Spent Nuclear Fuel Management: Outreach Needed to Help Gain Public Acceptance for Federal Activities That Address Liability
Published: 2014-10-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOE is responsible for disposing of commercial spent nuclear fuel. DOE entered into contracts with owners and generators of spent nuclear fuel to begin disposing of it beginning in 1998, with plans for disposal in a national repository. DOE, however, was unable to meet the 1998 date and, as a result of lawsuits, the federal government has paid out about $3.7 billion for storage costs. DOE proposed a new strategy in January 2013 to build consolidated interim storage facilities—starting operations in 2021 and 2025.
GAO was asked to review issues related to DOE's strategy for managing spent nuclear fuel. This report (1) describes the expected rate of spent nuclear fuel accumulation in wet and dry storage, (2) identifies the basis of federal liability for spent nuclear fuel management to date and of DOE's estimate of future liabilities, and (3) assesses challenges, if any, that experts and stakeholders have identified to the federal government's ability to meet DOE's time frames for managing spent nuclear fuel at consolidated interim storage facilities and potential ways for DOE to mitigate the challenges. GAO reviewed documents from DOE and other agencies, and interviewed experts and stakeholders from industry, federal and state governments, interest groups, and independent entities.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Spent nuclear fuel—the used fuel removed from nuclear power reactors—is expected to accumulate at an average rate of about 2,200 metric tons per year in the United States. This spent nuclear fuel is mostly stored wet, submerged in pools of water. However, since pools have been reaching their capacities, owners and generators of spent nuclear fuel (typically utilities and reactor operators) have been transferring it to canisters that are placed in casks on concrete pads for dry storage—which is an expensive and time-consuming process. When operating reactors' licenses begin to expire in the 2030s, the rate of spent nuclear fuel accumulation is expected to decrease, but the amount in dry storage will increase as the pools are closed and all spent nuclear fuel is transferred to dry storage. By 2067, the currently operating reactors are expected to have generated about 139,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel, nearly all of which is expected to be transferred to dry storage.
Federal liability for managing spent nuclear fuel has been based on costs that owners and generators of this fuel have paid because the Department of Energy (DOE) has not met its contractual obligation to dispose of spent nuclear fuel. DOE's estimate of future federal liability is based on how long DOE expects the federal government to continue to pay the costs for managing spent nuclear fuel to plant owners and generators. Generally, the damages paid—mostly for the costs of transferring spent nuclear fuel from wet to dry storage—have been for costs that owners and generators would not have incurred if DOE had begun disposing of the spent nuclear fuel. DOE's most recent estimate of future liability—$21.4 billion through 2071—assumes that DOE will begin taking title to and possession of spent nuclear fuel in 2021 and complete the process in 2071, thereby ending the federal liability. DOE has extended the expected date that the last of the spent nuclear fuel will be picked up several times, and each extension has added to the future federal liability.
Spent nuclear fuel management experts and stakeholders GAO spoke with identified several legislative, regulatory, technical, and societal challenges to meeting DOE's time frames for managing spent nuclear fuel at interim storage facilities. Although DOE has begun to take actions to address some of these challenges, officials noted that the department's strategy cannot be fully implemented until Congress provides direction on a new path forward. However, experts and stakeholders believe that one key challenge—building and sustaining public acceptance of how to manage spent nuclear fuel—will need to be addressed irrespective of which path Congress agrees to take. In this context, they suggested the need for a coordinated public outreach strategy regarding spent nuclear fuel management issues, including perceived risks and benefits, which would be consistent with the Administration's directive to be more transparent and collaborative. DOE officials stated they currently do not have such a strategy. Without a better understanding of spent nuclear fuel management issues, the public may be unlikely to support any policy decisions about managing spent nuclear fuel.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: DOE should implement a coordinated outreach strategy to better inform the public about federal spent nuclear fuel management issues. DOE generally agreed with the findings and recommendation in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Spent nuclear fuel—used nuclear fuel that has been removed from the  reactor core of a nuclear power plant—is an extremely harmful  substance if not managed properly. Without protective shielding, its  intense radioactivity can kill a person who is directly exposed to it or  cause long-term health hazards, such as cancer. In addition, if not  managed properly, or if it were released by a natural disaster or an act of  terrorism, it could contaminate the environment with radiation. The  nation’s inventory of spent nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear power  reactors is stored at 75 sites in 33 states, generally where it was  generated. The spent nuclear fuel is stored either wet in pools of water or  dry in storage systems that typically consist of stainless steel canisters  within protective casks. Over the past several decades, the inventory of  commercial spent nuclear fuel in storage in the United States has grown  to about 72,000 metric tons.
To address the growing inventory, Congress made disposal of spent  nuclear fuel a federal responsibility with the passage of the Nuclear  Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), which directed the Department of  Energy (DOE) to investigate sites for a permanent repository. The act  also authorized DOE to enter into contracts with owners and generators  of commercial spent nuclear fuel—typically utilities and reactor  operators—to begin taking title to (legal ownership) spent nuclear fuel  following commencement of a repository and disposing of spent nuclear  fuel beginning no later than January 31, 1998. In 1987, Congress  amended the act to direct DOE to focus its efforts only on a site at Yucca  Mountain, Nevada, about 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas. DOE did not  begin disposing of spent nuclear fuel by 1998 because of state and local  opposition to a repository in Nevada, technical complexities, and funding  uncertainties, among other reasons.
Since 1998, owners and generators of spent nuclear fuel have sued DOE  primarily in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims for failing to meet its  obligations under the contracts that DOE had entered into with them. The  Department of Justice reported that as of March 2014, 90 such lawsuits  had been filed. As of the end of fiscal year 2013, the federal government  had reimbursed owners and generators about $3.7 billion in connection  with such lawsuits. of Treasury’s judgment fund, which is financed by U.S. taxpayers. DOE  estimates that future federal liability for litigation related to storing spent  nuclear fuel will amount to $21.4 billion through 2071.
In addition to the $3.7 billion reimbursed to owners and generators through fiscal year  2013, the Department of Justice, which defends DOE in the lawsuits, has expended  approximately $219.5 million in defense-related costs, as of December 31, 2013. Industry  officials said that, for proprietary reasons, they could not provide a total for their litigation  costs but that they are also incurring similar expenses. While the courts have not ordered  the federal government to reimburse utilities for attorneys’ fees, the Court of Federal  Claims generally has awarded court costs to utility plaintiffs. responsible for regulating storage, transportation, and disposal of spent  nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear power reactors. Then, in a change  of policy in 2009, the Secretary of Energy said that a repository at Yucca  Mountain was not a workable option, and in 2010, DOE terminated its  efforts to license a repository there. In 2010, DOE chartered the Blue  Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future to recommend a plan  for management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. In January 2012, the  Blue Ribbon Commission recommended that Congress create and fund a  new organization dedicated solely to managing spent nuclear fuel. The  commission also recommended development of a consent-based  approach to locating or establishing (or “siting”) future spent nuclear fuel  management facilities, among other things. In January 2013, DOE issued  a strategy for managing spent nuclear fuel in response to the  commission’s recommendations.government to begin accepting spent nuclear fuel for management at a  pilot interim storage facility by 2021 and at a larger consolidated interim  storage facility by 2025, among other things. According to the strategy, it  represents “an initial basis for discussions among the Administration,  Congress and other stakeholders on a sustainable path forward for  disposal” of spent nuclear fuel and other types of high-level radioactive  waste. According to DOE’s strategy, beginning operations at the pilot and  larger interim storage facilities in 2021 and 2025, respectively, will allow  the federal government to accept enough spent nuclear fuel to limit  expected federal liabilities to DOE’s fiscal year 2013 liability estimate of  $21.4 billion. Delays in meeting the strategy’s milestones for interim  storage might result in additional liabilities.
The strategy calls for the federal  In light of the billions of dollars in liabilities being paid by taxpayers  because the federal government has not begun disposing of spent  nuclear fuel as it agreed to do, you asked us to review issues related to  DOE’s spent nuclear fuel strategy and the federal government’s liabilities.  This report (1) describes the expected rate of spent nuclear fuel  accumulation in wet and dry storage, (2) identifies the basis of federal  liability for spent nuclear fuel management to date and of DOE’s estimate  of future liabilities, and (3) assesses challenges, if any, that experts and  stakeholders have identified to the federal government’s ability to meet  DOE’s time frames for managing spent nuclear fuel at consolidated  interim storage facilities and potential ways for DOE to mitigate the  challenges.
