Defense Acquisition Workforce: Better Identification, Development, and Oversight Needed for Personnel Involved in Acquiring Services
Published: 2011-09-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2010, more than half of the $367 billion dollars the Department of Defense (DOD) spent on contracts was spent on services. Buying services is fundamentally different than buying weapon systems, yet most acquisition regulations, policies, processes, and training remain structured for acquiring weapon systems. Over the last decade, reports from GAO, DOD, and Congress have raised issues about services acquisitions and have also highlighted the importance of acquisition training. GAO previously reported on the training provided to the acquisition workforce as defined by the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA). This report addresses personnel working on services acquisitions who were outside the DAWIA acquisition workforce--termed non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities--and the extent to which (1) DOD knows the composition of this population, (2) this population is taking acquisition training, and (3) DOD has implemented past recommendations related to this population. To complete this work, GAO reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 29 service contracts, relevant policies, and recommendations from previous reports and met with key DOD officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities represented more than half of the 430 personnel involved in the 29 services acquisition contracts in this review. Several organizations have been tracking and managing the DAWIA workforce, but no DOD organization has systematically identified non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, the competencies they need to conduct their acquisition duties, or been designated responsibility for overseeing this group. DOD is not required to identify these personnel and has not established a process to do so. Identifying this population is challenging, partly because, as DOD officials noted, it is a transient one that is dispersed across many DOD organizations. Additionally, these people come from a variety of career fields and are often involved in acquisitions as a secondary duty. DOD has taken action to identify part of this population and provide them training--requirements personnel for major weapon systems--but has not done this for all non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. Most non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities in GAO's sample received some acquisition training. The required training was varied and limited and applied largely to contracting officer's representatives (CORs) and not to other non-DAWIA personnel such as requirements officials, technical assistants, or multifunctional team members. For example, the Air Force required two Air Force-specific phases of training, while the Navy and Marine Corps policy did not specify what training was required. Demand for acquisition training courses by non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities has been increasing in the past few years at the Defense Acquisition University, but DOD has limited information to gauge the current and future demand for training this population in the long term or the effectiveness of the current training that is available. DOD has taken short-term actions to require training and provide resources for some non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. For example, DOD recognized the importance of CORs in several memoranda requiring that they be properly trained and appointed before contract performance begins on services acquisitions. DOD has made some progress in implementing the recommendations of reports from the Panel on Contracting Integrity and GAO that related to management and training of the COR--a portion of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. For example, for the four relevant GAO recommendations--which are related to training, assignment, and oversight of the CORs--DOD fully concurred with all of them, has fully implemented three, and is implementing a COR tracking system to address the remaining recommendation. The House Armed Services Committee and the Defense Science Board issued reports since 2009 that made recommendations that were relevant to this population but were made too recently for GAO to assess their implementation. For example, the House Armed Services Committee Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform report recommended DOD reform the services requirements process in order to address the different set of challenges services acquisitions pose compared to the procurement of goods. Among other things, GAO recommends that DOD establish criteria for identifying non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities and assess the critical skills needed to perform their role in the acquisition process. DOD concurred with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2010, more than half of the $367 billion dollars the  Department of Defense (DOD) spent on contracts were spent on  acquiring or buying services. DOD services acquisitions can range from  aircraft maintenance or operations support for a missile range to grass  cutting, and many things in between. According to the Defense Science  Board, buying services is fundamentally different than buying weapon  systems because of the time it generally takes to move from the  identification of a requirement to contract. For example, the time,  discipline, and sophistication of a team developing a requirement for  repetitive building maintenance would be considerably less than a team  building the requirement for a weapon system such as a combat ship. Yet  most acquisition regulations, laws, policies, processes, standards,  training, education, and management structures remain largely structured  for acquiring weapon systems instead of services. Over the last decade,  our reports, as well as those from DOD and Congress, have raised issues  related to services acquisitions, including challenges in identifying  requirements and ineffective coordination between program and  contracting officials. The reports have linked acquisition training, including  training for the requirements community—which falls outside the  acquisition community—to successful services acquisitions.
The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 1201-1211  (1990). This act recognized acquisition as a multidisciplinary career field for DOD  comprised of 11 functional areas—program management; systems planning research,  development, engineering, and testing; procurement, including contracting; industrial  property management; logistics; quality control and assurance; manufacturing and  production; business, cost estimating and financial management, and auditing; education,  training, and career development; construction; and joint development and production with  other government agencies and foreign countries. Since the act was passed, DOD has  expanded the original list of 11 functional areas to include facilities engineering. Three  other career fields have been subdivided: cost estimating and financial management;  systems planning research, development, engineering, and testing; and program  management. There are now a total of 16 career fields/paths covered under DOD’s  implementation of DAWIA. effective management of the acquisition workforce through standardized  education, experience, and training. In October 2010, in response to a  mandate in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,  we reported on training provided by the Defense Acquisition University  (DAU) to the DAWIA-defined acquisition workforce.2,3 Still, there are  personnel outside of DAWIA that DOD relies upon to help ensure  successful, efficient services acquisitions. They have acquisition-related  responsibilities, particularly as they relate to requirements setting,  contractor oversight, and auditing for services acquisitions.4 This report  supplements the 2010 report and is focused on non-DAWIA personnel  involved with acquiring services. We assessed the extent to which (1)  DOD knows the composition of the population of non-DAWIA personnel  with acquisition-related responsibilities, (2) non-DAWIA personnel with  acquisition-related responsibilities are taking acquisition training, and (3)  selected recommendations related to non-DAWIA personnel with  acquisition-related responsibilities from previous DOD and GAO reviews  have been implemented.  We excluded contracts and personnel  associated with services acquisitions in conflict environments or  contingencies, as they are the subject of an ongoing review by GAO.
