Elections: The Nation's Evolving Election System as Reflected in the November 2004 General Election
Published: 2006-06-06T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The 2004 general election was the first presidential election that tested substantial changes states made to their election systems since the 2000 election, including some changes required by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). HAVA required some major changes in the nation's elections processes, not all which had to be implemented by the November 2004 election. HAVA addressed issues of people, processes, and technology, all of which must be effectively integrated to ensure effective election operations. GAO initiated a review under the authority of the Comptroller General to examine an array of election issues of broad interest to Congress. For each major stage of the election process, this report discusses (1) changes to election systems since the 2000 election, including steps taken to implement HAVA, and (2) challenges encountered in the 2004 election. For this report, GAO sent a survey to the 50 states and the District of Columbia (all responded) and mailed a questionnaire to a nationwide sample of 788 local election jurisdictions about election administration activities (80 percent responded). To obtain more detailed information about experiences for the 2004 election, GAO also visited 28 local jurisdictions in 14 states, chosen to represent a range of election system characteristics.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In passing HAVA, Congress provided a means for states and local jurisdictions to improve upon several aspects of the election system, but it is too soon to determine the full effect of those changes. For example, 41 states obtained waivers permitted under HAVA until January 1, 2006, to implement a requirement for statewide voter registration lists. States also had discretion in how they implemented HAVA requirements, such as the identification requirements for first-time mail registrants. Some local election jurisdictions described different identification procedures for first-time mail registrants who registered through voter registration drives. Although states differed regarding where voters who cast provisional ballots for federal office must cast those ballots in order for their votes to be counted, provisional voting has helped to facilitate voter participation. HAVA also created the Election Assistance Commission, which has issued best practice guides and voluntary voting systems standards and distributed federal funds to states for improving election administration, including purchasing new voting equipment. The results of our survey of local election jurisdictions indicate that larger jurisdictions may be replacing older equipment with technology-based voting methods to a greater extent than small jurisdictions, which continue to use paper ballots extensively and are the majority of jurisdictions. As the elections technology environment evolves, voting system performance management, security, and testing will continue to be important to ensuring the integrity of the overall elections process. GAO found that states made changes--either as a result of HAVA or on their own--to address some of the challenges identified in the November 2000 election. GAO also found that some challenges continued--such as problems receiving voter registration applications from motor vehicle agencies, addressing voter error issues with absentee voting, recruiting and training a sufficient number of poll workers, and continuing to ensure accurate vote counting. At the same time, new challenges arose in the November 2004 election, such as fraudulent, incomplete, or inaccurate applications received through voter registration drives; larger than expected early voter turnout, resulting in long lines; and counting large numbers of absentee ballots and determining the eligibility of provisional voters in time to meet final vote certification deadlines.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The November 2004 presidential election was not as close as the 2000 presidential  election, but it still raised concerns about our election processes.  Following the 2004  general election, a number of members of Congress asked GAO to review aspects of that  election.  In response to these requests, GAO initiated a review under the authority of the  Comptroller General to examine an array of election issues of broad interest to Congress.
This report focuses on the changing election processes in the United States and the  November 2004 general election.  Specifically, for each major stage of the election  process—voter registration, absentee and early voting, preparing for and conducting  elections, provisional voting, and counting the votes—plus voting methods, this report  discusses (1) changes to election systems since the 2000 election, including steps taken to  implement the Help America Vote Act, and (2) challenges encountered by election officials  in the November 2004 election.
Copies of this report are being sent to the congressional leadership and the Chairman and  Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Science. Copies will also be sent to  state election officials and the election official for the District of Columbia and local  elections jurisdictions that participated in our research and will be made available to other  interested parties upon request.  As a courtesy, we are providing other members of  Congress a copy of the report’s highlights page and executive summary.
