Aviation Safety: Advancements Being Pursued to Improve Airliner Cabin Occupant Safety and Health
Published: 2003-10-03T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Airline travel is one of the safest modes of public transportation in the United States. Furthermore, there are survivors in the majority of airliner crashes, according to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Additionally, more passengers might have survived if they had been better protected from the impact of the crash, smoke, or fire or better able to evacuate the airliner. As requested, GAO addressed (1) the regulatory actions that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has taken and the technological and operational improvements, called advancements, that are available or are being developed to address common safety and health issues in large commercial airliner cabins and (2) the barriers, if any, that the United States faces in implementing such advancements.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: FAA has taken a number of regulatory actions over the past several decades to address safety and health issues faced by passengers and flight attendants in large commercial airliner cabins. GAO identified 18 completed actions, including those that require safer seats, cushions with better fire-blocking properties, better floor emergency lighting, and emergency medical kits. GAO also identified 28 advancements that show potential to further improve cabin safety and health. These advancements vary in their readiness for deployment. Fourteen are mature, currently available, and used in some airliners. Among these are inflatable lap seat belts, exit doors over the wings that swing out on hinges instead of requiring manual removal, and photoluminescent floor lighting. The other 14 advancements are in various stages of research, engineering, and development in the United States, Canada, or Europe. Several factors have slowed the implementation of airliner cabin safety and health advancements. For example, when advancements are ready for commercial use, factors that may hinder their implementation include the time it takes for (1) FAA to complete the rule-making process, (2) U.S. and foreign aviation authorities to resolve differences between their respective requirements, and (3) the airlines to adopt or install advancements after FAA has approved their use. When advancements are not ready for commercial use because they require further research, FAA's processes for setting research priorities and selecting research projects may not ensure that the limited federal funding for cabin safety and health research is allocated to the most critical and cost-effective projects. In particular, FAA does not obtain autopsy and survivor information from NTSB after it investigates a crash. This information could help FAA identify and target research to the primary causes of death and injury. In addition, FAA does not typically perform detailed analyses of the costs and effectiveness of potential cabin occupant safety and health advancements, which could help it identify and target research to the most cost-effective projects.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Airline travel is one of the safest modes of public transportation in the  United States, in large part because of the Congress’s, Federal Aviation  Administration’s (FAA), commercial airlines’, aircraft manufacturers’, and  airports’ combined efforts to prevent commercial airliner accidents.  Furthermore, although a few airliner accidents are catastrophic, there are  survivors in a majority of crashes. According to the National  Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), passengers survived in 19 of the 26  U.S. large commercial airliner accidents that occurred from 1982 through  2001, and in these 19 accidents, over 76 percent of the passengers (1,523 of  1,988) survived. Additionally, some of the passengers who died in these  accidents might have survived if they had been better protected from the  impact of the crash or from the effects of smoke and fire and had been  better able to evacuate the airliner. This possibility of survival has led  federal safety officials to focus their efforts not only on preventing airliner  accidents, but also on increasing the chances of surviving them.
Over the past several decades, FAA has been taking regulatory actions to  require the implementation of technological and operational improvements  in cabin occupant safety and health to help increase passengers’ chances of  surviving large commercial airliner accidents. In addition, FAA and the  aviation community have been conducting research on new technological  and operational improvements, which we refer to in this report as  advancements, whose implementation could further increase passengers’  chances of survival and improve the safety and health of passengers and  flight attendants. This report discusses regulatory actions that FAA has  taken as well as potential advancements in cabin occupant safety and  health that are (1) currently available but not yet implemented or installed,  and (2) not yet available and subject to additional research to advance the  technology or lower costs. For implementation of these advancements to  occur, FAA often has to take regulatory action, that is, issuing regulations  or airworthiness directives that require the implementation of  technological and operational improvements in cabin occupant safety and  health. FAA continues to pursue regulatory initiatives as well as conduct  research to improve cabin occupant safety and health. The aviation  community is also attempting to enhance the safety and health of those  traveling and working in airliner cabins through such measures as  providing earlier warnings of turbulence and information on the potential  to develop blood clots on long-distance flights. Besides increasing cabin  occupants’ safety and health, these actions and efforts could benefit the  airlines by helping to restore passengers’ confidence in the safety of flight  and thereby increasing the demand for air travel, which fell sharply after  September 11, 2001, and still remains below fiscal year 2000 levels.
In response to your request, this report addresses the following questions:  (1) What regulatory actions has FAA taken, and what key advancements  are available or being developed by FAA and others to address safety and  health issues faced by passengers and flight attendants in large commercial  airliner cabins? (2) What factors, if any, slow the implementation of  advancements in cabin occupant safety and health? In addition, as  requested, we identified some factors faced by Canada and Europe in their  efforts to improve cabin occupant safety and health (see app. II).
To identify the regulatory actions FAA has taken and the key advancements  that are available or being developed to address safety and health issues  facing passengers and flight attendants (cabin occupants), we reviewed the  relevant literature, interviewed FAA officials, and reviewed FAA’s  documentation on the regulatory actions it has taken to enhance cabin  occupant safety and health. As part of this effort, FAA officials identified  key regulatory actions that had been completed in this area. In addition, we  interviewed other aviation safety experts in government, industry, and  academia from the United States, Canada, and Europe. (See app. I for  additional information.) Through our reviews and interviews, we found  that FAA’s regulatory actions and advancements fell into four broad  categories—three related to safety in the event of a crash and one related  to general cabin occupant safety and health. The regulatory actions and  advancements related to safety in the event of a crash are those actions  taken to (1) minimize injuries from the impact of a crash, (2) prevent fire or  mitigate its effects, and (3) improve the chances and speed of evacuation.  In addition, we discuss the regulatory actions and advancements FAA has  taken to address a fourth category—improving the safety and health of  cabin occupants. Using the results of our reviews and interviews, we  identified and categorized 28 advancements that are currently available or  being developed, including 5 impact advancements, 8 fire advancements,  10 evacuation advancements, and 5 cabin occupant safety and health  advancements. For each of these advancements, we discuss the  background, research, and regulatory status. We also discuss each  advancement’s technological readiness for use in the existing commercial  airliner fleet or in newly produced commercial airplanes. To identify  factors that have slowed implementation of airliner cabin occupant safety  and health advancements, we interviewed FAA, NTSB, and industry  officials. In addition, we analyzed documentation from FAA, NTSB, and  aviation safety experts to identify factors relating to key issues within FAA  and the aviation community related to prioritizing and funding research,  choosing advancements for regulatory implementation, and gaining the  aviation community’s acceptance of these advancements.
This report does not address cabin air quality because we are doing work in  this area for another congressional requester. In addition, given the large  scope of this review, the report does not focus on safety and health issues  for flight deck crews (pilots and flight engineers) since they face some  unique issues not faced by cabin occupants. It also does not address  aviation security issues, such as hijackings, sabotage, or terrorist activities.
We conducted our review from January 2002 through September 2003 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The safe travel of U.S. airline passengers is a joint responsibility of FAA and  the airlines in accordance with the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as  amended, and the Department of Transportation Act, as amended. To carry  out its responsibilities under these acts, FAA supports research and  development; certifies that new technologies and procedures are safe;  undertakes rule-makings, which when finalized form the basis of federal  aviation regulations; issues other guidance, such as Advisory Circulars; and  oversees the industry’s compliance with standards that aircraft  manufacturers and airlines must meet to build and operate commercial  aircraft. Aircraft manufacturers are responsible for designing aircraft that  meet FAA’s safety standards, and air carriers are responsible for operating  and maintaining their aircraft in accordance with the standards for safety  and maintenance established in FAA’s regulations. FAA, in turn, certifies  aircraft designs and monitors the industry’s compliance with the  regulations.
FAA’s general process for issuing a regulation, or rule, includes several  steps. When the regulation would require the implementation of a  technology or operation, FAA first certifies that the technology or  operation is safe. Then, FAA publishes a notice of proposed rule-making in  the Federal Register, which sets forth the terms of the rule and establishes  a period for the public to comment on it.  Next, FAA reviews the comments  by incorporating changes into the rule that it believes are warranted, and,  in some instances, it repeats these steps one or more times. Finally, FAA  publishes a final rule in the Federal Register.  The final rule includes the  date when it will go into effect and a time line for compliance.
Within FAA, the Aircraft Certification Service is responsible for certifying  that technologies are safe, including improvements to cabin occupant  safety and health, generally through the issuance of new regulations, a  finding certifying an equivalent level of safety, or a special condition when  no rule covers the new technology. The Certification Service is also  responsible for taking enforcement action to ensure the continued safety of  aircraft by prescribing standards for aircraft manufacturers governing the  design, production, and airworthiness of aeronautical products, such as  cabin interiors. The Flight Standards Service is primarily responsible for  certifying an airline’s operations (assessing the airline’s ability to carry out  its operations and maintain the airworthiness of the aircraft) and for  monitoring the operations and maintenance of the airline’s fleet.
FAA conducts research on cabin occupant safety and health issues in two  research facilities, the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center/Civil  Aerospace Medical Institute in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and the William  J. Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The institute  focuses on the impact of flight operations on human health, while the  technical center focuses on improvements in aircraft design, operation, and  maintenance and inspection to prevent accidents and improve survivability.  For the institute or the technical center to conduct research on a project,  an internal FAA requester must sponsor the project. For example, FAA’s  Office of Regulation and Certification sponsors much of the two facilities’  work in support of FAA’s rule-making activities. FAA also cooperates on  cabin safety research with the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA), academic institutions, and private research  organizations.
Until recently, NASA conducted research on airplane crashworthiness at its  Langley Research Center in Hampton, Virginia. However, because of  internal budget reallocations and a decision to devote more of its funds to  aviation security, NASA terminated the Langley Center’s research on the  crashworthiness of commercial aircraft in 2002. NASA continues to  conduct fire-related research on cabin safety issues at its Glenn Research  Center in Cleveland, Ohio.
NTSB has the authority to investigate civil aviation accidents and collects  data on the causes of injuries and death for the victims of commercial  airliner accidents. According to NTSB, the majority of fatalities in  commercial airliner accidents are attributable to crash impact forces and  the effects of fire and smoke. Specifically, 306 (66 percent) of the 465  fatalities in partially survivable U.S. aviation accidents from 1983 through  2000 died from impact forces, 131 (28 percent) died from fire and smoke,  and 28 (6 percent) died from other causes.
Surviving an airplane crash depends on a number of factors. The space  surrounding a passenger must remain large enough to prevent the  passenger from being crushed. The force of impact must also be reduced to  levels that the passenger can withstand, either by spreading the impact  over a larger part of the body or by increasing the duration of the impact  through an energy-absorbing seat or fuselage. The passenger must be  restrained in a seat to avoid striking the interior of the airplane, and the  seat must not become detached from the floor. Objects within the airplane,  such as debris, overhead luggage bins, luggage, and galley equipment, must  not strike the passenger. A fire in the cabin must be prevented, or, if one  does start, it must burn slowly enough and produce low enough levels of  toxic gases to allow the passenger to escape from the airplane. If there is a  fire, the passenger must not have sustained injuries that prevent him or her  from escaping quickly. Finally, if the passenger escapes serious injury from  impact and fire, he or she must have access to exit doors and slides or  other means of evacuation.
section_title: Regulatory Actions Have Been Taken and Additional Advancements Are Under Way to Improve Cabin Occupants’ Safety and Health
paragraphs: Over the past several decades, FAA has taken a number of regulatory  actions designed to improve the safety and health of airline passengers and  flight attendants by (1) minimizing injuries from the impact of a crash, (2)  preventing fire or mitigating its effects, (3) improving the chances and  speed of evacuation, or (4) improving the safety and health of cabin  occupants. (See app. III for more information on the regulatory actions  FAA has taken to improve cabin occupant safety and health.) Specifically,  we identified 18 completed regulatory actions that FAA has taken since  1984. In addition to these past actions, FAA and others in the aviation  community are pursuing advancements in these four areas to improve  cabin occupant safety and health in the future. We identified and reviewed  28 such advancements—5 to reduce the impact of a crash on occupants, 8  to prevent or mitigate fire and its effects, 10 to facilitate evacuation from  aircraft, and 5 to address general cabin occupant safety and health issues.
Minimizing Injuries from the  The primary cause of injury and death for cabin occupants in an airliner  Impact of a Crash 	 accident is the impact of the crash itself. We identified two key regulatory  actions that FAA has taken to better protect passengers from impact  forces. For example, in 1988, FAA required stronger passenger seats for  newly manufactured commercial airplanes to improve protection in  survivable crashes. These new seats are capable, for example, of  withstanding an impact force that is approximately 16 times a passenger’s  body weight (16g), rather than 9 times (9g), and must be tested dynamically  (in multiple directions to simulate crash conditions), rather than statically  (e.g., drop testing to assess the damage from the force of the weight alone  without motion). In addition, in 1992, FAA issued a requirement for  corrective action (airworthiness directive) for designs found not to meet  the existing rules for overhead storage bins on certain Boeing aircraft, to  improve their crashworthiness after bin failures were observed in the 1989  crash of an airliner in Kegworth, England, and a 1991 crash near  Stockholm, Sweden.
We also identified five key advancements that are being pursued to provide  cabin occupants with greater impact protection in the future. These  advancements are either under development or currently available.  Examples include the following:
Lap seat belts with inflatable air bags: Lap seat belts that contain  inflatable air bags have been developed by private companies and are  currently available to provide passengers with added protection during  a crash. About 1,000 of these lap seat belts have been installed on  commercial airplanes, primarily in the seats facing wall dividers  (bulkheads) to prevent passengers from sustaining head injuries during  a crash. (See fig. 1.)
Improved seating systems: Seat safety depends on several interrelated  systems operating properly, and, therefore, an airline seat is most  accurately discussed as a system. New seating system designs are being  developed by manufacturers to incorporate new safety and aesthetic  designs as well as meet FAA’s 16g seat regulations to better protect  passengers from impact forces. These seating systems would help to  ensure that the seats themselves perform as expected (i.e., they stay  attached to the floor tracks); the space between the seats remains  adequate in a crash; and the equipment in the seating area, such as  phones and video screens, does not increase the impact hazard.
Child safety seats: Child safety seats could provide small children with  additional protection in the event of an airliner crash. NTSB and others  have recommended their use, and FAA has been involved in this issue  for at least 15 years. While it has used its rule-making process to  consider requiring their use, FAA decided not to require child safety  restraints because its analysis found that if passengers were required to  pay full fare for children under the age of 2, some parents would choose  to travel by automobile and, statistically, the chances would increase  that both the children and the adults would be killed. FAA is continuing  to consider a child safety seat requirement.
Appendix IV contains additional information on the impact advancements  we have identified.
subsections: section_title: Preventing Fire or Mitigating Its Effect
paragraphs: Fire prevention and mitigation efforts have given passengers additional  time to evacuate an airliner following a crash or cabin fire. FAA has taken  seven key regulatory actions to improve fire detection, eliminate potential  fire hazards, prevent the spread of fires, and better extinguish them. For  example, to help prevent the spread of fire and give passengers more time  to escape, FAA upgraded fire safety standards to require that seat cushions  have fire-blocking layers, which resulted in airlines retrofitting 650,000  seats over a 3-year period. The agency also set new low heat/smoke  standards for materials used for large interior surfaces (e.g., sidewalls,  ceilings, and overhead bins), which FAA officials told us resulted in a  significant improvement in postcrash fire survivability. FAA also required  smoke detectors to be placed in lavatories and automatic fire extinguishers  in lavatory waste receptacles in 1986 and 1987, respectively. In addition, the  agency required airlines to retrofit their fleets with fire detection and  suppression systems in cargo compartments, which according to FAA,  applied to over 3,700 aircraft at a cost to airlines of $300 million. To better  extinguish fires when they do start, FAA also required, in 1985, that  commercial airliners carry two Halon fire extinguishers in addition to other  required extinguishers because of Halon’s superior fire suppression  capabilities.
We also identified 8 key advancements that are currently available and  awaiting implementation or are under development to provide additional  fire protection for cabin occupants in the future. Examples include the  following:
Reduced flammability of insulation materials: To eliminate a potential  fire hazard, in May 2000, FAA required that air carriers replace  insulation blankets covered with a type of insulation known as  metalized Mylar® on specific aircraft by 2005, after it was found that the  material had ignited and contributed to the crash of Swiss Air Flight  111. Over 700 aircraft were affected by this requirement. In addition,  FAA issued a rule in July 2003 requiring that large commercial airplanes  manufactured after September 2, 2005, be equipped with thermal  acoustic insulation designed to an upgraded fire test standard that will  reduce the incidence and intensity of in-flight fires. In addition, after  September 2, 2007, newly manufactured aircraft must be equipped with  thermal acoustic materials designed to meet a new standard for burn- through resistance, providing passengers more time to escape during a  postcrash fire.
Reduced fuel tank flammability: Flammable vapors in aircraft fuel  tanks can ignite. However, currently available technology can greatly  reduce this hazard by “blanketing” the fuel tank with nonexplosive  nitrogen-enriched air to suppress (“inert”) the potential for explosion of  the tank. The U.S. military has used this technology on selected aircraft  for 20 years, but U.S. commercial airlines have not adopted the  technology because of its cost and weight. FAA officials told us that the  military’s technology was also unreliable and designed to meet military  rather than civilian airplane design requirements. FAA fire safety  experts have developed a lighter-weight inerting system for center fuel  tanks, which is simpler than the military system and potentially more  reliable. Reliability of this technology is a major concern for the aviation  industry. According to FAA officials, Boeing and Airbus began flight  testing this technology in July 2003 and August 2003, respectively. In  addition, the Air Transport Association (ATA) noted that inerting is only  one prospective component of an ongoing major program for fuel tank  safety, and that it has yet to be justified as feasible and cost-effective.
Sensor technology: Sensors are currently being developed to better  detect overheated or burning materials. According to FAA and the  National Institute of Standards and Technology, many current smoke  and fire detectors are not reliable. For example, a recent FAA study  reported at least one false alarm per week in cargo compartment fire  detection systems. The new detectors are being developed by Airbus  and others in private industry to reduce the number of false alarms. In  addition, FAA is developing standards that would be used to approve  new, reduced false alarm sensors. NASA is also developing new sensors  and detectors.
Water mist for extinguishing fires: Technology has been under  development for over two decades to dispense water mist during a fire  to protect passengers from heat and smoke and prevent the spread of  fire in the cabin. The most significant development effort has been made  by a European public-private consortium, FIREDETEX, with over 5  million euros of European Community funding and a total project cost  of over 10 million euros (over 10 million U.S. dollars). The development  of this system was prompted, in part, by the need to replace Halon,  when it was determined that this main firefighting agent used in fire  extinguishers aboard commercial airliners depletes ozone in the  atmosphere.
Appendix V contains additional information on advancements that address  fire prevention and mitigation.
section_title: Improving the Chances and Speed of Evacuation
paragraphs: Enabling passengers to evacuate more quickly during an emergency has  saved lives. Over the past two decades, FAA has completed regulatory  action on the following six key requirements to help speed evacuations:
Improve access to certain emergency exits, such as those generally  smaller exits above the wing, by providing an unobstructed passageway  to the exit.
Install public address systems that are independently powered and can  be used for at least 10 minutes.
Help to ensure that passengers in the seats next to emergency exits are  physically and mentally able to operate the exit doors and assist other  passengers in emergency evacuations.
Limit the distance between emergency exits to 60 feet.
Install emergency lighting systems that visually identify the emergency  escape path and each exit.
Install fire-resistant emergency evacuation slides.
We also identified 10 advancements that are either currently available but  awaiting implementation or require additional research that could lead to  improved aircraft evacuation, including the following:
Improved passenger safety briefings: Information is available to the  airlines on how to develop more appealing safety briefings and safety  briefing cards so that passengers would be more likely to pay attention  to the briefings and be better prepared to evacuate successfully during  an emergency. Research has found that passengers often ignore the oral  briefings and do not familiarize themselves with the safety briefing  cards. FAA has requested that air carriers explore different ways to  present safety information to passengers, but FAA regulates only the  content of briefings. The presentation style of safety briefings is left up  to air carriers.
Over-wing exit doors: Exit doors located over the wings of some  commercial airliners have been redesigned to “swing out” and away  from the aircraft so that cabin occupants can exit more easily during an  emergency. Currently, the over-wing exit doors on most U.S. commercial  airliners are “self help” doors and must be lifted and stowed by a  passenger, which can impede evacuation. (See fig. 2.) The redesigned  doors are now used on new-generation B-737 aircraft operated by one  U.S. and most European airlines. FAA does not currently require the use  of over-wing exit doors that swing out because the exit doors that are  removed manually meet the agency’s safety standards. However, FAA is  working with the Europeans to develop common requirements for the  use of this type of exit door.
Audio attraction signals: The United Kingdom’s Civil Aviation  Authority and the manufacturer are testing audio attraction signals to  determine their usefulness to passengers in locating exit doors during  an evacuation. These signals would be mounted near exits and activated  during an emergency. The signals would help the passengers find the  nearest exit even if lighting and exit signs were obscured by smoke.
