Combating Gangs: Better Coordination and Performance Measurement Would Help Clarify Roles of Federal Agencies and Strengthen Assessment of Efforts
Published: 2009-07-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Justice (DOJ) estimates that the United States has about a million gang members. While state and local agencies have primary responsibility for combating gang crime, the federal government has key roles to enforce laws and help fund programs to provide alternatives to gang membership for at-risk youth. GAO was asked to examine federal efforts to combat gang crime. This report addresses (1) the roles of DOJ and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in combating gang crime and the extent to which DOJ and DHS agencies coordinate their efforts with each other and state and local agencies; (2) the extent to which DOJ and DHS measure their gang enforcement efforts; and (3) how federal grant funding is used to administer or support activities to reduce gang-related crime. GAO reviewed federal agencies' plans, resources, and measures and interviewed federal, state, and local officials in 15 localities with federally led anti-gang task forces representing varying population sizes and locations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Various DOJ and DHS components have taken distinct roles in combating gang crime, and at the headquarters level, DOJ has established several entities to share information on gang-related investigations across agencies. However, some of these entities have not differentiated roles and responsibilities. For example, two entities have overlapping responsibilities for coordinating the federal response to the same gang threat. Prior GAO work found that overlap among programs can waste funds and limit effectiveness, and that agencies should work together to define and agree on their respective roles and facilitate information sharing. At the field division level, federal agencies have established strategies to help coordinate anti-gang efforts including federally led task forces. Officials GAO interviewed were generally satisfied with the task force structure for leveraging resources and taking advantage of contributions from all participating agencies. Federal agencies have taken actions to measure the results of their gang enforcement efforts, but these efforts have been hindered by three factors. Among other measures, one agency tracks the number of investigations that disrupted or shut down criminal gangs, while another agency tracks its gang-related convictions. However, agencies' efforts to measure results of federal actions to combat gang crime have been hampered by lack of a shared definition of "gang" among agencies, underreporting of information by United States Attorneys Offices (USAOs), and the lack of departmentwide DOJ performance measures for anti-gang efforts. Definitions of "gang" vary in terms of number of members, time or type of offenses, and other characteristics. According to DOJ officials, lack of a shared definition of "gang" complicates data collection and evaluation efforts across federal agencies, but does not adversely affect law enforcement activity. DOJ officials stated that USAOs have underreported gang-related cases and work, in part because attorneys historically have not viewed data collection as a priority. In the absence of periodic monitoring of USAO's gang-related case information, DOJ cannot be certain that USAOs have accurately recorded gang-related data. Further, DOJ lacks performance measures that would help agencies to assess progress made over time on anti-gang efforts and provide decision makers with key data to facilitate resource allocation. DOJ administers several grant programs to assist communities to address gang problems; however, initiatives funded through some of these programs have had mixed results. A series of grant programs funded from the 1980s to 2009 to test a comprehensive communitywide model are nearing completion. Evaluations found little evidence that these programs reduced youth gang crime. DOJ does not plan to fund future grants testing this model; rather, DOJ plans to provide technical assistance to communities implementing anti-gang programs without federal funding. DOJ also awarded grants to 12 communities during fiscal years 2006 to 2008 under another anti-gang initiative. The first evaluations of this initiative are due in late 2009, and no additional grants will be funded pending the evaluation results.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: According to estimates from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the United  States has about 20,000 gangs and 1 million gang members, and gangs are  active in every U.S. state and territory and Washington, D.C. Once  considered a problem of urban areas of the country, gangs began  migrating in the 1980s and 1990s into suburban and rural communities, as  well. Gangs are involved in violent crimes such as armed robbery, assault,  homicide, and shootings. They dominate retail-level drug distribution  throughout the country, and they are increasingly becoming involved in  wholesale-level drug trafficking.
While most of the responsibility for combating gang crime rests with state  and local law enforcement and social service agencies as well as  community and local faith-based organizations, the federal government  also has important responsibilities. The federal government’s role includes  enforcing laws to combat gang crime and identifying and supporting  promising programs to help prevent young people from becoming gang  members or to intervene to provide at-risk youth with alternatives to being  part of a gang. DOJ and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement  (ICE), a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), have  key roles in federal law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute  gang-related crimes. DOJ also administers programs to assist local  communities in efforts designed to prevent the spread of gangs and gang  crime, and sponsors evaluations of whether the strategies it supports are  effective in reducing gang-related crime.
You asked us to review federal programs to combat gang violence and  coordination mechanisms among federal, state, and local agencies for anti- gang efforts. This report addresses the following questions: (1) What are  the roles of DOJ and DHS related to combating gangs, and to what extent  do DOJ and DHS agencies collaborate and coordinate their efforts in  combating gangs with each other and state and local partners? (2) To what  extent do DOJ and DHS measure the results of their gang enforcement  efforts? and (3) How does DOJ use grant funding to administer and/or  support activities to reduce gang-related crime and what have been the  reported results of grant-funded activities? We also provide information on  the nature and scope of the gang problem in the United States (see app. I);  federal statutes, including federal racketeering statutes, used to prosecute  gang members (see app. II); and factors to consider in developing and  implementing anti-gang approaches (see app. III).
To examine the roles of DOJ and DHS agencies in gang enforcement  efforts and the extent to which their efforts are coordinated with other  federal, state, and local partners, we reviewed federal strategies and plans  to combat gang crime and interviewed headquarters DOJ, DHS, and  component agency officials involved in gang crime enforcement activities.  We reviewed DOJ’s, DHS’s, and components’ strategic plans including  goals and objectives for efforts to combat gang crime. We compared DOJ  and DHS coordination and information sharing efforts to criteria in our  prior work on effective interagency collaboration and results-oriented  government. We also examined staffing levels and budgets for DOJ  agencies and ICE. To assess the reliability of statistical information and  budget data we obtained, we discussed the sources of the data with  agency officials and reviewed documentation regarding the compilation of  data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report. Using semi-structured interview instruments, we  interviewed the U.S. Attorney or designated staff of U.S. Attorneys Offices  (USAO) and supervisory agents of DOJ and DHS law enforcement  agencies involved in investigating and prosecuting gang members in 15  localities across the country. We also reviewed anti-gang strategies and  other documentation of enforcement efforts to reduce criminal gang  activity in these localities. The localities we visited were Atlanta, Ga.  Baltimore, Md. Brooklyn, N.Y.; Chicago, Il. Cleveland, Ohio; Dallas, Tex.;  Durham, N.C.; Los Angeles, Calif.; Manhattan, N.Y.; Milwaukee, Wisc.;  Newark, N.J.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; Raleigh, N.C.; Richmond, Va.; and Tampa,  Fla. We selected these localities based on a mix of criteria that included  population size, geographic location, violent crime rates, and receipt of  federal grants to address gang-related crime problems. Other criteria  considered in selecting these localities included the location of the USAO  and federal law enforcement agency field offices, the presence of federally  led task forces to combat gang crime, and suggestions from DOJ and DHS  components. In addition, we met with selected state and local prosecutors  and law enforcement officials in these localities to discuss the gang  problem in their area and the role of DOJ agencies and ICE in helping to  address it. The results of our site visits cannot be generalized across all  DOJ or ICE field offices and states and localities in the United States.  However, because we selected these sites and localities based on a variety  of factors, they provided us with an overview and examples of the  activities and coordination of DOJ and DHS efforts to combat gang crime,  including law enforcement as well as prevention and intervention  programs.
To determine the extent to which federal agencies have measured the  results of their gang enforcement efforts, we first assessed how DOJ and  DHS components defined “gang” and gang-related crimes. We reviewed  data maintained by DOJ and DHS law enforcement agencies and U.S.  Attorneys on gang-related investigations and prosecutions, and we  interviewed headquarters officials. To assess the reliability of statistical  information we obtained, we discussed the sources of the data with  agency officials and reviewed documentation regarding the compilation of  data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this review. We also reviewed DOJ and DHS strategic plans,  budgets, and performance reports. We compared DOJ and DHS efforts to  measure the results of their gang enforcement efforts to criteria in our  prior work on effective interagency collaboration and results oriented  government. We also asked interviewees in the 15 localities we visited  how they measured the results of local gang enforcement efforts.
To determine how DOJ administers and/or supports gang prevention,  intervention, and suppression programs through grant funding and the  programs’ reported results, we examined documentation on DOJ’s overall  approach and objectives for anti-gang grant programs as well as DOJ- sponsored evaluations and a guide on best practices to address  community gang problems. We also reviewed funding levels for fiscal  years 2007 and 2008 for the four DOJ grant programs that we identified as  being directly focused on anti-gang efforts. We interviewed DOJ  headquarters officials about the status of funding, sustainability of anti- gang programs without federal funding, and results of evaluations of the  effectiveness of the anti-gang grant programs, among other topics. Eight of  the 15 localities we visited had received federal grants for anti-gang  efforts, and we interviewed grant recipients to determine activities that  they were pursuing with the grant funds and how they planned to sustain  programs when federal funding expired. In addition, we interviewed USAO  officials in the 15 localities we visited to obtain information on their roles  in anti-gang efforts. We reviewed guidance on developing and  implementing comprehensive prevention, intervention, and suppression  programs and key documents related to the four federal grant programs,  such as grant applications. We also reviewed available nationwide  evaluations of grant programs sponsored by DOJ. We obtained  information and views from nine criminal justice researchers on how  effective the federal government has been in measuring its gang  suppression, prevention, and intervention activities; and on whether the  programs are sustainable without federal funding and likely to be  implemented by communities that did not receive federal grants based on  lessons learned from the federally funded projects. We identified the  researchers through a review of literature related to gangs and gang crime  issues, researchers’ participation in gang-related conferences, and by  asking federal officials for recommendations.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2007 through July  2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our  scope and methodology, including the locations we visited, are in  appendix IV.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Gangs Operate across the United States and Internationally
paragraphs: Gangs, which operate in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, vary in  size, ethnic composition, membership, and organizational structure. Gangs  range from groups that have regional or national status and operate in a  number of states throughout the country to local groups that are  associated with a particular neighborhood or street. Most gangs  nationwide are local neighborhood or street groups. Assessments by DOJ  and other organizations have identified gang crime problems nationwide  from large cities to rural communities. In many communities, criminal  gangs commit as much as 80 percent of crime, according to law  enforcement officials. See appendix I for information on the extent to  which communities of various sizes experience gang crime problems,  recent gang crime trends observed, descriptions of major national-level  gang organizations, and impacts of national and local street gangs in the  localities we visited.
Gang crime problems are not unique to the United States. In other  countries, urban youth gangs operate often in association with adult  organized-crime organizations. For example, gang activity has been  reported in Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Africa, and  Asia, as well as in Russia and the countries of eastern and central Europe  following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Some of these international  gangs can be linked to gangs in the United States. We have ongoing work  examining efforts to combat gangs with transnational connections and  plan to report on this issue later this year.
section_title: Overview of Missions and Responsibilities of Federal Agencies Involved in Enforcement Efforts to Combat Gang Crime
paragraphs: DOJ and DHS are the departments with key roles in federal enforcement  efforts to investigate and prosecute gang-related crimes (See fig. 1). DOJ’s  involvement is primarily through its Criminal Division; the 93 U.S.  Attorneys in 94 judicial districts across the nation that operate with  administrative and operational support from the Executive Office of U.S.  Attorneys (EOUSA); and three law enforcement agencies: the Federal  Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms  and Explosives (ATF); and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).  In addition, the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) fugitive task force program  assists law enforcement agencies in apprehending dangerous fugitives,  including gang members, who are not arrested after having been criminally  charged. ICE is the DHS agency with the largest role in investigating gang- related crimes, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is  responsible for interdicting gang-related illicit activities that cross United  States borders.
Within DOJ, the Criminal Division, along with U.S. Attorneys, is charged  with enforcing most federal criminal laws. The Criminal Division can  prosecute a wide range of criminal matters, including many of those  involving gangs and gang members. Criminal Division attorneys are to  prosecute nationally significant cases and formulate and implement  criminal enforcement policy, among other responsibilities. The Criminal  Division oversees the investigation and prosecution of gang-related crimes  under five Deputy Assistant Attorneys General. Each one supervises three  or four sections dealing with specific violations of criminal law. The work  of each of the sections is driven by the type of criminal matter under  investigation (i.e., organized crime and racketeering, as well as narcotics  and dangerous drugs), not whether gangs and/or gang members are  involved in the crimes. As a result, according to a DOJ Criminal Division  official, all five Criminal Division deputy assistant attorneys general  oversee sections that deal with crimes and criminal matters that involve  gangs and gang members. The Criminal Division has also established the  Gang Unit to help coordinate multi-jurisdictional gang investigations and  prosecutions.
The 93 U.S. Attorneys prosecute the majority of criminal cases as well as  civil litigation, handled by DOJ. In 2005, as part of a DOJ initiative to  combat gangs, the Attorney General instructed each U.S. Attorney to name  an anti-gang coordinator to work in consultation with federal, state, and  local agencies to develop a comprehensive anti-gang strategy focusing on  prevention and enforcement. EOUSA provides general executive  assistance and supervision to USAOs and has a national gang coordinator  who helps act as a liaison between the USAOs and other DOJ components  involved in gang prosecution efforts. EOUSA provides operational support  for information technology, training, and other functions, and prepares an  annual statistical report of U.S. Attorneys, among other functions.
