Homeland Security: DHS Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Border Security Programs and Operations, but Challenges Remain
Published: 2008-03-06T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, the need to secure U.S. borders has increased in importance and attracted greater public and Congressional attention. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has spent billions of dollars to prevent the illegal entry of individuals and contraband between ports of entry--government-designated locations where DHS inspects persons and goods to determine whether they may be lawfully admitted into the country. Yet, while DHS apprehends hundreds of thousands of such individuals each year, several hundreds of thousands more enter the country illegally and undetected. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component of DHS, is the lead federal agency in charge of securing our nation's borders. This testimony summarizes GAO's work on DHS's efforts on selected border security operations and programs related to (1) inspecting travelers at U.S. ports of entry, (2) detecting individuals attempting to enter the country illegally between ports of entry, and (3) screening of international travelers before they arrive in the United States and challenges remaining in these areas. GAO's observations are based on products issued from May 2006 through February 2008. In prior reports, GAO has recommended various actions to DHS to, among other things, help address weaknesses in the traveler inspection programs and processes, and challenges in training officers to inspect travelers and documents. DHS has generally agreed with our recommendations and has taken various actions to address them.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: CBP has taken actions to improve traveler inspections at U.S. ports of entry, but challenges remain. First, CBP has stressed the importance of effective inspections and trained CBP supervisors and officers in interviewing travelers. Yet, weaknesses in travel inspection procedures and lack of physical infrastructure and staff have hampered CBP's ability to inspect travelers thoroughly and detect fraudulent documents. Second, CBP is implementing an initiative requiring citizens of the United States, Bermuda, Canada, and Mexico to present certain identification documents when entering the United States. As of December 2007, actions taken to meet the initiative's requirements include selecting technology to be used at land ports of entry and developing plans to train officers to use it. Finally, DHS has developed a program to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the country. As of October 2007, the agency has invested more than $1.5 billion on the program over 4 years and biometrically-enabled entry capabilities now operate at more than 300 ports of entry. However, though allocating about $250 million since 2003 to exit-related efforts, DHS has not yet detailed how it will verify when travelers exit the country. In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing immigration of individuals who enter the United States illegally and undetected between ports of entry. One component of this program, which DHS accepted as complete in February 2008, was an effort to secure 28 miles along the southwest border using, among other means, improved cameras and radars. DHS plans to apply the lessons learned to future projects. Another program component, 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 300 miles of vehicle fence, has not yet been completed and DHS will be challenged to do so by its December 2008 deadline due to various factors, such as acquiring rights to border lands. Additionally, DHS is unable to estimate the total cost of this component because various factors are not yet known such as the type of terrain where the fencing is to be constructed. Finally, CBP has experienced unprecedented growth in the number of its Border Patrol agents. While initial training at the academy is being provided, Border Patrol officials expressed concerns about the agency's ability to provide sufficient field training. To screen international travelers before they arrive in the United States, the federal government has implemented new policies and programs, including enhancing visa security and providing counterterrorism training to overseas consular officials. As GAO previously recommended, DHS needs to better manage risks posed by a program that allows nationals from 27 countries to travel to the United States without a visa for certain durations and purposes. Regarding the prescreening of international passengers bound for the United States, CBP has a pilot program that provides additional scrutiny of passengers and their travel documents at foreign airports prior to their departure. CBP has reported several successes through the pilot but has not yet determined whether to make the program permanent.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the  Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to secure our nation’s  borders. In the years since the 2001 terrorist attacks, the need to secure  U.S. borders has taken on added importance and has received increasing  attention from Congress and the public. In August of last year, we issued  our report on the progress DHS has made in implementing its mission and  management functions. We reported that while DHS made some level of  progress in all of its mission and management areas, more work remains.  Regarding the border security mission area, we reported that DHS had  made modest progress in achieving border security performance  expectations. My testimony today summarizes the results of our work on  DHS’s efforts on selected border security operations and programs related  to (1) inspecting travelers at our nation’s ports of entry, (2) detecting  individuals attempting to enter the country illegally between the ports of  entry and (3) screening of international travelers before they arrive in the  United States.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—a major component within  DHS—is the lead federal agency in charge of securing our nation’s  borders. CBP employs nearly 18,000 CBP officers responsible for  inspecting travelers seeking to enter the United States at 326 air, land, and  sea ports of entry. To prevent individuals and contraband from illegally  entering the country between the ports of entry, CBP’s Office of Border  Patrol employs nearly 15,000 agents responsible for patrolling our  northern and southwest land borders as well as our coastal areas. In  addition, DHS, along with the Department of State, is responsible for  screening international travelers before they arrive in the United States,  including mitigating any risk associated with the Visa Waiver Program  (VWP), which enables citizens of participating countries to travel to the  United States without first obtaining a visa. The administration has  requested about $9.5 billion for CBP for fiscal year 2009.