Appendix VI contains additional information on advancements to improve  aircraft emergency evacuations.
section_title: Improving the Safety and Health of Cabin Occupants
paragraphs: Passengers and flight attendants can face a range of safety and health  effects while aboard commercial airliners. We identified three key actions  taken by FAA to help maintain the safety and health of passengers and the  cabin crew during normal flight operations. For example, to prevent  passengers from being injured during turbulent conditions, FAA initiated  the Turbulence Happens campaign in 2000 to increase public awareness of  the importance of wearing seatbelts. The agency has advised the airlines to  warn passengers to fasten their seatbelts when turbulence is expected, and  the airlines generally advise or require passengers to keep their seat belts  fastened while seated to help avoid injuries from unexpected turbulence.  FAA has also required the airlines to equip their fleets with emergency  medical kits since 1986. In addition, Congress banned smoking on most  domestic flights in 1990.
We also identified five advancements that are either currently available but  awaiting implementation or require additional research that could lead to  an improvement in the health of passengers and flight attendants in the  future.
Automatic external defibrillators: Automatic external defibrillators are  currently available for use on some commercial airliners if a passenger  or crew member requires resuscitation. In 1998, the Congress directed  FAA to assess the need for the defibrillators on commercial airliners. On  the basis of its findings, the agency issued a rule requiring that U.S.  airlines equip their aircraft with automatic external defibrillators by  2004. According to ATA, most airlines have already done so.
Enhanced emergency medical kits: In 1998, the Congress directed FAA  to collect data for 1 year on the types of in-flight medical emergencies  that occurred to determine if existing medical kits should be upgraded.  On the basis of the data collected, FAA issued a rule that required the  contents of existing emergency medical kits to be expanded to deal with  a broader range of emergencies. U.S. commercial airliners are required  to carry these enhanced emergency medical kits by 2004. Most U.S.  airlines have already completed this upgrade, according to ATA.
Advance warning of turbulence: New airborne weather radar and other  technologies are currently being developed and evaluated to improve  the detection of turbulence and increase the time available to cabin  occupants to avert potential injuries. FAA’s July 2003 draft strategic plan  established a performance target of reducing injuries to cabin occupants  caused by turbulence. To achieve this objective, FAA plans to continue  evaluating new airborne weather radars and other technologies that  broadly address weather issues, including turbulence. In addition, the  draft strategic plan set a performance target of reducing serious injuries  caused by turbulence by 33 percent by fiscal year 2008--using the  average for fiscal years 2000 through 2002 of 15 injuries per year as the  baseline and reducing this average to no more than 10 per year.
Improve awareness of radiation exposure: Flight attendants and  passengers who fly frequently can be exposed to higher levels of  radiation on a cumulative basis than the general public. High levels of  radiation have been linked to an increased risk of cancer and potential  harm to fetuses. To help passengers and crew members estimate their  past and future radiation exposure levels, FAA developed a computer  model, which is publicly available on its Web site  http://www.jag.cami.jccbi.gov/cariprofile.asp. However, the extent to  which flight attendants and frequent flyers are aware of cosmic  radiation’s risks and make use of FAA’s computer model is unclear.  Agency officials told us that they plan to install a counter capability on  its Civil Aerospace Medical Institute Web site to track the number of  visits to its aircrew and passenger health and safety Web site. FAA also  plans to issue an Advisory Circular by early next year, which  incorporates the findings of a just completed FAA report, “What  Aircrews Should Know About Their Occupational Exposure to Ionizing  Radiation.” This Advisory Circular will include recommended actions  for aircrews and information on solar flare event notification of  aircrews. In contrast, airlines in Europe abide by more stringent  requirements for helping to ensure that cabin and flight crew members  do not receive excessive doses of radiation from performing their flight  duties during a given year. For example, in May 1996, the European  Union issued a directive for workers, including air carrier crew  members (cabin and flight crews) and the general public, on basic safety  and health protections against dangers arising from ionizing radiation.  This directive set dose limits and required air carriers to (1) assess and  monitor the exposure of all crew members to avoid exceeding exposure  limits, (2) work with those individuals at risk of high exposure levels to  adjust their work or flight schedules to reduce those levels, and (3)  inform crew members of the health risks that their work involves from  exposure to radiation. It also required airlines to work with female crew  members, when they announce a pregnancy, to avoid exposing the fetus  to harmful levels of radiation. This directive was binding for all  European Union member states and became effective in May 2000.
Improved awareness of potential health effects related to flying: Air  travel may exacerbate some medical conditions. Of particular concern is  a condition known as Deep Vein Thrombosis (DVT), or travelers’  thrombosis, in which blood clots can develop in the deep veins of the  legs from extended periods of inactivity. In a small percentage of cases,  the clots can break free and travel to the lungs, with potentially fatal  results. Although steps can be taken to avoid or mitigate some travel- related health effects, no formal awareness campaigns have been  initiated by FAA to help ensure that this information reaches physicians  and the traveling public. The Aerospace Medical Association’s Web site  http://www.asma.org/publication.html includes guidance for physicians  to use in advising passengers with preexisting medical conditions on the  potential risks of flying, as well as information for passengers with such  conditions to use in assessing their own potential risks.
See appendix VII for additional information on health-related advances.
section_title: Advancements Vary in Their Readiness for Deployment
paragraphs: The advancements being pursued to improve the safety and health of cabin  occupants vary in their readiness for deployment. For example, of the 28  advancements we reviewed, 14 are mature and currently available. Two of  these, preparation for in-flight medical emergencies and the use of new  insulation, were addressed through regulations. These regulations require  airlines to install additional emergency medical equipment (automatic  external defibrillators and enhanced emergency medical kits) by 2004,  replace flammable insulation covering (metalized Mylar®) on specific  aircraft by 2005, and manufacture new large commercial airliners that use a  new type of insulation meeting more stringent flammability test standards  after September 2, 2005. Another advancement is currently in the rule- making process—retrofitting the existing fleet with stronger 16g seats. The  remaining 11 advancements are available, but are not required by FAA. For  example, some airlines have elected to use inflatable lap seat belts and exit  doors over the wings that swing out instead of requiring manual removal,  and others are using photo-luminescent floor lighting in lieu of or in  combination with traditional electrical lighting. Some of these  advancements are commercially available to the flying public, including  smoke hoods and child safety seats certified for use on commercial  airliners. The remaining 14 advancements are in various stages of research,  engineering, and development in the United States, Canada, or Europe.
section_title: Several Factors Have Slowed the Implementation of Cabin Occupant Safety and Health Advancements
paragraphs: Several factors have slowed the implementation of airliner cabin occupant  safety and health advancements in the United States. When advancements  are available for commercial use but not yet implemented or installed, their  use may be slowed by the time it takes (1) for FAA to complete the rule- making process, which may be required for an advancement to be  approved for use but may take many years; (2) for U.S. and foreign aviation  authorities to resolve differences between their respective cabin occupant  safety and health requirements; and (3) for the airlines to adopt or install  advancements after FAA has approved their use, including the time  required to schedule an advancement’s installation to coincide with major  maintenance cycles and thereby minimize the costs associated with taking  an airplane out of service. When advancements are not ready for  commercial use because they need further research to develop their  technologies or reduce their costs, their implementation may be slowed by  FAA’s multistep process for identifying advancements and allocating its  limited resources to research on potential advancements. FAA’s multistep  process is hampered by a lack of autopsy and survivor information from  past accidents and by not having cost and effectiveness data as part of the  decision process. As a result, FAA may not be identifying and funding the  most critical or cost-effective research projects.
subsections: section_title: FAA’s Rule-making Process to Require Advancements Can Be Lengthy
paragraphs: Once an advancement has been developed, FAA may require its use, but  significant time may be required before the rule-making process is  complete. One factor that contributes to the length of this process is a  requirement for cost-benefit analyses to be completed. Time is particularly  important when safety is at stake or when the pace of technological  development exceeds the pace of rule-making. As a result, some rules may  need to be developed quickly to address safety issues or to guide the use of  new technologies. However, rules must also be carefully considered before  being finalized because they can have a significant impact on individuals,  industries, the economy, and the environment. External pressures—such as  political pressure generated by highly publicized accidents,  recommendations by NTSB, and congressional mandates—as well as  internal pressures, such as changes in management’s emphasis, continue to  add to and shift the agency’s priorities.
The rule-making process can be long and complicated and has delayed the  implementation of some technological and operational safety  improvements, as we reported in July 2001.In that report, we reviewed 76  significant rules in FAA’s workload for fiscal years 1995 through 2000—10  of the 76 were directly related to improving the safety and health of cabin  occupants. Table 3 details the status or disposition of these 10 rules. The  shortest rule-making action took 1 year, 11 months (for child restraint  systems), and the longest took 10 years, 1 month (for the type and number  of emergency exits). However, one proposed rule was still pending after 15  years, while three others were terminated or withdrawn after 9 years or  more. Of the 76 significant rules we reviewed, FAA completed the rule- making process for 29 of them between fiscal year 1995 and fiscal year  2000, in a median time of about 2 ½ years to proceed from formal initiation  of the rule-making process through publication of the final rule; however,  FAA took 10 years or more to move from formal initiation of the rule- making process through publication of the final rule for 6 of these 29 rules.
section_title: Differences in U.S. and Foreign Requirements Can Hamper Adoption of Advancements
paragraphs: FAA and its international counterparts, such as the European Joint Aviation  Authorities (JAA), impose a number of requirements to improve safety. At  times, these requirements differ, and efforts are needed to reach agreement  on procedures and equipment across country borders. In the absence of  such agreements, the airlines generally must adopt measures to implement  whichever requirement is more stringent. In 1992, FAA and JAA began  harmonizing their requirements for (1) the design, manufacture, operation,  and maintenance of civil aircraft and related product parts; (2) noise and  emissions from aircraft; and (3) flight crew licensing. Harmonizing the U.S.  Federal Aviation Regulations with the European Joint Aviation Regulations  is viewed by FAA as its most comprehensive long-term rule-making effort  and is considered critical to ensuring common safety standards and  minimizing the economic burden on the aviation industry that can result  from redundant inspection, evaluation, and testing requirements.
According to both FAA and JAA, the process they have used to date to  harmonize their requirements for commercial aircraft has not effectively  prioritized their joint recommendations for harmonizing U.S. and European  aviation requirements, and led to many recommendations going  unpublished for years. This includes a backlog of over 130 new rule-making  efforts. The slowness of this process led the United States and Europe to  develop a new rule-making process to prioritize safety initiatives, focus the  aviation industry’s and their own limited resources, and establish  limitations on rule-making capabilities. Accordingly, in March 2003, FAA  and JAA developed a draft joint “priority” rule-making list; collected and  considered industry input; and coordinated with FAA’s, JAA’s, and  Transport Canada Civil Aviation’s management. This effort has resulted in a  rule-making list of 26 priority projects. In June 2003, at the 20th Annual  JAA/FAA International Conference, FAA, JAA, and Transport Canada Civil  Aviation discussed the need to, among other things, support the joint  priority rule-making list and to establish a cycle for updating it—to keep it  current and to provide for “pop-up,” or unexpected, rule-making needs.  FAA and JAA discussed the need to prioritize rule-making efforts to  efficiently achieve aviation safety goals; that they would work from a  limited agreed-upon list for future rule-making activities; and that FAA and  the European Aviation Safety Agency, which is gradually replacing JAA,  should continue with this approach.
In the area of cabin occupant safety and heath, some requirements have  been harmonized, while others have not. For example, in 1996, JAA  changed its rule on floor lighting to allow reflective, glow-in-the-dark  material to be used rather than mandating the electrically powered lighting  that FAA required. The agency subsequently permitted the use of this  material for floor lighting. In addition, FAA finalized a rule in July 2003 to  require a new type of insulation designed to delay fire burning though the  fuselage into the cabin during an accident. JAA favors a performance-based  standard that would specify a minimum delay in burn-through time, but  allow the use of different technologies to achieve the standard. FAA  officials said that the agency would consider other technologies besides  insulation to achieve burn-through protection but that it would be the  responsibility of the applicant to demonstrate that the technology provided  performance equivalent to that stipulated in the insulation rule. JAA  officials told us that these are examples of the types of issues that must be  resolved when they work to harmonize their requirements with FAA’s.  These officials added that this process is typically very time consuming and  has allowed for harmonizing about five rules per year.
section_title: Significant Time May Be Needed to Implement Advancements Once They Are Required, but Some May Enhance Airlines’ Competitiveness
paragraphs: After an advancement has been developed, shown to be beneficial,  certified, and required by FAA, the airlines or manufacturers need time to  implement or install the advancement. FAA generally gives the airlines or  manufacturers a window of time to comply with its rules. For example,  FAA gave air carriers 5 years to replace metalized Mylar® insulation on  specific aircraft with a less flammable insulation type, and FAA’s proposed  rule-making on 16g seats would give the airlines 14 years to install these  seats in all existing commercial airliners. ATA officials told us that this  would require replacement of 496,000 seats.
The airline industry’s recent financial hardships may also delay the  adoption of advancements. Recently, two major U.S. carriers filed for  bankruptcy, and events such as the war in Iraq have reduced passenger  demand and airline revenues below levels already diminished by the events  of September 11, 2001, and the economic downturn. Current U.S. demand  for air travel remains below fiscal year 2000 levels. As a result, airlines may  ask for exemptions from some requirements or extensions of time to install  advancements.
While implementing new safety and health advancements can be costly for  the airlines, making these changes could improve the public’s confidence in  the overall safety of air travel. In addition, some aviation experts in Europe  told us that health-related cabin improvements, particularly improvements  in air quality, are of high interest to Europeans and would likely be used in  the near future by some European air carriers to set themselves apart from  their competitors.
section_title: FAA’s Multistep Process for Allocating Limited Resources to Research Projects Is Hampered by Lack of Autopsy and Survivor Information and Cost and Effectiveness Data
paragraphs: For fiscal year 2003, FAA and NASA allocated about $16.2 million to cabin  occupant safety and health research. FAA’s share of this research  represented $13.1 million, or about 9 percent of the agency’s Research,  Engineering, and Development budget of $148 million for fiscal year 2003.  Given the level of funding allocated to this research effort, it is important to  ensure that the best research projects are selected. However, FAA’s  processes for setting research priorities and selecting projects for further  research are hampered by data limitations. In particular, FAA lacks certain  autopsy and survivor information from aircraft crashes that could help it  identify and target research to the most important causes of death and  injury in an airliner crash. In addition, for the proposed research projects,  the agency does not (1) develop comparable cost data for potential  advancements or (2) assess their potential effectiveness in minimizing  injuries or saving lives. Such cost and effectiveness data would provide a  valuable supplement to FAA’s current process for setting research priorities  and selecting projects for funding.
subsections: section_title: Federal Research on Aircraft Cabin Occupant Safety and Health Issues
paragraphs: Both FAA and NASA conduct research on aircraft cabin occupant safety  and health issues. The Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) and the Hughes  Technical Center are FAA’s primary facilities for conducting research in this  area. In addition, two facilities at NASA, the Langley and Glenn research  centers, have also conducted research in this area. As figure 3 shows,  federal funding for this research since fiscal year 2000, reached a high in  fiscal year 2002, at about $17 million, and fell to about $16.2 million in fiscal  year 2003. The administration’s proposal for fiscal year 2004 calls for a  further reduction to $15.9 million. This funding covers the expenses of  researchers at these facilities and of the contracts they may have with  others to conduct research. In addition, NASA recently decided to end its  crash research at Langley and to close a drop test facility that it operates in  Hampton, Virginia.
In fiscal year 2003, FAA and NASA both supported research projects,  including aircraft impact, fire, evacuation, and health. As figure 4 shows,  most of the funding for cabin occupant safety and health research has gone  to fire-related projects.
To establish research priorities and select projects to fund, FAA uses a  multistep process. First, within each budget cycle, a number of Technical  Community Representative Group subcommittees from within FAA  generate research ideas. Various subcommittees have responsibility for  identifying potential safety and health projects, including subcommittees  on crash dynamics, fire safety, structural integrity, passenger evacuation,  aeromedical, and fuel safety. Each subcommittee proposes research  projects to review committees, which prioritize the projects. The projects  are considered and weighted according to the extent to which they address  (1) accident prevention, (2) accident survival, (3) external requests for  research, (4) internal requests for research, and (5) technology research  needs. In addition, the cost of the proposed research is considered before  arriving at a final list of projects. The prioritized list is then considered by  the Program Planning Team, which reviews the projects from a policy  perspective.
Although the primary causes of death and injury in commercial airliner  crashes are known to be impact, fire, and impediments to evacuation, FAA  does not have as detailed an understanding as it would like of the critical  factors affecting survival in a crash. According to FAA officials, obtaining a  more detailed understanding of these factors would assist them in setting  research priorities and in evaluating the relative importance of competing  research proposals. To obtain a more detailed understanding of the critical  factors affecting survival, FAA believes that it needs additional information  from passenger autopsies and from passengers who survived. With this  information, FAA could then regulate safety more effectively, airplane and  equipment designers could build safer aircraft, including cabin interiors,  and more passengers could survive future accidents as equipment became  safer.
While FAA has independent authority to investigate commercial airliner  crashes, NTSB generally controls access to the accident investigation site  in pursuit of its primary mission of determining the cause of the crash.  When NTSB concludes its investigation, it returns the airplane to its owner  and keeps the records of the investigation, including the autopsy reports  and the information from survivors that NTSB obtains from medical  authorities and through interviews or questionnaires. NTSB makes  summary information on the crashes publicly available on its Web site, but  according to the FAA researchers, this information is not detailed enough  for their needs. For example, the researchers would like to develop a  complete autopsy database that would allow them to look for common  trends in accidents, among other things. In addition, the researchers would  like to know where survivors sat on the airplane, what routes they took to  exit, what problems they encountered, and what injuries they sustained.  This information would help the researchers analyze factors that might  have an impact on survival. According to the NTSB’s Chief of the Survival  Factors Division in the Office of Aviation Safety, NTSB provides  information on the causes of death and a description of injuries in the  information they make publicly available. In addition, although medical  records and autopsy reports are not made public, interviews with and  questionnaires from survivors are available from the public docket.
NTSB’s Medical Officer was unaware of any formal requests from the FAA  for the NTSB to provide them with copies of this type of information,  although the FAA had previously been invited to review such information at  NTSB headquarters. He added that the Board would likely consider a  formal request from FAA for copies of autopsy reports and certain survivor  records, but that it was also likely that the FAA would have to assure NTSB  that the information would be appropriately safeguarded. According to  FAA officials, close cooperation between the NTSB and the FAA is needed  for continued progress in aviation safety.
Besides lacking detailed information on the causes of death and injury, FAA  does not develop data on the cost to implement advancements that are  comparable for each, nor does it assess the potential effectiveness of each  advancement in reducing injuries and saving lives. Specifically, FAA does  not conduct cost-benefit analyses as part of its multistep process for setting  research priorities. Making cost estimates of competing advancements  would allow direct comparisons across alternatives, which, when  combined with comparable estimates of effectiveness, would provide  valuable supplemental information to decision makers when setting  research priorities. FAA considers its current process to be appropriate and  sufficient. In commenting on a draft of this report, FAA noted that it is very  difficult to develop realistic cost data for advancements during the earliest  stages of research. The agency cautioned that if too much emphasis is  placed on cost/benefit analyses, potentially valuable research may not be  undertaken. Recognizing that it is less difficult to develop cost and  effectiveness information as research progresses, we are recommending  that FAA develop and use cost and effectiveness analyses to supplement its  current process. At later stages in the development process, we found that  this information can be developed fairly easily through cost and  effectiveness analyses using currently available data. For example, we  performed an analysis of the cost to implement inflatable lap seat belts  using a cost analysis methodology we developed (see app. VIII). This  analysis allowed us to estimate how much this advancement would cost  per airplane and per passenger trip. Such cost analyses could be combined  with similar analyses of effectiveness to identify the most cost-effective  projects, based on their potential to minimize injuries and reduce fatalities.  Potential sources of effectiveness data include FAA, academia, industry,  and other aviation authorities.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Although FAA and the aviation community are pursuing a number of  advancements to enhance commercial airliners’ cabin occupant safety and  health, several factors have slowed their implementation. For example, for  advancements that are currently available but are not yet implemented or  installed, progress is slowed by the length of time it takes for FAA to  complete its rule-making process, for the U.S and foreign countries to agree  on the same requirements, and for the airlines to actually install the  advancements after FAA has required them. In addition, FAA’s multistep  process for identifying potential cabin occupant safety and health research  projects and allocating its limited research funding is hampered by the lack  of autopsy and survivor information from airliner crashes and by the lack  of cost and effectiveness analysis. Given the level of funding allocated to  cabin occupant safety and health research, it is important for FAA to  ensure that this funding is targeting the advancements that address the  most critical needs and show the most promise for improving the safety  and health of cabin occupants. However, because FAA lacks detailed  autopsy and survivor information, it is hampered in its ability to identify the  principal causes of death and survival in commercial airliner crashes.  Without an agreement with the National Transportation Safety Board  (NTSB) to receive detailed autopsy and survivor information, FAA lacks  information that could be helpful in understanding the factors that  contribute to surviving a crash. Furthermore, because FAA does not  develop comparable estimates of cost and effectiveness of competing  research projects, it cannot ensure that it is funding those technologies  with the most promise of saving lives and reducing injuries.  Such cost and  effectiveness data would provide a valuable supplement to FAA’s current  process for setting research priorities and selecting projects for funding. To  facilitate FAA’s development of comparable cost data across  advancements, we developed a cost analysis methodology that could be  combined with a similar analysis of effectiveness to identify the most cost- effective projects. Using comparable cost and effectiveness data across the  range of advancements would position the agency to choose more  effectively between competing advancements, taking into account  estimates of the number of injuries and fatalities that each advancement  might prevent for the dollars invested. In turn, FAA would have more  assurance that the level of funding allocated to this effort maximizes the  safety and health of the traveling public and the cabin crew members who  serve them.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To provide FAA decision makers with additional data for use in setting  priorities for research on cabin occupant safety and health and in selecting  competing research projects for funding, we recommend that the Secretary  of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to  initiate discussions with the National Transportation Safety Board in an  effort to obtain the autopsy and survivor information needed to more  fully understand the factors affecting survival in a commercial airliner  crash and supplement its current process by developing and using comparable  estimates of cost and effectiveness for each cabin occupant safety and  health advancement under consideration for research funding.
