Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of Systems Acquisition and the Transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System
Published: 2008-09-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), an interagency organization within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), was created to plan and coordinate research and development for the next generation air transportation system (NextGen). Transitioning to NextGen will require FAA to continue to acquire new air traffic control (ATC) systems on schedule and on budget. GAO's concerns about the size, complexity, and cost of FAA's acquisition of ATC systems led GAO to designate this issue as high-risk in 1995. NextGen includes system acquisitions but is a significantly larger initiative involving multiple federal agencies, such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which conducts aeronautics research and development for NextGen, and nonfederal aviation stakeholders, such as aviation equipment manufacturers, airports, and aircraft operators. GAO addressed (1) FAA's ATC systems acquisition activities, (2) key NextGen planning and transition issues, and (3) key challenges that FAA faces in implementing NextGen. GAO reviewed FAA's management processes and cost and schedule data for acquiring ATC systems, interviewed senior FAA, JPDO, and NASA officials, and 24 aviation stakeholders involved in NextGen. This report is also based on recent GAO products. The Department of Transportation (DOT) and NASA provided technical corrections, which GAO included.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The majority of FAA's key ATC acquisition programs are currently being managed within the established cost and time estimates since FAA created the performance-based Air Traffic Organization (ATO) in 2004 and improved its management of acquisitions. The agency has demonstrated executive-level commitment to addressing systemic factors that have contributed to historic cost overruns and schedule delays. FAA's response to over 45 recommendations by GAO contributed to significantly improved acquisition management. While FAA has implemented numerous acquisition management practices, areas remain that need further improvement, such as ensuring transparency on rebaselined programs. FAA plans to address this issue by reporting annually to Congress the original budget and schedule baselines and the reasons for the rebaselining. FAA needs to continue its progress in managing acquisitions, since it will be acquiring billions of dollars of new systems as part of the NextGen transformation. JPDO has completed the initial versions of three basic planning documents for NextGen, but many aviation stakeholders felt the documents, which focus on a 2025 time frame, lack the information that industry needs to make near-term business decisions to support NextGen. The next version of the NextGen work plan, scheduled to be issued in September 2008, will address some of these concerns. ATO recently reorganized to facilitate the transition to NextGen, but it is too early to tell if the reorganization addresses concerns about the fragmented management structure for NextGen, since multiple offices in ATO and FAA continue to have responsibility for NextGen. FAA's ability to implement NextGen will be affected by how it addresses research and development, human capital, and infrastructure challenges. Although research and development are critical for NextGen, research gaps exist because of a recent decline in NASA's aeronautical research funding and the expanded requirements of NextGen. FAA faces a human capital challenge of having the necessary knowledge and skills, such as contract management and system engineering expertise, to implement NextGen. In response to GAO's prior recommendation, in September 2008, FAA expects to complete an analysis comparing the skills needed for NextGen with its current staff resources. However, it may take considerable time to hire what FAA estimates could be up to 200 more staff with the needed skills. FAA also faces the challenge of maintaining and repairing existing ATC infrastructure, such as radar stations, while consolidating or realigning its facilities to accommodate NextGen technologies and operations. An additional infrastructure challenge is increasing airport runway capacity to handle the expected increases in traffic. While FAA's plans call for building or expanding runways at the nation's 35 busiest airports, its analyses indicate that 14 more airports will still need additional runway capacity. These efforts to expand capacity by means of runway development could be delayed without significant reductions in emissions and noise around some airports.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The nation’s air transportation system is experiencing some of the worst  delays in recent times with one in four flights facing delays. Currently, the  U.S. air transportation system handles about 50,000 flights over a 24-hour  period. By 2025, air traffic is projected to increase two- to three-fold,  equating to about 100,000 to 150,000 flights every 24 hours. It is  acknowledged that the current U.S. air transportation system will not be  able to meet these air traffic demands. In 2007, the aviation industry  recorded the second worst year for delays since 1995; 27 percent of flights  were delayed or canceled in 2007. According to the Senate Joint Economic  Committee these delays cost passengers, airlines, and the U.S. economy  over $40 billion. Although air traffic overall was down in the first half of  2008, in part because of economic factors that have led airlines to reduce  service, there has been no significant reduction in traffic at the most  congested airports, such as those in the New York and New Jersey area.  Congestion and delays at key airports cascade across the entire system.  Moreover, according to FAA, even if traffic is reduced, congestion at these  key airports will not be significantly reduced.
To try to reduce system congestion, FAA is in the process of implementing  a number of initiatives, such as redesigning airspace in certain locations to  improve efficiency, to try to alleviate choke points in the system. However,  the existing air traffic control (ATC) system is not scalable to meet the  forecasted traffic increases. To meet this expected increase in traffic, the  Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) was established by  Congress in 2003 to plan and coordinate an interagency effort to create a  new air traffic management system that will transform the current radar- based ATC system into a more automated aircraft-centered, satellite-based  system. This transformation to the next generation air transportation  system (NextGen) will require the acquisition and integration of billions of  dollars of sophisticated new ATC technologies with existing or legacy ATC  technologies as well as a major shift in the operating paradigm from air  traffic control to air traffic management by 2025.
You asked us to assess FAA’s ability to acquire and integrate new ATC  systems and transition to NextGen. Accordingly, we established the  following research questions: (1) What are the status and outcome of  FAA’s ATC systems acquisition activities? (2) What is the status of the key  NextGen planning and transition issues? (3) What key challenges does  FAA face in implementing NextGen?
To address these questions, we reviewed documents from FAA, JPDO, and  the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In addition,  we held discussions with senior FAA, JPDO, and NASA officials;  interviewed 24 private sector stakeholders involved in the NextGen effort,  including representatives of aviation associations, manufacturers, and  academics; and updated prior GAO studies. To address key NextGen  planning and transition issues and challenges to implementation, we  interviewed the 24 NextGen stakeholders and conducted a content  analysis of their responses. We then obtained further information related  to those responses from relevant NextGen federal partners—FAA, JPDO,  and NASA. We did not obtain further information from the other federal  partners—the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and Homeland  Security and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy  because the stakeholders did not articulate issues related to those  agencies. We conducted our performance audit from July 2007 to  September 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional  information on our methodology is found in appendix I. See appendix II  for our content analysis of the stakeholder interviews.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: For over two decades FAA has been conducting a major modernization of  its ATC systems but, until the last several years, has had difficulties in  meeting cost, schedule, and performance targets in acquiring major  systems. In 1995, GAO designated the ATC modernization program as a  high-risk information technology initiative because of its size, complexity,  cost, and problem-plagued past. We have issued numerous reports on  FAA’s inability to meet its acquisition performance goals. In addition, we  have reported that four key factors have historically contributed to  acquisitions missing their original cost, schedule, and performance targets:  (1) acquisitions receiving less funding than called for in agency planning  documents, (2) adding requirements or unplanned work,                             (3) underestimating the complexity of software development, and (4) not  sufficiently involving stakeholders throughout system development.
