Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts
Published: 2006-06-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The opportunity for employment is one of the most important magnets attracting illegal immigrants to the United States. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 established an employment eligibility verification process and a sanctions program for fining employers for noncompliance. Few modifications have been made to the verification process and sanctions program since 1986, and immigration experts state that a more reliable verification process and a strengthened worksite enforcement capacity are needed to help deter illegal immigration. This testimony is based on GAO's August 2005 report on the employment verification process and worksite enforcement efforts. In this testimony, GAO provides observations on (1) the current employment verification process and (2) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) priorities and resources for the worksite enforcement program and the challenges it faces in implementing that program.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The current employment verification (Form I-9) process is based on employers' review of documents presented by new employees to prove their identity and work eligibility. On the Form I-9, employers certify that they have reviewed documents presented by their employees and that the documents appear genuine and relate to the individual presenting the documents. However, document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) and identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or information belonging to others) have undermined the employment verification process by making it difficult for employers who want to comply with the process to ensure they hire only authorized workers and easier for unscrupulous employers to knowingly hire unauthorized workers with little fear of sanction. In addition, the large number and variety of documents acceptable for proving work eligibility has hindered employer verification efforts. In 1998, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now part of DHS, proposed revising the Form I-9 process, particularly to reduce the number of acceptable work eligibility documents, but DHS has not yet finalized the proposal. The Basic Pilot Program, a voluntary program through which participating employers electronically verify employees' work eligibility, shows promise to enhance the current employment verification process, help reduce document fraud, and assist ICE in better targeting its worksite enforcement efforts. Yet, several weaknesses in the pilot program's implementation, such as its inability to detect identity fraud and DHS delays in entering data into its databases, could adversely affect increased use of the pilot program, if not addressed. The worksite enforcement program has been a relatively low priority under both INS and ICE. Consistent with the DHS mission to combat terrorism, after September 11, 2001, INS and then ICE focused worksite enforcement efforts mainly on detecting and removing unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure sites. Since fiscal year 1999, the numbers of employer notices of intent to fine and administrative worksite arrests have generally declined. According to ICE, this decline is due to various factors, such as the prevalence of document fraud that makes it difficult to prove employer violations. ICE officials told us that the agency has previously experienced difficulties in proving employer violations and setting and collecting fine amounts that meaningfully deter employers from knowingly hiring unauthorized workers. In April 2006, ICE announced a new interior enforcement strategy to target employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers by bringing criminal charges against them, and ICE has reported increases in the number of criminal arrests and indictments since fiscal year 2004. However, it is too early to tell what effect, if any, this new strategy will have on enhancing worksite enforcement efforts and identifying unauthorized workers and their employers.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to participate in this hearing  on immigration enforcement at the workplace. As we and others have  reported in the past, the opportunity for employment is one of the most  important magnets attracting unauthorized immigrants to the United  States. To help address this magnet, in 1986 Congress passed the  Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which made it illegal for  individuals and entities to knowingly hire, continue to employ, or recruit  or refer for a fee unauthorized workers. The act established a two-pronged  approach for helping to limit the employment of unauthorized workers: (1)  an employment verification process through which employers verify all  newly hired employees’ work eligibility and (2) a sanctions program for  fining employers who do not comply with the act. Efforts to enforce these  sanctions are referred to as worksite enforcement and are conducted by  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
As the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform reported, immigration  contributes to the U.S. national economy by providing workers for certain  labor-intensive industries and contributing to the economic revitalization  of some communities. Yet, the commission also noted that immigration,  particularly illegal immigration, can have adverse consequences by helping  to depress wages for low-skilled workers and creating net fiscal costs for  state and local governments. Following the passage of IRCA, the U.S.  Commission on Immigration Reform and various immigration experts have  concluded that deterring illegal immigration requires, among other things,  strategies that focus on disrupting the ability of illegal immigrants to gain  employment through a more reliable employment eligibility verification  process and a more robust worksite enforcement capacity. In particular,  the commission report and other studies have found that the single most  important step that could be taken to reduce unlawful migration is the  development of a more effective system for verifying work authorization.  In the nearly 20 years since passage of IRCA, the employment eligibility  verification process and worksite enforcement program have remained  largely unchanged. Moreover, in previous work, we reported that  employers of unauthorized aliens faced little likelihood that the  Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) would investigate, fine, or  criminally prosecute them, a circumstance that provides little disincentive  for employers who want to circumvent the law. The legislative proposals  currently under consideration would revise the current employment  verification process and the employer sanctions program.
