Influenza Pandemic: Increased Agency Accountability Could Help Protect Federal Employees Serving the Public in the Event of a Pandemic
Published: 2009-06-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Protecting federal workers essential to ensuring the continuity of the country's critical operations will involve new challenges in the event of a pandemic influenza outbreak. This requested report discusses (1) the extent to which agencies have made pandemic plans to protect workers who cannot work remotely and are not first responders, (2) the pandemic plans selected agencies have for certain occupations performing essential functions other than first response, and (3) the opportunities to improve agencies' workforce pandemic plans. GAO surveyed pandemic coordinators from 24 agencies and selected three case study occupations for review: federal correctional workers, staff disbursing Treasury checks, and air traffic controllers.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Homeland Security Council's (HSC) 2006 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan required federal agencies to develop operational pandemic plans, and responses from the pandemic coordinators of the 24 agencies GAO surveyed indicate that a wide range of pandemic planning activities are under way. However, the responses also showed that several agencies had yet to identify essential functions during a pandemic that cannot be performed remotely. In addition, although many of the agencies' pandemic plans rely on telework to carry out their functions, several agencies reported testing their information technology capability to little or no extent. GAO's three case study agencies also showed differences in the degree to which their individual facilities had operational pandemic plans. The Bureau of Prisons' correctional workers had only recently been required to develop pandemic plans for their correctional facilities. Nevertheless, the Bureau of Prisons has considerable experience limiting the spread of infectious disease within its correctional facilities and had also made arrangements for antiviral medications for a portion of its workers and inmates. The Department of the Treasury's Financial Management Service, which has production staff involved in disbursing federal payments such as Social Security checks, had pandemic plans for its four regional centers and had stockpiled personal protective equipment such as respirators, gloves, and hand sanitizers at the centers. Air traffic control management facilities, where air traffic controllers work, had not yet developed facility pandemic plans or incorporated pandemic plans into their all-hazards contingency plans. The Federal Aviation Administration had recently completed a study to determine the feasibility of the use of respirators by air traffic controllers and concluded that their long-term use during a pandemic appears to be impractical. There is no mechanism in place to monitor and report on agencies' workforce pandemic plans. Under the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was required to monitor and report on the readiness of agencies to continue operations while protecting their employees during an influenza pandemic. The HSC, however, informed DHS in late 2006 or early 2007 that no specific reports on this were required to be submitted. Rather, the HSC requested that agencies certify to the council that they were addressing in their plans the applicable elements of a pandemic checklist in 2006 and again in 2008. This process did not include any assessment or reporting on the status of agency plans. Given agencies' uneven progress in developing their pandemic plans, monitoring and reporting would enhance agencies' accountability to protect their employees in the event of a pandemic. GAO has previously reported on the importance of internal control monitoring to assess the quality of performance over time. Without appropriately designed monitoring and reporting, the President and the Congress cannot fully assess the ability of the agencies to continue their operations while protecting their federal employees in the event of a pandemic.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Protecting federal workers essential to ensuring the continuity of the  country’s critical operations will involve new challenges in the event of an  influenza pandemic. While a pandemic will not directly damage physical  infrastructure, such as power lines or computer systems, it threatens the  operation of vital systems by endangering and potentially removing the  essential personnel needed to operate them from the workforce for weeks  or months. Many federal employees will be able to perform their agencies’  essential functions remotely through arrangements such as telework.  Other federal employees, however, such as federal correctional workers,  production staff involved in disbursing federal payments such as Social  Security checks, and air traffic controllers, will have to work at assigned  locations where there will be an increased chance of infection due to  proximity to others. While the roles and responsibilities of first  responders in emergencies and the risks these employees face are well  recognized, the risks to other federal employees unable to perform their  essential functions remotely are not as apparent.
Contingency planning for an event sometime in the future is often difficult  to justify, particularly in the face of limited resources and more urgent  problems and priorities. However, as we were recently reminded by the  outbreak of an H1N1 virus, an influenza pandemic remains a real threat to  our nation and to the world. Although the virus seems to have been  relatively mild, it could return in a second wave this fall or winter in a  more virulent form. Of the three pandemics of the 20th century, the most  deadly was the influenza pandemic of 1918-1919 during which scientists  estimate there were 50 million to 100 million deaths worldwide, including  at least 675,00 in the United States, making it among the most deadly  events in human history. A pandemic is likely to come in waves, each  lasting months, and pass through communities of all sizes across the  nation and the world simultaneously. As a pandemic influenza outbreak  spreads, federal employees may be infected and their ability to work may  be limited.
Many aspects of a pandemic and its consequences can be anticipated and  mitigated through planning. The Homeland Security Council’s (HSC)  National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan  (Implementation Plan) requires federal agencies to develop operational  plans addressing issues such as the protection of federal employees. This  report responds to your request that we examine (1) the extent to which  federal agencies have reported plans under way to protect their workforce  should an influenza pandemic occur and have reported identifying  essential functions, other than first response, that cannot be accomplished  remotely in the event of a pandemic; (2) the plans selected agencies have  established for certain occupations performing essential functions other  than first response; and (3) opportunities to improve federal agencies’  planning, enabling them to protect their workforce while maintaining their  essential functions in the event of a pandemic.
Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Federal Aviation Administration  (FAA).
We reviewed agency pandemic influenza plans, national pandemic pla prior GAO work related to pandemic influenza planning, and additional  relevant documents that assess pandemic influenza, public health,  other emergency preparedness and response issues. We interviewed  agency officials and managers from the case study agencies and made visits to case study facilities in the Kansas City metropolitan area,  including the United States Penitentiary (USP) in Leavenworth, Kansas. In addition, we made a site visit to the Allenwood Federal Correctional  Complex in Allenwood, Pennsylvania, and received written responses  interview questions from the FMS Philadelphia Financial Center. We also  met with FAA representatives at Ronald Reagan Washington National  Airport in Arlington, Virginia; the Potomac Terminal Radar Approach  Control Facility in Warrenton, Virginia; the Washington Air Route Traf Control Center in Leesburg, Virginia; and Air Traffic Control Systems  Command Center in Herndon, Virginia. Our work included interviews with  officials at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Labor (DOL), and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). In addition, we met with  White House counsel representing the HSC from the past and current  administrations to determine the role the HSC played in ensuring uniform  pandemic preparedness across the U.S. government. We also interviewed  representat ives from the Kansas City Federal Executive Board (FEB), the  Minnesota FEB, and the Oklahoma FEB and federal union representatives  to gather their perspectives on the protection of federal workers during a  pandemic.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 to April 2009 in se  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Tho standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficien t,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and elieve that the evidence  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We b obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. Detailed information on our scope and  methodology appears in appendix II.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Approximately 2.6 million federal employees throughout the United States and abroad execute the responsibilities of the federal government. Fed employees work in every state, with about 90 percent outside the  Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. Federal workers perform functions  across a multitude of sectors, from those vital to the long-term well-being  of the country—such as environmental protection, intelligence, social  work, and financial services—to those directly charged with aspects of  public safety—including corrections, airport and aviation safety, medical  services, border protection, and agricultural safety.
Worker protection strategies are crucial to sustain an adequate workforce  a  during a pandemic. During the peak of an outbreak of a severe influenz pandemic in the United States, an estimated 40 percent of the workforce  ly  could be unable to work because of illness, the need to care for ill fami s to  members, or fear of infection. While the commitment of federal worker carry out the missions of their agencies during natural and man-made  disasters and emergencies is evident from past disasters, critical federal  workers have sometimes been left to fend for themselves during such  situations. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, many essential federal personnel in New Orleans did not have housin and, therefore, were not able to return to work. Unlike oil and gas w in New Orleans, whose companies sought to secure housing for them,  local federal workers did not have an advocate that would ensure the  speedy reconstitution of essential services. In many cases, essential  federal employees queued up for temporary housing in long lines.
The federal government has issued guidance to assist organizations of all  types in developing plans for pandemic events, including a national  strategy that discusses the threat and potential impact of a pandemic  influenza event and an implementation plan for the national strategy that  identifies roles and responsibilities for the federal government sector, and others. HHS has also published a series of checklists inten to aid preparation for a pandemic across all segments of society. These  ded  include checklists for organizations such as state and local governments U.S. businesses, individuals and families, schools, health care  organizations, and community organizations. As pandemic influenza  presents unique challenges to the coordination of the federal effort, joint  and integrated planning across all levels of government and the private  sector is essential to ensure that available national capabilities and  authorities produce detailed plans and response actions that are  complementary, compatible, and coordinated.
