Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet Program Implementation
Published: 2007-10-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion dollar program to secure U.S. borders. One element of SBI is SBInet--the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) program responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system through a mix of security infrastructure (e.g., fencing), and surveillance and communication technologies (e.g., radars, sensors, cameras, and satellite phones). The House Committee on Homeland Security asked GAO to monitor DHS progress in implementing the SBInet program. This testimony provides GAO's observations on (1) SBInet technology implementation; (2) SBInet infrastructure implementation; (3) the extent to which CBP has determined the impact of SBInet technology and infrastructure on its workforce needs and operating procedures; and (4) how the CBP SBI Program Management Office (PMO) has defined its human capital goals and the progress it has made to achieve these goals. GAO's observations are based on analysis of DHS documentation, such as program schedules, contracts, status, and reports. GAO also conducted interviews with DHS officials and contractors, and visits to sites in the southwest border where SBInet deployment is underway. GAO performed the work from April 2007 through October 2007. DHS generally agreed with GAO's findings.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DHS has made some progress to implement Project 28--the first segment of SBInet technology across the southwest border, but it has fallen behind its planned schedule. The SBInet contractor delivered the components (i.e., radars, sensors and cameras) to the Project 28 site in Tucson, Arizona on schedule. However, Project 28 is incomplete more than 4 months after it was to become operational--at which point Border Patrol agents were to begin using SBInet technology to support their activities. According to DHS, the delays are primarily due to software integration problems. In September 2007, DHS officials said that the Project 28 contractor was making progress in correcting the problems, but DHS was unable to specify a date when the system would be operational. Due to the slippage in completing Project 28, DHS is revising the SBInet implementation schedule for follow-on technology projects, but still plans to deploy technology along 387 miles of the southwest border by December 31, 2008. DHS is also taking steps to strengthen its contract management for Project 28. SBInet infrastructure deployment along the southwest border is on schedule, but meeting CBP's goal to have 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 200 miles of vehicle barriers in place by December 31, 2008, may be challenging and more costly than planned. CBP met its intermediate goal to deploy 70 miles of new fencing in fiscal year 2007 and the average cost per mile was $2.9 million. The SBInet PMO estimates that deployment costs for remaining fencing will be similar to those thus far. In the past, DHS has minimized infrastructure construction labor costs by using Border Patrol agents and Department of Defense military personnel. However, CBP officials report that they plan to use commercial labor for future fencing projects. The additional cost of commercial labor and potential unforeseen increases in contract costs suggest future deployment could be more costly than planned. DHS officials also reported other challenging factors they will continue to face for infrastructure deployment, including community resistance, environmental considerations, and difficulties in acquiring rights to land along the border. The impact of SBInet on CBP's workforce needs and operating procedures remains unclear because the SBInet technology is not fully identified or deployed. CBP officials expect the number of Border Patrol agents required to meet mission needs to change from current projections, but until the system is fully deployed, the direction and magnitude of the change is unknown. For the Tucson sector, where Project 28 is being deployed, Border Patrol officials are developing a plan on how to integrate SBInet into their operating procedures. The SBI PMO tripled in size during fiscal year 2007, but fell short of its staffing goal of 270 employees. Agency officials expressed concerns that staffing shortfalls could affect the agency's capacity to provide adequate contractor oversight. In addition, the SBInet PMO has not yet completed long-term human capital planning.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss observations on selected aspects  of the Secure Border Initiative’s SBInet program implementation.
Securing the nation’s borders from illegal entry of aliens and contraband,  including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a  major concern. Much of the United States’ 6,000 miles of international  borders with Canada and Mexico remains vulnerable to illegal entry.  Although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) apprehends  hundreds of thousands of people entering the country illegally each year,  several hundreds of thousands of individuals also enter the United States  illegally and undetected. In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of  the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion dollar program  aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. Elements  of SBI will be carried out by several organizations within DHS. One  element of SBI is SBInet. Under SBInet, the U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) is responsible for developing a comprehensive border  protection system.
