State Department: Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S. Passport Fraud Detection Efforts
Published: 2005-06-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Maintaining the integrity of the U.S. passport is essential to the State Department's efforts to protect U.S. citizens from terrorists, criminals, and others. State issued about 8.8 million passports in 2004. During the same year, State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security arrested about 500 individuals for passport fraud, and about 300 persons were convicted. Passport fraud is often intended to facilitate other crimes, including illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and alien smuggling. GAO examined (1) how passport fraud is committed, (2) what key fraud detection challenges State faces, and (3) what effect new passport examiner performance standards could have on fraud detection.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Using the stolen identities of U.S. citizens is the primary method of those fraudulently applying for U.S. passports. False claims of lost, stolen, or damaged passports and child substitution are among the other tactics used. Fraudulently obtained passports can help criminals conceal their activities and travel with less scrutiny. Concerns exist that they could also be used to help facilitate terrorism. State faces a number of challenges to its passport fraud detection efforts, and these challenges make it more difficult to protect U.S. citizens from terrorists, criminals, and others. Information on U.S. citizens listed in the federal government's consolidated terrorist watch list is not systematically provided to State. Moreover, State does not routinely obtain from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) the names of other individuals wanted by federal and state law enforcement authorities. We tested the names of 67 federal and state fugitives and found that 37, over half, were not in State's Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database for passports. One of those not included was on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted list. State does not maintain a centralized and up-to-date fraud prevention library, hindering information sharing within State. Fraud prevention staffing reductions and interoffice workload transfers resulted in fewer fraud referrals at some offices, and insufficient training, oversight, and investigative resources also hinder fraud detection efforts. Any effect that new passport examiner performance standards may have on State's fraud detection efforts is unclear because State continues to adjust the standards. State began implementing the new standards in January 2004 to make work processes and performance expectations more uniform nationwide. Passport examiner union representatives expressed concern that new numerical production quotas may require examiners to "shortcut" fraud detection efforts. However, in response to union and examiner concerns, State eased the production standards during 2004 and made a number of other modifications and compromises.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our report on the State  Department’s efforts to strengthen U.S. passport fraud detection.
Maintaining the integrity of the U.S. passport is essential to the State  Department’s effort to protect U.S. citizens from terrorists, criminals, and  others. The department issued about 8.8 million passports in fiscal year  2004. Each year, State passport examiners refer tens of thousands of  applications they suspect may be fraudulent to their local fraud prevention  offices. In fiscal year 2004, State’s Diplomatic Security Service arrested  about 500 individuals for passport fraud and about 300 were convicted.  Passport fraud is often intended to facilitate such crimes as illegal  immigration, drug trafficking, and alien smuggling.
Our report addressed three key issues: (1) how passport fraud is  committed, (2) what key challenges State faces in its fraud-detection  efforts, and (3) what effect new passport examiner performance standards  could have on fraud detection. Today I am going to focus my discussion on  the first two issues, and I will also discuss our recommendations to State  and State’s response to them.
For our work on this subject, we reviewed various fraud statistics and  investigative case files maintained by relevant State bureaus and observed  State’s fraud detection efforts at 7 of the 16 domestic passport-issuing  offices. We also tested State’s use of electronic databases for fraud  detection and interviewed officials in various State offices and bureaus  involved in this issue. We conducted our work from May 2004 to March  2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: A U.S. passport is not only a travel document but also an official  verification of the bearer’s origin, identity, and nationality. Under U.S. law,  the Secretary of State has the authority to issue passports. Only U.S.  nationals may obtain a U.S. passport, and evidence of citizenship or  nationality is required with every passport application. Federal regulations  list those who do not qualify for a U.S. passport, including those who are  subjects of a federal felony warrant.
subsections: section_title: State Passport Operations
paragraphs: The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport Services oversees the  Passport Services Office, the largest component of State’s Consular Affairs  Bureau. Passport Services consists of three headquarters offices: Policy  Planning and Legal Advisory Services; Field Operations; and Information  Management and Liaison. Also within Consular Affairs is the Office of  Consular Fraud Prevention, which addresses passport, visa, and other  types of consular fraud; the Consular Systems Division, responsible for the  computer systems involved in passport services and other consular  operations; and the Office for American Citizens Services, which handles  most issues relating to passport cases at overseas posts. The Bureau of  Diplomatic Security is responsible for investigating individual cases of  suspected passport and visa fraud. The State Department Office of the  Inspector General (OIG) also has some authority to investigate passport  fraud.
