National Security: An Overview of Professional Development Activities Intended to Improve Interagency Collaboration
Published: 2010-11-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Agencies must engage in a whole-of-government approach to protect the nation and its interests from diverse threats such as terrorism and infectious diseases. However, GAO has reported that gaps in national security staff knowledge and skills pose a barrier to the interagency collaboration needed to address these threats. Training and other professional development activities could help bridge those gaps. GAO was asked to identify: (1) training and other professional development activities intended to improve the ability of key national security agencies' personnel to collaborate across organizational lines and (2) how these activities were intended to improve participants' collaboration abilities. To address these objectives, GAO asked nine key agencies involved in national security issues to submit information on professional development activities that were explicitly intended to build staff knowledge or skills for improving interagency collaboration. In addition, GAO gathered and analyzed other information such as target audience, participation levels, and participating agencies. GAO also interviewed responsible human capital and training officials. GAO will explore how interagency participation and other factors may influence the success of these activities in a subsequent review.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO identified 225 professional development activities intended to improve participants' ability to collaborate across agency lines. These ranged from ten- month joint professional military education programs and year-long rotations to 30-minute online training courses. Because these activities varied widely across dimensions such as length and learning mode, the activities were grouped to allow for appropriate analysis and comparisons of their characteristics. Overall, we found that DOD, State, and DHS provided most of the professional development activities that met our criteria. We found some variation within the different types of activities, mostly related to provider, mode of delivery, or participation levels. DHS, DOD, and State provided the majority of training activities, which primarily consisted of short-term, online, or classroom courses. DOD provided most of the exercise programs and all of the JPME programs. DOD and State provided the majority of interagency rotational programs and all of the leadership development programs that met our criteria. Although agencies could not provide participation data in every instance, the data obtained indicated that overall, interagency participation was lower in activities that required a longer time commitment, such as rotations and full-time joint professional military education. Analysis of the activities GAO identified showed that they are intended to provide opportunities to (1) build common foundational knowledge of the national security arena; (2) develop specific skills, such as how to plan, lead, and execute interagency efforts; and (3) establish networks among personnel from national security agencies that could lead to improved interagency collaboration. According to human capital and training officials at several agencies, the level of interagency participation may affect how a given professional development activity can improve its participants' ability to collaborate. GAO does not have any recommendations in this report. Technical comments from the agencies reviewed were incorporated where appropriate.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: With threats to the U.S. as diverse as terrorism, cyber attacks, drug  trafficking, infectious diseases, energy security, and the adverse effects of  climate change, the national security landscape has recently evolved in  complexity and scope. As we have reported, because no single federal  agency has the ability to address these threats alone, agencies must work  together in a whole-of-government approach to protect our nation and its  interests. Our previous work has shown that there are a number of  barriers to agencies’ collaboration in addressing these threats. One barrier  stems from gaps in the knowledge and skills national security  professionals need to work together across agency lines. Our work has  also shown that participation in interagency training and other  professional development activities may help bridge such gaps by  enhancing mutual trust and understanding among personnel from different  organizations. The 2010 National Security Strategy also underscores the  importance of professional development for improving interagency  collaboration, calling for adapting the education and training of national  security personnel to meet modern challenges.
To help Congress better understand what actions agencies are taking to  bridge these gaps in personnel knowledge and skills, you asked us to  identify: (1) training and other professional development activities  intended to improve the abilities of personnel from key agencies involved  in national security issues to collaborate across organizational lines and  (2) how these activities were intended to improve participants’  collaboration abilities. As you also requested, a subsequent report will  address factors that contribute to or challenge the success of such  activities and programs.
GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National  Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce and Information Sharing, GAO-09-904SP  (Washington, D.C.: September 2009).
We excluded Intelligence Community agencies under the Office of the Director of National  Intelligence, which will be addressed in a separate GAO review. asking them to identify and submit information on all professional  development activities they were aware of that met these criteria:    explicitly intends to build knowledge or skills among federal civilian  and/or military personnel to encourage or improve collaboration with  personnel of other federal departments;  targets federal civilian and/or military personnel involved in developing or  implementing national security policy, strategy, missions, or operations,  but not support functions such as administration, financial management,  or procurement;  relates to national security activities; and  is an ongoing, sustained activity, not a one-time event.
We took several steps to obtain as complete, consistent, and accurate  information as possible. We asked agency officials to submit information  on relevant professional development activities they hosted, as well as  activities their personnel attended at other agencies or training  institutions. By comparing these responses, we were able to identify and  include some relevant activities that host agencies did not submit. For  example, although officials at three agencies said their personnel  participated in the National Exercise Program, the two agencies chiefly  responsible for organizing the program did not initially include the  program in their responses. We followed up with human capital,  education, training, and program officials multiple times to reconcile such  differences, which may have occurred because agencies have different  working definitions of “national security” and “collaboration,” and  different ways of understanding how these concepts might intersect.
Agencies submitted a number of activities that they said were important to  improving interagency collaboration in the national security arena that we  excluded from our analysis because they were not explicitly intended to  improve their participants’ collaboration abilities and therefore did not fall  within the scope of this report. For example, several agencies submitted  information on collaborative work groups convened to address a  particular national security concern, such as the Treasury-led Committee  on Foreign Investment in the U.S., which brings together personnel from  multiple federal agencies to identify and address potential national  security risks posed by certain foreign investments. Several agencies also  submitted interagency assignments such as details, attachés, and advisors  intended to support the agencies’ missions, but the agencies did not  manage these positions as professional development opportunities, and as  such they lacked an explicitly developmental element intended to improve  participants’ collaboration abilities beyond the specific assignment.