To determine the composition of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition- related responsibilities, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of 29  service contracts from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next  Generation (FPDS-NG) that included each military service and the  Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The selected contracts were awarded  and active in fiscal year 2009, were valued at more than $1 million each,  and did not include work performed in a contingency environment.  Contracts that were related to major weapon systems acquisitions were  also excluded. We focused our selection on services acquisitions and  high-risk, cost-reimbursable contracts. We included at least two nonmajor  acquisition commands from the Air Force, the Navy, the Army, and DLA.
Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1108 (b)(2) (2009).
GAO, Defense Acquisition Workforce: DOD's Training Program Demonstrates Many  Attributes of Effectiveness, but Improvement Is Needed, GAO-11-22 (Washington, D.C.:  Oct. 28, 2010).
Contractor oversight personnel are known by many names, such as quality assurance  evaluator, contracting officer’s representative, or contracting officer’s technical  representative, but their duties are essentially the same. For the purposes of this report,  we refer to these personnel generally as contracting officer’s representatives (CORs).
For this sample of contracts, we asked DOD contracting and program  officials associated with each contract to identify the personnel with roles  and responsibilities related to that acquisition, including pre- and  postaward responsibilities.
We also met with key DOD officials—service, agency, contracting, and  quality assurance personnel coordinators—and reviewed relevant policies  to understand the status of DOD’s efforts to identify non-DAWIA  personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities and track their training.  We reviewed guidance to executive branch agencies that defines the  acquisition workforce to help determine the roles and responsibilities of  acquisition personnel, including those that may be outside of DOD’s  DAWIA definition. However, we did not review executive agencies’ efforts  to identify, develop, and train its acquisition workforce.
To identify the extent to which non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition- related responsibilities are taking acquisition training, we asked DOD to  identify all personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities for each  contract in our sample. We relied on DOD officials to specify whether the  personnel involved in each of the selected contracts were DAWIA  personnel or non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related  responsibilities. We also asked each military service and DLA to specify  any acquisition training the personnel they identified had received. We  compared the reported data on training with training records and  individual training certificates provided by commands, subcommands,  centers, and DLA as well as DAU training records.
To determine the extent to which recommendations from previous  reviews have been implemented, we identified previous reviews,  assessed which recommendations were relevant to our population of non- DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, and obtained  documentation from agency officials on the status of DOD’s  implementation of the selected recommendations.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 to September  2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for  additional details on our objectives, scope, and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Congress passed the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act  (DAWIA) in 1990 to address issues related to workforce quality, to  formally establish the acquisition workforce, and to increase its  professionalism by directing DOD to create certification requirements for  the acquisition workforce. In response, DOD defined its acquisition  workforce, which evolved into the 16 career fields and paths that currently  exist. According to DAU officials, this definition is still evolving. For each  of the career fields and paths that DOD established, there are minimum  requirements for education, experience, and training under DAWIA. The  DAWIA workforce numbered 133,103 at the end of fiscal year 2009 and  150,566 at the end of March 2011. In 2010, DOD developed a Defense  Acquisition Workforce Improvement Strategy to establish a  comprehensive acquisition workforce analysis and decision-making  capability that is still ongoing. The workforce analysis is focused on the  DAWIA workforce and does not cover non-DAWIA personnel with  acquisition-related responsibilities despite recognition of the important  roles they play in acquiring services in the federal government.
The number of personnel and roles on services acquisitions can vary  greatly. With the exception of DAWIA-certified contracting officers, who  administer services acquisitions and are involved throughout the life cycle  of a contract, other professionals do fall outside of DAWIA. A model of the  services acquisition process is demonstrated in figure 1 below along with  the roles of personnel who may be involved in the various stages  throughout the life cycle of services acquisitions.
Manage and assess contractor performance
Requirements official(s)
Source selection board   member
Contracting officer’s    representative(s)
Technical assistant(s)
GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Tailored Approach Needed to Improve Service Acquisition  Outcomes, GAO-07-20 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2006). complex investments that did not have well-defined requirements, a  complete set of measurable performance standards, or both.
The Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Federal Procurement  Policy (OFPP) issued guidance in 2005 that built on previous efforts to  improve the development of the acquisition workforce by defining the  acquisition workforce more broadly than DOD’s definition under DAWIA.  The OFPP policy applies to all executive agencies, except those subject  to DAWIA. OFPP’s definition includes individuals who perform various  acquisition functions to support accomplishing an agency’s mission. At a  minimum, the acquisition workforce of a civilian agency includes  contracting specialists, contracting officers regardless of general schedule  series, contracting officers’ representatives or equivalent positions,  program and project managers, positions in the purchasing series, and  any significant acquisition positions identified by the agency. Members of  the civilian acquisition workforce may also include:   individuals substantially involved in defining, determining, and  managing requirements;   individuals involved in acquisition planning and strategy;   individuals who participate in the contracting process (including  soliciting, evaluating, and awarding of contracts);   individuals who manage the process after the contract is awarded  (including testing and evaluating; managing, monitoring, and   evaluating performance on the contract; auditing; and administering  the contract);  individuals involved in property management;  individuals who support the business processes of the above listed  activities (e.g., General Counsel, finance, or other subject matter  experts); and  individuals who directly manage those involved in any of the above  activities.