If you or your offices have any questions about matters discussed in this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-5500; Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security  and Justice, at (202) 512- 8777; or William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director, at (202) 512-8757.  They  can also be reached by e-mail at rabkinn@gao.gov and jenkinswo@gao.gov, respectively.   Contacts and key contributors are listed in appendix XI.
subsections: section_title: Introduction
paragraphs: The basic goal of the elections system in the United States is  straightforward: All eligible persons, but only eligible persons, should be  able to cast their votes and, if such votes have been properly cast by the  voters, have those votes counted accurately. Faith in the fairness and  accuracy of the U.S. election system is at the foundation of our democracy.  Reports of problems encountered in the close 2000 presidential election  with respect to voter registration lists, absentee ballots, ballot counting,  and antiquated voting equipment raised concerns about the fairness and  accuracy of certain aspects of the U.S. election system. After the events  surrounding the November 2000 general election, the Help America Vote  Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted and major election reforms are now being  implemented. The November 2004 general election highlighted some of the  same challenges as 2000 as well as some new challenges in areas such as  electronic voting technology and implementation of some HAVA  requirements. The issues that arose in both elections highlighted the  importance of the effective interaction of people, processes, and  technology in ensuring effective election operations and maintaining public  confidence that our election system works.
Since 2001, GAO has issued a series of reports covering aspects of the  election process primarily with respect to federal elections. This report  focuses on the changing of such election processes in the United States and  the November 2004 general election. Specifically, primarily with respect to  federal elections, our objectives were to examine each major stage of the  election process to (1) identify changes to election systems since the 2000  election, including steps taken to implement HAVA, and (2) describe the  issues and challenges encountered by election officials in the November  2004 election.
subsections: section_title: Election Authority
paragraphs: Election authority is shared by federal, state, and local officials in the  United States. Congressional authority to affect the administration of  elections derives from various constitutional sources, depending upon the  type of election. Congress has passed legislation in several major areas of  the voting process. For example, the National Voter Registration Act of  1993 (NVRA), expanded the opportunities for citizens to register to vote  for federal elections by, among other things, requiring most states to accept  registration applications for federal elections by mail and at state motor  vehicle agencies (MVA) and at certain other state agencies. The act also  requires that in the administration of elections for federal office, states are  to take certain steps to accurately maintain voter registration lists, and it  limits the circumstances for removing names from voter lists. The  Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA)  requires states to, among other things, permit uniformed services voters  absent from the place of residence where they are otherwise qualified to  vote, their dependents, and U.S. citizens residing outside the country to  register and vote absentee in elections for federal office.
The Help America Vote Act was enacted into law on October 29, 2002. As  discussed below, the act includes a number of provisions related to voter  registration, provisional voting, absentee voting, voting equipment, and  other election administration provisions, and authorizes the appropriation  of funds to be used toward implementing the law’s requirements. HAVA  also provides that the choices on the methods of implementation of such  requirements, for example, a computerized statewide voter registration list,  provisional voting, voter information requirements at the polling place,  identification requirements, and voting system standards (for ballot  verification, manual audit capacity, accessibility, and error rates), are left to  the discretion of the states. HAVA further specifies that such requirements  are minimum requirements and should not be construed to prevent states  from establishing election technology and administration requirements that  are stricter than HAVA requirements as long as they are not inconsistent  with certain other specified provisions.
HAVA, in general, applies to all 50 states and the District of Columbia.  Areas covered by the law include  Computerized statewide voter registration list: HAVA requires most  states to implement a single, uniform, centralized, computerized  statewide voter registration list to serve as the official voter  registration list for the conduct of all elections for federal office in  each such state. Under HAVA, the computerized statewide voter  registration list was to have been implemented by 2004. However,   40 states and the District of Columbia received waivers to extend the  deadline until January 1, 2006. States are required to perform regular  maintenance of the voter list by comparing it to state records on  felons and deaths, and to match voter registration applicant  information on the voter list with information in the state motor  vehicle agency’s records and Social Security Administration records,  as appropriate.
