Environmental Satellites: Focused Attention Needed to Improve Mitigation Strategies for Satellite Coverage Gaps
Published: 2013-09-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: As requested, this statement summarizes two reports being released today on (1) the JPSS program's status and plans, schedule quality, and gap mitigation strategies, and (2) the GOES-R series program's status, requirements management, and contingency planning.
Since the 1960s, the United States has used polar-orbiting and geostationary satellites to observe the earth and its land, ocean, atmosphere, and space environments. Polar-orbiting satellites constantly circle the earth in a nearly north-south orbit, providing global coverage of conditions that affect the weather and climate. As the earth rotates beneath it, each polar-orbiting satellite views the entire earth's surface twice a day. In contrast, geostationary satellites maintain a fixed position relative to the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in space.
Both types of satellites provide a valuable perspective of the environment and allow observations in areas that may be otherwise unreachable. Used in combination with ground, sea, and airborne observing systems, satellites have become an indispensable part of monitoring and forecasting weather and climate. For example, polar-orbiting satellites provide the data that go into numerical weather prediction models, which are a primary tool for forecasting weather days in advance--including forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes. Geostationary satellites provide the graphical images used to identify current weather patterns and provide short-term warning. These weather products and models are used to predict the potential impact of severe weather so that communities and emergency managers can help prevent and mitigate its effects.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has made progress on both the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) and Geostationary Operational Environment Satellite-R series (GOES-R) programs, but key challenges remain to ensure that potential gaps in satellite data are minimized or mitigated. On the JPSS program, NOAA has made noteworthy progress in using Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership (S-NPP) data in weather forecasts and developing the JPSS-1 satellite. However, NOAA does not expect to validate key S-NPP products until nearly 3 years after the satellite's launch, and there are remaining issues with the JPSS schedule that decrease the confidence that JPSS-1 will launch by March 2017 as planned. On the GOES-R program, progress in completing the system's design has been accompanied by continuing milestone delays, including delays in the launch dates for both the GOES-R and GOES-S satellites. The potential for further milestone delays also exists due to remaining weaknesses in developing and maintaining key program schedules. Faced with an anticipated gap in the polar satellite program and a potential gap in the geostationary satellite program, NOAA has taken steps to study alternatives and establish mitigation plans. However, the agency does not yet have comprehensive contingency plans that identify specific actions with defined timelines, and triggers. Until NOAA establishes comprehensive contingency plans that addresses these shortfalls, its plans for mitigating potential gaps may not be effective in avoiding significant impacts to its weather mission.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on two  satellite program acquisitions within the Department of Commerce’s  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Both the Joint  Polar Satellite System (JPSS) and the Geostationary Operational  Environment Satellite-R series (GOES-R) programs are meant to replace  current operational satellite programs, and both are considered critical to  the United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for  weather forecasting.
As requested, this statement summarizes our two reports being released  today on (1) the JPSS program’s status and plans, schedule quality, and  gap mitigation strategies, and (2) the GOES-R program’s status,  requirements management, and contingency planning. In preparing this  testimony, we relied on the work supporting those reports. They each  contain a detailed overview of our objectives, scope, and methodology,  including the steps we took to assess the reliability of cost and schedule  data. As noted in those reports, we found that the JPSS data on schedule  milestones and estimated savings, and GOES-R data on schedules and  cost reserves were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. All of our work  for the reports was performed in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the 1960s, the United States has used polar-orbiting and  geostationary satellites to observe the earth and its land, ocean,  atmosphere, and space environments. Polar-orbiting satellites constantly  circle the earth in a nearly north-south orbit, providing global coverage of  conditions that affect the weather and climate. As the earth rotates  beneath it, each polar-orbiting satellite views the entire earth’s surface  twice a day. In contrast, geostationary satellites maintain a fixed position  relative to the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in space.
