Agricultural Quarantine Inspection Program: Management Problems May Increase Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture to Foreign Pests and Diseases
Published: 2007-10-03T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: U.S. agriculture generates over $1 trillion in economic activity annually, but concerns exist about its vulnerability to foreign pests and diseases. Under the agricultural quarantine inspection (AQI) program, passengers and cargo are inspected at U.S. ports of entry to intercept prohibited material and pests. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred responsibility for inspections from the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (CBP). APHIS retained some AQI-related responsibilities, such as policy setting and training. This testimony is based on issued GAO reports and discusses (1) steps DHS and USDA took that were intended to strengthen the AQI program, (2) views of agriculture specialists of their work experiences since the transfer, and (3) management problems. As part of these reports, GAO surveyed a representative sample of agriculture specialists on their work experiences, analyzed inspection and interception data, and interviewed agency officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: CBP and APHIS have taken steps intended to strengthen the AQI program since transfer of inspection responsibilities from USDA to DHS in March 2003. Specifically, CBP and APHIS have expanded the hours and developed a national standard for agriculture training; given agricultural specialists access to a computer system that is to better target inspections at ports; and established a joint review process for assessing compliance with the AQI program on a port-by-port basis. In addition, CBP has created new agricultural liaison positions at the field office level to advise regional port directors on agricultural issues. We have not assessed the implementation and effectiveness of these actions. However, GAO's survey of CBP agriculture specialists found that many believed the agriculture inspection mission had been compromised by the transfer. Although 86 percent of agriculture specialists reported feeling very well or somewhat prepared for their duties, 59 and 60 percent of specialists answered that they were conducting fewer inspections and interceptions, respectively, of prohibited agricultural items since the transfer. When asked what is going well with respect to their work, agriculture specialists identified working relationships (18 percent), nothing (13 percent), salary and benefits (10 percent), training (10 percent), and general job satisfaction (6 percent). When asked what areas should be changed or improved, they identified working relationships (29 percent), priority given to the agriculture mission (29 percent), problems with the CBP chain of command (28 percent), training (19 percent), and inadequate equipment and supplies (17 percent). Based on private and public sector experiences with mergers, these morale issues are not unexpected because employees often worry about their place in the new organization. CBP must address several management problems to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. agriculture to foreign pests and diseases. Specifically, as of May 2006, CBP had not used available inspection and interception data to evaluate the effectiveness of the AQI program. CBP also had not developed sufficient performance measures to manage and evaluate the AQI program. CBP's measures focused on only two pathways by which foreign pests and diseases may enter the country and pose a threat to U.S. agriculture. However, in early 2007, CBP initiated new performance measures to track interceptions of pests and quarantine materials at ports of entry. We have not assessed the effectiveness of these measures. In addition, CBP has allowed the agricultural canine program to deteriorate, including reductions in the number of canine teams and their proficiency. Lastly, CBP had not developed a risk-based staffing model for determining where to assign agriculture specialists. Without such a model, CBP did not know whether it had an appropriate number of agriculture specialists at each port. Subsequent to our review, CBP developed a model. As of mid-August 2007, CBP had 2,116 agriculture specialists on staff, compared with 3,154 specialists needed, according to the staffing model.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We are pleased to be here to discuss our work on the agricultural  quarantine inspection (AQI) program. Under the AQI program,  international passengers and cargo are inspected at U.S. ports of entry to  seize prohibited material and intercept foreign agricultural pests. The AQI  program is the first line of defense for agriculture, which is the largest  industry and employer in the United States, generating more than $1  trillion in economic activity annually. The entry of foreign pests and  diseases can harm this important sector of our economy, the environment,  plant and animal health, the food supply, and public health. The U.S.  Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates that foreign pests and  diseases cost the American economy tens of billions of dollars annually in  lower crop values, eradication programs, and emergency payments to  farmers. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 heightened concerns  about agriculture’s vulnerability to terrorism, including the deliberate  introduction of livestock, poultry, and crop diseases, such as foot-and- mouth disease or avian influenza.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred responsibility for  agricultural quarantine inspections from USDA to the Department of  Homeland Security’s (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (CBP)  effective in March 2003, but left certain other agricultural quarantine  responsibilities with USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service  (APHIS). APHIS’s responsibilities are to set agriculture inspection policy,  provide related training, and collect AQI user fees. Beginning in March  2003, more than 1,800 agriculture specialists who had formerly reported to  USDA became CBP employees, as CBP incorporated the protection of U.S.  agriculture into its primary anti-terrorism mission. In addition to  protecting U.S. agriculture and other functions, CBP’s mission is to detect  and prevent terrorists and their weapons from entering the United States,  interdict illegal drugs and other contraband, and apprehend individuals  who are attempting to enter the United States illegally. CBP faces a  daunting task in protecting U.S. agriculture from accidental or deliberate  introduction of diseases or pests, while attending to these missions.
