Overseas Security: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies
Published: 2005-05-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: U.S. government officials working overseas are at risk from terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have been attacked--23 fatally--by terrorists outside the embassy. As the State Department continues to improve security at U.S. embassies, terrorist groups are likely to focus on "soft" targets--such as homes, schools, and places of worship. GAO was asked to determine whether State has a strategy for soft target protection; assess State's efforts to protect U.S. officials and their families while traveling to and from work; assess State's efforts overseas to improve security at schools attended by the children of U.S. officials; and describe issues related to protection at their residences.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy, including security briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection. However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect U.S. officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats outside the embassy. State officials raised a number of challenges related to developing and implementing such a strategy. They also indicated that they have recently initiated an effort to develop a soft targets strategy. As part of this effort, State officials said they will need to address and resolve a number of legal and financial issues. Three State initiated investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S. officials outside of embassies found that the officials lacked the necessary hands-on training to help counter the attack. The investigations recommended that State provide hands-on counterterrorism training and implement accountability measures to ensure compliance with personal security procedures. After each of these investigations, State reported to Congress that it planned to implement the recommendations, yet we found that State's hands-on training course is not required, the accountability procedures have not been effectively implemented, and key embassy officials are not trained to implement State's counterterrorism procedures. State instituted a program in 2003 to improve security at schools, but its scope has not yet been fully determined. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, Congress earmarked $29.8 million for State to address security vulnerabilities against soft targets, particularly at overseas schools. The multiphase program provides basic security hardware to protect U.S. officials and their families at schools and some off-compound employee association facilities from terrorist threats. However, during our visits to posts, regional security officers were unclear about which schools could qualify for security assistance under phase three of the program. State's program to protect U.S. officials and their families at their residences is primarily designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The Residential Security program includes basic security hardware and local guards, which State officials said provide effective deterrence against crime, though only limited deterrence against a terrorist attack. To minimize the risk and consequences of a residential terrorist attack, some posts we visited limited the number of U.S. officials living in specific apartment buildings. To provide greater protection against terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used surveillance detection teams in residential areas.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: U.S. government officials and their families living and working overseas are  at risk from terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have been  attacked—23 fatally—by terrorists outside the embassy (see fig. 1). As the  State Department continues to improve security at U.S. embassies,  concerns are growing that terrorist groups are likely to focus on “soft”  targets—such as homes, schools, and places of worship. Recent terrorist  attacks against housing complexes in Saudi Arabia, a school in Russia, and  places of worship in Turkey illustrate this growing threat. State-initiated  security assessments have further documented this growing concern and  recommended that State develop better measures to protect U.S. officials  and their families in soft target areas.
Deaths and location (each square represents one death)
Because of the large number of U.S. officials and their families living  abroad that are potentially at risk, you requested that we evaluate State’s  programs and efforts to protect them from terrorist attacks while outside  the embassy. You specifically asked us to determine whether State has a  strategy for soft target protection; assess State’s efforts to protect U.S.  officials and their families against terrorist attacks while traveling to and  from work; assess State’s efforts overseas to improve security at schools  attended by the children of U.S. officials; and describe issues related to  protection at their residences.
To determine how the State Department protects U.S. officials and their  families while outside the embassy, we reviewed State documents,  interviewed State officials in Washington, D.C., and attended security  training and briefings available to State officials. In addition, we  interviewed several members of the Overseas Security Policy Board  (OSPB), an interagency consultative body that considers, develops,  coordinates, and promotes security policies, standards, and agreements on  overseas security programs that affect U.S. personnel at missions. We also  reviewed documents, conducted interviews, and held roundtable  discussions with State and other agency officials, including family  members, at five posts in four countries. Post selection was based on a  number of factors, including variety in post size and post terrorism threat  levels. For the purpose of this report, our focus on soft target protection  primarily pertains to U.S. government officials and their families and other  post personnel who fall under chief of mission authority. To limit the scope  of our review, we did not look at post evacuations, or security advice or  assistance provided through the Overseas Security Advisory Council, the  Antiterrorism Assistance Program, and the consular warden system.  Appendix I provides more information on our scope and methodology. We  conducted our evaluation from March 2004 through February 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: With the changing security environment and the emergence of terrorist  coalitions that operate across international borders, the threat of terrorism  against U.S. interests and personnel abroad has grown. Over the past  decades, and in particular in response to the 1998 embassy bombings in  Africa, the State Department has been hardening its official facilities to  protect its embassies, consulates, and personnel abroad. However, as State  hardened embassies, the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA)  raised concerns about the vulnerability of soft targets.
subsections: section_title: Soft Targets, Size, and Scope of American Overseas Diplomatic Presence Defined
paragraphs: According to a State Department travel warning, State considers soft  targets to be places, including but not limited to, where Americans and  other westerners live, congregate, shop, or visit. This can include hotels,  clubs, restaurants, shopping centers, housing compounds, places of  worship, schools, or public recreation events. Travel routes of U.S.  government employees are also considered soft targets, based on their  vulnerability to terrorist attacks. The State Department is responsible for  protecting more than 60,000 government employees who work in  embassies and consulates abroad in 180 countries. These government  officials at approximately 260 posts represent a number of agencies besides  State—including the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Homeland  Security, Justice, and the Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service, and the  United States Agency for International Development—and all fall under  chief of mission authority. State officials indicated that only about one-third  of officials at all posts are from the State Department.
