Space Shuttle: Costs for Hubble Servicing Mission and Implementation of Safety Recommendations Not Yet Definitive
Published: 2004-11-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Hubble's continued operation has been dependent on manned servicing missions using the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) shuttle fleet. The fleet was grounded in early 2003 following the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia, as NASA focused its efforts on responding to recommendations made by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). In January 2004, NASA announced its decision to cancel the final planned Hubble servicing mission, primarily because of safety concerns. Without some type of servicing mission, NASA anticipates that Hubble will cease to support scientific investigations by the end of the decade. NASA's decision not to service the Hubble prompted debate about potential alternatives to prolong Hubble's mission and the respective costs of these alternatives. This report addresses the basis of NASA's cost estimates to (1) service Hubble using the shuttle and (2) implement recommendations made by the CAIB. GAO is continuing its work on the Congressional request that GAO examine the potential cost of a robotic servicing mission to the Hubble Telescope.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Although a shuttle servicing mission is one of the options for servicing the Hubble Space Telescope, to date, NASA does not have a definitive estimate of the potential cost. At our request, NASA prepared an estimate of the funding needed for a shuttle servicing mission to the Hubble. NASA estimates the cost at between $1.7 billion to $2.4 billion. However, documentary support for portions of the estimate is insufficient. For example, NASA officials told us that the Hubble project's sustaining engineering costs run $9 to 10 million per month, but they were unable to produce a calculation or documents to support the estimate because they do not track these costs by servicing mission. Additionally, the agency has acknowledged that many uncertainties, such as the lack of a design solution for autonomous inspection and repair of the shuttle, could change the estimate. A t the same time, NASA has yet to develop a definitive cost estimate for implementing all of the CAIB's recommendations but has developed a budget estimate for safely returning the shuttle to flight--a subset of activities recommended by the CAIB as needed to return the shuttle to full operations. NASA currently estimates return to flight costs will exceed $2 billion, but that estimate will likely be refined as the agency continues to define technical concepts. NASA provided support for portions of the estimate, but we found the support to be insufficient--either because key documents were missing or the estimates lacked sufficient detail. Further, NASA cautions that return to flight costs will remain uncertain until the first return to flight shuttle mission, which is scheduled to go to the International Space Station in spring 2005.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: For more than a decade, the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration’s (NASA) Hubble Space Telescope has provided unique  images of the universe and has given scientists critical data needed to help  understand a number of space mysteries. Hubble’s continued operation  has been dependent on NASA’s space shuttle fleet, which carried  crewmembers to the telescope to perform periodic maintenance and  upgrades. The grounding of the shuttle fleet following the tragic loss of  Space Shuttle Columbia in February 2003 put these missions to Hubble on  hold, and in January 2004, NASA announced its decision to cancel the fifth  and final planned Hubble servicing mission. With no future servicing  missions, NASA anticipates that Hubble will cease to support scientific  investigations by the end of the decade.
NASA said that its decision to cancel the servicing mission was based  largely on concerns about shuttle safety—specifically, the need to  implement recommendations made by the Columbia Accident  Investigation Board (CAIB) for safely returning the space shuttle to flight.  NASA also recognized that a Hubble servicing mission would necessitate  further changes both to shuttle hardware and operational procedures.  However, NASA’s decision has prompted considerable debate.  Congressional members, scientists, and space policy experts have called  for an examination of alternatives to prolong Hubble’s mission, such as the  possibility of servicing Hubble robotically. The CAIB Chairman suggested  that only a study of the benefits and risks of a shuttle servicing mission to  extend Hubble’s life could determine whether it is worth the risks.
This report addresses the basis for NASA’s cost estimates to (1) service  the Hubble Telescope by using the shuttle and (2) implement the CAIB’s  recommendations, including those recommendations directly related to  safely returning the shuttle to flight. We are continuing our work on your  request that we examine the potential cost of a robotic servicing mission  to the Hubble Telescope.
