Visa Waiver Program: Additional Actions Needed to Mitigate Risks and Strengthen Overstay Enforcement
Published: 2012-03-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DHS manages the Visa Waiver Program, which allows nationals from 36 countries to apply for admission to the United States as temporary visitors for business or pleasure without a visa. From fiscal years 2005 through 2010, over 98 million visitors were admitted to the United States under the Visa Waiver Program. During that time period, the Department of State issued more than 36 million nonimmigrant visas for temporary travel to the country. DHS is also responsible for investigating overstaysunauthorized immigrants who entered the country legally on a temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) required DHS, in consultation with the Department of State, to take steps to enhance the security of the program. This testimony is based on GAO products issued in September 2008; April, May, and December 2011; and selected updates from DHS as of March 2012 on the status of DHSs efforts to implement the 9/11 Act requirements and to address prior GAO recommendations. As requested, it addresses the following issues: (1) challenges in the Visa Waiver Program, and (2) overstay enforcement efforts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO has reported on actions that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken to improve the security of the Visa Waiver Program; but, additional risks remain. In May 2011, GAO reported that DHS implemented the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), required by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act), and took steps to minimize the burden associated with this requirement. DHS requires Visa Waiver Program travelers to submit biographical information and answers to eligibility questions through ESTA prior to travel. DHS made efforts to minimize the burden imposed by this requirement. For example, although travelers formerly filled out a Visa Waiver Program application form for each journey to the United States, ESTA approval is generally valid for 2 years. However, GAO reported that DHS had not fully evaluated security risks related to the small percentage of travelers without verified ESTA approval. In 2010, airlines complied with the requirement to verify ESTA approval for almost 98 percent of Visa Waiver Program passengers prior to boarding, but the remaining 2 percentabout 364,000 travelerstraveled under the program without verified ESTA approval. In May 2011, GAO reported that DHS had not yet completed a review of these cases to know to what extent they pose a risk to the program and recommended that it establish timeframes for regular review. DHS concurred and has since established procedures to review a sample of noncompliant passengers on a quarterly basis. Further, per the 9/11 Act, DHS requires Visa Waiver Program countries to enter into three information-sharing agreements with the United States; however, DHS reported that only about half of the 36 countries have fully complied with this requirement as of March 2012, and many of the signed agreements have not been implemented. DHS, with its interagency partners, established a compliance schedule to finalize these agreements by June 2012. Also, DHS and its interagency partners have developed measures short of termination that could be applied on a case-by-case basis to countries not meeting their compliance date.
In April 2011, GAO reported that federal agencies take actions against a small portion of overstays, but improving planning could strengthen overstay enforcement. Immigration and Customs Enforcements (ICE) Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) is responsible for overstay enforcement. CTCEU arrests a small portion of the estimated 4 to 5.5 million overstays in the United States because of, among other things, competing priorities, but ICE expressed an intention to augment its overstay enforcement resources. From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, ICE reported devoting about 3 percent of its total field office investigative hours to CTCEU overstay investigations. ICE was considering assigning some responsibility for noncriminal overstay enforcement to its Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) directorate, which apprehends and removes aliens subject to removal from the United States. In April 2011, GAO recommended that developing a time frame for assessing needed resources ICE could strengthen ICEs planning efforts. DHS concurred and stated that ICE planned to identify resources needed to transition this responsibility to ERO as part of its fiscal year 2013 resource planning process.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO made recommendations in prior reports for DHS to, among other things, strengthen plans to address certain risks of the Visa Waiver Program and for overstay enforcement efforts. DHS generally concurred with these recommendations and has actions planned or underway to address them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Visa Waiver Program, which  allows nationals from 36 countries to apply for admission to the United  States as temporary visitors for business or pleasure without first  obtaining a visa from a U.S. consular office abroad. This statement also  addresses activities to identify and take enforcement against overstays— individuals who were admitted to the United States legally on a temporary  basis—either with a visa, or in some cases, as a visitor who was allowed  to enter without a visa such as under the Visa Waiver Program—but then  overstayed their authorized periods of admission. From fiscal years 2005  through 2010, more than 98 million visitors were admitted to the United  States under the Visa Waiver Program. During this same time period, the  Department of State issued more than 36 million nonimmigrant visas for  business travel, pleasure, tourism, medical treatment, or for foreign and  cultural exchange student programs, among other things. In addition, the  most recent estimates from the Pew Hispanic Center approximated that,  in 2006, out of an unauthorized resident alien population of 11.5 million to  12 million in the United States, about 4 million to 5.5 million were  overstays.