section_title: Entities Responsible for Protection of U.S. Officials and Their Families Abroad
paragraphs: The responsibilities for the protection of U.S. officials and their families are  defined in federal legislation and policies. Under the Omnibus Diplomatic  Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, the Department of State is given  responsibility for the protection of U.S. officials and their families  overseas. The act directs the Secretary of State to develop and implement  policies and programs, including funding levels and standards, to provide  for the security of U.S. government operations of a diplomatic nature and  establishes within State the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). The  mission of DS is to provide a safe and secure environment for the conduct  of U.S. foreign policy. Within DS, there are a number of offices that address  and implement security policies and practices to protect facilities and  personnel at posts. At posts abroad, the chiefs of mission are responsible  for the protection of personnel and accompanying family members at the  missions. Additionally, regional security officers (RSOs) administer all  aspects of security programs at posts. The RSOs’ responsibilities include  providing post officials and their families with security briefings upon their  arrival; designing and implementing residential security and local guard  programs; liaising and coordinating with the host country law enforcement  and U.S. private sector communities to discuss threat issues; and offering  security advice and briefings to schools attended by dependents of U.S.  government officials.
The host nation is responsible for providing protection to diplomatic  personnel and missions, as established by the 1961 Vienna Convention on  Diplomatic Relations. The convention states the host country should take  appropriate steps to protect missions, personnel, and their families,  including protecting the consular premises against any intrusion, damage,  or disturbances.
The Overseas Security Policy Board, which includes representatives from  19 U.S. intelligence, foreign affairs, and other agencies, is responsible for  considering, developing, coordinating, and promoting security policies,  standards, and agreements on overseas operations, programs, and projects  that affect U.S. government agencies under the authority of the chief of  mission. This responsibility includes reviewing and issuing uniform  guidance for residential security and local guard programs based on threat  levels. The Security Environment Threat List, published semiannually by  State, reflects the level of threat at all posts in six threat categories,  including crime, political violence, and terrorism. Over 50 percent of all  posts fall under the terrorism threat ratings of critical or high (see fig. 2).  State, in consultation with representatives of the board, develops security  standards, based on threat levels, for U.S. missions overseas.
When a security-related incident occurs that involves serious injury or loss  of life or significant destruction of property at a U.S. government mission  abroad, State is required to convene an Accountability Review Board  (ARB). ARBs are composed of five individuals, four appointed by the  Secretary of State and one by the Director of the Central Intelligence  Agency. Members investigate the security incident and issue a report with  recommendations to promote and encourage improved security programs  and practices. State is required to report to Congress on actions it has  taken in response to ARB recommendations. As of March 2005, there have  been 11 Accountability Review Boards convened since the board’s  establishment in 1986.
section_title: Appropriations Subcommittee Urges State to Develop a Soft Target Strategy
paragraphs: The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and  the Judiciary, in its 2002 and subsequent reports, urged State to formulate a  strategy for addressing, in the short and long term, threats to locales  abroad that are frequented by U.S. officials and their families. This included  providing security enhancements for locations that are affiliated with the  United States by virtue of the activities and the individuals they  accommodate and therefore might be soft targets. In a number of  subsequent reports, the subcommittee has focused its concern about soft  targets on schools, residences, places of worship, and other popular  gathering places. In fiscal year 2003, a total of $15 million was earmarked  for soft target protection, particularly to address security vulnerabilities at  overseas schools. Moreover, in fiscal year 2004, Congress earmarked an  additional $15 million for soft targets.
More recently, the fiscal year 2005 Senate Appropriations Subcommittee  report and the subsequent House Conference Report on fiscal year 2005  appropriations further stressed the need to protect these areas. The  language in the Senate appropriations report directs State to develop a  comprehensive, sustained strategy for addressing the threats posed to soft  targets. Specifically, the report language specifies that a strategy should be  submitted to the committee no later than June 1, 2005. For fiscal year 2005,  Congress earmarked $15 million to secure and protect soft targets, of  which $10 million is for security at overseas schools attended by  dependents of U.S. government employees.
section_title: State Has Not Developed a Strategy to Cover Soft Target Areas; Key Issues Need to Be Resolved
paragraphs: State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S.  officials and their families outside of the embassy, including security  briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection  (these programs are discussed in more detail later in this report). Despite  these efforts, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly  identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect  U.S. officials and their families from terrorist threats outside the embassy.  State officials raised a number of challenges related to developing and  implementing such a strategy. They indicated they have recently initiated  an effort to develop a soft target strategy. As part of this effort, State  officials said they will need to address and resolve a number of legal and  financial issues.
subsections: section_title: State Cites Limitations in Developing a Soft Target Strategy
paragraphs: State has not developed a comprehensive soft target strategy to protect  U.S. officials and their families from terrorist threats outside the embassy.  A comprehensive strategy would focus on protection of U.S. officials and  thief families in areas where they congregate, such as schools, residences,  places of worship, and other popular gathering spots.