Both types of satellites provide a valuable perspective of the environment  and allow observations in areas that may be otherwise unreachable.  Used in combination with ground, sea, and airborne observing systems,  satellites have become an indispensable part of monitoring and  forecasting weather and climate. For example, polar-orbiting satellites  provide the data that go into numerical weather prediction models, which  are a primary tool for forecasting weather days in advance—including  forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes. Geostationary satellites  provide the graphical images used to identify current weather patterns  and provide short-term warning. These weather products and models are  used to predict the potential impact of severe weather so that  communities and emergency managers can help prevent and mitigate its  effects.
Federal agencies are currently planning and executing major satellite  acquisition programs to replace existing polar and geostationary satellite  systems that are nearing the end of their expected life spans. However,  these programs have troubled legacies of cost increases, missed  milestones, technical problems, and management challenges that have  resulted in reduced functionality and major delays to planned launch  dates over time. We and others—including an independent review team  reporting to the Department of Commerce and its Inspector General— have raised concerns that problems and delays on environmental satellite  acquisition programs will result in gaps in the continuity of critical satellite  data used in weather forecasts and warnings. According to officials at  NOAA, a polar satellite data gap would result in less accurate and timely  weather forecasts and warnings of extreme events, such as hurricanes,  storm surge and floods. Such degradation in forecasts and warnings  would place lives, property, and our nation’s critical infrastructures in  danger. The importance of having such data available was highlighted in  2012 by the advance warnings of the path, timing, and intensity of  Superstorm Sandy. Given the criticality of satellite data to weather  forecasts, concerns that problems and delays on the new satellite  acquisition programs will result in gaps in the continuity of critical satellite  data, and the impact of such gaps on the health and safety of the U.S.  population, we concluded that the potential gap in weather satellite data is  a high-risk area and we added it to our High-Risk List in February 2013.
subsections: section_title: Events Leading to the JPSS Program
paragraphs: For over forty years, the United States has operated two separate  operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar- orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite series, which is managed by  NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, which is  managed by the Air Force. Currently, there is one operational Polar- orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite and two operational Defense  Meteorological Satellite Program satellites that are positioned so that they  cross the equator in the early morning, midmorning, and early afternoon.  In addition, the government relies on data from a European satellite,  called the Meteorological Operational satellite.
With the expectation that combining the Polar-orbiting Operational  Environmental Satellite program and the Defense Meteorological Satellite  Program would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a  May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and the  Department of Defense (DOD) to converge the two satellite programs into  a single satellite program—the National Polar-orbiting Operational  Environment Satellite System (NPOESS)—capable of satisfying both  civilian and military requirements. To manage this program, DOD, NOAA,  and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) formed a  tri-agency integrated program office. However, in the years after the  program was initiated, NPOESS encountered significant technical  challenges in sensor development, program cost growth, and schedule  delays. Specifically, within 8 years of the contract’s award, program costs  grew by over $8 billion, and launch schedules were delayed by over 5  years. In addition, as a result of a 2006 restructuring of the program, the  agencies reduced the program’s functionality by decreasing the number  of originally planned satellites, orbits, and instruments.
Even after this restructuring, however, the program continued to  encounter technical issues, management challenges, schedule delays,  and further cost increases. Therefore, in August 2009, the Executive  Office of the President formed a task force, led by the Office of Science  and Technology Policy, to investigate the management and acquisition  options that would improve the program. As a result of this review, the  Director of Office of Science and Technology Policy announced in  February 2010 that NOAA and DOD would no longer jointly procure  NPOESS; instead, each agency would plan and acquire its own satellite  system. Specifically, NOAA would be responsible for the afternoon orbit,  and DOD would be responsible for the early morning orbit. The  partnership with the European satellite agencies for the midmorning orbit  would continue as planned.
After the decision to disband NPOESS, DOD established its Defense Weather Satellite  System program office and modified its contracts accordingly before deciding in early  2012 to terminate the program and reassess its requirements (as directed by Congress). program will be $11.3 billion through fiscal year 2025. The current  anticipated launch date for the first JPSS satellite is March 2017, with a  second satellite to be launched in December 2022.
