Border Security: DHS Surveillance Technology Unmanned Aerial Systems and Other Assets
Published: 2016-05-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: CBP employs surveillance technologies, UAS, and other assets to help secure the border. For example, in January 2011, CBP developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, which includes seven acquisition programs related to fixed and mobile surveillance systems, among other assets. CBP has also deployed UAS, including Predator B aircraft, as well as tactical aerostats to help secure the border. In recent years, GAO has reported on a variety of CBP border security programs and operations.
This statement addresses (1) GAO findings on DHS's efforts to implement the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan and (2) preliminary observations related to GAO's ongoing work on CBP's use of UAS and tactical aerostats for border security. This statement is based on GAO products issued from November 2011 through April 2016, along with selected updates conducted in May 2016. For ongoing work related to UAS, GAO reviewed CBP documents and analyzed Predator B flight hour data from fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the time period when all Predator B centers became operational. GAO also conducted site visits in Texas and Arizona to view operation of Predator B aircraft and tactical aerostats and interviewed CBP officials responsible for these operations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO reported in March 2014 and April 2015 that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), had made progress in deploying programs under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan), but could take additional actions to strengthen its management of the Plan and its related programs. Specifically, in March 2014 GAO reported that CBP's schedules and life-cycle cost estimates for the Plan and its three highest-cost programs—which represented 97 percent of the Plan's total estimated cost—met some but not all best practices. GAO recommended that CBP ensure that its schedules and cost estimates more fully address best practices, such as validating cost estimates with independent estimates, and DHS concurred. As of May 2016, CBP has initiated or completed deployment of technology for each of the three highest-cost programs under the Plan, and reported updating some program schedules and cost estimates. For example, in May 2016, CBP provided GAO with complete schedules for two of the programs, and GAO will be reviewing them to determine the extent to which they address GAO's recommendation. GAO also reported in March 2014 that CBP had identified mission benefits of technologies under the Plan, such as improved situational awareness, but had not developed key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies, as GAO recommended in November 2011. As of May 2015, CBP had identified a set of potential key attributes for performance metrics for deployed technologies and expected to complete its development of baselines for measures by the end of 2015. In March 2016, GAO reported that CBP was adjusting the completion date to incorporate pending test and evaluation results for recently deployed technologies under the Plan.
GAO's ongoing work on CBP's use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) for border security shows that CBP operates nine Predator B aircraft in U.S. airspace in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requirements. Specifically, CBP's Air and Marine Operations operates the aircraft in accordance with FAA certificates of waiver or authorization for a variety of activities, such as training flights and patrol missions to support the U.S. Border Patrol's (Border Patrol) efforts to detect and apprehend individuals illegally crossing into the United States between ports of entry. Predator B aircraft are currently equipped with a combination of video and radar sensors that provide information on cross-border illegal activities to supported agencies. CBP data show that over 80 percent of Predator B flight hours were in airspace encompassing border and coastal areas from fiscal years 2011 through 2015. CBP officials stated that airspace access and hazardous weather can affect CBP's ability to utilize Predator B aircraft for border security activities. GAO's ongoing work shows that CBP has deployed six tactical aerostats—relocatable unmanned buoyant craft tethered to the ground and equipped with cameras for capturing full-motion video—along the U.S.-Mexico border in south Texas to support Border Patrol. CBP operates three types of tactical aerostats, which vary in size and altitude of operation. CBP officials reported that airspace access, hazardous weather, and real estate (e.g., access to private property) can affect CBP's ability to deploy and utilize tactical aerostats. Border Patrol has taken actions to track the contribution of tactical aerostats to its mission activities.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO has previously made recommendations to DHS to improve its management of plans and programs for surveillance technologies and DHS generally agreed.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Homeland  Security’s (DHS) efforts to acquire and deploy various technology and  assets to secure U.S. borders. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border  Protection’s (CBP) U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) is the federal  agency with primary responsibility for securing the national borders  between U.S. ports of entry (POE).  CBP’s Air and Marine Operations  (AMO) has primary responsibility for detecting, interdicting, and  preventing acts of terrorism and the unlawful movement of people, illegal  drugs, and other contraband toward or across U.S. borders utilizing  aviation and maritime assets. In the last 3 fiscal years, over 70 percent of  all annual apprehensions of illegal entrants by Border Patrol have  occurred along the Arizona and south Texas borders. Seizures of  marijuana and cocaine (in pounds) along the Arizona and south Texas  borders reported by Border Patrol, as a percentage of all annual seizures,  has ranged between 88 to 91 and 24 to 55 percent over the last three  years, respectively.
