Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Has Taken Some Initial Steps to Address Its Challenges, but Vulnerabilities Still Exist
Published: 2009-09-23T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: To accomplish its mission of protecting federal facilities, the Federal Protective Services (FPS), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), currently has a budget of about $1 billion, about 1,200 full-time employees, and about 15,000 contract security guards. This testimony is based on completed and ongoing work for this Subcommittee and discusses: (1) challenges FPS faces in protecting federal facilities and (2) how FPS's actions address these challenges. To perform this work, GAO visited FPS's 11 regions, analyzed FPS data, and interviewed FPS officials, guards, and contractors. GAO also conducted covert testing at 10 judgmentally selected level IV facilities in four cities. Because of the sensitivity of some of the information, GAO cannot identify the specific locations of incidents discussed. A level IV facility has over 450 employees and a high volume of public contact.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: FPS faces challenges that hamper its ability to protect government employees and members of the public who work in and visit federal facilities. First, as we reported in our June 2008 report, FPS does not have a risk management framework that links threats and vulnerabilities to resource requirements. Without such a framework, FPS has little assurance that its programs will be prioritized and resources will be allocated to address changing conditions. Second, as discussed in our July 2009 report, FPS lacks a strategic human capital plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts. FPS does not collect data on its workforce's knowledge, skills, and abilities and therefore cannot determine its optimal staffing levels or identify gaps in its workforce and determine how to fill these gaps. Third, as we testified at a July 2009 congressional hearing, FPS's ability to protect federal facilities is hampered by weaknesses in its contract security guard program. GAO found that many FPS guards do not have the training and certifications required to stand post at federal facilities in some regions. For example, in one region, FPS has not provided the required 8 hours of X-ray or magnetometer training to its 1,500 guards since 2004. GAO also found that FPS does not have a fully reliable system for monitoring and verifying whether guards have the training and certifications required to stand post at federal facilities. In addition, FPS has limited assurance that guards perform assigned responsibilities (post orders). Because guards were not properly trained and did not comply with post orders, GAO investigators with the components for an improvised explosive device concealed on their persons, passed undetected through access points controlled by FPS guards at 10 of 10 level IV facilities in four major cities where GAO conducted covert tests. FPS has taken some actions to better protect federal facilities, but it is difficult to determine the extent to which these actions address these challenges because many of the actions are recent and have not been fully implemented. Furthermore, FPS has not fully implemented several recommendations that GAO has made over the last couple of years to address FPS's operational and funding challenges, despite the Department of Homeland Security's concurrence with the recommendations. In addition, most of FPS's actions focus on improving oversight of the contract guard program and do not address the need to develop a risk management framework or a human capital plan. To enhance oversight of its contract guard program FPS is requiring its regions to conduct more guard inspections at level IV facilities and provide more x-ray and magnetometer training to inspectors and guards. However, several factors make these actions difficult to implement and sustain. For example, FPS does not have a reliable system to track whether its 11 regions are completing these new requirements. Thus, FPS cannot say with certainty that the requirements are being implemented. FPS is also developing a new information system to help it better protect federal facilities. However, FPS plans to transfer data from several of its legacy systems, which GAO found were not fully reliable or accurate, into the new system.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We are pleased to be here to discuss the Federal Protective Service’s  (FPS) efforts to ensure the protection of the over 1 million government  employees, as well as members of the public, who work in and visit the  nation’s 9,000 federal facilities each year. There has not been a large-scale  attack on a domestic federal facility since the terrorist attacks of  September 11, 2001, and the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal  Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Nevertheless, the recent shooting  death of a guard at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum—though not a  federal facility—demonstrates the continued vulnerability of public  buildings to domestic terrorist attack. To accomplish its mission of  protecting federal facilities, FPS currently has a budget of about $1  billion, about 1,200 full time employees, and about 15,000 contract security  guards deployed at federal facilities across the country.
As the primary federal agency that is responsible for protecting and  securing General Services Administration (GSA) facilities and federal  employees and visitors across the country, FPS has the authority to  enforce federal laws and regulations aimed at protecting federally owned  and leased properties and the persons on such property. FPS conducts its  mission by providing security services through two types of activities: (1)  physical security activities—conducting threat assessments of facilities  and recommending risk-based countermeasures aimed at preventing  incidents at facilities—and (2) law enforcement activities—proactively  patrolling facilities, responding to incidents, conducting criminal  investigations, and exercising arrest authority.
