Department of State: Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs Follow Legal Authority, but Some Activities Need Reassessment
Published: 2004-04-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of State requested $415 million to fund programs in the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) appropriations account for fiscal year 2005. Interest has been expressed in learning about whether programs are being implemented in accord with the law, and in the extent to which programs use experts hired on a contractual basis. GAO was asked to determine (1) the legal authorizations for the programs and the extent to which programs are implemented in accord with these authorizations and (2) the extent to which program management and implementation use outside experts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The seven major programs funded through the Department of State's Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs appropriations account are authorized by law and engage in activities that are in accord with their authority. However, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) engages in activities that, while authorized by law, appear to be inconsistent with expectations about the scope of the program's mission. Past appropriations committee reports and testimony by the Secretary of State indicated that the NDF is designed to respond to urgent, unanticipated nonproliferation events of immediate concern to the United States. However, at least half of the NDF's $35 million budget request for fiscal year 2004 and 57 percent of the $34.5 million request for fiscal year 2005 were designated for longer-term activities preplanned through the annual budget process, including expansion of an export control system called Tracker. Furthermore, the Tracker system has been developed and deployed independently of another Department of State program, the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program, which supports the development of export control capabilities in foreign countries. Currently, the Tracker system is not integrated into the export control assessments and activities of this program or the export control activities of other Departments, such as the Department of Commerce. Program management offices, which range in size from 1 to 26 staff, average about 80 percent federal employees and 20 percent experts hired on a contractual basis. In contrast, projects funded by these programs are implemented by experts on contract from other U.S. government agencies (who may also be federal employees), outside contractors, or international and nongovernmental organizations. The Department of State concurred with the need to integrate export control activities, but took exception to other issues regarding the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of State’s Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and  Related Programs (NADR) account funds programs that are designed to  advance U.S. national interests in a variety of areas. Those programs  address the spread of weapons of mass destruction, assist other countries  in fighting terrorism, and support humanitarian assistance programs such  as demining. Administration budget requests for fiscal year 2005 include  $415 million for these programs. You expressed interest in learning about  whether the major programs funded through the account are being  implemented in accord with their legal authorizations and in the extent to  which these programs use experts hired on a contractual basis. In  response, we determined (1) the legal authorizations for the programs and  the extent to which the types of activities funded are in accord with  program authorizations and (2) the extent to which program management  and project implementation use experts hired on a contractual basis.
To address these objectives, we focused our audit work on seven major  nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, and regional stability and humanitarian  assistance programs that are funded through the NADR account. We  obtained information and documentation on program authorizations and  activities, program funding histories, and program management and  implementation, including the use of outside experts. We also met with the  officials responsible for managing the programs to discuss these issues. We  reviewed the authorizing statutes for each program and compared those  provisions with the types of activities supported by the programs. We  reviewed the general reliability of the project data and found the data  sufficiently reliable for the purpose of representing program activities. We  conducted this review from August 2003 to March 2004 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
You also asked us to determine how national security goals are  incorporated into program budget planning; the nature and extent of  coordination with other U.S. government nonproliferation, anti-terrorism,  and regional stability and humanitarian assistance programs; and the  effectiveness of the major programs. By agreement with your staff, we will  address those issues in subsequent reports.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 1996, Congress established the NADR appropriations account in  response to the increased importance of nonproliferation and anti- terrorism efforts and to give the executive branch more flexibility in  administering funds for these kinds of activities. While some programs  funded through the account have been recently established—such as the  Small Arms/Light Weapons Destruction Program, other programs were  already in operation when the NADR account was created, including the  NDF. Programs funded through this account fall under the jurisdiction of  the Department of State and are grouped into three categories: (1)  Nonproliferation, (2) Anti-terrorism, and (3) Regional Stability and  Humanitarian Assistance.
There are three major nonproliferation programs:  The NDF funds projects to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass  destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials.
The Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program  assists other governments in implementing effective export control  systems to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and  their missile delivery systems as well as conventional weapons.
The Science Centers and Bio-Chem Redirection Program finances  civilian research by former Soviet nuclear, biological, and chemical  weapons scientists to provide incentives that would prevent them from  marketing their skills to other countries. The fiscal year 2005 budget  request refers to this program as the Nonproliferation of WMD  (weapons of mass destruction) Expertise Program.
There are two major anti-terrorism programs:  The Anti-terrorism Assistance Program provides training to foreign  nationals in such areas as law enforcement, border control, protection  of critical infrastructure, and crisis management to develop and sustain  other countries’ abilities to impede terrorist activities.
The Terrorist Interdiction Program helps countries improve border  security through the provision of a computerized database that enables  border control officials to identify, detain, or track individuals of  interest.
