Security Assistance: DOD's Ongoing Reforms Address Some Challenges, but Additional Information Is Needed to Further Enhance Program Management
Published: 2012-11-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Congress appropriated approximately $18.8 billion in fiscal year 2012 for various security cooperation and assistance programs that supply military equipment and training to more than 100 partner countries. Amid concerns that traditional security assistance programs were too slow, Congress established several new programs in recent years. DSCA oversees the security assistance process, with key functions in agreement development, acquisition, and equipment delivery performed by U.S. military departments. DOD has undertaken a variety of management reforms since 2010 to improve the security assistance process. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) DOD reforms address implementation challenges faced by security cooperation officials and (2) DSCA performance measures indicate improvement in the timeliness of security assistance. GAO analyzed DOD data and performance measures, conducted focus groups and interviews with security cooperation officials at all six geographic combatant commands, and interviewed SCO staff for 17 countries.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Security cooperation officials report three major types of challenges--training and workforce structure, defining partner country requirements, and obtaining acquisition and delivery status information--in conducting assistance programs. Ongoing Department of Defense (DOD) reforms address challenges that DOD security cooperation officials reported in meeting staff training needs and achieving the optimum workforce structure. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has also initiated efforts to respond to challenges in developing assistance requests resulting from the limited expertise of partner countries and U.S. Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) staff in identifying country assistance requirements and the equipment that can meet them. However, according to DOD security cooperation officials, information gaps in the acquisition and delivery phases of the security assistance process continue to hinder the effectiveness of U.S. assistance. Nearly all of GAO's focus groups and interviews reported persistent difficulties obtaining information on the status of security assistance acquisitions and deliveries because information systems are difficult to access and contain limited information. DOD's existing delivery tracking system provides only limited data on the status of equipment deliveries because partner country agents and DOD agencies are not entering the needed data into the system. Without advance notice of deliveries, SCO staff have been unable to ensure that addresses were correct and that partner countries were ready to receive and process deliveries, resulting in delays or increased costs. DOD is developing a new information system to address information gaps, but it is not expected to be fully implemented until 2020.
DSCA data indicate that DOD has improved timeliness in the initial phases of the security assistance process, but these data provide limited information on other phases. The average number of days spent developing a security assistance agreement has improved from an average of 124 days in fiscal year 2007 to 109 days in fiscal year 2011. However, assessing the timeliness of the whole security assistance process is difficult because DSCA has limited timeliness measures for later phases, which often comprise the most time-consuming activities. For example, DSCA has not established a performance measure to assess the timeliness of acquisition, which can take years. In addition, DSCA does not consistently measure delivery performance against estimated delivery dates. Without such performance measures, DSCA cannot assess historical trends or the extent to which reforms impact the timeliness of the security assistance process.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense (1) establish procedures to ensure that DOD agencies enter needed acquisition and delivery status data into security assistance information systems and (2) establish performance measures to assess timeliness for additional phases of the security assistance process. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: U.S. national security is inextricably tied to the effectiveness of our efforts  to help foreign partners and allies build their own security capacity. As  part of these efforts, Congress appropriated $18.75 billion in fiscal year  2012 for various security cooperation and assistance programs that  supply military equipment and training to more than 100 partner  countries. However, traditional security assistance programs such as  Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF),  while beneficial, have been criticized as being too slow and cumbersome  to meet needs for training and equipping foreign forces for  counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. In recent years  Congress has expanded the number of funding mechanisms and  programs to build partner capacity. The Department of Defense’s (DOD)  Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) oversees program  administration for both traditional and newer programs and has  undertaken a series of internal reform efforts to address concerns about  the timeliness of security assistance. In addition, the Secretary of  Defense convened a Security Cooperation Reform Task Force in fiscal  year 2010, which made additional recommendations for reform.
In response to a Senate Armed Services Committee mandate to review  DSCA’s program implementation processes, this report assesses the  extent to which (1) DOD reforms address challenges that security  cooperation officials face in implementing assistance programs and (2)  DSCA performance measures indicate improvement in the timeliness of  security assistance. While DOD and the Department of State (State)  manage other U.S. security cooperation and assistance programs, our  report addresses only those programs where DSCA plays a role.
To identify ongoing and planned DOD security cooperation reforms, we   analyzed its recommendations, and  reviewed a DOD task force report, discussed reform efforts with DSCA officials. To identify challenges that  DOD officials face in implementing security cooperation programs, we  convened focus groups and conducted interviews of security cooperation  officials in all six geographic combatant commands. We also conducted  interviews with staff at Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) — DOD officials located in a foreign country who manage DOD security  cooperation programs under the guidance of the combatant command— for 17 countries. We selected these countries based on geographic  representation, the value of U.S.-funded security assistance the country  received from 2006 to 2010, and other factors. We excluded International  Military Education and Training in order to focus on equipment and  equipment-associated training and because we had recently issued a  report specifically assessing International Military Education and  Training. To assess the extent to which DSCA performance measures  indicate improvement in the timeliness of security assistance, we  reviewed DSCA performance measures and discussed them with DSCA  officials and implementing agency officials. We reviewed the first three  quarterly management reports of performance measures for fiscal year  2012 to assess the extent that DSCA has performance measures that can  be used to assess timeliness. Where sample data permitted, we also  analyzed DOD data to assess performance trends. Appendix I provides  further details on our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 through  November 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The United States provides military equipment and training to partner  countries through a variety of programs. Foreign partners may pay the  U.S. government to administer the acquisition of materiel and services on  their behalf through the FMS program. The United States also provides  grants to some foreign partners through the FMF program to fund the  partner’s purchase of materiel and services through the process used for  FMS. In this report, we refer to FMS, FMF, and other State Department  programs implemented by DOD as “traditional” security assistance  programs. In recent years, Congress has expanded the number of  security cooperation programs to include several new programs with  funds appropriated to DOD, as well as administered and implemented by  DOD, that focus on building partner capacity (BPC). See table 1 for  descriptions of the BPC programs included in our report.
