Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's International Radiological Threat Reduction Program Needs to Focus Future Efforts on Securing the Highest Priority Radiological Sources
Published: 2007-01-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological sources were vulnerable to theft and posed a significant security threat to the United States and the international community. Radioactive material is encapsulated or sealed in metal to prevent its dispersal and is commonly called a sealed radiological source. Sealed radiological sources are used worldwide for many legitimate purposes, such as medical, industrial, and agricultural applications. However, the total number of these sources in use worldwide is unknown because many countries do not systematically account for them. It is estimated that thousands of these sources have been lost, stolen, or abandoned--commonly referred to as orphan sources. If certain types of these sources were obtained by terrorists, they could be used to produce a simple and crude, but potentially dangerous, weapon--known as a radiological dispersion device, or dirty bomb. In 2001, a congressional report directed DOE to use a portion of its fiscal year 2002 supplemental appropriation to address the threat posed by dirty bombs. In response to the congressional requirement, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Radiological Threat Reduction Task Force to identify, recover, and secure vulnerable, high-risk radiological sources, budgeting $20.6 million for the program in fiscal year 2002. The program initially focused on securing sources in the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) because DOE officials determined this region had the greatest number of vulnerable sources. In 2003, at the direction of the Secretary of Energy, DOE expanded the scope of the program to secure sealed sources worldwide, ultimately establishing the International Radiological Threat Reduction (IRTR) Program. The program's primary objective is to protect U.S. national security interests by (1) implementing rapid physical security upgrades at vulnerable sites containing radioactive sources; (2) locating, recovering, and consolidating lost or abandoned high-risk radioactive sources; and (3) supporting the development of the infrastructure necessary to sustain security enhancements and supporting regulatory controls, including the development of regional partnerships to leverage international resources. In addition, DOE has established a program to recover sealed sources produced and distributed in the United States, known as the U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction program. Part of this program's mission is to recover U.S.-origin sources on a case-by-case basis that were supplied by DOE to other countries under the Atoms for Peace program. The IRTR program is administered by NNSA with support from multiple national laboratories. The national laboratories' responsibilities include (1) assessing the physical security requirements of countries participating in the program, (2) recommending specific upgrades to strengthen radiological source security, and (3) ensuring that recommended upgrades are properly installed. In 2003, we issued a report at Congress' request focusing on U.S. and international efforts to secure sealed radiological sources. We recommended, among other things, that the Secretary of Energy take the lead in developing a comprehensive plan to strengthen controls over other countries' sealed sources. This report (1) assesses the progress the Department of Energy (DOE) has made in implementing its program to help other countries secure their sealed radiological sources, (2) identifies DOE's current and planned program costs, and (3) describes DOE's coordination with other U.S. agencies and international organizations to secure radiological sources in other countries.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain radiological sources in more than 40 countries since the program's inception in 2002. However, many of the highest-risk and most dangerous sources still remain unsecured, particularly in Russia. In 2003, when DOE decided to broaden the program's scope beyond the former Soviet Union, it also expanded the types of sites that required security upgrades. As a result, as of September 2006, almost 70 percent of all sites secured were medical facilities, which generally contain one radiological source. Several DOE and national laboratory officials with whom we spoke questioned the benefit of upgrading such a large number of medical facilities, while higher priority sites--such as waste storage facilities and Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs)--remained unsecured. In addition, DOE's program does not address the transportation of radiological sources from one location to another, a security measure that DOE and international officials have identified as the most vulnerable link in the radiological supply chain. DOE has experienced numerous problems and challenges implementing its program to secure radiological sources worldwide, including a lack of cooperation from some countries and access to sites with dangerous material. Furthermore, some high-risk countries have not given DOE permission to undertake security upgrades at all. Finally, DOE has not developed a plan to ensure that countries receiving security upgrades will be able to sustain them over the long term. From its inception in 2002 through August 31, 2006, DOE spent approximately $108 million to implement its program to secure radiological sources worldwide. A majority of the funds spent--$68 million--was to (1) conduct vulnerability assessments at a variety of sites containing radiological sources; (2) install physical security upgrades at these sites, such as hardened windows and doors, motion sensors and surveillance cameras; and (3) help countries draft laws and regulations to increase security and accounting of sources. In addition, DOE provided $13.5 million to IAEA to support activities to strengthen controls over radiological sources in IAEA member states. The remainder, or $26.5 million, paid for program planning activities such as developing program guidance documents, hiring private consultants, and conducting studies. To offset anticipated shortfalls in funding, DOE plans to obtain international contributions from other countries but efforts to date have produced limited results. DOE has improved coordination with the Department of State (State) and the Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRC) to secure radiological sources worldwide. Since we reported on this matter in 2003, DOE has involved State and NRC in its international radiological threat reduction activities more often and has increased information-sharing with the agencies. Additionally, DOE and NRC supported a State-led interagency effort to establish the Iraq Radioactive Source Regulatory Authority and develop a radiological regulatory infrastructure in Iraq. However, DOE has not always integrated its nuclear regulatory development efforts efficiently. In addition, DOE has not adequately coordinated the activities of multiple programs within the agency responsible for securing radiological and nuclear materials in other countries. DOE has generally improved coordination with IAEA to strengthen controls over other countries' radiological sources and has developed bilateral and multilateral partnerships with IAEA member states to improve their regulatory infrastructures. However, significant gaps in information-sharing between DOE and IAEA, and with the EC, have impeded DOE's ability to target the most vulnerable sites for security improvements and to avoid possible duplication of efforts.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and  international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological sources  were vulnerable to theft and posed a significant security threat to the  United States and the international community. Radioactive material, such  as cobalt-60, cesium-137, and strontium-90, is encapsulated or sealed in  metal—such as stainless steel, titanium, or platinum—to prevent its  dispersal and is commonly called a sealed radiological source. Sealed  radiological sources are used worldwide for many legitimate purposes,  such as medical, industrial, and agricultural applications. These  applications include radiation treatment for cancer patients, food and  blood irradiation, and oil drilling. However, the total number of these  sources in use worldwide is unknown because many countries do not  systematically account for them. It is estimated that thousands of these  sources have been lost, stolen, or abandoned—commonly referred to as  orphan sources. If certain types of these sources were obtained by  terrorists, they could be used to produce a simple and crude, but  potentially dangerous, weapon—known as a radiological dispersion  device, or dirty bomb. becquerels.
2,000 teletherapy sources located primarily in developing nations around  the world. Additionally, strontium-90 sources contained in large devices  known as radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG), designed to  provide electric power to navigational facilities such as lighthouses and  weather stations, contain between 25,000 and 250,000 curies. U.S. and  Russian officials have estimated that there were more than 1,050 RTGs  produced and distributed throughout the former Soviet Union. These  devices present a particularly high security risk because of their high  levels of radioactivity and inadequate protection. The Department of  Energy (DOE) has reported that the RTGs likely represent the largest  unsecured quantity of radioactivity in the world. Waste storage facilities  also pose a considerable threat if left unsecured because any one of these  facilities can store, at any given time, up to 3 million curies of material.
In 2001, a congressional report directed DOE to use a portion of its fiscal  year 2002 supplemental appropriation to address the threat posed by dirty  bombs. In response to the congressional requirement, the National  Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Radiological  Threat Reduction Task Force to identify, recover, and secure vulnerable,  high-risk radiological sources, budgeting $20.6 million for the program in  fiscal year 2002. The program initially focused on securing sources in the  countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) because DOE officials  determined this region had the greatest number of vulnerable sources. In  2003, at the direction of the Secretary of Energy, DOE expanded the scope  of the program to secure sealed sources worldwide, ultimately establishing  the International Radiological Threat Reduction (IRTR) Program. The  program’s primary objective is to protect U.S. national security interests  by (1) implementing rapid physical security upgrades at vulnerable sites  containing radioactive sources; (2) locating, recovering, and consolidating  lost or abandoned high-risk radioactive sources; and (3) supporting the  development of the infrastructure necessary to sustain security  enhancements and supporting regulatory controls, including the  development of regional partnerships to leverage international resources.  In addition, DOE has established a program to recover sealed sources  produced and distributed in the United States, known as the U.S.
Radiological Threat Reduction program. Part of this program’s mission is  to recover U.S.-origin sources on a case-by-case basis that were supplied  by DOE to other countries under the Atoms for Peace program.
The IRTR program is administered by NNSA with support from multiple  national laboratories, including Pacific Northwest National Laboratory  (PNNL), Sandia National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Oak  Ridge National Laboratory, Remote Sensing Laboratory, Brookhaven  National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los  Alamos National Laboratory. The national laboratories’ responsibilities  include (1) assessing the physical security requirements of countries  participating in the program, (2) recommending specific upgrades to  strengthen radiological source security, and (3) ensuring that  recommended upgrades are properly installed.
IRTR is one of eight programs within DOE’s Global Threat Reduction  Initiative (GTRI). These programs are responsible for identifying, securing,  and removing and/or facilitating the disposition of high-risk, vulnerable  nuclear and radiological materials and equipment around the world that  pose a potential threat to the United States and the international  community. In September 2006, DOE reorganized GTRI to consolidate its  nuclear and radiological threat reduction programs. As a result, the IRTR  program was integrated into a newly combined nuclear and radiological  threat reduction effort that focuses on three major geographic areas— North and South America, Europe and Africa, and Asia and countries of  the former Soviet Union. As part of this restructuring, DOE issued new  program guidance assigning priority rankings to the types of sites and  radiological sources that will be secured in the future.
The Department of State (State) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission  (NRC) also fund efforts to secure radiological sources in other countries,  though on a much smaller scale than DOE. State provides overall policy  direction for U.S. government international radiological source security  efforts and has broadened international support for the International  Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Code of Conduct, as well as guidance on  the import and export of radiological sources. State also provides IAEA  with funds to, among other things, conduct training, workshops, and  advisory missions to improve member states’ security practices and  procedures. NRC has advised and provided guidance on the development  of programs in Armenia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan to improve nuclear  regulatory controls over radiological sources, including establishing  radiological source inventories and promoting the development of laws,  rules, and regulations governing controls over this material.
In addition to IAEA, the European Commission (EC) also provides  assistance to countries—primarily those that are candidates or potential  candidates for joining the European Union (EU)—to improve the security  of sites containing radiological sources.
The EC manages foreign assistance programs for its 27 EU member states.
In 2003, we issued a report at your request focusing on U.S. and  international efforts to secure sealed radiological sources. We  recommended, among other things, that the Secretary of Energy take the  lead in developing a comprehensive plan to strengthen controls over other  countries’ sealed sources. This report (1) assesses the progress DOE has  made in implementing its program to help other countries secure their  sealed radiological sources, (2) identifies DOE’s current and planned  program costs, and (3) describes DOE’s coordination with other U.S.  agencies and international organizations to secure radiological sources in  other countries. To address these objectives, we analyzed documentation  on the IRTR program from DOE and its national laboratories and  conducted interviews with key program officials. We also visited four  countries that are major recipients of DOE assistance to improve  radiological source security—Georgia, Lithuania, Poland, and Russia—to  observe how equipment and training were being utilized and to discuss the  implementation of the program with foreign officials. In addition, we  analyzed cost and budgetary information, conducted a data reliability  assessment of the data we received, and interviewed knowledgeable  program officials on the reliability of the data. We determined that these  data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. More details  about the scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. We  conducted our review from November 2005 to December 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The small size, portability and potential value of sealed radiological  sources make them vulnerable to misuse, improper disposal and theft.  According to IAEA, the confirmed reports of illicit trafficking in  radiological materials have increased since 2002. For example, in 2004,  about 60 percent of the cases involved radiological materials, some of  which are considered by U.S. government and IAEA as attractive for the  development of a dirty bomb. Although experts generally believe that a  dirty bomb could result in a limited number of deaths, it could, however,  have severe economic consequences. Depending on the type, amount, and  form, the dispersed radiological material could cause radiation sickness  for people nearby and produce serious economic, psychological and social  disruption associated with the evacuation and subsequent cleanup of the  contaminated area. Although no dirty bombs have been detonated, in the  mid-1990s, Chechen separatists placed a canister containing cesium-137 in  a Moscow park. While the device was not detonated and no radiological  material was dispersed, the incident demonstrated that terrorists have the  capability and willingness to use radiological sources as weapons of  terror.
A 2004 study by the National Defense University noted that the economic  impact on a major populated area from a successful dirty bomb attack is  likely to equal, and perhaps exceed, that of the September 11, 2001, attacks  on New York City and Washington, D.C. According to another study, the  economic consequences of detonating a series of dirty bombs at U.S.  ports, for example, would result in an estimated $58 billion in losses to the  U.S. economy. The potential impacts of a dirty bomb attack could also  produce significant health consequences. In 2002, the Federation of  American Scientists concluded that an americium radiological source  combined with one pound of explosives would result in medical  supervision and monitoring required for the entire population of an area 10  times larger than the initial blast.
