DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel
Published: 2004-05-06T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Because of increased awareness of threats to national security and efforts to privatize federal jobs, the demand for security clearances for government and industry personnel has increased. Industry personnel are taking on a greater role in national security work for the Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies. Because many of these jobs require access to classified information, industry personnel need security clearances. As of September 30, 2003, industry workers held about one-third of the approximately 2 million DOD-issued security clearances. Terrorist attacks have heightened national security concerns and underscored the need for a timely, high-quality personnel security clearance process. However, GAO's past work found that DOD had a clearance backlog and other problems with its process. GAO was asked to review the clearance eligibility determination process and backlog for industry personnel. This testimony presents our preliminary observations on the security clearance process for industry personnel and describes (1) the size of the backlog and changes in the time needed to issue eligibility determinations, (2) the impediments to reducing the backlog and delays, and (3) some of the initiatives that DOD is considering to eliminate the backlog and decrease the delays. Later this month, we plan to issue our final report.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: On the basis of our preliminary observations, long-standing backlogs and delays in determining security clearance eligibility for industry personnel continue to exist and can have adverse effects. DOD's security clearance backlog for industry personnel was roughly 188,000 cases as of March 31, 2004. The backlog included estimates by the Defense Security Service (DSS)--the agency responsible for administering DOD's personnel security investigations program--that consisted of more than 61,000 reinvestigations (required for renewing clearances) that were overdue but had not been submitted to DSS; over 101,000 new DSS investigations or reinvestigations that had not been completed within DOD's established time frames; and over 25,000 cases awaiting adjudication (a determination of clearance eligibility) that had not been completed within DOD's established time frames. From fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003, the average time that it took DOD to determine clearance eligibility for industry personnel increased by 56 days to over 1 year. Delays in completing reinvestigations of industry personnel and others doing classified work can increase national security risks. In addition, delays in determining clearance eligibility can affect the timeliness, quality, and cost of contractor performance on defense contracts. Several impediments hinder DOD's ability to eliminate the backlog and decrease the amount of time needed to determine clearance eligibility for industry personnel. Impediments include a large number of new clearance requests; an increase in the proportion of requests for top secret clearances, which require more time to process; inaccurate workload projections for both the number and type of clearances needed for industry personnel; and the imbalance between workforces and workloads. Industrial contractors cited the lack of full reciprocity (the acceptance of a clearance and access granted by another department, agency, or military service) as an obstacle that can cause industry delays in filling positions and starting work on government contracts. Furthermore, DOD does not have an integrated, comprehensive management plan for addressing the backlog and delays. DOD is considering a number of initiatives to supplement actions that it has implemented in recent years to reduce the backlogs and the time needed to determine eligibility for a security clearance. Additional initiatives include (1) conducting a phased, periodic reinvestigation; (2) establishing a single adjudicative facility for industry; and (3) reevaluating investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines. GAO's forthcoming report will provide a more complete discussion of these and other initiatives.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our preliminary observations on  the process the Department of Defense (DOD) uses to determine security  clearance eligibility for industry personnel.
For a variety of reasons, including an increased awareness of threats to  our national security resulting from the terrorist attacks on the United  States on September 11, 2001, and efforts over the past decade to privatize  federal jobs, the demand for security clearances for both government  employees and industry personnel has increased over the last few years.  Individuals working for industry are playing an increasingly larger role in  national security work conducted by DOD and other federal agencies.  Many industry personnel hold jobs that allow them to work on classified  programs and activities and that require access to classified information.  To handle classified information, industry personnel must hold a security  clearance. As of September 30, 2003, industry personnel held about  682,000 (or about 34 percent) of the approximately 2 million DOD-issued  security clearances.
Terrorist attacks have heightened national security concerns and have  highlighted the need for a timely, high-quality personnel security clearance  process. As part of a three-stage process, DOD determines whether  industry personnel are eligible for a security clearance by conducting a  background investigation and adjudication (determining eligibility for  access to classified information). However, some government and industry  officials have recently expressed concern about the security clearance  backlog—overdue security clearance reinvestigations that have not been  requested and new investigations and adjudications that have not been  completed within established time frames—and the amount of time it  takes to determine eligibility for a security clearance for industry  personnel.
