Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery
Published: 2007-03-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: U.S ports are significant to the U.S. economy, handling more than 2 billion tons of domestic and import/export cargo annually. Since Sept. 11, 2001, much of the national focus on ports' preparedness has been on preventing potential acts of terror, the 2005 hurricane season renewed focus on how to protect ports from a diversity of threats, including natural disasters. This report was prepared under the authority of the Comptroller General to examine (1) challenges port authorities have experienced as a result of recent natural disasters, (2) efforts under way to address these challenges, and (3) the manner in which port authorities plan for natural disasters. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed various port stakeholders from 17 major U.S. ports.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Ports, particularly those impacted by the 2005 hurricane season, experienced many different kinds of challenges during recent natural disasters. Of the 17 U.S. ports that GAO reviewed, port officials identified communications, personnel, and interagency coordination as their biggest challenges. Many port authorities have taken steps to address these challenges. Individually, ports have created redundancy in communications systems and other backup equipment and updated their emergency plans. Collectively, the American Association of Port Authorities developed a best practices manual focused on port planning and recovery efforts, as well as lessons learned from recent natural disasters. Even ports that have not experienced problems as a result of recent disasters, but are nonetheless susceptible to disaster threats, have responded to lessons learned by other ports. Additionally, federal maritime agencies, such as the U.S. Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have increased their coordination and communication with ports to strengthen ports' ability to recover from future natural disasters and to build stakeholders' knowledge about federal resources for port recovery efforts. Most port authorities GAO reviewed conduct planning for natural disasters separately from planning for homeland security threats. Unlike security efforts, natural disaster planning is not subject to the same type of specific federal requirements and, therefore, varies from port to port. As a result of this divided approach, GAO found a wide variance in ports' natural disaster planning efforts including: (1) the level of participation in disaster forums, and (2) the level of information sharing among port stakeholders In the absence of appropriate forums and information sharing opportunities among ports, some ports GAO contacted were limited in their understanding of federal resources available for predisaster mitigation and postdisaster recovery. Other ports have begun using existing forums, such as their federally mandated Area Maritime Security Committee, to coordinate disaster planning efforts. Port and industry experts, as well as recent federal actions, are now encouraging an all-hazards approach to disaster planning and recovery. That is, disaster preparedness planning requires that all of the threats faced by the port, both natural (such as hurricanes) and man-made (such as terror events), be considered together. The Department of Homeland Security, which through the Coast Guard oversees the Area Maritime Security Committees, provides an example of how to incorporate a wider scope of activity for ports across the country. Additionally, the Maritime Administration should develop a communication strategy to inform ports of the maritime resources available for recovery efforts.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: U.S. ports and waterways handle more than 2 billion tons of domestic and  U.S. ports and waterways handle more than 2 billion tons of domestic and  import/export cargo annually, and more than 95 percent of U.S.  import/export cargo annually, and more than 95 percent of U.S.  international trade moves by water. As such, ports are a global gateway to  international trade moves by water. As such, ports are a global gateway to  world markets and significant engines in the U.S. economy. As important  world markets and significant engines in the U.S. economy. As important  as they are, virtually every major U.S. port faces one or more types of  as they are, virtually every major U.S. port faces one or more types of  natural disasters with potentially devastating consequences. Ports  natural disasters with potentially devastating consequences. Ports  throughout the eastern seaboard and the Gulf Coast face the possibility of  throughout the eastern seaboard and the Gulf Coast face the possibility of  hurricanes, and ports on the West Coast are in areas that are highly  hurricanes, and ports on the West Coast are in areas that are highly  susceptible to earthquakes. Losing a major port, even for a few weeks or  susceptible to earthquakes. Losing a major port, even for a few weeks or  months, could have a national economic impact, making effective recovery  months, could have a national economic impact, making effective recovery  a concern not only for the local area but for the federal government as  a concern not only for the local area but for the federal government as  well.  well.
The Dante B. Fascell Port of Miami-Dade is owned and managed by the local government,  Miami-Dade County.
Engineers, and the Maritime Administration. Despite these complexities,  ports have various forums in which these maritime stakeholders can  coordinate on issues that affect the port as a whole. For terrorism  concerns, for example, major U.S. ports have a Area Maritime Security  Committee (AMSC) that provides a venue for discussing security  concerns. For disaster relief concerns, U.S. ports would work with the  Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regarding disaster  assistance.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, much of the focus on  emergency preparedness has been on preparedness for preventing,  mitigating the effects of, and responding to terrorist attacks. Through  legislation and presidential directives, the Department of Homeland  Security (DHS) is the primary federal organization responsible for  preparing the nation both for terrorist attacks and for major disasters.  Homeland Security Presidential Directives 5 and 8 require that DHS  establish a single, comprehensive approach to and plans for the  management of emergency events whether the result of terrorist attacks or  large-scale natural or accidental disasters. As we have previously  reported, the capabilities needed to respond to major disasters, whether  the result of a terrorist attack or nature, are similar in many ways. The  devastating hurricane season of 2005, which included Hurricanes Katrina,  Rita, and Wilma, focused renewed attention on the potential effects that  natural disasters could pose to port operations. The numerous  vulnerabilities port operations face, together with the limited resources  available to deal with them, have also initiated a renewed look at how to  protect ports from a variety of threats.
In light of the continued attention both to port security and to federal  natural disaster response, we are providing a comprehensive view of steps  ports have taken to prepare and mitigate the impacts of natural disasters.  Consequently, we conducted this review, initiated under the Comptroller  General’s authority, to examine port disaster preparedness measures and  to examine the federal role in helping ports plan and recover from natural  disaster impacts. More specifically, this report examines (1) the challenges  port authorities have experienced as a result of recent natural disasters,  (2) the efforts under way to address challenges from these disasters, and  (3) the manner in which port authorities plan for natural disasters and the  effect of this approach on their ability to share information with port  stakeholders and access federal resources.
To address the challenges port authorities experience as a result of recent  disasters and the efforts to address these challenges, we selected 17 U.S.  ports for review (see fig. 1). We focused primarily on commercial ports  and various commercial aspects of these ports. The criteria we used  included selecting ports that (1) varied in size (based on cargo value) and  (2) varied in the degree to which they had experienced some type of  natural disaster since 1998. Based on guidance from DHS regarding the  most significant natural disaster threats to ports, we limited the natural  disasters we considered to earthquakes and hurricanes. In particular, we  focused on ports impacted by the 2005 hurricane season; in all, 11 of the  17 ports we selected were affected by hurricanes that year. We conducted  site visits at 7 of the 17 ports, where we interviewed various maritime  stakeholders, including officials from the port authorities, emergency  management agencies, and federal agencies such as the Coast Guard, U.S.  Army Corps of Engineers, Maritime Administration, and FEMA. We  contacted the remaining 10 ports by telephone and conducted a more  limited range of interviews. For all 17 ports, we reviewed numerous  planning documents, including emergency operations plans, business  continuity plans, and hurricane plans.
To determine the manner in which port authorities prepare for disasters  and its effect on information sharing and access to federal resources, we  relied primarily on information obtained from our 17 case studies and  phone interviews, supplementing it as necessary with other information  related to risk management and disaster planning. For perspective on risk  management, we used our body of work related to risk management  throughout the federal government and supplemented it with additional  risk management models and tools from a wide range of federal,  professional, and academic stakeholders, as well as interviews and  documents from the Coast Guard and offices within DHS. We did not  include any separate planning efforts conducted by private operators, for  two key reasons: their roles and responsibilities vary greatly from port to  port and; unlike their planning efforts for homeland security, their efforts  for natural disasters are not subject to the same type of federal  requirements or guidelines. We performed our work from December 2005  through March 2007, in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. See appendix I for more detail regarding our  objectives, scope, and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Port Activities Involve Many Different Entities
paragraphs: Ports comprise many different stakeholders, both public and private. Port  authorities also may have jurisdiction over some or all of the geographical  area of a port. The port authority can be an agency of the state, county, or  city in which the port is located. In most ports in North America, the actual  task of loading and unloading goods is carried out by private operators  who lease space or equipment from the port authority. (In some ports, the  port authority also manages some of these stevedoring activities.) The  percentage of the port area over which the port authority has jurisdiction,  and the level of involvement of the port authority in the port’s operations,  is different from port to port. This variability in port authority jurisdiction  and operational involvement has direct consequences for portwide  disaster preparedness. Even though a port authority may have a thorough  disaster plan in place, that plan may not be binding on any of the private  operators in the port.
