National Marine Fisheries Service: Improved Economic Analysis and Evaluation Strategies Needed for Proposed Changes to Atlantic Large Whale Protection Plan
Published: 2007-07-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) developed the Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction (ALWTR) plan to protect endangered large whales from entanglements in commercial fishing gear, which can cause injury or death. Because whales continued to die after the ALWTR plan went into effect, NMFS proposed revisions in 2005. GAO was asked to review these proposed revisions, including (1) their scientific basis and uncertainties regarding their effectiveness, (2) NMFS's plans to address concerns about the feasibility of implementing them, (3) the extent to which NMFS fully assessed the costs to the fishing industry and impacts on fishing communities, and (4) the extent to which NMFS developed strategies for fully evaluating their effectiveness. GAO reviewed the proposed changes to the ALWTR plan and obtained the views of NMFS officials, industry representatives, scientists, and conservationists.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: NMFS used scientific data on whale entanglements, scarification, and sightings as support for its proposed changes to the ALWTR plan. These data indicate that right and humpback whales are being injured and killed by entanglements in commercial fishing gear at a rate that limits the species' ability to recover. One of the key proposed changes to the ALWTR plan involves replacing floating groundline, which forms arcs in the water that can entangle whales, with sinking groundline that lies on the ocean bottom. While there is a consensus among whale experts that using sinking groundline will reduce risks to whales, uncertainties remain regarding how many fewer serious injuries and mortalities will occur as a result of this requirement. NMFS has not yet resolved implementation issues associated with using sinking groundline in rocky bottom areas, particularly off the coast of Maine. While NMFS believes that it is operationally feasible to use sinking groundline in all areas, it recognizes that fishermen may have to modify their fishing practices to use this type of gear effectively. Maine lobster industry representatives told GAO that fishermen who operate in rocky bottom areas will not be able to use sinking groundline because it will wear away and create safety hazards if the line snaps when it is hauled. NMFS's economic assessment of the costs of the proposed gear modifications did not reflect the significant uncertainties associated with the assessment, and the extent to which these costs to the fishing industry could be higher or lower than reported is unclear. Because NMFS lacked verifiable data for some of the key cost variables, it used estimates and assumptions that introduced a significant amount of uncertainty into the cost calculations, which the agency acknowledged. However, instead of presenting a range of costs to account for these uncertainties, NMFS produced a single estimate of compliance costs--about $14 million annually. Moreover, because it lacked key data on fishermen's ability to absorb these costs without going out of business, NMFS could not fully assess the impacts that the cost of gear modifications would have on fishing communities. For example, without knowing which specific fishermen would go out of business, NMFS could not determine the impact lost jobs would have on the communities in which they lived. NMFS has not developed strategies for fully evaluating the effectiveness of the proposed regulatory changes. Specifically, NMFS's gear-marking requirements may not be adequate for effectively assessing future whale entanglements because they do not include comprehensive markings that researchers could use to assess the type of rope involved in entanglements. Additionally, NMFS does not yet have a strategy to monitor the level of industry compliance and therefore lacks a means to determine whether any future entanglements are due to industry noncompliance with the regulatory requirements or the ineffectiveness of the gear modifications.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Despite regulatory actions designed to ensure their safety and survival,  endangered large Atlantic whales continue to become entangled in  commercial fishing gear, sometimes resulting in death or severe injury.  Right, humpback, and fin whales are three species of Atlantic large whales  that are protected under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and Marine  Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), under the administration of the National  Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). NMFS is particularly concerned about  the North Atlantic right whale because scientists estimate that there are  only about 300 of these whales in existence. NMFS has determined that  with a population reduced to such a low number, the death or serious  injury of even one right whale from human-related causes, such as fishing  gear entanglement, would limit the ability of the species to recover.
Atlantic large whales are at risk of entanglement in fishing gear because  they feed, travel, and breed in areas where commercial fishermen leave  traps and gillnets. Fishermen set lobster and other traps either singly, or  in strings of multiple traps linked together with rope known as groundline,  as shown in figure 1. A buoy at the surface, which fishermen use to locate  their gear, is connected to a vertical rope linked to the traps. Fishermen  use the vertical rope to haul traps into their boats. Gillnet fisheries, which  catch fish such as sharks and groundfish, use some of the same gear  components, but use nets instead of traps.
When whales become entangled in fishing gear, they can sometimes free  themselves without serious injury. However, in other cases, entanglement  can impede the whale’s normal breathing and movement, causing it to  drown. Even if the whale is eventually able to break free, part of the gear  may remain attached to its body, sometimes making it more difficult to  breathe, feed, and travel, and possibly leading to an early death.
In 1997, under the MMPA, NMFS developed the Atlantic Large Whale Take  Reduction (ALWTR) Plan to reduce the risk of serious injury and mortality  to right, humpback, and fin whales from entanglement in commercial  fishing gear. This plan included several gear modifications that apply to  lobster and certain gillnet fisheries—such as prohibiting floating vertical  line at the surface—as well as season-specific requirements that are in  effect when whales are expected in certain areas. Due to the continued  serious injury and mortality of large whales after the ALWTR plan was  implemented, NMFS established additional measures. For example, in  2002, NMFS established measures (1) restricting commercial fishing gear  in areas where right whales are known to feed and (2) allowing the agency  to temporarily restrict or prohibit gear in specific areas of the north  Atlantic if three or more right whales were observed within 75 square  nautical miles.
Despite NMFS’s efforts, whale entanglements and deaths continued. At the  end of 2002, NMFS determined, after an independent peer review, that a  right whale had been entangled in gear consistent with U.S. fishing gear.  Due to this and other fatal and nonfatal entanglements of right, humpback  and fin whales, NMFS filed a notice of intent in the June 30, 2003, Federal  Register that it planned to prepare an environmental impact statement to  analyze the impacts of revising the ALWTR plan and stated that it would  hold meetings with stakeholders to collect information on strategies to  reduce whale entanglements. Between 2003 and 2004, after the  stakeholder meetings, the agency developed proposed modifications to the  ALWTR plan and conducted an analysis on the effects these modifications  would have on whales, the fishing industry, and fishing communities. In  February 2005, the agency issued a draft environmental impact statement  (DEIS) that identified six alternative sets of proposed modifications to the  existing ALWTR plan. NMFS designated two of these as “preferred”  alternatives with the goal of selecting one in the final environmental  impact statement. The preferred alternatives outlined a broader approach  to whale protection by incorporating additional fisheries into the ALWTR  plan and requiring year-round and seasonal gear modifications in the  North Atlantic. One of the key proposed changes requires fishermen to  replace floating groundline, which creates arcs in the water that can  entangle whales, with sinking groundline, which lies on the ocean bottom.  However, there are concerns that the cost of the gear modifications,  particularly sinking groundline, may threaten the livelihood of fishermen,  especially lobstermen. In the DEIS, NMFS estimated that the total cost to  the fishing industry would be about $14 million annually and that the  lobster industry would incur more than $12.8 million of these projected  costs.
In June 2005, NMFS published a proposed rule to amend the regulations  implementing the ALWTR plan. In February 2007, after an interagency  review, NMFS withdrew the rule. According to a NMFS official, the  interagency review raised concerns that NMFS had not fully addressed  issues raised by the state of Maine and the Maine lobster industry, such as  which areas along the Maine coast should be exempt from the proposed  gear modifications. NMFS is currently reevaluating the proposed  regulation to determine if any revisions are needed. The agency hopes to  complete its review and have a final regulation in place by year-end 2007.  In the meantime, the current regulations remain in effect, and endangered  large whales continue to be at risk of entanglement in commercial fishing  gear.
Since NMFS has not issued a final environmental impact statement or  regulation, you asked us to review the proposed changes to the ALWTR  plan outlined in the DEIS. Specifically, you asked us to (1) describe the  scientific basis for the proposed changes to the ALWTR plan and the  extent to which uncertainties exist regarding how effectively they will  protect large whales; (2) describe how the agency plans to address  implementation issues, particularly in the rocky bottom areas of the North  Atlantic coast; (3) evaluate the extent to which NMFS fully assessed costs  to the fishing industry and the economic impacts on fishing communities;  and (4) evaluate the extent to which NMFS has developed strategies for  fully assessing the effectiveness of and industry compliance with the  proposed changes.
To address our objectives, we reviewed the DEIS, public comments on the  DEIS, and scientific literature on right, humpback, and fin whales. We also  obtained the views of a wide range of stakeholders on the proposed  changes to the ALWTR plan, such as marine mammal scientists, including  those at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and the Provincetown  Center for Coastal Studies; federal regulators, including officials at  NMFS’s Northeast Regional Office who participated in developing the  proposed changes to the plan; state fisheries management officials in  Maine and Massachusetts; industry groups, including the Maine  Lobstermen’s Association; a conservation group, the Humane Society of  the United States; and the Marine Mammal Commission, an independent  U.S. agency responsible for providing oversight of the marine mammal  conservation policies and programs carried out by federal regulatory  agencies. We also met with officials from Industrial Economics Inc., who  conducted the economic analysis for NMFS that was included in the DEIS.  Finally, we reviewed documentation of federal and state compliance  efforts related to the current ALWTR plan. A more detailed description of  our scope and methodology is presented in appendix I. We performed our  work between August 2006 and June 2007 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Right, humpback, and fin whales were hunted by commercial whalers. The  right whale, in particular, was targeted by whalers because it is a slow- moving animal that floats when it is killed, due to its high blubber content.  Accordingly, whalers gave the right whale its name because it was the  “right” whale to hunt. In 1949, the International Convention for the  Regulation of Whaling protected right whales from commercial whaling. In  1970, the species was listed as endangered under the Endangered Species  Conservation Act, the precursor to the ESA. Right whales were  subsequently listed as endangered under the ESA in 1973. Despite several  decades of conservation efforts, the right whale has struggled to recover  due to low reproductive rates and accidental human-caused mortality. The  North Atlantic right whale is among the most endangered large whale  species in the world. A 1999 study estimated that the species will be  extinct within 200 years if mortality rates continue. Humpback and fin  whales were hunted for oil, meat, and materials for utilitarian products  (e.g., corset stays, umbrella ribs, buggy whips, etc.) until the 20th century.  The International Whaling Commission banned commercial whaling of  North Atlantic humpback whales in 1955. Commercial whaling of the fin  whale was banned in the North Atlantic in 1987. Both humpback and fin  whales have been listed as endangered under the ESA since its passage in  1973.