However, in a number of meetings, State officials cited several complex  issues involved with protecting soft targets and raised concerns about the  broader implications of developing such a strategy. DS officials told us that  the mission and responsibilities of DS continue to grow and become more  complex, and they questioned how far State’s protection of soft targets  should extend. They said that providing U.S. government funds to protect  U.S. officials and their families at private sector locations or to places of  worship was unprecedented and raised a number of legal and financial  challenges, including sovereignty and separation of church and state, that  have not been resolved by the department. They also told us that specific  authorization language would be needed to move beyond a State program  that currently focuses on providing security upgrades to schools and off- compound employee association facilities abroad. State officials also  indicated they have not yet fully defined the universe of soft targets— including taking an inventory of potentially vulnerable facilities and areas  where U.S. officials and their families congregate—that would be  necessary to complete a strategy.
Although State has not developed a comprehensive soft target strategy,  some State officials told us that several existing programs could help  protect soft targets. However, they agreed that these existing programs are  not tied together in an overall strategy. State officials agreed that they  should undertake a formal evaluation of how existing programs can be  more effectively integrated as part of a soft target strategy, and whether  new programs might be needed to fill any potential gaps.
A senior DS official told us that in January 2005, DS formed a working  group to discuss and develop a comprehensive soft targets strategy to  address the appropriate level of protection of U.S. officials and their  families at schools, residences, and other areas outside the embassy.  According to the DS official, the strategy should be completed and  provided to the Senate Appropriations Committee by June 1, 2005.
section_title: State Has Not Fully Implemented ARB Training and Accountability Recommendations to Improve Security for Embassy Personnel
paragraphs: Investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S. officials found that, among  other things, the officials lacked the necessary hands-on training to help  counter the attacks. The ARBs recommended that State provide hands-on  counterterrorism training to help post officials identify terrorist  surveillance and quickly respond to an impending attack. They also  recommended State implement an accountability system to reduce  complacency about following these procedures. After each investigation,  State told Congress it would implement these recommendations, yet we  found that State’s hands-on training course is still not mandatory for all  personnel going to posts, and procedures to monitor compliance with  security requirements have not been fully implemented. According to State,  training has been hindered by limitations in funding and training capacities,  and implementing new accountability procedures globally is a long-term  process. We also found that ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and  RSOs were not trained in how to implement embassy procedures intended  to protect U.S. officials outside the embassies.
subsections: section_title: Investigations Identify Key Vulnerability, Recommend Training and Accountability Safeguards
paragraphs: Five of the 11 ARB investigations have focused on attacks of U.S. officials  on their way to work (see fig. 3): (1) the June 1988 assassination of a post  official in Greece, (2) the April 1989 assassination of a post official in the  Philippines, (3) the March 1995 assassination of two post officials in  Pakistan, (4) the October 2002 assassination of a post official in Jordan,  and (5) the October 2003 assassination in Gaza of three post contractors  from Israel.
Several of these ARBs recommended that State provide better training,  indicating that security briefings were not sufficient to identify  preoperational surveillance by terrorists, or to escape the attack once  under way. In addition, several ARBs found that State lacked monitoring or  accountability mechanisms to ensure that U.S. officials complied with  personal security measures. For example, a recent ARB recommended that  supervisors at all levels monitor their subordinates’ implementation of  these countermeasures.
section_title: State Agreed to Implement ARB Recommendations in Reports to Congress, but Implementation Is Incomplete
paragraphs: Although State agreed with the ARB’s recommendations and reported to  Congress that it planned to implement them, many have yet to be fully  implemented. For example, State’s hands-on training course, which  teaches surveillance detection and counterterrorism driving skills, is still  not required and has been taken by relatively few State Department  officials and their families. State provided posts with some additional  guidance to improve accountability, such as making personal security  mandatory and holding managers responsible for the “reasonable”  oversight of their staff’s personal security practices, but we found  implementation in the field to be incomplete. Furthermore, there are no  monitoring mechanisms to determine if post officials are following the new  security procedures.
subsections: section_title: Despite State Agreement that Counterterrorism Training Is Needed, It Is Still Not Required
paragraphs: State reported to Congress that it agreed with the ARB recommendations  to provide counterterrorism training. Specifically, in 1988, it reported that it  “agreed with the general thrust of the recommendations” to provide hands- on training and refresher courses. In 1995, State reported that it “re- established the Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Course (DSAC) for those  going to critical-threat posts to teach surveillance detection and avoidance,  and defensive and evasive driving techniques.” In 2003, State reported it  agreed with the recommendations that employees from all agencies should  receive security briefings and indicated that it would use the OSPB to  review the adequacy of its training and other personal security measures.