My testimony today is based on our August 2005 report to Congress on the  employment verification process and ICE’s worksite enforcement  program. Specifically, I will discuss our observations on (1) the current  employment verification process and (2) ICE’s priorities and resources for  the worksite enforcement program and the challenges it has faced in  implementing that program.
To address these objectives, we reviewed federal laws and information  obtained from ICE, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),  and Social Security Administration (SSA) officials in headquarters and  selected field locations. We examined regulations, guidance, past GAO  reports, and other studies on the employment verification process and the  worksite enforcement program. We also analyzed the results and  examined the methodology of an independent evaluation of the Basic Pilot  Program, an automated system through which employers electronically  check employees’ work eligibility information against information in  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and SSA databases, conducted  by the Institute for Survey Research at Temple University and Westat in  June 2004. Furthermore, we analyzed data on employer use of the Basic  Pilot Program and on worksite enforcement and assessed the data  reliability by reviewing them for accuracy and completeness, interviewing  agency officials knowledgeable about the data, and examining  documentation on how the data are entered, categorized, and verified in  the databases. We determined that the independent evaluation and these  data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. We  conducted the work reflected in this statement from September 2004  through July 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: IRCA provided for sanctions against employers who do not follow the  employment verification (Form I-9) process. Employers who fail to  properly complete, retain, or present for inspection a Form I-9 may face  civil or administrative fines ranging from $110 to $1,100 for each employee  for whom the form was not properly completed, retained, or presented.  Employers who knowingly hire or continue to employ unauthorized aliens  may be fined from $275 to $11,000 for each employee, depending on  whether the violation is a first or subsequent offense. Employers who  engage in a pattern or practice of knowingly hiring or continuing to  employ unauthorized aliens are subject to criminal penalties consisting of  fines up to $3,000 per unauthorized employee and up to 6 months  imprisonment for the entire pattern or practice.
subsections: section_title: Basic Pilot Program Employment Verification Process
paragraphs: The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act  (IIRIRA) of 1996 required INS and SSA to operate three voluntary pilot  programs to test electronic means for employers to verify an employee’s  eligibility to work, one of which was the Basic Pilot Program. The Basic  Pilot Program was designed to test whether pilot verification procedures  could improve the existing employment verification process by reducing  (1) false claims of U.S. citizenship and document fraud; (2) discrimination  against employees; (3) violations of civil liberties and privacy; and (4) the  burden on employers to verify employees’ work eligibility.
The Basic Pilot Program provides participating employers with an  electronic method to verify their employees’ work eligibility. Employers  may participate voluntarily in the Basic Pilot Program, but are still  required to complete Forms I-9 for all newly hired employees in  accordance with IRCA. After completing the forms, these employers query  the pilot program’s automated system by entering employee information  provided on the forms, such as name and social security number, into the  pilot Web site within 3 days of the employees’ hire date. The pilot program  then electronically matches that information against information in SSA  and, if necessary, DHS databases to determine whether the employee is  eligible to work, as shown in figure 1. The Basic Pilot Program  electronically notifies employers whether their employees’ work  authorization was confirmed. Those queries that the DHS automated  check cannot confirm are referred to DHS immigration status verifiers  who check employee information against information in other DHS  databases.
