Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment Needed to Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major Programs
Published: 2011-06-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Quality is key to success in U.S. space and missile defense programs, but quality problems exist that have endangered entire missions along with less-visible problems leading to unnecessary repair, scrap, rework, and stoppage; long delays; and millions in cost growth. For space and missile defense acquisitions, GAO was asked to examine quality problems related to parts and manufacturing processes and materials across DOD and NASA. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which parts quality problems affect those agencies' space and missile defense programs; (2) causes of any problems; and (3) initiatives to prevent, detect, and mitigate parts quality problems. To accomplish this, GAO reviewed all 21 systems with mature designs and projected high costs: 5 DOD satellite systems, 4 DOD missile defense systems, and 12 NASA systems. GAO reviewed existing and planned efforts for preventing, detecting, and mitigating parts quality problems. Further, GAO reviewed regulations, directives, instructions, policies, and several studies, and interviewed senior headquarters and contractor officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Parts quality problems affected all 21 programs GAO reviewed at the Department of Defense (DOD) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In some cases they contributed to significant cost overruns and schedule delays. In most cases, problems were associated with electronic versus mechanical parts or materials. In several cases, parts problems discovered late in the development cycle had more significant cost and schedule consequences. For example, one problem cost a program at least $250 million and about a 2-year launch delay. The causes of parts quality problems GAO identified were poor workmanship, undocumented and untested manufacturing processes, poor control of those processes and materials and failure to prevent contamination, poor part design, design complexity, and an inattention to manufacturing risks. Ineffective supplier management also resulted in concerns about whether subcontractors and contractors met program requirements. Most programs GAO reviewed began before the agencies adopted new policies related to parts quality problems, and newer post-policy programs were not mature enough for parts problems to be apparent. Agencies and industry are now collecting and sharing information about potential problems, and developing guidance and criteria for testing parts, managing subcontractors, and mitigating problems, but it is too early to determine how much such collaborations have reduced parts quality problems since such data have not been historically collected. New efforts are collecting data on anomalies, but no mechanism exists to use those data to assess improvements. Significant barriers hinder efforts to address parts quality problems, such as broader acquisition management problems, workforce gaps, diffuse leadership in the national security space community, the government's decreasing influence on the electronic parts market, and an increase in counterfeiting of electronic parts. Given this, success will likely be limited without continued assessments of what works well and must be done. DOD and NASA should implement a mechanism for periodic assessment of the condition of parts quality problems in major space and missile defense programs with periodic reporting to Congress. DOD partially agreed with the recommendation and NASA agreed. DOD agreed to annually address all quality issues, to include parts quality.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) space and missile defense systems play  a vital role in protecting national and homeland security, the National  Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) space systems provide  global weather forecasting and all government space organizations  facilitate important scientific research. Because of these systems’  complexity, the environments they operate in, and the high degree of  accuracy and precision needed for their operation, quality is paramount to  their success. Yet in recent years, many space and missile defense  programs, which rely on many of the same contractors, have struggled  with quality problems. For example, the Air Force’s Advanced Extremely  High Frequency communications satellite was launched on August 14,  2010, but has yet to reach its intended orbit because of a blockage in a  propellant line that was most likely caused by a small piece of cloth  inadvertently left in the line during the manufacturing process. In 2009, a  major test for the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Terminal High Altitude  Area Defense missile system was not completed because of a design and  quality problem affecting the target. While these two cases were widely  reported by the media, other space and missile defense programs have  struggled with less-visible quality problems that have resulted in  unnecessary repair, scrap, and rework, and in some cases, a complete halt  in large-scale programs, months of delay, and millions of dollars in cost  growth. Often, such problems have arisen at the tail end of problematic,  long-term development efforts, creating a great deal of frustration for  program and government officials. Moreover, while attention has  increased in recent years on problems related to counterfeit parts, we have  reported that problems affecting major missile defense and space  programs have generally been the result of other issues, such as design  instability and technology maturity.
In view of the cost and importance of space and missile defense  acquisitions, you asked that we examine parts quality problems affecting  satellites and missile defense systems across DOD and NASA. Our review  of parts quality problems includes problems with the materials and  processes used in manufacturing. Parts are the basic elements of a system;  their manufacturing must be dependable if a system’s hardware is to be  reliable. Moreover, given the span of agencies and systems we were  examining, our focus on parts enabled consistent analysis of problems,  causal factors, and improvement efforts. At the same time, however, our  scope excluded quality problems that arose during assembly and  integration of larger subsystems, assemblies, and components, unless such  problems were tied to a specific part. Figure 1 depicts the focus of our  review and figure 2 defines materials, process, and parts.
Our specific objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which parts quality  problems are affecting DOD and NASA space and missile defense  programs; (2) the causes behind these problems; and (3) initiatives to  prevent, detect, and mitigate parts quality problems.
To determine the extent to which parts quality problems affected a  program’s cost, schedule and performance, we identified 21 DOD and  NASA major acquisitions that had completed their critical design reviews  (CDR) as of October 2009. This universe of 21 programs includes 9 DOD  systems (4 Air Force, 1 Navy, and 4 MDA) and 12 NASA systems. We  asked officials from all 21 programs to identify the most significant parts  quality problems that had affected their programs, as well as the  associated cost and schedule impacts, causes, and contributing factors. A  quality problem is the degree to which the product attributes, such as  capability, performance, or reliability, did not meet the needs of the  customer or mission, as specified through the requirements definition and  allocation process.
From the 21 systems examined, we selected 2 from DOD (1 Air Force and  1 MDA program) and 1 from NASA with known quality problems, as  identified in previous GAO reports, for further review to gain greater  insight into the root causes of the parts quality problems. We are unable to  make generalizable or projectable statements about parts quality problems  related to space and missile programs beyond this stated scope. We  reviewed regulations, directives, instructions, and policies to determine  how DOD, the Air Force, MDA, and NASA define and address parts quality.  We interviewed senior DOD, MDA, and NASA headquarters officials, as  well as system program and contractor officials from the Air Force, MDA,  and NASA, about their knowledge of parts problems on their programs.  We also reviewed several studies on parts quality from the Aerospace  Corporation and met with officials to discuss their findings. To identify  the extent to which parts problems are common across DOD, MDA, and  NASA, we collected and reviewed failure review board reports, advisory  notices, and cost and schedule analysis reports on parts problems  affecting the 21 identified systems and interviewed program officials. To  identify initiatives planned and practices used by DOD, MDA, and NASA to  prevent and detect parts quality problems, we interviewed program  officials at DOD, the Air Force, MDA, and NASA responsible for systems  engineering and quality and obtained, reviewed, and discussed their parts  quality policies and factors contributing to parts problems. For more on  our scope and methodology, see appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2009 to May 2011 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD and NASA build costly, complex systems that serve a variety of  national security and science, technology, and space exploration missions.  Within DOD, the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center is  responsible for acquiring most of DOD’s space systems; however, the Navy  is also acquiring a replacement satellite communication system. MDA, also  within DOD, is responsible for developing, testing, and fielding an  integrated, layered ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) to defend  against all ranges of enemy ballistic missiles in all phases of flight. The  major projects that NASA undertakes range from highly complex and  sophisticated space transportation vehicles, to robotic probes, to satellites  equipped with advanced sensors to study the Earth. Requirements for  government space systems can be more demanding than those of the  commercial satellite and consumer electronics industry. For instance,  DOD typically has more demanding standards for radiation-hardened  parts, such as microelectronics, which are designed and fabricated with  the specific goal of enduring the harshest space radiation environments,  including nuclear events. Companies typically need to create separate  production lines and in some cases special facilities. In the overall  electronics market, military and NASA business is considered a niche  market.
Moreover, over time, government space and missile systems have  increased in complexity, partly as a result of advances in commercially  driven electronics technology and subsequent obsolescence of mature  high-reliability parts. Systems are using more and increasingly complex  parts, requiring more stringent design verification and qualification  practices. In addition, acquiring qualified parts from a limited supplier  base has become more difficult as suppliers focus on commercial markets  at the expense of the government space market—which requires stricter  controls and proven reliability.