All federal agencies are expected to develop their own pandemic plans  that along with other requirements, describe how each agency will prov for the safety and health of its employees and support the federal  government’s efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from a  pandemic. Because the dynamic nature of pandemic influenza requires  that the scope of federal government continuity of operations (COOP)  planning includes preparing for a catastrophic event that is not  geographically or temporally bounded, the Federal Emergency  Management Agency (FEMA) concluded that planning for a pandemic  requires a state of preparedness that is beyond traditional federal  government COOP planning. For example, for pandemic planning  purposes, essential functions may be broader than 30-day traditional  COOP-essential functions. Federal agency pandemic planning guidance  can be found at http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/federal/index.html.
section_title: Agencies Report Being in Various Stages of Plann the Protection of Their Employees in the Event of a Pandemic
paragraphs: The Implementation Plan issued in May 2006 directs federal agencies to  have operational pandemic plans. Agencies’ responses to our survey  questions indicate that the agencies’ preparedness efforts are less than  uniform. Although all of the 24 CFO Act agencies reported being engaged in planning for pandemic influenza to some degree, several agencies  reported that they were still developing their pandemic plans. According  to the survey responses, the development of practices for federal  workforce protection in the event of a pandemic is also at the beginning  stages for several agencies.
subsections: section_title: The HSC Requested That Agencies Certify Their Pandemic Plans with the Council
paragraphs: In November of 2006, the HSC issued the Key Elements of Departmental  Pandemic Influenza Operational Plan (Key Elements), which had a  checklist for federal agencies to use in their pandemic preparedness. The  Key Elements checklist covered subjects dealing with the safety and  health of department employees, essential functions and services and how  agencies will maintain them in the event of significant and sustained  absenteeism, support of the federal response, and communication with  stakeholders during a pandemic. The Key Elements stated that to ensure  uniform preparedness across the U.S. government, the HSC was including  a request that by December 2006 the agencies certify in writing to the HSC  that they were addressing applicable elements of the checklist. A letter to  the council stating that an agency was addressing the elements in the  checklist in its planning was sufficient for certification. According to  White House counsel from the prior administration, all of the 24 CFO Act  agencies required to certify with the HSC did so, although not all of the  agencies met the December 2006 deadline.
Subsequently, in August 2008, the HSC revised the Key Elements to reflect  current federal government guidance on pandemic planning. The HSC  requested that all department and agency heads recertify that their  pandemic plans were addressing all the applicable elements of pandemic  planning stipulated in the updated checklist by October 15, 2008. The  updated checklist provided revisions of some key elements and added new  elements. Additionally, the revised checklist required that agencies plan  for a severe pandemic, which requires planning for prolonged  implementation of community mitigation measures that could affect  workforce absenteeism, such as school closures, for up to 12 weeks. A  new planning element also asked if the agency planned to purchase and  stockpile antiviral medications and personal protective equipment for  employees identified through risk assessments.
Our survey questions for the pandemic coordinators of the 24 CFO Act  agencies focused on areas similar to the elements from the HSC checklist  dealing with the safety and health of agency employees and essential  functions. In addition to asking agencies about their pandemic plans, we  asked them whether they have identified essential functions other than  first response that cannot be performed remotely in the event of a  pandemic, planned measures to protect workers who will not be able to  work remotely, established social distancing strategies, tested their IT  capabilities, and communicated their human capital pandemic policies.  Survey responses represent the main department or agency only unless  components are specifically mentioned.
section_title: Several Agencies Were Still Developing Their Pandemic Plans
paragraphs: In the introduction to the Key Elements, the HSC recognized that  pandemic planning is not a static process and encouraged departments  and agencies to revise their plans and procedures as new federal guidance  is developed. However, several of the agencies we surveyed reported that  they were still formulating their pandemic plans in May 2008. For example,  the Small Business Administration (SBA) stated that the agency had begun  drafting its pandemic plan but had not completed or cleared it. In February  2009, SBA reported that it had begun to draft a more complete pandemic  influenza annex to its COOP plan with an estimated completion date of  spring 2009. The Department of Defense (DOD) had completed its  overarching departmentwide plan, which tasked its components to  develop COOP pandemic plans. The department was coordinating the  plans among the combatant commands and military services. DOD  officials commented that some DOD components have had pandemic  influenza plans in place for several years. In addition, DOD installations  have been required to have Force Health Protection Plans for years, and  DOD reported that the installations are tailoring these plans to include  pandemic influenza considerations.
All of the 24 CFO Act agencies surveyed, with the exception of OPM, the  National Science Foundation (NSF), and the Department of Housing and  Urban Development (HUD), required their components to develop  pandemic plans. OPM indicated that all of its essential functions are  performed at the department level. NSF reported not having any essential  functions as defined by Federal Continuity Directive 2 but that it does  have important government functions that the agency intends to continue  during a pandemic. According to an NSF continuity manager, all of NSF’s  government functions are performed at the department level. HUD did not  explain why it did not require its components to develop pandemic plans.  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), SBA, the General Services  Administration (GSA), the Department of State (DOS), the Department of  Energy (DOE), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) required  regional and program offices, in addition to components and bureaus,  where applicable, to develop pandemic plans, and as mentioned  previously, the DOD combatant commands and services were required to  prepare and validate plans. Six of the agencies surveyed—the Department  of Commerce (DOC), the Department of Education (Education), EPA,  Treasury, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and  SBA—reported requiring their components to incorporate pandemic  planning into or develop pandemic annexes or addenda to their COOP  plans. DOC, for example, reported providing templates to each of its  components to assist them in developing their own annexes or addenda to  their COOP plans.
section_title: Most, but Not All, of the Agencies Reported Identifying What Their On- site Essential Functions Would Be in the Event of Pandemic Influenza
paragraphs: The Implementation Plan instructs agencies that institutional planning  efforts should address the question of the agency’s essential functions and  how they will be maintained in the event of significant and sustained  absenteeism. Furthermore, the Key Elements asks for plans to include  definitions and identification of essential functions needed to sustain  agency mission and operation. This includes the determination of which, if  any, essential functions, or nonessential operational support functions can  be suspended and for what duration before adversely affecting agency  mission. The Key Elements also calls on agencies to identify positions,  skills, and personnel needed to continue essential functions and develop a  plan to ensure and consider appropriate level of staffing to continue these  functions. Identifying essential functions and enumerating the employees  who would perform them is the first step in training those employees,  communicating the risks and expectations of working during a pandemic,  and budgeting and planning for measures that would mitigate those risks.
Of the 24 agencies surveyed, 19 reported that they have identified essential  functions at both the department and component levels that cannot be  continued through telework in the event of pandemic influenza or, in the  case of OPM and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),  determined that all of their essential functions could be performed  remotely. NSF reported that all of its important government functions  could be performed remotely. Of the 5 agencies reporting that they had not  identified such functions, DOJ reported identifying essential functions at  the component level but not at the departmental level, noting that the  department’s plan is being revised. DOJ stated that upon completion the  plan will address department-essential functions that cannot be continued  via telework. At the time of our survey, GSA reported not identifying its  essential functions in the event of a pandemic while 3 agencies—DOD,  SBA, and HUD—were still identifying essential functions or determining  which essential functions could not be continued through telework. DOD  reported that its classified work prohibits telework for approximately  26,200 essential civilian personnel and its mission requirements preclude  telework for approximately 89,500 positions. DOD has approximately  700,000 civilian employees on its payroll. DOD stated that it is finalizing a  list of essential functions at the department and component levels. SBA  reported that it was expanding on its basic COOP planning to account for  the circumstances of a pandemic, stating that the agency has identified its  primary essential functions for COOP purposes, functions that could be  performed for the most part remotely and through telework. HUD  reported that it has identified its COOP-essential functions but has not  confirmed that they could be continued through telework. Table 1 lists  some examples agencies provided of their essential functions that cannot  be performed remotely in the event of a pandemic.