The Visa Waiver Program was established in 1986 to promote the  effective use of government resources and facilitate international travel   We have reported that the program  without jeopardizing U.S. security. was designed to boost international business and tourism, and allow the  Department of State to shift its consular resources to posts with higher- risk visa applicants. However, we have also reported that the program  has inherent risks. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11  Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) called for DHS, which implements the  Visa Waiver Program, to take steps to enhance its security. Among the  mandated changes were (1) the implementation of an electronic system  for travel authorization designed to determine in advance of travel the  eligibility of Visa Waiver Program applicants to travel to the United States  under the program, (2) a requirement that all Visa Waiver Program  countries enter into agreements to share information with the United  States on whether citizens and nationals of that country traveling to the  United States represent a threat to the security or welfare of the United  States, and (3) a requirement that all Visa Waiver Program countries  enter into agreements with the United States to report or make available  lost and stolen passport data to the United States. Prior to these changes,  the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002  mandated that DHS evaluate and report on the security risks posed by  each Visa Waiver Program country’s participation in the program at least  once every 2 years.
DHS has certain responsibilities for implementing the Visa Waiver  Program, as well as for overstay enforcement efforts. Overall, DHS is  responsible for establishing visa policy, including policy for the Visa  Waiver Program. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)  is tasked with, among other duties, inspecting all people applying for entry  to the United States to determine their admissibility to the country and  screening Visa Waiver Program applicants to determine their eligibility to  travel to the United States under the program. DHS’s U.S. Immigration  and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the lead agency responsible for  enforcing immigration law in the interior of the United States and is  primarily responsible for overstay enforcement. Within ICE, the  Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) is primarily  responsible for overstay investigations, including investigations of Visa  Waiver Program participants who overstay their authorized periods of  admission. Further, the Department of State is responsible for  adjudicating visas for foreign nationals seeking admission to the United  States.
Since September 11, 2001, GAO has published 5 reports on the Visa  Waiver Program. The reports have examined, for example, DHS’s  assessment of security risks associated with the program and proposed  changes to the program. As requested, my testimony will cover the  following key issues: (1) challenges and weaknesses in the Visa Waiver  Program; and (2) efforts to take enforcement action against overstays and  reported results. This testimony is based on our prior reports on the Visa  Waiver Program, and overstay enforcement efforts published in  September 2008 and May 2011, and April 2011, respectively. It is also  based on our December 2011 testimony on these issues. For these  reports, we examined program documentation, such as standard  operating procedures, guidance for investigations, and implementation  plans. We also interviewed DHS and Department of State officials.  Additional details on the scope and methodology are available in our  published reports. In addition, this statement contains updates to selected  information from these reports on, for example, the number of signed  information-sharing agreements. For these updates, we examined  documentation from DHS as of March 2012. All of our work was  conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Further Steps Are Needed to Mitigate Risks in the Visa Waiver Program
paragraphs: In May 2011, we reported that DHS implemented the Electronic System  for Travel Authorization (ESTA) to meet a statutory requirement intended  to enhance Visa Waiver Program security and took steps to minimize the  burden on travelers to the United States added by the new requirement.However, DHS had not fully evaluated security risks related to the small  percentage of Visa Waiver Program travelers without verified ESTA  approval. DHS developed ESTA to collect passenger data and complete  security checks on the data before passengers board a U.S. bound  carrier. DHS requires applicants for Visa Waiver Program travel to submit  biographical information and answers to eligibility questions through  ESTA prior to travel. Travelers whose ESTA applications are denied must  apply for a U.S. visa for travel to the United States. In developing and  implementing ESTA, DHS took several steps to minimize the burden  associated with ESTA use. For example, ESTA reduced the requirement  that passengers provide biographical information to DHS officials from  every trip to once every 2 years. In addition, because of ESTA, DHS  informed passengers who do not qualify for Visa Waiver Program travel  that they need to apply for a visa before they travel to the United States.  Moreover, most travel industry officials we interviewed in six Visa Waiver  Program countries praised DHS’s widespread ESTA outreach efforts,  reasonable implementation time frames, and responsiveness to feedback,  but expressed dissatisfaction over ESTA fees paid by ESTA applicants.
