Combating Terrorism: DHS Should Take Action to Better Ensure Resources Abroad Align with Priorities
Published: 2013-09-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Combating terrorism is a governmentwide effort, to which DHS contributes. In such efforts abroad, DHS partners with the Department of State (State)-- the lead agency at U.S. missions. DHS deploys resources abroad to carry out programs and build capacity within its areas of expertise--border, maritime, aviation, and cyber security; immigration; and law enforcement.
GAO was asked to examine DHS's efforts abroad to combat terrorism. This report answers the following questions: (1) What programs, activities, and resources does DHS have abroad to help combat terrorism? (2) How, if at all, has DHS contributed to U.S. missions and what, if any, factors have affected contributions? (3) To what extent has DHS aligned resource use abroad with strategic priorities?
GAO analyzed DHS expenditures for fiscal years 2008-2012, personnel data for May 2013 and documents, such as national strategies and management directives. GAO also interviewed DHS and State officials in headquarters and 10 countries, selected on the basis of factors such as the size of DHS's presence. The results from site visits cannot be generalized but provided insights. GAO also surveyed DHS and State personnel in all 57 U.S. missions where DHS has a presence.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) carries out a variety of programs and activities abroad within its areas of expertise that could have the effect of thwarting terrorists and their plots while also combating other categories of transnational crime, and DHS expended approximately $451 million on programs and activities abroad in fiscal year 2012. For example, through the Visa Security Program, DHS has deployed personnel abroad to help prevent the issuance of visas to people who might pose a threat. As of May 2013, DHS has stationed about 1,800 employees in almost 80 countries to conduct these and other activities. In addition, DHS has delivered training and technical assistance in areas such as border and aviation security to officials from about 180 countries to enhance partner nations' security capacities.
GAO identified five types of contributions DHS has made to U.S. missions (e.g., embassies and consulates), 12 factors that support DHS's ability to contribute, and a range of challenges and impacts related to DHS contributions. On the basis of surveys of DHS and State officials abroad, GAO found that DHS has significantly or moderately contributed to combating terrorism goals for each of the types of contributions GAO identified, including building relationships, identifying threats, and sharing information. The factors GAO identified that facilitated DHS's ability to contribute fell into two general categories: (1) facilitating a collaborative climate and (2) leveraging resources and clarifying roles and responsibilities. GAO also identified a variety of challenges, including DHS domestic management effectively coordinating with personnel abroad and partners at U.S. missions understanding of DHS's role. Fewer than half of respondents identified any challenge as moderate or significant. For impacts arising from these challenges, less than one-third of respondents identified them as causing a significant or moderate impact.
DHS has taken actions to increase organizational and programmatic alignment, but has not established mechanisms to ensure that resource use abroad aligns with department-wide and government-wide strategic priorities. DHS has a stated objective to improve alignment across the department, and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for agencies to implement mechanisms to help ensure achievement of their objectives. Although DHS conducted a onetime review of the department's international footprint and created a departmentwide international engagement plan, DHS has not established mechanisms to help ensure that decisions to deploy resources abroad--which are made at the individual component level--align with department-wide and government-wide strategic priorities. Specifically, DHS (1) has not established department-wide strategic priorities for international engagement, such as specific types of activities or target regions to further combating terrorism goals; (2) does not have a mechanism for monitoring alignment between resource deployment abroad and strategic priorities; and (3) does not have reliable, comparable cost data for its programs and activities abroad and has not established a standardized framework to capture these data. Strategic priorities, a mechanism to routinely monitor alignment between strategic priorities and resource deployment abroad, and reliable cost data could provide DHS with critical information to make informed resource deployment decisions and help achieve its objective to improve organizational alignment across components.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DHS establish (1) department-wide strategic priorities, (2) an institutionalized mechanism to review resource alignment abroad, and (3) a method to collect reliable and comparable cost data for resources abroad. DHS concurred with these recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The National Strategy for Counterterrorism calls for a rapid, coordinated,  and effective effort that uses the resources of the entire government to   The Department of  mitigate threats to national and homeland security.Homeland Security (DHS)—with its specific knowledge and skills in  border, maritime, and aviation security; immigration; and law  enforcement, among other areas—contributes to the U.S. government’s  efforts to combat terrorism. In pursuit of this objective, DHS seeks to  identify security vulnerabilities and interdict threats at the earliest possible  point with the aim of making the nation’s physical borders the last, not the  first, line of defense.
The Department of State (State) leads U.S. diplomatic efforts and has  established U.S. missions (e.g., embassies and consulates) in foreign  nations. One aim of these U.S. missions is to enhance national security  by strengthening the relationship between the United States and other  nations. State—through the U.S. missions—coordinates most U.S.  international efforts. Therefore, U.S. missions are uniquely positioned to  provide leadership, resources, and knowledge to U.S. efforts to combat  terrorism, in collaboration with various other U.S. government agencies  working abroad, including DHS, as well as with foreign partners.
One current priority of DHS leadership is better aligning its efforts across  the department with the aim of strengthening effectiveness, improving  decision making to address shared issues— such as managing  international affairs and combating terrorism —and prioritizing resource  use in an era of fiscal constraint. In this context, you asked us to examine  DHS’s efforts to combat terrorism abroad and how DHS’s resource use  abroad aligns with other U.S. efforts, including those carried out by U.S.  missions. This report answers the following questions:  1.  What programs, activities, and resources does DHS have abroad to  help combat terrorism?  2.  How, if at all, has DHS contributed to U.S. missions’ efforts to combat  terrorism, and what factors, if any, have facilitated or hampered those  contributions?  3.  To what extent has DHS taken action to align its resource use abroad  with departmental and government-wide strategic priorities?
To address our questions, we reviewed key government-wide strategies  related to combating terrorism, including the May 2010 National Security  Strategy and the June 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism. We  reviewed documentation such as DHS’s Quadrennial Homeland Security  Review (QHSR) and DHS component documentation describing goals,  objectives, and operations for DHS programs abroad. We also  interviewed officials with responsibility for programs and activities abroad  in DHS and component headquarters offices for the six operational  components that have missions related to combating terrorism—U.S.  Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S.  Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Coast Guard  (USCG), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS). In addition, we interviewed  officials in DHS’s Office of International Affairs (OIA) and DHS’s Office of  Policy-Counterterrorism division, who have department-level  responsibilities for DHS’s deployments abroad and counterterrorism  policy, respectively. We reviewed documentation about State programs  and activities on which DHS collaborates and interviewed officials in  Department of State Bureaus for Counterterrorism, Diplomatic Security,  and Consular Affairs, because DHS coordinates and collaborates with  them in its activities abroad. We also reviewed our prior work on specific  programs related to activities DHS carries out abroad, such as container  security, visa security, and foreign airport assessments. In addition, we  reviewed and discussed findings with the DHS Office of Inspector  General officials responsible for a 2008 report that made a number of  recommendations designed to enhance DHS’s management of  international affairs.
To address the first question, we first developed an operational definition  of combating terrorism, using information from government-wide strategy  documents and from interviews with DHS officials with responsibility for  programs abroad that have a nexus with counterterrorism and  antiterrorism efforts. We then identified the programs and activities DHS  carries out abroad that met that definition and verified the list of programs  and activities with officials in DHS OIA and the six operational  components in our review. Because many of DHS’s missions involve  carrying out the same set of activities with multifaceted purposes—such  as facilitating legitimate trade and travel while countering threats to the  homeland—we determined it would not be possible to isolate  expenditures for combating terrorism-related activities abroad from other  DHS activities abroad. Instead, we collected from each component in our  review expenditures for all activities conducted abroad for fiscal years  2008 through 2012. We collected data on full-time-equivalent employees  (FTE) from DHS’s Overseas Personnel and Activities Locator report for  May 2013, the most recent month available at the time of our work. We  reviewed the expenditure and FTE data provided for reasonableness and  discussed the actions taken to help ensure its reliability with  knowledgeable agency officials. We determined that the expenditure and  FTE data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of presenting general  information about DHS expenditures abroad and the number of FTEs by  country for a specific point in time. We also collected, from each of the six  operational components in our review, information on training and  technical assistance activities. Because of challenges such as  inconsistent data definitions, we determined that there were not  sufficiently reliable and comparable data to allow us to report  expenditures specific to training and technical assistance abroad, but  information could be reported about the foreign nation whose officials  have received the training and technical assistance.
