The Federal Workforce: Additional Steps Needed to Take Advantage of Federal Executive Boards' Ability to Contribute to Emergency Operations
Published: 2007-05-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which provides direction to the federal executive boards (FEBs), is now emphasizing that in the post-9/11 environment, the boards have a transformed emergency support role. The report discusses the boards' emergency preparedness roles and responsibilities and their potential role in preparing for and responding to pandemic influenza. GAO selected 14 of the 28 FEBs for review because they coordinate the greatest number of federal employees or had recent emergency management experience.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Located outside Washington, D.C., in 28 cities with a large federal presence, the federal executive boards (FEB) are interagency coordinating groups designed to strengthen federal management practices, improve intergovernmental relations, and participate as a unified federal force in local civic affairs. Created by a Presidential Directive in 1961, the boards are composed of the federal field office agency heads and military commanders in their cities. Although membership by agency heads on the boards is required, active participation is voluntary in practice. The boards generally have staff of one or two full-time personnel, including an executive director. The FEBs have no congressional charter and receive no congressional appropriation but rather rely on voluntary contributions from their member agencies. Although the boards are not intended to be first responders, the regulations that guide the FEBs state that emergency operations is one of their functions. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the FEBs have designated emergency preparedness, security, and employee safety as a core function of the boards and are continuing to work on a strategic plan that will include a common set of performance standards for their emergency support activities. All of the selected FEBs were performing emergency activities, such as organizing preparedness training, and FEB representatives and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials reported that these activities mutually advanced their missions. The FEBs, however, face key challenges in carrying out their emergency support role. First, their role is not defined in national emergency plans. According to several FEMA officials, FEBs could carry out their emergency support role more effectively if it was included in national emergency management plans. The framework within which the FEBs operate with member agencies and OPM also poses challenges in holding the boards accountable for their emergency support function. In addition, the funding sources for the boards are uncertain, affecting their ability to plan for and commit to providing emergency support services. Despite these challenges, the nature of pandemic influenza, which presents different concerns than localized natural disasters, makes the FEBs a particularly valuable asset in pandemic preparedness and response. Many of the selected boards had already hosted pandemic preparedness events, which included their member agencies and local community organizations. With the greatest burden of pandemic response resting on the local communities, the FEBs' outreach and their ability to coordinate across organizations suggest that they may be an important resource in preparing for and responding to a pandemic.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In an April 2004 report on opportunities to improve federal continuity  In an April 2004 report on opportunities to improve federal continuity  planning, we concluded that federal executive boards (FEB) are uniquely  planning, we concluded that federal executive boards (FEB) are uniquely  positioned to improve coordination of emergency preparedness efforts in  positioned to improve coordination of emergency preparedness efforts in  areas outside of Washington, D.C. Located in 28 cities with a large federal  areas outside of Washington, D.C.  Much  to blood donation needs; and communicating related leave policies.
GAO, Human Capital: Opportunities to Improve Federal Continuity Planning  Guidance, GAO-04-384 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2004).  5 C.F.R. § 960.107 (c) (6).
Determining the FEB role in emergency operations is particularly  challenging given that the boards operate with no independent authority  and with resources voluntarily provided by member agencies. The boards  depend on a host agency, generally the agency with the greatest number of  employees in the area, to provide staff of usually one or two full-time  personnel, including an executive director. The FEBs also rely on their  hosts and other member agencies for operating expenses. Important to  emergency preparedness, one of the FEB functions includes building  relationships with state and local organizations to promote federal  involvement within their communities.
Emergency preparedness efforts involve dealing with the full range of  emergencies, including natural and man-made disasters. Attention has  focused on pandemic influenza, a real and significant threat facing the  United States and the rest of the world. Influenza pandemics occur when a  novel influenza virus emerges that can be effectively transmitted between  humans who have little immunity to it. The last three pandemics in the  20th century occurred in 1918, 1957, and 1968, and killed approximately 40  million, 2 million, and 1 million people worldwide, respectively. Although  the timing of the next pandemic is unpredictable, there is widespread  agreement that an influenza pandemic will occur at some point. A  pandemic is not a singular event, but is likely to come in waves, each  lasting months, and pass through communities of all sizes across the  nation and the world simultaneously. A pandemic could threaten society  and the economy by removing essential personnel, including federal  government employees, from the workplace for weeks or months.
To obtain a better understanding of the roles, responsibilities, and  capacities of selected FEBs for emergency operations, particularly in the  event of pandemic influenza, you asked us to (1) identify the actions FEBs  have taken to fulfill their emergency preparedness and response roles and  responsibilities, (2) describe the key challenges facing the FEBs in  fulfilling these roles and responsibilities, and (3) evaluate the extent to  which the FEBs can contribute to emergency preparedness and response  to pandemic influenza.
To address our objectives, we selected 14 FEBs for our study. The selected  FEBs are Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth, Denver,  Los Angeles, Minnesota, New Orleans, New York City, Oklahoma,  Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Seattle. These FEBs were selected  because they coordinate the greatest number of federal employees or have  recent experience with specific emergency management events. We  obtained and reviewed FEB documents, such as annual reports, monthly  activity reports, minutes, and correspondence, and interviewed at least  two key FEB representatives from each selected board, including the chair  or vice chair and executive director. We also had discussions with and  obtained pertinent documentation from officials at OPM and the Federal  Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) at their headquarters in  Washington, D.C. Because the FEBs and FEMA collaborate closely on  continuity of operations (COOP) activities in the field, we also interviewed  the FEMA regional directors in regions V and VI based in Chicago, Illinois,  and Denton, Texas, respectively. In addition, we reviewed academic  literature and prior GAO reports about leveraging collaborative networks.
We conducted our review in the 14 case study FEB cities and Washington,  D.C., from March 2006 through February 2007 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Detailed information  on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: FEBs were established by a Presidential Directive in 1961 to improve  coordination among federal activities and programs outside Washington,  D.C. The boards’ overall mission includes supporting and promoting  national initiatives and responding to the local needs of federal agencies  and their communities. They provide a point of coordination for the  development and operation of federal programs having common  characteristics. Approximately 85 percent of all federal employees work  outside the greater Washington, D.C., area, and the number of FEBs has  grown from 10 to 28 over the past 46 years. When President Kennedy  established the FEBs, they were located in the major cities in each of the  10 Civil Service Commission administrative regions. He later added 2 more  boards, while President Johnson authorized 3 more, President Nixon  added 10, and President Ford added 1. Two more boards were added by  OPM in the 1990s bringing the total number of boards to 28. Figure 1  shows the metropolitan areas where the 28 boards are located.
According to the regulations that guide the FEBs, the Director of OPM is  responsible for overseeing and directing the operations of all of the FEBs  consistent with the law and with the directives of the President. The  boards are composed of the federal field office agency heads and military  commanders in their cities, and the regulations state that each FEB should  have a chair elected by the FEB members to serve a term not to exceed a  year. The regulations also state that the boards should be governed by  bylaws or other rules for their internal governance that are developed for  each board. Although through Presidential Directive FEB membership is  mandatory for the senior agency officials within the FEB’s geographic  boundaries, the boards have no independent authority and they rely on the  voluntary cooperation of their members to accomplish their goals.