Over the last several years, we have issued a series of reports on the  NPOESS program—and the transition to JPSS—that highlight the  technical issues, cost growth, key management challenges, and key risks  of transitioning from NPOESS to JPSS. In these reports, we made  multiple recommendations to, among other things, improve executive- level oversight and establish mitigation plans for risks associated with  pending polar satellite data gaps. NOAA has taken steps to address our  recommendations, including taking action to improve executive-level  oversight and in working to establish a contingency plan to mitigate  potential gaps in polar satellite data. We subsequently assessed NOAA’s  progress in implementing both of these recommendations in our reports  being issued today.
section_title: Overview of the GOES-R Program
paragraphs: In addition to the polar-orbiting satellites, NOAA operates GOES as a  two-satellite geostationary satellite system that is primarily focused on the  United States. The GOES-R series is the next generation of satellites that  NOAA is planning; the satellites are planned to replace existing weather  satellites that will likely reach the end of their useful lives in about 2015.
NOAA is responsible for GOES-R program funding and overall mission  success. The NOAA Program Management Council, which is chaired by  NOAA’s Deputy Undersecretary, is the program oversight body for the  GOES-R program. However, since it relies on NASA’s acquisition  experience and technical expertise to help ensure the success of its  programs, NOAA implemented an integrated program management  structure with NASA for the GOES-R program. Within the program office,  there are two project offices that manage key components of the GOES-R  system. NOAA has delegated responsibility to NASA to manage the Flight  Project Office, including awarding and managing the spacecraft contract  and delivering flight-ready instruments to the spacecraft. The Ground  Project Office, managed by NOAA, oversees the Core Ground System  contract and satellite data product development and distribution.
NOAA has made a number of changes to the program since 2006,  including the removal of certain satellite data products and a critical  instrument (the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite). In February 2011, as  part of its fiscal year 2012 budget request, NOAA requested funding to  begin development for two additional satellites in the GOES-R series. The  program estimates that the development for all four satellites in the  GOES-R series is to cost $10.9 billion through 2036. In August 2013,  NOAA announced that it would delay the launch of the GOES-R and S  satellites from October 2015 and February 2017 to the second quarter of  fiscal year 2016 and the third quarter of fiscal year 2017, respectively.  These are the current anticipated launch dates of the first two GOES-R  satellites; the last satellite in the series is planned for launch in 2024.
In September 2010, we recommended that NOAA develop and document  continuity plans for the operation of geostationary satellites that include  the implementation procedures, resources, staff roles, and time tables  needed to transition to a single satellite, a foreign satellite, or other  solution. In September 2011, the GOES-R program provided a draft  plan documenting a strategy for conducting operations if there were only  a single operational satellite.
In June 2012, we reported that, in order to oversee GOES-R contingency  funding, senior managers at NOAA should have greater insight into the  amount of contingency reserves set aside for each satellite in the program and detailed information on how reserves are being used on  both the flight and ground components. We recommended that the  program assess and report to the NOAA Program Management Council  the reserves needed for completing remaining development for each  satellite in the series. We also found that unresolved schedule  deficiencies remain in portions of the program’s integrated master  schedule, including subordinate schedules for the spacecraft and core   We recommended that the program address shortfalls  ground system.in schedule management practices, and NOAA has since taken steps to  improve these practices. We subsequently assessed NOAA’s progress in  implementing both of these recommendations in our reports being issued  today.
section_title: The JPSS Program Has Made Progress, but Faces Development Challenges, Has Weaknesses in Schedule Quality, and Lacks a Comprehensive Contingency Plan
paragraphs: NOAA has made progress towards JPSS program objectives of  sustaining the continuity of NOAA’s polar-orbiting satellite capabilities  through the S-NPP, JPSS-1, and JPSS-2 satellites by (1) delivering  S-NPP data to weather forecasters and (2) completing significant  instrument and spacecraft development for the JPSS-1 satellite.  However, the program has experienced delays on the ground system  schedules for the JPSS-1 satellite. Moreover, the program is revising its  scope and objectives to reduce costs and prioritize NOAA’s weather  mission.