My comments are based on GAO reports and testimonies issued from May  2006 through February 2008 addressing border security operations and  programs. We conducted these performance audits in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards from September 2005  through February 2008. Those standards require that we plan and perform  the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Inspecting Travelers at Ports of Entry
paragraphs: CBP’s ability to inspect travelers at our nation’s ports of entry has been  hampered by weaknesses in travel inspection procedures, inadequate  physical infrastructure, and lack of staff at the air, land, and sea ports of  entry. The use of fraudulent identity and citizenship documents by some  travelers to the United States as well as limited availability or use of  technology and lack of timely and recurring training have also hampered  CBP’s efforts in carrying out thorough inspections. DHS has taken several  actions to implement WHTI at air, land, and sea ports of entry nationwide  so that it can better secure the border by requiring citizens of the United  States, Bermuda, Canada, and Mexico to present documents to show  identity and citizenship when entering the United States from certain  countries in North, Central, or South America. DHS plans to move forward  to deploy technology to implement WHTI at land ports of entry, and staff  and train officers to use it. Finally, DHS has enhanced border security by  deploying US-VISIT biometric entry capability at over 300 air, sea, and land  ports of entry nationwide, but the prospects for successfully delivering an  operational exit solution remain uncertain because DHS has not detailed  how it plans to develop and deploy an exit capability at the ports.
subsections: section_title: Traveler Inspection Procedures and Physical Infrastructure
paragraphs: Each year individuals make hundreds of millions of border crossings into  the United States through the 326 land, air, and sea ports of entry. About  three-fourths of these crossings occur at land ports of entry. In November  2007, we reported that while CBP has had some success in interdicting  inadmissible aliens and other violators, weaknesses in its traveler  inspection procedures and related physical infrastructure increase the  potential that dangerous people and illegal goods could enter the country.  For example, CBP’s analyses indicated that several thousand inadmissible  aliens and other violators entered the country at land and air ports of entry  in fiscal year 2006.
One factor that contributed to failed inspections was weaknesses in travel  inspection procedures. In mid-2006, CBP reviewed videotapes from about  150 large and small ports of entry and, according to CBP officials,  determined that while CBP officers carried out thorough traveler  inspections in many instances, they also identified numerous instances  where traveler inspections at land ports of entry were weak in that they  did not determine the citizenship and admissibility of travelers entering  the country as required by law, such as officers not stopping vehicles for  inspection and pedestrians crossing the border without any visual or  verbal contact from a CBP officer despite operating procedures that  required officers to do so. In the summer of 2006, CBP management took  actions to place greater management emphasis on traveler inspections by  holding meetings with senior management to reinforce the importance of  carrying out effective inspections and by providing training to all  supervisors and officers on the importance of interviewing travelers,  checking travel documents, and having adequate supervisory presence.  However, tests our investigators conducted in October 2006 and January  2007—as many as 5 months after CBP issued guidance and conducted the  training—showed similar weaknesses as those on the videotape were still  occurring in traveler inspections at ports of entry. At two ports, our  investigators were not asked to provide a travel document to verify their  identity—a procedure that management had called on officers to carry  out—as part of the inspection. The extent of continued noncompliance is  unknown, but these results point to the challenge CBP management faces  in ensuring its directives are carried out.
In July 2007, CBP issued new internal policies and procedures for agency  officials responsible for its traveler inspection program at land ports of  entry. The new policies and procedures require field office managers to  conduct periodic audits and assessments to ensure compliance with the  new inspection procedures. However, they do not call on managers to  share the results of their assessments with headquarters management.  Without this communication, CBP management may be hindering its  ability to efficiently use the information to overcome weaknesses in  traveler inspections.
Another weakness involved inadequate physical infrastructure. While we  could not generalize our findings, at several ports of entry of entry that we  examined, barriers designed to ensure that vehicles pass through a CBP  inspection booth were not in place, increasing the risk that vehicles could  enter the country without inspection. CBP recognizes that it has  infrastructure weaknesses and has estimated it needs about $4 billion to  make the capital improvements needed at all 163 land crossings. CBP has  prioritized the ports with the greatest need. Each year, depending upon  funding availability, CBP submits its proposed capital improvement  projects based upon the prioritized list it has developed. Several factors  affect CBP’s ability to make improvements, including the fact that some  ports of entry are owned by other governmental or private entities,  potentially adding to the time needed to agree on infrastructure changes  and put them in place. As of September 2007, CBP had infrastructure  projects related to 20 different ports of entry in various stages of  development.