FAA, in response to over 45 recommendations we have made, has taken  steps to improve its acquisition management. For example, when  reviewing acquisitions, FAA now focuses on the acquisition’s impact on  customer service and contribution to achieving the agency’s strategic and  performance goals, including expanding the overall capacity of the  national airspace system, rather than on securing the approval of and  managing individual acquisition programs. FAA has also established basic  investment management capabilities, including many practices for  selecting and controlling its mission-critical information technology  investments. Our previous work showed that FAA was not regularly  reviewing investments that are more than 2 years into their operations. As  a result, FAA was limited in its ability to oversee, as a total package of  competing investment options, more than $1 billion of its information  technology investments, and to pursue only those that best meet its goals.  As a response to our recommendation, FAA stated that it had changed its  acquisition review process to a semiannual “service-level review” process  that encompasses systems that are in service. Additionally, FAA has  changed its format for justifying major technology investments to that  prescribed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). According to  FAA, this change provides more comprehensive information than the  previous format and provides efficiencies by avoiding the need to later  translate the information into OMB’s prescribed format.
In August 2005, FAA submitted a plan to OMB of steps it intended to take  to remove ATC modernization from GAO’s high-risk list. FAA submitted  this plan in response to a request from OMB, which had asked agencies  with programs on GAO’s high-risk list to identify their goals for reducing  fraud, waste, or mismanagement.
In addition to our recommendations and those of the Department of  Transportation Inspector General for improving FAA’s acquisition  management, Congress and others have taken steps to address these  issues. For example, in 1997, the congressionally appointed National Civil  Aviation Review Commission recommended, among other things, that  FAA’s management become more performance-based. In December 2000,  President Clinton signed an executive order, and Congress passed  supporting legislation that, together, provided FAA with the authority to  create the performance-based ATO to control and improve FAA’s  management of the modernization effort. FAA reorganized, transferring  36,000 employees, most of whom worked in air traffic services and  research and acquisitions, to ATO in February 2004. By creating ATO,  headed by a chief operating officer, FAA established a new, flatter  organizational structure and adopted more leading practices of private  sector businesses to address the cost, schedule, and performance  shortfalls that have plagued ATC acquisitions.
In 2003, Congress mandated the creation of JPDO, housed within FAA but  involving several federal partner agencies, for the agencies to  conceptualize and plan for NextGen. The previous ATC modernization  program largely consisted of FAA’s efforts to acquire more sophisticated  ATC equipment with a 10-year planning horizon. NextGen also includes  the acquisition of ATC systems. Moreover, NextGen is a multidecade,  multiagency effort to transform the current air traffic system to the next  generation air transportation system by moving from largely ground-based  radars to precision satellite-based navigation and includes digital,  networked communications and an integrated weather system. NextGen  involves the coordinated research activities of multiple federal agencies,  including NASA, FAA, and the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and  Homeland Security. To achieve the NextGen vision, JPDO was charged  with coordinating research activities of the federal agencies in developing  the 20-year research and development program for NextGen. FAA will play  the central role in implementing NextGen, as it will be responsible for  acquiring, integrating, and operating the new ATC systems. Industry  stakeholders will also play a key role in implementing NextGen because  they are expected to develop, finance, and operate many of the new  NextGen systems that will need to be installed in aircraft. JPDO reported  in 2006 that the total cost for NextGen infrastructure may range from   $15 billion to $22 billion. The agency also noted that it expects a  corresponding cost to system users, who will have to equip themselves  with the advanced avionics necessary to realize the full benefits of some  NextGen technologies, in the range of $14 billion to $20 billion.
section_title: Most Acquisition Programs Are Meeting Cost and Schedule Estimates since the Creation of ATO
paragraphs: Since the creation of ATO in 2004, FAA has shown significant  improvement in its management of ATC modernization through better  acquisitions management and the introduction of more efficient business  practices. FAA has demonstrated executive-level commitment to  addressing the systemic factors that we have identified as contributing to  FAA’s historic cost overruns and schedule delays. Since 2004, many more  acquisition programs are being completed within the original cost and  time estimates than prior to ATO’s existence. FAA data show that from  February 2004 to June 2008, 24 major acquisition programs experienced a  cumulative 2.5 percent cost underage and a cumulative 2.7 percent  schedule overage. Of the 24 programs, 19 were at or less than the baseline  cost estimate and 15 were at or earlier than the baseline schedule  estimate. However, the two programs with the largest reductions in cost— Airport Surveillance Radar Model 11 and FSAS Operations and  Supportability System—also had large reductions in the number of  systems to be acquired. Additional information on the 24 programs is shown  in appendix III.
A specific example of a successful acquisition management outcome is  ATO’s success in keeping the En Route Automation Modernization  (ERAM)—considered the heart of the new ATC system—acquisition on  schedule and close to budget. The ERAM acquisition began in 2003, a few  months before FAA formed ATO. ERAM replaces the software and  hardware in the host computers at FAA’s 20 en route ATC centers, which  provide separation, routing, and advisory information to aircraft. We and  the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General identified ERAM as  a high-risk effort because of its size and complex software requirements.  According to FAA, ERAM has met its original schedule and has remained  close to its original budget. Officials in the ERAM program office attribute  the program’s success to a number of factors, including having a thorough  understanding of the project’s requirements and costs prior to establishing  a baseline, imposing disciplined requirements control, having early  stakeholder involvement, and having a stable budget. Our research has  shown that the absence of these factors contributed to past problems in  acquisitions achieving cost and schedule targets. ERAM officials also  noted benefits from ATO’s flatter organizational structure and the  consolidation of responsibility for acquisitions and operations under a  single manager, the COO. They said, for example, that the elimination of  organizational stovepipes has allowed important conversations to take  place without going through several layers of administration. These  officials also noted that working under the former organizational structure  was much more difficult.
The positive cost and schedule outcomes have occurred subsequent to  ATO’s improved acquisition management practices. More specifically, to  better manage its acquisitions, ATO has done the following:    Established a portfolio approach to managing investments. This approach  allows ATO to evaluate the relative merits of spending funds to develop  new systems, enhance current systems, or continue operating and  maintaining existing systems.
Applied a business case approach to each project, which includes an  analysis of assumptions, constraints, and alternatives to the project, and  for each alternative, the full life cycle cost, benefit, schedule, risk, and  economics.
Established a capital investment team to review financial and performance  data. These reviews provide early warnings of potential problems as well  as help to develop corrective actions.