Since at least the late 1990s, the timeliness of DOD’s personnel security  clearance process has been at issue. As our previous work has shown,  backlogs and delays in personnel security investigations and adjudications  historically have been problems for DOD, and they affect industry  personnel as well as service members and civilian employees. In February  and September 2000 testimonies before the Subcommittee on National  Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee  on Government Reform, we noted our concerns about the amount of time  needed to obtain clearances and that DOD had historically reported a large  backlog of overdue but not submitted reinvestigations for security  clearances. In our February 2004 report, for example, we identified several  impediments that hinder DOD’s ability to eliminate its security clearance  backlog and made recommendations for decreasing the backlog and  improving timeliness. Likewise, this committee reported that DOD’s  personnel security investigations backlog poses a threat to national  security and recommended actions to address the backlog.
Mr. Chairman, in June 2003, you and the Vice Chairman of this committee  asked us to review the process DOD uses to determine security clearance  eligibility for industry personnel. Later this month, we plan to provide you  with a report containing the final results and our recommendations.
Today, I will present our preliminary observations on DOD’s security  clearance process for industry personnel. Specifically, I will discuss  (1) the size of the backlog and changes during the last 3 fiscal years in the  time needed to issue eligibility determinations, (2) the impediments to  reducing the backlog and delays, and (3) some of the initiatives that DOD  is considering to eliminate the backlog and decrease the delays.
In conducting this review, we examined DOD policy guidance, regulations,  instructions, and statistical evidence on the security clearance process  for industry personnel. In addition, we reviewed reports by GAO, DOD,  congressional staff, and other government entities. We also interviewed  DOD and industry officials, observed the procedures used to process  clearance information, and assessed the reliability of databases. We  determined that the data for fiscal years 2001 and thereafter were  sufficiently reliable for the purpose of our work. At the end of my  statement is a list of related GAO products. We conducted our review  from July 2003 through April 2004 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In March 1997, a White House memorandum implemented adjudicative  guidelines, temporary eligibility standards, and investigative standards  governmentwide. The National Security Council is responsible for  overseeing these guidelines and standards. Within DOD, the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD ) is responsible for  coordinating and implementing DOD-wide policies related to access to  classified information. Within OUSD (I), the Defense Security Service  (DSS) is responsible for conducting background investigations and  administering the personnel security investigations program for DOD and  24 other federal agencies that allow industry personnel access to classified  information. DSS’s Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO)  adjudicates cases that contain only favorable information or minor  security issues. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)  within DOD’s Office of General Counsel adjudicates cases that contain  more serious security issues.
As with military members and federal workers, industry personnel must  obtain a security clearance to gain access to classified information, which  is categorized into three levels: top secret, secret, and confidential.  Individuals who need access to classified information over a long period  are required to periodically renew their clearance (a reinvestigation).  The time frames for reinvestigations are 5 years for top secret clearances,  10 years for secret clearances, and 15 years for confidential clearances.
To ensure the trustworthiness, judgment, and reliability of contractor  personnel in positions requiring access to classified information, DOD  relies on a three-stage personnel security clearance process that includes  (1) determining that the position requires a clearance and, if so, submitting  a request for a clearance to DSS, (2) conducting an initial investigation or  reinvestigation, and (3) using the investigative report to determine  eligibility for access to classified information—a procedure known as  “adjudication.” Figure 1 depicts this three-stage process and the federal  government offices that have the lead responsibility for each stage.
In the preinvestigation stage, the industrial contractor must determine that  a position requires the employee to have access to classified information.  If a clearance is needed, the industry employee completes a personnel  security questionnaire, and the industrial contractor submits it to DSS. All  industry requests for a DOD-issued clearance are submitted to DSS while  requests for military members and federal employees are submitted to  either DSS or the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).
In the investigation stage, DSS, OPM, or one of their contractors conducts  the actual investigation of the industry employee by using standards  established governmentwide in 1997 and implemented by DOD in 1998.  As table 1 shows, the type of information gathered in an investigation  depends on the level of clearance needed and whether an initial  investigation or a reinvestigation is required. DSS forwards the completed  investigative report to DISCO.
