Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related Recommendations and Legislation
Published: 2007-07-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) faces the simultaneous challenges of preparing for the season and implementing the reorganization and other provisions of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. The Act stipulated major changes to FEMA that were intended to enhance its preparedness for and response to catastrophic and major disasters. As GAO has reported, FEMA and DHS face continued challenges, including clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse. This testimony (1) summarizes GAO's findings on these challenges and FEMA's and DHS's efforts to address them; and (2) discusses several disaster management issues for continued congressional attention.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Effective disaster preparedness and response require defining what needs to be done, where and by whom, how it needs to be done, and how well it should be done. GAO analysis following Hurricane Katrina showed that improvements were needed in leadership roles and responsibilities, development of the necessary disaster capabilities, and accountability systems that balance the need for fast, flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. To facilitate rapid and effective decision making, legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all government levels must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood. Adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic or major disaster are needed--particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3) evacuations; (4) search and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6) mass care and shelter. Implementing controls and accountability mechanisms helps to ensure the proper use of resources. FEMA has initiated reviews and some actions in each of these areas, but their operational impact in a catastrophic or major disaster has not yet been tested. Some of the targeted improvements, such as a completely revamped logistics system, are multiyear efforts. Others, such as the ability to field mobile communications and registration-assistance vehicles, are expected to be ready for the 2007 hurricane season. The Comptroller General has suggested one area for fundamental reform and oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to prepare for, respond to, recover, and rebuild after catastrophic events. FEMA enters the peak of the 2007 hurricane season as an organization in transition working simultaneously to implement the reorganization required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act and moving forward on initiatives to address the deficiencies identified by the post-Katrina reviews. This is an enormous challenge. In the short-term, Congress may wish to consider several specific areas for immediate oversight. These include (1) evaluating the development and implementation of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for natural disasters, terrorist incidents, and an influenza pandemic; (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants to enhance those capabilities; (3) examining regional and multi-state planning and preparation; (4) determining the status and use of preparedness exercises; and (5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss issues associated with the  Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA), an agency within the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and its efforts to address the  shortcomings of the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina and  enhance its capabilities for responding to major disasters, including  hurricanes. The 2007 hurricane season has started and its peak period will  begin in a few weeks.  Almost two years ago, Hurricane Katrina severely  tested disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and  revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding, to  and recovering from any catastrophic disaster. The goal of disaster  preparedness and response is easy to state but difficult to achieve and can  be stated as follows:  To prevent where possible, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to  disasters of any size or cause with well-planned, well-coordinated,  and effective actions that minimize the loss of life and property and  set the stage for a quick recovery.
Achieving this goal for major disasters, and catastrophic disasters in  particular, is difficult because success requires effective pre- and post- disaster coordination and cooperation among different levels of  government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.  Individuals can also contribute to success through such things as knowing  evacuation routes, complying with evacuation orders, and having a family  and individual disaster preparation plan and supplies.
As the Comptroller General testified in February 2007 on DHS’s high-risk  status and specifically disaster preparedness and response, DHS must  overcome continuing challenges, including those related to clearly  defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary  disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems to  provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, and  abuse. These issues are enormously complex and challenging for all levels  of government. It is important to view preparedness for and response to  major disasters as a national system with linked responsibilities and  capabilities. This is because effective preparedness for and response to  major disasters requires the coordinated planning and actions of multiple  actors from multiple first responder disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of  government as well as nongovernmental entities. Parochialism must be put  aside and cooperation must prevail before and after an emergency event.  The experience of Hurricane Katrina illustrated why it is important to  tackle these difficult issues.
My testimony today (1) summarizes our key findings on leadership,  response capabilities, and accountability controls and the efforts made by  DHS and FEMA in their implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act  and other recommendations made in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,  and (2) highlights several disaster management issues for continued  congressional attention. My comments today are based on our body of  work on disaster and emergency management including more than   30 reports on the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, our review of recent  emergency management reform legislative changes, and materials and  statements provided by FEMA. We conducted our audit work in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Several federal legislative and executive provisions support preparation  for and response to emergency situations. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster  Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) primarily  establishes the programs and processes for the federal government to  provide major disaster and emergency assistance to state, local, and tribal  governments, individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations.  FEMA, within DHS, has responsibility for administering the provisions of  the Stafford Act.
Besides using these federal resources, states affected by a catastrophic  disaster can also turn to other states for assistance in obtaining surge  capacity—the ability to draw on additional resources, such as personnel  and equipment, needed to respond to and recover from the incident. One  way of sharing personnel and equipment across state lines is through the  use of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), an  interstate compact that provides a legal and administrative framework for  managing such emergency requests. The compact includes 49 states, the  District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. We issued a  report this week examining how the Emergency Management Assistance  Compact has been used in disasters and how its effectiveness could be  enhanced. As the committee is aware, a number of specific  recommendations have been made to improve the nation’s ability to  effectively prepare for and respond to catastrophic disasters following the  aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Beginning in February 2006, reports by the  House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and  Response to Hurricane Katrina, the Senate Homeland Security and  Governmental Affairs Committee, the White House Homeland Security  Council, the DHS Inspector General, and DHS and FEMA all identified  a variety of failures and some strengths in the preparations for, response  to, and initial recovery from Hurricane Katrina. In addition to these  reviews, a report from the American National Standards Institute  Homeland Security Standards Panel (ANSI-HSSP) contains  recommendations aimed at bolstering national preparedness, response,  and recovery efforts in the event of a natural disaster. A key resource  identified in the document is the American National Standard for  Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs  (ANSI/NFPA 1600), which was developed by the National Fire Protection  Association (NFPA). The standard defines a common set of criteria for  preparedness, disaster management, emergency management, and  business continuity programs.
Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal,  state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of  preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic  disaster. Based on our work done during the aftermath of Hurricane  Katrina, we previously reported that DHS needs to more effectively  coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts,  particularly for catastrophic disasters in which the response capabilities of  state and local governments are almost immediately overwhelmed. Our  analysis showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood  leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary  disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively  balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent  waste, fraud, and abuse. In line with a recommendation we made  following Hurricane Andrew, the nation’s most destructive hurricane until  Katrina, we recommended that Congress give federal agencies explicit  authority to take actions to prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters  when there is warning. We also recommended that DHS  1.  rigorously retest, train, and exercise its recent clarification of the  roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of  leadership, implementing changes needed to remedy identified  coordination problems;  2.  direct that the NRP base plan and its supporting Catastrophic  Incident Annex be supported by more robust and detailed  operational implementation plans;  3.  provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local  planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully  support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a  jurisdictional and regional basis;  4.  take a lead in monitoring federal agencies’ efforts to prepare to  meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National  Preparedness Goal; and  5.  use a risk management approach in deciding whether and how to  invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic  disaster.
The Post-Katrina Reform Act responded to the findings and  recommendations in the various reports examining the preparation for and  response to Hurricane Katrina. While keeping FEMA within DHS, the act  enhanced FEMA’s responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. FEMA is  to lead and support the nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency  management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and  mitigation. Under the Act, the FEMA Administrator reports directly to the  Secretary of DHS; FEMA is now a distinct entity within DHS; and the  Secretary of DHS can no longer substantially or significantly reduce the  authorities, responsibilities, or functions of FEMA or the capability to  perform them unless authorized by subsequent legislation. FEMA has  absorbed many of the functions of DHS’s Preparedness Directorate (with  some exceptions). The statute establishes 10 regional offices with  specified responsibilities. The statute also establishes a National  Integration Center responsible for the ongoing management and  maintenance of the NIMS and NRP. The Post-Katrina Reform Act also  included provisions for other areas, such as evacuation plans and  exercises and addressing the needs of individuals with disabilities. In  addition, the act includes several provisions to strengthen the management  and capability of FEMA’s workforce. For example, the statute called for a  strategic human capital plan to shape and improve FEMA’s workforce,  authorized recruitment and retention bonuses, and established a Surge  Capacity Force. Most of the organizational changes became effective as of  March 31, 2007. Others, such as the increase in organizational autonomy  for FEMA and establishment of the National Integration Center, became  effective upon enactment of the Post-Katrina Reform Act on October 4,  2006.
section_title: FEMA Is Reviewing Its Responsibilities, Capabilities as It Implements Recommendations and Post-Katrina Reform Act
paragraphs: After FEMA became part of DHS in March 2003, its responsibilities were  over time dispersed and redefined. FEMA continues to evolve within DHS  as it implements the changes required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act,  whose details are discussed later. Hurricane Katrina severely tested  disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and revealed  weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding to, and  recovering from any catastrophic disaster. According to DHS, the  department completed a thorough assessment of FEMA’s internal  structure to incorporate lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and  integrate systematically new and existing assets and responsibilities within  FEMA.
The effective implementation of recent recommendations and the Post- Katrina Reform Act’s organizational changes and related roles and  responsibilities should address many of our emergency management  observations and recommendations. In addition, we previously reported  that DHS needs to more effectively coordinate disaster preparedness,  response, and recovery efforts, particularly for catastrophic disasters in  which the response capabilities of state and local governments are almost  immediately overwhelmed.  Our September 2006 analysis showed the need  for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and  responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster capabilities;  and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast  and flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and  abuse.
subsections: section_title: Leadership Is Critical to Prepare for, Respond to, and Recover from Catastrophic Disasters
paragraphs: In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic  disaster, the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of  authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, effectively  communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and effective  decision making. Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve  leadership at all levels of government to better respond to a catastrophic  disaster. As we have previously reported, developing the capabilities  needed for catastrophic disasters requires an overall national  preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and define what needs to  be done, where, and by whom (roles and responsibilities), how it should  be done, and how well it should be done—that is, according to what  standards. The principal national documents designed to address each of  these are, respectively, the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG.
All three documents are undergoing extensive review and revision by DHS  with input from state and local government officials, tribal authorities,  non-governmental and private sector officials. For example, the review of  the NRP is intended to assess the effectiveness of the NRP, identify  modifications and improvements and reissue the document. This review  includes all major components of the NRP including the base plan,  Emergency Support Functions (ESF), annexes such as the Catastrophic  Incident Annex and its Supplement; the role of the PFO and FCO, and the  Joint Field Office structure. Also during the current NRP review period,  FEMA has revised the organizational structure of Emergency Support  Function 6 (ESF-6), Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services, and places  FEMA as the lead agency for this emergency support function. The Red  Cross will remain as a supporting agency in the responsibilities and  activities of ESF-6. According to a February 2007 letter by the Red Cross,  this change will not take place until the NRP review process is complete  and all changes are approved.
The revised NRP and NIMS were originally scheduled for release in June  2007. In April 2007, however, DHS officials notified stakeholders that some  important issues were more complex and required national-level policy  decisions, and additional time was needed to complete a comprehensive  draft. DHS noted that the underlying operational principles of the NRP  remain intact and the current document, as revised in May 2006, still  applies. FEMA officials have told us that the final version of the National  Preparedness Goal and its corresponding documents like the Target  Capabilities List, are currently receiving final reviews by the White House  and are expected to be out shortly.
