Personnel Security Clearances: Actions Needed to Help Ensure Correct Designations of National Security Positions
Published: 2013-11-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Personnel security clearances allow individuals access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security. A sound requirements process to determine whether a national security position requires access to classified information is needed to safeguard classified data and manage costs. The DNI reported that more than 4.9 million federal government and contractor employees held or were eligible to hold a security clearance in 2012. GAO has reported that the federal government spent over $1 billion to conduct background investigations (in support of security clearances and suitability determinations--the consideration of character and conduct for federal employment) in fiscal year 2011.
This testimony addresses policies and procedures executive branch agencies use when (1) first determining whether federal civilian positions require a security clearance and (2) periodically reviewing and revising or validating existing federal civilian position security clearance requirements. This testimony is based on a July 2012 GAO report (GAO-12-800), in which GAO (1) reviewed relevant federal guidance and processes, (2) examined agency personnel security clearance policies, (3) obtained and analyzed an OPM tool used for position designation, and (4) met with officials from ODNI and OPM because of their Directors' assigned roles as Security and Suitability Executive Agents. Because DOD and DHS grant the most security clearances, that report focused on the security clearance requirements of federal civilian positions within those agencies.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In July 2012, GAO reported that the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), as Security Executive Agent, had not provided executive branch agencies clearly defined policy and procedures to consistently determine if a position requires a personnel security clearance. Absent this guidance, agencies are using an Office of Personnel Management (OPM) position designation tool to determine the sensitivity and risk levels of civilian positions which, in turn, inform the type of investigation needed. OPM audits, however, found inconsistency in these position designations, and some agencies described problems implementing OPM's tool. For example, in an April 2012 audit OPM assessed the sensitivity levels of 39 positions, and its designations differed from the agency in 26 positions. Problems exist, in part, because OPM and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) did not collaborate on the development of this tool, and because their respective roles for suitability and security clearance reform are still evolving. As a result, to help determine the proper designation, GAO recommended that the DNI, in coordination with the Director of OPM, issue clearly defined policy and procedures for federal agencies to follow when determining if federal civilian positions require a security clearance. The DNI concurred with this recommendation. In May 2013, the DNI and OPM jointly drafted a proposed revision to the federal regulation on position designation which, if finalized in its current form, would provide additional requirements and examples of position duties at each sensitivity level. GAO also recommended that once those policies and procedures are in place, the DNI and the Director of OPM, in their roles as Executive Agents, collaborate to revise the position designation tool to reflect the new guidance. ODNI and OPM concurred with this recommendation and recently told GAO that they are revising the tool.
GAO also reported in July 2012 that the DNI had not established guidance to require agencies to periodically review and revise or validate existing federal civilian position designations. GAO reported that Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) component officials were aware of the requirement to keep the number of security clearances to a minimum, but were not always required to conduct periodic reviews and validations of the security clearance needs of existing positions. GAO found that without such a requirement, executive branch agencies may be hiring and budgeting for initial and periodic security clearance investigations using position descriptions and security clearance requirements that do not reflect current national security needs. Further, since reviews are not done consistently, executive branch agencies cannot have assurances that they are keeping the number of positions that require security clearances to a minimum. Therefore, GAO recommended in July 2012 that the DNI, in coordination with the Director of OPM, issue guidance to require executive branch agencies to periodically review and revise or validate the designation of all federal civilian positions. As of October 2013, ODNI and OPM are finalizing revisions to the federal regulation on position designation. While the proposed regulation requires agencies to conduct a one-time reassessment of position designation within 24 months of the final rule's effective date, it does not require a periodic reassessment of positions' need for access to classified information. GAO continues to believe that periodic reassessment is important.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to be here to discuss executive branch  agencies’ requirements for personnel to have access to classified  information. As you know, my recent testimony on the government-wide  security clearance process before your Subcommittee on June 20, 2013  included a discussion of our work on the steps that executive branch  agencies use to first determine whether a federal civilian position requires  access to classified information. Today, I am here to elaborate on that  process and report on the extent of progress by executive branch  agencies in implementing our recommendations.
