Operational Contract Support: Actions Needed to Enhance the Collection, Integration, and Sharing of Lessons Learned
Published: 2015-03-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD has spent billions of dollars on contract support during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2002 and anticipates continuing its heavy reliance on contractors in future operations. Generally, OCS is the process of planning for and obtaining needed supplies and services from commercial sources in support of joint operations. GAO has previously identified long-standing concerns with DOD's efforts to institutionalize OCS.
This report examines the extent to which (1) the geographic combatant commands and the services collect OCS issues to develop lessons learned, (2) DOD has a focal point for integrating OCS issues from the JLLP, and (3) DOD organizations use JLLIS to share OCS issues and lessons learned. GAO evaluated OCS and lessons-learned guidance and plans and met with DOD commands and offices responsible for OCS planning, integration, policy, and contractor-management functions.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense's (DOD) geographic combatant commands are improving efforts to collect operational contract support (OCS) issues from operations and exercises needed to develop lessons learned, but the military services are generally not collecting them. Currently, four of the six geographic combatant commands—U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Southern Command—have identified OCS as a critical capability in their joint training plans and have incorporated it into planning, execution, and assessment of exercises, while U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific Command continue to make progress doing so. However, with the exception of the Army, the military services and their component commands are not generally collecting OCS issues to develop lessons learned. Officials from the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy stated that the lack of OCS awareness caused by not having (1) service-wide guidance on collecting OCS issues and (2) an OCS training requirement for senior leaders hinders their ability to develop lessons learned. Without guidance and a training requirement for senior leaders to improve OCS awareness, it will be difficult for DOD to ensure consistent collection of OCS issues and build on efficiencies that the services have identified to adequately plan for the use of contractor support.
DOD has made progress resolving some OCS issues, but does not have a focal point for integrating OCS issues identified through the Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP). The combatant commands and services are to use the JLLP to develop lessons learned related to joint capabilities from operations and exercises to improve areas such as doctrine and training. Currently, there are multiple organizations across DOD that are working on separate and sometimes disjointed OCS lessons-learned efforts. DOD has undertaken initial efforts to assign an OCS joint proponent with lessons-learned responsibilities. A joint proponent is an entity intended to lead collaborative development and integration of joint capability. However, DOD has not determined whether the joint proponent will be responsible for providing formal oversight and integration of OCS issues from the JLLP. As it develops the joint proponent, including such roles and responsibilities will help better position DOD to integrate all OCS issues from the JLLP, thereby addressing any gaps in its efforts.
DOD organizations do not consistently use the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) to share OCS issues and lessons learned due to the system's limited functionality. JLLIS is the JLLP's system of record and is to facilitate the DOD-wide collection and sharing of lessons learned. However, GAO found that geographic combatant commands and the Army use JLLIS to varying degrees. Further, DOD is generally not sharing OCS lessons learned in JLLIS because the system is not functional for users searching OCS issues due to, among other reasons, not having an OCS label and not having a designated location for sharing OCS lessons learned. JLLIS's limited functionality impedes information sharing department-wide. Until DOD improves the functionality of JLLIS, it will be difficult for users to search for OCS issues, and DOD runs the risk of not being able to systematically track and share OCS lessons learned department-wide, which could negatively affect joint force development and readiness.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends, among other things, that DOD and the services (1) issue service-wide OCS lessons-learned guidance; (2) establish an OCS training requirement for senior leaders; (3) ensure the planned OCS joint proponent's roles and responsibilities include integrating OCS issues from the JLLP; and (4) improve JLLIS's functionality. DOD concurred with three of these recommendations, but partially concurred with the third recommendation, stating the need to first evaluate its courses of action before establishing such a proponent. GAO believes this recommendation is still valid, as discussed in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent billions of  dollars on contract support during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,  and anticipates continuing its heavy reliance on contractors to support  ongoing and future operations. According to Joint Publication 4-10,  operational contract support (OCS) is the process of planning for and  obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in  support of joint operations. Given the importance of OCS capabilities to  current and future operations, the House Armed Services Committee  expressed its support in 2012 for efforts to collect lessons learned related  to the full breadth of OCS, noting that past DOD efforts to collect lessons  learned were slowed by a lack of resources and insufficient institutional  support.
GAO, High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing Problems with  Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces, GAO-07-145  (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2006). the experiences of units deployed to locations with OCS. DOD concurred  with our recommendation, and stated that it would develop and implement  a systematic strategy for capturing, retaining, and applying lessons  learned on the use of contractor support to deployed forces, as discussed  later in this report. In June 2010, we testified on the need for a cultural  change in DOD that emphasized an awareness of OCS throughout all  entities of the department to help address the challenges faced in  ongoing and future contingency operations. Additionally, in our February  2013 report on high-risk areas in the federal government, we reported  that DOD needed to sustain efforts to integrate OCS through policy,  planning, and training for both current and future contingency operations.  Also, in February 2013, we found that, with the exception of the Army, the  other military services (Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force) had not  issued comprehensive service-specific guidance that describes roles,  responsibilities, and requirements to help integrate OCS into their   We recommended that DOD  planning efforts for contingency operations.fully integrate OCS into contingency planning in the military services, and  the department concurred with our recommendation and took some  actions to address it, as discussed later in this report. For a listing of  relevant past GAO work, see the Related GAO Products list at the end of  this report.
We performed our work for this report under the Comptroller General’s  authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, in light of  congressional interest in DOD’s efforts to institutionalize lessons learned  related to OCS. This report examines the extent to which (1) the geographic combatant commands and the military services collect OCS  issues to develop lessons learned; (2) DOD has a focal point for  integrating OCS issues from the Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP);  and (3) DOD organizations use the Joint Lessons Learned Information  System (JLLIS) to share OCS issues and lessons learned.
To determine the extent to which the geographic combatant commands  and the services collect OCS issues to develop lessons learned, we  reviewed guidance including relevant provisions in part 158 of Title 32 of  the Code of Federal Regulations, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  Instruction 3150.25E, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Notice  3500.01, and Joint Publication 4-10 to understand the roles and  responsibilities of DOD entities, including the geographic combatant  commands, the services, and the service component commands,  regarding the collection of OCS issues. Additionally, we reviewed military  department and service guidance, such as Army Regulation 11-33, Air  Force Instruction 90-1601, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  Instruction 3500.37C, and Marine Corps Order 3504.1, to identify any  service-specific policies, guidance, or responsibilities for the collection of  issues. Additionally, we reviewed DOD’s Joint Concept for OCS, which  is intended to guide OCS capability development for the Joint Force 2020.  Furthermore, we interviewed OCS and lessons-learned officials from the  four military services, all six geographic combatant commands, and all the  associated military service component commands to discuss their roles  and responsibilities regarding the collection of OCS issues. We visited all  six geographic combatant commands to conduct our interviews with  them.
To determine the extent to which DOD has a focal point for integrating  OCS issues from the JLLP, we compared the process for the integration  of OCS lessons learned with guidance such as Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25E, which identifies the primary objective  of the JLLP—to enhance joint capabilities by contributing to  improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and  education, personnel and facilities as well as policy. Additionally, we  reviewed the charter for the OCS Functional Capabilities Integration  Board, the OCS Action Plan, and DOD Instruction 3020.41, which  identify responsibilities related to OCS. Additionally, we reviewed DOD  reports on OCS and lessons learned along with various GAO reports to  understand DOD’s progress integrating changes in OCS in doctrine,  policy, and training, and education. We also interviewed officials who  participate in the process for resolving or integrating OCS issues in  doctrine, policy, training, and education curriculum—such as those from  the Joint Staff, military services, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary  of Defense for Program Support, OCS Functional Capabilities Integration  Board, and Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office—regarding the  extent to which DOD has a focal point for integrating issues from the  JLLP. We compared this information to federal internal-control standards  that state a good internal-control environment requires that the agency’s  organizational structure clearly define key areas of authority and  responsibility and establish appropriate lines of reporting.