The FEB funding structure is unusual within the federal government. The  boards have no legislative charter and receive no congressional  appropriation. Rather, each FEB is supported by a host agency, usually the  agency with the greatest number of employees in the region. These host  agencies provide varying levels of staffing, usually one or two full-time  positions—an executive director and an executive assistant. Some  agencies also temporarily detail employees to the FEB staff to assist their  local boards and to provide developmental opportunities for their  employees. Additionally, the FEBs are supported by member agencies  through contribution of funds as well as in-kind support, such as office  space, personal computers, telephone lines, and Internet access. In 2006,  OPM estimated the cost of FEB operations at approximately $6 million.
section_title: FEB Emergency Preparedness and Response Roles and Responsibilities Are Being Developed as a Core Function of the Boards
paragraphs: To assist in standardizing emergency activities across the FEB system,  OPM and the FEBs are establishing an emergency preparedness, security,  and employee safety set of activities with performance measures that will  be common to all of the boards. Although this effort is not completed, all  of the selected FEBs were doing some emergency activities, such as  hosting emergency preparedness training and exercises. For example,  FEMA officials and the FEB representatives reported working together,  often with the General Services Administration (GSA), on COOP training  and exercises. In the past, some of the selected FEBs also played a role in  responding to emergencies, although not all of the FEB representatives  felt this was an appropriate activity for the boards.
subsections: section_title: OPM and the FEBs Continue to Work on a Common Set of Performance Standards for FEB Emergency Support Activities
paragraphs: OPM and the FEBs are developing a multiyear strategic plan that will  include a core function for the FEBs called emergency preparedness,  security, and employee safety. The plan will include expectations and  measures to assess how well each FEB is performing the activities. OPM  has reported working with the boards on emergency planning issues since  2001, and in March 2004, a document summarizing the FEB role in  emergency situations was finalized. The boards’ emergency support  responsibilities include elements such as serving as a federal liaison  between state and local emergency officials, establishing notification  networks and interagency emergency preparedness councils, and hosting  emergency preparedness exercises for agencies. A complete list of the  FEB emergency support responsibilities detailed in the 2004 document can  be found in appendix II. According to an OPM official, designating  emergency support as a core function of the FEBs will further enhance the  FEB role in emergency situations. OPM officials recognize that the FEBs  can add value to regional preparedness efforts as vehicles for  communication, coordination, and capacity building but acknowledge that  the emergency activities of the FEBs have varied from board to board. The  emergency support function is intended to provide consistent delivery of  FEB emergency preparedness and response programs and activities for  the federal workforce across the system of 28 boards.
Not all of the representatives from the selected FEBs were convinced that  the boards should have an expanded emergency service support role.  Although all of the selected boards had some type of emergency  communication network and emergency preparedness council in place,  there was disagreement among the FEB representatives on the role the  FEBs should play in emergency service support, particularly during an  emergency. Without adequate staff and resources, some of the executive  directors expressed concern that they will not be able to meet  expectations. One executive director, for example, noted that because her  local board lacked 24/7 communication and coordination abilities, it could  not be held accountable for emergency service roles and responsibilities.  Another executive director commented that there was a general  expectation within the board’s metropolitan federal community that the  FEB will assume a significant leadership role during a possible future  emergency. However, he observed that limited and declining funding does  not provide for an effective communication system. As a consequence, he  felt this expectation was unrealistic and may contribute to major  misunderstandings in the event of a significant emergency.
On the other hand, several of the executive directors felt that the FEBs  would be able to accomplish much more in this area with additional  resources. For example, one executive director, with an emergency  operations background, emphasized that if the boards were given  dependable funding and increased stature within the federal government  by formal recognition of their emergency support role, their return on  investment in terms of emergency support functions would be substantial.  In general, the consensus among those who viewed the FEBs as having an  increased role in emergency operations was that with dependable funding  and resources, all the boards in the FEB system could and should provide  a similar level of emergency operations support. Several FEB  representatives also stated that OPM leadership and direction in clearly  outlining emergency operations expectations and OPM’s oversight of these  activities would diminish uncertainty about the boards’ role in emergency  support, both among the boards and federal agencies in general. They  were encouraged by the designation of emergency services as a core FEB  function.
section_title: All of the Selected FEBs Were Performing Some Emergency Activities
paragraphs: The FEBs are charged with providing timely and relevant information to  support emergency preparedness and response coordination, and OPM  expects the boards to establish notification networks and communications  plans to be used in emergency and nonemergency situations. The boards  are also expected to disseminate relevant information received from OPM  and other agencies regarding emergency preparedness information and to  relay local emergency situation information to parties such as OPM, FEB  members, media, and state and local government authorities. FEB  representatives generally viewed the boards as an important  communications link between Washington and the field and among field  agencies. For example, the Atlanta FEB’s executive director described the  boards as a conduit for both emergency and nonemergency information to  member agencies through e-mail, telephone, and Web sites. While many of  the items needing dissemination are also passed through normal agency  channels, several FEB representatives noted that it usually takes longer  for communication to be received through their agency headquarters than  through the FEB channel. The Oklahoma FEB chair described the FEBs as  central depositories that receive information from headquarters and  quickly disseminate that information to the field, reducing the information  gap between Washington, D.C., and the rest of the country.
Previously, much of the emergency support responsibility of FEBs was in  providing communication regarding hazardous and inclement weather  conditions. Almost all of the selected FEBs reported this as an emergency  activity for which they continue to have responsibility. For example, the  Atlanta FEB executive director said that during potential weather  emergencies, she and members of the Policy and Steering Committee from  GSA and the National Weather Service gather information about the  forecast and road conditions. The executive director, FEB chair, and  members of the Policy and Steering Committee then conduct a 4:00 a.m.  conference call to make a decision about suggested agency closings or  delayed reporting. Following the conference call, the FEB executive  director posts a message on the board’s emergency hazard line that  designated agency employees can check. This message is also posted to  the FEB general telephone line and the FEB Web site. Several of the  executive directors emphasized that they can only make recommendations  to the federal agencies in their areas of service, but they cannot mandate  that federal agencies close for weather or other emergencies.
Although each of the selected boards we reviewed reported conducting  communications activities as a key part of its emergency support service,  they used a number of different types of communication systems. The  Boston FEB, for example, operates two electronic communications  mechanisms to be in contact with senior federal agency officials during  local and national emergencies, both during and after hours. The first is an  Internet portal, developed and maintained by the DHS Federal Protective  Service, which is designed to provide senior agency officials access to up- to-date information, such as threat assessments and emergency weather.  The second communications system is called EDIAL, housed and  maintained by the First U.S. Coast Guard District’s 24-hour command  system. EDIAL, funded for the FEB by GSA New England, enables the  board to communicate with agency officials simultaneously via an  electronic telephone message in times of emergency. Several of the  executive directors mentioned the importance of having access to the  Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) cards, a  White House-directed emergency phone service. GETS provides  emergency preparedness personnel a high probability of completion for  their phone calls when the probability of completing a call through normal  channels is significantly decreased. The majority of the selected boards  reported keeping an emergency contact list for officials in their member  agencies.
Several of the executive directors emphasized the importance of  standardizing the communications systems of the boards so that every  FEB is communicating in the same way. The communication abilities  among the selected FEBs did vary, often dependent on the communication  system provided by a supporting agency. For example, the Atlanta FEB  reported previously using an emergency call-down system supplied by the  Atlanta U.S. District Court, but the system was too slow. The executive  director there said she was exploring the possibility of transferring to the  Southwestern Emergency Response Network, which would give her  greater capacity to notify area agencies in emergency situations. A  complaint about many of the FEB communication systems was that they  were slow or needed to be manually updated. The Dallas-Fort Worth FEB  executive director noted that with the boards becoming more of a national  network and serving as backups to one another, the importance of a fully  supported national communication network for the FEBs is becoming  even more evident.