State implemented the board’s recommendation to require security  briefings for all staff. In December 2003, the OSPB members agreed that  predeparture security briefings should be mandatory for all officials  planning to work at posts abroad. On March 23, 2004, State notified posts  worldwide that, starting June 1, 2004, personal security briefings would be  required for all U.S. personnel working at posts. State has required that its  officials attend predeparture security briefings, such as Serving Abroad for  Families and Employees, since 1987. The briefing covers a variety of post- related issues, including alcoholism, fires, crime, sexual assaults, and  terrorist surveillance. Once officials arrive at their posts, they receive  country-specific security briefings by the RSO. In addition, RSOs can  provide threat-specific security briefings on a case-by-case basis. Family  members are strongly encouraged to attend both predeparture and post  security briefings. Figure 4 provides additional information on security  briefing and training available to U.S. officials and their families.
However, few officials or family members working at embassies have taken  DSAC. State offers DSAC as an elective to post officials and spouses going  to high- and critical-threat posts. State does not track the number of  officials who have taken DSAC; thus it is not clear how many officials have  received this training. State officials estimate that 10 percent to 15 percent  of department officials have taken the course, and this appears consistent  with our findings at the five posts we visited. DSAC consists of 2 days of  surveillance detection training, 2 days of counterterrorism driving, and 1  day of emergency medical training.
During our visits to five posts, we found significant disparities in the levels  of security briefings and training of post personnel. We held a variety of  round-table discussions at each of the five posts we visited, including with  senior and junior State Department officials, non-State officials, and  officials from the law enforcement, intelligence, and defense communities.  We found that post officials from law enforcement, intelligence, and  defense communities had generally received rigorous hands-on training in  areas such as surveillance detection, counterterrorism driving, emergency  medical procedures, and weapons handling. Officials who had completed  DSAC-type training agreed that hands-on training was needed to give  people the skills and confidence to identify and respond to terrorist threats.  In contrast, relatively few other officials, including those from State, had  received DSAC-type counterterrorism training. For example, we found that  roughly 10 percent of State Department officials indicated they had taken  hands-on training; the figure was even smaller for other employees.  Officials gave several reasons for not attending DSAC: they were not aware  the course was offered, did not believe they were eligible, or were under  pressure to quickly transfer to their new posts. They also told us that the  course often conflicted with other training offered by State.
Senior DS officials said they recognize that security briefings, like Serving  Abroad for Families and Employees, are no longer adequate to protect  against current terrorist threats. In response, DS developed a proposal in  June 2004 to make DSAC training mandatory. The proposal would provide  training, at an estimated cost of about $3.6 million, to about 775 officials,  including 95 eligible family members, from all agencies working at critical- threat posts. DS officials said that DSAC training should also be required  for all officials, but that issues related to costs, adequacy of training  facilities, and the ability to obtain Overseas Security Policy Board  agreement were constraining factors. As of April 18, 2005, the proposal had  not been approved.
section_title: Accountability Mechanism Still Not in Place to Promote Compliance with Personal Security Guidelines
paragraphs: Although State has agreed on the need to implement an accountability  system to promote compliance with personal security procedures since  1988, there is still no system in place to ensure that post-related personnel  are following personal security practices. Despite ARB recommendations  to implement accountability mechanisms for personal security, it remains  State’s position that security outside the post is primarily a personal  responsibility. As a result, there is no way to determine if post officials are  following prescribed security guidelines. Beginning in 2003, State has tried  to incorporate some limited accountability to promote compliance.  However, based on our work at five posts, we found that post officials are  not following many of these new procedures.
In response to the 2003 ARB, State took a number of steps to improve  compliance with State’s personal security procedures for officials outside  the embassy, including the following:  In June 2003, State revised its annual assessment criteria, known as the  core precepts, so that rating and reviewing officials could take personal  security into account when preparing performance appraisals. Posts  were notified of this new requirement on July 30, 2003.
On December 23, 2003, State made a number of revisions to its Foreign  Affairs Manual (FAM), such as stating that employees should  implement personal security practices.
On May 28, 2004, State notified posts worldwide on use of a Personal  Security Self-Assessment Checklist.
However, none of the posts we visited were even aware of these key policy  changes. For example, none of the officials we met with, including  ambassadors, DCMs, RSOs, or staff, were aware that the annual ratings  process now includes an assessment of whether staff are following the  personal security measures or that managers are now responsible for the  reasonable oversight of subordinates’ personal security activities.  Furthermore, none of the supervisors were aware of the checklist, and we  found no one was using the checklists to improve their personal security  practices.
Furthermore, State’s original plan, to use the checklist as an accountability  mechanism, was dropped before it was implemented. In its June 2003  report to Congress on implementation of the 2003 ARB recommendations,  State stipulated that staff would be required to use the checklist  periodically and that managers would review the checklists to ensure  compliance. However, State never implemented this accountability  mechanism. According to State officials, they dropped the accountability  features out of concern that the review would be too time consuming.
We found that State had not issued any guidance on how these new policies  and practices should be implemented or monitored. For example, the  Foreign Affairs Manual does not specify how managers are to provide for  the “reasonable” oversight of their staff’s personal security practices or  how to provide for compliance and oversight. As a result, post staff were  not sure how these new policies should be implemented. In addition, RSOs  lacked guidance on how to promote these new policies. RSOs and  supervisors stated that they have no responsibility or authority to monitor  post employees for compliance with the new security policies, and the  officials we spoke with at five posts said they did not have, and did not  want, this responsibility.