To determine the extent to which DOD organizations use JLLIS—the  JLLP’s system of record—to share OCS issues and lessons learned, we  reviewed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25E to  identify the role of commanders with respect to sharing lessons learned  and to identify the system of record for sharing those lessons.  Additionally, we participated in a demonstration of JLLIS to understand  and observe its capabilities. We also interviewed DOD officials, as  described above, about their experiences using JLLIS from 2006, when  the system was established, through December 2014. Furthermore, we  used Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25E and  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.25 to understand the JLLP phases—discovery, validation, integration, and evaluation. We  compared this information to federal internal-control standards, which  state that all significant events should be clearly documented and the  documentation readily available. To address these objectives, we  excluded from our work procurement-related issues and lessons learned  from the acquisition community—for example, contracting officers.  Additional information about our objectives, scope, and methodology is  included in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2014 to March 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: DOD Entities with OCS- Related Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: OCS planning, integration, and policy roles and responsibilities, along  with the associated contractor-management functions,of DOD command and staff, including the following entities:
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics has overall responsibility for establishing and publishing  policies and procedures governing administrative oversight of defense  contracts and for developing and overseeing the implementation of  DOD-level OCS policy. Within this office, the Deputy Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Program Support is responsible for  monitoring and managing the implementation of OCS policy.
The OCS Functional Capabilities Integration Board was created in  March 2010 and serves as the main forum for the combatant  commands, military departments, and defense agencies to address  OCS capability issues for support to the joint warfighter, to include  assessing and adopting appropriate lessons learned, and solutions  affecting future contingency operations.
The Joint Staff’s Logistics Directorate (J-4) is the primary staff  directorate on the Joint Staff for OCS matters and is responsible for  developing OCS planning policy, related procedures, and templates,  as well as ensuring that OCS policies and procedures are  incorporated in relevant policy documents and doctrinal publications.  J-4 created the Operational Contract Support & Services Division to  reflect the increased Joint Staff workload related to institutionalizing  OCS.
The Defense Logistics Agency is responsible for providing worldwide  logistics support to the military departments and the combatant  commands as well as to other DOD components and federal  agencies. It also provides OCS planning, integration, and exercises  support through its Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office  (JCASO).
The Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force service component  commands plan and execute OCS for their respective forces in  accordance with guidance from their respective military departments  and combatant commanders.
The six geographic combatant commands, which are supported by  multiple service component commands, play a key role in determining  and synchronizing contracted support requirements and contracting  planning, as well as executing OCS oversight. According to Joint  Publication 4-10, proper joint-force guidance on common contract  support–related matters is imperative for facilitating effective and  efficient use of contractors in joint operations.
In figure 1, we illustrate the six geographic combatant commands’ areas  of responsibility and show the locations of the service component  commands that provide support in each of those areas.
section_title: DOD’s Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP)
paragraphs: DOD established the JLLP in 2000 to enhance joint capabilities through  knowledge management in peacetime and wartime. The combatant  commands and the military services are to use the JLLP to develop  lessons learned related to joint capabilities by collecting issues from  operations and exercises in order to make improvements to areas such  as doctrine, policy, training, and education. For collected issues,  according to CJCS Instruction 3150.25E, the combatant commands and  the military services are to resolve and integrate them at the lowest  organizational level possible, with corrective action taken as close to the  issue occurrence as possible. An issue becomes a lesson learned once a  DOD entity has implemented corrective action that has contributed to  improved performance or that has increased capability at the strategic,  operational, or tactical level.
According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25E,  JLLP knowledge management is enabled by the Joint Lessons Learned  Information System (JLLIS). As the JLLP’s system of record, JLLIS is to  facilitate the collection, management, and sharing of issues and lessons  learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. An  electronic database, JLLIS is supposed to be used to track progress by  DOD stakeholders and other organizations involved in the collection of  issues. Additionally, if an issue is resolved and determined to be a lesson  learned, then it is to be published and shared using JLLIS for proper  institutionalization and learning to improve the operational effectiveness  of the joint force. According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  Instruction 3150.25E, organizations participating in the JLLP shall  collaboratively exchange information (including issues and lessons  learned) to the maximum extent possible.
The services have also established service-specific lessons-learned  programs and processes that include the collecting, integration, and  sharing of lessons learned in support of the JLLP. For example, the Air  Force Lessons Learned Program allows Airmen from all functional areas  to share their observations to help shape how the Air Force prepares for  and executes future operations. The Air Force Lessons Learned Program  is a “push-pull” process where members of the lessons-learned offices  coordinate with functional subject-matter experts to “pull” data and  information by conducting interviews and after-action reviews, issuing  flash bulletins, and generating formal issues identified. Reports are  loaded into JLLIS so that Airmen can track progress and share  knowledge.
section_title: DOD’s Geographic Combatant Commands Are Improving Efforts to Collect OCS Issues Needed to Develop Lessons Learned, but the Military Services Are Not Generally Collecting OCS Issues
subsections: section_title: The Geographic Combatant Commands Collect Some OCS Issues from Operations and Are Improving Efforts to Collect OCS Issues from Exercises
paragraphs: DOD’s geographic combatant commands have used large-scale  operations as sources for collecting OCS issues. For example, in 2012,  the U.S. Central Command, with support from JCASO, conducted  interviews to collect issues experienced in OCS activities during  Operation Iraqi Freedom / Operation New Dawn and made 24  recommendations within three general areas: contractor management,  contract closeout, and transition planning. For instance, in the area of  transition planning, the command found that OCS planning in Iraq was  not fully integrated into the overall joint task force drawdown or transition  plans. Therefore, the command recommended that OCS planners be  sourced and embedded with the operations directorate 2 years prior to a  transition so that contract support requirements between DOD and the  Department of State could be properly identified. In Afghanistan, senior  U.S. Central Command and U.S. Forces Afghanistan officials provided  observations and insights about the OCS Integration Cell (formerly the  OCS Drawdown Cell) and reported having several issues that could be  used to inform contractor management and OCS planning. For  example, the officials reported the need to change the ad hoc  organization of the cell, reduce overlap and confusion of duties and  responsibilities, and better integrate contracting support into the planning  process. In Afghanistan, officials recommended changing the OCS  Integration Cell’s organization and physical location, codifying in doctrine  the OCS Integration Cell authorities prior to a contingency, improving  sharing of OCS-related information with stakeholders, and combining  OCS and operational-contracting functions to improve OCS planning and  execution, among other things.
Smaller-scale operations have also provided the geographic combatant  commands with opportunities to collect OCS issues that affect their  command. For example, U.S. Pacific Command officials observed OCS  issues during Operation Tomodachi in 2011, following the earthquake and  tsunami near Japan. Specifically, an observation at U.S. Pacific  Command recommended that the command establish a Joint Theater  Support Contracting Command to coordinate contracting during the  disaster, which subsequently led the command to develop an instruction  that includes considerations and procedures for establishing a Joint  Theater Support Contracting Command and to hold a rehearsal-of- concept drill. In another smaller-scale operation, Operation Unified  Response in Haiti, U.S. Southern Command identified several OCS  issues. Specifically, the command identified the need to improve its  Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker policy, develop more OCS capabilities at the military service component commands, and  establish operational frameworks to enable cross-service OCS  collaboration within the context of theater security cooperation efforts.
Additionally, the geographic combatant commands are improving efforts  to collect OCS issues during exercises. The geographic combatant  commands are to use DOD’s Joint Training System in planning,  executing, and assessing joint training, like exercises. The Joint  Training System provides an integrated, requirements-based method for  aligning joint training programs with assigned missions consistent with  command priorities, capabilities, and available resources. We have  previously reported that evaluating lessons learned and identifying issues  for corrective actions are fundamental components of DOD’s training and  exercise process. We recommended that DOD develop guidance with  specific criteria for postexercise documentation, particularly to allow the  results and lessons learned from exercises to be easily reviewed and  compared. DOD agreed that such information should be provided in a  standardized format that can be easily accessed and understood by  authorized organizations that might benefit from such knowledge.  However, DOD cautioned that any actions taken in response to this  recommendation must accommodate constraints regarding classified  information. As of December 2014, four of the six geographic combatant  commands—U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S.  Northern Command, and U.S. Southern Command—have identified OCS  as a critical capability in their joint training plans and have integrated it  into the planning, execution, and assessment of training events. For  example, U.S. Southern Command has identified conducting OCS as a  critical capability and developed an associated supporting task, which it  integrates into its exercises like PANAMAX and Integrated Advance.
