Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Requirements Determination Process Has Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities
Published: 2008-09-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Increasing combat demands and fiscal constraints make it critical for the Department of Defense (DOD) to ensure that its weapon system investments not only meet the needs of the warfighter, but make the most efficient use of available resources. GAO's past work has shown that achieving this balance has been a challenge and weapon programs have often experienced cost growth and delayed delivery to the warfighter. In 2003, DOD implemented the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to prioritize and ensure that the warfighter's most essential needs are met. In response to Senate Report 109-69, GAO reported in March 2007 that DOD lacks an effective approach to balance its weapon system investments with available resources. This follow-on report focuses on (1) whether the JCIDS process has achieved its objective to prioritize joint warfighting needs and (2) factors that have affected DOD's ability to effectively implement JCIDS. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed JCIDS guidance and capability documents and budgetary and programming data on major weapon systems, and interviewed DOD officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The JCIDS process has not yet been effective in identifying and prioritizing warfighting needs from a joint, departmentwide perspective. GAO reviewed JCIDS documentation related to proposals for new capabilities and found that most--almost 70 percent--were sponsored by the military services, with little involvement from the joint community--including the combatant commands (COCOMs), which are largely responsible for planning and carrying out military operations. By continuing to rely on capability proposals that lack a joint perspective, DOD may be losing opportunities to improve joint warfighting capabilities and reduce the duplication of capabilities in some areas. In addition, virtually all capability proposals that have gone through the JCIDS process since 2003 have been validated--or approved. DOD continues to have a portfolio with more programs than available resources can support. For example, the remaining costs for major weapon system programs in DOD's portfolio went from being about four times greater to almost six times greater than annual funding available during fiscal year 2000 through 2007. The JCIDS process has also proven to be lengthy--taking on average up to 10 months to validate a need--which further undermines efforts to effectively respond to the needs of the warfighter, especially those that are near-term. DOD lacks an analytical approach to prioritize joint capability needs and determine the relative importance of capability proposals submitted to the JCIDS process. Further, the functional capabilities boards, which were established to manage the JCIDS process and facilitate the prioritization of needs, have not been staffed or resourced to effectively carry out these duties. Instead, the military services retain most of DOD's analytical capacity and resources for requirements development. The Joint Staff recently initiated a project to capture the near-, mid-, and long-term needs of the services and other defense components, and to synthesize them with the needs of the COCOMs. However, DOD officials told us that determining how best to integrate COCOM and service capability perspectives will be challenging because of differences in roles, missions, and time frames. Efforts have also begun to streamline the process and reduce the time it takes to validate proposals.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) expects the cost to develop and  procure the major weapon systems in its current portfolio to total           $1.6 trillion—$335 billion of which is expected to be spent over the next 5  years. Increasing combat demands and escalating fiscal constraints make  it critical for DOD to ensure that its weapon system investments not only  meet the needs of the warfighter but make the most efficient use of the  department’s substantial resources. Our past work has shown that  achieving this balance has been a challenge for DOD and that the  department has pursued more programs than its resources can support.  Our work has also shown that DOD has had difficulty translating needs  into executable programs, which has often led to cost growth and delayed  delivery of needed capabilities to the warfighter.
In 2003, DOD implemented the Joint Capabilities Integration and  Development System (JCIDS)—a requirements generation system  intended to prioritize and ensure that the most essential needs of the  warfighter are met. Through JCIDS, needs are expected to be determined  from a joint capabilities perspective, rather than from an individual service  or program perspective, which can lead to stovepiped solutions. In fiscal  year 2006, you directed that GAO review how DOD’s requirements and  resource allocation processes can better support program stability in  major weapon systems acquisition. In March 2007, we reported that DOD  lacks an effective, integrated approach to balance its weapon system  investments with available resources. This follow-on report, also done in  response to the fiscal year 2006 direction, focuses on requirements  management as embodied in the JCIDS process. Specifically, we              (1) determined whether the JCIDS process has achieved its objective to  prioritize joint warfighting needs and (2) identified any factors that have  affected DOD’s ability to effectively implement JCIDS.