A key issue in the response to Hurricane Katrina was the lack of clearly  understood roles and responsibilities. This is an issue that continues to be  a subject of discussion is the roles and responsibilities of the FCO, who  has the authority to make mission assignments to federal agencies for  response and recovery under the Stafford Act, and the PFO, whose role  was to provide situational awareness to the Secretary of Homeland  Security. The May 2006 revisions to the NRP made changes designed to  address this issue. However, the changes may not have fully resolved the  leadership issues regarding the roles of the PFO and the FCO. While the  Secretary of Homeland Security may avoid conflicts by appointing a single  individual to serve in both positions in non-terrorist incidents, confusion  may persist if the Secretary of Homeland Security does not exercise this  discretion to do so. Furthermore, this discretion does not exist for  terrorist incidents, and the revised NRP does not specifically provide a  rationale for this limitation.
For 2006, FEMA pre-designated five teams of FCOs and PFOs in the Gulf  Coast and eastern seaboard states at risk of hurricanes. This included  FCOs and PFOs for the Gulf Coast Region, Northeast Region, and the  Mid-Atlantic Region, and separate FCOs and PFOs for the states of  Florida and Texas.
However, this year’s designations of PFOs, deputy PFOs, and FCOs have  generated some questions in Congress as to the clarity of the lines of  authority between these designated officials and DHS leadership such as  the FEMA Administrator and the Secretary of DHS.  In a July letter to the  nation's governors, designating PFOs and FCOs, the Secretary of  Homeland Security directed states to contact the head of the Office of Risk  Management and Analysis at the National Protection and Programs  Directorate (NPPD) with questions related to these designated officials.   The reasons for this were not stated in the letter, and the Risk  Management and Analysis Directorate of the NPPD has no designated role  in the current National Response Plan, which outlines the principal roles  and responsibilities of federal agencies in a major disaster.  In a letter to  the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Chairman of the House  Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security expressed concern  about the role of the NPPD, noting that under the Post-Katrina Reform Act,  the FEMA Administrator is designated to “lead the Nation’s effort to  prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against  the risks of natural disasters, acts of terrorism and other man-made  disasters including catastrophic incidents.”
It is critically important that the authorities, roles, and responsibilities of  FEMA and the designated FCOs and PFOs be clear and clearly understood  by all. There is still some question among state and local first responders  about the need for both positions and how they will work together in  disaster response. One potential benefit of naming the FCOs and PFOs in  advance is that they have an opportunity to meet and discuss expectations,  roles and responsibilities with state, local, and nongovernmental officials  before an actual disaster, possibly setting the groundwork for improved  coordination and communication in an actual disaster.
section_title: Enhanced Capabilities Are Needed to Adequately Prepare for and Respond to Major Disasters
paragraphs: Numerous reports, including those by the House, Senate, and the White  House, and our own work suggest that the substantial resources and  capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal governments and  nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to meet the immediate  challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of damage and the number  of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Developing the ability to  prepare for, respond to, and recover from major and catastrophic disasters  requires an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to  integrate and define what needs to be done and where, how it should be  done, and how well it should be done—that is, according to what  standards. As previously discussed, the principal national documents  designed to address each of these are, respectively, the NRP, NIMS, and  the NPG, and each document is undergoing revision.
Overall, capabilities are built upon the appropriate combination of people,  skills, processes, and assets. Ensuring that needed capabilities are  available requires effective planning and coordination in conjunction with  training and exercises in which the capabilities are realistically tested and  problems identified and subsequently addressed in partnership with other  federal, state, and local stakeholders. In recent work on FEMA  management of day-to-day operations, we found that although shifting  resources caused by its transition to DHS created challenges for FEMA,  the agency’s management of existing resources compounded these  problems. FEMA lacks some of the basic management tools that help an  agency respond to changing circumstances. Most notably, our January  2007 report found that FEMA lacks a strategic workforce plan and related  human capital strategies—such as succession planning or a coordinated  training effort. Such tools are integral to managing resources, as they  enable an agency to define staffing levels, identify the critical skills needed  to achieve its mission, and eliminate or mitigate gaps between current and  future skills and competencies. FEMA officials have said they are  beginning to address these and other basic organizational management  issues. To this end, FEMA has commissioned studies of 18 areas.
An important element of effective emergency response is the ability to  identify and deploy where needed a variety of resources from a variety of  sources—federal, state, local or tribal governments; military assets of the  National Guard or active military; nongovernmental entities; and the  private sector. One key method of tapping resources in areas not affected  by the disaster is the EMAC. Through EMAC, about 46,000 National Guard  and 19,000 civilian responders were deployed to areas directly affected by  the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. We issued a report this week examining  how the Emergency Management Assistance Compact has been used in  disasters and how its effectiveness could be enhanced.
One of the resources accessed through EMAC is the National Guard.  States and governors rely on their National Guard personnel and  equipment for disaster response, and National Guard personnel are  frequently deployed to disaster areas outside their home states. However,  as we reported in January 2007, the types and quantities of equipment the  National Guard needs to respond to large-scale disasters have not been  fully identified because the multiple federal and state agencies that would  have roles in responding to such events have not completed and integrated  their plans. As a liaison between the Army, the Air Force, and the states,  the National Guard Bureau is well positioned to facilitate state planning  for National Guard forces. However, until the bureau’s charter and its civil  support regulation are revised to define its role in facilitating state  planning for multistate events, such planning may remain incomplete, and  the National Guard may not be prepared to respond as effectively and  efficiently as possible. In addition, questions have arisen about the level of  resources the National Guard has available for domestic emergency  response. DOD does not routinely measure the equipment readiness of  nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic civil support missions or  report this information to Congress. Thus, although the deployment of  National Guard units overseas has decreased the supply of equipment  available to nondeployed National Guard units in the U.S., there has been  no established, formal method of assessing the impact on the Guard’s  ability to perform its domestic missions. Although DOD has begun to  collect data on units’ preparedness, these efforts are not yet fully mature.