Two major programs support regional stability and humanitarian  assistance:  The Humanitarian Demining Program funds humanitarian assistance  programs that remove and destroy land mines and unexploded  ordnance from former combat areas.
The Small Arms/Light Weapons Destruction Program supports the  destruction worldwide of surplus and illicit stocks of military small  arms and light weapons that are easily transportable (e.g., small arms,  minor explosives, and hand-held missile systems).
Table 1 provides the appropriations history for these major programs for  fiscal years 1999 through 2005, as applicable.
In addition to these major programs, the NADR account funds other  activities, including contributions to international organizations that have a  more specific focus. For example, the NADR account includes funds that  support other nonproliferation activities, including the International  Atomic Energy Agency and the International Monitoring System. While  some of these activities may have received significant levels of  appropriations, we did not conduct in depth review of these activities  because they were generally more focused in scope. State officials,  nevertheless, consider the funding and programmatic support to the  International Atomic Energy Agency to be one of their more important  nonproliferation activities, and noted that the appropriations for the U.S.  voluntary contribution has been at least $50 million since fiscal year 2001.  Table 2 provides a funding history for these activities.
section_title: Program Activities Reflect Legislative Authorizations, but One Program’s Activities Appear to Go Beyond Expectations for the Scope of Its Mission
paragraphs: All the NADR programs are authorized by law, and program  implementation reflects those legislative authorizations. Because the NDF,  however, engages in both preplanned and longer-term activities, it also  engages in activities that, while legally authorized, appear to go beyond  expectations for the scope of the program’s mission of providing a flexible  funding source to respond to urgent nonproliferation activities. Program  expectations appear in congressional appropriations committee reports  and have been reiterated by the Secretary of State and the program’s own  mission statement. For example, appropriations committee report  language states that the program should focus on “urgent, unanticipated  nonproliferation activities of immediate concern to the United States.”  Furthermore, the program funds a longer-term export control activity that  is designated in committee reports as being outside the scope of the  program’s expected activities. That export control activity has not been  integrated with State’s Export Control and Related Border Security  Assistance Program, which supports development of export control  capabilities in other countries.
subsections: section_title: Program Activities Reflect Legislative Authorizations
paragraphs: State is authorized to engage in the activities of the major programs funded  through the NADR account. The legislative authorities for the programs  generally establish the scope of authorized activities, the countries in  which the programs may operate, the retention of appropriated funds, and  whether the programs can operate regardless of other existing laws.
We reviewed the types of activities funded by the major programs in the  context of program authorizations and found that these programs engage in  activities that are in accord with their legislative authorizations. For  example, among the nonproliferation programs, the Science Centers and  Bio-Chem Redirection Program is authorized to engage former Soviet  weapons scientists in civilian activities, and to facilitate conversion of  former Soviet military technologies and capabilities into civilian activities.  To fulfill this mission, the Science Centers and Bio-Chem Redirection  Program supports two international science centers—the International  Science and Technology Center in Moscow and the Science and  Technology Center in Ukraine—as well as other activities including those  that engage nuclear, biological, and chemical scientists in research  projects. These programs help focus on civilian research such as public  health, agriculture, the environment, measures to help combat biological  and chemical terrorism, and the development of vaccines for infectious  diseases.
Among the anti-terrorism programs, for example, the Anti-terrorism  Assistance Program is authorized to provide assistance to allied countries  to enhance their ability to deter terrorists and terrorist groups from  engaging in international terrorist acts. To fulfill its mission, this program  provides training and equipment to enhance other countries’ abilities to  fight and prevent terrorism. The program supports training and equipment  in such areas as bomb detection and disposal, management of hostage  situations, physical security for personnel, and law enforcement  management.
Among the regional stability and humanitarian assistance programs, for  example, the Humanitarian Demining Program is authorized to provide  assistance to help strengthen war-torn countries to develop their resources  and improve their living standards. To fulfill this mission, this program  assists with the clearance of land mines and unexploded ordnance,  provides workshops and classes regarding mine safety for people living in  mine-affected regions, and funds research and training for those who run  mine action programs.