Lack of inspection staff was also a problem. Based upon a staffing model it  developed, CBP estimated it may need several thousand more CBP  officers at its ports of entry. According to CBP field officials, lack of staff  affected their ability to carry out border security responsibilities. For  example, we examined requests for resources from CBP’s 20 field offices  and its pre-clearance headquarters office for January 2007 and reported  that managers at 19 of the 21 offices cited examples of anti-terrorism  activities not being carried out, new or expanded facilities that were not  fully operational, and radiation monitors and other inspection  technologies not being fully used because of staff shortages. At seven of  the eight major ports we visited, officers and managers told us that not  having sufficient staff contributes to morale problems, fatigue, lack of  backup support, and safety issues when officers inspect travelers— increasing the potential that terrorists, inadmissible travelers, and illicit  goods could enter the country.
CBP also had difficulty in providing required training to its officers. CBP  developed 37 courses on such topics as how to carry out inspections and  detect fraudulent documents and has instituted national guidelines for a  12-week on-the-job training program that new officers should receive at  land ports of entry. However, managers at seven of the eight ports of entry  we visited said that they were challenged in putting staff through training  because staffing shortfalls force the ports to choose between performing  port operations and providing training. Lastly, although CBP has  developed strategic goals that call for, among other things, establishing  ports of entry where threats are deterred and inadmissible people and  goods are intercepted—a key goal related to traveler inspections—it faces  challenges in developing a performance measure that tracks progress in  achieving this goal.
We made a number of recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland  Security to help address weaknesses in traveler inspections, challenges in  training, and problems with using performance data. DHS said it is taking  steps to address our recommendations.
section_title: Identifying Fraudulent Travel Documents
paragraphs: We also reported that CBP’s ability to do thorough inspections is made  more difficult by a lack of technology and training to help CBP officers  identify foreign nationals who attempt to enter the United States using  fraudulent travel documents. In July 2007, we reported that although the  State Department had improved the security features in the passports and  visas it issues, CBP officers in primary inspection—the first and most  critical opportunity at U.S. ports of entry to identify individuals seeking to  enter the United States with fraudulent travel documents—were unable to  take full advantage of the security features in passports and visas. This  was due to (1) limited availability or use of technology at primary  inspection and (2) lack of timely and recurring training on the security  features and fraudulent trends for passports and visas. For example, at the  time of our review, DHS had provided the technology tools to make use of  the electronic chips in electronic passports, also known as e-passports, to  the 33 airports of entry with the highest volume of travelers from Visa  Waiver Program countries.  However, not all inspection lanes at these air  ports of entry had the technology nor did the remaining ports of entry.  Further, CBP did not have a process in place for primary inspection  officers to utilize the fingerprint features of visas, including Border  Crossing Cards (BCC) which permit limited travel by Mexican citizens— without additional documentation—25 miles inside the border of the  United States (75 miles if entering through certain ports of entry in  Arizona) for fewer than 30 days. For example, although BCC imposter  fraud is fairly pervasive, primary officers at southern land ports of entry  were not able to use the available fingerprint records of BCC holders to  confirm the identity of travelers and did not routinely refer BCC holders to  secondary inspection, where officers had the capability to utilize  fingerprint records. Moreover, training materials provided to officers were  not updated to include exemplars—genuine documents used for training  purposes—of the e-passport and the emergency passport in advance of the  issuance of these documents. As a consequence, CBP officers were not  familiar with the look and feel of security features in these new documents  before inspecting them. Without updated and ongoing training on  fraudulent document detection, officers told us they felt less prepared to  understand the security features and fraud trends associated with all valid  generations of passports and visas.
Although CBP faces an extensive workload at many ports of entry and has  resource constraints, there are opportunities to do more to utilize the  security features in passports and visas during the inspection process to  detect their fraudulent use. We recommended that the Secretary of  Homeland Security make better use of the security features in passports  and visas in the inspection process and improve training for inspection  officers on the features and fraud trends for these travel documents. We  recommended that DHS take steps, including developing a schedule for  deploying technology to other ports of entry and updating training. DHS  generally concurred with our recommendations and outlined actions it had  taken or planned to take to implement them.