To answer these objectives, we reviewed documents and interviewed  officials from DOE and NRC regarding their regulatory roles related to  spent nuclear fuel management. We also consulted with Department of  Justice officials regarding their role in defending the government in the  owners’ and generators’ lawsuits. In addition, we obtained input from  experts and stakeholders in spent nuclear fuel management. Specifically,  to describe the expected rate of spent nuclear fuel accumulation in wet  and dry storage, we obtained data from the Nuclear Energy Institute, an  industry policy umbrella organization. This information contains the  amounts of spent nuclear fuel currently in wet and dry storage, and  projected amounts of spent nuclear fuel to be added to the current wet  and dry storage inventory as spent nuclear fuel is removed from reactors  until they shut down. To identify the basis of federal liability for spent  nuclear fuel management to date and of DOE’s estimate of future  liabilities, we reviewed DOE documents and interviewed DOE officials. To  assess the challenges, if any, that experts and stakeholders have  identified to the federal government’s ability to meet DOE’s time frames  for managing spent nuclear fuel at consolidated interim storage facilities  and potential ways for DOE to mitigate these challenges, we identified  individuals with spent nuclear fuel management experience and  expertise. We obtained input from these experts and stakeholders by  interviewing them and reviewing documents prepared by the  organizations with which they are affiliated. Appendix I presents our  scope and methodology in more detail and appendix II lists the experts  and stakeholders with whom we consulted.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2013 to October  2014, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Fuel for commercial nuclear power reactors is typically made from low  enriched uranium fashioned into thumbnail-size ceramic pellets of  uranium dioxide. These pellets are fitted into 12- to 15-foot hollow rods,  referred to as cladding, made of a zirconium alloy. The rods are then  bound together into a larger assembly. A typical reactor holds about 100  metric tons of fuel when operating—generally from 200 to 800 fuel  assemblies. The uranium in the assemblies undergoes fission—a process  of splitting atoms into fragments and neutrons that then bombard other  atoms—resulting in additional fission reactions and a sustainable chain  reaction that creates an enormous amount of heat and radioactivity in the  form of radioisotopes, or radioactive substances. The heat is used to  generate steam to turn a turbine, which generates electricity. The  radioisotopes produced in a reactor can remain hazardous from a few  days to many thousands of years; these radioisotopes remain in the fuel  assemblies and as components of the resulting spent nuclear fuel. Figure  1 shows what a fuel pellet for a commercial nuclear reactor and a fuel rod  in an assembly look like.
Each fuel assembly is typically used in the reactor from 4 to 6 years, after  which most of the uranium dioxide is no longer cost-efficient at producing  energy. Reactor operators typically discharge about one-third of the fuel  assemblies from a reactor every 18 months to 2 years and place the  spent nuclear fuel in a pool to cool. Most commercial spent nuclear fuel is  stored immersed in pools of water designed to cool and isolate it from the  environment. Water circulates in the pool to remove the heat generated  from the radioactive decay of some of the radioisotopes. In recent years,  reactor operators have used fuel that is burned longer in the reactor  under the same operating conditions, resulting in higher “burn-up” and  higher decay heat in comparison to the lower burn-up fuel that had been  in use. The pools of water for cooling spent nuclear fuel are typically  about 40 feet deep, with at least 20 feet of water covering the spent fuel.  Figure 2 shows a typical spent nuclear fuel pool.
Industry practice has been to store the spent nuclear fuel in the pools for  at least 5 years, with an industry expectation that, at some point, DOE  would begin to accept it. Spent nuclear fuel typically must remain in a  pool for at least 5 years to decay enough to remain within the heat limits  currently allowed for dry cask storage systems. Spent nuclear fuel can be  sufficiently cool to load into dry storage systems earlier than 5 years, but  doing so is generally not practical. Some dry storage systems, depending  on the rated heat load, may not accommodate a full load of spent nuclear  fuel. High burn-up fuel may have to remain in a pool longer than low burn- up fuel to cool sufficiently.
The pools at commercial nuclear power reactors have largely reached  their maximum capacities, however. When spent nuclear fuel is  discharged from a reactor at a plant where the spent nuclear fuel pool is  at maximum capacity, spent nuclear fuel equal to the amount of spent  nuclear fuel discharged from the reactor must be transferred to dry  storage. The dry storage systems typically consist of either a thick-walled,  bolted steel vertical cask, or a welded steel canister inside a vertical or  horizontal steel-reinforced concrete cask. Dry storage systems are  designed with thick steel and concrete walls to provide radiation shielding  and passive pathways for removal of spent nuclear fuel decay heat, such  as air vents in the casks. In one typical process of transferring spent fuel  to dry storage, reactor operators place a steel canister inside a larger  steel transfer cask and lower both into a pool. Spent nuclear fuel is  loaded into the canister, a lid is placed on the canister, and then both the  canister and transfer cask are removed from the pool. The transfer cask  shields nearby workers from the radiation produced by the spent nuclear  fuel in the canister. The water is drained and a lid is welded onto the  canister. Then the canister and transfer cask are aligned with a storage  cask and the canister is maneuvered into the storage cask. The transfer  cask can be re-used. The storage casks, in either vertical or horizontal  designs (see fig. 3), are usually situated on a large concrete pad with  safety and security measures, such as radiation detection devices and  intrusion detection systems.
NRC requires that spent fuel in dry storage be stored in approved  systems that offer protection from significant amounts of radiation. NRC  requires storage systems to demonstrate compliance with its regulations,  including through physical tests of the systems, scaled physical tests, and  computer modeling. Once a dry storage system is approved, NRC issues  a certificate of compliance for a cask design or a specific license. Figure 4  shows spent nuclear fuel on a concrete pad in dry storage.
Most U.S. reactors were built during the 1960s and 1970s and, after a 40- year licensing period have received a 20-year license extension, and  some may apply for subsequent extensions. Nevertheless, these reactors  may begin permanently shutting down in large numbers by about 2030  and emptying their pools by about 2040 absent additional license  renewals. In the absence of a repository, the reactors’ accumulated spent  nuclear fuel will be “stranded” in a variety of different dry storage systems,  with no easy way of repackaging the spent fuel should repackaging be  required to meet future storage or disposal requirements. NRC  regulations require radioactive contamination to be reduced at a reactor  to a level that allows NRC to terminate the reactor’s license and release  the property for other use after a reactor shuts down permanently. This  cleanup process is known as decommissioning.
section_title: About 2,200 Metric Tons of Spent Nuclear Fuel Is Expected to Accumulate Annually, Mostly in Wet Storage, but This Pace Is Expected to Change as Reactors Shut Down
paragraphs: Spent nuclear fuel is expected to accumulate at an average rate of about  2,200 metric tons per year in the United States, mostly in wet storage, but  this rate and the amount in wet storage are expected to decrease as  more reactors, as projected, begin to shut down in the 2030s. More  specifically, according to data provided by the Nuclear Energy Institute,  the rate of accumulation will be about 2,100 metric tons in 2031,  decreasing to about 1,200 metric tons in 2040, about 200 metric tons in  2050, and less than 100 metric tons per year from 2051 through 2055,  when the last one of the currently operating nuclear power reactors is  expected to shut down. These rates assume that except for the few  reactors that have announced early permanent shutdown dates, the  nation’s current reactors continue to operate through a 20-year extended  license period without any further license extensions and continue to  produce spent nuclear fuel at the same rate, and that no new reactors are  brought online.
Shutdown of Nuclear Reactors in the  United States  Of the 118 nuclear reactors in the United  States, 18 reactors have permanently shut  down. Three of these reactors are located on  a site that also has an operating reactor. The  remaining 15 reactors are located on 12 sites  where the reactors have been or will be  dismantled and decontaminated. After this  decommissioning, the site can be used for  other purposes and the only relic remaining at  the site will be the spent nuclear fuel storage  facility and the associated safety and security  infrastructure.
By the end of fiscal year 2013, DOE reported that it had signed contracts  with owners and generators of spent nuclear fuel involving 118 reactors.  The spent nuclear fuel from these 118 reactors is stored at 75 sites in  both wet and dry storage systems. Several reactors share the same site.  For example, the Palo Verde site in Arizona has 3 operating reactors.
In 2013, about 70 percent of accumulated spent nuclear fuel—about  50,000 metric tons—was stored in pools, with the remaining 30 percent— about 22,000 metric tons—in dry storage. Figure 5 shows the 75 spent  nuclear fuel wet and dry storage sites, including shut-down sites, in the  United States.
