Truck Safety: Share the Road Safely Pilot Initiative Showed Promise, but the Program's Future Success Is Uncertain
Published: 2006-09-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 2004, over 5,000 people died on our nation's roads in crashes involving large trucks. The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) operates truck safety programs, including Share the Road Safely (STRS), which has a goal to improve driving behavior around large trucks. At congressional direction, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) assumed responsibility for funding STRS in 2004, but returned STRS to FMCSA in 2006. The current transportation authorization bill requested GAO to update its 2003 evaluation of STRS. This report (1) describes the STRS initiatives DOT has implemented since 2003 and their design, (2) reviews evaluations of STRS initiatives, and (3) assesses DOT's plans for the future of STRS. GAO interviewed DOT and state officials, and reviewed program plans and evaluations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: During 2004 and 2005, Share the Road Safely funding was used to implement one initiative, a pilot in Washington State that focused on aggressive driving behaviors near or by large trucks. Known as Ticketing Aggressive Cars and Trucks (TACT), it combined education, such as highway message signs, and high-visibility law enforcement to reduce aggressive driving. TACT received about $892,000 in federal and state funds. TACT was generally modeled on successful behavior modification programs, including Click It or Ticket (a program to encourage safety belt use), but was more complex to implement than past initiatives since many behaviors constitute aggressive driving and Washington State lacked a single aggressive driving law. In addition, NHTSA sought to demonstrate to FMCSA staff how to operate similar initiatives in the future. To this end, FMCSA sent a liaison to NHTSA as requested by Congress. Lastly, initiatives that were a part of STRS in 2003 were still pursued by FMCSA, but were not funded. DOT and Washington State officials conducted an evaluation of TACT that demonstrated that the initiative was successful and well-designed. The evaluation found that TACT significantly reduced the number and severity of unsafe driving acts near or by trucks. While the evaluation did not assess changes in crashes, improved driver behavior should logically lead to fewer crashes, injuries, and fatalities. GAO found that TACT's design of combining education with law enforcement better lent itself to reaching agency goals of fatality reduction than previous STRS initiatives that were purely educational. FMCSA plans to expand development of new TACT-like initiatives, but lacks resources and experience to do so. In addition, FMCSA plans to spend most of its 2006 STRS funds on educational initiatives, which lack information showing whether they improve driver behavior. In terms of TACT expansion, FMCSA is currently developing a TACT-like pilot in Pennsylvania and plans to roll out initiatives similar to TACT nationally by 2009. FMCSA, however, has few people dedicated to education and outreach and lacks NHTSA's experience with behavior modification initiatives. While FMCSA designated a liaison to learn about TACT-like initiatives, GAO continues to have concerns about FMCSA's limited experience with these initiatives. NHTSA has considerable experience with such initiatives, but its role in STRS is still evolving. Finally, FMCSA plans to spend the majority of its fiscal year 2006 STRS funds on initiatives that do not have evaluations showing their impacts.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In 2004, over 42,000 people died on our nation’s roads. About 12 percent  (5,190) of these fatalities occurred in collisions involving large commercial  trucks, in which many more occupants were killed in the other vehicles  than in the trucks. Furthermore, large-truck traffic has increased  significantly (33 percent) from 1994 through 2004. This trend seems likely  to continue as the Transportation Research Board estimates that truck  traffic will increase by 3.5 percent annually. However, according to the  Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Large Truck Crash Causation  Study, passenger-vehicle drivers were responsible for the majority of these  large commercial truck crashes. The study found that specific passenger- vehicle driver behaviors, such as driving too fast for road conditions and  making illegal maneuvers, contributed significantly to crashes involving  large commercial trucks.
Within DOT, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) is  responsible for improving the safety of commercial-vehicle operations,  which include interstate truck and motor coach (bus) companies, while the  National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has a mission to  reduce deaths, injuries, and economic losses resulting from motor vehicle  crashes. FMCSA has set a safety goal to reduce the rate of fatalities from an  estimated 2.81 per 100 million truck-miles traveled in 1996 to no more than  1.65 by the end of 2008. In 2004, the fatality rate for truck-related crashes  was 2.3 per 100 million truck-miles traveled. To work toward its 2008 goal,  FMCSA leads enforcement efforts such as working with and providing  grants to states to enforce Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. In  addition, FMCSA operates several education and outreach programs. Share  the Road Safely (STRS) is one such program that aims to support FMCSA’s  goal by educating and changing the driving behavior of both passenger- vehicle and truck drivers so that they may interact safely with one another  on the road. NHTSA sets and enforces safety standards for motor vehicles  and motor vehicle equipment and provides grants to states to improve  passenger-vehicle driver safety.
In recent years, we raised concerns about FMCSA’s education and outreach  efforts. In 2003, we reported that STRS lacked a clear program strategy and  included activities that were only tenuously linked to program goals. We  also reported that FMCSA had not recently evaluated the program’s  effectiveness. Consequently, we recommended that DOT ensure that STRS  initiatives are directly linked to the program’s goals, and that DOT establish  a systematic process for evaluating the program’s effectiveness. We also  suggested that FMCSA apply strategies used by other parts of DOT, such as  NHTSA, to its evaluations of STRS. In fiscal year 2004, Congress  transferred funding for the program to NHTSA, an agency that sets and  enforces safety standards for motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment  and provides grants to states to improve passenger-vehicle driver safety.  Additionally, the Conference Report accompanying the DOT appropriations  act for fiscal year 2004 indicates the conferees wanted NHTSA and FMCSA  to apply lessons learned from NHTSA’s experience with high-visibility law  enforcement campaigns to STRS to educate drivers on how to drive safely  around large trucks. The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient  Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU)—which  authorized the federal surface transportation programs for highways,  highway safety, and transit between 2005 and 2009—annually provided $3  million to NHTSA and $1 million to FMCSA for administering education  and outreach activities associated with commercial-vehicle safety, such as  STRS. The Conference Report accompanying the DOT appropriations act  for fiscal year 2006, however, indicates that the conferees allocated the  entire $4 million for education and outreach activities associated with  commercial-vehicle safety to FMCSA, including $500,000 for STRS  initiatives.
