Defense Acquisitions: Navy Strategy for Unmanned Carrier-Based Aircraft System Defers Key Oversight Mechanisms
Published: 2013-09-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Navy estimates that it will need $3.7 billion from fiscal year 2014 through fiscal year 2020 to develop and field an initial UCLASS system. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated that GAO evaluate the UCLASS system acquisition strategy. This report (1) assesses the UCLASS acquisition strategy, (2) identifies key areas of risk facing the system, and (3) notes areas where the Navy's strategy contains good practices. To do this work, GAO reviewed the Navy's acquisition strategy and compared it to DOD's acquisition policy, among other criteria; and reviewed Navy acquisition documents and spoke with Navy and Office of the Secretary of Defense officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2014, the Navy plans to commit to investing an estimated $3.7 billion to develop, build, and field from 6 to 24 aircraft as an initial increment of Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) capability. However, it is not planning to hold a Milestone B review--a key decision that formally initiates a system development program and triggers key oversight mechanisms--until after the initial UCLASS capability has been developed and fielded in fiscal year 2020. The Navy views UCLASS as a technology development program, although it encompasses activities commensurate with system development, including system integration and demonstration. Because the initial UCLASS system is to be developed, produced, and fielded before a Milestone B decision, Congress's ability to oversee the program and hold it accountable for meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals will likely be limited. Specifically, the program will operate outside the basic oversight framework provided by mechanisms like a formal cost and schedule baseline, statutory unit cost tracking, and regular reports to Congress on cost, schedule, and performance progress. The Navy believes its approach effectively utilizes the flexibility in the Department of Defense's (DOD) acquisition policy to gain knowledge needed to ensure a successful UCLASS system development program starting in fiscal year 2020. Yet the Navy expects to review preliminary designs, conduct a full and open competition, and award a contract for UCLASS development in fiscal year 2014, a point at which DOD policy and best practices indicate that a program would be expected to hold a Milestone B review to initiate a system development program. Apart from deferring Milestone B, the Navy's plan would be consistent with the knowledge-based acquisition process reflected in DOD policy.
UCLASS faces several programmatic risks going forward. First, the UCLASS cost estimate of $3.7 billion exceeds the level of funding that the Navy expects to budget for the system through fiscal year 2020. Second, the Navy has scheduled 8 months between the time it issues its request for air vehicle design proposals and the time it awards the air vehicle contract, a process that DOD officials note typically takes 12 months to complete. Third, the UCLASS system is heavily reliant on the successful development and delivery of other systems and software, which creates additional schedule risk. Fourth, the Navy will be challenged to effectively manage and act as the lead integrator for three separate but interrelated segments--air vehicle, carrier, and control system--and 22 other government systems, such as the aircraft landing system, the timing and alignment of which are crucial to achieving the desired UCLASS capability. While the Navy recognizes many of these risks and has mitigation plans in place, they could lead to cost increases and schedule delays if not effectively addressed.
The Navy's UCLASS acquisition strategy includes some good acquisition practices that reflect aspects of a knowledge-based approach. For example, the Navy is leveraging significant knowledge gained from prior technology development efforts, incorporating an open systems design approach, working to match the system's requirements with available resources, and reviewing preliminary designs for the air vehicle before conducting a competition to select a single contractor to develop and deliver the air vehicle segment.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: Congress should consider directing the Navy to hold a Milestone B review for the UCLASS system after the system level preliminary design review is complete.If the Navy does not comply, Congress should consider limiting the amount of funding available for the UCLASS system until an acquisition program baseline is provided. GAO included these matters for consideration because the Navy does not plan to make changes as a result of GAOs recommendation to hold a Milestone B review following the system level preliminary design reviewwhich is currently scheduled in fiscal year 2015. The Navy did not concur with the recommendation, and believes that its approved strategy is compliant with acquisition regulations and laws. GAO continues to believe that its recommendation is valid as discussed in this report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Navy expects to invest $3.7 billion from fiscal year 2014 through  fiscal year 2020 to develop, test, and field an initial Unmanned Carrier- Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system. The  system is expected to provide intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,  targeting, and strike capabilities to the Navy’s aircraft carrier fleet. The  UCLASS system is made up of three primary segments: (1) unmanned air  vehicle, (2) aircraft carrier modifications, and (3) control system.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated  that GAO evaluate the UCLASS system’s acquisition strategy. report (1) assesses the Navy’s UCLASS acquisition strategy, (2) identifies  key areas of risk facing the UCLASS system, and (3) notes areas where  the Navy’s strategy contains good practices.