More than 200 of the more than 350 activities that agencies submitted met  our criteria and we therefore included them in our inventory. We gathered  additional information on these, including available fiscal year 2009  participation data, and analyzed characteristics and statistics such as  typical duration, eligibility criteria, participation rates, and participating  agencies to identify groups of activities, patterns, themes, and other  information. We determined these data to be reliable for the purposes of  identifying and describing developmental activities. We further assessed  the reliability of the participation data by interviewing knowledgeable  agency officials and determined these data to be sufficiently reliable to  report approximate participation levels for 2009. The complete inventory  of activities is available in appendix II and the electronic supplement  GAO-11-109SP.
We conducted our work from September 2009 to November 2010 in  accordance with all sections of GAO’s Quality Assurance Framework that  are relevant to our objectives. The framework requires that we plan and  perform the engagement to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to meet  our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations in our work. We  believe that the information and data obtained and the analysis conducted  provide a reasonable basis for any findings and conclusions in this  product.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In the past, DOD, USAID, and State were the federal agencies primarily  responsible for national security. Over the past decade, however, events  such as 9/11 and the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have  underscored the need for a broader and more integrated national security  effort. One of the first structural changes Congress made to address this  need was to integrate 22 separate agencies with domestic national security  responsibilities to create DHS. Today, greater emphasis is being placed on  identifying whole-of-government approaches to developing national  security policies and carrying out operations. Such an approach  emphasizes the contributions of agencies not traditionally associated with  national security. For example, Commerce plays a role in monitoring  exports of technology to make sure that sensitive items with military uses  do not fall into the hands of our enemies.
In light of the challenges that the U.S. government continues to experience  in its efforts to coordinate the actions of the agencies involved—whether it  be preventing a terrorist attack or overseeing reconstruction and  stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan—there is an ongoing policy  debate on how to enhance and sustain interagency collaborative efforts.  Among the range of proposals for reform, there is a growing consensus  that the government’s professional development efforts could contribute  to more effective interagency collaboration, which is seen as key to U.S.  national security. Specifically, a number of reports—such as the Project  on National Security Reform’s Forging a New Shield and the 2006  Quadrennial Defense Review, written by experts working in the national  security field—recommended establishing a cadre of national security  specialists from all relevant departments and agencies, and placing them  in a long-term career development program designed to provide them with  a better understanding of the processes and cultures of other agencies.  Proponents contend that such a program would help the U.S. government  prepare personnel with national security responsibilities to plan, execute,  and lead national security missions. More recently, in September 2010,  Congressmen Ike Skelton and Geoff Davis introduced the Interagency  National Security Professional Education, Administration, and  Development Systems Act of 2010 which seeks to create a system to  educate, train, and develop interagency national security professionals  across the government.
Agencies have historically defined their own professional development  activities for their national security personnel. In 2007, however, the Bush  Administration launched the National Security Professional Development  (NSPD) initiative to integrate professional development activities for  national security personnel as part of a larger effort to enhance  interagency collaboration. Executive Order 13434, May 17, 2007, entitled  National Security Professional Development, required the heads of all  agencies with national security responsibilities to identify or enhance  current professional development activities for their national security  personnel. In addition, the order established an Executive Steering  Committee composed of 15 agency Secretaries or Directors (or their  designees) to facilitate implementation of the National Strategy for  Professional Development. To coordinate NSPD-related activities among  agencies, the Executive Steering Committee established the NSPD  Integration Office, which created an online repository of information on  available training and other professional development activities for  national security professionals.
Recently, two studies have been launched to reexamine NSPD and to take  a more comprehensive look at the skills, education, training, and  professional experiences that interagency national security professionals  need at various career stages. While awaiting the results of these studies,  the NSPD executive staff is reviewing issues related to the scope and  definition of national security professionals and revising the NSPD  strategy and implementation plan. Several agencies reported putting  implementation of their NSPD-related training and professional  development activities on hold pending the results of these reviews, or  other direction from the administration. In addition, the online repository  of information is no longer available.
section_title: Key Agencies Involved in National Security Issues Offer a Range of Professional Development Activities Intended to Foster Interagency Collaboration
paragraphs: We identified 225 professional development activities intended to improve  participants’ abilities to collaborate across organizational lines. These  ranged from 10-month joint professional military education programs and  year-long rotations to 30-minute online courses. Because these activities  varied so widely across dimensions such as length and learning mode, we  grouped them in a way that would allow us to analyze their characteristics  and make appropriate comparisons. These five general groups included  training courses and programs, training exercises, interagency rotational  programs, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), and leadership  development programs. We provide further description of these groups in  figure 1.
Additionally, six of the eight agencies represented on the Executive  Steering Committee established by the executive order—DOD, DHS,  Justice, Commerce, State, and DOE—identified training related to the  National Security Professional Development (NSPD) initiative. We  categorized NSPD separately because, although the developmental  activities created under its auspices to date have included mostly online  training courses, when fully implemented, NSPD was intended to include a  range of activities from training courses to interagency assignments,  fellowships, and exchanges. NSPD was intended to play a critical role in  informing national security professional development activities, and as  such, is included in our review in addition to the five groups listed above.
Overall, we found that DOD, State, and DHS provided most of the  professional development activities that met our criteria. We found some  variation within the different types of activities, mostly related to provider,  mode of delivery, or participation levels. DHS, DOD, and State provided  the majority of training activities, which primarily consisted of short-term,  online, or classroom courses. DOD provided most of the exercise  programs and all of the JPME programs. DOD and State provided the  majority of interagency rotational programs and all of the leadership  development programs that met our criteria. Each of the other agencies  we reviewed provided at least one relevant professional development  activity. All of the agencies we reviewed reported sending personnel to  participate in one or more activities in fiscal year 2009.