Detailed information on program authorizations and activities, program  implementation, and program funding by type of activity and recipient  country, as available, are provided in appendixes II (nonproliferation  programs), III (anti-terrorism programs), and IV (regional stability and  humanitarian assistance programs).
section_title: The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund Appears to Engage in Activities Beyond Expectations for the Scope of its Mission
paragraphs: The NDF preplans some activities and engages in longer-term activities,  including export control activities that, while authorized by law, appear to  be inconsistent with expectations for the scope of the program’s mission.  According to past language included in appropriations committee reports,  and both reiterated by the Secretary of State and incorporated into the  program’s mission statement, the NDF is expected to provide a flexible  funding source to respond to urgent, unanticipated nonproliferation  activities. Furthermore, the longer-term preplanned export control activity  supported by the NDF has been, and continues to be, developed and  implemented independently from the responsibilities and activities of  State’s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program,  which is responsible for assisting the development of export control  capabilities in other countries.
subsections: section_title: Past Appropriations Committee Report Language Provides Guidance for NDF Activities
paragraphs: The 1997 congressional conference report on the appropriations for foreign  operations for fiscal year 1998 included language that directed the NDF to  focus on funding “urgent, unanticipated nonproliferation activities of  immediate concern to the United States.” That conference report also  stated that “Longer term programmatic activities, such as export controls  ”, should be funded separately “outside of the NDF account”  so that they would be subject to normal legislative oversight and review.  Between 1996 and 2000, the House Appropriations Committee included  similar language in committee reports on foreign operations and related  appropriations. This congressional appropriations committee report  language, however, is not legally binding because it is not part of the  program’s statutory authorization. Moreover, the committee has not  included similar language since calendar year 2000. Nevertheless,  committee reports are a standard source of congressional guidance for  program operations. While appropriations reports apply to appropriations  for the applicable fiscal year, the NDF’s appropriations are available  indefinitely, instead of having to be returned to the U.S. Treasury at the end  of a fiscal year if not obligated by then.
In testimony before the Senate Committee on Appropriations’  Subcommittee on Foreign Operations in May 2001, the Secretary of State  reiterated the emergency response nature of the NDF by characterizing it  as a contingency rapid reaction fund, which can meet unanticipated  challenges and disperse funds quickly in support of urgent nonproliferation  objectives. Also, the NDF acknowledges the nature of the committee  report language in its mission statement. In its September 2003 annual  report, the program’s mission statement states that the NDF is a “sharply  focused fund to permit rapid response to unanticipated (or unusually  difficult), high priority requirements/opportunities” in the field of  nonproliferation. The “unusually difficult” part of the program’s mission,  however, emanates from the program and not language in past  congressional committee reports. According to a program official, there are  no clear parameters for defining what would constitute an “unusually  difficult” activity that warranted support from the NDF. That official stated  that a determination of “unusually difficult” is made on a case-by-case basis  without standardized formal assessment criteria.
section_title: Some NDF Activities May Not Be Consistent with Expectations for the Scope of the Program’s Mission
paragraphs: The NDF implements its nonproliferation responsibilities through activities  such as the removal and/or destruction of weapons and the conversion of  weapons testing facilities. However, some activities that the program  engages in appear to go beyond the scope of the program’s expected  activities. In particular, the NDF (1) preplans some programmatic  expenditures and (2) funds at least one major longer-term activity, which is  an export control activity.
Applying the criteria of “urgent, unanticipated…activities of immediate  concern” suggests that a program address urgent needs that generally arise  unexpectedly and are not preplanned. Yet the NDF earmarked at least half  of its fiscal year 2004 request of $35 million for preplanned and longer-term,  multiyear activities to include (1) $8.75 million for a Biological Weapons  Terrorism Initiative to help countries develop laws and regulations,  inventory existing materials, track the movement of existing materials, and  secure existing stock and (2) $8.75 million for the expansion and  deployment of an automated export control system called Tracker, which  has been under development and deployment by the NDF since 1994. And  for fiscal year 2005, at least 57 percent of the requested $34.5 million is for  preplanned activities, including $7.5 million for a Biological and Chemical  Weapons Terrorism Initiative, $5 million for a Nuclear and Radiological  effort, and $7 million for the Tracker automated export control system.
To use funds to engage in preplanned activities may result in these funds  being unavailable to respond to urgent, unanticipated events. For example,  Libya’s recent decision to divest itself of weapons of mass destruction has  generated an immediate response from the United States in facilitating that  divestiture. Because of the immediacy of the need, the NDF has now been  tasked to respond. But, according to program officials, as of March 2004,  the NDF was looking to curtail planned expenditures to release funding to  meet the urgent needs of the Libya situation. According to State, the NDF  now has sufficient money to handle its unanticipated requirements in  Libya.
The NDF also engages in at least one longer-term activity—development  and deployment of the Tracker automated export control system. Tracker  is a software system that helps countries process export control  applications by providing a central location for inputting, processing,  tracking, approving or denying, and reviewing export license applications.
