Firearms Controls: Federal Agencies Have Firearms Controls, but Could Strengthen Controls in Key Areas
Published: 2003-06-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In March 2001, the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General reported that the Immigration and Naturalization Service could not account for over 500 of its firearms. Furthermore, in July 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation disclosed that 449 of its firearms were lost or stolen. Given the possible threat that lost, stolen, or missing firearms poses to the public, GAO assessed (1) the consistency of federal agencies' firearms controls with federal internal control standards and related criteria; and (2) compliance by Justice and Treasury agencies with established firearms controls and improvements made to strengthen and enforce controls.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO found that all 18 federal agencies reviewed, which accounted for over 95 percent of federal officers and agents authorized to carry firearms, had policies and procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms that were consistent with federal internal control standards and related criteria. However, agencies could strengthen their controls in key areas that have been consistently recognized as important for effective inventory management. These areas include recording and tracking firearms inventory data; maintaining, controlling, and accounting for firearms inventories; ensuring personal and supervisory accountability for firearms; and requiring investigations, and discipline when deemed appropriate, for individuals determined not to have followed firearms accountability procedures. Although agencies established policies and procedures to control firearms, audits conducted by the Departments of Justice and the Treasury found that agencies did not always follow established procedures, or implement procedures, for conducting periodic inventories, reporting and investigating missing firearms, and securing firearms inventories. Since these weaknesses were identified, we found that agencies have implemented, or are in the process of implementing, actions to strengthen their firearms controls. In addition, 15 of the 18 federal agencies GAO reviewed reported a total of 1,012 firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession between September 30, 1998 and July 2002, further indicating the need for stronger controls. Of these firearms, 188 were recovered, leaving 824 firearms still missing. While we could not determine the exact percentage of agency firearms that were reported lost, stolen, or missing, it appears that these firearms generally accounted for less than 1 percent of agencies' total firearms inventories. In independent reviews of selected missing firearms cases, the Departments of Justice and the Treasury identified instances of firearms recovered in connection with criminal activity or during the course of criminal investigations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In March 2001, the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General  (OIG) reported that over 500 firearms belonging to the U.S. Immigration  and Naturalization Service (INS) were lost, stolen, or missing. Four  months later, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) disclosed that 449  of its firearms were lost or stolen. The loss of firearms and other weapons  by federal law enforcement agencies may pose serious risks to the public,  including the risk that missing firearms may be used to inflict bodily harm  or to further criminal activity.
Given these losses, you expressed concern that federal agencies with  personnel authorized to carry firearms may lack adequate controls for  securing and accounting for their firearms. Accordingly, we determined  the extent to which agencies’ policies and procedures for controlling  and safeguarding firearms were consistent with federal internal control  standards and related criteria issued by law enforcement and  management organizations;    whether reviews conducted by the Departments of Justice and  Treasury identified instances of noncompliance with firearms policies  and procedures, and whether agencies took actions to correct  identified weaknesses, particularly related to (1) conducting  inventories, (2) investigating missing firearms, and (3) disciplining  employees; and  the number of firearms that federal agencies identified as lost, stolen,  or otherwise not in their possession between September 30, 1998 and  July 2002.
You also requested that we determine how federal agencies maintain  control and accountability over weapons other than firearms and  associated weapons components. Information on these weapons and  weapons components can be found in appendix II.
To evaluate agencies’ policies and procedures for controlling and  safeguarding firearms, the number of missing agency firearms, and  agencies’ control over other weapons and weapons components, we  reviewed the firearms control activities of 18 agencies with personnel  authorized to carry firearms and make arrests within the executive branch  of the federal government. We selected these agencies from four strata:  those with 1,000 or more law enforcement personnel, those with 500-999  law enforcement personnel, those with 100-499 law enforcement  personnel, and those with less than 100 law enforcement personnel.  Together, these agencies employed over 95 percent of approximately  80,000 federal officers and agents authorized to make arrests and carry  firearms, as of June 2000. Table 1 identifies the 18 federal law enforcement  agencies we surveyed and the number of firearms reported by the agencies  as of their most recently completed inventories, at the time of our survey.
We surveyed the 18 agencies to determine their policies and procedures  for controlling and safeguarding firearms inventories, and the numbers of  firearms lost, stolen, or not in their possession, and subsequently  recovered, between September 30, 1998 and July 2002. We also reviewed  agency policies and procedures, federal internal control standards, and  other criteria for controlling inventories to determine whether agencies’  policies and procedures for safeguarding firearms were consistent with  established criteria.
To determine whether the Departments of Justice and the Treasury  identified instances of noncompliance with firearms policies and  procedures and have taken action to correct identified weaknesses, we  reviewed the results of audits conducted by these departments of their  respective agencies’ firearms control practices. We also interviewed  agency officials and obtained documentation identifying corrective action  taken in response to departmental reviews. Appendix I contains detailed  information on the scope and methodology we used during our review.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 1982, Congress enacted the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act  requiring executive agencies to establish and maintain controls that,  among other things, provide reasonable assurance that assets are  safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use, and misappropriation.  The act also mandated that GAO’s internal control standards serve as the  framework for agencies to use in establishing and maintaining their  internal control systems. Among other things, GAO’s internal control  standards require agencies to establish physical controls to secure and  safeguard vulnerable assets such as cash, securities, inventories, and  equipment, which might be vulnerable to loss or unauthorized use. In  March 2002, GAO published a supplemental guide for inventory controls,  which summarized fundamental principles that have been successfully  implemented by seven private sector firms noted for outstanding inventory  management.
GAO internal control standards provide that in establishing internal  controls, agencies should assess the risks associated with asset losses and  establish control activities to help ensure those risks are addressed. The  standards further require that agencies document and monitor control  activities to ensure they are appropriately implemented and are effective  in addressing risk inherent in agency operations.