To address the second question, we visited U.S. missions in 10 countries  where one or more DHS components had FTEs stationed. We selected  the locations based on a range of factors, including the nature and scope  of DHS presence abroad; indicators of terrorist activities; and logistical  concerns, such as security and the opportunity to leverage resources. At  these locations we conducted interviews with DHS officials and State  officials about the opportunities for and the quality of collaboration  between DHS and other federal partners. The results from our visits to  these 10 countries cannot be generalized; however, the interviews  provided insights into how DHS contributes to U.S. missions’ combating  terrorism efforts, what is working well, and any barriers to effective  contributions.
We conducted two surveys to collect information about the kinds of  contributions DHS has made to U.S. missions, the factors that were  important to facilitate DHS’s contributions in the U.S. mission  environment, challenges DHS and the U.S. missions faced facilitating  DHS’s contributions, and the impacts of any such challenges. We  administered one survey to all DHS attachés and the other to all deputy  chiefs of mission (DCM) at all U.S. missions where DHS has permanently  stationed FTEs in the embassies—57 U.S. missions in total. The overall  response rate to the surveys was 82 percent for DHS attachés and 72  percent for DCMs.
To address the third question, we analyzed prescriptions in the February  2010 QHSR for maturing the department. These prescriptions include  improving organizational alignment—particularly among operational  components—and enhancing programmatic alignment to the homeland  security missions. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government calls for control activities—that is, policies, procedures,  techniques, and mechanisms—to enforce management’s directives. this respect, we evaluated the extent to which DHS had control activities  to help achieve the goals of organizational and programmatic alignment  and efficient, effective management processes around its resource  deployment abroad. To do this, we reviewed documentation, such as  DHS’s Management Directive describing roles and responsibilities for  DHS’s international affairs. In addition, we interviewed officials in OIA and  the six DHS components in our review about the extent to which they  undertake efforts to facilitate programmatic and organizational alignment  across the set of resources and efforts DHS deploys abroad. We also  interviewed officials in the Office of Counterterrorism Policy about how  DHS and government-wide counterterrorism goals inform resource use  decisions. For more information on our scope and methodology, see  appendix I.
GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1  (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: DHS’s Strategic Framework and Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism
paragraphs: DHS conducts four main types of efforts abroad that can help to combat  terrorism by thwarting terrorists and their plots before they reach the  homeland: deploying programs and activities abroad—especially screening and  targeting programs, along with select immigration benefit  processing—to help interdict people who present a threat to the  homeland and the money, information, and goods used to carry out  terrorist and other transnational criminal agendas sooner in the trade,  travel, and immigration cycles; working with and sharing information with international and federal  partners to help counter terrorism and other international crime; working alongside foreign officials to support them in assessing their  own security vulnerabilities and implementing mitigating actions; and helping other nations strengthen their security infrastructure by  providing training and consultations, conducting assessments, or  providing equipment.
section_title: DHS’s Roles and Responsibilities for Combating Terrorism and International Affairs
paragraphs: DHS component agencies and offices have primary responsibility for  conducting activities that correspond with their particular missions,  including those that help to combat terrorism. As shown in table 1, six  operational components in our review have mission responsibilities in  border, maritime, aviation, and cyber security; immigration; and law  enforcement that contribute to DHS’s efforts to combat terrorism. DHS  components are generally responsible for making operational decisions— such as how to allocate resources, both domestically and abroad—to  meet component and DHS mission needs.
DHS’s counterterrorism efforts are coordinated by DHS’s  Counterterrorism Coordinator through its Counterterrorism Advisory  Board. The board is co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary for Policy and  the Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis and also includes  component heads. According to Office of Policy officials responsible for  working with the board, it meets weekly to discuss and develop plans and  strategies related to counterterrorism. The Office of Policy, through the  Counterterrorism Policy Office, also coordinates DHS participation in  White House and interagency policy planning meetings related to  counterterrorism. OIA is also a member of the Counterterrorism Advisory  Board.
DHS’s OIA has primary responsibility for coordinating all aspects of  department international affairs, but does not have operational oversight  of component activities. In August 2012, the Secretary of Homeland  Security signed the DHS International Affairs Management Directive.  Consistent with the Management Directive, the Assistant Secretary for  International Affairs, in coordination with the heads of DHS’s operational  and support components, establishes strategies, plans, and appropriate  activities for DHS to develop foreign partner security capabilities and  international cooperative programs that align with DHS strategic planning  documents.
The Secretary of Homeland Security has testified that to achieve its  mission more effectively, it is important that DHS both identify and  operate as “One DHS” in pursuit of its overarching homeland security  missions. To that end, OIA is responsible for developing, coordinating,  and executing departmental international policy, including reviewing  departmental positions on international matters, negotiating agreements,  developing policy and programs, interacting with foreign officials, and  working with DHS personnel abroad. Although operational decision  making and resource use are generally the purview of the individual  components and offices, OIA is responsible for reviewing component  requests to State for international deployments.
section_title: DHS Collaboration with State and Other Federal Partners Abroad
paragraphs: Two White House strategies outline government-wide goals for promoting  national security and combating terrorism at the highest level—the May  2010 National Security Strategy and the June 2011 National Strategy for  Counterterrorism. The National Security Strategy articulates a strategic  approach for advancing U.S. interests, including security, economy, and  values. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism focuses more  specifically on one of the National Security Strategy’s priorities— disrupting, dismantling, and defeating terrorist networks. Both national  strategies call for a whole-of-government approach to help secure the  nation and combat terrorism. They each also call for contributions that are  in line with DHS activities abroad—carrying out programs to limit the  movement of people and goods that pose a threat to the homeland and  helping other nations build capacity to detect, deter, and capture such  people and goods to limit their global movement.
DHS coordinates its efforts abroad to combat terrorism with State and  other federal partners. State is the federal agency responsible for  coordinating and supervising efforts led out of U.S. missions—like  combating international terrorism—in collaboration with various other U.S.  government agencies working abroad, such as the Department of  Defense, Department of Justice, and DHS, as well as foreign partners  that are facing terrorist threats. When conducting efforts abroad, DHS  operates under the authority of the chief of mission (typically an  ambassador). Chiefs of mission are the principal officers in charge of U.S.  missions and have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and  supervision of all government executive branch employees in that  country, with some exceptions, like personnel under the Department of  Defense’s Combatant Commanders. The staffing levels of a U.S. mission are determined by the chief of mission through the National  Security Decision Directive-38 process. This directive, issued by the  President, authorizes the chief of mission to determine the size,  composition, or mandate of personnel operating at the U.S. mission.
DHS also collaborates with State and other federal partners that provide  the funding to support personnel who make the contributions. For  example, many of the activities to build capacity and provide training  abroad are funded through State programs. In some cases, DHS also  collaborates to share information, knowledge, and skills, where  appropriate, with other federal personnel operating abroad—for example,  contributing border security expertise in Department of Defense capacity- building efforts or sharing information with other law enforcement  personnel stationed at the same diplomatic U.S. mission.
