Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts
Published: 2005-10-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The July 2005 bombing attacks on London's subway system dramatically highlighted the vulnerability of passenger rail systems worldwide to terrorist attacks, and the need for an increased focus on security for these systems. This testimony provides information on how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), have assessed risks posed by terrorism to the U.S. passenger rail system using risk management principles; actions federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of U.S. rail systems; and rail security practices implemented by domestic and selected foreign passenger rail operators and differences among these practices.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Within DHS, ODP has completed numerous risk assessments of passenger rail systems around the country, and TSA has begun to conduct risk assessments as well as establish a methodology for determining how to analyze and characterize risks that have been identified. Until TSA completes these efforts, however, the agency will not be able to prioritize passenger rail assets and help guide security investment decisions. At the department level, DHS has begun developing, but has not yet completed, a framework to help agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks to transportation and other sectors. Until this framework is finalized and shared with stakeholders, it may not be possible to compare risks across different sectors, prioritize them, and allocate resources accordingly. In addition to the ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail security conducted by the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Transit Administration and Federal Railroad Administration, such as providing security training to passenger rail operators, TSA issued emergency security directives in 2004 to domestic rail operators after terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid and piloted a test of explosive detection technology for use in passenger rail systems. However, federal and rail industry officials raised questions about the feasibility of implementing and complying with the security directives, citing limited opportunities to collaborate with TSA to ensure that industry best practices were incorporated. Domestic and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted have taken a range of actions to help secure their systems. Most, for example, had implemented customer awareness programs to encourage passengers to report suspicious activities, increased the number and visibility of their security personnel, upgraded security technology, and improved rail system design to enhance security. We also observed security practices among certain foreign passenger rail systems or their governments not currently used by the domestic rail operators we contacted, or by the U.S. government, which could be considered for use in the United States. For example, some foreign rail operators randomly screen passengers or utilize covert testing to help keep employees alert to security threats, and some foreign governments maintain centralized clearinghouses on rail security technologies. While introducing any of these security practices into the U.S. rail system may pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, they may nevertheless warrant further examination.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for inviting me to participate in today’s hearing on passenger  and freight rail security. The London rail bombings that took place in  July—resulting in over 50 fatalities and more than 700 injuries—made  clear that even when a variety of security precautions are put in place,  passenger rail systems that move high volumes of passengers on a daily  basis remain vulnerable to terrorist attack. While securing the U.S.  passenger rail system is a daunting task—a shared responsibility requiring  coordinated action on the part of federal, state, and local governments and  the private sector—it is important nonetheless to take the necessary steps  to identify and mitigate risks to passenger rail systems.
As we have reported previously, the sheer number of stakeholders  involved in securing these systems can lead to communication challenges,  duplication of effort, and confusion about roles and responsibilities. Key  federal stakeholders with critical roles to play within the rail sector  include the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which is  responsible for transportation security overall, and the Office for Domestic  Preparedness (ODP), which provides grant funds to rail operators and  conducts risk assessments for passenger rail agencies, both within the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and the Federal Transit  Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), both  within the Department of Transportation (DOT). One of the critical  challenges facing these federal agencies, and rail system operators they  oversee or support, is finding ways to protect rail systems from potential  terrorist attacks without compromising the accessibility and efficiency of  rail travel.
At the federal level, another significant challenge to securing rail systems  involves allocation of resources. The U.S. passenger rail systems represent  one of many modes of transportation—along with aviation, maritime, and  others—competing for limited federal security resources. Within the  passenger rail sector itself, there is competition for resources, as federal,  state, and local agencies and rail operators seek to identify and invest in  appropriate security measures to safeguard these systems while also  investing in other capital and operational improvements. Moreover, given  competing priorities and limited homeland security resources, difficult  policy decisions have to be made by Congress and the executive branch to  prioritize security efforts and direct resources to areas of greatest risk  within the passenger rail system, among all transportation modes, and  across other nationally critical sectors.
In this regard, to help federal decision makers determine how to best  allocate limited resources, we have advocated, the National Commission  on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) has  recommended, and the subsequent Intelligence Reform and Terrorism  Prevention Act of 2004 requires, that a risk management approach be  employed to guide security decision making. A risk management  approach entails a continuous process of managing risks through a series  of actions, including setting strategic goals and objectives, assessing and  quantifying risks, evaluating alternative security measures, selecting which  measures to undertake, and implementing and monitoring those measures.  In July 2005, in announcing his proposal for the reorganization of DHS, the  Secretary of DHS declared that as a core principle of the reorganization,  the department must base its work on priorities driven by risk.
My testimony today focuses on the progress federal agencies and domestic  passenger rail operators have made in setting and implementing security  priorities in the wake of September 11 and terrorist attacks on rail  systems, and the security practices implemented by foreign passenger rail  operators. In particular, my testimony highlights three key areas: (1) the  actions that DHS and its component agencies have taken to assess the  risks posed by terrorism to the U.S. passenger rail system in the context of  prevailing risk management principles; (2) the actions that federal  agencies have taken to enhance the security of the U.S. passenger rail  system; and (3) the security practices that domestic and selected foreign  passenger rail operators have implemented to mitigate risks and enhance  security, and any differences in these practices. My comments today are  based upon our recently issued report to Senators Snowe and Boxer of  this committee, the chairman of the House Transportation and  Infrastructure Subcommittee on Railroads, and Representative Castle.
Within DHS, ODP has completed numerous risk assessments of  passenger rail systems around the country, and TSA has begun to  conduct risk assessments as well as establish a methodology for  determining how to analyze and characterize risks that have been  identified. Until TSA completes these efforts, however, or sets  timelines for doing so, the agency will not be able to prioritize  passenger rail assets and help guide security investment decisions. At  the department level, DHS has begun developing, but has not yet  completed a framework to help agencies and the private sector develop  a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks to  transportation and other sectors. Until this framework is finalized and  shared with stakeholders, it may not be possible to compare risks  across different sectors, prioritize them, and allocate resources  accordingly.
In addition to the ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail  conducted by the FTA and FRA, in 2004, TSA issued emergency  security directives to domestic rail operators after terrorist attacks on  the rail system in Madrid and piloted a test of explosive detection  technology for use in passenger rail systems. However, federal and rail  industry officials raised questions about the feasibility of implementing  and complying with these directives, citing limited opportunities to  collaborate with TSA to ensure that industry best practices were  incorporated. In September 2004, DHS and DOT signed a memorandum  of understanding to improve coordination between the two agencies,  and are developing agreements to delineate specific security-related  roles and responsibilities, among other things, for the different modes.   An agreement for transit security was signed in September 2005.
Domestic and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted have  taken a range of actions to help secure their systems. Most, for  example, had implemented customer awareness programs to  encourage passengers to remain vigilant and report suspicious  activities, increased the number and visibility of their security  personnel, increased the use of canine teams to detect explosives,  enhanced employee training programs, upgraded security technology,  tightened access controls, and made rail system design improvements  to enhance security. We also observed security practices among certain  foreign passenger rail systems or their governments that are not  currently used by the domestic rail operators we contacted, or by the  U.S. government, which could be considered for use in the United  States. For example, some foreign rail operators randomly screen  passengers or utilize covert testing to help keep employees alert to  security threats, and some foreign governments maintain centralized  clearinghouses on rail security technologies and best practices. While  introducing any of these security practices into the U.S. rail system  may pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, they may  nevertheless warrant further examination.
In our September 2005 report on passenger rail security, we  recommended, among other things, that to help ensure that the federal  government has the information it needs to prioritize passenger rail assets  based on risk, and in order to evaluate, select, and implement  commensurate measures to help the nation’s passenger rail operators  protect their systems against acts of terrorism, TSA should establish a plan  with timelines for completing its methodology for conducting risk  assessments and develop security standards that reflect industry best  practices and can be measured and enforced, by using the federal rule- making process. In addition, we recommended that the Secretary of DHS,  in collaboration with DOT and the passenger rail industry, determine the  feasibility, in a risk management context, of implementing certain security  practices used by foreign rail operators.  DHS, DOT, and Amtrak generally  agreed with the report’s recommendations.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Overview of the Passenger Rail System
paragraphs: Each weekday, 11.3 million passengers in 35 metropolitan areas and 22  states use some form of rail transit (commuter, heavy, or light rail).  Commuter rail systems typically operate on railroad tracks and provide  regional service (e.g., between a central city and adjacent suburbs).  Commuter rail systems are traditionally associated with older industrial  cities, such as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago. Heavy rail  systems—subway systems like New York City’s transit system and  Washington, D.C.’s Metro—typically operate on fixed rail lines within a  metropolitan area and have the capacity for a heavy volume of traffic.  Amtrak operates the nation’s primary intercity passenger rail service over  a 22,000-mile network, primarily over leased freight railroad tracks.  Amtrak serves more than 500 stations (240 of which are staffed) in 46  states and the District of Columbia, and it carried more than 25 million  passengers in 2004. Figure 1 identifies the geographic location of rail  transit systems and Amtrak within the United States.
section_title: Passenger Rail Systems Are Inherently Vulnerable to Terrorist Attacks
paragraphs: According to passenger rail officials and passenger rail experts, certain  characteristics of domestic and foreign passenger rail systems make them  inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks and therefore difficult to secure.  By design, passenger rail systems are open (i.e., have multiple access  points, hubs serving multiple carriers, and, in some cases, no barriers) so  that they can move large numbers of people quickly. In contrast, the U.S.  commercial aviation system is housed in closed and controlled locations  with few entry points. The openness of passenger rail systems can leave  them vulnerable because operator personnel cannot completely monitor  or control who enters or leaves the systems. In addition, other  characteristics of some passenger rail systems—high ridership, expensive  infrastructure, economic importance, and location (e.g., large  metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)—also make them attractive  targets for terrorists because of the potential for mass casualties and  economic damage and disruption. Moreover, some of these same  characteristics make passenger rail systems difficult to secure. For  example, the numbers of riders that pass through a subway system— especially during peak hours—may make the sustained use of some  security measures, such as metal detectors, difficult because they could  result in long lines that could disrupt scheduled service. In addition,  multiple access points along extended routes could make the cost of  securing each location prohibitive. Balancing the potential economic  impacts of security enhancements with the benefits of such measures is a  difficult challenge.
section_title: Multiple Stakeholders Share Responsibility for Security Passenger Rail Systems
paragraphs: Securing the nation’s passenger rail systems is a shared responsibility  requiring coordinated action on the part of federal, state, and local  governments; the private sector; and rail passengers who ride these  systems. Since the September 11 attacks, the role of federal government  agencies in securing the nation’s transportation systems, including  passenger rail, have continued to evolve. Prior to September 11, DOT— namely FTA and FRA—was the primary federal entity involved in  passenger rail security matters. In response to the attacks of September  11, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),  which created TSA within DOT and defined its primary responsibility as  ensuring security in all modes of transportation. The act also gave TSA  regulatory authority for security over all transportation modes. ATSA does  not specify TSA’s roles and responsibilities in securing the maritime and  land transportation modes at the level of detail it does for aviation  security. Instead, the act broadly identifies that TSA is responsible for  ensuring the security of all modes of transportation. With the passage of  the Homeland Security Act of 2002, TSA was transferred, along with over  20 other agencies, to the Department of Homeland Security.
