Human Capital: Opportunities to Improve Federal Continuity Planning Guidance
Published: 2004-04-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Federal agencies must have the capacity to serve the public during disruptions to normal operations. This depends, in part, on continuity efforts that help agencies marshal, manage, and maintain their most important asset--their people, or human capital. GAO identified the human capital considerations relevant to federal continuity efforts; described efforts by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to address these considerations relevant to continuity of operations (COOP); and described the role Federal Executive Boards (FEB) play in coordinating such efforts outside Washington, D.C.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: According to recognized experts from the private and public sectors, continuity efforts should give priority to the immediate aftermath of a crisis--securing the safety of all employees and addressing the needs of employees who perform essential operations. However, experts noted that additional human capital considerations, especially those associated with the majority of an organization's employees who would be needed to resume all other operations, are also crucial and have not been well developed by many public and private sector organizations. To more fully address human capital considerations, experts identified two human capital principles that should guide all continuity efforts--demonstrating sensitivity to individual employee needs and maximizing the contributions of all employees--and six key organizational actions designed to enhance continuity efforts. FEMA and OPM have exhibited leadership in addressing human capital considerations relevant to COOP, but opportunities to improve exist. For example, while both agencies have issued guidance that addresses securing the safety of all employees and responding to the needs of personnel performing essential operations, neither agency's guidance addresses human capital considerations related to resuming broader agency operations. Although not specifically tasked with coordinating emergency preparedness efforts, including COOP, FEBs are uniquely positioned to do so, given their general responsibility for improving coordination among federal activities in areas outside of Washington, D.C. While some FEBs already play an active role in coordinating such efforts, the current context in which FEBs operate, including the lack of a clearly defined role and varying capacities among FEBs, could lead to inconsistent levels of preparedness across the nation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The events of September 11, 2001, vividly demonstrated how important it  is, both symbolically and functionally, for federal government agencies to  continue to serve the American public during any emergency or situation  that may disrupt normal operations. Yet terrorist-related incidents are only  one in a broad spectrum of emergencies that can disrupt an agency’s  normal operations.  Agencies need a high level of preparedness to deal with  the full range of emergencies, including man-made disasters, whether  intentional or not; acts of nature, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, or  disease; and technological emergencies, including cyber-attacks or  computer viruses.
Continuity of operations (COOP) efforts are a comprehensive set of steps  agencies must undertake to help ensure that they can continuously provide  essential operations and resume full services to the American public in the  face of long-term, severe emergencies requiring agencies to occupy  alternate facilities.  This capacity to serve the public during any type of  disruption to normal operations depends, in part, on the ability of federal  agencies to marshal, manage, and maintain their most important asset— their people, or human capital.  The planning efforts that help agencies  build the capacity to effectively implement COOP may also help agencies  more effectively implement basic emergency preparedness procedures in  dealing with less severe disruptions to normal operations.
In response to your request that we identify the human capital  considerations in COOP emergencies, this report (1) identifies the human  capital considerations that are relevant to federal agencies’ continuity  planning and implementation efforts; (2) describes the COOP guidance  provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and  emergency preparedness guidance and activities of the Office of Personnel  Management (OPM) to address human capital considerations relevant to  COOP; and (3) describes the role Federal Executive Boards (FEB) play,  relevant to COOP, in coordinating efforts outside the Washington, D.C.,  area.
To address human capital considerations that are relevant to continuity  planning and implementation efforts, we reviewed relevant literature, such  as industry journals, federal guidance, and codes of standards on  disaster/emergency management and continuity programs.  Because the  available literature was limited in its attention to human capital, we  conducted semistructured interviews and held a 1-day interactive working  session with experts from the private sector, federal agencies, and other  public sector organizations.  With input from the National Academy of  Public Administration, the Private Sector Council, and FEMA, the experts  were selected based on their experience and knowledge of human capital  or emergency management as it relates to continuity.
Individuals from a total of 15 organizations, in addition to FEMA, provided  their expertise.  The organizations included five federal agencies—the  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Department of Housing  and Urban Development, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the General  Services Administration, and the Social Security Administration; five  private sector businesses—the Gillette Company, Lockheed Martin  Corporation, Macy’s West, Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc., and  Science Applications International Corporation; and five public  institutions—the Business Continuity Institute, the Disaster Recovery  Institute International, Emergency Management Alberta (Canada), Clark- Atlanta University, and the University of Tasmania (Australia).  We  supplemented the information from the expert panel by interviewing  officials from OPM, representatives from FEBs, and representatives from  federal employee unions.
To describe the COOP guidance issued by FEMA and the emergency  preparedness guidance and activities of OPM, we interviewed officials  from both agencies and analyzed relevant documents, including Federal  Preparedness Circular (FPC) 65, which is the primary federal COOP  guidance, and a series of emergency preparedness memorandums issued  by the Director of OPM.  To describe the role FEBs play in coordinating  federal efforts relevant to COOP, we interviewed officials from OPM and  the Chicago, Cleveland, and Philadelphia FEBs.
Our review was conducted from February through December 2003 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.   Appendix I provides additional information on our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The policy of the U.S. government is to have in place a comprehensive and  effective program to ensure continuity of essential federal functions under all circumstances.  COOP planning is an effort conducted by individual  agencies to fulfill that policy and assure that the capability exists to  continue essential agency functions across a wide range of potential  emergencies.  COOP has been closely associated with continuity of  government programs, which are meant to ensure the survival of our  constitutional form of government.  COOP was first conceived during the  Cold War to ensure that the U.S. government would be able to continue to  function in case of a nuclear war.  However, in the wake of the demise of  the Soviet Union and the reduced threat of nuclear attack in the early  1990s, COOP planning languished.
Following the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and the Oklahoma City  bombing in 1995, COOP as a program was given renewed attention based  on the recognition of emerging threats and the need to continue essential  functions of the federal government in an all-hazards environment, which  includes acts of nature, accidents, technological emergencies, and  incidents related to military or terrorist attacks.  A series of Presidential  Decision Directives (PDD) was issued that began to link programs for  terrorism, critical infrastructure protection, and COOP.  In addition, as we  approached the turn of the century, federal agencies also dealt with the  Year 2000 computer problem by developing business continuity and  contingency plans to ensure program delivery in the event of a technology  failure or malfunction.  Federal COOP efforts have evolved by building  upon the planning for each of these events that focused on protecting  critical infrastructure, both physical systems and cyber-based systems.  The  events of September 11, 2001, highlighted in dramatic fashion the  vulnerabilities agencies face in each of these areas and focused new  attention on the effects such events have on agencies’ most important  assets—their people, or human capital.