The JPSS program has made progress on S-NPP since its launch. For  example, in November 2012 the office completed an interim backup  command and control facility that could protect the health and safety of  the satellite if unexpected issues occurred at the primary mission  operations facility. Also, since completing satellite activation and  commissioning activities in March 2012, the JPSS program has been  working to calibrate and validate S-NPP products in order to make them  precise enough for use in weather-related operations by October 2013.  While the program office plans to have 18 products validated for  operational use by the end of September 2013, it is behind schedule for  other products. Specifically, the program expects to complete validating  35 S-NPP products by the end of September 2014 and one other product  by the end of September 2015, almost one and two years later than  originally planned.
In order to sustain polar-orbiting earth observation capabilities beyond  S-NPP, the program is working to complete development of the JPSS-1  systems in preparation for a March 2017 launch date. To manage this  initiative, the program office organized its responsibilities into two  separate projects: (1) the flight project, which includes sensors,  spacecraft, and launch vehicles and (2) the ground project, which  includes ground-based data processing and command and control  systems. JPSS projects and components are at various stages of system  development. The flight project has nearly completed instrument  hardware development for the JPSS-1 satellite and has begun testing  certain instruments. Key testing milestones and delivery dates for the  instruments and spacecraft have generally held constant since the last  key decision point in July 2012, and both the instruments and the  spacecraft are generally meeting expected technical performance. All  instruments are scheduled to be delivered to the spacecraft by 2014.  Also, the flight project completed a major design review for the JPSS-1  satellite’s spacecraft.
The JPSS ground project has also made progress in developing the  ground system components. However, the ground project experienced  delays in its planned schedule due to issues with the availability of  facilities required for hardware installation, software development, and  testing. Consequently, the program has replanned the ground project  schedule and is merging the next two major software releases. As a  result, any complications in the merged ground system upgrades could  affect the system’s readiness to support the JPSS-1 launch date.
While NOAA is moving forward to complete product development on the  S-NPP satellite and system development on the JPSS-1 satellite, the  agency recently made major revisions to the program’s scope and  planned capabilities and is moving to implement other scope changes as  it finalizes its plans pending coordination with congressional committees.  We previously reported that, as part of its fiscal year 2013 budget  process, NOAA was considering removing selected elements of the  program in order to reduce total program costs from $14.6 billion to $12.9  billion. By October 2012, NOAA had reduced the program’s scope by,  among other things, reducing the previously planned network of fifteen  ground-based receptor stations to two receptor sites at the north pole and  two sites at the south pole and increasing the time it takes to obtain  satellite data and deliver it to the end user on JPSS-2 from 30 minutes to  80 minutes. More recently, as proposed by the administration, NOAA  began implementing additional changes in the program’s scope and  objectives in order to meet the agency’s highest-priority needs for  weather forecasting and reduce program costs from $12.9 billion to $11.3  billion. In this latest round of revisions, NOAA revised the program’s  scope by, among other things, transferring requirements for certain  climate sensors to NASA, creating a new Polar Free Flyer program within  NOAA that would be responsible for missions supporting continued solar  measurements and user service systems, and reducing the JPSS  program’s mission life cycle by 3 years—from 2028 to 2025. The changes  NOAA implemented over the last 2 years will have an impact on those  who rely on polar satellite data. Specifically, satellite data products will be  delivered more slowly than anticipated because of the reduction in the  number of ground stations, and military users may not obtain the variety  of products once anticipated at the rates anticipated because of the  removal of their ground-based processing subsystems. As NOAA moves  to implement these program changes, it will be important to assess and  understand the impact the changes will have on satellite data users.