DHS has employed a variety of technology and assets to assist with its  efforts to secure the border. For example, in November 2005, DHS  announced the launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) program,  which was responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection  system using technology, known as the Secure Border Initiative Network  (SBInet). In January 2011, in response to internal and external  assessments that identified concerns regarding the performance, cost,  and schedule for implementing the systems, the Secretary of Homeland  Security announced the cancellation of further procurements of SBInet  systems. After the cancellation of SBInet, CBP developed the Arizona  Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan), in January 2011, which  includes a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras to help provide security  for the Arizona border to support Border Patrol. Additionally, AMO  operates a fleet of air and marine assets in support of federal border  security efforts, including surveillance through Predator B unmanned  aerial systems (UAS). CBP also operates tactical aerostats along the  border, which are relocatable unmanned buoyant craft tethered to the  ground and equipped with surveillance technologies.
Over the years, we have reported on the progress and challenges DHS  faces in implementing its border security efforts. My statement discusses  our findings on (1) DHS’s efforts to implement the Arizona Border  Surveillance Technology Plan and (2) preliminary observations related to  our ongoing work for this subcommittee on the use of UAS and tactical  aerostats for border security.
This statement is based on reports and testimonies we issued from 2011  through April 2016 that examined DHS efforts to secure the U.S. border.  It also includes selected updates we conducted in May 2016 on DHS’s  efforts to address our previous recommendations related to its Arizona  Border Surveillance Technology Plan. Our reports and testimonies  incorporated information we obtained and analyzed from officials from  various DHS components. More detailed information about our scope and  methodology can be found in our reports and testimonies. For the  updates on our Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan work, we  reviewed documents from DHS on actions it has taken to address  findings and recommendations made in our prior reports on which this  statement is based.
For ongoing work related to UAS, we analyzed CBP policies, reports,  requirements, and Predator B flight hour data from fiscal year 2011  through 2015, covering the time period when all Predator B centers  became operational. We also interviewed CBP officials responsible for  Predator B and tactical aerostat operations. To assess the reliability of  Predator B flight hour data, we reviewed guidance for reporting flight  hours, interviewed CBP officials about their policies and procedures  related to tracking flight hours, and compared monthly report data with  data from other CBP flight hour reports. We found the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting how CBP allocates its  Predator B flight hours. As part of our ongoing work, we also conducted  site visits to Arizona in February 2016 and south Texas in March 2016  where we observed Predator B and tactical aerostat operations and  interviewed CBP officials that operate and utilize these assets.
We conducted our past and ongoing work in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that  we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to  provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives.
subsections: section_title: CBP Has Made Progress in Implementing the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, but Could Take Additional Actions to Strengthen Management of the Plan
subsections: section_title: CBP Has Initiated or Completed Deployment of Technologies under the Plan and Has Taken Actions to Update Program Schedules and Cost Estimates
paragraphs: In March 2014 and April 2015, we reported that CBP had made progress  in deploying programs under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology  Plan, but that CBP could take additional action to strengthen its  management of the Plan and the Plan’s programs. As of May 2016, CBP  has initiated or completed deployment of technology to Arizona for each  of the programs under the Plan. Additionally, as discussed further below,  CBP has reported taking steps to update program schedules and life- cycle cost estimates for the three highest-cost programs under the Plan.  For example, in May 2016, CBP provided us with complete schedules for  two of the programs, and we will be reviewing them to determine the  extent to which they address our recommendation.
In March 2014, we found that CBP had a schedule for deployment of  each of the Plan’s seven programs, and that four of the programs would  not meet their originally planned completion dates. We also found that  some of the programs had experienced delays relative to their baseline  schedules, as of March 2013. Further, in our March 2016 assessment of  DHS’s major acquisitions programs, we reported on the status of the  Plan’s Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) program, noting that from March  2012 to January 2016, the program’s initial and full operational capability  dates had slipped. Specifically, we reported that the initial operational  capability date had slipped from the end of September 2013 to the end of  September 2015, and the full operational capability to the end of  September 2020. We also reported that this slippage in initial operational  capability dates had contributed to slippage in the IFT’s full operational  capability—primarily as a result of funding shortfalls––and that the IFT  program continued to face significant funding shortfalls from fiscal year  2016 to fiscal year 2020.