To conduct our work, we reviewed DOD, Joint Staff, and military service  guidance documents on JCIDS and other interdependent processes;  budgetary and programming data on major weapon systems; and Joint  Staff information on the status and sponsorship of capability proposal  documents submitted to the JCIDS process for review. We also reviewed  the findings of prior research on DOD requirements by audit agencies and  DOD-sponsored organizations. We interviewed requirements officials from  the Joint Staff, DOD’s functional capabilities boards, several combatant  commands (COCOMs), and the Army, Navy, and Air Force. We conducted  this performance audit from May 2007 to August 2008 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. For more information on our scope and methodology, see  appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Historically, new weapon systems have been developed by the military  services to counter specific threats. Under DOD’s Requirements  Generation System, the precursor to JCIDS, requirements frequently grew  out of the military services’ unique strategic visions and often lacked clear  linkages to the national military strategy and the needs of the joint force  commanders, who are responsible for carrying out military operations.  This service-centric, stovepiped approach often created weapon systems  that lacked interoperability, were duplicative, or did not fill critical gaps.  In a 2002 memo, the Secretary of Defense expressed dissatisfaction with  the requirements system and commented that the system “continues to  require things that ought not to be required, and does not require things  that need to be required.”
As part of its 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD determined that the  department needed to shift from threat-based defense planning to a  capabilities-based model that focuses more on how an adversary might  fight than who the adversary might be or where a war might be fought.  JCIDS was established to provide the department with an integrated,  collaborative process to identify and guide development of a broad set of  new capabilities that address the current and emerging security  environment. Through JCIDS, capabilities are to be developed from  national military strategy and should relate to joint concepts that describe  how the strategy will be implemented. JCIDS is also intended to ensure a  strong voice for warfighters and identify needs from a joint perspective to  ensure that current and future warfighters are provided the capabilities  they need to accomplish assigned missions. Furthermore, JCIDS  emphasizes that needs be derived in terms of capabilities instead of  specific system solutions.
The JCIDS process is overseen by the Joint Requirements Oversight  Council (JROC) and supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  who is responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense on the priorities  of military requirements in supporting the national military strategy.  Within JCIDS, FCBs—headed by a general or an admiral and made up of  military and civilian representatives from the military services, joint staff,  COCOMs, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense—manage different  capability area portfolios. The FCBs are intended to support the JROC by  evaluating capability needs, recommending enhancements to capabilities  integration, examining joint priorities, assessing program alternatives, and  minimizing duplication of effort across the department.
The JCIDS process requires that gaps in military capabilities be identified  and potential materiel and nonmateriel solutions for filling those gaps be  developed based on formal capability assessments. The results of these  capability assessments are formally submitted as initial capabilities  documents (ICD)—a capability proposal—by a military service, defense  agency, COCOM, FCB, or other sponsor. ICDs are intended to document a  specific capability gap or set of gaps that exist in joint warfighting  functions and propose a prioritized list of various solutions to address the  gap(s). When a capability proposal is submitted, a Joint Staff “gatekeeper”  conducts an initial review to determine what level of joint interest and  review there should be and which FCB should take the lead. Capability  proposals deemed to have a significant impact on joint warfighting, such  as those involving potential major defense acquisition programs, are  designated as “JROC interest” and must be validated or approved by the  JROC.
A JROC-validated ICD provides the basis for starting a major weapon  system acquisition. Specifically, it should lead to an analysis of  alternatives, a concept refinement phase, and a decision on a preferred  system concept. Before a weapon system program is approved to begin  system development, the sponsor is required to submit a capability  development document (CDD)—which defines a specific solution as  identified in the analysis of alternatives—through JCIDS for approval by  the JROC. The CDD defines the system’s key performance parameters or  attributes against which the delivered increment of capability will be  measured. Finally, the sponsor prepares a capability production document  (CPD) to address the production elements of an acquisition program prior  to the program starting production. Figure 1 shows how the  documentation relates to the major milestones for a weapon system  program in the Defense Acquisition System.
section_title: JCIDS Is Not Meeting Its Objective to Prioritize Joint Warfighting Needs
paragraphs: While JCIDS is intended to determine needs from a joint, departmentwide  perspective, capability needs continue to be proposed and defined  primarily by the military services, with little involvement from the joint  community—including the COCOMs, which plan and implement military  operations. This can lead to stovepiped and duplicative solutions that do  not necessarily support a joint force on the battlefield. In addition,  virtually all of the proposals for new capability needs and weapon system  solutions completing the JCIDS process since 2003 have been validated.