In discussing our preliminary findings with DS officials, they noted a range  of challenges associated with improving security for officials outside the  post. State’s primary focus has been, and will continue to be, protecting  U.S. officials inside the post since posts are considered higher value targets  symbolically and because of the potential for mass casualties. In explaining  why posts were not aware of the new personal security regulations, DS  officials noted that posts were often overwhelmed by work and may have  simply missed the cables and changes in the Foreign Affairs Manual. They  also noted that changes like this take time to be implemented globally.
Nonetheless, improving security outside the embassy is critical and,  according to a number of State officials, improvements in this area must  start with the ambassador and the deputy chief of mission. Yet we noted  that they, along with the RSOs, were not trained in how best to provide  such security before going to post. For example, based on our observations  at the training courses and a review of the course material, the ambassador,  deputy chief of mission, and RSO training courses did not address how  State’s personal security guidelines can be best promoted. The instructors  and DS officials agreed that this critical component should be added to  their training curriculum.
section_title: State Develops Soft Targets Program for Schools but Scope Is Not Yet Fully Defined
paragraphs: In response to congressional direction and funding, State, in 2003, began  developing a multiphase Soft Targets program that provides basic security  hardware to protect U.S. officials and their families at schools and some  off-compound employee association facilities. However, we found that  the scope of the program is not yet fully defined, including the criteria for  school selection.
subsections: section_title: State Initiates Multiphase Program to Primarily Protect Schools
paragraphs: In response to direction in both the House Conference report and Senate  Appropriations Subcommittee report, State addressed the issue of  providing security enhancements to overseas schools attended by  dependents of U.S. officials and American citizens. In 2003, State began  developing a plan, known as the Soft Targets program, to expand security  for overseas schools to protect against terrorism. Specifically, State’s Office  of Overseas Schools, Overseas Buildings Operations, and DS have been  working together on the program. The program has four proposed phases.  The first two phases focused on department-sponsored schools that have  previously received grant funding from the State Department. In phase  one of the program, department-sponsored schools were offered funding  for basic security hardware such as shatter-resistant window film, two-way  radios for communication between the school and the embassy or  consulate, and public address systems (see fig. 7). As of November 19,  2004, 189 department-sponsored schools had received $10.5 million in  funding for security equipment in phase one of the program.
The second phase of the program addresses any additional security  enhancements that department-sponsored schools could benefit from and  takes into consideration the local threat level, the nature of the  vulnerability and measures required to correct the deficiency, and the  percentage of U.S. government dependent students in the school. Schools  have requested funding for security enhancements such as perimeter  fencing, walls, lighting, gates, and guard booths (see fig. 8). As of  November, 2004, State has obligated over $15 million in funding for  department-sponsored schools for phase two security upgrades.
Phase three of the program plans to address security enhancement needs  of nondepartment-sponsored schools overseas attended by dependents of  U.S. government officials or U.S. citizens. This phase provides funding for  phase one enhancements such as the shatter-resistant window film, radios,  and public address systems. State plans to implement the fourth phase of  the Soft Targets program to include phase two enhancements for  nondepartment-sponsored schools overseas that qualify.
Within the Soft Targets program, State also has focused on enhancing the  security for embassy and consulate employee associations that have  facilities off-compound, such as recreation centers. The Bureau of  Overseas Buildings Operations has been collecting data on the security  needs of these facilities to determine the type of security equipment or  upgrades that would be most beneficial. The facilities, working with the  RSO at post, have been asked to identify physical security vulnerabilities  that could be exploited by terrorists. As of September 2004, 24 of the 34  posts with off-compound employee association facilities had requested a  total of $1.3 million in security upgrades, which includes funding for  perimeter walls and shatter-resistant window film. In fiscal year 2004,  almost $1 million was obligated by State for security enhancements at off- compound employee association facilities.
section_title: Full Scope of School Program Not Yet Determined
paragraphs: RSOs said that identifying and providing funding for security  enhancements at department-sponsored schools for phase one and phase  two security enhancements were straightforward because of the pre- existing relationship with these schools. However, they said it has been  difficult to identify nondepartment-sponsored schools for phase three of  the program. Some RSOs told us they were not sure about the criteria for  approaching nondepartment-sponsored schools in phase three and were  seeking guidance from headquarters on this issue. For example, some  RSOs were not sure what the minimum number of American students  attending a school needed to be for the school to be eligible to receive  grant money for security upgrades. Some RSOs at the posts we visited were  considering offering funding to schools with as few as one to five American  students. Moreover, one RSO was seeking guidance on what constitutes a  school and questioned whether informal facilities attended by children of  U.S. missionaries could qualify for the program.
