Rail Safety: Improved Human Capital Planning Could Address Emerging Safety Oversight Challenges
Published: 2013-12-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Railroad accidents pose significant safety risks to railroads, their employees, passengers, and the public. FRA oversees safety of the nation's railroads. In light of three high profile accidents in 2012 involving fatalities or hazardous materials, GAO was asked to review FRA's oversight processes and the challenges to railroad safety. This report examines (1) the overall framework that FRA, the states, and the railroads use to ensure rail safety; (2) the extent to which FRA and the railroads assess safety risks and allocate resources to address those risks; and (3) what challenges, if any, exist to FRA's current safety framework, and what ongoing and emerging issues FRA faces. GAO analyzed FRA accident and incident data, reviewed the analytical models FRA uses to incorporate risk into its inspection program, and interviewed FRA headquarters and field safety staff, officials from the 7 largest freight railroads and 11 smaller railroads, industry associations and 7 rail labor organizations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) rail-safety oversight framework relies on inspections to ensure railroads comply with federal safety regulations. FRA inspects railroad infrastructure and operations, identifies safety defects, and may, if warranted, cite the railroads for violations of federal safety regulations. The agency estimates that its inspectors have the ability to annually inspect less than 1 percent of the railroad activities covered in regulation. As a result, railroads have the primary responsibility for safety of the railroad system. To formulate regulations, FRA instituted the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, a forum for FRA, the railroads, rail labor organizations, and other stakeholders to arrive at a consensus on proposed rules. Thirty states partner with FRA in providing FRA-certified railroad safety inspectors who are also authorized to enforce federal safety regulations. Finally, many railroads have additional safety programs, rules, and technologies to ensure safety beyond the required federal standards.
FRA has developed a risk-based approach to direct its inspection efforts, but the agency has been slow to implement broader risk reduction planning. FRA has two tools to help direct its inspection efforts--the National Inspection Plan (NIP) and the Staffing Allocation Model (SAM). The NIP process uses past accident and other data to target FRA's inspection activities, and the SAM estimates the best allocation of the different types of inspectors across FRA regions in order to minimize damage and casualties from rail accidents. However, all eight FRA regional administrators expressed concerns about FRA's staffing process that relies primarily on the SAM to predict appropriate regional inspector needs, and that does not allow the flexibility needed to accommodate the regions' changing resource needs. In addition, the Railroad Safety Improvement Act of 2008 mandated safety risk reduction plans primarily for large freight and passenger railroads. FRA has not yet issued the final rule directing railroads to develop the plans, which was mandated to be issued by October 2012. According to FRA, the rulemaking was delayed due to concerns by railroads over their potential liability. Although FRA anticipates completing approval of railroad's plans by 2016, the agency has not developed an interim plan with specific timeframes to ensure that there are no further delays in issuing regulations and that timely evaluation and approval of the railroads' risk reduction plans occurs.
FRA faces several rail safety challenges, including how it will: (1) implement its oversight of positive train control (PTC), a technology designed to prevent certain types of rail accidents caused by human factors, and risk reduction plans; (2) adjust to changing rail traffic flows; and (3) ensure it has enough inspectors for its current and future oversight workload, as FRA expects 30 percent of field safety staff will be eligible to retire in 5 years. While FRA has long-term rail safety goals, its ability to meet those goals and respond to challenges is hampered by its lack of a strategic human capital plan. FRA officials stated that due to uncertainties about their budget, PTC implementation, and risk reduction plans, they plan for human capital needs in their annual budget request, rather than through a strategic human capital plan. However, without a plan, FRA may not make well-informed decisions about its workforce needs including having inspectors with the right skills for its current oversight activities and enough specialists to oversee the rail industry's implementation of PTC and safety risk reduction plans.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that FRA develop (1) a plan for finalizing its rulemaking and interim steps to implement its oversight of safety risk reduction programs, and (2) a strategic human capital plan that identifies and prioritizes FRAs human capital needs, links them to FRAs strategic goals and objectives, and includes approaches for how FRA will recruit, train, and retain inspectors and its new workforce of PTC and safety risk management specialists. DOT agreed to consider the recommendations and provided technical and other comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Railroad accidents pose significant safety risk to railroads, their  employees, passengers, and the public. In July 2013, approximately 20  miles from the United States border in Lac-Mégantic, Canada, a runaway  freight train derailed and exploded, killing 47 people and destroying the  center of the town. This and other recent accidents demonstrate the type  of destruction that train accidents can cause. The safety record of the  railroad industry in the United States has shown marked improvement in  the last 20 years, and according to Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)  data, 2012 was the safest year on record; nonetheless, recent train  accidents continue to underscore the need for vigilance. FRA provides  regulatory oversight of the safety of about 780 United States railroads  operating on about 200,000 miles of track, including both the issuing and  enforcing of safety regulations.
The most recent authorization of FRA’s rail safety activities occurred in  2008 through the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA). FRA is  responsible for implementing certain provisions of RSIA, which was due  to be reauthorized at the end of fiscal year 2013. RSIA gave FRA new  responsibilities, including the oversight of the implementation of positive  train control (PTC) and railroad safety risk reduction programs. Since the  enactment of RSIA, FRA has had to manage these new responsibilities,  in addition to its regular oversight activities, in an increasingly austere  budget environment.
In light of the three high-profile rail accidents in 2012 including fatal  accidents in Maryland and Illinois, and a hazardous materials accident  involving an explosion and fire in Ohio, you asked us to review FRA’s  railroad safety oversight and emerging rail-safety issues. This report  discusses (1) the overall framework that FRA, the states, and the  railroads use to ensure safety of rail operations and infrastructure, (2) the  extent that FRA and the railroads assess safety risks and allocate  resources to address those risks, and (3) the challenges to the framework  and the ongoing and emerging issues FRA faces in railroad-safety  oversight.
To determine the overall railroad-safety framework that FRA, the states,  and the railroads use to ensure the safety of railroad operations and  infrastructure, we examined applicable laws and regulations, FRA  guidance, and other documentation, including reports describing the  oversight mechanisms that FRA uses to ensure railroad safety. We  interviewed FRA headquarters and regional officials, state railroad-safety  program officials and railroad officials to understand railroad safety  programs, how inspections are conducted, and the extent to which  federal, state, and industry representatives coordinate with each other to  oversee railroad safety. We conducted site visits to three of FRA’s eight  regions: Atlanta, Georgia (Region 3); Chicago, Illinois (Region 4); and  Fort Worth, Texas (Region 5). These three regions together accounted for  over 50 percent of all train accidents that occurred from 2003 through  2012. We selected these regions using criteria which included the number  and mix of Class I, II, and III railroads operating in the region, the highest  number of reportable train accidents during the last 10 years by region  including highway-rail grade crossing accidents, as determined by our  analyses of FRA accident data, and the extent to which state safety  inspectors operated in the region. We also selected a non-probability  sample of 11 Class II and Class III railroads in four FRA regions to obtain  their perspectives about federal and state railroad safety oversight. We  selected railroads in these four regions (Regions 1, 3, 4, and 5) because  they had the highest number of train accidents based on our analysis of  FRA accident data. Our findings from our interviews in selected FRA  regions, states, and railroads are not generalizable to all FRA regions,  participating states, or across all Class II and III railroads.
To determine the extent to which FRA and the railroads assess safety  risks and allocate resources to address those risks, we reviewed FRA  documentation on the National Inspection Plan (NIP) process and the  Staffing Allocation Model (SAM) and interviewed relevant FRA  headquarters officials, all FRA regional administrators, and FRA safety  specialists in Regions 3, 4, and 5 to discuss FRA’s inspection and staffing  models, as well as other reports that track inspector activities and allocate  resources based on risk. We used standard economic and statistical  principles as criteria to assess the general reasonableness of the  approach and assumptions used in the models. We also obtained  information on the status of FRA’s implementation of its rulemaking  regarding railroads’ risk reduction plans. We interviewed representatives  from all seven Class I railroads and eight FRA regions about how they  managed safety risks, allocated inspection and other resources based on  risk, and responded to changes in safety risks. We interviewed officials at  our 11 selected Class II and III railroads to understand their safety  challenges and how they managed safety risks. We also interviewed  representatives of seven rail labor organizations and industry  associations to obtain their perspectives on these issues.
