Border Security: DHS's Visa Security Program Needs to Improve Performance Evaluation and Better Address Visa Risk Worldwide
Published: 2011-03-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 2003, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Visa Security Program (VSP) has participated in the visa process by reviewing applications at some embassies and consulates, with the intention of preventing individuals who pose a threat from entering the United States. The attempted bombing of an airline on December 25, 2009, renewed concerns about the security of the visa process and the effectiveness of the VSP. For this report GAO assessed (1) the ability of DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to measure the program's objectives and performance, (2) challenges to VSP operations, and (3) ICE efforts to expand the VSP program. To evaluate the VSP, we reviewed VSP data, guidance, and the ICE's 5-year expansion plan. We also interviewed ICE officials, and observed VSP operations at 6 posts overseas.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: ICE cannot accurately assess progress toward its VSP objectives. ICE outlined three primary objectives of the VSP--identifying and counteracting potential terrorist threats from entering the United States, identifying not-yet-known threats, and maximizing law enforcement and counterterrorism value of the visa process--and established performance measures intended to assess VSP performance, including situations where VSP agents provide information that results in a consular officer's decision to deny a visa. ICE's VSP tracking system, used to collect data on VSP activities, does not gather comprehensive data on all the performance measures needed to evaluate VSP mission objectives. In addition, data collected by ICE on VSP activities were limited by inconsistencies. ICE upgraded its VSP tracking system in April 2010 to collect additional performance data, but the system still does not collect data on all the performance measures. Therefore, ICE's ability to comprehensively evaluate the performance of the VSP remains limited. While ICE can provide some examples demonstrating the success of VSP operations, ICE has not reported on the progress made toward achieving all VSP objectives. Several challenges to the implementation of the VSP affected operations overseas. DHS and the Department of State (State) have issued some guidance, including several memorandums of understanding, to govern VSP operations. However, some posts experienced difficulties because of the limited guidance regarding interactions between State officials and VSP agents, which has led to tensions between the VSP agents and State officials at some posts. In addition, most VSP posts have not developed standard operating procedures for VSP operations, leading to inconsistency among posts. Additionally, the mandated advising and training of consular officers by VSP agents varies from post to post, and at some posts consular officers received no training. Finally, VSP agents perform a variety of investigative and administrative functions beyond their visa security responsibilities that sometimes slow or limit visa security activities, and ICE does not track this information in the VSP tracking system, making it unable to identify the time spent on these activities. In 2007, ICE developed a 5-year expansion plan for the VSP, but ICE has not fully followed or updated the plan. For instance, ICE did not establish 9 posts identified for expansion in 2009 and 2010. Furthermore, the expansion plan states that risk analysis is the primary input to VSP site selection, and ICE, with input from State, ranked visa-issuing posts by visa risk, which includes factors such as the terrorist threat and vulnerabilities present at each post. However, 11 of the top 20 high-risk posts identified in the expansion plan are not covered by the VSP. Furthermore, ICE has not taken steps to address visa risk in high-risk posts that do not have a VSP presence. Although the expansion of the VSP is limited by a number of factors, such as budgetary limitations or limited embassy space, ICE has not identified possible alternatives that would provide the additional security of VSP review at those posts that do not have a VSP presence. GAO made several recommendations designed to address weaknesses we identified in the VSP. DHS concurred with the recommendations that the VSP provide consular officer training and develop a plan to provide more VSP coverage at high-risk posts. DHS did not concur with the recommendations that the VSP collect comprehensive data on all performance measures and track the time spent on visa security activities. GAO continues to maintain that these recommendations are necessary to accurately assess VSP performance.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since its establishment in 2002, following the September 2001 terrorist  attacks on the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)  has been responsible for the issuance of visa policy. In 2003, DHS  implemented the Visa Security Program (VSP), and has since deployed  DHS officials to certain U.S. embassies and consulates to strengthen the  visa process by working with Department of State (State) officials in  reviewing visa applications. However, the attempted bombing of  Northwest Airlines flight 253 on December 25, 2009, by a Nigerian citizen  in possession of a valid U.S. visa renewed concerns about the security of  the visa process.
In 2005, we reported on VSP activities in Saudi Arabia—at that time, the  only country where DHS had implemented the program—and on the  department’s plans to expand the program to other countries. To help  ensure effective management of the VSP and its expansion, we  recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a strategic  plan that includes, among other things, information on criteria for  selecting locations for expansion. We also recommended that the  Secretary maintain performance data that could be used to assess the  program’s impact at each post. In response to our recommendations,  DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which oversees the  program, developed a 5-year expansion plan and deployed a tracking  system to capture performance data. As of December 2010, ICE had  established VSP units at 19 posts in 15 countries.
In response to your request, this report (1) assesses the ability of DHS to  measure the program’s objectives and performance, (2) identifies potential  challenges to VSP operations overseas, and (3) examines DHS efforts to  expand the VSP program.
To conduct our evaluation, we reviewed relevant legislation, such as the  Homeland Security Act of 2002, and documentation including internal  guidance and interagency memorandums. To assess ICE’s ability to  measure the objectives and performance of the VSP, we reviewed the VSP  mission objectives and performance measures identified by ICE. We also  reviewed data from VSP’s tracking system, and compared the data  collected with the performance measures to identify the ability of ICE to  assess its performance and progress toward the identified objectives. To  evaluate the challenges to VSP operations, we reviewed the issued  guidance governing the implementation of the VSP. We met with ICE and  State officials in Washington, D.C., and interviewed VSP agents and  consular officials, via telephone and e-mail, at 13 VSP posts that were  operational as of April 2010 to identify some VSP operational challenges.  We also visited six U.S. embassies and consulates with VSP operations to  observe VSP operations. To assess ICE’s efforts to expand the VSP, we  reviewed the VSP 5-year expansion plan and compared the expansion with  the plan. We also reviewed the criteria for the selection of posts identified  for expansion. We also interviewed ICE and State officials regarding the  expansion plan and the challenges of expanding the VSP.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2010 through March  2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Legislative Authority for the Visa Security Program
paragraphs: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established DHS and gave the agency  responsibility for visa policy. Specifically, the act granted DHS the  authority to issue regulations on, administer, and enforce the Immigration  and Nationality Act and other immigration and nationality laws relating to  the functions of U.S. consular officers in connection with the granting and  denial of visas. Section 428 of the act also authorized DHS to immediately  assign personnel to Saudi Arabia to review all visa applications prior to  final adjudication, and authorized DHS to assign officers to other locations  overseas to review visa applications. Section 428 designated the following  functions for DHS officers assigned overseas:  1.  provide expert advice and training to consular officers regarding  specific security threats relating to the adjudication of individual visa  applications or classes of applications, 2.  review visa applications either on the initiative of the employee of the  department or at the request of a consular officer, or other persons  charged with adjudicating such applications, and 3.  conduct investigations with respect to consular matters under the  jurisdiction of the Secretary of Homeland Security.
