Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and Increase Readiness
Published: 2003-07-07T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains equipment and infrastructure worth billions of dollars in many environments where corrosion is causing military assets to deteriorate, shortening their useful life. The resulting increase in required repairs and replacements drives up costs and takes critical systems out of action, reducing mission readiness. GAO was asked to review military activities related to corrosion control. Specifically, this report examines the extent of the impact of corrosion on DOD and the military services and the extent of the effectiveness of DOD's and the services' approach to preventing and mitigating corrosion.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Although the full impact of corrosion cannot be quantified due to the limited amount of reliable data captured by DOD and the military services, current cost estimates, readiness, and safety data indicate that corrosion has a substantial impact on military equipment and infrastructure. In 2001, a government-sponsored study estimated the costs of corrosion for military systems and infrastructure at about $20 billion annually and found corrosion to be one of the largest components of life-cycle costs for weapon systems. Corrosion also reduces readiness because the need to repair or replace corrosion damage increases the downtime of critical military assets. For example, a recent study concluded that corrective maintenance of corrosion-related faults has degraded the readiness of all of the Army's approximately 2,450 force modernization helicopters. Finally, a number of serious safety concerns have also been associated with corrosion, including Navy F-14 and F-18 landing gear failures during carrier operations and crashes of several Air Force F-16 aircraft due to the corrosion of electrical contacts that control fuel valves. DOD and the military services do not have an effective approach to prevent and mitigate corrosion. They have had some successes in addressing corrosion problems on individual programs, but several weaknesses are preventing DOD and the military services from achieving much greater benefits, including potentially billions of dollars in additional net savings annually. Each service has multiple corrosion offices, and their different policies, procedures, and funding channels limit coordination. Also, the goals and incentives that guide these offices sometimes conflict with those of the operational commands that they rely on to fund project implementation. As a result, proposed projects are often assigned a lower priority compared to efforts offering more immediate results. Together, these problems reduce the effectiveness of DOD corrosion prevention. While DOD is in the process of establishing a central corrosion control activity and strategy, it remains to be seen whether these efforts will effectively address these weaknesses.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains equipment and infrastructure  worth billions of dollars in many environments where corrosion, in one  form or another, is causing military assets to deteriorate, shortening their  useful lives. The resulting increase in needed repairs and replacements  drives up costs and takes critical systems out of action, reducing mission  readiness. Corrosion can also create severe safety hazards leading to loss  of life when, for example, corroded electrical contacts in aircraft cause  system failures during flight. Because numerous advances in products and  technologies have been found to enhance efforts to prevent and mitigate  corrosion, it is critical that DOD, as the steward of an enormous investment  in military assets, ensure that all appropriate measures are implemented to  reduce corrosion costs to the greatest extent possible.
The Congress, recognizing corrosion as a serious military concern, enacted  legislation as part of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 2003 which requires DOD to designate a senior official or  organization responsible for preventing and mitigating the corrosion of  military equipment and infrastructure. The act requires the designated  official or organization to oversee and coordinate efforts throughout the  department, recommend policy guidance, and review the funding levels  proposed by each military service. The Secretary of Defense is required  to develop and implement a long-term strategy to reduce the effects  of corrosion.
You requested that we review military activities related to the prevention  and mitigation of corrosion. In this report we address the following  questions: (1) What is the extent of the impact of corrosion on the  military services’ equipment and facilities? (2) To what extent do DOD  and the military services have an effective approach to prevent and  mitigate corrosion?
To respond to these questions, we reviewed numerous studies and  discussed military corrosion impact issues with experts in and outside  DOD. To examine DOD and the military services’ approach to corrosion  prevention and mitigation, we visited field installations and developed  several case studies on specific corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts  that are summarized in appendix II and referred to throughout the report.  More detailed information about our scope and methodology is contained  in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Corrosion affects all military assets, including approximately  350,000 ground and tactical vehicles, 15,000 aircraft and helicopters,  1,000 strategic missiles, and 300 ships. Maintenance activities—including  corrosion control—involve nearly 700,000 military (active and reserve)  and DOD civilian personnel, as well as several thousand commercial firms  worldwide. Hundreds of thousands of additional mission support assets  and thousands of facilities are also affected.
Corrosion is defined as the unintended destruction or deterioration of a  material due to interaction with the environment. It includes such varied  forms as rusting; pitting; galvanic reaction; calcium or other mineral build  up; degradation due to ultraviolet light exposure; and mold, mildew, or  other organic decay. It can be either readily visible or microscopic. Factors  influencing the development and rate of corrosion include the type and  design of the material, the presence of electrolytes (water, minerals,  and salts), the availability of oxygen, the ambient temperature, and the  amount of exposure to the environment. The rate of corrosion increases  exponentially when the ambient humidity is over 50 percent. Corrosion  can also occur in the absence of water, but only at high temperatures, such  as in gas turbine engines.
The effects of corrosion on DOD equipment and infrastructure have  become more prominent as the acquisition of new equipment has slowed  and more reliance is placed on the service of aging equipment and  infrastructure. The aging of military systems poses a unique challenge  for maintenance and corrosion control for all services.
A number of DOD and commercial studies have identified and evaluated  technologies and techniques for corrosion prevention and control. The  studies indicate that although effective corrosion prevention and control  methods and technologies are well known and have been recommended for  years, they have not been implemented effectively. The studies also  identify a number of relatively simple solutions—such as covered storage,  controlled environment, washing and rinsing, spray-on rust inhibitors, and  protective wrapping—to mitigate and control the effects of corrosion.
Congress has recognized the need to significantly reduce the economic  burden on the military services of the damage caused by corrosion and  of the efforts to mitigate its adverse affects. In November 2002,  Congress passed the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for  Fiscal Year 2003, which required the Department of Defense to take the  following steps:  Designate a responsible official or organization within the department  to (1) oversee and coordinate corrosion prevention and mitigation of  military equipment and infrastructure; (2) develop and recommend  policy guidance; (3) review programs and funding levels; and  (4) provide oversight and coordination of the efforts to incorporate  corrosion control during the design, acquisition, and maintenance of  military equipment and infrastructure.
Develop and implement a long-term strategy to reduce corrosion and  the effects of corrosion on the military equipment and infrastructure of  the Department of Defense not later than 1 year after the date of the  enactment of the act.
Submit to Congress an Interim Report regarding the actions taken to  date by the corrosion control office when the President submits the  budget for fiscal year 2004. On May 22, 2003, DOD submitted the report.
section_title: Impacts on Military Costs, Readiness, and Safety Indicate That Corrosion Is an Extensive Problem
paragraphs: Numerous studies in recent years have documented the pervasive nature of  corrosion and its various effects on military equipment and infrastructure.  Although the full impact of corrosion cannot be quantified due to the  limited amount of reliable data captured by DOD and the military services,  current cost estimates, readiness, and safety data indicate that corrosion  has a substantial effect on military equipment and infrastructure. Costs are  significant because corroded military assets must often be repaired or  replaced at great expense. Readiness is also severely impaired because  corrosion increases the maintenance needed and, therefore, the downtime  on a large quantities of military equipment. The effects extend to  infrastructure, which, in turn, has an adverse impact on the military’s  ability to meet mission requirements. Further, corrosion has an equally  profound effect on the safety of equipment and infrastructure.
subsections: section_title: Corrosion Costs Appear to Be Enormous
paragraphs: Corrosion’s impact on military costs appears to be enormous, representing  one of the largest life-cycle cost components of military weapon systems.  In a 2001 government-sponsored study, corrosion is estimated to cost the  Department of Defense at least $20 billion a year. Another study done in  1996 puts the cost at closer to $10 billion annually. The costs identified  in these reports are direct costs such as the manpower and material that  are used primarily to inspect and repair damage resulting from corrosion.  However, there are also indirect costs that, were they to be quantified,  would significantly increase the total reported costs. Indirect costs  include the loss of the opportunity to use equipment that is not in  operating condition. Although extensive equipment downtime results  from corrosion, the attendant financial impacts have not been fully  captured. Even more difficult to quantify is the cost of using equipment  that, while not inoperable, has diminished utility due to corrosion.  Considering the enormous total value of all of the equipment owned by  the military services, these costs are considerable, to say the least.  Corrosion also shortens the service life and accelerates the depreciation  of DOD facilities, which in a recent GAO report are estimated to have a  replacement value of over $435 billion. This impact on facilities translates  into costs that are not included in the government corrosion cost study.