The JCIDS process has also proven to be lengthy, taking on average up to  10 months to validate a need. Such a protracted process further  undermines the department’s efforts to effectively respond to the needs of  the warfighter, especially those that are near term.
subsections: section_title: The Services, Not the Joint Warfighting Community, Continue to Sponsor Most JCIDS Proposals
paragraphs: Our review of the documentation associated with 90 “JROC interest” ICDs  submitted to JCIDS since 2003 showed that 60 proposals, or 67 percent,  were sponsored by a military service, and 23, or 26 percent, were  sponsored by a COCOM, an FCB, or the Joint Staff. (See fig. 2.)
JCIDS is intended to encourage collaboration among the services,  COCOMs, and other DOD organizations to identify joint solutions to  capability gaps, and there are some cases where this has occurred. For  example, the Navy submitted a capability proposal through JCIDS to get a  precision and landing system in place to avoid delays in delivering its  aircraft carriers in development. The lead FCB reviewed the Navy’s  proposal and recognized that it was similar to a need identified by the Air  Force and determined that the Air Force’s needs could be met under the  same proposal. However, according to JCIDS officials, FCB, COCOM, and  other stakeholder reviews have had little influence in promoting joint  solutions.
Past studies have also raised concerns that the services and the COCOMs  do not routinely collaborate to identify possible joint solutions. For  example, in 2006 the Army Audit Agency recommended that the Army  improve collaboration with the joint community early in the capabilities  planning process to improve the quality of its capabilities documents and  facilitate more timely reviews of proposals that are submitted into the  JCIDS process. In January 2006, the Defense Acquisition Performance  Assessment Panel concluded that JCIDS resulted in capabilities that did  not meet warfighter needs in a timely manner and recommended that  JCIDS be replaced with a COCOM-led requirements process in which the  services and defense agencies compete to provide solutions. The Defense  Science Board similarly reported that JCIDS has not provided for  increased warfighter influence, but instead actually suppresses joint needs  in favor of military service interests, and recommended an increase in the  formal participation role of the COCOMs in the JCIDS process. The  Center for Strategic and International Studies has also pointed out that  while the services are responsible for supplying operationally capable  armed forces, the COCOMs are responsible for responding to threats and  executing military operations. Therefore, it recommended that the Joint  Forces Command take the lead in conducting capabilities development  planning for the COCOMs and become a formal member of the JROC.
By continuing to rely on stovepiped solutions to address capability needs,  DOD may be losing opportunities to improve joint warfighting capabilities  and reduce the duplication of capabilities in some areas. In January 2006,  we reported that military operations continue to be hampered by the  inability of communication and weapon systems to operate effectively  together on the battlefield. In May 2007, we reported that while the  military services have successfully planned and fielded a number of  unmanned aerial vehicle systems over the past several years, DOD has  struggled to coordinate the development of these systems across the  services and ensure that they complement one another and avoid  duplicating capabilities. Specifically, despite similarities in proposed  capabilities between two key unmanned aerial vehicle systems—the Air  Force’s Predator program and the Army’s Warrior program—the Army  awarded a separate development contract to the same contractor  producing the Predator. By taking separate tracks to developing these two  systems, the Air Force and the Army missed an opportunity to identify  potential similarities in their requirements and thereby avoid redundant or  non-interoperable systems. Although the Army and Air Force agreed to  consider cooperating on the acquisition of the two systems, the services  are struggling to agree on requirements.
section_title: Virtually All Capability Proposals That Have Completed the JCIDS Process Are Validated
paragraphs: JCIDS is intended to support senior decision makers in identifying and  prioritizing warfighting capability needs. As such, it is meant to be an  important tool in maintaining a balanced portfolio of acquisition programs  that can be executed within available resources. However, the vast  majority of proposals completing the JCIDS process are approved—or  validated. Adding to a portfolio that already contains more programs than  resources can support is likely to perpetuate instability and poor  outcomes in weapon system programs.
Of the 203 JROC-interest capability proposals (ICDs and CDDs) we  reviewed, 140 completed the JCIDS process and were validated. Of the  remaining proposals, 57 are still under review, and 6 are considered  inactive (see fig. 3). According to a Joint Staff representative, some  proposals are returned to sponsors for modifications because the  supporting documentation lacked sufficient analysis to justify the  capability gap and solutions being presented, or because reviewers raised  other technical concerns that needed to be resolved. Returned proposals  are usually modified and resubmitted to the JCIDS process. The 6  proposals that are considered inactive were not resubmitted by the  sponsors.