DSCA oversees program administration for both traditional programs and  newer BPC programs. DSCA establishes security assistance procedures  and systems, provides training, and guides the activities of implementing  agencies. Implementing agencies of the military departments—the  Army, Navy, and Air Force—are responsible for preparing, processing,  and executing the vast majority of security assistance agreements.While these implementing agencies maintain their own unique systems  and procedures, DSCA provides overall guidance through the Security  Assistance Management Manual and associated policy memos. DSCA  provides education and training to security cooperation officials through  its Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management.
Both the traditional and BPC programs that DSCA administers use the  FMS process to provide security assistance, but, as shown in figure 1,  some roles, responsibilities, and actors differ. In contrast to traditional  programs, under the BPC programs, the United States consults with the  partner country, but takes lead in identifying partner requirements and  funds, obtains, and delivers equipment on the partner’s behalf. The form  of the FMS process used to implement BPC programs is referred to as  the “pseudo-FMS” process. While the many steps of the FMS and  pseudo-FMS processes can be grouped in different ways, they fall into  five general phases: assistance request, agreement development,  acquisition, delivery, and case closure. See figure 1 for a summary of  selected entities and their roles in these phases of the FMS and pseudo- FMS processes.
Assistance Request. During the assistance request phase, in  traditional FMS, the partner country identifies its requirements  (needed materiel or services) and documents them in a formal letter  of request. Implementing agencies as well as SCOs and officials at  DOD’s six geographic combatant commands may provide input to the  assistance request. In the pseudo-FMS process, SCOs and  combatant commands consult with partner countries and take the lead  in identifying partner country requirements and drafting the request,  sometimes with input from the partner country.
Agreement Development. During the agreement development phase,  the implementing agency enters the letter of requestDefense Security Assistance Management System, a DSCA  information system used by all implementing agencies to process  letters of request and produce security assistance agreements. DSCA  reviews the draft agreement and coordinates with the State  Department before sending any congressional notifications that, for  the traditional FMS process, may be required based on the dollar  value or sensitivity of the potential sale but for pseudo-FMS are  required for all programs. When approvals are in place, DSCA  conducts a final quality assurance review and State performs a final  review. In traditional FMS, DSCA authorizes the implementing agency  to send the agreement to the partner country for acceptance; in the  pseudo-FMS process, the implementing agency accepts the  agreement on behalf of the combatant command.
Acquisition. During the acquisition phase, implementing agencies  requisition from existing supply or procure equipment and services  using the same procedures they use to supply the U.S. military. The  process is the same for both FMS and pseudo-FMS. Case managers  at implementing agencies monitor acquisitions and enter status  information into their data systems. Unlike the single information  system used to develop agreements, the information systems used in  the acquisition phase are not common across implementing agencies.  However, DSCA has created a web-based overlay, the Security  Cooperation Information Portal, which imports some of the information  available in implementing agency data systems and is accessible over  the Internet by security cooperation and partner country officials.
Delivery. In the traditional FMS process, the partner country takes  custody of materiel in the United States and is responsible for  arranging delivery. The partner country may pay to use the U.S.  military transportation system, but often uses its own freight  forwarder—an authorized agent responsible for managing shipment to  the final destination. If shipments are incomplete or otherwise  deficient, the partner country may file a supply discrepancy report to  seek redress. All BPC program shipments use the U.S. military  transportation system or other U.S. government-procured  transportation, with the SCO responsible for providing the delivery  address, ensuring foreign customs requirements can be met, jointly  checking shipments for completeness with the partner country, and  preparing any needed supply discrepancy reports. Implementing  agencies are responsible for conducting BPC deliveries and  confirming that SCOs are ready to receive a planned delivery. For  both FMS and pseudo-FMS processes, DOD uses the Enhanced  Freight Tracking System (EFTS), a secure web-based application  accessible within the Security Cooperation Information Portal  designed to provide visibility of the security assistance distribution  system.
Case Closure. An FMS case is a candidate for closure when all  materiel has been delivered, all ordered services have been  performed, no new orders exist or are forthcoming, and the partner  has not requested the case be kept open. At case closure, any  remaining case funds may be made available to the country for further  use. Pseudo-FMS cases may be submitted for closure as soon as  supply and services are complete.
DOD has undertaken internal improvement efforts designed to address  challenges in implementing security cooperation and security assistance  programs and improving timeliness of U.S. efforts. DSCA has also  undertaken improvements recommended by its internal improvement  program, begun in 2008, which has reviewed DSCA and implementing  agency processes.initiated a comprehensive review of DOD’s internal processes. The  results of the task force review led to recommendations focusing on areas   In fiscal year 2010, the Secretary of Defense  for improvement including: identification of partner requirements;  acquisition and transportation; and training, education, and workforce  development. DOD and DSCA have initiated a variety of efforts to  implement the recommendations, and a follow-up task force report  describes the status of action on the recommendations. In focus groups  we conducted in 2012 at all six combatant commands and interviews  with the officials at SCOs in 17 countries, security cooperation officials  reported three types of challenges: (1) optimizing training and workforce  structure, (2) defining partner country requirements, and (3) obtaining  information on the acquisition and delivery status of assistance  agreements.