There are numerous examples of how profoundly corrosion affects costs.  For example, in 1993, the Army estimated spending about $2 billion to  $2.5 billion a year to mitigate the corrosion of wheeled vehicles, including  5-ton trucks. (See fig. 1.)
Corrosion was found to be so extensive on some of the trucks that the  repair costs were greater than 65 percent of the average cost of a new  vehicle. Cost impacts appear to be even greater on Army helicopters, as  evidenced by a 1998 analysis estimating costs of about $4 billion to repair  damage attributed to corrosion. Corrosion is also a formidable cost  driver to the Navy. As an illustration, the Navy’s Pacific and Atlantic Fleets  estimate that about 25 percent of their total combined annual maintenance  budget is directed to the prevention and correction of corrosion. Navy  officials told us that the prevention and removal of corrosion on shipboard  tanks alone costs the Navy over $174 million a year. Navy facilities such  as waterfront structures are also decaying because of corrosion, and  these facilities will need to be replaced at considerable cost. For example,  naval military construction projects estimated to cost $727 million are  required to restore 20 piers that have suffered extensive corrosion damage.  (See fig. 2.)
In 1990, the Air Force estimated the cost of corrosion to be about  $700 million. Interestingly, even though the number of operational  Air Force aircraft decreased significantly, corrosion costs for the  Air Force increased to over $1 billion by 2001, or $300 million more  than previously reported.
section_title: Corrosion Substantially Degrades Equipment and Facilities Readiness
paragraphs: Corrosion has been shown to substantially increase equipment downtime,  thereby reducing readiness. Whether it affects a truck, helicopter, ship, or  pipeline, corrosion is a major contributor to the amount of maintenance  required on military equipment and infrastructure. Depending on the kind  and severity of corrosion, the maintenance may be performed as part of  the scheduled maintenance cycle or as emergency repairs, especially  when it involves safety concerns. Whether scheduled or not, maintenance  translates into equipment downtime. As a result, readiness is diminished  because the equipment cannot be used for training purposes or for other  kinds of operations. In addition, corrosion contributes to or accelerates the  deterioration of equipment and, therefore, reduces its service life. As a  result, the condition of some equipment is assessed to have deteriorated  beyond repair capability and the equipment is no longer usable.
The effects on readiness are extensive throughout the military services,  and they are clearly evidenced in regard to military aircraft. For example,  a 2001 study concluded that corrective maintenance of corrosion-related  faults has degraded the readiness of all of the Army’s approximately  2,450 force modernization helicopters. (See fig. 3.)
The effects on the Air Force’s KC-135 are particularly pronounced, with  corrosion identified as the reason for over 50 percent of the maintenance  needed on the aircraft. While the Air Force has yet to quantify the total  impact, one study identified corrosion of avionics equipment contacts to  be a significant cause of failure rates on all Air Force aircraft. Because  these failure rates affect equipment that is sophisticated and often occurs  in hard-to-access areas, a significant amount of time is needed for testing,  inspection, and repair. This extends aircraft downtime and reduces  readiness levels. Corrosion has also reduced the readiness levels for the  Navy’s P-3C aircraft. According to Navy officials, corrosion has always  been responsible for a large part of maintenance required for the aircraft,  but the amount has doubled in recent years. While these officials do not  have specific information regarding the effects of corrosion, they did  note that in just the past year they had to ground two aircraft specifically  because of severe corrosion.
The effects on readiness extend well beyond aviation and include  virtually every type of equipment maintained and operated by the military.  Corrosion also severely affects the readiness of other types of equipment,  such as Army vehicles. In 1996, the Army identified corrosion as the reason  why 17 percent of its trucks located in Hawaii were not mission capable.  Earlier in 1993, the availability of the Army’s High Mobility Multipurpose  Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) had been particularly diminished because of  corrosion. While some of the vehicles were out of service for as long as a  year, others had such severe corrosion that they had to be scrapped after  5 years, many years short of their expected 15-year service life. The Air  Force also identified severe corrosion on its ground vehicles, resulting  in increased maintenance and downtime. Some of the vehicles showed  significant deterioration just months after being delivered to field units.
Corrosion and its impact on readiness are especially a concern for the  Navy, because its ships operate in highly corrosive salt water and in  high-humidity locations. A notable example of these effects occurred in  2001 on the aircraft carrier USS John F Kennedy. Maintenance problems,  including many that were corrosion-related, were so severe that the  carrier could not complete its planned operations. Even more recently, the  carrier USS Kitty Hawk returned from a series of deployments, including  Operation Enduring Freedom, with significant maintenance problems  that also included topside corrosion. As a result, the carrier is expected  to undergo extensive maintenance.
Such effects are found Navy-wide, and the Navy estimates that about  25 percent of its fleet maintenance budget goes toward corrosion  prevention and control. This and other kinds of maintenance are largely  completed at a Navy depot and require an average of 6 months. During this  extended period of time, the ship is not available for service. The amount  of time the ship is in the depot is due in part to the repairs needed because  of corrosion; Navy officials told us this amount of corrosion-related  maintenance is understated because it does not include the vast amount  of manpower and resources spent on corrosion removal and repainting  while the ships are on operations. These repairs, too, have an impact on  readiness, because crew members who would normally be undergoing  training or other kinds of operations are, instead, required to  perform maintenance.
Corrosion also impairs the readiness of military armament. For example,  the Army reported a significant number of failures due to corrosion on the  155 mm medium-towed howitzer so severe that they resulted in aborted  missions. The study estimates that between 30 to 40 percent of the aborts  are direct results of corrosion. Corrosion is also identified as accounting  for 39 percent of all unscheduled maintenance for the howitzer, further  reducing the readiness levels of the equipment. In addition, corrosion has  affected the readiness of the Air Force’s general purpose iron bombs.  (See fig. 4.)
According to Air Force records, of the approximately 450,000 bombs of  this type in the Air Force inventory, more than 107,000 (or over 24 percent)  have varying levels of deterioration caused by corrosion and, as a result,  are not mission capable. While many of these bombs are repairable, a  certain level of maintenance is needed to restore most of them to  acceptable operational condition. Some of the bombs, however, are too  severely corroded to be salvageable.