FEMA, the General Services Administration (GSA), and OPM are the three  agencies that have the most direct impact on individual agency efforts to  develop viable COOP capabilities.  PDD 67, which outlined individual  agency responsibilities for COOP, identified FEMA as the executive agent  for federal COOP planning.  As executive agent, FEMA has the  responsibility for formulating guidance, facilitating interagency  coordination, and assessing the status of COOP capability across the  federal executive branch.  PDD 67 also required GSA to work with FEMA in  providing COOP training for federal agencies and to assist agencies in  acquiring alternate facilities.  In addition, the Federal Management  Regulation requires GSA to lead federal Occupant Emergency Program  (OEP) efforts, which are short-term emergency response programs that  establish procedures for safeguarding lives and property during  emergencies in particular facilities.  As the President’s agent and advisor  for human capital matters, OPM has been actively involved in federal  emergency preparedness efforts.  OPM has issued a series of emergency  preparedness guides for federal managers, employees, and their families;  issued a number of memorandums relating to planning, preparedness, and  the flexibilities available to agencies in emergency situations; and held  emergency planning and preparedness forums to help agencies select  emergency personnel.  In addition, FEMA, GSA, and OPM collaborate to  implement the Federal Workforce Release Decision and Notification  Protocol when emergency situations occur in the Washington, D.C., area.
section_title: Human Capital Considerations Are Relevant to Continuity Planning and Implementation Efforts
paragraphs: The current literature indicates, and experts that we consulted confirmed,  that the immediate response to a crisis should give priority to securing the  safety of all employees and addressing the needs of employees who  perform or directly support essential operations.  For example, the  standard for emergency management and business continuity, which was  developed by the National Fire Protection Association and endorsed by  FEMA, recommends that organizations include the following priorities in  their continuity program: ensuring the safety and health of employees,  establishing critical functions and processes, and identifying essential  representatives.
Consequently, the experts said that these priorities have received most of  the human capital attention in continuity efforts for both the private and  public sectors, including federal agencies.  Appropriately, organizations  focus on minimizing the loss of life and injuries, which is key to all other  recovery efforts.  Such efforts commonly include first aid training,  evacuation plans and drills, and dismissal policies.  Organizations also  focus on identifying the core group of employees that will establish and  maintain essential operations as dictated by an organization’s mission.   Organizations, for example, commonly identify leadership structures to  manage crisis response.  Even so, experts noted that organizations vary  widely in their effectiveness in addressing these priorities.
The continuity process, however, extends beyond the goals of life safety  and the performance of essential operations.  The experts identified a  number of human capital considerations beyond these goals that are not  well addressed.  For example, the priorities discussed above do not address  human capital considerations for employees who are not involved in  providing essential functions.  Such employees would be associated with  efforts to fully resume all other operations and represent the majority of an  organization.
The experts identified two principles that should guide actions to more  fully address human capital considerations applicable to all continuity  planning and implementation efforts.  The first is recognizing and  remaining sensitive to employees’ personal needs during emergencies  when shaping the appropriate organizational expectations of employees.   The emergency event that activates continuity plans may also cause  emergency events in the personal lives of individual employees.  Similar to  an organization placing its highest priority on the safety and well-being of  its employees, employees may have high-priority responsibilities to others.   These personal responsibilities may limit employees’ ability to contribute  to mission accomplishment until these other obligations are satisfied.
The second principle experts identified is maximizing the contributions of  all employees, whether in providing essential operations or resuming full  services.  This should be done within the limits of an employee’s ability to  contribute given the situation, as described in principle one, and within the  limits of the organization to use those contributions effectively.  According  to the experts, the experience of organizations during emergencies has  been that employees remain motivated to contribute to organizational  results, which is increasingly felt the longer the emergency continues.   Enabling employees to contribute promotes more effective delivery of  essential operations and more rapid resumption of full operations.  In  addition, in extreme disruptions of employees’ personal circumstances,  providing purposeful activities helps avoid the debilitating affects of a  disruption on employees, including job-related anxiety and post–traumatic  stress disorder.
The experts we interviewed also identified six organizational actions to  enhance continuity planning and implementation efforts, listed in figure 1.
Each of these actions is described in more detail below.
Our past work has shown that the demonstrated commitment of top  leaders is perhaps the single most important element of successful change  management and transformation efforts.  Effective continuity efforts have  the visible support and commitment of their organization’s top leadership.   According to the experts, traditional continuity planning focuses on the  operations side of recovery and often overlooks human capital  considerations.  As such, it is important for top leadership to ensure that  the appropriate balance is achieved in considering physical infrastructure,  technology, and human capital.  In providing leadership prior to the  emergency, leaders demonstrate their commitment to human capital by  establishing plans that value the organization’s intention to manage  employees with sensitivity to their individual circumstances, recover  essential operations on a priority basis, and resume other operations as  quickly as possible.
Organizational leaders show commitment to continuity planning by  allocating resources and setting policies that effectively meet the  organization’s continuity needs.  The experts told us that committed  leaders provide sufficient funding and staff to conduct planning and  preparation efforts effectively.  While the resources needed vary from  location to location within an organization, the experts said that  organizations should have enough resources available to develop effective  plans, test critical systems, train all staff, and conduct simulation exercises.   Committed top leadership also ensures that clear policies and procedures  are in place for all aspects of continuity to ensure that quick and effective  decisions are made during times of emergencies.  Those policies and  procedures should be fair, shared with employees and their representatives  in advance of an emergency, and able to be consistently applied to all  employees.  Experts and union leaders we met with agree that the  cooperation and input from all components within the organization,  including employees and their representatives, is important in developing  these policies.
Following a disruption to normal operations, top leadership sets the  direction and pace of organizational recovery.  According to the experts,  top leadership sets direction by providing the legitimate and identifiable  voice of the organization for employees to rally around during tumultuous  times.  An expert from Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc., a company that  lost over 350 people in the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001,  noted that in the aftermath of an emergency there is a fundamental need for  a strong, visible leader to provide constant reassurance.  The expert added  that “employees need to know that someone is in control, even if the  leaders do not know all the answers.”  In addition, top leaders set the pace  of organizational recovery by providing leadership to both the management  team leading recovery of essential operations and the management team  leading the resumption of all other operations.
As we have previously reported, effective organizations integrate human  capital approaches as strategies for accomplishing their mission and  programmatic goals.  According to the experts, strategic decisions made to  improve day-to-day operations, including human capital approaches, and  those made to build continuity readiness are not exclusive of one another  and may have synergies.  For example, early in 2001, GAO made the  business decision to supply all of its analysts with laptop computers for  financial reasons and to provide employees with flexibility in carrying out  their work.  That business decision, however, also contributed to our ability  to quickly adapt to unforeseeable circumstances in October 2001.  In  response to the release of anthrax bacteria on Capitol Hill, we opened our  doors to the 435 members of the House of Representatives and selected  members of their staffs.  Over 1,000 GAO employees were immediately able  to make use of their laptops to work from alternate locations.   Consequently, we minimized the disruption to our operations and assisted  the House of Representatives in continuing its operations.  To take  advantage of such synergies, the experts said that decisions regarding  continuity efforts should be integrated with broader business decision  making.
The integration of continuity planning with broader decision making helps  to ensure that the direction of all efforts is consistent and provides mutual  benefits.  In a limited resource environment, consideration of how  continuity investments benefit other program efforts also helps to  strengthen the business case for human capital investments that are meant  to improve continuity capabilities, day-to-day operations, or both.
