Border Security: DHS Could Strengthen Efforts to Establish Collaborative Mechanisms and Assess Use of Resources
Published: 2017-04-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Securing U.S. borders is the responsibility of DHS, in collaboration with other federal, state, local, and tribal entities. Within DHS, CBP is the lead agency for border security and is responsible for, among other things, keeping terrorists and their weapons, criminals and their contraband, and inadmissible aliens out of the country. In recent years, GAO has reported on a variety of DHS collaborative mechanisms and efforts to assess its use of border security resources.
This statement addresses (1) DHS's efforts to implement collaborative mechanisms along the southwest border and (2) DHS's efforts to assess its use of resources and programs to secure the southwest border. This statement is based on GAO reports and testimonies issued from September 2013 through February 2017 that examined DHS efforts to enhance border security and assess the effectiveness of its border security operations. GAO's reports and testimonies incorporated information GAO obtained by examining DHS collaborative mechanisms, reviewing CBP policies and procedures for coordinating use of assets, analyzing DHS data related to enforcement programs, and interviewing relevant DHS officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have implemented various mechanisms along the southern U.S. border to coordinate security operations, but could strengthen coordination of Predator B unmanned aerial system (UAS) operations to conduct border security efforts. In September 2013, GAO reported that DHS and CBP used collaborative mechanisms along the southwest border—including interagency Border Enforcement Security Task Forces and Regional Coordinating Mechanisms—to coordinate information sharing, target and prioritize resources, and leverage assets. GAO interviewed participants from the various mechanisms who provided perspective on successful collaboration, such as establishing positive working relationships, sharing resources, and sharing information. Participants also identified barriers, such as resource constraints, rotation of key personnel, and lack of leadership buy-in. GAO recommended that DHS take steps to improve its visibility over field collaborative mechanisms. DHS concurred and collected data related to the mechanisms' operations. Further, as GAO reported in June 2014, officials involved with mechanisms along the southwest border cited limited resource commitments by participating agencies and a lack of common objectives. Among other things, GAO recommended that DHS establish written interagency agreements with mechanism partners, and DHS concurred. Lastly, in February 2017, GAO reported that DHS and CBP had established mechanisms to coordinate Predator B UAS operations but could better document their coordination procedures. GAO made recommendations for DHS and CBP to improve coordination of UAS operations, and DHS concurred.
GAO recently reported that DHS and CBP could strengthen efforts to assess their use of resources and programs to secure the southwest border. For example, in February 2017, GAO reported that CBP does not record mission data consistently across all operational centers for its Predator B UAS, limiting CBP's ability to assess program effectiveness. In addition, CBP has not updated its guidance for collecting and recording mission information in its data collection system since 2014. Updating guidance consistent with internal control standards would help CBP better ensure the quality of data it uses to assess effectiveness. In January 2017, GAO found that methodological weaknesses limit the usefulness for assessing the effectiveness of CBP's Border Patrol Consequence Delivery System. Specifically, Border Patrol's methodology for calculating recidivism—the percent of aliens apprehended multiple times along the southwest border within a fiscal year—does not account for an alien's apprehension history over multiple years. Border Patrol could strengthen the methodology for calculating recidivism by using an alien's apprehension history beyond one fiscal year. Finally, CBP has not developed metrics that systematically use the data it collects to assess the contributions of its pedestrian and vehicle border fencing to its mission. Developing metrics to assess the contributions of fencing to border security operations could better position CBP to make resource allocation decisions with the best information available to inform competing mission priorities and investments. GAO made recommendations to DHS and CBP to update guidance, strengthen its recidivism calculation methodology, and develop metrics, and DHS generally concurred.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO has previously made numerous recommendations to DHS to improve the function of collaborative mechanisms and use of resources for border security, and DHS has generally agreed. DHS has taken actions or described planned actions to address the recommendations, which GAO will continue to monitor.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Homeland  Security’s (DHS) efforts to coordinate and assess its border security  operations. Securing U.S. borders is the responsibility of DHS, in  collaboration with other federal, state, local, and tribal entities. Within  DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the lead agency for  border security and is responsible for, among other things, keeping  terrorists and their weapons, criminals and their contraband, and  inadmissible aliens out of the country. The United States international  border with Mexico (southwest border) continues to be vulnerable to  illegal cross-border, and DHS reported apprehending over 331,000 illegal  entrants and making over 14,000 seizures of drugs in fiscal year 2015.