The stakeholders involved at any given port can vary but, in general, they  include port authorities, private-sector operators doing business within the  port, government agencies, and information-sharing forums. Table 1  summarizes these basic participants and their roles.
These various stakeholders interact in a variety of ways. The port  authority provides a limited governance structure for the port. Many port  authorities lease piers, or “terminals,” and equipment to stevedoring  companies and shipping lines that are responsible for the actual loading  and transport of cargo. Some port authorities also operate cargo terminals  alongside the private operators. Figure 3 depicts the main elements of a  typical port. Individual ports may not include all of these elements, or may  include some not depicted here.
section_title: Federal Role in Port Activities Is Extensive
paragraphs: Several federal agencies provide support to ports in natural disaster  planning, response, and recovery (see table 2). These agencies have  different missions that relate to port operations, including natural disaster  planning and response. For example, the Coast Guard is the agency  responsible for most federal oversight related to portwide safety and  security. It plays the primary role in coordinating efforts for homeland  security efforts. FEMA plays a role in homeland security planning and also  administers several assistance programs for disaster preparation and  recovery. The Maritime Administration plays a general role in coordinating  efforts to strengthen the maritime system and also has the ability to  provide maritime assets that could be used to support homeland security  interests. These vessels are part of the country’s National Defense Ready  Reserve Fleet, including ships and barges, which could be used for  housing, power generation, or the movement of water and other supplies.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, prompted additional federal  efforts to address a broad spectrum of emergencies. The Homeland  Security Act of 2002 required DHS to develop a comprehensive National  Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS is intended to provide a  consistent framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels  regardless of the cause, size, or complexity of the situation and to define  the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments, and  various first responder disciplines at each level during an emergency  event. To manage all major incidents, NIMS has a standard incident  management system, called the Incident Command System, with five  functional areas—command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance  and administration. NIMS also prescribes interoperable communications  systems and preparedness before an incident happens, including planning,  training, and exercises.
In December 2004, DHS issued the National Response Plan (NRP),  intended to be an all-discipline, all-hazards plan establishing a single,  comprehensive framework for the management of domestic incidents  where federal involvement is necessary. The NRP includes planning  assumptions, roles and responsibilities, concept of operations, and   incident management actions. The NRP also includes a Catastrophic  Incident Annex, which provides an accelerated, proactive national  response to a “catastrophic incident,” defined as any natural or man-made  incident, including terrorism, resulting in extraordinary levels of mass  casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population,  infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or government  functions.
Developing the capabilities needed to deal with large-scale disasters is part  of an overall national preparedness effort that should integrate and define  what needs to be done, where, based on what standards, how it should be  done, and how well it should be done. Along with the NRP and NIMS, DHS  has developed the National Preparedness Goal. Considered as a group,  these three documents are intended to guide investments in emergency  preparedness and response capabilities. The NRP describes what needs to  be done in response to an emergency incident, either natural or man-made,  the NIMS describes how to manage what needs to be done, and the  National Preparedness Goal describes how well it should be done. The  National Preparedness Goal is particularly useful for determining what  capabilities are needed, especially for a catastrophic disaster. The interim  goal addresses both natural disasters and terrorist attacks. It defines both  the 37 major capabilities that first responders should possess to prevent,  protect from, respond to, and recover from disaster incidents and the most  critical tasks associated with these capabilities. An inability to effectively  perform these critical tasks would, by definition, have a detrimental  impact on effective protection, prevention, response, and recovery  capabilities.
The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan (MIRP), released by DHS in  April 2006, applies these disaster preparedness documents to the maritime  sector. The MIRP is intended to facilitate the restoration of maritime  commerce after a terrorist attack or natural disaster and reflects the  disaster management framework outlined in the National Response Plan.  The MIRP addresses issues that should be considered by ports when  planning for natural disasters. However, it does not set forth particular  actions that should be taken at the port level, leaving those determinations  to be made by the port operators themselves.
The 9/11 Commission pointed out that no amount of money or effort can  fully protect against every type of threat. As a result, what is needed is an  approach that considers the relative risks these various threats pose and  determines how best to use limited resources to prevent threats, where  possible, and to respond effectively if they occur. While the Homeland  Security Act of 2002 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 call  for the use of risk management in homeland security, little specific federal  guidance or direction exists as to how risk management should be  implemented. In previous work examining risk management efforts for  homeland security and other functions, we developed a framework  summarizing the findings of industry experts and best practices. This  framework, shown in figure 4, divides risk management into five major  phases: (1) setting strategic goals and objectives, and determining  constraints; (2) assessing the risks; (3) evaluating alternatives for  addressing these risks; (4) selecting the appropriate alternatives; and   (5) implementing the alternatives and monitoring the progress made and  results achieved.
section_title: Recent Natural Disasters Created a Variety of Challenges; Some Recovery Efforts Were More Difficult Than Expected
paragraphs: Recent natural disasters—particularly Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita  in 2005—challenged affected ports on several fronts, according to port  authority officials. Since 1998, hurricanes have damaged buildings, cranes,  and other equipment owned by seven of the port authorities we  interviewed. Ports also reported damage to utility systems and  experienced delays in water, sewer, and power restoration. Port  authorities cited clearing waterways and debris removal as another  difficulty. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, some ports, such as Gulfport  and New Orleans, have not yet returned or took about 6 months to return  to predisaster operational levels, respectively. Separate from the physical  impact of the disasters, challenges occurred with personnel,  communications and coordination issues and, according to port authority  officials, these challenges proved more difficult than anticipated. In some  cases, personnel had evacuated the area, and port officials were unsure  when staff would be able to return to work. Given that many phone lines  were down, there were delays in restoring phone service and, in most  cases, ports did not have communications alternatives in place. Some port  authorities also reported difficulties in working with local, state, and  federal entities during the recovery process, including coordinating re- entry to the port of port personnel and filing for FEMA disaster recovery  assistance.
subsections: section_title: Damage to Infrastructure Affected Operations at Most Ports Experiencing Recent Natural Disasters
paragraphs: Even though most ports anticipated and had plans in place to mitigate  infrastructure damage from natural disasters, over half of the port  authorities we contacted reported that the disasters created infrastructure  challenges. Twelve of the 17 ports we reviewed had experienced a  hurricane or earthquake since 1998, and among those 12 port authorities, 7  reported challenges in restoring infrastructure (see fig.2). While we were  unable to review a complete list of disaster assistance estimates, some  port authorities were able to provide specific dollar amounts for repair  damage to buildings, cranes, or other equipment. For instance, the Port of  Miami reported spending more than $6 million on repairs as a result of  Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita, including damage to facilities,  signage, sea wall and storm drainage system. Likewise, The Port of  Houston reported spending $200,000 for facility repairs following  Hurricane Rita. Ports were still faced with these repair costs even though a  majority of the port plans we reviewed included infrastructure damage  mitigation. As a way to work around the damaged structures, ports also  utilized temporary trailers for administrative and operational functions.  For example, this occurred at the Port of Port Arthur, where the strategy  of reserving backup equipment with appropriate vendors was included in  that port’s Hurricane Readiness Plan.
Besides the repair costs involved, another indication of the significance of  damage to infrastructure was the effect on port operations. In several  cases, tenants left the port and moved elsewhere. For example, Port of  New Orleans officials said that because they are unsure if departed tenants  at the port will return, they have been reluctant to replace three severely  damaged container cranes. Operations have been even more curtailed at  the Port of Gulfport, also because of Hurricane Katrina. Port authority  officials report that they have been able to repair only 3 of their 12  warehouses, which limited their ability to accommodate storage for some  of their major operators. These operators have since moved their  operations to other nearby ports, such as Pascagoula, Mississippi, or  Mobile, Alabama.