Agency Comments and 	 We provided copies of a draft of this report to the Department of  Our Evaluation	 Transportation for its review and comment. FAA generally agreed with the report’s contents and its recommendations. The agency provided us with  oral comments, primarily technical clarifications, which we have  incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 10 days after the  date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate  congressional committees; the Secretary of Transportation; the  Administrator, FAA; and the Chairman, NTSB. We will also make copies  available to others upon request. In addition, this report is also available at  no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: As requested by the Ranking Democratic Member, House Committee on  Transportation and Infrastructure, we addressed the following questions:  (1) What regulatory actions has the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)  taken, and what key advancements are available or being developed by  FAA and others to address safety and health issues faced by passengers and  flight attendants in large commercial airliner cabins? (2) What factors, if  any, slow the implementation of advancements in cabin occupant safety  and health? In addition, as requested, we identified some factors affecting  efforts by Canada and Europe to improve cabin occupant safety and health.
The scope of our report includes the cabins of large commercial aircraft  (those that carry 30 or more passengers) operated by U.S. domestic  commercial airlines and addresses the safety and health of passengers and  flight attendants from the time they board the airliner until they disembark  under normal operational conditions or emergency situations. This report  identifies cabin occupant safety and health advancements (technological or  operational improvements) that could be implemented, primarily through  FAA’s rule-making process. Such improvements include technological  changes designed to increase the overall safety of commercial aviation as  well as changes to enhance operational safety. The report does not include  information on the flight decks of large commercial airliners or safety and  health issues affecting flight deck crews (pilots and flight engineers),  because they face some issues not faced by cabin occupants. It also does  not address general aviation and corporate aircraft or aviation security  issues, such as hijackings, sabotage, or terrorist activities.
To identify regulatory actions that FAA has taken to address safety and  health issues faced by passengers and flight attendants in large commercial  airliner cabins, we interviewed and collected documentation from U.S.  federal agency officials on major safety and health efforts completed by  FAA. The information we obtained included key dates and efforts related to  cabin occupant safety and health, such as rule-makings, airworthiness  directives, and Advisory Circulars.
To identify key advancements that are available or are being developed by  FAA and others to address safety and health issues faced by passengers and  flight attendants in large commercial airliner cabins, we consulted experts  (1) to help ensure that we had included the advancements holding the most  promise for improving safety and health; and (2) to help us structure an  evaluation of selected advancements (i.e., confirm that we had included the  critical benefits and drawbacks of the potential advancements) and  develop a descriptive analysis for them, where appropriate, including their  benefits, costs, technology readiness levels, and regulatory status. In  addition, we interviewed and obtained documentation from federal agency  officials and other aviation safety experts at the Federal Aviation  Administration (including its headquarters in Washington, D.C.; Transport  Airplane Directorate in Renton, Washington; William J. Hughes Technical  Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey; and Mike Monroney Aeronautical  Center/Civil Aerospace Medical Institute in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma);  National Transportation Safety Board; National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA); Air Transport Association; Regional Airline  Association; International Air Transport Association; Aerospace Industries  Association; Aerospace Medical Association; Flight Safety Foundation,  Association of Flight Attendants; Boeing Commercial Airplane Group;  Airbus; Cranfield University, United Kingdom; University of Greenwich,  United Kingdom; National Aerospace Laboratory, Netherlands; Joint  Aviation Authorities, Netherlands; Civil Aviation, Netherlands; Civil  Aviation Authority, United Kingdom; RGW Cherry and Associates; Air  Accidents Investigations Branch, United Kingdom; Syndicat National du  Personnel Navigant Commercial (French cabin crew union) and ITF Cabin  Crew Committee, France; BEA (comparable to the U.S. NTSB), France; and  the Direction Générale de l’Aviation Civile (DGAC), FAA’s French  counterpart.
To describe the status of key advancements that are available or under  development, we used NASA’s technology readiness levels (TRL). These  levels form a system for ranking the maturity of particular technologies and  are as follows:
TRL 1:  Basic principles observed and reported
TRL 2:  Technology concept and/or application formulated
TRL 3:  Analytical and experimental critical function and/or
TRL 4:  Component validation in laboratory environment
TRL 5:  Component and/or validation in relevant environment
TRL 6:  System or subsystem model or prototype demonstrated in a
TRL 7:  System prototype demonstrated in a space environment
TRL 8:  Actual system completed and “flight qualified” through test and
TRL 9:  Actual system “flight proven” through successful mission  To determine what factors, if any, slow the implementation of  advancements in cabin occupant safety and health, we reviewed the  relevant literature and interviewed and analyzed documentation from the  U.S. federal officials cited above for the 18 key regulatory actions FAA has  taken since 1984 to improve the safety and health of cabin occupants. We  used this same approach to assess the regulatory status of the 28  advancements we reviewed that are either currently available, but not yet  implemented or installed, or require further research to demonstrate their  effectiveness or lower their costs. In identifying 28 advancements, GAO is  not suggesting that these are the only advancements being pursued; rather,  these advancements have been recognized by aviation safety experts we  contacted as offering promise for improving the safety and health of cabin  occupants. To determine how long it generally takes for FAA to issue new  rules, in addition to speaking with FAA officials, we relied on past GAO  work and updated it, as necessary. In order to examine the effect of FAA  and European efforts to harmonize their aviation safety requirements, we  interviewed and analyzed documentation from aviation safety officials and  other experts in the United States, Canada, and Europe. Furthermore, to  examine the factors affecting airlines’ ability to implement or install  advancements after FAA requires them, we interviewed and analyzed  documentation from aircraft manufacturers, ATA, and FAA officials.
In addition, to determine what factors slow implementation we examined  FAA’s processes for selecting research projects to improve cabin occupant  safety and health. In examining whether FAA has sufficient data upon  which to base its research priorities, we interviewed FAA and National  Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) officials about autopsy and survivor  information from commercial airliner accidents. We also examined the use  of cost and effectiveness data in FAA’s research selection process for cabin  occupant safety and health projects. To facilitate FAA’s development of  such cost estimates, we developed a cost analysis methodology to illustrate  how the agency could do this. Specifically, we developed a cost analysis for  inflatable lap belts to show how data on key cost variables could be  obtained from a variety of sources. We selected lap belts because they were  being used in limited situations and appeared to offer some measure of  improved safety. Information on installation price, annual maintenance and  refurbishment costs, and added weight of these belts was obtained from  belt manufacturers. We obtained information from FAA and the  Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Bureau of Transportation Statistics  on a number of cost variables, including historical jet fuel prices, the  impact on jet fuel consumption of carrying additional weight, the average  number of hours flown per year, the average number of seats per airplane,  the number of airplanes in the U.S. fleet, and the number of passenger  tickets issued per year. To account for variation in the values of these cost  variables, we performed a Monte Carlo simulation. In this simulation,  values were randomly drawn 10,000 times from probability distributions  characterizing possible values for the number of seat belts per airplane,  seat installation price, jet fuel price, number of passenger tickets, number  of airplanes, and hours flown. This simulation resulted in forecasts of the  life-cycle cost per airplane, the annualized cost per airplane, and the cost  per ticket. There is uncertainty in estimating the number of lives potentially  saved and their value because accidents occur infrequently and  unpredictably. Such estimates could be higher or lower, depending on the  number and severity of accidents during a given analysis period and the  value placed on a human life.
To identify factors affecting efforts by Canada and Europe to improve cabin  occupant safety and health we interviewed and collected documentation  from aviation safety experts in the United States, Canada, and Europe.
We provided segments of a draft of this report to selected external experts  to help ensure its accuracy and completeness. These included the Air  Transport Association, National Transportation Safety Board, Boeing,  Airbus, and aviation authorities in the United Kingdom, France, Canada  and the European Union. We incorporated their comments, as appropriate.  The European Union did not provide comments.
We conducted our review from January 2002 through September 2003 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Canada and Europe Cabin Occupant Safety and Health Responsibilities
paragraphs: The United States, Canada, and members of the European Community are  parties to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), established  under the Chicago Convention of 1944, which sets minimum standards and  recommended practices for civil aviation. In turn, individual nations  implement aviation standards, including those for aviation safety. While  ICAO’s standards and practices are intended to keep aircraft, crews, and  passengers safe, some also address environmental conditions in aircraft  cabins that could affect the health of passengers and crews. For example,  ICAO has standards for preventing the spread of disease and for spraying  aircraft cabins with pesticides to remove disease-carrying insects.
subsections: section_title: Canada
paragraphs: In Canada, FAA’s counterpart for aviation regulations and oversight is  Transport Canada Civil Aviation, which sets standards and regulations for  the safe manufacture, operation, and maintenance of aircraft in Canada. In  addition, Transport Canada Civil Aviation administers, enforces, and  promotes the Aviation Occupational Health and Safety Program to help  ensure the safety and health of crewmembers on board aircraft. The  department also sets the training and licensing standards for aviation  professionals in Canada, including air traffic controllers, pilots, and aircraft  maintenance engineers. Transport Canada Civil Aviation has more than 800  inspectors working with Canadian airline operators, aircraft  manufacturers, airport operators, and air navigation service providers to  maintain the safety of Canada’s aviation system. These inspectors monitor,  inspect, and audit Canadian aviation companies to verify their compliance  with Transport Canada’s aviation regulations and standards for pilot  licensing, aircraft certification, and aircraft operation.
To assess and recommend potential changes to Canada’s aviation  regulations and standards, the Canadian Aviation Regulation Advisory  Council was established. This Council is a joint initiative between  government and the aviation community. The Council supports regulatory  meetings and technical working groups, which members of the aviation  community can attend. A number of nongovernmental organizations—  including airline operators, aviation labor organizations, manufacturers,  industry associations, and groups representing the public—are members.
The Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada is similar to NTSB in the  United States. TSB is a federal agency that operates independently of  Transport Canada Civil Aviation. Its mandate is to advance safety in the  areas of marine, pipeline, rail, and aviation transportation by conducting independent investigations, including public inquiries when  necessary, into selected transportation occurrences in order to make  findings as to their causes and contributing factors;  identifying safety deficiencies, as evidenced by transportation  occurrences; making recommendations designed to reduce or eliminate any such reporting publicly on their investigations and findings.
Under its mandate to conduct investigations, TSB conducts safety-issue- related investigations and studies. It also maintains a mandatory incident- reporting system for all modes of transportation. TSB and Transport  Canada Civil Aviation use the statistics derived from this information to  track potential safety concerns in Canada’s transportation system.
TSB investigates aircraft accidents that occur in Canada or involve aircraft  built there. Like NTSB, the Transportation Safety Board can recommend air  safety improvements to Transport Canada Civil Aviation.
section_title: Europe
paragraphs: Europe supplements the ICAO framework with the European Civil Aviation  Conference, an informal forum through which 38 European countries  formulate policy on civil aviation issues, including safety, but do not  explicitly address passenger health issues. In addition, the European Union  issues legislation concerning aviation safety, certification, and licensing  requirements but has not adopted legislation specifically related to  passenger health. One European directive requires that all member states  assess and limit crewmembers’ exposure to radiation from their flight  duties and provide them with information on the effects of such radiation  exposure. The European Commission is also providing flight  crewmembers and other mobile workers with free health assessments  prior to employment, with follow-up health assessments at regular  intervals.
Another European supplement to the ICAO framework is the Joint Aviation  Authorities (JAA), which represents the civil aviation regulatory authorities  of a number of European states that have agreed to cooperate in  developing and implementing common safety regulatory standards and  procedures. JAA uses staff of these authorities to carry out its  responsibilities for making, standardizing, and harmonizing aviation rules,  including those for aviation safety, and for consolidating common  standards among member counties. In addition, JAA is to cooperate with  other regional organizations or national European state authorities to reach  at least JAA’s safety level and to foster the worldwide implementation of  harmonized safety standards and requirements through the conclusion of  international arrangements.
Membership in JAA is open to members of the European Civil Aviation  Conference, which currently consists of 41 member countries. Currently, 37  countries are members or candidate members of JAA. JAA is funded by  national contributions; income from the sale of publications and training;  and income from other sources, such as user charges and European Union  grants. National contributions are based on indexes related to the size of  each country’s aviation industry. The “largest” countries (France, Germany,  and the United Kingdom) each pay around 16 percent and the smallest  around 0.6 percent of the total contribution income. For 2003, JAA’s total  budget was about 6.6 million euros.
In early 1998, JAA launched the Safety Strategy Initiative to develop a  focused safety agenda to support the “continuous improvement of its  effective safety system” and further reduce the annual number of accidents  and fatalities regardless of the growth of air traffic. Two approaches are  being used to develop the agenda:
The “historic approach” is based on analyses of past accidents and has  led to the identification of seven initial focus areas—controlled flight  into terrain, approach and landing, loss of control, design related,  weather, occupant safety and survivability, and runway safety.
The “predictive approach” or “future hazards approach” is based on an  identification of changes in the aviation system.
JAA is cooperating in this effort with FAA and other regulatory bodies to  develop a worldwide safety agenda and avoid duplication of effort. FAA has  taken the lead in the historic approach, and JAA has taken the lead in the  future hazards approach.
JAA officials told us that they use a consensus-based process to develop  rules for aviation safety, including cabin occupant safety and health-related  issues. Reaching consensus among member states is time consuming, but  the officials said the time invested was worthwhile. Besides making  aviation-related decisions, JAA identifies and resolves differences in word  meanings and subtleties across languages—an effort that is critical to  reaching consensus. JAA does not have regulatory rule-making authority.  Once the member states are in agreement, each member state’s legislative  authority must adopt the new requirements. Harmonizing new  requirements with U.S. and other international aviation authorities further  adds to the time required to implement new requirements.
According to JAA officials, they use expert judgment to identify and  prioritize research and development efforts for aviation safety, including  airliner cabin occupant safety and health issues, but JAA plans to move  toward a more data-driven approach. While JAA has no funding of its own  for research and development, it recommends research priorities to its  member states. However, JAA officials told us that member states’ research  and development efforts are often driven by recent airliner accidents in the  member states, rather than by JAA’s priorities. The planned shift from  expert judgment to a more data-driven approach will require more  coordination of aviation research and development across Europe. For  example, in January 2001, a stakeholder group formed by the European  Commissioner for Research issued a planning document entitled European  Aeronautics: A Vision for 2020, which, among other things, characterized  European aeronautics as a cross-border industry, whose research strategy  is shaped within national borders, leading to fragmentation rather than  coherence. The document called for better decision-making and more  efficient and effective research by the European Union, its member states,  and aeronautics stakeholders. JAA officials concurred with this  characterization of European aviation research and development.
Changes lie ahead for JAA and aviation safety in Europe. The European  Union recently created a European Aviation Safety Agency, which will  gradually assume responsibility for rule-making, certification, and  standardization of the application of rules by the national aviation  authorities. This organization will eventually absorb all of JAA’s functions  and activities. The full transition from JAA to the safety agency will take  several years--per the regulation,the European Aviation Safety Agency  must begin operations by September 28, 2003, and transition to full  operations by March 2007.
section_title: Summary of Key Actions FAA Has Taken to Improve Airliner Cabin Safety and Health Since 1984
paragraphs: To improve the  aircraft be subjected to more rigorous testing  crashworthiness of  than was previously required. The tests subject  airplane seats and  seats to the forward, downward, and other  directional movements that can occur in an  accident. Likely injuries under various  conditions are estimated by using instrumented  crash test dummies.
This rule was published on May  17, 1988, and became effective  June 16, 1988. However, only the  their ability to prevent  newest generation of airplanes is  or reduce the severity  required to have fully tested and  of head, back, and  femur injuries.  certificated 16g seats. FAA  proposed a retrofit rule on October  4, 2002, to phase in 16g seats  fleetwide within 14 years after  adoption of the final rule.
FAA issued an airworthiness directive requiring  To improve the  corrective action for overhead bin designs found  crashworthiness of  not to meet the existing rules.  some bins after  failures were  observed in a 1989  crash in Kegworth,  England.
The airworthiness directive to  improve bin connectors became  effective November 20, 1992, and  applied to Boeing 737 and 757  aircraft.
In 1986, FAA upgraded the fire safety standards  To give airliner cabin  FAA required that all commercial  for cabin interior materials in transport  airplanes, establishing a new test method to  determine the heat release from materials  exposed to radiant heat and set allowable  criteria for heat release rates.  occupants more time  aircraft produced after August 20,  to evacuate a burning  1988, have panels that exhibit  airplane by limiting  heat releases and  smoke emissions  when cabin interior  materials are  exposed to fire.  reduced heat releases and smoke  emissions to delay the onset of  flashover. Although there was no  retrofit of the existing fleet, FAA is  requiring that these improved  materials be used whenever the  cabin is substantially refurbished.
In 1984, FAA issued a regulation that enhanced  To retard burning of  flammability requirements for seat cushions. cabin materials to  increase evacuation  26, 1987.  time.
To extinguish in-flight  This rule became effective April  fires.  29, 1985, and required  compliance by April 29, 1986.
In March 1985, FAA issued a rule requiring air  To identify and  carriers to install smoke detectors in lavatories  extinguish in-flight  within 18 months. fires.
This rule became effective on April  29, 1985, and required  compliance by October 29, 1986.
In March 1985, FAA required air carriers to  install automatic fire extinguishers in the waste  extinguish prevent in- 29, 1985.  paper bins in all aircraft lavatories. flight fires.
This rule became effective on April  This rule required compliance by  April 29, 1987.
In 1986, FAA upgraded the airworthiness  standards for ceiling and sidewall liner panels  used in cargo compartments of transport  category airplanes.
To improve fire safety  This rule required compliance on  in the cargo and March 20, 1998.  baggage  compartment of  certain transport  airplanes.
In 1998, FAA required air carriers to retrofit the  To improve fire safety  This rule became effective March  and suppression systems in certain cargo  compartments. This rule applied to over 3,400  airplanes in service and all newly manufactured  certain transport  airplanes. airplanes. in the cargo and  baggage  compartment of  19, 1998, requiring compliance on  March 20, 2001.
This rule requires improved access to the Type  To help ensure that  III emergency exits (typically smaller, overwing passengers have an  exits) by providing an unobstructed unobstructed  passageway to the exit. Transport aircraft with passageway to exits  60 or more passenger seats were required to during an  comply with the new standards emergency.
This rule became effective June 3,  1992, requiring changes to be  made by December 3, 1992.
Public address system:  independent power source	 system be independently powered for at least  10 minutes and that at least 5 minutes of that  time is during announcements.
To eliminate reliance  This rule became effective  on engine or  auxiliary-power-unit  operation for  emergency  announcements.
November 27, 1989,  for air carrier  and air taxi airplanes  manufactured on or after  November 27, 1990.
This rule requires that persons seated next to  emergency exits be physically and mentally  capable of operating the exit and assisting other  evacuation in an  passengers in emergency evacuations. emergency.
This rule became effective April 5,  1990, requiring compliance by  October 5, 1990.
Rule issued to limit the distance between  adjacent emergency exits on transport  airplanes to 60 feet.
To improve  passenger  evacuation in an  emergency.
This rule became effective July 24,  1989, imposing requirements on  airplanes manufactured after  October 16, 1987.
Floor proximity emergency  Airplane emergency lighting systems must  escape path marking  visually identify the emergency escape path  and identify each exit from the escape path.
To improve  passenger  evacuation when  smoke obscures  overhead lighting.
This rule became effective  November 26, 1984, requiring  implementation for large transport  airplanes by November 26, 1986.
Emergency evacuation slides manufactured  after December 3, 1984, must be fire resistant  and comply with new radiant heat testing  procedures.
To improve  passenger  evacuation.
This technical standard became  effective for all evacuation slides  manufactured after December 3,  1984.
In 1986, FAA issued a rule requiring  commercial airlines to carry emergency medical  carriers’ preparation  1, 1986, requiring compliance as  kits. of that date.
This rule became effective August  for in-flight  emergencies.
In June 1995, following two serious events  involving turbulence, FAA issued a public  advisory to airlines urging the use of seat belts  at all times when passengers are seated but  concluded that existing rules did not require  strengthening.
To prevent passenger  injuries from  turbulence by  increasing public  awareness of the  importance of  wearing seatbelts.
Information is currently posted on  FAA’s Web site.
In May 2000, FAA instituted the Turbulence  Happens public awareness campaign.