After examining concerns that the transfer of agricultural inspections to  CBP could shift the focus away from agriculture to CBP’s other mission  priorities, we reported in May 2006 on the coordination between USDA  and DHS and made several recommendations to help ensure that U.S.  agriculture is protected from accidentally or intentionally introduced pests  and diseases. USDA and DHS generally agreed with the report’s  recommendations. In preparing this report, we surveyed a representative  sample of CBP’s agriculture specialists on their work experiences before  and after the transfer and included the responses to the survey’s 31  multiple-choice questions in the report. The survey also asked two open- ended questions: (1) What is going well with respect to your work as an  agriculture specialist? and (2) What would you like to see changed or  improved with respect to your work as an agriculture specialist? In  November 2006, we separately reported on the common themes in the  narrative responses. My testimony today is based on these two reviews.  We conducted the reviews from April 2005 through October 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
This morning I will focus on three key findings:    CBP and APHIS have taken steps intended to strengthen the AQI program  since the transfer of inspection responsibilities from USDA to DHS  following passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. CBP and APHIS  have expanded the hours of agricultural training for CBP officers and  developed a national standard for this training; given agriculture  specialists access to CBP’s Automated Targeting System to focus  inspections on higher-risk passengers and cargo; and established a joint  review process for assessing compliance with the AQI program on a port- by-port basis. Lastly, CBP has created new agricultural liaison positions at  the field office level to advise regional port directors on agricultural  issues. We have not assessed the implementation and effectiveness of  these actions.
Our survey of CBP agriculture specialists found that many believe the  agriculture inspection mission has been compromised by the transfer.  Although 86 percent of agriculture specialists reported feeling very well  prepared or somewhat prepared for their duties, 59 and 60 percent of  specialists answered that they were conducting fewer inspections and  interceptions, respectively, of prohibited agricultural items since the  transfer. When asked what is going well with respect to their work,  agriculture specialists identified working relationships (18 percent),  nothing (13 percent), salary and benefits (10 percent), training (10  percent), and general job satisfaction (6 percent). When asked what areas  should be changed or improved, they identified working relationships (29  percent), priority given to the agriculture mission (29 percent), problems  with the CBP chain of command (28 percent), training (19 percent), and  inadequate equipment and supplies (17 percent). Agriculture specialists  typically provided more examples or went into greater detail in answering  these questions and submitted 185 pages of comments about what needs  improvement—roughly 4 times more than their responses about what was  going well. Based on private and public sector experiences with mergers,  these morale issues are not unexpected because employees often worry  about their place in the new organization.
CBP must address several management challenges to reduce the  vulnerability of U.S. agriculture to foreign pests and diseases. Specifically,  as of our May 2006 report, CBP had not used available inspection and  interception data to evaluate the effectiveness of the AQI program,  although the agency told us it has subsequently taken some steps—such as  publishing monthly reports on inspections, arrivals, and seizures of  various prohibited items, including agricultural quarantine material and  pest interceptions—that we have not evaluated. Moreover, at the time of  our May 2006 review, CBP had not developed sufficient performance  measures to manage and evaluate the AQI program. CBP’s measures  focused only on two pathways—the percentage of (1) international air  passengers and (2) border vehicle passengers that comply with AQI  regulations—by which foreign pests and diseases may enter the country,  but did not consider other important pathways such as commercial  aircraft, vessels, and truck cargo that may pose a risk to U.S. agriculture.  In early 2007, a joint team from CBP and APHIS agreed to implement  additional performance measures for AQI activities in all major pathways  at ports of entry. Some of these measures were implemented in fiscal year  2007; others are planned for fiscal years 2008 and 2009. However, we have  not evaluated the adequacy of these new measures for assessing the AQI  program’s effectiveness at intercepting foreign pests and diseases. In  addition, CBP has allowed the agriculture canine program to deteriorate,  with fewer canine teams and declining proficiency scores. In the past,  these dogs have been a key tool for targeting passengers and cargo for  detailed inspections. Lastly, CBP does not have the agriculture specialists  needed to perform its AQI responsibilities based on its staffing model.  Specifically, as of mid-August 2007, CBP said it had 2,116 agriculture  specialists on staff, compared to 3,154 specialists needed, according to the  model.