We currently have work ongoing to examine DHS efforts to identify and  mitigate fraud associated with DHS documents used for travel and  employment verification purposes, such as the Permanent Resident Card  and the Employment Authorization Document. We expect to issue a report  on efforts to address fraud with these DHS documents later this year.
section_title: Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
paragraphs: One of the major challenges for CBP officers at our nation’s ports of entry  is the ability to determine the identity and citizenship of those who present  themselves for inspection. For years, millions of citizens of the United  States, Canada, and Bermuda could enter the United States from certain  parts of the Western Hemisphere using a wide variety of documents,  including a driver’s license issued by a state motor vehicle administration  or a birth certificate, or in some cases for U.S. and Canadian citizens,  without showing any documents. To help provide better assurance that  border officials have the tools and resources to establish that people are  who they say they are, section 7209 of the Intelligence Reform and  Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended, requires the Secretary of  Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to develop  and implement a plan that requires a passport or other document or  combination of documents that the Secretary of Homeland Security deems  sufficient to show identity and citizenship for U.S. citizens and citizens of  Bermuda, Canada, and Mexico when entering the United States from  certain countries in North, Central, or South America. DHS’ and the State  Department’s effort to specify acceptable documents and implement these  document requirements is called the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative  (WHTI).
In May 2006, we reported that DHS and State had not made decisions  about what documents would be acceptable, had not begun to finalize  those decisions, and were in the early stages of studying costs and benefits  of WHTI. In addition, DHS and State needed to choose a technology to use  with the new passport card—which State is developing specifically for  WHTI. DHS also faced an array of implementation challenges, including  training staff and informing the public. In December 2007, we reported  that DHS and State had taken important actions toward implementing  WHTI document requirements. DHS and State had taken actions in the  five areas we identified in our 2006 report:    DHS and State published a final rule for document requirements at air  ports of entry. The agencies also published a notice of proposed rule  making for document requirements at land and sea ports of entry.
By publishing a final rule for document requirements at air ports of entry,  DHS and State have established acceptable documents for air travel. DHS  has also published a notice of proposed rule making which includes  proposed documents for land and sea travel. Under current law, DHS  cannot implement WHTI land and sea document requirements until June 1,  2009, or 3 months after the Secretary of Homeland Security and the  Secretary of State have certified compliance with specified requirements,  whichever is later. In the meantime, in January 2008, CBP ended the  practice of oral declaration. According to CBP, until the WHTI document  requirements are fully implemented, all U.S. and Canadian citizens are  required to show one of the documents described in the proposed rule or a  government issued photo identification, such as a driver’s license, and  proof of citizenship, such as a birth certificate.
DHS has performed a cost-benefit study, but data limitations prevented  DHS from quantifying the precise effect that WHTI will have on wait times  at land ports of entry—a substantial source of uncertainty in its analysis.  DHS plans to do baseline studies at selected ports before WHTI  implementation so that it can compare the effects of WHTI document  requirements on wait times after the requirements are implemented.
DHS and State have selected technology to be used with the passport card.
To support the card and other documents that use the same technology,  DHS is planning technological upgrades at land ports of entry. These  upgrades are intended to help reduce traveler wait times and more  effectively verify identity and citizenship. DHS has outlined a general  strategy for the upgrades at the 39 highest volume land ports, beginning in  January 2008 and continuing over roughly the next 2 years.
DHS has developed general strategies for implementing WHTI—including  staffing and training. According to DHS officials, they also planned to  work with a contractor on a public relations campaign to communicate  clear and timely information about document requirements. In addition,  State has approved contracting with a public relations firm to assist with  educating the public, particularly border resident communities about the  new passport card and the requirements of WHTI in general.  Earlier this year, DHS selected a contractor for the public relations  campaign and began devising specific milestones and deadlines for testing  and deploying new hardware and training officers on the new technology.
section_title: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)
paragraphs: Another major initiative underway at the ports of entry is a program  designed to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals  entering and exiting the United States at air, sea, and land ports of entry,  called the US-VISIT Program. These data, including biometric identifiers  like digital fingerprints, are to be used to screen persons against watch  lists, verify identities, and record arrival and departure. The purpose of  US-VISIT is to enhance the security of U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate  legitimate travel and trade, ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration  system, and protect visitors’ privacy.
As of October 2007, after investing about $1.5 billion since 2003, DHS has  delivered essentially one-half of US-VISIT, meaning that biometrically  enabled entry capabilities are operating at more than 300 air, sea, and land  ports of entry, but comparable operational exit capabilities are not. That  is, DHS still does not have the other half of US-VISIT (an operational exit  capability) despite the fact that its funding plans have allocated about one- quarter of a billion dollars since 2003 to exit-related efforts.
