FBI Transformation: Data Inconclusive on Effects of Shift to Counterterrorism-Related Priorities on Traditional Crime Enforcement
Published: 2004-08-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: As a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has committed to a transformation to increase its focus on national security. The FBI has shifted agent resources to its top priorities of counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime. Some of these agent resources were shifted away from drug, white-collar, and violent crime enforcement programs. The FBI's drug program has sustained, by far, the largest reduction in FBI agent workforce--about 550 positions, or more than 80 percent of the nonsupervisory field agents who were permanently reprogrammed. In addition, the FBI has had a continuing need to temporarily redirect agents from drug, white-collar, and violent crime enforcement to address counterterrorism-related workload demands. While GAO and other organizations have focused considerable attention on the progress of the FBI's transformation, this report addresses questions about the extent to which the shift in resources has affected federal efforts to combat drug, white-collar, and violent crime and whether other agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the drug enforcement area, are filling gaps created by FBI resource shifts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The data GAO examined are inconclusive about the effect of the shifts in the FBI's priorities after September 11 on federal efforts to combat drug, white-collar, and violent crime. Indicators are mixed on the effect of the FBI shift on federal drug, white-collar, and violent crime enforcement. Further, GAO's analyses should be cautiously viewed as short-term indicators that are not necessarily indicative of long-term trends. Data GAO examined on federal drug enforcement efforts did not show a conclusive effect of the FBI's shift in agent resources to priority areas. GAO found that combined FBI and DEA nonsupervisory field agent resources decreased by about 10 percent since September 11 but that DEA is expecting significant increases in positions over the next 2 fiscal years. The combined number of newly opened FBI and DEA drug matters has declined by about 10 percent since 2001, from 22,736 matters in fiscal year 2001, which ended just after September 11, to 20,387 matters in fiscal year 2003. This decline may be attributed, at least in part, to an increased emphasis on cases targeting major drug organizations rather than to fewer investigative resources. In addition, referrals of drug matters to U.S. Attorneys from all federal sources decreased about 2 percent. Similarly, data do not show a conclusive impact on federal efforts to combat white-collar and violent crime resulting from the FBI's shift in priorities. For example, while the number of white-collar crime referrals from federal agencies to U.S. Attorneys declined by about 6 percent, from 12,792 in fiscal year 2001 to 12,057 in fiscal year 2003, violent crime referrals from all federal sources have increased by about 29 percent, from 14,546 in fiscal year 2001 to 18,723 in fiscal year 2003. Views of law enforcement practitioners GAO interviewed were mixed on the effect of the FBI's shift in resources on drug, white-collar, and violent crime enforcement efforts. Although these views are not representative of all practitioners, some did not think the FBI's shift had a significant impact on these crime enforcement efforts in their communities, while others said that drug, white-collar and violent-crime investigations had suffered.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has the dual mission of  protecting national security and combating traditional crimes such as  drug, white-collar, and violent crime. As a result of the September 11,   2001, terrorist attacks, the FBI committed to transforming itself to  strengthen its ability to combat terrorism. One of the goals of the FBI’s  transformation efforts was to shift its investigative resources to increase  its focus on its national security mission.
As we have previously reported, the FBI’s recent focus on its top priorities  of counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime has required a  continuous shift in resources away from drug, white-collar, and violent  crime enforcement, despite additional appropriations to hire special  agents in priority areas. Drug enforcement has sustained, by far, the  largest reduction in FBI agent workforce.
While GAO and other organizations, for example, the Congressional  Research Service (CRS) and the National Academy of Public  Administration, have focused considerable attention on the progress of the  FBI’s transformation efforts, we have also had questions about the extent  to which the shift in resources has affected federal efforts to combat  traditional crimes that were a significant portion of the FBI’s caseload  before the terrorist attacks. Questions have been raised about the effect, if  any, that the FBI’s shift in resources into priority areas may have had on  the enforcement of drug, white-collar, and violent crimes and whether  other federal agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Administration  (DEA) in the drug enforcement area, are filling gaps created as a result of  the FBI resource shift.
