Security Force Assistance: The Army and Marine Corps Have Ongoing Efforts to Identify and Track Advisors, but the Army Needs a Plan to Capture Advising Experience
Published: 2014-07-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: SFA—DOD activities that contribute to supporting the development of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions—is a key component of U.S. efforts to create sustainable security around the world. These activities are carried out by DOD personnel serving as advisors who may have SFA-related training, education, and prior experience to conduct the advising mission.
GAO was mandated to review the Army's and Marine Corps' approaches to the SFA mission. GAO assessed the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps (1) identify and track personnel with SFA-related training, education, and experience and (2) consider SFA-related training, education, and experience in the promotion process. This report also describes the Army's process for preparing units to perform their core mission while some members are deployed to support SFA activities. GAO reviewed DOD policies, directives, and other documents and interviewed cognizant DOD and service officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army and Marine Corps have taken steps to identify and track personnel with Security Force Assistance (SFA)-related training, education, and experience, but the Army does not have a plan with goals and milestones to fully capture advising experience. A key element in conducting SFA missions is being able to identify the right personnel with the right training, education, and experience to execute SFA activities. The Department of Defense (DOD) established a requirement for the services to identify and track personnel with SFA-related training, education, and experience. Although the Army is able to identify and track soldiers with certain SFA-related training and education, it does not have a mechanism to identify and track SFA-related experience. Moreover, the Army has not developed a plan with goals and milestones on how it will capture this information. As a result, it is unclear how long it will take the Army to implement DOD's requirement and be able to readily identify the right personnel to serve in the SFA mission. The Marine Corps is implementing a mechanism to identify and track personnel with SFA-related training, education, and experience that is planned to be available in October 2014.
The Army and the Marine Corps have taken steps to ensure the consideration of SFA-related training, education, and experience in the promotion process. Both services have incorporated language into the guidance given to promotion boards to ensure that appropriate consideration is given to individuals who have served on advisor teams. However, opinions differ regarding the effect the guidance has had on the manner in which individuals with SFA-related training, education, and experience are considered during the promotion process. Some officials said that serving in an SFA role could potentially negatively affect career progression. Others noted that the promotion process considers the entirety of an individual's career and not just the time spent as an SFA advisor. However, because the Army and Marine Corps do not yet have comprehensive information on SFA advisors, officials are unable to determine whether promotion rates differ for people who served on SFA advisor teams versus those who did not. Such differences could be a potential indicator that servicemembers with SFA-related experience were negatively affected during the promotion process.
According to Army officials, the Army has taken a number of actions to ensure that units are prepared to perform their core mission when part of the unit is deployed in support of SFA activities. Officials stated that some actions taken to manage units that remain at the home station, also known as the rear detachment, when part of the unit deploys include consolidating units so that they can conduct training, ensuring the right personnel are left behind to lead the rear detachment, developing training plans for what the rear detachment would train to, and reporting on the availability of all personnel and equipment.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Army develop and implement a plan, with goals and milestones, for how it will develop the means for systematically identifying and tracking personnel with SFA-related experience. DOD partially concurred with the recommendation, stating that sufficient guidance and direction exists for the Army to continue refining its processes and procedures. GAO continues to believe the recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Security Force Assistance (SFA) is a key component of U.S. efforts to  create sustainable security around the world. SFA is defined as  Department of Defense (DOD) activities that contribute to unified action  by the U.S. government to support the development of the capacity and  capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.  Advising is a primary type of SFA. Over the course of the military  conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as other locations, the Army and  Marine Corps have used company- and field-grade officers and senior  enlisted personnel to form advisor teams to support SFA missions  focused on advising and assisting partner-nation military forces.  Currently, to meet the requirements for SFA missions in Afghanistan, the  Army deploys SFA brigades, which include advisor teams that are  primarily created using personnel from the SFA brigade. The Marine  Corps creates advisor teams using nondeployed personnel from across  the Marine Expeditionary Forces who then deploy as formed teams.
We have issued several reports about DOD’s implementation of SFA. In  2013, we reported that the Army and Marine Corps have been able to fill  requests for SFA advisor teams using various approaches, such as  tasking nondeployed brigades to form advisor teams or creating teams  using personnel already deployed in Afghanistan. We also reported that  the Army’s reliance on brigades to provide a portion of their personnel to  form advisor teams has enabled them to meet requirements but has  resulted in leaving large numbers of personnel at the brigades’ home  stations, known as rear detachments. To manage these large rear  detachments, brigades have undertaken significant planning to ensure  that enough stay-behind leadership existed to maintain a sufficient  command structure and provide certain training. In 2012, we reported on  the actions needed to guide geographic combatant commands and  service efforts in regard to SFA. Specifically, we reported that DOD had  taken steps to establish its concept for conducting SFA, including broadly  defining the term and identifying actions needed to plan for and prepare  forces to execute it. We further reported that geographic combatant  commands face challenges that limit their ability to plan for and track SFA  as a distinct activity. In the 2012 report, we recommended that DOD  develop or modify existing guidance that further defines the department’s  intent for SFA and what additional actions are required by the geographic  combatant commands to plan for and conduct SFA beyond their existing  security cooperation efforts. We also recommended that DOD take  actions to ensure that updates to the Global Theater Security Cooperation  Management Information System and the business rules being developed  provide a mechanism and guidance to stakeholders to specifically identify  and track SFA activities. DOD partially concurred with our  recommendations, noting that it believed that the department had taken  some steps to address some of the issues identified in our report. For  example, DOD stated that additional guidance to the geographic  combatant commands and services would be useful to promote  understanding of SFA but noted that recently published strategic and  planning guidance incorporated SFA planning requirements.
H.R. Rep. No. 113-102, at 127-128 (2013).