Over time, DHS and CBP have established various collaborative  mechanisms along the southern U.S. border, including the southwest  border and southern maritime approaches, to integrate CBP operations  and improve interagency coordination. For example, CBP, U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Coast Guard (Coast  Guard), and other stakeholders have partnered to form multiple joint task  forces. To further support collaboration, DHS and CBP coordinate use of  resources, including a variety of technology and assets such as aircraft.  For example, CBP’s Air and Marine Operations (AMO) uses Predator B  unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and other aircraft equipped with video  and radar surveillance technology along the southwest border to conduct  border security efforts, in part, through coordination with joint task forces.
GAO has identified best practices for implementing interagency  collaboration—broadly defined as any joint activity that is intended to  produce more public value than could be produced when agencies act  alone. Among other things, these best practices note that agencies can  enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts by developing  mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results. In addition, we  found that all collaborative mechanisms benefit from certain key features,  such as implementing processes to track and monitor progress toward  short-term and long-term outcomes. With regard to assessing its progress  and efforts to secure the border, CBP components collect a variety of  data on their use of resources and programs. For example, CBP’s U.S.  Border Patrol (Border Patrol) collects data that support efforts to address  smuggling and other illegal cross-border activity along the U.S. southwest  border through its Consequence Delivery System (CDS) program—a  process to classify each apprehended alien into criminal or noncriminal  categories and apply various criminal, administrative, and programmatic  consequences, such as federal prosecution, most likely to deter future  illegal activity. In addition, Border Patrol collects a variety of data on its  apprehension of aliens and seizures of narcotics along the southwest  border and on use of resources such as tactical infrastructure—fencing,  gates, roads, bridges, lighting, and drainage—and surveillance  technology, such as towers equipped with video cameras and radar  technology. AMO also collects data on its use of air and maritime assets;  for example, seizures and apprehensions provided for by support from its  Predator B UAS and Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) program— fixed site unmanned buoyant craft tethered to the ground equipped with  radar technology.
Over the years, we have reported on the progress and challenges DHS  faces in implementing its border security efforts, including establishing  collaborative mechanisms and assessing the effectiveness of its use of  resources and programs along the border. My statement discusses our  past findings on (1) DHS’s efforts to implement collaborative mechanisms  along the southwest border and (2) DHS’s efforts to assess its use of  resources and programs to secure the southwest border.
My statement today is based on reports and testimonies we issued from  September 2013 through February 2017 that examined DHS efforts to  enhance border security and assess the effectiveness of its border  security operations (see Related GAO Products at the end of this  statement). Our reports and testimonies incorporated information we  obtained by examining DHS’s collaborative mechanisms established  along the southwest border; reviewing CBP policies and procedures for  coordinating use of assets; analyzing DHS data related to enforcement  program and asset assists or instances in which a technological asset  assisted in the apprehension of illegal entrants, seizure of drugs or other  contraband; and interviewing relevant DHS officials. In addition, since  2013, we assessed the extent to which DHS and CBP have implemented  recommendations by reviewing supporting documentation. More detailed  information about our scope and methodology can be found in our reports  and testimonies. We conducted all of this work in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: DHS and CBP Have Established Collaborative Mechanisms Along the Southwest Border, but Could Strengthen Coordination of Predator B UAS Operations
subsections: section_title: DHS and CBP Have Implemented a Variety of Collaborative Mechanisms to Coordinate Border Security Efforts
paragraphs: DHS and its components have used various mechanisms over time to  coordinate border security operations. In September 2013, we reported  that the overlap in geographic and operational boundaries among DHS  components underscored the importance of collaboration and  coordination among these components. To help address this issue and  mitigate operational inflexibility, DHS components, including those with  border security-related missions such as CBP, Coast Guard, and ICE,  employed a variety of collaborative mechanisms to coordinate their  missions and share information. These mechanisms had both similarities  and differences in how they were structured and on which missions or  threats they focused, among other things, but they all had the overarching  goal of increasing mission effectiveness and efficiencies. For example:  In 2011, the Joint Targeting Team originated as a CBP-led  partnership among the Del Rio area of Texas, including Border Patrol,  CBP’s Office of Field Operations, and ICE. This mechanism was  expanded to support the South Texas Campaign (STC) mission to  disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal organizations, and its  membership grew to include additional federal, state, local, tribal, and  international law enforcement agencies.