According to OPM, the FEB role in emergency service support also  includes coordination activities. For example, OPM reported that it  expects the boards to serve as federal liaisons for state and local  emergency officials and to assess local emergency situations in  cooperation with federal, state, and local officials. Although all of the  boards reported some involvement of state and local officials in their  emergency activities, the degree of board connections with state and local  officials varied. The Minnesota FEB and the Oklahoma FEB, for example,  reported strong relationships with state and local government officials,  state and local emergency management leaders, and private sector  businesses. The Dallas-Fort Worth FEB executive director reported that  the board partners with state and local government representatives, the  private sector, law enforcement, and first responders, all of which are key  players in assessing local emergency situations. On the other hand, the  Chicago FEB executive director said that because Chicago is so large, the  board has few established relationships with state and local officials. The  chair of the Boston FEB said its board had 24-hour contact numbers for  some state officials but not city officials.
In terms of coordination, the FEBs are also charged with identifying a core  group of federal leaders in each community to discuss planned courses of  action, such as delayed arrival and shelter in place, in the event of an  emergency. All of the selected boards had some type of emergency  preparedness council. In the case of the Los Angeles FEB, however, the  emergency preparedness committee had to disband because of significant  transportation challenges in the Los Angeles area. The board’s executive  director said they now have an emergency preparedness e-mail group. In  addition, OPM expects the boards to provide problem resolution  assistance as appropriate, to include identifying federal resources that may  be available to assist the community in responding to, or recovering from,  an emergency. Examples of some of the selected boards’ past responses  during emergencies are detailed in a section below.
OPM expects the FEBs in their capacity-building role to facilitate training  for member agencies regarding their responsibilities related to occupant  emergency plans, COOP planning, and other emergency preparedness  topics. All of the selected FEBs reported hosting at least one emergency  preparedness briefing, training, or exercise during the past year. The  Minnesota FEB, for example, hosted homeland security briefings by the  Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Transportation Security  Administration, the Minnesota Department of Health, the Secret Service,  FEMA, the Federal Protective Service, state and county emergency  management directors, and the Department of Defense. The Denver FEB  conducts a yearly scenario-based COOP exercise usually in conjunction  with FEMA, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA),  and GSA. In addition to other preparedness exercises, the Chicago FEB  hosted an exercise dealing with emergency preparedness and people with  disabilities. Several FEB representatives made the point that these  emergency preparedness exercises and activities are particularly valuable  for the smaller federal agencies. While military, law enforcement, and  public safety federal agencies may have a solid grasp of emergency  preparedness, some of the smaller administrative agencies need help  defining what their responsibilities are in this area. In addition, an FEB  executive director and a chair said that the interagency exercises help to  ensure that federal workers are receiving consistent treatment across the  agencies.
section_title: FEB Representatives Reported Working with FEMA on COOP Planning
paragraphs: One of the FEB emergency support responsibilities is facilitating COOP  training for federal agencies, and the FEB representatives reported  working with FEMA and, in many cases, GSA to accomplish this. As  mentioned previously, COOP planning is an effort conducted by agencies  to ensure that the capability exists to continue essential agency functions  across a wide range of potential emergencies. FEMA, GSA, and OPM are  the three agencies that have the most direct impact on individual agency  efforts to develop viable COOP capabilities. FEMA, as the lead agency for  executive branch COOP planning, has responsibility for formulating  guidance, facilitating interagency coordination, and assessing the status of  executive branch COOP capabilities. GSA is responsible for working with  FEMA in providing COOP training for federal agencies and assisting  agencies in acquiring alternate facilities in the event of an emergency,  while OPM is responsible for maintaining and revising human capital  management guidance for emergency situations and assisting the heads of  other departments and agencies with personnel management and staffing  during national security emergencies.
FEB representatives said they work with FEMA and GSA to develop and  strengthen agency COOP and other emergency plans. For example, most  of the boards have COOP working groups or emergency committees, often  lead by FEMA and GSA, which help conduct various emergency exercises.  The exercises are designed to provide insight and guidance that can be  used to develop specific action plans that address interruptions in services  provided by their agencies, and FEB representatives said that COOP plans  are tested through these exercises. A FEMA official testified in May 2006  that the COOP working groups established with the FEBs in New Orleans,  Houston, and Miami prior to the hurricanes of 2005 and the many COOP  training and exercise activities conducted by these organizations were  instrumental in facilitating federal agency recovery and reconstitution  efforts following hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. During the past  year, FEMA Region III nominated the Philadelphia FEB COOP working  group for a 2006 Excellence in Government Award because the group had  improved the federal image of preparedness among the Philadelphia  community through training, exercises, and interagency coordination  projects. The group received a Silver Medal Award as a result of the  nomination. As another example of joint activities, through a campaign  that is a collaboration between FEMA, the Red Cross, and other  emergency response groups, the Boston FEB hosted a series of seminars  aimed at educating employees about home preparedness.
Almost all of the FEB executive directors or chairs from the selected  boards cited a positive and beneficial working relationship with FEMA.  Some of the executive directors also said that a strong relationship exists  between their boards and the FEMA regional directors in their areas. In  addition, the regional FEMA officials we interviewed all said the FEBs  assist FEMA with its mission. Another FEMA official noted that reaching  out to the field can be difficult, but the FEBs provide communications and  access to the majority of federal agencies, which makes FEMA’s job much  easier. Although FEMA does not have a formal agreement with the FEBs,  FEMA and the FEBs have common interests in making sure the federal  workforce is protected, and the relationship proves mutually beneficial.  According to a FEMA official, many of the agencies in the field have COOP  policies, procedures, and planning in place in part because the FEBs have  assisted FEMA in getting this program out to them. He noted that the FEBs  carry the COOP activities forward and, although the boards operate under  tenuous conditions, their outreach is invaluable. Similar to most of the  opinions expressed regarding FEMA’s work with the FEBs, the Seattle  FEB chair said that FEMA has displayed active leadership and has proven  to be a good connection for sharing information.
section_title: FEBs Have Played a Role in Responding to Past Emergencies
paragraphs: The Oklahoma FEB response to the bombing of the Oklahoma City Murrah  Federal Building on April 19, 1995, illustrates the role of some of the  boards in aiding emergency response. The board staff knew all of the  agencies in the Murrah Building; the home telephone numbers of critical  staff; the city, county, and state principals in Oklahoma City; and which  federal agencies were available to provide immediate relief and support.  According to the Oklahoma executive director, with the information the  FEB was able to provide and a blueprint of the Murrah Building, the first  responders were able to determine where they might find more people  after the bombing. The FEB staff also played a role in providing support to  the victims and families of those who died in the bombing through  activities such as arranging counseling. In addition, shortly after the  disaster the Oklahoma FEB hosted a meeting with the Vice President in  which local agency leaders discussed what worked well and what needed  attention in recovering from the disaster.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita represented huge disasters in the history of  our nation, and according to a FEMA official, through these catastrophes  the New Orleans FEB’s executive director established and maintained an  essential communication link between FEMA’s Office of National Security  Coordination (ONSC) and OPM. A FEMA official noted that many federal  agencies, specifically smaller agencies or agencies with limited resources,  were better prepared because of the coordination, collaboration, training,  and resource sharing the New Orleans FEB was able to provide. The New  Orleans FEB executive director also became part of the nation’s first  federal agency COOP and Reconstitution Team, made up of  representatives from the New Orleans and Dallas-Fort Worth FEBs, GSA,  NARA, OPM, and FEMA. Additionally, following the interruption of  communications and loss of contact with federal leaders, the executive  director was able to work through ONSC to locate and reestablish contact  with all members of the FEB Policy Committee at their alternate sites,  beginning the reconstitution of the New Orleans FEB. The FEB served as a  conduit for information between Washington and the representative local  agencies, and the Policy Committee was able to provide status updates to  identify common needs or problems that agency leaders were facing that  required expedited assistance to resolve. According to a FEMA official, the  lessons learned during the conference calls with the New Orleans FEB  Policy Committee following Hurricane Katrina allowed for better national  response and coordination during Hurricane Rita. The New Orleans FEB  executive director reported that part of her role during Hurricane Katrina  was to raise awareness that many of the essential personnel of the federal  workforce in New Orleans had no housing and, therefore, were not able to  return to work. Eventually, essential federal and local workers and  members of the New Orleans police and fire departments and their  families were housed aboard ships.