section_title: Limited Identification of Non-DAWIA Personnel with Acquisition-related Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: Non-DAWIA personnel are assigned responsibilities in critical phases of  the acquisition process, but no DOD organization has systematically  identified these personnel and the acquisition-related competencies they  require or been designated the responsibility of overseeing this group—as   has been done for the personnel who are members of the DAWIA  workforce. In our sample of 29 service contracts, we determined that the  number of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities  was substantial. Identifying non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related  responsibilities is challenging, but DOD is working to identify a portion of  this population—requirements personnel for major weapon systems—and  provide specific training.
subsections: section_title: Number of Non-DAWIA Personnel Serving on Sample Contracts Was Substantial
paragraphs: DOD identified 218 of the 430 personnel (51 percent) reported to us as  involved in the 29 contracts in our sample as outside the DAWIA  workforce. While the absolute number is large, their acquisition-related  responsibilities are generally part-time, according to DOD officials.   Nonetheless, their roles and responsibilities touched all three phases of  the services acquisition life cycle and included personnel with such titles  as program managers, CORs, requirement officials, auditors, and legal  advisors. DAU has acknowledged that non-DAWIA personnel with  acquisition-related responsibilities may also include technical experts,  financial managers, and others whose duties may affect or be affected by  the acquisition process. According to senior DOD officials, DOD policy  does not require tracking or training for these non-DAWIA personnel with  acquisition-related responsibilities, but they are assigned responsibilities  in critical phases of the acquisition process—acquisition planning,  contract solicitation and award, and contract administration.
Decisions about the number and type of personnel involved in each  individual contract are made at the discretion of the organization  responsible for the contract and may vary widely from contract to contract  depending on the type of acquisition and the service or command. For 23  of the 29 contracts we reviewed, DOD officials identified non-DAWIA  personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities working on the contract.  The number of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related  responsibilities reported in our sample ranged from 61 on one Navy  contract to none on two different DLA contracts. For two similar Air Force  contracts involving aircraft maintenance, one reported 21 non-DAWIA  personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities involved in the contract,  and the other reported 3. According to an Air Force contracting officer, the  number of CORs associated with a contract can vary depending on the  experience and skills needed to monitor the work being performed by the  contractor. Additionally, variation among personnel identified on the  contracts is also a result of personnel turnover, which may impact the  overall number of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related  responsibilities identified on a particular contract.
Based on our sample of 29 contracts, we identified 12 categories of  personnel that have acquisition-related roles and responsibilities but are  not part of the DAWIA workforce. Figure 2 shows the number of non- DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities in each of the  12 categories we identified based on DOD data, titles, and policy. See  appendix II for a description of the 12 categories and acquisition-related  responsibilities associated with them. In some cases, DOD reported  personnel as serving in more than one role on the contract. For example,  a COR was also reported as serving as a program manager—who is the  principal technical expert usually most familiar with the requirements. In  another example, a multifunctional team member—who plans and  manages services acquisitions throughout the life of the requirement—  was reported as also being the functional commander, who is the senior  official of a requirements organization. Figure 2 below eliminates the  multiple roles as we included the individual in a specific role identified in  DOD’s guidebook, such as a COR, over a role within a group, such as a  member of a multifunctional team. In addition, DOD identified personnel  with acquisition-related responsibilities who had titles such as technical  assistants, assistant CORs, and task managers who were not designated  as the COR. This group along with CORs represented the vast majority of  personnel on our 29 contracts.
We were able to collect data on the non-DAWIA population from  individual commands and contracting organizations on a contract-by- contract basis, but no organization within DOD is responsible for  identifying, developing, and managing non-DAWIA personnel with  acquisition-related responsibilities—even though these personnel  represented over half the people reported as working on the service  contracts we reviewed. DOD is not required to identify non-DAWIA  personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, and senior officials  stated that DOD has not established criteria or a process to do so across  the department or among organizations in DOD that have a role in  helping to manage issues focused on services acquisitions. For the  DAWIA population, however, organizations within DOD—including DAU,  the Directors of Acquisition Career Management (DACMs), and the  Functional Integrated Process Teams (FIPTs)—have integrated tracking  responsibilities that allow DOD to strategically manage this population.8  DAU officials explained that in keeping with their mission and priority, they  focus their resources on DAWIA professionals.
section_title: Identification Is Challenging
paragraphs: According to DOD officials, the mission of each military service’s DACM is to track  personnel covered under DAWIA and identify demand for training.  FIPTs were  established for 14 different acquisition career fields for the DAWIA workforce. The FIPT  lead advises DOD on DAWIA career development policies and procedures, including  education, training, and experience requirements for civilian and military personnel in the  acquisition workforce. They also, in conjunction with the DACMs, identify demand for  training. as the medical monitor to review the research proposal to help ensure the  safety of the study participants. However, this official’s primary duty in the  Air Force was an active duty flight surgeon.
DOD officials stated that acquisition personnel may serve in both DAWIA  and non-DAWIA positions at different points in their DOD careers, further  complicating attempts to identify or track personnel. In the 29 contracts  we reviewed, we found several examples of personnel serving in the  same role with the same responsibilities—such as requirements  definition, program management, and contractor oversight—some of  whom were DAWIA personnel, while others were non-DAWIA personnel  with acquisition-related responsibilities. Figure 3 depicts our sample of  DOD’s acquisition workforce and the roles that overlap between the  DAWIA workforce and non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related  responsibilities.
