Chemical and Biological Defense: Updated Intelligence, Clear Guidance, and Consistent Priorities Needed to Guide Investments in Collective Protection
Published: 2007-01-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: For the military to operate in environments contaminated by chemical and biological warfare agents, the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed collective protection equipment to provide a protected environment for group activities. GAO previously reported persistent problems in providing collective protection for U.S. forces in high threat areas overseas. In this report, GAO examined (1) current intelligence assessments of chemical and biological threats, (2) the extent to which DOD has provided collective protection at critical overseas facilities and major expeditionary warfighting assets, and (3) DOD's framework for managing installation protection policies and prioritizing critical installations for funding. In conducting this review, GAO developed criteria to identify critical sites in the absence of a DOD priority listing of such sites in overseas high threat areas--areas at high risk of terrorist or missile attack.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The intelligence community is struggling with the changing security environment and communicating the uncertainties in the quality of chemical and biological threat information. Generally, the two key chemical and biological threats facing DOD forces are from hostile nations using missiles, or terrorist groups (e.g., Al Qaeda) using devices to release chemical or biological agents. DOD expects these threats to grow. The intelligence community has recognized the need to communicate more candidly about the uncertainties in intelligence regarding the type and amount of agents, the number of missiles likely armed with chemical and biological warheads, and the method of dissemination. Communicating these uncertainties helps in understanding the actual threat posed by our adversaries and in making risk management decisions on investments. However, while the intelligence community, under the Director of National Intelligence, has issued a new 2006 intelligence estimate regarding the uncertainties in the biological warfare threat, it has not issued an update on the chemical warfare threat since 2002 due to evolving assessment and communication policies. Despite the growing threat, collective protection at both critical overseas facilities and in some major expeditionary warfighting assets (e.g., infantry units, naval vessels, and medical units) is limited and inconsistent. Nearly 80 percent of overseas sites identified as critical by combatant commanders based on criteria GAO provided them, did not have collective protection equipment--including about two-thirds of the critical sites in high threat areas. At the same time, GAO found problems such as often vague and inconsistent guidance on the use of collective protection. DOD guidance encourages the use of collective protection but does not prescribe specific standards to guide strategic decisions on its use. Military service guidance, except the Air Force, was also vague and inconsistent on key issues such as (1) whether decisions on the need for the equipment should be left to local commanders' discretion, (2) when the various types of collective protection are most appropriate, and (3) what functions need to be protected. Thus, commanders have difficulty determining the need for collective protection. DOD's framework for managing collective protection and other related installation protection policies and activities is fragmented, which affects DOD's ability to ensure that collective protection resources are allocated efficiently and effectively. Prior GAO and DOD reports have highlighted continuing problems with fragmented policies and operating concepts among the many and varied programs and organizations involved. These problems result in unresolved conflict about issues, such as which critical facilities should receive priority for funding improvements, and make it difficult for DOD to balance competing warfighting and other needs and ensure that funding resources are prudently allocated. Previously, GAO and others have recommended DOD designate a single authority to integrate and coordinate installation protection policies and activities, and DOD agreed. However, despite a new ongoing reorganization, it has not yet done so.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The U.S. security environment has changed markedly in recent years.   Once focused on the Cold War threat of the Soviet Union, with its nuclear  arsenal and massive conventional forces, the Department of Defense  (DOD) and intelligence community now face a more diverse threat.  The  new security environment includes not only hostile nation states, but also  terrorist organizations around the world who may possess asymmetric  capabilities, including weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear,  chemical, and biological weapons.  Many of these weapons can be difficult  to detect, since much of the technology, equipment, and materials needed  to develop them also have legitimate commercial applications.  DOD has  repeatedly emphasized the growing threat of the use of chemical and  biological weapons against U.S. forces both at home and abroad, and  recently reported that it is continuing to increase funding for defenses  against such weapons.  Understanding the nature of the chemical and  biological threat from adversaries, and the dangers this threat poses to  U.S. forces, is fundamental to DOD’s ability to make risk management  decisions regarding where and how to focus investments in defending U.S.  forces.
In the event of chemical or biological weapons use, DOD policy  emphasizes avoidance of contaminated areas.  When avoidance is not  possible, DOD normally provides protective suits for military personnel  required to operate in contaminated environments.  However, while DOD  has made improvements, these suits limit mobility and are difficult to wear  for long periods.  For this reason, collective protection areas, which are  specially constructed environments such as portable tent systems or  rooms with equipment designed to provide a pressurized and filtered  environment for groups of personnel, may be needed at some fixed  facilities and expeditionary warfighting assets, including ground, naval,  and air assets.  Such collective protection equipment enables individuals  to remove their individual protective gear and still perform essential  activities, such as operational command and control, medical, and certain  logistics functions; or simply rest.  In prior reports on chemical and  biological defense, we have reported persistent problems regarding the  provision and effectiveness of collective protection for U.S. forces in high  threat areas overseas.  DOD states that American interests abroad will be  the most likely targets in the coming decade.  The department operates  numerous overseas facilities that are critical to U.S. ability to project,  support, and sustain military forces and operations worldwide during war  time.
DOD’s approach to risk management requires commanders to combine  assessments of the threats to facilities, their vulnerabilities, and critical  assets into an overall assessment of risk, which is then used to allocate  resources to correct vulnerabilities.  DOD introduced its risk management  approach in 2001.  However, we recently reported that it was facing  difficulties in its implementation.  For example, we found that DOD’s  organizational culture resists department-level approaches to priority  setting and investment decisions.  In addition, DOD also faced challenges  in integrating its management framework and reform initiatives into a  coherent, unified management approach.  DOD is currently examining a  series of management reforms to help unify and improve operations.  You asked that we review the effectiveness of DOD’s program to provide  collective protection for U.S. forces.  In this report, we examine   (1) current intelligence assessments of chemical and biological threats,   (2) the extent to which DOD has provided collective protection against  vulnerabilities at critical fixed facilities overseas and major warfighting  expeditionary assets, and (3) DOD’s framework for managing overall  installation protection policies and prioritizing critical installations for  funding.  This report is an unclassified version of our December 2006  classified report.