subsections: section_title: CBP and APHIS Have Taken Steps Intended to Strengthen the AQI Program
paragraphs: CBP and APHIS have taken four major steps intended to strengthen the  AQI program since the transfer of responsibilities following passage of the  Homeland Security Act of 2002. To date, we have not done work to assess  the implementation and effectiveness of these actions.
First, CBP and APHIS expanded the hours of training on agricultural  issues for CBP officers, whose primary duty is customs and immigration  inspection, and for CBP agriculture specialists, whose primary duty is  agricultural inspection. Specifically, newly hired CBP officers receive 16  hours of training on agricultural issues, whereas before the transfer to  CBP, customs inspectors received 4 hours of agricultural training, and  immigration inspectors received 2 hours. CBP and APHIS also expanded  agriculture training for CBP officers at their respective ports of entry to  help them make better-informed decisions on agricultural items at high- volume border traffic areas. Additionally, CBP and APHIS have  standardized the in-port training program and have developed a national  standard for agriculture specialists with a checklist of activities for  agriculture specialists to master. These activities are structured into an 8- week module on passenger inspection procedures and a 10-week module  on cargo inspection procedures. Based on our survey of agriculture  specialists, we estimate that 75 percent of specialists hired by CBP believe  that they received sufficient training (on the job and at the Professional  Development Center) to enable them to perform their agriculture  inspection duties.
Second, CBP and APHIS have taken steps designed to better target  shipments and passengers that potentially present a high risk to U.S.  agriculture. Specifically, some CBP agriculture specialists received  training and were given access to CBP’s Automated Targeting System, a  computer system that, among other things, is designed to focus limited  inspection resources on higher-risk passengers and cargo and facilitate  expedited clearance or entry for low-risk passengers and cargo. This  system gives agriculture specialists detailed information from cargo  manifests and other documents that shipping companies are required to  submit before the ship arrives in a port to help them select high-risk cargo  for inspection. CBP and APHIS headquarters personnel also use this  information to identify companies that had previously violated U.S.  quarantine laws. For example, according to a senior APHIS official, the  two agencies used this system to help identify companies that have used  seafood containers to smuggle uncooked poultry products from Asia,  which are currently banned because of concerns over avian influenza.
Third, CBP and APHIS established a formal assessment process intended  to ensure that ports of entry carry out agricultural inspections in  accordance with the agricultural quarantine inspection program’s  regulations, policies, and procedures. The process, called Joint Agency  Quality Assurance Reviews, covers topics such as (1) CBP coordination  with other federal agencies; (2) agriculture specialist training; (3)  specialist access to regulatory manuals; and (4) specialist adherence to  processes for handling violations at the port, inspecting passenger baggage  and vehicles, and intercepting, seizing, and disposing of confiscated  materials. The reviews address best practices and deficiencies at each port  and make recommendations for corrective actions to be implemented  within 6 weeks. For example, regarding best practices, a review of two  ports found that the placement of CBP, APHIS, and Food and Drug  Administration staff in the same facility enhanced their coordination. This  review also lauded their targeting of non-agricultural products that are  packed with materials, such as wood, that may harbor pests or diseases  that could pose a risk to U.S. agriculture. Regarding deficiencies, this  review found that the number of CBP agriculture specialists in each port  was insufficient, and that the specialists at one of the ports were  conducting superficial inspections of commodities that should have been  inspected more intensely. According to CBP, the agency took actions to  correct these deficiencies, although we have not evaluated those actions.  In September 2007, CBP said that the joint review team had conducted 13  reviews in fiscal years 2004 through 2006, and 7 reviews were completed  or underway for fiscal year 2007. Seven additional reviews are planned for  fiscal year 2008.