Atlantic large whales are at risk for entanglement in commercial fishing  gear when they are traveling, feeding, and breeding. For example, right  whales feed with their mouths open for extended periods of time using  their baleen—a substance that grows in comb-like rows from the upper  jaws of toothless whales—to filter plankton from seawater. Much about  the movements and habitats of right whales remains unknown. However, it  is generally thought that some right whales winter in the lower latitudes— off the southeast U.S. Atlantic coast, where calving takes place—then  migrate to higher latitudes, near Massachusetts and Maine for the summer,  following concentrations of copepods, their principal food source. Right  whales primarily use the mid-Atlantic region to migrate to and from the  calving grounds in the south. Like right whales, humpback whales also  feed off the coasts of Massachusetts and Maine, however, they winter  farther south. Humpback whales employ a variety of feeding techniques  that differ from right whale feeding techniques. For example, one way that  humpback whales feed is by lunging into a patch of small fish with their  mouth wide-open for a short period of time. Like right and humpback  whales, scientists believe that fin whales use northern waters primarily for  feeding and southern waters primarily for calving. Fin whales also engage  in lunge feeding.
Under the MMPA, NMFS must develop a plan to protect Atlantic large  whales from entanglements that cause serious injury or mortality. The  MMPA was enacted in 1972 to provide protection for all marine mammals.  Section 118, enacted in the 1994 amendments to the MMPA, specifically  outlines a process for reducing serious injury and mortality incidental to  commercial fishing operations. Under that process, if NMFS determines  that a species’ ability to recover has become diminished by commercial  fishing activities, the agency must develop and implement a plan—known  as a take reduction plan—to reduce serious injury and mortality to the  species. The MMPA requires a take reduction team to be involved in  developing a take reduction plan. Members of the team are required to  have either biological/conservation expertise relevant to the marine  mammal species addressed in the take reduction plan or the fishing  practices that result in the incidental mortality and serious injury of the  species. Team members must include representatives of federal agencies,  state agencies, Regional Fishery Management Councils, interstate fishery  commissions, academic and scientific organizations, environmental  groups, and fishery groups that use gear that could harm the species.
The immediate goal of a take reduction plan is to reduce, within 6 months,  mortality and serious injury below the potential biological removal level— meaning the maximum number of human-related mortalities that can  occur annually without limiting the species’ ability to recover. The long- term goal of a take reduction plan is to, within 5 years, reduce fishery- related mortality and serious injury to insignificant levels approaching  zero. The take reduction plan must include recommended regulatory and  voluntary measures aimed at reducing mortality and serious injury, such  as requiring the use of alternative commercial fishing gear or techniques.
The current ALWTR plan, originally developed in 1997, includes both  universal gear modifications that apply to all lobster traps and anchored  gillnets as well as area- and season-specific requirements. The universal  requirements prohibit floating vertical line at the surface, require gear to  be hauled out of the water at least once every 30 days, and encourage  fishermen to maintain knot-free vertical lines. In particular areas, such as  Cape Cod Bay, fishermen are required to use sinking groundline, which  poses less of an entanglement risk because it sinks to the ocean floor  rather than creating loops in the water. Fishermen in certain areas are also  required to attach weak links—devices that are designed to break if a  particular amount of pressure is applied—to their vertical lines or gillnet  panels and place marks on their gear so researchers may be able to  identify the fishery involved and the location where the gear was set if it is  later recovered from an entangled whale. In addition, certain restricted  areas are closed to lobster trap fishing or anchored gillnetting during  particular seasons when whales are likely to be in the area. When these  areas are open, fishermen are limited to using gear that meets particular  requirements, such as weak links.
While NMFS has developed the ALWTR plan pursuant to its  responsibilities under the MMPA, NMFS also has responsibilities under the  ESA. The ESA directs all federal agencies to utilize their authorities to  conserve threatened and endangered species. In addition, such species  and their habitats must be protected against adverse effects of federal  activities such as operating hydroelectric dams, thinning vegetation to  prevent wildfires, and—as in this case—permitting fishing, so that the  continued existence of protected species is not jeopardized. The right,  humpback, and fin whale species are all listed as endangered under the  ESA. Section 7 of the ESA directs federal agencies that are taking actions  that may affect protected species—referred to as action agencies—to  initiate a “consultation” to assess the impacts of their actions on  threatened and endangered species. Federal action agencies consult with  either NMFS or the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service within the Department  of the Interior, depending on which species their actions may affect.  These agencies are referred to as the consulting agencies. For example,  because NMFS regulates commercial fishing and the activities of the  fishing industry have seriously injured or killed endangered whales, NMFS  must consult on its proposed fishery regulation that may affect  endangered whales. Consequently, in this case, NMFS acts as both the  action agency and the consulting agency. Action agencies submit  biological assessments to the consulting agencies that discuss their  proposed activities and their likely effects on protected species and their  habitat. The consulting agency completes the formal consultation process  by issuing a biological opinion. If the consulting agency concludes that the  proposed activities are likely to jeopardize the species’ continued  existence or adversely modify its habitat, the biological opinion will  include reasonable and prudent alternatives that are necessary or  appropriate to minimize impacts to protected species. If any “take” of a  species is expected to occur, the biological opinion also must contain  terms and conditions designed to reduce take and address adverse  modification of designated critical habitat. For example, NMFS has  prepared biological opinions to assess the impact of continuing to permit  the multispecies, spiny dogfish, monkfish, and lobster fisheries on  protected marine species. In the most recent opinion, NMFS identified  the fishing gear modifications contained in the ALWTR plan as a  reasonable and prudent alternative to protect right whales from fishing  gear entanglements.
In 2000, after new whale entanglements caused serious injuries to right  whales, as well as at least one right whale fatality in gillnet gear, NMFS  reinitiated a section 7 consultation for the multispecies, spiny dogfish,  monkfish, and lobster fisheries. NMFS’s biological opinion found that its  administration of these fisheries was likely to jeopardize the continued  existence of the right whale. Consequently, NMFS developed the Seasonal  Area Management (SAM) and Dynamic Area Management (DAM)  programs as reasonable and prudent alternatives to avoid further  jeopardizing the existence of the right whale. The SAM program imposes  seasonal restrictions on lobster and gillnet fishermen to protect  predictable aggregations of right whales that annually feed in waters north  and east of Cape Cod. Gear set in the SAM zone during designated times  must be low-risk gear, which is defined as gear that is highly unlikely to  cause death or serious injury to large whales. For example, lobster and  gillnet fishermen are prohibited from using floating groundline in the  western part of the SAM area from March 1 to April 30 and in the eastern  part of the SAM area from May 1 to July 31, when whales are expected to  be in the area. The DAM program, on the other hand, requires temporary  gear restrictions in areas that experience an unexpected aggregation of  right whales. If three or more right whales are spotted within 75 square  nautical miles, NMFS can restrict fishing by taking one or all of the  following actions: (1) requiring lobster and gillnet fishermen to remove  their gear and prohibiting them from setting additional gear within the  area, (2) limiting the type of gear that can be used in the area, or (3)  encouraging fishermen to voluntarily stop fishing and remove their gear  from the area. DAM zone restrictions remain in effect for 15 days and can  be extended if three right whales continue to be sighted in the area within  75 nautical miles of each other.
Because whale entanglements that led to serious injury or mortality  continued to occur after the SAM and DAM programs went into effect, in  2003, NMFS began a process of revising the ALWTR plan to require  additional fishing gear modifications that apply to trap and gillnet fisheries  throughout the U.S. Atlantic coast. These fisheries were selected because  gear associated with them was found on entangled whales. In February  2005, NMFS issued a draft environmental impact statement under the  National Environmental Policy Act that outlined its proposed regulatory  changes to the ALWTR plan and the associated costs and impacts to those  affected by the regulation. The DEIS identified six regulatory alternatives,  two of which were identified as preferred alternatives. Some of the  elements of the proposed changes were to (1) replace floating groundline  with sinking groundline, (2) alter the requirements for weak links, and   (3) change the gear marking requirements. Regarding weak links, NMFS  proposed that lobster and other trap fisheries in some areas be required to  use weak links of a lower breaking strength—making it easier for whales  to break them—and that gillnet fisheries in some areas be required to use  more weak links per net panel than called for in the current requirements.  Regarding gear marking, NMFS proposed expanding the frequency of gear  marking to one 4-inch mark every 60 feet on the vertical line, among other  things.
NMFS also proposed applying these gear modifications more broadly than  previous regulations. First, NMFS proposed incorporating additional trap  and gillnet fisheries in to the ALWTR plan because these fisheries also use  gear that poses a risk to whales. Second, NMFS proposed year-round gear  modifications in the North Atlantic, because whales are always present  there, and seasonal gear modifications in the Mid-Atlantic and the South  Atlantic regions at times when right, humpback, and fin whales sightings  primarily occur.
In anticipation of increased gear costs to fishermen as a result of the  proposed gear modifications, NMFS and nonprofit organizations have  provided funding for fishermen to make initial replacements of floating  groundline with sinking groundline. NMFS officials told us the agency  recently funded a $600,000 rope buyback and recycling program for the  Mid-Atlantic trap fishermen. NMFS officials also told us that the agency  recently provided $2 million to the Gulf of Maine Lobster Foundation to  fund a rope buyback program to assist Maine lobster fishermen. The  foundation began disbursing the funds to fishermen in May 2007. In  addition, NMFS officials told us the agency provided $660,000 to the  International Fund for Animal Welfare, which matched the federal funding,  to finance a Massachusetts rope buyback and recycling program for the  lobster industry.
