U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: NOAA Has Expanded Its Tsunami Programs, but Improved Planning Could Enhance Effectiveness
Published: 2010-04-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In June 2006, GAO reported a number of concerns about the level of U.S. tsunami preparedness. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) leads U.S. efforts through three key programs: the Tsunami Program, which focuses on detection and warning activities; the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP), which is a partnership with federal and state agencies focusing on hazard assessment and mitigation; and TsunamiReady, which is a partnership with at-risk communities focusing on education and emergency planning. The Tsunami Warning and Education Act of 2006 directed improvements in NOAA's warning and mitigation efforts and mandated GAO to report on its progress. This report addresses (1) the extent to which NOAA developed effective strategic plans for its tsunami programs and (2) the status of NOAA's efforts to strengthen and expand the programs and move tsunami research to application. GAO analyzed NOAA documents and interviewed federal, state, and local officials responsible for tsunami planning and preparedness efforts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: NOAA adopted strategic plans for the Tsunami Program in 2008 and NTHMP in 2009, which it developed by following key planning practices and including most of the critical components of strategic plans identified by leading organizations, but some components have not been fully developed. GAO found that NOAA's planning process followed practices critical to creating effective strategic plans, such as involving stakeholders. Both plans also include most of the components of effective strategic plans--such as mission statements and long-term goals--but other necessary components were missing or incomplete. For example, in the Tsunami Program's strategic plan, NOAA identified nine long-term goals but did not identify strategies and performance measures for three of them. Similarly, in the strategic plan for NTHMP, NOAA identified eight long-term goals but did not identify performance measures, milestones, or who is responsible for achieving one of the goals. Although the strategic plan for NTHMP includes a goal for the TsunamiReady program, it does not identify strategies for achieving the goal. Since 2005, NOAA has made progress in expanding and strengthening its tsunami warning and mitigation capabilities but faces challenges in both areas, as well as in moving its tsunami research to application. To enhance its warning capabilities, NOAA has, among other actions, deployed 39 tsunami detection buoys. Operating and maintaining the buoys, however, has been difficult and costly, consuming about 28 percent of the fiscal year 2009 Tsunami Program budget. NOAA is exploring ways to reduce maintenance costs by improving buoy reliability. To enhance its tsunami hazard mitigation efforts, NOAA expanded NTHMP membership from the 5 Pacific Coast states to all 29 at-risk coastal U.S. states and territories, changed how it funds mitigation projects in states and territories, and restructured NTHMP to better meet its program goals. NOAA's efforts to mitigate tsunami impacts through its TsunamiReady program, however, have been hampered by limited community participation. Although the number of TsunamiReady communities has increased from 27 in 2006 to 74 as of February 2010, overall participation in this voluntary program remains relatively low among the more than 760 communities identified as at risk for a tsunami. In this regard, GAO recommended in 2006 that NOAA conduct an assessment to identify potential barriers to program participation. Although NOAA has not yet conducted this assessment, GAO continues to believe that such an assessment is needed to help inform the agency's strategic planning efforts. Finally, NOAA has not complied with the Tsunami Warning and Education Act's requirement to develop and execute a plan for the transfer of technology from research into the Tsunami Program. Furthermore, NOAA's initial failure to follow its agencywide research transition policy contributed to a 2-year delay in moving the new tsunami forecasting system from research to application in its tsunami warning centers. Only after NOAA developed a transition plan in 2009 that was consistent with the agencywide policy did the transition of the system begin to move forward more efficiently.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: On September 29, 2009, the U.S. territory of American Samoa was struck  by a tsunami that hit the island within 20 minutes after a strong  underwater earthquake, destroying coastal infrastructure and killing over  190 people in the region. Although such damaging tsunamis are relatively  rare, the destruction caused by this event—as well as by the December  2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the February 2010 tsunami that struck  Chilean shores after a magnitude 8.8 earthquake—has shown the  importance of having a robust system to detect, issue warnings for, and  mitigate the impacts of tsunamis. According to the National Oceanic and  Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Pacific Coast states of Alaska,  California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington, as well as Puerto Rico and  the U.S. Virgin Islands in the Caribbean Sea, face the greatest tsunami  hazard in the United States and its territories. In comparison, the U.S. East  and Gulf Coasts are relatively low-hazard areas.
Federal, state, and local government agencies are all involved in efforts to  reduce the potential impacts of tsunamis. NOAA’s Tsunami Program is  primarily responsible for federal tsunami detection and warning activities.  Under this program, NOAA’s National Weather Service operates two  tsunami warning centers, which monitor data from seismic networks  operated by NOAA, the U.S. Geological Survey, states, and universities,  and issue warnings when tsunamis are likely. NOAA’s Tsunami Program  also provides leadership and funding for the National Tsunami Hazard  Mitigation Program (NTHMP). This program, begun in 1996, is a  partnership among NOAA, the U.S. Geological Survey, the Federal  Emergency Management Agency, and coastal state emergency  management and geological agencies to assess tsunami hazards, improve  and coordinate tsunami warning systems, and develop state and local  hazard mitigation programs. In addition, NTHMP has taken a lead role in  overseeing and making recommendations for improving the  TsunamiReady preparedness program. TsunamiReady is a voluntary  program that encourages local communities to educate citizens on  tsunami hazards, develop tsunami mitigation plans, and establish local  warning systems; the program also confers TsunamiReady recognition on  communities that meet its guidelines.
