behind after other civilians have  evacuated, or to fill the positions of other DOD civilians who have  deployed to meet expeditionary requirements in order to ensure that  critical expeditionary requirements are fulfilled.directive, the components are to plan, program, and budget for CEW  requirements.
We found that DOD had taken preliminary steps to implement the CEW.  Specifically, DOD had (1) established a CEW program office, (2) created  a database containing resumes submitted by volunteers, (3) advertised  expeditionary positions for civilians on a designated website, and (4)  established predeployment training requirements for volunteers selected  to fill CEW positions. According to CEW officials, approximately 10  percent to 15 percent of the 2,929 filled civilian positions in Afghanistan  were filled by CEW volunteers and the remaining positions were primarily  filled by civilian personnel in the military services and other DOD  components.
However, the CEW program has not been fully developed and  implemented. In particular, DOD components have not identified and  designated the number and types of positions that should constitute the  emergency-essential, non-combat essential, and capability-based  volunteer segments of the CEW because guidance for making such  determinations has not been provided by the Office of the Secretary of  Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense officials stated that once key  assumptions regarding the size and composition of the CEW have been  finalized, implementing guidance will be issued that will contain  information on how the components are to identify and designate  positions as emergency-essential, non-combat essential and capability- based volunteers. However, Office of the Secretary of Defense officials  were not sure as to when this guidance would be issued.
By not developing guidance that instructs the components on how to  identify and designate the number and types of positions that will  constitute the CEW, DOD may not be able to (1) make the CEW a  significant portion of the civilian workforce as called for in DOD’s Fiscal   (2) meet readiness  Year 2009 Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan,goals for the CEW as required in DOD’s Strategic Management Plan for  Fiscal Years 2012-2013,missions. and (3) position itself to respond to future  First, in DOD’s fiscal year 2009 civilian human capital strategic plan, DOD  identified the CEW as a significant segment of the overall DOD civilian  workforce dedicated to supporting DOD operations, contingencies,  emergencies, humanitarian missions, stability and reconstruction  operations, and combat missions. Further, this plan noted the importance   to identify any differences between the  of conducting a gap analysis current civilian workforce and the workforce that will be needed in the  future for each of the department’s “mission critical occupations”—i.e.,  occupations that are essential to carrying out the department’s mission.  In July 2011, we testified that identifying skills and capability gaps of the  civilian workforce is critical for DOD’s strategic planning efforts and that  DOD should conduct gap analyses to identify gaps in both the current and  the future workforces.to develop strategies to acquire and retain the needed workforce. Further,  once workforce needs and strategies are identified, the DOD components  will be better positioned to plan, program, and budget for CEW  requirements as called for in the CEW directive.
Completing a gap analysis is important for DOD  Second, as called for by the Department of Defense Strategic  Management Plan for Fiscal Years 2012-2013, DOD’s goal to get the  right workforce mix should occur through several initiatives, including one  to improve the readiness of the CEW by increasing the percentage of  emergency-essential and non-combat essential personnel who are  qualified as ready. However, without an understanding of the number and  types of positions in the emergency-essential and non-combat essential  categories, the current CEW is not positioned to support this DOD priority.
Third, DOD officials told us that institutionalizing the CEW is critical to  DOD efforts to best utilize its total workforce structure—military, civilian,  and contractor personnel—because the difficulties associated with  identifying and deploying civilians are not unique to the ongoing  operations in Afghanistan. According to DOD officials, similar issues were  experienced in Bosnia, but because the organization and processes that  supported the deployment of civilians during that operation were not  retained, DOD had to reconstitute the capability to identify and deploy  civilians when the need arose for civilians to deploy to Iraq and  Afghanistan.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Established Afghanistan-Specific Predeployment Training Requirements, but DOD Faced Implementation Challenges
subsections: section_title: State Provided Required Training for Personnel Deploying to Afghanistan
paragraphs: State has established predeployment training requirements for all Chief of  Mission personnel deploying to Afghanistan, including courses offered by  State’s Foreign Service Institute, as well as key security training provided  by State’s Diplomatic Security Bureau—the FACT course. The Foreign  Service Institute’s Afghanistan-specific training courses address State’s  2009 training requirement for Chief of Mission personnel deploying to  Afghanistan and focus on providing Chief of Mission personnel with basic  professional skills and knowledge needed to participate in stabilization  and reconstruction activities as members of the U.S. Embassy Kabul or  its subordinate entities. Additionally, the training recognizes the  requirements for effectively operating in a complex environment, including  administrative, survival, and day-to-day functioning/life support. Table 5  further describes the Foreign Service Institute’s training for Chief of  Mission personnel.