GAO to review the Army’s and Marine Corps’ approaches to the SFA  mission. We assessed the extent to which (1) the Army and Marine Corps  identify and track personnel with SFA-related training, education, and  experience; and (2) the Army and Marine Corps consider SFA-related  training, education, and experience in the promotion process. In addition,  we describe the process the Army uses to prepare units to perform their  core missions while some unit members are deployed to support SFA  activities.
To determine the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps identify and  track personnel with SFA-related training, education, and experience, we  reviewed relevant policies, directives, and other documents and  interviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, and Marine Corps  officials to ascertain whether they have developed indicators to define  SFA-related training, education, and experience and mechanisms for  identifying and tracking personnel with such training, education, and  experience. To determine the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps  consider SFA-related training, education, and experience in the promotion  process, we analyzed guidance and other documents that identify critical  elements of a career path and reviewed guidance provided to promotion  boards to instruct them on how to incorporate SFA-related training,  education, and experience in their evaluation of individuals for promotion.  In addition, we interviewed Department of the Army Headquarters officials  from the Personnel and Operations and Plans directorates, Army Human  Resources Command, Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, and  Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve Affairs. To describe the process  that the Army uses to prepare units to perform their core missions when  some unit members are deployed to support SFA-related activities, we  reviewed documentation and interviewed knowledgeable officials from  four selected SFA brigades to ascertain any potential readiness  challenges to units having the ability to train and manage their readiness  for core and assigned missions; and we reviewed what mitigation  strategies, if any, they developed. We consulted with Army Forces  Command officials to identify brigades that recently deployed as SFA  Brigades. From the list these officials provided, we contacted brigades to  identify which ones had a large rear detachment and had personnel  available to speak with us. We then selected which brigades to visit.  Officials from these brigades were also able to provide their perceptions  of the effect that serving in an SFA-related role may have on promotion  opportunities. We did not report on the readiness of the rear detachment  for the Marine Corps because the Marine Corps’ sourcing approach does  not create the same type of large rear detachments that result from the  Army’s use of SFA brigades.  More detailed information on our scope and  methodology is provided in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2013 to July 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Army and Marine Corps use established mechanisms that allow them  to categorize and track personnel with specific skill sets. Specifically,  each service uses Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) and additional  skill identifiers to categorize the specific jobs and skill sets of officers and  enlisted servicemembers. Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3,  Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-25, Department of the Army  Pamphlet 611-21, and the Marine Corps’ Military Occupational Specialties  Manual outline the MOS and skill identifiers for officers and enlisted  personnel.extend over one or more grades. For instance, infantrymen in the Army  have an MOS of 11B, while those in the Marine Corps have an MOS of  03. Each MOS outlines a path for career development and management  of each MOS by grade. This path helps direct the training, education, and  experience that will guide a servicemember in career development, but it  does not guarantee that individual’s success. Instead, it describes the full  spectrum of development opportunities that an officer or enlisted  servicemember is expected to pursue throughout his or her career. For  example, majors seeking promotion to lieutenant colonel in the field  artillery branch of the Army are expected to continue their professional  development by completing certain required military education and  serving in key assignments such as fires brigade S3, as well as   The MOS describes a set of related duties and tasks that  developmental assignments such as training developer. Further, these  majors are expected to continue self-development efforts to build  organizational leadership and strategic perspective, and to hone  operational skills.
In addition to the MOS, a skill identifier is a career-management tool that  identifies specific skills that are required to perform the duties of a  particular position and are not related to any one branch, functional area,  or career field. For example, all Army infantry officers who have met  ranger training requirements will have a skill identifier of 5R, and those  who have met parachutist training requirements will have a skill identifier  of 5P. As servicemembers obtain additional skills not related to their  primary skill set, they can be awarded an additional skill identifier  associated with that skill set, based on their meeting criteria laid out in  training standards or manuals. MOS and additional skill identifiers are  maintained in the personnel data systems for the Army and Marine Corps  and can be searched to identify personnel with certain experience.
section_title: The Army and Marine Corps Have Taken Steps to Identify and Track Personnel with SFA-Related Training, Education, and Experience, but the Army Does Not Have a Plan or Time Frame for Completion
paragraphs: DOD has established a requirement for the services to identify and track  personnel who have completed SFA-related training, education, or  experience in the Defense Readiness Reporting System with a relevant  skill-designator indicating their SFA qualifications. According to  Department of the Army headquarters officials, the Army has developed a  mechanism to identify and track personnel who have completed certain  SFA-related training and education and is considering steps to take  toward identifying and tracking personnel with SFA-related experience,  but it has not made a decision on what approach it will take. Further, the  Army has not developed a plan with goals and milestones to identify and  track personnel with SFA-related experience. The Marine Corps is in the  process of implementing a means to identify and track individuals with  SFA-related training, education, and experience.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Established a Requirement for the Services to Identify and Track Personnel with SFA- Related Training, Education, and Experience
paragraphs: In October 2010, DOD issued an instruction—DOD Instruction (DODI)  5000.68— that broadly defines SFA and outlines responsibilities for key  stakeholders to plan, prepare for, and execute SFA activities. The  instruction states that DOD shall develop and maintain the capability  within DOD general purpose forces, special operations forces, and the  civilian expeditionary workforce to conduct SFA activities in support of  U.S. policy and in coordination with the relevant U.S. government  departments or agencies. The instruction further states that DOD shall  conduct SFA activities with the appropriate combination of general  purpose forces, special operations forces, and civilian expeditionary  workforce under a variety of conditions that include: (1) politically  sensitive environments where an overt U.S. presence is unacceptable to  the host-country government; (2) environments where a limited, overt  U.S. presence is acceptable to the host-country government; and (3)  environments where a large-scale U.S. presence is considered necessary  and acceptable to the host-country government. The instruction further  requires that the secretaries of the military departments identify and track  individuals who have completed SFA-related training, education, or  experience in the Defense Readiness Reporting Systemskill-designator indicating their SFA qualifications. According to DODI  5000.68, the secretaries shall develop, maintain, and institutionalize  capabilities of servicemembers to support DOD efforts to organize, train,  equip, and advise foreign military forces. Having the ability to identify and  track individuals with SFA-related training, education, and experience will  assist DOD in institutionalizing SFA capabilities. Officials at the Office of  the Secretary of Defense, Department of the Army, and Headquarters  Marine Corps stated that it was important to be able to identify and track  servicemembers with SFA-related training, education, and experience so  that they could be utilized for future SFA missions. Having this tracking  capability will assist the Army and Marine Corps in identifying the right  people to carry out SFA activities.   with a relevant  In April 2011, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council issued a  memorandum endorsing certain recommended SFA actions. As we  reported in 2012, the memorandum identified 25 tasks related to the  implementation of SFA across DOD in the areas of doctrine, organization,  training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities.  According to SFA Working Group officials, this memorandum does not  constitute policy. However, like DODI 5000.68, it emphasizes the need to  identify and track personnel with SFA-related training, education, and  experience. For example, one of the tasks that was emphasized for the  services was the need to establish skill identifiers for military personnel  with SFA-related training and experience, and the need to track these  personnel. According to the memorandum, this task was to be completed  by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the  services, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and United States  Special Operations Command by April 2013. According to officials, an  SFA Steering Committee and Working Group were established in January  2011 to coordinate the department’s efforts to develop SFA policy and  capabilities and manage the implementation of DODI 5000.68.
