Defense Infrastructure: Army Brigade Combat Team Inactivations Informed by Analyses, but Actions Needed to Improve Stationing Process
Published: 2013-12-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: As part of its plan to reduce its active duty force by 80,000 personnel by 2017, the Army will be inactivating 10 BCTs currently stationed in the United States and reorganizing the remaining BCTs. The Army conducted analyses of different stationing options, which included the use of its military value analysis model to compare installations based on their ability to support BCTs. GAO was asked to review the decision making process the Army used for its BCT stationing decision, including its military value analysis model. This report (1) describes the analyses the Army conducted to make its BCT decision and (2) evaluates the extent to which the Army has established guidance and processes related to the use of the military value analysis model as a part of its stationing decisions. GAO reviewed the Army's stationing guidance, current and previous versions of the military value analysis model, documents on the BCT decision, and spoke with cognizant officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: To make decisions regarding the installations at which to inactivate 10 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and reorganize others, the Army conducted quantitative and qualitative analyses and obtained community input. Specifically, in 2012 the Army established a BCT Reorganization Operational Planning Team to assess factors such as strategic considerations, military construction costs, and environmental and socioeconomic impacts, among others, and develop stationing options for decision makers. The Army also considered other factors, or attributes--such as training ranges, geographic distribution, and proximity to embarkation points--in its military value analysis model. In addition, the Army conducted community input sessions at installations with 5,000 or more military and civilian personnel, including the 15 under consideration for inactivation of a BCT. Several Army officials said that the sessions were valuable and could serve as a tool for future stationing decisions. However, the Army's stationing regulation does not include guidance on obtaining community input beyond what may be required in the context of environmental analysis. An Army official said that he is developing proposed guidelines for when such input should be considered, but was uncertain how they will be incorporated into formal guidance. Effective stakeholder involvement includes actively soliciting ongoing stakeholder input and fostering communication between stakeholders and decision makers. Incorporating this type of communication with external stakeholders into its stationing guidance for future decisions could lead to potentially greater buy-in from local communities for Army stationing decisions.
The Army expects to continue using its military value analysis model for major stationing decisions and has taken steps to validate the model, but has not established guidance and consistent formal processes related to its use, including when the model should be used or how it should be reviewed, updated, and approved. Standards for internal control state that control activities, such as established and consistent processes or policies, can help to ensure actions to mitigate risks are carried out. Army officials said that the model has generally been used for large-impact stationing decisions and may not be appropriate for minor decisions. However, the Army's stationing regulation does not discuss the model or provide guidance on the circumstances when the model should be used. Also, the Army has not established consistent processes for reviewing and updating attributes and attribute definitions within the model or for collecting and validating data, nor has it established guidance related to the level of input or approval required for changes to the model or how geographically distant training areas should be treated in the model. For instance, subject matter experts noted that the definitions of a couple of attributes should be updated or reviewed, but GAO found that there is no consistent process in place for addressing such issues. Army officials told GAO that the attributes and weighting of the attributes within the model may also change depending on the type of stationing decision, but there is no guidance on when revisions should be approved by Army leaders. Without consistent formal processes for updating and reviewing the model and data used, and guidance related to the level of approval required for changes to the model, the Army risks potential decline in the rigor and consistency of the model over time.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends the Army develop and implement guidance related to when community input should be obtained for stationing decisions, and related to the use of its military value analysis model, such as when it should be used, the level of approval required for changes to the model, and how certain training areas should be considered, as well as processes for updating and reviewing the model. The Army concurred with GAOs recommendations and explained how they will be implemented.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Army’s active component is set to decline from a peak of  approximately 570,000 soldiers in 2012 to 490,000 by 2017, in  accordance with anticipated reductions in defense spending and with  strategic guidance released in January 2012. The Army plans to reduce  its forces through a number of different actions, including eliminating  temporary personnel allowances related to operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan and reducing the number of military personnel at installations  around the United States and in Europe. Specifically, the Army will be  making reductions of approximately 17,700 personnel from the 15 U.S.  installations where at least one brigade combat team (BCT) is stationed.  As part of this reduction, the Army announced on June 25, 2013 that it  would reduce the number of active duty BCTs from 45 to 33 by  inactivating 12 BCTs—2 currently stationed in Europe and 10 currently  stationed at installations in the United States. The Army also announced  that it would reorganize the remaining BCTs into larger organizations  through the addition of more engineering capabilities and a third  maneuver battalion to most BCTs.
According to the Army, the magnitude of its force structure reductions  necessitated that the reductions be distributed broadly both in terms of  the number of installations that would be affected and the types of units  that would be inactivated. Decisions by the military services—the Army in  this instance—regarding where to base their force structure in the United  States can have significant strategic, socioeconomic, and cost  implications for both the Department of Defense (DOD) and the  communities surrounding the bases. For example, stationing decisions  can often result in changes to the numbers of personnel, military families,  and defense-related contractors working or living at DOD installations and  can have an effect on the off-base infrastructure, community services,  businesses, and environmental considerations of local communities. aid decision making for its current force reductions, the Army conducted a  number of different analyses, including the use of a military value analysis  model the Army has used to support previous major stationing decisions.
You asked us to conduct a review of the Army’s analysis and decision  making processes that were used to support the decisions on BCT force  structure and stationing changes, including reviewing the Army’s military  value analysis methodology. Specifically, our objectives were to: (1)  describe the analyses that the Army conducted to make determinations  regarding which BCTs would be inactivated or reorganized, and at which  installations; and (2) evaluate the extent to which the Army has  established guidance and processes related to the use of the military  value analysis model as a part of its stationing decisions.
The purpose of Army Regulation 5-10, Stationing, is to assign responsibilities for and  prescribe policies and procedures governing the Army stationing process. According to  the Regulation, stationing is the process of combining force structure and installation  structure at a specific location to satisfy a specific mission requirement. It includes all  forms of realignment or relocation and includes actions that determine the authorized  population (military and civilian) at a particular installation. Activation and inactivation of  force structure components are among the ways to accomplish stationing. See Army  Regulation 5-10, Stationing at 31 (Aug. 20, 2010) (hereinafter cited as AR 5-10 (Aug. 20,  2010)).
To address the first objective, we reviewed the Army’s stationing  regulation, reports, and guidance, examined briefings and documents  outlining the key components of the current decision process, such as  briefings related to the development and assessment of possible  stationing options, and interviewed knowledgeable Army officials about  the Army’s decision process and the key factors that were considered.  Additionally, we reviewed documents related to the Army’s environmental  analysis, such as environmental regulations and the Army’s programmatic  environmental assessment of 21 installations, and examined briefings  and an order related to the listening sessions held at Army installations to  obtain community input. Further, we examined documentation related to  the Army’s military value analysis model and methodology, such as  briefings and reports, to identify key elements of the model and determine  how the attributes within the model are defined and weighted to arrive at  the results. We also interviewed knowledgeable Army officials to  determine how the model’s results were considered as part of the broader  BCT decision process. The scope of our work was limited to inactivations  occurring at installations located within the United States.