Among the activities for which agencies provided participation data, we  found that short-term, online training tended to have the highest  participation levels. Participation levels associated with longer-term  activities—such as interagency rotational programs—were much lower.  Figure 1 below summarizes these and other findings and provides more  detailed descriptions of our six activity groups.
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Planned learning for acquiring and retaining  skills, knowledge, and attitudes. In our review,  most were online courses provided by DHS’s EMI  or DOD’s Joint Forces Command, or classroom  courses provided by State’s FSI.
Scenario-based training that allows for the  development, improvement, or display of  specific capabilities or skills. In our review, most  were DOD joint military exercises.
Work assignments at a different agency from  the one in which the participant is normally  employed, with an explicit professional  development purpose. In our review, most  involved sending personnel between civilian  agencies and the military. ■  Most exercises intended to bring participants    together to practice working collaboratively     within a range of national security-related     scenarios. ■  Fiscal year 2009 participation: 240 ■  Most courses provided a common framework    for understanding national security topics or    information on how to work with an agency     with national security responsibilities. ■  Most rotations provided participants      opportunities to learn about organizational     culture and build networks among partner     national security agencies.
Photo: Bureau  of Alcohol,  Tobacco,  Firearms and  Explosives.
Photo: State.
In or review, the mjority of trining was throgh DHS Emergency Mgement Intitte’s  online co on integrted ntionl emergency repone topic (fr left) or throgh Ste  Foreign Service Intitte’s classroom co (not pictred). A few other gencie nd  orgniztion o provided trining co on pecilized topic. For exmple, DOJ provided   coe for lw enforcement offici on condcting pot-ast invetigtion (fr right), nd  Ste’s Office of the Coordintor for Recontrction nd Sabiliztion provided  coe thdevelop the kill plnner need to condct intergency conflict assssment in the field  (center).
subsections: section_title: DHS, DOD, and State Provided Majority of Short- Term Training Courses and DHS Online Courses Had Highest Participation Levels of All Training Activities
paragraphs: According to our analysis, DHS, DOD, and State provided the majority of  the 101 short-term training courses that met our criteria. Over half of these  courses were provided in a classroom setting; most of the other courses  were provided as online independent study courses, and several courses  either mixed or offered a choice between the two modes. State’s Foreign  Service Institute (FSI) provided most of the 52 classroom directed-study  courses, which typically lasted several days or longer and covered the  range of policy issues that State addresses, such as post-conflict  reconstruction and stabilization and commercial and trade activity. DHS’s  Emergency Management Institute (EMI) and DOD—through its Joint  Knowledge Online system—provided the 43 online courses, most of which  lasted less than 3 hours. These online courses covered topics ranging from  the National Response Framework, which is a framework for how  agencies collaborate on national preparedness planning efforts, to the  roles and responsibilities of different agencies involved in interagency  planning efforts such as Joint Interagency Coordination Groups.16, 17 DOD’s  Information Resources Management College at the National Defense  University (NDU) provided the six courses that mixed classroom and  online learning or offered participants a choice between the two modes.  These courses, such as Multiagency Collaboration and Enterprise Strategic  Planning, covered organizational management topics in the context of  national security and interagency collaboration, and could be taken either  in a 10- to 12-week online format or as a 5-day classroom seminar on the  NDU campus.
Some of the courses targeted participants of certain career levels or with  certain areas of responsibility. For example, EMI’s introductory national  response framework course targeted executive-level personnel from  government and other organizations with responsibilities for emergency  response. Other courses, such as FSI’s Foundations of Interagency  Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations course, did not target a  specific employee level or rank but were open to anyone preparing to  deploy to Afghanistan, Iraq, or other conflict-prone countries.
The National Response Framework presents the guiding principles that enable all  response partners to prepare for and provide a unified national response to disasters and  emergencies—from the smallest incident to the largest catastrophe.
Joint Interagency Coordination Groups, housed within DOD combatant commands, are  intended to serve as a coordinating body among the civilian agencies in Washington, D.C.,  the country ambassadors, the combatant command’s staff, and other multinational and  multilateral bodies within the region.
The vast majority of participation in short-term training courses—95  percent—was associated with DHS online courses offered through EMI,  which is housed within the Federal Emergency Management Agency  (FEMA). EMI tracks participation in two categories: (1) FEMA, and (2) all  other entities, including participants from other DHS agencies. Therefore,  we could not determine how many participants were from DHS and how  many came from other agencies. State and most of the other agencies  providing classroom courses did track interagency participation. Data  show that interagency participation varied widely; some courses had none  at all, while others featured a mix of participants from various agencies.  For most courses, interagency participation was less than 15 percent. See  table 1 for additional information on training courses we identified.