Despite these delays, as of May 2016 CBP reported that it has initiated or  completed deployment of technology to Arizona for each of the three  highest-cost programs under the plan—IFT, the Remote Video  Surveillance System (RVSS), and the Mobile Surveillance Capability  (MSC). Specifically, CBP officials stated that MSC deployments in  Arizona are complete and that in April 2016, requirements to transition  sustainment from the contractor to CBP had been finalized. CBP also  reported that the RVSS system has been deployed, and testing on these  systems is ongoing in four out of five stations. Further, CBP reported it  had initiated deployment of the IFT systems and as of May 2016 has  deployed 7 out of 53 IFTs in one area of responsibility. CBP conditionally  accepted the system in March 2016 and is working to deploy the  remaining IFT unit systems to other areas in the Tucson sector.
With regard to schedules, we previously reported that CBP had at least  partially met the four characteristics of reliable schedules for the IFT and  RVSS schedules and partially or minimally met the four characteristics for  the MSC schedule. Scheduling best practices are summarized into four  characteristics of reliable schedules—comprehensive, well constructed,  credible, and controlled (i.e., schedules are periodically updated and  progress is monitored). We assessed CBP’s schedules as of March  2013 for the three highest-cost programs and reported in March 2014 that  schedules for two of the programs at least partially met each  characteristic (i.e., satisfied about half of the criterion), and the schedule  for the other program at least minimally met each characteristic (i.e.,  satisfied a small portion of the criterion). For example, the schedule for  the IFT program partially met the characteristic of being credible in that  CBP had performed a schedule risk analysis for the program, but the risk  analysis did not include the risks most likely to delay the project or how  much contingency reserve was needed. For the MSC program, the  schedule minimally met the characteristic of being controlled in that it did  not have valid baseline dates for activities or milestones by which CBP  could track progress. We recommended that CBP ensure that scheduling  best practices are applied to the IFT, RVSS, and MSC schedules. DHS  concurred with the recommendation and stated that CBP planned to  ensure that scheduling best practices would be applied, as outlined in our  schedule assessment guide, when updating the three programs’  schedules. In May 2016, CBP provided us with complete schedules for  the IFT and RVSS programs, and we will be reviewing them to determine  the extent to which they address our recommendation.
In March 2014, we also found that CBP had not developed an Integrated  Master Schedule for the Plan in accordance with best practices. Rather,  CBP had used separate schedules for each program to manage  implementation of the Plan, as CBP officials stated that the Plan contains  individual acquisition programs rather than integrated programs.  However, collectively these programs are intended to provide CBP with a  combination of surveillance capabilities to be used along the Arizona  border with Mexico, and resources are shared among the programs.  According to scheduling best practices, an Integrated Master Schedule is  a critical management tool for complex systems that involve a number of  different projects, such as the Plan, to allow managers to monitor all work  activities, how long activities will take, and how the activities are related to  one another. We concluded that developing and maintaining an  Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan could help provide CBP a  comprehensive view of the Plan and help CBP better understand how  schedule changes in each individual program could affect implementation  of the overall plan.
We recommended that CBP develop an Integrated Master Schedule for  the Plan. CBP did not concur with this recommendation and maintained  that an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan in one file undermines  the DHS-approved implementation strategy for the individual programs  making up the Plan, and that the implementation of this recommendation  would essentially create a large, aggregated program, and effectively  create an aggregated “system of systems.” DHS further stated that a key  element of the Plan has been the disaggregation of technology  procurements. However, as we noted in the 2014 report, collectively  these programs are intended to provide CBP with a combination of  surveillance capabilities to be used along the Arizona border with Mexico.  Moreover, while the programs themselves may be independent of one  another, the Plan’s resources are being shared among the programs. We  continue to believe that developing an Integrated Master Schedule for the  Plan is needed. Developing and maintaining an integrated master  schedule for the Plan could allow CBP insight into current or programmed  allocation of resources for all programs as opposed to attempting to  resolve any resource constraints for each program individually.