To address the second objective, we examined the Army’s stationing  regulation, 2011 stationing report to Congress, and other applicable  reports and guidance to determine the extent to which the Army’s military  value analysis model is established in guidance. We examined  documentation related to prior versions of the model and the current  model used for the recent BCT decision to determine how the model has  changed over time. We also reviewed key elements of the version of the  model used to support the BCT inactivation decision, such as the  attributes and weighting of the attributes, and interviewed knowledgeable  officials such as Center for Army Analysis personnel to discuss the  development of the model and how the key aspects of the model are  reviewed and updated for each use of the model. Additionally, we  examined documentation related to and interviewed subject matter  experts about the processes used by the Army to collect and validate the  data used in the model, but we did not review the completeness of the  data or validate the data itself.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2013 through December  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains  additional information about our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Army Reorganization of BCTs
paragraphs: In January 2011, the Secretary of Defense announced that the Army’s  end strength would be reduced by 27,000 active duty military personnel  beginning in 2015. According to Army officials, initial discussions  regarding how these reductions should be made began as part of the  2014-2018 Total Army Analysis, but no decisions on BCT inactivations in  the United States were made in 2011. As part of the early 2012 decision  to further reduce its active component end-strength to 490,000, the Army  determined that it would inactivate at least 8 of its 45 active component  BCTs. According to the Army, it began more extensive analysis of its BCT  organizational design, which included a series of vignettes addressing the  full range of Army missions, simulated combat that examined multiple  organizational options, and a strategic analysis focused on the ability of  the Army to support force demands in plausible future campaigns. As a  result of this analysis, the Army determined that it would inactivate 12  BCTs and reorganize the remaining BCTs by adding a third maneuver  battalion to armor and infantry brigades located in the continental United  States, among other additional capabilities.organization design, the Army has 45 active component BCTs with 98  maneuver battalions.
Under the current  Under the new design, the Army will reduce the number of BCTs to 33,  but will still maintain 95 maneuver battalions by focusing reductions on  headquarters organizations. According to Army officials, this  reorganization will allow the Army to maximize its combat power within its  reduced end-strength. The Army will conduct these BCT reorganizations  concurrently with BCT inactivations and has cited some benefits of doing  so, such as cost efficiencies that can be achieved by using inactivating  BCTs to provide personnel, equipment, and infrastructure to BCTs that  are reorganizing at the same installations. These BCT inactivations and  reorganizations will take place within the Army’s stationing process.
section_title: Army Regulation 5-10 Establishes Framework for Stationing Decisions
paragraphs: Stationing includes realignment or relocation, and those actions that  determine the population at a particular installation. As such, it may  involve activation or establishment, or inactivation or discontinuance, of  force structure components at one or more military installations in support  of operational requirements. The Army’s stationing process incorporates  both a force structure component and an installation component. Army  Regulation 5-10 on Stationing establishes the policy, procedures, and  responsibilities for Army stationing actions that occur outside of the Base  Realignment and Closure process. Under the regulation, the Army  Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans serves as the Army Staff  principal proponent for directing and monitoring stationing activities, but a  range of other Army staff directorates and organizations also have  responsibilities within the process. In addition to providing instruction on  administrative procedures for obtaining approval of stationing actions,  Army Regulation 5-10 provides a framework for planning stationing  actions, to include studying and analyzing feasible stationing options. This  framework allows for some flexibility in regard to the factors that should  be considered as part of stationing decisions. For example, the regulation  identifies 28 stationing planning factors, such as operational  considerations, for planners to consider as they identify, analyze, and  evaluate stationing options, but recognizes that some planning factors  may have little relevance for certain stationing actions. In addition,  environmental analysis is generally a necessary element of the Army’s  stationing process and Army Regulation 5-10 directs that stationing  proposals are to be evaluated for compliance with the National  Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
section_title: Military Value Analysis
paragraphs: The Army’s military value analysis model is a possible input to the Army’s  stationing process and has been a consideration in a number of prior  stationing decisions, including the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure  round. Based on tools used to analyze the military value of installations  as part of the Base Realignment and Closure process, the Army  developed a military value analysis model to support stationing decisions  for six new BCTs that were established as part of the 2007 Grow the  Army initiative, and has adapted that model for use in a number of other   The Army’s military value  brigade stationing decisions since that time.analysis model was developed by the Center for Army Analysis, which  reports to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs, and is a decision  analysis tool that is designed to rank-order installations based on  attributes that the Army has identified as being operationally important to  the type of unit in question for each stationing decision.
section_title: The Army’s BCT Stationing Decision Was Informed by Quantitative and Qualitative Analyses and Included an Effort to Obtain Community Input, Which May Provide Benefits for Future Stationing Decisions
paragraphs: The Army’s BCT stationing decision regarding the installations at which to  inactivate BCTs was informed by a number of quantitative and qualitative  analyses, including a military value analysis of installations, an  environmental assessment, and a qualitative analysis of different  stationing options. The Army also obtained community input through  listening sessions held at installations around the country, a practice that  is not currently required by Army guidance, but which may provide some  benefits for future stationing decisions.
subsections: section_title: Army’s BCT Stationing Decision Was Informed by Qualitative and Quantitative Analyses of Identified Stationing Factors
paragraphs: In May 2012, the Army established a BCT Reorganization Operational  Planning Team for the purpose of conducting, facilitating, and overseeing  planning and analysis to determine how to best achieve the targeted BCT  reductions. This team was led by the Force Management directorate  within the Army Staff and included stakeholders from across the Army  Staff and other Army organizations, such as the Office of the Assistant  Chief of Staff for Installation Management and Office of the Assistant  Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy, and Environment, among  others. Guidance from the Secretary of the Army and Director of Army  Force Management identifying a number of specific stationing factors to  be considered when assessing stationing options as part of the BCT  inactivation decision process was provided to the BCT Reorganization  Operational Planning Team. These key stationing factors for the  inactivation decision were initially established in an information paper  approved by the Secretary of the Army in November 2011 when the Army  was planning for the reduction of at least 8 BCTs and then further defined  and modified to account for potential BCT reorganizations in 2013. The  stationing factors included some factors to be considered as part of the  analysis conducted using the Army’s military value analysis model and  other stationing factors to be considered as part of analyses occurring  outside of the military value analysis model.
To inform its BCT inactivation decision, the Army used its military value  analysis model to measure the relative value of installations based on the  requirements of BCTs. Stationing factors considered under the model’s  analysis are specific to an installation’s ability to support a BCT, such as  maneuver land availability or housing. These factors, also known as  model attributes, were quantified as part of the military value analysis  model in order to rank order the installations under consideration  according to their military value. The 2013 version of the model used to  support the recent BCT inactivation decision scored the 15 installations  with BCTs based on 16 attributes identified by the Army as being  operationally important to a BCT. Each attribute within the model has a  formula or categorical definition that measures a certain characteristic  (see appendix III for a full list of the attributes used within the current  model and their definitions). The results of the formulas and categorical  ratings for each attribute are converted to 0-10 scores for each  installation. The attributes are weighted within the model based on their  operational importance and ease of change relative to each other. For  example, maneuver land is an attribute within the model and is  considered to be of high operational importance, but additional maneuver  land is not easily attainable, so that attribute is weighted more heavily  than an attribute such as quality of life facilities, which can be improved  through Army investment. Installations receive a score for each attribute  based on collected data and then individual attribute scores are weighted  and summed to produce the installations’ overall military value scores.  For the recent decision, the 15 installations were then rank-ordered, with  higher rankings indicating greater military value for stationing BCTs. Army  officials emphasized that the results of the model were used only as a  starting point for further analysis and were useful in comparing  installations, but that the model cannot account for all of the factors that  need to be considered in a complex decision, such as strategic  considerations.
The Army also identified other stationing factors, which were to be  considered outside of the military value analysis model as part of a  qualitative assessment of stationing options. These factors address  issues beyond a particular installation’s capabilities and infrastructure that  are not accounted for within the model, such as strategic considerations  or immediate impacts on readiness. Table 1 shows the key factors  identified for consideration outside of the military value analysis model as  part of the Army decision.
While some of the additional factors, such as strategic considerations,  were addressed primarily through the qualitative assessment of stationing  options, other factors required additional analysis, such as environmental  analysis. To comply with environmental regulations and to address one of  the stationing factors identified for consideration, the Army conducted a  programmatic environmental assessment of the 21 installations and their  associated maneuver training areas with the potential to gain or lose  1,000 or more military and civilian personnel due to the planned force  reductions and force structure changes—the 15 installations where BCTs  are currently stationed and 6 other installations that support major training  schools or Combat Training Centers—to identify potential environmental  and socioeconomic impacts of planned force reductions. The Army found  that no significant environmental impacts were expected as the result of  its proposed actions and, as a result, does not anticipate preparing a  more detailed programmatic environmental impact statement related to its  decisions.
