Defense Infrastructure: Planning Efforts for the Proposed Military Buildup on Guam Are in Their Initial Stages, with Many Challenges Yet to Be Addressed
Published: 2008-05-01T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: To reduce the burden of the U.S. military presence on Japanese communities while maintaining a continuing presence of U.S. forces in the region, in 2005 and 2006 the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative outlined the effort to relocate American military units in Japan to other areas, including Guam. The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to move 8,000 Marines and an estimated 9,000 dependents from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam by the 2014 goal. GAO was asked to discuss the planning effort for the buildup of U.S. forces and facilities on Guam. Accordingly, this testimony addresses (1) DOD's planning process for the military buildup on Guam, (2) potential challenges for DOD and the government of Guam associated with the buildup, and (3) the status of planning efforts by the government of Guam to meet infrastructure challenges caused by the buildup. This testimony is based largely on findings of a September 2007 GAO report on DOD's overseas master plans and prior work on issues related to the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. It is also based, in part, on preliminary observations from an ongoing GAO review of DOD's planning effort to address the challenges associated with the military buildup on Guam and on other GAO work on the effects of DOD-related growth on surrounding communities in the continental United States. GAO is not making recommendations at this time.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD has established a framework for the military buildup on Guam; however, many key decisions remain, such as the final size of the military population, which units will be stationed there, and what military facilities will be constructed. This part of the planning process is ongoing, along with the development of a required environmental impact statement, currently expected to be issued in 2010. However, DOD will submit budget requests for fiscal year 2010 prior to that date, and thus may not know the full extent of its facility requirements before asking Congress to provide the associated funding. Officials of the Navy's Joint Guam Program Office told us that immediately after the environmental impact statement is completed, DOD will commence construction of facilities in efforts to meet the 2014 goal discussed in the Defense Policy Review Initiative. However, other DOD and government of Guam officials believe that this is an optimistic schedule considering the possibility that the environmental impact statement could be delayed, the complexities of moving thousands of Marines and their dependents to Guam, and the need to obtain sufficient funding from the governments of United States and Japan to support the move. DOD and the government of Guam face several significant challenges associated with the proposed military buildup on Guam. DOD's challenges include obtaining adequate funding and meeting operational needs, such as mobility support and training capabilities. There are also challenges in addressing the effects of military and civilian growth on Guam's community and civilian infrastructure. For example, according to DOD and government of Guam officials, Guam's highways may be unable to bear the increase in traffic associated with the military buildup, its electrical system may not be adequate to deliver the additional energy needed, its water and wastewater treatment systems are already near capacity, and its solid waste facilities face capacity and environmental challenges even without the additional burden associated with the projected increase in U.S. forces and their dependents. The government of Guam's efforts to plan to meet infrastructure challenges caused by the buildup of military forces and facilities are in the initial stages, and existing uncertainties associated with the military buildup contribute to the difficulties Guam officials face in developing precise plans. These challenges are somewhat analogous to challenges communities around continental U.S. growth bases face. Government of Guam officials recognize that the island's infrastructure is inadequate to meet the projected demand; however, funding sources are uncertain. These same officials are uncertain as to whether and to what extent the government of Guam will be able to obtain financial assistance for projected infrastructure demands due to the military buildup. In September 2007, GAO reported that most communities experiencing civilian and military population growth at Army installations in the continental United States will likely incur costs to provide adequate schools, transportation, and other infrastructure improvements, and many of these communities are also seeking federal and state assistance.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the planning effort  for the buildup of U.S. forces and facilities in Guam and to describe the  associated challenges for the Department of Defense (DOD) and the local  community in accommodating the expansion of DOD’s military presence  on Guam. To reduce the burden of the U.S. military presence on Japanese  communities while maintaining a continuing presence of U.S. forces in the  region, the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative established a  framework for the future of U.S. force structure in Japan, including the  relocation of American military units in Japan to other areas, including  Guam. As a part of this initiative, DOD plans to move 8,000 Marines and  their estimated 9,000 dependents from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam by the  2014 goal. At the same time, the other military services are also planning to  expand their operations and military presence on Guam. For example, the  Navy plans to enhance its infrastructure, logistic capabilities, and  waterfront facilities; the Air Force plans to develop a global intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance strike hub at Andersen Air Force Base;  and the Army plans to place a ballistic missile defense task force on Guam.  As a result of these plans and the Marine Corps realignment, the total  military buildup on Guam is estimated to cost over $13 billion and increase  Guam’s current population of 171,000 by an estimated 25,000 active duty  military personnel and dependents (or 14.6 percent) to 196,000. The  government of Japan is expected to contribute about $6.1 billion toward  the costs of the Marine Corps move, although a portion of these funds  could be repaid over time by the U.S. government.
