Land Management Systems: Major Software Development Does Not Meet BLM's Business Needs
Published: 1999-03-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) Automated Land and Mineral Record System project, also known as the ALMRS/Modernization, focusing on: (1) the history of the project; (2) the results of GAO's reviews, including the key reasons for problems; and (3) where GAO believes BLM should go from here.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO noted that: (1) BLM spent over 15 years and estimates that it invested about $411 million planning and developing the ALMRS/Modernization, only to have the major software component--known as the ALMRS Initial Operating Capacity (IOC)--fail; (2) as a result of that failure, the bureau decided not to deploy ALMRS IOC at this time; (3) GAO has previously reported on the significant problems and risks that BLM has encountered; (4) GAO has made many recommendations to reduce those risks; however, BLM has been slow to implement some recommendations and has not yet fully implemented others; (5) BLM now needs to determine whether it can salvage any of the more than $67-million reported investment in ALMRS IOC software, by analyzing the software to determine if it can be cost-beneficially modified to meet BLM's needs; and (6) in addition, to reduce the risk that future efforts will result in similar failures, BLM should assess its information technology investment practices and systems acquisition capabilities.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for inviting us to participate in today’s hearing on the Bureau of  Land Management’s (BLM) Automated Land and Mineral Record System  project, also known as the ALMRS/Modernization.  The ALMRS/ Modernization was intended to provide modern computer and  telecommunications equipment and office automation for over 200 offices  nationwide as well as software to more efficiently record, maintain, and  retrieve land description, ownership, and use information to support BLM,  other federal programs, and interested parties.  As you requested, I will  discuss (1) the history of the project, (2) the results of our reviews,  including the key reasons for problems, and (3) where we believe BLM  should go from here.
Mr. Chairman, BLM spent over 15 years and estimates that it invested about  $411 million planning and developing the ALMRS/Modernization, only to  have the major software component—known as the ALMRS Initial  Operating Capability (IOC)—fail.  As a result of that failure, the bureau  decided not to deploy ALMRS IOC at this time.
We have previously reported on the significant problems and risks that  BLM has encountered.  We have made many recommendations to reduce  those risks; however, BLM has been slow to implement some  recommendations and has not yet fully implemented others.  The bureau  now needs to determine whether it can salvage any of the more than $67-million reported investment in ALMRS IOC software, by analyzing the  software to determine if it can be cost-beneficially modified to meet BLM’s  needs.  In addition, to reduce the risk that future efforts will result in  similar failures, BLM should assess its information technology investment  practices and systems acquisition capabilities.
We performed our work from July 1998 through February 1999, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: The ALMRS/ Modernization: A Brief History
paragraphs: During the energy boom of the early 1980s, BLM found that it could not  handle the case processing workload associated with a growing number of  applications for oil and gas leases.  The bureau recognized that to keep up  with increased demand, it needed to automate its manual records and case  processing activities.  Therefore, in the mid-1980s, it began planning to  acquire an automated land and mineral case processing system.  At that  time, BLM estimated that the life-cycle cost of such a system would be  about $240 million.
In 1988 BLM expanded the scope of the system to include a land  information system (LIS).  The expanded system was to provide automated  information systems and geographic information systems technology  capabilities to support other land management functions, such as land use  and resource planning.  BLM combined the LIS with a project to modernize  the bureau's computer and telecommunications equipment, and estimated  the total life-cycle cost of this combined project to be $880 million.
The project was reduced in scope in 1989 to respond to concern about the  high cost and named the ALMRS/Modernization.  The project consisted of  three major components—the ALMRS IOC, a geographic coordinate  database, and the modernization of BLM's computer and  telecommunications infrastructure and rehost of selected management and  administrative systems.  Estimated life-cycle costs were $575 million (later  reduced to $403 million), and BLM planned to complete the entire project  by the end of fiscal year 1996.
The ALMRS IOC was to be the flagship of the ALMRS/Modernization, and  was to replace various manual and ad hoc automated systems.  The bureau  designated the ALMRS IOC a critical system for (1) automating land and  mineral records, (2) supporting case processing activities, including leasing  oil and gas reserves and recording valid mining claims, and (3) providing  information for land and resource management activities, including timber  sales and grazing leases.  The system was expected to more efficiently  record, maintain, and retrieve land description, ownership, and use  information to support BLM, other federal programs, and interested  parties.  It was to do this by using the new computer and  telecommunications equipment that was deployed throughout the bureau,  integrating multiple databases into a single geographically referenced  database, shortening the time to complete case processing activities, and  automating costly manual records.