You requested that we monitor the SBInet program and provide periodic  updates on the status of the program. My testimony today is the first in a  series of interim reports on SBInet implementation and focuses on the  following issues:
SBInet’s technology implementation;
SBInet’s infrastructure implementation; the extent to which CBP has determined the impact of SBInet  technology and infrastructure on its workforce needs and operating  procedures; and how the CBP SBI Program Management Office (PMO) has defined its  human capital goals and the progress it has made to achieve these  goals.
To address these issues, we analyzed DHS documents, including program  schedules and status reports, and workforce data. We interviewed DHS  and CBP headquarters and field officials, including representatives of the  SBInet PMO, Border Patrol, CBP Air and Marine, and the DHS Science and  Technology Directorate. We also visited the Tucson and Yuma, Arizona  Border Patrol sectors—two sites where SBInet deployment was underway  at the time of our review. We performed our work from April 2007 through  October 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. (App. I provides a detailed discussion of our scope and  methodology.)
We also have work underway to review other components of the SBInet  program.  Specifically, we are conducting work for the House Committee  on Homeland Security to assess the development and deployment of  SBInet’s command, control, and communications systems, and  surveillance and detection systems and expect to issue a report next year.   In addition, we are reviewing DHS’s use of performance-based services  acquisition, an acquisition method structured around the results to be  achieved instead of the manner by which the service should be performed.   We expect to issue a report on this effort in January 2008.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The SBInet program is responsible for identifying and deploying an  appropriate mix of technology (e.g., sensors, cameras, radars,  communications systems, and mounted laptop computers for agent  vehicles), tactical infrastructure (e.g., fencing, vehicle barriers, roads,),  rapid response capability (e.g., ability to quickly relocate operational  assets and personnel) and personnel (e.g., program staff and Border Patrol  agents) that will enable CBP agents and officers to gain effective control  of U.S. borders.  SBInet technology is also intended to include the  development and deployment of a common operating picture (COP) that  provides uniform data through a command center environment to Border  Patrol agents in the field and all DHS agencies and to be interoperable  with stakeholders external to DHS, such as local law enforcement.  The  initial focus of SBInet is on the southwest border areas between ports of  entry that CBP has designated as having the highest need for enhanced  border security because of serious vulnerabilities. Through SBInet, CBP  plans to complete a minimum of 387 miles of technology deployment  across the southwest border by December 31, 2008. Figure 1 shows the  location of select SBInet projects underway on the southwest border.
In September 2006, CBP awarded a prime contract to the Boeing Company  for 3 years, with three additional 1-year options. As the prime contractor,  Boeing is responsible for acquiring, deploying, and sustaining selected  SBInet technology and tactical infrastructure projects.  In this way, Boeing  has extensive involvement in the SBInet program requirements  development, design, production, integration, testing, and maintenance  and support of SBInet projects. Moreover, Boeing is responsible for  selecting and managing a team of subcontractors that provide individual  components for Boeing to integrate into the SBInet system. The SBInet  contract is largely performance-based—that is, CBP has set requirements  for SBInet and Boeing and CBP coordinate and collaborate to develop  solutions to meet these requirements—and designed to maximize the use  of commercial off-the-shelf technology.  CBP’s SBInet PMO oversees and  manages the Boeing-led SBInet contractor team. The SBInet PMO  workforce includes a mix of government and contractor support staff. The  SBInet PMO reports to the CBP SBI Program Executive Director.
CBP is executing part of SBInet activities through a series of task orders to  Boeing for individual projects. As of September 30, 2007, CBP had  awarded five task orders to Boeing for SBInet projects.  These include task  orders for (1) Project 28, Boeing’s pilot project and initial implementation  of SBInet technology to achieve control of 28 miles of the border in the  Tucson sector; (2) Project 37, for construction approximately 32 miles of  vehicle barriers and pedestrian fencing in the Yuma sector along the Barry  M. Goldwater Range (BMGR); (3) Program Management, for engineering,  facilities and infrastructure, test and evaluation, and general program  management services; (4) Fence Lab, a project to evaluate the  performance and cost of deploying different types of fences and vehicle  barriers; and (5) a design task order for developing the plans for several  technology projects to be located in the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso  sectors.