Implemented earned value management on all new major acquisitions as a  way to prevent, detect, report, and correct problems in acquiring major  systems and to ensure that major programs are within budget and  schedule targets. While ATO has taken important steps to implement  earned value management policies, we have found that it needs to  strengthen its policies governing earned value management and add rigor  to its oversight processes.
Developed and applied a process improvement model in a number of  software-intensive system acquisitions, resulting in, among other things,  enhanced productivity and greater ability to predict schedules and  resource needs.
Undertaken human capital initiatives to improve its acquisition workforce  culture and build toward a results-oriented, high-performing organization.
Established annual acquisition performance goals to improve oversight  and accountability over acquisition processes.
Additionally, agency executives have met regularly with GAO and OMB  over the past 2 years to provide updates on FAA’s efforts to improve its  handling of ATC modernization and ensure transparency about these  efforts both inside and outside the agency. These meetings have included  updates on the status of a corrective action plan that FAA is implementing  to institutionalize sound acquisition management practices and successful  performance and outcomes. FAA is also working to establish an internal  oversight capability to validate the information that executives receive on  the status of the plan. OMB has seen sufficient progress in FAA’s efforts to  address the risk associated with ATC modernization that the meetings now  occur semiannually, rather than quarterly.
While FAA has made progress in improving acquisition management  practices in the 4 years since ATO was created, areas remain that need  further improvement. For example, in prior work we found that FAA does  not publicly report changes in the cost and schedule baselines for some  major ATC acquisitions and thus may not provide Congress and the public  with a complete picture of the agency’s overall performance in acquiring  these systems. Such unreported rebaselining could make budget increases  and schedule delays more difficult to identify. For instance, for fiscal years  2004 through 2006, FAA reported exceeding its annual goals to keep a high  percentage of the major acquisition programs within 10 percent of budget  and on schedule 80 percent of the time. However, we found that FAA  measures progress related only against current program baselines and  does not disclose when a system has been rebaselined (when cost and  schedule targets have been officially changed). According to ATO’s  performance reports, the organization showed nearly steady improvement  in fiscal years 2003 through 2006 and substantially exceeded its targets for  those years, twice reaching 100 percent. However, when performance was  measured against original baselines instead of annual budgets or  milestones, acquisition performance was lower than reported, but still  showed a general trend of improvement for that period. We believe that  rebaselining may be appropriate in some cases and that measuring  performance against the current baseline has value. However, annual  measurements for acquisitions that have been rebaselined and span  several years do not provide a complete picture of acquisition  performance over time.
In addition, based on original cost and schedule baselines, the acquisitions  on which FAA reported performance from 2003 to 2006 collectively  exceeded their original budget estimates by approximately $4.4 billion, or  over 66 percent, and experienced schedule slippages of from 1 to 10 years.  The Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (see fig. 1) and  the Wide Area Augmentation System—both key NextGen systems— accounted for most of the budget increase. The acquisition of both of  these systems began in the mid- to late 1990s, well before the  establishment of ATO. (See app. IV for a baseline history of the acquisition  programs FAA selected for performance measurement.)
In December 2007, we recommended that FAA identify or establish a  vehicle for regularly reporting to Congress and the public on the agency’s  overall, long-term performance in acquiring ATC systems by providing  original budget and schedule baselines for each rebaselined program and  the reasons for the rebaselining. We also recommended that FAA report  information on the potential effects that any budget increases or schedule  slippages could have on the overall transition to NextGen. FAA plans to  address our recommendation by reporting such information in its Capital  Improvement Plan, which it sends annually to Congress.
FAA will need to continue to manage the acquisition of billions of dollars  worth of new ATC systems as NextGen progresses. FAA plans to spend  roughly $5.4 billion from fiscal years 2009 through 2013 on NextGen  development and capital costs. The agency estimates that the total federal  cost for NextGen infrastructure through 2025 will range from $15 billion to          $22 billion. Therefore, it is now more important than ever for FAA to  continue to maintain progress and avoid cost overruns and schedule  delays, since they could have a cascading impact on the cost and schedule  of NextGen.
section_title: Basic Planning for NextGen Is Completed and ATO Has Reorganized as It Transitions to NextGen, but Stakeholders Have Concerns
paragraphs: Congress authorized JPDO to plan and coordinate the development of  NextGen and placed JPDO organizationally within FAA. JPDO initially  prepared three basic planning documents for NextGen—a Concept of  Operations, an Enterprise Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan.  Collectively, the three documents form the basis of the joint planning  environment for NextGen. Further iterations of these planning documents  will be needed as NextGen technologies are developed and implemented.  As NextGen has now progressed from the initial planning to the early  implementation phase, JPDO’s role has evolved to include coordination  and facilitation among the numerous federal and industry stakeholders,  JPDO has sought to institutionalize the collaborative process with partner  federal agencies by establishing a memorandum of understanding (MOU),  signed by the secretary or other high-ranking official from each partner  agency that broadly defines the partner agency’s roles and responsibilities.  As of June 2008, the MOU had been signed by all five partner agencies— the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, and  Transportation and NASA. For the transition to NextGen, ATO has  undergone a reorganization to facilitate its critical role in implementing  NextGen. However, stakeholders have raised concerns about their lack of  impact on NextGen planning, the usefulness of key planning documents,  and the adequacy of FAA’s management structure, including the  organizational placement of JPDO, for implementing NextGen.
subsections: section_title: Stakeholders Are Not Satisfied with their Participation in NextGen Planning or the Information Provided in NextGen Planning Documents
paragraphs: Thirteen of 15 industry stakeholders who discussed the issue raised  concerns over what they perceive as a lack of impact on NextGen planning  from their participation in the NextGen effort so far. Stakeholders can  provide input into NextGen planning through participation in JPDO  working groups and the NextGen Institute. JPDO’s organizational  structure includes nine working groups that were created to bring  together federal and nonfederal experts to plan for and coordinate the  development of NextGen systems. Similarly, the NextGen Institute was  established to incorporate the expertise of industry, state and local  governments, and academia into the NextGen planning process. The  Institute Management Council, composed of top agency officials and  representatives from the aviation community, oversees the policy,  recommendations, and products of the institute and provides a means for  advancing consensus positions on critical NextGen issues. All of the  stakeholders we interviewed, with the exception of stakeholders from an  FAA employee union—the Professional Aviation Safety Specialists  (PASS)—indicated that they participated in NextGen planning and  development activities as members of various JPDO working groups, as  members of the Institute Management Council, or by serving as  consultants to FAA. Stakeholders from the National Air Traffic Controllers  Association (NATCA)—another FAA employee union—indicated that  while the union does participate in FAA meetings and briefings related to  NextGen, their status is that of a recipient of information rather than an  equal party with other stakeholders on the development of NextGen.
