Managing Preparedness Grants and Assessing National Capabilities: Continuing Challenges Impede FEMA's Progress
Published: 2012-03-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: From fiscal years 2002 through 2011, the federal government appropriated over $37 billion to the Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) preparedness grant programs to enhance the capabilities of state and local governments to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks. DHS allocated $20.3 billion of this funding to grant recipients through four of the largest preparedness grant programsthe State Homeland Security Program, the Urban Areas Security Initiative, the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit Security Grant Program. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 requires the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to develop a national preparedness system and assess preparedness capabilitiescapabilities needed to respond effectively to disasters. FEMA could then use such a system to help it prioritize grant funding. This testimony addresses the extent to which DHS and FEMA have made progress in managing preparedness grants and measuring preparedness by assessing capabilities and addressing related challenges. GAOs comments are based on products issued from April 2002 through February 2012 and selected updates conducted in March 2012.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DHS and FEMA have taken actions with the goal of enhancing management of preparedness grants, but better project information and coordination could help FEMA identify and mitigate the risk of unnecessary duplication among grant applications. Specifically, DHS and FEMA have taken actions to streamline the application and award processes and have enhanced their use of risk management for allocating grants. For example, in November 2011, GAO reported that DHS modified its risk assessment model for the Port Security Grant Program by recognizing that different ports have different vulnerability levels. However, in February 2012, GAO reported that FEMA made award decisions for four of its grant programsthe State Homeland Security Grant Program, the Urban Area Security Initiative, the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit Security Grant Programwith differing levels of information, which contributed to the risk of funding unnecessarily duplicative projects. GAO also reported that FEMA did not have a process to coordinate application reviews across the four grant programs. Rather, grant applications were reviewed separately by program and were not compared across each other to determine where possible unnecessary duplication may occur. Thus, GAO recommended that (1) FEMA collect project information with the level of detail needed to better position the agency to identify any potential unnecessary duplication within and across the four grant programs, weighing any additional costs of collecting this data and (2) explore opportunities to enhance FEMAs internal coordination and administration of the programs to identify and mitigate the potential for any unnecessary duplication. DHS agreed and identified planned actions to improve visibility and coordination across programs and projects. FEMA has proposed consolidating the majority of its various preparedness grant programs into a single, comprehensive preparedness grant program called the National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP) in fiscal year 2013; however, this may create new challenges. For example, allocations under the NPGP would rely heavily on a states risk assessment, but grantees have not yet received guidance on how to conduct the risk assessment process. FEMA has established a website to solicit input from stakeholders on how best to implement the program.
DHS and FEMA have had difficulty implementing longstanding plans and overcoming challenges in assessing capabilities, such as determining how to validate and aggregate data from federal, state, local, and tribal governments. For example, DHS first developed plans in 2004 to measure preparedness by assessing capabilities, but these efforts have been repeatedly delayed. In March 2011, GAO reported that FEMAs efforts to develop and implement a comprehensive, measurable, national preparedness assessment of capability and gaps were not yet complete and suggested that Congress consider limiting preparedness grant funding until FEMA completes a national preparedness assessment of capability gaps based on tiered, capability-specific performance objectives to enable prioritization of grant funding. In April 2011, Congress passed the fiscal year 2011 appropriations act for DHS that reduced funding for FEMA preparedness grants by $875 million from the amount requested in the Presidents fiscal year 2011 budget. For fiscal year 2012, Congress appropriated $1.28 billion less than requested in the Presidents budget.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO has made recommendations to DHS and FEMA in prior reports to strengthen their management of preparedness grants and enhance their assessment of national preparedness capabilities. DHS and FEMA concurred and have actions underway to address them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing and to  discuss the efforts of the Federal Emergency Management Agency  (FEMA)—a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)— to manage preparedness grants and measure and assess national  capabilities to respond to a major disaster. From fiscal years 2002  through 2011, the federal government appropriated over $37 billion to a  variety of DHS homeland security preparedness grant programs to  enhance the capabilities of state, territory, local, and tribal governments to  prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks   DHS allocated more than half of this total—$20.3  and other disasters.billion—to grant recipients through four of the largest preparedness  programs—the State Homeland Security Program, the Urban Areas  Security Initiative, the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit  Security Grant Program.
Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act  of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act) in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. response to the Act, DHS centralized most of its preparedness programs  under FEMA’s Grant Programs Directorate to better integrate and  coordinate grant management. The Act also requires that FEMA develop  a national preparedness system and assess preparedness capabilities— capabilities needed to respond effectively to disasters—to determine the  nation’s preparedness capability levels and the resources needed to  achieve desired levels of capability.
The Post-Katrina Act was enacted as Title VI of the Department of Homeland Security  Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006). The provisions of  the Post-Katrina Act became effective upon enactment, October 4, 2006, with the  exception of certain organizational changes related to FEMA, most of which took effect on  March 31, 2007.
Over the last decade, we identified and reported on issues related to  DHS’s and FEMA’s management of four of the largest preparedness  grants and the challenges associated with assessing national  preparedness capabilities. In April 2002, shortly after the terrorist attacks  of September 11, 2001, we identified the need for goals and performance  indicators to guide the nation’s preparedness efforts and help to  objectively assess the results of federal investments. After DHS began  operations in March 2003, and leading up to catastrophic damage caused  by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in August and September 2005, our  reports focused on challenges in managing preparedness grant funds to  states and urban areas and minimizing the time it takes to distribute grant  funds and associated efforts to streamline the process while ensuring  appropriate planning and accountability for effective use of the funds.  After the renewed focus on all-hazards preparedness prompted by the  2005 hurricanes, we reported in 2007 and 2008 on the extent to which  DHS was using a risk-based approach in its grants distribution  methodology for states and urban areas.  Our reports in 2009, 2010, and  2011 analyzed the use of risk assessment in the management of transit  and port security grants and the impact of preparedness grants in  building national capabilities. During that same period, we reported on  FEMA’s limited progress in assessing national preparedness. Our most  recent report, which we issued in February 2012 and are releasing today,  addresses FEMA’s management of four of the largest preparedness grant  programs—the State Homeland Security Program, the Urban Areas  Security Initiative, the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit  Security Grant Program.
My remarks today are based on our work issued in the 10-year period  from April 2002 through February 2012 on the efforts of both DHS and,  more recently, FEMA, to manage preparedness grants; develop national  preparedness capabilities; implement a national framework for assessing  preparedness capabilities at the federal, state, and local levels; identify  capability gaps; and prioritize future national preparedness investments to  fill the most critical gaps. These remarks are also based on selected  updates conducted in March 2012 on FEMA’s proposal for consolidating  its various grant programs.
As requested, my testimony today focuses on the extent to which DHS  and FEMA have made progress in managing preparedness grants and  measuring national preparedness by assessing capabilities and  addressing related challenges. To conduct our work, we analyzed  documentation, such as DHS’s National Preparedness Goal and Core   and  Capabilities (the latest evolution of the Target Capabilities List),interviewed relevant DHS, FEMA, state, and local officials. More detailed  information on our scope and methodology appears in our published  products. In addition, we conducted updates to our work in March 2012  by analyzing FEMA’s guidance and policies.
subsections: section_title: FEMA Has Taken Actions to Address Grant Management Concerns but Needs Better Coordination
paragraphs: DHS and FEMA have streamlined application and award processes,  enhanced the use of risk management principles in its grant programs,  and proposed consolidation of its various grant programs to address grant  management concerns. In February 2012, we reported that better  coordination and improved data collection could help FEMA identify and  mitigate potential unnecessary duplication among four overlapping grant  programs—the Homeland Security Grant Program, the Urban Areas  Security Initiative, the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit  Security Grant Program. FEMA has proposed changes to enhance  preparedness grant management, but these changes may create new  challenges.