To identify challenges in safety oversight and emerging issues that FRA  and the railroads face, we interviewed FRA headquarters officials about  changes in safety risks and FRA’s plans to respond to those changes. We  interviewed all FRA regional administrators and FRA Region 3, 4, and 5  safety specialists. We interviewed state rail-safety program managers in  California, Florida, Illinois, and Texas and representatives from all seven  Class I railroads, selected Class II and III railroads, and seven rail labor  organizations about emerging and ongoing safety issues. Finally, we  interviewed FRA headquarters officials and obtained documentation on  their initiatives to meet current and expected human capital requirements.  Appendix I contains a more detailed explanation of our objectives, scope,  and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2012 to November  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The United States railroad system consists of a vast network of  operations that includes over 780 railroads with more than 230,000  employees and 200,000 miles of track in operation. The freight railroad  industry is dominated by the seven largest freight railroads, referred to as  Class I railroads, which collectively operate over 1.7 trillion ton-miles and  accounted for more than 90 percent of annual railroad-freight revenues in  2012. There are also 10 Class II freight railroads that typically operate  over 350 to 900 miles per railroad, and about 750 smaller Class III freight  railroads with less than 350 miles of track that typically perform point to  point service over short distances. In addition, Amtrak and 29 commuter  railroads collectively carry an average of about 670 million passengers a  year over 23 billion miles.
FRA provides regulatory oversight of the safety of United States railroads,  both passenger and freight. FRA issues and enforces numerous safety  regulations including requirements governing track, signal and train  control systems, highway-rail grade crossing warning systems,  mechanical equipment including locomotives and cars, and railroad- operating practices. FRA also enforces regulations related to the safe  transportation of hazardous materials by rail.
RSIA overhauled federal rail safety requirements by directing FRA to,  among other things, develop additional new rail safety regulations and  guidance in areas such as railroad risk reduction plans and highway-rail  grade crossing safety. RSIA authorized an additional 200 positions for  FRA during fiscal years 2009 through 2013, to meet these new  responsibilities, but federal budget constraints have prevented FRA from  filling these positions. In addition, from 2008 to 2010, FRA’s  responsibilities grew from its primary focus of improving safety to a  broader portfolio of safety and railroad project development activities. The   American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and subsequent  appropriation acts have provided more than $10 billion for rail corridor  improvement, development, and planning grants.
The overall trend in rail accidents has been positive over the last 30  years. Rail accident rates declined dramatically from 1980 to 1987, and  then fluctuated around four accidents per million train miles from 1992 to  2003. However, there has been a clear positive trend in recent years,  with the rate declining about 50 percent between 2004 and 2012. As a  result, according to FRA officials and FRA data, 2012 was the safest year  on record (see fig. 1).
Railroads are required to report the causes and other information  regarding all reportable rail accidents to the FRA. FRA classifies the  causes of train accidents into five categories: train operations – human  factors; track, roadbed and structures; signal and communication;  mechanical and electrical failures; and miscellaneous causes. According  to FRA data, track and human factors causes accounted for more than 70  percent of all the 25,342 reported railroad accidents from 2003 to 2012  (see fig. 2). Those accidents caused by human factors result from actions  such as improperly positioning track switches, moving train engines or rail  cars without proper authority, leaving rail cars in a position that obstructs  the track, or failing to secure a sufficient number of handbrakes.  Accidents caused by defective track result from such things as defective  or ineffective crossties; broken or worn switch points; or broken, fissured  or fractured rail components.
According to railroad and other stakeholders, a number of factors have  contributed to improvements in rail safety including: improved financial  health of railroads, investments in railroad infrastructure, and adoption of  new safety regulations or safety-related technologies. Even with the  significant reduction in accident rates, however, from 2003 to 2012, an  average of 10 people were killed and 300 people were injured in train  accidents annually.
In addition to FRA-reportable train accidents, highway-rail grade crossing  accidents and trespasser incidents constitute a majority of all fatalities  associated with the railroad industry. In 2012, there were 271 fatalities at  highway-rail grade crossings in the United States, and 554 trespasser  fatalities (see fig. 3). While there has been some decline in the number of  highway-rail grade crossing fatalities over the past 10 years, reducing the  number of trespasser fatalities has been more difficult. Improving this  aspect of safety is complicated by the fact that the amount of railroad  right-of-way and number of highway-rail grade railroad crossings in the  United States is very large. As of the end of 2012, FRA’s national  inventory identified 210,621 public and private highway-rail grade  crossings. Reducing highway-rail crossing and trespasser fatalities is  difficult because a train cannot swerve or easily stop to prevent collisions.  According to FRA officials, the average freight train is about one to one- and-a-quarter miles in length and at 55 miles per hour it can take a mile  or more to come to a stop after the locomotive engineer applies the  emergency brake.
section_title: FRA’s Rail-Safety Oversight Framework Relies on Compliance- Based Inspections
paragraphs: FRA conducts inspections to ensure railroads’ compliance with federal  safety regulations. Thirty states also partner with FRA in providing FRA- certified state railroad-safety inspectors, who have been delegated  authority to enforce federal safety regulations. Many railroads have  additional safety programs, rules, and technologies beyond the required  federal standards.
subsections: section_title: FRA Relies on Inspections to Ensure Railroads’ Compliance with Federal Safety Regulations
paragraphs: FRA is a small agency with limited resources available to execute the  large scope of its oversight responsibility especially compared to the size  of the industry it regulates. By FRA’s own estimation, its inspectors have  the ability to inspect less than 1 percent of the federally-regulated railroad  system. Therefore, railroads have the primary responsibility for safety,  and FRA relies on a number of strategies to achieve the maximum  possible oversight of the system. These strategies include conducting  inspections, enforcing compliance with regulations, issuing new  regulations, and coordinating with industry to employ additional safety  measures beyond the federal requirements, when possible.
FRA executes its regulatory and inspection responsibilities through a staff  of railroad safety experts, inspectors, and other professionals. For  example, to determine a railroad’s compliance with FRA regulations,  inspectors examine track, equipment, signal devices, employee actions,  and procedures and review maintenance and accident records. FRA also  conducts focused inspections involving inspectors from a variety of  disciplines or multiple inspectors from a single discipline, working together  at a specific location or rail facility to target railroad issues that pose the  greatest safety risk, based on inspection data, accident history, rail traffic  density, and professional judgment.
As of fiscal year 2013, there were 347 FRA safety inspectors, in five  safety disciplines, assigned to eight regional offices across the nation.  These disciplines are track, signal and train control, motive power and  equipment, operating practices, and hazardous materials. (See table 1.)
In addition, FRA’s regional offices include safety specialists and program  managers for highway-rail grade crossing safety and trespass prevention.
Railroads are required to comply with the safety standards set in federal  safety regulations. When railroads do not comply or identified defects are  serious, FRA may cite violations and assess civil penalties, either against  railroads or individuals. Thus, FRA’s approach is compliance-oriented and  does not holistically assess safety problems across a railroad’s system.  On average, FRA collected about $15.4 million per year in civil penalty  final assessments or settlements between fiscal years 2009 through  2012. Although FRA uses civil penalties as its primary enforcement tool,  under its authority, it can also take other enforcement actions. For  example, FRA can issue warnings, special notices for repair, compliance  and emergency orders and disqualification orders. For example, in  2012, to remove an imminent and unacceptable threat to public safety,  FRA issued an emergency order to prevent operation of trains over a  highway-rail grade crossing until the railroad restored the active warning  devices to proper working order. Figure 4 shows a serious defect  identified by an FRA motive power and equipment safety inspector while  conducting an inspection prior to a train departure. A broken safety  appliance such as the inoperable hand brake wheel can result in the  inability to properly secure a train during an emergency and can result in  the injury or death of a railroad employee. This defect resulted in a  citation because the condition did not meet the federal railroad safety  appliance standard.