The NDF has been paying for the initiation, development, and deployment  of this system since 1994, and has also funded, at its discretion, the  technical equipment to implement and operate the system. According to a  program official, as of February 2004, the Tracker system was operational  in nine countries—Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,  Romania, Slovakia, and Switzerland. Budget plans indicate significant  planned investment in further expansion of both the system’s capabilities  and the countries to which it is provided. In particular, the NDF’s fiscal year  2004 budget request preplanned $8.75 million to further enhance the  Tracker system by improving its ability to handle biological, chemical, and  radiological materials, and by expanding its deployment to South Asia and  the Middle East. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes another $7  million for the same effort.
Costs of the Tracker system have consumed a significant portion of the  NDF’s annual appropriation. As table 3 shows, those costs have ranged  from 21 percent of the appropriation level in fiscal year 1999 to as much as  32 percent in fiscal year 2003.
In addition, the Tracker system is an export control activity that the  language of congressional appropriations committee reports specifically  cited as an example of longer-term activities that the program should not be  funding. In 1996, the House Appropriations Committee report expressly  stated that the export control activities of the NDF, while worthwhile, did  not meet the committee’s criteria for the NDF to support only “urgent,  unanticipated nonproliferation activities of immediate concern to the  United States.” The 1997 conference report for fiscal year 1998  appropriations recommended that $3 million of NADR account funds be  used to support export control-related activities. State applied that $3  million toward the creation of the Export Control and Related Border  Security Assistance Program.
section_title: The Tracker System Is Developed Independently of State’s Export Control Program
paragraphs: The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund has developed and  implemented the Tracker automated export control system, and continues  to do so, independently from the responsibilities and activities of State’s  Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program. The  latter program conducts a comprehensive evaluation of the export control  capabilities in foreign countries, identifies deficiencies in those capabilities  including deficiencies in automated system capabilities, and funds  activities to resolve deficiencies. It has provided assistance to about 42  countries, including eight of the nine countries in which the Tracker system  is reported to be operational. According to State and Commerce officials, a  comprehensive export control capability generally includes such elements  as supporting laws, trained export control professionals, and implementing  policies and procedures. However, an official of the Export Control and  Related Border Security Assistance Program stated that the automated  Tracker system is not integrated into its program’s assessment of foreign  countries’ export control capabilities and deficiencies.
Department of Commerce officials who have participated in the  implementation of the Export Control and Related Border Security  Assistance Program expressed concern that the independent deployment  of the automated Tracker system may cause countries to mistakenly  believe that the Tracker system provides a comprehensive export control  capability rather than a single automated component of a comprehensive  export control system. Commerce officials noted that deploying any  automated export control system, such as the Tracker system, requires  careful consideration of a country’s current export control capabilities  overall.
section_title: Program Management Relies Less on Contracted Experts Than Project Implementation Does
paragraphs: The major NADR programs are managed primarily by full-time federal  employees. However, project implementation is generally performed by  experts from other U.S. government agencies who are also federal  employees, or by outside contractors. Both the number of contract  personnel for implementing projects, and the timeframe for project  implementation vary depending on the needs of the project.
subsections: section_title: Program Management Relies Primarily on Full- time Federal Employees
paragraphs: Program management offices for the major NADR programs consist mostly  of full-time federal employees. However, contract employees are also used  on a limited basis to assist with program management. The program  management personnel are primarily responsible for overall program  management rather than the implementation of projects funded by their  respective programs. Management responsibilities are generally comprised  of planning, oversight, and evaluation of program activities. Program  management staff develop projects to accomplish program objectives. As  table 4 illustrates, an average of 78.5 percent of program staff for the major  NADR programs were full-time federal employees in fiscal year 2003.
Except for the Terrorist Interdiction Program, all of the programs use  outside contract employees to assist with program management. The use of  contract staff for program management ranges from zero to 46 percent.  Officials from these programs indicated that, in general, the contract  employees are hired through annual, renewable personal service contracts.
section_title: NADR Programs Use Government Agencies and Other Experts to Implement Projects
paragraphs: Project implementation for the major NADR programs, in contrast with  general program management, is generally performed by experts, some of  whom may be federal employees contracted through other U.S.  government agencies to implement projects, and some of whom are  outside contractors. The NADR programs enter into interagency  agreements with other U.S. government agencies, provide grants to  international and nongovernmental organizations, and/or contract with  private companies in order to implement projects funded by the NADR  account. According to program officials, the NADR programs implement  projects through these mechanisms because those agencies, organizations,  and contractors have the expertise necessary to effectively implement the  projects.
To work through other U.S. government agencies to implement projects,  the major NADR programs generally enter into Interagency Acquisition  Agreements or Memorandums of Agreement/Understanding. These  agreements authorize the transfer of funds from the programming office to  the implementing agency and specify the work to be performed under the  agreement. Many of the NADR programs have entered into these  agreements with agencies and offices from the Departments of Defense,  Energy, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Justice, and  Agriculture, and the Environmental Protection Agency.
