Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve
Published: 2007-12-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round is the biggest, most complex, and costliest ever. DOD viewed this round as a unique opportunity to reshape its installations, realign forces to meet its needs for the next 20 years, and achieve savings. To realize savings, DOD must first invest billions of dollars in facility construction, renovation, and other up-front expenses to implement the BRAC recommendations. However, recent increases in estimated cost have become a concern to some members of Congress. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, GAO (1) compared the BRAC Commission's cost and savings estimates to DOD's current estimates, (2) assessed potential for change in DOD's current estimates, and (3) identified broad implementation challenges. GAO compared the BRAC Commission's estimates, which were the closest estimates available associated with final BRAC recommendations, to DOD's current estimates. GAO also visited 25 installations and major commands, and interviewed DOD officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since the BRAC Commission issued its cost and savings estimates in 2005, DOD plans to spend more and save less, and it will take longer than expected to recoup up-front costs. Compared to the BRAC Commission's estimates, DOD's cost estimates to implement BRAC recommendations increased from $21 billion to $31 billion (48 percent), and net annual recurring savings estimates decreased from $4.2 billion to $4 billion (5 percent). DOD's one-time cost estimates to implement over 30 of the 182 recommendations have increased more than $50 million each over the BRAC Commission's estimates, and DOD's cost estimates to complete 6 of these recommendations have increased by more than $500 million each. Moreover, GAO's analysis of DOD's current estimates shows that it will take until 2017 for DOD to recoup up-front costs to implement BRAC 2005--4 years longer than the BRAC Commission's estimates show. Similarly, the BRAC Commission estimated that BRAC 2005 implementation would save DOD about $36 billion over a 20-year period ending in 2025, whereas our analysis shows that BRAC implementation is now expected to save about 58 percent less, or about $15 billion. DOD's estimates to implement BRAC recommendations are likely to change further due to uncertainties surrounding implementation details and potential increases in military construction and environmental cleanup costs. Moreover, DOD may have overestimated annual recurring savings by about 46 percent or $1.85 billion. DOD's estimated annual recurring savings of about $4 billion includes $2.17 billion in eliminated overhead expenses, which will free up funds that DOD can then use for other priorities, but it also includes $1.85 billion in military personnel entitlements, such as salaries, for personnel DOD plans to transfer to other locations. While DOD disagrees, GAO does not believe transferring personnel produces tangible dollar savings since these personnel will continue to receive salaries and benefits. Because DOD's BRAC budget does not explain the difference between savings attributable to military personnel entitlements and savings that will make funds available for other uses, DOD is generating a false sense that all of its reported savings could be used to fund other defense priorities. DOD has made progress in planning for BRAC 2005 implementation, but several complex challenges to the implementation of those plans increase the risk that DOD might not meet the statutory September 2011 deadline. DOD faces a number of challenges to synchronize the realignment of over 123,000 personnel with the completion of over $21 billion in new construction or renovation projects by 2011. For example, the time frames for completing many BRAC recommendations are so closely sequenced and scheduled to be completed in 2011 that any significant changes in personnel movement schedules or construction delays could jeopardize DOD's ability to meet the statutory 2011 deadline. Additionally, BRAC 2005, unlike prior BRAC rounds, included more joint recommendations involving more than one military component, thus creating challenges in achieving unity of effort among the services and defense agencies.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In a 2001 testimony before Congress, the Secretary of Defense stated that another BRAC  round would generate recurring savings the department could use for other higher-priority  defense programs.
About 15,000 of these soldiers are included in the 123,000 personnel mentioned above.  Army plans to relocate the remaining soldiers in realignment actions not related to BRAC.
States, transforming the Army’s force structure from an organization based  on divisions to more rapidly deployable, brigade-based units, and seeks to  increase its active end strength by 92,000, all of which will affect DOD’s  facility infrastructure. Consequently, when evaluating DOD’s candidate  BRAC recommendations, the BRAC Commission focused not only on  costs and savings but also on DOD’s future force structure, the ongoing  conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and military transformation. In addition,  both DOD and the BRAC Commission reported that their primary  consideration in making recommendations for the 2005 round was military  value. To realize savings from BRAC, DOD must first invest billions of  dollars in facility construction, renovation, and other up-front expenses to  implement the BRAC recommendations. However, some members of  Congress have expressed concerns about DOD’s increased up-front cost  estimates to implement the BRAC 2005 recommendations.
This report is one in a series of reports we have undertaken on BRAC 2005  implementation. These reports have identified complex challenges to  implementing recommendations from this BRAC round, including  retraining personnel to new missions, completing many construction  projects in a compressed time frame, and synchronizing personnel  movements with planned infrastructure improvements. We also reported  that Congress does not have full visibility over the total expected cost of  DOD’s BRAC-related environmental cleanup efforts, several Air National  Guard recommendations are expected to result in annual costs instead of  annual savings, and DOD’s cost estimates for implementing  recommendations related to the Army’s reserve components have  increased while savings estimates have decreased. A listing of our   related products is at the end of this report.
As with most of our BRAC-related work, we initiated this review under the  authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on his own  initiative and are reporting the results of our evaluation to you because of  your oversight role of DOD’s infrastructure and the BRAC program. We are  also reporting the results of our work as a result of direction by the House  Armed Services Committee to report annually on DOD’s implementation  of BRAC 2005. Our objectives are to (1) compare cost and savings  estimates in the BRAC Commission’s report to DOD’s current cost and  savings estimates, (2) assess the potential for further change in DOD’s  estimated costs and savings related to implementing BRAC 2005  recommendations, and (3) identify broad challenges that could affect the  implementation of these recommendations and DOD’s ability to meet the  statutory 6-year completion period.
To address these objectives, we interviewed officials in the Office of the  Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment and  associated BRAC implementation offices in the Army, Navy, and Air Force.  To analyze BRAC cost and savings estimates, we compared the change in  these estimates using mostly information in two publicly available  documents—the BRAC Commission’s report to the President dated  September 2005 and DOD’s latest BRAC budget submission to Congress  dated February 2007—because they provided the most authoritative  financial information publicly available. Also, we compared the BRAC  Commission’s estimates, which were the closest estimates available  associated with final BRAC recommendations, to DOD’s current budgeted  estimates. To analyze net annual recurring savings estimates, we used  OSD’s savings data for fiscal year 2012—the fiscal year after DOD expects  to complete all BRAC recommendations—because it more fully captured  the expected savings and allowed us to replicate the same methodology  used by the BRAC Commission in its calculation of this estimate. We  generally reported costs and savings in current dollars and not constant  dollars except where noted. Given the unprecedented number of BRAC  2005 closures and realignments, we focused our analysis on broad issues  affecting DOD’s cost and savings estimates and implementation challenges  rather than on specific implementation issues of individual  recommendations. In addition, we visited 17 installations and 8 major  commands affected by some of the more costly BRAC realignments or  closures to obtain the perspective of officials directly involved in BRAC  implementation planning and execution. Overall, we determined that the  data to support our objectives were sufficiently reliable for the purposes  of making broad comparisons between the BRAC Commission and DOD’s  cost and savings estimates and identifying implementation challenges.
We conducted our work from November 2005, when the BRAC  recommendations became effective, through October 2007, so we could  analyze data in DOD’s BRAC budget submission provided to Congress in  February 2007. Our work was conducted in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. Further details on our scope and  methodology are described in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD has undergone four BRAC rounds since 1988 and is currently  implementing its fifth round. For the most recent BRAC round—referred  to in this report as the BRAC 2005 round—DOD applied legally mandated  selection criteria that included four criteria related to military value as  well as other criteria regarding costs and savings, economic impact to  local communities, community support infrastructure, and environmental  impact, as shown in figure 1.
In applying these BRAC 2005 selection criteria, priority consideration was  given to military value. In fact, as required by BRAC legislation, military  value was the primary consideration for making BRAC recommendations,  as reported by both DOD and the BRAC Commission. DOD also  incorporated into its analytical process several key considerations  required by BRAC legislation, including the use of certified data and  basing its analysis on its 20-year force structure plan. In commenting on  DOD’s BRAC process in July 2005, we reported that DOD established and  generally followed a logical and reasoned process for formulating its list of  BRAC recommendations. Using this analytical process, the Office of the  Secretary of Defense (OSD) provided over 200 BRAC recommendations to  the BRAC Commission for an independent assessment in May 2005.   The BRAC Commission had the authority to change the Secretary’s  recommendations if it determined that the Secretary deviated substantially  from the legally mandated selection criteria and DOD’s force structure  plan. After assessing OSD’s recommendations, the BRAC Commission  stated that it rejected 13 recommendations in their entirety and  significantly modified another 13. Ultimately, the BRAC Commission  forwarded a list of 182 recommendations for base closure or realignment  to the President for approval. The BRAC Commission’s recommendations  were accepted in their entirety by the President and Congress and became  effective November 9, 2005. The BRAC legislation requires DOD to  complete recommendations for closing or realigning bases made in the  BRAC 2005 round within a 6-year time frame ending September 15, 2011,  6 years from the date the President submitted to Congress his approval of  the recommendations.