Technical Class C category cargo compartments are required to have built-in extinguishing systems to  control fire in lieu of crewmember accessibility. Class D category cargo compartments are required to  completely contain a fire without endangering the safety of the airplane occupants.
section_title: Summaries of Potential Impact Safety Advancements
paragraphs: This appendix presents information on the background and status of  potential advancements in impact safety that we identified, including the  following: retrofitting all commercial aircraft with more advanced seats,  improving the ability of airplane floors to hold seats in an accident, preventing overhead luggage bins from becoming detached or opening, requiring child safety restraints for children under 40 pounds, and  installing lap belts with self-contained inflatable air bags.
subsections: section_title: Retrofitting All Commercial Aircraft with More Advanced Seats
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In commercial transport airplanes, the ability of a seat to protect a  passenger from the forces of impact in an accident depends on reducing  the forces of impact to levels that a person can withstand, either by  spreading the impact over a larger part of the person’s body or by  decreasing the duration of the impact through the use of energy-absorbing  seats, an energy-absorbing fuselage and floors, or restraints such as seat  belts or inflatable seat belt air bags adapted from automobile technology. In  a 1996 study by R.G.W Cherry & Associates, enhancing occupant restraint  was ranked as the second most important of 33 potential ways to improve  air crash survivability. Boeing officials noted that the industry generally  agrees with this view but that FAA and the industry are at odds over the  means of implementing these changes.
According to an aviation safety expert, seats and restraints should be  considered as a system that involves the seats themselves, seat restraints such as seat belts, seat connections to the floor, the spacing between seats, and furnishings in the cabin area that occupants could strike in an accident.
To protect the occupant, a seat must not only absorb energy well but also  stay attached to the floor of the aircraft. In other words, the “tie-down”  chain must remain intact. Although aircraft seat systems are designed to  withstand about 9 to 16 times the force of gravity, the limits of human  tolerance to impact substantially exceed the aircraft and seat design limits.  A number of seat and restraint devices have been shown in testing to  improve survivability in aviation accidents. Several options are to retrofit  the entire current fleet with fully tested 16g seats, use rearward-facing  seats, require three-point auto-style seat belts with shoulder harnesses, and  install auto-style air bags.
FAA regulations require seats for newly certified airplane designs to pass  more extensive tests than were previously required to protect occupants  from impact forces of up to 16 times the force of normal gravity in the  forward direction; seat certification standards include specific  requirements to protect against head, spine, and leg injuries (see fig. 5).FAA first required 16g seats and tests for newly designed, certificated  airplanes in 1988; new versions of existing designs were not required to  carry 16g seats. Since 1988, however, in anticipation of a fleetwide retrofit  rule, manufacturers have increasingly equipped new airplanes with “16g- compatible” seats that have some of the characteristics of fully certified  16g seats. Certifying a narrow-body airplane type to full 16g seat  certification standards can cost $250,000.
In 1998 FAA estimated that 16g seats would avoid between about 210 to 410  fatalities and 220 to 240 serious injuries over the 20-year period from 1999  through 2018. A 2000 study funded by FAA and the British Civil Aviation  Authority estimated that if 16g seats had been installed in all airplanes that  crashed from 1984 through 1998, between 23 to 51 fewer U.S. fatalities and  18 to 54 fewer U.S. serious injuries would have occurred over the period. A  number of accidents analyzed in that study showed no benefit from 16g  seats because it was assumed that 16g seats would have detached from the  floor, offering no additional benefits compared with older seats.Worldwide, the study estimated, about 333 fewer fatalities and 354 fewer  serious injuries would have occurred during the period had the improved  seats been installed. Moreover, if fire risks had been reduced, the estimated  benefits of 16g seats might have increased dramatically, as more occupants  who were assumed to survive the impact but die in the ensuing fire would  then have survived both the impact and fire.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Seats that meet the 16g certification requirements are currently available  and have been required on newly certificated aircraft designs since 1988.  However, newly manufactured airplanes of older certification, such as  Boeing 737s, 757s, or 767s, were not required to be equipped with 16g  certified seats. Recently, FAA has negotiated with manufacturers to install  full 16g seats on new versions of older designs, such as all newly produced  737s.In October 2002, FAA published a new proposal to create a timetable  for all airplanes to carry fully certified 16g seats within 14 years. The  comment period for the currently proposed rule ended in March 2003.
Under this proposal, airframe manufacturers would have 4 years to begin  installing 16g seats in newly manufactured aircraft only, and all airplanes  would have to be equipped with full 16g seats within 14 years or when  scheduled for normal seat replacement. FAA estimated that upgrading  passenger and flight attendant seats to meet full 16g requirements would  avert approximately 114 fatalities and 133 serious injuries over 20 years  following the effective date of the rule. This includes 36 deaths that would  be prevented by improvements to flight attendant seats that would permit  attendants to survive the impact and to assist more passengers in an  evacuation.
FAA estimated the costs to avert 114 fatalities and 133 serious injuries at  $245 million in present-value terms, or $519 million in overall costs, which,  according to FAA’s analysis, would approximate the monetary benefits  from the seats.FAA estimated that about 7.5 percent of airplane seats  would have to be replaced before they would ordinarily be scheduled for  replacement. FAA’s October 2002 proposal divides seats into three classes  according to their approximate performance level. Although FAA does not  know how many seats of each type seat are in service, it estimates that  about 44 percent of commercial-service aircraft are equipped with full 16g  seats, 55 percent have 16g-compatible seats, and about 1 percent have 9g  seats. The 16g-compatible or partial 16g seats span a wide range of  capabilities; some are nearly identical to full 16g seats but have been  labeled as 16g-compatible to avoid more costly certification, and other  partial 16g seats offer only minor improvements over the older generation  of 9g seats. To determine whether these seats have the same performance  characteristics as full 16g seats, it may be sufficient, in some cases, to  review the company’s certification paperwork; in other cases, however, full  crash testing of actual 16g seats may be necessary to determine the level of  protection provided.
FAA is currently considering the comments it received on its October 2002  proposal. Industry comments raised concerns about general costs, the  costs of retrofitting flight attendant seats, and the possibility that older  airplanes designed for 9g seats might require structural changes to  accommodate full 16g seats. One comment expressed the desire to give  some credit for and “grandfather” in at least some partial 16g seats.
section_title: Improving the Ability of Airplane Floors to Hold Seats in an Accident
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In an accident, a passenger’s chances of survival depend on how well the  passenger cabin maintains “living space” and the passenger is “tied down”  within that space. Many experts and reports have noted floor retention—  the ability of the aircraft cabin floor to remain intact and hold the  passenger’s seat and restraint system during a crash—as critical to  increasing the passenger’s chances of survival. Floor design concepts  developed during the late 1940s and 1950s form the basis for the cabin  floors found in today’s modern airplanes.
Accident investigations have documented failures of the floor system in  crashes. New 16g seat requirements were developed in the 1980s. 16g  seats were intended to be retrofitted on aircraft with traditional 9g floors  and were designed to maximize the capabilities of existing floor strength.  While 16g seats might be strong, they could also be inflexible and thus fail if  the floor deformed in a crash. Under the current 16g requirement, the seats  must remain attached to a deformed seat track and floor structure  representative of that used in the airplane. To meet these requirements,  the seat was expected to permanently deform to absorb and limit impact  forces even if the 16g test conditions were exceeded during a crash.
A major accident related to floor deformation occurred at Kegworth,  England, in 1989. A Boeing 737-400 airplane flew into an embankment on  approach to landing. In total, only 21 of the 52 triple seats—all “16g- compatible” —remained fully attached to the cabin floor; 14 of those that  remained attached were in the area where the wing passes through the  cabin and the area is stronger than other areas to support the wing. In this  section of the airplane, the occupants generally survived, even though they  were exposed to an estimated peak level of 26gs. The front part of the  airplane was destroyed, including the floor; most of these seats separated  from the airplane, killing or seriously injuring the occupants. An FAA  expert noted that the impact was too severe for the airplane to maintain its  structural integrity and that 16g seats were not designed for an accident of  that severity. The British Air Accidents Investigation Branch noted that  fewer injuries occurred in the accident than would probably have been the  case with earlier-generation seats. However, the Branch also noted that  “relatively minor engineering changes could significantly improve the  resilience and toughness of cabin floors . . . and take fuller advantage of the  improved passenger seats.”  The Branch reported that where failures  occurred, it was generally the seat track along the floor that failed, and not  the seat, and that the rear attachments generally remained engaged with  the floor, “at least partially due to the articulated joint built into the rear  attachment, an innovation largely stemming from the FAA dynamic test  requirements.”  The Branch concluded that “seats designed to these  dynamic requirements will certainly increase survivability” but “do not  necessarily represent an optimum for the long term . . . if matched with  cabin floors of improved strength and toughness.”
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Several reports have recommended structural improvements to floors. A  case study of 11 major accidents for which detailed information was  available found floor issues to be a major cause of injury or fatalities in 4  accidents and a minor cause in 1 accident. Another study estimated the  past benefits of 16g seats in U.S. accidents between 1984 and 1998 and  found no hypothetical benefit from 16g seats in a number of accidents  because the floor was extensively disrupted during impact. In other  words, unless the accidents had been less severe or the floor and seat  tracks had been improved beyond the 9g standard on both new and old jets,  newer 16g seats would not have offered additional benefits compared with  the older seats that were actually on the airplane during the accidents  under study.
A research program on seat and floor strength was recently conducted by  the French civil aviation authority, the Direction Générale de l’Aviation  Civile. Initial findings of the research program on seat-floor attachments  have not shown dramatic results and showed no rupture or plastic  deformation of any cabin floor parts during a 16g test. However, French  officials noted that they plan to perform additional tests with more rigid  seats. Because many factors are involved it is difficult to identify the  interrelated issues and interactions between seats and floors. A possible  area for future research, according to French officials, is to examine  dynamic floor warping during a crash to improve impact performance.
FAA officials said they have no plans to change floor strength  requirements. FAA regulations require floors to meet impact forces likely  to occur in “emergency landing conditions,” or generally about 9gs of  longitudinal static force. According to several experts, stronger floors  could improve the performance of 16g seats. In addition, further  improvement in seats beyond the 16g standard would likely require  improved floors.
section_title: Preventing Overhead Storage Bin Detachment to Protect Passengers in an Accident
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In an airplane crash, overhead luggage bins in the cabin sometimes detach  from their mountings along the ceiling and sidewalls and can fall  completely or allow pieces of luggage to fall on passengers’ heads (See fig.  6.). While only a few cases have been reported in which the impact from  dislodged overhead bins was the direct cause of a crash fatality or injury, a  study for the British Civil Aviation Authority that attempted to identify the  specific characteristics of each fatality in 42 fatal accidents estimated that  the integrity of overhead bin stowage was the 17th most important of 32  factors used to predict passenger survivability. Maintaining the integrity  of bins may also help speed evacuation after a crash.
Safer bins have been designed since bin problems were observed in a  Boeing 737 accident in Kegworth, England, in 1989, when nearly all the bins  failed and fell on passengers. FAA tested bins in response to that accident.  The Kegworth bins were certified to the current FAA 9g longitudinal static  loading standards, among others. When FAA subsequently conducted  longitudinal dynamic loading tests on the types of Boeing bins involved, the  bins failed. Several FAA experts said that the overhead bins on 737s had a  design flaw. FAA then issued an airworthiness directive that called for  modifying all bins on Boeing 737 and 757 aircraft. The connectors for the  bins were strengthened in accordance with the airworthiness directive, and  the new bins passed FAA’s tests.
The British Air Accidents Investigation Branch recommended in 1990 that  the performance of both bins and latches be tested more rigorously,  including the performance of bins “when subjected to dynamic crash  pulses substantially beyond the static load factors currently required.”  NTSB has made similar recommendations.
Turbulence reportedly injures at least 15 U.S. cabin occupants a year, and  possibly over 100. Most of these injuries are to flight attendants who are  unrestrained. Some injuries are caused by luggage falling from bins that  open in severe turbulence. Estimates of total U.S. airline injuries from bin- related falling luggage range from 1,200 to 4,500 annually, most of which  occur during cruising rather than during boarding or disembarking.
The study for the British Civil Aviation Authority noted above found that as  many as 70 percent of impact-related accidents involve overhead bins that  become detached. However, according to the report, bin detachment does  not appear to be a major factor in occupants’ survival and data are  insufficient to support a specific determination about the mechanism of  failure. FAA has conducted several longitudinal and drop tests since the  Kegworth accident, including drops of airplane fuselage sections with  overhead storage bins installed. A 1993 dynamic vertical drop test showed  some varying bin performance problems at about 36gs of downward force.  An FAA longitudinal test in 1999 tested two types of bins at 6g, at the 9g  FAA certification requirement, and at the 16g level; in the 16g longitudinal  test, one of the two bins broke free from its support mountings.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: In addition to the requirement that they withstand forward (longitudinal)  loads of slightly more than 9gs, luggage bins must meet other directional  loading requirements. Bin standards are part of the general certification  requirements for all onboard objects of mass. FAA officials said that  overhead bins no longer present a problem, appear to function as designed,  and meet standards. An FAA official told us that problems such as those  identified at Kegworth have not appeared in later crashes. Another FAA  official said that while Boeing has had some record of bin problems, the  problems are occasional and quickly rectified through design changes.  Boeing officials told us that the evidence that bins currently have latch  problems is anecdotal.
Suggestions for making bins safer in an accident include adding features to  absorb impact forces and keep bins attached and closed during structural  deformation; using dynamic 16g longitudinal impact testing standards  similar to those for seats; and storing baggage in alternative compartments  in the main cabin, elsewhere in the aircraft, or under seats raised for that  purpose.
section_title: Child Safety Seats
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Using a correctly-designed child safety seat that is strapped in an airplane  seat offers protection to a child in an accident or turbulence (see fig. 6). By  contrast, according to many experts, holding a child under two years old on  an adult’s lap, which is permitted, is unsafe for both the child and for other  occupants who could be struck by the child in an accident. Requiring child  safety seats for infants and small children on airplanes is one of NTSB’s  “most wanted” transportation safety improvements. The British Air  Accidents Investigation Branch made similar recommendations, as did a  1997 White House Commission report on aviation.
An FAA analysis of survivable accidents from 1978 through 1994 found that  9 deaths, 4 major injuries, and 8 minor injuries to children occurred. The  analysis also found that the use of child safety seats would have prevented  5 deaths, all the major injuries, and 4 to 6 of the minor injuries. Child safety  advocates have pointed to several survivable accidents in which children  died—a 1994 Charlotte, North Carolina, crash; a 1990 Cove Neck, New  York, accident; and a 1987 Denver, Colorado, accident—as evidence of the  need for regulation.
A 1992 FAA rule required airlines to allow child restraint systems, but FAA  has opposed mandatory child safety seats on the basis of studies showing  that requiring adults to pay for children’s seats would induce more car  travel, which the study said was more dangerous for children than airplane  travel. One study published in 1995 by DOT estimated that if families were  charged full fares for children’s seats, 20 percent would choose other  modes of transportation, resulting in a net increase of 82 deaths among  children and adults over 10 years.
If child safety seats are required, airlines may require adults wishing to use  child safety seats to purchase an extra seat for the child’s safety seat. FAA  officials told us that they could not require that the seat next to a parent be  kept open for a nonpaying child. However, NTSB has testified that the  scenarios for passengers taking other modes of transportation are flawed  because FAA assumed that airlines would charge full fares for infants  currently traveling free. NTSB noted in 1996 that airlines would offer  various discounts and free seats for infants in order to retain $6 billion in  revenue that would otherwise be lost to auto travel. Airlines have already  responded to parents who choose to use child restraint systems with  scheduling flexibility, and many major airlines offer a 50 percent discount  off any fare for a child under 2 to travel in an approved child safety seat.  The 1995 DOT study, however, estimated that even if a child’s seat on an  airplane were discounted 75 percent, some families would still choose car  travel and that the choice by those families to drive instead of fly would  result in a net increase of 17 child and adult deaths over 10 years.
In FAA tests, some but not all commercially available automobile child  restraint systems have provided adequate protection in tests simulating  airplane accidents. Prices range from less than $100 for a child safety seat  marketed for use in both automobiles and airplanes to as much as $1,300  for a child safety seat developed specifically for use in airplanes.
A drawback to having parents, rather than airlines, provide child safety  seats for air travel is that some models may be more difficult to fit into  airplane seat belts, making a proper fit more challenging. While the  performance of standardized airline-provided seats may be better than that  of varied FAA-certified auto-airplane seats, one airline said that providing  seats could present logistical problems for them. However, Virgin Atlantic  Airlines supplies its own specially developed seats and prohibits parents  from using their own child seats. Because turbulence can be a more  frequent danger to unrestrained children than accidents, one expert told us  that a compromise solution might include allowing some type of alternative  in-flight restraint.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Child safety seats are currently available for use on aircraft. The technical  issues involved in designing and manufacturing safe seats for children to  use in both cars and airplanes have largely been solved, according to FAA  policy officials and FAA researchers. Federal regulations establish  requirements for child safety seats designed for use in both highway  vehicles and aircraft by children weighing up to 50 pounds. FAA officials  explained that regulations requiring child safety seats have been delayed, in  part, because of public policy concerns that parents would drive rather  than fly if they were required to buy seats for their children. On February  18, 1998, FAA asked for comments on an advanced notice of proposed rule- making to require the use of child safety seats for children under the age of  2. FAA sponsored a conference in December 1999 to examine child  restraint systems. At that conference, the FAA Administrator said the  agency would mandate child safety seats in aircraft and provide children  with the same level of safety as adults. FAA officials told us that they are  still considering requiring the use of child safety seats but have not made a  final decision to do so. If FAA does decide to provide “one level of safety”  for adults and children, as NTSB advocates, parents may opt to drive to  their destinations to avoid higher travel costs, thereby statistically  exposing themselves and their children to more danger. In addition, FAA  will have to decide whether the parents or airlines will provide the seats.
If FAA decides to require child safety seats, it will need to harmonize its  requirements with those of other countries where requirements differ, as  the regulations on child restraint systems vary. In Canada, as in the United  States, child safety seats are not mandatory on registered aircraft. In  Europe, the regulations vary from country to country, but no country  requires their use. Australia’s policy permits belly belts but discourages  their use. An Australian official said in 1999 that Australia was waiting for  the United States to develop a policy in this area and would probably follow  that policy.
section_title: Inflatable Lap Belt Air Bags
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Lap belts with inflatable air bags are designed to reduce the injuries or  death that may result when a passenger’s head strikes the airplane interior.  These inflatable seat belts adapt advanced automobile air bag technology  to airplane seats in the form of seat belts with embedded air bags. If a  passenger loses consciousness because of a head injury in an accident,  even a minor, nonfatal concussion can cause death if the airplane is  burning and the passenger cannot evacuate quickly. Slowing the duration  of the impact with an air bag lessens its lethality. According to a  manufacturer’s tests using airplane seats on crash sleds, lap belts with air  bags can likely reduce some impact injuries to survivable levels.
FAA does not require seats to be tested in sled tests for head impact  protection when there would be “no impact” with another seat row or  bulkhead wall, such as when spacing is increased to 42 inches from the  more typical 35 inches. While more closely spaced economy class seat  rows can provide head impact protection through energy-absorbing seat  backs, seats in no impact positions have tested poorly in head injury  experiments, resulting in severe head strikes against the occupants’ legs or  the floor, according to the manufacturer. This no impact exemption from  FAA’s head injury criteria can include exit rows, business class seats, and  seats behind bulkhead walls and could permit as many as 30 percent of  seats in some airplanes to be exempt from the head impact safety criteria  that row-to-row seats must meet.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: According to the manufacturer, 13 airlines have installed about 1,000 of the  devices in commercial airliners, mainly at bulkhead seats; about 200 of  these are installed in the U.S. fleet. All of the orders and installations so far  have been done to meet FAA’s seat safety regulations rather than for  marketing reasons, according to the manufacturer.
The airlines would appear to benefit from using the devices in bulkhead  seats if that would allow them to install additional rows of seats. While the  amount of additional revenue would depend on the airplane design and  class of seating, two additional seats may produce more net revenue per  year than the cost for the devices to be installed throughout an aircraft.Economic constraints are acquisition costs, maintenance costs, and  increased fuel costs due to weight. The units currently weigh about 3  pounds per seat, or 2 pounds more than current seat belts. According to the  manufacturer, the air bag lap belts currently cost $950 to $1,100, including  maintenance. The manufacturer estimated that if 5 percent of all U.S. seat  positions were equipped with the devices (about 50,000 seats per year), the  cost would drop to about $300 to $600 per seat, including installation.
Lap belt air bags have been commercially available for only a few years.  FAA’s Civil Aerospace Medical Institute assisted the developers of the  devices; manufacturers for both passenger and military use (primarily  helicopter) are conducting ongoing research. FAA and other regulatory  bodies have no plans to require their installation, but airlines are allowed to  use them. The extent to which these devices are installed will depend on  each airline’s analysis of the cost and benefits.
section_title: Summaries of Potential Fire Safety Advancements
paragraphs: This appendix presents information on the background and status of  potential advancements in fire safety that we identified, including the  following: preventing fuel tank explosions with fuel tank inerting; preventing in-flight fires with arc fault circuit breakers;  identifying in-flight fires with multisensor fire and smoke detectors; suppressing in-flight and postcrash fires by using water mist fire mitigating postcrash damage and injury by using less flammable fuels; mitigating in-flight and postcrash fires by using fire-resistant thermal mitigating fire-related deaths and injuries by using ultra-fire-resistant mitigating fire deaths and injuries with sufficient airport rescue and fire  fighting.
subsections: section_title: Fuel Tank Inerting
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Fuel tank inerting involves pumping nitrogen-enriched air into an airliner’s  fuel tanks to reduce the concentration of oxygen to a level that will not  support combustion. Nitrogen gas makes a fuel tank safer by serving as a  fire suppressant. The process can be performed with both ground-based  and onboard systems, and it significantly reduces the flammability of the  center wing tanks, thereby lowering the likelihood of a fuel tank explosion.