In addition to individual training courses, there were also three long-term  programs associated with advanced degrees that met our criteria. The  College of International Security Affairs at DOD’s NDU provides a part- time certificate or 10-month full-time master’s program that teaches  students how to develop and implement whole-of-government national  and international security strategies for conditions of peace, crisis, and  war. The Interamerican Defense College provides an 11-month Advanced  Course on Hemispheric Security and Defense. Although the majority of  the participants are from other countries, State and DOD also send  personnel to this program, and one of its stated objectives is to foster  connections among participants. Finally, DOD’s Naval Postgraduate  School provides graduate programs ranging from month-long courses to  multiyear master’s and doctoral programs that focus on various aspects of  the defense and national security arenas within an interagency and  intergovernmental context.
section_title: Through Its Military Services and Combatant Commands, DOD Provided Majority of Exercise Programs
paragraphs: According to officials in DOD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD-Readiness), in fiscal year 2009, the  military services or combatant commands led an estimated 84 joint- military exercise programs that addressed a range of national security  matters and sought to improve the ability of participants to work across  agency lines by encouraging interagency participation. In addition, First  Army, which is responsible for U.S. Army Reserve and Army National  Guard training, led an exercise program for military and interagency  civilian personnel preparing to deploy to Afghanistan provincial  reconstruction teams. DOD’s Center for Applied Strategic Learning at  NDU also provided an exercise program for mid- and senior-level federal  personnel and members of Congress, which included crisis simulations in  a range of national security areas such as the Horn of Africa, international  water rights, and space policy.
During fiscal year 2009, there were also four exercise programs provided  by civilian agencies, including State, USDA, and DHS’s FEMA, which is  responsible for coordinating the National Exercise Program (NEP).  Officials from DHS Headquarters and FEMA said that FEMA had  conducted five NEP exercises in fiscal year 2009, including one national- level exercise and four principle-level exercises, which targeted senior  officials. They also said that although FEMA does not track information on  all levels of NEP exercises, up to three more federal strategy or policy- focused exercises are required annually, and there may have been many  more conducted regionally throughout the country during fiscal year  2009.
Some of the exercises, such as those conducted by the Center for Applied  Strategic Learning, targeted mid- and senior-level leadership of federal  agencies and other organizations. However, most of the exercise programs  did not specify a rank or career level for their target participant  population. See table 3 for more information on the subject matter and  number of military and civilian-agency-led exercises.
DOD OUSD-Readiness officials identified 84 exercise programs which  reported 212 individual joint-military exercises during fiscal year 2009.  Although the joint-military exercises were not necessarily created to  facilitate interagency collaboration, officials from both OUSD-Readiness  and the Joint Forces Command acknowledged the importance of such  interagency participation. They recognized that shared training  experiences strengthen the collaborative partnerships between the  military and civilian interagency communities by making the exercises  more realistic and establishing interagency networks among participants.  Joint Forces Command has taken steps to increase interagency  participation, creating a “Partnership Opportunities Catalog” of joint  exercises open to interagency and other partners. It has also begun to  collect and assist with requests for interagency participation from military  services and combatant commands looking for participants from specific  agencies or other partner organizations.
According to DOD, in fiscal year 2009, about 50 percent of the exercise  programs—43 of 84—had some interagency participation. However,  because DOD included state and local personnel in its definition of  interagency participation, it is possible that there were fewer exercise  programs with interagency participation as it is defined in this report.  Also, even though participation data were not systematically tracked for  the two First Army-led fiscal year 2009 Afghanistan provincial  reconstruction team predeployment exercises, an Army official estimated  that approximately 2,500 military personnel participated. In addition, a  USAID official estimated that approximately 40 civilians from USAID and  other agencies, such as State and USDA, participated in the interagency  modules of these exercises during the same time period.
An official at NDU’s Center for Applied Strategic Learning reported that in  fiscal year 2009, through its Strategic Policy Forum and its other policy- related exercises, the Center provided 18 crises simulations for personnel  from a range of agencies. Examples of participating agencies include DOD,  State, DHS, DOJ, USAID, National Aeronautics and Space Administration,  and others.
Both State and USDA provided participation data on their fiscal year 2009  exercises, which reported 24 participants for one State-led exercise and  170 for the USDA exercise. While DHS’s FEMA did not provide NEP data  that differentiated between federal, state, local, and other participants, one  FEMA official estimated that approximately 2,500 personnel from more  than 230 organizations participated in the 2009 national-level exercise.
section_title: Majority of Interagency Rotational Programs Send Personnel between Civilian Agencies and DOD
paragraphs: We identified seven interagency rotational assignment programs that  supported participating agencies’ efforts to achieve their missions while  explicitly seeking to develop participants’ abilities to collaborate on  national security. Five of these rotational assignment programs involved  sending personnel between civilian agencies and the Pentagon or military  learning institutions. For example, State’s Foreign Policy Advisors  program places Foreign Service Officers in the Pentagon and military  commands worldwide as personal advisors to senior military  commanders. State participants work alongside DOD civilians and officers  on a range of national security issues such as international relations and  diplomatic practices. The other two programs involved sending civilian  agency personnel to other federal agencies or executive offices.
Only one of the rotation programs is open to all levels of personnel. The  other programs target personnel at specific ranks or career levels. The  three State-sponsored programs target mid- and senior-level personnel,  while the DOD-sponsored programs are intended for junior or mid-level  personnel and are associated with educational programs. For example, the  Military Academic Collaborations program sends select midshipmen,  cadets, and some instructors from military officer development programs  such as the Academies and university Reserve Officers’ Training Corps  programs to DOE NNSA laboratories for summer internships. Table 4  describes selected characteristics of each rotational program.