Absentee ballots: HAVA contains various amendments to UOCAVA  regarding absentee voting for absent uniformed service voters and  certain other civilian voters residing outside of the United States.   The amendments, among other things, (1) required that the  secretaries of each military department, to the maximum extent  practicable, provide notice to military personnel of absentee ballot  deadlines, (2) extended the time that can be covered by a single  absentee ballot application from UOCAVA voters, and (3) prohibited  states from refusing to accept or process, with respect to federal  elections, a voter registration application or an absentee ballot  application by an absent uniformed services voter on the ground that  the application was submitted before the first date that the state  otherwise accepts or processes applications for that year from   nonuniformed service absentee voters.
Provisional ballots: HAVA requires most states to implement  provisional voting for elections for federal office. Under HAVA, in an  election for federal office, states are to provide a provisional ballot to  an individual asserting (1) to be registered in the jurisdiction for  which he or she desires to vote and (2) eligible to vote in a federal  election but (3) whose name does not appear on the official list of  eligible voters for the polling place. Provisional ballots are also to be  provided in elections for federal office to individuals who an election  official asserts to be ineligible to vote, and for court-ordered voting in  a federal election after the polls have closed. These various types of  individuals, under HAVA, are to be permitted to cast the provisional  ballot upon the execution of written affirmation at the polling place  that they are registered voters in the jurisdiction and that they are  eligible to vote in that election. If election officials determine that the  individual is eligible under state law to vote, the individual’s  provisional ballot is to be counted as a vote in accordance with state  law. HAVA also requires that a free access system be established to  inform voters if their votes were counted, and if not, the reason why.
Polling places: HAVA provisions targeted, among other things,  improving information at polling places and Election Day  procedures. To improve the knowledge of voters regarding voting  rights and procedures, HAVA requires election officials to post  voting information at each polling place on the days of elections for  federal office, including, for example, a sample ballot, polling place  hours, how to vote, instructions for first-time voters who registered  by mail, and general information on federal and state voting rights  laws and laws prohibiting fraud and misrepresentation. The act also  authorized the appropriation of funds for payments to states for  educating voters concerning voting procedures, voting rights, and  voting technology. Under HAVA, voting systems used in elections for  federal office are required to meet specified accessibility  requirements for individuals with disabilities. With respect to  improving accessibility, HAVA also authorized the appropriation of  funds for payments to states to be used for improved accessibility of  polling places for, among others, individuals with disabilities and  those with limited English proficiency. HAVA also requires that such  voting systems provide individuals with disabilities with the same  opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and  independence) as for other voters. In connection with this  requirement, HAVA provides for the use of at least one direct  recording electronic (DRE) device or other voting system equipped  for individuals with disabilities at each polling place.
Identification requirements: Under HAVA, states are to require that  certain voters who register by mail to provide specified types of  identification when voting at the polls or send a copy of the  identification with their mailed applications. Acceptable  identification includes a current and valid photo identification or  current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or  other government document that shows the name and address of the  voter. Under HAVA, voters at the polls who have not met the  identification requirement may cast a vote under HAVA’s provisional  voting section. Similarly, mail-in ballots from persons who have not  provided the required identification also are to be counted as HAVA  provisional ballots.