In 1996, FRA implemented a collaborative approach to developing and  issuing rail safety rules and regulations by creating the Railroad Safety  Advisory Committee (RSAC). The RSAC includes stakeholders in the rail  community such as government entities, railroads, rail labor  organizations, trade associations, suppliers, and others that work with  FRA to develop solutions to railroad safety and regulatory issues. FRA  develops and issues rail safety rules and regulations while involving  RSAC members in the rulemaking process. The RSAC recommendations  are advisory, and FRA may deviate from them, if it so chooses. Recent  RSAC-supported rulemakings have addressed passenger rail hours of  service, conductor certification, locomotive safety standards, and positive  train control. Achieving consensus from the stakeholders can be  challenging and time-intensive; however, six Class I railroads, one rail  labor organization, and one other rail-safety stakeholder we interviewed  told us they believe this process is an improvement over FRA’s prior  approach, which did not include them in the process before issuing a  notice of proposed rulemaking. In addition, they noted that in general, the  RSAC partnership has improved the quality of railroad safety initiatives  and fostered a greater level of compliance with safety regulations.
Even with the RSAC process, new technologies pose a challenge to FRA  regulations. In 2008, FRA noted that its regulations cannot keep up with  the rapid pace of technological change, citing, for example, the 8 years it  took to put one new technology signal and train control regulation in  place. According to railroad officials, FRA is not always able to quickly  adapt and respond to new railroad technologies. This situation affects the  FRA inspectors’ ability to maintain oversight. For example, two Class I  railroad officials we spoke with said that technological improvements such  as automated sensors that measure physical attributes or thermal output  on trains can be more comprehensive and identify defects that visual  inspections cannot. In contrast, officials from two rail labor organizations  we spoke with stated that technological advances, such as the use of  automated sensors, should supplement or enhance inspection  capabilities and not replace physical inspections.
FRA supplements oversight of Class I railroads through the Railroad  System Oversight program, established in October 2005. In addition to  addressing safety compliance issues, this program addresses safety  issues not subject to regulation, such as aspects of worker fatigue. Under  this program, the agency assigns an FRA manager to work with each  Class I railroad on identifying and resolving safety issues. According to  FRA officials, these managers analyze accident and inspection data for  their assigned railroad, and support FRA’s inspection and enforcement  efforts. Under this program, FRA has begun annual meetings with the  leadership of each Class I railroad to discuss its safety performance.  Officials from two Class I railroads we interviewed said that their  participation in this oversight program has enhanced their ability to ensure  safety.
In addition to the FRA oversight initiatives mentioned above, there are  other FRA initiatives that contribute to the overall safety framework. Some  of these other initiatives include partnering with organizations to increase  safety awareness; coordinating efforts on research and development to  test and evaluate the safety of locomotives, vehicles, track components,  and signaling devices; and offering training to Class II and III railroads to  ensure they are informed of changes in regulations and that railroad  safety and any other concerns are being addressed. For example, FRA,  in collaboration with the Association of American Railroads (AAR)  operates the Transportation Technology Center (TTC) located in Pueblo,  Colorado. The TTC is a 52-square mile test center that enables isolated  testing and evaluation of freight and passenger rolling stock, vehicle and  track components, and safety and signaling devices at a array of  specialized laboratories and on 48 miles of high-speed railroad track.  According to AAR officials, all classes of railroads have access to utilize  the testing and evaluation center and can benefit from the resulting  technological improvements made to safety. Also, the American Short  Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA), in conjunction with  FRA, offers numerous training seminars to Class II and Class III railroad  employees to increase their knowledge of important aspects of railroad  operations, including recent federal regulatory changes and oversight  issues specific to the five railroad safety disciplines.
section_title: State Inspectors Augment FRA’s Oversight, but Inspection Coverage and Coordination Vary
paragraphs: Thirty states have rail safety programs that partner with FRA to augment  and support the national railroad safety effort. Under the current program,  each participating state enters into an agreement with FRA to provide  enhanced investigative and surveillance capability. Under this program  FRA delegates oversight and enforcement authority to these state  inspectors, who are recruited and trained in disciplines that align with the  FRA’s inspection disciplines and are required to pass mandatory FRA  training before they can be FRA-certified as qualified to perform  inspections. Inspectors who participate in this program submit inspection  reports to FRA and enforce federal rail-safety regulations. State  participation in this voluntary program varies and, according to FRA data,  there are about 170 state inspectors in all. More than half of all state  inspectors are concentrated in six states: California, Illinois, Ohio,  Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia. In contrast, twelve participating  states have small programs with only one or two inspectors, and 20  states do not have any inspectors. California has the largest state  program, with 35 inspectors in all five federal rail-safety inspection  disciplines.
According to FRA region and state program officials we interviewed, the  level of coordination between federal and state inspectors varies from  state to state. Inspectors may divide up territories to ensure more  inspection coverage to maximize their limited resources. For example, in  one state, state track and structure inspectors take primary responsibility  for part of the state, allowing FRA track and structure inspectors the  flexibility to be deployed in another part of the state. In other states, the  federal and state inspectors may cover the same territory and conduct  inspections simultaneously, with or without advance coordination. FRA  and state inspectors may also collaborate on joint or focused inspections.  On the other hand, according to FRA regional and state officials, in some  states coordination happens between individual state and federal  inspectors in an informal manner. Representatives from five Class I  railroads we spoke with said there appeared to be good coordination  between the federal and state inspectors.
section_title: Railroads Also Conduct Inspections, and Many Have Safety Initiatives beyond Federal Regulations
paragraphs: Railroads must adhere to all federal railroad regulations, which govern  safety requirements, and applicable state railroad regulations in the states  in which they conduct railroad operations. The railroads have primary  responsibility for their own safe operation, and each performs its own  safety activities including reviewing track inspection reports for accuracy,  performing tests on electronic devices, understanding and utilizing  automated test data, identifying and analyzing defective components, and  identifying necessary corrective actions. Across all classes of railroads,  most railroad officials said that they adopted a range of safety oversight  approaches and technologies intended to provide additional assurance of  safety beyond the required federal regulatory safety standards. Railroad  officials we spoke with provided examples of various initiatives they have  instituted and ways in which they address their self-identified safety risks.  For example, Class I railroads have:
Participated in the Switching Operations Fatality Analysis (SOFA)  reporting. SOFA is a voluntary, non-regulatory, workplace-safety  partnership with railroads, rail labor organizations, industry  associations, and FRA. It was formed to look for commonalities  among the fatalities that occur during switching operations and to  develop findings and recommendations that will aid in preventing  railroad employee deaths.
Developed various policies, programs, incentives, and analyses to  discourage unsafe behavior and encourage safe behavior through  training, visual reminders of the importance of safety, and financial  incentives for safe workplace habits. Also, five Class I railroads–as  encouraged by a rail labor organization–conduct root-cause analyses  to determine why and how an accident occurred, and what can be  done to prevent similar accidents in the future across their rail  systems.
Participated in or have operating practices similar to the Confidential  Close Call Reporting System (C3RS), which allows railroad  employees to report close call events or “near-misses.” This effort  helps to identify safety trends within the rail network, learn about  potentially unsafe conditions, and improve safety practices to avoid an  accident or incident with more serious consequences.
Focused on improving the way training procedures and practices are  provided to railroad employees. Railroads have cited the use of  locomotive simulation training machines that allow train crews to learn  and make mistakes without consequences, and test their skills to  determine competency in realistic scenarios. This type of training  helps railroad training officials and management understand where  improvements can be made and areas to focus on training locomotive  employees who operate on certain trains and along different routes.
Incorporated new technologies and reinvested in infrastructure and  equipment, which has enhanced safety by allowing railroads to be  proactive in identifying various safety issues. Five Class I railroads  have cited the importance of using “machine vision” technologies and  wayside detection systems to identify undue stresses and potentially  unsafe conditions on railroad tracks, wheels, and other railroad  equipment. According to officials at one Class I railroad, the analysis  of the detector information can supplement mechanical analysis to  help determine when a train should be taken out of service for  mechanical components that are not operating consistently or that are  failing faster than others. Another Class I railroad cited the use of  inward-facing locomotive cab cameras to identify electronic device  distractions or issues that they would have not otherwise known  needed to be addressed, such as engineers’ not wearing seatbelts.
