Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces
Published: 2008-06-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 2002, the United States has worked to develop the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The Department of Defense (Defense), through its Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), directs U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan National Army (ANA) and, in conjunction with the Department of State (State), the Afghan National Police (ANP). To follow up on recommendations from GAO's 2005 report on the ANSF, GAO analyzed the extent to which U.S. plans for the ANSF contain criteria we recommended. GAO also examined progress made and challenges faced in developing the ANA and ANP. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed Defense, State, and contractor documents and met with cognizant officials. GAO has prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In 2005, GAO recommended that Defense and State develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the ANSF. In 2007, Defense provided a document in response to this recommendation. This 5-page document lacks sufficient detail for effective interagency planning and oversight. For example, while the document includes some broad objectives and performance measures, it identifies few long-term milestones and no intermediate milestones for assessing progress, and it lacks a sustainability strategy. Although Defense and State are partners in police training, the document does not include State's input or describe State's role. Further, State has not completed a plan of its own. In January 2008, CSTC-A completed a field-level plan to develop the ANSF that includes force goals, objectives, and performance measures. While this is an improvement over prior field-level planning, it is not a substitute for a coordinated, detailed Defense and State plan with near- and long-term resource requirements. In 2008, Congress mandated that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, provide a long-term strategy and budget for strengthening the ANSF, and a long-term detailed plan for sustaining the ANSF. These have not been provided. Without a detailed plan, it is difficult to assess progress and conduct oversight of the cost of developing the ANSF. This is particularly important given the limited capacity of the Afghan government to fund the estimated $2 billion per year ANSF sustainment costs for years into the future. The United States has invested over $10 billion to develop the ANA since 2002. However, only 2 of 105 army units are assessed as being fully capable of conducting their primary mission and efforts to develop the army continue to face challenges. First, while the army has grown to approximately 58,000 of an authorized force structure of 80,000, it has experienced difficulties finding qualified candidates for leadership positions and retaining personnel. Second, while trainers or mentors are present in every ANA combat unit, shortfalls exist in the number deployed to the field. Finally, ANA combat units report significant shortages in about 40 percent of equipment items Defense defines as critical, including vehicles, weapons, and radios. Some of these challenges are due in part to competing U.S. global priorities. Without resolving these challenges, the ability of the ANA to reach full capability may be delayed. Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an investment of over $6 billion, no police unit is fully capable and several challenges impede U.S. efforts to develop the police. First, less than one-quarter of the police have mentors present to provide training in the field and verify that police are on duty. Second, police units continue to face shortages in equipment items that Defense considers critical, such as vehicles, radios, and body armor. In addition, Afghanistan's weak judicial system hinders effective policing and rule of law, and the ANP consistently experiences problems with pay, corruption, and attacks from insurgents. Defense began a new effort in November 2007 to address these challenges, but the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put this effort at risk.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since 2002, the United States, with assistance from the North Atlantic  Treaty Organization (NATO) and other coalition nations, has worked to  develop the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police  (ANP)—collectively referred to as the Afghan National Security Forces  (ANSF)—to provide security for Afghanistan. The goal of these efforts is  to transfer responsibilities for the security of Afghanistan from the  international community to the Afghan government. From 2002 to 2008,  the United States provided about $16.5 billion to train and equip the  Afghan army and police forces. In 2005 and 2007, we found that the  training and equipping of the army and police had made some progress,  but that the Department of Defense (Defense) and the Department of State  (State), the agencies responsible for implementing these efforts, lacked  detailed plans and cost estimates for completing and sustaining the ANSF.  We concluded that, without capable and self-sustaining Afghan army and  police forces, terrorists could again create a safe haven in Afghanistan and  jeopardize efforts by the United States and the international community to  develop the country. Since 2005, security in Afghanistan has deteriorated  significantly. Attacks by armed opposition groups have grown across  Afghanistan, with numerous attacks directly targeting the ANA and ANP.
Because of broad congressional interest in this issue, we performed our  work under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States.  In this review, we (1) analyzed U.S. plans for developing the ANSF and  identified the extent to which these plans contained detailed objectives,  milestones, future funding requirements, and sustainability strategies; (2)  examined the progress made and challenges faced in developing the  capabilities of the ANA; and (3) examined the progress made and  challenges faced in developing the capabilities of the ANP.
To address the objectives of this engagement, we reviewed Defense and  State planning, funding, and evaluation documents related to the U.S.  efforts to establish, train, and equip Afghan army and police forces. We  discussed these efforts with Defense and State officials in Washington,  D.C.; Kabul, Afghanistan; and the U.S. Central Command in Tampa,  Florida, and with private contractors implementing U.S. programs. In  Afghanistan, we viewed Afghan army and police training facilities and  equipment warehouses and met with officials from the United States, the  Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior, NATO, and the United Nations.  We are currently performing separate reviews on the accountability of  equipment provided to the ANSF and U.S. efforts to reform the Afghan  Ministry of Interior and National Police. Consequently, we do not assess  these issues in depth in this report. See appendix I for a complete  description of our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2007 through June 2008  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, the United States, several  allies, and Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance forcibly removed the Taliban  regime from Afghanistan for providing a safe haven to al Qaeda terrorists.  After years of conflict and Taliban rule, the new Afghan government  inherited a state with limited capacity to govern; an economy dominated  by the narcotics trade; constraints on economic development due, in part,  to resource limitations and mountainous terrain (see fig. 1); a poorly  developed infrastructure with few roads and little household access to  power and running water; and weak national security forces.
In April 2002, the United States and other donor nations met in Geneva,  Switzerland, to help Afghanistan address threats to its security. At the  Geneva conference, the donors established a security reform strategy for  Afghanistan: the United States would lead the training of the Afghan army  and Germany would lead the police reconstitution effort. However, due, in  part, to Afghanistan’s pressing security needs and concerns that the  German training program was moving too slowly, the United States  expanded its role in the police training effort. As we reported in 2005,  according to cognizant German officials, Germany viewed its role in the  police sector as one of advising and consulting with donors and the  Afghan government rather than as the major implementer or funding  source.
subsections: section_title: The Role and Development of the Afghan National Army
paragraphs: In 2002, the international community endorsed the decision of the Afghan  government to create an ethnically balanced and voluntary ANA force of  no more than 70,000. In 2006, this vision was reaffirmed by the Afghan  government and the international community through its integration into  the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and Afghanistan  Compact, documents that articulated economic, social, and security  priorities for Afghanistan. These documents also set the end of 2010 as the  timeline for the establishment of the ANA. In February 2008, citing  increased security challenges, the Afghan government and its international  partners endorsed a 10,000-person increase in the force structure of the  ANA from 70,000 to 80,000.
The strategic role of the Afghan Ministry of Defense and the ANA is to  defend and deter aggression against Afghanistan, support and defend the  Afghan Constitution, defeat the insurgency and terrorism, and support  Afghanistan’s reconstruction and reintegration into the regional and  international community, among other things. To accomplish this, the  army’s current force structure includes (1) Ministry of Defense and general  staff personnel, (2) sustaining institutions, (3) intermediate command  staff, (4) combat forces, and (5) Afghan air corps personnel. Combat  forces form the basic operational arm of the ANA and are divided into five  corps, located in different regions of Afghanistan. A corps contains 1 or  more brigades. A typical brigade consists of approximately 2,800  personnel: three light infantry battalions (with approximately 650  personnel each), one combat support battalion (with approximately 500  personnel), and one combat services support battalion (with  approximately 350 personnel). (See app. II for additional details on the  force structure and functions of the ANA.)
U.S. efforts to establish the army are led by Defense, in partnership with the  government of Afghanistan. The Defense-staffed CSTC-A oversees the Afghan  army’s training, facilities development, assessment, and equipment provision.  Under CSTC-A is Task Force Phoenix, a joint coalition task force responsible  for training, mentoring, and advising the Afghan army at the Kabul Military  Training Center and elsewhere in the country (see fig. 2).
section_title: Reconstitution of the Afghan National Police Force
paragraphs: The reconstitution of the ANP began in February 2002 when donor nations  agreed to establish a multiethnic, sustainable, 62,000-member professional  police service committed to the rule of law. In May 2007, the Afghan  government and its international partners approved an interim increase in  the number of police forces from 62,000 to 82,000, to be reviewed every 6  months. The Afghan government and international community set the end  of 2010 as the timeline for the establishment of the ANP force.
In addition to enforcing the rule of law, the role of the ANP is to protect  the rights of citizens, maintain civil order and public safety, support  actions to defeat insurgency, control national borders, and reduce the  level of domestic and international organized crime, among other  activities. The force structure for the police includes Ministry of Interior  headquarters and administrative staff, uniformed police personnel, and  several specialized police units. This report primarily focuses on U.S.  efforts to build the uniformed police, the largest component of the Afghan  police force. (See app. II for further details on the force structure and  functions of the ANP.)