At each U.S. mission, State requires mission management to lead, in  consultation with relevant stakeholders, two processes to identify  strategies, priorities, and programming needs for the efforts that are to be  carried out through the mission—including combating terrorism. The  first—the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS)—is a multi-year plan that  articulates the U.S. priorities in a given country. It is a single overarching  strategy, completed every 3 years, that encapsulates government-wide  policy priorities, objectives, and the means by which diplomatic  engagement, foreign assistance, and other tools will be used to achieve  them. The second is the Mission Resource Request (MRR), which is a  budget document that explains and justifies the resources required to  achieve a given mission’s highest foreign policy and management  objectives, as drawn from the ICS. The MRR is submitted annually.
section_title: DHS Conducts Mission Activities and Capacity Building Abroad That Can Help Combat Terrorism
paragraphs: The DHS components within our review carry out programs and activities  abroad within their areas of expertise—border, maritime, aviation, and  cyber security; immigration; and law enforcement, among others—that  are designed to limit the movement of people and goods that could pose  a threat to the homeland before they reach the United States. They also  deliver training and technical assistance designed to enhance partner  nations’ ability to limit such movement globally. According to our analysis  of expenditure data and FTE data provided to us by DHS, DHS OIA and  the components within our review spent approximately $451 million  dollars on activities abroad in fiscal year 2012 and had about 1,800 FTEs  stationed abroad in almost 80 countries as of May 2013.
subsections: section_title: DHS Carries Out a Variety of Programs and Activities Abroad That Can Help Combat Terrorism
paragraphs: DHS conducts certain programs and mission activities abroad to prevent  people and goods that would pose a threat from reaching the homeland.  Table 2 details the mission activities falling within the definition of  combating terrorism used in this report—that is, they have the potential to  thwart terrorists and their plots whether designed specifically for that  purpose or not.
Within its areas of expertise, DHS also provides training and technical  assistance activities—often at the request of and in coordination with  other federal partners such as State or the Department of Defense— which are designed to help other nations build capacity and address  vulnerabilities in order to limit the movement of people who present a  threat to the homeland and the money, information, and goods used to  carry out terrorist and other transnational criminal agendas. Figure 1  shows that in fiscal year 2012, the DHS components in our review  conducted training and technical assistance to help combat terrorism with  partners from about 180 countries. See appendix II for data associated  with figure 1.
Click on the name of the country for more information. Click on the X to close. For a printer-friendly version, please see appendix II, table 5.
Participated in 1 activity (27)
Participated in 6-10  activities (40)
Participated in 2-5 activities (88)
Participated in 10+ training activities (23)
Table 3 provides additional detail about the types of training and technical  assistance that each DHS component in our review provided in fiscal year  2012 to help combat terrorism abroad. Combined, TSA’s and ICE’s efforts  to help foreign partners build capacity and address vulnerabilities in  transportation security, transnational crime, and immigration and customs  enforcement account for more than half of total foreign partner  participation in training and technical assistance activities.
According to our analysis of expenditure data provided to us by DHS OIA  and the components within our review, DHS spent approximately $451  million dollars on activities abroad in fiscal year 2012. Some but not all of  these expenditures were dedicated to combating terrorism. The budget  for these expenditures comes from various sources, including annual  appropriations, user fees collected, and interagency reimbursements.  Expenditures increased from about $391 million to about $451 million  over the 5-year period from fiscal years 2008 through 2012, as shown in  figure 2. In pursuit of their different mission goals, each DHS component  in our review conducts different activities abroad and tracks related  expenditures accordingly. Although each DHS component in our review  generally included salary and benefits, International Cooperative  Administrative Support Services (ICASS), Capital Security Cost-Sharing  Program (CSCS), travel, and operating costs in their data for  expenditures abroad, some components included additional  expenditures. For example, CBP includes expenditures in direct support  of the Immigration Advisory Program and preclearance activities abroad,  while other components do not include expenditures in direct support of  programs and activities abroad. Appendix III shows the various elements  included in each component’s expenditure data.
From fiscal years 2008 through 2012, CBP consistently accounted for 40  to 50 percent of DHS expenditures abroad, which was generally due to  the high number of FTEs dedicated to CBP airport preclearance and port  security programs. Preclearance countries—Aruba, the Bahamas,  Bermuda, Canada, and Ireland—account for more than 500 of the nearly  700 CBP FTEs abroad. These countries also account for about $117  million of CBP’s $187 million fiscal year 2012 expenditures abroad. About  $49 million of these expenditures were funded by user fees.
In some cases, DHS’s expenditures abroad are reimbursed by State and  the Department of Defense. For example:
State’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program and Regional Strategic  Initiative provide funding for DHS training and technical assistance  activities abroad that can help combat terrorism.
The Department of Defense and State provide funding for USCG  personnel who fill positions in their programs abroad, including those  that can help combat terrorism.
State provides funding for all DHS personnel and activities in  Afghanistan. In fiscal year 2012, State provided about $13 million that  largely supported CBP, ICE, and TSA efforts to share intelligence with  other federal partners and target illicit activities such as fraudulent  visa applications and human smuggling; transportation of drugs,  weapons, and precursor material for improvised explosive devices;  and illicit use of nontraditional money transfer networks.
Figure 3 shows expenditures abroad by country and component in fiscal  year 2012, as well as the locations of DHS FTEs stationed abroad as of  May 2013. In fiscal year 2012, DHS expenditures were highest in the  following five countries: Canada, Mexico, Bahrain, Germany, and the  Bahamas. These expenditures were generally associated with high  numbers of FTEs in each country. In Canada and Mexico, expenditures  supported a range of efforts to expedite the legitimate cross-border flow  of people, goods, and services and to interdict and prevent the illicit  cross-border flows of people, weapons, drugs, and currency. In Bahrain,  Germany, and the Bahamas, expenditures were primarily dedicated to  force protection of U.S. naval vessels (which is reimbursed by the  Department of Defense), aviation security efforts, and preclearance  efforts, respectively. See appendix II for data associated with figure 3.
Click on the name of the country for more information. Click on the X to close. For a printer-friendly version, please see appendix II, tables 6 and 7. $1-$500,000 (25) $2,000,001-$5,000,000 (26) $500,001-$2,000,000 (25) $5,000,000+ (18)
According to DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning data,  as of May 2013, DHS OIA and the six DHS operational components in  our review had approximately 1,800 FTEs in almost 80 countries to help  combat terrorism and achieve other mission goals. Employees include  DHS and component attachés, program personnel, and locally employed  staff. Some DHS employees also travel regionally and from the United  States on a more temporary basis to conduct capacity-building activities.  Table 4 shows the breakdown of FTEs by component for May 2013.
section_title: DHS and State Identified Five Key DHS Contributions to U.S. Missions and Multiple Factors and Challenges That Affected Contributions
paragraphs: On the basis of two surveys and interviews conducted with embassy  personnel, we found that DHS has made contributions to U.S. missions in  five key areas. We also identified 12 factors that facilitated DHS’s  contributions to U.S. missions’ combating terrorism goals. A majority of  DCMs and DHS attachés responding to our surveys reported that the  factors we identified were significantly or moderately important. They  most frequently identified as very important a set of factors that relate to  supporting a climate of collaboration at the embassy. We also identified a  variety of challenges DHS and other personnel in the U.S. missions have  faced. Although many of the DCMs and DHS attachés reported  experiencing these challenges to some degree, our survey results  indicate that a majority did not experience the challenges or their impacts  as significant.
subsections: section_title: Mission Management Reported That DHS Has Made Valuable Contributions to Combating Terrorism Efforts
paragraphs: Using State’s and DHS’s goals, along with interviews conducted with  DHS and State headquarters offices and interviews with embassy  personnel, we identified five specific types of contributions DHS might  make to a U.S. mission’s combating terrorism goals. As shown in figure 4,  according to our survey results, the majority of the 41 DCM respondents  indicated that DHS has significantly or moderately contributed to  combating terrorism goals for each of the types of contributions we  identified.
It is important to note that in some cases, DHS does not have the  opportunity to make certain types of contributions. For example, the  opportunity to negotiate bilateral information-sharing agreements may not  exist in some locations, while other locations may not engage in any  capacity building. Similarly, one DCM survey respondent noted that DHS  does not have primary responsibility for combating terrorism-related  activities at the embassy but plays an important supporting role and has  negotiated memorandums of understanding with host government  officials on immigration and customs enforcement. Another respondent  said that although DHS has not negotiated formal agreements, it has  improved counterterrorism cooperation with the host government through  informal understandings and relationships.
