Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Preparedness to Recover from Possible Attacks Using Radiological or Nuclear Materials
Published: 2009-09-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: A terrorist's use of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or improvised nuclear device (IND) to release radioactive materials into the environment could have devastating consequences. The timely cleanup of contaminated areas, however, could speed the restoration of normal operations, thus reducing the adverse consequences from an incident. This testimony examines (1) the extent to which federal agencies are planning to fulfill their responsibilities to assist cities and their states in cleaning up areas contaminated with radioactive materials from RDD and IND incidents; (2) what is known about the federal government's capability to effectively cleanup areas contaminated with radioactive materials from RDD and IND incidents, and (3) suggestions from government emergency management officials on ways to improve federal preparedness to provide assistance to recover from RDD and IND incidents. We also discuss recovery activities in the United Kingdom. This testimony is based on our ongoing review of recovery preparedness issues for which we examined applicable federal laws and guidance; interviewed officials from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Energy (DOE), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and surveyed emergency management officials from 13 large cities and their states, as well as FEMA and EPA regional office officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DHS, through FEMA, is responsible for developing a comprehensive emergency management system to respond to and recover from natural disasters and terrorists attacks, including RDD and IND attacks. The response phase would involve evacuations and providing medical treatment to those who were injured; the recovery phase would include cleaning up the radioactive contamination from an attack in order to permit people to return to their homes and businesses. To date, much federal attention has been given to developing a response framework, with less attention to recovery. Our survey found that almost all cities and states would be so overwhelmed by an RDD or IND incident that they would rely on the federal government to conduct almost all analysis and cleanup activities that are essential first steps towards recovery. However, we found that the federal government has not sufficiently planned to undertake these activities. For example, FEMA has not issued a national disaster recovery strategy or plans for RDD and IND incidents as required by law. Existing federal guidance provides only limited direction for federal agencies to develop their own recovery plans and conduct exercises to test preparedness. Out of over 70 RDD and IND exercises conducted in the last 5 years, only three have included interagency recovery discussions following a response exercise. Although DOE and EPA have experience in the cleanup of small-scale radiation-contaminated areas, their lack of knowledge and capability to apply approaches to address the magnitude of an RDD or an IND incident could increase recovery costs and delay completion. According to anexpert at Idaho National Laboratory, experience has shown that not selecting the appropriate decontamination technologies can generate waste types that are more difficult to remove than the original material and can create more debris requiring disposal--leading to increased costs. Limitations in laboratory capacity to rapidly test thousands of material samples during cleanup, and uncertainty regarding where to dispose of radioactive debris could also slow the recovery process. At least two-thirds of the city, state, and federal respondents expressed concern about federal capability to provide the necessary analysis and cleanup actions to promote recovery after these incidents. Nearly all survey respondents had suggestions to improve federal recovery preparedness for RDD and IND incidents. For example, almost all the cities and states identified the need for a national disaster recovery strategy to address gaps and overlaps in federal guidance. All but three cities wanted additional guidance, for example, on monitoring radioactivity levels, cleanup standards, and management of radioactive waste. Most cities wanted more interaction with federal agencies and joint exercising to test recovery preparedness. Finally, our review of the United Kingdom's preparedness to recover from radiological terrorism showed that that country has already taken actions similar to those suggested by our survey respondents, such as issuing national recovery guidance, conducting a full-scale recovery exercise, and publishing a national handbook for radiation incidents.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss preliminary observations from our  ongoing work reviewing the federal government’s preparedness to assist  localities in recovering from a terrorist attack involving either a  radiological dispersal device (RDD)—frequently referred to as a dirty  bomb—or an improvised nuclear device (IND). Responding to such an  attack would involve evacuations, providing medical treatment to those  who were injured, and protecting property; recovery would include  cleaning up the radioactive contamination from an attack in order to  permit people to return to their homes and businesses. A terrorist’s use of  an RDD or IND to release radioactive materials into the environment could  have devastating consequences. However, quickly analyzing and cleaning  up contaminated areas after a deliberate release of radioactive materials  could speed the recovery from such an attack by restoring normal  operations of critical infrastructure, services, businesses, and public  activities, and thus reducing the many adverse consequences from an  attack. According to a recent report of the National Science and  Technology Council, which coordinates science and technology policy  within the Executive Office of the President, the ability of government to  quickly and decisively respond to and recover from an RDD or IND  incident is key to national resiliency. Importantly, the Council noted that  being prepared to recover from these incidents may even provide an  element of deterrence if the adversary perceives less potential for long- lasting harm.