subsections: section_title: FEMA Has Streamlined Application and Award Processes and Enhanced Use of Risk Management Principles
paragraphs: Since its creation in April 2007, FEMA’s Grant Programs Directorate  (GPD) has been responsible for the program management of DHS’s  preparedness grants. GPD consolidated the grant business operations,  systems, training, policy, and oversight of all FEMA grants and the  program management of preparedness grants into a single entity. GPD  works closely with other DHS entities to manage grants, as needed,  through the grant life cycle, shown in figure 1. For example, GPD works  with the U.S. Coast Guard for the Port Security Grant Program and the  Transportation Security Administration for the Transit Security Grant  Program.
Since 2006, DHS has taken a number of actions to improve its risk-based  grant allocation methodology.
Specifically, in March 2008, we reported that DHS had adopted a  more sophisticated risk-based grant allocation approach for the Urban  Areas Security Initiative to (1) determine both states’ and urban areas’  potential risk relative to other areas that included empirical analytical  methods and policy judgments, and (2) assess and score the  effectiveness of the proposed investments submitted by the eligible  applicants and determine the final amount of funds awarded.
We also reported that DHS’s risk model for the Urban Areas Security  Initiative could be strengthened by measuring variations in  vulnerability. Specifically, we reported that DHS had held  vulnerability constant, which limited the model’s overall ability to  assess risk and more precisely allocate funds. Accordingly, we  recommended that DHS and FEMA formulate a method to measure  vulnerability in a way that captures variations in vulnerability, and  apply this vulnerability measure in future iterations of this risk-based  grant allocation model. DHS concurred with our recommendations  and FEMA took actions to enhance its approaches for assessing and  incorporating vulnerability into risk assessment methodologies for this  program. Specifically, FEMA created a risk assessment that places  greater weight on threat and calculates the contribution of vulnerability  and consequence separately.
In June 2009, we reported that DHS used a risk analysis model to  allocate Transit Security Grant Program funding and awarded grants  to higher-risk transit agencies using all three elements of risk—threat,  vulnerability, and consequence. Accordingly, we recommended that  DHS formulate a method to measure vulnerability in a way that  captures variations in vulnerability, and apply this vulnerability  measure in future iterations of this risk-based grant allocation model.  DHS concurred with our recommendations and FEMA took actions to  enhance its approach for assessing and incorporating vulnerability  into risk assessment methodologies for this program.
In November 2011, we reported that DHS had made modifications to  enhance the Port Security Grant Program’s risk assessment model’s  vulnerability element for fiscal year 2011. Specifically, DHS modified  the vulnerability equation to recognize that different ports have  different vulnerability levels. We also reported that FEMA had taken  actions to streamline the Port Security Grant Program’s management  efforts. For example, FEMA shortened application time frames by  requiring port areas to submit specific project proposals at the time of  grant application. According to FEMA officials, this change was  intended to expedite the grant distribution process. Further, we  reported that to speed the process, DHS took actions to reduce  delays in environmental reviews, increased the number of GPD staff  working on the Port Security Grants, revised and streamlined grant  application forms, and developed time frames for review of project  documentation.
section_title: FEMA Needs Better Coordination and Improved Data Collection to Reduce Risk of Unnecessary Duplication
paragraphs: Despite these continuing efforts to enhance preparedness grant  management, we identified multiple factors in our February 2012 report  that contributed to the risk of FEMA potentially funding unnecessarily  duplicative projects across the four grant programs we reviewed—the  Homeland Security Grant Program, the Urban Areas Security Initiative,  the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit Security Grant  Program.and geographic locations, combined with differing levels of information  that FEMA had available regarding grant projects and recipients. We also  reported that FEMA lacked a process to coordinate application reviews  across the four grant programs.