The nation’s experience with hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforces some  of the questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the context of  a catastrophic disaster—particularly in the areas of (1) situational  assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications,   (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care   and sheltering. According to FEMA, the agency has described a number of  actions it has taken or has underway to address identified deficiencies in  each of these areas. Examples include designating national and regional  situational awareness teams; acquiring and deploying mobile satellite  communications trucks; developing an electronic system for receiving and  tracking the status of requests for assistance and supplies; acquiring GPS  equipment for tracking the location of supplies on route to areas of need;  and working with the Red Cross and others to clarify roles and  responsibilities for mass care, housing, and human services. However, a  number of FEMA programs are ongoing and it is too early to evaluate their  effectiveness. In addition, none of these initiatives appear to have been  tested on a scale that reasonably simulates the conditions and demand  they would face following a major or catastrophic disaster. Thus, it is  difficult to assess the probable results of these initiatives in improving  response to a major or catastrophic disaster, such as a category 4 or   5 hurricane. The section below briefly discusses actions taken or  underway to make improvements in each of these areas.
Situational Awareness. FEMA is developing a concept for rapidly  deployable interagency incident management teams, at this time called  National Incident Management Team, to provide a forward federal  presence on site within 12 hours of notification to facilitate managing the  national response for catastrophic incidents. These teams will support  efforts to meet the emergent needs during disasters such as the capability  to provide initial situational awareness for decision-makers and support  the initial establishment of a unified command.
Emergency Communications. Agencies’ communications systems during  a catastrophic disaster must first be operable, with sufficient  communications to meet everyday internal and emergency communication  requirements. Once operable, systems should have communications  interoperability whereby public safety agencies (e.g., police, fire,  emergency medical services, etc.) and service agencies (e.g., public works,  transportation, and hospitals) can communicate within and across  agencies and jurisdictions in real time as needed. DHS officials have  identified a number of programs and activities they have implemented to  improve interoperable communications nationally, and FEMA has taken  action to design, staff, and maintain a rapidly deployable, responsive,  interoperable, and reliable emergency communications capability.
Logistics. FEMA’s inability to effectively manage and track requests for  and the distribution of water, ice, food, and other supplies came under  harsh criticism in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Within days, FEMA  became overwhelmed and essentially asked the military to take over much  of the logistics mission. In the Post-Katrina Reform Act, Congress  required FEMA to make its logistics system more flexible and responsive.  FEMA’s ongoing improvements to its logistics strategy and efforts are  designed to initially lean forward and provide immediate support to a  disaster site mainly through FEMA-owned goods and assets, and later on  to establish sustained supply chains with the private vendors whose  resources are needed for ongoing response and recovery activities,  according to FEMA officials. In addition, we recently examined FEMA  logistics issues, taking a broad approach, identifying five areas necessary  for an effective logistics system. In short, FEMA is taking action to  transition its logistics program to be more proactive, flexible, and  responsive. While these and other initiatives hold promise for improving  FEMA’s logistics capabilities, it will be several years before they are fully  implemented and operational.
Mass Care and Shelter. Our work examining the nation’s ability to  evacuate, care for, and shelter disaster victims, we showed that FEMA  needs to identify and assess the capabilities that exist across the federal  government and outside the federal government. In an April testimony,  FEMA’s Deputy Administrator for Operations said that emergency  evacuation, shelter and housing is FEMA’s most pressing priority for  planning for recovery from a catastrophic disaster. He said that FEMA is  undertaking more detailed mass evacuee support planning; the  Department of Justice and Red Cross are developing methods for more  quickly identifying and uniting missing family members; and FEMA and  the Red Cross have developed a web-based data system to support shelter  management, reporting, and facility identification activities.
In addition, FEMA is in the process of developing an Alternative Housing  Pilot Program (AHPP) designed to evaluate new options for housing  victims in the aftermath of a disaster.  We have been asked to review the  process FEMA used to evaluate proposals and award grants under this  program and we expect to release a report at the end of August of this  year.
section_title: Balance Needed between Quick Provision of Assistance and Ensuring Accountability to Protect against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
paragraphs: Controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources are  used appropriately. Nevertheless, during a catastrophic disaster, decision  makers struggle with the tension between implementing controls and  accountability mechanisms and the demand for rapid response and  recovery assistance. On one hand, our work uncovered many examples  where quick action could not occur due to procedures that required  extensive, time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of vital  supplies and other assistance. On the other hand, we also found examples  where FEMA’s processes assisting disaster victims left the federal  government vulnerable to fraud and the abuse of expedited assistance  payments.
We estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about $600 million  to $1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to  applicants who used invalid information to apply for expedited cash  assistance. DHS and FEMA have reported a number of actions that are to  be in effect for the 2007 hurricane season so that federal recovery  programs will have more capacity to rapidly handle a catastrophic incident  but also provide accountability. Examples include significantly increasing  the quantity of prepositioned supplies, such as food, ice, and water;  placing global positioning systems on supply trucks to track their location  and better manage the delivery of supplies; creating an enhanced phone  system for victim assistance applications that can handle up to 200,000  calls per day; and improving computer systems and processes for verifying  the eligibility of those applying for assistance. Effective implementation of  these and other planned improvements will be critical to achieving their  intended outcomes.
Finally, catastrophic disasters not only require a different magnitude of  capabilities and resources for effective response, they may also require  more flexible policies and operating procedures. In a catastrophe,  streamlining, simplifying, and expediting decision making should quickly  replace “business as usual” and unquestioned adherence to long-standing  policies and operating procedures used in normal situations for providing  relief to disaster victims. At the same time, controls and accountability  mechanisms must be sufficient to provide the documentation needed for  expense reimbursement and reasonable assurance that resources have  been used legally and for the purposes intended.