In 2010, airlines complied with the requirement to verify ESTA approval  for almost 98 percent of the Visa Waiver Program passengers prior to  boarding, but the remaining 2 percent—about 364,000 travelers—traveled  under the Visa Waiver Program without verified ESTA approval. In  addition, about 650 of these passengers traveled to the United States  with a denied ESTA. As we reported in May 2011, DHS had not yet  completed a review of these cases to know to what extent they pose a  risk to the program. At the time of our report, DHS officials told us that  there was no official agency plan for monitoring and oversight of ESTA.  DHS tracked some data on passengers that traveled under the Visa  Waiver Program without verified ESTA approval but did not track other  data that would help officials know the extent to which noncompliance  poses a risk to the program. Without a completed analysis of  noncompliance with ESTA requirements, DHS was unable to determine  the level of risk that noncompliance poses to Visa Waiver Program  security and to identify improvements needed to minimize  noncompliance. In addition, without analysis of data on travelers who  were admitted to the United States without a visa after being denied by  ESTA, DHS could not determine the extent to which ESTA was  accurately identifying individuals who should be denied travel under the  program. In May 2011, we recommended that DHS establish time frames  for the regular review and documentation of cases of Visa Waiver  Program passengers traveling to a U.S. port of entry without verified  ESTA approval. DHS concurred with our recommendation and has  established procedures to review quarterly a sample of noncompliant  passengers to evaluate potential security risks associated with the ESTA  program.
Further, in May 2011, we reported that to meet certain statutory  requirements, DHS requires that Visa Waiver Program countries enter  into three information-sharing agreements with the United States;  however, only about half of the countries had fully complied with this  requirement and many of the signed agreements have not been  implemented. The 9/11 Act specifies that each Visa Waiver Program  country must enter into agreements with the United States to share  information regarding whether citizens and nationals of that country  traveling to the United States represent a threat to the security or welfare  of the United States and to report lost or stolen passports. DHS, in  consultation with other agencies, has determined that Visa Waiver  Program countries can satisfy the requirement by entering into the  following three bilateral agreements: (1) Homeland Security Presidential  Directive (HSPD) 6, (2) Preventing and Combating Serious Crime  (PCSC), and (3) Lost and Stolen Passports.
HSPD-6 agreements establish a procedure between the United States  and partner countries to share watchlist information about known or  suspected terrorists. As of January 2011, 19 of the 36 Visa Waiver  Program countries had signed HSPD-6 agreements, and 13 had  begun sharing information according to the signed agreements.  Noting that the federal government continues to negotiate HSPD-6  agreements with Visa Waiver Program countries, officials cited  concerns regarding privacy and data protection expressed by many  Visa Waiver Program countries as reasons for the delayed progress.  According to these officials, in some cases, domestic laws of Visa  Waiver Program countries limit their ability to commit to sharing some  information, thereby complicating and slowing the negotiation  process. In March 2012, DHS reported that 24 of the 36 Visa Waiver  Program countries have signed HSPD-6 agreements.
The PCSC agreements establish the framework for law enforcement  cooperation by providing each party automated access to the other’s  criminal databases that contain biographical, biometric, and criminal  history data. As of January 2011, 18 of the 36 Visa Waiver Program  countries had met the PCSC information-sharing agreement  requirement, but the networking modifications and system upgrades  required to enable this information sharing to take place have not  been completed for any Visa Waiver Program countries. According to  officials, DHS is frequently not in a position to influence the speed of  PCSC implementation for a number of reasons. For example,  according to DHS officials, some Visa Waiver Program countries  require parliamentary ratification before implementation can begin.  Also, U.S. and partner country officials must develop a common  information technology architecture to allow queries between  databases. DHS reported in March 2012 that the number of Visa  Waiver Program countries meeting the PCSC requirement had risen  to 23.
The 9/11 Act requires Visa Waiver Program countries to enter into an  agreement with the United States to report, or make available to the  United States through Interpol or other means as designated by the  Secretary of Homeland Security, information about the theft or loss of  passports. As of March 2012, all Visa Waiver Program countries were  sharing lost and stolen passport information with the United States,  and all of the countries had entered into Lost and Stolen Passport  agreements, according to DHS.