With the creation of DHS in 2002, one of its components, ODP, became  primarily responsible for overseeing security funding for passenger rail  systems. ODP is the principal component of DHS responsible for  preparing the United States for acts of terrorism and has primary  responsibility within the executive branch for assisting and supporting  DHS, in coordination with other directorates and entities outside of the  department, in conducting risk analysis and risk management activities of  state and local governments. In carrying out its mission, ODP provides  training, funds for the purchase of equipment, support for the planning and  execution of exercises, technical assistance, and other support to assist  states, local jurisdictions, and the private sector to prevent, prepare for,  and respond to acts of terrorism. Through the Urban Area Security  Initiative (UASI) grant program, ODP has provided grants to urban areas  to help enhance their overall security and preparedness level to prevent,  respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. The DHS Appropriations  Act of 2005 appropriated $150 million for rail transit, intercity passenger  rail, freight rail, and transit agency security grants. With this funding, ODP  created and is administering two grant programs focused specifically on  transportation security, the Transit Security Grant Program and the  Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program. These programs provide  financial assistance to address security preparedness and enhancements  for transit (to include commuter, heavy, and light rail systems; intracity  bus; and ferry) and intercity rail systems.
While TSA is the lead federal agency for ensuring the security of all  transportation modes, FTA conducts nonregulatory safety and security  activities, including safety and security-related training, research, technical  assistance, and demonstration projects. In addition, FTA promotes safety  and security through its grant-making authority. FRA has regulatory  authority for rail safety over commuter rail operators and Amtrak, and  employs over 400 rail inspectors that periodically monitor the  implementation of safety and security plans at these systems.
State and local governments, passenger rail operators, and private industry  are also important stakeholders in the nation’s rail security efforts. State  and local governments may own or operate a significant portion of the  passenger rail system. Even when state and local governments are not  owners and operators, they are directly affected by passenger rail systems  that run within and through their jurisdictions. Consequently, the  responsibility for responding to emergencies involving the passenger rail  infrastructure often falls to state and local governments. Passenger rail  operators, which can be public or private entities, are responsible for  administering and managing passenger rail activities and services.  Passenger rail operators can directly operate the service provided or  contract for all or part of the total service. Although all levels of  government are involved in passenger rail security, the primary  responsibility for securing passenger rail systems rests with the passenger  rail operators.
section_title: Assessing and Managing Risks to Rail Infrastructure Using a Risk Management Approach
paragraphs: In recent years, we, along with Congress (most recently through the  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004), the executive  branch (e.g., in presidential directives), and the 9/11 Commission have  required or advocated that federal agencies with homeland security  responsibilities utilize a risk management approach to help ensure that  finite national resources are dedicated to assets or activities considered to  have the highest security priority. We have concluded that without a risk  management approach, there is limited assurance that programs designed  to combat terrorism are properly prioritized and focused. Thus, risk  management, as applied in the homeland security context, can help to  more effectively and efficiently prepare defenses against acts of terrorism  and other threats.
A risk management approach entails a continuous process of managing  risk through a series of actions, including setting strategic goals and  objectives, performing risk assessments, evaluating alternative actions to  reduce identified risks by preventing or mitigating their impact,  management selecting actions to undertake, and implementing and  monitoring those actions. Figure 2 depicts a risk management cycle that is  our synthesis of government requirements and prevailing best practices  previously reported.
Setting strategic goals, objectives, and constraints is a key first step in  implementing a risk management approach and helps to ensure that  management decisions are focused on achieving a strategic purpose.  These decisions should take place in the context of an agency’s strategic  plan that includes goals and objectives that are clear, concise, and  measurable.
Risk assessment, a critical element of a risk management approach, helps  decision makers identify and evaluate potential risks so that  countermeasures can be designed and implemented to prevent or mitigate  the effects of the risks. Risk assessment is a qualitative and/or quantitative  determination of the likelihood of an adverse event occurring and the  severity, or impact, of its consequences. Risk assessment in a homeland  security application often involves assessing three key elements—threat,  criticality, and vulnerability:    A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the  basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and past activities.
A criticality or consequence assessment evaluates and prioritizes assets  and functions in terms of specific criteria, such as their importance to  public safety and the economy, as a basis for identifying which  structures or processes are relatively more important to protect from  attack.
A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be exploited  by identified threats and suggests options to address those weaknesses.
Information from these three assessments contributes to an overall risk  assessment that characterizes risks on a scale such as high, medium, or  low and provides input for evaluating alternatives and management  prioritization of security initiatives. The risk assessment element in the  overall risk management cycle may be the largest change from standard  management steps and is central to informing the remaining steps of the  cycle.
The next step in a risk management approach—alternatives evaluation— considers what actions may be needed to address identified risks, the  associated costs of taking these actions, and any resulting benefits. This  information is then to be provided to agency management to assist in the  selection of alternative actions best suited to the unique needs of the  organization. An additional step in the risk management approach is the  implementation and monitoring of actions taken to address the risks,  including evaluating the extent to which risk was mitigated by these  actions. Once the agency has implemented the actions to address risks, it  should develop criteria for and continually monitor the performance of  these actions to ensure that they are effective and also reflect evolving  risk.
section_title: Federal Agencies with Risk Management Responsibilities
paragraphs: A number of federal departments and agencies have risk management and  critical infrastructure protection responsibilities stemming from various  requirements. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created DHS,  directed the department’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure  Protection (IAIP) Directorate to utilize a risk management approach in  coordinating the nation’s critical infrastructure protection efforts. This  includes using risk assessments to set priorities for protective and support  measures by the department, other federal agencies, state and local  government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities.  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) defines critical  infrastructure protection responsibilities for DHS, sector-specific agencies  (those federal agencies given responsibility for transportation, energy,  telecommunications, and so forth), and other departments and agencies.  The President instructs federal departments and agencies to identify,  prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure to  prevent, deter, and mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks. The Secretary  of DHS is assigned several responsibilities by HSPD-7, including  establishing uniform policies, approaches, guidelines, and methodologies  for integrating federal infrastructure protection and risk management  activities within and across sectors. To ensure the coverage of critical  sectors, HSPD-7 designated sector-specific agencies for 17 critical  infrastructure sectors. These agencies are responsible for infrastructure  protection activities in their assigned sectors, including coordinating and  collaborating with relevant federal agencies, state and local governments,  and the private sector to carry out their responsibilities and facilitating the  sharing of information about vulnerabilities, incidents, potential protective  measures, and best practices.
Pursuant to HSPD-7 and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan  (NIPP), DHS was designated as the sector-specific agency for the  transportation sector, a responsibility the department has delegated to  TSA. As the sector-specific agency for transportation, TSA is required to  develop a transportation sector-specific plan (TSSP) for identifying,  prioritizing, and protecting critical transportation infrastructure and key  resources that will provide key input to the broader National  Infrastructure Protection Plan to be prepared by IAIP. DHS issued an  interim NIPP in February 2005 that was intended to serve as a road map  for how DHS and stakeholders—including other federal agencies, the  private sector, and state and local governments—should use risk  management principles for determining how to prioritize activities related  to protecting critical infrastructure and key resources within and among  each of the 17 sectors in an integrated, coordinated fashion. DHS expects  the next iteration of the NIPP to be issued in November 2005, with the  sector-specific plans, including the TSSP, being incorporated into this plan  in February 2006. HSPD-7 also requires DHS to coordinate with DOT on all  transportation security matters.
section_title: DHS Has Taken Steps to Assess Risk to Passenger Rail Systems, but Additional Work Is Needed to Guide Security Investments
paragraphs: DHS component agencies have taken various steps to assess the risk  posed by terrorism to U.S. passenger rail systems. ODP has developed and  implemented a risk assessment methodology intended to help passenger  rail operators and others enhance their capacity to respond to terrorist  incidents and identify and prioritize security countermeasures. As of July  2005, ODP had completed 7 risk assessments with rail operators and 12  others were under way. Further, TSA completed a threat assessment for  mass transit and rail and has begun to identify critical rail assets, but it has  not yet completed an overall risk assessment for the passenger rail  industry. DHS is developing guidance to help these and other sector- specific agencies work with stakeholders to identify and analyze risk.
subsections: section_title: ODP Has Worked with Passenger Rail Operators to Develop Risk Assessments to Help Prioritize Rail Security Needs and Investments
paragraphs: In 2002, ODP began conducting risk assessments of passenger rail  operators through its Mass Transit Technical Assistance program. These  assessments are intended to help passenger rail operators and port  authorities enhance their capacity and preparedness to respond to  terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, and identify and  prioritize security countermeasures and emergency response capabilities.  ODP’s approach to risk assessment is generally consistent with the risk  assessment component of our risk management approach. The agency has  worked with passenger rail operators and others to complete several risk  assessments. As of July 2005, ODP had completed 7 risk assessments in  collaboration with passenger rail operators. Twelve additional risk  assessments are under way, and an additional 11 passenger rail operators  have requested assistance through this program. The results developed in  the threat, criticality, vulnerability, and impact assessments are then used  to develop an overall risk assessment in order to evaluate the relative risk  among various assets, weapons, and modes of attack. This is intended to  give operators an indication of which asset types and threat scenarios  carry the highest risk that, accordingly, are likely candidates for early risk  mitigation action.