Lastly, in May 2005, CBP required each director in its 20 district field  offices to appoint an agriculture liaison, with background and experience  as an agriculture specialist, to provide CBP field office directors with  agriculture-related input for operational decisions and agriculture  specialists with senior-level leadership. The agriculture liaisons are to,  among other things, advise the director of the field office on agricultural  functions; provide oversight for data management, statistical analysis, and  risk management; and coordinate agriculture inspection alerts. CBP  officials told us that all district field offices had established the liaison  position as of January 2006. Since the creation of the position, agriculture  liaisons have facilitated the dissemination of urgent alerts from APHIS to  CBP. They also provide information back to APHIS. For example,  following a large increase in the discovery of plant pests at a port in  November 2005, the designated agriculture liaison sent notice to APHIS,  which then issued alerts to other ports. APHIS and CBP subsequently  identified this agriculture liaison as a contact for providing technical  advice for inspecting and identifying this type of plant pest.
section_title: Many Agriculture Specialists Believe that the Agricultural Mission Has Been Compromised
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2006, we surveyed a representative sample of CBP  agriculture specialists regarding their experiences and opinions since the  transfer of the AQI program from APHIS to CBP. In general, the views  expressed by these specialists indicate that they believe that the  agricultural inspection mission has been compromised. We note that  morale issues are not unexpected in a merger such as the integration of  the AQI mission and staff into CBP’s primary anti-terrorism mission. GAO  has previously reported on lessons learned from major private and public  sector experiences with mergers that DHS could use when combining its  various components into a unified department. Among other things,  productivity and effectiveness often decline in the period following a  merger, in part because employees often worry about their place in the  new organization.
Nonetheless, based on the survey results, while 86 percent of specialists  reported feeling very well or somewhat prepared for their duties as an  agriculture specialist, many believed that the agriculture mission had been  compromised by the transfer. Specifically,    59 percent of experienced specialists indicated that they are doing either  somewhat or many fewer inspections since the transfer, and 60 percent  indicated that they are doing somewhat or many fewer interceptions.   63 percent of agriculture specialists believed their port did not have  enough specialists to carry out agriculture-related duties.
Agriculture specialists reported that they spent 62 percent of their time on  agriculture inspections, whereas 35 percent of their time was spent on  non-agricultural functions such as customs and immigration inspections.
In addition, there appear to be morale issues based on the responses to  two open-ended questions: (1) What is going well with respect to your  work as an agriculture specialist? and (2) What would you like to see  changed or improved with respect to your work as an agriculture  specialist? Notably, the question about what needs improving generated a  total of 185 pages of comments—roughly 4 times more than that generated  by the responses to our question on what was going well. Further,  “Nothing is going well” was the second-most frequent response to the  question on what is going well.
We identified common themes in the agriculture specialists’ responses to  our first question about what is going well with respect to their work as an  agriculture specialist. The five most common themes were:    Working relationships. An estimated 18 percent of agriculture specialists  cited the working relationship among agriculture specialists and CBP  officers and management as positive. These specialists cited increasing  respect and interest by non-specialists in the agriculture mission, and the  attentiveness of CBP management to agriculture specialists’ concerns.
Nothing. An estimated 13 percent of agriculture specialists reported that  nothing is going well with their work. For example, some respondents  noted that the agriculture inspection mission has been compromised  under CBP and that agriculture specialists are no longer important or  respected by management.
Salary and Benefits. An estimated 10 percent of agriculture specialists  expressed positive comments about their salary and benefits, with some  citing increased pay under CBP, a flexible work schedule, increased  overtime pay, and retirement benefits as reasons for their views.
Training. An estimated 8 percent of agriculture specialists identified  elements of classroom and on-the-job training as going well. Some  observed that new hires are well trained and that agriculture-related  classroom training at the Professional Development Center in Frederick,  Maryland, is adequate for their duties.
General job satisfaction. An estimated 6 percent of agriculture specialists  were generally satisfied with their jobs, reporting, among other things, that  they were satisfied in their working relationships with CBP management  and coworkers and that they believed in the importance of their work in  protecting U.S. agriculture from foreign pests and diseases.