In June 2006, we reported that NOAA faced significant challenges in  reducing the potential impacts of tsunamis on U.S. coastal communities.   Specifically, we reported that NOAA was significantly expanding its  tsunami warning, mitigation, and research efforts in the wake of the Indian  Ocean event, but the Tsunami Program and NTHMP lacked long-range  strategic plans. We also reported that although the two tsunami warning  centers could quickly detect and warn of potential tsunamis, false alarms  called into question the accuracy and reliability of the warnings. Further,  the efforts of at-risk communities to mitigate potential tsunami impacts  varied widely, and few communities had chosen to participate in the  TsunamiReady preparedness program. We recommended that NOAA take  actions to help communities determine the potential impact of tsunamis,  reduce the number of false alarms, improve testing of the warning system,  identify barriers to participation in TsunamiReady, evaluate the NTHMP to  assist in strategic planning, and develop comprehensive strategic plans for  the Tsunami Program and NTHMP.
Subsequently, in December 2006, Congress passed the Tsunami Warning  and Education Act to improve the Tsunami Program’s warning, mitigation,  and research efforts nationwide. The acts’ purposes include enhancing  and modernizing the existing detection and warning system for the Pacific  Ocean and expanding this system to include other vulnerable states and  territories in the Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean Sea, and Gulf of Mexico. The  act also requires NOAA’s National Weather Service to develop and execute  a transition plan for moving technology from its research efforts into  application within the forecasting and warning program. In addition, the  act mandates that we evaluate and report to relevant congressional  committees by January 31, 2010, the status of NOAA’s efforts. We reported  our preliminary findings in a briefing to the staff of the Senate  Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, of the  Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and to the staff of  the House Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, of the Committee  on Science and Technology, on December 11, 2009. We are following up  with this report, which provides more detail on the topics covered in the  briefing. This report addresses (1) the extent to which NOAA developed  effective strategic plans for the Tsunami Program and NTHMP and (2) the  status of NOAA’s efforts since 2005 to strengthen and expand the  programs and move tsunami research to application.
To assess the extent to which NOAA developed effective strategic plans  for the Tsunami Program and NTHMP, we reviewed the practices NOAA  used to develop the programs’ strategic plans and compared them with  key practices used by leading organizations we had previously identified.  We also compared the strategic plans’ components with critical  components that should be included in strategic plans as identified by  leading organizations and our prior work. In addition, we reviewed  agency documents and interviewed NOAA officials about the process and components of each plan. To describe the status of efforts since 2005  to improve the tsunami programs and move tsunami research to  application, we reviewed program requirements in the Tsunami Warning  and Education Act and analyzed NOAA documents to help determine the  extent to which the agency has implemented efforts to strengthen the  programs’ warning and mitigation components. We visited NOAA’s  tsunami warning centers in Alaska and Hawaii and met with the centers’  directors and staff to discuss their tsunami detection and warning efforts.  We discussed the status of NOAA’s tsunami warning and mitigation efforts  with federal, state, and local officials, including NTHMP participants and  officials from Alabama, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Maryland, Oregon, and  Washington to determine the extent to which services have changed. We  also analyzed NOAA’s policy and implementation procedures for the  transition of research to application and interviewed NOAA officials about  how such transitions in the Tsunami Program have been implemented,  focusing on the ongoing effort to move tsunami forecasting research to  application in the tsunami warning centers. We assessed the reliability of  the NOAA data that we used, by reviewing agency documentation and  interviewing agency officials about the data’s sources and uses, and found  them to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2009 to April 2010, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: A tsunami is a series of ocean waves typically generated by an underwater  earthquake. The size of the resulting tsunami depends on a complex set of  factors, including the earthquake’s magnitude, its depth below the ocean  floor, depth of the overlying water, type and amount of seafloor  movement, and energy released. A tsunami wave may be very small in the  deep ocean, but as it approaches land, it can increase to tens of feet in  height and reach shore as a fast-moving wall of turbulent water. Tsunamis  can be classified as local or distant. A tsunami generated by an earthquake  off the coast of Alaska would be considered a local tsunami for that state’s  coastal areas, striking within minutes of the event, while the same event  would be considered a distant tsunami for the coast of Washington, which  would not likely be hit until 3 or more hours later. Both types of tsunami  pose an inundation threat to low-lying coastal communities from multiple  destructive waves that can penetrate far inland. Local tsunamis pose  particular emergency preparedness challenges because there may not be  enough time to sound a warning. In this situation, public education and  outreach can save lives by teaching the community to recognize the  emergency and move immediately to higher ground.
