Littoral Combat Ship and Frigate: Slowing Planned Frigate Acquisition Would Enable Better-Informed Decisions
Published: 2016-12-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:
The Navy took a revolutionary, dual ship approach to buying the Littoral Combat Ship over a decade ago, but this approach has fallen short. LCS has taken longer, cost more, and delivered less capability than expected. The Navy recently decided to pursue a modified LCS that it calls a frigate.
The Navy intends to commit quickly and buy 12 frigates, but the ship's design, cost, and capabilities remain uncertain.
We testified that Congress faces a key decision in 2017—whether to authorize the Navy's strategy for buying all of the frigates, despite significant design and cost uncertainty and no schedule imperative to make such a decision.

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Navy envisioned a revolutionary approach for the LCS program: dual ship designs with interchangeable mission packages intended to provide mission flexibility at a lower cost. This approach has fallen short, with significant cost increases and reduced expectations about mission flexibility and performance. The Navy has changed acquisition approaches several times. The latest change involves minor upgrades to an LCS design—referred to now as a frigate. Yet, questions persist about both the LCS and the frigate.
GAO has reported on the acquisition struggles facing LCS and now the frigate. This statement discusses: (1) the evolution of the LCS acquisition strategy and where it stands today; (2) key risks in the Navy's plans for the frigate based on the LCS program; and (3) remaining oversight opportunities for the LCS and frigate programs. This statement is largely based on GAO's prior reports and larger work on shipbuilding and acquisition best practices. It incorporates limited updated audit work where appropriate.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Navy's vision for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has evolved significantly over the last 15 years, reflecting degradations of the underlying business case. Initial plans to experiment with two different prototype ships adapted from commercial designs were abandoned early in favor of an acquisition approach that committed to numerous ships before proving their capabilities. Cost, schedule, and capability expectations have eroded over time, as shown in the table below. More recently, the Navy attributed a series of engineering casualties on delivered LCS to shortfalls in crew training, seaframe design, and construction quality.
Concerned about the LCS's survivability and lethality, in 2014 the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to evaluate alternatives. After rejecting more capable ships based partly on cost, schedule, and industrial base considerations, the Navy chose the existing LCS designs with minor modifications and re-designated the ship as a frigate. Many of the LCS's capabilities are yet to be demonstrated and the frigate's design, cost, and capabilities are not well-defined. The Navy proposes to commit quickly to the frigate in what it calls a block buy of 12 ships.
Soon, Congress will be asked to make key decisions that have significant funding and oversight implications, but without having important information. The Navy plans to request fiscal year 2018 authorization for its frigate block buy approach. Of note, the pricing the Navy intends to seek from the shipyards will be for 12 basic LCS. Only later will the shipyards submit their proposals for adding frigate capabilities to the LCS hulls. Congress will be asked to authorize this approach many months before the Department of Defense (DOD) prepares an independent cost estimate. Further, there is no industrial base imperative to continue with the Navy's planned pace for the frigate acquisition. LCS workload backlogs, when combined with 2 LCS awarded earlier in 2016 and 2 more planned for award in fiscal year 2017, will take construction at both shipyards into 2021.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement but has made numerous recommendations to DOD in the past on LCS and frigate acquisition, including strengthening the program's business case before proceeding with acquisition decisions. While DOD has, at times, agreed with GAO's recommendations, it has taken limited action to implement them. GAO has also suggested that Congress take certain actions to support better LCS and frigate outcomes.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of the Navy’s  Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and frigate programs. The Navy envisioned a  revolutionary approach to the LCS program. Unlike other surface  combatant programs, LCS consists of two different ship design variants  (called seaframes) with interchangeable mission packages carrying  equipment for three mission areas—surface warfare, anti-submarine  warfare, and mine countermeasures—intended to give the Navy flexibility  to rapidly deploy equipment and incorporate new systems. Coupled with  this approach, the LCS would have a smaller crew that would rely on  shore-based support for its maintenance needs in an effort to reduce life- cycle costs.
To execute the program, the Navy deviated from traditional shipbuilding  acquisition in hopes of rapidly delivering ships to the fleet. The  consequences of this approach are well known today—costs to construct  the ships have more than doubled from initial expectations, with promised  levels of capability unfulfilled and deliveries significantly delayed.  Acknowledging capability and affordability concerns, the Navy—with the  Secretary of Defense’s approval—changed course in late 2014 to pursue  a more capable frigate based on the LCS concept. The current Secretary  of Defense also directed that the total seaframe buy be reduced from 52  to 40.