To examine the current intelligence assessments of chemical and  biological threats to DOD facilities, we reviewed briefings and other  intelligence products, and we interviewed officials from a variety of  national and DOD intelligence organizations.  These organizations  included the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Central  Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and each of the four  regional combatant commands with critical overseas facilities in their  areas of operations.  For the purposes of our review, we defined high  threat areas to be those within missile range of three nation states with  some chemical and biological warfare capabilities or those at high risk of  terrorist attack.  To determine the levels of collective protection provided  to critical facilities, in the absence of a DOD critical installation priority  listing across the services, we worked with a number of DOD offices to  develop the criteria needed to determine which sites were considered  critical. The criterion called for DOD to identify those sites that must  remain operational during a chemical or biological event, such as  command and control nodes, rest and relief areas, emergency medical  locations, and intelligence sites in order for DOD to complete its mission;  and where there would be no capability to transfer the function or  capability to an alternate location.  The Joint Staff then assisted us in  requesting information from the responsible combatant commands  regarding which installations and facilities overseas were considered  critical from their warfighting perspectives using our criteria, and the  amount and type of collective protection equipment available at each site.   We also worked with military service and department-level offices to  obtain detailed listings of the type and amount of equipment provided in  major expeditionary assets, such as ground forces, naval vessels, and  aircraft.  To examine DOD’s framework for managing overall installation  protection activities and for prioritizing critical installations for funding,  we reviewed applicable regulations, policies, and reports by GAO and  DOD.  We also conducted interviews with responsible officials at the  department and military services levels, as well as at the U.S. Central,  European, Pacific, and Southern Commands.  We assessed the reliability  of data used in this report and determined that they were sufficiently  reliable for our purposes.  We conducted our review from September 2005  through August 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.  More detailed information on our scope and  methodology is provided in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD’s program to provide collective protection is managed by the Joint  Project Manager for Collective Protection under the Joint Program  Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO).  The JPEO  has overall responsibility for research, development, acquisition, fielding,  and other aspects of support for chemical, biological, radiological, and  nuclear defense equipment, as well as medical countermeasures and  installation protection in support of the National Military Strategy.  As one  of eight project managers in the JPEO, the mission of the Joint Program  Manager for Collective Protection is to develop, procure, and field  collective protection equipment that protects U.S. forces from chemical,  biological, and radiological contamination.
Between fiscal years 2002 to 2005 DOD’s procurement budget for the  overall chemical and biological defense program totaled about $2.4 billion,  including about $218 million for collective protection.  During fiscal year  2006, the procurement budget for collective protection totaled about  $31.4 million.  Most of these funds, about $16.2 million, were budgeted for  the procurement of expeditionary medical shelters; another $10.4 million  was budgeted for installation of collective protection equipment on certain  classes of Navy ships; and another $5 million was budgeted to provide  collective protection for field hospitals.  The Joint Program Manager for  Collective Protection has no program to fund the integration of collective  protection systems into buildings.  Funds for this type of collective  protection often come from military service construction or operations  and maintenance program funds. Although the Guardian Installation  Protection Program under the JPEO was originally designed to provide  some funding for collective protection and other installation protection  improvements, this program was primarily focused on domestic  installations and its funding has been substantially reduced.
In making decisions regarding whether to seek funding for collective  protection under DOD’s risk management approach, commanders first  conduct threat assessments to identify and evaluate potential threats to  their facilities and forces, such as terrorist attacks, using intelligence  assessments of such factors as capabilities, intentions, and past activities.  The intelligence community continuously assesses the chemical and  biological warfare threats to U.S. interests around the world, and the  individual agencies issue finished intelligence products with those  assessments.  Under the leadership of the Office of the Director of  National Intelligence, the National Intelligence Council coordinates and  issues periodic national intelligence assessments reflecting the overall  intelligence community’s assessments and judgments on the current and  future threat from chemical and biological warfare and other threats.
Following the threat assessments, commanders also use vulnerability and  criticality assessments as additional inputs to the decision-making process  for making investments. Vulnerability assessments are conducted to  identify weaknesses that may be exploited by the identified threats and to  suggest options that address those weaknesses.  For example, a  vulnerability assessment might reveal weaknesses in security systems,  computer networks, or unprotected water supplies.  Criticality  assessments are conducted to evaluate and prioritize important assets and  functions for funding in terms of factors such as mission and significance  as a target, helping to reduce the potential for expending resources on  lower priority assets.
section_title: Intelligence Community Reports Uncertainties regarding Key Aspects of Chemical and Biological Threat
paragraphs: The intelligence community is struggling with the changing security  environment, including gaining agreement on issues such as how best to  provide decision makers with a more candid recognition of the significant  uncertainties in its ability to assess the chemical and biological threat.   These problems have challenged the community’s development of  assessments—such as the National Intelligence Estimate on chemical  warfare, which has not been updated since 2002—to help guide DOD and  other government agencies’ risk assessments and investment decisions.  Generally, the two primary chemical and biological threats facing DOD  installations are from adversarial nations using missiles with chemical or  biological warheads and from terrorists using explosive devices or other  means to release and spread chemical or biological agents. The missile  threat is currently assessed with varying levels of confidence to stem  primarily from a handful of countries, and DOD expects this threat to  increase in coming years as these countries continue to improve their  missile programs. The terrorist threat stems primarily from al Qaeda, and  while presently limited regarding chemical and biological weapons, this  threat is also expected to increase as al Qaeda continues to try to acquire  chemical and biological agents.  Despite these assessments, the  intelligence community has recently recognized significant uncertainties in  the quality and depth of intelligence about those threats. Such uncertainty  raises questions about the operational impact that might be sustained  during an attack and the actual threat posed by our adversaries, and is  thus critical information for officials making risk management decisions  on investments to protect U.S. forces.  However, while the intelligence  community has been able to work together and issue a new 2006 National  Intelligence Estimate assessing and recognizing the uncertainties in the  biological warfare threat to help decision makers, it has not been able to  issue a revised national intelligence estimate on the chemical warfare  threat since 2002.
subsections: section_title: Current Assessed Threat of Missile Attack Stems Mainly from Three Countries and Is Expected to Increase
paragraphs: The possibility of attack from nation states using missiles—or, in some  cases, artillery or Special Forces—to spread chemical or biological agents  is viewed as posing a significant threat to U.S. overseas installations.  DOD  intelligence assessments indicate that the current threat stems mainly  from a handful of countries and DOD expects this threat to increase.   Intelligence estimates assess that several other countries also have  chemical and biological warfare capability and the missiles to deliver  agents.  However, these countries are not assessed as major threats since  our relationships with them are not as adversarial as with the primary  threat countries. The intelligence community assesses that the primary  threat countries have the capability to produce at least some types of  chemical or biological agents, although there is considerable uncertainty  regarding many important aspects of these countries’ chemical and  biological warfare programs.  They are also assessed to possess the  missiles to deliver them, even though in most cases it is unclear whether  they have actually produced, weaponized, or stockpiled any agent.   Reports also indicate that the missile inventories of these countries are  composed primarily of SCUDs or their variants, with ranges of 300  kilometers to 700 kilometers.  Figure 1 shows a SCUD B missile with  launcher.
