Satellite Control: Long-Term Planning and Adoption of Commercial Practices Could Improve DOD's Operations
Published: 2013-04-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD manages the nation's defense satellites, which are worth at least $13.7 billion, via ground stations located around the world. These ground stations and supporting infrastructure perform three primary functions: monitoring the health of the satellite; ensuring it stays in its proper orbit; (activities collectively known as satellite control operations), and planning, monitoring, and controlling the execution of the overall mission of the satellite. Based on the House Armed Services Committee Report and discussions with defense committee staff, GAO (1) reviewed the Air Force's satellite control operations to assess the potential for fragmentation or duplication, (2) assessed the status of modernization efforts, (3) identified any commercial practices that could improve the Air Force's satellite control operations, and (4) identified any barriers to implementing them. GAO reviewed modernization funding documents, related studies and interviewed DOD and 7 commercial satellite companies, from a nongeneralizable sample selected in part because of their companies' satellite capabilities.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) satellite control networks are fragmented and potentially duplicative. Over the past decade, DOD has increasingly deployed standalone satellite control operations networks, which are designed to operate a single satellite system, as opposed to shared systems that can operate multiple kinds of satellites. Dedicated networks can offer many benefits to programs, including possible lower risks and customization for a particular program's needs. However, they can also be more costly and have led to a fragmented, and potentially duplicative, approach which requires more infrastructure and personnel than shared operations. For example, one Air Force base has 10 satellite programs operated by 8 separate control centers. According to Air Force officials, DOD continues to acquire standalone networks and has not worked to move its current standalone operations towards a shared satellite control network, which could better leverage DOD investments.
The Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN), DOD's primary shared satellite control network, is undergoing modernization efforts, but these will not increase the network's capabilities. The Air Force budgeted about $400 million over the next 5 years for these efforts. However, these efforts primarily focus on sustaining the network at its current level of capability and do not apply a decade of research recommending more significant improvements to the AFSCN that would increase its capabilities.
Commercial practices have the potential to increase the efficiency and decrease costs of DOD satellite control operations. These practices include: interoperability between satellite control operations networks; automation of routine satellite control operations functions; use of commercial off-the-shelf products instead of custom ones; and a "hybrid" network approach which allows a satellite operator to augment its network through another operator's complementary network. Both the Air Force and commercial officials GAO spoke to agree that there are opportunities for the Air Force to increase efficiencies and lower costs through these practices. Numerous studies by DOD and other government groups have recommended implementing or considering these practices, the Air Force has generally not incorporated them into Air Force satellite control operations networks.
DOD faces four barriers that complicate its ability to make improvements to its satellite control networks and adopt commercial practices. First, DOD has no long-term plan for satellite control operations. Second, the agency lacks reliable data on the costs of its current control networks and is unable to isolate satellite control costs from other expenses. Third, there is no requirement for satellite programs to establish a business case for their chosen satellite control operations approach. And fourth, even if program managers wanted to make satellite control operations improvements, they do not have the autonomy to implement changes at the program level. Until DOD begins addressing these barriers by implementing a long-term plan for future satellite control network investments that can capture estimates of satellite control costs as well as authorities that can be given to program managers and incorporates commercial practices, the department's ability to achieve significant improvements in satellite control operations capabilities will be hindered.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct future DOD satellite acquisition programs to determine a business case for proceeding with either a dedicated or shared network for that program's satellite control operations and develop a department-wide long-term plan for modernizing its AFSCN and any future shared networks and implementing commercial practices to improve DOD satellite control networks. DOD concurred with our recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) uses ground stations located around  the world to manage the nation’s defense satellites—satellites worth at  least $13.7 billion. These ground stations and supporting infrastructure  perform three primary functions: (1) monitoring the health of a satellite; (2)  ensuring the satellite stays in its proper orbit; (activities collectively known  as satellite control), and (3) planning, monitoring, and controlling the  execution of the overall mission of a satellite. Some of DOD’s ground  stations are linked together to form networks. The Air Force operates the  largest of these networks, the Air Force Satellite Control Network  (AFSCN), which is also the primary network for supporting the placement  of satellites into their proper orbit. Established in 1959, the AFSCN is also  the nation’s primary network for the emergency recovery of tumbling or  lost satellites.
Over the past two decades, the Air Force has replaced various outdated  computer and communications equipment to sustain the AFSCN. Today,  efforts continue to update the AFSCN satellite operations centers and  remote tracking stations by replacing outdated software and equipment  that, in some cases, have been in place over 40 years. According to the  Air Force, the AFSCN, as it currently stands, without planned upgrades  and modernizations, is not sustainable beyond 2020. At some point in the  near future, the Air Force will be confronted with making investment  decisions regarding the AFSCN to determine whether to continue to  support it or to pursue other options for satellite control operations. With  increasingly tighter budgets, these decisions will require accurate  information on all aspects of the Air Force’s satellite control operations to  make the best decisions for DOD. In the House Armed Services  Committee Report accompanying the fiscal year 2012 National Defense  Authorization Act, the committee raised questions as to whether satellite  control operations centers require more resources than their commercial  system counterparts. The committee also raised questions as to whether  the Air Force was fully leveraging commercial practices to achieve greater  efficiencies, though it recognized that some DOD-unique requirements  may preclude the adoption of certain commercial practices.
Based on the House Armed Services Committee Report’s requirement for  our review and discussions with defense committee staff, GAO (1)  reviewed the Air Force’s satellite control operations to assess the  potential for fragmentation or duplication, (2) assessed the status of  modernization efforts, (3) identified any commercial industry satellite  control practices that could improve the Air Force’s satellite control  operations, and (4) identified any barriers to implementing improvements  to satellite control operations.