Today, with 26 ships delivered or under contract, the LCS program again  stands at a crossroads. The Navy’s fiscal year 2017 budget request  asked Congress to fund the last two planned LCS. Further, early next  year Congress will need to decide whether to authorize the Navy’s plans  to procure the remaining 12 ships, including funding the lead frigate. With  that context in mind, I will discuss today: (1) how the LCS program has  evolved over time to where it stands today; (2) LCS program cost,  schedule, and performance, including several recent engineering  casualties on delivered ships; (3) key risks in the Navy’s plans for the  frigate based on the LCS program; and (4) remaining oversight  opportunities for the LCS and frigate programs.
This testimony largely leverages our past reports on the LCS program  from 2005 to 2016. We also draw on some conclusions from our broader  work on Navy shipbuilding and acquisition reform initiatives. More  detailed information on our objectives, scope, and methodology for that  work can be found in the issued reports. We conducted the work on which  this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. This  statement also includes updates to information, as appropriate, based on  program documentation and discussion with Department of Defense  (DOD) officials, work that also was conducted in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: The LCS Program Has Changed Significantly over Time
paragraphs: When the Navy first conceived the LCS in the early 2000s, the concept  was that two shipbuilders would build prototypes based on commercial  designs—Lockheed Martin’s Freedom variant and Austal USA’s  Independence variant. The Navy planned to experiment with these ships  to determine its preferred design variant. However, in relatively short  order, this experimentation strategy was abandoned in favor of a more  traditional acquisition of over 50 ships. More recently, the Secretary of  Defense questioned the appropriate capability and quantity of the LCS  and directed a re-evaluation of the small surface combatant needs  consistent with frigate-like capabilities. Thus, the program has evolved  from concept experimentation, to LCS, and more recently, to an LCS that  will be upgraded to a frigate. The strategy for contracting and competing  for ship construction has also changed. This evolution is captured in  figure 1.
While one could argue that a new concept could be expected to evolve  over time, the LCS evolution has been complicated by the fact that major  commitments have been made to build large numbers of ships before  proving their capabilities. Whereas acquisition best practices embrace a  “fly before you buy” approach, the Navy has subscribed to a buy before  you fly approach for LCS. Consequently, budgets were requested and  approved, contracts were awarded, and ship construction was undertaken  at two shipyards. This all happened without adherence to the principles  that lead to sound shipbuilding outcomes—namely, ensuring the maturity  of technologies, requirements, and design before construction begins,  and delaying commitments until testing can prove that needed capabilities  will be delivered.
As a result, taxpayers have paid for 8 delivered LCS, with 14 more in  some stage of the construction process (including LCS 21, with a planned  December 2016 construction start) without an understanding of the  capability that the ships will ultimately provide and with notable  performance issues discovered among the few ships that have already  been delivered. I will outline these issues in more detail below.
section_title: LCS Cost, Schedule, and Performance Expectations Have Eroded
paragraphs: In addition to significant changes to the acquisition strategy for LCS, the  program has also deviated substantially from expectations about its cost,  schedule, and the capabilities the ship would provide with the seaframes  as well as with the modular mission packages. All the while, the Navy has  continued to request funding to buy more ships and mission packages,  and Congress has appropriated funds. Table 1 compares the Navy’s  initial expectations of the LCS cost, schedule, capabilities, and crewing  concepts with the present version of the program.
We reported in July 2014 on issues with LCS training, manning, and  maintenance constructs during the 2013 deployment of USS Freedom.  We found that the seaframe crew experienced high workload even though  they were augmented by mission module crew and contractor ship riders,  and that gaps remained in fully training LCS sailors prior to deployment.
The Navy has attributed a series of recent engineering casualties on  delivered LCS to shortfalls in crew training, seaframe design, and  construction quality. According to the Navy, these failures have resulted  in substantial downtime and costs for repairs or replacements. Table 2  describes the recent major failures at sea.
However, these types of major incidents are not limited to the past 12  months. For example, LCS 4 also rubbed against the sides of the  Panama Canal locks and experienced hull damage in February 2014  when pieces of the lock penetrated the hull.