Army officials said that additional site-specific environmental analysis may  be necessary once the force structure changes at affected installations  have been finalized, particularly in instances where installations may  experience some growth or where the types of units stationed at an  installation may change, but this has not yet been determined. In  particular, the Army did not assess the environmental impacts at Fort  Benning of restructuring under the alternative that could lead to some  degree of force growth as part of the programmatic environmental  assessment because, as the assessment stated, there would not be a  situation where Fort Benning would see a net increase in soldiers overall  due to its lack of sufficient unrestricted maneuver land at that time to  support the training needs of additional maneuver units. The Army has  since announced that it will be retaining the BCT at Fort Benning, and  reorganizing it by adding an additional maneuver battalion and other  capabilities. An Army official said that Fort Benning had taken steps to  acquire additional maneuver land to mitigate the installation’s training  land limitations and in response to a Jeopardy Biological Opinion from  U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services prior to the BCT inactivation decision  process and related programmatic environmental assessment, but the  acquisition was put on hold pending Army force structure and budgetary  decisions. Army officials said that the Army still has some decisions to  make in regard to the BCT stationed at Fort Benning and the extent that  additional environmental analysis or other actions will be required at the  installation to mitigate challenges related to the lack of maneuver land.
The programmatic environmental assessment found that potentially  significant socioeconomic impacts could result at some installations due  to the proposed force reductions. In estimating these impacts, the  programmatic environmental assessment looked at the socioeconomic  impacts of the maximum possible reductions that could occur at the  installations, with an estimated loss of up to 8,000 military and civilian  personnel at some installations. However, because the Army will be using  units and personnel from inactivating BCTs to reorganize the remaining  BCTs at installations where possible, the Army projects that the  population losses at the installations that are losing BCTs, and thus the  projected socioeconomic impacts, will not be as large as the estimates  analyzed by the programmatic environmental assessment.
Prior to finalizing its analysis related to the environment, the Army  provided opportunity for public comment on the draft Finding of No  Significant Impact and the programmatic environmental assessment. A  30-day comment period is required by Army regulation, but the Army  then voluntarily extended it for an additional 30 days at the request of  some communities in order to encourage maximum stakeholder  participation.
Incorporating the results of the aforementioned programmatic  environmental assessment and the military value analysis, as well as  other stationing factors considered outside of the military value analysis  as described above, the BCT Reorganization Operational Planning Team  developed and assessed 10 potential stationing options. Each option  was developed to focus on a particular consideration, some of which were  identified as key stationing factors, some related to other considerations  such as impacts on training, and some options were directly related to the  outcomes of the programmatic environmental analysis and the military  value analysis. For example, two of the potential stationing options the  Army assessed in its qualitative analysis of options were developed to  identify those installations where BCT inactivation would result in minimal  environmental and socioeconomic impacts, respectively, as identified  through the programmatic environmental assessment. In addition, one of  the potential stationing options the Army assessed considered  inactivating BCTs solely according to the rank order of installations where  they are currently stationed based on the results of the military value  analysis (i.e., the BCTs would be identified for inactivation at the ten  installations with the lowest military value scores under this option) prior  to the consideration of other stationing factors.
Other options the planning team considered placed primary emphasis on  different stationing factors and then incorporated the results of the military  value analysis model as a secondary consideration. For example, one  option selected installations for BCT inactivation that would result in the  lowest overall military construction costs and then, once costs no longer  distinguished between the remaining installations, inactivated BCTs at  installations based on their military value analysis training rankings.  Another option was based on retaining BCTs at installations that would  best support the strategic realignment of forces to the Pacific and then,  once those strategic considerations were addressed, inactivated BCTs at  installations based on their military value analysis rankings.
Once the BCT Reorganization Operational Planning Team developed the  10 different options, the team analyzed each option and identified  advantages and disadvantages based on the Army’s stationing factors  and other considerations, such as impacts to training. For instance, the  team found that the stationing option that inactivated BCTs at installations  based on the results of the military value analysis would incur an  estimated $684 million in military construction costs and did not appear  to support the Defense Strategic Guidance regarding a realignment of  forces toward the Pacific because it would inactivate one BCT each at  installations in Hawaii, Alaska, and Washington. In general, the analysis  of the advantages and disadvantages of the various stationing options  found that reorganizing BCTs (i.e., adding additional units and personnel)  at installations with multiple BCTs without first inactivating a BCT resulted  in higher military construction costs because each BCT on the installation  would experience growth with no loss of population to offset that growth.  For example, according to the Army’s analysis, Fort Hood currently has  five BCTs and increasing the size of those BCTs without first inactivating  a BCT would have resulted in approximately $243 million in military  construction costs, whereas inactivating BCTs at installations with  multiple BCTs creates excess facilities capacity to allow for the  reorganization of the remaining units on the installation while incurring  lower estimated military construction costs. Further, according to the  Army, using inactivating BCTs at these locations as the initial source of  equipment and personnel for the remaining BCTs where possible is  expected to reduce costs related to transportation of equipment and to  mitigate some equipment and personnel readiness impacts. Additionally,  an official from the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for  Installations, Energy, and Environment said that inactivating BCTs at  single-BCT installations is less efficient because it creates excess  capacity without a readily available reutilization or disposal strategy for  those facilities.
Army officials involved in developing and assessing the stationing options  said that minimizing military construction costs became a major emphasis  of the analysis because it would be difficult to justify significant increases  in military construction costs while reducing the size of the force. The  Army’s military construction estimates were developed based primarily on  data available from the Real Property Planning and Analysis System,  which is an Army database that provides information on excess capacity  at installations by aggregated gross square footage and facility type. An  Army official said that these estimates are only rough order of magnitude  estimates. Other Army officials involved in developing the estimates said  that more accurate military construction cost estimates along with  estimates of other potential base support costs, such as those relating to  information technology or facilities sustainment, could have been  provided had they been able to gather data directly from the installations,  but non-disclosure agreements limited them to using data from the Real  Property Planning and Analysis System.
Military construction costs were the only costs specifically estimated for  each stationing option, although the stationing options did include  measures related to socioeconomic factors and basic allowance for  housing. equipment transportation for unit reorganization and for the training of  certain units, were considered during the development and assessment of  stationing options. According to Army officials, the Army is now  developing detailed cost estimates for its selected stationing option as it  completes the stationing documentation required under Army Regulation  5-10.
Basic allowance for housing is a U.S. based allowance prescribed by geographic duty  location, pay grade, and dependency status. It provides uniformed Service members  equitable housing compensation based on housing costs in local civilian housing markets  within the United States when government quarters are not provided.
The BCT Reorganization Operational Planning Team, which transitioned  to a Council of Colonels, developed summaries of each of the stationing  options with the identified advantages and disadvantages based on the  stationing factors, military value analysis results, military construction cost  estimates, and projected socioeconomic impacts. The stationing options  were then briefed to a 1-and 2-star general officer steering committee,  which voted on and screened out five of the stationing options. The  remaining five stationing options were then briefed to a 3-star general  officer steering committee, which screened out two more stationing  options. According to Army officials, the three recommended stationing  options that emerged from the general officer steering committees were  then submitted to Army senior leaders for a final determination. According  to Army officials, all of the stationing options that were considered by the  general officer steering committees were presented to senior leaders in  case they wanted to revisit a stationing option that was previously  screened out and senior leaders also had the ability to adjust the  recommended stationing options based on their judgment. Figure 1  shows the key elements of the Army’s BCT inactivation decision process.