As another example of FEB support following hurricanes Katrina, Rita,  and Wilma, FEMA Region V put into place a temporary Chicago call center  that was scheduled to open in early September 2005. The call center was  created in response to the projected volume of calls from victims of the  disasters to enable FEMA to more effectively and rapidly communicate  with them. Because of the requirement that call center staff must be  fingerprinted and have security clearances, federal employees were the  only ones who could immediately meet FEMA’s need to staff the center.  The Chicago FEB executive director coordinated with agency officials in  soliciting nearly 300 federal employees who were detailed to the center  while negotiations were being conducted with a contractor who would  then backfill these positions. According to FEMA and the Chicago FEB,  the effort in sharing federal personnel was highly successful.
During nonemergency but disruptive events, such as political conventions  or rallies, the FEBs in the affected areas have helped to contain the  potential disturbance for federal agencies’ operations. For example, the  FEB representatives from Boston and New York City said their boards  played a role during the national political conventions held there in the  summer of 2004. In preparation for the events, OPM conducted a series of  emergency preparedness seminars for local agency representatives  through the FEBs in both cities. The sessions provided information on  emergency planning and human resource flexibilities available to agencies  for use in emergency situations and during major public events and were  designed to prepare all federal agencies for emergencies, both natural and  man-made. In addition, OPM gave the Boston FEB vice chair and the New  York City chair onetime authority during the event to make decisions  regarding the nonemergency workforce should that become necessary. As  another example, during the immigration rallies in the summer of 2006 in  Chicago, the Chicago FEB reported that it was communicating with the  Federal Protective Service, which shared security information with the  board. The Chicago FEB was able to pass this information on to the local  agencies so employees could prepare and make alternative travel  arrangements since some streets were closed.
section_title: The FEBs Face Key Challenges in Providing Emergency Support Services
paragraphs: The distinctive characteristics of the FEBs within the federal government  help to explain the key challenges the boards face in providing emergency  support services. Factors including the boards’ lack of a defined role in  national emergency support structures, their accountability framework,  and the differences in their capacities present challenges in providing a  needed level of emergency support across the FEB service areas.
subsections: section_title: A Defined FEB Role in National Emergency Plans Would Better Ensure That the Boards Can Effectively Carry Out Their Emergency Support Role
paragraphs: According to several FEMA officials we interviewed, the FEBs could carry  out their emergency support role more effectively if their role was  included in national emergency management plans. FEMA officials from  two different regions with responsibility for emergency activities in 11  states said they felt the boards could be used more effectively and that  they add value to the nation’s emergency operations. They agreed with  several of the FEB executive directors we interviewed who felt the boards  lacked recognition within the federal government’s emergency response  structure and that their value in emergency support was often overlooked  by federal agency officials unfamiliar with their capabilities. A FEMA  regional director noted that it is very important that the FEB emergency  support role is understood, and he believed including the boards in  emergency management plans was an opportunity to communicate the  role of the FEBs and how they could contribute in emergencies involving  the federal workforce.
The FEMA officials provided examples of areas where the FEBs could  support the existing emergency response structure and where the boards’  role could be defined in emergency management plans. For example,  while FEBs are not first responders, the National Response Plan’s  emphasis on local emergency response suggests using the existing local  connections and relationships established by the FEBs. The National  Response Plan is also intended to provide a framework for how federal  departments and agencies will work together and coordinate with state,  local, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental organizations during  incidents through the establishment of several multiagency coordination  structures. Among other activities, these coordination structures are  responsible for maintaining situational awareness, information sharing,  and communications; coordinating internal operations; and coordinating  among the different entities. The FEMA officials agreed that the FEBs  could provide support to the existing emergency response structure via  these multiagency coordination centers, given the FEBs’ connections and  knowledge of their local communities. The boards could provide real-time  information to the centers and have access to status reports that they  could share with high-level federal officials within their service areas  during an emergency affecting the federal workforce.
FEMA officials had specific suggestions for where formal inclusion of the  FEBs should be considered in multiagency coordination centers. One  official noted that when a disaster threatens the federal community, it  would be advantageous for the FEB to have a seat in the joint field office  (JFO). A JFO is a temporary federal facility established locally to  coordinate operational federal assistance activities to the affected areas  during incidents of national significance. Within the JFO, senior federal  representatives form a multiagency coordination entity and direct their  staff in the JFO to share information, aid in establishing priorities among  incidents and associated resource allocation, and provide strategic  coordination of various federal incident management activities. The  reasoning behind the suggestion to include the FEBs was that the boards  have knowledge of the departments and agencies in their cities, making  them able to assess the status of the local federal community affected by  the disaster. According to the same official, another place for the FEBs to  contribute that merits consideration is the regional response coordination  center, which coordinates regional response efforts, establishes federal  priorities, and implements local federal program support until a JFO is  established.
FEMA officials also suggested that the FEBs could maintain the vital  records related to COOP, such as alternative COOP sites, phone numbers,  and emergency contacts. FEMA officials proposed that FEMA could  provide technical assistance to the FEBs to develop a COOP directory  format containing the specific information for their member agencies,  while the FEBs would be responsible for maintaining, updating,  protecting, and distributing the directory. FEMA officials also suggested  that it may be helpful for the FEBs and FEMA to draft a memorandum of  understanding that formalizes the role and responsibilities of the FEBs in  assisting FEMA with COOP and other emergency activities.
The need for formal agreements on emergency roles and responsibilities  has been highlighted in our previous work. For example, in assessing the  response to Hurricane Katrina, we recommended that it was important for  FEMA and the Red Cross to clarify their respective roles and  responsibilities. In May 2006, the two organizations entered into a  memorandum of understanding that outlines their areas of mutual support  and cooperation in disaster response and recovery operations and in  performance of their respective roles under the National Response Plan.
section_title: The Operational Framework for the Boards Poses Accountability Challenges
paragraphs: According to OPM, leadership and oversight of the FEBs is conducted  from OPM Headquarters in Washington, D.C. Although the FEB  regulations state that the chairs of the FEBs should report to OPM through  regional representatives, who were charged with overseeing the activities  of their FEBs, an OPM official explained that the regional oversight these  regulations refer to is now done from headquarters. Within OPM, the  Associate Director for Human Capital Leadership and Merit System  Accountability (HCLMSA) supervises the Director for FEB Operations.  Within the HCLMSA division, the field services group managers are  intended to serve in a liaison and support role with the FEBs in their  geographic areas. An OPM official said there are five field service  managers who interact with the FEBs in their jurisdictions. While the  official said the managers are not expected to provide oversight of FEB  activities, they are expected to regularly attend FEB executive board  meetings and help coordinate OPM-provided training. Some FEB  representatives reported that their OPM field service managers were  active in their FEBs, while others said their managers were not.