A group of organizations within DOD led by DAU officials has begun  identifying non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities  for developing requirements in major defense acquisition programs and is  requiring specific training for them to perform their role.9 DOD’s focus is  on personnel responsible for requirements for major weapon systems,  and DOD has not undertaken a similar effort for all non-DAWIA personnel  with roles and responsibilities on services acquisitions. As a part of the  effort to identify the major weapon system personnel, DAU officials said  DOD identified criteria to define the population—including non-DAWIA  personnel—who would receive requirements management certification  and training.
section_title: Acquisition Training for Personnel with Acquisition-related Responsibilities Is Limited
paragraphs: We found that most non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related  responsibilities on our 29 contracts received some acquisition training,  even though DOD does not require or track acquisition training for 11 of  the 12 roles of non-DAWIA personnel—the exception being for CORs.  The required training was limited and varied, and the current training and  education programs for acquisitions do not address services acquisitions.  This is different than for DAWIA-certified personnel who have minimum  requirements for education, experience, and training. DAU data suggest  that demand for training has increased, but DOD has limited metrics to  gauge the current size and future demand for training of the population in  the long term or the effectiveness of current training that is available. In  the short term, however, DOD has taken interim steps to require training  and provide resources for some non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition- related responsibilities.
subsections: section_title: Most Personnel Took Some Acquisition Training
paragraphs: The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No.  109-364 § 801 (2006). we did not assess the quality or effectiveness of any training as a  component of our work.  Included in the 218 non-DAWIA personnel with  acquisition-related responsibilities were 48 personnel who reported that  they did not receive any acquisition training, such as:    7 officials who were responsible for developing requirements    3 functional commanders—senior requirements officials of an  organization, such as the commanding officer for a missile range;10     1 COR; and    3 of 10 program managers.11  See figure 4 below to see the extent to which non-DAWIA personnel with  acquisition-related responsibilities on the 29 contracts we reviewed took  training.
For the majority of contracts in our sample, a functional commander was not included in  the list of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities reported to us by  DOD.
In some instances, there was more than one program manager reported per contract. In  others, no program manager was reported on a contract. There is no requirement for a  program manager on services contracts.
section_title: DAU Data Indicate That Demand for Acquisition Training Has Increased
paragraphs: Based on the number of courses completed, DAU faces growing demand  for training by non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related  responsibilities, despite few requirements for training. For 11 selected  courses, many of which are recommended by DOD to improve  requirements development, non-DAWIA training participation increased  from fiscal year 2008 to 2010, as shown in table 1 below. According to  DAU officials, DAU does not collect information on why personnel are  seeking training or what roles and responsibilities they have on contracts  to determine whether the individuals are working on major weapon  systems, services acquisitions, or other types of contracts.
According to DAU records, two of the courses listed above—the Overview  of Acquisition Ethics and the COR Mission with a Focus—accounted for  over 75 percent of the increase in the number of Web-based acquisition- related training courses taken by non-DAWIA personnel from 2008-2010.  The number of non-DAWIA personnel seeking acquisition training through  DAU is expected to increase with the introduction of a contracting officer’s  representative course in June 2009 and the Web-based equivalent in  August 2010, which is listed above in table 1.
Beyond the insight DAU course data provide, DOD has limited  information on the demand for and the effectiveness of acquisition  training for non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities.  First, tracking acquisition training for non-DAWIA personnel with  acquisition-related responsibilities, if it is done at all, is typically conducted  for COR training and auditors within organizations to which these  personnel are assigned and is decentralized across the department.  Second, DAU training participants' course evaluations through the middle  of July 2011 rated COR courses positively in job impact and learning  effectiveness, but according to a DAU official, these evaluations are  completed before participants begin their COR duties, and DAU does not  currently request feedback on the value of a course after the training  participants have begun their acquisition duties as CORs. DAU officials  acknowledged that DAU does not have information to assess the  effectiveness of COR training. They explained that COR training is  intended to be an introduction to acquisition-related duties and that  because DAU’s mission is to focus on DAWIA professionals and its  resources are limited, it does not collect more extensive feedback on  COR courses for personnel that will not likely remain in the acquisition  community because they are often involved in acquisitions as a  secondary and not a primary duty.
section_title: Several DOD Initiatives Provide Training and Resources
paragraphs: DOD has taken short-term actions to assist non-DAWIA personnel with  acquisition-related responsibilities to be successful in the role of COR for  services acquisitions. However, DOD has not identified a plan to develop  the skills or competencies necessary for other non-DAWIA personnel with  acquisition-related responsibilities in other roles. In 2006, 2008, and 2010  DOD recognized the importance of some non-DAWIA personnel with  acquisition-related responsibilities in several memoranda requiring that  CORs be properly trained and appointed before contract performance  begins on a services acquisition to address weaknesses in this key  function that the DODIG and we identified. In 2010, DOD developed a  COR certification standard that defines minimum COR competencies,  experience, and training, based on the complexity of the requirement and  contract performance risk. A DOD Instruction, currently in draft form and  undergoing review, will give more specificity to the COR certification  policy but has not been formally issued and published. Once this training  is implemented across DOD, it may only require training for approximately  one-fourth of the personnel identified as CORs for the contracts we  examined.
DOD and DAU officials stated that the training that is currently available  through DAU is geared toward weapon systems acquisitions and that  they do not have a curriculum developed for services acquisitions or for  non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, outside of  CORs. Recently, DOD and DAU have undertaken initiatives to address  training for requirements officials. For example, in 2009 DAU developed  optional Service Acquisition Workshops to assist acquisition teams and  guide them through the requirements writing process. According to DAU  officials, key participants who should participate in the workshop include  the program/project manager, contracting officer, and CORs. Both  DAWIA and non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related  responsibilities from a specific services acquisition team participate in the  workshop, writing the requirements together and building consensus on  their vision and goals for the acquisition.