In the past year, U.S. European Command has identified OCS as a  critical capability in its joint training plans, but it has not yet completed a  full cycle of planning, executing, and assessing training events that  include OCS as a critical capability. The command expects to complete  the other phases of the cycle following its forthcoming exercises. Prior to  the inclusion of OCS as a critical capability in its joint training plans, the  command included prescripted OCS-related events or master-scenario  events intended to guide exercises toward specific outcomes. According  to U.S. European Command officials, they have included OCS-related  master-scenario events as part of their exercises since 2008. While a  training proficiency assessment of these events is not typically performed  by the geographic combatant commands, master-scenario events can  provide command staff the opportunity to perform some OCS-related  tasks and familiarize themselves with OCS processes, among other  things. U.S. Pacific Command has not identified OCS as a critical  capability in the earliest phase of the Joint Training System, which  informs later phases like planning, execution, and assessment of OCS.  However, the command plans to progressively increase OCS play  through training objectives and master-scenario events in forthcoming  exercises—such as the OCS Joint Exercise-15 and Talisman Saber in  2015—to improve OCS issue-collection efforts.
section_title: With the Exception of the Army, the Military Services Are Not Generally Collecting OCS Issues
paragraphs: With the exception of the Army, the military services and their component  commands are not generally collecting OCS issues needed to develop  lessons learned. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction  3150.25E requires the services to conduct a service lessons-learned  program that includes active and passive collection. Furthermore,  guidance from the military departments and services, such as Army  Regulation 11-33, Air Force Instruction 90-1601, Office of the Chief of  Naval Operations Instruction 3500.37C, and Marine Corps Order 3504.1,  establish lessons-learned programs, procedures, and responsibilities,  including for the collection of lessons learned.
The Army collects OCS issues through its dedicated OCS organizations,  active collection tools, training, and comprehensive service-wide OCS  guidance. For example, the Army established the Acquisition, Logistics  and Technology-Integration Office, which is dedicated to leading the  development and integration of OCS across the Army and the Army’s  OCS Lessons Learned Program. Additionally, the Army’s Acquisition,  Logistics and Technology-Integration Office has fully integrated with the  Combined Arms Support Command’s Reverse Collection and Analysis  Team Forum, which collects OCS issues from senior unit leaders  returning from a deployed operation. The program includes live after- action reviews, commander interviews, and an OCS roundtable  discussion with the commander and staff, all of which work as issue- collection tools. In response to an OCS issue identified through its  lessons-learned program, the Army also developed and instituted a 10- day optional OCS course to prepare military and civilian personnel to  develop acquisition-ready requirements and manage a unit’s overall  contract support responsibilities. Graduates receive the Army’s 3C  additional skill identifier. According to Army officials, the Army’s training  has also improved its service members’ overall understanding of the  importance of OCS to mission success. In addition to training, the Army  has developed comprehensive service-wide OCS guidance—such as the  OCS Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures manual and several OCS- related handbooks—to provide tactical, service-specific details to its staff.  According to the Army, the intent of this OCS Tactics, Techniques, and  Procedures manual is to assist commanders in correctly implementing  OCS in the areas of planning, integrating, managing, and synchronizing  OCS. The manual outlines key OCS terms, the Army’s OCS structure,  organizational initiatives, planning, execution, and contractor  management.
While the Army has organization, tools, training, and guidance for  collecting OCS issues, its service component commands collect OCS  issues to varying degrees. For example, Army Northern Command  officials stated that they collected several OCS issues after participating  in the Joint Staff’s OCS exercise hosted by U.S. Northern Command in  January 2014. At U.S. Army South, the command provides its OCS  issues through U.S. Southern Command’s after-action review process,  but does not enter them into the lessons-learned system of record.  However, other Army component commands such as U.S. Army Europe  and U.S. Army Pacific have not collected OCS issues of their own. For  example, U.S. Army Europe relies on the 409th Contracting Support  Brigade to gather OCS issues, but these lessons have been primarily  contracting-related. As discussed later in the report, Army service  component commands are collecting OCS issues to varying degrees  because of a lack of awareness of OCS roles and responsibilities.
In contrast to the Army, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force—and their  component commands—are generally not collecting OCS issues. For  example, officials from the Navy and all the component commands we  interviewed stated that they are not collecting OCS issues or are doing so  to a limited degree. Furthermore, the Marine Corps does not  systematically collect OCS issues. For example, at Marine Corps  headquarters, the official responsible for OCS told us that the Marine  Corps does not systematically collect OCS issues, but that sometimes he  receives e-mails with OCS issues that he tries to resolve based on  experiences he gathered while deployed in Afghanistan. Additionally,  three of the six Marine Corps component commands, including Marine  Corps Forces Central Command, have identified some OCS-related  issues from exercises like Eager Lion in Jordan. six Air Force component commands we interviewed provided us with  examples of contracting issues; however, according to officials, few if any  noncontracting OCS issues had been collected.
Exercise Eager Lion is a multilateral exercise held annually since 2011 where coalition  forces conduct a live-fire, counterattack operation at a range near Jebel Petra, Jordan. In  2014, coalition forces included ground forces from the U.S. Marine Corps, Jordanian  Armed Forces, and the United Kingdom and aviation units from the Kingdom of Jordan,  the Republic of Turkey, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United States. part of OCS. According to these officials, this decision was made because  of a lack of awareness of OCS issues. Furthermore, U.S. Army South  officials noted that part of the challenge of collecting OCS issues from  exercises comes from a lack of understanding of OCS.
In June 2014, a DOD task force on contractor logistics in support of  contingency operations found that strategic leadership across the  department did not recognize OCS as a critical component of combat  readiness. One reason for the general lack of awareness of OCS issues  stems from not having DOD-level guidance that establishes military  service and component command roles and responsibilities regarding  collection of OCS issues. While existing lessons-learned guidance—like  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25E—identifies the  importance of enhancing capabilities by collecting issues in broad terms,  it does not list any specific capabilities such as OCS. Additionally, while  DOD has issued guidance through part 158 of Title 32 of the Code of  Federal Regulations and DOD Instruction 3020.41, which identify the  roles and responsibilities of various OCS stakeholders—including  lessons-learned responsibilities in the case of JCASO and the Director of  Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy—they do not clearly identify  roles and responsibilities for the military services and service component  commands to collect OCS issues. Furthermore, according to Joint  Publication 4-10, the military departments, among other things, are  responsible for integrating OCS into training, exercise, and lessons- learned programs; however, the publication does not specifically identify  collection of OCS issues in its discussion of military service or service  component command roles and responsibilities, as it did in its previous  version. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government, a good internal-control environment requires that the  agency’s organizational structure clearly define key areas of authority and  responsibility and establish appropriate lines of reporting.revises its existing guidance to specifically establish and detail the roles  and responsibilities of the services in collecting OCS issues, it will lack  reasonable assurance that the services and their component commands  recognize the importance of OCS.
Additionally, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force do not have service- specific OCS guidance that establishes and outlines their roles and  responsibilities for the collection of OCS issues, which according to  officials from these services contributes to the general lack of OCS  awareness. As previously discussed, in addition to the JLLP, the services  also have established service-specific lessons-learned programs and  processes in support of the JLLP. However, according to officials from Air  Force and Marine Corps component commands in Europe and Africa, the  lack of service-specific guidance on OCS affects the commands’  understanding of OCS roles and responsibilities, to include their collection  of OCS issues as part of lessons-learned processes.
