Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Improvements Needed in Continuity Planning and Involvement of Key Users
Published: 2010-09-01T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), with the aid of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), is to procure the next generation of geostationary operational environmental satellites, called Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) series. The GOES-R series is to replace the current series of satellites, which will likely begin to reach the end of their useful lives in approximately 2015. This new series is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting through the year 2028. GAO was asked to (1) determine the status of the GOES-R acquisition; (2) evaluate whether NOAA has established adequate contingency plans in the event of delays; and (3) assess NOAA's efforts to identify GOES data users, prioritize their data needs, and communicate with them about the program's status. To do so, GAO analyzed contractor and program data and interviewed officials from NOAA, NASA, and other federal agencies that rely on GOES data.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: NOAA has made progress on the GOES-R acquisition, but key instruments have experienced challenges and important milestones have been delayed. The GOES-R program awarded key contracts for its flight and ground projects, and these are in development. However, two instruments have experienced technical issues that led to contract cost increases, and significant work remains on other development efforts. In addition, since 2006, the launch dates of the first two satellites in the series have been delayed by about 3 years. As a result, NOAA may not be able to meet its policy of having a backup satellite in orbit at all times, which could lead to a gap in coverage if GOES-14 or GOES-15 fails prematurely. Even though there may be a gap in backup coverage, NOAA has not established adequate continuity plans for its geostationary satellites. To its credit, NOAA has established a policy to always have a backup satellite available and high-level plans if that policy is not met. Specifically, in the event of a satellite failure with no backup available, NOAA plans to reduce to a single satellite and, if available, rely on a satellite from an international partner. However, NOAA does not have plans that include processes, procedures, and resources needed to transition to a single or an international satellite. Without such plans, NOAA faces an increased risk that users will lose access to critical data. While NOAA has identified GOES data users and involved internal users in developing and prioritizing the GOES-R requirements, it has not adequately involved other federal users that rely on GOES data. Specifically, NOAA's processes for developing and prioritizing satellite requirements do not include documented input from other federal agencies. Further, since 2006, the GOES-R program has undergone significant changes (such as the removal of certain satellite data products), but these have not been communicated to federal agencies. Until improvements are made in NOAA's processes for involving key federal users, these users may not be able to meet mission requirements.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is recommending that NOAA address weaknesses in its continuity plans and improve its processes for involving other federal agencies. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Secretary of Commerce agreed with GAO's recommendations and identified plans for implementing them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Operational geostationary environmental satellites play a critical role in  our nation’s weather forecasting. These satellites—which are managed by  the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric  Administration (NOAA)—provide critical information on atmospheric,  oceanic, climatic, and solar conditions that help meteorologists observe  and predict global and local weather events. They also provide a means to  identify severe storm conditions, such as hurricanes and tornadoes, and to  track the movement and intensity of these storms once they develop.
NOAA, with the aid of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration  (NASA), is procuring the next generation of geostationary satellites, called  the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) series.  The GOES-R series is to replace the current series of satellites, which will  likely begin to reach the end of their useful lives in approximately 2015.  This new series is expected to mark the first major technological advance  in GOES instrumentation since 1994. It is also considered critical to the  United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for  weather forecasting through the year 2028.
This report responds to your request that we review NOAA’s management  of the GOES-R program. Specifically, we were asked to (1) determine the  status of the GOES-R acquisition, including cost, schedule, and  performance trends; (2) evaluate whether NOAA has established adequate  contingency plans in the event of delays; and (3) assess NOAA’s efforts to  identify GOES data users, prioritize their data needs, and communicate  with them about the program’s status.
To determine GOES-R acquisition status, we evaluated program  documents, including acquisition plans, contractor performance reports  on development efforts, and executive briefings. To evaluate whether  NOAA has established contingency plans, we compared NOAA’s  contingency planning documentation to federal requirements and industry  best practices and also met with key GOES data users to determine the  potential impact of NOAA’s plans on their data needs. To determine the  adequacy of NOAA’s efforts to identify GOES users, prioritize their data  needs, and communicate program status, we compared relevant program  documents, including acquisition plans, user requirements, and GOES user  group meeting minutes, to industry best practices. We also interviewed  key users of GOES data to determine whether NOAA’s efforts to prioritize  their data needs and communicate program status and changes were  adequate.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2009 to September  2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains  further details on our objectives, scope, and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the 1960s, geostationary and polar-orbiting environmental satellites  have been used by the United States to provide meteorological data for  weather observation, research, and forecasting. NOAA’s National  Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS) is  responsible for managing the civilian operational geostationary and polar- orbiting satellite systems as two separate programs, called GOES and the  Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites, respectively.
Unlike polar-orbiting satellites, which constantly circle the earth in a  relatively low polar orbit, geostationary satellites can maintain a constant  view of the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in space. NOAA  operates GOES as a two-satellite system that is primarily focused on the  United States (see fig. 1). These satellites are uniquely positioned to  provide timely environmental data about the earth’s atmosphere, surface,  cloud cover, and the space environment to meteorologists and their  audiences. They also observe the development of hazardous weather, such  as hurricanes and severe thunderstorms, and track their movement and  intensity to reduce or avoid major losses of property and life.  Furthermore, the satellites’ ability to provide broad, continuously updated  coverage of atmospheric conditions over land and oceans is important to  NOAA’s weather forecasting operations.