The consequences resulting from the improper use of radiological sources  are not theoretical. Some actual incidents involving sources can provide a  measure of understanding of what could happen in case of a dirty bomb  attack. In 1987, an accident involving a teletherapy machine containing  about 1,400 curies of cesium-137, which is generally in the form of a  powder similar to talc and highly dispersible, killed four people in Brazil  and injured many more. The accident and its aftermath caused about $36  million in damages to the region (Goiania) where the accident occurred,  according to an official from Brazil’s Nuclear Energy Commission. In  addition to the deaths and economic impact, the accident created  environmental and medical problems. For example, 85 houses were  significantly contaminated and 41 of these had to be evacuated. The  decontamination process required the demolition of homes and other  buildings and generated 3,500 cubic meters of radioactive waste. Over  8,000 persons requested monitoring for contamination in order to obtain  certificates stating they were not contaminated.
section_title: Although DOE Has Improved the Security of Many Sites Worldwide, It Has Not Developed a Long- Term Plan to Sustain the Improvements, and Many Dangerous Radiological Sources Remain Unsecured
paragraphs: DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain  radiological sources in more than 40 countries since the program’s  inception in 2002. However, despite these achievements, such as removing  dangerous sources from a waste storage facility in Chechnya, many of the  high-risk and most dangerous sources remain unsecured, particularly in  Russia. DOE officials told us that the program has barely “scratched the  surface” in terms of securing the most dangerous sources in the former  Soviet Union. Specifically, removing dangerous sources from 16 of 20  waste storage facilities across Russia and Ukraine remain unsecured while  more than 700 RTGs remain operational or abandoned in Russia and are  vulnerable to theft or potential misuse. In 2003, when DOE decided to  broaden the program’s scope beyond the former Soviet Union, it also  expanded the types of sites that required security upgrades. As a result, as  of September 2006, almost 70 percent of all sites secured were medical  facilities, which generally contain one radiological source. In addition,  DOE’s program does not address the transportation of radiological  sources from one location to another, a security measure that DOE and  international officials have identified as the most vulnerable link in the  radiological supply chain. DOE has experienced numerous problems and  challenges implementing its program to secure radiological sources  worldwide, including a lack of cooperation from host country officials.  Finally, DOE has not developed an adequate plan to ensure that countries  receiving security upgrades will be able to sustain them once installed.
subsections: section_title: DOE Has Secured over 300 Sites Worldwide, but Many High-Priority Radiological Sources Remain Unsecured
paragraphs: Since DOE began its program in 2002, it has taken steps to secure  radiological sources in more than 40 countries and has achieved some  noteworthy accomplishments. For example, DOE told us that it has (1)  facilitated the removal of 5,500 curies of cobalt-60 and cesium-137 sources  from a poorly protected nuclear waste repository in Chechnya, the  location of continuing political unrest in southeastern Russia; (2)  constructed storage facilities in Uzbekistan, Moldova, Tajikistan and  Georgia so that sources can be consolidated at one site to strengthen their  long-term protection; and (3) increased security at 21 sites in Greece prior  to the 2004 Olympics, including providing 110 hand-held radiation  detection devices for first responders. DOE secured, among other things,  facilities with blood irradiators containing cesium chloride and a large  industrial sterilization facility.
According to DOE, it has neither the resources nor staff to  comprehensively address and secure the tens of thousands of vulnerable  radiological sources worldwide on its own. As a result, it has enlisted the  support of regional partners and IAEA to implement programs to help  other countries find, characterize and secure their most dangerous  sources. DOE works with partner countries to identify sites where high- risk sources may be located and provides the equipment and training to  conduct searches. Once the sources have been located, DOE enlists the  support of IAEA or partner countries to transfer them to a secure facility.  For example, DOE established a regional partnership with Lithuania to  facilitate orphan source recovery efforts both in Lithuania and in  neighboring countries. DOE purchased radiation detection equipment and  trained Lithuanian specialists to initiate orphan source recovery efforts.  Lithuania was able to identify 41 former Soviet military and industrial sites  that potentially held high-risk radiological sources. Subsequently,  Lithuania assisted DOE in initiating search and secure efforts in Estonia  and Latvia, which resulted in the discovery and disposition of orphan  sources.
Despite these achievements, DOE’s program has not adequately addressed  many high-priority sources. In 2003, the Secretary of Energy directed  NNSA to expand its program to secure radiological sources worldwide,  which increased both the number of countries targeted to receive DOE  assistance and the types of sites to be secured. Expanding the program  into many countries outside of the former Soviet Union—the initial focus  and attention of DOE’s program—resulted in the addition of many medical  facilities that contained lower priority sources that were now being  targeted for physical security upgrades.
subsections: section_title: A Majority of Sites Secured by DOE Are Hospitals and Oncology Clinics
paragraphs: As of September 30, 2006, DOE’s program had completed the installation  of physical security upgrades at 368 sites in over 40 countries. However, a  majority of sites secured do not represent the highest-risk or the most  vulnerable sources. Of the total sites completed, 256—or about 70  percent—were hospitals and oncology clinics operating teletherapy  machines used to provide radiation treatment to cancer patients. These  machines generally contain a single cobalt-60 radiological source ranging  from about 1,000 to 10,000 curies. In 38 of the 41 countries—or 93  percent—DOE had upgraded at least one hospital or oncology clinic.  According to DOE, many of the countries that are included in its global  program have medical facilities with radiological sources. As a result,  these facilities were targeted for upgrades. In addition to the medical  facilities, DOE has completed security upgrades at 47 research institutes,  35 commercial and industrial sites, and 30 waste storage facilities. Figure 1  depicts the countries receiving security upgrades, and table 1 provides a  breakdown of the total number and types of facilities upgraded by DOE, as  of September 30, 2006.
Six national laboratory officials and security specialists responsible for  implementing the program told us that although progress had been made  in securing radiological sources, DOE had focused too much attention on  securing medical facilities at the expense of other higher-priority sites,  such as waste storage facilities and RTGs. In their view, DOE installed  security upgrades at so many of these facilities primarily because the  upgrades are relatively modest in scope and cost. For example, a typical  suite of security upgrades at a medical facility costs between $10,000 to  $20,000, depending on the size of the site, whereas the average cost to  remove and replace an RTG in the Far East region of Russia is about  $72,000 based on 2006 dollars.
Officials from three of the four recipient countries we visited also raised  concerns about DOE’s focus on securing radiological sources at so many  medical facilities. For example, staff responsible for operating the  teletherapy machines in hospitals in Lithuania and Poland told us that the  cobalt-60 sources contained in the teletherapy machine did not pose a  significant security risk. In their view, it was highly unlikely that the  sources could be easily removed from these machines and that it would  take more than one highly skilled and determined intruder to remove the  source and transport it out of the facility without being detected or  dangerously exposed to radiation. In fact, while emphasizing the  importance of securing medical facilities, DOE officials stated that getting  medical and security staff to buy into the need for improved security has  been a consistent challenge for the program. Further, Russian officials told  us that radiological sources in hospitals did not pose a comparable risk to  RTGs or lost or abandoned sources. DOE has not offered to fund any  security upgrades of Russian medical facilities since its funds are focused  on securing RTGs, Radons, and orphan sources.
According to five national laboratory officials and security specialists,  completing upgrades at medical facilities also served to demonstrate rapid  program progress because the upgrades are completed relatively quickly.  DOE has relied upon an indicator that focuses on the number of sites that  have been upgraded, or “sites secured.” While sites completed is the  primary metric used by DOE, the program does compile and track several  additional activities, including the amount of curies secured, countries that  receive regulatory assistance, and orphan sources recovered.
In measuring program performance, the Director of IRTR said that the  number of sites completed demonstrated conclusively that work has been  completed and represents the best available measurement. In discussions  with other high-level DOE officials about the program, they consistently  identified the number of sites upgraded as evidence that the program had  been achieving results and reducing the threat posed by radiological  sources overseas. However, PNNL and Sandia National Laboratory  officials told us that the measurement used by DOE does not demonstrate  how the program is reducing threats posed to U.S. national security  interests. In their view, this measurement is one-dimensional and does not  adequately distinguish lower-priority sites from higher-priority sites.
section_title: Hundreds of RTGs Remain Unsecured in Russia
paragraphs: DOE has made limited progress removing hundreds of RTGs containing  high-priority sources which, according to DOE, likely represent the largest  unsecured quantity of radioactivity in the world. These devices were  designed to provide electric power and are suited for remote locations to  power navigational facilities such as lighthouses and meteorological  stations. Each has activity levels ranging from 25,000 to 250,000 curies of  strontium-90—similar to the amount of strontium-90 released from the  Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident in 1986. As of September 30, 2006,  DOE had funded the removal of about 13 percent of all RTGs located in  Russia’s inventory. Until early 2000, approximately 1,049 RTGs were in  Russia. Of those, approximately 317 RTGs have been removed over the  past several years, according to DOE and Russian officials. DOE funded  about 40 percent of those removed (132 RTGs) and Norway, France, and  Russia funded the removal of the remaining 185. However, an estimated  732 RTGs, representing several million curies of radioactivity, remain  unsecured.
A majority of RTGs are located along coastlines in three major regions— the Baltic, Artic and Far East. To date, DOE has focused the majority of its  efforts on removing RTGs along the Arctic coast. However, more than 90  RTGs remain operational along the Baltic coast under control of the  Russian Ministry of Defense, which DOE does not plan to remove. DOE  officials said that the program will now focus its efforts almost exclusively  in the Far East because DOE expects other countries to remove RTGs  from the Baltic region. Figure 2 shows the location of the remaining RTGs  in Russia, and table 2 summarizes DOE’s efforts, along with other  countries, to remove RTGs in Russia.
DOE officials told us that the Far East region is now a priority for RTG  removal because Russian Ministry of Defense officials have specifically  requested DOE’s assistance for the Far East and provided DOE with a  prioritized list of RTGs to be removed. In addition, other countries have  expressed a willingness to support future RTG removal in the Baltic  region. For example, according to DOE, in February 2005 Denmark  announced that it had reached an agreement with Russia to replace and  remove all RTGs in the Baltic region. Other European nations, including  Germany, have also offered assistance. However, Russian officials told us  that assistance from Germany has not materialized and that Denmark had  rescinded its offer to provide assistance. Moreover, these officials  expressed concern regarding DOE’s decision to fund the removal of RTGs  exclusively from the Far East region. In their view, the RTGs in the Baltic  are more vulnerable and should be removed as soon as possible because  of their accessibility and proximity to large population centers. According  to DOE officials, if international funding for removal of these vulnerable  RTGs does not materialize, IRTR will likely have to fund the Baltic effort.
According to DOE and Russian officials, RTG removal is complex and  future efforts will face a number of challenges. No comprehensive  inventory of RTGs exists and, as a result, the actual number of these  devices is unknown. RTGs were originally manufactured in Estonia, but  the company dissolved with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and all the  records were lost. The Russian organization that originally designed them  is currently developing a database of known RTGs in Russia—with U.S.  funding and support—to reconstruct records and develop a reliable  accounting of the total number of devices produced. However, this effort  has been ongoing for years and remains incomplete. Officials from the  Russian organization told us that they lack confidence that the precise  number and location of RTGs, both in Russia and other countries of the  former Soviet Union, will ever be known.
RTGs contain sources with high levels of radioactivity, and their removal  requires specialized containers for their transport and adequate storage  capacity to securely house them once removed. Russian officials reported  that RTG removal had been slowed due to a lack of both. To address the  need for containers and space, DOE has enlisted Canada’s support to  provide funds to Russia for constructing an additional 17 containers for  transporting RTGs, bringing the total to 36. However, this effort is not  scheduled to be completed until early to mid-2007. DOE is also  supporting the construction of storage facilities at two locations in the  Russian Far East, Vladivostok and Kamchatka. When completed, the  Vladivostok facility is expected to house 150 to 200 RTGs. Moreover, a  smaller storage building is under construction at Kamchatka, which will  store RTGs until they can be shipped to Vladivostok for permanent  storage. According to DOE, the Vladivostok facility houses 25 RTGs that  were recovered from the Russian Far East. By the end of 2006, Vladivostok  is scheduled to house 33 additional recovered RTGs.
Finally, Russian officials told us that future RTG removal efforts will  depend on finding a viable, alternative energy source to replace power  supplied by radiological sources contained in RTGs. DOE has initiated a  project to provide alternative power sources, including wind and solar- powered energy panels to accelerate RTG removal. However these  replacements are not always viable. For example, navigational lighthouses  located in northern Russia experience severe weather and limited daylight  4 to 5 months per year and cannot rely on solar power during the winter  months. Russian Ministry of Defense officials have stated that the  navigational devices are critical and that they will not approve removal of  any additional RTGs without a viable energy source to replace them.  Figure 3 shows a navigational beacon with a solar-powered replacement  energy source funded by DOE that we observed during our fieldwork.