We have issued several reports on DOD’s integrated global presence and  basing strategy and its overseas master plans for changing U.S. military  infrastructure overseas as required by the fiscal year 2004 Senate military  construction appropriation bill report. Most recently, in September 2007,  we reported on DOD’s overseas master plans for changing its  infrastructure overseas and on the status of DOD’s planning effort and the  challenges associated with the buildup of military forces and facilities on  Guam. In that report, we found that DOD’s planning effort for the military  buildup on Guam was in its initial stages, with many key decisions and  challenges yet to be addressed. Additionally, we found that the potential  effects of the increase in military forces on Guam’s infrastructure—in  terms of population and military facilities—had not been fully addressed.  Also, in September 2007, we reported how communities in the continental  United States are planning and funding for infrastructure to support  significant personnel growth in response to implementing base  realignment and closure, overseas force rebasing, and force modularity  actions.
As requested, my testimony today will focus on three principal objectives.  First, I will address DOD’s planning process for the military buildup on  Guam. Second, I will point out potential challenges for DOD and the  government of Guam associated with the military buildup. Third, I will  describe the status of planning efforts by the government of Guam to  address infrastructure challenges to the local community caused by the  buildup of military forces and facilities.
My testimony is based largely on findings of our September 2007 report on  DOD’s overseas master plans and information from a prior report on  issues related to reducing the effects of the U.S. military presence in  Okinawa. My testimony is also based, in part, on preliminary observations  from our ongoing review of DOD’s overseas master plans and its planning  effort to address the challenges associated with the military buildup on  Guam and on two separate reports of the effects of DOD-related growth on  surrounding communities in the continental United States. As part of our  ongoing work, we met with officials from the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, U.S. Pacific Command, Marine Forces Pacific, Third Marine  Expeditionary Force, and the Navy’s Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO)— the office established to plan and execute the military buildup on Guam— to discuss the planning process for DOD’s military realignments on Guam  and to identify challenges associated with the buildup of military forces  and infrastructure on Guam. We also met with the Governor of Guam and  his staff, members of the Guam legislature, staff from the office of the  Guam Delegate to the House of Representatives, and various Guam  community groups to discuss their planning efforts and any challenges  they may face related to the military buildup. We expect to report the  results of our ongoing review to congressional defense committees later  this year. We conducted this performance audit and our prior reports in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the end of World War II, the U.S. military has based forces in  Okinawa and other locations in Japan. The U.S. military occupation of  Japan ended in 1952, but the United States administered the Ryukyu  Islands, including Okinawa, until 1972. Efforts to address the Japanese  population’s concerns regarding U.S. military presence in Okinawa began  more than a decade ago. One chief complaint is that the Okinawa  prefecture hosts over half of the U.S. forces in Japan and that more than   70 percent of the land U.S. forces utilize in Japan is on Okinawa. Many  citizens of Okinawa believe the U.S. presence has hampered economic  development. The public outcry in Okinawa following the September 1995  abduction and rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by three U.S.  servicemembers brought to the forefront long-standing concerns among  the Okinawan people about the effects of the U.S. military presence on the  island. According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, at that time,  the continued ability of the United States to remain in Japan was at risk,  and it was important to reduce the effects of the U.S. military presence on  the Okinawan people. To address these concerns, bilateral negotiations  between the United States and Japan began, and the Security Consultative  Committee established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa in  November 1995. The committee developed recommendations on ways to  limit the effects of the U.S. military presence on Okinawa by closing  Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and relocating forces from that base to  another base on Okinawa, and recommended numerous other operational  changes. On December 2, 1996, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, U.S.  Ambassador to Japan, Japan Ministers of Foreign Affairs and State, and  the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency issued the committee’s  final report.
In 1998, we reviewed the Special Action Committee’s Final Report. At  that time, among other things, we reported that the forward deployment  on Okinawa significantly shortens transit times, thereby promoting early  arrival in potential regional trouble spots such as the Korean peninsula  and the Taiwan straits. For example, it takes 2 hours to fly to the Korean  peninsula from Okinawa, as compared with about 5 hours from Guam,   11 hours from Hawaii, and 16 hours from the continental United States.  Similarly, it takes about 1-1/2 days to make the trip from Okinawa by ship  to South Korea, as compared with about 5 days from Guam, 12 days from  Hawaii, and 17 days from the continental United States. Also, the cost of  this presence is shared by the government of Japan, which provides land  and other infrastructure on Okinawa rent free and pays part of the annual  cost of Okinawa-based Marine Corps forces, such as a portion of the costs  for utilities and local Japanese labor. Most initiatives of the Special Action  Committee on Okinawa involving training operations, changes to the  status of forces agreement procedures, and noise reduction were  successfully implemented. In contrast, initiatives involving land returns  have not been as successful, with the majority still ongoing. For example,  the closure of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma was never completed and  the air station remains open and operational. According to U.S. Forces  Japan officials, these initiatives may involve multiple construction projects  to satisfy the requirements of the initiatives as well as detailed  coordination between the government of Japan and the local communities  to gain consensus for these projects.