In the adjudicative stage, DISCO uses the information from the  investigative report to determine whether an individual is eligible for a  security clearance. If the report is determined to be a “clean” case—a case  that contains no potential security issue or minor issues—then DISCO  adjudicators determine eligibility for a clearance. However, if the case  is an “issue” case—a case containing issues that might disqualify an  individual for a clearance (e.g., foreign connections or drug- or  alcohol-related problems)—then the case is forwarded to DOHA  adjudicators for the clearance-eligibility decision. Regardless of which  office determines eligibility, DISCO issues the clearance-eligibility decision  and forwards this determination to the industrial contractor. All  adjudications are based on 13 federal adjudicative guidelines established  governmentwide in 1997 and implemented by DOD in 1998.
Recent legislation could affect DOD’s security clearance process. The  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 authorized the  transfer of DOD’s personnel security investigative functions and more than  1,800 investigative employees to OPM. However, as of March 31, 2004,  this transfer had not taken place. The transfer can occur only after the  Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress that certain conditions can be  met and the Director of OPM concurs with the transfer.
section_title: Long-standing Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel Continue to Exist and Can Have Adverse Effects
paragraphs: DOD’s security clearance backlog for industry personnel is sizeable,  and the average time needed to determine eligibility for a clearance  increased during the last 3 fiscal years to over 1 year. DSS has established  case-completion time frames for both its investigations and adjudications.  For investigations, the time frames range from 75 to 180 days, depending  on the investigative requirements. For DISCO adjudications, the time  frames are 3 days for initial clearances and 30 days for periodic  reinvestigations. DOHA’s time frame is to maintain a steady workload of  adjudicating 2,150 cases per month within 30 days of receipt. Cases  exceeding these time frames are considered backlogged.
Sizeable backlog continues to exist—As of March 31, 2004, the  security clearance backlog for industry personnel was roughly  188,000 cases. This estimate is the sum of four separate DSS-supplied  estimates: over 61,000 reinvestigations that were overdue but had not been  submitted, over 101,000 ongoing DSS investigations, over 19,000 cases  awaiting adjudication at DISCO, and more than 6,300 cases awaiting  adjudication at DOHA that had exceeded the case-completion time frames  established for conducting them. However, as of March 31, 2004, DOHA  independently reported that it had eliminated its adjudicative backlog.
Moreover, the size of the total DSS-estimated backlog for industry  personnel doubled during the 6-month period ending on March 31, 2004, as  the comparison in table 2 shows. This comparison does not include the  backlog of overdue reinvestigations that have not been submitted because  DSS was not able to estimate that backlog as of September 30, 2003.
The industry backlogs for investigations and adjudications represent about  one-fifth of the DOD-wide backlog for investigations and adjudications as  of September 30, 2003 (the date of the most recent DOD-wide data). On  that date, the estimated size of the investigative backlog for industry  personnel amounted to roughly 44,600 cases, or 17 percent of the larger  DOD-wide backlog of approximately 270,000 cases, which included  military members, federal employees, and industry personnel. Similarly,  the estimated size of the adjudicative backlog for industry personnel  totaled roughly 17,300 cases, or 19 percent of the approximately  93,000 cases in the DOD-wide adjudicative backlog on that date.
Furthermore, the size of the industrial personnel backlog may be  underestimated. In anticipation of the authorized transfer of the  investigative function from DSS to OPM, DSS had opened relatively  few cases between October 1, 2003, and March 31, 2004. More specifically,  DSS had not opened almost 69,200 new industry personnel requests  received in the first half of fiscal year 2004. Because these requests have  not been opened and investigations begun, they are not part of the 188,000  case backlog identified above. An unknown number of these cases might  have already exceeded the set time frames for completing the  investigation.