While 21 of 22 stakeholders who discussed the issue felt that they were  provided the opportunity to participate in NextGen planning, many were  not satisfied with the impact of their participation on NextGen planning or  with the outcomes of their participation. Some stakeholders said that they  frequently attended meetings, but were frustrated by the lack of tangible  products being developed and lack of progress being made during these  meetings. Thirteen of 15 stakeholders who discussed the issue stated that  they did not feel that their level of participation in NextGen allowed for  sufficient or meaningful input toward decision making. Some stakeholders  expressed concern that JPDO and FAA did not include their input in the  development of planning documents and other products and that critical  issues are not being addressed or incorporated in NextGen plans. In  particular, some stakeholders noted that planning documents were drafted  by JPDO staff and then provided to them for review and comment. By  doing so, one industry stakeholder noted that JPDO was not taking full  advantage of their capabilities. Some stakeholders also suggested  examining the types of industry players involved with JPDO and how they  contribute, indicating that certain types of expertise may not be  represented, such as avionics experience.
In addition, a number of stakeholders as well as members of Congress  have expressed concerns with the key NextGen planning documents being  developed by JPDO and FAA—JPDO’s Concept of Operations, Enterprise  Architecture, and Integrated Work Plan and FAA’s implementation plan  for NextGen (a document previously known as the Operational Evolution  Partnership (OEP) and now called the NextGen Implementation Plan).  Nineteen of 21 industry stakeholders who discussed the issue said that the  planning documents lack the information that industry participants need  for planning. Many of the stakeholders we interviewed said that while the  planning documents provide a high-level view of NextGen benefits, they  do not provide specific details such as a catalog of critical needs, clearly  defined and prioritized intermediate objectives, and a structured plan for  achieving tangible results. According to aviation manufacturing  stakeholders, the plans lack specific details to inform them about the type  of technology they need to design for NextGen or provide insights to  market, build, and install systems that support NextGen. A senior JPDO  official noted, however, that the JPDO planning documents were not  intended to provide that level of detail. Some industry stakeholders further  noted that the current planning does not identify all of the needed  research, establish priorities for research and development, or show how  to obtain those results. We agree that the latest publicly available versions  of these documents lack information that various stakeholders need. For  example, the documents do not include key elements such as scenarios  illustrating NextGen operations, a summary of NextGen’s operational  impact on users and other stakeholders, and an analysis of the benefits,  alternatives, and trade-offs that were considered for NextGen. However,  the next version of the Integrated Work Plan, which JPDO plans to release  at the end of September 2008, has schedule information that has been  updated to reflect newly available information, coordination with FAA  schedule and plans, and revisions in response to public comments  received on the previous version, according to JPDO and FAA officials.  Our review of the upcoming version—which is an automated, searchable  database—verified that it will have the capability to track dates and  identify programs that are behind schedule. In addition, the new version is  able to identify programs, policies, or research that must be completed  before specific NextGen capabilities can be implemented as well as  identify whether industry or a specific federal agency is responsible for  completing the action. Agency officials expect subsequent versions of the  work plan to include cost information, which we believe will enhance the  work plan’s usefulness for NextGen oversight.
In addition, a key intended purpose of these planning documents,  according to JPDO officials, is to provide the means for coordinating  among the partner agencies and private sector manufacturers, aligning  relevant research and development activities, and integrating equipment.  However, as mentioned previously, 19 of 21 stakeholders who discussed  the issue said that the planning documents did not provide guidance for  their organizational decision making. For example, some of the  stakeholders noted that neither the JPDO planning documents nor FAA’s  NextGen Implementation Plan provide information on the requirements or  specifications needed to develop and manufacture NextGen equipment or  anticipate the changes resulting from the implementation of NextGen. As a  result, some stakeholders believe that FAA should develop an interim  architecture (a technical road map) that provides sufficient detail about  what can be accomplished by 2015. This interim document would help  bridge the gap between current systems and plans for the future and  would help stakeholders plan for the investments that they will need to  make in NextGen systems. According to FAA, it has updated its enterprise  architecture for the national airspace system and plans to do so annually.  According to the agency, the current version of the enterprise architecture  reflects NextGen and is being revised to reflect the fiscal year 2009 budget  submission and the budget planning time frame of fiscal years 2010  through 2013. However, FAA noted that the level of detail that some  stakeholders asked for, such as specifications to develop and manufacture  NextGen equipment, will not be available for projects that are still in the  concept development and investment analysis phase.
In addition, the Senate Appropriations Committee has expressed concern  that the JPDO planning documents lack details on how the various  NextGen initiatives will reduce delays and congestion between now and  2025. It would have FAA and JPDO include in future budget justifications  and NextGen planning documents a full explanation and quantitative  estimate of how much each new capability will reduce congestion,  increase capacity, and decrease delays; an explanation of how the data  was modeled and compiled; and a time frame for when these capacity  improvements and delay reduction measures will start to relieve  congestion.
section_title: Stakeholders Have Had Concerns over FAA’s Overall Management Structure for NextGen and the Organizational Placement of JPDO
paragraphs: Many stakeholders had concerns about the adequacy of FAA’s  management structure for NextGen prior to the May 2008 reorganization  of ATO, but that reorganization did not address all of their concerns. All   10 stakeholders who discussed the issue viewed FAA’s 2007 management  structure as not adequate for the transition to NextGen. In addition, 13 of  15 stakeholders who discussed the issue felt that FAA did not have the  leadership in place for the transition to NextGen. Prior to May 2008, the  executive responsible for developing and overseeing the OEP—FAA’s  implementation plan for NextGen—was one of nine FAA vice presidents  who report to the COO of FAA’s ATO, who, in turn, reports directly to the  FAA Administrator. Other ATO vice presidents are responsible for  NextGen-related activities in their designated areas, such as en route,  oceanic, and terminal services. In addition, the FAA executives  responsible for airports and aviation safety issues—areas that also  encompass NextGen-related activities—are associate administrators who  report through the Deputy FAA Administrator to the FAA Administrator.  Thus, while some of the activities for which the other vice presidents and  associate administrators are responsible are significant to NextGen’s  implementation, there was no direct line of authority between the Vice  President for Operations Planning Services and these activities. Figure 2  shows FAA’s management structure as of November 2007.
To address the inadequacy they saw in the management structure for  NextGen, some stakeholders we spoke with called for the establishment of  a NextGen management position or program office that would report  directly to the FAA Administrator to ensure accountability for NextGen  results. Some of these stakeholders expressed frustration that a program  as large and important as NextGen does not follow the industry practice of  having one person designated with the authority to make key decisions.  They pointed out that although FAA’s COO is nominally in charge of FAA’s  NextGen efforts, the COO must also manage the agency’s day-to-day air  traffic operations and may therefore be unable to devote enough time and  attention to managing NextGen. In addition, these stakeholders noted that  many of NextGen’s capabilities span FAA operational units whose heads  are at the same organizational level as the Vice President for Operations  and Planning Services or are outside ATO all together. Thus, they believed  that a position or office above the Vice President for Operations and  Planning Services and the other operational units is needed. In prior work,  we have found that programs can be implemented most efficiently when  managers are empowered to make critical decisions and are held  accountable for results.