In 2004, the United States and Japan began a series of sustained security  consultations aimed at strengthening the U.S.-Japan security alliance to  better address today’s rapidly changing global security environment.  DOD’s Defense Policy Review Initiative established a framework for the  future of U.S. force structure in Japan designed to create the conditions to  reduce the burden on Japanese communities and create a continuing  presence for U.S. forces in the Pacific theater by relocating units to other  areas, including Guam (app. I shows the location of Guam). This initiative  also includes a significant reduction and reorganization of the Marine  Corps presence on Okinawa to include relocating 8,000 Marines and their  estimated 9,000 dependents to Guam. More than 10,000 Marines and their  dependents will remain stationed in Okinawa after this relocation. Another  initiative includes the closure and replacement of Marine Corps Air Station  Futenma at a less densely populated location on Okinawa by the 2014 goal  as a result of local concerns involving safety and noise. DOD officials view  the success of the Futenma replacement facility as a key objective of the  initiative that will need to be completed in order for other realignment  actions to take place. Previously, the United States and Japan were  unsuccessful in closing and replacing the Marine Corps Air Station  Futenma as a part of the Special Action Committee effort on Okinawa.
subsections: section_title: Other Global Realignments
paragraphs: In recent years, DOD has been undergoing a transformation that has been  described as the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces  overseas since the end of the Korean War. The initiative is intended to  close bases no longer needed to meet Cold War threats as well as bring  home U.S. forces while stationing more flexible, deployable capabilities in  strategic locations around the world. As part of its transformation, DOD  has been reexamining overseas basing requirements to allow for greater  U.S. military flexibility to combat conventional and asymmetric threats  worldwide.
The Marine Corps realignment from Okinawa to Guam is just one of  several initiatives to move military forces and equipment and construct  supporting military facilities on Guam. In addition to the Marine Corps’  move to Guam, the Navy plans to enhance its infrastructure, logistic  capabilities, and waterfront facilities to support transient nuclear aircraft  carrier berthing, combat logistics force ships, submarines, surface  combatants, and high-speed transport ships at Naval Base Guam. The Air  Force plans to develop a global intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance strike hub at Andersen Air Force Base by hosting various  types of aircraft, such as fighters, bombers, and tankers, and the Global  Hawk system, which is a high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial  reconnaissance system, on both permanent and rotational bases. The  Army also plans to place a ballistic missile defense task force on Guam  with approximately 630 soldiers and 950 dependents. As a result of these  plans and the Marine Corps realignment, the active duty military personnel  and dependent population of more than 14,000 on Guam is expected to  increase approximately 176 percent to more than 39,000 (app. II shows  current U.S. military bases on Guam).
section_title: Master Planning Requirements for the Military Buildup on Guam
paragraphs: As initiatives for expanding the U.S. military presence on Guam began to  emerge, the Senate Appropriations Committee noted the ambitiousness of  the military construction program and the need for a well-developed  master plan to efficiently use the available land and infrastructure. In July  2006, the committee recommended deferral of two military construction  projects at Andersen Air Force Base that were included in the President’s  budget request until such time as they can be incorporated into a master  plan for Guam and viewed in that context. Further, the committee directed  the Secretary of Defense to submit to the appropriation committees a  master plan for Guam by December 29, 2006, and a report accounting for  the United States’ share of this construction program to project-level detail  and the year in which each project is expected to be funded. The Senate  report also directed GAO to review DOD’s master planning effort for  Guam as part of its annual review of DOD’s overseas master plans. As  discussed in our 2007 report, DOD has not issued a Guam master plan for  several reasons. First, the required environmental impact statement, which  will take at least 3 years to complete according to DOD documents and  officials, was initiated on March 7, 2007. According to DOD officials, the  results of that environmental impact statement will influence many of the  key decisions on the exact location, size, and makeup of the military  infrastructure development on Guam. Second, exact size and makeup of  the forces to be moved to Guam are not yet identified. Third, DOD officials  said that additional time is needed to fully address the challenges related  to funding uncertainties, operational requirements, and Guam’s economic  and infrastructure requirements.
section_title: Organizations and Responsibilities
paragraphs: The U.S. Pacific Command was responsible for the initial planning for the  movement of Marine Corps forces to Guam. In August 2006, the Office of  the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to establish JGPO to facilitate,  manage, and execute requirements associated with the rebasing of Marine  Corps assets from Okinawa to Guam, including the planning for all the  other remaining military realignments on Guam. Specifically, JGPO was  tasked to lead the coordinated planning efforts among all the DOD  components and other stakeholders to consolidate, optimize, and integrate  the existing DOD infrastructure on Guam. The office’s responsibilities  include integration of operational support requirements, development, and  program and budget synchronization; oversight of the construction; and  coordination of government and business activities. JGPO is expected to  work closely with the local Guam government, the government of Japan,  other federal agencies, and Congress in order to manage this  comprehensive effort and to develop a master plan.