Election administration: HAVA also established an agency with  wide-ranging duties to help improve state and local administration of  federal elections. The Election Assistance Commission is to be  involved with, among other things, providing voluntary guidance to  states implementing certain HAVA provisions, serving as a national  clearinghouse and resource for information with respect to the  administration of federal elections, conducting studies, administering  programs that provide federal funds for states to make improvements  to some aspects of election administration, and helping to develop  testing for voting systems, and standards for election equipment.  EAC is led by four Commissioners, who are to be appointed by the  President and confirmed by the Senate. The Commissioners, who,  under HAVA, were to be appointed by February 26, 2003, were  appointed by the President in October 2003 and confirmed by the  Senate in December 2003. Since beginning operations in January  2004, EAC has achieved many of its objectives. Among other things,  EAC has held hearings on the security of voting technologies and the  national poll worker shortage; established a clearinghouse for  information on election administration by issuing two best practices  reports; distributed payments to states for election improvements,  including payments for voter education and voting equipment  replacement; drafted changes to existing federal voluntary standards  for voting systems; and established a program to accredit the  national independent certified laboratories that test electronic voting  systems against the federal voluntary standards. However, EAC has  reported that its delayed start-up affected its ability to conduct some  HAVA-mandated activities within the time frames specified in the act.  In turn, according to its fiscal year 2004 annual report, the delayed  EAC start-up affected states’ procurement of new voting equipment  and the ability of some states and local jurisdictions to meet related  HAVA requirements by statutory deadlines.
Voting systems: One of the primary HAVA provisions relates to  encouraging states to replace punch card voting systems and lever  voting systems and authorizing appropriations for payments to  support states in making federally mandated improvements to their  voting systems. A voting system includes the people, processes, and  technology associated with any voting method. It encompasses the  hardware and software used to define the ballot, conduct the vote,  and transmit and tally results, and system maintenance and testing  functions. With respect to standards for voting systems used in  elections for federal office, HAVA requirements for such systems  include providing voters with the ability to verify their votes before  casting their ballots, producing permanent paper records for manual  auditing of voting systems, and compliance of voting system ballot  counting error rates with those set out in specified federal voting  system standards. HAVA also directs that updates to the federal  voluntary voting system standards for these requirements be in place  by January 1, 2004, and provides for additional updates to the  voluntary standards as approved by the Election Assistance  Commission. Mechanisms are also specified that can be used by  states and localities in acquiring and operating voting systems,  including accreditation of laboratories to independently test and  evaluate voting systems and federal certification for voting systems  that undergo independent testing.
The time frames for implementing various HAVA requirements ranged from  as early as 45 days after enactment (a deadline for establishing a grant  program for payment to the states for improved election administration) to  as late as January 1, 2006, for various voting system standards. Several  key deadlines were set for January 1, 2004, including implementation of  HAVA’s provisional voting requirements and the establishment of a  statewide voter registration list (or to request a waiver from the deadline  until January 1, 2006). States receiving funds to replace punch card voting  systems or lever voting systems could also request a waiver until January 1,  2006; otherwise such systems were to be replaced in time for the November  2004 general elections. The deadline for states and jurisdictions to comply  with specific requirements for voting systems, such as producing a paper  record for audit purposes, was January 1, 2006.
HAVA vests enforcement authority with the Attorney General to bring a  civil action against any state or jurisdiction as may be necessary to carry  out specified uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology and  administration requirements under HAVA. These requirements pertain to  HAVA voting system standards, provisional voting and voting information  requirements, the computerized statewide voter registration list  requirements, and requirements for persons who register to vote by mail.  The enforcement of federal statutes pertaining to elections and voting has,  with certain exceptions, been delegated by the Attorney General to the  Civil Rights Division.
section_title: Election System Elements
paragraphs: The U.S. election system is highly decentralized and based upon a complex  interaction of people (election officials and voters), processes, and  technology. Each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia has its own  election system with a somewhat distinct approach. Within each of these   51 systems, the guidelines and procedures established for local election  jurisdictions can be very general or specific. Each election system  generally incorporates elements that are designed to allow eligible citizens  to vote and ensures that votes are accurately counted. While election  systems vary from one local jurisdiction to another, most election systems  have the elements identified in figure 7.