This testimony is based on completed and ongoing work for this  Subcommittee and discusses (1) challenges FPS faces in protecting federal  facilities and (2) how FPS’s actions address these challenges. To perform  this work, we visited FPS’s 11 regions, analyzed FPS data, and interviewed  FPS officials, guards, and contractors. We also conducted covert testing at  10 judgmentally selected high risk facilities in four cities. Because of the  sensitivity of some of the information in our report, we cannot specifically  identify the locations of the incidents discussed. We conducted this  performance audit from April 2007 to September 2009 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: FPS Faces Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities
paragraphs: FPS faces a number of challenges that hamper its ability to protect  government employees and the public in federal facilities. For example,  these challenges include (1) developing a risk management framework, (2)  developing a human capital plan, and (3) better oversight of its contract  security guard program.
subsections: section_title: FPS Has Not Implemented a Risk Management Framework for Identifying Security Requirements and Allocating Resources
paragraphs: In our June 2008 report we found that in protecting federal facilities, FPS  does not use a risk management approach that links threats and  vulnerabilities to resource requirements. We have stated that without a  risk management approach that identifies threats and vulnerabilities and  the resources required to achieve FPS’s security goals, there is little  assurance that programs will be prioritized and resources will be allocated  to address existing and potential security threats in an efficient and  effective manner. While FPS has conducted risk related activities such as  building security assessments (BSAs), we have reported several concerns  with the Facilities Securities Risk Management system FPS currently uses  to conduct these assessments. First, it does not allow FPS to compare  risks from building to building so that security improvements to buildings  can be prioritized across GSA’s portfolio. Second, current risk  assessments need to be categorized more precisely. According to FPS, too  many BSAs are categorized as high or low risk, which does not allow for a  refined prioritization of security improvements. Third, the system does not  allow for tracking the implementation status of security recommendations  based on assessments.
BSAs are the core component of FPS’s physical security mission.  However, ensuring the quality and timeliness of them is an area in which  FPS continues to face challenges. Many law enforcement security officers  (LESOs) in the regions we visited stated that they do not have enough  time to complete BSAs. For example, while FPS officials have stated that  BSAs for level IV facilities should take between 2 to 4 weeks, several  LESOs reported having only 1 or 2 days to complete assessments for their  buildings, in part, because of pressure from supervisors to complete BSAs  as quickly as possible. Some regional supervisors have also found  problems with the accuracy of BSAs. One regional supervisor reported  that an inspector was repeatedly counseled and required to redo BSAs  when supervisors found he was copying and pasting from previous  assessments. Similarly, one regional supervisor stated that in the course of  reviewing a BSA for an address he had personally visited, he realized that  the inspector completing the BSA had not actually visited the site because  the inspector referred to a large building when the actual site was a vacant  plot of land owned by GSA.
Moreover, some GSA and FPS officials have stated that LESOs lack the  training and physical security expertise to prepare BSAs according to the  standards. Currently, LESOs receive instructions on how to complete  BSAs as part of a 4-week course at the Federal Law Enforcement Training  Center’s Physical Security Training Program. However, many LESOs and  supervisors in the regions we visited stated that this training is insufficient  and that refresher training is necessary to keep LESOs informed about  emerging technology, but that this refresher training has not been  provided in recent years. Regional GSA officials also stated that they  believe the physical security training provided to LESOs is inadequate and  that it has affected the quality of the BSAs they receive.
Further complicating FPS’s ability to protect federal facilities is the  building security committee structure. Building Security Committees  (BSC) are composed of representatives from each tenant agency who  generally are not security professionals but have responsibility for  approving the countermeasures FPS recommends. However, in some of  the facilities that we visited, security countermeasures were not  implemented because BSC members could not agree on what  countermeasures to implement or were unable to obtain funding from  their agencies. For example, an FPS official in a major metropolitan city  stated that over the last 4 years LESOs have recommended 24-hour  contract guard coverage at one high-risk building located in a high crime  area multiple times, but the BSC is not able to obtain approval from all its  members.