Average time to determine clearance eligibility has increased—In  the 3-year period from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003, the  average time that DOD took to determine clearance eligibility for industry  personnel increased from 319 days to 375 days, an increase of 18 percent.  (See table 3.) During fiscal year 2003, DOD took an average of more than  1 year from the time DSS received a personnel security questionnaire to  the time it issued an eligibility determination. From fiscal year 2001  through fiscal year 2003, the number of days to determine clearance  eligibility for clean cases increased from 301 days to 332 days, whereas  the time increased for issue cases from 516 days to 615 days.
Backlogs and delays can have adverse effects—Delays in renewing  security clearances for industry personnel and others who are doing  classified work can lead to a heightened risk of national security breaches.
In a 1999 report, the Joint Security Commission II pointed out that delays  in initiating reinvestigations create risks to national security because the  longer the individuals hold clearances, the more likely they are to be  working with critical information and systems. In addition, delays in  determining security clearance eligibility for industry personnel can affect  the timeliness, quality, and cost of contractor performance on defense  contracts. According to a 2003 Information Security Oversight Office  report, industrial contractor officials who were interviewed said that  delays in obtaining clearances cost industry millions of dollars per year  and affect personnel resources. The report also stated that delays in the  clearance process hampered industrial contractors’ ability to perform  duties required by their contracts and increased the amount of time  needed to complete national-security-related contracts. Industrial  contractors told us about cases in which their company hired competent  applicants who already had the necessary security clearances, rather than  individuals who were more experienced or qualified but did not have a  clearance. Industry association representatives told us that defense  contractors might offer monetary incentives to attract new employees  with clearances—for example, a $15,000 to $20,000 signing bonus for  individuals with a valid security clearance, and a $10,000 bonus to current  employees who recruit a new employee with a clearance. In addition,  defense contractors may hire new employees and begin paying them, but  not be able to assign any work to them—sometimes for a year or more— until they obtain a clearance. Contractors may also incur lost-opportunity  costs if prospective employees decide to work elsewhere rather than wait  to get a clearance.
section_title: Impediments Hinder Elimination of the Backlog and Reduction of Time Needed to Determine Eligibility for a Clearance
paragraphs: A number of impediments hinder DOD’s efforts to eliminate the clearance  backlog for industry personnel and reduce the time needed to determine  eligibility for a clearance. Impediments include large investigative and  adjudicative workloads resulting from a large number of clearance  requests in recent years and an increase in the proportion of requests  requiring top secret clearances, inaccurate workload projections, and the  imbalance between workforces and workloads. The underutilization of  reciprocity is an impediment that industrial contractors cited as an  obstacle to timely eligibility determinations. Furthermore, DOD does not  have a management plan that could help it address many of these  impediments in a comprehensive and integrative manner.
Large number of clearance requests—The large number of clearance  requests that DOD receives annually for industry personnel, military  members, and federal employees taxes a process that already is  experiencing backlogs and delays. In fiscal year 2003, DOD submitted over  775,000 requests for investigations to DSS and OPM, about one-fifth of  which (almost 143,000 requests) were for industry personnel. Table 4  shows an increase in the number of DOD eligibility determinations for  industry personnel made during each of the last 3 years. DOD issued  about 63,000 more eligibility determinations for industry personnel in  fiscal year 2003 than it did 2 years earlier, an increase of 174 percent.  During the same period, the average number of days required to issue an  eligibility determination for industry personnel grew by 56 days, or about  18 percent. In other words, the increase in the average wait time was small  compared to the increase in the number of cases.
Increase in the proportion of requests for top secret clearances— From fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2003, the proportion of all  requests requiring top secret clearances for industry personnel grew  from 17 to 27 percent. According to OUSD (I), top secret clearances take  eight times more investigative effort to complete and three times more  adjudicative effort to review than do secret clearances. The increased  demand for top secret clearances also has budget implications for DOD.  In fiscal year 2003, security investigations obtained through DSS cost  $2,640 for an initial investigation for a top secret clearance, $1,591 for  a reinvestigation of a top secret clearance, and $328 for an initial  investigation for a secret clearance. Thus, over a 10-year period, DOD  would spend $4,231 (in current-year dollars) to investigate and  reinvestigate an industry employee for a top secret clearance, a cost  13 times higher than the $328 it would require to investigate an individual  for a secret clearance.