The importance of communication cannot be overstated.  According to the  experts, two-way communication with employees, their representatives,  and other stakeholders is key to building relationships and partnerships  that can facilitate organizational recovery efforts.  We have also previously  reported that communication is most effective when done early, clearly,  often, and is downward, upward, and lateral.  According to a senior  National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) official, the union was able to  capitalize on ongoing two-way communications with the Internal Revenue  Service’s (IRS) regional leadership to provide members with information  following the September 11, 2001, attacks.  For example, during the  recovery efforts, the union provided supplementary channels for  communicating with employees, including daily joint messages from the  IRS Regional Director and the NTEU Chapter President.  In addition, when  the local New York office reopened on September 20, 2001, both the NTEU  National President and the IRS Commissioner greeted employees at the  door.  From the union’s perspective, communication efforts such as these  helped to provide reassurance and support as well as to maintain employee  trust.
According to experts, roles, responsibilities, and performance expectations  must be communicated to all employees, and their representatives, prior to  a disruption to promote the efficient and effective use of all of an  organization’s human capital assets.  Early communication enables  employees to assess and communicate to the organization any personal  circumstances that may limit their ability to carry out those roles.  The  experts and union officials whom we spoke with agreed that in some cases,  more formal communication vehicles, such as memorandums of  understanding or addenda to collective bargaining agreements, may be  necessary to negotiate changes or clarify roles and responsibilities in  continuity plans.
Because effective emergency two-way communication depends greatly on  technology, alternate and redundant communication infrastructures are  necessary.  In addition to technological vulnerabilities that can render  different methods of communication useless, people frequently do not  remain tied to the contact number or location listed in emergency records.   To address these challenges, Macy’s West, for example, has built an  alternate emergency communication system that serves as an employee  message retrieval system.  The system, which is based outside of the region  in case the local phone networks are overloaded, allows (1) the leadership  of Macy’s West to leave messages with instructions for employees,  (2) family members to leave messages for employees, and (3) employees to  leave messages for their loved ones.
Our past work has shown that organizations should consider making  targeted investments in human capital approaches, such as training and  development.  According to the experts, training and development  programs related to continuity efforts can help to raise awareness among  all employees.  The Social Security Administration (SSA), for example, has  developed a video-training course to provide an overview of COOP, which  includes an introduction from the Commissioner explaining why COOP is  so important, a discussion of SSA’s critical workloads and how they would  be processed during a disruption, and references to federal guides and  information.  The experts noted that less formal approaches, such as  continuity planning awareness weeks, could also help to raise awareness.
Our recent work has indicated that training and development programs  build skills and competencies that enable employees to fill new roles and  work in different ways, which helps to build organizational flexibility.   According to experts, the training and development goals for employees  assigned to the team that performs essential operations differ from those  for the employees assigned to the team that is responsible for resuming all  other organizational operations.  The goal for the team that performs  essential operations is to achieve “critical depth,” which occurs when an  adequate number of employees are available to staff each critical function,  in the event that a member of the team expected to perform that function is  unavailable.  Organizations can build critical depth in various ways,  including using exercises that simulate an emergency to train backup  employees alongside employees who have primary responsibility for an  essential operation, or allowing backup employees to perform the  operation while the primary employees oversee and critique their  performance.  In addition, critical depth can be built through succession  planning.  To be effective for this purpose, however, the scope of  succession planning is extended to recognize that there is no time to  develop successors in an emergency and incrementally increase levels of  authority as an individual matures in a position.  Therefore, organizations  may have to plan to use predecessors to a position, including retirees, as  successors.
With regard to the team that is responsible for resuming all other  organizational operations, experts said that the training and development  goal is to build sufficient breadth to enable members to contribute to  resumption efforts in a variety of ways.  For example, development  programs requiring employees to rotate within an organization to learn a  variety of positions, potentially at a variety of locations, contribute to  critical breadth.  We have previously reported that developmental  assignments place employees in new roles or unfamiliar job environments  in order to strengthen skills and competencies and broaden their  experience.
Effective training and development initiatives also help to foster a culture  that is characterized by flexible employees who are empowered to make  effective decisions independently.  According to experts, such a culture is  often critical to agency recovery and resumption efforts.  Experts from  Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc., reported that effective decision- making abilities could be developed through formal training about the  parameters in which employees are empowered to make decisions and on- the-job experiences demonstrating how employees can exercise authority  in making decisions that manage, rather than avoid, risk and are focused on  achieving results.
The events of September 11, 2001, give ample evidence of the dedication  and flexibility of federal, state, and local government employees in  providing services to the American public.  Disruption of normal  operations challenges an organization to use this dedication and flexibility  to its advantage, especially with regard to employees associated with the  resumption of all operations that are not considered essential.  According  to the experts, organizations may use approaches such as telework and  geographic dispersion, which includes regional structure, to increase the  ways in which employees may contribute.  As OPM guidance has  underscored and presenters at a recent conference held by the  International Telework Association and Council noted, telework is an  important and viable option for federal agencies in COOP planning and  implementation efforts, especially as the duration of the emergency event  is extended.  However, to make effective use of telework, experts told us  that organizations should identify those employees who are expected to  telework during a disruption and communicate that expectation to them in  advance.  In addition, organizations should provide teleworkers with  adequate support in terms of tools, training, and guidance. Geographic  dispersion can also provide a way for employees associated with  resumption activities to continue their normal functions albeit at or  through other locations.  For example, SSA recognizes that its field  structure enables the agency to make use of both multiple locations and  telework in providing its employees ways to contribute because most field  functions can be transferred fairly easily from one location to another in  the same region or performed remotely with laptop computers.  Based on  these efforts, SSA does not envision a scenario in which its field employees  would not contribute to their normal functions for more than 72 hours.
Employees demonstrate their flexibility by a willingness to contribute to  the organization in roles that may be unusual.  According to the experts,  flexible employees contribute as best they can usually in the following  sequence: (1) providing support to the team performing essential  operations, if needed; (2) continuing to contribute to their normal mission- related functions; (3) performing an alternate contribution for their  organization; or if none of these can be accomplished, (4) volunteering in  their communities as a direct form of public service.  Federal employees  may have additional opportunities to contribute to not only their own  agencies’ operations but also other agencies’ operations in serving the  American people.  In addition, a recent memorandum from OPM recognizes  the value of federal employees contributing to the general public through  community volunteer service in the range of alternative contributions.
Employees associated with providing essential operations may be working  under unusual pressures for extended periods of time, and organizations  need to consider ways to sustain these efforts.  The experts recommend  that if the circumstances of the emergency continue long enough to raise  concerns about burnout, organizations consider providing opportunities  for working in shifts; rotating assignments among team members;  providing relief through the use of qualified employees associated with  resumption activities; reemploying retirees; or utilizing employees from  stakeholder or networked organizations, such as suppliers or contractors.
According to the experts, the ability of organizations to match staffing  requirements with available skills and abilities could be enhanced through  various initiatives, such as job banks, skill profile databases, and pre- arranged partnerships with other organizations or community service  organizations.  For example, job banks that detail additional jobs that may  be required during an emergency but are not considered essential could  allow employees to preselect alternate contributions that they would be  able to perform.  In the federal government, agencies could establish their  own job banks; form interagency partnerships that link the potential needs  of several agencies; and create a cache for volunteer opportunities,  possibly tied to the Citizen Corps.  Organizations with databases that  collect employee knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA)—even those KSAs  outside the scope of an employee’s normal functions—may complement  the job banks by allowing organizations to match available KSAs with the  unmet needs of the organization.