The FBI has jurisdiction to investigate a broad range of violations of  federal law including organized crime and violent crime that can involve  gangs and gang members. ATF, as part of its mission, conducts  investigations to reduce violent crimes involving firearms and explosives,  which frequently involve gangs and gang members. DEA is the nation’s  single-mission drug enforcement agency with responsibility for enforcing  controlled substance laws and regulations. Some DEA priority  investigations target gangs involved in narcotics trafficking. USMS is the  enforcement arm of the federal courts with responsibilities including  apprehending fugitives from federal justice, protecting federal judges,  transporting federal prisoners, operating the witness security program,  and seizing property acquired by criminals through illegal activities. The  USMS fugitive task force program and other initiatives target fugitive gang  members who have been criminally charged.
Within DHS, ICE, the largest investigative arm of the department, has  responsibility for a range of issues that may threaten national security,  including financial and immigration fraud violations, as well as targeting  street gangs with connections to international criminal activities. Within  ICE’s Office of Investigation, the National Gang Unit manages and  coordinates national efforts to combat the growth and proliferation of  transnational criminal street gangs. Gang members who have prior  criminal convictions, are involved in crimes with a nexus to the border, or  are foreign-born and are in the United States illegally may be subject to  ICE’s dual criminal and administrative authorities that are used to disrupt  and dismantle transnational gang activities with criminal prosecutions and  deportation. In addition, CBP, the DHS component that protects U.S.  borders against terrorism, illegal immigration, and drug smuggling, among  other threats, participates in a national gang intelligence group.
section_title: Grant Funding Supports Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Enforcement Activities
paragraphs: DOJ supports community gang prevention, intervention, and enforcement  activities through grant funding of demonstration projects managed by  its Office of Justice Programs (OJP). The mission of OJP is to increase  public safety and improve the fair administration of justice across America  through innovative leadership and programs that include demonstration  programs to assist state and local governments to reduce crime, as well as  crime and criminal justice research and evaluation, training, and technical  assistance. OJP’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention  Programs (OJJDP) and Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) administer the  demonstration programs we have identified as being directly focused on  anti-gang efforts, while its National Institute of Justice is responsible for  evaluating some program results and generating research-based  knowledge to help inform policy, develop strategies, and deploy resources.
section_title: Lack of Differentiated Roles and Responsibilities among Headquarters Anti-Gang Coordinating Groups and Gaps in Participation Could Hinder Coordination Efforts
paragraphs: DOJ and DHS component agencies have different roles and  responsibilities for combating gang crime and focus on different aspects of  gang enforcement. At the headquarters level, DOJ and FBI have  established several coordinating entities to share information on gang- related investigations and intelligence across agency boundaries.  Nevertheless, some of these entities have not sufficiently differentiated  their roles and responsibilities, thus impacting their ability to coordinate  anti-gang efforts. In addition, ICE has not yet fully participated in some  coordinating group functions. At the field division level, federal law  enforcement agencies have established entities and strategies to help  coordinate anti-gang efforts by, for example, establishing anti-gang task  forces and case “deconfliction” mechanisms, and developing district- wide anti-gang strategies through the USAOs. In localities we visited  officials from federal, state, and local law enforcement offices cited  benefits to coordinating through task forces.
subsections: section_title: DOJ and DHS Component Agencies Focus on Different Aspects of Gang Enforcement and Have Dedicated More Resources to Gang Enforcement Efforts Since Fiscal Year 2003
paragraphs: Gang enforcement is primarily the responsibility of state and local law  enforcement agencies that address community-based violence and crime  on a daily basis. At the federal level, no one department or agency has sole  responsibility for gang enforcement. Various DOJ and DHS components  focus on different aspects of gang enforcement as part of their broader  missions. Within DOJ, the FBI focuses primarily on investigating violent,  multi jurisdictional gangs whose activities constitute criminal enterprises  by identifying, investigating, and prosecuting the leadership and key  members of violent gangs; disrupting or dismantling gangs’ criminal  enterprise; and recovering illegal assets through seizures and forfeitures.  ATF primarily focuses on efforts to reduce the occurrence of firearms,  arson, and explosives-related violent crime, including such crimes  committed by gang members. The primary focus of DEA’s enforcement  efforts is on the links between gangs and drug trafficking. USMS’s role is  to apprehend gang members who have been criminally charged but not  arrested. Within DHS, ICE’s primary focus for gang enforcement is to  disrupt and dismantle violent transnational criminal street gangs by  investigating cross-border smuggling and financial and fraud-related  crimes. ICE uses its dual criminal and administrative authorities to  address gang crime with the twofold approach of criminal prosecution and  deportation.
For these federal law enforcement agencies, enforcement of gang-related  crimes competes for resources with agencies’ other program areas, such  as counterterrorism, illegal-drug and firearms trafficking, white collar  crime, and public corruption. For example, the FBI investigation of gang  crime is part of two FBI priorities; major thefts and violent crime, and  combating transnational and criminal organizations and enterprises, FBI’s  tenth and sixth ranked priorities, respectively. FBI, ICE, and DEA are the  three federal law enforcement agencies that specifically track agent time  dedicated to gang enforcement efforts. These federal agencies have  dedicated a relatively small portion of overall agent resources to anti-gang  efforts, but these resource levels have increased since fiscal year 2003. For  example, according to FBI data, agent full time equivalents (FTEs) spent  on anti-gang efforts ranged from a low of 4.1 percent of total agent FTEs in  fiscal year 2003 to a high of 7.7 percent of total agent FTEs in fiscal year  2008. Figure 2 summarizes FBI FTEs on anti-gang efforts and all  investigative activities from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2008.
As shown in figure 3, DEA’s agent FTEs on anti-gang efforts are a  relatively small portion of overall agents FTEs, but have increased from  161 in fiscal year 2003 to 225 in fiscal year 2008.
The chief of the Gang Unit for DOJ’s Criminal Division said that federal  law enforcement agencies are spending more time on gang-related  investigations now than they did several years ago because (1) agencies  have been able to hire additional agents for counter-terrorism  investigations, so agents who were diverted from criminal investigations to  counter-terrorism immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11,  2001, are returning to criminal investigations and (2) the prior  administration and Congress had an interest in expanding the federal role  on addressing violent crime and supporting anti-gang efforts, so federal  law enforcement agencies responded by placing an increased emphasis in  these areas. At this point, it is too early to tell what impact, if any, these  additional resources would have on gang enforcement efforts.
section_title: DOJ and DHS Have Established Headquarters- Level Entities to Coordinate and Share Information on Gang Enforcement Efforts, but Have Not Differentiated Entities’ Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: Since 2004, at the headquarters level, DOJ has established several entities  to coordinate and share information on gangs and gang enforcement  efforts across department and agency boundaries. As shown in table 1,  these entities include the Gang Unit; the National Gang Targeting,  Enforcement, and Coordination Center (GangTECC); the National Gang  Intelligence Center (NGIC); the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee; and  Mara Salvaturcha (MS-13) National Gang Task Force. These entities have  different roles and responsibilities, but in general, they serve as  mechanisms for deconflicting cases, providing law enforcement agencies  with information on gangs and gang activities, and coordinating  participating agencies’ strategies and task forces.
These entities provide DOJ and DHS with a means to operate across  agency boundaries. For example, according to the Office of the Deputy  Attorney General, GangTECC has provided an avenue through which  participating agencies share information to help facilitate communication  among participating agencies at the headquarters level. NGIC has worked  to provide law enforcement agencies with information and analysis of  federal, state, and local law enforcement intelligence focusing on gangs  that pose a significant threat to U.S. communities, including information  on the growth, migration, criminal activity, and structure of gangs. NGIC  has helped to facilitate information sharing on gang-related issues by, for  example, issuing intelligence bulletins to law enforcement agencies.
Our work on effective interagency collaboration has shown that when  multiple agencies are working to address aspects of the same problem,  there is a risk that overlap or fragmentation among programs can waste  scarce funds, confuse and frustrate program customers or stakeholders,  and limit overall program effectiveness. Collaborating agencies should  work together to define and agree on their respective roles and  responsibilities and can use a number of possible mechanisms, such as  memoranda of understanding, to clarify who will do what, organize joint  and individual efforts, and facilitate information sharing. The  headquarters-level anti-gang entities have defined their individual roles  and responsibilities. Although some overlaps in mission may be  appropriate to help reduce gaps, these entities have not yet clearly  identified their differentiated roles and responsibilities, resulting in  possible gaps or unnecessary overlap in agencies’ coordination and  sharing of information on gang enforcement efforts. Examples include:    The purpose of GangTECC is to allow participating agencies including ICE  to access and use each respective agency’s gang intelligence, allow  immediate access to operational information in a collocated environment  and provide a national deconfliction center for gang operations. Although  the roles and participation by DOJ and its component agencies in  GangTECC were specified by the Deputy Attorney General in a July 2006  memorandum establishing GangTECC, as well as in the GangTECC  Concept of Operations, GangTECC and ICE have not yet documented  ICE’s participation in the center. ICE’s participation has varied since  GangTECC’s inception. According to the head of ICE’s National Gang Unit,  in the past ICE’s representative to GangTECC was engaged with other  responsibilities at ICE headquarters, which periodically impacted the  amount of time that the representative spent at GangTECC. However, the  head of the National Gang Unit said that ICE’s representative is assigned  to GangTECC on a full-time basis. ICE officials said that they are willing to  work with other GangTECC officials to develop a memorandum of  understanding that documents ICE’s role and participation in the center  but had not yet done so at the conclusion of our audit work.
Establishment of task forces at the field office level has not always been  fully coordinated with ICE. Specifically, according to Anti-Gang  Coordination Committee guidance, concurrence for each new gang or  violent crime task force at the field office level is to be obtained by  representatives of FBI, ATF, DEA, USMS, ICE, and the local USAO, as well  as local or state police departments. The Anti-Gang Coordination  Committee gives final approval to DOJ law enforcement agencies for  establishing new anti-gang task forces in field locations. According to the  Chief of the Gang Unit, this process for establishing new task forces in  field locations helps to reduce task force overlap and duplication of effort.  However, ICE did not have the opportunity to provide its concurrence for  the creation of all recently approved task forces, making it difficult for the  Anti-Gang Coordination Committee to ensure that there are no  unnecessary overlaps in the creation or mission of task forces. Our review  of the approval process for eight task forces authorized by the Anti-Gang  Coordination Committee from January 2008 through June 2008 found that  ICE’s concurrence was not obtained in three instances. Moreover, ICE is  not represented on the Task Force Subcommittee of the Anti-Gang  Coordination Committee, which, on behalf of the committee, reviews and  provides recommendations concerning new task force applications. DOJ  officials said that no Memorandum of Understanding or other document  outlines ICE’s participation in the process for approving task forces.
GangTECC and the MS-13 National Gang Task Force have overlapping  missions and responsibilities for coordination and deconfliction of multi- jurisdictional investigations involving the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs. The  two entities have these overlaps in part because the MS-13 Task Force  already existed when GangTECC was established in 2006 and was not  dismantled or folded into GangTECC at that time. The two entities differ in  that GangTECC has participants from ATF, DEA, ICE, FBI, USMS, and  other DOJ and DHS components and has responsibility for coordinating  multi-jurisdictional investigations of all gangs except FBI-led  investigations involving the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs. The MS-13  National Gang Task Force, on the other hand, has only FBI participants  and is responsible for coordinating FBI’s multi-jurisdictional investigations  involving MS-13 and 18th Street gangs. As a result, both entities coordinate  some multi-jurisdictional MS-13 and 18th Street gang investigations and  risk unnecessary federal resource expenditures to fund two entities when  a single group could be more efficient. The GangTECC and MS-13 Task  Force Directors acknowledged that there is overlap between the missions  and responsibilities of the two entities, and the chief of the DOJ Criminal  Division’s Gang Unit also noted that the two entities have overlapping  jurisdictions and no formal coordination mechanisms. The Directors  stated that the two entities do share information about the gangs and were  co-located to encourage that interaction. Moreover, the director of  GangTECC said he had invited representatives of the MS-13 National Gang  Task Force to participate in meetings. As the invitation had been extended  just prior to the conclusion of our audit work, we were not able to assess  the level of participation. The Directors also said that while there is  mission overlap, it has not jeopardized investigations or law enforcement  operations. Nevertheless, the rationale for why two separate entities are  needed is unclear. For example, the Criminal Division chief said that if  DOJ were starting from scratch in creating a structure for coordinating  federal anti-gang investigations, the department would not have the  structure that currently exists because of the potential for this overlap.  While the overlap may not have interfered with investigations or  operations to date, it is not clear that this is the most efficient and  effective use of federal resources.