Officials characterized the final decision by the Secretary of the Army as a  hybrid of a couple of the stationing options and the Army stated that  principal considerations in the inactivations were the Army’s ability to  meet the requirements of the defense strategy, including a rebalancing of  forces to the Pacific, minimizing military construction costs, and  minimizing immediate readiness impacts. The military value of  installations also played a role in the Army’s decision. While the various  analyses conducted by the Army played an important role in informing  decision makers about the implications of stationing options, according to  Army officials, decision makers also utilized military judgment in making  the final determination about where to inactivate BCTs.
section_title: The Army’s Efforts to Obtain Community Input Related to Force Structure Reductions May Provide Benefits for Future Stationing Decisions
paragraphs: The Army’s BCT stationing decision regarding the installations at which to  inactivate BCTs included steps to obtain community input, a practice that  may provide benefits for future stationing decisions. The Army conducted  listening sessions at installations that had more than 5,000 civilian and  military personnel—the 15 installations considered as part of the BCT  inactivation decision and 15 non-BCT installations—to give communities  an opportunity to provide input to the Army’s force structure reduction  decisions. These sessions had a range of attendees, such as local, state,  and federal elected officials and civic and business leaders from across  the individual communities. The primary focus of the listening sessions  was to capture community input for Army leaders to consider as part of  the Army’s overall analysis before any decisions were made, as well as to  explain the process that the Army would be using to make its decisions.
Army Force Management officials described holding community listening  sessions as an atypical part of the stationing process. They added that  the number and scope of public comments received as part of the  programmatic environmental assessment indicated the depth and breadth  of the public’s interest in the decision. Additionally, many installation  communities specifically requested a public forum to discuss their  concerns. An official from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the  Army for Installations, Energy, and Environment said that local  communities might see the stationing decision as a potential loss of force  structure similar to what could occur during the Base Realignment and  Closure process and that it was important for the communities to have a  public forum. This Army official stated that the listening sessions provided  the communities with an opportunity to express their concerns about the  projected socioeconomic impacts of the potential stationing decisions and  inform the Army about local community investments made to support the  installation and its military personnel. Input from the listening sessions  was provided to the general officer steering committees and Army senior  leaders as part of their consideration of potential stationing options during  the BCT inactivation determination. For instance, Army officials said that  officials participating in the general officer steering committees were  briefed at a high level on the communities’ primary concerns and given in- depth reports and data the communities provided as the officials  assessed the options to help them make informed decisions. In addition,  senior leaders were provided with daily and weekly summaries of the  listening sessions as they were taking place. These reports included  information on the community concerns, media coverage, and key  individuals attending each listening session, such as elected officials.  Additionally, an Army official involved in developing a stationing option  related to minimizing the socioeconomic impacts at installations said that  he considered the input from the listening sessions as he developed the  stationing option.
Several Army officials told us that they believed that the listening sessions  were a valuable tool to support the Army’s overall BCT inactivation  decision process and could serve as good precedent for future stationing  decisions. The stationing decision framework presented in Army  Regulation 5-10 includes local community impact as one of the stationing  factors that should be considered and requires a community impact  analysis for stationing proposals with a strength change of 200 or more  personnel unless a substantially similar analysis was already completed  in the context of analyses under the National Environmental Policy Act.  Analysis conducted under the National Environmental Policy Act and  implementing regulations often includes opportunity for public comment.  The community impact analysis required under Army Regulation 5-10  addresses the impacts of changes in population, personal income, tax  base, and employment, and may include an examination of the effects on  local businesses, schools, housing, and other public services and  economic factors. It is based on analysis generated from an economic  forecasting model. However, Army Regulation 5-10 does not provide  guidance for or discuss obtaining community input in the stationing  context as part of developing community impact analyses, such as when  community listening sessions or similar efforts to obtain community input  that are beyond the scope of environmental analyses should be  considered as part of a particular stationing decision. An Army Force  Management official said that he is currently developing proposed  guidelines for when community listening sessions should be proposed for  consideration by Army senior leaders in making stationing decisions, but  was uncertain how such guidelines would be incorporated into the  stationing process and related guidance. Principles for effective  stakeholder participation have shown that effective stakeholder  involvement includes actively soliciting stakeholder input from those  potentially affected by a decision, involving stakeholders early and  throughout the decision-making process, and fostering responsive,  interactive communication between stakeholders and decision makers.  Incorporating this type of communication with external stakeholders into  its stationing process could help to ensure that the Army takes into  account the views of external stakeholders and lead to potentially greater  buy-in from local communities for Army stationing decisions.
section_title: The Army Expects the Military Value Analysis Model Will Be an Enduring Tool but Has Not Established Guidance or Consistent Processes Related to the Use of the Model within Its Stationing Process
paragraphs: The Army has used its military value analysis model to inform several  recent stationing decisions and Army officials expect that the model will  be an enduring tool in stationing decisions. While the Army has taken  steps to validate the model, it has not yet formalized the use of the  military value analysis model within its stationing process by establishing  guidance related to the use of the model, including guidance related to  when the model should be used for stationing decisions or the processes  through which key aspects of the model are reviewed, updated, and  approved for each use of the model, and data collected and validated.  Internal control standards state that appropriate policies and procedures  are needed for an agency’s activities, and that relevant objectives and  associated risks for each activity should be identified along with the   Key practices for  control activities needed to address those risks. successful transformations state that stakeholders in public sector  transformations are concerned not only with the decisions made but also  the process used to make those decisions.
subsections: section_title: The Army Has Not Established Guidance Related to When and How the Model Should Be Used within Its Stationing Process
paragraphs: The military value analysis model has been used to inform several  stationing decisions since 2005, such as the stationing of additional BCTs  related to the Grow the Army initiative in 2007 and the stationing of an  aviation brigade in 2009. However, Army officials said that the Army has  not formally established in guidance the circumstances under which the  model would be used or how the model should be considered as a factor  within the stationing process. Army Force Management officials said that  the Army generally has used the model in stationing decisions with a  large impact, potentially greater risk, and requirement for more rigorous  analytical underpinning, such as in stationing decisions involving brigade  combat teams. One official added that the Army will likely continue to  utilize the model in future stationing decisions of a similar nature.  Conversely, Army officials said that for stationing decisions related to  smaller units, using the military value analysis model may be too labor  intensive and thus may not be an appropriate use of resources. In 2010,  as part of a prior review GAO conducted of the military services’  stationing processes, Army Force Management officials told GAO that the  Army would incorporate military value analysis into Army Regulation 5-10.  However, as of our current review, it has not yet done so. The Army has  documented its use of the military value analysis model in reports and  briefings, but has not incorporated in its stationing regulation or other  guidance any discussions of when the use of the model would be  warranted and how the model should be used in stationing decisions.
According to Army Force Management officials, the Army plans to include  a discussion of the military value analysis model in a pamphlet it has  been developing to supplement Army Regulation 5-10. Officials said that  the pamphlet may include when a military value analysis versus other  types of analyses should be conducted within the stationing process, but  they have not yet determined what other information related to the model  will be included. Further, the pamphlet has been in draft form for more  than two years, and the timeframe for its approval and release has not yet  been determined. Without formalizing the model within the Army’s  stationing process, such as documenting in guidance the circumstances  under which the model would be used to support stationing decisions and  how the results of the model are considered as part of the broader  stationing process, the model’s role within the stationing process may not  be transparent and it may not be clearly known how the results of the  model are used to inform decisions.
section_title: The Army Has Taken Steps to Validate the Model, but Has Not Established Consistent Formal Processes and Guidance Related to How the Model Is Reviewed, Updated, and Approved for Each Use
paragraphs: The Army has taken steps to ensure the validity of the military value  analysis model and its results, but has not established consistent formal  processes to guide how (a) the attributes of the model should be  reviewed and selected for use in the model, (b) attribute definitions should  be reviewed to determine if they are still relevant for a particular decision  and updated, and (c) data should be collected and validated. The Army  also lacks guidance related to the level of input or approval that is  necessary for changes to key elements of the model, and how non- contiguous training areas should be treated within the model. Internal  control standards state that control activities, such as consistent  processes or policies, can help to ensure that actions to mitigate risks are  carried out. In addition, control activities are essential for achieving  effective and efficient program results, and include the clear assignment  of stakeholder responsibilities.
