Counternarcotics Assistance: U.S. Agencies Have Allotted Billions in Andean Countries, but DOD Should Improve Its Reporting of Results
Published: 2012-07-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Hundreds of metric tons of cocaine flow annually from South America to the United States, threatening the security and well-being of U.S. citizens. South American cocaine production and trafficking is centered in the five countries in the Andean region. State, USAID, DOD, and DEA provide counternarcotics assistance to stem production and trafficking of narcotics in these countries. ONDCP oversees and coordinates this assistance.
In this report, GAO (1) describes the U.S. strategic approaches to counter- narcotics assistance in the Andean countries; (2) identifies amounts allotted for such assistance by State, USAID, DOD, and DEA in fiscal years 2006 through 2011; and (3) reviews the agencies reporting on their performance. GAO reviewed agency and U.S. strategy documents, analyzed available agency data, and interviewed agency officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: No single U.S. counternarcotics strategy exists for the Andean region. In each countryBolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuelathe U.S. embassys mission strategic resource plan, developed in consultation with the countrys government, guides counternarcotics assistance provided by U.S. agencies. Department of State (State) officials told GAO that these plans incorporate high- level guidance from the Office of National Drug Control Policys (ONDCP) annual National Drug Control Strategy.
In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, estimated allotments for counternarcotics assistance to the Andean countries by U.S. agenciesState, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)totaled about $5.2 billion. Total allotments declined for each country during this time period.
State, USAID, and DEA reported meeting or exceeding most annual targets for key measures of their counternarcotics activities in the Andean countries since 2007. For instance, State reported assisting in the eradication of illicit crops, USAID reported promoting alternative development, and DEA reported disrupting drug trafficking organizations. In addition, State, USAID, and DEA complied with an ONDCP requirement that each agencys Inspector General (IG) attest to the reliability of annual performance summary reports before submitting the reports to ONDCP. DOD reported tracking several performance measures, but DODs IG was unable to attest to the reliability of DODs reporting to ONDCP. As a result, ONDCP lacks assurance of the accuracy of information it receives from DOD and in turn reports to Congress.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that DOD submits performance summary reports to ONDCP including the Inspector Generals attestation that the reported information is reliable to facilitate good management and oversight. DOD concurred with this recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The United States provides assistance to several countries in the Andean  region of South America—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and  Venezuela—to help curb the supply of illicit drugs, primarily cocaine,  entering the United States. According to U.S. government estimates, most  of the cocaine entering the United States is produced in Colombia, while  Peru and Bolivia are also significant producers of coca, the plant used in  cocaine production. Ecuador and Venezuela serve mainly as transit routes  for criminal drug trafficking organizations transporting drugs into the United  States and other parts of the world from neighboring countries.
Several U.S. agencies—the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency  for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense  (DOD), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)—are primarily  involved in planning and executing counternarcotics assistance in the  Andean countries, in collaboration with authorities in each country. The  agencies’ assistance supports, among other things, the disruption of  cocaine processing and trafficking and coca cultivation and the promotion  of alternative livelihoods for coca farmers. The Office of National Drug  Control Policy (ONDCP) coordinates and oversees these efforts to reduce  the availability or use of drugs in the United States and abroad and  reports on these efforts to Congress.
In response to your request concerning the impact of the production and  trafficking of illicit drugs from the Andean region on the United States, we  undertook a review of U.S. counternarcotics assistance in the region. This  report  (1)  describes the U.S. strategic approaches to counternarcotics  assistance in the five Andean countries;  (2) identifies amounts allotted for this assistance by State, USAID, DOD,  and DEA in fiscal years 2006 through 2011; and  (3) reviews State, USAID, DOD, and DEA reporting on their  performance of counternarcotics activities in the Andean countries.
To address these objectives, we reviewed U.S. strategy documents  related to counternarcotics assistance and analyzed State, USAID, DOD,  and DEA budget and financial data. We also reviewed available agency  performance data and related documentation, including annual ONDCP  reports. To help assess the reliability of the financial and performance  data we received, we incorporated questions about the reliability of the  agencies’ data and information systems, conducted internal reliability  checks, and followed up as necessary with agency staff. We determined  that the data used in our report were sufficiently reliable for our purpose  of presenting estimated allotments of funding for counternarcotics  assistance. We also interviewed relevant officials from each agency to  corroborate information provided in agency documentation and discuss  each agency’s management of counternarcotics assistance in the Andean  region. (See app. I for a more detailed description of our scope and  methodology.) We conducted this performance audit from April 2011 to  July 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The five countries in the Andean region—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,  Peru, and Venezuela—represent primary sources of or transit routes for  cocaine entering the United States.    Bolivia. Bolivia is the world’s third largest producer of cocaine as well  as a transit zone for cocaine products from Peru, primarily to  neighboring countries in South America and to Europe. Although  cocaine production is illegal in Bolivia, coca farming is permitted in  some parts of the country.    Colombia. Colombia, within 3 hours flying time from Florida,  produces 90 percent of the cocaine entering the United States and  much of the heroin in the eastern United States. Several terrorist  organizations in Colombia, which commit wide-scale violence and  human rights abuses, engage in drug trafficking as a source of  income.    Ecuador. Ecuador is a major transit route for cocaine produced  primarily in neighboring Colombia and Peru. Since it uses the U.S.  dollar as its currency, Ecuador is also an attractive venue for money  laundering by individuals and organizations engaged in criminal  activities.    Peru. Peru is the world’s second largest producer of cocaine. Drug  trafficking also generates a significant amount of money laundering in  Peru.    Venezuela. Venezuela is one of the major drug transit countries in the  Western Hemisphere. Cocaine produced in Colombia is trafficked  through Venezuela; transported to locations in the Caribbean, Mexico,  or Central America; and then subsequently brought to the United  States and other locations.
The map in figure 1 shows the locations of the five Andean countries.
Several U.S. departments and agencies are involved in planning and  executing counternarcotics assistance in the Andean countries.    State. State manages and funds eradication, interdiction, and law  enforcement assistance, including programs implemented by a variety  of other U.S. agencies. State also funds security assistance programs  generally implemented by DOD, including Foreign Military Financing  and International Military Education and Training programs, which are  intended to strengthen the overall capacity of foreign forces to  address security threats such as the narcotics trade. In addition to  these activities, State provides limited funding to the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) to implement counternarcotics assistance  in the Andean region. DHS components that implement this  assistance include Customs and Border Protection (CBP),  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the U.S. Coast  Guard (USCG). State also provides funding for the Department of  Justice’s (DOJ) International Criminal Investigative Training and  Assistance Program (ICITAP), which supports prosecution of  members of paramilitary groups in Colombia.    USAID. USAID supports the U.S. counternarcotics effort through its  rule-of-law and alternative development programs in several of the  Andean countries.    DOD. DOD, primarily through its Office of the Deputy Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats  (DASD-CN>), provides oversight and funds for counternarcotics  activities in the Andean region.    DEA. DEA works, primarily through its Sensitive Investigative Unit  (SIU) program, to dismantle and disrupt drug trafficking organizations  that are active in the Andean region. DEA maintains SIU programs in  three of the five Andean countries.
For more information about each agency’s counternarcotics assistance in  the Andean countries, see appendixes II and III.
ONDCP produces the National Drug Control Strategy, which outlines the  administration’s initiatives to reduce illicit drug use, manufacturing and  trafficking, drug-related crime and violence, and drug-related health  consequences. ONDCP is also responsible for evaluating, coordinating,  and overseeing U.S. agencies’ counternarcotics activities. In December  2006, Congress directed ONDCP to produce an annual report describing  the national drug control performance measurement system and  identifying the efforts of agencies carrying out activities under the National  Drug Control Program. In May 2007, ONDCP issued guidance requiring  these agencies to submit annual performance summary reports to the  ONDCP Director. According to the guidance, these reports must  describe, among other things, performance measures used by the agency  to assess its counternarcotics activities; the prior year’s performance  targets and results; current fiscal year performance targets and  methodology used to establish those targets; and procedures used to  ensure that performance data are accurate, complete, and unbiased.  Prior to submitting these reports to ONDCP, agencies must provide the  reports to their Inspector General (IG) for attestation to the reliability of  each assertion made in the report.
As part of its counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere, the  United States has launched several regional initiatives outside the  Andean region—the Mérida Initiative, the Caribbean Basin Security  Initiative (CBSI), and the Central American Regional Security Initiative  (CARSI)—to combat rising drug-related crime in Mexico, the Caribbean,  and Central America. See appendix IV for additional information about  these regional initiatives.
section_title: Mission Plans Describe Strategic Approaches for U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Andean Countries
paragraphs: Although no single comprehensive U.S. counternarcotics strategy exists  for the Andean region, mission strategic resource plans (MSRPs) for each  of the countries in the region delineate the strategic approaches guiding  U.S. counternarcotics assistance. According to State officials, the MSRPs  incorporate high-level guidance from ONDCP’s annual National Drug  Control Strategy, which also includes specific policy guidance for the  Western Hemisphere. This strategy presents a broad framework for  reducing illicit drug use and its harmful effects on the United States.  Included in the strategy is a chapter on international partnerships focused  on reducing the supply of illicit drugs in the United States via U.S.  cooperative efforts, such as those with Colombia and Peru, the CBSI  countries, and the CARSI countries, and initiatives to combat trafficking  through transit countries such as Ecuador.
The MSRPs for the Andean countries, developed by interagency teams at  U.S. embassies in consultation with host country governments,  summarize conditions in each country, specify U.S. foreign assistance  goals, and describe in general terms the assistance planned to further  those goals. Following are highlights of the strategic approaches  described in MSRPs developed for each of the Andean countries in fiscal  years 2007 through 2011.
subsections: section_title: Bolivia
paragraphs: The MSRPs for Bolivia address counternarcotics assistance as one of the  U.S. mission’s highest priorities. The MSRPs generally focus on  developing the government of Bolivia’s capacity to interdict cocaine and  precursor chemicals, supporting multilateral cooperation, assisting the  government of Bolivia with demand reduction policies, and supporting  alternative development programs. Similarly, as part of U.S. public  diplomacy efforts to support understanding of U.S. policies, the MSRPs  call for U.S. support of drug-awareness programs to communicate the  damage done to Bolivian society caused by excess coca production, drug  trafficking and consumption, and the benefits of alternative development.
The MSRPs reflect a difficult bilateral relationship between the United  States and Bolivia, which has adversely affected counternarcotics  operations in that country. Bilateral ties were greatly strained in 2008,  when coca growers expelled USAID from the Chapare region in June,  followed by the Bolivian president’s declaring the U.S. Ambassador  persona non grata in September and expelling DEA in November of that  year. Although U.S. counternarcotics assistance in Bolivia has continued,  State officials report that resources for interdiction have declined in the  years since DEA’s departure.
section_title: Colombia
paragraphs: The MSRPs for Colombia characterize counternarcotics efforts as the  cornerstone of the U.S. bilateral relationship with that country. The U.S.  counternarcotics strategy in Colombia has focused on aerial eradication,  alternative development, interdiction, counterterrorism, and  demobilization of combatants. The MSRPs report a successful  partnership with Colombia over a number of years, with Colombian  authorities increasingly assuming responsibility for funding and sustaining  counternarcotics programs. The MSRPs also note that Colombia has  emerged as a provider of counternarcotics assistance to other countries  in the region.
Beginning in 2009, the MSRPs reflect the launch of the Colombian  Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI). CSDI supports the government  of Colombia’s National Territorial Consolidation Plan that aims to expand  state presence in four priority geographic zones previously dominated by  illegal armed groups. Many municipalities in the target areas suffer from  weak local institutions, lack of civilian authority, limited police capabilities,  and an ineffective or absent justice system, which undermine the rule of  law and perpetuate a vicious cycle of drug trafficking and violence. CSDI  supports the government of Colombia’s efforts by providing economic  opportunities once security and basic public services are established.  Through CSDI, the U.S. strategy intends to support the transfer of  security responsibilities from the Colombian military to the police. The  U.S. strategy also seeks to sharply curtail illicit crop cultivation and  cocaine production in priority conflict zones, thereby removing a vital  source of funding for illegal armed groups.
section_title: Ecuador
paragraphs: The MSRPs for Ecuador describe a strategic approach that, owing to  Ecuador’s role as a transit country for illicit drugs, has focused on  improving security along the northern border with Colombia and other key  transport choke points. The MSRPs generally reflect U.S. support in the  form of technical and advisory assistance, as well as equipment and  training for the Ecuadorian military and police forces to improve detection  and interdiction of drug trafficking. The MSRPs also note efforts to  provide licit employment opportunities for populations in regions  vulnerable to penetration by drug traffickers, as well as advocacy of  tougher penalties for money laundering. Until 2009, a key element of the  U.S. counternarcotics strategy for Ecuador and the Andean Region was  the Forward Operating Location at the Ecuadorian Air Force base at  Manta. This facility allowed detection, monitoring, and tracking of drug  trafficking activities in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. According to agency  officials, since 2009 U.S. monitoring of drug trafficking has been moved to  other locations in the region. For example, detection and monitoring are  now primarily focused on areas of arrival in Central America rather than  areas of departure in South America.
section_title: Peru
paragraphs: The MSRPs for Peru note a number of factors affecting the strategy for  counternarcotics assistance. Foremost among these factors is the cross- border nature of drug trafficking throughout the Andean region, where  successes in Colombia, for example, increase pressures on Peru. In  addition, these documents highlight the lack of a Peruvian government  presence in the principal areas of the country where coca production and  trafficking takes place, which has allowed narcotics traffickers to move in  to fill the vacuum.
Under the strategic goal of combating terrorism, the United States has  supported the government of Peru’s efforts against domestic terrorists,  who fund their operations and recruitment through drug production and  trafficking. U.S. assistance also has targeted efforts to bring greater  government control to border areas where Colombian terrorist  organizations have obtained a foothold. The most recent MSRPs identify  Mexican and Colombian drug cartels among the entities that benefit from  drug trafficking in Peru. Funding support for the Peruvian government’s  drug strategy is designated a priority. The Peruvian strategy focuses on  preventing and reducing consumption, disrupting production and  trafficking, and promoting alternative development, including helping  farmers grow licit, rather than illicit, crops. According to the MSRPs, the  eradication program combined with sustained alternative development  supported by USAID over the last several years has reduced coca  cultivation to nearly insignificant levels in San Martin department, once  one of the key coca growing areas of the world, and replaced it with licit,  high-value crops such as cacao, coffee, and oil palm. The U.S. strategy  seeks to replicate that model in other areas of Peru and to encourage  Peruvian authorities to assume greater responsibility for sustaining  counternarcotics programs. The MSRPs also reflect concerns over the  role that efforts to combat drug trafficking play in stemming other illicit  activities, such as money laundering, illegal logging, and trafficking in  wildlife.
section_title: Venezuela
paragraphs: The MSRPs for Venezuela reflect continuing concern over increased  trafficking of cocaine from neighboring Colombia, which apparently has  led to rising cocaine consumption in Venezuela. The MSRPs note that the  U.S. counternarcotics strategy for that country is constrained by the  Venezuelan government’s antagonism toward the United States. The  U.S. strategy has therefore aimed primarily at reducing demand for  cocaine, primarily through cooperation with local and regional law  enforcement.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Allotted Billions to Andean Countries for Counternarcotics Assistance in Fiscal Years 2006-2011
paragraphs: State, USAID, DOD, and DEA allotted a combined estimated total of  nearly $5.2 billion in counternarcotics assistance to Andean countries in  fiscal years 2006-2011. Of this amount, about $366 million (7 percent)  was allotted for Bolivia; $3.92 billion (76 percent) for Colombia; $233  million (5 percent) for Ecuador; $659 million (13 percent) for Peru; and $7  million (less than 1 percent) for Venezuela (see fig. 2).
Total estimated allotments for counternarcotics assistance programs in  the Andean countries declined overall by about 51 percent from fiscal  year 2006 to fiscal year 2011. Allotments for Bolivia declined by about  $103 million (87 percent); for Colombia, by $377 million (45 percent); for  Ecuador, by $32 million (59 percent); for Peru, by $87 million (52  percent); and for Venezuela, by $2 million (88 percent). In fiscal year  2008, allotments for counternarcotics assistance programs declined in all  Andean countries. (See fig. 3.)
Of the agencies’ combined estimated assistance in fiscal years 2006  through 2011, State provided about $3 billion (60 percent), USAID  provided $1 billion (21 percent), DOD provided $956 million (19 percent),  and DEA provided $25 million (less than 1 percent). As figure 4 shows,  each agency’s allotments decreased during this time period. State’s  allotments for counternarcotics assistance declined the most, dropping by  about 60 percent from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011. According to  agency officials, this decline in funding for counternarcotics assistance  could be attributed to factors such as the ongoing nationalization of U.S.  counternarcotics programs and assets in Colombia as well as a general  reduction in available resources across the federal government in recent  fiscal years.
section_title: State, USAID, and DEA Reported Meeting or Exceeding Many Targets, but DOD’s Reporting Has Been Unreliable
paragraphs: State, USAID, and DEA reported meeting or exceeding most of their  annual targets related to key counternarcotics performance measures in  the Andean countries, and each complied with the ONDCP requirement  that each agency obtain its IG’s attestation to the reliability of the  agency’s performance summary reports before submitting the reports to  ONDCP. DOD also reported tracking counternarcotics performance  measures, but we could not confirm the reliability of its performance data.  Moreover, DOD did not comply with ONDCP’s requirement that the IG  attest to the reliability of reported data.
subsections: section_title: State, USAID, and DEA Reported Meeting or Exceeding Targets for Key Measures
paragraphs: State, USAID, and DEA reported meeting or exceeding many  performance targets related to key measures since 2007, when ONDCP  called for these targets to be set. Performance measures are important  in helping managers assess progress toward goals and promoting  accountability by communicating agency performance to Congress and  the public. In addition, in compliance with ONDCP’s 2007 requirement,  each agency submitted IG attestations to the reliability of the data  reported.
State reported meeting or exceeding more than half of its annual targets  for two key measures of its counternarcotics activities: (1) hectares of  illicit crops eradicated and (2) kilos of narcotics seized. State reported  meeting or exceeding a total of 16 of 28 annual targets related to these  measures. State reported assisting in the eradication of about 915,000  hectares of illicit crops in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru in fiscal years 2006  through 2010, meeting or exceeding its annual targets in those countries  about half the time in the 4 years for which data are available. State also  reported assisting in the seizure of approximately 2,300,000 kilos of  narcotics in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru in fiscal years 2006  through 2010, meeting or exceeding more than half of its annual  interdiction targets in the four years for which data are available. State is  currently revising its performance measurements. Officials told us that  they are making efforts to develop more performance measures that do  not focus on eradication, because eradication is not the sole factor  influencing cultivation levels. State is also making efforts to develop  metrics that demonstrate progress toward turning over control of  counternarcotics programs to partner countries. (See app. II and app. III  for further details of State’s counternarcotics efforts in each of the Andean  countries.) State’s IG attested to the reliability of the department’s  reporting of performance results for fiscal years 2007 through 2010, in  accordance with ONDCP’s requirement.
In January 2010, State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law  Enforcement Affairs  issued guidelines for program monitoring  and evaluation. These guidelines were intended to help program  managers determine whether projects are achieving their goals and  adjust projects as necessary; plan effective programs; report program  results to key stakeholders and oversight entities; justify resource  requests; promote necessary changes in partner support, and contribute  to constructive policy dialogue within the U.S. government and  internationally. Departmentwide program evaluation guidance followed in  November 2010, when State announced its first-ever evaluation policy for  improving program management.
USAID reported generally exceeding annual targets related to two key  measures for its counternarcotics efforts in the Andean countries: (1)  hectares of land devoted to cultivating licit crops in areas receiving USAID  assistance and (2) number of jobs created by alternative development  projects each year. USAID reported exceeding a total of 26 of 32 annual  targets related to these measures. According to USAID data, 804,314  hectares were devoted to alternative crops and 761,031 full-time jobs  were created in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru in fiscal years 2006  through 2010. (See app. II and app. III for further details of USAID’s  counternarcotics efforts in each of the Andean countries.) In accordance  with ONDCP’s 2007 requirement, USAID’s IG attested to the reliability of  the agency’s reporting of performance results for fiscal years 2007  through 2010.
USAID conducts evaluations of its counternarcotics and development  programs in the Andean countries. These evaluations provide historical  and regional context for USAID projects, detailed descriptions of program  activities and results, findings, conclusions, recommendations, and  lessons learned. Some of the achievements reported in these evaluations  include the following:    USAID’s alternative development program has met and surpassed  annual targets for voluntary eradication of illicit crops in Peru.    USAID contributed to Plan Colombia, which reduced opium poppy  cultivation by 50 percent and improved security by suppressing  illegally armed groups.    USAID’s activities in Bolivia have contributed to improved poverty  indicators, and hectares of principal alternative crops—such as  bananas and citrus—have increased more than coca.
DEA reported generally exceeding regional targets related to two key  performance measures for its international counternarcotics efforts:(1)  number of drug trafficking organizations, or priority target organizations  (PTO), disrupted and (2) number of PTOs dismantled. DEA reported  meeting or exceeding 8 of 10 annual targets related to these measures.  DEA reported disrupting 73 PTOs and dismantling 144 in Colombia,  Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela in fiscal years 2006 through 2011,  meeting or exceeding its regional targets for every year except 2007 and  2011. (See app. II and app. III for country-level details on the results of  DEA’s counternarcotics activities in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and  Venezuela.) DOJ’s IG attested to the reliability of DEA’s reporting of its  performance results for 2007 through 2010, in accordance with ONDCP’s  requirement.
section_title: DOD Reported Various Performance Measures, but Its Reporting Has Not Been Reliable
paragraphs: DOD reported a number of performance measures for its  counternarcotics efforts in the Andean countries in fiscal years 2007  through 2011, such as training and military support. However, we could  not confirm the reliability of the counternarcotics performance data DOD  reported during these years. DOD is working to improve its  counternarcotics performance measurement system, but DOD officials  have reported challenges in measuring the performance of its  counternarcotics activities, such as difficulty in creating performance  measures that assess program outcomes, as well as dependence on host  nations and third parties for the collection and reporting of data related to  these results.
DOD’s efforts to develop counternarcotics performance measures are  long-standing. We reported in 1999 that DOD had taken initial steps to  develop better counternarcotics performance measures. In a  subsequent review, we found that DOD did not have an effective  performance measurement system to track the progress of its  counternarcotics activities. ONDCP also reported holding, since 2006,  numerous consultations with DOD regarding the department’s  development of a performance measurement system for its  counternarcotics efforts. In 2010 we recommended that (1) DOD review  the department’s performance measures for counternarcotics activities  and revise the measures, as appropriate, to include the key attributes of  successful performance measures that we had previously identified and  (2) apply practices that we had identified to facilitate the use of  performance data. In response to these recommendations, DOD issued  standard operating procedures for the development and documentation of  counternarcotics performance metrics. This guidance outlines  procedures for selecting and evaluating counternarcotics performance  measures, setting performance targets, and assessing the reliability and  limitations of performance data with the purpose of using this information  to provide oversight and guide management decisions about the  allotment of counternarcotics resources. According to ONDCP, as a result  of this standard operating procedure, DOD revised its performance  measurement system in fiscal year 2011 to improve the system’s quality  and usefulness. According to DOD officials, the department is currently  developing its counternarcotics performance measures and plans to  transition to a web-based system for reporting its performance metrics by  fiscal year 2013.
DOD did not submit IG statements attesting to the reliability of the  department’s performance data as required by ONDCP. DOD IG cited a  number of reasons for not attesting to the reliability of DOD’s performance  data. For example, according to the IG, DOD’s performance reports for  fiscal years 2007 through 2009 did not meet ONDCP requirements that  the reports clearly describe the meaning and relevance of performance  measures and explain why any targets were not met. In addition,  according to information we obtained during a 2010 interview with the IG,  DOD’s 2008 performance report did not include 4 consecutive years of  data required for tracking improvements. Further, targets for several  performance measures in the 2008 report appeared to have been set  after the actual results for these measures were determined, therefore  throwing the reliability of all the data into question. DOD IG saw no  changes in DOD’s 2009 performance report and therefore decided not to  dedicate resources to conducting a review for the 2009 report. ONDCP  confirmed that DOD again failed to comply with the IG review requirement  in fiscal year 2010. In June 2012, DOD IG stated that it was unable to  attest to the reliability of DOD’s fiscal year 2011 performance report.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Given the strategic importance of reducing drug production and trafficking  in the Andean countries—the source of more than 95 percent of the  cocaine seized in the United States and much of the heroin available east  of the Mississippi River—accurate and reliable information on the results  of this assistance is essential. State, USAID, and DEA have reported the  required information, with attestations of its reliability, regarding the  combined $4 billion in assistance that they provided in fiscal years 2006  through 2011. However, lacking attestations by DOD’s IG, ONDCP has  minimal assurance of the reliability of DOD’s reporting on its estimated  $956 million in counternarcotics assistance in those years. Without  reliable information, ONDCP may be limited in its ability to carry out its  responsibility for coordinating and overseeing implementation of the  policies, goals, objectives, and priorities established by the national drug  control program and to report accurately to Congress on counternarcotics  assistance provided by agencies under ONDCP’s purview. Moreover,  without reliable information, Congress and other decision makers,  including ONDCP, may lack information that is essential to assessing  progress toward the U.S. goal of curtailing illicit drug consumption in  America, making decisions on the allocation of resources, and conducting  effective oversight.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To strengthen ONDCP’s ability to coordinate, oversee, and report to  Congress on U.S. counternarcotics assistance in the Andean countries,  we recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that DOD complies  with the ONDCP requirement to submit to ONDCP performance summary  reports that are accompanied by IG attestations of the reliability of the  information reported.
section_title: Agency Comments and our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to State, USAID, DOD, DEA, and  ONDCP. State, DOD, DEA, ONDCP, and DHS provided technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. USAID and DOD also  provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendixes VI and  VII, respectively. In its written comments, DOD stated that it concurred  with our recommendation.
As discussed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents  of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of State, the  USAID Administrator, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General,  and the Director of National Drug Control Policy. In addition, the report  will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov  If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Public Affairs and Congressional Relations may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix VIII.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To identify U.S. agencies that provided counternarcotics assistance in the  Andean region during fiscal years 2006 through 2011, we reviewed past  GAO reports and relevant legislation. To identify counternarcotics  assistance activities, we reviewed funding amounts reported to us by  agencies, congressional budget submissions, agency annual reports, and  other program documents. We also interviewed officials from the  Department of State (State), the Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Drug  Enforcement Administration (DEA).
To describe the U.S. strategic approaches to counternarcotics assistance  in the five Andean countries, we examined multiple U.S. government  documents and interviewed U.S. government officials. Specifically, we  obtained and analyzed State’s mission and bureau performance plans to  understand U.S. foreign policy and security goals and priorities and the  executive branch’s approach to formulating those goals. We also  obtained State’s and USAID’s joint strategic 5-year plan, DOD’s  Counternarcotics and Global Threats strategy, and DEA’s agency  strategic plan. We interviewed officials from State, USAID, DOD, and  DEA in Washington, D.C., who are responsible for administering and  implementing the assistance programs to the five Andean countries. We  reviewed department and agency planning, reporting, and budgeting  documents and obtained and reviewed the various strategy documents  produced by the United States that are the basis for overall drug control  efforts, such as the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP)  annual National Drug Control Strategy and the U.S. embassy’s mission  strategic resource plans for fiscal years 2007 through 2011.
We defined “counternarcotics assistance” as all funding provided primarily  for the purpose of eradicating drug crop cultivation, interdicting trafficked  narcotics, supporting alternative livelihoods and alternative crop  cultivation, or training and equipping military and law enforcement for  counternarcotics operations. In addition, we included small amounts of  funding for assistance efforts in the region intended to support U.S.  counternarcotics goals in the region, such as legal sector reform and drug  demand reduction programs in Andean countries. The funding information  presented in this report is based on allotment data. We used GAO’s  definition of “allotment” as funds authorized by the head of an agency to  be used for obligations. Each agency provided their funding amounts  using internal, agency-specific budget terminology. This terminology  varied among agencies; for example, some agencies referred to their  funding amounts as ‘budget levels’ where other agencies referred to their  funding amounts as ‘allocations.’ We discussed our definition of the term  “allotment” with cognizant officials at each agency. At each agency, those  officials stated that the funding amounts they provided could be  characterized using our definition of allotment and thus could be  presented in this report as funds available for obligation in support of  counternarcotics efforts in each of the Andean countries.
To identify the amounts of U.S. government funding allotted for  counternarcotics, we requested funding data for counternarcotics  assistance in the Andean region for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. We  also interviewed cognizant agency officials and examined past GAO  reports and congressional budget submissions, including State’s Bureau  of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/INL)  program and budget guides for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. In  addition, we obtained technical comments from DHS to confirm that all  DHS counternarcotics efforts in the region are implemented using funds  from other U.S. agencies and international organizations. We collected  data for fiscal years 2006 through fiscal year 2011 to show trends in  counternarcotics assistance funding in the region. Each agency provided  funding data organized by country (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and  Venezuela) and by fiscal year (2006-2011). Based on our review of the  data and discussions with agency officials, we determined that the data  were sufficiently reliable for a broad estimate of U.S. government  counternarcotics program allotments the Andean region, and to provide  an indication of general trends over time as well as differences in funding  provided by country and agency.
The agencies took different steps and queried different systems to  provide the funding data we requested.
State. Officials from State’s Office of the Director of Foreign  Assistance provided data from the Foreign Assistance Coordination  and Tracking System (FACTS) database, which houses funding data  on U.S. foreign assistance programs. The FACTS funding data  included amounts from fiscal year 2006 through 2011 from the  following foreign assistance accounts: Andean Counterdrug Initiative  (ACI); Foreign Military Financing (FMF); International Military  Education and Training (IMET); International Narcotics Control and  Law Enforcement (INCLE); and Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism,  Demining and Related Programs (NADR). We requested the funding  amounts for these accounts after determining, through discussions  with State officials, that these accounts were the most relevant to our  scope. In addition, we requested specific amounts allotted for security  sector reform and combating transnational crime in the region from  the Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Fund (ESF)  accounts. In addition, State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and  Law Enforcement (INL) provided records on appropriations,  allotments, obligations, expenditures, and other budget categories.  We used these records to provide data on funding allotted for  assistance in Ecuador through DOD’s Section 1207 Assistance  program; we did not obtain any additional data on 1207 program  funding in the region.
USAID. USAID’s Office of Latin America and the Caribbean consulted  internal records and submitted a spreadsheet that combined (1)  amounts of ACI assistance provided in fiscal years 2006 and 2007,  which were not included in the State/F data and (2) data pulled by a  query of the FACTS database to provide amounts allotted for  counternarcotics assistance through the DA and ESF accounts for  fiscal years 2008 through 2011.
DOD. DOD’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Counternarcotics and Global Threats (DASD-CN>) provided a  document with funding data from the CTA for Counternarcotics.  DASD-CN> provides oversight of CTA funding through a Web- based database. DASD-CN> compiled funding data from this  database— which tracks funds by project code— and then asked  knowledgeable officials to provide estimated amounts of funds used in  support of each Andean country.
DEA. DEA reviewed interagency agreement documents with State to  obtain data on allotments for DEA’s SIU program. DEA provided a  spreadsheet with detail from those agreements on funding provided in  support of the program.
We combined the funding data provided by State, USAID, DOD, and DEA  to obtain total estimated U.S. government funds allotted. These amounts  are estimates because, according to agency officials, funding databases  may have imperfect or incomplete information, and some agencies relied  on manual estimates or manual review of agency documentation rather  than a central data management system to provide funding information.  Because State’s FACTS database was in the process of being created  and launched in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, some data may be missing  for those years. In addition, State officials told us that although assistance  provided through the FMF and IMET accounts is often used for  counternarcotics purposes, the main intent of these accounts is to provide  assistance to partner nation militaries. Some of the FMF and IMET  assistance included in this report may not have provided direct support to  counternarcotics efforts of Andean countries. In addition, State/INL’s  records on the allotments for the 1207 program may not be complete,  because the program was originally managed by DOD; authority for the  1207 program expired on September 30, 2010. According to State,  because State does not maintain separate records for the uses of funds  in the ACI account, State was not able to provide complete data specific  to this account. According to USAID, USAID’s Office for Latin America  and the Caribbean relied on internal records that had been maintained by  the staff since 2006 to provide GAO with data on ACI funding amounts  allotted by USAID in each country for counternarcotics programs.  Similarly, DOD provided manual estimates of amounts by country,  because according to DOD, the department tracks CTA funding by project  code—which indicates the general purpose of the funding—rather than by  country. According to DOD, there is no standard procedure for estimating  these amounts by country. Unlike funding data provided by other  agencies, DEA amounts were obtained by a manual review of agency  documentation, not pulled by query from a data management system,  according to DEA officials.
To assess State, USAID, DOD, and DEA reporting on their performance  of counternarcotics activities in the Andean countries, we reviewed  agency planning and reporting documents related to counternarcotics  performance measures and targets. We also met with State, USAID,  DOD, and DOJ officials to identify the most significant performance  measures for their counternarcotics activities in the Andean countries. For  the focus of our review, we selected two key measures for each agency  that were identified by agency officials as significant indicators of the  results of their counternarcotics activities, included in the agencies’  annual performance reports to ONDCP, and consistently reported to  ONDCP over the past 5 years for all Andean countries. We assessed the  reliability of agency performance data for these key measures by  interviewing cognizant agency officials about the methods used to gather  and verify this data. We also reviewed related documents, such as  independent data quality assessments and statements from agency  Inspector Generals (IG) attesting to the reliability of agency performance  data. We found limitations with some of the performance data for these  key measures, including (1) lack of available State and USAID data in  Venezuela, and of DEA data in Bolivia, due to limited U.S. presence in  these countries; (2) reliance on partner nations and third parties for  collection and reporting of certain performance data; and (3) lack of IG  authentication of DOD’s reported performance data. We used these data  to describe each agency’s counternarcotics performance measures and  the results related to these measures, as reported by the agencies, in  relation to their counternarcotics performance targets. With the exception  of DOD’s performance data, we determined that the performance data  provided by the agencies were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2011 through July 2012  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our work objectives.
Each U.S. agency involved in CSDI has a designated area of  responsibility.  State focuses on eradication, USAID focuses on land  reform and restitution, and DOD focuses on anti-insurgency support.  DEA’s SIU program is not part of CSDI but provides training and  equipment to a vetted unit within the Colombian National Police (CNP).  State, USAID, DOD, and DEA coordinate counternarcotics efforts in  country.
DOD  In fiscal years 2006 through 2011,  DOD allotted about $752 million for  counternarcotics-related security  assistance in Colombia (see fig. 8).  DOD has provided training and  equipment for the Regional  Helicopter Training Center and pilot  training program in Melgar. DOD has  also provided rotary-wing aircraft  support to the Colombian Joint Task  Force-Omega, which is the main  Colombian task force charged with  confronting the Revolutionary Armed  Forces of Colombia (known by its  Spanish acronym, FARC). DOD  counternarcotics funds have also  developed maritime interdiction  capacity through the purchase of  boats and construction of related  infrastructure in Santa Marta,  Cartagena and other locations.
Some counternarcotics programs and assets are being transferred to  Colombian control. For example, State’s Plan Colombia Helicopter  Program, initiated in 2002, provides rotary-wing aircraft to develop  Colombian Army aviation. State officials estimated that the last aircraft  provided by the program would be transferred to the government of  Colombia by the end of 2012. Similarly, State’s Colombian National  Police Aviation program has nationalized the cost of fuel to the CNP and  plans for the nationalization of rotary-wing aircraft in 2012. The CNP also  plans to assume financial responsibility for the purchase, transport, and  mixing of glyphosate, the chemical used in aerial eradication, in 2011 and  2012.
Bolivia  State supports manual eradication efforts in Bolivia by providing training  and equipment to military and police and through aviation programs that  provide aircraft with related training and maintenance to support  transportation and logistics. State also makes aviation assets available  for interdiction purposes, transporting manual eradication teams,  supplies, and equipment to otherwise inaccessible regions of the country.
State Department: Eradication  and Interdiction   State leads drug crop eradication  efforts in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru  and supports law enforcement in  each of these countries with training  and equipment to enhance drug  interdiction capacity. State’s primary  effort in Ecuador supports training  and equipment for Ecuador’s  counternarcotics police. State  provided limited assistance In  Venezuela in fiscal years 2006  through 2011. However, State has  used recently reprogrammed funds  for administrative costs associated  with closing its counternarcotics  programs in Venezuela.
Colombia  State supports aerial and manual eradication in Colombia and provides  assistance to enhance the country’s interdiction capacity. State supports  aerial eradication primarily by hiring a private U.S. contractor to aerially  spread herbicide over areas of coca cultivation. State supports manual  eradication, planned by the Colombian government, by providing  protective equipment for manual eradicators. State has also provided  helicopters and related training and equipment to both the Colombian  Army and the Colombian National Police to enhance the eradication and  interdiction capabilities of those institutions.
Ecuador  Because Ecuador is a major transit route for narcotics passing from  Colombia and Peru to the United States, State’s counternarcotics  assistance in Ecuador focuses on interdiction efforts and law enforcement  training. State supports programs to improve the institutional capabilities of  Ecuador’s military, police, and judicial sectors to combat narcotics  trafficking, money laundering, and other transnational crimes.
Peru does not allow aerial eradication.
The funding allotted by State,  USAID, DOD, and DEA in the  Andean countries primarily  supported, respectively, eradication  and interdiction, alternative  development, military assistance,  and law enforcement capacity  building in Andean countries in fiscal  years 2006 through 2011.
Bolivia  USAID works with the government of Bolivia to diversify the economies of  coca-growing regions, strengthen productive capacities, improve access to  essential social services, and improve rural road infrastructure. USAID’s  alternative development program provides opportunities for farmers to  transition from production of coca to other viable productive activities.
USAID: Alternative  Development   USAID focuses on alternative  development in Bolivia, Ecuador,  and Peru and leads stabilization and  alternative development programs in  Colombia. Alternative development  programs provide assistance to  individuals and communities to  facilitate the transition away from  drug crop cultivation as a source of  income. CSDI, the stabilization  program in Colombia, supports the  counternarcotics efforts of the  government of that country. USAID  reported that it did not provide  assistance in Venezuela in fiscal  years 2006 to 2011.
Colombia   In Colombia, USAID’s primary focus is supporting the stabilization efforts of  the Colombian government to establish and reinforce the government’s  credibility and legitimacy in regions where illegal armed narcotics-trafficking  organizations are active. At the U.S. embassy in Bogotá, USAID leads CSDI,  which coordinates U.S. programs in Colombia to support the Colombian  government in establishing control over high-priority areas of the country that  have been affected by drug-related conflict. This effort includes providing  support to improve the management of Colombian institutions, such as the  land-titling system.
Ecuador  In Ecuador, USAID’s counternarcotics effort includes a local business  development program to generate licit employment and increase income for  families along Ecuador’s northern and southern borders by supporting a  market-driven expansion of private enterprises linked to rural producer  groups and associations. Through local business development projects,  USAID provides technical assistance, training, and small grants to stimulate  investment in agribusinesses that are linked to both small producers and  larger markets.
Peru  USAID supports efforts to help communities to transition from growing coca  to cultivating licit crops. According to USAID, approximately 1 to 3 months  after eradication of illicit crops in an area, communities are offered the  opportunity to sign agreements with the government of Peru, in which the  communities commit to remaining coca free. USAID and DEVIDA, the  Peruvian drug control agency, commit to support the coca-free communities  with a package of assistance tailored to each community’s priorities and  needs. This assistance includes planting new crops, increasing farmers’  access to financial services, and strengthening producer associations and  cooperatives to facilitate access to local and international markets.
The funding allotted by State,  USAID, DOD, and DEA in the  Andean countries primarily  supported, respectively, eradication  and interdiction, alternative  development, military assistance,  and law enforcement capacity  building in Andean countries in fiscal  years 2006 through 2011.
DOD reported providing minimal counternarcotics-related military  support to members of the Bolivian armed forces since 2006. Generally,  this support has been provided as training for selected members of the  armed forces who receive instruction at U.S. military service schools.
DOD: Military Support and  Training   DOD leads counternarcotics-related  military support and training  programs in all countries in the  region. DOD reported minimal  engagement with the armed forces  of Bolivia. In Colombia and Peru,  DOD provides support to fight armed  groups that engage in narcotics  production and trafficking in these  countries. In Ecuador, DOD works  jointly with the military to counter  transnational criminal organizations  operating in the Ecuador-Colombia  border region. DOD reported minimal  engagement with the armed forces  of Venezuela.
DOD counternarcotics funding in Colombia supports development of   military air, maritime, river-based, and ground capabilities. For example,  DOD provides funding for the Regional Helicopter Training Center pilot  training program in Melgar, which has provided helicopter pilot training to  counternarcotics forces throughout Latin America. DOD has also supported  the helicopter capability of the Colombian Joint Task Force – Omega,  responsible for countering the FARC. Similarly, DOD has purchased and  funded the maintenance infrastructure necessary for boats used in the  Colombian military’s maritime interdiction operations.
DOD counternarcotics funding supports the Ecuadorian military in their  operations against transnational criminal organizations, principally in the  country’s northern border region with Colombia. DOD funding provides  spare parts and tools to support a fleet of tactical vehicles used in  operations to destroy narcotics processing locations. DOD also provides  support for efforts to improve river-based patrol capabilities in the same  northern border region.
The U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group focuses DOD  counternarcotics support in the interior of Peru and along the northern  coast.  In the interior, DOD has provided communications and surveillance  equipment to improve Peruvian forces’ ability to deploy for counternarcotics  patrols. DOD’s assistance in these regions is intended to enhance the  Peruvian military capacity to conduct operations against criminal and  terrorist organizations in the region. Along the coast, DOD provides fuel,  information sharing, training, and equipment to enhance detection and  monitoring capabilities in Peru’s coastal areas.
DOD reported providing limited counternarcotics support to Venezuela  since 2006. Until 2009, this support included a tactical analysis team that  provided actionable intelligence to both U.S. and select Venezuelan law  enforcement agencies. Since 2009, DOD resources in the area have been  used primarily in support of U.S. law enforcement.
Figures 18 and 19 show DEA’s targets for disrupting and dismantling priority  target organizations (PTOs) as well as the actual numbers of PTOs  disrupted and dismantled in the Andean region from fiscal year 2006 through  2011.
The funding allotted by State,  USAID, DOD, and DEA in the  Andean countries primarily  supported, respectively, eradication  and interdiction, alternative  development, military assistance,  and law enforcement capacity  building in Andean countries in fiscal  years 2006 through 2011.
DEA: Sensitive Investigative  Unit (SIU) Program  The SIU program, an international  drug enforcement initiative managed  by DEA, is currently active in three  countries of the Andean region— Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.  SIU  members work with the relevant DEA  country office to disrupt and  dismantle drug-trafficking  organizations. DEA operated the SIU  program in Bolivia through 2008 but  ended the program after DEA was  expelled from the country by a  declaration of President Morales.  DEA has had no formal relationship  with Venezuela since 2005.
Coordinator of Citizens  Security Initiatives in the  Western Hemisphere  State describes the Coordinator for  Citizens Security Initiatives in the  Western Hemisphere as being  responsible for coordination of four  initiatives: the Merida Initiative, the  Caribbean Basin Security Initiative  (CBSI), the Central American  Security Initiative (CARSI), and the  Colombian Strategic Development  Initiative (CSDI).
State reported that since 2008, it has allocated more than $1.6 billion for  the Merida Initiative in law enforcement support for Mexico. The Merida  Initiative guides U.S.-Mexico collaboration against violent drug trafficking  organizations. The initiative aims to increase Mexican counter-drug  capacity and to institutionalize the partnership focused on four goals or  pillars: (1) disrupt organized criminal groups, (2) strengthen law  enforcement and judicial institutions, (3) advance global competitiveness  while providing for security along the U.S.-Mexico border, and (4) build  strong and resilient communities.
According to State, the Coordinator  presides over a series of interagency  executive committee meetings  focused on counternarcotics efforts  in the Hemisphere, including the four  initiatives, as well as programs and  activities in the Andean countries  (see map.) The Coordinator has no  dedicated staff or budget. Although  the coordination meetings may result  in adjustments in the implementation  of programs, they do not determine  policy, which is the purview of the  National Security Council.
CBSI is an initiative focused on citizen safety that brings all member  countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Dominican  Republic together to collaborate on regional security with the United  States as a partner. To date, Congress has appropriated $203 million to  CBSI. CBSI aims to strengthen Caribbean partner nations’ capabilities,  including maritime security, law enforcement, information sharing, border  and migration control, transnational crime, and criminal justice.
CARSI seeks to address the corrosive impact of narcotics and weapons  trafficking, gangs, and organized crime that exist in many Central  American countries. Congress has appropriated $491 million for CARSI  to integrate U.S. security efforts from Guatemala to Panama. The pillars  of CARSI include (1) fostering streets free of violence and crime; (2)  disrupting the movement of criminals and contraband; (3) supporting  strong and accountable governments willing to combat the drug threats  with trained and resourced law enforcement; and (4) building state  presence in communities at risk.
The National Drug Control Strategy  includes information on the  coordination of the regional initiatives  as well as efforts in Colombia.
Beginning in 2009, U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Colombia has  focused on supporting the Colombian government’s National  Consolidation Plan through CSDI. The plan represents the centerpiece of  Colombian regional development and reform programs by responding to  issues of rural poverty, violence, human rights, the needs of vulnerable  groups, and the country’s internally displaced population. CSDI provides  integrated support for civilian institution-building, rule of law, and  alternative development programs coupled with security and  counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. The initiative is intended to support  the Colombian government’s goal of establishing and building state  presence in areas contested by terrorist groups linked to narcotics  trafficking, thereby integrating these priority regions into the country’s  broader political, economic, social, and institutional fabric.
subsections: section_title: U.S. agencies use a variety of funding sources to provide counternarcotics support to countries in the Andean region.
paragraphs: Funding source  Economic Support Fund  (ESF)
Foreign Military Financing  (FMF)
section_title: State Department State’s primary funding sources for counternarcotics assistance in the Andean region include the ESF, FMF, IMET, INCLE, and NADR foreign assistance accounts. State also allotted about $600,000 from the DA account for counternarcotics assistance to combat transnational crime in Ecuador in fiscal years 2009 and 2010.
paragraphs: International Military  Education and Training  (IMET)
Andean Counterdrug  Program (ACP)  International Narcotics  Control and Law  Enforcement (INCLE)
Nonproliferation, Anti- terrorism, Demining, and  Related Programs (NADR)
section_title: USAID USAID’s primary funding sources for counternarcotics assistance in the Andean region included the DA, ESF, and ACP accounts.
paragraphs: Andean Counterdrug  Program (ACP)  Development Assistance  (DA)  Economic Support Fund  (ESF)
section_title: Department of Defense DOD’s primary funding source for counternarcotics assistance in the Andean region is the Central Transfer Account for counternarcotics. DOD also allotted funds for stability assistance in Ecuador in fiscal year 2010 through the Section 1207 Assistance program.
paragraphs: Annual agency  appropriation  Sensitive Investigative Unit  (SIU)
section_title: Drug Enforcement Administration DEA’s primary funding source for counternarcotics assistance in the Andean region is annual agency appropriations used to support the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) program.
paragraphs: Totals have been rounded to the nearest million.
Licit crops supported in the Andean region include cacao, coffee, and oil palm.
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Juan Gobel (Assistant Director), Claude Adrien, Joshua Akery,  Martin de Alteriis, Bruce Kutnick, Reid Lowe, and Cristina Ruggiero.  Etana Finkler, Ernie Jackson, and Jena Sinkfield provided technical  support.