DOL reported identifying essential functions in accordance with federal  pandemic guidance. DOL stated that in recognition that an influenza  pandemic will last much longer than a traditional 30-day or less COOP  event, the DOL pandemic plan and component agency pandemic plans  include functions beyond the essential functions in the DOL and agency  COOP plans. The department expects that performance of its essential  functions will ebb and flow based on the availability of personnel and  telecommunications. DOL agencies identified which work would be  accomplished through telework and which could be done safely in the  office using social distancing methods. As part of its ongoing planning,  DOL requires its agencies to continuously identify who would accomplish  the essential functions and if the work could be done through telework,  cross-train at least three employees for each function, and ensure that  employees have the equipment needed to work at home and test their  ability to do so. Some, but not all, DOL component agencies have  identified which essential functions can only be performed within a DOL  facility with notice to the affected employees.
Identifying essential functions and the employees who perform them is the  first step before informing these employees that they may be expected to  continue operations in the event of a pandemic, as well as preparing them  for the risks of performing such functions on-site. Eighteen agencies  reported that they have notified some or all employees in department-level  essential functions that they may be expected to continue operations  during a pandemic and 16 reported doing so for employees in component- level essential functions. Three pandemic coordinators did not know  whether their employees had been notified. A number of agencies reported  having informed some employees who perform essential functions that  they may be expected to continue operations, despite not having  determined the number of such employees.
section_title: Agencies Reported Taking Measures Such as Procuring Gloves and Masks to Protect Employees during a Pandemic
paragraphs: We asked the pandemic coordinators from the 24 CFO Act agencies  whether they had planned or budgeted for any of seven potential measures  to protect workers whose duties require their on-site presence during a  pandemic. The measures included in our survey were among the  recommendations for worker protection issued through the Occupational  Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), HHS, or FEMA guidance. They  included procurement of personal protective equipment such as masks  and gloves; supplemental cleaning programs for common areas;  distribution of hygiene supplies (hand sanitizers, trash receptacles with  hands-free lids, etc.); obtaining antiviral medications; arrangements to  obtain pandemic vaccines to the extent available; prioritization of  employees for vaccinations; and prioritization of employees for antiviral  medications. The guidance recommends the measures according to risk  assessments for employees, and therefore, based on the agencies’ mission  and activities, not all measures are equally appropriate for all agencies.
Figure 1 details the agency responses to the measures they plan to protect  their employees during a pandemic. As the figure shows, procurement of  personal protective equipment and distribution of hygiene supplies had the  highest number of positive responses. Sixteen agencies reported arranging  for obtaining antiviral medication and supplemental office cleaning  programs for common areas. Agencies reported arrangements to obtain  vaccines, should they become available, less frequently. Eight agencies  said that they had planned for all seven measures to some degree.
Agency responses to this set of questions emphasized different approaches  to planning for employee protective measures in the event of a pandemic.  For example, DOD reported investing approximately $24 million in  antibiotics to treat bacterial infections secondary to pandemic influenza.  DOD also noted that a pandemic influenza vaccination strategy for key  civilian personnel within DOD is currently in development. DOJ said its  planning and budgeting for the measures are limited to departmental first  responders from its law enforcement components and leadership.  However, DOJ also reported that it plans to advise all components to  budget for emergency equipment and supplies in their future budget  submissions, in accordance with Federal Continuity Directive 1  requirements. DHS reported that it had done fit testing of employees for  N95 respirators and training on the proper use of other personal  protective equipment and had pre-positioned stockpiles of the equipment  for employees in 52 locations. DOS noted that it had provided pandemic  influenza-specific training to janitorial staffing, with a focus on  maintaining proper disinfection of restrooms, offices, and common areas  as well as on their own protection.
section_title: Agencies Reported That Social Distancing Strategies Were Part of Their Pandemic Plans
paragraphs: The Key Elements asks agencies if they have considered implementation  of social distancing policies to prevent influenza pandemic spread at work.  Influenza is thought to be primarily spread through large respiratory  droplets that directly contact the nose, mouth, or eyes. These droplets are  produced when infected people cough, sneeze, or talk, sending the  infectious droplets into the air and into contact with other people. Large  droplets can only travel a limited distance; therefore, people should limit  close contact with others when possible. Examples of social distancing  strategies include requiring six feet of separation between people or  canceling events and closing or restricting access to certain buildings.  Employees may decrease their risk of infection by practicing social  distancing and minimizing their nonessential contacts and exposure to  highly populated environments. In many instances, low-cost and  sustainable social distancing practices can be adopted by employees at the  workplace for the duration of a pandemic outbreak.
The agencies reported considering a variety of social distancing strategies  in the context of pandemic preparedness. For example, the survey  revealed that the most frequently cited social distancing strategies  involved using telework and flexible schedules for their workforce.  Eighteen agencies were considering low-cost social distancing strategies,  such as planning for restrictions on meetings and gatherings and canceling  unnecessary travel. Only 8 agencies reported considering alternatives to  public transportation for their employees. Figure 2 shows the number of  agencies responding positively about their plans to use various social  distancing strategies in the context of pandemic preparedness.
The agencies reported some other examples of social distancing strategies.  For instance, DOD’s pandemic plan provides authority to installation  commanders to implement Emergency Health Powers to impose  movement restriction and use of containment strategies, such as isolation  and quarantine. As a result of pandemic exercises, DOD also plans to  restructure cubicles and other work space during a pandemic. The  Department of Agriculture (USDA) intends to break up workdays into  shifts to minimize the number of people on-site performing essential  functions, whereas the Social Security Administration (SSA) reported  planning to stagger breaks and strategic reassignments. Although the  planning process has not been completed, DOL noted that it plans to  implement parking restrictions for essential employees who would need to  be physically in the office and post signage for elevators and restrooms to  limit use to one person at a time. In addition, NRC reported that it  enhanced telephone conferencing capability so that it can locate and  virtually assemble teams, managers, and staff as needed.
section_title: Only One Agency Reported Testing Its Information Technology Capabilities to a Great Extent
paragraphs: Many of the agencies’ pandemic influenza plans rely on social distancing  strategies, primarily telework, to carry out the functions of the federal  government in the event of a pandemic outbreak. Accordingly, the Key  Elements asks if agencies have ensured that their telecommunications  infrastructures are capable of handling telework arrangements. As part of  their pandemic planning, agencies need to review their telework  infrastructures and look for ways to expand their capacities, if necessary.
In our survey, agencies reported testing their IT capabilities to varying  degrees. Only one agency, NSF, stated that it tested its IT infrastructure to  a great extent. NSF reported assessing its telework system formally  several times each year and each day through various means. The agency  noted that it has an annual COOP exercise that tests the IT infrastructure  it would use in a pandemic situation. Twice a year, tests are done to  ensure that the NSF computer service recovery site can provide a  connection to the agency’s IT infrastructure. NSF also stated that it has a  majority of staff with telework agreements in place and who telework at  least on an episodic basis. In contrast, five of the surveyed agencies  acknowledged that they had tested their IT network capacity to little or no  extent. Table 2 shows the agency responses to this question.
Several agencies provided more detail on their IT network testing efforts.  For example, DOT stated that over the past 2 years, the department had a  number of IT and telework exercises. One of these occurred on April 17,  2008, when the department tested its telework capacity for all  headquarters operations during the visit of Pope Benedict XVI, who  conducted a Mass at the Washington Nationals Stadium, 1 block from DOT  headquarters. Other examples of IT capacity testing included the Office of  the Secretary of Defense’s live 2-day pandemic influenza-based exercise,  that included employees who teleworked from home or other alternative  worksites. An HHS component, the Division of Payment Management,  reported executing a business continuity exercise, which incorporated a  scenario of responding to an outbreak of influenza in the Washington,  D.C., area. The division directed 40 percent of its employees, 31 employees  plus 3 contractors, to work from home. The goal of the exercise was to  test employees’ access to critical systems and determine IT gaps, the  ability to continue transactions, and the ability to communicate during an  emergency. DOL stated that it has established a committee to focus on  increasing its telework testing and providing guidance for agency program  managers to do more direct tests. On the other hand, SSA noted that while  it has telework arrangements that can be used during a pandemic  outbreak, the agency has elected not to develop a specific telework  contingency because telework does not lend itself to the agency’s primary  mission.
section_title: Three Agencies Reported Not Providing Employees with Information on Human Capital Policy Changes in the Event of a Pandemic
paragraphs: Federal Continuity Directive 1 requires that each agency implement a  process to communicate its human capital guidance for emergencies— pay, leave, staffing, and other human resources flexibilities—to managers  and make staff aware of that guidance to ensure that the agency continues  essential functions during an emergency. Given the potential severity of  pandemic influenza, it is important that employees understand the policies  and requirements of their agencies and the alternatives, such as telework,  that may be available to them. Many employees and their supervisors will  have questions about their rights, entitlements, alternative work  arrangements, benefits, leave and pay flexibilities, and hiring flexibilities  available during the turmoil created by a pandemic.