In addition, over the last several years questions have been raised by  members of Congress and stakeholders about the appropriateness of  JPDO’s placement within FAA and its dual reporting to both the FAA  Administrator and the COO of ATO. We have reported that JPDO’s dual  reporting status hinders its ability to interact on equal footing with ATO  and other federal agencies. On one hand, JPDO must counter the  perception that it is a proxy for ATO and, as such, cannot act as an “honest  broker.” On the other hand, JPDO must continue to work with ATO and  the other federal agencies in a partnership in which ATO is the lead  implementer of NextGen. Therefore, we reported that it is important for  JPDO to have some independence from ATO and suggested that one  change that could begin to address this issue would be to have the JPDO  Director report directly to the FAA Administrator. Such a change may also  lessen what some stakeholders perceive as unnecessary bureaucracy and  red tape associated with decision making and other JPDO and NextGen  activities.
In May 2008, FAA announced a reorganization of its NextGen management  structure and named a Senior Vice President for NextGen and Operations  Planning who reports to the COO. According to ATO’s COO, a purpose for the  reorganization was to respond to industry stakeholders concerns about the  fragmentation of authority over NextGen within FAA by creating one “team”  that included NextGen implementation, planning, and oversight with one  identified person in charge. According to FAA, the Senior Vice President for  NextGen and Operations Planning is responsible for integrating and  implementing all elements of NextGen, most of which are executed by other  FAA offices within and outside of ATO. The NextGen Senior Vice President  also has authority over the allocation of the entire $5.4 billion NextGen  budget requested for fiscal years 2009 through 2013, no matter where that  budget is spent within FAA. However, it is too early to tell if this  reorganization sufficiently addresses concerns raised by stakeholders about  the fragmented management structure for NextGen since other executives  continue to have responsibility for parts of NextGen mentioned earlier in this  report, and the division of responsibility for NextGen efforts among the senior  vice presidents and associate administrators is not clear.  A senior FAA  executive noted that internal ATO executives are knowledgeable and  supportive of the reorganization, but that the agency could better  communicate the changes to stakeholders outside of FAA.  A focused  outreach to industry stakeholders would help to get their buy-in and support  of FAA’s efforts.
In addition, as part of this reorganization, JPDO is now housed within the new  NextGen and Operations Planning Office and reports through the Senior Vice  President for Next and Operations Planning only to ATO’s COO. Now that  JPDO is no longer a separate, independent office within FAA and no longer  reports directly to the FAA Administrator, its organizational position within  FAA has declined. This placement of JPDO also does not address a concern  expressed by eight industry stakeholders who told us that the previous  authority structure between FAA and JPDO—with JPDO reporting directly to  both the COO and the Administrator—was not adequate for the transition to  NextGen. Moreover, proposed legislation reauthorizing FAA would elevate  the Director of JPDO to the Associate Administrator for the Next  Generation Air Transportation System, appointed by and reporting directly  to the FAA Administrator. We believe the proposed legislation comes closer  to addressing concerns raised by stakeholders than ATO’s action. In addition,  the proposed legislation would address observations we have made about  JPDO’s organizational placement within FAA. (Fig. 3 shows ATO after the  May 2008 reorganization.)
According to FAA’s NextGen Implementation Plan, under this new  structure, JPDO will focus on long-term planning and cross-agency  cooperation. Other offices within the NextGen and Operations Planning  Office will carry out other aspects of implementing and planning for  NextGen. It is too early to tell how the reorganization will affect JPDO’s  overall role or its ability to coordinate and act as an honest broker among  the federal partners. According to a senior ATO official, the placement of  JPDO with the NextGen and Operations Planning Office was discussed  with the NextGen partner federal agencies prior to the announcement of  the reorganization, and no objections to the move were expressed.
section_title: FAA’s Ability to Implement and Obtain Expected Benefits from NextGen Will Be Affected by Research and Development, Human Capital, and Infrastructure Challenges
paragraphs: A number of areas are central to FAA’s ability to implement NextGen and  thus realize the safety and efficiency gains that are expected for the nation’s  air transportation system. Applied research and development are important  for implementation because they will help to reduce risk by better defining  and demonstrating new capabilities, setting parameters for the certification of  new systems, and informing decisions about the later transfer of systems to  industry for deployment into the national airspace system. However, it is  uncertain which entities will fund and conduct the research and development  needed for NextGen. The research and development of some new  technologies and procedures have reached the point in which they can be  demonstrated in the national airspace. FAA has only recently initiated a  project to deploy available NextGen technologies simultaneously in Florida to  better demonstrate their capabilities and interrelationships. In addition, a  human capital challenge to FAA’s implementation of NextGen will be having  personnel with the appropriate knowledge, skills, and training. Furthermore,  to fully realize NextGen capabilities, a new configuration of ATC facilities and  enhanced runway capacity will be required.
subsections: section_title: Research and Development Funding Uncertainties and Research Gaps Exist
paragraphs: In the past, NASA performed a significant portion of aeronautics research  and development. However, NASA’s aeronautics research budget has been  declining since the mid-1990s. As shown in figure 4, NASA’s aeronautics  research budget declined from about $959 million in 2004 to $511 million  in 2008. While NASA still plans to focus some of its research on NextGen  needs, the agency has moved toward a focus on fundamental research and  away from developmental work and demonstration projects. As a result, in  some cases, NASA’s research focuses on developing technologies to a  lower—and therefore less readily adopted—maturity level than in the past.  According to NASA officials, about $280 million of its proposed              $447 million aeronautics research budget proposed for fiscal year 2009  would contribute to NextGen efforts. Ten industry stakeholders told us  that the “research gap” left by NASA’s declining aeronautics research  budget needs to be addressed.
FAA has also determined that research gaps now exist as a result of both  the administration’s cuts to NASA’s aeronautics research funding and the  expanded requirements of NextGen. Budget requests for FAA have  increased to help provide the needed research and development funding  for NextGen. According to FAA, the agency will spend an estimated   $740 million on NextGen-related research and development during fiscal  years 2009 through 2013. The administration’s proposed budget for fiscal  year 2009 requests $56.5 million for FAA research and development to  support the integration and implementation of NextGen programs, a  substantial increase over the $24.3 million authorized for fiscal year 2008.  The actual and projected increases in FAA’s overall research and  development funding (see fig. 5) reflect the expected increases in NextGen  research funding.