The question may be asked: who pays for these types of damage and  deficiencies? Our past work has found that, by virtue of using guaranty  provisions as opposed to warranties (such as the U.S. Coast Guard  generally uses), the Navy is responsible for paying for the vast majority of  defects. Specifically regarding LCS, we found that for LCS 4, the Navy’s  guaranty provisions were structured such that the Navy paid all of the  costs to correct all defects. For LCS 3, the shipbuilder was responsible for  30 percent of the cost of the first $100,000 in defects—a number the  Navy surpassed just days after delivery. Thus, the Navy was 100 percent  responsible for the costs of all remaining defects. For LCS 5-8, the  shipbuilder is responsible for some portion of the first $1 million in defects  for each ship. Time will tell whether this amount is sufficient to account for  discovered defects.
Turning to cost and schedule, our recent work has shown that LCS under  construction have exceeded contract cost targets, with the government  responsible for paying for a portion of the cost growth. This growth has  prompted the Navy to request $246 million in additional funding for fiscal  years 2015-2017, largely to address cost overruns on 12 LCS seaframes.  Similarly, deliveries of almost all LCS under contract at both shipyards  (LCS 5-26) have been delayed by several months, and, in some cases,  close to a year or longer. Navy officials recently reported that, despite  having had 5 years of LCS construction to help stabilize ship delivery  expectations, the program would not deliver four LCS in fiscal year 2016  as planned.
The LCS mission packages have also lagged behind expectations. The  Navy has fallen short of demonstrating that the LCS with its mission  packages can meet the minimum level of capability defined at the  beginning of the program. As figure 2 shows, 24 LCS seaframes will  already be delivered by the time all three mission packages achieve only  a minimum level of capability.
Since 2007, delivery of the total initial mission package operational  capability has been delayed by about 9 years (from 2011 to 2020) and the  Navy has lowered the level of performance needed to achieve the initial  capability for two packages—surface warfare and mine countermeasures.  As the Navy continues to concurrently deliver seaframes and develop  mission packages, it has become clear that the seaframes and mission  package technologies were not mature and remain largely unproven.
Another area of concern is changes to the LCS concept of operations as  a consequence of less than expected lethality and survivability. LCS was  designed with reduced requirements as compared to other surface  combatants, and over time the Navy has lowered several survivability and  lethality requirements further and removed some design features— making the ships less survivable in their expected threat environments  and less lethal than initially planned. This has forced the Navy to redefine  how it plans to operate the ships. Our previous work highlighted the  changes in the LCS’s expected capability, as shown in table 3.
Further capability changes may be necessary as the Navy continues to  test the seaframes and mission packages, as well as gain greater  operational experience. For example, the Navy has not yet demonstrated  that LCS will achieve its survivability requirements and does not plan to  complete survivability assessments until 2018—after more than 24 ships  are either in the fleet or under construction. The Navy has identified  unknowns related to the Independence variant’s aluminum hull, and  conducted underwater explosion testing in 2016, but the Navy has yet to  compile and report the results. Both variants also sustained some  damage in trials in rough sea conditions, but the Navy has not completed  its analytical reports of these events. Results from air defense and  cybersecurity testing also indicate capability concerns, and both seaframe  variants were found to have significant reliability and maintainability  issues during several tests and trials.
A final issue I will comment on regarding testing is that the Navy’s Chief  of Naval Operations recently determined that LCS 1-4 will be test ships.  This decision supports an aggressive testing schedule between fiscal  years 2017 and 2022. The Navy noted that testing requirements have  contributed to limited operational availability for delivered LCS. Because  operational testing was not conducted in a timely manner to inform any  needed design changes to seaframes, additional deficiencies discovered  during upcoming tests could require expensive changes to the seaframes  and mission packages that have already been delivered.
section_title: Frigate Acquisition Strategy Rushes Procurement in Light of Continued Unknowns
paragraphs: The Navy has elected to pursue an acquisition strategy that starts with  getting what it calls block buy pricing from both shipyards for 12 LCS.  These basic LCS will then be converted to frigates at a later point in time.  The frigate, as planned, will provide multi-mission capability—which is an  improvement over LCS—and offers modest improvements to some other  capabilities, such as the air search radar. Still, many questions remain to  be settled about the frigate’s design, cost, schedule, and capabilities.