U.S. efforts to organize, train, and equip the ANP are directed by Defense,  through CSTC-A, with support from State, which provides policy guidance  to the effort and oversight of civilian contractors implementing police  training courses. The primary U.S. contractor involved in the police  training effort is DynCorp International, which provides police training  courses in criminal investigation, physical fitness, and weapons and  survival skills, and civilian mentors to assist in developing the Afghan  Ministry of Interior and the police forces it administers. Germany leads  efforts to train commissioned and noncommissioned Afghan police  officers at the Kabul Police Academy (see fig. 3).
section_title: U.S. Support to Train and Equip Afghan National Security Forces
paragraphs: The United States provided $16.5 billion from fiscal years 2002 through  2008 to support the training and equipping of the Afghan army and police  (see table 1). Slightly over 45 percent (approximately $7.6 billion) of the  funding was provided in fiscal year 2007, in an effort to accelerate the  training and equipping and enhance the capabilities of the ANSF. These  figures do not include certain operational costs, such as the personnel  costs for U.S. servicemembers assigned to the training and equipping  mission. (See app. I for further details on our methodology.)
section_title: Other Donor Support
paragraphs: More than 40 nations and international organizations have also provided  funds, equipment, or personnel to support U.S. efforts to train and equip  the ANSF. As of March 2008, non-U.S. donors have provided about $820  million in support of efforts to develop the ANSF: approximately $426  million was provided to supplement efforts to train and equip the Afghan  army and about $394 million in support of the Afghan police. Over 15  nations contribute mentors to the army, providing approximately one-third  of the personnel who assist in training ANA units in the field. The EU has  provided 80 mentors to assist the police at the ministerial, regional, and  provincial levels out of approximately 215 pledged. Additionally, the  United Nations Development Programme administers the Law and Order  Trust Fund for Afghanistan, which provides reimbursement to the Afghan  government for police salaries. Approximately 80 percent of international  donations for the ANP have supported programs through the Law and  Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (about $311 million of about $394  million).
section_title: Prior GAO Recommendations and Congressional Mandate
paragraphs: We previously identified the need for detailed plans to complete and  sustain the ANSF. In June 2005, GAO reported that the Secretaries of  Defense and State should develop detailed plans for completing and  sustaining the ANSF that contain clearly defined objectives and  performance measures, milestones for achieving stated objectives, future  funding requirements, and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved.  Our report recommended that the Secretaries provide this information to  Congress when the executive branch requests funding for the Afghan army  or police forces. Although Defense and State generally concurred with this  recommendation, both suggested that existing reporting requirements  addressed the need to report to Congress their plans for completing and  sustaining the Afghan army and police forces. Our analysis of Defense and  State reporting to Congress determined that the departments did not have  the detailed plans we recommended to guide the development of the ANSF  and to facilitate congressional oversight. As a result, in our 2007 report, we  reiterated the need for Defense and State to develop such plans.
Following our reports, in 2008, Congress mandated that the President,  acting through the Secretary of Defense, submit reports to Congress on  progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan, including a  comprehensive and long-term strategy and budget for strengthening the  ANSF. Reports must be submitted every 180 days after that date, through  the end of fiscal year 2010. The first such report was due by the end of  April 2008, but has yet to be provided to Congress. In addition, Congress  also mandated that Defense submit reports on a long-term detailed plan  for sustaining the ANSF. Reports must be submitted every 180 days after  that date, through the end of fiscal year 2010. The first such report was  due by the end of April 2008, but has yet to be provided to Congress.
section_title: The Departments of Defense and State Have Not Developed a Coordinated, Detailed Plan for Completing and Sustaining the ANSF
paragraphs: Defense and State have not developed a coordinated, detailed plan for  completing and sustaining the Afghan army and police forces, despite our  recommendation in 2005 and a mandate from Congress in 2008 that such a  plan be developed. Defense provided GAO a 5-page document in January  2007 that, according to Defense officials, is intended to meet GAO’s  recommendation. However, it does not include several of the key elements  identified in our recommendation and does not provide a sufficient level of  detail for effective interagency planning and congressional oversight.  Although CSTC-A has developed a field-level plan in Afghanistan that  integrates the Afghan government’s interest, this represents military  planning and is not a coordinated Defense and State plan with near- and  long-term resource requirements. Without a coordinated, detailed plan  containing the elements identified in our 2005 recommendation, as noted  earlier, congressional oversight concerning the extent and cost of the U.S.  commitment to train and equip the ANSF is difficult, and decision makers  may not have sufficient information to assess progress and allocate  defense resources among competing priorities.
subsections: section_title: Defense Document Is Limited in Scope and Detail
paragraphs: As of March 2008, neither Defense nor State had developed a coordinated,  detailed plan for completing and sustaining the ANSF that includes clearly  defined objectives and performance measures, milestones for achieving  stated objectives, and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved,  including transitioning program responsibility to Afghanistan. In January  2007, Defense provided us a 5-page document that, according to Defense  officials, is intended to meet GAO’s 2005 recommendation for detailed  plans to complete and sustain the ANSF. Although Defense and State are  partners in training the ANP, the Defense document does not describe the  role of State or other key stakeholders. State also did not contribute to the  development of this document and has not developed a plan of its own. In  addition, U.S. military officials responsible for the effort to build the ANSF  were not familiar with the document at the time of our visit to Kabul in  August 2007—over 6 months after we received the document from  Defense officials in Washington.
The 5-page document that Defense developed in response to our 2005  recommendation is limited in scope and detail. For example, although the  document provides some broad objectives and performance measures for  training and equipping the ANSF, it identifies few milestones. Further,  these milestones are not consistent with long-term milestones identified in  field documents generated by U.S. military forces operating in Afghanistan  and do not include intermediate milestones for judging progress in the  medium term. The document provides no mechanism for measuring  progress over time against established baselines, other than monthly  status reports from the field. These status reports, while useful in  identifying month-to-month progress in unit capabilities, use baselines that  generally go back no more than 18 months. As such, it is difficult to  identify progress since the start of the program and the effect that various  factors, such as additional resources, have had on training and equipment  availability, as discussed in prior GAO work.
section_title: High-Level Plan Lacks Focus on Sustainment Funding
paragraphs: Defense’s 5-page document, in response to our 2005 recommendations, does  not provide a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF. Defense currently  estimates that no additional money, beyond the approximately $16.5 billion  provided between fiscal years 2002 to 2008, is needed to complete the initial  training and equipping of a 70,000-person army force and an 82,000-person  police force. If the force structure grows, Defense officials acknowledged that  budgetary requirements likely would also increase. In February 2008, the  Afghan government and its international partners endorsed an increase in the  force structure of the ANA by 10,000. A Defense official stated that increasing  the force structure by 10,000 additional army personnel will cost  approximately an additional $1 billion.
In addition, Defense estimates that approximately $2 billion a year will be  needed for the next 5 years to sustain the ANSF—$1 billion for the Afghan  army and $1 billion for the police. This is based on a 152,000-person end- strength—70,000 ANA and 82,000 ANP. Defense officials estimate that  increasing the ANA force structure by 10,000 will cost about $100 million  annually to sustain. By comparison, in 2005, Defense and State estimated  the cost to sustain an ANA force of 70,000 and an ANP force of 62,000  would total $600 million per year. This sustainment estimate, however, did  not include the cost of sustaining capabilities such as airlift, which is  currently being developed for the Afghan army.
Defense expects the sustainment transition to begin in fiscal year 2009.  According to U.S. military officials in Afghanistan and the recently  approved CSTC-A Campaign Plan, U.S. involvement in training and  equipping the ANSF may extend beyond a decade. However, neither  Defense nor State has identified funding requirements or forecasts beyond  2013.
As noted earlier, the United States has been a major contributor to this  mission, providing approximately $16.5 billion between fiscal years 2002  and 2008 to train and equip the forces. At present, Afghanistan is unable to  support the recurring costs of its security forces, such as salaries and  equipment replacement, without substantial foreign assistance. An  international task force studying the effects of increasing the size of the  ANP noted that by 2012, if the Afghan Ministry of Finance assumed  responsibility for police salaries, the salary costs for an 82,000 police force  could total nearly 9 percent of the Afghan government’s budget—a cost  that could mean large cuts in other programs, such as education, health,  and other social services, according to the task force.
U.S. officials stated that until Afghan revenues increase substantially, the  international community would likely need to assist in paying sustainability  costs, including some salaries. However, despite what U.S. military officials in  Afghanistan stated, Defense officials in Washington have not indicated how  long and in what ways the U.S. government expects to continue assisting the  ANSF. In a briefing on the U.S. approach to sustaining the ANSF, Defense and  State officials stated that sustainment costs will be transitioned to the  government of Afghanistan commensurate with the nation’s economic  capacity, and that the United States and the international community will  need to assist Afghanistan in developing revenues and capacity to sustain the  army and police. For example, Defense and State officials stated that greater  revenues could be obtained by improving border management, noting that  customs duties generate more than half of Afghanistan’s revenues. These  officials, however, did not identify any other ways to improve revenues for  the security sector nor did they identify whether this information is being  incorporated into a broader plan for developing and sustaining the ANSF  when we inquired about such a plan.
section_title: CSTC-A Plan Provides Guidance for Field-Level Operations, but Is Not a Substitute for a Coordinated State and Defense Plan
paragraphs: Since GAO reported in 2005, field-level planning for the training and  equipping of the ANSF has improved. In January 2008, CSTC-A completed  a field-level plan for ANSF development, and an operations order with  further detail on the development and execution of the fiscal year 2008  ANSF force generation program. The Campaign Plan for the Development  of Afghan National Military and Police Forces (Campaign Plan) is a  military plan. It provides field-level goals, objectives, and capability  milestones for the development of the Ministries of Defense and Interior,  including Afghan army and police forces. With a new emphasis on quality  training, the plan extends the time frames for ANSF development beyond  those reported in our 2005 report. However, while this military plan  provides needed field guidance, it is not a coordinated Defense and State  plan with near- and long-term resource requirements.