section_title: Establishment of the Visa Security Program
paragraphs: DHS designated ICE to handle the operational and policy-making  responsibilities outlined in section 428 in January 2004. Subsequently, ICE  established the Office of International Affairs and gave it responsibility for  overseeing the Visa Security Program. Figure 1 shows the organization of  the Visa Security Program within DHS.
section_title: Primary Guidance Governing Visa Security Program Operations
paragraphs: Since the establishment of the Visa Security Program, ICE and State have  issued four primary forms of guidance governing VSP operations overseas:  (1) a 2003 memorandum of understanding (MOU) concerning  implementation of the Homeland Security Act; (2) a 2004 MOU on  administrative aspects of assigning personnel overseas; (3) a 2008 cable  directing State Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) officers, VSP agents,  and the senior consular officer at each post to develop standard operating  procedures; and (4) a 2011 MOU delineating the roles and responsibilities  of VSP agents, consular officers, and diplomatic security officers in daily  operations of VSP at posts overseas.  2003 MOU. In 2003, DHS and State issued a memorandum of  understanding to govern the implementation of section 428. In accordance  with the legislation, the memorandum outlined the following  responsibilities of DHS officers assigned to posts overseas to perform visa  duties:    Advising and training consular officers. DHS employees are to provide  expert advice to consular officers regarding specific security threats  relating to visa adjudication and provide training to consular officers on  terrorist threats and detecting applicant fraud.
Reviewing visa applications. DHS employees have the authority to  review visa applications on their own initiative or at the request of  consular officers, and provide input on or recommend security advisory  opinion requests.
Conducting investigations. DHS employees are authorized to conduct  investigations on consular matters under the jurisdiction of the Secretary  of Homeland Security, as well as conduct and support investigations under  other DHS authorities. 2004 MOU. In 2004, ICE and State signed a MOU on administrative aspects  of assigning personnel overseas. Among other things, this MOU described  administrative support, security, facilities, security awareness training,  and information systems for VSP personnel.  2008 cable. In 2008, State issued a cable in which ICE and State directed  VSP posts to develop standard operating procedures. The cable stated that  these standard operating procedures should include, but not be limited to,    clearance procedures for cables and other correspondence;    dispute resolution practices;    specific coordination procedures among the fraud prevention unit, VSP  agents, and the regional security officer;   procedures for determining case selection;    specific hours of operation and other coordination issues;    stating how electronic reviews will be conducted and documented;    stating how physical reviews will be conducted and documented;    coordination of procedures for handling expedited or exceptional visa    procedures for sharing and documenting applicant information  constituting grounds for ineligibility; and   procedures for VSP applicant interviews and re-interviews.  2011 MOU. On January 11, 2011, ICE and State issued a MOU that explains  the roles, responsibilities, and collaboration of VSP agents, consular  officers, and diplomatic security officers in daily operations of VSP at  posts overseas. The MOU outlines the following, among other things:    general collaboration between ICE and State for VSP operations;  roles and responsibilities of VSP agents and consular officers and routine  interaction between the officers and agents;   development of formal, targeted training and briefings by VSP agents for  consular officers and other U.S. government officials at post;    clarification of the dispute resolution process; and    collaboration between diplomatic security officers and VSP agents on visa  and passport fraud investigations.
section_title: Visa Adjudication Process
paragraphs: The review of visa applications by VSP agents is incorporated into the visa  process at overseas posts where the VSP is located. After consular officers  interview an applicant and review the relevant supporting documentation,  they make a preliminary determination about whether to issue or refuse  the visa or refer the case to Washington for additional security  clearances. The VSP agents screen the applicant information against  DHS’s Treasury Enforcement and Communications System (TECS)  database to identify applicants that potentially match records of  individuals who are known threats to the United States. The VSP age nts  then perform a vetting process on a smaller number of applications, base upon a threat-based targeting plan. During vetting, the VSP agents perf checks against additional law enforcement and other databases, a review the applications and supporting documentation for evidence o fraud or misrepresentation, indicators of potential national security risks,  criminal activity, and potential illegal immigration risks. During the  review, the VSP agents may also consult consular officers and other la enforcement officials as needed. On the basis of these reviews, the VSP agents will either agree with the consular officer’s original decision or  recommend refusal of the visa. The consular officer decides to issue or  deny the visa. a case, a dispute resolution process is started to render a final  determinatio  If the consular section chief and the VSP agents disagre n of the application.
Several other agencies stationed overseas have roles in the visa process.  For example, State regional security officers assist the consular section by  investigating passport and visa fraud detected through the consular  officers’ reviews of visa applications and supporting documents. In  addition, officials from the Federal Bureau of Investigation overseas can  assist consular officers when questions about an applicant’s potential  criminal history arise during adjudication. DHS’s Bureaus of Citizenship  and Immigration Services and Customs and Border Protection have  responsibility for some immigration and border security programs  overseas. For example, consular officers may seek advice from these  officials on issues such as DHS procedures at U.S. ports of entry.
Prior to adjudication, every visa application undergoes biometric and biographic  clearances against several databases, including Facial Recognition, Consular Lookout and  Support System, and Terrorist Screening databases.
section_title: Expansion Plan for the Visa Security Program
paragraphs: ICE’s 5-year plan for expanding the VSP, which ICE released in  consultation with State in 2007, states that global visa risk is substantial  and that the VSP must be expanded in order to mitigate threats identified  through the visa process and to address visa risk. The plan also includes  the following principles to guide the program’s expansion:    concentrate expansion on risk by deploying personnel sooner to the    develop a global capacity by expanding to select high-risk posts in diverse    cover the highest-risk visa activity while incorporating dynamic conditions  such as funding, personnel, and logistical issues such as the availability of  space.
The 5-year plan also includes the following site selection methodology to  inform the expansion process:  Initial quantitative risk analysis. ICE and State developed a list of 216  visa-issuing locations that are ranked according to risk. The underlying  analysis incorporates information on terrorist activity, DHS enforcement  and removals, host government circumstances, corruption, visa activity,  and several other factors.
Interagency and interdepartmental consultation. Throughout the site  selection process, ICE coordinates with State, law enforcement and  intelligence communities, and other components of DHS. This  coordination helps to establish mutual understanding among interested  parties and to inform and refine the decision-making process.
Site assessments. ICE selects a smaller number of locations for on-site  assessments to further improve communication and gather information  about local conditions at post.
Final evaluation and selection. Using all of the information gathered, ICE  makes a final evaluation and selection for new VSP unit locations.