According to rail operators who have used ODP’s risk assessment  methodology and commented about it to DHS or us, the method has been  successful in helping to devise risk reduction strategies to guide security- related investments. For example, between September 2002 and March  2003, ODP’s technical assistance team worked with the Port Authority of  New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) to conduct a risk assessment of all  of its assets—its Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) passenger rail  system, as well as airports, ports, interstate highway crossings, and  commercial properties. According to PANYNJ officials, the authority was  able to develop and implement a risk reduction strategy that enabled it to  identify and set priorities for improvements in security and emergency  response capability that are being used to guide security investments.  According to authority officials, the risk assessment that was conducted  was instrumental in obtaining management approval for a 5-year, $500  million security capital investment program, as it provided a risk-based  justification for these investments.
The six other passenger rail operators that have completed ODP’s risk  assessment process also stated that they valued the process. Specifically,  operators said that the assessments enabled them to prioritize investments  based on risk and are already allowing or are expected to allow them to  effectively target and allocate resources toward security measures that  will have the greatest impact on reducing risk across their system.
section_title: ODP Has Sought to Promote Risk-Based Decision Making among Federal Agencies and Rail Operators
paragraphs: On the basis of its own experience with conducting risk assessments in the  field, and in keeping with its mission to develop and implement a national  program to enhance the capacity of state and local agencies to respond to  incidents of terrorism, ODP has offered to help other DHS components  and federal agencies to develop risk assessment tools, according to ODP  officials. For example, ODP is partnering with FRA, TSA, the American  Association of Railroads (AAR), and others to develop a risk assessment  tool for freight rail corridors. In a separate federal outreach effort, ODP  worked with TSA to establish a Federal Risk Assessment Working Group  to promote interagency collaboration and information sharing. In addition,  in keeping with its mission to deliver technical assistance and training,  ODP has partnered with the American Public Transportation Association  (APTA) to inform passenger rail operators about its risk assessment  technical assistance program. Since June 2004, ODP has attended five  APTA conferences or workshops where it has set up information booths,  made the tool kit available, and conducted seminars to educate passenger  rail operators about the risk assessment process and its benefits.
ODP has leveraged its grant-making authority to promote risk-based  funding decisions for passenger rail. For example, passenger rail operators  must have completed a risk assessment to be eligible for financial  assistance through the fiscal year 2005 Transit Security Grant program  administered by ODP. To receive these funds, passenger rail operators are  also required to have a security and emergency preparedness plan that  identifies how the operator intends to respond to security gaps identified  by risk assessments. This plan, along with a regional transit security  strategy prepared by regional transit stakeholders, will serve as the basis  for determining how the grant funds are to be allocated.
Risk assessments are also a key driver of federal funds distributed through  ODP’s fiscal year 2005 Intercity Passenger Rail Grant Program. This $7.1  million program provides financial assistance to Amtrak for the protection  of critical infrastructure and emergency preparedness activities along  Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor and its hub in Chicago. Amtrak is required to  conduct a risk assessment of these areas in collaboration with ODP, in  order to receive the grant funds. A recent review of Amtrak’s security  posture and programs conducted by the RAND Corporation and funded by  FRA in 2004 found that no comprehensive terrorism risk assessment of  Amtrak has been conducted that would provide an empirical baseline for  investment prioritization and decision making for Amtrak’s security  policies and investment plans. As another condition for receiving the grant  funds, Amtrak is required to develop a security and emergency  preparedness plan that, along with the risk assessment, is to serve as the  basis for proposed allocations of grant funding. According to an Amtrak  security official, it welcomes the risk assessment effort and plans to use  the results of the assessment to guide its security plans and investments.  According to ODP officials, as of July 2005, the Amtrak risk assessment  was nearly 50 percent complete.
section_title: TSA Has Begun to Assess Risks to Passenger Rail
paragraphs: In October 2004, TSA completed an overall threat assessment for both  mass transit and passenger and freight rail modes. TSA began conducting  a second risk assessment element—criticality assessments of passenger  rail stations—in the spring of 2004, but the effort had not been completed  at the time of our review. According to TSA, a criticality assessment tool  was developed that considers multiple factors, such as the potential for  loss of life or effects on public health; the economic impact of the loss of  function of the asset and the cost of reconstitution; and the local, regional,  or national symbolic importance of the asset. These factors were to be  used to arrive at a criticality score that, in turn, would enable the agency  to rank assets and facilities based on relative importance, according to  TSA officials.
To date, TSA has assigned criticality scores to nearly 700 passenger rail  stations. In May 2005, TSA began conducting assessments for other  passenger rail assets such as bridges and tunnels. TSA officials told us that  as of July 2005, they had completed 73 criticality assessments for bridge  and tunnel assets and expect to conduct approximately 370 additional  assessments in these categories. Once TSA has completed its criticality  assessment, a senior group of transportation security experts will review  these scores and subsequently rank and prioritize them. As of July 2005,  TSA had not established a time frame for completing criticality  assessments for passenger rail assets or for ranking assets, and had not  identified whether it planned to do so.
In 2003, TSA officials stated that they planned to work with transportation  stakeholders to rank assets and facilities in terms of their criticality.  HSPD-7 requires sector-specific agencies such as TSA to collaborate with  all relevant stakeholders, including federal departments and agencies,  state and local governments, and others. In addition, DHS’s interim NIPP  states that sector-specific agencies, such as TSA, are expected to work  with stakeholders—such as rail operators—to determine the most  effective means of obtaining and analyzing information on assets. While  TSA’s methodology for conducting criticality assessments calls for  “facilitated sessions” involving TSA modal specialists, DOT modal  specialists, and trade association representatives, these sessions with  stakeholders have not been held. According to TSA officials, their final  methodology for conducting criticality assessments did not include DOT  modal specialists and trade associations. With respect to rail operators,  TSA officials explained that their risk assessment process does not require  operators’ involvement. TSA analysts said they have access to a great deal  of information (such as open source records, satellite imagery, and  insurance industry data) that can facilitate the assessment process.  However, when asked to comment on TSA’s ability to identify critical  assets in passenger rail systems, APTA officials and 10 rail operators we  interviewed told us it would be difficult for TSA to complete this task  without their direct input and rail system expertise.
TSA plans to rely on asset criticality rankings to prioritize which assets it  will focus on in conducting vulnerability assessments. That is, once an  asset, such as a passenger rail station, is deemed to be most critical, then  TSA would focus on determining the station’s vulnerability to attacks. TSA  plans to conduct on-site vulnerability assessments for those assets deemed  most critical. For assets that are deemed to be less critical, TSA has  developed a software tool that it has made available to passenger rail and  other transportation operators for them to use on a voluntary basis to  assess the vulnerability of their assets. As of July 2005, the tool had not yet  been used. According to APTA officials, passenger rail operators may be  reluctant to provide vulnerability information to TSA without knowing  how the agency intends to use such information. According to TSA, it is  difficult, if not impossible, to project any timelines regarding completion  of vulnerability assessments in the transportation sector because rail  operators are not required to submit them. In this regard, while the rail  operators are not required to submit this information, as the sector- specific agency for transportation, TSA is required by HSPD-7 to complete  vulnerability assessments for the transportation sector. Figure 3 illustrates  the overall progress TSA had made in conducting risk assessments for  passenger rail assets as of July 2005.
We recognize that TSA’s risk assessment effort is still evolving and TSA  has had other pressing priorities, such as meeting the legislative  requirements related to aviation security. However, until all three  assessments of rail systems—threat, criticality, and vulnerability—have  been completed in sequence, and until TSA determines how to use the  results of these assessments to analyze and characterize risk (e.g., whether  high, medium, or low), it may not be possible to prioritize passenger rail  assets and guide investment decisions about protecting them.
Finalizing a methodology for assessing risk to passenger rail and other  transportation assets and conducting the assessments are key steps  needed to produce the plans required by HSPD-7 and the Intelligence  Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. DHS and TSA have missed  both deadlines for producing these plans. Specifically, DHS and TSA have  not yet produced the TSSP required by HSPD-7 to be issued in December  of 2004, though a draft was prepared in November 2004. DHS and TSA also  missed the April 1, 2005, deadline for completing the national strategy for  transportation security required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism  Prevention Act of 2004. In an April 2005 letter to Congress addressing the  missed deadline, the DHS Deputy Secretary identified the need to more  aggressively coordinate the development of the strategy with other  relevant planning work such as the TSSP, to include further collaboration  with DOT modal administrations and DHS components. The Deputy  Secretary further stated that DHS expected to finish the strategy within   2 to 3 months. However, as of July 31, 2005, the strategy had not been  completed. In April 2005, senior DHS and TSA officials told us that in  addition to DOT, industry groups such as APTA and AAR would also be  more involved in developing the TSSP and other strategic plans. However,  as of July 2005, TSA had not yet engaged these stakeholders in the  development of these plans.
As TSA, other sector-specific agencies, and ODP move forward with risk  assessment activities, DHS is concurrently developing guidance intended  to help these agencies work with their stakeholders to assess risk. HSPD-7  requires DHS to establish uniform policies, approaches, guidelines, and  methodologies for integrating federal infrastructure protection and risk  management activities within and across sectors. To meet this  requirement, DHS has, among other things, been working for nearly 2  years on a risk assessment framework through IAIP. This framework is  intended to help the private sector and state and local governments to  develop a consistent approach to analyzing risk and vulnerability across  infrastructure types and across entire economic sectors, develop  consistent terminology, and foster consistent results. The framework is  also intended to enable a federal-level assessment of risk in general, and  comparisons among risks, for purposes of resource allocation and  response planning. DHS has informed TSA that this framework will  provide overarching guidance to sector-specific agencies on how various  risk assessment methodologies may be used to analyze, normalize, and  prioritize risk within and among sectors. The interim NIPP states that the  ability to rationalize, or normalize, results of different risk assessments is  an important goal for determining risk-related priorities and guiding  investments. One core element of the DHS framework—defining concepts,  terminology, and metrics for assessing risk—had not  yet been completed.  The completion date for this element—initially due in September 2004— has been extended twice, with the latest due date in June 2005. However,  as of July 31, 2005, this element has not been completed.