All Chief of Mission personnel are required to take the Afghanistan  Familiarization course, while all personnel deploying to locations outside  of Kabul are also required to take the Afghanistan Field Orientation and  the Interagency Civilian-Military Integration Training Exercise courses.  According to State officials, the Afghanistan Familiarization course covers  subjects that contribute to employees’ success on the job, such as  orientation issues and State support at high-threat posts. Additionally, the  Afghanistan Field Orientation course covers subjects that State has  identified as needed for the success of provincial reconstruction teams  and other civilian-military entities at the regional and district levels.  According to State and contractor officials we interviewed during our  observation of the Interagency Civilian-Military Integration Training  Exercise at the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center in Butlerville, Indiana,  personnel who attend this training are able to practice working in  situations they would likely encounter while deployed. The training  includes working through an interpreter and heavily interacting with  Afghan officials. In addition, because field-deployed civilians live and work  alongside military colleagues, the exercises focus on the cultural (e.g.,  education about military ranks) and practical (e.g., participation in convoy  security) aspects of working with the military, as shown in figure 4.
During the Interagency Civilian-Military Integration Training Exercise,  students get the opportunity to simulate living with the military on a  Forward Operating Base, and travel by convoy and helicopter to meetings  with their Afghan counterparts, played by domestic role-players. There is  also the opportunity to work through interpreters, negotiate sensitive  situations, and solve problems with Afghan authorities, officials, religious  leaders, and villagers, as shown in figure 5.
State implemented internal controls to help ensure that Chief of Mission  personnel took the required training before deployment. State’s Office of  Orientation and In-Processing acts as a central processing point for all  Chief of Mission personnel deploying to Afghanistan and works with the  Foreign Service Institute to ensure that all training requirements have  been met. Examples of the Center’s training verification activities include  accessing Foreign Service Institute online registration to determine the  accuracy of enrollment records, tracking completion of personnel’s  deployment checklists, and visiting classes to confirm enrolled personnel  attended the course. According to State officials, in addition to these  controls, Embassy Kabul also checks to make sure that the training  requirement is met before granting country clearance to individuals about  to be deployed. The Office of Orientation and In-Processing also reviews  these country clearances before allowing individuals to deploy.
To test the reliability of State’s internal controls, we compared State,  USAID, and USDA names from a March 2011 run of ACPTS personnel  data against Foreign Service Institute training records and State training  waiver logs. The analysis yielded 134 names of personnel who could  have potentially missed required Foreign Service Institute training. After  the names were submitted to the Orientation and In-Processing Center,  State stated it was able to account for all of the personnel, either by  verifying that they had taken the training or possessed a valid reason for  not having taken the training.
According to State officials, the Office of Orientation and In-Processing  and Embassy Kabul also check to verify that personnel have taken the  FACT course before being deployed to Afghanistan. In June 2011, we  reported that Diplomatic Security had difficulty verifying training taken by  non-State personnel and made several recommendations. Security was aware of this problem and, in June 2011, was in the process  of implementing the FACT Tracker to address it. This tracker could be  checked by regional security officers at high-threat posts to confirm  required training was taken before granting personnel country clearance.  At the time of our review, Diplomatic Security officials stated that the  FACT Tracker was fully operational and could verify FACT training going  back to 2005.
For example, we recommended that Diplomatic Security develop or improve the process  to track its individual training requirements and completion of training more broadly. See  GAO, Diplomatic Security: Expanded Missions and Inadequate Facilities Pose Critical  Challenges to Training Efforts, GAO-11-460 (Washington D.C.: June 1, 2011). As of  October 2011, Diplomatic Security was taking steps to improve its tracking of training  through collaboration with the Foreign Service Institute. against data in the FACT Tracker. We and Diplomatic Security, through  the use of the FACT Tracker, were able to account for all 65 names. As  100 percent of our sample received FACT or other appropriate training,  we believe that State has established an effective system of internal  controls over its training.
section_title: DOD Provided Afghanistan-Specific Training to Civilians, but Some Training Contained Gaps or Duplication
paragraphs: According to DOD guidance, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness is to develop policies, plans, and programs for  the training of DOD personnel, including civilians. In November 2010,  the Office of the Secretary of Defense established counterinsurgency  standards and required training of individuals and units, including DOD  civilians deploying to Afghanistan, on such things as language and  cultural awareness. DOD guidance also requires U.S. Central Command  to coordinate and approve training necessary to carry out missions  assigned to the command and U.S. Central Command-established  theater-training requirements that apply to DOD civilians deployed to the  command’s area of responsibility.training requirements include general requirements such as anti-terrorism  awareness training; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear  personnel protective measures and survival skills; mine and unexploded  ordnance awareness; and requirements specific to the country of  deployment—for Afghanistan, the requirements include, for example,  language and cultural awareness training, implementation of the  Secretary of Defense-approved counterinsurgency qualification  standards, and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)  and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) egress training. Finally,  DOD’s 2010 strategic plan calls for the establishment of a requirements   U.S. Central Command theater- process that includes front-end analysis and synchronizing service  training programs with combatant commander requirements.