Besides damage to buildings, cranes, and other equipment involved  specifically in moving cargoes, port authorities also reported damages to  their utility systems, including water, sewer, and power. For example,  following Hurricane Katrina, the Port of Port Arthur was without power  for approximately 2 weeks. Because of a lack of on-site generators, port  officials limited port operations to daylight hours only. The power outage  also limited operation of certain hangar doors that required electrical  power to be opened. Ports with damage to water and sewer included  Gulfport, where 2 months were needed to restore its sewer and water  capacity. Similarly, the Port of Pascagoula had three damaged water wells  as a result of Hurricane Katrina. Port officials told us one of those wells  was still not operational almost a year later. While some ports included  backup water and power resources in their contingency utility plans,  officials at one port said their backup resources may not be adequate to  address long-term or extensive outages. In fact, 10 of the 17 ports we  reviewed did not have plans for utility system restoration. The lack of  anticipation of these vulnerabilities was particularly apparent for ports  affected by Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita; only 4 of the 10 ports  impacted by those storms had planned for utility challenges. For example,  Port of New Orleans officials said their supply of 5 to 10 days of water and  3 to 5 days of power through generators was not enough to sustain them  through the outages caused by Hurricane Katrina.
While many ports indicated that several federal agencies were eventually  able to effectively aid in clearing the waterways and restoring aids to  navigation, ports’ experiences varied. Their experiences also  demonstrated that rapid clearing of waterways is key to reestablishing  port operations and emphasizes the need for ports to coordinate and  arrange for debris removal and restoring aids to navigation ahead of time.  Following are some examples:    Following Hurricane Katrina, the Port of Gulfport had to remove large  amounts of debris, such as tree limbs that were hanging and leaning over  roads, as well as containers, cargo, and other equipment that winds had  scattered into the roadways. Port officials said that clearing these  obstructions was essential to re-establishing port operations. Immediately  after the hurricane, the local Navy construction battalion (called Seabees)  volunteered to assist the port by clearing roads with their large bulldozers,  which enabled supplies and cargo to move in and out of the port. The  Seabees also cleared boat ramps so that Coast Guard search and rescue  vessels could safely enter the waterway. Port officials estimated that, over  a period of 3 weeks, the Seabees cleared about 30 percent of the debris in  the port area. After the Seabees were called to other duties, Port of  Gulfport officials hired a contractor to remove the remaining debris at a  cost of about $5 million. Port of Gulfport officials said that they applied for  FEMA reimbursement of these costs. Further, they explained that the use  of and planning for existing federal resources for debris removal, such as  the Navy Seabees, could have saved even more time and possibly federal  dollars that would later be paid to the port in the FEMA reimbursement  process.
Inside the port area, the Port of Mobile experienced challenges with debris  removal that federal agencies such as the Corps or the Coast Guard were  not responsible for removing. These challenges may have caused  additional delays in restoring port operations. For instance, port officials  explained that storm surge waters from Katrina loosened several oil rigs in  the Gulf, one of which made its way into the port’s pier area and damaged  several piers. They said the port is currently in litigation to resolve who  will pay for the damages. Port of Mobile officials also estimated that  dredging expenses, including the removal of branches, sand, and silt from  pier areas will be more than $7.5 million. Because the rig obstruction and  other pier damages were not in the federal waterway or jurisdiction, Port  of Mobile officials said they were only able to receive limited assistance  from federal agencies in resolving their internal damage issues.
section_title: Difficulties with Personnel, Communication, and Coordination Issues Were Greater Than Expected during Recovery Efforts
paragraphs: Officials of eight port authorities we contacted reported challenges related  to personnel, communications, or coordination with port stakeholders as a  result of hurricanes since 1998 and, in conversations with us, they  indicated that these challenges were more difficult than anticipated. Port  plans we reviewed addressed some of these types of vulnerabilities to  natural disasters. However, ports still identified such vulnerabilities as a  significant obstacle to their ability to return to predisaster operational  levels. Several ports cited examples about how their personnel had  evacuated and, for numerous reasons, were unable to return to work. For  example, several Port of Gulfport employees lost their homes during  Hurricane Katrina and had no local living arrangements for themselves or  their families. Likewise, the Port of New Orleans said its operations were  stifled by the lack of personnel and labor in both Hurricane Katrina and  Hurricane Rita. At the Port of Port Arthur, lack of power for area homes  kept employees from retuning immediately, causing temporary delays in  port operations.
Port authorities also did not anticipate the extent to which their  communications systems would be impacted. High winds and flooding  from the hurricanes rendered phone lines out of service. With phones lines  down, port authorities were unable to get in touch with their staff or other  port stakeholders to share information. For instance, we learned that  approximately 50 percent of phones at the Port of Mobile were out of  service for about 2 to 4 weeks. Other ports, including New Orleans,  Pascagoula, and Port Arthur, also experienced phone outages and  reported limitations in cell phone reception.
Ports also identified coordination challenges with local, state, and federal  stakeholders while planning for and recovering from natural disasters. At  the local level, one coordination problem port officials experienced was in  re-entering the port after the storm. For example, in Gulfport, port officials  were denied entry to port property for the first 2 weeks following  Hurricane Katrina. Similarly in Houston, law enforcement agencies  blocked roads for access back into Houston after the Hurricane Rita  evacuation. In some cases, port officials did not have the proper  credentials required by local police and other emergency management  officials to be allowed roadway access through the city to their port.
In other instances, we found that ports experienced varied levels of  coordination with local emergency management agencies, especially  regarding planning efforts. For example, Mobile County Emergency  Management officials affirmed that they have a close working relationship  with the Port of Mobile, where they have helped the port conduct risk  assessments and emergency planning activities, and where they  coordinate with port officials on other plans involving safety, security, and  the environment. Conversely, Port of Gulfport and Harrison County  Emergency Management officials in Mississippi said they had limited  contact and coordination regarding emergency recovery. One county  emergency management official said that although the agency has made  efforts to share planning documents with the port, the agency is required  to work through the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency and  follow any guidance in the state emergency plan to request resources from  or provide assistance to the port.
At the federal level, one coordination issue reported by port stakeholders  involved difficulties in coordinating with FEMA for recovery resources.  Some local emergency management officials and port officials that we  interviewed expressed concerns about the level of interaction with FEMA  officials before an incident occurs. For example, Port of Jacksonville  officials said they would like to see FEMA take a more active role in the  disaster planning process, such as participation on the AMSC at the local  level or coordinating with the Florida State Department of Community  Affairs at the state level. Similarly, Port of Los Angeles officials said  effective communication with FEMA is essential and that they would like  to communicate more clearly with FEMA about reimbursement policies  before a disaster takes place. In fact, in November 2006, port officials from  Los Angeles and Oakland held a joint meeting with FEMA and the  California Office of Emergency Services to discuss the current federal and  state regulations and practices regarding disaster relief fund and  reimbursement policy.
Port stakeholders also expressed concerns about coordinating with FEMA  after an incident occurred, including inconsistencies in information and  difficulty in appropriately completing FEMA forms and other documents  required for reimbursement. At the county emergency management level,  one agency official cited an inconsistency of the interpretation of FEMA  policies and changing personnel as some of the challenges in working with  FEMA. This official suggested that interacting with FEMA officials more  frequently before a disaster would help the port authority better  understand which personnel to contact in an emergency situation. The  official said this coordination problem became obvious during the  Hurricane Katrina recovery effort when, after the port had made several  requests, FEMA did not send a representative to the area. Port officials in  Gulfport also found it difficult to reconcile their damages using FEMA’s  cost estimate process. To resolve the paperwork confusion, the Port of  Gulfport hired an outside company to deal with FEMA directly and to  handle all reimbursement-related issues on their behalf. While Port of  Gulfport officials recognized that FEMA’s attention to detail was an effort  to prevent fraud and abuse, they also said FEMA staff could have done a  better job in providing guidance about the reimbursement process.