According to JCIDS officials, proposals are not prioritized across  capability and mission areas. Instead, the extent to which any  prioritization has occurred within JCIDS has been limited to the key  performance parameters or requirements within individual capability  proposals. For example, the Special Forces Command wanted to add  capabilities to a Navy-sponsored JCIDS proposal—described in a CDD— for a high-speed intratheater surface lift capability to transport military  units and supplies into shallow and remote areas. However, addressing a  key capability requested by the Special Forces Command—to land a V-22  aircraft on the surface ship—would have necessitated a major redesign for  the proposed Navy ship and delayed providing capabilities to the  warfighter by several years. While the JROC agreed that the Special Forces  Command’s requirement was valid, it decided to approve the Navy  capability proposal without the Special Forces Command requirement and  requested that a study be undertaken to identify how this requirement  could be addressed in the future.
The lack of early prioritization of capability needs through JCIDS makes it  difficult for DOD to balance its portfolio of weapons programs. Validated  proposals tend to gain momentum and win approval to become formal  weapon system programs—in part because other reviews are not  conducted prior to the start of system development and demonstration, or  Milestone B. In prior work, we found that 80 percent of the programs we  reviewed entered the acquisition system at Milestone B without a  Milestone A or other prior major review. By this time, the military  services have already established a budget and formed a constituency for  their individual capability needs. Successful commercial companies we  have reviewed value and use a disciplined approach to prioritize needs  early and often—one that views potential product development programs  as related parts of a companywide portfolio. These companies make  tough decisions to defer or say no to proposed products and achieve a  balanced portfolio—one that matches requirements with resources and  weighs near- and long-term needs.
Since JCIDS was implemented, the number of major defense acquisition  programs in DOD’s portfolio has increased from 77 to 93, or by 21 percent.  This increase is likely to exacerbate an already sizable disparity between  what programs are expected to cost and available funding. The estimated  acquisition costs remaining for major weapon system programs increased  130 percent from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2007, while the  annual funding for these programs increased by a more modest 67 percent  (see fig. 4). During the same time frame, the remaining costs for the major  weapon systems in DOD’s portfolio went from being about four times  greater to almost six times greater than annual funding.
Shortfalls as significant as this are likely to be fiscally unsustainable. As  we recently reported, to compensate for funding shortfalls, DOD has made  unplanned and inefficient program adjustments—including shifting  funding between programs, deferring work and associated costs into the  future, or cutting procurement quantities. Such reactive practices  contribute to the instability of many programs and undesirable acquisition  outcomes.
section_title: JCIDS Has Proven to Be a Lengthy Process
paragraphs: The JCIDS process may lack the efficiency and agility needed to respond  to warfighter needs—especially those that are near term—because the  review and validation of capability proposals can take a significant amount  of time. A proposal submitted to JCIDS can go through several review and  comment resolution phases before consensus is reached on the proposal,  and through several levels of approval before the JROC validates the  proposal. Our review of capability proposals submitted to JCIDS from  fiscal years 2003 through 2008 found that review and validation takes on  average 8 to 10 months (see fig. 5). JCIDS and service officials also  indicated that prior to submitting a JCIDS proposal, the sponsor can take a  year or more to complete a capabilities-based assessment and get a  proposal approved. In other words, 2 years or more can elapse from the  time a capability need is identified by a sponsor to the time the capability  is validated by the JROC.
Given the size and complexity and level of funding that will be committed  to many of these capability needs, the length of the process may be  warranted. However, concerns have been raised by officials within the  department about how responsive JCIDS can be—concerns that may  prompt some sponsors to bypass the process. According to some  department officials, too much time is spent reviewing individual  capability proposals with little evidence of increased attention to  prioritization or jointness. Senior COCOM officials we spoke with also  stated that the JCIDS process is not conducive to addressing near-term  requirements—the primary focus of the COCOMs—and that the lengthy  nature of the JCIDS process makes it difficult to adjust to emerging needs.  In one case, the Army used extraordinary measures, going outside DOD’s   normal requirements, acquisition, and budgeting process to acquire and  field the Joint Network Node-Network (JNN-N)—a $2 billion, commercial- based system designed to improve satellite communication capabilities for  deployed military units in Afghanistan and Iraq. While JNN-N provided  enhanced capability for the warfighter, the work-around allowed the Army  to bypass the management and oversight typically required of DOD  programs of this magnitude.