As shown in table 6, several DOD organizations deploying civilians to  Afghanistan provide predeployment training to address Office of the  Secretary of Defense, U.S. Central Command, and their own specific  requirements. To address these requirements, each of DOD’s  components independently developed its own training courses; however,  we identified some gaps and duplication in this training. For example, Air  Force civilians deploying to Afghanistan through the CEW were required  to attend both Air Force and CEW predeployment training. The CEW  predeployment training consists of an 11-day course that covers areas  such as personal and family benefits and legal information; survival skills,  including first aid; HMMWV rollover training and Counter-Improvised  Explosive Device training; and language and cultural awareness skills. As  a result, those Air Force civilians deploying through the CEW received  training on some of the same material, such as Counter-Improvised  Explosive Device training, twice prior to deployment. According to DOD  officials, in November 2011, DOD began granting some waivers from the  CEW training to Air Force civilians that completed Combat Airman Skills  Training. Afghanistan are required to complete this training; therefore, Air Force  civilians who do not receive Combat Airman Skills Training would still be  required to complete both Air Force and CEW predeployment training.  Additionally, some Army civilian training did not meet the requirements  established by U.S. Central Command. For example, Army civilian  training at the CONUS (continental United States) Replacement Center  did not cover either the U.S. Central Command-required HMMWV or  MRAP vehicle rollover techniques. Table 6 lists the gaps and duplication  we identified.
Combat Airman Skills Training is special training provided to personnel who will be  going into a hostile and uncertain environment.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan and the deployment of civilians  to Afghan provinces and districts remain crucial to U.S. efforts to build the  capacity of the Afghan government to provide essential services to its  people with limited international support. With the increased focus on  deploying more U.S. civilians throughout Afghanistan comes the need for  the U.S. Mission to be able to track and monitor the movement and  location of its civilian staff, especially given the ongoing drawdown of U.S.  troops and plans to transition lead security responsibility to the Afghan  government in 2014. We are encouraged by State and DOD’s efforts to  improve tracking of deployed civilian personnel. Additionally, as DOD has  expanded its involvement in overseas military operations worldwide, it  has grown increasingly reliant on its civilian workforce to provide support  to these operations. While DOD’s efforts to institutionalize the CEW are  commendable, until DOD makes decisions regarding the size of the CEW  and issues implementation guidance, the CEW may not be capable of  supporting future overseas operations as well as departmentwide goals to  strengthen and rightsize the DOD total workforce.
Furthermore, having policies and procedures in place to help ensure that  U.S. civilians receive necessary training before they deploy to a high- threat working environment such as Afghanistan can enhance their safety  as well as their ability to accomplish the mission. While agencies present  under Chief of Mission authority benefit from a centralized set of training  requirements and internal controls, DOD’s civilian training process does  not have the same level of oversight or centralized control. Enhancing  DOD’s civilian training process would provide greater synchronization of  training requirements while still allowing the various components to tailor  their training to mission-specific needs.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enable DOD to make the CEW a significant portion of the civilian  workforce, meet readiness goals for the CEW, and position itself to  respond to future missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness to take the following two actions:
Develop key assumptions concerning the size and composition of the  emergency-essential, non-combat essential, and capability-based  volunteer categories referred to in the 2009 CEW directive.
Finalize the implementation guidance to DOD components on how to  identify and designate the number and types of positions that constitute  the emergency-essential, non-combat essential, and capability-based  volunteer categories.
To provide a consistent approach for synchronizing predeployment  training for DOD civilians, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness to take the following two actions:
Establish a process to identify and approve predeployment training  requirements for all DOD civilians.