One of the programs, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College’s  Interagency Fellows Program, went beyond the scope of a typical rotation,  temporarily assigning military personnel to a civilian agency to enable  civilian personnel from that agency to attend a long-term JPME program.  See figure 2 for more information on that program.
section_title: Army Command and General Staff College’s Interagency Fellows Program
paragraphs: Officials from DOD, USAID, State, and other  agencies say that the disparity in the size of the  military and civilian workforces can make it difficult  for civilian agencies to “keep up” with the military  in participating in longer-term training programs. In  particular, officials point out that military staffing  levels take into account the need for extended  training at standard career intervals, while civilian  agency staffing levels do not. According to  officials at the Army Command and General Staff  College and USAID, the Interagency Fellows  Program was created to help alleviate such  resource limitations, while providing Army  participants with valuable developmental  opportunities. agencies where they work, and share with their  colleagues the Army’s approach to planning and  decision-making. Military and civilian officials  concur that it is important to bring students  together from a mix of organizations to provide a  realistic whole-of-government perspective.
A USAID official involved in the program said that  it is not a perfect exchange, and that the agency is  still learning how to most effectively make use of  the Interagency Fellows. For example, she  explained that there is a learning curve for people  on rotation to a new agency, and that it can take a  while to get them up to speed. She also said that  Interagency Fellows are not always of an  equivalent rank to the USAID personnel away at  the College, which means they cannot always truly  cover their responsibilities. However, despite these  challenges, she said, she believes that the  program provides a creative solution to  participation barriers and will continue to improve  over time. An Army official at the College agreed  that it’s a “win-win situation” for the College, the  agencies, and the participants.
Photos: Noah Albro, Army Command and  General Staff College.
A dent from the Deprtment of Ste  prticipte in the Intergency Fellow  progrm (above). Intergency dent join  militry dent in  class t the Army  Commnd nd GenerSff College (elow).
section_title: Interagency Participation Varied across DOD-Led JPME Programs
paragraphs: According to our analysis, DOD provides relevant JPME programs through  13 academic institutions operated by one of the four military services or  NDU. These programs must meet specific JPME curriculum requirements  established for intermediate, senior, and executive-level education, which  include learning objectives related to a whole-of-government approach to  national security, among other objectives. Such whole-of-government  approaches seek to identify or incorporate all agencies’ contributions to  addressing national security challenges. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and  Marines each have command and staff colleges that provide intermediate- level JPME and war colleges that provide senior-level JPME, within  military service-specific graduate programs. NDU has three colleges—the  Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the National War College, and the  Joint Forces Staff College—that incorporate senior-level JPME curriculum  into 10-month-long master’s programs, among other offerings. NDU also  administers Capstone, an executive-level JPME program that met our  criteria. The program length and target participant populations varied  depending on the level of education, as described in table 5.
Six of the nine agencies we reviewed—DOD, DHS, State, USAID, DOJ, and  DOE—said they sent personnel to one or more of DOD’s JPME programs.  According to information DOD provided for academic year 2009, some  programs, such as those at Air University, had few or no participants from  federal agencies outside of DOD. NDU’s National War College and its  Industrial College of the Armed Forces, which offered senior-level JPME  programs, had the greatest number of interagency participants. See table 6  for information on participation levels at each institution.
section_title: State and DOD Reported Relevant Leadership Development Programs with Varying Degrees of Interagency Participation
paragraphs: According to our analysis, DOD and State offer 11 leadership development  programs that include a focus on interagency collaboration in the national  security arena. Several programs include participation in other activities  described elsewhere in this report, such as JPME or interagency rotations.  For example, the Defense Senior Leadership Development Program  combines specialized courses with attendance in a 10-month JPME  program and a short-term rotation, as indicated by the participant’s  individual development plan, to help participants gain the competencies  needed to lead people and programs and achieve national security goals in  joint, interagency, and multinational environments.
These programs varied in length, mode of delivery, target population, and  interagency participation. The length of time and mode of delivery of these  courses ranged from 1 day of classroom training to 14 weeks of in-resident  training to a series of courses and seminars to be completed over a 3-year  period. Most of the programs targeted personnel at GS-12 or above,  because, according to officials at several agencies, these employees had  the experience needed to benefit from and contribute to training and  development programs with an interagency focus. For more information  about the target population and interagency participation of these  programs, see table 7.
Of the 11 reported programs, 6 leadership development programs were  open to and encouraged interagency participation. Two of these 6—the  Program for Emerging Leaders at NDU’s Center for the Study of Weapons  of Mass Destruction, and State’s National Security Executive Leadership  Seminar—intended to create an interagency cohort of leaders who can  work together seamlessly on national security issues. For example, to  promote a professional network among future U.S. government leaders in  the field of weapons of mass destruction, NDU’s Center for the Study of  Weapons of Mass Destruction offered Program for Emerging Leaders  students a variety of ways to connect outside the classroom, such as a  members-only Web site for online dialogue, school-sponsored social  events, and off-campus site visits.
Five of the 11 programs were closed to participation from other agencies.  For example, the Ambassadorial Seminar offered by State’s FSI only  prepares ambassadors-designate for their unique positions of leadership at  the head of an embassy, which requires extensive collaboration with  personnel from multiple agencies and other organizations.
section_title: Some Training Provided as Part of Agencies’ NSPD Programs
paragraphs: Six of the eight agencies represented on the Executive Steering  Committee—DOD, DHS, State, Justice, Commerce, and DOE—reported  making NSPD-related training available to their personnel with national  security responsibilities.
DOD and DHS reported developing some training specifically for their  NSPD programs, which consisted primarily of online courses on key  national security policies and procedures. Some agencies, however,  directed their national security personnel to take existing training, such as  EMI’s various online courses on national emergency response topics.  Other agencies augmented existing training with NSPD-specific materials.  Several of the existing courses that agencies used or modified under the  auspices of NSPD were included in previous sections of this report.  Officials from Commerce and DOE reported that in addition to taking  advantage of existing courses, they also sent their personnel to attend in- person orientation sessions or seminars, where they had the opportunity  to network with personnel from other agencies.