In cases when the pilot system cannot confirm an employee’s work  authorization status either through the automatic check or the check by an  immigration status verifier, the system issues the employer a tentative  nonconfirmation of the employee’s work authorization status. In this case,  the employers must notify the affected employees of the finding, and the  employees have the right to contest their tentative nonconfirmations by  contacting SSA or USCIS to resolve any inaccuracies in their records  within 8 days. During this time, employers may not take any adverse  actions against those employees, such as limiting their work assignments  or pay. Employers are required to either immediately terminate the  employment, or notify DHS of the continued employment, of workers who  do not successfully contest the tentative nonconfirmation and those who  the pilot program finds are not work-authorized.
section_title: Various Weaknesses Have Undermined the Employment Verification Process, but Opportunities Exist to Enhance It
subsections: section_title: Current Employment Verification Process Is Based on Employers’ Review of Documents
paragraphs: In 1986, IRCA established the employment verification process based on  employers’ review of documents presented by employees to prove identity  and work eligibility. On the Form I-9, employees must attest that they are  U.S. citizens, lawfully admitted permanent residents, or aliens authorized  to work in the United States. Employers must then certify that they have  reviewed the documents presented by their employees to establish identity  and work eligibility and that the documents appear genuine and relate to  the individual presenting them. In making their certifications, employers  are expected to judge whether the documents presented are obviously  counterfeit or fraudulent. Employers are deemed in compliance with IRCA  if they have followed the Form I-9 process, including when an  unauthorized alien presents fraudulent documents that appear genuine.
section_title: Form I-9 Process Is Vulnerable to Document and Identity Fraud
paragraphs: Since passage of IRCA in 1986, document and identity fraud have made it  difficult for employers who want to comply with the employment  verification process to ensure they hire only authorized workers. In its  1997 report to Congress, the Commission on Immigration Reform noted  that the widespread availability of false documents made it easy for  unauthorized aliens to obtain jobs in the United States. In past work, we  reported that large numbers of unauthorized aliens have used false  documents or fraudulently used valid documents belonging to others to  acquire employment, including at critical infrastructure sites like airports  and nuclear power plants. In addition, although studies have shown that  the majority of employers comply with IRCA and try to hire only  authorized workers, some employers knowingly hire unauthorized  workers, often to exploit the workers’ low cost labor. For example, the  Commission on Immigration Reform reported that employers who  knowingly hired illegal aliens often avoided sanctions by going through the  motions of compliance while accepting false documents. Likewise, in 1999  we concluded that those employers who do want to comply with IRCA can  intentionally hire unauthorized workers under the guise of having  complied with the employment verification requirements by claiming that  unauthorized workers presented false documents to obtain employment.
section_title: The Number and Variety of Acceptable Documents Hinders Employer Verification Efforts
paragraphs: The large number and variety of documents that are acceptable for  proving work eligibility have complicated employer verification efforts  under IRCA. Following the passage of IRCA in 1986, employees could  present 29 different documents to establish their identity and/or work  eligibility. In a 1997 interim rule, INS reduced the number of acceptable  work eligibility documents from 29 to 27. The interim rule implemented  changes to the list of acceptable work eligibility documents mandated by  IIRIRA and was intended to serve as a temporary measure until INS issued  final regulations on modifications to the Form I-9. In 1998, INS proposed a  further reduction in the number of acceptable work eligibility documents  to 14, but did not finalize the proposed rule.
Since the passage of IRCA, various studies have addressed the need to  reduce the number of acceptable work eligibility documents to make the  employment verification process simpler and more secure. For example,  we previously reported that the multiplicity of work eligibility documents  contributed to (1) employer uncertainty about how to comply with the  employment verification requirements and (2) discrimination against  authorized workers. In 1998, INS noted that, when IRCA was first passed,  a long inclusive list of acceptable work eligibility documents was allowed  for the Form I-9 to help ensure that all persons who were eligible to work  could easily meet the requirements, but as early as 1990, there had been  evidence that some employers found the list confusing.