To assess the basis for NASA’s Hubble servicing mission cost estimate,  we examined NASA’s rationale for its decision to cancel the final planned  shuttle servicing mission, analyzed available funding estimates, and  requested analytical and documentary support for selected high-dollar  items to identify the sufficiency of support. In reviewing the basis for  NASA’s cost estimate for implementing the CAIB’s recommendations, we  analyzed available funding estimates and requested analytical and  documentary support for selected high dollar portions of the estimate to  determine the sufficiency of such support. We performed our review from  March through September 2004 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. For a complete description of our scope  and methodology, see appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since it was launched in 1990, the Hubble Space Telescope has sent  back images of space that have made a significant contribution to our  understanding of the universe. The telescope uses pointing precision,  powerful optics, and state-of-the-art instruments to explore the visible,  ultraviolet, and near-infrared regions of the electromagnetic spectrum. To  keep it at the forefront of astronomical research and extend its operational  life, Hubble’s instruments have been upgraded through a series of shuttle  servicing missions. The fifth and final planned servicing mission was  intended to install new science instruments, replace the telescope’s  insulation, and replace the batteries and gyroscopes. According to NASA,  the lifetime of the observatory on orbit is ultimately limited by battery life,  which may extend into the 2007-2008 time frame, but scientific operations  are limited by the gyroscopes that stabilize the telescope—whose lifetimes  are more difficult to predict. NASA forecasts that the Hubble will likely  have fewer than three operating gyroscopes by mid-2006, and fewer than  two by mid-2007.
In response to congressional concerns about NASA’s decision to cancel  the servicing mission, NASA requested that the National Research Council  conduct an independent assessment of options for extending the life of the  Hubble Space Telescope. In May 2004, the Council established a  committee to assess the viability of a shuttle servicing mission, evaluate  robotic and ground operations to extend the life of the telescope as a  valuable scientific tool, assess telescope component failures and their  impact, and provide an overall risk-benefit assessment of servicing  options. In an interim report issued in July 2004, the committee urged  NASA to commit to a Hubble servicing mission that accomplishes the  objectives of the canceled servicing mission and to take no actions that  would preclude using a space shuttle to carry out this mission. According  to a NASA official, the agency is not actively pursuing the shuttle servicing  option but is not precluding it.
NASA is currently evaluating the feasibility of performing robotic  servicing of the Hubble Telescope. To facilitate the evaluation, the agency  has formulated a robotic mission concept, which includes a vehicle  comprised of a robotic servicing module and another module that can  be used to eventually de-orbit the telescope. The potential task list of  activities for robotic servicing includes replacing the gyroscopes and  batteries, installing new science instruments, and de-orbiting the  observatory at the end of its life. According to a NASA official, contracts to  facilitate the robotic mission were recently awarded for work to begin on  October 1, 2004.
The CAIB concluded that the Columbia accident was caused by  both physical and organizational failures. The Board’s 15 return to flight  recommendations necessary to implement before the shuttle fleet can  return to flight primarily address the physical causes of the accident and  include eliminating external tank debris shedding and developing a  capability to inspect and make emergency repairs to the orbiter’s thermal  protection system. NASA publishes periodic updates to its plan for  returning the shuttle to flight to demonstrate the agency’s progress in  implementing the CAIB recommendations. The most recent update is  dated August 27, 2004. This update identifies the first shuttle flight as  occurring in spring 2005.
section_title: NASA’s Cost Estimate for a Hubble Servicing Mission Using the Shuttle Is Not Definitive
paragraphs: NASA does not currently have a definitive cost estimate for servicing the  Hubble Telescope using the shuttle. The agency focused on safety  concerns related to a servicing mission by the space shuttle in deciding  not to proceed, and did not develop a cost estimate. At our request NASA  prepared an estimate of the funding needed for a Hubble servicing mission  by the space shuttle. NASA could not provide documented support for its  estimate. The agency recognizes that there are many uncertainties that  could change the estimate. NASA has now begun to explore the costs and  benefits of various servicing alternatives, including robotic servicing,  which should enable NASA to make a more informed decision regarding  Hubble’s future.