To bridge the gaps in skills and abilities of non-DAWIA personnel with  acquisition-related responsibilities who do not have acquisition  experience, several organizations across DOD have created a customer  liaison capability to assist the requiring activity on services acquisitions in  the absence of a program office to facilitate the interaction between the  contracting organization and the requiring organization. For example, a  Marine Corps contracting office official said they created a customer  liaison group of four DAWIA personnel to assist non-DAWIA personnel  with the acquisition process, including writing requirements. An Army  command used the experience and skills of a former federal contracting  officer to provide technical assistance to personnel developing  requirements for services acquisitions, usually non-DAWIA personnel with  acquisition-related responsibilities. Within the Army Corp of Engineers, a  project manager may be assigned to a contract to facilitate the  relationship between the requirements and contracting organizations.  DLA officials said that some organizations within DLA have an acquisition  assistance office to assist in preparing the requirements package.
DOD has two other ongoing initiatives to track and train a portion of the  non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. First, DOD  is developing a system to identify and manage CORs that will provide a  repository for COR training certificates and monthly contractor  surveillance reports. It will also give contracting personnel and requiring  activities the means to track and manage COR assignments. The system  is anticipated to provide DOD with insight into the size of the active and  inactive COR population within DOD. The system is anticipated to be fully  implemented during fiscal year 2012. Second, within the non-DAWIA  auditing community in DOD, DOD officials said that the DODIG has led a  working group, including DAU, to find spaces in a specific DAU course  through fiscal year 2011 so the non-DAWIA auditors can get the  equivalent training they need for certification based on their current  curriculum. In the long term, the working group is also meeting to  establish an auditor-specific curriculum at DAU for the non-DAWIA  auditors to receive acquisition training to address their specific needs.  However, according to the DODIG lead for the working group, long-term  plans and funding to support this training initiative for non-DAWIA  auditors are uncertain.
section_title: DOD Has Taken Some Steps to Address Previous Recommendations
paragraphs: DOD has made some progress in implementing the outstanding  recommendations from the Panel on Contacting Integrity, our previous  reports, and other reports that raised issues related to training for non- DAWIA personnel. For the Panel on Contracting Integrity (Panel), the  recommendations that were relevant to non-DAWIA personnel with  acquisition-related responsibilities focused on managing, training, and  certifying CORs. Based on the Panel’s 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010  reports with recommendations related to CORs and follow-up action by  the Panel, we determined that DOD has fully implemented 3, partially  implemented 7, and has not implemented 1 of the 11 recommendations.  Specifically, in response to the Panel’s recommendation that DOD  develop a certification standard for CORs, DOD developed a certification  program listing available training resources that meet the standard and  defining a reasonable time-phased implementation plan for the standard.  An example of one Panel recommendation that remains open is the  recommendation to develop an implementation plan for the COR  certification process. While DOD has issued a policy memorandum for the  COR certification process, it has not yet issued the DOD Instruction that  will implement the new certification standard policy. See appendix IV for  more detailed information on the Panel recommendations and their  implementation status.
Our previous work has focused on the roles, responsibilities, and training  of the professional DAWIA acquisition workforce and how DOD manages  services acquisitions. This is our first report providing insight on non- DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities on services  acquisitions. Recommendations from previous reports that are related to  our population have focused primarily on the role of CORs, which we  demonstrate are only a portion of a larger group of non-DAWIA personnel  with acquisition-related responsibilities. DOD has also made progress  addressing recommendations we made from 2005 to 2009. DOD  concurred with the four relevant recommendations, has fully implemented  three, and has taken action on the other.
In December 2005, DOD issued a memorandum to address our  recommendation that surveillance personnel—CORs—are properly  trained and appointed before contract award.    In December 2006, DOD issued a policy memorandum requiring DOD  components to ensure that the contribution of CORs in assisting in the  monitoring or administration of contracts is addressed in their  performance reviews to address our recommendation that DOD  develop practices to help ensure accountability for personnel carrying  out surveillance responsibilities.
In October 2006, DOD issued an Acquisition Services Policy to  address our recommendation that DOD’s service contract review  process and associated data collection provide management more  visibility over contract surveillance.     Our November 2009 recommendation that the military departments  review their procedures to ensure that properly trained surveillance  personnel have been assigned prior to and throughout a contract’s  period of performance has not been implemented.  Ongoing efforts to  develop a certification system for all DOD CORs should address this  recommendation.
See appendix V for a list of our recommendations and additional details  on the status of implementation.
Finally, the House Armed Services Committee and the Defense Science  Board recently issued reports including recommendations related to  training for those who are responsible for requirements development for  services acquisitions and non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related  responsibilities but the recommendations were made too recently for us to  assess the status of implementation. For example, in March 2010, the  House Armed Services Committee Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform  Report reported that DOD was not ensuring that personnel with  responsibilities for acquisition outcomes acquire the skills, training, and  experience needed to properly write, award, and oversee performance of  services acquisitions, which could pose a different set of challenges than  those associated with the procurement of goods. The report  recommended that the department reform the requirements process and  establish a clear career path for civilians in the defense acquisition  system. In March 2011, a Defense Science Board Task Force report  advised that DOD should systematically improve training for personnel  involved in services acquisitions and oversight.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Non-DAWIA personnel carry responsibilities that are essential to getting  good outcomes from DOD's services acquisitions. They are involved in  defining requirements, shaping the acquisition decision-making process,  and overseeing services acquisitions. While identifying these individuals  is challenging, without a clear understanding of this population, DOD  does not have sufficient oversight or assurance that the right people with  the right skills are involved in the critical phases of services acquisitions  to ensure successful outcomes. Challenges in identifying non-DAWIA  personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities exist, in part, because  the personnel are dispersed throughout the department, come from a  variety of career fields, and are often involved in acquisitions as a  secondary duty. DOD’s efforts to identify and provide acquisition training  to CORs, a portion of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related  responsibilities, is a good foundation for building a strategic and  sustainable approach to develop the skills and competencies of other  non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities.