In 2005, the first Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST)  was organized and led by ICE, in partnership with CBP, in Laredo,  Texas, and additional units were subsequently formed along both the  southern and northern borders. The BESTs’ mission was to identify,  disrupt, and dismantle existing and emerging threats at U.S. land,  sea, and air borders.
In 2011, CBP, Coast Guard, and ICE established Regional  Coordinating Mechanisms (ReCoM) to utilize the fusion of  intelligence, planning, and operations to target the threat of  transnational terrorist and criminal acts along the coastal border.  Coast Guard served as the lead agency responsible for planning and  coordinating among DHS components.
In June 2014, we reported on STC border security efforts along with the  activities of two additional collaborative mechanisms: (1) the Joint Field  Command (JFC), which had operational control over all CBP resources in  Arizona; and (2) the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT),  which was a multiagency law enforcement partnership in Arizona. We  found that through these collaborative mechanisms, DHS and CBP had  coordinated border security efforts in information sharing, resource  targeting and prioritization, and leveraging of assets. For example, to  coordinate information sharing, the JFC maintained an operations  coordination center and clearinghouse for intelligence information.  Through the ACTT, interagency partners worked jointly to target  individuals and criminal organizations involved in illegal cross-border  activity. The STC leveraged assets of CBP components and interagency  partners by shifting resources to high-threat regions and conducting joint  operations.
More recently, the Secretary of Homeland Security initiated the Southern  Border and Approaches Campaign Plan in November 2014 to address  the region’s border security challenges by commissioning three DHS joint  task forces to, in part, enhance collaboration among DHS components,  including CBP, ICE, and Coast Guard. Two of DHS’s joint task forces are  geographically based, Joint Task Force – East and Joint Task Force –  West, and one which is functionally based, Joint Task Force –  Investigations. Joint Task Force – West is separated into geographic  command corridors with CBP as the lead agency responsible for  overseeing border security efforts to include: Arizona, California, New  Mexico/West Texas, and South Texas. Coast Guard is the lead agency  responsible for Joint Task Force – East, which is responsible for the  southern maritime and border approaches. ICE is the lead agency  responsible for Joint Task Force – Investigations, which focuses on  investigations in support of Joint Task Force – West and Joint Task Force  – East. Additionally, DHS has used these task forces to coordinate  various border security activities, such as use of Predator B UAS, as we  reported in February 2017 and discuss below.