In addition, in March 2014, we reported that the life-cycle cost estimates  for the Plan reflected some, but not all, best practices. Cost-estimating  best practices are summarized into four characteristics—well  documented, comprehensive, accurate, and credible. Our analysis of  CBP’s estimate for the Plan and estimates completed at the time of our  review for the two highest-cost programs—the IFT and RVSS programs— showed that these estimates at least partially met three of these  characteristics: well documented, comprehensive, and accurate. In terms  of being credible, these estimates had not been verified with independent  cost estimates in accordance with best practices. We concluded that  ensuring that scheduling best practices were applied to the programs’  schedules and verifying life-cycle cost estimates with independent  estimates could help better ensure the reliability of the schedules and  estimates, and we recommended that CBP verify the life-cycle cost  estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs with independent cost  estimates and reconcile any differences. DHS concurred with this  recommendation, but stated then that it did not believe that there would  be a benefit in expending funds to obtain independent cost estimates and  that if the costs realized to date continued to hold, there may be no  requirement or value added in conducting full-blown updates with  independent cost estimates.
We recognize the need to balance the cost and time to verify the life-cycle  cost estimates with the benefits to be gained from verification with  independent cost estimates. CBP officials stated that in fiscal year 2016,  DHS’s Cost Analysis Division would begin piloting DHS’s independent  cost estimate capability on the RVSS program. According to CBP  officials, this pilot is an opportunity to assist DHS in developing its  independent cost estimate capability and that CBP selected the RVSS  program for the pilot because the program is at a point in its planning and  execution process where it can benefit most from having an independent  cost estimate performed as these technologies are being deployed along  the southwest border, beyond Arizona. CBP officials stated that details for  an estimated independent cost estimate schedule and analysis plan for  the RVSS program have not been finalized. CBP plans to provide an  update on the schedule and analysis plan as additional details become  available, and provide information on the final reconciliation of the  independent cost estimate and the RVSS program cost estimate once the  pilot has been completed at the end of fiscal year 2017. Further, CBP  officials have not detailed similar plans for the IFT. We continue to believe  that independently verifying the life-cycle cost estimates for the IFT and  RVSS programs and reconciling any differences, consistent with best  practices, could help CBP better ensure the reliability of the estimates.
section_title: CBP Has Made Progress toward Assessing Performance of Surveillance Technologies, but Has Not Fully Applied Performance Metrics or Assessed the Contributions of Its Technologies
paragraphs: We reported in March 2014 that CBP had identified mission benefits of its  surveillance technologies to be deployed under the Plan, such as  improved situational awareness and agent safety. However the agency  had not developed key attributes for performance metrics for all  surveillance technologies to be deployed as part of the Plan, as we  recommended in November 2011. Further, in March 2014, we found  that CBP did not capture complete data on the contributions of these  technologies, which in combination with other relevant performance  metrics or indicators, could be used to better determine the impact of  CBP’s surveillance technologies on CBP’s border security efforts, and  inform resource allocation decisions. Although CBP had a field within its  Enforcement Integrated Database for data on whether technological  assets, such as SBInet surveillance towers, and nontechnological assets,  such as canine teams, assisted or contributed to the apprehension of  illegal entrants and seizure of drugs and other contraband, according to  CBP officials, Border Patrol agents were not required to record these  data. This limited CBP’s ability to collect, track, and analyze available  data on asset assists to help monitor the contribution of surveillance  technologies, including its SBInet system, to Border Patrol apprehensions  and seizures and inform resource allocation decisions. We recommended  that CBP require data on asset assists to be recorded and tracked within  its database, and once these data were required to be recorded and  tracked, that it analyze available data on apprehensions and  technological assists— in combination with other relevant performance  metrics or indicators, as appropriate— to determine the contribution of  surveillance technologies to CBP’s border security efforts. CBP concurred  with our recommendations and has implemented one of them.  Specifically, in June 2014, CBP issued guidance informing Border Patrol  agents that the asset assist data field within its database was now a  mandatory data field. Agents are required to enter any assisting  surveillance technology or other equipment before proceeding.