The process that the tsunami warning centers use to detect potential  tsunamis and issue warnings involves several steps. The warning centers  first monitor and evaluate data from seismic networks, and if a tsunami is  likely, they transmit a tsunami warning message to NOAA’s weather- forecasting offices and state emergency management centers, among  others. The warning centers also monitor coastal water-level data, as well  as data from NOAA’s network of Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of  Tsunamis (DART) detection buoys, to determine if a tsunami has actually  been generated and, if not, to cancel any warning (see fig. 1). NOAA’s  Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory (PMEL) conducted the research  and developed the DART buoys and conducts other research in support of  the Tsunami Program, such as the development of tsunami inundation  forecast models for at-risk locations. Tsunami forecast models are used by  scientists at the warning centers and the research laboratory to help  estimate the size of the expected waves and their potential impact on  coastal areas. For example, after a massive magnitude 8.8 earthquake off  the coast of Chile in February 2010, NOAA scientists initially warned that  tsunami waves of about 8 feet could strike Hawaii, but as the tsunami  moved across the Pacific, the forecast models helped to more accurately  predict the approximately 3-foot tsunami waves that actually struck the  islands more than 12 hours after the earthquake.
NOAA allocates its annual appropriations and other funds to three main  categories of activities in its Tsunami Program:    warning: including activities pertaining to tsunami warning centers,  DART buoys, seismic and sea-level monitoring networks, and tsunami  data management;    mitigation: including activities pertaining to NTHMP, TsunamiReady,  and the International Tsunami Information Center; and    research: including activities conducted by PMEL and the National  Data Buoy Center.
From fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 2004, NOAA’s allocations to fund  tsunami activities remained fairly constant, ranging from about $5 million  to $10 million. After the Indian Ocean tsunami, funding increased  significantly, from about $27 million in fiscal year 2005 to $42 million in  fiscal year 2009 (see fig. 2).
While funding levels generally increased from fiscal year 1997 through  fiscal year 2009 for all three categories of tsunami-related activities,  according to NOAA officials, the proportion allocated to warning  increased from about 40 percent from fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year  2004 to approximately 70 percent of total program funding from fiscal year  2005 through fiscal year 2009 (see fig. 3). In comparison, the proportion  allocated to mitigation decreased from about 50 percent from fiscal year  1997 through fiscal year 2004 to approximately 30 percent of total funding  from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2009, and the proportion of  research funding remained relatively constant, at about 6 to 10 percent of  the total.
Starting in fiscal year 2009, funding for the Tsunami Program—including  all three categories of tsunami-related activity—received a significant  boost from the proceeds of the Federal Communication Commission’s  auctioning of the broadcast frequency spectrum previously devoted to  carrying analog television signals. The auction proceeds are to provide a  total of about $50 million to the program through fiscal year 2012, when  this funding will expire. In fiscal year 2009, spectrum auction funding  provided $13.7 million, which amounted to 32 percent of the $42 million of  total Tsunami Program funding for the year. The program also benefits  from significant in-kind support and resources, such as data from seismic  and water-level monitors operated by other agencies or nations; NOAA has  not estimated the monetary value of this support.
section_title: NOAA Followed Key Planning Practices and Generally Included Critical Components in Developing Its Tsunami Programs’ Strategic Plans
paragraphs: The planning processes NOAA used to develop its Tsunami Program and  NTHMP strategic plans followed the three key practices leading  organizations use to create effective strategic plans. The plans also  generally include the critical components of effective plans—such as  mission statements and long-term goals—and are closely linked through  their goals and strategies, but some components of the plans have not  been fully developed.
subsections: section_title: NOAA Followed Key Planning Practices to Develop Its Strategic Plans
paragraphs: In our prior work, we identified three key practices that were critical for  leading organizations to follow in the creation of effective strategic plans:  Involving stakeholders, such as federal agencies, state governments, or  others, in defining the mission and desired outcomes helps ensure that  their expectations and interests are met and that resources and efforts  are targeted at the program’s highest priorities.
Assessing external and internal forces helps managers anticipate  future challenges and make adjustments before potential problems  become crises. For example, external forces—such as emerging  technological trends and new statutory requirements—and internal  forces—such as culture, management practices, and business  processes—may influence the program’s ability to achieve its goals.
Aligning program activities to support mission-related outcomes  helps ensure that programs effectively and efficiently produce services  that meet customers’ needs and stakeholders’ interests. Assessing the  extent to which a program’s activities, processes, and resources  contribute to meeting its mission and desired outcomes can identify  inadequate or obsolete organizational structures that need to be  changed.