The Army has taken steps to validate the military value analysis model  and its results, such as involving key stakeholders and reviewing the  relevancy of key elements of the model for specific stationing decisions.  According to Center for Army Analysis officials, the military value analysis  models used in the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure round and the  2007 Grow the Army initiative stationing decisions were thoroughly vetted  within the Army and reviewed and approved by senior leaders. In  addition, Center for Army Analysis officials said that the model used for  the 2007 Grow the Army decisions was validated by the Naval Post  Graduate School, and that each version of the model is briefed to an  analytical review board within the Center for Army Analysis. In general,  each use of the military value analysis model begins with an examination  of the most recently used model. For example, for 2007 Grow the Army  initiative stationing decisions, the Army began by reviewing the attributes  used in the model that supported the 2005 Base Realignment and  Closure round and selected and developed attributes that were specific to  the requirements of stationing a BCT. The military value analysis models  used in several BCT stationing decisions in recent years have been  adapted from the model used for the 2007 Grow the Army initiative  stationing decisions.
In addition, each time the model has been used, the Center for Army  Analysis has conducted a sensitivity analysis to determine the extent to  which the weighting of the attributes changes the resulting military value  rankings of the installations. According to Center for Army Analysis  officials, this allows them to test the impact that any one attribute has on  the results of the model and thus be able to identify how any potential  flaws in the attribute definitions or data could affect the model and look for  opportunities to mitigate them. In the most recent version of the model,  the sensitivity analysis did not affect the 6 top-ranked installations or the  bottom-ranked installation, which, according to Center for Army Analysis  officials, indicates that the ranking of those installations within the model  were not affected by any one attribute. Center for Army Analysis officials  explained that rankings did change for certain installations during the  sensitivity analysis because there was little deviation in the model’s  scores for those installations. For example, 7 installations scored within  .11 points of one another on a 10-point scale. Overall, for the 2013  version of the model used to support the BCT inactivation decision, only  1.27 points separated the top-ranked installation from the bottom-ranked  installation, which, according to Army officials, indicates that all of the  installations considered within the model have fairly comparable military  value for supporting a BCT.
Several factors affect the need to review the model each time it is used.  According to Center for Army Analysis officials, a new stationing decision  may require different attributes to be included in the model because it  may involve different types of units and installations or seek to address a  different stationing scenario. The weighting of the attributes within the  model may require review because the relative importance of specific  attributes may change depending on those attributes’ importance to the  new stationing decision. The definitions for existing attributes can also  change over time depending on a number of factors, such as updates to  Army policy, availability of data, technological advances, or the question  the model seeks to address. While the model utilizes quantitative  comparison, some aspects of the model are subjective. For example,  decisions about which attributes to include within the model and the  weight of those attributes are determined by stakeholders who utilize  military judgment in deciding what attributes are important for the specific  decision and their relative importance within the model. Additionally, the  attribute definitions, including associated formulas and categorical ratings,  are developed based upon subject matter expertise. Because of the  subjectivity of some aspects of the model, its continued validity is largely  dependent on the involvement of key stakeholders, such as subject  matter experts and Army leaders. Additionally, due to the potential for  changing uses of the model, Center for Army Analysis officials said that  the model is reviewed by subject matter experts at the beginning of each  use to determine if the attributes are still relevant for the stationing  decision and if any aspects of the model should be changed, such as how  the attributes are defined.
The Army has not established consistent formal processes for (a)  reviewing the attributes to determine which attributes should be used in  the model, (b) reviewing and updating attribute definitions to determine if  they are still relevant for a particular decision, and (c) collecting and  validating the data for use in the model. We found that the Army took  steps to review the relevancy of the attributes in developing the version of  the model used to support the BCT inactivation decision, but we identified  a couple of instances where further review and updates to the attribute  definitions could have been beneficial. Also, although Army Force  Management issued direction related to data collection and validation for  the version of the model used to support the BCT inactivations, we found  some instances of inconsistency related to how data were updated that  indicate that a consistent process formalized through established  guidance could better ensure that expectations for stakeholders involved  in data collection are clear and that the data is current.
When force reductions were first announced in 2011, Army Force  Management officials met with subject matter experts to identify attributes  to be used in a new version of the military value analysis model to support  stationing decisions related to these force reductions. The working group  used the 14 attributes used in the 2010 version of the model as a  baseline and began an initial effort to review the 40 attributes used in the   According to  2005 Base Realignment and Closure round for additions.Army Force Management officials, some of the additional attributes that  were considered for the model were rejected because the characteristics  were accounted for in other analyses or existing attributes, the data was  not readily available, or did not clearly distinguish between the  installations. Additionally, the 14 attributes used in the 2010 version of the  model already represented attributes that were important to a BCT. While  the Army considered alternatives, Army Force Management officials said  that time constraints and a desire to maintain consistency with the  attributes used in prior BCT stationing models diffused enthusiasm for  including new attributes or removing attributes from the model. Ultimately,  for the 2011 model, Army Force Management decided to include the 14  attributes used in the 2010 model and added one attribute previously  used as a screening measure within the model. The Army collected data  for these 15 attributes and the preliminary results of the 2011 model were  briefed to senior leaders. However, the Army did not make any decisions  on force reductions or BCT inactivations in 2011.
According to an Army Force Management official, with the public release  of the programmatic environmental assessment in January 2013, a  decision on BCT reorganization and inactivation appeared imminent and  the Army focused on updating and validating the data used in the 2011  model. Army officials viewed the 2013 model as a continuation of the  2011 model with the assumption that the attributes in the 2011 model  were still valid. Army officials said that they added one attribute,  geographic distribution, to the 2013 model based on guidance from the  Secretary of the Army to include it in the Army’s decision making process.  While some Army officials raised concerns about the applicability of the  buildable acres attribute in a force reduction scenario, an Army Force  Management official told us that the attribute was kept in order to  preserve potential for growth regeneration in the Army. The official  additionally said that there was potential for growth at certain installations  resulting from the BCT inactivation and subsequent reorganization.
Further, Army officials said that the Army does not have a formal process  for reviewing and updating the attribute definitions in coordination with  subject matter experts to determine if they are still the best way to  measure a particular attribute and we found a couple of instances where  further review of and updates to the definitions could have been  beneficial. For the 2013 model, an Army Force Management official said  that the Army did not deliberately engage subject matter experts in  discussions regarding the attribute definitions. The Army focused on  updating and validating the data collected in 2011 for use for the 2013  model, which Army officials viewed as a continuation of the 2011 model.  Further, these officials told us that they generally rely on subject matter  experts to suggest proposed changes or updates to the attribute  definitions when necessary and noted that some subject matter experts  are more assertive in this regard than others. Officials at the Center for  Army Analysis and Army Force Management said that suggestions from  subject matter experts are addressed if they are compelling. For instance,  the attribute definition for the connectivity attribute was updated for the  2010 model that supported the stationing of a heavy BCT based on a   Subject matter experts  suggestion made by the subject matter expert.for many of the attributes we spoke with said that they were comfortable  with the attribute definitions related to their areas of expertise. However,  we did find a couple instances where subject matter experts identified the  need to update or review attribute definitions. For example, the subject  matter expert for the connectivity attribute said that technological  advances in cellular coverage had rendered one of the three sub-factors  within the attribute’s definition moot as all installations would receive the  same score for that sub-factor. This subject matter expert said that he  informed Army Force Management that the attribute definition needed to  be examined for future uses of the model as there was no time to  effectively address the issue for the current model.
Additionally, the subject matter expert for the family housing attribute  noted that it may be a good idea to revisit the definition for the attribute for  future uses of the model for a couple of reasons, including the attribute’s  data source. As the attribute is currently defined, it utilizes data from a  housing study that is conducted in various years for individual installations  and, as a result, it is possible that the data may not reflect the current  housing situation at some installations. For example, housing data used  in the model came from housing studies that were published between  2009 and 2012. Further, we found that the formula for the family housing  attribute was calibrated to prior force growth scenarios at installations in  that it included the specific addition of a heavy BCT as part of the  calculation of the availability of housing and was not updated for the  current version of the model. Center for Army Analysis officials told us  that they were unclear as to why the attribute definition would include the  addition of a BCT for this particular scenario, but said that they did not  believe this would affect the relative scores of the installations because  the same factor was added for all installations.