section_title: DOD Reforms Address Many Challenges, but More Comprehensive Acquisition and Delivery Information Is Needed
paragraphs: DSCA has undertaken reforms to address challenges associated with (1)  training and workforce structure, (2) defining partner country  requirements, and (3) obtaining information on the acquisition and  delivery status of assistance agreements.addressing the first two challenges in the short term, reforms to address  information system gaps are more long-term focused and are expected to  take years to complete.
subsections: section_title: DOD Reforms Are Addressing Training and Workforce Challenges
paragraphs: Security cooperation officials reported that the existing training and  workforce structure presented a challenge to successfully implementing  security assistance. Specifically, focus groups at four of the six combatant  commands indicated that training or staffing of SCOs was insufficient,  limiting SCO effectiveness as they develop assistance requests, build  relationships in-country, and track assistance agreements through to  delivery. These focus group participants and officials at the SCOs and  military departments reported that they felt a number of changes were  needed, such as including more training on newer security cooperation  authorities, providing additional refresher courses, and ensuring that  security cooperation officers meet with their military department points of  contact as part of their predeployment training for their SCO assignments.  In addition, according to focus groups and interviews we conducted with  SCOs, SCOs were insufficiently staffed or rotations in the field were not  long enough. For example, some SCOs reported having only one security  cooperation officer, and rotations sometimes lasted only 1 year, which  was often less than the cycle time to develop and execute a security  assistance agreement. Focus group participants said a lack of institutional  memory in these SCOs created challenges for new officers who must  assume responsibility for ongoing security cooperation efforts.
DSCA has initiated a number of reforms designed to address training and  workforce structure challenges previously identified by DOD and raised  again during our focus groups and interviews. DOD recognized the need  for improved training and workforce management as early as 2009, when  the Deputy Secretary of Defense included efforts to improve security  cooperation training in his top 10 Office of Management and Budget high- priority performance goals for 2010 and 2011. DSCA is developing  several courses to address reported gaps in knowledge and to increase  the percentage of the security cooperation workforce that receives  training. For example, the Deputy Secretary of Defense declared in 2009  that DSCA must plan to educate 95 percent of the security cooperation  workforce by the end of fiscal year 2011. As of September 2012, DSCA  has consistently reported that this goal has been met or exceeded since it  was first achieved in June 2011. DSCA and the Defense Institute of  Security Assistance Management are currently identifying key positions in  the security cooperation community and developing improved procedures  to help ensure the selection of well-qualified candidates for those  positions.
In addition to monitoring the percentage of people trained, DOD has  reforms underway to address concerns about the content of the training  for, and the staffing of, security cooperation positions. In 2011, DOD’s  Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management began expanding a  required course for DOD personnel responsible for security assistance  and security cooperation management in overseas positions such as at  SCOs, combatant commands, and Defense Attaché Offices. Furthermore,  the course now includes information that security cooperation personnel  identified as important, such as a section on BPC programs. As of  September 2012, the Institute reported that students found the initial  expansion of the required course better covered the planning and  execution of the wide variety of security cooperation programs. The  course changes are now complete and, beginning in October 2012, the  Institute plans to offer the final expanded course. As a result of changes  to this course, security cooperation officers are now able to meet—in  person and by video-teleconference—with the DOD points of contact they  will work with to implement security cooperation programs once they are  in the field. In addition, these new course offerings introduce the topic of  security cooperation to U.S. government officials who interact with partner  countries but do not necessarily work on security cooperation programs.
In addition to improvements to course offerings, DSCA has created  additional resources for security cooperation officials. In April 2012,  DSCA added a new chapter devoted specifically to building partner  capacity to the Security Assistance Management Manual. DSCA and the  Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy have created a tool kit which  provides points of contact and implementation guidance for each  assistance program. Mandatory training for security cooperation officers  includes a review of this tool kit.
section_title: DOD Reforms Are Responding to Challenges Defining Partner Country Requirements
paragraphs: Focus group participants in five of six combatant commands and officials  at 9 of the 17 SCOs noted challenges in identifying and defining partner  country assistance requirements. These officials noted that partner  countries did not have enough experience or expertise to identify their  requirements or develop an assistance request that DOD can act upon.  Further, focus groups at four of the six combatant commands reported  that SCOs lacked the experience or capacity necessary to identify  equipment to match the partner country’s requirements. For example,  officials in two focus groups reported that some SCOs lacked staff with  expertise to develop either traditional or BPC assistance requests.
Since 2009, DOD has initiated reforms to improve the process of  developing assistance requests intended to reduce implementation  delays and improve the effectiveness of assistance to partner countries.  DOD reforms include developing new training courses and providing in- country advisors to help country officials identify short-term and long-term  requirements and strategies to meet those requirements. DOD has also  reformed its own processes for defining requirements to improve long- term effectiveness of security cooperation programs and provide short- term solutions for meeting requirements using assistance requests. For  example, beginning in 2011, DOD issued new policies and guidance to  help combatant commands and implementing agencies plan for, and  better develop, security assistance requests. Also in 2011, DSCA  established a strategic planning support group to assist combatant  commands with early identification and resolution of issues related to  capability requirements and certain types of assistance requests. In  addition, DSCA established Expeditionary Requirements Generation  Teams whose purpose is to help the combatant commands, partner  countries, and security cooperation officers identify and refine a partner  country’s requirements. These teams are available for both traditional and  BPC programs upon request by combatant commands. DSCA noted that  these teams would be particularly useful when a security cooperation  officer lacks experience or familiarity with the type of equipment in  question. DSCA provided pilot teams for Bulgaria, Iraq, and Uzbekistan  and, after the pilot was determined to be successful, sent teams to assist  Armenia, the Philippines, and again Iraq. The pilot teams produced 34  assistance letters of request, including some for FMF programs.