Besides having coordination challenges with FEMA, we learned that  several ports were unclear about resources that were available for  recovery from the Maritime Administration. Immediately following  Hurricane Katrina, the Gulf area was in need of critical resources such as  power, water, and personnel. However, due to infrastructure damages  around the area, it was difficult to get these resources into ports. As such,  The Maritime Administration provided, with the concurrence of the  Department of Defense, ready reserve vessels for FEMA’s use. These ready  reserve vessels are strategic sealift assets usually used for defense  purposes that could be used for command and control, housing, power  generation, or the movement of water and other supplies. We found that  ports’ knowledge about these assets and how to request them was limited.  For example, port authority officials at one port turned down the Maritime  Administration’s offer for a housing vessel. The port determined that the  deep draft and large size of the vessel might impede commercial traffic  and block other vessels from entering their port. Port officials reached this  determination without the knowledge that smaller vessels for the same  purpose could have been provided by the Maritime Administration. The  vessel offered by the Maritime Administration, however, was instead  deployed to the Port of New Orleans area to house first responders.
section_title: Port Authorities Have Various Efforts Under Way to Mitigate Challenges
paragraphs: Many port authorities have taken steps to address the challenges resulting  from recent natural disasters. Individually, they have taken such steps as  upgrading communications equipment, adding backup communications  approaches and power equipment, and creating alternative sites for  administrative operations and storage of computer data. Collectively, they  have shared best practices for disaster planning and response, most  notably through an industry-wide publication with detailed planning steps  and guidelines. Port authorities that were not directly impacted by recent  disaster events have also taken steps to revise their planning efforts,  including greater coordination with other port stakeholders. Many port  authorities have adapted or improved existing stakeholder forums to assist  in facilitating port planning for natural disasters. At the federal level,  agencies such as the Maritime Administration have taken steps to assist  ports in identifying federal resources available for disaster response and  recovery.
subsections: section_title: Steps Taken Include Port- Specific and Industry-Wide Actions
paragraphs: As a result of the lessons learned from recent natural disasters, port  authorities report taking many steps to mitigate vulnerabilities. One  mitigation tactic reported by many port authorities is to add equipment  and develop redundant systems to help during any recovery efforts. The  most frequent redundancy added was in creating communications  alternatives. Various port authorities reported purchasing communications  equipment that does not necessarily rely on traditional land lines for  calling, such as analog pagers, wireless handheld devices, CB radios, and  satellite phones. They also integrated more sophisticated communications  hardware and software programs. Some ports, such as Houston and San  Diego, implemented 1-800 phone numbers to receive calls from port  personnel. As an additional precaution, the Port of Houston utilizes call  centers located out of state in areas that are less likely to have been  impacted by the same storm. In another effort to route calls out of the  impacted area, the Port of New Orleans has also been assigned phone  numbers with alternative area codes.
Besides making improvements to communications systems, many port  authorities took steps related to power and administrative operations.  Seven port authorities reported purchasing or arranging for alternative  power supplies that could be used during an outage. For example, the Port  of New Orleans purchased generators after the 2005 hurricane season.  Ports also recognized the need for administrative and information  technology location alternatives. Four port authorities reported changing  their alternative administrative sites since recent storms. Port authorities  also told us that they have changed the way they back up and store their  electronic data and equipment. For example, the Port of New Orleans  previously had its alternative work site only 3 miles away from its regular  operations location. Since both operations sites could be susceptible to  the same disaster event, Port of New Orleans officials have partnered with  the Port of Shreveport, Louisiana, almost 200 miles away, to use  Shreveport’s facilities as an alternate operations site if the Port of New  Orleans is out of business for more than 5 days. Further, the two ports  have prepared a mutual agreement, which includes cost sharing efforts for  information technology infrastructure upgrades at the Port of Shreveport,  to better accommodate New Orleans’ needs in a disaster.
Another mitigation tactic by ports has been the sharing of best practices  and lessons learned from recent natural disasters. Through efforts by the  AAPA, a nationwide industry group, ports from across the U.S. and Canada  participated in the development of an industry best practices document.  In developing this document, AAPA organized various working groups,  which included port officials from ports that had been affected by recent  natural disasters, as well as ports that had not been affected. Acting as a  forum for port officials to share their experiences with natural disasters,  these working groups were able to develop a manual focused on port  planning and recovery efforts. Vetted by AAPA members, the manual  includes planning for emergency operations, communications, damage  assessments, insurance and FEMA claims processes, coordinating with  federal agencies, and overall emergency planning objectives.
Another industry group, the GICA, has worked closely with the Corps,  Coast Guard and other maritime agencies to implement new practices for  a more efficient response to maritime related incidents. Many of these  efforts have been implemented as result of recent hurricanes. For  example, a special Logistics Support Center is set up during response  times for the sole purpose of assisting the Corps and Coast Guard with  contracting special equipment, including water, fuel and crane barges,  towing vessels, pumps, and generators. Regarding clearing the waterways,  GICA barge members have provided knowledgeable waterway operators  and state-of-the-art boats to assist Coast Guard personnel in conducting  channel assessments immediately following a storm. In an effort to restore  aids to navigation, GICA contacts also towed 50 temporary buoys and  supplied aircraft for aerial surveillance of the waterways. Moreover, the  Corps, Coast Guard, and GICA formed the Gulf Coast Inland Waterways  Joint Hurricane Team to develop a protocol for storm response. Finalized  in July 2006, the Joint Hurricane Response Protocol is an effort to more  fully develop lessons learned from previous hurricane seasons and  waterways management practices, with the goal of implementing an  effective restoration of Gulf Coast maritime commerce following future  storms.
Ports that have not experienced problems as a result of recent disasters  but that are nonetheless susceptible to disaster threats have also  responded to these lessons learned by other ports. For example, the Port  of Tacoma hired a consultant to assist in developing a business continuity  plan. The Port of Jacksonville has also undertaken a comprehensive  enhancement to its continuity of operations plan. Likewise, as a result of  lessons learned from the Loma Prieta Earthquake in Oakland, the Port of  Los Angeles developed more stringent seismic building codes.  Additionally, Port of Savannah officials told us that they, too, have  changed their prehurricane crane operations based on lessons learned  from hurricanes in the Gulf region.
section_title: Ports Have Taken Steps to Improve Stakeholder Coordination
paragraphs: We found several examples of port efforts to improve stakeholder  coordination, including utilizing existing forums to coordinate disaster  planning, as well as realigning and enhancing their current plans.  Regarding the use of existing forums, port authorities in both New Orleans  and Mobile said they were using their AMSC to coordinate response and  recovery efforts. Moreover, GAO has previously reported that in the wake  of Hurricane Katrina, information was shared collaboratively through  AMSCs to determine when it was appropriate to close and then reopen the  port. Port-specific coordination teams, such as those at the Port of  Houston, have also used their lessons learned to improve coordination for  natural disaster planning. Houston’s port coordination teams are an  outgrowth of the port’s relationships with other maritime stakeholders in  the Houston-Galveston Navigation Safety Committee, which includes a  wide variety of waterway users and operators. In another example, the  Port of Oakland works closely with the City Disaster Council on  emergency planning and participates in various exercises with city,  county, and state officials.
We also found several examples of how ports have aligned their local  planning with the national planning structure and have identified various  ways to enhance their current coordination plans. The national structure,  which includes NIMS and NRP, is designed to provide a consistent  framework and approach for emergency management. Port plans that we  reviewed, in particular those from ports in hurricane impacted areas, have  identified the importance of adapting to this national structure and  emergency response system. For example, the Port of Mobile’s emergency  operations plan explains that the complexity of incident management and  the growing need for stakeholder coordination has increased its need for a  standard incident management system. Therefore, the Port of Mobile’s  emergency operations plan outlines the use of an incident management  framework from which all agencies can work together in an efficient and  effective manner. Some port authorities making changes have not  experienced any significant impact from recent disasters. For instance,  Port of Jacksonville officials reported that Hurricane Katrina impacts in  the Gulf region prompted them to revise their disaster preparedness plans,  including reorganizing the plans to reflect NIMS language and alignment  with NRP guidelines. Similarly, Port of San Diego officials said they hired a  consultant to assist them with drafting their emergency response and  business continuity plan. San Diego’s plan prioritized risks, clarified roles  and responsibilities of key departments, and laid out directions on how to  better coordinate with local emergency management officials during a  disaster event.