Further, because DOD and NASA’s space systems cannot usually be  repaired once they are deployed, an exacting attention to parts quality is  required to ensure that they can operate continuously and reliably for  years at a time through the harsh environmental conditions of space.  Similarly, ballistic missiles that travel through space after their boost  phase to reach their intended targets are important for national security  and also require reliable and dependable parts. These requirements drive  designs that depend on reliable parts, materials and processes that have  passed CDRs, been fully tested, and demonstrated long life and tolerance  to the harsh environmental conditions of space.
subsections: section_title: Shifts in Government Oversight and Management of Parts
paragraphs: There have been dramatic shifts in how parts for space and missile  defense systems have been acquired and overseen. For about three  decades, until the 1990s, government space and missile development  based its quality requirements on a military standard known as MIL-Q- 9858A. This standard required contractors to establish a quality program  with documented procedures and processes that are subject to approval  by government representatives throughout all areas of contract  performance. Quality is theoretically ensured by requiring both the  contractor and the government to monitor and inspect products. MIL-Q- 9858A and other standards—collectively known as military  specifications—were used by DOD and NASA to specify the  manufacturing processes, materials, and testing needed to ensure that  parts would meet quality and reliability standards needed to perform in  and through space. In the 1990s, concerns about cost and the need to  introduce more innovation brought about acquisition reform efforts that  loosened a complex and often rigid acquisition process and shifted key  decision-making responsibility—including management and oversight for  parts, materials, and processes—to contractors. This period, however, was  marked by continued problematic acquisitions that ultimately resulted in  sharp increases in cost, schedule, and quality problems.
For DOD, acquisition reform for space systems was referred to as Total  System Performance Responsibility (TSPR). Under TSPR, program  managers’ oversight was reduced and key decision-making responsibilities  were shifted onto the contractor. In May 2003, a report of the Defense  Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force stated  that the TSPR policy marginalized the government program management  role and replaced traditional government “oversight” with “insight.” In  2006, a retired senior official responsible for testing in DOD stated that  “TSPR relieved development contractors of many reporting requirements,  including cost and technical progress, and built a firewall around the  contractor, preventing government sponsors from properly overseeing  expenditure of taxpayer dollars.” We found that TSPR reduced  government oversight and led to major reductions in various government  capabilities, including cost-estimating and systems-engineering staff.  MDA chose to pursue the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) approach as part  of its acquisition reform effort. The LSI approach used a single contractor  responsible for developing and integrating a system of systems within a  given budget and schedule. We found in 2007 that a proposal to use an LSI  approach on any new program should be seen as a risk at the outset, not  because it is conceptually flawed, but because it indicates that the  government may be pursuing a solution that it does not have the capacity  to manage.
Within NASA, a similar approach called “faster, better, cheaper” was  intended to help reduce mission costs, improve efficiency, and increase  scientific results by conducting more and smaller missions in less time.  The approach was intended to stimulate innovative development and  application of technology, streamline policies and practices, and energize  and challenge a workforce to successfully undertake new missions in an  era of diminishing resources. We found that while NASA had many  successes, failures of two Mars probes revealed limits to this approach,  particularly in terms of NASA’s ability to learn from past mistakes.
As DOD and NASA moved from military specifications and standards, so  did suppliers. According to an Aerospace Corporation study, both prime  contractors and the government space market lost insight and traceability  into parts as suppliers moved from having to meet military specifications  and standards to an environment where the prime contractor would  ensure that the process used by the supplier would yield a quality part.  During this time, downsizing and tight budgets also eroded core skills,  giving the government less insight, with fewer people to track problems  and less oversight into manufacturing details.
As DOD and NASA experienced considerable cost, schedule, and  performance problems with major systems in the late 1990s and early  2000s, independent government-sponsored reviews concluded that the  government ceded too much control to contractors during acquisition  reform. As a result, in the mid-to late 2000s, DOD and NASA reached broad  consensus that the government needed to return to a lifecycle mission  assurance approach aimed at ensuring mission success. For example,  MDA issued its Mission Assurance Provisions (MAP) for acquisition of  mission and safety critical hardware and software in October 2006. The  MAP is to assist in improving MDA’s acquisition activities through the  effective application of critical best practices for quality safety and  mission assurance. In December 2008, DOD updated its acquisition  process which includes government involvement in the full range of  requirements, design, manufacture, test, operations, and readiness  reviews.
Also in the last decade, DOD and NASA have developed policies and  procedures aimed at preventing parts quality problems. For example,  policies at each agency set standards to require the contractor to establish  control plans related to parts, materials, and processes. Policies at the Air  Force, MDA, and the NASA component we reviewed also establish  minimum quality and reliability requirements for electronic parts—such as  capacitors, resistors, connectors, fuses, and filters—and set standards to  require the contractor to select materials and processes to ensure that the  parts will perform as intended in the environment where they will  function, considering the effects of, for example, static electricity, extreme  temperature fluctuations, solar radiation, and corrosion. In addition, DOD  and NASA have developed plans and policies related to counterfeit parts  control that set standards to require contractors to take certain steps to  prevent and detect counterfeit parts and materials. Table 1 identifies the  major policies related to parts quality at DOD and NASA.
Government policies generally require various activities related to the  selection and testing of parts, materials, and processes. It is the prime  contractor’s responsibility to determine how the requirements will be  managed and implemented, including the selection and management of  subcontractors and suppliers. In addition, it is the government’s  responsibility to provide sufficient oversight to ensure that parts quality  controls and procedures are in place and rigorously followed. Finally,  DOD and NASA have quality and mission assurance personnel staff on  their programs to conduct on-site audits at contractor facilities. Table 2  illustrates the typical roles of the government and the prime contractor in  ensuring parts quality.
DOD and NASA also have their own oversight activities that contribute to  system quality. DOD has on-site quality specialists within the Defense  Contract Management Agency and the military services, MDA has its  Mission Assurance program, and NASA has its Quality Assurance program.  Each activity aims to identify quality problems and ensure the on-time, on- cost delivery of quality products to the government through oversight of  manufacturing and through supplier management activities, selected  manufacturing activities, and final product inspections prior to  acceptance. Likewise, prime contractors employ quality assurance  specialists and engineers to assess the quality and reliability of both the  parts they receive from suppliers and the overall weapon system. In  addition, DOD and NASA have access to one or more of the following  databases used to report deficient parts: the Product Data Reporting and  Evaluation Program (PDREP), the Joint Deficiency Reporting System  (JDRS), and the Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP).  Through these systems, the government and industry participants share  information on deficient parts.
section_title: Parts Quality Problems Are Widespread and in Some Cases Have Had a Significant Effect on Cost, Schedule, and Performance
paragraphs: Parts quality problems reported by each program affected all 21 programs  we reviewed at DOD and NASA and in some cases contributed to  significant cost overruns, schedule delays, and reduced system reliability  and availability. In most cases, problems were associated with electronics  parts, versus mechanical parts or materials. Moreover, in several cases,  parts problems were discovered late in the development cycle and, as  such, tended to have more significant cost and schedule consequences.
Table 3 identifies the cost and schedule effects of parts quality problems  for the 21 programs we reviewed. The costs in this table are the  cumulative costs of all the parts quality problems that the programs  identified as most significant as of August 2010 and do not necessarily  reflect cost increases to the program’s total costs. In some cases, program  officials told us that they do not track the cost effects of parts quality  problems or that it was too early to determine the effect. The schedule  effect is the cumulative total of months it took to resolve a problem.  Unless the problems affected a schedule milestone such as launch date,  the total number of months may reflect problems that were concurrent  and may not necessarily reflect delays to the program’s schedule.
subsections: section_title: Programs Are Primarily Experiencing Quality Problems with Electronic Parts
paragraphs: The programs we reviewed are primarily experiencing quality problems  with electronic parts that are associated with electronic assemblies, such  as computers, communication systems, and guidance systems, critical to  the system operations. Based on our review of 21 programs, 64.7 percent  of the parts quality problems were associated with electronic parts, 14.7  percent with mechanical parts, and 20.6 percent with materials used in  manufacturing. In many cases, programs experienced problems with the  same parts and materials. Figure 3 identifies the distribution of quality  problems across electronic parts, mechanical parts, and materials.
In many cases, programs experienced problems with the same parts and  materials. For electronic parts, seven programs reported problems with  capacitors, a part that is widely used in electronic circuits. Multiple  programs also reported problems with printed circuit boards, which are  used to support and connect electronic components. While printed circuit  boards range in complexity and capability, they are used in virtually all but  the simplest electronic devices. As with problems with electronic parts,  multiple programs also experienced problems with the same materials.
For example, five programs reported problems with titanium that did not  meet requirements. In addition, two programs reported problems with four  different parts manufactured with pure tin, a material that is prohibited in  space because it poses a reliability risk to electronics. Figure 4 identifies  examples of quality problems with parts and materials that affected three  or more programs.
section_title: Parts Problems Discovered Late in Development Cycle Had More Significant Consequences
paragraphs: While parts quality problems affected all of the programs we reviewed,  problems found late in development—during final integration and testing  at the instrument and system level—had the most significant effect on  program cost and schedule. As shown in figure 5, part screening,  qualification, and testing typically occur during the final design phase of  spacecraft development. When parts problems are discovered during this  phase, they are sometimes more easily addressed without major  consequences to a development effort since fabrication of the spacecraft  has not yet begun or is just in the initial phases. In several of the cases we  reviewed, however, parts problems were discovered during instrument  and system-level testing, that is, after assembly or integration of the  instrument or spacecraft. As such, they had more significant consequences  as they required lengthy failure analysis, disassembly, rework, and  reassembly, sometimes resulting in a launch delay.
