Operational Contract Support: Actions Needed to Enhance Capabilities in the Pacific Region
Published: 2017-06-23T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: A key element of DOD military strategy since 2012 has been a rebalance of U.S. presence and capabilities toward the Asia-Pacific region, PACOM's area of responsibility. U.S. military personnel in this region rely on contracted services to provide support to military operations. PACOM's humanitarian and disaster-relief efforts in response to a May 2015 earthquake in Nepal highlighted the importance of OCS in the Asia-Pacific region.
GAO was asked to assess PACOM's processes to plan for, manage, and oversee contractors that support military operations in the Asia-Pacific region. This report assesses the extent to which PACOM (1) has accounted for contractor personnel and has a process to vet foreign vendors; (2) has established an organizational structure to manage and oversee OCS; and (3) has integrated OCS into key planning documents. GAO reviewed documents and data, interviewed relevant officials involved in OCS activities in the region, and analyzed OCS annexes to certain plans.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) does not fully account for contractor personnel in a steady-state, or peacetime, environment and lacks a process to vet foreign vendors. Department of Defense (DOD) guidance requires the accounting of certain contractor personnel during contingency operations, but is unclear for steady-state environments. PACOM issued limited guidance in November 2016 to address accountability processes in contingency and steady-state environments, and PACOM and some of its components use multiple mechanisms to account for contractor personnel, resulting in inconsistencies in the numbers of contractor personnel accounted for, which could present difficulties in an emergency or contingency operation. Additionally, PACOM lacks a foreign vendor vetting process due to a lack of DOD guidance identifying what vendor vetting processes should be established at combatant commands. PACOM has taken some action on vendor vetting, such as including vetting in exercises and screening some contractor personnel, but it lacks a process that includes details, such as under what circumstances a vetting cell should be established. DOD guidance specifying under what circumstances a vetting cell should be established would better position PACOM to avoid contracting with the enemy in high-threat areas.
PACOM established an interim operational contract support (OCS) organizational structure through a pilot program that ends in June 2017. PACOM officials stated that, upon completion of the pilot, they intend to establish the structure as an enduring OCS capability within the command's logistics directorate. The intent is to provide the combatant command, subordinate unified commands, and service components a central entity to integrate OCS across joint functions, such as directorates dealing with personnel or intelligence. However, service component officials stated that PACOM's OCS organizational structure might have been more effective if it engaged all joint staff functions, including directorates beyond logistics. DOD, Joint Staff, and PACOM guidance identify the important role that directorates beyond logistics should play as stakeholders in OCS. Similarly, GAO has previously reported on the challenges DOD has faced integrating OCS in functional areas beyond logistics. By considering ways to expand its OCS organizational structure beyond the logistics directorate and better integrate the equities of other directorates, PACOM could be better positioned to build on the progress made during the pilot program.
PACOM has integrated OCS into key planning documents, as required by guidance, by developing OCS annexes for 6 of its 11 operational, concept, and campaign plans. Officials added that they will continue to update the remaining plans as planning cycles and resources allow. However, the annex appendixes generally lack key details, such as contractor management and support estimates. PACOM officials told GAO that such details are determined through requirements development at the service component commands, but challenges exist related to these issues due to unclear guidance. Without guidance that clarifies the requirements-development process for OCS annexes, PACOM will continue to lack important details that are needed to determine OCS requirements for operations.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is making six recommendations, including that DOD and PACOM develop or update guidance related to contractor personnel accountability, vendor vetting, and OCS organizational structure; and that PACOM develop guidance that clarifies requirements development for plans. DOD concurred with two recommendations and partially concurred with four. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid, as discussed in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: A key element of Department of Defense (DOD) military strategy since  2012 has been a rebalance of U.S presence and capabilities toward the  Asia-Pacific region, U.S. Pacific Command’s (PACOM) area of  responsibility. U.S. military personnel have deployed to locations within  this region, where they rely on a variety of contracted services to provide  needed support to conduct military operations, including exercises,  humanitarian responses, and contingency operations. DOD describes the  process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction  from commercial sources in support of joint operations as operational  contract support (OCS). One example that highlights the importance of  OCS in the Asia-Pacific region is PACOM’s foreign humanitarian  assistance efforts in response to the May 2015 earthquake in Nepal. As  part of that effort, PACOM established a joint task force that provided  aviation capabilities to enable delivery of relief supplies and executed  OCS to provide logistical support to deployed U.S. forces.
According to data from the Federal Procurement Data System–Next  Generation, DOD obligated more than $40 billion between fiscal years  2011 and 2015 within PACOM’s area of responsibility, including for  contracts supporting deployed forces. DOD joint doctrine projects that  the continual introduction of high-tech equipment, combined with military  force structure reductions, mission-specific force cap restrictions, and  high operating tempo means that contract support will continue to be  relied upon to augment military forces in most operations. A growing  reliance on contractors to provide logistical, transportation, intelligence,  and other support to the combatant command’s missions in this region  requires advanced planning, rapid response, flexible procedures, and  integration of efforts.
Since 2010, we have reported on challenges DOD has experienced in  managing OCS and made recommendations to strengthen its efforts in  this area, including incorporating OCS into planning, ensuring  accountability for contractor personnel, and properly vetting contractors  and contractor employees. For example, in March 2010 we  recommended that DOD incorporate the potential need for contractor  support into plans for military operations and that it include assumptions  about the use and role of contractors. In February 2013 we recommended  that the Joint Staff provide training for OCS planners and, in March 2015,  we recommended that DOD revise existing guidance and the services  issue service-wide guidance related to collecting OCS lessons learned.  Most recently, in December 2015 we recommended that DOD clarify  guidance on contractor accountability and issue department-wide  guidance on foreign vendor vetting. DOD generally concurred with these  recommendations and, in response, has issued and updated DOD and  Joint Staff OCS guidance related to OCS roles and responsibilities,  planning for OCS requirements, ensuring accountability of contractors  authorized to accompany the force, and implementing OCS within the  combatant commands’ area of responsibility.
You asked us to review the processes PACOM uses to plan for, manage,  and oversee contractors that support military operations in the Asia- Pacific region. This report addresses the extent to which PACOM has: (1)  accounted for contractor personnel and has a process to vet foreign  vendors in its area of responsibility, (2) established an organizational  structure to manage and oversee OCS, and (3) integrated OCS into key  planning documents.
To determine the extent to which PACOM accounts for contractor  personnel and has a process to vet foreign vendors in its area of  responsibility, we reviewed and analyzed DOD and PACOM guidance as  well as the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement and other  guidance on requirements for the use of contractors. We collected and  analyzed data from 2015 and 2016 on the use of contractors, and  assessed the reliability of the data by interviewing knowledgeable officials  about the data and the steps that they had taken to verify the data’s  accuracy. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable, and  compared the data to criteria related to contractor personnel  accountability found in DOD guidance and federal regulations, and  interviewed key officials at various organizational levels. We reviewed  guidance and documentation and interviewed officials to determine the  processes in place to vet non-U.S. contractors and their employees,  including requirements and screenings.