In contrast, agriculture specialists wrote nearly 4 times as much in  response to our question about what they would like to see changed or  improved with respect to their work as agriculture specialists. In addition,  larger proportions of specialists identified each of the top five themes.
Declining mission. An estimated 29 percent of agriculture specialists were  concerned that the agriculture mission is declining because CBP has not  given it adequate priority. Some respondents cited the increase in the  number of cargo items and flights that are not inspected because of staff  shortages, scheduling decisions by CBP port management, and the release  of prohibited or restricted products by CBP officers.
Working relationships. An estimated 29 percent of the specialists  expressed concern about their working relationships with CBP officers  and management. Some wrote that CBP officers at their ports view the  agriculture mission as less important than CBP’s other priorities, such as  counternarcotics and anti-terrorism activities. Others noted that CBP  management is not interested in, and does not support, agriculture  inspections.
CBP chain of command. An estimated 28 percent of agriculture specialists  identified problems with the CBP chain of command that impede timely  actions involving high-risk interceptions, such as a lack of managers with  an agriculture background and the agency’s rigid chain-of-command  structure. For example, agriculture specialists wrote that requests for  information from USDA pest identification experts must be passed up the  CBP chain of command before they can be conveyed to USDA.
Training. An estimated 19 percent of agriculture specialists believed that  training in the classroom and on the job is inadequate. For example, some  respondents expressed concern about a lack of courses on DHS’s targeting  and database systems, which some agriculture specialists use to target  high-risk shipments and passengers. Also, some agriculture specialists  wrote that on-the-job training at their ports is poor, and that CBP officers  do not have adequate agriculture training to recognize when to refer items  to agriculture specialists for inspection.
Lack of equipment. An estimated 17 percent of agriculture specialists were  concerned about a lack of equipment and supplies. Some respondents  wrote that the process for purchasing items under CBP results in delays in  acquiring supplies and that there is a shortage of agriculture-specific  supplies, such as vials, gloves, and laboratory equipment.
These themes are consistent with responses to relevant multiple-choice  questions in the survey. For example, in response to one of these  questions, 61 percent of agriculture specialists believed their work was not  respected by CBP officers, and 64 percent believed their work was not  respected by CBP management.
section_title: Management Problems May Leave U.S. Agriculture Vulnerable to Foreign Pests and Diseases
paragraphs: Although CBP and APHIS have taken a number of actions intended to  strengthen the AQI program since its transfer to CBP, several management  problems remain that may leave U.S. agriculture vulnerable to foreign  pests and diseases. Most importantly, CBP has not used available data to  evaluate the effectiveness of the program. These data are especially  important in light of many agriculture specialists’ views that the  agricultural mission has been compromised and can help CBP determine  necessary actions to close any performance gaps. Moreover, at the time of  our May 2006 review, CBP had not developed sufficient performance  measures to manage and evaluate the AQI program, and the agency had  allowed the agricultural canine program to deteriorate. Furthermore,  based on its staffing model, CBP does not have the agriculture specialists  needed to perform its AQI responsibilities.
CBP has not used available data to monitor changes in the frequency with  which prohibited agricultural materials and reportable pests are  intercepted during inspection activities. CBP agriculture specialists record  monthly data in the Work Accomplishment Data System for each port of  entry, including (1) arrivals of passengers and cargo to the United States  via airplane, ship, or vehicle; (2) agricultural inspections of arriving  passengers and cargo; and (3) inspection outcomes, i.e., seizures or  detections of prohibited (quarantined) agricultural materials and  reportable pests. As of our May 2006 report, CBP had not used these data  to evaluate the effectiveness of the AQI program.
For example, our analysis of the data for the 42 months before and 31  months after the transfer of responsibilities from APHIS to CBP shows  that average inspection and interception rates have changed significantly  in some geographical regions of the United States, with rates increasing in  some regions and decreasing in others. (Appendixes I and II provide more  information on average inspection and interception rates before and after  the transfer from APHIS to CBP.) Specifically, average inspection rates  declined significantly in the Baltimore, Boston, Miami, and San Francisco  district field offices, and in preclearance locations in Canada, the  Caribbean, and Ireland. Inspection rates increased significantly in seven  other districts—Buffalo, El Paso, Laredo, San Diego, Seattle, Tampa, and  Tucson. In addition, the average rate of interceptions decreased  significantly at ports in six district field offices—El Paso, New Orleans,  New York, San Juan, Tampa, and Tucson—while average interception  rates have increased significantly at ports in the Baltimore, Boston,  Detroit, Portland, and Seattle districts.