Despite the promise of ALMRS IOC to significantly improve business  operations, repeated problems with its development have prevented  deployment.  For example, during a user evaluation test in May 1996,  problems were reported involving unacceptably slow system performance.   Subsequent testing in 1996 uncovered 204 high-priority software problems,  which delayed project completion by about a year.  In testing conducted in  November 1997, BLM encountered workstation failures and slowdowns  caused by insufficient workstation memory and by problems discovered in  two BLM-developed software applications.  Some of these problems had  been identified in earlier tests but had not been corrected.  Additional  testing uncovered software errors that resulted in missing, incorrect, and  incomplete data, and error files that contained accurate data.  As a result of  these problems, BLM postponed the Operational Assessment Test and  Evaluation (OAT&E) that had been scheduled for December 1997.  The  OAT&E was to determine whether ALMRS IOC was ready to be deployed to  the first state office.
In October 1998, the OAT&E was conducted and showed that ALMRS IOC  was not ready to be deployed because it did not meet requirements.  During  the test, users reported several problems, including that ALMRS IOC (1) did  not support BLM’s business activities, (2) was too complex, and (3) significantly impeded worker productivity.  For example, one tester  reported that entering data for a $10 sale of a commodity, such as gravel,  required an hour of data entry using ALMRS IOC, whereas with the existing  system, the same transaction would have taken about 10 minutes.  Users  also reported that system response time problems were severe or  catastrophic at all test sites.  One user said “It is ridiculous to spend 2 or 3  hours to enter information in this system, when it takes 30 minutes to an  hour to process the information into the legacy system.”  Finally, users  reported data converted from legacy databases were not accurate, and that  validation of the converted legacy data required inordinate effort and time.
Because these problems are significant, senior BLM officials have decided  that ALMRS IOC is not currently deployable.  According to BLM, it  obligated about $411 million on the ALMRS/Modernization project between  fiscal years 1983 and 1998, of which more than $67 million was spent to  develop ALMRS IOC software.  The $67 million does not include ALMRS  IOC costs that are part of other cost categories, such as costs for work  performed from fiscal years 1983 through 1988, project management,  computer and telecommunications hardware and software, data  management, and systems operation and maintenance.  The reported  obligations associated with the major cost categories of the ALMRS/ Modernization are summarized in table 1.
Senior BLM officials told us that although ALMRS IOC is not currently  deployable, BLM has benefited from the ALMRS/Modernization work.  BLM  has deployed about 6,000 workstations throughout the bureau, provided  office automation capabilities, and implemented a national  telecommunications network with electronic mail and internet access,  which has enhanced communications and enabled BLM to communicate  with other federal agencies.  BLM’s view of the benefits received, however,  does not reflect the fact that it has not realized the significant business- related benefits and improvements ALMRS IOC was to provide.
section_title: Our Reviews Have Shown Long-Standing Project Weaknesses
paragraphs: Mr. Chairman, since May 1995 we have reported many problems and risks  that threatened the successful development and deployment of the ALMRS/ Modernization.  Our reports have discussed these issues, their causes, and  our recommended corrective actions.  BLM has been slow to implement  some of our recommendations and has not yet fully implemented others.   Following is a summary of the problems, causes, and associated  recommendations we have reported.
BLM did not develop a system architecture or formulate a concept of  operations before designing and developing the ALMRS/Modernization.   A system architecture describes the components of a system, their  interrelationships, and principles and guidelines governing their design  and evolution.  A concept of operations describes how an organization  would use planned information technology to perform its business  operations and accomplish its missions.  Designing and developing the  project without a system architecture and concept of operations  unnecessarily increased the risk that the ALMRS/Modernization would  not meet the business and information needs of the bureau.
BLM has never had a credible project schedule, reliable milestones, or a  critical path to manage the development and deployment of the ALMRS/ Modernization.  As a result, BLM has not known with any certainty how  long it would take and, therefore, how much it would cost to complete  the ALMRS/Modernization.  Because BLM has not implemented our  recommendation to establish a credible project schedule, the ALMRS/ Modernization has been driven by self-imposed deadlines.  In trying to  meet those deadlines, BLM has deferred some tasks until after  completion of the project, and has not corrected all problems when it  found them because doing so would cause it to miss the self-imposed  project deadlines.
BLM faced serious risks because it had not established a robust  configuration management program for the ALMRS/Modernization.   Configuration management is essential to controlling the composition of  and changes to computer and network systems components and  documentation.  The lack of configuration management increased the  risks that system modifications could lead to undesirable consequences,  such as causing system failures, endangering system integrity,  increasing security risks, and degrading system performance.  In  response to our recommendation, BLM later developed a configuration  management plan and related policies and procedures for the ALMRS/ Modernization.  We planned to review field office implementation of the  configuration management program after completion of the ALMRS  IOC; however, we have not done so because the system was not  deployed.