Twenty-one of the 24 pandemic coordinators surveyed reported making  information available to their employees on how human capital policies  and flexibilities will change in the event of a pandemic outbreak. Three  agencies—DOC, GSA, and SSA—reported that they have not. Of the  agencies that reported making information available, 2 had done so  indirectly. HUD stated that it shared information with unions, and  Treasury reported that it briefed its human capital officers on the human  capital policies and flexibilities available to address pandemic issues. NRC  reported that in September 2008 its pandemic plan was completed and  made available to staff through the agencywide document management  system. The plan reflected human capital policies and flexibilities. Many of  the agencies that made information available did so through their internal  Web sites, both by posting their own plans and guidance and by linking to  OPM guidance on human capital policies. Of those agencies, several also  held town hall meetings or all-staff briefings to share guidance with  employees. A number of agencies reported distributing pamphlets or  brochures that contained human capital information.
section_title: Pandemic Preparations for Correctional Workers, Production Staff Responsible for Disbursing Federal Payments, and Air Traffic Controllers Are in Various Stages of Development
subsections: section_title: BOP Has Taken Steps to Protect Correctional Workers in the Event of a Pandemic
paragraphs: BOP, a component of DOJ, has the mission of protecting society by  confining offenders in the controlled environments of prisons and  community-based facilities that are safe, humane, cost-efficient, and  appropriately secure and that provide work and other self-improvement  opportunities to assist offenders in becoming law-abiding citizens. BOP  has 114 correctional facilities with a central office located in Washington,  D.C., and 6 regional offices. The central office provides administrative  oversight of its facilities, and the 6 regional offices directly support  operations of the facilities in their respective geographic areas of the  country. As of January 8, 2009, the agency was responsible for the custody  and care of 201,113 federal inmates. Approximately 35,000 federal  employees ensure the security of federal prisons and provide inmates with  programs and services. According to BOP officials, the warden is  permitted to use all facility staff, including noncorrectional services staff,  such as secretaries, nurses, or dentists, for correctional service  assignments during emergencies and at other designated times. One of  BOP’s published core values is that all employees are “correctional  workers first,” regardless of the specific position to which an individual is  hired, and both correctional services staff and noncorrectional services  staff are responsible for the safety and security of the facility.
BOP operates facilities at different security levels, and each facility is  designated as either minimum, low, medium, or high security—with  increasing security features, inmate to staff ratios, and control of inmate  movement with each increasing security level—and administrative  facilities that have special missions, such as the detention of pretrial  offenders and the treatment of inmates with serious or chronic medical  problems. Some BOP facilities are part of BOP’s 13 federal correctional  complexes, which consist of two or more colocated facilities. BOP  facilities are given a security designation based on the level of security and  staff supervision the facility is able to provide.
subsections: section_title: Pandemic Planning for Correctional Workers
paragraphs: DOJ’s pandemic influenza plan focuses on minimizing the effects of a  pandemic on its workforce and operations via techniques such as social  distancing, infection control, personal hygiene, personnel training, and  telework. The department’s plan is designed to supplement the traditional,  all-hazards COOP plan. According to DOJ’s plan, each DOJ component is  required to identify its specific responsibilities for maintaining essential  functions during a pandemic influenza outbreak, comply with Federal  Continuity Directives 1 and 2 and FEMA guidelines, and certify  compliance with DOJ’s Security and Emergency Planning Department.  DOJ’s primary function with its components in pandemic planning is its  periodic random assessments of component continuity programs.
BOP’s pandemic influenza plan was developed through its Office of  Emergency Preparedness and was disseminated to its central office and  six regional offices in May 2008. In conjunction with BOP’s pandemic plan,  BOP’s Health Services Division developed four supplemental pandemic flu  modules for facility-level planning—Surveillance and Infection Control,  Antiviral Medications and Vaccines, Health Care Delivery, and Care of  the Deceased—which provide detailed instructions for health-related  aspects of pandemic flu emergency response. Specifically, the modules  contain guidelines, standard operating procedures, checklists, and  screening forms. The final modules became available to individual BOP  facilities in August 2008, and the deadline to submit facility-specific  pandemic plans was extended from September to November 2008. Prior to  the plan’s release, BOP held conferences with the Health Services Division  and infection control officers to solicit feedback on the draft plan’s  feasibility and to encourage the facilities to start implementing elements of  the plan, such as early coordination with local communities, surveillance  of seasonal influenza, and promotion of good health habits among the  correctional workers and the inmates.
BOP’s Antiviral Medications and Vaccines outlines guidance on  stockpiling, distribution, and dispensation of antiviral medications. The  module also requires the facilities to review HHS priority groups for  receiving antiviral medication and pandemic vaccine; develop local  procedures for dispensing antiviral medication and vaccine to employees  and inmates according to the central regional office guidance issued by the  medical director; and coordinate with local health departments to ensure  the facility’s inclusion in the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS),which is a  national repository of medical supplies that is designed to supplement and  resupply local public health agencies in the event of a national emergency.
BOP headquarters provided funding to the central regional offices to  stockpile Tamiflu, an antiviral medication, and a list of GSA-approved  sources to procure additional supplies. Based on a historical review of the  1918 pandemic influenza and HHS planning assumptions, BOP intends to  supply antiviral medication to 15 percent of the correctional workers and  inmates in each facility if the influenza outbreak is geographically spread  throughout the United States. BOP’s pandemic plan anticipates that its  supply of Tamiflu will come from two sources—BOP’s established  stockpile and each BOP facility’s coordinated effort with its local health  department to ensure inclusion in the SNS for antiviral medication for  treatment. According to a regional BOP official, antiviral medication is  already stockpiled at designated storage sites in each region, and each  storage site is responsible for plans to distribute the antiviral medication  throughout its respective region. For example, the North Central Regional  Office in Kansas City, Missouri, reported managing its stockpile through a  GSA contract with McKesson Pharmaceuticals. Under the terms of the  contract, the regional office can exchange the antiviral medication after 5  years if a pandemic does not occur. Upon expiration of the antiviral  medication, the contract requires either recertification of the existing  medications or a new shipment.
At the time of our review, no BOP-wide pandemic or health care  management exercise had been conducted; however, the Office of  Emergency Preparedness was planning such exercises. At the same time,  individual institutions and regional health services offices have conducted  exercises on specific aspects of pandemic preparedness. For example, the  North Central Regional Office in Kansas City reported participating in  pandemic tabletop exercises and interagency tests coordinated by the  Kansas City FEB. Regional directors have had basic pandemic training, but  there have not been exercises on how to manage a pandemic or manage a  local facility in the event of a pandemic. The regional managers have  ongoing conferences and have been trained on overarching BOP pandemic  plans and strategies, such as social distancing, hand hygiene, and  stockpiling.