DHS, with the support of interagency partners, established a compliance  schedule requiring the last of the Visa Waiver Program countries to  finalize these agreements by June 2012. Although termination from the  Visa Waiver Program is one potential consequence for countries not  complying with the information-sharing agreement requirement, U.S.  officials have described it as undesirable. DHS, in coordination with the  Department of State and the Department of Justice, developed measures  short of termination that could be applied to countries not meeting their  compliance date. Specifically, DHS helped write a classified strategy  document that outlines a contingency plan listing possible measures short  of termination from the Visa Waiver Program that may be taken if a  country does not meet its specified compliance date for entering into  information-sharing agreements. The strategy document provides steps  that would need to be taken prior to selecting and implementing one of  these measures. According to officials, DHS plans to decide which  measures to apply on a case-by-case basis.
In addition, as of May 2011, DHS had not completed half of the most  recent biennial reports on Visa Waiver Program countries’ security risks in  a timely manner. In 2002, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry  Reform Act mandated that, at least once every 2 years, DHS evaluate the  effect of each country’s continued participation in the program on the  security, law enforcement, and immigration interests of the United  States.counterterrorism capabilities and immigration programs. However, DHS  had not completed the latest biennial reports for 18 of the 36 Visa Waiver  Program countries in a timely manner, and over half of these reports are  more than 1 year overdue. Further, in the case of 2 countries, DHS was  unable to demonstrate that it had completed reports in the last 4 years.  DHS cited a number of reasons for the reporting delays. For example,  DHS officials said that they intentionally delayed report completion  because they frequently did not receive mandated intelligence  assessments in a timely manner and needed to review these before  completing Visa Waiver Program country biennial reports. We noted that  DHS had not consistently submitted these reports in a timely matter since  the legal requirement was made biennial in 2002, and recommended that  DHS take steps to address delays in the biennial country review process  so that the mandated country reports can be completed on time. DHS  concurred with our recommendation and, in March 2012, reported that the  Visa Waiver Program Office had implemented a reporting process and  schedule to address delays in completing the biennial reviews and  associated reports.
section_title: Federal Agencies Take Actions against a Small Portion of the Estimated Overstay Population
subsections: section_title: ICE Investigates Few In- Country Overstays, but Its Efforts Could Benefit from Improved Planning
paragraphs: As we reported in April 2011, ICE CTCEU investigates and arrests a  small portion of the estimated in-country overstay population due to,  among other things, ICE’s competing priorities; however, these efforts  could be enhanced by improved planning and performance management.  CTCEU, the primary federal entity responsible for taking enforcement  action to address in-country overstays, identifies leads for overstay cases;  takes steps to verify the accuracy of the leads it identifies by, for example,  checking leads against multiple databases; and prioritizes leads to focus  on those the unit identifies as being most likely to pose a threat to  national security or public safety. CTCEU then requires field offices to  initiate investigations on all priority, high-risk leads it identifies.
According to CTCEU data, as of October 2010, ICE field offices had  closed about 34,700 overstay investigations that CTCEU headquarters  assigned to them from fiscal year 2004 through 2010. These cases  resulted in approximately 8,100 arrests (about 23 percent of the 34,700  investigations), relative to a total estimated overstay population of   4 million to 5.5 million. About 26,700 of those investigations (or   77 percent) resulted in one of three outcomes. In 9,900 investigations,  evidence was uncovered indicating that the suspected overstay had  departed the United States.  In 8,600 investigations, evidence was  uncovered indicating that the subject of the investigation was in-status  (e.g., the subject filed a timely application with the United States  Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to change his or her status  and/or extend his or her authorized period of admission in the United  States).  Finally, in 8,200 investigations, CTCEU investigators exhausted  all investigative leads and could not locate the suspected overstay. Of  the approximately 34,700 overstay investigations assigned by CTCEU  headquarters that ICE field offices closed from fiscal year 2004 through  2010, ICE officials attributed the significant portion of overstay cases that  resulted in a departure finding, in-status finding, or with all leads being  exhausted generally to difficulties associated with locating suspected  overstays and the timeliness and completeness of data in DHS’s systems  used to identify overstays.