To provide a framework for promoting consistency in estimating the costs  and savings associated with various proposed BRAC recommendations,  DOD used an estimation model, known as the Cost of Base Realignment  Actions (COBRA). The COBRA model has been used in the base closure  process since 1988. It provided important financial information to the  selection process as decision makers weighed the financial implications  for various BRAC actions along with military value and other selection  criteria when arriving at final decisions regarding the suitability of BRAC  recommendations. In addition, the department designed the model to  calculate estimated costs and savings associated with actions that are  necessary to implement BRAC recommendations over the 6-year  implementation period and to calculate recurring costs or savings  thereafter. As such, the BRAC Commission continued to use DOD’s  COBRA model for making its cost and savings estimates.
The COBRA model relies to a large extent on standard factors and  averages but is not intended to—and consequently does not—represent  budget-quality estimates. As a result, neither DOD’s or the BRAC  Commission’s COBRA-generated estimates can be assumed to represent  the actual completion costs that Congress will need to fund through  appropriations or fully reflect the savings to be achieved after  implementation. We have examined COBRA in the past and have found it  to be a generally reasonable estimator for comparing potential costs and  savings among candidate alternatives but have not considered it a tool for  use in budgeting. In the intervening years, COBRA has been revised to  address certain problems we and others have identified after each round.  As with any model, the quality of the output is dependent on the quality of  the input. For example, a DOD analyst could assume a building could be  renovated to accommodate receiving personnel; however, when BRAC  implementation began, site surveys showed that the building could not be  renovated, thus requiring new construction that increased estimated costs.
The model provides a standard quantitative approach to comparing  estimated costs and savings across various proposed recommendations.   In this and previous BRAC rounds, DOD subsequently developed budget- quality estimates once BRAC recommendations became effective. Thus,  the BRAC Commission’s estimated implementation costs and savings were  useful for comparing candidate recommendations and DOD has  subsequently refined these estimates based on better information after  conducting site surveys.
BRAC legislation requires DOD to submit an annual schedule containing  revised BRAC cost and savings estimates for each closure and realignment  recommendation to Congress. To meet this legislative requirement, DOD  presents its schedule in its annual BRAC budget submission to Congress.  For BRAC 2005 recommendations, DOD’s first presentation of its cost and  savings schedule was in its fiscal year 2007 budget submission to Congress  in March 2006. However, the department stated in its submission that it did  not have enough time to formulate a reasonable BRAC budget and that the  fiscal year 2007 BRAC budget submission contained significant funding  shortfalls. DOD’s second presentation of its cost and savings schedule was  its fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission to Congress in February 2007.
For the BRAC 2005 round, the OSD BRAC Office—under the oversight of  the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics—has monitored the services’ and defense agencies’  implementation progress, analyzed budget justifications for significant  differences in cost and savings estimates, and facilitated the resolution of  any challenges that may impair the successful implementation of the  recommendations within the 6-year completion period. To facilitate its  oversight role, OSD required the military departments and certain defense  agencies to submit a detailed business plan for each of their  recommendations. These business plans include information such as a  listing of all actions needed to implement each recommendation,  schedules for personnel movements between installations, updated cost  and savings estimates based on better and updated information, and  implementation completion time frames. OSD’s general process for  reviewing business plans is shown in figure 2.
OSD BRAC officials consider their business plans to be living documents  that will evolve over the course of the 6-year implementation period.  Additionally, OSD’s General Counsel assesses whether the business plans  meet the intent of the BRAC Commission’s recommendations.
section_title: DOD Plans to Spend More and Save Less Than Originally Estimated and Will Take Longer Than Expected to Recoup Up-Front Costs
paragraphs: Compared to the BRAC Commission’s estimates, DOD plans to spend  more and save less to implement BRAC recommendations than the BRAC  Commission originally estimated, and it will take longer than expected for  DOD to recoup its up-front costs. Since the BRAC Commission issued its  cost and savings estimates in 2005, DOD’s reported estimates of the costs  to implement about 180 BRAC recommendations have increased by  $10 billion to about $31.2 billion while annual savings estimates have  decreased by about $200 million—$4.2 billion to $4 billion. Moreover, our  analysis of DOD’s current estimates shows that it will take until 2017 for  the department to recoup its up-front costs to implement BRAC  recommendations—4 years longer than the BRAC Commission’s estimates  indicate this would happen. Similarly, whereas the BRAC Commission  estimated that the implementation of the BRAC 2005 recommendations  would save DOD about $36 billion over a 20-year period ending in 2025,  BRAC implementation is now expected to save about $15 billion, a  decrease of 58 percent.
subsections: section_title: DOD Plans to Spend More and Save Less Than Originally Estimated
paragraphs: Since the BRAC Commission issued its cost and savings projections in  2005, cost estimates to implement the BRAC 2005 recommendations have  increased from $21 billion to $31 billion (48 percent) compared to the  BRAC Commission’s reported estimates and net annual recurring savings  estimates have decreased from $4.2 billion to $4 billion (5 percent)  compared to the BRAC Commission’s reported estimates as shown in   table 1.
A comparison of the BRAC Commission’s reported projections with DOD’s  data shows that estimated implementation costs have increased by   $10.1 billion or 48 percent and estimated net annual recurring savings have  decreased by $212 million or 5 percent. However, another way to compare  expected BRAC costs and saving is by omitting the effects of inflation.   We found that using the same constant dollar basis as used by the BRAC  Commission—meaning inflation is not considered—DOD’s estimated one- time costs to implement BRAC increased to about $28.6 billion or   36 percent in constant dollars and estimated net annual recurring savings  decreased to about $3.4 billion or 20 percent in constant dollars compared  to the BRAC Commission’s reported estimates.
We found that estimated military construction costs accounted for about  64 percent of the increase in expected BRAC one-time costs. Specifically,  the BRAC Commission estimated that to implement the BRAC  recommendations, military construction costs would be about $13 billion,  whereas DOD’s current estimates for military construction, without  inflation, were about $20 billion. We estimated that inflation accounted for  about 25 percent, or about $2.6 billion of the increase in expected one-time  costs. This mostly occurred because the BRAC Commission presented its  estimates using constant fiscal year 2005 dollars, which does not include  the effects of projected inflation, whereas DOD’s budgeted estimates were  presented in current (inflated) dollars because budget requests take into  consideration projected inflation. Further, the BRAC Commission  estimates did not include projected environmental cleanup costs for  BRAC-affected bases, which is a consistent practice with past BRAC  rounds because DOD is required to perform needed environmental  cleanup on its property whether a base is closed, realigned, or remains  open. Environmental cleanup added about 6 percent, or about $590 million  in expected costs. Finally, other projected expenses such as operation and  maintenance accounted for about 5 percent or about $500 million of the  increase in expected costs. Because the BRAC Commission’s data do not  include some specific budget categories that are used in the DOD BRAC  budget, we could not make direct comparisons and precisely identify all  estimated cost and savings changes.
subsections: section_title: Estimated One-time Costs Have Increased
paragraphs: Our analysis shows that estimated one-time costs to implement 33 BRAC  recommendations, representing nearly 1/5 of all the BRAC  recommendations for this round, increased by more than $50 million each  compared to the BRAC Commission’s estimates. (See app. II for a listing of  these recommendations.) DOD’s expected costs to implement 6 of these  recommendations increased by a total of about $4 billion. Specifically, we  found about:    $970 million increase in the estimated costs of consolidating various  leased locations and closing other locations of the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, largely because the agency  identified the need for additional supporting facilities, such as a  technology center and additional warehouse space, as well as increased  costs for information technology and furnishings to outfit the new  buildings. According to OSD’s business plan, the COBRA analysis of  specific costs and the number of personnel to realign were classified;    $700 million increase in the estimated costs of realigning Walter Reed  Army Medical Center, D.C., and relocating medical care functions to the  National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, and Fort Belvoir,  Virginia, largely because planning officials identified the need for  additional space and supporting facilities at the receiving installations   that increased estimated military construction costs by almost   $440 million. Most of these estimated cost increases are expected to occur  at the National Naval Medical Center, Maryland, because of increased  requirements to renovate existing facilities, such as the medical center.  Additionally, several other facilities, such as a parking structure and a  larger than-initially-expected addition to the medical center, increased the  construction cost estimates as well;    $680 million increase in the estimated costs of relocating the Army’s armor  center and school from Fort Knox, Kentucky, to Fort Benning, Georgia, to  support the creation of a new maneuver school, largely because the Army  identified the need for about $400 million in construction of several facility  projects, such as training ranges, instructional facilities, barracks, medical  facilities, and a child development center that were not in the initial  estimates. Also, the Army identified the need for about $280 million more  in infrastructure support, such as water, sewer, and gas lines, as well as  roads to support the new maneuver school at Fort Benning;    $680 million increase in the estimated costs of closing Fort Monmouth,  New Jersey, largely because of increases in expected military construction  costs, such as $375 million at Aberdeen Proving Ground, which is to  receive many of the missions from the planned closure of Fort Monmouth  and for additional facilities, such as a communications equipment building  and an instructional auditorium. Also, the Army identified the need for  additional infrastructure improvements at Aberdeen such as utilities,  roads, and information technology upgrades. The Army determined that its  military construction estimates would increase because the existing  facilities at Aberdeen could not accommodate an increase in size of   Fort Monmouth’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers,  Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance mission as originally  estimated. Moreover, military construction costs to relocate the U.S. Army  Military Academy Preparatory School from Fort Monmouth to West Point,  New York, increased about $175 million largely because the scope of the  facility construction increased from approximately 80,000 square feet to  more than 250,000 square feet and planning officials identified the need to  spend about $40 million to prepare the site for construction, particularly  for rock removal, given the terrain at West Point. Also, DOD’s cost  estimates for environmental cleanup at Fort Monmouth have increased by  more than $60 million;    $600 million increase in the estimated costs of co-locating miscellaneous  OSD, defense agency, and field activity-leased locations to Fort Belvoir  and Fort Lee, Virginia, largely due to increases in military construction  cost due to the identification of various required facilities at the receiving  installations not included in the original estimate. For example,  construction costs increased because it was determined a structured  parking garage costing about $160 million would be needed to  accommodate the increase in personnel with parking needs compared to  the original nearly $3 million estimate for a flat surface parking lot. An  additional estimated cost increase of nearly $50 million is needed to cover  the costs for a heating and cooling plant and various safety and  antiterrorism protection features. Estimated costs also increased by more  than $160 million to implement this recommendation for increased  information technology needs; and    $550 million increase in the estimated costs of establishing the   San Antonio Regional Medical Center and realigning enlisted medical  training to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, largely because planning officials  identified additional requirements to move medical inpatient care  functions from Wilford Hall Medical Center at Lackland Air Force Base,  Texas to Fort Sam Houston, including operating rooms and laboratory  facilities not included in the original estimate. Additionally, requirements  for more instructional and laboratory space increased to accommodate an  increase in the number of students expected to receive medical training at  Fort Sam Houston. Based on the services conducting additional analysis  and using other planning assumptions, the number of students now  expected to arrive at Fort Sam Houston for medical enlisted training  increased by more than 2,700 (44 percent)—from about 6,270 students to  approximately 9,000 students.