The consequences of a terrorist attack using an RDD or IND would not  only include loss of life but also enormous psychological and economic  impacts. An RDD would disperse radioactive materials into the  environment through a conventional explosive or through other means.  Depending on the type of RDD, the area contaminated could be as small as  part of a building or city block or as large as several square miles. An IND  would create a nuclear explosion producing extreme heat, powerful  shockwaves, and intense radiation that would be immediately lethal to  individuals within miles of the explosion, as well as radioactive fallout  over thousands of square miles. Thus, the consequences of RDD and IND  incidents would vary in magnitude, with an RDD expected to cause few  deaths but produce significant economic and psychological impacts, and  an IND causing thousands of deaths and more extensive destruction. An  RDD is thought to be a more likely terrorist weapon than an IND given the  prevalent commercial use of radioactive source material—for example, in  some medical and industrial equipment—and the relatively uncomplicated  way in which this material could be dispersed. In contrast, detonating an  IND would require a terrorist group to obtain nuclear weapons material— which is generally heavily secured—and have highly sophisticated  expertise and equipment to fabricate this material into a weapon.
If an RDD or IND incident occurred, a number of federal, state, and local  government departments and agencies would be involved in the analysis  and cleanup of areas contaminated with radioactive material as part of the  recovery process. Generally, state and local governments have primary  responsibility for recovering from disasters, but the federal government  may provide assistance when an incident exceeds state and local  resources or when an incident is managed by federal agencies under their  own authorities. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the  principal federal agency for domestic incident management. The primary  mission of its Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is to  develop a comprehensive emergency management system of  preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation. For an RDD  or IND incident, DHS would be the lead agency in coordinating federal  assistance to state and local governments. For these incidents, DHS would  rely on other federal agencies that have more experience with the analysis  and cleanup of areas contaminated with radioactive materials. For  example, in certain circumstances, the Department of Energy (DOE)  would have primary responsibilities for the initial analysis of areas  contaminated with radioactive materials, and the Environmental  Protection Agency (EPA) would have primary responsibility for cleaning  up the radiation-contaminated areas. The Department of Defense (DOD)  would act in support of the primary federal agencies. Federal agencies,  including EPA, DOE, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as well as state  regulatory agencies have set various cleanup standards for  decontaminating affected areas.
The risk of terrorists using an RDD or IND is, in large part, determined by  their ability to gain access to the materials needed to construct these  devices. Over the past few years, we have issued a number of reports on  the security of nuclear and radiological materials, and facilities that house  them. Overall, our work has shown that despite investing billions of  dollars in new technology to upgrade security procedures, gaps continue  to exist in our nation’s ability to prevent terrorists from accessing or  smuggling dangerous quantities of radioactive material into the country.  For example, in 2007, we testified before Congress that our own  investigators were able to set up phony businesses and obtain a legitimate  NRC license that would have permitted us to obtain dangerous quantities  of radioactive material. Our investigators were able to obtain this NRC  license just months after NRC had completed a lengthy process to  strengthen its licensing procedures. In 2008, we reported that NRC, in  developing its security requirements for research reactors, had not fully  considered the risks associated with terrorists attacking these facilities— many of which are located on college campuses. Such an attack could  involve terrorists sabotaging a reactor in order to disperse radioactive  material over neighboring communities—similar to an RDD. We have also  reported on DHS’s and FEMA’s preparedness for, response to, and  recovery from disasters in 2007, 2008, and 2009.
Our testimony today presents preliminary observations from our ongoing  effort to examine (1) the extent to which federal agencies are planning to  fulfill their responsibilities to assist cities and their states in cleaning up  areas contaminated with radioactive material from RDD and IND  incidents; (2) what is known about the federal government’s capability to  effectively cleanup areas contaminated with radioactive material from  RDD and IND incidents; and (3) suggestions from government emergency  management officials on ways to improve federal preparedness to assist  state and local governments in recovering from RDD and IND incidents. In  addition, we are providing information on our review of actions taken in  the United Kingdom to prepare for recovering from RDD and IND  incidents. We expect to issue our final report on this topic in November  2009.