section_title: DOD Efforts Underway Will Not Provide Comprehensive Information on Acquisition and Delivery Status until 2020
paragraphs: DOD officials participating in focus groups at all six combatant commands  and officials at 16 of the 17 SCOs we interviewed reported difficulties  obtaining information from DSCA and the implementing agencies of the  military departments—the Army, Navy, and Air Force—on the status of  assistance agreements throughout the security assistance process.  These officials reported that obtaining information on acquisition and  delivery status was particularly problematic. According to DSCA’s  Security Assistance Management Manual, in order to facilitate information  sharing regarding assistance agreement status, the implementing  agencies must communicate frequently with DSCA, the combatant  commands, and the security cooperation officers, as well as with other  entities involved in executing security assistance programs. However,  focus group participants at the commands and the security cooperation  officers we interviewed reported a number of problems obtaining the  information they need in order to implement security assistance programs  throughout the process. Specifically, they reported that:
DSCA and implementing agency information systems were difficult to  implementing agency information systems often did not contain  current information;  these systems often did not contain the specific type of information  the officials needed;  implementing agencies generally did not proactively provide the  information that was available;  shipping documentation was often missing or inadequate; and deliveries arrived when the SCOs did not expect them.
Security cooperation officials we interviewed reported examples of this  lack of information delaying assistance, increasing costs, or negatively  affecting their ability to keep partner countries and senior officers at the  combatant commands informed about the progress of the assistance  agreements. For example, security cooperation officers at four SCOs  reported that equipment was held by the partner country’s customs  agency because the delivery lacked proper documentation or proper  address labels, and additional customs fees were incurred while the  security cooperation officers found the missing information. Security  cooperation officers in two SCOs noted instances where shipments were  warehoused in a customs office for 2 years because they had no  addresses or were improperly addressed. Security cooperation officers in  three SCO reported discovering equipment at ports and airports that had  arrived without advance notice.
In addition to receiving reports of challenges encountered by officials  using the various DOD information systems, we analyzed the extent to  which data were available in the delivery tracking information system.  DOD has created an information system intended to provide a single,  consolidated, authoritative source for security assistance shipment  information tracking. However, we found that DOD is not ensuring that  entities charged with carrying out deliveries are fully providing data for  this system. The Security Assistance Management Manual recommends  that SCOs use the EFTS to maintain awareness of incoming shipments to  the partner country when the items are shipped using the U.S. Defense  Transportation System. EFTS, accessible through the Security  Cooperation Information Portal, collects, processes, and integrates  transportation information generated by the military services, Defense  Logistics Agency, the U.S. Transportation Command, participating  carriers, freight forwarders, and partner countries—all of which can play a  role in the equipment delivery process and in populating the information  systems.
However, EFTS is not currently populated with sufficient information to  provide transit visibility. The system currently provides information  regarding when cargo leaves the supply source for most security  assistance deliveries, but we found that information availability decreases  as deliveries transit through intermediate points and on to final  destinations. EFTS provides limited information documenting, for  example, the date a shipment departs the United States and arrives at a  port in the recipient country. In addition, the system documents about 1  percent of the dates that equipment arrived at the in-country final  destination. Figure 2 provides percentages of fields in EFTS for which  participating entities provided data, based on a sample of FMF deliveries,  for fiscal years 2007-2011.
The lack of data in EFTS is caused by inconsistent participation by the  entities executing deliveries, which need to provide the data that would  populate the system. Equipment deliveries for traditional security  assistance programs are often executed by partner country freight  forwarders. According to DOD officials, some freight forwarders have  been reluctant to participate in EFTS and must be directed by the partner  country to do so, possibly requiring a change to the freight forwarder’s  contract with the partner country. Although DSCA can issue guidance to  freight forwarders, according to DSCA officials, it has no authority to  require them to follow the guidance. The 2008 DSCA memo announcing  the introduction of EFTS notes that the success of the program relies  greatly on the participation of partner countries and their freight  forwarders, and DSCA officials have since discussed ways to encourage  freight forwarders to participate in the EFTS system and report final  shipments. DSCA officials have acknowledged that there is still work to  be done to address challenges in implementing EFTS.
DOD has reforms underway for additional information systems to address  the lack of information across the process. In an effort to develop more  complete, comparable, and detailed data on security assistance  agreement execution, DSCA is developing a new electronic system, the  Security Cooperation Enterprise Solution, to aggregate data from the  separate computer management systems used by DOD’s implementing  agencies and standardize the handling of security assistance agreements  regardless of the assigned military service. The system is intended to  improve visibility on the acquisition and later phases of the security  assistance process. Agency leaders have noted that the Army’s Security  Assistance Enterprise Management Resource system has already  contributed to significantly increased management visibility across the  entire security assistance process for Army-implemented assistance  agreements and will bolster efforts to make similar management tools  available across implementing agencies, particularly once incorporated  into the Security Cooperation Enterprise Solution.