BRAC implementing officials told us that information gained from site  visits, such as better information on the actual condition and availability of  certain facilities, was a key factor as to why the department’s estimates  changed from the BRAC Commission’s estimates. For example, DOD’s  estimated cost increased over earlier projections as a result of better data  becoming available on the realignment of the Army Forces Command  headquarters due to the closure of Fort McPherson, Georgia. These data  showed the Command realigned to Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base,  North Carolina would be located in over 20 different buildings. The Army  decided, therefore, to preserve existing operational efficiencies by keeping  the entire Command intact in one location, as it is now at Fort McPherson,  by building a new facility at Fort Bragg although this plan led to the  increase in expected costs to implement the recommendation.
Moreover, data for some recommendations changed as certain  requirements became better defined over time. For example, personnel  requirements related to the recommendation to activate a brigade combat  team and its associated headquarters unit at Fort Hood, Texas, and then  relocate it to Fort Carson, Colorado, became better defined after the  BRAC Commission made its estimates. During the BRAC decision-making  process in 2005, the Army planned its facility requirement on about   3,200 soldiers per brigade combat team but subsequently increased the  personnel requirement to 3,900 soldiers per brigade combat team as it  budgeted for needed facilities in formulating the fiscal year 2008 BRAC  budget submission. Likewise, the personnel requirement in providing  facilities for an associated headquarters unit increased from 300 soldiers in  the initial analysis to 900, thus increasing the expected costs. Thus, the  number of personnel to be accommodated at Fort Carson in order to  implement this BRAC recommendation increased by 37 percent from what  was initially expected, which in turn increased the size of the facilities  necessary to house the additional soldiers expected to arrive at Fort  Carson, leading to an increase in expected cost to implement this  recommendation.
As in all previous BRAC rounds, the BRAC Commission used DOD’s  COBRA model to generate its estimates. Both we and the BRAC  Commission acknowledged in our respective BRAC 2005 reports that the  COBRA model, while valuable as a comparative tool, does not provide  estimates that DOD is expected to use in formulating the BRAC budget  and against which Congress will appropriate funds. We have stated that  COBRA does not necessarily reflect with a high degree of precision the  actual costs or savings that are ultimately associated with BRAC  implementation. We have also stated that the services are expected to  refine COBRA estimates following the BRAC decision-making process to  better reflect expected costs and savings using site-specific information.  While COBRA estimates do not reflect the actual costs and savings  ultimately attributable to BRAC, we have recognized in the past and  continue to believe that COBRA is a reasonably effective tool for the  purpose for which it was designed—to aid in BRAC decision making—and  that the BRAC Commission’s COBRA-generated estimates are the only  reasonable baseline to use to identify BRAC cost and savings changes  since the recommendations became effective.
section_title: Savings Estimates Have Decreased
paragraphs: Our analysis shows that estimated net annual recurring savings to  implement 13 BRAC recommendations decreased by more than   $25 million each compared to the BRAC Commission’s estimates.   (See app. III for a listing of these recommendations.) The BRAC  Commission estimated that BRAC 2005 would result in net annual  recurring savings of $4.2 billion beginning in fiscal year 2012; however, we  calculated that the net annual recurring savings have decreased to   $4 billion (5 percent). DOD attributed the decrease in its savings estimate  primarily to changes in initial assumptions or plans. We identified several  BRAC recommendations for which savings estimates decreased compared  to the BRAC Commission’s estimates. Specifically, we found about:    $90 million decrease in the estimated savings of closing various leased  locations of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and realigning  other locations to Fort Belvoir, Virginia.  Initially, officials at the National  Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the OSD BRAC Office explained that  fewer personnel eliminations caused some of the decrease in savings.  Additionally, the day before we released this draft for comment, an OSD  BRAC Office official explained to us that they underreported the estimated  savings from expected lease terminations in the fiscal year 2008 BRAC  budget submission. However, time did not permit us to analyze this  information.    $80 million decrease in the estimated savings of closing three chemical  demilitarization depots (Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah; Newport Chemical  Depot, Indiana; and Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon), largely because  the Army expects not to close these facilities within the BRAC statutory  implementation time frame because DOD must complete the chemical  demilitarization mission to comply with treaty obligations before these  facilities can close, which resulted in less expected savings;    $70 million decrease in the estimated savings of establishing joint bases at  multiple locations, largely because the Army did not include its share of  the expected savings due to unresolved issues concerning joint base  operations, whereas the other services included the COBRA-generated  savings in DOD’s BRAC budget submission to Congress. OSD had not  approved the business plan for this recommendation; thus additional  information on expected savings was not available for us to review; and    $50 million savings decrease in realigning the Defense Logistics Agency’s  supply, storage, and distribution network, largely because of the need to  retain higher inventory levels than anticipated and less personnel  elimination.
section_title: DOD Will Take Longer to Recoup Up-Front Costs Than the BRAC Commission Expected
paragraphs: DOD’s current estimates to implement the BRAC recommendations   show that it will take until 2017 for the department to recoup its up-front  costs—4 years longer than the BRAC Commission’s estimates indicated it  would take for DOD’s up-front investments to begin to pay back.  Historically, it has taken DOD about 6½ years to recoup up-front costs for  actions such as constructing new facilities, providing civilian severance  pay, or moving personnel and equipment as a result of implementing  BRAC recommendations. Our analysis of the BRAC Commission’s  estimates shows that the time required to recoup such costs would be 8  years, or in 2013. However, using DOD’s current estimates, our analysis  shows that the time required to recoup costs would be 12 years, or in 2017,  as shown in figure 3.
Similarly, because DOD expects to spend more and save less compared   to the BRAC Commission’s estimates, projected 20-year savings have  decreased by more than half. The BRAC Commission estimated that the  implementation of this BRAC round would save about $36 billion over a  20-year period ending in 2025. However, based on our analysis of DOD’s  current estimates, implementation of this BRAC round will save about   $15 billion, a decrease of $21 billion (58 percent), in fiscal year 2005  constant dollars. OSD BRAC officials told us that, although the 20-year  savings estimate is less than the BRAC Commission expected, the  department expects the implementation of this BRAC round to produce  capabilities that will enhance defense operations and management, despite  less than anticipated savings.