Following the crash of TWA Flight 800 in 1996, in which 230 people died,  NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was an explosion  in the center wing fuel tank. The explosion resulted from the ignition of  flammable fuel vapors in this tank, which is located in the fuselage in the  space between the wing junctions. NTSB subsequently placed the  improvement of fuel tank design on its list of “Most Wanted Safety  Improvements” and recommended that fuel tank inerting be considered an  option to eliminate the likelihood of fuel tank explosions.
FAA issued Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 to eliminate or  minimize the likelihood of ignition sources by revisiting the fuel tank’s  design. Issued in 2001, the regulation consists of a series of FAA regulatory  actions aimed at preventing the failure of fuel pumps and pump motors,  fuel gauges, and electrical power wires inside these fuel tanks. In late 2002,  FAA amended the regulation to allow for an “equivalent level of safety” and  the use of inerting as part of an alternate means of compliance.
In a 2001 report, an Aviation Rule-making Advisory Committee tasked with  evaluating the benefits of inerting the center wing fuel tank estimated these  benefits in terms of lives saved. After projecting possible in-flight and  ground fuel tank explosions and postcrash fires from 2005 through 2020,  the committee estimated that 132 lives might be saved from a ground-based  system and 253 lives might be saved from an onboard system.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Neither of the two major types of fuel tank inerting—ground-based and  onboard—is currently available for use on commercial airliners because  additional development is needed.Both types offer benefits and  drawbacks.
A ground-based system sends a small amount of nitrogen into the center  wing tank before departure. Its benefits include that (1) it requires no  new technology development for installation, (2) the tank can be inerted  in 20 minutes, and (3) it carries a lesser weight penalty. Its drawbacks  include that it is unable to inert for descent, landing, and taxiing to the  destination gate, and nitrogen supply systems are needed at each  terminal gate and remote parking area at every airport.
An onboard system generates nitrogen by transferring some of the  engine bleed air – air extracted from the jet engines to supply the cabin  pressurization system in normal flight—through a module that separates  air into oxygen and nitrogen and discharges the nitrogen enriched air  into the fuel tank. Its benefits include that (1) it is self-reliant and (2) it  significantly reduces an airplane’s vulnerability to lightning, static  electricity, and incendiary projectiles throughout the flight’s duration.Its drawbacks include that it (1) weighs more, (2) increases the aircraft’s  operating costs, and (3) may decrease the aircraft’s reliability.
According to FAA, its fire safety experts’ efforts to develop a lighter-weight  system for center wing tank inerting have significantly increased the  industry’s involvement. Boeing and Airbus are working on programs to test  inerting systems in flight. For example, Boeing has recently completed a  flight test program with a prototype system on a 747.
None of the U.S. commercial fleet is equipped with either ground-based or  onboard inerting systems, though onboard systems are in use in U.S. and  European military aircraft. Companies working in this field are focused on  developing new inerting technologies or modifying existing ones. A  European consortium is developing a system that combines onboard center  wing fuel tank inerting with sensors and a water-mist-plus-nitrogen fire  suppression system for commercial airplanes.
In late 2002, FAA researchers successfully ground-tested a prototype  onboard inerting system using current technology on a Boeing 747SP. New  research also enabled the agency to ease a design requirement, making the  inerting technology more cost-effective. This new research showed that  reducing the oxygen level in the fuel tank to 12 percent—rather than 9  percent, as was previously thought—is sufficient to prevent fuel tank  explosions in civilian aircraft. FAA also developed a system that did not  need the compressors that some had considered necessary. Together, these  findings allowed for reductions in the size and power demands of the  system.
FAA plans to focus further development on the more practical and cost- effective onboard fuel tank inerting systems. For example, to further  improve their cost-effectiveness, the systems could be designed both to  suppress in-flight cargo fires, thereby allowing them to replace Halon  extinguishing agents, and to generate oxygen for emergency  depressurizations, thereby allowing them to replace stored oxygen or  chemical oxygen generators.
NASA is also conducting longer-term research on advanced technology  onboard inert gas-generating systems and onboard oxygen-generating  systems. Its research is intended (1) to develop the technology to improve  its efficiency, weight, and reliability and (2) to make the technology  practical for commercial air transport. NASA will fund the development of  emerging technologies for ground-based technology demonstration in  fiscal year 2004. NASA is also considering the extension of civilian  transport inerting technology to all fuel tanks to help protect airplanes  against terrorist acts during approaches and departures.
The cost of the system, its corresponding weight, and its unknown  reliability are the most significant factors affecting the potential use of  center wing fuel tank inerting. New cost and weight estimates are  anticipated in 2003.
In 2001, FAA estimated total costs to equip the worldwide fleet at $9.9  billion for ground-based, and $20.8 billion for onboard, inerting  systems.
In 2002, FAA officials developed an onboard system for B-747 flight- testing. The estimated cost was $460,000. The officials estimated that  each system after that would cost about $200,000. The weight of the FAA  prototype system is 160 pounds. A year earlier, NASA estimated the  weight for a B-777 system with technology in use in military aircraft at  about 550 pounds.
section_title: Arc Fault Circuit Breaker
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Arcing faults in wiring may provide an ignition source that can start fires.  Electrical wiring that is sufficiently damaged might cause arcing or direct  shorting resulting in smoking, overheating, or ignition of neighboring  materials. A review of data produced by FAA, the Airline Pilots Association,  and Boeing showed that electrical systems have been a factor in  approximately 50 percent of all aircraft occurrences involving smoke or  fire and that wiring has been implicated in about 10 percent of those  occurrences. In addition, faulty or malfunctioning wiring has been a factor  in at least 15 accidents or incidents investigated by NTSB since 1983.  Properly selecting, routing, clamping, tying, replacing, marking, separating,  and cleaning around wiring areas and proper maintenance all help mitigate  the potential for wire system failures, such as arcing, that could lead to  smoke, fire and loss of function. Chemical degradation, age induced  cracking, and damage due to maintenance may all create a scenario which  could lead to arcing. Arcing can occur between a wire and structure or  between different wire types. Wire chafing is a sign of degradation; chafing  happens when the insulation around one wire rubs against a component  tougher than itself (such as structure or control cable) exposing the wire  conductor. This condition can lead to arcing. When arcing wires are too  close to flammable materials or are flammable themselves, fires can occur.
In general, wiring and wiring insulation degrade for a variety of reasons,  including age, inadequate maintenance, chemical contamination, improper  installation or repair, and mechanical damage. Vibration, moisture, and  heat can contribute to and accelerate degradation. Consequences of wire  systems failures include loss of function, smoke, and fire. Since most  wiring is bundled and located in hidden or inaccessible areas, it is difficult  to monitor the health of an aircraft’s wiring system during scheduled  maintenance using existing equipment and procedures. Failure  occurrences have been documented in wiring running to the fuel tank, in  the electronics equipment compartment, in the cockpit, in the ceiling of the  cabin, and in other locations.
To address the concerns with arcing, arc fault circuit breakers for aircraft  use are being developed. The arc fault circuit breaker cuts power off as it  senses a wire beginning to arc. It is intended to prevent significant damage  before a failure develops into a full-blown arc, which can produce  extremely localized heat, char insulation, and generally create problems in  the wire bundles. Arc fault circuit protection devices would mitigate arcing  events, but will not identify the wire breaches and degradation that  typically lead up to these events.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: FAA, the Navy, and the Air Force are jointly developing arc fault circuit  breaker technology. Boeing is also developing a monitoring system to  detect the status of and changes in wiring; and power shuts down when  arcing is detected. This system may be able to protect wiring against both  electrical overheating and arcing and is considered more advanced than the  government’s circuit breaker technology.
FAA developed a plan called the Enhanced Airworthiness Program for  Airplane Systems to address wiring problems, which includes development  of arc fault circuit breaker technology and installation guidance along with  proposals of new regulations. The plan provides means for enhancing  safety in the areas of wire system design, certification, maintenance,  research and development, reporting, and information sharing and  outreach. FAA also tasked an Aging Transport Systems Rule-making  Advisory Committee to provide data, recommendations, and evaluation  specifically on aging wiring systems. The new regulations being considered  are entitled the Enhanced Airworthiness Program for Airplane Systems  Rule and are expected by late-2005. Under this rule-making package,  inspections would evaluate the health of wiring and all of its components  for operation, such as connectors and clamps. Part of the system includes  visual inspections of all wiring within arm’s reach, enhanced by the use of  hand-held mirrors. This improvement is expected to catch more wiring  flaws than current visual inspection practices. Where visual inspections  can not be assumed to detect damage, detailed inspections will be required.  The logic process to establish proper inspections is called the Enhanced  Zonal Analysis Procedure, which will be issued as an Advisory Circular.  This procedure is specifically directed towards enhancing the maintenance  programs for aircraft whose current program does not include tasks  derived from a process that specifically considers wiring in all zones as the  potential source of ignition of a fire.
Additional development and testing will be required before advanced arc  fault circuit breakers will be available for use on aircraft. The FAA  currently is in the midst of a prototype program where arc fault circuit  breakers are installed in an anticollision light system on a major air  carrier’s Boeing 737. The FAA and the Navy are currently analyzing tests of  the circuit breakers to assess their reliability. The Society of Automotive  Engineers is in the final stages of developing a Minimum Operating  Performance Specification for the arc fault circuit breaker.
section_title: Multisensor Detectors
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Multisensor detectors, or “electronic noses,” could combine one or more  standard smoke detector technologies; a variety of sensors for detecting  such gases as carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, or hydrocarbon; and a  thermal sensor to more accurately detect and locate overheated or burning  materials. The sensors could improve existing fire detection by discovering  and locating potential or actual fires sooner and reducing the incidence of  false alarms. These “smart” sensors would ignore the “nuisance sources”  such as dirt, dust, and condensation that are often responsible for  triggering false alarms in existing systems.
According to studies by FAA and the National Institute of Standards and  Technology, many current smoke and fire detection systems are not  reliable. A 2000 FAA study indicated that cargo compartment detection  systems, for example, resulted in at least one false alarm per week from  1988 through 1990 and a 200:1 ratio of false alarms to actual fires in the  cargo compartment from 1995 through 1999.  FAA has since estimated a  100:1 cargo compartment false alarm ratio, partly because reported actual  incidents have increased  According to FAA’s Service Difficulty Report  database,about 990 actual smoke and fire events were reported for  2001.
Multisensor detectors could be wired or wireless and linked to a  suppression system. One or several sensor signals or indicators could  cause the crew to activate fire extinguishers in a small area or zone, a  larger area, or an entire compartment, resulting in a more appropriate and  accurate use of the fire suppressant. For example, in areas such as the  avionics compartment, materials that can burn are relatively well-defined.  Multisensor detectors the size of a postage stamp could be designed to  detect smoldering fires in cables or insulation or in overheated equipment  in that area. Placing the detectors elsewhere in the airplane could improve  the crew’s ability to respond to smoke or fire, including occurrences in  hidden or inaccessible areas.
Improved sensor detection technologies would both enhance safety by  increasing crews’ confidence in the reliability of alarms and reduce costs  by avoiding the need to divert aircraft in response to false alarms. One  study estimated the average cost of a diversion at $50,000 for a wide-body  airplane and $30,000 for a narrow-body airplane. A diversion can also  present safety concerns because of the possible increased risk of an  accident and injuries to passengers and crew if there is (1) an emergency  evacuation, (2) a landing at an unfamiliar airport, (3) a change to air traffic  patterns, (4) a shorter runway, (5) inferior fire-fighting capability, (6) a loss  of cargo load, or (7) inferior navigation aids. In 2002, 258 unscheduled  landings due to smoke, fire, or fumes occurred. In addition, 342 flights were  interrupted; some of these flights had to return to the gate or abort a  takeoff.
FAA established basic detector performance requirements in 1965 and  1980. Detectors were to be made and installed in a manner that ensured  their ability to resist, without failure, all vibration, inertia, and other loads  to which they might normally be subjected; they also had to be unaffected  by exposure to fumes, oil, water, or other fluids. Regulations in 1986 and  1998 further defined basic location and performance requirements for  detectors in different areas of the cargo compartment. In 1998, FAA issued  a requirement for detection and extinguishment systems for one class of  cargo compartments, which relied on oxygen starvation to control fires.  This requirement significantly increased the number of detectors in use.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Multisenor detectors are not currently available because additional  research is needed. Although they have been demonstrated in the  laboratory and on the ground, they have not been flight-tested. FAA and  NASA have multisensor detector research and development efforts under  way and are working to develop “smart” sensors and criteria for their  approval. FAA will also finish revising an Advisory Circular that establishes  test criteria for detection systems, designed to ensure that they respond to  fires, but not to nonfire sources. In addition, several companies currently  market “smart” detectors, mostly for nonaviation applications. For  example, thermal detection systems sense and count certain particles that  initially boil off the surface of smoldering or burning material.
A European consortium has been developing a system, FIREDETEX, that  combines the use of multisensor detectors, onboard fuel tank inerting, and  water-mist-plus-nitrogen fire suppression systems for commercial  airplanes. This program and associated studies are still ongoing and flight  testing is planned for the last quarter of calendar year 2003. The results of  tests on this system are expected to be made public in early 2004, and will  help to clarify the possible costs, benefits, and drawbacks of the combined  system.
Additional research, development, and testing will be required before  multisensor technology is ready for use in commercial aviation. NASA,  FAA, and private companies are pursuing various approaches. Some  experts believe that some forms of multisensor technology could be in use  in 5 years. When these units become available, questions may arise about  where their use will be required. For example, the Canadian Transportation  Safety Board has recommended that some areas in addition to those  currently designated as fire zones may need to be equipped with  detectors. These include the electronics and equipment bay (typically  below the floor beneath the cockpit and in front of the passenger cabin),  areas behind interior wall panels in the cockpit and cabin areas, and areas  behind circuit breaker and other electronic panels.
section_title: Water Mist Fire Suppression
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: For over two decades, the aviation industry has evaluated the use of  systems that spray water mist to suppress fires in airliner cabins, cargo  compartments, and engine casings (see fig. 7). This effort was prompted, in  part, by a need to identify an alternative to Halon, the primary chemical  used to extinguish fires aboard airliners. With few exceptions, Halon is the  sole fire suppressant installed in today’s aircraft fire suppression systems.  However, the production of Halon was banned under the 1987 Montreal  Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and its use in many  noncritical sectors has been phased out. Significant reserves of Halon  remain, and its use is still allowed in certain “critical use” applications,  such as aerospace, because no immediate viable replacement agent  exists. To enable the testing and further development of suitable  alternatives to and substitutes for Halon, FAA has drafted detailed  standards for replacements in the cargo and engine compartments. These  standards typically require replacement systems to provide the same level  of safety as the currently used Halon extinguishing system.
According to FAA and others in the aviation industry, successful water mist  systems could provide benefits against an in-flight or postcrash fire,  including cooling the passengers, cabin surfaces, furnishings and overall cabin decreasing toxic smoke and irritant gases; and delaying or preventing “flashover” fires from occurring.
In addition, a 1996 study prepared for the British Civil Aviation Authority  examined 42 accidents and 32 survivability factors and found that cabin  water spray was the factor that showed the greatest potential for reducing  fatality and injury rates. In the early 1990s, a joint FAA and Civil Aviation  Authority study found that cabin water mist systems would be highly  effective in improving survivability during a postcrash fire. However, the  cost of using these systems outweighed the benefits, largely because of the  weight of the water that airliners would be required to carry to operate  them. In the mid- and late-1990s, FAA and others began examining water  mist systems in airliner cargo compartments to help offset the cost of a  cabin water mist system because the water could be used or shared by both  the cargo compartment and the cabin. European and U.S. researchers also  designed systems that required much less water because they targeted  specific zones within an aircraft to suppress fires rather than spraying  water throughout the cabin or the cargo compartment.
In 2000, Navy researchers found a twin-fluid system to be highly reliable  and maintenance-free. Moreover, this system’s delivery nozzles could be  installed without otherwise changing cabin interiors. The Navy  researchers’ report recommended that FAA and NTSB perform follow-up  testing leading to the final design and certification of an interior water mist  fire suppression system for all passenger and cargo transport aircraft. Also  in 2000, a European consortium began a collaborative research project  called FIREDETEX, which combines multisensor fire detectors, water  mist, and onboard fuel tank inerting into one fire detection and suppression  system.
In 2001 and 2002, FAA tested experimental mist systems to determine what  could meet its preliminary minimum performance standards for cargo  compartment suppression systems. A system that combines water mist  with nitrogen met these minimum standards. In this system, water and  nitrogen “knock down” the initial fire, and nitrogen suppresses any deep- seated residual fire by inerting the entire compartment. In cargo  compartment testing, this system maintained cooler temperatures than had  either a plain water mist system or a Halon-based system.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Additional research and testing are needed before water mist technology  can be considered for commercial aircraft. For example, the weight and  relative effectiveness of any water mist system would need to be  considered and evaluated. In addition, before it could be used in aircraft,  the consequences of using water will need to be further evaluated. For  example, Boeing officials noted that using a water mist fire suppression  system in the cabin in a post crash fire might actually reduce passenger  safety if the mist or fog creates confusion among the passengers, leading to  longer evacuation times. Further, of concern is the possible shorting of  electrical wiring and equipment and damage to aircraft interiors (e.g., seats,  entertainment equipment, and insulation). Water cleanup could also be  difficult and require special drying equipment.
section_title: Fire-Safe Fuels
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Burning fuel typically dominates and often overwhelms postcrash fire  scenarios and causes even the most fire-resistant materials to burn. Fuel  spilled from tanks ruptured upon crash impact often forms an easily  ignitable fuel-air mixture. A more frequent fuel-related problem is the fuel  tank explosion, in which a volatile fuel-air mixture inside the fuel tank is  ignited, often by an unknown source. For example, it is believed that fuel  tank explosions destroyed a Philippines Air 737 in 1990, TWA Flight 800 in  1996, and a Thai Air 737 in 2001. Therefore, reducing the flammability of  fuel could improve survivability in postcrash fires as well as reduce the  occurrence of fuel tank explosions.
Reducing fuel flammability involves limiting the volatility of fuel and the  rate at which it vaporizes.Liquid fuel can burn only when enough fuel  vapor is mixed with air. If the fuel cannot vaporize, a fire cannot occur. This  principle is behind the development of higher-flashpoint fuel, whose use  can decrease the likelihood of a fuel tank explosion. The flash point is the  lowest temperature at which a liquid fuel produces enough vapor to ignite  in the presence of a source of ignition—the lower the flash point, the  greater the risk of fire. If the fuel is volatile enough, however, and air is  sucked into the fuel tank area upon crash impact, limiting the fuel’s  vaporization can prevent a burnable mixture from forming. This principle  supports the use of additives that modify the viscosity of fuel to limit  postcrash fires; for example, antimisting kerosene contains such additives.
According to FAA and NASA, however, these additives do nothing to  prevent fuel tank explosions.
From the early 1960s to the mid-1980s, FAA conducted research on fuel  safety. The Aviation Safety Act of 1988 required that FAA undertake  research on low-flammability aircraft fuels, and, in 1993, FAA developed  plans for fuel safety research. In 1996, a National Research Council experts’  workshop on aviation fuel summarized existing fuel safety research efforts.  The participants concluded that although postcrash fuel-fed aircraft fires  had been researched, limited progress had been achieved and little work  had been published.
As part of FAA’s research, fuels have been modified with thickening  polymer additives to slow down vaporization in crashes.  Participants in  the 1996 National Research Council workshop identified several long-term  research goals for consideration in developing modified fuels and fuel  additives to improve fire safety. They also agreed that a combination of  effective fire-safe fuel additives could probably be either selected or  designed, provided that fuel performance requirements were identified in  advance. In addition, they agreed that existing aircraft designs that reduce  the chance of fuel igniting do not present major barriers to the  implementation of a fire-safe fuel.
A 1996 European Transport Safety Council report suggested that  antimisting kerosene be at least partially tested on regular military  transport flights (e.g., in one tank, feeding one engine) to demonstrate its  operational compatibility. The report also recommended the consideration  of a study comparing the costs of the current principal commercial fuel and  the special, higher-flashpoint fuel used by the Navy. According to NASA and  FAA fire-safe fuels experts, military fuel is much harder to burn in storage  or to ignite in a pan because of its lower volatility; however, it is just as  flammable as aviation fuel when it is sprayed into an engine combustor.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Fire-safe fuels are not currently available and are in the early stages of  research and development. In January 2002, NASA opened a fire-safe fuels  research branch at its Glenn Research Center in Ohio. NASA-Glenn is  conducting aviation fuel research that evaluates fuel vapor flammability in  conjunction with FAA’s fuel tank inerting program, including the  measurement of fuel “flash points.”  NASA is examining the effects of  surfactants, gelling agents, and chemical composition changes on the  vaporization and pressure characteristics of jet fuel.