Personnel security clearances allow federal government and industry  personnel (contractors) to gain access to classified information that,  through unauthorized disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally  grave damage to U.S. national security. In 2008, I testified that  developing a sound requirements process to determine whether a  position requires a security clearance for access to classified information  is important because unnecessary requests for clearances have the  potential to increase investigative workload and related costs. As you  know, a high volume of clearances continue to be processed and a sound  requirements determination process is needed to effectively manage  costs, since agencies spend significant amounts annually on national  security and other background investigations.
In addition to cost implications, limiting the access to classified  information and reducing the associated risks to national security  underscore the need for executive branch agencies to have a sound  process to determine which positions require a security clearance. In  2012, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) reported that more than  4.9 million federal government and contractor employees held or were  eligible to hold a security clearance. Furthermore, in fiscal year 2011, the  federal government spent over $1 billion to conduct more than 2 million  background investigations in support of both personnel security  clearances and suitability determinations for government employment  outside the intelligence community.
My statement today will primarily discuss our July 2012 report in which we  evaluated federal government practices for identifying federal civilian  positions that require personnel security clearances. Specifically, my  statement will address policies and procedures that executive agencies  use (1) when first determining whether federal civilian positions require a  security clearance and (2) to periodically review and revise or validate  existing federal civilian position security clearance requirements.
My statement is based primarily on our July 2012 report on defining policy  for civilian position requirements. A list of products from our body of work  focused on the personnel security clearance process appears at the end  of my statement. As part of the work for our 2012 report, we reviewed  relevant executive orders and federal guidance and processes, examined  agency personnel security clearance policies, obtained and analyzed an  Office of Personnel Management (OPM) tool used for position  designation, and interviewed executive branch agency officials.  Specifically, the scope of our work focused on the security clearance  requirements of federal civilian positions from selected components within  the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Homeland Security  (DHS), due to the volume of clearances that these two agencies process.  Further, as part of our ongoing effort to determine the status of agency  actions to address our prior recommendations, we reviewed the current  proposal to revise a relevant federal regulation regarding position  designation.
The work upon which this testimony is based was conducted in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Further details about the  scope and methodology can be found in each of these related products.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In light of delays in completing security clearance background  investigations and adjudicative decisions, as well as a significant backlog  of clearances to be processed, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform  and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which set objectives and  established requirements for improving the personnel security clearance  process, including improving the timeliness of the clearance process,  achieving interagency reciprocity, establishing an integrated database to  track investigative and adjudicative information, and evaluating available  technology for investigations and adjudications.
In July 2008, Executive Order 13467 designated the DNI as the Security  Executive Agent, who is responsible for developing uniform and  consistent policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and  timely completion of background investigations and adjudications relating  to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information and  eligibility to hold a sensitive position. Additionally, the order designated  the Director of OPM as the Suitability Executive Agent. Determinations of  suitability for government employment include consideration of aspects of  an individual’s character or conduct. Accordingly, the Suitability Executive  Agent is responsible for developing and implementing uniform and  consistent policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and  timely completion of investigations and adjudications relating to  determinations of suitability.
The order also established a Suitability and Security Clearance  Performance Accountability Council, commonly known as the  Performance Accountability Council, to be the government-wide  governance structure responsible for driving implementation and  overseeing security and suitability reform efforts. Further, the executive  order designated the Deputy Director for Management at the Office of  Management and Budget (OMB) as the chair of the council and states  that agency heads shall assist the Performance Accountability Council  and Executive Agents in carrying out any function under the order, as well  as implementing any policies or procedures developed pursuant to the  order.
The relevant orders and regulations that guide the process for  designating national security positions include executive orders and  federal regulations. For example, Executive Order 10450, which was  originally issued in 1953, makes the heads of departments or agencies  responsible for establishing and maintaining effective programs for  ensuring that civilian employment and retention is clearly consistent with  the interests of national security. Agency heads are also responsible for  designating positions within their respective agencies as sensitive if the  occupant of that position could, by virtue of the nature of the position,  bring about a material adverse effect on national security.