When we last reported in 2005, Defense had not fully implemented or been  able to reach agreement on criteria for assessing an Afghan army unit’s  readiness to operate without training assistance. Since that time, Defense has  developed criteria—called capability milestones (CM)—to assess army and  police progress in manning, training, and equipping the forces. Units are  assessed against four capability milestones that range from CM1 to CM4. A  unit, agency, staff function, or installation rated at CM1 is fully capable of  conducting its primary operational mission but may require assistance from  the international community in certain situations. For instance, a combat unit  capable of operating at CM1 is fully capable of planning, executing, and  sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level; however,  coalition support may be required for certain capabilities, such as close air  support, medical evacuation, or indirect fire support. By contrast, a unit,  agency, or staff function rated at CM4 has been established but is not yet  capable of conducting its primary operational mission and can only undertake  portions of its mission with significant assistance, and reliance on,  international support. The table below provides descriptions of the capability  milestones, as identified in the CSTC-A Campaign Plan.
The Campaign Plan identifies three key phases in the development of  Afghan army and police forces: fielding/generating forces, developing  forces, and transitioning to strategic partnership. Table 3 describes these  phases and their corresponding milestones. It is not clear from the  Campaign Plan whether the milestones are based on an ANA force  structure of 70,000 or 80,000. If based on 70,000, the milestones would  likely need to be revisited.
Milestone dates for the accomplishment of certain objectives have been  extended beyond those reported earlier. For example, our 2005 report  states that Defense officials estimated that basic training for 43,000 ground  combat troops would be accomplished by the fall of 2007. However, the  Campaign Plan extends this date to mid-2010. According to the CSTC-A  Commander, given resource constraints and the new emphasis on fielding  quality forces, certain deadlines for the fielding, generation, and  development of Afghan forces have had to be extended.
In addition to capability milestones, personnel and equipment  requirements have also been established since our last report. In 2005, we  noted that documents identifying personnel and equipment requirements  for the Afghan National Security Forces were not complete. However,  since that time, the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior, assisted by  CSTC-A, have completed personnel and equipment requirements, known  as Tashkils. The Tashkils list in detail the authorized staff positions and  equipment items for the ANA and ANP. Moreover, ANA Tashkils have been  converted into an electronic force management database by the U.S. Army  Force Management Support Agency, which provides standardization and  consistency given frequent CSTC-A personnel rotations. Agency officials  expect that the ANP Tashkils will also be converted to a similar system.
section_title: Few Afghan Army Units Are Capable of Leading Operations and Efforts to Develop Their Capability Face Several Challenges
paragraphs: The United States has invested over $10 billion to develop the ANA since  2002, but less than 2 percent (2 of 105 ANA units rated) are assessed at  CM1—full operational capability. Building an Afghan army that can lead its  own operations requires manning, training, and equipping army personnel;  however, U.S. efforts to build the Afghan army have faced challenges in all  of these areas. First, while the ANA has increased in size and basic  recruiting is strong, the ANA has experienced difficulties manning the  army, such as finding qualified candidates for leadership positions and  retaining personnel. Second, the insufficient number of U.S. trainers and  coalition mentors in the field is a major impediment to providing the ANA  with the follow-up training, including in areas such as advanced combat  skills and logistics, needed to sustain the force in the long term. Finally,  ANA combat units report significant shortages in approximately 40  percent of items defined as critical by Defense, including machine guns  and vehicles. Some of these challenges, such as shortages of mentors and  equipment, are due in part to competing global priorities, according to  senior Defense officials. Without resolving these challenges, the ability of  the ANA to reach full capability may be delayed.
subsections: section_title: More Troops Trained, but Very Few ANA Units Rated as Having Capability to Lead Operations
paragraphs: Defense planning calls for the development of an 80,000-person ANA force  structure that includes Ministry of Defense personnel, sustaining  institutions, and infantry forces capable of accomplishing its mission with  limited assistance from the international community. As of April 2008,  Defense reports that approximately 58,000 army personnel received  training and were assigned to the ANA. The chart below details the  number of ANA forces authorized compared with the number currently  assigned (see table 4).
Since we reported in 2005, more personnel have been trained and assigned  to the ANA. Specifically focusing on combat troops, Defense reports that  37,866 combat troops have been trained and assigned to the ANA as of  April 2008, compared with 18,300 troops in March 2005. Although this  represents more than a twofold increase in the amount of combat troops,  it is approximately 5,000 forces less than Defense had predicted would be  trained by fall 2007. Moreover, new positions have been added to the  ANA’s structure since our 2005 report, including an expanded Afghan air  corps and the ANA force structure has increased to 80,000.
While more troops have received training, as of April 2008, only two ANA  units—out of 105 rated—are assessed as CM1—fully capable. Thirty-six  percent of ANA units (38 of 105 rated units) are assessed at CM2 and are  capable of conducting their primary mission with routine international  support. The remaining ANA units are less capable. Thirty-one percent (32  of 105 rated units) are CM3—capable of partially conducting their primary  mission, but reliant on international support; 11 percent (11 of 105 rated  units) are CM4—formed but not yet capable; and 21 percent (22 of 105  rated units) are not yet formed or not reporting (see table 5).
While few ANA units are rated as fully capable, Defense officials stated  that ANA troops had performed well in combat situations. Personnel  assigned to mentor the ANA that we interviewed in Afghanistan praised  the efforts of Afghan troops, and U.S. and Afghan officials stated they were  pleased with the development of the army to date.
The expected date when the ANA will gain the capability to assume lead  responsibility for its own security is unclear. As of April 2008, monthly  reports provided by CSTC-A show the expected date of full ANA capability  as March 2011. However, this date does not account for shortfalls in the  required number of mentors and trainers. Thus, Defense officials  cautioned that currently predicted dates for the achievement of a fully  capable Afghan army are subject to change and may be delayed.
section_title: Development of a Capable Army Faces Challenges in Manning, Training, and Equipping the Force
paragraphs: U.S. efforts to build the ANA have faced challenges in manning the army,  such as recruiting for leadership positions and retaining personnel;  shortfalls in the number of U.S. trainers and coalition mentors deployed  with ANA units in the field to assist in developing capable ANA forces; and  shortages of critical equipment items.
subsections: section_title: Afghan Army Faces Difficulties Reducing Absenteeism, Recruiting Qualified Candidates for Leadership and Specialist Positions, and Retaining Personnel
paragraphs: Although the ANA has grown in numbers, it faces manning challenges,  including absenteeism, recruitment of leaders and specialists, and  retention of personnel.
First, although approximately 32,700 combat personnel received training  and were assigned to one of the five ANA corps, the number of combat  troops on hand is less than those trained and assigned due to attrition,  absenteeism, scheduled leave, and battlefield casualties. As of February  2008, Defense reported that about 20 percent of combat personnel  assigned were not present for duty (see fig. 4).
Although some of those absent from the army may have scheduled their  absence or been killed in duty, Defense assessment reports from  November 2007 to February 2008 show between 8 and 12 percent of  combat unit personnel were absent without leave (AWOL), with AWOL  rates as high as 17 percent for soldiers in one ANA corps. For the ANA to  achieve sustained growth, a senior Defense official stated that AWOL rates  should be no higher than 8 percent. Officials attributed these absences to a  variety of causes, such as soldiers leaving their units to take their pay  home and the lack of significant penalties for such absences. To address  these issues, the Afghan Ministry of Defense, assisted by CSTC-A, has  initiated programs to allow soldiers to transfer their pay to family  members and to facilitate the deposit of ANA salaries directly into  soldiers’ bank accounts. CSTC-A officials stated these programs should  reduce AWOL rates.
Second, although basic recruiting is strong, the ANA is experiencing  difficulties finding qualified candidates for leadership and specialist  positions. Defense reports that recruiting goals for ANA infantry positions  have been met, despite adjustments to increase ANA training output by  6,000 soldiers annually. However, CSTC-A noted shortfalls in the number  of candidates available for non-commissioned officer (NCO) and specialty  skill positions, such as logistics and medical support. Between November  2007 and February 2008, ANA manning levels for NCOs ranged between 50  to 70 percent of the authorized number. NCOs provide a vital link between  senior officers and soldiers and can provide leadership to ANA units in the  field, according to a senior Defense official. Officials attributed the  shortage to the low level of literacy among ANA recruits. CSTC-A is  attempting to address this shortfall by promoting NCOs from within ANA  ranks and implementing new programs to target literate recruits. CSTC-A  expects to have greater than 90 percent of the ANA’s authorized NCOs  staffed by summer 2008. The ANA is also experiencing difficulties manning  specialist positions such as logistics, medical support, and engineering.  Although the ANA has developed courses to train military specialists, the  current Afghan army is comprised primarily of infantry forces. This is, in  part, because ANA recruits learn basic infantry skills first. However, this  focus is also due to difficulties identifying candidates who are suitable for  advanced training. According to Defense officials, without suitably trained  support personnel, the ANA will need to rely on coalition forces to provide  support services.
Third, the ANA is facing challenges retaining personnel. A typical ANA  contract lasts for 3 years. At the end of a contract, ANA personnel are  given the opportunity to re-enlist with the Afghan army. Between March  2006 and February 2008, just over half of those combat personnel eligible  to re-enlist opted to do so, as shown in table 6.