Pub. L. No.112-81, § 213(b) (2011). of Defense (DOD) acquisition policy.acquisition strategy with officials from the UCLASS system program  office, the Naval Air Systems Command, the Chief of Naval Operations,  and organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)  including the Director of OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation,  the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering, and  the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics. See appendix I for additional information on our objectives,  scope, and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2013 to September 2013  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Navy’s UCLASS system will be the first unmanned aircraft system  deployed on an aircraft carrier. Efforts to develop an unmanned combat  air system for the Navy can be traced back to 2003 when DOD  established a joint Navy and Air Force program called the Joint  Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS). This joint effort drew on  knowledge that the Air Force had gained through early development of  the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle, an effort that began in the late 1990s.  The J-UCAS program was canceled in late 2005. The following year, the  Navy initiated the Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration (UCAS- D) program—the immediate predecessor to UCLASS—with the intent to  design, develop, integrate, test, and demonstrate the technical feasibility  of operating unmanned air combat systems from an aircraft carrier. In  2013, the Navy successfully launched and landed a UCAS-D on an  aircraft carrier. In total the Navy invested more than $1.4 billion in the  UCAS-D program. In 2011, as UCAS-D efforts were ongoing, the Navy  received approval from DOD to begin planning for the UCLASS  acquisition program.
In our past work examining weapon acquisition and best practices for  product development, we found that leading commercial firms and  successful DOD programs pursue an acquisition approach that is  anchored in knowledge, whereby high levels of knowledge are  demonstrated at critical junctures. Specifically, there are three critical  junctures—knowledge points—in an acquisition program at which  decision makers must have adequate knowledge to make large  investment decisions. If the knowledge attained at each juncture does  not confirm the business case on which the acquisition was originally  justified, the program does not go forward. At the first knowledge point, a  match must be made between the customers’ needs and the available  resources—technical and engineering knowledge, time, and funding— before a system development program is started. At the second  knowledge point, about midway through development, the developer must  demonstrate that the system’s design is stable and that it can meet  performance requirements. At the third knowledge point, the developer  must show that the system can be manufactured within cost, schedule,  and quality targets and that it is reliable before beginning production. The  first knowledge point is the most critical point of the three. At that point  programs should present their business case for review and approval,  which establishes an acquisition program baseline. This baseline  describes the cost, quantity, schedule, and performance goals of a  program and provides a framework for effective oversight and  accountability. This first knowledge point typically coincides with a  substantial financial commitment.
DOD’s acquisition policy and guidance encourage the use of a  knowledge-based acquisition approach, in which major decision reviews  are aligned with the start of key acquisition phases, including technology  development, system development—referred to as engineering and  manufacturing development—and production. Figure 1 aligns the  knowledge points with key decision points in DOD’s acquisition process.
According to DOD acquisition policy, the purpose of the technology  development phase is to reduce technology risk, determine and mature  the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system, and  to demonstrate critical technology elements on prototypes. A system  level preliminary design review is to be held during the technology  development phase to inform requirements trades; improve cost  estimation; and identify remaining design, integration, and manufacturing  risks. The results of the preliminary design review are to be reported to  decision makers at Milestone B—the decision review in DOD’s process  that corresponds with knowledge point 1 and initiates system  development. The purpose of system development is to develop a system  or an increment of capability, complete full system integration, develop an  affordable and executable manufacturing process, and demonstrate  system integration, interoperability, safety, and utility, among other things.
System development provides a critical opportunity for objective oversight  before beginning production.