To address these objectives, we reviewed various satellite control  upgrades, sustainment efforts, and modernization efforts by the Air Force,  Navy, and Army. To identify the potential for fragmentation or duplication,  we assessed satellite control plans, requirements, programs, budgets,  and studies associated with current and future capabilities. For the  purposes of our analysis, we considered “duplication” to occur when two  or more agencies or programs are engaged in the same activities or  provide the same services to the same beneficiaries. We used the term  “fragmentation” to refer to those circumstances in which more than one  federal agency (or more than one organization within an agency) is  involved in the same broad area of national need, and opportunities may  exist to improve how the government delivers these services. We  analyzed documentation such as reports and studies on satellite control  operations by government and industry groups, and interviewed officials  from various offices of the Secretary of Defense, Air Force, Navy, and  Army, and the National Reconnaissance Office. We also determined the  extent to which various aspects of the modernization efforts were  duplicative by reviewing DOD planning documents and discussing these  topics with DOD officials. Our review focused on the ground systems  used at command and control centers to perform satellite control  operations. To determine the costs associated with current and planned  upgrades, sustainment, and modernization efforts for the AFSCN and  other military services’ satellite control efforts, we reviewed the DOD’s  satellite operations funding documents for fiscal years 2011 through  2017. To determine which commercial practices could benefit the Air  Force’s satellite control operations, we asked 13 companies to provide  information on how they develop, conduct, and manage their satellite  control activities. From this nongeneralizable sample, seven companies  met with us and provided information. We conducted internet searches  and attended conferences on the related subject matter to identify  potential companies, and selected participants based on their companies’  satellites’ constellation size, orbit, and capabilities. We interviewed key  personnel and reviewed company data to identify potential practices that  could potentially be employed by the Air Force to improve its satellite  operations. To identify any potential barriers to DOD of implementing  these commercial practices, we analyzed documentation such as DOD  and other government studies on the organization of satellite control  operations, and interviewed DOD officials. We used the information to  assess any barriers impacting the funding, cost, schedule, and  performance of satellite control operations.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to April 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our scope  and methodology are provided in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Every satellite has a bus and payload. The bus is the body of the satellite.  It carries the payload and is composed of a number of subsystems, like  the power supply, antennas, telemetry and tracking command, and  mechanical and thermal control subsystems. The bus also provides  electrical power, stability, and propulsion for the entire satellite. The  payload—carried by the bus—includes all the devices a satellite needs to  perform its mission, which differs for every type of satellite. For example,  the payload for a weather satellite could include cameras to take pictures  of cloud formations, while the payload for a communications satellite may  include transponders to relay data such as television or telephone  signals. Monitoring and commanding of the satellite payload is done to  collect data or provide a capability to the warfighter. Satellite control  operations are used to manage the bus and are the focus of this report.
Satellite control operations essentially consist of (1) tracking— determining the satellite’s location based on position and range  measurements to receive commands from the ground, (2) telemetry— collecting health and status reports which are transmitted from the  satellite to the ground, and (3) commanding—transmitting signals from  the ground to the satellite to control satellite subsystems. Tracking,  telemetry, and commanding (TT&C) are accomplished by a network of  ground stations, ground antennas, and communication links between the  centers, antennas, and satellites, strategically located around the world.  TT&C is essentially the same for any given satellite, based on its orbit,  regardless of its mission. Payload control involves operation and control  of the payload on the satellite, or managing the operations of a satellite’s  mission equipment.
The ground segment of satellite control is made up of various ground  control centers, ground stations, and user elements. There are two kinds  of satellite ground stations: control stations and tracking stations. Satellite  control ground stations perform the TT&C functions to ensure that  satellites remain in the proper orbit and are performing as designed, and  are the stations that manage the bus. The tracking stations enable  contact with the satellites through communication uplinks and downlinks.
Ground stations can be tied together and can form two types of networks  —shared and dedicated. A shared network can support several satellite  systems, and is able to share its antennas and software among many  different kinds of satellites. While not considering the payload, a shared  network is primarily used for bus control and for controlling satellites that  are only contacted intermittently using relatively low data rates. However,  a shared network can also support functions such as launch and early  orbit tracking of satellites, and telemetry and commanding of satellites  that are experiencing anomalies. Examples of DOD satellite systems that  are controlled by a shared network include the Defense Satellite  Communications System and Ultra High Frequency Follow-On system,  also a communications satellite.
The AFSCN is DOD’s largest shared network. It supports national  security (defense and intelligence) satellites during launch and early orbit  periods, and is used to analyze anomalies affecting orbiting satellites. It  also acts as a backup control system for national security satellites, even  for satellites that are not routinely controlled by the AFSCN. AFSCN is  comprised of three interrelated segments: (1) operational control centers  that provide satellite TT&C support from launch preparation through on- orbit operations, (2) remote tracking stations that provide the space- ground link between satellites on-orbit and the AFSCN, and (3) an  interconnected network of space and ground assets with communication  links that provides interfaces for external users to access network data.  The AFSCN has two operational control centers: a primary center located  at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado; and a secondary control node  (backup center) at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The AFSCN  also has antennas and tracking stations dispersed throughout the world.  Figure 1 outlines the AFSCN and related centers, stations, and antennas.
The Navy and Army also operate smaller shared satellite control networks  with satellite control operations centers, antennas, and tracking stations  that support several satellite programs, including:
The Naval Satellite Control Network, which operates, manages, and  maintains five missions through one operational control center and  four remote sites.
The Naval Research Laboratory satellite control network, which  supports multiple classified and scientific satellite missions through  one operational control center.
The Army conducts payload control, transmission control, and backup  platform control for two missions through five operations centers  located throughout the world.