To the department’s credit, operational entry capabilities have produced  results, including, as of June 2007, more than 1,500 people having adverse  actions, such as denial of entry, taken against them. Another likely  consequence is the deterrent effect of having an operational entry  capability, which officials have cited as a byproduct of having a publicized  capability at the border to screen entry on the basis of identity verification  and matching against watch lists of known and suspected terrorists.  Related to identity verification, DHS has also taken steps to implement US- VISIT’s Unique Identity program to enable CBP and other agencies to be  better equipped to identify persons of interest and generally enhance law  enforcement. Integral to Unique Identity is the capability to capture 10  fingerprints and match them with data in DHS and FBI databases. The  capability to capture and match 10 fingerprints at ports of entry is not only  intended to enhance CBP’s ability to verify identity, but, according to DHS,  is intended to quicken processing times and eliminate the likelihood of  misidentifying a traveler as being on a US-VISIT watchlist.
Nonetheless, the prospects for successfully delivering an operational exit  solution remain uncertain. In June 2007, we reported that DHS’s  documentation showed that, since 2003, little has changed in how DHS is  approaching its definition and justification of future US-VISIT exit efforts.  As of that time, DHS indicated that it intended to spend about $27.3 million  on air and sea exit capabilities. However, it had not produced either plans  or analyses that adequately defined and justified how it intended to invest  these funds. Rather, it had only described in general terms near-term  deployment plans for biometric exit capabilities at air and sea ports of  entry. Beyond this high-level schedule, no other exit program plans were  available that defined what would be done by what entities and at what  cost. In the absence of more detailed plans and justification governing its  exit intentions, it is unclear whether the department’s efforts to deliver  near-term air and sea exit capabilities will produce results different from  the past.
The prospect for an exit capability at land ports of entry is also unclear.  DHS has acknowledged that a near-term biometric solution for land ports  of entry is currently not feasible. According to DHS, at this time, the only  proven technology available for biometric land exit verification would  necessitate mirroring the processes currently in use for entry at these  ports of entry, which would create costly staffing demands and  infrastructure requirements, and introduce potential trade, commerce, and  environmental impacts. A pilot project to examine an alternative  technology at land ports of entry did not produce a viable solution. US- VISIT officials stated that they believe that technological advances over  the next 5 to 10 years will make it possible to utilize alternative  technologies that provide biometric verification of persons exiting the  country without major changes to facility infrastructure and without  requiring those exiting to stop and/or exit their vehicles, thereby  precluding traffic backup, congestion, and resulting delays.
US-VISIT also faces technological and management challenges. In March  2007, we reported that while US-VISIT has improved DHS’s ability to  process visitors and verify identities upon entry, we found that  management controls in place to identify and evaluate computer and other  operational problems at land ports of entry were insufficient and  inconsistently administered. In addition, DHS had not articulated how  US-VISIT is to strategically fit with other land border security initiatives  and mandates and could not ensure that these programs work in harmony  to meet mission goals and operate cost effectively. DHS had drafted a  strategic plan defining an overall immigration and border management  strategy and the plan has been under review by OMB. Further, critical  acquisition management processes had not been established to ensure that  program capabilities and expected mission outcomes are delivered on  time and within budget. These processes include effective project  planning, requirements management, contract tracking and oversight, test  management, and financial management.
We currently have work underway examining DHS’ strategic solution,  including a comprehensive exit capability, and plan to issue a report on  the results of our work in Spring 2008.
section_title: Between the Ports of Entry
paragraphs: As part of its Secure Border Initiative (SBI), DHS recently announced final  acceptance of Project 28, a $20.6 million dollar project designed to secure  28 miles of southwestern border. However, DHS officials said that the  project did not fully meet agency expectations and will not be replicated.  Border Patrol agents in the Project 28 location have been using the system  since December 2007 and 312 agents had received updated training. Still,  some had not been trained to use the system at all. Deployment of fencing  along the southwest border is on schedule, but meeting CBP’s December  2008 goal to deploy 370 miles of pedestrian and 300 miles of vehicle  fencing will be challenging because of factors that include difficulties  acquiring rights to border land and an inability to estimate costs for  installation. Besides undergoing technological and infrastructure  improvements along the border, the Border Patrol has experienced  unprecedented growth and plans to increase its number of agents by 6,000  by December 2008. Border Patrol officials are confident that the academy  can accommodate this influx but are also concerned about the sectors’  ability to provide sufficient field training.
subsections: section_title: The Secure Border Initiative
paragraphs: In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of SBI aimed at securing  U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. Elements of SBI are to be  carried out by several organizations within DHS. One component is CBP’s  SBI program office which is responsible for developing a comprehensive  border protection system using people, technology, known as SBInet, and  tactical infrastructure—fencing, roads, and lighting.