DOE also noted that RTG removal and replacement has been slowed by  challenges in project negotiation with Russian officials. For example, costs  of RTG removal and transport have consistently risen as a result of  increased Russian price demands and the failure of the Russian  government to contribute funds to the effort. DOE has also experienced  long delays while waiting for the Russian Ministry of Defense to approve  the release of information regarding certain RTGs. Inadequate funding to  support RTG removal has extended the deadline for completion from 2014  to 2021.
As an interim measure to help reduce the risk posed by RTGs that have not  yet been removed, DOE has equipped a select number of RTGs with alarm  systems that are remotely monitored via satellite as part of a pilot project.  Specifically the alarm consists of sensors that monitor, among other  things, vibrations of the device and the source’s movement. Because the  source is inside the RTG, the alarms on both the device and its source emit  regular, electronic signals to a regional base station. If the signals are  interrupted, then the alarm is triggered. As of September 2006, DOE had  funded the installation of these security systems for 24 RTGs in the Baltic  region and 20 RTGs in the Far East region. According to DOE, the cost of  the alarm system is about $5,000, and about $8,000 to establish the  regional base station. DOE officials said they will continue to install  security upgrades to RTGs as an interim measure, as long as the costs  remain at those levels.
section_title: Waste Storage Facilities Need to Be Secured in Russia and Ukraine
paragraphs: In addition to RTGs, DOE also has made limited progress securing  radiological sources stored at waste storage facilities in Russia and  Ukraine. DOE has determined that the storage facilities in Russia and  Ukraine are the most vulnerable in the world and pose a significant risk,  due to the very large quantities of radioactive sources currently housed at  each site. According to DOE, waste storage facilities can store up to 3  million curies of radioactive waste. However, upgrades at a majority of  these facilities throughout the former Soviet Union, particularly in Russia  and Ukraine, remain incomplete. To date, upgrades at 4 of 15 Radons in  Russia have been completed since DOE began work in 2002. According to  DOE, upgrades are under way at seven additional Radons. However, work  has been delayed at several of these facilities. According to DOE, delays in  upgrades to Radons were due in large part to delays in the Russian  certification process of physical equipment for upgrades at these types of  facilities. In addition, reorganization and managerial changes at the  primary Russian agency with oversight authority over construction at  Radon facilities presented challenges for DOE officials trying to gain  access to Radons for physical security assessments. Furthermore, DOE  officials noted that progress has been slowed because several Radon  managers were unwilling to participate in the program until they received  assurances from DOE that their Radon would receive a level of funding  comparable to larger Radons.
DOE has not completed upgrades at any of Ukraine’s five Radon sites, one  of which contains all 13 RTGs recovered in Ukraine. According to DOE  officials, initiating work at the Radons has been problematic because  Ukrainian officials have designated some sites as “sensitive” and thus  denied DOE access to them. As a result, security upgrades have been  delayed for at least 2 years. In May 2005, Ukraine agreed to provide DOE  access to two of the five sites, and security upgrades at those facilities are  under way. DOE plans to complete the remaining three Radons by 2010  but have found that Ukraine is impeding access to these additional sites.
In addition, DOE has identified 49 vulnerable waste storage facilities  worldwide for assistance and has completed work at 26 of these sites in  several countries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia,  Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Lithuania. DOE is also undertaking  upgrades at 23 additional sites. However, DOE has not addressed sites in  the following countries: Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil,  Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Libya, Peru, Serbia, and South  Africa. It was unclear, based on our discussions with DOE officials, when,  if ever, security upgrades would be completed in these countries.
section_title: Transportation of High-Risk Sources Is a Critical Gap in DOE’s Program
paragraphs: Although IAEA officials told us that transportation of high-risk radiological  sources is the most vulnerable part of the nuclear and radiological supply  chain, DOE determined that source transport is generally outside the  scope of the program. Some DOE officials have expressed concern about  the lack of security during the transport of radiological sources and  questioned whether transportation should be a component of DOE’s  program. For example, a May 2005 DOE analysis concluded that DOE was  addressing transportation security on an ad-hoc basis, and the existing  method of providing transportation security had serious limitations. The  analysis also noted that DOE’s current approach is resource limited and  lacked a commitment to integrate transport security into all countries  participating in the program. According to DOE’s 2003 program guidelines,  DOE will fund transportation security upgrades only in Russia and  Uzbekistan because the United States had international agreements with  these countries to provide liability coverage when transporting  radiological sources. As a result, DOE security specialists were not  pursuing transportation security-related projects with the majority of  countries participating in the program. However, DOE noted that its  national laboratories were working with the U.S. Department of  Transportation, IAEA, and key IAEA donor states to strengthen  transportation security regulations and procedures to reduce the risks of  theft or diversion of nuclear and other radioactive materials in transit.
In every country we visited, host country officials identified the  transportation of sources as a critical vulnerability and a priority for  security upgrades. Moscow Radon officials told us that transportation  security had emerged as one of their top priorities. DOE has, in fact,  provided a fleet of transport vehicles for the Moscow Radon, including  guard vehicles, escort vehicles, and cargo trucks for transporting both  liquid and solid waste. However, Radon officials told us that they also  needed a reliable communication system to ensure the security of sources  in transit. Consequently, the Moscow Radon funded a satellite-linked cell  phone to facilitate communication and to monitor vehicles that transport  radiological sources. However, at another Radon site we visited in Russia,  a similar communications system did not exist. Moreover, officials from  this site told us that their fleet of transportation vehicles was about 30  years old and needed to be replaced. These officials stated that they  requested funds from DOE for the vehicle replacement but were told that  no funds were available.
Another aspect of transportation security concerns equipment containing  small, easily transportable sources—typically weighing less than 25  pounds with an average radioactivity level of several curies. DOE  estimates that about 10,000 of these smaller sources exist in several  different countries. Specifically these sources, such as americium and  beryllium, are used in the oil and gas industry for exploration purposes.  According to DOE, these sources routinely move from one base camp to  another with limited security, making them vulnerable to theft and  potential misuse. We saw first-hand how vulnerable these sources were  during our visit to one industrial facility where we observed a truck used  to transport a cesium-137 source to a remote gas exploration site. Host  country officials showed us how easy it would be to remove the sources  from the truck as they were being secured with a simple lock. In addition,  country officials told us that although some trucks are equipped with  mobile phones, many areas along transportation routes are remote, and  the phones often have no signal. Figure 4 shows an unsecured truck used  to transport radiological sources.
DOE has taken some steps to address this problem, but agency officials  said that securing mobile sources is too costly and should be the  responsibility of private industry. In this regard, DOE initiated efforts with  U.S. industry partners to identify better ways to secure sources that have  industrial applications and are frequently in transit. In February 2006, DOE  attended a forum with NRC and the Society for Petroleum Engineers to  discuss security issues and develop best practices within the industry to  better control radiological sources used overseas for industrial purposes.
section_title: DOE Has Revised Its Criteria for Site Selection and Increased the Level of Upgrades Required to Secure Certain Sites and Sources
paragraphs: In September 2006, as part of the broader reorganization of its Global  Threat Reduction Initiative, DOE established new guidance for selecting  sites to receive physical security upgrades. Under the new guidance, DOE  has combined its radiological and nuclear material security efforts to  develop a single threat reduction strategy. This integrated strategy  prioritizes security efforts, based most importantly on the attractiveness of  the different types of radiological and nuclear material and (1) their  proximity to U.S. strategic interests, such as military bases overseas or  commercial ports; (2) external threat environment within the country; and  (3) internal site vulnerability, which measures existing physical protection  on site. This new criteria also increased the level of the design basis threat  required to secure each type of material. For example, sources having a  curie level exceeding 1,000 could have the same priority for security  upgrades as certain amounts of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. As  a result, RTG security remains a high priority, while in DOE’s view, some  medical radiological sources could also be considered a high priority.  However, when we asked DOE officials in September 2006 about the  relative priority of medical sites, they said all of the sites that were  upgraded under the old guidance would still be considered high priority  under the new criteria.
DOE’s previous guidance, developed in 2003, based site selection on a  minimum threshold level—measured in curies—of radiological sources  present at a particular location. In addition, the guidance factored in  other conditions such as the location of the site, the security conditions of  the site, and evidence of illicit trafficking in the country. According to  DOE, in a presentation made to us in September 2006, this guidance gave  equal treatment to all sites within countries receiving security upgrades.  This guidance did not clearly discriminate between the different types of  sites secured and whether they were considered to be the highest priority.  For example, securing a waste storage facility, which can contain up to  three million curies, was given the same weight as securing an oncology  clinic with one source containing 1,000 curies. Security measures  recommended for radiological sources were based on a threat scenario of  one outsider penetrating the facility, equipped with a handgun while  working with one complicit insider. However, the new guidance  significantly increases the threat by advancing a more intense scenario,  including six outsiders with automatic weapons and 10 kilograms of  explosives working with one complicit insider. As a result, DOE officials  said that future upgrades to secure radiological sources will have to be  strengthened to meet the new protection levels. Additional enhancements  at some sites are now being considered to address a more robust design- basis scenario.
section_title: Numerous Problems and Challenges Impeded DOE’s Efforts to Secure High- Priority Radiological Sources at High-Risk Radiological Sites
paragraphs: DOE experienced numerous problems and challenges during program  implementation that impeded its efforts to secure radiological sources. As  a result, some projects were delayed, and in some extreme cases, DOE  was unable to implement its program at all. DOE said it was limited in its  ability to enhance physical protection in several countries because IRTR is  a voluntary program. For example, high-risk countries such as Nigeria and  Turkey were unwilling to cooperate to implement security upgrades. In  addition, Mexico declined DOE upgrades, although DOE had identified  several vulnerable sites. While Mexico has continued to decline physical  security assistance, Mexican officials have since agreed to accept  regulatory infrastructure development assistance.
In targeting countries to receive assistance, DOE developed a  prioritization model that ranked countries as high, medium, and low risk.  To date, DOE has initiated work in 49 of the countries identified as  priorities for assistance. Our analysis showed that DOE attempted to  initiate efforts to secure radiological sources in 31 high-priority, 17  medium-priority and one low-priority country. Consequently, about 40  percent of countries receiving assistance do not represent the highest- priority countries. According to DOE officials, medium and low-priority  countries-—more than one-third of the total in DOE’s program—were  selected because these countries had expressed a willingness to receive  assistance.
We found a variety of problems and challenges that affected DOE’s ability  to implement its program in several of the countries targeted for  assistance. These included, among other things, problems with foreign  contractor performance and lack of adequate physical infrastructure to  support security upgrades. DOE officials said that various combinations of  these and other impediments resulted in delays implementing security  upgrades in about 75 percent of all countries participating in the program.  DOE also stated that many of these problems were identified and  corrected during quality assurance visits by DOE inspection teams.
Contractor performance emerged as a key challenge. Six DOE officials  told us that contractor performance and selection of reputable, reliable in- country contractors was critical to successful project implementation.  DOE asserted that it has to maintain flexibility in selecting foreign  contractors because most of the countries do not follow normal Western  business practices. In DOE’s view, problems arising from contractor  performance resulted from “security culture” and language barriers, which  caused miscommunication. Some problems we found with reliable in- country contractors included the following:  In Bulgaria, a contractor installed steel security doors—which protected  radiological sources—with the hinges on the outside of the door. As a  result, a potential transgressor could have unhinged the door and accessed  the sources; In Kazakhstan, a contractor provided security manuals and procedures for  newly installed equipment in English instead of the native language. As a  result, DOE officials found that the hospital staff had not changed the  security codes and were not well versed in proper security procedures;  and In Georgia, hospital staff told us that the contractor did not train them on  operating the alarm systems.
DOE did, however, report working with competent contractors in Poland,  Lithuania, and Egypt that resulted in timely project implementation. DOE  project managers for these countries told us that contractors conducted  adequate training and followed up with security upgrades maintenance.
Several DOE officials told us that implementing security upgrades also  presented challenges due to inadequate physical infrastructure. In these  countries, the types of challenges included lack of reliable electricity, a  backup power source, and telecommunications at sites containing  radiological sources. For example, in both Nicaragua and Tanzania, DOE  officials said that frequent power outages diminished the detection  capability of security alarms installed and that neither country had a  backup source of power to operate the security alarms and security  lighting provided by DOE.
section_title: DOE Has Not Developed a Plan to Ensure the Long- Term Sustainability of Physical Security Upgrades
paragraphs: DOE has not developed an adequate comprehensive strategy to better  ensure that physical security upgrades that have been installed, and the  security training that has been provided, will be effectively sustained over  the long term. DOE’s current guidance states that DOE will sustain  upgrades by providing countries with a 3-year warranty on newly installed  security equipment and preventative maintenance contracts, as well as  providing training on newly installed equipment for operational staff at the  sites. However, DOE has not formulated a long-term sustainability plan  that identifies expected completion dates for each country, including an  exit strategy, and approaches for sustaining upgrades, including how host  countries will financially continue maintenance of upgrades following  DOE warranty expiration. In fact, a senior DOE official told us that  responsibility for drafting and implementing long-term sustainability  should be that of the host country. Furthermore, DOE has not adequately  addressed the lack of regulatory infrastructure to provide oversight of  source security in a majority of countries to receive DOE assistance.