While fishing gear entanglement is a significant source of risk for Atlantic  large whales, so are collisions with ships. For example, from 2000 to 2004,  NMFS reported that one right whale and 0.6 humpback whale serious  injuries or mortalities per year were attributable to collisions with ships in  U.S. waters. NMFS has proposed a regulation to reduce the risk of ship  strikes to North Atlantic right whales, which would restrict ship speed  along certain areas of the east coast during certain times of the year.  NMFS expects to issue the regulation in 2007. In addition to this  regulation, NMFS has also recommended changes to shipping routes off  four major ports where high densities of ships and right whales overlap.
section_title: NMFS Based Proposed Gear Modifications on Scientific Research, but It Cannot Estimate the Extent to Which Risks to Whales Will Be Reduced
paragraphs: Based on its scientific stock assessments of whale populations, NMFS  determined that right and humpback whales are being seriously injured or  killed at a rate that limits the species’ ability to recover. NMFS also  analyzed scientific data on whale entanglements, scarification caused by  entanglement, and sightings, which supported the need to propose  changes to the ALWTR plan. These data indicate that whales travel widely  up and down the Atlantic coast and encounter and become entangled in  commercial fishing gear. NMFS then developed the specific proposed gear  modifications based, in part, on a study of the gear involved in  entanglements of right and humpback whales that indicated that all parts  of commercial fishing gear pose a risk to whales. While there is general  agreement among scientists, conservationists, federal and state regulators,  and industry groups that requiring certain commercial fisheries to use  sinking groundline—one of the key features of NMFS’s proposed  modifications to the ALWTR plan—will reduce risks to whales,  uncertainties remain regarding how many fewer serious injuries and  mortalities will occur. There is also uncertainty over whether other  proposed changes to the ALWTR plan will effectively protect large whales.
subsections: section_title: NMFS Based Its Proposed Gear Modifications on Scientific Studies of Whale Entanglement, Scarification, and Sightings
paragraphs: To support the need to propose changes to the ALWTR plan, NMFS used  its annual stock assessment reports of endangered large whale  populations and entanglement reports, which showed that—despite  current regulatory measures—right and humpback whales were being  seriously injured or killed by entanglements in commercial gear at a rate  that limits the species’ ability to recover to their maximum sustainable  population. In the 2003 stock assessment report, the agency  determined—based on the size of the right whale population—that the  maximum annual number of human-related mortalities that can occur  without limiting the species’ ability to recover is zero. However, this  stock assessment report showed that from 1997 to 2001, there were about  1.2 documented serious injuries and mortalities annually to right whales  from fishing-gear entanglements. The 2003 stock assessment report also  indicated that humpback whales were being seriously injured or killed  from fishing-gear entanglements at a rate that limits the species’ ability to  recover. The most recent stock assessment report (2006) indicates that  right and humpback continue to be seriously injured or killed from fishing- gear entanglements at a rate that limits their ability to recover. In  contrast, NMFS determined that fin whales are not being seriously injured  or killed at a rate that limits their ability to recover based on their  population size and the number of serious injuries and mortalities that  occur annually. Table 1 shows the data that NMFS used to assess the  ability of the three species to recover based on their population size and  the number of annual serious injuries and mortalities from entanglements.
However, NMFS’s annual stock assessment reports are likely to understate  the full extent of whale entanglements in commercial fishing gear, as the  reports only include confirmed entanglements in commercial fishing gear  that have caused serious injury or mortality to whales. Additional serious  entanglements may occur, but either because researchers do not recover  the corpses or there is not enough evidence to determine that  entanglement in commercial fishing gear caused the whales’ deaths, these  incidents are not captured in the stock assessment reports. A NMFS  scientist with whom we spoke believes that it is likely that the agency  documents only a small to modest fraction of large whale entanglements  that result in serious injury or mortality. Although NMFS’s stock  assessment reports include data on seriously injured or dead whales found  in Canadian waters, whether these whales were entangled in U.S. or  Canadian gear is generally not known.
In addition to the serious injuries and mortalities from entanglements  documented in NMFS’s stock assessment reports, NMFS also used  information from scarification studies developed by various scientific  institutions to demonstrate a need to revise the ALWTR plan. These  studies analyzed the rate of scarring on large whales due to entanglement  in fishing rope—thereby identifying the percentage of the right and  humpback whale populations that experience entanglement. For these  studies researchers identified individual whales using a photographic  database and determined the percent that have physical evidence  indicative of entanglement. For example, in a 2005 report, researchers  from the New England Aquarium found that approximately 75 percent of  right whales had scars indicating that they had survived an entanglement  in fishing rope. Similarly, a 2004 report by scientists at the Provincetown  Center for Coastal Studies found that approximately half of the humpback  whale population also had entanglement scars. However, according to a  scientist with whom we spoke, these scarification studies may actually  underestimate the percentage of whales that have experienced  entanglement because whales that die of entanglement may not be found;  researchers only count scars that they believe, based on their professional  judgment, are highly likely to be from entanglement in fishing gear; and  some scars may fade over time.
To determine the specific gear-modification requirements to be included in  the revised ALWTR plan, NMFS relied, in part, on a study of the fishing  gear found on entangled right and humpback whales conducted by NMFS  researchers and gear specialists as well as researchers from the  Provincetown Center for Coastal Studies and the New England  Aquarium. This study found that any fishing rope from trap and gillnet  fisheries presents an entanglement risk to large whales because all parts of  the rope, such as vertical line and groundline, have been found on  entangled whales.
To determine when and where to implement the proposed gear  modifications, NMFS used data from the North Atlantic Right Whale  Sightings Database, supplemented by additional data on humpback and fin  whale sightings. Using these data, researchers can identify where large  whales are at risk of entanglement based on where they congregate during  certain times of the year. For example, NMFS determined that right and  humpback whales are sighted in the South Atlantic region from late  November through early April, but are typically not present there the rest  of the year. NMFS acknowledges that large whales can be found  throughout the year in the Mid-Atlantic but notes that sightings occur  primarily between September and May. As a result, in its preferred  alternatives, the agency proposed seasonal, as opposed to year-round, gear  modifications in the Mid- and South Atlantic. NMFS also used the sightings  data to modify the exempted areas—those areas where commercial  fishermen are not subject to the gear modifications outlined in the ALWTR  plan because whales rarely, if ever, venture there.
section_title: Uncertainties Exist Regarding the Extent to Which the Proposed Gear Modifications Will Protect Large Whales
paragraphs: There is general agreement among scientists, conservationists, federal and  state regulators, and industry groups that requiring the use of sinking  groundline will reduce risks to whales. However, uncertainties remain  regarding how many fewer serious injuries and mortalities will occur.  NMFS was unable to quantify how much the risk of whale entanglement  will be reduced by sinking groundline because researchers cannot quantify  the extent to which each component of fishing gear poses a risk to whales.  In addition, the scientists with whom we spoke stated that the proposed  modifications to the ALWTR plan will not eliminate all entanglements  because NMFS has not fully addressed the risks posed by vertical line.  Although NMFS has taken some actions to mitigate the risk associated  with vertical line, the agency recognizes that more needs to be done  because whales continue to become entangled in this line. The agency  stated that it will further address vertical line after conducting additional  research and consulting with the ALWTR Team.
The scientists and conservationists with whom we spoke or who provided  written comments to NMFS on the DEIS are also uncertain about the  effectiveness of other aspects of the proposed changes to the ALWTR plan.  Specifically, they were uncertain about whether the use of weak links will  reduce risks to whales because whales have been found entangled in  fishing rope that had weak links, but the links failed to break apart. A  NMFS official acknowledged that weak links are not effective for all types  of entanglements. For example, if the whale thrashes around in response  to the entanglement and becomes wrapped in the gear, the weak link will  not disengage. However, NMFS officials noted that weak links were  designed for mouth entanglements, and there have been no documented  cases of weak links malfunctioning in a mouth entanglement. Rather, the  entanglements with weak links that failed to break apart were  entanglements that involved the whale’s tail. Even though weak links may  not enable whales to free themselves each time they encounter gear, some  scientists told us that weak links should be required because they may  prevent certain entanglements and are inexpensive and easy for fishermen  to use. In fact, two of the three fishing industry association groups with  whom we spoke support the use of weak links. The third group, while  supportive of using weak links, wanted the breaking strength of weak  links to be maintained at its current level during the fall and winter months  because if the breaking strength was any weaker, rough tides and weather  in offshore waters may cause the buoy to break from the vertical line at  the weak link.
Despite their general support of weak links, some of the scientists and  conservationists with whom we spoke or who provided written comments  to NMFS on the DEIS remain concerned that the breaking strengths of  weak links established by NMFS were based on fishing industry needs and  not whale protection. According to NMFS scientists, the tests the agency  conducted to determine the appropriate breaking strength of weak links  were designed to ensure the line does not break when fishermen haul their  gear. NMFS officials stated that the agency also considered what was  needed to protect whales when developing the breaking strength for weak  links. However, research by a scientist at the Stellwagen Bank National  Marine Sanctuary and members of the fishing industry suggests that gillnet  fishermen could operate successfully using weak links that would be  easier for whales to break, specifically a 600-pound breaking strength  rather than the current 1,100-pound strength. NMFS officials stated that  despite what the report said, the lower breaking strength may not be  operationally feasible because after the report was released a fisherman  involved in the study experienced failures on some of the weak links in his  gear. NMFS officials also questioned whether larger gillnet vessels in  deeper water would be able to successfully operate with 600-pound weak  links.