SAFETEA-LU also asked us to update our 2003 evaluation of STRS to  determine if the program has achieved reductions in the number and  severity of commercial motor vehicle crashes, including reductions in the  number of deaths and the severity of injuries sustained in these crashes. To  update our 2003 STRS report and assess the impact of the program on the  interaction between large commercial trucks and passenger vehicles, we  (1) describe what STRS initiatives DOT has implemented since 2003 and  assess whether its initiatives are reasonably designed; (2) review the  results of DOT evaluations of STRS initiatives and assess the evaluation  methods; and (3) assess DOT’s plans for the future of STRS initiatives.
To determine how STRS has changed since 2003 and whether the design of  its initiatives is reasonable, we interviewed DOT officials and reviewed  agency documents. Additionally, we interviewed FMCSA, NHTSA, and local  officials involved in the operation of the STRS pilot initiative in Washington  State and reviewed related program documents. We examined the design of  the Washington State pilot to determine how it compares with other  initiatives intended to modify driver behavior, and whether the pilot’s  activities links to agency goals. We did not assess the design of other STRS  initiatives because they were not funded in 2004 and 2005, and we reported  on these initiatives in our 2003 report. To determine what the evaluation of  STRS pilot initiative showed, we reviewed evaluation plans and evaluation  results and spoke with DOT and state officials responsible for conducting  the evaluation. We also compared DOT’s evaluation approach with  accepted evaluation methods. Although SAFETEA-LU asked us to  determine if STRS achieved reductions in the number of deaths and the  severity of injuries sustained in commercial-vehicle crashes, DOT’s  evaluation did not assess these outcomes because the number of fatalities  and injuries on DOT’s study corridors were too low to reliably measure any  appreciable change. Therefore, we did not discuss in this report STRS’s  impact on specific numbers of fatalities and injuries. To assess DOT’s  future plans for STRS, we interviewed program administrators at DOT and  reviewed provided budget and planning documents. We also compared the  planned initiatives (1) with high-visibility law enforcement campaign  models, shown to change behavior by prior research, to assess their  implementation and (2) with the initiatives described in our prior report to  see how they have evolved. We conducted our review from October 2005  through July 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Appendix I provides additional details of our scope and  methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The occupants of other vehicles are several times more likely to die in  crashes involving large commercial trucks than the occupants of the  trucks. From 1995 through 2004, there were 51,791 people killed in large- truck crashes. Of this total, 40,438 were occupants of other vehicles, while  7,131 were the occupants of large trucks and 4,222 were nonmotorists,  such as pedestrians. Figure 1 shows the number of passenger-vehicle and  large-truck occupants killed in collisions involving large trucks from 1995  through 2004, according to NHTSA’s Fatality Analysis Reporting System.
In 2004, we presented information on traffic fatalities using data contained in NHTSA’s  Fatality Analysis Reporting System database. We determined that these data were  sufficiently reliable for reporting purposes. See GAO, Highway Safety: Federal and State  Efforts to Address Rural Road Safety Challenges, GAO-04-663 (Washington, D.C.: May 28,  2004).
section_title: During 2004 and 2005, the Share the Road Safely Program Funded a Reasonably Designed Education and Enforcement Pilot in Washington State
paragraphs: During 2004 and 2005, NHTSA funded the Share the Road Safely program  and implemented an aggressive driving pilot initiative in Washington State.  Known as Ticketing Aggressive Cars and Trucks (TACT), it combined  education and law enforcement activities in an effort to reduce aggressive  driving between passenger vehicles and trucks. Another objective of the  pilot was for NHTSA to show FMCSA staff how to operate similar  initiatives in the future. TACT generally conformed to the proven high- visibility law enforcement model, although it dealt with more complex  issues than previous high-visibility law enforcement campaigns. TACT’s  design and implementation linked to the STRS goal of changing driver  behavior, whereas past STRS initiatives sometimes did not link to goals or  were not designed to maximize the potential for success. In addition,  Congress requested FMCSA to use a liaison to facilitate the transfer of  knowledge about high-visibility law enforcement campaigns from NHTSA  to FMCSA. Lastly, educational initiatives that were a part of STRS in 2003  were pursued by FMCSA, although not funded under NHTSA in 2004 and  2005.
subsections: section_title: DOT Helped Establish and Operate an Aggressive Driving Pilot Initiative in Washington State
paragraphs: According to DOT officials, Share the Road Safely program funding has  supported an aggressive driving pilot initiative in Washington State starting  in 2004. In 2004, DOT selected Washington State for the pilot initiative and  signed a cooperative agreement with the Washington Traffic Safety  Commission. The pilot, known as TACT, combined high-visibility law  enforcement waves with education and outreach activities in an effort to  reduce aggressive driving between passenger-vehicle and large-truck  drivers. TACT focused on four interstate highway corridors, each covering  a distance of approximately 25 miles. (See fig. 2.) Two intervention  corridors in the western part of the state received media messages and 2  weeks of increased, high-visibility law enforcement waves in July and  September, 2005, while two comparison corridors did not. During these  waves, law enforcement officers patrolled the intervention corridors in  marked and unmarked patrol cars, in state patrol aerial units when weather  permitted, and from the cabs of semitrucks to target unsafe driving around  large trucks.