To address these objectives, we examined pertinent federal law,  presidential directives, and other executive guidance; interviewed  cognizant officials from DHS, DOE, EPA, FEMA, NRC, and national  laboratories; and conducted a survey of emergency management officials  in 13 cities considered to be at high- or medium-risk of such attacks,  officials in these cities’ states, and similar officials in all federal FEMA and  EPA regional offices. We also reviewed information on the number and  type of RDD and IND response and recovery exercises that have been  conducted in the last 5 years. Finally, we visited the United Kingdom to  review its preparedness to recover from RDD and IND incidents at the  suggestion of EPA officials and because it has addressed a fairly recent  radiological release incident in a large urban area.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that  terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials into the  United States. These materials could be used to produce either an IND or  an RDD. An IND is a crude nuclear bomb made with highly enriched  uranium or plutonium. Nonproliferation experts estimate that a successful  IND could have a yield in the 10 to 20 kiloton range (the equivalent to  10,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT). An IND with a 20-kiloton yield would have  the same force as the equivalent of the yield of the bomb that destroyed  Nagasaki; it could devastate the heart of a medium-sized U.S. city and  result in thousands of casualties and radiation contamination over a wide  area.
Security experts have also raised concerns that terrorists could obtain  radioactive material used in medicine, research, agriculture, and industry  to construct an RDD, or dirty bomb. This radioactive material is  encapsulated, or sealed in metal, such as stainless steel, titanium, or  platinum, to prevent its dispersal and is commonly called a sealed  radioactive source. These sealed sources are used throughout the United  States and other countries in equipment designed to, among other things,  diagnose and treat illnesses, preserve food, detect flaws in pipeline welds,  and determine the moisture content of soil. Depending on their use, sealed  sources contain different types of radioactive material, such as strontium- 90, cobalt-60, cesium-137, plutonium-238, and plutonium-239. If these  sealed sources fell into the hands of terrorists, they could use them to  produce a simple, but potentially dangerous weapon, by packaging  explosives, such as dynamite, with the radioactive material, which would  be dispersed when the bomb went off. Depending on its type, amount, and  form (powder or solid), the dispersed radioactive material could cause  radiation sickness in people nearby and produce serious economic costs  and the psychological and social disruption associated with the evacuation  and subsequent cleanup of the contaminated area. While no terrorists have  detonated a dirty bomb in a city, Chechen separatists placed a canister  containing cesium-137 in a Moscow park in the mid-1990s. Although the  device was not detonated and no radioactive material was dispersed, the  incident demonstrated that terrorists have the capability and willingness  to use radiological materials as weapons of terrorism.
Another form of nuclear terrorism occurred with the release of radioactive  materials in London. In November 2006, Alexander Litvinenko, a former  officer of the Russian Federal Security Service, was poisoned with a gram  of polonium-210—about the size of a grain of salt. His poisoning was  detected only after he was hospitalized for a few weeks and tested for  symptoms of radiation exposure because of hair loss. Following the  poisoning, forensic investigators identified, with the help of the victim, 47  sites across London where he had been during the few days between his  poisoning and death. Of these locations, about 20 showed signs of this  radioactive material. Investigators identified over 900 people who might  have been exposed to the polonium, including some who may have been  exposed while aboard airplanes. After a thorough examination, a few of  these individuals turned out to have significant exposure levels. The  decontamination activities at these sites, including a hotel room, spanned  19 days, involved a number of methods and technologies, and cost in  excess of $200,000.
section_title: Cities and States Would Likely Request Federal Assistance for Cleanup of Radiation- Contaminated Areas after RDD and IND Incidents, but Limited Federal Planning Exists for Recovering from Such Incidents
paragraphs: While state and local government responders would be expected to  respond first to a terrorist incident within their jurisdiction, they would  also expect that the federal government would be prepared to provide the  necessary assistance for them to expedite the recovery from such an  incident. Emergency management officials from 13 cities and the majority  of their respective states indicated in our survey that they would rely on  the federal government to conduct and fund all or almost all analysis and  cleanup activities associated with recovering from an RDD or IND incident  of the magnitude described in the National Planning Scenarios. However,  when asked which federal agencies they would turn to for this assistance,  city and state respondents replied inconsistently and frequently listed  several federal agencies for the same activity. In our view, these responses  indicate that there is confusion among city and state officials regarding  federal responsibilities for these activities in the event of a terrorist  incident. This confusion, if not addressed, could hamper the timely  recovery from an RDD or IND incident. Emergency management officials  from all the cities and most of their respective states told us they would  rely on the federal government because their technical and financial  resources would be overwhelmed by a large RDD incident—and certainly  by an IND incident. Most of these officials believe they could adequately  address a smaller RDD incident, such as one that is confined to a city  block or inside a building. Despite this anticipated reliance on the federal  government, we obtained mixed responses as to whether these RDD and  IND recovery activities should be primarily a federal responsibility. Fewer  than half of the respondents from the cities (6 of 13), but most of those  from states (8 of 10) indicated that it should be primarily a federal  responsibility. The others stressed the need for shared responsibilities  with the federal government.