The Secretary of the Interior has administrative responsibility over the  insular areas for all matters that do not fall within the program  responsibility of other federal departments or agencies. Also, the Interior  Secretary presides over the Interagency Group on Insular Areas and may  make recommendations to the President or heads of agencies regarding  policy or policy implementation actions of the federal government  affecting insular areas. The Secretary, as the presiding officer of this  interagency group, established a Working Group on Guam Military  Expansion to address issues related to the military buildup. The working  group includes representatives of the Departments of State, Agriculture,  Health and Human Services, Labor, Justice, Transportation, Housing and  Urban Development, Education, and Veterans Affairs as well as the Navy,  the Small Business Administration, the Office of Management and Budget,  and others. Five ongoing subgroups were established to discuss policy and  resource requirements relating to (1) labor and workforce issues,   (2) Guam civilian infrastructure needs, (3) health and human services  requirements, (4) the environment, and (5) socioeconomic issues.
section_title: DOD Has Established a Framework for Military Buildup on Guam, but the Planning Process Is Ongoing
paragraphs: The U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative has established the  framework for the future of the U.S. force structure in Japan, including the  realignments on Okinawa and Guam. However, no final decision on the  exact size and makeup of the forces to move to Guam, including their  operational, housing, and installation support facilities, has been made.  The environmental impact statement expected in 2010 may affect many  key planning decisions.
subsections: section_title: Framework for the Military Realignment and Buildup
paragraphs: DOD has established various planning and implementation documents that  serve as a framework to guide the military realignment and buildup on  Guam. Originally, the Marine Corps realignment was discussed in the U.S.- Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative, which established the framework  for the future of U.S. force structure in Japan designed to create the  conditions to reduce the burden of American military presence on local  Japanese communities and to create a continuing presence for U.S. forces  by relocating units to other areas, including Guam. In its Defense of Japan  2006 publication, the Japan Ministry of Defense reported that more than   70 percent of U.S. facilities and areas are concentrated in Okinawa and  regional development has been greatly affected by the concentration.  That publication recommended that the relocation of the U.S. Marine  Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam should occur as soon as possible. It  further noted that based on bilateral meetings in 2005 and 2006, the  government of Japan had decided to support the United States in its  development of necessary facilities and infrastructure, including  headquarters buildings, barracks, and family housing, to hasten the  process of moving Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam.
Subsequently, in July 2006, the U.S. Pacific Command developed the Guam  Integrated Military Development Plan to provide an overview of the  projected military population and infrastructure requirements; however, it  provides limited information on the expected effects of the military  buildup on the local community and off base infrastructure. The plan is  based upon a notional force structure that was used to generate land and  facility requirements for basing, operations, logistics, training, and quality  of life involving the Marine Corps, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special  Operations Forces in Guam. Also, JGPO has completed its first phase of  the Guam master planning process and developed basic facility  requirements with general cost estimates and mapping concepts. The  second phase of the master planning is in progress and will include more  detailed infrastructure requirements, facility layouts, and cost estimates  for fiscal years 2010 and 2011. JGPO is developing a planning-level Guam  joint military master plan that will be submitted to congressional staff by  September 15, 2008. However, that plan is not considered a final master  plan since DOD is awaiting the results of the environmental impact  statement and record of decision, which are due in 2010.
section_title: Size and Makeup of Forces and Other Variables Are Not Yet Known
paragraphs: The exact size and makeup of the forces to move to Guam and the  operational, housing, and installation support facilities required are not yet  fully known. While the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative  identified Marine Corps units for relocation from Okinawa, assessments  are still under way within DOD to determine the optimal mix of units to  move to Guam, which may also include Marines from other locations, such  as Hawaii and the continental United States.
Approximately 8,000 Marines and their estimated 9,000 dependents of the  Third Marine Expeditionary Forces Command Element, Third Marine  Division Headquarters, Third Marine Logistics Group Headquarters, 1st  Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters  are expected to be included in the move to Guam. The Marine Corps  forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of approximately 10,000 Marines  plus their dependents of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. While these  broad estimates provide a baseline, according to DOD officials we spoke  with, the Marine Corps is still determining the specific mix of units and  capabilities needed to meet mission requirements on Guam. In addition,  Marine Corps officials said that the department was reviewing the mix of  units moving to Guam in light of the department’s plan to increase the  number of Marines to 202,000 from 180,000.