Further, as of May 2015, CBP had identified a set of potential key  attributes for performance metrics for all technologies to be deployed  under the Plan. However, CBP officials stated that this set of performance  metrics was under review as the agency continued to refine the key  attributes for metrics to assess the contributions and impacts of  surveillance technology on its border security mission. In our March  2016 update on the progress made by agencies to address our findings  on duplication and cost savings across the federal government, we  reported that CBP had modified its time frame for developing baselines  for each performance measure and that additional time would be needed  to implement and apply key attributes for metrics. According to CBP  officials, CBP expected these performance measure baselines to be  developed by the end of calendar year 2015, at which time the agency  planned to begin using the data to evaluate the individual and collective  contributions of specific technology assets deployed under the Plan.  Moreover, CBP planned to use the baseline data to establish a tool that  explains the qualitative and quantitative impacts of technology and  tactical infrastructure on situational awareness in specific areas of the  border environment by the end of fiscal year 2016. While CBP had  expected to complete its development of baselines for each performance  measure by the end of calendar year 2015, as of March 2016 the actual  completion is being adjusted pending test and evaluation results for  recently deployed technologies on the southwest border. Until CBP  completes its efforts to fully develop and apply key attributes for  performance metrics for all technologies to be deployed under the Plan, it  will not be well positioned to fully assess its progress in implementing the  Plan and determining when mission benefits have been fully realized.
section_title: CBP Utilizes Unmanned Predator B Aircraft and Tactical Aerostats for a Variety of Border Security Activities
subsections: section_title: Preliminary Observations on CBP’s Utilization of Predator B Aircraft
paragraphs: Our ongoing work shows that as of May 2016, CBP operates nine  Predator B from four AMO National Air Security Operations Centers  (NASOC) located in Sierra Vista, Arizona; Grand Forks, North Dakota;  Corpus Christi, Texas; and Jacksonville, Florida. Three Predator B  aircraft are assigned to the NASOCs in Arizona, North Dakota, and Texas  while the NASOC in Florida remotely operates Predator B aircraft  launched from the other NASOCs. AMO began operation of Predator B  aircraft in fiscal year 2006, and all four NASOCs became operational in  fiscal year 2011. See figure 1 for a photograph of a CBP Predator B  aircraft.
CBP’s Predator B aircraft may be equipped with video and radar sensors  utilized primarily to support the operations of other CBP components, and  federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. CBP’s Predator B  operations in support of its components and other law enforcement  agencies include patrol missions to detect the illegal entry of goods and  people at and between U.S. POEs and investigative missions to provide  aerial support for law enforcement activities and investigations. For  example, CBP’s Predator B video and radar sensors support Border  Patrol activities to identify and apprehend individuals entering the United  States between POEs. CBP collects and tracks information on the  number of assists provided for apprehensions of individuals and seizures  of contraband, including narcotics, in support of law enforcement  operations by Predator B aircraft. In addition, CBP’s Predator B aircraft  have been deployed to provide aerial support for monitoring natural  disasters such as wildfires and floods. For example, CBP’s Predator B  were deployed in 2010 and 2011 to support federal, state, and local  government agencies in response to flooding in the Red River Valley area  of North Dakota.
CBP’s Predator B aircraft operate in the U.S. national airspace system in  accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requirements for  authorizing all UAS operations in the National Airspace System. In  accordance with FAA requirements, all Predator B flights must comply  with a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA). The COA-designated  airspace establishes operational corridors for Predator B activity both  along and within 100 miles of the border for the northern border, and  along and within 25 to 60 miles of the border for the southern border,  exclusive of urban areas. COAs issued by FAA to CBP also include  airspace for training missions which involve take offs and landings around  a designated NASOC and transit missions to move Predator B aircraft  between NASOCs. As of May 2016, CBP has utilized the NASOC in  North Dakota as a location to train new and existing CBP Predator B  pilots. For our ongoing work, we analyzed CBP data on reported Predator  B COA-designated flight hours from fiscal years 2011 to 2015 and found  that 81 percent of flight hours were associated with COA-designated  airspace along border and coastal areas. For more information on  Predator B flight hours in COA-designated airspace, see figure 2.
Based on our ongoing work, we found that airspace access and weather  can impact CBP’s ability to utilize Predator B aircraft. According to CBP  officials we spoke with in Arizona, Predator B flights may be excluded  from restricted airspace managed by the Department of Defense along  border areas which can affect the ability of Predator B to support Border  Patrol. CBP officials we spoke with in Arizona and Texas told us that  Predator B missions are affected by hazardous weather conditions that  can affect their ability to operate the aircraft. According to CBP officials  we spoke with in Texas, CBP took steps to mitigate the impact of  hazardous weather in January and February 2016 by deploying one  Predator B aircraft from Corpus Christi, Texas, to San Angelo, Texas, at  San Angelo Regional Airport which had favorable weather conditions.  CBP’s deployment of a Predator B at San Angelo Regional Airport was in  accordance with a FAA-issued COA to conduct its border security mission  in Texas and lasted approximately 3 weeks. We plan to evaluate how  these factors affect CBP’s utilization of Predator B aircraft as part of our  ongoing work.
