Ready Reserve Force: Ship Readiness Has Improved, but Other Concerns Remain
Published: 1994-11-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) program, focusing on: (1) the readiness of RRF ships to respond to large-scale contingencies; (2) the program changes that were implemented to improve ship readiness and address problems encountered during the Persian Gulf War; (3) whether the readiness level of the highest-priority ships exceeds other strategic mobility components; and (4) the effect of further decreases in the number of available U.S. merchant mariners on RRF crew availability.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO found that: (1) as a result of the problems it encountered during the Persian Gulf War, the Maritime Administration (MARAD) identified and corrected equipment deficiencies, instituted comprehensive specifications for the deactivation and preservation of RRF ships, strengthened ship manager controls, developed automated information systems for tracking maintenance repairs, and implemented new strategies for maintaining high-priority ships; (2) RRF ships will be able to meet their delivery schedules and sail within specified time frames as a result of maintenance and repairs performed during and after the Persian Gulf War; (3) MARAD ability to activate ships within 4 or 5 days exceeds the readiness level of other strategic mobility components; (4) the Army's ability to transfer unit equipment from key Army installations to seaports is constrained by deteriorated facilities; (5) although the Army plans to increase its capability to activate ships within 4 or 5 days, most projects will not be completed by 1999; (6) the Department of Defense has not justified maintaining 63 ships in a high state of readiness; (7) although the reduced number of available mariners should not immediately affect MARAD ability to crew RRF ships, its future ability to crew RRF ships is questionable; and (8) none of the proposed alternatives to resolve this situation have been adopted.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: As requested, we reviewed the Ready Reserve Force program. Our analysis included the ships’ overall readiness, the required readiness level for the highest priority ships, and the long-term effect of the decline in the number of available U.S. merchant mariners to crew the Ready Reserve Force ships. This report contains recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense and Transportation.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to interested parties and make copies available to others upon request.
Please contact me on (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions regarding this report. Other major contributors are listed in appendix III.
subsections: section_title: Introduction
paragraphs: The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) is a government-owned, inactive fleet of former commercial ships of various configurations and capabilities that should be ready to sail within 4, 5, 10, or 20 days in response to national emergency sealift requirements. The RRF was organized in 1976 with  30 ships drawn from the 360 ships in the National Defense Reserve Fleet, which was created in 1946 to be able to respond to national emergencies.During fiscal year 1994, the RRF consisted of 108 ships. The fleet is expected to increase to 142 ships by 1999 in accordance with the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Mobility Requirements Study and defense plans.
subsections: section_title: Organization and Management of the RRF
paragraphs: The Department of Transportation, through the Maritime Administration (MarAd), manages and maintains RRF ships, and DOD directs and controls operations once the ships have been activated. The Military Sealift Command, under the Transportation Command, carries out DOD’s oversight and operational control responsibilities.
RRF ships are berthed at Reserve Fleet sites located in James River, Virginia; Beaumont, Texas; Suisun Bay, California; and other locations in the United States and overseas. MarAd contracts with ship managers, who are responsible for activating, maintaining, crewing, operating, and deactivating the ships as directed. The American Bureau of Shipping and the U.S. Coast Guard conduct periodic limited inspections of the ships for compliance with marine safety regulations. The ship managers are required to ensure that the ships are fully operational once MarAd notifies them to activate the ships. The Military Sealift Command designates a ship as being fully operational when, among other things, a complete crew has been provided, all required regulatory certificates have been obtained, and sea trials have been performed.
section_title: RRF Use During the Persian Gulf War
paragraphs: Of the 96 ships that were in the RRF in August 1990, 78 were called upon to support the Persian Gulf War. This was the first large-scale activation and employment of the RRF since it was separated from the National Defense Reserve Fleet. These ships transported nearly one-fifth of the dry cargo deployed. However, ship activations were not as timely as planned—only 25 percent of the activated ships met their assigned readiness goals. Although insufficient fiscal year 1990 maintenance funding has been cited as a major reason for many late activations, a Department of Transportation Inspector General report attributed ships’ mechanical and crewing problems as the primary reasons the RRF ships were not able to meet specified activation times.
Mechanical problems were attributed to (1) the poor condition of the ships when they were purchased for the RRF, (2) the age of the ships’ equipment, (3) improper steps taken to deactivate the ships, (4) the ships’ lack of use, (5) shipyard repairs and upgrades not being tested upon completion, and (6) uncorrected deficiencies identified during the periodic Coast Guard inspections and during specified fleet maintenance procedures. The Transportation Inspector General reported that 45 of the 79 ships activated for the Persian Gulf War had not been operated since their acquisition and acceptance into the RRF.