In February 2013, based on our finding that the Navy, Marine Corps, and  Air Force lacked comprehensive OCS guidance, we recommended that  they develop guidance, which would include the requirement to plan for  OCS. DOD concurred with our recommendation and has tasked the  military services with issuing OCS guidance by the second quarter of  fiscal year 2015. The Army developed OCS guidance in 2010 and 2011.  Additionally, the Marine Corps has developed draft OCS guidance that is  in the review process and is expected to be issued in the spring 2015.  According to Navy officials, the Navy expects to issue its OCS guidance  by the first quarter of fiscal year 2016. However, Air Force officials have  not indicated whether the Air Force will meet DOD’s deadline as it  continues to work to identify a lead to integrate and synchronize OCS  issues. While we continue to believe that comprehensive service-wide  guidance for these services is needed to further the integration of OCS  into all of the services’ planning, our prior recommendation did not  address the issue of the services’ roles and responsibilities for the  collection of OCS issues as part of a lessons-learned process.  Furthermore, according to DOD officials, it is unclear whether future OCS  service-wide guidance from the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force will  include roles and responsibilities for the collection of OCS issues. By not  including the services’ roles and responsibilities to collect OCS issues in  comprehensive service-specific guidance, the services and the service  component commands may not fully understand the importance of their  roles in collecting OCS issues as part of their specific service’s lessons- learned processes. As a result, commanders may be unable to build on  efficiencies that their services have identified by collecting OCS issues  and may be unable to adequately plan for the use of contractor support.
According to DOD officials, another reason that the military services and  their component commands lack awareness of OCS and therefore the  importance of collecting OCS issues is that senior service members—that  is, commanders and senior leaders—do not have an OCS training  requirement. According to DOD’s Joint Concept for OCS, developing a  skilled cadre of multidisciplinary military and civilian personnel with  specialized OCS training and experience is one part of a holistic solution  required to achieve a cultural change to integrate OCS throughout  institutional and operational processes. However, according to senior  service officials there is a lack of awareness of OCS at the leadership  level within their services or component commands, which can be  attributed to inadequate OCS training. According to these officials, OCS  training can help improve commanders’ and senior leaders’ awareness of  OCS issues. For example, service members who attended the Joint  Staff’s Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course generally praised it,  noting that prior to attending the course they had a limited understanding  of OCS issues. However, while the Joint Staff offers the Joint OCS  Planning and Execution Course as an opportunity to educate senior  service members from the geographic combatant commands, military  services, and service component command on OCS, according to senior  Joint Staff officials, the course attendance of senior service members  outside of the logistics functional area has been limited. According to a  senior Joint Staff official, the initial approach for the Joint OCS Planning  and Execution Course was to reach a broad audience as well as to  provide OCS training to those that needed it the most. However, the  official added that DOD needs to find a more-permanent training solution  for OCS. The department also offers several online courses about OCS,  but they are also electives, and none of the services has an OCS training  requirement to take any of these existing courses. Several officials we  interviewed from across the services cited the need for OCS training to  improve awareness of OCS throughout their services. Additionally, senior  officials from the Joint Staff and Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary  of Defense (Program Support) stated that an OCS training requirement  would help the services address their lack of awareness of OCS issues.  The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 recently  added OCS to the list of subject matter to be covered by joint professional  military education, which consists of the instruction and examination of  officers in an environment designed to promote a theoretical and practical  in-depth understanding of joint matters and, specifically, the subject   Without an OCS training requirement, commanders and  matter covered.senior leaders at the military services and component commands may not  be fully aware of OCS and its importance to the success of the  warfighting mission. Furthermore, without this awareness of OCS’s  importance, senior service members may not properly prioritize the  collection of OCS issues.
section_title: DOD Has Made Progress Integrating Some OCS Lessons Learned, but Lacks a Focal Point for Integrating OCS Issues from the JLLP
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Made Progress Integrating Some OCS Changes across the Department, Largely as a Result of Sources outside the JLLP
paragraphs: DOD has made progress integrating some changes resulting from  lessons learned in OCS in doctrine, policy, and training, but these have  largely come as a result of OCS issues raised outside of the JLLP. For  example, in July 2014, DOD published a new version of Joint Publication  4-10, Operational Contract Support, that provides updated doctrine for the  planning, conducting, and managing of OCS in joint operations. It also  provides guidance on matters such as OCS organization command and  control. For example, the new version of Joint Publication 4-10  recommends the establishment of a permanent OCS integration cell at  each geographic combatant command to perform contract-support  integration and to provide oversight of any subordinate joint force  command contract-integration cell when formed. The development of  this concept, according to Joint Publication 4-10, was a direct outgrowth  from experiences in Afghanistan. DOD has also made progress in  integrating changes in OCS through its revision of DOD Instruction  3020.41 and issuance of corresponding regulations in the Code of  Federal Regulations.assign responsibilities, and provide procedures for OCS, including OCS   The instruction and regulations establish policy,  program management, contract-support integration, and integration of  defense contractor personnel into contingency operations outside the  United States. According to DOD documentation, initial lessons from  Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom provided  impetus for developing a DOD policy for managing contractor personnel  in support of contingency operations.
Additionally, the Joint Staff (J-4) developed a 10-day Joint OCS Planning  and Execution Course for officers with support from Joint Staff (J-7), the  Army’s Acquisition, Logistics, Technology and Integration Office, and the  Defense Acquisition University. According to DOD officials, the course  was developed to fill the training gap in joint OCS planning and execution  of OCS planners at the geographic combatant commands, sub–joint force  command and service-component levels to plan and execute OCS across  the range of military operations. The joint course, which is targeted at  officers, senior noncommissioned officers, and government civilians  focuses primarily on operational-level OCS staff responsibilities and tasks  during military operations. Moreover, based on information from a  Reverse Collection and Analysis Team, the Army identified that it lacked  personnel that could provide primarily tactical-level OCS capabilities for  units. In response, the Army established an additional skill identifier for  OCS and developed an OCS course to train and prepare designated  soldiers on how to prepare acquisition-ready requirements and manage a  unit’s overall contract-support responsibilities.
Sources of information outside of the JLLP have generally proved more  significant in shaping changes in OCS. For example, according to a  December 2013 DOD report on OCS Lessons Learned, the Secretary of  the Army–directed Commission on Army Acquisition and Program  Management in Expeditionary Operations (otherwise known as the  Gansler Commission), the Commission on Wartime Contracting, and  various GAO reports have proved more relevant than DOD’s lessons- learned program in effecting changes in doctrine, policy, training, and  education among other areas. Further, according to the DOD report,  legislation and congressional focus and oversight provided additional  urgency and visibility to OCS lessons learned, garnering the attention and  focus of senior DOD leaders to institute improvements. For example,  according to the department’s report on OCS lessons learned, the Joint  OCS Planning and Execution Course addresses a provision in the  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. DOD also  stated in the report that many of the OCS lessons learned identified from  the JLLP are too tactically focused to help shape needed changes.
section_title: DOD Lacks a Focal Point for Integrating OCS Issues from the JLLP
paragraphs: The extent to which DOD can integrate OCS issues from the JLLP is  limited because the department does not have a focal point for OCS  lessons learned. As noted by DOD’s OCS Joint Concept, there are  multiple organizations across the department that are working on  separate, and sometimes disjointed, OCS lessons-learned efforts.  Without a lead for lessons learned, as stated in the document, the  department will continue to develop OCS capabilities in a haphazard and  inefficient manner. According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned  handbook, which serves a guide for establishing a lessons-learned  capability, the successful resolution and integration of lessons learned   If unit commanders  requires executive-level support or involvement.have the capability to correct an issue internally, according to the  handbook, they should do that. However, according to the handbook,  there will be issues that rise to the next level of attention that an  organization is unable to correct internally. Further, the Center for Army  Lessons Learned handbook emphasizes that without senior-level  leadership involvement, with the authority to task agencies to work issues  and reallocate resources, the lessons-learned process will fail. Moreover,  according to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, a  good internal-control environment requires that the agency’s  organizational structure clearly define key areas of authority and  responsibility and establish appropriate lines of reporting.