To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several satellites  at a time as part of a series and launches new satellites every few years  (see table 1). NOAA’s policy is to have two operational satellites and one  backup satellite in orbit at all times.
Five GOES satellites—GOES-11, GOES-12, GOES-13, GOES-14, and GOES- 15—are currently in orbit. Both GOES-11 and GOES-13 are operational  satellites, with GOES-11 covering the west and GOES-13 the east. GOES-14  is currently a backup for the other two satellites should they experience  any degradation in service. The final satellite in the series, GOES-15, is  undergoing a post-launch test period until October 2010, at which time it  will also be put in on-orbit storage mode. GOES-12 is at the end of its  service life, but is being used to provide coverage of South America. The  GOES-R series is the next generation of satellites that NOAA is planning;  the satellites are planned for launch beginning in 2015.
Each of the operational geostationary satellites continuously transmits  raw environmental data to NOAA ground stations. The data are processed  at these ground stations and transmitted back to the satellite for broadcast  to primary weather services and the global research community in the  United States and abroad. Raw and processed data are also distributed to  users via ground stations through other communication channels, such as  dedicated private communication lines and the Internet. Figure 2 depicts a  generic data relay pattern from the geostationary satellites to the ground  stations and commercial terminals.
subsections: section_title: Overview of the GOES-R Program
paragraphs: NOAA plans for the GOES-R program to improve on the technology of  prior series, in terms of both system and instrument improvements. The  system improvements are expected to fulfill more demanding user  requirements by updating the satellite data more often and providing  satellite products to users more quickly. The instrument improvements are  expected to significantly increase the clarity and precision of the observed  environmental data. NOAA originally planned to acquire six different types  of instruments. Furthermore, two of these instruments—the Advanced  Baseline Imager and the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite—were  considered to be the most critical because they would provide data for key  weather products. Table 2 summarizes the originally planned instruments  and their expected capabilities.
However, in September 2006, NOAA decided to reduce the scope and  technical complexity of the GOES-R program because of expectations that  total costs, which were originally estimated to be $6.2 billion, could reach  $11.4 billion. Specifically, NOAA reduced the minimum number of  satellites from four to two, cancelled plans for developing the  Hyperspectral Environmental Suite (which reduced the number of planned  satellite products from 81 to 68), and divided the Solar Imaging Suite into  two separate acquisitions. In light of the cancellation of the Hyperspectral  Environmental Suite, NOAA decided to use the planned Advanced  Baseline Imager to develop certain satellite data products that were  originally to be produced by this instrument. The agency estimated that  the revised program would cost $7 billion.
Subsequently, NOAA made several other important decisions about the  cost and scope of the GOES-R program. In May 2007, NOAA had an  independent cost estimate completed for the GOES-R program. After  reconciling the program office’s cost estimate of $7 billion with the  independent cost estimate of about $9 billion, the agency established a  new program cost estimate of $7.67 billion. This was an increase of $670  million from the previous estimate. Further, in November 2007, to mitigate  the risk that costs would rise, program officials decided to remove  selected program requirements from the baseline program and treat them  as contract options that could be exercised if funds allow. These  requirements include the number of products to be distributed, the time to  deliver the remaining products (product latency), and how often these  products are updated with new satellite data (refresh rate). For example,  program officials eliminated the requirement to develop and distribute 34  of the 68 envisioned products, including aircraft icing threat, turbulence,  and visibility. Program officials included the restoration of the products,  latency, and refresh rates as options in the ground system contract that  could be acquired at a later time. Program officials later reduced the  number of products that could be restored as a contract option (called  option 2) from 34 to 31 because they determined that two products were  no longer feasible and two others could be combined into a single product.  See table 3 below for an overview of key changes to the GOES-R program.
NOAA’s original acquisition strategy was to award contracts for concept  development of the GOES-R system to several vendors who would  subsequently compete to be the single prime contractor responsible for  overall system development and production. In keeping with this strategy,  NOAA awarded contracts for concept development of the overall GOES-R  system to three vendors in October 2005. However, in March 2007, NOAA  revised its acquisition strategy for the development contract. In response  to recommendations by independent advisors, the agency decided to  separate the overall system development and production contract into two  separate contracts—the spacecraft and ground system contracts.