Our work identified a number of cases in which parts problems identified  late in development caused significant cost and schedule issues.
Parts quality problems found during system-level testing of the Air  Force’s Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite program  contributed to a launch delay of almost 2 years and cost the program at  least $250 million. A power-regulating unit failed during system-level  thermal vacuum testing because of defective electronic parts that had  to be removed and replaced. This and other problems resulted in  extensive rework and required the satellite to undergo another round  of thermal vacuum testing. According to the program office, the  additional thermal vacuum testing alone cost about $250 million.
At MDA, the Space Tracking and Surveillance System program  discovered problems with defective electronic parts in the Space- Ground Link Subsystem during system-level testing and integration of  the satellite. By the time the problem was discovered, the manufacturer  no longer produced the part and an alternate contractor had to be  found to manufacture and test replacement parts. According to  officials, the problem cost about $7 million and was one of the factors  that contributed to a 17-month launch delay of two demonstration  satellites and delayed participation in the BMDS testing we reported on  in March 2009.
At NASA, parts quality problems found late in development resulted in  a 20-month launch delay for the Glory program and cost $71.1 million.  In August 2008, Glory’s spacecraft computer failed to power up during  system-level testing. After a 6-month failure analysis, the problem was  attributed to a crack in the computer’s printed circuit board, an  electronic part in the computer used to connect electronic  components. Because the printed circuit board could not be  manufactured reliably, the program had to procure and test an  alternate computer. The program minimized the long lead times  expected with the alternate computer by obtaining one that had already  been procured by NASA. However, according to contractor officials,  design changes were also required to accommodate the alternate  computer. In June 2010, after the computer problem had been resolved,  the Glory program also discovered problems with parts for the solar  array drive assembly that rendered one of the arrays unacceptable for  flight and resulted in an additional 3-month launch delay.
Also at NASA, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental  Satellite System Preparatory Project experienced $105 million in cost  increases and 27 months of delay because of parts quality problems.  In one case, a key instrument developed by a NASA partner failed  during instrument-level testing because the instrument frame fractured  at several locations. According to the failure review board, stresses  exceeded the material capabilities of several brazed joints—a method  of joining metal parts together. According to officials, the instrument’s  frame had to be reinforced, which delayed instrument delivery and  ultimately delayed the satellite’s launch date. In addition, officials  stated that they lack confidence in how the partner-provided satellite  instruments will function on orbit because of the systemic mission  assurance and systems engineering issues that contributed to the parts  quality problems.
For some of the programs we reviewed, the costs associated with parts  quality problems were minimized because the problems were found early  and were resolved within the existing margins built into the program  schedule. For example, the Air Force’s Global Positioning System (GPS)  program discovered problems with electronic parts during part-level  testing and inspection. An investigation into the problem cost about  $50,000, but did not result in delivery delays. An independent review team  ultimately concluded that the parts could be used without a performance  or mission impact. At NASA, the Juno program discovered during part- level qualification testing that an electronic part did not meet performance  requirements. The program obtained a suitable replacement from another  manufacturer; it cost the program $10,000 to resolve the issue with no  impact on program schedule.
In other cases, the costs of parts quality problems were amplified because  they were a leading cause of a schedule delay to a major milestone, such  as launch readiness. For example, of the $60.9 million cost associated with  problems with the Glory spacecraft computer found during system-level  testing, $11.6 million was spent to resolve the issue, including personnel  costs for troubleshooting, testing, and oversight as well as design,  fabrication, and testing of the new computer. The majority of the cost— $49.3 million—was associated with maintaining the contractor during the  15-month launch delay. Similarly, problems with parts for Glory’s solar  array assembly cost about $10.1 million, $2.7 million to resolve the  problem and $7.4 million resulting from the additional 3-month schedule  delay. Similarly, program officials for NASA’s National Polar-orbiting  Environmental Satellite System Preparatory Project attributed the $105  million cost of its parts quality problems to the costs associated with  launch and schedule delays, an estimated $5 million a month.
In several cases, the programs were encountering other challenges that  obscured the problems caused by poor quality parts. For example, the Air  Force’s Space-Based Infrared System High program reported that a part  with pure tin in the satellite telemetry unit was discovered after the  satellite was integrated. After an 11-month failure review board, the  defective part was replaced. The program did not quantify the cost and  schedule effect of the problem because the program was encountering  software development issues that were already resulting in schedule  delays. Similarly, NASA’s Mars Science Laboratory program experienced a  failure associated with joints in the rover propulsion system. According to  officials, the welding process led to joint embrittlement and the possibility  of early failure. The project had to test a new process, rebuild, and test the  system, which cost about $4 million and resulted in a 1-year delay in  completion. However, the program’s launch date had already been delayed  25 months because of design issues with the rover actuator motors and  avionics package—in effect, buying time to resolve the problem with the  propulsion system.
section_title: In Some Cases, Parts Quality Problems Affected System Reliability and Availability
paragraphs: In addition to the launch delays discussed above, parts quality problems  also resulted in reduced system reliability and availability for several other  programs we reviewed. For example, the Air Force’s GPS program found  that an electronic part lacked qualification data to prove the part’s quality  and reliability. As a result, the overall reliability prediction for the space  vehicle was decreased. At MDA, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense  program discovered problems with an electronic part in the telemetry unit  needed to transmit flight test data. The problem was found during final  assembly and test operations of the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle resulting  in the cancellation of a major flight test. This increased risk to the program  and the overall BMDS capability, since the lack of adequate intercept data  reduced confidence that the system could perform as intended in a real- world situation. Also, MDA’s Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense program  recalled 16 missiles from the warfighter, including 7 from a foreign  partner, after the prime contractor discovered that the brackets used to  accommodate communications and power cabling were improperly  adhered to the Standard Missile 3 rocket motor. If not corrected, the  problem could have resulted in catastrophic mission failure.
section_title: The Costs of Parts Quality Problems Are Primarily Borne by the Government
paragraphs: Regardless of the cause of the parts quality problem, the government  typically bears the costs associated with resolving the issues and  associated schedule impact. In part, this is due to the use of cost- reimbursement contracts. Because space and missile defense acquisitions  are complex and technically challenging, DOD and NASA typically use  cost-reimbursement contracts, whereby the government pays the prime  contractor’s allowable costs to the extent prescribed in the contract for  the contractor’s best efforts. Under cost-reimbursement contracts, the  government generally assumes the financial risks associated with  development, which may include the costs associated with parts quality  problems. Of the 21 programs we reviewed, 20 use cost-reimbursement  contracts. In addition, 17 programs use award and incentive fees to reduce  the government’s risk and provide an incentive for excellence in such  areas as quality, timeliness, technical ingenuity, and cost-effective  management. Award and incentive fees enable the reduction of fee in the  event that the contractor’s performance does not meet or exceed the  requirements of the contract. Aside from the use of award fees, senior  quality and acquisition oversight officials told us that incentives for prime  contractors to ensure quality are limited.
section_title: Parts Quality Problems Were Caused by Poor Manufacturing Controls, Design, and Supplier Management
paragraphs: The parts quality problems we identified were directly attributed to poor  control of manufacturing processes and materials, poor design, and lack of  effective supplier management. Generally, prime contractor activities to  capture manufacturing knowledge should include identifying critical  characteristics of the product’s design and then the critical manufacturing  processes and materials to achieve these characteristics. Manufacturing  processes and materials should be documented, tested, and controlled  prior to production. This includes establishing criteria for workmanship,  making work instructions available, and preventing and removing foreign  object debris in the production process.
Poor workmanship was one of the causes of problems with electronic  parts. At DOD, poor workmanship during hand-soldering operations  caused a capacitor to fail during testing on the Navy’s Mobile User  Objective System program. Poor soldering workmanship also caused a  power distribution unit to experience problems during vehicle-level testing  on MDA’s Targets and Countermeasures program. According to MDA  officials, all units of the same design by the same manufacturer had to be  X-ray inspected and reworked, involving extensive hardware disassembly.  As a corrective action, soldering technicians were provided with training  to improve their soldering operations and ability to perform better visual  inspections after soldering. Soldering workmanship problems also  contributed to a capacitor failure on NASA’s Glory program. Analysis  determined that the manufacturer’s soldering guidelines were not  followed.