According to officials with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness, SFA continues to be a priority for DOD. As a  result, officials stated that an instruction on irregular warfare  and SFA is  being drafted in order to emphasize how DOD will conduct SFA activities.  Among other things, according to officials, the instruction will reiterate the  importance of identifying and tracking personnel with SFA-related  training, education, and experience so that they can be utilized for future  missions.
Irregular warfare is defined as a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for  legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. It favors indirect and asymmetric  approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order  to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.
section_title: The Army Is Able to Identify and Track Personnel with Certain SFA-Related Training and Education, but It Lacks a Mechanism to Identify and Track SFA-Related Experience
paragraphs: The Army has taken steps toward identifying and tracking personnel with  certain SFA-related training and education, but efforts to identify and track  SFA-related experience are incomplete. Officials told us that since 2008,  they have been identifying and tracking soldiers who attend certain SFA  training with a Personnel Development Skill Identifier code. The Army  uses Personnel Development Skill Identifier codes in combination with an  area of concentration or MOS to identify unique skills, training, and  experience personnel may obtain during their careers. Normally, the  principal organizations or agency may request establishment of a  Personnel Development Skill Identifier code for tracking unique skills,  training, or experience where identification of qualified personnel would  be beneficial to the Army. Personnel Development Skill Identifier codes  identify skills, training, and experience that do not meet the minimum  standards for establishment of an additional skill identifier or have too few  individuals meeting the qualifications to warrant the creation of an  additional skill identifier. For example, the Army has created Personnel  Development Skill Identifier codes to identify and track soldiers who have  completed congressional fellowship training, completed training and 6- month deployment in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations,  and completed training for the maintenance of various weapons systems.  With regard to certain SFA-related training and education, the Army has  established Personnel Development Skill Identifier codes for the following  training activities:  successfully completing a resident advisor training course at Fort  Riley and Fort Polk; successfully completing an advisor training course at the Phoenix  Academy in Iraq; and successfully completing advisor training offered by the mobile  training team from Fort Polk.
Army officials acknowledged that while these Personnel Development  Skill Identifier codes can be used to identify and track soldiers who attend  these SFA-related training courses, the codes do not identify and track  the actual experience that a soldier obtains from serving in an SFA- related role or any other SFA-related training and education that soldiers  might receive. For example, according to an Army official, one brigade  that is regionally aligned to Africa receives SFA-related training through a  course called Dagger University at Fort Riley that is not captured by any  of the existing Personnel Development Skill Identifier codes. Further,  Army officials noted that some personnel trained in these activities might  not have actually served in these roles.
Army officials stated that the Army has been considering steps to take  toward identifying and tracking personnel with SFA experience, but has  not yet developed a mechanism with which to do so. Officials from  Department of the Army Headquarters Operations and Plans office stated  that they have ongoing efforts to identify the best approach, which may  include developing or expanding on existing Personnel Development Skill  Identifier codes, or creating an additional skill identifier or MOS to meet  the requirement in DODI 5000.68 to identify and track personnel with  SFA-related experience. Army officials told us that they could create new  SFA-related Personnel Development Skill Identifier codes or expand  existing ones to identify and track personnel with SFA-related experience.  The officials stated that they use a similar process to capture not only the  education and training, but also the experience of individuals who have  served in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program. For example,  Personnel Development Skill Identifier code T2A identifies soldiers who  completed language, counterinsurgency, and culture training as part of  that program. Personnel Development Skill Identifier code T2B identifies  the soldiers who successfully completed a 1-year deployment to  Afghanistan or Pakistan and utilized skills and training from the  Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program. Officials indicated to us that they  could potentially enhance existing SFA-related Personnel Developer Skill  Identifier codes to capture the SFA-related experience of soldiers.  However, as of the time of our review, Army headquarters officials stated  that the Army had not decided which approach it would use. As a result,  while they can identify personnel with certain SFA-related training and  education, they have not developed a mechanism to identify and track  personnel with SFA-related experience.
