Space Acquisitions: Major Space Programs Still at Risk for Cost and Schedule Increases
Published: 2008-03-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Each year, the Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions of dollars to acquire space-based capabilities to support current military and other government operations as well as to enable DOD to transform the way it collects and disseminates information, gathers data on adversaries, and attacks targets. In fiscal year 2009 alone, DOD expects to spend over $10 billion to develop and procure satellites and other space systems. At the same time, however, DOD's space system acquisitions have experienced problems over the past several decades that have driven up costs by hundreds of millions, even billions, of dollars; stretched schedules by years; and increased performance risks. In some cases, capabilities have not been delivered to the warfighter after decades of development. This testimony relies on the extensive body of work GAO has produced reviewing DOD space acquisitions. It comments on the persistent problems affecting space acquisitions, the actions DOD has been taking to address these problems, and what remains to be done.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The majority of major acquisition programs in DOD's space portfolio have experienced problems during the past two decades that have driven up cost and schedules and increased technical risks. At times, cost growth has come close to or exceeded 100 percent, causing DOD to nearly double its investment in the face of technical and other problems without realizing a better return. Along with the increases, many programs are experiencing significant schedule delays--as much as 7 years--postponing delivery of promised capabilities to the warfighter. Outcomes have been so disappointing in some cases that DOD has had to go back to the drawing board to consider new ways to achieve the same, or less, capability. Our past work has identified a number of causes behind the cost growth and related problems. These include: optimistic cost and schedule estimating; the tendency to start programs with too many unknowns about technology; inadequate contracting strategies; contract and program management weaknesses; the loss of technical expertise; capability gaps in the industrial base; tensions between labs that develop technologies for the future and acquisition programs; divergent needs in users of space systems; and diffuse leadership. DOD has taken a number of actions to address the problems that GAO has reported on. These include initiatives at the department level that will affect all major weapons programs, as well as changes in course within specific Air Force programs. Most notable, the Air Force has sustained its commitment to reduce technology risks in programs and acted to restructure new programs so that its space portfolio can be more affordable. These actions are a step in the right direction and will be effective, particularly if they are complemented by more accurate cost estimating; continued prioritization of investments; actions to address capacity shortfalls, such as low-cost launch and shortages of staff in program offices; and changes to acquisition policies to reflect the best practices the Air Force is committing to.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s  (DOD) space acquisitions. Each year, DOD spends billions of dollars to  acquire space-based capabilities to support current military and other  government operations as well as to enable DOD to transform the way it  collects and disseminates information, gathers data on adversaries, and  attacks targets. In fiscal year 2009 alone, DOD expects to spend over $10  billion to strengthen space-based capabilities and $7.6 billion of this  amount is targeted for selected major space acquisition efforts. At the  same time, however, DOD’s space system acquisitions have experienced  problems over the past several decades that have driven up costs by  hundreds of millions, even billions, of dollars; stretched schedules by  years; and increased performance risks. In some cases, capabilities have  not been delivered to the warfighter after decades of development. Today,  we are here to comment on what problems affecting space acquisitions  still persist, what actions DOD has been taking to address these problems  and what remains to be done. In general, we found this year that space  programs that have been troubled in recent years still face problems that  are driving up costs and schedule.  At the same time, senior leadership has  remained committed to reducing technology risks and ensuring newer  programs are more affordable.  Investment prioritizing, realistic cost  estimating, policy changes, and other actions we identify can help this  commitment take further hold.
subsections: section_title: Space Acquisition Problems Persist
paragraphs: The majority of major acquisition programs in DOD’s space portfolio have  experienced problems during the past two decades that have driven up  cost and schedules and increased technical risks. Several programs have  been restructured by DOD in the face of delays and cost growth. At times,  cost growth has come close to or exceeded 100 percent, causing DOD to  nearly double its investment in the face of technical and other problems  without realizing a better return on investment. Along with the increases,  many programs are experiencing significant schedule delays—as much as  7 years—postponing delivery of promised capabilities to the warfighter.  Outcomes have been so disappointing in some cases that DOD has had to  go back to the drawing board to consider new ways to achieve the same,  or less, capability.