The number of contract personnel needed to implement a project varies by  project but can range, according to program officials, from as few as one  person to as many as several hundred. Project length also varies depending  on individual project requirements.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: There are differing expectations or interpretations about what the role of  the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund should be in responding to  nonproliferation objectives of the United States. Program management  implements a broad mission for the NDF, as permitted by law, that includes  not only the responsibility to provide a source of emergency response  funding, but also to engage in unusually difficult activities. The latter could  include longer-term efforts that may not be considered urgent,  unanticipated activities of immediate concern. However, the expectations  expressed in language in past congressional committee reports, and the  characterization of the NDF’s focus in testimony by the Secretary of State  before a Senate committee, describe a program mission that can be  expected to focus on the objective of providing emergency response  capability rather than engaging in longer-term programmatic activities such  as export controls. The discrepancy between these expectations and  permissible activities under the law would benefit from clarification of  congressional intent through legislation. In the light of such clarification,  program activities should be reassessed.
Furthermore, the NDF’s export control activities and the export control  activities in the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance  Program warrant evaluation, coordination, and integration. Having two  programs assisting the development of export control capabilities in other  countries from two separate approaches that are not integrated or  coordinated can result in duplication of effort and wasteful expenditure.
section_title: Recommendation
paragraphs: In this report, we are recommending that the Secretaries of State and  Commerce evaluate the extent to which the export control activities of the  Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and the Export Control and  Related Border Security Assistance Program are integrated and thus ensure  that recipient countries are receiving comprehensive assistance to improve  their export control systems.
section_title: Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: The Congress may want to consider conditioning future year funding  requests for the Tracker export control system until the Secretaries of State  and Commerce have determined whether the two systems should be  integrated.
The Congress may also want to consider clarifying through legislation its  intent with respect to the scope and direction of the NDF’s activities.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: State provided written comments on the draft report. These comments are  reprinted in appendix V. The department also provided technical  comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.
State concurred with our recommendation that the Tracker export control  program being developed and implemented by the NDF be integrated with  the export control activities of State’s Export Control and Related Border  Security Assistance Program.
The Department of State took exception, however, to our use of the term  “earmarking” in characterizing the plans delineated in the budget requests  of the NDF. The department states that it has not earmarked any funds of  the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund nor does it plan to do so in  future years. State notes that funds can only be committed through the  NDF’s review process. We understand that appropriated funds cannot be  committed for specific expenditures except through that process.  However, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund has informed the  Congress in its budget justifications that it designated requested  appropriations for the preplanned longer-term activities we cite in the  report, which is the point we are making.
The department also stated that it had more than sufficient funds to handle  the unanticipated nonproliferation requirements in Libya. Nevertheless, the  director of the NDF explicitly told us at a meeting on February 5, 2004, and  at the exit conference with the department on March 10, 2004, that the NDF  was searching for funds that could be de-obligated from approved activities  in order to cover the costs for its Libya activities. We have modified the  body of the report to state that according to State, the NDF now has  sufficient money to handle its unanticipated requirements in Libya.
The Department of State further stated that the NDF is not a contingency  fund awaiting opportunities. However, the Secretary of State specifically  characterized, in his testimony of May 15, 2001, before the Senate  Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, the NDF, as we note  in the report, as a “contingency rapid-reaction fund which can meet  unanticipated challenges and disperse funds quickly in support of urgent  nonproliferation objectives.” In addition, the Department of State stated it  often used the NDF to create opportunities, start new initiatives or  programs, and undertake unique and unusually difficult work. As we state  in the report, some of the NDF’s activities appear to go beyond  expectations for the scope of its mission. As a result, we have made a  matter for congressional consideration that, if desired, the legal authority  for the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund should be clarified  through legislation.
The Department of State commented that 1996 conference report language  reflected concerns about the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund  being the sole source of export control assistance funding, and that the  department responded to those concerns by creating an export control  assistance account in fiscal year 1998. However, the November 1997  appropriations conference committee report for fiscal year 1998  appropriations, specifically stated that “he conferees strongly support  the core nonproliferation activities of the NDF. The NDF is designed to  provide the Secretary of State with a flexible funding source to respond to  urgent, unanticipated nonproliferation activities of immediate concern to  the United States. Longer term programmatic activities, such as export  controls, should be funded separately outside of the NDF account and  therefore subject to the normal conditions for legislative oversight and  review. For this reason the conference agreement recommends that $3  million in NADR account funds be used to support export control related  activities.”
The Department of State also took exception to the report’s relegation of  the United States’ voluntary contribution to the International Atomic  Energy Agency to nonmajor status, although the department acknowledged  that we did not appear to intend to diminish the importance of the program.  As agreed with the department, we did not intend to diminish the  importance of this program, so we have revised the report language to  more appropriately reflect the importance of the U.S. contribution to the  International Atomic Energy Agency’s mission.