At Milestone B, major defense acquisition programs are required by DOD  policy to have approved requirements, an independent cost estimate, and  an acquisition program baseline; begin tracking unit cost changes and  report unit cost growth against Nunn-McCurdy statutory thresholds; and  periodically report to Congress on the cost, schedule, and performance  status of the program in Selected Acquisition Reports. At that time, major  defense acquisition programs are also required by statute to present a  business case analysis and certify on the basis of that analysis that the  program is affordable, has reasonable lifecycle cost and schedule  estimates, and that technologies have been demonstrated in a relevant  environment, among other things. Taken together, these requirements  form the basic oversight framework to ensure that Congress and DOD  decision makers are adequately informed about the program’s cost,  schedule, and performance progress. In addition, the information is  valuable for identifying areas of program risk and its causes, and helps to  ensure that decision makers consider the full financial commitment before  initiating a new development program. Once initiated at Milestone B,  major defense acquisition programs are required to measure program  performance against the program’s baseline estimate. Changes to the  baseline are only authorized under certain conditions, including a  program restructure that is approved by the milestone decision authority,  or a breach of the critical Nunn-McCurdy statutory threshold where DOD  certifies continuation of the program to Congress.
section_title: The Navy’s UCLASS Acquisition Strategy Defers Key Oversight Mechanisms
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2014, the Navy plans to commit to investing an estimated  $3.7 billion to develop, produce, and field from 6 to 24 aircraft and modify  1 to 4 aircraft carriers as an initial increment of UCLASS capability— referred to as an early operational capability. The Navy plans to manage  UCLASS as if it were a technology development program, although its  strategy encompasses activities commensurate with a program in system  development and early production. Accordingly, it is not planning to hold a  Milestone B review to formally initiate a system development program— which would trigger key oversight mechanisms—until after the initial  capability is fielded in fiscal year 2020. This strategy means the program  will not be subject to these oversight mechanisms including an acquisition  program baseline; Nunn-McCurdy unit cost growth thresholds; and  periodic reporting of the program’s cost, schedule, and performance  progress. This strategy will likely limit Congress’s ability to oversee this 6- year multibillion dollar program. Navy officials believe that their approach  effectively utilizes the flexibility in DOD’s acquisition policy to ensure that  UCLASS requirements and concept of operations are well understood  and achievable before formally beginning a system development  program. Yet they emphasize that by fiscal year 2020 they may have  accumulated enough knowledge to allow them to bypass a formal  development program and proceed directly to production at Milestone C.  Figure 2 illustrates the Navy’s strategy.
As indicated above, the Navy plans to award four firm fixed-price  contracts in fiscal year 2013 to competing contractors to develop  preliminary designs for the UCLASS air vehicle. The following year, the  Navy plans to review those preliminary designs, conduct a full and open  competition, and award a contract to develop and deliver the UCLASS air  vehicles, effectively ending competition within the air vehicle segment. A  review of the full system level preliminary design—including the air  vehicle, carrier, and control segments—is scheduled for fiscal year 2015.  DOD policy and best practices indicate that around this review point a  program would typically be expected to hold a Milestone B review and  transition from technology development to system development. Figure 3  illustrates the later point in the process in which the Navy plans to  establish the UCLASS acquisition program baseline and formally initiate a  development program.
Although the Navy does not plan to hold a Milestone B review until 2020,  if at all, it is effectively committing to system development and early  production in fiscal year 2015. According to the Navy’s strategy, system  development and early production activities, including system integration  and air vehicle fabrication, will begin in fiscal year 2015 around the time of  the system-level preliminary design review. The Navy also expects to  increase annual funding for the UCLASS system from $146.7 million to  $522.5 million between fiscal years 2014 and 2015. Testing to  demonstrate the system’s capabilities is scheduled to take place from  fiscal year 2017—scheduled first flight—through fiscal year 2020, when  an early operational capability is expected to be achieved. If the program  proceeds according to the Navy’s plan, by 2020, it will have completed  many of the activities typically authorized by a Milestone B decision.  Moreover, since enough quantities of UCLASS are expected to be  delivered for operational use on one or more aircraft carriers, the strategy  could also be seen as having begun early production before a Milestone  C decision is held.