At our request NASA began development of an estimate of the funding  needed for a shuttle servicing mission to the Hubble. The estimate  provided captures additional funds over and above NASA’s fiscal year 2005  budget request that would be required to reinsert the mission in the shuttle  flight manifest for launch in March 2007. The estimate does not include  funding already expended to support the canceled servicing mission and  develop the science instruments. NASA has determined that the additional  funds needed to perform a shuttle servicing mission for Hubble would be  in the range of $1.7 billion to $2.4 billion. According to NASA, this estimate  is based on what it might cost, but it does not take into account the  technical, safety, and schedule risks that could increase the cost and/or  undermine the viability of the mission. For example, NASA cites  uncertainties related to two safety-related requirements: inspection and  repair and crew rescue mission capabilities that would be autonomous of  the International Space Station and for which NASA currently has not  formulated a design solution. In addition, NASA cautions that it did not  examine whether design solutions could be accomplished in time to  service Hubble before it ceases operations. Table 1 shows NASA’s budget  estimate phased by fiscal year (FY) for shuttle servicing of the Hubble  Space Telescope, including ranges for some of the estimates.
While we did not independently verify each component of NASA’s  estimate, we requested that NASA provide the analytical basis and  documentary support for selected portions of the estimate, primarily those  with large dollar values. NASA could not provide the requested  information. For example, NASA officials told us that the Hubble project’s  sustaining engineering costs run $9 to10 million per month, but they were  unable to produce a calculation or documents to support the estimate  because they do not track these costs by servicing mission. We also  requested the basis of estimate for the costs to delay shuttle phase-out and  for tools development for vehicle inspection and repair without the  International Space Station (a component of extravehicular activity  above). In response, NASA provided the assumptions upon which the  estimates were based and stated that the estimates were based on  information provided by Johnson Space Center and Kennedy Space Center  subject matter experts. NASA also added that rigorous cost estimating  techniques could not be applied to the tools development estimate  because a rescue mission currently is only a concept. No analytical or  documentary support was provided. In estimating the cost for the  autonomous inspection and repair and rescue mission capabilities, NASA  used a 30 to 50 percent uncertainty factor because of the very high  uncertainty in the cost of developing and conducting a mission that is not  adequately defined—i.e., NASA’s estimate of $425 million plus 50 percent  equals the $638 million upper range shown in the table above for these two  items added together. As with the other estimates for which we requested  analytical and documentary support, NASA was not able to provide it  because the agency could not do a risk analysis without a design solution,  according to a NASA official. The lack of documented support for portions  of NASA’s estimate increases the risk of variation to the estimate. Further,  NASA recognizes that there are many uncertainties that could change the  current estimate.
The 2004 NASA Cost Estimating Handbook states that cost analysts should  document the results of cost estimates during the entire cost estimating  process and that the documentation should provide sufficient information  on how the estimate was developed so that independent cost analysts  could reproduce the estimate. According to the handbook, the value of the  documentation and analysis is in providing an understanding of the cost  elements so that decision-makers can make informed decisions.
Recently, we also reported that dependable cost estimates are essential for  establishing priorities and making informed investment decisions in the  face of limited budgets. Without this knowledge, a program’s estimated  cost could be understated and thereby subject to underfunding and cost  overruns, putting programs at risk of being reduced in scope or requiring  additional funding to meet their objectives.
Since we began our review, attention has focused on alternatives to a  shuttle mission, such as robotic servicing of Hubble. NASA has formed a  team to evaluate Hubble servicing alternatives, including cost information.  This analysis should enable NASA to make a more informed decision  about Hubble’s future and facilitate NASA’s evaluation of the feasibility of  robotic servicing options.
section_title: Estimate for Implementing CAIB Recommendations Is Not Fully Developed
paragraphs: Currently, NASA has developed budget estimates for implementing the  CAIB recommendations required to return the space shuttle to flight but  not for all of the CAIB recommendations. NASA provided us with  documentary support for portions of the return to flight estimate, but we  found it to be insufficient. According to NASA, the agency’s cost for  returning the shuttle to flight, which is slightly over $2 billion, will remain  uncertain until the completion of the first shuttle missions to the  International Space Station in fiscal year 2005.