In addition, to reduce the risks associated with developing technically  advanced instruments, NASA awarded contracts for concept development  for five of the planned instruments. NASA subsequently awarded  development contracts for five instruments and, upon completion and  approval by NASA, these instruments will be provided to the prime  contractor responsible for the spacecraft of the GOES-R program. NASA  will then work with the spacecraft contractor to integrate and test these  instruments. The sixth instrument, the Magnetometer, is to be developed  as part of the spacecraft contract.
subsections: section_title: Program Office Structure
paragraphs: NOAA is solely responsible for GOES-R program funding and overall  mission success. However, since it relies on NASA’s acquisition  experience and technical expertise to help ensure the success of its  programs, NOAA implemented an integrated program management  structure with NASA for the GOES-R program (see fig. 3). NOAA also  located the program office at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. Within  the program office, there are two project offices that manage key  components of the GOES-R system. These are called the flight and ground  system project offices. The Flight Project Office, managed by NASA, is  responsible for awarding and managing the spacecraft contract and  delivering flight-ready instruments to the spacecraft. The Ground System  Project Office, managed by NOAA, oversees the Core Ground System  contract and satellite data product development and distribution.
section_title: Prior Report Noted Challenges with Instrument Development and Recommended Steps to Improve Management and Oversight
paragraphs: In April 2009, we reported that a key instrument had experienced technical  challenges that led to cost overruns and schedule delays. Specifically, the  Advanced Baseline Imager experienced problems with the quality of  components in the focal plane module, mirrors, and telescope. As of  November 2008, the contractor had incurred a cost overrun of  approximately $30 million and delayed $11 million worth of work. In  addition, we found that the contractors for both the Advanced Baseline  Imager and the Geostationary Lightning Mapper programs had not  documented all of the reasons for cost and schedule variances in certain  cost reports. At the time, we recommended that NOAA improve its ability  to oversee contractor performance by ensuring that the reasons for cost  and schedule variances are fully disclosed and documented. Over the past  year, NOAA has improved its ability to oversee contractor performance by,  for example, ensuring that the reasons for cost and schedule variances are  fully documented in contractor monthly variance reports.
In that same report, we also found that NOAA had delayed key GOES-R  program milestones, including the launch of the first satellite, which was  delayed from December 2014 to April 2015. Program officials attributed  these delays to providing more stringent oversight before releasing the  request for proposals for the spacecraft and ground system, additional  time needed to evaluate the contract proposals, and funding reductions in  fiscal year 2008. We reported that, as a result of these delays, NOAA may  not be able to meet its policy of having a backup satellite in orbit at all  times. Specifically, in 2015, NOAA expected to have two operational  satellites in orbit, but it would not have a backup satellite in place until  GOES-R is launched. As a result, any further delays in the launch of the  first satellite in the GOES-R program would increase the risk of gaps in  satellite coverage.
section_title: GOES-R Is in Development, but Delays in Key Program Milestones Have Endangered Satellite Continuity
paragraphs: The GOES-R program has continued to make progress in the development  of its major projects, but key instruments have experienced technical  issues and significant work remains to be completed. Further, key  program milestones, including the launch dates for the first two satellites  in the series, have been further delayed. As a result, NOAA may not be able  to meet its policy of having a backup satellite in orbit at all times, which  could lead to a gap in satellite coverage if an existing satellite fails  prematurely.
subsections: section_title: Progress Continues to Be Made on GOES-R Procurement, but Much Work Remains to Be Completed on the Flight and Ground Projects
paragraphs: NOAA and NASA have made progress on the procurement of its two major  projects—the flight project and the ground project. The flight project  includes contracts for the development of the five key instruments and  spacecraft while the ground project includes contracts for the  development of key systems needed for the on-orbit operation of the  satellites, receipt and processing of information, and distribution of  satellite data products to users.
For the flight project, between September 2004 and December 2008, the  GOES-R program awarded contracts for the five key instruments and  spacecraft. The contractors are making progress in completing key  milestones in developing these components. However, due to bid protests  of the award of the spacecraft contract in December 2008, work on the  contract did not begin until August 2009. As a result of these delays, NOAA  later approved a 6-month delay in the launch date for the first satellite  (GOES-R), from April 2015 to October 2015, and the second satellite  (GOES-S), from August 2016 to February 2017. Program officials stated  that the estimated program life-cycle cost estimate remains steady at $7.67  billion. Table 4 describes the development contracts for the flight project,  including their contract award date, and their cost and schedule estimates.
For the ground project, a contract for one of three key subcomponents,  the Core Ground System, was awarded in May 2009, and contracts for the  two other subcomponents are planned to be awarded in July 2010. The  Core Ground System is of critical importance because it provides for  command and control and ground processing capabilities for GOES-R  satellites and instruments. Table 5 describes the development contracts  for the ground project, including their contract award date, and their cost  and schedule estimates, while figure 4 depicts the schedule for both the  overall GOES-R program as well as the flight and ground projects.
The GOES-R program has continued to make progress on the development  of the spacecraft and five key instruments. After starting work on the  spacecraft contract in August 2009, the contractor worked to establish the  initial cost and schedule baseline and completed a key program milestone  intended to demonstrate that the spacecraft concept meets mission  requirements. The contractor is currently conducting preliminary design  activities and plans to assess the readiness of the program to proceed with  detailed design activities in January 2011. In addition, three instruments, the  Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor, the Solar Ultraviolet Imager,  and the Space Environmental In-Situ Suite have recently completed critical  design reviews. Completion of this review is intended to demonstrate that  the instruments’ detailed design is appropriate to support proceeding to full- scale fabrication, assembly, integration, and testing.