To assist with its oversight responsibilities, the House Appropriations  Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary and Related  Agencies has requested that we study the effects FBI’s shift to its new  priorities has had on enforcement of selected traditional crimes. To assess  overall impacts of the FBI’s shift in resources, this report examines the  following issues: (1) How has FBI’s shift in agent resources since  September 11 affected federal efforts to combat drug crime? (2) How has  FBI’s shift in priorities affected federal efforts to combat white-collar and  violent crime?
To examine the effect of FBI’s post-September 11 shift in resources to  national security priorities on federal efforts to combat domestic drug  crime, we analyzed data related to (1) the combined nonsupervisory field  agent resources devoted to drug enforcement by the FBI and DEA; (2) the  number of newly opened FBI and DEA drug matters; (3) the number of  drug matters referred from all federal agencies to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices  for prosecution. We also conducted semistructured interviews to  determine what impacts, if any, selected headquarters and field law  enforcement officials have observed. To examine the effect of the FBI’s  post-September 11 priority shifts on federal efforts to combat white-collar  and violent crime, we analyzed data indicating the number of such matters  referred to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for prosecution from the FBI and all  other federal agencies. In addition, we included in our semistructured  interview for law enforcement officials questions related to impacts  observed, if any, on violent and white-collar crime caseloads and  enforcement activities. The interviewees, although working in locations  that experienced some of the sharpest reductions in FBI drug program  resources, are not representative of all locations or even of all of those  locations that experienced similar reductions in resources. The data we  analyzed and interviews with law enforcement officials should be  considered as short-term indicators with limitations in their ability to  determine the effect of FBI priority shifts.
Because the reliability of FBI, DEA, and Executive Office for U.S.  Attorneys (EOUSA) information management systems data is significant to  the findings of this review, we also interviewed officials of FBI, DEA, and  EOUSA to determine what steps they take to assess the accuracy of data  elements in these systems and what limitations, if any, they have identified  with the data elements used for our review. We also did a limited  assessment of the reliability of the data systems used for this report, and  we determined that the required data elements are sufficiently reliable for  the purposes of this review.
We performed our work from December 2003 to July 2004 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Our scope and  methodology are discussed in greater detail in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, national security, including  counterterrorism, was a top-tier priority for the FBI. However, this top tier  combined national security responsibilities with other issues, and the  FBI’s focus and priorities were not entirely clear. According to a  Congressional Research Service report, the events of September 11 made  clear the need to develop a definitive list of priorities. In June 2002, the  FBI’s director announced 10 priorities. The top 3 priorities were to   (1) protect the United States from terrorist attack (counterterrorism),   (2) protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and  espionage (counterintelligence), and (3) protect the United States against  cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes (cyber crime). White- collar crime ranked seventh in the priority list, and violent crime ranked  eighth. Drug crimes that were not part of transnational or national  criminal organizations were not specifically among the FBI’s top   10 priorities.
In June 2003 and March 2004, we testified that a key element of the FBI’s  reorganization and successful transformation is the realignment of  resources to better ensure focus on the highest priorities. Since  September 11, the FBI has permanently realigned a substantial number of  its field agents from traditional criminal investigative programs to work on  counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations. The FBI’s staff  reprogrammings carried out since September 11 have permanently shifted  674 field agent positions from the drug, white-collar, and violent crime  program areas to counterterrorism and counterintelligence.  About 550 of  these positions (more than 80 percent of the permanently shifted  positions) came from the FBI’s drug program, with substantially smaller  reductions from the white-collar and violent crime programs. In addition,  the FBI established the cyber program. As figure 1 shows, about   25 percent of the FBI’s field agent positions were allocated to  counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime programs prior to  the FBI’s change in priorities. As a result of the staff reprogrammings and  funding for additional special agent positions received through various  appropriations between 2002 and 2004,  the FBI staffing levels allocated to  the counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber program areas have  increased to about 36 percent and now represent the single largest  concentration of FBI resources. Figure 1 also notes that the number of  nonsupervisory FBI field agent positions has increased from 10,292 in  fiscal year 2002 to 11,021 in fiscal year 2004, about 7 percent.