The Transportation Inspector General also reported that mariners must be onboard the activating ships at specified times and should be knowledgeable of the ships and their operating systems. They are responsible for testing and operating all components and systems required to make the ships operational. Crewing problems during the war were caused by crew members that arrived late, lacked knowledge of the specific ship and operating systems, or had to be replaced because of crew turnover.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services, asked us to evaluate whether RRF ships would be ready within specified time frames in the event of a large-scale contingency. Specifically, we determined whether (1) the changes implemented to address problems encountered during war activations have improved the ships’ overall readiness, (2) the readiness level of the highest priority ships exceeds that of other strategic mobility components, and (3) a further decline in the number of available U.S. merchant mariners would have a long-term effect on crewing the force.
To determine whether the overall readiness of the RRF had improved since the Persian Gulf War, we compared selected ships’ 1990 and 1993 activation performance. The selected ships included those activated in 1993 for purposes other than testing post-war repairs. We reviewed MarAd, Military Sealift Command, Coast Guard, and American Bureau of Shipping records, as well as related external studies, to determine the length of activation, significant machinery failures, and costs.
We identified and reviewed program modifications initiated since the war. We visited ships on the East, Gulf, and West Coasts; interviewed officials from the Military Sealift Command, the U.S. Coast Guard, the American Bureau of Shipping, MarAd, the Merchant Marine Academy, and unions, as well as RRF crew members and ship managers; and reviewed studies and documents to assess the relative benefits of these program changes. We examined the status and effect of post-war repair expenditures, changes in MarAd’s policies for maintaining and preserving the ships, changes to MarAd’s contractual agreement with ship manager companies, and new automated maintenance management systems. We also assessed MarAd’s plans for maintaining the readiness of the RRF and the consequences of reduced funding.
To determine the appropriate readiness status for the RRF, we obtained and analyzed data on several strategic mobility factors that may diminish the need for RRF ships to be maintained in a high-priority status. We analyzed the Mobility Requirements Study’s volume I and II reports, using the Middle East scenario, to determine the times specific types of ships first loaded, the ports that were assumed to be loading cargo within the first 30 days, and the locations and readiness goals set in the study. We discussed our analysis with Joint Chiefs of Staff officials.
We reviewed the Army’s Strategic Mobility Program’s Management Plan to identify funding and plans for improvement to the continental United States infrastructure that would increase the mobility of selected military units to their seaports of embarkation. We discussed the status of these improvements with Army headquarters, Forces Command, Transportation Command, and Military Traffic Management Command officials.
To determine the current and future availability of crews, we reviewed Persian Gulf War RRF activation data, RRF crewing requirements, and labor availability estimates. We sponsored a workshop on April 5, 1994, to discuss the impact of the declining merchant marine pool on U.S. sealift capability, identify impediments in crewing RRF ships, and reach consensus among the participants on how to address the issues discussed. We issued a report, that provided a summary of views expressed at the workshop.
We have issued several other products on issues related to the RRF. In our testimony,  we discussed several issues related to U.S. mobility capabilities that need to be resolved, including the Army’s current ability to get cargo to the ports. In our letter to the Maritime Administrator (GAO/NSIAD-94-96R, Jan. 7, 1994), we provided information on the latest selection of 12 roll-on/roll-off ships for the RRF. We stated that these ships would provide 1.6 million square feet of additional deck space for surge requirements, thereby increasing the fleet’s roll-on/roll-off cargo capacity by 40 percent. Three of the ships have been upgraded to U.S. specifications, and the other nine ships are expected to be completed by November 1994. Two of these ships are serving as Army prepositioning ships. A complete list of related GAO products appears on the last page of this report.
We conducted our review between August 1993 and June 1994 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: RRF Readiness Has Improved Since the Persian Gulf War
paragraphs: MarAd has made significant progress in implementing changes to address problems encountered while activating RRF ships for the Persian Gulf War. It identified and corrected equipment deficiencies, instituted more uniform and comprehensive specifications for the deactivation and preservation of RRF ships, strengthened ship manager controls by expanding and clarifying the manager’s contractual responsibilities, and developed and implemented automated information systems for tracking maintenance repairs. MarAd also initiated programs, such as assigning permanent, nucleus crews onboard high-priority ships to help maintain the RRF’s material condition achieved after the war and alleviate crewing concerns. Total RRF program expenditures between fiscal years 1990 and 1993 were more than $1 billion when Persian Gulf War activation and deactivation costs are included.