Two other instruments—the Advanced Baseline Imager and the  Geostationary Lightning Mapper—have experienced significant technical  issues, which have resulted in cost increases and schedule delays to the  contractors’ performance baselines. The Advanced Baseline Imager  program has experienced technical issues primarily related to  underestimating the design and development complexity of two  components—the focal planes and telescope, which led to cost increases  and delays in developing the prototype model. As a result, in September  2009, the program office rebaselined the cost and schedule targets of the  Advanced Baseline Imager program. This increased contract costs from  the most recent estimate of $375 million to $537 million, an increase of  $162 million, and delayed the completion of the prototype model from  March 2010 to December 2010. Program officials reported that the  rebaseline did not affect the instrument’s completion date and that they  have sufficient contingency reserves to address the cost overruns  experienced to date, meaning that these system-specific cost overruns will  not affect the overall GOES-R program’s cost. The program is currently  testing the prototype model and plans to conduct an updated critical  design review in January 2011 to validate any required design changes as a  result of testing.
The Geostationary Lightning Mapper experienced technical issues  primarily related to underestimating the design complexity of the  instrument, as well as an architecture change that significantly increased  the electronics design and fabrication cost. As a result, in March 2010, the  program office rebaselined the cost and schedule targets of the  Geostationary Lightning Mapper program, which increased contract costs  from $71 million to $157 million, an increase of about $86 million, and  delayed the contract completion from June 2012 to September 2012—a 3- month delay. According to GOES-R program officials, contingency funds  are available to cover these changes and they will not affect the overall  cost or schedule of the GOES-R program. In addition, the program  replaced the development of a prototype model with an engineering  development unit, which requires less rigorous development procedures  and testing requirements. For example, the planned engineering  development unit is not required to undergo comprehensive  environmental testing to validate that the instrument will meet mission  objectives in the launch and space environment. According to GOES-R  program officials, this decision was made to reduce program risk because  the schedule for development of the prototype model and production  model would have otherwise overlapped—thus reducing the inherent  benefits of a prototype model. However, the lack of a prototype model  increases the risk that design issues that would have been identified  during more comprehensive testing will surface in the production model,  when it is too late to make changes.
The status and program-identified risk level of each of the components of  the flight project is described in table 6.
Our analysis of contractor-provided earned value management data  showed that most components of the flight project were on track between  May 2009 and April 2010. Specifically, contractors for three instruments— the Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor, the Space  Environmental In-Situ Suite, and the Solar Ultraviolet Imager—and the  spacecraft are generally meeting cost and schedule targets. The other two  instruments, the Advanced Baseline Imager and the Geostationary  Lightning Mapper, are meeting their revised cost and schedule targets  since completing their rebaselining efforts in September 2009 and March  2010, respectively.
subsections: section_title: Ground Project—Development Is Under Way, but Important Work Remains to Be Done
paragraphs: Development of the ground project is under way. After awarding the  contract for the Core Ground System in May 2009, the contractor has been  conducting system definition activities and plans to conduct a preliminary  design review in February 2011 to assess the readiness of the program to  proceed with detailed design activities.
However, the awards of two additional ground project contracts have been  delayed and important work remains to be completed. For example,  contract award for the GOES-R Access Subsystem has slipped 6 months,  from January 2010 to July 2010. These delays were due, in part, to delays  in releasing the request for proposals. Award of the antennas contract has  also been delayed by 3 months. Both contracts are critical to ensuring that  GOES-R data are received, stored, and distributed to users. The status and  program-identified risk level of each of the components of the ground  project is described in table 7.
Our analysis of contractor-provided earned value management data for the  Core Ground System indicates that cost and schedule performance were  generally on track between June 2009 and April 2010. Between these dates,  the contractor for the Core Ground System completed work slightly under  budget.
section_title: Continued Delays in Launch Dates Put the Continuity of Satellite Operations at Risk
paragraphs: Over the last few years, NOAA has delayed the satellite launch dates  several times. We previously reported that, since 2006, the launch of the  first satellite had been delayed from September 2012 to April 2015—a slip  of more than 30 months. These delays were due, in part, to delays in  releasing the requests for proposals for the spacecraft and Core Ground  System and additional time needed to evaluate the contract proposals.  Since our last report, NOAA further delayed key GOES-R program  milestones by 6 months, including the dates when the first two satellites in  the series would be available for launch. These recent delays were due to  bid protests of the award of the spacecraft contract in December 2008,  which delayed the start of work until August 2009. In order to allow  sufficient time for the 72-month development cycle required for the  spacecraft, NOAA approved a 6-month delay in the launch dates for the  first two satellites in the series. Table 8 identifies the delays in the satellite  launch dates over time.
While NOAA’s policy is to have two operational satellites and one backup  satellite in orbit at all times, continued delays in the launch of the first  GOES-R satellite could lead to a gap in satellite coverage. This policy  proved useful in December 2008, when NOAA experienced problems with  GOES-12, but was able to use GOES-13 as an operational satellite until the  problems were resolved. However, beginning in April 2015, NOAA expects  to have two operational satellites in orbit (GOES-14 and GOES-15), but it  will not have a backup satellite in place until GOES-R is launched and  completes an estimated 6-month post-launch test period—resulting in a 12- month gap during which time a backup satellite would not be available.  Figure 5 below depicts this gap in backup coverage.