Similarly, some of the scientists and conservationists with whom we spoke  or who provided written comments to NMFS on the DEIS expressed  concern about the areas NMFS proposed for exemption from the gear  modifications. Some cautioned that there are risks associated with any  exemption area because it only takes one whale traveling within exempted  waters for a fatal entanglement to occur—and for right whales one death  limits the ability of the species to recover. In addition, some scientists told  us that they were concerned that the sightings data used to draw the  exemption line may not reflect the actual long-term distribution of whales,  as there have been limited efforts to survey the whale population outside  of known calving and feeding grounds. In addition, some conservationists  note that there have been whale sightings within the exempted areas.  However, NMFS officials stated that the agency conducts broad-scale  aerial surveys of whales from the Maine-Canada border to New York and  has aerial survey coverage in other areas along the east coast as well. In  addition, NMFS said in the DEIS that it plans to monitor whale sightings in  exempted areas and assess if gear modifications are necessary in these  areas.
section_title: NMFS Has Not Resolved Potential Implementation Challenges with Using Modified Fishing Gear in Rocky Ocean Bottom Areas
paragraphs: A controversial aspect of the proposed changes to the ALWTR plan that  has yet to be resolved is whether sinking groundline is operationally  feasible in rocky ocean bottom areas. NMFS told us that it is operationally  feasible to use sinking groundline in all areas, but that fishermen may have  to modify their fishing practices. For example, the Massachusetts  Lobstermen’s Association stated that while fishermen have experienced  problems operating in rocky bottom areas off the coast of Massachusetts,  they have been able to adapt to using sinking groundline. In contrast,  officials from the Maine Lobstermen’s Association (MLA) told us that  fishermen who operate in rocky ocean bottom areas will not be able to use  sinking groundline because it will abrade on the rocky bottom—requiring  them to replace their rope too frequently and causing gear loss—and may  create safety hazards for fishermen.
To assess the feasibility of using sinking groundline, NMFS gear specialists  distributed it to 55 fishermen in Northeast states, including Maine, in  2000. NMFS then formally surveyed these fishermen to assess the  performance of the sinking groundline in 2003. The 25 fishermen who  responded to the survey reported mixed views on the performance of the  sinking groundline, with the greatest amount of negative feedback coming  from fishermen who operate in eastern Maine. Fishing industry  representatives told us that the waters off the coast of eastern Maine  consist of rocky bottom. Some of the fishermen who responded to the  survey reported experiencing rope abrasion when using sinking  groundline in rocky ocean bottom areas. NMFS gear specialists stated that  there was a wide range in the length of time that fishermen used the line  that was distributed to them in 2000—while some stopped using it after 1  week due to abrasion, others are still using the line today, including some  in the rocky bottom areas of Maine. The agency maintains that while  fishermen will experience different rates of abrasion in different areas,  overall, abrasion will not be a significant problem because fishermen move  around and operate in multiple bottom types, instead of exclusively fishing  in one area. In addition, NMFS officials noted that rope abrasion is not a  problem exclusively associated with the use of sinking groundline;  fishermen who use floating groundline also experience rope abrasion.
In addition, NMFS gear specialists maintain that fishermen will be able to  use sinking groundline once they gain experience using it. NMFS gear  specialists attributed the increased negative feedback regarding using  sinking groundline in the rocky areas of Maine to the fact that fishermen in  these areas are less likely than fishermen elsewhere to have experience  using sinking groundline. The gear specialists told us that fishermen may  have to modify their fishing practices in order to successfully use sinking  groundline, although NMFS did not discuss this in the DEIS. For example,  when using sinking groundline, fishermen will have to be more precise  when positioning their boat to haul up their traps. According to these gear  specialists, one technique that fishermen could use is to set their boats  directly above the traps, so that the fishermen can haul the line straight up  and prevent it from getting caught on rocks. However, NMFS maintains  that there is no one answer to successfully fishing with sinking groundline  on rocky bottom, and it will take fishermen several attempts and  techniques to adjust to using sinking groundline.
In contrast, the MLA conducted some limited testing of experimental  sinking groundline under contract with the Consortium for Wildlife  Bycatch Reduction and concluded that it was not feasible to use in all  areas. According to an MLA official, some Maine fishermen reported that  sinking groundline performed well, but fishermen who fish in rocky areas  generally reported negative experiences. An MLA official told us that, due  to abrasion, sinking groundline does not last longer than 1 month in the  rockiest areas of Maine, where fishermen experienced such bad abrasion  that they stopped using the line to avoid losing their traps. At best, in areas  of Maine that are not as rocky, the MLA official told us that sinking  groundline would last 1 year—5 years less than NMFS’s estimate in the  DEIS. However, the MLA acknowledged that sinking groundline was only  tested for a short period of time and therefore recommends additional  testing to get a better understanding of its durability.
Fishermen are also concerned that rope abrasion from using sinking  groundline in rocky bottom areas will cause gear loss. Based on his  professional experience, an MLA official told us that Maine fishermen who  fish in rocky bottom areas will experience more gear loss than NMFS  estimated because the weakened rope will cause the traps to easily  separate. NMFS recognizes that gear loss will be higher, in certain areas, if  sinking groundline is required, but a NMFS official told us that rope  abrasion will not cause more gear loss than fishermen currently  experience because fishermen have the ability to recognize when their  rope should be replaced. The NMFS official maintained that fishermen  need to be vigilant about the condition of their rope—whether it is floating  groundline or sinking groundline—and replace it, as needed, in order to  avoid gear loss. However, the agency recognizes that sinking groundline  could contribute to increased gear loss as a result of line wrapping around  rocks or other marine debris on the ocean floor. If the line becomes  caught on the ocean floor, it may break as it hauled to the surface, causing  the traps to become separated from the vertical line. When traps become  separated from the vertical line, NMFS officials told us that it may be more  difficult for fishermen to retrieve their gear if they are using sinking  groundline. For Maine inshore fishermen, lost traps will also be more  difficult to retrieve because (1) these fishermen are more likely to use  shorter trawls than fishermen in other areas—which can be more  challenging to locate than a longer trawl that covers more area—and (2)  the hook used to retrieve lost gear can bounce off of the rocky bottom,  instead of grasping the gear. While an MLA official did not dispute that the  factors NMFS cited will contribute to gear loss, he maintained that rope  abrasion will also cause gear loss.
MLA officials told us that the Association also has concerns about hauling  gear in the manner NMFS described and indicated that there are safety  issues with using sinking groundline in rocky bottom areas. Due to rough  tidal and weather conditions, an MLA official told us that it is not possible  for fishermen to haul their traps from a precise location, as NMFS  described. The MLA also is concerned that using sinking groundline in the  rocky bottom areas of Maine poses safety issues. For example, if  fishermen attempt to haul line that is caught on a rock, their boat could  tip, potentially causing injury. Also, if the line snaps when being hauled  because it has been weakened due to abrasion, it could strike and injure  people on the boat. The Atlantic Offshore Lobstermen’s Association also  expressed concern about the safety hazards associated with hauling traps  using an abraded line that may break. In the DEIS, NMFS acknowledged  that there are potential safety hazards associated with the use of sinking  groundline. However, an agency official told us that floating groundline  can also pose a similar type of safety hazard.
To overcome the operational difficulties associated with using sinking  groundline in rocky bottom areas, the Maine Department of Marine  Resources submitted a proposal to NMFS in January 2007 that outlined an  alternative to the use of sinking groundline along rocky areas of Maine’s  coast. One of the most prominent features of this proposal involves using  low-profile groundline instead of sinking groundline in Maine’s rocky  bottom areas. Low-profile groundline is still in development, but to reduce  abrasion, the Department of Marine Resources tested a line that floats, on  average, about 3 feet above the ocean bottom instead of sinking to the  bottom. Maine officials acknowledge that whales are present in the waters  where they proposed using low-profile line, but maintain that it is a better  alternative to using sinking groundline in rocky bottom areas. The state  believes that low-profile groundline will be beneficial for fishermen in  these areas, while also protecting whales from entanglement. The  scientists with whom we spoke were not willing to support low-profile  groundline until further research is conducted because they were unsure if  it would reduce the risk of entanglement. NMFS is also concerned because  although the low-profile groundline tested by the Maine Department of  Marine Resources may on average float 3 feet above the ocean floor, in  reality the rope moves constantly in the water, sometimes higher than 3  feet and sometimes lower. When it moves above the average height it  could form an arc similar to that of floating groundline creating an  entanglement risk for large whales. A NMFS official told us that the agency  plans to compile proposals on issues related to overcoming the  operational difficulties associated with using sinking groundline, including  the Maine Department of Marine Resources’ low-profile groundline  proposal, and will circulate them to the ALWTR Team for comment and  discussion.
section_title: NMFS Did Not Adequately Represent Uncertainties Associated With Proposed Gear Modifications Cost and Could Not Fully Assess Impacts on Potentially Affected Fishing Communities
paragraphs: NMFS did not have verifiable data for some of the key variables used in its  assessment of the fishing industry’s costs of complying with the proposed  gear modifications. In lieu of such data, NMFS relied on data that  contained significant uncertainties about the compliance costs. NMFS  acknowledged these uncertainties but, by not analyzing and presenting a  range of possible costs, did not adequately represent them in the cost  assessment included in the DEIS. As a result, the extent to which the  fishing industry’s actual costs to comply with the proposed gear  modifications could be lower or higher than the amount reported in the  DEIS is unclear. In addition, NMFS could not fully assess the impacts of  these costs on fishing communities because it lacked data to estimate the  affected fishermen’s ability to absorb additional compliance costs as well  as which specific communities would have to absorb any loss in jobs.  Without such data, the agency could not adequately determine how many  fishermen would be forced out of business or what impact this would have  on communities whose economies are closely tied to the fishing industry.
subsections: section_title: Significant Uncertainties Exist Regarding NMFS’s Cost Estimates of Complying with the Proposed Gear Modifications
paragraphs: NMFS estimated that the total cost to the fishing industry of complying  with the proposed gear modifications would be about $14 million  annually. NMFS estimated that the lobster industry would incur more  than $12.8 million of the projected $14 million costs. To estimate these  costs, NMFS analyzed important differences between fishermen such as  their location of operation, number of months of operation, and what they  catch. This approach allowed the agency to capture variations in the gear  configurations and operating characteristics of different types of  fishermen and their associated differences in expected compliance costs.  NMFS also identified and analyzed the key variables that are responsible  for the total cost of complying with the proposed gear modifications, such  as the lifespan of groundline, price of groundline, amount of gear loss, and  the number of fishermen that would incur these costs. However, there  were significant uncertainties associated with the data used to develop  these cost estimates, which were not fully represented in NMFS’s single  cost estimate.