Because neither this element nor the framework as a whole has been  finalized or provided to TSA or other sector-specific agencies, it is not  clear what impact, if any, DHS’s framework may have on ongoing risk  assessments conducted by, and the methodologies used by, TSA, ODP, and  others, and whether or how DHS will be able to use these results to  compare risks and prioritize homeland security investments among  sectors. Until DHS finalizes this framework, and until TSA completes its  risk assessment methodology, it may not be possible to determine whether  different methodologies used by TSA and ODP for conducting threat,  criticality, and vulnerability assessments generate disparate qualitative and  quantitative results or how they can best be compared and analyzed. In  addition, TSA and others will have difficulty taking into account whether  at some point TSA may be unnecessarily duplicating risk management  activities already under way at other agencies and whether other agencies’  risk assessment methodologies, and the data generated by these  methodologies, can be leveraged to complete the assessments required for  the transportation sector. In the future, the implementation of DHS’s  departmentwide proposed reorganization could affect decisions relating to  critical infrastructure protection as new directorates are established, such  as the directorates of policy and preparedness, and other preparedness  assets are consolidated from across the department.
section_title: Multiple Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Enhance Passenger Rail Security
paragraphs: FTA and FRA were the primary federal agencies involved in passenger rail  security matters prior to the creation of TSA. Before and after September  11, these two agencies launched a number of initiatives designed to  strengthen passenger rail security. TSA also took steps to strengthen rail  security, including issuing emergency security directives to rail operators  and testing emerging rail security technologies for screening passengers  and baggage. Rail industry stakeholders and federal agency officials raised  questions about how effectively DHS had collaborated with them on rail  security issues. DHS and DOT have signed a memorandum of  understanding intended to identify ways that collaboration with federal  and industry stakeholders might be improved.
subsections: section_title: DOT Agencies Led Initial Efforts to Enhance Passenger Rail Security
paragraphs: Prior to the creation of TSA in November 2001, DOT agencies (i.e., modal  administrations)—notably FTA and FRA—were primarily responsible for  the security of passenger rail systems. These agencies undertook a number  of initiatives to enhance the security of passenger rail systems after  September 11. FTA, using an $18.7 million appropriation by the  Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act  of 2002, launched a multipart transit security initiative, much of which is  still in place. The initiative included security readiness assessments,  technical assistance, grants for emergency response drills, and training.  For example, in 2003, FTA instituted the Transit Watch campaign—a  nationwide safety and security awareness program designed to encourage  the active participation of transit passengers and employees in maintaining  a safe transit environment. The program provides information and  instructions to transit passengers and employees so that they know what  to do and whom to contact in the event of an emergency in a transit  setting. FTA plans to continue this initiative, in partnership with TSA and  ODP, and offer additional security awareness materials that address  unattended bags and emergency evacuation procedures for transit  agencies. In addition, FTA has issued guidance, such as its Top 20 Security  Program Action Items for Transit Agencies, which recommends measures  for passenger rail operators to implement into their security programs to  improve both security and emergency preparedness.
FTA has also used research and development funds to develop guidance  for security design strategies to reduce the vulnerability of transit systems  to acts of terrorism. In November 2004, FTA provided rail operators with  security considerations for transportation infrastructure. This guidance  provided recommendations intended to help operators deter and minimize  attacks against their facilities, riders, and employees by incorporating  security features into the design of rail infrastructure.
FRA has also taken a number of actions to enhance passenger rail security  since September 11. For example, it has assisted commuter railroads in  developing security plans, reviewed Amtrak’s security plans, and helped  fund FTA security readiness assessments for commuter railroads. More  recently, in the wake of the Madrid terrorist bombings, nearly 200 FRA  inspectors, in cooperation with DHS, conducted multi-day team  inspections of each of the 18 commuter railroads and Amtrak to determine  what additional security measures had been put into place to prevent a  similar occurrence in the United States. FRA also conducted research and  development projects related to passenger rail security. These projects  included rail infrastructure security and trespasser monitoring systems  and passenger screening and manifest projects, including explosives  detection.
Although DOT modal administrations now play a supporting role in  transportation security matters since the creation of TSA, they remain  important partners in the federal government’s efforts to improve rail  security, given their role in funding and regulating the safety of passenger  rail systems. Moreover, as TSA moves ahead with its passenger rail  security initiatives, FTA and FRA are continuing their passenger rail  security efforts.
section_title: TSA Issued Mandatory Security Directives to Rail Operators but Faces Challenges Related to Compliance and Enforcement
paragraphs: In response to the March 2004 commuter rail attacks in Madrid and federal  intelligence on potential threats against U.S. passenger rail systems, TSA  issued security directives to the passenger rail industry in May 2004. TSA  issued these security directives to establish a consistent baseline standard  of protective measures for all passenger rail operators, including Amtrak.  The directives were not related to, and were issued independent of, TSA’s  efforts to conduct risk assessments to prioritize rail security needs. TSA  considered the measures required by the directives to constitute  mandatory security standards that were required to be implemented  within 72 hours of issuance by all passenger rail operators nationwide. In  an effort to provide some flexibility to the industry, the directives allowed  rail operators to propose alternative measures to TSA in order to meet the  required measures. Table 1 contains examples of security measures  required by these directives.
Although TSA issued these directives, it is unclear how TSA developed the  required measures contained in the directives, how TSA plans to monitor  and ensure compliance with the measures, how rail operators are to  implement the measures, and which entities are responsible for their  implementation. According to the former DHS Undersecretary for Border  and Transportation Security, the directives were developed based upon  consultation with the industry and a review of best practices in passenger  rail and mass transit systems across the country and were intended to  provide a federal baseline standard for security. TSA officials stated to us  that the directives were based upon FTA and APTA best practices for rail  security. Specifically, TSA stated that it consulted a list of the top 20  actions FTA identified that rail operators can take to strengthen security,  FTA-recommended protective measures and activities for transit agencies  that may be followed based on current threat levels, and an APTA member  survey. While some of the directives correlate to information contained in  the FTA guidance, such as advocating that rail personnel watch for  abandoned parcels, vehicles, and the like, the source for many of the  directives is unclear. For example, the source material TSA consulted does  not support the requirement that train cabs or compartment doors should  be kept locked. Furthermore, the sources do not necessarily reflect  industry best practices, according to FTA and APTA officials. FTA’s list of  recommended protective measures and the practices identified in the  APTA survey are not necessarily viewed as industry best practices. For  example, the APTA member survey that TSA used reports rail security  practices that are in use by operators but which are not best practices  endorsed by the group or other industry stakeholders.
TSA officials have stated that they understood the importance of  partnering with the rail industry on security matters, and that they would  draw on the expertise and knowledge of the transportation industry and  other DHS agencies, as well as all stakeholders, in developing security  standards for all modes of transportation, including rail. TSA officials held  an initial meeting with APTA, AAR, and Amtrak officials to discuss the  draft directives prior to their issuance and told them that they would  continue to be consulted prior to their final issuance. However, these  stakeholders were not given an opportunity to comment on a final draft of  the directives before their release because, according to TSA, DHS  determined that it was important to release the directives as soon as  possible to address a current threat to passenger rail. In addition, TSA  stated that because the directives needed to be issued quickly, there was  no public comment as part of the rule-making process. Shortly after the  directives were issued, TSA’s Deputy Assistant Administrator for Maritime  and Land Security told rail operators at an APTA conference we attended  in June 2004 that if TSA determined that there is a need for the directives  to become permanent, they would undergo a notice-and-comment period  as part of the regulatory process. As of July 2005, TSA had not yet  determined whether it intends to pursue the rule-making process with a  notice and comment period.
APTA and AAR officials stated that because they were not consulted  throughout the development of the directives, the directives did not, in  their view, reflect a complete understanding of the passenger rail  environment or necessarily incorporate industry best practices. For  example, APTA, AAR, and some rail operators raised concerns about the  feasibility of installing bomb-resistant trash cans in rail stations because  they could direct the force of a bomb blast upward, possibly causing  structural damage in underground or enclosed stations. DHS’s Office for  State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness recently  conducted tests to determine the safety and effectiveness of 13 models of  commercially available bomb-resistant trash receptacles. At the time of  our review, the results of these tests were not yet available.
Amtrak and FRA officials raised concerns about some of the directives, as  well, and told us they questioned whether the requirements reflected  industry best practices. For example, before the directives were issued,  Amtrak expressed concerns to TSA about the feasibility of the requirement  to check the identification of all adult passengers boarding its trains  because it did not have enough staff to perform these checks. However,  the final directive included this requirement, and after they were released,  Amtrak told TSA it could not comply with this requirement “without  incurring substantial additional costs and significant detrimental impacts  to its operations and revenues.” Amtrak officials told us that since  passenger names would not be compared against any criminal or terrorist  watch list or database, the benefits of requiring such identification checks  were open to debate. To resolve its concern, and as allowed by the  directive, Amtrak proposed, and TSA accepted, random identification  checks of passengers as an alternative measure. FRA officials further  stated that current FRA safety regulations requiring engineer compartment  doors be kept unlocked to facilitate emergency escapes conflicts with the  security directive requirement that doors equipped with locking  mechanisms be kept locked. This requirement was not included in the  draft directives provided to stakeholders. TSA did call one commuter rail  operator prior to issuing the directives to discuss this potential proposed  measure, and the operator raised a concern about the safety of the locked  door requirement. TSA nevertheless included this requirement in the  directives.