Additionally, the FBI has had a continuing need to temporarily redirect  special agent resources from other criminal investigative programs to  address counterterrorism and other higher-priority needs. The FBI  continues to redirect agents from drug, white-collar, and violent crime  programs to address the counterterrorism-related workload demands.  These moves are directly in line with the FBI’s priorities and in keeping  with its policy that no counterterrorism leads will go unaddressed. Figure  2 shows that the counterterrorism program continues to rely on resources  that are temporarily redirected from other crime programs. Appendix   II contains figures that show the reductions in FBI nonsupervisory field  agent positions and work years charged to the drug program and, to a  lesser extent, the white-collar and violent crime programs after   September 11.
As one might expect, the reallocation of resources to align with post- September 11 priorities resulted in a significant increase in newly opened  FBI counterterrorism matters, while the number of newly opened FBI  drug, white-collar, and violent crime matters declined between fiscal year  2001 and the third quarter of fiscal year 2004. As shown in figure 3, the  FBI’s newly opened counterterrorism matters increased by about   183 percent, from 1,006 matters in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2001 to  2,850 matters in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2003.
In contrast, the number of newly opened FBI drug matters declined from  1,447 in fiscal year 2001 to 587 in fiscal year 2003—a decrease of about   60 percent. FBI newly opened white-collar and violent crime matters also  remained below pre-September 11 levels, though the decreases have not  been as dramatic as those in the drug crime program. The decreases from  fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2003 were about 32 percent in the number of  newly opened white-collar crime matters and about 40 percent in newly  opened violent crime matters. See appendix III for figures showing the  pre- and post-September 11 changes in the FBI’s newly opened drug,  white-collar, and violent crime matters.
Also, as expected with the significant shift in resources to address national  security priorities, the FBI’s referrals of counterterrorism matters to U.S.  Attorneys’ Offices for prosecution have increased since September 11,  while referrals of drug, white-collar, and violent crime matters have  decreased. In fiscal year 2001, which ended just after September 11, 2001,  the FBI referred 236 counterterrorism matters to U.S. Attorneys for  prosecution. In fiscal year 2003, the FBI referred 1,821 of these matters to  U.S. Attorneys, an increase of about 671 percent. At the same time, FBI  referrals of drug, white-collar, and violent crime matters decreased about  39 percent, 23 percent, and 10 percent respectively.
section_title: No Conclusive Effect on Federal Drug Enforcement Resulting from FBI Agent Resource Shifts because Results Are Mixed and Available Data Have Limitations
paragraphs: We could not conclusively identify an effect on federal drug enforcement  resulting from the FBI’s shift in resources after September 11, because  results of our analyses were mixed and the data we used had limitations.  While the number of FBI nonsupervisory field agents assigned to the drug  program decreased by more than 40 percent after September 11, the  decrease in the number of combined FBI and DEA field agents assigned to  drug work was about 10 percent because the number of DEA field agent  positions increased slightly. Further, DEA, the lead agency for federal drug  enforcement, is continuing to increase its resources as positions  appropriated by Congress in prior fiscal years are filled. The combined  number of newly opened FBI and DEA drug matters has declined by about  10 percent since September 11. However, the combined number of  referrals of drug matters to U.S. Attorneys from all federal sources  decreased about 2 percent. Finally, law enforcement officials from the  FBI, DEA, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, and local police departments that we  interviewed had mixed views on whether the FBI’s shift of resources had  an impact on drug enforcement in their communities. The data we  analyzed and interviews with law enforcement officials should be  considered short-term indicators with some limitations in their ability to  depict the complete impact of FBI priority changes.