We also provided the Department of Commerce with a copy of the draft  report for its review and comment. Commerce stated that it had no  comments.
We conducted this review from August 2003 to March 2004 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Commerce. We  will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this  report will be available at no cost on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-8979 if you or your staff have any questions  about this report. Key contributors to this report were F. James Shafer,  Beverly Ann Bendekgey, Joseph Brown, John F. Miller, Joe Zamoyta, Mark  Dowling, Martin de Alteriis, and Lynn Cothern.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the legal authorizations for the programs funded through the  NADR account, and the extent to which the types of activities funded met  program authorizations, we obtained the statutory authorizations from  program officials and from our independent legal searches; we discussed  those authorizations with program officials and reviewed them to  determine if they were the statutes that applied to their respective  programs. We obtained from program officials information and related  documentation, as well as project data, on the types of activities funded by  the programs. We compared those types of activities with program  authorizations to determine if the activities funded were generally in  accord with the authorizations.
To determine the extent to which program management utilized outside  experts, we met with program officials responsible for implementing the  NADR programs to discuss, and obtain information and documentation on,  the composition of program management staff and the extent to which  programs utilized outside experts in project implementation. Program  managers provided us with information on each filled position on the  program staff and whether the position was filled with federal employees  or outside experts hired under contract.
To develop program funding histories for the report appendixes, we  obtained a 5-year funding history (fiscal years 1999 through 2003) of  individual projects for the major programs. We reviewed the reliability of  the project data provided by program officials by performing initial testing  of the funding data for completeness, consistency, and reasonableness. We  also interviewed program officials responsible for managing the data to  assess how the data are developed and maintained, including the security  of access to the data. We found the data sufficiently reliable for  representing program activities.
We conducted this review from August 2003 to March 2004 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Nonproliferation Programs Funded through the Department of State’s NADR Account
paragraphs: The Department of State’s nonproliferation programs funded through the  Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR)  account are designed to help achieve U.S. national security interests by  preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery  systems, and related materials. There are three major nonproliferation  programs funded through the NADR account: the Nonproliferation and  Disarmament Fund (NDF), the Export Control and Related Border Security  Assistance Program, and the Science Centers and Bio-Chem Redirection  Program, now referred to as the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass  Destruction Expertise Program. Each program operates within State’s  Bureau of Nonproliferation under the authority of the Undersecretary of  State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. In addition to  these three major programs, the NADR account also includes funding for  additional nonproliferation activities that are more narrowly focused.
State officials consider the voluntary contribution and programmatic  support to the International Atomic Energy Agency to be one of their more  important nonproliferation activities. While this contribution may have  received considerable levels of appropriations, we did not conduct in-depth  review of these activities because they were generally more specific in  scope than the three nonproliferation programs we reviewed in depth. The  International Atomic Energy Agency is discussed at the end of this  appendix.
subsections: section_title: Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
paragraphs: The NDF was established in 1992 to help (1) prevent the proliferation of  weapons of mass destruction and related materials, (2) destroy or  neutralize such weapons and materials, and (3) limit the spread of  advanced conventional weapons and their delivery systems by providing a  flexible funding source that could respond rapidly to nonproliferation  needs and activities. To meet its mission, the NDF can hold appropriated  funds until expended, and these funds can be expended notwithstanding  any other provision of law. The NDF may engage in certain activities  worldwide, while some authorized activities are restricted to countries that  were part of the former Soviet Union.
Table 5 provides detailed information on program authorization, activities,  and implementation. Table 6 provides data on program funding by type of  activity for fiscal years 1999 through 2003.
section_title: Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program
paragraphs: The Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program was  established as a separate program in 1998 to help prevent the proliferation  of weapons of mass destruction, their missile delivery systems,  conventional weapons, and related items and materials by (1) assisting  foreign governments to establish and implement effective export control  systems that meet international standards and (2) preventing transfers of  sensitive goods to other countries and terrorist networks. The program  cannot hold appropriated funds and must obligate funds within 1 year.
Table 7 provides detailed information on program authorization, activities,  and implementation. Table 8 provides data on program funding by  country—and table 9 by type of activity—for fiscal years 2000 through  2003.
section_title: Science Centers and Bio-Chem Redirection Program
paragraphs: The Science Centers and Bio-Chem Redirection Program pursues its  responsibilities through three main activities: (1) the Science Centers, (2)  the Bio-Chem Redirection Program, and (3) the BioIndustry Initiative. The  Science Centers program was established in 1992 in the Department of  Defense and transferred to the Department of State in 1996. Along with the  Bio-Chem Redirection Program, which was established in 1997, these  programs help prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by  (1) engaging former Soviet Union nuclear, biological, and chemical  weapons scientists in civilian research to prevent them from providing  expertise and weapons to other states and terrorist networks and (2)  countering the threat of bio-terrorism through transformation of former  Soviet weapons research and production facilities for civilian research. The  Science Centers and the Bio-Chem Redirection programs finance civilian  research by former Soviet weapons scientists as an alternative to their  providing their expertise to terrorist networks and other states.
