Immigration Enforcement: Preliminary Observations on DHS's Overstay Enforcement Efforts
Published: 2013-05-21T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Each year, millions of visitors come to the United States legally on a temporary basis either with or without a visa. Overstays are individuals who were admitted into the country legally on a temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission. DHS has primary responsibility for identifying and taking enforcement action to address overstays. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection is tasked with inspecting all people applying for entry to the United States. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is responsible for enforcing immigration law in the interior of the United States. In April 2011, GAO reported on DHS's actions to identify and address overstays and made recommendations to strengthen these processes. DHS concurred and has taken or is taking steps to address them. Since April 2011, DHS has reported taking further actions to strengthen its processes for addressing overstays.
This testimony discusses GAO's preliminary observations on DHS's efforts since April 2011 to (1) review potential overstay records for national security and public safety concerns, (2) improve data on potential overstays and report overstay rates, and (3) plan for a biometric exit system. This statement is based on preliminary analyses from GAO's ongoing review of overstay enforcement for this subcommittee and other congressional requesters. GAO analyzed DHS documents and data related to overstays and interviewed relevant DHS officials. GAO expects to issue a final report on this work in July 2013. DHS provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since GAO reported on overstays in April 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken action to address a backlog of potential overstay records by reviewing such records to identify national security and public safety threats, but unmatched arrival records remain in DHS's system. In April 2011, GAO reported that, as of January 2011, DHS's Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) contained a backlog of 1.6 million potential overstay records. DHS uses ADIS to match departure records to arrival records and subsequently close records for individuals with matching arrival and departure records. Unmatched arrival records--those that do not have corresponding departure records--remain open and indicate that the individual is a potential overstay. In the summer of 2011, DHS reviewed the 1.6 million potential overstay records. As a result, DHS closed about 863,000 records and removed them from the backlog. Since that time, DHS has continued to review all potential overstay records for national security and public safety concerns. However, as of April 2013, DHS continues to maintain more than 1 million unmatched arrival records in ADIS. GAO's preliminary analysis identified nonimmigrants traveling to the United States on a tourist visa constitute 44 percent of unmatched arrival records, while tourists admitted under a visa waiver constitute 43 percent. The remaining records include various types of other nonimmigrants, such as those traveling on temporary worker visas.
DHS has actions completed and under way to improve data on potential overstays and report overstay rates, but the impact of these changes is not yet known. DHS has streamlined connections among databases used to identify potential overstays, among other things. Although these actions have resulted in efficiencies in processing data, they do not address underlying data quality issues, such as missing land departure data. Further, because many of these changes were implemented in April 2013, it is too early to assess their effect on the quality of DHS's overstay data. DHS continues to face challenges in reporting reliable overstay rates. Federal law requires DHS to report overstay estimates, but DHS or its predecessors have not regularly done so since 1994. In September 2008, GAO reported on limitations in overstay data that affect the reliability of overstay rates. In April 2011, GAO reported that DHS officials said that they have not reported overstay rates because DHS has not had sufficient confidence in the quality of its overstay data and that, as a result, DHS could not reliably report overstay rates. In February 2013, the Secretary of Homeland Security testified that DHS plans to report overstay rates by December 2013.
DHS faces challenges planning for a biometric exit system at air and sea ports of entry. Beginning in 1996, federal law has required the implementation of an integrated entry and exit data system for foreign nationals. As of April 2013, DHS's planning efforts are focused on developing a biometric exit system for airports, with the potential for a similar solution at sea ports. However, in October 2010, DHS identified key challenges as to why it has been unable to determine how and when to implement a biometric air exit capability, including challenges in determining what personnel should be responsible for the capture of biometric information.
GAO is assessing DHS's plans and efforts in these areas and plans to report on its results in July 2013.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to provide our preliminary observations on  the actions that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken  since April 2011 to address overstays. Each year, millions of visitors  come to the United States legally on a temporary basis either with a visa  or, in some cases, as visitors who were allowed to enter without a visa.  Overstays are individuals who were admitted into the country legally on a  temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized periods of  admission. We have reported that most overstays are likely motivated by  economic opportunities to stay in the United States beyond their  authorized periods of admission. However, overstays could pose  homeland security concerns—for example, 5 of the 19 September 11,  2001, hijackers were overstays.
