Army Reserve Components: Improvements Needed to Data Quality and Management Procedures to Better Report Soldier Availability
Published: 2015-07-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The sustained readiness and availability of the Army's reserve component forces (the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard) is critical to U.S. national defense. These soldiers comprise over half of the Army's total force and their availability is key, as the Army plans to reduce its number of soldiers over the next several years.
The House Report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision for GAO to review issues related to the non-availability of soldiers in the Army reserve components. In this report GAO examined, among other things, the extent to which the Army reserve components (1) have complete, accurate, and timely soldier information to report soldiers' non-availability rates and (2) verify in a timely manner whether soldiers' injuries and illnesses are service-connected, as delays can affect soldier non-availability.
GAO reviewed Army regulations and analyzed soldier non-availability data for fiscal years 2012-14; however, due to concerns with data reliability, GAO focused its analysis on January 2015.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army reserve components do not have complete, accurate, and timely information to report soldiers' non-availability rates. In January 2015, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard reported overall non-availability rates of 22 and 21 percent, respectively. However, GAO analyzed a limited number of medical, training, and administrative availability-related variables for all 85,000 soldiers in six units during this time period and identified more than 3,800 examples of soldiers' records that were inaccurate, incomplete, or inconsistent. For example, GAO identified soldiers who were listed as available but were incarcerated or had a medically limiting condition. A comprehensive analysis could reveal additional inaccuracies. While the Army reserve component commands and some units perform some data quality reviews to identify and correct discrepancies within the multiple data systems that they rely on for availability data, these reviews examine a limited scope of availability-related variables and are performed infrequently. For example, one system generates a report that identifies a small number of problematic variables, but only reports this information quarterly. Further, it does not provide information specific enough to correct individual problems or cover the full range of variables contributing to inaccurate data. Furthermore, the multiple systems do not interface with each other in a way to allow for timely updates of inconsistent availability information. Without an increase in the scope and frequency of data quality reviews, and improvements to systems to update information in a timely manner, the Army reserve components' availability data will continue to be inaccurate.
The Army reserve components do not verify in a timely manner whether soldiers' injuries or illnesses are service-connected (i.e., occurred in the line of duty) which could lengthen the time that some soldiers are classified as non-available. In January 2015, 81 percent of Army Reserve and 74 percent of the Army National Guard investigations of soldiers' injuries and illnesses were overdue per Army regulation. However, the Army does not have a plan to reduce the existing backlog which officials said is caused in part by soldiers not complying with information requests during investigations. The Army is updating its program guidance to address some of the causes cited for these delays, but as of June 2015, officials stated that the revised regulation had not been issued and did not address soldier noncompliance.
Note: Overdue means the investigation has been in process longer than the standard processing time as prescribed by Army Regulation 600-8-4.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Army reserve components increase the scope and frequency of data quality reviews; improve data system updates of availability-related information; reduce the backlog of investigations of service-connected injuries and illnesses; and issue revised guidance that addresses causes for the delays. In written comments, DOD agreed with the recommendations and provided additional comments for context.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: As an integral part of the Army, its reserve components (the Army  Reserve and the Army National Guard) are called upon to meet a full  spectrum of defense requirements including those related to homeland  security, civil support, domestic disaster requirements, and operations  around the globe. The availability and readiness of the Army’s reserve  components for mobilization is critical as together these components  make up over 50 percent of the Army’s total force. By meeting a  combination of specific medical, training, and administrative  requirements, soldiers are available to support their unit’s mission. As the  Army reduces its number of soldiers over the next several yearsmanaging their availability will be especially important as those who are  non-available for mobilization impact their unit’s ability to perform its  required tasks and require unit level commanders to find other individuals  to fill vacancies left by these non-available soldiers from a smaller  population of the remaining available soldiers.
In June 2011, we reported that the Army needed to implement actions to  improve data consistency as units were reporting their personnel  numbers differently from what was called for in guidance. reported that Army quality assurance reviews had not identified all  inconsistencies, and system mechanisms were not preventing the  submission of inconsistent data. As a result, we concluded that until  internal controls improve, decision makers will continue to rely on  readiness information that is based on inconsistent reporting. Therefore,  we recommended that the Army provide additional internal controls such  as increasing quality assurance reviews or putting system technical  checks in place to prevent the submission of data that does not comply  with service reporting requirements. However, the Department of Defense  (DOD) disagreed with this recommendation stating that it believed its  internal controls to be sufficient.
GAO, Military Readiness: Army and Marine Corps Reporting Provides Additional Data,  but Actions Needed to Improve Consistency, GAO-11-526 (Washington, D.C.: June 2011). initial military training. In April 2015, we submitted our preliminary  observations in a briefing your Committees.
For our first objective, we obtained solider identification information and  medical-, training- and administrative-related data for the Army Reserve  and the Army National Guard for fiscal years 2010 through 2014. We  identified inconsistencies in the way the medical availability data were  reported around the June to July 2012 timeframe, which we determined  had resulted from a change in how soldiers with certain medically limiting  conditions were being accounted for. As a result, we analyzed data from  the time period after the policy change, July 2012 through the end of  fiscal year 2014, in order to have consistent data over the entire time  frame for our review. However, due to the magnitude of discrepancies  that we found using these data, we decided we could more  comprehensively analyze these discrepancies with a snapshot of the  most current data available (January 2015), from a non-generalizable  sample of a combination of six units— two Army Reserve commands and  four Army National Guard states—based on individual soldier availability  data. We obtained the soldier availability data for the soldiers in this  sample of six units from five data systems that the Army uses to obtain  soldier availability information. We determined that the information we  analyzed, though not representative of all units, was sufficient to provide  relevant insights for our review.