The number and mix of units is significant because, according to Marine  Corps officials, the operational, housing, and installation support facilities  on Guam will depend on the type, size, and number of units that will make  the move. That determination will define the training and facility  requirements, such as the number and size of family housing units,  barracks, and schools and the capacity of the installation support facilities  needed to support the military population and operations. In response to  the ongoing assessment by the Marine Corps, JGPO officials said that they  were initiating a master plan that will reflect the building of “flexible”  infrastructure that could accommodate any mix of military units that may  move to Guam. However, the lack of information on the number and mix  of forces makes it difficult to provide an accurate assessment of specific  facility and funding requirements at this time.
section_title: Results of the Required Environmental Impact Statement May Affect Several Key Decisions
paragraphs: Before JGPO can finalize its Guam master plan, it will need to complete  the required environmental impact statement. According to DOD officials,  the results of the environmental statement, currently expected to be  issued in 2010, can affect many of the key decisions on the exact location,  size, and makeup of the military infrastructure development.
On March 7, 2007, the Navy issued a public notice of intent to prepare an  environmental impact statement pursuant to the requirements of the  National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), as implemented by  the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations, and Executive Order  12114. The notice of intent in the Federal Register states that the  environmental impact statement will:    Examine the potential environmental effects associated with relocating  Marine Corps command, air, ground, and logistics units (which  comprise approximately 8,000 Marines and their estimated 9,000  dependents) from Okinawa to Guam. The environmental impact  statement will examine potential effects from activities associated with  Marine Corps units’ relocation to include operations, training, and  infrastructure changes.
Examine the Navy’s plan to enhance the infrastructure, logistic  capabilities, and pier/waterfront facilities to support transient nuclear  aircraft carrier berthing at Naval Base Guam. The environmental  impact statement will examine potential effects of the waterfront  improvements associated with the proposed transient berthing.
Evaluate placing a ballistic missile defense task force (approximately  630 solders and their estimated 950 dependents) in Guam. The  environmental impact statement will examine potential effects from  activities associated with the task force, including operations, training,  and infrastructure changes.
JGPO officials recognize that the results of this environmental assessment  process may affect the development and timing of JGPO’s master plan for  Guam. Under NEPA and the regulations established by the Council on  Environmental Quality, an environmental impact statement must include a  purpose and need statement, a description of all reasonable project  alternatives and their environmental effects (including a “no action”  alternative), a description of the environment of the area to be affected or  created by the alternatives being considered, and an analysis of the  environmental impacts of the proposed action and each alternative.  Further, accurate scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and public  scrutiny are essential to implementing NEPA. For example, federal  agencies such as DOD are required to ensure the professional integrity,  including scientific integrity, of the discussions and analyses contained in  the environmental impact statement. Additionally, after preparing a draft  environmental impact statement, federal agencies such as DOD are  required to obtain the comments of any federal agency that has  jurisdiction by law or certain special expertise and request the comments  of appropriate state and local agencies, Native American tribes, and any  agency that has requested that it receive such statements. Until an agency  issues a final environmental impact statement and record of decision, it  generally may not take any action concerning the proposal that would  either have adverse environmental effects or limit the choice of reasonable  alternatives.
DOD officials stated that performing these alternative site analyses and  cumulative effects analyses may delay the completion of Guam master  plan and thus affect the construction schedule of military facilities needed  to accommodate thousands of Marines and dependents by the 2014 goal  identified in the Defense Policy Review Initiative. DOD will submit its  fiscal year 2010 budget request to Congress for the first phase of military  construction projects prior to the completion of the environmental impact  statement. Thus, DOD may be asking Congress to fund the military  construction projects without the benefit of a completed environmental  impact statement or a final decision on the full extent of its facility and  funding requirements. DOD officials said that this practice of requesting  funding during the development of environmental impact statements is  common within the department for large projects, such as major base  realignments and closures. JGPO officials told us that immediately after  the environmental impact statement and record of decision are completed,  the department will commence construction of facilities in efforts to meet  the 2014 goal. However, other DOD and government of Guam officials  believe that this is an ambitious and optimistic schedule considering the  possibility that the environmental impact statement could be delayed, the  complexities of moving thousands of Marines and dependents from  Okinawa to Guam, and the need to obtain funding from the United States  and Japan to support military construction projects.