subsections: section_title: Combined FBI and DEA Drug Program Agent Resources Have Decreased, but More DEA Positions Are Planned
paragraphs: As figure 4 shows, the combined number of FBI and DEA nonsupervisory  field agent positions has decreased about 10 percent since the terrorist  attacks, from about 4,500 nonsupervisory field agents at the end of fiscal  year 2001 to about 4,000 field agent positions in the second quarter of  fiscal year 2004.  The decrease has not been more pronounced because  DEA, as the nation’s single-mission drug enforcement agency, has devoted  more resources to domestic drug enforcement than has the FBI in both  pre- and post-September 11 periods. As the number of FBI nonsupervisory  field special agents assigned to drug program investigations has decreased  from about 1,400 in fiscal year 2001 to about 800 in fiscal year 2004, the  number of DEA nonsupervisory field agents has increased slightly. These  DEA positions increased from a little less than 3,100 positions in fiscal  year 2001 to a little more than 3,200 positions in the second quarter of  fiscal year 2004.  DEA devoted about twice as many agent resources as  the FBI did to domestic drug enforcement before the terrorist attacks, and  the DEA share of the combined FBI and DEA domestic drug enforcement  agent resources has continued to increase since then.
A Department of Justice official noted that Justice has pursued the goal of  increasing agent strength, and the DEA domestic drug operations chief  said that he expects the number of DEA domestic drug agents to increase  significantly over the next 2 fiscal years, when positions already  appropriated by Congress are filled. According to the chief, DEA expects  to fill 216 new special agent positions appropriated in fiscal year 2003 by  the end of fiscal year 2004. The agency plans to fill 365 additional positions  appropriated in fiscal year 2004 during fiscal year 2005. Thus, in fiscal year  2005, the combined number of FBI and DEA drug enforcement agent  resources should exceed the pre-September 11 workforce strength, and in  fiscal year 2006, the total should continue to increase. In fiscal year   2005, DEA is requesting 111 additional agent positions for domestic  enforcement. The chief said that he has worked with FBI and Department  of Justice officials to determine where to deploy new special agent  positions allocated since September 11 and that DEA has put additional  resources in high-threat areas where the FBI had shifted resources out of  drug enforcement. The chief said that DEA is pacing the hiring of new  agents in an effort to manage its growth so that as new special agents  come on board, DEA has the necessary infrastructure, including office  space, cars, equipment, and training resources, to support them.
In contrast, the chief of the FBI’s drug section said that FBI officials do not  foresee a significant increase in the number of agents assigned to drug  investigations. However, he was not aware of any plans to withdraw  additional agent resources from the drug program.  He also said he was  hopeful that in future years, as the FBI gained experience and resources  for its national security-related priorities, fewer temporary diversions of  special agents from drug work to higher priorities would be necessary. In  addition, a Justice Department official noted that in fiscal year 2004, FBI  received additional agent positions funded under the Organized Crime  Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program, and that additional  OCDETF field positions were requested for the FBI in the 2005 budget.   Since FBI officials do not foresee a significant increase in the number of  special agents deployed to its drug program, if the trends continue, DEA  would have an even larger portion of the combined FBI and DEA domestic  drug program agent resources in the future than it currently has.
section_title: Number of FBI and DEA Newly Opened Drug Matters Decreased About 10 Percent after September 11
paragraphs: Although the number of the FBI’s newly opened drug matters decreased  about 60 percent after September 11, the combined decrease in the  number of FBI and DEA newly opened matters is much smaller—about   10 percent—because DEA has a much larger drug caseload than the FBI.  As shown in Figure 5, the FBI and DEA together opened 22,736 domestic  drug matters in fiscal year 2001, compared with a combined total of   20,387 domestic drug matters in fiscal year 2003. Assuming that the FBI  and DEA open new matters at about the same pace in the last two quarters  of fiscal year 2004 as they did during the first two quarters, fiscal year   2004 levels of newly opened drug crime matters will be similar to those in  fiscal year 2003.
The DEA Chief of Domestic Drug Operations said that he thought the  decrease in the number of newly opened matters was due in part to an  increased Department of Justice emphasis on cases targeting major drug  organizations in its Consolidated Priority Organization Targeting (CPOT)  initiative rather than reduced federal resources for drug enforcement. He  said that the policy has resulted in DEA opening fewer cases but that those  cases have potential to dismantle or disrupt the operations of major drug  cartels.  In commenting on a draft of this report, a Department of Justice  official more broadly stated that the decrease in newly opened drug  matters was due to the Justice strategy, which directs resources on  complex, nationwide investigation of entire drug trafficking networks.   The networks involve major international sources of supply, including  those on the Consolidated Priority Organization Target list.