subsections: section_title: Integration Problems and Other Weaknesses Reduce JPSS Schedule Quality and Confidence
paragraphs: According to our draft guidance on best practices in scheduling,success of a program depends, in part, on having an integrated and  reliable master schedule that defines when and how long work will occur  and how each activity is related to the others. The JPSS program office  provided a preliminary integrated master schedule in June 2013, but this  schedule is incomplete. The schedule contains the scope of work for key  program components, such as the JPSS-1 and JPSS-2 satellites and the  ground system, and cites linkages to more detailed component  schedules. However, significant weaknesses exist in the program’s  schedule. Specifically, about one-third of the schedule is missing logical  relationships called dependencies that are needed to depict the sequence   the  in which activities occur. Complete network logic between all activities is  essential if the schedule is to correctly forecast the start and end dates of  activities within the plan. Program documentation acknowledges that this  schedule is not yet complete and the program office plans to refine it over  time. Until the program office completes its integrated schedule and  includes logically linked sequences of activities, it will lack the information  it needs to effectively monitor development progress, manage  dependencies, and forecast the JPSS-1 satellite’s completion and launch.
While the program plans to refine its integrated master schedule, three  component schedules supporting the JPSS-1 mission—VIIRS, the  spacecraft, and the ground system—varied in their implementation of  characteristics of high-quality, reliable schedules. Each schedule had  strengths and weaknesses with respect to sound scheduling practices,  but VIIRS was a stronger schedule with fewer weaknesses compared to  the ground system and spacecraft schedules. The following table  identifies the quality of each of the selected JPSS-1 component  schedules based on the extent to which they met ten best practices of  high-quality and reliable schedules.
The inconsistency in quality among the three schedules has multiple  causes, including the lack of documented explanations for certain  practices and schedule management and reporting requirements that  varied across contractors. Since the reliability of an integrated schedule  depends in part on the reliability of its subordinate schedules, schedule  quality weaknesses in these schedules will transfer to an integrated  master schedule derived from them. Consequently, the extent to which  there are quality weaknesses in JPSS-1 support schedules further  constrains the program’s ability to monitor progress, manage key  dependencies, and forecast completion dates. Until the program office  addresses the scheduling shortfalls in its component schedules, it will  lack the information it needs to effectively monitor development progress,  manage dependencies, and forecast the JPSS-1 satellite’s completion  and launch.
The JPSS program office used data from flight project component  schedules as inputs when it recently conducted a schedule risk analysis  on the JPSS-1 mission schedule (and launch date) through NASA’s joint  cost and schedule confidence level (JCL) process. The JCL  implemented by the JPSS program office represents a best practice in  schedule management for establishing a credible schedule and reflects a  robust schedule risk analysis conducted on key JPSS-1 schedule  components. Based on the results of the JCL, the program office reports  that its level of confidence in the JPSS-1 schedule is 70 percent and that  it has sufficient schedule reserve to maintain a launch date of no later  than March 2017. However, the program office’s level of confidence in the  JPSS-1 schedule may be overly optimistic for two key reasons. First, the  model that the program office used was based on flight project activities  rather than an integrated schedule consisting of flight, ground, program  office, and other activities relevant to the development and launch of  JPSS-1. As a result, the JPSS program office’s confidence level  projections do not factor in the ongoing scheduling issues that are  impacting the ground project. Second, there are concerns regarding the  spacecraft schedule’s quality as identified above. Factoring in these  concerns, the confidence of the JPSS-1 satellite’s schedule and projected  launch date would be lower. Until the program office conducts a schedule  risk analysis on an integrated schedule that includes the entire scope of  effort and addresses quality shortfalls of relevant component schedules, it  will have less assurance of meeting the planned March 2017 launch date  for JPSS-1.
section_title: NOAA Has Analyzed Alternatives for Addressing Gaps in Satellite Data, but Lacks a Comprehensive Contingency Plan
paragraphs: In recent years, NOAA officials have communicated publicly and often  about the risk of a polar satellite data gap. Currently, the program  estimates that there will be a gap of about a year and a half from the time  when the current Suomi NPP satellite reaches the end of its expected  lifespan and when the JPSS-1 satellite will be in orbit and operational.  Satellite data gaps in the morning or afternoon polar orbits would lead to  less accurate and timely weather forecasting; as a result, advanced  warning of extreme events—such as hurricanes, storm surges, and  floods—would be affected. See figure 1 for a depiction of a potential gap  in the afternoon orbit lasting 17 months.
