Federal Advisory Committee Act: Issues Related to the Independence and Balance of Advisory Committees
Published: 2008-04-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Because advisory committees provide input to federal decision makers on significant national issues, it is essential that their membership be, and be perceived as being, free from conflicts of interest and balanced as a whole. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) was enacted in 1972, in part, because of concerns that special interests had too much influence over federal agency decision makers. The General Services Administration (GSA) develops guidance on establishing and managing FACA committees. The Office of Government Ethics (OGE) develops regulations and guidance for statutory conflict-of- interest provisions that apply to some advisory committee members. As requested, this testimony discusses key findings and conclusions in our 2004 report, Federal Advisory Committees: Additional Guidance Could Help Agencies Better Ensure Independence and Balance; GAO's recommendations to GSA and OGE and their responses; and potential changes to FACA that could better ensure the independence and balance of advisory committees. For our 2004 work, we reviewed policies and procedures issued by GSA, OGE, and nine federal agencies that sponsor many committees. For this testimony, we obtained information from GSA and OGE on actions they have taken to implement our recommendations; we also reviewed data in GSA's FACA data base on advisory committee appointments.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In 2004, GAO concluded that additional governmentwide guidance could help agencies better ensure the independence of federal advisory committee members and the balance of federal advisory committees. For example, OGE guidance to federal agencies did not adequately ensure that agencies appoint individuals selected to provide advice on behalf of the government as "special government employees" subject to conflict-of-interest regulations. Further, GAO found that some agencies were inappropriately appointing most or all members as "representatives"--expected to reflect the views of the entity or group they are representing and not subject to conflict-of-interest reviews--even when the agencies call upon the members to provide advice on behalf of the government and thus should have been appointed as special government employees. In addition, GSA guidance to federal agencies and agency-specific policies and procedures needed to be improved to better ensure that agencies collect and evaluate information, such as previous or ongoing research, that could be helpful in determining the viewpoints of potential committee members regarding the subject matters being considered and in ensuring that committees are, and are perceived as being, balanced. GAO also identified several promising practices for forming and managing federal advisory committees that could better ensure that committees are independent and balanced as a whole, such as providing information on how the members of the committee are identified and screened and indicating whether the committee members are providing independent or stakeholder advice. To help improve the effectiveness of federal advisory committees so that members are, and are perceived as being, independent and committees as a whole are properly balanced, GAO made 12 recommendations to GSA and OGE to provide additional guidance to federal agencies under three broad categories: (1) the appropriate use of representative appointments; (2) information that could help ensure committees are, in fact, and in perception, balanced; and (3) practices that could better ensure independence and balanced committees and increase transparency in the federal advisory process. GSA and OGE implemented our recommendations to clarify the use of representative appointments. However, current data on appointments indicate that some agencies may continue to inappropriately use representatives rather than special government employees on some committees. Further, GSA said it agrees with GAO's other recommendations, including those relating to committee balance and measures that would promote greater transparency in the federal advisory committee process, but has not issued guidance in these areas as recommended, because of limitations in its authority to require agencies to comply with its guidance. In light of indications that some agencies may continue to use representative appointments inappropriately and GSA's support for including GAO's 2004 recommendations in FACA--including those aimed at enhancing balance and transparency--the Subcommittee may wish to incorporate the substance of GAO's recommendations into FACA as it considers amendments to the act.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our 2004 report on the  independence and balance of federal advisory committees in the context  of possible amendments to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).  In fiscal year 2007, 52 agencies sponsored 915 active federal advisory  committees with a total of about 65,000 members. Federal advisory  committees have been called the “fifth arm of government” because of the  significant role they play in advising federal agencies, the Congress, and  the President on important national issues. To be effective, advisory  committees must be—and, just as importantly, be perceived as being— independent and balanced as a whole. As we reported in 2004,  controversies regarding the federal advisory committee system have  included concerns that some appointments have been based on ideology  rather than expertise or were weighted to favor one group of stakeholders  over others.