In addition to the initiatives mentioned above, there are other activities  that railroads, states and local entities, and safety organizations are  involved with that also contribute to the overall safety framework. These  other contributing initiatives include public education and outreach,  enforcement, engineering, and evaluation. For example, Class I railroads  have hosted an “Officer on A Train” event, in which participating railroads  partner with local law enforcement to promote compliance with state  motor-vehicle laws and penal codes on highway-rail grade crossings and  rights-of-way. Also, state departments of transportation, local law  enforcement, and railroads have partnered with Operation Lifesaver by  providing presentations to schools, community organizations, driver’s  education classes, as well as teaming up to provide education at  weekend events such as festivals and safety fairs. Together these entities  work to ensure that public education about the hazards surrounding  railroad property and trains, implement railroad engineering initiatives to  increase safety and reduce trespassing and injuries and deaths, and  encourage police enforcement to discourage unsafe actions and ensure  public safety around railroads.
section_title: FRA Uses A Risk- Based Approach to Direct Inspections, but Has Been Slow to Implement Broader Risk Reduction Planning
paragraphs: Since 2006, FRA has developed a risk-based approach to help direct its  inspection efforts, but FRA regional officials expressed concerns about  how well its risk-based model appropriately balances inspector needs in  their regions. RSIA mandated risk reduction plans for Class I, passenger  (commuter and inter-city), and other railroads that FRA determined  needed such plans based on safety performance. The development of  this risk reduction approach to oversight is intended to augment FRA’s  current inspection regime and is a significant departure from FRA’s  traditional compliance-driven approach. However, FRA has not yet issued  the final rule directing railroads to develop such plans, which, under RSIA,  was to be issued by October 2012.
subsections: section_title: FRA’s National Inspection Plan and Staffing Allocation Model Incorporate an Assessment of Risk
paragraphs: FRA has developed a risk-based approach to its inspection program  using two quantitative tools to help direct its inspection efforts. First, in  2006, FRA developed the National Inspection Plan (NIP) process to use  safety risk information to help target limited inspection resources to areas  of higher risk. There are three steps to the NIP: (1) a quantitative model  produces an initial, baseline set of targets for inspections; (2) FRA  regions discuss the baseline targets with headquarters and adjustments  are made to the initial inspection targets; and (3) the NIP is updated mid- year to adjust for unforeseen events that required the use of inspection  resources, such as accident investigations or changing safety conditions.
The NIP’s quantitative model minimizes the predicted number and  severity of railroad accidents given the number of available FRA  inspectors in each FRA region. The quantitative model for making this  estimation uses data including: (1) the most recent 3 years of accident  data from reports that railroads are required to file about accidents that  occur on their tracks, (2) data from FRA and state inspection activity,  and (3) information on railroad activities such as train miles and other  data. The model uses these data to determine the scope of what FRA’s  inspectors should inspect in a given year. The NIP model provides  targets for the amount of inspection activity each FRA inspector should  have at each railroad within each state. After the baseline inspection  targets are established, FRA’s regional directors propose modifications to  the inspection targets produced for each region, using their judgment and  knowledge of which railroads or disciplines may require more FRA  oversight than the NIP’s model indicates. As a result of these discussions,  FRA headquarters and regions arrive at a modified set of inspection  targets. All the FRA regional administrators told us that the flexibility in  this process allows them to target inspection needs based on changing  conditions in their regions.
FRA headquarters officials stated that the NIP model is not designed to  account for newly emerging risks or react swiftly to recent accidents.  Consequently, FRA allows for a mid-year correction of the NIP targets,  based on input from FRA’s regional management. FRA regional  administrators we spoke with indicated that this flexibility can help  address new or emerging rail safety risks by deviating from the original  NIP targets. For example, they stated that they sometimes re-allocate  inspection targets to railroads that have had recent accidents, or because  inspectors indicate a need for more oversight at a certain railroad based  on assessments made during their regular inspection duties. Throughout  the year, according to FRA regional administrators we spoke with, FRA  headquarters and regional management monitor the inspection activities  against the modified inspection baseline to determine if the inspection  targets are being met. FRA’s regional administrators use the NIP to  monitor and help manage the use of inspectors with “dashboard” reports  that track progress in meeting plan targets. FRA regional administrators  and supervisors said the dashboards are a good tool that gives them a  quick review of their plan progress. Inspectors are expected to stay within  2.5 percent of the NIP inspection targets and supervisors generally direct  the activity of inspectors to meet the goals.
In addition to the NIP, FRA has also developed the Staffing Allocation  Model (SAM), which is a planning and evaluation tool used to assess its  inspection resources from a nationwide perspective. FRA uses the SAM  to establish targets for the number of inspectors in four FRA inspection  disciplines across all eight regions. In using the targets to help allocate  and balance staff among disciplines and regions, FRA expects to  minimize the resulting estimated costs of train accidents, including  casualties. FRA uses the SAM results to determine where it may need to  adjust the number of inspectors in a given region and discipline, given the  resource constraints provided by the total number of inspector positions.
In 2007, the SAM model results indicated that there needed to be a  change in the relative number of inspectors among the disciplines. FRA  rebalanced its workforce using the SAM results, increasing the number of  track inspectors and reducing the number of equipment inspectors. FRA  officials stated that more recent SAM outputs have not indicated the need  for major movements of inspectors between regions or disciplines. As of  April 2013, no region and no inspection discipline within any region varied  by more or less than two positions from the SAM model result; at that  time FRA had 324 full-time inspectors and 23 vacant inspector positions.  While FRA headquarters officials anticipate that there may be minor  variations from SAM’s targets as a result of natural turnover of inspectors  (e.g., retirements), they do not believe that these temporary variations will  have long-term effects on FRA’s safety activities in the regions. However,  FRA officials also stated that when the SAM calls for a change in the  distribution of inspectors, they are somewhat limited in their ability to  implement changes due to federal budget constraints. Adding new  inspector positions in one region requires the rebalancing of inspector  positions in another region.
section_title: Regional Officials Have Concerns about FRA’s Process to Allocate Staff
paragraphs: Although FRA regional administrators we spoke with stated that the NIP  process provides them with a good tool for planning for yearly inspection  needs in their regions, all eight regional administrators told us that they  see limitations in the process that FRA uses to determine staffing  allocations. Further, all eight administrators noted that the staffing  allocation model does not always reflect the appropriate inspection needs  in their regions. FRA regional administrators can provide input to FRA  headquarters on the model’s results based on their views of how many  inspectors the region needs; however, the overall process for determining  inspector resources across the regions was perceived by the  administrators to be much less flexible than the NIP process. Specifically,  several regional administrators told us that even though they have  inquired about obtaining inspectors in a specific discipline to meet current  safety inspection needs, they were generally unable to get additional  inspectors because the staffing process is not flexible enough to meet  these demands. They also expressed concern over the staffing pressures  this can create, as they are forced to spread inspectors over larger  territories, sometimes spanning several states.
FRA headquarters officials also told us that while the SAM model  provides an initial basis for allocating staff, and has been refined based  on what they have learned from making improvements to the NIP model,  the SAM is not designed to take into account certain changes. For  example, it does not quickly reflect increasing freight train volume or  increasing accidents in a particular region because the SAM uses past  accident data to provide a baseline for the nationwide distribution of its  inspectors. Over time, changes in accident data will be reflected in the  model, but this will be evident some time after the change has occurred.  While the SAM model allows FRA to account for some risks, it is not  designed to anticipate quickly changing circumstances that may affect  risk such as changes in the type or amount of freight traffic in a region.  FRA officials stated that they handle those types of changes to inspector  needs on an as-needed basis through temporary detail assignment of  FRA inspectors from other regions or headquarters.