Articulating and differentiating among roles, responsibilities, and missions  of headquarters-level anti-gang entities and ensuring ICE’s full  participation in authorizing anti-gang task forces would help to identify  gaps or overlaps among the entities and participating agencies and help to  increase the understanding of federal, state, and local law enforcement  agencies of each of the entities’ mission and goals. In addition, such action  would strengthen these headquarters-level coordination efforts to help to  ensure that they are not unnecessarily expending resources on  overlapping missions.
section_title: In Localities We Visited Agencies Cited Benefits to Coordinating Federal Anti- Gang Efforts Primarily through Taskforces
paragraphs: At the field level, federal law enforcement agencies primarily conduct and  coordinate their gang enforcement efforts through task forces. Examples  include:    The FBI’s Violent Gang Safe Street Task Forces were established in 1992  to serve as long-term and coordinated teams of federal, state, and local law  enforcement officers and prosecutors. These task forces focus on  disrupting and dismantling the most violent and criminally active gang  threats in the United States. According to the FBI, as of April 2009, 144  Safe Streets Taskforces were operating in locations across the country.
ATF’s Violent Crime Impact Teams were established in 2004 through  partnerships with other state and local agencies to reduce firearms-related  violent crime including violent gang crime in small, geographic areas  experiencing an increase in violent crime. As of April 2009, 31 Violent  Crime Impact Teams were operating in locations across the country,  according to ATF.
DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) program was established in 1995  to address the spread of drug trafficking and associated violent crime in  urban and rural areas. Due to budgetary constraints, the MET program  was temporarily suspended in June 2007, however, in January 2008,  Congress directed DEA to use appropriated funds to continue the MET  program. At that time, DEA also made MET investigations targeting the  drug trafficking activities of criminal street gangs and criminal  organizations that supply them a priority. Teams of eight agents each  operate in ten DEA field divisions nationwide, according to DEA.
USMS’ fugitive task force program and other initiatives such as Operation  FALCON (Federal and Local Cops Organized Nationally) target fugitive  gang members. Additionally, USMS coordinates a “Most Wanted Gang  Members” list through GangTECC.
ICE works with state and local law enforcement agencies in conducting its  gang enforcement activities under its anti-gang initiative called Operation  Community Shield. Under this initiative, investigations focus on  transnational street gangs, gangs whose members are subject to ICE’s  immigration and customs authorities because the members are foreign  born and/or in the country illegally or have been involved in crimes with a  nexus to the U.S. borders (i.e. narcotics trafficking and human trafficking).  ICE investigations also focus on gangs operating in the United States and  abroad as complex organized criminal organizations.
At the field division level, many officials from federal, state, and local law  enforcement offices cited benefits to coordinating federal anti-gang efforts  primarily through task forces and were generally satisfied that the task  force approach resulted in collaboration and information sharing among  the various law enforcement entities. These officials provided examples of  how these taskforces provide avenues through which federal, state, and  local agencies can directly share resources and partner in conducting gang  investigations, as noted below:    Ten of the twenty local police chiefs or supervisors of gang units that we  interviewed said that federally-led taskforces have resources to pay  informants, conduct wiretaps, and purchase vehicles for surveillance and  undercover operations; among other resources which state and local law  enforcement agencies often do not have, or the officials noted that local  law enforcement officers assigned to federally-led taskforces have better  access to technology and new investigative techniques than officers not  assigned to task forces. Use of these investigative tools and equipment  allow state and local agencies to work with federal agencies in conducting  investigations that target gangs as criminal enterprises, types of cases  which state and local agencies would generally not be able to conduct in  the absence of federal resources and assistance.
Officials also provided examples of how task forces provide opportunities  for direct information and intelligence sharing among federal, state, and  local law enforcement agencies, as noted below:    Four of the twenty local law enforcement officials said that one of the  primary benefits to their agencies participating in federally led task forces  is access to information and intelligence on gangs. State and local officers  assigned to federally led task forces benefit by learning new investigative  techniques that they, in turn, can share with other local law enforcement  officers.
In nineteen of the thirty four federal law enforcement field division offices  we visited, supervisory agents noted that their task forces also benefited  from state and local police officers’ intimate knowledge of the gang  problems in their local communities.
In addition to these benefits, several officials identified a challenge to the  task force structure that they work to overcome. In some cases, federal,  state, and local agencies that participate in task forces may have differing  priorities and interests for gang enforcement activities. For example,  supervisors at two FBI field divisions said that the FBI focuses on long- term gang investigations designed to eliminate entire gangs. In contrast,  they said that state and local law enforcement agencies tend to focus on  efforts to help reduce gang crime and violence in the short-term and look  for short-term results for their communities. Consequently, the officials  said that state and local law enforcement agencies are sometimes  reluctant to dedicate resources to support the long-term investigations, but  that these issues are worked through jointly by federal and local agencies  involved in the task force.
In addition to task forces, interviewees in the localities we visited  described other mechanisms or tools for deconflicting law enforcement  actions, sharing information, and coordinating gang enforcement activities  with one another. In areas of the country identified by the White House  Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) as high intensity drug  trafficking areas (HIDTA), including New York City, Chicago, and Los  Angeles, the HIDTAs monitored law enforcement activities including anti- gang operations to deconflict and coordinate across law enforcement  agencies. In Richmond, Virginia, federal, state, and local agencies met  regularly to deconflict cases and discuss anti-gang initiatives through a  Cooperative Violence Reduction Partnership, which was created and  chaired by the Richmond Chief of Police. Similarly, in Tampa, Florida, the  Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Department and the Tampa Police  Department co-chair of a Multi-Area Gang Task Force composed of  representatives of 60 law enforcement agencies, including local, state and  county police departments, FBI, ATF, and ICE. The task force participants  share intelligence at monthly meetings and support one another in major  anti-gang operations.
The USAOs also have responsibilities for coordinating anti-gang efforts in  their districts. For example, each of the 15 USAOs we visited had complied  with DOJ requirements to appoint an Anti-Gang Coordinator for the  district to help formulate the anti-gang strategies for their districts. The  Anti-Gang Coordinators implement training opportunities for prosecutors  and law enforcement agents and officers, act as liaisons for the USAO on  gang-related cases with prosecutors from other offices as well as law  enforcement officers and agents, and are proactively involved in  developing strategies for investigating and prosecuting gang members with  violent criminal behavior. Each USAO we visited had also completed a  districtwide anti-gang strategy, as required by the Attorney General in  2005. According to guidance from the Attorney General, USAOs were to  consult with federal, state, and local law enforcement; social service  organizations; and community and faith-based groups in their district to  develop the strategies. They included a description of the gang problem in  each district; a description of how agencies within the district were  responding or planned to respond to the problem; a description of whether  the district has a specific gang unit or the resources being used to  investigate and prosecute gangs; a description of the roles played by state  and local law enforcement agencies in combating gangs; and any  suggestions on how DOJ could more effectively address the gang problem  on a local or national level. Anti-Gang Coordinators are required to  prepare annual reports on the district’s anti-gang strategy, which are  submitted to EOUSA and then provided to the Deputy Attorney General  who informs the Attorney General of anti-gang activities throughout the  nation. The reports are used to identify best practices, which are discussed  at national conferences and informally among prosecutors.
section_title: Federal Agencies Have Measures for Gang Enforcement Efforts, but Lack a Common Definition of “Gang” and a DOJ Departmentwide Performance Measure
paragraphs: Federal agencies have developed and used measures to assess their gang  enforcement efforts, but they lack a common or shared definition for  “gang,” hindering their efforts to measure and report on gangs, gang crime,  and enforcement activities. While DOJ has emphasized strategies for  combating gangs as a part of its strategic objective to reduce violent crime,  the department lacks a departmentwide performance measure for its anti- gang efforts. DOJ and DHS law enforcement agencies measure their gang  crime enforcement efforts by counting outputs such as gang activities  disrupted, arrests made, and enforcement activities conducted. However,  U.S. Attorneys have underreported their efforts in prosecuting gang- related cases as well as the amount of time spent working on gang-related  cases. EOUSA has taken steps to improve reporting on gang enforcement  efforts. For example, as a result of our review and in following up on its  2006 guidance on reporting case and time management information on  “gang-related” activities, the EOUSA Director issued guidance to USAOs in  February 2009 noting the underreporting of gang cases and gang-related  work time, and reinforcing the importance of tracking anti-gang activities.
subsections: section_title: Lack of a Shared Definition for Gangs Hinders Measurement of Gang Crime Enforcement across Federal Departments and Agencies
paragraphs: Gangs vary in size, ethnic composition, membership, and organizational  structure, which makes it challenging to develop a uniform definition of  “gang.” Federal law enforcement agencies have developed and used  different working definitions of a “gang” and other associated terms, such  as “gang-related.” However, these agencies lack a common or shared  definition for “gang” and related terms, hindering federal agencies’ efforts  to accurately measure and report on gangs, gang crime, and enforcement  activities.
Our prior work on performance management and measurement practices  for entities involved in implementing crosscutting programs has shown  that establishing common definitions can help to ensure that data used for  common purposes or assessing performance is, among other things,  consistently defined and interpreted. For example, we noted that a  broadly accepted definition of “homeland security” did not exist and that  some officials believed it was essential that the concept and related terms  be defined, particularly because homeland security initiatives are  crosscutting, and a clear definition promotes a common understanding of  operational plans and requirements, and can help avoid duplication of  effort and gaps in coverage. Common definitions promote more effective  agency and intergovernmental operations and permit more accurate  monitoring of homeland security expenditures at all levels of  government.
With respect to the definition of “gang,” DOJ and its components have  discussed needs and possibilities for developing a common or shared  definition for gangs in terms of numbers of members and organizational  characteristics, but have not yet reached consensus on such a shared  definition. DOJ developed a working definition of a “gang” as a group or  association of three or more persons who may have a common identifying  sign, symbol, or name and who are involved in criminal activity which  creates an atmosphere of fear and intimidation. The DOJ definition is used  by its component agencies such as ATF and FBI. ICE’s working definition  of a gang also specifies that three or more persons must be involved in  criminal activity; however, ICE’s definition requires that a gang crime be  an ongoing pattern of criminal activity committed on two or more separate  occasions. These working definitions are also distinct from a provision of  federal law, which, for specified purposes, defines a criminal street gang  as “an ongoing group, club, organization, or association of five or more  persons that has as one of its primary purposes the commission of one or  more of the described criminal offenses; the members of which engage, or  have engaged within the past 5 years, in a continuing series of described  offenses; and the activities of which affect interstate or foreign  commerce.
According to the FBI’s National Gang Strategy, a universal definition for a  “gang” would facilitate intelligence collection and sharing, target selection,  prosecution, and overall program management. The DOJ Criminal Division  Gang Unit Chief recognized that having a standard definition of “gang”  across agencies and departments would result in better statistics on how  agencies are performing on gang-related criminal investigations. Other  DOJ components also identified negative impacts resulting from the  absence of a shared definition. For example, in its 2009 National Gang  Threat Assessment, DOJ reported that one of the greatest impediments to  the collection of accurate gang-related data was the lack of a national  uniform definition of a gang used by all federal, state, and local law  enforcement agencies. EOUSA officials also said that lack of consistent  definitions of “gang member” and “gang-related crime” contributed to  underreporting of gang-related cases by USAOs; therefore, EOUSA may  not have complete data on its gang-related cases. Given the lack of a  common definition, federal agencies do not have consistent and  comprehensive data on the scope of the gang problem and the resources  allocated to anti-gang efforts.
According to DOJ and DHS agencies, lack of a shared definition of “gang”  and related terms stems, in part, from headquarters-level coordination  entities not attempting to reach consensus on how to use the term, and  DOJ’s desire to provide agencies with flexibility in defining gangs. Agency  officials said lack of a common definition did not adversely affect law  enforcement activity. According to the Chief of the Gang Unit, agencies  have not attempted to reach a consensus on a shared definition of “gang”  because, while consistent use of the term would improve the quality of  information available on federal efforts to combat gang violence, it would  not make a difference in the cases investigated and prosecuted by federal  agencies. For example, this official noted that a consistent definition of  “gang” has no impact on U.S. Attorneys’ decisions to prosecute cases nor  on the charges brought against gang-related defendants. Although lack of a  common definition for “gang,” may not negatively affect gang  investigations and prosecutions, the absence of a common or shared  definition for “gang” and related terms makes it difficult for federal  agencies to completely and accurately report on gang-related data.
section_title: DOJ Lacks a Departmentwide Performance Measure for Anti-Gang Efforts
paragraphs: At the department level, DOJ lacks a performance measure for anti-gang  efforts. Congress enacted the Government Performance and Results Act  of 1993 (GPRA) to have agencies focus on the performance and results of  programs, rather than on program resources and activities. The principles  of the act include establishing measurable goals and related measures,  developing strategies for achieving results, and identifying the resources  that will be required to achieve the goals. GPRA requires federal agencies  to develop strategic plans and performance goals and to identify resources  needed to achieve them, as well as for agencies to develop performance  measures to use in assessing the relevant outputs, service levels, and  outcomes of each program activity. The act does not require agencies to  use these principles for individual programs, but our related work and the  experience of leading organizations have shown that the principles are the  basic underpinning for performance-based management—a means to  strengthen program performance. Performance measures help federal  agencies to assess progress made on anti-gang efforts over time and  provide decision makers with key data to facilitate the resource allocation  process.