The TACT pilot initiative used paid radio advertising and earned media,  such as local news coverage, to inform the targeted audience of the  dangers of aggressive driving related to trucks and to announce that law  enforcement officers would issue tickets for such behavior. TACT’s radio  advertisement was aired over 6,000 times during the course of the  enforcement waves, and eight local television stations dedicated coverage  to the pilot. Figure 3 shows an example of the earned media coverage.
DOT officials said they selected Washington State to participate in this pilot  because of the state’s experience with other related safety initiatives, its  accurate fatality and crash database, and its strong relationships with key  stakeholders. TACT built upon a previous STEP model campaign, Step Up  and R.I.D.E., which operated in Washington for several years. In the Step  Up and R.I.D.E. program, Washington partnered with the local trucking  industry to periodically place police officers in commercial vehicles to  identify and issue citations to drivers observed committing offenses. DOT  officials also stated that Washington has shown itself capable of  successfully implementing and evaluating a high-visibility law enforcement  campaign—specifically its Click It or Ticket campaign, which in 2002  increased safety belt use from about 80 percent to 95 percent. Additionally,  DOT cited Washington as having good data on crashes and fatalities. In a  2005 report, we also recognized that Washington has very good cooperation  among state agencies involved in crash data collection and reporting, and a  strong relationship with its FMCSA division office. Finally, according to  DOT officials, a particular strength of Washington is that the Washington  Traffic Safety Commission, the lead organization in implementing the TACT  initiative, comprises multiple state agencies, including all of the agencies  that are participating in TACT, thus setting the stage for easy coordination  and cooperation among participating agencies.
Federal, state, and local organizations participated in and contributed  about $892,000 for the planning and operation of TACT. A steering  committee led by the Washington Traffic Safety Commission planned and  administered the pilot project. Other partners on the steering committee  included the Washington DOT, the Washington State Patrol, the Association  of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs, and the Washington Trucking Association.  Officials on the steering committee believed having all of these groups  involved in developing the pilot was important to the successful  implementation of the pilot. The Washington Traffic Safety Commission  also contributed $118,000 to the pilot for project management and  communications. Local and state police made officers available for the  enforcement waves, and the Washington Trucking Association worked with  trucking companies to provide decoy trucks and drivers. NHTSA provided  considerable assistance in developing and implementing the initiative and  supplied the majority of TACT’s funding, awarding $497,000 in fiscal year  2004 and an additional $68,000 for evaluation activities in fiscal year 2005.  Congress also provided NHTSA with an additional $99,000 for the TACT  initiative in fiscal year 2005. FMCSA did TACT’s initial planning and  provided ongoing assistance, including reviewing plans. It also provided  $100,000 in fiscal year 2005 for TACT’s enforcement efforts through  MCSAP.
section_title: FMCSA Sought to Learn How to Operate a High- Visibility Law Enforcement Campaign
paragraphs: DOT officials told us that a goal for FMCSA in the TACT initiative was to  gain institutional knowledge on the operation of high-visibility law  enforcement campaigns, such as Click It or Ticket. These campaigns  combine education and outreach activities with high-visibility law  enforcement to bring about a change in driver behavior. Our 2003 report  stated that highway safety experts agree that attempts to modify behavior  are more effective when educational and enforcement efforts are used  together. However, the STRS initiatives we identified in our 2003 report  were purely educational. The report added that FMCSA could improve  STRS by drawing from NHTSA’s considerable experience with high- visibility law enforcement campaigns like Click It or Ticket, which has been  widely considered effective in increasing the rate of safety belt use.  Furthermore, a NHTSA evaluation report found that 10 states that used the  Click It or Ticket model had significantly greater increases in safety belt  use compared with states that attempted to increase safety belt use  through other initiatives. TACT offered FMCSA an opportunity to learn  from NHTSA’s experience with high-visibility law enforcement campaigns  and learn how to develop similar aggressive driving initiatives in other  states. To further ensure this transfer of knowledge as requested by  conferees in the Conference Report accompanying its 2005 appropriations  act, FMCSA hired and detailed a staff member to NHTSA to act as a  communications liaison for STRS. The liaison was involved in some facets  of TACT, including meeting with its steering committee and preparing  briefings on the pilot. According to DOT officials, however, the liaison  came aboard after the completion of the last enforcement wave—later in  this report, we discuss this matter further in relation to the future of STRS  initiatives.
section_title: Pilot Generally Conformed to the Proven High-Visibility Law Enforcement Campaign Model with Some Variation, but Dealt with More Complex Issues
paragraphs: Our analysis of TACT’s design and implementation shows that it generally  conformed to the high-visibility law enforcement campaign model as  intended, but varied in a few aspects. Specifically, TACT was modeled after  NHTSA’s Click It or Ticket campaign. In modeling Click It or Ticket’s  approach, officials in the TACT program collected data before and after its  enforcement waves to identify behavior changes; it had highly visible  enforcement on each day of its enforcement waves; and it had used both  paid and earned media to publicize its enforcement.
