Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and Overcome Certain Challenges
Published: 2007-06-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendation to establish fleet readiness centers was expected to yield more savings than any other of the 2005 BRAC recommendations. To achieve these savings the Navy plans to integrate civilian depot personnel to complete some repairs at intermediate maintenance departments to reduce aviation maintenance costs. This report, prepared under the Comptroller General authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, is one in a series of reports related to the 2005 BRAC recommendations. GAO's objectives were to (1) analyze the reasons for changes in costs and savings estimates since the recommendation was approved, and (2) identify challenges in implementing this BRAC recommendation. GAO analyzed Navy and BRAC Commission costs and savings estimates and interviewed officials at the Naval Air Systems Command and at three fleet readiness centers.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Navy has increased onetime costs, decreased onetime savings and increased annual recurring savings expected from the fleet readiness centers recommendation, but GAO believes the savings are likely overstated. In preparing a detailed business plan for implementing the recommendation, the Navy increased onetime costs by $31 million or 96 percent because of costs associated with relocating employees and inflation. The Navy also decreased expected onetime savings from reduced inventory levels by $594 million or 92 percent because Navy officials believed earlier estimates were too optimistic. GAO's analysis of inventory levels for a sample of aviation items indicates that the majority of the revised savings estimate will not occur during the 6-year BRAC implementation period and the amount of such savings are uncertain at this time. GAO believes the annual recurring savings are overstated by about $53 million or 15 percent because the Navy's estimate includes $28 million in savings from eliminating military personnel, which may be assigned elsewhere rather than taken out of the force structure, and $25 million in onetime savings that was erroneously reported as recurring savings. While projected savings would remain substantial, they are still subject to some uncertainties and further efforts will be required to assess actual savings as this recommendation is implemented. The Navy faces challenges in ensuring projected savings are realized and faces some workforce challenges in implementing the recommendation. Since the Navy has already included projected BRAC savings in its budget for fiscal years 2007 through 2011, it will be important for the Navy to monitor the extent to which these savings are actually achieved to prevent adverse affects on naval aviation readiness or the need for additional funding. The Navy also faces workforce challenges, such as identifying and moving about 150 depot artisans with the right skills to various intermediate maintenance departments and integrating a primarily civilian depot workforce with the military intermediate department workforce. This mixing of diverse cultures could pose some challenges in implementation but should help develop a better trained and more productive workforce. The Navy will need sustained leadership to successfully establish the fleet readiness centers.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: On May 13, 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) made public its  recommendations to realign and close bases. DOD projected these actions  would yield nearly $50 billion in net savings over a 20-year period. The  Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission evaluated DOD’s  recommendations and recommended reducing the estimated 20-year net  savings by about $12 billion over a 20-year period. The BRAC Commission  recommendations were accepted by the President and the Congress, and  became effective on November 9, 2005. The recommendation to establish  six fleet readiness centers reengineers naval air maintenance, which  blends some civilian depot employees with military personnel to complete  repairs at intermediate maintenance departments. The intent behind this  action was to avoid some redundant maintenance procedures and supply  overhead charges and reduce aviation maintenance costs. DOD initially  estimated this recommendation would yield about $4.7 billion in net  savings over 20 years including onetime savings of about $648 million.
In July 2005, we reported some uncertainty regarding the magnitude of  the expected savings from the recommendation to establish fleet readiness  centers because the estimates were based on assumptions that had  undergone limited testing, and were also dependent on transformation of  the Navy supply system. In addition, after performing its own analysis, the  BRAC Commission believed the Navy overestimated the savings that may  be achieved from business process reengineering efforts. The BRAC  Commission approved the recommendation to establish fleet readiness  centers with an estimated 20-year net savings of $3.7 billion. Of the large  number of 2005 BRAC recommendations, this recommendation is  projected to produce the most dollar savings, based on DOD’s total BRAC  savings projections.
Once the recommendation became effective, the Navy became responsible  for executing the recommendation to establish fleet readiness centers. The  Office of the Secretary of Defense required the Navy to submit a detailed  business plan for implementing the recommendation, to update estimated  costs and savings, and to provide a schedule for implementing the  recommendation. The fleet readiness center plan was approved by the  Office of the Secretary of Defense on August 1, 2006.
This report is one in a series of reports that detail the progress DOD has  made in implementing the base closures and realignments included in the  2005 BRAC round. We performed our work on the basis of the authority of  the Comptroller General to initiate reviews and are reporting the results  to you in order to facilitate your oversight of DOD’s infrastructure and  BRAC initiative. In this report, we address the Navy’s efforts to implement  the BRAC recommendation to establish fleet readiness centers. Our  specific objectives were to (1) analyze the reasons for changes to the costs  and savings estimates since the recommendation to establish fleet  readiness centers was amended and approved as part of the 2005 BRAC  round; and (2) identify the challenges the Navy faces in successfully  implementing this BRAC recommendation.