In addition, the three primary threat countries are assessed not only to be  actively pursuing technological improvements to these SCUDs and other  ballistic missiles to increase accuracy, range, and survivability but also  pursuing the development of new missile systems.  For example,  intelligence reports indicate that one country is trying to extend the range  and accuracy of some of its existing ballistic missiles and is also  developing a solid propellant medium range missile with a range of at least  2,000 kilometers. Similarly, intelligence reports indicate that another of the  primary threat countries continues to pursue an intercontinental ballistic  missile and continues to develop extended range SCUDs and variants for  its medium range missiles that will likely enhance its warfighting  capabilities and complicate U.S. missile defense systems.
section_title: Terrorist Threat to U.S. Installations Also Is Expected to Increase
paragraphs: Intelligence officials believe that terrorists, primarily al Qaeda, continue to  try to acquire chemical and biological agents and therefore pose a threat  to overseas DOD installations. While the actual status of al Qaeda’s  acquisition and development of chemical and biological agents is unclear  and its access to effective delivery methods presently is limited, some  intelligence agencies expect this threat to increase.  For example, some  intelligence reporting projects that over the next decade terrorists are  likely to conduct a chemical attack against United States’ interests either  at home or overseas.  Future delivery methods could include such devices  as balloons, crop sprayers, mortars, or unmanned aerial vehicles.  During  our review, 22 countries overseas were assessed as being at high risk of  some type of terrorist attack.
section_title: Significant Uncertainties Exist regarding Key Aspects of the Terrorist and Missile Threat
paragraphs: DOD expects both adversarial nation states and terrorists to increase their  chemical and biological warfare capabilities.  However, as acknowledged  by intelligence agencies and officials, and highlighted by the Commission  on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of  Mass Destruction in its report to the President, the intelligence  community has struggled to handle the changing security environment.   These struggles include significant uncertainty regarding important  aspects of the chemical and biological threat and how to communicate  assessments of those threats. These problems can undermine the ability of  the intelligence community to develop assessments—such as the National  Intelligence Estimate on chemical warfare, produced under the leadership  of the Director of National Intelligence. The Estimate has not been  updated since 2002 and would help guide DOD and other government  agencies’ risk assessments and investment decisions.
As discussed in the Commission’s report, many of the intelligence  community’s assessments on secretive nations like Iran and North Korea  rely largely on inherently ambiguous indicators, such as capabilities  assessments, indirect reports of intentions, deductions based on denial  and deception efforts associated with suspect weapons of mass  destruction sites, and ambiguous or limited pieces of “confirmatory”  evidence. As a result, significant uncertainty arises regarding important  aspects of states’ actual ability to employ chemical and biological warfare  agents in ways needed to cause large-scale casualties. However, as noted  in the Commission’s report, in past years the intelligence community may  not have clearly communicated that uncertainty and dissenting opinions  about assessments based on that information, to decision makers in an  attempt to provide a “consensus” assessment.  According to intelligence  officials, in the wake of the intelligence failures in Iraq, the community is  attempting to develop reforms such as providing better assessments that  more candidly recognize the uncertainties in the intelligence, and  dissenting views regarding the meaning of such information; as well as  reforms in areas such as the terms and definitions used to describe the  severity of the threat.  According to these officials, notwithstanding the  attempts at reforms, there are continuing difficulties in gaining agreement  on such issues which can delay issuance of assessment information.  For  example, we were able to obtain the recent 2006 national intelligence  estimate on the biological warfare threat.  However, we were not able to  obtain a recent national intelligence estimate on the chemical warfare  threat because it remains in development.  The chemical warfare estimate  was last updated in 2002.
With respect to specific chemical and biological warfare capabilities of  individual nation states, we found significant uncertainties regarding the  ability of the primary threat countries to use sophisticated dissemination  techniques to effectively disperse chemical and biological agents and  cause large scale casualties.  Most ballistic missiles currently in their  arsenals, such as the SCUD and its variants, are relatively inaccurate, and  this inaccuracy increases with the range to the target.  Accordingly,  techniques such as “air bursting” or “submunition” warhead loads may be  used to compensate for this inaccuracy.  Air bursting, which is literally the  bursting of a warhead filled with chemical or biological agents in the air,  can dramatically increase the area of contamination compared to the use  of warheads bursting on the ground.  Similarly, submunitions—which are  small bomblets inside a warhead—also improve agent dissemination by  covering an area more evenly than bulk filled munitions.  Submunitions  also provide the opportunity to deliver agents such as sarin that are not  robust enough to survive release subsequent to a ground detonation or  supersonic airburst.
There is also significant uncertainty regarding terrorists’ ability to acquire  and disseminate chemical and biological agents. Unclassified intelligence  information states that al Qaeda is interested in acquiring or producing  chemical warfare agents such as mustard gas and Sarin, but it is unclear if  it has actually acquired any chemical or biological agents.  However, as we  reported in 1999, there are many technical challenges that terrorist groups  such as al Qaeda would have to overcome in order to cause mass  casualties using sophisticated chemical and biological warfare agents.  For  example, while terrorists do not need specialized knowledge or  dissemination methods to use simple toxic industrial chemicals such as  chlorine, they would need a relatively high degree of expertise to  successfully cause mass casualties with sophisticated agents, such as VX  and anthrax.  As such, some intelligence reporting concludes that given  our limited access to the al Qaeda organization and its heightened sense of  operational security, the U.S. intelligence community may not be able to  confirm that it has that capability until it is actually used.
section_title: Collective Protection Vulnerabilities Are Not Widely or Consistently Addressed
paragraphs: Combined with the uncertainty of the threat as previously discussed,  commanders face the difficulty of identifying their vulnerability to that  threat and how best to protect against it.  In judging the vulnerability of his  or her command to that threat, the commander determines whether to  have collective protection, and if so, what type of protection is most  appropriate and what functions need to be protected. At the critical  facilities identified by the combatant commanders, we found that  collective protection equipment was not widely or consistently available.  The reasons for the limited and inconsistent fielding of collective  protection appear to be rooted in unclear and inconsistent guidance on the  use of collective protection. For example, while DOD guidance encourages  the use of collective protection, it does not prescribe specific criteria to  guide strategic decisions on its use.  Moreover, guidance provided by the  individual military services—excepting the Air Force—is often vague,  inconsistent, or both with respect to key issues.  Such issues include  whether local commanders make the decision to provide or not provide  the protection or the services prescribe those decisions, as is done in the  Air Force; what type of collective protection is most appropriate; and what  functions need to be protected. Similarly, we also found collective  protection equipment shortages and inconsistent guidance affected some  major expeditionary warfighting assets, such as infantry units, naval  vessels, and medical units. The intelligence uncertainties and vague and  inconsistent guidance all combine to make it difficult for commanders to  make clear risk management assessments of the need for collective  protection and the risks of not providing it.
subsections: section_title: Most Critical Fixed Facilities in High Threat Areas Do Not Have Collective Protection
paragraphs: Officials from the four regional combatant commands responsible for  overseas operations identified 125 critical sites in 19 countries as critical  to their operations, 97 of which did not have collective protection.  Moreover, two-thirds of the critical sites in high threat areas did not  receive collective protection. In addition, the department did not have an  overall DOD-wide list of sites formally identified as critical despite long- standing requirements to identify and prioritize such sites.  As a result, in  conjunction with several DOD offices, we developed a definition of the  term critical and requested that the four regional combatant commanders  identify sites meeting that definition.