section_title: Federal Agencies Have Attempted to Help Ports Strengthen Recovery Efforts
paragraphs: Since the 2005 hurricane season, federal agencies have also taken steps to  help port authorities strengthen ports’ ability to recover from future  natural disasters. These efforts have focused on increased coordination  and communication with stakeholders and also on building stakeholders’  knowledge about federal resources for port recovery efforts. The efforts  primarily involve four federal agencies that in some fashion work directly  with ports—the Maritime Administration, the Coast Guard, FEMA and the  U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Efforts for those four agencies are as  follows:  Maritime Administration Efforts: The Maritime Administration has taken  two main steps: developing an approach for activating maritime assets in  disaster recovery, and updating a risk management guidebook. During the  2005 hurricane season, the Maritime Administration emerged as a critical  resource for the Gulf area by providing vessels from the nation’s National  Defense Ready Reserve Fleet to enable recovery operations and provide  shelter for displaced citizens. Since that time, FEMA developed a one-time  plan—the Federal Support Plan, which was cited specifically for the 2006  Hurricane Season and specific to the federal government’s response  efforts in the State of Louisiana. The Maritime Administration contributed  to this plan by identifying government and commercial maritime  capabilities that could be employed in response to a disaster. According  to Maritime Administration officials, while the information is focused on  the Gulf area, it could be easily adapted to other areas in the United States  if a disaster occurred. To date, the Maritime Administration is completing  the process of identifying needs and capabilities and plans to provide a  directive regarding capabilities to its regional offices in June 2007.  However, no strategy exists for communicating this information to ports.
The Maritime Administration is also currently updating its publication  titled Port Risk Management and Insurance Guidebook (2001). This  publication is the Maritime Administration’s “best practices” guide for port  risk management. Developed primarily to assist smaller ports in  conducting risk management, it includes information on how ports can  obtain insurance coverage, facilitate emergency management and port  security, and apply risk management. The Maritime Administration began  updating the guidebook after the 2005 hurricane season. According to  officials from the Maritime Administration, ports are actively using this  guidebook, especially since many of the contributors are port directors  and risk managers at the ports.
While these efforts demonstrate the Maritime Administration’s increased  involvement in assisting ports in planning for future disasters, we also  observed that Maritime Administration regions vary in their level of  communication and coordination with ports. According to a Maritime  Administration official, the Gulf and East Coast regions have been working  with FEMA regional offices to quickly activate needed assets in case of a  disaster. However, while the Gulf and East Coast regions have been  strengthening these relationships, other regions may not have the same  level of coordination. We found, in general, port authorities’ interaction  with the Maritime Administration was limited for natural disaster planning,  and the ports we spoke to said they usually did not work directly with the  agency in disaster planning. This view was echoed by Maritime  Administration officials who said that the relationship between the  agency’s regional offices and the ports in their respective areas varied  across the country.
Coast Guard efforts: Coast Guard efforts in natural disaster planning  varied considerably from port to port and were most extensive in the Gulf.  While in general, the Coast Guard was considered successful in its  missions during the 2005 hurricane season, its officials said they were  taking additional steps in improving planning for recovery efforts with  port stakeholders based on their experiences with recent natural disasters.  For example, at the Port of Mobile, Coast Guard officials said that  participating in an actual Incident Command Systememergency centers  has been as helpful as exercises and, since the 2005 hurricane season, they  have utilized such a unified command at least 10 times in preparation for  potential hurricane landfalls in the region. At other ports, the Coast Guard  had a more limited role in assisting ports in planning for natural disasters.
Even at ports that had not experienced substantial damage from a recent  natural disaster, however, Coast Guard units were applying lessons  learned from other ports’ experiences and increasing their level of  involvement. For example, the Port of Houston sustained minimal damage  from Hurricane Rita; however, Coast Guard officials said that they  identified areas where they could make improvements. The Coast Guard at  the Port of Houston leads a recovery planning effort through port  coordination teams, which include stakeholders such as the port authority,  Coast Guard, and private operators, working together during disaster  recovery efforts. These teams are all-hazards focused and are activated  differently for terrorist incidents or natural disasters. Coast Guard officials  said that although the teams were successful in planning for Hurricane  Rita, there were areas for improvement, including outreach and training  with port stakeholders and communication. Further, Coast Guard officials  at the Port of Tacoma said that other ports’ experiences with recent  natural disasters has generated interest in them becoming more involved  in the planning and coordination of natural disasters. They also indicated  they were interested in adapting, in some form, a planning forum similar to  the Port of Houston’s port coordination teams.
FEMA efforts: While state and local emergency management agencies  assist in facilitating FEMA disaster planning at the port level, FEMA has  several efforts under way to improve its assistance to ports for disaster  recovery. For instance, FEMA officials said that through the Public  Assistance Program, FEMA is able to provide assistance to ports that are  eligible applicants after a major disaster or emergency. Based on lessons  learned from Hurricane Katrina, FEMA is also reviewing and updating its  policies and guidance documents associated with this program. To  administer the program, FEMA will coordinate closely with federal, state,  and local authorities (including emergency management agencies) through  its regional offices. Officials also said that through planning, training, and  exercise activities sponsored by DHS, they hope to have greater  opportunities to interact and coordinate with port authorities and other  local agencies before disasters occur. Further, officials agree that  coordination with their local counterparts is an important part of  emergency management and disaster recovery efforts.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers efforts: Although the U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers generally does not conduct natural disaster planning with ports,  staff at the district level have made some efforts to increase their level of  involvement in this process, particularly in the Gulf region. For example,  district U.S. Army Corps of Engineers staff have (1) organized and chaired  yearly hurricane planning forums to which all ports in the region are  invited; (2) organized prestorm teleconferences for port stakeholders,  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Navy, and in some  instances, the media; (3) participated in the Coast Guard’s Partner  Emergency Action Team, which specifically address disaster  preparedness; (4) geographically aligned with the Coast Guard to better  facilitate coordination during an emergency; and (5) implemented  informational training on planning for hurricanes to ports and other  maritime stakeholders. Many of these improvements were implemented as  a result of Hurricane Ivan (2001) and the hurricanes from the 2005 season.  However, the extent of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers participation in  natural disaster planning with ports varies. For instance, U.S. Army Corps  of Engineers representatives in Savannah said they do not play a  significant role in the port’s natural disaster planning for recovery efforts.  Similarly in Jacksonville, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers officials explained  that their primary natural disaster recovery duty at the Port of Miami is to  repair the federal channel and they do not participate in the port  authority’s disaster planning efforts. However, the Jacksonville U.S. Army  Corps of Engineers does cooperate with the Coast Guard’s Marine Safety  Office in Jacksonville in the development of their hurricane preparedness  plan. For this effort, it assisted in determining what vessels could remain  in port during a hurricane and what vessels would be required to leave.
section_title: Current Planning Approach Lessens Effective Coordination among All Port Stakeholders
paragraphs: Most port authorities we reviewed conduct planning for natural disasters  separately from planning for homeland security threats. Federal law  established security planning requirements that apply to ports. Similar  requirements do not exist with regard to natural disaster planning. The  ports we contacted used markedly different approaches to natural disaster  planning, and the extent and thoroughness of their plans varied widely. A  few ports have integrated homeland security and natural disaster planning  in what is called an all-hazards approach, and this approach appeared to  be generating benefits and is in keeping with experts’ recommendations  and with the newest developments in federal risk management policy. A  consequence of the divided approach was a wide variance in the degree to  which port stakeholders were involved in natural disaster planning and the  degree to which port authorities were aware of federal resources available  for disaster recovery. For homeland security planning, federal law  provides for the establishment of AMSCs with wide stakeholder  representation, and some ports are using these committees or another  similar forum with wide representation in their disaster planning efforts.  DHS, which through the Coast Guard oversees the AMSCs, provides an  example of how to incorporate a wider of scope of committee activity.
subsections: section_title: Port-Level Natural Disaster Planning Is Primarily Conducted Separately from Other Threats
paragraphs: Of the ports we visited, more than half developed plans for natural  disasters separately from plans that address security threats. This is likely  due to the requirement that port authorities carry out their planning for  homeland security under the federal framework created by the Congress  in the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), under which all port  operators are required to draft individual security plans identifying  security vulnerabilities and approaches to mitigate them. Under the Coast  Guard’s implementing regulations, these plans are to include such items as  measures for access control, responses to security threats, and drills and  exercises to train staff and test the plan. The plans are “performance- based”; that is, the security outcomes are specified, but the stakeholders  are free to identify and implement appropriate solutions as long as these  solutions achieve the specified outcomes. Because of the similarities in  security and natural hazard planning these plans can be useful for guiding  natural disaster response.