In addition to the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act and GAO  standards, two other organizations issued advisory criteria addressing  inventory controls. In June 1995, the Joint Financial Management  Improvement Program issued advisory criteria for implementing and  maintaining inventory systems. The criteria addressed management’s  responsibility to provide guidelines for developing, documenting, and  implementing physical controls to safeguard and provide accountability  for inventory items. Furthermore, in August 1983, the Commission on  Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc., an independent  accrediting authority for law enforcement agencies, published  accreditation standards to include procedures for inventory and property  control.
section_title: Agencies’ Policies and Procedures Were Consistent with Internal Control Standards, but Agencies Could Strengthen Controls in Key Areas
paragraphs: All 18 of the federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed had policies  and procedures designed to control and safeguard firearms, one of the  first steps in developing and implementing an effective system of internal  control.  These controls were generally consistent with federal internal  control standards and related criteria issued by law enforcement and  management organizations. However, agencies could strengthen controls  in key areas consistently identified as important for effective inventory  management.  Strengthening controls could assist agencies in ensuring  their firearms are secured from loss, theft, or unauthorized use.
subsections: section_title: Federal Standards and Other Criteria Provide Guidance for Controlling and Safeguarding Firearms
paragraphs: In order to assess the consistency of selected agencies’ policies and  procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms with established  criteria, we reviewed federal and other internal control standards designed  to help ensure that assets, including firearms, are protected against  damage, loss, theft, and unauthorized use. The criteria included GAO’s  internal control standards and supplemental inventory guidelines, advisory  criteria issued by the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program  for maintaining inventory systems, and accreditation standards for  inventory and property control issued by the Commission on Accreditation  for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc.
Our analysis of federal internal control standards and other related criteria  found four key areas that were consistently identified as important for  effective inventory management. These four areas include (1) recording  firearms inventory data in property management records and systems  (inventory data); (2) controlling and safeguarding firearms inventories  (inventory control); (3) assigning responsibility for safeguarding firearms  and overseeing the conducting of firearms inventories (personal and  supervisory accountability); and (4) investigating missing firearms and  considering employee discipline when requirements for maintaining and  controlling firearms are not met (investigations and discipline).
Within each of these four areas, federal internal control standards and  related criteria identify specific controls designed to assist agencies in  controlling and safeguarding their firearms inventories. For example, in  the area of inventory control, the standards and criteria recommend that  agencies (1) have written policies and procedures for issuing agency  firearms to individuals, organizational units, and functional areas;   (2) conduct periodic inventory counts of firearms; (3) use occasions other  than periodic inventories to confirm employees’ possession of assigned  firearms; and (4) limit access to secured firearms storage areas and  facilities to authorized personnel.
We compared agency policies and procedures for maintaining firearms  with controls identified in federal internal control standards and related  criteria for each of the four key control areas. Appendix III identifies, for  each agency reviewed, whether the agency established policies and  procedures addressing specific controls recommended by GAO and other  management organizations within each of the four areas.
section_title: Inventory Data—Agencies Required the Recording and Update of Firearms Data
paragraphs: We surveyed agencies to determine whether they established controls to  record and update firearms inventory data in agency property records and  property management systems, consistent with standards issued by GAO  and other management organizations. Specifically, we determined whether  agencies had written policies and procedures requiring the update of  property records and systems (1) upon their receipt of new firearms, (2) as  a result of discrepancies identified during periodic firearms inventories,  and (3) upon the removal of firearms from agency inventories.
The recording and update of firearms inventory data is an important  component of maintaining and controlling agency firearms. Data on  activities that monitor the receipt and removal of firearms from inventory,  as well as discrepancies found during periodic inventories, are needed to  ensure management has adequate oversight over agency firearms. The  absence of these controls could result in management being unaware of  the number and location of firearms they have on-hand, and could result in  a lack of appropriate oversight over these assets.
The majority of agencies we reviewed usually required in their policies and  procedures the recording and update of firearms inventory data.  Specifically, 16 of the 18 agencies required that the date of receipt and the  specific identification of the firearm, as well as the person and unit to  which the firearm was assigned, be reported in property management  records as new firearms are received. In addition, 17 of the 18 agencies  required that adjustments be made to firearms inventory records as a  result of discrepancies identified during physical inventory counts. Sixteen  agencies also required the update of property management records upon  the removal of firearms from agency inventories.
section_title: Inventory Control— Agencies Required the Recording of Firearms Data and Periodic Inventories, but Could Strengthen Other Controls
paragraphs: In the area of inventory control, we surveyed agencies to determine  whether they established written policies and procedures, consistent with  federal internal control standards and related criteria, addressing the   (1) issuance of agency firearms to individuals, organizational units, and  functional areas; (2) conducting of periodic inventory counts of firearms  and the manner in which inventories should be conducted; and (3) use of  occasions other than periodic inventories to confirm employees’  possession of assigned firearms. We also surveyed agencies to determine  whether they (4) limited access to secured firearms storage areas and  facilities to authorized personnel.
The issuance of firearms, periodic checks of firearms on-hand, and limited  access to firearms storage areas are important in ensuring that agencies  appropriately safeguard their firearms. Agencies often learn of missing or  stolen firearms when conducting periodic inventories, or when they use  occasions other than inventories to confirm employee’s possession of  firearms. Without these controls, management may not be alerted when  firearms are not appropriately maintained, or when stored firearms are not  adequately protected from loss, theft, or unauthorized use.
The agencies we reviewed generally established written policies and  procedures for issuing firearms and conducting firearms inventories, but  could strengthen other inventory controls. Specifically, agencies generally  had written policies and procedures addressing the issuance of agency  firearms to individuals (18 out of 18) and organizational units (16 out of   16 that reported the control applicable). In addition, all 18 agencies  required the conducting of periodic inventory counts of firearms, and 15 of  these agencies required that the objectives, timing, and instructions for the  counts be established. However, only 11 of the 18 agencies required that  persons assigned responsibility for conducting inventories be trained in  inventory counting procedures.
In addition, 15 of the 18 agencies required counters to verify firearm ID  numbers and descriptive information about the firearm during inventory  counts. However, 9 agencies did not preclude individuals from counting  firearms if they had firearms custodial responsibilities. Furthermore, only  2 of these 9 agencies established compensating procedures such as using  count teams of 2 or more members, or ensuring that counters have no  prior knowledge of the firearms inventory being counted.
Agencies also varied in using occasions other than inventories to verify  employees’ possession of an assigned firearm and limiting access to  secured firearms storage areas. Fifteen of the 18 agencies surveyed  confirmed an employee’s possession of an assigned firearm during  firearms retraining or retesting. However, only 8 of the 18 agencies  required unannounced inspections to verify employees’ possession of  assigned firearms. In addition, of the 15 agencies that reported this control  applicable, only 7 required limited access to firearms storage areas and  facilities.
section_title: Personal and Supervisory Accountability—Agencies Required that Firearms Be Safeguarded, but Could Strengthen Other Controls
paragraphs: We surveyed agencies to determine whether they established policies and  procedures, consistent with federal internal control standards and related  criteria, requiring individuals to (1) safeguard assigned firearms from  damage, loss, theft, and unauthorized use, and (2) store firearms in lock  boxes or secure gun cases, or use trigger locks. We also surveyed agencies  to determine whether (3) job descriptions included requirements for  conducting inventories, (4) individual performance in conducting  inventories is assessed during performance evaluations, and (5) whether  supervisory oversight is provided over periodic firearms inventories.