In light of the recent emphasis on systemwide expectations and  accountability measures for the boards, many of the FEB representatives  we interviewed believed OPM needs to provide additional leadership and  feedback to them. The relationship between OPM and the FEBs is  complicated, in part because the boards need a certain level of autonomy  to address regionally identified issues through projects and programs  specific to their localities. More recently, however, particularly with the  emergency support expectations for the boards that cut across the FEB  system, many of the FEB representatives felt more assistance and  feedback from OPM on FEB activities are warranted. Many were  frustrated with what they perceived as a lack of priority given to the  boards by OPM. For example, some noted that the Director of FEB  Operations is a one-person office, which they felt was inadequate to meet  the needs of and provide oversight for the 28 boards. Several of the FEB  representatives also pointed to a recent incident where the FEB system’s  host Web site server, contracted out by OPM, was defaced. Service was  not restored to some of the FEB Web sites until several weeks later.
The accountability structure for the FEB executive directors poses  additional challenges. An OPM official reported that the executive  directors are rated by their supervisors of record in their host agencies. In  2004, OPM worked with the FEB executive directors to develop critical  performance standards to be used by the FEB chairs to provide input to  the host agency supervisors on the performance of the FEB executive  directors. Executive directors were asked by OPM to use the standards to  solicit input from their FEB chairs for their performance evaluations,  although there is no provision to ensure the performance standards are  consistently applied among the individual director ratings. Of the 14  selected boards, 5 boards had an arrangement where the performance  appraisal was done by the host agency supervisor who received  performance appraisal input from the FEB chair. Four executive directors  reported they were rated by their host agencies with no input from the  FEB chairs, while for four of the executive directors, the chair provided  the executive director’s rating to the host agency. One executive director  did not receive a performance appraisal because she was still considered  an employee of one agency even though her salary was paid by another  agency.
Some of the executive directors we interviewed said that under their  current accountability structure, they answer to OPM, the chair or policy  committee of the FEB, and the board’s host agency, which generally pays  their salaries. When asked about accountability, some of the executive  directors said they would follow the host agency’s guidance given that  their salaries were paid by them. Others said they would answer primarily  to their chairs or policy committees. One of the FEB representatives noted  that he believes the current performance system does not reward high- performing FEBs.
section_title: Varying FEB Capacities Test the Boards’ Ability to Provide Consistent Levels of Emergency Support Services across the Country
paragraphs: As we reported in 2004, the context in which the FEBs operate, including  varying capacities among the boards for emergency preparedness efforts,  could lead to inconsistent levels of preparedness across the nation.  Figure 2 illustrates that the service areas of the FEBs differ substantially in  the size of their formal jurisdictions, and table 1 shows how the number of  federal employees and agencies served by each board varies. These  factors may affect a board’s capacity to provide emergency support. For  example, FEB representatives from Chicago and Los Angeles said their  locations in large cities made providing FEB emergency support services  for their service areas more difficult. The Los Angeles executive director,  for example, noted that the Los Angeles FEB primarily serves a six-county  area in the immediate vicinity of Los Angeles with notable transportation  problems. This makes in-person meetings a challenge. The service area  includes approximately 120,000 federal employees from 230 different  agencies. Yet the executive director noted that the FEB’s staffing is similar  to that of FEBs covering much smaller areas and numbers of employees  and agencies. The Cincinnati FEB, in contrast, covers approximately  15,000 federal employees from 90 different agencies. Appendix III lists the  28 FEBs along with their host agencies.
There is no consistency for funding the FEBs nationwide, and the levels of  support provided to the boards in terms of operating expenses, personnel,  and equipment vary considerably. For example, some of the executive  directors reported they received an operating budget allocation for travel  and supplies, while others said they received nothing or very little in this  regard. Without adequate and consistent levels of funding and resources  across the FEB system, some FEB representatives we interviewed were  skeptical as to whether any standardization of emergency activities could  be implemented.
The FEBs’ dependence on host agencies and other member agencies for  their resources also creates uncertainty for the boards in planning and  committing to provide emergency support services. The lack of funding in  a particular year may curtail the amount of emergency support an  individual board could provide. Many of the FEB representatives  characterized the board funding structure as dysfunctional, and some  expressed concern that their activities will be further affected by reduced  agency funding and resource support as agency budgets grow more  constrained. When boards’ funding is precarious, the executive directors  spend the majority of their time soliciting resources from member  agencies, without adequate time or resources to focus on mission-related  activities. Federal agencies that have voluntarily funded FEB positions in  the past have begun to withdraw their funding support. Of our 14 case  study boards, representatives from 3 of the boards said they had recently  had their host agencies withdraw funding for their boards’ executive  assistant positions. Several FEB representatives felt the uncertainty about  the funding of the FEBs raises questions as to the survivability of the  system and its ability to fulfill its emergency support function.
Recognizing that the capacities of FEBs vary across the nation, OPM  established an internal working group in August 2003 to study the  strengths and weaknesses of the boards. According to OPM, the working  group reviewed funding and staffing levels for possible recommendations  of funding enhancements in challenged areas and developed several  products to assist OPM in communicating the value of the FEBs to  agencies. In 2006, OPM proposed a three-part plan, including restructuring  the network of 28 boards to try to address the resource issues of some of  the boards by combining them with other boards. Federal population  numbers and geographic proximity of existing FEBs were used to develop  the proposed structure, which reduced the 28 boards into a system of 21  boards. The majority of the FEBs did not support the restructuring  component of the plan, asserting that the proposal was not well developed  and stressing the importance of maintaining local presence for FEB  operations and activities in the current locations. OPM decided not to  pursue the approach. However, OPM officials said they will revisit  restructuring the FEB network if resource issues remain a problem.
There have been different options considered for FEB funding in the past.  For example, in 1988, OPM developed a budget proposal to include in its  fiscal year 1990 budget submission base dollars and full-time equivalents  to fully fund the FEBs. Ultimately, OPM reported only receiving a fraction  of the money requested, and OPM did not request additional funding for  the next fiscal year. OPM has not requested funding of this type for the  FEBs since that time. The current funding arrangements continue to  emphasize local agency responsibility whereby usually one major  department or agency in each city provides funding for an executive  director and an assistant, although other federal agencies can contribute.  OPM officials said they continue to support local agency commitment to  the FEBs. From OPM’s vantage point, the boards that have developed  strong relationships with their partner agencies have more success  securing the necessary resources within existing funding arrangements.  Although OPM officials stated they play an integral role in facilitating  discussions to resolve FEB funding issues, some of the FEB  representatives reported that OPM told them that if any of the FEBs  encountered funding difficulties, the boards were on their own to solve the  problems since the FEBs were unwilling to accept OPM’s restructuring  proposal.
The problem of unstable resources is one that could affect any networked  organization similar to the FEBs that relies, more or less, on voluntary  contributions from members. Agencies may be reluctant to contribute  resources to an initiative that is not perceived as central to their  responsibilities, especially during periods of budgetary constraints. This  reluctance may, however, limit the long-term investment of the federal  government in working more collaboratively. For example, we recently  reported on the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), a  congressionally created entity designed to plan for and coordinate a  transformation from the current air traffic control system to the next  generation air transportation system by 2025. Housed within the Federal  Aviation Administration, JPDO has seven federal partner agencies. One of  the greatest challenges that JPDO officials cited was creating mechanisms  to leverage partner agency resources. Although leveraging efforts have  worked well so far, we noted that JPDO could face difficulties in securing  needed agency resources if the priorities of the partner agencies change  over time. This has been a long-standing problem for the FEBs as well. In a  1984 report, we concluded that although the FEBs have contributed to  improved field management, the future of the boards was uncertain  because funding for staff and board participation had declined. Similar to  the boards’ current situation, in 1983, five FEBs lost all or part of their  staff support as agency budgets grew more constrained.