NOAA adopted strategic plans in 2008 for the Tsunami Program and in  2009 for NTHMP. We found that NOAA’s planning process for developing  these plans included the three key practices. Specifically, to develop the  Tsunami Program’s strategic plan, NOAA assembled a planning committee  of relevant agency officials, who drafted the plan, and then involved  stakeholders, including NTHMP members, by giving them the opportunity  to review and comment on the draft plan. The planning committee  assessed the external and internal forces relevant to the program by  analyzing the program’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats.  For example, the planning committee determined that the tsunami  warning centers were issuing confusing information statements during  events, an internal weakness that threatened its warning mission. In  addition, as the planning committee developed the Tsunami Program’s  strategic plan, NOAA officials aligned the program’s structure to meet the  purpose of the program as provided in the Tsunami Warning and  Education Act and to ensure that its activities supported this mission. For  example, the plan identifies four areas of responsibility in the Tsunami  Program that align with the main sections of the act: (1) tsunami  forecasting and warning, (2) National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program,  (3) tsunami research, and (4) global tsunami warning and mitigation.
Likewise, when developing the NTHMP’s strategic plan, NOAA assembled  a planning committee of stakeholders and then shared a draft of the  strategic plan with all NTHMP members to incorporate their comments,  helping to ensure that their interests and expectations were met.  According to NOAA officials, the planning committee assessed the  external and internal forces potentially affecting the NTHMP, as was done  for the Tsunami Program. For example, the analysis identified certain  NTHMP goals that depended on external forces, such as state and local  agencies, and were therefore beyond the program’s full control. Finally,  NTHMP’s strategic plan was organized to align its goals and strategies with  key components of the program as identified in the Tsunami Warning and  Education Act, specifically, to coordinate warning activities, promote and  improve community education and mitigation, and improve the quality and  extent of inundation modeling and mapping.
section_title: NOAA’s Tsunami Strategic Plans Generally Include Critical Components, but Some Are Missing or Incomplete
paragraphs: Our past work has shown that effective strategic plans should include six  critical components:    A comprehensive mission statement that explains why a program  exists and tells what it does.
Long-term goals and objectives that specify how an agency will carry  out its mission and explain what results are expected from the  program.
Strategies to achieve the goals and objectives that are specific enough  to allow an assessment of whether they will help achieve those goals.  For example, strategies may describe the processes, skills,  technologies, and resources needed to achieve a program’s goals and  objectives.
A description of how performance measures will be used to assess  progress toward long-term goals, including (1) the specific activities  within the program that will be assessed for performance and (2) the  target level of performance to be achieved for each measure.
The identification of external factors that could significantly affect  achievement of the strategic goals, such as economic trends or actions  by Congress, state and federal agencies, or other entities. Assessing  external factors helps agencies evaluate the likelihood of achieving  strategic goals that depend on the actions of others.
A description of how program evaluations are to be used to establish  or revise strategic goals and a schedule of future planned evaluations.
We found that the Tsunami Program and NTHMP strategic plans generally  include most of the critical components of effective strategic plans.  Specifically, for the Tsunami Program’s strategic plan, we found that it  identifies the program’s mission, nine long-term goals for meeting its  mission, strategies to achieve most of the goals, activities to implement the  strategies, and some performance measures to assess progress.  Additionally, during the planning process, the Tsunami Program’s strategic  planning team identified factors external to the program that could  significantly affect achievement of the strategic goals. For example, the  planning committee identified current support from the U.S. Geological  Survey, which provides seismic data, as one external factor that, if  changed, could affect the program’s ability to achieve its goals. Also, the  planning committee reviewed relevant program evaluations, such as our  2006 report, to incorporate these findings and recommendations into the  strategic plan.
Nevertheless, some key components of the Tsunami Program’s strategic  plan are not fully developed. For example, although the plan identifies  nine long-term goals, it does not identify strategies, performance  measures, or the agency offices responsible for achieving the strategies for  three of the goals. These three goals are (1) provide technical assistance,  training, and capacity development both at global and regional levels,  supporting a fully operational tsunami warning system; (2) integrate with  other relevant national, regional, and global ocean and coastal  observation, warning, mitigation, and risk management systems; and (3)  develop effective networks to disseminate tsunami information to the  public through partnerships with formal and informal education entities.  Furthermore, while the strategic plan lists performance measures for six  goals that the program aims to achieve from 2008 to 2017, some are vague  or lack a specific date for completion. For example, “reduce the cost for  the DART network operation and maintenance” is one of the performance  measures.  This measure may not be a useful one, however, for the goal of  having timely and accurate tsunami forecast and warning products  because the measure lacks a specific target for cost reduction and a date  for achieving it. The Tsunami Program manager acknowledged these  limitations in the strategic plan but said that although the plan did not  contain strategies and performance measures for the three goals, the  planning committee had developed an action plan, separate from the  strategic plan, which identified specific tasks to complete each year to  help reach the goals. The program manager also told us that the planning  committee was hampered in its efforts to identify performance measures  for the three goals because they were very general, and no performance  data existed to provide a baseline against which to measure progress.