First, NMFS determined the lifespan of both floating and sinking  groundline based on undocumented estimates from fishermen and  commercial marine suppliers it interviewed, rather than data that could be  verified from field tests of groundline. Knowing the lifespan of groundline  is important because replacing it more frequently results in higher costs to  fishermen. Though NMFS tested sinking groundline to determine if it was  operationally feasible to use throughout the northeast coast, it did not use  the results of these tests to determine its lifespan. The agency believes that  field testing would not have provided better information than the  interviews it conducted on the lifespan of groundline because its use  varies from fisherman to fisherman. Based on its interviews, NMFS  reported in the DEIS that sinking groundline, depending on its diameter,  would last between 1 and 3 years less—a 17 to 33 percent shorter  lifespan—than the corresponding diameter of floating groundline.  However, NMFS could not provide documentation of its interviews or  details on how the lifespan—as reported by those interviewed—varied.  According to the MLA, the lifespan of sinking groundline can range  substantially and could be much shorter than the average NMFS reported  in the DEIS. In the DEIS, NMFS acknowledged that the lifespan of  groundline is extremely uncertain due to variations in where it is used,  such as water temperature and bottom conditions, and the specific  operating practices of fishermen. NMFS does not expect that all  fishermen’s groundline would have the same lifespan as the estimates  reported in the DEIS and acknowledges that actual costs to replace  groundline could be higher or lower than estimated. Nonetheless, the  agency believes that its estimates of the lifespan of sinking groundline are  accurate and reflect what fishermen would experience in typical operating  conditions. However, by using an average lifespan of groundline in its cost  estimate, rather than the range of data collected from fishermen, NMFS  did not fully address the concern that the useful life of groundline can vary  significantly, depending on a fisherman’s practices and fishing location.
Second, while the price of groundline can vary substantially, NMFS did not  use a range of prices in its analysis to account for these differences. In  2003, NMFS contacted four commercial marine suppliers and dealers to  obtain prices of both sinking and floating groundline. The agency used the  median reported price to estimate the costs of replacing floating  groundline with sinking groundline. However, the agency does not have  documentation of the prices collected and could not describe how these  prices varied. We contacted the same suppliers and dealers and found that  the price of groundline can range substantially. For example, in February  and April 2007 the price of 3/8” sinking groundline—the most commonly  used groundline by fishermen and within NMFS’s cost analysis—ranged  from almost 1 percent to almost 34 percent higher than the price reported  in the DEIS. NMFS acknowledges that the price of groundline could be  higher or lower than reported in the DEIS but did not analyze and report  the range of groundline prices it collected from suppliers and dealers.
Third, NMFS’s estimates of the costs of gear loss were based on expert  opinion because data from field tests were not available. In the DEIS,  NMFS generally reported that fishermen that comply with the proposed  gear modifications would experience greater gear loss than they do  currently. For example, sinking groundline could lead to greater gear loss  because the groundline can get caught on rocks and break as gear is  hauled up. However, due to a lack of data, NMFS cannot estimate with  confidence how much gear loss would increase for fishermen complying  with the proposed gear modifications. The agency did not believe it would  be practical to conduct field testing to determine what gear loss could be  throughout the Atlantic because it can vary greatly, depending on how and  where the gear is used. Instead, NMFS relied on the expert opinions of its  gear research team, composed of ex-fishermen who are experienced with  fishing gear, and the contractor that prepared the DEIS to estimate gear  loss. The research team and the contractor assumed that gear loss  attributable to the proposed gear modifications would be approximately  double what the fishing industry currently loses in most areas. They  estimated that gear loss would be even higher—approximately three times  as much as they currently lose—for fishermen operating in areas near the  coast of Maine due to difficulties with retrieving gear in rocky bottom  areas. While NMFS believes its estimates were reasonable, the MLA  believes that these gear-loss estimates are inaccurate and likely to be too  low in Maine’s rocky bottom areas. The agency does acknowledge that  actual gear-loss costs could be higher or lower than it estimated in the  DEIS. However, by not analyzing and reporting a range of possible gear- loss costs, NMFS did not fully represent the uncertainty of its gear-loss  assumptions, even though it recognized that gear loss can vary, depending  on the conditions of use.
Fourth, NMFS may have underestimated the number of Maine lobster  fishermen that would be required to comply with the proposed gear  modifications. While all fishermen that operate in northern federal waters  would be subject to gear modification requirements, all fishermen that  operate in state waters along the east coast would not share these  requirements because NMFS proposed that some areas be exempted from  the regulation. However, NMFS lacked data to effectively determine  where state-permitted fishermen operate throughout the year and  specifically how many would operate in waters exempted from the new  requirements because Maine does not require fishermen to report where  they operate. Without this information, NMFS assumed that the  percentage of fishermen who would operate in areas exempt from the  proposed regulation would correspond to the percentage of state waters  that are exempt. For example, NMFS reported in the DEIS that  approximately 50 percent of Maine’s state waters would be exempted from  the gear-modification requirements. The agency also assumed that  fishermen would operate in the same areas year-round so those operating  in exempted waters would not be affected by the proposed gear  modifications. NMFS made this assumption because it believes that  lobster fishing in Maine is extremely territorial, and therefore the distance  that fishermen move their gear is limited by traditional fishing area  boundaries. Consequently, the agency assumed that approximately 50  percent of Maine’s lobster fishermen, or approximately 1,853 fishermen,  would operate exclusively in exempted waters and would not be affected  by the gear-modification requirements. However, a Maine state official  and a MLA representative told us that it was unreasonable to assume that  lobster fishermen would operate in only one area throughout the year. In  fact, they said that fishermen operate wherever lobsters are, which may be  in or out of exempted waters. If so, NMFS may not have captured the costs  of the proposed gear modifications for an unknown number of Maine  fishermen, and therefore may have underestimated how many would be  affected by the proposed ALWTR plan changes and thus the total  associated costs to the fishing industry.
NMFS acknowledges that there were uncertainties with the data used in  its analysis of the costs to the fishing industry and that actual costs could  be higher or lower than presented in the DEIS. However, NMFS did not  determine the extent to which changes in the lifespan of groundline, price  of groundline, amount of gear loss, or the number of fishermen who would  have to comply with these requirements would impact the overall $14  million cost estimate. By reporting a single estimate rather than a range of  the fishermen’s compliance costs, the DEIS did not adequately represent  the uncertainties of these key variables in NMFS’s assessment.  Furthermore, without reporting such a range to account for these  uncertainties, the extent to which the total estimated cost of complying  with the proposed gear modifications could be different than the $14  million estimate reported in the DEIS is unclear.
section_title: NMFS Could Not Fully Assess the Impacts of the Proposed Changes on Fishing Communities Because It Lacked Data on Fishermen’s Ability to Absorb Additional Costs and Remain in Business
paragraphs: In addition to assessing the cost of the proposed gear modifications to the  fishing industry, NMFS analyzed the effects of the costs of complying with  the proposed gear modifications on both fishermen and fishing  communities. Conducting an analysis of the effects on fishing communities  first requires determining fishermen’s ability to absorb additional costs  and remain in business and may also include an estimate of changes in  regional employment and income directly and indirectly related to the cost  of complying with the proposed regulation. However, NMFS could not  fully conduct these analyses due to a lack of data.
Specifically, NMFS lacked data on fishermen’s costs and revenue in a way  that it could estimate their ability to absorb the increased costs of  complying with the proposed gear modifications without going out of  business. Instead, NMFS estimated fishermen’s average annual revenue  and then made an arbitrary assumption about the level of increased costs  that would cause a fisherman to go out of business. First, NMFS estimated  fishermen’s annual revenue based on a limited number of fishermen  because comprehensive revenue data do not exist. For example, NMFS  used data from 9 lobster fishermen to estimate the revenue of 284 northern  lobster fishermen that operate vessels less than 28 feet long. However,  without fishermen-specific revenue data for all fishermen, the agency was  unsure how well its estimates would compare with their actual revenue.  Regarding small lobster vessels, NMFS said that it is possible that its  analysis in the DEIS systematically underestimates their revenue. NMFS  then made an arbitrary assumption that if gear-modification costs were  greater than 15 percent of a fisherman’s estimated annual revenue, then  the fisherman could not absorb the additional costs and would go out of  business. NMFS reported in the DEIS that it made this assumption because  there is no clearly defined threshold of additional costs that would cause a  fisherman to go out of business. Using this assumption, NMFS estimated  that approximately 379 fishermen would go out of business, including  many that operate smaller vessels for which NMFS lacked actual revenue  data. However, because fishermen’s actual revenues, as well as their  ability to absorb additional costs, could be noticeably different from what  NMFS assumed, the number of fisherman that would go out of business  could be lower or higher than NMFS estimated.