FRA’s ability to quickly adjust to changing conditions also is affected by  the fact that hiring and staffing decisions are long-term decisions, and  filling a gap in staffing with a qualified person can take years. According  to FRA officials, it can take 1 to 2 years to find, hire, train, and certify a  new inspector with previous railroad experience, and 3 to 4 years to  certify an inexperienced trainee. For example, in one case, an FRA  regional administrator stated that when the staffing decisions did not  provide for a replacement for a certain discipline, he covered that  inspection load with inspectors from other states for 3 years until a  replacement could be approved, hired, trained, and qualified.
section_title: FRA Has Missed the Mandated Deadline to Implement a Comprehensive Risk Reduction Approach
paragraphs: FRA was required to issue a rulemaking for railroads’ development of risk  reduction plans within 4 years of RSIA’s enactment. Although FRA issued  an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and a Notice of Public  Hearings, the agency has been slow to issue final regulations for the  railroads to follow in developing the plans, and FRA missed the October  2012 deadline for requiring certain railroads to develop and implement  risk reduction plans. RSIA mandated that all Class I railroads, passenger  railroads, and any railroad that FRA determines has inadequate safety  performance develop a risk reduction plan and have it approved by  FRA. The risk reduction concept is a comprehensive, system-oriented  approach to safety that first determines an operation’s level of risk by  identifying and analyzing applicable hazards and then develops plans to  mitigate that risk. The objective is to identify and mitigate those risks  proactively, with the intent of reducing or eliminating risks before an  accident, injury, or fatality occurs. Railroad and rail-labor officials we  interviewed said the risk reduction approach has the potential to improve  safety because it provides the opportunity to identify the root cause of  safety problems across a railroad’s system. As required by law, each  railroad’s Risk Reduction Program Plan must include a risk-based hazard  analysis, a Technology Implementation Plan and a Fatigue Management  Plan.
According to FRA officials, a significant factor in the delay resulted from  the railroads’ concerns about access to information contained in the plans  that could affect railroad liability. In particular, railroads expressed  concern that risks identified in the plans would leave them exposed to  legal liability in the case of an accident. FRA chose to split the risk  reduction plan process for freight and passenger railroads, and  passenger-railroad guidance has progressed further than freight-railroad  guidance. Under this split approach, passenger railroads will be required  to have a System Safety Plan (SSP), a comprehensive process for the  application of engineering and management principles, criteria, and  techniques to optimize safety that might require a railroad to manage risk  and to develop proactive hazard management methods that would  support safety improvement. FRA expects to issue the final rule for the  SSPs in early 2014. In addition, agency officials told us that they  continue to work through their RSAC process to develop guidance and  FRA anticipates issuing a final rule for the freight railroads’ Risk  Reduction Program plans in early 2015 and expects that the railroads will  have approved risk reduction plans in place by 2016. Implementing such  an approach will likely take several years particularly given that FRA  estimates that it will not complete the approval of railroads’ plans until  2016. This delay continues to prevent FRA from implementing proactive  oversight to help mitigate safety risks through risk management plans.
The Department of Transportation’s Inspector General has also reported  on delays in FRA’s rulemaking related to a number of RSIA’s mandates. It  recommended that FRA develop a plan for completion of outstanding  RSIA-related rulemakings, including milestones for completion and a  description of FRA’s rationale for prioritizing rulemakings. However, FRA  only partially concurred with this recommendation. During our review,  the agency had not yet developed an interim plan with specific time  frames to direct and manage the implementation of the risk reduction  program to prevent further delays. Developing a report that outlines these  time frames and the steps needed to implement the program could help  ensure that FRA identifies risks associated with the start of the program  and would allow FRA to better inform Congress and other stakeholders of  its progress in implementing the risk reduction program.
This is particularly important in light of the fact that implementing the more  comprehensive risk-based approach to safety is a significant procedural  and cultural change for FRA and the railroad industry. One Class I  railroad official we interviewed observed that when his railroad instituted a  risk reduction approach, employees had to think differently, in “root  cause” terms rather than individual safety defects, and it was a difficult  cultural transition. The addition of a risk reduction approach to FRA  oversight will likewise be a cultural shift. As we noted earlier, FRA’s  current oversight framework is largely a compliance-based framework,  focused on ensuring adherence to federal safety regulations—the safety  standards a railroad must meet. While FRA will continue with its current  compliance-based inspections, auditing a railroad’s comprehensive  approach to safety across its operations, as a risk reduction plan requires,  is a substantially different task.
Moreover, this is the first time that FRA has overseen risk management at  the system level. Other agencies involved in transportation safety,  including the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration  (PHMSA) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), have utilized  risk management approaches, in addition to standard compliance-based  inspections, to enforce their safety rules and regulations. For example,  prior to 2003, PHMSA traditionally performed its oversight role using  safety standards that all operators must meet. However, PHMSA’s gas  integrity management program is designed to improve pipeline safety by  supplementing standard safety requirements with risk-based  management principles, including performance indicators to measure  progress. To implement the gas integrity management program, PHMSA  had to develop both specialized training for its safety inspectors and a  workforce plan that identified the resources and expertise it needed. Our  past review of this program concluded that the gas integrity management  program enhanced pipeline safety. Similarly, FAA is currently  undertaking a broader risk-management approach called Safety  Management Systems (SMS). SMS is designed to address cultural and  organizational problems that lead to safety hazards, identifying system- wide trends in aviation safety, and managing the hazards before they  result in accidents. Our past review of FAA’s implementation of SMS  noted that FAA needed to acquire skills not currently found in its  workforce to implement this change.
FRA anticipates that oversight of risk reduction plans will increase the  agency’s workload and require the addition of a new safety discipline, as  the task of reviewing and approving the plans is significantly different than  conducting safety inspections in the five traditional disciplines. To review  and approve the risk reduction plans, FRA has hired three staff with  experience in this safety approach and requested funding to hire an  additional 10 risk-management specialists in its fiscal year 2014 budget  submission. FRA officials stated that these specialists will both review  railroad risk reduction plans and audit, in a broader sense, plans, data  and other performance indicators generally without requiring an onsite  presence at a railroad. Risk-management specialists will need to be able  to identify systemic issues such as a need for training, as well as  understand specific technical problems, and to serve as leaders of teams  that will include relevant discipline inspectors or specialists.
section_title: FRA Faces Challenges to Rail Safety Oversight, and Lack of a Strategic Human Capital Plan Hampers Its Ability to Respond to These Challenges
paragraphs: FRA faces several ongoing and emerging challenges to its rail-safety  oversight framework. These challenges include how FRA will: respond to  highway-rail grade crossing and trespasser fatalities; accommodate  adverse weather conditions; adjust its resources to industry changes like  increasing rail traffic flows; adapt to the new safety implications posed by  technology changes in the railroad industry, such as Positive Train  Control (PTC); implement its new comprehensive safety risk reduction  program; and ensure it has enough inspectors to fulfill its current and  future oversight workload. While FRA has developed long-term rail safety  goals, FRA’s ability to meet those goals and to respond to these  challenges is hampered by its lack of strategic human capital planning. A  strategic human capital plan would help define how FRA will ensure that  its workforce will have the skills and the resources to meet these  challenges. Without a human capital plan, FRA may not have trained,  qualified workforce of inspectors and specialists in place to carry out its  current inspections or to oversee the railroad industry’s implementation of  PTC or comprehensive safety risk reduction plans.
subsections: section_title: FRA Faces Several Ongoing Safety Challenges
subsections: section_title: Highway-rail Grade Crossing and Trespasser Fatalities
paragraphs: Highway-rail grade crossing collisions and trespasser fatalities are  ongoing problems currently handled outside of FRA’s compliance-based  rail-safety oversight framework. Addressing highway-rail grade crossing  collisions involves a variety of railroad and non-railroad actors, such as  state highway departments, local governments, and the general public. In  addition, the Rail-Highway Crossing Program administered by the Federal  Highway Administration (FHWA) grants funds for highway-rail crossing  safety improvements. States determine what improvements need to be  made at highway-rail grade crossings, and typically use the federal  program to pay railroads to make the planned improvements. About 48  percent of public highway-rail grade crossings are equipped with active  warning devices, such as flashing lights and gates. Rail safety  stakeholders such as railroad and FRA officials stated that the current  level of funding is inadequate to address the magnitude of the problem;  however, FHWA officials noted that the level of funding is high per fatality  compared with other types of auto fatalities, which account for many more  deaths per year.