Figure 2 shows a timeline for the establishment of the VSP and the  expansion of the program. As of December 2010, ICE had established VSP  units at 19 posts in 15 countries.
section_title: Visa Security Program Funding
paragraphs: For fiscal years 2007 through 2010, ICE reported that approximately $94  million in appropriated funds was allotted for the Visa Security Program.  Of these amounts, in fiscal years 2009 and 2010, Congress specified that  $6.8 million and $7.3 million, respectively, would remain available for 1  additional year. In fiscal year 2010, the Visa Security Program received  $30.7 million in appropriated funds, and the agency requested $30.7 million  in the fiscal year 2011 budget request.
section_title: ICE Remains Unable to Accurately Measure the Performance of the Visa Security Program
paragraphs: ICE does not maintain comprehensive performance data to accurately  evaluate progress toward all VSP mission objectives. In 2007, ICE outlined  three primary objectives of the Visa Security Program in its 5-year  expansion plan and identified and established performance measures  intended to assess performance toward the stated objectives. However,  the initial VSP tracking system did not gather data on all the performance  measures and mission objectives identified in the VSP expansion plan.  Although ICE upgraded the VSP tracking system in April 2010 to collect  additional performance data, the system still does not collect data on all  the performance measures, hampering ICE’s efforts to comprehensively  evaluate the performance of the VSP. While ICE can provide some  examples demonstrating the success of VSP operations, ICE has not  produced reports identifying the progress made toward achieving VSP  objectives. In addition, data collected by ICE on VSP activities prior to  2010 were limited by inconsistencies.
subsections: section_title: ICE Unable to Accurately Assess the Value of the VSP
paragraphs: From 2003 to 2010, ICE did not maintain comprehensive data on its  identified performance measures to fully assess progress toward VSP  objectives. As we reported in 2005, ICE did not maintain data on VSP  activities in order to assess the program’s performance since its  establishment in 2003. In the fall of 2005, in response to GAO  recommendations, ICE developed a database to track VSP workload and  to serve as a performance management tool. The initial VSP tracking  system, which was operational until 2010, collected information on the  results of the review of visa applications by VSP agents, including tracking  the number of visas screened, the number of visas vetted, and the number  of visas recommended for denial by VSP agents.
While the initial tracking system allowed ICE to track VSP workload and  assist with performance assessment, the VSP did not establish program  objectives until 2007. The Government Performance and Results Act of  1993 requires agencies to develop objective performance goals and report  on their progress. In addition, GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in  the Federal Government state that U.S. agencies should monitor and  evaluate the quality of performance over time. ICE’s 5-year expansion  plan for the VSP, issued in 2007, identified three primary mission  objectives to enhance national security and public safety:  1. identify and counteract threats before they reach the United States, 2. identify not-yet-known threats to homeland security, and 3.  maximize the law enforcement and counterterrorism value of the visa  process.
Furthermore, the expansion plan indicates that the program must measure  its performance and demonstrate the value it contributes to homeland  security, with mechanisms in place to adequately and accurately measure  its performance. ICE identified six categories of performance measures to  assess the progress toward the objectives of the program (see table 1):  The VSP tracks and reports on activities through reports submitted  regularly by VSP agents at overseas posts, through the activities recorded  in the TECS database, and through the VSP tracking system. The VSP  tracking system is used by ICE to monitor and report on performance of  its VSP agents overseas.
While ICE developed a VSP tracking system before the expansion plan  identified the VSP objectives in 2007, ICE did not modify the system to  collect data related to the performance measures and objectives in the  expansion plan. The initial VSP tracking system tracked the results of one  of the six identified performance measures—the number of  recommendations for refusal—and the system did not track the other five  performance measures (see table 1). Furthermore, the initial VSP tracking  system did not collect performance data to evaluate progress toward two  of its overall objectives, identifying not-yet-known threats and maximizing  law enforcement and counterterrorism value.
According to VSP officials, in April 2010, ICE implemented a new data  tracking system intended, among other things, to better track  performance, to better reflect the work performed by the VSP agents  overseas, and to provide management with improved reports to better  evaluate the VSP activities performed overseas. However, the new system  does not collect performance data on three of the measures identified in  the plan: (1) investigations opened or closed and hours spent supporting  investigative activity, (2) consular and other training provided, and (3)  assistance and liaison provided by VSP agents. Furthermore, while ICE  has some information regarding the hours charged to VSP activities at  posts, it cannot accurately determine the time VSP agents spend on non- VSP activities. An ICE official indicated that some activities are recorded  outside of the VSP tracking system. For example, training for consular  officers performed by VSP agents are often included in the weekly reports  submitted to ICE. In addition, some of the liaison activities and assistance  VSP agents provide to local law enforcement is captured in TECS and  other DHS reports, such as search, arrest, and seizure reports. However,  ICE does not track these activities systematically and cannot evaluate the  comprehensive effort of these activities. ICE has requested upgrades to  the VSP tracking system to capture additional data on training and liaison  activities, but according to an ICE official, because of development delays,  the system upgrades are not complete.
section_title: ICE Does Not Produce Reports Evaluating VSP Performance
paragraphs: ICE has reported on the results of some VSP activities, but these reports  do not address all of the VSP performance measures and therefore do not  show progress toward each of the VSP mission objectives. For example,  ICE annual reports and DHS’s performance report for fiscal years 2008 to  2010 address only one of the six VSP performance measures—the number  of visa applications denied because of recommendations from VSP agents.  For example, ICE reported that the VSP recommended refusal of more  than 900 visa applications in fiscal year 2008. ICE has presented some  anecdotal examples of VSP participation in the visa process. For example,  in testimony in 2009, the Assistant Secretary of ICE stated that the review  of a specific visa applicant revealed information that resulted in the denial  of the applicant’s visa on the basis of national security. However, because  these reports do not address all VSP performance measures, they do not  comprehensively show progress toward all of the VSP objectives identified  in the expansion plan.
According to ICE officials, the VSP reviews monthly statistical reports on  the activities performed by the VSP agents at each post, which allows  management to identify discrepancies in the VSP activities and eliminate  potential errors in the system. According to ICE, reports and information  from the VSP tracking system are routinely used to inform budget  decisions as well as other resource decisions including permanent and  temporary duty staffing of VSP posts.
section_title: VSP Data Collected at Posts Have Not Been Reliable
paragraphs: VSP data collected through the initial tracking system are significantly  limited by inconsistencies. As we reported in 2005, ICE had not maintained  measurable data to fully demonstrate the impact of VSP agents on the visa  process.