In the future, more spent nuclear fuel is expected to be put into dry  storage for two reasons. First, since most spent nuclear fuel pools have  reached their maximum capacities, reactor operators must transfer fuel  from the pools to dry storage to make room for newer spent nuclear fuel,  a time-consuming and costly process. Second, the amount of spent  nuclear fuel transferred to dry storage is expected to increase as reactors  shut down and their pools are closed. According to data from the Nuclear  Energy Institute, by 2024, the proportion of spent fuel in wet storage and  dry storage from currently existing reactors should be roughly equal— about 48,000 metric tons each. By 2040, about 70 percent of the spent  fuel is expected to be in dry storage, or about 89,000 metric tons,  compared to about 39,000 metric tons in wet storage. By 2067—after the  last of the currently operating reactors have shut down—nearly all the  139,000 metric tons of spent fuel expected to be generated by currently  operating reactors is expected to be in dry storage. Figure 6 shows the  estimated amounts of spent nuclear fuel accumulation and transfer from  wet storage to dry storage through 2067.
section_title: Federal Liability for Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Is Based on Costs Incurred Because DOE Has Not Met Contract Obligations
paragraphs: Federal liability for managing spent nuclear fuel has been based on costs  that owners and generators of this fuel have paid because DOE has not  met its contractual obligations to begin disposing of this fuel, and DOE’s  estimate of future liability—$21.4 billion through 2071—is based on how  long the federal government is expected to pay these costs. This estimate  is based on DOE’s strategy to begin accepting spent nuclear fuel in 2021  and assumes no delays in their schedule.
Generally, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims has held that the federal  government’s liability covers the cost of managing the spent nuclear fuel  that DOE was obligated to begin disposing of in 1998. The Department of  Justice has also agreed to pay such costs as a result of settlement  agreements. (See app. IV for additional information on the settlement  agreements.) Under the standard contract, DOE was obligated to take  title to and dispose of a certain quantity of spent nuclear fuel beginning in  1998. The order in which spent nuclear fuel was to be picked up is based  on the order in which it was removed from reactors—or the oldest fuel  first. The owner or generator was expected to pay continued storage  costs for the spent nuclear fuel that DOE was not obligated to pick up.
Some of the costs for which the federal government has been liable have  related to expanding wet storage of spent nuclear fuel. For example, the  federal government has compensated owners and generators for  replacing lower-density storage racks with higher-density storage racks in  pools to increase the capacity of the pools. The capacity of nearly all the  spent nuclear fuel pools in the country has been expanded to the extent  practical, and according to NRC, most pools have been filled to their  maximum prudent capacities.
The majority of the types of costs for which the federal government has  been liable have pertained to dry storage costs of spent nuclear fuel.  Some have been one-time costs, such as the cost of constructing a  concrete pad for storing spent nuclear fuel once it has been transferred  from the pools to dry canisters or casks. Constructing a concrete storage  pad typically costs from about $5.5 million to $6.5 million, but can range  higher if additional equipment or special design requirements are needed.
Other dry storage costs are recurring; for example, the cost of the  canisters themselves, which depends on the size of the canister and type  of spent nuclear fuel stored in it. Table 1 shows the differences in sizes of  canisters, which typically cost from $700,000 to $1.5 million, and how the  numbers of canisters for which the federal government may have to pay  can vary from site to site.
Another recurring cost is the cost of transferring spent nuclear fuel in the  canisters from the pools to dry storage. Table 2 reflects typical costs  associated with the transfer of spent nuclear fuel from wet to dry storage  that may contribute to federal liabilities.
DOE’s estimate of future liability is based on how long DOE expects the  federal government to continue to pay for managing spent nuclear fuel  that DOE was obligated to have begun disposing of if it had begun picking  up the fuel in 1998. DOE’s most recent estimate of this liability is $21.4  billion through 2071. This estimate assumes that DOE will begin  accepting spent nuclear fuel in 2021 and complete the process in 2071,  ending the federal government’s liability. However, DOE has previously  extended the dates in its liability estimates several times. For example, in  the fiscal year 2006 liability estimate, DOE estimated (1) that the federal  liability was $6.9 billion, (2) that DOE would begin accepting spent  nuclear fuel in 2017, and (3) it would complete the process by 2055. Each  time extension adds to the federal government’s liability.
section_title: Experts and Stakeholders Identified Challenges to and Suggestions for Managing Spent Nuclear Fuel at Interim Storage Facilities within DOE’s Time Frames
paragraphs: Experts and stakeholders in the area of spent nuclear fuel management,  including DOE and other government officials, identified four major types  of challenges to the federal government’s ability to meet DOE’s time  frames for managing spent nuclear fuel at consolidated interim storage  facilities. First, DOE does not have legislative authority to fully implement  its strategy, although DOE officials said they are conducting some  planning activities that are allowed by the NWPA. Second, the licensing  process could take more time than DOE has allowed. Third, there are  several technical challenges to transporting some spent nuclear fuel.  Fourth, achieving sustainable public acceptance of transporting and  storing spent nuclear fuel is a societal challenge that will need to be  addressed irrespective of any policy that is implemented and that experts  said DOE could mitigate with a coordinated outreach strategy. Figure 8  summarizes the four major types of challenges identified by experts and  stakeholders with whom we spoke.
subsections: section_title: DOE Does Not Have Legislative Authority to Fully Implement Its Strategy
paragraphs: In general, experts identified the legislative challenges as critical to  implementing DOE’s strategy within the time frames proposed. In  particular, the experts pointed out that new legislative authority is needed  for developing interim storage that is not tied to Yucca Mountain, creating  a new waste management organization, and providing predictable funding  for carrying out spent nuclear fuel management. However, experts and  stakeholders generally noted that because the Congress has not agreed  on a new path forward for managing spent nuclear fuel since funding was  suspended in 2010, nor have DOE officials proposed legislation  requesting new authority, obtaining specific legislative authority in time to  meet DOE’s proposed time frames might be challenging.
subsections: section_title: Siting, Licensing, Constructing, and Operating of Interim Storage Facilities Included in DOE’s Strategy Have Not Been Authorized
paragraphs: As we reported in November 2009 and August 2012,NWPA that authorize DOE to arrange for consolidated interim storage  have either expired or are unusable because they are tied to milestones  in the development of a repository at Yucca Mountain that have not been  met. DOE officials and experts from industry agreed with this  assessment, and they noted that the federal government’s ability to site,  license, construct, and operate a consolidated interim storage facility is  dependent upon new legislative authority. Some industry representatives  we spoke with said that such authority would be needed by the end of  2014 to meet DOE’s 2021 goal to begin operations at a pilot interim  storage facility. DOE officials noted that their strategy is available to  Congress and is intended to initiate discussions on developing a future  path forward or future policy to be implemented. However, experts and  stakeholders generally noted that there is not agreement between the  House and Senate on a path forward, and therefore obtaining such  authority in 2014 is unlikely. Pending such agreement, the agency has  been planning what it can do, and the agency has undertaken some  activities allowed under current authority to inform the development of an  interim storage facility. For example, the agency is reviewing reports  submitted by contractors in 2013 on design concept alternatives for a  consolidated interim storage facility. DOE officials said, however, that the  agency’s strategy could not be fully implemented until Congress provides  direction on a path forward.
section_title: Development of a New Waste Management and Disposal Organization Has Not Been Authorized
paragraphs: DOE’s strategy calls for a new waste management and disposal  organization for managing spent nuclear fuel; however, Congress has not  authorized such an organization. According to DOE, a new organization  separate from DOE is needed to “provide stability, focus, and credibility to  build public trust and confidence.” Industry representatives and  presenters at a Bipartisan Policy Center Conference in 2014 agreed that  DOE is not the right organization to implement its strategy because the  public lacks confidence in the agency and its ability to move forward in  managing spent nuclear fuel. In addition, an expert from industry said that  a new organization designed to implement a consent-based process  would be better suited to site a consolidated storage facility—a view that  is generally consistent with one of our past matters for congressional  consideration noting that an independent organization, outside DOE,  could be more effective in siting and developing a permanent repository  for the nation’s nuclear waste. Similarly, the Blue Ribbon Commission  on America’s Nuclear Future recommended establishing a new federal  corporation or similar independent organization to implement, among  other things, a consent-based siting process. Such an organization would  be more effective because it would be less vulnerable to political  interference, according to the commission.