In February 2008, we testified that DHS had announced its final  acceptance of Project 28, a $20.6 million project to secure 28 miles along  the southwest border, and was gathering lessons learned to inform future  border security technology development. The scope of the project, as  described in the task order between DHS and Boeing—the prime  contractor DHS selected to acquire, deploy, and sustain the SBInet system  across the U.S. borders—was to provide a system with the detection,  identification, and classification capabilities required to control the  border, at a minimum, along 28 miles in the Border Patrol’s Tucson  sector. After working with Boeing to resolve problems identified with  Project 28, DHS formally accepted the system, noting that it met contract  requirements. Officials from the SBInet program office said that although  Project 28 did not fully meet their expectations, they are continuing to  develop SBInet with a revised approach and have identified areas for  improvement based on their experience with Project 28. For example,  both SBInet and Border Patrol officials reported that Project 28 was  initially designed and developed by Boeing with limited input from the  Border Patrol, whose agents are now operating Project 28 in the Tucson  sector; however, they said that future SBInet development will include  increased input from the intended operators. The schedule for future  deployments of technology to the southwest border that are planned to  replace most Project 28 capabilities has been extended and officials  estimated that the first planned deployment of technology will occur in  other areas of the Tucson sector by the end of calendar year 2008. In  February 2008, the SBI program office estimated that the remaining  deployments of the first phase of technology development planned for the  Border Patrol’s Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors are expected to be  completed by the end of calendar year 2011.
Border Patrol agents in the Project 28 location have been using the system  as they conduct their border security activities since December 2007, and  as of January 2008, 312 agents in the Project 28 location had received  updated training. According to Border Patrol agents, while Project 28 is  not an optimal system to support their operations, it has provided them  with greater technological capabilities—such as improved cameras and  radars—than the legacy equipment that preceded Project 28. Not all of the  Border Patrol agents in the Project 28 location have been trained to use  the system’s equipment and capabilities, as it is expected to be replaced  with updated technologies developed for SBInet.
Deployment of tactical infrastructure projects along the southwest border  is on schedule, but meeting the SBI program office’s goal to have 370 miles  of pedestrian fence and 300 miles of vehicle fence in place by December  31, 2008, will be challenging and the total cost is not yet known. As of  February 21, 2008, the SBI program office reported that it had constructed  168 miles of pedestrian fence and 135 miles of vehicle fence. Although the  deployment is on schedule, SBI program office officials reported that  keeping on schedule will be challenging because of various factors,  including difficulties in acquiring rights to border lands. In addition, SBI  program office officials are unable to estimate the total cost of pedestrian  and vehicle fencing because of various factors that are not yet known,  such as the type of terrain where the fencing is to be constructed, the  materials to be used, and the cost to acquire the land. Furthermore, as the  SBI program office moves forward with tactical infrastructure  construction, it is making modifications based on lessons learned from  previous fencing efforts. For example, for future fencing projects, the SBI  program office plans to buy construction items, such as steel, in bulk; use  approved fence designs; and contract out the maintenance and repair of  the tactical infrastructure.
The SBI program office established a staffing goal of 470 employees for  fiscal year 2008, made progress toward meeting this goal, and published its  human capital plan in December 2007; however, the SBI program office is  in the early stages of implementing this plan. As of February 1, 2008, SBI  program office reported having 142 government staff and 163 contractor  support staff for a total of 305 employees. SBI program office officials told  us that they believe they will be able to meet their staffing goal of 470 staff  by the end of September 2008. In December 2007, the SBI program office  published the first version of its Strategic Human Capital Management  Plan and is now in its early implementation phase. The plan outlines seven  main goals for the office and activities to accomplish those goals, which  align with federal government best practices.
section_title: Border Patrol
paragraphs: In addition to technological and infrastructure improvements along the  border, the Border Patrol has experienced an unprecedented growth in the  number of its agents. As we reported last year, in a little over 2 years,  between fiscal year 2006 and December 2008, the Border Patrol plans to  increase its number of agents by 6,000. This is nearly equivalent to the  increase in the number of agents over the previous 10 years, from 1996  through 2006. As of September 30, 2007, CBP had 14,567 Border Patrol  agents onboard. It plans to have 18,319 Border Patrol agents on board by  the end of calendar year 2008. While Border Patrol officials are confident  that the academy can accommodate the large influx of new trainees  anticipated, they have expressed concerns over the sectors’ ability to  provide sufficient field training. For example, officials are concerned with  having a sufficient number of experienced agents available in the sectors  to serve as field training officers and first-line supervisors. The large influx  of new agents and the planned transfer of more experienced agents from  the southwest border to the northern border could further exacerbate the  already higher than desired agent-to-supervisor ratio in some southwest  border sectors.