According to DHS officials, the department is assessing possible revisions  to the Form I-9 process, including reducing the number of acceptable  work eligibility documents, but has not established a target time frame for  completing this assessment and issuing regulations on Form I-9 changes.  DHS released an updated version of the Form I-9 in May 2005 that changed  references from INS to DHS but did not modify the list of acceptable work  eligibility documents on the Form I-9 to reflect changes made to the list by  the 1997 interim rule. Moreover, DHS recently issued interim regulations  on the use of electronic Forms I-9, which provide guidance to employers  on electronically signing and storing Forms I-9.
section_title: The Basic Pilot Program Shows Promise to Enhance Employment Verification, but Current Weaknesses Could Undermine Increased Use
paragraphs: Various immigration experts have noted that the most important step that  could be taken to reduce illegal immigration is the development of a more  effective system for verifying work authorization. In particular, the  Commission on Immigration Reform concluded that the most promising  option for verifying work authorization was a computerized registry based  on employers’ electronic verification of an employee’s social security  number with records on work authorization for aliens. The Basic Pilot  Program, which is currently available on a voluntary basis to all employers  in the United States, operates in a similar way to the computerized registry  recommended by the commission, and shows promise to enhance  employment verification and worksite enforcement efforts. Only a small  portion—about 8,600 as of June 2006—of the approximately 5.6 million  employer firms nationwide have registered to use the pilot program, and  about 4,300 employers are active users.
The Basic Pilot Program enhances the ability of participating employers to  reliably verify their employees’ work eligibility and assists participating  employers with identification of false documents used to obtain  employment by comparing employees’ Form I-9 information with  information in SSA and DHS databases. If newly hired employees present  counterfeit documents, the pilot program would not confirm the  employees’ work eligibility because their employees’ Form I-9 information,  such as the false name or social security number, would not match SSA  and DHS database information when queried through the Basic Pilot  Program.
Although ICE has no direct role in monitoring employer use of the Basic  Pilot Program and does not have direct access to program information,  which is maintained by USCIS, ICE officials told us that program data  could indicate cases in which employers do not follow program  requirements and therefore would help the agency better target its  worksite enforcement efforts toward those employers. For example, the  Basic Pilot Program’s confirmation of numerous queries of the same social  security number could indicate that a social security number is being used  fraudulently or that an unscrupulous employer is knowingly hiring  unauthorized workers by accepting the same social security number for  multiple employees. ICE officials noted that, in a few cases, they have  requested and received pilot program data from USCIS on specific  employers who participate in the program and are under ICE investigation.  However, USCIS officials told us that they have concerns about providing  ICE broader access to Basic Pilot Program information because it could  create a disincentive for employers to participate in the program, as  employers may believe that they are more likely to be targeted for a  worksite enforcement investigation as a result of program participation.  According to ICE officials, mandatory employer participation in the Basic  Pilot Program would eliminate the concern about sharing data and could  help ICE better target its worksite enforcement efforts on employers who  try to evade using the program. Moreover, these officials told us that  mandatory use of an automated system like the pilot program, could limit  the ability of employers who knowingly hired unauthorized workers to  claim that the workers presented false documents to obtain employment,  which could assist ICE agents in proving employer violations of IRCA.
Although the Basic Pilot Program may enhance the employment  verification process and a mandatory program could assist ICE in targeting  its worksite enforcement efforts, weaknesses exist in the current program.  For example, the current Basic Pilot Program cannot help employers  detect identity fraud. If an unauthorized worker presents valid  documentation that belongs to another person authorized to work, the  Basic Pilot Program would likely find the worker to be work-authorized.  Similarly, if an employee presents counterfeit documentation that contains  valid information and appears authentic, the pilot program may verify the  employee as work-authorized. DHS officials told us that the department is  currently considering possible ways to enhance the Basic Pilot Program to  help it detect cases of identity fraud, for example, by providing a digitized  photograph associated with employment authorization information  presented by an employee.