TACT did deviate from the Click It or Ticket model in two ways. First, the  pilot did not use paid television advertising. Washington State officials  explained that this was because of the program’s limited budget. While  evaluations of Click It or Ticket show that radio advertisements were  effective in reaching the motoring public, radio is not as effective a medium  as television. Second, the media for the TACT pilot described the  enforcement campaign as zero tolerance as prescribed by the Click It or  Ticket model, and enforcement was stepped up; however, law enforcement  officers participating in TACT issued warnings instead of citations in 28  percent of the traffic stops. NHTSA officials explained that law  enforcement officers always have discretion on whether to issue citations,  and what is more important is that the public perceive an increase in law  enforcement. Furthermore, they explained there is no research about the  most effective level of citation tickets. See appendix II for a detailed  comparison of TACT’s implementation of the Click It or Ticket model.
Although TACT is based on the high-visibility law enforcement campaign  model, it deals with more complex issues than previous initiatives. In the  case of Click It or Ticket, law enforcement is simply checking for safety  belt use. With TACT, there are a number of behaviors that may constitute  aggressive driving, including tailgating, speeding, and unsafe merging.  These multiple factors also made it more difficult to develop a primary  message for TACT to communicate to the public. TACT administrators, for  example, determined that they had to choose a primary behavioral theme— leaving more space around trucks—to communicate to motorists, although  obeying the speed limit and staying out of a truck’s blind spots also are  important and were secondary themes. See figure 4 for a depiction of  TACT’s selected message. This message was posted on 16 highway signs in  the intervention corridors. Additionally, TACT was more difficult to  institute from a legal standpoint. Washington has a primary safety belt law,  meaning that officers can pull over drivers solely for not wearing their  safety belts. In the case of TACT, however, Washington has no single  aggressive driving law. Washington State officials told us they had to ensure  that courts would be willing to enforce the tickets because police officers  issued citations for violations under a number of laws.
section_title: Previous STRS Initiatives Were Not Funded under NHTSA
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, STRS did not fund initiatives that were a part  of the program in 2003. All STRS funds in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 were  directed to the TACT pilot. According to FMCSA officials, however, they  continued to disseminate education and outreach materials. For instance,  the No-Zone campaign—a major initiative of STRS—was not funded during  this period. FMCSA did, however, keep No-Zone information available on  its Web site and responded to requests for educational material. For  example, according to FMCSA officials, during this period they distributed  over 200,000 copies of the No-Zone brochure through venues such as  conferences and industry events. Also prior to TACT, FMCSA developed a  curriculum for teaching students about sharing the road with trucks.  FMCSA completed work on the curriculum and produced a video for the  course, and it distributed the materials during fiscal years 2004 and 2005,  including 1,500 copies of the video.
section_title: Evaluation of TACT Demonstrated Positive Results and Was Generally Well- Designed
paragraphs: DOT and Washington State officials conducted an evaluation of TACT that  demonstrated the initiative’s success and was generally well-designed.  Specifically, analysis of videotaped driver behavior showed reductions in  aggressive driving, and targeted motorists reported significant exposure to  the initiative’s message. Additionally, the evaluation followed accepted  experimental design principles by comparing changes on two intervention  highway corridors, which were exposed to the initiative’s message and  enforcement, with changes on two comparison highway corridors, which  were not exposed to the message. This experimental setup enabled  program administrators to attribute positive changes in driver behavior to  TACT initiatives. The evaluation did not assess changes in crashes, but  increased driver awareness and improved driver behavior should logically  lead to reduced crashes, injuries, and fatalities. Also, TACT’s design of  combining education outreach with law enforcement better lent itself to  reaching STRS goals than previous initiatives that were purely educational.
subsections: section_title: TACT Improved Driver Behavior and Public Awareness
paragraphs: The TACT evaluation demonstrated that the initiative was able to produce  improvements in driver behavior. TACT evaluated changes in driver  behavior by recording video footage of drivers in the four corridors and  using three groups of reviewers—police officers, truck drivers, and  Washington Traffic Safety Commission staff—to rate the seriousness of any  unsafe driving acts. (See app. III for a more detailed explanation of how  this video footage was analyzed.) This analysis found that the rate of unsafe  driving acts per observation hour was nearly cut in half, from 5.80 to 3.05,  for the intervention corridors, as compared with a slight decrease, from  4.03 to 3.92, for the comparison corridor. When controlled for the  preenforcement rates, these data represent a 46 percent decrease in unsafe  driving in the intervention corridors. The comparison corridors also had  1.85 times as many violations per hour than the intervention corridors  when the data are controlled for the corridors’ respective violation rates  prior to enforcement. (Fig. 5 shows the rate of violations per observation  hour.) Also, analysis of driver behavior in the intervention corridors found  that crash risk decreased and driver behavior was less illegal and less  intimidating, among other things.
The TACT initiative improved driver behavior by successfully reaching its  intended audience. TACT evaluators demonstrated this by using a survey to  measure the extent to which the initiative changed the awareness of the  target audience. In each of the four communities selected for the project,  TACT administrators distributed surveys to the public at driver licensing  offices both before and after the enforcement waves. For example, the  percentage of respondents on the intervention corridors that reported  general exposure to media about giving trucks more space nearly  quadrupled, from about 18 to 67 percent. These data contrast with data for  the comparison corridors, where the percentage only increased from about  17 to 20 percent. (Fig. 6 shows the percentages of respondents that  reported hearing or seeing TACT-related media outreach.) Additionally, the  evaluation found significant increases in the percentages of respondents on  the intervention corridors that specifically reported hearing the radio  message and seeing the TACT road sign, television, and newspaper  messages. Furthermore, surveys of drivers also showed a significant  increase in drivers reporting that they leave more space when passing  trucks (the intended behavioral change theme of the project) from about 16  to 24 percent for the intervention corridors as compared with a slight  increase from about 15 to 16 percent for the comparison corridors.