In addition, Executive Order 12968, issued in 1995, makes the heads of  agencies—including executive branch agencies and the military  departments—responsible for establishing and maintaining an effective  program to ensure that access to classified information by each employee  is clearly consistent with the interests of national security. This order also  states that, subject to certain exceptions, eligibility for access to classified  information shall only be requested and granted on the basis of a  demonstrated, foreseeable need for access. Further, part 732 of Title 5 of  the Code of Federal Regulations provides requirements and procedures  for the designation of national security positions, which include positions  that (1) involve activities of the government that are concerned with the  protection of the nation from foreign aggression or espionage, and (2)  require regular use of or access to classified national security  information.
Part 732 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations also states that  most federal government positions that could bring about, by virtue of the  nature of the position, a material adverse effect on national security must  be designated as a sensitive position and require a sensitivity level  designation. The sensitivity level designation determines the type of  background investigation required, with positions designated at a greater  sensitivity level requiring a more extensive background investigation. Part  732 establishes three sensitivity levels—special-sensitive, critical- sensitive, and noncritical-sensitive—which are described in figure 1.  According to OPM, positions that an agency designates as special- sensitive and critical-sensitive require a background investigation that  typically results in a top secret clearance. Noncritical-sensitive positions  typically require an investigation that supports a secret or confidential  clearance. OPM also defines non-sensitive positions that do not have a  national security element, but still require a designation of risk for  suitability purposes. That risk level informs the type of investigation  required for those positions. Those investigations include aspects of an  individual’s character or conduct that may have an effect on the integrity  or efficiency of the service.
As previously mentioned, DOD and DHS grant the most security  clearances. Figure 1 illustrates the process used by both DOD and DHS  to determine the need for a personnel security clearance for a federal  civilian position generally used government-wide.
section_title: DNI and OPM are Collaborating to Finalize Clearly Defined Policy Guidance for Determining When a Federal Civilian Position Needs a Security Clearance
paragraphs: During the course of our 2012 review, we found that the executive branch  had not issued clearly defined policy guidance for determining when a  federal civilian position needs a security clearance. In the absence of  such guidance, agencies are using a position designation tool that OPM  designed to determine the sensitivity and risk levels of civilian positions  that, in turn, inform the type of investigation needed. Further, we found  that OPM’s position designation tool lacked input from the DNI and that  audits had revealed problems with the use of OPM’s tool, leading to some  incorrect position designations.
subsections: section_title: The DNI Has a Role to Guide Agencies in Designating Positions for Security Clearances, But Has Not Yet Provided Agencies with Clearly Defined Policy Guidance
paragraphs: The first step in the personnel security clearance process is to determine  if the occupant of a federal position needs a security clearance to  effectively and efficiently conduct work. However, we found in July 2012  that the DNI had not provided agencies with clearly defined policy through  regulation or other guidance to help ensure that executive branch  agencies use appropriate and consistent criteria when determining if  positions require a security clearance. According to Executive Order  13467, issued in June 2008, the DNI, as the Security Executive Agent, is  responsible for developing uniform policies and procedures to ensure the  effective, efficient, and timely completion of investigations and  adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for access to  classified information or to hold a sensitive position. Further, the order  states that agency heads shall assist the Performance Accountability  Council and Executive Agents in carrying out any function under the  order, as well as implementing any policies or procedures developed  pursuant to the order. Although agency heads retain the flexibility to make  determinations regarding which positions in their agency require a  security clearance, the DNI, in its capacity as Security Executive Agent, is  well positioned to provide guidance to help align the personnel security  clearance process.