Similarly, we found that NOAA also used a planning committee to create a  strategic plan for the NTHMP that includes nearly all the critical  components of an effective plan. For example, to achieve NTHMP’s  mission “to reduce loss of life and property damage from tsunamis,” the  strategic plan identifies eight long-term goals. For most of these goals, the  plan identifies several strategies and performance measures. For example,  for the goal of having “tsunami inundation maps that support informed  decision making in tsunami-threatened communities,” the strategic plan  lists several strategies designed to help achieve the goal, one of which is to  “develop guidelines for tsunami inundation maps.” The plan also names  NTHMP’s Mapping and Modeling Subcommittee as responsible for  executing the strategy. Next, the plan identifies a performance measure for  this strategy—that “new NTHMP-funded maps…will meet established  guidelines by 2012”—so that program officials can assess progress toward  implementation. The NTHMP strategic planning committee also  considered external factors and reviewed program evaluations as it  developed the program’s strategic plan, according to NOAA officials. For  example, as it developed the plan, the planning committee took into  account the recommendations of several reviews, including our 2006  report and a 2005 National Science and Technology Council report on  reducing tsunami risk in the United States. We also found that the  Tsunami Program and NTHMP strategic plans are closely linked to each  other in that some of the Tsunami Program’s goals and strategies are  actually met through NTHMP’s actions. For example, the Tsunami  Program identifies NTHMP as one of five key strategies to achieve its own  goals.
Nevertheless, as with the Tsunami Program’s strategic plan, we found that  some of the components of NTHMP’s strategic plan are missing or not  fully developed. For example, although the plan identifies eight long-term  goals, it does not identify performance measures, milestones, or who is  responsible for achieving the goal of developing understandable and  effective tsunami warning center communications, such as tsunami  warning messages for communities. According to the Tsunami Program  manager, the NTHMP planning committee did not establish performance  measures or milestones because achieving this goal is actually the  responsibility of the warning centers, with guidance from NTHMP. In  addition, the NTHMP strategic plan contains a goal of establishing more  tsunami-resilient communities and establishes a performance measure of  increasing the number of TsunamiReady communities to 105 by 2013. The  plan does not, however, contain any specific strategies for increasing the  number of communities. The TsunamiReady program manager told us that  the NTHMP plans to develop goals, strategies, and performance measures  for the TsunamiReady program in 2013, after new program recognition  guidelines are issued.
Table 1 summarizes our analysis of the extent to which the Tsunami  Program and NTHMP plans include the critical components of strategic  plans.
section_title: NOAA Has Expanded and Strengthened Its Tsunami Programs, but Some Challenges Remain
paragraphs: Since our 2006 report, NOAA has made progress in expanding and  strengthening its tsunami warning and mitigation capabilities, but  maintaining a reliable DART detection buoy network and increasing  community participation in the TsunamiReady program have proven to be  challenging. In addition, NOAA’s initial failure to follow its agencywide  research transition policy contributed to about a 2-year delay in moving a  new tsunami forecast system from research to application in the warning  centers, and NOAA has not complied with the Tsunami Warning and  Education Act’s requirement that it develop and execute a plan for the  transfer of technology from ongoing research into the tsunami forecasting  and warning program.
subsections: section_title: NOAA Has Strengthened Its Tsunami Warning Capabilities While Efforts to Improve Reliability and Reduce the Costs of Its DART Detection Buoy Network Continue
paragraphs: In 2006, NOAA strengthened its tsunami warning capabilities by expanding  the operating hours and geographic areas of responsibility for both of its  tsunami warning centers. Before the strengthening effort, each of the  warning centers operated with staff on site 8 hours a day, 5 days a week,  with personnel on standby the remainder of the time. NOAA has since  increased staffing levels to operate the warning centers with staff on site  24 hours, 7 days a week. Additionally, NOAA expanded the geographic  area for which each warning center is responsible. As shown in figure 4,  the West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center is responsible for warning  Alaska and coastal states of the U.S. mainland, as well as Canada, Puerto  Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center is  responsible for warning Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean, as  well as over 90 countries across the Pacific, Indian, and Caribbean  basins.
To improve its ability to detect tsunamis, NOAA upgraded and expanded  its observational networks for monitoring seismic activity and changes in  coastal water levels, and it deployed additional DART buoys to detect  deep-ocean tsunami waves far from shore. Since 2005, NOAA has installed  new seismic stations in Hawaii and Alaska and integrated its stations with  stations maintained by the U.S. Geological Survey, which has installed new  stations in the Caribbean. Additional enhancements to other seismic  monitoring stations operated by the U.S. Geological Survey in partnership  with the National Science Foundation were completed to increase the  number of stations capable of transmitting seismic data during an event.  In the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea, NOAA also added 16 new      water-level monitoring stations and upgraded 33 existing stations to  support tsunami detection. The new and upgraded water-level stations  are now capable of providing data on changes in water level to the  warning centers faster and more often to confirm whether a seismic event  has actually generated a tsunami. Additionally, in March 2008, NOAA  completed its 3-year project to expand the network of DART detection  buoys from 6 to 39 buoys. These buoys are strategically deployed across  the Pacific, Atlantic, and Caribbean basins, as shown in figure 5, in regions  with a history of generating tsunamis.