Military facilities are also decaying due to corrosion and, as a result,  readiness is affected adversely. In 2001, the Department of Defense  reported that more than two-thirds of its military facilities have serious  deficiencies and are in such poor condition that they are unable to meet  certain mission requirements. The department identifies corrosion as a  major contributor to much of this deterioration. According to military  service officials, the most significant area of concern may be the condition  of military airfields. Each of the military services has reported runway  cracking so severe that the runways were judged unusable. Deterioration  of this kind was even identified in airfields used for operations during  Enduring Freedom. For example, runway cracks at Pope Air Force Base,  North Carolina, were so extensive that several C-130 cargo planes and A-10  fighters heading for Afghanistan were diverted to other U.S. installations.  Further, Navy facilities officials told us that infrastructure deterioration is  so significant that it has adverse impacts on the service’s ability to perform  required maintenance on its equipment. For example, they said that parts  of the ceiling of an aircraft hanger located at North Island Naval Air Station,  California, had crumbled as a result of corrosion. Because of the safety  hazard and potential damage to aircraft, the hanger had to be closed down  for several months for repairs and the aircraft relocated to other storage  facilities. Corrosion of facilities and the impacts on readiness go well  beyond problems experienced at airfields and hangars. The Pacific Air  Force Command cited corrosion as the cause of failures of numerous  critical infrastructure, including aircraft refueling, fire protection,  electrical, and command and control facilities. The Command noted that  this kind of deterioration can significantly impact its ability to perform  its mission.
section_title: Corrosion Poses Numerous Safety Risks
paragraphs: Corrosion also poses numerous safety risks and is a source of major  concern to all military services. This concern is particularly acute when  associated with the safety of military aircraft. According to an Army study,  from 1989 through 2000 the Army experienced 46 mishaps, 9 fatalities,  and 13 injuries directly related to corrosion. During calendar year 2001, the  Army issued four Safety of Flight messages for its rotary wing systems due  to corrosion-related material deficiencies that adversely affected 2,100,  or over 88 percent, of its force modernization helicopters. As recently as  March 2002, the Navy suspended carrier operations for F-14 aircraft when  one aircraft crashed because its landing gear collapsed due to corrosion.
Just 2 years earlier, the Navy had identified corrosion as the cause of a  landing gear failure on a F-18 that occurred during carrier operations.  Despite regular inspections, stress cracking in the landing gear evaded  detection, and the problem was not revealed until after the accident when  the equipment was examined under an electron microscope. Perhaps even  more difficult to detect, but nevertheless just as significant, are the safety  risks corrosion presents on F-16 avionics connectors. This aircraft has  sophisticated electronics equipment that is housed in Line Replaceable  Units. Although these containers provide considerable protection from the  elements, they cannot entirely eliminate moisture from entering, and even  microscopic amounts of moisture can cause catastrophic accidents. For  example, during the 1980s, uncommanded fuel valve closures caused  several F-16 aircraft crashes. The equipment failures were believed to  be the result of corrosion on the avionics connectors.
Corrosion also poses major safety hazards at military facilities. Perhaps  the greatest safety risk, according to facilities officials, is the cracking  of concrete runways at airfields operated by all of the military services.  (See fig. 5.)
One of the causes of this deterioration results from a corrosive chemical  process called alkali-silica reaction, which occurs when alkalis react with  water in ways that cause cracking, chipping, and expansion of concrete. As  airfields continue to decay and crumble, more pieces of concrete are left on  the runway, and these pieces have been absorbed by military aircraft and  cited as the causes of innumerable aircraft safety incidents and accidents.  Airfield cracking due to corrosion and the safety risk that it presents is so  extensive that all the military services have experienced serious incidents  resulting from this hazard. Examples of this kind of damage have been  reported at Osan Air Base, Korea; Ft. Campbell Army Airfield, Kentucky;  Naval Air Station Point Mugu, California; and Marine Corps Air Station,  Iwakuni, Japan. The foreign object debris hazard was so severe at the Little  Rock Air Force Base that the Air Mobility Command assessed a taxiway as  unsuitable for operations. At Naval Air Station Pensacola, several recent  incidents were reported of Navy aircraft penetrating cracked airfield  pavement and jeopardizing pilot safety.
Pipelines that contain natural gas and other kinds of fuel also pose a  safety risk at military facilities. A majority of the pipelines are quite old and  are constructed largely of metal that is susceptible to corrosion, which is  the major cause of pipeline ruptures. Air Force facilities officials told us  that some of the pipelines were installed as far back as the 1950s, and  older pipelines pose an even greater hazard because they have a higher  probability of rupturing from corrosion. The services are gradually  replacing many of the metal pipelines with pipelines made of high-density  polyethylene plastic and other materials that are more corrosion resistant.  The use of cathodic protection devices also helps to prevent corrosion.  Facilities officials told us that despite these measures and periodic  inspections, they have experienced numerous pipeline ruptures they  attribute to corrosion. They said that until all of the existing pipelines are  replaced, such ruptures will continue to be a source of major concern.  However, replacing pipelines is very expensive, and facilities officials said  that it would take many years to obtain enough funds to replace all of them.  Facilities officials at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, said  that they have experienced several fuel line ruptures, many of them caused  by corroded pipe valves. They said fuel lines that run alongside base  housing pose the greatest safety concern, and they have begun to replace  these lines first. Eventually they hope to replace all of them throughout  the base.
section_title: Full Impact of Corrosion Unknown Due to Incomplete Cost, Readiness, and Safety Data
paragraphs: For more than a decade, a number of DOD, military service, and  private-sector studies have cited the lack of reliable data to adequately  assess the overall impact of the corrosion problem. Studies done in  1996 and 2001 on DOD corrosion data collection and analysis found that,  while individual services have attempted to quantify the cost of corrosion,  neither the mechanisms nor the methodologies exist to accurately quantify  the problem. A 2001 Army study found that no single data system provides  aggregate corrosion data related to cost, maintenance, and readiness, and  that the existence of many separate databases restrict the ability to collect  standardized data reflecting consistent characteristics. The study, which  focused on Army aviation, concluded that existing automated information  systems do not provide decision makers with complete, accurate, or timely  corrosion repair and replacement data. An Air Force study came to similar  conclusions. Navy officials told us that information regarding the cost of  corrosion is incomplete because these costs are difficult to isolate from  overall maintenance costs. They said these data limitations make it difficult  to determine the severity of the problems and to justify the funding needed  to prevent corrosion problems in the future. Facilities officials at Marine  Corps Base Camp Pendleton said that their databases do not specifically  identify data as corrosion related. They told us they would prefer to have  better data for making investment decisions but instead must rely primarily  on information obtained from periodic and annual corrosion inspections.
We identified many examples of how the lack of reliable and complete  information impeded the funding and progress of corrosion prevention  projects. In addition, military officials at the unit level told us that they  had trouble obtaining sufficient data and analysis to justify the cost  effectiveness of prevention projects. They cited the lack of information as  one of the main reasons why corrosion mitigation projects were not being  funded. For example, Air Force officials told us that an aircraft rinsing  facility at Hickam Air Force Base is no longer operable, and they need  about $4 million for a new facility. They also said that although they do not  have sufficient data to accurately estimate expected cost savings from  reduced maintenance, they believe it would far exceed initial investment  costs. They added that their inability to move forward stems largely from a  lack of the data and analysis needed to justify the projects. The Marine  Corps faced similar obstacles in justifying the installation of a helicopter  rinsing facilities at Marine Corps Air Facility, Kaneohe Bay. (See fig. 6.)