To accomplish these objectives, we performed our work at the Naval Air  Systems Command headquarters, Patuxent River, Maryland; the aviation  intermediate maintenance departments at North Island, San Diego,  California; Mayport, Florida; and Whidbey Island, Oak Harbor,  Washington; and the naval aviation depots at North Island, San Diego,  California, and Jacksonville, Florida. We analyzed the changes to the costs  and savings estimates between the BRAC Commission’s amended and  approved recommendation and the Navy’s approved business plan and  interviewed key Navy officials to identify the reasons for changes and the  challenges they face in implementing the recommendation. To assess the  reliability of data used to generate costs and savings estimates, we  reviewed Navy regulations and instructions for reporting aviation  maintenance data and interviewed officials at the Navy Air Systems  Command, Naval Aviation Depots, and Commander, Naval Air Forces,  about the data and assumptions underlying the estimates. Based on these  discussions and observations and review of the Navy’s calculations, we  believe the DOD data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report. We conducted our work between February and December 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Further details on the scope and methodology are described in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Navy has three levels of naval aviation maintenance—organizational,  intermediate, and depot—to support naval aviation. Organizational  maintenance is performed by sailors on the flight line and generally items  are repaired on the aircraft, whether at sea or at a naval station. The  intermediate maintenance activity is generally performed by sailors at the  Navy’s aviation intermediate maintenance departments, which focus on  item repairs in close proximity to the flight line but off-aircraft. Depot  maintenance activities, generally performed by civilian aviation depot  artisans, provide a comprehensive combination of major repair, overhaul,  and modifications to weapons systems and components, assemblies, and  subassemblies in off-flight-line maintenance. The current aviation  maintenance process generally flows as follows: when the organizational  maintenance crews cannot fix a broken aircraft component or item, it is  sent to the intermediate department; if the intermediate maintenance  department cannot repair an item, it declares that the item is beyond its  capability of maintenance. The broken item is then turned over to the  supply system in exchange for a replacement part; and the broken item is  shipped to the depot for further repairs or overhaul.
The recommendation to establish fleet readiness centers affects the  intermediate department and depot maintenance levels, but not the  organizational level. It involves moving about 150 artisans from the depots  to the intermediate departments to perform aviation repairs. In addition,  six fleet readiness centers will be established to transform naval aviation  maintenance at the intermediate departments and depots as seen in   figure 1.
According to this BRAC recommendation, relocating depot artisans to  intermediate departments is expected to reduce the number of items that  are declared to be beyond the capability of maintenance at the  intermediate departments and therefore, will not require some items to be  sent to the depot for repair. As a result, repeated and duplicated  maintenance procedures are projected to be avoided and turnaround times  projected to be reduced. More specifically, prior to implementing this  recommendation, when an item is being repaired by military personnel at  the intermediate department, they perform diagnostics, disassemble the  item, and attempt to repair it. When they determine it cannot be repaired  and declare that it is beyond their capability of maintenance, the item is  reassembled, repackaged, and shipped to the depot for repair. Upon  arrival at the depot, the artisans must perform similar diagnostics, and  repeat the processes of disassembly and repair that have already been  performed at the intermediate department. According to Navy officials,  after fleet readiness centers are established, the depot artisans positioned  at the intermediate departments are expected to be able to complete more  repairs there, which will reduce or eliminate some packaging, shipping,  and administrative costs as seen in figure 2.
At the time DOD originally submitted its recommendations to the BRAC  Commission, it estimated this recommendation would yield $341 million in  annual recurring savings, or $4.7 billion net savings over 20 years. The  preponderance of the annual recurring savings was expected to come  from fewer items being sent to the depots for repair, thus reducing per  item maintenance costs. DOD also expected to achieve significant onetime  savings by reducing existing inventory levels of aircraft component parts.  In July 2005, we reported that while there is potential for significant  savings, there is some uncertainty over the full magnitude of savings. Our  report noted that the Navy used assumptions that had undergone limited  testing, and the full savings realization depends upon the transformation of  the Navy’s supply system to achieve organizational efficiencies. Moreover,  we pointed out that realizing the full extent of the savings would depend  on actual implementation of the recommended actions.
The BRAC Commission also believed DOD’s overall estimated savings  were overstated because savings were derived from overhead efficiencies  that had not been validated. The commission projected annual recurring  savings of about $248 million a year or $3.7 billion net present value  savings over a 20-year period—about $1 billion less than the DOD’s  estimate. Also, the commission reduced the estimated savings because it  eliminated the proposed realignment of workload from the Naval Support  Activity in Crane, Indiana, to Whidbey Island, Washington, since the Navy  planned to phase out the aircraft associated with the proposed workload  transfer in 10 to 15 years regardless of BRAC. In addition, the commission  found errors in DOD’s estimation of construction costs and the savings  projections based on eliminated personnel.
The President and the Congress accepted the BRAC Commission  recommendations, which became effective on November 9, 2005. Once the  recommendations became effective, the Office of the Secretary of Defense  designated one of the military services or defense agencies as the business  manager responsible for implementing each recommendation. The Navy is  responsible for establishing the six fleet readiness centers. The Office of  the Secretary of Defense also required the Navy to submit a detailed  business plan to update estimated costs and savings and identify a  schedule for implementing the recommendation. The Navy’s detailed  business plan was approved to implement the recommendation to  establish fleet readiness centers on August 1, 2006. However, the Office of  the Secretary of Defense has requested that the Navy resubmit its plan to  accurately reflect the savings realized based on the Navy’s current  implementation of this BRAC recommendation. The Navy’s plan was still  in-process as of March 15, 2007.
In addition, the Navy must comply with Title 10, Section 2466 of the United  States Code (U.S.C.), which provides that not more than 50 percent of the  funds made available in a fiscal year to the Navy for depot maintenance  and repair workload may be used to pay for work performed by private  contractors. The statute also requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a  report to Congress (known as the “50/50” report) by April 1 annually, on  public-private depot maintenance funding distributions. The 50/50 report  notes the percentage of depot maintenance funding between the public  and private sectors during the preceding fiscal year, the projected  distribution for the current fiscal year, and the ensuing fiscal year.
section_title: Estimated Savings Likely Overstated
paragraphs: In comparing the Navy’s business plan with the BRAC Commission  estimates of costs and savings, the Navy’s business plans shows an  increase in one-time costs, a decrease in one-time savings, and an increase  in annual recurring savings as seen in table 1 below.