In a March 2007 report we identified oversight challenges presented by  an acquisition strategy that calls for proceeding into system development,  demonstration, manufacturing, and fielding without the benefit of a  Milestone B decision. A framework of laws make major defense  acquisition programs accountable for their planned outcomes and cost,  give decision makers a means to conduct oversight, and ensure some  level of independent program review. The application of these acquisition  laws is typically triggered by a program’s entry into system development.  While the activities the UCLASS program plans to undertake exemplify  that the program is entering into system development, these laws will not  be triggered because the program is not holding a Milestone B review and  formally initiating a development program. Therefore, the UCLASS  program will not be accountable for establishing a program baseline or for  reporting any cost growth to that baseline to DOD and Congress.
section_title: UCLASS Faces Cost, Schedule, and Program Management Risks
paragraphs: The UCLASS system faces several risks related to cost, schedule, and  program management that, if not addressed, could lead to additional cost  and significant schedule delays for the system. The Navy recognizes that  many of these risks exist and has mitigation plans in place to address  them.
UCLASS cost estimates are uncertain and could exceed available  funding: Preliminary cost estimates completed by the Navy indicate  that the development and fielding of the initial UCLASS system  through fiscal year 2020 could cost between $3.7 and $5.9 billion, all  of which is expected to be development funding. However, the Navy  has only projected funding of $3.2 billion for the system through fiscal  year 2020. The variability in the cost estimates is due largely to cost  estimating ground rules and assumptions. For example, Navy officials  stated that the $3.7 billion cost estimate reflects an assumed savings  of 15 to 20 percent that they believe is achievable since competing  contractors’ preliminary designs will be relatively mature. Navy and  DOD officials we spoke with emphasized that no true sense of cost  will be known until after the air vehicle segment preliminary design  reviews have been completed and a single contractor has been  selected. If the preliminary designs are less mature than assumed,  costs could increase significantly, further exceeding budgeted  resources.
Source selection schedule is compressed: After the four  competing contractors have completed their preliminary air vehicle  designs, the Navy plans to conduct a full and open competition before  awarding the air vehicle segment contract. The Navy’s strategy allows  for about 8 months between the time that it issues its request for air  vehicle proposals and the time it awards the contract. According to  OSD officials, this type of contract award process typically takes  approximately 12 months.
UCLASS is dependent on development and delivery of other  systems: The Navy identifies the delivery of the Common Control  System software as a risk and notes that if it is delayed, alternative  control system software would be needed to achieve the established  deployment timeline. Using alternative software would increase  integration costs and extend the testing timeline, resulting in  duplicated development, integration, and testing once the common  control system software is delivered. The Navy expects this risk to be  mitigated over time as individual segments of the control system  software are built, delivered, integrated, and tested.
UCLASS is also critically dependent on the development and fielding  of the Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS), which  is a global positioning system-based aircraft landing system that  guides the aircraft to make a safe landing on the aircraft carrier deck.  However, in a March 2013 report, we found that the JPALS program  has experienced significant schedule delays. Additional JPALS  delays would likely affect the Navy’s UCLASS schedule, in which case  the Navy may need to identify an alternative landing system for  UCLASS, thus increasing the cost and delaying delivery of the  capability. The Navy recognizes this risk. The program office holds  weekly integrated master schedule reviews with the JPALS program  and plans to mitigate risk through JPALS testing, initial deployments,  and continued communication with the JPALS program and other  Navy offices.
UCLASS system integration will be challenging: The Navy plans  to act as the lead systems integrator for all three segments through  the development and fielding of the initial UCLASS system. The Navy  will have three separate but interrelated segments to manage, the  timing and alignment of which are crucial to success of the overall  system. The system is reliant on 22 existing government systems,  such as JPALS. The Navy recognizes that there is risk associated  with its role as the lead systems integrator, as it does not routinely act  in this capacity. Therefore, the Navy plans to manage this risk through  interaction with industry and regular system level reviews. According  to program officials, this integration effort will require the number of  full time equivalent staff in the program office to double from its  current level of 150 staff to around 300 staff.