In 2005, DOD established the Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON)  process to respond to urgent needs associated with combat operations in  Afghanistan and Iraq and the war on terror. The JUON process is  intended to prevent mission failure or loss of life and is generally  considered to be more efficient than JCIDS for meeting urgent needs.  However, short-term needs that do not qualify as urgent operational  needs—such as JNN-N—must still go through JCIDS.
section_title: DOD Has Faced Challenges in Implementing JCIDS but Has Efforts Under Way to Improve the Prioritization of Joint Needs
paragraphs: DOD lacks the necessary framework for more effective implementation of  JCIDS. The department has not yet developed a structured, analytical  approach to prioritize capability proposals submitted to the JCIDS  process. Additionally, the FCBs, which were established to manage the  JCIDS process, do not have the capacity to effectively take the lead in  prioritizing capability needs. Without an approach and entity in charge to  determine what capabilities are needed, all proposals tend to be treated as  priorities within the JCIDS process. The Joint Staff has recently taken  steps to improve the prioritization of capability needs across DOD.
subsections: section_title: DOD Lacks an Effective Structure to Facilitate the Prioritization of Capability Needs
paragraphs: DOD’s failure to prioritize capability needs through the JCIDS process is  due in part to the lack of an analytic framework to determine and manage  capability needs from a departmentwide perspective. To date, JCIDS  largely responds to capability proposals that are submitted by component  sponsors on a case-by-case basis. Lacking a more proactive approach,  JCIDS has been ineffective at integrating and balancing needs from the  military services, COCOMs, and other defense components. DOD has  several different approaches to identify capability needs but they do not  appear to be well integrated with JCIDS. For example, each COCOM  submits annually to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff an integrated  priority list, which defines the COCOM’s highest-priority capability gaps  for the near term, including shortfalls that may adversely affect COCOM  missions. However, it is unclear to what extent integrated priority lists or  other approaches, such as JUONs and lessons learned from recent and  ongoing military operations, inform the JCIDS process. According to  officials from several COCOMs, needs identified through integrated  priority lists are not typically developed into JCIDS capability proposals.  These officials indicated that to be successful in getting a need addressed,  they have to build a coalition with one or more services that may have  similar needs.
At the same time, the military services continue to drive the determination  of capability needs, in part because they retain most of DOD’s analytical  capacity and resources for requirements development. According to Air  Force and Army officials, they have several hundred staff involved in  capabilities planning and development. In contrast, the FCBs are relatively  small, with the majority having 12 or fewer staff members. FCB officials  noted that the assessments that must be conducted to support a capability  proposal can cost several million dollars and require several staff years of  effort. Consequently, the FCBs only sponsored five capability development  proposals over the last 5 years and generally devote most of their time and  effort to reviewing documents submitted by sponsors and providing  recommendations on them to the JROC. In March 2008, we reported that  the FCB responsible for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance  capabilities lacked sufficient resources to engage in early coordination  with sponsors and review the sponsors’ capability assessments.  Representatives from several of the FCBs also indicated that they lack the  expertise to effectively weigh in on the technical feasibility and costs of  sponsors’ capability proposals and identify trade-offs that may be needed  to modify proposals. A study performed under contract for the Joint Staff  in July 2007 also found that some FCBs were under resourced for  performing their duties.
COCOMs, particularly the regional commands, also lack analytic capacity  and resources to become more fully engaged in JCIDS—either by  developing their own capability assessments or participating in reviews  and commenting on proposals submitted to JCIDS. Some COCOM officials  pointed out that because of their limited resources, they must pick and  choose capability proposals to get involved in. Several studies have  recommended that DOD increase joint analytic resources for a less  stovepiped understanding of warfighting needs.
section_title: Efforts Under Way to Improve Prioritization and Streamline the JCIDS Process
paragraphs: In 2006, the JROC developed a most pressing military issues list in an  effort to identify the most important high-level issues facing the  department and thereby provide better guidance to sponsors and FCBs on  what capability assessments to focus on. In addition, the JROC directed  the FCBs to develop and implement an approach to synthesize the  COCOMs’ annual integrated priority lists and bring greater focus to  prioritizing joint capability needs. This resulted, in 2007, in a consolidated  list of capability needs. The JROC has also increased its involvement with  the COCOMs through regular trips and meetings to discuss capability  needs and resourcing issues. According to joint staff officials, these efforts  have helped the JROC gain an increased understanding of the COCOMs’  needs as well as provided the COCOMs with a forum for communicating  their needs. Officials from several COCOMs noted that many of the near-  term needs reflected in their integrated priority lists are now being  addressed more effectively through annual budget adjustments and force  structure changes.