To determine the extent to which PACOM has established an  organizational structure to manage and oversee OCS, we reviewed and  analyzed key criteria related to OCS roles and responsibilities found in  DOD, PACOM, and other guidance and compared them to the OCS  organizational structure at PACOM and its subordinate commands, and  interviewed relevant officials. Finally, to determine the extent to which  PACOM has integrated OCS into key planning documents, we reviewed  and analyzed planning criteria found in DOD and PACOM guidance, and  compared them to PACOM planning documents, including the OCS  annex in the theater campaign plan and select operation and contingency  plans. For a more detailed discussion on our objectives, scope, and  methodology, see appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2015 to June 2017  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Commander of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is the primary U.S.  military authority in the Pacific area of responsibility. PACOM’s area of  responsibility spans approximately half the earth’s surface and  encompasses 36 countries, including Australia, China, India, Japan, the  Philippines, and South Korea. PACOM is supported by four service  component commands: U.S. Army Pacific; U.S. Pacific Air Forces; U.S.  Marine Forces, Pacific, and the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Each component  command is generally responsible for its service’s actions and missions  within the PACOM area of responsibility. In addition, PACOM has two  subordinate unified commands, which help support the combatant  command’s presence in the region. In Japan, U.S. Forces Japan supports  U.S. forward presence and ensures bilateral defense cooperation with the  government of Japan. In Korea, U.S. Forces Korea coordinates U.S.  military operations and activities in South Korea.
subsections: section_title: OCS Functions, Roles, and Responsibilities
paragraphs: DOD describes OCS as the process of planning for and obtaining  supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support  of joint operations. OCS encompasses three functions: contract support  integration, contracting support, and contractor management. These  functions and their associated tasks are described in figure 1.
Determining OCS requirements, as well as conducting the initial planning  for and coordination of these tasks, is primarily an operational, versus a  contracting, function. As a result, and according to joint doctrine, all of the  directorates within a command have OCS roles or responsibilities. The  2014 update to Joint Publication 4-10 introduced the concept of an OCS  Integration Cell as a central coordination point that can, among other  things, provide staff integration by assisting and advising the directorates  on these issues.
The Defense Logistics Agency’s Joint Contingency Acquisition Support  Office provides support to combatant command OCS planning efforts and  training events, and, when requested, advises, assists, and supports joint  force command oversight of OCS operations. Additionally, the Joint  Contingency Acquisition Support Office provides the combatant  commander joint OCS planners embedded within the combatant  command staff, including as part of their OCS Integration Cells.
section_title: OCS in Combatant Command Planning for Contingencies
paragraphs: The department uses contingency planning to develop its operation plans,  which describe how DOD will respond to a potential event that might  require the use of military force, such as terrorism, hostile foreign nations,  and natural disasters. An operation plan generally consists of a base plan  and annexes. The base plan describes the concept of operations, major  forces, sustainment concept, and anticipated timelines for completing the  mission. The annexes of an operational plan provide further details on  areas such as logistics (Annex D), personnel (Annex E), and OCS (Annex  W). Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3130.03, Adaptive  Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance,  provides more detailed guidance on the format of plans, including  templates for the base plan and annexes.
As described in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, the  framework for military operational planning generally encompasses six  phases, ranging from Phase 0 to Phase V. Phases are distinct in time,  space, or purpose from one another. According to Joint Publication 5-0,  Phase 0 or steady-state operations encompass normal and routine  military activities performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and  to assure or solidify relationships with allies. In general, terms such as  steady-state operations, steady-state environment, and Phase 0 are used  in reference to peacetime operations or to denote the absence of a  declared contingency operation. Phases I through V generally involve the  demonstration and use of military forces to deter an adversary, seize the  initiative, dominate the adversary, participate in stability operations  subsequent to combat operations, and support civil authorities,  respectively.
section_title: Contractor Personnel Accountability
paragraphs: Personnel accountability is the general process by which commanders  identify, capture, and record information about the number and type of  personnel, including contractor personnel, in their area of operations. To  help commanders improve their ability to account for contractor personnel  (which may include U.S. citizen, third-country, and local national  personnel, depending on the circumstances), DOD uses a database— Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT)—to serve  as the department’s central repository for contractor personnel  accountability data in contingency operations. Specifically, SPOT assists  the combatant commander in ensuring that accountability, visibility, force  protection, medical support, personnel recovery, and other related  support can be accurately forecasted and provided for the contractor  personnel in the command’s area of responsibility. When specified by  contract, vendors are responsible for inputting and maintaining their  employees’ personnel data in SPOT throughout the employees’ periods  of performance.
Personnel accountability is also conducted by means of the Joint  Personnel Status Report database. According to PACOM guidance,  PACOM headquarters and subordinate activities are to report the total  number of DOD-affiliated personnel assigned to PACOM (inclusive of all  applicable active-duty service members, selected reservists, DOD civilian  employees, and DOD contractors ), as well  as other DOD personnel physically present in the PACOM area of  responsibility. Personnel status reports are to be submitted weekly. This  information, along with SPOT and service-specific accountability systems,  typically feed information into DOD’s primary accountability system—Joint  Personnel Accountability Reconciliation and Reporting—to produce joint  personnel status reports, which include military, civilian, and contractor  employees.
section_title: Vendor Vetting and Contractor Employee Screening
paragraphs: Vendor vetting and contractor employee screening are processes by  which DOD conducts intelligence-based threat mitigation to minimize  operational risks potentially posed by contracted companies and their  employees.
Vendor Vetting: DOD contracting officers are required to check  prospective contractors’ names against a list of prohibited, restricted, or  otherwise ineligible entities in a U.S. government contracting database  called the System for Award Management. The database contains a list  of sanctioned and other prohibited entities identified by the Department of  the Treasury, Department of State, DOD, and other U.S. agencies.  Additionally, Joint Staff guidance discusses the establishment of a  foreign-vendor vetting cell within a combatant command to vet selected  local national and third-country national companies to prevent DOD from  awarding contracts to companies having ties to insurgents or other  inappropriate entities. Generally, such vetting consists of researching  the principal owners and connections of the company using information  provided by owners and then cross-checking this information against  various intelligence sources.
Contractor Employee Screening: According to joint doctrine,  subordinate and individual base commanders are responsible for the  security of military facilities within the combatant commander’s area of  responsibility. Joint doctrine notes that part of this process is the  screening and badging of contractor personnel who are authorized to  have base access. A contractor employee screening process can  mitigate the potential security risk that third-country and local national  contractor personnel may pose when they have access to DOD facilities.
section_title: PACOM Does Not Fully Account for Contractor Personnel in a Steady-State Environment and Does Not Have a Process to Vet Foreign Vendors
paragraphs: PACOM does not fully account for contractor personnel in a steady-state  environment, and does not have a process to vet foreign vendors. DOD  guidance requires accountability for certain contractor personnel during  contingency operations, but contractor accountability guidance in steady- state environments is unclear. In the absence of clear guidance from  DOD, PACOM has used multiple mechanisms for contractor personnel  accountability, which has resulted in inconsistent reporting. PACOM  subsequently issued accountability guidance in November 2016, but it is  limited in that it excludes foreign-national contractors. Additionally,  PACOM does not have a process in place to vet foreign vendors in  contingency operations due to a lack of DOD guidance that clarifies what  foreign-vendor vetting steps or process should be established at each  combatant command.
subsections: section_title: DOD Guidance Requires Accountability for Certain Contractor Personnel during Contingencies, but the Accountability Is Unclear for Steady-State Environments
paragraphs: DOD guidance provides procedures for identifying, capturing, and  recording information about certain contractor personnel in combatant  command areas of operation during applicable contingency operations  outside the United States. For example:
DOD Instruction 3020.41 states contractor visibility and accountability  shall be maintained in applicable contingency operations through a  common joint database, SPOT, or its successor.
Joint Publication 4-10 states that DOD policy requires accountability  of all contractors authorized to accompany the force, as well as other  contractor employees designated by the Office of the Secretary of  Defense (OSD) or combatant commander, in SPOT. It notes that  contractor personnel visibility and accountability are essential to  determine and resource government support requirements in  uncertain, hostile, or austere operational environments, and that  accountability of contractor personnel may be a critical information  requirement for commanders in some operations.
A Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement clause, to be  used in certain contracts, requires the contractor to use SPOT to enter  and maintain data for all contractors authorized to accompany the  force and, as designated, other contractor employees supporting U.S.  armed forces deployed outside the United States in applicable  operations, including contingency operations, or other designated  military operations or exercises.
In addition, PACOM has issued guidance regarding contractor personnel  accountability during contingencies. For example, PACOM Instruction  0601.7 indicates that personnel-directorate officials are to provide status  reports via SPOT for contractors authorized to accompany the force.  Similarly, PACOM Instruction 0250.1 states that subordinate commands  are to implement the use of SPOT for the tracking and accountability of  contractors authorized to accompany the force, as directed by PACOM  headquarters.
Both Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and PACOM guidance on  personnel accountability call for the use of Joint Personnel Status  Reports, which are meant, in part, to authenticate the total number of personnel, including military, DOD civilian, and DOD contractor  personnel, who are physically present in a geographic combatant  commander’s area of responsibility. According to PACOM guidance,  PACOM headquarters and subordinate activities are to report on a weekly  basis via joint personnel status reports the total number of DOD-affiliated  personnel assigned to PACOM (inclusive of all applicable active-duty  service members, selected reservists, DOD civilian employees, and DOD  contractors ), as well as DOD personnel  physically present in the PACOM area of responsibility.
Although the Joint Staff updated Joint Publication 1-0 in May 2016 to  clarify, among other things, accountability of DOD contractor personnel  overseas, it does not clearly specify the types of contractor personnel  (U.S., third-country national, or local national) that are to be accounted for  in a steady-state environment. We have previously reported that DOD  guidance is unclear with regard to the types of contractor personnel that  should be accounted for in a steady-state environment. For example, as  we reported in 2015, the Joint Staff guidance is unclear as to what types  of contractor personnel should be accounted for in the Joint Personnel  Status Report. Specifically, we found confusion among U.S. Africa  Command officials regarding the types of contractor personnel—including  U.S., local national, host-nation, and third-country nationals—to be  included in the joint personnel status report as compared with SPOT, as  well as unclear guidance regarding the relationship between information  in SPOT and reporting through the Joint Personnel Status Report.
Similarly, during this engagement, PACOM personnel-directorate officials  told us they report the total number of DOD-affiliated personnel assigned  to PACOM by means of the Joint Personnel Status Report database, as  required by PACOM guidance. As part of this process, officials told us  they account for some contractor personnel. Specifically, they account for  contractors authorized to accompany the force, but they do not report  numbers on third-country nationals or local nationals.
DOD officials responsible for OCS issues stated in May 2017 that, when  requested by combatant commands, they have facilitated the use of  SPOT in Phase 0 or steady-state environments to capture accountability  data on all types of contractor personnel (U.S., third-country national, and  local national). Hence, the commanders of U.S. Africa Command and  U.S. Southern Command identified the need to use SPOT in steady-state  environments, even though that is not currently required under DOD  guidance. To support these efforts, DOD issued guidance for the use of  clauses in solicitations and contracts with performance in these  combatant command areas of responsibility, which require contractors to  use SPOT to enter and maintain data for certain contractor personnel.  However, without guidance clarifying the types of contractor personnel to  be accounted for in a steady-state environment, DOD may continue to  have limited visibility over contractor personnel for whom it may be  responsible in the event of a contingency operation or an emergency.
section_title: PACOM Uses Multiple Mechanisms to Account for Contractor Personnel, Which Has Resulted in Inconsistent Reporting
paragraphs: PACOM and some of its components use multiple mechanisms to  account for contractor personnel in a steady-state environment. For  example, although PACOM headquarters officials stated they do not use  SPOT to track contractor personnel in a steady-state environment, we  determined that some PACOM contractor personnel were accounted for  in SPOT. According to data obtained from the SPOT Program Office, in  September 2016 approximately 1,400 contractor personnel in the  PACOM area of responsibility were recorded in SPOT. Four hundred of  these contractor personnel were third-country nationals or local nationals  who would not be required to be reported in PACOM’s Joint Personnel  Status Reports based on its accountability guidance. We also found that  some PACOM service components and subordinate unified commands  use their own accountability systems—as well as SPOT—to account for  contractor personnel. Further, the collected data included third-country  and local national contractor personnel, information that similarly would  not be required to be reported in Joint Personnel Status Reports.
The use of multiple mechanisms to account for various types of contractor  personnel have in some cases resulted in inconsistent and incomplete  outcomes regarding the total numbers of contractor personnel accounted  for in a steady-state environment. For example:
U.S. Forces Japan collects data on personnel who are full-time  contract employees permitted to be in Japan in accordance with the  terms of the Status of Forces Agreement between the two nations.  However, the number of contractor personnel accounted for by U.S.  Forces Japan in the first quarter of fiscal year 2016 (1,485) was not  consistent with the number of contractor personnel reported in SPOT  (approximately 900).
III Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa relies on three information  systems, including SPOT, to account for contractors and contractor  personnel in a steady-state environment, but the numbers found in  these systems are inconsistent. Specifically, the number of contractor  personnel accounted for by III Marine Expeditionary Force as of June  2016 (approximately 500) was not consistent with the number of  contractor personnel in SPOT for the area of responsibility  (approximately 700).
U.S. Forces Korea officials provided a detailed accounting of  contractor personnel, specifying the number of individuals by  geographic area and the number of dependents, and stated that the  detail was a result of the Invited Contractor / Technical Representative  Program that governs U.S. Forces Korea use of U.S. or third-country  contractors. However, the number of contractor personnel accounted  for by the Invited Contractor Program in Korea in July 2016 (2,527  U.S. contractor personnel) was not consistent with the number of  contractor personnel in SPOT for the area of responsibility  (approximately 300).
Such inconsistencies regarding contractor personnel accountability in a  steady-state environment could present difficulties in an emergency or  contingency operation. Joint Publication 4-10 notes that steady-state  activities can have a significant impact on OCS in later phases of the  operation, and, consequently, OCS planners should be aware of and pay  close attention to steady-state activities that can provide critical  information to support subsequent phases of an operation. Similarly, in  2015, we reported that if DOD does not have timely and reliable contract  and contractor personnel data, the department will not have complete  visibility as to whom it may have to develop plans for, regarding such  services as force protection, sustenance, and repatriation of injured or  deceased contractor personnel.
Without PACOM guidance clarifying the types of contractor personnel that  should be accounted for in a steady-state environment, PACOM and its  subordinate commands may continue to have limited visibility over  contractor personnel. Similarly, without the development and  implementation of guidance specifying a system of record, such as  SPOT, for the collection of this information during a steady-state  environment, PACOM may not have a comprehensive and consistent  accounting of contractor personnel in its area of responsibility, which  could potentially limit PACOM’s visibility over contractor personnel for  whom it may be responsible in the event of a contingency operation or an  emergency.
In an attempt to clarify accountability guidance, PACOM issued additional  guidance in November 2016. Among other things, the guidance requires  PACOM activities to report some contractor personnel by means of joint  personnel status reporting and directs subordinate commands to  implement SPOT as directed by PACOM headquarters. However, the  guidance excludes foreign nationals from the contractor personnel to be  reported via the Joint Personnel Status Report database. In addition, it  does not specify a system of record to be used for all contractor  personnel in steady-state environments.
section_title: PACOM Does Not Systematically Vet Foreign Vendors or Have a Vendor Vetting Process in Place
paragraphs: DOD guidance generally discusses the benefits of vendor vetting in the  OCS context, but does not require combatant commands to establish  vendor vetting processes. For example, Joint Publication 4-10 discusses  the benefit of establishing a vendor vetting cell, when circumstances  warrant, to vet foreign vendors for possible security concerns and avoid  awarding contracts to companies that have ties to insurgents. Similarly,  in 2011, we reported on the importance of establishing vendor vetting  processes to help mitigate the risk that malign actors could profit from  U.S. government contracts in the context of contracting with local vendors  during operations in Afghanistan.