Recent activations of the RRF have demonstrated the ships’ ability to meet readiness requirements and operate with fewer mechanical failures. These successful activations resulted largely from maintenance and repairs made during and after the war. In fact, activations without prior notice occurred an average of only 7 months after the ships had been deactivated from the war. However, continuing the present high readiness status of the RRF ships depends on MarAd’s future budgets and maintenance strategies.
subsections: section_title: MarAd Has Addressed Wartime Problems
paragraphs: MarAd spent more than $1 billion to resolve mechanical, management, and crewing problems encountered during Persian Gulf War activations. Problems targeted were the poor condition of the ships upon entry to the force; improper deactivation, as well as insufficient preservation and maintenance techniques; insufficient monitoring of ship manager companies; unknown, deferred, or unreported equipment deficiencies; and inadequate crewing. MarAd has made significant progress toward solving those problems.
subsections: section_title: Equipment Deficiencies Were Identified and Corrected
paragraphs: The war experience enabled MarAd to identify and repair equipment deficiencies at an average cost of $5.5 million per ship. These repairs had been deferred because many of the ships had been laid up since being acquired for the RRF. Many ships had been added to the RRF with many known and unknown machinery deficiencies, and MarAd lacked the funding at that time to activate, fully inspect, and repair many of the ships. In fact, prior to the war, only 34 ships had been activated since entering the RRF.
section_title: Preservation and Maintenance Techniques Were Improved
paragraphs: Improper deactivation and inconsistent preservation maintenance techniques for RRF ships contributed to mechanical problems encountered during war activations. Inadequate lay-up and maintenance techniques contributed to boiler problems, clogged pipe systems, freeze damage, and impurities in lubrication systems. After the war, MarAd instituted more uniform and comprehensive specifications for the deactivation and preservation of RRF ships. For example, to reduce corrosion in boiler tubes—a problem for steam-powered ships laid up in colder climates—some boiler panels are now left uncovered, and fans and heaters are installed to improve the circulation of dehumidified air to prevent freezing. These new techniques, however, have raised the cost of standard maintenance procedures.
section_title: Ship Manager Controls Were Strengthened
paragraphs: Some ship managers contributed to activation delays during the war because of their lack of capability. For example, two ship managers were unable to activate their ships due to their lack of knowledge. (These managers’ contracts were subsequently canceled.) As a result of this and other contract management difficulties during the war, MarAd expanded and clarified ship managers’ contractual responsibilities at an estimated annual cost increase of $18,000 per ship. The new contracts raise the standards of technical competence, increase the number of technical employees per ship, clarify penalties, and emphasize monitoring ship manager performance.
section_title: Automated Maintenance Information Systems Were Developed
paragraphs: Before the war, RRF ship logs and machinery history records appear to have been randomly kept by the chief and port engineers. For example, according to MarAd officials during the war activation, one of five similar ships had recently had an engine overhaul, but MarAd personnel and ship managers were unsure which ship had been repaired. Up-to-date inventories of vital components and spare parts were also not available for the aging machinery on the RRF ships, which caused activation delays while some parts had to be manufactured and shipped to the activation sites.
After the war, MarAd implemented automated systems for tracking maintenance, repairs, and spare parts inventories. A Maintenance and Repair Tracking System has been developed by MarAd officials and contractors, and all repair funding requests must now be supported by deficiencies recorded in this system. Contractors have also developed an automated system for maintaining spare parts records and are completing inventories of shipboard spares to update the system’s records. As of April 1994, MarAd had invested $26 million in its new logistics program, and annual spare parts costs are estimated to be $70,000 to $80,000 per ship.
section_title: Ship Outporting Was Improved
paragraphs: The location of the RRF ships at the time of the war degraded the ships’ ability to be activated within planned time frames. Every ship required some maintenance at a shipyard before reaching its designated loading seaport. Although half the RRF ships were outported—berthed at locations other than the three MarAd reserve fleet sites—they were not necessarily located near a shipyard. During activation for the war, the number of ships requiring simultaneous activation in a given location sometimes exceeded the capacity of the local shipyards. As a result, queuing occurred, and some ship activations were delayed.
When reassigning ships to a particular location, MarAd officials considered factors such as towing time; likely congestion in shipyards; and, for high-priority ships, transit times to likely seaports of embarkation. By fiscal year 1994, MarAd had reassigned most RRF ships accordingly. For example, 5- and 10-day ships have been better distributed according to shipyard facilities for activation, and the high-priority 4-day ships have been positioned closer to their ports of embarkation because they do not require shipyard services to be activated.
section_title: Key Personnel Are Being Assigned to Ships in Reduced Operating Status
paragraphs: To address the problems of identifying crews and transporting them to the ships in a timely manner, MarAd placed the highest priority ships in reduced operating status (ROS) with permanent, nucleus crews onboard. These crews form the core of the required operating crew, which ensures that key personnel needed for swift activation are onboard ships. According to MarAd, about 50 percent of the senior engineers and 34 percent of the junior engineers required by the RRF are already serving onboard ROS ships.