Moreover, DOD expects a majority of the expected costs and savings to   be related to the implementation of a small percentage of the BRAC  recommendations. For example, we determined that DOD expects the  implementation of about 13 percent of the recommendations to incur   65 percent of the expected one-time costs (see app. IV); 15 percent of the  recommendations to generate 85 percent of the expected annual recurring  savings (see app. V); and 16 percent of the recommendations to generate  85 percent of the expected 20-year savings (see app. VI).
section_title: DOD’s Estimates to Implement BRAC Recommendations Will Likely Continue to Evolve, and Savings Estimates May be Overstated
paragraphs: Based on our analysis, we believe DOD’s cost and savings estimates to  implement the BRAC 2005 recommendations are likely to continue to  evolve in future BRAC budget submissions. First, DOD’s estimates for  some key recommendations are uncertain because they are based on  implementation details that are still evolving, especially for some complex  recommendations such as establishing 12 new joint bases. Second,  military construction costs could increase due to various economic factors  and a possible readjustment of Army construction costs. Third,  environmental cleanup costs for BRAC implementation are preliminary  and are likely to increase. Furthermore, we believe that DOD’s annual  recurring savings estimates may be overstated, largely because 46 percent  of this savings is due to questionable military personnel savings.
subsections: section_title: Details for Several Key Recommendations Are Uncertain and Estimates Are Likely to Change
paragraphs: Many details involved in the implementation of several key BRAC  recommendations were uncertain when the department submitted its  fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission to Congress in February 2007;  thus, these estimates are likely to continue to change in succeeding BRAC  budget submissions. OSD officials told us that some estimates could  change as implementation planning progresses and that initial planning for  many recommendations was very difficult but they wanted to provide  Congress with the best budget data available at the time of the budget  submission. However, until DOD resolves implementation details  surrounding its BRAC recommendations, it will continue to have difficulty  in more precisely estimating costs and savings and the resolution of these  details could cause the department’s cost and savings estimates to change.  For example:    Realigning Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C.  Multiple groups reviewed current and future medical care for wounded  soldiers, and DOD officials told us that cost estimates in DOD’s next BRAC  budget submission to Congress could change pending the outcomes of  these various review groups. OSD officials told us implementation costs  will likely increase from the reported $1.7 billion estimate if the time frame  to complete the recommendation is accelerated, as recommended by  OSD’s independent panel to review current rehabilitative care at Walter  Reed.
Co-locating miscellaneous OSD, defense agency, and field activity  leased locations to Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The Army had planned to  relocate these agencies and activities to Fort Belvoir’s Engineering  Proving Ground, but in August 2007 the Army announced it is considering  a nearby location currently belonging to the U.S. General Services  Administration in Springfield, Virginia. Then, in October 2007, the Army  announced it is also considering another site in Northern Virginia for  relocating about 6,000 personnel. The reported cost estimate of $1.2 billion  to implement this recommendation is likely to change depending on the  Army’s site location for relocating these OSD offices, defense agencies,  and defense field activities.
Establishing Army Centers of Excellence at several locations. The  Army was not certain about the number of personnel it expected to  eliminate as a result of combining several Army schools and centers at the  time of the fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission to Congress. Based  on our analysis, once the Army resolves the implementation details for  these recommendations, the combined net annual savings estimate of   $332 million is likely to change in the next BRAC budget submission.
Realigning Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The decision as to where to  relocate on Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, the Army’s 7th Special Forces  Group currently located at Fort Bragg remained uncertain as of August  2007. According to officials at Eglin, the planned location of the Special  Forces Group could change because of various space and noise issues  associated with the installation’s implementation of another BRAC  recommendation to establish a joint training site for the Joint Strike  Fighter aircraft, also at Eglin Air Force Base. DOD’s estimated $343 million  in cost in its fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission to Congress would  change depending on the final site location for the 7th Special Forces  Group at Eglin.
Establishing joint basing at multiple locations. The services have   yet to agree on many of the details involved with this recommendation to  create 12 joint bases. According to BRAC implementing officials and  recent testimony before Congress, it is still uncertain what the  organizational and personnel requirements will be for these joint bases,  thus making it difficult to provide a realistic estimate on the costs or  savings from implementing this recommendation. DOD is currently  estimating net savings of $116 million annually.
Realigning medical enlisted training at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
Part of this recommendation required the services to co-locate their  medical training to one location with the potential of transitioning to a  joint training effort. Fort Sam Houston officials told us that the expected  savings from this recommendation were anticipated based on a joint  training effort. However, BRAC implementing officials told us the services  had not yet agreed on the final joint curriculum when the fiscal year 2008  BRAC budget submission was provided to Congress; thus the number of  instructors needed and several other details remained uncertain. These  officials told us that once these details become final, the amount of  expected net savings, which DOD estimated to be about $91 million  annually, could change for this recommendation.
Creating a Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments Research,  Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation Center mostly  at Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, California. Navy officials  told us they were uncertain how many personnel associated with a testing  range mission will realign as they plan for the implementation of this  recommendation. Moreover, the DOD Inspector General recently reported  that the Navy did not adequately document the number of personnel  expected to realign in this recommendation’s proposed business plan,  citing that the number of personnel to move has ranged from about 1,660  to nearly 650. Until OSD resolves implementation details surrounding this  recommendation, it will continue to have difficulty in more precisely  estimating the associated costs and savings. DOD estimated it will cost  about $427 million to implement this recommendation as presented in the  fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission and OSD estimated it will accrue  a net recurring savings of $68 million annually after 2011.
Co-locating medical command headquarters. Various BRAC  implementing officials associated with planning the implementation for  this recommendation told us that depending on the still undecided final  site location and the number of personnel to relocate, the $50 million in  estimated costs to implement this recommendation could likely change.
These recommendations illustrate the evolving nature of implementation  planning and the likelihood that the associated cost and savings estimates  could likely change. They are not the only recommendations which may  experience changes in costs or savings; however, they are some of the  recommendations from which DOD expects to incur the most costs and  savings relative to other BRAC 2005 recommendations. Thus, changes to  cost and savings estimates related to these recommendations will have a  larger effect on the overall BRAC implementation estimates.
section_title: Military Construction Costs Could Increase
paragraphs: Military construction costs could increase due to various economic  pressures and if the Army’s new initiatives designed to reduce  construction costs do not achieve the planned results. DOD’s current cost  estimates of $31 billion to implement the BRAC recommendations involve  about $21 billion in estimated costs for military construction that could  likely increase because of greater than expected inflation and the market  demand for new construction. Since the majority of expected BRAC costs  are for military construction, systemic increases in the cost of  construction could have a considerable effect on the total cost to  implement BRAC 2005. This change is important because DOD’s estimate  of $21 billion in military construction is the single largest cost item  associated with implementing BRAC 2005 recommendations and is  unprecedented given that DOD spent less than $7 billion for military  construction in the four previous BRAC rounds combined. In addition, we  recognize that determining costs in construction programs that span years  of effort is difficult. As such, DOD told us they will continue to monitor  reasons for potential cost growth for BRAC construction contracts.
Additionally, BRAC implementing officials expressed concern that  construction costs have the potential to increase in areas already  experiencing high commercial construction demands such as the National  Capital Region, Washington, D.C. and San Antonio, Texas. For example,  DOD estimated it could cost about $3.4 billion in construction to  implement several recommendations in the National Capital Region,  Washington, D.C. (the realignment of Walter Reed Medical Center, the  relocation of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the  realignment to Fort Belvoir due to numerous terminations of DOD-leased  space in the Washington, D.C. area). Moreover, DOD estimated it could  cost about $1.3 billion in construction to implement the recommendation  to establish a new joint medical enlisted training center and relocate  Lackland Air Force Base’s medical inpatient care to Fort Sam Houston,  San Antonio, Texas. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) officials told  us they are concerned about what effect construction demand might have  on bid proposals given the sizable amount of construction to take place in  a limited amount of time to meet the BRAC statutory completion time  frame. Additionally, service officials at various installations expressed  concern about the potential for increases in construction costs because of  ongoing reconstruction due to damage caused by Hurricane Katrina,  coupled with the large volume of anticipated BRAC construction that  could also affect bid proposals.
Similar to the current commercial construction market in general, military  construction has been affected by rising costs for construction labor and  materials for the last several years. USACE officials told us the actual rate  of construction inflation for the last several years has exceeded the federal  government’s inflation rate used for budgetary purposes, which is required  to be used in budgeting for construction projects. While this difference  was as high as 6.1 percentage points in 2004, the difference between the  actual rate of construction inflation and the government’s budgetary  inflation rate has diminished recently. USACE officials told us that if   the extent to which the actual rate of inflation continues to exceed the  budgeted rate as implementation proceeds, and if construction material  costs are higher than anticipated, they would either have to redirect  funding from other sources to provide for construction projects or resort  to a reduction in the scope of some construction projects. However, this  trend may not necessarily continue into the future depending on the  economics surrounding the construction industry.
USACE is currently transforming and streamlining its process for  managing and contracting for military construction. USACE officials told  us that these transformation efforts could help in meeting Army’s expected  large volume of military construction as well as costs associated with  BRAC and other force structure initiatives such as overseas rebasing and  Army modularity. USACE has developed a strategy intended to reduce  construction costs by 15 percent and reduce construction time by   30 percent. Through its transformation strategy, USACE intends to change  how it executes construction projects by    standardizing facility designs and processes,    expanding the use of premanufactured building where sections or modules  of a building are constructed and transported to a construction site to be  assembled,    executing military construction as a continuous building program rather  than a collection of individual construction projects, and    emphasizing commercial rather that government building standards,  which would allow contractors greater flexibility to use a wider variety of  construction materials to meet construction requirements.