In addition, FPS faces challenges in ensuring that its fee-based funding  structure accounts for the varying levels of risk and types of services  provided at federal facilities. FPS funds its operations through security  fees charged to tenant agencies. However, FPS’s basic security fee, which  funds most of its operations, does not account for the risk faced by  specific buildings, the level of service provided, or the cost of providing  services, raising questions about equity. FPS charges federal agencies the  same basic security fee regardless of the perceived threat to a particular  building or agency. In fiscal year 2009, FPS is charging 66 cents per square  foot for basic security. Although FPS categorizes buildings according to  security levels based on its assessment of each building’s risk and size,  this assessment does not affect the security fee FPS charges. For example,  level I facilities typically face less risk because they are generally small  storefront-type operations with a low level of public contact, such as a  small post office or Social Security Administration office. However, these  facilities are charged the same basic security fee of 66 cents per square  foot as a level IV facility that has a high volume of public contact and may  contain high-risk law enforcement and intelligence agencies and highly  sensitive government records.
FPS’s basic security rate has raised questions about equity because federal  agencies are required to pay the fee regardless of the level of service FPS  provides or the cost of providing the service. For instance, in some of the  regions we visited, FPS officials described situations where staff are  stationed hundreds of miles from buildings under its responsibility, with  many of these buildings rarely receiving services from FPS staff and  relying mostly on local law enforcement agencies for law enforcement  services. However, FPS charges these tenant agencies the same basic  security fees as buildings in major metropolitan areas where numerous  FPS police officers and LESOs are stationed and are available to provide  security services. Consequently, FPS’s cost of providing services is not  reflected in its basic security charges. We also have reported that basing  government fees on the cost of providing a service promotes equity,  especially when the cost of providing the service differs significantly  among different users, as is the case with FPS. In our July 2008 report, we  recommended that FPS improve FPS’s use of the fee-based system by  developing a method to accurately account for the cost of providing  security services to tenant agencies and ensuring that its fee structure  takes into consideration the varying levels of risk and service provided at  GSA facilities. While DHS agreed with this recommendation, FPS has not  fully implemented it.
section_title: FPS Does Not Have A Strategic Human Capital Plan to Guide Its Current and Future Workforce Planning Efforts
paragraphs: In our July 2009 report, we reported that FPS does not have a strategic  human capital plan to guide its current and future workforce planning  efforts. Our work has shown that a strategic human capital plan addresses  two critical needs: It (1) aligns an organization’s human capital program  with its current and emerging mission and programmatic goals, and (2)  develops long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining staff  to achieve programmatic goals. In 2007, FPS took steps toward developing  a Workforce Transition Plan to reflect its decision to move to a LESO- based workforce and reduce its workforce to about 950 employees.  However, in 2008, FPS discontinued this plan because the objective of the  plan—to reduce FPS staff to 950 to meet the President’s Fiscal Year 2008  Budget—was no longer relevant because of the congressional mandate in  its Fiscal Year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act to increase its  workforce to 1,200 employees. FPS subsequently identified steps it  needed to take in response to the mandate. However, we found that these  steps do not include developing strategies for determining agency staffing  needs, identifying gaps in workforce critical skills and competencies,  developing strategies for use of human capital flexibilities, or strategies for  retention and succession planning.
Moreover, we found FPS’s headquarters does not collect data on its  workforce’s knowledge, skills, and abilities. Consequently, FPS cannot  determine what its optimal staffing levels should be or identify gaps in its  workforce needs and determine how to modify its workforce planning  strategies to fill these gaps. Effective workforce planning requires  consistent agencywide data on the skills needed to achieve current and  future programmatic goals and objectives. Without centralized or  standardized data on its workforce, it is unclear how FPS can engage in  short- and long-term strategic workforce planning. Finally, FPS’s human  capital challenges may be further exacerbated by a proposal in the  President’s 2010 budget to move FPS from Immigration and Custom  Enforcement to the National Protection and Programs Directorate within  DHS. If the move is approved, it is unclear which agency will perform the  human capital function for FPS, or how the move will affect FPS’s  operational and workforce needs. We also recommended that FPS take  steps to develop a strategic human capital plan to manage its current and  future workforce needs. FPS concurred with our recommendation.