According to rail safety advocates, educating the public, enforcing traffic  laws, and developing engineering improvements at highway-rail grade  crossings are the three key elements of improving highway-rail grade  crossing safety. As such, FRA employs railroad highway-rail grade  crossing managers in each region who work with local communities to try  to resolve highway-rail grade crossing issues. These managers do not  perform railroad inspections, but rather perform a wide range of tasks  including interacting directly with elected officials and the public on the  topic of highway-rail grade crossing safety, establishing “quiet zones”,  and closing highway-rail grade crossings. Officials from FRA, the  railroads, and Operation Lifesaver emphasized the importance of  educating the public about highway-rail grade crossing safety and closing  crossings wherever possible. The railroads have made progress in recent  years in reducing the total number of highway-rail grade crossings, and  railroads may provide funds to local communities if they close or  consolidate highway-rail grade crossings. For example, one Class I  railroad we interviewed cited a program through which it offers  communities up to $10,000 if the community will close the highway-rail  grade crossing. FRA regional and railroad officials noted how difficult it  can be to get a community to close a highway-rail grade crossing due to  the local residents’ interest in maintaining convenient access to the  community or because closing a highway-rail grade crossing could  increase the amount of time it takes for emergency response personnel to  reach someone in need. As of 2012, there were 210,621 public and  private at-grade crossings, about 36,000 fewer than in 2003.
In addition to highway-rail grade crossing concerns, trespasser fatalities  remain an on-going challenge for railroads. The rates of trespasser  fatalities have seen little improvement in recent years. The sheer amount  of railroad track throughout the United States makes preventing  trespassers difficult to address, and railroad officials noted that  trespassing cannot be easily predicted or controlled. In some cases these  events are suicides, which are particularly difficult to control. Officials we  interviewed at one railroad said they have tried posting suicide hotline  information in potential hot spots in the hope that they might, at the last  moment, help deter the victim.
While progress in the area of trespasser fatalities has been slow, some  noteworthy efforts are being made. Amtrak officials said that they recently  conducted a mapping analysis to try to determine trespasser hot spots,  and in doing so discovered the worst problem locations; Amtrak now  hopes to develop ways to address the problems in these places. In  addition, the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center is conducting  a study of trespasser problems in West Palm Beach, Florida.
Railroads also face a variety of ongoing adverse weather conditions that  affect safety for railroad crews, passengers, and the communities they  serve and run through. Extreme heat or cold, floods, tornadoes, wildfires  and hurricanes can affect rail operations and infrastructure. For example,  during periods of extreme heat, railroad tracks (especially newer  “continuously-welded” railroad tracks) can expand out of alignment  without warning causing train derailments. During periods of extreme  cold, tracks may contract causing the rails to break as well. To counter  these threats, FRA has certain regulations related to weather conditions,  such as standards related to bridge safety and track safety, when adverse  weather events such as fires, floods, and extreme heat conditions could  affect the rail infrastructure. Railroads we spoke with have also   established procedures for weather-related risks, including very specific  operating practices to be followed during or prior to these adverse  weather events. For example, railroads we interviewed commonly reduce  speeds during periods of extreme heat or cold to avoid derailments due to  track misalignment or broken rails (see fig. 5 below for examples of the  effects of adverse weather on railroad track). FRA has worked with the  railroad industry through the RSAC process to determine what measures  need to be taken to prevent the effects of adverse weather on continuous  welded rails.
FRA faces an emerging challenge in dealing with expected increases in  freight rail traffic. FRA has estimated that the amount of freight shipped in  the United States would increase by 1.1 billion tons (about 9 percent)  across all modes from 2010 to 2020, with about 176 million tons of the  increased amount shipped by rail. According to the Association of  American Railroads, this includes the rapid increase in freight rail traffic  related to energy production, both in the transport of materials such as  sand for use in hydraulic fracturing and the shipment of crude oil from oil  fields. For example, crude oil shipments by rail increased from 9,500  carloads in 2009 to almost 234,000 carloads in 2012. These oil fields  have rapidly developed in different areas across the country (such as  North Dakota, west Texas, eastern Ohio, and western Pennsylvania). As  the recent accident at Lac Mégantic, Quebec, has shown, movement of  hazardous materials, such as petroleum products, also involves the  potential for severe accidents. Increases in freight rail volumes and  shipment patterns, including the possible impact of the Panama Canal’s  widening in 2014, could result in shifts in railroad operations, which would  increase the need for FRA safety personnel in locations where they may  not currently be positioned. However, as previously discussed, FRA’s  staffing process may not be flexible enough to respond quickly to such  shifts. For example, FRA’s tools for allocating its inspector resources rely  on past accident data and inspection points. Although the data and  models are updated periodically, it can take some time for the models’  results (i.e., the inspection and staff allocation targets) to reflect new  railroad infrastructure or shifting freight traffic. In addition, as previously  discussed, FRA headquarters and regional officials stated it can take  between 4 to 6 months and up to 4 years to get new inspectors hired,  trained, and qualified to conduct inspections on their own.
In response to the rapid increase in rail traffic due to increased energy  production, FRA headquarters officials have made a few temporary  adjustments to respond to changes in traffic flows in some areas. For  example, FRA responded to changes resulting from the development of  the oil fields in North Dakota, where FRA did not have many inspectors,  by reallocating an inspector position from inside the region, now assigned  to Montana and North Dakota due to a recent vacancy. FRA regional  officials said that it can be challenging to hire qualified inspectors for  these affected areas or permanently relocate qualified inspectors there,  but they do not see a need to reallocate any additional resources at this  time.
Positive Train Control (PTC)
PTC is a significant technological change for the railroads and represents  a groundbreaking new technology, unlike other aspects of railroad  technology and operations. As we have previously reported, PTC is a  communications-based system designed to prevent certain types of rail  accidents caused by human factors, such as train-to-train collisions.
PTC technology can automatically slow or stop a train that is not being  operated safely due to some types of operator errors or a switch left in the  wrong position. Further, PTC implementation is a complex and costly  endeavor that touches almost every part of major rail lines and almost  every aspect of their train operations. According to FRA, railroads  required to implement PTC must do so on over 60,000 miles of track  nationwide. In addition, FRA has reported that railroads must design,  produce, and install more than 20 major PTC components, such as data  radios for locomotive communication, locomotive management  computers, and back office servers as part of the PTC implementation.  When deployed, PTC systems will include hardware and software  applications inside locomotives, stationary wayside detection devices and  in centralized control facilities that will cut across the silos of FRA’s  traditional rail safety disciplines. Given the recent development of PTC,  according to both FRA and railroad officials, there is not a large pool of  expertise either inside or outside of FRA with extensive background in the  operation of PTC systems.
FRA officials want to hire additional staff to oversee the certification and  testing of PTC systems and believe that they will need more specialists in  PTC to do so. While FRA has determined that these specialists will be a  new discipline that will fall outside of FRA’s traditional compliance-based  inspection rail safety oversight framework, FRA has not yet determined  how many PTC specialists it will need or how they will be trained to  oversee the new technology. FRA officials stated that they are looking to  expand the agency’s typical hiring pool to find specialists with the  required expertise to oversee how PTC systems will be developed,  tested, and maintained. However, FRA officials also stated that to date,  they have had little success competing with railroads and railroad  suppliers to hire specialists.
FRA is currently facing some difficulty in recruiting, training, and certifying  qualified inspectors in a timely manner. FRA’s need to find an inspector  for a certain discipline in specific geographic regions and to hire new PTC  and safety risk reduction specialists can have an effect on FRA’s ability to  have certified inspectors where they are most needed. FRA regional  administrators told us they were dissatisfied with the hiring process, which  they perceive as slow and cumbersome and which can lengthen the time  required to get a new inspector qualified to begin inspections. The speed  of the hiring process is important since FRA officials estimate that 150  inspectors (about 30 percent of the current field safety workforce) will be  eligible to retire over the next 5 years. FRA also competes with the  railroad industry to hire qualified inspector candidates for their existing  disciplines as well as PTC and safety risk reduction specialists. FRA  headquarters officials stated that they were confident that they could  recruit replacements and that not all inspectors may retire immediately  when they are eligible. FRA headquarters officials stated that they have  also hired some PTC and comprehensive rail safety risk reduction  specialists; however, as these areas are new to FRA and FRA’s oversight  framework for them has not yet been fully implemented, FRA officials did  not know how many more PTC or safety risk reduction specialists they  will need to hire for these areas.