U.S. and Afghan officials attributed these re-enlistment rates to a variety of  factors, such as stationing soldiers away from their families, the rapid pace  of ANA military operations, and the higher salaries offered by private  companies and insurgent groups looking to recruit trained Afghan  soldiers. To address these factors, a senior Defense official stated that the  Ministry of Defense and CSTC-A are discussing the implementation of  several programs such as allowing re-enlisting soldiers greater choice in  determining where they will be stationed and increasing re-enlistment  bonuses. Without the ability to retain trained personnel, ANA units will  continue to lack experience and thus may be delayed in reaching their  ability to lead security operations. For instance, in November 2007, the  capability assessment of the ANA’s 209th corps in northern Afghanistan  lowered the rating of one of its battalions from CM2 to CM3 when the  battalion failed to retain approximately half of its NCOs. Further, the  assessment noted that progress developing the capability of this battalion  could be delayed nearly a year.
section_title: Shortage of U.S. Embedded Trainers and Coalition Mentors Delaying Advanced Skill Training for the ANA
paragraphs: Although some U.S. embedded trainers or coalition mentors are present in  every ANA corps, the ANA is experiencing shortages in the number of  these required personnel to assist in its development. According to CSTC- A’s Campaign Plan, after an ANA unit is fielded, either an embedded  training team (comprised of U.S. personnel) or a mentoring team  (comprised of coalition personnel) should be assigned to the unit. These  teams are responsible for developing the skills of ANA army units from  initial fielding until the unit has developed the capability to assume lead  responsibility for its security mission. As the ANA unit builds capability,  embedded trainers and mentors guide and assess the units and provide  them with access to air support and medical evacuation.
Shortages exist in the number of embedded trainers and mentors fielded.  For instance, as of April 2008, the United States has fielded 46 percent  (1,019 of 2,215) of Defense’s required number of embedded trainers.  Officials attributed these shortfalls to competing U.S. priorities for  Defense personnel, including the war in Iraq. CSTC-A has submitted  requests for additional forces to act as embedded trainers to assist the  ANA; however, the request has been deferred. As of April 2008, members  of the international community assisting in this effort have fielded 32 out  of 37 mentor teams promised, although the number of international  mentors in the field is smaller than the number of U.S embedded trainers.  Approximately one-third of personnel in the field assisting ANA unit  development are coalition mentors, while two-thirds are U.S. personnel.
Without adequate training or mentoring, the ANA’s ability to take the lead  in security operations may be delayed. First, Defense officials have cited  an insufficient number of embedded trainers and coalition mentors  deployed with units in the field as the major impediment to providing the  ANA with the training it needs to establish the capabilities necessary to  sustain the force in the long term, such as maneuver skills in battalion- level operations, intelligence collection, and logistics. Without these skills,  smaller ANA units cannot operate collectively at the battalion level, must  rely on the coalition for support tasks, and cannot assume the lead for  their own security. Secondly, as ANA units achieve greater levels of  capability, embedded trainers and mentors are responsible for assessing  and validating their progress. CSTC-A’s Campaign Plan states that the  validation process is intended to improve collective training of ANA units;  however, without adequate numbers of U.S. embedded trainers and  coalition mentors, this validation will be slowed. CSTC-A officials stated  that this delay in validation would lengthen the amount of time it will take  the ANA to achieve full capability. Moreover, Defense officials noted that,  as the number of ANA units fielded increases, the number of U.S.  embedded training and coalition mentoring personnel needed also rises.  For instance, when we visited Afghanistan in August 2007, Defense  officials stated 73 U.S.-embedded training and coalition mentoring teams  were needed to assist the development of the ANA; however, Defense  officials projected that by December 2008 103 teams would be needed.  Without additional training and mentoring personnel to meet this  increased need, delays in ANA development will likely be exacerbated.
section_title: Critical Equipment Shortfalls Remain Due to Changing Procurement Plans, Competing Global Priorities, and Production Limitations
paragraphs: Since we reported in 2005, new equipment plans for the ANA have been  implemented and the ANA has received more equipment items. In 2005,  Defense planned to equip the Afghan army with donated and salvaged  weapons and armored vehicles. However, much of this equipment proved  to be worn out, defective, or incompatible with other equipment. In 2006,  Defense began providing some ANA forces with U.S. equipment. Further,  as security deteriorated, equipment needs changed and Defense planned  to provide more protective equipment, such as armored Humvees, and  more lethal weapons, such as rocket-propelled grenades.
In support of these efforts, approximately $3.7 billion was provided  between fiscal years 2005 and 2008 to equip the ANA. As of February  2008, CSTC-A reports that the ANA combat forces are equipped with 60  percent of items defined as critical by Defense, a 7 percentage point  increase since August 2007.
Despite these advances, shortages exist in a number of equipment items  defined as critical by Defense. For instance, of 55 critical equipment items  for ANA combat forces, CSTC-A reports having less than half of the  required amount on hand for 21 of these items. Types of critical equipment  items with significant shortfalls include vehicles, weapons, and  communication equipment (see table 7).
Although shortfalls exist for certain items defined as critical by Defense,  such as NATO-standard machine guns, this does not necessarily mean that  the ANA is unequipped. Defense officials stated that while ANA forces  wait to receive NATO-standard weapons, Eastern bloc substitutes will be  used. However, several ANA combat corps reported shortages in these  items as well. For instance, each month between November 2007 and  February 2008 at least 2 of 5 ANA corps reported shortages in Eastern bloc  anti-tank weapons and 1 of 5 ANA corps reported shortages in Eastern  bloc light machine guns. Moreover, shortfalls in items for which no  Eastern bloc substitute is being used, such as communication equipment  and cargo trucks, were reported in every ANA combat corps in February  2008.
Defense officials attribute these shortfalls to a variety of factors, such as  competing global priorities for equipment, production delays, and delayed  receipt and execution of fiscal year 2007 funding, among other reasons. As  equipment orders are filled, ANA units may not be the top priority to  receive certain equipment items. CSTC-A officials said that U.S. soldiers  currently in combat have first priority to receive some of the equipment  that is also requested for the ANA, while security forces in other nations,  such as Iraq, may also be higher priority than the Afghan army. When U.S.  forces or other nations have higher priority to receive equipment, CSTC-A  officials noted that ANA orders are delayed. Officials at the U.S. Army  Security Assistance Command also stated that Iraq may be a higher  priority than Afghanistan, while a senior official from the Defense Security  Cooperation Agency (DSCA) stated that other nations, such as Georgia  and Lebanon, may also receive higher priority. Furthermore, production  delays for certain equipment items may contribute to equipment shortfalls.  For instance, CSTC-A officials stated that due to production delays,  certain equipment items, such as NATO-standard heavy machine guns and  mortars, were not currently available and would not likely be delivered  until 2009 or 2010. Similarly, Defense officials in Washington, D.C., stated  that production limitations were responsible for some equipment  shortages, particularly in the case of NATO-standard mortars. Additional  factors cited as contributing to equipment shortages included delayed  receipt and execution of fiscal year 2007 funding, accelerated fielding of  ANA units, and difficulties distributing equipment to the field.
One method to help address shortages while western equipment is delayed  is through increased equipment donations from the international  community. CSTC-A is currently seeking additional contributions,  particularly of Eastern bloc equipment, such as the basic soldier assault  rifle. Between 2002 and March 2008, over 40 non-U.S. donors provided  approximately $426 million to assist in the training and equipping of the  ANA. Eighty-eight percent of this support has been in the area of  equipment; however, the value of equipment donations is determined by  the donor, according to CSTC-A officials. The quality of this donated  equipment has been mixed (see fig. 5), and delivery of some donations has  been delayed due to limited funds to pay for shipments into Afghanistan.
To address quality issues, NATO and CSTC-A have established procedures  to verify that international donations comply with current needs for the  ANA and, if necessary, verify the condition and completeness of  equipment. Furthermore, to defray the cost of shipments into Afghanistan,  a NATO-administered trust fund has been established to support the  transportation of equipment into Afghanistan. However, Defense officials  stated that the amount of money in the trust fund, which they estimated to  be approximately $1 million, is limited and may not support the  transportation of a large number of donations. Additionally, CSTC-A has  also set aside funding to transport donated goods when required.