subsections: section_title: Delegation of Election Responsibility
paragraphs: Typically, states have decentralized elections so that the details of  administering elections are determined at the local jurisdiction. States can  be divided into two groups according to how they delegate election  responsibilities to local jurisdictions. The first group include 41 states  where election responsibilities are delegated to counties, with a few of  these states delegating election responsibilities to some cities, and 1 state  that delegates these responsibilities to election regions. We included the  District of Columbia along with this group. The second group is composed  of 9 states that delegate election responsibilities to subcounty  governmental units, known by the U.S. Census Bureau as minor civil  divisions (MCD). However, in 1 of these states, Minnesota, election  functions are split between county-level governments and MCDs. For  example, registration is handled exclusively by county officials, and  functions, such as polling place matters, are handled by MCDs. Overall,  about 10,500 local government jurisdictions are responsible for conducting  elections nationwide, with the first group of states containing about one- fourth of the local election jurisdictions and about three-fourths of the local  election jurisdictions located in the states delegating responsibilities to  MCDs. Although more election jurisdictions are in the 9 states, most of the  population (88 percent of the U.S. population based on the Census of 2000)  lives in the states delegating responsibilities primarily to counties.
section_title: Voter Registration
paragraphs: While voter registration is not a federal requirement, the District of  Columbia and all states, except North Dakota, generally require citizens to  register before voting. The deadline for registering, and what is required  to register, varies; at a minimum, state eligibility provisions typically  require a person to be a U.S. citizen, at least 18 years of age, and a resident  of the state, with some states requiring a minimum residency period.  Citizens apply to register to vote in various ways, such as at motor vehicle  agencies, during voter registration drives, by mail, or at local voter registrar  offices. Election officials process registration applications and compile and  maintain the list of registered voters to be used throughout the  administration of an election. Prior to HAVA, voter registration lists were  not necessarily centralized at the state level, and separate lists were often  managed by local election officials. HAVA requires voter registration  information for federal elections to be maintained as a statewide  computerized list and matched with certain state data, and that voter  registration application information be matched with certain state data  and, in some cases, with federal data, to help ensure that the voter list is  accurate.
section_title: Absentee and Early Voting
paragraphs: All states and the District of Columbia have provisions allowing voters to  cast their ballot before Election Day by voting absentee with variations on  who may vote absentee, whether the voter needs an excuse, and the time  frames for applying and submitting absentee ballots. In addition, some  states also allow early voting, in which the voter goes to a specific location  to vote in person prior to Election Day. As with absentee voting, the  specific circumstances for early voting—such as the dates, times, and  locations—are based on the state and local requirements. In general, early  voting allows voters from any precinct in the jurisdiction to cast their vote  before Election Day either at one specific location or at one of several  locations. The early voting locations are staffed by poll workers who have a  registration list for the jurisdiction and ballots specific to each precinct.  The voter is provided with and casts a ballot for his or her assigned  precinct.
section_title: Conducting Elections
paragraphs: Election officials perform a broad range of activities in preparation for and  on Election Day itself. Prior to an election, officials recruit and train poll  workers to have the skills needed to perform their Election Day duties,  such as opening and closing the polls, operating polling place equipment,  and explaining and implementing provisional voting procedures for certain  voters such as those who are not on the registration list. Where needed and  required, election officials must also recruit poll workers who speak  languages other than English. Polling places have to be identified as  meeting basic standards for accessibility and having an infrastructure to  support voting machines as well as voter and poll worker needs. Ballots are  designed and produced to meet state requirements, voter language needs,  and identify all races, candidates, and issues on which voters in each  precinct in their jurisdiction will vote. Election officials seek to educate  voters on topics such as what the ballot looks like, how to use a voting  machine, and where their particular polling place is located. Finally,  election officials seek to ensure that voting equipment, ballots, and  supplies are delivered to polling places.