In addition to recruiting and certifying their inspectors and specialists,  FRA must determine how to keep its growing and highly specialized  workforce trained. Implementation of PTC will require extensive training of  the FRA specialists responsible for its oversight, both initially as it is being  developed and over time as the system is tested, implemented, and  improved. Safety risk reduction specialists may also need ongoing  training to keep up with new developments or standards in their field. FRA  headquarters officials stated that they do not have a formal training plan  that addresses the training needs for FRA’s anticipated new rail safety  oversight responsibilities, such as PTC or safety risk reduction plans. In  addition, FRA regional administrators also expressed concern about both  continuing “refresher” training and training for their current inspectors  regarding new technologies, especially for PTC. Officials from six of the  Class I railroads we spoke with said that FRA is slow to adapt to  advances in railroad safety technology. For example, one Class I railroad  safety official stated that FRA’s inspectors largely inspected specific  devices using visual observations in a straightforward, pass or fail  inspection process. However, new technologies such as PTC are not as  straightforward to inspect because PTC consists mainly of software, not  physical components. Several FRA regional administrators and  inspectors we spoke with stated that their access to training opportunities  has been reduced in recent years due to budget constraints and that the  lack of training opportunities has affected their ability to learn about and  familiarize themselves with new safety technologies.
As stated above, certain railroads were mandated by RSIA to develop  comprehensive safety risk reduction plans. According to FRA officials,  this new approach to improving railroad safety will require FRA and the  railroads to identify systemic safety issues as well as understand specific  technical problems. The safety risk reduction plans will include a  comprehensive process for the application of criteria and techniques to  optimize safety that should help railroads to manage risk, and develop  proactive hazard management methods that would improve safety.
According to FRA officials, once guidelines for risk reduction plans are  developed, the railroads will draft the plans and submit them to FRA for  approval. FRA officials stated that instead of using compliance-based  inspections to ensure that railroads are following any FRA rules and  regulations regarding risk reduction plans, FRA specialists will lead a  team of FRA inspectors and specialists to audit a railroad’s compliance  against its own plan. In addition, the officials noted that because  comprehensive system safety is a new approach to safety, FRA’s current  inspector workforce does not have the skill set to conduct comprehensive  audits. Although FRA has started hiring some new specialists who are  trained in risk reduction to complete these audits, the agency has not  determined how many railroads will be required to develop risk reduction  plans, how audits of the plans will be conducted, or how the results of the  audits will be used. FRA officials noted that the agency cannot make  many of these determinations until the final rulemaking is completed.
section_title: FRA’s Rail Safety Strategy Lacks a Strategic Human Capital Plan to Meet Rail- Safety Oversight Challenges
paragraphs: While FRA officials told us that they have addressed their hiring needs  through their existing process and have been able to hire some PTC and  safety risk reduction specialists, the agency has no formal plans to  strategically address its human capital challenges. RSIA required FRA to  create a long-term strategy setting out goals to improve railroad safety  along with an annual plan that would include, among other things,  estimates of the staff resources and training needs that are necessary to  achieve those goals. Pursuant to this requirement, FRA has created a  long-term safety strategy and included an annual plan in its annual  budget request to Congress. While FRA’s safety strategy includes rail  safety goals such as reduced accident rates from 2014 through 2018, it  does not include estimates of staff resources or training needed to  achieve the safety goals for those years. The fiscal year 2014 version of  the strategy states that the resources needed to meet the goals in the  strategy are contained in the fiscal year 2014 budget request. However,  the budget request does not include an estimate of resources or training  needed beyond fiscal year 2014, critical years in which FRA will have to  incorporate PTC and risk reduction plans into its current rail safety  framework. In addition, as mentioned above, all of FRA’s regional  administrators told us that they see limitations in the process that FRA  uses to determine staffing allocations and that FRA’s current staffing  model may not be flexible enough to provide the appropriate inspection  needs in their regions. FRA officials stated that they are addressing their  human capital needs through multiple avenues including rotational  programs, knowledge transfers between departing and new employees,  annual training opportunities, and monitoring staffing levels for mission- critical occupations for their annual budget requests. However, these  efforts are not coordinated and integrated into a multi-year strategic  human capital plan.
Moreover, FRA officials stated that while they have estimated projections  for how many inspectors they may need for the next fiscal year, due to  uncertainty around their annual budget, and how PTC and safety risk  reduction plans will be implemented, they do not have a formal process to  determine staffing needs and reassess their human capital needs year by  year. In addition, FRA officials do not know how they will integrate new  rail safety approaches, such as implementing risk reduction plans and  PTC, into their current rail safety oversight framework.
We have reported that federal agencies need to determine the  occupations, skills, and competencies critical to achieving their missions  and goals, as well as to identify any gaps between their current workforce  and the workforce they will need in the future. In addition, strategic human  capital management is on our High Risk List. We have found that  widespread lack of attention to strategic human capital management in  the past has created a fundamental weakness in the federal  government’s ability to perform its missions economically, efficiently, and  effectively. To address this issue, we have determined that successful  strategic human capital plans should:  1.  involve top management, employees, and other stakeholders in  developing, communicating, and implementing the strategic workforce  plan;  2.  determine the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to  achieve current and future programmatic results;  3.  develop strategies that are tailored to address gaps in number,  deployment, and alignment of human capital approaches for enabling  and sustaining the contributions of all critical skills and competencies;  4.  build the capability needed to address administrative, educational,  and other requirements important to support workforce strategies; and  5.  monitor and evaluate the agency’s progress toward its human capital  goals and the contribution that human capital results have made  toward achieving programmatic goals.
Without a comprehensive strategic human capital plan, FRA management  may be unable to appropriately determine the number of inspectors and  specialists FRA needs to meet the ongoing and future challenges to its  rail safety oversight mission and achieve its strategic rail safety goals.  Such a plan could also help FRA management identify industry trends,  projected retirements, skill gaps, and training needs. Without a  comprehensive strategic plan, FRA may also not have the ability to make  well-informed decisions about how to best meet the challenges to its rail  safety oversight mission now and in the future. FRA also risks not having  enough inspectors with the right skill set in the right locations across the  country to achieve rail safety goals. In addition, FRA may not have  enough specialists to oversee the rail industry’s implementation of both  PTC and railroad safety risk reduction plans.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: FRA faces several current and evolving challenges to its rail-safety  oversight mission. In addition to being a relatively small agency compared  to the industry it oversees, recent legislation has expanded its  responsibilities at the same time as federal budgets have been  constrained. In particular, RSIA mandated that FRA implement a risk  reduction program—an effort that incorporates a more comprehensive  risk-based approach to safety and represents a significant procedural and  cultural change for FRA and the railroad industry. FRA has slowly taken  steps to implement the risk reduction program, but the agency missed the  mandated October 2012 deadline requiring certain railroads to develop  and implement risk reduction plans. While the agency expects to  complete the regulations in 2015, FRA has not developed a detailed  strategy to manage the oversight of this effort to avoid further delays in  issuing the regulations and to ensure the timely evaluation and approval  of the railroads’ risk reduction plans when they are developed.
In addition, FRA must compete with the railroad industry for qualified  inspectors to support the FRA’s existing rail safety oversight framework  as well as for new safety specialists to oversee railroads’ implementation  of their safety risk reduction plans and new PTC systems. While FRA has  long-term rail safety goals, it does not have a corresponding human  capital strategy that lays out: 1) the resources it needs to achieve those  goals, 2) how it will meet its current limitations to its staffing process, 3)  how to maintain the existing workforce in numbers or training, 4) how it  will meet its new PTC requirements and safety risk reduction plan  initiative, or 5) meet future changes in freight flows. The uncertainty FRA  faces regarding its future budgets in light of these human capital  challenges underscores the need for FRA to focus and plan how it will  recruit, train, deploy and retain its workforce to meet these challenges.