Army officials knowledgeable about these efforts told us that they have  not yet determined what mechanism they might use to identify and track  personnel with SFA-related experience for several reasons, including a  lack of clarity regarding what activities and experience constitute SFA.  For example:
Determining activities that constitute SFA. According to officials  from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Personnel and  Readiness, SFA continues to evolve to meet emerging threats. Army  officials stated that they are still trying to determine what activities  constitute SFA. An Army headquarters official stated that identifying  an activity as SFA is subjective and the Army is still trying to figure out  how SFA fits into irregular warfare.
Determining SFA experience. Army officials with whom we spoke  stated that they are trying to determine the level of SFA responsibility  that a soldier must assume in order for it to be recognized as sufficient  for SFA experience and thereby tracked. For example, some  individuals serve as junior members on SFA teams and may not  continually engage in an advising role, whereas the leader of the SFA  team is continuously advising foreign military officials.
Officials from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness office told us they do not intend to issue any more prescriptive  guidance to the services about SFA. Similarly, members of the SFA  Working Group stated that the information available on SFA is adequate  and they believe it is unnecessary to provide the services with any  additional SFA guidance. We found several issued documents that define  SFA or identify the characteristics that individuals conducting SFA  activities should possess. These documents include the following:
The 2013 Army Field Manual on Army Support to Security  Cooperation, which provides details on the advisor roles,  considerations for working effectively with foreign security forces, and  personality traits of advisors. According to this manual, not every  soldier is well suited to be an advisor. It identifies tolerance for  ambiguity, open-mindedness, and empathy, among others, as traits  that greatly enhance the advisor’s ability to adapt and thrive in a  foreign culture.
The Security Force Assistance Lexicon and Framework, issued in  November 2011, was intended to promote a common understanding  of SFA and related terms by providing greater clarity on the definition  of SFA and how it relates to other existing terms, such as security  cooperation and security assistance.
The International Security Assistance Force Guide 2.0, which was  updated in January 2014, defines SFA and provides information about  advisor characteristics for the advising mission in Afghanistan.  According to this guide, not everyone is qualified to perform advisory  functions. Similar to the Army Field Manual on Army Support to  Security Cooperation, it identifies a tolerance for ambiguity, empathy,  and open-mindedness, among others, as characteristics that will  enhance an advisor’s ability to adapt and thrive in a foreign culture.
In January 2014, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness issued a memorandum with guidance that identifies the  common training standards for the SFA mission. The memorandum  lays out a list of skills—such as patience, adaptability, judgment, and  initiative—related to SFA that are common across the forces, as well  as standards that can be used as guidelines for measuring the  qualifications of individuals and collective forces. It identifies a set of  benchmarks for the services to use to identify, train, and track  individuals and collective forces conducting SFA activities. For  example, according to the memorandum, a servicemember should be  proficient in cross-cultural communications, which include the ability to  identify and discern cultural differences, and should demonstrate  adaptability to engage in unfamiliar situations.
In 2012, we reported that combatant commanders lacked a clear  understanding of SFA and therefore DOD made efforts to clarify the  meaning of SFA. In spite of DOD’s efforts, Army officials with whom we spoke stated that confusion still remains regarding what constitutes SFA.  According to SFA Working Group members, there may be a need for  additional education regarding available resources that define and list  activities that constitute SFA.
Although Army officials stated that the Army has considered steps to  identify and track personnel with SFA-related experience, the Army has  not established a plan with goals and milestones for how or when these  steps will be completed. Since the Army does not have a mechanism to  identify and track personnel with SFA-related experience, the Army would  have to review duty descriptions in personnel files individually in order to  determine which servicemembers have SFA-related experience. Manually  reviewing files can be a laborious, time-consuming effort. Some DOD  officials told us that it is not an efficient way to conduct business. Further,  reviewing personnel files individually to identify servicemembers with  SFA-related experience does not meet the requirement to identify and  track individuals who have completed SFA-related training, education, or  experience in the Defense Readiness Reporting System with a relevant  skill-designator indicating their SFA qualifications. According to DODI  5000.68, individuals with SFA-related training, education, or experience  were to be identified and tracked in the Defense Readiness Reporting  System. However, since the Army has not established a method to  identify and track personnel with SFA-related experience, this information  is not being integrated into that system. Instead, personnel at Human  Resources Command said they are able to manually review personnel  files in order to identify servicemembers with SFA-related experience.
As noted above, the Army has not decided what approach it will take to  identify and track personnel with SFA-related experience. Further,  according to a headquarters Army official, no time frame has been set for  meeting this requirement. Standard practices for project management call  for agencies to conceptualize, define, and document specific goals and  objectives in the planning process, along with appropriate steps,  milestones, time frames, and resources to achieve those results.  Without goals and milestones, it is unclear how long the Army’s  implementation of the DODI 5000.68 requirement to identify and track  personnel with SFA-related experience might take. As a result, the Army  is at risk for not being able to readily identify the right personnel with the  right SFA-related skills and experience to serve in an SFA mission. This  could potentially limit the effectiveness of the advisor teams and the  Army’s ability to develop, maintain, and institutionalize the capabilities of  servicemembers to conduct SFA activities to build the capacity and  capability of foreign military forces.
section_title: The Marine Corps Is Establishing a Free Military Occupational Specialty to Identify and Track Personnel with SFA- Related Training, Education, and Experience
paragraphs: The Marine Corps has approved and is in the process of implementing an  officer and enlisted Free MOS to identify and track personnel with SFA- related training, education, and experience. A Free MOS is an auxiliary  MOS that can be assigned to any Marine to reflect the acquisition of  certain skill sets beyond those related to the primary MOS. Initially, in  2011, the Marine Corps developed an online irregular-warfare skills  tracker to provide this capability, and the information in it was not readily  accessible, could not be grouped by unit, and was not integrated with any  other system in the Marine Corps. While the tracker met the intent of  DODI 5000.68 to identify and track personnel with SFA-related  experience and will be developed to meet emerging irregular warfare  requirements, it was not sufficient in helping the Marine Corps assign  servicemembers to SFA positions. As a result, in April 2013, the Marine  Corps decided to develop a Free MOS that could be used to identify and  track personnel with SFA-related training, education, and experience. The  Marine Corps currently uses Free MOS to capture personnel with other  skill sets and experience, such as personnel who have served as foreign  area officers and regional area officers. The Marine Corps tasked its  human resources command—Manpower and Reserve Affairs— as the  lead to integrate the Free MOS into existing personnel systems in  accordance with standard procedures for the creation of a new Free  MOS.