As with our survey, DCMs we interviewed during our site visits also noted  important contributions DHS has made to their mission’s combating  terrorism goals in a variety of ways. For example, one DCM pointed to  progress a DHS-affiliated law enforcement group had made to foreign  partners’ ability to combat international crime. Another DCM said that  DHS brought new networks of contacts to the table and leveraged  relationships with host country partners, including one recent substantial  contribution to a major nonproliferation effort. An ambassador we  interviewed stated that CBP has facilitated numerous weapons and other  illicit material seizures, including improvised explosive device precursor  materials.
section_title: Certain Factors Facilitate Use of DHS Knowledge and Skills
paragraphs: By reviewing our prior work on interagency collaboration, along with  information collected in our interviews with agency officials, we identified  12 factors that could facilitate DHS’s ability to contribute to U.S. missions’  combating terrorism efforts. DCMs and DHS attachés we surveyed  provided information about the extent to which they believe the factors we  identified are important for DHS to be able to contribute its knowledge  and skills. Figures 5 and 6 show the complete list of factors we identified  and the extent to which DCMs and DHS attaché respondents to our  survey identified them as important. Overall, a majority of respondents to  both surveys reported that nearly all of the factors we identified were very  or moderately important to facilitating DHS’s contributions to U.S.  missions’ combating terrorism efforts.
The 12 factors we identified generally fall into two categories: (1) efforts to  foster a collaborative climate, and (2) mechanisms to leverage resources  and clarify roles and responsibilities.
As we reported in September 2012, one of the key considerations in  developing interagency collaborative mechanisms is whether the  participating agencies have the means to recognize and reward  collaboration. Another of these key features is bridging organizational  cultures. We reported that different agencies participating in any  collaborative mechanism bring diverse organizational cultures to it. To  address these differences, we have found that it is important to establish  ways to operate across agency boundaries, by, for example, developing  common terminology and compatible policies and procedures, and  fostering open lines of communication.
Three of the factors we identified—the 3 that were most commonly  selected as very important by DCM survey respondents—related to  fostering an organizational culture that supports collaborative behaviors— (1) U.S. mission management promotes collaborative behaviors, (2) U.S.  mission management actively seeks to help bridge organizational  cultures, and (3) a culture of cooperation and informal information sharing  exists. U.S. mission management promoting collaborative behaviors was  most frequently identified as very important by both DCMs and DHS  attachés. All 47 DHS attaché respondents identified it as very or  moderately important, as did 40 out of 41 DCMs. A culture of cooperation  and informal information was the second most frequently reported as very  important for DCMs and third for DHS Attachés.
Echoing our survey results, officials we interviewed at one U.S. mission  we visited reported a strong collaborative relationship between DHS and  other federal partners, and attributed it, at least in part, to the “tone at the  top”—including both rewarding collaborative behaviors and discouraging  failure to collaborate. At another U.S. mission we visited, an official noted  that the DCM had forbidden the use of acronyms in interagency meetings,  which had the effect of helping to ensure that use of specialized  vocabulary did not unintentionally exclude participants from collaborative  discussions. This official at this embassy noted that the action may seem  simple but was nevertheless a critical signal to all the federal personnel at  the embassy that the management valued collaborative action.
Another related factor a majority of DHS attaché and DCM respondents— 33 of 47 and 34 of 40, respectively—identified as very important is having  routine formal mechanisms for information sharing. One such mechanism  U.S. missions use to facilitate effective contribution of DHS skills and  expertise is law enforcement working groups focused on counterterrorism  or security issues. Working groups, which are routine, formal meetings of  diverse agency personnel with similar goals or functions, provide an  opportunity for parties carrying out ongoing activities to share information  and avoid conflicts. At two U.S. missions we visited, officials we  interviewed pointed to the working groups as an essential collaboration  mechanism.
Our October 2005 work on practices to enhance and sustain interagency  collaboration called for agencies to address needs by leveraging  resources and agreeing on roles and responsibilities. Among the factors  we identified that relate to this is DHS’s participation in developing U.S.  mission strategic goals, and 35 of 41 DCMs and 43 of 47 DHS attachés  responded that the factor was very or moderately important in facilitating  DHS’s contributions. With some exceptions, such as military activities,  federal activities abroad are conducted through the embassies under the  authority of the chief of mission. DHS receives funding from State for a  number of its training and technical assistance programs abroad, through  programs like the Regional Strategic Initiative and the Antiterrorism  Assistance program. For State, funding decisions are based in part on the  product of planning processes undertaken at each individual U.S.  mission. Therefore, the ability for DHS and State to share information  about both strategic and programming decisions, particularly through U.S.  mission planning processes, is an important element in DHS’s ability to  make the maximum possible contribution to U.S. mission efforts.
During our fieldwork we saw variation in the extent to and manner in  which U.S. mission management integrated DHS into planning  processes. In addition, open-ended comments on our survey reflected  some frustrations with DHS integration—though these concerns did not  appear to be pervasive or systemic. We visited two missions where  officials expressed positive remarks about DHS’s opportunities to  collaborate with its federal partners in the respective U.S. mission. In both  of these missions, the DCM stressed to us the importance of fully  integrating the DHS attaché into U.S. mission strategic planning. At these  same two U.S. missions, the DHS attachés said they make a focused  effort to ensure that the other federal partners understand the roles and  responsibilities of DHS and all of its components—whether or not their  personnel are stationed at the embassy.
At another U.S. mission we visited, the DCM told us that the DHS attaché  had an opportunity to participate in a strategic planning process and was  later able to comment on the final product. However, this DHS attaché  told us that he did not fully understand the purpose of the planning  meeting he attended nor did he believe he had been provided  encouragement or channels for further participation beyond the single  meeting. At this U.S. mission, DHS personnel reported frustrations about  limits on their ability to contribute, while U.S. mission management raised  questions about DHS’s value to their mission. At another U.S. mission  with border security concerns, DHS officials said the embassy’s border  working group had not been addressing DHS priorities or activities.  According to the DHS officials, the embassy was not encouraging a  “whole-of-government” approach that recognizes the value of DHS  contributions.
Although few DCMs and DHS attachés reported that DHS does not  participate in helping to develop U.S. mission strategic goals, some  respondents discussed issues in open-ended comments with DHS’s  integration and clarity of roles within U.S. missions. For example, in open- ended survey responses, one DCM said DHS personnel are individually  cooperative, but internal stove-piping limits DHS’s ability to contribute.  Another DCM commented that DHS is organized and deployed in a  manner that limits its ability to bring its knowledge and skills to bear.
section_title: Survey Respondents Reported Facing Some Challenges, but Few Indicated Impacts Were Significant
paragraphs: We identified 14 potential challenges that could hinder the contribution of  DHS knowledge and skills abroad to combating terrorism efforts. Fewer  than half of respondents identified any of the challenges as moderate or  significant challenges. In most cases, more than two-thirds said the  challenges were minimal or did not apply to them. Figures 7 and 8 show  the top 5 (or 6 in case of a tie for fifth place) most frequently identified  challenges that DCMs and DHS attachés identified as representing some  level of challenge—significant, moderate, or minimal—ranked by  frequency. See appendix IV for a list of all 14 challenges and the extent to  which DCMs and DHS attachés reported experiencing them.
Some survey respondents elaborated, in written comments, about issues  with DHS domestic management effectively coordinating with and  leveraging personnel abroad. For example, one DHS respondent stated  that DHS domestic management, through contact with foreign embassies  in the United States, has come into conflict with DHS operations in  country. A DCM respondent indicated that when issues arise, they often  originate from insufficient coordination with DHS domestic management,  with State, and with DHS in the field. Another DCM respondent indicated  that DHS domestic management regularly gets involved in international  affairs without informing DHS field office or embassy management. In  addition, a DCM respondent indicated that challenges come primarily  from the U.S. side (rather than DHS personnel at the embassy). In  addition, officials we spoke with mentioned that sometimes  miscommunication or misalignment between DHS domestic management  and embassies causes problems. For example, at one U.S. mission we  visited, the DCM and DHS personnel described an instance in which DHS  domestic operations took down a communication link used by  transnational criminals in the country without consulting anyone at the  embassy, including DHS personnel. However, DHS’s law enforcement  partners were monitoring the link for more strategic purposes and the  action negatively affected their operation—an outcome that DHS  personnel at the embassy could have alerted them to had they been  consulted.