Determining the requirements of a federal position includes assessing  both the risk and sensitivity level associated with a position, which  includes consideration of whether that position requires access to  classified information and, if required, the level of access. Security  clearances are generally categorized into three levels of access: top  secret, secret, and confidential. The level of classification denotes the  degree of protection required for information and the amount of damage  that unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause to  national defense or foreign relations.
section_title: OPM Has Developed a Tool to Help Agencies Determine the Proper Sensitivity Level for Most Federal Positions; However the Tool Was Not Developed with Input from the DNI
paragraphs: In the absence of clearly defined guidance to help ensure that executive  branch agencies use appropriate and consistent criteria when  determining if positions require a personnel security clearance, agencies  are using an OPM-designed tool to determine the sensitivity and risk  levels of civilian positions which, in turn, inform the type of investigation  needed. We reported in July 2012 that in order to assist with position  designation, the Director of OPM—the Executive Agent for Suitability— has developed a process that includes a position designation system and  corresponding automated tool to guide agencies in determining the  proper sensitivity level for the majority of federal positions. This tool— namely, the Position Designation of National Security and Public Trust  Positions—enables a user to evaluate a position’s national security and  suitability requirements so as to determine a position’s sensitivity and risk  levels, which in turn dictate the type of background investigation that will  be required for the individual who will occupy that position.
In most agencies outside the Intelligence Community, OPM conducts the  background investigations for both suitability and security clearance  purposes. The tool does not directly determine whether a position  requires a clearance, but rather helps determine the sensitivity level of the  position. The determination to grant a clearance is based on whether a  position requires access to classified information and, if access is  required, the responsible official will designate the position to require a  clearance.
OPM developed the position designation system and automated tool for  multiple reasons. First, OPM determined through a 2007 initiative that its  existing regulations and guidance for position designation were complex  and difficult to apply, resulting in inconsistent designations. As a result of  a recommendation from the initiative, OPM created a simplified position  designation process in 2008. Additionally, OPM officials noted that the  tool is to support the goals of the security and suitability reform efforts,  which require proper designation of national security and suitability  positions.
OPM first introduced the automated tool in November 2008, and issued  an update of the tool in 2010. In August 2010, OPM issued guidance      (1) recommending all agencies that request OPM background  investigations use the tool, and (2) requiring agencies to use the tool for  all positions in the competitive service, positions in the excepted service  where the incumbent can be noncompetitively converted to the  competitive service, and career appointments in the Senior Executive  Service. Both DOD and DHS components use the tool. In addition, DOD  issued guidance in September 2011 and August 2012 requiring its  personnel to use OPM’s tool to determine the proper position sensitivity  designation. A DHS instruction requires personnel to designate all DHS  positions—including positions in the DHS components—by using OPM’s  position sensitivity designation guidance, which is the basis of the tool.  Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) officials told us that  they believe OPM’s tool is useful for determining a position’s sensitivity  level. However, although the DNI was designated as the Security  Executive Agent in 2008, ODNI officials noted that the DNI did not have  input into recent revisions of OPM’s position designation tool.
This lack of coordination for revising the tool exists, in part, because the  execution of the roles and relationships between the Director of OPM and  the DNI as Executive Agents are still evolving, although Executive Order  13467 defines responsibilities for each Executive Agent. Accordingly, we  found in July 2012 that the Director of OPM and the DNI had not fully  collaborated in executing their respective roles in the process for  determining position designations. For example, OPM has had long- standing responsibility for establishing standards with respect to suitability  for most federal government positions. Accordingly, the sections of the  tool to be used for evaluating a position’s suitability risk level are  significantly more detailed than the sections designed to aid in  designating the national security sensitivity level of the position. While  most of OPM’s position designation system, which is the basis of the tool,  is devoted to suitability issues, only two pages are devoted to national  security issues. Moreover, OPM did not seek to collaborate with the DNI  when updating the tool in 2010.
During our review completed in 2012, human capital and security officials  from DOD and DHS and the selected components we examined affirmed  that they were using the existing tool to determine the sensitivity level  required by a position. However, in the absence of clearly defined policy  from the DNI and the lack of collaborative input into the tool’s design,  officials explained that they sometimes had difficulty in using the tool to  designate the sensitivity level of national security positions.
OPM regularly conducts audits of its executive branch customer agency  personnel security and suitability programs, which include a review of  position designation to assess the agencies’ alignment with OPM’s  position designation guidance. In the audit reports we obtained as part of  our 2012 review, OPM found examples of inconsistency between agency  position designation and OPM guidance, both before and after the  implementation of OPM’s tool. For instance, prior to the implementation of  the tool, in a 2006 audit of an executive branch agency, OPM found that  its sensitivity designations differed from the agency’s designation in 13 of  23 positions.