One of the three strategic goals in DOJ’s fiscal year 2007 to 2012 strategic  plan is the goal to “prevent crime, enforce federal laws and represent the  rights and interests of the American people.” A strategic objective under  this goal is to “reduce the threat, incidence, and prevalence of violent  crime.” As shown in figure 4, associated with this strategic objective are  various strategies, four of which are directly related to anti-gang efforts.
While DOJ has outlined a number of departmentwide performance  measures under the strategic goal, none relate specifically to gangs. undertook a process to identify long-term, measurable goals (key  indicators) that would show, at a high level, progress toward meeting the department’s strategic goals and objectives. Such measures are  departmentwide in nature as they represent priority areas for DOJ, and ar e  reflected in DOJ’s strategic plan, as well as other GPRA-related documents  such as the performance and accountability report. According to DOJ,  anti-gang efforts are folded into several of the performance measures,  including disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations and reducing the supply of drugs available for consumption in the United  States. Given that efforts to address gangs have been a major part of DO J’s  overall approach to combating violent crime, the lack of a departmentwide  performance measure or measures focused specifically on anti-gang   DOJ  efforts makes it difficult for the department and Congress to assess the  effectiveness of the department’s overall anti-gang effort.
section_title: DOJ and DHS Law Enforcement Agencies Have Established Measures to Assess Their Anti-Gang Efforts, and Outputs Measured Have Generally Increased since Fiscal Year 2003
paragraphs: It can be difficult for law enforcement agencies to measure outcomes or  results of their law enforcement efforts, including anti-gang efforts. Trying  to isolate the effects of federal law enforcement efforts from other factors  that affect outcomes but over which DOJ has little or no control presents a  formidable challenge because many factors contribute to the rise and fall  of crime rates including federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement  activities and sociological, economic, and other factors. DOJ and DHS law  enforcement agencies have established output measures, such as numbers  of arrests and convictions, for assessing their gang crime enforcement  efforts. Outputs provide status information about an initiative or program  in terms of completing an action in a specified time frame. For example,  the FBI uses disruptions and dismantlements as its primary gang  enforcement measures and also reports on gang-related convictions.  Among other things, ATF collects and reports information on gang-related  convictions, and DEA and ICE collect and report information on gang- related arrests. USAOs collect information on gang-related cases filed  and gang-related defendants.
Since fiscal year 2003, federal law enforcement agencies’ gang-related  measures have generally increased. DOJ and DHS officials attributed these  increases to the allocation of additional resources for anti-gang efforts  over the past few years. As shown in figure 5, since fiscal year 2003, the  number of FBI gang-related disruptions has increased from 166 to 716 in  fiscal year 2008.
As shown in figure 6, the number of FBI gang-related dismantlements has  remained fairly constant over the 6 years from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal  year 2008, ranging from a high of 67 dismantlements reported in fiscal year  2006 to a low of 40 dismantlements reported in fiscal year 2004.
In addition, FBI reports on gang-related convictions. From fiscal year 2003  through 2008, the FBI reported gang-related convictions that ranged from  a high of 2,762 in fiscal year 2008 to a low of 1,690 in fiscal year 2005.
Among other gang-related measures, ATF also reports the number of gang- related convictions by fiscal year. As shown in figure 7, since fiscal year  2003, the number of convictions has generally increased each year, and the  number of gang-related convictions in fiscal year 2008 was about 5 times  the number of such convictions in fiscal year 2003.
As shown in figure 8, DEA reported number of gang-related arrests have  also increased slightly from 1,823 in fiscal year 2003 to 2,038 in fiscal year  2008, but were at their highest level over the 6-year period in fiscal year  2006.
Among other gang-related measures, ICE reports on the number of gang- related criminal and administrative arrests by fiscal year. As shown in  figure 9, the number of criminal and administrative gang-related arrests  made by ICE has increased since fiscal year 2006, the first full fiscal year  that it compiled this information.
section_title: Underreporting of U.S. Attorneys’ Gang-Related Case and Time Management Information Has Resulted in Inaccurate Measurement of Federal Gang Enforcement Efforts, but EOUSA Has Taken Action to Improve Reporting
paragraphs: According to EOUSA officials, USAOs have underreported the number of  gang-related cases their offices handle and the amount of time they spend  working on these gang-related cases. For fiscal year 2008, EOUSA data  showed 536 cases filed in which a gang member had a participating role, a  number that officials said they believe underreports the extent to which  USAOs were prosecuting gang-related crimes. In 2006, EOUSA issued  guidance to USAO personnel for them to record information in National  Legal Information Office Network System (LIONS) and U.S. Attorney-5  (USA-5) systems on numbers of gang-related cases and matters and time  spent working on gang-related cases and matters to assist in tracking  resources and outputs for gang enforcement efforts. LIONS is the  centralized computer database used by USAOs and managed by EOUSA to  prepare annual statistical reports on the activities of the U.S. Attorneys by  types of cases opened, pending, and closed. USAO personnel use the USA- 5 system for time management, and EOUSA uses the system to analyze  and help manage assignment of resources to priority crime areas such as  counter-terrorism, narcotics, and organized crime.
EOUSA officials said that improvements to the data collection are needed.  A 2008 DOJ Office of Inspector General report found that caseload and  time management concerns contributed to reliance by EOUSA on  incomplete and inaccurate data to determine resource needs, allocate  positions, and respond to inquiries from Congress and other interested  parties. EOUSA officials identified three key challenges that impact the  reliability of all case and time management information. First, because  every attorney and support person in USAOs enters data into the  information systems, the potential for errors and omissions is great.  Second, the systems have become more complex to use as additional  codes are created to record information on cases and time spent on  various activities to respond to congressional interest, DOJ priorities, and  audits. Third, attorneys, historically, have not viewed data entry as a  priority, so they have not always been diligent about being sure that it is  done correctly. With regard to collecting data specifically on gang-related  cases, EOUSA officials identified other specific challenges. For example,  extra data entry steps are required to enter information on gangs into  LIONS and USA-5 beyond those steps required for inputting general case  information to the systems. Moreover, attorneys may not determine until  after initial information on a case is entered into LIONS that the case is  gang-related and then not go back into LIONS and revise the initial  information to show that defendants are gang-related. In addition, EOUSA  officials noted that attorneys do not have a common definition for what  constitutes a “gang” and “gang-related crime” that would allow for  consistent reporting.
EOUSA has taken steps to improve reporting on gang enforcement efforts.  As a result of our review and in following up on its 2006 guidance on  reporting case and time management information on “gang-related”  activities, the EOUSA Director issued guidance to USAOs in February 2009  noting the underreporting of gang cases and gang-related work time in  LIONS and USA-5, respectively, and reinforcing the importance of  providing accurate information on anti-gang activities in these systems. In  addition, EOUSA officials said that they continue to provide training to  USAO personnel on use of the information systems and the importance of  reporting complete and accurate information. Peer reviews conducted at  USAOs every 3 years also assess, among other operations, the systems in  place for entering information into LIONS and USA-5. This February 2009  guidance and training for USAOs are positive steps to help improve  USAOs’ collection and reporting of data on gang-related cases. GAO’s  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that  internal controls should generally be designed to assure that ongoing  monitoring occurs in the course of normal operations. Given that USAOs  have not consistently and accurately entered data on gang-related cases  into their case and time management systems as required by EOUSA’s  2006 guidance, in the absence of periodic monitoring of USAOs’ gang- related data, EOUSA cannot be certain that USAOs have followed the  guidance and accurately recorded gang-related data.
section_title: DOJ Has Funded Grant Programs to Test Anti-Gang Models, but Evaluations Have Reported Mixed Results in the Programs’ Sustainability and Contributions to Reductions in Crime
paragraphs: DOJ anti-gang grants involve not only law enforcement efforts, but also  efforts focused on gang prevention, intervention, and re-entry support for  former gang members who are released from prison. DOJ, through OJJDP,  has provided grant funding to localities across the nation under the Gang- Free Schools and Communities Program, Gang Reduction Program, and  the Gang Prevention Coordination Assistance Program primarily to test  models for communities to follow in implementing approaches for  addressing gang problems. DOJ, through, BJA, also provides grant funding  under the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative, which is the largest current  anti-gang program. Communities that received grants from OJJDP and BJA  had flexibility in determining how to allocate and use grant funding and  used the funding in support of different anti-gang approaches and  programs. Grant programs for which DOJ-sponsored evaluations were  completed reported mixed results for achieving reductions in gang crime  with benefits for grant recipients but little evidence that the programs  effectively reduced youth gang crime. Sustainability of grant programs  after federal funding ended has also been a concern.
subsections: section_title: DOJ Has Supported Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Enforcement Programs through Grant Programs That Emphasize Coordination and Collaboration
paragraphs: DOJ, the department with responsibility for administering anti-gang grants,  has pursued a strategy to assist communities in combating gang crime that  involves not only law enforcement efforts, but also efforts to prevent  young people from joining gangs, intervene and provide alternatives to  gang membership for youth who are gang-affiliated, and offer support  through re-entry activities for former gang members who are released  from prison and returning to their communities. In fiscal year 2008, DOJ,  through OJJDP and BJA, reported providing $14.9 million for three grant  programs specifically directed to combating gang activity, and  demonstration projects were still spending OJJDP funds for two other  anti-gang programs. Three of the current grant programs—Gang Free  Schools and Communities, Gang Reduction, and Gang Prevention  Coordination Assistance—are administered by OJJDP. The other program,  the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative, is administered by BJA. In  addition to allocating funding under these discretionary grant programs,  DOJ reported that it allocated about $8.1 million in fiscal year 2008 for  specific anti-gang programs, as directed by Congress. Grantees included  cities, counties, law enforcement agencies, and private organizations in  locations across the United States.
Officials of OJP noted many similarities in the grant initiatives funded by  OJJDP and BJA. Most importantly, officials said, both models emphasize  coordination and collaboration among law enforcement and social service  agencies at the federal, state, and local levels, as well as community and  faith-based groups that are involved in anti-gang efforts. However, the  officials also noted differences between the OJJDP and BJA grant  programs. For example, BJA does not specifically direct services to  juveniles, and the BJA grant program has a component to provide  assistance to former gang members released from prison and reentering  their communities that was not present in the OJJDP grant programs.
section_title: OJJDP Grants Tested a Communitywide Gang Program Model
paragraphs: DOJ has provided grant funding to localities across the nation under the  Gang-Free Schools and Communities Program, Gang Reduction Program,  and the Gang Prevention Coordination Assistance Program primarily to  test models for communities to follow in implementing approaches for  addressing gang problems. Since the 1980’s, OJJDP’s anti-gang programs  for juveniles were demonstrations or tests of the Comprehensive  Community-Wide Gang Program Model developed by Irving Spergel, a  researcher and professor at the University of Chicago. This model was  based on the results of an assessment directed by Dr. Spergel and funded  by OJJDP beginning in 1987 and was first implemented in the Little Village  neighborhood of Chicago in 1993. To develop the model, Dr. Spergel and  his research team conducted a national survey to attempt to identify every  promising community gang program in the United States and then identify  the common elements that were essential to each program’s successes  based on community representatives’ responses to the survey questions.
The research team identified the following five elements common to  promising community gang programs that became the comprehensive  model:    Community mobilization: Involvement of local citizens, including former  gang-involved youth; community groups; and agencies, as well as  coordination of programs and staff functions within and across agencies.
Opportunities provision: Development of a variety of specific education,  training, and employment programs targeting gang-involved youth.
Social intervention: Involvement of youth-serving agencies, schools, faith- based organizations, police, and other juvenile and criminal justice  organizations in reaching out to gang-involved youth and their families and  linking them to needed services.
Suppression: Use of procedures including close supervision and  monitoring of gang-involved youth by agencies of the juvenile and criminal  justice systems and also by community-based agencies, schools, and other  groups.
Organizational change and development: Development and  implementation of policies and procedures that result in the most effective  use of available and potential resources, within and across agencies, to  better address the gang problem.
In 1995, OJJDP awarded funds to five competitively-selected sites that  demonstrated the capacity to implement the model and then, in 1999,  OJJDP funded a rural gang initiative to test the model in four rural  communities with growing gang problems. Evaluations of the first five  sites to demonstrate the model determined that, while results varied from  location to location, when properly implemented, a combination of  prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies was successful in  reducing the gang problem. A national evaluation of the rural gang  initiative was not completed because of staffing issues on the evaluation  team.