BOP’s pandemic plan addresses the need for infection control measures to  mitigate influenza transmission and calls for education of correctional  workers and the inmate population. Accordingly, all facilities are  instructed that they should have readily available and ample supplies of  bar soap and liquid soap in the restrooms, alcohol-based wipes throughout  the facility, and hand sanitizers if approved by the warden. A BOP official  noted that alcohol-based antibacterial hand sanitizers would not be  available to the inmates because of the sanitizer’s high alcohol content,  which can be misused by the inmates. The Surveillance and Infection  Control details recommendations for use of personal protective equipment  such as surgical or procedure masks; N95 respirators, which BOP  stipulates should only be used in the context of an OSHA-defined  respiratory protection program; and gloves, when directly involved in  caring for ill correctional workers and inmates. BOP’s pandemic influenza  plans also require training and education of correctional workers and  inmates on pandemic influenza and aspects of facility management in case  of an outbreak at the component and facility levels.
section_title: Challenges in Protecting Correctional Workers
paragraphs: The use of social distancing measures to protect correctional workers in  the event of a pandemic presents a challenge. Although BOP’s  Surveillance and Infection Control advocates social distancing during a  pandemic outbreak, according to several BOP officials, social distancing  measures are difficult to implement at the facility level. In older facilities,  such as USP Leavenworth, there may be a greater need for correctional  workers to be physically present and work in proximity to one another  and the inmates to maintain facility security, address emergencies, and  deal with the inmate population. On the other hand, recently constructed  facilities such as the Allenwood Federal Correctional Complex have  closed-circuit video monitoring systems throughout the facilities, which  enable the correctional workers to better monitor the inmate population  and minimize contact. However, BOP officials said that there are many  situations in which close contact is inevitable between correctional  workers and inmates and where personal protective equipment, such as  gloves and masks, would not be feasible. In the event of a fight between  inmates, for example, correctional workers would not have time to put on  gloves or masks and any in-place masks would be likely to fall off. In  addition, according to a medical officer at USP Leavenworth, gloves  cannot be worn for a long period of time without compromising the health  of the skin. Another BOP official said that various facilities have unique  requirements that they need to factor into planning for the use of social  distancing measures. Examples include prisons with different layouts;  facilities where inmates have increased needs, for example, inmates with  diabetes or those who need wheelchairs; and facilities where there are  inmates who cannot be colocated for security reasons.
A unique pandemic planning challenge facing federal correctional workers  is the maintenance of an effective custodial relationship between them and  the inmates in federal prisons. According to BOP officials, this relationship  depends on communication and mutual trust, as correctional workers in  federal prisons do not carry weapons or batons inside the cellblocks.  Rather, they use verbal methods of communication to keep order. The  BOP officials at USP Leavenworth said that they would not allow a  situation where correctional workers wear N95 respirators or surgical  masks but the inmates do not. Seeing a correctional worker wearing a  mask may cause fear among inmates and could potentially contribute to  an unstable situation. The BOP officials at the Allenwood Federal  Correctional Complex said that they would provide personal protective  equipment to both correctional workers and inmates and use antiviral  medication combined with social distancing strategies to mitigate the  spread of influenza. An Allenwood Federal Correctional Complex official  noted that education of staff and the inmate population about pandemic  influenza would be an important part of the facility’s pandemic effort.
The guidance provided by BOP’s central office and regional offices does  not clearly determine prioritization and allocation of pandemic  pharmaceutical interventions to the facilities. For example, an official at  USP Leavenworth said that the facilities do not know how much antiviral  medication they can rely on from the SNS in addition to the 15 percent  BOP allocation. The distribution of antiviral medications to Leavenworth  correctional workers and inmates would take into account a variety of  factors, such as age; health factors, including preexisting conditions; and  severity of the pandemic event. Based on these factors, the numbers of  antivirals needed would be difficult to calculate in advance. In addition,  priority would always depend on the situation, and the warden working  with the facility’s medical director would make the final determinations.
Despite the challenges BOP faces with pandemic influenza planning, the  bureau has advantages, which are unique to its facilities. Every  correctional facility is a closed and self-contained system, and each facility  is somewhat self-sufficient, maintaining a 30-day supply of food, water,  and other necessities for any type of contingency. Correctional facilities  also have well-tested experience in emergency and health hazard planning  and management and infection control, which provide them with a solid  foundation to build on for pandemic influenza preparedness. Additionally,  correctional facilities generally have strong ties with their local  communities, important because pandemic influenza will be largely  addressed by the resources available to each community it affects. For  example, in addition to their own medical staff, BOP facilities rely on local  hospitals and work with community first responders in emergencies.  Having medical staff on board, an advantage some of the other agencies  lack, also makes pandemic planning and decision making easier.
section_title: FMS Has Operational Pandemic Plans for Production Staff Responsible for Disbursing Federal Payments
paragraphs: FMS, a component of Treasury, provides central payment services to  federal agencies, operates the federal government’s collections and  deposit systems, provides governmentwide accounting and reporting  services, and manages the collection of delinquent debt owed to the  government. FMS is the primary disburser of payments to individuals and  businesses on behalf of federal agencies, disbursing more than $1.6 trillion  in federal payments annually, including Social Security payments,  veterans’ benefits, and income tax refunds, to more than 100 million  people. FMS has about 2,100 employees, one-third of whom are located in  four regional financial centers—Austin, Texas; Kansas City, Missouri;  Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and San Francisco, California. The regional  financial centers issue the majority of their payments by electronic fund  transfers and the rest by wire transfers and paper checks. The centers are  production facilities that rely heavily on integrated computer and  telecommunications systems to perform their mission. However, they also  rely on light manufacturing operations to print and enclose checks for  releasing at specific times of the month.
For the most part, the regional financial centers are planning that in the  event of a pandemic, the nature of their business will be unchanged, but  there will be issues with sickness, absenteeism, communication, and  hygiene that they must address. Employees whose positions require, on a  daily basis, direct handling of materials or on-site activity that cannot be  handled remotely or at an alternative worksite are not eligible for  telework. According to an FMS official, even with a minimum crew on-site  to produce paper checks, there will still be instances when employees will  need to be within 3 feet of other employees. For example, a certification  process for the checks includes internal controls, which necessitates  having more than one employee present in a confined space. The Kansas  City Financial Center (KFC) estimated that it would need 13 essential  employees to continue on-site operations in the event of a pandemic,  including employees such as payment control technicians, mail processing  clerks, and production machinery repairers. The Philadelphia Financial  Center (PFC) explained that its peak production workload is toward the  end of the month when it is preparing the monthly Social Security benefit  payments. At this point in the month, the PFC will need the majority of the  payment and mail operations branch employees present, approximately 25  employees.
subsections: section_title: Pandemic Planning for FMS Production Workers
paragraphs: Treasury’s pandemic plan is an annex to its COOP plan and describes how  departmental offices and its bureaus will discharge their responsibilities in  the event of a pandemic. The Treasury pandemic plan describes the  department’s operational approach to employee safety and COOP and the  manner in which Treasury will communicate with its stakeholders. To  facilitate consistent planning across Treasury, its Office of Emergency  Preparedness provided all department offices and bureaus with guidance  for departmental planning from the Implementation Plan. According to an  FMS official, Treasury also directed its components to  www.pandemicflu.gov for additional guidance.
FMS officials said that they have a biweekly teleconference to discuss  business continuity planning, including the pandemic plans for the  regional financial centers. An FMS official commented that the primary  guidance from FMS to the regional centers came from the Key Elements  provided by the HSC. The KFC reported that the Kansas City FEB’s  Continuity Working Group held several workshops to discuss pandemic  planning. At these workshops, and in conjunction with online guidance  from the Office of Management and Budget, OPM, and FEMA, the KFC  developed its own plan, striving for consistency in assimilating the  guidance from all sources. FMS officials reported that the labor union  representing FMS’s bargaining unit employees, the National Treasury  Employees Union, was involved in the pandemic planning process for  FMS.
The FMS Security Division is responsible for ensuring uniformity in  pandemic planning across the regional financial centers. The four regional  financial centers’ pandemic plans follow the same basic template with an  overview and center objectives followed by sections on succession  planning, human resource issues, telework issues, communication, and  hygiene. All of the regional financial centers’ pandemic plans contain  detailed guidance for employees on human capital policies in the event of  a pandemic. All of the regional plans also have guidance to maintain links  with their respective FEBs in order to be involved in local planning and  communications. At the KFC, for example, through monthly meetings and  special workshops sponsored by the Kansas City FEB, the regional   financial center has had interactions with state and local entities, including  representatives from the Missouri state emergency network and two local  county health offices. PFC officials also reported participating in two  tabletop exercises focused on emergency planning that were hosted by the  Philadelphia FEB.
As part of the center pandemic plans, officials researched the types of  supplies they would need based on the risks faced in their facilities. For  example, the janitorial staff now routinely wipes off door handles,  tabletops, and other high-traffic areas. As part of the KFC’s plan, the  center stocks such items as N95 respirators, gloves, hand sanitizers,  disinfectants, and fanny packs that include items such as ready to eat  meals, hand-cranked flashlights, small first-aid kits, and emergency  blankets. The KFC Deputy Director commented that in the event of a  pandemic, the KFC would encourage the use of N95 respirators and gloves  and that the facility had made a decision to pre-position these supplies.  The KFC plans to stock enough for 15 to 20 employees per day for the first  pandemic wave. Preceding the first wave, the KFC plans to order  additional supplies from GSA at the onset of the first pandemic trigger.  KFC officials believe that this will allow the center to have enough  supplies to last during subsequent pandemic waves. The KFC has also  discussed housing some employees on-site during a pandemic, but this will  be a greater possibility once the exercise facility, including showers and  lockers, is finished. The KFC Deputy Director said that the organization is  aware that the basis of part of the U.S. economy rests on the regional  financial centers and that they will need to issue payments even during a  pandemic. PFC officials reporting having in stock approximately 1,200 N95  respirators, hand sanitizers, and gloves, and the PFC has pre-positioned  masks and gloves in each branch. PFC officials noted that additional  supplies are being procured.