DOE officials responsible for program implementation said that they were  uncertain that security upgrades installed would be sustained by countries  once DOE assistance was no longer available. In fact, our analysis showed  that these officials had confidence that the security upgrades would be  sustained in only 25 percent of the countries. Specifically, officials pointed  out that countries, such as Bangladesh or Tajikistan, would be unlikely to  sustain upgrades because they do not have the resources to maintain the  equipment and have not identified or allocated funding to maintain them  beyond the 3-year warranty period. In addition, several host-country  officials with whom we met expressed similar concerns. For example,  hospital administrators in three countries told us that hospital budgets  were already strained and that they could not be certain that funding  would be available once the warranties expired. Moreover, hospital  administrators told us it was difficult to estimate the level of resources  needed to sustain the upgrades because DOE had not provided them with  future maintenance costs.
Several sites that received DOE upgrades have already experienced  maintenance problems. For example, in Georgia, we found that a storage  facility containing RTGs and a seed irradiator—which has thousands of  curies of a cesium-137 source—had several large openings in the roof.  When we asked host government officials about the cause of the openings,  they stated that a recent storm had shifted the metal sheets covering the  storage facility’s roof. The officials did not state when the roof would be  fixed or how funds would be allocated for the repair. In addition, we found  that surveillance monitors were not being used at a medical facility. In  fact, according to the hospital staff, the monitors, which were not broken,  had been turned off for several days.
In Lithuania we visited an oncology clinic and observed that the security  cable, used to secure a teletherapy machine’s cobalt-60 source, had been  broken for almost a month. According to a DOE physical protection  specialist, the cable was the most important security feature because it  triggered an alarm directly connected to the teletherapy machine’s “head,”  which contains the radiological source. According to DOE, this was  subsequently corrected as part of program assurance procedures. In  addition, in Poland, we visited a research facility containing a 22,000 curie  irradiator. We observed that the motion detection device in the room  housing the irradiator was not working because of the high level of  radioactivity present. According to the in-country contractor, the device  had been disabled at least three times since the equipment was installed  about a year earlier. Figure 5 shows the temporary storage facility with  large openings in the roof, and figure 6 shows the broken cable at the  oncology clinic.
In addition to maintenance problems, we also found that a lack of  adequate training on newly installed equipment further raised questions  about the long-term success of the program. According to the hospital staff  at a facility in Georgia, they had not received adequate training from the  in-country contractor on how to operate the installed alarm systems. We  found similar problems in other countries we visited. For example, at  some of the hospitals, security codes allowing entry into rooms where  sources were located had not been changed on a regular basis. Also, at one  medical site, more than 50 staff had access to the security code for a room  storing a radiological source of about 1,250 curies. A DOE physical  security specialist reported that the security code had not been changed  from the default settings in at least three FSU countries. Furthermore, this  specialist noted that staff in charge of protecting the equipment had  copied security access codes onto checklists that were readily accessible  to unauthorized staff in about 15 countries.
According to DOE, another key element of sustaining security of sources  is having an organized, competent guard force. In general, the guard force  serves as a critical communications link between the facility staff and the  response force. We found that several of the 49 countries did not possess  adequate guard or response forces, and in several cases, the guard forces  in these countries were untrained and unarmed. Specifically, at one site  that DOE upgraded, the guard with whom we spoke was unarmed and had  no viable form of communication in the case of an emergency. At the same  site, the guard told us that he shared responsibility for site security with an  individual who served as a guard on a part-time basis in exchange for  being able to live at the site. Moreover, we found that the absence of a  reliable source of electricity made it difficult to complete and ensure the  sustainability of alarms and motion detection devices in some of the  countries receiving upgrades. For example, both Ecuador and El Salvador  have limited telephone line access. As a result, according to DOE, the local  guard forces could not be contacted immediately after an alarm was  triggered at a site containing radiological sources. Consequently, security  alarms installed in lesser developed countries may have marginal long- term impact.
At some of the facilities we visited, there appeared to be a well trained  guard force equipped with flashlights, radios, walkie-talkies, or cell  phones. However, we also found that even at locations where improved  security systems were in place, only a single guard was present and had no  reliable method of contacting a response force. In these types of  situations, according to DOE, the site is very vulnerable to theft. At one  facility in Lithuania, we were told that the police were located about 30  minutes from the site. At that facility, we observed that the guards were  not equipped with guns, and officials were not sure they were always  present. However, DOE did fund remote monitoring equipment, which  allowed the local police force to view the site 24 hours per day from the  police station.
According to IAEA experts and at least five DOE and NRC senior level  officials, a strong and independent nuclear regulatory authority that is able  to provide effective radiological source oversight is critical to program  sustainability. A key function of a nuclear regulatory body is to establish  procedures for the control of radiological sources, including the  development of a basic registry of sources. The absence of reliable  registries in many countries impeded DOE’s ability to identify a  comprehensive list of sites to upgrade. Also, the absence of such a list  complicates DOE’s ability to determine when it has completed its program  in a particular country. More specifically, DOE physical security  specialists told us that sources that had been identified and inventoried at  various hospitals were subsequently moved to another location within the  facility or are no longer being used. Consequently, some of the upgrades  that DOE installed had limited security impact, or DOE has had to fund  additional upgrades for the same source.
We previously reported that DOE was focusing its source security program  too narrowly on physical security upgrades and not taking into account  respective countries’ long-term needs to develop better nuclear regulatory  infrastructures. DOE recognized the critical role of regulatory  infrastructure development midway through the program and  subsequently added a small regulatory infrastructure development  component that is designed to support the creation and strengthening of  effective and sustainable national regulatory infrastructures. DOE officials  told us that the department’s regulatory infrastructure development efforts  are meant to complement the more comprehensive efforts of IAEA. In  1994, IAEA established a “model project” program to enhance countries’  regulatory capacity, and the program was available to any member state  upon request. IAEA continues to provide a variety of regulatory  infrastructure support services and training to both member and  nonmember states to support radiological source security and safety.
The director of the IRTR program said that the long-term impact of DOE’s  program would likely have been enhanced had there been a stronger  regulatory infrastructure in place to support the recommended security  upgrades efforts in many of the countries. However, many countries  participating in the IRTR program—specifically lesser developed  countries—lack an independent regulator. According to IAEA, as many as  110 countries worldwide lacked the regulatory infrastructure to  adequately protect or control sealed sources as of 2003.
section_title: DOE Has Spent Approximately $108 Million to Secure Radiological Sources Worldwide, but Future Program Funding Is Uncertain because of an Increased Emphasis on Securing Special Nuclear Materials
paragraphs: As of August 31, 2006, DOE spent approximately $108 million to  implement the IRTR program. This money was spent to, among other  things, conduct vulnerability assessments at a variety of sites containing  radiological sources and to install physical security upgrades at these  sites, such as hardened windows and doors, motion sensors and  surveillance cameras. Russia received almost one-third of total DOE  funding—about $33 million—which focused primarily on orphan source  recovery, RTG removal and disposal and physical security upgrades at  waste storage facilities. However, one-fourth of total expenditures—about  $26.5 million—paid for program planning activities such as development  of program guidance documents, hiring private consultants, and  conducting studies. The program has also carried over large balances of  unspent, unobligated funds each fiscal year since its inception in 2002,  because of, among other things, large supplemental appropriations at the  onset of the program and systemic delays in project implementation. DOE  officials told us that securing radiological sources in other countries is a  lower priority than securing more dangerous nuclear materials, such as  plutonium and highly enriched uranium. As a result, DOE reduced funding  for radiological security activities and future funding for the program is  uncertain. DOE program officials are concerned that DOE may be unable  to meet outstanding contractual commitments to maintain the more than  $40 million in upgrades already installed.
subsections: section_title: DOE Expenditures Have Focused Primarily on Physical Security Upgrades and Recovering Lost or Abandoned Sources; However, About $26.5 Million Has Been Spent on Program Planning Activities
paragraphs: As of August 31, 2006, DOE had spent about $108 million to implement the  IRTR program. A majority of this money—$68 million—was spent to (1)  physically secure sites containing radiological sources; (2) locate, recover,  and dispose of lost or abandoned sources; and (3) help countries draft  laws and regulations to increase security and accounting of sources. In  addition, DOE provided $13.5 million to IAEA to support activities to  strengthen controls over radiological sources in IAEA member states.  However, one-fourth of the total budget—about $26.5 million—was spent  on program planning activities not directly attributed to a specific country,  such as hiring private consultants, and building a database for  international law enforcement officials. Table 3 provides a breakdown of  DOE program expenditures.
Physical security upgrades to secure sites containing radiological sources  accounted for the largest program expenditure—almost $43 million. The  majority of DOE-funded upgrades were at hospitals and oncology clinics.  DOE also funded upgrades at other types of facilities that utilize or store  radiological sources and materials, including waste storage facilities,  commercial and industrial facilities, and other research institutes. While  DOE estimates that costs for each facility type range from $15,000 to  secure a medical facility to $50,000 to secure a waste storage facility,  actual expenditures for securing sites varied based on factors such as  regional labor rates, conditions of existing infrastructure, and remoteness  of location.
DOE officials stated that cost estimates of upgrade projects included  vulnerability assessments, equipment costs and installation, and warranty  contracts covering equipment maintenance for three years. DOE physical  security specialists conducted vulnerability assessments to identify  security weaknesses at facilities, including adequacy of the local guard  force, exposed windows and doors, and access to sources. In some  instances, mostly at lower-risk sites, DOE authorized contractors  responsible for equipment installation to conduct these assessments with  direction from DOE. The contractors provided DOE with reports and  photographs that summarized findings and proposed recommended  upgrades. Types of upgrades installed varied based on assessment findings  and host country laws and policies, but standard equipment packages  consisted mostly of hardened windows and doors; motion sensors and  alarms; access control systems, such as coded keypads or swipe card  entry; security cameras; and video monitoring. At some sites, DOE also  provided guard forces with enhanced communication equipment,  including radios and mobile panic buttons that send emergency signals to  local police or security companies. Installation costs also included training  for on-site personnel that would be responsible for operating the  equipment.
Costs of physical security upgrades also included 3-year warranty  contracts that cover maintenance costs, such as the cost of remote  monitoring and spare parts. DOE officials told us that contracts are  negotiated with contractors responsible for equipment installation and  require that countries receiving assistance assume the costs of sustaining  the equipment no later than three years after the upgrades have been  installed. For the duration of the warranty period, DOE estimated that, on  average, it would cost $40,000 per country, per year to maintain  equipment. This estimate includes sending one DOE team per country,  per year to conduct assurance visits, any equipment contractors have to  replace, and costs of remote monitoring systems.
DOE also spent $23 million to provide countries with radiation detection  equipment and training to locate and recover lost or abandoned  radiological sources and secure them in interim or permanent storage  facilities. DOE has two programs to support orphan source recovery  efforts—the Russian Orphan Source Recovery program, which is focused  solely in Russia, and the Global Search and Secure Program, which  includes search and recovery efforts in other countries receiving DOE  assistance. More than 80 percent of orphan source recovery expenditures  were spent in Russia—about $19 million. To support GSSP, DOE spent $4  million in 11 countries—Azerbaijan, Croatia, Estonia, Indonesia,  Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Philippines, Romania, Tajikistan, and  Tanzania. These funds were spent primarily to provide countries with (1)  standard packages of equipment such as hand-held radiation detection  monitors and characterization instruments to properly identify recovered  sources; (2) training workshops on the appropriate use of the equipment;  and (3) physical security upgrades at some facilities storing recovered or  disposed sources.
In addition, DOE spent about $2 million in ten countries (Bulgaria,  Colombia, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Moldova, Philippines,  Thailand, and Vietnam) to help develop national standards and regulations  for the control and accounting of radiological sources. A majority of these  funds were spent in the United States—$1.8 million—to develop a set of  security-based regulations to be utilized by countries with limited  resources and inadequate radiological source inventories. Once countries  drafted an initial set of regulations, DOE experts reviewed drafts and  provided feedback and proposals for improvement. DOE also provided  training workshops and seminars on appropriate regulatory inspection  practices for radiological source controls and accounting. In particular,  DOE has been working with regional partners, such as the Australian  Nuclear Science and Technology Organization (ANSTO), to implement  many of its regulatory development activities. For example, DOE and  ANSTO have conducted regulatory development training workshops for  countries located in East Asia and the Pacific region.