Despite the anticipated reliance by city and state governments on the  federal government for analysis and cleanup activities following an RDD  or IND incident, FEMA has not developed a national disaster recovery  strategy or related plans to guide involvement of federal agencies in these  recovery activities, as directed by federal law and executive guidance. To  date, much federal attention has been given to developing a response  framework, with less attention to recovery. The new FEMA coordinator  for the development of a national disaster recovery strategy told us that  while the previous administration had drafted a “white paper” addressing  this strategy, the new administration has decided to rethink the entire  approach. She also told us that FEMA recognizes its responsibility to  prepare a national disaster recovery strategy but she could not provide a  time frame for its completion. However, she stated that when a recovery  strategy is issued it should provide guidance to revise state, local, and  other federal agency operational plans to fulfill their respective  responsibilities. Moreover, the FEMA official in charge of planning told us  that the agency has put on hold issuing component plans that describe  how federal capabilities would be integrated to support state and local  planning for response to and recovery from RDD and IND incidents.
Some existing federal guidance documents addressing the assets and  responsibilities of federal agencies for both response and to a lesser extent  recovery-related activities have been issued as annexes to the National  Response Framework and in other documents. For example, there is a  nuclear and radiological incident annex, which describes the policies,  situations, concept of operations, and responsibilities of the federal  departments and agencies for the immediate response and short-term  recovery from incidents involving the release of radiological materials.  There are also emergency support function annexes that provide a  structure for coordinating federal interagency support in response to  domestic incidents.
In addition, two other sources of guidance have been issued that,  according to FEMA officials, represent stop-gap measures until it can issue  more integrated planning guidance. In 2008, FEMA issued updated  guidance for protection and recovery following RDD and IND incidents.  This guidance was to provide some direction to federal, state, and local  emergency response officials in developing operational plans and  response protocols for protection of emergency workers after such an  incident. In regard to recovery, this document recommended a process to  involve the affected public, state and local officials, and other important  stakeholders in the identification of acceptable cleanup criteria, given the  specifics of the incident. The other document, issued by the Homeland  Security Council, pertains to responding to an IND in the first few days  prior to the arrival of other necessary federal resources. This document  was prepared because the prior FEMA guidance did not sufficiently  prepare state and local emergency response authorities for managing the  catastrophic consequences of a nuclear detonation. Moreover, DOE, EPA  and DOD are developing more detailed operational guidance on their own  based on the existing federal guidance. For example, DOE has supported  research on operational guidelines for implementation of protective  actions described in the FEMA guidance, EPA has drafted guidance for  the optimization process following RDD and IND incidents, and DOD has  established operational plans for consequence management following  terrorist incidents, including RDD and IND attacks.
Federal agencies and local jurisdictions have been using the available  guidance as a basis for planning RDD and IND exercises to test the  adequacy of their plans and skills in a real-time, realistic environment to  evaluate their level of preparedness. We identified more than 70 RDD and  IND response exercises planned and carried out by federal, state and local  agencies since mid-2003. However, officials with FEMA’s National  Exercise Directorate told us that only three of the RDD response exercises  had a recovery component. According to these officials, recovery  discussions following an RDD or IND response exercise have typically not  occurred because of the time needed to fully address the response  objectives of the exercise, which are seen as a higher priority. The most  recent response exercise, based in Albany, New York, and planned by  DOE, set aside 2 days for federal, state, and local agencies to discuss  operational recovery issues. One unresolved operational issue discussed  during this exercise pertained to the transition of the leadership of the  Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) from  the initial analysis of the contaminated area, led by DOE, to the later  cleanup phase, led by EPA. For example, there are remaining questions  regarding the level and quality of the monitoring data necessary for EPA to  accept the leadership of FRMAC. While we were told that this transitional  issue has been discussed in exercises dating back to the development of  the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan in 1984, it has only  recently been discussed in RDD or IND response exercises. Another  unresolved operational recovery issue pertains to the distribution of  responsibilities for the ownership, removal, and disposal of radioactive  debris from an RDD or IND incident. Both of these operational issues are  to be examined again in the first full-scale RDD recovery exercise, planned  and led by EPA, to take place April 2010.