An evaluation process that explicitly identifies and disseminates lessons  learned during disruptions, or simulations of disruptions, promotes  learning among all of an organization’s human capital assets and helps to  improve organizational performance.  An organization that is committed to  learning has an inclusive and supportive process and a framework designed  prior to a disruption to gather important data.  According to experts,  organizations committed to learning will ensure that those employees who  are key to the recovery and resumption efforts are involved in the formal  evaluation process in a timely manner and will seek the input from as many  other employees as possible.  Such an inclusive environment will enable  the organization to discover valuable lessons learned by employees in  unusual circumstances.  In addition, conducting evaluations in a “no- blame,” nonattribution atmosphere and taking organizational ownership of  any problems that might be identified increases the openness with which  participants are willing to share their experiences.  To encourage such an  environment, FEMA officials told us that the agency’s Office of National  Security Coordination has recently implemented a reporting system that  allows any employee to identify lessons learned anonymously during an  emergency, instead of waiting for the formal review process.
Our past work has shown that human capital approaches are best designed  and implemented based on data-driven decisions.  According to experts,  having a framework prior to a disruption helps to gather data important to  evaluating the effectiveness of human capital approaches during a  disruption.  Some measures that they suggested include number of  employees contributing to mission-related outcomes each day; degree of  contribution (e.g., part time or full time); location of employee when  contributing (e.g., at alternate facility or home); type of contribution (e.g.,  performing same function, performing an alternate function within the  department, working with another department, or volunteering); or  obstacles to contribution (e.g., organizational or personal).
Once identified, it is important for the lessons learned during the  evaluation to be made explicit and then widely disseminated.  According to  experts, the manner and formality of documentation and dissemination,  however, depend on the situation or needs of the organization (e.g., after- action reports, detailed analyses, executive summaries, video tapes, CDs,  or Web-based reports).  There are unique opportunities in the federal  government for agencies to share explicit lessons learned both internally  and with other federal agencies and stakeholders.  For example, following  the September 11, 2001, attacks, senior Department of Housing and Urban  Development officials asked the New York Acting Regional Director to  recount her experiences and lessons learned in front of a video camera.   The accounts were edited down into a 30-minute video entitled Thinking  the Unthinkable: Preparing for Disaster.  That video has been used within  the department as a training aid and has been shared with over 50 federal  agencies with the help of the Washington, D.C.–based interagency COOP  Working Group (CWG) and the FEBs in cities across the United States.  In  Canada, Emergency Management Alberta (EMA) employs a centralized  Disruption Incident Reporting System for all government agencies, which  is accessible via the Internet, to obtain timely and accurate reporting of all  disruptions and “most importantly, ensure lessons learned can be  documented for follow-up.”  EMA has also created a Lessons Learned  Warehouse Web site to share continuity lessons learned in all aspects of  crisis management.
section_title: FEMA and OPM Have Exhibited Leadership in Addressing Human Capital Considerations Relevant to COOP
paragraphs: As we stated earlier, the human capital considerations related to life safety  and the needs of personnel performing essential operations have largely  been addressed in continuity efforts.  In the federal government, FEMA has  issued guidance that has addressed these considerations and has  recognized the opportunity to more fully address human capital  considerations in its guidance.  In addition, OPM has issued federal  emergency preparedness guidance relevant to COOP that also addresses  these considerations and is working with FEMA to more fully address  human capital considerations in federal guidance.
subsections: section_title: FEMA Issued Guidance That Addresses Human Capital Considerations, but Recognizes Opportunity to Do More
paragraphs: As executive agent for federal COOP planning, FEMA issued FPC 65 in July  1999 as the primary guidance for agencies developing viable COOP plans.   According to FPC 65, the purpose of COOP planning is to facilitate the  performance of agency essential functions for up to 30 days during any  emergency or situation that may disrupt normal operations.  The five  objectives of a viable COOP plan listed in FPC 65 are (1) ensuring the  continuous performance of an agency’s essential functions during an  emergency; (2) protecting essential facilities, equipment, records, and  other assets; (3) reducing or mitigating disruptions to operations;   (4) reducing loss of life, minimizing damage and losses; and (5) achieving a  timely and orderly recovery from an emergency and resumption of full  service to customers.
The guidance subsequently limits a COOP event to one that significantly  affects the facilities of an organization and requires the establishment of  essential operations at an alternate location.  Therefore, as FEMA  recognizes, the guidance does not apply to significant disruptions that  leave facilities intact, such as a severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)  outbreak that could lead a large number of employees to avoid congested  areas, including their workplaces.  Although a people-only event such as  SARS would significantly disrupt normal operations, the current COOP  guidance would not apply because facilities would remain available.  FPC  65 also indicates that the guidance is for use at all levels and locations of  federal agencies.  FEMA officials acknowledge, however, that the priority  of COOP planning to date has been focused on agency headquarters  located in the Washington, D.C., area.
Given the purpose of COOP and the nature of its objectives, the human  capital considerations FEMA included in the guidance primarily relate to  life safety for all employees and addressing the needs of employees  performing essential operations.  For example, the guidance states that one  of the objectives of COOP is “reducing loss of life, minimizing damage and  losses.”  It also refers to the legal requirement that each agency develop a  viable OEP, which is a short-term emergency response program that  establishes procedures for safeguarding lives and property during  emergencies in particular facilities.  FPC 65 more broadly defines life  safety by including a statement related to the need to consider the health  and emotional well-being of employees on the essential operations team.   Also, with respect to employees who perform essential functions, the  guidance directs agencies to designate an emergency team, delegate  authority, establish orders of succession, develop communication plans,  develop training programs, and provide for accountability.
FEMA officials we spoke with recognized that there is a need to go beyond  the human capital considerations that have already been addressed within  federal COOP guidance in order to achieve the full range of COOP  objectives.  Specifically, FEMA officials agreed that it was particularly  important to deal with the human capital considerations inherent to the  resumption activities needed to fully recover from an emergency.  To that  end, FEMA has taken several steps to more fully address these  considerations.  FEMA has worked with a subcommittee of the interagency  CWG—a Washington, D.C.–based group that meets monthly to discuss  issues related to COOP—to rewrite the federal COOP guidance.  The  agency has requested OPM’s assistance in incorporating these  considerations into the new federal COOP guidance.  FEMA has also  worked in cooperation with us as we developed this report.  As a result,  FEMA officials told us that the draft guidance would include an augmented  discussion of human capital considerations.
section_title: OPM Has Also Exhibited Leadership in Addressing Human Capital Considerations Related to Emergency Preparedness
paragraphs: OPM has also recognized the value of human capital in COOP and other  emergency preparedness efforts.  In a memorandum to the heads of  executive departments and agencies, for example, the Director of OPM  stated that “the American people expect us to continue essential  government services without undue interruption, no matter the  contingency, and Federal agencies must have the human resources to  accomplish their missions, even under the most extreme of  circumstances.”  To this end, OPM has established the Emergency  Preparedness subcommittee of the Chief Human Capital Officers Council  that is tasked with recommending policy changes, legislative changes, or  other strategies for moving the issue forward.  In addition, OPM has  initiated several efforts to help agencies address human capital  considerations in emergency preparedness related to life safety and the  needs of personnel performing essential operations, as well as to recognize  the role that employee organizations and unions could play in supporting  those efforts.  These initiatives are important first steps; however, they do  not fully address human capital considerations related to the resumption of  all agency operations that are not considered essential.