OJJDP continued to test the model with two of the three programs that  were funded as of January 2009. The Gang-Free Schools and Communities  Program began in 2000 and the Gang Reduction Program began in 2003.  The third program, the Gang Prevention Coordination Assistance Program,  is not an additional test of Dr. Spergel’s Comprehensive Community-Wide  Gang Program Model. Rather, the program provides funds for  demonstration locations to hire a coordinator who will enhance the  coordination of existing community-based gang prevention and  intervention strategies that are closely aligned with local law enforcement  efforts. Table 2 provides information on these four anti-gang programs that  were currently funded as of January 2009.
section_title: BJA’s Comprehensive Anti- Gang Initiative Is the Largest Current Anti-Gang Program
paragraphs: The Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative administered by BJA is the largest  currently funded anti-gang program. The initiative was announced in 2006  as an extension of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), which has the  broader goal of reducing violent crime in communities. The  Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative was designed to build on successes in  the Project Safe Neighborhoods program by stressing the importance of  collaboration among federal, state, and local law enforcement and  community organizations. The initiative provided grant funding to sites in  the following three areas: (1) law enforcement; (2) programs to prevent  youth from joining gangs or remaining affiliated with gangs; and (3)  services for former gang members re-entering the community after prison  terms. Specifically, each community awarded funds under the initiative  received a total grant of $2.5 million to be used over 3 years. Of the $2.5  million in grant funding, $1 million was to be spent on law enforcement; $1  million on prevention and intervention activities; and $0.5 million to create  reentry assistance programs for transitional housing, job readiness and  placement assistance, and substance abuse and mental health treatment to  prisoners re-entering society. By incorporating these three components  into the grant program, DOJ intends to address gang membership and gang  violence at every stage. The following 12 locations received grant awards  from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2008:    Fiscal year 2006 grantees: Los Angeles, Calif.; Tampa, Fla.; Milwaukee,  Wisc.; Cleveland, Ohio; an area of Pennsylvania encompassing  communities from Easton to Lancaster, Pa.; and Dallas/Fort Worth, Tex.
Fiscal year 2007 grantees: Oklahoma City, Okla.; Raleigh/Durham, N.C.;  Rochester, N.Y.; and Indianapolis, Ind.
Fiscal year 2008 grantees: Chicago, Ill., and Detroit, Mich.
section_title: Communities Have Used Federal Anti-Gang Grants for Different Approaches and Programs
paragraphs: Communities that received grants from OJJDP and BJA had flexibility in  determining how to allocate and use grant funding and used the funding in  support of different anti-gang approaches and programs, including  intervention activities directed specifically to at-risk youth and prevention  activities designed to benefit a range of residents in the targeted  communities. Examples of activities initiated by OJJDP-funded  communities in locations we visited include:    A summer program with activities for youth and families at city parks that  stayed open until midnight.—Los Angeles, Calif.
A full range of services for gang-affiliated offenders who had been  incarcerated and were returning to the community. Services available  included training in adult literacy and anger management, substance abuse  prevention, housing assistance, and job placement.—Dallas, Tex.
Parenting classes and prenatal and infant health care services.—   Youth mentoring programs.—Durham, N.C.
The way communities chose to distribute grant funds also differed. Some  communities chose to distribute a larger amount of funds to a small  number of subgrantees and participants, whereas other communities  chose to distribute smaller funding amounts to a larger number of sub- grantees and/or serve large numbers of people. Officials in Pittsburgh, Pa.,  and Richmond, Va., who participated in OJJDP’s Gang-Free Schools and  Communities Program and the Gang Reduction Program, respectively,  provided examples of how funds were allocated in their communities.
In Pittsburgh, Pa., the Gang-Free Schools and Communities project served  about 100 boys in the area where the highest incidents of violent gang  activity were reported. This target area was also heavily affected by  poverty, unemployment, and social disorganization. The participants were  identified by the schools or other community organizations as being “gang- involved” and were provided with prevention and intervention services.  Services include an after-school program and a mentoring program, as  well as substance abuse treatment and employment services.
In Richmond, Va., the Gang Reduction and Intervention Program was  broader in scope, serving youth with a range of services from medical care  to job training based on their needs. Officials stressed the importance of  the assessment phase of the program. The officials developed a resource  inventory tool to assess resource availability and gaps that has been  shared with other communities nationwide. Richmond was using both  proven and new programs in two target areas of the city to work on gang  prevention and intervention issues. For example, the officials said that one  of their subgrantees, the Boys and Girls Club, had a proven track record in  successfully implementing gang prevention and intervention programs, but  that they had also supported more than 60 other promising programs  through the grant, ranging from small faith-based groups to larger  community organizations. The grant had been used to provide services to  a large number of young people and other residents, and it resulted in  collaborative partnerships among social service agencies and community  service providers and, to an extent, between law enforcement and social  service agencies. Figure 10 shows several services and programs that  received funding under the grant.
Communities we visited that received funding under the Comprehensive  Anti-Gang Initiative also were using, or planned to use, the grants for a  wide variety of activities. For example, in Dallas, Tex., program officials  said that gang prevention activities would take place primarily in schools.  The officials planned to use the law enforcement component of the  initiative for police overtime for operations designed to get gang members  off of the streets in targeted areas. The re-entry component funds were to  be used to implement a comprehensive strategy to assist offenders to  prepare for release while still in prison and then offer services on their  release from prison. In Tampa, Fla., the city’s “Gang Out” program  provided many prevention activities. For example, in June 2008, more than  1,200 at-risk youth aged 7 to 14 in nine neighborhoods identified as “hot  spots” for gang activity were participating in “Gang Out” programs.  Children were referred to the program by law enforcement, social  services, school officials, parents, or others, and they were provided  access to a variety of structured services and activities according to their  needs (i.e. mental health counseling, tutoring, mentoring, field trips, and  participation on sports teams). Tampa officials said they were using the  law enforcement portion of the grant to help pay overtime for law  enforcement task forces investigating gang crime, and to develop a  database to facilitate information sharing among federal, state, and local  law enforcement agencies. Re-entry funding was being used to provide  counseling, job placement assistance, housing, and other services to ex- gang members about to exit prison and return to the Tampa area. Figure  11 shows one young Gang-Out participant at work on an anti-gang mural  and the mural the young people completed.
section_title: DOJ Reported Lessons Learned and Grant Recipients Reported Benefits, but Projects Had Mixed Results and Were Difficult to Sustain
paragraphs: DOJ sponsored evaluations of OJJDP grant programs that reported both  benefits and challenges faced by communities in implementing  comprehensive anti-gang models and awarded a contract to Michigan  State University for a national evaluation of BJA’s Comprehensive Anti- Gang Initiative. Cosmos Corporation completed an evaluation of the Gang  Free Schools and Communities program in November 2007. The Urban  Institute completed an interim evaluation of the Gang Reduction Program  in May 2008. The final evaluation of the Gang Reduction Program was not  completed in April 2009 as scheduled because OJJDP officials said that the  evaluators were waiting to receive additional data from one demonstration  site and anticipated that the evaluation would be completed in 2009. The  officials did not provide a revised estimated completion date for the  evaluation. Officials said that no evaluation component of the Gang  Prevention Coordination Assistance Program was funded because funding  levels awarded to communities for gang prevention coordinator positions  were relatively small amounts of $200,000 or less. With respect to BJA’s  Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative, Michigan State University is expected  to complete an interim report in late 2009 and provide it to NIJ, the OJP  component handling the evaluation of the program.
According to DOJ-sponsored evaluations, grant recipients benefited in  various ways from the grant programs. First, grant recipients received  federal funds to implement gang enforcement, prevention, intervention,  and reentry programs that they might otherwise not have been able to  implement. These programs benefited those individuals who participated  in them. For example, the evaluation of the Gang-Free Schools and  Communities Program found that each of the four communities awarded  grants implemented the programs according to requirements by providing  outreach and social services to at least 100 youth in targeted communities  and neighborhoods. The youth served ranged in age from 12 to 24 years  with a median age of 16.2 years, and 75 percent of the participating youth  were gang members. Second, grant recipients received technical  assistance and support from OJJDP and BJA to implement their  approaches to addressing gangs. For example, the interim evaluation of  the Gang Reduction Program found that significant implementation  successes were achieved at all four of the sites. Each grantee developed  strategic plans consistent with target area needs and problems and  achieved broad participation in planning the program. Communication  about gang issues within the target area and among participating  organizations generally improved over the course of the program. Third, as  a result of having federal funds and participating in a grant program, sites  obtained needed leverage to bring together a wide range of stakeholders,  such as law enforcement agencies, social service providers, and faith- based and community groups, to address communities’ gang problems.
Despite these benefits, the projects reported mixed results in achieving  reductions in gang crime. For example, evaluations of OJJDP-funded  programs—the Gang-Free Schools and Communities Program and the  Gang Reduction Program—showed that, while grantees were successful in  doing strategic planning, forming community partnerships, and  implementing programs, and their experiences offered insights on best  practices, they found little evidence that the programs effectively reduced  youth gang crime. In particular, the Gang-Free Schools and Communities  Program evaluation concluded that while some measures of gang crime  decreased and each location had anecdotal evidence of success with some  individuals, overall, the program had little positive effect on the targeted  youth who participated in the programs. Similarly, the preliminary  evaluation of the Gang Reduction Program found that the program had not  achieved its goal of reducing gang crime. One location, Los Angles, Calif.,  had a decrease in gang crime rates. The other locations had no changes or  slight increases in gang crime after program implementation.
In addition, communities that received funding under OJJDP’s grants to  demonstrate the Comprehensive Community-Wide Anti-Gang Model faced  difficulties in sustaining their programs after federal funding ended. No  sites that received grant funds under the Rural Gang Initiative sustained  the project with local funding or new grants after federal funding ended.  Likewise, by 2004, all of the communities that had received funding under  the Gang-Free Communities program had used all of the federal funding  allocated and could not continue the programs with other funding sources.  Of communities that received funding under the Gang-Free Schools  program, Cleveland, Ohio did not sustain the program, however, as of  March 2009, three other communities that received grants were sustaining  at least some parts of their programs with other sources of funding. For  example, the Houston, Tex., and North Miami Beach, Fla., programs  received city funds; and the Pittsburgh, Pa., program received funding  from the School Board and Project Safe Neighborhoods. The project  coordinator in Pittsburgh, Pa., noted that sustainability is a great  challenge. According to the coordinator, sustaining a program that  targeted and enrolled about 100 gang-involved youth who lived or attended  school in the target area once federal funding expires was definitely  possible. However, expanding the program was a concern. For example,  the coordinator wanted the project to be able to serve girls in addition to  boys and increase efforts to provide services to youth reentering the  community after being detained in juvenile facilities, but she had not  identified funding sources to do so. Finally, OJJDP reported that very little  planning for sustainability of projects and services funded by the Gang  Reduction Program had taken place by 2006; however, in 2007, OJJDP  reported that three of the four communities that were awarded funding  under the Gang Reduction Program had taken steps toward sustaining at  least portions of the initiative beyond the federal funding period. For  example, in North Miami Beach, Fla., the initiative was incorporated as a  nonprofit organization in 2007 and in Richmond, Va., partnerships with the  Office of the Attorney General and Richmond Police Department ensured  that some efforts would be sustained.
DOJ has not yet made decisions about whether to expand existing anti- gang grant programs or fund new programs in the future. In particular,  OJJDP and BJA officials told us that the department has not yet made  decisions about priorities and availability of funding for future anti-gang  programs. As of March 2009, OJJDP officials said that in the short term, no  plans are in process for funding future demonstration projects of the  Comprehensive Community-Wide Gang Program Model because OJJDP  plans to use the funding it has available to provide information and  technical assistance to communities nationwide to assist them in  implementing community-based anti-gang efforts using lessons learned  from the demonstration projects that have been completed or are  underway. To this end, in 2008, DOJ published a report on best practices  to address community gang problems based on OJJDP’s comprehensive  gang model and lessons learned from the demonstration projects. The  report is available to interested communities through OJJDP’s Web site,  and OJJDP officials said that they had discussed aspects of the report with  officials of communities that were interested in implementing the model.  According to OJJDP officials, communities in Nevada, Oklahoma, Utah,  and North Carolina are developing anti-gang programs based on OJJDP’s  recommendations without federal funding, and have consulted OJJDP for  information on best practices and lessons learned. Since these programs  are all in the planning stages, it is too early to tell whether they will be  successfully implemented, reduce youth gang crime, and be sustainable by  the communities without federal funding. With regard to the  Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative, the BJA-sponsored evaluation of sites  funded under this program has not yet been completed, but the evaluation  will include assessments of programs’ outcomes and sustainability, among  other things. As of April 2009, BJA officials said that the agency does not  currently plan to fund additional locations under the initiative in the short  term and that results achieved in the communities currently funded under  the program would be considered in making any future determination of  whether to expand federal funding for the initiative to additional  communities, and whether it is feasible for communities to implement the  model without federal funding.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Gangs have spread across community, state, and regional boundaries to  become a national problem, requiring federal agencies to strengthen their  coordination and collaboration on anti-gang programs and initiatives to  combat gang crime and violence. Carrying out gang enforcement,  prevention, and intervention efforts that involve multiple agencies with  varying jurisdictions and missions is not an easy task, especially since  agencies have limited resources and, in most cases, competing priorities.  Federal agencies have taken positive actions to coordinate their anti-gang  programs and initiatives and share information about gang threats and  multijurisdictional investigations. However, these actions have not  addressed all possible gaps or unnecessary overlaps in anti-gang  programs, nor have they addressed all of the challenges identified in this  report. Further actions by DOJ and DHS would enhance and sustain their  collaboration in combating gangs. In particular, differentiation of the roles,  responsibilities, and missions of headquarters-level gang coordination  entities—including the MS-13 National Gang Task Force, NGIC, and  GangTECC—could enhance DOJ and DHS’s collaboration in combating  gang crime and reduce the potential for expending resources on  overlapping missions. Moreover, DOJ and DHS could strengthen their  efforts to more fully involve ICE in the task force review and approval  process. In addition, to assist Congress, federal agencies, and other  stakeholders in understanding and assessing gang enforcement efforts,  additional actions are needed on the part of DOJ and DHS to improve  performance measurement and evaluation. More specifically, consensus is  needed on a shared definition of “gang” and other related terms to help  federal law enforcement agencies improve their collection, evaluation, and  reporting on gang enforcement efforts. For DOJ, a departmentwide  performance measure for gangs is needed to help the department and  Congress track the progress of the department’s overall gang enforcement  efforts. Additionally, at a component level, additional monitoring of the  extent to which USAOs track and record gang-related case information is  needed to ensure accurate reporting of such information within DOJ and  to external stakeholders, such as Congress.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To strengthen federal agencies’ coordination of anti-gang efforts; help  reduce gaps or unnecessary overlaps in federal entities’ roles and  responsibilities; and assist the department, Congress, and other  stakeholders in assessing federal gang enforcement efforts, we  recommend that the Attorney General take the following three actions:    direct DOJ law enforcement agencies that lead or participate in the  headquarters-level anti-gang coordination entities—including GangTECC,  NGIC, the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee, and the MS-13 National  Gang Task Force—to, in consultation with DHS, reexamine and reach  consensus on the entities’ roles and responsibilities, including identifying  and addressing gaps and unnecessary overlaps;    develop a departmentwide, strategic-level performance measure for the  department’s anti-gang efforts; and    direct EOUSA to periodically review gang-related case information  entered by USAOs into the case and time management systems to ensure  more accurate and complete reporting of USAOs’ gang-related cases.