Internal controls addressing an individual’s responsibility in maintaining  assigned firearms, and a supervisor’s responsibility in overseeing the  control of those firearms, are needed to help ensure firearms policies are  adhered to and firearms are appropriately secured. In order to be  accountable for safeguarding firearms, employees and supervisors must be  made aware of their responsibilities related to firearms control. The lack  of these controls could make responsibilities related to firearms control  unclear and result in difficulties in holding appropriate individuals  accountable for failing to follow established procedures.
The agencies we reviewed generally established written policies and  procedures requiring individuals to safeguard assigned firearms, but could  strengthen controls for conducting and overseeing firearms inventories.  Specifically, 17 of the 18 agencies had policies and procedures requiring  individuals to safeguard assigned firearms from damage, theft, loss, and  unauthorized use. In addition, all 18 agencies required that firearms be  secured in lock boxes or secured gun cases or that trigger locks be used.  However, only 12 agencies assigned responsibility for conducting firearms  inventories in job descriptions, and only 7 agencies assessed individuals’  performance in conducting firearms inventories during performance  evaluations. In addition, only 11 of the 18 agencies required that  supervisors oversee periodic firearms inventories.
section_title: Investigations and Discipline—Agencies Required Investigations of Missing Firearms and Discipline When Deemed Appropriate
paragraphs: We surveyed agencies to determine whether they established written  policies and procedures, in accordance with federal internal controls  standards and related criteria, to ensure that instances of missing firearms  are investigated, and employees are appropriately disciplined for not  safeguarding firearms or reporting missing firearms. Specifically, we  determined whether agencies had policies and procedures requiring that  (1) missing firearms be investigated, (2) investigations of missing firearms  be conducted by an independent body, (3) missing firearms be reported to  the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), (4) disciplinary action be  taken for failing to report missing firearms, and (5) disciplinary action be  taken for failing to properly safeguard assigned firearms.
Federal internal control standards and related criteria provide that  agencies should have the ability to investigate instances of missing  firearms and consider appropriate disciplinary action to enforce  compliance with firearms controls. Instances of missing firearms should  be investigated to identify the reasons the firearms were missing and to  provide management with information to implement any corrective  actions needed. In addition, procedures requiring the discipline of  individuals who did not appropriately secure their firearm or report a  missing firearm could act as a deterrent to others in failing to adhere to  these controls.
The agencies we reviewed generally had written policies and procedures  requiring that incidents of missing or stolen firearms be appropriately  investigated and reported. Specifically, all 18 agencies required that  physical count discrepancies of firearms be investigated, and 17 agencies  required that written instructions for investigating such discrepancies be  developed. In addition, 15 agencies had written policies and procedures  requiring that an independent body conduct the investigations, and   15 agencies required that missing firearms be reported to the NCIC.
Agencies also generally required disciplinary action for employees failing  to report missing firearms and for not adhering to firearms accountability  procedures. Fifteen of the 18 agencies required that disciplinary action be  taken for employees failing to report missing firearms. In addition,   14 agencies required disciplinary action for employees failing to  appropriately safeguard their firearms.
section_title: Agencies Did Not Always Document Firearms Controls in Policies and Procedures
paragraphs: Agencies did not always document their controls for maintaining and  controlling firearms inventories in policies and procedures. Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government issued by GAO require that  internal control activities be clearly documented in management  directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals. Although we  found that agencies documented most of the firearms controls reviewed,  16 of the 18 agencies reported implementing some firearms controls as a  matter of practice, without documenting the controls in their policies and  procedures. Only the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) and  INS reported documenting in their policies and procedures all of the  controls we reviewed.
Appendix III identifies, for the four areas reviewed, whether agencies  relied on control activities that were not documented in their policies and  procedures. In the area of inventory data, for example, 1 agency reported  updating property management records and systems to identify out-of- service and disposed of firearms, but did not include this requirement in  its policies and procedures. Another agency reported adjusting inventory  records as a result of physical inventories, but did not require this in its  policies and procedures.
In the inventory control area, 13 of the 18 agencies surveyed reported  conducting some aspect of inventory control that was not required by their  policies and procedures. For example, 9 agencies reported taking  measures to ensure the integrity of firearms counts, and 9 agencies  reported limiting access to secured firearms storage areas, but did not  include these controls in their policies and procedures.
Agencies also reported following unwritten practices to hold individuals  accountable for firearms inventories and to help ensure that inventories  are properly performed. For example, 5 agencies reported assessing  individuals’ participation in inventories during performance evaluations,  and 2 agencies reported providing supervisory oversight of firearms  inventories, without including these requirements in their policies and  procedures.
Regarding the investigation of missing firearms and associated employee  discipline, 2 agencies reported requiring that an independent body  investigate missing firearms, but did not include this requirement in their  policies and procedures.  In another example, 3 agencies reported that  while employees who fail to safeguard their firearms are subject to  disciplinary action, disciplinary action was not required by the agencies’  policies and procedures.
Controls that are not included in policies and procedures may not be  consistently applied throughout the agency and may not be effective in  helping ensure that firearms are appropriately controlled and safeguarded.  Without documented controls, individuals may not know the controls are  required, and management may not be able to enforce their use. Agencies  that rely on unwritten practices to protect their firearms run the risk that  those controls may not be followed, and their firearms may not be  appropriately secured.
section_title: Key Controls Provide Framework for Controlling and Safeguarding Firearms, but Appropriate Mix of Controls Should be Based on Agency Needs
paragraphs: The key control areas identified in federal internal control standards and  other criteria—inventory data, inventory control, personal and supervisory  accountability, and investigations and discipline—provide a framework to  assist agencies in building their systems of firearms controls. However,  internal control guidance recommends that agencies tailor these controls  to reflect their unique needs and circumstances, as well as their relative  risks for firearms losses. Agency management is ultimately responsible for  implementing the combination of controls deemed reasonable to  effectively control and safeguard their firearms, based on agency needs.