section_title: Referrals of Drug Crime Matters to U.S. Attorneys from All Investigative Agencies Did Not Change Significantly after September 11
paragraphs: While the FBI’s referrals of drug matters to U.S. Attorneys for prosecution  have decreased about 40 percent, from 2,994 matters to 1,840 matters  between fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2003, DEA referrals increased over  the same period by about 7 percent, from 9,907 matters in fiscal year   2001 to 10,596 matters in fiscal year 2003. Almost half of the total number  of drug matters that were referred to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices came from  federal agencies other than the FBI and DEA in fiscal year 2003. The  number of referrals from all federal agencies and departments other than  the FBI and DEA was almost unchanged over the period, with 9,793  referrals in fiscal year 2001 and 9,816 referrals in fiscal year 2003.
As figure 6 shows, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices received 22,694 drug offense  referrals in fiscal year 2001 and 22,252 drug offense referrals in fiscal year  2003, a decrease of about 2 percent from all federal agencies. The FBI and  DEA referred 12,901 drug matters to U.S. Attorneys in fiscal year 2001 and  12,436 drug matters in fiscal year 2003, a decrease of about 4 percent.
section_title: Law Enforcement Practitioners We Interviewed Valued the FBI’s Role but Had Mixed Views on the Effect of the FBI’s Shift in Resources on Drug Enforcement Efforts
paragraphs: Law enforcement practitioners we interviewed had mixed views about the  impact of the FBI’s shift in resources on drug enforcement efforts. While  many interviewees representing each of the locations and criminal justice  organizations we visited generally described the FBI as a valuable law  enforcement partner, some of them said that they did not think the FBI’s  shift in resources had a significant impact on drug enforcement efforts in  their communities. Other interviewees said that drug investigations have  suffered as a result of the FBI’s shift in resources to new priority areas.  For example, officials from 9 of the 14 law enforcement agencies we  visited said that the FBI did not bring any specialized drug program  expertise that in most cases could not be supplied by other agencies.  However, 7 of the 14 interviewees said that there was a significant impact  on overall drug enforcement efforts in the locations we visited as a result  of the FBI’s shift in resources to new priorities. It is important to keep in  mind that the interviewees, although working in locations that  experienced some of the sharpest reductions in the FBI drug program  resources, are not representative of all locations or even of all of those  locations that experienced similar reductions in resources.
The following are examples of some of the comments we received from  law enforcement practitioners who did not think that the shift in the FBI’s  resources had an impact on drug crime enforcement efforts in their  communities.
On the other hand, some law enforcement officials said that drug  investigations have suffered as a result of the FBI shift in resources to new  priority areas.  The following are several of the other comments from law  enforcement practitioners we interviewed who thought that the FBI’s shift  in resources had affected efforts to combat crime.
The FBI’s shift out of drug enforcement is having an impact in this city. We are  receiving fewer drug referrals from the FBI since September 11, 2001, and,  consequently, we are receiving fewer drug referrals overall. The FBI is the best agency  at understanding the relationship between drugs and violence. —U.S. Attorney’s Office  Criminal Division Chief  Referrals have dropped off since the shift in priorities because there are fewer agents  working in the FBI criminal divisions. The FBI is not working the long-term drug cases  like they did in the past because the bureau cannot afford to keep cases open for a  year or two. —First Assistant U.S. Attorney  The FBI’s shift out of drug work has layered more responsibilities on state and local  police. The organizations are responding by juggling resources, requiring officers to  work more hours, and attempting to work smarter by improving information systems,  using technology, and communicating more effectively with one another. State and  local police agencies are more efficient now than they have ever been. As a result, FBI  involvement is perhaps not as critical as it may have been in the past. —International  Association of Chiefs of Police representative.
section_title: Current Data Should Be Viewed as Short-Term Indicators with Limitations
paragraphs: Our analyses provide perspectives in the short term (less than 3 years) and  are not necessarily indicative of long-term trends. With respect to the  short-term perspective, a U.S. Attorneys’ Office Criminal Division chief  noted that cases can take many years to develop, and the full impact of the  FBI’s shift in priorities may not be apparent for several years. He said that  cases are being referred to his office for prosecution now that began long  before the September 11 attacks.