The Security Cooperation Enterprise Solution is intended to be a long- term solution to information management challenges. DSCA officials  expect to provide the system to one of the implementing agencies in 2015  and plan to complete system implementation in 2020, when the remaining  two implementing agencies will have access to the system. DSCA has  also initiated reforms intended to increase visibility for specific phases of  the process. For example, in 2010, DSCA undertook an effort to improve  the quality of the documentation included with each shipment. As a result,  the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management issued a  training guide in 2012 to improve the accuracy of addresses on  shipments. Furthermore, to address problems with the agreement  development phase, DSCA is working with the Defense Contracting  Management Agency to develop a way to make contract information  available to FMS customers via the Security Cooperation Information  Portal. The stated goal is to allow customers to search for the information  as well as to create reports containing contract information that can be  sent to a range of FMS customers. The training and workforce structure  reforms discussed earlier may also address some of the reported  challenges regarding information accessibility.
section_title: DSCA Data Indicate Improved Timeliness in the Initial Phases of the Security Assistance Process, but Provide Limited Information on Other Phases
paragraphs: DSCA has collected data that show improved timeliness in processing  security assistance requests and developing security assistance  agreements. However, assessing the timeliness of the entire security  assistance process is difficult, because DSCA lacks timeliness  performance measures for the other phases and for the overall process.For example, the agency does not measure the timeliness of assistance  acquisition, delivery, and case closure, which usually comprise the most  time-consuming activities.
subsections: section_title: DSCA Collects Information from Implementing Agencies to Monitor Performance across the Security Assistance Process
paragraphs: According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,  U.S. agencies should monitor and assess the quality of performance over  time. Furthermore, the Government Performance and Results Act of  1993, as amended, requires agencies to develop performance measures,  monitor progress on achieving goals, and report on their progress in their  annual performance reports. Our previous work has noted that the lack  of clear, measurable goals makes it difficult for program managers and  staff to link their day-to-day efforts to achieving the agency’s intended  mission.
DSCA has access to many security assistance management systems that  implementing agencies use and maintain to manage the security  assistance process. DSCA routinely extracts selected information from  these systems to oversee the process and has established some  performance measures to assess timeliness in various phases.
section_title: DOD Has Improved Request Processing Time, but DSCA Cannot Measure All Time Spent Developing Assistance Requests
paragraphs: DSCA data indicate improvements in the timeliness of assistance request  processing. In the assistance request phase, DSCA measures the  number of security assistance requests and the time spent processing  them after they are received. DSCA measures processing time as the  number of days from the time a request is formally received until it is  “complete,” or ready for the agreement development phase. According to  DSCA data, the number of days necessary for processing assistance  requests once they are formally received has improved from about 22  days in fiscal year 2008 to about 13 days in fiscal year 2011.
While DOD has improved its response to the formal request, a partner  country or combatant command’s perspective of the time required to  develop security assistance requests may be different from the portion of  that time under the oversight of DSCA. A significant amount of time  devoted to the development of assistance requests takes place before the  customer submits an assistance request to an implementing agency or  DSCA. For example, U.S. officials such as combatant command and  SCO staff as well as experts on relevant defense equipment may work  intensively with partner country officials before the request is officially  submitted.
section_title: DOD Has Improved the Timeliness of Agreement Development
paragraphs: DSCA data show that implementing agencies have reduced the time  spent during the agreement development phase of the security  assistance process. DSCA uses a single data system to collect detailed  information from implementing agencies on the time required to develop  security assistance agreements. This information allows common  performance measurement that provides a basis for focused reforms to  reduce process times in this phase. Aggregate DSCA data for all  agreements indicate a reduction in the average, or mean, number of days  for an assistance agreement to be fully developed and offered to partner  countries from 124 days in fiscal year 2007 to 109 days in fiscal year  2011, with a fiscal year 2009 low of 103 days (see fig. 3).
In addition, sample DSCA data we analyzed indicate that agreement  development is faster for BPC programs than the traditional FMF security  assistance program for the 17 countries in our sample.years 2007 through 2011, FMF security assistance agreement  development for our 17 sample countries took an average of 89 days,  whereas agreement development for BPC programs in sample countries  other than Iraq and Afghanistan took an average of 76 days. Agreement   During fiscal  development for BPC assistance projects in Afghanistan and Iraq was  faster still—36 days on average. See table 2.
DOD officials we interviewed suggested several factors that may be  contributing to the faster agreement development time for Afghanistan,  Iraq, and other BPC programs in our sample. For example, funding for  BPC programs may need to be obligated more quickly than traditional  security assistance funding; intensive management offices for  Afghanistan and Iraq help expedite agreement development for those  partner countries; and DOD’s combatant command for the region  including Iraq and Afghanistan has created a task force to enhance  communication of command priorities. Furthermore, our analysis of  sample data did not indicate that the improved timeliness in developing  BPC security assistance agreements decreased the timeliness of  developing FMF agreements for our sample countries. We found that the  time spent developing FMF agreements in our selected countries  decreased slightly from over 100 days in fiscal year 2007 to less than 90  days in fiscal year 2011.
Despite reducing the time spent in the agreement development phase,  implementing agencies have not consistently met DSCA’s established  timeliness goal. In 2010, DSCA defined this goal as providing security  assistance agreements to customers on or before the anticipated offer  date for at least 85 percent of agreements. The anticipated offer date is  the target date by which the implementing agency is to complete  agreement development and offer the agreement for acceptance. As  shown in table 3, DSCA data indicate that in fiscal year 2011,  implementing agencies met DSCA’s timeliness goal for BPC agreements,  88 percent of which were completed by the anticipated offer date. For  traditional agreements, the implementing agencies fell short of this goal,  regardless of the complexity of the agreement.