State officials told us they sent cables to posts in the summer of 2004 with  more detailed information on school selection. They explained that they  have asked RSOs to gather data on nondepartment-sponsored schools  attended by American students, particularly U.S. government dependents.  State officials from DS and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations  (OBO) acknowledged that the process of gathering data has been difficult  since there are hundreds of such schools worldwide. According to an OBO  official, as of December 2004, only about 81 out of the more than 250 posts  have provided responses regarding such schools. OBO officials stated they  will use the data to develop criteria for which schools might be eligible for  funding under phase three and, eventually, phase four of the program. In  anticipation of any future phases of the Soft Targets program, OBO officials  further explained they have also asked RSOs to identify other facilities and  areas that Americans frequent, beyond schools and off-compound  employee association facilities, that may be vulnerable against a terrorist  attack.
section_title: Issues Related to the Protection of U.S. Officials and Their Families at Residences against Terrorist Threats
paragraphs: State’s primary program in place to protect U.S. officials and their families  at their residences, the Residential Security program, is principally  designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The program includes basic security  hardware and guard service; as the threat increases, the hardware and  guard services can be correspondingly increased at the residences. State  officials said that while the Residential Security program, augmented by  the local guard program, provides effective deterrence against crime, it  could provide limited or no deterrence against a terrorist attack. To provide  greater protection against terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used  surveillance detection teams in residential areas, despite guidance that  limits their use primarily to the embassy.
subsections: section_title: Residential Security and Local Guard Programs Tied to Crime Levels
paragraphs: State has a responsibility for providing a secure housing environment for  U.S. officials and their families overseas. Housing options could include  single-family dwellings, apartments, and compound and clustered  housing. Each post is responsible for designing and implementing its  Residential Security program based on factors that include host country  law enforcement capabilities, the post-specific threat environment, and  available funding. The Residential Security program includes basic security  hardware, such as alarms, shatter-resistant window film, access control  measures, and local guards. As the threat increases, hardware and guard  services can be correspondingly increased at the residences. The standards  used to determine the minimum acceptable level of residential security  protection are guided by threat ratings established in the Security  Environment Threat List. For the Residential Security program, DS uses the  standards for the threat rating categories of political violence and crime,  though not for terrorism. Standards for residential security also differ  depending on the types of residences.
Security at the residences can be augmented by the use of local guards.  Local guard functions vary by threat ratings for crime and political violence  and by the type of residence protected. The local guard program for  residential security may include mobile patrols, quick reaction forces, and  stationary guards. Figure 9 provides an illustration of a stationary guard at  a residence. The mobile patrols are assigned responsibility for visiting  residences periodically, and respond to alarms at residences or when  emergencies arise. All posts we visited utilized local guards for some  aspect of residential security; some posts, due to the higher threat levels,  had more comprehensive local guard coverage than others. For example,  all posts we visited had mobile patrols for residential neighborhoods, while  only two posts had stationary guards at residential housing. Moreover,  some posts with mostly apartment housing had a guard or doorman  stationed at the entrance of the building to provide a first line of security,  primarily against crime.
Post officials, including RSOs, told us that the Residential Security program  provides effective deterrence against crime and could provide some  deterrence against a terrorist attack, though State officials felt it could  provide little or no deterrence against a terrorist attack. State and post  officials indicated that the biggest concern at residences, when considering  the type of security to implement, has been the threat from crime.
However, as the threat environment has changed and terrorists have  changed tactics from kidnapping to detonating car bombs outside of  residences, some posts have changed their housing profile. Some posts we  visited limited the number of U.S. officials living in specific apartments or  neighborhoods to minimize the risk and consequences of a residential  terrorist attack. For example, post management at two of the posts we  visited have decided to limit the number of Americans in apartment  housing to 25 percent of the entire building population to minimize the  impact of a car bomb detonated outside residential housing. Some senior  DS officials told us that the best residential scenario for posts is to have a  variety of housing options, including apartments and single-family homes.  By having a mix of housing options, post officials are dispersed, reducing  the number of potential targets.
section_title: Use of Surveillance Detection Program at Residences
paragraphs: To provide greater protection against terrorist attacks, most posts we  visited used surveillance detection teams in the residential areas. The  Surveillance Detection program was implemented in response to the U.S.  Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The  mission of the program is to enhance the ability of all posts to detect  preoperational terrorist surveillance directed against primary diplomatic  facilities, such as the embassy. According to State’s Surveillance Detection  Operations Field Guide and the Foreign Affairs Handbook, surveillance  detection units can be used to cover other facilities, such as off-compound  employee association facilities and residences, only if there is a specific  threat directed against such areas. In addition, surveillance detection can  be used to cover large official functions.
At many of the posts we visited, the RSOs were routinely utilizing  surveillance detection units to cover areas outside key embassy facilities,  such as residences, school bus stops and routes, and schools where U.S.  embassy dependents attend. RSOs told us that the Surveillance Detection  program is instrumental in providing deterrence against potential terrorist  attacks. Furthermore, some RSOs told us that the use of surveillance  detection at school bus stops and outside schools provides a sense of  comfort for post officials and their spouses who have dependents in  international or American schools. During our post visits, some RSOs  argued that the current program guidelines are too restrictive and that  State should allow flexibility in using surveillance detection for areas  outside the embassy deemed appropriate by the RSO. Senior State  officials told us, while the use of the surveillance detection in soft target  areas could be beneficial, the program is labor intensive and expensive and  any expansion of the program could require significant funding.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: The State Department is responsible for protecting more then 60,000  employees and their families who work overseas. Recent terrorist attacks  and threats have heightened demands that State provide adequate safety  and security outside embassy compounds. We found that State has not yet  developed a strategy addressing the appropriate level of protection needed  for schools, places of worship, and private sector recreation facilities  where employees and families tend to congregate. State officials are  concerned about the feasibility and costs associated with providing  protection for these “soft targets.”