We also recommend that the Attorney General and the Secretary of  Homeland Security jointly take the following two actions:    ensure that ICE is part of the process for reviewing and approving the  creation of new anti-gang task forces and  jointly develop a common or shared definition of “gang” for use by DOJ,  DHS, and component agencies for reporting purposes.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In providing written comments on a draft of this report, DOJ concurred  with three of our five recommendations and stated that it will consider the  other two recommendations. DHS concurred with the two  recommendations directed to DHS. DOJ and DHS provided information on  steps they were taking or planning to take to address the  recommendations.
First, DOJ concurred with our recommendation to, in consultation with  DHS, reexamine the roles and responsibilities of four DOJ headquarters  anti-gang coordinating entities, including identifying and addressing any  potential gaps and unnecessary overlaps. DOJ commented that this role is  performed by the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee and that the  department will continue to work with ICE, the headquarters-level anti- gang entities, and other DOJ agencies to identify and address gaps and  unnecessary overlaps.
Second, DOJ stated that the department will consider the recommendation  to develop a departmentwide strategic-level performance measure for its  anti-gang efforts as part of its strategic planning process. DOJ stated that it  is in the initial stages of developing its next strategic plan and that it is too  early in the planning process to state for certain that such a measure  would be included. DOJ commented that senior leadership will consider  including such a measure and that it recognizes that gangs are a major  factor in many crimes and that it is possible that raising the visibility of  DOJ’s efforts to combat gangs would weigh in favor of including such a  measure. Given that efforts to address gangs have been a major part of  DOJ’s overall approach to combating violent crime, we continue to believe  that a departmentwide performance measure for gangs would help DOJ  and Congress track the progress of the department’s overall anti-gang  efforts.
Third, DOJ concurred with our recommendation for EOUSA to review the  case and time management systems of the USAOs to ensure more accurate  and complete reporting of their gang-related cases and noted that  beginning in fiscal year 2010, USAOs will be specifically required to enter  gang-related information into the data management systems accurately  and in a timely manner. According to DOJ, compliance with this  requirement will be measured in performance evaluations of each USAO  approximately every 3 years by evaluation and review staff. We believe  this is a positive step that could help DOJ strengthen the completeness and  accuracy of USAOs’ data on gang-related cases.
Fourth, DOJ and DHS concurred with our recommendation to ensure that  ICE is part of the process for reviewing the creation of new anti-gang task  forces. DOJ and DHS said they would work on implementing a procedure  for reviewing the creation of new anti-gang task forces, and DOJ outlined  steps it has begun to take to address this recommendation. Specifically, in  a letter dated July 17, 2009, the Deputy Attorney General formally  extended an invitation to ICE to be a member of the Anti-Gang  Coordination Committee and its Taskforce Review Subcommittee and to  be afforded the same level of review as participating DOJ law enforcement  agencies.
Finally, DOJ agreed that a shared definition of “gang” for use by DOJ, DHS,  and component agencies for reporting purposes would facilitate data  collection and evaluation efforts and stated that it would broaden the  discussion on whether to develop such a common definition to include  DHS, and, specifically, ICE; however DOJ also noted some technical and  operational challenges to implementing a uniform definition, including  consideration of possible implementation costs. DOJ noted that it will use  the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee as a forum to jointly consider a  common definition or otherwise develop an effective performance  measurement system for anti-gang activities. DHS concurred with the  recommendation. We agree that it is important for DOJ to consider the  costs in implementing a common definition for “gang” as it explores this  issue with DHS through the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee.  We  continue to believe that a shared definition of “gang” would help agencies  improve their collection, evaluation, and reporting of gang enforcement  efforts.
DOJ’s and DHS’s written comments are contained in appendices V and VI,  respectively. We also incorporated technical comments provided by DOJ,  DHS, and component agencies as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General and the  Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, selected congressional  committees, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Please  contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 if you or your staff have any  questions concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Nature and Scope of Gang and Gang Crime in the United States
subsections: section_title: Department of Justice Assessments Identify Gang Crime Problems Nationwide from Large Cities to Rural Communities
paragraphs: Historically, gang crime has been associated with urban areas of the  country. However, as shown in figure 12, Department of Justice (DOJ)  National Youth Gang Surveys from 2002 through 2006 showed that youth  gangs are a problem not only for inner cities, but for surrounding suburbs  and rural areas, as well.
The surveys found that respondents who reported gang problems in their  jurisdictions reported increases in various categories of gang-related  crime, as well. More than half of respondents with gang problems reported  increases from 2004 to 2006 in gang-related aggravated assaults and drug  sales. Some respondents also reported increases in gang-related robberies,  larceny/theft, burglary, and auto theft. In 2007, jurisdictions reported the  highest annual estimate of youth gang problems since before 2000, with 86  percent of law enforcement agencies serving larger cities, 50 percent of  suburban counties, 35 percent of smaller cities, and 15 percent of rural  counties reporting that they experienced problems.
In 2005 and 2009, DOJ reported on the gang threat nationally and by region  to assist policymakers and law enforcement agency administrators  understand the dimensions of the problem and assist them in facilitating  policy and allocating resources to address it. The following were some  trends the reports identified.    58 percent of state and local law enforcement agencies reported criminal  gangs were active in their jurisdictions in 2008 compared with 45 percent  of state and local agencies in 2004.
Local street gangs, or neighborhood-based street gangs, remained a  significant threat because they continue to account for the largest number  of gangs nationwide. Most engage in violence in conjunction with a variety  of crimes, including retail-level drug distribution.
Gangs remain the primary retail-level distributors of most illicit drugs  throughout the United States. They are also increasingly distributing  wholesale-level quantities of marijuana and cocaine in most urban and  suburban communities.
Criminal gangs commit as much as 80 percent of the crime in many  communities, according to law enforcement officials throughout the  nation.
Gang members are becoming more sophisticated in their use of computers  and technology. These new tools are used to communicate, facilitate  criminal activity, and avoid detection by law enforcement. Many gang  members use the Internet to recruit new members and to communicate  with members in other areas of the United States and in foreign countries.
Forming multi-agency task forces and joint community groups is an  effective way to combat the problem. However, decreases in funding and  staffing to many task forces have created new challenges for communities.
section_title: Composition, Size and Criminal Activities of Four Major National-Level Street Gangs
paragraphs: Major national-level street gangs include the Bloods, Crips, and Mara  Salvatrucha, or MS 13, and 18th Street. Brief descriptions of the  composition, size, and criminal activities of these four national gangs  follow.
Bloods. Bloods members are predominantly African American males.  Membership estimates range from 5,000 to 20,000 members in 37 states.  Bloods members are involved in distribution of drugs, including cocaine;  methamphetamine; heroin; and marijuana, and they are involved in many  other criminal activities, including assault, auto theft, burglary, car  jacking, drive-by shooting, extortion, homicide, and identification theft.
Crips. Crips members are also predominantly African American males.  Membership is estimated to be 30,000 to 35,000 members in 41 states.  Crips members engage in street-level distribution of powder and crack  cocaine, marijuana, and PCP and are involved in other criminal activity  such as assault, auto theft, burglary, and homicide.
MS-13. MS-13 is an Hispanic street gang estimated to have 8,000 to 10,000  members in at least 38 states. MS-13 is an international gang with an  estimated 30,000 to 50,000 members worldwide. Traditionally in the United  States the gang consisted of loosely affiliated groups; however, law  enforcement officials have reported the coordination of criminal activity  among MS-13 members operating in Atlanta, Dallas, Los Angeles, New  York, and Washington, D.C. metropolitan areas. MS-13 members smuggle  drugs into the United States and transport and distribute them throughout  the country. Some members are also involved in alien smuggling, assault,  drive-by shooting, homicide, identification theft, prostitution operations,  robbery, and weapons trafficking.  18th Street. 18th Street formed in Los Angeles, Calif., but now has an  estimated membership of 30,000 to 50,000 in 28 states. In California, about  80 percent of its members are illegal aliens from Mexico and Central  America. Gang members are involved in retail-level distribution of cocaine  and marijuana, and, to a lesser extent, heroin and methamphetamine. They  also commit assault, auto theft, car jacking, robbery, identification fraud,  and homicide.
section_title: Impacts of National-Level Street Gangs and Local Neighborhood Gangs in Localities Visited
paragraphs: Interviewees in 8 of the 15 localities we visited reported the presence of  organized national-level street gangs in their communities in addition to  local neighborhood gangs, while officials in 8 localities said that local  neighborhood gangs were the primary source of gang-related crime. In all  of the localities, officials attributed a wide range of violent crimes and  other criminal activities to gangs.
Interviewees in Baltimore, Md.; Los Angeles, Calif.; Chicago, Ill.; Dallas,  Tex.; Durham, N.C.; Brooklyn and Manhattan, N.Y.; and Newark, N.J., said  that organized national-level gangs are active in their communities. The  level of organization and hierarchy of the national gangs varied from  location to location.
The following are three examples of descriptions by interviewees of how  national gangs impact their communities:  Los Angeles, Calif.: The city and the eight surrounding counties  have about 150,000 gang members linked to 1,000 different gangs.  The gangs are very aggressive and violent. Twenty years ago, the  Bloods and Crips were the national gangs in control. Now, MS-13  and other Hispanic street gangs, as well as Asian and East  European gangs are emerging with sophisticated structures like  organized crime groups. Gangs are developing increasingly  sophisticated tools to engage in criminal enterprise. For example,  Eastern European and other ethnic gangs appear to be active in  white collar crimes such as identify theft and credit card and  health care fraud. Hispanic gangs have affiliated with international  drug trafficking organizations, and an African American gang is  engaged in extortion of money from small business owners.
Chicago, Ill.: The city has a long history of gang activity that spans  generations. The police department has identified families in which  grandparents, parents, and children had all affiliated with gangs.  The city police estimate 70,000 to 100,000 gang members in the  area. Some gangs have as many as 10,000 members. Gangs here are  large, territorial, and highly organized with written rules and a  reporting structure to national gang leaders. Gangs control the  retail drug trade. Gangs have corrupted local officials by having  members serve as election workers at polling places. The city has  experienced cases of police corruption by gang members and gang  members employed by the police department and prisons.
Newark, N.J.: Ten different sects of Bloods have been identified  here. They fight each other but occasionally align against the Crips.  The relationship between drugs and gangs is strengthening. Gang  membership is rising as various gangs establish territory and  relationships with narcotics trafficking markets in urban areas and  more recently establishing transportation routes to suburban and  rural markets in other states.
Interviewees in the other 7 of the 15 localities we visited described the  gangs in their area as primarily neighborhood or street-based. Officials in  Atlanta, Ga.; Cleveland, Ohio; Milwaukee, Wisc.: Pittsburgh, Pa.; Raleigh,  N.C.; Richmond, Va.; and Tampa, Fla., said that gangs present in their  areas were primarily local street gangs. In some areas the local gangs  loosely identified with national organizations by, for example, wearing the  colors of the Bloods; however officials said that they did not communicate  closely with the national gang hierarchies. Officials described gang  organizations that were fluid and rapidly changing. Officials said that local  gangs can literally take over neighborhoods. They are no less violent than  national gang members. For example, officials in Newark, N.J., and  Brooklyn, N.Y., said that in areas where both national and street gangs  were present, the local gangs were violent and intimidating enough to hold  their territory against the national gangs. The following are three examples  from officials we interviewed of the composition, size, and criminal  activities of the neighborhood gangs in their localities, and how they  impact their communities.