Members appointed to federal advisory committees to provide advice on  behalf of the government on the basis of their best judgment are appointed  as “special government employees.” Members may also be appointed to  federal advisory committees as “representatives” to provide stakeholder  advice—that is, advice reflecting the views of the entity or interest group  they are representing, such as industry, labor, or consumers. The General  Services Administration (GSA) is responsible for developing regulations  and guidance regarding the establishment of advisory committees under  FACA. The Office of Government Ethics (OGE) is responsible for  developing regulations and guidance for federal advisory committee  members serving as special government employees who must meet certain  federal requirements pertaining to freedom from conflicts of interest. In  addition to OGE and GSA regulations and guidance, federal agencies have  their own policies and procedures to establish and manage advisory  committees.
As requested, my testimony today addresses (1) key findings and  conclusions in our 2004 report, Federal Advisory Committees: Additional  Guidance Could Help Agencies Better Ensure Independence and  Balance, (2) the recommendations we made in that report to GSA and  OGE to address deficiencies we identified and their responses to the  recommendations, and (3) potential changes to FACA that could better  ensure the independence and balance of advisory committees as the  Subcommittee considers amendments to the act. For our 2004 work, we  reviewed relevant policies and procedures issued by GSA, OGE, and nine  federal agencies that sponsor many advisory committees.  For this  testimony, we supplemented our 2004 report with information we  obtained from GSA and OGE on actions the agencies have taken to  implement our recommendations. Several recommendations remained  open as of March 2008, and we followed up with GSA and OGE to identify  their responses to these recommendations. Using the GSA FACA database,  we updated some advisory committee information about selected agencies  and reviewed governmentwide data on appointments to advisory  committees. Finally, in light of the GSA and OGE responses to our  recommendations and the actions taken by some agencies sponsoring  advisory committees regarding appointments, we identified potential  changes to FACA that the Congress may wish to consider to help GSA and  OGE better ensure independence and balance. We conducted this work  from March 17, 2008, to April 2, 2008, in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we  plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to  provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: When the Congress enacted FACA in 1972, one of the principal concerns it  was responding to was that certain special interests had too much  influence over federal agency decision makers. In this act, the Congress  articulated certain principles regarding advisory committees, including  broad requirements for balance, independence, and transparency.  Specifically, FACA requires that the membership of committees be “fairly  balanced in terms of points of view presented and the functions to be  performed by the advisory committee.”  Courts have interpreted this  requirement as providing agencies with broad discretion in balancing their  committees.
Further, FACA requires that any legislation or agency action that creates a  committee contain provisions to ensure that the advice and  recommendations of the committee will be independent and not  inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority (the agency) or any  special interest. Finally, FACA generally requires that agencies announce  committee meetings ahead of time and give notice to interested parties  about such meetings. With some exceptions, the meetings are to be open  to the public, and agencies are to prepare meeting minutes and make them  available to interested parties. FACA also set broad guidelines for the  creation and management of federal advisory committees, most of which  are created or authorized by the Congress. Agencies also establish  committees using their general statutory authority, and some are created  by presidential directives.
Further, the act requires that all committees have a charter, and that each  charter contain specific information, including the committee’s scope and  objectives, a description of duties, and the number and frequency of  meetings. As required by FACA, advisory committee charters generally  expire at the end of 2 years unless renewed by the agency or by the  Congress. This requirement encourages agencies to periodically  reexamine their need for specific committees. GSA, through its Committee  Management Secretariat, is responsible for prescribing administrative  guidelines and management controls applicable to advisory committees  governmentwide. However, GSA does not have the authority to approve or  deny agency decisions regarding the creation or management of advisory  committees.