In addition to the shared network, the Air Force operates a number of  dedicated satellite control networks. A dedicated network operates a  single satellite system, and its assets are generally not shared with other  satellite systems. Dedicated networks are usually customized or tailored  to their associated satellite and therefore unsupportable on the shared  networks. In addition, unlike a shared network, a dedicated network often  performs both bus and payload control through the same antenna.  Examples of Air Force satellite systems controlled by a dedicated network  include the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), a missile warning  satellite system, and the Global Positioning System (GPS), a constellation  of satellites that provides positioning, navigation, and timing data to users  worldwide. These dedicated networks have 23 antennas at 10 locations  around the world. Figure 2 shows the number of antennas at various sites  around the world for the AFSCN, a shared network, and for several  dedicated networks, such as those used by SBIRS and GPS.
Although some satellites using dedicated networks require continuous  contact with their ground antennas, thereby precluding those antennas  from being shared with other satellite systems, other satellites need only  be in contact with their ground antennas on an intermittent basis, thus  being potentially compatible with a shared network.
section_title: DOD’s Satellite Control Networks are Fragmented, Resulting in Inefficiencies Across Satellite Programs
paragraphs: Over the past 50 years, and especially in the last decade, DOD has  increasingly deployed dedicated satellite control networks in lieu of  integrating them into a larger shared satellite control network. DOD is  currently operating at least a dozen dedicated satellite control networks,  which typically do not share assets or personnel with other dedicated or  shared networks, resulting in fragmented and potentially duplicative  operations and inefficiencies across its satellite control operations. While  dedicated networks offer a handful of advantages to the specific satellite  systems they serve, shared networks offer potential advantages DOD- wide in leveraging hardware, software, and personnel. As of February  2013, Air Force officials stated that the Air Force had not worked to move  its current dedicated operations to a shared satellite control network,  which could better leverage investments.
Since 1992, DOD has described its largest shared network, the AFSCN,  as among other things, fragmented and lacking standardization and  interoperability. In addition, Air Force Space Command officials also  stated that consolidation of functions and capabilities, reduction of  potential duplication and improvement in interoperability at all levels, is  needed. DOD’s share of satellite programs using dedicated networks has  increased since 1960, as shown in figure 3.
Long-standing systems, such as the Defense Support Program and  Defense Satellite Communication System, were developed with their own  control centers and antenna sites because existing shared networks  could not accommodate them, or because the programs were determined  to be better served by combining payload and satellite control operations  into a single, dedicated network. As a result of these types of decisions,  DOD now uses multiple dedicated networks built specifically for individual  satellite programs. Some of these networks include:
GPS, which is comprised of two control centers and four antenna sites
SBIRS, which is comprised of three control centers and four sites  which each have up to five antennas.
In recent years, the Air Force has acquired and launched the Space  Based Space Surveillance satellite that has its own dedicated system. In  addition, plans for other future satellite acquisitions indicate likely  additional dedicated networks. While these networks enable satellite  control operations, they were not designed to be interoperable. As a  result, they require dedicated and unshared control centers and  antennas, even when sites are co-located. Figure 4 below illustrates the  co-location of several antennas in the Indian and Pacific Oceans operated  by the Air Force and Navy (a smaller network), but are not interoperable.
Even when control centers are co-located, the configuration of the various  networks as well as the organizational structure of the Air Force centers is  often fragmented. For example, at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado,  10 satellite programs are operated by eight separate satellite operations  centers under the command of six separate space squadrons, or units, as  shown in figure 5.
DOD’s reliance on dedicated satellite control operations networks is  continuing with its newest satellite system acquisitions, as well as with  updates for established systems. Despite being required to conduct a  cost analysis and other analyses, DOD officials managing acquisitions of  new satellite systems are not required to develop a business case when  deciding whether to acquire a dedicated network or to use an existing  shared network. Air Force officials stated that in some cases, satellite  programs are required to make their dedicated networks compatible with  a potential future standard, but many programs receive waivers from that  requirement. Furthermore, because dedicated networks effectively meet  mission needs, the status quo is upheld without regard for cost or  department-wide strategic planning for satellite control operations. New  satellites in the early stages of development are already being designed  to operate on dedicated networks rather than being designed with the  interoperability needed for shared networks. For example, the Precision  Tracking Space System, which will be part of the Missile Defense  Agency’s Ballistic Missile Defense System, has been designed with a  dedicated satellite control operations network. In addition, updates of  existing systems, such as the third generation of GPS satellites, are also  continuing with the dedicated network approach.
Although dedicated networks support the unique needs of some satellite  programs, not all satellite control networks need to be dedicated.  According to Air Force officials, the increase in dedicated networks  reflects more of a preference by satellite program managers than a need.  Officials stated that program managers would rather have the large,  individual budget for completing its mission, to include a satellite control  operations network, and have other programs become compatible with  their satellite control operations network, if necessary. By customizing  satellite control operations for each satellite, program managers do not  have to modify their plans to fit within a larger organizational structure, or  negotiate with any other programs over the satellite control operations  system, which they may need to do if they used a shared network.  However, development of a dedicated network can also result in higher  costs due to the unique development required, as well as for follow-on  support, since the original contractor is typically the only one able to  provide this proprietary or specialized support. At the same time, while  shared networks offer efficiencies and lower costs, they can have other  limitations, like not being able to support unique data rates and  continuous contact needs. Some potential pros and cons of the two types  of networks, based on our analysis, are outlined in table 1.