PACOM headquarters officials stated that the combatant command is  aware of the importance of foreign-vendor vetting, but, in the absence of  specific requirements from DOD, the command does not have a  documented vendor vetting mechanism, such as a vendor vetting cell or  other process by which to vet vendors. PACOM headquarters intelligence  officials stated that they may occasionally receive requests to assist with  vetting of a specific vendor from other headquarters directorates or  supporting commands. Officials noted that in those cases, PACOM’s  intelligence directorate—the joint directorate identified in Joint Publication  4-10 as having key OCS duties related to vendor vetting—responds to the  request by relying on the standing vendor vetting cell within U.S.  Transportation Command to evaluate the level of operational risk posed  by contracting with a commercial vendor. Officials noted that U.S.  Transportation Command’s vendor vetting cell has served as a resource  for other combatant commands in lieu of establishing their own  corresponding cell. However, OSD officials stated that the cell at U.S.
Transportation Command could be overwhelmed if the number of vetting  requests from other combatant commands continues to rise.
Officials at PACOM headquarters and subordinate commands have taken  several additional actions regarding vendor vetting, including  incorporating vendor vetting into PACOM exercises and screening  contractor personnel through background checks and badging processes.
Additionally, PACOM has developed antiterrorism guidance with vendor  vetting considerations. However, while the antiterrorism guidance  presents a checklist of questions for evaluating how contracting aligns  with the command’s overall antiterrorism program, it does not discuss the  operational conditions under which a foreign-vendor vetting cell would be  established or outline a process for conducting comprehensive foreign- vendor vetting through a cell at the command or leverage an existing cell  at another command.
From a department-wide perspective, DOD has begun to take steps to  identify foreign-vendor vetting needs. According to the OCS Action Plan  for Fiscal Years 2017–2020—the DOD document that assigns tasks to  various stakeholders to operationalize OCS—foreign-vendor vetting is  becoming increasingly important. OSD officials who developed the action  plan added that the department is trying to determine how foreign-vendor  vetting relates to and affects OCS. To this end, DOD established a  foreign-vendor vetting working group in January 2017 to, among other  things, define foreign-vendor vetting as a distinct function and provide  combatant commanders with guidance on addressing the risks  associated with relying on commercial vendors. According to officials, this  working group is in its infancy, and DOD decision makers are still  exploring which entities should be key stakeholders to vendor vetting,  including which entity should have primary responsibility for vendor  vetting.
Furthermore, officials indicated DOD is currently inclined to examine  solutions that can address vendor vetting issues globally rather than  requiring geographic combatant commands to establish their own vendor  vetting cells. Additionally, according to OSD officials, the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics  drafted a directive-type memorandum related to the collection of  intelligence-based vendor threat information through a mechanism such  as a foreign-vendor vetting entity or cell in order to mitigate operational  risk. Officials stated, however, that this memorandum will not be finalized  until after the vendor vetting working group has collected more  information to determine the best way forward.
In lieu of comprehensive department-wide guidance on vendor vetting,  two other combatant commands—U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Central  Command—have developed their own foreign-vendor vetting guidance.  Specifically, we reported in 2015 that U.S. Africa Command had not  established a foreign-vendor vetting process or vendor vetting cell that  would preemptively identify vendors who support terrorist or other  prohibited organizations. In response, U.S. Africa Command issued an  instruction establishing a vendor vetting program, naming a service as the  lead in establishing the capability and a joint staff intelligence directorate  subdivision to provide support. Under the instruction, the vendor vetting  cell would likely operate in contingency operation environments as well as  in some steady-state environments. Similarly, U.S. Central Command  established a vendor vetting cell to vet non-U.S. vendors in Afghanistan  to minimize the risk of insurgents or criminal groups using contracts to  fund their operations. PACOM headquarters officials, however, stated the  command does not plan to issue vendor vetting guidance in the absence  of overarching DOD guidance on how vendor vetting should be  addressed at a combatant command.
While the establishment of a foreign-vendor vetting cell may not be  appropriate for all operations or circumstances, published DOD guidance  specifying under what circumstances and how a vetting cell should be  established would better position PACOM and other combatant  commands to avoid contracting with the enemy in high-threat areas.  Furthermore, as the recently established working group identifies DOD  entities to be key stakeholders in vendor vetting, including which entity  should have primary responsibility for vendor vetting, PACOM could  consider developing its own vendor vetting guidance as other combatant  commands have done, to prepare for the event that it becomes actively  engaged in hostilities.
section_title: PACOM Established an Interim Organizational Structure to Manage and Oversee OCS, but the Future Organizational Structure Is Focused in the Logistics Directorate
paragraphs: In June 2014, PACOM established an interim organizational structure to  oversee and manage OCS in its area of responsibility. DOD introduced  the concept of an OCS Integration Cell in a 2014 update to Joint  Publication 4-10 as a permanent, full-time cell at the combatant-command  level that can, among other things, provide staff integration by assisting  and advising the directorates of a combatant command on determining  OCS requirements as well as conducting the initial planning for and  coordination of OCS tasks. In PACOM, the role of the OCS Integration  Cell is performed by the OCS Mission Integrator Demonstration—a 3-year  pilot program that began in June 2014 and is scheduled to end in June  2017. The pilot program is designed to establish OCS as an enduring,  warfighting capability that supports implementation of Joint Force 2020.
The intent of the OCS Mission Integrator Demonstration is to establish  OCS as an enduring capability to provide the combatant command,  subordinate unified commands, and service components a central entity  to integrate OCS across joint functions—in effect, to operationalize OCS  within PACOM—in steady-state and contingency environments.  Specifically, the PACOM OCS Mission Integrator Demonstration has  three primary purposes: establish a capability to address current PACOM gaps regarding the  ability to plan and integrate OCS into operations and training;  contribute to the department’s mandate to improve acquisition  processes through training and continuous improvement in the  qualifications and experience both of the acquisition workforce and of  nonacquisition personnel; and  inform OCS force development across DOD.
PACOM officials provided examples of how the OCS Mission Integrator  Demonstration has enhanced OCS capabilities at PACOM through  training in Joint Operational Contract Support Planning and Execution  Courses at PACOM, and the integration of key OCS features or practices  into four major exercises, including the OCS Joint Exercise 2015,  Talisman Sabre, Pacific Sentry, and Keen Edge. See appendix II for  additional details on the integration of OCS into these exercises.
The OCS Mission Integrator Demonstration team comprises military  personnel assigned to PACOM, two Joint Contingency Acquisition  Support Office (JCASO) civilian planners, and six contractor personnel.  These personnel are all located in PACOM’s J4 logistics directorate and  the logistics directorates in three of PACOM’s service component  commands, although the distribution has varied during the 3 years of the  experiment. Officials stated that this horizontal and vertical integration— horizontally across the PACOM logistics directorate and vertically down to  the logistics directorates within the service components—will remain in  place through 2017, and acknowledged it has both advantages and  disadvantages. For example, PACOM officials stated that maintaining a  separate OCS branch within the logistics directorate simplifies  assignment tasking, but makes it more difficult to embrace OCS outside  of the designated OCS billets.