section_title: FPS’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered by Weaknesses in Its Contract Guard Program
paragraphs: FPS’s contract guards are the most visible component of FPS’s operations  as well as the public’s first contact with FPS when entering a federal  facility. Moreover, FPS relies heavily on its guards and considers them to  be the agency’s “eyes and ears” while performing their duties. However, as  we testified at a July 2009 congressional hearing, FPS does not fully ensure  that its guards have the training and certifications required to be deployed  to a federal facility. While FPS requires that all prospective guards  complete approximately 128 hours of training, including 8 hours of x-ray  and magnetometer training, FPS was not providing some of its guards with  all of the required training in the six regions we visited. For example, in  one region, FPS has not provided the required 8 hours of x-ray or  magnetometer training to its 1,500 guards since 2004. X-ray and  magnetometer training is important because the majority of the guards are  primarily responsible for using this equipment to monitor and control  access points at federal facilities. According to FPS officials, the 1,500  guards were not provided the required x-ray or magnetometer training  because the region does not have employees who are qualified or have the  time to conduct the training. Nonetheless, these guards continue to  control access points at federal facilities in this region. In absence of the x- ray and magnetometer training, one contractor in the region said that they  are relying on veteran guards who have experience operating these  machines to provide some “on-the-job” training to new guards. Moreover,  in the other five regions we visited where FPS is providing the x-ray and  magnetometer training, some guards told us that they believe the training,  which is computer based, is insufficient because it is not conducted on the  actual equipment located at the federal facility.
Lapses and weaknesses in FPS’s x-ray and magnetometer training have  contributed to several incidents at federal facilities in which the guards  were negligent in carrying out their responsibilities. For example, at a level  IV federal facility in a major metropolitan area, an infant in a carrier was  sent through the x-ray machine. Specifically, according to an FPS official  in that region, a woman with her infant in a carrier attempted to enter the  facility, which has child care services. While retrieving her identification,  the woman placed the carrier on the x-ray machine. Because the guard  was not paying attention and the machine’s safety features had been  disabled, the infant in the carrier was sent through the x-ray machine. x- ray machines are hazardous because of the potential radiation exposure.  FPS investigated the incident and dismissed the guard. However, the guard  subsequently sued FPS for not providing the required x-ray training. The  guard won the suit because FPS could not produce any documentation to  show that the guard had received the training, according to an FPS official.  In addition, FPS officials from that region could not tell us whether the x- ray machine’s safety features had been repaired.
Moreover, FPS’s primary system—Contract Guard Employment  Requirements Tracking System (CERTS)—for monitoring and verifying  whether guards have the training and certifications required to stand post  at federal facilities is not fully reliable. We reviewed training and  certification data for 663 randomly selected guards in 6 of FPS’s 11 regions  maintained either in CERTS, which is the agency’s primary system for  tracking guard training and certifications, databases maintained by some  regions, or contractor information. We found that 62 percent, or 411 of the  663 guards who were deployed to a federal facility had at least one expired  certification, including for example, firearms qualification, background  investigation, domestic violence declaration, or CPR/First Aid training  certification. Without domestic violence declarations certificates, guards  are not permitted to carry a firearm. In addition, not having a fully reliable  system to better track whether training has occurred may have  contributed to a situation in which a contractor allegedly falsified training  records. In 2007, FPS was not aware that a contractor who was  responsible for providing guard service at several level IV facilities in a  major metropolitan area had allegedly falsified training records until it was  notified by an employee of the company. According to FPS’s affidavit, the  contractor allegedly repeatedly self-certified to FPS that its guards had  satisfied CPR and First Aid training, as well as the contractually required  bi-annual recertification training, although the contractor knew that the  guards had not completed the required training and was not qualified to  stand post at federal facilities. According to FPS’s affidavit, in exchange  for a $100 bribe, contractor officials provided a security guard with  certificates of completion for CPR and First Aid. The case is currently  being litigated in U.S. District Court.
FPS has limited assurance that its 15,000 guards are complying with post  orders once they are deployed to federal facilities. At each guard post, FPS  maintains a book, referred to as post orders, that describes the duties that  guards are to perform while on duty. According to post orders, guards  have many duties, including access and egress control, operation of  security equipment, such as x-ray and magnetometer, detecting, observing  and reporting violations of post regulations, and answering general  questions and providing directions to visitors and building tenants, among  others. We found that in the 6 regions we visited that guard inspections are  typically completed by FPS during regular business hours and in cities  where FPS has a field office. In most FPS regions, FPS is only on duty  during regular business hours and according to FPS, LESOs are not  authorized overtime to perform guard inspections during night shifts or on  weekends. However, on the few occasions when LESOs complete guard  inspections at night or on their own time, FPS has found instances of  guards not complying with post orders. For example, at a level IV facility,  an armed guard was found asleep at his post after taking the pain killer  prescription drug Percocet during the night shift. FPS’s guard manual  states that guards are not permitted to sleep or use any drugs (prescription  or non-prescription) that may impair the guard’s ability to perform duties.