section_title: Insufficient Knowledge and Capability to Use Available Approaches for Cleanup of Radiation- Contaminated Areas Could Impede Efforts to Recover from RDD and IND Incidents
paragraphs: Although some federal agencies, such as DOE and EPA, have substantial  experience using various cleanup methods and technologies to address  radiation-contaminated areas, little is known about how these approaches  might be applied in an RDD or IND incident. For example, DOE has  invested hundreds of millions of dollars in research, development, and  testing of methods and technologies for cleaning up and decommissioning  contaminated structures and soils—legacies of the Cold War. In addition,  since the passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,  Compensation, and Liability Act in 1980, which established the Superfund  program, EPA has undertaken significant efforts to study, develop, and use  technologies that can address radioactive contamination.  DOD has also  played a major role in studying potential applications for innovative  technologies for its Superfund sites.
Not much is known, however, about the application to RDD and IND  incidents of available cleanup methods and technologies because such an  incident has never occurred in this country, although research is currently  underway to gain a better understanding of potential applications.  According to decontamination experts at Lawrence Livermore National  Laboratory, current research has focused on predicting the effects of  radiation release in urban settings through simulation, small scale testing,  and theory. In addition, researchers at EPA’s National Homeland Security  Research Center informed us that while there are standard methods and  technologies for cleaning up radiation-contaminated areas, more research  is needed to develop standard national guidance for their application in  urban environments. The lack of guidance for identifying cost-effective  cleanup methods and technologies in the event of an RDD or IND incident  might mean that the cleanup approach taken could unnecessarily increase  the cost of recovery. According to a decontamination expert at Idaho  National Laboratory, for example, experience has shown that not selecting  the appropriate decontamination technologies can generate waste types  that are more difficult to remove than the original material and can create  more debris requiring disposal—leading to increased costs. Moreover, he  told us that without guidance and discussion early in the response phase, a  contractor might use an approach for no other reason than it was used  before in an unrelated situation. In addition, the Lawrence Livermore  National Laboratory decontamination experts told us that  decontamination costs can increase dramatically depending on the  selection of an initial approach and the length of time before remediation  actions are taken. For example, they said that the conventional use of high  pressure water hosing to decontaminate a building is effective under  normal conditions but could be the wrong cleanup approach for an RDD  using cesium-137 because the force of the water would actually cause this  radioactive isotope to penetrate even further into porous surfaces. A  senior EPA official with the Office of Radiation and Indoor Air told us that  studies are currently underway to determine the efficacy of pressure  washing for removing contamination from porous urban surfaces.
In addition to the lack of knowledge about the application of cleanup  methods and technologies for wide-area urban contamination from an  RDD or IND incident, there are also limitations in federal capabilities to  handle in a timely manner the magnitude of tasks and challenges that  would be associated with these incidents. For example, we found that  limitations in federal capabilities to complete some analysis and cleanup  activities might slow the recovery from an RDD or IND incident, including:  (1) characterizing the full extent of areas contaminated with radioactive  materials; (2) completing laboratory validation of contaminated areas and  levels of cleanup after applying decontamination approaches; and (3)  removing and disposing of radioactive debris and waste. Respondents  representing most of the cities (9 of 13) and states (7 of 10), and  respondents from most FEMA regional offices (6 of 9) and almost all EPA  regional offices (9 of 10) expressed concerns about the capabilities of  federal agencies to provide the assistance needed to complete the  necessary analysis and cleanup activities in the event of an RDD or IND  incident.
section_title: City, State, and Federal Emergency Management Officials Have Several Suggestions to Improve Federal Recovery Preparedness for RDD and IND Incidents
paragraphs: Respondents from nearly all the cities and states we surveyed expressed  the need for a national disaster recovery strategy to address gaps and  overlaps in current federal guidance. According to one city official,  “recovery is what it is all about.” In developing such a recovery strategy,  respondents from the cities, like those from their states, want the federal  government to consult with them in the initial formulation of a recovery  strategy through working and focus groups, perhaps organized on a  regional basis. Respondents representing most cities (10 of 13) and states  (7 of 10) also provided specifics on the type of planning guidance  necessary, including integration and clarification of responsibilities among  federal, state, and local governments. For example, respondents from  some of the cities sought better guidance on monitoring radioactivity  levels, acceptable cleanup standards, and management of radioactive  waste. Most respondents from cities expressed the need for greater  planning interactions with the federal government and more exercises to  test recovery plans. One city respondent cited the need for recovery  exercises on a regional basis so the cities within the region might better  exchange lessons learned. Respondents from most cities (11 of 13) and  their states (7 of 10) said that they planned to conduct RDD and IND  recovery exercises in the future. Finally, emergency management officials  representing almost all cities and states in our survey offered some  opinions on the need for intelligence information on RDD and IND threats.  They said that sharing information with law enforcement agencies is  necessary for appropriate planning for an RDD or IND incident—which  they generally consider as low-level threats—but only half of the  respondents indicated that they were getting sufficient intelligence  information. Emergency management officials from FEMA and EPA  regional offices generally concurred with these observations and  suggestions of the city and state respondents.