While each dedicated network optimizes its individual operations, our  analysis indicates that multiple dedicated systems are inefficient, because  they increase fragmentation and the potential for duplication across DOD  satellite control operations, and they are ultimately more expensive for  DOD to acquire and operate. This fragmented approach requires more  infrastructure and personnel than shared networks, because the  dedicated networks often require unique software, separate and possibly  unique hardware, and specialized training. As such, dedicated networks  that require global access to their satellites will each have to install at  least one control center and several ground stations, whereas a shared  network could accommodate multiple programs with one control center  and a set of global ground sites. Dedicated networks typically require  individualized training for their operators, and therefore personnel tend to  be specialized to one system, leading to potentially higher overall costs.  Satellite operators learn how to use unique software that is not  transferable across satellite programs, as well as unique protocols for the  various dedicated networks, since they are built by several companies  with no common standards. The current practice is that satellite control  operators specialize in functional areas for a specific satellite program.  The narrowly focused training associated with this specialization limits  satellite and ground system technical knowledge, resulting in heavy  reliance on “back room engineering” or experts to diagnose problems.  Training people on each of these programs requires time and personnel  investment. Thus, a satellite operator who transfers from one satellite  program to another will likely have to be retrained because even though  the tasks are similar, satellite control operations are conducted differently.  Networks established to operate under common standards, or with a  common control interface, would likely not need special training.
section_title: Air Force’s Modernization Efforts May do Little to Improve the Air Force Satellite Control Network
paragraphs: The Air Force has budgeted about $400 million to modernize the AFSCN  over the next five years, but the planned upgrades will do little to increase  the network’s capability. These efforts are mainly focused on sustaining  the network at its current level of capability, and ignore more than a  decade of research recommending more significant improvements to the  AFSCN.
subsections: section_title: Air Force Spending to Modernize the Air Force Satellite Control Network will do Little to Increase the Network’s Capability
paragraphs: The Air Force’s approximately $400 million investment in modernizing the  AFSCN over the next five years is to extend its life by replacing  unsupportable equipment. According to Air Force Space Command  officials, these efforts will provide minor capability upgrades that will  maintain the aging system, but will not provide material improvements in  service.
Specifically, this modernization funding is being spent mainly on two  efforts:
The Electronic Schedule Disseminator (ESD) system, which  schedules activities on the network, is to be upgraded from ESD 2.7  to ESD version 3.0. Version 2.7 has been the operational baseline  since 1991 and operates on 1980s computer technology. The ESD  upgrade will run on a Microsoft Windows operating system and  commercial off the shelf (COTS) hardware. This upgrade is currently  underway with a planned completion in mid-2015.
The Remote Tracking Station Block Change effort is to upgrade  existing electronics on the network’s ground control computers and  antennas to more modern versions on a Microsoft Windows operating  system. This upgrade is currently underway and the Air Force plans to  have all of its stations upgraded by 2019. The AFSCN is currently  using 1980s-era hardware based on the disk operating system.
While not fully funded, the Air Force plans to modify the AFSCN so that it  is able to operate on an additional communication frequency, or band.  This upgrade is to allow the network to perform data uplinks on both the  L-Band and the S-Band, to add greater flexibility and avoid potential  sources of interference.
While these modernization efforts are intended to improve the aging  system, according to Air Force officials, these measures sustain the  system at the current level of performance and do not offer a material  improvement in capability. For example, some of the equipment the Air  Force is replacing was so outdated that program officials had to search  on an online auction site for replacement parts, because they were no  longer being sold by manufacturers. Air Force officials said that one  reason the new upgrades were not undertaken to provide more capability  is that the requirements for the network have not changed, and the Air  Force does not want to pay for capabilities above and beyond the  established requirements. For example, Air Force officials cited one case  where the program acquired a new piece of hardware to replace an  outdated piece. The new hardware provided additional capabilities  beyond what was called for in the requirements document. However, the  added capabilities are being turned off so that the Air Force does not  have to pay to maintain them when they are not required. Though it is  prudent for programs to only pay for capabilities called for by program  requirements, the overall approach of making minor changes to keep the  system operating with its current capabilities may not be the best use of  Air Force funds in the long-term.
The Air Force’s actions are somewhat contrary to more than 15 years of  government and space industry reports that recommended that the Air  Force incorporate newer and more efficient technologies into the AFSCN  to improve its capability. As long ago as 1994, Air Force Space Command  identified the need for improved satellite control operations capabilities. It  cited, among other things, aging equipment and technological  opportunities as reasons for needed network upgrades. In 1999, GAO  reported that DOD had made minimal progress in integrating and  improving its satellite control operations capabilities in accordance with  the then 1996 national space policy. More recently, in 2008, the  Commander of Air Force Space Command issued a memo describing the  need for increased satellite control operations efficiencies, improved  interoperability, and consolidated functions. Despite these  recommendations having been made over the course of almost two  decades, no guidance currently exists directing the Air Force to increase  the efficiency or capacity of the AFSCN. Thus, modernization efforts have  continued to focus on sustaining systems at current levels of  performance. A long-term plan for modernizing the network and any  future shared satellite control operations networks could assist DOD in  making more informed decisions about investments and whether and to  what extent expand satellite control operations capabilities.
section_title: Commercial Practices Have the Potential to Increase DOD’s Satellite Control Operations Efficiencies
paragraphs: Commercial satellite companies that we spoke with incorporate varying  degrees of interoperability, automation, and other practices into their  satellite control operations networks to decrease programs costs and  increase efficiencies. According to Air Force officials, commercial  practices could offer the Air Force similar benefits for routine functions.  Satellite control operations officials at commercial companies also agree  that there is potential for improvement if the Air Force adopts some  commercial practices. Furthermore, for over 10 years, government and  space industry reports have asserted that commercial practices for  satellite control operations may increase the efficiency and effectiveness  of government satellite control operations. Although there is ample  evidence that these leading commercial practices could generate cost  savings and improve efficiency, the Air Force has generally not  implemented these practices.
subsections: section_title: Commercial Satellite Companies have Taken Steps to Lower Costs and Increase Satellite Control Operations Efficiencies
paragraphs: Officials from the seven commercial satellite companies that we spoke  with leverage practices such as interoperability and automation to realize  cost efficiencies and increase the accuracy of their satellite control  operations. Because this industry is extremely competitive, these  companies have been reluctant to publicize or share with us specific  program costs, though they noted that since their companies are profit- oriented, they would not undertake the various commercial practices if  they did not reduce costs and increase efficiency. Specifically, officials  from all seven of the commercial companies we spoke with have found  some or all of the practices below to be beneficial:  Interoperability: Interoperable satellite control operations networks  allow a single operator to control multiple satellites from one terminal,  with one software interface, regardless of the satellite’s age or  manufacturer. For example, one company that we spoke with  develops satellite control operations software for multiple companies.  One of their software programs is being used to control four satellites,  each of which was made by a different contractor, and all four are of  different ages.