DOD, Joint Staff, and PACOM guidance indicate the important role  directorates beyond logistics should play as stakeholders in OCS. As  described by Joint Publication 4-10, an OCS Integration Cell leads the  OCS planning and integration efforts across multiple staff sections,  helping to ensure OCS is fully embedded and integrated throughout the  command structure, as depicted in figure 2 below.
In October 2016, DOD issued Command and Staff Guide to Operational  Contract Support, which identifies key OCS questions a commander  should ensure staff across multiple directorates can answer. For  example:  J1 personnel directorate: How many DOD contractors are in the  operational area? What is the breakdown of contractor personnel with  respect to U.S. citizens, third-country nationals, and local nationals?
J2 intelligence directorate: How are vendors being vetted? How are  the vetting results communicated within DOD and among U.S.  government agencies?
J3 operations directorate: How is the command measuring the  operational impacts of contracts? What is our process for determining  base access?
Further, joint doctrine identifies a key OCS principle that states that  contracted support is not restricted to logistics support, but may include  significant nonlogistic support as well. Joint doctrine also notes that close  coordination between all primary and special staff members is required to  ensure OCS planning balances effectiveness with efficiency and risk  while seeking to attain the commander’s strategic end state. The Joint  Staff is in the process of developing an OCS planning manual that,  according to officials, would encourage OCS integration with all staff  directorates at a combatant command. Specifically, officials stated the  manual will discuss ways in which a command can ensure OCS equities  are being considered from all directorates, including hosting OCS  Integration Cell meetings open to all command staff. However, as of  February 2017, this manual had not been issued.
PACOM guidance also recognizes the important role directorates beyond  logistics should play as stakeholders in OCS. Specifically, PACOM’s OCS  guidance identifies recommended planning considerations for command  directorates, including nonlogistics directorates, with respect to OCS  within the command’s area of responsibility in preparation for a  contingency operation. For example:  J1 Manpower and Personnel Directorate is to provide status reports  (through SPOT) to DOD on contractors authorized to accompany the  force and to develop contractor reception policies and procedures in  coordination with the J3 Operations Directorate.
J2 Intelligence Directorate is to conduct intelligence-specific activities  associated with data reported in SPOT, as required.
J3 Operations Directorate is to integrate SPOT data into Anti- Terrorism Force Protection networks.
J5 Strategic Planning and Policy Directorate is to provide awareness  on joint planning tools in regard to generating OCS requirements and  identifying capability gaps.
While each of these directorates has OCS responsibilities as outlined  above, they did not have representation in the OCS Mission Integrator  Demonstration. PACOM officials acknowledged that maintaining its OCS  Integration Cell within the logistics directorate complicates assignment  tasking outside of that directorate and reinforces the view of OCS as a  separate function, making it difficult to integrate OCS efforts in other  directorates. In addition, PACOM service component officials told us that  the OCS Mission Integrator Demonstration might have been more  effective if it integrated individuals from all joint staff functions, including  other directorates beyond logistics. Officials from one component told us  they thought a key purpose of the OCS Mission Integrator Demonstration  was to engage all staff directorates in OCS issues and integrate OCS  across all joint functions to best optimize total force capability, which may  not have been optimally met by placing the pilot program within the  logistics directorate.
PACOM has not determined the size and organizational structure of an  entity managing OCS following the conclusion of the pilot in June 2017.  PACOM officials told us the future OCS capability, at a minimum, will  consist of one military officer and the two civilian embedded planners  from JCASO and will remain within the logistics directorate.
We have previously reported that because DOD doctrine recognizes that  OCS is more than just logistical support, it is important that a significant  culture change occur, one that emphasizes OCS throughout all aspects of  the department, including planning, training, and personnel requirements.  Moreover, as we reported in 2013, DOD has faced challenges integrating  OCS in functional areas beyond logistics. For example, we determined  that combatant commands and their components were not planning for  the potential use of contractors in areas where they may be needed  beyond logistics such as communications. Additionally, we reported that  OCS planners embedded in a combatant command do not typically focus  on OCS matters in areas beyond logistics, leaving DOD at risk of being  unprepared to plan and manage deployed contractor personnel across  functional areas and provide the necessary oversight during future  operations. By considering ways to integrate individuals from all joint staff  functions beyond the logistics area into its enduring OCS organizational  structure, PACOM may be better positioned to build upon the progress  made during the OCS Mission Integrator Demonstration and more  effectively integrate OCS across the command.
section_title: PACOM Has Integrated OCS Annexes into Operational and Concept Plans, but the Information Lacks Details on Contractor Management and Support Estimates
paragraphs: PACOM has integrated OCS into 6 of its 11 operational, concept, and  campaign plans for potential contingencies by developing OCS  annexes—known as Annex Ws— that are required by DOD guidance for  certain plans, but the annexes lack details on contractor management  and support estimates in required appendixes. PACOM planners from  the OCS Mission Integrator Demonstration as well as the plans  directorate worked with logistics directorate officials at PACOM  headquarters, the service component commands, and subordinate unified  commands to develop the annexes. PACOM officials noted that although  the 5 remaining plans do not require the annex, they will update them with  Annex Ws as planning cycles dictate and resources allow, and noted that  personnel will have to prioritize planning efforts when the OCS Mission  Integrator Demonstration pilot program ends in June 2017, as previously  discussed.
According to joint doctrine, an Annex W is the primary means used by  combatant command staff, subordinate staff, service components, and  other organizations to document OCS in operation plans. DOD  Instruction 3020.41 directs combatant commanders to include an Annex  W in operation plans and in concept plans with time-phased force and  deployment data. Additionally, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  Manual 3130.03 identifies the key components of an Annex W, including  a description of key OCS-related planning assumptions and limiting  factors, key tasks for subordinate units, and commercial sourcing for  nonlogistics support such as intelligence and communications, as well as  logistics support such as commodities, base life support, and common  equipment maintenance. PACOM’s annexes generally include these  elements, such as assumptions about the number and types of services  that may require contract support (e.g., bottled water, base life support,  construction, and maintenance).
However, we determined that PACOM Annex Ws lacked detailed  information in appendixes required by guidance. Specifically, Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3130.03 identifies the key components of  an Annex W, including three appendixes. For example, these  appendixes should include a
Summary of Contracting Capabilities and Capacities Support  Estimate, which identifies the estimated numbers of support personnel  for each assigned unit, designated locations, and key contracting  organizations;
Contractor Management Plan, which focuses on contractor personnel  and equipment tasks, to include contractor personnel accountability,  as well as government-furnished support and equipment; and
Summary of Contractor Support Estimate, which includes estimates of  the number of contractors authorized to accompany the force by  operational phase and capability area.
We found PACOM’s Annex Ws do not have precise information in their  Summary of Contracting Capabilities and Capacities Support Estimate,  Contractor Management Plans, and Summary of Contractor Support  Estimate appendixes. While the details of these annexes are classified, in  general the appendixes did not always include the estimated number of  support personnel or key contracting organizations. Additionally, some of  the appendixes did not include the number of contractors authorized to  accompany the force by operational phase and capability area.
PACOM officials stated that they face several challenges with regard to  including this detail in appendixes. For example, PACOM headquarters  and service component officials identified challenges related to planning  cycles and the tendency of operational planners to review only the  annexes that pertain to their own issue areas. Additionally, officials stated  that other challenges hinder requirements development, which is a  necessary step to developing the needed details for Annex W  appendixes. For example, requirements development can be hindered by  limited access to the operational environment in order to conduct site  surveys, as well as dependence on host nations to support site surveys.  Officials also stated that lack of visibility into details regarding the  capabilities that will be available during a contingency makes it difficult to  develop detailed requirements.