However, experts from industry told us that even with congressional  authorization, such an organization would take time to create, in part,  according to an industry expert, because a new organization would need  to acquire personnel, implement a quality assurance program, and  develop an implementation plan. These could take from 2 to 5 years,  according to the experts.
section_title: Funding for DOE’s Past Work on Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Was Unpredictable, and Experts Said More Predictability Is Essential
paragraphs: In 2011, we reported that funding for DOE’s work related to Yucca  Mountain was unpredictable, noting that DOE’s annual appropriations  related to spent nuclear fuel management had varied by as much as 20  percent from year to year; further, DOE’s average annual appropriations  fell about $90 million short of the amount DOE requested each year. We  reported that this unpredictability made long-term planning difficult, and  we suggested that Congress may wish to consider whether a more  predictable funding mechanism would enhance future spent nuclear fuel  management efforts. According to experts from industry and community  action groups we interviewed, having sufficient funds consistently  available is essential for any spent nuclear fuel management effort.  However, as noted earlier, there is not agreement on a path forward— including developing a more predictable funding mechanism. DOE  reported in 2001 that the budgetary requirements enacted by Congress,  subsequent to the creation the Nuclear Waste Fund, reduced financial  flexibility. These funding challenges were also echoed by the Blue Ribbon  Commission, which recommended that a new, more predictable, funding  mechanism be developed.
section_title: Experts and Stakeholders Identified Regulatory Challenges Related to Licensing a Consolidated Interim Storage Facility
paragraphs: Because the NRC licensing process is time consuming, it may be difficult  for DOE or an alternative waste management and disposal organization  to begin operations at a pilot interim storage facility in 2021 and a  consolidated interim storage facility in 2025, as called for in DOE’s  strategy. The NRC licensing process cannot begin until an interim storage  site has been selected, which, as stated previously in this report, cannot  happen under existing legislative authority. Some industry experts, as  well as a scientist from a national laboratory, told us licensing an interim  facility could be achieved within 5 to 7 years of site selection. Other  industry experts and a community action group told us licensing will more  likely be an 8- to 10-year process because of the potential for legal  concerns raised by the public. Such concerns may originate with an  environmental impact statement—such a statement is required before a  license can be granted, and it allows for public input that may require  adjudication. The NRC hearing process could also lengthen the licensing  process. For example, in 2006, after a 9-year licensing process, a  consortium of electric power companies called Private Fuel Storage  obtained an NRC license for a private consolidated storage facility on an  Indian reservation in Utah. As we previously reported, the delay in  licensing Private Fuel Storage was due to state opposition and to  challenges raised during the license review process.
section_title: Experts and Stakeholders Identified Technical Challenges That Could Be Resolved over Time
paragraphs: Experts described technical challenges that could be resolved with  sufficient time. In particular, there are uncertainties regarding  transportation of spent nuclear fuel, including the uncertainties related to  the safety of high burn-up fuel during transportation, readiness of spent  nuclear fuel to be transported under current guidelines, and sufficiency of  the infrastructure to support transportation. In addition, there are  uncertainties related to repackaging spent nuclear fuel for transportation.  According to DOE officials, the agency is taking steps to begin addressing  technical challenges, but not all of the challenges can be addressed until  uncertainties regarding the path forward are resolved.
subsections: section_title: High Burn-Up Fuel Has Uncertainties Related to Long-term Storage and Future Transportation
paragraphs: According to some industry experts, more information is needed about  how to safely store and transport high burn-up fuel. Before 2000, most  fuel discharged from U.S. nuclear power reactors was considered low  burn-up fuel, and consequently, the industry has had decades of  experience in storing and transporting it. In addition, the first dry storage  canisters were loaded in 1986. One of these, containing low burn-up fuel,  was opened 15 years later and the spent nuclear fuel inspected. The  spent nuclear fuel was found to be in good condition, giving NRC  additional confidence in the safe storage and transport of spent nuclear  fuel. According to NRC, there has been considerable analysis performed  on high burn-up fuel, but because it has only been used for about the past  10 years, there has been little testing performed on it. According to  various reports from DOE, NRC, the Electric Power Research Institute,  and the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, as well as experts we  spoke with, uncertainties exist on how long high burn-up fuel can be  stored and then still be safely transported. Once sealed in a canister, the  spent fuel cannot easily be inspected for degradation.
Description of Concerns Related to High Burn-Up Fuel  According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), burn up is  considered as part of NRC’s reviews of spent nuclear fuel cask designs  because each dry storage system has limits on temperature and radiation,  both of which are higher for high burn-up fuel. While in the reactor, hydrogen  gas is generated and is absorbed by the cladding. Then, during the transfer  from wet to dry storage, the spent nuclear fuel is loaded into a storage cask,  which is removed from the storage pool and drained of water to dry the fuel.  During the drying process, the fuel heats up, dissolving the hydrogen in the  cladding structure. While the spent nuclear fuel is still hot and the cladding is  still supple, there is little uncertainty in storing or transporting it, as long as  temperature and radiation limits are met. However, as the spent nuclear fuel  cools over extended periods in dry storage, the dissolved hydrogen can  change the characteristics of the cladding and, if certain conditions exist, can  cause the cladding to become brittle over time. The extent of the changes in  cladding depend on the burn-up of the fuel, the type of cladding, and the  temperatures reached during the drying process, and need to be accounted  for in the storage and transportation of high burn-up spent nuclear fuel. There  is not the same level of concern about changes in the cladding causing  brittleness with low burn-up fuel because not as much hydrogen becomes  dissolved in the cladding. In addition, there is more data available on the  performance of low burn-up fuel during storage, since low burn-up fuel has  been stored for long periods.
As of August 2014, NRC officials told us that they had analyzed  laboratory tests and models developed to predict the changes that occur  during dry storage and the results indicate that high burn-up fuel will  maintain its integrity over very long periods of storage and can eventually  be safely transported. However, NRC officials said they continue to seek  additional evidence to confirm their position that long-term storage and  transportation of high burn-up spent nuclear fuel is safe. In an effort to  obtain evidence confirming the test and modeling results, DOE and the  Electric Power Research Institute have planned a joint development  project to load a special dry cask storage system with high burn-up fuel in  mid-2017 and, using instrumentation built into the cask, monitor the spent  nuclear fuel over a period of about 10 years. At that point, DOE and the  Electric Power Research Institute expect to transport the canister to an  appropriate facility and open it to inspect the high burn-up fuel and its  cladding, as well as the cask, for any indication of damage or  degradation. According to DOE and the Electric Power Research  Institute, the project’s execution has been planned through 2018 and  many future elements of the project still need to be developed. Experts  and stakeholders expressed various views regarding the level of  uncertainty of the safe transportation of high burn-up fuel after long-term  storage. But one theme conveyed during our discussions with them was  that high burn-up fuel would continue to be stored in dry storage canisters  without knowing how long the spent nuclear fuel would be stored or how  safe future transportation would be. DOE officials stated that their  strategy would not involve transportation of large amounts of high burn-up  fuel until at least 2025 and that even then, there is likely going to be  enough low burn-up fuel to ship for the first several years, giving more  time for the development project to yield results.
section_title: Some Stored Spent Nuclear Fuel May Not Be Readily Transportable
paragraphs: Because the guidelines governing dry storage of spent nuclear fuel allow  higher temperatures and external radiation levels than guidelines for  transporting the fuel, some of the spent nuclear fuel in dry storage may  not be ready to be moved to an interim storage facility in time to meet  DOE’s time frames. For example, according to the Nuclear Energy  Institute, as of 2012, only about 30 percent of spent nuclear fuel currently  in dry storage is cool enough to be directly transportable. For safety  reasons, transportation guidelines do not allow the surface of the  transportation cask to exceed 185 degrees Fahrenheit (85 degrees  Celsius) because the spent nuclear fuel is traveling through public areas  using the nation’s public transportation infrastructure. NRC’s guidelines  on spent nuclear fuel dry storage limit spent nuclear fuel temperature to  752 degrees Fahrenheit (400 degrees Celsius).spent nuclear fuel dry storage systems are typically found, are usually in  secluded areas with a buffer zone between the spent nuclear fuel and the  public. Dry storage sites are also usually located so that workers and the  public have minimal exposure to radiation from the spent nuclear fuel.  According to experts from industry, spent nuclear fuel has typically been  stored in large dry storage canisters to maximize storage capacity and   Reactor sites, where  minimize costs. Spent nuclear fuel stored in the large canisters, however,  may have temperatures that exceed the limits of transportation  guidelines.