If NOAA experiences a problem with either of its operational satellites  before GOES-R is in orbit and operating, it will need to rely on older  satellites that are beyond their expected operational lives and therefore  may not be fully functional. Any further delays in the launch of the first  satellite in the GOES-R program would likely continue to increase the risk  of a gap in satellite coverage.
section_title: NOAA Has Not Established Adequate Continuity Plans for Its Geostationary Satellites
paragraphs: While federal policy and industry best practices call for the development  of plans for continuing essential operations during a disruption or  emergency, NOAA has not developed adequate continuity plans for its  geostationary satellites for the period of time when there will be no  backup in orbit. Planning for the continuity of operations facilitates the  performance of an organization’s essential functions during emergency  events or other situations that disrupt normal operations. Federal policy  requires agencies to develop and document continuity of operations plans  for essential functions that provide, among other things, a description of  the resources, staff roles, procedures, and timetables needed for the plan’s  implementation. NOAA has defined providing satellite imagery in support  of weather forecasting as one of its essential functions.
NOAA has developed continuity plans for the ground systems used to  operate and process data from geostationary satellites. Specifically,  NOAA’s continuity plans for its Satellite Operation Control Center and its  Environmental Data Processing Center describe plans to transfer critical  functions to a backup facility during an emergency. Both of these  continuity plans contain, among other things, descriptions of the alternate  locations for performing key functions, resources, and implementation  procedures.
In addition to planning for the continuity of its ground systems, NOAA has  established a policy to ensure the continuity of its geostationary  satellites—and high-level plans if that policy is not met. As previously  mentioned, NOAA’s policy is to have two operational satellites and one  backup satellite in orbit at all times. That way, if an operational satellite  fails, the backup satellite would be moved into place to pick up  operations. However, if there is no backup satellite in orbit—as is  expected to be the case during the year leading up to when GOES-R  becomes operational—NOAA officials stated that they would move the  single remaining operational satellite to the middle of the continental  United States. According to NOAA officials, this would provide sufficient  coverage of the continental United States, but would provide limited  coverage of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (see fig. 6). In addition, NOAA  would contact other nations to request that a spare geostationary satellite,  if available, be positioned to provide temporary coverage of the coastal  regions, as well as the oceans.
However, NOAA has not established continuity plans for its geostationary  satellites that describe the resources, staff roles, procedures, and  timetables needed for the plan’s implementation. This is important  because there are many procedures and coordinating activities that NOAA  would need to perform to ensure the continuity of geostationary satellite  data in the event of a satellite failure with no backup available. For  example, the transition to a single satellite would require NOAA, at a  minimum, to inform users of changes to the in-orbit configuration through  various methods, including users groups and Web site postings.  Alternatively, the transition to an international satellite would require  modifications to the software code of several processing systems to  account for expected differences in spectral channels, refresh rate,  resolution, and coverage areas due to the repositioning of the satellites.  Further, all geostationary satellite data products would need to be  reverified and validated to account for differences in product coverage.  Lastly, NOAA would have to notify GOES data users of differences in  satellite capabilities, such as the loss of space weather instruments and  data, and changes to viewing angles caused by satellite positions that are  different from current GOES locations. For example, the orbital location  of an international satellite positioned in a backup configuration may  provide a less comprehensive view due to the more severe observing angle  over the United States.
In addition, NOAA’s lack of continuity plans has precluded the agency  from documenting and communicating the operational impact of its plans  to reduce to a single satellite and rely on an international satellite. For  example, a single satellite configuration would reduce coverage of the  Atlantic and Pacific Oceans where satellite data provide critical warnings  of approaching severe weather, such as tropical cyclone and hurricane  activity. According to air traffic officials from the Federal Aviation  Administration, the reduction to a single satellite would have a significant  impact on the agency’s ability to make informed aviation planning  decisions over the ocean areas surrounding the continental United States.  In addition, transitioning to an international satellite would be dependent  on the availability of foreign satellites and it could take several months to  reposition an international satellite to provide backup coverage.  Furthermore, foreign satellites lack capabilities currently available to  GOES users, such as instruments that provide space weather information.  For example, the National Weather Service’s (NWS) Space Weather  Prediction Center relies solely on space weather data from GOES for two- thirds of its data products, which are critical to providing warnings of  severe space weather that may impact airline and maritime  communication, satellite operations, and astronaut safety.
According to the Deputy Director of the Office of Satellite Operations,  continuity plans for geostationary satellites have not been established  because the transition to single satellite and to an international satellite  has been done previously. Specifically, in 1989, after the failure of GOES-6,  NOAA repositioned GOES-7 to the middle of the continental United States.  Subsequently, in 1991, the European Organisation for the Exploitation of  Meteorological Satellites and the European Space Agency repositioned the  Meteosat-3 satellite to backup NOAA’s aging GOES-7 satellite in order to  provide coverage of the Atlantic Ocean in case GOES-7 failed before a  replacement could be launched and placed into operation. While this  accomplishment has merit, current GOES and their related ground  processing systems are increasingly complex and have enhanced  capabilities as compared to earlier satellites, such as ability to capture and  process higher resolution images of weather patterns and atmospheric  measurements. In addition, there are likely new staff who will not be able  to rely on the 1989 and 1991 experiences. Establishing continuity plans  that describe the resources, staff roles, procedures, and timetables needed  for the plans’ implementation (as required by federal policy) would better  ensure that NOAA can continue to provide these critical capabilities in the  event of a satellite failure.