With regard to providing for the safety of all employees, OPM has issued  four preparedness guides to educate federal employees, managers, and  their families on how to protect themselves from a potential biological,  chemical, or radiological release, whether accidental or intentional.  The  guides also spell out the responsibilities of the federal government and  individual agencies to protect employees in the event of an emergency.  In  addition to the guides, OPM has addressed safety issues by revising the  Washington, D.C., area emergency dismissal protocols for federal  employees and contractors, in conjunction with FEMA and GSA; issuing  memorandums to all agency heads detailing the “minimum obligations”  agencies have to secure the safety of federal workers; issuing two  emergency preparedness surveys through which federal agencies could  report on their progress in ensuring the safety of their employees; and  highlighting the role that Employee Assistance Programs can play in  responding to employee needs in emergency situations.
Related to providing for the needs of employees performing or supporting  essential operations, OPM has led two forums focusing on emergency  employee designations and the flexibilities that are available to agencies in  emergency situations.  OPM has also issued a series of memorandums  outlining the existing human resource management flexibilities that  agencies might employ in emergency situations.  Other human capital  flexibilities that are available to agencies in nonemergency situations, such  as telecommuting, job sharing, and flexible scheduling, might provide  additional assistance during emergency situations and are detailed in  OPM’s handbook, Human Resources Flexibilities and Authorities in the  Federal Government.  (See app. II for a list of human resource flexibilities  that agencies may use to respond to emergency situations.)
In addition to initiating efforts to address several human capital  considerations, OPM has highlighted the need to work with and through  employee organizations and unions in developing and executing emergency  management strategies.  For example, OPM has held meetings with federal  labor union leaders and employee associations to discuss relevant  employee safety issues and has specifically encouraged agencies to work  with and share information on preparedness efforts with applicable  employee organizations and unions.  Senior union officials whom we spoke  with from the American Federation of Government Employees and NTEU  agreed that it is important for unions to be involved throughout COOP  planning and implementation efforts.  These officials also stated that  unions could be resources for agencies in communicating with employees,  both before and during an emergency, as well as in engaging employees in  recovery and resumption efforts.
section_title: FEBs Have Opportunities to Coordinate Regional Emergency Planning Efforts, Including COOP, in Major Metropolitan Areas
paragraphs: Although FEMA heads the interagency CWG to help coordinate COOP  efforts in the Washington, D.C., area, the efforts of this group do not apply  to the over 80 percent of federal employees who work outside of this area.   While not specifically tasked with coordinating COOP efforts, FEBs are  generally responsible for improving coordination among federal activities  and programs in major metropolitan areas outside of Washington, D.C.   Under the direction of OPM, FEBs support and promote national initiatives  of the President and the administration and respond to the local needs of  federal agencies and the community.  OPM officials have recognized that  FEBs can add value to regional emergency preparedness efforts, including  COOP, as vehicles for communication, coordination, and capacity building.   To make use of these capabilities, OPM has provided FEBs with relevant  emergency preparedness materials, encouraged FEBs to focus on  preparedness issues in their regions, requested that FEBs test their  emergency communication plans, and encouraged FEBs to inform OPM of  any emergency-related events affecting federal employees in the regions.
The FEBs that we visited are already playing active roles in regional  emergency preparedness and COOP efforts.  For example, the Chicago  FEB has established committees to deal with Disaster Recovery Planning  and Emergency Release; surveyed its member agencies to determine the  status of COOP planning in the region; sponsored a series of seminars, in  conjunction with GSA and FEMA, on topics related to COOP, sheltering in  place, and national security; participated in regional exercises, such as  TOPOFF 2; and sponsored a COOP exercise to provide agencies with a  forum for validating their COOP plans, policies, and procedures.  The  Cleveland FEB has established an emergency preparedness committee to  promote awareness and preparation, developed an Employee Emergency  Contingency Handbook that provides basic actions to respond to  emergencies that may be encountered by federal employees, and helped to  make training available to all federal agencies.  The Philadelphia FEB has  held several COOP workshops for agencies and regularly shares relevant  information with agency officials via e-mail.  In addition, these FEBs play a  role in developing and activating dismissal and closure procedures for  federal agencies located in their particular regions.
Although both OPM officials and the FEB officials whom we spoke with  recognized that FEBs can add value in coordinating emergency  preparedness efforts, including COOP, and that such a role is a natural  outgrowth of general FEB activities, a specific role and responsibilities  have not been defined.  In addition, the current structure in which FEBs  operate results in differing capacities of FEBs across the nation.  For  example, each agency’s participation in FEB activities is voluntary.   Consequently, FEBs can only make recommendations to agencies, without  the ability to require agency compliance.  Also, FEBs rely on host agencies  for funding, which results in variable funding and staffing from year to year  and across FEBs.  OPM has recognized that the roles and capacities of  FEBs vary across the nation and has established an internal working group  to study the strengths and weaknesses of FEBs and develop  recommendations for improving their capacity to coordinate in regions  outside of Washington, D.C.  According to OPM, such efforts in regard to  local emergency preparedness and response will include improving  dissemination of information and facilitation of COOP training and tabletop  exercises; addressing the implications for strategic human capital  management in continuing the operations of the federal government (e.g.,  alternate work schedules, remote work sites, and telecommuting  capabilities); and developing strategies to better leverage the network of  FEBs to help departments and agencies implement their initiatives.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: More fully addressing human capital considerations in emergency  preparedness guidance, including COOP, could improve agency response  capabilities to large-scale COOP emergencies or situations; could help  minimize the impact of more common, yet less catastrophic disruptions  (e.g., snowstorms and short-term power outages); and is consistent with  building a more flexible workforce, which would enhance ongoing efforts  across the federal government to create more responsive human capital  management systems.  As FEMA works to update its federal COOP  guidance and OPM continues to issue emergency preparedness guidance  relevant to COOP, several areas require attention to more fully address  human capital considerations relevant to COOP.
By limiting COOP to situations that necessitate moving to an alternate  facility, agencies are left without guidance for situations in which an  agency’s physical infrastructure is unharmed, but its employees are  unavailable or unable to come to work for an extended period of time.   While facilities and technology would not be affected by such situations,  the unavailability of people to contribute to mission-related outcomes  could cause a significant disruption to normal operations.
Emergency guidance, including COOP, generally does not extend beyond  consideration of life safety and the needs of employees performing  essential operations.  Therefore, the guidance excludes most agency  employees—those who would be associated with resuming all other  operations.
FEBs are uniquely situated to improve coordination of emergency  preparedness efforts, including COOP, in areas outside of Washington, D.C.   However, the context in which FEBs currently operate, including the lack  of a clearly defined role in emergency preparedness efforts, including  COOP, and varying capacities among FEBs, could lead to inconsistent  levels of preparedness across the nation.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under  Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response to take the following  two actions:  Expand the definition of a COOP event in federal guidance to recognize  that severe emergencies requiring COOP implementation can include  people-only events.