section_title: The Evaluation of TACT Was Generally Well- Designed and Links Results to Its Intended Goal of Crash Reduction
paragraphs: We found that the evaluation of TACT was generally well-designed, since it  appropriately used an experimental design to attribute outcomes to TACT’s  initiatives. An experimental design permits researchers to attribute  outcomes to the effects of the program and rule out other influences. Often  with this kind of evaluation design, the participants in the intervention  group are exposed to the initiative, while similar participants in the  comparison group are unexposed. Aside from the initiative, participants  experience the same influences. That is, they face conditions that are alike  during the same period. More specifically, the evaluation of the TACT  initiative exposed drivers in the intervention corridors to paid and earned  media and high-visibility law enforcement waves, while simultaneously  leaving unexposed comparable drivers in similar comparison corridors.  Then the evaluation compared outcomes in the two groups. This procedure  was repeated in two additional corridors to make sure that any detected  differences in outcomes were not unique to the first two corridors. Our  2003 review of STRS recommended that DOT establish a systematic  process for evaluating the effectiveness of the program. Therefore, the  evaluation of TACT’s methodology represents a positive step toward  meeting our 2003 recommendation.
The evaluation report concludes that the initiative was a success, but it did  not report on TACT’s effect on the long-term results of the initiative, such  as the impact on the number of crashes, despite earlier plans to do so. Both  TACT implementation plans and a NHTSA official stated that the evaluation  would assess the impact of the initiative on the number of crashes in the  intervention corridors. However, as the evaluation report states, it is  difficult to determine changes in crashes given the low number of crashes  in Washington State; therefore, intermediate measures for evaluating the  initiative had to be relied upon. NHTSA officials stated that although the  evaluation was unable to report on long-term results, the program’s finding  of improved driver behavior around trucks would logically indicate an  expected decrease in truck-related crashes, injuries, and fatalities.  Furthermore, NHTSA does not evaluate individual Click It or Ticket  campaigns, which are considered to successfully modify behavior, for their  effect on long-term results such as fatality reduction. Figure 7 shows how  TACT linked short-term results (such as awareness and knowledge of the  dangers of driving around trucks) and intermediate results (such as  changed driver behavior around trucks) to the long-term results of fewer  truck-related crashes, injuries, and fatalities.
section_title: TACT Is Better Designed to Successfully Reach Agency Goals Than Past STRS Initiatives
paragraphs: The design of TACT provided a better opportunity for successfully reaching  desired results and goals than past STRS initiatives. Our 2003 report on  STRS found that some of FMCSA’s education and outreach initiatives were  not directly connected to agency goals and recommended that future  initiatives be so connected. While program initiatives that exclusively rely  on education and outreach, such as distributing informational pamphlets or  advertising, can increase awareness and encourage the intended behaviors,  thereby linking to a program’s goals, attempts to modify the behaviors of  drivers are more effective when educational initiatives are combined with  enforcement. This conclusion is supported by the evaluation of past  initiatives to change driver behavior, particularly of efforts to increase  safety belt use. For example, a 2002 study by NHTSA included data from  Texas, which showed that while the baseline percentage of individuals  wearing safety belts (80 percent) increased slightly with advertising alone,  the combination of advertising and enforcement caused the number to  increase another 6 percent. TACT’s use of media, road signs, and other  educational outreach tools therefore directly linked to the STRS goal of  decreasing unsafe driver behavior around commercial vehicles by truck  drivers and passenger-vehicle drivers, and incorporating high-visibility law  enforcement increased the initiative’s potential for successfully reaching  that goal. In effect, TACT represents a positive step toward meeting our  2003 recommendation that STRS initiatives clearly link to STRS goals.
section_title: FMCSA Plans Expanded Development of High- Visibility Law Enforcement Campaigns Similar to TACT, but Lacks a Clear Strategy and Expertise
paragraphs: Following the success of TACT in Washington State, FMCSA is developing  plans encouraging states to adopt similar initiatives in other states;  however, its strategy for expanding TACT and its ability to manage these  initiatives remain unknown. FMCSA officials stated that they plan a  nationwide rollout of initiatives similar to TACT by 2009, and that in the  interim, they are currently developing another TACT pilot in Pennsylvania.  FMCSA, however, has yet to articulate a strategy for expanding TACT into a  nationwide program or to identify funding. Additionally, FMCSA’s ability to  administer future TACT initiatives is uncertain, since FMCSA has limited  experience with high-visibility law enforcement campaigns. Finally,  FMCSA plans to spend the majority of its STRS funds on initiatives that are  purely educational, even though little information is available to show that  these activities will improve driver behavior and contribute to reducing  fatalities.
subsections: section_title: FMCSA Plans to Implement More TACT-Like Initiatives but Has Yet to Articulate Its Strategy
paragraphs: FMCSA plans to expand initiatives similar to TACT to new states and,  eventually, nationwide. FMCSA officials stated that they plan to issue a  Federal Register notice in fiscal year 2008 before rolling out TACT on a  nationwide basis in 2009. In the interim, FMCSA is currently developing  plans to implement another TACT pilot in Pennsylvania, using primarily  MCSAP grants and state funds. There, FMCSA will contract with the  Pennsylvania State Police to develop and operate a high-visibility law  enforcement campaign in at least two intervention corridors and two  comparison corridors in an area with a high concentration of commercial- vehicle fatalities and crashes. Pennsylvania will also be responsible for  evaluating its pilot. Agency officials anticipate this pilot taking 18 months  to complete. FMCSA also plans to conduct two additional pilots in fiscal year 2007, but has not yet identified states. Additionally, FMCSA issued a  Federal Register notice in March 2006 stating that states could use MCSAP  High Priority grants to comply with provisions of SAFETEA-LU that  require states to conduct comprehensive and highly visible traffic  enforcement and commercial-vehicle safety inspection programs in high- risk locations and areas. FMCSA added that these initiatives could be  similar to TACT.