Inaccurate workload projections—Although DSS has made efforts to  improve its projections of industry personnel security clearance  requirements, problems remain. For example, inaccurate forecasts for  both the number and type of security clearances needed for industry  personnel make it difficult for DOD to plan ahead to size its investigative  and adjudicative workforce to handle the workload and fund its security  clearance program. For fiscal year 2003, DSS reported that the actual cost  of industry personnel investigations was almost 25 percent higher than  had been projected. DOD officials believed that these projections were  inaccurate primarily because DSS received a larger proportion of  requests for initial top secret investigations and reinvestigations. Further  inaccuracies in projections may result when DOD fully implements a new  automated adjudication tracking system, which will identify overdue  reinvestigations that have not been submitted DOD-wide.
Imbalance between workforces and workloads—Insufficient  investigative and adjudicative workforces, given the current and projected  workloads, are additional barriers to eliminating the backlog and reducing  security clearance processing times for industry personnel. DOD partially  concurred with our February 2004 recommendation to identify and  implement steps to match the sizes of the investigative and adjudicative  workforces to the clearance request workload. According to an OPM  official, DOD and OPM together need roughly 8,000 full-time-equivalent  investigative staff to eliminate the security clearance backlogs and deliver  timely investigations to their customers. In our February 2004 report, we  estimated that DOD and OPM have around 4,200 full-time-equivalent  investigative staff who are either federal employees or contract  investigators.
In December 2003, advisors to the OPM Director expressed concerns  about financial risks associated with the transfer of DSS’s investigative  functions and 1,855 investigative staff authorized in the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. The advisors therefore  recommended that the transfer not occur, at least during fiscal year 2004.  On February 6, 2004, DSS and OPM signed an interagency agreement that  leaves the investigative functions and DSS personnel in DOD and provides  DSS personnel with training on OPM’s case management system and  investigative procedures as well as access to that system. According to our  calculations, if all 1,855 DSS investigative employees complete the 1-week  training program as planned, the loss in productively will be equivalent to  35 person-years of investigator time. Also, other short-term decreases in  productivity will result while DSS’s investigative employees become  accustomed to using OPM’s system and procedures.
Likewise, an adjudicative backlog of industry personnel cases  developed because DISCO and DOHA did not have an adequate number  of adjudicative personnel on hand. DISCO and DOHA have, however,  taken steps to augment their adjudicative staff. DISCO was recently  given the authority to hire 30 adjudicators to supplement its staff of  62 nonsupervisory adjudicators. Similarly, DOHA has supplemented its  23 permanent adjudicators with 46 temporary adjudicators and, more  recently, has requested that it be able to hire an appropriate number of  additional permanent adjudicators.
Reciprocity of access underutilized—While the reciprocity of security  clearances within DOD has not been a problem for industry personnel,  reciprocity of access to certain types of information and programs within  the federal government has not been fully utilized, thereby preventing  some industry personnel from working and increasing the workload on  already overburdened investigative and adjudicative staff. According to  DOD and industry officials, a 2003 Information Security Oversight Office  report on the National Industrial Security Program, and our analysis,  reciprocity of clearances appears to be working throughout most of DOD.  However, the same cannot be said for access to sensitive compartmented  information and special access programs within DOD or transferring  clearances and access from DOD to some other agencies. Similarly, a  recent report by the Defense Personnel Security Research Center  concluded that aspects of reciprocity for industrial contractors appear not  to work well and that the lack of reciprocity between special access  programs was a particular problem for industry personnel, who often  work on many of these programs simultaneously.
Industry association officials told us that reciprocity of access to certain  types of information and programs, especially the lack of full reciprocity in  the intelligence community, is becoming more common and one of the top  concerns of their members. One association provided us with several  examples of access problems that industry personnel with DOD-issued  security clearances face when working with intelligence agencies. For  example, the association cited different processes and standards used by  intelligence agencies, such as guidelines for (1) the type of investigations  and required time frames, (2) the type of polygraph tests, and (3) not  accepting adjudication decisions made by other agencies.