Despite these uncertainties, the Navy’s current acquisition strategy  indicates it intends to request authorization from Congress for all of the  planned frigates—12 in total—and for funding the lead frigate before  establishing realistic cost, schedule, and technical parameters. Further,  the frigate will inherit many of the shortcomings or uncertainties of the  LCS and does not address all of the priorities that the Navy had identified  for its future frigate.
subsections: section_title: Frigate Cost Uncertainty and a Compressed Schedule Contribute to Gaps in Program Knowledge
paragraphs: The costs for the frigate are still uncertain. Navy officials have stated that  the frigate is expected to cost no more than 20 percent—approximately  $100 million—more per ship than the average LCS seaframes, though  this is still just an initial estimate. In addition to the continued cost  uncertainty, the schedule and approach for the frigate acquisition have  undergone substantial changes in the last year, as shown in table 4.
According to frigate program officials, under the current acquisition  approach, the Navy will award contracts in fiscal year 2017 to each of the  current LCS contractors to construct one LCS with a block buy option for  12 additional LCS—not frigates. Then, the Navy plans to obtain proposals  from both LCS contractors in late 2017 that would upgrade the block buy  option of LCS to frigates using frigate-specific design changes and  modifications. The Navy will evaluate the frigate upgrade packages and  then exercise the option—now for frigates—on the contract that provides  the best value based on tradeoffs between price and technical factors.  This downselect to one shipyard is planned to occur in summer 2018.  Figure 3 illustrates how the Navy plans to modify the fiscal year 2017 LCS  contract to convert the ships in the block buy options to frigates.
The Navy’s current plan, which moves the frigate award forward from  fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2018, is an acceleration that continues a  pattern of committing to buy ships in advance of adequate knowledge.  Specifically, the Navy has planned for its downselect award of the frigate  to occur before detail design of the ship begins. As we previously  reported, awarding a contract before detail design is completed—though  common in Navy ship acquisitions—has resulted in increased ship  prices. Further, without a year of frigate detail design that had been  previously planned before the contract award, the Navy plans to rely on a  contractor-driven design process that is less prescriptive than a  government-driven design process. This approach is similar to what the  Navy used for the original LCS program, whereby the shipyards were  given performance specifications and requirements, selecting the design  and systems that they determined were best suited to fit their designs in a  producible manner. Program officials told us that this new approach  should yield efficiencies; however, history from LCS raises concern that  this approach for the frigate similarly could lead to the ships having non- standard equipment, with less commonality with the other design and the  rest of the Navy.
section_title: Frigate Does Not Address All Navy Priorities and Will Likely Carry Forward Some LCS Design Limitations
paragraphs: As LCS costs grew and capabilities diluted, the Secretary of Defense  directed the Navy in February 2014 to explore alternatives to the LCS to  address key deficiencies. In response, the Navy created the Small  Surface Combatant Task Force and directed it to consider new and  existing frigate design options, including different types of modified LCS  designs. As we reported in June 2016, the task force concluded that the  Navy’s desired capability requirements could not be met without major  modifications to an LCS design or utilizing other non-LCS designs. When  presented with this conclusion, senior Navy leadership directed the task  force to explore what capabilities might be more feasible on a minor  modified LCS. This direction led the task force to develop options with  diminished capabilities, such as reduced speed or range, resulting in  some capabilities becoming equal to or below expected capabilities of the  current LCS. Ultimately, the department chose a frigate concept based on  a minor modified LCS in lieu of more capable—and more expensive— small surface combatant options. Navy leadership indicated this decision  was based on LCS’s relatively lower cost and quicker ability to field, as  well as the ability to upgrade remaining LCS and maintain stability in the  industrial base and vendor supply chain.
Table 5 presents an analysis from our June 2016 report, which found that  the Navy’s proposed frigate will offer some improvements over LCS. For  example, the Navy plans to equip the frigates with the mission systems  from both the surface and anti-submarine warfare mission packages  simultaneously instead of just one at a time (e.g., in a modular fashion)  like LCS. However, the Navy’s planned frigate upgrades will not result in  significant improvements in survivability areas related to vulnerability—the  ability to withstand initial damage effects from threat weapons—or  recoverability— the ability of the crew to take emergency action to contain  and control damage.
Further, the Navy sacrificed capabilities that were prioritized by fleet  operators. For example, fleet operators consistently prioritized a range of  4,000 nautical miles, but the selected frigate concept is as much as 30  percent short of achieving such a range.