The Army has already incorporated a 15 percent reduction into its BRAC  construction estimates and has budgeted accordingly. Although USACE  officials expressed optimism that these cost savings will be realized, and  preliminary results are encouraging, these results are based on recent,  limited experience using this new process. Specifically, USACE initiated  five construction pilots in 2006, all of which were awarded under its price  limit. However, if the cost of construction materials escalates or if there is  a shortage of construction labor, especially in locations of high  construction volume such as Washington, D.C, and San Antonio, Texas,  USACE told us that some of the expected military construction  transformation savings could decrease. Given that the Army is expected to  incur almost 60 percent of the estimated BRAC construction costs   ($12 billion), the impact on overall BRAC costs if the Army is unable to  achieve its projected 15 percent savings could be considerable, especially  since USACE officials told us the majority of the Army’s BRAC-related  construction projects incorporated the 15 percent reduction into their  estimates.
section_title: Environmental Cleanup Costs Are Preliminary and Likely to Increase
paragraphs: We reported in January 2007 that DOD’s available data showed that at  least $950 million will be needed to complete environmental cleanups  underway for known hazards on the military bases scheduled for closure  as a result of the BRAC 2005 round. Our prior work has shown that some  closures result in more intensive environmental investigations and the  uncovering of additional hazardous contaminations, thus resulting in  higher cleanup costs than DOD predicted and budgeted. For example,  additional hazardous contaminations were found at the former McClellan  Air Force Base, California, which was recommended for closure in 1995.  The discovery of traces of plutonium during a routine cleanup in 2000  caused cleanup costs to increase by $21 million. However, as certain bases  undergo more complete and in-depth environmental assessments, a  clearer picture of environmental cleanup costs will likely emerge.
section_title: Annual Recurring Savings Estimates May be Overstated
paragraphs: DOD’s estimated annual recurring savings resulting from base closures  and realignments may be overstated by about 46 percent. Currently, DOD  calculates total estimated annual recurring savings of about $4 billion. This  amount includes $2.17 billion in eliminated overhead expenses such as the  costs no longer needed to operate and maintain closed or realigned bases  and reductions in civilian salaries, which will free up funds that DOD can  then use for other defense priorities. However, DOD’s annual recurring  savings estimate also includes $1.85 billion in military personnel  entitlements—such as salaries and housing allowances—for military  personnel DOD plans to shift to other positions but does not plan to  eliminate. While DOD disagrees with us, we do not believe that  transferring personnel to other locations produces tangible dollar savings  outside the military personnel accounts that DOD can use to fund other  defense priorities since these personnel will continue to receive salaries  and benefits.
We recognize that DOD is trying to transform its infrastructure and the  Secretary of Defense’s primary goal for the BRAC 2005 process was  military transformation. We also recognize DOD’s position that military  personnel reductions allow the department to reapply these personnel to  support new capabilities and improve operational efficiencies.  Nonetheless, DOD’s inclusion of military personnel entitlements in its  estimates of annual recurring savings could generate a false sense that all  of its reported savings would generate funds that DOD could apply  elsewhere. Because DOD’s BRAC budget submission to Congress does not  explain the difference between recurring savings attributable to military  personnel entitlements and recurring savings that will make funds  available for other defense priorities, DOD’s overall estimated annual  recurring savings appear almost twice as large as those which will actually  be realized. In addition, our analysis shows that the current percentage of  estimated annual recurring savings from military personnel entitlements  (46 percent) is considerably higher compared to the last round of BRAC  that took place in 1995, in which DOD derived about 5 percent of BRAC  annual recurring savings from military personnel entitlements. During the  previous four rounds of BRAC that took place between 1988 and 1995, the  military was downsizing in personnel strength, yet the average percentage  of annual recurring savings DOD derived from military personnel  entitlements was 26 percent.
We reported in July 2005 that military personnel position eliminations are  not a true source of savings since DOD intends to reassign or shift  personnel to other positions without reducing military end strength  associated with the corresponding BRAC recommendation. Moreover, the  BRAC Commission stated in its September 2005 report that DOD’s  inclusion of savings from eliminating military personnel positions distorts  the actual savings attributable to BRAC recommendations. The service  officials we interviewed could not link actual military personnel  eliminations directly to implementing a BRAC recommendation, as  illustrated in the following:    Army officials said its military end strength will not be reduced due to any  BRAC recommendations. In fact, the Army plans to increase its active-duty  end strength by 65,000 over the next several years.
Navy officials said they anticipate reducing the Navy’s end strength by   26,000 active duty military personnel between fiscal years 2006 and 2011.  However, they told us they have not linked any of these anticipated  reductions to BRAC recommendations.
Air Force officials said they are in the process of reducing the service’s  active-duty end strength by about 40,000. However, Air Force officials said  that they cannot link any reductions in military end strength to  implementing their BRAC recommendations and the personnel drawdown  is independent of BRAC.
DOD policy and Office of Management and Budget’s guidance require  that an economic analysis be explicit about the underlying assumptions  used to estimate future costs and benefits, which we believe includes  estimating BRAC savings. If the savings we question were omitted from  DOD’s savings estimates, net annual recurring savings would decrease by  about 46 percent. As a result, DOD’s BRAC budget submission does not  provide enough information to allow Congress full oversight of the savings  that can be applied to other programs outside of the military personnel  account. Greater transparency over the assumptions behind DOD’s BRAC  savings estimates would help to promote independent analysis and   review and facilitate congressional decision making related to the  multibillion-dollar BRAC implementation program.
In addition to taking issue with how DOD characterizes military personnel  savings, we also disagree with DOD claiming savings for closing a base  that is actually going to stay open. At the time of DOD’s fiscal year 2008  BRAC budget submission to Congress, DOD claimed about $260 million in  annual recurring savings for closing Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico,  which is now going to remain open. Although DOD recommended closing  Cannon in May 2005 as a proposed recommendation, the BRAC  Commission modified the proposed closure, and stated in its September  2005 report to the President that Cannon could remain open if the  Secretary of Defense identified a new mission for the base and relocated  the base’s fighter wing elsewhere. Subsequently, the Air Force announced  in June 2006 that Cannon would remain open and the 16th Special  Operations Wing, currently located at Hurlburt Field, Florida, would  relocate to Cannon. Nevertheless, DOD still claimed about $200 million in  annual savings for military personnel entitlements and about $60 million in  annual savings for  categories such as base operation and maintenance in  its fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget. Officials at the Air Force BRAC office  told us that they claimed these annual savings because they disestablished  the fighter wing at Cannon, although they said most of the military  personnel and aircraft associated with the disestablished fighter wing  were reassigned or relocated and will continue to operate.
Furthermore, we have taken issue with estimated savings for several Air  National Guard BRAC recommendations. As we reported in May 2007, the  implementation of several Air National Guard recommendations is  expected to result in annual recurring costs of $53 million rather than the  annual recurring savings of $26 million estimated by the BRAC  Commission—a $79 million per year difference that occurred primarily  due to language in the BRAC Commission’s report that prevents the Air  National Guard from reducing its current end strength in some states.
section_title: DOD Has Made Progress Implementing BRAC, but Several Challenges Increase Risk That All Recommendations Might Not be Completed by the Statutory Deadline
paragraphs: DOD has made progress implementing BRAC 2005, but faces a number of  synchronization and coordination challenges related to implementing  many BRAC recommendations. These challenges increase DOD’s risk of  not meeting the September 2011 statutory deadline. For example,  personnel movements involving tens of thousands of personnel must be  synchronized with the expenditure of billions of dollars to construct or  renovate facilities needed to support them by 2011. The time frames for  completing many BRAC recommendations are so closely sequenced and  scheduled to be completed in 2011 that any significant changes in  personnel movement schedules or construction delays could jeopardize  timely completion. Also, some recommendations are dependent on the  completion of others, and delays in completing some interrelated actions  might cause a domino effect that could jeopardize DOD’s ability to meet  the statutory 2011 BRAC deadline. BRAC 2005, unlike prior BRAC rounds,  included more joint recommendations involving more than one military  component, thus creating challenges in achieving unity of effort among the  services and defense agencies.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Made Progress Implementing BRAC
paragraphs: DOD’s implementation of BRAC 2005 has progressed since the  recommendations became effective in November 2005. For example, Navy  officials reported that they completed implementing 14 BRAC actions  involving the closure of Navy reserve centers and recruiting districts. To  dedicate resources and facilitate communications to plan for the  implementation of hundreds of BRAC actions, the military services and  affected defense agencies have their own BRAC program management  offices. Over the past 2 years, these offices have begun the planning and  design for the $21 billion military construction program necessitated by  the most recent BRAC round, including initiating site surveys and  environmental assessments needed before military construction projects  can begin.
OSD realized that the complexity of the BRAC 2005 round required it to  strategically manage and oversee the entire BRAC 2005 program. During  prior BRAC rounds, OSD’s oversight of BRAC implementation was  typically limited to adjudicating disagreements among the services over  implementation issues, according to OSD BRAC officials. However, for  this BRAC round, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics stated in 2005 that the large number  of transformational recommendations, particularly recommendations to  promote joint facility operations, would present OSD with significant  implementation challenges. To meet these challenges, the department  initiated a process to develop business plans that laid out the requisite  actions, timing of those actions, and the costs and savings associated with  implementing each recommendation. Additionally, OSD recognized that  the development of business plans would serve as the foundation for the  complex program management necessary to implement the BRAC 2005  recommendations. As such, the primary implementation activity of the  military services, and defense agencies has been to develop about 240  business plans for OSD review and approval. According to OSD, these  business plans have been used as the primary vehicle to delineate resource  requirements and generate military construction requirements.