While the Navy has started to implement the recommendation and achieve  savings, we believe the latest savings estimates are still overstated and  uncertain. The majority of the savings consist of onetime savings from  projected decreases in the inventory of aircraft components and  replacement parts, and annual recurring savings from reduced depot labor  and overhead charges and reductions in military personnel. While savings  from lower inventory levels may be possible, our analysis of a judgmental  sample of items targeted for inventory reduction concluded that the  majority of these savings would not occur during the 6-year  implementation period of this BRAC recommendation. Further, we  believe the Navy’s estimated annual recurring savings remain overstated  because they included savings from eliminating military personnel that are  not expected to result in a reduction to its overall service force structure  and included onetime savings erroneously reported as recurring savings.
subsections: section_title: Onetime Costs Increased
paragraphs: The Navy’s business plan shows onetime costs increased by 96 percent  (from $34 million to $65 million) as compared to the BRAC Commission’s  estimates, which was primarily due to increased costs associated with  relocating depot employees to the intermediate level, other miscellaneous  program management actions, and inflation. For example, Navy officials  stated that they need to add more equipment or specialized workbenches  to support depot artisans relocated to the intermediate departments. The  program management costs are primarily for information technology  upgrades. For example, Navy officials stated the need for an interim  logistics tracking and accounting mechanism, using its current Naval  Aviation Logistics Command/Management Information System to track  depot maintenance repairs at the intermediate departments. While  onetime costs have nearly doubled, they have limited effect on the long- term recurring savings expected from establishing fleet readiness centers  once those savings offset implementation costs.
section_title: Onetime Savings Have Been Reduced, but Uncertainty Exists about When They Will be Achieved
paragraphs: While the Navy has reduced the projected onetime savings from lower  levels of inventory, our analysis of a sample of aviation inventory items  targeted for reduction concludes that the majority of these savings would  not occur during the 6-year implementation period, and the amount of  such savings over time is uncertain. In preparing the business plan, the  Navy reduced its onetime savings by 92 percent (from $648 million to   $54 million) mostly by lowering the estimated savings from reducing  inventory of aircraft components and replacement parts. According to  Navy officials, the initial inventory savings estimate was overly optimistic.  In addition, the lower estimate was based on the BRAC Commission’s  determination that the Navy’s projected savings were overstated because  the commission found errors in the Navy’s savings estimates. Additionally,  our July 2005 report stated that the magnitude of the expected savings for  the fleet readiness centers is in part dependent upon transformation of the  Navy’s supply system, such as eliminating unneeded management  structures and duplicate layers of inventory in the supply system.
DOD’s original submission to the BRAC Commission assumed that the  dollar value of the inventory of aircraft components and replacement parts  could be reduced by 15 percent. According to Navy officials, the   15 percent savings factor was based on the professional judgment of the  Industrial Joint Cross Service Group members. They expected savings  because fewer items would need to be kept in the shore-based aviation  consolidated inventory because items would be getting repaired more  quickly and returned to the inventory faster. However, the Navy officials  stated that they did not have time during the BRAC process to discuss the  estimated inventory and supply savings with officials from the Navy  Supply Command to validate the estimate. Navy officials stated that they  estimated the onetime savings from inventory reductions ($648 million) by  multiplying the 15 percent factor times the total dollar value of the  inventory and supply of aircraft components and replacement parts in  fiscal year 2003.
In developing the business plan, the Navy reduced the inventory and  supply savings factor from 15 percent to less than 4 percent based on  discussions with Naval Supply Command officials and a better  understanding of how other BRAC recommendations affected DOD’s and  Navy’s supply system. Specifically, two other recommendations involved  significant savings projections from reengineering DOD’s inventory and  supply system and the reconfiguration of supply, storage, and distribution  management. After considering how these other BRAC recommendations  could affect the Navy’s projected inventory and supply savings estimates,  Navy officials concluded there would be a greater potential overlap of  savings with the fleet readiness center BRAC recommendation. However,  the Navy could not provide us documentation to support the lower  inventory savings estimate.
While savings from lower inventory may be possible, our analysis of a  judgmental sample of 99 items targeted for inventory reduction concludes  that the majority of these savings will not occur during the 6-year  implementation period of this BRAC recommendation as the Navy  originally projected. Our analysis shows that for 83 percent of the items  sampled, the Navy will take more than the implementation period to  achieve lower inventory levels because the majority of replacement items  on-hand is sufficient to provide many years worth of supply, and the rate  of replacement for that inventory will not be a factor contributing to  savings, as seen in table 2.
Since the Navy has not yet identified all of the inventory items that could  be affected by the fleet readiness centers recommendation, we could not  estimate the effect of delayed inventory savings reductions on the Navy’s  estimated onetime savings or the total amount of savings likely to be  realized.
section_title: Annual Recurring Savings Likely Remain Overstated
paragraphs: The Navy increased the annual recurring savings estimate by 25 percent  (from about $250 million to $311 million) primarily by increasing projected  savings from military personnel eliminations and inflation. These increases  were offset to some degree by decreases in projected savings from  maintaining facilities. However, we believe the Navy’s revised annual  recurring savings estimates are still overstated by approximately $53  million because they include $28 million in savings from eliminating  military personnel, which may be assigned elsewhere rather than taken  out of the force structure, and $25 million that should have been reported  as onetime, and not recurring, savings. In addition, we estimate that  projected annual recurring savings increased by approximately $42 million  due to inflation.