Delays in the entry of information on arrivals and employment  authorization into DHS databases can lengthen the pilot program  verification process for some secondary verifications. Although the  majority of pilot program queries entered by employers are confirmed via  the automated SSA and DHS verification checks, about 15 percent of  queries authorized by DHS required secondary verifications by  immigration status verifiers in fiscal year 2004. According to USCIS, cases  referred for secondary verification are typically resolved within 24 hours,  but a small number of cases take longer, sometimes up to 2 weeks, due to,  among other things, delays in entry of data on employees who received  employment authorization documents generated by a computer and  camera that are not directly linked to DHS databases. Secondary  verifications lengthen the time needed to complete the employment  verification process and could harm employees because employers might  reduce those employees’ pay or restrict training or work assignments,  which are prohibited under pilot program requirements, while waiting for  verification of their work eligibility. DHS has taken steps to increase the  timeliness and accuracy of information entered into databases used as part  of the Basic Pilot Program and reports, for example, that data on new  immigrants are now typically available for verification within 10 to 12 days  of an immigrant’s arrival in the United States while, previously, the  information was not available for up to 6 to 9 months after arrival.
Furthermore, employer noncompliance with Basic Pilot Program  requirements may adversely affect employees queried through the  program. The Temple University Institute for Survey Research and Westat  evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program concluded that the majority of  employers surveyed appeared to be in compliance with Basic Pilot  Program procedures. However the evaluation and our review found  evidence of some noncompliance with these procedures, such as those  that prohibit screening job applicants or limiting of employees’ work  assignments or pay while contesting tentative nonconfirmations. The  Basic Pilot Program provides a variety of reports that may help USCIS  determine whether employers follow program requirements, but USCIS  officials told us that their efforts to review employers’ use of the pilot  program have been limited by lack of staff available to oversee and  examine employer use of the program.
According to USCIS officials, due to the growth in other USCIS  verification programs, current USCIS staff may not be able to complete  timely secondary verifications if the number of employers using the  program significantly increased. In particular, these officials said that if a  significant number of new employers registered for the program or if the  program were mandatory for all employers, additional staff would be  needed to maintain timely secondary verifications. USCIS has  approximately 38 Immigration Status Verifiers allocated for completing  Basic Pilot Program secondary verifications, and these verifiers reported  that they are able to complete the majority of manual verification checks  within their target time frame of 24 hours. However, USCIS officials said  that the agency has serious concerns about its ability to complete timely  verifications if the number of Basic Pilot Program users greatly increased.
section_title: Competing Priorities and Implementation Challenges Have Hindered Worksite Enforcement Efforts
subsections: section_title: Worksite Enforcement Has Been a Relatively Low Priority
paragraphs: Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement  programs that competes for resources and among INS and ICE  responsibilities, and worksite enforcement has been a relatively low  priority. For example, in the 1999 INS Interior Enforcement Strategy, the  strategy to block and remove employers’ access to undocumented workers  was the fifth of five interior enforcement priorities. In that same year, we  reported that, relative to other enforcement programs in INS, worksite  enforcement received a small portion of INS’s staffing and enforcement  budget and that the number of employer investigations INS conducted  each year covered only a fraction of the number of employers who may  have employed unauthorized aliens.
In keeping with the primary mission of DHS to combat terrorism, after  September 11, 2001, INS and then ICE focused investigative resources  primarily on national security cases. In particular, INS and then ICE  focused available resources for worksite enforcement on identifying and  removing unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure sites, such as  airports and nuclear power plants, to help reduce vulnerabilities at those  sites. We previously reported that, if critical infrastructure-related  businesses were to be compromised by terrorists, this would pose a  serious threat to domestic security. According to ICE, the agency adopted  this focus on critical infrastructure protection because the fact that  unauthorized workers can obtain employment at critical infrastructure  sites indicates that there are vulnerabilities in those sites’ hiring and  screening practices, and unauthorized workers employed at those sites are  vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists, smugglers, traffickers, and other  criminals. ICE has inspected Forms I-9 and employer records at hundreds  of critical infrastructure sites, including at about 200 airports as part of  Operation Tarmac and at more than 50 nuclear power plants as part of  Operation Glow Worm. More recently, ICE announced conducting  worksite enforcement operations at other critical infrastructure sites,  including at an airport, chemical plants, and a water and power facility.