As figures 1 and 2 below indicate, five programs that were begun in the  late 1990s / early 2000s to replenish aging constellations of satellites have  incurred substantial cost growth and schedule delays, including the (1) the  Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) communications satellite  program, (2) the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental  Satellite System (NPOESS), which DOD is jointly developing with the  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, (3) the Space Based  Infrared System (SBIRS), which detects missile launches, (4) the  Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS), another communications satellite, and  (5) the Global Positioning System (GPS) IIF program. Last year we  reported that AEHF and WGS had worked through the bulk of their  technical problems. Since our testimony, the first WGS satellite was  launched, but the AEHF program experienced technical problems with  hardware components that have pushed back its first launch date by 6  months. Also, this year, as described below, we found that NPOESS and  SBIRS still face very high risks, even after recent acquisition replanning  efforts. Further, GPS IIF has experienced additional technical problems.
SBIRS continues to face cost and schedule setbacks. Software problems  have recently delayed the first satellite launch by about a year, which will  likely increase the program’s overall delay to roughly 7 years. Correcting  the problems may necessitate hardware and software changes that could,  according to the Air Force, also drive cost increases up to $1 billion, which  would be in addition to the $6 billion cost growth already incurred.  Management-reserves expenditure continues at an unsustainable rate.  Program officials acknowledge that management reserves set aside to fix  unexpected problems will likely be depleted in early 2009, even though the  reserves were intended to last through 2012. Given the complexity of the  SBIRS satellites, it is possible that further design flaws may be discovered,  leading to more cost and schedule increases. If management reserves are  depleted and not replenished, the program will likely experience further  cost and schedule problems.
In July 2007, the NPOESS program finalized its restructure in response to a  Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. § 2433) program acquisition unit breach of the  critical cost growth threshold. The restructure included about an  additional $4.1 billion, or about a 49 percent, life-cycle cost increase for  fewer satellites to be acquired, delays in satellite launches, and deletions  or replacements of satellite sensors. The restructure also included  removing 7 of the original 14 critical technologies from the program.  Furthermore, 3 of the remaining technologies remain immature and the  program continues to experience development problems, increasing risks  of further problems. At this point, the program has seen a 153 percent unit  cost increase.
The GPS IIF program has faced technical challenges in completing  development and production, causing another schedule delay in the  launch of the first IIF satellite—over a 2-year slip from the original launch  Not all of DOD’s space programs are facing the problems being  experienced by GPS, NPOESS, and SBIRS. For example, the Navy’s Mobile  User Objective System (MUOS), another communications satellite  program, is meeting cost and schedule goals. Further, as discussed later in  this testimony, newer Air Force acquisition efforts such as the  Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) and Space  Radar have been taking actions to ensure they can meet their cost and  schedule goals, though their funding has been reduced in light of overall  affordability of space acquisitions. These two efforts were highly complex  and ambitious and were predicted to be the most expensive military  satellite developments ever.
In addition, in December 2005, the Air Force was directed to begin efforts  to develop competing capability in parallel with the SBIRS program; this  effort was previously known as the Alternative Infrared Satellite System  (AIRSS). We reported in September 2007 that DOD had not positioned the  AIRSS effort for success. DOD agreed, and revised the effort’s  development strategy to reflect best practices. The effort has a new name,  the Third Generation Infrared Surveillance (Third Gen), and is now a  follow on to the SBIRS program. The first sensor prototypes are expected  later this month.
Lastly, our annual weapons system assessment this year will be reporting  on challenges faced by the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)  program, as the two providers—Boeing and Lockheed Martin—undertake  a joint venture that will provide U.S. government launches of medium- to  heavy-lift rockets. The consolidation of production, engineering, test, and  launch operations under the joint venture, called the United Launch  Alliance or ULA, is expected to yield cost savings in the future, but when  and how much remains unknown. ULA expects the consolidation to be  nearly complete by the end of 2010, but there are preliminary indications  that some elements of the consolidation are falling behind schedule.
Furthermore, the Air Force revised its acquisition and contracting strategy  for EELV in 2005, which among other things increased program office  oversight responsibilities. The change in contracting strategy created new  data analysis activities for the program and expanded the types of  expertise needed by the program office to utilize the new information  provided by contractors. Despite its increased responsibilities, the  program office is experiencing staff reductions and expects staffing  vacancies to continue in the near term. The current military staff lacks  some of the technical expertise needed to fully analyze contractor  performance data now being collected under the new contracting strategy.
section_title: Causes of Acquisition Problems in Space Programs
paragraphs: Our work has identified a variety of reasons for this cost growth, most  notably that weapons programs are incentivized to produce and use  optimistic cost and schedule estimates in order to successfully compete  for funding. We have also found that DOD starts its space programs too  early, that is, before it has assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can  be achieved within available resources and time constraints.
We have also tied acquisition problems in space to inadequate contracting  strategies; contract and program management weaknesses; the loss of  technical expertise; capability gaps in the industrial base; tensions  between labs that develop technologies for the future and current  acquisition programs; divergent needs in users of space systems; diffuse  leadership; and other issues that have been well documented in DOD and  GAO studies.
Many of these underlying issues affect the broader weapons portfolio as  well, though we have reported that space programs are particularly  affected by the wide disparity of users, who include DOD, the intelligence  community, other federal agencies, and in some cases, other countries and  U.S. business and citizens. Moreover, problematic implementation of an  acquisition strategy in the 1990s, known as Total System Performance  Responsibility, for space systems resulted in losses of technical expertise  and weaknesses in contracting strategies that space programs are still  dealing with the effects of.
section_title: Actions Needed to Address Space and Weapon Acquisition Problems
paragraphs: Over the past decade, we have identified best practices that DOD space  programs can benefit from. DOD has taken a number of actions to address  the problems that we have reported on. These include initiatives at the  department level that will affect its major weapons programs, as well as  changes in course within specific Air Force programs. Although these  actions are a step in the right direction, additional leadership and support  are still needed to ensure that reforms that DOD has begun will take hold.
Our work—which is largely based on best practices in the commercial  sector—has recommended numerous actions that can be taken to address  the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended that DOD  separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an incremental  path toward meeting user needs, match resources and requirements at  program start, and use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to  make decisions to move to next phases. We have also identified practices  related to cost estimating, program manager tenure, quality assurance,  technology transition, and an array of other aspects of acquisition program  management that space programs could benefit from. Table 1 highlights  these practices; appendix II provides more detail.
section_title: Constructive Actions Are Being Taken
paragraphs: DOD is attempting to implement some of these practices for its major  weapons programs. For example, we recently reported that DOD released  a strategy to enhance the role of program managers in carrying out its  major weapon system acquisitions. As part of this strategy, DOD  established a policy that requires formal agreements among program  managers, their acquisition executives, and the user community intended  to set forth common program goals. In addition, DOD plans a variety of  actions to enhance development opportunities, provide more incentives,  and arrange knowledge-sharing opportunities for its program managers.  Within this strategy, the department also acknowledged that any actions  taken to improve accountability must be based on a foundation from  which program managers can launch and manage programs toward  greater performance, and must include an overarching strategy and  decision-making processes that prioritize programs based on a match  between customer needs and available resources. DOD highlighted several  initiatives that, if adopted and implemented properly, could provide such a  foundation. Some of these include establishing an early decision gate to  review proposed programs at the concept stage, testing portfolio  management approaches in selected capability areas and using capital  budgeting accounts for programs in development.
Additionally, as we reported previously, the Air Force adopted a “back to  basics” approach for space designed to reduce technology risk and ensure  programs were more executable. Specifically, for its TSAT and Space  Radar acquisition efforts, the Air Force committed to delaying product  development until critical technologies could be demonstrated to work in  a relevant environment. This stood in sharp contrast to previous programs,  started with immature technologies, such as NPOESS and SBIRS.
The Air Force also committed to deferring more ambitious technology  efforts associated with these efforts to science and technology  organizations until they are ready to be added to future increments. TSAT,  for example, deferred the wide-field of view multi-access laser  communication technology, and contributed about $16.7 million for “off- line” maturation of this technology that could be inserted into future  increments. It laid out incremental advances in other capabilities over two  increments. Space Radar has deferred lithium-ion batteries, more efficient  solar cells, and onboard processing for its first increment, and like TSAT,  contributed toward their development by space and technology  organizations. Further, both efforts have used systems engineers to help  determine achievability of requirements.
In our experience, the Navy has tended to follow good acquisition  practices for its space programs, especially in relation to keeping  technology risks out of programs. The Navy’s Mobile User Objective  System (MUOS) is an example. Specifically, the MUOS acquisition effort  began development with almost all of its critical technologies mature.  Additionally, about 95 percent of design drawings had been completed at  the critical design review milestone in March 2007. Since MUOS’s  development start in September 2004, the program has been meeting its  overall cost and schedule goals, with the first satellite expected to become  operational in March 2010.