We also determined that it was too early to assess possible changes in  drug price, purity, use, and availability, as well as any drug-related crime  trends that have occurred since September 11. Key statistical studies that  track the price and purity of illegal drugs and reports on hospital  emergency department drug episodes and drug abuse violations were not  current enough to provide more than a year of trend data after September  11. Data over several more years are needed to determine whether  changes in drug use and availability have occurred, and even when data  are available, it will be very difficult to determine whether changes are  specifically attributable to the FBI’s shift in priorities or to other factors  (such as improved drug prevention programs or new methods of drug  importation).
There are also other limitations to the data we analyzed. It is important to  note that while we looked at numbers of agent resources, matters opened,  and matters referred for prosecution, we could not fully assess the less  tangible factors of the quality of agent resources and investigations and  the complexity of investigations. Neither could we determine what drug  investigations the FBI might have pursued had it had additional drug  program agent resources.
We did ask interviewees their opinions on whether the quality of drug  agent resources and the quality and complexity of drug investigations had  changed since September 11. Some FBI officials said that experienced  agents were lost to the drug program when they were assigned to work in  higher-priority areas and that these agents were unlikely to return to drug  investigations. A top DEA official said that drug investigations are more  complex now than they were prior to September 11. He said that the  reason for the increased complexity is unrelated to counterterrorism  efforts; instead it is the result of a Department of Justice strategy to target  major drug organizations.
section_title: Our Analysis Did Not Identify Conclusive Effect on Federal White-Collar and Violent Crime Enforcement Resulting from FBI Priority Shifts
paragraphs: We did not conclusively identify an effect on federal white-collar and  violent crime enforcement resulting from the FBI’s shift in priorities after  September 11. Our analysis was limited to only the number of these  matters referred to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for prosecution from the FBI  and all other federal agencies and impacts observed by law enforcement  officials we interviewed. Overall, all federal agencies referred about   6 percent fewer white-collar crime matters to U.S. Attorneys—-down from  12,792 matters in fiscal year 2001 to 12,057 matters in fiscal year 2003.  However, violent crime referrals increased about 29 percent during this  period—from 14,546 matters in fiscal year 2001 to 18,723 matters in fiscal  year 2003. Headquarters and field law enforcement officials we  interviewed had mixed views on whether the FBI’s shift of resources had  an effect on white-collar and violent crime enforcement in their  communities. Caveats to the results we reported on impacts of the FBI’s  shift in priorities on drug enforcement apply to white-collar and violent  crime enforcement, as well. The data we analyzed and interviews with law  enforcement officials should be considered as short-term indicators with  limitations in their ability to determine the impact of the FBI priority  shifts.
subsections: section_title: White-Collar Crime Matters Referred to U.S. Attorneys Decreased, while Violent Crime Referrals Increased after September 11
paragraphs: All federal agencies referred about 6 percent fewer white-collar crime  matters to U.S. Attorneys, down from 12,792 matters in fiscal year 2001 to  12,057 matters in fiscal year 2003. However, violent crime referrals  increased about 29 percent during this period, from 14,546 matters in fiscal  year 2001 to 18,723 matters in fiscal year 2003. Figures 7 and 8 show  changes in the number of referrals of white-collar and violent crime  matters to U.S. Attorneys from all federal enforcement agencies since  September 11, 2001.
Of all the federal agencies and departments, the FBI refers the greatest  number of white-collar crime matters to U.S. Attorneys. FBI referrals  decreased about 23 percent, from 6,941 matters in fiscal year 2001 to   5,331 matters in fiscal year 2003. At the same time, referrals by all other  agencies increased by about 15 percent, from 5,851 matters in fiscal year  2001 to 6,726 in fiscal year 2003. Other lead agencies and departments for  referring white-collar crime cases included the Department of Health and  Human Services and the Social Security Administration, with health care  and federal program fraud and other white collar crime referrals; the U.S.  Postal Service, with referrals of tax and bank fraud, and other white-collar  crime matters; the U.S. Secret Service; and the Internal Revenue Service,  with securities and other fraud referrals.