Since fiscal year 1999, INS and ICE have dedicated a relatively small  portion of overall agent resources to the worksite enforcement program.   As shown in figure 2, in fiscal year 1999 INS allocated about 240 full-time  equivalents to worksite enforcement efforts, while in fiscal year 2003, ICE  allocated about 90 full-time equivalents.  Between fiscal years 1999 and  2003, the percentage of agent work-years spent on worksite enforcement  efforts generally decreased from about 9 percent to about 4 percent.
Although worksite enforcement has been a low priority relative to other  programs, ICE has proposed increasing agent resources for the worksite  enforcement program. For example, in its fiscal year 2007 budget  submission, ICE requested funding for 206 additional positions for  worksite enforcement. Yet, at this point, it is unclear what impact, if any,  these additional resources would have on worksite enforcement efforts.
section_title: ICE Attributes Decline in Numbers of Employer Fine Notices and Worksite Arrests to Document Fraud and Resource Allocation Decisions
paragraphs: The number of notices of intent to fine issued to employers as well as the  number of unauthorized workers arrested at worksites have generally  declined. Between fiscal years 1999 and 2004, the number of notices of  intent to fine issued to employers for improperly completing Forms I-9 or  knowingly hiring unauthorized workers generally decreased from 417 to 3.  (See fig. 3.)
The number of unauthorized workers arrested during worksite  enforcement operations has also declined since fiscal year 1999. As shown  in figure 4, the number of worksite arrests for administrative violations of  immigration law, such as for violating the terms of a visa, declined by  about 84 percent from 2,849 in fiscal year 1999 to 445 in fiscal year 2003.
ICE attributes the decline in the number of notices of intent to fine issued  to employers and number of administrative worksite arrests to various  factors including the widespread availability and use of counterfeit  documents and the allocation of resources to other priorities. Various  studies have shown that the availability and use of fraudulent documents  have made it difficult for ICE agents to prove that employers knowingly  hired unauthorized workers. ICE officials also told us that employers who  agents suspect of knowingly hiring unauthorized workers can claim that  they were unaware that their workers presented false documents at the  time of hire, making it difficult for agents to prove that the employer  willfully violated IRCA.
In addition, according to ICE, the allocation of INS and ICE resources to  other priorities has contributed to the decline in the number of notices of  intent to fine and worksite arrests. For example, INS focused its worksite  enforcement resources on egregious violators who were linked to other  criminal violations, like smuggling, fraud or worksite exploitation, and de- emphasized administrative employer cases and fines. Furthermore, ICE  investigative resources were redirected from worksite enforcement  activities to criminal alien cases, which consumed more investigative  hours by the late 1990s than any other enforcement activity. After  September 11, 2001, INS and ICE focused investigative resources on  national security cases, and in particular, focused worksite enforcement  efforts on critical infrastructure protection, which is consistent with DHS’s  primary mission to combat terrorism. According to ICE, the redirection of  resources from other enforcement programs to perform national security- related investigations resulted in fewer resources for traditional program  areas like fraud and noncritical infrastructure worksite enforcement.  Additionally, some ICE field representatives, as well as immigration  experts, noted that the focus on critical infrastructure protection does not  address the majority of worksites in industries that have traditionally  provided the magnet of jobs attracting illegal aliens to the United States.