In Canada, the federal government has adopted a mix of both central  funding and departmental contributions for its regional coordinating  entities. Regional federal councils, the Canadian equivalent of the FEBs,  are sustained by a balance between central funding and departmental  contributions at the local level. The role of the councils was the subject of  in-depth consideration by Canadian government officials in 1996, and at  that time, the Treasury Board increased the level of support it provided to  the councils, including central funding to support staff positions and some  operating expenses. A 2000 report on the councils concluded that a  balance between central funding and departmental contributions at the  local level may well be the model best suited to financially sustain the  councils.
Although OPM and the FEBs are now involved in a strategic planning  effort, OPM has not to date considered the resource requirements to  support an expanded emergency support role for the FEBs. Yet, as we  have pointed out in our previous reports, a strategic plan should include a  description of the resources—both sources and types—that will be needed  for the strategies intended to achieve the plan’s goals and objectives.
section_title: The Nature of Pandemic Influenza May Make the FEBs a Particularly Valuable Asset in Pandemic Preparedness and Response
paragraphs: Despite the challenges the FEBs face in providing emergency support,  their potential to add value to the nation’s emergency preparedness and  response is particularly evident given an event like pandemic influenza.  The distributed nature of a pandemic and the burden of disease across the  nation dictate that the response will be largely addressed by each  community it affects. Using their established and developing community  relationships to facilitate communication and coordination with local  federal agency leaders and state and local governments, FEBs are well  positioned to assist in pandemic preparedness and response. In the  current pandemic planning stages, many of the selected FEBs were  already acting as conveners, hosting pandemic influenza preparedness  events, such as briefings and training and exercises, and were considering  how federal agencies could share resources during a pandemic.
subsections: section_title: Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Present Different Concerns Than Localized Natural Disasters
paragraphs: According to the Homeland Security Council, the distributed nature of a  pandemic, as well as the sheer burden of disease across the nation, means  that the physical and material support states, localities, and tribal entities  can expect from the federal government will be limited in comparison to  the aid it mobilizes for geographically and temporarily bounded disasters  like earthquakes and hurricanes. Unlike those incidents that are discretely  bounded in space or time, an influenza pandemic could spread across the  globe over the course of months or over a year, possibly in waves, and  would affect communities of all sizes and compositions. While a pandemic  will not directly damage physical infrastructure, such as power lines or  computer systems, it threatens the operation of critical systems by  potentially removing the essential personnel needed to operate them from  the workplace for weeks or months.
The Homeland Security Council issued two documents to help address the  unique aspects of pandemic influenza. The November 2005 National  Strategy for Pandemic Influenza is intended to guide the overall effort to  address the threat and provide a planning framework consistent with the  National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Homeland  Security. This planning framework is also intended to be linked with the  National Response Plan. In May 2006, the Homeland Security Council also  issued the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic  Influenza. This plan lays out broad implementation requirements and  responsibilities among the appropriate federal agencies and also describes  expectations for nonfederal stakeholders, including state and local  governments, the private sector, international partners, and individuals.  Further, all federal agencies are expected to develop their own pandemic  plans that along with other requirements, describe how each agency will  provide for the health and safety of its employees and support the federal  government’s efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from a  pandemic.
The Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza  states that the greatest burden of the pandemic response will be in the  local communities. Local communities will have to address the medical  and nonmedical effects of pandemic influenza with available resources.  The implementation plan maintains that it is essential for communities,  tribes, states, and regions to have plans in place to support the full  spectrum of their needs over the course of weeks or months, and for the  federal government to provide clear guidance on the manner in which  these needs may be met. As pandemic influenza presents unique  challenges to the coordination of the federal effort, joint and integrated  planning across all levels of government and the private sector is essential  to ensure that available national capabilities and authorities produce  detailed plans and response actions that are complementary, compatible,  and coordinated.
section_title: FEBs’ Unique Role in the Local Federal Community Can Aid in Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response
paragraphs: Research has shown that systems like the FEBs have proven to be  valuable public management tools because they can operate horizontally,  across agencies in this case, and integrate the strengths and resources of a  variety of organizations in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors to  effectively address critical public problems, such as pandemic influenza.  Government leaders are increasingly finding that using traditional  hierarchical organizations does not allow them to successfully address  complex problems. As a result, they are beginning to explore the use of  collaborative networks that reach across agencies and programs.
The boards bring together the federal agency leaders in their service areas  and have a long history of establishing and maintaining communication  links, coordinating intergovernmental activities, identifying common  ground, and building cooperative relationships. Documents supporting the  establishment of the FEBs noted that it is important that field executives  have a broader picture of government and a general understanding of the  interrelationships of government activity. The boards also partner with  community organizations and participate as a unified federal force in local  civic affairs. This connection to the local community could play a role in  pandemic influenza preparedness and response as predisaster relationship  building and planning are often the cornerstones to incident management.
Many of the selected FEBs cultivated relationships within their federal,  state, and local governments and their metropolitan area community  organizations as a natural outgrowth of their general activities. For  example, FEB activities, such as the Combined Federal Campaign and  scholarship programs, brought the boards into contact with local charities  and school boards. In addition, through activities such as hosting  emergency preparedness training or through participation in certain  committees, some of the selected FEBs reported a connection with  emergency management officials, first responders, and health officials in  their communities. Through their facilitation of COOP exercises and  training, the FEBs bring together government leaders, health officials, and  first responders in a venue where the parties can share ideas, discuss  plans, and coordinate approaches. The San Francisco FEB executive  director and chair said they attend FEMA’s Regional Interaction Steering  Committee meetings, which brought them in contact with federal, state,  and local government emergency management partners. The Minnesota  FEB plays an active role in both the Association of Minnesota Emergency  Managers (AMEM) and the Metropolitan (Twin Cities) Emergency  Managers Association. The Minnesota FEB executive director, for  example, serves on the AMEM board of directors as federal agency liaison,  a newly created partnership with the organization. As another example,  the Oklahoma FEB partnered with the fire departments in Oklahoma City  and Tulsa to provide site visits to the federal agencies there to help  strengthen emergency preparedness plans and update evacuation and  shelter-in-place plans. The executive director said the site visits also  provided agency leaders with the opportunity to interact with the most  likely first responders in the event of an emergency and to obtain valuable  information to include in emergency preparedness plans.
As with the boards’ emergency support role in general, some of the FEB  representatives envisioned their boards taking a more active role in  pandemic influenza preparedness and response than others did. While  some FEB representatives stressed the unique characteristics of the  boards that position them to help prepare and respond to pandemic  influenza, others noted the boards’ limited staffing and resources. One  FEB executive director remarked that although the boards have no real  authority, they are valuable because of the community relationships they  have forged and their unique ability to coordinate resources and  communicate. As previously discussed, several representatives were  concerned, however, about the role the FEBs could play in the event of a  large-scale emergency, such as an influenza pandemic.
section_title: FEBs Are Acting as Conveners to Deliver Planning and Training Needed for Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Have a Potential Role in Pandemic Response
paragraphs: In terms of current pandemic planning, many of the selected FEBs were  building capacity for pandemic influenza response within their member  agencies and community organizations by hosting pandemic influenza  training and exercises. The Implementation Plan for the National Strategy  for Pandemic Influenza highlights training and exercises as an important  element of pandemic planning. For example, 13 of the 14 selected FEBs  were involved in pandemic influenza-related activities that ranged from  informational briefings to coordinating pandemic exercises, some that  included nonprofit organizations, the private sector, and government. The  one exception was the New Orleans FEB, where the executive director  said the board is still too heavily involved with Hurricane Katrina recovery  to focus on helping agencies to collaborate on pandemic influenza  preparedness.