Although FMS said that continuing communication with employees is  needed, training, education, and materials have been provided to  managers concerning essential functions and employee safety and health  in the event of a pandemic. Essential employees have been told in broad  terms that operations will continue during a pandemic. For example, the  KFC Director has asked that designated critical employees be approached  to determine in the event of a pandemic crisis whether they would be  receptive to sheltering in place. An FMS official reported that the agency  presented a pandemic preparedness briefing in 2006, which shared with  the regional facilities’ employees pandemic-related subjects, such as cough  etiquette. FMS also reported communicating the elements needed for a  home pandemic preparedness kit as well as personal pandemic planning  to all employees. The PFC stated that it plans to obtain informational  materials on safety and health during a pandemic from local health care  facilities for distribution to employees. The center incorporated training  on pandemic awareness into its annual safety and health training.
section_title: Challenges in Protecting FMS Production Staff
paragraphs: The FMS regional financial centers face some unique pandemic planning  challenges. Since the regional financial centers are production facilities  with large open spaces as well as enclosed office areas, pandemic  planning requires different responses for different areas. For example, in  the office and common areas, cleaning and disinfecting will be a key  component. An FMS official said that the employees’ response and  diligence in following disease containment measures would be what  determines the success of those measures. Scheduling of production  personnel is also a challenge. Since the production of the checks must be  done according to a deadline and internal controls must be maintained,  schedules are not flexible. The KFC explained that its peak production  workload is toward the end of the month when it is preparing the monthly  Social Security benefit payments. PFC officials noted that although they  could identify certain positions that could be performed remotely, there  are issues surrounding personally identifiable information, which must be  protected and which requires that special equipment needs be addressed.  The PFC is exploring its telework options as part of its pandemic planning,  but officials acknowledged that protecting sensitive data would be a  significant consideration of any formal telework program.
FMS officials had not made any arrangements for pandemic  pharmaceutical interventions for the regional financial centers. According  to an FMS official, Treasury asked its components to determine the  number and courses of antiviral medications needed for very high-risk,  high-risk, and medium-risk staff with critical professional responsibilities,  consistent with HSC guidance documents. Aside from that action, FMS  had not determined priorities for medical countermeasures in part  because the relatively small number of essential employees required to be  on-site, as well as the large open spaces in the regional facilities, makes  social distancing measures more feasible.
section_title: FAA Pandemic Plans to Protect Air Traffic Controllers Are Not Ready for Implementation
paragraphs: FAA, a component of DOT, expects the National Airspace System to  function throughout an influenza pandemic, in accordance with the  preparedness and response goal of sustaining infrastructure and mitigating  impact to the economy and the functioning of society. FAA’s Interim Plan  for Sustaining Essential Government Services (SEGS) During a  Pandemic states that since an influenza pandemic would not damage  physical infrastructure, FAA facilities would remain operational and day- to-day operations would continue based on the number of available  personnel. Maintaining the functioning of the National Airspace System  will require that FAA’s air traffic controllers, who ensure that aircraft  remain safely separated from other aircraft, vehicles, and terrain, continue  to work on-site. Under nonpandemic circumstances, FAA’s over 15,000 air  traffic controllers guide more than 7,000 aircraft in the United States each  hour during peak hours and about 50,000 aircraft each day through the  National Airspace System. While FAA expects the demand for air traffic  control, which manages cargo as well as passenger travel, to be reduced in  the event of a severe pandemic outbreak, its contingency plans assume full  air traffic levels as a starting baseline. According to an FAA official,  although passenger travel may be diminished, the shipping of cargo may  increase.
subsections: section_title: Pandemic Planning for Air Traffic Controllers
paragraphs: DOT and FAA pandemic plans and guidance provide the basis for the air  traffic management facility pandemic plans. DOT’s Guidance to the Office  of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) and Operating  Administrations (OA) addresses the protection of employees and  explicitly distinguishes pandemic plans from COOP plans, emphasizing a  pandemic’s duration and expected absenteeism rate and stating that plans  must address workforce protective policies, equipment, and measures.  The guidance requires that each component use an accompanying  template to develop a plan to sustain essential government services  (SEGS) during a pandemic. The guidance set deadlines of March 24, 2006,  for the plans and July 31, 2006, for each operating administration office to  conduct an exercise to validate its individual SEGS plan.
FAA’s SEGS plan defines essential services in the event of a pandemic  outbreak more broadly than those of COOP, because of the longer  duration of a pandemic. The essential services comprise all the services  that FAA deems necessary to provide to the aviation sector and employees  to keep the National Airspace System operational. The plan addresses  sustaining such services amid high employee absenteeism at the peak of a  pandemic wave. In broadening its categorization of essential services, FAA  considered whether and for how long the functions can be deferred;  whether the functions can be performed off-site; the interchangeability of  the occupation, such as those with limited interchangeability because of  certification requirements; as well as operational contingency measures  such as devolution, functional backups, and system redundancies. FAA’s  SEGS plan also acknowledges employee protection measures, stating that  FAA will ensure the ready availability of soap and water, tissues and waste  receptacles, and environmental cleaning supplies throughout work  facilities.
The Air Traffic Organization (ATO), FAA’s line of business responsible for  the air traffic management services that air traffic controllers provide, had  not yet directed facilities, such as its air route traffic control centers, to  develop pandemic-specific plans or incorporate these pandemic plans into  their all-hazards contingency plans. FAA officials said that all-hazards  contingency and continuity plans are adapted to the facility level and are  regularly implemented during natural disasters such as hurricanes.  Although these plans are not specific to a pandemic, FAA officials  reported that the all-hazards plans allow ATO to mitigate the impact of  adverse events, including reduced staffing levels, on National Airspace  Systems operations. FAA reported that ATO completed a national-level  pandemic plan in 2006 as part of FAA’s SEGS plan that addressed essential  missions and services, as well as general direction on social distancing and  workforce protection. FAA is incorporating detailed HHS antiviral  stockpiling guidance, issued in December 2008, into an FAA workforce  protection policy that it estimates will be completed by mid-2009. ATO will  then update its national-level pandemic plan with detailed protective  measures for its workforce, including air traffic controllers. ATO will also  use the national-level updates to direct its facilities to develop pandemic- specific plans or enhance their preexisting all-hazards contingency plans  to incorporate and implement workforce protection measures at the local  field facility level.
FAA was also expecting the results of a powered air purifying respirator  (PAPR) feasibility study, completed in November 2008, to help inform  pandemic planning at the facility level. The objective of the study was to  determine whether PAPRs are suitable for long-term use and whether air  traffic controllers can communicate with aircraft and other controllers  while wearing the PAPRs, as controllers cannot communicate adequately  while wearing N95 respirators or surgical facemasks. At this time, FAA has  provided PAPRs for short-term use by air traffic controllers so that they  can transfer control of air traffic to other air traffic facilities, per existing  contingency plans. This use was intended primarily for situations involving  asbestos in air route traffic control centers. PAPRs cost approximately  $1,000 each plus filter and battery expenses, and FAA estimates the total  cost for PAPRs for its air traffic controller workforce would reach $15  million. In addition to the cost, the study findings suggested there are  many potential problems, including noise, visibility, and comfort, with the  PAPR approach that FAA would have to address. The study concluded  that FAA would need to evaluate many concerns in a more operationally  realistic environment before recommending PAPRs for use by air traffic  controllers. Because of the nature of these concerns, FAA agency officials  said that the long-term use of PAPRs in a pandemic appears to be  impractical.