According to officials at most of these agencies, although they have  continued to work on planning and implementation efforts, much of the  actual training activity has slowed or stopped altogether since fiscal year  2008. As mentioned previously, many of these agencies have put  implementation of their NSPD-related training and professional  development activities on hold pending the results of executive-level  review of this governmentwide initiative.
section_title: Professional Development Activities Provide Opportunities to Build Foundational Knowledge, Skills, and Networks That Are Intended to Improve Interagency Collaboration
paragraphs: Based on our analysis, the relevant professional development activities  were intended to improve the ability of national security personnel to  collaborate across agency lines by focusing on three general approaches:  providing foundational knowledge, developing skills, and providing  networking opportunities. We found that the activities included one or  more of these approaches to improving their participants’ abilities to  collaborate:    Building common foundational knowledge of the national security  arena. Some of the activities establish a common foundation of shared  knowledge for understanding partner agencies’ roles, responsibilities,  authorities or capabilities, or specific national security subject matters.  According to agency officials, such training can help reinforce a  common vocabulary or framework for understanding complex policy  issues. This is important for allowing personnel who may normally  approach national security issues from sometimes disparate  diplomatic, defense, commercial, or law enforcement perspectives to  employ a whole-of-government approach to national security. For  example, DHS offers an introductory online course on the National  Incident Management System, which is available to personnel across  federal, state, and local government and provides an overview of the  roles and responsibilities of various agencies and how they are  supposed to work together in different emergency situations such as  responding to terrorist attacks and other national security-related  incidents.
Developing skills for interagency collaboration on national security.
Some of the activities agencies identified build specific skills needed  for interagency collaboration, such as how to plan, lead, and execute  interagency efforts. For example, the Whole-of-Government Planning  for Reconstruction and Stabilization course, offered by NDU in  cooperation with State, teaches skills to coordinate, facilitate, or  participate in the planning process for reconstruction and stabilization  operations. These skills include the ability to work effectively with  federal agency and other partners involved in whole-of-government  planning.
Establishing networks across national security agency lines. Some of  the activities were explicitly designed to facilitate networks among  personnel from two or more national security agencies. For example,  NDU’s Capstone course for Generals, Flag Officers, and members of  the civilian Senior Executive Service brings together participants from  the four military services and a range of federal agencies to deepen  their understanding of the whole-of-government-approach to national  security, among other things. One of Capstone’s learning objectives is  that participants establish a peer network for future cooperation and  the program is designed to maximize peer-to-peer interaction.
The way these approaches manifest themselves in the activities we  reviewed varied. For example, activities that required the least time  commitment, such as EMI’s online courses and NSPD online orientations,  primarily provided basic foundational knowledge of a specific partner  agency or national security topic. Conversely, more time-intensive  activities, such as JPME and some of the leadership development  programs and classroom courses that lasted several months or brought  participants together on a recurring basis tended to incorporate two or  more approaches to improving participants’ abilities to collaborate across  agency lines. For example, a 10-month program at NDU’s College of  International Security Affairs included coursework on foundational  knowledge of national security issues and specific skills related to  interagency planning and management, along with interagency networking  events.
According to human capital and training officials we interviewed at  several agencies, the level of interagency participation may affect how a  given professional development activity can improve its participants’  abilities to collaborate. Agency officials noted that interagency  collaboration in the development and design of activities can lead to a  more accurate portrayal of different agencies’ policies and processes.  Moreover, agency officials said a mix of interagency participants can  provide a realistic perspective of their respective agencies’ cultures,  capabilities, and constraints. Greater interagency participation can also  lead to the development of professional networks, and improve working  relationships. Several military officials we interviewed emphasized that in  order to work effectively side by side, civilian and military personnel  should train together to learn how operate before they are out in the field.  Several agency officials agreed, noting that even when a professional  development activity is designed to build foundational knowledge, skills,  or networks, lack of interagency participation can limit the extent to  which this occurs. For example, as a DHS official pointed out, if only one  agency participates in an exercise, there is clearly no opportunity to  establish a network that could facilitate future interagency collaboration.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Training, interagency rotations, exercises, and other professional  development activities can help to improve participants’ abilities to  collaborate in an increasingly complex national security arena. However,  with national security responsibilities and associated personnel located  throughout the U.S. government, it could be challenging for agency  officials to identify the relevant training and professional development  opportunities available to the national security community. Our review is a  first step in describing the broad spectrum of professional development  activities that are intended to build foundational knowledge, skills, and  networks among federal national security professionals. According to  agency officials who develop and oversee these professional development  activities, interagency participation can be key to the activities’ success,  enhancing the knowledge and skills participants acquire and the  professional networks they establish. Although agencies could not provide  participation data in every instance, the data we were able to obtain  indicated that overall, interagency participation was lower in activities  that required a longer time commitment, such as rotations and full-time  joint professional military education. This raises questions about barriers  to participation and other factors that may influence the success of such  professional development activities, which we will explore in a subsequent  review.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft report for review and comment to the Secretaries of  State, Defense, DHS, the Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and Energy,  the Administrator of USAID, and the Attorney General. State, DHS,  Commerce, Energy, USDA and USAID provided technical comments  which we incorporated where appropriate. DOD, DOJ, and Treasury did  not provide comments.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  date of this letter. We will then send copies of this report to the Secretaries  of State, Defense, Homeland Security, the Treasury, Commerce,  Agriculture, and Energy, the Administrator of USAID, and the Attorney  General, and other congressional committees interested in improving  collaboration among agencies involved in national security issues. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-6543 or steinhardtb@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of our review were to identify:  training and other professional development activities intended to improve  the abilities of personnel from key agencies involved in national security  issues to collaborate across organizational lines and    how these activities were intended to improve participants’ collaboration  abilities.