Of particular note are three districts that have experienced a significant  increase in their rate of inspections and a significant decrease in their  interception rates since the transfer. Specifically, since the transfer, the  Tampa, El Paso, and Tucson districts appear to be more efficient at  inspecting (e.g., inspecting a greater proportion of arriving passengers or  cargo) but less effective at interceptions (e.g., intercepting fewer  prohibited agricultural items per inspection). Also of concern are three  districts—San Juan, New Orleans, and New York—that are inspecting at  about the same rate, but intercepting less, since the transfer.
When we showed the results of our analysis to senior CBP officials, they  were unable to explain these changes or determine whether the current  rates were appropriate relative to the risks, staffing levels, and staff  expertise associated with individual districts or ports of entry. These  officials also noted that CBP has had problems interpreting APHIS data  reports because CBP lacked staff with expertise in agriculture and  APHIS’s data systems in some district offices. As of our May 2006 report,  CBP had not yet completed or implemented its plan to add agriculture- related data to its system for monitoring customs inspections. However, in  September 2007, CBP said it had taken steps to use these data to evaluate  the program’s effectiveness. For example, CBP publishes a monthly report  that includes analysis of efficiency inspections, arrivals, exams, and  seizures of prohibited items, including agricultural quarantine material and  pest interceptions, for each pathway. CBP also conducts a mid-year  analysis of APHIS and CBP data to assess agricultural inspection  efficiency at ports of entry. While these appear to be positive steps, we  have not assessed their adequacy to measure the AQI program’s  effectiveness.
A second management problem for the AQI program is an incomplete set  of performance measures to balance multiple responsibilities and  demonstrate results. As of our May 2006 report, CBP had not developed  and implemented its own performance measures for the program. Instead,  according to CBP officials, CBP carried over two measures that APHIS had  used to assess the AQI program before the transfer: the percentages of  international air passengers and border vehicle passengers that comply  with program regulations. However, these measures addressed only two  pathways for agricultural pests, neglecting other pathways such as  commercial aircraft, vessels, and truck cargo. Further, these performance  measures did not provide information about changes in inspection and  interception rates, which could help assess the efficiency and  effectiveness of agriculture inspections in different regions of the country  or at individual ports of entry. They also did not address the AQI  program’s expanded mission—to prevent agro-terrorism while facilitating  the flow of legitimate trade and travel. In early 2007, a joint team from CBP  and APHIS agreed to implement additional performance measures for AQI  activities in all major pathways at ports of entry. Specifically, CBP said  that in fiscal year 2007 it implemented measures for the percentages of  land border, air, and maritime regulated cargo and shipments in  compliance with AQI regulations. Furthermore, the agency plans to add  additional performance measures such as percentage of passengers,  vehicles, or mail in compliance in fiscal years 2008 and 2009. However, we  have not evaluated the adequacy of these new performance measures for  assessing the AQI program’s effectiveness at intercepting foreign pests and  diseases.
Third, the number and proficiency of canine teams decreased substantially  between the time of the transfer, March 2003, and the time of our review,  May 2006. In the past, these dogs have been a key tool for targeting  passengers and cargo for detailed inspections. Specifically, APHIS had  approximately 140 canine teams nationwide at the time of the transfer, but  CBP had only 80 such teams at the time of our review. With regard to  proficiency, 60 percent of the 43 agriculture canine teams tested by APHIS  in 2005 failed proficiency tests. These tests require the dog to respond  correctly in a controlled, simulated work environment and ensure that  dogs are working effectively to catch potential prohibited agricultural  material. In general, canine specialists we interviewed expressed concern  that the proficiency of their dogs was deteriorating due to a lack of  working time. That is, the dogs were sidelined while the specialists were  assigned to other duties. In addition, based on our survey results, 46  percent of canine specialists said they were directed to perform duties  outside their primary canine duties daily or several times a week.