It is unclear whether reviews and updates to the attribute definitions in  these instances would have affected the relative scores of the  installations or whether, after review, the Center for Army Analysis and  subject matter experts would have determined that changes were indeed  necessary. However, these examples indicate that it may be beneficial to  have an established process in place to review attribute definitions to  determine whether adjustments are needed.
Moreover, the Army has not established a consistent formal process for  collecting and validating the data used in the model each time the model  is used. In lieu of such a process, to update the data for the model used  to support the BCT inactivation decision, Army Force Management  instructed the subject matter experts for each of the attributes to update  and validate the data that was used in the 2011 version of the model and  directed them to, among other things, coordinate at the installation level  to ensure accuracy with the installation-level data. An Army Force  Management official said that the 2011 data sheets for the attributes were  also sent to the installations through the senior maneuver commander at  the installation, but the official said that the process for distributing the  data sheets may have varied by installation. In communications to both  the organizations providing data and the installation commanders, Army  Force Management officials emphasized the importance of ensuring that  the data used in the model was consistent with that at the installation  level. Despite this direction, we found some inconsistencies in the  process that was used to update and validate the data for the 2013  model.
We found that the subject matter experts responsible for updating and  validating the data underlying each attribute in the model that we spoke  with were generally confident with the accuracy of the data that they  provided, but subject matter experts differed in the extent to which they  coordinated with installations to update and validate the data. While  subject matter experts for a few of the attributes said that they  coordinated directly with the installations to validate data, some subject  matter experts said that they did not coordinate with the installations  because they had other sources for obtaining data, such as Army  databases, program records, or the use of mapping tools that they  believed to be sufficient. Given how some of these attributes are  formulated and the data sources used, these data sources may have  been the best sources for providing the most consistent and reliable data  across installations. Subject matter experts who utilized Army databases  for one of the attributes said that different factors may affect the quality of  some of the data in the systems at a given time, but noted that these  systems have annual validation processes in place that are meant to  keep the data accurate and up-to-date. The subject matter expert for  another attribute said that he obtained data from studies and a database  that are kept up to date with information, gathered from the installations,  that he believes to be fair and objective. He additionally said that he did  not coordinate directly with the installations to collect data in prior  stationing decisions but did so for this stationing decision in response to  instruction from Army Force Management. In doing so, he said that he  had to exercise judgment in determining which inputs to accept from  installations because installations may not always be objective given their  interest in receiving the best rating possible.
Additionally, the subject matter expert for three of the attributes said that  he expected the installations to contact him in response to the data  sheets from 2011 that Army Force Management had sent to the  installations if the data needed to be updated. While some installations  did respond and the subject matter expert said he updated data for those  installations and validated it using other data sources to ensure  consistency, he said that he did not review or update the data for these  attributes using available data systems for, or coordinate directly with,  other installations that did not respond. This official noted that the data for  one of these attributes is fairly static and, in general, most changes in the  data set for the model made by the installations are related to actions that  his office would be aware of and thus are not surprising. An Army Force  Management official said that some installations could have been  proactive and provided data updates in certain instances, but that it was  incumbent upon the subject matter experts to update and validate the  data in coordination with the installations. Ultimately, this official said that  the data’s accuracy and the decision about whether coordination with the  installations was needed on the individual attributes were decided by the  subject matter experts.
Data collection may be more challenging in some instances because the  Army does not routinely collect and maintain the data used for certain  attributes, such as buildable acres or indirect fire. For example, the  subject matter expert for one attribute said that he was not able to update  or validate the data for the attribute because the level of analysis that  would have had to be conducted in coordination with the installations  could not be completed within the timeframes of the request. Thus, he  informed Army Force Management that the existing data was the best  data available within the timeframes identified to update the data.  However, the subject matter expert told us that the data may not be  reflective of the current status at the installations because of Army  facilities planning policy changes and military construction that may have  occurred at the installations since the data was last updated.
It is unclear whether data obtained based on additional coordination with  the installations in these instances would have been significantly different  than the data that was obtained under the current approach. While Army  Force Management did issue direction related to the data collection effort  for the 2013 model in the absence of an existing process, an Army Force  Management official said that the model would benefit from a consistent  process for updating data so that guidance and expectations are clear for  all of the stakeholders involved in the process. A process would also help  to ensure that data is reviewed and updated for each use of the model.  For example, one subject matter expert who updated data for an attribute  for the 2013 model said that the data for this attribute had not been  updated since 2004 when it was used to support the Base Realignment  and Closure decisions, even though the attribute has been used in more  recent stationing decisions. This subject matter expert said that the data  does not change much from year to year, although his data collection  effort did result in changes to the prior data.
An Army Force Management official who oversaw the use of the model in  the BCT inactivation decision said that it would be valuable for the Army  to have formal processes that allow for time to review and update the  attributes within the model when the model is used, including a more  deliberative analysis of the attributes in terms of how they are defined and  measured and a process for updating data. The official also noted that the  lack of a process for periodic review and updates to the model puts  subject matter experts in the difficult position of raising issues when the  pressure to update data is at its greatest. A couple of the subject matter  experts we spoke with noted that potential upcoming changes in their  areas of responsibility would likely result in the need to make changes to  the attributes in the future. Without deliberate processes that allow for  time to review attributes and attribute definitions in coordination with  subject matter experts and consider necessary updates to the model,  potential issues could remain unaddressed throughout each use of the  model, and necessary changes to the model might not be made, leading  to a reduced relevance of the model to the current environment and in  future uses. Further, without a consistent formal process for collecting  and validating data each time the model is used that ensures consistency  with data at the installation level and allows for time to update the data,  the Army risks not having the most current and accurate data for use in  the military value analysis model.
One of the model’s assumptions is that the attributes and weighting within  the model reflect current senior Army leader priorities. However, the Army  has not established clear guidance for when review of the key elements  of the model or changes to the model require higher-level input or  approval. Center for Army Analysis officials said that, in general,  removing or adding model attributes should be approved by higher level  officials, such as a general officer steering committee, because they  provide a broader perspective on the Army’s priorities. For example, in  discussions with a subject matter expert about whether an attribute  should be removed, an official from the Center for Army Analysis  suggested that a general officer steering committee should be convened  in order to drop the attribute from the model. Also, for the recent BCT  inactivation decision, the Army held a three-star general officer steering  committee specifically to review and update the weighting of the attributes  within the model, which the Secretary of the Army then approved.  However, Center for Army Analysis officials said that, while prior versions  of the model were approved by various chains of command, there is no  specific threshold for holding a general officer steering committee and  holding one may not always be feasible if the model is being used under  constrained timeframes. Further, Army officials indicated that whether a  general officer steering committee is needed is based on the risks and  potential impacts related to the decision. For example, Center for Army  Analysis officials said that they recommended using a general officer  steering committee for the 2013 use of the model because of the  sensitivity of the BCT inactivation decision and because the model was  being used in a reduction scenario, in contrast to a growth scenario as in  previous models. By contrast, the same officials said that a general officer  steering committee may not be needed for smaller scale decisions.
During our review, an Army Force Management official expressed  concern about making any significant changes to the model, such as  removing any of the attributes within the model, without a compelling  reason. The official explained that because the Army had only recently  described the attributes used within the model to Congress in its March  2011 Report to Congress, Army Stationing Decisions, they believed that  external stakeholders might perceive any changes to the model so close  to a significant stationing decision as being arbitrary or as if the Army was  attempting to manipulate the results of the model to influence a desired  outcome. Key practices for successful transformations state that the  demand for transparency and accountability needs to be accepted in any  public sector transformation and stakeholders are concerned not only with  the decisions made but also the process used to make those decisions.  Caution related to making changes to the key elements of the model for  such a sensitive decision is understandable, but without establishing  transparent and consistent policies and guidance around the model, Army  concerns about how changes to the model may appear to external  stakeholders are likely to continue. Further, without consistent formal  processes through which key aspects of the model are reviewed and  updated, and guidance that establishes the circumstances under which  changes to the model require input or approval from Army leaders, the  Army risks potential decline in the rigor and consistency of the model over  time.