We have reported that for agencies to be able to assess progress toward  performance goals, the performance measures, and the quality of the data  supporting those measures, must be reliable and valid. Our analysis of  VSP data collected at posts in fiscal years 2007 to 2010 identified  significant limitations to the data’s reliability. For example, at one post the  data recorded for the category “sum of post-adjudication: vetted” rose  from 1,630 applications in fiscal year 2007 to 28,856 in fiscal year 2008, and  then decreased to 2,754 in fiscal year 2009. In addition, another post  recorded in fiscal year 2007 that VSP agents screened and vetted over  13,000 applicants that received security advisory opinions, but recorded  zero applicants in the security advisory opinion categories in any  subsequent year. ICE officials indicated that ICE did not provide guidance  to the VSP agents on the proper use of the tracking system, which likely  resulted in inconsistent use of the system. Furthermore, according to an  ICE official, the accuracy of the data in the tracking system is contingent  upon VSP agents at post entering the data and using the system  consistently across all posts. ICE officials acknowledged that turnover of  VSP agents at many posts likely resulted in inconsistent use of the tracking  system.
section_title: Several Challenges Affect Visa Security Operations Overseas
paragraphs: The Visa Security Program faces several key challenges in implementing  operations at overseas posts. First, limited guidance from headquarters  regarding VSP operations has led to confusion and inconsistency among  posts. Both VSP and consular officials indicated that ICE and State have  issued limited official guidance about how VSP agents, consular officers,  and DS officials should interact with one another at post or resolve  disputes concerning specific visa applications. Second, VSP agents’  advising and training of consular officers, as mandated by section 428 of  the Homeland Security Act, varies from post to post, and some posts  provided no training to consular officers. Third, VSP agents perform a  variety of investigative and administrative functions beyond their visa  security responsibilities, including criminal investigations, attaché  functions, and regional responsibilities. Fourth, ICE’s use of 30-day  temporary duty assignments has created challenges and affected  continuity of operations at some posts. Last, ICE does not provide  language or country-specific training for its agents serving overseas,  thereby limiting agents’ ability to conduct interviews and coordinate with  host country officials.
subsections: section_title: VSP and Consular Interaction Has Been Difficult at Some Posts, and ICE Has Provided Limited Guidance for Such Interaction
paragraphs: Some VSP posts reported difficulties in the interactions between VSP  agents and consular officers at post, and ICE and State had provided  limited guidance in this regard. During our visits to several posts in 2010,  both VSP agents and consular officers at several posts we visited indicated  that difficulties arose from confusion surrounding the VSP-consular  relationship. For example, a consular official at one post stated that he  does not know how to interact with the VSP agents or what to do with the  information VSP agents provide on visa applicants, particularly when that  information is insufficient to render an applicant ineligible for a visa. This  official suggested State’s Visa Office provide yearly guidance on the VSP- consular relationship and instructions on how to use information from the  VSP tracking system reports. At another post, disagreement over how the  consular section should share information with law enforcement agencies  at post led to significant tension between VSP agents and DS officials. One  consular official at this post stated that tension between VSP agents and  DS officials at post sometimes prevents the consular section from  receiving information in a timely manner. At a third post, the Consular  Chief stated that VSP agents and consular officials rarely interacted with  one another and that visa applications sometimes “disappeared” in the  VSP unit. Consular officers at this post stated they did not understand the  VSP’s mission.
ICE had issued limited guidance for VSP-consular interaction. ICE  guidance, including the 2003 joint DHS-State MOU and the 2008 cable,  does not explicitly address VSP-consular interaction at posts. The 2003  MOU states that DHS, in consultation with State, will develop policies and  procedures for DHS employees’ overseas functions, but does not detail  such policies. The 2008 cable directs VSP posts to develop standard  operating procedures for a number of operational areas requiring  interaction among VSP, consular officers, and DS officials, such as chain  of command, dispute resolution practices, specific coordination  procedures between VSP agents and State officials at post, and case  selection procedures. However, the cable does not include guidelines for  such procedures. The most recent ICE-State MOU, issued in January 2011,  addresses roles, responsibilities, and collaboration at VSP posts abroad.  Specifically, the new MOU provides additional information on routine  interaction between VSP agents and consular officers at post. For  example, it indicates that interviewing officers can request VSP screening  prior to an interview, VSP can request cases to be put on hold for  additional investigation, and the consular chief may ask VSP to expedite  cases.
section_title: Most VSP Posts Have Not Developed Standard Operating Procedures
paragraphs: Most of the VSP posts had not developed written standard operating  procedures as recommended by the 2008 ICE-State cable. Two of the 13  posts had developed written standard operating procedures, but those  procedures did not include all of the components identified in the 2008  cable. Nine of the 13 consular sections and 13 of 13 VSP units reported  having developed informal standard operating procedures, but the scope  and content of these procedures varied widely. VSP agents at 1 post told  us that they were waiting for the issuance of the 2011 MOU before  developing standard operating procedures and hoped that the MOU would  provide additional operational guidance. At 1 post, VSP agents said that  they had declined to develop standard operating procedures with the  consular section and told consular officials that headquarters did not want  them to develop “post-specific” standard operating procedures.
The 2008 cable issued by ICE and State—intended to address consular  concerns about the VSP, according to VSP officials—recommends that  VSP posts develop standard operating procedures. The 2008 cable also  directs regional security officers and VSP agents to work with consular  officers to establish post-specific procedures to manage fraud  investigations that comply with the 2003 MOU. However, VSP officials told  us that they later instructed VSP agents to postpone development of post- specific standard operating procedures pending completion of the new  MOU with State. The 2011 MOU states that ICE and State may develop  post-specific standard operating procedures or other agreements  regarding VSP operations, adding that these procedures may further  refine, but must remain consistent with, the roles, responsibilities, and  collaboration described in previous guidance.
At posts that had developed standard operating procedures, consular  officers stated that these procedures had improved the VSP-consular  relationship. For example, a VSP agent at 1 post developed standard  operating procedures with both the consular section and DS officials. The  standard operating procedures at this post address the timing of VSP  screening and vetting activities, how much time those activities will take,  and points of contact in each agency. One VSP agent at this post described  the process of developing these standard operating procedures as  “painless,” and the Consular Chief at post indicated that the VSP agents’  reviews of visa applications were helpful because they provided a second  review of visa applicants. In addition, a State official at another post that  had developed standard operating procedures stated that having written  guidance is crucial to a good relationship and valuable for new consular  officers.
section_title: Advising and Training Performed by VSP Agents Varies among Posts
paragraphs: Although the Homeland Security Act requires DHS to advise and train  consular officers, VSP agents’ training and advising of consular officers  varies among posts. Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act directs VSP  agents to provide “expert advice and training to consular officers  regarding specific security threats relating to the adjudication of individual  visa applications or classes of applications.” In addition, the 2003 and 2011  MOUs also state that VSP agents will provide training to consular officers.
Five of the 13 consular sections we interviewed stated that they had  received no training from the VSP agents in the last year, and none of the  VSP agents we interviewed reported providing training on specific security  threats. At posts where VSP agents provided formal training for consular  officers, topics covered included fraudulent documents, immigration law,  human smuggling, and interviewing techniques. In addition, 6 of the 13  VSP agents interviewed provided introductory briefings to new consular  officers during the past year, but the VSP agents at the other 7 posts did  not provide these briefings. VSP agents at 3 posts stated that they do not  have time to deliver advice and training to consular officers. At 1 post, VSP  agents refused to allow consular officers to observe VSP screening and  vetting activities on the ground that they did not have a law enforcement  “need to know.” At the embassy in Riyadh, consular officers generally  agreed that the VSP agents do not provide advice and training and are not  proactive in developing such programs. Additionally, Riyadh consular  officers stated that the VSP agents do not advise them on the security  situation, current trends, or types of information to collect to assist the  agents.