One critical area in which a research and development gap has been  identified is the environmental impact of aviation. According to a JPDO  analysis, environmental impacts will be the primary constraint on the  capacity and flexibility of the national airspace system unless these  impacts are managed and mitigated. In proposed legislation reauthorizing  FAA, $111 million for fiscal years 2009 through 2011 may be used for a new  FAA program to help close the research and development gap and reduce  aviation noise and emissions. This program—the Continuous Lower  Energy, Emissions, and Noise (CLEEN) initiative—would facilitate over  the next 10 years the development, maturation, and certification of  improved airframe technologies. The CLEEN program, in which NASA  would participate as an adviser, is intended to address the gap between  NASA’s fundamental research in noise reduction and the need for near- term demonstrations of technology. The program would establish a  research consortium of government, industry, and academic participants  that would allow for the maturation of these technologies via  demonstration projects.
Our work indicates that a research gap also exists in the area of human  factors research. Human factors research explores what is known about  people and their abilities, characteristics, and limitations in the design of  the equipment they use, the environments in which they function, and the  jobs they perform. Seven of eight stakeholders that discussed the issue  expressed concern that NextGen plans do not adequately address human  factors research. For example, a central assumption of the NextGen  system is an increased reliance on automation, which dramatically  changes the roles and responsibilities of both air traffic controllers and  pilots. These changes in roles and responsibilities raise significant human  factors issues for the safety and efficiency of the national airspace system.  According to an FAA official, verbal communication is an example of a  human factors area that requires further research and development.  Currently, air traffic controllers primarily rely on verbal communication to  direct aircraft. Because NextGen will rely more on data link and other  automated communications, controllers will require training in both  understanding and operating in an automated communications  environment. The research to support such training has not been  conducted, according to FAA. FAA plans to invest $180.4 million in  human factors research from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2013.  Furthermore, NASA recently adjusted the size of its human factors  research staff starting in fiscal year 2005, reassigning some staff to other  programs and reducing the contractor and academic technical support for  human factors research. However, according to NASA, human factors  research continues to be a critical component of its aeronautics research  program, with activity focused at the foundational level. It remains to be  seen if FAA’s planned research and development in this area will offset  NASA’s reductions, since FAA’s research is typically at a more applied  level.
To help bridge the gap between NASA’s research and FAA’s need to  develop and implement new technology, the two agencies have developed  a strategy to identify, conduct, and transfer to FAA the research and  development needed for NextGen. The strategy initially establishes four  “research transition teams” that align with JPDO’s planning framework  and outlines how the two agencies will jointly develop research  requirements—FAA will provide user requirements, and NASA will  conduct the research and provide an understanding of the engineering  rationale for design decisions. In addition, the strategy calls for defining  metrics for evaluating the research. According to JPDO, as of August 2008,  the four teams had been established and held initial meetings. While these  developments are positive steps, it is too early to tell if they will be  effective in addressing NextGen’s overall research needs. Unless  NextGen’s developmental research needs are met in a timely manner, the  implementation of NextGen is also likely to be delayed, jeopardizing  NextGen’s goals of increased safety, efficiency, and capacity of the system.
FAA and NASA have worked to identify the research and development that  is needed for NextGen, including research on aviation’s impact on the  environment and human factors research, and have prioritized their  individual research portfolios. However, JPDO has not yet determined  what NextGen research and development needs to be done first and at  what cost to demonstrate and integrate NextGen technologies into the  national airspace system. JPDO’s prioritization of research needs is an  essential step in identifying the resources required to undertake needed  research and development. One stakeholder suggested a risk-based  approach to prioritization. Prioritization of research is critical to avoid  spending limited funds on lower-priority efforts or conducting work out of  sequence. As mentioned previously in this report, the next version of  the  Integrated Work Plan, scheduled to be released in September 2008, will be  able to identify the sequencing of research that must be completed before  specific NextGen capabilities can be implemented. This should provide a  useful tool in prioritizing and tracking NextGen research.
section_title: Regional Demonstrations Could Accelerate Integration and Adoption of NextGen Technologies
paragraphs: Some stakeholders are concerned that although new technologies and  procedures are being researched and developed, they are not being  implemented as quickly as needed to reach the goal of having NextGen in  place by 2025. Thirteen industry stakeholders told us that technologies are  available now that should be used immediately. Among the NextGen  technologies and procedures that are already available, FAA has  implemented a few individually, such as Continuous Descent Arrival  (CDA) procedures in use in Los Angeles and Louisville and Automatic  Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) in Alaska. In addition, FAA is  working with a few airlines, such as United Parcel Service (UPS), which is  installing ADS-B on all of its Boeing 757 and 767 aircraft. The equipment  will record and transmit each aircraft’s speed, heading, altitude, and global  positioning system coordinates to all other aircraft similarly equipped,  allowing each to map the traffic around it. With fleetwide equipage of ADS- B, carriers such as UPS may be able to increase landing rates enough to  justify the equipage costs, according to an aviation research organization.  (Fig. 6 shows examples of ADS-B in use.) In past work, we have reported  that available NextGen technologies and procedures have not yet been  deployed simultaneously to demonstrate that they can be operated safely  as an integrated suite of technologies and procedures in the national  airspace system.
Eleven of 12 stakeholders who discussed the issue suggested that FAA  consider a gradual rollout of NextGen technologies and procedures in a  designated area. For example, ADS-B technologies; CDA, Area Navigation  (RNAV) and Required Navigation Performance (RNP) procedures; and  high-density airport operations could be deployed in a defined location,  possibly in sequence over time, to test their combined use and  demonstrate the safety and efficiency of an integrated suite of NextGen  advancements. Such a graduated rollout is sometimes referred to as  “NextGen lite.”
Along these lines, in June 2008, FAA signed a memorandum of agreement  with the state of Florida and DayJet—a carrier that provides air taxi  service—to establish a government and industry partnership for  demonstrating NextGen technologies prior to national implementation.  For the Florida demonstration, FAA, together with aviation equipment  manufacturers and municipalities, will use the NextGen capabilities of  ADS-B, RNAV, and RNP for an on-demand air taxi fleet’s operations. As  other NextGen capabilities, such as System-Wide Information Management  (SWIM), are deployed and if the air taxi fleet’s operations move to other  airports and regions, the demonstration is expected to be expanded to  include those new capabilities and other airports and regions. In addition,  in June 2008, FAA signed an agreement with Embry-Riddle Aeronautical  University to Support future research and demonstrations that are  expected to lead to proof of concept and early implementation of NextGen  capabilities, according to FAA. According to the airlines and other  stakeholders we interviewed, a demonstration of the integration of  NextGen capabilities and of efficiencies resulting from their use would  give airlines an incentive to equip their aircraft with NextGen  technologies. They could then lower their costs by reducing their fuel  consumption and decrease the impact of their operations on the  environment. Our research indicate that such regional or targeted  demonstrations could accelerate the delivery of NextGen benefits while  helping to ensure safe operations within the current system. By  establishing benefits early in a program’s development, demonstrations  can increase stakeholders’ confidence in the overall NextGen initiative and  provide incentives for the aviation community to equip aircraft with  compatible technology.