In December 2006, we found that there was no organization within DOD  responsible for developing procedures to systematically collect and share  its institutional knowledge regarding the use of contractors to support  deployed forces. point to, among other things, lead and coordinate the development of a  department-wide lessons-learned program to capture the experiences of  units deployed to locations with OCS. DOD concurred with our  recommendation, and stated that DOD would develop and implement a  systematic strategy for capturing, retaining, and applying lessons learned  on the use of contractor support to deployed forces. Additionally, DOD  subsequently stated in response to this recommendation that JCASO  would be deemed responsible for collecting OCS lessons learned. While  the department, as of December 2014, has not developed a systematic  strategy for capturing, retaining, and applying OCS lessons learned, it has  assigned JCASO responsibility for collecting joint operations–focused  OCS lessons learned and best practices from contingency operations and  exercises in order to inform OCS policy and recommend solutions in  doctrine and training, among other areas, in cooperation with the services  and other DOD components.senior DOD officials, JCASO does not serve as a focal point for  integrating OCS issues from the JLLP, but rather informs policy and  recommends solutions on joint OCS issues. JCASO was tasked in the  DOD OCS Action Plan to provide an assessment of OCS lessons learned  to the OCS Functional Capabilities Integration Board and to lead efforts to  identify enterprise-wide solutions to incorporate them, such as in doctrine,  policy, and procedures. However, according to officials, the assessment  will be completed by the end of 2016.
GAO-07-145. meet emerging OCS requirements. JCASO’s responsibilities regarding  lessons learned will be included in this assessment. According to senior  DOD officials, they expect to complete this review by the end of fiscal  year 2015.
In the past few years, there has been significant support within the  department for an OCS joint proponent with lessons-learned  responsibilities. Joint Publication 1-02 defines a joint proponent as a  service, combatant command, or Joint Staff directorate assigned  coordinating authority to lead the collaborative development and  integration of joint capability with specific responsibilities designated by  the Secretary of Defense. The October 2013 OCS Joint Concept  outlined a plan to designate a proponent that would, among things,  manage the OCS lessons-learned process to ensure the latest lessons  and best practices from the field are recorded to ensure that capability  requirements and content across DOD’s institutional processes are  consistent. According to the plan, this proponent would establish and  maintain the OCS joint lessons-learned process to collect, catalog, and  validate observations, insights, and lessons from operations and  exercises. Furthermore, the services, geographic combatant commands,  and the combat service agencies would work collaboratively with the  proponent to ensure issues and lessons learned are entered into the  process. Additionally, a June 2014 report from the Defense Science  Board also recommended that the department establish a 3-star- equivalent, director-level proponent that would coordinate OCS efforts  across the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the military  departments, and the defense agencies, and support efforts to resource  critical OCS-related requirements across these organizations. The  report recommended that this proponent oversee the creation of a visible  and transparent knowledge-management system for OCS that links  planning, requirements, contracting, and audit functions.
Several officials we spoke with expressed support for an OCS joint  proponent with lessons-learned responsibilities. As Joint Staff (J-7)  officials explained, having a joint proponent is essential to integrating  issues in cross-capabilities such as OCS because it allows OCS  stakeholders, for example, to better advocate for additional resources  during high-level DOD processes such as the Joint Capabilities  Integration and Development System. Additionally, Joint Staff (J-4)  officials noted that the OCS lessons-learned process has many owners  and lacks a singular point of focus. They added that OCS in general can  become compartmentalized among the defense agencies, military  services, and combatant commands. However, according to officials,  since the community is relatively small currently, they prefer to talk and  share relevant information informally rather than through the JLLP  process. Army lessons-learned officials stated that the OCS lessons- learned community is disjointed and lacks synchronization, and stated  that a joint proponent with lessons-learned responsibilities is the next  logical step in institutionalizing OCS in the department. However, Army  officials cautioned that DOD should be careful in selecting a joint  proponent, as it must be properly situated in the department and staffed  with personnel with diverse and relevant expertise.
DOD has undertaken initial efforts to identify and assign an OCS joint  proponent that will include lessons-learned responsibilities. According to  officials, as of December 2014, the Joint Staff (J-4) is leading a feasibility  assessment with the Functional Capabilities Integration Board for an OCS  Joint Proponent. The assessment team plans to issue its findings to the  Functional Capabilities Integration Board in February 2015. According to  officials, they have agreed to recommend a single OCS joint proponent to  handle multiple areas such as training, personnel, materiel, as well as  lessons learned. However, according to officials, they have not  determined specific roles and responsibilities, such as whether the joint  proponent would be responsible for providing formal oversight for  integrating OCS issues from the JLLP. As DOD develops its concept for  an OCS joint proponent, by establishing such roles and responsibilities,  DOD could help ensure that it has a systematic strategy for capturing,  retaining, and applying lessons learned on the use of OCS, to include  integrating issues from the JLLP. Including such roles and responsibilities  in the concept for the OCS joint proponent will help better position DOD to  integrate all OCS issues identified from the JLLP, thereby addressing any  key OCS gaps and shortfalls in its efforts.
section_title: DOD Organizations Inconsistently Use JLLIS to Share OCS Issues and Lessons Learned Due to Challenges with the System’s Limited Functionality
subsections: section_title: DOD Organizations That Collect and Resolve OCS Issues and Lessons Learned Use JLLIS to Varying Degrees
paragraphs: The geographic combatant commands and Army use JLLIS to varying  degrees to share OCS lessons learned department-wide. Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25E states that the Joint Staff Joint  Directorates and combatant commands shall share joint issues in the  JLLP, and the military services shall share information across the joint  force in support of the JLLP. According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs  of Staff Instruction 3150.25E, JLLIS is the department’s system of record  for the JLLP, the primary means of dissemination of lessons learned, and  facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative  resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the  development and readiness of the joint force. Furthermore, Standards  for Internal Control in the Federal Government indicate that all  transactions and other significant events should be clearly documented  and the documentation readily available.
We found that all of the geographic combatant commands enter OCS  issues into JLLIS, but do not use the system to track the progress of  collection and resolution efforts. For example, U.S. Pacific Command  officials entered issues from Operation Tomodachi into JLLIS, such as the  need for a Joint Theater Support Contracting Command. In August  2012, U.S. Pacific Command officials used this issue and others to inform  the development of U.S. Pacific Command Instruction 0601.7 on OCS,  which included planning considerations and procedures for establishing a  Joint Theater Support Contracting Command, and a month later,  cohosted a rehearsal-of-concept drill with the Joint Staff (J-4). The  objectives of the rehearsal-of-concept drill included testing and adjusting  tactics, techniques, and procedures developed by the Joint Staff (J-4) and  the methodology for establishing and manning a Joint Theater Support  Contracting Command. However, U.S. Pacific Command officials did not  use the system to track these resolution activities. As a result, U.S.  Pacific Command’s resolution involving the development and issuance of  U.S. Pacific Command Instruction 0601.7 was neither entered into JLLIS  nor shared through JLLIS so that other geographic combatant commands  encountering similar challenges could view it. Similarly, U.S. Southern  Command entered issues collected from exercises and operations into  JLLIS, but used processes outside of JLLIS to resolve OCS issues. As  the JLLP’s system of record, JLLIS facilitates the collaborative resolution  of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint  force. For instance, the lessons-learned process provides DOD  organizations with a joint lesson memorandum, a tool that may be used  by organizations’ leadership to inform the Joint Staff of lessons requiring  their analysis and resolution. However, U.S. Southern Command officials  stated that they have used means such as the Program Budget Review  process, or even phone calls to communicate OCS issues and shortfalls  to the Joint Staff, but that no issues have been forwarded to the Joint  Staff through the formal issue-resolution process.