The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation has noted that the Navy’s  proposed frigate design is not substantially different from LCS and does  not add much more redundancy or greater separation of critical  equipment or additional compartmentation, making the frigate likely to be  less survivable than the Navy’s previous frigate class. Further, the Navy  plans to make some similar capability improvements to existing and future  LCS, narrowing the difference between LCS and the frigate. We found  that the proposed frigate does not add any new offensive anti-submarine  or surface warfare capabilities that are not already part of one of the LCS  mission packages, so while the frigate will be able to carry what equates  to two mission packages at once, the capabilities in each mission area  will be the same as LCS. While specific details are classified, there are  only a few areas where there are differences in frigate warfighting  capability compared to the LCS.
Since it will be based on the LCS designs, the frigate will likely carry  forward some of the limitations of those designs. For example, LCS was  designed to carry a minimally-sized crew of approximately 50. The Navy  has found in various studies that the crew is undersized and made some  modest increases in crew size. A frigate design based on LCS may not be  able to support a significant increase in crew size due to limited space for  berthing and other facilities. Additionally, barring Navy-directed changes  to key mechanical systems, the frigate will carry some of the more failure- prone LCS equipment, such as some propulsion equipment, and will likely  carry some of the non-fleet-standard, LCS-unique equipment that has  challenged the Navy’s support and logistics chain. Uncertainties or needs  that remain with the surface and anti-submarine warfare mission  packages, such as demonstrating operational performance of the surface- to-surface missile and the anti-submarine warfare package, also pose risk  for the frigate based on the Navy’s planned timeframes.
section_title: Limited Opportunities Remain to Shape LCS and Frigate Programs
paragraphs: Over the past 10 years, we have made recommendations to DOD on a  number of issues with the LCS program. We have also suggested actions  for Congress to consider. Now, with the fiscal year 2018 budget request  imminent, opportunities for Congress to affect the way forward for this  program are becoming limited. This upcoming request, which will include  the start of frigate acquisition, presents Congress with an opportunity to  ensure the Navy possesses sufficient knowledge before making a  substantial commitment to the frigate.
Our recommendations to DOD since 2005 have largely focused on LCS  combat capability shortfalls and the Navy’s acquisition strategy. While  DOD agreed, at times, with these recommendations, it seldom took action  if a consequence would be to slow LCS procurement, even when doing  so would enable the Navy to build and demonstrate sufficient knowledge  in critical areas. Table 6 highlights some of our past recommendations  and the department’s response.
In addition to these recommendations to DOD, our past reports have  made suggestions to Congress on actions to support better LCS program  outcomes. For instance, in 2013, we asked Congress to consider  restricting construction funding for additional LCS seaframes until the  Navy had adequate knowledge to mitigate substantial unknowns about  LCS capabilities, use, and costs. Congress responded to our suggestion  in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, restricting  the use of funds for LCS seaframes until the Navy submitted information  to the defense committees on LCS requirements, maturity, testing, and  concept of operations. In other cases, however, Congress has opted to  take alternative routes. For example, we suggested in June 2016 that the  Congress consider a pause in LCS procurement funding for fiscal year  2017. In doing so, we noted such a pause would provide the Navy with an  opportunity to address unresolved LCS performance concerns without  creating production problems at the shipyards. However, the Conference  Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal  Year 2017 reflects funding for two more LCS, suggesting that LCS  procurement will continue as planned.
The Navy’s plans for fiscal year 2018 involve significant decisions for  Congress in terms of the way forward in the immediate future the frigate  program, including potential future commitments of about $9 billion based  on early budget estimates. On the heels of the decision to fund two LCS  in fiscal year 2017 is a decision on whether to authorize the frigate  contracting approach and fund the lead frigate.
As I noted above, the current acquisition plans for the frigate have been  accelerated during the past year. If these plans hold, the Navy will ask  Congress in a few months to consider authorizing a block buy of 12  frigates and funding the lead frigate when the fiscal year 2018 budget is  proposed. This request appears premature, as it requires Congress to  make a decision on the frigate before detail design has begun and before  the scope and cost of the design changes needed to turn an LCS into a  frigate are well understood. The Navy will not establish its cost estimate  until May 2017—months after requesting authorization from Congress for  the block buy contracting approach for 12 frigates. Further, DOD’s Office  of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation is not expected to complete  an independent cost estimate on the frigate until fiscal year 2018. This  means that the upcoming budget request is unlikely to reflect the most  current costs for the program moving forward.