section_title: Several DOD and Government of Guam Challenges Have Yet to Be Addressed
paragraphs: DOD and the government of Guam face several significant challenges  associated with the military buildup, including addressing funding and  operational challenges and community and infrastructure impacts, which  could affect the development and implementation of their planning efforts.  First, DOD has not identified all funding requirements and may encounter  difficulties in obtaining funding given competing priorities within the  department. Second, DOD officials need to address the operational and  training limitations on Guam, such as for sea and airlift capabilities, and  training requirements for thousands of Marines. Third, the increase in  military personnel and their dependents on Guam and the large number of  the construction workers needed to build military facilities will create  challenges for Guam’s community and civilian infrastructure.
subsections: section_title: DOD Faces Funding Challenges
paragraphs: The military services’ realignments on Guam are estimated to cost over  $13 billion. Included in this $13 billion cost estimate, the Marine Corps  buildup is estimated to cost $10.3 billion. However, these estimates do not  include the estimated costs of all other defense organizations that will be  needed to support the additional military personnel and dependents on  Guam. For example, the Defense Logistics Agency, which will help  support the services’ influx of personnel, missions, and equipment to  Guam, will likely incur additional costs that are not included in the current  estimate. Also, the costs to move and accommodate Marine Corps units  from locations other than Okinawa to Guam are not included in the  estimate. In addition, the costs associated with the development of  training ranges and facilities on nearby islands are not included in the  current estimate for the military buildup. According to JGPO officials, the  total costs for the military buildup will eventually be identified and  integrated into JGPO’s master plan for Guam.
Of the $10.3 billion estimate for the Marine Corps buildup, the government  of Japan is expected to contribute up to $2.8 billion in funds without  reimbursement for the construction of facilities, such as barracks and  office buildings. The government of Japan is also expected to provide  another $3.3 billion in loans and equity investments for installation support  infrastructure, such as on base power and water systems, and military  family housing. Most of this $3.3 billion is expected over time to be  recouped by Japan in the form of service charges paid by the U.S.  government and in rents paid by American servicemembers with their  overseas housing allowance provided by DOD.
In addition, according to DOD officials, there are several conditions that  must be met before the government of Japan contributes to the cost of the  Marine Corps move. First, the government of Japan has stipulated that its  funds will not be made available until it has reviewed and agreed to  specific infrastructure plans for Guam. Second, failure or delay of any  initiative outlined in the Defense Policy Review Initiative may affect the  other initiatives, because various planning variables need to fall into place  in order for the initiatives to move forward. For example, DOD officials  expect that if the Futenma replacement facility in Okinawa (estimated to  cost from $4 billion to $5 billion) is not built, the Marine Corps relocation  to Guam may be canceled or delayed. Previously, the United States and  Japan were unsuccessful in closing and replacing Marine Corps Air Station  Futenma as a part of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa process in  1996. DOD officials view the success of the Futenma replacement facility  as a key objective of the initiative that will need to be completed in order  for other realignment actions to take place, including the move to Guam.  Finally, the government of Japan may encounter challenges in funding its  share of the Marine Corps move considering Japan’s other national  priorities and its commitments associated with funding several other  major realignments of U.S. forces in Japan under the Defense Policy  Review Initiative.
section_title: DOD Faces Operational Challenges
paragraphs: Operational challenges, such as providing appropriate mobility support  and training capabilities to meet Marine Corps requirements, have not  been fully addressed. According to Marine Forces Pacific officials, the  Marine Corps in Guam will depend on strategic military sealift and airlift  to reach destinations in Asia that may be farther away than was the case  when the units were based in Okinawa. For example, in a contingency  operation that requires sealift, the ships may have to deploy from Sasebo,  Japan, or other locations to collect the Marines and their equipment on  Guam and then go to the area where the contingency is taking place,  potentially risking a delayed arrival at certain potential trouble spots.  According to Marine Corps officials, amphibious shipping capability and  airlift capacity are needed in Guam, which may include expanding existing  staging facilities and systems support for both sealift and airlift. The  Marine Corps estimated additional costs for strategic lift operating from  Guam to be nearly $88 million annually.
Existing training ranges and facilities on Guam are not sufficient to meet  the training requirements of the projected Marine Corps force. A DOD  analysis of training opportunities in Guam concluded that no ranges on  Guam are suitable for the needs of the projected Marine Corps force  because of inadequacy in size or lack of availability. U.S. Pacific Command  is also in the process of conducting a training study that covers both Guam  and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to see what  options are available for training in the region. Marine Forces Pacific  officials stated that live-fire artillery training, amphibious landings, and  tracked vehicle operations will be challenging because of the combination  of factors associated with the limited size of training areas available and  the environmental concerns on the Northern Mariana Islands.
section_title: Increase in Military Presence Is Likely to Cause Local Community and Infrastructure Challenges
paragraphs: The increase in military presence is expected to have significant effects on  Guam’s community and infrastructure, and these challenges have not been  fully addressed. This undertaking is estimated to increase the current  Guam population of approximately 171,000 by an estimated 25,000 active  duty military personnel and dependents (or 14.6 percent) to 196,000. The  Guam population could also swell further because DOD’s personnel  estimates do not include defense civilians and contractors who are also  likely to move to Guam to support DOD operations.