Some respondents elaborated about the extent to which the availability of  U.S. mission resources to sponsor programs that would call for  contributions of DHS knowledge and skills is a challenge. For example,  one DCM respondent indicated that the embassy is an old facility that is  not sized adequately to house all the federal agencies and space  restrictions affect the U.S. mission’s ability to accommodate DHS’s  presence. In addition, at two sites we visited, officials indicated that space  is scarce, especially given rapidly growing needs, so making room for  DHS staff, or any other federal stakeholder, is challenging and requires a  strong cost-benefit case. In addition, officials we spoke with mentioned  constrained or unpredictable budgets hampering planning and the ability  to dedicate resources to DHS programs or personnel. One DHS survey  respondent commented that with little to no budget, it is difficult to build  contacts with foreign partners, effectively communicate meeting  outcomes, and develop long term strategic plans.
Some respondents elaborated about the extent to which U.S. mission  understanding of DHS’s role is a challenge. For example, one DHS  respondent commented that in larger embassies the mission of  counterterrorism is focused on other agencies, and DHS sometimes does  not have the opportunity to discuss what it can offer. Another DHS  respondent indicated that other mission personnel do not understand  exactly the role of DHS and how it contributes to mission-related  objectives.
We also surveyed DCMs and DHS attachés about the extent to which the  challenges they have experienced have affected DHS’s ability to  contribute—for example, by creating conflicts, missed opportunities,  project delays, or unnecessary overlap. As shown in figures 9 and 10, for  all impacts that might have arisen from the identified challenges, more  than two-thirds of respondents said the impact was minimal or did not  affect them.
section_title: DHS Has Acted to Enhance Department- wide Alignment, but Could Have Better Assurance That Resources Abroad Support Highest Priorities
paragraphs: DHS has taken actions to increase organizational and programmatic  alignment for its resource use abroad—including establishing an  intradepartmental governance board, reviewing the department’s  international footprint, and creating a department-wide international  engagement plan. However, DHS has not established mechanisms to  help ensure that decisions to deploy resources abroad—which are made  at the individual component level—effectively, efficiently, and consistently  align with department-wide strategic priorities.
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Taken Some Actions to Enhance Department-wide Organizational and Programmatic Alignment across Its Resource Deployment Abroad
paragraphs: DHS’s QHSR calls for a specific focus on strengthening the homeland  security enterprise, in part by maturing the department. According to the  QHSR, critical aspects of maturing the department include (1) improved  organizational alignment—particularly among DHS headquarters  components—(2) enhanced programmatic alignment to the homeland  security missions; and (3) more efficient and effective management  processes, including strategic planning, performance management, and  accounting structures. To that end, DHS and OIA have taken three  actions related to its resource use abroad since 2010.
Establishment of the DHS International Governance Board in August  2012. The board is chaired by the Assistant Secretary for International  Affairs and composed of heads of international affairs from the DHS  components. The board provides a formal organizational mechanism  for the component heads and OIA to collaborate and coordinate  crosscutting policy issues related to international engagement.  According to OIA officials, since its establishment, the board has met  monthly to discuss and resolve issues like designating DHS attachés,  expanding criminal history information sharing for law enforcement,  responding to a new presidential directive that calls for interagency  collaboration to enhance security capacity around the globe, and  coordinating with State on DHS’s presence abroad. For example, in  May 2013 the group considered who should be designated the DHS  attaché in a country where two components had recently established  offices.
Review of the DHS international footprint. Over the period spanning  2011 and early 2012, DHS reviewed the department’s international  footprint—the complete set of resources and efforts DHS had  deployed abroad—with the intention of enhancing organizational and  programmatic alignment. This “footprint review” was led by OIA, in  coordination with component heads, and it evaluated the placement of  resources on the basis of the QHSR’s five strategic missions, cost,  and potential for engagement with host nations. In at least one case,  according to OIA officials, this resulted in components reducing FTEs  in one country and increasing them in another—generally in response  to the potential to achieve key strategic priorities by strengthening  engagement in the country where they increased the resources and to  realize cost savings.
Creation of an international engagement plan. In March 2013, the  Secretary of Homeland Security signed DHS’s first International  Engagement Plan. To promote common international objectives and  priorities across the department, the plan maps key activities abroad  to DHS’s five strategic missions. It also includes specific strategies in  separate international engagement plans for various regions of the  world including Canada; Mexico; Latin America and the Caribbean;  Europe; the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia; and Asia Pacific.Each regional international engagement plan discusses DHS  interests, challenges and opportunities, and strategic objectives,  among other things. For example, the plan on Mexico states that the  flow of goods and people through the Western Hemisphere and  across the United States border, particularly those flows originating in  or transiting through Mexico, represent both the most significant  challenges and the best opportunities for DHS.
section_title: DHS Has Not Established Mechanisms to Help Ensure Department-wide Organizational and Programmatic Alignment in Its Resource Use Abroad
paragraphs: Although a stated goal of DHS’s QHSR is to strengthen the homeland  security enterprise and mature the department through improved  organizational alignment across the components and programmatic  alignment to homeland security missions, DHS has not established  mechanisms to help provide assurance of alignment of its resource use  abroad with department-wide and government-wide strategic priorities.  Specifically, it (1) has not established specific department-wide strategic  priorities to guide organizational and programmatic alignment; (2) does  not have an institutionalized mechanism to ensure ongoing monitoring of  alignment between resource use and strategic priorities; and (3) does  not have the means to produce reliable, comparable cost data to support  analysis of organizational and programmatic alignment in its department- wide resource use abroad.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for  agencies to implement policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms  to enforce management’s directives—for example, to help achieve the  goals of organizational and programmatic alignment and efficient,  effective management processes around its resource deployment abroad.  In addition, the standards call for agencies to ensure that ongoing  monitoring occurs in the course of normal operations, is performed  continually, and is ingrained in the agency’s operations. Finally, the  standards say that relevant, reliable, and timely information should be  available to help an agency achieve its objectives.
Although DHS has a broad mission set and decision making about  resource use abroad is decentralized, it has not established specific  department-wide strategic priorities—such as specific types of activities or  target regions to further combating terrorism goals—for resource use  abroad to help promote organizational alignment in resource decision  making. DHS is tasked with a variety of responsibilities that are not  directly aimed at preventing terrorist attacks. In the course of efforts to  secure the homeland, some activities focus more broadly on transnational  crime such as narcotics and human smuggling, money laundering, and  immigration fraud that could be, in some cases, enablers for terrorist  networks. In addition, the QHSR notes that DHS’s missions are  multifaceted by nature, and efforts to fulfill them also involve promoting  legitimate trade, travel, and immigration.
DHS’s International Engagement Plan links the five QHSR missions to  the kinds of activities that DHS conducts abroad. In this way, it helps  ensure programmatic alignment to homeland security missions at a high  level. However, it does not establish specific priorities to help guide  resource decision making. For example, our analysis of DHS’s  International Engagement Plan found that although there were goals  listed for each region, there was no ordering of priorities by region, by  source of terrorism, by function, or by goal (e.g., combating international  terrorism). Because the plan covers all mission activities described within  the QHSR without clear, specific priorities, it does not convey information  about what might be most important when deciding how to deploy scarce  resources.
The lack of specific department-wide strategic priorities for resource use  abroad also creates limitations in DHS’s ability to help ensure alignment  of its priorities and abilities with government-wide efforts. Officials in the  Office of Counterterrorism Policy and in OIA stated that DHS’s highest  priority for resource use abroad is prevention of attacks on the homeland.  Focusing on preventing attacks on the homeland is consistent with the  National Security Strategy’s and the National Strategy for  Counterterrorism’s calls for the use of homeland security tools to promote  national security and counter terrorism. However, DHS’s Office of  Counterterrorism Policy officials told us that because the regional plans  within DHS’s International Engagement Plan covers all countries with  which DHS engages, from Canada to Afghanistan, the plan does not  represent a clear priority focus on countries with factors that represent  more immediate threats to the homeland. They noted that in their  engagement with the White House and other federal partners for  government-wide counterterrorism efforts, DHS’s International  Engagement Plan—because it covers all DHS missions, not just  counterterrorism—does not help them demonstrate DHS’s  counterterrorism priorities within its overall international engagement.