BLM incurred serious risks because it had not established a security  plan or security architecture for the ALMRS/Modernization.  The lack of  such security controls increased risks to the confidentiality, integrity,  and availability of stored and processed data.  BLM recently completed  work in response to our recommendation.  It performed a risk analysis,  developed a system security plan and architecture, identified  management and operational controls, and developed disaster and  recovery plan procedures.  As with configuration management, we  planned to review field office implementation of the security program  after completion of the ALMRS IOC, but have not done so because the  system was not deployed.
BLM invited serious risks because it had not established transition plans  to guide the incorporation of ALMRS IOC into its daily operations.   Deploying a major information system that people will use to do their  jobs requires careful planning to avoid business and operational  problems.  Without transition plans, BLM increased the risk that using  ALMRS IOC would disrupt, rather than facilitate, its work processes and  ability to conduct land and mineral management business.  In response  to our recommendation, BLM developed transition plans; however, the  plans were not adequate.  They did not outline needed changes in  organizational roles, responsibilities, and interrelationships, or address  issues such as how state and subordinate offices would deal with oil and  gas, mining, and solid mineral business process changes that would  result from implementing ALMRS IOC.
BLM faced serious risks because it had not established operations and  maintenance plans.  The lack of plans increased the risk that the bureau  would not meet its automation objectives or the daily needs of its  offices.  BLM developed operations and maintenance plans in response  to our recommendation.  We expected to review field office  implementation of the operations and maintenance plans after  completion of the ALMRS IOC; however, we have not done so because  the system was not deployed.
BLM invited serious risks because it planned to stress test only the  ALMRS IOC component—state and district offices, ALMRS IOC servers,  terminals, and workstations. This increased the risk that BLM would  deploy the ALMRS IOC nationwide without knowing whether the  ALMRS/Modernization—ALMRS IOC, office automation, e-mail,  administrative systems, and various departmental, state, and district  software applications in a networked environment—would perform as  intended during peak workloads.  BLM agreed to fully stress test the  entire ALMRS/Modernization before deploying the ALMRS IOC  component throughout the bureau.
BLM did not develop a Year 2000 contingency plan to ensure that critical  legacy systems could operate after January 1, 2000, if the ALMRS IOC  could not be delivered in 1999.  We recommended that BLM develop a  Year 2000 contingency plan to ensure continued use of those critical  legacy systems ALMRS IOC was to replace.  BLM implemented this  recommendation and began executing the plan in 1998, when it became  clear that ALMRS IOC would not be fully implemented by the end of  1999.
section_title: Where BLM Should Go From Here
paragraphs: At this point, BLM has made an enormous investment in software that does  not meet its business needs.  At the same time, it has not adopted  information technology management practices required by recent  legislation or suggested by industry best practices.  Because of its large  investment, BLM should analyze ALMRS IOC to determine whether the  software can be cost-beneficially modified to meet the bureau’s needs.  In  addition, to reduce the risk that future information technology efforts will  result in a similar outcome, BLM should assess its investment management  practices and its systems acquisition capabilities.  Until these assessments  and subsequent improvement actions are taken, BLM will not be  adequately prepared to undertake any sizable system acquisition.
subsections: section_title: Analysis of ALMRS IOC Software Is Needed
paragraphs: We believe that since BLM has invested over $67 million to develop the  ALMRS IOC software, the bureau should thoroughly analyze the software  to determine whether it can be modified to meet users’ needs and at what  cost.  This analysis should be part of an overall effort to identify and assess  all viable alternatives, including (1) using or modifying ALMRS IOC  software, (2) modifying or evolving existing land and recordation systems,  (3) acquiring commercial, off-the-shelf software, or (4) developing new  systems.  The alternative analysis should clearly identify the risks, costs,  and benefits of each alternative, and should be performed only after BLM is  assured that it has fully verified its current business requirements.  In this  regard, senior BLM officials said they are performing an analysis to  determine where ALMRS IOC failed to meet users’ expectations and critical  business requirements.
section_title: Assessment of BLM’s Information Technology Investment Management Practices Is Needed
paragraphs: According to the acting land and resources information systems program  manager, BLM is beginning to develop plans for future information  technology modernization.  These plans are to identify alternatives to  deploying ALMRS IOC, and evaluate those alternatives based on cost,  functionality, and return on investment.  BLM also plans to document its  current and planned business processes and systems architectures as part  of this effort.