As part of the Secure Border Initiative, in April 2006 ICE announced a new  interior enforcement strategy to target employers of unauthorized aliens,  immigration violators, and criminal networks. Under this strategy, ICE  plans to target employers who knowingly employ unauthorized workers by  bringing criminal charges against them. ICE has reported increases in the  numbers of criminal arrests, indictments, and convictions between fiscal  years 2004 and 2005 as a result of these efforts. Between fiscal years 2004  and 2005, ICE reported that the number of criminal arrests increased from  160 to 165. Furthermore, in fiscal year 2005 ICE reported that the number  of criminal indictments and convictions were 140 and 127, respectively,  and in fiscal year 2004 the number of indictments and convictions were 67  and 46, respectively. In addition, ICE reported arresting 980 individuals on  administrative immigration violations in fiscal year 2005 as a result of its  worksite enforcement efforts.
section_title: INS and ICE Have Faced Difficulties in Setting Fine Amounts and in Detaining Unauthorized Workers, but Have Taken Steps to Address Difficulties
paragraphs: INS and ICE have faced difficulties in setting and collecting fine amounts  that meaningfully deter employers from knowingly hiring unauthorized  workers and in detaining unauthorized workers arrested at worksites. ICE  officials told us that because fine amounts are so low, the fines do not  provide a meaningful deterrent. These officials also said that when agents  could prove that an employer knowingly hired an unauthorized worker  and issued a notice of intent to fine, the fine amounts agents  recommended were often negotiated down in value during discussion  between agency attorneys and employers. The amount of mitigated fines  may be, in the opinion of some ICE officials, so low that they believe that  employers view the fines as a cost of doing business, making the fines an  ineffective deterrent for employers who attempt to circumvent IRCA.  According to ICE, the agency mitigates employer fine amounts because  doing so may be a more efficient use of government resources than  pursuing employers who contest or ignore fines, which could be more  costly to the government than the fine amount sought.
An ICE official told us that use of civil settlements and criminal charges  instead of pursuit of administrative fines, specifically in regard to  noncritical infrastructure employers, could be a more efficient use of  investigative resources. In 2005, ICE settled a worksite enforcement case  with a large company without going through the administrative fine  process. As part of the settlement, the company agreed to pay $11 million  and company contractors agreed to pay $4 million in forfeitures—more  than an administrative fine amount ever issued against an employer for  ICE violations. ICE officials also said that use of civil settlements could  help ensure employers’ future compliance by including in the settlements  a requirement to entire into compliance agreements, such as the Basic  Pilot Program. In addition, as part of ICE’s new interior enforcement  strategy, the agency plans to bring criminal charges against employers  who knowingly hire unauthorized workers, rather than using  administrative fines to sanction employers. The practice of using civil  settlements and criminal charges against employers is in the early stages  of implementation; therefore, the extent to which it may help limit the  employment of unauthorized workers is not yet known.
The former INS also faced difficulties in collecting fine amounts from  employers, but collection efforts have improved. We previously reported  that the former INS faced difficulties in collecting fine amounts from  employers for a number of reasons, including that employers went out of  business, moved, or declared bankruptcy. In 1998, INS created the Debt  Management Center to centralize the collections process, and the center is  now responsible for collecting fines ICE issued against employers for  violations of IRCA, among other things. The ICE Debt Management Center  has succeeded in collecting the full amount of final fines on most of the  invoices issued to employers between fiscal years 1999 and 2004.