Complete efforts to revise federal COOP guidance to more fully address  human capital considerations by incorporating the six organizational  actions identified in this report.
We recommend that the Director of OPM take the following two actions:  Develop and provide additional emergency preparedness guidance to  more fully address human capital considerations by incorporating the  six organizational actions identified in this report.
Determine the desired role for FEBs to play in improving coordination  of emergency preparedness efforts, including COOP, and identify and  address FEB capacity issues to meet that role.  It would be appropriate  for FEBs to be formally incorporated into federal emergency  preparedness guidance, including COOP guidance, for areas outside of  Washington, D.C.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of OPM a  draft of this report for review and comment.  We received written  comments from the Under Secretary of Emergency Preparedness and  Response on behalf of FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security,  which are reprinted in appendix III.  In his comments, the Under Secretary  stated that the draft accurately addressed human capital considerations  relevant to COOP guidance and coordination and noted that DHS and  FEMA will continue to work with OPM and other federal partners to  improve the federal government’s COOP plan by incorporating our  recommendations in its federal COOP guidance.  In addition, he stated that  FEMA would expand its efforts with its regional offices and FEBs to  improve coordination of COOP programs at the regional level.
The Director of OPM also provided written comments, which are reprinted  in appendix IV.  In her comments, the Director noted her appreciation for  our acknowledgement of the agency’s leadership role in addressing human  capital considerations relevant to COOP planning.  However, the Director  of OPM stated that the agency has already carried out our recommendation  to more fully address human capital considerations in emergency  preparedness guidance, including COOP, by incorporating the key actions  identified in the report.  The Director provided numerous examples of  actions OPM has taken to support emergency preparedness efforts, all of  which she noted were influenced by the agency’s human capital  framework.  In addition, the Director also attached an enclosure to the  agency comments that contain examples of OPM’s internal COOP-related  efforts that she believes would be helpful to federal agencies.
Most of the examples of emergency preparedness guidance that the  Director of OPM provided were included in the draft report and deal largely  with the human capital considerations related to life safety and the needs  of personnel performing essential operations.  While such initiatives are  important first steps, there remain opportunities to improve OPM’s  emergency preparedness guidance to include a fuller range of human  capital considerations, particularly related to the resumption of all agency  operations that are not considered essential.  As such, our assessment of  OPM’s guidance and our recommendation for the agency to develop and  provide additional emergency preparedness guidance that incorporates the  key actions identified in the report remain unchanged.
With regard to our second recommendation for OPM to determine the  desired role of FEBs in improving coordination of emergency preparedness  efforts, including COOP, and address any resulting capacity issues, the  Director of OPM stated that the leadership role the agency plays with  respect to FEBs was not sufficiently developed in the report and she  provided examples of OPM’s support for the FEB’s efforts.  Most of the  supporting examples that the Director provided were included in the draft  report.  Moreover, the additional examples generally do not address our  larger point that the role of FEBs in coordinating emergency preparedness  efforts, including COOP, needs to be clearly defined.  As such, we maintain  our conclusion that the context in which FEBs currently operate, including  the lack of a clearly defined role in emergency preparedness efforts and the  varying capacities among FEBs, could lead to inconsistent levels of  preparedness across the nation.
The Director of OPM suggested several clarifications to the report, which  we considered and incorporated where appropriate.  For example, she  suggested both technical and substantive changes to a footnote describing  Federal Executive Associations (FEA) and Federal Executive Councils  (FEC).  While we made technical changes in response to these comments,  our work does not allow us to categorically exclude all FEAs and FECs as  viable options for the coordination of emergency preparedness activities,  as the Director suggested in her response.  Instead, we recognize that any  guidance provided to FEBs would likely be beneficial to FEAs and FECs  despite their differences.  The Director also provided additional details  describing OPM’s internal working group that is studying the strengths and  weaknesses of FEBs, and we have incorporated these details into the  report.
We are sending copies of this report to the Ranking Minority Member,  Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal  Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on  Governmental Affairs; the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House  Committee on Government Reform; the Chairman and Ranking Minority  Member, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, House Committee on  Appropriations; the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member,  Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International  Relations, House Committee on Government Reform; and other interested  congressional parties.  We will also send copies to the Secretary of  Homeland Security, the Under Secretary of Emergency Preparedness and  Response and the Director of OPM.  This report will also be available at no  charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me or William Doherty on (202) 512-6806.  Key contributors to this  report include Kevin J. Conway, Tiffany Tanner, Thomas Beall, Amy Choi,  Amy Rosewarne, John Smale, and Michael Volpe.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of this report were to  identify the human capital considerations that are relevant to federal  agencies’ continuity planning and implementation efforts;   describe the continuity of operations (COOP) guidance provided by the  Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and emergency  preparedness guidance and activities of the Office of Personnel  Management (OPM) to address human capital considerations relevant  to COOP; and  describe the role Federal Executive Boards (FEB) play, relevant to  COOP, in coordinating efforts outside of the Washington, D.C., area.
To address human capital considerations that are relevant to continuity  planning and implementation efforts, we reviewed relevant literature, such  as industry journals, federal guidance, and codes of standards on  disaster/emergency management and continuity programs.  Because the  available literature was limited in its attention to human capital, we based  our work primarily on semistructured interviews with experts from private  sector businesses, federal government agencies, and public institutions.   We first reviewed industry journals, magazines, and Web sites; queried state  and international auditors; attended a national business continuity  conference; and sought input from the National Academy of Public  Administration (NAPA), the Private Sector Council (PSC), and FEMA to  identify individuals or organizations with the relevant knowledge needed to  address our first objective.  We selected individuals or organizations that  had one or more of the following characteristics: (1) experience  responding to, recovering from, and resuming business activities following  an emergency, from which human capital lessons may have been drawn;   (2) experience incorporating human capital considerations into their  organization’s continuity planning efforts; (3) specific human capital  expertise that could be applied to continuity planning and implementation  efforts; and (4) specific continuity expertise that is broad enough to  identify those critical areas that require human capital attention.  When an  organization was selected, we then contacted the organization to identify  the specific individuals who had the relevant expertise.
On the basis of these characteristics and the input from NAPA, PSC, and  FEMA, we selected organizations or individuals within organizations to  obtain a diversity of views from both the public and private sector.   Individuals from a total of 15 organizations, in addition to FEMA, provided  their expertise in addressing our objective.  The organizations include five  federal agencies—the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the  Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of  Veterans Affairs, the General Services Administration, and the Social  Security Administration; five private sector businesses—the Gillette  Company, Lockheed Martin Corporation, Macy’s West, Marsh & McLennan  Companies, Inc., and Science Applications International Corporation; and  five public institutions—the Business Continuity Institute, the Disaster  Recovery Institute International, Emergency Management Alberta  (Canada), Clark-Atlanta University, and the University of Tasmania  (Australia).