The geographic combatant commands also enter OCS issues into JLLIS  at different rates. According to CJCS Instruction 3150.25E, combatant  commands are to collect and share key, overarching, and crosscutting  issues using JLLIS no later than 45 days after the end of an exercise, in  order to facilitate the timely sharing of issues from combatant-command  exercises.geographic commands enter OCS issues into JLLIS varies. For instance,  U.S. European Command officials stated that they use JLLIS as a  repository to store OCS issues until they can be reviewed for possible  resolution efforts. Other commands enter OCS issues into JLLIS after a  resolution has been validated. Officials from U.S. Northern Command,  U.S. European Command, and U.S. Africa Command stated that they  have internal processes for collecting and resolving OCS issues prior to  submission into JLLIS. According to an official with U.S. European  Command, this process could take a year or more.
However, according to DOD officials, the rate at which  On the other hand, the Army developed an OCS concept to synchronize  efforts on OCS lessons learned that included utilizing the Army Lessons  Learned Information System, the Army’s portal to JLLIS to share issues  and lessons learned. The Army’s Acquisition, Logistics, Technology, and  Integration Office, which leads the development and integration of OCS  across the Army and the Army’s OCS lessons learned program,  recognized that OCS issues collected from after-action reports, reverse  collection and analysis action teams, and the Center for Army Lessons  Learned resided in multiple repositories and were not shared throughout  the Army. As a result, the Army’s Acquisition, Logistics and Technology- Integration Office developed and currently administers an OCS lessons- learned portal on the Army Lessons Learned Information System to  create a primary system to input OCS issues and ensure that OCS  lessons learned are shared within the system. However, the Navy, Marine  Corps, and Air Force are not generally collecting OCS issues, and  therefore, not generally sharing OCS issues in JLLIS. For example, while  Air Force officials provided us with examples of contracting issues they  collected, they reported that few, if any, noncontracting OCS issues had  been collected.
section_title: DOD Organizations Generally Rely on Forums and Systems outside of JLLIS to Share OCS Issues and Lessons Learned
paragraphs: Those DOD organizations that collect and resolve OCS issues and  lessons learned generally rely on forums and systems outside of DOD’s  lessons-learned program to share OCS issues and lessons learned. We  found that five of the six geographic combatant commands rely on OCS- related boards and working groups to share OCS lessons learned within  their geographic combatant commands and respective service  component commands. For example, officials from U.S. Africa Command  and U.S. Northern Command reported that they share OCS lessons  learned during meetings of their respective OCS Working Groups and  Commanders Logistics Procurement Support Boards; however, U.S.  Northern Command officials clarified that meeting minutes were the only  way to record lessons learned discussed during their meetings of the  Commanders Logistics Procurement Support Board. U.S. Central  Command officials stated that they rely exclusively on personal  relationships, e-mails, and telephone calls to share OCS lessons learned.  However, by using forums and methods outside of JLLIS to share OCS  issues and lessons learned, such as meeting minutes and telephone  calls, DOD runs the risk of not being able to systematically track, resolve,  and share OCS issues department-wide, which could negatively affect  joint force development and readiness.
The geographic combatant commands and service component  commands also store and share OCS lessons learned on local  SharePoint portals, which limit information sharing to the other  geographic combatant commands and service component commands.  For example, U.S. European Command stores and shares OCS issues  and lessons learned on its classified SharePoint portal. In another  instance, U.S. Pacific Air Forces does not input any lessons learned into  JLLIS; instead, it houses lessons learned on a classified community of  practice on U.S. Pacific Air Forces’ SharePoint portal, which as of July  2014, was not active or available to users. Two out of six Army service  component commands—U.S. Army Europe and U.S. Army Pacific—also  store lessons learned on their local SharePoint portals. Officials with U.S.  Army Europe reported that they occasionally share issues and lessons  learned with the European Contracting Coordination Board. Meanwhile,  officials with U.S. Army Pacific stated that sharing issues and lessons  learned throughout U.S. Pacific Command or other geographic combatant  commands can prove difficult since they store their lessons on local  SharePoint portals, which exist behind firewalls.
section_title: JLLIS’s Functionality as an Information-Sharing Mechanism Is Limited
paragraphs: DOD is generally not sharing OCS lessons learned in JLLIS because the  system is not functional for users searching OCS issues. JLLIS’s limited  functionality for OCS issues is due to (1) its inadequate search features,  (2) not having an OCS label in JLLIS, and (3) the lack of a central location  for sharing information about OCS issues and lessons learned within  JLLIS. According to the Joint Staff (J-7), which serves as the office of  primary responsibility for JLLIS, the system’s search features pose  significant challenges to retrieving information for civilian and military  users without expertise or experience with JLLIS. Officials with the Joint  Staff (J-7) stated that users who regularly utilize the system, such as  doctrine writers, know how to mine the system for pertinent information,  but JLLIS’s search features can be difficult to use for infrequent users of  the system. Furthermore, officials at three of the six commands—U.S.  Africa Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Southern  Command—reported that it is difficult to research OCS issues and  lessons learned due to JLLIS’s poor search functionality.
In addition to JLLIS’s limited search features, JLLIS does not have a label  for OCS issues and lessons learned. When users enter issues and  lessons learned into JLLIS, the system allows users to label information  as pertaining to a certain topic, which improves their ability to later search  for issues and lessons learned related to that topic. For example, JLLIS  has a label for Sustainment issues and lessons learned. JLLIS users  researching issues and lessons learned on Sustainment can search for  that label, and the system will return information related to Sustainment.  However, there is no label for OCS in JLLIS. Officials at three of the six  commands—U.S. Africa Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S.  Southern Command—reported that it is difficult to research OCS issues  and lessons learned because JLLIS does not have a label for OCS. In the  absence of an OCS label, officials at U.S. Southern Command noted that  they use related functional areas and joint mission-essential tasks to label  OCS issues and lessons learned to improve their ability to find relevant  information; however, this process does not ensure that those issues and  lessons learned will be properly categorized as OCS. Joint Staff (J-4)  officials stated that there is little chance that OCS issues or lessons  learned in JLLIS will be useful or communicated to a broader OCS  audience if they are labeled incorrectly or do not specifically refer to OCS.
In July 2014, we visited the Joint Staff (J-7) for a demonstration of JLLIS.  During that meeting, JLLIS allowed users viewing information to search  only by a single word. For example, when tested during the  demonstration, “operational contract support” was an invalid search term  because it contained a phrase with multiple words. On the other hand,  “OCS” was a valid search term because it contained only a single word.  When tested during the demonstration, the search for “OCS” yielded  2,191 results. However, these results included information regarding  “officer candidate school” and “joint operation command systems”—other  topics that also include the letters OCS. Without an OCS label, we were  unable to narrow the search results to information pertaining only to OCS.
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,  Report on Contingency Contracting and Operational Contract Support Lessons Learned  (Dec. 20, 2013), p. 19. repositories, which limits the sharing of OCS information department- wide.
According to officials with the Joint Staff (J-7), they have received  feedback from several JLLIS users reporting that the search features are  not user friendly. The officials stated that JLLIS’s search features can  make the system difficult for the average user to utilize. As a result, they  informed us that they have made improving the search features in JLLIS  a priority. During our visits in July 2014, the Joint Staff (J-7) was in the  process of acquiring software to upgrade the search feature in JLLIS, and  according to the Joint Staff (J-7), as of November 2014 the upgrade had  been approved and funded. Joint Staff (J-7) officials stated that JLLIS will  be enhanced with the integration of IBM Content Analytics software. The  software package will provide enhanced search capability that includes  keyword and phrase search features, search suggestions, and spelling  correction. The estimated timeline for full implementation of the upgrade  within JLLIS ends in approximately May 2015. However, the software  upgrade will not address the lack of an OCS label or designated OCS  community of practice. As a result, the software upgrade will have a  limited effect on improving JLLIS’s functionality for searching and sharing  OCS issues and lessons learned.