In December 2013, the Commanding General of the United States Marine  Corps Training and Education Command approved the Foreign Security  Force Advisor Free MOS for officers and enlisted personnel. The Free  MOS is currently being finalized and is expected to be included in the  Marine Corps fiscal year 2015 MOS Manual. The Marine Corps is  planning for the Free MOS to be available by October 1, 2014, to assign  to those Marines who meet specified qualifications. Those qualifications  are identified as follows in the memorandum that approved the language  for the Free MOS that will be added to the MOS manual:
Prerequisites. The Marine must complete the appropriate Regional,  Culture, and Language training for that Marine’s grade. In addition,  the Marine must have an endorsement from a battalion- or squadron- level commanding officer certifying that the Marine has met the  prerequisites, is mature, and is capable of independent operations.
Requirements. The Marine must complete the Marine Corps Advisor  Course. Alternatively, if the Marine does not complete the Marine  Corps Advisor Course, the Marine can be certified by a commanding  officer after demonstrating sufficient expertise in advising foreign  security forces in an on-the-job training environment spanning a  cumulative period of at least 6 months while still serving in the  position.
According to the Marine Administrative Message that the Marine Corps  has developed to announce approval of the Free MOS, Marines who  have already graduated from an advisor course or who have 6 months or  more of cumulative on-the-job experience advising foreign security forces  may apply to be grandfathered in to receive the Free MOS. The Marine  Corps Security Cooperation Group will convene a panel in order to review  these applicants’ packages, which should include a letter from the  applicant to the commanding officer of the Marine Corps Security  Cooperation Group, endorsement from battalion- or squadron-level or  higher commanding officer, and documentation demonstrating that the  Marine graduated from an advisor training course, among other things.  The Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group is responsible for  managing the Foreign Security Force Advisor MOS and the Marine  Advisor Course. In the event that the Marine Corps Security Cooperation  Group is disbanded, the Training and Education Command commanding  officer would be responsible for determining who would provide the  training going forward.
section_title: The Army and Marine Corps Have Taken Steps to Ensure the Consideration of SFA- Related Training, Education, and Experience in the Promotion Process
paragraphs: The Army and Marine Corps have established processes to guide and  evaluate career progression. Both services have taken a number of  actions to give consideration to those serving in SFA-related positions  during the promotion process. However, DOD cannot evaluate the effect  that serving in an SFA-related role could have on career progression  because the Army and Marine Corps have not established a mechanism  to identify and track servicemembers with SFA-related experience.
subsections: section_title: The Army and Marine Corps Have Established Processes to Guide and Evaluate Career Progression
paragraphs: The Army and Marine Corps convene promotion boards to review  personnel for career advancement. These promotion boards consist of 5  to 21 servicemembers whose rank is above that of the promotion  candidates. The promotion cycles for officers and enlisted personnel  occur throughout the year. The promotion process is confidential, and  each board member is briefed on and reviews the same information for  each candidate, to include performance evaluations, assignment history,  and professional development and education. According to DOD officials,  board members review the entirety of servicemembers’ careers when  making decisions about promotions.
Both the Army and the Marine Corps provide guidance to promotion  boards to assist them in their deliberations. Specifically, the Army  provides every promotion board member with a Memorandum of  Instruction signed by the Secretary of the Army for officers and the Army  Chief of Staff for enlisted personnel. Similar to the Army, the Marine  Corps provides every promotion board member with instructions, also  referred to as precepts, that are signed by the Secretary of the Navy for  officers and the Commandant of the Marine Corps for the enlisted  personnel. According to the Memoranda of Instruction and precepts,  promotion board members should not consider demographic information  such as gender and ethnic background when making promotion  decisions, as they have no bearing on servicemembers’ merit and  abilities. However, they should consider education, experience, and  physical fitness in their deliberations. More specifically, for example, one  of the Army’s Memoranda of Instruction that we reviewed states that it is  important that officers selected by board members for promotion possess  the right mix of field and headquarters experience, as well as the training  and education to meet current and future leadership requirements.
Further, it states that all assignments are important to sustain a trained  and ready Army.
section_title: The Army and Marine Corps Have Taken a Number of Actions to Give Consideration to Those Serving in SFA-Related Positions during the Promotion Process
paragraphs: The Army and the Marine Corps have taken a number of steps to ensure  that servicemembers with SFA-related experience receive consideration  for serving in these positions during the promotion process. Both services  have incorporated language into the guidance given to each promotion  board member every time a promotion board is held to ensure that  appropriate consideration is given to individuals who have served on  advisor teams. For example, both the Army’s Memoranda of Instruction  and the Marine Corps’ precepts for promotion boards state that, given the  current operational environment, promotion board members should pay  particular attention to servicemembers with unique key and  developmental positions, to include serving on an advisor team.
Specifically, as it relates to SFA, one of the Army’s Memoranda of  Instruction states that the absence of command, combat experience, or  support of deployed forces should not be a basis for nonselection for  promotion. With regard to service as an advisor, the memorandum cites  the important role that advisor teams play in enabling the United States to  hand over security responsibilities to host-nation security forces and  notes that advisor teams operate under very austere conditions and  coach, teach, and mentor host-nation security forces while simultaneously  conducting combat operations as they are embedded with host-nation  security forces. The memorandum instructs the promotion board to  appreciate the challenging nature of demands of advisor team jobs and to  provide appropriate consideration in the overall evaluation of the record of  each officer and enlisted servicemember who has served on these teams.