The current crew structure on a ROS ship consists of a Chief Engineer; 1st, 2nd, and 3rd assistant engineers; a qualified member of the Engineering Department; an electrician; a chief mate; a bosun; a steward/cook; and a steward/utility. The crew’s familiarity with the ship’s particular operating systems and characteristics can avoid costly and time-consuming activation delays. For example, during the war, one newly assigned crew could not keep the steam propulsion system operating shortly after the ship had been loaded and left the port. The ship had to be towed back to port, where shipyard personnel that assisted in the ship’s activation restored the system within 30 minutes. ROS crews could also help newly arriving crew members make the transition to a level of full competence on an unfamiliar ship.
section_title: Recent Activations Show That RRF Readiness Has Improved
paragraphs: Comparisons of recent activations to those during the war demonstrate that MarAd’s efforts to improve readiness have been successful. Sixteen of the 20 ships we reviewed had been activated for the war and were an average of 11.6 days late. In 1993, some of those 20 RRF ships were activated earlier than Military Sealift Command or MarAd criteria; they were activated more quickly with fewer, less significant equipment failures and at less cost. Military Sealift Command, American Bureau of Shipping, and MarAd officials agree that the improved readiness of RRF ships is largely due to the extensive repairs made during and after the war.
Six of the 20 ships were activated without prior notice to test their readiness and therefore the tests were the most realistic tests of the RRF’s ability to meet defense requirements. All six ships were activated on time or earlier than the time required, and the average cost to activate them was about $1 million less than during the war. The ships had been inactive between 6 and 9 months, or an average of 7 months, before their unannounced activations. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 compare the time and cost for five of the ships activated without notice both in wartime and in 1993.
For both the wartime and 1993 activations without prior notice, DOD reimbursed MarAd for activation and deactivation costs. Specific data that compares two of the five ships’ recent tests and wartime activations follow:
The Cape Isabel, a steam-powered ship, was built in 1976, added to the RRF in 1986, and laid up until its activation for the war in August 1990. During its wartime activation, the ship had many equipment failures in its boiler system, fuel system, evaporators, and service generator. After the war, MarAd spent almost $5.6 million improving the ship’s habitability and overhauling its steam engine and other major equipment. In 1993, the ship was activated without prior notice and, according to the after-action report, overall ship systems operated well during the activation and the sea trial.
The Comet, a steam-powered ship built in 1958, was added to the RRF in 1985, and laid up until its wartime activation in August 1990. During this activation, the ship encountered numerous problems with its steam plant, ballast tank pumps and indicators, salt water service systems, electrical equipment, and service generator. During postwar deactivations, MarAd spent almost $5.6 million overhauling the ship. When the ship was activated without notice in 1993, no major deficiencies were reported during the activation or the sea trial.
The remaining 14 ships we reviewed were activated on less demanding schedules for either sea trials or operations. These activation costs were on average about $0.6 million less than during wartime activations. Also, there were fewer and generally less critical equipment failures and fewer delays in making these repairs.
section_title: New Strategies to Sustain Readiness Depend on Funding Availability
paragraphs: MarAd has initiated RRF maintenance strategies that will sustain fleet readiness. These strategies combine various actions taken after the Persian Gulf War to solve activation problems at an annual cost of $3 million for a 4- or 5-day ship compared with $800,000 for an average ship before the war. MarAd believes that these strategies should provide reasonable assurance that MarAd can activate RRF ships within required time frames. Table 2.3 identifies the major components of MarAd’s current maintenance strategies.
The ROS concept and the annual test activations are significant changes to the RRF maintenance program. MarAd cannot be certain that funding will be available in the future to continue all of its preferred maintenance strategies and has begun examining variations within its overall RRF maintenance program. For example, MarAd assigned one 14-person crew onboard two roll-on/roll-off ships berthed together, and it is considering placing all 5-day ships in ROS with 9-person crews onboard.
MarAd’s fiscal year 1994 RRF budget request submitted to the Congress for maintenance and operations was $136 million, or approximately $221 million less than the $357 million identified in the Mobility Requirements Study. To make up this difference, only 11 of the designated 22 4-day ships currently have permanent, nucleus crews. Also, the number of planned maintenance test activations was reduced from 93 in accordance with mobility study standards to 32. MarAd officials concluded that reduced funding in fiscal year 1994 would not result in a great degradation of readiness. Although budget constraints are expected to continue, MarAd’s fiscal year 1995 budget request includes $246 million for maintenance and operations.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The readiness of the RRF has improved since the Persian Gulf War due to the $1 billion invested in the program. Officials from the Military Sealift Command, American Bureau of Shipping, and MarAd agree that the satisfactory readiness of RRF ships is primarily due to the identification and repair of machinery deficiencies during and after the war. Despite this investment, however, these officials could not say how long the ships will stay as ready. They agree that continuing the present readiness status of RRF ships depends on MarAd’s future budgets and maintenance strategies.
section_title: RRF Readiness Exceeds Other Deployment Components and Is Not Supportable
paragraphs: On the basis of DOD’s 1992 Mobility Requirements Study, MarAd plans to keep 63 RRF ships in a high state of readiness (i.e., ready to activate within 4 or 5 days) starting in fiscal year 1996. However, this high state of readiness exceeds the Army’s ability to transport heavy equipment, such as large vehicles, tanks, weapon systems, and helicopters, to seaports for initially deploying units. Army deployment operations are hindered in the continental United States by deteriorating transportation-related facilities and overseas by its limited ability to unload ships in underdeveloped seaports. Moreover, DOD’s mobility study’s recommendation to keep  63 RRF ships in a high readiness status is not justified by the detailed study analysis.
subsections: section_title: Deteriorated Infrastructure Constrains Army Operations
paragraphs: In the event of a large-scale contingency, the Army must be able to deploy heavy divisions rapidly from the continental United States. These divisions are located at Fort Stewart and Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and Fort Hood and Fort Bliss, Texas. The movement of people, equipment, and supplies to ports of embarkation is the first stage of a major operation, called “fort to port” movement. Figure 3.1 displays the fort to seaport movement for selected heavy divisions.