Scientists from the national laboratories and experts from industry  suggested three options for dealing with the stored spent nuclear fuel so it  can be transported safely: (1) the spent nuclear fuel may be left to cool  and decay at reactor sites, (2) the spent nuclear fuel may be repackaged  into smaller canisters that reduce the heat and radiation, or (3) a special  transportation “overpack” may be developed to safely transport the spent  nuclear fuel in the current large canisters. Since Congress has not agreed  on a new path forward since funding was suspended in 2010, it may be  difficult to assess the options.
section_title: Current Transportation Infrastructure May Not Be Adequate
paragraphs: In a 2013 report, DOE states that the preferred mode for transporting  spent nuclear fuel to a consolidated interim storage facility would be rail.  However, several experts from industry pointed out that not all of the  spent nuclear fuel currently in dry storage is situated near rail lines; also,  one of these experts said that procuring qualified rail cars capable of  transporting spent nuclear fuel will be a lengthy process. Storage sites  without access to a rail line may require upgrades to the transportation  infrastructure or alternative modes of transportation to the nearest rail  line. Constructing new rail lines or extending existing rail lines could be a  time-consuming and costly endeavor. In addition, an industry official  noted that if spent nuclear fuel were trucked to the nearest rail line, the  federal government would have to develop a safe method of transferring  the spent nuclear fuel from heavy haul trucks onto rail cars. In September  2013, DOE completed a preliminary technical evaluation of options  available and needed infrastructure for DOE or a new waste management  and disposal organization to transport spent nuclear fuel from shut-down  sites to a consolidated interim storage facility. According to DOE officials,  currently there is no need to make a decision regarding how best to move  forward with the study results because there is, at this time, no site and  no authorization to site, license, construct, and operate a consolidated  interim storage facility.
DOE’s Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Spent Nuclear Fuel from  Shutdown Sites  DOE’s “Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from  Shutdown Sites” looked at 12 permanently shutdown sites, which included  Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock  Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, and  San Onofre. The evaluation found that some shut-down sites, because the  facilities have been decommissioned and lack onsite infrastructure, required  multiple transportation modes such as heavy-haul-truck to rail, barge to rail,  and in the cases of Kewaunee and Humboldt Bay, potentially heavy-haul- truck to barge to rail. For example, Trojan’s rail spur was removed during the  decommissioning process and Big Rock Point will probably need to truck its  spent nuclear fuel 52 miles to Gaylord, Michigan. Some of the sites evaluated  have no rail spur, and heavy haul trucking will be required for anywhere from  7.5 miles to potentially 260 miles, depending on the site.
A DOE official and experts from industry also told us that DOE needs to  begin procuring qualified rail cars capable of transporting spent nuclear  fuel. DOE officials stated that the agency is beginning to request  information from the rail car industry on the rail car design, testing, and  approval for the transportation of commercial spent nuclear fuel and  anticipates getting responses from interested parties by July 2014.  According to an industry representative, the Association of American  Railroads established the S-2043 standard, which sets higher standards  for transportation of spent nuclear fuel than for normal rail operations. S- 2043 requires, for example, on-board safety protection technology unique  to spent nuclear fuel shipments and a high performance structural  upgrades to accommodate the extra weight of spent nuclear fuel as well  as the transportation cask, which according to the industry representative,  can weigh up to 500,000 pounds. Industry experts said it may be  challenging to design and fabricate rail cars that meet the S-2043  standard for transporting heavy, fully loaded spent nuclear fuel canisters  within DOE’s time frames. According to industry experts, it will take, at a  minimum, 2 years to design and fabricate a new rail car, in addition to an  extensive quality control process to ensure the car meets the S-2043  standard. For example, an industry representative estimated that the  entire rail car procurement process may take up to 9 years and another  agreed that it may be feasible to begin to move the spent fuel by 2025 if  DOE initiates the necessary planning soon. Another option would be for  DOE to use what the U.S. Navy has learned from its rail cars designs for  its nuclear navy program, which also generates spent nuclear fuel. DOE  officials told us they would consider this suggestion as they proceed.
section_title: Repackaging Requirements, If Any, Are Uncertain
paragraphs: According to experts, some spent nuclear fuel in dry storage may need to  be repackaged before it can be transported, and the repackaging is likely  to be costly and difficult to accomplish. More specifically, as noted earlier,  some dry storage canisters may be too hot or radioactive to meet  transportation regulations. If the decision were made to transport the  spent nuclear fuel before it had a chance to cool sufficiently, the canisters  may have to be repackaged into smaller canisters that meet the  transportation regulations. In addition, an industry expert and an expert  from a community action group told us repackaging may also be required  if current storage canisters, or the spent nuclear fuel in them, has  degraded. For example, we previously reported that canisters are likely to  last about 100 years, after which the spent nuclear fuel may have to be  repackaged because of canister degradation.repackaging might be needed, reactor operators may no longer have  pools or the necessary infrastructure to undertake the repackaging.
By the time such  According to DOE, under provisions of the standard contract, the agency  does not consider spent nuclear fuel in canisters to be an acceptable form  for waste it will receive. This may require utilities to remove the spent  nuclear fuel already packaged in dry storage canisters. Nuclear power  reactors that have closed their spent nuclear fuel pools would likely have  to transport their spent nuclear fuel to operating reactors with pools, build  a new pool, or repackage it in a yet-to-be-developed dry transfer facility.  Cutting open these canisters is likely to be an expensive process for  utilities that would require using specialized equipment to open welded  lids, placing the assemblies back into a wet pool, and then packaging the  assemblies into a new cask that DOE would provide under the terms of  the standard contract. Such a process would require personnel and  equipment, increase worker radiation exposure, increase the potential for  fuel damage, produce additional low level waste, and, may, according to  an industry expert, hinder electricity generating activities. In addition,  another industry expert also expressed concerns that re-wetting and re- drying during the repackaging process may lead to cladding degradation  issues. However, NRC officials stated that prior to NRC’s granting a  storage license, each system is analyzed by the applicant and reviewed  by the NRC to ensure it can be re-flooded safely with no damage to the  spent fuel. Until decisions have been made regarding a new path  forward—storage and disposal—repackaging requirements will remain  uncertain. However, according to scientists from national laboratories,  given a path forward, technical challenges, such as repackaging, can be  overcome with time and sufficient funding.
section_title: Experts and Stakeholders Said Developing Interim Storage Facilities Depends on Achieving Sustainable Public Acceptance, Which May Be Difficult without a Coordinated Outreach Strategy
paragraphs: Experts and stakeholders with expertise in spent nuclear fuel  management identified achieving sustainable public acceptance as a  challenge that needs to be overcome to implement a spent nuclear fuel  management program, and they stated that public acceptance cannot be  achieved without a coordinated outreach strategy.
subsections: section_title: Development of Interim Storage Facilities Depends on Achieving Sustainable Public Acceptance
paragraphs: Reports spanning several decades cite societal and political opposition as  key obstacles to siting and building a permanent repository for disposal of  spent nuclear fuel. For example, in 1982, the congressional Office of  Technology Assessment reported that public and political opposition  were key factors to siting and building a repository. The National  Research Council of the National Academies reiterated this conclusion in  a 2001 report, stating that the most significant challenge to siting and  commencing operations at a repository is societal. Our analysis of  stakeholder and expert comments indicates the societal and political  factors opposing a repository are the same for a consolidated interim  storage facility.
This lesson has been borne out in efforts to site, license, build, and  commence operations at a consolidated interim storage facility. As we  reported in 2011 and as experts and stakeholders reiterated, it may be  possible to find a willing community to host a consolidated interim storage  facility, but obtaining and sustaining state support may be more difficult  because of broader state constituencies and state-federal relations. For  example, the Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator, established by the  NWPA amendments in 1987, tried to broker an agreement for a  community to host a repository or interim storage facility. Two negotiators  worked with local communities and Native American tribes for several  years, but neither was able to conclude a proposed agreement with a  willing community by January 1995, when the office’s authority expired. In  one siting effort, in 1992, a county in Wyoming sought to host a  consolidated interim storage facility, but the Wyoming governor stopped  that effort. The governor expressed concerns that despite the assurances  of federal officials, even those with “personal integrity and sincerity,” he  could not be sure that the federal government’s attitudes or policies would  remain the same over the next 50 years or that the state would have any  future say in the program. The experience of Private Fuel Storage is  another example in which a consortium of owners and generators of  spent nuclear fuel found a willing community to host a consolidated  interim storage site on the Goshute Indian reservation in Utah. The state  of Utah opposed the effort and although the Private Fuel Storage site  received a license in 2006, operations never began there because of  ongoing legal battles and land use issues. A spokesperson for the State  of Utah stated that if the owners and generators renewed their efforts to  begin operations at Private Fuel Storage, Utah would continue to fight the  effort. Furthermore, in 2014, the Western Governors Association—an  association representing 19 western states—passed a resolution stating  that the Governor of a state must agree in writing if an interim storage site  for spent nuclear fuel is to be considered in the state. Experts and  stakeholders we spoke with reiterated this position, stating that states,  and many local communities, are concerned that a consolidated interim  storage site could become a de facto permanent storage site.
In 2011, we reported that no nation had ever succeeded in building a  permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel, in part due to societal  concerns, and that there was no model or set of lessons that would  guarantee success in such a complex, decades-long endeavor. Based  on our discussions with experts and stakeholders and a review of relevant  documents on spent nuclear fuel management, those same societal  concerns apply to building a consolidated interim storage facility.  However, as we reported in 2011, efforts to site and commence  operations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico succeeded  largely because a contractor addressed public opposition to the facility.