Automation: All but one of the commercial companies we spoke with  use automation of routine functions, such as downloading telemetry  data, which allows these companies to reduce the number of  operators they need, and can reduce the risk of human errors. One  commercial company we spoke with wrote software that allows its  customer to leverage automation to operate a fleet of communication  satellites with nearly “lights out” operations—needing only one  operator at a time to control 15 satellites.
Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products: All but one of the  commercial companies we spoke with agreed that COTS products are  less expensive than custom ones and can be modified to meet each  company’s needs. A number of companies we spoke with take  advantage of COTS products, which are also easier to replace when  needed. For example, one of the COTS satellite control operations  software systems that is used by many commercial satellite operators  allows a satellite to be controlled by any company that uses the same  software. This can be beneficial when companies buy and sell  satellites, or when a company leases out control of its satellite to  another company.
Hybrid network: A hybrid network arrangement allows a company to  augment its ground network of antennas and control stations by  leasing antenna time on another company’s network. One company  we spoke with has found that using pre-existing physical assets from  other providers can be less costly than building and maintaining all of  the ground assets they use.
section_title: Commercial Practices are Applicable to DOD Satellite Control Operations
paragraphs: While commercial satellites and Air Force satellites can greatly differ in  their missions, and to some extent may differ in their need for information  security, basic satellite control operations functions of most of these  satellites are generally the same, allowing trusted practices from the  commercial sector to be applicable to many Air Force satellite programs.  Air Force satellite control officials have stated that there are opportunities  for increasing efficiencies and reducing costs in Air Force satellite control  operations by using these commercial practices. Officials at three of the  commercial satellite operations companies we spoke with that have  knowledge or experience with DOD satellite control networks, agreed with  these statements. The practices mentioned above are trusted and proven  in the commercial sector, and incorporating some or all of them may  result in improved Air Force satellite control operations. For example:  Interoperability: While implementing an interoperable infrastructure  for software and hardware could have a dramatic impact on program  costs, many Air Force satellites currently rely on separate interface  software and hardware to control each kind of satellite. For example,  when looking at basic control functions, the control interface for a  communications satellite is significantly different from a positioning,  navigation, and timing satellite, and even two positioning, navigation,  and timing satellites may have different control interfaces, depending  on when they were built and what company built them. Making future  Air Force satellite programs’ satellite control operations interoperable  would allow one operator to use a single terminal to control numerous  satellites, similar to commercial practices. This could reduce costs  associated with purchasing multiple types of software and training the  operators on each system, as well as potentially reduce the number of  staff required, since one person could operate multiple satellites more  easily. One example put forward by an industry group study estimated  that increasing interoperability and automation could allow one Air  Force satellite control operations group to reduce its operations  personnel by 45 percentuse common software would likely be cost-prohibitive, but it would be  possible for programs under development to be designed and built  utilizing standard satellite control operations software programs,  allowing for greater flexibility in the future. . Retrofitting existing satellite programs to
Automation: While commercial companies use computer programs  to perform routine tasks, the Air Force typically uses human  operators. Increasing automation for routine control functions could  reduce Air Force personnel costs, and the potential for human errors.  According to satellite control operations officials at Air Force Space  Command, the use of automation in Air Force satellite control network  is discouraged by the risk averse culture of the service.
COTS products: Basic satellite control operations software programs  exist on the market that could be modified to meet the Air Force’s  needs, but the Air Force continues to purchase custom software  solutions. Specialized software systems are usually expensive and  often take longer to develop than planned. Not only are customized  systems expensive to acquire, they are also proprietary to the  company that developed them, requiring the Air Force to use the  original contractor for any follow-up modifications to the software.
Hybrid networks: Although the Air Force has selectively and  sparingly used commercial networks for some satellite control  operations, it has no future plans to regularly use any commercial  antennas or control centers for its satellite control operations. The Air  Force by necessity has very high standards for security and reliability,  and Air Force officials have said that these security standards are  higher than those of private sector space systems. However, officials  from the commercial companies we spoke with that have used this  practice told us that they have similarly high security standards to the  Air Force, and have been able to effectively use hybrid networks. Both  large defense contractors and space agencies in other countries use  second party providers for some of their satellite control operations.  Also, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has  embraced a hybrid system for its Near Earth Network, and although it  owns and operates some control stations, NASA has seen benefits  from contracting out its service in other locations. According to NASA  officials, there were cost avoidances associated with not building  satellite tracking stations in geographical areas where mission  requirements were minimal. In this case, a commercial network was  able to provide the necessary capabilities to augment NASA’s network  with a lower cost alternative. According to NASA officials, obtaining  geographically diverse support from commercial providers enables  NASA to avoid some infrastructure costs. Although NASA was unable  to quantify the exact cost savings from using hybrid networks, one  commercial company who provides services to NASA estimated the  use of commercial networks reduced NASA’s operations and  maintenance cost by about 30 percent with very low mission risk.  According to Air Force Space Command satellite control operations  officials, the Air Force has not yet explored this possibility. Air Force  officials acknowledged that they may be missing out on an  inexpensive way to improve their satellite control operations at a low  cost, though said that security issues, such as handling of classified  data, would have to be addressed to the Air Force’s satisfaction to  make this a possibility.
section_title: Over a Decade of Government and Industry Research Supports Applying Commercial Practices to DOD’s Satellite Control Operations
paragraphs: Government and space industry reports for over 10 years have reported  that commercial practices for satellite interoperability may increase the  efficiency and effectiveness of government satellite control operations,  and many of these studies have recommended that DOD adopt these  practices. Since 1996, a number of reports by government and industry  groups have described opportunities for Air Force satellite control  operations to improve their efficiency through methods such as  interoperability between satellite control networks and the adoption of  commercial practices. These reports generally concluded that there are  numerous opportunities for improvement in Air Force satellite control  operations in the near- and long-term as indicated in figure 6.