During our site visits and interviews, consular officers at several posts  stated that they do not understand either the VSP’s mission, or what the  VSP agents do, or what types of information they collect. Officers at 6 of  13 consular sections interviewed requested additional training on the  VSP’s procedures and activities. For example, in Riyadh, consular officers  generally agreed that greater knowledge of VSP activities would inform  their interviews of visa applicants. At 1 post the VSP agents provided  lunchtime briefings on patterns or trends with implications for visa  issuance, as well as an orientation for all new consular officers and allow  consular officers to observe screening and vetting activities. The Consular  Chief at this post stated that the training was very useful to consular  officers and provided a better appreciation for how the VSP operates.
section_title: Guidance for Visa Dispute Resolution Mechanism Has Not Helped Resolve Some VSP-Consular Disagreements
paragraphs: Although ICE and State have developed formal and informal procedures  for resolving disputes about specific visas, both VSP and consular officials  stated that these procedures are sometimes insufficient for resolving such  disputes. Disagreement between VSP and consular officials about specific  visa applications is generally infrequent, and posts usually resolve these  disputes through informal discussions between VSP and consular officials.  However, 4 of 6 posts we visited reported disagreements about specific  visa cases that could not be resolved informally at the post, and that in  some cases, unresolved disputes have led to tension at post.
ICE and State officials told us that the two agencies sometimes have  different interpretations of visa law, such as criteria for ineligibility based  on “fraud or misrepresentation” or “crimes of moral turpitude.” VSP  officials also told us that they sometimes disagree with consular officials  as to what degree of “association” with a terrorist is sufficient to render an  applicant ineligible for a visa. Further, according to State officials, ICE and  State have differing understandings of the VSP’s jurisdiction under the  Homeland Security Act.
Although the 2003 MOU outlines a dispute resolution mechanism, both  ICE and State officials told us in May 2010 that this mechanism is not  sufficient. The 2003 MOU states, “If the chief of section or supervisory  consular officer does not agree that the visa should be refused or revoked,  the post will initiate a request for a security or other advisory opinion and  the DHS employee will be consulted in its preparation.” The MOU goes on  to state that no advisory opinion will be issued thereafter without the full  consultation of State and DHS. However, both VSP and consular officials  told us that this process has not always worked well in practice and that  security advisory opinions sometimes do not result in the resolution of the  dispute. According to ICE and State officials, because the Secretary of  Homeland Security has not delegated authority to refuse visas under  section 428 of the Homeland Security Act, any irreconcilable dispute about  a visa application ultimately must be elevated to the Secretary level for  final resolution. ICE and State officials stated that to supplement this  process, ICE and Consular Affairs officials at headquarters have  sometimes used other informal methods to reach agreement on the  adjudication of a visa. For example, ICE and State tried to resolve  disagreements at the unit chief level when possible.
The 2011 MOU addresses some of these issues by specifying that posts can  raise disputes to the Managing Director of the Visa Office and the Assistant  Director of ICE Homeland Security Investigations–International Affairs  and, subsequently, to the State Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs  and the Director of ICE.
section_title: VSP Agents’ Performance of Nonconsular Activities Sometimes Constrains Visa Security Operations
paragraphs: In some cases, VSP agents’ performance of activities unrelated to visa  security has limited their ability to carry out visa security activities. VSP  agents perform a variety of investigative and administrative functions in  addition to their visa security workload, such as conducting nonconsular  investigations, serving as ICE’s official presence in the region, and  performing the duties of DHS attachés. According to ICE officials, VSP  agents perform non-VSP functions only after completing their visa security  screening and vetting workload. However, both VSP agents and State  officials at some posts told us that these other investigative and  administrative functions sometimes slow or limit VSP agents’ visa security- related activities.
Existing guidance for VSP agents’ performance of other non-VSP functions  is limited. Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act states that one of the  functions of VSP employees assigned to overseas posts is to conduct  investigations with respect to consular matters under the jurisdiction of  the Secretary of Homeland Security. For example, VSP agents may  uncover and follow up on leads as a result of their screening and vetting  activities. While the 2003 MOU between DHS and State states that DHS  employees may conduct investigations with regard to consular matters  under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, those  officials shall not conduct investigations that are within the jurisdiction of  the Bureau of Diplomatic Security or the State Inspector General.  Furthermore, VSP agents have the same position description as other ICE  agents and have the authority to perform a wide range of tasks unrelated  to visa security, including the ability to investigate a wide range of cases  within ICE’s jurisdiction. For example, VSP agents pursue cases related to  bulk cash smuggling or human rights violations. According to ICE officials,  ICE has not issued formal guidance that dictates how VSP agents should  spend their time. ICE officials told us that, in some cases, requests to VSP  agents come directly from other agencies, not from ICE itself. The 2011  MOU states that the primary responsibility of VSP agents is visa security.  However, the 2011 MOU acknowledges that ICE personnel perform  functions of regional or worldwide scope related to the post where they  are assigned and that VSP agents may be called upon to perform other  functions in support of the consulate.
ICE officials told us that, at most Visa Security Program posts, the VSP  units represent the only ICE presence at post, and that some VSP agents  have ICE responsibilities for other countries in the region. ICE officials  told us that VSP agents are frequently tasked with collateral requests to  assist other ICE offices with investigations. For example, as part of an  ongoing investigation into a U.S.-hosted Web site, one VSP agent assisted  in the arrest of two individuals who were producing and distributing child  pornography. VSP agents are also tasked with a variety of attaché  functions, including serving as the liaison between ICE and other U.S.  government agencies. For example, as the only DHS representative in  Saudi Arabia, the VSP in Riyadh is also responsible for supporting the  Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration, official visitors, and  detention and removal operations. In addition, the regional responsibilities  of the VSP agent may require the agent to work on other investigations or  respond to collateral requests in other countries in the region. At one post,  VSP agents told us that these responsibilities were essentially nominal and  involved very little additional work. In Riyadh, these regional  responsibilities involved frequent travel throughout the region to perform  other investigations.
ICE officials told us that agents pursue these other investigations only  after completing Visa Security Program responsibilities. However,  consular officers at some posts told us that these additional investigations  interfered with completion of visa security work and made ICE agents less  available to consular officers. For example, at one post, the VSP agent told  us he was sometimes unable to complete his screening and vetting  activities because of other ICE responsibilities. At another post, VSP  agents worked alongside other ICE agents, and the VSP agent at this post  told us he focused primarily on visa security work. In our interviews, VSP  agents’ estimates of the amount of time spent on nonvisa requests and  investigations ranged from 5 percent to 40 percent. ICE does not track the  time VSP agents spend on both its visa security activities and its nonvisa  requests and investigations. While the VSP expansion plan identifies the  hours spent performing investigations as a performance measure, ICE can  not accurately determine the amount of time that VSP agents spend on  investigative and visa security activities, as its systems do not distinguish  between the time VSP agents and other ICE officials spend on  investigations at post. Furthermore, the VSP tracking system does not  collect data on the time VSP agents spend on visa security activities. ICE  cannot identify the time VSP agents spend on visa security operations or  on the other investigation and attaché functions performed by VSP agents  stationed overseas.