Specifically, the contractor involved local communities situated along the  transportation routes throughout the state, providing education and  training programs and equipment related to the safe transportation of  radioactive waste. The project might have ended because of state  opposition if DOE had not conceded some oversight authority to the state.
section_title: Experts and Stakeholders Said Coordinated Outreach May Help Achieve and Sustain Public Acceptance
paragraphs: In our discussions with experts and stakeholders, one common theme  was apparent: public acceptance cannot be achieved without a  coordinated outreach strategy, which would include components such as  transparent transportation planning, and a defined consent-based  process. According to these experts and stakeholders, a coordinated  outreach strategy could include, among other things, sharing information  with specific stakeholders and the general public about DOE’s ongoing  activities related to managing spent nuclear fuel. The experts and  stakeholders said that DOE has no coordinated outreach strategy, which  DOE officials confirmed. A coordinated outreach strategy would be an  important aspect of informing the public about spent nuclear fuel  management plans and DOE’s current management efforts irrespective of  which path Congress agrees upon.
DOE officials confirmed that they do not have a coordinated outreach  strategy for communicating with specific stakeholders and the general  public about their activities related to spent nuclear fuel management.  Instead, DOE officials said they communicate regularly with certain  stakeholders. For example, DOE officials told us that they actively obtain  the input of state and tribal representatives on spent nuclear fuel  transportation-planning issues. In addition, DOE officials told us they plan  to continue to participate in meetings with technical experts and industry  stakeholders and to post information online. For example, DOE officials  made several presentations on issues related to storage, transportation,  and disposal at the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board’s meeting in  November 2013. Some experts we spoke with were critical of DOE efforts  to involve stakeholders. For example, experts who represent multi-state,  regional organizations active in spent-nuclear-fuel transportation planning  said DOE has not been transparent or effective in its communication with  stakeholders. Furthermore, although DOE had issued fact sheets related  to spent nuclear fuel management related to work on Yucca Mountain,  DOE has not recently developed spent nuclear fuel information for the  general public, such as a fact sheet explaining issues related to  transporting spent nuclear fuel, nor does DOE have plans to do so in the  upcoming fiscal year. DOE officials said that recently they have stepped  up their outreach efforts with stakeholders. For example, in April 2014,  DOE completed a Draft National Transportation Plan for moving spent  nuclear fuel.
In terms of DOE’s efforts to inform specific stakeholders and the general  public about spent nuclear fuel issues by posting information online, DOE  has two websites devoted to spent nuclear fuel issues. However, we  found that the information on those sites either does not provide  information about the agency’s ongoing activities or is not easily  accessible. DOE also has an online library where it has posted selected  technical studies; however, the agency has done little to explain how it  plans to use these studies. DOE officials acknowledged that they could  better explain the studies posted. They indicated that it is premature to  conduct more extensive public outreach until the timing and logistics of  transporting spent nuclear fuel have been determined. Experts from multi- state organizations disagree, stating that if DOE does not engage the  public soon, then DOE could appear to be unilaterally making decisions  without considering public input.
According to experts from industry and an entity representing state  regulatory agencies, DOE officials have not defined a consent-based  process or engaged interested communities in discussions on hosting a  consolidated interim storage facility. An expert from an entity representing  state regulatory agencies said that in order to consent, potential host  communities need to know what consent entails, both in the short and  long term, including the perceived risks and benefits and the planned  duration and proposed capacity of the facility before any decisions can be  made. Furthermore, a few experts told us that they had heard of some  community representatives who approached DOE to express their  interest in hosting a storage facility, but DOE did not engage in  substantive discussions with them. DOE has requested funding in its  fiscal year 2014 and 2015 budget requests to plan for consent-based  siting, but DOE officials said they had not developed a formal siting  process for an interim storage facility.
A 2013 report by the University of Oklahoma, in collaboration with Sandia  National Laboratory, documented the importance of social media, such  as Twitter postings and Google searches, as public attention to both  nuclear energy and nuclear waste management spiked immediately after  the earthquake and tsunami struck the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power  plant complex in Japan on March 11, 2011, causing widespread concern  of a potential release of radiation. Furthermore, according to experts  and stakeholders, social media have been used effectively to provide  information to the public through coordinated outreach efforts by  organizations with an interest in spent nuclear fuel policy. Some of these  organizations oppose DOE’s strategy and the information they distribute  reflects their position. In the absence of a coordinated outreach strategy  by DOE, including social media, DOE does not effectively provide a forum  to share information and offer greater transparency. DOE promotes the  use of social media platforms to engage in open discussions about  energy issues, but has posted only a few reports and descriptions of  spent nuclear fuel management on its web page.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOE has made efforts to share information about its ongoing spent  nuclear fuel management activities by presenting at technical meetings  and posting information on its website. Sharing information is made more  difficult for DOE by uncertainties about the future path of spent nuclear  fuel management. DOE intends for its strategy to provide an initial basis  for discussions on a sustainable path forward. Until the federal  government proceeds with a new policy to meet its contractual  obligations, the federal liability for litigation related to spent nuclear fuel  management will continue to grow. Our analysis of expert and  stakeholders comments indicates four types of challenges to  implementing DOE’s January 2013 strategy to manage spent nuclear fuel  within the time frames projected. DOE has begun to address aspects of  these challenges, but the challenges cannot be fully addressed until  uncertainties regarding a path forward are resolved. The societal  challenge of building and sustaining public acceptance of the federal  government’s spent nuclear fuel management activities, however, will  need to be addressed irrespective of the path the federal government  agrees upon. Unless and until there is a broad understanding of the  issues associated with transporting spent nuclear fuel and managing it at  consolidated facilities, specific stakeholders and the general public may  be unlikely to support any spent nuclear fuel management program that is  decided on in the future. According to experts and stakeholders,  organizations that oppose DOE’s strategy have reached the public by  effectively using social media to promote their positions. In contrast, DOE  currently has no coordinated outreach strategy. In the absence of a  coordinated outreach strategy by DOE, specific stakeholders and the  general public may not have complete and accurate information about the  agency’s activities, making it more difficult for the federal government to  move forward with any policy to manage spent nuclear fuel and address  federal liability.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help achieve and sustain public acceptance for future spent nuclear- fuel management efforts, the Secretary of the Department of Energy  should develop and implement a coordinated outreach strategy for  providing information to specific stakeholders and the general public on  federal activities related to managing spent nuclear fuel.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided DOE with a draft of this report for review and comment. In  written comments, which are reproduced in appendix VI, DOE generally  agreed with our findings and the recommendation in our report. DOE said  that it plans to continue to engage states, tribes, and other stakeholders  regarding planning for future transportation of spent nuclear fuel and that  it would improve its outreach to the general public. DOE also said it would  make an effort to provide the public with more complete information about  its ongoing activities and the issues associated with spent fuel  management. DOE also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate  congressional committees, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of  the Environmental Protection Agency, the Attorney General, the  Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Secretary of  Transportation, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To describe the expected rate of spent nuclear fuel accumulation in wet  and dry storage, we obtained data from the Nuclear Energy Institute, an  industry policy umbrella organization. These data included information on  the amounts of spent nuclear fuel currently in wet and dry storage and  projected amounts of spent nuclear fuel to be added to the current wet  and dry storage inventory as it is removed from a reactor until it is  permanently shut down. We updated the data as necessary to account  for, among other things, reactors shutting down early. In describing the  rate at which spent nuclear fuel accumulates, we assumed that except for  the few reactors that have announced early permanent shutdown dates,  the nation’s current reactors continue to operate through a 20-year  extended license period and continue to produce spent nuclear fuel at the  same rate; that no new reactors are brought online, and that the  generation of spent nuclear fuel declines as reactors shut down. To  ensure the accuracy of our estimates, we provided selected sections of  the draft report to representatives from the Nuclear Energy Institute for  their review and comment. We incorporated their comments, as  appropriate, in the final report.
To identify the basis of federal liability for spent nuclear fuel management  to date and of DOE’s estimate of future liabilities, we reviewed documents  from the Departments of Energy (DOE) and Justice. These documents  included a generic Department of Justice settlement agreement, DOE’s  annual memorandums that described the liability estimate, and DOE’s  annual financial reports that include the figures on the cumulative  amounts paid to settle with utilities for DOE’s inability to accept spent  nuclear fuel for disposal and the estimated remaining liability. In addition,  we interviewed officials from DOE and the Department of Justice. We  also relied on our prior work (GAO-10-48) to provide information on the  typical costs that may contribute to the federal government’s future  liabilities. To ensure that we had complete and accurate information on  these costs, we provided selected sections of the draft report to  representatives from the Nuclear Energy Institute for their review and  comment. We incorporated their comments, as appropriate, in the final  report.