In addition to the reciprocity concerns relating to access to sensitive  compartmented information and special access programs, industry  officials identified additional reciprocity concerns. First, DSS and  contractor association officials told us that some personnel with an  interim clearance could not start work because an interim clearance does  not provide access to specific types of national security information, such  as sensitive compartmented information, special access programs, North  Atlantic Treaty Organization data, and restricted data.  Second,  intelligence agencies do not always accept clearance reinstatements and  conversions (e.g., a security clearance may be reactivated depending on  the recency of the investigation and the length of time since the clearance  was terminated). Third, the Smith Amendment—with exceptions— prohibits an individual with a clearance from being eligible for a  subsequent DOD clearance if certain prohibitions (e.g., unlawful user of a  controlled substance) are applicable.
Lack of overall management plan—Finally, DOD has numerous plans  to address pieces of the backlog problem but does not have an overall  management plan to eliminate permanently the current investigative and  adjudicative backlogs, reduce the delays in determining clearance  eligibility for industry personnel, and overcome the impediments that  could allow such problems to recur. These plans do not address process  wide objectives and outcome-related goals with performance measures,  milestones, priorities, budgets, personnel resources, costs, and potential  obstacles and options for overcoming the obstacles.
section_title: DOD Is Considering Several Initiatives to Decrease the Backlog and Time Period Needed to Obtain Eligibility for a Clearance
paragraphs: DOD and industry association officials have suggested several initiatives  to reduce the backlog and delays in issuing eligibility for a security  clearance. They indicated that these steps could supplement actions that  DOD has implemented in recent years or has agreed to implement as a  result of our recommendations or those of others. Even if positive effects  would result from these initiatives, other obstacles, such as the need to  change investigative standards, coordinate these policy changes with other  agencies, and ensure reciprocity, could prevent their implementation or  limit their use. Today, I will discuss three of the suggested initiatives. Our  final report to you will provide a more complete evaluation of these and  other initiatives.
Conducting a phased periodic reinvestigation—A phased approach to  periodic reinvestigations for top secret clearances involves conducting a  reinvestigation in two phases; the second phase would be conducted only  if potential security issues were identified in the initial phase. Phase 1  information is obtained through a review of the personnel security  questionnaire, subject and former spouse interviews, credit checks, a  national agency check on the subject and former spouse or current  cohabitant, local agency checks, records checks, and interviews with  workplace personnel. If one or more issues are found in phase 1, then  phase 2 would include all of the other types of information gathered in the  current periodic reinvestigation for a top secret investigation. Recent  research has shown that periodic reinvestigations for top secret  clearances conducted in two phases can save at least 20 percent of the  normal effort with almost no loss in identifying critical issues for  adjudication. According to DSS, this initiative is designed to use the  limited investigative resources in the most productive manner and reduce  clearance-processing time by eliminating the routine use of low-yield  information sources on many investigations and concentrating  information-gathering efforts on high-yield sources. While analyses have  not been conducted to evaluate how the implementation of phasing would  affect the investigative backlog, the implementation of phasing could be a  factor in reducing the backlog by decreasing some of the hours of  fieldwork required in some reinvestigations. Even if additional testing  confirms promising earlier findings that the procedure very rarely fails  to identify critical issues, several obstacles, such as noncompliance  with existing governmentwide investigative standards and reciprocity  problems, could prevent the implementation or limit the use of  this initiative.
Establishing a single adjudicative facility for industry—Under this  initiative, DOD would consolidate DOHA’s adjudicative function with that  of DISCO’s to create a single adjudicative facility for all industry  personnel cases. At the same time, DOHA would retain its hearings and  appeals function. According to OUSD (I) officials, this consolidation  would streamline the adjudicative process for industry personnel and  make it more coherent and uniform. A single adjudicative facility would  serve as the clearinghouse for all industrial contractor-related issues. As  part of a larger review of DOD’s security clearance processes, DOD’s  Senior Executive Council is considering this consolidation. An OUSD (I)  official told us that the consolidation would provide greater flexibility in  using adjudicators to meet changes in the workload and could eliminate  some of the time required to transfer cases from DISCO and to DOHA.  If the consolidation occurred, DISCO officials said that their operations  would not change much, except for adding adjudicators. On the other  hand, DOHA officials said that the current division between DISCO and  DOHA of adjudicating clean versus issue cases works very well and that  combining the adjudicative function for industry into one facility could  negatively affect DOHA’s ability to prepare denials and revocations of  industry personnel clearances during appeals. They told us that the  consolidation would have very little impact on the timeliness and quality  of adjudications.