To fulfill its responsibilities, GSA has developed guidance to assist  agencies in implementing FACA requirements, provides training to agency  officials, and was instrumental in creating the Interagency Committee on  Federal Advisory Committee Management. GSA also has created and  maintains an online FACA database (available to the public at  www.fido.gov/facadatabase) for which the agencies provide and verify the  data, which include committee charters; membership rosters; budgets;  and, in many cases, links to committee meeting schedules, minutes, and  reports. The database also includes information about a committee’s  classification (e.g., scientific and technical, national policy issue, or grant  review).
While GSA’s Committee Management Secretariat provides FACA guidance  to federal agencies, each agency also develops its own policies and  procedures for following FACA requirements. Under FACA, agency heads  are responsible for issuing administrative guidelines and management  controls applicable to their agency’s advisory committees. Generally,  federal agencies have a reasonable amount of discretion with regard to  creating committees, drafting their charters, establishing their scope and  objectives, classifying the committee type, determining what type of  advice they are to provide, and appointing members to serve on  committees. In addition, to assist with the management of their federal  advisory committees, agency heads are required to appoint a committee  management officer to oversee the agency’s compliance with FACA  requirements, including recordkeeping. Finally, agency heads must  appoint a designated federal official for each committee to oversee its  activities. Among other things, the designated federal official must  approve or call the meetings of the committee, approve the agendas  (except for presidential advisory committees), and attend the meetings.
OGE is responsible for issuing regulations and guidance for agencies to  follow in complying with statutory conflict-of-interest provisions that  apply to all federal employees, including special government employees  serving on federal advisory committees. A special government employee is  statutorily defined as an officer or employee who is retained, designated,  appointed, or employed by the government to perform temporary duties,  with or without compensation, for not more than 130 days during any  period of 365 consecutive days. Many agencies use special government  employees, either as advisory committee members or as individual experts  or consultants. Special government employees, like regular federal  employees, are to provide their own best judgment in a manner that is free  from conflicts of interest and without acting as a stakeholder to represent  any particular point of view. Accordingly, special government employees  appointed to federal advisory committees are hired for their expertise and  skills and are expected to provide advice on behalf of the government on  the basis of their own best judgment. Special government employees are  subject to the federal financial conflict-of-interest requirements, although  ones that are somewhat less restrictive than those for regular federal  government employees. Specifically, special government employees  serving on federal advisory committees are provided with an exemption  that allows them to participate in particular matters that have a direct and  predictable effect on their financial interest if the interest arises from their  nonfederal employment and the matter will not have a special or distinct  effect on the employee or employer other than as part of a class. This  exemption does not extend to a committee member’s personal financial  and other interests in the matter, such as stock ownership in the employer.  If a committee member has a potential financial conflict of interest that is  not covered under this or other exemptions, a waiver of the conflict-of- interest provisions may be granted if the appointing official determines  that the need for the special government employee’s services outweighs  the potential for conflict of interest or that the conflict is not significant.  This standard for granting waivers is less stringent than the standard for  regular government employees.
The principal tool that agencies use to assess whether nominees or  members of advisory committees have conflicts of interest is the OGE  Form 450, Executive Branch Confidential Financial Disclosure Report,  which special government employees are required to submit annually. The  Form 450 requests financial information about the committee member and  the member’s spouse and dependent children, such as sources of income  and identification of assets, but it does not request filers to provide the  related dollar amounts, such as salaries. Even if committees are  addressing broad or general issues, rather than particular matters,  committee members hired as special government employees are generally  required to complete the confidential financial disclosure form. Agencies  appoint ethics officials who are responsible for ensuring agency  compliance with the federal conflict-of-interest statutes, and OGE  conducts periodic audits of agency ethics programs to evaluate their  compliance and, as warranted, makes recommendations to agencies to  correct deficiencies in their ethics programs.