In addition to deploying technology across the southwest border, the  SBInet PMO plans to deploy 370 miles of single-layer pedestrian fencing  and 200 miles of vehicle barriers by December 31, 2008.  Whereas  pedestrian fencing is designed to prevent people on foot from crossing the  border, vehicle barriers are other physical barriers meant to stop the entry  of vehicles.  The SBInet PMO is utilizing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers  (USACE) to contract for fencing and supporting infrastructure (such as  lights and roads), complete required environmental assessments, and  acquire necessary real estate.
DHS has estimated that the total cost for completing the deployment for  the southwest border—the initial focus of SBInet deployment—will be  $7.6 billion from fiscal years 2007 through 2011. DHS has not yet reported  the estimated life cycle cost for this program, which is the total cost to the  government for a program over its full life, consisting of research and  development, operations, maintenance, and disposal costs. For fiscal year  2007, Congress appropriated about $1.2 billion for SBInet, about which 40  percent DHS had committed or obligated as of September 30, 2007. For  fiscal year 2008, DHS has requested an additional $1 billion.
section_title: SBInet Technology Deployment Delays May Increase Schedule Risks
paragraphs: DHS has made some progress to implement Project 28—the first segment  of technology on the southwest border, but it has fallen behind its planned  schedule.  Project 28 is the first opportunity for Boeing to demonstrate  that its technology system can meet SBInet performance requirements in a  real-life environment. Boeing’s inability thus far to resolve system  integration issues has left Project 28 incomplete more than 4 months after  its planned June 13 milestone to become operational—at which point,  Border Patrol agents were to begin using SBInet technology to support  their activities, and CBP was to begin its operational test and evaluation  phase.  Boeing delivered and deployed the individual technology  components of Project 28 on schedule. Nevertheless, CBP and Boeing  officials reported that Boeing has been unable to effectively integrate the  information collected from several of the newly deployed technology  components, such as sensor towers, cameras, radars, and unattended  ground sensors. Among several technical problems reported were that it  was taking too long for radar information to display in command centers  and newly deployed radars were being activated by rain, making the  system unusable. In August 2007, CBP officially notified Boeing that it  would not accept Project 28 until these and other problems were  corrected.  In September 2007, CBP officials told us that Boeing was  making progress in correcting the system integration problems; however,  CBP was unable to provide us with a specific date when Boeing would  complete the corrections necessary to make Project 28 operational. See  figures 2 and 3 below for photographs of SBInet technology along the  southwest border.
The SBInet PMO reported that is in the early stages of planning for  additional SBInet technology projects along the southwest border;  however, Boeing’s delay in completing Project 28 has led the PMO to  change the timeline for deploying some of these projects. In August 2007,  SBInet PMO officials told us they were revising the SBInet implementation  plan to delay interim project milestones for the first phase of SBInet  technology projects, scheduled for calendar years 2007 and 2008. For  example, SBInet PMO officials said they were delaying the start dates for  two projects that were to be modeled on the design used for Project 28  until after Project 28 is operational and can provide lessons learned for  planning and deploying additional SBInet technology along the southwest  border. According to the SBInet master schedule dated May 31, 2007, these  projects were to become operational in December 2007 and May 2008.  Despite these delays, SBInet PMO officials said they still expected to  complete all of the first phase of technology projects by the end of  calendar year 2008. As of October 15, 2007, the SBInet PMO had not  provided us with a revised deployment schedule for this first phase.
CBP reports that it is taking steps to strengthen its contract management  for Project 28. For example, citing numerous milestone slippages by  Boeing during Project 28 implementation, in August 2007, CBP sought and  reached an agreement with Boeing to give it greater influence in milestone  setting and planning corrective actions on the Project 28 task order. While  CBP had selected a firm-fixed-price contract to limit cost overruns on  Project 28, CBP officials told us that the firm-fixed-price contract CBP  used for Project 28 had limited the government’s role in directing Boeing  in its decision making process. For example, CBP and contractor officials  told us they expressed concern about the timeline for completing Project  28, but CBP chose not to modify the contract because doing so would have  made CBP responsible for costs beyond the $20 million fixed-price  contract. In mid-August 2007, CBP organized a meeting with Boeing  representatives to discuss ways to improve the collaborative process, the  submission of milestones, and Boeing’s plan to correct Project 28  problems. Following this meeting, CBP and Boeing initiated a Change  Control Board. In mid-September representatives from Boeing’s SBInet  team and its subcontractors continued to participate on this board and  vote on key issues for solving Project 28 problems. Although CBP  participates on this committee as a non-voting member, a senior SBInet  official said the government’s experience on the Change Control Board  had been positive thus far. For example, the official told us that the  Change Control Board had helped improve coordination and integration  with Boeing and for suggesting changes to the subcontractor companies  working on Project 28.