Officials told us that the corrosion maintenance costs they would avoid in  the first year alone would exceed the total amount of funding needed to  build an additional facility, but they do not have the data or resources to  support the necessary analysis, and without it they cannot justify the  project or obtain approval for the funds.
section_title: DOD and Services’ Approach to Corrosion Control Is Not Effective but Has Achieved Some Successes
paragraphs: While the military services have achieved some successes on individual  corrosion prevention projects, significant weaknesses in their overall  approach to corrosion control have decreased the effectiveness of their  efforts. An important limitation is the lack of a strategic plan that includes  long-term goals and outcome-based performance measures. In addition,  coordination within and among the services is limited, and the priorities of  organizations that plan corrosion prevention projects and those that  implement and fund them are frequently in conflict. As a result, promising  projects often fall far short of their potential, and many are never initiated  at all.
subsections: section_title: Some Corrosion Prevention Improvements Are Being Introduced during and after Acquisition Production Process
paragraphs: Major commands, program offices, and research and development  centers servicewide have made and continue to make improvements  in the methods and techniques for preventing corrosion. Corrosion  prevention improvements can either be introduced during the design and  production phases or some time after equipment is fielded. For example,  durable coatings, composite materials, and cathodic protection are being  incorporated to an increasing extent in the design and construction of  military facilities and equipment to reduce corrosion-related maintenance.  Systems as diverse as the joint strike fighter, the DD-X destroyer,  amphibious assault vehicles, and HMMWV trucks plan to use composite  materials and advanced protective coatings to increase corrosion  resistance. The military services estimate that as much as 25 to 35 percent  of corrosion costs can be eliminated by using these and other corrosion  prevention efforts, which would amount to billions of dollars in potential  savings each year. Our recent report on total ownership costs of military  equipment discusses some of the approaches DOD is using to incorporate  maintenance reduction techniques, including corrosion mitigation, into the  design and development of new systems.
Regarding the maintenance of existing equipment and infrastructure, we  have identified several examples of projects that show potential for a  high return on investment and advances in the technologies of corrosion  prevention but which have not, for various reasons, been fully  implemented. For example, the Naval Sea Systems Command has  developed durable coatings that increase the amount of corrosion  protection for various kinds of tanks (such as fuel and ballast tanks)  on Navy ships to 20 years instead of the 5 years formerly possible. The  installation of the coatings started in fiscal year 1996. However, by the  end of fiscal year 2002, the Navy had installed these coatings on less than  7 percent of the tanks, for an estimated net savings of about $10 million  a year. The tank preservation effort has not been widely implemented  because, Navy officials told us, the fleet has other needs that have a higher  priority. Navy officials told us they frequently have to defer the installation  of the new coatings because of the limited availability of ships due to the  increased pace of Fleet operations and more pressing maintenance  requirements. As a result, the Navy estimates that it is about $161 million  short of achieving the total annual net cost savings projected for this  corrosion prevention effort. The Command has numerous other projects  that have fallen short of their potential because the fleet had higher  priorities. While these projects have total projected annual net savings of  another $919 million, they have achieved about $33 million in yearly  savings to date. Once implemented, the benefits of these efforts extend  well beyond cost savings because they have the potential to significantly  reduce ship maintenance, thereby increasing the availability of ships for  operations.
The Army National Guard’s Controlled Humidity Preservation project  represents another example of a high potential savings effort that has not  been fully realized. Under this project, dehumidified air is pumped into  buildings or equipment to reduce the rate of corrosion. (See fig. 7.)
Project officials claimed net savings of $225 million through the end of  fiscal year 2002. While officials state the project has proven to be a success  so far, they now estimate that it will take about 15 years to achieve the total  projected savings, or 5 years longer than originally planned. Army National  Guard officials told us they could achieve greater savings if they receive  additional funding earlier than is currently planned.
The Air Force’s bomb metalization project is also not achieving its full  cost savings potential. According to an Air Force study, treating cast iron,  general-purpose bombs with a special protective metallic spray coating  would save the Air Force at least $30 million in maintenance costs over  30 years, although one study estimated the savings to be as much as  $100 million. The Air Force stores about 450,000 of this type of bomb in  locations throughout the world. Air Force officials told us that the total  investment costs for the project are about $5 million, which, based on the  higher cost savings estimate, translates into a return on investment ratio  of 20 to 1. After several years of planning and implementation, about  15,000 bombs, or 3 percent, have received the treatment.
Appendix II provides more detailed information about these and other  examples of projects that are not reaching their full potential.
section_title: Strategic Plan Lacking for DOD and Service Corrosion Efforts
paragraphs: DOD does not currently have a strategic plan for corrosion prevention and  mitigation, and the services either have not developed such plans or have  not implemented them.
However, DOD is required within 1 year of enactment of the  Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003  (i.e., by December 2, 2003) to submit to Congress a report setting forth  its long-term strategy to reduce corrosion and the effects of corrosion on  military equipment and infrastructure. The act requires DOD include in  its long-term strategy performance measures and milestones for reducing  corrosion that are compatible with the Government Performance and  Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). GPRA offers a model for developing an  effective management framework to improve the likelihood of successfully  implementing initiatives and assessing results. Under GPRA, agencies at all  levels are required to set strategic goals, measure performance, identify  levels of resources needed, and report on the degree to which goals have  been met. Without implementing these critical performance-measuring  elements, management is unable to identify and prioritize projects  systematically, allocate resources effectively, and determine which  projects have been successful. As a result, managers are not in a position to  make sound investment decisions on proposed corrosion control projects.
The military services either have not established effective strategic plans  that include goals, objectives, and performance measuring systems or  they have not implemented them. The limitations to the military services’  efforts to establish strategic plans are as follows:  The Army created a comprehensive corrosion control program plan— including goals, objectives, and performance measures—but the plan  was never fully implemented. As part of the plan, the Army defined  specific performance measures to track the progress of corrosion  mitigation efforts, but these were not put into effect. The strategy  called for the creation of panels comprised of top government and  industry corrosion experts who would use performance metrics to  evaluate proposed and ongoing projects against approved goals and  objectives. However, the panels were never established and the metrics  were not implemented. Army corrosion control officials told us that they  have very little performance data, such as return on investment or  annual savings, for any of their corrosion control initiatives. Officials at  the Army Center for Economic Analysis told us they have not measured  performance for the purpose of determining the return on investment  for any corrosion control project for many years; the last performance  evaluation was carried out in 1997.
In 1998, the Air Force published a business plan for equipment corrosion  control, but the plan was implemented for a short time and did not  contain all of the elements of a strategic plan. For example, it identified  three management goals, but did not include performance measures.  Also, the Air Force Equipment Maintenance Instruction that identifies  responsibilities for the Air Force Corrosion Prevention and Control  Office does not identify goals or performance measures. Although an Air  Force Instruction on Performance Management states that performance  management, including goals and performance measures, is the  Air Force’s framework for a continual improvement system,  officials told us that the business plan was no longer being used.  They said that, in the past, there has been more emphasis on creating  goals and monitoring performance, but because of limited resources,  reductions in personnel, and increased optempo these activities are  no longer performed.
The Navy commands (Naval Air Systems Command and Naval Sea  Systems Command) have engaged in some strategic planning for  corrosion control, but the Navy does not have a servicewide strategic  plan in this area, and its corrosion control offices lack the information  and metrics needed to track progress. The Naval Air Systems Command  planned to establish a corrosion control and prevention office but the  plan—which included goals and objectives and outlined how progress  would be measured—was never approved. The corrosion control and  prevention activity at Naval Sea Systems Command is also not a formal  program, and it lacks clearly defined overall goals and objectives. This  office has identified cost avoidance projects and tracks the amount of  savings achieved to date. However, more could be done to monitor  performance. For example, there was no analysis of the reasons why  specific projects were proceeding at a slow pace. Without this  information, the office is not in a position to know what actions can be  taken to improve the effectiveness of these projects.