MTSA also provided the Secretary of Homeland Security with the  authority to create AMSCs at the port level. These committees—with  representatives from the federal, state, local, and private sectors—offer a  venue to identify and deal with vulnerabilities in and around ports, as well  as a forum for sharing information on issues related to port security. The  committee assists the Coast Guard’s COTP in developing an area maritime  security plan, which complements the facility security plans developed by  individual port operators. The plan provides a framework for  communication and coordination among port stakeholders and law  enforcement officials and identifies and reduces vulnerabilities to security  threats throughout the port area.
In contrast, port authority and operator natural disaster planning  documents are generally not required by law and vary widely. According  to one member from the AAPA, ports will have various interrelated plans,  such as hurricane readiness plans, emergency operations plans,  engineering plans, and community awareness and emergency response  plans. Taken as a whole, the distinct plans for a particular port may  represent the port’s risk management approach to disaster planning.
In addition, port natural disaster plans are not reviewed by the Coast  Guard. Representatives of the Coast Guard at locations we visited  confirmed they do not review port authority or port operator planning  documents pertaining to natural disaster planning. For example, officials  at the Port of Oakland and the Port of Tacoma said they do not review the  port or port stakeholders planning documents for natural disaster  planning. Coast Guard officials at the Port of Savannah also noted that  they do not review the hurricane plans for port operators. They contended  that they do not have the expertise to advise the operators on how to  protect or restart their particular operations. Moreover, natural disaster  plans developed by port authorities generally do not apply to the port’s  private operators. Only in one case did a port authority state that it  required its private operators to draft a natural disaster plan.
section_title: Under the Separate Approach, Disaster Plans Show Wide Variation
paragraphs: We found that the thoroughness of natural disaster plans varied  considerably from port to port. For instance, the Port of Mobile had a  relatively thorough plan. The Port of Mobile was affected by three major  hurricanes in 2005-2006. Roughly a year after Hurricane Katrina, the  Alabama State Port Authority completed an extensive emergency  operations plan, based on an analysis that considered natural, man-made,  and security-related hazards. The operations plan describes preparedness,  response, recovery, and mitigation procedures for each identified threat,  establishes requirements for conducting exercises, and establishes a  schedule for regular plan reviews and updates. In contrast, the Port of  Morgan City does not have a written plan for preparing for natural disaster  threats but instead relies on port personnel to assess disaster risk and  prepare appropriately. Following a disaster, the port authority relies on  senior personnel to direct recovery efforts as needed.
In the absence of uniform federal guidance for port disaster planning,  some local governments have instituted local planning requirements. The  differences in these local guidelines account for some of the variation in  the content and thoroughness of port disaster plans. For example, the  Miami-Dade County Emergency Management Office helps to coordinate  disaster preparedness for all county agencies, including the Port of Miami.  As such, the port submits its hurricane plans and continuity of operations  plan to the office each year for review, which provides a certain level of  quality assurance. By comparison, the Port of Los Angeles found local  seismic building codes were insufficient to reach the desired level of  preparedness, so the port developed its own seismic codes to guide  infrastructure construction and repair.
section_title: Combined All-Hazards Approach Shows Promise for Improved Planning
paragraphs: In contrast to the disjunctional planning for both natural disasters and  security at ports, industry experts encourage the unified consideration of  all risks faced by the port. Unified disaster preparedness planning requires  that all of the threats faced by the port, both natural and man-made, be  considered together. This is referred to as an all-hazards approach.  Experts consider it to offer several advantages:    Application of planning resources to both security and natural disaster  preparedness. Because of the similarities between the effects of terrorist  attacks and natural or accidental disasters, much of the planning,  personnel, training, and equipment that form the basis of protection,  response, and recovery capabilities are similar across all emergency  events. As we have previously reported, the capabilities needed to respond  to major disasters, whether the result of terrorist attack or nature, are  similar in many ways. Unified risk management can enhance the  efficiency of port planning efforts because of the similarity in recovery  plans for both natural and security-related disasters. One expert noted that  responding to a disaster would likely be the same for a security incident  and a natural disaster incident from an operational standpoint.
Efficient allocation of disaster-preparation resources. An all-hazards  approach allows the port to estimate the relative impact of mitigation  alternatives and identify the optimal mix of investments in these  alternatives based on the costs and benefits of each. The exclusion of  certain risks from consideration, or the separate consideration of a  particular type of risk, gives rise to the possibility that risks will not be  accurately assessed or compared, and that too many or too few resources  will be allocated toward mitigation of a particular risk. Port risk  management experts noted that, in the absence of an all-hazards risk  management process, it is difficult to accurately assess and address the  full spectrum of threats faced by a port.
subsections: section_title: Federal Actions Reflect Movement Toward All-Hazards Approach
paragraphs: At the federal level, the Congress has introduced various elements of an  all-hazards approach to risk management and assistance to ports.  Examples are as follows:    Single response approach to all types of emergency events. NIMS and  NRP, which were implemented by DHS, provide a unified framework for  responding to security and natural disaster events. NIMS is a policy  document that defines roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local  first responders during all types of emergency events. The NRP is designed  to integrate federal government domestic prevention, protection,  response, and recovery plans into a single operational plan for all-hazards  and all-emergency response disciplines. Using the framework provided by  NIMS, the NRP describes operational procedures for federal support to  emergency managers and organizes capabilities, staffing, and equipment  resources in terms of functions that are most likely to be needed during  emergency events. In addition, along with the NRP and NIMS, DHS has  developed the National Preparedness Goal, as required by Homeland  Security Presidential Directive 8. Considered as a group, these three  documents are intended to guide investments in emergency preparedness  and response capabilities for all hazards. An inability to effectively  perform these critical tasks would, by definition, have a detrimental  impact on effective protection, prevention, response, and recovery  capabilities.
Broadened focus for risk mitigation efforts. Security and Accountability  for Every Port Act, passed in October 2006, contains language mandating  that the Coast Guard institute Port Security Training and Exercise  Programs to evaluate response capabilities of port facilities to respond to  acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other emergencies.  Officials from the DHS Preparedness Directorate’s Grants and Training  Office also noted that the criteria for the Port Security Grant Program is  beginning to reflect the movement toward all-hazards planning in the  future. DHS officials stated that the program may evolve to focus more on  portwide risk management, rather than on risk mitigation for particular  assets. Furthermore, grant applications that demonstrate mitigation of  natural hazard risks in addition to security risks may be more competitive.  Other officials noted that while the program may focus more on all  hazards in the future, it will remain focused on security priorities for now.
Another agency-level movement toward the all-hazards approach is  occurring in the Coast Guard’s improvement of a computer tool it uses to  compare security risks for targets throughout a port, including areas not  under the jurisdiction of a local port authority. This tool, called the  Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model (MSRAM), provides information  for the U.S. Coast Guard COPT to use in deciding the most efficient  allocation of resources to reduce security risks at a port. The Coast Guard  is developing an all-hazards risk assessment and management system,  partially fed by MSRAM, which will allow comparison of risks and risk- mitigation activities across all goals and hazards. The Coast Guard directs  the Area Maritime Security Committee to use MSRAM in the development  of the Area Maritime Security Plan. Given that the Coast Guard is  enhancing the MSRAM with a tool that will incorporate natural hazards,  the risks addressed in the Area Maritime Security Plan could likely include  both natural and security threats in the future.