section_title: SBInet Tactical Infrastructure Deployment on Track but May Be Challenging and More Costly than Planned
paragraphs: Deploying SBInet’s tactical infrastructure along the southwest border is on  schedule, but meeting the SBInet program’s goal to have 370 miles of  pedestrian fence and 200 miles of vehicle barriers in place by December  31, 2008, may be challenging and more costly than planned. CBP set an  intermediate goal to deploy 70 miles of new pedestrian fencing by the  close of fiscal year 2007 and, having deployed 73 miles by this date,  achieved its goal. Table 1 summarizes CBP‘s progress and plans for  tactical infrastructure deployment.
Costs for the 73 miles of fencing constructed in fiscal year 2007 averaged  $2.9 million per mile and ranged from $700,000 in San Luis, Arizona, to $4.8  million per mile in Sasabe, Arizona. CBP also deployed 11 miles of vehicle  barriers and, although CBP has not yet been able to provide us with the  cost of these vehicle barriers, it projects that the average per mile cost for  the first 75 miles of barriers it deploys will be $1.5 million. Figure 4  presents examples of fencing deployed.
CBP estimates costs for the deployment of fencing in the future will be  similar to those thus far. However, according to CBP officials, costs vary  due to the type of terrain, materials used, land acquisition, who performs  the construction, and the need to meet an expedited schedule.  Although  CBP estimates that the average cost of remaining fencing will be $2.8  million per mile, actual future costs may be higher due to factors such as  the greater cost of commercial labor, higher than expected property  acquisition costs, and unforeseen costs associated with working in remote  areas.  To minimize one of the many factors that add to cost, in the past  DHS has used Border Patrol agents and DOD military personnel.   However, CBP officials reported that they plan to use commercial labor  for future infrastructure projects to meet their deadlines. Of the 73 miles  of fencing completed to date, 31 were completed by DOD military  personnel and 42 were constructed through commercial contracts.  While  the non-commercial projects cost an average of $1.2 million per mile, the  commercial projects averaged over three times more—$4 million.
According to CBP officials, CBP plans to utilize exclusively commercial  contracts to complete the remaining 219 miles of fencing. If contract costs  for deployment of remaining miles are consistent with those to deploy  tactical infrastructure to date and average $4 million per mile, the total  contract cost will be $890 million, considerably more than CBP’s initial  estimate of $650 million.
Although deployment of tactical infrastructure is on schedule, CBP  officials reported that meeting deadlines has been challenging because  factors they will continue to face include conducting outreach necessary  to address border community resistance, devoting time to identify and  complete steps necessary to comply with environmental regulations, and  addressing difficulties in acquiring rights to border lands. As of July 2007  CBP anticipated community resistance to deployment for 130 of its 370  miles of fencing.  According to community leaders, communities resist  fencing deployment for reasons including the adverse effect they  anticipate it will have on cross-border commerce and community unity. In  addition to consuming time, complying with environmental regulations,  and acquiring rights to border land can also drive up costs.  Although CBP  officials state that they are proactively addressing these challenges, these  factors will continue to pose a risk to meeting deployment targets.