The Marine Corps has a corrosion control plan that includes long-term,  broadly stated goals but does not include measurable, outcome-oriented  objectives or performance measures. Marine Corps officials told us that  they are in the process of revising the plan to include measures that will  track progress toward achieving servicewide goals.
Corrosion control officials said they measure progress through a  combination of field surveys, special corrosion assessments, and  Integrated Product Teams. They also rely on the evaluations of  operational and installation commands and program offices but readily  acknowledge that this is not sufficient. They told us that they would prefer  to have more systematic performance measures and that these tools  would improve the success of individual projects and the corrosion effort  as a whole.
section_title: Limited Coordination Within and Among the Services
paragraphs: DOD has multiple corrosion control efforts—with different policies,  procedures, and funding channels—that are not well coordinated with each  other; as a result, opportunities for cost savings have been lost. DOD is in  the process of establishing a central corrosion control office in response to  the authorization act, but no single office exists within each of the military  services to provide leadership and oversight for corrosion control of  equipment and infrastructure. Although the services have attempted to  establish central corrosion control offices, the responsibility largely falls  on numerous commands, installations, and program offices to fund and  implement projects. Military officials told us the offices were not fully  established, primarily because of limited funding. The Army, for example,  has established a central office for corrosion control of all service  equipment; the chain of command for the Army corrosion office for  facilities is separate from this office. Although a central office for  equipment exists, each Army command also has separate corrosion control  offices that are responsible for certain types of equipment—for example,  tanks/automotive, aviation/missiles, armaments, and electronics. Further,  individual weapon system program offices within each command may have  their own corrosion control functions. In addition, installations implement  their own corrosion control projects with the assistance of the Army  Department of Public Works and the Army Corps of Engineers. The  recently established Army Installation Management Agency provides  overall management and funding for upkeep on Army installations.
The Navy and Air Force also have multiple corrosion prevention and  mitigation offices. The Navy manages them through the materials offices  within the Naval Sea Systems Command and Naval Aviation Command.  The Air Force Materiel Command manages the Air Force’s efforts at an  office located at Robins Air Force Base. Like the Army, these commands  have multiple weapon systems program offices that also plan and  implement corrosion projects. The Navy and Air Force also have separate  organizations that are responsible for corrosion prevention and mitigation  efforts related to infrastructure. The Naval Facilities Engineering Center at  Port Hueneme, California, provides this service for both the Navy and  Marine Corps and, in turn, relies on the individual installations to manage  and implement their own efforts. The Air Force Civil Engineering Support  Agency provides this service for the Air Force.
This fragmentation of corrosion prevention efforts minimizes coordination  and limits standardization within and among the services, as evidenced by  the following examples:  A June 2000 corrosion assessment of the Army’s Pacific area of  operations concluded that no standard corrosion control program,  policy, or training exists for any Army commodity, which reduces the  effectiveness of the Army’s efforts to control corrosion on vehicles,  tanks, and other equipment.
Even when the services are in a severely corrosive environment  in which they operate relatively near to one another, few formal  mechanisms exist to facilitate the exchange of corrosion information.  For example, in Hawaii Army officials for the Reserve and National  Guard and active units stated that they had limited knowledge of one  another’s corrosion control activities or the activities of other services.  Army officials told us they cannot afford to miss an opportunity to use  the latest corrosion control products and practices, and it would be  unfortunate to be deprived of any advances, especially if they are  available and being used elsewhere. In addition, Air Force facilities  officials in Hawaii told us that they are not aware of any formal process  for sharing corrosion prevention and control information with  other services.
Officials at Marine Corps Air Facility Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, an area of  high humidity and salt, told us that temporary shelters can be a very  cost-effective way to reduce the corrosion of equipment such as  vehicles, transformers, and aviation ground equipment that are  currently stored outside because of limited space. (See fig. 8.)
These officials were unable to acquire the shelters because they did  not have the time or resources to undertake the analysis necessary to  support the purchase. They were aware that temporary shelters are  being used at other Marine Corps and Army installations, but they did  not know how the installations acquired the shelters or justified their  purchase. The officials suggested a standard mechanism for gathering  and communicating the information necessary to justify purchase of  the shelters.
The Air Force conducted a series of multiyear studies that found that  using inexpensive corrosion-inhibiting lubricants on aircraft electrical  connectors has the potential to save hundreds of millions of dollars  annually. (See fig. 9.)
Air Force officials estimate that using corrosion-inhibiting lubricants  could save more than $500 million annually on the F-16 fleet alone.  Although the use of these lubricants is recommended in a joint  technical manual on avionics corrosion control, their use is not  required. The Air Force and Navy have developed different product  specifications for the lubricants. The Navy’s specification covers  the lubricants’ use on both metal surfaces and electrical connectors,  and more than a dozen products have qualified for use under the  specification. However, Air Force studies determined that while  some of the products work well on electrical connectors, others are  detrimental. As a result, the Air Force created a new specification for  lubricant use, limiting it to electrical connectors. Air Force officials  want the Navy to modify its specification so that only the appropriate  products can qualify; otherwise, Air Force officials believe, those who  refer to the joint manual containing both specifications could order a  product detrimental to electronic systems. An Air Force contractor  has drafted specification revisions for the Navy, but due to differing  requirements and changes of personnel, the Navy has apparently  decided to conduct further studies before revising its specifications.  According to Air Force officials, these and other difficulties in  coordinating with the Navy have prompted the Air Force to consider  withdrawing from participation with the Navy in joint service manuals  on corrosion control of aircraft and avionics.
Army National Guard officials in Hawaii told us that they were not  aware of the status of the Army’s nearby corrosion inhibitor application  center. (See fig. 10.) The facility currently has the capacity to apply  corrosion inhibitors to about 6,000 vehicles per year. National Guard  officials told us that they often store vehicles for long periods of time,  and corrosion is always a problem. They indicated interest in finding  out more about the Army’s facility and any opportunities for  participating with the Army if the corrosion inhibitors can reduce  corrosion cost effectively.
The services have created some valuable mechanisms, including  special working groups and annual corrosion conferences, which make  important contributions to corrosion prevention efforts and help facilitate  intra- and inter-service coordination. However, these mechanisms do not  represent a systematic approach to coordination. The effectiveness of  these mechanisms is often dependent on the individual initiative of those  who participate directly, as well as on the funds available to initiate  corrosion-related activities. For example, each of the services hosts an  annual corrosion conference, but individuals attend only to the extent that  available time and travel funds allow. Furthermore, the dissemination of  conference information relies to a large extent on attendees taking the  initiative to use the information or communicate it to others. Limited  follow-up is carried out to determine the extent to which this information  is used in new applications. Several of the officers acting as corrosion  coordinators in Hawaii indicated that their commands were often unable  to allow them the time or travel funds to attend corrosion conferences.  They added that some, but not all, of the conference papers and briefings  were available to them.
section_title: Conflicting Incentives and Priorities Limit Corrosion Project Implementation
paragraphs: Because of the differing priorities between short-term operational needs  and long-term preventative maintenance needs, corrosion projects are  often given a low priority.
Corrosion control offices act largely in an advisory role, providing  guidance, information, and expertise on initiatives and practices. They  have limited funding and authority, and they promote initiatives with  benefits that may not become apparent until a project is far along in its  implementation, which may be years in the future. These priorities and  incentives are very different from and sometimes conflict with those held  by the operational or installation commands and their subordinate units.  While these commands also strive for better corrosion prevention, they  place a greater emphasis on more immediate, short-term needs that are  directly tied to current operations.