Though Air Force officials, management at commercial companies, and a  decade of government research agree that there are opportunities to use  commercial practices in Air Force satellite control operations, the Air  Force has generally not implemented these practices. Efforts to  implement commercial practices have been discussed, and in some  cases initial steps to initiate changes have been taken, but the Air Force  has not followed through with their implementation. For example, the Air  Force participates in the annual Ground Systems Architecture Workshop,  where experts in the field gather to discuss ground system issues and  collaborate on solutions, but according to Air Force officials, few if any of  the solutions discussed have been implemented. In addition, DOD  initiated the SATOPS (satellite operations) Enterprise Transformation  effort in 2011 to reduce duplication, improve interoperability, enable  consolidation, and move to more efficient satellite control operations.  However, one of the new technologies that was planned as part of this  effort, a new type of antenna, has not been proven to be cost effective,  and progress appears to be stalled overall on the proposed  improvements, resulting in no change to the way the Air Force conducts  its satellite control operations.
section_title: DOD Faces Barriers to Making Improvements to its Satellite Control Networks and Adopting Commercial Practices
paragraphs: While opportunities exist to improve DOD satellite control operations,  there are also barriers that hinder DOD’s ability to make these  improvements. These barriers exist at both at the program level and at  higher management levels within DOD, and include: the lack of a long- term plan for satellite control; limited insight into satellite control  operations spending; no existing requirement to establish a business  case for a program’s satellite control operations approach; and lack of  autonomy at the program level to implement satellite control operations  improvements. In particular:
DOD does not have a long-term plan for satellite control  operations. Several DOD officials we spoke with stated that although  they believe there are efficiencies to be gained from alternative ways  of performing satellite control, there is nothing prompting them do  things differently. Furthermore, they stated that there is no DOD-wide  guidance or long-term plan that directs or supports the implementation  of alternative methods for performing satellite control operations. In  addition, DOD does not have plans to transition its dedicated  networks to shared networks. Instead, the agency plans to continue  deploying dedicated networks, in part because it is not required to  justify whether a shared or dedicated network best meets overall  requirements. However, we found that there have been some plans to  evolve future satellite operations centers to be more integrated and  interoperable. For example, in an Air Force briefing from June 2007,  plans were depicted to evolve stove-piped centers—where each  satellite program procures its own TT&C system—to centers where  compatible systems share TT&C services. In addition, in December  2008, the Air Force Space Command Commander issued a  memorandum on its intent for an Air Force Satellite Operations  Enterprise Architecture Transformation. The Commander cited fiscal  realities, operational efficiencies and emerging threats as reasons for  reevaluating how satellite operations, to include satellite control, are  conducted for on-orbit systems. However, Air Force officials told us  that other than the current, limited AFSCN modernization efforts, there  are no other current plans in place to update or modernize the  capabilities of the network, and at this time, according to Air Force  documents, there is no end-of-life or follow-on projected for the  network, either.
DOD is unable to quantify all spending on satellite ground  control operations across DOD programs. DOD is unable to  identify all funding for satellite control operations across all DOD  satellite programs. Programs have not needed to keep track of  budgets by dividing satellite control operations funding out from other  satellite mission funding since the focus has been on dedicated  ground control networks. However, without knowing how much it  spends on basic satellite control operations for all of its satellites,  DOD cannot calculate the potential savings or perform a cost/benefit  analysis of any future changes to satellite control operations. Each of  the individual satellite programs with a dedicated ground system  manages and reports that program’s satellite control operations  budget separately from AFSCN funding. These budget reports do not  separate the satellite control operations funding from other program  funds, such as those expended on mission data. Furthermore, the  way that programs are budgeted and organized makes it onerous for  them to determine how much of their budget is spent on satellite  control operations. It can be particularly challenging when programs  use the same communication paths and staff for satellite control  operations and mission data transfers, or when a satellite ground  control center controls multiple systems, because program costs are  accounted for as a whole for these functions. For example, the Navy’s  Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) program office officials said  that MUOS uses the same communications paths for both the satellite  control operations and the mission data commands. As a result,  determining how much of the communication time is spent on satellite  control operations versus mission data would be hard to do  accurately. In addition, three satellite constellations are controlled  from the same Navy satellite operations center using the same people  and same equipment. To determine how much time spent on each  piece of equipment by each person in order to divide the funding  between the three systems would be difficult to do with any degree of  reliability. Similarly, the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program  sends communications for both satellite control operations and  mission data simultaneously over the same routes. The program  utilizes commercial circuits for this, and pays for these connections  under the same invoice, with no way to determine how much would be  allocated to satellite control operations and to mission data. However,  it may be possible to track costs associated with satellite control  operations through the program’s individual work breakdown structure  which is the cornerstone of every program because it defines in detail  the work necessary to accomplish a program’s objectives.  Establishing a work breakdown structure to track weapon system  acquisition costs is a best practice because it allows a program to  track cost and schedule by defined deliverables.