To assess the challenges, if any, that experts and stakeholders have  identified to the federal government’s ability to meet DOE’s time frames  for managing spent nuclear fuel at consolidated interim storage facilities  and potential ways for DOE to mitigate the challenges, we identified  individuals with spent nuclear fuel management experience and  expertise. In our prior work (GAO-10-48), we had already identified  experts in spent nuclear fuel management. Starting with this group and  using a snowballing technique, we asked experts about their own  expertise and also asked each expert or stakeholder to recommend other  individuals that we might consider including in our discussions. We  determined that we had a sufficient sample of relevant experts and  stakeholders when the names of experts and stakeholders recommended  to us became repetitive and when we determined that we had a balanced  set of viewpoints represented. In total, we interviewed over 90 individuals,  including federal officials, who represented a wide range of viewpoints  and expertise. However, our selection of experts is nongeneralizable, in  that opinions cannot be generalized to other experts or tallied, either  within or across types of expertise.
Once identified, we contacted the individuals and confirmed their  familiarity with the issues. Before we began each interview, we asked the  individual to provide information on his or her background, including  education, employment history, and experiences related to spent nuclear  fuel management to assess their level of expertise. In addition, we asked  all interview participants to self-assess their expertise in various aspects  of spent nuclear fuel management such as the political, technological,  and regulatory issues related to spent nuclear fuel management. Using  our professional judgment, we assessed the level of expertise for each  individual in the different issues we considered in our analysis. Opinions  of experts on a topic outside their own area of expertise are sometimes  presented as the opinions of “stakeholders.” In some cases, the same  individual might be considered an expert in one specific issue, but a  stakeholder on another issue.
Generally, the experts and stakeholders represented their organization’s  views. The experts and stakeholders we consulted included:
DOE in headquarters, field offices, and scientists from several  national laboratories, including Argonne National Laboratory, Oak  Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory,  and Sandia National Laboratories; officials from other federal agencies and organizations involved with  spent nuclear fuel management activities, including the Department of  Navy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Nuclear Waste  Technical Review Board;  state, local, and regional governments or organizations, including the  states of Nevada, Texas, and Utah; the State of Minnesota Public  Utilities Commission; Eddy County, New Mexico; and Nye County,  Nevada; Council of State Governments, Eastern Regional  Conference; National Association of Regulatory Utility  Commissioners; the National Conference of State Legislatures;  Southern States Energy Board; The Council of State Governments,  Midwestern Office; Western Governors’ Association; Western  Interstate Energy Board;  industry: including AHL Consulting; AREVA; Association of American  Railroads; Chicago Bridge & Iron; Dairyland Power Cooperative;  Dominion; Duke Energy; Energy Resources International, Inc.; Energy  Solutions, Inc.; Exelon Corporation; Kouts Consulting; L. Barrett  Consulting; Nuclear Energy Institute; Nuclear Waste Strategy  Coalition; Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP; PSEG Nuclear, LLC;  Tennessee Valley Authority; The Brattle Group; Governmental  Strategies, Inc.; The Yankee Nuclear Power Companies: Yankee  Atomic, Connecticut Yankee, and Maine Yankee; Van Ness Feldman  LLP; and Xcel Energy;  representatives from a range of interest groups, including Beyond  Nuclear, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Natural  Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Information and Resource  Service, Southwest Research and Information Center, Union of  Concerned Scientists, U.S. Chamber of Commerce – Institute for 21st  Century Energy; and  independent entities, including Black Mountain Research; Carnegie  Institution for Science; Kadak Associates; Leroy Law Office; National  Research Council, National Academy of Sciences; TA Frazier LLC;  and University of Oklahoma.
To ensure we asked consistent questions among all the indentified  experts and stakeholders, we developed a data collection instrument that  included broad questions related to the challenges, if any, to the federal  government’s ability to meet DOE’s time frames for accepting spent  nuclear fuel at consolidated interim storage facilities. We pre-tested the  instrument with a few individual experts and stakeholders to ensure that  our questions were clear and would provide us with the information that  we needed. After each pretest, we refined the instrument, accordingly.  We analyzed the interviews to identify consistent themes and issues that  emerged. See appendix II for a list of the experts and stakeholders whom  we interviewed and their affiliations.
In addition to the interviews, we reviewed relevant documents, such as  DOE’s January 2013 strategy for the management and disposal of used  nuclear fuel and high level waste and the January 2012 Blue Ribbon  Commission on America’s Nuclear Future’s report to the Secretary of  Energy. We also reviewed documents prepared by the organizations that  we interviewed and attended conferences sponsored by relevant  organizations, including  the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board’s Technical  Workshop on the Impacts of Dry Storage Canister Designs on the  Future Handling, Storage, Transportation, and Geologic Disposal of  Spent Nuclear Fuel in the United States;  the Nuclear Energy Institute’s Used Fuel Management Conference;  and  the Bipartisan Policy Center’s regional meeting of Identifying a Path  Forward on America’s Nuclear Waste.
We also interviewed officials from the Department of Transportation and  the Environmental Protection Agency. According to officials from these  agencies, each agency has a specified role with respect to regulating  transportation and interim storage of spent nuclear fuel. According to  Department of Transportation officials, the agency coordinates and  shares responsibility with the NRC on issues related to transporting spent  nuclear fuel as stipulated in a memorandum of understanding between  the two agencies. According to Environmental Protection Agency officials,  the agency has a regulatory framework in place for storage of spent  nuclear fuel that will allow NRC to license interim storage facilities.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2013 to October  2014, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Spent Nuclear Fuel Experts and Stakeholders We Interviewed
paragraphs: Appendix II: Spent Nuclear Fuel Experts and  Stakeholders We Interviewed State of Minnesota Public Utilities Commission  The Yankee Nuclear Power Companies: Yankee Atomic, Connecticut Yankee,   and Maine Yankee  Eddy County, New Mexico  National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences  U.S. Chamber of Commerce – Institute for 21st Century Energy  Southwest Research and Information Center  National Conference of State Legislatures  Nuclear Regulatory Commission  Affiliation  Oak Ridge National Laboratory  The Council of State Governments, Midwestern Office  Institute for Energy and Environmental Research  Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board  National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners  Nuclear Information and Resource Service  Energy Solutions, Inc.
Department of Energy  Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP  Governmental Strategies, Inc.
Energy Resources International, Inc.
section_title: Appendix III: Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Stored in Wet, Dry, and Shutdown Storage Sites (Text for Interactive Figure 5)
paragraphs: Appendix III: Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel  Stored in Wet, Dry, and Shutdown Storage  Sites (Text for Interactive Figure 5)
1.  Beaver Valley  2.  Callaway  3.  Clinton  4.  Fermi  5.  Shearon Harris  6.  Pilgrim  7.  South Texas Project  8.  Virgil C. Summer  9.  Three Mile Island  10.  Watts Bar  11.  Wolf Creek  12.  GE Morris  1.  Arkansas Nuclear One  2.  Braidwood  3.  Browns Ferry  4.  Brunswick  5.  Byron  6.  Calvert Cliffs  7.  Catawba  8.  Columbia Generating Station  9.  Comanche Peak  10.  Cooper  11.  Davis-Besse  12.  Diablo Canyon  13.  Donald C. Cook  14.  Dresden  15.  Duane Arnold  16.  Joseph M. Farley  17.  James A. FitzPatrick  18.  Fort Calhoun  19.  R.E. Ginna  20.  Grand Gulf  21.  Edwin I. Hatch  22.  Hope Creek  23.  Indian Point  24.  La Salle  25.  Limerick  26.  McGuire  27.  Millstone  28.  Monticello  29.  Nine Mile Point  30.  North Anna  31.  Oconee  32.  Oyster Creek  33.  Palisades  34.  Palo Verde  35.  Peach Bottom  36.  Perry  37.  Point Beach  38.  Prairie Island  39.  Quad Cities  40.  River Bend  41.  H. B. Robinson  42.  St. Lucie  43.  Salem  44.  Seabrook  45.  Sequoyah  46.  Surry  47.  Susquehanna  48.  Turkey Point  49.  Vermont Yankee  50.  Vogtle  51.  Waterford  1.  Big Rock Point  2.  Maine Yankee  3.  Yankee Rowe  4.  Haddam Neck  5.  Crystal River  6.  Kewaunee  7.  La Crosse  8.  Zion  9.  Trojan  10.  Humboldt Bay  11.  Rancho Seco  12.  San Onofre  1.  Alabama  2.  Arizona  3.  Arkansas  4.  California  5.  Connecticut  6.  Florida  7.  Georgia  8. Illinois  9. Iowa  10.  Kansas  11.  Louisiana  12.  Maine  13.  Maryland  14.  Massachusetts  15.  Michigan  16.  Minnesota  17.  Mississippi  18.  Missouri  19.  Nebraska  20.  New Hampshire  21.  New Jersey  22.  New York  23.  North Carolina  24.  Ohio  25.  Oregon  26.  Pennsylvania  27.  South Carolina  28.  Tennessee  29.  Texas  30.  Vermont  31.  Virginia  32.  Washington  33.  Wisconsin  In addition, there are three permanently shutdown reactors at sites that continue to have operating  reactors. The sites that have both shutdown and operating reactors include the Dresden, Indian Point,  and Millstone sites. Of the 12 shutdown reactor sites, the Zion site has two permanently shutdown  reactors and the San Onofre site has three permanently shutdown reactors. Also, the operator at the  Vermont Yankee site has announced that it plans to shut down the reactor at the end of 2014.