Establish a process to coordinate with key stakeholders such as the  military services and subordinate commands to ensure that  requirements are synchronized among and within DOD components  and with departmentwide guidance.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, USAID, USDA, as well  as the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice and the Treasury.  DOD provided written comments, reprinted in their entirety in appendix II,  and concurred with our four recommendations—characterizing them as  supporting its current initiative to transform the CEW. Specifically,
DOD concurred with our recommendations to (1) develop key  assumptions concerning the size and composition of the emergency- essential, non-combat essential, and capability-based volunteer  categories referred to in the 2009 CEW directive and (2) finalize the  implementation guidance to DOD components on how to identify and  designate the number and types of positions for these categories. DOD  did not specify how it would implement these recommendations.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to establish a process to  identify and approve pre-deployment training requirements for all DOD  civilians. DOD stated that through the process of identifying pre- deployment training requirements, DOD will establish a core set of  training needs that are applicable under all circumstances under which  DOD civilians may deploy. DOD also stated that it will develop policy that  recognizes the agility necessary to prepare DOD civilians for unique  mission requirements and conditions now and in the future.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to establish a process to  coordinate with key stakeholders such as the military services and  subordinate commands to ensure that training requirements are  synchronized among and within DOD components and with department- wide guidance. DOD stated the process it develops for identifying pre- deployment training requirements will account for the need to make the  best use of resources using guiding principles and criteria from the  Secretary of Defense and advice from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff as needed to ensure an agile and effective contingency workforce.
State, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Homeland  Security provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into  the report as appropriate. The Department of the Treasury noted that  State’s database had not been updated to reflect 13 total approved  Treasury positions. Treasury further noted that two of its positions listed  as “open” remained programmatically on hold, resulting in 11 active slots  filled. We incorporated this technical comment in our report.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Homeland Security,  and State; the U.S. Attorney General; the Administrator of USAID; and  other interested parties. The report also is available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov or Charles  Michael Johnson Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To review the U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan, we obtained  information from pertinent strategic planning, recruitment, staffing, and  reporting documents and interviewed relevant officials from the  Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Homeland Security,  Justice, State (State), and the Treasury, as well as the U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID). We did not examine costs for the  deployment or support of civilian personnel in Afghanistan due to a  concurrent review by the Office of the Special Inspector General for  Afghanistan Reconstruction on this topic, published in September 2011.
To examine the expansion of the U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan,  we obtained and analyzed staffing data from State and DOD regarding  staffing requirements and fill rates for all civilian positions under Chief of  Mission authority and key positions under combatant commander  authority deployed in-country following the President’s March 2009 call to  enhance support of Afghan national and subnational government  institutions. Our scope was limited to U.S. direct hires and did not include  locally engaged staff or contractors. Because, according to DOD officials,  the majority of DOD civilians directly serve in combat support positions,  we focused our request for staffing data on organizations or programs  intended to enhance the capacity of the Afghan government, which  included the Ministry of Defense Advisors and Afghanistan Pakistan  Hands programs. We validated reports on Chief of Mission staffing  progress through interviews with officials representing agencies that  deployed staff to fill positions in Afghanistan since January 2009,  including officials from Homeland Security, Justice, State, the Treasury,  USAID, and USDA. We did not meet with officials from several agencies  with fewer than five permanent staff deployed to Afghanistan, such as the  Departments of Transportation and Health and Human Services.
To assess the reliability of the staffing data reported by State and DOD  for civilians in Afghanistan, we reviewed available documentation,  examined the data for outliers and missing observations, and conducted  follow-up interviews to discuss questions that arose in our analysis of the  data. Additionally, for Chief of Mission data, we compared complementary  datasets from State’s Afghanistan Civilian Personnel Tracking System  (ACPTS) and the Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix to identify  whether any reporting discrepancies existed. We requested datasets from  State from each database over corresponding time periods; our first data  run compared February 10, 2011, Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing data  with March 16, 2011, ACPTS data; our second data run compared June  28, 2011, Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix data with July 7, 2011,  ACPTS data. We further met with State officials to identify the cause and  effect of discrepancies that were found to exist, in order to assess  whether the discrepancies limit the ability of U.S. agencies to evaluate  their staffing progress. For DOD, we requested data from the Ministry of  Defense Advisors program, the Afghanistan Pakistan Hands program,  and the Joint Personnel Status Report to identify DOD’s civilian presence  in Afghanistan. We also met with officials from the Ministry of Defense  Advisors program, Afghanistan Pakistan Hands program, and Joint Chiefs  of Staff to discuss the data sources, internal controls, and data reliability  related to their respective staffing data. We found State civilian staffing  data for Afghanistan to be sufficiently reliable to provide an indication of  the positions filled at the level of the agency, but State ACPTS data were  not sufficiently reliable to report on more-detailed staffing information,  such as position type. For the Ministry of Defense Advisors program and  the Afghanistan Pakistan Hands program, we found that program  documents supported the requirements and the number of filled positions  that the program offices provided and that the data from these programs  were sufficiently reliable to illustrate the positions filled within these  programs. However, the extent to which DOD staffing data in the Joint  Personnel Status Report are reliable is unknown because previous  reports have omitted or double counted personnel. DOD officials noted  that while errors do occur in the daily submission of Joint Personnel  Status Report data from the combatant commands, the reports are  accurate enough to identify trends in DOD’s civilian presence over time,  and we agree. As of late 2011, we could not fully verify the accuracy of  the ACPTS system. However, during the course of our review and after  several discussions with us regarding data reliability, State began taking  steps to improve the reliability of the ACPTS database.