Under administrative guidance initially developed in the early 1960s, a  number of members of federal advisory committees are not hired as  special government employees, but are instead appointed as  representatives. Members appointed to advisory committees as  representatives are expected to represent the views of relevant  stakeholders with an interest in the subject of discussion, such as an  industry, a union, an environmental organization, or other such entity.  That is, representative members are expected to represent a particular and  known bias—it is understood that information, opinions, and advice from  representatives are to reflect the bias of the particular group that they are  appointed to represent. Because these individuals are to represent outside  interests, they do not meet the statutory definition of federal employee or  special government employee and are therefore not subject to the criminal  financial conflict-of-interest statute. According to GSA and OGE officials,  in 2004 reliable governmentwide data on the number of representative  members serving on federal advisory committees were not available.
section_title: Findings and Conclusions from Our 2004 Report on the Independence and Balance of Committees
paragraphs: In 2004, we concluded that additional governmentwide guidance could  help agencies better ensure the independence of federal advisory  committee members and the balance of federal advisory committees. We  found that OGE guidance to federal agencies had shortcomings and did  not adequately ensure that agencies appropriately appoint individuals  selected to provide advice on behalf of the government as special  government employees. We found that some agencies were  inappropriately appointing members as representatives who, as a result,  were not subject to conflict-of-interest reviews. In addition, GSA guidance  to federal agencies, and agency-specific policies and procedures, needed  to be improved to better ensure that agencies elicit from potential  committee members information that could be helpful in determining their  viewpoints regarding the subject matters being considered—information  that could help ensure that committees are, and are perceived as being,  balanced. Specifically, we found the following:    OGE guidance on the appropriate use of representative or special  government employee appointments to advisory committees had  limitations that we believed were a factor in three of the agencies we  reviewed continuing the long-standing practice of essentially appointing  all members as representatives. That is, the Department of Energy, the  Department of the Interior, and the Department of Agriculture had  appointed most or all members to their federal advisory committees as  representatives—even in cases where the members were called upon to  provide advice on behalf of the government and thus would be more  appropriately appointed as special government employees. Because  conflict-of-interest reviews are required only for federal or special  government employees, agencies do not conduct conflict-of-interest  reviews for members appointed as representatives. As a result, the  agencies could not be assured that the real or perceived conflicts of  interest of their committee members who provided advice on behalf of the  government were identified and appropriately mitigated. Further,  allegations that the members had conflicts of interest could call into  question the independence of the committee and jeopardize the credibility  of the committee’s work.
In addition to the FACA requirement for balance, it is important that  committees are perceived as balanced in order for their advice to be  credible and effective. However, we reported that GSA guidance did not  address what types of information could be helpful to agencies in  assessing the points of view of potential committee members, nor did  agency procedures identify what information should be collected about  potential members to make decisions about committee balance.  Consequently, many agencies did not identify and systematically collect  and evaluate information pertinent to determining the points of view of  committee members regarding the subject matters being considered. For  example, of the nine agencies we reviewed, only the Environmental  Protection Agency (EPA) consistently (1) collected information on  committee members appointed as special government employees that  enabled the agency to assess the points of view of the potential members  and (2) used this information to help achieve balance. Without sufficient  information about prospective committee members prior to appointment,  agencies cannot ensure that their committees are, and are perceived as  being, balanced.
We identified several promising practices for forming and managing  federal advisory committees that could better ensure that committees are,  and are perceived as being, independent and balanced. These practices  include (1) obtaining nominations for committees from the public, (2)  using clearly defined processes to obtain and review pertinent information  on potential members regarding potential conflicts of interest and points  of view, and (3) prescreening prospective members using a structured  interview. In our view, these measures reflect the principles of FACA by  employing clearly defined procedures to promote systematic, consistent,  and transparent efforts to achieve independent and balanced committees.  In addition, we identified selected measures that could promote greater  transparency in the federal advisory committee process and improve the  public’s ability to evaluate whether agencies have complied with conflict- of-interest requirements and FACA requirements for balance, such as  providing information on how the members of the committees are  identified and screened and indicating whether the committee members  are providing independent or stakeholder advice. Implemented effectively,  these practices could help agencies avoid the public criticisms to which  some committees have been subjected. That is, if more agencies adopted  and effectively implemented these practices, they would have greater  assurance that their committees are, and are perceived as being,  independent and balanced.