The 125 sites identified as critical by the combatant commanders are  located on 64 large installations and other facilities and included many  command and control centers; many intelligence, communications,  logistics, and medical facilities; and a number of air bases.  These facilities  were spread across the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the Pacific and  were largely concentrated in four countries.  As shown in table 1, 28 of  these sites (22 percent) had collective protection equipment available to  allow personnel to continue operations in case of attack.  The limited  amount of collective protection we found is consistent with the findings of  our earlier reports dating back to at least the late 1990s.  For example in  1997, we reported that few defense facilities in Southwest Asia and South  Korea had collective protection.
While collective protection was limited in all commands, it was also not  consistently fielded in high threat areas.  As shown in table 1, 24 of the 28  sites with collective protection equipment were located in areas assessed  to be at high risk of attack by terrorists or within range of missile attack by  the primary threat countries.  However, the 24 sites with collective  protection totaled about one-third of the total of 71 critical fixed facilities  in high threat areas. For example, 12 of the sites with collective protection  were located in one country, which is assessed to have a moderate threat  of attack from terrorists, but is within range of attack from a nearby  hostile nation.  The Army identified 4 of its sites in this country as critical  to its mission, but only 2 of the sites had collective protection.  Additionally, a 2004 DOD security assessment identified 1 of those 2 sites  as having major shortcomings in collective protection equipment, which  raised questions about the command post’s viability as a warfighting  command center.  The Air Force provided all 10 of the critical sites on its  air bases in this country with collective protection, but critical air bases in  another nearby country did not have collective protection despite also  being in range of missile attack by the hostile neighbor.  Air Force officials  told us they view the threat in this country as moderate.
Similarly, the Navy provided collective protection to its five critical sites in  one country in the Middle East, which is assessed as being at high threat of  terrorist attack and within range of missile attack from a nearby hostile  country.  However, none of the four critical sites on a key air base in  another nearby country were provided with collective protection, despite  also being assessed at high threat of terrorist attack and being within  range of missile attack from the same hostile country.  According to Air  Force officials, while there is no collective protection currently at the  base, they plan to provide such equipment in the future.
section_title: Guidance on the Use of Collective Protection Was Often Unclear and Inconsistent
paragraphs: While it is difficult to precisely specify the ultimate reasons for the limited  and inconsistent fielding of collective protection, the quality of guidance  on the use of the equipment appears to have been a contributing factor  since it was often unclear and inconsistent.  DOD does not provide clear  overarching strategic guidance on many key issues that would help  commanders make decisions on the use of collective protection.  Military  services and installation commanders are generally expected to address  key issues that include what level of threat justifies the investment in  collective protection. DOD guidance generally encourages the use of  collective protection and provides information on, among other things, the  nature of the chemical and biological threat to installations and forces, the  types of equipment available, and the pros and cons of using each, but it  does not prescribe criteria to guide the use of collective protection.  For  example, in determining what level of threat justifies the investment in  collective protection, the commander assesses vulnerability from both  terrorist attack and missile attack. However, as discussed earlier,  intelligence on these threats does not make clear whether terrorists, such  as al Qaeda, possess the capability to produce mass casualties through the  use of chemical or biological weapons. A number of officials told us that  they believed the provision of collective protection equipment should be  targeted only at installations at high risk of missile attack, given limited  DOD resources and the likelihood that terrorist attacks alone lack the  capability to produce large-scale damage. However, the guidance does not  establish criteria differentiating between the two types of attacks, which  would help guide decision making.
In addition to DOD’s lack of guidance, military service guidance on the use  of collective protection, excepting the Air Force, is often vague,  inconsistent, or both. For example, the Army, the Navy, and the Marine  Corps do not require collective protection to be provided at their critical  fixed facilities or other fixed facilities. Rather, these services rely on the  discretion of their local installation commanders to determine whether to  have the protection, what type of collective protection should be provided,  and which functions should be protected. In contrast, Air Force policy  requires that in the absence of guidance from higher commands, Air Force  commanders should plan to provide collective protection for 30 percent of  the personnel on their bases in areas judged by the intelligence community  to be at high risk of attack from terrorists or other non state actors or  attack from missiles launched by adversarial nations. Consistent with the  Air Force requirement for collective protection, it had the most critical  sites with the equipment. Of the 50 critical sites the Air Force operated, 16  had collective protection. Meanwhile, the Army operated 51 critical sites  and provided 7 sites with collective protection, while the Navy operated 23  critical sites and provided 5 with collective protection.
Once the decision to provide collective protection equipment is made, the  services—again excepting the Air Force—lack specific guidance to  determine what type of protection is most appropriate and what functions  need to be protected. The critical facilities identified in our review used  both integrated systems—with overpressure and filtration systems built in  to existing buildings—as well as simple portable tent systems. Eighteen of  the 28 sites had the overpressure and filtration systems integrated into the  construction of the buildings, while 10 sites had portable systems such as  tents with liners and filtration systems, which could be erected inside the  buildings or set up at locations around the installations. While both can  provide protection for groups of various sizes, costs vary significantly  depending upon factors such as square footage to be protected and other  construction elements. According to officials, the portable tent systems  may cost as little as $18,000 depending on the configuration. However, a  recent installation of an integrated system at Andrews Air Force Base in  Maryland cost about $1.8 million. In addition, local commands must divert  existing operations and maintenance funds to pay for the replacement  filters and other costs to sustain the integrated collective protection  systems over time.  According to officials, this creates a significant  disincentive to the initial procurement of integrated collective protection  equipment.
Finally, we also found little clear guidance regarding which functions  should be protected.  Commanders generally do not have guidance to help  them determine whether to provide protection for command and control  functions, medical treatment facilities, areas for rest and relief, and other  base functions, or to cover only parts of these functions.  Only the Air  Force provided clear guidance on this issue. As discussed above, Air Force  regulations state that commanders should plan to provide collective  protection for at least 30 percent of base personnel. These regulations also  describe requirements for coverage of specific functions, including  command and control, medical facilities, and dormitories and dining  facilities, and the level of protection required for each. During our  discussions at the combatant commands we noted that the other services  often had different views on the costs and benefits of the Air Force  requirement.
The intelligence uncertainties and vague and inconsistent guidance all  contribute to the difficulty commanders face in making clear risk  management assessments of the need for collective protection or of the  risk of not providing it.  In the absence of clear guidance to aid such  decisions, the potential for inconsistent and inefficient allocation of DOD  resources increases.
section_title: Inconsistent Guidance and Limited Resources Affected Some Major Expeditionary Warfighting Assets
paragraphs: Similar to the inconsistent availability of collective protection for critical  overseas fixed facilities, collective protection equipment shortages and  inconsistent requirements also affected some major expeditionary  warfighting assets, such as infantry units, naval vessels, and medical units  (see table 2).