We reported in 1992 that fort to port cargo movement during Operation Desert Shield was constrained by deteriorated rail facilities that could have threatened the Army’s ability to move equipment to seaports rapidly.
Although the equipment reached the ports on time despite serious rail deficiencies, movement of equipment for Desert Shield was on a smaller scale and took a longer time than strategic mobility plans require today. Current deployment plans call for moving the same amount of cargo in  8 weeks that was moved during the first 6 months of the Persian Gulf War.
The Army has a plan that identifies needed improvements to the transportation infrastructure in the continental United States to meet the cargo flows assumed in DOD’s mobility study. The Army’s plan identifies improvement projects such as acquiring rail cars and upgrading or constructing facilities, highway, and rail networks and ports for receiving, storing, and loading Army equipment and supplies. These improvements are projected to cost about $550 million and be funded through fiscal year 2001. As of August 1994, only $28 million had been spent on these projects. At the Army’s planned funding levels, some projects will take 15 to  20 years to complete and, therefore, will not be in place by the 1999 time frame assumed in the mobility study.
Army officials acknowledged that many infrastructure conditions remain essentially the same since the war. The deployment problems of three key contingency divisions and the improvements identified by the Army are discussed below. (The Mobility Requirements Study assumes that these three divisions are a part of an early response.)
The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) deploys from Fort Campbell, which is approximately 630 miles from its seaport of embarkation in Jacksonville, Florida. The mobilization plan for this division relies heavily on the use of rail transportation. However, this method of transportation could not be used during Desert Shield because of deteriorated conditions and limitations of the Hopkinsville, Kentucky, rail interchange.
The Army has identified approximately $23 million in infrastructure improvements that are necessary to meet the requirements in DOD’s mobility study. Projects identified include rail upgrades, additional track (for a Hopkinsville bypass), and a pallet warehouse. In addition, 200 rail cars are to be acquired for Fort Campbell to execute the mobility plans. At the time of our review, none of the rail cars had been delivered.
The 1st Cavalry Division deploys out of Fort Hood, which is about  320 miles from its seaport of embarkation in Beaumont, Texas. The division’s mobilization plan calls for the lead brigade to move to this seaport by rail. However, the existing rail system at Fort Hood cannot support these deployment requirements, according to the Military Traffic Management Command’s 1993 Engineering Study.
Infrastructure improvements totaling $69 million have been identified. Projects include rail upgrades, additional tracks for storing and switching rail cars, a warehouse, and airfield upgrades. In addition, 512 rail cars are needed for prepositioning at this installation, but only 14 percent had been delivered at the time of our review.
The 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), stationed at Fort Stewart is only 40 miles from its designated seaport of embarkation in Savannah, Georgia. Fort Stewart was one of the first units during Desert Shield to transport large numbers of heavy tracked vehicles by rail. However, train speeds were restricted to 10 miles per hour or less, compared with 25 miles per hour under normal circumstances, because of deteriorated rail conditions.
Fort Stewart needs $30 million in infrastructure upgrades and construction to meet deployment goals. Projects identified include rail passing tracks, a container handling facility, and a cargo staging area. Of the 220 rail cars needed to meet mobility requirements, 42 percent are currently located at the fort.
The Army believes that many infrastructure improvements have been accomplished that are necessary to support the initial surge units, as demonstrated by readiness exercises. The Army conducts these exercises to train heavy units in the continental United States on strategic deployment. However, only a portion of a division takes part in the exercises. For example, in September 1993, the Army conducted an exercise moving selected military equipment for a brigade task force of the 1st Cavalry Division from Fort Hood to Beaumont. The equipment used for this exercise only accounted for 474 of 1,975 pieces of the brigade task force. In 1994, the Army conducted a similar exercise with 900 pieces of equipment. Movement of an entire division has not yet been tested in the exercises to date.
section_title: Ability to Unload Ships Is Limited in Underdeveloped Overseas Ports
paragraphs: The Army’s ability to meet its mobility requirements is also affected by its capability to deliver forces to underdeveloped or damaged overseas seaports. The Joint Logistics Over the Shore is a system of floating causeways that the Army can use to unload ships when the ships cannot enter a foreign seaport. As part of that concept, auxiliary crane ships will be used to unload RRF ships. Overall, the auxiliary crane ships are not kept in as high a readiness status as the surge cargo ships. Of the nine crane ships in the RRF, four are maintained in a 5-day status and five are maintained in a 10-day status.