Similarly, the Marine Corps’ precepts direct each promotion board to be  especially diligent in weighing the qualifications of officers and enlisted  personnel serving in advisor teams. They further state that, in board  deliberations, service in these critical positions should be weighted  equally with traditional Marine Corps officer and enlisted positions in the  operational forces supporting overseas contingency operations because  assignments are made in the best interest of the Marine Corps. To  emphasize the importance of giving proper consideration to  servicemembers who have served in SFA positions, according to a  Marine Corps official, the Marine Corps is planning to draft additional  language that will be briefed to members of each promotion board prior to  their ranking of servicemembers for promotion.
In addition, according to an Army headquarters official, in an effort to  ensure that servicemembers who serve on advisor teams are given credit  for SFA-related experience, the Army made changes to its MOS  publications. In 2008, the Army Chief of Staff stated that soldiers who  served on advisor teams were developing the skills and experience that  are vital for the Army to accomplish tasks from direct combat to stability  operations, recognizing that these skills will be a major part of military  operations in the future. To ensure that majors serving on advisor teams  receive recognition and credit for their service, the Army Chief of Staff  directed the Army to designate service on an advisor team as a key  assignment for infantry majors in Department of the Army Pamphlet 600- 3. For majors, serving on a brigade or battalion advisor team is therefore  comparable to being assigned as, among other things, a battalion  executive officer or brigade operations officer. According to an Army  personnel official, the Army Chief of Staff’s statement also served as a  driver for the Army not only to change Department of the Army Pamphlet  600-3, but also to change Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-25, as  well as the Memorandum of Instruction provided to promotion board  members. The pamphlets have been updated to indicate that service in  an advisor role is a key developmental opportunity. For example, the  MOS of Army infantry majors and lieutenant colonels now reflect that  service on advisor teams can be considered part of their key  developmental assignments.
section_title: Opinions Differ Regarding the Effect of Serving in an SFA-Related Position on Career Progression
paragraphs: We found differing opinions regarding the effect that Army and Marine  Corps guidance have on the manner in which individuals with SFA-related  training, education, and experience are considered during the promotion  process. Several officials from the SFA brigades as well as officials at the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army and Marine Corps headquarters,  Human Resources Command, and Manpower and Reserve Affairs stated  that serving as an SFA advisor could negatively affect career progression.  Specifically, in 14 of the 24 interviews we conducted at these  organizations, officials stated that serving in an SFA-related role could  potentially negatively affect career progression, or that their own careers  had been negatively affected as a result of serving in an SFA-related role.  According to officials, serving in an SFA-related position could cause a  servicemember to miss or be delayed in completing a key developmental  step outlined in the MOS publication, which could negatively affect the  member’s career progression. For example:
One servicemember stated that he was taken out of company  command to serve on an advisor team. This cut his company  commander time down, which he believed made him less competitive  compared to other servicemembers in his year group who had  completed company command in accordance with the professional  development outlined for his MOS.
One soldier said that he wanted to apply for an opportunity that would  allow him to transfer from a combat arms position into the Foreign  Area Officer branch. According to the soldier, the time spent serving  on an advisor team shortened the amount of time he could spend  completing key developmental steps that were a prerequisite for him  to transfer. The soldier stated that as a result of not completing the  key developmental steps in his MOS, he did not qualify to apply for  the transfer.
Conversely, some servicemembers with whom we spoke stated that they  felt their careers had not been negatively affected. For example, one  servicemember told us that he served on an advisor team and is now a  colonel. He stated that serving in an SFA-related role is viewed in a  positive manner and that soldiers seek these positions. Similarly, officials  from the Army’s Operations and Plans office stated that some soldiers’  careers could potentially be enhanced as a result of serving in an SFA- related position.
In addition, officials from Army Human Resources Command and Marine  Corps Manpower and Reserve Affairs, as well as officials from the Office  of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,  Department of the Army Headquarters, and the Marine Corps Security  Cooperation Group, stated that other factors likely play into decisions not  to promote an individual. They noted that the promotion process  considers the entirety of an individual’s career and not just the time spent  as an advisor. According to the Army’s MOS manual, success does not  depend on the number or type of positions held, but rather on the quality  of duty performance in every assignment. As a result, officials stated that  serving as an advisor was unlikely to be the sole explanation for a failure  to be promoted. According to officials, if a soldier performs well, that  soldier will be promoted regardless of the role he or she was assigned.
According to DOD officials, it is difficult if not impossible to determine why  a servicemember did not get promoted, because the promotion boards do  not maintain a record of or discuss the reasons why a person did not get  promoted. Officials from the Army Human Resources Command and the  Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve Affairs Department informed us  that they monitor where servicemembers are in their career to try to  ensure that servicemembers are able to obtain a key developmental step  that may be missed. Although some servicemembers stated that their  careers could potentially be negatively affected as a result of serving in  an SFA-related role, the Army and Marine Corps are currently unable to  assess this potential negative effect or to take any needed corrective  actions. Specifically, information about who has SFA-related experience  is necessary in order to isolate this population from those who have not  served in an SFA-related role. As noted above, while the Army has  developed a Personnel Development Skill Identifier to identify and track  soldiers with SFA-related training and education, the Army has not  developed a mechanism with which to identify and track personnel with  SFA-related experience, and the Marine Corps’ mechanism will not be  available until October 2014. As a result, officials are not able to conduct  an assessment of personnel to determine whether there are different  promotion rates for people who served on advisor teams versus those  who did not, which could be a potential indicator that servicemembers  with SFA-related experience were negatively affected during the  promotion process.