The BRAC Commission projected annual recurring savings of about   $10 million from eliminating about 120 military positions, while the Navy  business plan includes about $28 million in annual recurring savings from  eliminating about 290 military positions as originally planned. Regardless  of the number of military personnel affected by the recommendations, as  we reported in July 2005, the projected net annual recurring savings  associated with eliminating jobs currently held by military personnel could  create a false sense of savings available for other purposes because they  do not represent dollar savings that can be readily reallocated outside the  military personnel accounts. Rather than reduce end strength, these  positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas, which may  enhance capabilities but also limit dollar savings available for other uses.
The Navy incorrectly reported onetime savings as annual recurring savings  in its business plan. Navy officials stated that $25 million onetime savings  were incorrectly categorized as annual recurring savings in its business  plan. These onetime savings included reductions in aviation depot level  repair charges, decreased spare parts inventory, and reduced materials to  repair aviation components. As a result of the fleet readiness center  implementation to date, Navy has begun to reduce its current spare parts  inventory, which translates into less physical space needed to store the  inventory and fewer sailors needed to manage it. However, GAO believes  that the Navy’s business plan should correctly report the   $25 million as onetime savings and not annual recurring savings.
Increases in the Navy’s annual recurring savings estimates were offset to  some degree by decreases in projected savings expected from reduced  facility costs. According to the Navy officials, the projected reductions in  personnel should result in reducing floor space for numerous work shops,  but they will not free up enough space to allow the Navy to vacate any  buildings at this time. Since no buildings will be vacated, the Navy reduced  the annual recurring savings expected from facilities maintenance by  about $3 million. Navy officials indicated that as fleet readiness center  implementation progresses, there may be opportunities to combine similar  work shops at some sites, which may result in entire buildings being  vacated, and produce savings in the funding for facilities maintenance. If  this occurs, a Navy official noted the business plan would be updated to  reflect these savings.
In addition, Navy’s implementation efforts are beginning to show savings.  The Navy reported savings of $19 million from October 2006 to April 2007  at the 6 fleet readiness centers. These savings are from repairing selected  aviation items at the fleet readiness centers instead of sending them to the  depots for repair.
section_title: Challenges to Realizing Savings from Establishing Fleet Readiness Centers
paragraphs: The Navy faces challenges in ensuring that projected savings are realized  from implementing the fleet readiness center recommendation in addition  to some workforce challenges in implementing the recommendation. Since  the Navy has already included projected BRAC savings in its budget for  fiscal years 2007 through 2011, the Navy will need to monitor the extent to  which these savings are achieved. If savings are not realized, the Navy may  need to get funds from another Navy program or request additional funds  to offset unrealized savings or be unable to repair aviation components in  a timely manner, which could impact readiness. Accordingly, the Navy has  developed an interim method for tracking aviation maintenance repair  costs and calculating the BRAC savings from establishing fleet readiness  centers, which addresses our prior recommendation to DOD to update and  track savings. In addition, the Navy acknowledges that other challenges  remain, such as identifying and moving necessary depot artisans with the  right skills to various intermediate maintenance departments and  integrating a primarily civilian depot workforce with the military  intermediate department workforce. Navy officials recognize that this  mixing of workforces could create some cultural tension in the workforce,  but this blending may facilitate the development of a better-trained and  more-productive workforce. The Navy has recognized many of these  challenges and outlined steps to be taken to address them. Our prior work  has shown that strong and sustained executive leadership is needed if  reform efforts are to succeed. Furthermore, our prior work has raised  questions about the reasonableness and consistency of depot maintenance  workload data submitted to the Congress. Therefore, the Navy will need  to ensure that depot maintenance work performed at intermediate  departments is accurately reported to satisfy congressional reporting  requirements.
subsections: section_title: Planned Short-Term Monitoring Will Need to Be Extended
paragraphs: The Navy has developed an interim method for tracking aviation  maintenance repair costs and calculating the BRAC savings from  establishing fleet readiness centers, but it will be important to ensure this  effort continues over time to validate savings. Navy officials noted that if  the expected savings are not realized, this decrease in savings could  adversely affect the Navy’s ability to perform its mission within budgeted  funds. Furthermore, inadequate implementation could affect readiness,  and the Navy may need to request additional funds to offset unrealized  savings. Our previous work has raised concerns with prior DOD efforts to  reduce related operating budgets in advance of actual savings being  realized.
The Navy reduced its aviation maintenance budget for fiscal years 2007  through 2011 by the estimated BRAC savings it projects will result from  establishing fleet readiness centers. Navy officials recognized its  challenges in achieving these estimated savings as well as the importance  of monitoring and tracking the actual and realized BRAC savings. The  Navy has developed an interim method for calculating the BRAC savings  realized at the newly established fleet readiness centers during the  implementation time frame. This interim method utilizes information from  two separate logistic systems, one at the depots and the other at the  intermediate departments, to allow Navy officials to evaluate each fleet  readiness center’s performance in meeting its BRAC savings targets.  However, this short-term solution for tracking BRAC savings is not  designed to go beyond 2011 or address long-standing business and  financial system challenges.
section_title: Workforce Challenges
subsections: section_title: Identifying Maintenance Items and Critical Skills
paragraphs: To achieve desired savings, the Navy has begun identifying which items  currently repaired at the depots could be repaired at the former  intermediate departments (now fleet readiness centers/sites). The Navy  originally calculated about 38,000 items that were beyond the capability of  maintenance of the intermediate departments, which could be repaired by  potentially moving about 150 depot artisans to the intermediate  departments. As of November 2006, the Navy has identified about 1,800  items that can be repaired at intermediate departments. Twenty-five depot  artisans have already begun to repair 127 of these items at the  intermediate departments. The number of items ultimately selected will  dictate the number of personnel needed and savings to be realized. Our  prior work on strategic workforce planning highlighted the need for  organizations to identify the right number of staff with the right skills and  competencies in the right locations to fulfill their missions and goals.  Based on the items identified for repair, the Navy will determine the skill  sets required for depot artisans to perform repairs at the intermediate  departments. Consequently, the Navy will request depot artisan volunteers  to relocate to the intermediate departments. If artisans do not volunteer to  relocate to the intermediate departments or if artisans with the necessary  skill sets have retired or stopped working through normal attrition, the  Navy plans to hire or contract for the necessary skill sets. Navy officials  stated that intermediate departments are located in heavily industrialized  areas that may enable them to hire people with the necessary skill sets.