section_title: Appendix IV: Additional Information on the Spent Nuclear Fuel Settlement Agreements
paragraphs: The settlement agreements between the Department of Justice and the  owners or generators of spent nuclear fuel have not been identical and  have changed over time. For example, from 2004 through 2009, the  Department of Justice settled with six owners and generators  representing 40 of the 118 reactors covered under the standard contract.  Under the settlement agreements—known as the Exelon Settlement  agreements—it was assumed that the Department of Energy (DOE)  would have accepted spent nuclear fuel for disposal at a rate of 900  metric tons per year from 1998 through 2014, and at a rate of 2,100  metric tons per year thereafter. Under the Exelon Settlement agreements,  DOE is liable for spent nuclear fuel storage costs that owners and  generators would not have incurred if DOE had accepted and disposed of  the fuel at this rate. Beginning in 2011, the Department of Justice began  using a new settlement agreement—called the New Framework  Settlement agreement. As of September 8, 2014, the Department of  Justice reported that it has executed New Framework Settlement  Agreements with 20 litigants representing 45 reactors covered under the  standard contract. These settlement agreements do not supersede the  Exelon agreements, which remain effective for the parties that settled  through 2009. The New Framework Settlement agreements assumed a  higher rate of acceptance of spent nuclear fuel, based on an appellate  decision. Specifically, the new settlement agreements assumed that DOE  would have accepted spent nuclear fuel for disposal at a rate of 1,200  metric tons per year from 1998 through 2002; 2,000 metric tons in 2003;  2,650 metric tons per year from 2004 through 2007; and 3,000 metric  tons per year beginning in 2008. The result is that some types of spent  nuclear fuel storage costs for which owners and generators were deemed  responsible under the Exelon Settlement agreement are now a DOE  liability under the new settlement agreements.
According to a Department of Justice document used to discuss  settlements for the owners and generators covered by the New  Framework Settlement agreements, there are five categories of  reimbursable costs:  1.  Additional Pool Storage: Costs to purchase, license, and install  new, additional, or replacement storage racks or to make available  additional storage spaces to the extent, and only to the extent,  necessary to provide additional capacity in the spent nuclear fuel pool  at the site.  2.  Dry Storage Costs: Costs to purchase canisters and casks, including  canisters that may be licensed for transport and casks for transferring  spent nuclear fuel to the dry storage facility; costs to load spent  nuclear fuel into and to transport canisters and casks to the dry  storage facility; costs of ancillary equipment for casks and cask  loading, such as crawler-type transporters, dollies, and vacuum-drying  equipment; costs to conduct initial loading demonstrations required by  the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); costs for training and  development of procedures; costs for cask-loading campaign  mobilization and demobilization; costs to study and to evaluate spent  nuclear fuel storage options; costs for quality assurance inspections of  cask vendors; costs for security improvements required by NRC for  the dry storage facility; costs of maintaining and operating the dry  storage facility; costs for security improvements or upgrades required  to comply with utility’s security plan approved by the NRC; and costs  to design, license and build the dry storage facility, including costs of  building the portion of the facility that will be required for the dry  storage of the utility’s spent nuclear fuel in addition to utility’s  allocations, provided that the utility can demonstrate that it was more  cost effective to incur the costs to design, license and build the dry  storage facility during the claim period rather than after termination of  the agreement. If the utility previously constructed a dry storage  facility for reasons other than to store the utility’s allocations or needs  to place, or places, items other than canisters or casks containing the  utility’s allocations in dry storage, only the costs attributable to the  portion of the dry storage facility needed to store the utility’s  allocations will be allowable.  3.  Modifications of the Existing Plant: Costs paid to modify cranes to  the extent, and only to the extent, necessary to increase the rated  lifting capacity of the crane(s) used in the loading of spent nuclear fuel  from the fuel storage pool, provided that the utility can establish that  these modifications would not have been necessary to meet the  requirements of NUREG-0612 or load spent nuclear fuel in casks or  canisters provided by DOE had DOE begun performance in 1998;  building modifications that the utility can establish would not have  been necessary to load spent nuclear fuel into casks or canisters  provided by DOE (e.g., seismic restraints for fuel pool or upgrades to  floor of cask-loading area); and costs to improve the haul path from  the fuel building to the dry storage facility, to the extent that the haul  path is different from the path that the utility would have used to  deliver fuel to DOE. If the utility incurs costs for site modifications or  equipment purchases to store the utility’s allocations that otherwise  benefit the operation of the plant, including crane modifications for  purposes other than loading storage canisters or casks, the cost  reimbursed will be proportional to the benefit to the operation of the  plant.  4.  Property Taxes: Costs paid as a result of any increase in assessed  property tax resulting from and traceable to projects, as identified in  the preceding three paragraphs, that were undertaken to provide  additional storage for the utility’s allocations.  5.  Labor and Overhead: The cost of labor charged directly by the  utility’s employees to any project that is otherwise allowable shall be  considered allowable, provided that the hours expended on such  project are charged in accordance with utility’s standard time  recordation system and are identified at the individual employee level.  In addition, the following types of overhead charges will be deemed  allowable provided that the charges are calculated in accordance with  the utility’s established accounting practice and policy: (a) payroll  overheads or “burdens” associated with labor hours charged to  allowable projects and (b) non-payroll overheads allocated to  allowable projects claimed up to a maximum of 5 percent of the  portion of the utility’s claim which is otherwise allowable and to which  such non-payroll overheads are allocated.
section_title: Appendix V: Process and Costs of Transferring Spent Nuclear Fuel from Wet to Dry Storage (Text for Interactive Figure 7)
paragraphs: Appendix V: Process and Costs of  Transferring Spent Nuclear Fuel from Wet to  Dry Storage (Text for Interactive Figure 7)
Nuclear power reactor and spent nuclear fuel pools—Spent nuclear fuel typically  cools for at least 5 years in a pool before a canister ($700,000 to $1.5 million) is placed in  the pool, filled with spent nuclear fuel, removed from the pool, and dried. A reusable steel  transfer cask ($1.5 million to $3 million) provides shielding for nearby workers as the  spent nuclear fuel is transferred from the pool and placed into either a vertical or  horizontal dry storage system. The process of transferring spent nuclear fuel, excluding  the canister, transfer cask, and storage system costs $150,000 to $550,000. Then the  canister is placed into either a vertical or horizontal dry storage system.  Transporter— For vertical storage, a crawler-type transporter ($1 million to $1.5 million)  carries the entire canister and storage cask in a vertical orientation to a storage pad. For  horizontal storage, a tractor with a transfer trailer carries the canister in a reusable  transfer cask in a horizontal orientation ($1.5 million to $3 million) to the horizontal  module.   Vertical storage cask/horizontal storage module—Utilities typically choose either a  vertical storage system ($250,000 to $350,000 per cask) or a horizontal storage system  ($500,000 to $600,000 per module) for a particular site.
Safety and security systems and annual operations—Design, licensing, and  construction of the dry storage facility and safety and security systems ($5.5 million to  $42 million). Annual operations include costs of security, operations, and maintenance  cost. Annual operations at an operating reactor site: $100,000 to $300,000 and at a  shutdown reactor site: $2.5 million to $6.5 million.
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Energy
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Karla Springer (Assistant  Director), Arkelga Braxton, Kevin Bray, Ross Gauthier, Diana C. Goody,  Armetha Liles, Wendell Matt, Mehrzad Nadji, Cynthia Norris, Katrina  Pekar-Carpenter, Timothy Persons (Chief Scientist), Anne Rhodes-Kline,  and Robert Sánchez made key contributions.