There are five attributes related to training within the military value analysis model— airspace, maneuver land, range sustainability, training facilities, and indirect fire. associated installations depends on the stationing decision. For example,  in the model used to support the 2007 Grow the Army initiative stationing  decisions, the Army identified Yakima Training Center, located in  Washington state, as a stand-alone installation because it was  considering stationing a BCT at Yakima. In contrast, in the 2013 version  of the model supporting the BCT inactivation decisions, Army training  officials told us that Yakima should be considered as part of Joint Base  Lewis McChord because Yakima’s primary purpose is to support the  training of units assigned to the installation.
Despite the potential for different treatment of these non-contiguous areas  in different stationing decisions, the Army has not established a clear and  consistent policy in this regard. Army training officials said that subject  matter experts that provide data for the installations do not have a holistic  view of the model and their individual views on whether to include non- contiguous areas may differ depending on their area of expertise.  Additionally, communication between Army officials indicated that subject  matter experts raised questions about whether certain non-contiguous  training areas should be combined with the installation for some of the  attributes, such as indirect fire, within the 2013 model. Without a  consistent policy, the Army has wavered in how to deal with this issue.  For example, there has been a lack of clarity regarding the extent to  which Joint Base Lewis McChord and Yakima should be aggregated and  for what attributes within the military value analysis model. In a 2010  version of the model used to determine where to station a heavy BCT and  a fires brigade, as well as the 2011 interim model, the two locations were  aggregated for the airspace attribute. However, a 2012 interim version of  the model that was prepared for senior Army leaders did not aggregate  Yakima with Joint Base Lewis McChord for this attribute. As a result, Joint  Base Lewis McChord received a lower military value score relative to  other installations in this 2012 interim version of the model than it had in  prior versions of the model. After reviewing the results of the interim  model, an Army Force Management official said that the goal was to  maintain consistency with how non-contiguous training areas were  treated in the past and to treat all installations with non-contiguous  training land the same. However, a lack of clarity still remained for the  airspace attribute leading up to the BCT inactivation decision and the  Center for Army Analysis ran two different versions of the model, one that  aggregated airspace data for the two locations and one that excluded  airspace data for Yakima. The two versions of the model produced  different military value scores and rankings for Joint Base Lewis  McChord. Ultimately, the version of the model used to support the BCT  inactivation stationing decision did not aggregate the two locations for the  airspace attribute.
Army training officials said that the Army has long struggled with how to  treat non-contiguous training areas in models to best simulate reality.  These officials said that clear guidance prior to data collection is needed  to ensure that non-contiguous training areas are treated consistently  within the military value analysis model. Without establishing a clear  policy and communicating it to subject matter experts regarding how non- contiguous training areas should be treated in the model for specific  attributes, the Army risks inconsistent consideration of these non- contiguous training areas across installations and attributes, which could  influence the results of the model.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Army recognizes that its decision to meet part of its planned active  component force reductions through the inactivation of 10 BCTs currently  stationed in the United States, coupled with the reorganization of the  remaining BCTs in the continental United States, will have strategic,  operational, and cost implications. The decision will also alter existing  demands on the infrastructure, services, businesses and other aspects of  communities surrounding the affected installations. Thus, the Army  carried out a variety of analyses in order to inform its decision,  emphasizing key considerations such as supporting the strategic focus on  the Pacific, minimizing additional military construction costs, and  minimizing immediate readiness impacts. In addition, concerns about the  implications for local communities led to the Army obtaining input through  open meetings with communities around installations being considered  for stationing changes, which could provide useful lessons for obtaining  stakeholder support in future stationing decisions. The Army has  indicated it may use such meetings prior to future force structure  changes, but without assessing and establishing in guidance when it is  appropriate to obtain community input and how such efforts should be  conducted, the Army may miss opportunities to obtain input from  communities, and the installations themselves and their surrounding  communities may lack insight into the Army’s decisions on force structure  and stationing. Similarly, the Army’s use of its military value analysis  model is consistent with its use of the model for making previous major  stationing decisions. However, other actions the Army could take would  improve the model’s analytical rigor, credibility, and transparency, and  mitigate risk. For instance, without formalizing the military value analysis  model in its stationing process guidance or as part of other guidance,  including when it should be used and how it should be considered within  the stationing process, the transparency of the model’s role in stationing  decisions may be limited. Further, without established processes through  which key aspects of the model are reviewed and updated, and data  collected and validated, as well as guidance related to the level of  approval required for changes to the key elements of the model and how  non-contiguous training areas should be considered within the model, the  Army and external stakeholders may lack certainty as to the model’s  analytic rigor and stakeholder buy-in could be limited. Taking action now  could help the Army balance the need to ensure a methodologically  sound and rigorous process while considering both resources and risk to  ensure that stakeholders, including affected communities and  installations, can provide input into and understand the basis for its  stationing decisions.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of the Army take the following five  actions to improve the stationing process:  To obtain input from communities and installations affected by significant  stationing decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct  the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans to develop and  implement guidance related to when community listening sessions or  other similar efforts to obtain community input should be conducted and  incorporated as part of the Army’s process for making future stationing  decisions.
To better ensure the Army military value analysis model’s analytical rigor  and credibility, minimize risk, and further enhance the transparency of the  process used to make stationing decisions, we recommend that the  Secretary of the Army direct the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and  Plans, in coordination with the Center for Army Analysis, to take the  following four actions to formalize the model as part of its stationing  process:
Develop and implement guidance that establishes the circumstances  the model should be used in stationing decisions and update  stationing regulations or related documents accordingly;  key elements of the model or changes to the model require input  or approval from Army leaders, such as through the use of a  general officer steering committee; and, non-contiguous training areas should be considered within the  model that are specific to the stationing decision under  consideration and communicate those policies to subject matter  experts.
Establish and implement through guidance consistent formal  processes through which attributes and attribute definitions will be  deliberately reviewed and updated for use in the model, in  coordination with subject matter experts, and data will be collected  and validated for these attributes.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense for review  and comment. The Department of the Army provided written comments.  The Army concurred with all five of our recommendations and cited plans  to issue guidance through Army Pamphlet 5-10, which is currently being  developed to supplement Army Regulation 5-10, to address our  recommendations. The Army’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in  appendix IV. In addition, the Army provided technical comments, which  we have incorporated into the report as appropriate.
The Army concurred with our recommendation to develop and implement  guidance related to when community listening sessions or other similar  efforts to obtain community input should be conducted as part of the  Army’s process for making future stationing decisions. The Army stated  that it values community input into important decisions that impact  soldiers, civilians, families and local communities, and is planning to issue  guidance directing that stationing actions that meet a specific threshold  will include a staff recommendation for the Secretary of the Army on the  use of community meetings as a means to gather public input. We believe  that this is a positive step that will position the Army to take advantage of  opportunities to obtain community input for relevant future stationing  decisions.
The Army also concurred with our recommendations related to the  military value analysis model. Specifically, the Army concurred with our  recommendation to develop and implement guidance that establishes the  circumstances under which the model should be used in stationing  decisions. It noted that the military value analysis model is an important  decision support tool that it has used to inform all significant stationing  actions since the Base Realignment and Closure round in 2005. The  Army stated that it will issue guidance directing that the model will be  used to inform stationing decisions involving the activation, inactivation, or  relocation of a brigade size unit or other units that meet a certain  threshold. The Army additionally concurred with our recommendation to  develop and implement guidance that establishes the circumstances  under which key elements of the model or changes to the model require  input or approval from Army leaders, stating that it would issue guidance  directing that significant changes to the military value analysis model will  be reviewed by a general officer steering committee, chaired by the  Director of Force Management, prior to approval. We believe these  actions will enhance the transparency of the model’s role within the  stationing process and, to the extent that the guidance defines what  constitutes significant changes to the model, the process used to make  changes to the model, as well as better ensure the model’s rigor and  mitigate risk related to key decisions.