Pittsburgh, Pa.: The big problem here is with neighborhood street  gangs that are involved in drug trafficking and retaliation against  witnesses and rival gangs. A recently completed survey determined  that affiliations with national gangs do not exist. Gangs are  relatively small, usually 10 to 25 members, and are typically  affiliated by neighborhood or street block. Some gang sets have  adopted the names of streets where their members live. Gang  members are predominantly young, with ages from early teens to  twenties.
Richmond, Va.: Gangs are widespread in the city. The major  problem is “home-grown” gang members, many of whom have gone  to prison and come back to the community. Because they see no  other options, siblings and children of older gang members follow  in family footsteps and join local gangs. Crimes committed by  these groups include vandalism, murder, assault, and drive-by- shootings.
Tampa, Fla.: The gang problem is mostly local. Some gangs operate  within the city limits and some in the outlying county. The entire  area has about 3,000 gang members. Gang members who live  outside of the area also come into the beach, so the police and  sheriff’s departments spend time tracking gangs that are not local.  Gangs cross geographic, racial, and cultural boundaries. They are  not closely affiliated with national organizations, although national  gang groups do come through the area. The gangs are extremely  violent as they fight for control of turf and control of the drug  trade. Newly arriving immigrants, who tend to carry large amounts  of cash and face language barriers, are susceptible to being  victimized and may turn to Hispanic gangs for protection and  support.
section_title: Appendix II: Federal Statutes Used in Gang- Related Prosecutions
paragraphs: Most criminal cases involving gang members are prosecuted by state and  local prosecutors; however the Department of Justice (DOJ), through its  Criminal Division and U.S. Attorneys, brings federal charges under a  number of different federal statutes against gang members. U.S. Attorneys  prosecute most federal gang-related crimes, and the Criminal Division  prosecutes or assists U.S. Attorneys in prosecuting gang cases of national  significance or those that involve national gangs operating across United  States Attorneys Office (USAO) jurisdictions (e.g. Bloods and MS-13).  Officials in 15 USAOs we visited said that U.S. Attorneys’ guidelines on the  types of gang cases that warrant federal prosecution are generally those  involving the most violent and dangerous gang members and gangs located  in the USAO districts.
Federal statutes under which gangs members are prosecuted fall into three  categories:    criminal drug, firearm, and other violent crime statutes where the unlawful  acts are not specifically related to membership in a gang;   broad statutes under which criminal enterprises—including gangs—may    enhanced penalties added to the criminal convictions of defendants who  are gang members.
subsections: section_title: Federal Prosecutors Most Frequently Reported Using Criminal Drug, Firearm, and Violent Crime Statutes to Prosecute Gang Members
paragraphs: Officials in the 15 USAOs we visited most frequently reported prosecuting  gang members under statutes for offenses involving drugs, firearms, and  violent crimes. These offenses are related to the criminal acts the gang  members have committed and not their gang membership specifically.  Officials noted the following reasons that they frequently prosecuted gang  cases under these criminal statutes:    evidence to support such charges is relatively easy for juries to  investigative and prosecutive resources required to build the cases are not  as great as for organized criminal enterprise prosecutions; and   penalties and prison sentences for convictions can be substantial.
Table 3 lists the offense and code section, the statutory elements of the  offense, and penalties for conviction for the federal statutes USAO  officials said they used frequently to prosecute gang members.
section_title: Organized Crime Statutes Allow for Focus on the Criminal Activities of Entire Gangs, but Prosecutions Can Be Resource Intensive, Time Consuming, and Complex
paragraphs: In some instances, USAOs use two broad federal statutes—the Racketeer  Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act and the Violent Crimes  in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) Act—to prosecute criminal enterprise  organizations. While RICO was originally enacted to dismantle organized  crime groups such as the Mafia, prosecutors have successfully used it to  bring cases against members of organized gangs. RICO prohibits the  commission of a pattern of racketeering activity to invest in, maintain an  interest in, or participate in, directly or indirectly, an enterprise, the  activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; it also prohibits  conspiracy to commit any of these activities. The second statute, VICAR,  was intended to supplement RICO and makes it unlawful to commit any of  a list of violent crimes in return for anything of pecuniary value from an  enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, or for the purpose of joining,  remaining with, or increasing a position in such an enterprise. The listed  violent crimes are murder, kidnapping, maiming, assault with a dangerous  weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and threatening to  commit a crime of violence and may be violations of state or federal law.  The statute also makes unlawful attempt and conspiracy to commit the  listed crimes. To use these statutes to prosecute gangs, prosecutors must  prove several elements. In particular, prosecutors must prove that the  gang functions as an “enterprise”  through evidence of an ongoing  organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various  associates function as a continuing unit. This may be accomplished by  showing that the gang holds meetings, has a specific, stated mission,  collects dues, and has a decision-making structure, among other  characteristics.
DOJ requires that prosecutions under these statutes be coordinated with  DOJ Criminal Division and approved for prosecution by the Criminal  Division’s Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. In addition, the staff  of that section has developed extensive manuals on RICO and VICAR to  assist federal prosecutors in the preparation for and litigation of cases  involving those statutes.
According to USAO officials we spoke to, RICO and VICAR are tools for  prosecution that can disrupt and destroy entire gang structures. One  USAO official explained that the organized crime statutes allow  prosecutors to tell the entire story of a gang’s existence and criminal  activity in an indictment and later to a jury. The official noted that every  aspect of the gang and its history—including how it acquired its territory;  how it makes and disposes of its money; how it uses coded language, hand  signals, and graffiti; and what crimes it has committed and why—can be  offered in one coherent story during the trial. Gang cases prosecuted  under an organized crime statute generally have more co-defendants than  cases prosecuted under narcotics trafficking, firearms, and other violent  crime statutes. The officials explained that such cases allow prosecutors  to reach deep into the gang hierarchy to the top leaders of the gang  organizations and are generally well-publicized by the news media.
Violations of the criminal provisions of RICO and VICAR carry significant  penalties. A gang member convicted under RICO is subject to up to 20  years imprisonment, or up to life imprisonment if the violation is based on  racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes life  imprisonment. Defendants also remain subject to conviction and  sentencing for the underlying or predicate crimes that make up the  racketeering activity. Additionally, the statute provides for the forfeiture of  property maintained or acquired in violation of the Act. Under VICAR,  conviction may result in up to life imprisonment depending on the  predicate offense committed; VICAR murder is a death-eligible offense.  Gang members convicted of crimes under RICO or VICAR may be fined up  to $250,000. RICO also contains a civil provision that allows people who  have been injured by a RICO defendant to recover damages in federal  court.
USAO interviewees also cited limitations to the use of RICO and VICAR  statutes. RICO and VICAR cases are resource-intensive, time consuming,  and complex, according to some interviewees, and only suited to  prosecutions of highly structured gang organizations; not the local street  gangs that are the predominant gang crime concern in some localities.
Although U.S. Attorneys do not maintain data on the number of gang- related organized crime cases they accept for prosecution, the total  number of organized crime cases they accept for prosecution is a small  percentage of the overall caseload. In fiscal year 2007, a total of 217  organized crime cases of all types, including gangs and traditional groups,  against 483 defendants were filed in the United States, about 0.4 percent of  the total cases filed—and that figure was an increase of 39 percent from  the previous year.
A case charged under organized crime statutes in Los Angeles, Calif.,  provides an example of the large commitment of time and investigative  and prosecution resources that are required for these complex cases that  result in indictments of leaders and members of large gang operations.
A 3-year investigation of the Florencia 13 Gang in Southern Los Angeles,  Calif., resulted in indictments against 102 defendants on RICO and  narcotics trafficking charges. As of January 2009, 76 defendants had been  convicted with other cases pending trial. The defendants were alleged to  be part of a controlled drug distribution operation. Gang leaders were  charged with collecting fees and/or rent from gang members and others  engaged in criminal conduct in areas controlled by the Florencia 13 Gang.  Numerous federal and local law enforcement agencies were involved in  the investigation. Federal agencies included FBI, DEA, ATF, USMS, ICE,  and IRS. Local agencies included Los Angeles City Police Department, Los  Angeles County Sheriff’s and Probation Departments, and local police  departments in five other area towns.
section_title: DOJ Officials Said Enhanced Penalties for Gang Membership Are Generally Not Used Because the Elements Are Difficult to Prove
paragraphs: As part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,  Congress established an enhanced penalty for gang-related crimes by  authorizing the imposition of an additional term of imprisonment of up to  10 years for participation in certain federal felonies involving drugs or  violence by members of criminal street gangs. Some USAO officials we  visited said that the sentencing enhancement for gang members was  generally not used because the elements of proof required are difficult for  prosecutors to establish. For the defendant to be subject to the  enhancement, prosecutors must prove several elements. At the outset,  there are four components required to establish the “criminal street gang”  under the statute: (1) an ongoing group, club, organization, or association  of five or more persons; (2) that has as one of its primary purposes the  commission of one or more specified felonies involving violence or drugs  in violation of federal law; (3) the members of which engage, or have  engaged within the past 5 years, in a continuing series of the same  specified felonies; and (4) the activities of the criminal street gang affect  interstate or foreign commerce. In addition, prosecutors must establish  that the defendant committed the crime for which he was charged to  promote the felonious activities of the gang or maintain or increase his  position in the gang; that the defendant had been convicted of another  crime of violence or drug offense arising to a felony under state or federal  law within the past 5 years; and that the defendant participates in a  criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage or have  engaged, in a “continuing series” of federal felonies involving violence or  drugs.
section_title: Appendix III: Important Elements of an Approach to Combating Gangs
paragraphs: Federal and local agencies, research experts, and others we interviewed,  as well as research we reviewed, identified important elements for  consideration in developing and implementing an approach for combating  gangs. Among others, these elements include:  thorough assessment and understanding of local gang problem(s);   ongoing communication and coordination among stakeholders;    comprehensive and varied efforts (i.e., prevention, intervention,  suppression, and re-entry);   public and community outreach and visibility for programs;    plans for sustainability of programs and efforts; and commitment to long-   performance monitoring, evaluation, and feedback incorporation.
Presence of these elements does not guarantee that an approach to  addressing gangs will be successful. These elements are important for  federal, state, and local agencies and communities to consider in  developing and implementing anti-gang approaches. In addition, these  elements should not be considered as an exhaustive list of items for  agencies and communities to consider in developing their anti-gang  approaches. Rather, these elements were identified as key considerations  by the agencies and individuals we interviewed and the research we  examined.
Thorough assessment and understanding of local gang problem(s):  Agencies and individuals we interviewed and research we examined  indicated that it is important for agencies and communities to thoroughly  assess their gang problems in order to gain a complete understanding of  the nature of the gang threat and the resources needed to address that  threat. For example, in identifying best practices that resulted from its  projects testing the Comprehensive Community-Wide Anti-Gang Model,  the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP)  reported assessments of gang problems helped projects determine types  and levels of gang activity, gang crime patterns, community perceptions,  and gaps in available services. OJJDP found that assessment also assisted  communities in identifying target populations to be served, understanding  why those populations merited attention, and making the best use of  available resources. Similarly, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)  reported that a needs assessment is often the first step in planning a  comprehensive solution to a gang problem, as it can help uncover hidden  problems, set priorities, and develop a communitywide consensus about  what to do.
Similarly, agency officials and research experts we interviewed noted the  importance of agencies and communities thoroughly assessing gang  problems and threats. For example, one prosecutor told us that a “one– size fits all approach” does not work for addressing gangs. This prosecutor  stated that each jurisdiction or community is different, and a program that  works in one community may not work in another. This is because of  different characteristics and different gang problems in each community; a  gang problem in one community has different characteristics and occurs  in a different environment than a gang problem in another community.  Furthermore, officials from one U.S. Attorneys Office (USAO) suggested  that communities recognize and admit their gang problems, complete an  assessment of those problems, and plan strategically for how to best  address them. Several research experts also emphasized that gangs are  inherently a local problem best addressed through targeted solutions  carefully vetted through community input.
Consensus among key stakeholders: Based on our interviews and  examination of research, it is important for stakeholders, including law  enforcement agencies, prosecutors, community-based social service  agencies, schools, citizens’ groups, and other interested community  residents, to reach consensus on an overall approach and goals for a  coordinated anti-gang effort. For example, OJJDP reported that partners  should try to find shared goals for anti-gang efforts. According to BJA,  planning can help stakeholders to establish a common mission and  common priorities and minimize parochial perspectives in favor of  broader goals.
Agency officials and research experts we interviewed also noted the  importance of obtaining consensus for anti-gang strategies from all key  stakeholders. Officials involved in managing one Department of Justice  (DOJ) funded grant program said that it is important for all stakeholders to  feel like they have ownership and have bought into the program. They said  that allowing all stakeholders to take credit for program successes and  providing them all with an opportunity to discuss failures and obstacles  helps the program succeed and last over the long term. Furthermore, one  local prosecutor stated that a comprehensive approach requires all  stakeholders within a community—police, prosecutors, social service  providers, and elected officials—to buy into a comprehensive approach  for addressing gang problems. If just one of these groups is not committed  to such an approach, the approach ultimately may not be successful.  Likewise, officials from two USAOs stated that organizing the effort to  combat gang violence and understanding the problem are key to  combating gangs. They suggested that communities, law enforcement  agencies, and researchers agree and buy into the assessment of the gang  problem and the strategies developed to address that problem.