section_title: Screening of International Travelers Before They Arrive in the United States
paragraphs: Because citizens of other countries seeking to enter the United States on a  temporary basis generally must apply for and obtain a nonimmigrant visa,  the visa process is important to homeland security. While it is generally  acknowledged that the visa process can never be entirely failsafe, the  government has done a creditable job since September 11 in strengthening  the visa process as a first line of defense to prevent entry into the country  by terrorists. Before September 11, U.S. visa operations focused primarily  on illegal immigration concerns—whether applicants sought to reside and  work illegally in the country. Since the attacks, Congress, the State  Department, and DHS have implemented several measures to strengthen  the entire visa process as a tool to combat terrorism. New policies and  programs have since been implemented to enhance visa security, improve  applicant screening, provide counterterrorism training to consular officials  who administer the visa process overseas, and help prevent the fraudulent  use of visas for those seeking to gain entry to the country. The State  Department also has taken steps to mitigate the potential for visa fraud at  consular posts by deploying visa fraud investigators to U.S. embassies and  consulates and conducting more in-depth analysis of the visa information  collected by consulates to identify patterns that may indicate fraud, among  other things. (Notably, 2 of the 19 terrorist hijackers on September 11th  used passports that were manipulated in a fraudulent manner to obtain  visas.)
The Visa Waiver Program allows nationals from 27 countries to travel to  the United States for 90 days or less for business and tourism purposes  without first having to obtain a visa. The program’s purpose is to  facilitate international travel for millions of people each year and promote  the effective use of government resources. While valuable, the program  can pose risks to U.S. security, law enforcement, and immigration interests  because some foreign citizens may try to exploit the program to enter the  United States. Effective oversight of the program entails balancing the  benefits against the program’s potential risks. To find this balance, we  reported in July 2006 that the U.S. government needs to fully identify the  vulnerabilities posed by visa waiver travelers, and be in a position to  mitigate them. In particular, we recommended that DHS provide the  program’s oversight unit with additional resources to strengthen  monitoring activities and improve DHS’s communication with U.S. officials  overseas regarding security concerns of visa waiver countries. We also  recommended that DHS communicate to visa waiver countries clear  reporting requirements for lost and stolen passports and that the  department implement a plan to make Interpol’s lost and stolen passport  database automatically available during the primary inspection process at  U.S. ports of entry. DHS is in the process of implementing these  recommendations and we plan to report later this year on the  department’s progress.
Until recently, U.S. law required that a country may be considered for  admission into the Visa Waiver Program if its nationals’ refusal rate for  short-term business and tourism visas was less than 3 percent in the prior  fiscal year. According to DHS, some of the countries seeking admission to  the program are U.S. partners in the war in Iraq and have high  expectations that they will join the program due to their close economic,  political, and military ties to the United States. The executive branch has  supported more flexible criteria for admission, and, in August 2007,  Congress passed legislation that provides DHS with the authority to admit  countries with refusal rates between 3 percent and 10 percent, if the  countries meet certain conditions. For example, countries must meet all  mandated Visa Waiver Program security requirements and cooperate with  the United States on counterterrorism initiatives.
Before DHS can exercise this new authority, the legislation also requires  that the department complete certain actions aimed at enhancing security  of the Visa Waiver Program. These actions include:  Electronic Travel Authorization System:  The August 2007 law requires that DHS certify that a “fully operational”  electronic travel authorization (ETA) system is in place before expanding  Visa Waiver Program to countries with refusal rates between 3 and 10  percent. This system would require nationals from visa waiver countries to  provide the United States with biographical information before boarding a  U.S.-bound flight to determine the eligibility of, and whether there exists a  law enforcement or security risk in permitting, the foreign national to  travel to the United States under the program. In calling for an ETA,  members of Congress and the administration stated that this system was  an important tool to help mitigate security risks in the Visa Waiver  Program and its expansion. DHS has not yet announced when or how it  will roll out the ETA system.