We then conducted three cycles of work to identify the human capital  considerations that are relevant to continuity, with each subsequent cycle  building upon the information gathered in previous cycles.  We adopted this  approach because our initial conversations with experts indicated that a  common perspective of the continuity process could help structure and  focus our subsequent interviews with experts about the relevant human  capital considerations.  Cycle one involved conducting semistructured  interviews with experts from FEMA and 5 of the 15 organizations.  We  asked each to describe a view of the entire continuity process from a  human capital perspective.  We used those descriptions to synthesize a  framework that we then shared with each of the first cycle experts for  comment.  The experts generally agreed with the content of the framework  and agreed that it would be useful in focusing subsequent interviews about  human capital considerations.  In the second cycle, we used this  framework as a reference when conducting in-depth, semistructured  interviews with experts from all 15 organizations and FEMA about the  human capital considerations relevant to continuity.  For the third cycle,  we held a 1-day working group, in cooperation with FEMA, to more fully  discuss the human capital considerations previously identified in cycles  one and two.  The interactive nature of the working group, which included  a cross-section of the experts and additional representatives from GAO,  helped to ensure that we had adequately captured the key considerations  relevant to continuity.  As a final check, we provided all of the experts with  a summary document that included the statements used throughout this  report and attributed to the experts.  We asked the experts to review the  statements for fundamental disagreement or fatal flaws.  Almost all experts  responded and generally agreed with our treatment of these issues.
To supplement information we received in the three cycles, we held  additional interviews with officials from OPM; representatives from the  Chicago, Cleveland, and Philadelphia FEBs; and representatives from the  National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) and the American Federation  of Government Employees (AFGE).  We spoke with representatives of the  FEBs because the FEBs’ role as coordinative bodies in regions across the  nation gives them a unique view of federal emergency preparedness efforts  outside of the Washington, D.C., area.  We spoke with representatives from  NTEU and AFGE because unions can play a key role in addressing human  capital considerations.
To describe the COOP guidance provided by FEMA and emergency  preparedness guidance and activities of OPM to address human capital  considerations relevant to COOP, we interviewed officials from both  agencies.  In addition, we reviewed and analyzed relevant documents.  For  example, we reviewed Federal Preparedness Circular 65, the primary  guidance for federal executive branch COOP, to identify the human capital  considerations that are included in federal COOP guidance.  We also  reviewed OPM publications, including four emergency preparedness  guides and a series of memorandums that list available agency flexibilities  in times of emergencies.
To describe the role FEBs play, relevant to COOP, in coordinating efforts  outside of the Washington, D.C., area, we held interviews with officials  from OPM with responsibility for FEBs nationwide and representatives  from the three FEBs discussed above.
We conducted our work from February 2003 through December 2003 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Emergency Human Capital Flexibilities Listed in OPM Emergency Memorandums
paragraphs: OPM has issued a series of memorandums outlining the existing human  resources management flexibilities that executive departments and  agencies might employ in emergency situations with and without OPM  approval.  Other human capital flexibilities and programs, such as those  detailed in OPM’s handbook, Human Resources Flexibilities and  Authorities in the Federal Government, that are available to agencies in  nonemergency situations may also provide additional assistance in  responding to and recovering from COOP emergencies.  For additional  information on these flexibilities, OPM has advised that agency chief  human capital officers, human resources (HR) directors, or both should  contact their assigned OPM human capital officer.  Employees are advised  to contact their agency HR offices for assistance.
A compilation of the emergency flexibilities outlined by OPM in its  emergency guidance memorandums appears below.
subsections: section_title: Leave
subsections: section_title: Excused Absence
paragraphs: Agencies have the discretion, without OPM approval, to grant excused  absence to employees who are prevented from reporting to work because  of an emergency.  The authority to grant excused absence also applies to  employees who are needed for emergency law enforcement, relief, or  recovery efforts authorized by federal, state, or local officials having  appropriate jurisdiction and whose participation in such activities has been  approved by the employing agency.  Military leave under 5 U.S.C. § 6323(b)  is appropriate for federal employee members of the National Guard or  Reserves who are called up to assist in an emergency.
section_title: Emergency Leave Transfer Program
paragraphs: Subject to approval by the President, OPM may establish an emergency  leave transfer program, which is separate from the federal leave-sharing  program, to assist employees affected by an emergency or major disaster.   Under 5 U.S.C. § 6391, the emergency leave transfer program would permit  employees in an executive agency to donate unused annual leave for  transfer to employees of the same or other agencies who have been  adversely affected by an emergency and who need additional time off work  without having to use their own paid leave.  If agencies believe there is a  need to establish an emergency leave transfer program to assist employees  affected by an emergency, they are to contact their OPM human capital  officer.
section_title: Pay
subsections: section_title: Premium Pay for Employees Performing Emergency Overtime Work
paragraphs: In certain emergency or mission-critical situations, agencies have the  discretion, without OPM approval, to apply an annual premium pay cap  instead of a biweekly premium pay cap, subject to the conditions set forth  in 5 U.S.C. § 5547(b) and 5 C.F.R. § 550.106.  In this regard, the agency head,  his or her designee, or OPM may determine that an emergency exists.   Agencies have the discretion, without OPM approval, to apply an annual  cap to certain types of premium pay for any pay period for (1) employees  performing work in connection with an emergency, including work  performed in the aftermath of such an emergency, or (2) employees  performing work critical to the mission of the agency.  Such employees  may receive premium pay under these conditions only to the extent that the  aggregate of basic pay and premium pay for the calendar year does not  exceed the greater of the annual rate for (1) General Schedule (GS)–15 step  10 (including any applicable special salary rate or locality rate of pay, or   (2) level V of the Executive Schedule.
section_title: Furlough
paragraphs: In some emergency situations, agencies have the discretion, without OPM  approval, to furlough employees, that is, to place them in a temporary  status without duties and pay for nondisciplinary reasons.  Under 5   C.F.R. § 752.404(d)(2), agencies are relieved of the requirement to provide  employees advanced notice and an opportunity to respond when the  furlough is based on “unforeseeable circumstances,” such as a sudden  breakdown in equipment, an act of nature, or a sudden emergency  requiring the agency to immediately curtail activities.
section_title: Benefits
subsections: section_title: Workers’ Compensation Benefits
paragraphs: Workers’ compensation benefits are available when federal employees are  injured or killed while on duty.  The Department of Labor may establish  special procedures to provide direct assistance to affected employees and  their families.
section_title: Expedited Processing of Retirement and Life Insurance Benefits
paragraphs: To assist agencies in responding to employee needs during and after an  emergency situation, OPM may establish special expedited arrangements  for processing disability retirement applications; survivor benefits; and  payments under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program,  currently administered by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.
section_title: Death Gratuity
paragraphs: Under Section 651 of Pub. L. No. 104-208 (Omnibus Consolidated  Appropriations Act, 1997), 5 U.S.C. § 8133 note, agencies have the authority,  without OPM approval, to pay up to $10,000 to the personal representative  of a civilian employee who dies in the line of duty.
section_title: Telework
paragraphs: Agencies have the discretion, without OPM approval, to approve  telecommuting arrangements and alternative work sites to accommodate  emergency situations.  According to OPM, one of the major benefits of the  telework program is the ability of telework employees to continue working  at their alternative work sites during a disruption to operations.  In  recognition of the growing importance of teleworkers in the continuity of  agency operations, OPM states that agencies may wish to modify their  current policies concerning teleworkers and emergency closures.   Agencies may also wish to require that some or all of their teleworkers  continue to work at their alternative work sites on their telework day  during emergency situations when the agency is closed.  Although agencies  would not have to designate a teleworker as an emergency employee, OPM  states that any requirement that a telework employee continue to work if  the agency closes on his or her telework day should be included in the  employee's formal or informal telework agreement.
section_title: Emergency Hiring Flexibilities
subsections: section_title: Emergency Critical Hiring
paragraphs: Under 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(i)(2), agencies have the discretion, without OPM  approval, to fill positions for which an emergency or critical hiring need  exists; however, initial excepted appointments under this authority may not  exceed 30 days and may be extended only for an additional 30 days.  Such  an extension may be made only if the appointee’s continued employment  would be essential to the agency’s operations.