Without a plan, FRA risks not having a skilled and trained workforce,  deployed in the right technical domains, to meet present and future  challenges to the FRA’s rail-safety oversight framework, especially to  oversee the railroad industry’s implementation of positive train control and  comprehensive rail safety risk reduction plans. Although a strategic  human capital plan does not guarantee FRA the resources it may need to  meet these challenges, it could help FRA better align its strategic rail- safety goals and objectives with its limited resources to meet these  human capital challenges. In addition, such a plan would demonstrate to  internal and external stakeholders how FRA officials could proactively  meet these challenges and define FRA’s rationale for those decisions,  providing greater assurance that FRA officials are prioritizing resources to  mitigate the largest rail-safety oversight risks and better prevent rail  accidents.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that the Federal Railroad Administration timely and  effectively implements oversight of railroad risk reduction programs,  manages its limited resources, and accounts for the evolving rail safety  environment, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct  the Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration to:  (1) develop an implementation plan for oversight of risk reduction  programs for passenger and freight railroads, including interim milestones  for finalizing its rulemaking and milestones for the review and approval of  the plans; and  (2) develop a strategic human capital plan that identifies and prioritizes  FRA’s human capital needs and links them to FRA’s strategic goals and  objectives. This plan should include specific approaches for how FRA will  recruit, train, and retain both its current inspectors as well as its new  workforce of PTC and safety risk management specialists.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation for  review and comment. In an email response, DOT reiterated its  commitment to continuous rail safety improvement and stated that GAO’s  review of FRA’s railroad safety oversight program had provided useful  findings and recommendations for improving the program. DOT agreed to  consider our recommendations and also provided technical comments  that we incorporated as appropriate.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)  512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of   Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report assesses the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA)  approach to railroad safety oversight as well as ongoing and emerging  issues affecting rail safety oversight. We addressed the following  objectives: 1) What is the overall framework that FRA, the states, and the  railroads use to ensure safety of railroad operations and infrastructure? 2)  To what extent do FRA and the railroads assess safety risks and allocate  resources to address those risks? 3) What are the challenges to FRA’s  current safety framework, and what are the ongoing and emerging issues  FRA faces in railroad safety oversight?
To address all objectives, we reviewed documentation from FRA  including applicable laws and regulations. We interviewed FRA  headquarters and region officials including administrators and specialists  for each railroad safety discipline, and state rail safety officials as well as  representatives from all Class I and selected Class II and III railroads, rail  labor organizations, and representatives from selected industry  stakeholders. We also reviewed and analyzed reportable accident and  incident data from 2003 through 2012 obtained from the FRA’s Railroad  Accident and Incident Reporting System (RAIRS) database. We  conducted a data reliability assessment of the RAIRS database by  interviewing knowledgeable agency officials, reviewing data and  documents, and conducting electronic testing of the data. We determined  that the data were complete, reasonable, and sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report. These data were used to obtain current and  historical descriptive statistics on train accidents across the nation and to  make high-level comparisons about railroad safety across regions,  classes of railroads, and primary causes of accidents, including accidents  related to highway-rail grade crossings and weather.
To determine the overall railroad safety framework that FRA, the states,  and the railroads use to ensure safety of railroad operations and  infrastructure, we examined applicable laws and regulations including the  Rail Safety Improvement Act (RSIA) of 2008, FRA guidance, and other  documentation, including a recent Department of Transportation Inspector  General report and prior GAO reports describing the oversight  mechanisms that FRA uses to ensure railroad safety. We conducted site  visits to three of FRA’s eight regions, including Atlanta, Georgia (Region  3), Chicago, Illinois (Region 4), and Fort Worth, Texas (Region 5). These  regions together accounted for over 50 percent of all train accidents that  occurred from 2003 through 2012. We selected these regions using  criteria that included the number and mix of Class I, II and III railroads  operating in the region, the highest number of reportable train accidents  during the last 10 years in each region, including highway-rail grade  crossing accidents as determined by our analyses of FRA accident data,  and the extent to which the region had state safety inspectors. We also  used FRA accident and incident data to identify the four FRA regions with  the highest number of reportable train accidents for Class II and Class III  railroads from 2003 through 2012. Within these four regions (Regions 1,  3, 4, 5), we selected a non-probability sample of 11 different Class II and  Class III railroads to learn their perspectives about federal and state  railroad-safety oversight including the extent of federal and state  coordination and the frequency of inspections at their railroads. We  interviewed eight FRA regional administrators and 15 FRA safety  specialists, the FRA State Program Manager and five state railroad-safety  program managers in California, Florida, Illinois, and Texas to understand  their railroad safety framework and programs and the extent that FRA and  state safety officials coordinate with each other to oversee railroad safety.  We also interviewed operations and safety representatives from all seven  Class I railroads, three Class II railroads, eight Class III railroads, and two  railroad holding companies that own over 100 Class III railroads to  understand their railroad safety framework and programs, including how  railroads conduct their own inspections and oversight to ensure railroad  safety. The results of the interviews in the selected FRA regions, states,  and railroads are not generalizable to all the FRA regions, participating  states, or across all Class II and III railroads.
To determine the extent to which FRA and the railroads assess safety  risks and allocate their resources to address those risks, we reviewed  FRA documentation on the NIP process and the SAM model and  interviewed FRA Office of Safety Analysis officials as well as all FRA  regional administrators and FRA regional specialists in FRA Regions 3, 4  and 5. We used standard economic and statistical principles as criteria to  assess the general reasonableness of the approach and assumptions  used in FRA’s Staff Allocation Model and its National Inspection Plan  model. We reviewed FRA’s approach for ensuring the reliability of the  data used in the NIP process and SAM model. In addition, we interviewed  all eight FRA regional administrators and FRA Regions 3, 4, and 5 safety  specialists to discuss the usefulness of the NIP process and models and  other tools that track inspector activity and allocate resources based on  risk. We also obtained information on the status of FRA’s implementation  of its rulemaking regarding railroads’ Risk Reduction Plans, as required  by RSIA. We interviewed representatives from all seven Class I railroads  about how they managed their safety risks, allocated inspection and other  resources based on risk, and responded to changes in safety risks. We  also interviewed officials at selected Class II and III railroads as well as  rail labor organizations and other industry associations to understand  their safety challenges and how they managed their risks.
To identify challenges in safety oversight and emerging safety issues that  FRA and railroads face, we interviewed FRA headquarters officials about  changes in safety risks and FRA’s plans to respond to those changes. We  interviewed all FRA regional administrators and FRA Region 3, 4, and 5  specialists for each rail safety discipline. We also interviewed state  railroad safety program managers in California, Florida, Illinois, and  Texas and representatives from all seven Class I railroads, selected  Class II and III railroads, and seven rail labor organizations about  emerging safety issues and challenges posed by adverse weather and  new railroad technologies. We also discussed with these groups ongoing  issues related to highway-rail grade crossing safety. In addition, we  observed railroad operating and safety practices, as well as railroad  equipment and procedures used to ensure safety. Further, we were  provided a tour of selected Class I and II training centers and the types of  training provided to railroad employees, such as how simulators were  being used to ensure safety. We also interviewed rail labor organization  and railroad officials at selected Class II and III railroads to understand  emerging safety risks and challenges at smaller railroads. Finally, we  interviewed and obtained documentation from FRA headquarters officials  on their initiatives to meet human capital requirements, such as hiring  specialists and providing training to meet the emerging challenges and  changes in the railroad industry.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2012 to November  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Organizations Interviewed
paragraphs: We met with or contacted the following organizations in order to obtain a  better understanding of railroad safety issues and obtain their  perspectives on FRA’s oversight approach.
section_title: Other federal agencies:
paragraphs: Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
section_title: Freight railroads (Class I):
paragraphs: Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF)  Canadian National Railway (CN)  Canadian Pacific Railway (CP)  CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX)  Kansas City Southern Railway (KCS)  Norfolk Southern Railway Company (NS)  Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP)
section_title: Passenger railroads:
paragraphs: National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)  Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Rail Corporation (Metra)
section_title: Regional and short line (Class II and Class III) railroads:
section_title: Holding companies:
section_title: Industry associations:
section_title: Rail labor organizations:
paragraphs: American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA)  Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET)  Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Division of the  International Brotherhood of Teamsters (BMWE)  Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS)  International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation  Workers (SMART)  International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW)  Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO (TTD)
section_title: State oversight organizations:
section_title: Safety association:
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, other key contributors to this  report were Susan Zimmerman (Assistant Director), Melissa Bodeau,  Richard D. Brown, Aisha Cabrer, Robert Ciszewski, Tim Guinane, Greg  Hanna, Rick Jorgenson, Sara Ann Moessbauer, Joshua Ormond, and  Crystal Wesco.