Evaluation of the investigative standards and adjudicative  guidelines—This initiative would involve an evaluation of the  investigative standards used by personnel security clearance investigators  to help identify requirements that do not provide significant information  relevant for adjudicative decisions. By eliminating the need to perform  certain tasks associated with these requirements, investigative resources  could be used more efficiently. For example, DSS officials told us that less  than one-half of one percent of the potential security issues identified  during an investigation are derived from neighborhood checks; however,  this information source accounts for about 14 percent of the investigative  time. The modification of existing investigative standards would involve  using risk management principles based on a thorough evaluation of the  potential loss of information. Like a phased periodic reinvestigation, this  initiative would require changes in the governmentwide investigative   standards. In addition, the evaluation and any suggested changes would  need to be coordinated within DOD, intelligence agencies, and others.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to  respond to any questions you or other Members of the committee may  have at this time.
section_title: Appendix I: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Individuals making key contributions to this statement include  Mark A. Pross, James F. Reid, William J. Rigazio, and Nancy L. Benco.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its  Oversight Ensures the Protection of Classified Information. GAO-04-332.  Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments  to Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size. GAO-04-344.  Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2004.
DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility  for Top Secret Security Clearances. GAO-01-465. Washington, D.C.:  April 18, 2001.
DOD Personnel: More Accurate Estimate of Overdue Security Clearance  Reinvestigation Is Needed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-246. Washington, D.C.:  September 20, 2000.
DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security  Clearance Reinvestigations. GAO/NSIAD-00-215. Washington, D.C.:  August 24, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Weaknesses in Security Investigation Program Are  Being Addressed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-148. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose  National Security Risks. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-65. Washington, D.C.:  February 16, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations  Pose National Security Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-12. Washington, D.C.:  October 27, 1999.
Background Investigations: Program Deficiencies May Lead DEA to  Relinquish Its Authority to OPM. GAO/GGD-99-173. Washington, D.C.:  September 7, 1999.
Military Recruiting: New Initiatives Could Improve Criminal History  Screening. GAO/NSIAD-99-53. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 1999.
Executive Office of the President: Procedures for Acquiring Access  to and Safeguarding Intelligence Information. GAO/NSIAD-98-245.  Washington, D.C.: September 30, 1998.
Privatization of OPM’s Investigations Service. GAO/GGD-96-97R.  Washington, D.C.: August 22, 1996.
Cost Analysis: Privatizing OPM Investigations. GAO/GGD-96-121R.  Washington, D.C.: July 5, 1996.
Personnel Security: Pass and Security Clearance Data for the  Executive Office of the President. GAO/NSIAD-96-20. Washington, D.C.:  October 19, 1995.
Privatizing OPM Investigations: Perspectives on OPM’s Role in  Background Investigations. GAO/T-GGD-95-185. Washington, D.C.:  June 14, 1995.
Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating  Investigations and Adjudicative Functions. GAO/NSIAD-95-101.  Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995.
Security Clearances: Consideration of Sexual Orientation in the  Clearance Process. GAO/NSIAD-95-21. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995.
Personnel Security Investigations. GAO/NSIAD-94-135R.  Washington, D.C.: March 4, 1994.
Nuclear Security: DOE’s Progress on Reducing Its Security Clearance  Work Load. GAO/RCED-93-183. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 1993.
Personnel Security: Efforts by DOD and DOE to Eliminate  Duplicative Background Investigations. GAO/RCED-93-23.  Washington, D.C.: May 10, 1993.
DOD Special Access Programs: Administrative Due Process Not  Provided When Access Is Denied or Revoked. GAO/NSIAD-93-162.  Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993.
Administrative Due Process: Denials and Revocations of Security  Clearances and Access to Special Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-14.  Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993.
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