section_title: Collaborative Mechanism Participants Identified Practices that Enhanced or Served as Challenges to Collaboration
paragraphs: In September 2013, we reported on successful collaborative practices  and challenges identified by participants from eight border security  collaborative field mechanisms we visited—the STC, four BESTs and 3  ReCoMs. Their perspectives were generally consistent with the seven  key issues to consider when implementing collaborative mechanisms that  we identified in our 2012 report on interagency collaboration. Among  participants who we interviewed, there was consensus that certain  practices facilitated more effective collaboration, which, according to  participants, contributed to the groups’ overall successes. For example,  participants identified three of the seven categories of practices as keys  to success: (1) positive working relationships/communication, (2) sharing  resources, and (3) sharing information. Specifically, in our interviews,  BEST officials stated that developing trust and building relationships  helped participants respond quickly to a crisis, and communicating  frequently helped participants eliminate duplication of efforts. Participants  from the STC, BESTs, and ReCoMs also reported that having positive  working relationships built on strong trust among participants was a key  factor in their law enforcement partnerships because of the sensitive  nature of law enforcement information, and the risks posed if it is not  protected appropriately. In turn, building positive working relationships  was facilitated by another collaborative factor identified as important by a  majority of participants: physical collocation of mechanism stakeholders.  Specifically, participants from the mechanisms focused on law  enforcement investigations, such as the STC and BESTs, reported that  being physically collocated with members from other agencies was  important for increasing the groups’ effectiveness.
Participants from the eight border security collaborative field mechanisms  we visited at the time also identified challenges or barriers that affected  their collaboration across components and made it more difficult.  Specifically, participants identified three barriers that most frequently  hindered effective collaboration within their mechanisms: (1) resource  constraints, (2) rotation of key personnel, and (3) lack of leadership buy- in. For example, when discussing resource issues, a majority of  participants said funding for their group’s operation was critical and  identified resource constraints as a challenge to sustaining their  collaborative efforts. These participants also reported that since none of  the mechanisms receive dedicated funding, the participating federal  agencies provided support for their respective representatives assigned  to the selected mechanisms. Also, there was a majority opinion among  mechanism participants we visited that rotation of key personnel and lack  of leadership buy-in hindered effective collaboration within their  mechanisms. For example, STC participants stated that the rotation of  key personnel hindered the STC’s ability to develop and retain more  seasoned personnel with expertise in investigations and surveillance  techniques.
In addition, in June 2014, we identified coordination benefits and  challenges related to the JFC, STC, and ACTT. For example, DHS and CBP leveraged the assets of CBP components and interagency partners  through these mechanisms to conduct a number of joint operations and  deploy increased resources to various border security efforts. In addition,  these mechanisms provided partner agencies with increased access to  specific resources, such as AMO air support and planning assistance for  operations. Officials involved with the JFC, STC, and ACTT also reported  collaboration challenges at that time. For example, officials from 11 of 12  partner agencies we interviewed reported coordination challenges related  to the STC and ACTT, such as limited resource commitments by  participating agencies and lack of common objectives. In particular, one  partner with the ACTT noted that there had been operations in which  partners did not follow through with the resources they had committed  during the planning stages. Further, JFC and STC officials cited the need  to improve the sharing of best practices across the various collaborative  mechanisms, and CBP officials we interviewed identified opportunities to  more fully assess how the mechanisms were structured. We  recommended that DHS establish written agreements for some of these  coordination mechanisms and a strategic-level oversight mechanism to  monitor interagency collaboration. DHS concurred and these  recommendations were closed as not implemented due to planned  changes in the collaborative mechanisms.
section_title: CBP Has Established Mechanisms to Coordinate Its Use of Predator B UAS, but Could Benefit from Documented Procedures for Coordinating its Predator B UAS Operations
paragraphs: In February 2017, we found that as part of using Predator B aircraft to  support other government agencies, CBP established various  mechanisms to coordinate Predator B operations. CBP’s Predator B  aircraft are national assets used primarily for detection and surveillance  during law enforcement operations, independently and in coordination  with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies throughout the  United States. For example, at AMO National Air Security Operations  Centers (NASOC) in Arizona, North Dakota, and Texas, personnel from  other CBP components are assigned to support and coordinate mission  activities involving Predator B operations. Border Patrol agents  assigned to support NASOCs assist with directing agents and resources  to support its law enforcement operations and collecting information on  asset assists provided for by Predator B operations. Further, two of  DHS’s joint task forces also help coordinate Predator B operations.  Specifically, Joint Task Force – West, Arizona and Joint Task Force –  West, South Texas coordinate air asset tasking and operations, including  Predator B operations, and assist in the transmission of requests for  Predator B support and communication with local field units during  operations, such as Border Patrol stations and AMO air branches.