FAA also plans to augment its agencywide pandemic plan with a  workplace protection policy. Among the issues this policy would cover are  the classification of employees’ workplace exposure risk and the  identification of categories of critical employees that should be given  upgraded personal protective equipment beyond what would be indicated  by their workplace exposure risk. Once the FAA-wide workforce  protection policy is determined, ATO and other lines of business will be  expected to incorporate it into their line of business-specific pandemic  plans or revise and elaborate those policies where they exist and  implement the policy.
Both DOT and FAA’s pandemic plans emphasize employee awareness  training and both agencies already offer information and training to  employees through their intranet sites; however, the air traffic controllers  we interviewed did not generally access the intranet. DOT and FAA  intranet sites provide checklists for personal and family preparedness;  simple cleaning and decontamination guidance; hygiene reminders; social  distancing practices, such as no handshake policies and the use of  teleconferences in place of in-person meetings; and links to sites for  pandemic influenza-related information from the Centers for Disease  Control and Prevention, World Health Organization, and OPM. FAA’s  intranet also has pandemic influenza frequently asked questions and links  to the latest Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidance on  public health measures to reduce the spread of influenza and other  communicable diseases. FAA plans to publish its pandemic influenza plan  on its intranet. However, FAA officials responsible for pandemic planning  have acknowledged that disseminating information through agency e-mail  or its intranet site is not effective for communicating with air traffic  controllers, as they do not have ready access to either during their shifts.
FAA has additional media through which to communicate pandemic  awareness to its employees. For example, FAA has developed a “Pandemic  Flu 101” training program, which is undergoing testing, and it has  arrangements in place for managers to alert air traffic controllers of  critical information and announcements when they are on duty. FAA also  plans to provide copies of its pandemic plan to employees who do not  have ready access to the intranet during duty hours. Managers will ensure  that new hires review the FAA pandemic plan as well as other applicable  documents and that employees undergo annual refresher training.
section_title: Challenges in Protecting Air Traffic Controllers
paragraphs: Protecting air traffic controllers in the event of a pandemic outbreak is  particularly challenging for several reasons. Air traffic controllers work in  proximity to one another; the 6 feet of separation recommended for social  distancing during a pandemic by the Centers for Disease Control and  Prevention and OSHA is not possible for them. Figure 3 shows federal  employees working in an air traffic control tower. In addition, air traffic  controllers cannot use personal protective equipment such as N95  respirators or surgical masks, as these impede the clear verbal  communication necessary to maintain aviation safety. FAA officials and air  traffic controllers we interviewed also reported that the common  workstations that air traffic controllers share are not regularly sanitized  between users. FAA must certify that any sanitizer, many of which are  caustic chemicals, does not corrode sensitive equipment necessary to  ensure flight safety. FAA is exploring this issue to determine if any  sanitizer can be used safely. Moreover, cross-certification of air traffic  controllers is problematic. Attaining full performance levels for the  controllers takes up to 3 years, and air traffic controllers proficient in one  area of airspace cannot replace controllers proficient in another airspace  without training and certification. This could result in reduced air traffic  management services. Finally, FAA regulations on medication for air  traffic controllers are strict because certain medications may impair an air  traffic controller’s performance, and the Office of Aviation Medicine’s  policy on the use of Tamiflu for prophylactic use by on-duty controllers  was still in draft as of March 2009. An FAA official said that FAA would  make final the policy for this use when the workforce protection policy is  approved.
section_title: Monitoring and Reporting on Agencies’ Pandemic Workforce Protection Plans Could Improve Efforts to Protect Employees in the Event of a Pandemic
paragraphs: Although the Implementation Plan includes action items aimed at  developing and tracking progress relative to the national response for  pandemic preparedness, there is no mechanism in place to track the  progress of federal agencies’ workforce preparedness efforts. Action items  in the Implementation Plan specify roles and responsibilities as well as  deadlines and performance measures, and the HSC has issued public  progress reports on the status of the action items.
The survey results from the 24 CFO Act agency pandemic coordinators, as  well as information from the case study agencies, indicate that a wide  range of pandemic planning activities are under way and that all of the  agencies are taking steps to some degree to protect their workers in the  event of a pandemic. However, agencies’ progress is uneven, and while we  recognize that the pandemic planning process is evolving and is  characterized by uncertainty and constrained resources, some agencies  are clearly in the earlier stages of developing their pandemic plans and  being able to provide the health protection related to the risk of exposure  their essential employees may experience. For example, our previous  work showed that agencies’ plans lack important elements, such as  identifying which essential veterinarian functions must be performed on- site and how they will be carried out if absenteeism reaches 40 percent— the rate predicted at the height of the pandemic and used for planning  purposes. An example of an essential veterinarian function is helping to  ensure the safety of meat and poultry products.
Under the HSC’s Implementation Plan, DHS was charged with, among  other things, monitoring and reporting to the Executive Office of the  President on the readiness of departments and agencies to continue their  operations while protecting their workers during an influenza pandemic.  While directed by the plan, however, the report was not included as a  specific action item. DHS officials reported that in late 2006 or early 2007  they asked HSC representatives with direct responsibility for the  Implementation Plan for clarification on the issue of reporting agencies’  ability to continue their operations while protecting their workers during a  pandemic. DHS officials said they were informed that they did not have to  prepare a report. Instead, according to White House counsel  representatives, the HSC planned to take on the monitoring role through  its agency pandemic plan certification process. The HSC, as noted earlier,  had requested that agencies certify that they were addressing the  applicable elements of a pandemic checklist in their plans in late 2006 and  again in late 2008.
As originally envisioned in the Implementation Plan, the report was to be  directed to the Executive Office of the President. There was no provision  in the plan, however, for the report to be made available to the Congress.  We have previously reported on the importance of internal control  monitoring to assess the quality of performance over time. Without  appropriately designed monitoring and reporting, the President and the  Congress cannot fully assess the ability of the agencies to continue their  operations while protecting federal employees in the event of a pandemic.
The HSC’s certification process, as implemented, did not provide for  monitoring and reporting as envisioned in the Implementation Plan  regarding agencies’ abilities to continue operations in the event of a  pandemic while protecting their employees. Although the council had  asked agencies to certify that they were addressing the applicable  elements of a pandemic planning checklist, the process did not include  any assessment of, or reporting on, agencies’ progress as was the case for  the action items in the plan. Moreover, according to agency officials we  interviewed, this certification process was the only effort to check on  individual agencies’ pandemic plans.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Given the threat of pandemic influenza, heightened by recent events, it is  imperative that agencies have pandemic plans that ensure their ability to  continue operations while protecting their workers who serve the  American public. The survey of the 24 CFO Act agencies showed that  while some have progressed in their planning to address how their  employees’ safety and health will be protected and have identified the  essential functions they will maintain in the face of significant and  sustained absenteeism, several agencies have yet to complete such  necessary initial steps. It is important to recognize that agency pandemic  plans will continue to be revised and improved with additional time and  information regarding pandemic preparedness and that some agencies  face greater complexities in their planning than others. However, some  agencies are not close to having operational pandemic plans, particularly  at the facility level. Federal agencies must progress to establish  operational plans to ensure the maintenance of essential services during  times in which widespread disease will affect the health care system, the  broader economy, and society as a whole.
The three case study agencies illustrate that filtering pandemic plans down  to individual facilities and making them operational present challenges for  the agencies. Because the primary threat to continuity of operations  during a pandemic is the threat to employee health, agencies’ plans to  protect their workforce need to progress to be operational at the facility  level. However, unlike other action items in the Implementation Plan that  address the federal response to pandemic influenza, there is no real  monitoring mechanism in place to ensure that agencies’ workforce  pandemic plans are complete and ensure that the agencies can protect  their workers in the event of a pandemic. The process of monitoring  should ensure that federal agencies are making progress in developing  their plans to protect their workforce in the event of a pandemic and have  the information and guidance they need to develop operational pandemic  plans.