DHS has primary responsibility for identifying and taking enforcement  action to address overstays. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) is tasked with, among other duties, inspecting all people  applying for entry to the United States to determine their admissibility to  the country and screening Visa Waiver Program applicants to determine  their eligibility to travel to the United States under the program. U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the lead agency for  enforcing immigration law in the interior of the United States and is  primarily responsible for overstay enforcement. Within ICE, the  Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) and the  Overstay Analysis Unit are primarily responsible for overstay  investigations. The Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM),  within DHS’s National Protection and Programs Directorate, supports the  identification of overstays by managing the Arrival and Departure  Information System (ADIS), which tracks and matches arrival and  departure records for the purpose of identifying potential overstays, and  the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), which maintains  biometric information, such as fingerprints, collected from nonimmigrants  upon their entry into the United States.
In April 2011, we reported on DHS’s actions to identify and take actions to  address overstays and made recommendations to the department to  strengthen these efforts. has taken or is taking steps to address them. Further, since April 2011,  DHS has reported taking additional actions to strengthen its processes for  identifying and taking enforcement action against overstays.
GAO-11-411. review potential overstay records and collect additional data to improve  overstay identification. We analyzed DHS’s unmatched arrival records as  of November 2012, the most recent date for which DHS had compiled the  records at the time we began our review. We also reviewed statutory  requirements and a May 2012 DHS report on the status of efforts to  implement biometric exit capabilities at airports. To analyze the reliability  of data on previously unreviewed potential overstay records and DHS’s  current set of unmatched arrival records, we reviewed documentation  regarding the databases used to collect these data and interviewed DHS  officials familiar with the data. We determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted this work in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We provided a draft of this  statement to DHS for review and incorporated its comments where  appropriate.
subsections: section_title: DHS Continually Reviews Potential Overstay Records, but Unmatched Arrival Records Remain
subsections: section_title: DHS Reviewed a Backlog of 1.6 Million Potential Overstay Records
paragraphs: DHS has taken action to address a backlog of potential overstay records  we previously identified in April 2011. Specifically, in April 2011, we  reported that, as of January 2011, ADIS contained a backlog of 1.6 million  potential overstay records, which included prior nonpriority overstay leads  that had not been reviewed, nonpriority leads that continued to accrue on  a daily basis, and leads generated in error as a result of CBP system  changes. DHS uses ADIS to match departure records to arrival records  and subsequently close records for individuals with matching arrival and  departure records because either (1) the individual departed prior to the  end of his or her authorized period of admission and is therefore not an  overstay or (2) the individual departed after the end of his or her  authorized period of admission and is therefore an out-of-country  overstay. Unmatched arrival records—those records in ADIS that do not  have corresponding departure records—remain open and indicate that  those individuals are potential in-country overstays.
To determine whether an unmatched arrival record is likely to be an in-country overstay,  DHS agencies review multiple databases to determine if any information is available to  document a departure or a change in immigration status. For example, the review process  includes both automated searches, such as searching for immigration benefit application  information through a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services database, and manual  searches, such as determining whether the individual applied for refugee or asylum status. provided them to CTCEU for further review and consideration for  enforcement action. Table 1 describes how CTCEU resolved these leads.
Since completing this review of the backlog of potential overstay records  in the summer of 2011, DHS has continued to review all potential  overstay records through national security and law enforcement  databases to identify potential threats, regardless of whether the subjects  of the records meet ICE’s priorities for enforcement action. This occurs on  an ongoing basis such that DHS may identify threats among individuals  who were not previously identified as such when new information  becomes available in various national security and law enforcement  databases.
section_title: DHS Has More than 1 Million Unmatched Arrival Records
paragraphs: As of April 2013, DHS continues to maintain more than 1 million  unmatched arrival records in ADIS (that is, arrival records for which ADIS  does not have a record of departure or status change). Some of these  individuals are overstays, while others have either departed or changed  immigration status without an ADIS record of their departure or status  change. For example, the individual may have departed via a land port of  entry without providing a record of departure or the individual may have  applied for immigration benefits using a different name. In addition, these  records include those from the previous backlog of unmatched arrival  records that were not prioritized for enforcement in the summer of 2011  and have not subsequently been matched against a departure or change  of status record. As part of our ongoing work, we are analyzing these data  to identify various trends among these unmatched arrival records. For  example, our preliminary analysis shows that 44 percent of the  unmatched arrival records are nonimmigrants traveling to the United  States on a tourist visa, while 43 percent are also tourists but were  admitted under the Visa Waiver Program. Figure 1 presents our  preliminary analysis of the breakdown of unmatched arrival records by  admission class.