section_title: NextGen Will Require New Skills and Abilities of FAA Personnel
paragraphs: FAA will need technical skills such as systems engineers and contract  management expertise to implement NextGen. Because of the scope and  complexity of the NextGen effort, the agency may not currently have the  in-house expertise to manage the transition to NextGen without  assistance. In November 2006, we recommended that FAA examine its  strengths and weaknesses with regard to the technical expertise and  contract management expertise that will be required to define, implement,  and integrate the numerous complex programs inherent in the transition  to NextGen. In response to our prior recommendation, FAA contracted  with NAPA to determine the mix of skills, including technical and contract  management skills, and strategies to obtain necessary expertise for  NextGen. In December 2007, NAPA provided FAA with its report on the types  of skills that will be needed by FAA. NAPA has undertaken a second part  of the study to identify skill gaps between FAA’s current staff and the staff  that would be required to implement NextGen. NAPA officials told us that  they expect to publish the findings of the second part of the study in  September 2008. We believe that this is a reasonable approach that should  help FAA begin to address this issue, recognizing that once the right skill  set is identified, it may take considerable time to select, hire, and integrate  what FAA estimates could be 150 to 200 more staff. This situation has the  potential to contribute to delays in integrating new technologies and  transforming the national airspace system.
In addition, the implementation of NextGen will involve training personnel  across FAA as new systems are brought online. NextGen entails an  increased reliance on automation and changing roles for both air traffic  controllers and pilots. In such an automated environment, some of the  responsibilities of controllers will shift from air traffic control to air traffic  management, and pilots will take on a greater share of the responsibility  for maintaining safe separation between aircraft and other tasks currently  performed by controllers. FAA’s air traffic controllers and repair  technicians will have to be trained to operate and maintain both the old  and new systems as new technologies are gradually brought online. While  15 stakeholders told us that it was too early to begin training for new  systems that are not close to deployment, 4 stakeholders who represent  groups that would be using the new systems or teaching those users said  that now was the time to begin developing the training to prepare FAA  personnel and others for the changing operating procedures that will  occur under NextGen. For example, one stakeholder noted that the  educational community needs to be engaged now so that it can be  prepared to teach future air traffic controllers and pilots. Another  stakeholder believed that during the transition to NextGen, FAA would  need training capabilities at each ATC facility for air traffic controllers  who may be using both NextGen systems and legacy systems. While FAA  believes that it is too early to begin such training, according to the agency,  it began a strategic job analysis in fiscal year 2008 to determine how the  controller’s job will change as a result of NextGen. In fiscal year 2009, the  agency plans to conduct a strategic training analysis to identify training for  controllers that will be needed to address those job changes.
section_title: Facilities and Airport Limitations Present Challenges to Realizing the Full Potential of NextGen
paragraphs: To fully realize all of NextGen’s capabilities, a new configuration of ATC  facilities and enhanced runway capacity will be required. According to a  senior ATO official, the agency plans to report on the cost implications of  reconfiguring its facilities in 2009. However, FAA has not developed a  comprehensive plan to reconfigure its facilities. Until the cost analysis is  completed and the reconfiguration plan has been developed, the  configurations needed for NextGen cannot be implemented and potential  savings that could help offset the cost of NextGen will not be realized.  Some FAA officials have said that planned facility maintenance and  construction based on the current ATC system are significant cost drivers  that could, without reconfiguration, significantly increase the cost of  NextGen.
In the meantime, FAA faces an immediate task to maintain and repair  existing facilities so that the current ATC system continues to operate  safely and reliably. The agency is currently responsible for maintaining  over 400 terminal facilities. While FAA has not assessed the physical  condition of all of these facilities, the agency rated the average condition  of 89 of them as “fair,” with some rated “good” and others “very poor.”  Based on its assessment of these 89 facilities, FAA estimated that a  onetime cost of repair to all of its terminal facilities would range from   $250 million to $350 million. Two FAA employee unions (NATCA and  PASS) contend that these facilities are deteriorating because of lack of  maintenance and that working conditions are unsafe because of leaking  roofs, deteriorating walls and ceilings, and obsolete air-conditioning  systems. According to FAA officials, while some of these facilities can  accommodate the new technologies and systems of NextGen, many of  them are not consistent with the configurations that will be needed under  NextGen. Once FAA develops a facility reconfiguration plan that identifies  facilities for consolidation, the costs of repairing and maintaining its  facilities may be reduced. In the meantime, FAA will have to manage its  budgetary resources so that it can maintain legacy systems and legacy  infrastructure while configuring the national airspace system to  accommodate NextGen technologies and operations.
With regard to airport infrastructure, a transition to NextGen will also  depend on the ability of airports to handle greater capacity. One way that  FAA is endeavoring to increase airport runway capacity is its High-Density  Terminal and Airport Operations initiative, which the agency has just  begun to implement. Under this initiative, aircraft arriving and departing  from different directions would be assigned to multiple runways and  safely merged into continuous flows despite bad weather and low  visibility. To guarantee safe separation between aircraft, these airports  would need enhanced navigation capabilities and controllers with access  to increased automation. Under this initiative, aircraft would also move  more efficiently on the ground, using procedures that are under  development to reduce spacing and separation requirements and improve  the flow of air traffic into and out of busy metropolitan airspace. Although  the implementation of this initiative is in the early stages, FAA has  identified the research and development needed to move it forward. FAA  has also identified runway safety technologies for accelerated  implementation.