With respect to how the directives were to be enforced, rail operators  were required to allow TSA and DHS to perform inspections, evaluations,  or tests based on execution of the directives at any time or location. Upon  learning of any instance of noncompliance with TSA security measures,  rail operators were to immediately initiate corrective action. Monitoring  and ensuring compliance with the directives has posed challenges for TSA.  In the year after the directives were issued, TSA did not have dedicated  field staff to conduct on-site inspections. When the rail security directives  were issued, the former DHS Undersecretary for Border and  Transportation Security stated that TSA planned to form security  partnership teams with DOT, including FRA rail inspectors, to help ensure  that industry stakeholders complied with the directives. These teams were  to be established in order to tap into existing capabilities and avoid  duplication of effort across agencies. As of July 2005, these teams had not  yet been utilized to perform inspections. TSA has, however, hired rail  compliance inspectors to, among other things, monitor and enforce  compliance with the security directives. As of July 2005, TSA had hired 57  of up to 100 inspector positions authorized by Congress. However, TSA  has not yet established processes or criteria for determining and enforcing  compliance, including determining how rail inspectors or DOT partnership  teams will be used in this regard.
Establishing criteria for monitoring compliance with the directives may be  challenging because the language describing the required measures allows  for flexibility and does not define parameters. In an effort to acknowledge  the variable conditions that existed in passenger rail environments, TSA  designed the directives to allow flexibility in implementation through the  use of such phrases as “to the extent resources allow,” “to the extent  practicable,” and “if available.” The directives also include nonspecific  instructions that may be difficult to measure or monitor, telling operators  to, for example, perform inspections of key facilities at “regular periodic  intervals” or to conduct “frequent inspections” of passenger rail cars.  When the directives were issued, TSA stated that it would provide rail  operators with performance-based guidance and examples of  announcements and signs that could be used to meet the requirements of  the directives, including guidance on the appropriate frequency and  method for inspecting rail cars and facilities. However, as of July 2005, this  information had not been provided.
Industry stakeholders we interviewed raised questions about how they  were to comply with the measures contained in the directives and which  entities were responsible for implementing the measures. According to an  AAR official, in June 2004, AAR officials and rail operators held a  conference call with TSA to obtain clarification on these issues. According  to AAR officials, in response to an inquiry about what would constitute  compliance for some of the measures, the then-TSA Assistant  Administrator for Maritime and Land Security told participants that the  directives were not intended to be overly prescriptive but were guidelines,  and that operators would have the flexibility to implement the directives  as they saw fit. The officials also asked for clarification on who was legally  responsible for ensuring compliance for measures where assets, such as  rail stations, were owned by freight railroads or private real estate  companies. According to AAR officials, TSA told them it was the  responsibility of the rail operators and asset owners to work together to  determine these responsibilities. However, according to AAR and rail  operators, given that TSA has hired rail inspectors and indicated its  intention to enforce compliance with the directives, it is critical that TSA  clarify what compliance entails for measures required by the directives  and which entities are responsible for compliance with measures when  rail assets are owned by one party but operated by another—such as when  private companies that own terminals or stations provide services for  commuter rail operations.
The challenges TSA has faced in developing security directives as  standards that reflect industry best practices—and that can be measured  and enforced—stem from the original emergency nature of the directives,  which were issued with limited input and review. TSA told rail industry  stakeholders when the directives were issued 15 months ago that the  agency would consider using the federal rule-making process as a means  of making the standards permanent. Doing so would require TSA to hold a  notice-and-comment period, resulting in a public record that reflects  stakeholders’ input on the applicability and feasibility of implementing the  directives, along with TSA’s rationale for accepting or rejecting this input.  While there is no guarantee that this process would produce more  effective security directives, it would be more transparent and could help  TSA in developing standards that are most appropriate for the industry  and can be measured, monitored, and enforced.
section_title: TSA Has Begun Testing Rail Security Technologies
paragraphs: In addition to issuing security directives, TSA also sought to enhance  passenger rail security by conducting research on technologies related to  screening passengers and checked baggage in the passenger rail  environment. Beginning in May 2004, TSA conducted a Transit and Rail  Inspection Pilot (TRIP) study, in partnership with DOT, Amtrak, the  Connecticut Department of Transportation, the Maryland Transit  Administration, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority  (WMATA). TRIP was a $1.5 million, three-phase effort to test the feasibility  of using existing and emerging technologies to screen passengers, carry-on  items, checked baggage, cargo, and parcels for explosives. Figure 4  summarizes TRIP’s three-phased approach.
According to TSA, all three phases of the TRIP program were completed  by July 2004. However, TSA has not yet issued a planned report analyzing  whether the technologies could be used effectively to screen rail  passengers and their baggage. According to TSA officials, a report on  results and lessons learned from TRIP is under review by DHS. TSA  officials told us that based upon preliminary analyses, the screening  technologies and processes tested would be very difficult to implement on  more heavily used passenger rail systems because these systems carry  high volumes of passengers and have multiple points of entry. However,  TSA officials stated to us that the screening processes used in TRIP may  be useful on certain long-distance intercity train routes, which make fewer  stops. Further, officials stated that screening could be used either  randomly or for all passengers during certain high-risk events or in areas  where a particular terrorist threat is known to exist. For example,  screening technology similar to that used in TRIP was used by TSA to  screen certain passengers and belongings in Boston and New York during  the Democratic and Republican national conventions, respectively, in  2004.
APTA officials and the 28 passenger rail operators we interviewed—all  who are not directly involved in the pilot—agreed with TSA’s preliminary  assessment. They told us they believed that the TRIP screening procedures  could not work in most passenger rail systems, given the number of  passengers using these systems and the open nature (e.g., multiple entry  points) of the systems. For example, as one operator noted, over 1,600  people pass through dozens of access points in New York’s Penn Station  per minute during a typical rush hour, making screening of all passengers  very challenging, if not impossible. Passenger rail operators were also  concerned that screening delays could result in passengers opting to use  other modes of transportation. APTA officials and some rail operators we  interviewed said that had they been consulted by TSA, they would have  recommended alternative technologies to explore and indicated that they  hoped to be consulted on security technology pilot programs in the future.  FRA officials further stated that TSA could have benefited from earlier and  more frequent collaboration with them during the TRIP pilot than  occurred, and could have tapped their expertise to analyze TRIP results  and develop the final report. TSA research and development officials told  us that the agency has begun to consider and test security technologies  other than those used in TRIP, which may be more applicable to the  passenger rail environment. For example, TSA’s and DHS’s Science and  Technology Directorate are currently evaluating infrared cameras and  electronic metal detectors, among other things.
section_title: DHS and DOT Are Taking Steps to Improve Coordination and Collaboration with Federal Agencies and Industry Stakeholders
paragraphs: In response to a previous recommendation we made in a June 2003 report  on transportation security, DHS and DOT signed a memorandum of  understanding (MOU) to develop procedures by which the two  departments could improve their cooperation and coordination for  promoting the safe, secure, and efficient movement of people and goods  throughout the transportation system. The MOU defines broad areas of  responsibility for each department. For example, it states that DHS, in  consultation with DOT and affected stakeholders, will identify, prioritize,  and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure. The MOU between  DHS and DOT represents an overall framework for cooperation that is to  be supplemented by additional signed agreements, or annexes, between  the departments. These annexes are to delineate the specific security- related roles, responsibilities, resources, and commitments for mass  transit, rail, research and development, and other matters.  The annex for  mass transit security was signed in September 2005.  According to DHS  and DOT officials, this annex is intended to ensure that the programs and  protocols for incorporating stakeholder feedback and making  enhancements to security measures are coordinated. For example, the  annex requires that DHS and DOT consult on such matters as regulations  and security directives that affect security and identifies points of contact  for coordinating this consultation.
In addition to their work on the MOU and related annexes, DHS and TSA  have taken other steps in an attempt to improve collaboration with DOT  and industry stakeholders. In April 2005, DHS officials stated that better  collaboration with DOT and industry stakeholders was needed to develop  strategic security plans associated with various homeland security  presidential directives and statutory mandates, such as the Intelligence  Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which required DHS to  develop a national strategy for transportation security in conjunction with  DOT. Responding to the need for better collaboration, DHS established a  senior-level steering committee in conjunction with DOT to coordinate  development of this national strategy. In addition, senior DHS and TSA  officials stated that industry groups will also be involved in developing the  national strategy for transportation security and other strategic plans.  Moreover, according to TSA’s assistant administrator for intermodal  programs, TSA intends to work with APTA and other industry  stakeholders in developing security standards for the passenger rail  industry.
section_title: U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Have Taken Similar Actions to Secure Rail Systems, and Opportunities for Additional Domestic Security Actions May Exist
paragraphs: U.S. passenger rail operators have taken numerous actions to secure their  rail systems since the terrorist attacks of September 11, in the United  States, and the March 11, 2004, attacks in Madrid. These actions included  both improvements to system operations and capital enhancements to a  system’s facilities, such as track, buildings, and train cars. All of the U.S.  passenger rail operators we contacted have implemented some types of  security measures—such as increased numbers and visibility of security  personnel and customer awareness programs—that were generally  consistent with those we observed in select countries in Europe and Asia.  We also identified three rail security practices—covert testing, random  screening of passengers and their baggage, and centralized research and  testing—utilized by foreign operators or their governments that are not  currently utilized by domestic rail operators or the U.S. government.
subsections: section_title: Actions Taken by U.S. and Foreign Passenger Rail Operators to Strengthen Security Reflect Security Assessments, Budgetary Constraints, and Other Factors
paragraphs: All 32 of the U.S. rail operators we interviewed or visited reported taking  specific actions to improve the security and safety of their rail systems by,  among other things, investing in new security equipment, utilizing more  law enforcement personnel, and establishing public awareness campaigns.  Passenger rail operators we spoke with cited the 1995 sarin gas attacks on  the Tokyo subway system and the September 11 terrorist attacks as  catalysts for their security actions. After the attacks, many passenger rail  operators used FTA’s security readiness assessments of heavy and  passenger rail systems as a guide to determine how to prioritize their  security efforts, as well as their own understanding of their system’s  vulnerabilities, to determine what actions to take to enhance security.  Similarly, as previously mentioned, the rail systems that underwent ODP  risk assessments are currently using or plan to use these assessments to  guide their security actions. In addition, 20 of the 32 U.S. operators we  contacted or visited had conducted some type of security assessment  internally or through a contractor, separate from the federally funded  assessments. For example, some assessments evaluated vulnerabilities of  physical assets, such as tunnels and bridges, throughout the passenger rail  system. Passenger rail operators stated that security-related spending by  rail operators was also based, in part, on budgetary considerations, as well  as other practices used by other rail operators that were identified through  direct contact or during industry association meetings. Passenger rail  operators frequently made capital investments to improve security, and  these investments often are not part of federal funding packages for new  construction unless they are part of new facilities being constructed.  According to APTA, 54 percent of transit agencies are facing increasing  deficits, and no operator covers expenses with fare revenue; thus,  balancing operational and capital improvements with security-related  investments has been an ongoing challenge for these operators. Several  foreign rail operators we interviewed also stated that funding for security  enhancements was limited in light of other funding priorities within the  rail system, such as personnel costs and infrastructure and equipment  maintenance.