Because the corrosion control offices generally receive only limited  start-up funding for corrosion prevention projects, they must rely  heavily on operational commands and other program offices to provide  the necessary resources and implementation. However, these commands  often have limited resources beyond those needed to carry out their  immediate mission objectives, and the military services have not  established sufficient incentives for the commands (which have the  approval and funding authority) to invest in the long-term, cumulative  benefits of corrosion prevention and control efforts. As a result, many  proposed corrosion control projects—even those with large cost saving  potential and other benefits, such as increased readiness and enhanced  safety—often remain underfunded because they are a low priority to the  commands compared to operational and repair projects that offer more  immediate results.
These conflicting incentives and priorities are demonstrated by the fact  that the services have sacrificed the condition of their facilities and  infrastructure by using base maintenance accounts, including funds  for corrosion prevention and control, to pay for training and combat  operations. We were told at many of the bases we visited that the problem  with maintaining the infrastructure was that base commanders siphon  off infrastructure maintenance and repair funds for other operational  priorities. For example, at Fort Irwin we were told that only 40 percent  of infrastructure requirements were funded and that most preventative  maintenance is deferred. Officials at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton  said that they have an infrastructure maintenance backlog totaling over  $193 million and many of the projects are to repair facilities that have  deteriorated due to corrosion. The backlog is not limited to this location,  as the Navy reports an infrastructure backlog of $2 billion Navy-wide.  Navy officials said they do not have accurate data but estimate that a  large percentage of the deferred maintenance is corrosion related.  Hickam Air Force Base facilities officials also told us that they often  have to defer or reduce corrosion prevention projects because the base  continually needs funds for higher priorities, usually those associated  with operations. At the same time, the Army, in its 2002 Annual Report  to Congress, stated that it cannot continue to fully fund its Combat Arms  Training Strategy without further degrading its infrastructure and related  activities. The Army recently established a new agency that centralizes  all installation management activities to ensure that maintenance  dollars, including those for corrosion control, are disbursed equitably  and efficiently across installations. Officials of the new Installation  Management Agency said that the goal of centralization is to halt the trend  of major commands transferring funding from infrastructure maintenance  accounts to pay for other operations.
The Navy’s corrosion projects are similarly affected by a tendency to  postpone maintenance projects to address more immediate demands.  For example, the Navy’s efforts to reduce corrosion on more than  11,700 tanks on Navy ships are very time-consuming and expensive.  (See app. II for more details of this case study.) To reduce costs, the Navy  developed advanced coatings that are intended to last much longer, require  less maintenance, and result in net savings of over $170 million annually.  As of the end of fiscal year 2002, the Navy has only been able to install the  new coatings on about 750 tanks, or less than 7 percent. Navy officials  attribute the slow pace to the fact that shipyards place a higher priority on  maintenance that requires immediate attention. These officials told us that  the shipyards are hard-pressed to complete even necessary repairs and  have little incentive to undertake prevention projects that will not show  any benefits for many years.
Conflicting priorities are also evidenced by Navy and Marine Corps efforts  to prevent the corrosion of underground pipelines. Navy officials informed  us that pipeline corrosion is one of their major facilities maintenance  concerns. According to these officials, many pipelines at multiple Navy  installations are several decades old and made of metal that is highly  susceptible to corrosion. (See fig. 11.)
Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center officials told us that they do  not have accurate data, but they estimate that several million dollars are  being spent each year to fix leaks and ruptures that result from corrosion.  They further stated that they could save significant maintenance costs if  they were to aggressively start replacing existing pipelines with pipelines  made of high-density polyethylene plastic and other nonmetallic material  that is much more corrosion resistant. Naval facilities officials said that  while this replacement project would be a big money-saver in the long run,  the strategy would require a substantial investment, and they need to place  a higher priority on fixing more immediate problems that disrupt or impair  current operations. The Marine Corps is faced with similar conflicting  pressures. At Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, officials told us  that they have old and decaying pipelines and valves throughout the  installation. To save significant repair costs, they would prefer to replace  them with pipelines and valves made of high-density polyethylene plastic as  quickly as possible. (See fig. 12.)
However, the process is labor-intensive and, therefore, very expensive.  They said that as a rule they must attend to more immediate problems, and  only when resources permit are they able to invest in projects that have  more long-term benefits.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: At present, DOD and the military services do not systematically assess  proposals for corrosion control projects, related implementation issues,  or the results of implemented projects, and they disseminate project  results on a limited, ad hoc basis. Without a more systematic approach  to corrosion problems, prevention efforts that have a high return on  investment potential will likely continue to be underresourced and  continue to proceed at a slow pace. As a result, DOD and the military  services will continue to expend several billion dollars annually in  avoidable costs and continue to incur a significant number of avoidable  readiness and safety problems. Since corrosion that is left unmitigated  only worsens with time, costs will likely increase as weapon systems and  infrastructures age. Perhaps this is why the adage “pay now or pay more  later” so appropriately describes the dilemma with which the military  services are repeatedly confronted when making difficult investment  decisions. The military services will continue to pay dearly for their limited  corrosion prevention efforts and will be increasingly challenged to find the  funds for ongoing operations, maintenance, and new systems acquisitions.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In an effort to improve current military approaches to corrosion control,  the Bob Stump Defense Authorization Act of 2003 requires the department  to develop and implement a long-term strategy to mitigate the effects of  corrosion in military equipment and infrastructure. If properly crafted, this  strategy can become an important means of managing corrosion control  efforts and addressing the problems and limitations of these efforts as  described in this report.
To craft an effective strategy, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  direct that the department’s strategic plan for corrosion prevention and  mitigation include the following:  develop standardized methodologies for collecting and analyzing  corrosion cost, readiness, and safety data;  develop clearly defined goals, outcome-oriented objectives, and  performance measures that show progress toward achieving objectives  (these measures should include such elements as the expected return  on investment and realized net savings of prevention projects);  identify the level of resources needed to accomplish goals   establish mechanisms to coordinate and oversee prevention and  mitigation projects in an interservice and servicewide context.
To provide greater assurances that the department’s strategic plan will be  successfully implemented, we recommend that the secretaries of each of  the services develop servicewide strategic plans that are consistent with the goals,  objectives, and measures in the departmentwide plan and  establish procedures and milestones to hold major commands and  program offices that manage specific weapon systems and facilities  accountable for achieving the strategic goals.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our  recommendations. The comments are included in this report in  appendix III. DOD also provided technical clarifications, which we  incorporated as appropriate. In its technical comments, DOD did not  concur with our finding that the department does not have an effective  approach to prevent and mitigate corrosion. DOD noted that the  department develops and incorporates prevention and mitigation strategies  appropriate to DOD’s national defense mission within various constraints  associated with operational needs, affordable maintenance schedules,  environmental regulations, and other statutory requirements. DOD  noted that corrosion is one of many issues that must be managed and  incorporated into an overall defense mission. DOD also noted that it  continually endeavors to improve its ability to manage corrosion through  advanced research, upgrading of systems and facilities, application of new  materials, processes and products and continuous information sharing.  Our report recognizes and mentions DOD's efforts and successes with  corrosion mitigation. However, we believe that DOD lacks an effective  approach to deal with corrosion since it lacks an overall strategy, has  limited coordination within and among the services, and conflicting  incentives and priorities. As we noted in our report, the current DOD  approach has led to readiness and safety issues as well as billions of dollars  of corrosion-related maintenance costs for DOD and the services annually.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense;  the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested  congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others  upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me on (202) 512-8365 if you or your staff have any questions  concerning this report. Key contributors to this report were Allan Roberts,  Allen Westheimer, Dorian Dunbar, Sarah Prehoda, Sandra Sokol, and  Susan Woodward.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: Our study focused on how the military services implement and manage  corrosion prevention and control efforts for both equipment and  infrastructure. To perform our review, we contacted corrosion control  offices and officials in each of the four military services. We also  reviewed studies and discussed military corrosion issues with experts  within and outside the Department of Defense (DOD). To develop an  in-depth understanding of how corrosion prevention projects are initiated  and managed, we visited field installations and developed case studies  on corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts. We also contacted and  obtained information from DOD, services headquarters, materiel  management, research and development, logistics, systems acquisitions,  safety, and installation management and maintenance organizations.