section_title: UCLASS Acquisition Strategy Contains Aspects of a Knowledge-Based Approach
paragraphs: While the Navy has not yet established a business case or acquisition  program baseline, the UCLASS strategy reflects aspects of a knowledge- based approach. Some of these aspects are discussed in more detail  below:
Leveraging significant knowledge gained from prior technology  development efforts: The Navy is planning to maximize the use of  technologies for carrier-based unmanned aircraft systems operations  that have been developed under other efforts like the UCAS-D  program, which recently demonstrated the feasibility of launching and  landing an unmanned aircraft on an aircraft carrier. Navy officials note  that they plan to leverage navigation and control technologies, among  other things, from the demonstration program. By effectively  leveraging these types of previous investments, along with other  existing systems and technologies, the Navy could reduce cost and  schedule for the UCLASS system and promote affordability.
Incorporating an open systems design approach: We reported in  July 2013 that the Navy is planning to use an open systems approach  for the UCLASS system. The Navy has identified key system  interfaces and, according to program officials, plans to require  contractors to comply with particular open system standards, which it  believes will reduce acquisition costs and simplify integration. The  Navy also plans to incorporate an open systems architecture  developed by OSD for the UCLASS system control segment. This  architecture implements a common framework, user interfaces,  software applications, and services, and is designed to be common  across unmanned aircraft systems. DOD estimates that the open  architecture will reduce costs and allow for rapid integration of  payloads.
Matching requirements to available resources: In 2012, the Joint  Requirements Oversight Council issued a memorandum that required  the Navy to reduce its UCLASS requirements because at that time  they were deemed unaffordable. The Joint Requirements Oversight  Council specifically noted that the Navy’s requirements should focus  on achieving an affordable, adaptable platform that supports a wide  range of missions within 3 to 6 years. As a result, the Navy scaled  down the UCLASS requirements and updated its analysis of  alternatives to include requirements that are more affordable and  feasible. Our prior work has found that matching requirements with  resources before beginning a system development program increases  the likelihood that the program will meet cost and schedule  objectives.
Holding competition for preliminary designs: In fiscal year 2013,  the Navy plans to award four firm fixed-price contracts to competing  contractors to develop and deliver preliminary air vehicle designs. The  Navy then plans to review those preliminary designs, conduct a full  and open competition, and award a single air vehicle segment  contract. The Navy believes that this competition will drive efficiencies  and ultimately result in cost savings across the system’s life cycle.  This strategy reflects recent DOD initiatives that emphasize the  importance of competition, which we have noted in the past, can help  reduce program costs.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Navy plans to manage UCLASS as a technology development  program, although its strategy encompasses activities commensurate  with system development and early production. The Navy believes the  strategy provides considerable latitude to manage UCLASS development  and to demonstrate significant knowledge before the Milestone B  decision. Indeed, we have often reported that programs tend to move  forward with Milestone B and system development before they have  demonstrated enough knowledge. But the Navy’s plan to develop,  manufacture, and field operational UCLASS systems on up to four aircraft  carriers before holding a Milestone B decision would defer the decision  and mechanisms that would otherwise enable oversight of these very  program activities until after they are over. Without a program baseline  and regular reporting on progress, it will be difficult for Congress to hold  the Navy accountable for achieving UCLASS cost, schedule, and  performance goals. As we have noted, these kinds of risks are present in  the program and warrant such oversight. Looking ahead to fiscal year  2020, when the UCLASS system is already being delivered, Congress  may have few options other than to continue authorizing funding for  UCLASS manufacturing and fielding.
If the UCLASS program can be executed according to the Navy’s  strategy, it would be consistent with the normal DOD acquisition process  that applies to most weapon system programs, with the exception of the  deferral of the Milestone B review. In fact, the timing of the Milestone B  review notwithstanding, the actual program activities planned are  consistent with a knowledge-based acquisition approach. For example,  the Navy is leveraging knowledge gained from prior technology  development programs, incorporating an open systems design, matching  resources with requirements, and utilizing competition. Given the  competitive preliminary design process planned and subsequent  competitive contract award, it seems reasonable that a Milestone B  decision could be held following the competition and before the beginning  of system development, providing a solid oversight framework with little or  no change to the strategy’s schedule.
section_title: Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: To enhance program oversight and accountability given that the Navy  does not plan to modify its acquisition strategy and hold a Milestone B  decision review for the UCLASS system following the system level  preliminary design review in fiscal year 2015, Congress should consider  directing the Navy to hold a Milestone B review for the system after the  system level preliminary design review is complete.