The BioIndustry Initiative, which was established in 2002, helps  reconfigure large scale former Soviet biological weapons production  facilities to commercial uses, and engages former biological and chemical  weapons scientists in civilian research projects, such as developing drugs  and vaccines. Program activities are restricted to countries that were part  of the former Soviet Union, and funds must be obligated within 1 fiscal  year. Table 10 provides detailed information on program authorization,  activities, and implementation.
As noted above, the funding for the Science Centers effort goes to two  international science centers—the International Science and Technology  Center in Moscow, Russia, and the Science and Technology Center in Kiev,  Ukraine. Table 11 provides the funding history for these two centers for  fiscal years 1999 through 2003.
As noted above, the Bio-Chem Redirection effort funds projects through  other U.S. federal agencies. Table 12 provides the funding history for bio- chem redirection projects for fiscal years 1999 through 2003 by the agency  that implemented the projects.
The BioIndustry Initiative is a relatively new program, with initial funding  provided in fiscal year 2002. Slightly over 88 percent of the $30 million the  initiative provided that year went to the International Science and  Technology Center in Moscow, while the remaining nearly 12 percent went  to projects funded through the Civilian Research and Defense Fund, a  private organization that engages in activities similar to that of the science  center. In fiscal year 2003, $2 million was provided to the international  science center.
section_title: Additional Nonproliferation Programs Funded through the NADR Account
paragraphs: In addition to the three major programs, the NADR appropriations account  included funding for some additional nonproliferation activities that were  more narrowly focused. We did not conduct in-depth review of these  activities because they were generally more limited in scope than the  nonproliferation activities discussed above. The additional activities  include the following:  The International Atomic Energy Agency Voluntary Contribution  supplements the agency’s operating budget to help implement  strengthened nuclear safeguards measures, allow expansion in nuclear  safety cooperation with key countries, and combat nuclear and  radiological terrorism.
Funding to the International Monitoring System, which is part of the  Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, helps detect nuclear  explosions.
U.S. assistance to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development  Organization funded some administrative expenses and provided annual  shipments of heavy fuel oil to the Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea in lieu of the energy given up when the country froze its declared  nuclear facilities. The last funding provided for this activity occurred in  fiscal year 2003.
The United States provided a one-time voluntary contribution in fiscal  year 2002 to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,  which implements provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention that  banned the development, production, acquisition, and use of chemical  weapons by member states. U.S. assistance was limited to activities  mutually agreed to by the organization and the U.S. government to meet  exceptional needs, including (1) the conduction of additional industry  inspections, (2) improvements to a relational database for verification  planning and reporting, (3) outreach for implementation of legislation to  combat chemical terrorism, and (4) support of management and  planning functions of the organization.
section_title: Anti-terrorism Programs Funded through the Department of State’s NADR Account
paragraphs: The Department of State’s anti-terrorism programs funded through the  NADR account are designed to help achieve U.S. national security interests  by providing foreign countries with training and technical capabilities that  enhance their ability to prevent terrorist activities. There are two major  anti-terrorism programs funded through the NADR account: the Anti- terrorism Assistance Program and the Terrorist Interdiction Program. In  addition to these two major programs, the NADR account also includes  funding for additional anti-terrorism activities that are more narrowly  focused.
subsections: section_title: Anti-terrorism Assistance Program
paragraphs: The Anti-terrorism Assistance Program was established in 1983 in response  to the bombings of U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. The program is intended  to help prevent terrorist activities by providing training, equipment, and  advice to foreign countries to (1) enhance the anti-terrorism skills and  capabilities of foreign law enforcement and security officials to build the  capacity of key countries abroad to fight terrorism; (2) establish security  relationships between U.S. and foreign officials to strengthen cooperative  anti-terrorism efforts; and (3) share modern, humane, and effective anti- terrorism techniques. There is no geographic restriction on which  countries may participate in this program, and no time limit for the  expenditure of appropriated funds.