Prior investigations into attacks against U.S. officials have resulted in  recommendations that State implement improvements to protect U.S.  officials against terrorist attacks. However, our analysis indicated that  State has not fully implemented several of these recommendations related  to training and accountability mechanisms designed to improve personal  safety. Overall, we believe State should develop a strategy to protect U.S.  officials and their families, and as part of this effort, undertake an  assessment of the level of protection to be afforded to officials and their  families while commuting, and at residences, schools, and other  community-based facilities. We also believe that State should provide  adequate counterterrorism training and fully implement its accountability  mechanisms to afford greater awareness and implementation of security  safeguards for U.S. officials and their family members while outside the  embassy compounds.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of State, working with the Overseas  Security Policy Board, take the following 11 actions:   Include in the current development of a comprehensive soft target  strategy information that (1) determines the extent of State’s  responsibilities for providing security to U.S. officials and their families  outside the embassy; (2) addresses the legal and financial ramifications  of funding security improvements to schools, places of worship, and the  private sector; (3) develops programs and activities with FAM standards  and guidelines to provide protection for those areas for which State is  deemed responsible for; and (4) integrates into the embassy emergency  action plan elements of the soft targets program.
Mandate counterterrorism training and prioritize which posts, officials,  and family members should receive counterterrorism training first;  track attendance to determine compliance with this new training  requirement; and add a “soft target protection” training module to the  ambassadorial, deputy chief of mission, and RSO training to promote  the security of U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy.
Fully implement the personal security accountability system that State  agreed to implement in response to the 2003 ARB for all embassy  officials, and develop related accountability standards for the Foreign  Affairs Manual that can be used to monitor compliance.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: The Department of State provided written comments on a draft of this  report (see app. II). State generally agreed with most of our report  recommendations and said it would examine the others. Specifically, State  agreed to incorporate a soft target training module into RSO training, and  stated that the department would ensure that similar training be developed  and added to the ambassadorial and deputy chief of mission training to  promote the security of U.S. officials and their families outside the  embassy. The department also agreed to track attendance with the  counterterrorism training course if it becomes a requirement, and noted  that, as of March 2005, all diplomatic security courses are now tracked for  enrollment and attendance. With regard to the recommendation to fully  implement the personal security accountability system, State agreed to  reiterate, through additional notifications and guidance, the accountability  requirements and other tools available to improve personal security.  Regarding our recommendation that State develop a comprehensive  strategy, State indicated that it was prepared to examine, in conjunction  with the OSBP, the contents and recommendations of the report as they  relate to their security programs, but did not indicate whether they would  incorporate any of the specific elements of the recommendations into its  new soft targets security strategy.
State expressed concern that our draft report mischaracterized the  department’s responsibility to protect Americans living abroad, and implied  that State was responsible for providing these Americans a similar level of  protection provided to diplomats and their families. We have clarified the  scope and methodology and text of the report to focus on State’s roles and  responsibilities to protect U.S. diplomats and their families, and have  deleted references to how State provides safety and security support to  U.S. citizens abroad.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 1 day from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested  congressional committees and to the Secretary of State. We will also make  copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4268 or at fordj@gao.gov. Another contact and staff  acknowledgments are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine how the State Department protects U.S. officials and their  families while outside the embassy, we reviewed State documents and  conducted interviews with State officials in Washington, D.C. In addition,  we reviewed documents, conducted interviews, and held roundtable  discussions with State and other agency officials at four U.S. embassies and  one consulate overseas. In Washington, D.C., we reviewed the Diplomatic  Security sections of State’s Foreign Affairs Manual and Foreign Affairs  Handbook and read numerous State cables pertaining to personal security  and other security practices. In addition, we reviewed eight Accountability  Review Board (ARB) reports and State’s responses to Congress based on  these ARBs, and met with the Chairman of the Amman, Jordan ARB. We  interviewed officials from a number of State bureaus and offices. We met  with officials from State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), including  officials from the Office of International Programs, Office of Facility  Protection Operations, Office of Physical Security Programs, Office of  Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Office of Regional Directors, Office of  Countermeasures, and DS Training. We also met with officials from State’s  Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Office of Management Policy,  Office of Overseas Schools, Office of Commissary and Recreation Affairs,  Foreign Service Institute, and Office of the Inspector General. Moreover,  we met with representatives of the Overseas Security Policy Board. To  better understand the support for the Soft Targets program, we met with  executive members of the American Foreign Service Association and also  reviewed a number of congressional reports that mention the protection of  soft targets.