These factors include overlap among grant recipients, goals,  Overlap among grant recipients, goals, and geographic locations  exist. The four grant programs we reviewed have similar goals and fund  similar activities, such as equipment and training in overlapping  jurisdictions, which increases the risk of unnecessary duplication among  the programs. For instance, each state and eligible territory receives a  legislatively-mandated minimum amount of State Homeland Security  Program funding to help ensure that geographic areas develop a basic  level of preparedness, while the Urban Areas Security Initiative grants  explicitly target urban areas most at risk of terrorist attack. However,  many jurisdictions within designated Urban Areas Security Initiative  regions also apply for and receive State Homeland Security Program  funding. Similarly, port stakeholders in urban areas could receive funding  for equipment such as patrol boats through both the Port Security Grant  Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative, and a transit agency  could purchase surveillance equipment with Transit Security Grant  Program or Urban Areas Security Initiative funding. While we understand  that some overlap may be desirable to provide multiple sources of  funding, a lack of visibility over grant award details around these  programs increases the risk of unintended and unnecessary duplication.
FEMA made award decisions for all four grant programs with  differing levels of information. In February 2012, we reported that  FEMA’s ability to track which projects receive funding among the four  grant programs varied because the project information FEMA had  available to make award decisions—including grant funding amounts,  grant recipients, and grant funding purposes—also varied by program due  to differences in the grant programs’ administrative processes. For  example, FEMA delegated some administrative duties to stakeholders for  the State Homeland Security Program and the Urban Areas Security  Initiative, thereby reducing its administrative burden. However, this  delegation also contributed to FEMA having less visibility over some grant  applications. FEMA recognized the trade-off between decreased visibility  over grant funding in exchange for its reduced administrative burden.
Differences in information requirements also affected the level of  information that FEMA had available for making grant award decisions.  For example, for the State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas  Security Initiative, states and eligible urban areas submit investment  justifications for each program with up to 15 distinct investment  descriptions that describe general proposals in wide-ranging areas such  as “critical infrastructure protection.” Each investment justification  encompasses multiple specific projects to different jurisdictions or entities,  but project-level information, such as a detailed listing of subrecipients or  equipment costs, is not required by FEMA. In contrast, Port Security and  Transit Security Grant Program applications require specific information  on individual projects such as detailed budget summaries. As a result,  FEMA has a much clearer understanding of what is being requested and  what is being funded by these programs.
FEMA has studied the potential utilization of more specific project-level  data for making grant award decisions, especially for the State Homeland  Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative. However, while  our analysis of selected grant projects determined that this additional  information was sufficient for identifying potentially unnecessary  duplication for nearly all of the projects it reviewed, the information did not  always provide FEMA with sufficient detail to identify and prevent the risk  of unnecessary duplication. While utilizing more specific project-level data  would be a step in the right direction, at the time of our February 2012  report, FEMA had not determined the specifics of future data  requirements.
FEMA lacked a process to coordinate application reviews across the  four grant programs. In February 2012, we reported that grant  applications were reviewed separately by program and were not  compared across each other to determine where possible unnecessary  duplication may occur. Specifically, FEMA’s Homeland Security Grant  Program branch administered the Urban Areas Security Initiative and  State Homeland Security Program while the Transportation Infrastructure  Security branch administered the Port Security Grant Program and  Transit Security Grant Program. We and the DHS Inspector General  concluded that coordinating the review of grant projects internally would  give FEMA more complete information about applications across the four  grant programs, which could help FEMA identify and mitigate the risk of  unnecessary duplication across grant applications.
In our February 2012 report, we note that one of FEMA’s section chiefs  said that the primary reasons for the current lack of coordination across  programs are the sheer volume of grant applications that need to be  reviewed and FEMA’s lack of resources to coordinate the grant review  process. She added that FEMA reminds grantees not to duplicate grant  projects; however, due to volume and the number of activities associated  with grant application reviews, FEMA lacks the capabilities to cross-check  for unnecessary duplication. We recognize the challenges associated with  reviewing a large volume of grant applications, but to help reduce the risk  of funding duplicative projects, FEMA could benefit from exploring  opportunities to enhance its coordination of project reviews while also  taking into account the large volume of grant applications it must process.