Firearms control needs may vary depending on an agency’s operations and  structure. For example, law enforcement employees at the Bureau of  Engraving and Printing (BEP) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH)  generally secure fixed buildings and store their firearms in one or few  central locations when they are off-duty. Conversely, employees at the  FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and INS conduct  investigations nationwide and generally keep their firearms with them at  all times. As a result, BEP and NIH may require different methods for  conducting firearms inventories than may be needed at the FBI, DEA, and  INS. In addition, the FBI, DEA, and INS may wish to use other occasions to  check an employee’s possession of an assigned firearm, along with annual  inventories, such as unannounced inspections and checks during  retraining or testing in firearms use.
section_title: Audits Found Weaknesses in Firearms Controls at Justice and Treasury Agencies, but Improvements Are Being Made
paragraphs: Audits conducted by the Departments of Justice and Treasury OIGs and  TIGTA found that agencies did not always comply with agency policies  and procedures for maintaining and controlling firearms inventories or  establish needed controls. Specifically, the audits found that some  agencies did not conduct periodic inventories of firearms or report and  investigate instances of missing firearms, as required. However, the audits  found that agencies generally disciplined employees who did not  appropriately control their firearms or report missing firearms. Although  these weaknesses were found, agencies have taken, or are in the process  of taking, actions to improve their controls over firearms inventories. See  appendix VI for a detailed listing of audits conducted by the OIGs and  TIGTA of their agencies’ controls over firearms.
subsections: section_title: Justice’s OIG Found that Agencies Did Not Always Control and Maintain Firearms as Required
paragraphs: The Department of Justice’s OIG reviewed the firearms control activities  of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), DEA, U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), FBI,  and INS from March 1999 through March 2002, to assess the effectiveness  of agencies’ controls over firearms and to determine what actions were  taken by the agencies in response to the identification of lost or stolen  firearms. The OIG reported that some agencies did not always conduct  periodic physical inventories of firearms or investigate instances of  missing firearms, but generally disciplined employees who did not report  or control missing firearms as required by their policies and procedures. In  addition, the OIG found that employees did not always report missing  firearms or follow established procedures for storing firearms in vehicles  or retrieving firearms from separating employees.
subsections: section_title: Justice Agencies Did Not Always Conduct Periodic Firearms Inventories
paragraphs: Justice’s OIG found that FBI, DEA, and INS did not conduct periodic  physical inventories of firearms as required by their policies and  procedures. The FBI required that periodic inventories be conducted every  2 years, while the DEA and INS required annual physical inventories of  firearms. Despite these requirements, the OIG found that until it began its  review in 2001, FBI had not completed a firearms inventory since prior to  1993. In addition, the OIG found that DEA and INS did not properly  conduct or document past inventories, including not inventorying all  firearms. For example, INS had not completed inventories in accordance  with its policies and procedures, including tracking inventory adjustments  and confirming that that appropriate property was inventoried. The OIG  found that BOP and USMS were generally current in conducting firearms  inventories.
According to the OIG, FBI and DEA officials stated that they had not  conducted or completed required inventories for a variety of reasons,  including not having the required funds to conduct the inventories and  relying on other methods to verify inventories. For example, FBI officials  said that they did not conduct all required inventories due to budgetary  and equipment limitations and due to the reassignment of personnel who  had conducted inventories in the past. At DEA, officials stated that they  relied on the physical check of assigned firearms during agents’ annual  firearms qualifications as a substitute for the required annual inventories.  Despite this reliance, however, DEA still reported firearms as lost or  stolen from its inventories.
section_title: Justice Agencies Did Not Always Investigate Missing Firearms, but Generally Disciplined Responsible Employees
paragraphs: While BOP and DEA initiated investigations of all missing firearms, FBI  and INS did not always initiate investigations, as required by agency  policies and procedures, or could not provide documentation that  investigations were conducted. Justice requires that component agencies  investigate instances of missing property, including firearms, and grants  agencies the authority to discipline employees determined not to have  followed property control procedures. However, the OIG determined that  29 of 74 missing firearms incidents at the INS between January 1996 and  September 1999 were not investigated. In addition, the OIG could not find  evidence that the FBI investigated 141 of 212 missing firearms incidents  reported for the period October 1999 through January 2002.
Although the OIG found that investigations of missing firearms were not  always initiated, they found that investigations of missing firearms usually  resulted in employees found responsible for the loss being disciplined.
For example, at the DEA, 10 of 15 missing firearms cases reviewed for the  period October 1999 through August 2001 resulted in disciplinary action,  including letters of reprimand and recommendations for suspensions  without pay. In another example, the OIG concluded that 37 of 70  investigations of missing property (firearms and laptops) at the FBI from  October 1999 through January 2002, resulted in recommendations for  disciplinary action, including letters of censure and suspensions without  pay.
section_title: Justice Agencies Did Not Always Report Missing Firearms or Secure and Retrieve Firearms
paragraphs: Justice’s OIG found that agencies did not always report, or report in a  timely manner, missing firearms internally or to the NCIC. The OIG further  found that some agencies did not always follow established procedures for  storing firearms in vehicles or retrieving firearms from separating  employees. Table 2 identifies the average time taken for employees to  report missing firearms within their agency and the number of missing  firearms reported to the NCIC.
The OIG found that the average timeframe for employees reporting  missing firearms within their agency ranged from the same day at the BOP  to 4.3 years at the FBI. While the USMS required the immediate reporting  of missing firearms, and DEA required reporting within 48 hours, the FBI  and BOP did not include a timetable for reporting missing firearms in their  policies and procedures. The OIG attributed delays for reporting missing  firearms at the FBI to the absence of a required timetable for reporting  missing firearms, but concluded that the BOP generally reported missing  firearms in a timely manner due to firearms being stored in a central  location. The OIG could not determine whether USMS experienced delays  in reporting missing firearms because agency loss reports did not identify  the date the loss was discovered. The OIG found reporting delays of 1 to  89 days in 11 of the 16 DEA lost firearms cases examined, but did not  identify the reasons for these delays.
The OIG also found that the agencies had inconsistent practices for  reporting missing firearms to the NCIC. The OIG discovered that all  agencies reviewed, with the exception of BOP, had policies and  procedures requiring that missing firearms be reported to NCIC. However,  the OIG found that FBI, DEA, and INS had not reported from 2 to more  than 300 of their missing firearms to the NCIC, and that only USMS had  reported all missing firearms. Reporting missing firearms to NCIC would  assist agencies in retrieving lost or stolen firearms recovered by the law  enforcement community, since the NCIC system is generally regarded by  law enforcement agencies as the primary nationwide method for tracking  stolen firearms.