According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25E,  JLLIS is the JLLP’s system of record and facilitates the collection,  tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and  dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and  readiness of the joint force. Due to JLLIS’s limited functionality for  searching OCS issues and lessons learned, DOD organizations rely  instead on forums and systems outside of JLLIS to share OCS issues and  lessons learned. By sharing OCS issues and lessons learned using  limited distribution channels like e-mails, specific forums, or SharePoint  portals, OCS information may not be clearly documented in a single  location and readily available to a wider audience for examination,  consistent with standards for internal control in the federal government.  As a result, until DOD improves the functionality of JLLIS it will be difficult  for users to search for OCS issues, and DOD runs the risk of working on  duplicative efforts and repeating past mistakes. For example, officials  from one geographic combatant command we interviewed reported  having difficulty developing a policy for Synchronized Predeployment and  Operational Tracker in their area of responsibility. However, other  geographic combatant commands, such as U.S. European Command  and U.S. Africa Command, have already developed and implemented  independent policies for this system throughout their area of  responsibility. According to the JLLP, the challenges associated with the  policy development should have been entered in JLLIS so other  geographic combatant commands would not encounter the same  difficulties. As we reported in 2006 and later testified in 2008, when OCS  lessons learned are not systematically shared, DOD runs the risk of being  unable to build on the efficiencies and effectiveness others have  developed during past operations that involved OCS.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD has spent billions of dollars on contract support since 2002, and  while it has taken some positive steps in recent years to institutionalize  OCS, the department has experienced challenges in collecting,  integrating, and sharing OCS issues and lessons learned. The  geographic combatant commands continue to improve efforts to collect  OCS issues from operations and exercises, but the military services other  than the Army are not generally collecting OCS issues nor is there a  requirement for training on OCS lessons learned issues. Actions to  improve and develop specific guidance as well as require OCS training  for commanders and senior leaders could improve awareness of OCS  capabilities and the importance of collecting OCS issues for mission  success. Additionally, DOD has made progress integrating some OCS  issues, largely as a result of sources outside of the JLLP. With multiple  organizations across the department working on separate and sometimes  disjointed lessons-learned efforts, the department’s ability to integrate  issues from the JLLP remains limited. By not including specific roles and  responsibilities related to lessons learned in its concept for the OCS joint  proponent, DOD may not be positioned to integrate all OCS issues  identified from the JLLP, and may be unable to address any key OCS  gaps and shortfalls in its efforts. Further, we found that while JLLIS  remains the department’s JLLP system of record, DOD organizations  generally rely on systems outside of JLLIS to collect, resolve, and share  OCS issues and lessons learned. Until DOD improves the functionality of  JLLIS, it will be difficult for users to search for OCS issues, and DOD runs  the risk of working on duplicative efforts and repeating past mistakes. In a  resource-constrained environment, DOD will continue to depend on  contractors to provide increased capacity, capabilities, and skills in the  future. However, without more consistent and systematic OCS lessons  learned efforts, the department lacks reasonable assurance that it has  identified key gaps in OCS capabilities and that it will not repeat past  mistakes in future contingencies.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are recommending that the department take five actions to improve  efforts to collect, integrate, and share OCS lessons learned.
To help improve collection of OCS issues by the military services and  service component commands, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense revise existing DOD guidance, such as DOD Instruction  3020.41, to specifically detail the roles and responsibilities of the services  in collecting OCS issues.
To specifically identify and improve awareness of OCS roles and  responsibilities and to collect OCS issues at the military services and the  service component commands, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force to include the  services’ roles and responsibilities to collect OCS issues in  comprehensive service-specific guidance on how the Navy, Marine  Corps, and Air Force should integrate OCS.
To help improve awareness of OCS roles and responsibilities and to  collect OCS issues at the military services and the service component  commands, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Secretaries of the military departments, in coordination with the Chairman  of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to establish an OCS training requirement for  commanders and senior leaders.
To help improve DOD’s management of OCS lessons learned, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that, as the department  develops a concept for an OCS joint proponent, it include specific roles  and responsibilities for a focal point responsible for integrating OCS  issues from the Joint Lessons Learned Program.
To help improve the functionality of JLLIS for sharing OCS lessons  learned, we recommend that, as DOD upgrades JLLIS, the Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the Joint Staff (J-7) and Joint Staff (J-4) to  implement an OCS label in JLLIS and designate a single community of  practice for OCS in JLLIS.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with four of  the five recommendations and partially concurred with one  recommendation. DOD’s comments are summarized below and reprinted  in appendix III. DOD also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated where appropriate.
DOD concurred with the first recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense revise existing DOD guidance, such as DOD Instruction  3020.41, to specifically detail the roles and responsibilities of the services  in collecting OCS issues. In its response, DOD stated that specific details  regarding the roles and responsibilities of the services in collecting OCS  issues will be incorporated in the revised Instruction. We believe that this  action, if fully implemented, would meet the intent of the recommendation.
DOD concurred with the second recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force to include the  services’ roles and responsibilities to collect OCS issues in  comprehensive service-specific guidance on how the Navy, Marine  Corps, and Air Force should integrate OCS. Although DOD stated in its  response that the services should take steps to include such guidance, it  did not identify any actions DOD would take to direct the services to do  so. We believe such direction from the Secretary of Defense to the  services, as we recommended, is necessary to ensure roles and  responsibilities for collecting OCS issues are adequately and consistently  identified in each of the services’ OCS guidance.
DOD concurred with the third recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretaries of the military departments, in coordination  with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to establish an OCS  training requirement for commanders and senior leaders. In its response,  DOD stated that the services are developing OCS training requirements  for commanders and senior leaders in coordination with the Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We believe that this action, if fully implemented,  would meet the intent of the recommendation.
DOD partially concurred with the fourth recommendation that the  Secretary of Defense ensure that, as the department develops a concept  for an OCS joint proponent, it include specific roles and responsibilities for  a focal point responsible for integrating OCS issues from the JLLP. In its  comments, DOD stated that efforts to review and evaluate potential  courses of action to establish an OCS joint proponent are under way and  upon completion, the department will determine the way ahead. We agree  that this is a reasonable approach. However, as we noted in our report,  DOD could help ensure that it has a systematic strategy for capturing,  retaining, and applying OCS lessons learned by establishing specific  OCS lessons-learned responsibilities for a future OCS joint proponent,  such as whether it would be responsible for providing formal oversight for  integrating OCS issues from the JLLP. Including such roles and  responsibilities in the concept for the OCS joint proponent will help better  position DOD to integrate all OCS issues identified from the JLLP,  thereby addressing any key OCS gaps and shortfalls in its efforts.
DOD concurred with the fifth recommendation that, as DOD upgrades  JLLIS, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the Joint Staff (J-7)  and Joint Staff (J-4) to implement an OCS label in JLLIS and designate a  single community of practice for OCS in JLLIS. In its response, DOD  stated that the Joint Staff is working to develop a single community of  practice.  However, DOD did not specifically address how it would  implement an OCS label in JLLIS. As we noted in our report, establishing  a specific OCS label in JLLIS would improve the search capabilities for  OCS issues and better enable communication of lessons learned to a  broader OCS audience.  Accordingly, we believe that DOD also needs to  establish such an OCS label in JLLIS to fully address the  recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense, the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of the military  departments. The report is also available at no charge on GAO’s website  at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page   of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: We performed our work under the Comptroller General’s authority to  conduct evaluations at his own initiative, in light of congressional interest  in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to institutionalize lessons  learned related to operational contract support (OCS). This report  examines the extent to which (1) the geographic combatant commands  and the services collect OCS issues to develop lessons learned; (2) DOD  has a focal point for integrating OCS issues from the Joint Lessons  Learned Program (JLLP); and (3) DOD organizations use the Joint  Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) to share OCS issues and  lessons learned. To address these objectives, we excluded OCS issues  and lessons learned from the acquisition community—for example,  contracting officers. According to Joint Publication 4-10, the Director of  Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy is responsible for developing  and implementing a DOD-wide contingency contracting–related lessons- learned program and ensuring validated lessons from this program are  disseminated and incorporated into relevant Defense Acquisition  University instruction.