We have recommended that DHS create accountability systems that  effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need  to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. Doing so would enable DHS to provide  assistance quickly following a catastrophe and keep up with the  magnitude of needs to confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster  assistance, or assure that there were provisions in contracts for response  and recovery services to ensure fair and reasonable prices in all cases. We  also recommended that DHS provide guidance on advance procurement  practices and procedures (precontracting) for those federal agencies with  roles and responsibilities under the NRP. These federal agencies could  then better manage disaster-related procurement and establish an  assessment process to monitor agencies’ continuous planning efforts for  their disaster-related procurement needs and the maintenance of  capabilities. For example, we identified a number of emergency response  practices in the public and private sectors that provide insight into how  the federal government can better manage its disaster-related  procurements. These practices include developing knowledge of  contractor capabilities and prices, and establishing vendor relationships  prior to the disaster and establishing a scalable operations plan to adjust  the level of capacity to match the response with the need.
Recent statutory changes have established more controls and  accountability mechanisms. For example, The Secretary of DHS is  required to promulgate regulations designed to limit the excessive use of  subcontractors and subcontracting tiers. The Secretary of DHS is also  required to promulgate regulations that limit certain noncompetitive  contracts to 150 days, unless exceptional circumstances apply. Oversight  funding is specified. FEMA may dedicate up to one percent of funding for  agency mission assignments as oversight funds. The FEMA Administrator  must develop and maintain internal management controls of FEMA  disaster assistance programs and develop and implement a training  program to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of federal funds in response to  or recovery from a disaster. Verification measures must be developed to  identify eligible recipients of disaster relief assistance.
section_title: Several Disaster Management Issues Should Have Continued Congressional Attention
paragraphs: In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the congressional  leadership suggesting areas for congressional oversight. He suggested  that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight was preparing  for, responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic  events. Recent events—notably Hurricane Katrina and the threat of an  influenza pandemic—have illustrated the importance of ensuring a  strategic and integrated approach to catastrophic disaster management.  Disaster preparation and response that is well planned and coordinated  can save lives and mitigate damage, and an effectively functioning  insurance market can substantially reduce the government’s exposure to  post-catastrophe payouts.
Lessons learned from past national emergencies provide an opportunity  for Congress to look at actions that could mitigate the effects of potential  catastrophic events. On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice  of implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization  requirements and additional organizational changes made under the  Homeland Security Act of 2002. All of the changes, according to DHS, were  to become effective on March 31, 2007. The effective implementation of  the Post-Katrina Reform Act’s organizational changes and related roles  and responsibilities—in addition to those changes already undertaken by  DHS—should address many of our emergency management observations  and recommendations.
The Comptroller General also suggested in November 2006 that Congress  could also consider how the federal government can work with other  nations, other levels of government, and nonprofit and private sector  organizations, such as the Red Cross and private insurers, to help ensure  the nation is well prepared and recovers effectively. Given the billions of  dollars dedicated to preparing for, responding to, recovering from, and  rebuilding after catastrophic disasters, congressional oversight is critical.
Congress might consider starting with several specific areas for immediate  oversight, such as (1) evaluating development and implementation of the  National Preparedness System, including preparedness for an influenza  pandemic, (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal  grants in building and sustaining those capabilities, (3) examining regional  and multistate planning and preparation, (4) determining the status of  preparedness exercises, and (5) examining DHS policies regarding  oversight assistance.
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Reorganized Pursuant to the Post- Katrina Reform Act
paragraphs: On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice of implementation  of the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization requirements and additional  organizational changes made under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. All  of the changes, according to DHS, were to become effective on March 31,  2007. According to DHS, the department completed a thorough assessment  of FEMA’s internal structure to incorporate lessons learned from  Hurricane Katrina and integrate systematically new and existing assets  and responsibilities within FEMA. DHS transferred the following DHS  offices and divisions to FEMA:    United States Fire Administration,    Office of Grants and Training,    Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Division,    Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program,    Office of National Capital Region Coordination, and,    Office of State and Local Government Coordination.
DHS officials stated that they have established several organizational  elements, such as a logistics management division, a disaster assistance  division, and a disaster operations division. In addition, FEMA expanded  its regional office structure with each region in part by establishing a  Regional Advisory Council and at least one Regional Strike Team. FEMA  officials have noted that for the first time in recent memory there will be  no acting regional directors and all 10 FEMA regional offices will be  headed by experienced professionals.
Further, FEMA will include a new national preparedness directorate  intended to consolidate FEMA’s strategic preparedness assets from  existing FEMA programs and certain legacy Preparedness Directorate  programs. The National Preparedness Directorate will contain functions  related to preparedness doctrine, policy, and contingency planning. It also  will include the National Integration Center that will maintain the NRP and  NIMS and ensure that training and exercise activities reflect these  documents.
subsections: section_title: Effective Implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act’s Provisions Should Respond to Many Concerns
paragraphs: The effective implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act’s  organizational changes and related roles and responsibilities—in addition  to those changes already undertaken by DHS—should address many of  our emergency management observations and recommendations.
As noted earlier, our analysis in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina  showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles  and responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster  capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance the  need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent waste,  fraud, and abuse. The statute appears to strengthen leadership roles and  responsibilities. For example, the statute clarifies that the FEMA  Administrator is to act as the principal emergency management adviser to  the President, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of DHS  and to provide recommendations directly to Congress after informing the  Secretary of DHS. The incident management responsibilities and roles of  the National Integration Center are now clear. The Secretary of DHS must  ensure that the NRP provides for a clear chain of command to lead and  coordinate the federal response to any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or  other man-made disaster. The law also establishes qualifications that  appointees must meet. For example, the FEMA Administrator must have a  demonstrated ability in and knowledge of emergency management and  homeland security and 5 years of executive leadership and management  experience.