The development of capable ANA forces may be delayed by shortages in  equipment, as units cannot be certified as fully capable in equipment  unless they have 85 percent or more of their critical equipment items.  CSTC-A anticipates that all ANA brigades will be equipped to at least 85  percent of requirements for critical equipment items by December 2008;  however, according to Defense’s March 2008 monthly status report,  expected dates for achieving CM1 in equipment were pushed back for 12  of 14 combat brigades by between 1 to 7 months due, in part, to delayed  delivery and distribution of items such as vehicles and weapons.  Moreover, shortages in equipment items may hinder training efforts, since  having certain equipment items on hand, such as trucks, may be necessary  to teach ANA personnel logistics and maintenance skills.
section_title: Several Challenges Impede Efforts to Improve Capability of Afghan National Police Forces
paragraphs: Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an  investment of nearly $6 billion, no police unit is assessed as fully capable  of performing its mission. Development of an Afghan police force that is  fully capable requires manning, training, and equipping of police  personnel. However, the United States faces challenges in several areas  related to these efforts to build a capable police force. First, less than one- quarter of the ANP has police mentors present to provide training in the  field and verify that police are on duty. Second, the Afghan police have not  received about one-third of the equipment items Defense considers  critical, and continue to face shortages in several categories of equipment,  including trucks, radios, and body armor. In addition, Afghanistan’s weak  judicial system hinders effective policing, and our analysis of status  reports from the field indicates that the ANP consistently experiences  problems with police pay, corruption, and attacks, including by insurgents.  Recognizing that these challenges hamper ANP development, Defense  began a new long-term initiative in November 2007 to reconstitute the  uniformed police—the largest component of the Afghan police. However,  the continuing shortfall in police mentors may pose a risk to the initiative’s  success.
subsections: section_title: No Police Units Are Rated as Fully Capable of Performing Their Mission
paragraphs: Defense defines a fully capable 82,000-person ANP force as one that is able  to independently plan, execute, and sustain operations with limited  coalition support. However, Defense reporting indicates that, as of April  2008, no police unit was assessed as fully capable of performing its  mission (see table 8). Furthermore, among rated units, about 96 percent  (296 of 308) of uniformed police districts and all border police battalions  (33 of 33), which together comprise about three-fourths of the ANP’s  authorized end-strength, were rated at CM4—the lowest capability rating.  Six of the remaining 12 uniformed police districts were rated at CM2, and  the other 6 at CM3. Overall, Defense assessed approximately 4 percent (18  of 433 units rated) of police units as partially capable and about 3 percent  (12 of 433 units rated) as capable of leading operations with coalition  support.
According to Defense reporting as of April 2008, the expected date for  completion of a fully capable Afghan police force is December 2012—a  date that conflicts with the Afghan government and international  community benchmark of establishing police forces that can effectively  meet Afghanistan’s security needs by the end of 2010.
section_title: Growth of Police Force Is Difficult to Quantify
paragraphs: Defense reporting indicates that, as of April 2008, nearly 80,000 police had  been assigned out of an end-strength of 82,000 (see table 9). This is an  increase of more than double the approximately 35,000 we previously  reported as trained as of January 2005.
Despite this reported increase in police manning, it is difficult to  determine the extent to which the police force has grown. As we noted in  May 2007, the Afghan Ministry of Interior produces the number of police  assigned and the reliability of these numbers has been questioned. A  Defense census undertaken since our May 2007 report raises additional  concerns about these manning numbers. Specifically, Defense conducted a  census to check the reliability of ministry payroll records and reported in  September 2007 that it was unable to verify the physical existence of about  20 percent of the uniformed police and more than 10 percent of the border  police listed on the ministry payroll records for the provinces surveyed.  Because Defense’s census did not cover all 34 Afghan provinces, these  percentages cannot be applied to the entire police force. Nonetheless, the  results of Defense’s census raise questions about the extent to which the  ANP has grown since our 2005 report.
section_title: Shortage of Police Mentors Hinders Training, Evaluation, and Verification of Police on Duty
paragraphs: According to Defense officials, the shortage of available police mentors  has been a key impediment to U.S. efforts to conduct training and  evaluation and verify that police are on duty. Police mentor teams in  Afghanistan consist of both civilian mentors, who teach law enforcement  and police management, and military mentors, who provide training in  basic combat operations and offer force protection for the civilian  mentors. As we reported in 2005, international peacekeeping efforts in  Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor have shown that field-based training of  local police by international police mentors is critical to the success of  similar programs to establish professional police forces. Such training  allows mentors to build on classroom instruction and provide a more  systematic basis for evaluating police performance.
Defense reporting indicates that, as of January 2008, less than one-quarter  of the ANP had police mentor teams present. DynCorp, State’s contractor  for training and mentoring the police, was able to provide about 98 percent  (540 of 551) of the authorized number of civilian mentors as of April 2008.  However, as of the same date, only about 32 percent (746 of 2,358) of  required military mentors were present in country. Due to this shortage of  military mentors to provide force protection, movement of available  civilian mentors is constrained—a serious limitation to providing mentor  coverage to a police force that is based in more than 900 locations around  the country and, unlike the army, generally operates as individuals, not as  units. Moreover, a knowledgeable CSTC-A official stated that additional  civilian mentors would not help to address the shortfall in military  mentors because they could not be deployed to the field without military  mentors to provide protection. According to Defense officials, the shortfall  in military mentors for the ANP is due to the higher priority assigned to  deploying U.S. military personnel elsewhere, particularly Iraq.
While the United States and the EU have taken steps to provide additional  police mentors, the extent to which these efforts will address current  shortfalls is unclear. In January 2008, Defense announced that  approximately 1,000 Marines would be sent to Afghanistan in the spring of  2008 on a one-time, 7-month deployment to assist in the training and  development of the ANP. However, this temporary deployment will  neither fully nor permanently alleviate the underlying shortage of military  mentors for the ANP, which stood at over 1,600 as of April 2008. In June  2007, the EU established a police mission in Afghanistan with the objective  of providing nearly 200 personnel to mentor, advise, and train the Ministry  of Interior and ANP. According to State, the number of EU personnel  pledged has subsequently increased to about 215. However, State figures  indicate that the EU had staffed about 80 personnel as of February 2008— less than 40 percent of its pledged total. Moreover, State officials said that  restrictions in the EU mandate limit the extent to which its personnel are  permitted to provide field-based training.
Defense, State, and DynCorp officials all identified the continuing shortfall  in police mentors as a challenge to U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan  police. Specifically, the mentor shortage has impeded U.S. efforts in three  areas:    Field-based training: Senior Defense officials, including the commanding  general of CSTC-A, stated that the ongoing shortfall in police mentors has  been the primary obstacle to providing the field-based training necessary  to develop a fully capable police force. In addition, State has reported that  a significant increase in mentoring coverage is essential to improving the  quality of the police through field-based training. DynCorp officials also  acknowledged the shortage of mentors to be a challenge to providing  necessary training.
Evaluation: According to a knowledgeable CSTC-A official, the shortage  of police mentors is a serious challenge to evaluating the capability of the  police and identifying areas in need of further attention. Defense recently  introduced a monthly assessment tool to be used by mentors to evaluate  police capability and identify strengths and weaknesses. However, CSTC-A  identified extremely limited mentor coverage of the police as a significant  challenge to using this tool to generate reliable assessments. As of  February 2008, police mentors were able to assess only about 11 percent  of uniformed police districts using this new tool.
Verification of police on duty: The shortage of available police mentors  has impeded U.S. efforts to verify the number of Afghan police on duty.  For example, as of April 2008, Defense could not verify whether any police  were reporting for duty in 5 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces due to the lack  of mentors. Furthermore, although Defense has planned to conduct  monthly surveys to determine how many police are reporting for duty in  selected districts, a knowledgeable CSTC-A official stated that mentors are  not available to conduct surveys. However, a random sample of 15 police  districts conducted by the United Nations found fewer than half of  authorized police reporting for duty.
Without sufficient police mentors present to conduct field-based training  and evaluation and verify police manning, development of fully capable,  fully staffed Afghan police forces may continue to be delayed.
subsections: section_title: Efforts of Civilian Mentors Complicated by Dual Chain of Command
paragraphs: Although DynCorp has been able to provide nearly all of the authorized  number of civilian mentors, DynCorp stated that the activities of these  mentors have been complicated by a dual chain of command between  State and Defense. According to a 2005 interagency decision, Defense is  responsible for directing the overall U.S. effort to train and equip the  Afghan police, while State is responsible for providing policy guidance and  management of the DynCorp contract. According to DynCorp, this dual  chain of command has affected its efforts in multiple ways, such as by  producing conflicting guidance and complicating reporting, placement of  personnel, the use of facilities, and training and mentoring activities.
section_title: Police Continue to Face Difficulties with Equipment Shortages and Quality
paragraphs: Between fiscal years 2005 and 2008, Congress made available $5.9 billion  to support the training and equipping of the ANP. At least $1.3 billion of  that amount, or 22 percent, has been directed toward equipment  purchases. Although equipping of the police has improved in recent  months, shortages remain in several types of equipment that Defense  considers critical. Since our August 2007 visit to Afghanistan, the  percentage of critical ANP equipment on hand has grown from 53 to 65  percent as of February 2008. This improvement includes increased totals  of items on hand, such as rifles and grenade launchers. Further, Defense  anticipates the ANP will be equipped with 85 percent of critical equipment  items by December 2008. However, as of February 2008, shortages  remained in several types of critical equipment, such as trucks, radios, and  body armor. Defense officials cited several factors that have contributed  to these shortages. First, according to CSTC-A officials, equipment  shortages are due to competing priorities, particularly the need to equip  U.S. forces deployed to operational situations and security forces in Iraq.  Second, CSTC-A attributed the specific shortage in body armor to the  inability of two supplying contractors to deliver the requested items on  schedule. Third, Defense officials cited additional causes of equipment  shortages such as delayed receipt and execution of fiscal year 2007  funding and instances where CSTC-A did not provide equipment orders in  a timely manner. Defense officials and documentation also indicated that  distributing equipment to police in the field once it is procured is  challenging due to the unstable security situation, difficult terrain, weather  conditions, and the remoteness of some police districts. In addition,  Defense officials expressed concerns with the quality and usability of  thousands of weapons donated to the police. For example, officials  estimated that only about 1 in 5 of the nearly 50,000 AK-47 automatic rifles  received through donation was of good quality.