In addition to FAA’s and NASA’s research, some university and industry  researchers have made progress in developing fire-safe fuels. Many use  advanced analytical, computational modeling technologies to inform their  research. A council of producers and users of fuels is also coordinating  research on ways to use such fuels. NASA fuel experts remain optimistic  that small changes in fuel technologies can have a big impact on fuel safety.
Developing fire-safe fuels will require much more research and testing.  There are significant technical difficulties associated with creating a fuel  that meets aviation requirements while meaningfully decreasing the  flammability of the fuel.
section_title: Thermal Acoustic Insulation Materials
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: To keep an airplane quieter and warmer, a layer of thermal acoustic  insulation material is connected to paneling and walls throughout the  aircraft. This insulation, if properly designed, can also prevent or limit the  spread of an in-flight fire. In addition, thermal acoustic insulation provides  a barrier against a fire burning through the cabin from outside the  airplane’s fuselage (See fig. 8.). Such a fire, often called a postcrash fire,  may occur when fuel is spilled on the ground after a crash or an impact.
While this thermal acoustic insulation material could help prevent the  spread of fire, some of the insulation materials that have been used in the  past have contributed to fires. For example, FAA indicated that an  insulation material, called metallized Mylar®, contributed to at least six in- flight fires. Airlines have stopped using this material and are removing it  from existing aircraft.
FAA’s two main efforts in this area are directed toward preventing fatal in- flight fire and improving postcrash fire survivability.
Since 1998, FAA has been developing test standards for preventing in- flight fires in response to findings that fire spread on some thermal  acoustic insulation blanket materials. In 2000, FAA issued a notice of  proposed rule-making that outlined new flammability test criteria for in- flight fires. FAA’s in-flight test standards require thermal acoustic  insulation materials to protect passengers. According to the standards,  insulation materials installed in airplanes will not propagate a fire if  ignition occurs.
FAA is also developing more stringent burnthrough test standards for  postcrash fires. FAA has been studying the penetration of the fuselage  by an external fire—known as fuselage burnthrough—since the late  1980s and believes that improving the fire resistance of thermal acoustic  insulation could delay fuselage burnthrough. In laboratory tests  conducted from 1999 through 2002, an FAA-led working group  determined that insulation is the most potentially effective and practical  means of delaying the spread of fire or creating a barrier to burnthrough.  In 2002, FAA completed draft burnthrough standards outlining a  proposed methodology for testing thermal acoustic insulation. The  burnthrough standards would protect passengers and crews by  extending by at least 4 minutes the time available for evacuation in a  postcrash fire.
Various studies have estimated the potential benefits from both test  standards:
A 1999 study of worldwide aviation accidents from 1966 through 1993  estimated that about 10 lives per year would have been saved if  protection had provided an additional 4 minutes for occupants to exit  the airplane.
A 2000 FAA study estimated that about 37 U.S. fatalities would be  avoided between 2000 and 2019 through the implementation of both  proposed standards.
A 2002 study by the British Civil Aviation Authority of worldwide  aviation accidents from 1991 through 2000 estimated that at least 34  lives per year would have been saved if insulation had met both  proposed standards.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Insulation designed to replace metallized Mylar® is currently available.  A  2000 FAA airworthiness directive gave the airlines 5 years to remove and  replace metallized Mylar® insulation in 719 affected airplanes.  Replacement insulation is required to meet the in-flight standard and will  be installed in these airplanes by mid-2005. In that airworthiness directive,  FAA indicated that it did not consider other currently installed insulation to  constitute an unsafe condition.
Thermal acoustic insulation is currently available for installation on  commercial airliners. This insulation has been demonstrated to reduce the  chance of fatal in-flight fires and to improve postcrash fire survivability. On  July 31, 2003, FAA issued a final rule requiring that after September 2, 2005,  all newly manufactured airplanes having a seating capacity of more than 20  passengers or over 6,000 pounds must use thermal acoustic insulation that  meets more stringent standards for how quickly flames can spread. In  addition, for aircraft of this size manufactured before September 2, 2003,  replacement insulation in the fuselage must also meet the new, higher  standard.
Research is continuing to develop thermal acoustic insulation that provides  better in-flight and burnthrough protection. Even when this material is  available, the high cost of retrofitting airplanes may limit its use to newly  manufactured aircraft. For example, FAA estimates that the metallized  Mylar® retrofit alone will cost a total of $368.4 million, discounted to  present value terms, for the 719 affected airplanes. Because thermal  acoustic insulation is installed throughout the pressurized section of the  airplane for the life of its service, retrofitting the entire fleet would cost  several billion dollars.
section_title: Ultra-Fire-Resistant Polymers
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Polymers are used in aircraft in the form of lightweight plastics and  composites and are selected on the basis of their estimated installed cost,  weight, strength, and durability. Most of the aircraft cabin is made of  polymeric material. In the event of an in-flight or a postcrash fire, the use of  polymeric materials with reduced flammability could give passengers and  crew more time to evacuate by delaying the rate at which the fire spreads  through the cabin.
FAA researchers are developing better techniques to measure the  flammability of polymers and to make polymers that are ultra fire resistant.  Developing these materials is the long-term goal of FAA’s Fire Research  Program, which, if successful, will “eliminate burning cabin materials as a  cause of death in aircraft accidents.”  Materials being improved include  composite and adhesive resins, textile fibers, rubber for seat cushions, and  plastics for molded parts used in seats and passenger electronics. (See fig.  9.)
Adding flame-retardant substances to existing materials is one way to  decrease their flammability. For example, some manufacturers add  substances that release water when they reach a high temperature. When a  material, such as wiring insulation, is heated or burns, the water acts to  absorb the heat and cools down the fire. Other materials are designed to  become surface-scorched on exposure to fire, causing a layer of char to  protect the rest of the material from burning. Lastly, adding a type of clay  can have a flame-retardant effect. In general, these fire-retardant polymers  are formulated to pass an ignition test but do not meet FAA’s criterion for  ultra fire resistance, which is a 90 percent reduction in the rate at which the  untreated material would burn. To meet this strict requirement, FAA is  developing new “smart” polymers that are typical plastics under normal  conditions but convert to ultra-fire-resistant materials when exposed to an  ignition source or fire.
FAA has adopted a number of flammability standards over the last 30 years.  In 1984, FAA passed a retrofit rule that replaced 650,000 seat cushions with  flame-retardant seat cushions at a total cost of about $75 million. The  replacement seat cushions were found to delay cabin flashover by 40 to 60  seconds. Fire-retardant seat cushions can also prevent ramp and in-flight  fires that originate at a seat and would otherwise burn out of control if left  unattended. In 1986 and 1988, FAA set maximum allowable levels of heat  and smoke from burning interior materials to decrease the amount of  smoke that they would release in a postcrash fire. These standards affected  paneling in all newly manufactured aircraft. Airlines and airframe  manufacturers invested several hundred million dollars to develop these  new panels.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Ultra-fireresistant polymers are not currently available for use on  commercial airliners. These polymers are still in the early stages of  research and development. To reduce the cost and simplify the testing of  new materials, FAA is employing a new technique to characterize the  flammability and thermal decomposition of new products; this technique  requires only a milligram of sample material. The result has been the  discovery of several new compositions of matter (including “smart”  polymers). The test identifies key thermal and combustion properties that  allow rapid screening of new materials. From these materials, FAA plans  to select the most promising and work with industry to make enough of the  new polymers to fabricate full-scale cabin components like sidewalls and  stowage bins for fire testing.
FAA’s phased research program includes the selection in 2003 of a small  number of resins, plastics, rubbers, and fibers on the basis of their  functionality, cost, and potential to meet fire performance guidelines. In  2005, FAA plans to fabricate decorative panels, molded parts, seat  cushions, and textiles for testing from 2007 through 2010. Full-scale testing  is scheduled for 2011 but is contingent upon the availability of program  funds and commercial interest from the private sector.
Research continues on ultra-fire-resistant polymers that will increase  protection against in-flight fires and cabin burnthrough. According to an  FAA fire research expert, issues facing this research include (1) the current  high cost of ultra-fire-resistant polymers; (2) difficulties in producing ultra- fire-resistant polymers with low to moderate processing temperatures,  good strength and toughness, and colorability and colorfastness; and (3)  gaps in understanding the relationship between material properties and fire  performance and between chemical composition and fire performance,  scaling relationships, and fundamental fire-resistance mechanisms. In  addition, once the materials are developed and tested, getting them  produced economically and installed in aircraft will become an issue. It is  expected that such new materials with ultra fire resistance would be more  expensive to produce and that the market for such materials would be  uncertain.
section_title: Airport Rescue and Fire-Fighting Operations
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Because of the fire danger following a commercial airplane crash, having  airport rescue and fire-fighting operations available can improve the  chances of survival for the people involved. Most airplane accidents occur  during takeoff or landing at the airport or in the surrounding community. A  fire outside the airplane, with its tremendous heat, may take only a few  minutes to burn through the airplane’s outside shell. According to FAA,  firefighters are responsible for creating an escape path by spraying water  and chemicals on the fire to allow the passengers and crew to evacuate the  airplane. Firefighters use one or more trucks to extinguish external fires,  often at great personal risk, and use hand-held attack lines when  attempting to put out fires within the airplane fuselage. (See fig. 10). Fires  within the fuselage are considered difficult to control with existing  equipment and procedures because they involve complex conditions, such  as smoke-laden toxic gases and high temperatures in the passenger cabin.  FAA has taken actions to control both internal and external postcrash fires,  including requiring major airports to have airport rescue and fire-fighting  operations.
In 1972, FAA first proposed regulations to ensure that major airports have a  minimal level of airport rescue and fire-fighting operations. Some changes  to these regulations were made in 1988. The regulations establish, among  other things, equipment standards, annual testing requirements for  response times, and operating procedures. The requirements depend on  both the size of the airport and the resources the locality has agreed to  make available as needed.
In 1997, FAA compared airport rescue and fire-fighting missions and  standards for civilian airports with DOD’s for defense installations and  reported that DOD’s requirements were not applicable to civilian airports.  In 1988, and again in 1998, Transport Canada Civil Aviation also studied its  rescue and fire-fighting operations and concluded that the expenditure of  resources for such unlikely occurrences was difficult to justify from a  benefit-cost perspective. This conclusion highlighted the conflict between  safety and cost in attempting to define rescue and fire-fighting  requirements.
A coalition of union organizations and others concerned about aviation  safety released a report critical of FAA’s standards and operational  regulations in 1999. According to the report, FAA’s airport rescue and fire- fighting regulations were outdated and inadequate.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: In 2002, FAA incorporated measures recommended by NTSB into FAA’s  Aeronautical Information Manual Official Guide to Basic Flight  Information and Air Traffic Control Procedures. These measures (1)  designate a radio frequency at most major airports to allow direct  communication between airport rescue and fire-fighting personnel and  flight crewmembers in the event of an emergency and (2) specify a  universal set of hand signals for use when radio communication is lost.
In March 2001, FAA responded to the reports criticizing its airport rescue  and fire-fighting standards by tasking its Aviation Regulatory Advisory  Committee to review the agency’s rescue and fire-fighting requirements to  identify measures that could be added, modified, or deleted. In 2003, the  committee is expected to propose requirements for the number of trucks,  the amount of fire extinguishing agent, vehicle response times, and staffing  at airports and to publish its findings in a notice of proposed rule-making.  Depending on the results of this FAA review, additional resources may be  needed at some airports. The overall cost of improving airport rescue and  fire-fighting response capabilities could be a significant barrier to the  further development of regulations. For example, some in the aviation  industry are concerned about the costs of extending requirements to  smaller airports and of appropriately equipping all airports with resources.  According to FAA, extending federal safety requirements to some smaller  airports would cost at least $2 million at each airport initially and $1 million  annually thereafter.
section_title: Summaries of Potential Improved Evacuation Safety Advancements
paragraphs: This appendix presents information on the background and status of  potential advancements in evacuation safety that we identified, including  the following:  improved passenger safety briefings; exit seat briefings; photo-luminescent floor track marking; crewmember safety and evacuation training; acoustic attraction signals; exit slide testing; overwing exit doors; evacuation procedures for very large transport aircraft; and personal flotation devices.
subsections: section_title: Passenger Safety Briefings
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Federal regulations require that passengers receive an oral briefing prior to  takeoff on safety aspects of the upcoming flight. FAA also requires that oral  briefings be supplemented with printed safety briefing cards that pertain  only to that make and model of airplane and are consistent with the air  carrier’s procedures. These two safety measures must include information  on smoking, the location and operation of emergency exits, seat belts,  compliance with signs, and the location and use of flotation devices. In  addition, if the flight operates above 25,000 feet mean sea level, the briefing  and cards must include information on the emergency use of oxygen.
FAA published an Advisory Circular in March 1991 to guide air carriers’  development of oral safety briefings and cards. Primarily, the circular  defines the material that must be covered and suggests material that FAA  believes should be covered. The circular also discusses the difficulty in  motivating passengers to attend to the safety information and suggests  making the oral briefing and safety cards as attractive and interesting as  possible to increase passengers’ attention. The Advisory Circular suggests,  for example, that flight attendants be animated, speak clearly and slowly,  and maintain eye contact with the passengers. Multicolored safety cards  with pictures and drawings should be used over black and white cards.  Finally, the circular suggests the use of a recorded videotape briefing  because it ensures a complete briefing with good diction and allows for  additional visual information to be presented to the passengers. (See fig.  11.)
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Despite efforts to improve passengers’ attention to safety information, a  large percentage of passengers continue to ignore preflight safety briefings  and safety cards, according to a study NTSB conducted in 1999. Of 457  passengers polled, 54 percent (247) reported that they had not watched the  entire briefing because they had seen it before. An additional 70 passengers  indicated that the briefing provided common knowledge and therefore  there was no need to watch it. Of 431 passengers who answered a question  about whether they had read the safety card, 68 percent (293) indicated  that they had not, many of them stating that they had read safety cards on  previous flights.
Safety briefings and cards serve an important safety purpose for both  passengers and crew. They are intended to prepare passengers for an  emergency by providing them with information about the location and  operation of exits and emergency equipment that they may have to  operate—and whose location and operation may differ from one airplane  to the next. Well-briefed passengers will be better prepared in an  emergency, thereby increasing their chances of surviving and lessening  their dependence on the crew for assistance.
In its emergency evacuation study, NTSB recommended that FAA instruct  airlines to “conduct research and explore creative and effective methods  that use state-of-the-art technology to convey safety information to  passengers.” NTSB further recommended “the presented information  include a demonstration of all emergency evacuation procedures, such as  how to open the emergency exits and exit the aircraft, including how to use  the slides.” That research found that passengers often view safety briefings  and cards as uninteresting and the information as intuitive. FAA has  requested that commercial carriers explore different ways to present the  materials to their passengers, adding that more should be done to educate  passengers about what to do after an accident has occurred.
section_title: Exit Seat Briefing
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Passengers seated in an exit row may be called on to assist in an  evacuation. Upon a crewmember’s command or a personal assessment of  danger, these passengers must decide if their exit is safe to use and then  open their exit hatch or door for use during an evacuation. In October 1990,  FAA required airlines to actively screen passengers occupying exit seats for  “suitability” and to administer one-on-one briefings on their  responsibilities. This rule does not require specific training for exit seat  occupants, but it does require that the occupants be duly informed of their  distinct obligations.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: According to NTSB, preflight briefings of passengers in exit rows could  contribute positively to a passenger evacuation. In a 1999 study, NTSB  found that the individual briefings given to passengers who occupy exit  seats have a positive effect on the outcome of an aircraft evacuation. The  studies also found that as a result of the individualized briefings, flight  attendants were better able to assess the suitability of the passengers  seated in the exit seats.
According to FAA’s Flight Standards Handbook Bulletin for Air  Transportation, several U.S. airlines have identified specific cabin  crewmembers to perform “structured personal conversations or briefings,”  designed to equip and prepare passengers in exit seats beyond the general  passenger briefing. Also, the majority of air carriers have procedures to  assist crewmembers with screening passengers seated in exit rows.
FAA’s 1990 rule requires that passengers seated in exit rows be provided  with information cards that detail the actions to be taken in the case of an  emergency. However, individual exit row briefings, such as those  recommended by NTSB, are not required. Also included on the information  cards are provisions for a passenger who does not wish to be seated in the  exit row to be reseated. Additionally, carriers are required to assess the exit  row passenger’s ability to carry out the required functions. The extent of  discussion with exit row passengers depends on each airline’s policy.
section_title: Photo-luminescent Floor Track Marking
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In June 1983, an Air Canada DC-9 flight from Dallas to Toronto was cruising  at 33,000 feet when the crew reported a lavatory fire. An emergency was  declared, and the aircraft made a successful emergency landing at the  Cincinnati Northern Kentucky International Airport. The crew initiated an  evacuation, but only half of the 46 persons aboard were able to escape  before becoming overcome by smoke and fire. In its investigation of this  accident, NTSB learned that many of the 23 passengers who died might  have benefited from floor tracking lighting. As a result, NTSB  recommended that airlines be equipped with floor-level escape markings.  FAA determined that floor lighting could improve the evacuation rate by 20  percent under certain conditions, and FAA now requires all airliners to  have a row of lights along the floor to guide passengers to the exit should  visibility be reduced by smoke.
On transport category aircraft, these escape markings, called floor  proximity marking systems, typically consist primarily of small electric  lights spaced at intervals on the floor or mounted on the seat assemblies,  along the aisle. The requirement for electricity to power these systems has  made them vulnerable to a variety of problems, including battery and  wiring failures, burned-out light bulbs, and physical disruption caused by  vibration, passenger traffic, galley cart strikes, and hull breakage in  accidents. Attempts to overcome these problems have led to the proposal  that nonelectric, photo-luminescent (glow-in-the-dark) materials be used in  the construction of floor proximity marking systems. The elements of these  new systems are “charged” by the normal airplane passenger cabin lighting,  including the sunlight that enters the cabin when the window shades are  open during daylight hours. (See fig. 12.)
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Floor track marking using photo-luminescent materials is currently  available but not required for U.S. commercial airliners. Performance  demonstrations of photo-luminescent technology have found that  strontium aluminate photo-luminescent marking systems can be effective  in providing the guidance for egress that floor proximity marking systems  are intended to achieve. According to industry and government officials,  such photo-luminescent marking systems are also cheaper to install than  electric light systems and require little to no maintenance. Moreover,  photo-luminescent technology weighs about 15 to 20 pounds less than  electric light systems and, unlike the electric systems, illuminates both  sides of the aisle, creating a pathway to the exits.
Photo-luminescent floor track marking technology is mature and is  currently being used by a small number of operators, mostly in Europe. In  the United States, Southwest Airlines has equipped its entire fleet with the  photo-luminescent system. However, the light emitted from photo- luminescent materials is not as bright as the light from electrically operated  systems. Additionally, the photo-luminescent materials are not as effective  when they have not been exposed to light for an extended period of time,  as after a long overseas nighttime flight. The estimated retail price of an  entire system, not including the installation costs, is $5,000 per airplane.
section_title: Crewmember Safety and Evacuation Training
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: FAA requires crewmembers to attend annual training to demonstrate their  competency in emergency procedures. They have to be knowledgeable and  efficient while exercising good judgment. Crewmembers must know their  own duties and responsibilities during an evacuation and be familiar with  those of their fellow workers so that they can take over for others if  necessary.
The requirements for emergency evacuation training and demonstrations  were first established in 1965. Operators were required to conduct full- scale evacuation demonstrations, include crewmembers in the  demonstrations, and complete the demonstrations in 2 minutes using 50  percent of the exits. The purpose of the demonstrations was to test the  crewmembers’ ability to execute established emergency evacuation  procedures and to ensure the realistic assignment of functions to the crew.  A full-scale demonstration was required for each type and model of  airplane when it first started passenger-carrying operations, increased its  passenger seating capacity by 5 percent or more, or underwent a major  change in the cabin interior that would affect an emergency evacuation.  Subsequently, the time allowed to evacuate the cabin during these tests was  reduced to 90 seconds.
The aviation community took steps in the 1990s to develop a program  called Crew Resource Management that focuses on overall improvements  in crewmembers’ performance and flight safety strategies, including those  for evacuation. FAA officials told us that they plan to emphasize the  importance of effective communication between crewmembers and are  considering updating a related Advisory Circular. Effective communication  between cockpit and cabin crew are particularly important with the added  security precautions being taken after September 11, 2001, including the  locking the cockpit door during flight.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: The traditional training initiative now has an advanced curriculum,  Advanced Crew Resource Management. According to FAA, this  comprehensive implementation package includes crew resource  management procedures, training for instructors and evaluators, training  for crewmembers, a standardized assessment of the crew’s performance,  and an ongoing implementation process. This advanced training was  designed and developed through a collaborative effort between the airline  and research communities. FAA considers training to be an ongoing  development process that provides airlines with unique crew resource  management solutions tailored to their operational demands. The design of  crew resource management procedures is based on principles that require  an emphasis on the airline’s specific operational environment. The  procedures were developed to emphasize these crew resource  management elements by incorporating them into standard operating  procedures for normal as well as abnormal and emergency flight situations.
Because commercial airliner accidents are rare, crewmembers must rely  on their initial and recurrent training to guide their actions during an  emergency. Even in light of advances and initiatives in evacuation  technology, such as slides and slide life rafts, crewmembers must still  assume a critical role in ensuring the safe evacuation of their passengers.  Airline operators have indicated that it is very costly for them to pull large  numbers of crewmembers off-line to participate in training sessions.