Programs also reported quality problems because of the use of  undocumented and untested manufacturing processes. For example,  MDA’s Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense program reported that the brackets  used to accommodate communications and power cabling were  improperly bonded to Standard Missile 3 rocket motors, potentially  leading to mission failure. A failure review board determined that the  subcontractor had changed the bonding process to reduce high scrap rates  and that the new process was not tested and verified before it was  implemented. Similarly, NASA’s Landsat Data Continuity Mission program  experienced problems with the spacecraft solar array because of an  undocumented manufacturing process. According to program officials, the  subcontractor did not have a documented process to control the amount  of adhesive used in manufacturing, and as a result, too much adhesive was  applied. If not corrected, the problem could have resulted in solar array  failure on orbit.
Poor control of manufacturing materials and the failure to prevent  contamination also caused quality problems. At MDA, the Ground-Based  Midcourse Defense program reported a problem with defective titanium  tubing. The defective tubing was rejected in 2004 and was to be returned  to the supplier; however, because of poor control of manufacturing  materials, a portion of the material was not returned and was inadvertently  used to fabricate manifolds for two complete Ground-Based Interceptor  Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles. The vehicles had already been processed  and delivered to the prime contractor for integration when the problem  was discovered. Lack of adherence to manufacturing controls to prevent  contamination and foreign object debris also caused parts quality  problems. For example, at NASA, a titanium propulsion tank for the  Tracking Data and Relay Satellite program failed acceptance testing  because a steel chip was inadvertently welded onto the tank. Following a  3-month investigation into the root cause, the tank was scrapped and a  replacement tank was built.
subsections: section_title: Design Flaws Also Resulted in Parts Quality Problems
paragraphs: In addition to problems stemming from poor control of manufacturing  processes and materials, many problems resulted from poor part design,  design complexity, and inattention to manufacturing risks. For example,  attenuators for the Navy’s Mobile User Objective System exhibited  inconsistent performance because of their sensitivity to temperature  changes. Officials attributed the problem to poor design, and the  attenuators were subsequently redesigned. At NASA, design problems also  affected parts for the Mars Science Laboratory program. According to  program officials, several resistors failed after assembly into printed  circuit boards. A failure review board determined that the tight design  limits contributed to the problem. Consequently, the parts had to be  redesigned and replaced.
Programs also underestimated the complexity of parts design, which  created risks of latent design and workmanship defects. For example,  NASA’s Glory project experienced problems with the state-of-the-art  printed circuit board for the spacecraft computer. According to project  officials, the board design was almost impossible to manufacture with  over 100 serial steps involved in the manufacturing process. Furthermore,  failure analysis found that the 27,000 connection points in the printed  circuit board were vulnerable to thermal stresses over time leading to  intermittent failures. However, the quality of those interconnections was  difficult to detect through standard testing protocols. This is inconsistent  with commercial best practices, which focus on simplified design  characteristics as well as use of mature and validated technology and  manufacturing processes.
section_title: Supplier Management Contributed to Quality Problems
paragraphs: Program officials at each agency also attributed parts quality problems to  the prime contractor’s failure to ensure that its subcontractors and  suppliers met program requirements. According to officials, in several  cases, prime contractors were responsible for flowing down all applicable  program requirements to their subcontractors and suppliers. Requirements  flow-down from the prime contractor to subcontractors and suppliers is  particularly important and challenging given the structure of the space and  defense industries, wherein prime contractors are subcontracting more  work to subcontractors. At MDA, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense  program experienced a failure with an electronics part purchased from an  unauthorized supplier. According to program officials, the prime  contractor flowed down the requirement that parts only be purchased  from authorized suppliers; however, the subcontractor failed to execute  the requirement and the prime contractor did not verify compliance.  Program officials for NASA’s Juno program attributed problems with a  capacitor to the supplier’s failure to review the specification prohibiting  the use of pure tin. DOD’s Space-Based Infrared System High program  reported problems with three different parts containing pure tin and  attributed the problems to poor requirements flow-down and poor supplier  management. Figure 6 shows an example of tin whiskers on a capacitor,  which can cause catastrophic problems to space systems.
section_title: Agency and Industry Efforts to Address Parts Quality Problems Face Significant Challenges
paragraphs: DOD and NASA have instituted new policies to prevent and detect parts  quality problems, but most of the programs we reviewed were initiated  before these policies took effect. Moreover, newer programs that do come  under the policies have not reached the phases of development where  parts problems are typically discovered. In addition, agencies and industry  have been collaborating to share information about potential problems,  collecting data, and developing guidance and criteria for activities such as  testing parts, managing subcontractors, and mitigating specific types of  problems. We could not determine the extent to which collaborative  actions have resulted in reduced instances of parts quality problems or  ensured that they are caught earlier in the development cycle. This is  primarily because data on the condition of parts quality in the space and  missile community governmentwide historically have not been collected.  And while there are new efforts to collect data on anomalies, there is no  mechanism to use these data to help assess the effectiveness of  improvement actions. Lastly, there are significant potential barriers to  success of efforts to address parts quality problems. They include broader  acquisition management problems, workforce gaps, diffuse leadership in  the national security space community, the government’s decreasing  influence on the overall electronic parts market, and an increase in  counterfeiting of electronic parts. In the face of such challenges, it is likely  that ongoing improvements will have limited success without continued  assessments to determine what is working well and what more needs to be  done.
subsections: section_title: Agencies Are Undertaking Efforts to Strengthen Parts Quality Management
paragraphs: As noted earlier in this report, the Air Force, MDA, and NASA have all  recently instituted or updated existing policies to prevent and detect parts  quality problems. At the Air Force and MDA, all of the programs we  reviewed were initiated before these recent policies aimed at preventing  and detecting parts quality problems took full effect. In addition, it is too  early to tell whether newer programs—such as a new Air Force GPS  development effort and the MDA’s Precision Tracking Space System—are  benefiting from the newer policies because these programs have not  reached the design and fabrication phases where parts problems are  typically discovered. However, we have reported that the Air Force is  taking measures to prevent the problems experienced on the GPS IIF  program from recurring on the new GPS III program. The Air Force has  increased government oversight of its GPS III development and Air Force  officials are spending more time at the contractor’s site to ensure quality.  The Air Force is also following military standards for satellite quality for  GPS III development. At the time of our review, the program had not  reported a significant parts quality problem. Table 4 highlights the major  differences in the framework between the GPS IIF and GPS III programs.
In addition to new policies focused on quality, agencies are also becoming  more focused on industrial base issues and supply chain risks. For  example, MDA has developed the supplier road map database in an effort  to gain greater visibility into the supply chain in order to more effectively  manage supply chain risks. In addition, according to MDA officials, MDA  has recently been auditing parts distributors in order to rank them for risk  in terms of counterfeit parts. NASA has begun to assess industrial base  risks and challenges during acquisition strategy meetings and has  established an agency Supply Chain Management Team to focus attention  on supply chain management issues and to coordinate with other  government agencies.
Agencies and industry also participate in a variety of collaborative  initiatives to address quality, in particular, parts quality. These range from  informal groups focused on identifying and sharing news about emerging  problems as quickly as possible, to partnerships that conduct supplier  assessments, to formal groups focused on identifying ways industry and  the government can work together to prevent and mitigate problems. As  shown in table 5, these groups have worked to establish guidance, criteria,  and standards that focus on parts quality issues, and they have enhanced  existing data collection tools and created new databases focused on  assessing anomalies.
One example of the collaborative efforts is the Space Industrial Base  Council (SIBC)—a government-led initiative—which brings together  officials from agencies involved in space and missile defense to focus on a  range of issues affecting the space industrial base and has sparked  numerous working groups focused specifically on parts quality and critical  suppliers. These groups in turn have worked to develop information- sharing mechanisms, share lessons learned and conduct supplier  assessments, soliciting industry’s input as appropriate. For instance, the  SIBC established a critical technology working group to explore supply  chains and examine critical technologies to put in place a process for  strategic management of critical space systems’ technologies and  capabilities under the Secretary of the Air Force and the Director of the  National Reconnaissance Office. The working group has developed and  initiated a mitigation plan for batteries, solar cells and arrays, and  traveling wave tube amplifiers. In addition, the Space Supplier Council  was established under the SIBC to focus on the concerns of second-tier  and lower-tier suppliers, which typically have to go through the prime  contractors, and to promote more dialogue between DOD, MDA, NASA,  other space entities, and these suppliers. Another council initiative was  the creation of the National Security Space Advisory Forum, a Web-based  alert system developed for sharing critical space system anomaly data and  problem alerts, which became operational in 2005.