section_title: Introducing Civilian Depot Artisans at Intermediate Departments
paragraphs: As the Navy establishes the fleet readiness centers, the Navy will relocate  some civilian depot artisans to work alongside military personnel at the  intermediate maintenance departments, which has the potential to create  cultural challenges within the workforce. Navy officials recognized that  this mixing of civilian and military workforces with their differences in  working environments could create some cultural tension, but this  blending may facilitate the development of a better-trained and more-  productive workforce. The Navy’s civilian depot artisans work under a  collective bargaining agreement which specifies employee work hours,  maximum allowable excess work hours, and the number and duration of  an artisan’s guaranteed breaks. At the intermediate maintenance  departments, the military personnel are required to work according to  mission needs, which may exceed normal work hours and disallow breaks,  if necessary. Navy officials stated that they do not foresee any labor  problems when the Navy establishes fleet readiness centers. Our prior  work recognizes that certain organizational and environmental differences  cause stresses that may affect an agency’s ability to attain its strategic  goals. Certain key human capital practices can be employed to overcome  such differences, such as developing policies and procedures to allow for  the flexible use of the workforce to ensure consistency, equity,  transparency, and address employee concerns.
While this mixing of diverse cultures could pose some challenges in  implementation, it could also help in developing a better-trained and more- productive workforce if properly managed. As implementation of this  BRAC recommendation begins, the Navy will temporarily assign civilian  artisans to predominately military intermediate maintenance departments  to perform repairs. As fleet readiness centers are established, the  temporary assignments will become permanent. As the artisans and  military personnel become accustomed to working side-by-side, the Navy  may combine similar shops that have existed separately at depots and  intermediate maintenance departments to assure efficient use of  personnel, equipment, and facilities. This effort to determine if shops can  be combined will begin over the next several years. According to Navy  officials, when depot artisans begin to work with military personnel, the  artisans will provide on-the-job training as a means to increase the military  personnel ability to perform aviation repairs and improve aviation  maintenance efficiency. However, Navy officials stated that some  workforce members are concerned about the long-term effect of these  changes. For example, it is unclear whether shops that are comprised of  military and civilian workforce members will be managed by military or  civilian leadership. In addition, these combined shops may have an effect  on the career paths of aviation maintenance officers and civilian  managers.
section_title: Navy’s Communication Strategy to Promote Goals of Fleet Readiness Centers
paragraphs: Communicating the mission and goals of the fleet readiness centers is  critical to implementing this BRAC recommendation. To address this  challenge, the Navy has focused on developing a communication plan to  mitigate the risk of inaccurate or inconsistent information and address  workforce fears. The communication plan goal is to maximize stakeholder  ownership and involvement with the implementation of the fleet readiness  centers to minimize uncertainty and anxiety inherent with organizational  change. In our prior report, we stated that strategic workforce planning is  most effective when an agency’s goals, approach, and results are  communicated early, clearly, and often. Navy officials said that early  communication is critical to mitigate rumors and speculation about  potential workforce changes at the intermediate departments and depot  maintenance facilities. Accordingly, the Navy has developed a detailed  communication plan to describe the challenges associated with  implementing this BRAC recommendation. This plan details the approach  that will be used to establish fleet readiness centers, the goals they are  expected to achieve, and the results that are desired from introducing  depot artisans into the intermediate workforce. The Navy expects to  evaluate the success of the communication plan using several methods  including monthly key stakeholder feedback reports; postbriefing and  post–town hall audience surveys; circulation or number of memos and  number of people who actually saw the message; and other surveys to  determine changes in awareness (knowledge), attitudes (opinions) or  respondent’s reports of past or anticipated/intended actions (behaviors).
As part of the Navy’s communications strategy, the Commander, Aviation  Depots, Naval Air Systems Command has traveled in excess of 200 days  during the past year in order to communicate the fleet readiness center  concept to the entire aviation maintenance workforce. He stated he will  meet or exceed that travel schedule during the implementation phase to  ensure that all workforce members have heard his message. During a  portion of his travel time, he plans to conduct “town hall” meetings with  the aviation maintenance workforce members at fleet readiness center  locations and affiliated sites. Following these meetings, the commander  will send teams to each newly established fleet readiness center to  introduce the concepts and the expected changes in establishing the  centers to the workforce. These teams will also provide information with  regard to procedural changes that will be necessary to assure that costs  and savings are properly tracked at each fleet readiness center and  affiliated site. According to Navy officials, as the implementation  proceeds, efforts will be undertaken to apply lessons learned as fleet  readiness centers are established.
section_title: Providing Sustained Leadership
paragraphs: Generally, commanding officers in the Navy change commands every   2 years, which can make sustained leadership in a reorganization effort  challenging, and there is no guarantee that leadership will remain in place  throughout the implementation of this BRAC recommendation. Our prior  work on strategic workforce planning states that sustained leadership and  succession planning is necessary to achieve workforce reorganizations  and agency goals. Navy officials stated that they expect to achieve the  largest change in naval aviation maintenance since 1959 in only 3 to   5 years and the Commander, Aviation Depots, Naval Air Systems  Command, expects his assignment to continue until fleet readiness center  implementation is complete. The Navy has 26 Naval Aviation Maintenance  duty captains, which comprise a cadre of officers available for selecting  successive commanding officers to oversee the implementation of the  recommendation to establish and manage fleet readiness centers. In  addition to top-level leadership, the Navy plans to utilize the Navy’s chief  petty officers, the Marine Corps’ senior noncommissioned officers, and  seasoned civilian maintainers as key enablers of the implementation  process. Navy officials feel that these individuals can reinforce the  communications of senior Navy leadership and clarify the intent of  establishing fleet readiness centers to sailors, marines, and the civilian  workforce.