Despite these limitations, progress has been made by selected PACOM  subordinate commands regarding requirements development. For  example, officials from III Marine Expeditionary Force stated that they are  working to address this concern through the development of a Marine  Requirements and Resourcing Review Board. According to officials, this  board will focus not just on requirements, but also on the resources that  will be needed to obtain them. The board reviews all contracts for III  Marine Expeditionary Force, validates the resourcing for those contracts,  prioritizes the current and future requirements in relation to the resources,  and makes recommendations to the Deputy Commanding General.  Because the board validates not just the requirement but also the  resources available to fulfill that requirement, officials stated that it should  help to obtain information that could be useful in Annex Ws and their  accompanying appendixes.
PACOM officials acknowledged the need to address these challenges  and conducted a series of five OCS planning working groups from  November 2016 to January 2017 to discuss the development of OCS  requirements in support of planning efforts. Additionally, OCS working  groups housed within the logistics directorate have been integrated into  PACOM’s daily planning activities in order to ensure that OCS equities  are considered within the command’s activities. The establishment of  working groups and incorporation of OCS equities into the command’s  regular planning activities demonstrate progress in improving the  development of OCS requirements. However, a lack of clarity continues  to exist with respect to the roles and responsibilities associated with  headquarters and service component officials and the level of detail  needed in the development of Annex Ws and their appendixes.  Specifically, PACOM officials stated that this information is not included in  the completed Annex W appendixes that PACOM expects the  requirements generators within the service components to provide.  However, service component and subordinate unified command officials  stated that they need additional guidance from PACOM or their service  headquarters to determine the level of detail that is needed.
Combatant commanders have discretion regarding the amount of detail  needed in the relevant annexes and their appendixes both at the  combatant command and subordinate levels. However, service  component officials stated that additional direction or an established  mechanism for communication from PACOM headquarters or their  service headquarters could help to clarify the level of detail needed to  enhance the usefulness of the Annex Ws and their accompanying  appendixes. Also, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government states that management should assign responsibility and  delegate authority to achieve the entity’s objectives, including determining  the level of authority that should be delegated to key roles. Without  guidance that clarifies roles and responsibilities as well as the process for  requirements development to inform the development of Annex Ws and  their appendixes, the annexes will continue to lack important details that  are needed to determine OCS requirements and adequately plan for  future operations.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: While PACOM has taken steps to manage and oversee OCS, challenges  remain in areas such as accounting for the total number of contractor  personnel, vendor vetting, the enduring OCS organizational structure, and  OCS requirements-development planning for incorporation into  operational plans. PACOM’s November 2016 personnel accountability  guidance demonstrates progress toward addressing the collection of  contractor personnel data, but it does not specifically account for third- country nationals and local nationals or specify a system of record to be  used for all contractor personnel in steady-state environments.  Additionally, DOD accountability guidance on the types of contractor  personnel to account for in steady-state environments remains unclear.  PACOM also has not established a foreign-vendor vetting process to  preemptively identify vendors that support criminal, terrorist, or other  sanctioned organizations due in part to a lack of DOD guidance  specifying under what conditions a vendor vetting process or cell should  be established. Additionally, without updated guidance that integrates  individuals from directorates beyond logistics into the OCS Integration  Cell, PACOM may lose some of the ground gained during the OCS  Mission Integrator Demonstration. Finally, PACOM has made progress in  developing OCS annexes to plans, but those annexes do not include  precise and important details on contractor management. OCS is a critical  force multiplier that supports U.S. military forces in the region when they  respond rapidly to crises, such as threats including North Korea.  PACOM’s readiness is evaluated against its ability to execute operational  and contingency plans, which place a premium on forward-stationed,  ready forces that can exercise, train, and operate with our partner nations’  militaries, and on follow-on forces, including contractor support, to be able  to respond to operational contingencies.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following six  actions:  To enable the department to enhance its visibility over contractor  personnel for whom it may become responsible in the event of  contingency and other applicable operations, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff, update accountability guidance clarifying the types of  contractor personnel that are to be accounted for in a steady-state  environment.
To enable PACOM to consistently account for contractor personnel in its  area of responsibility, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  the PACOM Commander to clarify contractor personnel accountability  guidance for the collection of all contractor personnel data in a steady- state environment and specify a system of record, such as SPOT, for the  collection of this information.
To ensure that combatant commands are not contracting with entities that  may be connected to or supporting prohibited organizations, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop and issue guidance that  clarifies the foreign-vendor vetting steps or process that should be  established at each combatant command, including the operational  conditions under which a foreign-vendor vetting cell should be  established.
To ensure that PACOM is not contracting with entities that may be  connected to or supporting prohibited organizations, we recommend that,  while awaiting DOD guidance on vendor vetting, the Secretary of Defense  direct the PACOM commander to consider developing vendor vetting  guidance as other combatant commands have done, to prepare for the  event that PACOM becomes actively engaged in hostilities.
To enable OCS to be fully embedded in the command structure at the  command and continue to build upon the progress of integrating OCS into  the command, we recommend that as PACOM updates OCS guidance,  the Secretary of Defense direct the PACOM Commander to consider  ways to ensure all joint staff functions beyond the logistics area are fully  integrated into its OCS organizational structure and OCS Integration Cell.
To enable PACOM to better identify OCS requirements and incorporate  those requirements into Annex Ws and their appendixes, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense direct the PACOM Commander to develop  guidance that clarifies roles and responsibilities and the process that  should be followed for OCS requirements development.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD and PACOM concurred  with two recommendations and partially concurred with four  recommendations. Comments from DOD and PACOM are summarized  below and reprinted in appendix III. DOD and PACOM also provided  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
DOD concurred with the first recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  update accountability guidance clarifying the types of contractor  personnel that are to be accounted for in a steady state environment. In  its response, DOD stated that DOD Instruction 3020.41, Operational  Contract Support, is being updated, and will include guidance on the  types of contractor personnel that are to be accounted for in Phase 0  operations, when directed by the combatant commander or joint task  force commander, using SPOT. The department will also update  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.13C, Joint Personnel  Reporting Structure—Personnel Manual, to clarify the types of contractor  personnel that are to the accounted for, based on the updates to DOD  Instruction 3020.41. We agree that these guidance updates, when  completed and issued as stated, would meet the intent of the  recommendation.
DOD partially concurred with the second recommendation that the  PACOM Commander clarify contractor personnel accountability guidance  for the collection of all contractor personnel data during a steady state  environment and specify a system of record, such as SPOT, for the  collection of this information. In its response, PACOM stated that the  accountability instruction issued in November 2016, referenced earlier in  this report, prescribes guidance for the reporting of DOD-affiliated  personnel, to include contractors, in crisis, contingency, and steady state  operations using the Joint Personnel Status Report as the system of  record. Additionally, PACOM noted that it is conducting a feasibility  assessment of implementing SPOT in Phase 0 operations in three  countries where the majority of contractors currently work, and will  conduct a review of its accountability instruction to further clarify  contractor accountability and visibility guidance. We agree that the review  of accountability guidance and the feasibility assessment would be  beneficial in further clarifying contractor accountability and visibility  guidance. As we discuss in the report, in the absence of clear  accountability guidance from DOD, PACOM has used multiple  mechanisms for contractor personnel accountability, which has resulted in  inconsistent reporting. Additionally, PACOM’s accountability guidance  issued in November 2016 is limited in that it excludes foreign-national  contractor personnel. This recommendation was intended to provide  PACOM with the flexibility to identify a system of record in its  accountability guidance for the collection of contractor personnel  accountability information in a steady-state or Phase 0 environment so  that PACOM could utilize a single mechanism for contractor personnel  accountability. Without updated guidance to clarify what types of  contractor personnel are to be accounted for in Phase 0 operations, as  well as the identification of a system of record for contractor personnel  accountability information, PACOM may not have a comprehensive and  consistent accounting of contractor personnel in its area of responsibility,  which could potentially limit PACOM’s visibility over contractor personnel  for whom it may be responsible in the event of a contingency operation or  an emergency.