On Election Day, poll workers set up and open the polling places. This can  include tasks such as setting up the voting machines or voting booths,  readying supplies, testing equipment, posting required signs and voter  education information, and completing paperwork such as confirming that  the ballot is correct for the precinct. Before a voter receives a ballot or is  directed to a voting machine, poll workers typically are to verify his or her  eligibility. The assistance provided to voters who are in the wrong precinct  depends on the practices for that particular location.
section_title: Provisional Voting
paragraphs: One of the most significant post-2000 election reforms found in HAVA,  according to the Election Assistance Commission, is that states are  required to permit individuals, under certain circumstances, to cast a  provisional ballot in federal elections. More specifically, states are to  provide a provisional ballot to an individual asserting to be (1) registered in  the jurisdiction for which he or she desires to vote and (2) eligible to vote  in a federal election, but (3) whose name does not appear on the official list  of eligible voters for the polling place. In addition, provisional ballots are to  be provided in elections for federal office to individuals who an election  official asserts to be ineligible to vote, and for court-ordered voting in a  federal election after the polls have closed. Although many states had some  form of provisional balloting prior to the passage of HAVA, 44 of the   50 states and the District of Columbia were required to provide provisional  ballots for the 2004 general election. Under HAVA, 6 states were exempt  from HAVA’s provisional voting requirements because they either permitted  voters to register on Election Day or did not require voter registration.   If individuals are determined to be eligible voters, their provisional ballots  are to be counted as votes in accordance with state law, along with other  types of ballots, and included in the total election results.
section_title: Vote Counting and Recounting
paragraphs: Following the close of the polls, election officials and poll workers  complete a number of basic steps to get the votes counted and determine  the outcome of the election. Equipment and ballots are to be secured, and  votes are to be tallied or transferred to a central location for counting. The  processes used to count or to recount election votes vary with the type of  voting equipment used in a jurisdiction, state statutes, and local jurisdiction  policies. Votes from Election Day, absentee ballots, early votes (where  applicable), and provisional ballots are to be counted and consolidated for  each race to determine the outcome. While preliminary results are  available usually by the evening of Election Day, the certified results are  generally not available until days later. Some states establish a deadline for  certification of results, while other states do not.
section_title: Voting Methods and Technologies
paragraphs: Voting methods are tools for accommodating the millions of voters in our  nation’s approximately 10,000 local election jurisdictions. Since the 1980s,  ballots in the United States have been cast and counted using five methods:  paper ballots, lever machines, punch cards, optical scan, and DREs. Four of  the five methods by which votes are cast and counted involve technology;  only the paper ballot system does not use technology. The three newer  methods—punch card, optical scan, and DRE—depend on computers to  tally votes. Punch card and optical scan methods rely on paper ballots that  are marked by the voter, while many DREs use computers to present the  ballot to the voter. Voting systems utilize technology in different ways to  implement these basic voting methods. For instance, some punch card  systems include the names of candidates and issues on the printed punch  card, while others use a booklet of candidates and issues that must be  physically aligned with the punch card. The way systems are designed,  developed, tested, installed, and operated can lead to a variety of situations  where misunderstanding, confusion, error, or deliberate actions by voters  or election workers can, in turn, affect the equipment’s performance in  terms of accuracy, ease of use, security, reliability, and efficiency. In fact,  some recent election controversies have been specifically associated with  particular voting methods and systems. Nevertheless, all voting methods  and systems can benefit from established information technology  management practices that effectively integrate the people, processes,  technologies.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: For this report, we conducted a Web-based survey of election officials in all  50 states and the District of Columbia, surveyed by mail a nationally  representative stratified random probability sample of 788 local election  jurisdictions, and conducted on-site interviews with election officials in   28 local jurisdictions in 14 states. Copies of the survey instruments are in  appendixes II and III. In addition, the results of our state and local surveys  are presented in two supplemental GAO products that can be found on our  Web site at www.gao.gov. Appendix IV provides a summary of  jurisdictions we visited. In reporting the state survey data, actual numbers  of states are provided. When reporting local jurisdiction survey data, we  provide estimates for jurisdictions nationwide. Unless otherwise noted, the  maximum sampling error, with 95 percent confidence, for estimates of all  jurisdictions from our local jurisdiction survey is plus or minus   5 percentage points (rounded). We also provide some national estimates  by jurisdiction population size, and the sampling errors for these estimates  are slightly higher. For these estimates, large jurisdictions are defined as  those with a population over 100,000, medium jurisdictions have a  population of over 10,000 to 100,000, and small jurisdictions have a  population of 10,000 or less. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates from our  local jurisdiction survey are within our planned confidence intervals.