While differing missions and other factors may explain inconsistencies in  the use of collective protection, no clear guidance was evident in many  cases to explain why forces operating in similar environments were not  provided the same level of protection against chemical or biological  attack.
subsections: section_title: Infantry Units Operating in Similar Environments Have Different Guidance for Collective Protection
paragraphs: Despite operating in similar environments in areas such as Iraq and  Afghanistan, Army and Marine Corps infantry units had different  requirements for collective protection.  For example, according to Army  officials, the Army requires its light infantry units at the battalion level to  provide collective protection equipment (M20/M20A1 Simplified Collective  Protection Equipment Shelters), but the unit commander must make the  decision to actually request this equipment. Army officials told us that as  of August 2006, commanders had requested and received 2,506 of the total  Army authorization of 3,558 (70 percent).  However, they could not  provide details on the units requesting the shelters because their systems  do not track non major end items.
In contrast, Marine Corps officials stated that they had no requirement for  collective protection and no systems on hand.  According to these  officials, the current systems that are available are too large and bulky to  be carried with their fast-moving infantry units.  They preferred to depend  on avoidance and decontamination techniques to mitigate any potential  chemical or biological threat.  However, Marine Corps officials also  acknowledged their potential vulnerability and the need for collective  protection in documents dating back to at least 2002.  Despite the  acknowledged need for the systems, concerns were subsequently raised  that analyses of the workload requirements for setup, installation, and  maintenance requirements, as well as formal techniques and tactics on  their use, would be needed before any collective protection systems could  be fielded.  According to Marine Corps officials, these requirements had  not been completed at the time of our review.
section_title: About One-Half of Navy Ships Are Not Meeting Requirements
paragraphs: Navy guidance has for many years required ships, such as aircraft carriers,  destroyers, frigates, and some supply ships to have prescribed levels of  collective protection equipment.   However, as shown in table 3, about 47  percent of naval vessels required to have collective protection have such  protection actually installed. According to Navy officials, many of these  ships were built prior to the requirement for collective protection, and  funds to retrofit these ships have been limited.
Navy guidance requiring collective protection also appears outdated,  inconsistent, or both in some areas.  For example, according to Navy  officials, funding limitations have required them to focus existing  resources on those ships operating closer in to shore in “littoral” waters,  since these ships are more likely to be exposed to chemical or biological  agents than ships operating further out in deeper “blue water.”  However,  the Navy guidance continues to require that aircraft carriers, which  generally operate in deep water far from shore, have collective protection  installed.  Navy officials told us that they believed that the requirement  was originally based on the threat of Cold War Soviet naval tactics, and  that the guidance had not yet been updated to reflect the current threat  environment. We also found inconsistencies in the guidance regarding  supply ships, such as station ships (required) and shuttle ships (not  required), operating in littoral waters.
section_title: Inconsistent Guidance and Shortages of Collective Protection Found at Medical Units
paragraphs: We also found inconsistencies and shortages of collective protection at  medical units, such as small units that travel with their parent infantry  units and large hospital systems designed to be set up in rear areas. These  problems create military limitations and increase risks to U.S. forces and  capabilities.
For example, Army infantry units contain medical support groups, such as  battalion aid stations, that deploy with the parent unit into battlefield  areas.  Army guidance requires these medical units to have a certain  number of Chemical and Biological Protective Shelters consisting  basically of tents with protective linings and overpressure systems  attached to the backs of transport vehicles (see fig. 2).  In contrast, the  Marine Corps had not established any requirements for its medical units to  have these systems.  According to Marine Corps officials, avoidance and  decontamination strategies are their preferred method for handling  chemical or biological events while operating on the battlefield. In  addition, according to DOD officials, the Marine Corps often moves in  small air and sea transports with little room for collective protection  equipment, consistent with its traditional strategic mission. As a result,  Marine Corps units may use Army medical support in the areas where they  are deployed.  However, the increasing use of joint operations, where both  operate in the same geographic area at the same time, may be blurring  traditional missions.
While the Army requires its medical support units to have collective  protection systems, Army figures indicate that only 191 of the 1,035  required systems (18 percent) were on hand as of the end of fiscal year  2005.  This situation is similar to that found in our 2002 review of Army  medical units in South Korea, when we found that only about 20 percent of  the required systems were scheduled to be purchased.  The JPEO, which  procures these systems for the military services, has plans to procure  additional systems through fiscal year 2014.  However, the planned  funding for these systems is lagging behind requirements, and the office  will not be able to procure all the needed systems by 2014.  Officials told  us that only about 60 percent of the funding needed has been budgeted,  and they need an additional $323 million to fulfill all requirements.
Collective protection for larger expeditionary hospital operations is  provided by large portable tent systems with liners and pressurized  interiors, which may be combined to provide 200 to 300 beds or more.  The  Army, Navy, and Air Force all have versions of these mobile hospitals (see  fig. 3). However, while the Air Force generally met its goal, shortages and  other serious problems continue to affect Army and Navy medical facility  collective protection.
According to Army officials, the Army acquisition goal was to have 23 of  these systems on hand, but it was only able to obtain 14 because of  funding limitations.  Similarly, Navy officials told us that they only had  enough tent liners to protect about 460 beds of the approximately 2,220  total bed spaces currently required.  Moreover, the collective protection  liners used to make the hospital tent systems resistant to chemical and  biological attack were not located with the tents, which were  prepositioned at various sites around the world.  The liners were located  at a site in Virginia and would need to be moved to the same locations as  the hospital tent systems in order to provide a collective protection  capability. According to Navy officials, the Navy is aware of this shortfall  and is in the process of redesigning the requirements to provide collective  protection for its mobile fleet hospital tent systems.  We reported similar  shortfalls in collective protection equipment at Army, Navy, and Air Force  portable hospital systems in South Korea in our 2002 report.
Our current review found that the Air Force generally met its goal for the  transportable hospital systems.  According to data provided by the Air  Force, as of May 31, 2006, it had 156 of 162 (96 percent) required systems  on hand.  Marine Corps officials told us that the Corps does not establish  such large transportable hospital operations and it has no systems in  stock, instead relying on the Navy to provide for Marine needs in this area.
section_title: Fragmented Approach to Overall Installation Protection Policies Undermines Decision Making on Critical Priorities
paragraphs: Our prior work and that of several DOD offices has highlighted DOD’s  fragmented framework for managing the strategic use of collective  protection and other installation protection activities.  This, combined  with the lack of agreed upon installation priorities guided by the robust  application of risk management principles, makes it difficult for the  department to ensure that funding resources are allocated efficiently and  effectively.  More specifically, opportunities to target funds to improve  preparedness and protect critical military personnel, facilities, and  capabilities from attacks using weapons of mass destruction may be lost.   Responsibilities for installation protection activities are spread over a  variety of DOD organizations and programs.  These programs are designed  to address protection from threats ranging from terrorist attacks to  industrial accidents; however, with their different operating definitions  and evolving concepts, gaps and inefficiencies in collective protection  program coverage are created.  In a 2004 report, we recommended that  DOD designate a single authority with responsibility for unifying and  coordinating installation protection policies.  However, despite DOD’s  agreement with that recommendation it has not yet implemented it.  These  problems also prevent DOD from reaching agreement regarding  departmentwide standards to identify which facilities and infrastructure  are critical and compile an overall list of critical facilities prioritized for  receiving funds for protection improvements.
subsections: section_title: Overall Installation Protection Activities Are Fragmented and Disjointed
paragraphs: DOD policies and resulting management activities that direct the strategic  use of collective protection and other installation protection activities are  fragmented and disjointed. Responsibilities for key installation protection  activities such as (1) policy and oversight, (2) installation threat and  vulnerability assessments and risk management decisions on appropriate  protections, and (3) funding programs for installation protection  improvements are spread across a variety of programs and DOD  organizations, as shown in figure 4.  No single DOD organization has  responsibility for developing unified policy and coordinating these  activities.