To determine the extent of the military services’ corrosion problems, we  reviewed numerous studies and contacted experts in both government  and private industry. We contacted and obtained information from  DOD, military service headquarters, strategic planning, research and  development, systems acquisitions, materiel management, logistics,  safety, and installation management and maintenance organizations.  We also attended the U.S. Navy and Industry Rust 2002 Corrosion  Technology and Exchange Conference, and we reviewed papers and  presentations of other service and private industry corrosion conferences  and forums. In addition, we contacted private industry suppliers,  consultants, and research organizations. We contacted the following  research organizations to obtain information regarding the extent of  military service corrosion problems:  NCI Information Systems, Inc.
CC Technologies Laboratories, Inc.
Calibre Systems, Inc.
subsections: section_title: California
section_title: Hawaii
paragraphs: Diamond Head Complex, Hawaii Army National Guard  Pearl City Unit Training and Equipment Site, Hawaii Army   Marine Corps Air Facility Kaneohe Bay  Marine Corps Camp H.M. Smith We conducted our review from August 2002 through April 2003 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts That Have Not Realized Their Full Potential
subsections: section_title: Durable Coatings for Tanks on Navy Ships
paragraphs: The Navy has over 11,700 tanks, such as ballast, fuel, and potable water  tanks, on all of its surface vessels and submarines. Because of their  constant exposure to salt and moisture, these tanks rapidly lose their  exterior and interior protective coatings and begin to corrode. Although  maintenance personnel spend considerable time and resources removing  as much of the visible corrosion as possible and repainting while the ship is  deployed, some of the work cannot be accomplished until the ship returns  to its home port and undergoes scheduled and unscheduled maintenance.  Maintaining the tanks is labor intensive, costly, and extends the amount of  time ships must spend undergoing maintenance, thereby reducing their  operational availability. Naval Sea Systems Command has developed  coating systems that are expected to last 20 years instead of the 5 years  that existing coatings last. According to the Navy, the effort could  potentially save more than $170 million a year in maintenance costs. The  initiative appears to be somewhat successful, because the Navy reports  that it has achieved net savings of about $10 million a year. However, in  the past several years, the Navy has installed the new coatings on only  about 750 tanks, or less than 7 percent of the total. Navy officials attribute  the slow pace to the fleet placing higher priorities on other needs, and  explained that they often must defer the installation of the new coatings  because of the limited availability of ships due to increased optempo and  more pressing maintenance requirements. Navy officials added that  because of higher operational and maintenance priorities, resources in  the form of funding and manpower usually go to these needs instead of  prevention efforts such as tank coatings. These officials told us that the  shipyards that perform most of the maintenance for the fleet have difficulty  trying to complete the work currently scheduled with available resources  and would be further challenged by having to add the application of new  coatings to their existing workload. In addition, the officials told us that  there is limited incentive for shipyard maintenance workers to carry out  preventive projects that show benefits only in later years instead of  completing more immediate repairs that show more immediate benefits.
section_title: Army National Guard Controlled Humidity Preservation
paragraphs: The Army National Guard maintains a wide range of equipment that  includes M1 tanks, howitzers, air defense artillery systems, and radars.  This equipment is susceptible to corrosion, and one of the primary causes  of corrosion is humidity. The Army National Guard estimates it could  achieve cost savings totaling more than $1.6 billion over 10 years by  storing its equipment in short- and long-term controlled-humidity  preservation centers. Depending on the type of equipment, some will be  stored in long-term facilities and some will be stored for the short-term.  Equipment that is not required for regular training use will be preserved in  metal shelters for an average of 3 years, while equipment for which there is  a recurring need will be preserved by installing dehumidifying air ducts in  crew compartments and other vehicle spaces. The project, which started in  1997, is expected to have a return on investment of over 9 to 1. According  to Army National Guard officials, through the end of fiscal year 2002, the  project has achieved a total of $225 million in cost savings. While Army  officials state that the project has proven to be a success so far, they now  estimate that it will take about 15 years to accomplish the total projected  savings, or 5 years longer than originally planned. They attribute the  delay to other needs being given a higher priority and, as a result, not  receiving the necessary funds and having to defer the installation of  some controlled-humidity centers. These officials still expect to acquire  and install all of the facilities, but at a slower pace. They acknowledge  that the delay will likely mean deferring a significant amount of cost  savings—perhaps as much as $100 million—for several years.
section_title: Fly Ash in Concrete Airfields
paragraphs: Concrete airfield pavements for all of the military services have  experienced cracking and expansion that pose significant safety hazards,  impair readiness, and increase maintenance costs. One of the causes of this  deterioration results from a corrosive chemical reaction called alkali-silica  reaction, which occurs when alkalis react with water in ways that cause  cracking, chipping, and expansion of concrete. Examples of this kind of  damage have been reported at facilities for all military services, such as  Osan Air Base, Korea; Ft. Campbell Army Airfield, Kentucky; Naval Air  Station Point Mugu, California; and Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni,  Japan. The foreign object debris hazard caused by cracking and crumbling  concrete was so severe that the Air Mobility Command assessed a taxiway  at Little Rock Air Force Base as unsuitable for use. While the military  services do not have cost estimates, DOD facilities officials told us that  significant resources are spent each year on mitigating the effects of  alkali-silica reaction.
The Navy determined that one way to mitigate the effects of alkali-silica  reaction in the future is to substitute fly ash for a certain amount of cement.  According to a Navy study, the use of fly ash increases the strength and  durability of cement structures such as airfields. Navy officials told us  that this mitigation would increase the operational availability of airfields  because the facilities would experience less cracking and chipping and,  therefore, pose fewer foreign object debris hazards. While the Navy did not  perform the analysis, these officials told us that perhaps the greatest  benefit would be the savings that would result from a marked reduction  in manpower needed for maintenance. The study did not include cost  savings or a return on investment analysis because its focus was on the  causes of and methods for mitigating the deterioration. The study did  note that fly ash substitution could save the Navy about $4 million a year  in construction costs because the material is less expensive than the  kinds of cement currently being used. Navy officials told us that their  understanding of the overall benefits is convincing enough that the use of  fly ash is required for all Navy and Marine Corps construction projects that  include pavements.
The Air Force recommends the use of fly ash, but only in certain  circumstances. Air Force officials told us that requiring the use of fly ash  for all construction projects is not feasible because fly ash is not available  at all locations where the Air Force has facilities, and the additional  cost and time involved in transporting the material to these places may  be greater than the benefits from using it. However, Air Force officials  acknowledge that they have not done a return-on-investment analysis that  includes construction and maintenance costs, and additional information  like this would be very useful in making decisions regarding the use of  fly ash.