Government and industry best practices call for the development of  contingency plans to maintain an organization’s essential functions in the  case of an adverse event and to reduce or control negative impacts from  such risks. In October 2012, in response to our earlier  recommendations to establish mitigation plans,mitigation plan to address the impact of potential gaps in polar afternoon   NOAA established a  satellite data. This plan identifies alternatives for mitigating the risk of a  14- to 18-month gap in the afternoon orbit beginning in March 2016,  between the current polar satellite and the JPSS-1 satellite. However,  NOAA did not implement the actions identified in its mitigation plan and  decided to identify additional alternatives. In October 2012, at the  direction of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and  Atmosphere (who is also the Administrator of NOAA), NOAA contracted  for a detailed technical assessment of alternatives to mitigate the  degradation of products caused by a gap in satellite data in the afternoon  polar orbit. This assessment solicited input from experts within and  outside of NOAA and resulted in a range of alternatives that included  relying on existing polar satellites, making improvements to the forecast  models, and relying on the use of a foreign satellite.
By documenting its mitigation plan and conducting a study on additional  alternatives, NOAA has taken positive steps towards establishing a  contingency plan for handling the potential impact of satellite data gaps in  the afternoon polar orbit. However, NOAA does not yet have a  comprehensive contingency plan because it has not yet selected the  strategies to be implemented or established procedures and actions to  implement the selected strategies. In addition, there are shortfalls in the  agency’s current plans as compared to government and industry best  practices, such as not always identifying specific actions with defined  roles and responsibilities, timelines, and triggers. Moreover, multiple  steps remain in testing, validating, and implementing the contingency  plan. NOAA officials stated that the agency is continuing to work on  refinements to its gap mitigation plan, and that they anticipate issuing an  updated plan in fall 2013 that will reflect the additional alternatives. While  NOAA expects to update its plan, the agency does not yet have a  schedule for adding key elements—such as specific actions, roles and  responsibilities, timelines, and triggers—for each alternative. Until NOAA  establishes a comprehensive contingency plan that integrates its  strategies and addresses the elements identified above to improve its  plans, it may not be sufficiently prepared to mitigate potential gaps in  polar satellite coverage.
section_title: GOES-R Has Made Development Progress, but Continues to Experience Milestone Delays and Weaknesses in Scheduling Practices and Contingency Planning
paragraphs: The GOES-R program has completed its design and made progress in  building flight and ground components. Specifically, the program  completed critical design reviews for the flight and ground projects and for  the overall program between April and November 2012. The GOES-R  flight components are in various stages leading up to the system  integration review, with five of six completing a key environmental testing  review. In addition, the program began building the spacecraft in February  2013. On the GOES-R core ground system, a prototype for the operations  module was delivered in late 2012 and is now being used for initial testing  and training.
The program has also installed antenna dishes at NOAA’s primary  satellite communications site, and completed two key reviews of antennas  at the GOES remote backup site. After the completion of design, and as  the spacecraft and instruments are developed, NASA plans to conduct  several interim reviews and tests before proceeding to the next major  program-level review, the system integration review.
However, the program has delayed several key milestones. Over the past  12 to 18 months, both the flight and ground segments experienced delays  in planned dates for programwide milestones. More recently, in August  2013, the program announced that it would delay the launch of the first  two satellites in the program. Specifically, the launch of the GOES-R  satellite would be delayed from October 2015 to the quarter ending March  2016, and that the expected GOES-S satellite launch date would be  delayed from February 2017 to the quarter ending June 2017.
The GOES-R program is also experiencing technical issues on the flight  and ground projects that could cause further schedule delays. For  example, the electronics unit of the Geostationary Lightning Mapper flight  instrument experienced problems during testing, which led the program  office to delay the tests. The program is considering several options to  address this issue, including using the electronics unit being developed  for a later GOES-R satellite to allow key components to proceed with  testing. If the issue cannot be resolved, it would affect the instrument’s  performance. As a result, the program is also considering excluding the  Geostationary Lightning Mapper from the first GOES-R satellite. It plans  to make its decision on whether or not to include the instrument in late  2013. The removal of this instrument would cause a significant reduction  in the satellite’s functionality.