Further, the Army concurred with our recommendation to develop and  implement guidance that establishes the circumstances under which non- contiguous training areas should be considered within the model that are  specific to the stationing decision under consideration and communicate  those policies to subject matter experts. The Army stated that the quality  and quantity of training resources are important considerations in  stationing decisions, although not all training areas are equally  accessible, and that when non-contiguous training areas are included in  the military value analysis model, the assigned attribute score should  reflect all relevant aspects of the training area. In this regard, the Army  stated that it will issue guidance directing that the military value analysis  model attribute scores for installations with non-contiguous training areas  include a statement explaining the manner in which the non-contiguous  nature of the training area was given due consideration in the applicable  attribute scores. This planned action will provide greater transparency  with regard to how non-contiguous training areas are considered for  specific attributes.
Additionally, the Army concurred with our recommendation to establish  and implement through guidance consistent formal processes through  which attributes and attribute definitions will be deliberately reviewed and  updated for use in the model, in coordination with subject matter experts,  and data will be collected and validated for these attributes. The Army  noted that technology, tactics, and business practices are constantly  changing and improving and that, therefore, the military value analysis  model attributes should be regularly reviewed and, when appropriate,  updated. Along these lines, the Army stated that it will issue guidance  directing a regular review and update of the military value analysis model  attribute definitions and data, with reviews and updates occurring a  minimum of every two years. We believe that the Army’s plan to establish  regular reviews will better ensure that the model attribute definitions and  data used in the military value analysis model remain relevant and up-to- date for a changing environment while balancing the Army’s concerns  about time constraints surrounding certain stationing decisions.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30  days from the report date. At that time, we will distribute this report to the  Secretaries of Defense and the Army; the Director, Office of Management  and Budget; and appropriate congressional committees. The report also  will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To describe the analyses that the Army conducted to make  determinations regarding which brigade combat teams (BCTs) would be  inactivated or reorganized and at which U.S. installations, we identified  and examined regulations, briefings and other relevant documents  outlining the Army’s decision process and interviewed knowledgeable  Army officials about the Army’s decision process and the key factors that  were considered. Specifically, we reviewed the Army stationing  regulation, Army Regulation 5-10 on Stationing—the document that  establishes policies, procedures, and responsibilities for Army stationing  actions. We also examined documents related to the Army’s  environmental analysis, such as environmental regulations and the  Army’s programmatic environmental assessment of 21 installations, and  discussed this analysis with Army officials. Further, we examined  documentation related to the Army’s military value analysis model, such  as briefings and reports on the model, and interviewed Army officials to  determine how the model was used to inform the recent stationing  decision. In addition, we reviewed documents and briefings related to the  development and assessment of the stationing options the Army  considered as part of its decision process and interviewed Army officials  to discuss how the stationing options were analyzed in light of the  identified stationing factors and the process used to screen the stationing  options prior to the final Army decision. We also met Army officials to  discuss the methodology used to develop the military construction cost  estimates that were considered as part of the stationing options and how  other costs were considered as part of the Army’s analysis, but did not  review these cost estimates or analyses as they did not materially affect  our findings, recommendations, or conclusions. Further, we examined  briefings, orders, and other documentation related to the listening  sessions held at Army installations, such as summaries from the  meetings and information provided by installations, to obtain information  on community input used to inform these decisions and spoke with Army  officials regarding the extent to which they considered such information  as part of the stationing decision.
To evaluate the extent to which the Army has established guidance and  processes related to the use of the military value analysis model as a part  of its stationing decisions, including the recent BCT decision, we  examined the Army’s stationing guidance, stationing report to Congress,  and reports and briefings that documented previous uses of the model.  We examined and compared prior versions of the model and the current  model used for the recent BCT decision to determine if and how the  process for conducting the model, including the key elements of the  model, such as the attributes used within the model, and the review and  approval process for key elements of the model, has changed over time.  We reviewed documentation related to key elements of the current model,  such as the attributes that were included, weighting of the attributes, and  scoring of the attributes for each installation. We interviewed  knowledgeable officials at the Center for Army Analysis and Army Force  Management to discuss the development of the model, including how  attributes were identified, the factors that determine if an attribute would  be included in the model, and how weights for the attributes were  determined. Additionally, we interviewed knowledgeable officials about  how the key aspects of the model are reviewed, updated and if relevant,  approved, for each use of the model. We obtained and reviewed the  spreadsheet-based military value analysis model to examine the technical  components of the tool and how the tool is used to calculate the scores.  This included some general checks for basic internal consistency and  coherence of key elements in the tool as well as a general check of the  consistency of the tool with key documents, such as briefings and reports  related to the model. We also examined documents related to collecting  and validating the data used in the model, and interviewed subject matter  experts from various Army organizations who provided the data about  their role in developing the attributes’ definition and their methods and  processes used to collect and validate the data, but we did not validate  the data itself.
During the course of our review, we interviewed officials from the  following Army organizations:
Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Personnel G-1
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations G-3/5/7 (Force Management,  Training Support)
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics G-4 (Strategic Mobility Division and  Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Transportation  Engineering Agency)
Chief Information Officer G-6 (Installation Infrastructure Division)
Deputy Chief of Staff for Financial Management G-8 (Program  Analysis and Evaluation)
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy,  and Environment
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management
U.S. Army Installation Management Command
U.S. Army Environmental Command
Center for Army Analysis
Office of the Surgeon General/U.S. Army Medical Command
U.S. Army Aeronautical Services Agency  We conducted this performance audit from April 2013 through December  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Brigade Combat Team Inactivations and Projected Installation Population Changes
paragraphs: On June 25, 2013, the Army announced that it will be inactivating one  brigade combat team (BCT) from each of 10 different U.S. installations.  An additional 5 installations were considered as part of the Army’s  decision process, but these installations will not have a BCT inactivated at  this time. Table 2 shows the BCT inactivations by installation as well as  changes to the number of BCTs and projected population as a result of  these inactivations and other force structure changes.
section_title: Appendix III: Army’s Military Value Analysis Model Attributes
paragraphs: Table 3 identifies the 16 attributes used in the Army’s military value  analysis model that supported the Army’s brigade combat team (BCT)  inactivation decision and the definitions of each attribute.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of the Army
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact:
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments:
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Mark J. Wielgoszynski, Assistant  Director; Bonita P. Anderson; David Dornisch; Kasea Hamar; Michael  Shaughnessy; Erik Wilkins-McKee; and Weifei Zheng made key  contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Headquarters: DOD Needs to Reassess Options for Permanent  Location of U.S. Africa Command, GAO-13-646. (Washington, D.C.:  September 9, 2013).
Military Bases: DOD Has Processes to Comply with Statutory  Requirements for Closing or Realigning Installations, GAO-13-645.  (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2013).
Defense Infrastructure: Communities Need Additional Guidance and  Information to Improve Their Ability to Adjust to DOD Installation Closure  or Growth, GAO-13-436. (Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2013).
Defense Infrastructure: Improved Guidance Needed for Estimating  Alternatively Financed Project Liabilities. GAO-13-337. (Washington,  D.C.: April 18, 2013).
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Updated Costs and Savings  Estimates from BRAC 2005. GAO-12-709R. (Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2012).
Defense Infrastructure: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Navy’s Basing  Decision Process and DOD Oversight, GAO-10-482. (Washington, D.C.:  May 10, 2010).
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the  2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. (Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007).
Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and  Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905.  (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005).
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and  Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785.  (Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005).