State operates 16 domestic passport-issuing offices, which employ  approximately 480 passport examiners who approve and issue most U.S.  passports that are printed each year. The number of passports issued by  domestic passport offices has risen steadily in recent years, increasing  from about 7.3 million in fiscal year 2000 to 8.8 million in fiscal year 2004.  Overseas posts deal with a much lower volume of passports by  comparison, handling about 300,000 worldwide in fiscal year 2004.
section_title: Passport Application and Approval Process
paragraphs: The majority of passport applications are submitted by mail or in-person at  one of almost 7,000 passport application acceptance facilities nationwide.  The passport acceptance agents at these facilities are responsible for,  among other things, verifying whether an applicant’s identification  document (such as a driver’s license) actually matches the applicant.
Then, through a process called adjudication, passport examiners  determine whether they should issue each applicant a passport.  Adjudication requires the examiner to scrutinize identification and  citizenship documents presented by applicants to verify their identity and  U.S. citizenship. The passport adjudication process is facilitated by  computer systems, including the Travel Document Issuance System, which  appears on passport examiners’ screens when the adjudication begins and  automatically checks the applicant’s name against several databases.  Figure 1 identifies the key computer databases available to help examiners  adjudicate passport applications and detect potential fraud.
In addition, examiners scrutinize paper documents and other relevant  information during the fraud detection process, watch for suspicious  behavior and travel plans, and request additional identification when they  feel the documents presented are insufficient. When examiners detect  potentially fraudulent passport applications, they send the applications to  their local fraud prevention office for review and potential referral to  State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security for further investigation.
section_title: Identity Theft a Primary Means of Committing Fraud
paragraphs: State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security investigators stated that imposters’  use of assumed identities, supported by genuine but fraudulently obtained  identification documents, was a common and successful way to  fraudulently obtain a U.S. passport. This method accounted for 69 percent  of passport fraud detected in fiscal year 2004. Investigators found  numerous examples of aliens and U.S. citizens obtaining U.S. passports  using a false identity or the documentation of others to hide their true  identity. In one example, in 1997, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Cuba  stole a Lear jet and transported it to Nicaragua. At the time of his arrest in  2003, he was using an assumed identity and possessed both false and  legitimate but fraudulently obtained identification documents, including a  U.S. passport in the name he used while posing as a certified pilot and  illegally providing flight instruction. Seized at his residence when he was  arrested were two Social Security cards, four driver’s licenses, three  Puerto Rican birth certificates, one U.S. passport, one pilot identification  card, numerous credit cards and checking account cards, and items used  to make fraudulent documents. In October 2004, he pled guilty to  knowingly possessing five or more “authentication devices” and false  identification documents, for which he was sentenced to 8 months  confinement. In another case, a man wanted for murdering his wife  obtained a Colorado driver’s license and a passport using a friend’s Social  Security number and date and place of birth. Three and four years later he  obtained renewal and replacement passports, respectively, in the same  assumed identity. He was later arrested and pled guilty to making a false  statement in an application for a passport. He was sentenced to about 7  months time served and returned to California to stand trial for murdering  his wife.