A number of the selected FEBs have held pandemic influenza tabletop  exercises. A pandemic influenza tabletop exercise would be based on a  fictitious account of a plausible outbreak of pandemic influenza with  scenarios constructed to facilitate problem solving and to provoke  thinking about gaps and vulnerabilities. The Boston FEB, together with the  Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency and FEMA, held a  pandemic influenza tabletop exercise in November 2006. The exercise  objectives included goals such as helping to increase the awareness of  federal, state, local, and tribal government agencies of the requirement to  incorporate pandemic influenza procedures into COOP planning and  identifying special considerations for protecting the health and safety of  employees and maintaining essential government functions and services  during a pandemic outbreak. In addition, the Baltimore FEB hosted a  pandemic influenza exercise on November 1, 2006, facilitated by FEMA  Region III and the Maryland Emergency Management Agency. The Seattle  FEB, with the assistance of FEMA and the City of Seattle, sponsored an  all-day conference in October 2006 called Pandemic Flu: Get Smart, Get  Ready! Conversation Tools and Tips.
The Minnesota FEB has been a leader among the boards in pandemic  influenza planning. Using a tabletop exercise it created, the board hosted  its first pandemic influenza exercise in February 2006, with a follow-up  exercise in October 2006. The October exercise included approximately  180 participants from 100 organizations within federal agencies, state and  local government, and the private sector. Figure 3 illustrates the breadth of  participation in the exercises, including key infrastructure businesses such  as power and telecommunications. The Minnesota FEB executive director  noted that Minnesota has excellent state and local government  relationships, which help to facilitate planning of this nature. Examples of  partnerships the board has with state and local entities include those with  the State of Minnesota Division of Homeland Security and Emergency  Management, the Minnesota Department of Health, the St. Paul Chamber  of Commerce, and the American Red Cross.
The Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic  Influenza emphasizes that government and public health officials must  communicate clearly and continuously with the public throughout a  pandemic. The plan recognized that timely, accurate, credible, and  coordinated messages will be necessary. According to many of the FEB  representatives we interviewed, the communications function of the  boards is a key part of their activities and could be an important asset for  pandemic response. For example, when asked about the role they envision  the FEBs playing in the response to a pandemic, the Dallas-Fort Worth  FEB representatives said that because the board is viewed by its member  agencies as a credible source of information, the board’s role should be to  coordinate communications among member agencies. They gave the  example of the Department of Health and Human Services working  through the board to disseminate medical information to their local  community.
In addition to their communications role, during pandemic influenza the  FEBs have the potential to broaden the situational awareness of member  agency leaders and emergency coordinators and provide a forum to inform  their decisions, similar to what the FEBs provide for other hazards, such  as inclement weather conditions. A FEMA official noted that FEBs have  vital knowledge of the federal agencies in their jurisdictions, which can  provide valuable situational awareness to community emergency  responders.
Some of the FEBs were also considering the role they can play in assisting  member agencies by supporting human capital functions, such as  supporting the federal workforce and coordinating the deployment of  personnel among member agencies as may be appropriate. Several FEB  representatives said, for example, that they were considering how they  could provide assistance in coordinating support to federal agencies  responding to pandemic influenza, such as addressing personnel shortages  by locating available resources among member agencies. Other FEB  representatives we interviewed reiterated a theme that even the critical  federal employees in the field can be left to fend for themselves when  disasters strike their communities. Consequently, they are not able to  handle the emergency issues of the federal government. For example,  according to the New Orleans executive director, in New Orleans after  Hurricane Katrina the oil and gas workers had their companies as  powerful advocates in securing housing for them so they could resume  working. She reported that in sharp contrast, there was no entity  nationally that was an advocate for the local federal workforce to ensure  the speedy reconstitution of essential services. In the majority of cases,  she said that essential federal employees queued up for temporary housing  in long lines. She intervened to bring attention to the need for expedited  temporary housing for federal employees, who were responsible for  providing essential functions, but who were also victims of the disaster.
To avoid a similar situation during pandemic influenza, the Minnesota and  Oklahoma FEBs are trying to negotiate with their states to create  memorandums of agreement between the states and the federal agencies,  represented by the FEBs. Their objectives are to identify how medical  supplies and vaccines from the Advanced Pharmaceutical Cache (APC) or  the Strategic National Stockpile, which will be distributed by the states,  will be dispersed to essential federal government employees in the event  of a pandemic or bioterrorist attack. To accomplish this, the FEBs are  working with their federal members to apply the states’ guidelines for  vaccine priorities to the federal workforce in their areas of service so that  essential federal employees, such as air traffic controllers, federal law  enforcement officers, and correctional facilities staff, are appropriately  integrated in the state vaccine distribution plans. They also want to  identify federal agencies and their resources that can augment the states’  operation of the mass vaccine dispensing sites. The Minnesota FEB has  inventoried all of the federal agencies within its jurisdiction and feels it  has a good idea of the resources that will be needed. According to the  Minnesota FEB executive director, however, Minnesota currently does not  have enough medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, and vaccines in its APC to  cover the emergency personnel of the federal government in Minnesota  nor does it have the resources for purchasing these supplies.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Achieving results for the nation increasingly requires that federal agencies  work with each other and with the communities in which they serve. The  federal executive boards are uniquely able to bring together federal agency  and community leaders in major metropolitan areas outside Washington,  D.C., to meet and discuss issues of common interest, such as preparing for  and responding to pandemic influenza. As we reported in 2004, such a role  is a natural outgrowth of general FEB activities and can add value in  coordinating emergency operations efforts.
Several interrelated issues limit the capacity of FEBs to provide a  consistent and sustained contribution to emergency preparedness and  response. These issues may present limitations to other areas of FEB  activities, not solely to emergency preparedness. Among them are the  following:    The role of the FEBs in emergency support is not defined in national  emergency guidance and plans.
Performance standards, for which the boards will be held accountable,  with accompanying measures, are not fully developed for FEB emergency  support activities.
The availability of continuing resource support for the FEBs is uncertain  and the continued willingness of host and member agencies to commit  resources beyond their core missions may decrease, especially in times of  increasing budgetary constraints.
While the FEBs and FEMA have established important working  relationships in a number of locations, these have, to date, been largely  informal. As FEMA officials have noted, including the FEBs in federal  emergency guidance and plans provides an opportunity for the FEBs to  leverage the network of community relationships they have already  established. OPM and FEMA could formalize the FEBs’ contribution to  FEMA’s emergency preparedness and response efforts through a  memorandum of understanding, or some similar mechanism, between  FEMA and the FEBs, and a formal designation of the FEB role in FEMA  guidance. Likewise, recognition of the FEB emergency support role in the  national emergency structure could help the boards carry out their  emergency support role more effectively by underscoring the value they  add, which may be overlooked by federal agency officials unfamiliar with  their capabilities.
The ability of FEBs and organizations like them to fulfill important  collaborative national missions is hampered if they are dependent on the  willingness of host agencies to provide support. OPM has determined that  the FEBs should have an important and prominent role in emergency  support and envisions a set of emergency support activities across the  FEB system. The current structure of host agencies and in-kind  contributions puts at risk the achievement of that goal.
OPM’s work on a strategic plan with the FEBs affords the opportunity to  complete the development of clear expectations for the FEBs in  emergency operations and to develop appropriate performance measures  for these expectations. OPM also has an opportunity, as part of this  planning process, to consider alternative funding arrangements that would  better match the roles envisioned for the FEBs. As noted earlier, a  strategic plan should describe how goals and objectives are to be  achieved, including how different levels of resources lead to different  levels of achievement and the sources of those resources.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: Consistent with OPM’s ongoing efforts in this regard, we recommend that  the Director of OPM take the following four actions to help improve the  ability of the FEBs to contribute to the nation’s emergency preparedness  efforts, particularly given the threat of pandemic influenza:    Once OPM completes defining emergency support expectations for the  FEBs, OPM should work with FEMA to develop a memorandum of  understanding, or some similar mechanism, that formally defines the FEB  role in emergency planning and response.