NASA’s return to flight activities involve enhancing the shuttle’s external  tank, thermal protection system, solid rocket boosters, and imagery  system to address the physical cause of the Columbia accident—a piece of  insulating foam that separated from the external tank and struck a  reinforced carbon-carbon panel on the leading edge of the orbiter’s left  wing. To address this cause, NASA is working to eliminate all external  tank debris shedding. Efforts are also in place to improve the orbiter’s  thermal protection system, which includes heat resistant tiles, blankets,  and reinforced carbon-carbon panels on the leading edge of the wing and  nose cap of the shuttle, to increase the orbiter’s ability to sustain minor  debris damage. NASA is also redesigning the method for catching bolts  that break apart when the external tank and solid rocket boosters separate  as well as providing the capability to obtain and downlink images after the  separation. NASA and the United States Air Force are working to improve  the use of ground cameras for viewing launch activities. Table 2 shows  NASA’s budget estimates for return-to-flight activities.
However, the majority of NASA’s budget estimates for returning the  shuttle to flight are not fully developed—including those for fiscal year  2005—as indicated by the agency’s internal approval process. The Program  Requirements Control Board (PRCB) is responsible for directing studies of  identified problems, formulating alternative solutions, selecting the best  solution, and developing overall estimates. According to NASA, actions  approved with PRCB directives have mature estimates, while those with  control board actions in process—that is currently under review but with  no issued directives yet—are less mature. Both the content and estimates  for return to flight work that have not yet been reviewed by the control  board are very preliminary and subject to considerable variation. Table 3  shows the status of control board review of NASA return to flight budget  estimates and the percent of the total estimate at each level of review.
NASA provided us with the PRCB directives and in some cases,  attachments which the agency believes support the estimate. However,  we did not find this support to be sufficient. According to NASA’s cost  estimating handbook, estimates should be documented with sufficient  detail to be reproducible by an independent analyst. Nevertheless, in many  cases, there were no documents attached to the directive, and in cases  where documents were attached to the directives, the documents  generally provided high-level estimates with little detail and no  documentation to show how NASA arrived at the estimate. For example, a  request for $1.8 million to fund the network to support external tank  camera transmissions indicated that $1.516 million of the amount would  be needed for Goddard Space Flight Center to provide the necessary  equipment at receiving stations, labor, subcontractor costs, and travel and  that the remaining $290,000 would be needed for improvements to the  receiving antennas ($104,000) and recurring costs ($62,000 per flight) for  three trucks and the associated transponder time. However, the  documents did not show how the requester for the $1.8 million arrived at  the estimates. NASA officials told us that the reason for this was that the  managers approving the directives trusted their employees to accurately  calculate the estimate and maintain the support. In addition, our review of  the documents indicated and NASA confirmed that quite a few of the  estimates were based on undefinitized contract actions (UCA)—that is,  unnegotiated contract changes. Under these actions, NASA officials can  authorize work to begin before NASA and the contractor agree on a final  estimated cost and fee. As we have stated in our high-risk series, relying  on unnegotiated changes is risky because it increases the potential for  unanticipated cost growth. This, in turn, may force the agency to divert  scarce budget resources intended for other important programs. As of  July 31, 2004, NASA records showed 17 UCAs related to return to flight  with not-to-exceed amounts totaling $147.5 million. NASA’s estimate for  the entire effort under these UCAs totals about $325 million, or 15 percent  of NASA’s current $2.2 billion return to flight estimate.
In June 2004, NASA established additional requirements for funding  requests submitted to the PRCB. Under the new policy, an independent  cost estimate must be developed for requests greater than $25 million, and  a program-level cost evaluation must be completed for requests over  $1 million. The program-level evaluation consists of a set of standard  questions to document the rationale and background for cost-related  questions. The responses to the questions are initially assessed by a cost  analyst but are reviewed by the Space Shuttle Program Business Manager  before submission to the PRCB.