In addition, Justice’s OIG found that some agencies did not always follow  established procedures for storing firearms in vehicles or retrieving  firearms from separating employees. Specifically, the OIG found that 4 of  16 firearms losses at DEA, for the period October 1999 through September  15, 2001, occurred as a result of vehicle thefts. In some cases, the  employees stored their firearms in unattended vehicles, despite internal  policies prohibiting this practice. At FBI, the OIG found that some of the  52 firearms stolen from FBI or privately owned vehicles, during the  period October 1999 through January 2002, were due to firearms not being  properly secured in vehicles. In addition, 3 of the 6 firearms losses at  USMS were due to thefts from vehicles. Both FBI and USMS allowed the  storage of firearms in vehicles either temporarily (FBI) or indefinitely  (USMS), as long as the vehicle was secured and the firearm was placed in  a locked container.
The OIG also found weaknesses in the agencies’ use of accountable  property checklists designed to retrieve property from separating  employees, sometimes resulting in instances of firearms not being  retrieved. Department of Justice policies require that each agency develop,  maintain, and distribute an accountable property checklist for employees  to complete prior to separating from the department to help facilitate the  return of agency property, including firearms. Despite this requirement,  the OIG found weakness in the use of these checklists at all of the  agencies reviewed, including (1) failure to enforce the use of the checklist;  (2) lack of relevant accountable signatures; and (3) failure to include key  identifying information, such as the firearm’s serial number. As a result,  firearms were not always retrieved from separating employees. For  example, the OIG reported that in 2001, FBI found that at least 31 firearms  of separated employees could not be accounted for.
section_title: Treasury’s OIG and TIGTA Found Agencies Safeguarded Firearms, but Could Strengthen and Enforce Controls in Some Areas
paragraphs: Treasury’s OIG and TIGTA reviewed the firearms control activities of the  ATF, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Secret Service, BEP, the U.S. Mint, and  Internal Revenue Service/Criminal Investigation (IRS/CI) for fiscal years  1999 through 2001. The purpose of these reviews was to determine  whether the agencies’ inventory practices were sufficient for controlling  items that, if lost or stolen, might compromise the public’s safety, national  security, or ongoing criminal investigations. The OIG and TIGTA  concluded that the agencies generally conducted periodic firearms  inventories; investigated instances of missing firearms; and disciplined  employees for not maintaining firearms as required by agency policies and  procedures. However, the OIG determined that the U.S. Mint did not  follow all policies and procedures related to conducting periodic  inventories or identify its firearms from its property management records.  In addition, TIGTA determined that IRS/CI did not appropriately record  and report missing firearms data.
subsections: section_title: Treasury Agencies Generally Conducted Firearms Inventories, Investigated Missing Firearms, and Disciplined Employees
paragraphs: Treasury’s OIG and TIGTA found that the agencies reviewed, with the  exception of the U.S. Mint, conducted periodic inventories at least  annually, as required by their internal policies and procedures. For  example, at ATF, the OIG concluded that frequent, independent physical  inventories reduced the risk that weapons would be lost or stolen without  being promptly detected. At IRS/CI, TIGTA found that property inventories  were conducted locally on an annual basis and in accordance with  established policies and procedures. However, the OIG determined that  the U.S. Mint had not conducted a complete annual physical inventory of  firearms during fiscal years 1999, 2000, or 2001, and the firearms inventory  completed in October 2001 was not conducted in accordance with agency  policies and procedures.
In addition, Treasury found that ATF, U.S. Customs Service, Secret  Service, and IRS/CI investigated instances of firearms losses and  appropriately considered employee discipline, as required by agency  policies and procedures. For example, the OIG determined that ATF’s  Professional Review Board investigated 15 of 16 instances of missing  firearms identified during the period October 1, 1998 through September  30, 2001, and appropriately considered employee discipline in each of  those cases. The board recommended employee suspensions in 9 of the  cases and no disciplinary action in 3 of the cases. The remaining 3 cases  were still under investigation at the completion of the OIG’s review.
The OIG also determined that the U.S. Customs Service’s Board of Survey,  the unit responsible for investigating missing firearms, investigated all   72 missing firearms identified during the period October 1, 1998 through  September 30, 2001. The OIG determined that employees were held  financially responsible for losses in 26 of the cases and not financially  responsible in 37 of the cases. The remaining 7 cases were still under  investigation at the completion of the OIG’s review.
section_title: U.S. Mint and IRS/CI Did Not Always Record or Report Firearms Information
paragraphs: The OIG determined that the U.S. Mint could not provide a listing of  firearms from its property management records to support reported  firearms inventories, as required by their policies and procedures. The OIG  concluded that without this list it would not be possible to reconcile the  firearms that were on-hand against recorded inventory counts, resulting in  the possibility that missing firearms might not be identified. The OIG  concluded that these and other factors, including the number and storage  of its firearms at several locations, increased the Mint’s risk of lost or  stolen firearms.
TIGTA reported that it could not determine the number of IRS/CI missing  firearms from its management information system and that the hard copy  reports of IRS/CI missing firearms were not always prepared or  completed. Specifically, TIGTA found that IRS/CI’s inventory management  system did not differentiate between lost or stolen firearms and, as a  result, TIGTA could not rely on that system to identify IRS/CI missing  firearms inventories accurately. Although TIGTA was able to review and  comment on hard copy reports from IRS/CI field offices in order to  identify missing firearms, TIGTA found that some of these reports were  not completely prepared.
section_title: Justice and Treasury Agencies Are Taking Action to Strengthen and Enforce Firearms Controls
paragraphs: Justice and Treasury agencies have taken many actions designed to  strengthen and enforce firearms controls, based on recommendations  made by the OIGs and TIGTA. Specifically, in reports issued in March   2001 and August 2002, Justice’s OIG made a total of 63 recommendations  to INS, BOP, DEA, FBI, and USMS designed to improve firearms control  activities. Treasury’s OIG and TIGTA also made five firearms-related  recommendations in reports to the U.S. Mint in May 2002 and to IRS/CI in  November 2001 and March 2002. According to the OIGs and TIGTA,  agencies agreed to all recommendations and have taken, or are in the  process of taking, corrective action addressing all identified weaknesses.
Specifically, the INS, BOP, DEA, FBI, and USMS have implemented 29   of the 63 recommendations made by the Justice OIG, and are in the  process of implementing the remaining 34 recommendations. Of the   34 recommendations that have not been implemented, management has  begun taking corrective actions and is working with the OIG to ensure  their efforts address the weaknesses identified. Completed and ongoing  actions include establishing procedures requiring periodic firearms  inventories on an annual basis and the appropriate segregation of duties  during physical inventories. The agencies are also requiring that missing  firearms be immediately reported and minimum timeframes for  completing investigations of missing firearms be established. In addition,  agencies are requiring that all missing firearms cases be adjudicated and  that controls for securing firearms in vehicles and recovering firearms  from separating employees be strengthened.
In addition, the U.S. Mint and IRS/CI have implemented all five  recommendations made by the Treasury OIG and TIGTA. The U.S. Mint  now requires the performance and documentation of an independent  physical inventory of firearms annually and the reconciliation of those  inventories against property management records. Furthermore, IRS/CI  agreed to change its inventory management system to be able to  differentiate between lost, stolen, and damaged items in their property  management system, and now requires that missing firearms reports be  completely prepared. IRS/CI also established guidelines addressing the  types of lost or stolen equipment that should be referred to TIGTA for  investigation.
section_title: Majority of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Reviewed Reported Missing Firearms
paragraphs: Fifteen of the 18 federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed reported  firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession during some  point in time between September 30, 1998 and July 2002. Agency officials  reported that although some firearms were lost due to negligence, some  losses occurred despite appropriate precautions being taken by  employees. Audits conducted by Justice’s and Treasury’s OIGs found that  some missing firearms were recovered during the commission of a crime,  or in connection with a criminal investigation.
subsections: section_title: Fifteen of 18 Agencies Surveyed Reported Missing Firearms
paragraphs: Fifteen of the 18 federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed reported  1,012 firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession during  some point in time between September 1998 and July 2002. As of July  2002, 188 of these firearms had been subsequently recovered, leaving   824 still missing. While we could not determine the exact percentage of  agency firearms that were reported lost, stolen, or missing, it appears that  these firearms generally accounted for less than one percent of agencies’  total firearms inventories. Only BEP, the U.S. Mint, and Veterans Affairs  reported having no lost, stolen, or missing firearms. Agencies identified  missing firearms using internal reporting systems, through which  personnel reported weapons as missing, and from periodic physical  inventories of firearms. Table 3 identifies firearms as lost, stolen, or  otherwise not in an agency’s possession for the 18 agencies surveyed,  those firearms subsequently recovered, and those firearms still missing as  of July 2002.
Of the 1,012 firearms that agencies reported lost, stolen, or otherwise not  in their possession, most missing firearms were pistols (541). Agencies  also reported 187 revolvers or other handguns, 157 training weapons,   92 shotguns, 38 rifles, 19 submachine guns, and 1 stun gun as missing.
Agency officials recognized that firearms were sometimes lost due to  negligent behavior, such as employees not properly securing firearms in  locked vehicles, as required by agency policies and procedures. However,  officials also identified that some firearms were lost despite appropriate  precautions being taken by the employee. For example, one agency  reported that four firearms were stolen while in the custody of the airlines,  and that the theft did not occur due to the negligent behavior of the  employee. Specifically, the firearms were checked in a locked, hard-sided  gun case, in accordance with agency policies and procedures. Due to the  manner in which the agencies recorded missing firearms data, they usually  could not readily identify, for the missing firearms we reviewed, the  number of firearms determined to have been lost due to negligence.
Agencies also identified cases where lost firearms, although not in the  agency’s possession, were not recoverable and could not be used to harm  the public. For example, several agencies reported firearms being lost in  the ocean or in a river. These weapons were considered unrecoverable  and therefore did not pose a threat to the public.
section_title: Justice and Treasury Audits Identified Instances of Recovered Firearms Used in Criminal Activity
paragraphs: Audits conducted by Justice’s and Treasury’s OIGs identified several  incidents where missing firearms had been recovered in connection with  criminal activity or during a criminal investigation. The OIGs made this  determination during separate audits of agency controls over weapons,  laptops, and other sensitive items at FBI, DEA, INS, U.S. Secret Service,  and U.S. Customs.
For example, Justice’s OIG reviewed 16 missing firearms cases reported to  the DEA Board of Professional Conduct, for the time period   October 1, 1999 through November 15, 2001, and found that 3 had been  recovered by local law enforcement during an arrest of an individual for a  handgun violation, and 2 in connection with searches during unrelated  criminal investigations. In another example, Treasury’s OIG reviewed 10 of  13 firearms reported missing and recovered by U.S. Customs Service, for  the time period October 1, 1998 through September 30, 2001, and found  that   5 of the 10 firearms had been recovered in connection with a robbery, a  drive-by shooting, or during the execution of a search warrant.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: The Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act requires that executive  agencies establish and maintain controls that provide reasonable  assurance that all assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized  use, and misappropriation. Standards and guidance for effectively  maintaining and controlling firearms inventories are available to assist  federal law enforcement agencies in designing controls to safeguard their  firearms. Although these controls provide a framework to assist agencies  in controlling and safeguarding their firearms, agencies should tailor these  controls to meet their unique needs and circumstances, as well as their  risks for firearms losses. Accordingly, the appropriate mix of controls may  vary for each federal law enforcement agency.
When agencies discover lost, stolen, or missing firearms, they should  reassess their firearms controls to determine why they were not effective  and if they should be modified. This is particularly important when  agencies find that existing controls have not been implemented or have  been implemented but have not prevented the loss of agency firearms, as  was the case with some agencies reviewed by the Departments of Justice  and Treasury OIGs. Internal controls that have been established to  safeguard firearms, but were not appropriate controls based on the  agencies’ needs, or were not implemented or properly applied, provide  little assurance that firearms are safe from loss, theft, or misuse.
In addition, agencies should document their firearms controls in policies  and procedures. Without documenting these controls, employees may not  know of their requirement, and the controls may not be uniformly applied  agencywide. In addition, it may be difficult for management to enforce a  control that is not required by policy and procedures, such as disciplining  employees who do not adhere to firearms controls.
The need for an assessment of firearms controls, and documentation of  controls in policies and procedures, is demonstrated by the majority of  agencies reviewed reporting missing firearms. These firearms may pose a  serious risk to the public, including the risk that they may be used to inflict  bodily harm or to further criminal activity.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: The Attorney General; the Secretaries of the Treasury, Interior, Veterans  Affairs, and Homeland Security; the Director of the National Institutes of  Health, and the Postmaster General should    periodically assess existing policies and procedures designed to control  and safeguard firearms and determine whether they have been  effective, or should be modified to help prevent future firearms losses.  In assessing firearms controls, agencies should use as guides   (1) internal control standards issued by GAO, Joint Financial  Management Improvement Program, and Commission on Accreditation  for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc; and (2) audits conducted by the  Department of Justice OIG, Department of the Treasury OIG, and  TIGTA of agencies firearms controls, and    document internal controls in agency policies and procedures to the  maximum extent practical to help ensure that they are consistently  understood and applied.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We requested and received comments on a draft of this report from the  Attorney General, Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of the Interior,  Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security, the  Director of the National Institutes of Health (Department of Health and  Human Services), and the Postmaster General. Officials generally agreed  with the information presented. Six agencies provided technical changes  that have been incorporated, as appropriate. Four agencies—the NIH, Fish  and Wildlife Service (Department of the Interior), U.S. Postal Inspection  Service, and Department of Veterans Affairs—provided comments on the  report recommendation. NIH and Fish and Wildlife Service agreed with the  recommendation and identified actions taken to strengthen their controls  over firearms. The U.S. Postal Inspection Service also identified actions  taken to strengthen firearms controls consistent with the  recommendation. The Department of Veterans Affairs expressed  concerned about our recommendation, saying that its controls were  effective in preventing firearms losses. Appendixes VII, VIII, X, and XI   include the written comments from these four agencies. In addition,  although the Department of Justice did not comment on the  recommendation, its letter presents general observations regarding  standards for control over agency firearms and is included in appendix IX.
NIH agreed with the recommendation, saying that in response to a review  conducted by the department’s OIG, NIH has taken numerous steps to  strengthen its controls over firearms. These efforts include updating and  including accurate descriptions of firearms in its firearms inventory  database, and appointing and training property custodial officers for the  NIH Police Branch. The Fish and Wildlife Service also agreed with the  recommendation, and said that as a result of an internal assessment, the  Service will (1) develop a Web-based firearm training guide addressing  various internal controls over firearms, (2) conduct unscheduled random  checks of firearms against property records, and (3) annually review  reports of any lost and/or stolen firearms to determine if policies and  procedures should be modified to prevent future losses.
Although not saying whether it agreed with our recommendation, the U.S.  Postal Inspection Service said that it had reviewed the Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government and will assess these  standards along with the results of a firearms review conducted by the  Inspection Service Firearms Task Force. In addition, the Service provided  us with a copy of its proposed policy update that it plans to incorporate  into its firearms inventory and accountability procedures. We appreciate  that the Service provided the proposed update and look forward to  receiving the final updated policy.
VA expressed concerned about our recommendation, saying that its lack  of firearms losses during the time period of our review was due to its  having appropriate internal controls over firearms. VA further said that its  police officers document the handling of firearms on a daily basis;  generally do not remove their firearms from department property; check  their assigned firearms out of and into the armory each day; conduct  monthly inventories of all firearms, ammunition, and magazines; have  unannounced inventories and spot checks; and conduct independent  annual inventories of firearms.
Although VA did not report missing firearms during the time period of our  review, the potential exists that firearms could be lost or stolen at some  point in the future. Accordingly, we believe that VA and other agencies we  reviewed should periodically assess their firearms controls, particularly  when their organizations or operations have changed, or when firearms  are identified as missing. These assessments should be conducted to  determine whether established controls have been effective, are still  relevant, or should be modified. For example, VA recently reported that as  of March 2003, police officers at more than 100 of its field sites were  assigned firearms. Prior to 2000, officers at only 27 sites were armed. We  believe that this is a good example of when an organizational change  necessitates a reevaluation of an agency’s firearms controls to reduce the  risk of potential firearms losses. We further believe that federal internal  control standards and other criteria included in our report provide a useful  framework from which to conduct these assessments, and identify  appropriate firearms controls when an agency’s environment has changed,  or when existing controls have not been effective.
In addition, six agencies requested that we change some of their original  responses to our survey regarding firearms controls, usually to identify  that they had a written policy and procedure addressing a specific control.  We made these technical changes in all cases in which the agency  provided documentation of its policy. However, if the agency said that the  policy change was planned but had not yet been made, we did not change  the original response and look forward to receiving documentation  identifying changes that have been incorporated into its policy.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release its content earlier,  we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue  date. At that time, we will provide copies of this report to the appropriate  congressional committees, the Attorney General, Secretary of the  Treasury, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary  of Homeland Security, the Director of the National Institutes of Health,  and the Postmaster General. We will also make copies available to others  on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions on this report, please call me on  (202) 512-8777. Key contributors are listed in appendix XII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: We reviewed federal law enforcement agencies’ control over firearms to  determine (1) the extent to which these agencies’ policies, procedures,  and practices for controlling and safeguarding firearms were consistent  with federal internal control standards and related criteria issued by law  enforcement and management organizations; (2) whether reviews  conducted by the Department of Justice and Department of Treasury  identified instances of noncompliance with firearms policies and  procedures, and whether agencies have taken actions to correct identified  weaknesses, particularly regarding (a) conducting inventories, (b)  investigating missing firearms, and (c) disciplining employees; and (3) the  number of firearms that selected federal law enforcement agencies  identified as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession between  September 30, 1998 and July 2002. We also determined how selected  agencies maintained control and accountability over weapons other than  firearms and weapons components. (See app. II.)
To answer objectives 1 and 3, and to determine how agencies maintained  and controlled weapons other than firearms and weapons components, we  selected for review 18 out of 33 federal civilian law enforcement agencies  in the executive branch identified by the Department of Justice’s Bureau  of Justice Statistics (BJS), as of June 2000, as having personnel with the  authority to carry firearms and make arrests.
We systematically selected the agencies for our review. First, we stratified  the 33 agencies according to size, based on whether the agency had   (1) 1,000 or more, (2) 500—999, (3) 100—499, or (4) less than 100 law  enforcement personnel. We then selected all agencies with 1,000 or more  law enforcement personnel (11 agencies) and the 2 agencies with the  largest number of law enforcement personnel in each of the remaining   3 strata (6 agencies in total). To account for all Department of Justice and  Treasury law enforcement agencies, we also included BEP, which fell into  the 100—499 strata (1 agency). These 18 agencies employed about 96  percent (76,510) of the total personnel employed by the federal civilian  law enforcement agencies (79,910) that are authorized to carry firearms  and make arrests, as reported in the BJS. Table 4 identifies the 18 agencies  selected for review, along with the strata from which they were selected.
We surveyed the 18 agencies using a detailed questionnaire. We pretested  the questionnaire with 2 of the 18 agencies and a third federal law  enforcement agency, not included in the final survey, and made relevant  changes to the questions based on these pretests. We also surveyed the   18 agencies using a follow-up questionnaire to obtain additional related  information. See appendixes IV and V for the initial and follow-up  questionnaire, respectively.
In the questionnaire, we asked agencies about their firearms inventories  and the policies, procedures, and practices currently in place to control  their firearms. We also asked agencies to provide the results of their most  recently completed 100-percent inventory since September 30, 1998, and  the date of the inventory. We asked the 18 agencies to identify their  policies and procedures related to recording firearms inventory data,  controlling firearms inventories, ensuring personal and supervisory  accountability for agency firearms, and investigating missing firearms and  administering associated employee discipline. We also asked agencies to  identify the number of firearms reported missing since September 30,  1998, the number of those missing firearms recovered up to the time of our  survey, and the sources of the missing firearms information.
To determine how federal law enforcement agencies maintained control  and accountability over weapons other than firearms and weapons  components, specifically ammunition, explosives, and gas and chemical  agents, we surveyed the 18 agencies regarding their policies, procedures,  and practices for tracking and controlling these items.
Because this was not a sample survey, there are no sampling errors.  However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce  errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example,  difficulties in how a particular question is interpreted, in the sources of  information that are available to respondents, or in how the data are  entered into a database or were analyzed can introduce unwanted  variability into the survey results. We took steps in the development of the  questionnaires, the data collection, and the data editing and analysis to  minimize these nonsampling errors. In addition, to the extent possible, we  obtained and reviewed agencies’ firearms control policies and procedures  to verify their responses to our questionnaire.
To answer objective 2, we reviewed the results of audits conducted by the  Departments of Justice and Treasury Offices of Inspector General (OIG)  and the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA).  These audits evaluated the extent to which Justice and Treasury law  enforcement agencies adhered to internal controls over firearms  inventories and other sensitive properties and were completed between  March 2001 and August 2002. (See app. VI for audit reports and dates  issued.) In addition, we reviewed documents from selected Justice and  Treasury law enforcement agencies detailing their firearms control  policies, procedures, and practices. We also reviewed selected agencies’  internal reports on compliance with firearms control policies and  procedures and interviewed officials on corrective actions taken in  response to OIG and TIGTA recommendations.
We conducted our review between August 2001 and May 2003 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons Components
subsections: section_title: Agencies Established Controls to Account for Other Weapons and Weapons Components
paragraphs: Federal law enforcement agencies generally reported establishing  inventory controls to account for weapons other than firearms and  weapons components. The 18 agencies we surveyed reported maintaining  accountability for their stocks of explosives, gas and/or chemical agents,  and ammunition through conducting periodic physical inventory counts of  the items, or maintaining running balances through perpetual inventories.  Agencies also reported using other methods, such as tracking the  distribution of items to individuals or organizational units and limiting  access to areas in which inventories are stored, or a combination of  methods, to account for the inventories.
section_title: Agencies Reported Having Inventories of Explosives, Gas and/or Chemical Agents, and Ammunition
paragraphs: The 18 federal law enforcement agencies we reviewed reported having  explosives, gas and/or chemical agents, and ammunition. Table 5 identifies  weapons other than firearms and weapons components reported by the  agencies surveyed.
While all 18 agencies reported having ammunition, only 7 reported having  explosives, and 12 reported having gas and/or chemical agents. Seven  agencies reported inventory in all three categories, including BOP, FBI,  USMS, ATF, U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Mint, and U.S. Secret Service.
Agencies reporting inventories of explosives and gas and chemical agents  responded that the weapons were primarily diversionary devices,  defensive chemical sprays, and chemical projectiles. Included were items  such as flash-bangs that distract with a flash and bang effect and smoke  grenades that dispense chemically based inflammatory agents or  membrane irritants.
section_title: Agencies Used Inventory Counts and Other Methods to Control Weapons and Weapons Components
paragraphs: The 18 federal law enforcement agencies we reviewed reported having  accountability procedures for weapons other than firearms and weapons  components, and these agencies generally reported that they relied on  inventories to account for these items. As shown in table 6, the agencies  reported that they controlled weapons and weapons components through  monthly and annual inventory counts, or by maintaining a running  summary of the quantities on hand through perpetual inventories.
In addition to relying on monthly, annual, and periodic inventories to  control weapons other than firearms and weapons components, some  agencies reported using additional procedures, or a combination of  procedures, to account for their inventories. For example, IRS/CI reported  controlling ammunition and pepper spray by tracking their distribution to  field installations from a headquarters procurement office, while the  National Park Service reported that it controlled ammunition by  monitoring its distribution to law enforcement personnel. In addition, the  Fish and Wildlife Service reported that it controlled ammunition by  monitoring its distribution and limiting access to supply. In another  example, the FBI reported maintaining its supply of gas and/or chemical  agents at a military storage facility, thereby reducing access and the  potential for unauthorized use or loss.
In addition, the FBI, INS, USMS, ATF, Secret Service, and the VA reported  using a combination of methods to account for these weapons and  weapons components. For example, the FBI reported controlling access to  ammunition supplies in addition to maintaining a record of each time  ammunition was received or disbursed. INS reported that, in addition to  conducting annual inventories of ammunition and gas and chemical  agents, it maintains logs at all locations that record receipts from  manufacturers and issuances for operational purposes. In another  example, the ATF reported controlling explosives by maintaining a  separate record of acquisitions and removals; keeping a daily, perpetual  record of transactions; and conducting annual inventories and inspections.
section_title: Appendix III: Presence of Key Firearms Activities in Agency Policies and Procedures
section_title: Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire
section_title: Appendix V: Follow-up Survey Questionnaire
section_title: Appendix VI: Justice and Treasury Reports on Internal Controls Over Firearms and Other Sensitive Property
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services
section_title: Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of the Interior
section_title: Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Justice
section_title: Appendix X: Comments from the United States Postal Service
section_title: Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs
section_title: Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Fredrick D. Berry, Miguel A. Salas, Barbara A. Stolz, Christine F. Davis,  Katherine M. Davis, Stuart M. Kaufman, David P. Alexander, Delois N.  Richardson, Daniel C. Harris, and Miko D. Johnson made key  contributions to this report.