More recently, after the implementation of the tool, in an April 2012 audit  of a DOD agency, OPM assessed the sensitivity levels of 39 positions,  and OPM’s designations differed from the agency’s designations in 26 of  those positions. In the April 2012 report, the DOD agency agreed with  OPM’s recommendations related to position designation, and the audit  report confirmed that the agency had submitted evidence of corrective  action in response to the position designation recommendations. OPM  provided us with the results of 10 audits that it had conducted between  2005 and 2012, and 9 of those audit reports reflected inconsistencies  between OPM position designation guidance and determinations of  position sensitivity conducted by the agency. OPM officials noted,  however, that they do not have the authority to direct agencies to make  different designations because Executive Order 10450 provides agency  heads with the ultimate responsibility for designating which positions are  sensitive positions. ODNI conducted a separate position designation audit  in response to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. In  that 2011 report, ODNI found that the processes the executive branch  agencies followed differed somewhat depending whether the position was  civilian, military, or contractor.
During the course of our 2012 review, DOD and DHS officials raised  concerns regarding the guidance provided through the tool and  expressed that they had difficulty implementing it. Specifically, officials  from DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement stated that the  use of the tool occasionally resulted in inconsistency, such as over- or  underdesignating a position, and expressed a need for additional clear,  easily interpreted guidance on designating national security positions.  DOD officials stated that they have had difficulty implementing the tool  because it focuses more on suitability than security, and the national  security aspects of DOD’s positions are of more concern to them than the  suitability aspects.
Further, an official from DOD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  for Personnel and Readiness stated that the tool and DOD policy do not  always align and that the tool does not cover the requirements for some  DOD positions. For example, DOD’s initial implementing guidance on  using the tool stated that terms differ between DOD’s personnel security  policy and the tool, and the tool might suggest different position sensitivity  levels than DOD policy required. Also, officials from the Air Force  Personnel Security Office told us that they had challenges using the tool  to classify civilian positions, including difficulty in linking the tool with Air  Force practices for position designation. Moreover, an Air Force official  stated a concern that the definition for national security positions is  broadly written and could be considered to include all federal positions.
Because we found that the executive branch had not provided clear  guidance for the designation of national security positions, we  recommended that the DNI, in coordination with the Director of OPM and  other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue clearly defined  policy and procedures for federal agencies to follow when determining if  federal civilian positions require a security clearance. In written comments  on our July 2012 report, the ODNI concurred with this recommendation  and agreed that executive branch agencies require simplified and uniform  policy guidance to assist in determining appropriate sensitivity  designations.
We routinely monitor the status of agency actions to address our prior  report recommendations. As part of that process, we found that a January  25, 2013 presidential memo authorized the DNI and OPM to jointly issue  revisions to part 732 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which  is intended to provide requirements and procedures for the designation of  national security positions. Subsequently, ODNI and OPM drafted the  proposed regulation, published it in the Federal Register on May 28,  2013, and obtained public comment on the regulation through June 27,  2013. ODNI and OPM officials told us they plan to jointly adjudicate public  comments and prepare the final regulation for approval from OMB during  October 2013.
In reviewing the proposed regulation, we found that it would, if finalized in  its current form, meet the intent of our recommendation to issue clearly  defined policy and procedures for federal agencies to follow when  determining if federal civilian positions require a security clearance.  Specifically, the proposed regulation appears to add significant detail  regarding the types of duties that would lead to a critical-sensitive  designation, or those national security positions which have the potential  to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security. Critical- sensitive positions detailed in the proposed regulation include positions  that develop or approve war plans, major or special military  operations, or critical and extremely important items of war, involve national security policy-making or policy-determining positions, with investigative duties, including handling of completed counter- intelligence or background investigations, having direct involvement with diplomatic relations and negotiations,  in which the occupants have the ability to independently damage  public health and safety with devastating results, and in which the occupants have the ability to independently compromise  or exploit biological select agents or toxins, chemical agents, nuclear  materials, or other hazardous materials, among several others.