The services continue to study the effects of alkali-silica reaction and  what to do about them. However, due to limited funding, efforts to identify  feasible comprehensive solutions to the entire problem for all military  services have been delayed. In the meantime, airfields continue to decay,  resulting in high maintenance costs as well as restricted use.
section_title: Army Corrosion Inhibitors
paragraphs: Corrosion damage to tactical wheeled vehicles and ground equipment is  costly and prolongs equipment downtime. According to officials of the  Army Materiel Command, seawater that seeps into the inner cavities of  equipment that is being transported overseas causes serious corrosion  damage and represents the highest risk to the command. The equipment  then decays rapidly in humid environments.
This kind of corrosion damage was so extensive that in 1998 the  Commanding General U.S. Army Pacific requested that all ground  vehicles shipped to his command be treated with rust inhibitors. Army  data indicated that 17 percent of the Army trucks in Hawaii were so  corroded that performance of their missions was impaired. In 1999, the  Commanding General of the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii indicated  that unit readiness was in serious jeopardy and requested funding for  several corrosion control projects, including one to treat an estimated  3,000 remaining vehicles with corrosion inhibitors. Army testing had  demonstrated that corrosion inhibitors, compared to other products,  provided a high degree of corrosion protection and enough corrosion- reducing potential to warrant beginning their limited use. Initial estimates  indicated a return on investment of 4 to 1 for every dollar spent.
In 2000, the Army awarded a contract for approximately $400,000 to treat  3,000 vehicles over a period of 12 months. The contract was later doubled,  increasing costs to nearly $900,000 for 6,000 vehicles over a period of  24 months. Army officials plan to analyze the information obtained on the  performance of the product before deciding whether to continue using it  or expand the effort to other locations. The Army has over 341,000 tactical  vehicles and pieces of ground support equipment worldwide, as well as  3,770 airframes, and a significant amount of this equipment is exposed to  harsh, corrosion-inducing environments.
The Army originally planned to establish an all-purpose, full service  corrosion control center to repair corrosion damage, as well as provide  preventative corrosion-inhibitor treatments. The center, which would have  had multiple service bays and wash racks would have processed more than  15,000 vehicles per year, was to have been used by all the military services  in Hawaii. However, the center is currently only being used by the Army as  a corrosion-inhibitor application facility. In addition, a lack of coordination  exists within the individual services. For example, at an Army National  Guard facility in Hawaii officials told us that they were not aware of the  status of the Army’s corrosion-inhibitor application facility but that they  would be interested in finding out more about it, the application of  corrosion inhibitors, and participating in the project.
section_title: Air Force Bomb Metalization
paragraphs: The Air Force stores about 450,000 cast iron general-purpose bombs  in locations throughout the world. The bombs are estimated to have  a replacement cost exceeding $1 billion. Many of the locations are in  high-humidity environments that contribute to corrosion. As of  February 2003, more than 107,000 of these bombs, or 24 percent,  have been assessed as being no longer mission capable because of  excessive corrosion. The Air Force acquires new bombs and repairs  existing ones so that it will have enough mission-capable bombs to meet its  requirements. The Air Force spends about $7 million a year for corrosion  protection of cast iron general-purpose bombs. Until 1996, all the bombs  were renovated by maintenance personnel who removed any signs of  corrosion and recoated them with liquid paint. The bombs would undergo  this labor-intensive process every 3 to 8 years. In 1996, the Air Force  converted a bomb renovation plant at Kadena Air Base, Japan, from a  facility that used liquid paint to one that used a metal wire arc spray  technique that is otherwise known as metalization. The plant conversion  cost about $3 million. A metal wire arc spray coating is expected to  preserve cast iron bombs for 30 years, or about 25 years longer than liquid  paint. By using this preservation method, the Air Force estimates saving  maintenance costs of $30 to $100 million over 30 years, resulting in a return  on investment ratio of 20 to 1. The plant successfully renovated about  8,000 bombs. Based on previous successes, the Air Force decided to  acquire and install mobile versions of the Kadena unit in other locations.  In 2000, a prototype of the Mobile Bomb Renovation System was acquired  and installed at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, at a cost of about  $2 million. About 500 bombs received the metal arc spray coating at Guam  before the system experienced equipment failures. To date, the system  remains inoperable. The Army has also refurbished and metalized about  6,500 bombs for the Air Force.
Air Force studies show that although the metal arch spray coating process  is more expensive than the use of liquid paint, it greatly minimizes the risk  that bombs will need costly maintenance or deteriorate so severely that  they will need replacing. Despite these benefits, about 3 percent of Air  Force bombs have been treated with this coating process. While Air Force  officials recommended that a much higher percentage of bombs receive  this treatment, they explained that their role is mostly advisory, and the  Air Force Material Command and Pacific Air Force Command together  must determine the relative importance of the project, given other  competing priorities.
section_title: F-16 Aircraft Corrosion Inhibitors
paragraphs: Although not visible, the corrosion of connectors on aircraft electronics  equipment is prevalent throughout DOD and a significant safety risk for  aircraft in all military services. The resources spent on this kind of  corrosion are so vast that it is estimated that the Air Force spends perhaps  as much as $500 million a year on corrosion control on the F-16 fleet alone.
The costs are high because of the significant amount of labor that is  involved in locating and eliminating the often microscopic sources of  corrosion on very sophisticated avionics equipment. Avionics corrosion  has been a topic of major interest to the Air Force for several decades. This  concern was particularly heightened in 1989, when the Air Force reported  several F-16 accidents caused by uncommanded fuel valve closures that  were believed to have been caused by corrosion.
For several decades, the Air Force has conducted extensive studies on the  corrosion of aircraft avionics connectors and what should be done about it.  In the 1990s, several studies recommended the use of certain lubricants  that have the potential of eliminating connector corrosion on F-16 aircraft,  with estimated savings exceeding $500 million a year. Although the Air  Force did not complete a return on investment analysis, the return would  be very impressive, given the low cost of purchasing this off-the-shelf  product. The Air Force has yet to take full advantage of these corrosion- inhibiting lubricants, even though they appear to be widely available. While  the use of such lubricants is recommended in the joint service technical  manual on avionics corrosion control, it is not required. We were told  that the Air Force would need to amend in detail more than 200 specific  technical orders and job guides to require the use of lubricant to protect  F-16 aircraft electrical connectors, but progress in this area has been  sluggish at best. For every year that the Air Force does not require the  use of the lubricants, the service loses the opportunity to avoid annual  expenses that total hundreds of millions of dollars.
section_title: Army Helicopter Rinse Facilities
paragraphs: Conflicting incentives also impeded the Army’s efforts to obtain modern  helicopter rinse facilities called “birdbaths.” According to the Army  Aviation Corrosion Prevention and Control office, these facilities are  expected to extend the life of costly aircraft components, reduce  contractor man-hour expenditures, increase aircraft fleet readiness, and  provide an added margin of crew safety. The project is estimated to cost  $12 million for startup and $400 thousand per year in operating costs.  Even more notable was the analysis showing a 31 to 1 return on  investment, with the investment costs recouped within 2 years. Citing  opportunities to implement and promote effective corrosion control, the  Army recommended identification of locations and deployment areas for  establishing birdbath rinse facilities. Despite the potential benefits, the  project has not received funding to date. Army officials told us that the  project cannot compete with efforts that have a higher priority, and they  have deferred the request for funds until fiscal year 2005. The Army’s  attempt to obtain funding for a birdbath facility in Hawaii suffered the  same fate. During our field visit to Hawaii, we were told that for a number  of years a birdbath facility was included in a list of projects that required  funding, but the facility never received the funds because other operational  needs were considered to have a higher priority. Army officials said that  funding more pressing operational needs almost always takes precedence  over funding projects that have a strong potential to avoid future  maintenance costs.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
subsections: section_title: GAO’s Mission
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