In addition to these mechanisms, CBP has documented procedures for  coordinating Predator B operations among its supported or partner  agencies in Arizona specifically by developing a standard operating  procedure for coordination of Predator B operations through its NASOC in  Arizona. However, CBP has not documented procedures for coordination  of Predator B operations among its supported agencies through its  NASOCs in Texas and North Dakota. CBP has also established national  policies for its Predator B operations that include policies for prioritization  of Predator B missions and processes for submission and review of  Predator B mission or air support requests. However, these national  policies do not include coordination procedures specific to Predator B  operating locations or NASOCs. Without documenting its procedures for  coordination of Predator B operations with supported agencies, CBP does  not have reasonable assurance that practices at NASOCs in Texas and  North Dakota align with existing policies and procedures for joint  operations with other government agencies. Among other things, we  recommended that CBP develop and document procedures for Predator  B coordination among supported agencies in all operating locations. CBP  concurred with our recommendation and stated that it plans to develop  and implement an operations coordination structure and document its  coordination procedures for Predator B operations through Joint Task  Force – West, South Texas and document its coordination procedures for  Predator B operations through its NASOC in Grand Forks, North Dakota.
section_title: DHS and CBP Could Strengthen Efforts to Assess Use of Resources and Programs to Secure the Border
subsections: section_title: Border Patrol Could Benefit From Improving Its Methodology to Assess Effectiveness of its Consequence Delivery System Program
paragraphs: In January 2017, we reported that Border Patrol agents use the CDS to  classify each alien apprehended illegally crossing the border and then  apply one or more post-apprehension consequences determined to be  the most effective and efficient to discourage recidivism, that is, further  apprehensions for illegal cross-border activity. We found that Border  Patrol uses an annual recidivism rate to measure performance of the  CDS; however, methodological weaknesses limit the rate’s usefulness for  assessing CDS effectiveness. Specifically, Border Patrol’s methodology  for calculating recidivism—the percent of aliens apprehended multiple  times along the southwest border within a fiscal year—does not account  for an alien’s apprehension history over multiple years. In addition, Border  Patrol’s calculation neither accounts for nor excludes apprehended aliens  for whom there is no ICE record of removal from the United States. Our  analysis of Border Patrol and ICE data showed that when calculating the  recidivism rate for fiscal years 2014 and 2015, Border Patrol included in  the total number of aliens apprehended, tens of thousands of aliens for  whom ICE did not have a record of removal after apprehension and who  may have remained in the United States without an opportunity to  recidivate. Specifically, our analysis of ICE enforcement and removal data  showed that about 38 percent of the aliens Border Patrol apprehended  along the southwest border in fiscal years 2014 and 2015 may have  remained in the United States as of May 2016.
To better inform the effectiveness of CDS implementation and border  security efforts, we recommended that, among other things, (1) Border  Patrol strengthen the methodology for calculating recidivism, such as by  using an alien’s apprehension history beyond one fiscal year and  excluding aliens for whom there is no record of removal; and (2) the  Assistant Secretary of ICE and Commissioner of CBP collaborate on  sharing immigration enforcement and removal data to help Border Patrol  account for the removal status of apprehended aliens in its recidivism rate  measure. CBP did not concur with our first recommendation and stated  that CDS uses annual recidivism rate calculations to measure annual  change, which is not intended to be, or used, as a performance measure  for CDS, and that Border Patrol annually reevaluates the CDS to ensure  that the methodology for calculating recidivism provides the most effective  and efficient post apprehension outcomes. We continue to believe that  Border Patrol should strengthen its methodology for calculating  recidivism, as the recidivism rate is used as a performance measure by  Border Patrol and DHS. DHS concurred with our second  recommendation, but stated that collecting and analyzing ICE removal  and enforcement data would not be advantageous to Border Patrol for  CDS purposes since CDS is specific to Border Patrol. However, DHS also  stated that Border Patrol and ICE have discussed the availability of the  removal and enforcement data and ICE has agreed to provide Border  Patrol with these data, if needed. DHS requested that we consider this  recommendation resolved and closed. While DHS’s planned actions are a  positive step toward addressing our recommendation, DHS needs to  provide documentation of completion of these actions for us to consider  the recommendation closed as implemented.