OPM should initiate discussion with DHS and other responsible  stakeholders to consider the feasibility of integrating the FEB emergency  support responsibilities into the established emergency response  framework, such as the National Response Plan.
OPM should continue its efforts to establish performance measures and  accountability for the emergency support responsibilities of the FEBs  before, during, and after an emergency event that affects the federal  workforce outside Washington, D.C.
As an outgrowth of the above efforts and to help ensure that the FEBs can  provide protection of the federal workforce in the field, OPM, as part of its  strategic planning process for the FEBs, should develop a proposal for an  alternative to the current voluntary contribution mechanism that would  address the uncertainty of funding sources for the boards.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided the Director of OPM and the Secretary of Homeland Security  a draft of this report for review and comment. We received written  comments from OPM, which are reprinted in appendix IV. While not  commenting specifically on the recommendations, OPM stated that it  understands the importance of the issues raised in the report, noting that it  is building the boards’ capacity by developing a national FEB strategic and  operational plan that will ensure consistent delivery of services across the  FEB network. By documenting results and creating a consistent  accountability mechanism, OPM said it is building a strong business case  through which it can address the resources FEBs need to continue  operations. OPM also stated that it believed institutionalized relationships  with strategic partners like FEMA can demonstrate FEBs’ business value  and help address ongoing funding issues. In comments received from  FEMA by e-mail, FEMA concurred with the findings of the report and  welcomed the opportunity to work with OPM to develop a memorandum  of understanding that more formally defines the FEB role in emergency  planning and response. FEMA also recognized the current personnel and  budget limitations of the FEBs in supporting emergency planning and  response activities and said that a proposal for an alternative to the  current FEB voluntary contribution mechanism should assist with  providing an improved capability for the boards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Director of OPM and the  Secretary of Homeland Security and appropriate congressional  committees. We will also provide copies to others upon request. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-6806 or steinhardtb@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of our review were to  identify the actions the federal executive boards (FEB) have taken to  fulfill their emergency preparedness and response roles and  responsibilities,    describe the key challenges facing the FEBs in fulfilling these roles and    evaluate the extent to which the FEBs can contribute to emergency  preparedness and response to pandemic influenza.
To address these objectives, we reviewed FEB annual reports and  academic literature as well as prior GAO reports about leveraging  collaborative networks. Additionally, we reviewed the National Response  Plan, Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic  Influenza, and the Joint Field Office Activation and Operations Interagency  Integrated Standard Operating Procedure to assess the feasibility of FEB  involvement in those plans. We interviewed Office of Personnel  Management (OPM) officials, and we consulted with three GAO field  office managers who are members of their local FEBs to gain a greater  understanding of FEB activities. We selected 14 of the 28 FEBs for more  detailed review. Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth,  Denver, Los Angeles, New York City, Oklahoma, Philadelphia, San  Francisco, and Seattle were selected because they are 12 of the 15 largest  FEBs in terms of number of federal employees served. Minnesota was  selected because it is considered a leader in pandemic influenza planning,  and New Orleans was selected because of its recent emergency  management experience with Hurricane Katrina. GAO headquarters and  field office teams interviewed at least two key FEB representatives,  including the chair or vice chair and the executive director from the 14  selected boards. Additionally, we obtained and reviewed FEB documents,  such as annual reports, monthly activity reports, minutes, and  correspondence, at the selected sites. Because our selection of FEBs was  nonprobabilistic, the results of our review of these selected FEBs are not  generalizable to all other FEBs. However, the challenges and issues that  were identified in our coverage of half of all FEBs along with our review of  materials concerning the FEBs as a group suggests that these matters are  not limited to just the selected FEBs.
OPM provided data on the counties of jurisdiction for all of the boards as  well as their host agencies and the number of federal and military  employees and agencies in each service area. We determined these data  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
We also interviewed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)  officials at their headquarters in Washington, D.C. FEMA serves as the  Department of Homeland Security’s designated lead agent for continuity of  operations (COOP) plans for the FEBs’ executive branch members.  Because the FEBs and FEMA collaborate on COOP activities in the field,  we interviewed the FEMA regional directors in regions V and VI based in  Chicago, Illinois, and Denton, Texas, respectively, to obtain an outside  perspective of the boards and their role in emergency operations. Our  analysis of the capacity of FEBs to support emergency preparedness is  drawn from our collective review and assessment of information and  documents provided to us by officials from OPM and FEMA and the FEB  representatives at the selected FEBs as well as our examination of the  relevant literature described above.
Our review was conducted from March 2006 through February 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Office of Personnel Management Document Describing the FEB Role and Responsibilities in Emergency Situations
paragraphs: Appendix II: Office of Personnel Management  Document Describing the FEB Role and  Responsibilities in Emergency Situations ROLE: PROVIDE EMERGENCY LIAISON AND COMMUNICATIONS - FEBs stand ready to provide timely and relevant information  to support emergency preparedness and response coordination.  -FEBs will serve as a Federal liaison for State and Local emergency officials.  -FEBs will establish notification networks and develop a protocol (Communications Plan) to be used in nonemergency and  emergency situations.  -FEBs will disseminate relevant information received from OPM/DC regarding emergency preparedness information (memorandums  from OPM officials, emergency guides, training opportunities, information from other departments/agencies, etc.)  -FEBs will identify a core group of Federal leaders in each community who will meet regularly to discuss planned courses of action  (delayed arrival, early dismissal, shelter in place, emergency personnel only, etc.) in the event of an emergency.  -FEBs will survey and/or facilitate training for member agencies regarding their roles and responsibilities related to occupant  emergency plans.  -FEBs will facilitate training on Continuity of Operations (COOP), and other emergency preparedness topics, i.e., shelter in place,  triage, onsite responder, etc. for Federal agencies.  -FEBs will assess local emergency situations in cooperation with Federal, State and Local officials.  -FEBs will activate established notification system for transmission of local emergency information, as prescribed by the FEB’s  protocol (Communications Plan).  -FEBs will provide problem resolution assistance as appropriate, to include identifying Federal resources which may be available to  assist the community in responding to, or recovering from, an emergency.  -FEBs relay local emergency situation information, by way of periodic reports to the appropriate authorities, to include, but not limited  to: OPM/DC, FEB members, media, State and Local government authorities.  -FEBs will disseminate information received from OPM/DC regarding emergency information at the national level – decision on  employee work status, information from other departments/agencies, etc.  -FEBs alert those responsible for implementing the Occupant and Agency Emergency Plans and serve as a redundant (back-up)  communication vehicle to ensure notification.
subsections: section_title: Social Security Administration-Regional Office
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Office of Personnel Management
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were William Doherty, Assistant Director; Dominic Barranca; Scott Behen;  Kathleen Boggs; Deirdre Brown; Beverly Burke; Jimmy Champion; Betty  Clark; Derrick Collins; Daniel Concepcion; Amber Edwards; Richard  Guthrie; Bonnie Hall; Charles Hodge; Aaron Kaminsky; Judith Kordahl;  Susan Mak; Signora May; Samuel Scrutchins; Gabriele Tonsil; George  Warnock; and Daniel Zeno. In addition, William Bates, Thomas Beall,  David Dornisch, and Donna Miller provided key assistance.