Similar to what we previously have advised about LCS block buy  contracting, a frigate block buy approach also could reduce funding  flexibility. For example, the LCS block buy contracts provide that a failure  to fully fund the purchase of a ship in a given year would make the  contract subject to renegotiation. DOD has pointed to this as a risk that  the contractors would supersede the block buy pricing with higher prices.  Thus, DOD and Congress have had a notable disincentive to take any  action that might delay procurement, even when a program is  underperforming as has been the case with LCS.
Also, the shipyards’ existing LCS construction workload suggests that a  request to authorize the frigate in early 2017 (with the fiscal year 2018  budget request) may not only be premature, but also unnecessary.  Although the Navy has argued that pausing LCS production would result  in loss of production work and start-up delays to the frigate program, the  schedule suggests that both shipyards have sufficient workload remaining  from prior LCS contract awards that could offset the need to award the  frigate in 2018 as planned. The Navy’s concern also does not account for  any other work that the shipyards may have from other Navy or  commercial contracts and the possibility of continued delays in the  delivery of LCS. As figure 4 depicts, delays that have occurred for  previously funded ships have resulted in a construction workload that  extends into fiscal year 2020. This prolonged workload, when combined  with the two LCS awarded earlier in 2016 and the two LCS planned to be  awarded in fiscal year 2017, takes construction at both shipyards into  2021.
With 14 LCS in various phases of construction (LCS 9-22) and 3 more  (LCS 23, 24, and 26) set to begin construction later in fiscal year 2017,  delaying a decision on the frigate until fiscal year 2019 would enable the  Navy and the shipbuilders to improve design and cost knowledge. This, in  turn, would offer Congress an opportunity to be better informed on the  expectations for the frigate before making a decision on the program.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you or your staff has any questions about this statement, please contact  Michele Mackin at (202) 512-4841 or mackinm@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key  contributions to this testimony are Diana Moldafsky (Assistant Director),  Pete Anderson, Jacob Leon Beier, Laurier Fish, Laura Greifner, Kristine  Hassinger, C. James Madar, Sean Merrill, LeAnna Parkey, Anne  Stevens, Roxanna Sun, Abby Volk, and Robin Wilson.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Littoral Combat Ship and Frigate: Congress Faced with Critical  Acquisition Decisions. GAO-17-262T. Washington, D.C.: December 1,  2016.
Littoral Combat Ship: Need to Address Fundamental Weaknesses in LCS  and Frigate Acquisition Strategies. GAO-16-356. Washington, D.C.: June  9, 2016.
Littoral Combat Ship: Knowledge of Survivability and Lethality Capabilities  Needed Prior to Making Major Funding Decisions. GAO-16-201.  Washington, D.C.: December 18, 2015.
Littoral Combat Ship: Navy Complied with Regulations in Accepting Two  Lead Ships, but Quality Problems Persisted after Delivery. GAO-14-827.  Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2014.
Littoral Combat Ship: Additional Testing and Improved Weight  Management Needed Prior to Further Investments. GAO-14-749.  Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2014.
Littoral Combat Ship: Deployment of USS Freedom Revealed Risks in  Implementing Operational Concepts and Uncertain Costs. GAO-14-447.  Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2014.
Navy Shipbuilding: Opportunities Exist to Improve Practices Affecting  Quality. GAO-14-122. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2013.
Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship  Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost.  GAO-13-738T. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2013.
Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship  Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost.  GAO-13-530. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2013.
Defense Acquisitions: Realizing Savings under Different Littoral Combat  Ship Acquisition Strategies Depends on Successful Management of  Risks. GAO-11-277T. Washington, D.C.: December 14, 2010.
National Defense: Navy’s Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for  the Littoral Combat Ship Program. GAO-11-249R. Washington, D.C.:  December 8, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the  Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities. GAO-10-523.  Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2010.
Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost  Estimates and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts.  GAO-10-257. Washington, D.C.: February 2, 2010.
Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate  Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding. GAO-09-322.  Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Overcoming Challenges Key to Capitalizing on  Mine Countermeasures Capabilities. GAO-08-13. Washington, D.C.:  October 12, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Plans Need to Allow Enough Time to Demonstrate  Capability of First Littoral Combat Ships. GAO-05-255. Washington, D.C.:  March 1, 2005.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.