The program has reported that it is on track to stay within its $10.9 billion  life cycle cost estimate. However, program officials reported that, while  the program is currently operating without cost overruns on any of its  main components, program life cycle costs may increase by $150 to $300  million if full funding in the current fiscal year is not received.
While some improvements have been made, the GOES-R program  continues to demonstrate weaknesses in the development of component  schedules, which have the potential to cause further delays in meeting  milestone timelines. In the time since our previous work on examining  program schedules in June 2012, it has since improved selected  practices on its spacecraft and core ground schedules. For example,  NOAA has since included all subcontractor activities in the core ground  schedule, and allocated a higher percentage of activities to resources in  its schedules. As a result of these improvements, the program has  increased the reliability of its schedules, and also decreased the risk of  further delaying satellite launch dates due to incorrect schedule data.
However, the program’s performance on other scheduling best practices  stayed the same or worsened. For example, both the spacecraft and core  ground schedules have issues with sequencing remaining activities and  integration between activities. Without the right linkages, activities that  slip early in the schedule do not transmit delays to activities that should  depend on them. Both schedules also have a very high average of total  float time for detailed activities. Such high values of total float time can  falsely depict true project status, making it difficult to determine which  activities drive key milestone dates. Finally, the project’s critical path does  not match up with activities that make up the driving path on the core  ground schedule. Without a valid critical path to the end of the schedule,  management cannot focus on activities that will have a detrimental effect  on the key project milestones and deliveries if they slip.
Taken together, delays in key milestones, technical issues, and  weaknesses in schedule practices could lead to further delays in the  launch date of the first GOES-R satellite, currently planned to occur by  March 2016.
subsections: section_title: Launch Delays Increase the Risk of a Satellite Coverage Gap, and Weaknesses in Contingency Plans Increase the Impact of a Coverage Gap
paragraphs: Launch delays such as the one recently experienced by the GOES-R  program also increase the time that NOAA is without an on-orbit backup  satellite. This is significant because, in April 2015, NOAA expects to retire  one of its operational satellites and move its back-up satellite into  operations. The recent delay in expected launch of the first GOES-R  satellite from October 2015 to as late as March 2016 increases the  projected gap in backup coverage to just short of two years. Also, the first  satellite is now expected to complete its post-launch testing by  September 2016, only five months before NOAA expects to retire the  GOES-15 satellite. If launch of the first satellite were to have a further slip  of more than five months, a gap in satellite coverage could occur. Figure  2 shows current anticipated operational and test periods for the two most  recent series of GOES satellites.
Because of the expected imminent use of the current on-orbit back-up  satellite, a launch delay to GOES-R would also increase the potential for  a gap in GOES satellite coverage should one of the two operational  satellites (GOES-14 or -15) fail prematurely (see graphic)—a scenario  given a 36 percent likelihood of occurring by an independent review team.  Without a full complement of operational GOES satellites, the nation’s  ability to maintain the continuity of data required for effective weather  forecasting could be compromised. This, in turn, could put the public,  property, and the economy at risk.
The impact of a gap in satellite coverage may also increase based on  issues with NOAA’s current contingency plans. Government and industry  best practices call for the development of contingency plans to maintain  an organization’s essential functions in the case of an adverse event.
These practices include key elements such as identifying and selecting  strategies to address failure scenarios, developing procedures to  implement selected strategies, and involving affected stakeholders.
NOAA has established contingency plans for the loss of its GOES  satellites and ground systems that are generally in accordance with best  practices. Specifically, NOAA identified failure scenarios, recovery  priorities, and minimum levels of acceptable performance. NOAA  provided a final version of its satellite plan in December 2012 that  included scenarios for three, two, and one operational satellites. It also  established contingency plans that identify solutions and high-level  activities and triggers to implement the solutions.