The variety of DOD organizations bring their own approaches to policy  and programs for installation protection, and these different approaches  can result in unresolved conflict and inefficient application of resources.  For example, responsibilities for installation protection (including  collective protection) reside primarily with installation commanders,  regional combatant commanders, the military services, and the Joint Staff.   At the same time, responsibilities for policy and oversight of installation  protection activities, such as the antiterrorism program, are spread among  the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low  Intensity Conflict, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland  Defense, and others.  Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict  developed worldwide antiterrorism policies and standards.  However,  Homeland Defense is responsible for providing policy and oversight of  domestic antiterrorism activities.
Responsibilities for making installation threat and vulnerability  assessments and risk management decisions on collective protection or  other needed improvements are also spread across multiple organizations  and levels.  For example, local installation commanders have basic  responsibility for these activities, but the military services, combatant  commanders, and others with responsibilities for missions taking place at  the installations are also involved.  At the same time, organizations such as  the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Joint Staff are involved in  providing over 20 different types of formal assessments of installation  vulnerabilities.  For example, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency  conducts Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments, which examine  the vulnerability of large installations with 300 or more personnel to a  terrorist attack and the potential for mass casualties and large-scale loss of  life.  The agency as well as others may also conduct “full spectrum  vulnerability assessments.”  As the name implies, these assessments  examine an installation’s vulnerability to a wide range of threats that could  interrupt its ability to fulfill its mission, including attacks using chemical  or biological agents, attacks against information networks, and attacks  against supporting non-DOD infrastructure.
Similarly, funding for installation protection improvements also involves a  variety of organizations.  For example, the combatant commanders have  no programs of their own to fund improvements at overseas facilities  important to their warfighting needs.  According to combatant command  officials, much of the funding for improvements at the overseas  installations comes from the construction or operations and maintenance  programs of the military services that operate them.  The JPEO Guardian  Installation Protection program provided another potential source of  funding, but the program has faced a number of problems.  The Guardian  program was initiated in 2004 to provide improvements to protect critical  facilities from attacks ranging from terrorists to nation states using  chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.  The program was  initially provided approximately $1.2 billion in funding for improvements  at 185 domestic and 15 overseas sites from fiscal years 2004 through 2009.   However, DOD recently cut funding for the program by about $760 million.   According to officials, because of the cuts, they stopped funding for  collective protection and other such improvements while the role of the  program and its list of projects were being reviewed by DOD.    Antiterrorism programs also provide some potential funding.  Oversight of  resources used for overall antiterrorism activities is conducted by the  Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict,  while oversight of resources used for domestic antiterrorism activities is  conducted by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense.
We and several DOD offices have reported on problems associated with  the fragmented installation protection program structure.  For example in  August 2004, we reported that the large number of organizations engaged  in efforts to improve installation preparedness, and the lack of centralized  authority and responsibility to integrate and coordinate departmentwide  installation preparedness efforts were hindering overall preparedness  efforts and DOD’s ability to ensure that its resources were applied  efficiently and effectively.  Officials at the department, Joint Staff, service,  and installation levels told us that the lack of a single focal point to  integrate departmentwide installation preparedness efforts among the  many involved organizations adversely affected their ability to resolve  disagreements and develop needed overarching guidance, concepts of  operations, and chemical and biological defense standards.  Because of  the absence of departmentwide standards, military services and  installations faced problems in prioritizing requirements for funding and  personnel resources, since such standards provided the basis for  calculating requirements.  We recommended that DOD designate a single  authority with the responsibility to coordinate and integrate worldwide  installation preparedness improvement efforts at the department, service,  and installation levels.
In May 2006, the DOD Inspector General reported that the problems with  the fragmented and disjointed program structure were continuing.   According to the report, responsibilities for installation protection  activities continued to be spread across multiple programs and  organizations, with no single DOD organization responsible for unifying  and coordinating these activities.  Problems such as inadequate program  structure, inadequately coordinated program concepts, and a lack of  generally accepted terminology describing concepts and doctrine resulted  in confusion and disagreement in attempts to establish policy and assign  responsibilities, inefficient application of resources, and the lack of a  strategic vision balancing all areas of program responsibility.  For  example, the report found that the lack of clear lines of authority and  responsibilities for installation protection activities between the Assistant  Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the Office  of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense was causing confusion  and inefficiency.  In this regard, coincident with the establishment of the  Homeland Defense office in 2003, the Secretary of Defense called for  development of a chartering DOD Directive within 45 days to formalize the  responsibilities of the new Assistant Secretary and clarify the relationship  between Homeland Defense and other offices, such as Special Operations  and Low Intensity Conflict.  However, according to officials in Homeland  Defense, the chartering directive was never formalized because of  problems in coordinating with the many DOD offices involved, the  continuing evolution of their responsibilities, and the focusing of  resources on developing the June 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and  Civil Support.
In June 2006, DOD’s Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,  Chemical, and Biological Programs and the Joint Requirements Office also  issued a study on installation protection confirming many of the problems  identified earlier by us and the DOD Inspector General.  This study was  called for as a result of the funding cuts in the Guardian Installation  Protection Program. The study pointed out that problems with the  alignment of antiterrorism, chemical and biological defense, critical  infrastructure protection, and other programs create difficulty in providing  military installations with capabilities for all-hazard planning,  preparedness, response, and recovery.  The study also noted that DOD  organizations were not developing guidance to sufficiently resolve  problems related to inadequate policy, standards, and doctrine in these  areas.  Moreover, it also reported that despite agreement with our 2004  recommendation calling for designation of a single authority responsible  for coordinating and integrating overall installation protection efforts,  DOD still had not done so.  This study made a series of recommendations  designed to integrate and unify installation protection and emergency  preparedness programs and concepts.  This study also developed a plan to  improve installation protection at DOD facilities, recommending that some  $560 million be provided for installation protection improvements over 4  years, with priority given to overseas facilities.  However, the amount of  funding approved by DOD was sufficient only for the lowest levels of  improvements and did not include funding for collective protection and  chemical and biological detection improvements.