At the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff has  also recently begun a project to provide a more systematic approach to  prioritizing capability areas and gaps that need to be addressed across the  department. This effort is intended to identify the near-, mid-, and long- term needs of the military services and other defense components and  synthesize them with the needs of the COCOMs. The project’s first step,  which is expected to be completed by the Joint Staff by the end of 2008,  focuses on establishing what capabilities are most important to carrying  out military operations either now or in the future. Capability areas will  then be assessed to identify and prioritize where deficiencies or gaps in  capabilities exist, and where additional capabilities may or may not be  needed. The framework being used in the project is similar to one that the  Institute for Defense Analysis developed with the U.S. Pacific Command a  few years ago to strengthen the analytical basis for the integrated priority  lists. The framework used by U.S. Pacific Command links capability needs  to elements of the operational plans that the command is responsible for  executing. Capability needs are determined by consolidating the views of  operational planners, capability developers, and other subject matter  experts from within the command.
If the project achieves expected results, the FCBs—and ultimately, the  JROC—would be able to screen new capabilities proposals during the  JCIDS review process while having knowledge of the capacity and  sufficiency of existing requirements. According to Joint Staff officials,  however, there are key challenges to implementing the project and coming  up with a credible prioritization of capability needs. A major challenge will  be to determine how best to integrate service and COCOM capability  perspectives that are typically based on different roles, missions, and time  frames. The military services tend to address capabilities in terms of  defense planning scenarios that identify the mid- and long-term challenges  the department must be prepared to handle. This has led to the  development of capability proposals that advocate the need for the “next  generation” of weapon system capability. In contrast, the COCOMs tend to  address capabilities in terms of being able to execute operational plans  they have developed for assigned missions in their geographic areas of  responsibility. As such, the COCOMs’ focus has been on current and near- term needs. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and others  have advocated that mid- and long-term capability planning capacity is  needed for COCOMs and that the functional COCOMs should perhaps play  a stronger role in representing the regional COCOMs. Another challenge  will be in developing appropriate criteria and measures for identifying  capability gaps and determining the relative importance of these needed  capabilities. Such criteria and measures have generally been lacking in the  JCIDS process.
Adjustments have also been made to try to streamline the JCIDS process  to reduce the time it typically takes to validate capability proposals. One  recent change to the process means a sponsor does not have to submit a  CPD if the program is on track and there are no changes since the CDD  was validated. In addition, the Joint Staff has been tracking the amount of  time it takes to get through the various review and comment phases of  JCIDS and implemented measures to speed up the adjudication of  reviewers’ comments on capability proposals. As a result, there has been  some improvement in reducing the time it takes to validate capability  proposals. For example, we found that capability proposals (ICDs and  CDDs) took about 9.5 months to be validated during 2003 to 2005  compared to about 8 months during 2006 to 2008. The Joint Staff has also  recognized that the definitions used to determine what capability  proposals must be brought to the JROC for approval is too broad and  some proposals could be delegated to other authorities for validation. The  definitions are being modified in part to focus JROC oversight on  proposals that may truly warrant JROC involvement. Furthermore, the  JROC is considering delegating authority for some JROC-interest  capability proposals to lower levels, such as the Joint Capabilities Board  and the FCBs.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: By establishing JCIDS, DOD has, to some extent, recognized the need to  better ensure that joint warfighting needs can be addressed within fiscal  resource constraints. However, the process has not proven to be an  effective approach to increase the level of joint participation or to  prioritize the capability needs of the services, COCOMs, and other DOD  components. While DOD has begun initiatives to improve JCIDS, the  department continues to lack an analytic approach and an appropriate  alignment of resources to balance competing capability needs.  Consequently, DOD continues to start more weapons programs than  current and likely future financial resources can support and miss  opportunities to improve joint warfighting capabilities. Until JCIDS  evolves from a service-centric process to a process that balances service  and joint near-, mid-, and long-term capability needs, DOD will continue to  contend with managing a portfolio that does not match available resources  and risk failing to provide joint capabilities needed by the warfighter.