This diverse population, because of its differences from DAWIA  personnel, may require different ways to prepare its members for their  unique roles and responsibilities in supporting the services acquisition  process. Yet DOD does not have a deliberate approach to identifying  non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities or ensuring  they have the skill sets, resources, and tools they need. Apart from the  new training for one of the non-DAWIA roles—the CORs—training for  non-DAWIA personnel is limited. DOD does not have a way of knowing  whether the training these people take is targeted to critical skills and  competencies related to carrying out their acquisition responsibilities.  Without a departmentwide focus and an organization within DOD with  designated responsibility for the population of non-DAWIA personnel with  acquisition-related responsibilities—as the professional DAWIA workforce  has to provide leadership on training, identification, and development of  personnel—it is unclear whether these personnel have the training they  need to help ensure that DOD obtains its desired acquisition outcomes. In  the area of weapon systems, DOD has taken steps to assure that non- DAWIA personnel are getting needed acquisition training. Specifically,  DOD has identified some requirements positions involved in major  weapon systems that should receive additional training and built a  curriculum designed for this group to obtain certification. This is one of  perhaps several approaches to managing an amorphous and transient  population within DOD.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that training and development efforts for non-DAWIA  personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities are deliberate and  contribute to successful services acquisitions—meaning DOD buys the  right thing, the right way, while getting the desired outcomes—we  recommend the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions:    establish criteria and a time frame for identifying non-DAWIA  personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, including  requirements officials;    assess what critical skills non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition- related responsibilities might require to perform their role in the  acquisition process and improve acquisition outcomes; and     designate an organization that has the responsibility to track DOD’s  progress in identifying, developing, and overseeing non-DAWIA  personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities to help ensure they  have the skills necessary to perform their acquisition function.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In written  comments, DOD agreed with our recommendations. DOD provided  technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as  appropriate. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix VI.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, and other interested parties.  The  report is also available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4841 or martinb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. Staff acknowledgements are listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 included a  provision requiring that GAO report on the Department of Defense’s  (DOD) training for its acquisition and audit workforce.1 Our October 2010  report addressed training provided by the Defense Acquisition University  (DAU) to the DAWIA workforce.2 In addition to that report, we agreed to  review training provided to non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related  responsibilities in a noncontingency environment. To accomplish this, we  assessed the extent to which (1) DOD knows the composition of the  population of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related  responsibilities, (2) non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related  responsibilities are taking acquisition training, and (3) selected  recommendations related to non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition- related responsibilities from previous reviews have been implemented.
Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1108 (b)(2) (2009).
GAO, Defense Acquisition Workforce: DOD's Training Program Demonstrates Many  Attributes of Effectiveness, but Improvement Is Needed, GAO-11-22 (Washington, D.C.:  Oct. 28, 2010).
We initially selected 33 contracts during the design phase of our work to understand the  differences between how goods and services were acquired by DOD. Once we narrowed  our scope to focus on service contracts in a noncontingency environment, we removed 3  contracts for goods and a fourth contract that was contingency-related. and personnel involved in the contracts to verify the specific service being  provided and to enhance specific details not provided in FPDS-NG such  as where work was being conducted. Through these steps, we found  FPDS-NG to be reliable for the purposes of this report.
For this sample of contracts, we asked DOD contracting and program  officials associated with each contract to identify the personnel with roles  and responsibilities related to that acquisition, including pre- and  postaward responsibilities. We relied on DOD officials to specify whether  the personnel involved in each of the selected contracts were DAWIA- certified, and thus a member of the DAWIA workforce, or were non- DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. To gather more  specific information from each organization responsible for the contracts  in our selected sample, we also interviewed DOD officials, DAWIA  contracting personnel, requirements officials, and other personnel who  performed specific roles on the contracts from each of the services and  DLA. We obtained information about the involvement of non-DAWIA  personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities in the selected  contracts, the organizations’ training policies when the contracts were  awarded, and how the individual organizations each tracked training for  CORs and other non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related  responsibilities. To help determine the roles and responsibilities of  acquisition personnel, we reviewed guidance to executive branch  agencies that defines the acquisition workforce, including those that may  be outside of DOD’s DAWIA definition. However, we did not review  executive agencies’ efforts to identify, develop, and train its acquisition  workforce. To understand DOD’s ability to define, identify, and track non- DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, we interviewed  officials from the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), Defense  Procurement Acquisition Policy (DPAP), each of the services’ Director of  Acquisition Career Management (DACM) offices, the Air Force Program  Executive Office for Combat and Mission Support (AFPEO/CM), the  Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Services, the Director for  Services Acquisition for the Navy, the Functional Integrated Process  Team for Program Management, the Department of Defense Inspector  General (DODIG), the Naval Audit Service, the Army Audit Agency, and  the Air Force Audit Agency.