To address our objectives, we first reviewed our prior work and other  literature and interviewed experts on workforce development, education,  national security, organizational culture, and collaboration to define the  types of activities relevant to our topic. We then selected key agencies  involved in national security issues—the Department of Defense (DOD),  the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the  Department of Treasury (Treasury), the Department of Justice (Justice),  the Department of Energy (Energy), the U.S. Department of Agriculture  (USDA), and the Department of Commerce (Commerce)—based on a  review of our prior work and other literature and interviews with subject- matter experts. We excluded the Office of the Director of National  Intelligence and its member agencies because it overlapped with similar  work we have underway.
In order to identify and obtain key information on national security  collaboration-related professional development activities, we undertook  extensive data collection efforts involving both formal data collection  instruments and intensive interactions with the agencies noted above.  There were two main phases to this effort. In each, several steps were  taken to ensure the reliability of the information obtained, including its  consistency, completeness, and accuracy.
In the first phase, we developed a data collection instrument (DCI) to  obtain a broad list of activities potentially applicable to our review as well  as a number of key general characteristics of the activities including, for  example, overall goals, how the program prepares participants to  collaborate across department lines, agencies involved, and general  information about participation levels.
We validated the DCI by conducting pretests of the instrument with points  of contact (POCs) in four agencies. These pretests included in-depth  probing on the clarity of instrument, the criteria for including activities in  the instrument, respondent burden, and usability of the instrument  spreadsheet. The GAO engagement team staff worked with their technical  advisors to revise the DCI as appropriate to address issues that arose over  these topics during the pretesting process.
A key element of this first phase of data collection was defining the  criteria to guide agency POCs in determining the appropriate professional  development activities for submission. These criteria were included in the  instrument itself, with instructions to the POCs to include all programs  open to their staff that met all of the following four criteria:  (1) The activity explicitly prepares federal civilian and/or military  personnel to collaborate with personnel of other federal departments. In  particular, the activity: (a) can involve personnel of other entities—such as  contractors or NGOs—or can include only personnel from the POC’s  department; (b) may be provided by the POC’s department or it may be  provided by another organization; and (c) must prepare personnel for  interagency collaboration. POCs were not to include activities that  focused solely on intraagency collaboration (e.g., collaboration among  DHS component agencies or among other services within DOD). This  criterion excludes programs that bring personnel of multiple agencies  together for specific assignments but did not have preparation for future  interagency collaboration as an explicit purpose.  (2) The activity targets agency personnel involved in developing or  implementing national security policy, strategy, missions, or operations,  but not support functions such as administration, financial management,  or procurement.  (3) The activity relates to the agency’s national security activities. In  particular, an activity can and should be included despite having a broader  focus than interagency national security collaboration as long as it  includes a component on this topic; for example, a leadership  development program may have a module on interagency collaboration or  provide an interagency rotation to a national security mission.  (4) The activity is ongoing and sustained, not a one-time event.
We identified POCs in each of the selected agencies who were to  determine which activities met our criteria and complete the DCI for each.  We identified the POCs during our initial conference with agency  personnel and then in subsequent meetings or conversations, in which we  requested the names of individuals who could work with us to identify the  appropriate offices, bureaus, or functional areas that should receive our  questionnaire, disseminate our questionnaire to the appropriate contacts  throughout the agency, and consolidate their responses. We sent DCIs to  POCs and asked them to provide the requested information for all  activities that met our criteria. In addition to completing the DCIs, POCs  also provided other relevant information including course manuals and  evaluations.
We then compiled all of the DCIs received from the nine agencies into one  master file. A key element of this effort was to eliminate from the master  list duplicate activities reported by POCs in multiple offices or agencies. In  general, we relied on submissions from the agency we determined to be  the “lead agency” for administering the activity. In some cases, however,  an activity was identified by an agency that participated in, but did not  provide, the activity. For example, although officials at three agencies said  their personnel participated in the National Exercise Program, the two  agencies chiefly responsible for organizing the program did not initially  include the program in their responses. To reconcile such differences,  which may have occurred because agencies have different working  definitions of “national security” and “collaboration,” and different ways of  understanding how these concepts might intersect, we followed up with  our POCs. In some cases, the titles of activities were similar but not  identical and to determine whether they were the same we contacted the  relevant POCs for clarification. This process resulted in more than 350  total activities.
The final step in phase 1 of our work was to review the entire list of  activities identified to verify that they conformed to our four criteria. To  make this assessment and to ensure its reliability, two analysts separately  analyzed the list, identifying those activities that conformed and did not  conform to our criteria. In cases where the analysts differed they had a  third analyst review the information and then met to reconcile these  differences. In cases where the data provided were ambiguous we  contacted our agency POCs to obtain additional information in the form of  additional interviews and/or documentation. This process reduced the  number of activities in our review to 225.
In the second phase, we collected more detailed information on the  activities that met our criteria for inclusion, as follows:  (1) The number of participants in each activity in fiscal year 2009, both  from the agency that hosted the activity and from outside the agency;  (2) The levels or ranks of staff targeted for participation in the activity, if  any. Agencies described target populations in terms of General Schedule  (GS) levels, Foreign Service (FS) levels, and/or Officer grade (O) levels. At  the executive level, target populations were described as Senior Executive  Service (SES), Senior Foreign Service (SFS) , Senior-Level and Scientific  or Professional (SL/ST), or Generals/Flag Officers (O-7–O-10). In some  cases, the equivalent levels from other federal pay schedules or personnel  systems were noted; and  (3) The methods of evaluation the agency might use to evaluate the  effectiveness or impact of the activity.