Foreign rail operators we visited also told us that risk assessments played  an important role in guiding security-related spending for rail. For  example, one foreign rail operator with a daily ridership of 2.3 million  passengers used a risk management methodology to assess risks, threats,  and vulnerabilities to rail in order to guide security spending. The  methodology is part of the rail operator’s corporate focus on overall safety  and security and is intended to help protect the operator’s various rail  systems against, among other things, terrorist attacks, as well as other  forms of corporate loss, such as service disruption and loss of business  viability.
section_title: U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Employ Similar Security Practices
paragraphs: Both U.S. and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted have  implemented similar improvements to enhance the security of their  systems. A summary of these efforts follows.
Customer awareness: Customer awareness programs we observed used  signage and announcements to encourage riders to alert train staff if they  observed suspicious packages, persons, or behavior. Of the 32 domestic  rail operators we interviewed, 30 had implemented a customer awareness  program or made enhancements to an existing program. Foreign rail  operators we visited also attempt to enhance customer awareness. For  example, 11 of the 13 operators we interviewed had implemented a  customer awareness program. Similar to programs of U.S. operators, these  programs used signage, announcements, and brochures to inform  passengers and employees about the need to remain vigilant and report  any suspicious activities. Only one of the European passenger rail  operators that we interviewed has not implemented a customer security  awareness program, citing the fear or panic that it might cause among the  public.
Increased number and visibility of security personnel: Of the 32 U.S.  rail operators we interviewed, 23 had increased the number of security  personnel they utilized since September 11, to provide security throughout  their system or had taken steps to increase the visibility of their security  personnel. In addition to adding security personnel, many operators stated  that increasing the visibility of security was as important as increasing the  number of personnel. For example, several U.S. and foreign rail operators  we spoke with had instituted policies such as requiring their security staff,  in brightly colored vests, to patrol trains or stations more frequently, so  they are more visible to customers and potential terrorists or criminals.
These policies make it easier for customers to contact security personnel  in the event of an emergency, or if they have spotted a suspicious item or  person. At foreign sites we visited, 10 of the 13 operators had increased  the number of their security officers throughout their systems in recent  years because of the perceived increase in risk of a terrorist attack.
Increased use of canine teams: Of the 32 U.S. passenger rail operators  we contacted, 21 had begun to use canine units, which include both dogs  and human handlers, to patrol their facilities or trains or had increased  their existing utilization of such teams. Often, these units are used to  detect the presence of explosives, and may be called in when a suspicious  package is detected. Some operators that did not maintain their own  canine units stated that it was prohibitively expensive to do so and that  they could call in local police canine units if necessary. In foreign  countries we visited, passenger rail operators’ use of canines varied. In  some Asian countries, canines were not culturally accepted by the public  and thus were not used for rail security purposes. As in the United States,  and in contrast to Asia, most European passenger rail operators used  canines for explosive detection or as deterrents.
Employee training: All of the domestic and foreign rail operators we  interviewed had provided some type of security training to their staff,  either through in-house personnel or an external provider. In many cases,  this training consisted of ways to identify suspicious items and persons  and how to respond to events once they occur. For example, the London  Underground and the British Transport Police developed the “HOT”  method for its employees to identify suspicious items in the rail system. In  the HOT method, employees are trained to look for packages or items that  are Hidden, Obviously suspicious, and not Typical of the environment.  Items that do not meet these criteria would likely receive a lower security  response than an item meeting all of the criteria. However, if items meet  all of these criteria, employees are to notify station managers, who would  call in the authorities and potentially shut down the station or take other  action. According to London Underground officials, the HOT method has  significantly reduced the number of system disruptions caused when a  suspicious item was identified. Several passenger rail operators in the  United States and abroad have trained their employees in the HOT  method. Several domestic operators had also trained their employees in  how to respond to terrorist attacks and provided them with wallet-size  cards highlighting actions they should take in response to various forms of  attack. It is important to note that training such as the HOT method is not  designed to prevent acts of terrorism like the July 2005 London attacks,  where suicide bombers killed themselves rather than leaving bombs  behind.
Passenger and baggage screening practices: Some domestic and  foreign rail operators have trained employees to recognize suspicious  behavior as a means of screening passengers. Eight U.S. passenger rail  operators we contacted were utilizing some form of behavioral screening.  For example, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA),  which operates Boston’s T system, has utilized a behavioral screening  system to identify passengers exhibiting suspicious behavior. The  Massachusetts State Police train all MBTA personnel to be on the lookout  for behavior that may indicate someone has criminal intent, and to  approach and search such persons and their baggage when appropriate.  Massachusetts State Police officers have been training rail operators on  this behavior profiling system, and WMATA and New Jersey Transit were  among the first additional operators to implement the system. According  to MBTA personnel, several other operators have expressed interest in this  system. Abroad, we found that 4 of 13 operators we interviewed had  implemented forms of behavioral screening similar to MBTA’s system.
All of the domestic and foreign rail operators we contacted have ruled out  an airport-style screening system for daily use in heavy traffic, where each  passenger and the passenger’s baggage are screened by a magnetometer or  X-ray machine, based on cost, staffing, and customer convenience factors,  among others. For example, although the Spanish National Railway  screens passenger baggage using an X-ray machine on certain long- distance trains that it believes could be at risk, all of the operators we  contacted stated that the cost, staffing requirements, delay of service, and  inconvenience to passengers would make such a system unworkable in  highly trafficked, inherently open systems like U.S. and foreign passenger  rail operations. In addition, one Asian rail official stated that his  organization was developing a contingency plan for implementing an  airport-style screening system, but that such a system would be used only  in the event of intelligence information indicating suicide bomb attacks  were imminent, or if several attacks had already occurred during a short  period of time. According to this official, the plan was in the initial stages  of development, and the organization did not know how quickly such a  system could be implemented.
Upgrading technology: Many rail operators we interviewed had  embarked on programs designed to upgrade their existing security  technology. For example, we found that 29 of the 32 U.S. operators had  implemented a form of CCTV to monitor their stations, yards, or trains.
While these cameras cannot be monitored closely at all times, because of  the large number of staff they said this would require, many rail operators  felt the cameras acted as a deterrent, assisted security personnel in  determining how to respond to incidents that have already occurred, and  could be monitored if an operator has received information that an  incident may occur at a certain time or place in their system. One rail  operator, New Jersey Transit, had installed “smart” cameras, which were  programmed to alert security personnel when suspicious activity  occurred, such as if a passenger left a bag in a certain location or if a boat  were to dock under a bridge. According to the New Jersey Transit  officials, this technology was relatively inexpensive and not difficult to  implement. Several other operators stated they were interested in  exploring this technology. Abroad, all 13 of the foreign rail operators we  visited had CCTV systems in place. As in the United States, foreign rail  operators use these cameras primarily as a crime deterrent and to respond  to incidents after they occur, because they do not have enough staff to  continuously monitor all of these cameras.
In addition, 18 of the 32 U.S. rail operators we interviewed had installed  new emergency phones or enhanced the visibility of the intercom systems  they already had. Passengers can use these systems to contact train  operators or security personnel to report suspicious activity, crimes in  progress, or other problems. Furthermore, while most rail operators we  spoke with had not installed chemical or biological agent detection  equipment because of the costs involved, a few operators had this  equipment or were exploring purchasing it. For example, WMATA, in  Washington, D.C., has installed these sensors in some of its stations,  thanks to a program jointly sponsored by DOT and the Department of  Energy that provided this equipment to WMATA because of the high  perceived likelihood of an attack in Washington, D.C. Also, at least three  other domestic rail operators we spoke with are exploring the possibility  of partnering with federal agencies to install such equipment in their  facilities on an experimental basis.
Also, as in the United States, a few foreign operators had implemented  chemical or biological detection devices at these rail stations, but their use  was not widespread. Two of the 13 foreign operators we interviewed had  implemented these sensors, and both were doing so on an experimental  basis. In addition, police officers from the British Transport Police— responsible for policing the rail system in the United Kingdom—were  equipped with pagers to detect chemical, biological, or radiological  elements in the air, allowing them to respond quickly in case of a terrorist  attack using one of these methods. The British Transit Police also has  three vehicles carrying devices to determine if unattended baggage  contains explosives—these vehicles patrol the system 24 hours per day.
Access control: Tightening access procedures at key facilities or rights- of-way is another way many rail operators have attempted to enhance  security. A majority of domestic and selected foreign passenger rail  operators had invested in enhanced systems to control unauthorized  access at employee facilities and stations. Specifically, 23 of the 32 U.S.  operators had installed a form of access control at key facilities and  stations. This often involved installing a system where employees had to  swipe an access card to gain access to control rooms, repair facilities, and  other key locations. All 13 foreign operators had implemented some form  of access control to their critical facilities or rights-of-way. These  measures varied from simple alarms on doors at electrical substations on  one subway system we visited to infrared sensors monitoring every inch of  right-of-way along the track on three of the high-speed interurban rail  systems.
Rail system design and configuration: In an effort to reduce  vulnerabilities to terrorist attack and increase overall security, passenger  rail operators in the United States and abroad have been, or are now  beginning to, incorporate security features into the design of new and  existing rail infrastructure, primarily rail stations. For example, of the 32  domestic rail operators we contacted, 22 of them had removed their  conventional trash bins entirely, or replaced them with transparent or  bomb-resistant trash bins, as TSA instructed in its May 2004 security  directives. Foreign rail operators had taken steps to remove traditional  trash bins from their systems. Of the 13 operators we visited, 8 had either  removed their trash bins entirely or replaced them with blast-resistant  cans or transparent receptacles.
Many foreign rail operators are also incorporating aspects of security into  the design of their rail infrastructure. Of the 13 operators we visited, 11  have attempted to design new facilities with security in mind and have  attempted to retrofit older facilities to incorporate security-related  modifications. For example, one foreign operator we visited is retrofitting  its train cars with windows that passengers could open in the event of a  chemical attack. In addition, the London Underground, one of the oldest  rail systems in the world, incorporates security into the design of all its  new stations as well as when existing stations are modified. We observed  several security features in the design of Underground stations, such as  using vending machines that have no holes that someone could use to hide  a bomb, and sloped tops to reduce the likelihood that a bomb can be  placed on top of the machine. In addition, stations are designed to provide  staff with clear lines of sight to all areas of the station, such as underneath  benches or ticket machines, and station designers try to eliminate or  restrict access to any recessed areas where a bomb could be hidden.
In one London station, we observed the use of netting throughout the  station to help prevent objects, such as bombs, from being placed in a  recessed area, such as beneath a stairwell or escalator. In this station and  other stations we visited, Underground officials have installed “help posts”  at which customers can call for help if an incident occurs. When these  posts are activated, CCTV cameras display a video image of the help post  and surrounding area to staff at a central command center. This allows the  staff to directly observe the situation and respond appropriately. See  figure 5 for a photograph of a help post.
Underground officials stated that the incorporation of security features in  station design is an effective measure in deterring some terrorists from  attacking the system. For example, officials told us that CCTV video  recorded the efforts by Irish Republican Army terrorists attempting to  place an explosive device inside a station—and when they could not find a  suitable location to hide the device, they placed it outside in a trash can  instead, thereby mitigating the impact of the explosion.
In the United States, several passenger rail operators stated that they were  taking security into account when designing new facilities or remodeling  older ones. Twenty-two of 32 rail operators we interviewed told us that  they were incorporating security into the design of new or existing rail  infrastructure. For example, New York City Transit and PATH officials  told us they are incorporating security into the design of its new stations,  including the redesigned Fulton Street station and the World Trade Center  Hub that were damaged or destroyed during the September 11 attacks. In  addition, in June 2005, FTA issued guidelines for use by the transit  industry encouraging the incorporation of particular security features into  the design of transit infrastructure. These guidelines include, for example,  increasing visibility for onboard staff, reducing the areas where someone  could hide an explosive device on a transit vehicle, and enhancing  emergency exits in transit stations.
Figure 6 shows a diagram of several security measures that we observed in  passenger rail stations both in the United States and abroad. It should be  noted that this represents an amalgam of stations we visited, not any  particular station.
K-9 patrol unit(s)
section_title: Amtrak Faces Challenges Specific to Intercity Passenger Rail in Securing Its System
paragraphs: In securing its extensive system, Amtrak faces its own set of security- related challenges, some of which are different from those facing a  commuter rail or transit operator. First, Amtrak operates over thousands  of miles, often far from large population centers. This makes its route  system much more difficult to patrol and monitor than one contained in a  particular metropolitan region, and it causes delays in responding to  incidents when they occur in remote areas. Also, outside the Northeast  Corridor, Amtrak operates almost exclusively on tracks owned by freight  rail companies. Amtrak also utilizes stations owned by freight rail  companies, transit and commuter rail authorities, private corporations,  and municipal governments. This means that Amtrak often cannot  unilaterally make security improvements to others’ rights-of-way or station  facilities and that it is reliant on the staff of other organizations to patrol  their facilities and respond to incidents that may occur. Furthermore, with  over 500 stations, only half of which are staffed, screening even a small  portion of the passengers and baggage boarding Amtrak trains is difficult.  Last, Amtrak’s financial condition has never been strong—Amtrak has  been on the edge of bankruptcy several times.
Amid the ongoing challenges of securing its coast-to-coast railway, Amtrak  has taken some actions to enhance security throughout its intercity  passenger rail system. For example, Amtrak has initiated a passenger  awareness campaign, similar to those described elsewhere in this report.  Also, Amtrak has begun enforcing existing restrictions on carry-on luggage  that limit passengers to two carry-on bags, not exceeding 50 pounds. All  bags also must have identification tags on them. Furthermore, Amtrak has  begun requiring passengers to show positive identification after boarding  trains when asked by staff to ensure that tickets have not been transferred  or stolen, although Amtrak officials acknowledge their onboard staffs only  sporadically enforce this requirement because of the numerous tasks these  staff members must perform before a train departs. However, in November  2004, Amtrak implemented the Tactical Intensive Patrols (TIPS) program,  under which its security staff flood selected platforms to ensure Amtrak  baggage and identification requirements are met by passengers boarding  trains. In addition, Amtrak increased the number of canine units patrolling  its system, most of which are located in the Northeast Corridor, looking  for explosives or narcotics and assigned some of its police to ride trains in  the Northeast Corridor. Also, Amtrak has instituted a policy of randomly  inspecting checked luggage on its trains. Finally, Amtrak is making  improvements to the emergency exits in certain tunnels to make  evacuating trains in the tunnels easier in the event of a crash or terrorist  attack.
To ensure that security measures are applied consistently throughout  Amtrak’s system, Amtrak has established a series of Security Coordinating  Committees, which include representatives of all Amtrak departments.  These committees are to review and establish security policies, in  coordination with Amtrak’s police department, and have worked to  develop countermeasures to specific threats. According to Amtrak, in the  aftermath of the July 2005 London bombings, these committees met with  Amtrak police and security staff to ensure additional security measures  were implemented. Also in the wake of the London attacks, Amtrak began  working with the police forces of several large east coast cities, allowing  them to patrol Amtrak stations to provide extra security. In addition, all  Amtrak employees now receive a “Daily Security Awareness Tip” and are  receiving computer-based security training. Amtrak police officers are also  now receiving specialized counterterrorism training.
While Amtrak has taken the actions outlined above, it is difficult to  determine if these actions appropriately or sufficiently addressed pressing  security needs. As discussed earlier, Amtrak has not performed a  comprehensive terrorism risk assessment that would provide an empirical  baseline for investment prioritization and decision making for Amtrak’s  security policies and investment plans. However, as part of the 2005  Intercity Passenger Rail Grant Program, Amtrak is required to produce a  security and emergency preparedness plan, which is to include a risk  assessment that Amtrak currently expects to finish by December 31, 2005.  Upon completing this plan, Amtrak management should have a more  informed basis regarding which security enhancements should receive the  highest priority for implementation.
section_title: Three Foreign Rail Security Practices Are Not Currently Used in the United States
paragraphs: While many of the security practices we observed in foreign rail systems  are similar to those U.S. passenger rail operators are implementing, we  encountered three practices in other countries that were not currently in  use among the domestic passenger rail operators we contacted as of June  2005, nor were they performed by the U.S. government. These practices  are discussed below.
Covert testing: Two of the 13 foreign rail systems we visited utilize  covert testing to keep employees alert about their security responsibilities.  Covert testing involves security staff staging unannounced events to test  the response of railroad staff to incidents such as suspicious packages or  setting off alarms. In one European system, this covert testing involves  security staff placing suspicious items throughout their system to see how  long it takes operating staff to respond to the item. Similarly, one Asian  rail operator’s security staff will break security seals on fire extinguishers  and open alarmed emergency doors randomly to see how long it takes  staff to respond. Officials of these operators stated that these tests are  carried out on a daily basis and are beneficial because their staff know  they could be tested at any moment, and they, therefore, are more likely to  be vigilant with respect to security.
Random screening: Of the 13 foreign operators we interviewed, 2 have  some form of random screening of passengers and their baggage in place.  In the systems where this is in place, security personnel can approach  passengers either in stations or on the trains and ask them to submit their  persons or their baggage to a search. Passengers declining to cooperate  must leave the system. For example, in Singapore, rail agency officials  rotate the stations where they conduct random searches so that the  searches are carried out at a different station each day. Prior to the July  2005 London bombings, no passenger rail operators in the United States  were practicing a form of random passenger or baggage screening on a  continuing daily basis. However, during the Democratic National  Convention in 2004, MBTA instituted a system of random screening of  passengers, where every 11th passenger at certain stations and times of  the day was asked to provide his or her bags to be screened. Those who  refused were not allowed to ride the system. MBTA officials recognized  that it is impossible to implement such a system comprehensively  throughout the rail network without massive amounts of additional staff,  and that even doing random screening on a regular basis would be a drain  on resources. However, officials stated that such a system is workable  during special events and times of heightened security but would have to  be designed very carefully to ensure that passengers’ civil liberties were  not violated. After the July 2005 London bombings, four passenger rail  operators—PATH, New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority, New  Jersey Transit, and Utah Transit Authority in Salt Lake City—implemented  limited forms of random bag screening in their system. In addition, APTA,  FTA, and the National Academy of Science’s Transportation Research  Board are currently conducting a study on the benefits and challenges that  passenger rail operators would face in implementing a randomized  passenger screening system. The study is examining such issues as the  legal basis for conducting passenger screening or search, the precedence  for such measures in the transportation environment, the human resources  required, and the financial implications and cost considerations involved.
National government maintains clearinghouse on technologies and  best practices: According to passenger rail operators in five countries we  visited, their national governments have centralized the process for  performing research and developing passenger rail security technologies  and maintaining a clearinghouse on these technologies and security best  practices. According to these officials, this allows rail operators to have  one central source for information on the merits of a particular passenger  rail security technology, such as chemical sensors, CCTVs, and intrusion  detection devices. Some U.S. rail operators we interviewed expressed  interest in there being a more active centralized federal research and  development authority in the United States to evaluate and certify  passenger rail security technologies and make that information available  to rail operators. Although TSA is the primary federal agency responsible  for conducting transportation security research and development, and has  conducted the TRIP as previously mentioned, most of the agency’s  research and development efforts to date have focused on aviation  security technologies. As a result, domestic rail operators told us that they  rely on consultations with industry trade associations, such as APTA, to  learn about best practices for passenger rail security technologies and  related investments. Several rail operators stated that they were often  unsure of where to turn when seeking information on security-related  products, such as CCTV cameras or intrusion detection systems.  Currently, many operators said they informally ask other rail operators  about their experiences with a certain technology, perform their own  research via the Internet or trade publications, or perform their own  testing.