Agency officials also cited other informal channels used to share  information regarding parts issues. For example, NASA officials stated  that after verifying a parts issue, they will share their internal advisory  notice with any other government space program that could potentially be  affected by the issue. According to several government and contractor  officials, the main reasons for delays in information sharing were either  the time it took to confirm a problem or concerns with proprietary and  liability issues. NASA officials stated that they received advisories from  MDA and had an informal network with MDA and the Army Space and  Missile Defense Command to share information about parts problems.  Officials at the Space and Missile Systems Center also mentioned that they  have informal channels for sharing part issues. For example, an official in  the systems engineering division at the Space and Missile Systems Center  stated that he has weekly meetings with a NASA official to discuss parts  issues.
In addition to the formal and informal collaborative efforts, the Air Force’s  Space and Missile Systems Center, MDA, NASA, and the National  Reconnaissance Office signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in  February 2011 to encourage additional interagency cooperation in order to  strengthen mission assurance practices. The MOU calls on the agencies to  develop and share lessons learned and best practices to ensure mission  success through a framework of collaborative mission assurance. Broad  objectives of the framework are to develop core mission assurance  practices and tools; to foster a mission assurance culture and world-class  workforce; to develop clear and executable mission assurance plans; to  manage effective program execution; and to ensure program health  through independent, objective assessments. Specific objectives include  developing a robust mission assurance infrastructure and guidelines for  tailoring specifications and standards for parts, materials, and processes  and establishing standard contractual language to ensure consistent  specification of core standards and deliverables.
In addition, each agency is asked to consider the health of the industrial  base in space systems acquisitions and participate in mission assurance  activities, such as the Space Supplier Council and mission assurance  summits. In signing the MOU, DOD, MDA, NASA, and the National  Reconnaissance Office acknowledged the complexity of such an  undertaking as it typically takes years to deliver a capability and involves  hundreds of industry partners building, integrating, and testing hundreds  of thousands of parts, all which have to work the first time on orbit—a  single mishap, undetected, can and has had catastrophic results.
Although collaborative efforts are under way, we could not determine the  extent to which collaborative actions have resulted in reduced instances  of parts quality problems to date or ensured that they are caught earlier in  the development cycle. This is primarily because data on the condition of  parts quality in the space and missile community governmentwide  historically have not been collected. The Aerospace Corporation has  begun to collect data on on-orbit and preflight anomalies in addition to the  Web alert system established by the Space Quality Improvement Council.  In addition, there is no mechanism in place to assess the progress of  improvement actions using these data or to track the condition of parts  quality problems across the space and missile defense sector to determine  if improvements are working or what additional actions need to be taken.  Such a mechanism is needed given the varied challenges facing  improvement efforts.
section_title: Improvement Efforts Face Potential Barriers to Success
paragraphs: There are significant potential barriers to the success of improvement  efforts, including broader acquisition management problems, diffuse  leadership in the national security space community, workforce gaps, the  government’s decreasing influence on the overall electronic parts market,  and an increase in counterfeiting of electronic parts. Actions are being  taken to address some of these barriers, such as acquisition management  and diffuse leadership, but others reflect trends affecting the aerospace  industry that are unlikely to change in the near future and may limit the  extent to which parts problems can be prevented.
Broader acquisition management problems: Both space and  missile defense programs have experienced acquisition problems—well  beyond parts quality management difficulties—during the past two  decades that have driven up costs by billions of dollars, stretched  schedules by years, and increased technical risks. These problems have  resulted in potential capability gaps in areas such as missile warning,  military communications, and weather monitoring, and have required  all the agencies in our review to cancel or pare back major programs.  Our reports have generally found that these problems include starting  efforts before requirements and technologies have been fully  understood and moving them forward into more complex phases of  development without sufficient knowledge about technology, design,  and other issues. Reduced oversight resulting from earlier acquisition  reform efforts and funding instability have also contributed to cost  growth and schedule delays. Agencies are attempting to address these  broader challenges as they are concurrently addressing parts quality  problems. For space in particular, DOD is working to ensure that  critical technologies are matured before large-scale acquisition  programs begin, requirements are defined early in the process and are  stable throughout, and system designs remain stable. In response to  our designation of NASA acquisition management as a high-risk area,  NASA developed a corrective action plan to improve the effectiveness  of its program/project management, and it is in the process of  implementing earned value management within certain programs to  help projects monitor the scheduled work done by NASA contractors  and employees. These and other actions have the potential to  strengthen the foundation for program and quality management but  they are relatively new and implementation is uneven among the  agencies involved with space and missile defense. For instance, we  have found that both NASA and MDA lack adequate visibility into costs  of programs. Our reports also continue to find that cost and schedule  estimates across all three agencies tend to be optimistic.
Diffuse leadership within the national security space  community: We have previously testified and reported that diffuse  leadership within the national security space community has a direct  impact on the space acquisition process, primarily because it makes it  difficult to hold any one person or organization accountable for  balancing needs against wants, for resolving conflicts among the many  organizations involved with space, and for ensuring that resources are  dedicated where they need to be dedicated. In 2008, a congressionally  chartered commission (known as the Allard Commission) reported that  responsibilities for military space and intelligence programs were  scattered across the staffs of DOD organizations and the intelligence  community and that it appeared that “no one is in charge” of national  security space. The same year, the House Permanent Select  Committee on Intelligence reported similar concerns, focusing  specifically on difficulties in bringing together decisions that would  involve both the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of  Defense. Prior studies, including those conducted by the Defense  Science Board and the Commission to Assess United States National  Security Space Management and Organization (Space Commission),  have identified similar problems, both for space as a whole and for  specific programs. Changes have been made this past year to national  space policies as well as organizational and reporting structures within  the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force to address  these concerns and clarify responsibilities, but it remains to be seen  whether these changes will resolve problems associated with diffuse  leadership.
Workforce gaps: Another potential barrier to success is a decline in  the number of quality assurance officials, which officials we spoke with  pointed to as a significant detriment. A senior quality official at MDA  stated that the quality assurance workforce was significantly reduced  as a result of acquisition reform. A senior DOD official responsible for  space acquisition oversight agreed, adding that the government does  not have the in-house knowledge or resources to adequately conduct  many quality control and quality assurance tasks. NASA officials also  noted the loss of parts specialists who provide technical expertise to  improve specifications and review change requests. According to NASA  officials, there is now a shortage of qualified personnel with the  requisite cross-disciplinary knowledge to assess parts quality and  reliability. Our prior work has also shown that DOD’s Defense Contract  Management Agency (DCMA), which provides quality assurance  oversight for many space acquisitions, was downsized considerably  during the 1990s. While capacity shortfalls still exist, DCMA has  implemented a strategic plan to address workforce issues and improve  quality assurance oversight. The shortage in the government quality  assurance workforce reflects a broader decline in the numbers of  scientists and engineers in the space sector. The 2008 House  Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence report mentioned above  found that the space workforce is facing a significant loss of talent and  expertise because of pending retirements, which is causing problems in  smoothly transitioning to a new space workforce. Similarly, in 2010 we  reported that 30 percent of the civilian manufacturing workforce was  eligible for retirement, and approximately 26 percent will become  eligible for retirement over the next 4 years. Similar findings were  reported by the DOD Cost Analysis Improvement Group in 2009.
Industrial base consolidation: A series of mergers and  consolidations that took place primarily in the 1990s added risks to  parts quality—first, by shrinking the pool of suppliers available to  produce specialty parts; second, by reducing specialized expertise  within prime contractors; and third, by introducing cost-cutting  measures that de-emphasize quality assurance. We reported in 2007  that the GPS IIF program, the Space-Based Infrared High Satellite  System, and the Wideband Global SATCOM system all encountered  quality problems that could be partially attributed to industry  consolidations. Specialized parts for the Wideband Global SATCOM  system, for example, became difficult to obtain after smaller  contractors that made these parts started to consolidate. For GPS,  consolidations led to a series of moves in facilities that resulted in a  loss of GPS technical expertise. In addition, during this period, the  contractor took additional cost-cutting measures that reduced quality.  Senior officials responsible for DOD space acquisition oversight with  whom we spoke with for this review stated that prime space  contractors have divested their traditional lines of expertise in favor of  acting in a broader “system integrator” role. Meanwhile, smaller  suppliers that attempted to fill gaps in expertise and products created  by consolidations have not had the experience and knowledge needed  to produce to the standards needed for government space systems. For  instance, officials from one program told us that their suppliers were  often unaware that their parts would be used in space applications and  did not understand or follow certain requirements. Officials also  mentioned that smaller suppliers attempting to enter the government  space market do not have access to testing and other facilities needed  to help build quality into their parts. We recently reported that small  businesses typically do not own the appropriate testing facilities, such  as thermal vacuum chambers, that are used for testing spacecraft or  parts under a simulated space environment and instead must rely on  government, university, or large contractor testing facilities, which can  be costly.