DOD and government of Guam officials recognize that the military buildup  will have significant effects on the local community. For example:    As a result of the military buildup on Guam, construction demands will  exceed local capacity and the availability of workers, though the extent  to which the local workers can meet this increase has yet to be  determined. For example, on the basis of trend data, government of  Guam officials estimate the current construction capacity to be  approximately $800 million per year, as compared with the estimated  construction capacity of more than $3 billion per year needed by DOD  to meet the planned 2014 completion date. In addition, Guam currently  faces a shortage of skilled construction workers. Preliminary analysis  indicates that 15,000 to 20,000 construction workers will be required to  support the projected development on Guam. One estimate is that  Guam may be able to meet only 10 to 15 percent of the labor  requirement locally, a concern to federal, military, and local officials.  Nearby countries may have workers willing to come to Guam to take  jobs to construct needed facilities, but these workers will have to  temporarily enter the United States on temporary nonagricultural  workers visas, currently capped at 66,000 per year. JGPO officials said  that legislation recently passed by both the Senate and the House of  Representatives that will increase the cap in the short term is a first  step toward addressing many of their concerns with temporary  nonagricultural workers visas.
The government of Guam has expressed several concerns about the  potential effects of an influx of foreign workers on Guam’s community.  The Civilian Military Task Force recommended that Guam needs to  establish a department that would focus on processing foreign  workers. Further, a government of Guam report stated that the influx  of foreign workers would put a strain on existing emergency care  services, medical facilities, and public utilities.
In addition, DOD and government of Guam officials recognize that the  island’s infrastructure is inadequate to meet the increased demand due to  the military buildup. For example:    Guam’s commercial port has capacity constraints with pier berthing  space, crane operations, and container storage locations. The military  buildup requires a port with double the current capacity, and military  cargo is expected to increase sixfold during construction of facilities  required for the buildup.
Guam’s two major highways are in poor condition and, when ordnance  (ammunition and explosives) is unloaded from ships for Andersen Air  Force Base now and for the Marine Corps in the future, the ordnance  must be transported on one of these major roads that run through  highly populated areas. The current highway system also experiences  slippery surfaces, potholes, and occasional flooding. Traffic between  military installations and commercial, business, and residential areas is  anticipated to increase significantly with the military buildup.
Guam’s electrical system—the sole power provider on the island—is  not reliable and has transmission problems resulting in brownouts and  voltage and frequency fluctuations. The system may not be adequate to  deliver the additional energy requirements associated with the military  buildup.
Guam’s water and wastewater treatment systems are near capacity and  have a history of failure due to aged and deteriorated distribution lines.  The military buildup may increase demand by at least 25 percent.
Guam’s solid waste facilities face capacity and environmental  challenges as they have reached the end of their useful life. Currently,  the solid waste landfills in Guam have a number of unresolved issues  related to discharge of pollutants and are near capacity.
section_title: Government of Guam’s Planning Efforts Are in Their Initial Stages
paragraphs: The government of Guam’s planning efforts to address infrastructure  challenges associated with the buildup of military forces are in the initial  stages, and several uncertainties further contribute to the difficulties the  government of Guam faces in developing precise plans to address the  effects of the military buildup on the local community and infrastructure.  In addition, funding sources to address infrastructure challenges are  uncertain. As we have found with some communities experiencing civilian  and military population growth surrounding Army installations in the  continental United States, the government of Guam will likely ask for  assistance to provide civilian infrastructure improvements.
Two recent studies that examine the various effects of the military buildup  on the local infrastructure and community were developed by the  government of Guam and KPMG. First, the Governor of Guam  commissioned the Civilian Military Task Force to develop a plan that  would both accommodate the military personnel expansion and provide  opportunities for the Guam community. The task force issued its report in  November 2007, which provided a synopsis of the various funding and  resource needs. Second, the government of Guam contracted KPMG to  examine the needs and challenges Guam faces in regard to the military  buildup. The October 2007 report made preliminary assessments on the  effects of the military buildup on Guam’s infrastructure, economy, and  social services. One study estimated that more than $3 billion will be  required for civilian infrastructure and government services to address the  military buildup.