Department of the Army, Army Regulation 600-8-4, Line of Duty Policy, Procedures, and  Investigations, September 4, 2008. trainingmobilization and subsequent deployment and the timelines for completing  the training. We also analyzed Army Reserve and Army National Guard  summary reports as well as data for individual soldiers from the six units  we selected for the most recent point in time that data were available  (January 2015) showing the number of soldiers that were not available  because they had not completed their initial military training. To identify  the extent to which delays exist in the process of soldiers completing their  initial military training, we also requested information from the U.S. Army  Recruiting Command, the U.S. Army Reserve Command, and the  National Guard Bureau for January 2015 showing the number of soldiers  who were delayed in completing their initial military training. Additionally,  to determine how the Active Army, the Army Reserve and the Army  National Guard account for their soldiers who are in training or otherwise  in a non-available status, we researched applicable laws or regulations  governing the assignment of soldiers to units or to a separate personnel  account. We interviewed U.S. Army Reserve Command, Army National  Guard, and unit officials to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of  using the different assignment approaches. In order to better understand  how initial military training policies and procedures were being applied to  individuals processing through the training, we interviewed officials from  the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, National Guard Bureau, U.S. Army  Reserve Command, and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.  We also interviewed both Army Reserve and Army National Guard  command and unit leaders at our selected locations to identify the  management challenges, as well as the effect that soldiers who were not  available because they had not completed initial military training had on  those locations.   requirements for new soldiers to be considered available for  We conducted this performance audit from July 2014 to July 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. A more detailed discussion of  our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Determining that Army reserve component soldiers are available to  mobilize involves the oversight and management by officials from multiple  DOD entities, the application of criteria regarding the soldiers’ medical-,  training-, and administrative-related availability status, and the recording  of this information throughout multiple data systems.
subsections: section_title: DOD Entities with Oversight and Management Responsibilities Related to Army Reserve Component Soldiers’ Availability Status
paragraphs: Overall, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs is to  advise the Secretary of Defense on reserve component matters and  oversee all reserve component-related matters. Further, the Secretary of  the Army is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct,  all affairs of the Department of the Army. These responsibilities include,  among other things, organizing, training, and mobilizing forces within two  distinct components: the active component and the reserve  components—the U.S. Army Reserve and the Army National Guard.  Within the Department of the Army, the Assistant Secretary of the Army  for Manpower and Reserve Affairs is to develop, oversee, and review  policies and programs pertaining to the mobilization, demobilization, and  availability of the reserve components.
The Chief of the Army Reserve is to advise the Secretary of the Army and  the Chief of Staff of the Army on all issues related to the U.S. Army  Reserve Command, which provides trained, equipped, and ready  soldiers, leaders, and units to support the combatant commands.  Further, as the other reserve component of the Army, the Army National  Guard provides trained and equipped units ready to (1) defend property  and life to the 54 states and territories of the United States and (2)  respond to overseas combat missions, counterdrug efforts, reconstruction  missions, and more, as needed. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau  is responsible for creating and implementing policy and guidance so that  Army National Guard soldiers meet overall Department of the Army  standards. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is also responsible for  ensuring that Army National Guard soldiers are accessible, capable, and  ready to protect the homeland and to provide combat resources to the  Army.
The Army Training and Doctrine Command develops, educates, and  trains soldiers; supports unit training; and designs, builds, and integrates  a mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment in support of Army  soldier and unit training. Additionally, the Director of the Defense Health  Agency is responsible for managing an Individual Medical Readiness  Working Group to monitor, revise, evaluate, and validate data results in  conjunction with the services and to recommend individual soldier  medical readiness goals.
section_title: Criteria for Determining Army Reserve Component Soldiers’ Availability Status
paragraphs: According to Army guidance, unit commanders are to consider soldiers  available if they meet a combination of medical, training, and  administrative criteria. The following are the six individual medical  readiness requirements: annual completion of a periodic health assessment; annual completion of a dental assessment; current on required immunizations;  current on required medical laboratory studies such as an HIV test  and a DNA sample; possession of individual medical equipment items; and, free of any deployment-limiting medical or dental conditions that may  interfere with the soldier’s ability to perform duties while deployed.
The following categories are used to define a soldier’s medical availability  status depending on how many of the six individual medical readiness  requirements are completed:  “Fully Medically Ready” if the soldier is current on all six individual  medical requirements;  “Partially Medically Ready” if the soldier is lacking one or more of the  individual medical requirements that could be resolved within 72  hours;  “Not Medically Ready” if the soldier possesses a chronic or prolonged  deployment- limiting medical or mental condition; or  “Medically Indeterminate” if the soldier is missing health information— a status used only until the soldier has completed the required  medical and dental examinations.
To determine a soldier’s training-related availability status, a unit  commander must determine whether the soldier has completed (1) a  basic officer leadership course, a warrant officer basic course, or initial  entry training requirements, as applicable and also (2) the required  training for an assigned duty position. Under law, soldiers in the Army  Selected Reserve have up to 2 years to complete these initial training  requirements and until they do, they are not considered available to  mobilize.
Finally, other situations may arise that could lead to a soldier being  classified as non-available regardless of the soldier’s medical or training  availability status. For example, a soldier is considered “administratively  non-available” if he or she is without a family care plan that indicates who will take care of his or  her dependents in the case of deployment; under arrest or held in confinement because of legal issues; convicted of a Lautenberg (criminal domestic violence) violation,  which makes the soldier non-available for missions requiring the use  of firearms:   less than 18 years of age; mobilized or deployed; a conscientious objector; or in the process of retiring or being released from active duty.
section_title: Line of Duty Investigations of Soldier Injuries and Illnesses Are Part of a Process to Manage Medically Non-Available Soldiers
paragraphs: Line of Duty investigations are part of the Army reserve components’  process to manage their soldiers whose service has been interrupted by  injury, illness, disease, or death. Soldiers who are not medically ready  with medical conditions that will require longer than 72 hours to resolve  are to be reported as not available to their units according to Army  regulation. Army Reserve and Army National Guard soldiers are entitled  to hospital benefits, pensions, and other compensation for injury, illness,  or disease incurred in the line of duty unless their condition was caused  by their intentional misconduct or willful negligence. Line of duty  investigations are conducted in order to determine whether the soldier  was at fault at the time of an injury or death. Possession of one or more  medical conditions or physical defects does not mean automatic  retirement or separation from the service because many medical  conditions are temporary such as broken bones, recovery from surgery,  or pregnancy. However, once a medical treatment provider determines  that a soldier has a condition that does not appear to meet medical  retention standards, the soldier is to be referred to a Medical Evaluation  Board Physical Evaluation Board as part of DOD and the Department of   The board  Veterans Affairs Integrated Disability Evaluation System.considers numerous pieces of information in assessing the soldier for  continued service, and one of these pieces of required information is a  Line of Duty investigation. In order for these soldiers to again be  considered medically ready, and thus available to their units, they must  complete the board’s process and be deemed to meet medical retention  standards and be fit for duty. Alternatively, the non-available soldier could  be discharged from the service.
section_title: Systems for Recording Information Used to Determine Army Reserve Component Soldiers’ Availability Status
paragraphs: The Army Reserve and the Army National Guard use more than a dozen  data systems to record or analyze various pieces of data related to the  individual information and medical, training, and administrative status of  their soldiers. The Army Reserve and Army National Guard provided  individual soldier availability data, listed in Table 1, from the five main  data systems they use to track soldier availability-related data.