In addition, ICE’s Office of Detention and Removal has limited detention  space, and unauthorized workers detained during worksite enforcement  investigations have been a low priority for that space. In 2004, the Under  Secretary for Border and Transportation Security sent a memo to the  Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Assistant  Secretary for ICE outlining the priorities for the detention of aliens.  According to the memo, aliens who are subjects of national security  investigations were among those groups of aliens given the highest priority  for detention, while those arrested as a result of worksite enforcement  investigations were to be given the lowest priority. ICE officials stated that  the lack of sufficient detention space has limited the effectiveness of  worksite enforcement efforts. For example, they said that if investigative  agents arrest unauthorized aliens at worksites, the aliens would likely be  released because the Office of Detention and Removal detention centers  do not have sufficient space to house the aliens and they may re-enter the  workforce, in some cases returning to the worksites from where they were  originally arrested. Congress has provided funds to the Office of Detention  and Removal for additional bed spaces. Yet, given competing priorities for  detention space, the effect, if any, these additional bed spaces will have on  ICE’s priority given to workers detained as a result of worksite  enforcement operations cannot currently be determined.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Efforts to reduce the employment of unauthorized workers in the United  States necessitate a strong employment eligibility verification process and  a credible worksite enforcement program to ensure that employers meet  verification requirements. The current employment verification process  has not fundamentally changed since its establishment in 1986, and  ongoing weaknesses have undermined its effectiveness. Although DHS and  the former INS have been contemplating changes to the Form I-9 since  1997, DHS has not yet issued final regulations on these changes, and it has  not yet established a definitive time frame for completing the assessment.   We recommended that DHS set a target time frame for completing this  assessment and issuing final regulations to strengthen the current  employment verification process and make it simpler and more secure.   Furthermore, the Basic Pilot Program shows promise for enhancing the  employment verification process and reducing document fraud if  implemented on a much larger scale. However, current weaknesses in  pilot program implementation would have to be fully addressed to help  ensure the efficient and effective operation of an expanded or mandatory  pilot program, or a similar automated employment verification program,  and the cost of additional resources would be a consideration.  USCIS is  currently evaluating the Basic Pilot Program to include, as we have  recommended, information on addressing the program’s weaknesses to  assist USCIS and Congress in addressing possible future use of the Basic  Pilot Program.
Even with a strengthened employment verification process, a credible  worksite enforcement program would be needed because no verification  system is foolproof and not all employers may want to comply with IRCA.   ICE’s focus of its enforcement resources on critical infrastructure  protection since September 11, 2001, is consistent with the DHS mission to  combat terrorism by detecting and mitigating vulnerabilities to terrorist  attacks at critical infrastructure sites which, if exploited, could pose  serious threats to domestic security.  This focus on critical infrastructure  protection, though, generally has not addressed noncritical infrastructure  employers’ noncompliance with IRCA.  As a result, employers, particularly  those not located at or near critical infrastructure sites, who attempted to  circumvent IRCA have faced less of a likelihood  that ICE would  investigate them for failing to comply with the current employment  verification process or for knowingly hiring unauthorized workers.  ICE is  taking some steps to address difficulties it has faced in its worksite  enforcement efforts, but it is too early to tell whether these steps will  improve the effectiveness of the worksite enforcement program and help  ICE identify the millions of unauthorized workers and the employers who  hired them.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any  questions you and the Subcommittee Members may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact Richard Stana  at 202-512-8777.
Other key contributors to this statement were Frances Cook, Michelle  Cooper, Orlando Copeland, Michele Fejfar, Rebecca Gambler, Kathryn  Godfrey, Eden C. Savino, and Robert E. White.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Social Security Numbers: Coordinated Approach to SSN Data Could Help  Reduce Unauthorized Work.  GAO-06-458T.  February 16, 2006.
Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment  Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts.  GAO-05-813.  August 31,  2005.
Immigration Enforcement: Preliminary Observations on Employment  Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts.  GAO-05-822T.  June 21,  2006.
Social Security: Better Coordination among Federal Agencies Could  Reduce Unidentified Earnings Reports. GAO-05-154. February 4, 2005.
Immigration Enforcement: DHS Has Incorporated Immigration  Enforcement Objectives and Is Addressing Future Planning  Requirements. GAO-05-66. October 8, 2004.
Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a  Layered Defense. GAO-04-82. May 21, 2004.
Homeland Security: Challenges to Implementing the Immigration  Interior Enforcement Strategy. GAO-03-660T. April 10, 2003.
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