section_title: Our 2004 Recommendations to GSA and OGE and Their Responses
paragraphs: Because the effectiveness of competent federal advisory committees can  be undermined if the members are, or are perceived as, lacking in  independence or if committees as a whole do not appear to be properly  balanced, we made 12 recommendations to GSA and OGE to provide  additional guidance to federal agencies under three broad categories: (1)  the appropriate use of representative appointments; (2) information that  could help ensure committees are, in fact and in perception, balanced; and  (3) practices that could better ensure independent and balanced  committees and increase transparency in the federal advisory process.  While our report focused primarily on scientific and technical federal  advisory committees, the limitations of the guidance and the promising  practices we identified pertaining to independence and balance are  pertinent to federal advisory committees in general. Thus, our  recommendations were directed to GSA and OGE because of their  responsibilities for providing governmentwide guidance on federal ethics  and advisory committee management requirements. GSA and OGE have  taken steps to implement many, but not all, of the recommendations we  made in 2004.
Regarding representative appointments, we recommended that guidance  from OGE to agencies could be improved to better ensure that members  appointed to committees as representatives were, in fact, representing a  recognizable group or entity. OGE agreed with our conclusion that some  agencies may have been inappropriately identifying certain advisory  committee members as representatives instead of special government  employees and issued OGE guidance documents in July 2004 and August  2005 that clarified the distinction between special government employees  and representative members. In particular, as we recommended, OGE  clarified that (1) members should not be appointed as representatives  purely on the basis of their expertise, (2) appointments as representatives  are limited to circumstances in which the members are speaking as  stakeholders for the entities or groups they represent, and (3) the term  “representative” or similar terms in an advisory committees’ authorizing  legislation or other documents does not necessarily mean that members  are to be appointed as representatives. We also recommended that OGE  and GSA modify their FACA training materials to incorporate the changes  in guidance regarding the appointment process, which they have done. In  addition, we recommended that GSA expand its FACA database to identify  each committee member’s appointment category and, for representative  members, the entity or group represented. GSA quickly implemented this  recommendation and now has data on appointments beginning in 2005.
We also recommended that OGE and GSA direct agencies to review their  appointments of representative and special government employee  committee members to make sure that they were appropriate. OGE’s 2004  and 2005 guidance documents addressed this issue by, among other things,  recommending that agency ethics officials periodically review  appointment designations to ensure that they are proper. OGE’s guidance  expressed the concern that some agencies may be designating their  committee members as representatives primarily to avoid subjecting them  to the disclosure statements required for special government employees to  identify potential conflicts of interest. The guidance further stated that  such improper appointments should be corrected immediately. OGE also  suggested that for the committees required to renew their charters every 2  years, agencies use the rechartering process to ensure that the  appointment designations are correct. In March 2008, the Director of  GSA’s Committee Management Secretariat told us that while GSA has not  issued formal guidance directing agencies to review appointment  designations, it has addressed this recommendation by examining the  types of appointments agencies are planning when it conducts desk audits  of committee charters for both new and renewed committees and by  providing information on appropriate appointments at quarterly meetings  with committee management staff and at FACA training classes. The GSA  official said that when GSA sees questionable appointments—for example,  subject matter experts being appointed as representatives instead of as  special government employees—it recommends that agency staff clear this  decision with their legal counsel. However, he added that agencies are not  compelled to respond to GSA guidance, and some have not changed their  long-standing appointment practices despite GSA’s questions and  suggestions. He noted that, under FACA, GSA has the authority to issue  guidance but not regulations.