section_title: The Army Reserve Components Do Not Have Complete, Accurate, and Timely Data to Support Reported Soldier Non-Availability Rates
paragraphs: We found that the Army reserve components do not have complete,  accurate, and timely data to support the non-availability rates that they  report to their higher commands. In January 2015, the Army Reserve and  Army National Guard reported overall non-availability rates of 22 percent  and 21 percent, respectively. Initially, we obtained and analyzed  nationwide soldier non-availability related data from July 2012 through  fiscal year 2014 from both the Army Reserve and the Army National  Guard in order to conduct a trend analysis of the data. However, due to  the magnitude of discrepancies that we found using these historical data,  we then requested and obtained data from a non-generalizable sample of  six specific units (two Army Reserve commands and four Army National  Guard states) for the most recent month available, January 2015, to  analyze these discrepancies. The six units provided data on the 85,000  soldiers assigned to these units during this time frame –about 66,000  soldiers listed as available, and 19,000 soldiers listed as non-available.  We analyzed a limited number of medical, training, and administrative  availability-related variables from five Army reserve component data  systems for this sample and found one-third to one-half of the 19,000  soldiers listed as non-available in this sample were non-available due to  medical reasons; about one-third were non-available due to training  reasons; and about one-quarter were non-available due to other or  multiple reasons. Overall, we found that the availability data for more than  3,800 soldiers of the 85,000 soldiers assigned to these units were  incomplete, inaccurate, or inconsistent, thus making the data used to  report these rates not sufficiently reliable. Because we only analyzed a  selection of medical-, training-, and administrative-related availability  data, a more comprehensive analysis of the universe of availability- related variables could reveal additional examples of incorrect availability  statuses— meaning that the overall non-availability rates reported by the  Army Reserve and Army National Guard could be different than the  percentages stated above.
Of the 66,000 soldiers in our sample reported by the Army Reserve and  the Army National Guard as available for mobilization in January 2015,  we identified more than 750 soldiers who were inaccurately reported as  available—that is, they had conditions that according to Army guidance  would mean they were non-available. For example:
More than 600 soldiers were listed as available but were currently
About 100 soldiers were listed as available but were less than 18
About 30 soldiers listed as available had medically limiting conditions.
More than a dozen soldiers were listed as available but were missing  health information for more than 5 years; and
About 10 soldiers were listed as available but were currently  incarcerated.
In addition, we also found about 350 cases of soldiers with what unit  officials considered to be questionable or incomplete statuses. For  example, about 280 individuals had not been present at drill for at least  the last 6 months but were listed as available and about 90 individuals  had been listed as non-available with a short-term medically limiting code  (medically ready within 30 days) for longer than 2 years. Table 2  summarizes the categories and attributes of the incomplete, inaccurate,  or inconsistent data that we identified for the sample of six units as of  January 2015.
Senior Army Reserve and Army National Guard unit officials agreed that  the examples we identified showed instances of inaccurate information,  represented situations that were questionable in nature, or highlighted  records that were incomplete. Officials also noted that the data in the  system are only as good as the information entered into the system and  in many instances the information is incomplete or inaccurate due to  soldier self-reporting or inaccuracies problems during data entry. Officials  noted that the existing internal quality controls may not be adequate to  completely identify and address these issues.
As stated above, Army Reserve and Army National Guard officials  identified soldiers’ self- reported information as a cause of incomplete and  inaccurate availability data within the multiple data systems. The Army  National Guard provided the following specific examples of situations they  have encountered in which self-reporting has directly led to incomplete or  inaccurate data:
Soldiers’ family members might not be timely in reporting a non- military service related death.
Soldiers may understate or not report chronic health conditions.
Soldiers may not report that they have medical conditions for which  they are receiving Department of Veterans Affairs’ disability benefits.  According to officials, because there is no connectivity between the  Veterans Affairs and DOD systems, such information would not be  identified other than through self-reporting by the soldier.
Soldiers have to hand-carry their certificates of training and inform  their units when they have completed their training because the  training data system does not automatically connect to and update the  personnel system with such information.
Of the 10,500 soldiers in our sample reported by the Army Reserve as  non-available for mobilization, as of January 2015, we identified about  2,700 soldiers with inconsistent data between the five main data  systems—- that is, the way the data systems currently interface does not  allow for timely updates and reconciliation of conflicting data among all  systems as a soldier’s availability data changes in individual systems,  putting the relevance of the availability data at risk. Specifically, soldiers  listed with a long-term medically limiting condition in one data system  were listed as having only a short-term disability, or no medical  limitations, in other systems. We also found examples of data system  inconsistencies to a lesser degree in the Army National Guard data,  including soldiers who were identified as having physical limitations  during their annual physical, but did not have a medically limiting status  code listed in the Medical Protection System (referred to as MEDPROS).  In addition, some of the examples of inaccurate data discussed above are  also affected by untimely updates between data systems, some of which  have lag times of weeks or months between updates, leading to  inaccuracies. Even systems that update every 24 hours can negatively  affect the accuracy and completeness of the data, depending on the  timing of report creation and information input.
Furthermore, both Army Reserve and Army National Guard officials  stated that commander discretion in the interpretation of soldier  availability data at the unit level allows for operational flexibility but may  create inconsistent data among systems. For example, a commander  may classify soldiers who are in the process of retraining to a different  military occupational specialty or transitioning from an enlisted soldier to  an officer or warrant officer as available in the Standard  Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) or Total Army  Personnel Data Base-Reserve (TAPDB-R) based on the soldiers’  previous training or qualifications. However, the individual would still be  listed as non-available due to training in Army Training Requirements and  Resources System (ATRRS) because the data systems do not currently  interface in a way to allow for timely updates of this new availability data  to keep the soldier’s information relevant. Because soldier availability  information is always changing, without timely updates between data  systems that occur as soon as new information is added, commanders  and unit administrators responsible for managing soldiers are unable to  ensure that the data remains relevant and valuable for reporting soldier  non-availability rates.   states  The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Governmentthat complete and accurate information should be available on a timely  basis to maintain its relevance and value to management, allow for  effective monitoring of events, and effective decision-making to  accomplish agency objectives. While the Army reserve component  commands and the units we selected perform some data quality reviews  to identify and correct discrepancies within the multiple data systems that  they rely on for availability data, these reviews examine a limited scope of  availability-related variables and are performed infrequently. For example,  the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard stated that they use  reports, such as the quarterly Data Quality Index (DQI) reports which are  narrowly scoped reports, focusing on the top 25 problematic variables of  more than 8,000 variables across each of the Army reserve components.  Officials stated that the DQI is intended to identify missing, incomplete, or  inconsistent availability data between systems but does not identify  invalid values unless they contradict data in a different system, or keep  track of past variables when the new list is issued each quarter. These  top 25 problematic variables are not necessarily representative of data  inconsistencies specific to a particular unit, thus the unit may assume its  data for other variable are accurate and may not look for other issues  within its data. As a result, the DQI may only be helpful to units that  identify issues similar to the top 25 problematic variables within their own  data and units may be unaware of other issues. Unit administrators can  create “on-demand” discrepancy reports to help address other issues  resulting from self-reporting and data entry, but the administrators have to  suspect a potential problem with the data (e.g., available statuses despite  contradiction with the guidance or inaccuracies due to self-reporting)  before they can run the corresponding, issue-specific “on-demand”  reports to identify and resolve the issue. While National Guard officials  stated the DQI was intended to validate soldier statuses against Army  policy and guidance, we identified soldiers in the data who were listed as  available despite having statuses in contradiction with the guidance  concerning availability, bringing the effectiveness of these existing quality  reviews into question.