Furthermore, the Air Force, U.S. Strategic Command, and other key  organizations have made progress in implementing the Operationally  Responsive Space (ORS) initiative. This initiative encompasses several  separate endeavors with a goal to provide short-term tactical capabilities  as well as identifying and implementing long-term technology and design  solutions to reduce the cost and time of developing and delivering simpler  satellites in greater numbers. ORS provides DOD with an opportunity to  work outside the typical acquisition channels to more quickly and less  expensively deliver these capabilities. In performing a review of ORS for  this committee, we found that DOD has made progress in putting a  program management structure in place for ORS as well as executing ORS- related research and development efforts, which include development of  low-cost small satellites, common design techniques, and common  interfaces.
Other parts of DOD are also moving towards space programs with less risk  and that have a greater chance of being more successful. The Missile  Defense Agency’s Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS)  program office is seeking an operational constellation that would be easier  to produce than originally envisioned for the constellation. The new  development approach for the constellation would involve no technology  breakthroughs or scientific discovery, and the program office wants to  scale the system design so that it will only require only a 5- to 6-year build  cycle.
DOD has also pushed back the decisions to start the TSAT and Space  Radar acquisitions so it could reformulate their acquisition schedules and  approaches to make them more affordable within DOD’s overall space  portfolio. For example, TSAT is currently being assessed by the Office of  the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to better ensure that proposed future  funding levels for TSAT are affordable in the near term. In the meantime,  the program office is continuing to fund risk-reduction efforts between  two separate contractors to further reduce overall risk in TSAT. Similarly,  the Space Radar program office told us that it is adjusting its acquisition  approach to better balance affordability through incremental evolution of  the Space Radar capability. In both of these cases, DOD will likely be  better positioned with acquisition programs that are more affordable and  executable in terms of meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals.
section_title: Additional Actions Needed
paragraphs: The actions that the Air Force and OSD have been taking to address  acquisition problems are good first steps. The back to basics policy and  ORS, in particular, represent significant shifts in thinking about how space  systems should be developed as well as commitment from senior  leadership. But, there are still more, significant changes to processes,  policies, and support needed to ensure reforms can take hold.
First, while DOD pilot initiatives related to portfolio management are  targeted at addressing funding pressures, there has not been a real  commitment to prioritizing investments across DOD. For the past several  years, we have emphasized that DOD starts more space and weapon  programs than it can afford, creating a competition for funding that  encourages low cost estimating, optimistic scheduling, overpromising,  suppressing of bad news, and, for space programs, forsaking the  opportunity to identify and assess potentially better alternatives. Programs  focus on advocacy at the expense of realism and sound management.  Invariably, with too many programs in its portfolio, DOD is forced to  continually shift funds to and from programs—particularly as programs  experience problems that require additional time and money to address.  Such shifts, in turn, have had costly, reverberating effects. This year,  significant cuts were made to several major space programs including  TSAT, Space Radar, and STSS largely in light of the realization that new,  expensive programs were not affordable at a time when DOD was  attempting to upgrade other capabilities and still contending with  problematic programs like SBIRS. In the case of TSAT, resulting delays in  capability could have a dramatic effect on other new programs, such as  the Army’s Future Combat System, which were counting on TSAT-like  capabilities to enhance their performance.
Second, as we have testified before, space programs are facing capacity  shortfalls. These include shortages of staff with science and engineering  backgrounds as well as staff with program-management and cost- estimating experience. Several of our reviews of major space programs  have cited shortages of personnel as a key challenge that increases risk for  the program, specifically in technical areas. In addition, during our review  of DOD’s space cost estimating function, Air Force space cost-estimating  organizations and program offices said that they believed their cost- estimating resources were inadequate to do a good job of accurately  predicting costs. Because of the decline in in-house cost-estimating  resources, space program offices and Air Force cost-estimating  organizations are now more dependent on support contractors. We  recognize that there are actions being taken to strengthen the space  acquisition workforce, but we have not yet seen the condition get much  better at the individual program office level.