section_title: CBP Collects Data that Could be Useful in Assessing How Border Fencing Contributes to Border Security Operations but Needs Metrics to Assess the Contribution to Its Mission
paragraphs: In February 2017, we reported on CBP’s efforts to secure the border  between U.S. ports of entry using tactical infrastructure, including fencing,  gates, roads, bridges, lighting, and drainage. For example, border  fencing is intended to benefit border security operations in various ways,  according to Border Patrol officials, including supporting Border Patrol  agents’ ability to execute essential tasks, such as identifying illicit-cross  border activities. CBP collects data that could help provide insight into  how border fencing contributes to border security operations, including  the location of illegal entries. However, CBP has not developed metrics  that systematically use these data, among other data it collects, to assess  the contributions of its pedestrian and vehicle border fencing to its  mission. For example, CBP could potentially use these data to determine  the extent to which border fencing diverts illegal entrants into more rural  and remote environments, and border fencing’s impact, if any, on  apprehension rates over time. Developing metrics to assess the  contributions of fencing to border security operations could better position  CBP to make resource allocation decisions with the best information  available to inform competing mission priorities and investments.
To ensure that Border Patrol has the best available information to inform  future investments and resource allocation decisions among tactical  infrastructure and other assets Border Patrol deploys for border security,  we recommended, among other things, that Border Patrol develop  metrics to assess the contributions of pedestrian and vehicle fencing to  border security along the southwest border using the data Border Patrol  already collects and apply this information, as appropriate, when making  investment and resource allocation decisions. DHS concurred with our  recommendation and plans to develop metrics and incorporate them into  the Border Patrol’s Requirements Management Process. These actions, if  implemented effectively, should address the intent of our  recommendation.
section_title: CBP Has Taken Actions to Assess the Effectiveness of Its Predator B UAS and Aerostats for Border Security, but Could Improve Its Data Collection Efforts
paragraphs: In February 2017, we found that CBP has taken actions to assess the  effectiveness of its Predator B UAS and tactical aerostats for border  security, but could improve its data collection efforts. CBP collects a  variety of data on its use of the Predator B UAS, tactical aerostats, and  TARS, including data on their support for the apprehension of individuals,  seizure of drugs, and other events (asset assists). For Predator B UAS,  we found that mission data—such as the names of supported agencies  and asset assists for seizures of narcotics—were not recorded  consistently across all operational centers, limiting CBP’s ability to assess  the effectiveness of the program. We also found that CBP has not  updated its guidance for collecting and recording mission information in  its data collection system to include new data elements added since  2014, and does not have instructions for recording mission information  such as asset assists. In addition, not all users of CBP’s system have  received training for recording mission information. We reported that  updating guidance and fully training users, consistent with internal control  standards, would help CBP better ensure the quality of data it uses to  assess effectiveness. For tactical aerostats, we found that Border Patrol  collection of asset assist information for seizures and apprehensions does  not distinguish between its tactical aerostats and TARS. Data that  distinguishes between support provided by tactical aerostats and support  provided by TARS would help CBP collect better and more complete  information and guide resource allocation decisions, such as the  redeployment of tactical aerostat sites based on changes in illegal cross- border activity for the two types of systems that provide distinct types of  support when assisting with, for example, seizures and apprehensions.