FBI violent crime referrals decreased about 10 percent from 5,003 matters  in fiscal year 2001 to 4,491 matters in fiscal year 2003. However, over the  same period ATF’s violent crime referrals increased from 6,919 to   10,789. Several other agencies and departments, including all of the  military services and the Departments of the Interior and Housing and  Urban Development, also referred violent crime matters to U.S. Attorneys  for prosecution. The Chief of the FBI’s Violent Crime Section noted that  violent crime referrals by all federal agencies have increased because  efforts are under way nationwide to prosecute gang violence. The  Department of Justice is targeting cities nationwide where high murder  and violence rates persist despite an overall reduction in violent crime  rates to the lowest level in 30 years.
section_title: Law Enforcement Practitioners We Interviewed Had Mixed Views on Whether the FBI’s Shift of Resources Had an Impact on White- Collar and Violent Crime Enforcement
paragraphs: Law enforcement officials we interviewed had mixed views on whether  the FBI’s shift of resources had a negative impact on white-collar and  violent crime enforcement in their communities. For example, police and  federal prosecutors in two locations noted that the FBI had continued to  provide necessary resources for critical white-collar and violent crime  concerns, while prosecutors in another location expressed concern that  white-collar crime enforcement was suffering because of the reduced FBI  involvement.
The following are comments we received from the local police supervisors  and officials of several U.S. Attorneys’ Offices who did not think that the  FBI’s shift in resources had an impact on white-collar and violent crime  enforcement efforts in their communities.
The following are two of the other comments from U.S. Attorneys’ Office  and FBI managers and supervisors who thought that the FBI’s shift in  resources had affected efforts to combat white-collar and violent crime.
section_title: Current Data Should Be Viewed as Short-Term Indicators with Limitations
paragraphs: Caveats to the results we reported on impacts of the FBI’s shift in  priorities on drug enforcement apply to indicators of possible impacts on  white-collar and violent crime enforcement as well. The data we analyzed  and interviews with law enforcement officials should be considered as  short-term indicators with limitations in their ability to determine the full  impact of the FBI priority shifts. The data provide perspectives in the short  term of less than 3 years, and they do not consider important factors such  as whether changes have occurred in the quality or complexity of white- collar and violent crime matters being referred from federal law  enforcement agencies to U.S. Attorneys for prosecution. Also, our analysis  does not consider the number and quality of cases that could have been  referred for prosecution by the FBI had additional white-collar and violent  crime program resources been available.
We are providing copies of this report to the Department of Justice and  interested congressional committees We will also make copies available to  others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on  GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Major contributors to this report  are listed in appendix IV.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me on (202) 512-8777 or by email at ekstrandl@gao.gov, or Charles Michael  Johnson, Assistant Director on (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov.   Key contributors to this report are listed in Appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To examine the effect of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) post- September 11 priority shifts on federal efforts to combat domestic drug  crime, we analyzed (1) the impact of resource shifts on the combined FBI  and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) nonsupervisory field special  agent resources devoted to drug enforcement; (2) changes in the number  of newly opened FBI and DEA drug crime matters; (3) changes in the  number of drug crime matters referred from all federal agencies to U.S.  Attorneys’ Offices for prosecution; and (4) impacts, if any, observed by  headquarters and field law enforcement officials we interviewed.
Specifically, to determine changes in the combined level of FBI and DEA  nonsupervisory field special agent resources devoted to domestic drug  enforcement, we analyzed FBI time utilization data and DEA data on  funded staff levels for fiscal year 2001, which ended September 30, 2001,  through the second quarter of fiscal year 2004, ending on March 31, 2004.  We also analyzed FBI and DEA budget and resource allocation  information. We focused our analysis primarily on nonsupervisory field  special agent positions because these positions are directly involved in  investigations, while supervisors, managers, and headquarters agents often  have noninvestigative responsibilities in addition to their investigative  duties. To determine the number of newly opened FBI and DEA drug  matters, we analyzed case management system data for the period from  fiscal year 2001 through the second quarter of fiscal year 2004. We also  reviewed the Department of Justice’s Domestic Drug Enforcement  Strategy and discussed resource allocation issues and concerns with FBI  and DEA officials. We did not attempt to analyze data on drug  enforcement resource allocations and drug matters opened for federal  agencies and departments other than the FBI and DEA that are involved in  investigating drug-related crimes. To determine the number of drug  referrals from the FBI, DEA, and other federal agencies to U.S. Attorneys,  we analyzed Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA) case  management data on the number of referrals received by referring agency  and type of referral for fiscal year 2001 through 2003. We did not have  access to criminal case files and thus did not provide any assessment of  changes in the quality or complexity of traditional criminal investigations  in pre- and post-September 11 periods.