DOD partially concurred with the third recommendation that the Secretary  of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  develop and issue guidance that clarifies the foreign vendor vetting steps  or process that should be established at each combatant command,  including the operational conditions under which a foreign vendor vetting  cell should be established. DOD agreed that it needs to develop and  issue overarching guidance. As a result, DOD noted that, in October  2016, OSD and Joint Staff established a quarterly working group to  develop a framework for intelligence-based vendor threat mitigation— vendor vetting—objectives across DOD. The working group identified  three major objectives for DOD, including providing an overarching  framework, identifying a DOD lead for program policy and oversight, and  improving information sharing across DOD and other federal agencies.  DOD indicated that an office within OSD, as part of the working group,  has incorporated inputs through a draft directive type memorandum that  will provide guidelines to meet the objectives while ensuring combatant  commands retain the flexibility needed to tailor vetting programs to meet  their specific theater and mission needs. However, DOD noted that under  section 164 of Title 10, U.S. Code, combatant commanders have the  authority to organize commands and forces as necessary to carry out  missions. We agree with DOD’s assessment, and as we discuss in the  report, the establishment of a foreign-vendor vetting cell may not be  appropriate for all operations or circumstances. However, publishing  guidance for the combatant commanders to consider in their decision and  approach to establishing a foreign vendor cell would provide important  information to guide their efforts. Therefore, we continue to believe that  publishing DOD guidance identifying relevant operational conditions and  how a vetting cell should be established would better position PACOM  and other combatant commands to avoid contracting with the enemy in  high-threat areas.
DOD concurred with the fourth recommendation that while awaiting DOD  guidance on vendor vetting, the PACOM commander consider developing  vendor vetting guidance as other combatant commands have done in the  event that they become actively engaged in hostilities. In its response,  PACOM stated that they have begun gathering facts and best practices  regarding vendor vetting, and in the absence of DOD guidance, both the  process and echelon at which vetting should occur deserves additional  study and refinement. PACOM also stated that implementation of vendor  vetting will be dependent on resource availability and priority, and ability  to leverage the capabilities and accesses of a broader community of  concern. We agree that PACOM’s further study and refinement of vendor  vetting processes in its geographic area of responsibility would be  beneficial in the absence of DOD vendor vetting guidance, and would  meet the intent of the recommendation.
DOD partially concurred with the fifth recommendation for the PACOM  Commander to consider ways to ensure all joint staff functions beyond  the logistics area are fully integrated into its OCS organizational structure  and OCS Integration Cell. In its response, PACOM stated that it will  continue the ongoing process of publishing an updated OCS instruction,  as we discussed in the report, including specific primary and special staff  responsibilities related to OCS. However, PACOM stated that it integrates  staff with the OCS Integration Cell through its established process for  daily activities, including an OCS working group, but does not plan to  physically integrate other staff members into the OCS Integration Cell.  PACOM noted that it routinely integrates OCS with the greater staff by  inviting representatives to the established OCS working group, based on  agenda items, attending routine activities hosted by other staff  directorates, and hosting an internal OCS working group with  headquarters staff. We noted a number of these actions in the report and  agree that they are beneficial to the integration of OCS throughout the  staff directorates. Additionally, we recognize that Joint Publication 4-10  does not specifically call for representation from all staff within the OCS  Integration Cell itself, and notes only that the OCSIC should be made up  of a mixture of specially trained personnel with operational-level logistics  and contingency contracting experience, as DOD states in its comments.  However, as also noted in our report, PACOM officials stated that  maintaining its OCS Integration Cell within the logistics directorate  complicates assignment tasking outside of that directorate and reinforces  the view of OCS as a separate function, making it difficult to integrate  OCS efforts in other directorates. In addition, PACOM service component  officials told us that the OCS Mission Integrator Demonstration might  have been more effective if it integrated individuals from all joint staff  functions, including other directorates beyond logistics. Accordingly, we  continue to believe that PACOM should consider additional ways to  ensure all joint staff functions beyond the logistics area are fully  integrated into its OCS organizational structure and OCS Integration Cell.
DOD partially concurred with the sixth recommendation for the PACOM  Commander to develop guidance that clarifies roles and responsibilities  and the process that should be followed for OCS requirements  development. In its response, PACOM stated that its requirements  determination in support of planning requires improvement, but that its  guidance is clear. Specifically, PACOM stated that existing published  guidance from the Joint Staff logistics directorate and PACOM logistics  directorate is clear and concise, and identifies the roles and  responsibilities of the command and subordinate units regarding planning  and the process of determining requirements. PACOM agreed that a  need exists to emphasize existing guidance to subordinate commands in  order to assist them in developing and documenting requirements.
Emphasizing existing guidance is a good first step in improving the  requirements development and documentation process. However, as  discussed in the report, PACOM officials also stated that some key details  are not included in the completed Annex W appendixes, which the  command expects requirements generators within the service  components to provide. Service component officials stated that additional  direction or an established mechanism for communication from PACOM  headquarters or their service headquarters could help to clarify the level  of detail needed to enhance the usefulness of the Annex Ws and their  accompanying appendixes. We continue to believe that until PACOM  addresses this issue, annexes could continue to lack important details  that are needed to determine OCS requirements and adequately plan for  future operations.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff, and the PACOM Commander. The report will also be available at  no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of the final report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of our review were to determine the extent to which U.S.  Pacific Command (PACOM) has: (1) accounted for contractor personnel  and has a process to vet foreign vendors in its area of responsibility; (2)  an organizational structure to manage and oversee operational contract  support (OCS); and (3) integrated OCS into key planning documents. The  focus of this review was on PACOM and its subordinate service  components and subordinate unified commands, including U.S. Army  Pacific; U.S. Pacific Air Forces; U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific (inclusive of  III Marine Expeditionary Force on the Japanese island of Okinawa); the  U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S. Forces Japan; and, U.S. Forces Korea. Further, in  terms of our review of PACOM contractor personnel accountability and  contractor vetting, our scope included only contract support in the  PACOM area of responsibility, excluding contract support located at  PACOM headquarters.
To determine the extent to which PACOM accounts for contractor  personnel, we reviewed the Department of Defense (DOD), PACOM, and  Joint Staff personnel accountability guidance and interviewed PACOM,  service component, and subordinate unified command J1 personnel- directorate officials. We additionally requested, received, and reviewed  Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) data as of  September 30, 2016, from the SPOT Program Management Office to  determine the number of contractor personnel captured in SPOT for the  PACOM area of responsibility. We conducted a data-reliability analysis of  this information, including the transmittal of a data-accuracy and - completeness questionnaire to the SPOT Program Management Office.  On the basis of the SPOT Program Management Office’s responses to  the team’s data-reliability questionnaire and our prior reporting on SPOT,  we determined the data are reliable for the purposes of identifying a  “rough order of magnitude” in regard to the number of contractor  personnel in the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility as of  September 30, 2016. We compared these data to DOD and PACOM  guidance regarding personnel accountability processes and reporting,  including for contractor personnel.