We also analyzed the records to assess the amount of time that has  elapsed since travelers were expected to depart the country, based on  travelers’ “admit until” date. CBP assigns certain nonimmigrants an “admit  until” date, by which they must leave the country to avoid overstaying.  Figure 2 presents our preliminary analysis of the breakdown of the  amount of time elapsed, as of November 2012, since the “admit until”  date. The average amount of time elapsed for all unmatched arrival  records was 2.7 years.
As of April 2013, DHS has not analyzed its unmatched arrival records to  identify whether there are any trends in these data that could inform the  department’s overstay enforcement efforts. We will continue to evaluate  these data as part of our ongoing work.
section_title: DHS Has Actions Completed and Under Way to Improve Data, but the Effect of These Changes Is Not Yet Known
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Begun Collecting Additional Data and Improved Sharing of Data among Its Databases to Help Identify Potential Overstays
paragraphs: Since April 2011, DHS has taken various actions to improve its data on  potential overstays. In April 2011, we reported that DHS’s efforts to  identify and report on overstays were hindered by unreliable data, and we  identified various challenges to DHS’s efforts to identify potential  overstays, including the incomplete collection of departure data from  nonimmigrants at ports of entry, particularly land ports of entry, and the  lack of mechanisms for assessing the quality of leads sent to ICE field  offices for investigations. Since that time, DHS has taken action to  strengthen its processes for reviewing records to identify potential  overstays, including (1) streamlining connections among DHS databases  used to identify potential overstays and (2) collecting information from the  Canadian government about those exiting the United States and entering  Canada through northern land ports of entry.
First, DHS has taken steps to enhance connections among its component  agencies’ databases used to identify potential overstays and reduce the  need for manual exchanges of data. For example:  In August 2012, DHS enhanced data sharing between ADIS and  IDENT. This improved connection provides additional data to ADIS to  improve the matching process based on fingerprint identification. For  example, when an individual provides fingerprints as part of an  application for immigration benefits from U.S. Citizenship and  Immigration Services or a visa from the State Department, or when  apprehended by law enforcement, IDENT now sends identity  information, including a fingerprint identification number, for that  individual to ADIS. This additional source of data is intended to help  allow ADIS to more effectively match the individual’s entry record with  a change of status, thereby closing out more unmatched arrival  records.
Beginning in April 2013, ICE’s Student and Exchange Visitor  Information System (SEVIS) began automatically sending data to  ADIS on a daily basis, allowing ADIS to review SEVIS records against  departure records and determine whether student visa holders who  have ended their course of study departed in accordance with the  terms of their stay. Prior to this date, DHS manually transferred data  from SEVIS to ADIS on a weekly basis. According to DHS officials,  these exchanges were unreliable because they did not consistently  include all SEVIS data—particularly data on “no show” students who  failed to begin their approved course of study within 30 days of being  admitted into the United States.
Also in April 2013, DHS automated the exchange of potential overstay  records between ADIS and CBP’s Automated Targeting System  (ATS), which is intended to allow DHS to more efficiently (1) transfer  data between the systems for the purpose of identifying national  security and public safety concerns, and (2) use matching algorithms  in ATS that differ from those in ADIS to close additional records for  individuals who departed.
These changes have resulted in efficiencies in reviewing records for  determining possible overstay leads; however, they do not address some  of the underlying data quality issues we previously identified, such as  incomplete data on departures through land ports of entry. Furthermore,  because many of these changes were implemented in April 2013, it is too  early to assess their effect on the quality of DHS’s overstay data.