Without continuity plans, NOAA may not be able to fully meet its mission- essential function of providing satellite imagery in support of weather  forecasting. This could have a devastating affect on the ability of  meteorologists to observe the development of severe storm conditions,  such as hurricanes and tornados, and track their movement and intensity  to reduce or avoid major losses of property and life. In addition, the loss of  a single satellite could affect many satellite data users outside NOAA,  including the Federal Aviation Administration, which use satellite- provided weather data for air traffic management, and the U.S. Forest  Service (within the U.S. Department of Agriculture), which uses satellite- provided weather data to predict and prevent wildfires and mitigate their  damage.
section_title: NOAA’s Efforts to Involve External GOES Data Users, Prioritize Their Data Needs, and Communicate Program Status Have Shortfalls
paragraphs: NOAA has identified key GOES data users and involved internal users in  defining and prioritizing the GOES-R program requirements, but lacks a  comprehensive approach for eliciting and prioritizing the satellite data  needs of external users. Further, while NOAA has taken steps to  communicate program status and changes to all GOES data users,  important changes to currently available GOES data products have not  been adequately communicated to external users. Until these weaknesses  are addressed, NOAA faces the increased risk that its satellite acquisitions  may not meet the needs of key GOES data users.
subsections: section_title: Key GOES Data Users Have Been Identified, but Efforts to Involve Other Federal Agencies and Prioritize Their Data Needs Are Not Sufficient
paragraphs: Leading organizations routinely identify relevant operational users and  involve these users in key program activities, including requirements  definition. Moreover, best practices call for eliciting the needs of  operational users and developing these needs into prioritized  requirements. Prioritized requirements should serve as the basis for  determining project scope and can help to ensure that requirements  critical to key users are addressed quickly.
Key GOES data users can be categorized into three tiers. The first tier  includes internal NOAA users that depend on GOES data for their primary  mission, such as NWS. The second tier includes other federal agencies that  depend on GOES data for their primary mission, such as the Department  of Defense and the Federal Aviation Administration. The third tier includes  all other users that receive GOES data, including private industry and  universities. See table 9 below for descriptions and examples of each tier  of GOES data users.
In formulating the GOES-R program, NOAA primarily involved internal  NOAA users (tier 1) in requirements definition activities, but did receive  input from one other federal agency, the Department of Defense.  Beginning in 1998, NOAA collected high-level system requirements from  NWS. Over the next few years, NOAA continued to collect and refine these  requirements by including input from other NOAA offices, including  NESDIS, NOAA Ocean Service, NOAA Research, NOAA Fisheries, and  NOAA Marine and Aviation Operations. Also, in February 2003, the  Department of Commerce requested that the Department of Defense  provide a consolidated list of its environmental information needs,  including those data needs that could be met by geostationary satellites.  This input, combined with that of NOAA’s offices, served as the basis for  the 2004 GOES-R Program Requirements Document, which represented a  preliminary set of GOES-R requirements.
In June 2007, prior to entering the development phase of the GOES-R  program lifecycle, the Deputy Undersecretary for Commerce Oceans and  Atmosphere approved a baseline set of prioritized GOES-R requirements  (known as the Level 1 Requirements). Efforts to prioritize the Level 1  Requirements were led by a working group of representatives from  various NOAA organizations. This working group categorized the  requirements into four priority levels according to the importance of each  requirement to NOAA, as well as the requirements contribution to the  GOES-R series.
However, other than the Department of Defense’s input into the 2004  version of the requirements, external users that rely on GOES data were  not adequately involved in the GOES-R requirements definition or  prioritization process. According to NOAA officials, input to the  requirements from other federal agencies (tier 2) and other interested  users (tier 3) was collected via casual conversations between NOAA  offices and these users, as well as during GOES User Conferences, which  were held to educate and obtain input from prospective GOES-R users.  While these methods are reasonable for eliciting input from tier 3 users,  federal agencies that rely on GOES data to meet unique mission  requirements warrant documented input to the GOES-R requirements. For  example, the U.S. Forest Service relies on GOES for fire monitoring and  detection capabilities to sustain an estimated 193 million acres of the  nation’s forests and grasslands. According to U.S. Forest Service officials,  the lack of a structured process for their agency to provide input into the  requirements definition process has made it difficult to ensure that its  requirements have been and will be implemented.
Further, NOAA did not account for the priority data needs of other federal  users in prioritizing the Level 1 requirements. As previously mentioned,  the priorities of the requirements were established by the GOES-R  requirements working group. However, this group only includes  membership from NOAA offices, such as NWS and NESDIS, and does not  include membership from other federal agencies. According to GOES-R  program officials, the Level 1 Requirements are intended to reflect the  priorities of NOAA users, primarily those of NWS, and the assumption is  that other users will adapt to the data provided by NOAA. However, given  the unique missions of other federal agencies and their reliance on GOES  data to meet their missions, input into the prioritization of GOES-R  requirements is critical to ensure that GOES-R will meet the needs of their  organizations.