To determine the extent to which the geographic combatant commands  and the services collect OCS issues to develop lessons learned, we  reviewed guidance to understand the roles and responsibilities of these  DOD entities regarding the collection of OCS issues and compared them  with the information we collected during our interviews to identify the  extent to which the geographic combatant commands and the services  collect OCS issues. Specifically, we reviewed the relevant provisions in  part 158 of Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations and DOD  Instruction 3020.41, which establish policy, assign responsibilities, and  provide procedures for OCS, including OCS program management,  contract support integration, and integration of defense contractor   We  personnel into contingency operations outside the United States. also reviewed Joint Publication 4-10, which provides joint doctrine for  planning, executing, and managing OCS in all phases of joint operations.
32 C.F.R. pt. 158; Department of Defense Instruction 3020.41, Operational Contract  Support (OCS) (Dec. 20, 2011).
Additionally, we reviewed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction  3150.25E, which establishes policy, guidance, and responsibilities for the  JLLP, to understand the established lessons-learned process.  Furthermore, to understand how OCS should be integrated into the  geographic combatant commands’ training systems and plans, we  reviewed joint training guidance, such as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff Instruction 3500.01H and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  Notice 3500.01. Additionally, we reviewed the Joint Concept for OCS,  which is intended to guide OCS capability development for the Joint  Force 2020. In addition to joint guidance, we reviewed military department  and service guidance, such as Army Regulation 11-33, Air Force  Instruction 90-1601, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction  3500.37C, and Marine Corps Order 3504.1, to identify any military  department- or service-specific policies, guidance, and responsibilities for  the collection of issues. We also interviewed OCS and lessons-learned  officials from all six geographic combatant commands, all of the  associated military service component commands, and the Army, the  Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps to discuss their roles and  responsibilities regarding the collection of OCS issues. We visited all six  geographic combatant commands to conduct our interviews with them.
To determine the extent to which DOD has a focal point for integrating  OCS issues learned from the JLLP, we reviewed related GAO reports on  OCS, as well as related reports issued by the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, OCS  Functional Capabilities Integration Board, and the Center for Army  Lessons Learned. Furthermore, we reviewed the Joint Contingency  Acquisition Support Office’s (JCASO) OCS issue collection documents— presentation and reports—to understand the scope of its efforts to  integrate OCS lessons learned into doctrine, policy, training, and  education. We compared guidance, such as relevant provisions in part  158 of Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25E, DOD Instruction 3020.41, Joint  Publication 4-10, and charters for the OCS Functional Capabilities  Integration Board, with DOD’s process for the integration of OCS lessons  learned. Additionally, we interviewed officials from the Joint Staff and  JCASO, which participate in the process of integrating OCS lessons  learned in doctrine, policy, training, and education and informing OCS  policy and recommending solutions, respectively. We also interviewed  officials specifically focused on integrating OCS department-wide, such  as officials from the Operational Contract Support Functional Capabilities  Integration Board, to obtain their perspective on the progress the  department has made in integrating OCS. In addition to these officials, we  interviewed officials from each of the services—Army, Navy, Air Force,  and Marine Corps—to gain an understanding of how each service has  integrated OCS lessons learned from the JLLP. We compared this  information to federal internal-control standards that state a good internal- control environment requires that the agency’s organizational structure  clearly define key areas of authority and responsibility and establish  appropriate lines of reporting.
To determine the extent to which DOD organizations have used JLLIS to  share OCS issues and lessons learned, we collected and analyzed  documentation, such as guidance related to the dissemination of OCS  issues and lessons learned. Specifically, we reviewed Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25E, which establishes policy,  guidance, and responsibilities for the JLLP, to identify the roles and  responsibilities of commanders to share OCS issues and lessons learned  and identify the JLLP system of record for sharing those issues and  lessons learned. Additionally, we participated in a demonstration of JLLIS  led by the Joint Staff (J-7) to understand and observe JLLIS’s function as  an information-sharing system, specifically its search and cataloging  capabilities. Due to the OCS responsibilities identified in DOD guidance,  we also interviewed officials from the Joint Staff (J-4), geographic  combatant commands, each of the services, and their respective service  component commands to obtain their perspective on JLLIS for sharing  OCS issues and lessons learned. To determine the extent to which DOD  organizations have used JLLIS to share OCS issues and lessons learned,  we interviewed officials from the aforementioned organizations to gain an  understanding of how each organization shares OCS issues and lessons  learned. We also compared this information to federal internal-control  standards that indicate that all significant events should be clearly  documented and the documentation readily available.
We visited or contacted officials from the following DOD organizations  during our review:
Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia  Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  Joint Staff J-4 (Logistics) Directorate, Washington, D.C.  Joint Staff J-7 (Joint Force Development) Directorate,  Washington, D.C.
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology  and Logistics
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program  Support), Washington, D.C.
OCS Functional Capabilities Integration Board, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Africa Command, Stuttgart, Germany
U.S. Central Command, Tampa, Florida
U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany
U.S. Northern Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado
U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii
U.S. Southern Command, Doral, Florida
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4 (Logistics), Washington, D.C.
U.S. Army Acquisition, Logistics and Technology-Integration Office,
U.S. Army Africa, Vicenza, Italy
U.S. Army Central, Kuwait City, Kuwait
U.S. Army Europe, Wiesbaden, Germany
U.S. Army North, San Antonio, Texas
U.S. Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, Hawaii
U.S. Army South, Fort Sam Houston, Texas
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy–Acquisition and Procurement,  Washington, D.C.
U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia
U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base,
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa, Stuttgart, Germany
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Northern Command, New Orleans,
U.S. Marine Corps Forces South, Doral, Florida
U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, Bahrain
U.S. Naval Forces Europe–Africa, Naples, Italy
U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command, Naval Station Mayport,
U.S. Pacific Fleet, Makalapa, Hawaii  Department of the Air Force
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition),  Directorate of Contracting, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Air Forces Air Combat Command Lessons Learned (A9L),  Washington, D.C.
U.S. Air Forces Central Command, Shaw Air Force Base, South
U.S. Air Forces Europe and Air Forces Africa, Ramstein Air Base,
U.S. Air Forces Northern (1st Air Force), Tyndall Air Force Base,
U.S. Air Forces Southern (12th Air Force), Tucson, Arizona
U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Joint Base Pearl Harbor–Hickam, Hawaii  We conducted this performance audit from March 2014 to March 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Department of Defense’s Geographic Combatant Commands and Their Service Component Commands
paragraphs: Appendix II contains information presented in figure 1 in a noninteractive  format.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Carole Coffey, Assistant Director;  Adam Anguiano; Mae Jones; Marcus Lloyd Oliver; Ashley Orr; James A.  Reynolds; Michael Shaughnessy; and Michael Silver made key  contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Warfighter Support: DOD Needs Additional Steps to Fully Integrate  Operational Contract Support into Contingency Planning. GAO-13-212.  Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2013.
Contingency Contracting: Agency Actions to Address Recommendations  by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.  GAO-12-854R. Washington, D.C.: August 1, 2012.
Operational Contract Support: Management and Oversight Improvements  Needed in Afghanistan. GAO-12-290. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2012.
Defense Contract Management Agency: Amid Ongoing Efforts to Rebuild  Capacity, Several Factors Present Challenges in Meeting Its Missions.  GAO-12-83. Washington, D.C.: November 3, 2011.
Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility,  Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role.  GAO-11-774. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2011.
Afghanistan: U.S. Efforts to Vet Non-U.S. Vendors Need Improvement.  GAO-11-355. Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2011.
Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using  Contractors to Support Future Military Operations. GAO-10-472.  Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.