No federal agency has compiled or disseminated best practices to rail  operators to aid in this process. We have previously reported that  stakeholders have stated that the federal government should play a greater  role in testing transportation security technology and making this  information available to industry stakeholders. TSA and DOT agree that  making the results of research testing available to industry stakeholders  could be a valuable use of federal resources by reducing the need for  multiple rail operators to perform the same research and development  efforts, but they have not taken action to address this.
Implementing these three practices—covert testing, random screening,  and a government-sponsored clearinghouse for technologies and best  practices—in the United States could pose political, legal, fiscal, and  cultural challenges because of the differences between the United States  and these foreign nations. For instance, many foreign nations have dealt  with terrorist attacks on their public transportation systems for decades,  compared with the United States, where rail transportation has not been  specifically targeted during terrorist attacks. According to foreign rail  operators, these experiences have resulted in greater acceptance of  certain security practices, such as random searches, which the U.S. public  may view as a violation of their civil liberties or which may discourage  them from using public transportation. The impact of security measures  on passengers is an important consideration for domestic rail transit  operators, since most passengers could choose another means of  transportation, such as a personal automobile. As such, security measures  that limit accessibility, cause delays, increase fares, or otherwise cause  inconvenience could push people away from transit and into their cars. In  contrast, the citizens of the European and Asian countries we visited are  more dependent on public transportation than most U.S. residents and  therefore, according to the rail operators we spoke with, may be more  willing to accept more intrusive security measures, simply because they  have no other choice for getting from place to place. Nevertheless, in  order to identify innovative security measures that could help further  mitigate terrorism-related risk to rail assets—especially as part of a  broader risk management approach discussed earlier—it is important to at  least consider assessing the feasibility and costs and benefits of  implementing the three rail security practices we identified in foreign  countries in the United States. Officials from DHS, DOT, passenger rail  industry associations, and rail systems we interviewed told us that  operators would benefit from such an evaluation. Furthermore, the  passenger rail association officials told us that such an evaluation should  include practices used by foreign rail operators that integrate security into  infrastructure design.
Differences in the business models and financial status of some foreign  rail operators could also affect the feasibility of adopting certain security  practices in the United States. Several foreign countries we visited have  privatized their passenger rail operations. Although most of the foreign rail  operators we visited—even the privatized systems—rely on their  governments for some type of financial assistance, two foreign rail  operators generated significant revenue and profits in other business  endeavors, which they said allowed them to invest heavily in security  measures for their rail systems. In particular, the Paris Metro system is  operated by the RATP Corporation (Régie Autonome des Transports  Parisiens), which also contracts with other cities in France and throughout  the world to provide consulting and project management services. RATP’s  ability to make a profit, according to its officials, through its consulting  services allows the agency to supplement government funding in order to  support expensive security measures for the Paris mass transit system.  For example, RATP recently installed a computer-assisted security control  system that uses CCTV, radio, and global positioning technology that it  says has significantly reduced the amount of time it takes for security or  emergency personnel to respond to an incident or emergency, such as a  terrorist attack. Because of RATP’s available funding for security, the  corporation also purchased an identical system for the Metropolitan Paris  Police, so the RATP and the police system would be compatible. In  contrast, domestic rail operators do not generate a profit and therefore are  dependent on financial assistance from the federal, state, and local levels  of government to maintain and enhance services, including funding  security improvements.
Another important difference between domestic and foreign rail operators  is the structure of their police forces. In particular, England, France,  Belgium, and Spain all have national police forces patrolling rail systems  in these countries. The use of a national police force is a reflection that  these foreign countries often have one nationalized rail system, rather than  over 30 rail transit systems owned and operated by numerous state and  local governments, as is the case in the United States. For example, in  France, the French National Railway operates all intercity passenger rail  services in the country and utilizes the French Railway police to provide  security. According to foreign rail operators, the use of one national rail  police force allows for consistent policing and security measures  throughout the country. In the United States, in contrast, there is not a  national police force for the rail transit systems. Rather, some transit  agencies maintain individual polices forces, while others rely on their city  or county police forces for security.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we are encouraged by the steps DHS  components have taken to use elements of a risk management approach to  guide critical infrastructure protection decisions for the passenger rail  industry. However, enhanced federal leadership is needed to help ensure  that actions and investments designed to enhance security are properly  focused and prioritized, so that finite resources may be allocated  appropriately to help protect all modes of transportation and secure other  national critical infrastructure sectors. Leadership on this issue should  reflect the shared responsibilities required to coordinate actions on the  part of federal, state, and local governments; the private sector; and rail  passengers who ride these systems.
Specifically, both DHS and TSA could take additional steps to help ensure  that the risk management efforts under way clearly and effectively identify  priority areas for security-related investments in rail and other sectors. We  recognize that TSA has had many aviation security-related responsibilities  and has implemented many security initiatives to meet legislative  requirements. Notwithstanding, TSA has not yet completed its  methodology for determining how the results of threat, criticality, and  vulnerability assessments will be used to identify and prioritize risks to  passenger rail and other transportation sectors. In order to complete and  apply its methodology as part of the forthcoming transportation sector- specific plan, TSA needs to more consistently involve industry  stakeholders in the overall risk assessment process and collaborate with  them on collecting and analyzing information on critical infrastructure and  key resources in the passenger rail industry. Without consistent and  substantive stakeholder input, TSA may not be able to fully capture critical  information on rail assets—information that is needed to properly assess  risk. In addition, as part of the process to complete its risk assessment  methodology, TSA needs to consider whether other proven approaches,  such as ODP’s risk assessment methodology, could be leveraged for rail  and other transportation modes, such as aviation. Until the overall risk to  the entire transportation sector is identified, TSA will not be able to fully  benefit from the outcome of risk management analysis—including  determining where and how to target the nation’s limited resources to  achieve the greatest security gains.
Once risk assessments for the passenger rail industry have been  completed, it will be critical to be able to compare assessment results  across all transportation modes as well as other critical sectors and make  informed, risk-based investment trade-offs. The framework that DHS is  developing to help ensure that risks to all sectors can be analyzed and  compared in a consistent way needs to be completed and shared with TSA  and other sector-specific agencies. The delay in completing the element of  the framework that defines concepts, terminology, and metrics for  assessing risk limits DHS’s ability to compare risk across sectors as sector- specific agencies are concurrently conducting risk assessment activities  without this guidance. Until this framework is complete, it will not be  possible for information from different sectors to be reconciled to allow  for a meaningful comparison of risk—a goal outlined in DHS’s interim  NIPP.
Apart from its efforts to formally identify risks, TSA has taken steps to  enhance the security of the overall passenger rail system. The issuance of  security directives in the wake of the Madrid bombings was a well- intentioned effort to take swift action in response to a current threat.  However, because these directives were issued under emergency  circumstances, with limited input and review by rail industry and federal  stakeholders—and no public comment period—they may not provide the  industry with baseline security standards based on industry best practices.  Nor is it clear how these directives are to be measured and enforced.  Consequently, neither the federal government nor rail operators can be  sure they are requiring and implementing security practices proven to help  prevent or mitigate disasters. Collaborating with rail industry stakeholders  to develop security standards is an important starting point for  strengthening the security of passenger rail systems.
While foreign passenger rail operators face similar challenges to securing  their systems and have generally implemented similar security practices as  U.S. rail operators, there are some practices that are utilized abroad that  U.S. rail operators or the federal government have not studied in terms of  the feasibility, costs, and benefits. For example, an information  clearinghouse for new passenger rail technologies that are available and  have been tested might allow rail operators to efficiently implement  technologies that had already received approval. In addition, while FTA  plans to require rail operators to consider its security infrastructure design  guidelines when renovating or constructing rail systems or facilities,  opportunities may still exist to further research and evaluate ways of  integrating security into design, as some foreign rail operators have done.  Another rail security practice—covert testing of rail security procedures— is being used in two foreign rail systems we visited and is considered by  them as an effective means of keeping rail employees alert to their  surroundings and potential security threats. And finally, random searches  of passengers and baggage are being used by two foreign rail operators  and this practice has recently been adopted by four domestic rail  operators in the wake of the London attacks.
Introducing these security practices into the United States may involve  cultural, financial, and political challenges, owing to differences between  the United States and foreign nations. Nonetheless, as part of the overall  risk management approach, there may be compelling reasons for  exploring the feasibility, costs, and benefits of implementing any of these  practices in the United States. Doing so could enable the United States to  leverage the experiences and knowledge of foreign passenger rail  operators and help identify additional innovative measures to secure rail  systems against terrorist attack in this country.
In our recently issued report on passenger rail security, we recommended,  among other things, that to help ensure that the federal government has  the information it needs to prioritize passenger rail assets based on risk,  and in order to evaluate, select, and implement commensurate measures  to help the nation’s passenger rail operators protect their systems against  acts of terrorism, TSA should establish a plan with timelines for  completing its methodology for conducting risk assessments and develop  security standards that reflect industry best practices and can be  measured and enforced, by using the federal rule-making process. In  addition, we recommended that the Secretary of DHS, in collaboration  with DOT and the passenger rail industry, determine the feasibility, in a  risk management context, of implementing certain security practices used  by foreign rail operators.  DHS, DOT, and Amtrak generally agreed with  the report’s recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer  any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have at  this time.
section_title: Contact Information
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A.  Berrick at (202) 512- 3404 or JayEtta Z. Hecker at (202) 512-2834.  Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Seto  Bagdoyan, Amy Bernstein, Leo Barbour, Christopher Currie, Nikki  Clowers, David Hooper, Kirk Kiester, and Ray Sendejas.
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