An all-hazards approach is in many ways a logical maturation of port  security planning, which saw an aggressive homeland security expansion  in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. One expert in  seismic risk management we spoke with said port officials he contacted  indicated that they were not focused on natural disaster risk because, in  their view, the federal government wanted them to focus on security risks  instead. At some ports, hurricanes or earthquakes may be a greater threat  than terrorism, and a case can be made that overall risk to a port might be  more effectively reduced through greater investment in mitigating these  risks. While federal law provides guidance on addressing security risks  through MTSA and its implementing regulations, it does not provide  similar guidance pertaining to mitigation of natural disaster threats.
Our previous work on risk management has examined the challenges  involved in comparing risk across broader threat categories. A risk  management framework that analyzes risks based on the likelihood that  they will occur and the consequences of their occurrence is a useful tool  for ensuring that program expenditures are prioritized and properly  focused. In light of the competition for scarce resources available to deal  with the threats ports face, a clear understanding of the relative  significance of these threats is an important step.
section_title: Port Authorities Using an All- Hazards Approach Indicate Benefits Resulted
paragraphs: Two port authorities we reviewed have begun to take an all-hazards  approach to disaster planning by developing planning documents and  structures that address both security risks and natural disasters, and  officials at both ports said this approach yielded benefits. At the Port of  Houston, the Coast Guard used its authority to mandate the creation of  port coordination teams by creating teams that include all port  stakeholders and combine planning and response efforts for both security  and natural disaster threats. This unified approach to risk management has  allowed the port to respond efficiently to disasters when they occur,  according to port officials. In particular, they said, the organization of the  team changes to match the nature of the threat. For security threats, the  teams are organized geographically and do not require that the entire port  close down, thereby appropriately matching resources to the threat being  faced. For natural disasters, the teams are organized functionally because  of the more dispersed nature of the threat.
Following the 2005 hurricane season, the Port of Mobile convened a task  force to reorganize its disaster planning to address both security incidents  and natural disasters. The task force, which recently completed its  emergency operations plan, included the Port Authority Police Chief;  Harbormaster; Environmental, Health and Safety Manager; and  representatives of the port’s rail, cargo, intermodal and development  divisions. A member of the county emergency management agency also  served on the task force to provide expert guidance on emergency  response planning.
Port stakeholders in other ports that had not moved to an all-hazards  approach also said preparedness and response practices for security  incidents and natural disasters are sufficiently similar to merit combined  planning. Officials in several ports said that although they are required to  allocate certain resources to security risk mitigation, overall risk to the  port would be more effectively reduced if they had the flexibility to  allocate some of those resources to mitigating natural disaster risk.
section_title: Under the Separate Approach, Gaps Exist in Coordinating Maritime Stakeholders and Obtaining Information about Federal Resources
paragraphs: We have previously reported that, for homeland security planning, the  AMSCs established under federal law have been an effective coordination  tool. These committees have provided a structure to improve the  timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of information sharing between  federal and nonfederal stakeholders. Port stakeholders said that the  committees were an improvement over previous information-sharing  efforts because they established a formal structure for communicating  information and new procedures for sharing information. Stakeholders  stated that, among other things, the committees have been used as a forum  for sharing assessments of vulnerabilities, providing information on illegal  or suspicious activities, and providing input on Area Maritime Security  Plans. Stakeholders, including private operators, said the information  sharing had increased their awareness of security issues around the port  and allowed them to identify and address security issues at their facilities.  Likewise, Coast Guard officials said the information they received from  nonfederal participants had helped in mitigating and reducing risks.
In contrast to the regulatory requirements for the establishment of AMSCs,  there are no nationwide federal mandates for all-hazards planning forums  that involve a broad spectrum of stakeholders in disaster planning. In the  absence of any consistent requirement or approach, we found substantial  variation in the maturity of, and participation in, natural disaster planning  forums at ports. As table 3 shows, the level of activity and the participants  varied considerably. Some ports utilized their AMSC for both types of  planning, while others conducted natural disaster planning efforts  primarily within the local area’s broader emergency management forums,  and still others conducted their planning piecemeal, with various entities  meeting separately and not in one coordinated forum.
The Port of Savannah provides an example of how separate planning for  natural disasters and security can lead to a lack of coordination and  information-sharing. While officials from the local emergency management  agency said they reviewed and provided comments on the Georgia Port  Authority’s most recent Hurricane Plan and Draft Emergency Operations  Plan, this had not traditionally been the case over the past several years.  According to a representative from the emergency management agency, if  the port is not sharing its emergency operations plans, it makes it difficult  for responders in the local area to understand what is happening within  the port in terms of planning for natural disasters. Additionally, while the  local EMA is enjoying an ongoing productive dialogue with port  representatives in developing the Emergency Operations Plan and working  on port safety and security issues, they are not having the same level of  success with port representatives responsible for hurricane planning. Even  so, officials said that they had seen marked improvement in the area of  portwide cooperation and involvement among stakeholders.
Port authorities’ lack of familiarity with FEMA’s programs is another  example of the gaps that exist. We found that port authorities’  understanding of FEMA’s assistance was dependent on their relationship  with the local or state emergency management office—a stakeholder that  is not necessarily involved in the forums where the port’s natural disaster  planning occurs. We discussed three FEMA programs with officials from  our seven case study ports: the Public Assistance Program, Hazard  Mitigation Grant Program and the Predisaster Mitigation Grant Program  (see table 4 for brief descriptions). These programs provide ports with  funds for disaster mitigation efforts before and after disaster events and  assist ports in avoiding costly damages. Of the three programs, port  authorities were most knowledgeable about, and most involved with, the  Public Assistance Program, although even with this program, some port  authorities reported encountering challenges with the process during the  2005 hurricane season. Their knowledge and participation in the two  hazard mitigation grant programs was dependent on their involvement  with the emergency planning office. FEMA officials told us that no ports  have applied as an applicant or subapplicant for the Predisaster Mitigation  Program, and only a few had received assistance through the Hazard  Mitigation Grant Program since 1998. AAPA officials made the same  point—that many ports are unaware, unsure how to navigate or do not  understand the resources that are available to them for disasters. In its  new best practices manual for natural disaster planning, AAPA included a  section regarding various federal resources available, including FEMA.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The 2005 hurricane season emphasized the need for ports to plan for other  threats in addition to security. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11,  2001, the country has focused on enhancing its security measures, and  ports in particular have been targeted due to their vulnerability and their  criticality to the U.S. economy. While ports have long prepared to some  degree for hurricanes and earthquakes, the hurricanes of 2005 highlighted  key areas in which natural disaster planning was often inadequate. Even  ports that were not directly impacted by the hurricanes recognized their  own vulnerabilities and took additional actions. As ports continue to  revise and improve their planning efforts, available evidence indicates  that, if ports take a system-wide approach, thinking strategically about  using resources to mitigate and recover from all forms of disaster, they  will be able to achieve the most effective results. The federally established  framework for ports’ homeland security planning appears to provide  useful elements for establishing an all-hazards approach and adopting  these elements appears to be a logical starting point for an all-hazards  approach for port authorities. In particular, greater coordination between  stakeholders appears important to ensure that available federal resources  can be most effectively applied. A forum for sharing information and  developing plans across a wide range of stakeholders, as occurs with a  port’s AMSC, is critical for ensuring that local stakeholders can use federal  resources effectively. This is especially the case for mitigation grants  administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the  Maritime Administration’s communication of information regarding  making ships and other maritime resources available for disaster recovery.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that ports achieve adequate planning for natural disasters  and effectively manage risk to a variety of threats, we are recommending  that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security encourage port  stakeholders to use existing forums for discussing all-hazards planning  efforts and include appropriate representatives from DHS, the port  authority, representatives from the local emergency management office,  the Maritime Administration, and vessel and facility owner/operators.
To help ensure that ports have adequate understanding of maritime  disaster recovery resources, we recommend that the Secretary of the  Department of Transportation direct the Administrator of the Maritime  Administration to develop a communication strategy to inform ports of the  maritime resources available for recovery efforts.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOT, and DOD for their review  and comment.