Our analysis of weekly progress reports produced in 2007 by DynCorp  civilian police mentors provides additional evidence of equipment-related  challenges and other logistical difficulties. Specifically, 88 percent (46 of  52) of weekly reports contained instances of police operating with  equipment of insufficient quality or quantity or facing problems with  facilities or supplies. For example, the reports include several cases where  Afghan border police are inadequately equipped to defend their positions  on the border or face insurgent forces. Recognizing this shortcoming,  CSTC-A has planned to equip the border police with heavy machine guns,  which it expects to arrive in the fall of 2008. In addition, 81 percent (42 of  52) of weekly reports contained examples of limited police ability to  account for the equipment provided to them. In July 2007, CSTC-A  initiated efforts to train the police in basic supply and property  accountability procedures. According to CSTC-A, equipment is no longer  being issued to police districts unless the districts’ property officers are  first trained. For example, more than 1,500 trucks have been on hand and  ready for issue since late 2007 (see fig. 6), but the Afghan Minister of  Interior has delayed distribution of these vehicles until adequate  accountability procedures and driver training are established in the target  districts. Similarly, as of February 2008, about half of the approximately  17,000 machine guns on hand had not been distributed to the police.
section_title: Police Face Problems with Weak Judicial Sector, Pay, Corruption, and Attacks
paragraphs: Establishing a working judiciary in Afghanistan based on the rule of law is  a prerequisite for effective policing. However, in 2005 and 2007, we  reported that few linkages existed in Afghanistan between the Afghan  judiciary and police, and the police had little ability to enforce judicial  rulings. According to State, much of Afghanistan continues to lack a  functioning justice system. In addition, according to CSTC-A, the slow rate  at which the rule of law is being implemented across Afghanistan inhibits  effective community policing.
Our analysis of DynCorp’s weekly progress reports from 2007 indicates  that police in the field also face persistent problems with pay, corruption,  and attacks.
Pay problems: 94 percent (49 of 52) of weekly reports contained instances  of police experiencing problems with pay. These include numerous  examples of police who have not been paid in several months and multiple  cases of police who quit their jobs as a result of pay-related problems,  thereby potentially leaving their districts more vulnerable to insurgent  forces. Our prior work found that one cause for the corrupt practices  exhibited by many Afghan police is their low, inconsistently paid salaries.  Furthermore, according to State, the Ministry of Interior’s traditional  salary distribution process afforded opportunities for police chiefs and  other officials to claim a portion of their subordinates’ salaries for  themselves. To minimize skimming of salaries, CSTC-A is instituting a  three-phase program to pay all salaries into bank accounts via electronic  funds transfer by December 2008. According to Defense, electronic funds  transfer had been implemented in 12 of 34 provinces as of August 2007.  The government of Afghanistan also has decided to increase police  salaries to achieve pay parity with the Afghan army.
Corruption: 87 percent (45 of 52) of weekly reports contained instances of  corruption within the police force or the Ministry of Interior. These  include multiple examples of police personnel providing weapons or  defecting to the Taliban and several cases of high-ranking officials  engaging in bribery or misconduct. Moreover, State documentation notes  that one branch of the ANP, the highway police, was disbanded in early  2007 because it was notorious for corruption. However, DynCorp weekly  reporting indicates that several thousand highway police were still  working and being paid by the Ministry of Interior as of September 2007.  The ministry, in conjunction with CSTC-A and the United Nations  Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, is currently engaged in an effort to  reform and streamline the ANP rank structure according to several  criteria, including evidence of previous corruption amongst ANP officers.
Attacks: 85 percent (44 of 52) of weekly reports contained instances of  attacks against the police. These include numerous cases where police are  targeted by suicide bombers or with improvised explosive devices.  According to DynCorp, insurgent attacks against the ANP have increased  due to greater involvement of the ANP in counterinsurgency operations  and the perception that the police are a more vulnerable target than the  Afghan army and coalition forces. DynCorp weekly reports do include  several instances where police were able to successfully fend off attack;  however, they also contain multiple cases of the dangerous working  conditions that police face causing difficulties in retaining or recruiting  personnel.
section_title: New Initiative to Reconstitute Police Has Begun, but Limited Mentor Coverage a Risk Factor
paragraphs: Recognizing several of the challenges faced by the ANP, Defense began a  new initiative in November 2007 to train and equip the Afghan uniformed  police. Defense documentation that outlines this initiative acknowledges  that the Afghan police lack capability, have been inadequately trained and  equipped, and are beset by corruption. To target these and other  challenges, Defense introduced the Focused District Development plan in  November 2007 to train and equip the uniformed police—those assigned to  police districts throughout the country who comprise over 40 percent of  the intended ANP end-strength of 82,000. According to Defense, reforming  the uniformed police—the immediate face of the Afghan government to  citizens at the local level—is the key to the overall reform of the ANP.  Under the Focused District Development model, the entire police force of  a district is withdrawn from the district and sent to a regional training  center to train together for 8 weeks and receive all authorized equipment  while their district is covered by the Afghan National Civil Order Police  (ANCOP), a specialized police force trained and equipped to counter civil  unrest and lawlessness (see fig. 7). The police force then returns to its  district, where a dedicated police mentor team provides follow-on training  and closely monitors the police for at least 60 days. Defense expects to be  able to reconstitute about 5 to 10 districts at a time for the first year of  Focused District Development, with each training cycle lasting about 6 to  8 months. Overall, according to State, it will take a minimum of 4 to 5  years to complete the initiative.
State documentation indicates that no districts had completed an entire  Focused District Development cycle as of March 2008. Until an entire cycle  is completed, it will be difficult to fully assess the initiative. However, limited  police mentor coverage may complicate efforts to execute this new program.  Defense documentation identifies sufficient police mentor teams as the most  important requirement for successful reform. However, according to the  commanding general of CSTC-A, the ongoing shortfall in police mentors  available to work with newly trained district police will slow implementation  of the initiative. In addition, a senior Defense official stated that unless the  mentor shortage is alleviated, the number of police mentor teams available to  provide dedicated training and monitoring will eventually be exhausted.  Moreover, according to DynCorp, civilian mentors have an important role in  Focused District Development—particularly in providing district-level  mentoring—but are not accompanying military mentors into districts that are  considered unsafe. Given that one selection criterion for districts is location  in unstable areas of the country where better policing might improve the  security situation, it is unclear how often civilian mentors will be able to  participate in district-level mentoring. Defense documentation also identifies  sufficient equipment availability as a requirement for successful reform.  According to Defense, adequate equipment is currently on hand to support  the Focused District Development initiative. However, given current  shortfalls in various ANP equipment items, it is unclear if having sufficient  equipment on hand for the initiative may lead to increased equipment  shortages for elements of the ANP, such as the border police, that are not  currently being targeted through the initiative.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: Establishing capable Afghan national security forces is critical to  improving security in Afghanistan and the U.S. efforts to assist foreign  allies and partners in combating terrorism. To date the U.S. has invested  billions of dollars in this effort and estimates that billions more will be  required to build and sustain the ANSF beyond the existing forces—few of  which have been assessed as fully capable of conducting their primary  mission. As such, measuring progress and estimating long-term costs are  particularly important given that U.S. officials estimate that this mission  could exceed a decade. The recommendations in our 2005 report called for  detailed Defense and State plans that include clearly defined objectives  and performance measures, milestones for achieving these objectives,  future funding requirements, and a strategy for sustaining the results  achieved, including plans for transitioning responsibilities to Afghanistan.  In 2007, Defense provided a 5-page document in response to our  recommendation. However, this document included few long-term  milestones, no intermediate milestones for judging progress, and no  sustainability strategy. In 2008, Congress mandated that Defense, in  coordination with State, submit reports on a comprehensive and long-term  strategy and budget for strengthening the ANSF and a long-term detailed  plan for sustaining the ANSF. Defense has yet to provide these reports. As  such it remains difficult to determine if U.S. efforts are on track and how  much more they will cost to complete. Until a coordinated, detailed plan is  completed, Congress will continue to lack visibility into the progress made  to date and the cost of completing this mission—information that is  essential to holding the performing agencies accountable. Consequently,  we believe that future U.S. investments should be conditioned on the  completion of a coordinated, detailed plan for developing a capable ANSF.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: To help ensure that action is taken to facilitate accountability and  oversight in the development and sustainment of the ANSF, and consistent  with our previous 2005 recommendation and the 2008 congressional  mandate, Congress should consider conditioning a portion of future  appropriations related to training and equipping the ANSF on completion  of a coordinated, detailed plan that, among other things, includes clearly  defined objectives and performance measures, milestones for achieving  these objectives, future funding requirements, and a strategy for sustaining  the results achieved, including plans for transitioning responsibilities to  Afghanistan; and the timely receipt of the reports mandated by sections  1230 and 1231 of Pub. L. 110-181, the first of which are already late.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: State and Defense provided written comments on a draft of this report.  State’s comments are reproduced in appendix III. Defense’s comments,  along with GAO responses to selected issues raised by Defense, are  reproduced in appendix IV. The agencies also provided us with technical  comments, which we have incorporated throughout the draft as  appropriate.
State appreciated GAO’s views on how to improve efforts to develop the  ANSF, which it considers critical to long-term sustainable success in  Afghanistan. State expressed concerns about conditioning future  appropriations on the completion of a detailed plan. In addition, State  highlighted ongoing coordination efforts with Defense as well as certain  other operational changes, many of which occurred after the completion  of our fieldwork in August 2007. For example, while we note that civilian  mentors are not accompanying military mentors into districts that are  considered unsafe, State notes in its comments that civilian police mentors  are now deployed with their military counterparts to all ongoing Focused  District Development districts and that all efforts are made to enable the  deployment of civilian police in support of the program.