Many provisions are designed to enhance preparedness and response. For  example, the statute requires the President to establish a national  preparedness goal and national preparedness system. The national  preparedness system includes a broad range of preparedness activities,  including utilizing target capabilities and preparedness priorities, training  and exercises, comprehensive assessment systems, and reporting  requirements. To illustrate, the FEMA Administrator is to carry out a  national training program to implement, and a national exercise program  to test and evaluate the NPG, NIMS, NRP, and other related plans and  strategies.
In addition, FEMA is to partner with nonfederal entities to build a national  emergency management system. States must develop plans that include  catastrophic incident annexes modeled after the NRP annex to be eligible  for FEMA emergency preparedness grants. The state annexes must be  developed in consultation with local officials, including regional  commissions. FEMA regional administrators are to foster the development  of mutual aid agreements between states. FEMA must enter into a  memorandum of understanding with certain non-federal entities to  collaborate on developing standards for deployment capabilities, including  credentialing of personnel and typing of resources. In addition, FEMA  must implement several other capabilities, such as (1) developing a  logistics system providing real-time visibility of items at each point  throughout the logistics system, (2) establishing a prepositioned  equipment program, and (3) establishing emergency support and response  teams.
section_title: The National Preparedness System Is Key to Developing Disaster Capabilities
paragraphs: More immediate congressional attention might focus on evaluating the  construction and effectiveness of the National Preparedness System,  which is mandated under the Post-Katrina Reform Act. Under Homeland  Security Presidential Directive-8, issued in December 2003, DHS was to  coordinate the development of a national domestic all-hazards  preparedness goal “to establish measurable readiness priorities and targets  that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist  attacks and large scale natural or accidental disasters with the resources  required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them.” The goal was  also to include readiness metrics and standards for preparedness  assessments and strategies and a system for assessing the nation’s overall  preparedness to respond to major events.
To implement the directive, DHS developed the NPG using 15 emergency  event scenarios, 12 of which were terrorist related, with the remaining   3 addressing a major hurricane, major earthquake, and an influenza  pandemic. According to DHS’s National Preparedness Guidance, the  planning scenarios are intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude of  large-scale, catastrophic emergency events for which the nation needs to  be prepared and to form the basis for identifying the capabilities needed to  respond to a wide range of large scale emergency events. The scenarios  focused on the consequences that first responders would have to address.  Some state and local officials and experts have questioned whether the  scenarios were appropriate inputs for preparedness planning, particularly  in terms of their plausibility and the emphasis on terrorist scenarios.
Using the scenarios, and in consultation with federal, state, and local  emergency response stakeholders, DHS developed a list of over   1,600 discrete tasks, of which 300 were identified as critical. DHS then  identified 36 target capabilities to provide guidance to federal, state, and  local first responders on the capabilities they need to develop and  maintain. That list has since been refined, and DHS released a revised draft  list of 37 capabilities in December 2005. Because no single jurisdiction or  agency would be expected to perform every task, possession of a target  capability could involve enhancing and maintaining local resources,  ensuring access to regional and federal resources, or some combination of  the two. However, DHS is still in the process of developing goals,  requirements, and metrics for these capabilities and the NPG in light of the  Hurricane Katrina experience.
Several key components of the National Preparedness System defined in  the Post-Katrina Reform Act—the NPG, target capabilities and  preparedness priorities, and comprehensive assessment systems—should  be closely examined. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, DHS had established  seven priorities for enhancing national first responder preparedness,  including, for example, implementing the NRP and NIMS; strengthening  capabilities in information sharing and collaboration; and strengthening  capabilities in medical surge and mass prophylaxis. Those seven priorities  were incorporated into DHS’s fiscal year 2006 homeland security grant  program (HSGP) guidance, which added an eighth priority that  emphasized emergency operations and catastrophic planning.
In the fiscal year 2007 HSGP program guidance, DHS set two overarching  priorities. DHS has focused the bulk of its available grant dollars on risk- based investment. In addition, the department has prioritized regional  coordination and investment strategies that institutionalize regional  security strategy integration. In addition to the two overarching priorities,  the guidance also identified several others. These include (1) measuring  progress in achieving the NPG, (2) integrating and synchronizing  preparedness programs and activities, (3) developing and sustaining a  statewide critical infrastructure/key resource protection program,   (4) enabling information/intelligence fusion, (5) enhancing statewide  communications interoperability, (6) strengthening preventative  radiological/nuclear detection capabilities, and (7) enhancing catastrophic  planning to address nationwide plan review results. Under the guidance,  all fiscal year 2007 HSGP applicants will be required to submit an  investment justification that provides background information, strategic  objectives and priorities addressed, their funding/implementation plan,  and the impact that each proposed investment (project) is anticipated   to have.
section_title: The Particular Challenge of Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic
paragraphs: The possibility of an influenza pandemic is a real and significant threat to  the nation. There is widespread agreement that it is not a question of if but  when such a pandemic will occur. The issues associated with the  preparation for and response to a pandemic flu are similar to those for any  other type of disaster: clear leadership roles and responsibilities,  authority, and coordination; risk management; realistic planning, training,  and exercises; assessing and building the capacity needed to effectively  respond and recover; effective information sharing and communication;  and accountability for the effective use of resources.
However, a pandemic poses some unique challenges. Hurricanes,  earthquakes, explosions, or bioterrorist incidents occur within a short  period of time, perhaps a period of minutes, although such events can  have long-term effects, as we have seen in the Gulf region following  Hurricane Katrina. The immediate effects of such disasters are likely to  affect specific locations or areas within the nation; the immediate damage  is not nationwide. In contrast, an influenza pandemic is likely to continue  in waves of 6 to 8 weeks for a number of weeks or months and affect wide  areas of the nation, perhaps the entire nation. Depending upon the severity  of the pandemic, the number of deaths could be from 200,000 to 2 million.  Seasonal influenza in the United States results in about 36,000 deaths  annually. Successfully addressing the pandemic is also likely to require  international coordination of detection and response.
The Department of Health and Human Services estimates that during a  severe pandemic, absenteeism may reach as much as 40 percent in an  affected community because individuals are ill, caring for family members,  or fear infection. Such absenteeism could affect our nation’s economy, as  businesses and governments face the challenge of continuing to provide  essential services with reduced numbers of healthy workers. In addition,  our nation’s ability to respond effectively to hurricanes or other major  disasters during a pandemic may also be diminished as first responders,  health care workers, and others are infected or otherwise unable to  perform their normal duties. Thus, the consequences of a pandemic are  potentially widespread and effective planning and response for such a  disaster will require particularly close cooperation among all levels of  government, the private sector, individuals within the United States, as  well as international cooperation.
We have engagements under way examining such issues as barriers to  implementing the Department of Health and Human Services’ National  Pandemic Influenza Plan, the national strategy and framework for  pandemic influenza, the Department of Defense and Department of  Agriculture’s preparedness efforts and plans, public health and hospital  preparedness, and U.S. efforts to improve global disease surveillance.   We expect most of these reports to be issued by late summer 2007.
section_title: Knowledge of the Effects of State and Local Efforts to Improve Their Capabilities Is Limited
paragraphs: Possible congressional oversight in the short term also might focus on  state and local capabilities. As I testified in February on applying risk  management principles to guide federal investments, over the past 4  years DHS has provided about $14 billion in federal funding to states,  localities, and territories through its HSGP grants. However, little has been  reported about how states and localities finance their efforts in this area,  have used their federal funds, and are assessing the effectiveness with  which they spend those funds.
Essentially, all levels of government are still struggling to define and act on  the answers to basic, but hardly simple, questions about emergency  preparedness and response: What is important (that is, what are our  priorities)? How do we know what is important (e.g., risk assessments,  performance standards)? How do we measure, attain, and sustain success?  On what basis do we make necessary trade-offs, given finite resources?
There are no simple, easy answers to these questions. The data available  for answering them are incomplete and imperfect. We have better  information and a better sense of what needs to be done for some types of  major emergency events than for others. For some natural disasters, such  as regional wildfires and flooding, there is more experience and therefore  a better basis on which to assess preparation and response efforts and  identify gaps that need to be addressed. California has experience with  earthquakes; Florida, with hurricanes. However, no one in the nation has  experience with such potential catastrophes as a dirty bomb detonated in  a major city. Although both the AIDS epidemic and SARS provide some  related experience, there have been no recent pandemics that rapidly  spread to thousands of people across the nation.
A new feature in the fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant  guidance for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants was that  eligible recipients must provide an “investment justification” with their  grant application. States were to use this justification to outline the  implementation approaches for specific investments that will be used to  achieve the initiatives outlined in their state Program and Capability  Enhancement Plan. These plans were multiyear global program  management plans for the entire state homeland security program that  look beyond federal homeland security grant programs and funding. The  justifications must justify all funding requested through the DHS homeland  security grant program. In the guidance DHS noted that it would use a  peer review process to evaluate grant applications on the basis of the  effectiveness of a state’s plan to address the priorities it has outlined and  thereby reduce its overall risk.
For fiscal year 2006, DHS implemented a competitive process to evaluate  the anticipated effectiveness of proposed homeland security investments.  For fiscal year 2007, DHS continued to use the risk and effectiveness  assessments to inform final funding decisions, although changes have been  made to make the grant allocation process more transparent and more  easily understood. DHS officials have said that they cannot yet assess how  effective the actual investments from grant funds are in enhancing  preparedness and mitigating risk because they do not yet have the metrics  to do so.
section_title: Regional and Multistate Planning and Preparation Should Be Robust
paragraphs: Through its grant guidance, DHS has encouraged regional and multistate  planning and preparation. Planning and assistance have largely been  focused on single jurisdictions and their immediately adjacent neighbors.  However, well-documented problems with the abilities of first responders  from multiple jurisdictions to communicate at the site of an incident and  the potential for large-scale natural and terrorist disasters have generated  a debate on the extent to which first responders should be focusing their  planning and preparation on a regional and multi-governmental basis.
As I mentioned earlier, an overarching national priority for the NPG is  embracing regional approaches to building, sustaining, and sharing  capabilities at all levels of government. All HSGP applications are to  reflect regional coordination and show an investment strategy that  institutionalizes regional security strategy integration. However, it is not  known to what extent regional and multistate planning has progressed and  is effective.