A second DCI was developed for this purpose. For each POC, we  customized this data collection instrument with information about  activities they had reported to us in phase 1. Like the first phase of data  collection, this second phase involved close interaction with the POCs,  and in some instances POCs provided information to us in forms other  than the data collection instrument (e.g., published program materials, or  e-mails containing the information we requested). Data collected during  this phase were compiled and combined with data from the first phase to  yield an overall set of data on activities that met our criteria for inclusion.  We analyzed data for these activities, such as typical duration, eligibility  criteria, participation rates, and participating agencies, to identify groups  of activities, patterns, themes and other information. We determined these  data to be reliable for the purposes of identifying and describing such  activities.
Upon reviewing the data the agencies provided, we found that activities  varied widely across dimensions such as length and learning mode, and  decided to group the activities in a way that would allow us to analyze  their characteristics and make appropriate comparisons. To develop these  categories of training and professional development activities, we  reviewed activity data, conducted a limited literature search of GAO  reports and agency guidance, and met with human resource professionals.  These five general groups included training courses and programs, training  exercises, interagency rotational programs, Joint Professional Military  Education, and leadership development programs.
After the data had been compiled, we conducted a series of follow-up  interviews with POCs to gauge the completeness and accuracy of the  participation data we had received. POCs were asked about the sources of  counts of participants, how these counts had been stored, whether they  had been checked for accuracy, and other topics relevant to verifying the  reliability of these data. All of the participation data used in the present  report were judged reliable for the purpose of establishing approximate  levels of participation in the national security collaboration activities.
As part of the data collection instrument used in phase I, we asked agency  officials to describe how each activity they submitted was intended to  improve the ability of national security personnel to collaborate across  agency lines. We reviewed the answers they provided as well as other  materials such as course descriptions and catalogues of exercises and  JPME programs to identify common themes. Based on our analysis, we  determined that these activities generally employed one or more of the  following approaches: building foundational knowledge of the national  security arena such as other agencies’ roles, responsibilities, authorities or  capabilities; developing skills for interagency collaboration, such as how  to plan, lead, and execute interagency efforts; or establishing networks  among national security professionals. We also discussed these  approaches with agency officials during our interviews, and they  concurred that they were appropriate and accurate.
section_title: Appendix II: Inventory of Professional Development Activities Intended to Foster Interagency Collaboration
paragraphs: Appendix II: Inventory of Professional  Development Activities Intended to Foster  Interagency Collaboration This entry for joint military exercises represents 84 individual exercise programs which conducted  multiple exercises during fiscal year 2009.
In 2010, USAID changed the name of this course from Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning  Framework to District Stability Framework.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgements
paragraphs: Elizabeth Curda and Laura Miller Craig managed this assignment. Jessica  Nierenberg, Kate Hudson Walker, Albert Sim, Melanie Papasian, David  Dornisch, and Russ Burnett made key contributions to all aspects of the  report. Esther Toledo, Mark Kehoe, David P. Owen, Lauren Levine,  Andrew Stavisky, John Mingus, Jr., John Pendleton, Marie Mak, Alissa  Czyz, William Trancucci, Judith Kordahl, and Crystal Robinson also  provided assistance. In addition, Lois Hanshaw and Karin Fangman  provided legal support and Donna Miller developed the report’s graphics.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of  Africa Task Force. GAO-10-504. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency  Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions,  GAO-10-364. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of  National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and  Information Sharing. GAO-09-904SP. Washington, D.C.: September 25,  2009.
Military Training: DOD Needs a Strategic Plan and Better Inventory  and Requirements Data to Guide Development of Language Skills and  Regional Proficiency. GAO-09-568. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2009.
Influenza Pandemic: Continued Focus on the Nation’s Planning and  Preparedness Efforts Remains Essential. GAO-09-760T. Washington, D.C.:  June 3, 2009.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight.  GAO-09-679SP. Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2009.
Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and  Interagency Coordination for the Commander’s Emergency Response  Program in Afghanistan. GAO-09-61. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2009.
Foreign Aid Reform: Comprehensive Strategy, Interagency  Coordination, and Operational Improvements Would Bolster Current  Efforts. GAO-09-192. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2009.
Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges  to Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies.  GAO-09-476T. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 2009.
Drug Control: Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland  Security and an Updated Accountability Framework Can Further  Enhance DEA’s Efforts to Meet Post-9/11 Responsibilities. GAO-09-63.  Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2009.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns,  Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs  Associated with the U.S. Africa Command. GAO-09-181. Washington,  D.C.: February 20, 2009.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of  Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. GAO-08-860. Washington,  D.C.: July 31, 2008.
Information Sharing: Definition of the Results to Be Achieved in  Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Is Needed to Guide  Implementation and Assess Progress. GAO-08-637T. Washington, D.C.:  July 23, 2008.
Highlights of a GAO Forum: Enhancing U.S. Partnerships in  Countering Transnational Terrorism. GAO-08-887SP. Washington, D.C.:  July 2008.
Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a  Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian  Reserve Corps. GAO-08-39. Washington, D.C.: November 6, 2007.
Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some  Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.  GAO-08-35. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Stability  Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning. GAO-07-549.  Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2007.
Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to  Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists.  GAO-07-697. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2007.
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and  Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. GAO-06-15. Washington,  D.C.: October 21, 2005.