Jurisdictions in which we conducted on-site interviews were chosen based  on a wide variety of characteristics, including voting methods used,  geographic characteristics, and aspects of election administration, such as  whether early voting was offered. We did not select jurisdictions we visited  on the basis of size, but as appropriate, we identify the size of a jurisdiction  we visited using the same groupings we used for our nationwide mail  survey.
We also reviewed extensive prior GAO work and other national studies and  reports, and attended an annual election official conference. A  comprehensive description of our methodology for this report is contained  in appendix V.
We conducted our work between March 2005 and February 2006 in  Washington, D.C.; Dallas; Los Angeles; and 28 local election jurisdictions in  14 states, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards.
section_title: Voter Registration
paragraphs: In general, the goal of a voter registration system is to ensure that eligible  citizens who complete all the steps required of them to register to vote in  their jurisdictions are able to have their registrations processed accurately  and in a timely fashion, so they may be included on the rolls in time for  Election Day. The November 2000 general election resulted in widespread  concerns about voter registration in the United States. Headlines and  reports questioned the mechanics and effectiveness of voter registration by  highlighting accounts of individuals who thought they were registered  being turned away from polling places on Election Day, the fraudulent use  of the names of dead people to cast additional votes, and jurisdictions  incorrectly removing the names of eligible voters from voter registration  lists. With the passage of HAVA, with respect to federal elections, most  states were required to establish statewide computerized voter registration  lists and perform certain list maintenance activities as a means to improve  upon the accuracy of voter registration lists. List maintenance is  performed by election officials and consists of updating registrants’  information and deleting duplicate registrations and the names of  registrants who are no longer eligible to vote.
The voter registration process includes the integration of people,  processes, and technology involved in registering eligible voters and in  compiling and maintaining accurate and complete voter registration lists.  In managing the voter registration process and maintaining voter  registration lists, state and local election officials must balance two goals— minimizing the burden on eligible persons registering to vote, and ensuring  that voter lists are accurate, that is, limited to those eligible to vote and that  eligible registered voters are not inadvertently removed from the voter  registration lists. This has been a challenging task, and remains so, as we  and others have noted. While registering to vote appears to be a simple step  in the election system generally, applying to register and being registered  are not synonymous, and election officials face challenges in processing  the voter registration applications they receive. This chapter describes  various HAVA and state changes related to the voter registration processes  that have occurred since the 2000 general election. It also examines  continuing and new registration challenges encountered by local  jurisdictions for the 2004 general election.
subsections: section_title: Overview
paragraphs: With respect to voter registration, a significant change since the 2000  general election is the HAVA requirement for states to each establish a  single, uniform, statewide, computerized voter registration list for  conducting elections for federal office. The HAVA requirements for states  to develop statewide lists and verify voter information against state and  federal agency records presented a significant shift in voter list  management in many states. While the initial deadline to implement HAVA’s  statewide list requirement was January 1, 2004, more than 40 states took  advantage of a waiver allowing an extra 2 years to complete the task, or  until January 1, 2006. The statewide registration lists for federal elections  are intended to implement a system capable of maintaining voter  registration lists that are more accurate by requiring states to (1) match  voter registration application information against other state and federal  agency databases or records to help ensure that only eligible voters are  added to such lists, (2) identify certain types of ineligible voters whose  names should be removed from the lists, and (3) identify individual voter  names that appear more than once on the list to be removed from the lists.  While HAVA defined some parameters for the required statewide voter  registration lists and required matching voter information with certain state  and federal records, the act leaves the choices on the methods of  implementing such statewide list requirement to the discretion of the  states. On the basis of our survey of state election officials, states varied in  the progress made in implementing their statewide voter registrations lists,  how they have implemented these systems, and the capabilities of their  systems to match information with other state and federal agency records  as well as many other features of the state systems.