Government’s declining share of the overall electronic parts  market: DOD and NASA officials also stated that the government’s  declining share of the overall electronic parts market has made it more  difficult to acquire qualified electronic parts. According to officials, the  government used to be the primary consumer of microelectronics, but  it now constitutes only a small percentage of the market. As such, the  government cannot easily demand unique exceptions to commercial  standards. An example of an exception is DOD’s standards for  radiation-hardened parts, such as microelectronics, which are designed  and fabricated with the specific goal of enduring the harshest space  radiation environments, including nuclear events. We reported in 2010  that to produce such parts, companies would typically need to create  separate production lines and in some cases special facilities. Another  example is that government space programs often demand the use of a  tin alloy (tin mixed with lead) for parts rather than pure tin because of  the risk for growth of tin whiskers. According to officials, as a result of  European environmental regulations, commercial manufacturers have  largely moved away from the use of lead making it more difficult and  costly to procure tin alloy parts, and increasing the risk of parts being  made with pure tin. Similarly, officials noted concerns with the  increased use of lead-free solders used in electronic parts. Moreover,  officials told us that when programs do rely on commercial parts, there  tends to be a higher risk of lot-to-lot variation, obsolescence, and a lack  of part traceability.
An increase in counterfeit electronic parts: Officials we spoke  with agreed that an increase in counterfeit electronics parts has made  efforts to address parts quality more difficult. “Counterfeit” generally  refers to instances in which the identity or pedigree of a product is  knowingly misrepresented by individuals or companies. A 2010  Department of Commerce study identified a growth in incidents of  counterfeit parts across the electronics industry from about 3,300 in  2005 to over 8,000 incidents in 2008. We reported in 2010 that DOD is  limited in its ability to determine the extent to which counterfeit parts  exist in its supply chain because it does not have a departmentwide  definition of “counterfeit” and a consistent means to identify instances  of suspected counterfeit parts. Moreover, DOD relies on existing  procurement and quality control practices to ensure the quality of the  parts in its supply chain. However, these practices are not designed to  specifically address counterfeit parts. Limitations in the areas of  obtaining supplier visibility, investigating part deficiencies, and  reporting and disposal may reduce DOD’s ability to mitigate risks  posed by counterfeit parts. At the time of our review, DOD was only in  the early stages of addressing counterfeiting. We recommended and  DOD concurred that DOD leverage existing initiatives to establish  anticounterfeiting guidance and disseminate this guidance to all DOD  components and defense contractors.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Space and missile systems must meet high standards for quality. The 2003  Defense Science Board put it best by noting that the “primary reason is  that the space environment is unforgiving. Thousands of good engineering  decisions can be undone by a single engineering flaw or workmanship  error, resulting in the catastrophe of major mission failure. Options for  correction are scant.” The number of parts problems identified in our  review is relatively small when compared to the overall number of parts  used. But these problems have been shown to have wide-ranging and  significant consequences. Moreover, while the government’s reliance on  space and missile systems has increased dramatically, attention and  oversight of parts quality declined because of a variety of factors,  including the implementation of TSPR and similar policies, workforce  gaps, and industry consolidations. This condition has been recognized and  numerous efforts have been undertaken to strengthen the government’s  ability to detect and prevent parts problems. But there is no mechanism in  place to periodically assess the condition of parts quality problems in  major space and missile defense programs and the impact and  effectiveness of corrective measures. Such a mechanism could help ensure  that attention and resources are focused in the right places and provide  assurance that progress is being made.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making two recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the  NASA Administrator. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense and  the Administrator of NASA direct appropriate agency executives to  include in efforts to implement the new MOU for increased mission  assurance a mechanism for a periodic, governmentwide assessment and  reporting of the condition of parts quality problems in major space and  missile defense programs. This should include the frequency such  problems are appearing in major programs, changes in frequency from  previous years, and the effectiveness of corrective measures. We further  recommend that reports of the periodic assessments be made available to  Congress.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided draft copies of this report to DOD and NASA for review and  comment. DOD and NASA provided written comments on a draft of this  report. These comments are reprinted in appendixes III and IV,  respectively. DOD and NASA also provided technical comments, which  were incorporated as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to include in its efforts  to implement the new MOU for increased mission assurance a mechanism  for a periodic, governmentwide assessment and reporting of the condition  of parts quality problems in major space and missile defense programs, to  include the frequency problems are appearing, changes in frequency from  previous years, and the effectiveness of corrective measures. DOD  responded that it would work with NASA to determine the optimal  governmentwide assessment and reporting implementation to include all  quality issues, of which parts, materials, and processes would be one of  the major focus areas. In addition, DOD proposed an annual reporting  period to ensure planned, deliberate, and consistent assessments. We  support DOD’s willingness to address all quality issues and to include  parts, materials, and processes as an important focus area in an annual  report. Recent cases of higher-level quality problems that did not fall  within the scope of our review include MDA’s Terminal High Altitude Area  Defense missile system and the Air Force’s Advanced Extremely High  Frequency communications satellite, which were mentioned earlier in our  report. It is our opinion that these cases occurred for reasons similar to  those we identified for parts, materials, and processes. We recognize that  quality issues can include a vast and complex universe of problems.  Therefore, the scope of our review and focus of our recommendation was  on parts, materials, and processes to enable consistent reporting and  analysis and to help direct corrective actions. Should a broader quality  focus be pursued, as DOD indicated, it is important that DOD identify  ways in which this consistency can be facilitated among the agencies. In  response to our second recommendation, DOD stated that it had no  objection to providing a report to Congress, if Congress desired one. We  believe that DOD should proactively provide its proposed annual reports  to Congress on a routine basis, rather than waiting for any requests from  Congress, which could be inconsistent from year to year.
NASA also concurred with our recommendations. NASA stated that  enhanced cross-agency communication, coordination, and sharing of parts  quality information will help mitigate threats poses by defective and  nonconforming parts. Furthermore, NASA plans to engage other U.S.  space agencies to further develop and integrate agency mechanisms for  reporting, assessing, tracking, and trending common parts quality  problems, including validation of effective cross-agency solutions.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate  congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of  the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and other interested  parties. The report also will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site  at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are provided in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: Our specific objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which parts quality  problems are affecting Department of Defense (DOD) and National  Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) space and missile defense  programs; (2) the causes of these problems; and (3) initiatives to prevent,  detect, and mitigate parts quality problems.
To examine the extent to which parts quality problems are affecting DOD  (the Air Force, the Navy, and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)) and  NASA cost, schedule, and performance of space and missile defense  programs, we reviewed all 21 space and missile programs—9 at DOD,  including 4 Air Force, 1 Navy, and 4 MDA systems, and 12 at NASA—that  were, as of October 2009, in development and projected to be high cost,  and had demonstrated through a critical design review (CDR) that the  maturity of the design was appropriate to support proceeding with full- scale fabrication, assembly, integration, and test.
DOD space systems selected were major defense acquisition programs— defined as those requiring an eventual total expenditure for research,  development, test, and evaluation of more than $365 million or for  procurement of more than $2.190 billion in fiscal year 2000 constant  dollars. All four MDA systems met these same dollar thresholds. NASA  programs selected had a life cycle cost exceeding $250 million. We chose  these programs based on their cost, stage in the acquisition process—in  development and post- CDR—and congressional interest. A quality  problem was defined to be the degree to which the product attributes,  such as capability, performance, or reliability, did not meet the needs of  the customer or mission, as specified through the requirements definition  and allocation process.
For each of the 21 systems we examined program documentation, such as  parts quality briefings, failure review board reports, advisory notices, and  cost and schedule analysis reports and held discussions with quality  officials from the program offices, including contractor officials and  Defense Contract Management Agency officials, where appropriate. We  specifically asked each program, at the time we initiated our review, to  provide us with the most recent list of the top 5 to 10 parts, material or  processes problems, as defined by that program, affecting its program’s  cost, schedule, or performance. Based on additional information gathered  through documentation provided by the programs and discussions with  program officials, we reviewed each part problem reported by each  program to determine if there was a part problem, rather than a material,  process, component, or assembly level problem. In addition, when  possible we identified the impact that a part, material, or process quality  problem might have had on system cost, schedule, and performance. We  selected one system with known quality problems, as previously reported  in GAO reports, within the Air Force (Space-Based Space Surveillance  System), MDA (Ground-Based Midcourse Defense), and NASA (Glory) for  further review to gain greater insight into the reporting and root causes of  the parts quality problems. Our findings are limited by the approach and  data collected. Therefore, we were unable to make generalizable or  projectable statements about space and missile programs beyond our  scope. We also have ongoing work through our annual DOD assessments  of selected weapon programs and NASA assessments of selected larger- scale projects for many of these programs, which allowed us to build upon  our prior work efforts and existing DOD and NASA contacts. Programs  selected are described in appendix II and are listed below.
Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites    Global Positioning System Block IIF    Space-Based Infrared System High Program    Space-Based Space Surveillance Block 10    Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense    Ground-Based Midcourse Defense    Space Tracking and Surveillance System    Aquarius    Global Precipitation Measurement Mission    Glory    Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory    James Webb Space Telescope    Juno    Landsat Data Continuity Mission    Magnetospheric Multiscale    Mars Science Laboratory    National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System    Radiation Belt Storm Probes    Tracking and Data Relay Satellite Replenishment  DOD and NASA have access to one or more of the following databases  used to report deficient parts: the Product Data Reporting and Evaluation  Program, the Joint Deficiency Reporting System, and the Government  Industry Data Exchange Program. We did not use these systems in our  review because of the delay associated with obtaining current information  and because it was beyond the scope of the review to assess the utility or  effectiveness of these systems.
To determine the causes behind the parts quality problems, we asked each  program to provide an explanation of the root causes and contributing  factors that may have led to each part problem reported. Based on the  information we gathered, we grouped the root causes and contributing  factors for each part problem. We reviewed program documentation,  regulations, directives, instructions, and policies to determine how the Air  Force, MDA, and NASA define and address parts quality. We interviewed  senior DOD, MDA, and NASA headquarters officials, as well as system  program and contractor officials from the Air Force, MDA, and NASA,  about their knowledge of parts problems on their programs. We reviewed  several studies on quality and causes from the Subcommittee on Technical  and Tactical Intelligence, House Permanent Select Committee on  Intelligence; the Department of Commerce; and the Aerospace  Corporation to gain a better understanding of quality and challenges facing  the development, acquisition, and execution of space systems. We met  with Aerospace Corporation officials to discuss some of their reports and  findings and the status of their ongoing efforts to address parts quality. We  relied on previous GAO reports for the implementation status of planned  program management improvements.
To identify initiatives to prevent, detect, and mitigate parts quality  problems, we asked each program what actions were being taken to  remedy the parts problems. Through these discussions and others held  with agency officials, we were able to obtain information on working  groups. We reviewed relevant materials provided to us by officials from  DOD, the Air Force, MDA, NASA, and the Aerospace Corporation. We  interviewed program officials at the Air Force, MDA, NASA, and the  Aerospace Corporation responsible for quality initiatives to discuss those  initiatives that would pertain to parts quality and discuss the  implementation status of any efforts.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2009 to May 2011 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Description of DOD Satellite Systems, MDA Systems, and NASA Systems
subsections: section_title: DOD Satellite Systems
subsections: section_title: Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites
paragraphs: The Air Force’s AEHF satellite system will replenish the existing Milstar  system with higher-capacity, survivable, jam-resistant, worldwide, secure  communication capabilities for strategic and tactical warfighters. The  program includes satellites and a mission control segment. Terminals used  to transmit and receive communications are acquired separately by each  service. AEHF is an international program that includes Canada, the  United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.
section_title: Global Positioning System (GPS) Block IIF
paragraphs: The Air Force’s GPS includes satellites, a ground control system, and user  equipment. It conveys positioning, navigation, and timing information to  users worldwide. In 2000, Congress began funding the modernization of  Block IIR and Block IIF satellites. GPS IIF is a new generation of GPS  satellites that is intended to deliver all legacy signals plus new capabilities,  such as a new civil signal and better accuracy.
section_title: Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)
paragraphs: The Navy’s MUOS, a satellite communication system, is expected to  provide a worldwide, multiservice population of mobile and fixed-site  terminal users with an increase in narrowband communications capacity  and improve availability for small terminals. MUOS will replace the Ultra  High Frequency Follow-On satellite system currently in operation and  provide interoperability with legacy terminals. MUOS consists of a  network of satellites and an integrated ground network.
section_title: Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Program
paragraphs: The Air Force’s SBIRS High satellite system is being developed to replace  the Defense Support Program and perform a range of missile warning,  missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace awareness  missions. SBIRS High consists of four satellites in geosynchronous earth  orbit plus two replenishment satellites, two sensors on host satellites in  highly elliptical orbit plus two replenishment sensors, and fixed and  mobile ground stations.
section_title: Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) Block 10
paragraphs: The Air Force’s SBSS Block 10 satellite is intended to provide a follow-on  capability to the Midcourse Space Experiment / Space Based Visible  sensor satellite, which ended its mission in July 2008. SBSS will consist of  a single satellite and associated command, control, communications, and  ground processing equipment. The SBSS satellite is expected to operate 24  hours a day, 7 days a week, to collect positional and characterization data  on earth-orbiting objects of potential interest to national security.
section_title: MDA Systems
subsections: section_title: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
paragraphs: MDA’s Aegis BMD is a sea-based missile defense system being developed  in incremental, capability-based blocks to defend against ballistic missiles  of all ranges. Key components include the shipboard SPY-1 radar,  Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) missiles, and command and control systems. It  will also be used as a forward-deployed sensor for surveillance and  tracking of ballistic missiles. The SM-3 missile has multiple versions in  development or production: Blocks IA, IB, and IIA.
section_title: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
paragraphs: MDA’s GMD is being fielded to defend against limited long-range ballistic  missile attacks during their midcourse phase. GMD consists of an  interceptor with a three-stage booster and exoatmospheric kill vehicle,  and a fire control system that formulates battle plans and directs  components integrated with Ballistic Missile Defense System (BDMS)  radars. We assessed the maturity of all GMD critical technologies, as well  as the design of the Capability Enhanced II (CE-II) configuration of the  Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), which began emplacements in fiscal  year 2009.
section_title: Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS)
paragraphs: MDA’s STSS is designed to acquire and track threat ballistic missiles in all  stages of flight. The agency obtained the two demonstrator satellites in  2002 from the Air Force SBIRS Low program that halted in 1999. MDA  refurbished and launched the two STSS demonstrations satellites on  September 25, 2009. Over the next 2 years, the two satellites will take part  in a series of tests to demonstrate their functionality and interoperability  with the BMDS.
section_title: Targets and Countermeasures
paragraphs: The Targets and Countermeasures program provides ballistic missiles to  serve as targets in the MDA flight test program. The targets program  involves multiple acquisitions—including a variety of existing and new  missiles and countermeasures.
section_title: NASA Systems
subsections: section_title: Aquarius
paragraphs: Aquarius is a satellite mission developed by NASA and the Space Agency  of Argentina (Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales) to investigate  the links between the global water cycle, ocean circulation, and the  climate. It will measure global sea surface salinity. The Aquarius science  goals are to observe and model the processes that relate salinity variations  to climatic changes in the global cycling of water and to understand how  these variations influence the general ocean circulation. By measuring  salinity globally for 3 years, Aquarius will provide a new view of the  ocean’s role in climate.
section_title: Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Mission
paragraphs: The GPM mission, a joint NASA and Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency  project, seeks to improve the scientific understanding of the global water  cycle and the accuracy of precipitation forecasts. GPM is composed of a  core spacecraft carrying two main instruments: a dual-frequency  precipitation radar and a GPM microwave imager. GPM builds on the work  of the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission and will provide an opportunity  to calibrate measurements of global precipitation.
section_title: Glory
paragraphs: The Glory project is a low-Earth orbit satellite that will contribute to the  U.S. Climate Change Science Program. The satellite has two principal  science objectives: (1) collect data on the properties of aerosols and black  carbon in the Earth’s atmosphere and climate systems and (2) collect data  on solar irradiance. The satellite has two main instruments —the Aerosol  Polarimetry Sensor (APS) and the Total Irradiance Monitor (TIM)—as well  as two cloud cameras. The TIM will allow NASA to have uninterrupted  solar irradiance data by bridging the gap between NASA’s Solar Radiation  and Climate Experiment and the National Polar-orbiting Operational  Environmental Satellite System. The Glory satellite failed to reach orbit  when it was launched on March 4, 2011.
section_title: Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory (GRAIL)
paragraphs: The GRAIL mission will seek to determine the structure of the lunar  interior from crust to core, advance our understanding of the thermal  evolution of the moon, and extend our knowledge gained from the moon  to other terrestrial-type planets. GRAIL will achieve its science objectives  by placing twin spacecraft in a low altitude and nearly circular polar orbit.  The two spacecraft will perform high- precision measurements between  them. Analysis of changes in the spacecraft-to-spacecraft data caused by  gravitational differences will provide direct and precise measurements of  lunar gravity. GRAIL will ultimately provide a global, high-accuracy, high-  resolution gravity map of the moon.