Further, we also recommended in 2012 that once clear policy and  procedures for position designation are issued, the DNI and the Director  of OPM should collaborate in their respective roles as Executive Agents  to revise the position designation tool to reflect that guidance. ODNI  concurred with this recommendation in its written comments on our report  and stated that it planned to work with OPM and other executive branch  agencies to develop a position designation tool that provides detailed  descriptions of the types of positions where the occupant could bring  about a material adverse impact to national security due to the duties and  responsibilities of that position. OPM also concurred with this  recommendation, stating that it was committed to revising the tool after  revisions to position designation regulations are complete.
The proposed revisions to part 732 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal  Regulations appeared in the Federal Register, but have not yet been  issued, and we recommended that the position designation tool be  revised once policies and procedures for position designation are issued.  We note that the proposed regulation states that OPM issues, and  periodically revises, a Position Designation System, which describes in  greater detail agency requirements for designating positions that could  bring about a material adverse effect on the national security. Further, the  proposed regulation would require that agencies use OPM’s Position  Designation System to designate the sensitivity level of each position  covered by the regulation.
As part of our ongoing processes to monitor agency actions in response  to our recommendations, ODNI and OPM officials told us that actions  were underway to revise the tool. For example, officials stated that an  interagency working group had been established to oversee the updates  to the current tool, while also determining the way forward to creating a  new tool, and that officials were developing a project plan to guide the  revision process. We plan to continue to review OPM guidance on the  Position Designation System and to review steps taken by OPM and the  DNI to revise the associated position designation tool to determine if the  revised regulation and actions taken to revise the tool meet the intent of  our recommendation.
section_title: The Executive Branch Does Not Have a Process for Periodically Reviewing and Validating Existing Security Clearance Designations for Civilian Positions
paragraphs: In July 2012, we reported that the executive branch did not have a  consistent process for reviewing and validating existing security clearance  requirements for federal civilian positions. According to Executive Order  12968, the number of employees that each agency determines is eligible  for access to classified information shall be kept to the minimum required,  and, subject to certain exceptions, eligibility shall be requested or granted  only on the basis of a demonstrated, foreseeable need for access.  Additionally, Executive Order 12968 states that access to classified  information shall be terminated when an employee no longer has a need  for access, and that requesting or approving eligibility for access in  excess of the actual requirements is prohibited.
Also, Executive Order 13467 authorizes the DNI to issue guidelines or  instructions to the heads of agencies regarding, among other things,  uniformity in determining eligibility for access to classified information.  However, we reported in 2012 that the DNI had not issued policies and  procedures for agencies to periodically review and revise or validate the  existing clearance requirements for their federal civilian positions to  ensure that clearances are 1) kept to a minimum and 2) reserved only for  those positions with security clearance requirements that are in  accordance with the national security needs of the time. Position  descriptions not only identify the major duties and responsibilities of the  position, but they also play a critical role in an agency’s ability to recruit,  develop, and retain the right number of individuals with the necessary  skills and competencies to meet its mission. Position descriptions may  change, as well as the national security environment as observed after  September 11, 2001.
During our 2012 review of several DOD and DHS components, we found  that officials were aware of the requirement to keep the number of  security clearances to a minimum but were not always subject to a  standard requirement to review and validate the security clearance needs  of existing positions on a periodic basis. We found, instead, that agencies’  policies provide for a variety of practices for reviewing the clearance  needs of federal civilian positions. In addition, agency officials told us that  their policies are implemented inconsistently. DOD’s personnel security  regulation and other guidance provides DOD components with criteria to  consider when determining whether a position is sensitive or requires  access to classified information, and some DOD components also have  developed their own guidance. For example, we found that:
An Air Force Instruction requires commanders to review all military  and civilian position designations annually to ensure proper level of  access to classified information.