Further, ICE reported allocating a small percentage of its resources in  terms of investigative work hours to overstay investigations since fiscal  year 2006, but the agency expressed an intention to augment the  resources it dedicates to overstay enforcement efforts moving forward.  Specifically, from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, ICE reported devoting  from 3.1 to 3.4 percent of its total field office investigative hours to  CTCEU overstay investigations. ICE attributed the small percentage of  investigative resources it reported allocating to overstay enforcement  efforts primarily to competing enforcement priorities. According to the ICE  Assistant Secretary, ICE has resources to remove 400,000 aliens per  year, or less than 4 percent of the estimated removable alien population  in the United States. In June 2010, the Assistant Secretary stated that  ICE must prioritize the use of its resources to ensure that its efforts to  remove aliens reflect the agency’s highest priorities, namely  nonimmigrants, including suspected overstays, who are identified as high  risk in terms of being most likely to pose a risk to national security or  public safety. As a result, ICE dedicated its limited resources to  addressing overstays it identified as most likely to pose a potential threat  to national security or public safety and did not generally allocate  resources to address suspected overstays that it assessed as non- criminal and low risk. ICE indicated it may allocate more resources to  overstay enforcement efforts moving forward, and that it planned to focus  primarily on suspected overstays who ICE has identified as high risk or  who recently overstayed their authorized periods of admission.
ICE was considering assigning some responsibility for noncriminal  overstay enforcement to its Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)  directorate, which has responsibility for apprehending and removing  aliens who do not have lawful immigration status from the United States.  However, ERO did not plan to assume this responsibility until ICE  assessed the funding and resources doing so would require. ICE had not  established a time frame for completing this assessment. We reported in  April 2011 that by developing such a time frame and utilizing the  assessment findings, as appropriate, ICE could strengthen its planning  efforts and be better positioned to hold staff accountable for completing  the assessment. We recommended that ICE establish a target time frame  for assessing the funding and resources ERO would require in order to  assume responsibility for civil overstay enforcement and use the results of  that assessment. DHS officials agreed with our recommendation and  stated that ICE planned to identify resources needed to transition this  responsibility to ERO as part of its fiscal year 2013 resource planning  process.
section_title: More Reliable, Accessible Data Could Improve DHS’s Efforts to Identify and Share Information on Overstays
paragraphs: DHS has not yet implemented a comprehensive biometric system to  match available information provided by foreign nationals upon their  arrival and departure from the United States. In 2002, DHS initiated the  United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program  (US-VISIT) to develop a comprehensive entry and exit system to collect  biometric data from aliens traveling through U.S. ports of entry. In 2004,  US-VISIT initiated the first step of this program by collecting biometric  data on aliens entering the United States. In August 2007, we reported  that while US-VISIT biometric entry capabilities were operating at air, sea,  and land ports of entry, exit capabilities were not, and that DHS did not  have a comprehensive plan or a complete schedule for biometric exit  implementation. Moreover, in November 2009, we reported that DHS  had not adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, executing, and  tracking the work that needed to be accomplished to deliver a  comprehensive exit solution as part of the US-VISIT program. We  concluded that, without a master schedule that was integrated and  derived in accordance with relevant guidance, DHS could not reliably  commit to when and how it would deliver a comprehensive exit solution or  adequately monitor and manage its progress toward this end. We  recommended that DHS ensure that an integrated master schedule be  developed and maintained. DHS concurred and reported, as of July 2011,  that the documentation of schedule practices and procedures was  ongoing, and that an updated schedule standard, management plan, and  management process that are compliant with schedule guidelines were  under review.
In the absence of a comprehensive biometric entry and exit system for  identifying and tracking overstays, US-VISIT and CTCEU primarily  analyze biographic entry and exit data collected at land, air, and sea ports  of entry to identify overstays. In April 2011, we reported that DHS’s efforts  to identify and report on visa overstays were hindered by unreliable data.  Specifically, CBP does not inspect travelers exiting the United States  through land ports of entry, including collecting their biometric information,  and CBP did not provide a standard mechanism for nonimmigrants  departing the United States through land ports of entry to remit their  arrival and departure forms. Nonimmigrants departing the United States  through land ports of entry turn in their forms on their own initiative.  According to CBP officials, at some ports of entry, CBP provides a box for  nonimmigrants to drop off their forms, while at other ports of entry  departing nonimmigrants may park their cars, enter the port of entry  facility, and provide their forms to a CBP officer. These forms contain  information, such as arrival and departure dates, used by DHS to identify  overstays. If the benefits outweigh the costs, a standard mechanism to  provide nonimmigrants with a way to turn in their arrival and departure  forms could help DHS obtain more complete and reliable departure data  for identifying overstays. We recommended that the Commissioner of  CBP analyze the costs and benefits of developing a standard mechanism  for collecting these forms at land ports of entry, and do so to the extent  that benefits outweigh the costs. CBP agreed with our recommendation  and in September 2011 stated that it planned to complete a cost-effective  independent evaluation of possible solutions and formulate an action plan  based on the evaluation for implementation by March 2012.
Further, we previously reported on weaknesses in DHS processes for  collecting departure data, and how these weaknesses impact the  determination of overstay rates. The 9/11 Act required that DHS certify  that a system is in place that can verify the departure of not less than   97 percent of foreign nationals who depart through U.S. airports in order  for DHS to expand the Visa Waiver Program. In September 2008, we  reported that DHS’s methodology for comparing arrivals and departures  for the purpose of departure verification would not inform overall or  country-specific overstay rates because DHS’s methodology did not begin  with arrival records to determine if those foreign nationals departed or  remained in the United States beyond their authorized periods of  admission. Rather, DHS’s methodology started with departure records  and matched them to arrival records. As a result, DHS’s methodology  counted overstays who left the country, but did not identify overstays who  have not departed the United States and appear to have no intention of  leaving. We recommended that DHS explore cost-effective actions  necessary to further improve the reliability of overstay data. DHS  concurred and reported that it is taking steps to improve the accuracy and  reliability of the overstay data, by efforts such as continuing to audit  carrier performance and working with airlines to improve the accuracy  and completeness of data collection. Moreover, by statute, DHS is  required to submit an annual report to Congress providing numerical  estimates of the number of aliens from each country in each  nonimmigrant classification who overstayed an authorized period of  admission that expired during the fiscal year prior to the year for which  the report is made.provided Congress annual overstay estimates regularly since 1994  because officials do not have sufficient confidence in the quality of the  department’s overstay data—which is maintained and generated by US- VISIT. As a result, DHS officials stated that the department cannot  reliably report overstay rates in accordance with the statute.
DHS officials stated that the department has not  In addition, in April 2011 we reported that DHS took several steps to  provide its component entities and other federal agencies with information  to identify and take enforcement action on overstays, including creating  biometric and biographic lookouts—or electronic alerts—on the records of  overstay subjects that are recorded in databases. However, DHS did not  create lookouts for the following two categories of overstays:   (1) temporary visitors who were admitted to the United States using  nonimmigrant business and pleasure visas and subsequently overstayed  by 90 days or less; and (2) suspected in-country overstays who CTCEU  deems not to be a priority for investigation in terms of being most likely to  pose a threat to national security or public safety. Broadening the scope  of electronic lookouts in federal information systems could enhance  overstay information sharing. In April 2011, we recommended that the  Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of Customs and  Border Protection, the Under Secretary of the National Protection and  Programs Directorate, and the Assistant Secretary of Immigration and  Customs Enforcement to assess the costs and benefits of creating  biometric and biographic lookouts for these two categories of overstays.  Agency officials agreed with our recommendation and have actions under  way to address it. For example, agency officials stated that they have met  to assess the costs and benefits of creating lookouts for those categories  of overstays.
Chairman Schumer, Ranking Member Cornyn, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions that you may have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Rebecca  Gambler at (202) 512-6912 or gamblerr@gao.gov or Michael J. Courts at  (202) 512-8980 or courtsm@gao.gov. In addition, contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to  this testimony are Kathryn H. Bernet, Assistant Director; Anthony Moran,  Assistant Director; Frances Cook; Nanette Barton; and, Wendy Johnson.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Visa Waiver Program: DHS Has Implemented the Electronic System for  Travel Authorization, but Further Steps Needed to Address Potential  Program Risks. GAO-11-335. (Washington, D.C., May 5, 2011).
Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, Assessing,  and Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS’s Efforts but Would Have Costs.  GAO-11-411. (Washington, D.C., April 15, 2011).
Visa Waiver Program: Actions Are Needed to Improve Management of  the Expansion Process, and to Assess and Mitigate Program Risks.  GAO-08-967. (Washington, D.C., Sep 15, 2008).
Border Security: State Department Should Plan for Potentially Significant  Staffing and Facilities Shortfalls Caused by Changes in the Visa Waiver  Program. GAO-08-623. (Washington, D.C., May 22, 2008).
Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks  of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-854. (Washington, D.C., Jul 28,  2006).
Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a  Layered Defense. GAO-04-82. (Washington, D.C., May 21, 2004).
Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program.  GAO-03-38. (Washington, D.C., Nov 22, 2002).
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