Furthermore, because NMFS lacked information about which specific  fishermen, living in which communities, would go out of business, it could  not predict the extent to which specific communities would be affected.  That is, NMFS could not identify exactly which communities would lose  jobs or quantify any loss of regional income as the result of complying  with the regulation. NMFS officials stated that associating any impact to a  particular fishing community is particularly difficult because fishermen  can sell their fish in one town, harbor their boat in a different town, and  reside in a neighboring town. As an alternative, the agency identified  potentially affected counties that had (1) over 100 fishermen that would be  subject to the ALWTR plan requirements and (2) reported annual  landings—seafood caught by fishermen—over 2 million pounds by vessels  using ALWTR plan regulated gear. The agency identified 15 counties that  met these criteria, many of which were in Maine and economically  dependent on the fishing industry. The agency reported a general  description of possible employment effects on these counties, but could  not quantify and specifically associate the impact of lost income and  employment to any specific community. Consequently, it is not clear how  significant the potential economic impacts on these communities would be  and how well these communities could withstand the potential loss of  fishing jobs and related income.
section_title: NMFS Has Not Developed Strategies for Fully Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Proposed Gear Modifications
paragraphs: Although NMFS’s proposed modifications to the ALWTR plan contain  some revisions to the current gear-marking requirements, such as  increased marking of the vertical line, the agency has not developed a  comprehensive approach to gear marking that would provide more  complete information about the gear involved in future whale  entanglements. Markings on commercial fishing gear can enable  researchers to assess the type of rope involved in an entanglement,  thereby providing critical information to assess the effectiveness of  current whale protection measures and insights into needed changes. In  addition, NMFS has not developed a strategy for determining whether  future entanglements are due to industry noncompliance with the gear  modification requirements or the ineffectiveness of the gear modifications  themselves.
subsections: section_title: Lack of Comprehensive Gear-Marking Requirements Could Hamper Assessment of Proposed Gear Modifications
paragraphs: Research on the nature and source of whale entanglements is challenging  in that entanglements are not directly observed when they occur. Instead,  NMFS’s gear research team is forced to rely on the gear it retrieves from  entangled whales and/or photographs taken of the entanglement, if any.  Even when gear is recovered, the gear research team may have only a rope  fragment to evaluate. Therefore, markings on gear can play a critical role  in informing scientists about the nature of the entanglement. Gear  markings can potentially indicate whether a whale became entangled in  groundline or vertical line, whether the gear was from the lobster fishery  or some other fishery, and the geographic area where the gear was set.  Currently, gear markings, such as vessel or permit numbers on buoys, can  identify the name of the fisherman who set the gear so that NMFS officials  can obtain specific information from the fisherman, such as the exact  location where the gear was set.
Under the current regulation, NMFS requires some trap and gillnet  fishermen to place one color-coded, 4-inch mark on the vertical line mid- way through its length, which fishermen typically paint on or tape to the  rope. The color-coding scheme provides information about the location  and fishery involved in the entanglement. For example, lobster fishermen  in the Cape Cod Bay Restricted Area in federal waters—an area NMFS has  designated as a critical habitat for large whales—are required to use a red  mark. Other colors are used to indicate other fisheries and areas.  However, according to a NMFS official, the current gear-marking scheme  has not been effective in assisting researchers because only rarely have  fragments of vertical line been recovered that included the required mark.
NMFS proposed a new requirement for marking vertical line because the  agency recognized that markings would be useful as the agency and the  ALWTR Team further evaluate vertical line for future regulatory action.  For example, if the agency recovered a rope that was marked, it would be  better able to determine that it was vertical line and how frequently  vertical line was involved with entanglements. Specifically, NMFS  proposed expanding the frequency of gear marking—to one 4-inch mark  every 60 feet on the vertical line. A NMFS official with whom we spoke  said the agency based the 60-foot requirement on the average length of  rope found on entangled whales. The official explained that the 60-foot  requirement would increase the likelihood of recovering marked rope  from an entangled whale and would also minimize the burden on  fishermen by not requiring them to mark rope even more frequently.
However, we believe NMFS’s proposed gear-marking requirement may not  be adequate in assisting researchers in identifying the gear that is  recovered from an entangled whale because it is not comprehensive. First,  even with increased markings on vertical lines, researchers may still not  retrieve the marked portion of the rope. For example, some of the rope  recovered from entangled whales has been only 6 feet long. Some  stakeholders, including scientists at the Provincetown Center for Coastal  Studies, recommended that NMFS require continuous marking throughout  the length of the rope through the use of tracer lines—colored threads of  line throughout the length of the rope. However, according to a NMFS  official, continuous marking throughout the length of the rope is not  practical because, among other reasons, it would limit fishermen’s ability  to move between different fishing areas that require different color  markings.
Second, NMFS has not proposed marking sinking groundline. NMFS did  not provide a rationale in the DEIS for not requiring the marking of sinking  groundline. However, a NMFS official told us that the agency believed that  sinking groundline would be completely effective at reducing groundline  entanglements, and therefore there was no need to burden fishermen with  a marking requirement on such line. However, scientists with whom we  spoke believe that while sinking groundline will reduce entanglement risk,  they do not believe that its complete success can be guaranteed. For  example, scientists have observed endangered whales with mud on their  heads, which scientists believe whales acquired scraping the ocean floor  as they feed. Based on this information, scientists are concerned that  endangered whales could become entangled in sinking groundline.  Consequently, several scientists with whom we spoke, including several  NMFS scientists, told us that sinking groundline should be marked so its  performance can be evaluated.
Third, NMFS did not require gear markings in areas that have been  exempted from the proposed gear modifications. NMFS developed  exempted areas because the agency determined, based on whale sighting  data, that certain waters pose a relatively low risk of entanglement  because they are not as frequently traveled by endangered whales as  others. However, because some of these areas are dense with commercial  fishing gear, they nevertheless pose some risk. Consequently, we believe  that any assessment of the new regulations would benefit from gear  markings on the gear used by fishermen in exempted areas, even if they  are not required to use modified gear.
Various stakeholders with whom we spoke or who submitted comments  on the DEIS expressed concern about NMFS’s proposed gear-marking  scheme. Industry representatives were concerned about the burden the  requirement would place on fishermen who would have to mark rope  more frequently and the impracticality of marking rope every 60 feet.  According to the Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Association, painted marks  can fade or become covered by algae and therefore must be maintained to  retain their visibility—a problem that would be exacerbated with  additional marking requirements. Also, maintaining a 60-foot space  between marks is difficult because commercial fishermen must routinely  cut and splice fishing lines. For example, fishermen may find their ropes  inadvertently cut due to commercial and recreational vessel traffic and  need to splice rope together. Fishermen may also change the length of  their ropes when moving gear into and out of deep water. Given the  impracticality of marking rope every 60 feet, the Cetacean Society  International stated that NMFS should consider requiring rope that was  marked continuously through the length of the rope by the manufacturer.
Stakeholders with whom we spoke observed that markings that were  specific to individual fishermen could be useful to researchers because  they would enable researchers to obtain information from fishermen,  specifically on how and where they set their gear. The Maine Lobstermen’s  Association and the Provincetown Center for Coastal Studies noted that  new technology, such as microchips embedded in fishing rope, could  potentially provide fishermen-specific information and that they would  favor its use if the technology was feasible in the commercial fishing  environment. NMFS’s gear research team is aware of this technology, but  believes that it is not yet suited to commercial fishing conditions because  microchips embedded in rope may pop out as the rope moves through  hauling devices used to pull gear out of the water.
section_title: NMFS Lacks a Strategy for Assessing Industry Compliance with the Proposed Gear Modifications
paragraphs: NMFS has not developed a strategy that will allow it to determine whether  any future whale entanglements are due to noncompliance with the  proposed new gear requirements by fishermen or the ineffectiveness of the  gear modifications. NMFS did not specify in the DEIS how it plans to  monitor industry compliance with its proposed rule and has not developed  such a plan outside of the DEIS. Stakeholders with whom we spoke or  who submitted comments on the DEIS have expressed concern that the  DEIS did not include a plan for monitoring compliance with the proposed  rule. According to the Whale Center of New England, the lack of  monitoring plans in the past have made it difficult to evaluate the  effectiveness of previous actions, and as a new regulation goes into effect,  a monitoring plan would be critical in assessing the success or failure of  the proposed actions. A Provincetown Center for Coastal Studies  scientist observed that a plan for monitoring the proposed rule is as  important to effectively protecting whales as the gear modifications  themselves. A NMFS official told us that the agency understands the  importance of having a compliance strategy and plans to develop one.
Regarding the current regulatory requirements, NMFS has not conducted a  systematic survey of industry compliance and therefore, does not know  the extent of industry compliance along the east coast. Maine is the only  state to have conducted even limited compliance surveys of its state- permitted vessels. Since 2002, Maine has conducted annual compliance  surveys over a 30-day period in both state and federal waters off the coast  of Maine, according to a Maine Department of Marine Resources official.
During the survey, enforcement officers in patrol boats target large  concentrations of gear and randomly pull gear out of the water. The  enforcement officers document information about the type and location of  gear, the owner, and what species the fishermen were targeting. This effort  is conducted separately from routine enforcement patrols during which  enforcement officers complete logs that record only violations. According  to a Department of Marine Resources official, the state can conduct this  compliance survey because it has vessels that are equipped to haul  commercial fishing gear, even from deep water areas and because NMFS  has provided funding to support this effort. Although Maine’s annual  compliance survey indicates a high rate of compliance, it is subject to a  number of limitations. The survey is not conducted using scientific  sampling of gear, so the results cannot be generalized to all gear, and it  does not incorporate all segments of Maine’s fishing industry, so it is not  comprehensive.