Our limited regional work indicated there are challenges in planning. Our  early work addressing the Office of National Capital Region Coordination  (ONCRC) and National Capital Region (NCR) strategic planning reported  that the ONCRC and the NCR faced interrelated challenges in managing  federal funds in a way that maximizes the increase in first responder  capacities and preparedness while minimizing inefficiency and  unnecessary duplication of expenditures. One of these challenges  included a coordinated regionwide plan for establishing first responder  performance goals, needs, and priorities, and assessing the benefits of  expenditures in enhancing first responder capabilities. In subsequent work  on National Capital Region strategic planning, we highlighted areas that  needed strengthening in the Region’s planning, specifically improving the  substance of the strategic plan to guide decision makers. For example,  additional information could have been provided regarding the type,  nature, scope, or timing of planned goals, objectives, and initiatives;  performance expectations and measures; designation of priority initiatives  to meet regional risk and needed capabilities; lead organizations for  initiative implementation; resources and investments; and operational  commitment.
section_title: Exercises Must Be Carefully Planned and Deployed and Capture Lessons Learned
paragraphs: Our work examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane  Katrina highlighted the importance of realistic exercises to test and refine  assumptions, capabilities, and operational procedures; build on the  strengths; and shore up the limitations revealed by objective assessments  of the exercises. The Post-Katrina Reform Act mandates a national  exercise program, and training and exercises are also included as a  component of the National Preparedness System. With almost any skill  and capability, experience and practice enhance proficiency. For first  responders, exercises—especially of the type or magnitude of events for  which there is little actual experience—are essential for developing skills  and identifying what works well and what needs further improvement.  Major emergency incidents, particularly catastrophic ones, by definition  require the coordinated actions of personnel from many first responder  disciplines and all levels of government, nonprofit organizations, and the  private sector. It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of effective  interdisciplinary, intergovernmental planning, training, and exercises in  developing the coordination and skills needed for effective response.
For exercises to be effective in identifying both strengths and areas  needing attention, it is important that they be realistic, designed to test and  stress the system, involve all key persons who would be involved in  responding to an actual event, and be followed by honest and realistic  assessments that result in action plans that are implemented. In addition  to relevant first responders, exercise participants should include,  depending upon the scope and nature of the exercise, mayors, governors,  and state and local emergency managers who would be responsible for  such things as determining if and when to declare a mandatory evacuation  or ask for federal assistance.  We are initiating work that will further  examine the development and implementation of a national exercise  program.
section_title: DHS Has Provided Limited Transparency for Its Management or Operational Decisions
paragraphs: Congressional oversight in the short term might include DHS’s policies  regarding oversight assistance. The Comptroller General has testified that  DHS has not been transparent in its efforts to strengthen its management  areas and mission functions. While much of its sensitive work needs to be  guarded from improper disclosure, DHS has not been receptive toward  oversight. Delays in providing Congress and us with access to various  documents and officials have impeded our work.
We need to be able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that  DHS has implemented many of our past recommendations or has taken  other corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However,  DHS has not made its management or operational decisions transparent  enough so that Congress can be sure it is effectively, efficiently, and  economically using the billions of dollars in funding it receives annually,  and is providing the levels of security called for in numerous legislative  requirements and presidential directives.
That concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond to any  questions you and subcommittee members may have.
section_title: Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this statement, please contact   William O. Jenkins Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on  (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.
In addition to the contact named above the following individuals from  GAO’s Homeland Security and Justice Team also made major contributors  to this testimony: Sharon Caudle, Assistant Director; and John Vocino,  Analyst-in-Charge.
section_title: Appendix I: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare  for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address  Related Recommendations and Legislation. . Washington, GAO-07-835T D.C.: May 15, 2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing  the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-833T. Washington, D.C.:  May 10, 2007.
First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications  Interoperability. GAO-07-301. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007.
Emergency Preparedness: Current Emergency Alert System Has  Limitations, and Development of a New Integrated System Will be  Challenging. GAO-07-411. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Disaster Preparedness: Better Planning Would Improve OSHA’s Efforts  to Protect Workers’ Safety and Health in Disasters. GAO-07-193.  Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007.
Public Health and Hospital Emergency Preparedness Programs:  Evolution of Performance Measurement Systems to Measure Progress.  GAO-07-485R. Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2007.
Coastal Barrier Resources System: Status of Development That Has  Occurred and Financial Assistance Provided by Federal Agencies.   GAO-07-356. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings of  Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. GAO-07-300. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007.
Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters.   GAO-07-395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007.
Hurricane Katrina: Agency Contracting Data Should Be More Complete  Regarding Subcontracting Opportunities for Small Businesses.   GAO-07-205. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2007.
Hurricane Katrina: Allocation and Use of $2 Billion for Medicaid and  Other Health Care Needs. GAO-07-67. Washington, D.C.: February 28,  2007.
Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of  Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-07-88. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007.
Highway Emergency Relief: Reexamination Needed to Address Fiscal  Imbalance and Long-term Sustainability. GAO-07-245. Washington, D.C.:  February 23, 2007.
Small Business Administration: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance  Agency Preparedness for Future Disasters. GAO-07-114. Washington,  D.C.: February 14, 2007.
Small Business Administration: Response to the Gulf Coast Hurricanes  Highlights Need for Enhanced Disaster Preparedness. GAO-07-484T.  Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Federal Actions Could Enhance  Preparedness of Certain State-Administered Federal Support Programs.  GAO-07-219. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to  Allocate Funds to Selected Urban Areas. GAO-07-381R. Washington, D.C.:  February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing  the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-452T. Washington, D.C.:  February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide  Federal Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is the Key to  Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO-07-418T.  Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2007.
GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions needed to Identify National Guard  Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60  Washington, D.C.: January 26, 2007.
Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to  Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139.  Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007.
Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify  Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations. GAO-07-44.  Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006.
Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-235R.  Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and  Abuse. GAO-07-252T. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006.
Capital Financing: Department Management Improvements Could  Enhance Education’s Loan Program for Historically Black Colleges and  Universities. GAO-07-64. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the  Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions  Needed to Reduce Such Problems in Future. GAO-06-1013. Washington,  D.C.: September 27, 2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and  Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,  D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and  Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for  the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes. GAO-06-834. Washington, D.C.:  September 6, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red  Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO-06-712.  Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and  Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement. GAO-06-746T.  Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.:  March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges  Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,  D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All- Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.:  July 11, 2005.
Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better  Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies.   GAO-05-577. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005.
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