The uncertainties associated with exact size, makeup, and timing of the  forces to be moved to Guam make it difficult for the government of Guam  to develop comprehensive plans to address the effects of the proposed  military buildup. Guam officials said that without accurate information it  is difficult to develop an infrastructure program that identifies civilian  construction projects and financing to support the military buildup and to  form an administrative structure to oversee and coordinate project  scheduling and implementation. In our September 2007 report on  communities experiencing civilian and military population growth at  continental U.S. Army installations, we found that without knowing  whether Army headquarters-level offices or the local base plans have  accurate information about the expected growth, communities are not  well positioned to plan for and provide adequate schools, housing,  transportation, and other infrastructure.
As discussed previously, government of Guam officials recognize that the  island’s infrastructure is inadequate to meet the projected demand and will  likely require significant funding to address this challenge. However, the  extent to which the government of Guam will be able to obtain financial  assistance for projected infrastructure demands from the federal  government is unclear. Government of Guam officials we met with were  uncertain as to whether and to what extent federal grant programs will be  available to address Guam’s public infrastructure to support the military  realignments. On the basis of its initial review, KPMG reported that the  data it collected from the government of Guam suggested that it is likely  there will be a significant funding gap between the availability of funds  and requirements for Guam’s infrastructure program. KPMG further  reported that $282 million in federal funding was provided to Guam in  2006. Without additional federal assistance, government of Guam officials  believe that local infrastructure improvements to accommodate the  military buildup would take decades to complete. In our September 2007  report on U.S. communities experiencing civilian and military population  growth at Army installations, we found that communities will likely incur  costs to provide adequate schools, transportation, and other infrastructure  improvements. Because of limited local funding, some of these  communities are seeking federal and state assistance.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer  any questions you or any members of the committee may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information regarding this statement, please contact Brian J.  Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this testimony. GAO staff members making major  contributions to this testimony are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Location of Guam
paragraphs: Guam is the westernmost territory of the United States and is located in  the Pacific Ocean approximately 3,810 miles southwest of Honolulu,  Hawaii; 1,600 miles east of Manila, the Philippines; and 1,560 miles  southeast of Tokyo, Japan (see fig. 1).
section_title: Appendix II: Military Installations on Guam
paragraphs: According to the Department of Defense (DOD), about 29 percent of the  land on Guam is controlled by DOD (as indicated in white in fig. 2), 52  percent is privately owned, and 19 percent is under the supervision of the  government of Guam.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Mark Little, Assistant Director;  Nelsie Alcoser; Susan Ditto; Kate Lenane; and Jamilah Moon made major  contributions to this testimony.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD  Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military  Buildup on Guam. GAO-07-1015. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2007.
Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting  Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD’s Global Posture  Restructuring. GAO-06-852. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2006.
DOD’s Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve. GAO- 06-913R. Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2006.
Opportunities Exist to Improve Comprehensive Master Plans for  Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas. GAO-05-680R.  Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2005.
Defense Infrastructure: Factors Affecting U.S. Infrastructure Costs  Overseas and the Development of Comprehensive Master Plans. GAO-04- 609. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2004.
Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S.  Military Presence on Okinawa. GAO/NSIAD-98-66. Washington, D.C.:  March 2, 1998.
subsections: section_title: Community Growth Bases
paragraphs: Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road  Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. GAO-08-602R.  Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely  Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial  Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.
section_title: U.S. Insular Areas
paragraphs: Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: Pending Legislation  Would Apply U.S. Immigration Law to the CNMI with a Transition  Period. GAO-08-466. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2008.
U.S. Insular Areas: Economic, Fiscal, and Financial Accountability  Challenges. GAO-07-119. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2006.
U.S. Insular Areas: Multiple Factors Affect Federal Health Care Funding.  GAO-06-75. Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2005.
Environmental Cleanup: Better Communication Needed for Dealing  with Formerly Used Defense Sites in Guam. GAO-02-423. Washington,  D.C.: April 11, 2002.
Compact of Free Association: Negotiations Should Address Aid  Effectiveness and Accountability and Migrants’ Impact on U.S. Areas.  GAO-02-270T. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2001.
Foreign Relations: Migration From Micronesian Nations Has Had  Significant Impact on Guam, Hawaii, and the Commonwealth of the  Northern Mariana Islands. GAO-02-40. Washington, D.C.: October 5, 2001.
U.S. Insular Areas: Application of the U.S. Constitution. GAO/OGC-98-5.  Washington, D.C.: November 7, 1997.
Insular Areas Update. GAO/GGD-96-184R. Washington, D.C.:   September 13, 1996.
U.S. Insular Areas: Information on Fiscal Relations with the Federal  Government. GAO/T-GGD-95-71. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 1995.
U.S. Insular Areas: Development Strategy and Better Coordination  Among U.S. Agencies Are Needed. GAO/NSIAD-94-62. Washington, D.C.:   February 7, 1994.
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