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop an analytic approach within JCIDS to  better prioritize and balance the capability needs of the military services,  COCOMs, and other defense components. The Joint Staff should consider  whether current efforts—particularly, the capabilities prioritization  project—should be adopted as a framework for this approach. The  approach should also establish appropriate criteria and measures for  identifying capability gaps and determining the relative importance of  near-, mid-, and long-term capability needs. Ultimately, the approach  should provide a means to review and validate proposals more efficiently  and ensure that the most important capability needs of the department are  being addressed.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense determine and allocate  appropriate resources for joint capabilities development planning. In so  doing, the Secretary should consider whether the responsibility and  capacity of the COCOMs and FCBs to conduct joint capabilities  development planning should be increased, whether one or more of the  functional COCOMs should be given the responsibility and capacity to  conduct joint capabilities development planning, and whether resources  currently residing within the military services for capabilities development  planning should be shifted to the COCOMs and FCBs.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred  with our first recommendation and concurred with the second  recommendation. DOD’s partial concurrence with our first  recommendation—that an analytic approach be developed within JCIDS  to better prioritize and balance the capability needs of the military  services, COCOMs, and defense components—is based on the premise  that prioritization occurs through several existing processes in the  department, and that JCIDS is not intended to be the primary means of  prioritizing. DOD’s concurrence with our second recommendation—to   determine and allocate appropriate resources for joint capabilities  development planning—is based on its position that resources are  adequate and have been allocated appropriately. The department’s  response to both of our recommendations leads us to conclude that it does  not see a need to improve its ability to prioritize and balance joint  capability needs.
In commenting on our first recommendation, DOD pointed out that  identifying, prioritizing, and balancing joint capability needs occurs  through multiple processes both within and outside of JCIDS, such as  COCOM integrated priority lists and JUONs, as well as through the  department’s budgeting and acquisition systems. We acknowledge that  these DOD processes play a role in delivering capabilities to the  warfighter; however, as we note in our report, these processes do not  appear to be well integrated with JCIDS. Regardless, DOD established  JCIDS as the principal process to support senior decision makers in  identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint warfighting needs. The process  was intended to move the department away from a service-centric,  stovepiped approach to a joint approach that helps ensure that COCOMs  are provided the capabilities needed to carry out military operations.  However, many of the COCOMs do not believe that their needs are  sufficiently addressed through JCIDS and there is no evidence that the  process has achieved its intended goals. In fact, capability proposals  submitted through JCIDS are not prioritized and largely continue to reflect  insular interests. Unless an analytic approach to prioritize and balance the  capability needs of the services, COCOMs, and other defense components  is established, DOD will continue losing opportunities to strengthen joint  warfighting capabilities and constrain its portfolio of weapon system  programs. Given that JCIDS was established for this purpose, it seems  logical to build such an approach within JCIDS.
In concurring with our second recommendation, DOD asserts that the  resources currently allocated for joint capabilities development planning  are appropriate. However, while the FCBs may be sufficiently resourced to  review capability proposals submitted by sponsors into JCIDS, they lack  the resources and capacity to play a leading role in defining and  prioritizing joint capability needs for their functional capability areas. In  addition, while the JCIDS process provides opportunities for their  participation, the COCOMs lack the resources and analytic capacity to  conduct their own capability assessments or review proposals submitted  by other sponsors. Several other recent studies similarly indicated that  the COCOMs are underrepresented in the department’s efforts to  determine joint capabilities. We continue to believe that a better alignment  of resources for conducting joint capabilities planning—among the  services, FCBs, and COCOMs—would help the department to more  effectively prioritize and balance competing capability needs.
DOD also provided information about recent initiatives that are being  implemented to improve the JCIDS, budgeting, and acquisition processes,  and to strengthen the involvement of the joint community in determining  capability needs. For example, since completing our draft report, the  JROC moved to give the COCOMs a greater voice in the JCIDS process by  delegating responsibility for validating requirements in the command and  control functional area to the Joint Forces Command. While this initiative  and others appear promising, as DOD notes, it is too early to determine  whether the full benefits of these initiatives will be realized.