The increases in capacity expected from the High-Density Terminal and  Airport Operations initiative are not likely to be sufficient to handle the  expected increases in traffic. As a result, new or expanded runways will  likely be needed. FAA has developed a rolling 10-year plan for capacity  improvements at the nation’s 35 busiest airports, and some airports are  building new runways. Moreover, FAA simulated the expected capacity  enhancement of these currently planned runway improvements and the  additional capacity gained through the implementation of some NextGen  initiatives and found that by 2025, 14 airports will still need additional  capacity. In addition, building new runways at some of these airports will  present considerable obstacles. The 14 airports are as follows:    Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International    Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International    John F. Kennedy International    John Wayne-Orange County    LaGuardia    Long Beach-Daugherty Field    McCarran International    Metropolitan Oakland International    Midway    Newark Liberty International    Philadelphia International    Phoenix Sky Harbor International    San Diego International    San Francisco International In part, as a result of the continuing need for runway development, some  of the planning for NextGen includes reducing the environmental impact  of aviation because of local community concerns about aviation emissions  and noise. Thirteen industry stakeholders view community opposition to  the environmental impacts of aviation as a key issue affecting the success  of NextGen. Furthermore, state and local governments play a large role in  providing needed support for expanding airport capacity for the national  air transportation system. Without significant reductions in emissions and  noise around the nation’s airports and continuing efforts at all levels of  government, efforts to expand airport capacity could be stalled and the  implementation of NextGen delayed.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOT and NASA for their review and  comments. Both agencies provided technical clarifications, which we  incorporated into this report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Transportation,  Defense, Commerce, and Homeland Security and the Administrators of  NASA and FAA. We will also make copies available to others upon request.  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site  at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report  are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In this report, we assessed the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA)  ability to acquire and integrate new air traffic control (ATC) systems and  transition to the next generation air transportation system (NextGen).  Specifically, we established the following research questions: (1) What are  the status and outcome of FAA’s ATC systems acquisition activities?   (2) What is the status of the key NextGen planning and transition issues?  (3) What key challenges does FAA face in implementing NextGen?
To determine the status and outcome of FAA’s ATC systems acquisition  activities, we updated acquisition baseline information on cost and  schedule and we summarized our recent work on acquisition  performance. To determine FAA’s Air Traffic Organization’s (ATO)  progress in acquisitions management, we analyzed the trends for budget  and schedule outcomes between the original baselines and current budget  and schedule baselines for the acquisitions that ATO selected for  performance reporting and monitoring from fiscal years 2004 through  2008. We also drew upon past work in which we undertook detailed  reviews of the status of ATC acquisition programs, and obtained updated  information as necessary from FAA by reviewing documents and  interviewing agency officials. Through discussions with ATO officials, we  determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  our report.
To determine the status of the key NextGen planning and transition issues  and key challenges facing FAA in implementing NextGen, we interviewed  senior ATO and Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) officials.  We also reviewed relevant literature and JPDO publications, including  JPDO’s Concept of Operations, Enterprise Architecture, and Integrated  Work Plan, and previous GAO reports on NextGen. In addition, we  obtained the views of key nonfederal aviation stakeholders involved with  NextGen and JPDO on the progress of, and challenges to achieving and  planning for, the transition to NextGen. We identified those key  stakeholders who, by virtue of their positions, possessed special  knowledge that they were willing to share with us through formal  interviews. We selected a sample of 24 key stakeholders from various  categories of the community of aviation stakeholders. Within the  categories (e.g., manufacturers, operators, airports, air traffic controllers,  pilots, and academia) we balanced the selection of stakeholders to capture  the views of the different stakeholder categories. The key stakeholders  were representatives from the following organizations:    Aerospace Industries Association of America    American Association of Airport Executives    Airports Council International – North America    Airbus    Air Line Pilots Association    Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association    Air Transport Association    Air Traffic Control Association    Boeing Company    Cargo Airline Association    Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University    Flight Safety Foundation    General Aviation Manufacturers Association    Honeywell   ITT Corporation    Lockheed-Martin    National Association of State Aviation Officials    National Air Traffic Controllers Association    National Business Aviation Association    Professional Aviation Safety Specialists    Regional Airline Association    Raytheon    Rockwell-Collins    RTCA (formerly known as the Radio Technical Corporation of  America)
We conducted the stakeholder interviews using open-ended questions  arranged by topics with standard probe notes to help ensure consistent  results. The topics included stakeholder participation in NextGen, JPDO  activities, the transition to NextGen, training, environmental issues, and  research and development. With the permission of stakeholders, we  recorded the interviews and had them professionally transcribed. The  information contained in the transcripts was analyzed and coded into  response categories for each topic. A reviewer checked the resulting  categories and coded responses and, when interpretations differed,  agreement was reached between the initial coder and the reviewer. The  result of this content analysis is found in appendix II.
We then obtained further information related to the stakeholder responses  by conducting interviews with representatives of relevant NextGen partner  agencies—JPDO, FAA, and the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA). We also obtained and reviewed relevant  documentation from these agencies, including research and development  budget documents from FAA and NASA. We did not obtain further  information from the other federal partners—the Departments of  Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security and the White House Office  of Science and Technology Policy—because the stakeholders did not  articulate issues related to those agencies. We also interviewed  representatives from the National Academy of Public Administration to  obtain information on their work related to FAA’s skill needs for NextGen.  In addition, we summarized information on NextGen environmental issues  from our recent report and testimony.
We conducted our performance audit from July 2007 to September 2008 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Stakeholder Responses to Semistructured GAO Interview Questions
subsections: section_title: Community opposition to the environmental impact of aviation is a key issue affecting the success of NextGen
section_title: Appendix III: ATC Acquisition Performance
subsections: section_title: Free Flight Phase 2 Traffic Management Advisor - Single Center
paragraphs: (9) (0.0%)
Airport Surface Detection Equipment – Model X  (44.9) (10)
Airport Surface Detection Equipment - Model X  Upgrade Sites with Multilateration  Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator Replacement  (52) (9.8%) (57.8%)  behind  0.0 (0.0%) (0.0%)
Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System  (1.8%) (0.0%) (0.0%)
0 (0.0%) (24.0%) (8.7%)
Aviation Surface Weather Observation Network  (4.8%) (36)  (16.5%)  behind  (0.0%) (0.0%)
FSAS Operational and Supportability Implementation  System  (32.2%) (9.9%)
National Airspace System Infrastructure Management  System-Phase 2  (14) (0.0%)
ASR-9 / Mode S SLEP Phase 1A External  Modifications  (1.2) (8.4%)  over  (26.9%)
ASR-9 / Mode S SLEP Phase 1B Transmitter  Modifications  (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)
0.0 (0.0%) (0.0%)
Voice Switch and Control System Tech Refresh Phase  2  (0.0%) (0.0%)
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast  Segments 1 & 2  (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)
0.0 (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%)  (36) (0.0%)
En Route Control Center System Modernization  (16.8%) (34.8%)
Voice Recorder Replacement Program Next  Generation  (0.0%) (0.0%) $370.7 (2.5%)
section_title: Appendix IV: Baseline History for Programs Selected for Acquisition Performance Measurement
subsections: section_title: Original schedule and budget
paragraphs: User Request Evaluation Tool  Jun-02  Sep-06  uisition program baseline.
X baseline approved in June 2002, which added ASDE-X  capabilities to seven ASDE- sites. The ASDE-X and ASDE-X acuisitions were combined in the  September 2005 rebaselining.
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, individuals making key  contributions to this report include Teresa Spisak (Assistant Director),  Kevin Egan, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Brandon Haller, Bert Japikse,   Edmond Menoche, Faye Morrison, Colleen Phillips, Taylor Reeves, and  Richard Scott.