As of October 2007, OSD has approved about 220 business plans. Some  business plans remain in draft and have not been approved for various  reasons. According to OSD, these business plans involve complex issues  associated with the services’ lines of authority and sizeable personnel  realignments that OSD BRAC officials told us they intend to resolve soon.  However, OSD has deferred the approval of about 15 business plans  pending the development of broader policies to facilitate the  implementation of the recommendations associated with joint basing and  chemical demilitarization. Finally, officials in OSD’s BRAC Office told us  they plan to continue reviewing business plans as part of their  comprehensive, centrally managed oversight of the BRAC program.  Recognizing that business plans provide important implementation details,  in June 2007 OSD directed the services and defense agencies to update  these business plans twice a year in conjunction with OSD program  reviews.
section_title: Challenges in Synchronizing Many BRAC Actions Could Hinder DOD’s Ability to Complete Recommendations within the Statutory Time Frame
paragraphs: The department faces a number of challenges related to synchronizing the  completion of many BRAC recommendations in order to meet the  statutory 2011 time frame. For example, personnel movements involving  tens of thousands of military and civilian personnel must be synchronized  with billions of dollars worth of construction or renovation activities  needed to ensure they have the necessary facilities to support them. Also,  the implementation of some recommendations is dependent on the  completion of other recommendations before facilities can be renovated  for new uses, and some DOD installations are affected by more than   six separate recommendations. Delays in synchronizing and completing  these interrelated actions could cause a domino effect that might  jeopardize DOD’s ability to meet the statutory 2011 BRAC deadline. Also,  synchronizing the implementation of several force structure initiatives  could further complicate DOD’s BRAC implementation efforts.
subsections: section_title: DOD Must Synchronize Personnel Movements with Construction Time Frames
paragraphs: Implementation challenges primarily stem from the complexity of  synchronizing the realignment of over 123,000 personnel with the  completion of over $21 billion in new construction or renovation projects.  According to DOD officials, construction schedules are often the primary  driver in setting BRAC implementation timelines due to the amount of  time needed to design and build new facilities or renovate existing  facilities. The time frames for completing many BRAC recommendations  are closely sequenced and scheduled to be completed in 2011 but any  significant changes in personnel movement schedules or construction  delays could jeopardize DOD’s ability to meet the statutory 2011 BRAC  deadline.
According to OSD’s approved business plans and DOD officials, the  following are some BRAC recommendations that could experience  synchronization challenges:    Realigning Army reserve components, constructing 125 new Armed  Forces Reserve Centers, and closing 387 existing reserve  component facilities: Army reserve component officials told us they are  managing the construction of new Armed Forces Reserve Centers in a  compressed time frame. The data in our recently issued report show that  26 percent of the BRAC actions implementing these recommendations will  begin in fiscal year 2010, according to the approved business plans. This  approach compresses the amount of time available to construct the  facilities and respond to any construction delays that might arise, which  increases the risk that the projects might not be completed in time to meet  the BRAC statutory completion deadline. On the other hand, Army  officials told us that they would assume less risk because many of these  projects are small and can be completed within shorter time frames  compared to larger projects. For example, the Army considered starting  construction on the Armed Forces Reserve Centers toward the beginning  of the implementation period and closing older reserve facilities. Instead,  more complex and costly recommendations became a higher priority and  reserve center actions were delayed.
Co-locating miscellaneous OSD, defense agency, and field activity  leased locations at Fort Belvoir, Virginia: OSD officials told us that  these activities have scheduled the arrival of over 6,000 personnel by  September 1, 2011—2 weeks before the BRAC statutory deadline—to  implement over 30 discrete actions associated with this recommendation.  In addition, recent developments could affect the timing of this  realignment to Fort Belvoir because, at the time of our review, the Army  was revising its implementation planning to accommodate the possibility  of using nearby land owned by the U.S. General Services Administration or  another location in Northern Virginia, which will require additional studies  to determine environmental impacts and transportation requirements at  the new location, according to Fort Belvoir officials. If the process of  identifying alternative site locations results in delaying the movement of  miscellaneous OSD offices, defense agencies, and field offices, this could  jeopardize meeting the statutory deadline.
Realigning the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to Fort  Belvoir, Virginia: The fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission shows  that construction is expected to be completed by June 2011, which allows  3 months before the statutory deadline to move its missions. To mitigate  mission impact and the risk of not completing these moves if construction  is delayed, the agency plans to begin moving its personnel in phases  starting in April 2010.
Realigning Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C., to  the National Naval Medical Center, Maryland, and Fort Belvoir,  Virginia: Completion is scheduled by September 2011 according to the  business plan. The medical joint cross-service group that developed this  recommendation in 2005 stated that delays in constructing and occupying  the buildings could risk the timely completion of this recommendation and  concluded that aggressive actions would be needed to meet the 6-year  deadline. Army and OSD officials testified before Congress in January 2007  that the time frame was “very tight” for completing this recommendation.  Also, in response to various concerns about the quality of care for  warfighters at Walter Reed, an official with the Army’s Surgeon’s General  Office told us in September 2007 that certain parts of the recommendation  supporting the construction of intensive medical care facilities are  expected to be completed sooner than originally planned, while the move  to the National Naval Medical Center, Maryland, and Fort Belvoir, Virginia  is still scheduled to be completed by September 2011. DOD’s standard  construction schedules for medical facilities indicate new hospitals, or  additions and renovations to an existing hospital, generally take longer to  complete compared to other facilities.
section_title: Some Recommendations Are Dependent on the Completion of Others
paragraphs: In some cases, DOD’s synchronization challenges are exacerbated when  the completion of one recommendation is dependent on the completion   of another. For example, the BRAC recommendation to close Fort  Monmouth, New Jersey, involves relocating personnel from the Army’s  Communications-Electronics Life Cycle Management Command currently  located at Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The new  facilities at Aberdeen are expected to be renovated by February 2011.  However, DOD cannot begin those renovations until the training activity  currently occupying the Aberdeen facilities relocates to Fort Lee, Virginia,  an action associated with the implementation of another BRAC  recommendation. Consequently, the training activity cannot vacate the  Aberdeen space until a new facility is built for them at Fort Lee sometime  in 2009. This interdependence is shown in figure 4.
Likewise, such interdependence could undermine the Navy’s ability to  complete within the statutory deadline the recommendation to consolidate  various Navy-leased locations onto government-owned property. The  business plan that describes the actions and time frames for moving  various Navy-leased locations onto government-owned property stated  that it will begin renovating space for the move to Arlington, Virginia, in  September 2008. However, the current occupant of the space—a  component of the Defense Information Systems Agency—is not scheduled  to vacate the space the Navy is to move into until June 2011 because the  Defense Information Systems Agency component needs to wait until it can  move into newly constructed space at Fort Meade, Maryland—an action  associated with another BRAC recommendation. Although both DOD  components are working on a solution, the business plans for these two  recommendations stated several options in order to meet the 2011 BRAC  deadline, such as having the Navy occupy “portable facilities,” build a new  facility, or explore other workarounds to meet the statutory time frame.
section_title: Some Installations Affected by Multiple Recommendations
paragraphs: Another factor that could threaten the timely completion of some of the  BRAC recommendations is the number of DOD installations that are  affected by more than one recommendation. Based on BRAC Commission  data, 27 installations are affected by six or more BRAC recommendations  that include installations such as Fort Belvoir, Virginia; Fort Sam Houston,  Texas; Lackland Air Force Base, Texas; Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,  Ohio; Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia; Aberdeen Proving Ground,  Maryland; and Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. In addition to their routine  duties for facility management, installation officials are responsible for  synchronizing and coordinating the movements of personnel with the  availability of facilities. The following are examples of installations  affected by multiple recommendations:    Fort Belvoir, Virginia: Officials responsible for implementing the BRAC  actions associated with 14 separate recommendations told us that they  need to synchronize the availability of various facilities to accommodate  the increase of nearly 24,000 personnel expected to arrive, primarily as a  result of BRAC recommendations resulting in the closure or realignment  of numerous DOD agencies and activities. These officials said that they  have concerns about meeting the overall time frame because their plans  do not allow for any delays in construction projects or funding. Fort  Belvoir officials told us they are encountering challenges when planning  the synchronization of the large volume of construction and personnel  movement throughout the implementation period. For example, the Army  initially planned to site the implementation of 2 recommendations  (realigning the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and co-locating  miscellaneous OSD, defense agency, and field activity leased locations) at  Fort Belvoir that would have an unfavorable impact on the surrounding  community due to increased traffic congestion. Though Fort Belvoir in  October 2007 announced new plans to obtain property near Fort Belvoir  that might lessen traffic congestion for the move of miscellaneous OSD,  defense agency, and field activity leased locations, Fort Belvoir officials  told us that these plans could raise new implementation challenges to  meet the statutory deadline because of additional time needed for  environmental impact studies, planning and design of new construction,  and demolition of existing structures at the new proposed site.