DOE also provided about $13.5 million to IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund to  support efforts to strengthen controls over sources with IAEA member  states, including technical training on fundamental principles and  objectives of radiological source security. IAEA established the fund,  which consists of voluntary budget contributions from other countries,  after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The fund is designed to  improve nuclear security in IAEA member states by helping countries to  protect their nuclear and radiological materials and facilities. Specifically,  DOE funded IAEA missions that carried out safety and security  assessments at sites identified by member states containing vulnerable  radiological sources. Additionally, DOE contributions to IAEA supported  training conferences and other advisory services. DOE funds also enabled  IAEA to transport several high-risk sources to secure storage facilities and  provide conditioning equipment to prepare recovered sources for disposal.
Finally, DOE spent one-fourth of total program expenditures—about $26.5  million—on activities not directly attributed to a specific country.  Specifically, these costs included, among other things, program planning  activities such as the development of program guidance documents. For  example, DOE hired an outside contractor to conduct a review of the  radiological source security program and to help DOE develop a plan to  guide future efforts. The contractor spent several months interviewing  agency officials and program staff to assess the strengths and weaknesses  of the program and the level of DOE coordination with State, NRC, and  IAEA. The final report provided recommendations to improve  coordination with other U.S. agencies and within DOE. In addition, DOE  spent $1.5 million of these funds to facilitate an information exchange with  Interpol, an international agency that coordinates the law enforcement  activities of the national police bureaus in each of its member states, in  order to obtain information about international arrests involving theft or  smuggling of radiological materials. DOE’s intent was to provide Interpol  the capacity to contribute law-enforcement data into DOE’s database,  which contains country-specific information regarding, among other  things, criminal activity. Funds provided to Interpol paid for computers  and software and the salaries for two staff located at Interpol headquarters  in Lyon, France, to set up and operate the database for two years. A DOE  program manager expressed concern about whether providing funds to  Interpol would provide tangible results or increase the effectiveness of the  radiological sources program. This program manager questioned whether  the Interpol project contributed to the program’s core objectives of  securing the highest risk, highest priority sources in other countries.
A senior DOE official told us that these funds—identified by DOE as  strategic development and program integration funds—were established at  the onset of the program and were intended to carry out activities not  directly related to country-specific physical security upgrade projects and  initiatives. This official added that in the early stages of the program,  expenditures of this type focused primarily on strategic planning,  developing program technical documents and processes, conducting  studies, and developing a database of regional country information to  support program objectives.
While DOE assistance was spread among 49 countries, Russia received the  largest amount, $33 million, nearly one-third of total program  expenditures. DOE’s cost manager for the IRTR program reported that  expenditures in Russia supported three primary program components: (1)  orphan source recovery efforts ($18.5 million); (2) RTG removal and  disposal, including alternative energy source development ($7 million);  and (3) physical security upgrade projects, including waste repository  sites ($7.5 million). The 13 other FSU countries received a total of about  $11 million, with Ukraine being the largest recipient, receiving about $3.5  million. In addition, about 65 percent of DOE expenditures in FSU  countries was spent in these countries for services, equipment, and  materials that were used to improve physical security.
By comparison, DOE spent significantly less outside the FSU, and  expenditures in these countries were both modest by comparison and  disproportionately spent in the United States by DOE’s national  laboratories for labor, travel, equipment and overhead costs. For  example, the 35 non-FSU countries received a total of about $17 million, or  just 28 percent of total country-specific expenditures. Two-thirds of  funds spent for non-FSU countries were spent in the United States.  Furthermore, five countries in Africa received no in-country expenditures.  Although many countries in Africa have been defined as high-risk by DOE,  countries in this region received a total of about $1.3 million, about two- thirds the amount spent in one European country—Poland. While  expenditures in South America were more evenly divided between in- country costs and funds spent in the United States, the region received  only about $3.5 million spread among 12 countries. Figure 7 provides a  regional breakout of these expenditures. Additionally, see appendix II for  more details about regional and individual country expenditures for fiscal  years 2002 through 2006.
section_title: DOE Has Consistently Carried Over Large Balances of Unspent and Unobligated Funds
paragraphs: As of August 31, 2006, DOE had carried over almost $23 million in unspent  or unobligated funds for the IRTR program from previous years. Moreover,  the program consistently carried over a substantial uncosted balance each  fiscal year throughout the life of the program. For example, for fiscal years  2003 through 2005, the program carried over uncosted funds totaling $27.4  million, $34.1 million, and $22.4 million, respectively. According to the  program’s director, a majority of carryover balances were due to, among  other things, large supplemental appropriations at the onset of the  program and delays in implementing security upgrade projects. As we  reported in 2004, large carryover balances are not uncommon in DOE  nuclear nonproliferation programs—especially in Russia—because of,  among other things, difficulties in negotiating and executing contracts and  the multiyear nature of programs. Table 4 shows DOE total budget and  uncosted balances for fiscal years 2002 through 2006.
section_title: DOE’s Budget for Radioactive Source Security Has Been Reduced, and Future Program Funding Is Uncertain
paragraphs: DOE has significantly decreased IRTR program funding since 2003, and  DOE officials expect further reductions over the next several years.  Specifically, DOE’s internal budget allotments for the IRTR program have  gone from a high of $38 million in fiscal year 2003 to $24 million in fiscal  year 2006. According to a senior DOE official, priorities within GTRI,  which funds DOE’s nuclear and radiological threat reduction efforts, have  shifted, and future funding will be redirected to, among other things,  securing special nuclear material, such as plutonium and highly enriched  uranium (HEU). In particular, DOE has assigned the highest budget  priority to three specific GTRI elements that address the threats posed by  an attack using an improvised nuclear device: the (1) Reduced Enrichment  for Research and Test Reactors program, (2) Russia Research Reactor  Fuel Return program, and (3) Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear  Fuel program. The goal of the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test  Reactors program is to get research reactors around the world to convert  from HEU to low enriched uranium with conversion of all U.S. civilian  research reactors to be completed by 2014. The Russia Research Reactor  Fuel Return and Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel programs  are designed specifically for returning HEU to the United States or Russia  and are expected to be completed by 2013 and 2019, respectively.
In contrast, other GTRI elements, including the IRTR program, do not have  presidential commitment dates for completion and, as a result, are lower  priorities for funding. DOE’s Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for  Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, told us that DOE initially placed a high  priority on securing radiological material and the Secretary of Energy  made a personal commitment to this activity. More recently, because of  budget reductions affecting the entire agency, DOE has had to review and  evaluate program priorities. This official noted that while the likelihood of  a dirty bomb attack is much greater than a nuclear attack, the  consequences in terms of loss of life and the overall catastrophic impact of  the latter would be much greater. He also noted that, if given a choice, he  would place more emphasis on securing radiological sources in the United  States than in other countries. In his view, there is still a significant  amount of work to be done to secure radiological sources in the United  States.
Future anticipated reductions in funding for the IRTR program will have  significant implications for the amount of sources that can be secured in  other countries. DOE’s initial target for program completion was to secure  1,500 high-priority sites in 100 countries by 2014. This goal assumed that  the program would receive $25 million per year over the life of the  program. DOE officials told us that currently projected budget reductions  may jeopardize the program’s ability to fund even the existing warranty  contracts applied to physical security upgrades already installed.  Moreover, DOE has not determined the extent to which the program will  fund warranties for future upgrade projects meaning countries will need to  assume greater financial responsibility for sustaining upgrades. However,  DOE officials who are responsible for project implementation told us they  lacked confidence that a majority of countries would be able to maintain  upgrades without further DOE assistance, mostly because many recipients  do not have adequate resources. For example, DOE officials responsible  for project implementation said that neither Ukraine nor Tajikistan, where  DOE has spent a total of about $3.5 million, has identified resources for  radiological source security once DOE warranties expire.
In addition, DOE has not fully addressed the cost implications of the  increased levels of physical security required by the new design basis  threat assigned to radiological sources under GTRI’s reorganization.  Although DOE’s new program guidance says that the radiological security  upgrades strategy will continue to focus on inherently sustainable, low- cost upgrades, it specifically states that the revised threat scenario  significantly increases the threat that physical security upgrades must  withstand. As a result, the new guidance states that upgrades will need to  be significantly enhanced to meet the new threat level. DOE officials have  raised concerns regarding DOE’s ability to sustain low-cost upgrades  already installed. In light of the program’s ongoing budget reductions, the  new guidance raises further concern regarding DOE’s ability to sustain the  increased cost of enhanced upgrades for future projects.
To offset anticipated shortfalls in funding, DOE plans to seek international  contributions to secure radiological sources in other countries. DOE  officials said that several countries, including, Canada, Japan and Norway,  have inquired about contributing funds directly to GTRI but that, until  recently, DOE had no authority to accept direct financial support from  international partners for GTRI activities or to use funds received outside  of the normal appropriations process. In October 2006, Congress  authorized DOE to enter into agreements, with the concurrence of State,  to receive contributions from foreign countries and international  organizations for IRTR and other GTRI programs, and to use those  contributed funds without fiscal year limitation. Additionally, Russian  officials told us that because of the importance of the IRTR program, they  are interested in providing increased financial commitments to secure  radiological sources. In particular, the Deputy Head of the Russian Radon  waste storage facilities, known officially as the Federal Agency for  Construction and Utilities, told us that the organization would be willing to  make a sizeable contribution to Radon upgrades. DOE officials stated that  international source security is not the sole responsibility of the United  States government and that increased foreign cooperation will be  necessary to complete program objectives.
section_title: Coordination with State and NRC Has Improved, but DOE Still Faces Coordination Problems Securing Radiological Sources Worldwide
paragraphs: DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC to secure radiological  sources worldwide. Since we reported on this matter in 2003, DOE has  involved State and NRC in its international radiological threat reduction  activities more often and has increased information-sharing with the  agencies. However, DOE has not always integrated its efforts efficiently  and coordinated efforts among the agencies have been inconsistent.  Moreover, DOE has not adequately coordinated the activities of multiple  programs within the agency responsible for securing radiological and  nuclear materials in other countries and, at times, this has resulted in  conflicting or overlapping efforts. DOE has improved coordination with  IAEA to strengthen controls over other countries’ radiological sources and  has developed bilateral and multilateral partnerships with IAEA member  states to improve their regulatory infrastructures. DOE funding to IAEA  has supported, among other things, IAEA missions to assess the safety and  security of sites containing radiological sources and IAEA-sponsored  training programs and regional workshops focusing on radiological source  security. However, significant gaps in information-sharing between DOE  and IAEA, and with the European Commission, have impeded DOE’s  ability to target the most vulnerable sites for security improvements and to  avoid possible duplication of efforts.
subsections: section_title: DOE Has Improved Efforts to Coordinate Its Program Activities, but Governmentwide Coordination Is Inconsistent
paragraphs: In recent years, DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC and  has taken steps to work more collaboratively with U.S. agencies to secure  radiological sources in other countries. An example of improved U.S.  coordination is the interagency effort to establish a radiological source  regulatory infrastructure in Iraq. Since 2003, with the support of DOE and  NRC, State has led the effort to establish the Iraq Radioactive Source  Regulatory Authority (IRSRA) and develop a radiological regulatory  infrastructure in Iraq. State and DOE provided IRSRA with equipment,  training, technical assistance, and funding to help the new agency assume  increased responsibility for establishing radiological source regulations  and procedures consistent with international standards. Specifically, with  funding and logistical support from DOE, State coordinated several  meetings in Amman, Jordan, in 2004 and 2005 to provide IRSRA personnel  training by IAEA staff. These meetings resulted in the development of new  Iraqi laws and regulations for the regulation, transport, import and export  of radiological sources, including physical security requirements. DOE  experts reviewed draft Iraqi laws and regulations for their relevance to the  security of radiological sources, and NRC provided guidance for  developing import and export controls for radiological sources. State also  funded procurement of mobile radiation detection equipment so that Iraqi  regulatory personnel can survey various cities to search for orphaned  radiological sources. This equipment, provided by DOD’s Defense Threat  Reduction Agency, included radiological handling, measurement, and  protective equipment, such as radiation meters, respirators, and protective  clothing. Hand-held radiation equipment from DOE has also been  transferred to Iraqi agencies for border monitoring. DOE experts also  trained IRSRA officials and personnel on how to conduct vulnerability  assessments.
Finally, to financially support IRSRA’s efforts, State provided a portion of  $1.25 million in funding from its Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund  (NDF), to IAEA for training and other assistance to IRSRA, including an  IAEA review of Iraq’s draft laws and regulations. State also used a portion  of this funding to purchase a specially equipped vehicle that can be driven  through neighborhoods to detect unsecured radiological sources. DOE and  State officials told us that although the Iraq project is a unique  circumstance, it is an example of improved U.S. government coordination  to strengthen controls over radiological sources and could provide a  model for future efforts.