Thus, we recommended that FEMA take actions to identify and mitigate  any unnecessary duplication in these programs, such as collecting more  complete project information as well as exploring opportunities to  enhance FEMA’s internal coordination and administration of the  programs. In commenting on the report, DHS agreed and identified  planned actions to improve visibility and coordination across programs  and projects. We also suggested that Congress consider requiring DHS  to report on the results of its efforts to identify and prevent duplication  within and across the four grant programs, and consider these results  when making future funding decisions for these programs.
section_title: FEMA Has Proposed Changes to Enhance Preparedness Grant Management, but these Changes May Create Challenges
paragraphs: In the President’s Fiscal Year 2013 budget request to Congress, FEMA  has proposed consolidating its various preparedness grant programs— with the exception of the Emergency Management Performance Grants  and Assistance to Fire Fighters Grants—into a single, comprehensive  preparedness grant program called the National Preparedness Grant  Program (NPGP) in fiscal year 2013. FEMA also plans to enhance its  preparedness grants management through a variety of proposed  initiatives to implement the new consolidated program.
According to FEMA, the new NPGP will require grantees to develop and  sustain core capabilities outlined in the National Preparedness Goal  rather than work to meet mandates within individual, and often  disconnected, grant programs. NPGP is intended to focus on creating a  robust national response capacity based on cross-jurisdictional and  readily deployable state and local assets. According to FEMA’s policy  announcement, consolidating the preparedness grant programs will  support the recommendations of the Redundancy Elimination and  Enhanced Performance for Preparedness Grants Act, and will streamline  the grant application process. This will, in turn, enable grantees to focus  on how federal funds can add value to their jurisdiction’s unique  preparedness needs while contributing to national response capabilities.  To further increase the efficiency of the new grant program, FEMA plans  to issue multi-year guidelines, enabling the agency to focus its efforts on  measuring progress towards building and sustaining national capabilities.  The intent of this consolidation is to eliminate administration redundancies  and ensure that all preparedness grants are contributing to the National  Preparedness Goal. For fiscal year 2013, FEMA believes that the  reorganization of preparedness grants will allow for a more targeted  grants approach where states build upon the capabilities established with  previous grant money and has requested $1.54 billion for the National  Preparedness Grant Program.
FEMA’s Fiscal Year 2013 Grants Drawdown Budget in Brief also  proposes additional measures to enhance preparedness grant  management efforts and expedite prior years’ grant expenditures. For  example, to support reprioritization of unobligated prior year funds and  focus on building core capabilities, FEMA plans to: allow grantees to apply prior years’ grant balances towards more  urgent priorities, promising an expedited project approval by FEMA’s  Grant Programs Directorate; expand allowable expenses under the Port Security Grant Program  and Transit Security Grant Program, for example, by allowing  maintenance and sustainment expenses for equipment, training, and  critical resources that have previously been purchased with either  federal grants or any other source of funding to support existing core  capabilities tied to the five mission areas contained within the National  Preparedness Goal.
The changes FEMA has proposed for its fiscal year 2013 National  Preparedness Grants program may create new management challenges.  As noted by Chairman Bilirakis in last month’s hearing by the House  Homeland Security Committee’s Subcommittee on Emergency  Preparedness, Response, and Communications, allocations under the  new grant program would rely heavily on a state’s Threat and Hazard  Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA). However, nearly a year  after the THIRA concept was first introduced as part of the fiscal year  2011 grant guidance, grantees have yet to receive guidance on how to  conduct the THIRA process. As we reported in February 2012, questions  also remain as to how local stakeholders would be involved in the THIRA  process at the state level. In March 2012, FEMA’s GPD announced that  FEMA has established a website to solicit input from stakeholders on how  best to implement the new program. According to Chairman Bilirakis, it is  essential that the local law enforcement, first responders, and emergency  managers who are first on the scene of a terrorist attack, natural disaster,  or other emergency be involved in the THIRA process. They know the  threats to their local areas and the capabilities needed to address them.  Finally, according to FEMA’s plans, the new National Preparedness Grant  Program will require grantees to develop and sustain core capabilities;  however, the framework for assessing capabilities and prioritizing national  preparedness grant investments is still not complete. As we noted in our  February 2012 report, FEMA’S efforts to measure the collective  effectiveness of its grants programs are recent and ongoing and thus it is  too soon to evaluate the extent to which these initiatives will provide  FEMA with the information it needs to determine whether these grant  programs are effectively improving the nation’s security.