section_title: The Army Continues to Manage the Large Rear Detachments That Result from Deploying Personnel to Support SFA Missions
paragraphs: We recently reported that the Army’s use of SFA brigades to form advisor  teams has enabled it to meet requirements, but this practice results in  those brigades leaving behind large numbers of personnel at the  brigades’ home stations. Officials from each of the four SFA brigades with  whom we met confirmed that this continues to be the case and said that  they left behind a large rear detachment when they deployed. For  example, according to officials from one of the brigades we visited, the  brigade deployed approximately 500 people to create advisor teams,  leaving approximately 3,000 personnel behind at their home station.  Officials from another brigade that deployed as an SFA brigade stated  that approximately 1,900 personnel were deployed, leaving behind about  the same number in the rear detachment. In 2013, we reported that  because the advisor team requirement calls for high numbers of  company- and field-grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers,  staffing the teams requires the brigades to deploy a significant portion of  their leadership and expertise, including the brigade commanders and  many battalion, company, and platoon commanders, for the advisor  mission. Army Forces Command officials confirmed that this continues  to be the Army’s process and that as a result, in providing these senior  servicemembers to the advisor teams, the brigades are forced to rely on  more junior officers and enlisted personnel at their home stations to  manage the rear detachment. For example, according to SFA brigade  officials we interviewed, in some cases they relied on captains, who  would typically be responsible for leading a company, to serve as rear- detachment battalion commanders.
The rear-detachment commanders and other SFA brigade officials with  whom we spoke stated they faced numerous challenges with managing  personnel who were left at home stations. Officials from two of the SFA  brigades we spoke with stated that their biggest challenge stemmed from  effectively managing medical, legal, and other administrative issues while  concurrently maintaining readiness and responding to installation tasks.  These officials also stated that another challenge they faced was  ensuring that equipment was accounted for properly.
During this review, officials from the SFA brigades we met with stated that  the brigades’ predeployment planning efforts ensured that the brigades  left behind sufficient leadership to manage the rear detachments and  develop training plans to maintain readiness. A number of other actions  were also taken to maintain readiness that included the following:
Consolidating Units: According to officials from two of the brigades we  spoke with, to ensure that leadership is available to conduct training,  some brigades consolidated units. For example, one rear-detachment  battalion commander told us that his battalion teamed up with another  battalion to ensure they could conduct training to maintain their  readiness.
Leaving Key Leadership Personnel: Officials told us that leaving the  right personnel behind to manage the rear detachment is just as  important as deploying the right personnel. Officials from the four SFA  brigades we met with stated that brigade leadership had to undertake  significant planning to ensure that the right leadership remained at the  home station. One SFA brigade official with whom we spoke said that  rear-detachment leadership candidates were interviewed prior to  being assigned as rear-detachment commanders to ensure that they  had the personal and professional attributes needed to effectively  manage the rear detachment. Officials from two of the SFA brigades  we met with stated that the right leadership was needed to manage  the training, legal, medical, and other administrative issues of the  soldiers who remained at the home station.
Conducting Training and Maintaining Readiness: Army Forces  Command issued guidance for the training and employment of rear  detachments during advisor team deployments, including missions the  force may be assigned to, training expectations, and equipment  maintenance responsibilities. According to Army Forces Command  officials, Army Forces Command allowed the brigade leadership to  determine the type and amount of training that could be conducted  based on the number of personnel remaining at the home station. For  example, officials from each of the four SFA brigades with whom we  met stated that they developed training plans for what the rear  detachment would train on while the rest of the brigade was deployed.
Reporting Readiness: Prior to October 2013, brigades were required  to report only on the status of deployed forces and equipment. The  Department of the Army issued guidance in October 2013 to gain  better visibility over all available personnel and equipment. It required  units to report on personnel and equipment that were deployed and at  the rear detachment. However, it is still up to the rear-detachment  brigade leadership to determine the level of readiness that they can  achieve with the personnel and equipment remaining at the home  station.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: SFA has been and continues to be an enduring part of the U.S. military  effort in Afghanistan and other locations around the world. Accordingly,  DOD wants to ensure that it has the ability to develop, maintain, and  institutionalize the capabilities of servicemembers to provide SFA to  foreign military forces. To ensure that the Army and Marine Corps have  the right people with the right skill sets to serve in an SFA mission, DOD  must be able to identify and track personnel with SFA-related training,  education, and experience. Without a systematic means to identify and  track personnel with SFA-related training, education, and experience, the  Army and Marine Corps (1) cannot monitor the career progression of  servicemembers with SFA-related experience; and (2) are limited in their  ability to evaluate the effectiveness of their guidance. Currently DOD  lacks this capability, and the Army has not developed a plan—including  goals and milestones—to complete the implementation and  institutionalization of its ability to identify and track personnel with SFA- related experience. Until the Army develops such a plan, it is at risk of not  being able to readily identify the right personnel with the right skills and  experience to serve in an SFA mission. Further, the absence of such a  plan could limit the effectiveness of the advisor teams and DOD’s ability  to develop, maintain, and institutionalize the capabilities of  servicemembers to provide SFA to foreign military forces.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enable the Army to address the requirement to identify and track  personnel with SFA-related experience, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and  implement a plan with goals and milestones for how it will develop the  means for systematically identifying and tracking personnel with SFA- related experience.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In  written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with  the report’s recommendation. DOD’s comments are summarized below  and reprinted in appendix II.