section_title: James Webb Space Telescope (JWST)
paragraphs: The JWST is a large, infrared-optimized space telescope that is designed to  find the first galaxies that formed in the early universe. Its focus will  include searching for first light, assembly of galaxies, origins of stars and  planetary systems, and origins of the elements necessary for life. JWST’s  instruments will be designed to work primarily in the infrared range of the  electromagnetic spectrum, with some capability in the visible range. JWST  will have a large mirror, 6.5 meters (21.3 feet) in diameter and a sunshield  the size of a tennis court. Both the mirror and sunshade will not fit onto  the rocket fully open, so both will fold up and open once JWST is in outer  space. JWST will reside in an orbit about 1.5 million kilometers (1 million  miles) from the Earth.
section_title: Juno
paragraphs: The Juno mission seeks to improve our understanding of the origin and  evolution of Jupiter. Juno plans to achieve its scientific objectives by using  a simple, solar-powered spacecraft to make global maps of the gravity,  magnetic fields, and atmospheric conditions of Jupiter from a unique  elliptical orbit. The spacecraft carries precise, highly sensitive  radiometers, magnetometers, and gravity science systems. Juno is slated  to make 32 orbits to sample Jupiter’s full range of latitudes and longitudes.  From its polar perspective, Juno is designed to combine local and remote  sensing observations to explore the polar magnetosphere and determine  what drives Jupiter’s auroras.
section_title: Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM)
paragraphs: The LDCM, a partnership between NASA and the U.S. Geological Survey,  seeks to extend the ability to detect and quantitatively characterize  changes on the global land surface at a scale where natural and man-made  causes of change can be detected and differentiated. It is the successor  mission to Landsat 7. The Landsat data series, begun in 1972, is the longest  continuous record of changes in the Earth’s surface as seen from space.  Landsat data are a resource for people who work in agriculture, geology,  forestry, regional planning, education, mapping, and global change  research.
section_title: Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS)
paragraphs: The MMS is made up of four identically instrumented spacecraft. The  mission will use the Earth’s magnetosphere as a laboratory to study the  microphysics of magnetic reconnection, energetic particle acceleration,  and turbulence. Magnetic reconnection is the primary process by which  energy is transferred from solar wind to Earth’s magnetosphere and is the  physical process determining the size of a space weather storm. The  spacecrafts will fly in a pyramid formation, adjustable over a range of 10 to  400 kilometers, enabling them to capture the three-dimensional structure  of the reconnection sites they encounter. The data from MMS will be used  as a basis for predictive models of space weather in support of  exploration.
section_title: Mars Science Laboratory (MSL)
paragraphs: The MSL is part of the Mars Exploration Program (MEP). The MEP seeks  to understand whether Mars was, is, or can be a habitable world. To  answer this question, the MSL project will investigate how geologic,  climatic, and other processes have worked to shape Mars and its  environment over time, as well as how they interact today. The MSL will  continue this systematic exploration by placing a mobile science  laboratory on the Mars surface to assess a local site as a potential habitat  for life, past or present. The MSL is considered one of NASA’s flagship  projects and will be the most advanced rover yet sent to explore the  surface of Mars.
section_title: NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP)
paragraphs: The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System  NPP is a joint mission with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric  Administration and the U.S. Air Force. The satellite will measure ozone,  atmospheric and sea surface temperatures, land and ocean biological  productivity, Earth radiation, and cloud and aerosol properties. The NPP  mission has two objectives. First, NPP will provide a continuation of  global weather observations following the Earth Observing System  missions Terra and Aqua. Second, NPP will function as an operational  satellite and will provide data until the first NPOESS satellite launches.
section_title: Radiation Belt Storm Probes (RBSP)
paragraphs: The RBSP mission will explore the sun’s influence on the Earth and near- Earth space by studying the planet’s radiation belts at various scales of  space and time. This insight into the physical dynamics of the Earth’s  radiation belts will provide scientists data with which to predict changes  in this little understood region of space. Understanding the radiation belt  environment has practical applications in the areas of spacecraft system  design, mission planning, spacecraft operations, and astronaut safety. The  two spacecrafts will measure the particles, magnetic and electric fields,  and waves that fill geospace and provide new knowledge on the dynamics  and extremes of the radiation belts.
section_title: Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) Replenishment
paragraphs: The TDRS replenishment system consists of in-orbit communication  satellites stationed at geosynchronous altitude coupled with two ground  stations located in New Mexico and Guam. The satellite network and  ground stations provide mission services for near-Earth user satellites and  orbiting vehicles. TDRS K and L are the 11th and 12th satellites,  respectively, to be built for the TDRS replenishment system and will  contribute to the existing network by providing high bandwidth digital  voice, video, and mission payload data, as well as health and safety data  relay services to Earth-orbiting spacecraft, such as the International Space  Station.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, David B. Best, Assistant Director;  Maricela Cherveny; Heather L. Jensen; Angie Nichols-Friedman; William K.  Roberts; Roxanna T. Sun; Robert S. Swierczek; and Alyssa B. Weir made  key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-10-388SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight Needed  to Improve DOD’s Acquisition Environment and Weapon System  Quality. GAO-08-294. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2008.
Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon  System Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes.  GAO-07-388. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD Technology  Transition Processes. GAO-06-883. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2006.
Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers  Needed to Improve Outcomes. GAO-06-110. Washington, D.C.: November  30, 2005.
Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon  Systems’ Total Ownership Costs. GAO-03-57. Washington, D.C.: February  11, 2003.
Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early  Improves Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-02-701. Washington, D.C.: July 15,  2002.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best  Practices. GAO-02-469T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to  Better Weapon System Outcomes. GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8,  2001.
Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better  Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-00-199. Washington, D.C.: July 31,  2000.
Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better  Weapon System Decisions. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137. Washington, D.C.: April  26, 2000.
Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can  Improve Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-162. Washington,  D.C.: July 30, 1999.
Defense Acquisition: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program  Outcomes. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999.
Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisitions Requires  Changes in DOD’s Environment. GAO/NSIAD-98-56. Washington, D.C.:  February 24, 1998.
subsections: section_title: Space Reports
paragraphs: Global Positioning System: Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading  Capabilities Persist. GAO-10-636. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2010.
Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to  Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate  Data. GAO-10-558. Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2010.
Space Acquisitions: DOD Poised to Enhance Space Capabilities, but  Persistent Challenges Remain in Developing Space Systems.  GAO-10-447T. Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2010.
Space Acquisitions: Government and Industry Partners Face  Substantial Challenges in Developing New DOD Space Systems.  GAO-09-648T. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2009.
Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch  Vehicle Program Pose Management and Oversight Challenges.  GAO-08-1039. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2008.
Defense Space Activities: National Security Space Strategy Needed to  Guide Future DOD Space Efforts. GAO-08-431R. Washington, D.C.: March  27, 2008.
Space Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Expand and Sustain Use of Best  Practices. GAO-07-730T. Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of Selected Major Weapon Programs.  GAO-06-391.  Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006.
Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Take More Action to Address  Unrealistic Initial Cost Estimates of Space Systems. GAO-07-96.  Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006.
Defense Space Activities: Management Actions Are Needed to Better  Identify, Track, and Train Air Force Space Personnel. GAO-06-908.  Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2006.
Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems  Acquisitions and Keys to Achieving Them. GAO-06-626T. Washington,  D.C.: April 6, 2006.
Space Acquisitions: Stronger Development Practices and Investment  Planning Needed to Address Continuing Problems. GAO-05-891T.  Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Risks Posed by DOD’s New Space Systems  Acquisition Policy. GAO-04-379R. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems  Acquisition Management Policy. GAO-03-1073. Washington, D.C.:  September 15, 2003.
Military Space Operations: Common Problems and Their Effects on  Satellite and Related Acquisitions. GAO-03-825R. Washington, D.C.: June  2, 2003.
Defense Space Activities: Organizational Changes Initiated, but Further  Management Actions Needed. GAO-03-379. Washington, D.C.: April 18,  2003.
section_title: Missile Defense Reports
paragraphs: Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach Acquisitions Face  Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability Challenges.  GAO-11-179R. Washington, D.C.: December 21, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Program Instability Affects  Reliability of Earned Value Management Data. GAO-10-676. Washington,  D.C.: July 14, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-10-388SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and  Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities.  GAO-09-856. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2009.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and  Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European  Sites. GAO-09-771. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2009.
Defense Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When  Considering Changes to Missile Defense Agency’s Roles and Missions.  GAO-09-466T. Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense  Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned.  GAO-09-338. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2009.
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost  Estimates for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense.  GAO-08-1068. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2008.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Process for  Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities.  GAO-08-740. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but  Program Is Short of Meeting Goals. GAO-08-448. Washington, D.C.: March  14, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency’s Flexibility Reduces  Transparency of Program Cost. GAO-07-799T. Washington, D.C.: April 30,  2007.