FMCSA officials stated that they will develop guidance for states to follow,  but gaps remain in their strategy for expanding TACT nationwide. Agency  documents state that the Washington State TACT pilot and the future  Pennsylvania initiative will form the foundation of a best practices guide to  share with states. However, FMCSA has yet to articulate how it will expand  TACT from several planned pilot initiatives in 2007 to a nationwide  program 2 years later, or how this expansion will be funded. Additionally,  although FMCSA enabled states to apply for MCSAP High Priority grants to  develop initiatives similar to TACT, FMCSA did not provide states with the  guidance to do so. Applications for these funds were due before the  Washington TACT evaluation report was published; therefore, states  seeking to begin similar initiatives needed to design their own initiatives  without the benefit of Washington’s experience. Finally, FMCSA officials  stated that no state applied for a fiscal year 2006 grant before the  application deadline in the Federal Register; however, FMCSA will accept  applications until the end of fiscal year 2006 or until the available funds are  awarded.
Although FMCSA has plans for a nationwide expansion of TACT, the  majority of FMCSA’s STRS funds will be spent on other activities. Program  planning documents state that FMCSA has decided to transition STRS to  focus on developing initiatives similar to TACT in other states, but FMCSA  plans to invest just $150,000 of its $500,000 fiscal year 2006 STRS budget to  do this. FMCSA officials told us that STRS funds would pay for the  evaluation component of this initiative, and FMCSA will supplement  activities with MCSAP funds. The $150,000 fiscal year 2006 STRS  investment in these future initiatives is significantly less than the  approximately $664,000 in STRS funds provided solely to TACT in fiscal  years 2004 and 2005.
section_title: FMCSA’s Ability to Manage Future Initiatives Is Unclear and NHTSA’s Role Is Still Evolving
paragraphs: FMCSA’s ability to administer future high-visibility law enforcement  campaigns and NHTSA’s role in future STRS initiatives are unclear. As we  previously mentioned, a goal of the TACT pilot was for FMCSA to learn  about the operation of high-visibility enforcement programs from NHTSA,  and to support this goal, FMCSA detailed a liaison to NHTSA following  congressional direction. FMCSA, however, missed valuable opportunities  for learning because of the time it took to fill the position, since the liaison  came aboard late in the TACT program and returned to FMCSA before  NHTSA conducted its annual Click It or Ticket enforcement campaign.  After discussing our findings with FMCSA officials, they clarified that other  FMCSA staff participated in TACT and knowledge transfer was not limited  to the liaison.
Furthermore, NHTSA’s participation in future STRS activities is still  evolving. As we previously mentioned, SAFETEA-LU authorized $3 million  to NHTSA and $1 million annually to FMCSA for administering education  and outreach activities associated with commercial-vehicle safety for the 4- year period from 2006 through 2009. However, the Conference Report  accompanying the DOT appropriations act for fiscal year 2006 indicates  that the conferees did not fund the amounts authorized. Instead, they  funded $4 million to FMCSA alone for these purposes. Given its limited  experiences with programs designed to modify driver behavior, however,  FMCSA’s plans call for continuing cooperation with NHTSA in future aggressive driving programs. For example, staff in FMCSA’s Washington  Divisional Office told us that their agency lacks NHTSA’s experience with  initiatives that change driver behavior and does not have staff with a  background in the area, especially at the division office level. This is  important because TACT’s evaluation report states that having an  experienced evaluation team that can develop and implement a  comprehensive evaluation design was critical to the success of the project.  As we previously mentioned, NHTSA has experience in operating  successful campaigns to increase safe behavior by motorists. Additionally,  FMCSA has only a small number of staff dedicated to its education and  outreach programs. NHTSA staff with whom we spoke initially stated that  the agency’s involvement will end with the issuance of the TACT program  evaluation report. Currently, however, NHTSA staff said they will provide  FMCSA with general assistance, and FMCSA has formed a transition team  to help ensure that the necessary expertise will be available to future  initiatives. NHTSA officials added that specific experience with behavioral  issues is not required to replicate the TACT initiative. They said that a  program plan, a media plan, an enforcement plan, and an evaluation plan  are required.
section_title: FMCSA’s Short-term Plans Focus on Initiatives That Do Not Include Enforcement and That Have Not Been Shown to Be Effective
paragraphs: FMCSA plans to spend the majority of its 2006 STRS funds on updating the  STRS Web site and producing outreach materials. These funds will be spent  on initiatives that have limited potential for reducing fatalities and provide  limited opportunities for evaluation, representing a return to an earlier era  of STRS. FMCSA will spend $200,000 in updating its Web site, $100,000 on  education and outreach materials promoting sharing the road, and $50,000  on printing. FMCSA plans to update its Web site with information on  preventing aggressive driving, which will include Spanish-language  content. The Web site also will include a user survey to gauge satisfaction  and will be able to ask up to five questions about a user’s knowledge of  STRS initiatives. Currently, FMCSA can only collect information on the  number of visits to the Web site. In addition, FMCSA plans to distribute  education and outreach materials promoting sharing the road. These  initiatives were not financially supported during fiscal years 2004 and 2005,  when NHTSA had responsibility for STRS. As we previously stated, purely  educational initiatives may conceptually link to FMCSA’s goal of reducing  accidents and fatalities, but initiatives such as TACT have a better potential  to improve driver behavior by incorporating local enforcement efforts with  educational outreach. Figure 8 shows four categories of FMCSA’s planned  STRS spending in fiscal year 2006. Table 1 lists FMCSA’s planned outreach  activities within two of these categories.