DOD partially concurred with the recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and implement a  plan with goals and milestones for how it will develop the means for  systematically identifying and tracking personnel with SFA-related  experience. In its letter, DOD stated that it concurred with our underlying  assessment that the Army has had difficulty in systematically identifying  and tracking personnel with SFA-related experience. However, DOD  stated that sufficient guidance and direction exists for the Army to  continue refining its processes and procedures. Specifically, DOD stated  that the Army, through the application of its Personnel Development Skill  Identifier (PDSI), is capable of identifying and designating all soldiers who  have satisfactorily completed SFA training. DOD stated that it will  continue to work with the Army in this important area.
We agree that the Army may have sufficient guidance to continue refining  its processes and procedures. As noted in the report, the Army uses  PDSI codes to capture certain SFA-related training activities; however,  some SFA-related training and education may not be captured. Moreover,  as noted in the report, the PDSI codes do not capture SFA-related  experience. DODI 5000.68, which was issued in October 2010, requires  the Army to, among other things, identify and track individuals with SFA- related training, education, and experience. As noted in the report, Army  officials told us that they were discussing the best method to identify and  track personnel with SFA-related experience, but the Army has not  established a plan with goals and milestones to develop this capability.  Such a plan will provide the necessary direction to enable the Army to  develop the means for systematically identifying and tracking personnel  with SFA-related training, education, and experience, as required by  DODI 5000.68.
DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; and the  Commandant of the Marine Corps. The report is also available at no  charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix  III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of this engagement were to assess the extent to which (1)  the Army and Marine Corps identify and track personnel with SFA-related  training, education, and experience; and (2) the Army and Marine Corps  consider SFA-related training, education, and experience in the promotion  process; and to describe the process the Army uses to prepare units to  perform their core missions while some unit members are deployed to  support SFA activities.
To determine the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps identify and  track personnel with SFA-related training, education, and experience, we  reviewed relevant policies, directives, and other documents. The  documents that we reviewed included the Department of Defense  Instruction 5000.68, the 2013 Army Field Manual on Army Support to  Security Cooperation, International Security Assistance Force SFA Guide  2.0, and Marine Corps memorandum approving a Free MOS for SFA, as  well as other memorandums as appropriate. We also interviewed officials  from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of the Army, and  Headquarters Marine Corps, and personnel from Army Human Resources  Command and Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
To determine the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps consider  SFA-related training, education, and experience in the promotion process,  we analyzed guidance and other documents that identify critical elements  of a career path and reviewed guidance provided to promotion boards to  instruct them on how to incorporate advisor experience in their evaluation  of individuals for promotion. In addition, we interviewed Department of the  Army, Headquarters Marine Corps, and service-level officials about the  promotion process. We discussed their concerns about the potential  negative effect of serving in SFA-related positions on their careers and  the careers of others. Information that we received is not generalizable.
To describe how the Army prepares units to perform their core missions  when some unit members are deployed to support SFA activities, we  reviewed documentation and interviewed knowledgeable officials from  four SFA brigades, and Army headquarters and service-level officials to  ascertain any potential challenges to units having the ability to train and  manage their readiness for core missions and mitigation strategies, if any,  they developed. As part of this review, we selected an illustrative,  nongeneralizable sample of brigades that sent SFA advisor teams to  Afghanistan. We worked with Army Forces Command officials to identify  brigades that recently deployed as SFA Brigades in Afghanistan and left a  large rear detachment. Army Forces Command provided us with a list of  five brigades that had recently served as SFA brigades in Afghanistan  and had left a large rear detachment. From the list that it provided, we  contacted the five brigades, but only four of them were available for us to  interview. We could not conduct interviews with the fifth one due to  conflicts with its deployment. From the four brigades that left a large rear  detachment when they deployed and that were available to meet with us,  we interviewed officials from the division, brigade, and battalion levels  that were responsible for managing the rear detachment at each of the  brigades we visited. We obtained testimonial evidence from the four  selected brigades to ascertain any potential readiness challenges  presented by the need to meet SFA requirements. Officials from these  brigades were also able to provide information about their perceptions of  the effect that serving in an SFA-related role has on promotion  opportunities. We did not report on the readiness of the rear detachment  for the Marine Corps because the Marine Corps’ sourcing approach does  not create the same type of large rear detachments that result from the  Army’s use of SFA brigades.
We visited or contacted officials from the following organizations during  our review:
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Arlington, Virginia
Personnel & Readiness
Military Personnel and Policy
Security Force Assistance Steering Committee and Working
Department of the Army Headquarters, Office of the Deputy Chief  of Staff for Personnel (G-1), Arlington, Virginia
Department of the Army Headquarters, Operations and Plans (G- 3/5/7), Arlington, Virginia
Human Resources Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky
101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky  A.  B.  C.  D.
1/101st Brigade Combat Team  2/101st Brigade Combat Team  3/101st Brigade Combat Team  1/101st Combat Aviation Brigade
3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia
1st Infantry Division, Regionally Aligned Forces, Fort Riley,  Kansas
United States Marine Corps
Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Arlington, Virginia
Manpower and Reserve Affairs Department, Quantico, Virginia  We conducted this performance audit from August 2013 to July 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, James A. Reynolds, Assistant  Director; Emily Biskup; Richard Burkard; Michael Silver; Sonja Ware; and  Cheryl Weissman made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Reports
paragraphs: Security Force Assistance: More Detailed Planning and Improved Access  to Information Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in Afghanistan.  GAO-13-381. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2013.
Building Partner Capacity: Key Practices to Effectively Manage  Department of Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation.  GAO-13-335T. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2013.
Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues. GAO-13-218SP. Washington, D.C.:  February 11, 2013.
Afghanistan Security: Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress and  Sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces. GAO-12-951T.  Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2012.
Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide  Geographic Combatant Command and Service Efforts. GAO-12-556.  Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2012.
Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Enhance the Ability of Army  Brigades to Support the Advising Mission. GAO-11-760. Washington,  D.C.: August 2, 2011.