NASA provided us with two examples of requests falling under the new  requirements. Both of the examples had better support than those with  PRCB directives, but documentary support was still not apparent. For  example, the funding request for a debris radar indicated that the estimate  was based on a partnering agreement with the Navy and the Navy’s use of  the technology. However, the program-level evaluation pointed out that no  detailed cost backup was provided. The other example, which was a  funding request to change the processes currently in place for the Space  Shuttle Program’s problem reporting and corrective action system, was  very well supported in terms of analysis, as the requester prepared  detailed spreadsheets calculating the funding requirements according to a  breakdown of the work to be performed, cited sources for labor rates, and  provided assumptions underlying the calculations. However, as pointed  out in the program evaluation of the request, there was no support  provided for the estimate other than the initiator’s knowledge of the  change. We believe that future compliance with NASA’s new policy  establishing additional requirements for funding requests and the inclusion  of documentary support could potentially result in more credible return to  flight budget estimates.
According to NASA, estimates for fiscal year 2005 and beyond will be  refined as the Space Shuttle Program comes to closure on return to flight  technical solutions and the return to flight plan is finalized. NASA expects  that by late fall of 2004, a better understanding of the fiscal year 2005  financial situation will be developed. However, NASA cautions that the  total cost of returning the shuttle to flight will remain uncertain until  completion of the first shuttle missions to the space station, scheduled to  begin in spring 2005.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, the NASA Deputy  Administrator stated that the agency believes that both the estimate and  methodology used in the calculation of costs for reinstating the Hubble  Space Telescope servicing mission are sound and accurate, given the level  of definition at this point in time. Notwithstanding that belief, the agency  agreed that portions of the servicing mission activities lacked the design  maturity required to estimate the costs according to accepted and  established NASA procedures.
Specifically, NASA agrees that the Hubble Space Telescope work  breakdown structure was not constructed to collect program costs. At the  same time, NASA believes it is erroneous to suggest that NASA has no  valid basis for the numbers provided, citing the “Servicing Mission 4  Resources Management Plan,” which describes the effort required for  completion of a servicing mission. According to NASA, although the  program’s accounting system does not capture sustaining engineering  costs in GAO’s preferred format, the Servicing Mission 4 Resources  Management Plan details mission schedules and staffing, and applying  contractor and civil service rates to that staffing level can accurately  reflect the effort required to execute a servicing mission. We requested  this type of analysis and documentary support, but NASA representatives  did not offer such a calculation. Rather, the officials stated that the  sustaining engineering costs were based on management’s assessment of  contractor financial data and in-house service pool charges and that these  activities could not be traced back to source documentation. Without  adequate supporting data, we cannot assess the accuracy and reliability of  such information.
NASA acknowledged that the agency does not have a technical design  from which to derive the cost for the on-orbit inspection and repair of the  shuttle independent of support from the International Space Station. In the  case of the unsupported cost estimate for delaying the phase out of the  space shuttle in order to complete a manned Hubble servicing mission,  NASA stated that it used approved budget projections for the operating  years affected by the insertion of the Hubble servicing mission and  prorated the extension of the service life. According to NASA, a range was  added to the estimate to account for uncertainties and retention of critical  skills. The estimates were presented as a rough order of magnitude. NASA  stated that it provided its assumptions to demonstrate the reasonableness  of the estimates. Nevertheless, in spite of the uncertainties in the estimate,  which we recognized in our report, NASA guidance states that cost  estimates should be documented during the entire cost estimating process  and that the documentation should provide sufficient information on how  an estimate was developed to be reproducible by independent cost  analysts. NASA did not provide us with this type of documentation.  Without adequate supporting data, we cannot assess the accuracy and  reliability of such information. We do not agree that the use of approved  budget projections is a reliable cost estimating methodology, particularly  given the long-term budget implications of the extension of the space  shuttle’s service life.