The August 2007 law also required that, before DHS can admit countries  with refusal rates between 3 percent and 10 percent to the Visa Waiver  Program, DHS must certify that an air exit system is in place that can  verify the departure of not less than 97 percent of foreign nationals who  depart through U.S. airports. Last month, we testified that DHS’s plan to  implement this provision had several weaknesses.  Using this  methodology, DHS stated that it can attain a match rate above 97 percent,  based on August 2007 data, to certify compliance with the air exit system  requirement in the legislation. On December 12, 2007, DHS reported to us  that it will match records, reported by airlines, of visitors departing the  country to the department’s existing records of any prior arrivals,  immigration status changes, or prior departures from the United States. On  February 21, 2008, DHS indicated that it had not finalized its decision on  the methodology the department would use to certify compliance.  Nevertheless, the department confirmed that the basic structure of its  methodology would not change, and that it would use departure records  as the starting point. Because DHS’s approach does not begin with arrival  records to determine if those foreign nationals stayed in the United States  beyond their authorized periods of admission, information from this  system will not inform overall and country-specific overstay rates—key  factors in determining illegal immigration risks in the Visa Waiver  Program. The inability of the U.S. government to track the status of  visitors in the country, to identify those who overstay their authorized  period of visit, and to use these data to compute overstay rates have been  longstanding weaknesses in the oversight of the Visa Waiver Program. We  reported that DHS’s plan to meet the “97 percent” requirement in the visa  waiver expansion legislation will not address these weaknesses.
subsections: section_title: DHS Pilot on the Immigration Advisory Program
paragraphs: DHS has also has begun to pilot the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP),  which is designed to provide additional scrutiny to passengers and their  travel documents at foreign airports prior to their departure for the United  States. This pilot program began in 2004 and was designed to identify and  target potential high-risk passengers. Under the IAP pilot, CBP has  assigned trained officers to foreign airports where they personally  interview pre-identified high-risk passengers, conduct behavioral  assessments, and evaluate the authenticity of travel documents prior to  the passenger’s departure to the United States. The pilot program has been  tested in several foreign airports, and CBP is negotiating with other  countries to expand it elsewhere and to make certain IAP sites permanent.
CBP has reported several successes through the IAP pilot. According to  CBP documents, from the start of the IAP pilot in June 2004 through  February 2006, IAP teams made more than 700 no-board recommendations  for inadmissible passengers and intercepted approximately 70 fraudulent  travel documents. CBP estimated that these accomplishments equate to  about $1.1 million in cost avoidance for the U.S. government associated  with detaining and removing passengers who would have been turned  away after their flights landed, and $1.5 million in air carrier savings in  avoided fines and passenger return costs. According to CBP, these  monetary savings have defrayed the costs of implementing the program.
In May 2007, we reported that CBP has not taken all of the steps necessary  to fully learn from its pilot sites in order to determine whether the  program should be made permanent and the number of sites that should  exist. These steps are part of a risk management approach to developing  and evaluating homeland security programs. A risk management  framework includes such elements as formally outlining the goals of the  program, setting measurable performance measures, and evaluating  program effectiveness. Although CBP is currently taking steps to make its  IAP sites permanent and to expand the program to other foreign locations,  CBP has not finalized a strategic plan for the program that delineates  program goals, objectives, constraints, and evaluative criteria. CBP  officials told us that they have drafted a strategic plan for the IAP, which  contains program goals and performance measures. CBP stated that the  plan has not yet been finalized.
section_title: Concluding Remarks
paragraphs: CBP has made progress in taking actions to secure our nation’s borders. It  has enhanced its ability to screen travelers before they arrive in the United  States as well as once they arrive at a port of entry. Nevertheless,  vulnerabilities still exist and additional actions are required to address  them. How long it will take and how much it will cost are two questions  that plague two of DHS’s major border security initiatives. Whether DHS  can implement the exit portion of US-VISIT is uncertain. For land ports of  entry, according to DHS, there is no near-term solution. Completing the  SBI initiative within time and cost estimates will be challenging, including  the building of nearly 700 miles of fencing. These issues underscore  Congress’ need to stay closely attuned to DHS’s progress in these  programs to help ensure performance, schedule, and cost estimates are  achieved and the nation’s border security needs are fully addressed.
This concludes my prepared testimony. I would be happy to respond to  any questions that you or members of subcommittees may have.
section_title: Contact and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions regarding this testimony, please call Richard M. Stana at  (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Other key contributors to this statement were John  Brummet, Assistant Director; Deborah Davis, Assistant Director; Michael  Dino, Assistant Director; John Mortin, Assistant Director; Teresa Abruzzo;  Richard Ascarate; Katherine Bernet; Jeanette Espinola; Adam Hoffman;  and Bintou Njie.
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