Under 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(i)(3), OPM may also grant agencies the authority  to temporarily appoint individuals to the excepted service in positions for  which OPM has determined that examination is impracticable (e.g.,  because of the time involved).  For example, in the aftermath of the  September 11, 2001, attacks, OPM granted agencies authority to fill  positions affected by or that needed to deal with the attacks for up to 1  year, and later extended that authority.
When OPM grants agencies the authority to appoint individuals under 5  C.F.R. § 213.3102, agencies, not OPM, are responsible for establishing the  qualifications that an individual must have to fill the position.  In addition,  in accordance with 5 C.F.R. pt. 330, agencies are not required to comply  with the regulations regarding the Career Transition Assistance Plan  (CTAP), Reemployment Priority List (RPL), and Interagency CTAP (ICTAP)  because these regulations do not apply to excepted appointments.
Agencies have the discretion, without OPM approval, to use the authority  granted by OPM under 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102 to fill senior-level positions, as  well as positions at lower levels.  Under appropriate circumstances, OPM  may also authorize agencies to use a senior-level position allocation to  appoint an individual under this section (5 C.F.R. § 319.104).
section_title: Direct-Hire Authority
paragraphs: Agencies have the authority to appoint candidates directly when OPM  determines there is a critical hiring need, or a shortage of candidates, for  particular occupations, grades (or equivalent), geographic locations, or  some combination of the three.  This authority can be governmentwide or  limited to one or more specific agencies depending on the circumstances.
OPM has granted governmentwide direct-hire authority for GS-0602  Medical Officers, GS-0610 and GS-0620 Nurses, GS-0647 Diagnostic  Radiologic Technicians, and GS-0660 Pharmacists, at all grade levels and all  locations, and for GS-2210 Information Technology Specialists  (Information Security) positions at GS-9 and above, at all locations, in  support of governmentwide efforts to carry out the requirements of the  Government Information Security Reform Act and the Federal Information  Security Management Act.  OPM also approved a direct-hire authority that  permits agencies to immediately appoint individuals with fluency in Arabic  or other Middle Eastern languages to positions in support of the  reconstruction efforts in Iraq.
Agencies have the discretion, without OPM approval, to give individuals in  the categories, occupations and specialties, and grades listed above  competitive service career, career-conditional, term, temporary, emergency  indefinite, or overseas limited appointments, as appropriate.  In all cases,  agencies must adhere to public notice requirements in 5 U.S.C. §§ 3327 and  3330 and ICTAP requirements.
If agencies believe they have one or more occupations for which an agency- specific direct-hire authority may be appropriate in support of emergency  relief and recovery efforts, they are to contact their OPM human capital  officer.
section_title: Senior Executive Service Limited Emergency Appointments
paragraphs: To meet a bona fide, unanticipated, urgent need, agencies have the  authority under 5 C.F.R. § 317.601 to make Senior Executive Service limited  emergency appointments of career employees, without OPM approval.   OPM approval is required to appoint individuals who are not current career  employees and OPM cannot delegate this authority; however, OPM will  process such requests on a priority basis and will also consider temporary  position allocations for agencies that identify the need as essential to deal  with the emergency.
section_title: Reemploying Retirees
paragraphs: Agencies have the discretion, without OPM approval, to employ retirees to  deal with an emergency, to replace employees called to active duty military  service, or both.  Agencies may immediately offer reemployment to retirees  under any applicable appointing authority.  However, generally, dual  compensation restrictions (e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 8344 and 8468) require agencies  to reduce the pay of a federal civil service retiree by the amount of his or  her annuity.  For details, see the CSRS and FERS Handbook for Personnel  and Payroll Offices, Chapter 100 – Reemployed Annuitants.
OPM may waive these dual compensation restrictions and, upon request,  may also delegate such authority to an agency head or designee to deal  with emergency staffing requirements.  See 5 C.F.R. pt. 553 for details.  Dual  compensation waivers cannot be approved retroactively.  However,  according to OPM guidance, annuitants who agree to work under salary  offset pending a dual compensation waiver may be recognized for their  special service by the agency through an individual cash award.
section_title: Reemploying Voluntary Separation Incentive Payment Recipients
paragraphs: Ordinarily, employees who resign or retire upon acceptance of a voluntary  separation incentive payment (VSIP) (or buyout) can be reemployed only if  they agree to repay the amount of that payment.  However, upon agency’s  request, OPM may waive the repayment requirement if the individual’s  reemployment is necessary to deal with the emergency situation.  (See 5  C.F.R. § 576.203(a)(1).)  Persons being considered for VSIP repayment  waivers must be the only qualified applicants available for the positions  and possess expertise and special qualifications to replace persons lost or  otherwise unavailable.  Waivers may be limited by the agency’s specific  statutory VSIP authority.
section_title: Other Emergency Hiring Flexibilities
paragraphs: Under 5 C.F.R. pt. 300, subpart E, agencies have the discretion, without  OPM approval, to contract with private sector temporary employment  firms for services to meet their emergency staffing needs.  These contracts  may be for 120 days and may be extended for an additional 120 days,  subject to displaced employee procedures.
Agencies have the discretion, without OPM approval, to make competitive  service appointments of 120 days or less without regard to CTAP, ICTAP, or  RPL eligibles.  These programs do not apply to such appointments.  See 5  C.F.R., pt. 330, Subparts F and G for CTAP/ICTAP conditions and 5 C.F.R. §  330.207(d) for RPL conditions.
Agencies have the discretion, without OPM approval, to appoint current  and former employees from RPL to temporary, term, or permanent  competitive service appointments.  Conversely, agencies may make  exceptions to the RPL provisions to appoint others under 5 C.F.R.  330.207(d).
section_title: Comments from the Federal Emergency Management Agency
section_title: Comments from the Office of Personnel Management
subsections: section_title: GAO’s Mission
paragraphs: The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of  Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities  and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government  for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal  programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other  assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding  decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of  accountability, integrity, and reliability.
section_title: Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
paragraphs: The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is  through the Internet. GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts and full- text files of current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older  products. The Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents  using key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their entirety,  including charts and other graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and  correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its Web site  daily. The list contains links to the full-text document files. To have GAO e-mail this  list to you every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to   e-mail alerts” under the “Order GAO Products” heading.
subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
section_title: Public Affairs