To identify the extent to which non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition- related responsibilities are taking acquisition training, we asked each  service and DLA to report any acquisition training that non-DAWIA  personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities associated with our  sample had taken and specific training auditors had taken from each  respective audit agency noted above. We also asked each audit agency  for aggregate counts of the number of their non-DAWIA auditors who  worked on contracting and acquisition who had received DAWIA- equivalent certification. In order to confirm training taken by the non- DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities for the contracts  in our sample we requested DAU training records, training certificates,  and locally maintained training records. To identify the demand for DAU  acquisition training by non-DAWIA personnel over time, we requested  data on 15 classroom and Web-based courses from DAU for fiscal years  2008 through 2010 that were identified from DOD policy documents as  training for requirements officials or CORs. We made an effort to only  include designated non-DAWIA personnel to establish the amount of  training taken and additionally calculated the number of unique individuals  by removing duplicate names to provide a more accurate number to the  demand for training. However, we were not able to determine whether  individuals worked on major weapon systems, services acquisitions,  another type of contract, or did not work in acquisition at all. To identify  the individual courses that non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related  responsibilities took and the sources for training on the 29 contracts, we  compiled the training identified by DOD officials and cross-referenced  individuals listed with DAU’s training database. However, these data  sources did not provide us enough information to completely verify the  training individuals identified as non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition- related responsibilities have taken. We did not assess the content or the  effectiveness of the required or available training. Despite some of the  limitations noted above, we found the data to be reliable for the purposes  of this report. To understand DOD’s ability to strategically plan for the  training or development of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related  responsibilities we interviewed officials from DAU, DPAP, and the  services’ DACMs. We also interviewed contracting and requirement  officials with the Air Force, Army, Navy, and DLA to obtain acquisition  training and evidence of completed training. We reviewed relevant  legislation, acquisition policy, and service and agency-specific policies  and guidance, such as the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal  Year 2010, the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and the Defense Federal  Acquisition Regulation Supplement in order to understand any training  requirement for non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related  responsibilities.
To identify the extent to which recommendations addressing non-DAWIA  personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities from previous reviews  have been implemented, such as the Panel on Contracting Integrity  (Panel), we reviewed 2007-2010 annual updates prepared by DOD to  address the Panel’s recommendations. Specifically, we compared the  recommended actions from the previous reports with each additional  report and conducted a comparative analysis of the Panel’s status of  each recommendation with our own assessment. We provided our  analysis to DPAP officials to review and provide additional information  that we considered in making our final determination. We also reviewed  past GAO reports that made recommendations on non-DAWIA personnel  with acquisition-related responsibilities from 2005-2009 and provided an  update on the status of DOD’s implementation or current work to  implement past recommendations. We also reviewed more recently  issued reports by the House Armed Services Committee Panel and the  Defense Science Board that addressed issues impacting non-DAWIA  personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities and services  acquisitions.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 to September  2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Summary of DOD Descriptions of Non-DAWIA Personnel with Acquisition- related Responsibilities
paragraphs: Based on the guidance and policies issued by DOD and the Air Force as  well as from information collected on personnel reported in our sample,  DOD’s non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities are  a substantial group of DOD civilians and military personnel who perform  acquisition duties in their current positions or assignments and are not  members of the DAWIA workforce. Following is a list of categories of  roles, titles, and a description of the acquisition responsibilities for non- DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities.      1.  Alternate/assistant contracting officer’s representative  (ACOR)/technical assistant/task manager: Serves as support to the  COR in the administration of the contract but does not have the  authority to provide any technical direction or clarification to the  contractor.    2.  Contracting officer’s representative (COR): Serves as the onsite  technical subject matter expert assessing contractor performance  against contract performance standards and recording and reporting  this information, including inspecting and accepting supplies and  services. The COR represents and is nominated by the requiring  organization and designated by the contracting officer. The personnel  responsible for developing the requirements may or may not be  assigned as the COR on services acquisitions. Regardless, DOD  guidance states that the COR should be identified early in the  acquisition cycle and included in preaward activities, such as  requirements definition/acquisition planning and contract formation  processes. In our selected contracts, CORs were sometimes DAWIA  personnel, but the majority of them were not. In 17 of 29 contracts,  there was more than one COR assigned.  3.  Requirements official: Represents an organization with a need for a  particular product or service. Requirements officials are responsible  for technical requirements, for prescribing contract quality  requirements, and for defining the requirement. According to agency  officials, acquisition planning activities generally begin when the  program office, along with requirements officials, identifies a need.  The program office is primarily responsible for conducting market  research, defining requirements in a document such as a statement of  work, developing cost estimates, and developing a written acquisition  plan, if required. In the 29 contracts we reviewed, there were non- DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities identified as  requirements officials.  4.  Source selection board member: Evaluates contract proposals  against requirements and recommends contractors for award.   5.  Program/project manager: Serves as the principal technical expert  and is usually the most familiar with the requirement and best able to  identify potential technical trade-offs and determine whether the  requirement can be met by a commercial solution. In the absence of a  program office or program/project manager, requirements officials  from the customer organization serve in a similar role as the  program/project manager. In contrast to major weapon programs, for  services acquisitions, a program office is not usually established, so  the contracting organization works directly with the requirements  organization—which typically consists of non-DAWIA personnel with  acquisition-related responsibilities in our selected contracts. In our  selected contracts, DOD does not require a program/project manager  to be appointed for services acquisitions, and there is no requirement  for those that are serving in this role for services acquisitions to be  DAWIA personnel. Of the contracts in our sample, 13 reported having  program/project managers and 16 did not. Some contracts had more  than one person serving in a role similar to that of a program/project  manager.   6.  Legal advisor: Ensures that terms and conditions contemplated are  consistent with the government’s legal rights, duties, and  responsibilities. Reviews contracting documents and request for  proposals for legal sufficiency and advises on acquisition strategies  and contracts.  7.  Multifunctional team member: Plans and manages services  acquisitions throughout the life of the requirement. The functional  experts on the team maintain knowledge and provide continuity and  stability. The duties, expertise, and contributions of each team  member are important to the success of a services acquisition. Of the  29 contracts we reviewed, 24 used multifunctional teams or the  equivalent, and 5 did not.  8.  Functional commander: Directs or commands the requirements  organization responsible for the actual performance of a given  service. Identifies mission-essential services and develops,  implements, and assists in the execution of services acquisitions.  Some responsibilities may include developing acquisition strategy and  overseeing performance and monitoring the service throughout the life  of the acquisition, including reviewing contractor performance  documentation on a regular basis to ensure performance is  compatible with the contract and mission objectives. They are also  responsible for assigning primary and alternate CORs and assigning  functional experts to the multifunctional team. DOD officials in this role  are generally non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related  responsibilities.  9.  Auditor: Conducts acquisition and contract-related audits at any  phase in the services acquisition life cycle. Non-DAWIA auditors  include those in the Army Audit Agency, the Naval Audit Service, the  Air Force Audit Agency, and the DOD Inspector General. In our  selected contracts, non-DAWIA audit personnel do not have and are  not required to receive DAWIA certification.  10. Financial/budget officer: Serves as an advisor for fiscal and  budgetary issues.   11. Price analyst: Analyzes and evaluates financial and cost-based data  for reasonableness, completeness, accuracy, and affordability at  initiation or contract award phases of services acquisitions.   12. Small Business Administration advisor: Serves as the principal  advisor and advocate for small business issues.