To provide perspectives of law enforcement officials on impacts, if any,  they observed on traditional FBI criminal enforcement areas as a result of  the FBI’s shift of resources to new priorities, we interviewed selected  federal headquarters and field officials, police department supervisors,  and representatives of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. At  FBI headquarters we interviewed the chief of the drug section, and at DEA  headquarters we interviewed the chief of the domestic drug program. The  field locations we visited, as shown in table 1, had among the greatest  shifts of FBI resources from traditional criminal programs into new  priorities. Using a semistructured interview and a data collection  instrument, at each location we asked FBI and DEA field office managers  and U.S. Attorney’s Office supervisory prosecutors and local police  department supervisors responsible for drug enforcement about any  impacts they had observed on their caseloads, workloads, and crime in  their communities as a result of the FBI shift in priorities. The results of  these interviews cannot be generalized to any broader community of law  enforcement agencies or officials or to other geographic locations.
To examine the effect of the FBI’s post-September 11 priority shifts on  federal efforts to combat white-collar and violent crime, we considered   (1) the number of matters referred to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for  prosecution from the FBI and all other federal agencies and (2) the effects,  if any, observed by law enforcement officials we interviewed. To  determine how the numbers of white-collar and violent crime matters  referred to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for prosecution from the FBI and all  other federal agencies have changed, we analyzed case-management  system data from EOUSA. To provide perspectives from selected law  enforcement officials on any changes in federal white-collar and violent  crime enforcement activities as a result of the FBI’s shift in priorities, we  included in our structured interview questions about effects federal and  local law enforcement officials we visited might have observed on white- collar and violent crime caseloads, workloads, and law enforcement  activities in their communities. We did not attempt to collect information  on the number of newly opened white-collar and violent crime matters  from all federal sources because there is no agency comparable to DEA,  with single-mission dedication to white-collar crime or violent crime  investigations. Many different federal agencies and offices, including  criminal investigative agencies and inspectors general, investigate these  matters, but our time frames did not allow us to obtain resource allocation  data from them.
The data should be viewed as short-term indicators with limitations. The  full impact of the FBI’s shift in priorities may not be apparent for several  years. While we looked at numbers of agent resources, matters opened,  and matters referred for prosecution, we could not fully assess the less  tangible factors of the quality of agent resources and investigations and  the complexity of investigations. Neither could we determine what  investigations the FBI might have pursued had it had additional agent  resources.
Because the reliability of FBI, DEA, and EOUSA information management  systems data is significant to the findings of this review, we interviewed  FBI, DEA, and U.S. Attorney personnel to determine what steps they take  to assess the accuracy of data elements and what limitations, if any, they  have identified with the data elements used for our review. As a result of  our assessment, we determined that the required data elements are  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review.
We performed our work from December 2003 to July 2004 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: FBI Nonsupervisory Field Special Agent Positions and Work Years
paragraphs: FBI Nonsupervisory Field Special Agent Positions and Work Years  Charged to the Drug, White-Collar, and Violent Crime Programs (fiscal  year 2001 to second quarter, fiscal year 2004).
section_title: Appendix III: Decreases in FBI’s Newly Opened Drug, White-Collar and Violent Crime Matters Since September 11, 2001
paragraphs: Non-Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF)
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: David Alexander, Leo Barbour, William Bates, Geoffrey Hamilton,  Benjamin Jordan, Deborah Knorr, Jessica Lundberg, Andrew O’Connell,  and Kathryn Young made significant contributions to this report.