The lack of involvement by federal agencies in GOES-R requirements  definition and prioritization is due to weaknesses in NOAA’s processes for  defining and prioritizing satellite data requirements. Specifically, the lack  of a structured process for eliciting the data needs of key operational users  inhibits NOAA’s ability to produce prioritized requirements that reflect the  needs of other federal agencies that depend on these satellites. Without  improvements in these processes, NOAA’s satellite acquisitions may not  fully meet the needs of important GOES data users.
section_title: NOAA Has Not Effectively Communicated with Other Federal Agencies
paragraphs: While NOAA has taken steps to communicate program status and changes  to internal and external GOES data users, important changes to currently  available GOES data products have not been communicated to key  external users. According to industry best practices, programs should  regularly communicate program status to relevant operational users.  Moreover, best practices call for identifying and documenting deviations  from plans and communicating significant issues to relevant operational  users.
NOAA has taken steps to communicate program status and changes to  GOES data users. For example, the GOES-R requirements working group  was established to identify and represent NOAA user requirements and  serves as a forum for communication of GOES-R requirements status and  changes with internal NOAA users. Another initiative, known as the GOES- R Proving Ground, engages the NWS forecast and warning community in  preoperational demonstrations of selected capabilities anticipated from  GOES-R. Through this program, NWS users are given the ability to test and  evaluate expected GOES-R capabilities, such as lightning detection, before  the satellites are operational. Lastly, GOES User Conferences are held to  educate and obtain input from any prospective GOES users, including  other agencies, universities, and industry.
However, the GOES-R program has undergone significant changes over  the course of its acquisition lifecycle, and these changes have not been  communicated to GOES data users outside of NOAA. As previously  mentioned, in 2007, program officials removed requirements from the  baseline program to treat them as a contract option that could be  exercised if funds allow (known as Option 2). These changes resulted in a  baseline program of 34 satellite data products and 31 Option 2 products.  However, NOAA did not communicate the removal of these products to  external federal agencies. In addition, 9 Option 2 products are currently  available to GOES data users, which means that users may lose access to  these products if the contract option is not exercised. These 9 products  are critical to measuring cloud properties, infrared radiation, and sulfur  dioxide in the atmosphere. However, NOAA did not inform external  federal agencies about the potential loss of these products. See figure 7 for  a description of the 9 currently available products removed from the  GOES-R program baseline.
According to GOES-R program officials, the decision to make these  products part of the contract option was based on NOAA’s input and was  approved by the requirements working group. However, key GOES data  users at other federal agencies that currently rely on these products have  not been involved in, nor told of, these changes. For example, the U.S.  Department of Agriculture uses cloud-based products (such as cloud liquid  water) to develop weather forecasts used by farmers and radiation-based  products (such as upward longwave radiation) for streamflow simulation  modeling. In addition, the Department of Defense relies on the cloud- based products (such as cloud type and cloud heights) as input into  weather prediction models for forecasting of high-altitude winds, which  are used to navigate ships and planes.
If the contract option is not exercised, these agencies will not have access  to these GOES data products that they currently utilize. If this occurs,  GOES-R program officials stated that GOES data users may be able to get  these products via the Internet from NESDIS, but added that the details for  this alternative have not been determined because the program expects to  receive approval from NESDIS to exercise this contract option by  December 2010. Given that these products are currently available to GOES  data users, any significant changes to these products should be  communicated to these users to ensure that they have sufficient time to  implement workarounds or determine other sources for the data. Without  communicating significant changes, other federal agencies may lose  access to critical data products needed to meet mission requirements.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Over the last few years, the GOES-R program has continued to make  progress on key development efforts, but much work remains to be  completed. While the GOES-R program has awarded most development  contracts, two instruments have experienced technical challenges that led  to contract cost increases, and significant work remains on the program’s  flight and ground projects. In addition, continued delays in the launch date  of the first two satellites in the GOES-R series have endangered satellite  continuity because these delays extend the time in which there will not be a  backup satellite in orbit. Any further delays in the launch of the first satellite  in the GOES-R program increases the risk of a gap in satellite coverage.
The risk of a gap in coverage is further exacerbated because NOAA has not  established adequate continuity plans. While NOAA plans to reduce to a  single satellite and, if available, rely on an international satellite, these plans  have weaknesses, including a lack of continuity plans needed to support  geostationary satellite operations during an emergency. Until these  weaknesses are addressed, NOAA faces a potential 12-month gap where it  may not be able to provide critical geostationary data needed for predicting  global and local weather events in the event of a satellite failure.