At the close of our review in August 2006, DOD announced a new  reorganization that will affect some of the organizations involved in  installation protection activities.  The need for reorganization was  identified in the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report as  necessary to respond to the changing security threat by reshaping DOD  offices to better support the warfighting combatant commands and  respond to the new threat environment.  According to DOD officials, the  specific policy and organizational changes that will result from the  reorganization will develop over the coming months.
section_title: Priorities for Allocation of Installation Protection Resources Were Not Identified
paragraphs: Program fragmentation can also prevent DOD from reaching agreement in  prioritizing facilities for protection funding.  A long-standing series of  directives and instructions, as well as DOD’s June 2005 “Strategy for  Homeland Defense and Civil Support,” have recognized the importance of  prioritizing installations in light of constrained resources and called on  DOD to identify critical infrastructure and to prioritize these assets for  funding improvements.  Accordingly, early in our review, we requested a  list of critical overseas facilities from the Directors for Critical  Infrastructure Protection and Combating Terrorism, Office of the Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, as well as from other offices  throughout DOD and the military services.  However, DOD was unable to  provide us with such a list.
According to DOD officials, there are a variety of listings of critical  facilities and other infrastructure.  However, each is compiled from the  limited perspective of the military service or other DOD organization  responsible for the asset, and not from an overall DOD strategic  perspective.   According to these officials, gaining agreement on DOD-wide  priorities is difficult because of the fragmented organizational structure, as  well as policy and program changes following September 11, 2001.   According to the May 2006 DOD Inspector General report, a lack of stable  funding and centralized prioritization and oversight for critical  infrastructure improvements has created problems throughout the  combatant commands.  According to the report, determining which assets  were critical depended on mission requirements that varied with the level  of command.  Thus, an effort to protect an asset critical to a combatant  commander from his or her warfighting perspective could receive a low  priority from an installation commander who may be focused on a  different, non-warfighting perspective.  Similarly, DOD’s June 2006 study  of installation protection was directed to create a prioritized list of  installations to receive funding for protective measures, but was unable to  do so.  According to the report, it could not develop the list because of the  short time frame allowed for completion of the study and the controversial  nature of installation prioritization.
In recognition of this problem, we sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense  in November 2005 requesting clarification of the situation and DOD  actions to correct the problem (see app. II).  DOD’s response (see app. III)  acknowledged the importance of prioritizing its critical assets and stated  that it published DOD Directive 3020.40, Defense Critical Infrastructure  Program, in August 2005.  This directive called for the development of  policy and program guidance for DOD-wide critical infrastructure,  including criteria and methodology to identify and prioritize these assets.   At the time of our review, this effort was being conducted through the  Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection Program under the Office of the  Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense.  In addition, this office was  also directed to conduct an assessment of all of the activities that  contribute to the department’s ability to achieve mission assurance to  identify program gaps and other problems that could interfere with  mission assurance.  According to program officials, the framework for  prioritizing DOD’s critical infrastructure was expected to be published in  August 2006 but has not yet been formally adopted.  It is unclear when the  assessment of program gaps will be completed.  It is also unclear to what  extent the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense will address aspects  of critical infrastructure protection related to overseas facilities identified  as critical to warfighting missions.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: As we and others have observed for several years, notwithstanding the  emergence of adversaries that can use chemical and biological weapons,  the fielding of collective protection equipment at both critical overseas  fixed facilities and major expeditionary warfighting assets remains limited  and inconsistent.  Assessing the need and priority for such equipment is  difficult because of the significant uncertainties in the intelligence about  the nature of the chemical and biological threat. While the intelligence  community recognizes the need to assess and communicate these  uncertainties about the chemical warfare threat, this information has not  been available to the agencies that need it. Specifically, the intelligence  community, under the leadership of the Director of National Intelligence,  has not been able to complete an up-to-date National Intelligence Estimate  on chemical warfare in part due to changing assessment and  communication policies, as well as issues surrounding the basis or  evidence for the assessments.  In our view, an updated chemical warfare  National Intelligence Estimate is needed to provide a critical input and  basis for decisions on investments in chemical warfare defenses, including  collective protection.
Uncertainty about the threat can lead to resources being invested in assets  where they may not be needed.  Conversely, not providing collective  protection where it may be needed can place military personnel and  operations at increased risk.  In addition, allowing the current fragmented  and disjointed framework for managing installation protection policies to  continue without agreed-upon priorities for funding or clear requirements  and service guidance on the appropriate use of collective protection,  further increases the likelihood that limited DOD resources will be used  inefficiently and ineffectively.  DOD’s ongoing reorganization provides a  good opportunity to review the policy and programmatic gaps and  inconsistencies, gain the agreement of the competing organizations  needed to integrate the policies and operating concepts, and correct the  long-standing need for an overarching authority in this area.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In light of the need for the most current intelligence estimates to help  guide the government’s—including DOD’s—risk assessments and  investment decisions, we are recommending that the Director of National  Intelligence identify the impediments interfering with his ability to update  the chemical warfare National Intelligence Estimate, and take the  necessary steps to bring the report to issuance.
To ensure that the problems in the overall installation protection and  collective protection policies and programs do not continue to place  military personnel and operations at increased risk and undercut the  efficiency and effectiveness of DOD resource allocations, we are  recommending that the Secretary of Defense—as part of the ongoing  reorganization—take the following four actions to ensure better  coordination and integration of these activities and clearer guidance on  key operating concepts.  To ensure better coordination and integration of  the overall installation protection activities, we are recommending that the  Secretary of Defense    designate a single integrating authority with the responsibility to  coordinate and integrate worldwide installation preparedness policies  and operating concepts and    assign this single authority with the responsibility to oversee efforts to  gain DOD-wide agreement on criteria for identifying critical facilities  and to develop a system for prioritizing critical facilities and  infrastructure for funding protection improvements.
To help ensure clear and consistent guidance in the chemical and  biological collective protection program, we are recommending that the  Secretary of Defense    direct the Joint Staff and military services to develop clear and  consistent criteria to guide overarching strategic decisions on the use  of collective protection at DOD facilities, including issues such as  whether decisions on the need for collective protection should be  prescribed or left to commanders’ discretion, the use of integrated  overpressure and filtration systems versus portable structures, and  what mission functions must be protected, and     direct the Joint Staff and military services to review their current  policies and, where appropriate, develop consistent requirements on  when collective protection is required for medical units, and naval,  ground, and air forces.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a classified version of our draft report, DOD and  the Director of National Intelligence both generally agreed with all five of  our recommendations.  Their unclassified comments on the classified  version are reprinted in appendices IV and V.  DOD also provided technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
Regarding our first recommendation that the Director of National  Intelligence identify the impediments interfering with his ability to update  the chemical warfare National Intelligence Estimate, and take the  necessary steps to bring the report to issuance; the Director’s office stated  that the National Intelligence Council began the process of developing that  estimate several months ago, and expects the update to be published in  early 2007.  In this regard, DOD also called for the Director of National  Intelligence to prepare an integrated, worldwide chemical, biological,  radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive threat assessment.  DOD  stated that current assessments are fragmented and not consistent across  geographic areas.  We agree that better coordinated and integrated threat  assessments, consistent across geographic regions could help improve  DOD’s decisions regarding investments in the security needs of U.S. forces  worldwide.  We encourage DOD to make this recommendation directly to  the Director of National Intelligence.
DOD also concurred with our second recommendation that the Secretary  of Defense designate a single integrating authority with the responsibility  to coordinate and integrate worldwide installation preparedness policies  and operating concepts.  DOD acknowledged that as currently practiced,  installation preparedness is not a formal program within the department.   DOD also noted that while it agreed with our recommendation, it believed  that the combatant commanders should be responsible for their respective  areas of responsibility and determine collective protection requirements  based on operational needs.  We agree that the combatant commanders  should have flexibility to recognize special operational needs in the  fielding of collective protection in their areas of responsibility.  However,  as our report clearly points out such determinations should take place  within an agreed-upon, coordinated, and integrated framework of DOD- wide installation preparedness policies and operating concepts.
DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation, that the  integrating authority discussed in our second recommendation also be  given responsibility to oversee efforts to gain DOD-wide agreement on  criteria for identifying critical facilities and for developing an overall  prioritized list of critical facilities and infrastructure for funding protection  improvements.  The department agreed with our recommendation to  assign oversight responsibility to a single integrating authority; however, it  suggested that rather than develop an overall prioritized list, DOD should  develop a “system” to prioritize the critical facilities for funding protective  improvements.  DOD stated that this “system” to prioritize facilities does  not have to be a list “from 1 to n”, but instead may be tiers or bands of  assets based on the strategic impact if that asset was lost or degraded,  using the all hazards approach to vulnerability assessments.  We agree that  the identification of prioritized tiers or types/bands of assets could satisfy  DOD’s needs in this area, if done appropriately.  However, we believe the  danger with this approach is the identification of tiers or types of assets so  broad as to invite continued disagreement and gridlock, leaving the  situation essentially unchanged.  Nonetheless, to provide the department  with flexibility to implement this key action as a system, we adjusted our  recommendation to reflect DOD’s suggestion.
DOD concurred without comment with our fourth and fifth  recommendations that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint Staff and  Military Services to develop clear and consistent criteria to guide  overarching strategic decisions on the use of collective protection; and  that those offices review their current policies and develop consistent  requirements on the use of collective protection at medical units, and  naval, ground, and air forces.
As we agreed with your office, we plan no further distribution of this  report until 30 days from the date of this letter.  We will then send copies  of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National  Intelligence, and to interested congressional committees.  We will also  make copies available to others upon request.  In addition, this report will  be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report.  Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix  VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To examine the current assessments of chemical and biological threats to  Department of Defense facilities located overseas, we interviewed  intelligence officials from a variety of national and DOD intelligence  organizations, and reviewed briefings and other intelligence products  generated by these organizations.   Specifically, we met with officials from  the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National  Ground Intelligence Center and DOD intelligence officials from each of the  four regional combatant commands with critical overseas facilities located  in their area of operations.  During our meetings, we obtained detailed  briefings and other intelligence products, which described the nature and  likelihood of a chemical or biological attack on U.S. troops and  installations, as well as other documents that described the capabilities of  terrorist organizations and adversarial nation states.  Although we could  not independently verify the reliability of the information, we obtained  explanations of the basis for the assessments from intelligence analysts  and other officials.  We also requested access to and briefings on the most  recent national intelligence estimates for both chemical and biological  threats from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.  Although  the office provided us with the latest intelligence estimate on biological  warfare, we were unable to obtain the latest national intelligence estimate  on chemical warfare.  At the close of our review in August 2006, the  estimate remained in draft status and we were unable to schedule a  briefing with officials to discuss its contents.
To determine the levels of collective protection provided to critical  overseas facilities we worked with several DOD offices, first to develop  criterion needed to determine which DOD sites were considered critical,  and second, to identify the type and amount of any collective protection  equipment at each site.  During the time of our review DOD had not  developed an overall agreed-upon methodology and listing of facilities  considered to be critical.  As a result, we were required to develop our  own criterion for the purposes of this review.  To develop this criterion we  reviewed existing DOD regulations and discussed potential options with  officials from a variety of DOD offices, including the Defense Critical  Infrastructure Program, the Joint Staff Office for Antiterrorism and  Homeland Defense, the Joint Requirements Office, the Joint Program  Manager for Collective Protection, and the Guardian Installation  Protection Program office. The criterion called for DOD to identify those  sites that must remain operational to complete its mission during a  chemical or biological event, such as command and control nodes, rest  and relief areas, emergency medical locations, and intelligence sites, and  where there would be no capability to transfer the function or capability to  an alternate location.  The Joint Staff then assisted us by forwarding our  criterion to the regional combatant commanders for the U.S. Central,  European, Pacific, and Southern Commands, and requesting that they  identify their critical facilities and the type and amount of any collective  protection equipment currently located at those sites.  Our method of  quantifying the critical sites counted the number of individual buildings  identified as critical sites on DOD installations, when identified separately  by DOD officials.  Following receipt of the responses from the combatant  commands, we verified the accuracy of those lists with officials from each  command.
To determine the levels of collective protection provided to major  expeditionary warfighting assets, such as ground forces, naval vessels, and  aircraft, we reviewed DOD’s Annual Report on Chemical and Biological  Defense Programs and interviewed contractors and officials from each  service component, the Tank and Automotive Command, and the Joint  Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense to obtain  detailed listings of the type and amount of collective protection equipment  currently fielded by each service component.  Once we obtained these  listings, we verified the information with officials from each service and  the Joint Program Executive Office.  Based on these efforts and our  discussions with department and military service officials, we believe that  the information we obtained is sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report.
To examine DOD’s framework for managing overall installation protection  activities and for prioritizing critical installations for funding, we reviewed  applicable regulations, policies, and prior GAO and DOD reports and  interviewed officials from a variety of DOD offices responsible for  program management and oversight.  Specifically, we met with officials  from the following offices:    Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense,    Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and    Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and  Chemical and Biological Defense Programs    Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense    Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and    Joint Staff, Anti-Terrorism/Homeland Defense    Office of the Inspector General
Regional combatant commands (Central Command, European  Command, Pacific Command, and Southern Command)
Military service components (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine  Corps)
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
U.S. Army Chemical School  We conducted our review from September 2005 through August 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Letter of Inquiry to the Secretary of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: DOD Response to GAO Letter of Inquiry
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Director of National Intelligence
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, William Cawood,   Assistant Director (retired); Robert Repasky, Assistant Director; Lorelei St.  James, Assistant Director; Shawn Arbogast; Angela Bourciquot; Grace  Coleman; Jason Jackson; John Nelson; Rebecca Shea; Karen Thornton;  and Cheryl Weissman also made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Management: Additional Actions Needed to Enhance DOD’s  Risk-Based Approach for Making Resource Decisions. GAO-06-13.   Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2005.
Combating Terrorism: DOD Efforts to Improve Installation  Preparedness Can Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and  Comprehensive Planning.  GAO-04-855.  Washington, D.C.: August 12,  2004.
Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk  Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks.  GAO/NSIAD-99-163.   Washington, D.C.: September 14, 1999.