We acknowledge State’s concerns and appreciate its efforts to coordinate  with Defense. However, we believe that a coordinated, detailed plan that  clearly identifies the various agencies’ roles would be beneficial, given the  continuous turnover of U.S. government staff in Afghanistan. We believe a  coordinated, detailed plan with intermediate milestones is also important  particularly in light of the new Focused District Development initiative for  ANP training, which will entail considerable resources and time to  complete. Further, intermediate milestones would provide policymakers  with more information regarding the transition to a normalized security  assistance relationship, as discussed by State in its comments.
Defense disagreed that Congress should consider conditioning a portion of  future appropriations on completion of a coordinated, detailed plan to  develop the ANSF, and stated that current guidance provided by State and  Defense to the field is sufficient to implement a successful program to  train and equip the ANSF. Defense noted that the 5-page document it  provided to GAO in January 2007 articulated goals for the size,  capabilities, and requirements for the ANSF, and reflected an approach  approved by multiple agencies—including State. Defense also cited a  number of other documents it considers to be part of the effort to develop  the ANSF. Furthermore, Defense disagreed with our conclusion that,  absent a detailed plan, progress in developing the ANSF is difficult to  assess, and stated that monthly progress reports and communication with  Congress provide legislators with the information needed to assess the  program and allocate resources.
We do not believe that the 5-page document provides a strategic-level plan  for the development of the ANSF. The document does not represent a  coordinated Defense and State plan for completing and sustaining the  ANSF with sufficient detail and transparency for Congress and others to  make informed decisions concerning future resources. This 5-page  document, which Defense now refers to as a “Strategic Vision” and which  CSTC-A officials were unaware of at the time of our review, does not  identify or discuss the roles and responsibilities of the Department of  State, Defense’s key partner in training the ANP. This is an element that  one would expect in a strategic planning document for ANSF  development. Furthermore, the document contains just one date-- December 2008, by which time the 152,000 person ANSF would be  completed. Defense’s document lacks any other intermediate or long-term  milestones by which progress could be measured. While the U.S. role in  training and equipping the ANSF could exceed a decade, according to  CSTC-A representatives, neither the 5-page document nor the documents  identified by Defense in its comments to GAO constitute a sustainability  strategy. For example, while Defense states that the international  community will need to sustain the ANSF for the “near-term” until  government revenues increase in Afghanistan, the document lacks further  detail regarding the expected time frames for increasing government  revenues, as well as a definition of “near-term.” As such, it remains unclear  how long Defense and State expect to support the ANSF.
Furthermore, we maintain that, without a coordinated, detailed plan,  assessing progress in developing the ANSF is difficult. While Defense  produces various documents that report in detail on the current status of  the ANSF, these documents do not contain intermediate milestones or  consistent end dates necessary to determine if the program is on track to  achieve its desired results within a set timeframe. For additional details,  refer to GAO comments that follow appendix IV.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees.  We will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, this  report is available on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your  staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202)  512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of  this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To analyze U.S. plans for developing and sustaining the Afghan National  Security Forces (ANSF) and identify the extent to which these plans  contain detailed objectives, milestones, future funding requirements, and  sustainability strategies, we reviewed planning documents from Combined  Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the Office of  the Secretary of Defense, including draft and CSTC-A-approved versions of  the Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Military and  Police Forces (Campaign Plan); a planning document provided by the  Office of the Secretary of Defense; and a Defense briefing on ANSF  sustainment. We evaluated these documents to determine the extent to  which they contain the four criteria previously recommended by GAO and  discussed them with cognizant Defense officials in the Office of the  Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We also spoke with  officials from the U.S. Central Command and State’s Bureau of  International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to discuss their  contribution to the Campaign Plan. In addition, while in Kabul, we  discussed the Campaign Plan with officials from Embassy Kabul; the  commanding general of CSTC-A and other CSTC-A officials; and the  Afghan Minister of Defense. Finally, we examined the Afghanistan  Compact and Afghanistan National Development Strategy to gain  familiarity with documents developed by Afghanistan and the international  community. The information on foreign law in this report does not reflect  our independent legal analysis but is based on interviews and secondary  sources.
To determine the progress made and challenges faced by the United States  in building the Afghan National Army (ANA), we reviewed monthly  assessment reports produced by Task Force Phoenix and the Joint Chiefs  of Staff as well as documents obtained from several other Defense offices  and agencies, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, CSTC-A, the  Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the U.S. Army Force  Management Support Agency. In addition, we met with the following  officials to discuss the progress made and challenges faced by the United  States in building the ANA:  In the Washington, D.C., area, we met with officials from the Joint Chiefs  of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Security  Cooperation Agency, the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency,  the Defense Intelligence Agency, and State’s Bureau of Political-Military  Affairs.
In Kabul, Afghanistan, we met with personnel mentoring the army;  officials from CSTC-A, including its commanding general; Task Force  Phoenix; Embassy Kabul; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; MPRI;  and the Afghan Ministry of Defense, including the Minister of Defense. We  also visited an equipment warehouse and army training facilities.  Moreover, we interviewed officials based in Afghanistan by telephone,  including several CSTC-A representatives.
To determine the progress made and challenges faced by the United States  in building the Afghan National Police (ANP), we reviewed monthly  assessment reports produced by Task Force Phoenix and the Joint Chiefs  of Staff as well as documents obtained from several other Defense offices  and agencies, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, CSTC-A, the  Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the U.S. Army Force  Management Support Agency. In addition, we met with the following  officials to discuss the progress made and challenges faced by the United  States in building the ANP:  In the Washington, D.C., area, we met with officials from the Joint Chiefs  of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Security  Cooperation Agency, the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency,  the Defense Intelligence Agency, State’s Bureaus of International  Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and Political-Military Affairs, and  DynCorp International.
In Kabul, Afghanistan, we met with U.S. police mentors; officials from  CSTC-A, including its commanding general; Task Force Phoenix; Embassy  Kabul; the United Nations; DynCorp International; MPRI; and the Afghan  Ministry of Interior, including the Minister of Interior. We also visited an  equipment warehouse and police training facilities. Further, we  interviewed officials based in Afghanistan by telephone, including  representatives of CSTC-A, DynCorp International, and the United Nations  Development Programme’s Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan.
Additionally, we asked State to provide weekly progress reports produced  by DynCorp International for 2005, 2006, and 2007. To identify challenges  faced by the police, we conducted a content analysis to categorize and  summarize the observations contained in these reports. Specifically, we  independently proposed categories, agreed on the relevant categories,  reviewed reports, and categorized the observations contained therein.  Instances discussed in more than one report were only categorized and  counted the first time they appeared. To ensure the validity and reliability  of this analysis, we reconciled any differences. Once all differences were  reconciled, we analyzed the data to identify the challenges most often  discussed. Because State did not provide us a complete set of reports for  2005 or 2006, we were only able to perform this analysis on 2007 reports.
To determine the reliability of the data we collected on funding, mentors,  equipment, and ANSF personnel numbers and capability, we compared  and corroborated information from multiple sources and interviewed  cognizant officials regarding the processes they used to compile the data.
To determine the completeness and consistency of U.S. and international  funding data, we compiled and compared data from Defense, State, and  other donor countries with information from cognizant U.S. agency  officials in Washington, D.C. We also compared the funding data with  appropriations and authorization legislation, congressional budget  requests, and reports to Congress to corroborate their accuracy.  Additionally, we compared the funding data with our May 2007  Afghanistan report. Differences between table 1 in this report and the  funding chart presented in our May 2007 report are due to the following  factors:   Certain funds were removed, such as those provided to support a  protective detail for Afghanistan’s President, because agency officials  later clarified that these dollars did not support efforts to train and  equip the ANSF, while certain funds were added, such as those used to  provide support for counter narcotics police, because agency officials  later clarified that these dollars supported efforts to train and equip the  ANSF.
For fiscal years 2007 and 2008, totals printed in May 2007 included  budget requests. Subsequently, some of these requested totals changed,  such as the allocation of money in Defense’s 2008 Global War on Terror  request and Defense’s support of efforts to train and equip Afghan  counter narcotics police.
Although we did not audit the funding data and are not expressing an  opinion on them, based on our examination of the documents received  and our discussions with cognizant agency officials, we concluded that the  funding data we obtained were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  engagement.
To determine the reliability of data on the number of military mentors, we  corroborated figures in unclassified progress reports against classified  mentor requirements and discussed Defense progress reports with the  Joint Chiefs of Staff. We checked the reliability of data on the number of  civilian mentors by comparing Defense and State figures for consistency  and speaking to State officials. Finally, we assessed the reliability of data  on European Union police mentors by comparing Defense, State, and  European Union data and checking for inconsistencies. Based on these  assessments and interviews, we determined that these data on mentors  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement.
To assess the reliability of equipment data, we compared different lists of  equipment on hand to corroborate their accuracy and interviewed  cognizant officials by telephone to discuss shortages of equipment and  procedures for keeping track of equipment provided to the ANA and ANP.  Based on these comparisons and discussions, we concluded that the  equipment data provided to us were sufficiently reliable for the purposes  of this engagement.