In an effort to identify low cost and easily deployable fencing solutions,  CBP funded a project called Fence Lab. CBP plans to try to contain costs  by utilizing the results of Fence Lab in the future.  Fence Lab tested nine  fence/barrier prototypes and evaluated them based on performance  criteria such as their ability to disable a vehicle traveling at 40 miles per  hour (see fig. 5), allowing animals to migrate through them, and their cost- effectiveness.  Based on the results from the lab, SBInet has developed  three types of vehicle barriers and one pedestrian fence that meet CBP  operational requirements (see fig. 6).  The pedestrian fence can be  installed onto two of these vehicle barriers to create a hybrid pedestrian  fence and vehicle barrier.  CBP plans to include these solutions in a  “toolkit” of approved fences and barriers, and plans to deploy solutions  from this toolkit for all remaining vehicle barriers and for 202 of 225 miles  of remaining fencing.  Further, CBP officials anticipate that deploying  these solutions will reduce costs because cost-effectiveness was a  criterion for their inclusion in the toolkit.  SBInet officials also told us that  widely deploying a select set of vehicle barriers and fences will lower  costs through enabling it to make bulk purchases of construction and  maintenance materials.
section_title: SBInet Impact on Border Patrol’s Workforce Needs and Operating Procedures Remains Unclear
paragraphs: While SBInet Program officials expect SBInet to greatly reduce the time  spent by CBP enforcement personnel in performing detection activities, a  full evaluation of SBInet’s impact on the Border Patrol’s workforce needs  has not been completed. The Border Patrol currently uses a mix of  resources including personnel, technology, infrastructure, and rapid  response capabilities to incrementally achieve its strategic goal of  establishing and maintaining operational control of the border. Each year  through its Operational Requirements Based Budget Program (ORBBP),  the Border Patrol sectors outline the amount of resources needed to  achieve a desired level of border control. Border Patrol officials state this  annual planning process allows the organization to measure the impact of  each type of resource on the required number of Border Patrol agents. A  full evaluation of SBInet’s impact on the Border Patrol’s workforce needs  is not yet included in the ORBBP process; however, the Border Patrol  plans to incorporate information from Project 28 a few months after it is  operational.
According to agency officials, CBP is on track to meet its hiring goal of  6,000 new Border Patrol agents by December 2008, but after SBInet is  deployed, CBP officials expect the number of Border Patrol agents  required to meet mission needs to change from current projections,  although the direction and magnitude of the change is unknown. In  addition, in June 2007, we expressed concern that deploying these new  agents to the southwest sectors coupled with the planned transfer of more  experienced agents to the northern border will create a disproportionate  ratio of new agents to supervisors within those sectors—jeopardizing the  supervisors’ availability to acclimate new agents.  Tucson Sector officials  stated CBP is planning to hire from 650 to 700 supervisors next year. To  accommodate the additional agents, the Border Patrol has taken initial  steps to provide additional work space through constructing temporary  and permanent facilities, at a projected cost of about $550 million from  fiscal year 2007 to 2011.
The SBInet PMO expects SBInet to support day-to-day border enforcement  operations; however, analysis of the impact of SBInet technology on the  Border Patrol’s operational procedures cannot be completed at this time  because agents have not been able to fully use the system as intended.  Leveraging technology is part of the National Border Patrol Strategy which  identifies the objectives, tools, and initiatives the Border Patrol uses to  maintain operational control of the borders. The Tucson sector, where  Project 28 is being deployed, is developing a plan on how to integrate  SBInet into its operating procedures. Border Patrol officials stated they  intend to re-evaluate this strategy, as SBInet technology is identified and  deployed, and as control of the border is achieved.
According to agency officials, 22 trainers and 333 operators were trained  on the current Project 28 system, but because of deployment delays and  changes to the COP software, the SBInet training curriculum is to be  revised by Boeing and the government.  Training is continuing during this  revision process with 24 operators being trained each week.  According to  CBP officials, Border Patrol agents are receiving “hands on” training  during evening and weekend shifts at the COP workstations to familiarize  themselves with the recent changes made to the Project 28 system.   However, training is to be stopped once a stabilized version of the COP  can be used and both trainers and operators are to be retrained using the  revised curriculum.  Costs associated with revising the training material  and retraining the agents are to be covered by Boeing as part of the  Project 28 task order; however, the government may incur indirect costs  associated with taking agents offline for retraining.