section_title: FEMA Has Not Yet Completed National Preparedness Assessment Efforts to Address Longstanding Concerns
paragraphs: DHS and FEMA have had difficulty in implementing longstanding plans to  develop and implement a system for assessing national preparedness  capabilities. For example, DHS first developed plans in 2004 to measure  preparedness by assessing capabilities, but these efforts have been  repeatedly delayed and are not yet complete. FEMA’s proposed revisions  to the new NPGP may help the agency overcome these continuing  challenges to developing and implementing a national preparedness  assessment.
subsections: section_title: DHS and FEMA’s Longstanding Plans to Develop and Implement a National Assessment of Preparedness Have Not Been Fulfilled
paragraphs: Since 2004, DHS and FEMA have initiated a variety of efforts to develop  a system of measuring preparedness. From 2005 until September 2011,  much of FEMA’s efforts focused on developing and operationalizing a list  of target capabilities that would define desired capabilities and could be  used in a tiered framework to measure their attainment. In July 2005, we  reported that DHS had established a draft Target Capabilities List that  provides guidance on the specific capabilities and levels of capability at  various levels of government that FEMA would expect federal, state,  local, and tribal first responders to develop and maintain.to organize classes of jurisdictions that share similar characteristics— such as total population, population density, and critical infrastructure— into tiers to account for reasonable differences in capability levels among  groups of jurisdictions and to appropriately apportion responsibility for  development and maintenance of capabilities among levels of  government and across these jurisdictional tiers. According to DHS’s  Assessment and Reporting Implementation Plan, DHS intended to  implement a capability assessment and reporting system based on target  capabilities that would allow first responders to assess their preparedness  by identifying gaps, excesses, or deficiencies in their existing capabilities  or capabilities they will be expected to access through mutual aid. In  addition, this information could be used to (1) measure the readiness of  federal civil response assets, (2) measure the use of federal assistance at  the state and local levels, and (3) assess how federal assistance  programs are supporting national preparedness.
DHS planned  DHS’s efforts to implement these plans were interrupted by the 2005  hurricane season. In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina—the worst natural  disaster in our nation’s history—made final landfall in coastal Louisiana  and Mississippi, and its destructive force extended to the western  Alabama coast. Hurricane Katrina and the following Hurricanes Rita and  Wilma—also among the most powerful hurricanes in the nation’s  history—graphically illustrated the limitations at that time of the nation’s  readiness and ability to respond effectively to a catastrophic disaster; that  is, a disaster whose effects almost immediately overwhelm the response  capabilities of affected state and local first responders and require outside  action and support from the federal government and other entities. In  June 2006, DHS concluded that target capabilities and associated  performance measures should serve as the common reference system  for preparedness planning.
In September 2006, we reported that numerous reports and our work  suggested that the substantial resources and capabilities marshaled by  federal, state, and local governments and nongovernmental organizations  were insufficient to meet the immediate challenges posed by the  unprecedented degree of damage and the resulting number of hurricane  victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We also reported that  developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters should be  part of an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to  integrate and define what needs to be done, where it needs to be done,  how it should be done, how well it should be done, and based on what  standards.
FEMA’s National Preparedness Directorate within its Protection and  National Preparedness organization was established in April 2007 and is  responsible for developing and implementing a system for measuring and  assessing national preparedness capabilities. Figure 2 provides an  illustration of how federal, state, and local resources provide capabilities  for different levels of “incident effect” (i.e., the extent of damage caused  by a natural or manmade disaster).
In October 2006, Congress passed the Post-Katrina Act that required  FEMA, in developing guidelines to define target capabilities, to ensure  that such guidelines are specific, flexible, and measurable.  In addition,  the Post-Katrina Act calls for FEMA to ensure that each component of the  national preparedness system, which includes the target capabilities, is  developed, revised, and updated with clear and quantifiable performance  metrics, measures, and outcomes.  We recommended in September  2006, among other things, that DHS apply an all-hazards, risk  management approach in deciding whether and how to invest in specific  capabilities for a catastrophic disaster. DHS concurred with this  recommendation and FEMA said it planned to use the Target Capabilities  List to assess capabilities to address all hazards.
In September 2007, FEMA issued an updated version of the Target  Capabilities List to provide a common perspective in conducting  assessments that determine levels of readiness to perform critical tasks  and identify and address any gaps or deficiencies. According to FEMA,  policymakers need regular reports on the status of capabilities for which  they have responsibility to help them make better resource and  investment decisions and to establish priorities.
In April 2009, we reported that establishing quantifiable metrics for target  capabilities was a prerequisite to developing assessment data that can be  compared across all levels of government. At the time of our review,  FEMA was in the process of refining the target capabilities to make them  more measurable and to provide state and local jurisdictions with  additional guidance on the levels of capability they need. Specifically,  FEMA planned to develop quantifiable metrics—or performance  objectives—for each of the 37 target capabilities that are to outline  specific capability targets that jurisdictions (such as cities) of varying size  should strive to meet, recognizing that there is not a “one size fits all”  approach to preparedness.
In October 2009, in responding to congressional questions regarding  FEMA’s plan and timeline for reviewing and revising the 37 target  capabilities, FEMA officials said they planned to conduct extensive  coordination through stakeholder workshops in all 10 FEMA regions and  with all federal agencies with lead and supporting responsibility for  emergency support-function activities associated with each of the 37  target capabilities. The workshops were intended to define the risk  factors, critical target outcomes, and resource elements for each  capability. The response stated that FEMA planned to create a Task  Force comprised of federal, state, local, and tribal stakeholders to  examine all aspects of preparedness grants, including benchmarking  efforts such as the Target Capabilities List. FEMA officials have described  their goals for updating the list to include establishing measurable target  outcomes, providing an objective means to justify investments and  priorities, and promoting mutual aid and resource sharing.
In November 2009, FEMA issued a Target Capabilities List  Implementation Guide that described the function of the list as a planning  tool and not a set of standards or requirements. Finally, in 2011, FEMA  announced that the Target Capabilities List would be replaced by a new  set of national Core Capabilities. However, it is not clear how the new  approach will help FEMA overcome ongoing challenges to assessing  national preparedness capabilities discussed below.
section_title: FEMA Has Not Yet Fully Addressed Ongoing Challenges to Assessing National Preparedness Capabilities
paragraphs: FEMA has not yet fully addressed ongoing challenges in developing and  implementing a system for assessing national preparedness capabilities.  For example, we reported in July 2005 that DHS had identified potential  challenges in gathering the information needed to assess capabilities,  including determining how to aggregate data from federal, state, local,  and tribal governments and others and integrating self-assessment and  external assessment approaches. In analyzing FEMA’s efforts to assess  capabilities, we further reported in April 2009 that FEMA faced  methodological challenges with regard to (1) differences in data available,  (2) variations in reporting structures across states, and (3) variations in  the level of detail within data sources requiring subjective interpretation.  As noted above, FEMA was in the process of refining the target  capabilities at the time of our review to make them more measurable and  to provide state and local jurisdictions with additional guidance on the  levels of capability they need. We recommended that FEMA enhance its  project management plan to include milestone dates, among other things,  a recommendation to which DHS concurred. In October 2010, we  reported that FEMA had enhanced its project management plan by  providing milestone dates and identifying key assessment points  throughout the project to determine whether project changes are  necessary.
Nonetheless, DHS and FEMA have had difficulty overcoming the  challenges we reported in July 2005 and April 2009 in establishing a  system of metrics to assess national preparedness capabilities.  As we reported in October 2010, FEMA officials said that, generally, evaluation  efforts they used to collect data on national preparedness capabilities  were useful for their respective purposes but that the data collected were  limited by data reliability and measurement issues related to the lack of  standardization in the collection of data.
FEMA officials reported that one of its evaluation efforts, the State  Preparedness Report, has enabled FEMA to gather data on the progress,  capabilities, and accomplishments of the preparedness program of a  state, the District of Columbia, or a territory. However, they also said that  these reports included self-reported data that may be subject to  interpretation by the reporting organizations in each state and not be  readily comparable to other states’ data. The officials also stated that they  have taken actions to address these limitations by, for example, creating  a Web-based survey tool to provide a more standardized way of  collecting state preparedness information that will help FEMA officials  validate the information by comparing it across states.
We reported in October 2010 that FEMA had an ongoing effort to develop  measures for target capabilities that would serve as planning guidance,  not requirements, to assist in state and local capability assessments.  FEMA officials had not yet determined how they planned to revise the  Target Capabilities List and said they were awaiting the completed  revision of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, which was to  address national preparedness. That directive, called Presidential Policy  Directive 8 on National Preparedness (PPD-8), was issued on March 30,  2011.
In March 2011, we reported that FEMA’s efforts to develop and  implement a comprehensive, measurable, national preparedness  assessment of capability and gaps were not yet complete and suggested  that Congress consider limiting preparedness grant funding until FEMA  completes a national preparedness assessment of capability gaps at  each level based on tiered, capability-specific performance objectives to  enable prioritization of grant funding. In April 2011, Congress passed  the fiscal year 2011 appropriations act for DHS, which reduced funding  for FEMA preparedness grants by $875 million from the amount  requested in the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget. The consolidated  appropriations act for fiscal year 2012 appropriated $1.7 billion for FEMA  Preparedness grants, $1.28 billion less than requested. The House  committee report accompanying the DHS appropriations bill for fiscal year  2012 stated that FEMA could not demonstrate how the use of the grants  had enhanced disaster preparedness.
According to FEMA’s testimony in a hearing on the President’s Fiscal  Year 2013 budget request before the House Committee on Homeland  Security’s Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and  Communications, FEMA became the federal lead for the implementation  of PPD-8 in 2011. The new presidential policy directive calls for the  development of both a National Preparedness Goal and a National  Preparedness System (both of which were required by the Post-Katrina  Act in 2006). FEMA issued the National Preparedness Goal in September  2011, which establishes core capabilities for prevention, protection,  response, recovery, and mitigation that are to serve as the basis for  preparedness activities within FEMA, throughout the federal government,  and at the state and local levels. These new core capabilities are the  latest evolution of the Target Capabilities List. According to FEMA  officials, they plan to continue to organize the implementation of the  National Preparedness System and will be working with partners across  the emergency management community to integrate activities into a  comprehensive campaign to build and sustain preparedness. According  to FEMA, many of the programs and processes that support the  components of the National Preparedness System exist and are currently  in use, while others will need to be updated or developed.
For example, FEMA has not yet developed national preparedness  capability requirements based on established metrics for the core  capabilities to provide a framework for national preparedness  assessments. As I testified last year, until such a framework is in place,  FEMA will not have a basis to operationalize and implement its  conceptual approach for assessing federal, state, and local preparedness  capabilities against capability requirements to identify capability gaps for  prioritizing investments in national preparedness.
Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and Members of the  Committee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to  respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this statement, please contact William O.  Jenkins Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512- 8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. In addition to the contact named above, the following  individuals from GAO’s Homeland Security and Justice Team also made  major contributions to this testimony: Chris Keisling, Assistant Director;  Allyson Goldstein, Dan Klabunde, Tracey King, and Lara Miklozek.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.