Furthermore, 65 percent of canine specialists indicated that they  sometimes or never had funding for training supplies. Another major  change to the canine program, following the transfer, was CBP’s  elimination of all canine management positions.
Finally, based on its staffing model, CBP lacks adequate numbers of  agriculture specialists to accomplish the agricultural mission. The  Homeland Security Act authorized the transfer of up to 3,200 AQI  personnel from USDA to DHS. In March 2003, APHIS transferred a total of  1,871 agriculture specialist positions, including 317 vacancies, to CBP and  distributed those positions across CBP’s 20 district field offices,  encompassing 139 ports of entry. Because of the vacancies, CBP lacked  adequate numbers of agriculture specialists from the beginning and had  little assurance that appropriate numbers of specialists were staffed at  each port of entry. Although CBP has made some progress in hiring  agriculture specialists since the transfer, we previously reported that CBP  lacked a staffing model to ensure that more than 630 newly hired  agriculture specialists were assigned to the ports with the greatest need,  and to ensure that each port had at least some experienced specialists.  Accordingly, in May 2006 we recommended that APHIS and CBP work  together to develop a national staffing model to ensure that agriculture  staffing levels at each port are sufficient. Subsequently, CBP developed a  staffing model for its ports of entry and provided GAO with its results.  Specifically, as of mid-August 2007, CBP said it had 2,116 agriculture  specialists on staff, compared to 3,154 such specialists needed according  to the model.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The global marketplace of agricultural trade and international travel has  increased the number of pathways for the movement and introduction into  the United States of foreign and invasive agricultural pests and diseases  such as foot-and-mouth disease and avian influenza. Given the importance  of agriculture to the U.S. economy, ensuring the effectiveness of federal  programs to prevent accidental or deliberate introduction of potentially  destructive organisms is critical. Accordingly, effective management of the  AQI program is necessary to ensure that agriculture issues receive  appropriate attention. Although we have reported that CBP and APHIS  have taken steps to strengthen agricultural quarantine inspections, many  agriculture specialists believe that the agricultural mission has been  compromised. While morale issues, such as the ones we identified, are to  be expected in the merger establishing DHS, CBP had not used key data to  evaluate the program’s effectiveness and could not explain significant  increases and decreases in inspections and interceptions. In addition, CBP  had not developed performance measures to demonstrate that it is  balancing its multiple mission responsibilities, and it does not have  sufficient agriculture specialists based on its staffing model. Until the  integration of agriculture issues into CBP’s overall anti-terrorism mission  is more fully achieved, U.S. agriculture may be left vulnerable to the threat  of foreign pests and diseases.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may  have at this time.
section_title: Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. For further  information about this testimony, please contact Lisa Shames at (202) 512- 3841 or shamesl@gao.gov. Key contributors to this testimony were James  Jones, Jr., Assistant Director, and Terrance Horner, Jr. Josey Ballenger,  Kevin Bray, Chad M. Gorman, Lynn Musser, Omari Norman, Alison O’Neill,  and Steve C. Rossman also made important contributions.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation  of Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-1240T. Washington, D.C.:  September 18, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation  of Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-454. Washington, D.C.:  August 17, 2007.
Customs Revenue: Customs and Border Protection Needs to Improve  Workforce Planning and Accountability. GAO-07-529. Washington, D.C.:  April 12, 2007.
Homeland Security: Agriculture Specialists’ Views of Their Work  Experiences after Transfer to DHS. GAO-07-209R. Washington, D.C.:  November 14, 2006.
Invasive Forest Pests: Recent Infestations and Continued Vulnerabilities  at Ports of Entry Place U.S. Forests at Risk. GAO-06-871T. Washington,  D.C.: June 21, 2006.
Homeland Security: Management and Coordination Problems Increase  the Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture to Foreign Pests and Disease. GAO- 06-644. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2006.
Homeland Security: Much Is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a  Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain. GAO-05-214.  Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2005.
Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and  Organizational Transformations. GAO-03-669. Washington, D.C.: July 2,  2003.
Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department of  Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies. GAO-03-293SP.  Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2002.
Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues. GAO- 02-957T. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002.
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