The Army plans to unload equipment and supplies from ships within  48 hours of the ships reaching their overseas destination. A recent DOD Inspector General report determined that the Army would not be able to meet its 48-hour requirement if all the factors—including the ships’ distances from shore, the ocean conditions, the number of crane ships available, and the number of watercraft (small ships, tugboats, and floating causeways)—were not optimal. Army officials are planning on improving the effectiveness of the Joint Logistics Over the Shore concept through training and additional acquisition.
section_title: Surge Sealift Requirements Are Not Supportable
paragraphs: The mobility study examined a range of potential crises, including regional wars in Europe, the Middle East, and Korea, in the 1999 time frame. The most logistically demanding scenario examined, because of the number of forces and the distances involved, was a major regional war in the Middle East. DOD used a model’s results to support the study’s recommendation that the RRF maintain 36 ships in 4-day status and 27 ships in 5-day readiness.
Our analysis of DOD’s model for the Middle East scenario does not support the study’s recommendation. The study’s model assumed that 6 RRF roll-on/roll-off ships, not 36, would be needed at the seaports of embarkation by day 4 and that 8 other RRF ships, not 27, would be needed at the seaports by day 5. By the 10th day, the model assumed that only  36 ships would have arrived at the seaports. DOD officials could not explain the wide discrepancy between the model’s data and the mobility study’s recommendation; however, DOD officials confirmed that they believe this recommendation is still valid.
DOD is conducting another review of its strategic mobility requirements. This review will be based on the requirement from the October 1993 Bottom-Up Review to fight two regional conflicts nearly simultaneously. DOD anticipates issuance of a report by January 1995.
In addition to DOD’s ongoing mobility study, the Transportation Command is conducting an RRF modernization study. The objectives of this study are to determine the optimum RRF size, composition, and readiness to meet surge sealift requirements. The study’s final recommendations will be submitted to DOD’s Joint Staff/Transportation Command working group for inclusion in an update to the Bottom-Up Review report.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD’s determination of the number of RRF ships it wants maintained at various readiness levels is overstated, given (1) the current ability of the Army to get from the forts to the ports and (2) the disparity between the output of the analytical model and the mobility study’s recommendation. The results of DOD’s updated mobility study should guide future RRF ship readiness levels.
Given these problems, we believe DOD needs to provide more realistic readiness requirements to MarAd. We recognize one lesson of the Persian Gulf War—RRF ships need to be more ready than they were at that time—however, we also believe that the government should not pay to keep an excess number of ships in a high-priority status.
section_title: Recommendation
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander in Chief, Transportation Command, to annually review RRF ship readiness requirements provided to MarAd and ensure that they are in line with current military deployment capabilities.
section_title: DOD Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD generally agreed with our findings and concurred with our recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. DOD stated that RRF readiness requirements are reviewed annually in cooperation with MarAd as part of budget reviews. DOD also noted that RRF readiness levels are currently being examined as part of the Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update.
DOD’s comments are reproduced in appendix I.
section_title: Future Availability of Merchant Mariners Remains a Concern
paragraphs: MarAd and DOD agree that a viable U.S. merchant marine industry is the best source for mariners to crew the RRF in an emergency. However, future declines in the pool of U.S. mariners seem likely and would affect MarAd’s ability to adequately crew these ships. The Department of Transportation has proposed legislation designed to help support the U.S. merchant marine industry. If, however, this legislation is not implemented or does not adequately support a mariner labor pool capable of providing enough mariners for the RRF, other measures will need to be taken. Both DOD and MarAd have studied the idea of a merchant marine reserve program to either supply or augment the required crew. Maritime labor unions, who are opposed to reserve programs, have proposed other alternatives, such as chartering commercially useful RRF ships to U.S. operators. DOD is also examining a proposal that has the potential of eventually increasing the available U.S. merchant marine labor pool.
subsections: section_title: RRF Crewing Requirements
paragraphs: The RRF currently requires around 3,700 mariners for 108 ships. To meet DOD’s Mobility Requirements Study, the RRF will require approximately 4,800 mariners, as shown in table 4.1. DOD is currently reevaluating the size and composition of the RRF in an update of the Mobility Requirements Study. Once DOD determines the number and type of ships in the RRF, crewing levels in accordance with Coast Guard regulations and MarAd recommendations can be reestablished.
According to DOD, if the RRF crewing requirements remain about 4,800, and the U.S. merchant marine labor pool continues to decline, steps must be taken to ensure that an adequate pool of qualified mariners is in place.
section_title: U.S. Merchant Marine Pool Is Declining
paragraphs: Crews for the RRF come from the labor pool that exists to operate ships in the active U.S. commercial fleet. Each merchant mariner job supports about two mariners in the labor pool to allow for training, vacations, and job rotations. The U.S. commercial ocean-going labor pool, from which crew members are drawn, currently consists of about 21,000 mariners competing for about 9,300 shipboard jobs. Therefore, MarAd should not have a labor supply problem for crewing RRF ships in the near term.