To determine the extent to which PACOM has a process to vet  contractors and contractor employees, we reviewed DOD, Joint Staff, and  combatant command guidance on OCS and compared them to data  collected in interviews with PACOM, service component, and subordinate  unified command intelligence-directorate officials and other staff  stakeholders. We additionally reviewed DOD OCS and acquisition  guidance, DOD OCS action plans, U.S. Africa Command guidance, and a  draft Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) memorandum.
To determine the extent to which PACOM has an organizational structure  in place to manage and oversee OCS, we gathered information from and  conducted interviews with officials at PACOM, service components, and  subunified command headquarters, and compared it to DOD, PACOM,  Joint Staff, and multiservice OCS guidance we reviewed that identifies  roles and responsibilities for multiple directorates outside the logistics  area with OCS equities. Additionally, we reviewed OCS Mission Integrator  Demonstration documentation, including annual progress reports,  combatant command briefing documents, combatant command after- action reports for theater exercises; and Joint Operational Planning and  Execution Course documentation.
To determine the extent to which PACOM has integrated OCS into key  planning documents, we gathered information from and conducted  interviews with officials at PACOM, service components, and subunified  command headquarters. We reviewed and analyzed the OCS annexes— Annex Ws—to PACOM’s theater campaign plan and operation plans to  determine the extent to which they included key OCS concepts outlined in  DOD and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance, including  whether they contained key details in annex appendixes related to  contractor management plans, summaries of contractor support  estimates, and summaries of contracting capabilities and capacities  support estimates. To complete this review, we first identified and created  a checklist of Annex W elements as specified in Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff guidance regarding operation plan formats. Then each of  the three team members reviewed each Annex W and recorded whether  the annex featured the specified information. We additionally analyzed  the level of detail provided in the annex for each element. We then  aggregated the observations completed for each annex, and the team  members collectively identified generalizable trends regarding the extent  to which the reviewed Annex Ws featured OCS concepts. The details of  this analysis are classified.
U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)
PACOM Headquarters, Honolulu, Hawaii
PACOM J1 (Personnel) Directorate, Honolulu, Hawaii
PACOM J2 (Intelligence) Directorate, Honolulu, Hawaii
PACOM J3 (Operations) Directorate, Honolulu, Hawaii
PACOM J4 (Logistics) Directorate, Honolulu, Hawaii
PACOM OCS Mission Integrator Demonstration, Honolulu, Hawaii
U.S. Forces Japan Headquarters, Yokota Air Base, Japan
U.S. Army Garrison, Camp Zama, Japan
U.S. Forces Korea Headquarters, Seoul, South Korea
411th Contract Support Brigade, Seoul, South Korea  Department of the Air Force
Department of the Air Force, Arlington, Virginia
U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Honolulu, Hawaii
U.S. Air Force A1 (Personnel), Honolulu, Hawaii
U.S. Air Force A2 (Intelligence), Honolulu, Hawaii
U.S. Air Force A3 (Operations), Honolulu, Hawaii
U.S. Air Force A4 (Logistics), Honolulu, Hawaii
374th Contracting Squadron U.S. Air Force Japan, Yokota Air  Base, Japan
Department of the Army, Arlington, Virginia
U.S. Army Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii
U.S. Army Pacific G1 (Personnel), Honolulu, Hawaii
U.S. Army Pacific G2 (Intelligence), Honolulu, Hawaii
U.S. Army Pacific G3 (Operations), Honolulu, Hawaii
U.S. Army Pacific G4 (Logistics), Honolulu, Hawaii
413th Contracting Support Brigade, Honolulu, Hawaii
Department of the Navy, Arlington, Virginia
U.S. Commander, Pacific Fleet, Honolulu, Hawaii
U.S. Commander, Pacific Fleet N1 (Personnel), Honolulu, Hawaii
U.S. Commander, Pacific Fleet N2 (Intelligence), Honolulu, Hawaii
U.S. Commander, Pacific Fleet N3 (Operations), Honolulu, Hawaii
U.S. Commander, Pacific Fleet N4 (Logistics), Honolulu, Hawaii
Naval Facilities Command Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Arlington, Virginia
U.S. Marine Corps Pacific Forces, Honolulu, Hawaii
U.S. Marine Corps Pacific Forces G-1 (Personnel) Directorate,
U.S. Marine Corps Pacific Forces G-2 (Intelligence) Directorate,
U.S. Marine Corps Pacific Forces G-3 (Operations) Directorate,
U.S. Marine Corps Pacific Forces G-4 (Logistics) Directorate,  III Marine Expeditionary Force, Okinawa, Japan  III Marine Expeditionary Force G-1 (Personnel) Directorate,  Okinawa, Japan  III Marine Expeditionary Force G-2 (Intelligence) Directorate,  Okinawa, Japan  III Marine Expeditionary Force G-3 (Operations) Directorate,  Okinawa, Japan  III Marine Expeditionary Force G-4 (Logistics) Directorate,  Okinawa, Japan  We conducted this performance audit from December 2015 to June 2017  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Operational Contract Support Features and Practices Included in U.S. Pacific Command Exercises
paragraphs: Operational Contract Support (OCS) Mission Integrator Demonstration  personnel developed numerous OCS-related features or practices that  were incorporated into at least one of the four major exercises at various  U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) command levels. Table 1 below  provides additional details on the integration of OCS into these exercises.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, James A. Reynolds, Assistant  Director; Courtney Reid-Bond, Analyst in Charge; Vijay Barnabas;  Ricardo Marquez; Richard Powelson; Michael Shaughnessy; Mike Silver;  Amie Lesser; and Cheryl Weissman made contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Operational Contract Support: Additional Actions Needed to Manage,  Account for, and Vet Defense Contractors in Africa. GAO-16-105.  Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2015.
Operational Contract Support: Actions Needed to Enhance the Collection,  Integration, and Sharing of Lessons Learned. GAO-15-243. Washington,  D.C.: March 16, 2015.
Contingency Contracting: Contractor Personnel Tracking System Needs  Better Plans and Guidance. GAO-15-250. Washington, D.C.: February  18, 2015.
High Risk Series: An Update. GAO-15-290. Washington, D.C.: February  11, 2015.
Defense Acquisitions: Update on DOD’s Efforts to Implement a Common  Contractor Manpower Data System. GAO-14-491R. Washington, D.C.:  May 19, 2014.
Warfighter Support: DOD Needs Additional Steps to Fully Integrate  Operational Contract Support into Contingency Planning. GAO-13-212.  Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2013.
Operational Contract Support: Management and Oversight Improvements  Needed in Afghanistan. GAO-12-290. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2012.
Afghanistan: U.S. Efforts to Vet Non-U.S. Vendors Need Improvement.  GAO-11-355. Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2011.
Warfighter Support: Cultural Change Needed to Improve How DOD Plans  for and Manages Operational Contract Support. GAO-10-829T.  Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2010.
Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using  Contractors to Support Future Military Operations. GAO-10-472.  Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Contingency Contract Management: DOD Needs to Develop and Finalize  Background Screening and Other Standards for Private Security  Contractors. GAO-09-351. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2009.
Military Operations: DOD Needs to Address Contract Oversight and  Quality Assurance Issues for Contracts Used to Support Contingency  Operations. GAO-08-1087. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2008.
Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long- standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors  Supporting Deployed Forces. GAO-07-145. Washington, D.C.: December  18, 2006.
Military Operations: Background Screenings of Contractor Employees  Supporting Deployed Forces May Lack Critical Information, but U.S.  Forces Take Steps to Mitigate the Risk Contractors May Pose.  GAO-06-999R. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2006.