According to OIA officials, the International Engagement Plan lays out in  one place for the first time all of DHS’s international activities in an effort  to improve organizational and programmatic resource alignment.  However, they acknowledged that it does not necessarily serve to identify  a clear set of priorities and principles that would help to guide future  resource decisions. Instead, it represents more of a compendium of the  many activities and priorities each of the contributing components and  offices within DHS already had planned or under way. They noted that  having a crosscutting view of all the activities and goals across the  international footprint is a significant step forward for the department.  They also said that more clarity on strategic priorities in future iterations  would help ensure better organizational and programmatic alignment, but  current priorities are largely determined independently by each  component, and the department has not established a routine and  crosscutting process for clarifying department-wide priorities. Specific  strategic priorities would provide DHS critical information to guide  resource trade-off decisions and ensure that resources are directed to the  highest homeland security priorities across the department and  government-wide.
Although OIA conducted a one-time exercise to evaluate the  department’s international footprint to try to bring it into better  organizational and programmatic alignment, DHS has not established a  routine or ingrained process that would continually assess the alignment  between strategic goals and resource decisions. Each of the operational  components we interviewed described different rationales and methods  for deciding where and how many resources to deploy around the world.
OIA officials acknowledged the need for mechanisms—such as the  footprint review—to be conducted routinely in order to meet the goal of  facilitating enhanced organizational and programmatic alignment. They  also said the development of an institutionalized mechanism that includes  department-wide methods and metrics that were meaningful to all of the  components would help provide coherent strategic overlay to give the  department better assurance of alignment between resource use and  strategic priorities. These OIA officials added that they would like to  enhance the rigor of the footprint review process and implement it on a  routine basis, but have not done so because of resource limitations and  competing priorities. Officials noted that ensuring a coherent department- wide approach to resource use abroad is an important goal. However,  they said the first review was a major undertaking. They stated they have  not devised an approach for implementing a routine, ingrained process  with department-wide methods and metrics.
Given that DHS’s components make individual decisions about resource  deployment abroad, an institutionalized mechanism—whether it is  enhancement and institutionalization of the footprint review or another  control activity—to help routinely monitor and adjust organizational and  programmatic alignment across the department would provide DHS better  assurance that its strategic priorities translate to resource use decisions  on an ongoing basis to support the QHSR’s goals.
DHS does not have comparable cost data for its programs and activities  abroad and has not established a standardized framework to capture  these data to help inform resource decision making and to achieve  management efficiencies when addressing issues that are common  across the department. To achieve the organizational and programmatic  alignment called for by the QHSR, it is important for decision makers at  the component level to have information that helps promote such  alignment on an ongoing basis and during routine monitoring activities.
However, each of the components tracks its international expenditures  differently, and according to OIA officials, the effort to collect comparable  information that reliably informs management decision making has been  challenging.framework for the costs of conducting activities abroad—for example,  salaries, housing, and fees paid to embassies to cover certain  administrative and security costs—across the department could enable  OIA to identify best practices that could lead to cost savings in  international deployments and enhance the ability to assess the  outcomes and cost-effectiveness of programs and activities carried out  abroad. A framework to help capture comparable cost data department- wide could provide with DHS critical information to make informed  resource trade-off decisions and increase cost efficiency.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Combating terrorism is a government-wide responsibility, which requires  contributions from departments and agencies across the U.S.  government. DHS and its components have made meaningful  contributions by carrying out key homeland security activities abroad and  through international engagement that helps other nations strengthen  their security functions, making it harder for terrorists to operate globally.
Although the operational decisions to deploy resources abroad are  generally made by individual DHS components, DHS’s QHSR calls for  efforts to mature the department through improved organizational and  programmatic alignment around specific mission objectives like  international engagement and combating terrorism. DHS has made some  progress toward such alignment across its international footprint with  recent actions it has taken—like completing an international footprint  review that provided the department with an opportunity to help ensure  that resources deployed abroad are devoted to the highest department-  and government-wide priorities. However, the one-time review has not  been established as an institutional process to help ensure alignment  between priorities and resource decisions on an ongoing basis.  Therefore, DHS does not have full assurance that department-wide  priorities translate to resource-tradeoff decisions at the component level.  Moreover, there are limitations that hamper DHS’s ability to consider two  key factors for resource trade-off decisions—strategic priorities and cost.  Although DHS’s International Engagement Plan describes how  programmatic activities abroad align with the five missions outlined in the  QHSR, these documents do not establish clear and specific strategic  priorities for resource deployment abroad.
In addition, without a common framework for tracking international  expenditures across the department, DHS is limited in its ability to make  informed resource trade-off decisions. An institutionalized process for a  routine strategic review of DHS’s international footprint, supported by  clear and specific priorities to inform trade-offs and a framework to  capture comparable and reliable cost data across the department could  help provide better assurance of organizational and programmatic  alignment.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In order to help ensure that DHS’s resource use abroad aligns with the  highest department-wide and U.S. government-wide priorities, we  recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following  three actions: establish specific department-wide priorities for resource use abroad; establish a routine, institutionalized mechanism to ensure alignment of  the department’s resource use abroad with the highest department- wide and government-wide strategic priorities; and establish a common reporting framework to allow for the collection of  reliable, comparable department-wide cost data for resource use  abroad.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS and received written comments,  which are reproduced in full in appendix V. We also provided a draft of  this report to State and the Departments of Defense and Justice, which  did not provide written comments. DHS and State provided technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
DHS concurred with all three recommendations, noting that it will take  steps to implement them. With respect to the first recommendation, DHS  stated that it will shape its International Engagement Plan into a more  specific, comprehensive, and strategic plan for resource allocation abroad  across the Department’s international organizations, with an estimated  completion date of March 31, 2014.
Regarding the second recommendation, DHS stated that it will develop a  methodology and system for tracking newly identified strategic priorities  and objectives that meet DHS and U.S. Government-wide priorities  related to counterterrorism, with an estimated completion date of  September 30, 2014.
Finally, for the third recommendation, DHS stated that it will establish a  working group to focus on a Department-wide system to capture  individual component expenditure data and represent the information in a  cohesive, comparable manner, with an estimated completion date of  September 30, 2014.
We believe these actions, if fully implemented, will address the intent of  our recommendations.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to Secretaries of Defense,  Homeland Security, and State; the Attorney General; selected  congressional committees; and other interested parties. In addition, the  report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any further questions about this report, please  contact Dave Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or MaurerD@gao.gov, or Charles  Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 or JohnsonCM@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to  this report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to answer the following questions: (1) What  programs, activities, and resources does the Department of Homeland  Security (DHS) have abroad to help combat terrorism? (2) How, if at all,  has DHS contributed to U.S. missions’ efforts to combat terrorism and  what factors, if any, have facilitated or hampered those contributions? (3)  To what extent has DHS taken action to align its resource use abroad  with departmental and government-wide strategic priorities?
To define the scope of activities and resources to be included in this  performance audit, we reviewed and analyzed key government-wide  strategies related to combating terrorism—the May 2010 National  Security Strategy and the July 2011 National Strategy for Combating  Terrorism. We also reviewed DHS documents designed to establish its  mission and goals such as the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security  Review (QHSR), DHS’s Strategic Plan FY2012-2016, and DHS’s  Performance and Accountability Report 2011-2013. Additionally, we  reviewed DHS program documentation related to activities established in  those documents. We also reviewed and discussed findings with the DHS  Office of Inspector General officials responsible for a 2008 report that  made a number of recommendations designed to enhance DHS’s  management of international affairs.