To obtain firsthand experience of security and antiterrorism training  available to State and non-State personnel, we attended a number of  training courses and briefings. We attended the 2-day Security Overseas  Seminar, the 5-day Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Course, and Regional  Security Officer security in-briefings at posts we visited. We also attended  sections of the Ambassadorial Seminar and the Regional Security Officer  Training to better understand how the issue of protecting U.S. officials and  their families outside the embassy was addressed.
We conducted fieldwork at five posts—four embassies and one consulate— in four countries. We chose the posts based on a number of factors,  including variety in post size and post terrorism threat levels. At each of the  posts, we generally met with the Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of Mission,  DS and other State officials, and post officials representing other U.S.  government agencies, including personnel from the law enforcement,  intelligence, and defense communities. We also held roundtables, at all  posts, with State and non-State officials as well as spouses of post officials,  to obtain information on their security awareness and training. At most of  the posts we visited, we met with representatives of the post’s Emergency  Action Committee and the host nation police. In addition, we met with  representatives of the Overseas Security Advisory Council at some posts.  To better understand the Soft Targets program, we met with school officials  at American or international schools in each country. Finally, we observed  residential security measures at post housing at each post we visited.
To assess the reliability of the funding data for the Soft Targets Program,  we asked State officials to respond to a standard set of data reliability  questions. Based on their responses and follow up discussions, we  determined that the data used in the report for Soft Targets funding is  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
Our focus on soft target protection pertains primarily to U.S. government  officials and their families and other post personnel who fall under chief of  mission authority and not to the entire American community abroad. To  limit the scope of our review, we did not assess the security advice or  assistance provided through the Overseas Security Advisory Council, the  Antiterrorism Assistance Program, the consular warden system, or  evacuations. We also did not undertake a comprehensive review of  residential housing to determine which residential option provides the  most effective deterrent against terrorist attacks.
We conducted our work from March 2004 through February 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Comments from the Department of State
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on State’s letter dated April 18, 2005.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. We agree that State does not have an official definition of soft targets  and modified the text, where appropriate, to make this clear. Given this  absence, we relied upon a State Department travel warning that  included the specific language used in the draft report.  2. State indicated that, had we used a narrower definition of soft targets, it  could have dramatically changed the conclusions of our work. We  disagree. Our report focuses on State Department efforts to protect  U.S. officials and their families from terrorist threats, at their homes,  recreation centers, schools, commuting, and living outside the embassy  compounds. 3. Although State, in its comments, indicated that it has long had a  “security strategy” to protect U.S. officials and their families outside the  embassy, it was never able to produce such a document. In addition,  while State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect  U.S. officials and their families at soft target areas, senior DS officials  agreed that these programs are not tied together in an overall strategy.  In January 2005, State agreed that it should develop a comprehensive  soft target strategy, and as part of that effort, undertake a formal  evaluation of how existing programs can be more effectively integrated  and whether new programs might be needed to fill any potential gaps.  State said it planned to complete the strategy by June 1, 2005. 4. We have taken out reference to “other Americans” throughout the  report, except in reference to the Soft Targets Program, which covers  U.S. children and teachers who have no affiliation with the U.S.  government. We have also modified the scope and methodology to  show that our focus is “primarily” on the protection of U.S. government  officials and their families. 5. We have clarified the sentence by indicating that RSOs were unclear  about which schools could qualify for security assistance under phase  three of the Soft Targets Program. Phase three, because it can  encompass all schools in a country with one or more Americans, can  potentially include vastly more schools than in phase one or two of the  program. We recognize that the department’s Soft Targets Working  Group is currently defining parameters for which schools could qualify  under phase three, in addition to identifying other vulnerable off- compound facilities. We believe that a soft target strategy could help  identify which schools most urgently need security improvements.  6. We clarified the report to stipulate that these reports focused on the  security of U.S. officials. 7. See GAO comment 1. We have also changed the word “defines” to  “considers.”
8.
It is not uncommon for GAO to clarify, add specificity and thus make  adjustments or changes to a requested engagement, provided that these  adjustments and changes are discussed and agreed upon by the  requester. We informed State of these changes. 9. See GAO comment 4. 10. See GAO comment 1. 11. See GAO comment 4. 12. The appropriations subcommittee report language is within the scope  of the GAO review because it covers U.S. officials and their dependents,  which is the primary focus of our review. Moreover, this language was  based on testimony provided by AFSA out of concern that the  department was not providing adequate security for U.S. diplomats and  their families while they are outside of the embassy compound. GAO  agrees that the subcommittee report language is not binding and we are  not judging the department’s performance against this language.  However, we agree with the subcommittee, as State has, that State  should develop a comprehensive soft targets strategy.  13. In our draft, we noted that the officials were attacked on their way to  work, either in their driveway or as they drove to a work site. The Gaza  attack occurred while the officials were on their way to the work site.  14. See GAO comment 4.
We have incorporated technical comments in the report where appropriate.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the above named individuals, Edward George and Andrea  Miller made key contributions to this report. Joe Carney, Martin De Alteriis,  Etana Finkler, Ernie Jackson, Elizabeth Singer, and Michael Derr provided  technical contributions.