To enhance its tsunami forecasting capabilities, NOAA began  implementing in 2006 a new tsunami forecasting system developed by  PMEL, called the Short-term Inundation Forecasting for Tsunamis (SIFT),  which uses data from the DART detection buoys. NOAA’s tsunami warning  centers have been relying on a model that uses location and magnitude  data from previous earthquakes in the Pacific Ocean to predict whether a  seismic event could generate a tsunami, the potential wave heights, and  possible impact areas. The new forecast system will supplement the  existing model by providing estimates of additional tsunami  characteristics, such as current velocities and inundation levels, for 75  specific coastal locations. Additionally, the SIFT system uses deep-ocean  tsunami wave measurements to produce, before the wave reaches shore, a  more precise forecast than the existing model’s. DART buoys provide data  the SIFT system needs by detecting small changes in deep-ocean waves  and quickly transmitting these data to the warning centers. Although  warning center officials expressed concerns to us about SIFT’s complexity  and the staff time needed to operate the system during an event, they  acknowledged that it provides a more accurate forecast than the existing  model. NOAA is currently testing the SIFT system for use in the tsunami  warning centers.
Collectively, NOAA’s data indicate that its efforts have enhanced its  tsunami detection capabilities and contributed to more accurate and  timely warnings. For example, NOAA’s data indicate that the tsunami  warning centers have a 100 percent detection rate for tsunamis generated  within their areas of responsibility since fiscal year 2005. NOAA has also  reduced the time needed after a seismic event for the warning centers to  issue a warning message. For example, the time needed for the warning  centers to issue a message for a distantly generated tsunami has been  reduced from an average of 24 minutes in fiscal year 2005 to 15.7 minutes  in fiscal year 2009, and the time needed for a local event has been  reduced from an average of 9.9 minutes in fiscal year 2005 to 5.8 minutes  in fiscal year 2009. The warning centers have likewise made progress  reducing false alarms, both in terms of reducing the extent of areas subject  to a tsunami warning, as well as shortening the time that areas remain  under a warning. For example, in fiscal year 2009, NOAA reduced the  average time from initial warning to cancellation to about 90 minutes,  surpassing its fiscal year 2013 goal of reducing the time that areas remain  under warning from 3 hours to less than 2 hours.
While NOAA has improved its tsunami warning capabilities, maintaining  the reliability of the DART detection buoys has been challenging and  costly. The Tsunami Warning and Education Act requires NOAA, through  the National Weather Service, to ensure that maintaining operational  tsunami detection equipment is the Tsunami Program’s highest priority.  When DART buoys are out of service, they cannot detect tsunamis or  transmit data to the tsunami warning centers. According to NOAA records  on DART buoy performance from July 2006 to August 2009, data were  available from the buoys, on average, about 84 percent of the time, and  according to officials, about one or two buoy outages occurred per  month. In general, data availability goes down and the number of buoy  outages goes up during the winter months, when maintenance is virtually  impossible because of harsh ocean conditions. The situation reverses  during the spring and summer months, when NOAA runs its scheduled  buoy maintenance cruise. According to data from NOAA’s National Data  Buoy Center, which operates and maintains the DART buoy network,  failure of mooring lines accounted for almost 60 percent of DART buoy  outages from December 2005 to November 2009. Center officials told us  that mooring lines fail for a variety of reasons, including ship collisions  and vessels that tie up to a buoy. NOAA officials told us they are working  to resolve these problems as part of the agency’s goal of having data from  its three observational networks available at least 90 percent of the time  by fiscal year 2013. Meanwhile, the costs of operating and maintaining  the DART detection buoy network have been significant. For example,  in  fiscal year 2009, NOAA allocated nearly $12 million—about 28 percent of  NOAA’s total tsunami budget—to DART operation and maintenance.  NOAA’s research program and the National Data Buoy Center are  exploring ways to reduce these costs by improving DART buoy  reliability—for example, by identifying more durable materials for the  mooring line and exploring alternative configurations for anchoring the  buoys. Moving some DART stations to less hostile locations with reduced  ocean currents and vessel traffic is also being assessed in an effort to  improve reliability.
section_title: NOAA Has Expanded and Reorganized Its Hazard Mitigation Program, but Community Participation in TsunamiReady Remains Limited
paragraphs: To improve its mitigation capabilities, NOAA significantly expanded  NTHMP’s membership and reorganized the program to better focus its  activities toward achieving tsunami mitigation goals. In 2005, NOAA  expanded NTHMP membership from five Pacific Coast states into a  nationwide program including all 29 at-risk coastal U.S. states and  territories. NOAA then restructured the NTHMP in 2007 to better meet the  needs of the expanded program. As a result of the restructuring, the  program consists of an overarching coordinating committee, along with a  subcommittee to manage program efforts for key areas of mitigation  activity: warning coordination, mapping and modeling, and mitigation and  education. Comprising representatives from federal, state, and territory  agencies, the coordinating committee assists NOAA in overall program  implementation, including recommending how funds are to be allocated  and supporting periodic reviews to assess the program’s strengths and  weaknesses. NOAA also changed the previous annual contracting process  for funding mitigation projects—in which the original five member states  decided among themselves how to divide the money—to a competitive  grant process in 2008. Under the new process, NTHMP members seeking  funding must submit proposals for mitigation projects to a panel of  subject-matter experts for evaluation, according to an established set of  criteria, before recommending to NOAA which projects should be funded.  Although the original five member states were initially concerned that  NTHMP expansion could divert much-needed mitigation resources away  from high-risk areas in those states, officials we spoke with from these  states generally agreed that management of the program had improved and  available resources had increased for their states.