Applicants commit passport fraud through other means, including  submitting false claims of lost, stolen, or mutilated passports; child  substitution; and counterfeit citizenship documents. Some fraudulently  obtain new passports by claiming to have lost their passport or had it  stolen or damaged. For example, one individual who used another  person’s Social Security number and Ohio driver’s license to report a lost  passport obtained a replacement passport through the one-day expedited  service. This fraudulently obtained passport was used to obtain entry into  the United States 14 times in less than three years. Diplomatic Security  officials told us that another means of passport fraud is when individuals  obtain replacement passports by using expired passports containing  photographs of individuals they closely resemble. This method of fraud is  more easily and commonly committed with children, with false  applications based on photographs of children who look similar to the  child applicant. Assuming the identity of a deceased person is another  means of fraudulently applying for a passport.
subsections: section_title: Passports Used to Commit Other Crimes
paragraphs: According to State Bureau of Diplomatic Security documents, passport  fraud is often commited in connection with other crimes, including  narcotics trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, and alien  smuggling. According to Diplomatic Security officials, concerns exist  within the law enforcement and intelligence communities that passport  fraud could also be used to help facilitate acts of terrorism. Using a  passport with a false identity helps enable criminals to conceal their  movements and activities, and U.S. passports provide their holders free  passage into our country with much less scrutiny than is given to foreign  citizens. U.S. passports also allow visa-free passage into many countries  around the world, providing obvious benefits to criminals operating on an  international scale. According to State officials, the most common crime  associated with passport fraud is illegal immigration. For example, one  woman was recently convicted for organizing and leading a large-scale  passport fraud ring that involved recruiting American women to sell their  children’s identities, so that foreign nationals could fraudulently obtain  passports and enter the United States illegally. According to the  Department of State, the woman targeted drug-dependent women and  their children, paying them about $300 for each identity and then using the  identities to apply for passports. The woman then sold the fraudulently  obtained passports to illegal aliens for as much as $6,000 each.
section_title: State Faces Challenges to Fraud Detection Efforts
paragraphs: One of the key challenges to State’s fraud detection efforts is limited  interagency information sharing. Specifically, State currently lacks access  to the Terrorist Screening Center’s consolidated terrorist watch list  database, which was created in 2003 to improve information sharing  among government agencies. By consolidating terrorist watch lists, TSC is  intended to enable federal agencies to access critical information quickly  when a suspected terrorist is encountered or stopped within the United  States, at the country’s borders, or at embassies overseas. However,  because State’s CLASS name-check database does not contain the TSC  information, U.S. citizens with possible ties to terrorism could potentially  obtain passports and travel internationally without the knowledge of  appropriate authorities.
Although TSC has been operational since December 2003, State and TSC  did not begin exploring the possibility of uploading data from the TSC  database into passport CLASS until December 2004. State and TSC have  not reached an agreement about information-sharing, though State sent an  official proposal to TSC in January 2005. A TSC official told us that she  does not foresee any technical limitations, and added that TSC agrees that  it is important to work out an agreement with State. We recommended  that State and other parties expedite such arrangements, and State said  that it and the TSC are actively working to do so.
subsections: section_title: CLASS Does Not Include Names of All Wanted Federal and State Fugitives
paragraphs: Because the FBI and other law enforcement agencies do not currently  provide State with the names of all individuals wanted by federal law  enforcement authorities, State’s CLASS name-check system does not  contain the names of many federal fugitives, some wanted for murder and  other violent crimes; these fugitives could therefore obtain passports and  potentially flee the country. The subjects of federal felony arrest warrants  are not entitled to a U.S. passport. According to FBI officials, FBI  databases contain the names of approximately 37,000 individuals wanted  on federal charges. State Department officials acknowledge that many of  these individuals are not listed in CLASS. We tested the names of 43  different federal fugitives and found that just 23 were in CLASS; therefore,  passport examiners would not be alerted about the individuals’ wanted  status if any of the other 20 not in CLASS applied for a passport. In fact,  one of these 20 did obtain an updated U.S. passport 17 months after the  FBI had listed the individual in its database as wanted. A number of the 20  federal fugitives who were included in our test and were found not to be in  CLASS were suspected of serious crimes, including murder. One was on  the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list. Table 1 lists the crimes suspected of the  federal fugitives in our test.
State officials told us that they had not initiated efforts to improve  information sharing with the FBI on passport-related matters until the  summer of 2004 because they had previously been under the impression  that the U.S. Marshals Service was already sending to CLASS the names of  all fugitives wanted by federal law enforcement authorities. State officials  were not aware that the information in the U.S. Marshal’s database was  not as comprehensive as that contained in the FBI-operated National  Crime Information Center database. State officials became aware of this  situation when the union representing passport examiners brought to their  attention that a number of individuals on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list  were not in CLASS. In the summer of 2004, the FBI agreed to State’s  request to provide the names from the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list. As part  of these discussions, State and the FBI explored other information-sharing  opportunities as well, and FBI headquarters officials sent a message  instructing agents in its field offices how to provide names of U.S. citizens  who are FBI fugitives to State on a case-by-case basis.
Additionally, State began discussions with the FBI about receiving  information on individuals with FBI warrants on a more routine and  comprehensive basis. According to FBI officials, State requested that the  FBI provide only the names of FBI fugitives and not those of individuals  wanted by other federal law enforcement entities. However, the FBI is the  only law enforcement agency that systematically compiles comprehensive  information on individuals wanted by all federal law enforcement  agencies, and, according to FBI officials, it is the logical agency to provide  such comprehensive information to State. We recommended that State  expedite arrangements to enhance interagency information sharing with  the FBI to ensure that the CLASS system contains a more comprehensive  list of federal fugitives. According to State, it sent a written request on this  issue to the FBI in April 2005. State also noted that it had reached  agreement in principal with the FBI on information sharing efforts related  to FBI fugitives.
In addition to its role in compiling information on federal fugitives, the FBI  is also the only law enforcement agency that compiles comprehensive  information on individuals wanted by state and local authorities.  According to FBI officials, FBI databases contain the names of  approximately 1.2 million individuals wanted on state and local charges  nationwide. FBI officials told us that some of the most serious crimes  committed often involve only state and local charges. We tested the names  of 24 different state fugitives and found that just 7 were in CLASS;  therefore, the CLASS system would not flag any of the other 17, were they  to apply for a passport. Table 2 lists the crimes suspected of the 17 tested  state fugitives not in CLASS who were included in our test.
During our review, State Department officials told us that having a  comprehensive list of names that included both federal and state fugitives  could “clog” State’s CLASS system and slow the passport adjudication  process. They also expressed concern that the course of action required of  State would not always be clear for cases involving passport applicants  wanted on state charges. We recommended that State work with the FBI  to ensure that the CLASS system contains a more comprehensive list of  state fugitives. In commenting on a draft of our report, State said that it  now intends to work with the FBI and U.S. Marshals Service to establish  an automated mechanism for integrating information on state warrants  into CLASS.
section_title: Limited Intra-agency Information Sharing May Be Affecting Fraud Detection
paragraphs: State does not maintain a centralized and up-to-date electronic fraud  prevention library, which would enable passport-issuing office personnel  to efficiently share fraud prevention information and tools. As a result,  fraud prevention information is provided inconsistently to examiners  among the 16 domestic offices. For example, at some offices, examiners  maintain individual sets of fraud prevention materials. Some print out  individual fraud alerts and other related documents and file them in  binders. Others archive individual e-mails and other documents  electronically. Some examiners told us that the sheer volume of fraud- related materials they receive makes it impossible to maintain and use  these resources in an organized and systematic way.
Other information sharing tools have not been effectively maintained.  Consular Affairs’ Office of Consular Fraud Prevention maintains a Web  site and “e-room” with some information on fraud alerts, lost and stolen  state birth documents, and other resources related to fraud detection,  though fraud prevention officials told us the Web site is not kept up to  date, is poorly organized, and is difficult to navigate. We directly observed  information available on this Web site during separate visits to State’s  passport-issuing offices and noted that some of the material was outdated  by as much as more than a year. The issuing office in Seattle developed its  own online fraud library that included information such as the specific  serial numbers of blank birth certificates that were stolen, false driver’s  licenses, fraud prevention training materials, and a host of other fraud  prevention information resources and links. However, this library is no  longer updated. Most of the 16 fraud prevention managers we talked to  believed that the Bureau of Consular Affairs should maintain a centralized  library of this nature for offices nationwide.
We recommended that State establish and maintain a centralized and up- to-date electronic fraud prevention library that would enable passport  agency personnel at different locations across the United States to  efficiently access and share fraud prevention information and tools.  Commenting on our draft report, State said that it now intends to design a  centralized online passport “knowledgebase” that will include extensive  sections on fraud prevention resources.
section_title: Staffing Change Reduced Time Available to Review Fraud Cases
paragraphs: In January 2004, State eliminated the assistant fraud prevention manager  position that had existed at most of its domestic passport-issuing offices,  and most Fraud Prevention Managers believe that this action was harmful  to their fraud detection program. State eliminated the position primarily to  enable more senior passport examiners to serve in that role on a rotational  basis to gain deeper knowledge of the subject matter and enhance overall  fraud detection efforts when they returned to adjudicating passport  applications. However, managers at 10 of the 12 offices that previously had  permanent assistants told us that the loss of this position had been  harmful to their fraud detection program. In particular, managers  indicated that the loss of their assistant impacted their own ability to  concentrate on fraud detection by adding to their workload significant  additional training, administrative, and networking responsibilities, while  also diverting from their fraud trend analysis and preparation of reports  and case referrals.
Fraud Prevention Managers and other State officials have linked declining  fraud referrals to the loss of the assistant fraud prevention manager  position. In the 12 offices that previously had permanent assistants, fraud  referral rates from the managers to Diplomatic Security decreased overall  by almost 25 percent from fiscal year 2003 through 2004, the period during  which the position was eliminated, and this percentage was much higher  in some offices. Without their assistants helping them screen fraud  referrals, check applicant information, and assist with other duties related  to the process, managers said they are making fewer fraud referrals to  Diplomatic Security because they lack the time and do not believe they  can fully rely on new rotational staff to take on these responsibilities.
We recommended that State consider designating additional positions for  fraud prevention coordination and training in domestic passport-issuing  offices. Passport Services management told us they were not planning to  re-establish the permanent assistant role, but that they are in the process  of filling one to two additional fraud prevention manager positions at each  of the 2 offices with the largest workloads nationwide. State also plans to  establish one additional fraud prevention manager position at another  issuing office with a large workload. Commenting on our draft report,  State said that it would now also consider rotating GS-12 Adjudication  Supervisors through local fraud prevention offices to relieve Fraud  Prevention Managers of some of their training responsibilities.
section_title: Interoffice Transfers of Passport Adjudication Workload Result, in Some Cases, in Fewer Fraud Referrals Back to Originating Office
paragraphs: State routinely transfers adjudication cases among the different offices to  balance workloads, and Fraud Prevention Managers at a number of issuing  offices said they had noticed a lower percentage of fraud referrals  returned to them from the 3 offices that were assigned a bulk of the  workload transfers. In fiscal year 2004, 28 percent of passport applications  were transferred to 1 of these 3 offices for adjudication, while other  issuing offices adjudicated 72 percent. Although these 3 offices received 28  percent of the applications, they provided only 11 percent of total fraud  referrals to the originating agencies. For fiscal year 2003, the 3 processing  centers adjudicated 26 percent of the applications but provided only 8  percent of the fraud referrals. In 2004, 1 of the issuing offices transferred  out to processing centers 63 percent of its applications (about 287,000) but  received back from the processing centers only 2 percent of the fraud  referrals it generated that year. In 2003, this office transferred out 66  percent of its workload while receiving back only 8 percent of its total  fraud referrals.
Fraud Prevention Managers and other officials told us that one reason  fewer fraud referrals return from these 3 offices is that passport examiners  handling workload transfers from a number of different regions are not as  familiar with the demographics, neighborhoods, and other local  characteristics of a particular region as are the examiners who live and  work there. For example, some officials noted that, in instances when they  suspect fraud, they might telephone the applicants to ask for additional  information so they can engage in polite conversation and ask casual  questions, such as where they grew up, what school they attended, and  other information. The officials noted that, due to their familiarity with the  area, applicants’ answers to such questions may quickly indicate whether  or not their application is likely to be fraudulent. One examiner in an  office that handled workload transfers from areas with large Spanish- speaking populations said that the office had an insufficient number of  Spanish-speaking examiners, emphasizing the usefulness of that skill in  detecting dialects, accents, handwriting, and cultural references that  conflict with information provided in passport applications.
We recommended that State assess the extent to which and reasons why  workload transfers from one domestic passport issuing office to another  were, in some cases, associated with fewer fraud referrals and to take any  corrective action that may be necessary. In its official comments on our  draft report, State did not address this recommendation.
section_title: State Lacks Established Refresher Training; Such Training Is Provided Unevenly
paragraphs: State has not established a core curriculum and ongoing training  requirements for experienced passport examiners, and thus such training  is provided unevenly at different passport-issuing offices. While State  recently developed a standardized training program for new hires that was  first given in August 2004, we reviewed the training programs and  materials at all 7 issuing offices we visited and discussed the programs and  materials at other offices with the remaining nine Fraud Prevention  Managers by telephone and found that the topics covered and the amount  and depth of training varied widely by office. Some had developed region- specific materials; others relied more heavily on materials that had been  developed by passport officials in Washington, D.C., and were largely  outdated. Some scheduled more regular training sessions, and others did  so more sporadically. Several examiners told us they had not received any  formal, interactive fraud prevention training in at least 4 years. Some  Fraud Prevention Managers hold brief discussions on specific fraud cases  and trends at monthly staff meetings, and they rely on these discussions to  serve as refresher training. Some Fraud Prevention Managers occasionally  invite officials from other government agencies, such as the Secret Service  or DHS, to share their fraud expertise. However, these meetings take place  only when time is available. For example, officials at one issuing office  said the monthly meetings had not been held for several months because  of high workload; another manager said he rarely has time for any monthly  meetings; and two others said they do not hold such discussions but e-mail  to examiners recent fraud trend alerts and information.
We recommended that State establish a core curriculum and ongoing  fraud prevention training requirements for all passport examiners. State  said that it is implementing a standardized national training program for  new passport examiners but that it is still providing training to existing  passport examiners on a decentralized basis. State officials told us that  they intend to develop a national training program for experienced  examiners, after certain organizational changes are made in State’s  headquarters passport operation.
section_title: Sporadic Training and Limited Oversight of Acceptance Agents Constitute Significant Fraud Vulnerability
paragraphs: Numerous passport-issuing agency officials and Diplomatic Security  investigators told us that the acceptance agent program is a significant  fraud vulnerability. Examples of acceptance agent problems that were  brought to our attention include important information missing from  documentation and identification photos that did not match the applicant  presenting the documentation. Officials at one issuing office said that their  office often sees the same mistakes multiple times from the same  acceptance facility. These officials attributed problems with applications  received through acceptance agents to the sporadic training provided for  and limited oversight of acceptance agents. State has almost 7,000  passport acceptance agency offices, and none of the 16 issuing offices  provide comprehensive annual training or oversight to all acceptance  agency offices in their area. Instead, the issuing offices concentrate their  training and oversight visits on agency offices geographically nearest to  the issuing offices, or in large population centers, or where examiners and  Fraud Prevention Managers had reported problems, or in high fraud areas.  Larger issuing offices in particular have trouble reaching acceptance  agency staff. At one larger issuing office with about 1,700 acceptance  facilities, the Fraud Prevention Manager said he does not have time to  provide acceptance agent training and that it is difficult for issuing office  staff to visit many agencies. A manager at another large issuing office that  covers an area including 11 states said she does not have time to visit  some agencies in less populated areas.
While State officials told us all acceptance agency staff must be U.S.  citizens, issuing agency officials told us they have no way of verifying that  all of them are. Management officials at one passport-issuing office told us  that, while their region included more than 1,000 acceptance facilities, the  office did not maintain records of the names of individuals accepting  passport applications at those facilities.
We recommended that State strengthen its fraud prevention training  efforts and oversight of passport acceptance agents. In commenting on a  draft of our report, State said that it is adapting and expanding computer- based training for U.S. Postal Service acceptance facilities for more  widespread use among acceptance agents nationwide. State also indicated  that it would institute a nationwide quality review program for its  acceptance facilities. However, State officials recently told us that the  quality reviews would focus only on new acceptance facilities and existing  facilities with reported problems. It is unclear whether State will perform  quality reviews for the rest of its nearly 7,000 facilities.
section_title: Overstretched Investigative Resources Hinder Fraud Detection
paragraphs: Although State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security has provided additional  resources for investigating passport fraud in recent years, its agents must  still divide their time among a number of competing demands, some of  which are considered a higher priority than investigating passport fraud. A  Diplomatic Security official told us that, after the September 11th terrorist  attacks, the bureau hired about 300 additional agents, at least partially to  reduce investigative backlogs. Diplomatic Security and passport officials  told us that, while the increased staff resources had helped reduce  backlogs to some degree, agents assigned to passport fraud investigations  are still routinely pulled away for other assignments. At most of the offices  we visited, few of the agents responsible for investigating passport fraud  were actually there. At one office, all of the agents responsible for  investigating passport fraud were on temporary duty elsewhere, and the  one agent covering the office in their absence had left his assignment at  the local Joint Terrorism Task Force to do so. Agents at one office said  that five of the eight agents involved in passport fraud investigations there  were being sent for temporary duty in Iraq, as were many of their  colleagues at other offices.
Agents at all but 2 of the 7 bureau field offices we visited said they are  unable to devote adequate time and continuity to investigating passport  fraud. We noted that the number of new passport fraud investigations had  declined by more than 25 percent over the last five years, though  Diplomatic Security officials attributed this trend, among other factors, to  refined targeting of cases that merit investigation. The Special-Agent-in- Charge of a large Diplomatic Security field office in a high fraud region  expressed serious concern that, in 2002, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security  began requiring, to reduce backlog of old cases, that most cases be closed  after 12 months, whether or not the investigations were complete. The  agent said that about 400 incomplete cases at his office were closed. A  Diplomatic Security official in Washington, D.C., told us that, while field  offices had been encouraged to close old cases that were not likely to be  resolved, there had not been a formal requirement to do so. State officials  agreed that Diplomatic Security agents are not able to devote adequate  attention to investigating passport fraud, and told us that the Bureau of  Diplomatic Security plans to hire 56 new investigative agents over the next  few years. According to State officials, these new investigators will be  solely dedicated to investigating passport and visa fraud and will not be  pulled away for other duty.
section_title: Effect of New Examiner Performance Standards on Fraud Detection Remains Unclear
paragraphs: Although State’s approach to developing new nationwide passport  examiner production standards, implemented in January 2004, raises  methodological concerns, subsequent changes to the standards make an  assessment of their impact on fraud detection premature. State developed  new nationwide passport examiner production standards in an effort to  make performance expectations and work processes more uniform among  its 16 issuing offices. However, State tested examiner production before  standardizing the passport examination process; differences in work  processes across offices at the time of the test limited the validity of the  test results. State then used the results in conjunction with old standards  to set new nationwide standards. The new standards put additional  emphasis on achieving quantitative targets. Responding to concerns about  their fairness due to changes that may have slowed the examination  process, as well concerns that the new standards led examiners to take  “shortcuts” in the examination process to meet their number targets, State  made a number of modifications to the production standards during the  year. The various modifications have made it unclear what impact the  standards have had on passport fraud detection.
Madam Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be  happy to respond to any questions you or other Members of the  Committee may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact  Jess Ford at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov, or Michael Courts at (202)  512-8980 or courtsm@gao.gov.
Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Jeffrey  Baldwin-Bott, Joseph Carney, Paul Desaulniers, Edward Kennedy, and  Mary Moutsos.
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