It is unclear if evaluations of these planned STRS education and outreach  activities will provide meaningful insight into their effectiveness. FMCSA  officials told us that they hired a contractor to develop evaluations of STRS  education and outreach activities, but plans to evaluate the impact of these  activities on fatality and injury rates have yet to be developed. This  contractor will be required to (1) develop an evaluation study that gathers  baseline data and (2) assess whether the education and outreach materials  and activities reached the intended audience, changed attitudes and  behaviors, and helped the program meet its safety goals. However, in  discussing these plans, a NHTSA official told us that it will be difficult to  measure the impact of educational materials on driver behavior.  Furthermore, in our 2003 report, we stated that previous evaluations of  STRS activities shed little light on their short-term, intermediate, and long- term outcomes. This was due, in part, to FMCSA’s heavy reliance on self- reported data and to FMCSA’s not establishing a baseline of driver behavior  and knowledge before the program started. By contrast, TACT’s evaluation  visually assessed driver behavior before and after motorists received  education and enforcement. If FMCSA cannot evaluate the effect of these  activities on driver behavior, then the planned activities may represent a  return to the practices that we questioned in our 2003 report.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The TACT initiative represented a significant departure from previous  STRS initiatives and, by following the high-visibility law enforcement  campaign model, incorporated program elements that experts believe are  most effective in changing driver behavior. Its systematic evaluation and  clear link to agency goals were important steps toward addressing  concerns with STRS that we raised in the past. Furthermore, the positive  results shown by the TACT evaluation and the ongoing problem of crashes  between trucks and passenger vehicles demonstrate that there is merit in  further developing and implementing high-visibility law enforcement  campaigns similar to TACT. FMCSA’s plans for future aggressive driving  initiatives are still evolving, but the agency is currently developing a second  pilot in Pennsylvania and has a goal of rolling out TACT-like initiatives  nationwide in 2009. However, FMCSA has yet to develop a clear strategy  describing how it will expand initiatives similar to TACT from a series of  pilots into a nationwide program or to describe how these programs will be  funded.
Furthermore, some of FMCSA’s plans for addressing unsafe driving do not  focus on expanding education and enforcement initiatives such as TACT.  Instead, FMCSA has chosen to spend the majority of its fiscal year 2006  STRS funds on initiatives that are purely educational, which safety experts  agree are less effective than when educational outreach is combined with  enforcement. Because FMCSA has not identified a cohesive strategy to  expand TACT and not focused on proven approaches such as high-visibility  law enforcement campaigns, it is unclear how FMCSA’s STRS initiatives  will contribute to FMCSA’s goal of expanding TACT and reducing crashes  and fatalities.
Finally, there are doubts about FMCSA’s ability to ensure the success of  STRS in the future. Although funding responsibility for STRS returned to  FMCSA in 2006 and FMCSA participated in the initial planning for TACT,  NHTSA and the Washington Traffic Safety Commission significantly  supported TACT’s implementation and evaluation. Additionally, FMCSA  may have missed valuable opportunities to learn about the operation of  TACT and other similar programs because its involvement was limited by  not being able to use its legislatively mandated liaison to the fullest extent  possible. DOT, through staff from both NHTSA and FMCSA, demonstrated  that it has the ability to develop state initiatives that change driver behavior  around trucks by successfully implementing TACT. Even so, it is uncertain  that DOT will effectively use these resources in the future, given that the  relationship between NHTSA and FMCSA is still evolving and that FMCSA  has limited staff and experience in administering high-visibility law  enforcement campaigns.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that the Share the Road Safely program continues to improve  driver behavior around commercial vehicles, thereby potentially reducing  fatalities, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the  Administrators of the appropriate agencies to take the following three  steps:  develop a comprehensive strategy describing how FMCSA will  implement and fund an expansion of TACT-like initiatives from several  pilots into a nationwide program and detail how STRS initiatives  contribute to this goal;  complete and execute plans to evaluate STRS outreach activities that  are purely educational and discontinue activities with no demonstrable  impact on behavior; and  monitor whether FMCSA has sufficient staff and expertise to  successfully develop and administer future high-visibility law  enforcement campaigns, and, if it does not, determine the best methods  for DOT to use its resources and expertise to modify driver behavior and  address the problem of aggressive driving around trucks.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided DOT with a draft of this report for review and comment. DOT  officials, including FMCSA's Outreach Division Chief and NHTSA's  Behavioral Technology Research Chief, provided oral and written  comments and generally agreed with our recommendations. These FMCSA  and NHTSA officials clarified FMCSA’s role in developing initial plans for  an education and enforcement project after we issued our 2003 report and  before Congress provided NHTSA with Share the Road Safely funding.  FMCSA officials also provided additional information on, and  documentation of, a contract to develop an evaluation of FMCSA’s  education and outreach programs, including Share the Road Safely  educational initiatives. Finally, the officials provided information on a team  of FMCSA and NHTSA staff established in May 2006 to assist FMCSA with  the expansion of TACT as fiscal responsibility for STRS transitions from  NHTSA to FMCSA. We incorporated this information as well as technical  comments throughout the report as appropriate.