In addition, DOD commented that our report did not sufficiently recognize  the extent of joint participation that occurs through the JCIDS process.  DOD stated that many of the services’ proposals are in direct response to  capability gaps identified by the COCOMs and that the JCIDS process is  structured to provide the joint community multiple opportunities and time  to review proposals and ensure that they correctly state the needs of the  joint warfighter. While we agree that some proposals submitted to JCIDS  do address joint needs, the services still largely drive the vast majority of  capability needs that are pursued in the department. Furthermore, once  proposals are submitted to JCIDS, there is little evidence of increased  attention to prioritization or jointness that results from the review of these  proposals.
DOD’s letter, with its written comments and description of new initiatives,  is reprinted in appendix IV.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; and the Director of the  Office of Management and Budget. We will provide copies to others on  request. This report will also be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site  at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report or need additional information,  please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were John  Oppenheim, Assistant Director; John Krump; Sean Seales; Karen Sloan;  and Don Springman.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine whether the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development  System process has achieved its objective to prioritize joint warfighting  needs, we analyzed information and capability documents contained in the  Joint Staff’s Knowledge Management/Decision Support tool compiled  since the inception of JCIDS. First, we determined how many capability  documents—initial capabilities documents (ICD) and capability  development documents (CDD)—were designated “JROC-interest,” which  are defined as all Acquisition Category (ACAT) I programs and other  programs whose capabilities have a significant impact on joint  warfighting. We identified a total of 203 capability documents—90 ICDs  and 113 CDDs.  We then analyzed and determined whether the capability  documents were sponsored by the joint community, military services, and  other Department of Defense (DOD) agencies. In addition, we determined  which documents had completed the JCIDS process and been validated,  which had completed the process and are inactive, and which are still  under review. We also determined the amount of time required for  capability documents to complete the JCIDS process and the amount of  time other documents have remained in the process. We also reviewed  Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) memorandums validating  requirements documents to determine if requirements were assigned a  priority upon validation. Further, we reviewed budgeted and projected  program costs for major defense acquisitions reported by DOD’s Selected  Acquisition Report summary tables for the years 2000 to 2007, covering  periods before and after the inception of JCIDS.
To identify factors affecting DOD’s ability to effectively implement JCIDS,  we analyzed the existing structure of the JCIDS process and evaluated the  sufficiency of the Joint military community workforce for preparing and  reviewing JCIDS requirements documents. We provided written  questionnaires to functional capability boards (FCB) to determine staffing  and resource levels. We also evaluated recent DOD initiatives designed to  improve the JCIDS process.
In researching both of our primary objectives, we interviewed officials  from the Joint Staff; DOD’s FCBs; U.S. Special Operations Command; U.S.
Joint Forces Command; U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Central Command;  Department of the Air Force; Department of the Navy; and Department of  the Army. We reviewed statements made by DOD officials in prior  congressional testimony. We reviewed prior GAO and other audit reports  as well as DOD-sponsored studies related to JCIDS that were conducted  by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for  Defense Analyses, the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment  Project, the Defense Science Board, and Booz Allen Hamilton. We  reviewed guidance and regulations issued by the Joint Staff, the military  services, and DOD, as well as other DOD-produced documentation related  to JCIDS.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2007 to August 2008 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Functional Capabilities Boards
paragraphs: Nine FCBs have been established by the JROC to evaluate issues  impacting their respective functional areas and provide subject matter  expertise to the JROC. The assigned functional areas and sponsoring  organizations of the FCBs are shown in table 1. FCBs assist the JROC in  overseeing capabilities development within JCIDS, to include assessment  of ICDs, CDDs, and CPDs. FCBs can only make recommendations, and are  not empowered to approve or disapprove of proposals.
section_title: Appendix III: Combatant Commands
paragraphs: There are currently 10 unified combatant commands (COCOM) serving as  DOD’s operational commanders—6 with geographic responsibilities and 4  with functional responsibilities. The 6 COCOMs with geographic  responsibilities are U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S.  European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and  U.S. Southern Command. Their geographic areas of responsibility are  shown in figure 6.
The four functional COCOMs are U.S. Joint Forces Command, which  engages in joint training and force provision; U.S. Special Operations  Command, which trains, equips, and deploys special operations forces to  other COCOMs and leads counterterrorist missions worldwide; U.S.  Strategic Command, whose missions include space and information  operations, missile defense, global command and control, intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance, strategic deterrence, and integration and  synchronization of DOD’s departmentwide efforts in combating weapons  of mass destruction; and U.S. Transportation Command, which provides  air, land, and sea transportation for DOD.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense