Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach
Published: 2005-06-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In its December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Department of Defense (DOD) created a New Triad by significantly changing its definition and conceptual framework for its strategic capabilities to include not only the nuclear capabilities of the old Triad that consisted of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers, but also the capabilities of offensive conventional strike forces, active and passive defenses, and a revitalized defense infrastructure. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which DOD has (1) identified the projected spending for the New Triad in its Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and (2) developed a long-term investment approach to identify and manage future spending for the New Triad.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Although DOD broadened its definition of strategic capabilities during the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and established a New Triad, it has not developed a way to use the FYDP to identify the total amount it plans to spend to sustain and enhance New Triad capabilities during the next few years. The FYDP is one of the principal tools available to help inform DOD and Congress about spending plans for the next 5 years and to make informed decisions in light of competing priorities. While DOD has identified some New Triad spending included in the FYDP, it has not identified all associated spending. GAO's notional analysis of New Triad-related programs in the FYDP through 2009 shows that overall spending could be significantly greater than DOD's limited analyses have identified to date. According to DOD officials, DOD has not fully identified spending in the FYDP because of the diversity and broad scope of the concept. A mechanism for aggregating FYDP data, known as a "virtual major force program," could help DOD address these obstacles and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with better visibility into overall DOD spending plans for the New Triad. DOD also faces long-term affordability challenges in funding the New Triad. However, it has not developed an overarching and integrated long-term investment approach to identify the projected resource requirements and funding timelines to acquire and sustain New Triad capabilities beyond the period of time covered by FYDP. Long-term capital investment planning is an important tool to help organizations establish priorities and develop future budgets. DOD is likely to face significant affordability challenges in the long term in deciding the mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities needed to implement the vision of the New Triad, as existing nuclear weapons platforms begin to reach the end of their lives within the next 15 years and missile defense capabilities are expanding. While DOD has identified some near-term investments, its investment plans are incomplete and it lacks a comprehensive strategy for developing a long-term plan.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In its December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Department of Defense  (DOD) presented a conceptual framework for transforming U.S. strategic  capabilities. The review proposed that the United States move away from  depending heavily on nuclear weapons and instead bring together the  capabilities of nuclear and conventional offensive strike forces, active and  passive defenses, and a revitalized defense infrastructure, to create a New  Triad to achieve the desired strategic effects. Enhanced command and  control, planning, and intelligence capabilities would also support the New  Triad. The review stated that the synergism achieved through the  integration of nuclear and conventional offensive strike and defensive  capabilities would provide the President and Secretary of Defense with a  broad array of military options to better address the spectrum of potential  opponents and contingencies that may arise in the coming decades.
The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review also concluded that new defense  initiatives and investments would be required to transform U.S. strategic  capabilities and realize the full potential of the New Triad. The Future Years  Defense Program (FYDP), a DOD centralized report consisting of  thousands of program elements that provides information on DOD’s  current and planned out year budget requests, is one of DOD’s principal  tools to manage the spending for its transformation of strategic  capabilities. The FYDP provides visibility over DOD’s projected spending  and helps inform DOD and Congress about resource data relating to  identifying priorities and trade-offs.
DOD is transforming its strategic capabilities at a time when it is also faced  with fiscal challenges brought about by ongoing military operations and  other major initiatives to transform the way it prepares to fight and win  wars. In our February 2005 report entitled 21st Century Challenges:  Reexamining the Base of Government, we concluded that the magnitude  of funding and potential for current investments and operations to turn into  long-term financial commitments are prompting real questions about the  affordability and sustainability of the rate of growth in defense spending.  We also observed that the role, size, and structure of forces and capabilities  comprising the strategic triad are key issues that may need to be assessed  in view of the new security and fiscal environment.
At your request, we reviewed the progress made by DOD in determining  and allocating resources needed to implement the New Triad today and in  the future. Specifically, you asked us to determine the extent to which DOD  has (1) identified the projected spending for the New Triad in its FYDP and  (2) developed a long-term investment approach to identify and manage  future investments needed to achieve the synergistic capabilities  envisioned for the New Triad.
To obtain information on DOD’s efforts to identify projected spending and  develop future investment strategies for the New Triad, we reviewed  documents and interviewed officials in the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, the Joint Staff, U.S. Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps  headquarters, and the U.S. Strategic Command. We also conducted a  notional analysis to identify projected spending for the New Triad by  analyzing resource data for program elements related to the New Triad  included in the FYDP prepared to support the President’s fiscal year 2005  budget submission to Congress. The results of our notional analysis are not  meant to provide a definite accounting of the projected New Triad spending  included in the FYDP but rather to illustrate an approach that could be  used to align the concepts and capabilities of the New Triad with program  elements in the FYDP. We did not analyze resource data from the FYDP  prepared to support the President’s fiscal year 2006 budget submission  because the data were not yet available during our review. In conducting  our analysis, we determined that the automated FYDP data were  sufficiently reliable for meeting our objectives. Additionally, we compared  DOD’s investment planning actions for the New Triad against the best  practices identified for leading capital decision making to determine the  extent that DOD has followed these practices. We conducted our review  from December 2003 through April 2005 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. See appendix II for a more  complete description of our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD significantly expanded the range  of strategic capabilities to include not only the old Triad, which consisted  of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched  ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers, but also conventional and  nonkinetic offensive strike and defensive capabilities. The review also  called for revitalizing the U.S. research and development and industrial  infrastructure that would develop, build, and maintain offensive forces and  defensive systems and be capable of responding in a timely manner to  augment U.S. military capabilities when necessary. According to DOD, the  three legs of the New Triad–offensive strike, active and passive defenses,  and responsive infrastructure–are intended to be supported by timely and  accurate intelligence, adaptive planning, and enhanced command and  control capabilities. Figure 1 shows the three legs of the New Triad and its  supporting elements.
DOD concluded in the 2001 review that while nuclear weapons will  continue to play a critical role in defending the United States, the  combination of capabilities included in the New Triad would increase the  military options available to the President and Secretary of Defense and  allow for the development of responsive, adaptive, and interoperable joint  forces that could be employed in a wider range of contingencies. DOD’s  review indicated that the additional capabilities provided by the New Triad  would partially mitigate the effects of any reductions in the number of  operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads that are planned  through 2012. Table 1 shows the weapons systems and capabilities that  make up the New Triad.
In its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD indicates that new initiatives and  investments would be required to achieve a mix of new or improved  capabilities that compose the offensive, defensive, and responsive  infrastructure legs and supporting command and control, intelligence, and  adaptive planning elements of the New Triad. In particular, the review  found that major investment initiatives would be needed in the areas of  advanced nonnuclear strike, missile defenses, command and control, and  intelligence. DOD also plans to improve existing New Triad-related  capabilities by modernizing existing weapon systems and enhancing the  tools used to build and execute strike plans to provide more flexibility in  adapting or developing military options during crises. An Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense  told us that DOD intends to partially address near-term affordability issues  for the New Triad by enhancing capability characteristics of current  weapon systems, such as range, and leveraging capabilities already in  development. In March 2003, DOD published a Nuclear Posture Review  Implementation Plan that is intended to identify initiatives for developing the New Triad and institutionalizing the Nuclear Posture Review. DOD  plans to implement the New Triad concept and many of the capabilities  identified by the Nuclear Posture Review by 2012. However, DOD states  that further investments are likely to be needed beyond that time frame as  existing nuclear platforms age, such as the Minuteman III intercontinental  ballistic missile system, and follow-on nuclear weapon systems are  proposed.
The Nuclear Posture Review also states that DOD should conduct periodic  assessments to determine its progress in developing and integrating  capabilities for the New Triad. Specifically, these strategic capability  assessments are to review the (1) progress to date in reducing the number  of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, (2) state of the  security environment, and (3) progress made in the development of the  New Triad. An assessment team, which included representatives from DOD  and the Department of Energy, completed its first Nuclear Posture Review  strategic capability assessment and associated report in April 2005. An  Office of the Secretary of Defense official told us that DOD plans to update  its first assessment in the fall of 2005 to support the department’s conduct  of the Quadrennial Defense Review. DOD intends to conduct subsequent  assessments about every 2 years through 2012.
Many DOD organizations, including the Joint Staff, military services,  combatant commands, and defense agencies, and the Department of  Energy, have responsibilities for implementing various aspects of the New  Triad. These responsibilities are broadly defined in relevant New Triad  implementation and guidance documents. Within the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, two organizations have key responsibilities for  overseeing and managing the New Triad implementation efforts:  The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible  for developing the policy and guidance to implement the 2001 Nuclear  Posture Review and for establishing an organizational framework for  coordinating New Triad initiatives within DOD.
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology and Logistics is responsible for providing oversight for the  development and deployment of New Triad capabilities.
The U.S. Strategic Command also has a significant role in implementing the  New Triad and supporting its missions. In addition to its responsibilities for  strategic nuclear deterrence and military space operations missions, the  command was assigned several new missions related to the New Triad in  January 2003. These missions are: global strike; integrated missile defense;  DOD information operations; and command, control, communications,  computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In January 2005,  the Secretary of Defense also assigned the command responsibility for the  mission of combating weapons of mass destruction. Appendix I provides  additional information about the U.S. Strategic Command’s missions.
Additionally, the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation in the Office of  the Secretary of Defense is responsible for assembling and distributing the  FYDP, which DOD uses to formulate the estimated projected resources and  proposed appropriations to support DOD programs, projects, and  activities, including those related to the New Triad. The office is also  responsible for coordinating with DOD components any proposed changes  to the FYDP’s structure, such as updates to existing program element titles  and definitions. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  (Comptroller) has responsibility for the annual budget justification  material that is presented to Congress. These offices work collaboratively  to ensure that the data presented in the budget justification material and  the FYDP are equivalent at the appropriation account level.
The FYDP is a report that resides in an automated database, which is  updated and published at least 3 times a year to coincide with DOD’s  internal budget development activities and annual budget submission to  Congress. It provides projections of DOD’s near and midterm funding  needs and reflects the total resources programmed by DOD, by fiscal year.  The FYDP includes data on estimates for the fiscal year reflected in the  current budget request and at least 4 subsequent years. Both detailed data  and a summary report are generally provided to Congress with DOD’s  annual budget submission.
The FYDP is used as a source of data both for analysis and as an input to  alternative ways of displaying and portraying actual and programmed  resources. It contains data related to the forces, manpower, and  total obligation authority for each program element. The FYDP is organized  into 11 major force program categories, comprising combat forces and  support programs, which are used as a basis for internal DOD program  review. The major force program categories include strategic forces,  general-purpose forces, research and development, and special operations  forces. The FYDP is further arranged according to the appropriation  structure utilized by Congress to review budget requests and enact  appropriations, which includes major appropriation categories for  procurement; operation and maintenance; military personnel; research,  development, test, and evaluation; and military construction. Therefore,  the FYDP’s structure serves the purpose of crosswalking DOD’s internal  review structure with the congressional review structure.
In 2003, DOD began implementing the Joint Capabilities Integration and  Development System (JCIDS) process to identify improvements to existing  capabilities and guide development of new capabilities from a joint  perspective that recognizes the need for trade-off analysis. The new  process is designed to provide an approach to defense planning that looks  at the broad range of capabilities to address contingencies that the  United States may confront in the future. When fully implemented, JCIDS is  intended to provide an enhanced methodology utilizing joint concepts that  will identify and describe existing or future shortcomings in capabilities  and identify integrated solutions that meet those capability needs. The  system is also expected to provide better linkage to the acquisition process  and improve prioritization of validated joint warfighting capability  proposals. Specifically, it is intended to provide a broader review of  proposals than did the previous planning process by involving additional  participants, including the combatant commands, early in the process. The  analyses conducted during the process are to result in a set of potential  solutions, including additional resources or changes to doctrine and  training designed to correct capability shortcomings. These solutions are  then incorporated into roadmaps that show the resource strategies to  develop and acquire the needed capabilities.
section_title: DOD Has Not Fully Identified Projected New Triad Spending in the FYDP
paragraphs: DOD has not fully identified the projected spending for New Triad in the  FYDP to date. In light of the challenges DOD faces in transforming strategic  capabilities, decision makers need to have the best and most complete data  available about the resources being allocated to the New Triad in making  decisions on the affordability, sustainability, and trade-offs among the  efforts to develop and acquire capabilities. The FYDP is one of the principal  tools available to help inform DOD and Congress about resource data  relating to these efforts. While DOD has identified some New Triad  spending in its analyses and in relevant New Triad documents, our notional  analysis of New Triad-related program elements indicates that overall  projected spending for the New Triad through fiscal year 2009 could be  much greater when other program elements that provide New Triad  capabilities are considered. Additionally, the current FYDP data structure  does not expressly identify and aggregate New Triad program elements that  would allow identification of New Triad spending, and the program  elements included in the FYDP’s existing major force program category for  strategic forces do not fully capture the broader range of strategic  capabilities that were envisioned in the Nuclear Posture Review. DOD does  not plan to develop a complete and approved inventory of New Triad- related program elements in its FYDP because DOD officials believe that it  is difficult to reach agreement on the program elements to be included in  such an inventory. However, an inventory of New Triad-related program  elements that provides a more complete and clear identification of the  projected spending currently planned for the New Triad could help DOD  and Congress make decisions on the affordability and spending needed for  programs to develop and acquire New Triad capabilities.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Not Fully Aligned Projected Spending with New Triad Capabilities
paragraphs: While DOD has identified some program elements related to the New Triad  in documents and internal reviews, it still has not fully identified  projected spending associated with the New Triad. DOD documents related  to the New Triad, including the Nuclear Posture Review, the Nuclear  Posture Review Implementation Plan, and the Secretary of Defense’s  fiscal year 2002 Annual Defense Report to the President and the Congress,  broadly describe the capabilities of the New Triad and indicate the range  and types of activities and weapon systems that provide these capabilities.  DOD has also identified and directed resources for some New Triad  programs. For example, as the Nuclear Posture Review was being  completed in late 2001, DOD issued guidance for preparing its fiscal year  2003 budget that identified 12 initiatives that were considered key to  developing the New Triad, such as programs to provide capabilities to  defeat hard and deeply buried targets.
In anticipation of a potential requirement to identify New Triad program  elements in the FYDP, DOD’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation  conducted an analysis in 2003 that identified a list of 188 FYDP program  elements, which accounted for about $186.7 billion in then-year dollars of  projected spending for fiscal years 2004 through 2009. The office  identified another $17.4 billion for programs and activities that are not  readily identifiable in the FYDP, bringing the total to about $204.1 billion.  However, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation officials told us that  the analysis included only those program elements that supported the  initiatives identified in DOD’s programming guidance or otherwise clearly  provide New Triad capabilities. The officials said that the list of programs  identified in this analysis was never agreed upon and approved within DOD  and there are no current plans to update the analysis.
Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told us that the team conducting  the first strategic capability assessment for the New Triad performed a  subsequent survey of current program elements in the FYDP to determine  the capabilities these program elements would provide for the New Triad  by 2012. An Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation official said that the  survey included all of the program elements on their list. However, the  official did not know whether the survey identified any additional program  elements.
In addition to DOD’s projected spending in the FYDP for the New Triad, the  Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration  identified $41.7 billion for nuclear weapons activities for fiscal years 2004  through 2009 in its Future Years Nuclear Security Program prepared for the  fiscal year 2005 President’s budget submission. This agency is responsible  for maintaining the infrastructure to support nuclear weapons capabilities,  including the refurbishment and service-life extension of currently  deployed nuclear warheads.
section_title: New Triad Spending Could be Much Greater Than DOD Has Currently Identified
paragraphs: DOD’s analyses of FYDP program elements did not include many of the  program elements that make up several capabilities identified for the New  Triad in the Nuclear Posture Review, such as special operations and  intelligence, or those that provide capabilities that are needed to perform  New Triad missions but also have wider military applications. If these  additional program elements are considered, the overall projected  spending for the New Triad could be much greater than DOD has currently  identified in New Triad-related documents and in either of the analyses  conducted by its Office of Program Evaluation and Analysis or strategic  capability assessment team.
We conducted a notional analysis to identify any additional spending for  New Triad-related program elements included in the FYDP. Our notional  analysis considered a broader range of FYDP program elements than either  of the analyses conducted by DOD’s Office of Program Evaluation and  Analysis or strategic capability assessment team and included many  elements that provide capabilities for conducting New Triad missions, but  also have wider military applications, such as communications,  intelligence, and special operations program elements. Using available  DOD definitions of New Triad capabilities, we reviewed each of the  FYDP’s 4,725 program elements to determine to what extent the elements  provided capabilities needed for New Triad missions. We further  distinguished the program elements we identified as being fully dedicated  to the missions of the New Triad or not fully dedicated to the New Triad  because the capabilities provided by these latter program elements  could be used in a wider range of military applications than just for the  New Triad.
Compared to the 188 program elements and $204.1 billion in then-year  spending for fiscal years 2004 through 2009 identified by the Office of  Program Analysis and Evaluation, our notional analysis identified a total  of 737 program elements in the FYDP that are aligned with New Triad  capabilities, with a total associated spending of $360.1 billion over the  same period, or about $156.0 billion more than the DOD analysis.  Of the 737 program elements that we identified, 385 program elements  provide capabilities that would be fully dedicated to New Triad missions,  such as program elements for weapons of mass destruction defense  technologies and for the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense  Organization. The other 352 program elements we identified provide  capabilities, such as special operations, that would be used in conducting  New Triad missions but could also be used for other military missions.  Figure 2 shows the number of New Triad program elements identified by  the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation and the number of  additional program elements identified in GAO’s analysis.
Of the $360.1 billion we identified in projected spending for the New Triad,  $231.8 billion was for programs that are fully dedicated to the New Triad  and $128.3 billion for programs that are not fully dedicated. As table 2  shows, we broke out the spending into the New Triad’s four capability  areas–offensive strike; active and passive defenses; responsive  infrastructure; and command and control, intelligence, and planning–and  created a fifth area for program elements that supported more than one  capability area. Our notional analysis shows that projected spending for  offensive strike and enhanced command and control, intelligence, and  planning capability areas almost doubles when program elements that are  not fully dedicated to the New Triad are included. The offensive strike  capability area represents the largest amount of the projected spending,  $156.0 billion in then-year dollars, and the command and control,  intelligence, and planning capability area is next with $108.0 billion in  projected spending. Together, these two capability areas account  for 73 percent, or about $264.0 billion, of the $360.1 billion total projected  spending identified in our analysis. Most of the $86.3 billion of projected  spending for the active and passive defenses capability area is in the fully  dedicated category. Appendix III provides additional information on the  results of our analysis.
Officials with Program Analysis and Evaluation, Policy, and Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the  U.S. Strategic Command stated that the methodology we used for our  notional analysis was reasonable. Officials from the Office of Program  Analysis and Evaluation and from U.S. Strategic Command told us that the  program elements we identified were consistent with the capabilities  defined for the New Triad. Officials from the Office of Program Analysis  and Evaluation also said that our analysis used a more systematic approach  in identifying New Triad-related program elements included in the FYDP  than was followed in DOD’s analyses. The officials added that when they  were compiling their own analysis of New Triad-related program elements,  many of the documents that GAO used to identify relevant programs had  not yet been published. Therefore, while DOD did not include many  program elements that are not fully dedicated to the New Triad in their  analyses, the officials told us that it was not unreasonable to include those  program elements in our analysis. As our notional analysis shows,  including these program elements not only provides greater transparency  of the projected spending for the New Triad in the FYDP but also identifies  many additional program elements that provide capabilities necessary for  carrying out New Triad missions.
section_title: New Triad Spending Is Not Readily Identified in the FYDP’s Structure
paragraphs: While the FYDP is a report that provides DOD and Congress with a tool for  looking at future funding needs, the current FYDP structure does not  readily identify and aggregate New Triad-related program elements to  provide information on current and planned resource allocations–including  spending changes, priorities, and trends–for the New Triad. In conducting  our analysis of FYDP program elements, we observed that DOD has not  created any data fields in the FYDP’s structure that would expressly  identify program elements as being relevant to the New Triad. According to  DOD Program Analysis and Evaluation officials, there is no plan to modify  the data fields in the FYDP structure to allow the ready identification of  New Triad program elements and associated spending because they have  not received direction to do so. Additionally, these officials told us that if  DOD were to modify the FYDP structure to allow such identification, it  would need to develop an approved list of existing New Triad program  elements to allow capture of these elements in the data fields.
Additionally, as we have reported in the past, the FYDP’s 11 major force  program categories have remained virtually unchanged since the 1960s.  Our notional FYDP analysis indicates that the FYDP’s definition of the existing major force program for strategic forces–one of the key major  force program categories associated with the New Triad–does not fully  capture the projected New Triad spending for the broader range of  strategic capabilities that are envisioned for the New Triad in the Nuclear  Posture Review. We determined that only $55.6 billion, or about 15 percent  of the $360.1 billion of projected spending that we identified in our notional  analysis of FYDP program elements, is associated with the FYDP’s strategic  forces major force program category, which largely captures projected  spending on offensive nuclear capabilities. The remaining $304.6 billion is  dispersed among the other 10 major force programs. For example, program  elements for the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, which is an  autonomous, stealthy, long-range, conventional, air-to-ground, precision  cruise missile designed to destroy high-value, well-defended fixed or  moveable targets, and the Patriot missile defense system, which  contributes to the defense leg of the New Triad, are included in the FYDP’s  general-purpose forces major force program. Similarly, intelligence-related  program elements for hard and deeply buried targets and to support  U.S. Strategic Command are part of the FYDP’s command, control,  communications, and intelligence major force program.
In the past, DOD created new aggregations of program elements and  changed the FYDP’s structure as decision makers needed information not  already captured in the FDYP. For example, a recent aggregation allows  data that relate to every dollar, person, and piece of equipment in the FYDP  to be identified as being in either a force or infrastructure category. DOD  has also made it possible to identify program elements in the FYDP that are  related to activities to capture the resources associated with specific areas  of interest, such as space activities. In 2001, DOD established a “virtual  major force program” for space to increase the visibility of resources  allocated for space activities. This is a programming mechanism that  aggregates most space-unique funding by military department and function crosscutting DOD’s 11 existing major force program categories. The  Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, who has key responsibilities  for implementing the New Triad, told us that creating a virtual major force  program for the New Triad could help align New Triad capabilities with the  projected spending in the FYDP, identify responsible organizations, reduce  ambiguity of the New Triad concept, and provide better visibility and focus  for DOD efforts to develop and acquire New Triad capabilities. The  Commander suggested that it could be necessary to create more than one  virtual major force program, possibly one for each of the New Triad legs,  because of the diversity and scope of New Triad capabilities. Some Office  of the Secretary of Defense officials also told us that creating a virtual  major force program could provide Congress with more visibility of DOD’s  efforts underway to develop the capabilities needed for the New Triad.  Until such time as a tool such as a virtual major force program becomes  available that can capture and categorize the projected spending for the  New Triad in the FYDP, we believe that DOD will be limited in its ability to  guide and direct all its efforts to develop, acquire, and integrate New Triad  capabilities and Congress will not have full visibility of the resources being  allocated.
section_title: DOD Lacks a Plan to Fully Identify New Triad Spending
paragraphs: DOD has not established a requirement to develop a complete and  approved list of the program elements included in the FYDP that are  associated with New Triad spending. Office of the Secretary of Defense  officials told us that DOD has not established such a requirement because  the diversity and scope of the New Triad make it difficult for DOD officials  to reach agreement on a complete list of programs. They also told us that  because the New Triad is an ambiguous concept, the program elements  included in such a list would change as the New Triad evolves and becomes  better defined.
However, without a complete and approved DOD list of New Triad program  elements included in the FYDP, there is some uncertainty about the total  range of programs and projected spending that are being pursued to  achieve New Triad capabilities. It also will be difficult for Congress to  assess DOD’s progress in achieving the goals identified in the Nuclear  Posture Review without having complete information on the resources  being spent or needed in the future to meet those goals. Additionally, the  broad scope of the New Triad concept and large number of organizations  with New Triad-related spending responsibilities makes it even more  important to have complete information available on the projected  spending being provided for each of the New Triad capability areas and for  each of the many organizations developing and acquiring New Triad  capabilities. For example, our notional analysis identified as many  as 23 defense organizations, including the military services, offices within  the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, several combatant  commands, and defense agencies, with FYDP spending related to the New  Triad. Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told us that having an  approved program list would promote a common understanding of the New  Triad and benefit future department program reviews. Additionally, an  Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation official told us that an approved  program list would aid DOD in making resource decisions for the New  Triad. In preparing DOD’s fiscal year 2006 budget, the official told us that an  approved list of programs would have made it easier to evaluate the effects  of programming changes proposed by the military services on capabilities  being acquired for the New Triad.
section_title: DOD Lacks an Overarching and Integrated Long-term Investment Approach for Acquiring and Sustaining New Triad Capabilities
paragraphs: While several New Triad documents and DOD’s recent strategic capability  assessment identify investment needs through 2012, DOD’s near-term  investment direction is incomplete. Additionally, DOD has not yet  developed an overarching and integrated long-term investment approach to  identify and plan investments needed to acquire and sustain capabilities for  the New Triad. A long-term investment approach is an important tool in an  organization’s decision-making process to define direction, establish  priorities, assist with current and future budgets, and plan the actions  needed to achieve goals. Although DOD recognizes the need for a long-term  investment approach, it does not plan to develop one until nonnuclear  strike and missile defense concepts are mature. DOD has not identified a  specific date for when this will occur. The new JCIDS process could  complement any long-term investment approach developed for the New  Triad by providing additional analysis and discussions to support New  Triad investment and the development of a plan.
subsections: section_title: Long-term Investment Approach Is a Useful Tool to Establish Priorities
paragraphs: In our past reporting on leading capital decision-making practices, we  have determined that leading organizations have decision-making  processes in place to help them assess where they should invest their  resources for the greatest benefit over the long term. These processes help  an organization determine whether its investments are the most cost  effective, support its goals, and consider alternatives before making a final  selection. A long-term investment approach is an important tool in an  organization’s decision-making process to define direction, establish  priorities, assist with current and future budgets, and plan the actions  needed to achieve goals. Our analysis of several investment plans showed  that such an approach includes information on future investment  requirements, projected resources, investment priorities and trade-offs,  milestones, and funding timelines, and is intended to be a dynamic  document, which would be updated to adapt to changing circumstances.
In the past, DOD has developed and maintained long-term investment  planning documents for major defense capabilities–such as the Unmanned  Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027 and the “Bomber Roadmap”–to  provide senior decision makers options in the development of broad  strategies that will define future DOD force structure and help with the  resource allocation process. In 2003, DOD also published an Information  Operations Roadmap, which supports collaboration of broad information  operations efforts and endorses the need for the department to better track  information operations investments.
section_title: DOD’s Near-term Investment Direction for the New Triad Is Incomplete
paragraphs: As noted earlier, Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told us that  New Triad documents–including the Nuclear Posture Review, Nuclear  Posture Review Implementation Plan, and the first strategic capability  assessment–identify some of the near-term investments needed to provide  capabilities for the New Triad. However, this investment direction is  incomplete and does not address long-term affordability challenges that  DOD may be faced with in sustaining and developing new capabilities to  implement the New Triad. Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told  us that the strategic capability assessment provides a near-term investment  approach by identifying priorities for focusing resources to keep  investment efforts on track to reach New Triad implementation goals for  2012. According to the officials, the team conducting the strategic  capability assessment developed a list of capabilities that were needed in  key areas, such as strategic strike and missile defense, from the Nuclear  Posture Review’s vision of the New Triad. The team then reviewed current  operation activities, acquisition programs of record, and a potential range  of new technologies to determine any capability shortcomings. Based on  this review, the assessment team was able to determine whether initiatives  to develop New Triad capabilities in the key areas were (1) met or on track  to be satisfied by 2012; (2) on track, but would not be met by 2012; or  (3) not on track to be met by 2012 unless additional funding was provided.  Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told us that by determining the  status of meeting capabilities in each of the key areas, DOD would be able  to better prioritize future investment decisions for the New Triad.
However, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy officials  acknowledge that the first strategic capability assessment provides only a  limited, near-term investment approach for the New Triad. These officials  told us that the assessment did not review and assess some key capabilities  of the New Triad, such as cruise missile defense, information operations,  and passive defense, and may not have fully surveyed existing capabilities  in the areas that were included in the assessment. Further, it does not  address the potential for further investments to replace one or more  existing nuclear platforms that will approach the end of their useful lives.  These officials told us that they expect future strategic capability  assessments to include New Triad key areas not reviewed in the first  assessment. Additionally, Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told  us that while the assessment’s recommendations are not binding on DOD  programming and budgeting decisions, the assessment was used during the  department’s last program review in developing the fiscal year 2006 defense  budget.
DOD, in its 2003 Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan, called for  the creation of an overarching strategic planning document for the New  Triad that would establish the strategies and plans for developing new  strategic capabilities to meet national security goals stated in the Nuclear  Posture Review. The plan also was to provide broad guidance for  integrating the elements of the New Triad as new capabilities came on line  and for the development of future forces, supporting systems, planning and  the creation of a responsive infrastructure. However, Office of the  Secretary of Defense Policy officials told us that while a draft plan was  prepared, they decided not to circulate the draft for comments because  they believed the results of the first strategic capability assessment would  result in too many changes to the plan. Instead, the officials told us that the  strategic capability assessment process would develop the strategy, plans,  and guidance that were to be provided by the plan.
section_title: DOD Does Not Plan to Develop a New Triad Long-term Investment Approach Until Concepts Mature
paragraphs: In its Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan, DOD states a need  for a long-term investment strategy for the New Triad, and according to the  plan, intends to conduct a study to evaluate options for preparing an  integrated, long-term investment strategy for strike capabilities, defensive  capabilities, and infrastructure when nonnuclear strike and missile defense  concepts are mature. Policy and Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics  officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense told us that there are  several concepts related to New Triad capabilities being developed,  including the Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept and concept  and operational plans for global strike and integrated ballistic missile  defense. The officials told us that once nonnuclear strike and missile  defense concepts are developed, specific programs could be better  identified to implement these concepts, including new programs to develop  capabilities that do not currently exist. These officials told us that they  recognize the importance of a long-term investment approach for the New  Triad to provide a basis for decisions on resources for future capabilities  initiatives. However, they do not believe the development of the nonnuclear  strike and missile defense concepts are far enough along to begin the study  leading to development of a long-term investment strategy. These officials  did not provide us with an estimate for when these concepts would be  considered sufficiently mature to begin the study.
While we agree that some concepts are continuing to evolve, and that new  systems are still under development, we do not believe that these  circumstances preclude DOD from beginning to plan for the future of the  New Triad. For example, although DOD is still developing concepts for  missile defense, it is planning to spend billions of dollars over the next  several years to develop a range of missile defense capabilities. As new  information becomes available, we would expect to see adjustments in DOD’s plans–that is the nature of long-term planning. Further, without the  context of a long-term investment approach for acquiring new capabilities  and replacing some or all of its aging systems that provide New Triad  capabilities, DOD will continue to invest billions of dollars on capabilities  that will affect the long-term composition of the New Triad. DOD is likely  to face significant affordability challenges in the long term as some existing  nuclear weapons platforms begin reaching the end of their expected  service lives within the next 15 years and as missile defense capabilities are  expanding. Given the length of time to develop and acquire capabilities for  the New Triad and the need to consider long-term affordability issues, DOD  is also at risk of not considering the best approaches to developing and  sustaining capabilities needed to provide the broad range of military  options for the President and Secretary of Defense that are envisioned for  the New Triad. DOD is further at risk of not effectively integrating the wide  range of diverse New Triad capabilities as they are developed and being  able to effectively determine future investment costs and the priorities  and trade-offs needed to sustain New Triad implementation. In our  February 2005 report addressing the challenges that the nation faces by its  growing fiscal imbalance in the 21st century, we stated that DOD’s current  approach to planning and budgeting often results in a mismatch between  programs and budgets and that DOD does not always fully consider  long-term resource implications and the opportunity cost of selecting one  alternative over another.
section_title: JCIDS Process Could Complement Any Long-term Investment Approach
paragraphs: The new JCIDS process could play a role in any long-term investment  approach that is eventually prepared for the New Triad by providing a  forum for additional analyses and assessments to support New Triad  investment decisions and ensure that those decisions are in concert with  DOD’s overall investment priorities. The JCIDS process is intended to  provide a means to ensure that new capabilities are conceived and  developed in a joint warfighting context. The process intends to (1) focus  on achieving joint operational capabilities rather than on individual  weapon systems and (2) provide a systematic means to identify capability  gaps, propose solutions, and establish roadmaps for future investments to  acquire needed capabilities. Capability assessments, developed through the  process, are designed to have a long-term focus, consider a wide range of  potential materiel and nonmateriel solutions across the military services,  analyze trade-offs among different solutions, and identify areas where  existing capabilities are redundant or excessive. The process offers  proposed solutions that are intended to be integrated and prioritized and  would eventually be incorporated into resource roadmaps that show the  investment strategies to develop and acquire the needed capabilities.
JCIDS also intends to involve the combatant commanders early in the  decision-making process to provide a strong warfighter perspective in  identifying capabilities and resource priorities. The U.S. Strategic  Command has created mission capabilities teams within its Capability and  Resource Integration Directorate that closely align its missions with the  JCIDS process to strengthen its ability to more effectively advocate for the  capabilities needed to perform its missions. The Commander of the U.S.  Strategic Command told us that his intent is for these teams to play an  active role in identifying and developing New Triad capabilities.
New Triad capabilities span most of the functional areas established in the  JCIDS process, including command and control and force application.  Officials in the Joint Staff’s Office of Requirements Assessment told us that  the JCIDS process does not currently identify and track joint warfighting  capabilities as capabilities for the New Triad and Office of the Secretary of  Defense officials told us that there are no efforts at this time to crosswalk  the JCIDS’ joint warfighting capabilities with the New Triad. However, Joint  Staff officials said that organizations with New Triad responsibilities, such  as the U.S. Strategic Command, do participate in the working groups and  other activities throughout the JCIDS process to ensure that their equities  are addressed. The JCIDS process could provide benefits to defense  planning, but because the process is still very early in its development it is  unclear whether or how DOD plans to use JCIDS to address its New Triad  investments.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: It is important for DOD and congressional decision makers to have the  most complete accounting possible of the projected spending planned for  the New Triad over the next several years as they deliberate the budget.  Until DOD reaches agreement on the program elements that comprise New  Triad spending in its FYDP, and creates a way to aggregate spending,  neither defense officials nor Congress will have visibility over all of the  projected spending planned in the near-term for the New Triad.  Importantly, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, who has been  assigned significant responsibilities for coordinating and integrating New  Triad capabilities from a warfighter perspective, will not have the resource  visibility needed to effectively carry out this new role. This information is  needed to accurately assess the affordability of the various activities and  weapon systems that make up the New Triad, and to make timely and  informed decisions on the funding required to develop, acquire, and  integrate the wide range of diverse New Triad capabilities.
Moreover, without an overarching and integrated long-term investment  approach for the New Triad, information on affordability challenges, future  funding priorities, and requirements beyond the current FYDP is not fully  known. While DOD believes it is still too early to develop a long-term  investment approach, further delaying the start of this effort puts the  department at risk of not developing and acquiring capabilities for the New  Triad when needed. As a result, the President and Secretary of Defense can  not be assured that DOD has the broad range of military options envisioned  in the New Triad. Although New Triad concepts are continuing to evolve  and mature, laying the foundation now for a long-term investment  approach would provide DOD with an additional planning tool for future  development of the New Triad concept–a tool that could be continuously  improved and updated as better information becomes available and as  changing security and fiscal circumstances warranted. The need for such  an approach becomes increasingly important as existing nuclear platforms  begin approaching the end of their useful lives and decisions to replace one  or more of the platforms are required. Additionally, without such an  approach, decision makers lack information on projected costs, spending  priorities and trade-offs, resource requirements, and funding timelines in  making decisions on the spending commitments needed to sustain New  Triad implementation. Further, without a long-term investment approach,  the large number of New Triad stakeholders, such as the military services,  defense agencies, and combatant commands, will lack the direction and  focus they need to effectively prepare future funding plans to develop,  acquire, and integrate the capabilities. Lastly, while the new JCIDS process  is intended to provide a better approach to identifying solutions to  capability shortcomings and strengthen the role of combatant commanders  in making decisions on capability investments, it is yet unclear how the  process will be used to specifically support investment decisions for the  New Triad.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To strengthen DOD’s implementation of the New Triad and provide greater  transparency of resources that are being applied to developing, acquiring,  and sustaining the needed capabilities, we recommend that the Secretary  of Defense take the following four actions:  Direct the Director, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, in  consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), to  (1) develop and obtain approval of a comprehensive list of program  elements in the FYDP, which support activities for developing,  acquiring, and sustaining New Triad capabilities; (2) modify the FYDP to  establish a virtual major force program for the New Triad by creating  new data fields that would clearly identify and allow aggregation of New  Triad-related program elements to provide increased visibility of the  resources allocated for New Triad activities; and (3) report each year the  funding levels for New Triad activities and capabilities in the  department’s summary FYDP report to Congress. The Secretary of  Defense should direct that these three actions be completed at or about  the time when the President’s budget for fiscal year 2007 is submitted to  Congress.
Direct the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics to develop an overarching and integrated  long-term investment approach for the New Triad that provides decision  makers with information about future joint requirements, projected  resources, spending priorities and trade-offs, milestones, and funding  timelines. As part of developing and implementing this approach, DOD  should leverage the analyses, assessments, and other information  prepared under the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development  System process. The Secretary of Defense should direct that  development of a long-term investment approach be completed in time  for it to be considered in the department’s preparation of its submission  for the President’s budget for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 and be updated,  as needed, to adapt to changing circumstances.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: On April 28, 2005, we provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and  comment. As of the time this report went to final printing, DOD had not  provided comments as requested. However, DOD did provide technical  changes, which have been incorporated in this report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Commander, U.S. Strategic  Command; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will  make copies available to others upon request. In addition the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on (202) 512-4402.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Staff members who  made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: U.S. Strategic Command Missions
paragraphs: U.S. Strategic Command has a significant role in implementing the New  Triad, advocating for the development of New Triad capabilities, and  supporting its missions. It derives these responsibilities from missions  assigned by the President and the Secretary of Defense. Table 3 describes  U.S. Strategic Command’s current missions.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has  fully identified projected spending for the New Triad in its Future Years  Defense Program (FDYP), we reviewed key DOD documentation to  identify and define the New Triad’s capabilities and determine whether  DOD had identified specific, related programs in the FYDP.
Specifically, we obtained and reviewed relevant documents on the New  Triad, including the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Nuclear Posture  Review Implementation Plan, the Secretary of Defense’s fiscal year 2002  Annual Defense Report, the Defense Science Board’s February 2004 report,  Future Strategic Strike Forces, briefings by DOD officials, and relevant  programming guidance. We also obtained the results of an analysis  performed by the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation that identified  New Triad spending in the FYDP, and discussed the purpose, scope,  methodology, and limitations of the analysis with officials from this office.  In addition, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, including officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy, the Office of Strategic and Space  Programs in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, the Office of  the Deputy Assistant of the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, and  the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,  and Logistics. We also interviewed officials from the Joint Staff, U.S. Air  Force headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps headquarters, and the Department  of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration to gain an  understanding of their role in implementing the New Triad. We met with  officials of the U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska, to discuss the  command’s missions that are relevant to the New Triad.
As part of our effort to determine the extent to which DOD has identified  the projected spending for the New Triad in its FYDP, we performed our  own notional analysis of the FYDP to identify resources associated with the  New Triad. In doing so, we examined the FYDP’s structure and related  documentation to determine whether the FYDP was designed to capture  information that would identify specific program elements as being related  to the New Triad. We met with relevant DOD officials to discuss our  approach, and reviewed the analysis performed by the Office of Program  Analysis and Evaluation. We also reviewed prior GAO work to gain a better  understanding of whether the FYDP has been modified to allow for new  program element aggregations. In performing our analysis, we assessed the  reliability of the FYDP data by (1) performing electronic testing of required  data elements, (2) reviewing existing information about the data and the  system that produced them, (3) interviewing a knowledgeable DOD official  about the data, and (4) reviewing data reliability tests on these data  previously performed by GAO. We determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. Additional details about  how we performed our notional analysis are presented in appendix III.
To determine the extent to which DOD has developed a long-term  investment approach to identify and manage future investments needed to  achieve the synergistic capabilities envisioned for the New Triad, we  interviewed officials and reviewed key documentation to determine  whether DOD has taken steps to develop and follow such an approach.  Specifically, to identify best practices for a long-term investment approach,  we reviewed relevant GAO reports, and identified and reviewed investment  approaches of other organizations. We then compared DOD’s approach for  the New Triad against these elements that we had identified in other  organizations to determine the extent to which DOD had these elements in  place. In addition, we obtained and reviewed relevant documents,  including the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Nuclear Posture Review  Implementation Plan, the Secretary of Defense’s fiscal year 2002 Annual  Defense Report, the Defense Science Board’s February 2004 report, Future  Strategic Strike Forces, briefings provided by DOD officials, and relevant  programming guidance to identify investments and investment priorities in  building New Triad capabilities. We also met with officials from the Joint  Staff’s Directorate for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments to  discuss the development and implementation of the department’s new Joint  Capabilities Integration and Development System, and to determine  whether the New Triad’s plans for achieving desired capabilities were  aligned to this new system.
Additionally, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, including officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy, the Office of Strategic and Space  Programs in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, the Office of  the Deputy Assistant of the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, and  the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,  and Logistics. We also interviewed officials from the Joint Staff, U.S. Air  Force headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps headquarters, and the Department  of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration to gain their  perspectives. In addition, we visited the headquarters of the  U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska, and met with command  officials to discuss investments needed to acquire capabilities and  implement the command’s missions.
Our review was conducted between December 2003 and April 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: GAO’s Notional Analysis of the Programs and Projected Spending on the New Triad in the Future Years Defense Program
paragraphs: To determine how much the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend  on the New Triad, we performed a notional analysis of the Future Years  Defense Program (FYDP) to identify programs and projected spending  associated with New Triad capabilities. This analysis identifies 737  program elements that are either “fully dedicated” or “not fully dedicated”  to the New Triad. “Fully dedicated” program elements provide capabilities  that primarily execute or support New Triad missions, whereas “not fully  dedicated” program elements provide capabilities that have wider military  application than just the New Triad.
Our notional analysis is based on certain assumptions, which we  considered to be relevant and reasonable, about how to align New Triad  capabilities to FYDP program elements. For example, we assume that:  All program elements in the FYDP that are not defined as “historical” are  currently active and valid for analysis, even though there may not be any  spending currently associated with the program elements over the fiscal  years 2004 through 2009 time frame.
Certain FYDP field values, or combinations of values, can be used to  identify groups of program elements as being related to the New Triad.  For example, certain combinations of Force and Infrastructure Codes  and Defense Mission Codes can be used to identify particular New Triad  capabilities.
To ensure that our assumptions were reasonable, we discussed our overall  approach with budget experts at GAO and the Congressional Budget Office  and with DOD officials. Generally, these officials agreed with our approach  to identify the projected spending associated with the New Triad included  in the FYDP. However, DOD officials cautioned that identifying program  elements that are not fully dedicated to the New Triad can be difficult  because of the subjectivity required in deciding on the extent to which a  program element provides capabilities for the New Triad. Therefore, our  notional analysis suggests a methodology that can be used to conduct a  comprehensive accounting of the spending plans for the New Triad, and is  not meant to provide a definitive accounting of projected New Triad  spending. We recognize that the assumptions we made are subjective, and  that other analyses to identify projected spending on New Triad capabilities  in the FYDP may use different assumptions and obtain somewhat different  results.
subsections: section_title: Our Methodology for Identifying FYDP Program Elements Related to the New Triad
paragraphs: To identify DOD’s definitions of the four New Triad capabilities—offensive  strike; active and passive defenses; responsive infrastructure; and  command and control, intelligence, and planning—we used relevant DOD  documentation, such as the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Nuclear  Posture Review Implementation Plan, the Secretary of Defense’s fiscal  year 2002 Annual Defense Report, and the Defense Science Board’s  February 2004 report, Future Strategic Strike Forces. We compared these  capability definitions with information about each of the 4,725 FYDP  program elements we reviewed. When we determined that a program  element was related to one or more of the New Triad’s capabilities, we  categorized it according to the particular capability that it supported.
We then determined whether the program elements that we identified were  either fully dedicated or not fully dedicated to the New Triad. In making  this determination, we assumed that all of the program elements identified  in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation analysis were fully  dedicated to the New Triad. Table 4 summarizes the criteria we used to  identify and categorize program elements that are linked to the New Triad.
We then used the FYDP data to identify the projected spending associated  with these program elements for fiscal years 2004 through 2009, and  expressed our results in then-year dollars. The data for the projected  spending are current as of the President’s budget submission to Congress  for fiscal year 2005.
section_title: Projected New Triad Spending by FYDP Major Force Program
paragraphs: The FYDP’s strategic forces major force program, one of 11 major force  programs in the FYDP, includes $55.6 billion in then-year dollars for the  New Triad for fiscal years 2004 through 2009, or 15 percent of the  $360.1 billion of total spending that we identified. The offensive forces and  weapons systems in this program are primarily nuclear-focused. As  indicated in table 5, the remaining $304.6 billion, or 85 percent of the  projected spending that we identified, is dispersed among 7 of the  remaining 10 major force programs in the FYDP. The command, control,  communications, and intelligence program accounted for the largest share  of New Triad-related spending—$133.5 billion, or 37 percent of the  projected spending that we identified. We did not identify any projected  spending on the New Triad in major force programs for central supply and  maintenance; training, medical, and other general personnel activities; and  support of other nations.
section_title: Projected New Triad Spending by Primary Appropriation Category
paragraphs: We analyzed the $360.1 billion of projected spending associated with the  New Triad based on primary appropriation category, as illustrated in  figure 3. We determined that the largest amount of projected spending is for  research, development, test, and evaluation funding, which accounts for  $141.8 billion or 39 percent of the $360.1 billion in projected spending that  we identified. We identified $111.0 billion in projected spending for  operation and maintenance appropriations, or 31 percent of the total  spending that we identified.
section_title: Projected New Triad Spending by DOD Organizations
paragraphs: Defensewide programs, including programs managed by the Missile  Defense Agency, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and intelligence- related defense agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, account  for 50 percent of the $360.1 billion of projected spending that we identified  as being associated with the New Triad. Spending for Missile Defense  Agency-related program elements totals $53.1 billion during fiscal years  2004 through 2009 and is greater than the spending we identified for either  the departments of the Army or Navy. As shown in figure 4, among the  military departments the Air Force accounts for the largest share of New  Triad spending—$112.9 billion, or 31 percent of the $360.1 billion that we  identified for fiscal years 2004 through 2009. Spending by the Air Force,  Army, and Navy includes service support for defense agencies and  combatant commands, such as the U.S. Strategic Command.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Gwendolyn R. Jaffe,  Mark J. Wielgoszynski, David G. Hubbell, Kevin L. O’Neill,  Julie M. Tremper, and Renee S. McElveen made key contributions to  this report.