In the acquisition phase of the security assistance process, DSCA has not  established performance measures to assess timeliness of acquisitions,  which are carried out by the implementing agencies. This phase, from  when implementing agencies begin to make acquisitions needed for  finalized security assistance agreements until such activities are  completed and equipment is ready to ship, is often the longest phase of  the process. DSCA data indicate that acquisitions that required DOD to  award a contract in fiscal year 2011 took between 376 and 1,085 days,  but there are limited common data sources across implementing agencies  for assessing acquisition performance and documenting trends. DOD’s  implementing agencies manage acquisitions with several unique  electronic systems, each of which allows for various status updates and  reporting. However, we have previously reported that although the  systems may provide performance information within each implementing  agency, the information is not comparable across agencies, thus reducing  its value to DSCA for overall oversight. DSCA plans for the Security  Cooperation Enterprise Solution to include information from all  implementing agencies and improve DSCA’s ability to monitor acquisition  activities across agencies. This new system is intended to be fully  implemented in 2020.
section_title: DSCA Does Not Measure Delivery Timeliness
paragraphs: DSCA does not measure the timeliness of all security assistance  deliveries. Furthermore, DSCA does not consistently record either the  original target delivery dates or the actual delivery dates required to  determine delivery timeliness. DSCA monitors and reports one timeliness  target that is common across implementing agencies. According to this  target, estimated delivery dates for major assistance items, established  by implementing agencies, should be met for 95 percent or more of these  cases. However, the usefulness of this measure for assessing or noting  improvement in performance is limited. First, it does not cover all security  assistance agreements. Rather, it is used only for major equipment items  and excludes all BPC deliveries. Second, estimated delivery dates may  be extended in some circumstances. For example, DSCA officials have  noted that implementing agencies frequently change these dates when it  is determined that the original commitments cannot be met. Therefore,  the measure monitors timeliness against the most recently updated  estimated delivery date, not the original date.
The Security Cooperation Information Portal includes a data field for an  estimated date by which all security assistance materiel and services  contained in an agreement are envisioned to be delivered, as well as a  field for the actual date. Implementing agencies update the estimated  date when schedules change, rather than maintaining the original date.  Furthermore, while DSCA cannot compel partner nations to provide  actual receipt information for all traditional security assistance deliveries,  and U.S. SCO staff are required to record the actual receipt date of BPC  deliveries, they rarely do. As a result, DSCA does not always have  information regarding the actual receipt dates of security assistance  deliveries. Without original estimated delivery dates and actual delivery  receipt dates, DSCA cannot fully assess the timeliness of deliveries.  Furthermore, DSCA cannot assess historical delivery timeliness  performance to identify challenges to be addressed or report  improvements achieved through reform efforts.
Learning that there is a problem with equipment that has been delivered  is often the only indication of delivery DSCA receives from partner  countries that use freight forwarders. If a partner country identifies  delivery errors, such as equipment that is missing or damaged upon  receipt, it may file a supply discrepancy report to request restitution. It is  then the implementing agencies’ responsibility, along with the DOD or  commercial source of the item in question, to address the complaints.  DSCA does have a performance measure related to adjudication of  supply discrepancy reports—the number of reports that have not been  addressed within 1 year.the number of reports that have taken more than 1 year to address, as  shown in figure 4.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Increasing global threats to U.S. interests abroad make the timely  provision of U.S. assistance in building foreign partner capacity to  address transnational threats vital to U.S. national security. Congress has  created new programs to build partner capacity, and DOD has in turn  created new procedures to implement those programs. DOD has  recognized a number of challenges to managing its efforts to build foreign  partner capacity and has ongoing reforms to address challenges  associated with personnel training and workforce structure and with  defining partner country needs. While DOD’s reforms are addressing  several challenges, existing information systems are not consistently  populated with needed data. A lack of timely and accurate information for  partners, combatant commands, and SCO staff on agreement and  delivery status can delay assistance, impact the costs of fielding  equipment and training, and may adversely affect U.S. relationships with  partner countries. Without performance measures to monitor timeliness  across all phases of the security assistance process—particularly  acquisition, delivery, and case closure, which comprise some of the most  time-consuming activities—DSCA cannot assess the results of reforms or  inform Congress of their progress.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the ability of combatant command and SCO officials to obtain  information on the acquisition and delivery status of assistance  agreements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish  procedures to help ensure that DOD agencies are populating security  assistance information systems with complete data.
To improve the ability to measure the timeliness and efficiency of the  security assistance process, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense take the following actions: establish a performance measure to assess timeliness for the  acquisition phase of the security assistance process; establish a performance measure to assess timeliness for the delivery  phase of the security assistance process; and establish a performance measure to assess timeliness for the case  closure phase of the security assistance process.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and  Defense for comment. State elected not to provide comments on the draft  report; DSCA concurred with the report’s recommendations. DSCA stated  that it would work with military departments to ensure that information  systems are populated with acquisition and delivery status data and  continue to promote the use of the EFTS. In addition, DSCA stated that it  will work with the military departments to assess timeliness during the  acquisition phase; establish performance measures for the delivery phase  and encourage adherence to reporting in-country deliveries; and establish  performance measures to assess the timeliness of case closure. DOD  also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as  appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State. In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our  offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: In response to a Senate Armed Service Committee mandate to review the  Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) program implementation  processes, this report assesses the extent to which (1) Department of  Defense (DOD) reforms address challenges that security cooperation  officials face in implementing assistance programs and (2) DSCA  performance measures indicate improvement in the timeliness of security  assistance.
To describe the phases and participants in the traditional Foreign Military  Sales (FMS) process and the pseudo-FMS process used for newer  programs, we reviewed and summarized the Security Assistance  Management Manual description of these processes and DSCA flow  charts that illustrate the FMS process at varying levels of detail. We also  met with DSCA officials and reviewed system documentation describing  the functions of DSCA information systems. Our summary of the FMS  and pseudo-FMS processes does not encompass all steps and actors  that may be involved, such as technology releasability reviews that may  be required for sensitive equipment. To describe newer building  partnership capacity programs (BPC), we reviewed summaries of those  programs in the Security Assistance Management Manual, previous GAO  reports and appropriations and authorizing legislation creating the  programs. Our review focuses on those security cooperation programs  where DSCA plays a role, and it does not assess other security  assistance programs implemented by the State Department or most DOD  counternarcotics programs.