VSP agents’ additional investigations also overlap with consular and DS  investigations at some posts, leading to confusion in the consular section.  According to the 2008 joint ICE-State cable to VSP posts, VSP agents’  responsibility to identify the potential exploitation of the visa process by  terrorists frequently overlaps the responsibilities of consular units  investigating fraud and criminal investigations. According to one State  official, all three units have a general understanding of their respective  jurisdictions but sometimes interpret these jurisdictions differently.  Generally, consular fraud investigations begin with consular officers, who  check for fraudulent documentation and application information. When  consular officers notice organized fraud activity, they refer the case to the  post’s Fraud Prevention Unit. When this organized activity is criminal, the  post’s DS office launches an investigation. When the activity is terrorism- related, the post’s VSP agents investigate. However, some posts we visited  had experienced tension between VSP agents and other law enforcement  agency officials at post. For example, at one post, the VSP agents and DS  officials disagreed about whether the VSP agent had authority and  responsibility to conduct investigations locally. Consular officials at  another post wanted a DS officer to serve as a liaison between VSP and the  consular section. The 2011 MOU describes the types of cases that fall  under the jurisdiction of diplomatic security investigators and VSP agents,  and states that cases that fall under the responsibility of both parties will  require the officials to notify each other.
section_title: Staffing Shortages and Use of Temporary Duty Agents Have Caused Difficulties at Some Posts
paragraphs: Staffing shortages, and a reliance on temporary duty VSP agents to fill  such shortages, have led to difficulties at some posts. Consular officers at  3 of 13 posts we interviewed discussed challenges caused by this use of  temporary duty agents. For example, the VSP unit in Riyadh used two  temporary duty agents per month in fiscal year 2009 and one temporary  duty agent per month in fiscal year 2010. Although ICE officials indicated  that the VSP filled its positions in Riyadh as of December 2010, both VSP  and consular officials stated that this reliance on temporary duty agents  affected continuity of operations. One consular official pointed to a  “severe lack of coverage” for consular operations in Riyadh, because the  unit was not fully staffed and relied on temporary duty agents. Consular  officers stated that agents in Riyadh are rarely available to answer  questions and that the value of these temporary duty agents was limited,  because it took them several weeks of their 30-day tour to learn VSP  policies and procedures. Additionally, consular officers stated that  temporary duty agents’ grounds for recommending refusal of visa  applications were sometimes inconsistent or insufficient. Lack of staff at  VSPs in Jeddah and Dhahran also created delays and forced consular  officers to re-adjudicate cases because VSP agents delayed an application  beyond the point where consular “name checks” of applicants expire.  According to one VSP official, reliance on temporary duty agents limits  continuity of operations at post.
The Visa Security Program’s 5-year plan identified recruitment of qualified  personnel as a challenge and recommended incentives for VSP agents as  critical to the program’s mission, stating, “These assignments present  significant attendant lifestyle difficulties. If the mission is to be  accomplished, ICE, like State, needs a way to provide incentives for  qualified personnel to accept these hardship assignments.” However,  according to ICE officials, ICE has not has not provided incentives to  facilitate recruitment for hardship posts. ICE officials stated that they  have had difficulty attracting agents to Saudi Arabia, and ICE agents at  post told us they have little incentive to volunteer for Visa Security  Program assignments. ICE officials in headquarters stated that  opportunities to gain international experience and earn danger pay are the  primary recruitment incentives for VSP service. Additionally, according to  ICE officials, some hardship posts, such as Riyadh, now allow spouses to  accompany agents during their tour. However, according to an ICE  official, ICE does not offer career and financial incentives for personnel at  hardship posts, such as Washington, D.C.-based locality pay or priority  consideration for onward assignments, which State Foreign Service  Officers receive when posted at the same locations.
section_title: VSP Agents Do Not Receive Language Training, and Additional Training May Be Helpful
paragraphs: VSP agents generally do not receive foreign language training before  deployment overseas. Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act allows  that, to the extent possible, VSP agents shall be provided the necessary  training to enable them to perform their designated functions—reviewing  visa applications, and conducting investigations on consular matters— including training in foreign languages, interview techniques, and fraud  detection techniques, in conditions in the particular country where each  employee is assigned, and in other appropriate areas of study. The 2003  MOU states that DHS training and assignment policies will emphasize  identification or development of personnel with the ability to speak the  host country language and “experience in or knowledge of the host  country and extensive understanding of terrorism or other homeland  security concerns in the host country.” The 2011 MOU states that  whenever practical, VSP staff should receive interagency training and,  prior to deployment, should undergo orientation including, if possible,  appropriate specialized consultations and briefings with Consular Affairs  and Diplomatic Security officers.
ICE provides some training for VSP agents. ICE trains agents for Visa  Security Program duties in a 3-week training course, sponsored by ICE  and two other DHS divisions and conducted three times per year at the  Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. This  training includes, among other things, interview techniques, VSP systems,  document examination, and terrorist trends.
However, ICE does not have a program for language training and has not  established language training as a requirement for VSP agents. To date,  VSP agents at one post have received language training. This was because,  at one post, the Chief of Mission required language training as a condition  for approving the VSP’s request to send personnel to post. According to a  VSP agent who received this training at the start of his deployment,  language skills were “critical” because he was able to interact with host  country law enforcement and conduct interviews. Both the VSP agent and  Consul General at this post recommended that all VSP agents receive  language training. According to ICE officials, ICE’s ability to provide  language training for VSP agents is limited by budgetary constraints.  Because some VSP agents serve 1- or 2-year tours, language training can  be an expensive investment given the amount of time an agent would  actually use this training. ICE officials told us that, when possible, they  deploy ICE agents with existing language skills. ICE also indicated that  self-study language training is available for VSP agents.
According to some consular officers and VSP agents, VSP agents who have  prior experience with immigration law may be better able to advise  consular officers than officers whose training on the subject is limited to  the VSP training course. For example, a consular official at one post stated  that she found VSP agents with backgrounds in the former Immigration  and Naturalization Service to be particularly helpful because they have  extensive expertise on immigration law. All ICE agents receive basic  instruction on immigration law, and ICE provides additional instruction to  its agents during VSP training. One VSP agent stated he was unsure  whether this training would provide sufficient expertise in immigration  law for less experienced agents. VSP agents do not attend State’s Consular  General training at the Foreign Service Institute, although VSP agents and  consular officials at some posts stated that attending such training would  be beneficial. VSP agents at several posts also expressed a desire for more  frequent opportunities to share problems, techniques, and best practices  with headquarters and other VSP units.