NASA believes that the examples it provided of the actions to implement  several of the CAIB recommendations attest to the rigor of the process and  approved procedures NASA utilized to validate the costs. According to  NASA, the estimates will mature as the technical solutions mature, but the  estimates were not refined at the time of our review. The agency believes  the outstanding technical issues necessary to return to flight are beginning  to be resolved. However, the examples that NASA provided were in  support of estimates that the agency considers mature. We requested  support for high dollar portions of NASA’s estimate, which the agency did  not provide. However, NASA selectively provided examples of what it  considered to be mature estimates. We reviewed the examples but found  that most of them contained insufficient documentation to assess the  reliability of the estimates. In many cases, there were no documents in the  approval packages to support the estimates, and in cases where there were  documents, they generally provided high-level estimates with little detail  and no documentation to show how NASA arrived at the estimates. We  believe that because of its difficulty providing reliable cost estimates,  NASA cannot provide the Congress assurance that its budget request for  the shuttle program for fiscal year 2006 will be sufficient and that  shortfalls would not need to be met through reductions in other NASA  programs.
NASA stated that it believes the use of UCAs is both reasonable and  necessary for return to flight activities. We agree that UCAs may be  justified to facilitate work outside the scope of existing contracts to  expedite the return to flight activities. However, the use of UCAs appears  to be a growing trend and is a risky contract management practice because  it increases the potential for unanticipated cost growth. In the past, we  cited the agency’s use of UCAs as one of the reasons we retained contract  management as a high-risk designation for NASA to focus management  attention on problem areas that involve substantial resources.
Finally, NASA agrees that cost estimates for significant development  activities should be appropriately documented. According to NASA,  additional requirements for cost estimates and internal controls recently  established by the program represent a step in ensuring the appropriate  documentation is developed as solutions are identified. As stated in our  report, we believe that future compliance with this new policy could  potentially result in more credible budget estimates.
In a broader context, reliable and supportable cost estimating processes  are important tools for managing programs. Without this knowledge, a  program’s estimated cost could be understated and thereby subject to  underfunding and cost overruns, putting programs at risk of being reduced  in scope or requiring additional funding to meet their objectives. Further,  without adequate financial and nonfinancial data, programs cannot easily  track an acquisition’s progress and assess actions to be taken before it  incurs significant cost increases and schedule delays.
As agreed with your offices, unless you announce its contents earlier, we  will not distribute this report further until 30 days from its date. At that  time, we will send copies to the NASA Administrator and interested  congressional committees. We will make copies available to others upon  request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-4841 or lia@gao.gov. Key contributors to this  report are acknowledged in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the basis for NASA’s Hubble servicing mission cost estimate, we  analyzed NASA’s estimate of the funding needed for a shuttle servicing  mission and supporting documentation, and we reviewed NASA  documents explaining the rationale for the decision and identifying  alternatives to shuttle servicing. We interviewed program and project  officials to clarify our understanding of the available cost information and  NASA’s rationale for the decision. To test the sufficiency of the support for  the estimates provided by NASA, we requested the analytical basis and  documentary support for selected portions of the estimates, primarily  those with large dollar values. In addition, we compared NASA’s decision- making process with relevant Office of Management and Budget and NASA  guidance on information and analyses recommended to enable decision- makers to select the best alternative.
To determine the basis for NASA’s cost estimate for implementing all of  the CAIB recommendations, we reviewed the CAIB report (volume 1),  NASA’s return to flight implementation plan and budget estimates, and  agency documentation discussing the return to flight budget estimate. We  interviewed program officials to obtain a better understanding of NASA’s  plans for returning the space shuttle to flight, the status of that effort, and  the estimated cost. To test the sufficiency of the support for NASA’s return  to flight estimate, we requested the analytical basis and documentary  support for selected high dollar portions of the estimate.
To accomplish our work, we visited NASA Headquarters, Washington,  D.C.; and Goddard Space Flight Center, Maryland.
We performed our review from March through September 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Staff making key contributions to this report were Jerry Herley, Erin  Schoening, Karen Sloan, and Jonathan Watkins.