We also interviewed officials in DHS Office of International Affairs (OIA)  and the Office of Counterterrorism Policy within DHS’s Office of Policy  about the nature and scope of DHS activities abroad and DHS  counterterrorism activities. In addition, we interviewed officials from the  Department of State’s (State) Bureaus for Counterterrorism, Diplomatic  Security, and Consular Affairs about the nature and scope of their  coordination between their efforts and DHS efforts abroad, because these  bureaus have efforts that involved collaboration with DHS abroad. On the  basis of those document reviews and interviews, we determined that the  DHS operational components with mission activities most relevant for a  review of DHS efforts abroad to combat terrorism included U.S. Customs  and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S.  Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  (USCIS), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS).
To identify the programs and activities that DHS has to help combat  terrorism abroad, on the basis of our interviews with the DHS components  and offices and the State bureau officials, we established a definition of  combating terrorism for the purposes of identifying and collecting data on  programs and activities: Any DHS program or activity that in the course of  its normal operation may have the effect of thwarting terrorists or their  plots whether designed solely and specifically for that purpose or not.  Using that definition and through reviews of our prior work and DHS  program documentation, we independently identified the list of programs  and activities that constitute DHS’s efforts to combat terrorism abroad.  We then verified the list with DHS officials responsible for various  programs, refining it, as appropriate.
To identify resources used abroad in support of these programs and  activities, we asked DHS to provide expenditure and related data. On the  basis of our interviews with OIA and budget officials from the six DHS  operational components in our review, we determined that because  DHS’s missions involve carrying out activities for multifaceted purposes, it  would not be possible to isolate expenditures abroad for combating  terrorism from expenditures abroad to carry out other mission activities.  Therefore, we asked OIA and the six operational components in our  review to provide data separately on all expenditures abroad, as well as  data specific to training and technical assistance activities that met our  definition for combating terrorism, for fiscal years 2008 through 2012.
For the 5 years of expenditure data, we checked for consistency and  reasonableness and discussed data reliability controls with OIA and each  component office that provided it to determine how the data were  collected and what controls were in place to help ensure its accuracy,  among other things. We found that because of the differences in missions  and methods for tracking expenditure data, the data sets provided by the  components had some variations in the elements included in the data  sets and limitations in the ability to isolate expenditures by country. In  these cases, we attempted to harmonize the data definitions across the  component data sets and worked with DHS component officials to agree  on methods for estimating expenditures by country. For example, the  individual country break-down of travel costs in USCIS’s Refugee Affairs  Division was not consistently tracked separately by country, because the  program’s activities commonly involved multicountry trips. To obtain travel  costs for this program, USCIS joined three different sets of data:  obligations, itineraries, and the central bill account for travel  reimbursements. In fiscal year 2012, there were approximately 500  international travel authorizations. Of these, about 400 were for a single  country. For the remaining multicountry itineraries, USCIS calculated  expenditures by country by using the number of days spent in each  country to calculate a percentage and divide the total itinerary cost. For  example, on a $10,000 trip visiting country A for 4 days and country B for  6 days, expenditures would be calculated as $4,000 in country A and  $6,000 in country B.
We noted any remaining differences among component expenditure data  sets, as necessary (see also app. III). On the basis of our discussions  with knowledgeable DHS officials and the actions we took, we found that  the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of providing a general  estimate of expenditures abroad for fiscal years 2008 through 2012, with  the additional information provided. The full-time-equivalent employees  (FTE) stationed abroad are monitored at DHS through its Overseas  Personnel and Activities Locator, which is maintained by DHS Office of  Operations Coordination and Planning. The locator is updated monthly  with self-reported data from the components, which may capture some  personnel on travel duty in additional to permanently deployed FTEs. We  collected these data for May 2013, the most recent month for which DHS  was able to provide the data during the period of our study. On the basis  of discussions about the system and relevant control activities with the  responsible officials, we determined that these data were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of reporting FTEs abroad during the specified  month in which they were collected.
For the data we gathered on training and technical assistance activities  for fiscal years 2008 through 2012, we attempted to obtain the number of  personnel and expenditures dedicated to staff who conducted training  and technical assistance on a temporary basis, but some components  were unable to provide data for multiple fiscal years, and we encountered  numerous challenges, such as inconsistent data definitions and lack of  confidence by DHS officials in the accuracy or completeness of the data.  As a result, we did not include this information in our report. However, we  determined that information the six DHS operational components in our  review were able to provide was sufficiently reliable for the purpose of  reporting the foreign nation whose officials received DHS-delivered  training and technical assistance. We made this determination on the  basis of checks for reasonableness and discussions with responsible  DHS officials about the steps taken to help ensure accuracy of the data.
To examine how DHS has contributed to U.S. missions’ efforts to combat  terrorism and the factors that have facilitated or hampered those  contributions, we reviewed documentation about DHS’s component  activities abroad and State programs and activities on which DHS  collaborates. We also relied on our interviews with agency officials and  web-based surveys of deputy chiefs of mission (DCM) and DHS attachés  in U.S. missions where DHS components were stationed in the embassy.  We interviewed officials from DHS OIA and the Office of Counterterrorism  Policy with DHS’s Office of Policy; the six operational DHS operational  components; and the State Bureaus for Counterterrorism, Diplomatic  Security, and Consular Affairs about the nature and scope of DHS  activities abroad and coordination with State.
We visited 10 U.S. missions where FTEs from one or more DHS  components were stationed. During these visits, we interviewed officials  from DHS, generally including the DHS attaché and other senior DHS  officials at the U.S. mission. We also interviewed State officials, including  the DCM at each mission and other senior officials with responsibility for  programs abroad that involve coordination or collaboration with DHS. On  the basis of advice from State and DHS personnel at each U.S. mission,  as well as availability and relevance, we also interviewed some officials  from the Departments of Defense and Justice that may collaborate with  DHS abroad. We conducted a total of 70 interviews. During these  interviews, we asked questions and gathered specific examples of how  DHS works abroad with federal partners under the authority of the chief of  mission to help support government-wide efforts to combat terrorism.
To provide balance and diversity, we selected the 10 U.S. mission sites  based on a range of factors, including  the nature and scope of DHS’s presence abroad—for example, the  number of components represented and the size of the overall DHS  deployment;  indicators of terrorism risk—specifically we considered (1) inclusion in  CBP’s Aliens from Special Interest Countries, (2) State’s country  reports on terrorism, (3) designation as a terrorist safe haven, and (4)  advice from DHS and State subject matter experts;  safety, security, and related logistical concerns—based on State  advice; and the opportunity to leverage resources.
We visited Mexico City, Mexico; Panama City, Panama; Buenos Aries,  Argentina; Manila, the Philippines; Tokyo, Japan; Jakarta, Indonesia;  Singapore; Amman, Jordan; Kabul, Afghanistan; and Abu Dhabi and  Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The results from our visits to these 10  countries cannot be generalized; however, the visits provided insights on  how DHS contributes to U.S. mission combating terrorism efforts, what is  working well, and any barriers to effective contribution.
We analyzed the responses to our interviews about the nature and scope  of DHS activities abroad and DHS counterterrorism activities with State  and DHS officials at headquarters and with federal officials in the first 3 of  the 10 site visits, to identify types of knowledge and skill contributions  DHS has made to U.S. missions and any challenges and impacts DHS  and its federal partners have encountered. We also relied on this set of  interviews to identify factors that helped to facilitate DHS contributions in  the U.S. mission environment. Because a U.S. mission is an inherently  interagency environment, in addition to the interview responses, we  considered the practices and considerations for promoting effective  interagency collaboration outlined in two prior GAO reports when  identifying factors that facilitate DHS’s ability to contribute its knowledge  and skills.
We used this analysis to develop two web-based surveys to be  administered to all DCMs and DHS attachés in U.S. missions where one  or more DHS components had FTEs stationed in the embassy. We  identified all DCMs and DHS attachés meeting this definition from lists  provided to us by State for DCMs and DHS OIA for DHS attachés. Our  final survey populations included DCMs and DHS attachés in 57 U.S.  missions. We selected DCMs to provide a perspective from State  because the DCM supervises department heads within the U.S. mission  and handles many issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the  mission. We selected DHS attachés to provide a perspective from DHS  because these officials act as the in-country representatives for DHS.
We conducted survey pretests with five DHS attachés and three DCMs, a  mix of officials with whom we had already met and with whom we had  never discussed the purpose of our evaluation. During the pretests, we  worked with the respondents to ensure the clarity and appropriateness of  the language and questions in the survey. We also discussed with  respondents the comprehensiveness of the lists we had developed—DHS  contributions, facilitation factors, challenges, and impacts. On the basis of  pretest feedback, we further refined our analysis of these items. In  addition, to provide further assurance that our analysis was  comprehensive in identifying DHS contributions, facilitation factors,  challenges, and impacts, we included in our survey questionnaires open- ended questions that allowed respondents to provide additional  information about these items.
We administered the surveys between April 16, and July 19, 2013, to  DCMs and DHS attachés in the 57 U.S. missions. We sent follow-up e- mail messages on April 24, 2013, May 1, 2013, and May 13, 2013, to  those who had not yet completed the survey. Overall, we received  responses from 41 DCMs and 47 DHS attachés, yielding a response rate  of 72 percent and 82 percent, respectively. We ran comparative tests on  the responses for factors, challenges, and impacts on the responses  provided by DCMs and DHS attachés, and found no significant  differences between the two groups. Additionally, in the survey we asked  both groups to identify which facilitation factors were important, and in  separate questions asked them to identify which were in place and  operating effectively. We checked the responses for the factors most  frequently identified as important against the factors in place and  operating effectively and found no meaningful systematic trends  indicating that any single factor was not in place across the embassies we  surveyed.
Because this was not a sample survey, it has no sampling errors.  However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce  errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example,  difficulties in interpreting a particular question, sources of information  available to respondents, or entering data into a database or analyzing  them can introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We took  steps in developing the questionnaire, collecting the data, and analyzing  them to minimize such nonsampling errors. In addition to pretesting our  survey questionnaires as already mentioned, we worked with our social  science survey specialists to design the questionnaire, and the  questionnaires went through internal reviews with independent survey  experts. When we analyzed the data, an independent analyst checked all  computer programs. Since this was a web-based questionnaire,  respondents entered their answers directly into the electronic  questionnaire, eliminating the need to key data into a database,  minimizing error. See appendix IV for survey results for contributions,  challenges, and impacts.
To evaluate the extent to which DHS has taken action to align its  resource use abroad with departmental and government-wide strategic  priorities, we analyzed DHS’s QHSR, in particular its prescriptions for  maturing the department. These prescriptions include improving  organizational alignment—particularly among operational components— enhanced programmatic alignment to the homeland security missions,  and more efficient and effective management processes, including  strategic planning, performance management, and accounting structure.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for control  activities—that is policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms—to  enforce management’s directives. In this respect, we evaluated the  extent to which DHS had control activities in place to help achieve the  goals of organizational and programmatic alignment and efficient,  effective management processes around its resource deployment abroad.  To evaluate the extent to which DHS had mechanisms in place designed  to provide reasonable assurance of achieving its stated goal of  department-wide organizational and programmatic alignment in the  allocation and deployment of resources abroad, we reviewed  documentation such as DHS’s Management Directive that describes roles  and responsibility for managing international affairs. We also interviewed  officials in OIA, the six DHS components in our review, and DHS’s Office  of Policy about how decisions to deploy resources abroad are made and  the extent to which they undertake efforts to facilitate programmatic and  organizational alignment across the complete set of resources and efforts  DHS deploys abroad. We also interviewed officials in the Office of  Counterterrorism Policy within DHS’s Office of Policy about how DHS and  government-wide counterterrorism goals inform resource use decisions.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Training or Technical Assistance and Expenditure Data for Figures 1 and 3
paragraphs: Table 5 shows the number of training or technical assistance activities  provided by components, by country in fiscal year 2012.
section_title: Appendix III: Elements of Expenditures Included in Data for Expenditures Abroad by Component
paragraphs: Appendix III: Elements of Expenditures  Included in Data for Expenditures Abroad by  Component Elements of expenditures included  CBP Office of International Affairs expenditure elements include salary and benefits, operating costs,  International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS), Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program  (CSCS), guard services, medical, and Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office (DTSPO)  expenditures by foreign post. In Kuwait, Office of International Affairs includes charges for personal service  contractor moves. In Iraq, operating costs include travel, supplies, equipment, and training.  CBP Office of Border Patrol expenditure elements include personnel costs and travel expenditures by foreign  country. In Mexico and Canada, Office of Border Patrol also includes program costs such as various program  and operating costs.  CBP Office of Field Operations expenditure elements include salary and benefits, operating costs, ICASS,  CSCS, guard services, medical, DTSPO, and training by foreign post. For the Immigration Advisory Program  and Preclearance programs, Office of Field Operations also includes headquarters costs. For the Container  Security Initiative, they also include charges for relocations, central circuits, travel, Container Security  Initiative/ICE agent support, and other central expenses (information technology services and ICASS  overhead) in support of foreign posts, but do not break these costs down by foreign post.
ICE’s overseas expenditure elements by foreign post include salary and benefits, operating costs,  dependent’s educational allowances, operational travel, permanent change of station moves (PCS),  Department of State’s ICASS and CSCS charges for fiscal years 2009-2012, and purchase cards. ICE’s  overseas expenditure elements also include Department of State’s ICASS and CSCS charges for fiscal year  2008, which cannot be broken down by foreign post.
TSA expenditure elements include payroll, travel, ICASS charges, embassy expenses, and CSCS by foreign  post.
USCG expenditure elements include personnel costs, operating expenses, CSCS charges, and ICASS by  foreign post.
USCIS expenditure elements include payroll, general expenses, CSCS, ICASS, and travel by foreign post.  USCIS also includes expenditures for total ICASS overhead costs in support of foreign posts.
USSS expenditure elements include salaries, benefits, travel, communications and rents, guard services,  medical, permanent change of station moves, supplies, equipment, building and maintenance, contractual  services, Department of State support services, physical examinations, ICASS, and training expenses by  foreign post. USSS’s overseas expenditure elements also include other central expenses (such as information  technology services, CSCS, and ICASS overhead) in support of foreign posts), which cannot be broken down  by foreign post.
DHS OIA overseas expenditure elements include salaries, benefits, ICASS, operating costs, guard services,  medical, and DTSPO by individual country for fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2012. Fiscal year 2008 data  are unavailable. DHS OIA overseas expenditure elements also include CSCS, but those expenditures are not  broken down by individual country.
section_title: Appendix IV: Complete Survey Results for Contributions, Challenges, and Impacts
paragraphs: Figure 11 shows the results of the survey question: In the last 24 months,  how much, if at all, has DHS contributed to your mission’s combating  terrorism goals?
Figure 12 shows the results of the survey question: In the last 24 months,  how much, if at all, has DHS contributed in the following ways to U.S.  government-wide combating terrorism goals in the mission for which you  serve as DHS attaché?
Figure 13 shows the results of the survey question: In last 24 months,  what degree of challenge, if any, have the following been to DHS’s ability  to contribute its knowledge and skills to your mission’s combating  terrorism goals?
Figure 14 shows the results of the survey question: In last 24 months,  what degree of challenge, if any, have the following been to DHS’s ability  to contribute its knowledge and skills to U.S. government-wide combating  terrorism goals in the mission for which you serve as DHS attaché?
Figure 15 shows the results of the survey question: In the last 24 months,  if any of the following have occurred as a result of challenges described in  question 6, how much of an impact has it had on DHS’s contributions to  U.S. government-wide combating terrorism goals?
Figure 16 shows the results of the survey question: In the last 24 months,  if any of the following have occurred as a result of challenges described in  question 6, how much of an impact has it had on DHS’s contributions to  U.S. government-wide combating terrorism goals?
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contacts named above, Adam Hoffman and Jason Bair,  Assistant Directors; Chloe Brown; Marc Castellano; and Kathryn Godfrey  made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were  Josh Diosomito; Lorraine Ettaro; Eric Hauswirth; Paul Hobart; Brandon  Hunt; Thomas Lombardi; Alicia Loucks; Erin O’Brien; Anthony Pordes;  and Christine San.