Events in the maritime industry have had a direct impact on the potential crewing of RRF ships. During the 1960s, commercial ships registered in the United States typically went to sea with crews of more than  40 persons. The average crew size has since declined in response to labor-saving technology and automation. For example, the introduction of automated boiler controls during the mid-1960s and diesel-powered ships during the 1970s reduced crew size. As a result, the number of shipboard jobs decreased. For example, in 1970, the 843 ships in the U.S.-registered, ocean-going fleet provided around 40,000 jobs. By 1993, the number of ships had declined to 350, and only about 9,300 jobs were available. The gradual decline in the pool of qualified and available mariners needed for the RRF is shown in figure 4.1.
section_title: Resolving Future Crewing Concerns
paragraphs: The Department of Transportation and DOD have conducted numerous studies that address the continued decline in the merchant marine industry. General and specific proposals have been suggested to aid the industry. Thus far, Transportation, DOD, and others involved, such as unions and ship operators, have been unable to reach consensus on specific programs or crewing alternatives. Therefore, action has not occurred.
subsections: section_title: 1994 Maritime Security Program
paragraphs: Transportation has proposed legislation—the Maritime Security Program (H.R. 4003 and S. 1945)—to the 103rd Congress to help revitalize the U.S. Merchant Marine. The $1 billion, 10-year program proposes subsidizing up to 52 U.S.-registered liner ships. One of the program’s goals is to provide additional sealift capacity for national emergencies. Therefore, this program would help maintain an active pool of U.S. mariners that can provide the necessary crews to operate RRF ships during an emergency.
However, the specific number of mariners the program may ultimately provide to RRF vessels is not known.
section_title: Expansion of Naval Merchant Marine Reserve
paragraphs: In 1986, the Navy examined crewing alternatives for the RRF and DOD sealift ships. One alternative was to expand the existing Merchant Marine Reserve component of the U.S. Naval Reserve. At that time, the Merchant Marine Reserve’s purpose was to maintain an organization of merchant marine officers who were trained to operate merchant ships and a shoreside cadre assigned to naval activities supporting strategic sealift. The expanded program would include inactive, qualified mariners. The cost to implement this alternative was estimated to be $10 million annually. The Congress directed Transportation to explore establishing a civilian reserve program.
section_title: Creation of a Civilian Reserve
paragraphs: In 1987, MarAd examined the concept of creating a civilian merchant marine reserve program. Qualified mariners who were not actively sailing but were willing to commit themselves under contract for service when needed would form the base for this program. MarAd envisioned that the program would be comprised of 6,480 mariners and estimated its cost to be $46 million a year. By 1991, MarAd had completed another study that included the concept of a civilian merchant marine reserve. MarAd studied four options that could increase mariner availability. These options ranged from a program with 500 members costing between approximately $3 million and $6 million annually to a program with over 2,000 mariners costing about $19 million annually.
Studies completed after the Persian Gulf War also called for the need to consider a civilian reserve. For example, a 1991 Department of Transportation Inspector General report recommended that a civilian reserve program based on MarAd’s 1991 study be implemented. In addition, a 1991 DOD and Transportation RRF working group report recommended that the agencies jointly pursue efforts to formulate a civilian merchant marine reserve program.
section_title: New Naval Reserve Units
paragraphs: In 1986, the Navy examined an alternative establishing specific new Naval Reserve units dedicated to manning all defense sealift ships. These units would be comprised of about 9,000 personnel who are members of existing naval reserve programs and naval retirees. The cost of this alternative was estimated to be $46 million annually.
In 1988 and 1989, the Navy told the Congress a number of its concerns about the use of naval reservists for crewing RRF ships. The Navy stated that (1) naval reservists would not be available until DOD mobilization, even though RRF ships would most likely be requested to be activated before that time; (2) civilian mariners, not Navy reservists, have the expertise in operating RRF ships; (3) no training capability is currently available in the armed forces for training personnel to operate civilian ships; and (4) crewing RRF ships with naval reservists would change their noncombatant status under international law.
section_title: Maritime Labor Union Views
paragraphs: Maritime labor unions have opposed government efforts to establish any merchant marine reserve. They believe that a government reserve program would limit potential future jobs. They also believe that the potential implementation of any merchant marine reserve program shows a lack of support for the U.S. commercial merchant marine industry and that government funds should be directed toward aiding the maritime industry.