section_title: ICE Has Not Fully Adhered to the VSP Expansion Plan
paragraphs: Although ICE developed a plan to expand the VSP to additional high-risk  visa-issuing posts, ICE has not fully adhered to the plan or kept it up to  date. The VSP 5-year expansion plan, developed in 2007, identifies 14 posts  for expansion between 2009 and 2010, but 9 of these locations have not  been established, and ICE has not updated the plan to reflect the current  situation. Furthermore, ICE has not fully addressed remaining visa risk in  high-risk posts that do not have a VSP presence. ICE, with input from  State, developed a list of worldwide visa-issuing posts that are ranked  according to visa risk. Although the expansion plan states that risk  analysis is the primary input to VSP site selection and that the expansion  plan represents an effort to address visa risk, ICE has not expanded the  VSP to some high-risk posts. For example, 11 of the top 20 high-risk posts  identified by ICE and State are not covered by VSP. The expansion of the  VSP may be limited by a number of factors—including budget limitations  and objections from State officials at some posts—and ICE has not  identified possible alternatives that would provide the additional security  of VSP review at those posts that do not have a VSP presence.
subsections: section_title: VSP Expansion Plan Has Not Been Fully Followed or Updated
paragraphs: Although ICE has expanded the VSP to a total of 19 posts in 15 countries,  the agency has not fully followed the 5-year expansion plan. ICE’s plan  identified 14 posts for expansion in 2009 and 2010, but ICE did not  establish VSP units at 9 of these 14 posts. Further, ICE officials stated that  3 locations planned for 2011 may not be opened because of budget  constraints. Moreover, the expansion plan has not been updated since its  release in 2007, although ICE officials said that the expansion plan will be  revised in 2011. In the expansion plan, ICE notes that the locations it  identifies for expansion reflect its best current assessment of the factors  relevant to decision makers and that evolving variables, including changes  in risk and the results of site assessments to determine the feasibility and  timing of deployment, may affect, among other things, the ultimate  selection of locations for VSP expansion. The plan states that ICE will  continue to update its assessment of conditions based on the most current  information and intelligence.
A number of factors have limited the VSP’s expansion and consequently its  coverage of global visa risk. According to ICE officials, expansion of the  VSP has been constrained by budget limitations, difficulties in obtaining  visas to certain countries, State’s mandate to reduce personnel overseas,  and objections from State officials at some posts for reasons such as  limited embassy space and security concerns. For example, space  limitations and security concerns are currently hindering VSP’s expansion  to a high-risk post of interest to ICE officials. The inability to obtain visas  to another country is preventing ICE officials from conducting a  preliminary site assessment at a possible expansion post in that country.
section_title: ICE Has Not Taken Steps to Address Remaining Visa Risk
paragraphs: ICE has not consistently located VSP units at the posts identified as  highest risk and has not ensured VSP coverage for the posts without a VSP  unit, leaving significant gaps in the program’s capacity to address global  visa risk. The VSP expansion plan states that global visa risk is substantial  and that the VSP addresses threats that could exploit the visa process.  ICE, in consultation with State, ranked 216 overseas posts based upon the  visa security risk posed at each location. However, 5 of the 19 established  VSP units are located at posts other than the 50 posts in the top tier, or  critical quartile, of the agencies’ rankings of high-risk posts. One  established location ranks 70th on the list, while another ranks 86th. ICE  officials explained that certain posts were opened to achieve regional  coverage for other ICE activities. Moreover, of the 20 posts identified by  ICE and State as highest risk, 11 do not have a VSP unit.
ICE officials stated that visa risk at posts without a VSP presence is  addressed through the security advisory opinion (SAO) process, which  provides in-depth screening and vetting of certain visa applicants at posts  worldwide, regardless of whether the post has a VSP unit. SAOs are  initiated when an applicant meets certain predefined criteria or when a  consular officer requests an SAO for a specific visa application. Officials  from several agencies, including ICE and State, participate in certain  categories of SAO reviews in Washington, D.C. However, while the SAO  process can mitigate some visa risk at those locations without a VSP unit,  it does not ensure the breadth of coverage provided by VSP agents through  the routine screening and vetting of applicants who are not subjected to  the SAO process.
ICE’s expansion plan does not identify ways in which to address this lack  of VSP coverage at the remaining high-risk posts it identified. However,  ICE officials in headquarters indicated that they have used TECS, the  primary database used by VSP agents to screen and vet visa applicants, to  conduct screening and vetting domestically when a VSP unit at a post  experienced computer problems or temporary personnel shortages. TECS  interfaces with other law enforcement databases can be accessed by ICE  officials. Similarly, one VSP agent stated that agents can perform screening  and vetting for other posts in the event of a computer systems outage. In  addition, ICE officials stated that they are currently developing a system  that will make the screening and vetting process more automated and will  provide information to consular officers in advance of the visa applicant’s  interview and adjudication decision. Further, several ICE and State  officials at post indicated that the screening and vetting of visa applicants  could be performed domestically on a permanent basis.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: The Visa Security Program is intended to build additional security into the  visa process by incorporating a law enforcement function at posts with the  highest risk. However, the program is hampered in its efforts to strengthen  visa security globally. A lack of comprehensive performance data  collected since the establishment of the VSP in 2003 hinders ICE’s ability  to evaluate and report on the extent to which the VSP enhances the  security of the visa process. Although ICE officials state that they have  made improvements to their data tracking systems, the agency cannot  demonstrate the progress of the VSP prior to 2010 toward its stated  objectives of enhancing public safety and national security. Furthermore,  the responsibility of VSP agents to perform investigations unrelated to visa  security may limit their ability to carry out visa security activities, their  primary responsibility, further affecting the relationship with consular  officials, and may limit the VSP’s performance and its ability to enhance  national security and public safety. In addition, the VSP is not contributing  to the visa process at many high-risk posts. As a result, there is a  significant gap in the additional scrutiny that VSP provides in the visa  process among many posts considered to be of high risk. ICE has not  considered other options to strengthen security at those posts where VSP  does not have a physical presence. The VSP will be limited in its goal to  minimize global visa risk until DHS addresses the challenges of guidance,  staffing, and data collection, and provides coverage and support to those  high-risk posts without VSP agents at post.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that the Visa Security Program enhances the security of the visa  process at posts overseas, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland  Security take the following four actions:  1. ensure that the VSP tracking system collects reliable data on all  performance measures, to allow ICE to accurately evaluate VSP  performance and report to Congress on progress toward the VSP  mission objectives;  2. issue guidance requiring VSP agents to provide training for consular  officers as mandated by section 428 of the Homeland Security Act;  3.  develop a mechanism to track the amount of time spent by VSP  agents on visa security activities and other investigations, in order to  determine appropriate staffing levels and resource needs for VSP  operations at posts overseas to ensure visa security operations are  not limited; and  4.  develop a plan to provide VSP coverage at high-risk posts where the  possibility of deploying agents may be limited.
section_title: Agency Comments and our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of our report to DHS and State. DHS provided written  comments about the draft, which are reproduced in appendix II. State did  not provide official comments on the draft. In addition, DHS and State  provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
DHS agreed with our recommendation that the department issue guidance  instructing VSP agents to provide training to consular officers as mandated  by section 428 of the Homeland Security Act. In addition, DHS concurred  with our recommendation that it develop a plan to provide coverage for  posts that lack a VSP presence and indicated that it is taking steps to  address this recommendation.