Finally, NOAA has taken steps to identify GOES data users, prioritize their  data needs, and communicate program changes, but has not adequately  involved or communicated with key external users. For example, while  NOAA involved internal users in its process for defining and prioritizing  the GOES-R requirements, improvements are needed in these processes to  ensure that other federal agencies that rely on GOES data have a means to  provide documented input to the requirements and the prioritization of  those requirements. Further, while NOAA has taken steps to communicate  with GOES data users, it has not established processes to notify other  federal agencies of GOES-R program status and significant changes. Until  these improvements are made, important GOES users may lose access to  critical data products and future GOES acquisitions may not meet the  mission requirements of these users.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve NOAA’s ability to maintain geostationary satellites continuity  and improve efforts to involve key GOES data users, we recommend that  the Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator to ensure that  the following three actions are taken:    Develop and document continuity plans for the operation of geostationary  satellites that include the implementation procedures, resources, staff  roles, and timetables needed to transition to a single satellite, an  international satellite, or other solution.
Establish processes for satellite data requirements definition and  prioritization to include documented input from external federal agencies  that rely on GOES data on future satellite acquisitions.
Establish and implement processes to notify these agencies of GOES-R  program status and changes.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We received written comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary  of Commerce, who transmitted NOAA’s comments. The department  agreed with our recommendations and identified plans to implement them.  For example, the department stated that NOAA will develop a plan for  transitioning to a single satellite that leverages existing contingency  agreements with its international partners. In addition, the department  stated that NOAA will document a process to define and prioritize the  requirements of other federal agencies and provide these users with  updates on GOES-R program status and changes. The department’s  comments are provided in appendix II.
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If you or your staffs have any questions on the matters discussed in this  report, please contact me at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major  contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to (1) determine the status of the Geostationary  Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) series acquisition,  including cost, schedule, and performance trends; (2) evaluate whether  the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has  established adequate contingency plans in the event of delays; and (3)  assess NOAA’s efforts to identify GOES data users, prioritize their data  needs, and communicate with them about the program’s status.
To determine GOES-R acquisition status, we evaluated various  programmatic and technical plans, management reports, and other  program documentation. We reviewed the cost and schedule estimates  (including launch dates), planned system requirements, and monthly  executive-level management briefings. We also interviewed agency  officials from NOAA and the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA) to determine key dates for future GOES-R  acquisition efforts and milestones and progress made on current  development efforts. Furthermore, we analyzed the earned value data on  development efforts contained in contractor performance reports obtained  from the program. To perform this analysis, we compared the cost of work  completed with budgeted costs for scheduled work for a 12-month period  to show trends in cost and schedule performances. To assess the reliability  of the cost data, we compared it with other available supporting  documents (including monthly program management reviews);  electronically tested the data to identify obvious problems with  completeness or accuracy; and interviewed program officials about the  data. For the purposes of this report, we determined that the cost data  were sufficiently reliable. We did not test the adequacy of the agency or  contractor cost-accounting systems.
To evaluate whether NOAA has established adequate contingency plans,  we analyzed relevant continuity planning documentation, agreements with  international partners, and meeting reports from the Coordination Group  for Meteorological Satellites. In addition, we compared NOAA’s  continuity of operations plans to federal policy and industry best practices  to determine the extent to which the plans will ensure the continuity of  critical functions related to geostationary satellites in the event of a  satellite failure. We met with NOAA officials responsible for continuity of  operations planning and coordination with international partners, as well  as GOES data users within NOAA and at other federal agencies to  determine the potential impact of NOAA’s plans on their data needs.
To determine the adequacy of NOAA’s efforts to identify GOES users,  prioritize their data needs, and communicate program status, we analyzed  relevant program documents, including acquisition plans, user  requirements, and GOES user group meeting minutes. We compared  NOAA’s efforts to industry best practices to determine the extent to which  users were appropriately identified and involved in program activities. We  also interviewed key users of GOES data to determine whether NOAA’s  efforts to identify and prioritize their data needs and communicate  program status and changes were adequate. In consultation with NOAA  officials, we identified key GOES users at organizations within NOAA and  other federal agencies that depend on GOES data for their primary  mission. We selected three organizations within NOAA that are primarily  responsible for environmental satellite data acquisition, processing and  exchange, and environmental research. These organizations include the  National Weather Service, National Environmental Satellite, Data and  Information Service, and the Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research.  We also identified federal government users outside of NOAA with the  largest funding levels for meteorological operations in fiscal year 2009.  These agencies were the Department of Defense and the Department of  Transportation (including the Federal Aviation Administration). On the  basis of discussions with GOES-R program officials and the Office of the  Federal Coordinator for Meteorology, we then selected additional federal  agencies that rely extensively on GOES data to meet their mission  requirements. These agencies include the Department of the Interior  (including the U.S. Geological Survey and Bureau of Reclamation), and the  U.S. Department of Agriculture (including the U.S. Forest Service).
We primarily performed our work at the Department of Defense,  Department of the Interior, Department of Transportation, NOAA, NASA,  and U.S. Department of Agriculture offices in the Washington, D.C.,  metropolitan area. In addition, we conducted work at Department of  Defense weather agencies in Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska and Stennis  Space Center, Mississippi. We conducted this performance audit from  October 2009 to September 2010, in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and  perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact name above, individuals making contributions to  this report included Colleen Phillips (Assistant Director), Clayton Brisson,  William Carrigg, Neil Doherty, Rebecca Eyler, Franklin Jackson, Jonathan  Ticehurst, and Adam Vodraska.