Table 13 provides detailed information on program authorization, activities,  and implementation. Table 14 provides data on program funding by country  for the fiscal years 1999 through 2003, while table 15 provides data on  program funding by type of activity for those same fiscal years.
section_title: Terrorist Interdiction Program
paragraphs: The Terrorist Interdiction Program was established in 2000 to help prevent  terrorist activities by enhancing the ability of foreign countries’ law  enforcement personnel to deter terrorists by (1) installing and maintaining  a computer database system in participant countries that allows border  control officials to quickly identify and either detain or track suspect  persons attempting to cross borders and (2) increasing countries’  capability to collect, compare, and analyze traveler data to increase  knowledge of terrorist movements. Country participation is not  geographically restricted.
Table 16 provides detailed information on program authorization, activities,  and implementation.
The Terrorist Interdiction Program primarily funded the installation and  maintenance of the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and  Evaluation System in several countries since fiscal year 2000. Table 17 lists  those countries and the expenditures for each country. The cost figures,  however, do not represent the funds provided to the countries or the sole  cost of equipment or services provided. The figures generally represent the  costs of software development, including contractor engineering labor,  hardware, travel expenses, and program administration associated with the  project for a particular country.
section_title: Additional Anti- terrorism Activities Funded through the NADR Account
paragraphs: In addition to the two major programs, the NADR appropriations account  included funding for some additional anti-terrorism activities that were  more narrowly focused. We did not conduct in-depth review of these  activities because they were generally more limited in scope than the  activities discussed above. The additional activities include the following:  Counterterrorism Engagement with Allies funds workshops and  conferences to help improve the capability of the United States and  interested governments to respond to terrorist incidents overseas  involving weapons of mass destruction. In fiscal year 2004, according to  agency officials, those activities will be funded through the Anti- terrorism Assistance Program.
The Israel Counterterrorism Assistance was a one-time emergency  funding in fiscal year 2002 to help replace the Israeli government’s law  enforcement bomb detection equipment that was destroyed during the  multiple terrorist attacks in 2001.
The United States provided a one-time payment in fiscal year 2001  through the NADR account to the government of the Netherlands in  support of the Lockerbie Trial to cover a portion of the costs of the  international trial of the suspects responsible for the 1988 terrorist  bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.
For fiscal year 2005, funds have been requested for the  Counterterrorism Financing Program that would provide training and  technical assistance to combat terrorist financing.
section_title: Regional Stability and Humanitarian Assistance Programs Funded through the Department of State’s NADR Account
paragraphs: The Department of State’s regional stability and humanitarian assistance  programs funded through the NADR account are designed to promote  peace and regional stability, as well as meet humanitarian needs in post- conflict situations.  These programs work to achieve U.S. national security  interests by supporting demining activities and the destruction of small  arms and light weapons in areas that have suffered from hostilities. There  are two major programs supporting regional stability and humanitarian  assistance: the Humanitarian Demining Program and the Small Arms/Light  Weapons Destruction Program.  The NADR account also includes funding  for an additional demining activity.
subsections: section_title: Humanitarian Demining Program
paragraphs: The Humanitarian Demining Program was established in 1997 to help  achieve U.S. regional stability and humanitarian assistance foreign policy  goals by (1) reducing land mine casualties worldwide; (2) developing  conditions that allow people in areas ravaged by hostilities to return home  in safety; (3) restoring land to productive use; (4) revitalizing commercial  infrastructure to restore economic health; and (5) extending U.S. bilateral,  regional, and international influence.  There is no geographic restriction for  program activities and appropriated funds are available until expended.
Table 18 provides detailed information on program authorization and  activities as well as program implementation.  Table 19 provides data on  program funding by country and type of activity for the fiscal years 1999  through the budget request for 2005.
section_title: Small Arms/Light Weapons Destruction Program
paragraphs: The Small Arms/Light Weapons Destruction Program was established in  2001 to support the destruction of surplus and illicit stocks of military small  arms and light weapons worldwide by funding programs that destroy easily  transportable weapons in other countries.  Small arms/light weapons  generally refers to military-style automatic rifles, machine guns, man- portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, rocket-propelled grenades, and  light mortars.  These weapons are a major source of arms for terrorists,  criminals, and violent insurgent groups.  There is no geographic restriction  for program activities and appropriated funds are available until expended.
Table 20 provides detailed information on program authorization and  activities as well as program implementation.  Table 21 provides data on  program funding by country for fiscal years 2001 through 2003.
section_title: Additional Regional Stability and Humanitarian Assistance Program Funded through the NADR Account
paragraphs: In addition, the NADR appropriations account included funding for an  additional activity.  The United Sates provides matching funds to the  Republic of Slovenia International Trust Fund for Mine Action and Victims’  Assistance for demining activities in the Balkan countries. We did not  conduct in-depth review of this activity because the U.S. role is more  limited in scope than in the activities discussed above.
section_title: Comments from the Department of State
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