Finally, we identified substantial security vulnerabilities related to FPS’s  guard program. Each time they tried, our investigators successfully passed  undetected through security checkpoints monitored by FPS guards, with  the components for an IED concealed on their persons at 10 level IV  facilities in four cities in major metropolitan areas. The specific  components for this device, items used to conceal the device components,  and the methods of concealment that we used during our covert testing  are classified, and thus are not discussed in this testimony. Of the 10 level  IV facilities we penetrated, 8 were government owned and 2 were leased  facilities. The facilities included field offices of a U.S Senator and U.S.  Representative as well as agencies of the Departments of Homeland  Security, Transportation, Health and Human Services, Justice, State and  others. The two leased facilities did not have any guards at the access  control point at the time of our testing. Using publicly available  information, our investigators identified a type of device that a terrorist  could use to cause damage to a federal facility and threaten the safety of  federal workers and the general public. The device was an IED made up of  two parts—a liquid explosive and a low-yield detonator—and included a  variety of materials not typically brought into a federal facility by  employees or the public. Although the detonator itself could function as an  IED, investigators determined that it could also be used to set off a liquid  explosive and cause significantly more damage. To ensure safety during  this testing, we took precautions so that the IED would not explode. For  example, we lowered the concentration level of the material. To gain  entry into each of the 10 level IV facilities, our investigators showed photo  identification (state driver’s license) and walked through the  magnetometer machines without incident. The investigators also placed  their briefcases with the IED material on the conveyor belt of the x-ray  machine, but the guards detected nothing. Furthermore, our investigators  did not receive any secondary searches from the guards that might have  revealed the IED material that we brought into the facilities. At security  checkpoints at 3 of the 10 facilities, our investigators noticed that the  guard was not looking at the x-ray screen as some of the IED components  passed through the machine. A guard questioned an item in the briefcase  at one of the 10 facilities but the materials were subsequently allowed  through the x-ray machines. At each facility, once past the guard screening  checkpoint, our investigators proceeded to a restroom and assembled the  IED. At some of the facilities, the restrooms were locked. Our  investigators gained access by asking employees to let them in. With the  IED completely assembled in a briefcase, our investigators walked freely  around several floors of the facilities and into various executive and  legislative branch offices, as described above.
Despite increased awareness of security vulnerabilities at federal facilities,  recent FPS penetration testing—similar to the convert testing we  conducted in May 2009—showed that weaknesses in FPS’s contract guard  training continue to exist. In August 2009, we accompanied FPS on a test  of security countermeasures at a level IV facility. During these tests, FPS  agents placed a bag on the x-ray machine belt containing a fake gun and  knife. The guard failed to identify the gun and knife on the x-ray screen  and the undercover FPS official was able to retrieve his bag and proceed  to the check-in desk without incident. During a second test, a knife was  hidden on a FPS officer. During the test, the magnetometer detected the  knife, as did the hand wand, but the guard failed to locate the knife and the  FPS officer was able to gain access to the facility. According to the FPS  officer, the guards who failed the test had not been provided the required  x-ray and magnetometer training. Upon further investigation, only two of  the eleven guards at the facility had the required x-ray and magnetometer  training. However, FPS personnel in its mobile command vehicle stated  that the 11 guards had all the proper certifications and training to stand  post. It was unclear at the time, and in the after action report, whether  untrained guards were allowed to continue operating the x-ray and  magnetometer machines at the facilities or if FPS’s LESOs stood post until  properly trained guards arrived on site.
section_title: FPS Has Recently Taken Some Actions to Better Protect Federal Facilities, However Many are Not Fully Implemented
paragraphs: While FPS has taken some actions to improve its ability to better protect  federal facilities, it is difficult to determine the extent to which these  actions address these challenges because most of them occurred recently  and have not been fully implemented. It is also important to note that most  of the actions FPS has recently taken focus on improving oversight of the  contract guard program and do not address the need to develop a risk  management framework and a human capital plan. In response to our  covert testing, FPS has taken a number of actions. For example, in July  2009,  the Director of FPS instructed Regional Directors to accelerate the  implementation of FPS’s requirement that two guard posts at Level IV  facilities be inspected weekly.