FAA officials told us that improving flight and cabin crew communication  holds promise for ensuring the evacuation of passengers during an  emergency. To improve this communication and coordination between  flight and cabin crew, FAA plans to update the related Advisory Circular,  oversee training, and charge FAA inspectors with monitoring air carriers  during flights to see that improvements are being implemented. In addition,  FAA is enhancing its guidance to air carriers on preflight briefings for flight  crews to sharpen their responses to emergency situations and mitigate  passengers’ confusion. FAA expects this guidance to bolster the use and  quality of preflight briefings between pilots and flight attendants on  security, communication, and emergency procedures. According to FAA,  these briefings have been shown to greatly improve the flight crew’s safety  mind-set and to enhance communication.
section_title: Acoustic Attraction Signals
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Acoustic attraction signals make sounds to help people locate the doors in  smoke, darkness, or when lights and exit signs are obscured. When  activated, the devices are intended to help people to determine the  direction and approximate distance of the sound—and of the door.  Examples of audio attraction signals include recorded speech sounds,  broadband multifrequency sounds (“white noise”), or alarm bells.
Research to determine if acoustic attraction signals can be useful in aircraft  evacuation has included, for example, FAA’s Civil Aeromedical Institute  testing of recorded speech sounds in varying pitches, using phrases such as  “This way out,” “This way,” and “Exit here.”  Researchers at the University  of Leeds developed Localizer Directional Sound beacons, which combine  broadband, multifrequency “white noise” of between 40Hz and 20kHz with  an alerting sound of at least one other frequency, according to the inventor  (see fig. 13).
The FAA study noted above of acoustic attraction signals found that in the  absence of recorded speech signals, the majority of participants evacuating  a low-light-level, vision-obscured cabin will head for the front exit or will  follow their neighbors. In contrast, participants exposed to recorded  speech sounds will select additional exits, even those in the rear of the  airplane. During aircraft trials conducted by Cranfield University and  University of Greenwich researchers, tests of directional sound beacons  found that under cabin smoke conditions, exits were used most efficiently  when the cabin crew gave directions and the directional sound beacons  were activated. With this combination, the distribution of passengers to the  available exits was better than with cabin crew directions alone, sound  beacons alone, no cabin crew directions, or no sound beacons.  Researchers found that passengers were able to identify and move toward  the closest sound source inside the airplane cabin and to distinguish  between two closely spaced loudspeakers. However, in 2001, Airbus  conducted several evacuation test trials of audio attraction signals using an  A340 aircraft. According to Airbus, the acoustic attraction signals did not  enhance passengers’ orientation, and, overall, did not contribute to  passengers’ safety.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: While acoustic attraction signals are currently available, further research is  needed to determine if their use is warranted on commercial airliners. FAA,  Transport Canada Civil Aviation, and the British Civilian Aviation Authority  do not currently mandate the use of acoustic attraction signals. The United  Kingdom’s Air Accidents Investigation Branch made a recommendation  after the fatal Boeing 737 accident at Manchester International Airport in  1985 that research be undertaken to assess the viability of audio attraction  signals and other evacuation techniques to assist passengers impaired by  smoke and toxic or irritant gases. The Civilian Aviation Authority accepted  the recommendation and sponsored research at Cranfield University;  however, it concluded from the research results that the likely benefit of  the technology would be so small that no further action should be taken,  and the recommendation was closed in 1992.
The French Direction Generale de l’Aviation Civile funded aircraft  evacuation trials using directional sound beacons in November 2002, with  oversight by the European Joint Aviation Authorities. The trials were  conducted at Cranfield University’s evacuation simulator with British  Airways cabin crew and examined eight trial evacuations by two groups of  ‘passengers.’ The study surveyed the participants’ views on various aspects  of their evacuation experience and measured the overall time to evacuate.
The speed of evacuation was found to be biased by the knowledge  passengers’ gained in the four successive trials, and by variations in the  number of passengers participating on the 2 days (155 and 181). The four  trials by each of the two groups of passengers also involved different  combinations of crew and sound in each. The study concluded that the  insufficient number of test sessions further contributed to bias in the  results, and that further research would be needed to determine whether  the devices help to speed overall evacuation.
Further research and testing are needed before acoustic attraction signals  can be considered for widespread airline use. The signals may have  drawbacks that would need to be addressed. For example, the Civil  Aviation Authority found that placing an audio signal in the bulkhead might  disorient or confuse the first few passengers who have to pass and then  move away from the sound source to reach the exit. Such hesitation slowed  passengers’ evacuation during testing. The researchers at Cranfield  University trials in 1990 concluded that an acoustic sound signal did not  improve evacuation times by a statistically significant amount, suggesting  that the device might not be cost-effective.
section_title: Smoke Hoods
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Smoke hoods are designed to provide the user with breathable, filtered air  in an environment of smoke and toxic gases that would otherwise be  incapacitating. More people die from smoke and toxic gases than from fire  after an air crash. Because only a few breaths of the dense, toxic smoke  typically found in aircraft fires can render passengers unconscious and  prevent their evacuation, the wider use of smoke hoods has been  investigated as a means of preventing passengers from being overcome by  smoke and of giving them enough breathable air to evacuate. However,  some studies have found that smoke hoods are only effective in certain  types of fires and in some cases may slow the evacuation of cabin  occupants.
As shown in figure 14, a filter smoke hood can be a transparent bag worn  over the head that fits snugly at the neck and is coated with fire-retardant  material; it has a filter but no independent oxygen source and can provide  breathable air by removing some toxic contaminants from the air for a  period ranging from several minutes to 15 minutes, depending on the  severity and type of air contamination. The hood has a filter to remove  carbon monoxide—a main direct cause of death in fire-related commercial  airplane accidents, as well as hydrogen cyanide—another common cause  of death, sometimes from incapacitation that can prevent evacuation.  Hoods also filter carbon dioxide, chlorine, ammonia, acid gases such as  hydrogen chloride and hydrogen sulfide, and various hydrocarbons,  alcohols, and other solvents. Some hoods also include a filter to block  particulate matter. One challenge is where to place the hoods in a highly  accessible location near each seat.
Certain smoke hoods have been shown to filter out many contaminants  typically found in smoke from an airplane cabin fire and to provide some  temporary head protection from the heat of fire. In a full-scale FAA test of  cabin burnthrough, toxic gases became the driving factor determining  survivability in the forward cabin, reaching lethal levels minutes before the  smoke and temperature rose to unsurvivable levels.
A collaborative effort to estimate the potential benefits of smoke hoods  was undertaken in 1986 by the British Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), the  Federal Aviation Administration, the Direction Générale de l’Aviation Civile  (France) and Transport Canada Civil Aviation. The resulting 1987 study  examined the 20 accidents where sufficient data was available out of 74  fire-related accidents worldwide from 1966 to 1985. The results were  sensitive to assumptions regarding extent of use and delays due to putting  on smoke hoods. The study concluded that smoke hoods could  significantly extend the time available to evacuate an aircraft and would  have saved approximately 179 lives in the 20 accidents studied, assuming  no delay in donning smoke hoods. Assuming a 10 percent reduction in the  evacuation rate due to smoke hood use would have resulted in an  estimated 145 lives saved in the 20 accidents with adequate data. A 15  second delay in donning the hoods would have saved an estimated 97 lives  in the 20 accidents. When the likelihood of use of smoke hoods was  included in the analysis for each accident, the total net benefit was  estimated at 134 lives saved in the 20 accidents. The study also estimated  that an additional 228 lives would have been saved in the 54 accidents  where less data was available, assuming no delay in evacuation.
The U.S. Air Force and a major manufacturer are developing a drop-down  smoke hood with oxygen. Because current oxygen masks in airplanes are  not airtight around the mouth, they provide little protection from toxic  gases and smoke in an in-flight fire. To provide protection from these  hazards, as well as from decompression and postcrash fire and smoke, the  Air Force’s drop-down smoke hood with oxygen uses the airplane’s existing  oxygen system and can fit into the overhead bin of a commercial airliner  where the oxygen mask is normally stowed. This smoke hood is intended  to replace current oxygen masks but also be potentially separated from the  oxygen source in a crash to provide time to evacuate.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Smoke hoods are currently available and produced by several  manufacturers; however, not all smoke hoods filter carbon monoxide. They  are in use on many military and private aircraft, as well as in buildings. An  individually-purchased filter smoke hood costs about $70 or more, but  according to one manufacturer bulk order costs have declined to about $40  per hood. In addition, they estimated that hoods cost about $2 a year to  install and $5 a year to maintain. They weigh about a pound or less and  have to be replaced about every 5 years. Furthermore, airlines could incur  additional replacement costs due to theft if smoke hoods were placed near  passenger seats in commercial aircraft.
Neither the British CAA, the FAA, the DGAC, nor Transport Canada Civil  Aviation has chosen to require smoke hoods. The British Air Accident  Investigations Branch recommended that smoke hoods be considered for  aircraft after the 1985 Manchester accident, in which 48 of 55 passengers  died on a runway from an engine fire before takeoff, mainly from smoke  inhalation and the effects of hydrogen cyanide. Additionally, a U.K.  parliamentary committee recommended research into smoke hoods in  1999, and the European Transport Safety Council, an international  nongovernmental organization whose mission is to provide impartial  advice on transportation safety to the European Commission and  Parliaments, recommended in 1997 that smoke hoods be provided in all  commercial aircraft. Canada’s Transportation Safety Board has taken no  official position on smoke hoods, but has noted a deficiency in cabin safety  in this area and recommended further evaluation of voluntary passenger  use.
Although smoke hoods are currently available, they remain controversial.  Passengers are allowed to bring filter type smoke hoods on an airplane, but  FAA is not considering requiring airlines to provide smoke hoods for  passengers. The debate over whether smoke hoods should be installed in  aircraft revolves mainly around regulatory concerns that passengers will  not be able to put smoke hoods on quickly in an emergency; that hoods  might hinder visibility, and that any delay in putting on smoke hoods would  slow down an evacuation. FAA’s and CAA’s evacuation experiments—to  determine how long it takes for passengers to unpack and don smoke  hoods and whether an evacuation would be slowed by their use—have  reached opposite conclusions about the effects of smoke hoods on  evacuation rates. The CAA has noted that delays in putting on smoke hoods  by only one or two people could jeopardize the whole evacuation. An  opposite view by some experts is that the gas and smoke-induced  incapacitation of one or two passengers could also delay an evacuation.
FAA believes that an evacuation might be hampered by passengers’  inability to quickly and effectively access and don smoke hoods, by  competitive passenger behavior, and by a lack of passenger attentiveness  during pre-flight safety briefings. FAA noted that smoke hoods can be  difficult to access and use even by trained individuals. However, other  experts have noted that smoke hoods might reduce panic and help make  evacuations more orderly, that competitive behavior already occurs in  seeking access to exits in a fire, and that passengers could learn smoke  hood safety procedures in the pre-flight safety briefings in the same way  they learn to use drop-down oxygen masks or flotation devices.
The usefulness of smoke hoods varies across fire scenarios depending on  assumptions about how fast hoods could be put on and how much time  would be available to evacuate. One expert told us that the time needed to  put on a smoke hood might not be important in several fire scenarios, such  as an in-flight fire in which passengers are seeking temporary protection  from smoke until the airplane lands and an evacuation can begin. In other  scenarios—a ground evacuation or postcrash evacuation — some experts  argue that passengers in back rows or far from an exit may have their exit  path temporarily blocked as other passengers exit and, because of the  delay in their evacuation, may have a greater need and more time available  to don smoke hoods than passengers seated near usable exits.
section_title: Exit Slide Testing
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Exit slide systems are rarely used during their operational life span.  However, when such a system is used, it may be under adverse crash  conditions that make it important for the system to work as designed. To  prevent injury to passengers and crew escaping through floor-level exits  located more than 6 feet above the ground, assist devices (i.e., slides or  slide-raft systems) are used. (See fig. 15.)
The rapid deployment, inflation, and stability of evacuation slides are  important to the effectiveness of an aircraft’s evacuation system, as was  illustrated in the fatal ground collision of a Northwest Airlines DC-9 and a  Northwest Airlines 727 in Romulus, Michigan, in December 1990. As a  result of the collision, the DC-9 caught fire, but there were several slide  problems that slowed the evacuation. For example, NTSB later found that  the internal tailcone exit release handle was broken, thereby preventing the  tailcone from releasing and the slide from deploying.
Because of concerns about the operability of exit slides, NTSB  recommended in 1974 that FAA improve its maintenance checks of exit  slide operations. In 1983, FAA revised its exit slide requirements to specify  criteria for resistance to water penetration and absorption, puncture  strength, radiant heat resistance, and deployment as flotation platforms  after ditching.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: All U.S. air carriers have an FAA-approved maintenance program for each  type of airplane that they operate. These programs require that the  components of an airplane’s emergency evacuation system, which includes  the exit slides, be periodically inspected and serviced. An FAA principal  maintenance inspector approves the air carrier’s maintenance program.  According to NTSB, although most air carriers’ maintenance programs  require that a percentage of emergency evacuation slides or slide rafts be  tested for deployment, the percentage of required on-airplane deployments  is generally very small. For example, NTSB found that American Airlines’  FAA-approved maintenance program for the A300 requires an on-airplane  operational check of four slides or slide rafts per year. Delta Air Lines’ FAA- approved maintenance program for the L-1011 requires that Delta activate a  full set of emergency exits and evacuation slides or slide rafts every 24  months. Under an FAA-approved waiver for its maintenance program,  United is not required to deploy any slide on its 737 airplanes.
NTSB also found that FAA allows American Airlines to include inadvertent  and emergency evacuation deployments toward the accomplishment of its  maintenance program; therefore, it is possible that American would not  purposely deploy any slides or slide rafts on an A300 to comply with the  deployment requirement during any given year. In addition, NTSB found  that FAA also allows Delta Air Lines to include inadvertent and emergency  evacuation deployments toward the accomplishment of its maintenance  program.
NTSB holds that because inadvertent and emergency deployments do not  occur in a controlled environment, problems with, or failures in, the system  may be more difficult to identify and record, and personnel qualified to  detect such failures may not be present. For example, in an inadvertent or  emergency slide or slide raft deployment, observations on the amount of  time it takes to inflate the slide or slide raft, and the pressure level of the  slide or slide raft are not likely to be documented. For these reasons, a 1999  NTSB report said that FAA’s allowing these practices could potentially  leave out significant details about the interaction of the slide or slide raft  with the door or how well the crew follows its training mock-up  procedures. Accordingly, in 1999, NTSB recommended that FAA stop  allowing air carriers to count inadvertent and emergency deployments  toward meeting their maintenance program requirement because  conditions are not controlled and important information (on, for example,  the interface between the airplane and the evacuation slide system, timing,  durability, and stability) is not collected. The recommendation continues to  be open at the NTSB. NTSB officials said they would be meeting to discuss  this recommendation with FAA in the near future.
Additionally, NTSB recommended that FAA, for a 12-month period, require  that all operators of transport-category aircraft demonstrate the on- airplane operation of all emergency evacuation systems (including the  door-opening assist mechanisms and slide or slide raft deployment) on 10  percent of each type of airplane (at least one airplane per type) in their  fleets. NTSB said that these demonstrations should be conducted on an  airplane in a controlled environment so that qualified personnel can  properly evaluate the entire evacuation system. NTSB indicated that the  results of the demonstrations (including an explanation of the reasons for  any failures) should be documented for each component of the system and  should be reported to FAA.
section_title: Overwing Exit Doors
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Prompted by a tragedy in which 57 of the 137 people on board a British  Airtours B-737 were killed because passengers found exit doors difficult to  access and operate, the British Civil Aviation Authority initiated a research  program to explore changes to the design of the overwing exit (Type III)  door.
Trained crewmembers are expected to operate most of the emergency  equipment on an airplane, including most floor-level exit doors. But  overwing exit doors, termed “self-help exits,” are expected to be and will  primarily be opened by passengers without formal training. NTSB reported  that even when flight attendants are responsible for opening the overwing  exit doors, passengers are likely to make the first attempt to open the  overwing exit hatches because the flight attendants are not physically  located near the overwing exits.
There are now two basic types of overwing exit doors—the “self-help”  doors that are manually removed inward and then stowed and the newer  “swing out” doors that open outward on a hinge.
According to NTSB, passengers continue to have problems removing the  inward-opening exit door and stowing it properly. The manner in which the  overwing exit is opened and how and where the hatch should be stowed is  not intuitively obvious to passengers, nor is it easily or consistently  depicted graphically. NTSB recently recommended to FAA that Type III  overwing exits on newly manufactured aircraft be easy and intuitive to  open and have automatic stowage out of the egress path. NTSB has  indicated that the semiautomatic, fast-opening, Type III overwing exit  hatch could give passengers additional evacuation time.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Over-wing exit doors that “swing out” on hinges rather than requiring  manual removal are currently available. The European Joint Aviation  Authorities (JAA) has approved the installation of these outward-opening  hinged doors on new-production aircraft in Europe. In addition, Boeing has  redesigned the overwing exit door for its next-generation 737 series. This  redesigned, hinged door has pressurized springs so that it essentially pops  up and outward, out of the way, once its lever is pulled. The exit door  handle was also redesigned and tested to ensure that anyone could operate  the door using either single or double handgrips. Approximately 200 people  who were unfamiliar with the new design and had never operated an  overwing exit tested the outward-opening exit door. These tests found that  the average adult could operate the door in an emergency. The design  eliminates the problem of where to stow the exit hatch because the door  moves up and out of the egress route.
While the new swing-out doors are available, it will take some time for  them to be widely used. Because of structural difficulties and cost, the new  doors are not being considered for the existing fleet. For new-production  airplanes, their use is mixed because JAA requires them in Europe for some  newer Boeing 737s, but FAA does not require them in the United States.  However, FAA will allow their use. As a result, some airlines are including  the new doors on their new aircraft, while others are not. For example,  Southwest Airlines has the new doors on its Boeing 737s. The extent to  which other airlines and aircraft models will have the new doors installed  remains to be seen and will likely depend on the cost of installation, the  European market for the aircraft, and any additional costs to train flight  attendants in its use.
section_title: Next Generation Evacuation Equipment and Procedures
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Airbus, a leading aircraft manufacturer, has begun building a family of A380  aircraft, also called Large Transport Aircraft (see fig. 16). Early versions of  the A380, which is scheduled to begin flight tests in 2005 and enter  commercial service in 2006, will have 482 to 524 seats. The A380-800  standard layout references 555 seats. Later larger configurations could  accommodate up to 850 passengers. The A380 is designed to have 16  emergency doors and require 16 escape slides, compared with the 747,  which requires 12. Later models of the A380 could have 18 emergency exits  and escape slides.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: The advent of this type of Large Transport Aircraft is raising questions  about how passengers will exit the aircraft in an emergency. The upper  deck doorsill of the A380 will be approximately 30 feet above the ground,  depending on the position (attitude) of the aircraft. According to an Airbus  official responsible for exit slide design and operations, evacuation slides  have to reach the ground at a safe angle even if the aircraft is tipped up;  however, extra slide length is undesirable if the sill height is normal.
Previously, regulations would have required slides only to touch the ground  in the tip-up case, even if that meant introduction of relatively steep sliding  surfaces. However, because of the sill height, passengers may hesitate  before jumping and their hesitation may extend the total evacuation time.  Because some passengers may be reluctant to leap onto the slide when  they can see how far it is to the ground, the design concept of the A380  evacuation slides includes blinder walls at the exit and a curve in the slide  to mask the distance to the ground.
A next-generation evacuation system developed by Airbus and Goodrich  called the “intelligent slide” is a possible solution to the problem of the  Large Transport Aircraft’s slide length. The technology is not a part of the  slide, but is connected to the slide through what is called a door  management system composed of sensors. The “brains” of the technology  will be located inside the forward exit door of the cabin, and the  technology is designed to adjust the length of the slide according to the  fuselage’s tipping angle to the ground. The longest upper-deck slide for an  A380 could exceed 50 feet.
The A380 slides are made of a nylon-based fabric that is coated with  urethane or neoprene, and they are 10 percent lighter than most other  slides on the market. They have to be packed tightly into small bundles at  the foot of emergency exit doors and are required to be fully inflated in 6  seconds. Officials at Airbus noted that the slides are designed to withstand  the radiant heat of a postimpact fire for 180 seconds, compared with the 90  seconds required by regulators.
According to a Goodrich official, FAA will require Goodrich to conduct  between 2,000 and 2,500 tests on the A380 slides to make sure they can  accommodate a large number of passengers quickly and withstand wind,  rain, and other weather conditions. The upper-level slides, which are wide  enough for two people, have to enable the evacuation of 140 people per  minute, according to Airbus officials. An issue to be resolved is whether a  full-scale demonstration test will be required or whether a partial test using  a certain number of passengers, supplemented by a computer simulation of  an evacuation of 555 passengers, can effectively demonstrate an  evacuation from this type of aircraft. Airbus officials told us that a full-scale  demonstration could result in undesirable injuries to the participants and is  therefore not the preferred choice.
Officials at the Association of Flight Attendants have expressed concern  that there has not been a full-scale evacuation demonstration involving the  A380. They are concerned that computer modeling might not really match  the human experience of jumping onto a slide from that height. In addition,  they are concerned that other systems involved in emergency exiting, such  as the communication systems, need to be tested under controlled  conditions. As a result, they believe a full-scale demonstration under the  current 90-second standard is necessary.
section_title: Personal Flotation Devices
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: All commercial aircraft that fly over water more than 50 nautical miles from  the nearest shore are required to be equipped with flotation devices for  each occupant of the airplane. According to FAA, 44 of the 50 busiest U.S.  airports are located within 5 miles of a significant body of water. In  addition, life vests, seat cushions, life rafts, and exit slides may be used as  flotation devices for water emergencies.
FAA policies dictate that if personal flotation devices are installed beneath  the passenger seats of an aircraft, the devices must be easily retrievable.  Determinations of compliance with this requirement are based on the  judgment of FAA as the certifying authority.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: FAA is conducting research and testing on the location and types of  flotation devices used in aircraft. When it has completed this work, it is  likely to provide additional guidance to ensure that the devices are easily  retrievable and usable. FAA’s research is designed to analyze human  performance factors, such as how much time passengers need to retrieve  their vests, whether and how the cabin environment physically interferes  with their efforts, and how physically capable passengers are of reaching  their vests while seated and belted. FAA is reviewing four different life vest  installation methods and has conducted tests on 137 human subjects.  According to an early analysis of the data, certain physical installation  features significantly affect both the ability of a typical passenger to  retrieve an underseat life vest and the ease of retrieval. This work may lead  to additonal guidance on the location of personal flotation devices.
FAA’s research may also indicate a need for additional guidance on the use  of personal flotation devices. In a 1998 report on ditching aircraft and water  survival, FAA found that airlines differed in their instructions to passengers  on how to use personal flotation devices. For example, some airlines  advise that passengers hold the cushions in front of their bodies, rest their  chins on the cushions, wrap their arms around the cushions with their  hands grasping the outside loops, and float vertically in the water. Other  airlines suggest that passengers lie forward on the cushions, grasp and hold  the loops beneath them, and float horizontally. FAA also reported that  airlines’ flight attendant training programs differed in their instructions on  how to don life vests and when to inflate them.
section_title: Summaries of General Cabin Occupant Safety and Health Advancements
paragraphs: This appendix presents information on the background and status of  potential advancements in general cabin occupant safety and health that  we identified, including the following: advanced warnings of turbulence; preparations for in-flight medical emergencies; reductions in health risks to passengers with certain medical conditions,  including deep vein thrombosis; and  improved awareness of radiation exposure.
This appendix also discusses occupational safety and health standards for  the flight attendant workforce.
subsections: section_title: Advanced Warnings of Turbulence
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: According to FAA, the leading cause of in-flight injuries for cabin  occupants is turbulence. In June 1995, following two serious events  involving turbulence, FAA issued a public advisory to airlines urging the  use of seat belts at all times when passengers are seated, but concluded  that the existing rules did not require strengthening. In May 2000, FAA  instituted a public awareness campaign, called Turbulence Happens, to  stress the importance of wearing safety belts to the flying public.
Because of the potential for injury from unexpected turbulence, ongoing  research is attempting to find ways to better identify areas of turbulence so  that pilots can take corrective action to avoid it. In addition, FAA’s July 2003  draft strategic plan targets a 33 percent reduction in the number of  turbulence injuries to cabin occupants by 2008—from an annual average of  15 injuries per year for fiscal years 2000 through 2002 to no more than 10  injuries per year.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: FAA is currently evaluating new airborne weather radar and other  technologies to improve the timeliness of warnings to passengers and flight  attendants about impending turbulence. For example, the Turbulence  Product Development Team, within FAA’s Aviation Weather Research  Program, has developed a system to measure turbulence and downlink the  information in real time from commercial air carriers. The International  Civil Aviation Organization has approved this system as an international  standard. Ongoing research includes (1) detecting turbulence in flight and  reporting its intensity to augment pilots’ reports, (2) detecting turbulence  remotely from the ground or in the air using radar, (3) detecting turbulence  remotely using LIDAR or the Global Positioning System’s constellation of  satellites, and (4) forecasting the likelihood of turbulence over the  continental United States during the next 12 hours. Prototypes of the in- flight detection system have been installed on 100 737-300s operated by  United Airlines, and two other domestic air carriers have expressed an  interest in using the prototype. FAA also plans to improve (1) training on  standard operating procedures to reduce injuries from turbulence, (2) the  dissemination of pilots’ reports of turbulence, and (3) the timeliness of  weather forecasts to identify turbulent areas. Furthermore, FAA  encourages and some airlines require passengers to keep their seatbelts  fastened when seated to help avoid injuries from unexpected turbulence.
Currently, pilots rely primarily on other pilots to report when and where  (e.g., specific altitudes and routes) they have encountered turbulent  conditions en route to their destinations; however, these reports do not  accurately identify the location, time, and intensity of the turbulence.  Further research and testing will be required to develop technology to  accurately identify turbulence and to make the technology affordable to the  airlines, which would ultimately bear the cost of upgrading their aircraft  fleets.
section_title: Preparations for In- flight Medical Emergencies
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Aviation Medical Assistance Act of 1998 directed FAA to determine  whether the current minimum requirements for air carriers’ emergency  medical equipment and crewmember emergency medical training should  be modified. In accordance with the act, FAA collected data for a year on  in-flight deaths and near deaths and concluded that enhancements to  medical kits and a requirement for airlines to carry automatic external  defibrillators were warranted. Specifically, the agency found that these  improvements would allow cabin crewmembers to deal with a broader  range of in-flight emergencies.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: On April 12, 2001, FAA issued a final rule requiring air carriers to equip  their aircraft with enhanced emergency medical kits and automatic  external defibrillators by May 12, 2004. Most U.S. airlines have installed this  equipment in advance of the deadline.
In the future, new larger aircraft may require additional improvements to  meet passengers’ medical needs. For example, new large transport aircraft,  such as the Airbus A-380, will have the capacity to carry about 555 people  on long-distance flights. Some aviation safety experts are concerned that  with the large number of passengers on these aircraft, the number of in- flight medical emergencies will increase and additional precautions for in- flight medical emergencies (e.g., dedicating an area for passengers who  experience medical emergencies in flight) should be considered. Airbus  has proposed a medical room in the cabin of its A-380 as an option for its  customers.
section_title: Reducing Health Risks to Passengers with Certain Medical Conditions
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Passengers with certain medical conditions (e.g., heart and lung diseases)  can be at higher risk of health-related complications from air travel than  the general population. For example, passengers who have limited heart or  lung function or have recently had surgery or a leg injury can be at greater  risk of developing a condition known as deep vein thrombosis (DVT) or  travelers’ thrombosis, in which blood clots can develop in the deep veins of  the legs from extended periods of inactivity. Air travel has not been linked  definitively to the development of DVT, but remaining seated for extended  periods of time, whether in one’s home or on a long-distance flight, can  cause blood to pool in the legs and increase the chances of developing DVT.  In a small percentage of cases, the clots can break free and travel to the  lungs, with fatal results.
In addition, the reduced levels of oxygen available to passengers in-flight  can have detrimental health effects on passengers with heart, circulatory,  and respiratory disorders because lower levels of oxygen in the air produce  lower levels of oxygen in the body—a condition known as hypoxia.  Furthermore, changes in cabin pressure (primarily when the aircraft  ascends and descends) can negatively affect ear, nose, and throat  conditions and pose problems for those flying after certain types of surgery  (e.g., abdominal, cardiac, and eye surgery).
section_title: Status
paragraphs: Information on the potential effects of air travel on passengers with certain  medical conditions is available; however, additional research, such as on  the potential relationship between DVT and air travel, is ongoing. The  National Research Council, in a 2001 report on airliner cabin air quality,  recommended, among other things, that FAA increase efforts to provide  information on health issues related to air travel to crewmembers,  passengers, and health professionals. According to FAA’s Federal Air  Surgeon, since this recommendation was received, the agency has  redoubled its efforts to make information and recommendations on air  travel and medical issues available through its Web site  www.cami.jccbi.gov/aam-400/PassengerHandS.htm. This site also includes  links to the Web sites of other organizations with safety and health  information for air travelers, such as the Aerospace Medical Association,  the American Family Physician (Medical Advice for Commercial Air  Travelers), and the Sinus Care Center (Ears, Altitude, and Airplane Travel),  and videos on safety and health issues for pilots and air travelers. The  Aerospace Medical Association’s Web site,  http://www.asma.org/publication.html, includes guidance for physicians to  use in advising passengers about the potential risks of flying based on their  medical conditions, as well as information for passengers to use in  determining whether air travel is advisable given their medical conditions.  Furthermore, some airlines currently encourage passengers to do exercises  while seated, to get up and walk around during long flights, or to do both to  improve blood circulation; however, walking around the airplane can also  put passengers at risk of injuries from unexpected turbulence. In addition,  a prototype of a seat has been designed with imbedded sensors, which  record the movement of a passenger and send this information to the cabin  crew for monitoring. The crew would then be able to track passengers  seated for a long time and could suggest that these passengers exercise in  their seats or walk in the cabin aisles to enhance circulation.
While FAA’s Web site on passenger and pilot safety and health provides  links to related Web sites and videos (e.g., cabin occupant safety and health  issues), historically, the agency has not tracked who uses its Web site or  how frequently it is used to monitor the traveling public’s awareness and  use of this site. Agency officials told us that they plan to install a counter  capability on its Civil Aerospace Medical Institute Web site by the end of  August 2003 to track the number of visits to its aircrew and passenger  health and safety Web site. The World Health Organization has initiated a  study to help determine if a linkage exists between DVT and air travel.  Further, FAA developed a brochure on DVT that has been distributed to  aviation medical examiners and cited in the Federal Air Surgeon’s Bulletin.  The brochure is aimed at passengers rather than airlines and suggests  exercises that can be done to promote circulation.
section_title: Improved Awareness of Radiation Exposure
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Pilots, flight attendants, and passengers who fly frequently are exposed to  cosmic radiation at higher levels (on a cumulative basis) than the average  airline passenger and the general public living at or near sea level. This is  because they routinely fly at high altitudes, which places them closer to  outer space, which is the primary source of this radiation. High levels of  radiation have been linked to an increased risk of cancer and potential  harm to fetuses. The amount of radiation that flight attendants and frequent  fliers are exposed to—referred to as the dose—depends on four primary  factors: (1) the amount of time spent in flight; (2) the latitude of the flight—  exposure increases at higher latitudes; for example, at the same altitude,  radiation levels at the poles are about twice those at the equator; (3) the  altitude of the flight—exposure is greater at high altitudes because the  layer of protective atmosphere becomes thinner; and (4) solar activity—  exposure is higher when solar activity increases, as it does every 11 years  or so. Peak periods of solar activity, which can increase exposure to  radiation by 10 to 20 times, are sometimes called solar storms or solar  flares.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: FAA’s Web site currently makes available guidance on radiation exposure  levels and risks for flight and cabin crewmembers, as well as a system for  calculating radiation doses from flying specific routes and specific  altitudes. To increase crewmembers’ awareness of in-flight radiation  exposure, FAA issued two Advisory Circulars for crewmembers. The first  Advisory Circular, issued in 1990, provided information on (1) cosmic  radiation and air shipments of radioactive material as sources of radiation  exposure during air travel; (2) guidelines for exposure to radiation; (3)  estimates of the amounts of radiation received on air carriers’ flights on  various routes to and from, or within, the contiguous United States; and (4)  examples of calculations for estimating health risks from exposure to  radiation. The second Advisory Circular, issued in 1994, recommended  training for crewmembers to inform them about in-flight radiation  exposure and known associated health risks and to assist them in making  informed decisions about their work on commercial air carriers. The  circular provided a possible outline of courses, but left it to air carriers to  gather the subject matter materials. To facilitate the monitoring of radiation  exposure levels by airliner crewmembers and the public (e.g., frequent  fliers), FAA has developed a computer model, which is publicly available  via the agency’s Web site. This Web site also provides guidance and  recommendations on limiting radiation exposure. However, it is unclear to  what extent flight attendants, flight crews, and frequent fliers are aware of  and use FAA’s Web site to track the radiation exposure levels they accrue  from flying. Agency officials told us that they plan to install a counter  capability its Civil Aerospace Medical Institute Web site by the end of  August 2003, to track the number of visits to its aircrew and passenger  health and safety Web site. FAA also plans to issue an Advisory Circular by  early next year, which incorporates the findings of a just completed FAA  report, “What Aircrews Should Know About Their Occupational Exposure  to Ionizing Radiation.” This Advisory Circular will include recommended  actions for aircrew and information on solar flare event notification of  aircrew. While FAA provides guidance and recommendations on limiting  the levels of cosmic radiation that flight attendants and pilots are exposed  to, it has not developed any regulations.
In contrast, the European Union issued a directive for workers in May 1996,  including air carrier crewmembers (cabin and flight crews) and the general  public, on basic safety and health protections against dangers arising from  ionizing radiation. This directive set dose limits and required air carriers to  (1) assess and monitor the exposure of all crewmembers to avoid  exceeding exposure limits, (2) work with those individuals at risk of high  exposure levels to adjust their work or flight schedules to reduce those  levels, and (3) inform crewmembers of the health risks that their work  involves from exposure to radiation. It also required airlines to work with  female crewmembers, when they announce a pregnancy, to avoid exposing  the fetus to harmful levels of radiation. This directive was binding for all  European Union member states and became effective in May 2000.  According to European safety officials, pregnant crewmembers are often  given the option of an alternative job with the airline on the ground to avoid  radiation exposure to their fetuses. Furthermore, when flight attendants  and pilots reach recommended exposure limits, European air carriers work  with crewmembers to limits or change their subsequent flights and  destinations to minimize exposure levels for the balance of the year. Some  air carriers ground crewmembers when they reach annual exposure limits  or change their subsequent flights and destinations to minimize exposure  levels for the balance of the year.
section_title: Occupational Safety and Health Standards for Flight Attendants
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 1975, FAA assumed responsibility from the Occupational Health and  Safety Administration (OSHA) for establishing safety and health standards  for flight attendants. However, FAA has only recently begun to take action  to provide this workforce with OSHA-like protections. For example, in  August 2000, FAA and OSHA entered into a memorandum of understanding  and issued a joint report in December 2000, which identified safety and  health concerns for the flight attendant workforce and the extent to which  OSHA-type standards could be used without compromising aviation safety.  On September 29, 2001, the DOT Office of the Inspector General (DOT IG)  reported that FAA had made little progress toward providing flight  attendants with workplace protections and urged FAA to address the  recommendations in the December 2000 report and move forward with  setting safety and health standards for the flight attendant workforce. In  April 2002, the DOT IG reported that FAA and OSHA had made no progress  since it issued its report in September 2001. According to FAA officials, the  joint FAA and OSHA effort was put on hold because of other priorities that  arose in response to the events of September 11, 2001.
section_title: Status
paragraphs: FAA has not yet established occupational safety and health standards to  protect the flight attendant workforce. FAA is conducting research and  collecting data on flight attendants’ injuries and illnesses.
On March 4, 2003, FAA announced the creation of a voluntary program for  air carriers, called the Aviation Safety and Health Partnership Program.  Through this program, the agency intends to enter into partnership  agreements with participating air carriers, which will, at a minimum, make  data on their employees’ injuries and illnesses available to FAA for  collection and analysis. FAA will then establish an Aviation Safety and  Health Program Aviation Rule-Making Committee to provide advice and  recommendations to develop the scope and core elements of the partnership program review and analyze the data on employees’ injuries and illnesses;  identify the scope and extent of systematic trends in employees’ injuries  and illnesses; recommend remedies to FAA that use all current FAA protocols,  including rule-making activities if warranted, to abate hazards to  employees; and create any other advisory and oversight functions that FAA deems  necessary.
FAA plans to select members to provide a balance of viewpoints, interests,  and expertise. The program preserves FAA’s complete and exclusive  responsibility for determining whether proposed abatements of safety and  health hazards would compromise or negatively affect aviation safety.
FAA is also funding research through the National Institute for  Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to, among other things, determine  the effects of flying on the reproductive health of flight attendants, much of  which has been completed. FAA plans to monitor cabin air quality on a  selected number of flights, which will help it set standards for the flight  attendant workforce.
The Association of Flight Attendants has collected a large body of data on  flight attendants’ injuries and illnesses, which it considers sufficient for use  in establishing safety and health standards for its workforce. Officials from  the association do not believe that FAA needs to collect additional data  before starting the standard-setting process.
The European Union has occupational safety and health standards in place  to protect flight attendants, including standards for monitoring their levels  of radiation exposure. An official from an international association of flight  attendants told us that while flight attendants in Europe have concerns  similar to those of flight attendants in the United States (e.g., concerns  about air quality in airliner cabins), the European Union places a heavier  emphasis on worker safety and health, including safety and health  protections for flight attendants.
section_title: Application of a Cost Analysis Methodology to Inflatable Lap Belts
paragraphs: The following illustrates how a cost analysis might be conducted on each of  the potential advancements discussed in this report. Costs estimated  through this analysis could then be weighed against the potential lives  saved and injuries avoided from implementing the advancements. This  methodology would allow advancements to be compared using comparable  cost data that when combined with similar analyses of effectiveness to help  decisionmakers determine which advancements would be most effective in  saving lives and avoiding injuries, taking into account their costs. The  methodology provides for developing a cost estimate despite significant  uncertainties by making use of historical data (e.g, historical variations in  fuel prices) and best engineering judgments (e.g., how much weight an  advancement will add and how much it will cost to install, operate, and  maintain). The methodology formally takes into account the major sources  of uncertainty and from that information develops a range of cost  estimates, including a most likely cost estimate. Through a common  approach for analyzing costs, the methodology facilitates the development  of comparable estimates. This methodology can be applied to  advancements in various stages of development.
subsections: section_title: Inflatable Lap Belts
paragraphs: Inflatable lap belts are designed to protect passengers from a fatal impact  with the interior of the airplane, the most common cause of death in  survivable accidents. Inflatable seat belts adapt advanced automobile  technology to airplane seats in the form of seat belts with air bags  embedded in them. Several hundred of these seatbelt airbags have been  installed in commercial airliners in bulkhead rows.
section_title: Summary of Results
paragraphs: We calculated that requiring these belts on an average-sized airplane in the  U.S. passenger fleet would be likely to cost from $98,000 to $198,000 and to  average about $140,000 over the life of the airplane. On an annual basis, the  cost would be likely to range from $8,000 to $17,000 and to average $12,000.
We considered several factors to explain this range of possible costs. The  installation price of these belts is subject to uncertainty because of their  limited production to date. In addition, these belts add weight to an  aircraft, resulting in additional fuel costs. Fuel costs depend on the price of  jet fuel and on how many hours the average airplane operates, both subject  to uncertainty. Table 5 lists the results of our cost analysis for an average- sized airplane in the U.S. fleet.
According to our analysis, the life-cycle and annualized cost estimates in  table 5 are influenced most by variations in jet fuel prices, followed by the  average number of hours flown per year and the installation price of the  belts. The cost per ticket is influenced most by variations in jet fuel prices,  followed by the average number of hours flown per year, the number of  aircraft in the U.S. fleet, and the number of passenger tickets issued.
section_title: Methodology
paragraphs: To analyze the cost of inflatable lap belts, we collected data on key cost  variables from a variety of sources. Information on the belts’ installation  price, annual maintenance and refurbishment costs, and added weight was  obtained from belt manufacturers. Historical information on jet fuel prices,  extra gallons of jet fuel consumed by a heavier airplane, average hours  flown per year, average number of seats per airplane, number of airplanes  in the U.S. fleet, and number of passenger tickets issued per year was  obtained from FAA and DOT’s Office of Aviation Statistics.
To account for variation in the values of these cost variables, we performed  a Monte Carlo simulation. In this simulation, values were randomly drawn  10,000 times from probability distributions characterizing possible values  for the number of seat belts per airplane, seat belt installation price, jet fuel  price, number of passenger tickets, number of airplanes, and hours flown.This simulation resulted in forecasts of the life-cycle cost per airplane, the  annualized cost per airplane, and the cost per ticket.
Major assumptions in the cost analysis are described by probability  distributions selected for these cost variables. For jet fuel prices, average  number of hours flown per year, and average number of seats per airplane,  historical data were matched against possible probability distributions.Mathematical tests were performed to find the best fit between each  probability distribution and the data set’s distribution. For the installation  price, number of passenger tickets, and number of airplanes, less  information was available. For these variables, we selected probability  distributions that are widely used by researchers. Table 6 lists the type of  probability distribution and the relevant parameters of each distribution for  the cost variables.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Chuck Bausell, Helen Chung, Elizabeth  Eisenstadt, David Ehrlich, Bert Japikse, Sarah Lynch, Sara Ann Moessbauer, and Anthony Patterson made key contributions to this report.
section_title: GAO’s Mission
paragraphs: The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of  Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities  and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government  for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal  programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other  assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding  decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of  accountability, integrity, and reliability.
section_title: Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
paragraphs: The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is  through the Internet. GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts and full- text files of current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older  products. The Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents  using key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their entirety,  including charts and other graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and  correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its Web site  daily. The list contains links to the full-text document files. To have GAO e-mail this  list to you every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to  e-mail alerts” under the “Order GAO Products” heading.
subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
section_title: Public Affairs