To evaluate the implementation of DOD’s Civilian Expeditionary  Workforce (CEW) policy, we obtained and reviewed relevant documents.  Specifically, we reviewed the DOD directive that established the program  to understand the structure of the CEW as presented in this document  and reviewed the 2009 DOD Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan to  identify the steps DOD had established as a road map for implementing  the CEW directive. We also reviewed other documents such as DOD’s  Strategic Management Plan Fiscal Years 2012-2013 to determine how  the CEW related to high-priority departmentwide programs. In addition,  we interviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense and CEW program  officials to further understand the current status of efforts to fully  implement the CEW and the department’s plans for the CEW of the  future. We also interviewed U.S. Central Command officials to determine  how the CEW was being used to satisfy its needs for deployable civilians  in Afghanistan and officials from the Air Force, Army, and Navy, to  determine how these agencies coordinated efforts to identify deployable  civilians.
To determine the extent to which U.S. agencies had provided required  Afghanistan-specific training to their personnel before deployment, we  reviewed predeployment training requirements established by the  Department of State for all Chief of Mission personnel and the  requirements set by various programs and components within the DOD.  We did not analyze training provided by the Department of Justice or its  components due to its specialized law-enforcement nature. For DOD  training, we reviewed training programs for the CEW, Ministry of Defense  Advisors program, Afghanistan Pakistan Hands program, and U.S. Army  Corps of Engineers as well as civilian training for the Air Force, Army, and  Navy. We focused on these DOD programs because of their capacity- building focus. On two separate occasions, we observed scenario-based  training administered to Chief of Mission personnel and the Ministry of  Defense Advisors program, both held at the Muscatatuck Urban Training  Center in Indiana.
To assess the extent to which the agencies complied with predeployment  training requirements for Chief of Mission personnel, we compared a  March 2011 data run of State, USAID, and USDA personnel from State’s  ACPTS system against Foreign Service Institute training rosters for the  three Afghanistan-specific, mandatory training courses as well as against  a State training waiver log. We focused on State, USAID, and USDA  personnel due to the size of their respective civilian presence, as well as  their primacy in deploying civilians to the field. This analysis yielded 134  names that did not appear on the Foreign Service Institute rosters or in  the waiver log, which we submitted to State’s Office of Orientation and In- Processing for explanation. Additionally, to test Diplomatic Security’s  FACT Tracker, we selected a random sample of 65 State, USAID, and  USDA names from July 2011 ACPTS personnel data and compared  these names against data in the FACT Tracker. This sample was  designed so that if we found that all sample cases received FACT or  other appropriate training, we would be at least 95 percent confident that  fewer than about 5 percent of State, USAID, and USDA personnel in  Afghanistan during July 2011 did not receive FACT training. Although we  note weaknesses in ACPTS’s data reliability, we judged the database  sufficiently reliable to compare names against training rosters, waiver  logs, and the FACT Tracker.
For DOD personnel, we compared the training curricula utilized by the  military services, defense agencies, and the CEW to U.S. Central  Command, U.S. Forces—Afghanistan, and Office of the Secretary of  Defense requirements and guidance to see whether the training  addressed the requirements. In addition, we compared the various  training received by deploying civilians to determine if there was any  duplication or repetition in the training provided. Because training record  keeping within DOD is decentralized, we did not verify individual training  records to establish whether deployed civilians had received the required  training. We did, however, review the procedures that the military services  and defense agencies have in place to ensure that deploying civilians  have taken required training. In addition, we interviewed officials with the  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,  CEW training office, Air Force, Army, Navy, U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers, and U.S. Central Command to discuss the predeployment  training requirements for deployed civilians.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2010 to February 2012 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contacts named above, Hynek Kalkus, Assistant  Director; Kimberly Seay, Assistant Director; David Adams; Adam  Bonnifield; Virginia Chanley; David Hancock; Mae Jones; Linda Keefer;  Shakira O’Neil; and John Wren made key contributions to this report.