section_title: SBI PMO Did Not Meet All of Its Staffing Goals and Has Not Yet Completed Long-Term Human Capital Planning
paragraphs: The SBI PMO tripled in size in fiscal year 2007 but fell short of its staffing  goal of 270 employees.  As of September 30, 2007, the SBI PMO had 247  employees onboard, with 113 government employees and 134 contractor  support staff.  SBI PMO officials also reported that as of October 19, 2007,  they had 76 additional staff awaiting background investigations.  In  addition, these officials said that a Human Capital Management Plan has  been drafted, but as of October 22, 2007, the plan had not been approved.  In February 2007, we reported that SBInet officials had planned to finalize  a human capital strategy that was to include details on staffing and  expertise needed for the program. At that time, SBI and SBInet officials  expressed concern about difficulties in finding an adequate number of  staff with the required expertise to support planned activities about  staffing that shortfalls could limit government oversight efforts. Strategic  human capital planning is a key component used to define the critical  skills and competencies that will be needed to achieve programmatic goals  and outlines ways the organization can fill gaps in knowledge, skills, and  abilities. Until SBInet fully implements a comprehensive human capital  strategy, it will continue to risk not having staff with the right skills and  abilities to successfully execute the program.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Project 28 and other early technology and infrastructure projects are the  first steps on a long journey towards SBInet implementation that will  ultimately require an investment of billions of taxpayer dollars.  Some of  these early projects have encountered unforeseen problems that could  affect DHS’s ability to meet projected completion dates, expected costs,  and performance goals. These issues underscore the need for both DHS  and Boeing, as the prime contractor, to continue to work cooperatively to  correct the problems remaining with Project 28 and to ensure that the  SBInet PMO has adequate staff to effectively plan and oversee future  projects.  These issues also underscore Congress’s need to stay closely  attuned to DHS’s progress in the SBInet program to make sure that  performance, schedule, and cost estimates are achieved and the nation’s  border security needs are fully addressed.
This concludes my prepared testimony. I would be happy to respond to  any questions that members of the Subcommittees may have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions regarding this testimony, please call Richard M. Stana at  (202) 512-8777 or StanaR@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this  statement were Robert E. White, Assistant Director; Rachel Beers; Jason  Berman; Katherine Davis; Jeanette Espínola; Taylor Matheson; and Sean  Seales.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the progress that the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) has made in implementing the Secure Border Initiative (SBI)  SBInet’s technology deployment projects, we analyzed DHS  documentation, including program schedules, project task orders, status  reports, and expenditures. We also interviewed DHS and the U.S. Customs  and Border Protection (CBP) headquarters and field officials, including  representatives of the SBInet Program Management Office (PMO), Border  Patrol, CBP Air and Marine, and the DHS Science and Technology  Directorate, as well as SBInet contractors. We visited the Tucson Border  Patrol sector—the site where SBInet technology deployment was  underway at the time of our review.
To determine the progress that Department of Homeland Security (DHS)  has made in infrastructure project implementation, we analyzed DHS  documentation, including schedules, contracts, status reports, and  expenditures. In addition, we interviewed DHS and CBP headquarters and  field officials, including representatives of the SBInet PMO, and Border  Patrol. We also interviewed officials from the U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers and the Department of the Interior. We visited the Tucson and  Yuma, Arizona Border Patrol sectors—two sites where tactical  infrastructure projects were underway at the time of our review. We did  not review the justification for infrastructure project cost estimates or  independently verify the source or validity of the cost information.
To determine the extent to which CBP has determined the impact of  SBInet technology and infrastructure on its workforce needs and  operating procedures, we reviewed documentation of the agency’s  decision to hire an additional 6,000 agents and the progress hiring these  agents.  We also interviewed headquarters and field officials to track if and  how CBP (1) is hiring and training its target number of personnel, (2) it is  planning to train new agents on SBInet technology, and (3) it will  incorporate the new system into its operational procedures, and any  implementation challenges it reports facing in conducting this effort.
To determine how the SBInet PMO defined its human capital goals and  progress it has made in achieving these goals, we reviewed the office’s  documentation on its hiring efforts related to SBInet, related timelines,  and compared this information with agency goals. We determined that the  workforce data were sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report. We  also interviewed SBI and SBInet officials to identify challenges in meeting  the goals and steps taken by the agency to address those challenges.
We performed our work from April 2007 through October 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
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