Neither OGE nor GSA implemented our recommendation aimed at  ensuring that committee members serving as representative members do  not have points of view or biases other than the known interests they are  representing. Because members appointed to committees as  representatives do not undergo the conflict-of-interest review that special  government employees receive, we recommended that representative  members, at a minimum, receive ethics training and be asked whether they  know of any reason their participation on the committee might reasonably  be questioned—for example, because of any personal benefits that could  ensue from financial holdings, patents, or other interests. OGE neither  agreed or disagreed with this recommendation when commenting on our  draft report but subsequently stated in its comments on the published  report that it does not have the authority to prescribe rules of conduct for  persons who are not employees or officers of the executive branch, such  as committee members appointed as representatives. The GSA official said  while the agency supports the intent of our recommendation, it defers to  OGE on ethics matters. However, in this case, given the limitations OGE  identified, it may be more appropriate for GSA to take the lead on  implementing this recommendation under FACA.
Regarding the importance of ensuring that committees are, in fact and in  perception, balanced in terms of points of view and functions to be  performed, we recommended that GSA issue guidance to agencies on the  types of information that they should gather about prospective committee  members. While GSA has not issued formal guidance in this regard, its  does include in its FACA training materials examples of agency practices  that do ask prospective members about, for example, their previous or  ongoing involvement with the issue or public statements or positions on  the matter being reviewed.
Finally, to better ensure independent and balanced committees and  increase transparency in the federal advisory process, we recommended  that GSA issue guidance to agencies to help ensure that the committee  members, agency and congressional officials, and the public better  understand the committee formation process and the nature of the advice  provided by advisory committees. Specifically, we recommended that GSA  issue guidance that agencies should  identify the committee formation process used for each committee,  particularly how members are identified and screened and how the  committees are assessed for balance;   state in the appointment letters whether the members are special  government employees or representatives and, in cases where  appointments are as representatives, the letters should further identify the  entity or group that they are to represent; and   state in the committee products the nature of the advice that was to be  provided—that is, whether the product is based on independent advice or  on consensus among the various identified interests or stakeholders.
In its comments on our draft 2004 report and in a July 2004 letter regarding  the published report, GSA stated that addressing these recommendations  would require further consultation with OGE and affected executive  agencies. In the ensuing years, GSA has not issued formal guidance  implementing these recommendations. In March 2008, the Director of the  Committee Management Secretariat told us that he generally supports the  intent of the recommendations but that GSA is reluctant to direct agencies  to carry out these aspects of their personnel or advisory committee  practices without the statutory authority to do so. He noted that regarding  the recommendation addressing the committee formation process, GSA’s  FACA management training materials provide information on the best  practice employed by some of EPA’s federal advisory committees of  articulating their committee formation process and providing this  information on their committees’ Web pages. We consider this action a  partial implementation of the recommendation.
section_title: Potential Changes to FACA That Could Help Agencies Better Ensure Independence, Balance, and Transparency
paragraphs: You asked us to provide recommendations for improving the Federal  Advisory Committee Act. Regarding the key recommendations we made  aimed at addressing the inappropriate use of representative appointments,  while both OGE and GSA were fully responsive to our recommendations  to issue guidance to federal agencies clarifying such appointments,  appointment data we reviewed raise questions about agency compliance.  For example, in 2004, we reported that three of the nine agencies we  reviewed had historically used representative appointments for all or most  of their advisory committees, even when the agencies called upon the  members to provide independent advice on behalf of the government.  Overall, based on our review of the latest data on committee  appointments, for these three agencies, this appointment practice  continued through fiscal year 2007. Further, of these three agencies, which  we identified as having questionable practices with respect to  appointments for scientific and technical committees in 2004, one is still  appointing members to scientific and technical committees primarily as  representatives, and one has reduced the number of representative  appointments but still has a majority of representative appointments. The  third shifted substantially away from representative appointments for its  scientific and technical committees in 2006 following our report—but  made appointments to two new committees in 2007 with representative  members that might be more appropriately appointed as special  government employees.