Although coordination among the agencies has improved, these efforts  have been inconsistent and there is no comprehensive governmentwide  approach to securing radiological sources overseas. We reported in 2003  that DOE’s efforts to secure sources in other countries had not been well  coordinated with those of other U.S. agencies. Specifically, DOE had not  fully coordinated with State and NRC to leverage program resources,  maximize available expertise, avoid potential duplication of efforts, and  help ensure the program’s long-term success. We also recommended that  DOE take the lead in developing a comprehensive governmentwide plan to  strengthen controls over sources in other countries. In response to our  report, DOE hired a consultant to determine, among other things, whether  gaps exist in agency program activities with respect to securing  radiological sources worldwide and what role and responsibilities DOE  should assume in coordinating U.S. government efforts.
In December 2004, the consultant reported that although DOE had  addressed many of its issues with State and NRC, more effective  coordination was needed. Moreover, the consultant stated that the lack of  effective coordination among these agencies posed the greatest potential  for conflict, as a result of differing mandates and conflicting philosophical  approaches to radiological source security. Specifically, effective and  systematic coordination between U.S. agencies has been impeded at times  because individual agency missions differ and, as a result, agency efforts  have been, at times, at odds with one another. For example, the consultant  reported that NRC had expressed concern that DOE’s regulatory  infrastructure development activities infringed on a decades-long NRC  function. Furthermore, DOE is primarily concerned with security of  sources while NRC has traditionally focused more on safety issues related  to the use of sources. The report also concluded that the debate between  DOE and NRC over the importance of the safety versus the security of  radiological sources had negatively impacted effective coordination  between the two agencies.
DOE, State, and NRC have differed on, among other things, funding and  implementation of regulatory infrastructure development activities in  other countries. For example, in May 2003, NRC’s Office of International  Programs sought $5 million in appropriated funds to assist its regulatory  counterparts in the FSU and countries of central and eastern Europe to  enhance (1) existing laws, rules, and regulations governing use of  radiological sources; (2) mechanisms used to track radiological sources,  such as databases and registries; and (3) day-to-day regulatory oversight of  sources. NRC stated in its request that DOE’s physical security  enhancements would not likely be sustained in the medium to long-term  absent clear, enforceable regulatory requirements. Moreover, NRC sought  to assist DOE by providing assistance to regulatory authorities in the FSU,  where a majority of DOE’s efforts were focused at the time.
NRC officials noted that the biggest challenge they have faced has been  identifying adequate, reliable, and predictable funding to support  international assistance activities. NRC, unlike other U.S. government  agencies, has largely relied upon other agencies—Departments of State,  Energy and Defense—to support its international programs and is required  by law to recover about 90 percent of its annual budget authority through  licensing and inspection fees assessed on the U.S. nuclear industry.  Furthermore, the U.S. nuclear industry has raised concerns about using  NRC funds to support international assistance. Despite these funding  limitations, NRC has a long history of supporting regulatory strengthening  efforts in the countries of central and eastern Europe and the FSU. These  efforts have included training other countries’ regulators in all aspects of  licensing and inspection procedures and developing a control and  accounting system for nuclear materials.
In July 2003, the Senate Appropriations Committee directed that $5 million  out of certain amounts appropriated to NNSA be made available to NRC  for bilateral and international efforts to strengthen regulatory controls  over radioactive sources that are at the greatest risk of being used in a  dirty bomb attack. In September 2003, according to the Director of the  NRC Office of International Programs, NRC and the Director of DOE’s  International Materials Protection, Control and Cooperation program  reached an initial agreement in principle, whereby DOE would provide  NRC with $1 million per year for 5 years to conduct regulatory activities in  countries outside of Russia.
According to DOE officials, the funds were never transferred because the  Senate withdrew the direction to allocate the funds to NRC during  conference negotiations because the House did not provide comparable  language in its report. DOE officials added that the provision directing the  transfer to NRC did not appear in the final conference report and was not  included in the appropriation legislation. Furthermore, these officials  added that DOE was directed by guidance received from House Energy  and Water Development Subcommittee staff to not transfer the funds.  According to a senior NRC official in the Office of International Programs,  the conference report included a joint explanatory statement, which  directed that allocations set forth in the House and Senate reports “should  be complied with unless specifically addressed to the contrary in the  conference report and statement of the managers.” NRC asserts that this  reinforced the intent of the original Senate report, and that without  language to further clarify or to state otherwise, NRC should have received  the funding as originally directed by the Senate Appropriations  Committee. The conference report does not specifically address this  funding issue.
In addition, in 2003, NRC requested $1 million from State to support  radiological source-related regulatory strengthening activities in Ukraine.  Specifically, NRC proposed to develop a national registry of radiological  sources and strengthen Ukraine’s overall radiological source-related laws,  rules, and regulations. NRC chose Ukraine because of its relatively large  inventory of high-risk radioactive sources; the stability of its existing  nuclear regulatory infrastructure; and NRC’s long-standing history of  assisting Ukraine’s nuclear regulatory authority, the State Nuclear  Regulatory Committee of Ukraine (SNRCU). NRC requested funding for  the Ukraine project from State’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund.  The total cost of the project was estimated at $2.2 million.
The original proposal, as approved by State, stated that the project’s aim  was to establish key elements of a national system to provide long-term  security of high-risk radioactive sources in Ukraine by utilizing NRC’s  overall expertise and experienced contractor personnel. Furthermore, the  proposal stated that because NRC and its contractors had been involved in  an identical program in Armenia for the previous 2 years the effort in  Ukraine would capitalize on those experiences, utilizing much of that  background data and materials. However, managers for NDF projects  ultimately decided that State would not use NRC resources and would  undertake and manage the project itself, even though the agency had no  prior experience in directly supporting regulatory infrastructure  development in Ukraine. According to a State official, the agency made  this decision because, among other things, NRC planned to hire a  contractor—the Ukrainian State Scientific and Technical Center—to  manage the project, which would have increased the project’s overall cost  by about 20 percent.
State officials said that their approach departed from that which was  originally envisioned by NRC in the original proposal in many respects.  However, the NDF has always reserved the right to implement its projects  as it deems appropriate. These officials added that State chose to work  directly with the Ukrainian regulator instead of the State Scientific and  Technical Center because, among other things, the approach streamlined  oversight and accountability for project performance and reduced  overhead expenses. According to the NDF manager of the Ukraine project  through October 2005, the Ukraine project experienced significant delays.  However, State officials told us the project is currently on track. Following  a November 30, 2006 meeting with State officials to discuss our draft  report, State provided us a letter from the Deputy Chairperson for SNRCU  dated December 4, 2006. The letter states that SNRCU views the Ukraine  project as one of the most successful and efficient international assistance  projects between the United States and Ukraine and that the project was  implemented in the shortest possible time period.
Finally, State and NRC raised concerns when DOE with IAEA developed a  set of draft regulations on the physical security of radiological sources.  Although the draft regulations had not been through a formal IAEA review  process, DOE had intended to distribute them during IAEA-sponsored  training workshops to assist member states to strengthen regulatory  controls over their sources. Specifically, NRC officials expressed  significant concerns that DOE was planning to distribute unofficial  guidance to countries that was in conflict with U.S. regulations. In a  December 2004 memorandum to the Deputy Director General of Nuclear  Safety and Security at IAEA, NRC stated that publishing interim guidance  that had not been reviewed in advance, and as a result may need to be  substantially modified, was neither efficient nor effective. State officials  told us that their chief concern was the manner in which any such  guidance would be construed abroad. These officials added that many of  the specific problems associated with the original DOE draft guidance lie  with internal issues regarding the process for reviewing security  documents at IAEA. In addition, they said that concerns over the  development of IAEA guidance on security of radioactive sources, which  preceded development of the draft regulations, are long standing and that  State has worked consistently with IAEA to develop and implement a  consistent process for preparation and review of security guidance similar  to the established process used by IAEA to develop safety guidance.
Following informal discussions with State and NRC, DOE did work with  the agencies to ensure that draft guidance was consistent with established  domestic and international guidance and protocols. IAEA has since  proposed a new Nuclear Security Series and review process, and the DOE  draft regulations will now support a new IAEA Security Series document  entitled “Security of Radioactive Sources,” which was coordinated with  State and NRC.
Our 2003 report concluded that DOE has the primary responsibility for  helping other countries to strengthen controls over their radiological  sources. We recommended that DOE take the lead in developing a  comprehensive governmentwide plan to accomplish this goal. In addition,  DOE’s consultant report stated that DOE, in its view, is the only U.S.  government agency with the resources to focus solely on international  source security. Similar to our recommendation, the consultant report  recommended that DOE take the lead in adopting an interagency, site- specific approach to international radiological source security, including  development of a long-term strategy that leveraged resources and  leadership of other agencies. DOE officials said the department has not  implemented these recommendations to initiate and lead a  governmentwide plan for the security of radiological sources in other  countries because it does not have the mandate to instruct other U.S.  agencies on how to conduct their efforts, and other agencies’ programs are  not within DOE’s control. However, DOE is currently taking steps, as part  of the GTRI reorganization, to address several coordination issues within  the department, including establishing regional points of contact to  interface with other U.S. agencies to coordinate interagency efforts.
section_title: DOE’s Efforts Have Not Been Well-Coordinated within the Department, and Program Overlap Has Led to Inefficiencies
paragraphs: The 2004 consultant report also concluded that DOE had not adequately  coordinated the activities of multiple programs within DOE that are  responsible for securing radiological and nuclear materials in other  countries.  As a result, these programs often worked at cross-purposes.  For example, we visited a site in Poland that housed several nuclear  facilities including a radiation waste management plant and Poland’s  nuclear research reactor. Country officials managing the site told us that  DOE had conducted vulnerability assessments of each of the facilities, one  of which stored several high-risk radiological sources as well as spent fuel  from the research reactor. Although the material was collocated in the  same storage facility, we observed that the sources had been secured in a  locked cage by the IRTR program, but the spent fuel had no security and  was being stored unprotected in underground canisters. Figure 8 shows  secured radiological sources collocated with unsecured spent fuel  contained in underground storage.
Polish officials told us that installation of DOE physical security upgrades  at the site had been inconsistent and not adequately coordinated by DOE.  Furthermore, security officials that had installed the physical security  upgrades told us that the overall security in the facility was inadequate,  given the types of nuclear and radioactive material being housed there.  The director of the site said that he expressed concern to DOE about the  lack of security of the spent nuclear fuel and requested similar upgrade  improvements. However, he said that it was his understanding that DOE’s  radiological program was only authorized to fund radiological source  security upgrades and not the security of spent nuclear fuel, which was the  responsibility of DOE’s nuclear security upgrades program.
The director of the facility, and his staff, said that it was unclear to them  why DOE could not concurrently secure nuclear and radiological material  stored at the same site and what can and cannot be secured by different  DOE entities. The director added that it sends the wrong signal to host  country officials when DOE programs have such different security  approaches and time frames for implementing security upgrades.  Subsequent to our visit, DOE sent a letter to Polish government officials in  March 2006 offering to return to Poland and provide further DOE technical  and financial support to protect the nuclear material stored at the facility.
Within the IRTR program, different components of the program are led  primarily out of two DOE national laboratories, and we found that the  laboratories, at times, applied different approaches to securing  radiological sources. For example, according to a senior DOE program  manager, each laboratory employs its own physical security specialists  and in turn, applies its own approach to conducting vulnerability  assessments and selecting physical security upgrades. During our site  visits, we observed that similar types of facilities varied in terms of the  types of upgrades installed and that security measures were not  standardized. For example, we toured numerous oncology clinics and  found that, although they housed the same equipment and radiological  sources, they had received different upgrades as a result of assessments  conducted by different laboratory security specialists. Specifically,  teletherapy units in certain countries had fiber optic cables attached to the  sources that sent alarm signals if the device was tampered with. Security  specialists traveling with us at those sites told us that the cable was the  key security feature for this type of device. However, during a meeting  with a senior security specialist from a different laboratory, we were told  that his teams do not install fiber optic cables as part of security upgrades  to the same devices because the cables can break.
We also found that DOE’s IRTR program components are not well- coordinated. For example, more than one program manager told us that  DOE had not consistently coordinated its orphan source recovery efforts  or regulatory infrastructure development assistance with physical security  upgrades. According to officials responsible for managing the majority of  the program’s physical security upgrade projects, IRTR program managers  did not coordinate efforts that resulted in multiple visits to the same  country. In their view, this caused confusion within the recipient countries  because country officials had difficulty understanding why some parts of  the same DOE program were being addressed separately. Officials from  Sandia National Laboratories, the lead for GSSP, told us that projects were  often implemented independently from physical security upgrade projects  and that Sandia did not routinely coordinate its efforts with those of PNNL  prior to initiating search and secure activities. PNNL officials, who  brought this matter to our attention, concurred and stated that GSSP  officials did not routinely consult with their physical security specialists  prior to visiting countries with which PNNL had already established  relationships.
Furthermore, according to PNNL officials, DOE’s regulatory infrastructure  development team had visited several countries without coordinating with  the physical security upgrade teams. According to a DOE program  manager, host country officials were frequently uncertain whether these  two components were part of the same program. According to PNNL, this  fragmented approach created confusion and required them to explain to  country officials that the program components were meant to complement  one another. The lead official for regulatory infrastructure development  activities told us that future visits would be better planned to ensure that  an integrated approach to source security was undertaken.