DHS did not agree with our recommendation that it ensure that the VSP  tracking system collected reliable data on all performance measures. In its  written comments, DHS stated that the VSP currently captures all the  required performance metrics identified in its 5-year expansion plan  through the VSP tracking system and TECS. Although we acknowledge  that ICE is collecting some data on the performance measures identified in  the VSP expansion plan, our analysis showed that the data were not  sufficient to accurately demonstrate the progress made toward the stated  objectives. As we report, the 5-year expansion plan identifies six  performance measures to assess VSP performance. The documents that  ICE provided us indicate that ICE has collected comprehensive data on  three of the performance measures, but not on the three remaining  performance measures. Specifically, ICE did not provide us evidence that  it collected data on the assistance and liaison activities performed by VSP.  Furthermore, although ICE collects some information on the hours that  VSP agents spend on investigations and the training they provided to  consular officials, the VSP tracking system and TECS do not collect  comprehensive data on the activities performed by all of its VSP agents  abroad. Without collecting comprehensive data on the performance  measures identified by ICE, DHS cannot accurately demonstrate progress  toward its stated objectives of enhancing national security. Therefore we  have retained our recommendation.
DHS did not agree with our draft recommendation to issue operational  guidance for VSP posts. DHS stated that the 2011 MOU provides general  guidance for the visa process and the development of standard operating  procedures. We acknowledge that the MOU between ICE and State, signed  on January 11, 2011, clarifies the respective roles and responsibilities of  VSP agents and consular officers at post and states that posts may develop  standard operating procedures that were identified in the 2008 cable.  Therefore, we are removing our draft recommendation from the report.  However, although the 2011 MOU and the 2008 cable provide a basis for  developing effective standard operating procedures, we remain concerned  that, during our review, most posts had not developed these procedures.  Only 2 of 13 posts we contacted had developed standard operating  procedures as recommended in the 2008 cable. At the 2 posts that  developed standard operating procedures, consular officers stated that  procedures had improved the consular-VSP relationship. It is critical for  DHS to encourage posts to develop standard operating procedures to  improve the VSP-consular relationship and strengthen VSP operations at  posts.
DHS also did not agree with our recommendation to develop a mechanism  to track the amount of time that VSP agents spend on visa security  activities and other investigations. DHS states that ICE currently tracks  case investigation hours through TECS, and that adding the metric to the  VSP tracking system would be redundant. DHS’s response does not  address our finding that ICE does not have a mechanism that allows the  agency to track the amount of time VSP agents spend on both investigation  hours and hours spent on visa security activities. Although ICE states that  its system tracks case hours of its agents, we found, based on ICE  documentation, that ICE cannot accurately determine the amount of time  that VSP agents spend on investigative and visa security activities. First,  the reports that ICE provided us show the hours ICE officials spent on  investigative and noninvestigative activities, but do not distinguish  between the hours logged by VSP agents and hours logged by other ICE  officials at posts abroad. During our structured interviews, VSP agents  indicated that the time they spent on activities other than visa security  reviews ranged from 5 to 40 percent. Second, our analysis of the VSP  tracking system, which is intended to track visa-related activities of VSP  agents, identified significant limitations to the reliability of the data. Thus,  ICE does not maintain accurate data on the time VSP agents spend on visa  security activities at posts. The VSP is intended to add additional security  to the visa process through the screening and vetting of visa applications  by experienced law enforcement officers. Without accurate data to  determine the amount of time VSP agents spend on the visa security  activities, ICE will not be able to determine whether the current  allocations of staffing and resources at posts are adequate to carry out the  visa security reviews and thereby fulfill the VSP objective of enhancing  national security and public safety. Therefore, we have not changed our  recommendation.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries of  Homeland Security and State, as well as other interested Members of  Congress. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512-4128  or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  GAO staff who made major contribution to this report are listed in  appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the ability of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to  measure the objectives and performance of the Visa Security Program  (VSP), we reviewed VSP mission objectives and performance measures  identified in Bureau of Immigration and Custom Enforcement’s (ICE) 5- year expansion plan. We reviewed data from the VSP tracking system,  used to collect information on daily VSP activities, and compared the data  collected from the system with the measures and mission objectives  identified in the expansion plan. On the basis of inconsistencies of the data  from the reporting systems prior to 2010 that we identified through our  analysis of the reports and confirmed with ICE officials, we determined  that the data that we received were not sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report. We also reviewed performance reports from DHS  and ICE that included references to the VSP. In addition, we met with ICE  officials in Washington, D.C., who manage the VSP. We also observed VSP  agents at six U.S. embassies and consulates conducting their daily  screening and vetting activities and using the VSP Tracking System.
To identify challenges to the VSP’s capacity to accomplish its goals, we  reviewed the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which authorized DHS to  assign DHS employees to posts overseas to support the visa process  through various functions. We also reviewed documentation including the  2003 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between DHS and the  Department of State (State) governing the implementation of section 428  of the Homeland Security Act; the 2004 administrative MOU; the 2008  cable directing VSP units to develop standard operating procedures; the  2011 MOU explaining the roles, responsibilities, and collaboration of VSP  agents and other officials at posts overseas; VSP’s training curriculum; and  the VSP expansion plan. We met with ICE officials in Washington, D.C.,  who manage the VSP and State officials from the Bureaus of Consular  Affairs and Diplomatic Security. We also visited six U.S. embassies and  consulates with established VSP units where we interviewed and observed  VSP agents, State officials from the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and  Diplomatic Security, and chiefs of mission or deputy chiefs of mission. In  order to allow for post-by-post comparison, we administered a set of  structured interview questions to both the VSP units and consular sections  in person at the six previously mentioned posts and by phone at an  additional seven VSP locations. The five most recently established VSP  posts, as well as one unit that underwent recent personnel turnover, were  not included in our review.
To examine DHS’s efforts to expand the Visa Security Program, we  reviewed relevant documents such as the VSP 5-year expansion plan,  which includes the mission and contributions of the program, criteria for  selecting new expansion posts, cost estimates for establishing and  maintaining VSP posts, and projected budget information. In addition, we  reviewed the ranked list of visa-issuing posts identified by ICE, in  consultation with State. We then compared the expansion plan and the  ranked list of posts with the VSP’s actual expansion between 2005 and  2010. In addition, we reviewed the requests submitted by ICE to overseas  posts for expansion of the program. Our interviews with ICE and State  officials at 13 VSP locations worldwide and in Washington, D.C., also  informed this analysis.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact names above, Anthony Moran (Assistant  Director) and Jeff Miller, Ashley Vaughan, Dave Bieler, Katie Bernet,  Amanda Miller, Mary Moutsos, Sushmita Srikanth, and Brian Egger made  key contributions to this report.