Satellite programs are not required to present a business case  when choosing to develop a dedicated network. Air Force satellite  program officials are currently free to choose the satellite control  network type that best suits their program without needing to justify  that choice. Without the requirement to weight potential compromises  in performance with potential reductions in cost, most new programs  are choosing to build a dedicated network. For some satellite  programs, having a dedicated satellite control operations network  might still be the most efficient choice, due to unique mission  requirements. However, programs are not required to conduct an  analysis to determine a business case for proceeding with a dedicated  or shared network, or to validate their network’s requirements Currently, the lack of cost data means that DOD cannot perform a  cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the potential benefits of  individual programs using dedicated networks outweighs the potential  drawbacks of continued and even increased systemic fragmentation  and inefficiency. Without a cost-benefit analysis, DOD has a less  compelling business case for its current approach for acquiring  satellite control networks and cannot strategically determine if its  .
While business case analyses are required for milestone B certification of major  defense acquisition programs, which is approval to enter system development, there is not  a specific requirement or policy to analyze whether or not to use a shared satellite control  operations network. 10 U.S.C. §2366b (a); DOD Instruction 5000.02, Encl. 2, §6 (c) (5)  (Dec. 8, 2008). DOD Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-027, “Implementation of  Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009,” (Dec. 4, 2009, incorporating Change 4,  Jan. 11, 2013). Major defense acquisition programs are those estimated by DOD to  require an eventual total expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of  more than $365 million, or for procurement  of more than $2.19 billion, including all  planned increments or spirals, in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars. current options of shared and dedicated networks are the best option  or whether other options, such as hybrid networks, might be better  suited to meet its satellite control operational needs.
GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide states that a business  case analysis or a cost-benefit analysis seeks to find the best value  solution by linking each alternative to how it satisfies a strategic  objective. This linkage is achieved by developing business cases that  present facts and supporting details among competing alternatives,  including the life cycle costs and quantifiable and non-quantifiable  benefits. Specifically, each alternative should identify: (1) relative life  cycle costs and benefits; (2) methods and rationale for quantifying the  life cycle costs and benefits; (3) effect and value of cost, schedule,  and performance trade-offs; (4) sensitivity to changes in assumptions;  and (5) risk factors. DOD guidance regarding economic analysis  similarly encourages the use of sensitivity analysis, a tool that can be  used to determine the extent to which costs and benefits change or  are sensitive to changes in key factors; this analysis can produce a  range of costs and benefits that may provide a better guide or  indicator than a single estimate. While historical trends show a move  away from shared networks to dedicated networks, AFSCN, the  largest shared network, is currently undergoing expensive efforts to  sustain the networks capabilities. This is happening at the same time  that DOD is planning on building new dedicated networks for  upcoming satellite programs. These are large investments for DOD,  and approaching them without a thorough analysis of the options for  satellite control operations may lead to wasted money and missed  opportunities to reduce fragmentation and increase satellite control  operations efficiencies.
Satellite programs do not have the autonomy to implement  improvements to satellite control operations. It is difficult to  implement improvements to satellite control operations practices,  because changes must be initiated at a level higher than at the  individual program-level. According to Air Force officials, even if an  individual satellite program’s managers wanted to begin to incorporate  commercial practices, they have limited flexibility to do so. We  reported above that DOD allows programs to begin without  establishing a business case resulting in program managers not being  well-positioned to successfully execute a weapon acquisition.  Program officials are required to adhere to established program  requirements, and many such requirements do not allow for these  improvements. For example, Air Force officials cited one case where  the program acquired a new piece of hardware to replace an outdated  piece. The new hardware provided additional capabilities beyond what  was called for in the requirements document. However, the added  capabilities are being turned off so that the Air Force does not have to  pay to maintain them when they are not required. In addition,  according to Air Force Space Command officials, some DOD satellite  program managers prefer to have satellite control networks that are  optimized for their specific mission needs and are wary of introducing  alternative ways of doing business, such as automation and  interoperability into satellite systems. Officials explained that concerns  about information security, automation errors, and a lack of desire to  change the status quo, keep programs from implementing changes  that they feel might threaten their missions. Information security in  particular is of concern for the Air Force. According to Air Force  officials, satellite control operations are highly dependent on accurate  and precise information, and security threats such as introduction of  malicious code to the system or interception of sensitive data could  pose significant risks to the satellite’s mission. The perception that a  large upfront investment would be needed to implement new satellite  operation practices likely make the status quo of dedicated networks  the preferred acquisition approach going forward. In addition, the time  that would be needed to develop a shared system with increased  automation, for example, also likely makes the status quo more  appealing.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD’s current array of satellite control networks favor dedicated systems  that have been largely shaped by past practices. Dedicated networks are  the default option because they offer custom solutions for each satellite  system. For this reason, there have been and will continue to be good  reasons for having dedicated networks. However, opting for dedicated  systems does not form a clear approach for acquiring satellite control  networks that are a result of analysis, not a presumption. Given the  prevalence of dedicated networks, DOD has had long-standing difficulty  in effectively implementing improvements across its varied satellite  control operations which has hindered its ability to achieve significant  results in this area. At the moment, DOD lacks the incentive to change its  current practices, in part, because it does not know the total cost  associated with its satellite control operations, though it is currently  spending millions on modernization efforts. Numerous studies,  commercial practices, and fiscal constraints all offer compelling reasons  for DOD to take a fresh look in how it designs and invests in control  networks. But several barriers have maintained the status quo, to include  the lack of a long-term plan, an aversion to risk, and no cost visibility.  Thus, by developing a plan for modernizing its shared satellite control  operations networks, DOD could be better positioned to address barriers,  reduce fragmentation, and increase efficiencies.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better facilitate the conduct of satellite control operations and  accountability for the estimated millions of dollars in satellite control  investments, and to reduce fragmentation, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:  1.  Conduct an analysis at the beginning of a new satellite acquisition  to determine a business case for proceeding with either a shared  or dedicated satellite control system, to include its associated  ground antenna network. The analysis should include a  comparison of total dedicated network costs to the incremental  cost of integrating onto a shared network to determine applicable  cost savings and efficiencies.  2.  Develop a department-wide long-term plan for modernizing its Air  Force Satellite Control Network and any future shared satellite  control services and capabilities. This plan should identify  methods that can capture or estimate satellite control costs as well  as authorities that can be given to the program managers to give  them the flexibility needed to ensure ground systems are built to a  common network when the business case analysis shows it to be  beneficial. This plan should also identify which commercial  practices, if any, can improve DOD satellite control operations in  the near- and long-term, and as appropriate, develop a plan of  action for implementing them.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment.  In its written  comments, DOD concurred with our two recommendations. The  comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided technical  comments which were incorporated as appropriate.