Fort Sam Houston, Texas: Installation officials at Fort Sam Houston  told us that they have to synchronize numerous actions involving eight  separate BRAC recommendations and have concerns about coordinating  the availability of facilities—either to be constructed or renovated—with  the planned net increase of over 10,000 personnel. Furthermore, officials  told us the lack of guidance on how installation officials will establish a  joint base with nearby Lackland and Randolph Air Force Bases, Texas, in  accordance with the BRAC recommendation on joint basing exacerbates  the uncertainty in planning for the implementation of these  recommendations.
section_title: Force Structure Initiatives Further Complicate DOD’s BRAC Implementation Efforts
paragraphs: Two Army force restructuring initiatives—modularity and overseas  rebasing strategy—could exacerbate the Army’s BRAC synchronization  challenges. The Army considers modularity to be the most extensive  reorganization of its force since World War II, in which it restructures  itself from a division-based force to a more agile and responsive modular  brigade-based force. According to Army estimates, this initiative will  require a significant investment through fiscal year 2011. DOD’s Global  Defense Posture Realignment Plan, also known as overseas rebasing, will  result in a global realignment of U.S. forces and installations, including the  planned transfer to American territory of up to 70,000 defense personnel  and about 100,000 family members and civilian employees currently living  overseas. As a result of mostly these force structure initiatives and BRAC,  the Army plans to relocate over 150,000 soldiers and civilian personnel by  fiscal year 2012, representing over 20 percent of the Army’s total projected  active-duty and civilian personnel end strength. To illustrate, Army  installations that expect personnel increases of greater than 5,000 over the  next 5 years, as of March 2007, are shown in table 2.
As shown in table 2, some installations are expecting substantial growth;  Forts Belvoir, Bliss, Riley, and Lee each anticipate net personnel gains of  more than 50 percent. For example, the Army plans to relocate at Fort  Bliss, Texas, about 18,000 personnel as part of BRAC, the transformation  of Army modular brigade units, and DOD’s overseas rebasing efforts. The  Army is planning 54 new construction projects over the 6-year BRAC  implementation period to accommodate the increase in base population at  Fort Bliss. Also, some of the installations listed in table 2 may experience  more growth in the next several years depending on whether the Army’s  active end strength is increased by 65,000 soldiers.
section_title: Coordination Among Multiple Services and Agencies Presents Additional Challenges
paragraphs: BRAC 2005, unlike prior BRAC rounds, included more joint  recommendations involving more than one military component, thus  creating challenges in achieving unity of effort among the services and  defense agencies. According to our analysis, 43 percent of the 240 OSD- required business plans involved formal coordination between at least two  services or agencies. Service officials said that gaining consensus among  military services and defense agencies has been challenging in the areas of  personnel and facility requirements, implementation schedules, and  funding responsibilities. For example, officials told us it was a challenge  due to the joint nature in planning for the implementation of the  recommendation to realign Fort Bragg, North Carolina, by relocating  Army’s 7th Special Forces Group to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Service  officials told us it took time for the Army and Air Force to coordinate how  to share base operations costs given these two services have different  standards for calculating these costs. Similarly, regarding the  recommendation to establish the Joint Strike Fighter initial joint training  site at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, it took time for the Navy, Marine  Corps, and Air Force to agree on cost-sharing arrangements and a joint  training curriculum designed to achieve savings from consolidated training  on the aircraft. Likewise, other complex joint cross-service  recommendations could be slowed by a similar need to coordinate and  negotiate agreements. The following are some BRAC recommendations  with unresolved coordination challenges.
Create joint bases involving multiple defense installations: The   26 defense installations involved with creating 12 new joint bases required  DOD to define the governance structure over how these joint bases should  be organized, the associated chain of command authority, and the  operational concepts for managing these joint bases. According to  service officials, some of their most challenging issues to resolve include   1) transferring real property and budget authority to the lead service,   2) determining standard levels of base operating support and which base  functions to transfer to the lead service, 3) deciding whether civilian  personnel on a joint base will become employees of the lead service,   4) agreeing on common terminology and standards, and 5) funding  contributions from each service. These challenges to establishing joint  bases have been problematic since each service has its own concept of  how installations should be managed and organized. In particular, during  recent congressional testimony, the Air Force expressed views on joint  basing concepts contrary to those of OSD and the other services. To  overcome these challenges, OSD formed a special working group to  resolve these issues and OSD officials told us they would approve the joint  basing business plan when more of the planning details have been  resolved.
Realign supply, storage, and distribution management at multiple  locations: There are several potential issues between the Defense  Logistics Agency and the military services that may affect the planned  implementation of the recommendation. While baseline agreements have  been reached between the Defense Logistics Agency and the services on  the transfer of supply-related personnel positions and related inventories  to the Defense Logistics Agency, some important aspects of the  implementation plans are incomplete and still need to be resolved. For  example, performance-based agreements that will establish  responsibilities, metrics to measure performance, costs, and business  rules between the Defense Logistics Agency and the services have yet to  be negotiated and agreed upon. Additionally, the funding and decision- making process for future maintenance, upgrades, usage, and integration  of information technology systems transferring to Defense Logistics  Agency has not been agreed to. Lastly, due to the way the Defense  Logistics Agency plans to implement the recommendation by staging the  personnel transfers over time by each military service, it plans to apply  lessons learned to resolve issues as implementation proceeds. We also  reviewed a separate BRAC action, which is part of this recommendation,  in more detail and issued our report in October 2007.
Co-locate medical command headquarters: The affected agencies have  had challenges in reaching agreement on where to co-locate these medical  commands. Specifically, the Air Force and OSD Health Affairs have  disagreed with the business manager on associated cost and  implementation time frames. As such, OSD has not yet approved the  business plan for this recommendation.
As a result of these coordination challenges, the planning process has  lengthened beyond that which DOD officials initially expected, which  could result in delayed implementation of certain recommendations.   The need for gaining consensus about planning and implementation details  among the services and defense agencies could continue throughout the  BRAC implementation period.  At the same time, DOD believes the review  process helps to ensure that BRAC actions meet the intent of the law, are  accurate, and effectively coordinated. However, if gaining consensus  among these entities continues to be a challenge or if new organizations  established under BRAC continue to lack fully developed operational  concepts and organizational structures, it may become increasingly  difficult to implement these recommendations before the statutory 2011  deadline.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: DOD recognizes that its BRAC recommendations and its implementation  are of high public interest. As such, it is paramount that DOD  communicates openly about the expected savings that could result from  the implementation of BRAC actions. As long as DOD continues to assert  that nearly half of its estimated $4 billion in annual recurring BRAC  savings come from military personnel reassignments, which will not free  up funds for other defense priorities, DOD could create a false sense that  BRAC 2005 will result in a much higher dollar savings than will actually be  realized to readily fund other priorities. Without explaining the difference  between annual recurring savings attributable to military personnel  reassignments and annual recurring savings that will make funds available  for other defense priorities, DOD could lessen the credibility of the BRAC  program and decrease the public’s trust in the BRAC process. Greater  transparency over the source of expected BRAC savings could help to  preserve public confidence in the integrity of the BRAC program.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To provide more transparency over DOD’s estimated annual recurring  savings from BRAC implementation, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology  and Logistics, in consultation with the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense (Comptroller), to explain, in DOD’s BRAC budget submission to  Congress, the difference between annual recurring savings attributable to  military personnel entitlements and annual recurring savings that will  readily result in funds available for other defense priorities.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our  recommendation and agreed to include an explanation of the annual  recurring savings in its BRAC budget justification material that  accompanies the annual President’s budget. DOD also noted in its  comments to us that military personnel reductions attributable to a BRAC  recommendation as savings are as real as savings generated through end  strength reductions. DOD also stated that while it may not reduce overall  end strength, its reductions in military personnel for each  recommendation at a specific location are real and these personnel  reductions allow the department to reapply these military personnel to  support new capabilities and improve operational efficiencies. While we  recognize these benefits from reapplying freed up military personnel to  other locations due to implementing BRAC recommendations, we do  question that nearly half of DOD’s annual recurring savings estimate of $4  billion includes military personnel entitlements—such as salaries and  housing allowances—for military personnel DOD plans to shift to other  positions but does not plan to eliminate thus requiring DOD to continue  paying the salaries and benefits. While DOD disagrees with us, we do not  believe that shifting or transferring personnel to other locations produces  tangible dollar savings outside the military personnel accounts that DOD  can use to fund other defense priorities since these personnel will  continue to receive salaries and benefits. DOD did acknowledge however,  that these savings may not be available to fund other defense priorities  because they have already been spent to fund military personnel priorities.  It is also worth noting that DOD commented that although its net annual  recurring savings estimates have decreased from $4.2 billion to $4 billion,  these savings still represent a significant benefit that will result from the  implementation of BRAC recommendations. DOD’s written comments are  reprinted in appendix VII. DOD also provided technical comments, which  we have incorporated into this report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees; the Secretaries of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy,  and Air Force; Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office  of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others  upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on  GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff has any questions concerning this report, please  contact me on (202) 512-4523 or by e-mail at leporeb@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs are on  the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix VIII.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We reviewed the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission’s  182 recommendations to realign and close military bases, but mostly  focused our work on the recommendations that changed the most in  expected costs and savings compared to the Commission’s estimates.  Recognizing that the Department of Defense (DOD) was in the process of  initial planning for base realignment and closure (BRAC) implementation,  and the associated financial data were changed frequently during our  review, we compared BRAC cost and savings estimates primarily using  two key publicly available documents—the 2005 BRAC Commission report  to the President released in September 2005 and DOD’s latest BRAC  budget submission provided to Congress in February 2007. We used data  from the BRAC Commission report to the President because the estimates  contained in this report were the closest estimates available associated  with the final and approved BRAC recommendations. We used DOD’s  most recent BRAC budget submission because it was the most  authoritative information publicly available for making broad comparisons  of BRAC cost and savings estimates. Specifically, we compared the change  in cost estimates as well as the estimates for net annual recurring savings  that DOD expects to incur after BRAC implementation and noted those  recommendations that have increased the most in expected costs and  decreased the most in expected savings. In addition, we used the BRAC  Commission’s data generated from DOD’s estimation model, known as the  Cost of Base Realignment Actions, to determine changes in expected one- time costs, to include military construction cost estimates and inflation.  We generally reported costs and savings in current dollars and not  constant dollars except where noted.