Maritime labor unions have proposed that commercially useful ships in the RRF be chartered to U.S. operators. This proposal would help maintain a trained and experienced crew available at no cost to the government. The chartered rate would be set at the market rate and would be reduced if there were no U.S.-flag competitors. The terms of the charter would include a guarantee that an operational ship would be made available to DOD when needed. However, because these ships would be engaged in active shipping, some ships would have to first unload cargo and then return to the United States when notified and, therefore, might not be available to help meet DOD’s surge shipping requirements.
Another maritime labor union proposal is to develop a designated cadre of volunteers from within the ranks of the unions to be trained and available for surge call-up. This cadre would consist of three times the number of crew members required for RRF ships to account for mariners currently at sea and others not immediately available. DOD would set the standards for training, and mariners would receive 2 weeks paid training aboard RRF ships. The cost of training, mariner wages, subsistence, transportation, and ship activity would be provided by DOD, according to this proposal. The cost for this proposal was not provided.
section_title: Other Recent Proposals
paragraphs: At the RRF crewing workshop we sponsored in April 1994, MarAd presented an emergency crewing concept that would allow the unions time to assemble regular crews from the commercial sector. Under the proposal, teams of 10 to 15 inactive mariners would assist ships’ managers to activate RRF ships. The activation teams would then step aside once union crews reported to the ships. If some mariners were not available from a union, then team members could be tasked to fill those slots. MarAd stated that 2,000 mariners would be needed for this program. MarAd estimated that the initial cost would be $2.2 million and that the program would eventually cost around $11 million annually. However, funding to develop this program was not approved in MarAd’s fiscal year 1995 budget.
DOD is currently considering a concept to move Navy ships, such as oilers, combat stores ships, and salvage ships, into the Military Sealift Command. Civilian mariners could crew these ships, which is a practice the Military Sealift Command currently uses for crewing its fast sealift ships. This concept could result in an increase in the size of active mariner pool and therefore the number of mariners available to the RRF. The number of mariners that could become part of the active pool would depend upon the mariner-to-billet ratio used by the Military Sealift Command. This concept may also result in substantial Navy cost savings because civilian crews aboard Sealift Command auxiliary ships are generally smaller than Navy crews aboard ships assigned to Navy battle forces.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In 1986, the Chairman of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries recognized the warning signs of a declining pool of mariners when he said that “inadequate manning is the Achilles heel of emergency sealift.” The Persian Gulf War clearly demonstrated how vulnerable the RRF could be if sufficient numbers of properly skilled mariners are not available to sail when the ships are ready. However, since the war, little has been done to improve the likelihood that RRF ships will be adequately crewed in the future. Neither DOD nor MarAd has proposed alternatives that seem to garner universal consensus—including from the Congress, the Coast Guard, maritime unions, and ship operators. Our workshop was the first time many of these players were together discussing this issue.
Crewing the RRF will become a major problem as the pool of available mariners declines and the requirements remain stable or grow.
section_title: Recommendation
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Maritime Administrator to annually assess whether an adequate number of experienced U.S. merchant mariners would be available to crew RRF ships within DOD’s specified time frames. If these assessments indicate that the number of qualified mariners may not be sufficient, the Secretary should propose a specific merchant marine crewing alternative to the Congress.
section_title: Transportation Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: Transportation partially concurred with our recommendation to annually assess the number of qualified U.S. mariners available to crew RRF ships and, if necessary, report crewing options. Transportation said it maintains maritime workforce statistics on the size and the composition of U.S. merchant mariners and that the Coast Guard is making progress toward improving the accuracy regarding availability of mariners. However, this information is not reported to the Congress in conjunction with defense requirements. We believe that MarAd’s assessment would be an appropriate first step to define the effect that the declining U.S. merchant marine pool might have on national security.
Transportation said that the recommendation should focus on the need for reemployment rights legislation for U.S. merchant mariners if called upon to serve during a war or national emergency. It pointed out that reemployment rights were discussed in our workshop report. While Transportation acknowledged that consensus has not been achieved on certain proposals—such as a civilian merchant marine reserve or expansion of the naval merchant marine reserve—it believes that identified crewing proposals have the potential to achieve consensus. Transportation stated that our workshop was particularly beneficial toward providing a forum to meet this end. Transportation also noted that it is hopeful that its Maritime Security Program, designed to strengthen the U.S. merchant marine, will pass the Congress this fall.
We do believe that reemployment rights for U.S. mariners equivalent to the rights and benefits provided any member of a reserve component of the Armed Forces would be fair and equitable. However, the number of mariners who would be influenced to serve on RRF ships by this incentive is unknown and, therefore, the impact of such a program cannot be determined. In view of the continuing decline in the pool of U.S. mariners, we believe the central issue of how to crew RRF ships in the future has not been adequately addressed. Therefore, we believe that an annual assessment of the crewing issue could clearly identify specific actions needed to meet defense objectives related to sealift requirements. Further, the Congress has considered legislation for reemployment rights three times, and has not approved it twice, and at the time of issuance of this report, passage was still uncertain as was Maritime Security Reform passage.
The full text of Transportation’s comments is reproduced in appendix II.