Second, DHS is implementing the Beyond the Border initiative to collect  additional data to strengthen the identification of potential overstays. In  October 2012, DHS and the Canada Border Services Agency began  exchanging entry data on travelers crossing the border at selected land  ports of entry. Because an entry into Canada constitutes a departure from  the United States, DHS will be able to use Canadian entry data as proxies  for U.S. departure records. We have previously reported that DHS faces  challenges in its ability to identify overstays because of unreliable  collection of departure data at land ports of entry. This effort would help  address that challenge by providing a new source of data on travelers  departing the United States at land ports on the northern border. In the  pilot phase, DHS exchanged data with the Canada Border Services  Agency on third-country nationals at four of the five largest ports of entry  on the northern border. These data covered entries from September 30,  2012, through January 15, 2013. DHS plans to expand this effort to  collect data from additional ports of entry and to share data on additional  types of travelers. According to DHS officials, after June 30, 2013, DHS  plans to exchange data for third-country nationals at all automated ports  of entry along the northern border. At that time, DHS also plans to begin  using these data for operational purposes (e.g., taking enforcement action  against overstays, such as revoking visas or imposing bars on  readmission to the country based on the length of time they remained in  the country unlawfully). After June 30, 2014, DHS plans to exchange  data on all travelers, including U.S. and Canadian citizens, at all  automated ports of entry along the northern border.
section_title: DHS Continues to Face Challenges in Reporting Reliable Overstay Rates, and Recent Changes Have Not Yet Been Fully Implemented
paragraphs: DHS has not reported overstay rates because of concerns about the  reliability of its data on overstays. According to federal law, DHS is to  submit an annual report to Congress providing numerical estimates of the  number of aliens from each country in each nonimmigrant classification  who overstayed an authorized period of admission that expired during the  fiscal year prior to the year for which the report is made. Since 1994,  DHS or its predecessors have not reported annual overstay rates  regularly because of its concerns about the reliability of the department’s  overstay data. In September 2008, we reported on limitations in overstay  data, such as missing data for land departures, that affect the reliability of  overstay rates. In April 2011, we reported that DHS officials stated that  the department had not reported overstay rates because it had not had  sufficient confidence in the quality of its overstay data. DHS officials  stated at the time that, as a result, the department could not reliably  report overstay estimates in accordance with the statute. Although the  new departure data DHS is collecting as part of the Beyond the Border  initiative may allow DHS to close out more potential overstay records in  the future, these data are limited to land departure at northern border  ports of entry, and as the initiative has not yet been fully implemented, it  is too early to assess its effect on helping strengthen the reliability of  DHS’s overstay data for reporting purposes. In February 2013, the  Secretary of Homeland Security testified that DHS plans to report  overstay rates by December 2013. As of April 2013, DHS was working  to determine how it plans to calculate and report these overstay rates. As  part of our ongoing review, we are assessing how the changes DHS has  made to its processes for matching records to identify potential overstays  may affect the reliability of overstay data and DHS’s ability to report  reliable overstay rates.
section_title: DHS Faces Challenges Planning for a Biometric Exit System at Air and Sea Ports of Entry
paragraphs: Developing a biometric exit capability has been a long-standing challenge  for DHS. Beginning in 1996, federal law has required the implementation  of an integrated entry and exit data system for foreign nationals. The  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required the  Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a plan to accelerate full  implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit data system that  matches available information provided by foreign nationals upon their  arrival in and departure from the United States. Since 2004, we have  issued a number of reports on DHS’s efforts to implement a biometric  entry and exit system. For example, in November 2009, we reported that  DHS had not adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, executing,  and tracking the work that needed to be accomplished to deliver a  comprehensive exit solution. We concluded that without a master  schedule that was integrated and derived in accordance with relevant  guidance, DHS could not reliably commit to when and how it would  deliver a comprehensive exit solution or adequately monitor and manage  its progress toward this end. We have made recommendations to  address these issues, including that DHS ensure that an integrated  master schedule be developed and maintained. DHS has generally  concurred with our recommendations and has reported taking action to  address them. For example, in March 2012, DHS reported that the   US-VISIT office was adopting procedures to comply with the nine  scheduling practices we recommended in our November 2009 report and  has conducted training on our scheduling methodology.