Our past work has also pointed to capacity shortfalls that go beyond  workforce. For example, in 2006, we reported that cost-estimation data  and databases are incomplete, insufficient, and outdated. And in previous  testimonies, we pointed to limited opportunities and funding for space  technologies, and the lack of low-cost launch vehicles. The ORS initiative  is designed to help alleviate shortfalls in launch and testing resources, but  one concern raised in interviews with launch providers was that there was  still not enough investment being directed toward low-cost launch.
Furthermore, policies that surround space acquisition need to be further  revised to ensure best practices are instilled and sustained. For example,  DOD’s space acquisition policy does not require that acquisition efforts  such as TSAT and Space Radar achieve a technology readiness level (TRL)  6 (that is, testing in a relevant environment) or higher for key technologies  before being formally started—key decision point B (KDP B). Instead, the  policy suggests that TRL 6 be achieved later—at preliminary decision  review (KDP C) or soon after. In fact, the back to basics approach that was  adopted by the Air Force has not been incorporated into DOD’s  space  acquisition policy. Given that there are many pressures and incentives that  are driving space and other weapon programs to begin too early and to  drive for dramatic rather than incremental leaps in capability, DOD needs  acquisition policies that ensure programs have the knowledge they need to  make investment decisions and that DOD and Congress have a more  accurate picture of how long and how much it will take to get the  capability that is being promised. In addition, although the policy requires  that independent cost estimates be prepared by bodies outside the  acquisition chain of command, it does not require that they be relied upon  to develop program budgets. Officials within the space cost-estimating  community also believed that the policy was unclear in defining roles and  responsibilities for cost estimators. We continue to recommend changes  be made to the policy—not only to further ingrain the shift in thinking  about how space systems should be developed, but to ensure that the  changes current leaders are trying to make can be extended beyond their  tenure.
Last, while DOD is planning many new practices that will provide program  managers with more incentives, support and stability, the overall  environment within which program managers perform their work is very  difficult to change simply with policy initiatives. Policies similar to the one  DOD issued in 2007 to increase accountability of program managers have  existed for some time, but according to DOD and Air Force officials, they  have not always been practiced. For example, while DOD policy provides  for program managers of major defense acquisition programs to serve as  close to a 4-year tenure as practicable, many serve for only 2 years. One  example is the SBIRS program, which has had six program managers in 12  years. In fact, our work has shown that rather than lengthy assignment  periods between key milestones as suggested by best practices, many of  the programs we have reviewed had multiple program managers within  the same milestone.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In conclusion, senior leaders managing DOD’s space portfolio are clearly  working in a challenging environment. There are pressures to deliver new,  transformational capabilities, but problematic older satellite programs  continue to cost more than expected, constrain investment dollars, pose  risks of capability caps, and thus require more time and attention from  senior leaders than well-performing efforts. To best mitigate these  circumstances and put future programs on a better path, DOD needs to  continue with the actions it has begun undertaken. However, these  measures should be complemented by realistic estimating of what it will  take to complete space programs, prioritizing programs for investment,  and strengthening DOD acquisition policy for space. At the same time,  DOD should ensure its ORS program is well-supported and focused on  alleviating capability gaps as well as developing longer-term solutions for  space programs. Taken together, such actions, with the support of  Congress, should help senior leaders negotiate acquisitions in a  challenging environment and ensure their commitments to reform can be  sustained into the next administration.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement.  I will be happy to answer any  questions that you have.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In preparing this testimony, we relied on our body of work in space  programs, including previously issued GAO reports on assessments of  individual space programs, common problems affecting space system  acquisitions, and the Department of Defense’s (DOD) space acquisition  policy. We relied on our best practices studies, which comment on the  persistent problems affecting space acquisitions, the actions DOD has  been taking to address these problems, and what remains to be done. We  also relied on work performed in support of our 2008 annual weapons  system assessment. The individual reviews were conducted in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. We conducted  this performance audit from February 26 to March 4, 2008, in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Commercial Best Practices Identified in GAO Reports from Which Space Programs Can Benefit
subsections: section_title: Practices That Can Reduce Acquisition Risk
paragraphs: Because there are more product ideas than there is funding to pursue them, successful organizations  we have studied ensure that decisions to start new product developments fit within an investment  strategy. The investment strategy determines project priority as well as providing a basis for trade-off  decisions against competing projects. Program managers find their company’s use of investment  strategies helpful because it gives them confidence that their project has commitment from their  organization and from their top leaders and managers, and clearly identifies where their project  stands within the company’s overall investment portfolio and funding priorities.