section_title: Reporting Depot Maintenance Funding between the Public and Private Sectors
paragraphs: Navy officials noted another challenge may exist after fleet readiness  centers are established that involves accurately recording and reporting  depot maintenance performed at intermediate departments. Under 10  U.S.C. § 2466, the military departments and defense agencies can use no  more than 50 percent of annual depot maintenance funding for work  performed by private-sector contractors. In fiscal year 2006, the Navy  reported that 52 percent of naval aviation depot work was performed by  civilian depot artisans and 48 percent was performed by private  contractors. As depot artisans begin to work in intermediate maintenance  departments, adequate systems and management commitment for  verifying the amount of public-sector depot maintenance is necessary to  comply with 50/50 requirements. We previously reported that the Navy did  not maintain documentation to support the amounts in its 50/50 report and  no formal training on procedural requirements or Navy guidance to  develop and report the 50/50 data was provided to the personnel  responsible for compiling the data. Our report noted that persistent  deficiencies limit the accuracy and usefulness of DOD’s funding allocation  data reported to the Congress, and further, that it is difficult to project out- year data due to factors such as changing depot maintenance requirements  and the ongoing consolidation of maintenance facilities. When the fleet  readiness centers are implemented, depot artisans will be stationed at the  intermediate departments and must document the depot maintenance  performed, which is used for entry into the depot accounting system and  the Naval Aviation Logistics Command/Management Information System.  The Navy has drafted a handbook that provides procedures and quality  assurance for the required details of documentation by the artisans. For  example, all maintenance documentation goes through layers of quality  assurance such as validation specifications within the Naval Aviation  Logistics Command/Management Information System, production controls  that approve each component before moving it back into the supply  system, database administrator screening, and a final reality check by the  fleet readiness center command subject matter experts.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Although projected savings from establishing fleet readiness center remain  significant, it appears likely that the majority of onetime savings from  reduced inventory levels may not occur as expected during the BRAC  implementation period, and projected long-term savings are likely  overstated. To accurately account for and report BRAC savings, the Navy  business plan to establish fleet readiness centers should include onetime  savings that will be achieved during the implementation period and long- term savings that are directly attributed to implementing the  recommendation. While the Navy has recognized the need to assess  progress against goals and track savings, our prior work has shown that  sustained leadership and follow-through will be important to ensure the  recommendation is successfully implemented.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the reporting of savings projected from BRAC 2005  recommendations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Secretary of the Navy to    update the business plan for the fleet readiness centers (1) to reflect only  savings that are directly related to implementing the recommendation, and  (2) update projected onetime savings when data are available; and    monitor implementation of the recommendation to determine the extent  that savings already taken from the Navy budget are actually achieved.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees; the Secretaries of Defense and the Navy; and the Director,  Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to  others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge  on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our  recommendations. DOD noted that it considers military personnel  reductions attributable to a BRAC recommendation as real savings. It  noted that while the department may not reduce end strength, these  reductions allow the department to reapply these military personnel to  support new capabilities. We believe the department counting of savings  from eliminating military personnel positions, without corresponding  reductions in end strength, creates a false sense of savings available for  other purposes because they do not represent dollar savings that can be  readily reallocated outside the military personnel accounts. We do agree  that assigning these positions to other areas may enhance capabilities.  DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided  technical comments, which we have incorporated into this report as  appropriate.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  on (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Additional contacts and staff acknowledgments are  provided in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We performed our work at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the  office the Commander, Naval Air Forces, Naval Air Systems Command,  Patuxent River, Maryland; the Naval Aviation Depots in Coronado,  California, and Jacksonville, Florida, as well as the Aviation Intermediate  Maintenance Departments located at Oak Harbor, Washington; Coronado,  California; and Mayport, Florida.
To determine the extent to which estimated costs and savings have  changed, we compared the Navy’s business plan approved in August 2006  to the recommendation approved by the Base Realignment and Closure  (BRAC) Commission. We focused on the major factors that affected  projected onetime costs, onetime savings, and annual recurring savings.  We determined the reasonableness of these estimates by reviewing and  analyzing source data and the methodology used to generate savings  estimates and interviewing Navy officials who prepared these estimates.  We discussed the reasons for variances in costs and savings estimates  between the BRAC Commission and the approved business plan with Navy  officials. To analyze projected onetime savings from reduced levels of  aircraft component inventory, we took a judgmental sample of 99 items  targeted for inventory reduction. We calculated the years of supply for  each item using its required inventory level, inventory on-hand, excess on- hand inventory, condition, and recurring and nonrecurring demands. Our  analysis was reviewed by Navy Supply System officials. We analyzed the  business plan to identify the major elements that contributed to projected  annual recurring savings. Our analysis indicated that the business plan  included savings from an initiative to reduce aviation maintenance costs  referred to as AirSpeed. We interviewed Navy officials to determine the  relationship of AirSpeed to the BRAC recommendation. To assess the  reliability of the data used to generate estimates of costs and savings and  the validity of underlying assumptions used to generate cost and savings  estimates, we reviewed Navy regulations and instructions for reporting  aviation maintenance data and interviewed officials at Navy Air Systems  Command, Navy Aviation depots, Navy Aviation Intermediate Maintenance  Departments, and Naval Supply Systems Command knowledgeable about  the data and the assumptions underlying estimated costs and savings.  Based on this, we believe that the assumptions underlying estimated costs  and savings are generally valid, and that the data used were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of this report.