FPS also required more x-ray and magnetometer training for LESOs and  guards. For example, FPS has recently issued an information bulletin to all  LESOs and guards to provide them with information about package  screening, including examples of disguised items that may not be detected  by magnetometers or x-ray equipment. Moreover, FPS produced a 15- minute training video designed to provide information on bomb- component detection. According to FPS, each guard was required to read  the information bulletin and watch the DVD within 30 days.
However, there are a number of factors that will make implementing and  sustaining these actions difficult. First, FPS does not have adequate  controls to monitor and track whether its 11 regions are completing these  new requirements. Thus, FPS cannot say with certainty that it is being  done. According to a FPS regional official implementing the new  requirements may present a number of challenges, in part, because new  directive appears to be based primarily on what works well from a  headquarters or National Capital Region perspective, and not a regional  perspective that reflects local conditions and limitations in staffing  resources. In addition, another regional official estimated that his region is  meeting about 10 percent of the required oversight hours and officials in  another region said they are struggling to monitor the delivery of  contractor-provided training in the region. Second, according to FPS  officials, it has not modified any of its 129 guard contracts to reflect these  new requirements, and therefore the contractors are not obligated to  implement these requirements. One contractor stated that ensuring that its  guards receive the additional training will be logistically challenging. For  example, to avoid removing a guard from his/her post, one contractor  plans to provide some of the training during the guards’15 minute breaks.  Third, FPS has not completed any workforce analysis to determine if its  current staff of about 930 law enforcement security officers will be able to  effectively complete the additional inspections and provide the x-ray and  magnetometer training to 15,000 guards, in addition to their current  physical security and law enforcement responsibilities. Our previous work  has raised questions about the wide range of responsibilities LESOs have  and the quality of BSAs and guard oversight. According to the Director of  FPS, while having more resources would help address the weaknesses in  the guard program, the additional resources would have to be trained and  thus could not be deployed immediately.
In addition, as we reported in June 2008, FPS is in the process of  developing a new system referred to as the Risk Assessment Management  Program (RAMP). According to FPS, RAMP will be the primary tool FPS  staff will use to fulfill their mission and is designed to be a comprehensive,  systematic, and dynamic means of capturing, accessing, storing, managing,  and utilizing pertinent facility information. RAMP will replace several  legacy GSA systems that FPS brought to DHS, including CERTS, Security  Tracking System, and other systems associated with the BSA program. We  are encouraged that FPS is attempting to replace some of its legacy GSA  systems with a more reliable and accurate system. However, we are not  sure FPS has fully addressed some issues associated with implementing  RAMP. For example, we are concerned about the accuracy and reliability  of the information that will be entered into RAMP. According to FPS, the  agency plans to transfer data from several of its legacy systems including  CERTS into RAMP. In July 2009, we reported on the accuracy and  reliability issues associated with CERTS. FPS subsequently conducted an  audit of CERTS to determine the status of its guard training and  certification. However, the results of the audit showed that FPS was able  to verify the status for about 7,600 of its 15,000 guards. According to an  FPS official, one of its regions did not meet the deadline for submitting  data to headquarters because its data was not accurate or reliable and  therefore about 1,500 guards were not included in the audit. FPS was not  able to explain why it was not able to verify the status of the remaining  5,900 guards. FPS expects RAMP to be fully operational in 2011, however  until that time FPS will continue to rely on its current CERTS system or  localized databases that have proven to be inaccurate and unreliable.
Finally, over the last couple of years we have completed a significant  amount of work related to challenges described above and made  recommendations to address these challenges. While DHS concurred with  our recommendations, FPS has not fully implemented them. In addition, in  October 2009, we plan to issue a public report on FPS key practices  involving risk management, leveraging technology and information sharing  and coordination.
This concludes our testimony. We are pleased to answer any questions you  might have.
section_title: Contact Information
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Mark Goldstein  at 202-512-2834 or by email goldsteinm@gao.gov. Individuals making key  contributions to this testimony include Tida Barakat, Jonathan Carver,  Tammy Conquest, Bess Eisenstadt, Daniel Hoy, Susan Michal-Smith, and  Lacy Vong.
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