section_title: Appendix III: Acquisition Training Resources Used by Non-DAWIA Personnel with Acquisition-related Responsibilities Identified on 29 Services Acquisition Contracts
section_title: Appendix IV: Status of Selected Recommendations from 2007-2010 Panel on Contracting Integrity Reports
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which training recommendations from the  Panel on Contracting Integrity (Panel) have been implemented, we  examined whether DOD had implemented the Panel’s recommendations  in 2007, 2008, and 2009 by reviewing the 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010  reports. To assess the implementation of the 2010 recommendations,  DPAP provided information on the status of the recommendations.  Specifically, we compared the recommended actions from the 2007 report  with the reported action in the 2008 report. The same comparative  analysis was conducted using the recommended actions from 2008,  2009, and 2010 reports. We differentiated between recommendations that  specifically mention training from those that did not, as well as  recommendations in which training was involved in the implementation of  the recommendation. We analyzed the supporting documents to assess  the status, and, based on our review, we assigned one of the following  four status assessments to each of the recommendations:  1.  Fully Implemented. The entire wording of the action item has been  fulfilled.   2.  Partially Implemented. Only a portion of the action has been  implemented. When the wording of the action item had multiple parts,  if one part or a portion of a part had been implemented (but not all  parts), we categorized the action item as “partially implemented.”   3.  Not Implemented-Action Taken. No part of the action item has been  implemented, but steps have been taken toward the completion of the  action item. For example, if legislation had been introduced to address  the action but had not been enacted into law, we categorized the  action item as “not implemented-action taken.”   4.  Not Implemented-No Action. No part of the action item has been  completed, and no action has been taken to address the action item.  For example, if the action item called for changes in legislation but no  legislation has even been proposed, we categorized the action item  as “not implemented-no action.”
section_title: Appendix V: Selected GAO Recommendations Related to Non-DAWIA Personnel with Acquisition-related Responsibilities
paragraphs: We identified previous recommendations involving CORs—identified as  surveillance personnel in table 5 below—in reports from 2005-2009 as  being relevant to the training or management of non-DAWIA personnel  with acquisition-related responsibilities. To determine the status of their  implementation by DOD, we obtained and analyzed documentation from  agency officials and assigned one of the following four status  assessments to each of the recommendations:  1.  Fully Implemented. The entire wording of the action item has been  fulfilled.   2.  Partially Implemented. Only a portion of the action has been  implemented. When the wording of the action item had multiple parts,  if one part or a portion of a part had been implemented (but not all  parts), we categorized the action item as “partially implemented.”   3.  Not Implemented-Action Taken. No part of the action item has been  implemented, but steps have been taken toward the completion of the  action item. For example, if legislation had been introduced to address  the action but had not been enacted into law, we categorized the  action item as “not implemented-action taken.”   4.  Not Implemented-No Action. No part of the action item has been  completed, and no action has been taken to address the action item.  For example, if the action item called for changes in legislation but no  legislation has even been proposed, we categorized the action item  as “not implemented-no action.”
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense
paragraphs: GAO Draft Report Dated SEPTEMBER, 2011  GAO-11-892 (GAO CODE 120930)  “DEFENSE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE: BETTER IDENTIFICATION,  DEVELOPMENT AND OVERSIGHT NEEDED FOR PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN  ACQUIRING SERVICES”
RECOMMENDATION 1:  The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense establish  criteria and a timeframe for identifying non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related  responsibilities, including requirements officials.  (See page /GAO Draft Report.)
DoD RESPONSE:  Concur.
RECOMMENDATION 2:  The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense assess what  critical skills non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities might require to  perform their role in the acquisition process and improve acquisition outcomes (See  page 17/GAO Draft Report.)
DoD RESPONSE:  Concur.
RECOMMENDATION :  The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense designate an  organization that has the responsibility to track DOD's progress in identifying, developing, and  overseeing non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities to help ensure they  have the skills necessary to perform their acquisition function (See page 17/GAO Draft Report.)
DoD RESPONSE:  Concur.
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact above, Penny Berrier, Assistant Director; Patrick  Breiding; Heather Miller; John K. Needham; Keo Vongvanith; Morgan  Delaney Ramaker; Roxanna Sun; Julia Kennon; and John Krump made  key contributions to this report.