To assess the extent to which ongoing DOD security cooperation reforms  address challenges that security cooperation officials face in  implementing assistance programs, we compared security assistance  implementation challenges to DOD reforms that are currently planned or  in progress. To identify ongoing reform efforts, we reviewed the Security  Cooperation Reform Phase I Report and analyzed its recommendations  to identify those that required action by DSCA. To verify our analysis of  DSCA’s role in addressing the recommendations, we met with the director  and deputy director of the Security Cooperation Reform Task Force and  DSCA officials who participated in the Task Force or are involved in  addressing the recommendations. We also met with DSCA’s Acting Chief  Performance Officer and the Manager of DSCA’s Continuous Process  Improvement Program to identify and describe DSCA-directed internal  process reviews and requested and received documentation of these  efforts.
To identify challenges to the implementation of security assistance, we  conducted focus groups or interviews with security cooperation officials in  the six geographic combatant commands and interviewed security  cooperation officers in Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) in 17  countries. These officers manage DOD security cooperation programs  under the guidance of the combatant commands. To select the 17  countries, we obtained data from DSCA regarding total value of  transactions per fiscal year from 2006 to 2010 for each country benefitting  from seven U.S. government-funded programs administered by DSCA:  Foreign Military Financing; Section 1206; Peacekeeping Operations and  the Global Peace Operations Initiative; Iraq Security Forces Fund;  Afghanistan Security Forces Fund; Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund;  and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund. We did not include the  Global Security Contingency Fund as part of our data analysis because it  was newly authorized in fiscal year 2012. We excluded International  Military Education and Training in order to focus on equipment and  equipment-associated training and because we had recently issued a  report specifically assessing International Military Education and  Training.
We then selected three countries from each of the combatant commands  for inclusion in our review based on those countries that received both the  highest volume of assistance and received the widest diversity of  programs. For Northern Command, however, we selected the only two  countries within the combatant command’s area of responsibility, Mexico  and the Bahamas, which benefitted from one of these programs. For the  remaining five geographic combatant commands, countries included in  our review were: Africa Command: Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Tunisia; Central  Command: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan; European Command:  Albania, Romania, and Ukraine; Pacific Command: Bangladesh,  Indonesia, and the Philippines; and Southern Command: Belize, the  Dominican Republic, and Honduras.
Using questions tailored slightly for individual countries where  appropriate, we interviewed the staff of SCOs in these 17 countries. We  also interviewed officials at the military departments, and in the Office of  the Secretary of Defense to further clarify these challenges and their  effects. In addition, at the recommendation of security cooperation  officials we interviewed at the combatant commands and DSCA, we also  interviewed the staff of SCOs of two additional countries, Georgia and  Yemen. These two SCOs each had experience with a specific program,  the Coalition Readiness Support Program in Georgia and the new Global  Security Contingency Fund program in Yemen.
Using a single facilitator and common set of questions, we conducted  eight focus groups with more than 50 security cooperation officials at all  geographic combatant commands except Northern Command. We  conducted at least one focus group in each command and two in Pacific  Command, Central Command, and Africa Command. For Northern  Command, we conducted the discussion as a phone interview due to the  small number of officials involved but used the same questions that we  used with the focus groups. The focus group questions asked security  cooperation officials to describe challenges they experienced in each  phase of the security assistance process. For these sessions, we divided  the process into: creating a case (beginning with the development of a  letter or memorandum of request and ending with the finalization of a  letter of offer and acceptance); approvals (including disclosure  notification, technology transfer, Congressional notifications, and State  Department concurrence); executing a case (including procurement or  provision from DOD stock); delivery and case closure, and postdelivery  sustainment in the form of training and spares. We requested that  combatant commands identify focus group participants who would be  able to speak about their experience implementing security cooperation at  the combatant command as well as having responsibility for one or more  of the 17 countries selected for SCO interviews. During the focus groups,  the GAO facilitator wrote comments as they were made so that all focus  group participants could see them and other GAO staff took notes  documenting the discussion. No audio recordings were made.
GAO staff then consolidated the notes from each session and two GAO  staff members independently summarized the challenges and common  themes identified by each focus group and the Northern Command  interview. The two independent staff members then met to resolve any  discrepancies and agreed to a common set of 65 distinct challenges to  the implementation of U.S. government-funded programs raised in the  focus group discussions and the Northern Command interview. For  additional analyses of the challenges, we counted which challenges were  raised by more than one geographic combatant command. We then  conducted a second round of coding. Two staff members independently  analyzed the challenges and identified those that were within DSCA’s  purview and identified themes under which these challenges could be  grouped. The two coders met to resolve any discrepancies and identified  20 challenges within DSCA’s purview that were raised by more than one  geographic combatant command. The coders grouped the challenges  according to categories; along with 2 other challenges that did not fit  these categories. Additional challenges fall under the authority of  government agencies other than DSCA, and others fall beyond the U.S.  government’s control. The focus group and interview results are not  generalizable to all recipient countries but represent the experiences of  security cooperation officials in all combatant commands for the countries  with the highest transaction values. We also reviewed interviews with the  SCOs to further document the challenges identified by focus group  participants.
To determine the availability of data on the status of deliveries in process,  we requested data on all deliveries from fiscal years 2007 to 2011 for the  17 countries and BPC programs in our sample from DOD’s Enhanced  Freight Tracking System. We then analyzed the extent to which data in  the system were populated for key milestones in the delivery process  from origin to final destination.