Effective January 2007, Massachusetts required that sinking groundline be  used throughout state waters—a requirement similar to what NMFS  proposed along the north Atlantic coast. Officials with the Massachusetts  Office of Law Enforcement Environmental Police stated that they are  exploring the use of a vessel equipped with sonar to assess whether  fishermen are complying with the state’s sinking groundline requirement.  Through sonar, the department can detect if fishermen are using floating  or sinking groundline without hauling the gear out of the water. They  explained that sonar could be an efficient method for conducting a  systematic survey because hauling gear is time consuming, particularly  since the gear must be placed back carefully where the fisherman had the  gear set.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: NMFS has a challenging mandate of reducing the risks posed to the  survival of Atlantic large whales by entanglements in commercial fishing  gear, while also taking into account the economic interests of commercial  fishermen. In its continuing efforts to protect endangered whales,  including the right whale which is critically endangered, NMFS is  considering various revisions to the existing regulations which include  certain gear modifications for the fishing industry. However, the economic  analysis that NMFS developed to support its actions does not disclose the  full range of possible costs that the proposed gear modifications may  impose on fishermen although it acknowledges that costs could be higher  or lower than it presented. While we believe the approach that NMFS used  to estimate compliance costs is reasonable, we are concerned that the  presentation of costs did not fully reflect the uncertainty of the analysis.
Moreover, given the concerns raised by scientists and other experts  regarding the effectiveness of the proposed gear modifications in  eliminating whale entanglements, it is important for NMFS to develop  strategies that will allow it to assess the effectiveness of these changes as  well as monitor industry compliance. However, NMFS has neither  developed a comprehensive strategy to help it assess whether its proposed  gear modifications are effective in eliminating whale entanglements nor  has it developed a program to monitor industry compliance.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: Before NMFS finalizes its proposed regulations for the ALWTR plan, we  recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Administrator of  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to direct the Assistant  Administrator for NMFS to take the following three actions:    adequately represent the uncertainty in data that the agency used to  determine the costs of the proposed fishing gear modifications, by  presenting a range of possible costs in the economic analysis section of  the final environmental impact statement; revise the proposed gear-marking requirements to include markings on  sinking groundline and gear marking requirements in exempted areas; and   develop a strategy for assessing the extent of industry compliance with the  gear modification requirements.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Commerce for  review and comment. In its comments, the Department of Commerce’s  NOAA questioned whether we had obtained input from a broad range of  stakeholders, felt the report appeared to focus solely on the impacts to the  Maine fishing community, and disagreed with two of our  recommendations.
We disagree with NOAA’s comment that we did not obtain and reflect a  range of stakeholders’ views in this report. As described in detail in our  objectives, scope, and methodology, included in appendix I, we conducted  interviews, reviewed documents, and took other steps to ensure that our  work adequately portrays a wide range of stakeholders’ views and  appropriately addresses the complexities of these issues. In addition to  NMFS officials, the stakeholders we contacted include state marine fishery  management agency officials from Maine and Massachusetts; fishing  industry representatives from the Massachusetts Lobstermen’s  Association, Maine Lobstermen’s Association, and the Atlantic Offshore  Lobstermen’s Association; a representative from the Humane Society of  the United States; and scientists from the Provincetown Center for Coastal  Studies, the New England Aquarium, the Woods Hole Oceanographic  Institution, and the Marine Mammal Commission. We also reviewed all of  the stakeholders’ comments submitted to NMFS on the DEIS and attended  a meeting of the ALWTR Team—composed of fishermen, scientists,  conservationists, and state and federal officials who are tasked with  monitoring the status of the ALWTR plan and advising NMFS as it  develops revisions to the plan.
In its general comments, NOAA also stated that, in its view, the draft  report appears to focus solely on the impacts to the Maine fishing  community. We do not agree with this characterization of the report.  Although the report clearly places some emphasis on issues of concern to  the Maine lobster industry, we believe this is appropriate given the  objectives we were asked to address in this review. Two of our objectives  specifically focus on how NMFS plans to address issues related to  implementing the proposed changes to the ALWTR plan, particularly in the  rocky bottom areas of the north Atlantic coast, and to evaluate the extent  to which NMFS fully assessed costs to the fishing industry and economic  impacts on fishermen. The rocky bottom areas of concern are located  primarily off the coast of Maine; and as a result, the report describes  concerns raised by Maine lobstermen regarding the implementation  challenges they believe they will face. In addition, according to NMFS’s  analysis contained in the DEIS, the lobster industry will bear $12.8 million  of the approximately $14 million annual cost of complying with the  proposed regulatory changes, and this industry is primarily centered in  Maine and Massachusetts. Consequently, the report appropriately includes  concerns raised by Maine lobstermen about NMFS’s analysis of the costs  of complying with the proposed regulatory changes.
With regard to our recommendations, NOAA believes that the uncertainty  of the data was adequately represented in the DEIS and therefore did not  agree with our recommendation that the agency present a range of  possible costs in its final economic analysis to represent the uncertainty in  the data. Nonetheless, NOAA said that it is planning to clarify the  variations and uncertainties within its analysis in the Final Environmental  Impact Statement (FEIS). NOAA said that this clarification would discuss  potential differences in total compliance cost from variations in several of  the assumptions that we had identified in our report. By recognizing that  the treatment of uncertainty in the DEIS can be improved and by taking  additional steps to explain the effect of uncertainty on compliance costs,  the agency appears to be taking a step in the direction we recommended.  However, we continue to believe that unless NMFS includes a range of  possible costs facing the fishing industry in the FEIS, the agency will not  have clearly and thoroughly represented the uncertainties in its analysis.
NOAA also did not agree with our recommendation that the agency revise  the proposed gear-marking requirements to include markings on sinking  groundline and gear marking in exempted areas. Although NOAA  concurred that methods are needed for identifying sinking groundline and  gear from exempted areas, it stated that such markings are not feasible or  practical at this time. It is unclear to us why NOAA would make such a  statement given that in the DEIS, NMFS has proposed marking  requirements for vertical line. We believe that if such marking is feasible  and practical for vertical line, similar marking should also be feasible and  practical for sinking groundline. Without such comprehensive gear-  marking requirements, we believe that NMFS will not be in a position to  evaluate whether or not its regulations, including the use of sinking  groundline, will be effective in protecting Atlantic large whales from  entanglement.
NOAA did agree with our recommendation that NMFS should develop a  strategy for assessing industry compliance with the gear-modification  requirements. However, NOAA stated that the recommendation cannot be  implemented before NMFS finalizes its proposed regulations for the  ALWTR plan, as we recommended. This is because NMFS is currently  working on the strategy and plans to continue discussions with the  ALWTR team at its next meeting, tentatively scheduled for early 2008,  which is beyond the time the FEIS and final regulation will be issued. If  NOAA is unable to complete its strategy for assessing industry compliance  prior to finalizing its proposed regulations, we believe the agency should  have the strategy in place by the effective date of the final regulations so  that NMFS can be in a position to evaluate the effectiveness of its  regulatory changes from their inception.
NOAA also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated in  this report as appropriate. NOAA’s comments and our detailed responses  are presented in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Commerce,  appropriate congressional committees, and other interested Members of  Congress. We also will make copies available to others upon request. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Since the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has not issued a final  environmental impact statement or regulation, we have reviewed the  proposed changes to the Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction (ALWTR)  plan outlined in the draft environmental impact statement (DEIS).  Specifically we (1) described the scientific basis for the proposed changes  to the ALWTR plan and the extent to which uncertainties exist regarding  how effectively they will protect large whales; (2) described how the  agency plans to address implementation issues, particularly in the rocky  bottom areas of the North Atlantic coast; (3) evaluated the extent to which  NMFS fully assessed costs to the fishing industry and economic impacts  on fishermen; and (4) evaluated the extent to which NMFS has developed  strategies for fully assessing the effectiveness of and industry compliance  with the proposed changes.
To address all four objectives, we reviewed the DEIS and the public  comments made in response to the issuance of the DEIS. We interviewed  officials at NMFS’s Northeast Regional Office who participated in  developing the proposed changes to the plan outlined in the DEIS. We  interviewed state marine fishery management agency officials from the  Maine Department of Marine Resources and the Massachusetts Division of  Marine Fisheries. We also interviewed fishing industry representatives  from the Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Association, Maine Lobstermen’s  Association, and the Atlantic Offshore Lobstermen’s Association. We  interviewed a representative from the Humane Society of the United  States, a conservation group. Finally, we attended a meeting of the ALWTR  Team—composed of fishermen, scientists, conservationists, and state and  federal officials who are tasked with monitoring the status of the ALWTR  plan and advising NMFS as it develops revisions to the plan—held in  December 2006. At this meeting, we observed presentations on the status  of endangered whales, new strategies to reduce the entanglement risk of  vertical line, and experimental whale safe rope that could be used in rocky  bottom areas.
To obtain information on the scientific basis for the proposed changes to  the ALWTR plan outlined in the DEIS and any uncertainties regarding how  effectively they will protect large whales, we interviewed NMFS scientists  at its Northeast Fisheries Science Center and officials that developed the  proposed changes to the ALWTR plan. In addition, we interviewed marine  mammal scientists from the Provincetown Center for Coastal Studies, the  New England Aquarium, the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, and  the Marine Mammal Commission to obtain expert opinions on the need for  regulatory action and the effectiveness of the actions proposed by NMFS.  We also reviewed scientific literature on right, humpback, and fin whale  behaviors and entanglements in commercial fishing gear. Additionally, we  attended the annual meeting of the North Atlantic Right Whale  Consortium, a group composed of a number of both nongovernmental and  governmental organizations and individuals, including marine mammal  scientists, who study and work to conserve North Atlantic right whales. At  this meeting, we observed presentations on recent scientific research on  right whales, including their migratory behaviors and entanglement risks.
To obtain information on how NMFS plans to address issues with  implementing its proposed changes to the ALWTR plan, especially in rocky  bottom areas of the North Atlantic coast, we obtained the opinions of  representatives from fishing industry associations on the challenges posed  by the proposed gear modifications. We also interviewed NMFS officials  from its gear research team—former fishermen who develop whale safe  gear and provide educational outreach to fishermen—to obtain  information on how fishermen could overcome these challenges. In  addition, we interviewed officials from the Maine Department of Marine  Resources and the Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries to obtain  their views on how these challenges could impact fishermen. Finally, we  reviewed the results from NMFS’s testing of sinking groundline throughout  the east coast as well as the results of the Maine Lobstermen’s  Association’s tests of sinking groundline.