Ongoing communication and coordination among stakeholders: After  consensus is established among stakeholders, agencies we interviewed  and research we reviewed indicated that it is important that there be  ongoing communication and coordination among stakeholders involved in  overall anti-gang efforts. For example, according to BJA, one of the most  important components of a successful approach to gangs is multiagency  cooperation. BJA reported that communities should actively involve all  community components that have a potential interest in responding to  gang problems.
Federal agencies similarly affirmed the importance of coordination and  multiagency efforts to address gangs as part of a comprehensive approach  but also within specific efforts. For example, officials from three Federal  Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field offices told us that the most critical  element to an approach for successfully addressing gangs is for federal,  state, and local law enforcement agencies to work together through joint  investigations and task forces to leverage information, experience, and  resources. These agencies also need to coordinate with and gain  cooperation from the USAO to get USAO support for prosecuting cases.  Officials from another FBI field office told us that a task force or  collaborative approach is crucial in successfully addressing gangs.  Agencies that participate in a task force or collaborative approach should  clearly define their roles and responsibilities and clearly understand other  agencies’ roles, responsibilities, resources, and missions. In addition, Drug  Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials discussed the task force  model as being a critical element in any successful effort to combat gangs,  drugs, and violent crime. They stated that task forces facilitate information  sharing among participating agencies, nurture cooperation, and build trust  among participants.
Comprehensive and varied efforts (i.e., law enforcement, prevention,  intervention, and reentry): Agencies and research experts we visited and  research we reviewed indicated that overall anti-gang approaches should  include a variety of efforts that address law enforcement, prevention,  intervention, and reentry. For example, OJJDP reported that  comprehensive programs that incorporate prevention, intervention, and  enforcement components are most likely to be effective. Gang research  experts have argued that enforcement responses are less likely to be  successful if isolated from other strategies. It is important that prevention  and intervention activities occur in conjunction with suppression, despite  challenges in implementing and maintaining such efforts. Moreover, BJA  recommended that communities with emerging or existing gang problems  plan, develop, and implement comprehensive responses that include a  broad range of community-based components.
Officials we interviewed similarly commented on the importance of an  overall anti-gang approach including programs and initiatives that address  law enforcement, prevention, intervention, and reentry. For example,  officials managing one DOJ-grant funded program stated that strong state  laws and gang enforcement efforts are needed to complement prevention,  intervention, and reentry programs. They said that a successful gang  approach is one that appropriately includes and balances prevention,  intervention, enforcement, and reentry. One local prosecutor suggested  that a community or local government invest in prevention and  intervention programs as well as law enforcement programs, suggesting  that communities may be more successful at combating gangs and curbing  gang violence when they take a communitywide approach in addressing  the problem. For example, one of the research experts we interviewed  suggested that pulling together strategies “across intervention domains”  such as law enforcement, social services, and schools is an effective way  to sustain anti-gang efforts.
Public and community outreach and visibility for programs: Our  interviews indicated that it is important for entities involved in  implementing anti-gang programs to conduct community outreach and  provide publicity and visibility for the programs and program  accomplishments. For example, officials from one DOJ-funded grant  program told us that one element important to successful program  implementation is for program officials to be visible to communities. When  program officials are on the streets in communities, it shows communities  that the officials care and are invested in the program. DEA officials also  suggested that community leaders need to be willing to speak out against  violence. They stated that before prevention and intervention efforts can  be effective in a specific community, law enforcement agencies first have  to get violence under control so that community members are not afraid to  participate in community events or report crimes to law enforcement  agencies. Moreover, according to one USAO, anti-gang programs and  services can be unified under a common brand and marketed aggressively,  so that the public is aware of the existence and affiliation of anti-gang  efforts.
Plans for sustainability of programs and efforts: Entities we interviewed  and research we reviewed suggested that agencies and communities  should plan on how to sustain their anti-gang programs and initiatives over  time, particularly as gang problems and availability of resources change.  For example, OJJDP recommended that programs begin planning for long- term sustainability during the initial stages of implementation.
Agency officials and experts interviewed also noted that resolving gang  problems can require a long-term commitment. For example, one local  prosecutor told us it can be challenging to sustain a communitywide  approach to dealing with gang problems because such an approach  requires leaders committed to making a long-term investment in the  approach and resources to sustain the long-term effort. Another local  prosecutor noted that it is important to sustain gang programs over the  long term because as soon as a community or region believes it has solved  its gang problems and scales programs back, gangs reemerge. Research  experts noted that communities have to be willing to invest resources in  anti-gang programs, particularly comprehensive programs, for a long  period of time in order to achieve results and establish programs that  include adequate study time up-front in order to measure results.
Performance monitoring, evaluation, and feedback incorporation: A  final common element identified by individuals we interviewed and  research we examined was the regular monitoring and evaluation of  program progress and performance and the incorporation of feedback and  performance results into programs. For example, OJJDP reported that  evaluation is a valuable tool that can tell the community whether it has  accomplished what it set out to do and whether there are ways to do it  better.
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and  Delinquency Prevention, OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model: Planning for  Implementation (Washington, D.C.: June 2002).
section_title: Appendix IV: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To examine the roles of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department  of Homeland Security (DHS) in gang enforcement efforts and the extent to  which the efforts are coordinated with each other and state and local  partners, we reviewed federal agencies’ strategies and plans to combat  gang crime and interviewed headquarters DOJ and DHS officials involved  in gang crime enforcement activities. We reviewed DOJ’s and DHS’s  strategic plans including goals and objectives for efforts to combat gang  crime and how the departments assessed their performance in meeting  these goals and objectives. We compared DOJ and DHS coordination and  information sharing efforts to criteria in our prior work on effective  interagency collaboration and results-oriented government. We also  examined staffing levels and budgets for DOJ and U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement (ICE) within DHS.
To assess the reliability of statistical information and budget data we  obtained, we discussed the sources of the data with agency officials and  reviewed documentation regarding the compilation of data. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report. Using semi-structured interview instruments, we interviewed the  U.S. Attorney or designated staff of U.S. Attorneys Offices (USAO) and  supervisory agents of DOJ and DHS law enforcement agencies involved in  investigating and prosecuting gang members in 15 localities across the  country. We also reviewed anti-gang strategies and other documentation  of enforcement efforts to reduce criminal gang activity in these localities.  We focused our discussions on particular localities within the U.S.  Attorneys’ districts rather than the district as a whole. For example, in the  U.S. Attorney District of Maryland, we discussed anti-gang efforts in  Baltimore. The localities we visited were Atlanta, Ga.; Baltimore, Md.;  Brooklyn, N.Y.; Chicago, Ill.; Cleveland, Ohio; Dallas, Tex.; Durham, N.C.;  Los Angeles, Calif.; Manhattan, N.Y.; Milwaukee, Wisc.; Newark, N.J.;  Pittsburgh, Pa.; Raleigh, N.C.; Richmond, Va.; and Tampa, Fla. We selected  these localities based on a mix of criteria that included a desire to talk  with officials in communities of varying sizes and geographic locations  that had received federal grants to address gang-related crime problems.  Other criteria considered in selecting these localities included the location  of the USAO and federal law enforcement agency field offices, the  presence of federally led task forces to combat gang crime, and  recommendations of officials of DOJ and DHS components during our  preliminary interviews.
We also considered the results of our review of data from the 2006 Federal  Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Report on localities’  population and number of violent crimes. We considered this data in order  to select localities that represent a range of population sizes and violent  crime concerns. We also considered sites that were located in close  geographic proximity where possible in order to maximize travel  resources. At each locality, in addition to meeting with federal officials, we  met with selected state and local prosecutors and law enforcement  officials to discuss the gang problem in their area and the federal agencies’  role in helping to address it. The results of our site visits cannot be  generalized across all U.S. Attorney districts, DOJ or ICE field offices, or  states and localities in the United States. However, because we selected  sites and localities based on a variety of factors, they provided us with a  broad overview of activities of DOJ and ICE related to federal anti-gang  activities including law enforcement, as well as prevention and  intervention programs. See table 4 for additional information on the  interviews we conducted in each locality we visited.
To determine how DOJ and DHS have measured the results of their gang  enforcement efforts, we first assessed how DOJ and DHS components  define “gang” and gang-related crimes. We then reviewed data on gang- related investigations and prosecutions maintained by DOJ and DHS law  enforcement agencies and U.S. Attorneys. To assess the reliability of  statistical information and budget data we obtained, we discussed the  sources of the data with agency officials and reviewed documentation  regarding the compilation of data. We determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We also interviewed  headquarters officials about performance measurement initiatives and  reviewed DOJ and DHS strategic plans, budgets, and performance reports,  and we reviewed a DOJ Office of Inspector General report that evaluated  the Executive Office of U.S. Attorney’s (EOUSA) case management  system. We compared DOJ and DHS efforts to measure the results of their  gang enforcement efforts to our prior work on effective interagency  collaboration and results oriented government. In addition, we asked  state and local law enforcement officials in nine of the 15 localities we  visited how they measured the results of local gang enforcement efforts.
To determine how DOJ administers and/or supports gang prevention,  intervention and law enforcement programs through grant funding, we  examined documentation of DOJ’s overall approach and objectives for  anti-gang grant programs, as well as DOJ-sponsored evaluations and a  guide to best practices to address community gang problems. We  interviewed Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention  (OJJDP) and Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) officials about the status  of funding, sustainability of anti-gang programs without federal funding,  and results of evaluations of the effectiveness of the anti-gang grant  programs, among other topics. We also reviewed funding levels for fiscal  years 2007 and 2008 for the four active grant programs that we identified  as being directly focused on anti-gang efforts and included in the scope of  our review. In eight localities we visited that received federal grants for  anti-gang efforts, we interviewed grant recipients to determine activities  that they were pursuing with the grant funds and how they planned to  sustain programs when federal funding expired. In two of these locations,  we observed youth gang prevention and intervention programs in process  and spoke with participants and representatives of community-based  groups implementing them to gain an understanding of the scope of the  demonstration projects and how they used federal funds for anti-gang  prevention and intervention activities. In addition, we interviewed USAO  officials to obtain information on their roles in anti-gang programs. We  reviewed guidance on developing and implementing comprehensive  prevention, intervention, and suppression programs and key documents  related to the four federal grant programs, including grant applications,  community reports on the use of grant funding and performance data. We  did not, however, review every program supported by federal funding that  communities could use for anti-gang efforts or for other law enforcement  and crime prevention efforts. For example, DOJ grant programs including  the Community Oriented Policing Services, Weed and Seed, Project Safe  Neighborhoods, and Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant  Program were not in the scope of our review because they are not  specifically designated for anti-gang efforts, although communities could  choose to use funds from the grants for anti-gang activities or for other  law enforcement and crime prevention purposes. We also reviewed  available nationwide evaluations of grant programs sponsored by DOJ.
Nine criminal justice researchers with expertise on anti-gang issues  provided their views on how effective the federal government has been in  measuring its gang suppression, prevention, and intervention activities and  whether the programs are sustainable without federal funding and likely to  be implemented by communities that did not receive federal grants based  on lessons learned from the federally funded projects.
Semistructured interviews with officials in 15 localities provided  information to help address each of our three reporting objectives. During  our visits, we interviewed officials of the following offices:    FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); Drug  Enforcement Administration (DEA); and ICE offices when a field division  or resident office or an FBI, ATF, DEA or ICE-led task force was present  and found to be engaged in local anti-gang efforts through communication  with officials of the USAO; local law enforcement agencies when those agencies accepted our request  for interview; and   state, local, or nongovernmental entities that received or were responsible  for administering DOJ anti-gang grants.
Table 4 lists the officials we interviewed at each locality visited.
We also interviewed officials of the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s  Office and the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office who had an established  history of prosecuting gang-related crime, and we pre-tested our  structured interview instruments with law enforcement officials in  Washington, D.C.; Montgomery County, Md.; and Northern Virginia.
Research experts provided input to our reporting objective on how DOJ  administers and/or supports gang prevention, intervention and law  enforcement programs through grant funding and to appendix IV, which  provides perspective on important elements for consideration in  developing and implementing an approach for combating gangs. We  identified research experts through a review of literature related to gangs  and gang crime issues, their participation in gang-related conferences, and  by asking federal officials for recommendations. We contacted these  research experts by e-mail with several questions, and we either discussed  their answers in telephone interviews or received e-mail responses from  them. The following research experts contributed their views:    G. David Curry, University of Missouri-St. Louis    Scott Decker, Arizona State University    Finn-Aage Esbensen, University of Missouri–St. Louis    Karl Hill, University of Washington    Ronald Huff, University of California-Irvine    Charles Katz, Arizona State University    David M. Kennedy, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of    Malcolm Klein, University of Southern California  Irving Spergel, University of Chicago  We conducted this performance audit from December 2007 through July  2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Justice
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Rebecca Gambler, Assistant  Director; Katherine Davis; Anthony Fernandez; Deborah Knorr; Amanda  Miller; Jeffrey Niblack; Octavia Parks; Janet Temko; and Jeremy Williams  made significant contributions to this report.