Organizations we have studied generally follow an evolutionary path toward meeting market needs  rather than attempting to satisfy all needs in a single step. In effect, the companies evolve products,  continuously improving their performance as new technologies and methods allow. These  evolutionary improvements to products eventually result in full desired capability, but in multiple  steps, delivering enhanced capability to the customer more quickly through a series of interim  products. The approach permits program managers to focus more on design and manufacturing with  a limited array of new content and technologies in a program.
The organizations we have studied are able to achieve their overall investment goals by matching  requirements to resources—that is time, money, technology, and people—before undertaking a new  development effort. Any gaps that existed are relatively small, and it is the program manager’s job to  quickly close them as development begins.
As part of the effort to build a business case, requirements are researched and defined before  programs start to ensure that they are achievable given available resources.
Successful organizations ensure cost estimates are complete and accurate. They hold program  managers accountable for their estimates. They also develop common templates and tools to support  data gathering and analysis and maintain databases of historical cost, schedule, quality, test, and  performance data. Cost estimates themselves are continually monitored and regularly updated  through a series of numerous gates or milestone decisions that demand programs assess readiness  and remaining risk within key sectors of the program as well as overall cost and schedule issues.
Once cost estimates are complete, the organization commits to fully funding projects before they  begin.
As part of the effort to build a business case, critical technologies are matured by the start of a  program, that is, proven to work as intended. More ambitious technology development efforts are  assigned to research departments until they are ready to be added to future generations (increments)  of a product. In rare instances when less mature technologies are being pursued, the organization  accepts and plans for the additional risk.
Systems engineering is used to close gaps between resources and requirements before launching  the development process. As our previous work has shown, requirements analysis, the first phase of  any robust systems engineering regimen, is a process that enables the product developer to translate  customer wants into specific product features for which requisite technological, software, engineering,  and production capabilities can be identified.
Once a new product development begins, program managers and senior leaders use quantifiable  data and demonstrable knowledge to make go/no-go decisions. These cover critical facets of the  program such as cost, schedule, technology readiness, design readiness, production readiness, and  relationships with suppliers. Development is not allowed to proceed until certain thresholds are met,  for example, a high proportion of engineering drawings completed or production processes under  statistical control. Program managers themselves place high value on these requirements, as it  ensures they are well positioned to move into subsequent phases and are less likely to encounter  disruptive problems.
The organizations we have studied empower program managers to make decisions on the direction  of the program and to resolve problems and implement solutions. The program managers can make  trade-offs among schedule, cost, and performance features, as long as they stay within the confines  of the original business case. When the business case changes, senior leaders are brought in for  consultation—at this point, they could become responsible for trade-off decisions.
Program managers are held accountable for their choices. Sometimes this accountability is shared  with the program team or senior leaders, or both. Sometimes, it resides solely with the program  manager on the belief that the company provides the necessary levels of support. In all cases, the  process itself clearly spells out what the program manager is accountable for—the specific cost,  performance, schedule, and other goals that need to be achieved. In a recent study, we also noted  that successful organizations hold their suppliers accountable to deliver high-quality parts for their  product through such activities as regular supplier audits and performance evaluations of quality and  delivery, among other things.
To further ensure accountability, program managers are also required to stay with a project to its end.  Sometimes senior leaders are also required to stay. At the same time, program managers are  incentivized to succeed. If they meet or exceed their goals, they receive substantial bonuses or salary  increases, or both. Awards can also be obtained if the company as a whole meets larger objectives.  In all cases, companies refrain from removing a program manager in the midst of a program. Instead,  they chose first to assess whether more support is needed in terms of resources for the program or  support and training for the program manager.
Use of common tools and templates to support data gathering and analysis.
Implementation and adherence to formal lessons-learned processes.
Senior leaders stay committed to projects, mentor program managers, instill trust with their  program managers, encourage program managers to share bad news, and encourage  collaboration and communication.
section_title: Appendix III: Contact and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information, please contact Cristina Chaplain at 202-512- 4841or chaplainc@gao.gov. Individuals making contributions to this  testimony include Art Gallegos, Greg Campbell, Claire Cyrnak, Anne  Hobson, Rich Horiuchi, Sigrid McGinty, Angela Pleasants, Josie Sigl, and  Alyssa Weir.
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