Finally, we found coordination problems between IRTR and the U.S.  Radiological Threat Reduction program, which is primarily responsible for  domestic source recovery efforts, including repatriating U.S.-origin  radiological sources in other countries. U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction  program officials said there have been limited opportunities to share  information or to assess the potential to coordinate international source  recovery activities so as to leverage DOE resources. For example, the  domestic program recently discovered a large quantity of unsecured  radiological sources in South America. The sources were no longer in use  and were inadequately secured. Officials managing DOE’s domestic  program informed IRTR mangers of the finding and the location of the  sources. However, IRTR officials declined to immediately secure the  sources because the country where they were discovered, which is  considered high risk, is not scheduled for IRTR upgrades until 2011. As a  result, the sources will remain unsecured until the international program  completes upgrades in this country.
In our discussions, DOE officials recognized that coordination within the  department needed to be improved and that a comprehensive and  consistent approach to threat reduction efforts between its nuclear and  radiological programs should be established. They acknowledged that it  was inefficient for multiple DOE teams to visit the same sites as part of  different programs to address multiple threat reduction activities. To that  end, DOE’s recent reorganization of GTRI is designed to create a more  streamlined structure that is organized geographically to address all threat  reduction activities more effectively. Specifically, DOE plans to increase  efficiency and improve coordination by (1) integrating multiple GTRI  programs working in the same country or at the same sites; (2)  redistributing workloads across the radiological and nuclear programs;  and (3) improving relationships with host country officials by tailoring  comprehensive strategies and incentives to more effectively meet unique  country-specific conditions.
section_title: Despite Some Improvements, Critical Information-Sharing Gaps between DOE and IAEA Have Impeded DOE’s Efforts to Target the Highest Priority Sites for Security Upgrades
paragraphs: DOE has improved coordination with IAEA in recent years to strengthen  controls over other countries’ radiological sources and has developed  several successful bilateral and multilateral partnerships with countries  around the world to support and share the agency’s international efforts.  IRTR’s director told us that these partnerships have helped to foster  increased awareness of the security of sources through country-specific  training and regional workshops. For example, with the assistance of  IAEA, DOE has established a partnership with the Australian Nuclear  Science and Technology Organization through which DOE has increased  opportunities to conduct physical security assessments and strengthen  regulatory inventories of radiological sources in Southeast Asia.  Specifically, ANSTO has identified and facilitated communication with  several high-risk countries, which has helped DOE gain access to  countries that DOE had difficulty initiating contact with, like Vietnam.  DOE has also provided funding to support, among other things, IAEA- sponsored training programs and regional workshops focusing on  radiological source security.
DOE also coordinated with Russia and IAEA as part of the Tripartite  Initiative to conduct physical security assessments and install upgrades at  102 sites in 13 FSU countries—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia,  Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan,  Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The objective of the Tripartite Initiative was to  improve the security of dangerous radioactive sources in the FSU. We  noted in our 2003 report that, in its early stages, the Tripartite Initiative  was not well planned, that initial efforts were ad hoc, and a more  systematic approach to program activities was needed. However, an  IAEA official recently told us that coordination with DOE has improved  significantly as the program evolved.
Despite the success of the Tripartite Initiative, critical information gaps  exist between DOE and IAEA that impede DOE’s ability to target the most  vulnerable sites and countries for security improvements. First, according  to DOE, IAEA has not shared with them, the countries that IAEA considers  the most in need of security assistance. Second, although DOE funds IAEA  appraisal missions—known as Radiation Safety and Security  Infrastructure Appraisals—to assess the weaknesses in radioactive source  security in IAEA member states, IAEA does not provide DOE with the  findings of these missions because member state information is  considered country-sensitive and confidential. The objective of these  missions is to evaluate, among other things, the quality of regulatory  controls countries exercise over their radiological sources. Results of the  appraisals are formalized into action plans that provide the framework for  subsequent IAEA assistance to improve the security of sources. Because  IAEA does not provide DOE with the results of the missions, DOE is  unable to effectively prioritize those sites that the missions identified to be  most vulnerable. DOE officials told us that the lack of country-specific  information has been an ongoing problem that limits DOE’s ability to  effectively leverage its resources to maximize program impact and  effectiveness.
We also found that little coordination exits between DOE and the  European Commission, which has resulted in the potential for overlap in  assistance and duplication of efforts. Specifically, the EC provides  financial support through IAEA, and on a bilateral basis, to secure  radioactive sources in countries that are candidates for EU membership.  EC officials told us that no formal communication exists with the United  States on matters related to radioactive source security assistance, and as  a result, each is largely unaware of the specific sites and locations the  other is securing, or whether recipient countries are receiving too little or  too much assistance. DOE officials told us that coordination with the EC  has been conducted primarily at IAEA donor meetings.
The EC has coordinated with IAEA to provide assistance to its member  states to improve control over radiological sources. Specifically, the EC  works jointly with IAEA on several action projects to strengthen the  security of radiological materials used for nuclear and non-nuclear  purposes, including upgrading regulatory infrastructures, installing  physical security upgrades and, as appropriate, disposing of vulnerable  radiological sources. As a result of these efforts, the EC has worked with  IAEA in several regions, but has focused primarily on the Caucasus,  Central Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Mediterranean countries.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOE has achieved noteworthy accomplishments in improving the security  of radiological sources at hundreds of sites in more than 40 countries. We  recognize that DOE faces a considerable challenge in securing other  countries’ most dangerous radiological sources, given the number of these  sources and their widespread dispersal. However, when DOE decided to  expand its program beyond securing sites in Russia and the FSU, it  diverted a significant portion of its limited program funding away from  securing the highest priority and most dangerous radiological sources.
Instead of focusing increased attention on these highest priority threats,  such as RTGs, DOE allocated significant program funding resources to  securing medical facilities that, in our view—as well as several DOE  officials associated with the program—pose considerably less threat to  U.S. security interests. While many of the RTGs cannot be removed until  alternate energy sources are developed to replace them, removing as many  RTGs as possible, or securing them until they can be removed, should be a  critical component of DOE’s radiological threat reduction efforts.
We believe that DOE’s current reorganization of its nuclear and  radiological threat reduction efforts is a step in the right direction toward  improving the management of the program. However, there are still many  significant management issues that need to be addressed and resolved.  DOE has not paid adequate attention to the long-term sustainability of the  equipment, which could jeopardize the significant investment made to  improve the security of radiological sources in many countries. The  security equipment and upgraded storage facilities funded by DOE will  require a long-term commitment by the countries to help ensure their  continued use and operation, and it is not clear to us that a sustained  stream of funding will be made available by DOE or by recipient countries  to maintain and/or replace aging or defective equipment. Moreover, there  are continuing concerns that many of the countries do not have adequate  nuclear regulatory infrastructures in place to promote sustainability.  Without a comprehensive sustainability plan that adequately addresses a  country’s ability to reliably install and maintain upgrades and provide  adequate oversight for source security, DOE risks losing a significant  portion of its investment to improve the security of radiological sources in  many countries. Furthermore, DOE’s decision to increase physical security  requirements for sites selected for upgrades, based on revised threat  protection criteria, may have significant cost implications for a program  that is already facing severe budget reductions. This raises concerns  because DOE has not adequately evaluated the increased costs associated  with its elevated threat protection criteria.
This may also be an opportune time for DOE to streamline the program,  particularly in light of budget reductions. We question, for example, how  certain program activities, such as the development of the Interpol  database, directly contribute to the program’s core mission of securing  radiological sources in other countries. There are other management  issues that require DOE’s attention. First, DOE has not developed  meaningful performance measurements to demonstrate the extent to  which the radiological threat has been reduced as a direct result of its  efforts, including measuring the impact of training and distinguishing  between the types of sources secured. Second, we recognize the pool of  reliable contractors to implement security projects and provide adequate  training may be limited in some countries. However, many project delays  could be avoided in the future if DOE developed specific selection criteria  or a set minimum standard for foreign contractor qualifications.
Improving radiological source security is a shared responsibility. DOE’s  investment has been significant and reflects a commitment to addressing  the problem. However, DOE should not underwrite the majority of the  costs on behalf of the international community. Specifically, certain EU  accession candidates and FSU countries, most prominently Russia, should  be willing to contribute more resources to improve the security of  dangerous and vulnerable sources in their own countries. In addition, DOE  now has the authority to accept foreign contributions for GTRI programs  from other interested countries, such as Canada, Japan, and Norway.  However, gaps in communication between DOE and international  partners, such as IAEA and the EC, significantly impede effective global  radiological threat reduction.
Finally, developing foreign countries’ nuclear regulatory organizations is a  well recognized and critical component in strengthening radiological  source security worldwide. NRC has a long-standing history of promoting  regulatory controls in the FSU and should, in our view, play a more  prominent role in this regard. DOE’s refusal to transfer $5 million from its  appropriations to NRC to conduct regulatory development activities,  despite the direction of the Senate Appropriations Committee,  underscores NRC’s limited ability to provide international assistance,  while reliant on funding from other agencies. Most of the coordination  problems we identified between NRC and other agencies could have been  avoided if NRC had its own stream of predictable and reliable funding for  international regulatory development, rather than having to rely on DOE  or State for funds. However, without a direct appropriation, NRC will  continue to depend on other agencies for funds, thus increasing the  likelihood that similar problems will occur in the future.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that DOE’s program focuses on securing the highest  priority radiological sources and sites, we recommend that the Secretary  of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security  Administration take the following two actions:    Limit the number of hospitals and clinics containing radiological sources  that receive security upgrades to only those deemed as the highest-risk,  and   To the extent possible, accelerate efforts to remove as many RTGs in  Russia and, as an interim measure, improve the security of those  remaining until they can be removed from service.
Furthermore, we recommend that Secretary of Energy and the  Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration take the  following seven actions to improve program management:    Develop a long-term sustainability plan for security upgrades that  includes, among other things, future resources required to implement such  a plan;   Reevaluate program activities and eliminate those that do not directly  contribute to securing the highest priority radiological sources in other  countries;   Conduct an analysis to determine the projected costs associated with  increased security upgrades in light of newly proposed threat protection  criteria and limit the number sites to receive increased security upgrades  until such an analysis has been completed;   Establish meaningful performance measurements that demonstrate real  risk reduction and go beyond a quantitative listing of the number countries  and sites that have received physical security upgrades;   Apply a more rigorous approach to foreign contractor selection to help  reduce potential project delays in the future;   Seek assurances from recipient countries that plans are in place to  maintain security-related equipment and facilities funded by the United  States; and   Develop strategies to encourage cost sharing with recipient countries,  including Russia and EU accession countries.
Finally, in an effort to improve coordination, the Secretary of Energy and  the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, in  consultation with the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Nuclear  Regulatory Commission, should work with IAEA and European  Commission officials to consider ways to systematically improve  information sharing to maximize and leverage resources and institutional  expertise.
section_title: Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: If the Congress believes that regulatory infrastructure development is the  key to the long-term sustainability of radiological source security efforts, it  should consider providing NRC with authority and a direct appropriation  to conduct these activities. The appropriation would be provided to NRC  in lieu of providing the funds to DOE or another agency to reimburse NRC  for its activities. Should the Congress decide to do so, NRC’s efforts need  to be fully coordinated with those of State, DOE, and IAEA.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided DOE and NRC with draft copies of this report for their review  and comment. DOE provided written comments, which are presented as  appendix III. NRC’s written comments are presented as appendix IV. NRC  also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report.  NRC neither agreed nor disagreed with our matter for congressional  consideration, which would provide NRC with the legal authority and a  direct appropriation to conduct international regulatory activities for  radiological source security. However, NRC stated that if Congress acts  upon our matter for consideration, NRC would work closely with State,  relevant executive branch agencies, and IAEA to implement the program.
In its written comments, DOE agreed with our conclusion that the  department faced a considerable challenge in securing other countries’  most dangerous radiological sources, given the number of these sources  and how widely dispersed they are. Furthermore, DOE stated that  enormous amounts of dangerous material have not been secured, although  the IRTR program has achieved a great deal of threat reduction in a short  period of time. DOE stated that the recommendations were very helpful  and would further strengthen its program.
DOE also noted that it had measures in place—as a result of its  reorganization of GTRI—to address program challenges and concerns that  we raised, such as site prioritization; quality assurance/sustainability;  coordination; and transportation. We recognized in the report that the  reorganization of the program was a step in the right direction toward  improving program management. However, as we noted in our report,  many significant management issues still need to be addressed and  resolved despite the reorganization. That is why we believe it was  important to offer recommendations to improve program management and  source prioritization efforts.