The HSC has been serving as the hub of federal preparedness activities for  pandemic flu, coordinating activities across HHS, DHS, and other federal  agencies. However, the council’s certification process has not included  any assessment or reporting on the status of agency plans. Having DHS  monitor and report on the status of agencies’ pandemic plans to protect  the safety and health of their employees while maintaining essential  operations could enhance agencies’ accountability for this responsibility  and serve as an effective way of tracking agencies’ progress in making  their pandemic plans operational by planning for the protection of their  workforce. Although the directive in the Implementation Plan required  DHS to report to the Executive Office of the President, the Congress may  want DHS to report to it on agencies’ progress on their pandemic plans to  allow it to carry out its oversight role. Given the important role that the  federal government will play in responding to a pandemic, planning to  ensure the safety and well-being of federal employees is vital to the  success of government operations.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: To help support its oversight responsibilities, the Congress may want to  consider requiring DHS to report to it on agencies’ progress in developing  and implementing their pandemic plans, including any key challenges and  gaps in the plans.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure agencies’ greater accountability in developing operational plans  that will protect their workforce in the event of a pandemic, we  recommend that the HSC request that the Secretary of Homeland Security  monitor and report to the Executive Office of the President on the  readiness of agencies to continue their operations while protecting their  workers during an influenza pandemic. The reporting should include an  assessment of the agencies’ progress in developing their plans, including  any key challenges and gaps in the plans. The request should also establish  a specific time frame for reporting on these efforts.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided the Acting Executive Secretary of the HSC and the Secretary  of Homeland Security with a draft of this report for review and comment.  The Acting Executive Secretary of the HSC commented that the report  makes useful points regarding opportunities for enhanced monitoring and  reporting within the executive branch concerning agencies’ progress in  developing plans to protect their workforce. She noted that the council  will give serious and careful consideration to the report findings and  recommendations in this regard. The Under Secretary for Management at  DHS said that in the coming weeks and months, the department would be  involved in efforts to ensure that government entities are well prepared for  what may come next. She expressed her appreciation for the report’s  findings and recommendations, which she said would contribute to the  department’s efforts. The HSC’s written comments are reprinted in  appendix III, and DHS’s comments are reprinted in appendix IV.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. We are sending copies of this report to the Homeland Security  Council, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice,  the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Transportation,  relevant congressional committees, and other interested parties. The  report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-6543 or steinhardtb@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Chief Financial Officers Act Agencies
section_title: Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to determine (1) the extent to which federal agencies  have reported plans under way to protect their workforce should an  influenza pandemic occur and have reported identifying essential  functions, other than first response, that cannot be accomplished remotely  in the event of pandemic influenza; (2) the plans selected agencies have  established for certain occupations performing essential functions other  than first response; and (3) the opportunities to improve federal agencies’  planning enabling them to protect their workforce while maintaining their  essential functions in the event of a pandemic.
To address the first objective, we developed and administered a Web- based survey. Our intent was to survey the pandemic coordinators from  the 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990. We  developed the survey questions based on guidelines for worker protection  from the Homeland Security Council (HSC), Occupational Safety and  Health Administration, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),  and Federal Emergency Management Agency. We asked the pandemic  coordinators questions about (1) their pandemic plans, (2) the  department- and component-level functions the agencies consider  essential in the event of a pandemic that are not first response and cannot  be continued remotely, (3) measures planned to protect workers who will  not be able to work remotely, (4) social distancing strategies, (5)  information technology testing, and (6) communication of human capital  pandemic policies. Furthermore, in addressing the first objective, we  reviewed national pandemic plans, prior GAO work assessing influenza,  and additional relevant documents that assess influenza, public health, and  other emergency preparedness and response issues. We defined essential  functions based on Federal Continuity Directive 1 as those functions that  enable an organization to provide vital services, exercise civil authority,  maintain the safety of the public, and sustain the industrial and economic  base during disruption of normal operations. We defined first responders  as emergency personnel called to the scene of a crisis or responding to  emergency calls for assistance and medical personnel. The scope of our  work did not include an independent evaluation of the effectiveness of the  workforce protection measures recommended by federal lead pandemic  planning agencies.
From April 8 through April 17, 2008, we conducted a series of pretests with  current and former federal pandemic coordinators and emergency  managers to further refine our questions, clarify any ambiguous portions  of the survey, and identify potentially biased questions. Upon completion  of the pretests and the development of the final survey questions and  format, we sent an announcement of the upcoming survey to the 24  pandemic coordinators on May 13, 2008. These pandemic coordinators  were notified that the survey was available online on May 15, 2008. We  sent a reminder e-mail message to nonrespondents on May 28, 2008, and  conducted follow-up calls over the next few weeks. The survey was  available online until July 25, 2008, and the results were confirmed or  updated in early 2009. All 24 pandemic coordinators completed the survey  for a response rate of 100 percent.
To address the second and third objectives and to provide a more in-depth  examination of agencies’ pandemic planning, we reviewed agency-level  pandemic planning for protection of employees for three case study  occupations. Our case studies included correctional workers from the  Department of Justice’s Bureau of Prisons (BOP); production staff  responsible for disbursing federal payments from the Department of the  Treasury’s Financial Management Service (FMS); and air traffic controllers  from the Department of Transportation’s Federal Aviation Administration  (FAA). The primary criteria for selecting the case studies were that they  represent non-first response occupations involved in an essential function  that federal employees need to provide on-site. In addition, we excluded  from our case study selections occupations in agencies that have a  primary role in the federal response to pandemic influenza.
To assess the extent to which the case study agencies, BOP, FMS, and FAA  have operational plans to protect their workforce, we reviewed agency  and component pandemic plans and conducted interviews with agency  officials, employees in the case study occupations, and facility managers  and emergency planners for the sites at which the employees work. We  also met with union representatives from the American Federation of  Government Employees, the National Treasury Employees Union, and the  National Air Traffic Controllers Association to get their perspective on  plans to protect the federal workforce in the event of a pandemic. In  addition, we conducted interviews with the executive directors of the  Kansas City, Minnesota, and Oklahoma Federal Executive Boards (FEB)  to better understand federal planning for workforce protection in the  event of a pandemic at the regional level. Minnesota and Oklahoma were  selected because we had identified them in a previous report as leaders in  pandemic planning; Kansas City was selected because of the large  population of federal workers in its jurisdiction, including many in our  case study occupations.
To better understand the challenges and assess the progress made in  planning to protect employees, we visited several facilities where the  employees in our case study occupations worked. Kansas City, Kansas;  Kansas City, Missouri; and Leavenworth, Kansas, were selected as site visit  locations because all of the case study agencies had facilities in the  metropolitan statistical area that were also in the jurisdiction of an FEB,  namely the Kansas City FEB. We selected as site visit facilities the United  States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas, and BOP’s North Central  Regional Office in Kansas City, Kansas, as the supporting regional office  for that facility; the Kansas City Financial Center in Kansas City, Missouri;  and FAA’s Central Regional Office in Kansas City, Missouri. We also  visited the Allenwood Federal Correctional Complex in Allenwood,  Pennsylvania. We selected FAA air traffic facilities to cover the array of  types of facilities in which air traffic controllers work. We visited the  Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport in Arlington, Virginia; the  Potomac Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility in Warrenton,  Virginia; the Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center in Leesburg,  Virginia; and the Air Traffic Control Systems Command Center in  Herndon, Virginia. Although we did not conduct a site visit, the  Philadelphia Financial Center provided us with written answers to our  questions.
We conducted interviews with officials from HHS, the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM),  and the Department of Labor (DOL). We met with HHS officials to get a  better understanding of how access to antiviral medications and vaccines  by federal agencies is envisioned in the event of a pandemic. HHS is  responsible for the overall coordination of the public health and medical  emergency response during a pandemic. DHS has responsibility for  coordinating the overall domestic federal response during an influenza  pandemic, including implementing policies that facilitate compliance with  recommended social distancing measures, developing a common  operating picture for all federal agencies, and ensuring the integrity of the  nation’s infrastructure. OPM has responsibility for providing direction to  the FEBs and the Chief Human Capital Officers Council as well as  responsibility for developing human capital policy guidance for federal  employees in the event of a pandemic. DOL’s Occupational Safety and  Health Administration has responsibility for promoting the safety and  health of workers. We also met with White House counsel from the past  and current administrations representing the HSC to determine what role  the council played in ensuring uniform pandemic preparedness across the  U.S. government.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 to April 2009 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Homeland Security Council
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, William J. Doherty, Assistant  Director, and Judith C. Kordahl, Analyst-in-Charge, supervised the  development of this report.
Alisa Beyninson, Ryan Little, Ulyana Panchishin, and Nicholas Petrovski  made significant contributions to all aspects of this report. David Dornisch  and Andrew Stavisky assisted with the design and methodology. Karin  Fangman provided legal counsel. Mallory Barg Bulman verified the  information in the report.