To improve its efforts to assess the effectiveness of its Predator B and  tactical aerostat programs, we recommended, among other things, that  CBP (1) update guidance for recording Predator B mission information in  its data collection system; (2) provide training to users of CBP’s data  collection system for Predator B missions; and (3) update Border Patrol’s  data collection practices to include a mechanism to distinguish and track  asset assists associated with tactical aerostats from TARS. CBP  concurred and identified planned actions to address the  recommendations, including incorporating a new functionality in its data  collection system to include tips and guidance for recording Predator B  mission information and updating its user manual for its data collection  system; and making improvements to capture data to ensure asset  assists are properly reported and attributed to tactical aerostats, and  TARS, among other actions.
section_title: CBP Uses Other Assets to Provide Security at the Arizona Border, and Would Benefit from Reporting and Tracking Asset Assist Data
paragraphs: In March 2014, we reported that CBP had identified mission benefits for  technologies under its Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan— which included a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras to help provide  security for the Arizona border—but had not yet developed performance  metrics for the plan. CBP identified mission benefits such as improved  situational awareness and agent safety. Further, a DHS database  enabled CBP to collect data on asset assists, instances in which a  technology—such as a camera, or other asset, such as a canine team— contributed to an apprehension or seizure, that in combination with other  relevant performance metrics or indicators, could be used to better  determine the contributions of CBP’s surveillance technologies and inform  resource allocation decisions. However, we found that CBP was not  capturing complete data on asset assists, as Border Patrol agents were  not required to record and track such data. We concluded that requiring  the reporting and tracking of asset assist data could help CBP determine  the extent to which its surveillance technologies are contributing to CBP’s  border security efforts.
To assess the effectiveness of deployed technologies at the Arizona  border and better inform CBP’s deployment decisions, we recommended  that CBP (1) require tracking of asset assist data in its Enforcement  Integrated Database, which contains data on apprehensions and seizures  and (2) once data on asset assists are required to be tracked, analyze  available data on apprehensions and seizures and technological assists,  in combination with other relevant performance metrics to determine the  contribution of surveillance technologies to CBP’s border security efforts.  DHS concurred with our first recommendation, and Border Patrol issued  guidance in June 2014 and Border Patrol officials confirmed with us in  June 2015 that agents are required to enter this information into the  database. These actions met the intent of our recommendation. DHS also  concurred with our second recommendation, and as of September 2016  has taken some action to assess its technology assist data and other  measures to determine contributions of surveillance technologies to its  mission. However, until Border Patrol completes its efforts to fully develop  and apply key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies to be  deployed under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, it will  not be well positioned to fully assess its progress in determining when  mission benefits have been fully realized.
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and members of the  subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to  answer any questions you may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact Rebecca  Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. In addition, contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key  contributions to this statement included Kirk Kiester (Assistant Director),  as well as Stephanie Heiken, David Lutter, Sasan “Jon” Najmi, and Carl  Potenzieri.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Assess  Fencing’s Contributions to Operations and Provide Guidance for  Identifying Capability Gaps. GAO-17-331. Washington, D.C.: February  16, 2017.
Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Collection of  Unmanned Aerial Systems and Aerostats Data. GAO-17-152.  Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2017.
Border Patrol: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Post- Apprehension Consequences. GAO-17-66. Washington, D.C.: January  12, 2017.
Border Security: DHS Surveillance Technology Unmanned Aerial  Systems and Other Assets. GAO-16-671T. Washington, D.C.: May 24,  2016.
Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Assess  Resource Deployment and Progress. GAO-16-465T. Washington, D.C.:  March 1, 2016.
Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Implement  and Assess Infrastructure and Technology. GAO-15-595T. Washington,  D.C.: May 13, 2015.
Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Collaborative  Mechanisms along the Southwest Border. GAO-14-494: Washington,  D.C.: June 27, 2014.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed  to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-14-368.  Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2014.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and  Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. GAO-12-22. Washington, D.C.:  November 4, 2011.
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