section_title: Preliminary Observations on CBP’s Utilization of Tactical Aerostats in South Texas
paragraphs: Our ongoing work shows that as of May 2016, CBP has deployed six  tactical aerostats along the U.S.-Mexico border in south Texas to support  Border Patrol. Specifically, CBP deployed five tactical aerostats in Border  Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley sector and one tactical aerostat In Laredo  sector. CBP utilizes three types of tactical aerostats equipped with  cameras for capturing full-motion video: Persistent Threat Detection  System (PTDS), Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS), and  Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID). Each type of tactical aerostat  varies in size and altitude of operation. See figure 3 for a photograph of a  RAID aerostat. CBP owns the RAID aerostats and leases PTDS and  PGSS aerostats through the Department of Defense. CBP operates its  tactical aerostats in accordance with FAA regulations through the  issuance of a COA.
Tactical aerostats were first deployed and evaluated by CBP in August  2012 in south Texas. CBP’s Office of Technology Innovation and  Acquisition manages aerostat technology and the operation of each site  through contracts, while Border Patrol agents operate tactical aerostat  cameras and provide security at each site. As of May 2016, Border Patrol  has taken actions to track the contribution of tactical aerostats to its  mission activities. Specifically, agents track and record the number of  assists aerostats provide for apprehensions of individuals and seizures of  contraband and narcotics.
Based on our ongoing work, we found that airspace access, weather, and  real estate can impact CBP’s ability to deploy and utilize tactical aerostats  in south Texas.
Airspace access: aerostat site placement is subject to FAA approval  to ensure the aerostat does not converge on dedicated flight paths.
Weather: aerostat flight is subject to weather restrictions, such as  hazardous weather involving high winds or storms.
Real estate: aerostat sites utilized by CBP involve access to private  property and land owner acceptance, and right of entry is required  prior for placement. In addition, CBP must take into consideration any  relevant environmental and wildlife impacts prior to deployment of a  tactical aerostat, such as flood zones, endangered species, migratory  animals, among others.
We plan to evaluate how these factors affect CBP’s utilization of tactical  aerostats as part of our ongoing work.
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and members of the  subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to  answer any questions you may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact Rebecca  Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. In addition, contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key  contributions to this statement included Kirk Kiester (Assistant Director),  as well as Jeanette Espinola, Yvette Gutierrez, Amanda Miller, Jon Najmi,  and Carl Potenzieri.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: 2016 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation,  Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits.  GAO-16-375SP. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2016.
Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Has Strengthened Management,  but Execution and Affordability Concerns Endure. GAO-16-338SP.  Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2016.
Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Assess  Resource Deployment and Progress. GAO-16-465T. Washington, D.C.:  March 1, 2016.
GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules.  GAO-16-89G. Washington, D.C.: December 2015.
Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Implement  and Assess Infrastructure and Technology. GAO-15-595T. Washington,  D.C.: May 13, 2015.
Homeland Security Acquisitions: Addressing Gaps in Oversight and  Information is Key to Improving Program Outcomes. GAO-15-541T.  Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2015.
Homeland Security Acquisitions: Major Program Assessments Reveal  Actions Needed to Improve Accountability. GAO-15-171SP. Washington,  D.C.: April 22, 2015.  2015 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation,  Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits.  GAO-15-404SP. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2015.
Border Security: Additional Efforts Needed to Address Persistent  Challenges in Achieving Radio Interoperability. GAO-15-201.  Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2015.
Unmanned Aerial Systems: Department of Homeland Security’s Review  of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Use and Compliance with  Privacy and Civil Liberty Laws and Standards GAO-14-849R.  Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2014.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed  to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-14-411T.  Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2014.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed  to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-14-368.  Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2014.
Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS Implementation and  Assessment Efforts. GAO-13-653T. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2013.
Border Security: DHS’s Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S.  Borders. GAO-13-414T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2013.
Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of  DHS’s Air and Marine Assets. GAO-12-518. Washington, D.C.: March 30,  2012.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing,  Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2011 Expenditure Plan.  GAO-12-106R. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and  Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. GAO-12-22. Washington, D.C.:  November 4, 2011.
GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for  Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs. GAO-09-3SP.  Washington, D.C.: March 2009.
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