To calculate DOD’s estimate of net annual recurring savings, we used  OSD’s data provided to us for estimated savings in fiscal year 2012—the  year after OSD expects all recommendations to be completed—because  these data more fully captured these savings and allowed us to replicate  the same methodology used by the BRAC Commission in its calculation of  this estimate. We used OSD’s fiscal year 2012 data and subtracted the  estimates for annual recurring costs from the estimates for annual  recurring savings, which is the same method both DOD and we have used  for prior BRAC rounds. To determine expected 20-year savings—also  known as the 20-year net present value—we used the same formulas and  assumptions as DOD and the BRAC Commission used to calculate these  savings. Specifically, we used DOD’s BRAC fiscal year 2008 budget data  for expected costs and savings to implement each recommendation for  fiscal years 2006 through 2011. We also used data that the BRAC Office in  the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and  Environment provided us for expected net annual recurring savings after  the completion of each recommendation for fiscal years 2012 to 2025. We  then converted these data to fiscal year constant 2005 dollars using DOD  price indexes to distinguish real changes from changes due to inflation.  We used fiscal year 2005 dollars to calculate 20-year savings because the  BRAC Commission also used fiscal year 2005 dollars for this calculation.Finally, we calculated how many years it would take for expected BRAC  savings to recoup the expected initial investment costs to implement the  recommendations, comparing the fiscal years, or break-even points, when  cumulative net savings would exceed cumulative one-time costs. We did  this to be consistent with the way DOD had reported their break-even  points for past BRAC rounds, which is a methodology we also replicated in  our prior reports on BRAC implementation.
To assess the reliability of DOD’s BRAC cost and savings data, we tested  computer-generated data for errors, reviewed relevant documentation, and  discussed data quality control procedures with officials at the Office of the  Secretary of Defense (OSD) BRAC Office. We determined that the data  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of making broad comparisons  between DOD’s reported cost and savings estimates and the BRAC  Commission’s reported estimates.
To determine why DOD’s estimates changed compared to the BRAC  Commission’s estimates, we reviewed over 200 OSD-approved business  plans that outlined actions, time frames, and financial estimates for  implementing each BRAC recommendation. We also obtained and  analyzed information from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers about its  recent initiative to transform how it manages military construction  projects and how these new initiatives are expected to reduce military  construction costs during BRAC implementation. We did not validate the  services’ or defense agencies’ BRAC military construction requirements  because DOD’s Office of the Inspector General, the Army Audit Agency,  the Naval Audit Service, and the Air Force Audit Agency were reviewing  BRAC military construction projects at the time of this report. Their work  in this area is expected to continue over the next several years. However,  we met with staff of these audit services periodically over the course of  our review.
Further, we met periodically with officials at the OSD BRAC office and  corresponding BRAC implementation offices in the Army, Navy, and Air  Force to determine why DOD’s estimates changed compared to the BRAC  Commission’s estimates. We also met with these officials to discuss their  roles and responsibilities as they began BRAC implementation planning  and to obtain their perspectives on any implementation challenges that  they encountered. Given the unprecedented number of BRAC 2005  closures and realignments, we focused our analysis on broad issues  affecting DOD’s cost and savings estimates and implementation challenges  rather than on specific implementation issues of individual  recommendations.
To obtain the perspective of installation and command officials directly  involved in BRAC implementation planning and execution, we visited   17 bases and 8 major commands affected by BRAC. We selected these  bases and commands because they were among the closures or  realignments that DOD projected to have significant costs or savings, or  because we wanted to obtain more information about particular  implementation issues. Installations we visited include:    Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland;    Brooks City-Base, Texas;    Eglin Air Force Base, Florida;    Fort Belvoir, Virginia;    Fort Benning, Georgia;    Fort Bliss, Texas;    Fort Dix, New Jersey;    Fort McPherson, Georgia;    Fort Monmouth, New Jersey;    Fort Monroe, Virginia;    Fort Sam Houston, Texas;    Lackland Air Force Base, Texas;    McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey;    National Naval Medical Center, Maryland;    Randolph Air Force Base, Texas;    Rock Island Army Arsenal, Illinois; and    Walter Reed Army Medical Center, District of Columbia.
In addition, we met with officials from eight commands to obtain a  command-level perspective about BRAC implementation and because  these commands were involved in coordinating the business plans or were  responsible for key decisions in implementation planning. Commands  visited include the Air Force’s Air Education and Training Command;  Army Communications–Electronics Life Cycle Management Command;  Army Forces Command; Army Information Systems Engineering  Command; Army Medical Command; Army Training and Doctrine  Command; Naval Installations Command; and the U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers. As we obtained information concerning implementation  challenges during interviews, we assessed the reliability of that  information by asking similar questions from officials at different military  services at the installation and headquarters levels.
We conducted our work from November 2005, when the BRAC  recommendations became effective, through October 2007 so we could  analyze data in DOD’s BRAC budget submission provided to Congress in  February 2007. Our work was done in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: BRAC Recommendations with the Largest Increases in Estimated Costs
paragraphs: Appendix II lists specific base realignment and closure (BRAC)  recommendations that have increased the most in estimated one-time  costs compared to the BRAC Commission estimates reported in  September 2005. Table 3 shows that the Department of Defense’s (DOD)  one-time implementation cost estimates have increased by more than   $50 million each for 33 recommendations compared to BRAC Commission  estimates.
section_title: Appendix III: BRAC Recommendations with the Largest Decreases in Estimated Net Annual Recurring Savings
paragraphs: Appendix III lists specific base realignment and closure (BRAC)  recommendations that have decreased the most in estimated net annual  recurring savings compared to the BRAC Commission estimates. Table 4  shows that the Department of Defense’s (DOD) net annual recurring  savings estimates have decreased by more than $25 million each for 13  recommendations compared to BRAC Commission estimates.
section_title: Appendix IV: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Cost the Most
paragraphs: Appendix IV lists individual base realignment and closure (BRAC)  recommendations that the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to cost  the most to implement. DOD expects 24 recommendations (13 percent) to  generate 65 percent of the one-time costs to implement BRAC  recommendations during fiscal years 2006 through September 15, 2011, as  shown in table 5.
section_title: Appendix V: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Save the Most Annually
paragraphs: Appendix V lists individual base realignment and closure (BRAC)  recommendations that the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to save  the most annually after it has implemented the recommendations. DOD  expects 28 recommendations (15 percent) to generate 85 percent of the  net annual recurring savings as shown in table 6.
section_title: Appendix VI: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Save the Most Over a 20-Year Period
paragraphs: Appendix VI lists individual base realignment and closure (BRAC)  recommendations that the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to save  the most over a 20-year period. DOD expects the implementation of   29 recommendations (16 percent) to generate 85 percent of the 20-year  savings as shown in table 7.
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Barry Holman, Director  (retired); Laura Talbott, Assistant Director; Leigh Caraher; Grace Coleman;  Susan Ditto; Thomas Mahalek; Julia Matta; Charles Perdue; Benjamin  Thompson; and Tristan T. To made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating,  Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute of  Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage,  and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics  Agency. GAO-08-121R. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007.
Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely  Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial  Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor  Challenges for Completing More than 100 Armed Forces Reserve Centers.  GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the  2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers  Are Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and  Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2007.
Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate  Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely  Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641.  Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental  Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property.  GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007.
Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and  Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905.  Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and  Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785.  Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC  Rounds. GAO-05-614. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and  Closures. GAO-05-138. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need  for a Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760. Washington,  D.C.: May 17, 2004.
Military Base Closures: Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming  Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-558T. Washington, D.C.:  March 25, 2004.