To determine the challenges to successfully implement the fleet readiness  centers, we analyzed pertinent documents and reports and interviewed  officials responsible for developing the original proposal and the business  plan. We also interviewed Navy officials at the Aircraft Intermediate  Maintenance Departments at Whidbey Island, Washington; North Island,  California; and Mayport, Florida; and at Naval Aviation Depots at North  Island, California, and Jacksonville, Florida. In addition, we also reviewed  statutes related to continuing congressional oversight of annual depot  maintenance funding, related reports, and court cases involving depot  personnel.
We conducted our work from February 2006 to March 2007 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Fleet Readiness Centers Recommendation
paragraphs: 165. FLEET READINESS CENTERS (IND 19)  a. Realign Naval Air Station Oceana, VA, by disestablishing the Aircraft  Intermediate Maintenance Department Oceana, the Naval Air Depot  Cherry Point Detachment, and the Naval Air Depot Jacksonville  Detachment; establishing Fleet Readiness Center Mid Atlantic, Naval Air  Station Oceana, VA; and transferring all intermediate maintenance  workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Mid Atlantic, Naval Air  Station Oceana, VA.  b. Realign Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, by disestablishing the  Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department at Naval Air Warfare  Center Aircraft Division; establishing Fleet Readiness Center Mid Atlantic  Site Patuxent River, Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD; and  transferring all intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet  Readiness Center Mid Atlantic Site Patuxent River, Naval Air Station  Patuxent River, MD.  c. Realign Naval Air Station Norfolk, VA, by disestablishing the Aircraft  Intermediate Maintenance Department Norfolk VA, the Naval Air Depot  Jacksonville Detachment, and Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division  Lakehurst Detachment; establishing Fleet Readiness Center Mid Atlantic  Site Norfolk, Naval Air Station Norfolk, VA; and transferring all  intermediate and depot maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet  Readiness Center Mid Atlantic Site Norfolk, Naval Air Station Norfolk, VA.  d. Realign Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA, by  disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department,  establishing Fleet Readiness Center Mid Atlantic Site New Orleans, Naval  Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA; and transfer all  intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness  Center Mid Atlantic Site New Orleans, Naval Air Station Joint Reserve  Base New Orleans, LA.  e. Realign Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC, as follows:  disestablish Naval Air Depot Cherry Point; establish Fleet Readiness  Center East, Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC; relocate depot  maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics  Components (approximately 39 K DLHs) , Aircraft  Hydraulic Components (approximately 69 K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear  Components (approximately 8 K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components  (approximately 23 K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural Components  (approximately 126 K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center Mid Atlantic, Naval  Air Station Oceana, VA; relocate depot maintenance workload and  capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 11  K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 19 K DLHs),  Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 2 K DLHs), Aircraft  Structural Components (approximately 35 K DLHs), and Aircraft Other  Components (approximately 6 K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center Mid  Atlantic Site Norfolk, Naval Air Station Norfolk, VA; relocate depot  maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics  Components (approximately 6 K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components  (approximately 10 K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components  (approximately 1 K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 3 K  DLHs), and Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 18 K DLHs) to  FleetReadiness Center Mid Atlantic Site Patuxent River, Naval Air Station  Patuxent River, MD; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity  for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 2 K DLHs),  Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 3 K DLHs), Aircraft  Landing Gear Components (approximately 0.4K DLHs), Aircraft Other  Components (approximately 1 K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural  Components (approximately 6 K DLHs) to FRC Mid Atlantic Site New  Orleans, Naval Air Station JRB New Orleans, LA.; relocate depot  maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics  Components (approximately 9 K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components  (approximately 16 K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components  (approximately 2 K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 6 K  DLHs) and Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 30 K DLHs) to  the Fleet Readiness Center East Site Beaufort, hereby established at  Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC; relocate depot maintenance  workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components  (approximately 11 K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components  (approximately 20 K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components  (approximately 2 K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 6 K  DLHs), Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 36 K DLHs),  Aircraft Rotary (approximately 1 K DLHs), Aircraft VSTOL (approximately  2 K DLHs), Aircraft Cargo/Tanker (approximately 0.02K DLHs,), Aircraft  Other (approximately 18 K DLHs), Aircraft Structural Components  (approximately 0.001K DLHs), Calibration (approximately 0.15 K DLHs)  and “Other” Commodity (approximately 0.3 K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness  Center East Site New River, hereby established at Marine Corps Air  Station New River, Camp Lejeune, NC; and transfer all remaining depot  maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center East,  Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC.  f. Realign Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC, by disestablishing Naval  Air Depot Jacksonville Detachment Beaufort and transferring all depot  maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center East Site  Beaufort, Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC.  g. Realign Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL, as follows: disestablish Naval  Air Depot Jacksonville, Naval Air Depot Jacksonville Detachment  Jacksonville, and Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department  Jacksonville; establish Fleet Readiness Center Southeast, Naval Air  Station, Jacksonville, FL; relocate depot maintenance workload and  capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 8 K  DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 6 K DLHs), Aircraft  Landing Gear Components (approximately 3 K DLHs), Aircraft Other  Components (approximately 27 K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural  Components (approximately 9 K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center  Southeast Site Mayport, hereby established at Naval Air Station, Mayport,  FL; transfer all remaining intermediate and depot maintenance workload  and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Southeast, Naval Air Station  Jacksonville, FL.  h. Realign Naval Air Station Mayport, FL, by disestablishing Aircraft  Intermediate Maintenance Department, Naval Air Depot Jacksonville  Detachment Mayport, and Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division  Lakehurst Voyage Repair Team Detachment Mayport and transferring all  intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness  Center Southeast Site Mayport, Naval Air Station Mayport, FL.  i. Realign Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA, by disestablishing Aircraft  Intermediate Maintenance Department Lemoore and Naval Air Depot  North Island Detachment; establishing Fleet Readiness Center West, Naval  Air Station Lemoore, CA; and transferring all intermediate and depot  maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center West, Naval  Air Station Lemoore, CA.  j. Realign Naval Air Station Fallon, NV, by disestablishing the Aircraft  Intermediate Maintenance Department Fallon and the Naval Air Depot  North Island Detachment Fallon; establishing Fleet Readiness Center West  Site Fallon, Naval Air Station Fallon, NV; and transferring all intermediate  and depot maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center  West Site Fallon, Naval Air Station Fallon, NV.  k. Realign Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division China Lake, CA, by  disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department and  relocating its maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft  (approximately 3 K DLHs), Aircraft Components (approximately 45 K  DLHs), Fabrication & Manufacturing (approximately 6 K DLHs) and  Support Equipment (approximately 16 K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center  West, Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA.  l. Realign Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX, by  disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department,  establishing Fleet Readiness Center West Site Fort Worth, Naval Air  Station Fort Worth, TX, and transferring all intermediate maintenance  workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center West Site Fort Worth,  Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX.  m. Realign Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA, by disestablishing the  Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department, establishing Fleet  Readiness Center Northwest, Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA, and  transferring all intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet  Readiness Center Northwest, Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA.  n. (Deleted)  o. Realign Naval Air Station North Island, Naval Base Coronado, CA, as  follows: disestablish Naval Air Depot North Island,  COMSEACONWINGPAC (AIMD), and NADEP North Island Detachment  North Island; establish Fleet Readiness Center Southwest, Naval Air  Station North Island, Naval Base Coronado, CA; relocate depot  maintenance workload and capacity for aircraft Avionics/Electronics  Components (approximately 6 K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components  (approximately 2 K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components  (approximately 3 K DLHs), aircraft Other Components (approximately 13  K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 4 K DLHs)  from Naval Air Depot North Island to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest  Site Point Mugu, hereby established at Naval Air Station Point Mugu, Naval  Base Ventura, CA; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for  Aircraft avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 26 K DLHs),  Aircraft Hydraulic Component (approximately 8 K DLHs), Aircraft Landing  Gear Components (approximately 13 K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components  (approximately 55 K DLHs), Aircraft Structural Components  (approximately 16 K DLHs) from Naval Air Depot North Island to Fleet  Readiness Center Southwest Site Miramar, hereby established at Marine  Corps Air Station Miramar, CA; relocate depot maintenance workload and  capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 8 K  DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 2 K DLHs), Aircraft  Landing Gear Components (approximately 4 K DLHs), Aircraft Other  Components (approximately 17 K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural  Components (approximately 5 K DLHs) from Naval Air Depot North Island  to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Pendleton, hereby established at  Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, CA; relocate depot  maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics  Components (approximately 6 K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components  (approximately 2 K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components  (approximately 3 K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 12  K DLHs), Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 3 K DLHs) from  Naval Air Depot North Island to Fleet Readiness Southwest Site Yuma,  hereby established at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, AZ; relocate depot  maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics  Components (approximately 6 K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components  (approximately 2 K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components  (approximately 3 K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 12  K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 3 K DLHs)  from Naval Air Depot North Island to Fleet Readiness Center West Site  Fort Worth, Fort Worth TX; relocate depot maintenance workload and  capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 25  K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 8 K DLHs),  Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 13 K DLHs), Aircraft  Other Components (approximately 53 K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural  Components (approximately 15 K DLHs), from Naval Air Depot North  Island to Fleet Readiness Center Northwest, Naval Air Station Whidbey  Island, WA; and transfer all remaining intermediate and depot  maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest,  Naval Air Station North Island, Naval Base Coronado, CA.  p. Realign Naval Air Station Point Mugu, Naval Base Ventura, CA, by  disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department and  transferring all intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet  Readiness Center Southwest Site Point Mugu, Naval Base Ventura, CA.  q. Realign Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA, by transferring depot  maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Other (approximately 28  K DLHs) and Aircraft Fighter/Attack (approximately 39 K DLHs) and  intermediate maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft  Components, Aircraft Engines, Fabrication & Manufacturing and Support  Equipment from Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS)-11 and 16 to  Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Miramar, Marine Corps Air Station  Miramar, CA.  r. Realign Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, CA, by transferring  depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Other  (approximately 22 K DLHs) and Aircraft Rotary (approximately 102 K  DLHs) and intermediate maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft  Components, Aircraft Engines, Fabrication & Manufacturing and Support  Equipment from MALS-39 to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Camp  Pendleton, Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, CA.  s. Realign Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, AZ, by transferring depot  maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Fighter/Attack, Aircraft  Other and Aircraft Rotary and intermediate maintenance workload and  capacity for Aircraft Components, Aircraft Engines,  Communication/Electronics Equipment, Ordnance Weapons & Missiles,  Software and Support Equipment from MALS-13 to Fleet Readiness Center  Southwest Site Yuma, Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, AZ.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the person named above, Michael Kennedy, Assistant  Director; Avrum I. Ashery; Pat L Bohan; Grace A. Coleman; Julia C. Matta;  Charles W. Perdue; Maria-Alaina I. Rambus; and John E. Trubey also made  major contributions to this report.