If the Navy does not comply, Congress should consider limiting the  amount of funding available for the UCLASS system until the Navy  provides the basic elements of an acquisition program baseline, such as  development and production cost estimates, unit costs, quantities,  schedules, annual funding profiles, and key performance parameters  needed for such a large investment. The Navy should also be required to  periodically report the program’s status against the baseline.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: In order to provide for increased congressional oversight and program  accountability, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Secretary of the Navy to hold a Milestone B decision review for the  UCLASS system following the system level preliminary design review— which is currently scheduled in fiscal year 2015.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: The Navy provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The  Navy’s comments are reprinted in appendix II. The Navy also provided  technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
The Navy did not concur with our recommendation to hold a Milestone B  decision review for the UCLASS system following its planned system  level preliminary design review in 2015. The Navy stated that the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics approved  its UCLASS acquisition strategy in 2013 and certified that the strategy  was compliant with the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of  2009, the amendments made to that Act, and DOD policy. The Navy  pointed out that DOD’s policy defines the technology development phase  as an “iterative process designed to assess the viability of technologies  while simultaneously refining user requirements.” The Navy went on to  state that the UCLASS user requirements and Concept of Operations will  be refined during the early operational capability fleet exercises currently  scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2020 and that, at that time, the Navy  plans to request approval to hold a Milestone B review to continue  development of the UCLASS capability.
While the Navy’s UCLASS acquisition strategy may be compliant with  laws and DOD policy, the development, production, and fielding of an  operational system before holding a Milestone B review will limit  congressional oversight of a significant investment in weapon system  development. An estimated development cost of $3.7 billion makes this  UCLASS investment larger than the majority of DOD’s current major  weapon system development programs. We agree that the technology  development phase of an acquisition program is intended to assess the  viability of technologies while refining requirements. However, the system  development and early production activities included in the Navy’s  UCLASS acquisition strategy go well beyond technology development  and requirements refinement, and thus warrant oversight commensurate  with a major weapon system development program. Thus, we continue to  believe that our recommendation is valid and are making two matters for  congressional consideration to ensure Congress has information  available to oversee the UCLASS system and to hold the Navy  accountable for achieving UCLASS cost, schedule, and performance  goals.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Secretary of the Navy, and interested congressional committees. In  addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report or need additional information,  please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated  that GAO evaluate the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne  Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system acquisition strategy. This  report (1) assesses the Navy’s UCLASS acquisition strategy, (2) identifies  key areas of risk facing the UCLASS system, and (3) notes areas where  the Navy’s strategy contains good practices.
In order to assess the Navy’s UCLASS acquisition strategy, we collected,  reviewed, and compared the UCLASS acquisition strategy with best  practice standards for using knowledge to support key program  investment decisions.  These standards are based on GAO’s extensive  body of work in this area. Additionally we compared the Navy’s strategy  against DOD acquisition policy.
In order to identify any key areas of risk facing the UCLASS system and  note areas where the Navy’s strategy contains good practices, we  collected and reviewed additional UCLASS documentation, such as the  analysis of alternatives, capabilities development document, and other  relevant Navy management documents. We discussed the Navy’s  UCLASS acquisition strategy with officials from the UCLASS system  program office, the Naval Air Systems Command, the Chief of Naval  Operations, and organizations within the Office of the Secretary of  Defense (OSD) including the Director of OSD Cost Assessment and  Program Evaluation, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Systems Engineering, and the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2013 to September 2013  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  finding based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Travis Masters, Assistant Director; Laura Greifner; Julie Hadley;  Kristine Hassinger; Laura Jezewski; Matt Lea; John Pendleton; Dr.  Timothy M. Persons; and Roxanna Sun.