We will send copies of this report to interested congressional committees,  the Secretary of Transportation, and other interested parties. We will also  make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Scope And Methodology
paragraphs: To address our first objective and describe what the Department of  Transportation (DOT) has done with the Share the Road Safely (STRS)  program since 2003, we interviewed DOT officials to determine the  changes made in the program since May 2003. Additionally, we interviewed  officials from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA),  the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and the  Washington State Traffic Safety Commission to report on the  implementation and administration of Washington State’s Ticketing  Aggressive Cars and Trucks (TACT) pilot project. To determine whether the  design of TACT was reasonable, we reviewed TACT programming  documentation to determine if the design of the program links program  initiatives to goals and if the design follows the high-visibility law  enforcement campaign model for behavior change. We did not assess the  design of other STRS initiatives because they were not actively funded in  fiscal years 2004 and 2005, and because we reported on these activities in  our 2003 report.
To address our second objective—to determine what DOT evaluations have  shown and whether the methods were acceptable—we reviewed  evaluation results and analyzed evaluation plans to determine if short-term,  intermediate, and long-term outcomes were measured and if external  factors were considered and controlled for in the assessment. We reviewed  and summarized the results of the Washington State pilot evaluation and  determined if program initiatives linked to agency goals. In addition, we  reviewed the evaluation results to determine if the evaluation illustrates  that the pilot met its criteria for success. Due to the nature of the TACT  program, we could not determine in this report whether the Share the Road  Safely program achieved reductions in the number of deaths and severity of  injuries as requested by the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient  Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). Specifically,  SAFETEA-LU asked us to update our prior evaluation of STRS to determine  if the program has achieved reductions in the number and severity of  commercial-vehicle crashes, including reductions in the number of deaths  and the severity of injuries sustained in these crashes. NHTSA officials,  however, told us that the evaluation did not assess these long-term results  because the numbers of injuries and fatalities on the pilot’s intervention  corridors were too low to reliably measure any appreciable change.
Therefore, we did not discuss in this report the program’s impact on  specific numbers of fatalities and injuries.
To assess DOT’s plans for the future of STRS, we interviewed program  administrators at DOT and reviewed relevant budget and planning  documents to determine DOT’s direction for STRS. We interviewed the  FMCSA staff member assigned to transfer knowledge about administering  high-visibility law enforcement campaigns from NHTSA to FMCSA to  assess the staff member’s ability to accomplish this task. We also compared  the design of future FMCSA initiatives with findings we listed in previous  reports on programs designed to modify driver behavior and increase a  program’s effectiveness at reducing crashes, injuries, and fatalities  associated with commercial vehicles.
We conducted our review from October 2005 through July 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: TACT’s Implementation of the Click It or Ticket Model
paragraphs: Click It or Ticket criteria Data collection, before, during, and immediately after media and enforcement phases.
Earned and paid publicity announcing strict enforcement.
Highly visible enforcement each day of enforcement period.
Analysis of crash locations in determining the need for improvement and for targeting  efforts.
Areas should be defined so that residents have a sense of belonging to a community.
Enforcement agencies should partner with local government, public service  organizations, the media, and businesses to generate overwhelming program  intensity.
Maximum involvement among the state, county, and local enforcement agencies  serving the community.
Areas should try to include as large a percentage of the population as resources  permit.
Up-front commitment to the program is needed from top management in each  participating enforcement agency.
Officer training should be conducted.
A high-level enforcement official should take the lead in carrying the message to the  public.
Organizers must have the full support of elected officials.
The program should be coordinated with the courts, since their caseloads will be  affected directly by the number of citations issued.
Enforcement messages repeated over and over during the publicity period.
Continual use of earned media.
Paid advertisement campaigns.
Radio advertisements timed to run during drive times. Television advertisements are  run at times when most viewers are present.
Enforcement campaigns usually last 2 weeks. During this period, zero-tolerance  enforcement is carried out.
Enforcement visible for entire enforcement period.
section_title: Description of TACT Methodology for Analyzing Video Footage of Driver Behavior
paragraphs: To determine whether driver behavior changed, TACT administrators  measured the incidence and rates of unsafe driver behavior in the vicinity  of commercial vehicles. Washington State Police troopers collected these  data by videotaping traffic from unmarked cars. Troopers drove behind  commercial vehicles and provided narration indicating the type of behavior  observed each time an unsafe act was seen. Unsafe behaviors included  making unsafe lane changes, cutting in front of a truck, following another  vehicle too closely, engaging in unsafe merging, and speeding. Troopers  also provided narration detailing whether they would issue citations for  driving violations. Later, 99 video clips were randomly selected and shown  to three sets of reviewers consisting of police officers, truck drivers, and  Washington Traffic Safety Commission employees. Reviewers filled out a  score sheet for each video clip indicating how dangerous they believed the  driver behavior was and whether it deserved a citation. Evaluators  quantified these responses to generate a score indicating the seriousness of  the unsafe driving act.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Catherine Colwell, Assistant Director, and Samer Abbas, Analyst-in-Charge,  managed this assignment and made significant contributions to all aspects  of the work. Daniel Concepcion also made significant contributions to all  aspects of this report. In addition, Joel Grossman assisted in our  assessment of the TACT initiative’s design and evaluation. Tamera Dorland  provided writing assistance, Bert Japikse provided legal support, and  Joshua Ormond and Theresa Perkins assisted with graphics.