In DHS’s letter, the department generally agreed existing forums provide a  good opportunity to conduct outreach to and participation by stakeholders  from various federal, state, and local agencies and, as appropriate,  industry and nongovernmental organizations. However, the department  said it did not endorse placing responsibility for disaster contingency  planning on existing committees in ports and said these responsibilities  should remain with state and local emergency management planners. Our  recommendation was not to place responsibility for such planning within  port committees, but rather to use these existing forums as a way to  engage all relevant parties in discussing natural disaster planning for ports.  The problem we found at various locations we visited was that all parties  have not been involved in these efforts. In our view, these committees  represent a ready way to accomplish this task. While we understand Coast  Guard’s concern with diluting existing statutorily mandated port-related  committees, we found during the course of our fieldwork that some ports  were already using existing port committees effectively to plan for all  hazards. Further, we believe that the unique nature of ports and their  criticality to goods movement warrants that all ports be encouraged to  have a specific forum for all-hazard planning. DHS’s letter is reprinted in  appendix II. DHS officials provided technical comments and clarifications,  which we incorporated as appropriate to ensure the accuracy of our  report.
In general, DOT agreed with the facts presented in the report. Department  officials provided a number of comments and clarifications, which we  incorporated as appropriate to ensure the accuracy of our report. The  department generally concurred with GAO’s recommendation.
Additionally, DOD generally agreed with the facts presented in the report.  Department officials provided some technical comments and  clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate to ensure the  accuracy of our report.
We will send copies of this report to the interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and other interested parties.  We also will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the  report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-6570 or sigerrudk@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report, initiated under the Comptroller General’s authority to  examine government operations, examines (1) the challenges port  authorities have experienced as a result of recent natural disasters, (2) the  efforts under way to address challenges from these disasters, and (3) the  manner in which port authorities prepare for disasters and the effect of  this approach on their ability to share information with port stakeholders  and access federal resources.
To address these objectives, we focused much of our work on 17 U.S.  ports. We focused primarily on commercial ports and various commercial  aspects of these ports. The main criteria we used to select ports for study  were as follows:    Size of port, based on the value of imported cargo. To ensure a varied size  of ports, we selected ports that were among the top 50 in size, but within  these 50, we chose ports whose total cargo values were greater than and  less than the average cargo value for all 50 top ports.
Experience with recent natural disasters. We focused our efforts  primarily—but not exclusively—on ports that had some degree of  experience with a natural disaster since 1998. Based on Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) guidance about the most significant disaster  threats and potential hazards, we limited our focus to ports that have  hurricane or seismic threats. In particular, we included a number of ports  affected by the 2005 hurricane season—primarily hurricanes Katrina,  Wilma, and Rita. In all, 10 of the 17 ports we selected were affected by  hurricanes that year.
Operational type. We chose ports that reflected a range of operating  types, including those that (1) manage port operations and provide all  services, (2) act as a landlord and lease operations and facilities to tenants,  and (3) conduct limited operations in the port and lease facilities to others.
Region of the United States. We selected ports from the East, Gulf, and  West Coasts. There is an overrepresentation of Gulf region ports to ensure  adequate coverage of hurricane affected ports.
In making our selections, we used information from the Maritime  Administration, including port demographics operational, legal type, and  region from the Public Port Finance Survey Report and Maritime  Administration waterborne statistics which report the top 50 ports in  terms of total cargo value. We determined that what we found at those  ports is not generalizable to all U.S. ports. We used disaster data from  Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assess how many  natural disasters had affected the counties in which each port was located.  Based on our review of data documentation, we determined that the data  we used in applying our criteria for port selection were sufficiently reliable  for our purposes.
We took two approaches to reviewing these ports—site visits and  telephone interviews. We conducted site visits at seven ports, as follows:    Tacoma, Washington    Houston, Texas    Oakland, California    Gulfport, Mississippi    Mobile, Alabama    Miami, Florida    Savannah, Georgia  During these visits, we gathered information from various maritime  stakeholders, including officials from port authorities, emergency  management agencies, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers, and the Maritime Administration. Although we talked to four  private operators, we excluded interviewing other private operators  because their roles and responsibilities vary greatly from port to port and  because their efforts for natural disasters, unlike their efforts for  homeland security, are not subject to federal requirements or guidelines.  We designed our case study interview questions to provide insight on (1)  general governance and operations of the port, (2) impacts from recent  natural disasters, (3) lessons learned from previous natural disasters, (4)  risk management procedures, and (5) stakeholder collaboration.
We conducted telephone interviews with officials at 10 ports, as follows:    Freeport, Texas    Jacksonville, Florida    Los Angeles, California    Morgan City, Louisiana    New Orleans, Louisiana    Pascagoula, Mississippi    Port Arthur, Texas    Richmond, Virginia    San Diego, California    Wilmington, North Carolina  At these ports, we limited our telephone interviews to port authorities  only. These semi-structured interviews addressed the same topics as the  case study but focused more on damages and lessons learned as a result of  recent natural disasters. For both sets of ports, we also reviewed  numerous planning documents from port stakeholders including  emergency preparedness plans, disaster recovery plans, hurricane  operations, hurricane manuals, seismic guidelines, and business continuity  plans.
To assess the challenges port authorities experienced as a result of recent  natural disasters, we used the interviews we conducted and the  documents we obtained from officials at the 17 ports. To determine the  efforts under way to address these challenges, we reviewed information  from our interviews with and documents from American Association of  Port Authorities (AAPA) officials and various federal agencies. In  particular, we reviewed the Emergency Preparedness and Continuity of  Operations Planning: Manual for Best Practices that was developed  through several working groups coordinated by the AAPA. The working  groups provided a forum for port officials across the United States and  Canada to share their experience in planning for the impacts of recent  natural disasters and to share their best practices. We conducted  interviews with the Chair of the working groups and other AAPA officials  to gather more information about the working group’s procedures and  vetting process. Additionally, we interviewed various regional and  headquarter officials of the Maritime Administration, U.S. Coast Guard  (Coast Guard), Department of Transportation, U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers, FEMA, and DHS. We reviewed the following federal risk  management plans:    The draft appendix for maritime resources for the Federal Support Plan.  The appendix is part of a one-time joint planning document between the  Department of Transportation and FEMA for the state of Louisiana (2006  Hurricane Season). The Maritime Administration, an agency within the  Department of Transportation, developed this appendix to assist in future  recovery efforts by identifying resources, protocols, and organizations for  maritime resources.
The Port Risk Management and Insurance Guidebook, developed by the  Maritime Administration. This publication is a best practices guide for port  risk management, including information on how ports obtain insurance  coverage and facilitate emergency management.
To determine how port authorities plan for natural disasters and the  effects of that approach on information-sharing among port stakeholders  and access to federal resources, we reviewed port and federal disaster  planning documents collected from various port stakeholders at each of  the seven ports we visited in person. In order to gain an understanding of  best practices for such planning efforts, we interviewed academic,  industry, and government experts. In particular, we interviewed risk  management experts from the following organizations:    Georgia Institute of Technology’s Port Seismic Risk Management Team  conducted damage assessments at seven ports in south Louisiana in  October 2005 immediately following Hurricane Katrina.
ABS Consulting has worked with a variety of clients including the Coast  Guard, Maritime Administration, and FEMA and thus helped develop  several port risk management tools.
The Office of Grants and Training at DHS administers both Port Security  and Homeland Security Grants.
The Coast Guard has expertise in utilizing the Maritime Security Risk  Assessment Model (MSRAM) to assess security risk and has plans to  incorporate natural disaster risks into the model.
We also reviewed related laws and mandates that provide federal oversight  to ports—namely the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002  and  its implementing regulations and other applicable law. We also reviewed  the Puget Sound area maritime security plan and attended an Area  Maritime Security Committee meeting at the Port of Houston-Galveston.  To determine steps that federal agencies were taking with regard to all- hazards risk management, we reviewed (1) the Security and  Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act), which addresses risk  mitigation of transportation disruptions, including disruptions caused  natural disasters and (2) policy documents including the National  Response Plan and the National Incident Management System. We also  reviewed a presentation on the Coast Guard’s MSRAM.
Our work, which we conducted from December 2005 through February  2007, was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Sally Moino, Assistant Director;  Casey Hanewall; Lindsey Hemly; Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt; Bert Japikse;  Erica Miles; Sara Ann Moessbauer; Jamilah Moon; Sharon Silas; Stan  Stenerson; and Randall Williamson made key contributions to this report.