To assess the reliability of ANSF capability figures, we spoke with officials  from CSTC-A, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and State to discuss the processes  by which these data are generated. Additionally, while in Kabul, we  attended the monthly meeting during which Defense officials discuss and  determine ANA capability figures. Moreover, we requested after-action  reports to evaluate the capability of ANA troops in the field. However,  Defense officials were not able to provide us with this documentation. To  evaluate the reliability of ANSF personnel numbers, we spoke with  officials from CSTC-A and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Overall, based on our  discussions with cognizant officials, we concluded that ANSF capability  and ANA personnel data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  engagement. However, based on concerns expressed by the Joint Chiefs of  Staff and highlighted in our prior work, as well as the results of the census  conducted by Defense, we note in this report that the number of ANP  reported as assigned may not be reliable. Because Defense relies on the  number of ANP reported as assigned as a measure of progress in building  the ANP, we include this figure in our report as evidence that the ANP  appear to have grown in number over the last 3 years. However, we also  note that due to concerns about the reliability of the figure, it is difficult to  quantify the exact extent to which the ANP has grown.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2007 through June 2008  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Structure of the Afghan National Security Forces
paragraphs: The Afghan National Security Forces are comprised of the Afghan  National Army and Afghan National Police. The structure of these  organizations is described below. (See table 10 for the Afghan army and  table 11 for the Afghan police.)
Combat forces comprise 70 percent of the ANA’s personnel and are  divided into five corps, located in different regions of Afghanistan. Each  corps contains a number of brigades, most of which consist of five  battalions: three light infantry battalions, one combat support battalion,  and one combat services support battalion. The exception is the quick  reaction force in 201st corps, which is comprised of one infantry battalion,  one mechanized infantry battalion, and one armored battalion, in place of  the three light infantry battalions. Each corps also includes one battalion  of the National Commando Brigade (see fig. 8).
The ANP currently consists of six authorized components under the  Ministry of Interior. The uniformed police, the largest of these six  components, report to the police commanders of each Afghan province.  Provincial commanders report to one of five regional commanders, who  report back to the Ministry of Interior. The other five authorized  components of the ANP all report directly to the ministry (see fig. 9).
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on Defense’s written response, dated  May 27, 2008, to our draft report.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  Defense states that its document establishes quantitative and  qualitative measures to assess ANSF development. While the 5-page  document contains some qualitative measures to assess ANSF  development, it contains only one milestone date, December 2008,  when, according to the document, the ANSF will have achieved initial  independent operating capability. However, this one milestone is not  consistent with dates contained in monthly reports that track manning,  training, equipment, and capability, which have fluctuated. While the  monthly updates are useful in providing the status of ANSF capability,  each monthly report is a snapshot in time without consistent baselines  that would facilitate an assessment of progress over time. For  example, even though the United States began funding and training the  ANA in 2002, the February 2007 report that was provided to GAO as an  attachment to the 5-page document uses three different baselines for  assessing the ANSF—July 2005 for the number of trained and equipped  Afghan army and police, June 2006 for the status of the ANA battalion  Training and Readiness Assessments, and the first quarter of 2007 for  the status of ANA and ANP embedded training teams and mentors.  However, the report does not refer back to 2002 in measuring progress.  Similarly, the Training and Readiness Assessments that are provided  on a quarterly basis to congressional oversight committees are also  snapshots in time.   2.  Defense maintains that the CSTC-A milestones are consistent with  those in the 5-page Defense document. We disagree. The three phases  and associated time frames of ANSF development are articulated  differently in the 5-page document and the CSTC-A Campaign Plan.   For example, Phase III in CSTC-A’s Campaign Plan—Transition to  Strategic Partnership—is not identified as a phase in the 5-page  document.
Defense also contends that differences between the two documents are  due to developments in the security environment.  While this may be  true, absent a detailed plan with specific time frames, it is difficult to  assess the extent to which deteriorating security delayed ANSF  development.  3.  Defense notes that until government revenues increase in Afghanistan,  the international community will need to sustain the ANSF and that  such international support is required for the “near-term.” Moreover,  Defense states that, where appropriate, it supports efforts to increase  government revenues in Afghanistan. However, in the absence of  further detail regarding the expected timeline for increasing  government revenues—or the definition of “near-term”—it remains  unclear how long the United States will need to support the ANSF. As  we note in our report, the United States has been a major contributor  to this mission—investing about $16.5 billion to develop the ANSF.  Furthermore, current costs to sustain the force are estimated to be at  over $2 billion annually. Given that the Afghan government is currently  unable to support the recurring costs of its security forces and that  U.S. officials estimate this mission could exceed a decade, additional  clarity on the estimated length of time and amount of money needed to  complete this mission, and the potential for Afghan financial  contributions, could assist in conducting oversight of the program.  4.  Defense states that the 5-page document received by GAO was a longer  articulation of a plan approved by State. However, although Defense  and State are partners in training the ANP, the fact remains State did  not participate in the development of the 5-page document Defense  provided to GAO, nor has State developed a plan of its own. Defense’s  5-page document does share basic end-strength and capability  information with two slides on ANSF development approved by the  Principals Committee for ANSF Development. However, these slides  do not themselves constitute a coordinated plan and do not contain  elements, such as intermediate milestones, identified by GAO in our  2005 recommendation and agreed to by Defense and State as needed.  5.  Defense contends that the role of State in ANSF development is  articulated in documents other than the 5-page document provided to  GAO. However, while State’s role may be discussed elsewhere, the 5- page document provided to us by Defense does not describe the role of  State or other key stakeholders. If, as stated, Defense intends this  document to provide strategic-level guidance for the development of  the ANSF, including in it an articulation of the roles and  responsibilities of partners and key stakeholders could assist in  implementing and coordinating the program’s efforts. For instance, we  note in our report that the dual chain of command between State and  Defense has complicated the efforts of civilian mentors assisting with  the program.  6.  We maintain that, without a detailed plan, assessing progress in  developing the ANSF is difficult. While Defense produces various  documents that report in detail on the current status of the ANSF,  these documents do not contain consistent baseline data, intermediate  milestones, or consistent end dates necessary to determine if the  program is on track to achieve its desired results within a set time  frame. For example, after 6 years and a U.S. investment of about $16.5  billion in the program, Defense status reports show that, as of April  2008, less than 2 percent (2 of 105) ANA units and no ANP units (0 of  433) are rated as fully capable and the estimated completion date of  these forces is March 2011 and December 2012, respectively. Defense  asserts this is impressive, particularly for the ANA. However, without  interim milestones against which to assess the ANSF, it is difficult to  know if this status constitutes progress or will allow Defense to meet  its currently projected completion dates. Moreover, the completion  dates cited by Defense do not constitute firm goals and have shifted  numerous times during the course of our review. For instance, in  monthly Defense reports dated June 2007, November 2007, and May  2008, completion dates for the ANA fluctuated from December 2008 to  September 2010 to March 2011. Likewise, over the same period,  completion dates for the ANP fluctuated from December 2008 to  March 2009 to December 2012, with a 3-month period when the  completion date was reported as “to be determined.” Moreover, as we  note in our report, Defense officials stated that completion dates  contained in its monthly status reports did not account for shortfalls in  the required number of mentors and trainers and, therefore, could be  subject to further change.
Defense also states that it only began to support independent  operations capability for the ANA in 2006. While it is true that planned  capability for the ANA was upgraded in 2006, absent a detailed plan, it  is unclear the extent to which this planned capability upgrade should  be expected to affect the timeline for the development of individual  ANA units. Had Defense implemented GAO’s 2005 recommendation to  produce such a plan, it might be able to provide more clarity on the  relationship between planned capability upgrades and program  timelines. Moreover, even though planned ANA capability was  upgraded in 2006, prior to that time, the U.S. invested nearly $3 billion  to develop the ANA and reported approximately 20,000 troops trained  as of May 2005. Absent a plan with performance measures, such as  planned capability, linked to intermediate milestones and end dates, it  is difficult to assess the results achieved by this financial investment.
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Key contributors to this report include Hynek Kalkus, Assistant Director;   Lynn Cothern; Aniruddha Dasgupta; Mark Dowling; Cindy Gilbert;  Elizabeth Guran; Al Huntington; and Elizabeth Repko.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Combating Terrorism: U.S. Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy  Terrorist Threat and Close Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally  Administered Tribal Areas.  GAO-08-622.  Washington, D.C.:   April 17, 2008.
Combating Terrorism: State Department’s Antiterrorism Program Needs  Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes.   GAO-08-336.  Washington, D.C.: February 29, 2008.
Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces’  Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are  Not Fully Developed.  GAO-08-143R.  Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2007.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not  Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks.    GAO-07-1195.  Washington, D.C.: September 4, 2007.
Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has  Reached Iraqi Security Forces.  GAO-07-711.  Washington, D.C.:   July 31, 2007.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for  Congressional Oversight.  GAO-07-801SP.  Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007.
Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi  Security Forces.  GAO-07-612T.  Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2007.
Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating  Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals.  GAO-07-78.  Washington, D.C.:  Nov. 15, 2006.
Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating  Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of U.S.  Goals.  GAO-05-742.  Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005.
Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made  Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined.  GAO-05-575.   Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.
Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in  Transferring Security Responsibility to Iraqi Military and Police.    GAO-05-431T.  Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2005.
Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited  Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy  Needed.  GAO-04-403.  Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2004.
Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to  Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan’s Stability.  GAO-03-607.   Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.