The Army issued a memorandum in 2006 that required an immediate  review of position sensitivity designations for all Army civilian positions  by the end of the calendar year and requires subsequent reviews  biennially. That memorandum further states that if a review warrants  a change in position sensitivity affecting an individual’s access to  classified information, then access should be administratively adjusted  and the periodic reinvestigation submitted accordingly. However,  officials explained that improper position sensitivity designations  continue to occur in the Army because they have a limited number of  personnel in the security office relative to workload, and they only spot  check clearance requests to ensure that they match the level of  clearance required.
Officials from DOD’s Washington Headquarters Services told us that  they have an informal practice of reviewing position descriptions and  security designations for vacant or new positions, but they do not  have a schedule for conducting periodic reviews of personnel security  designations for already-filled positions.
According to DHS guidance, supervisors are responsible for ensuring that  (1) position designations are updated when a position undergoes major  changes (e.g., changes in missions and functions, job responsibilities,  work assignments, legislation, or classification standards), and               (2) position security designations are assigned as new positions are  created. Some components have additional requirements to review  position designation more regularly to cover positions other than those  newly created or vacant. For example,
U.S. Coast Guard guidance states that hiring officials and  supervisors should review position descriptions even when there is no  vacancy and, as appropriate, either revise or review them.
According to officials in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,  supervisors are supposed to review position descriptions annually  during the performance review process to ensure that the duties and  responsibilities on the position description are up-to-date and  accurate. However, officials stated that U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement does not have policies or requirements in place to  ensure any particular level of detail in that review.
Some of the components we met with as part of our 2012 review were, at  that time, in the process of conducting a onetime review of position  designations. In 2012, Transportation Security Administration officials  stated that they reevaluated all of their position descriptions during the  last 2 years because the agency determined that the re-evaluation of its  position designations would improve operational efficiency by ensuring  that positions were appropriately designated by using OPM’s updated  position designation tool. Further, those officials told us that they review  position descriptions as positions become vacant or are created. Between  fiscal years 2010 and 2011, while the Transportation Security  Administration’s overall workforce increased from 61,586 to 66,023, the  number of investigations for top secret clearances decreased from 1,483  to 1,127.
Conducting background investigations is costly. The federal government  spent over $1 billion to conduct background investigations in fiscal year  2011. Furthermore, this does not include the costs for the adjudication or  other phases of the personnel security clearances process. DOD and  DHS officials acknowledged that overdesignating a position can result in  expenses for unnecessary investigations. When a position is  overdesignated, additional resources are unnecessarily spent conducting  the investigation and adjudication of a background investigation that  exceeds agency requirements.
Specifically, the investigative workload for a top secret clearance is about  20 times greater than that of a secret clearance because it must be  periodically reinvestigated twice as often as secret clearance  investigations (every 5 years versus every 10 years) and requires 10  times as many investigative staff hours. The fiscal year 2014 base price  for an initial top secret clearance investigation conducted by OPM is  $3,959 and the cost of a periodic reinvestigation is $2,768. The base  price of an investigation for a secret clearance is $272. If issues are  identified during the course of an investigation for a secret clearance,  additional costs may be incurred.
Agencies employ varying practices because the DNI has not established  a requirement that executive branch agencies consistently review and  revise or validate existing position designations on a recurring basis.  Such a recurring basis could include reviewing position designations  during the periodic reinvestigation process. Without a requirement to  consistently review, revise, or validate existing security clearance position  designations, executive branch agencies—such as DOD and DHS—may  be hiring and budgeting for both initial and periodic security clearance  investigations using position descriptions and security clearance  requirements that do not reflect national security needs. Finally, since  reviews are not being done consistently, DOD, DHS, and other executive  branch agencies cannot have reasonable assurance that they are  keeping to a minimum the number of positions that require security  clearances on the basis of a demonstrated and foreseeable need for  access.
Therefore, we recommended in July 2012 that the DNI, in coordination  with the Director of OPM and other executive branch agencies as  appropriate, issue guidance to require executive branch agencies to  periodically review and revise or validate the designation of all federal  civilian positions. In written comments on that report, the ODNI concurred  with this recommendation and stated that as duties and responsibilities of  federal positions may be subject to change, it planned to work with OPM  and other executive branch agencies to ensure that position designation  policies and procedures include a provision for periodic reviews. OPM  stated in its written comments to our report that it would work with the DNI  on guidance concerning periodic reviews of existing designations, once  pending proposed regulations are finalized.