However, these plans are missing key elements. For example, NOAA has  not demonstrated that the contingency strategies for both its satellite and  ground systems are based on an assessment of costs, benefits, and  impact on users. Furthermore, NOAA did not work with the user  community to address potential reductions in capabilities under  contingency scenarios or identify alternative solutions for preventing a  delay in the GOES-R launch date. In addition, while NOAA’s failure  scenarios for its satellite system are based on the number of available  satellites—and the loss of a backup satellite caused by a delayed GOES- R launch would fit into these scenarios—the agency did not identify  alternative solutions or time lines for preventing a GOES-R launch delay.  Until NOAA addresses the shortfalls in its contingency plans and  procedures, the plans may not work as intended in an emergency and  satellite data users may not obtain the information they need to perform  their missions.
section_title: Implementation of Recommendations Should Help Mitigate Program Risks
paragraphs: Both the JPSS and GOES-R programs continue to carry risks of future  launch delays and potential gaps in satellite coverage; implementing the  recommendations in our accompanying reports should help mitigate  those risks. In the JPSS report being released today, we recommend,  among other things, that NOAA establish a complete JPSS program integrated master schedule that  includes a logically linked sequence of activities; address the shortfalls in the ground system and spacecraft  component schedules outlined in our report; after completing the integrated master schedule and addressing  shortfalls in component schedules, update the joint cost and schedule  confidence level for JPSS-1, if warranted and justified; and establish a comprehensive contingency plan for potential satellite data  gaps in the polar orbit that is consistent with contingency planning  best practices identified in our report. The plan should include, for  example, specific contingency actions with defined roles and  responsibilities, timelines, and triggers; analysis of the impact of lost  data from the morning orbits; and identification of opportunities to  accelerate the calibration and validation phase of JPSS-1.
In the GOES-R report being released today, we recommend, among  other things, that NOAA given the likely gap in availability of an on-orbit GOES backup satellite  in 2015 and 2016, address the weaknesses identified in our report on  the core ground system and the spacecraft schedules. These  weaknesses include, but are not limited to, sequencing all activities,  ensuring there are adequate resources for the activities, and  conducting a schedule risk analysis and  revise the satellite and ground system contingency plans to address  weaknesses identified in our report, including providing more  information on the potential impact of a satellite failure, identifying  alternative solutions for preventing a delay in GOES-R launch as well  as time lines for implementing those solutions, and coordinating with  key external stakeholders on contingency strategies.
On both reports, NOAA agreed with our recommendations and identified  steps it is taking to implement them.
In summary, NOAA has made progress on both the JPSS and GOES-R  programs, but key challenges remain to ensure that potential gaps in  satellite data are minimized or mitigated. On the JPSS program, NOAA  has made noteworthy progress in using S-NPP data in weather forecasts  and developing the JPSS-1 satellite. However, NOAA does not expect to  validate key S-NPP products until nearly 3 years after the satellite’s  launch, and there are remaining issues with the JPSS schedule that  decrease the confidence that JPSS-1 will launch by March 2017 as  planned. On the GOES-R program, progress in completing the system’s  design has been accompanied by continuing milestone delays, including  delays in the launch dates for both the GOES-R and GOES-S satellites.  The potential for further milestone delays also exists due to remaining  weaknesses in developing and maintaining key program schedules.  Faced with an anticipated gap in the polar satellite program and a  potential gap in the geostationary satellite program, NOAA has taken  steps to study alternatives and establish mitigation plans. However, the  agency does not yet have comprehensive contingency plans that identify  specific actions with defined timelines, and triggers. Until NOAA  establishes comprehensive contingency plans that addresses these  shortfalls, its plans for mitigating potential gaps may not be effective in  avoiding significant impacts to its weather mission.
Chairman Broun, Chairman Stewart, Ranking Member Maffei, Ranking  Member Bonamici, and Members of the Subcommittees, this completes  my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions  that you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony, please  contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov.  Other key contributors include Colleen Phillips (assistant director), Shaun  Byrnes, Lynn Espedido, Nancy Glover, Franklin Jackson, Joshua Leiling,  and Meredith Raymond.
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