DHS has not yet implemented a biometric exit capability, but has planning  efforts under way to assess options for such a capability at airports and  seaports. In 2009, DHS conducted pilots for biometric exit capabilities in  airport scenarios, as called for in the Consolidated Security, Disaster  Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009. In August 2010,  we reported on the results of our review of DHS’s evaluation of these pilot  programs. Specifically, we reported that there were limitations with the  pilot programs—for example, the pilot programs did not operationally test  about 30 percent of the air exit requirements identified in the evaluation  plan for the pilot programs—which hindered DHS’s ability to inform  decision making for a long-term air exit solution and pointed to the need  for additional sources of information on air exit’s operational impacts.  According to DHS officials, the department’s approach to planning for  biometric air exit has been partly in response to our recommendation that  DHS identify additional sources for the operational impacts of air exit not  addressed in the pilot programs’ evaluation and to incorporate these  sources into its air exit decision making and planning. As of April 2013,  the department’s planning efforts are focused on developing a biometric  exit system for airports, with the potential for a similar solution to be rolled  out at seaports, according to DHS officials. However, in October 2010,  DHS identified three primary reasons why it has been unable to  determine how and when to implement a biometric air exit solution:   (1) the methods of collecting biometric data could disrupt the flow of  travelers through air terminals; (2) air carriers and airport authorities had  not allowed DHS to examine mechanisms through which DHS could  incorporate biometric data collection into passenger processing at the  departure gate; and (3) challenges existed in capturing biometric data at  the point of departure, including determining what personnel should be  responsible for the capture of biometric information at airports.
According to DHS officials, these challenges have affected the  department’s planning efforts. In 2011, DHS directed its Science and  Technology Directorate (S&T), in coordination with other DHS component  agencies, to research “long-term options” for biometric exit. In May 2012, DHS reported internally on the results of S&T’s analysis of previous  air exit pilot programs and assessment of available technologies, and the  report made recommendations to support the planning and development  of a biometric air exit capability. In that report, DHS concluded that the  building blocks to implement an effective biometric air exit system were  available. However, DHS reported that significant questions remained  regarding (1) the effectiveness of current biographic air exit processes  and the error rates in collecting or matching data, (2) methods of cost- effectively integrating biometrics into the air departure processes (e.g.,  matching arrival and departure records based on biometric information  like fingerprints rather than based on biographic information, such as  names and dates of birth), (3) the additional value biometric air exit would  provide compared with the current biographic air exit process, and (4) the  overall value and cost of a biometric air exit capability. The report  included nine recommendations to help inform DHS’s planning for  biometric air exit, such as directing DHS to develop explicit goals and  objectives for biometric air exit and an evaluation framework that would,  among other things, assess the value of collecting biometric data in  addition to biographic data and determine whether biometric air exit is  economically justified.
DHS reported that, by May 2014, it planned to take steps to address the  recommendations in its report; however, according to DHS Office of  Policy and S&T officials, the department has not yet completed actions in  response to these recommendations, although DHS officials reported that  DHS has plans to do so to help support development of a biometric air  exit concept of operations. For example, DHS’s report recommended that  DHS develop explicit goals and objectives for biometric air exit and use  scenario-based testing rather than operational pilot programs to inform  the concept of operations for biometric air exit. As of April 2013, DHS  officials stated that they expect to finalize goals and objectives in the near  future and are making plans for future scenario-based testing. In addition,  DHS’s report stated that new traveler facilitation tools and technologies— for example, online check-in, self-service, and paperless technology— could support more cost-effective ways to screen travelers, and that these  improvements should be leveraged when developing plans for biometric  air exit. However, DHS officials stated that there may be challenges to  leveraging new technologies to the extent that U.S. airports and airlines  rely on older, proprietary systems that may be difficult to update to  incorporate new technologies. Furthermore, DHS officials stated they face  challenges in coordinating with airlines and airports, which have  expressed significant reluctance about biometric exit because of concerns  over its effect on operations and potential costs. To address these  concerns, DHS is conducting outreach and soliciting information from  airlines and airports regarding their operations.
DHS officials stated that the goal of its current efforts is to develop  information about options for biometric exit and to report to Congress in  time for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle regarding (1) the additional  benefits that biometric exit provides beyond enhanced biographic exit and  (2) costs associated with biometric exit. As part of our ongoing work, we  are assessing DHS’s progress in meeting its goals for addressing the  recommendations in its biometric exit report by May 2014. We plan to  report on the results of our analysis in July 2013.
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and members of the  subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased  to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For information about this statement please contact Rebecca Gambler at  (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Other individuals making key contributions included  Kathryn Bernet, Assistant Director; Susan Baker; Frances A. Cook;   Alana Finley; Lara Miklozek; Amanda Miller; and Ashley D. Vaughan.