While NOAA has also taken steps to strengthen its TsunamiReady  program, increasing community participation in this voluntary program  has been challenging. The number of communities recognized as  TsunamiReady has increased from 27 (at the time of our 2006 report) to 74  communities located in 10 states, Puerto Rico, and the Pacific territories,  as of February 2010. Despite this progress, overall community  participation remains relatively low. For example, the 74 communities that  NOAA has recognized as TsunamiReady account for less than 10 percent  of the more than 760 communities identified as at risk for a tsunami (see  table 2).
Communities along the Pacific Coast and in the Caribbean, where tsunami  hazard is highest, have been the most active in seeking TsunamiReady  recognition, while those in other areas, such as the East and Gulf Coasts,  have been less active in participating in the program. For example, only 2  of 64 at-risk Gulf Coast communities and only 13 of 312 at-risk East Coast  communities have been recognized as TsunamiReady. NOAA program  staff and state and local emergency management officials offered a  number of reasons for this apparent lack of interest in TsunamiReady  recognition by the East and Gulf Coast communities, including limited  information on the extent of the tsunami hazard; competing priorities for  time and resources to plan for and respond to more common events, such  as hurricanes; and costs to meet the recognition requirements.  Additionally, some officials told us that some communities have been  reluctant to pursue the designation because they believe it might draw  undue attention to the tsunami hazard and potentially deter tourists from  visiting their communities.
NOAA has not conducted a formal assessment to identify barriers to or  possible incentives for participating in the TsunamiReady program, as we  recommended in 2006. Instead, in part on the basis of recommendations  from a 2007 NTHMP review of the program and feedback from a series of  NTHMP meetings and local community workshops, NOAA decided to  focus its efforts on revising the program’s recognition guidelines. Existing  TsunamiReady guidelines have emphasized warning and preparedness  efforts. These guidelines require TsunamiReady communities to establish  a 24-hour warning point and emergency operations center and have more  than one means of receiving tsunami warnings and alerting the public; to  promote public readiness through community education; and to develop a  formal tsunami plan, including plans for emergency exercises. According  to a program official, revised guidelines under development are intended  to take a more comprehensive approach and to address all aspects of  emergency management planning: mitigation, preparedness, warning,  response, and recovery. NOAA officials told us that over the next 2 years,  they plan to work with social scientists to conduct a survey to establish a  baseline of tsunami preparedness in at-risk coastal communities, to  conduct pilot projects in selected communities to obtain feedback on and  test implementation of the revised guidelines, and to conduct internal and  external reviews of the revised guidelines. NOAA then plans to further  revise the guidelines to address issues identified through these efforts  before submitting them to the NTHMP coordinating committee for its  approval. NOAA anticipates implementing the new TsunamiReady  recognition guidelines nationwide sometime in 2012. Although developing  new guidelines may help strengthen the TsunamiReady program, we  continue to believe that it does not substitute for a comprehensive  assessment to determine what potential barriers may be inhibiting  community participation and that NOAA should conduct such an  assessment.
section_title: NOAA’s Failure to Follow Its Research Transition Policy Contributed to Delays in Implementing a New Tsunami Forecasting System
paragraphs: Since 2006, NOAA has been transitioning the SIFT tsunami forecasting  system from its developer, PMEL, to application at the tsunami warning  centers. In large part because the laboratory and Tsunami Program  officials did not follow NOAA’s agencywide policy and implementation  procedures for the transition of new technologies from research to  application, numerous modifications were needed to make the system  usable by the warning centers, leading to about a 2-year delay in  implementation. The agency’s policy and procedures describe a four-step  process for systematically reviewing all research projects and, if  appropriate, moving them to application. This process includes  checkpoints for NOAA officials to ensure that all activities have been  successfully completed before a research project can proceed to the next  step (see fig. 6).
When PMEL began the SIFT transition, it prepared an initial transition  plan in 2006. This plan did not follow NOAA’s transition policy, however,  and as a result, did not undergo checkpoint reviews or contain all of the  plan elements required by NOAA’s policy and implementation procedures.  Tsunami Program and PMEL officials told us they did not realize that this  policy applied to the transition of relatively small research efforts like the  SIFT system, which the officials said accounted for their failure to follow  NOAA’s transition policy. Although a transition team consisting of officials  from the warning centers and PMEL was assembled, the warning center  officials were not actively involved in developing the transition plan,  which should identify requirements for the new technology and criteria it  must meet to be implemented, among other things. Thus, the 2006  transition plan did not identify requirements for the SIFT system or  performance measures to enable PMEL and the warning centers to test  and evaluate the system. These shortcomings left the warning centers with  no formal mechanism to provide input into the transition process or to  evaluate the SIFT system before accepting it for implementation. As a  result, numerous modifications to the system were needed to make it  practical for use after the warning centers received it.