section_title: The United Kingdom’s Handling of the 2006 Polonium Incident and Subsequent Actions to Better Prepare for an RDD or IND Incident
paragraphs: While it was more limited in scope than what is usually envisioned as an  RDD incident, the aftermath of the 2006 polonium poisoning incident in  London had many of the characteristics of an RDD including testing  hundreds of people who may have been exposed to radiation and a  cleanup of numerous radiation-contaminated areas. All this activity  resulted from an amount of radioactive material the size of a grain of  salt—many times smaller than the amount of radioactive material found in  certain common medical devices that could be used in an RDD. Because of  its experience in dealing with the cleanup from the 2006 polonium incident  and other actions the United Kingdom has taken to prepare for an RDD or  IND attack, we visited that country to examine its recovery preparedness  programs. United Kingdom officials told us that the attention to recovery  in their country is rooted in decades of experience with the conflict in  Northern Ireland, dealing with widespread contamination from the  Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, and a national history of  resilience—that is, the ability to manage and recover from hardship. We  found that actions the United Kingdom reported taking to prepare for  recovery from RDD and IND incidents are similar to many of the  suggestions for improvement in federal preparedness that we obtained  through our survey of city, state, and federal regional office emergency  management officials in the United States. For example, we found that the  United Kingdom reported taking the following actions:    Enacted civil protection legislation in 2004, with subsequent non-statutory  emergency response and recovery guidance to complement this  emergency preparedness legislation. The emergency response and  recovery guidance describes the generic framework for multi-agency  response and recovery for all levels of government. The guidance  emphasizes that response and recovery are not discrete activities and do  not occur sequentially, rather recovery should be an integral part of  response from the very beginning, as actions taken at all times can  influence longer-term outcomes of the communities.
Developed on-line, updatable national recovery guidance in 2007. This  guidance reinforces and updates the early emergency response and  recovery guidance by establishing, among other things, a recovery  planning process during the response phase so that the potential impacts  of early advice and actions are explored and understood for the future  recovery of the affected areas.
Issued a national handbook for radiation incidents in 2008. This handbook  provides scientific information, including checklists for planning in  advance of an incident, fact sheets on decontamination approaches, and  advice on how to select and combine management of these approaches.
Conducted a full-scale RDD recovery exercise in 2008. This exercise,  involving several hundred participants, provided a unique opportunity to  examine and test the recovery planning process within the urgency of a  compressed time frame. The lessons learned from this exercise were  incorporated into the United Kingdom’s recovery strategy.
Issued updated nuclear recovery plan guidance in 2009. This guidance  provides direction on recovery from events involving a radiological release  from a civil or defense nuclear reactor, as well as the malicious use of  radiological or nuclear materials. Among other things, it requires that all  high-risk cities in the United Kingdom prepare recovery plans for such  incidents.
In addition to these initiatives, in 2005, the United Kingdom established a  special Government Decontamination Service. This organization was  created out of recognition that it would not be cost-effective for each  entity—national, regional, and local government—to maintain the level of  expertise needed for cleaning up chemical, biological, radiological, and  nuclear materials, given that such events are rare.
Finally, according to United Kingdom officials, the 2006 polonium incident  in London showed the value of recovery planning. In particular, through  this incident United Kingdom officials gained an appreciation for the need  to have an established cleanup plan, including a process for determining  cleanup levels, sufficient laboratory capacity to analyze a large quantity of  samples for radiation, and procedures for handling the radioactive waste.  Furthermore, they found that implementing cleanup plans in the polonium  poisoning incident and testing plans in the November 2008 recovery  exercise have helped the United Kingdom to better prepare for a larger  RDD or IND incident.
Madam Chairwoman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be  happy to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the  Subcommittee may have at this time.
For further information about this testimony, please contact me at   (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Individuals who made important  contributions to this testimony were Ned Woodward (Assistant Director),  Nancy Crothers, James Espinoza, Tracey King, Thomas Laetz, Tim  Persons, Jay Smale, and Keo Vongvanith.
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