ODNI and OPM are currently in the process of finalizing revisions to the  position designation federal regulation. As part of our ongoing processes  to routinely monitor the status of agency actions to address our prior  recommendations, we note that the proposed regulation would newly  require agencies to conduct a one-time reassessment of position  designations within 24 months of the final regulation’s effective date,  which is an important step towards ensuring that the current designations  of national security positions are accurate. However, the national security  environment and the duties and descriptions of positions may change  over time, thus the importance of periodic review or validation. The  proposed regulation does not appear to require a periodic reassessment  of positions’ need for access to classified information as we  recommended. We believe this needs to be done and, as part of  monitoring the status of our recommendation, we will continue to review  the finalized federal regulation and any related guidance that directs  position designation to determine whether periodic review or validation is  required.
In conclusion, the correct designation of national security positions is a  critical first step for safeguarding national security and preventing  unnecessary and costly background investigations. We are encouraged  that in response to our recommendations, ODNI and OPM have drafted a  revised federal regulation and plan to jointly address comments and  finalize these regulations. We will continue to monitor the outcome of the  final federal regulation as well as other agency actions to address our  remaining recommendations.
Chairman Tester, Ranking Member Portman, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to answer any questions that you or the other Members of the  Subcommittee may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgement
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Brenda S.  Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, who may be  reached at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to  this testimony include Lori A. Atkinson (Assistant Director), Renee Brown,  Sara Cradic, Jeffrey Heit, Erik Wilkins-McKee, Suzanne M. Perkins, and  Michael Willems.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Personnel Security Clearances: Opportunities Exist to Improve Quality  Throughout the Process. GAO-14-186T. Washington, D.C.: November  13, 2013.
Personnel Security Clearances: Full Development and Implementation of  Metrics Needed to Measure Quality of Process. GAO-14-157T.  Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2013.
Personnel Security Clearances: Further Actions Needed to Improve the  Process and Realize Efficiencies. GAO-13-728T. Washington, D.C.: June  20, 2013.
Managing for Results: Agencies Should More Fully Develop Priority Goals  under the GPRA Modernization Act. GAO-13-174. Washington, D.C.:  April 19, 2013.
Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for  Determining Civilian Position Requirements. GAO-12-800. Washington,  D.C.: July 12, 2012.
Personnel Security Clearances: Continuing Leadership and Attention Can  Enhance Momentum Gained from Reform Effort. GAO-12-815T.  Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2012.  2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and  Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue.  GAO-12-342SP. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.
Background Investigations: Office of Personnel Management Needs to  Improve Transparency of Its Pricing and Seek Cost Savings.  GAO-12-197. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.
GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington,  D.C.: February 17, 2011.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February  16, 2011.
Personnel Security Clearances: Overall Progress Has Been Made to  Reform the Governmentwide Security Clearance Process. GAO-11-232T.  Washington, D.C.: December 1, 2010.
Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Improve  Timeliness but Continued Oversight Is Needed to Sustain Momentum.  GAO-11-65. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2010.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations on DOD’s  Progress on Addressing Timeliness and Quality Issues. GAO-11-185T.  Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2010.
Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy and  Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide  Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process. GAO-10-117T.  Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2009.
Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Reduce  Delays but Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain  Reform Efforts. GAO-09-684T. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2009.
Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is  Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process.  GAO-09-488. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting,  Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed  to Further Improve the Clearance Process. GAO-09-400. Washington,  D.C.: May 19, 2009.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January  2009.
Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint  Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility  Process. GAO-08-1050T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance  Process. GAO-08-776T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.
Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD’s  Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement.   GAO-08-551T. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform  Security Clearance Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.:  February 27, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its Efforts  to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel. GAO-08-470T.  Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable  More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.:  February 13, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation  Found for Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17,  2007.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January  2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to  Improve the Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-1070. Washington,  D.C.: September 28, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of  Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments  Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington,  D.C.: May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain.   GAO-06-233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles  Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk  Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January  2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to  Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for  Industry Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004.
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