While such planning is necessary, BLM also needs to assess its investment  management practices to help avoid future problems.  The Clinger-Cohen  Act of 1996 seeks to maximize the return on investments in information  systems by requiring agencies to institute sound capital investment  decision-making.  Under the act, agencies must design and implement a  process for maximizing the value and assessing and managing the risks of  information technology acquisitions.
An information technology investment process is an integrated approach  that provides for data-driven selection, control, and evaluation of  information technology investments.  The investment process is  comprised of three phases.  The first phase involves selecting investments  using quantitative and qualitative criteria for comparing and setting  priorities for information technology projects.  The second phase includes  monitoring and controlling selected projects through progress reviews at  key milestones to compare the expected costs, risks encountered, and  performance benefits realized to date.  These progress reviews are  essential for senior managers to decide whether to continue, accelerate,  modify, or terminate a selected project.  The third phase involves a  postimplementation review or evaluation of fully implemented projects to  compare actuals against estimates, assess performance, and identify areas  where future decision-making can be improved.
According to senior BLM officials, the bureau has established an  Information Technology Investment Board to provide support for its capital  planning processes.  It intends to apply more rigorous, structured  processes to analyze its information technology investments and select,  control, and evaluate information technology investment alternatives.   Until such processes are fully in place, the bureau cannot be assured that  future investments will be properly selected, managed, and evaluated using  sound investment criteria to provide effective support for the bureau’s  mission and goals.
Further, to ensure that information technology investment processes are  carried out adequately, the Clinger-Cohen Act also requires agencies to  assess the knowledge and skills of its executive and management staff to  meet agencies’ information resources management requirements, and to  take steps to rectify any deficiencies.  The Software Engineering Institute  (SEI) has identified the need for organizations to focus on information  resources management capabilities.  Organizations should improve their  capabilities using a process to characterize the maturity of their workforce  practices, guide a program of workforce development, set priorities for  immediate actions, and establish a culture of software engineering  excellence.
According to senior BLM officials, the bureau examined the kind of skills  that its field office computer specialists had, and identified the skills they  would need.  However, the officials recognize that this was not the same as  the more comprehensive assessment suggested by SEI.  Such assessments  are needed to better identify and manage information technology  investments.  Consequently, the bureau should evaluate and, where needed,  enhance the knowledge and skills of its staff to help ensure that the  investment management processes it puts in place can be effectively  carried out by its information resources management organization.
Finally, the Clinger-Cohen Act requires agencies to develop, maintain, and  facilitate the implementation of a sound and integrated information  technology architecture.  An information technology architecture provides  a comprehensive blueprint that systematically details the breadth and  depth of an organization’s mission-based mode of operation.  An  architecture provides details first in logical terms, such as defining  business functions, providing high-level descriptions of information  systems and their interrelationships, and specifying information flows; and  second in technical terms, such as specifying hardware, software, data,  communications, security, and performance characteristics.  By enforcing  an information technology architecture to guide and constrain a  modernization program, an agency can preclude inconsistent systems  design and development decisions, and the resulting suboptimal  performance and excess cost.
As I discussed earlier, BLM did not develop a system architecture before  designing and developing the ALMRS/Modernization.  This is a key reason  why ALMRS IOC did not meet the bureau’s business needs.  BLM still has  not developed an architecture that documents its business processes and  the technology and systems that support them.  BLM needs to develop an  information technology architecture to guide its future investment plans.
section_title: BLM Needs to Assess Its Systems Acquisition Capabilities
paragraphs: Research by SEI has shown that defined and repeatable processes for  managing software acquisition are critical to an organization’s ability to  consistently deliver high-quality information systems on time and within  budget.  These critical management processes include project planning,  requirements management, software project tracking and oversight,  software quality assurance, software configuration management, and  change control management.   To assist organizations in evaluating and  enhancing systems acquisition capabilities and processes, SEI has  developed models for conducting software process assessments and  software capability evaluations to determine the state of their capabilities  and identify areas requiring improvement.
BLM also needs an independent assessment of its systems acquisition  capabilities, and must ensure that it uses sound systems acquisition  processes.  As I discussed earlier, BLM did not develop several key  management controls for the ALMRS/Modernization.  BLM did not develop  a credible project schedule or develop adequate transition plans.  In  addition, the lack of a configuration management program, security plan  and architecture, and operations and maintenance plans further increased  BLM’s risks.  These problems indicate the need for BLM to ensure that the  deficiencies in its systems acquisition capabilities and processes are  acknowledged and corrected.  Until such assessments are completed and  corrective action taken, BLM should not undertake any sizable systems  acquisition or development efforts.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement.  I would be happy to respond  to any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have  at this time.
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