Overall, the national and unit level data quality reviews do not check the  full range of potential errors, missing or invalid values, and inconsistent  data among all the data systems used to track soldier availability. The  reports only focus on known potential issue areas and often once issues  identified by these reports are addressed, they may not be considered in  future reports, until it becomes such a systematic problem that it is once  again identified in the DQI. Furthermore, these reports are conducted on  an infrequent basis, with the DQI only being updated quarterly, and units  running intermittent on-demand reports on a weekly or monthly basis, or  as they have time to address suspicions of a potential issue. Thus, if data  systems are updated with new information that is incomplete or incorrect,  and a data quality review is not scheduled for another week or month, the  data in these systems could be used to create inaccurate availability  reports that hinder management’s ability to make effective, well-informed  decisions.
In addition, the multiple data systems (e.g., individual systems for  recording medical, training, and administrative information) used to track  availability data do not currently interface in a way to allow for timely  updates between all systems to ensure the relevance and value of the  data management uses to make soldier availability-related decisions. For  example, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard have access to  the Reserve Component Manpower System (RCMS), a centralized data  warehouse, which offers one point of access to all of the soldier  availability data contained in the multiple data systems. But, while the  RCMS warehouse has some algorithms in place to reconcile  inconsistencies that exist between data systems, this reconciliation is only  used for reports derived from warehouse data. Specifically, the  warehouse does not update the availability data in the conflicting  individual data systems or automatically inform the units that there is a  problem with their specific availability data. Once the issue is identified  and addressed in one data system, at the unit level, the current interfaces  between systems do not allow for timely updates to ensure relevant and  valuable data is available in all other applicable data systems as soon as  the change is made. Internal control standards state that controls should  be installed at the interfaces between systems to ensure all inputs  received are valid, all outputs are correct and properly distributed, and  information is provided in a timely manner to maintain its relevance and  value to decision makers. Some of the data systems used by the Army  Reserve and Army National Guard have lag times of weeks or months  between updates and are not automated, leading to inconsistencies and  inaccurate information. Even systems that update every 24 hours can  negatively affect the accuracy and completeness of the data, depending  on the timing of report creation and information input, hindering  management’s ability to make informed decisions.
We determined that, for the purpose of reporting soldier availability rates,  the issues we identified within and between data systems used for  tracking individual soldier availability render the data not sufficiently  reliable. Because the Army Reserve and Army National Guard do not  have constant oversight of their soldiers, they rely on self-reported  information and cannot guarantee that soldiers are providing complete  and accurate information. Without effective internal controls consisting of  frequent data quality reviews that cover the full range of availability- related variables and timely updates between data systems, the Army  reserve components will not be able to ensure that the data in and among  systems is complete, accurate, and timely to efficiently and effectively  manage individual soldier availability.
Both the Army and DOD are aware of the data issues resulting from the  lack of integration of the Army’s multiple data systems. For example, a  September 2012 Army National Guard document on personnel data  systems and data processing and metrics noted that data systems face  systemic issues, accuracy issues, and delays in updating information, and  had suggested the creation of the Data Quality Index to address the  problem. In addition, DOD tried to address the errors caused by the lack  of integration of personnel and pay systems that we previously reported in  1993, through the implementation of the Defense Integrated Military  Human Resources System. This system was intended to provide a joint,  integrated, standardized personnel and pay system for all military  personnel, but in February 2010, the project was canceled after 10 years  of development due, in part, to a lack of strategic alignment, governance,  and requirements management, as well as because of the overall  magnitude of the project.
Subsequent to the cancelation of the Defense Integrated Military Human  Resources System, the Army began designing the Integrated Personnel  and Pay System-Army, which is intended to provide a 24-hour, web- based, integrated human resources system to soldiers, human resource  professionals, combatant commanders, personnel and pay managers,  and other authorized Army users. However, full deployment of the system  is not expected until April 2020, and as we reported in February 2015, the  Army had not developed any portion of the system as of November  2014. ever fully implemented, they are concerned that it will be problematic for  managing the availability statuses of their soldiers. Specifically, officials  noted that unit administrators will have to learn an entirely new system  with its own idiosyncrasies and also learn how this system interfaces with  all the existing systems—effectively causing more problems than the lack  of timely updates resulting from the current interface issues between data  systems.
GAO, Defense Major Automated Information Systems: Cost and Schedule  Commitments Need to Be Established  Earlier, GAO-15-282 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2015) their availability based on complete, accurate, and timely data will be  especially important as soldiers who are non-available impact their unit’s  ability to perform its required tasks and require commanders to fill  vacancies from a smaller population of available soldiers.
section_title: The Army Reserve Components Do Not Verify in a Timely Manner Whether Soldiers’ Injuries and Illnesses Are Service Connected, Which Could Lengthen Soldier Non- Availability
paragraphs: The Army Reserve and the Army National Guard do not verify whether  not medically ready soldiers’ injuries or illnesses are service-connected in  accordance with Line of Duty investigation completion time lines  prescribed by Army regulation, which could lengthen the time which  some soldiers are reported as non-available. In analyzing January 2015  soldier non-availability data, we found that over three-fourths of the Army  Reserve and the Army National Guard’s Line of Duty investigations were  overdue, and that the Army Reserve and Army National Guard have not  developed a plan for addressing the current backlog of investigations.  Further, while the Army is updating the Line of Duty program regulation,  the draft we reviewed does not fully address specific implementation  challenges, including soldier non-compliance with reporting, which  contribute to delays in processing soldiers’ claims of having incurred  service-connected injuries and illnesses.
subsections: section_title: A Majority of Both Army Reserve and Army National Guard Line of Duty Investigations Are Overdue and No Plan Exists to Specifically Address the Backlog
paragraphs: The Army Reserve and the Army National Guard report that their Line of  Duty investigations are significantly behind schedule. Army Reserve and  Army National Guard soldiers are entitled to hospital benefits, pensions,  and other compensation for injury, illness, or disease incurred in the line  of duty unless their condition was caused by their intentional misconduct  or willful negligence. Line of Duty investigations are conducted to  determine the circumstances of injury, illness, disease, or death of a  soldier, and they are conducted essentially to make two determinations:  (1) the duty status of a soldier at the time of an incident and (2) whether  misconduct or negligence was involved in that incident and, if so, to what  degree. According to the Line of Duty program regulation, Line of Duty  investigations can be conducted (1) informally through the soldier’s chain  of command where no misconduct or negligence is indicated, has fewer  required steps in the process, and should be completed within 40 days or  (2) formally where an investigating officer is appointed to conduct an  investigation into suspected misconduct or negligence, has more required  steps to complete, and should be completed within 75 days after the  soldier reports the incident. See figure 1 for an explanation of the  processes and requirements of informal and formal Line of Duty  investigations.
In analyzing January 2015 soldier non-availability data, we found that 81  percent—or 1,781 of 2,204 investigations—of Army Reserve Line of Duty  investigations underway were overdue. Additionally, as of the same time,  74 percent—or 3,364 of 4,538—Army National Guard Line of Duty  investigations underway were overdue. See figure 2 where we break  down these percentages in terms of the backlog of formal and informal  Line of Duty investigations as of January 2015.
The Army Reserve and the Army National Guard have not developed a  plan for addressing the backlog of Line of Duty investigations. While time  standards exist for the completion of Line of Duty investigations as well as  for each of the other steps that soldiers pass through in the Integrated  Disability Evaluation System, Army Reserve and Army National Guard  officials we interviewed stated that they did not know of a plan specifically  established to address the Line of Duty investigation backlog. While there  is no specific plan for addressing the backlog, the Army National Guard  sends a weekly report to each of the states and territories to inform them  of their delinquent investigation status rate. We have reported previously  on the importance of developing detailed implementation plans for  achieving agency goals, to include milestones to guide agencies’  actions. More specifically, developing and using specific milestones and  timelines to guide and gauge progress toward achieving an agency’s  desired results informs management of the rate of progress in achieving  the goals or whether adjustments need to be made in order to maintain  progress within given timeframes. Without an effective and efficient  process to reduce the current backlog of Line of Duty investigations, Army  Reserve and Army National Guard soldiers will continue to await  decisions and be non-available during the process for an extended period  of time.
section_title: Many Causes Exist for Line of Duty Investigation Delays, and the Army Is Reviewing the Line of Duty Program Regulation
paragraphs: Army guidance indicates that a soldier’s primary responsibility is to attend  medical and administrative appointments and to assist in providing  required personnel and administrative data, and maintain regular, open  communication in order to meet all requirements.we interviewed said that soldiers can be noncompliant with meeting the  processes’ requirements. They stated that many soldiers do not actively  participate in their medical appointments or provide necessary supporting  documents. Sometimes, soldiers are unwilling to reveal all of their  medical conditions or provide permission for release of their medical  records from their private providers, where applicable, which slows the  process.
Another cause we identified for the delay in completing Line of Duty  investigations is the absence of a time limit for reporting incidents. Army  Reserve and Army National Guard unit officials we interviewed said that  having to investigate soldiers’ claims of injuries or illnesses from many  years past was burdensome as the Line of Duty program regulation sets  no statute of limitations on reporting their incidents to their unit. One  National Guard unit official said that processing a claim that a soldier was  injured 5 or 10 years prior takes an extensive amount of time and  resources. Additionally, several Army Reserve and National Guard  officials stated that the time standards within which the Line of Duty  investigations are to be completed are unreasonable for the reserve  components.
Army Reserve and Army National Guard officials stated that there are  training opportunities on Line of Duty investigations given along with other  aspects of the disability evaluation system. For example, National Guard  Bureau officials told us that they conduct Line of Duty training on a  quarterly basis at the Professional Education Center, located in North  Little Rock, Arkansas, and the class is open to all commanders, case  managers, medical readiness unit officials, and health services  specialists. However, officials from at least one National Guard state  indicated that more unit leader training on Line of Duty responsibilities  would be welcome as, according to these officials, the only Line of Duty  investigation training that they knew of was for company commanders  and it consisted of a 30-minute block of training given during their  company pre- command course. They said additional training would be  helpful because a high percentage of the Line of Duty investigations are  returned to the units for corrections. These same National Guard officials  said that even if the pre-command course included more training, funding  levels in their state has precluded them from holding any pre-command  courses in 2015. They added that they could not send one-fourth of their  state’s company commanders to any of the three courses that were held  in 2014 due to a shortage of funding.
section_title: The Army Reserve Components Account for Their Soldiers Who Have Not Completed their Initial Military Training and Are Considered Non- Available within Their Home Units
paragraphs: The Army reserve components account for their soldiers who have not  completed initial military training—this includes basic training and  qualifications for a specific job—directly within their home units instead of  through a separate account as the Active Army does. As of January 2015,  the Army Reserve reported that about one-third of its non-available  soldiers and the Army National Guard reported approximately half of its  non-available soldiers were categorized as non-available because they  had not completed their initial military training. According to Army reserve  component unit officials, certain situations can delay new soldiers from  completing their training and make them non-available for extended  periods of time. For example:
Enlistees under the Split Training Option are enlisted soldiers who  complete basic training, return to their civilian education or  occupation, and then receive their job-specific or advanced training  the next year. However, Army Reserve and Army National Guard  information indicates that Split Training Option soldiers represent a  small non-available population of less than 1.5 percent of their total  number of soldiers.
Soldiers who are injured or become ill during initial military training  may have to withdraw from the training, take time to heal, and start  over again, prolonging their overall time in a non-available status.
Changes in the level of funding for training can lead to the  cancellation of classes and delay the start or completion of a soldier’s  required training.
Soldiers who do not meet height and weight or physical fitness  standards cannot attend initial military training until the standards are  met.
Soldiers who cannot complete the required initial military training must  be processed for discharge, and the discharge process can be  delayed because of notification requirements. As such, the affected  soldier remains non-available during this time.
The Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 as  amended requires that initial military training be completed within 2 years  from an individual’s start date.  Additionally, Army Regulation 220-1  specifies a training qualification rate between 85 and 100 percent for  optimum unit readiness. The Army National Guard also establishes a  training qualification rate of 85 percent in its 2014 – 2020 Strategic  Planning Guidance document. As of January 2015, both the Army  Reserve commands and the Army National Guard states we reviewed  were meeting their identified training goal of 85 percent.
According to the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of  1992, as amended, the Secretary of the Army has the legal authority to  establish a personnel accounting category to be used for reserve  component soldiers who have not completed their initial military training  or who are otherwise not available. This account provides units with  improved unit availability rates by assigning soldiers who are non- available due to training or other issues to a separate personnel account  that is external from the unit’s personnel roster. However, Army Reserve  and Army National Guard officials stated that, unlike the Active Army,  they do not use a separate personnel account to assign soldiers who are  in training, in transit, or incapacitated for a long period of time—referred to  as a Trainees, Transients, Holdovers, and Students account. The Army  reserve component soldiers in these situations who are non-available are  directly assigned to their units and are counted against their home units’  manning and personnel readiness levels, and therefore, their unit non- availability rates are typically higher than those of the Active Army. For  example, a senior official said that the Army National Guard units usually  have approximately 20 percent of their unit non-available because of  having not completed initial military training or because of other issues  that make them non-available.
The Army Reserve and the Army National Guard officials stated that they  have not established a personnel account for reserve component soldiers  who have not completed their initial military training or who are otherwise  not available for several reasons. For example, Army Reserve officials  stated that during a 2012 pilot of administratively assigning soldiers who  had not completed training or other non-available soldiers to a separate  personnel account, they found that the unit commanders felt that they had  lost some level of accountability for their soldiers once they were being  managed by others outside of the unit. Further, officials stated that costs  were incurred to hire additional personnel to support the management of  individuals assigned to a Trainees, Transients, Holdovers, and Students  account outside of their home unit. National Guard and unit officials we  interviewed agreed that implementing a separate account to manage  these soldiers outside of their home unit is currently cost prohibitive.
Army reserve component officials stated that there will always be a  portion of the force in the training pipeline and, therefore, non-available as  long as new soldiers are recruited. Not separately accounting for these  new soldiers negatively affects the overall availability rate of the unit to  which they are assigned. Alternatively, utilizing a separate account to  manage soldiers allows the Active Army to fill its units with only those who  have completed initial military training and who are considered available  from a training perspective. Regardless of whether the Army reserve  components use a separate personnel account or accounting for non- available soldiers within the units, soldier availability rates of the force as  a whole do not change, as those non-available soldiers would still exist  within the reserve components and would have to be accounted for and  managed.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Army Reserve and the Army National Guard categorized about a  quarter of their soldiers as not available for mobilization due to various  reasons such as duty-limiting medical conditions, lack of initial training, or  other administrative situations that exist. While the Army reserve  components collect a large amount of data regarding soldier medical,  training, and other statuses to report non-availability rates, the  completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of these data are not sufficiently  reliable for supporting their reported soldier non-availability rates.
Specifically, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard currently do  not frequently conduct data quality reviews that identify the full range of  potential errors, missing or invalid values, and inconsistent data among all  the data systems used to track soldier availability, which cause soldiers to  be listed as available despite having statuses in contradiction with the  guidance concerning availability. In addition, the multiple data systems  used to track availability data do not currently interface in a way to allow  for timely updates between all systems to ensure the relevance and value  of the data management uses to make soldier availability-related  decisions. These data problems hinder Army leaders’ ability to know the  true extent to which their reserve component soldiers are available and  ready for duty at a given point in time. Without quality data that is readily  available to leaders at all levels from systems that interface in a way that  produces the most up-to-date information possible, the Army and its  reserve component leaders will not be able to adequately monitor and  manage the availability of soldiers who make up over half of the total  Army force.
Moreover, the majority of Line of Duty investigations to verify such  circumstances as solider injury and illness are overdue. Thus, many of  these soldiers are being maintained in a non-available status for extended  periods of time while awaiting the completion of these investigations. A  planned revised program regulation for Line of Duty investigations could  address some of the delays, but its issuance has been pending for years  and does not appear to address all causes of the delays, such as soldiers  not providing information as required. Within units, the overall non- available percentage is not just an aggregate number but represents  individual soldiers with particular skills who are needed to perform specific  roles and tasks for the unit. As the Army and its reserve components  reduce their overall number of soldiers in the near future, each soldier  that remains plays a larger part in contributing to the missions of their  units. Consequently, it becomes critically important for commanders to  effectively manage their non-available soldiers so as to minimize the  impact to their unit’s readiness as well as that of the total Army force.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Army to take the following four actions:  Improve the Army Reserve’s and the Army National Guard’s internal  control procedures to ensure that individual soldier availability  information in each data system is complete, accurate, and timely by  increasing the scope and frequency of data quality reviews at the unit  and national levels to address issues resulting from self-reporting and  inaccurate inputs;
Develop and implement ways that the Army reserve components can  facilitate timely updates of availability data between all data systems  through the current system interfaces to improve the relevance and  value of the data that management is using to make soldier  availability-related decisions;
Develop a plan with timelines and take actions accordingly to address  the backlog of Line of Duty investigations; and
Revise the Line of Duty program regulation to include procedures that  would address implementation challenges that contribute to delays in  the processing of Army Reserve and Army National Guard soldiers’  claims of incurring service-connected injuries and illnesses, such as  by including the identification of and procedures to address non- compliance by soldiers, and take steps to expeditiously issue that  revised program regulation.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In DOD’s written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with  comments on each of our four recommendations. DOD’s comments are  included in appendix II.
DOD concurred with comment on our first and second recommendations  to (1) improve internal control procedures to help ensure that individual  soldier availability information in each data system is complete, accurate,  and timely and (2) to develop and implement ways to facilitate timely  updates of availability data between all systems that management uses to  make soldier availability-related decisions. In its comments, the Army  National Guard stated that, while it concurred with the recommendations,  it believes our report did not analyze the lack of training for personnel  clerks within the states. Additionally, it stated that system limitations as  well as staffing shortages and budget constraints contribute to the delays  in updating information within its primary system, SIDPERS. Further, the  Army National Guard believes that the deployment of the Integrated  Personnel and Pay System-Army will resolve the identified issues, and  training will play a vital role in the implementation of that system. In the  report we state several reasons why the soldier non-availability  information is not complete, accurate or timely. The lack of training for  personnel clerks, staffing shortages, and budget constraints may certainly  be additional causes for the data problems identified. We encourage the  Army National Guard to take all necessary actions to remedy these  problems they have identified. However, we continue to believe that the  completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of solider availability-related data  will be improved by taking actions to strengthen the internal control  procedures and developing and implementing ways to facilitate timely  updates of availability data between all systems.
In their comments related to the reliability of its soldier availability-related  data, the Army Reserve stated that the report contains an inaccuracy  regarding the Data Quality Index and its intended use and capability.  More specifically, the Army Reserve contends that the Data Quality Index  is an “on-demand” report that can identify blank, invalid, and pay-related  data discrepancies, and are available to unit commanders to run as  needed and to monitor the data quality of their assigned unit. In our  report, we state that unit administrators can create “on-demand”  discrepancy reports to help address data, but the administrators have to  suspect a potential problem with the data before they run the  corresponding, issue-specific “on-demand” reports to identify and help  resolve any problems. We also state that unit officials are running their  unit level data quality reviews, intermittently and that these unit reviews  do not check the full range of potential errors, missing or invalid values,  and inconsistent data among all the data systems used to track soldier  availability. Since the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard use  more than a dozen data systems to record or analyze various pieces of  data related to the medical, training, and administrative status of their  soldiers, we continue to believe that these reserve components need to  take appropriate steps to improve the reliability of their soldier availability  information.
DOD concurred with comment on our third and fourth recommendations  related to improving the completion of Line of Duty investigations.  Specifically, the Army Reserve states that we did not fully analyze the  manpower necessary for completing the Line of Duty investigations.  Further, it stated that we did not mention that major contributing factors to  the increase in the number of investigations are soldiers with pre-existing  medical conditions who are transitioning from the active duty to the  reserve components as well as the Department of Veterans Affairs’  requirement for a completed Line of Duty investigation for every claimed  condition. Our report states that many causes exist for the delays in  completing Line of Duty investigations, and we provide examples of  common causes that we heard during our review. However, we recognize  that these are not the only causes for delays in completing Line of Duty  investigations. It may be very likely that the manpower demands, soldier  transition issues and the Department of Veterans Affairs’ requirement  mentioned by the Army Reserve could be additional causes for the  delays. No matter the cause for the delays, the significant backlog of  incomplete Line of Duty investigations shows that this has been a long- standing issue within the reserve components. Therefore, it is imperative  that they resolve this problem as it is in the best interest of the soldiers to  expeditiously address their medical situations in order to minimize the  number of non-available soldiers being retained within Army reserve  component units.
Further, the Army Reserve stated in its comments that it is developing a  plan of action to address the critical findings related to Line of Duty  investigations and that two agencies are currently testing a streamlined  Line of Duty process. Upon review of quantitative data from the test, the  Army Reserve states that it will develop a comprehensive plan of action to  address its backlog of late Line of Duty investigations. According to the  Army Reserve, the plan of action will streamline and standardize internal  processes in order to reduce the backlog and adjudicate cases more  efficiently. Finally, it plans to review the feasibility of creating a Process  Act Team to both address the existing backlog and develop a more active  method of processing new Line of Duty investigations. We are  encouraged by the Army Reserve plans to take actions to address this  important issue which can hold injured and ill soldiers in a non-available  status for extended periods of time.
The Army Reserve also stated that our report did not mention that it had  established a separate personnel account known as a Trainees,  Transients, Holdovers, and Students account back in the mid to late  2000, but it was later dissolved. The Army Reserve stated that the  account was dissolved due to lack of commander's accountability and  ownership of their soldiers when they were assigned and managed  outside of their home unit, and because of the resources (people,  systems, etc) involved in managing the account. However, our draft report  did note the 2012 pilot of administratively assigning soldiers who had not  completed training or other non-available soldiers to a separate personnel  account. Moreover, our report provides a description of how the Army  Reserve components’ accounting of soldiers who have not completed  initial military training—that is, directly within their home units—differs  from the active Army’s practice of using a separate account. We did not  evaluate the advantages or disadvantages of either accounting practice.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of the Army; the Chief, Army Reserve  Command; the Director, National Guard Bureau; the Director, Defense  Health Agency, and the Surgeon General of the Army. In addition, the  report is available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report  are included in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of our review were to (1) examine the extent to which the  Army reserve components have complete, accurate, and timely  information to report soldiers’ non-availability rates and (2) examine the  extent to which the Army reserve components verify in a timely manner  whether soldiers’ injuries and illnesses are service-connected, as delays  can affect soldier non-availability and (3) provide a description of how the  Army reserve components account for new soldiers who are not available  because they have not completed initial military training.
For our first objective, we obtained solider identification information and  medical-, training-, and administrative-related data for the Army Reserve  and the Army National Guard for fiscal years 2010 through 2014. In table  3, we list examples of the categories of unit-level availability-related data  categories provided to us by the U.S. Army Reserve Command and the  National Guard Bureau for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, from the five  data systems we discuss in this report.
For the availability data we received, we identified inconsistencies in the  way the medical availability data were reported around the June to July  2012 timeframe. Through discussions with Army Reserve and Army  National Guard officials, we determined that in 2012 there was a change  in how soldiers with certain medically limiting conditions were being  accounted for. As a result, we analyzed the data from the time period  after the policy change, July 2012 through the end of calendar year 2014,  in order to have consistent data over the entire timeframe for our review.  We also decided to use a non-generalizable sample of a combination of  six units—two Army Reserve commands and four Army National Guard  states— for a detailed analysis of the individual soldier non-availability  data.
In order to select a non-generalizable sample of commands to review, we  initially obtained summary data for each of the 54 Army National Guard  states and territories of the United States as of September 2014. This  summary availability data included the number of Army National Guard  soldiers: assigned to each state or territory, reported as non-available,  reported as non-available due to medical reasons and reported as a  percentage of the total number of soldiers reported as non-available,  and  reported as non-available due to training reasons and as a  percentage of the total number of soldiers reported as non-available  In table 4, we list the four Army National Guard states we selected for our  non-generalizable sample and the criteria we used for selecting each  one—that is, the combination of the number of assigned soldiers in the  state or territory, their geographic dispersion across the country, and  whether they have high or low rates of overall, medical- or training-related  soldier non- availability.
In addition to these four Army National Guard states, we also selected  two Army Reserve commands, as a part of our non-generalizable sample,  on the basis of (1) the number of assigned soldiers and (2) their proximity  to and geographic dispersion with the four Army National Guard states in  order to allow for regional perspectives between organizations. As such,  we selected the largest command—the 377th Theater Sustainment  Command in Louisiana—and one medium-sized command—the 807th  Medical Support Command in Utah.
Due to the magnitude of discrepancies that we found using the historical  data from July 2012 through the end of fiscal year 2014, we decided we  could more comprehensively analyze these discrepancies with a  snapshot in time of soldier availability data rather than using historical  trend data. We decided to use a snapshot of the most current data  available (January 2015), from the same six Army Reserve and Army  National Guard units rather than using data from all Army Reserve and  Army National Guard units. After we decided to focus our review on a  snapshot in time of the soldier non-availability data, we obtained  individual soldier availability information as of January 2015 (see table 5)  for the selected four Army National Guard states and two Army Reserve  commands. We determined that the information we obtained and  analyzed, though not representative of all units, was sufficient to provide  relevant insights for our review.
We spoke to officials from each of these commands and states (excluding  Michigan), as well as the US Army Reserve Command and the National  Guard Bureau regarding the data we analyzed and the discrepancies we  identified to obtain a complete understanding of the availability data and  multiple data systems. Officials from Michigan were willing to speak with  us, but we were unable to coordinate on a mutually agreeable time.
The Army Reserve and Army National Guard provided us individual  soldier availability data from the five main data systems they use to track  availability-related data, including the Medical Protection System  (MEDPROS), the Army Training Requirements and Resources System  (ATRRS), the Total Army Personnel Data Base-Reserve (TAPDB-R), the  Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS), and the  Reserve Component Manpower System (RCMS). The availability data  from these five systems were sufficient to answer the objectives for the  purpose of this report for the following reasons. First, the entire Army  uses MEDPROS to track immunization and medical readiness for all  active and reserve components as well as other pieces of information  affecting soldiers’ medical availability to deploy. ATRRS is the  Department of the Army’s management information system of record for  managing soldier training information. TAPDB-R is the Army Reserve’s  database of record for personnel data to fully support all personnel  manning functions during peacetime and deployment. SIDPERS is the  database of record for all personnel information for Army National Guard  soldiers. Both TAPDB-R and SIDPERS track the administrative causes of  non-availability. Lastly, both the Army Reserve and the Army National  Guard use RCMS to provide decision makers with standard reports for  analyzing personnel and operational readiness data by aggregating  sources of information from multiple data systems. The Army reserve  components use the information in these multiple data systems  collectively to assess a soldier’s and a unit’s overall availability for  mobilization and deployment.
We compared these solider availability data from these five data systems  for the six selected locations with (1) Standards for Internal Control in the   and (2) Army guidance documents for reporting the  Federal Governmentavailability of soldiers, and assessed the soldier availability information for  completeness, accuracy, and timeliness. Specifically, Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government states that complete and  accurate information should be available on a timely basis to maintain its  relevance and value to management in making decisions, allow for  effective monitoring of events, and effective decision-making to  accomplish agency objectives. Furthermore the Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government defines “timeliness” as information  that is promptly recorded to maintain its relevance and value to  management in making decisions such as reporting soldier non- availability rates. In addition, these standards state that controls should  be installed at the interfaces between systems to ensure all inputs  received are valid, all outputs are correct and properly distributed, and  information is provided in a timely manner to maintain its relevance and  value to decision makers. We also used Department of the Army  Pamphlet 220-1 to provide us with the instructions and reference  information related to (1) determining and reporting personnel data, (2)  the mobilization of Army National Guard and Army Reserve units, and (3)  the duty-limiting conditions which would make a soldier non-available for  mobilization. We assessed the reliability of the data elements in the  multiple data systems needed for this engagement based on the criteria  above and identified the data reliability issues discussed in the body of  this report. As previously discussed, the data systems contain inaccurate  and incomplete records, soldiers listed as available in contradiction with  availability reporting guidance, and availability data that may not be  relevant or valuable to management due to current system interfaces that  do not allow for timely updates between all systems. Overall, the issues  we identified within and between data systems used for tracking individual  soldier availability render them not sufficiently reliable for the purpose of  reporting soldier availability rates.
For our second objective, we obtained and reviewed the Line of Duty  program regulation, which details the policies and procedures for  investigating the circumstances of a soldier’s disease, injury, or death.  The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Personnel (G-1) is the  proponent and exception authority that includes the investigation  procedures and the processing time standards for these investigations.  Further, we obtained summary information from the Army Reserve and  the Army National Guard from January 2015 that showed (1) the total  number of Line of Duty investigations that were in process at that time for  the entire Army Reserve by support command level and Army National  Guard by state or territory and (2) the breakdown of the total as to the  number that were on-time and overdue as compared with the Line of Duty  program regulation’s processing time standards. We discussed the Line  of Duty investigation process and the challenges that exist with the  implementation of this program with officials from the U.S. Army Reserve  Command, the National Guard Bureau, the California National Guard, the  Georgia National Guard, the Utah National Guard, the 377th Theater  Sustainment Command, and the 807th Medical Support Command.  Further, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Surgeon General- Army, the U.S. Army Human Resources Command, and the  Headquarters, Department of the Army to determine the status of the  review of the Line of Duty program along with any updates in process to  its governing regulation.
For our third objective, we identified relevant active and reserve  component regulations, laws and policies describing the initial military  training requirements for new soldiers to be considered available for  mobilization and subsequent deployment and the timelines for completing  the training. We also analyzed Army Reserve and Army National Guard  summary reports as well as data for individual soldiers from the six sites  we selected for January 2015 showing the number of soldiers that were  not available because they had not completed their initial military training.  To identify the extent to which delays exist in the process of soldiers  completing their initial military training, we also requested information  from U.S. Army Recruiting Command, the U.S. Army Reserve Command,  and the National Guard Bureau for January 2015 showing the number of  soldiers who were delayed in completing their initial military training.
Additionally, to determine how the Active Army, the Army Reserve and  the Army National Guard account for their soldiers who are in training or  otherwise in a non-available status, we researched applicable laws  governing the assignment of soldiers to units or to a separate personnel  account. We interviewed U.S. Army Reserve Command, Army National  Guard, and unit officials to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of  using the different assignment approaches. In order to better understand  how initial military training policies and procedures were being applied to  individuals processing through the training, we interviewed officials from  U.S. Army Recruiting Command, the National Guard Bureau, the U.S.  Army Reserve Command, and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine  Command. We also interviewed both Army Reserve and Army National  Guard command and unit leaders at our selected locations to identify the  management challenges, as well as, the effect that soldiers who were not  available because they had not completed initial military training had on  those locations.
To further our understanding of issues regarding the availability of Army  Reserve and Army National Guard soldiers across each of these three  objectives, we interviewed officials, or where appropriate, obtained  documentation from the organizations listed below:
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Office of the Surgeon General, Army
U.S. Army Human Resources Command
Defense Health Agency
National Guard Bureau
U.S. Army Reserve Command
Army Reserve Medical Management Center
California National Guard
Georgia National Guard
Michigan National Guard
Utah National Guard
377th Theater Sustainment Command
807th Medical Support Command  We conducted this performance audit from July 2014 to July 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Lori Atkinson (Assistant Director),  Rebecca Beale, Caitlin Dardenne, Mae Jones, Amie Steele-Lesser, Terry  Richardson, Jerry Sandau, Paul Seely, and Sabrina Streagle made  significant contributions to this report.