To evaluate the extent to which NMFS fully assessed the costs to the  fishing industry and impacts to fishing communities, we interviewed  representatives of Industrial Economics Inc., the contractor who  conducted the economic analysis that is included in the DEIS. We also  interviewed officials from NMFS’s Northeast Regional Office, including the  gear research team, that contributed to the economic assessment. In  addition, we interviewed economists from NMFS’s Northeast Fisheries  Science Center. We also interviewed fishing industry representatives to get  their views on the data and assumptions used within the DEIS analysis. We  also contacted commercial marine suppliers in February and April of 2007  to obtain the price of sinking groundline.
To evaluate the extent to which NMFS has developed strategies for  assessing the effectiveness of and industry compliance with the proposed  ALWTR plan changes, we interviewed officials from NMFS’s Northeast  Regional Office on NMFS’s current and planned evaluation strategies. We  interviewed NMFS’s gear research team and officials from the Northeast  Regional Office that developed the gear-marking scheme on the proposed  gear-marking requirements and how they were developed. We interviewed  scientists from the Provincetown Center for Coastal Studies, the New  England Aquarium, and the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution to  obtain their views on the proposed gear-marking requirements and which  markings would be most beneficial to assessing the effectiveness of gear  modifications. We also interviewed representatives from the Maine  Lobstermen’s Association to obtain their views on gear-marking  requirements. Finally, we interviewed marine fisheries law enforcement  officials from the Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental  Affairs and the Maine Department of Marine Resources on gear-marking  requirements and their current compliance evaluation strategies.
We conducted our review from August 2006 through June 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Deputy Secretary of Commerce  letter dated July 5, 2007.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  We believe that the report reflects a wide variety of input from a  diverse group of stakeholders. For this reason, we did not revise the  report based on this comment. As discussed in appendix I of the  report, we obtained input from stakeholders through interviews, a  review of relevant documents, and attendance at meetings. We  interviewed fishing industry representatives from the Maine  Lobstermen’s Association (MLA), the Massachusetts Lobstermen’s  Association, and the Atlantic Offshore Lobstermen’s Association. We  obtained the views of the Garden State Seafood Association and the  Downeast Lobstermen’s Association through the written comments  they submitted on the DEIS. We also interviewed officials from Maine’s  and Massachusetts’ state marine agencies because 10 of the 15  communities that the DEIS identified as “at-risk” as a result of the  projected economic impacts of the ALWTR plan modifications are  located in these two states. We also interviewed a representative of the  Humane Society of the United States and marine mammal scientists at  the New England Aquarium, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution,  the Provincetown Center for Coastal Studies, and the Marine Mammal  Commission. Moreover, we obtained views from scientists at the  NMFS Northeast Fisheries Science Center as well as the views of the  NMFS gear research team. We attended the annual meeting of the  North Atlantic Right Whale Consortium, a group that studies and  works to conserve North Atlantic Right Whales. We also attended the  December 2006 ALWTR Team meeting, which included representatives  from a wide range of groups including trap and gillnet fishing groups,  conservation groups, federal and state agencies, and  academic/scientific organizations. Finally, we reviewed all of the  public comments submitted to NMFS on the DEIS, which included  comments from a wide variety of government, scientific, industry, and  environmental groups.  2.  We do not agree with National Oceanic and Atmospheric  Administration’s (NOAA) contention that the report appears to focus  solely on the impacts to the Maine fishing community. In addressing  the first and fourth objectives of the report, we broadly describe the  scientific basis for the proposed changes to the ALWTR plan and  evaluate the extent to which NMFS has developed strategies for fully  assessing the effectiveness of and industry compliance with the  proposed changes. Our second objective was to describe how NMFS  plans to address issues related to implementing the proposed changes  to the ALWTR plan, particularly in the rocky bottom areas of the North  Atlantic coast. These rocky bottom areas are located primarily off of  the coast of Maine; and as a result, the report describes concerns  raised by Maine lobstermen regarding the implementation challenges  they believe they will face. Finally, our third objective was to evaluate  the extent to which NMFS fully assessed costs to the fishing industry  and economic impacts on fishermen. As NMFS stated in the DEIS, the  lobster industry is expected to bear more than $12.8 million of the  approximately $14 million annual cost of complying with the proposed  regulatory changes, and the Atlantic lobster industry is primarily  centered in Maine and Massachusetts. Consequently, the report  includes concerns raised by Maine lobstermen about NMFS’s analysis  of the costs of complying with the proposed regulatory changes. For  the reasons stated above, we did not revise the report.  3.  As stated in comment two, we do not believe that the report focuses  on one industry sector affected by the ALWTR plan. Because we  believe that the report title is accurate and appropriate we did not  revise the report in response to this comment.  4.  We did not rely heavily on the views of the MLA in developing our  finding and conclusions as NOAA contends. As we stated in comment  one, we made use of information from a wide range of stakeholders in  developing our findings. Although the report clearly places some  emphasis on issues of concern to the Maine lobster industry, we  believe this is appropriate given the objectives we were asked to  address in the report. As a result, we did not revise the report in  response to this comment.  5.  We believe that the report adequately describes the geographic extent  of the proposed changes to the ALWTR plan and the range of fisheries  affected. In addition, we reviewed comments on the DEIS submitted  by the Garden State Seafood Association and obtained input from the  Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Association and the Atlantic Offshore  Lobstermen’s Association through interviews with their  representatives. We have revised the report to include specific  comments from the latter two groups.  6.  As we noted in comment one, we interviewed a representative from  the Humane Society of the United States and scientists from the New  England Aquarium. We also reviewed comments on the DEIS  submitted by the Ocean Conservancy and the International Wildlife  Coalition. Consequently, we did not revise the report in response to  this comment.  7.  NOAA correctly states that our report identifies instances in which  NMFS could not provide documentation for some of the estimates it  used in the economic analysis in the DEIS, including how the lifespan  of sinking groundline varied based on interviews NMFS conducted.  However, NOAA then erroneously claims that we used statements  from the MLA to support the fact that the lifespan of sinking  groundline varied. We reported NMFS’s contention that the lifespan of  sinking groundline varied, despite the fact that it could not provide  documentation of the interviews it conducted. We also reported the  MLA’s view that, based on its experience, the lifespan of sinking  groundline can range substantially and could be shorter than the  average NMFS reported in the DEIS. For these reasons, we did not  revise the report in response to this comment.  8.  As stated in comment one, we made use of information from a wide  range of stakeholders in developing our findings, including those in the  science and environmental communities. However, regarding the costs  and economic impacts of gear modifications, we relied on the views of  the affected fishermen because they have direct experience in this  area, whereas scientists and conversation groups generally do not.  Consequently, we did not revise the report in response to this  comment.  9.  We do not agree that NOAA has adequately represented the  uncertainty in the data the agency used to determine the costs of the  proposed fishing gear modifications. We believe that presenting its  estimates as single point values (for example, $14 million) rather than  showing the range of possible costs, implies a degree of preciseness  that is misleading and not supportable by the limitations and  sometimes lack of available data. Moreover, while, on one hand, NOAA  claims that it has adequately addressed uncertainty, on the other hand,  it goes on to say that it is planning to clarify the variations and  uncertainties within its analysis contained in the Final Environmental  Impact Statement. This clarification would discuss potential  differences in total compliance costs from variations in several of the  assumptions identified in our report. We believe such clarification is  needed and continue to believe that presenting a range of possible  costs would be the best way to represent the uncertainty in the  analysis. For these reasons, we did not revise the report in response to  this comment.  10. We agree that gear loss and replacement and the associated  compliance costs could be higher or lower than the average cost that  NMFS reported in the DEIS and that is why we recommended that  NMFS represent this uncertainty by presenting a range of possible  costs in its economic analysis. We did not recommend applying higher  gear loss and replacement rates to the entire fishing industry as NOAA  seems to suggest in its comments. Therefore, we did not revise the  report in response to this comment.  11. We recognize that portions of Maine’s state waters are proposed to be  exempt from the changes to the ALWTR plan. This does not change the  fact that NMFS’s gear research team estimated that gear loss would  vary by area of fishing operation and that, according to the MLA,  NMFS’s estimates are likely to be too low in Maine’s rocky bottom  areas that will be subject to the new regulation. Furthermore, the  report does not attempt to identify a particular level of uncertainty  related to gear loss as NOAA contends. For these reasons, we did not  revise the report in response to this comment.  12. We do not agree with NOAA’s comment that markings for identifying  sinking groundline and gear in exempted areas are not feasible or  practical at this time. In the DEIS, NOAA proposed requiring that  vertical line be marked. If such marking is feasible and practical for  vertical line, the same type of marking should be feasible and practical  for sinking groundline. Many scientists we spoke to indicated that  sinking groundline should be marked. Consequently, we did not revise  the report in response to this comment.  13. Because the draft report already included a paragraph which discusses  the status of efforts to use “chip technology” to identify fishing gear,  including that NMFS believes that it is not yet ready to be  implemented, we made no changes in response to this comment.  14. If NOAA is unable to complete its strategy for assessing industry  compliance prior to finalizing its proposed regulations, we believe the  agency should have the strategy in place by the effective date of the  final regulations so that it is in a position to evaluate the effectiveness  of its regulatory changes from their inception. We did not revise the  report in response to this comment.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Anu K. Mittal, Director, (202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Stephen D. Secrist, Assistant  Director; John W. Delicath; Doreen S. Feldman; Nancy A. Hess; Justin M.  Jaynes; Gregory A. Marchand, Mehrzad Nadji; Kelly Agnese Richburg; and  Bruce Skud made key contributions to this report.