In concurring with our recommendations, DOD agreed that efficiencies  can be gained from investing in shared satellite control operations  networks, with a goal of reducing duplication and improving  interoperability among networks. DOD also agreed that developing a  long-term, department-wide plan for modernizing satellite control  operations is needed. DOD noted that both of GAO’s recommendations  are similar to concepts endorsed by the Air Force, Army, and Navy, and  DOD plans to initiate a comprehensive Satellite Operations Enterprise  Architectural Analysis to serve as a foundation to define requirements for  planning new satellite program acquisitions.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Air Force,  Navy, and Army; and other interested parties. In addition, the report is  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: Our review focused on the ground networks used to perform satellite  control operations. As such, we reviewed relevant satellite control  upgrades, and sustainment and modernization efforts for the Air Force,  Navy and Army to determine the potential for fragmentation or  duplication. We reviewed satellite control plans, requirements, budgets,  and studies associated with current and future capabilities. We developed  an inventory of key satellite programs to enable a comparison of satellite  control operations types, attributes, and funding. To identify any potential  for fragmentation and duplication, we assessed military service  investments in satellite control operations, acquisitions, and capabilities,  and reviewed prior GAO work for relevant criteria. We also used the  information associated with various aspects of the modernization efforts,  and actual or planned satellite control operations capabilities, to assess  whether any of the efforts were potentially duplicative. We analyzed  documentation and interviewed officials from various offices of the  Secretary of Defense, to include the Office of the Deputy Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Communications, Command and Control and  Cyber, Air Force, Navy, Army, and National Reconnaissance Office  (NRO). We did not, however, review NRO systems, budgets, or  requirements, but did obtain perspectives on satellite operations from the  NRO, which could not be incorporated due to their classification. We also  determined the extent to which various aspects of the modernization  efforts were duplicative by reviewing briefings on satellite control  operations and obtaining status updates from Air Force, Navy, and Army  officials.
To assess the status of modernization efforts and the costs associated  with current and planned upgrades and sustainment efforts for the Air  Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) and other services’ satellite  control efforts, we reviewed the military services’ satellite operations  budget documents for fiscal years 2011 through 2017. Specifically, we  obtained budget documentation from the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense (Comptroller) for all 7 years. Based on our review of budget  information we collected from agencies that we contacted as well as from  presidential budget estimates, we determined that the AFSCN was the  largest satellite control operations network within DOD and that the Air  Force was responsible for most satellite control programs. We  interviewed AFSCN officials and asked for an explanation and description  of each planned upgrade, sustainment and modernization effort. We  reviewed documentation and interviewed officials on the status,  technology, and actual or planned operational characteristics. We  reviewed and analyzed the budget documents and program  documentation to determine how the Air Force defined and was  proceeding with its modernization efforts for the AFSCN and interviewed  DOD officials. We also reviewed our prior reports on satellite control  operations to gain a better understanding of the progress DOD has made  on its satellite control operations.
To determine which commercial practices could benefit the Air Force’s  satellite control operations, we conducted internet searches and attended  conferences on the related subject matter to identify potential companies  to participate. We then selected a nongeneralizable sample of 13  commercial companies that are known in the space community to operate  satellites and have knowledge of satellite control operations and based on  their satellite constellation size, orbit and capabilities. We asked the 13  companies to provide information on how they perform or build their  satellite control operations and capabilities. Of the 13 companies we  contacted, we received detailed information from 7. We interviewed  officials from these commercial companies and reviewed documentation  on their practices associated with satellite control operations and  compared and contrasted them with Air Force practices. We interviewed  key personnel and reviewed company data to compile a list of potential  practices that could be employed by the Air Force to improve its satellite  operations. Based on interviews and reviews of commercial  documentation and DOD reports on satellite control operations, we  determined that specific commercial practices—such as automation and  commercial off- the-shelf products—may be beneficial to DOD satellite  programs. It should be noted that the commercial practices used by the  companies that we included in our review align with practices that other  satellite industry companies, as well as DOD, have cited as beneficial for  improving the effectiveness of satellite control operations. Our  assessment of the applicability of satellite control operations practices  adopted by commercial companies is focused primarily on unclassified  DOD satellite programs and may not be applicable to classified NRO  systems.
To identify any potential barriers to the implementation of commercial  practices, we reviewed reports and documentation, such as the National  Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) 2007 Summer Study –AFSPC  Satellite Operations Enterprise Assessment and briefings from the  Ground Systems Architectures Workshop and interviewed officials from  the organizations mentioned above. We interviewed commercial company  officials with prior military service and Air Force officials, given that the Air  Force Satellite Control Network is DOD’s largest satellite control network.  We reviewed our prior reports to compare and contrast previous DOD  efforts to improve satellite control operations. In doing so, we were able  to identify if DOD had improved its operations, or if barriers persisted. We  used the information to assess whether barriers had affected the funding,  cost, schedule, and performance of satellite control operations.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Arthur Gallegos, Assistant  Director; Marie P. Ahearn; Maricela Cherveny; Danielle Greene; Laura  Hook; Ioan Ifrim; Angela Pleasants; and Roxanna T. Sun made key  contributions to this report.