Regarding the agency that is still primarily using representative members  on its scientific and technical committees, not only do the subject matters  being considered by many of these committees suggest that the  government would be seeking independent expert advice rather than  stakeholder advice, but the agency’s identification of the entities or  persons some representatives are speaking for suggests this agency is not  abiding by the OGE and GSA guidance regarding representative  appointments. For example, for some committees, this agency identifies  the entity that all of the individual representative members are speaking  for as the advisory committee itself. We believe these instances likely  reflect an inappropriate use of representative rather than special  government employee appointments. In addition, we note that some  members appointed as representatives are described in the FACA  database as representing an expertise or “academia” generally. As  discussed above, the OGE guidance clarified that generally members may  not be appointed as representatives to represent classes of expertise.  Thus, it is not clear that agencies inappropriately using representative  appointments have taken sufficient corrective action or that such actions  will be sustained despite steps OGE and GSA have taken to clarify the  appropriate use of representatives in response to our recommendations.
Governmentwide data collected by GSA show that from 2005 (when GSA  began to collect the data in response to our recommendation to do so)  through 2007, the percentage of committee members appointed as special  government employees increased from about 28 percentage to about 32  percent; the members appointed as representatives declined from just over  17 percent to about 16 percent. In March 2008, the Director of the  Committee Management Secretariat at GSA told us that it is not clear  whether these data indicate that the problem of inappropriate use of  representative appointments has been fixed. He emphasized that GSA can  suggest to agencies that they change the type of committee appointments  they make but cannot direct them to do so. He noted that the agencies that  historically have relied on representative appointments may not feel  compelled to comply with the guidance because “it is not in the law.”  Finally, he said GSA would support incorporating the substance of our  recommendations regarding representative and special government  employees into FACA. Clarifying appointment issues in the act could  resolve questions about or challenges to GSA’s authorities and thereby  better support agency compliance with GSA and OGE guidance on this  critical issue.
In consideration of the above, the Subcommittee may want to consider  amendments to FACA that could help prevent the inappropriate use of  representative appointments and better ensure the independence of  committee members by clarifying the nature of advice to be provided by  special government employees versus representative members of advisory  committees and require that all committee members, not just special  government employees, be provided ethics training.
In addition, as discussed above, our 2004 recommendations to GSA  addressing (1) committee balance and (2) practices that could better  ensure independent and balanced committees and increase transparency  have either not been implemented or have been partially addressed. We  believe it is significant that, on the basis of its understanding of its  authorities and its experience in overseeing federal advisory committees— including trying to convince agencies to follow its guidance and training  materials—GSA told us in March 2008 that it would support incorporating  the substance of our recommendations in these areas into FACA. Not only  are our recommendations consistent with four categories (or objectives)  of amendments to the act that GSA told us the agency generally supports,  but they identify actions that GSA believes could help achieve its  objectives, such as enhancing the federal advisory committee process and  increasing the public’s confidence both in the process and in committee  recommendations. Consequently, we believe the Subcommittee may also  wish to incorporate into FACA the substance of our recommendations  addressing (1) the types of information agencies should consider in  assessing prospective committee members’ points of view to better ensure  the overall balance of committees, (2) the committee formation process,  clarity in appointment letters as to the type of advice members are being  asked to provide, and (3) identifying in committee products the nature of  the advice provided. Along these lines, we understand that the proposed  legislative amendments to FACA that may be introduced today may  incorporate some of our 2004 recommendations. Overall, we believe that  additions to FACA along the lines discussed in our testimony and detailed  in our 2004 report could provide greater assurance that committees are,  and are perceived as being, independent and balanced.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased  to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the  Subcommittee may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact Robin M.  Nazzaro on (202) 512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs Offices may be found on the  last page of this statement. Contributors to this testimony include  Christine Fishkin (Assistant Director), Ross Campbell, Carol Kolarik,  Nancy Crothers, Richard P. Johnson, and Jeanette Soares.
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