In other comments, DOE stated that the IRTR program uses a number of  factors to determine priority levels for the sites it selects to upgrade in  addition to the amount of radioactivity contained in radiological sources.  These other factors include (1) known terrorist threat in the  country/region; (2) current level of security at the site; and (3) the  proximity of the site in relationship to potential strategic targets of U.S.  interest. In our report, we stated that site selection was based on a number  of factors, including those specifically noted by DOE in its written  comments. We also pointed out in our report that DOE’s guidance on site  selection has not clearly discriminated between the different sites secured  and which sites were to be considered the highest priority. We are  encouraged that DOE is explicitly linking its prioritization guidelines to a  site’s proximity to potential strategic targets of U.S. interest. However, it  remains to be seen how consistently DOE will apply this criteria to its site  selection process in the future. In a related comment, DOE stated that it  will continue to accelerate RTG recoveries but must also address high  priority medical and other sources. In our view, this action by DOE would  be consistent with the key conclusions and recommendations in our  report. Our recommendations specifically state that DOE should, to the  extent possible, remove as many RTGs in Russia and limit the number of  hospitals and clinics containing radiological sources that receive security  upgrades to only those deemed to be the highest risk.
With regard to quality assurance and program sustainability issues, DOE  stated that it employs a standard process that ensures quality assurance  for the security equipment that it installs. This process includes, among  other things, conducting post-installation visits by technical experts for  the purpose of assuring that all equipment and systems are installed as  agreed upon. DOE also noted that despite these measures, it would further  investigate its process to identify and implement additional improvements.  We think DOE should take these steps because, as discussed in our report,  we identified several problems with malfunctioning equipment and other  maintenance problems at sites containing radiological sources. DOE also  noted that it has a short-term sustainability program for every site that it  upgrades that includes a 3-year warranty as well as preventative  maintenance contracts and training for operational staff. DOE believes  that we should revise the report to indicate the existence of the 3-year  warranty. Our report recognizes that DOE’s program guidance calls for  preventative maintenance contracts and training. We also noted that DOE  provides a 3-year warranty, and we gave DOE credit for providing this  coverage. Our main point remains—which DOE explicitly agreed with— that DOE has not developed a long-term sustainability plan for the  equipment it has installed. Nevertheless, we clarified our report language,  as appropriate, to state that DOE does have a short-term sustainability  plan but has not developed a long-term plan to maintain the security  upgrades completed.
Regarding coordination, DOE cited numerous examples in its written  comments of close cooperation with other U.S. government agencies,  other DOE elements, and international partners on matters pertaining to  international radiological source security. We believe the report fairly  characterized DOE’s coordination efforts in each of these areas.  Specifically, we noted that DOE had improved coordination with State and  NRC since we reported on this matter in 2003 and has increased  information-sharing with the agencies. In addition, we believe our  characterization of coordination problems within the department is  correct. Our evaluation was based on information provided by an  independent consultant’s report as well as our own analysis of conditions  we found within the department pertaining to inconsistent and, at times,  inadequately coordinated efforts by different DOE programs responsible  for threat reduction activities in the same country. As we noted in the  report, DOE officials recognized that coordination within the agency  needs to be improved and that a comprehensive and consistent approach  to threat reduction efforts between nuclear and radiological threat  reduction activities should be established. We also noted in the report that  DOE’s September 2006 reorganization of its GTRI efforts is designed to  create a more streamlined structure that is organized along three  geographic regions, which could improve program coordination.
On a related matter, DOE stated that we should have given IAEA an  opportunity to review and address some of the issues raised in our report  about limited information sharing, which impeded DOE’s ability to target  the most vulnerable sites and countries for security improvements. Since  this information was provided to us by DOE officials, it is unclear to us  what benefit would have been achieved by providing a draft of this report  to IAEA for review and comment of DOE’s views. Our report notes that  DOE has, despite some information-sharing problems with IAEA,  improved coordination with the agency in recent years to strengthen  controls over other countries’ radiological sources.
Finally, with regard to transportation of sources, DOE commented that,  among other things, it had been working with the U.S. Department of  Transportation, IAEA, and key IAEA donor countries to strengthen  transport security regulations. We added this information to our report  based on DOE’s comments. DOE also stated that it was working with  Russia to enhance the security of radioactive materials, including  providing cargo trucks and escort vehicles for the Moscow waste storage  facility. We had already recognized this fact in the report. More broadly,  however, we believe that the report accurately and fairly depicts the  limitations of DOE efforts regarding transportation security. A primary  source of information for our observation came directly from a DOE  analysis—cited in the report—which concluded that the department was  addressing transportation security on an ad-hoc basis and that the existing  method of providing transportation security had serious limitations and  lacked a commitment to integrate transport security into all countries  participating in the IRTR program.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. We will then send copies of this report to the Secretary of  Energy; the Secretary of State; the Administrator, National Nuclear  Security Administration; the Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission;  the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested  congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others  upon request. In addition, the report will be made available at no charge  on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report include Erika D. Carter, Glen  Levis, Mehrunisa Qayyum, Keith Rhodes (GAO’s Chief Technologist), and  Jim Shafer.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We focused our review primarily on the Department of Energy (DOE),  since it is the lead federal agency for improving the security of radiological  sources worldwide and provides significant funds for that purpose. We  also performed work at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and  Department of State (State) in Washington, D.C., which also provide  assistance to help other countries secure their sealed radiological sources.  In addition, we reviewed program-related activities and interviewed  program officials from Argonne National Laboratory in Argonne, Illinois;  the Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico; Pacific  Northwest National Laboratory in Richland, Washington; Sandia National  Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico; the International Atomic  Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria; and the European Commission  (EC) in Brussels, Belgium. We also met with nongovernmental  organizations, including, the Council on Foreign Relations and the  Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In November 2005, we  attended the Trilateral Commission meeting held in the United Kingdom,  which discussed international approaches to securing radiological sources  against terrorism.
We visited four countries to determine how DOE has implemented its  program to secure radiological sources overseas. We selected these  countries based on several criteria, including where DOE has spent the  most funds since 2002. Overall, these four countries represented about  $37.4 million, or about 35 percent, of overall program expenditures. We  selected Lithuania and Poland since, among other reasons, DOE officials  told us that these were model countries in securing radiological sources  and implementing effective physical security upgrades. Also, we selected  Russia and Georgia because they received significant program funds,  totaling about $34.2 million of the $107.7 million. In addition, thousands of  radiological sources are located in these two countries. In the case of  Russia, it contains the majority of RTGs worldwide and operates 44  percent of all Radons in the former Soviet Union.
During our review, we observed physical security upgrades at all types of  sites: medical, industrial, research, storage facilities, and RTGs. For  instance, we visited numerous medical and industrial sites throughout  Lithuania and Poland. Specifically in Lithuania, we visited the Radiation  Protection Center, Vilnius Oncology Institute Clinic, Klaipeda City  Hospital, the Kaunas Oncology Clinic, and Saiuliu Oncology Hospital, as  well as the Lithuanian Institute of Physics and the Maisiagala Repository.  In Poland, we visited the Regionaine Centreem Kriwodawstwa I  Krwiolecznictwa (Children’s Hospital) as well as the Glowny Urzad Miar  (Main Measurement Office), Polytechnic Institute of Lodz, Radioisotope  Center (Polatom), Geofizyka Krakow, Radioisotope Waste Management  Plant in Swierk, Technical University Institute of Applied Radiation  Chemistry, and the Technical Institute of Applied Physics. At each  location, we interviewed facility staff who were responsible for  implementing radiological source security procedures and using the  monitoring equipment funded by DOE. Facility staff included—but was  not limited to—doctors, clinical technicians, and other medical support  staff. At each site, we met with local guards to determine how well they  were trained and equipped. We also interviewed host country contractors  who were responsible for installing and maintaining physical security  upgrades.
We also met with host government officials in both countries. In Lithuania  we met with officials from the Ministry of Economy; RATA (Lithuanian  Radioactive Waste Management Agency); the Radiation Protection Center  (nuclear regulatory organization); and the Ministry of Environment. In  Poland, we interviewed officials from the National Atomic Energy Agency  (Poland’s nuclear regulator), the Department of Environmental Hygiene,  and the Ministry of Health.
We also visited Russia and Georgia to obtain a first-hand look at waste  facilities that contain radiological sources. Specifically, we visited the  Moscow Radon site at Sergiev Posad, located about 90 kilometers from  Moscow and the St. Petersburg Radon site, located about 80 kilometers  from St. Petersburg. While in Russia we also met with the key federal  agencies responsible for radiological source management and oversight.  Specifically, we met with several high-level officials from Rostechnadzor,  Russia’s nuclear regulator (the Federal Environmental, Industrial and  Nuclear Supervision Service of Russia); the Federal Agency for  Construction and Utilities; and the Department for Nuclear and Radiation  Safety at the Federal Atomic Energy Agency. Additionally, we interviewed  directors of both the Moscow and St. Petersburg Radon facilities; officials  of the IBRAE Institute (Russian National Academy of Sciences); and  directors of VNIITFA (Russian National Technical Physics and Automation  Research Institute), the designer of RTGs. Moreover, after meeting with  officials from the Kurchatov Institute, which is primarily responsible for  the RTG removal, we visited three sites where RTGs had been removed  and replaced with alternative energy sources.
In Georgia, we visited the Mtsheta national repository located at the  Institute of Physics near Tbilisi, Georgia, as well as Georgia’s temporary  national storage facility that stores many high-risk radiological sources,  including six RTGs and a seed irradiator. Regarding Georgia’s medical  sites, we also visited the National Cancer Center of Georgia and the  Kutaisi Oncological Center and interviewed staff and guards who were  responsible for source security. We met with officials from the Nuclear  and Radiation Safety Service of the Ministry of Environmental Protection  and Natural Resources (Georgia’s nuclear regulator), the Nuclear and  Radiation Safety Department, the Institute of Radiobiology, and the  Chamber of Control.
To assess the progress of DOE’s efforts to help other countries secure  their sealed radiological sources, we obtained and analyzed  documentation on DOE’s International Radiological Threat Reduction  Program (IRTR), including project work plans for each country and  program activity; strategic planning documents; and internal briefings. For  example, we reviewed DOE’s Action Plan to Secure and Control Foreign- Origin Source Materials for Radiological Dispersal Devices (April 2003),  and Programmatic Guidelines for Site Prioritization and Protection  Implementation (September 2006). We supplemented the documentation  with interviews with senior level DOE officials responsible for  implementing the IRTR program.
To specifically determine the status of efforts across the 49 countries  receiving DOE’s assistance, we reviewed DOE’s Project Management  Information System database to construct a summary table that included  factors, among other things, the number of sites completed; host country  agencies and international organizations involved in radiological source  security; and program accomplishments and challenges. To identify  challenges DOE faces in securing sources in other countries and to assess  sustainability efforts, we collected and analyzed (1) IRTR program trip  reports for all countries participating in the program, and (2) testimonial  evidence obtained from project managers, security specialists, and  contracting officers to identify all programmatic and management  challenges. Furthermore, we performed a comprehensive review and  analysis of trip reports from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2006.
To assess current and planned program costs of U.S. programs that  provide assistance to secure radiological sources in other countries, we  reviewed budget documents from DOE and NRC detailing program  expenditures from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2006. We obtained  responses from key agency database officials to a number of questions  focused on data reliability, covering issues such as data-entry access and  the accuracy and completeness of the data. For DOE specifically, to  determine how much DOE had budgeted and spent through August 31,  2006, to secure radiological sources in other countries, we reviewed  element of cost reports detailing program expenditures by country,  national laboratory, and program objective per fiscal year to determine the  amount spent in-country and the overall carryover of unspent and  unobligated funds. Furthermore, to determine planned program costs for  DOE, we reviewed DOE’s congressional budget request for fiscal year 2007  and met with senior DOE officials to learn about DOE’s plans for  addressing reduced program funding. Follow-up questions were added  whenever necessary. Caveats and limitations to the data were noted in the  documentation, where necessary. We determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, based on work we  performed to ensure the data’s reliability.
To assess the extent to which coordination has occurred within DOE as  well as on an interagency basis, we obtained and analyzed documents  from DOE, NRC, and State regarding their radiological threat reduction  and nonproliferation activities. We interviewed several senior officials at  NRC, including the Senior Advisor for Nuclear Security, a senior foreign  policy advisor for the Office of International Programs, and a Senior  Engineer. At State, we interviewed several high-level officials, including  the Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Safety from the Bureau of  International Security and Nonproliferation. We also reviewed State, NRC,  and DOE documents regarding Iraq work to highlight interagency  coordination. To address the level of coordination with international  organizations, we met with senior officials at the International Atomic  Energy Agency and the European Commission, including the Director of  Nuclear Safety, and a senior official from the External Relations  Directorate, respectively. Finally, we met with the Director of the Nuclear  and Radiation Safety Centre from the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory  Authority to learn about NRC’s role in providing regulatory assistance to  Armenia.
We performed our review in Washington, D.C., and other locations, from  November 2005 to December 2006 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: DOE’s IRTR Program Expenditures, Allocated by Region, as of August 31, 2006
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Energy
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission