NASA: Human Space Exploration Programs Face Challenges
Published: 2014-12-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: NASA is undertaking a trio of closely related programs to continue human space exploration beyond low-Earth orbit: the SLS vehicle; the Orion capsule, which will launch atop the SLS and carry astronauts; and GSDO, the supporting ground systems. As a whole, the efforts represent NASA's largest exploration investment over the next decade, approaching $23 billion, to demonstrate initial capabilities.
In May 2014, GAO found that NASA's preliminary life-cycle cost estimates for human exploration were incomplete and recommended that NASA establish life-cycle cost and schedule baselines for each upgraded block of SLS, Orion, and GSDO; NASA partially concurred. In July 2014, GAO issued a report on SLS's progress toward its first test flight and recommended that NASA match SLS's resources to its requirements and define specific missions beyond the second test flight, among other actions. NASA concurred with these recommendations.
This testimony is based on GAO's May 2014 report ( GAO-14-385 ), July 2014 report ( GAO-14-631 ), and ongoing audit work related to SLS and Orion. It discusses NASA's efforts to match resources to requirements for the SLS program and developmental challenges facing the SLS and Orion programs. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed relevant design, development, cost, and schedule documents and interviewed program officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In 2014, GAO reported on a number of issues related to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) human exploration programs: the Space Launch System (SLS) vehicle, the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion), and the Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO). For example, in July 2014, GAO found that NASA had not matched resources to requirements for the SLS program and was pursuing an aggressive development schedule—a situation compounded by the agency's reluctance to request funding commensurate with the program's needs. In August 2014, NASA established formal cost and schedule baselines for the SLS program at the agency-required 70 percent joint cost and schedule confidence level (JCL), which satisfied one recommendation from GAO's July 2014 report. The JCL is a calculation NASA uses to estimate the probable success of a program meeting its cost and schedule targets. To satisfy the 70 percent JCL requirement, the SLS program delayed its committed launch readiness date for its first test flight from December 2017 to November 2018. The program is still pursuing December 2017 as an internal goal, or target date, for the test flight, even though NASA calculated the JCL associated with launching SLS on this date at 30 percent. Moreover, neither the Orion nor GSDO program expects to be ready for the December 2017 launch date. With these programs likely unable to meet the December 2017 date, NASA risks exhausting limited human exploration resources to achieve an accelerated SLS program schedule when those resources may be needed to resolve challenges on other human exploration programs.
In addition, GAO's ongoing work has found that the Orion program is facing significant technical and funding issues. Orion just completed its first test flight, and data from this flight is required to address several risks that must be resolved before the second test flight in 2021 because they represent risks to crew safety. For example, during parachute testing, NASA discovered that when only two of the three main parachutes are deployed, they begin to swing past each other creating a “pendulum” effect. This effect could cause the capsule to increase speed and to hit the water at an angle that may damage the capsule, thereby endangering the crew. In addition, data from the test is necessary to inform NASA's design solution to address heat shield cracking issues, which NASA has been working to resolve since August 2013. The heat shield is integral to crew safety during re-entry.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the Space Launch  System (SLS) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s  (NASA) other human exploration programs. SLS is NASA’s first  exploration-class launch vehicle in over 40 years. It is being developed to  launch astronauts and carry cargo into space, beyond low-Earth orbit.  SLS progress cannot be fully discussed without considering the progress  of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion) and Ground Systems  Development and Operations (GSDO) programs. The Orion program is  developing a capsule that will launch atop the SLS and carry the  astronauts, and the GSDO program is developing systems and  infrastructure to support such activities as assembly, test, and launch of  the SLS and Orion. As a whole, these efforts may cost nearly $23 billion  to demonstrate initial capabilities, including the first planned SLS flight in  2018, the ground systems for that effort, and the first two Orion flights  currently planned for fiscal years 2018 and 2021. This amount represents  a significant portion of NASA’s planned budget for major projects during  that period and also a significant portion of government-wide launch- related research and development funding. As we have reported, any  cost or schedule overrun on NASA’s largest, most complex projects— including SLS, Orion, and GSDO—could have a ripple effect on the  portfolio and has the potential to postpone, or even cancel altogether,  projects in earlier development stages. Given the expensive nature of  developing space systems for human exploration, in today’s constrained  government budget environment, it is essential that NASA manage the  acquisition of these systems as efficiently and effectively as possible.
GAO has designated NASA’s management of acquisitions as a high-risk  area for more than two decades in view of persistent cost growth and  schedule slippage in the majority of its major projects. NASA’s attempts to  develop systems capable of transporting humans to space since the  development of the Space Shuttle have been unsuccessful. For example,  prior development programs, the most recent being the Constellation  program, were canceled in the face of acquisition problems and funding- related issues. While the agency has made progress in recent years in  reducing risk on smaller-scale, less complex projects, demonstrating that  this progress can be translated to larger, more complex projects, such as  SLS and Orion, is more challenging yet exceedingly important.
We recently issued two reports on NASA’s current human exploration  program. In addition, we regularly review SLS and Orion as part of our  annual review of major NASA programs and projects. My remarks today  are based on these reports and our ongoing work. Specifically, I will  discuss NASA’s efforts to establish baselines for the SLS program based  on matching cost and schedule resources to requirements,  developmental challenges facing the SLS and Orion programs, and  shortcomings in NASA’s planning and cost estimates for the SLS, Orion,  and GSDO programs. To conduct this work, we reviewed relevant design,  development, cost, and schedule documents; interviewed program  officials; and evaluated SLS and Orion program actions using acquisition  and cost estimating best practices. More information on our scope and  methodology is available in our related GAO products.
The work that supports this statement was performed in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of  2010 directed NASA to, among another things, develop a Space Launch  System as a follow-on to the Space Shuttle and as a key component in  expanding human presence beyond low-Earth orbit. To that end, NASA  plans to incrementally develop three progressively more capable SLS  launch vehicles—70-, 105-, and 130-metric ton (mt) variants. When  complete, the 130-mt vehicle is expected to have more launch capability  than the Saturn V vehicle, which was used for Apollo missions, and be  significantly more capable than any recent or current launch vehicle. The  act also directed NASA to prioritize the core elements of SLS with the  goal of operational capability not later than December 2016. NASA  negotiated an extension of that date, to December 2017, based on the  agency’s initial assessment of the tasks associated with developing the  new launch vehicle, and has subsequently committed to a launch  readiness date of November 2018.
In 2011, NASA formally established the SLS program. To fulfill the  direction of the 2010 act, the agency plans to develop the three SLS  launch vehicle capabilities, complemented by Orion, to transport humans  and cargo into space. The first version of the SLS that NASA is  developing is a 70-mt launch vehicle known as Block I. NASA has  committed to conduct two test flights of the Block I vehicle—the first in  2018 and the second in 2021. The vehicle is scheduled to fly an  uncrewed Orion some 70,000 kilometers beyond the moon during the first  test flight, known as Exploration Mission-1 (EM-1), and to fly a second  mission known as Exploration Mission-2 (EM-2) beyond the moon to  further test performance with a crewed Orion vehicle. After 2021, NASA  intends to build 105- and 130-mt launch vehicles, known respectively as  Block IA/B and Block II, which it expects to use as the backbone of  manned spaceflight for decades. NASA anticipates using the Block IA/B  vehicles for destinations such as near-Earth asteroids and LaGrange  points and the Block II vehicles for eventual Mars missions.
Space launch vehicle development efforts are high risk from technical,  programmatic, and oversight perspectives. The technical risk is inherent  for a variety of reasons including the environment in which they must  operate, complexity of technologies and designs, and limited room for  error in the fabrication and integration process. Managing the  development process is complex for reasons that go well beyond  technology and design. For instance, at the strategic level, because  launch vehicle programs can span many years and be very costly,  programs often face difficulties securing and sustaining funding  commitments and support. At the program level, if the lines of  communication between engineers, managers, and senior leaders are not  clear, risks that pose significant threats could go unrecognized and  unmitigated. If there are pressures to deliver a capability within a short  period of time, programs may be incentivized to overlap development and  production activities or delete tests, which could result in late discovery of  significant technical problems that require more money and ultimately  much more time to address. For these reasons, it is imperative that  launch vehicle development efforts adopt disciplined practices and  lessons learned from past programs.
Best practices for acquisition programs indicate that establishing  baselines that match cost and schedule resources to requirements and  rationally balancing cost, schedule, and performance is a key step in  establishing a successful acquisition program. Our work has also shown  that validating this match before committing resources to development  helps to mitigate the risks inherent in NASA’s programs. We have  reported that within NASA’s acquisition life cycle, resources should be  matched to requirements at key decision point (KDP)-C, the review that  commits the program to formal cost and schedule baselines and marks  the transition from the formulation phase into the implementation phase,  as seen in figure 1 below. The SLS program completed its KDP-C review  in August 2014, GSDO completed its KDP-C review in September 2014,  and the KDP-C review for Orion is currently scheduled for May 2015.
section_title: NASA Delayed SLS Launch Date to Better Match Resources to Requirements
paragraphs: NASA has taken positive steps to address specific concerns we raised in  July 2014 regarding aggressive schedules and insufficient funding by  establishing the SLS program’s committed launch readiness date as  November 2018—almost a year later than originally planned. Specifically,  we reported in July 2014 that NASA had yet to establish baselines that  matched the SLS program’s cost and schedule resources with the  requirement to develop the SLS and launch the first flight test in  December 2017 at the required confidence level of 70 percent. NASA  policy generally requires a 70 percent joint confidence level—a  calculation NASA uses to estimate the probable success of a program  meeting its cost and schedule targets—for a program to proceed with final  design and fabrication. At the time of our July 2014 report, NASA had  delayed its review to formally commit the agency to cost and schedule  baselines for SLS from October 2013, as the agency considered future  funding plans for the program. At that time, the agency’s funding plan for  SLS was insufficient to match requirements to resources for the  December 2017 flight test at the 70 percent joint confidence level and the  agency’s options for matching resources to requirements were largely  limited to increasing program funding, delaying the schedule, or accepting  a reduced confidence level for the initial flight test. We have previously  reported that it is important for NASA to budget projects to appropriate  confidence levels, as past studies have linked cost growth to insufficient  reserves, poorly phased funding profiles, and more generally, optimistic  estimating practices.
We found that NASA’s proposed funding levels had affected the SLS  program’s ability to match requirements to resources since its inception.  NASA has requested relatively consistent amounts of funding of about  $1.4 billion each year since 2012. According to agency officials, the  program has taken steps to operate within that flat funding profile,  including streamlining program office operations and asking each  contractor to identify efficiencies in its production processes. Even so,  according to the program’s own analysis, going into the agency review to  formally set baselines, SLS’s top risk was that the current planned budget  through 2017 would be insufficient to allow the SLS as designed to meet  the EM-1 flight date. The SLS program office calculated the risk  associated with insufficient funding through 2017 as 90 percent likely to  occur; furthermore, it indicated the insufficient budget could push the  December 2017 launch date out 6 months and add some $400 million to  the overall cost of SLS development. The cost risk was considerably  greater than $400 million in the past, but according to program officials  they were able to reduce the affect due to receiving more funding than  requested in fiscal years 2013 and 2014. Similarly, our ongoing work on  human exploration programs has found that the Orion program is  currently tracking a funding risk that the program could require an  additional $560 to $840 million to meet the December 2017 EM-1 flight  date. However, the agency has yet to complete the review that sets  formal cost or schedule baselines for the Orion program. At this time, we  have not conducted enough in-depth work on the GSDO program to  comment on any specific risks the program is tracking.
In our July 2014 report we recommended, among other things, that NASA  develop baselines for SLS based on matching cost and schedule  resources to requirements that would result in a level of risk  commensurate with its policies. NASA concurred with our findings and  recommendations. In August 2014, NASA established formal cost and  schedule baselines for the SLS program at the 70 percent joint  confidence level for a committed launch readiness date of November  2018. Nevertheless, the program plans to continue to pursue an initial  capability of SLS by December 2017 as an internal goal and has  calculated a joint cost and schedule confidence level of 30 percent  associated with that date.
As illustrated by table 1 below, the SLS and GSDO programs are  pursuing ambitious and varying target dates for the EM-1 test flight. In  addition, the Orion program is currently tracking and reporting to  December 2017. The agency acknowledges differences in the target  dates the programs are pursuing and has indicated that it will develop an  integrated target launch date after all three systems hold their individual  critical design reviews.
The SLS program has assigned a low confidence level—30 percent— associated with meeting the program’s internal target date of December  2017. Even if SLS does meet that goal, however, it is unlikely that both  Orion and GSDO will achieve launch readiness by that point. For  example, the GSDO program only has a 30 percent confidence level  associated with a later June 2018 date. Additionally, the Orion program is  currently behind its planned schedule and is facing significant technical  risks and officials indicated that the program will not achieve launch  readiness by December 2017. The Orion program has submitted a  schedule to NASA headquarters that indicates the program is now  developing plans for a September 2018 EM-1 launch, though that date is  preliminary until the program establishes official cost and schedule  baselines now planned for May 2015. With the Orion and GSDO  programs likely unable to meet the December 2017 date, NASA risks  exhausting limited human exploration resources to achieve an aggressive  SLS program schedule when those resources may be needed to resolve  other issues within the human exploration effort. In other work, we have  reported that in pursuing internal schedule goals, some programs have  exhausted cost reserves, which has resulted in the need for additional  funding to support the agency baseline commitment date once the target  date is not achieved.
NASA’s urgency to complete development and demonstrate a human  launch capability as soon as possible is understandable. The United  States has lacked the ability to launch humans into space since the last  flight of the Space Shuttle in July 2011 and the initial goal from Congress  was that NASA demonstrate a new human launch capability by 2016.  Also, the SLS and GSDO programs have already slipped their committed  launch readiness dates to November 2018, and Orion appears likely to  follow suit. While these delays were appropriate actions on the agency’s  part to reduce risk, their compounding effect could have impacts on the  first crewed flight—EM-2—currently scheduled for 2021.
section_title: NASA’s SLS and Orion Programs Are Making Progress, but the Orion Program Is Facing Technical Challenges
paragraphs: We reported in July 2014 that NASA’s metrics indicated the SLS program  was on track to meet many of its design goals for demonstrating the initial  capability of SLS. However, we found that the development of the core  stage—SLS’s fuel tank and structural backbone—represents the critical  path of activities that must be completed to maintain the program’s  schedule as a whole. The core stage development had an aggressive  schedule in order to meet the planned December 2017 first test flight. For  example, the core stage had threats of nearly 5 months to its schedule  due to difficulty acquiring liquid oxygen fuel lines capable of meeting SLS  operational requirements. The aggressiveness of, and therefore the risk  associated with the core stage schedule was reduced when the agency  delayed its commitment for initial capability of SLS until November 2018.  With SLS continuing to pursue a target date of December 2017, however,  the aggressive core stage schedule remains a risk. Further, we reported  that the program faced challenges integrating heritage hardware, which  was designed for less stressful operational environments, into the SLS  design. We found that these issues were not significant schedule drivers  for the program as each had, and continues to have, significant amounts  of schedule reserve to both the target and agency baseline commitment  dates for launch readiness.
The Orion program just completed its first experimental test flight—EFT-1.  This flight tested Orion systems critical to crew safety, such as heat shield  performance, separation events, avionics and software performance,  attitude control and guidance, parachute deployment, and recovery  operations. According to NASA, the data gathered during the flight will  influence design decisions and validate existing computer models. Data  from this flight are required to address several significant risks that the  Orion program is currently tracking that must be addressed before  humans can be flown on Orion. Specifically, our ongoing work indicates  that the Orion program passed its preliminary design review—a review  that evaluates the adequacy of cost schedule and technical baselines and  whether the program is ready to move forward—in August 2014 by  meeting the minimum standards for all 10 success criteria. For 7 of the 10  success criteria, however, review officials highlighted known issues that  could compromise Orion’s success. Specifically, the review officials noted  concerns about several unresolved design risks, including technical  challenges with the parachute system and heat shield. For example,  during parachute testing, NASA discovered that when only two of the  three main parachutes are deployed, they begin to swing past each other  creating a “pendulum” effect. This effect could cause the capsule to  increase speed and to hit the water at an angle that may damage the  capsule thereby endangering the crew. Further, NASA faces choices  between differing design solutions to resolve cracking issues discovered  during manufacturing of the heat shield that protects the capsule during  re-entry. Program officials plan to make a decision prior to the program’s  critical design review, based on additional testing and analysis, about how  to resolve these risks with a goal of limiting design changes to the  capsule’s structure. Both the parachute and heat shield challenges must  be resolved before EM-2 because each represents a significant risk to  crew safety. Significant cost and schedule impacts could result if a  redesign is required to address any of these unresolved design risks.
section_title: NASA’s Human Exploration Programs’ Long-Term Missions and Affordability Are Uncertain
paragraphs: NASA has yet to address our concerns regarding mission planning or life- cycle cost estimates. NASA has not yet defined specific mission  requirements for any variant of the SLS. The two currently scheduled  flights are developmental test flights designed to demonstrate and test the  capabilities of the 70-mt launch vehicle and the capability of the core  stage in particular. Office of Management and Budget guidance indicates  that agencies should develop long-range objectives, supported by  detailed budgets and plans that identify the agency’s performance gaps  and the resources needed to close them. With mission requirements  unspecified, NASA has not yet finalized plans for the next step in evolving  the SLS and risks investing limited available resources in systems and  designs that are not yet needed and missing opportunities to make early  investments in developing systems that may be needed in the future.  According to agency officials, beyond the two scheduled test flights,  future mission destinations remain uncertain. In the absence of specific  mission requirements, officials indicated the SLS program is developing  current and future variants based on top-level requirements derived from  NASA’s Design Reference Architectures for conducting missions in line  with the agency’s strategic plan. NASA’s 2014 strategic plan, for example,  identifies sending humans to Mars as one of the agency’s long-term  goals; in turn, the agency’s Mars Design Reference Architecture indicates  that multiple missions using a vehicle with a lift capability of about 130-mt  will be necessary to support that goal. We recommended based on these  findings that NASA define a range of possible missions beyond the  second test flight and introduce increased competition in the acquisition of  hardware needed for future variants to reduce long-term costs. The  agency concurred with our recommendations, but has not yet taken  specific actions to address our concerns  The long-term affordability of the human exploration programs are also  uncertain, as we found in May 2014, because NASA’s cost estimates for  the programs do not provide any information about the longer-term, life- cycle costs of developing, manufacturing, and operating the launch  vehicles.estimate for SLS does not cover program costs after EM-1 or costs to  design, develop, build, and produce the 105- or 130-mt variants. Though  the subsequent variants will evolve from the first variant, they each  represent substantial, challenging development efforts and will require  billions of more dollars to complete. For example, the 105-mt vehicle will  require development of a new upper stage and upper stage engine or the  development of advanced boosters, either of which will be significant  efforts for the program.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please  contact Cristina T. Chaplain, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing  Management at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this statement.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Shelby S.  Oakley, Assistant Director; Jennifer Echard; Laura Greifner; Sylvia  Schatz; Ryan Stott; Ozzy Trevino; Kristin Van Wychen; and John S.  Warren, Jr.
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