In 2008, however, to revise the transition plan and accelerate the system’s  implementation, NOAA’s Tsunami Program manager collaborated with  staff from PMEL and the warning centers and established a SIFT transition  team with more involvement from the warning centers. According to  NOAA officials, the transition team completed a revised plan in June 2009  that meets the requirements of NOAA’s research transition policy and  implementation procedures, such as defining system requirements and  performance measures. Additionally, NOAA officials performed a  checkpoint review of the transition. As a result of these changes,  according to officials at PMEL and the warning centers, communication  between them has improved, and NOAA is closer to implementing the  SIFT system in the centers.
Moreover, NOAA has not complied with the Tsunami Warning and  Education Act’s requirement that it, through the National Weather Service,  develop and execute a plan for the transfer of technology from ongoing  research into the tsunami forecasting and warning program. Although  NOAA has developed a specific transition plan for the SIFT system, this  transition plan does not meet the act’s requirement because it does not  generally address how other research should undergo transition. In  response, NOAA officials told us they believe that NOAA’s general  transition policy and implementation procedures, along with individual  transition plans for selected projects, satisfy its planning obligations  under the act. But when we first asked program officials about the  required tsunami research transition plan, they told us they did not have  one and that they were unfamiliar with the act’s requirement. Because  NOAA’s existing policy and procedures, which predated the act, do not  provide a plan specifically for the transfer of tsunami research into the  Tsunami Program, and because NOAA has not created a separate plan for  the transfer of tsunami research, we believe that NOAA has not fully  complied with the act’s requirement for a transition plan for tsunami  research.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: NOAA and its partners have taken important initial steps toward  implementing effective, results-oriented management by creating strategic  plans for the Tsunami Program and NTHMP. By following the key  practices we and leading organizations have identified for developing  strategic plans and generally including the critical components of effective  plans—such as long-term goals and strategies to achieve them—NOAA has  established a solid foundation for managing its programs. Nevertheless,  because NOAA has not identified strategies or performance measures for  some goals, it is not clear how the agency intends to pursue these goals or  how it will measure its progress toward achieving them. In this regard,  identifying barriers to participation, as we previously recommended, and  developing strategies for achieving the goal of expanding TsunamiReady  program participation could help address the low participation rate in this  community preparedness program. In addition, both the warning and  mitigation components of NOAA’s programs can benefit greatly from the  results of tsunami-related research. As demonstrated by the transition of  SIFT from research to application in the warning centers, however, the  failure to plan properly can result in the need for multiple modifications to  a system to make it usable, leading to delays in implementing a promising  new technology. Until NOAA develops a plan specifically for the transition  of technology from research to application in the Tsunami Program, it will  not be in compliance with the requirement of the Tsunami Warning and  Education Act, and the potential persists for delays like those experienced  in the SIFT transition.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve national tsunami preparedness and ensure that NOAA fulfills  its responsibilities under the Tsunami Warning and Education Act, we are  recommending that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Administrator of  NOAA to take the following two actions:    Revise the Tsunami Program’s and NTHMP’s strategic plans to ensure  that all the components are fully developed, in particular, that they  include effective strategies and performance measures for all goals,  including those for the TsunamiReady program.
Develop a transition plan for tsunami research, as required by the  Tsunami Warning and Education Act. The plan should incorporate  lessons learned from the transition of the SIFT tsunami forecasting  system.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a copy of our draft report to the Department of Commerce  for review and comment. The Department provided us NOAA’s comments  on the draft report, in which NOAA said that the report captures and  addresses the major elements of the Tsunami Program and acknowledges  the involvement and roles of all levels of government. NOAA also agreed  with our two recommendations. NOAA said that it will initiate revisions to  the Tsunami Program’s and NTHMP’s strategic plans upon receipt of the  National Academy of Sciences’ report on the Tsunami Program expected  in the summer of 2010. NOAA also said that it will initiate the development  of a Tsunami Program transition plan for tsunami research in the summer  of 2010 in coordination with its research partners. NOAA also provided  technical comments that we incorporated into the report as appropriate.  NOAA’s comments are presented in appendix I.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, Secretary of Commerce, Administrator of NOAA, and other  interested parties. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on  the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this  report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Commerce
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Stephen D. Secrist, Assistant  Director; Elizabeth R. Beardsley; Ellen W. Chu; Brad C. Dobbins; Wyatt R.  Hundrup; Katherine Killebrew; Michael J. Meleady; and Katherine M.  Raheb made key contributions to this report.