To identify the extent to which DSCA performance measures indicate  improvement in the timeliness of security assistance, we reviewed DSCA  performance measures reported at DSCA’s Security Cooperation  Business Forum and the discussion of these measures reflected in the  minutes of these quarterly meetings. We met with DSCA officials and  implementing agency officials to further understand these measures and  the systems that implementing agencies have in place to track and report  data to DSCA. We also inquired of DSCA’s acting Chief Performance  Officer whether there were any other performance measures routinely  compiled for senior management review. We reviewed the additional  measures provided and determined that these did not assess timeliness.  We reviewed the first three quarterly forum reports for fiscal year 2012 to  identify the current performance measures that exist for the five phases of  the FMS process we identified in order to determine whether DSCA has  data in that phase on the time required to complete it, and performance  measures to assess the timeliness of the phase. We then analyzed these  data and measures to assess the extent that DSCA has performance  measures that can be used to assess timeliness.
To determine the timeliness of the phases of the security assistance  process, we summarized existing DSCA data reporting and performed  additional analyses of DSCA source data. We also performed an  independent analysis of the number of days spent by DSCA and  implementing agencies developing security assistance agreements based  on security assistance requests received from the 17 partner countries in  our sample and for BPC programs for fiscal years 2007 through 2011. For  this analysis we used data from the DSCA’s Defense Security Assistance  Management System. The system contains information regarding key  milestone dates that can be used to assess timeliness of some aspects of  the security assistance process. We determined the DSCA performance  metrics and data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes by undertaking  data reliability steps including reviewing system usage and  documentation guidance; interviewing knowledgeable agency officials;  conducting electronic and manual data testing to identify missing data,  outliers, and obvious errors; and by reviewing internal controls. To  determine the time to develop an agreement, we calculated the number of  days between the date listed for “Customer Request Complete” and  “Document Sent,” in accordance with DSCA’s method of measuring  processing time from the time when a letter of request is complete until  the release of the security assistance agreement to partner countries for  signature. Using these data, we analyzed the time frames to develop  agreements for BPC programs and traditional programs for the 17 sample  countries. The results of our analysis may differ from overall DSCA  timeliness metrics due to factors such as the type of equipment and  training requested by sample partner countries and the quality of the  assistance request submitted. The results of our work for the BPC  programs and 17 countries in our sample are not generalizable to all  countries receiving assistance.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 through  November 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Challenges Identified by Geographic Combatant Command Security Cooperation Officials
paragraphs: Between April and June 2012, GAO conducted eight focus groups with 50  security cooperation officials at all geographic combatant commands  except Northern Command. For Northern Command, we conducted the  discussion as an interview in June due to the small number of officials  involved but used the same questions as for the focus groups. GAO  analyzed the results and identified 65 distinct challenges to implementing  security assistance programs, 20 of which were raised in two or more of  the six commands and are within DOD’s purview. GAO grouped these 20  challenges into four categories: U.S. training and workforce structure;  U.S. ability to define partner country requirements; information on  assistance security agreement status; and other challenges.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, James B. Michels, Assistant  Director; Kathryn Bolduc; Martin DeAlteriis; Karen Deans; Katherine  Forsyth; Mary Moutsos; Michael Silver; and Michael Simon made key  contributions to this report. C. Etana Finkler provided additional technical  assistance.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training  Needed for National Guard’s Efforts with Foreign Partners. GAO-12-548.  Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2012.
Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide  Geographic Combatant Command and Service Efforts. GAO-12-556.  Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2012.
Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and  Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military’s Efforts.  GAO-12-359. Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2012.
Persian Gulf: Implementation Gaps Limit the Effectiveness of End-Use  Monitoring and Human Rights Vetting for U.S. Military Equipment.  GAO-12-89. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.
International Military Education and Training: Agencies Should  Emphasize Human Rights Training and Improve Evaluations.  GAO-12-123. Washington, D.C.: October 27, 2011.
Foreign Police Assistance: Defined Roles and Improved Information  Sharing Could Enhance Interagency Collaboration. GAO-11-860SU.  Washington, D.C: May 9, 2012.
International Affairs: Accountability for U.S. Equipment Provided to  Pakistani Security Forces in the Western Frontier Needs to Be Improved.  GAO-11-156R. Washington, D.C: February 15, 2011.
Defense Exports: Reporting on Exported Articles and Services Needs to  Be Improved. GAO-10-952. Washington, D.C.: Sep 21, 2010.
Persian Gulf: U.S. Agencies Need to Improve Licensing Data and to  Document Reviews of Arms Transfers for U.S. Foreign Policy and  National Security Goals. GAO-10-918. Washington, D.C: September 20,  2010.
International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment  Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207  Assistance Programs. GAO-10-431. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.
Defense Exports: Foreign Military Sales Program Needs Better Controls  for Exported Items and Information for Oversight. GAO-09-454.  Washington, D.C.: May 20, 2009.
Afghanistan Security: Lack of Systematic Tracking Raises Significant  Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to Afghan National  Security Forces. GAO-09-267. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2009.
Combating Terrorism: Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed  over Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds.  GAO-08-806. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2008.
Preliminary Observations on the Use and Oversight of U.S. Coalition  Support Funds Provided to Pakistan. GAO-08-735R. Washington, D.C.:  May 6, 2008.
Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has  Reached Iraqi Security Forces. GAO-07-711. Washington, D.C.: July 31,  2007.
Section 1206 Security Assistance Program—Findings on Criteria,  Coordination, and Implementation. GAO-07-416R. Washington, D.C.:  February 28, 2007.
Security Assistance: State and DOD Need to Assess How the Foreign  Military Financing Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and  Security Goals. GAO-06-437. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2006.