In addition to requiring states to develop statewide voter registration lists,  HAVA provides that states must require that mail registrants who have not  previously voted in a federal election in the state are to provide certain  specified types of identification with their mail application, and if they do  not provide such identification with their application, these first-time mail  registrants are to provide the identification at the polls. Furthermore, if  such a voter does not have the requisite identification at the polls, HAVA  requires that the voter be provided a provisional ballot with the status of  his or her ballot to be determined by the appropriate state or local official.  As with the statewide voter registration list requirement, HAVA leaves the  choices on the methods of implementing the provisional voting  requirement to the discretion of the states. On the basis of interviews of  officials in 28 local election jurisdictions, implementation of the  requirement for first-time voters who registered by mail varied. One  noteworthy variation is in the definition of mail registration, where some  local jurisdictions we visited told us that applications received through  voter registration drives would be treated as mail registrations subject to  HAVA identification requirements and other local jurisdictions we visited  told us applications from registration drives were not treated as mail  registrations and therefore were not treated as subject to HAVA  identification requirements.
As noted above, during 2004 and 2005 many states were in the process of  implementing their HAVA-required statewide voter registration lists and  associated requirements for maintaining the lists. Thus, the potential  benefits to be gained from HAVA’s requirement for the statewide voter  registration lists were not evident in many states at the time of the  November 2004 general election. Maintenance requirements in HAVA  intended to help states and local election jurisdictions to have access to  more accurate voter registration list information, such as identifying  duplicate registrations and matching the voter information against other  state agency databases or records, were not yet fully implemented by many  states. Many local jurisdictions were not yet seeing the benefits of being  able to verify voter registration application information with state motor  vehicle agency databases to identify eligible voters, or to match voter  registration lists with state vital statistics agency records to identify  deceased persons, and to appropriate state agency’s records to identify  felons who may be ineligible to vote. Thus, on the basis of our nationwide  survey and local election jurisdictions we visited, many local jurisdictions  continued to encounter challenges with the voter registration lists that they  had experienced in the 2000 general election, such as difficulties related to  receiving inaccurate and incomplete voter registration information,  multiple registrations, or ineligible voters appearing on the list. In addition,  election officials in some jurisdictions we visited told us they continued to  face challenges obtaining voter registration applications from motor  vehicle agencies and other NVRA entities.
In addition, for some local election jurisdictions we visited, election  officials told us that efforts on the part of various groups to get out the vote  by registering new voters through voter registration drives created new  challenges not identified to us as a problem in the 2000 general election.  Specifically, at some local jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us  they faced a challenge processing large volumes of voter registration  applications just prior to the deadlines for registration, which included  challenges in some large jurisdictions to resolve issues of incomplete or  inaccurate (and potentially fraudulent) applications submitted by entities  conducting voter registration drives.
section_title: Changes Required by HAVA Subsequent to the 2000 General Election
paragraphs: HAVA requires states to, among other things, (a) implement a single,  uniform, computerized statewide voter registration list for conducting  elections for federal office; (b) perform regular maintenance by comparing  the voter list against state records on felons and deaths; (c) verify  information on voter registration applications with information in state  motor vehicle agency databases or with a Social Security Administration  database, as appropriate. In addition, HAVA imposes new identification  requirements for certain mail registrants—such as, individuals who register  by mail and have not previously voted in a federal election within the state.
subsections: section_title: HAVA Requirements for Statewide Voter Registration List
paragraphs: Historically, to ensure that only qualified persons vote, states and local  jurisdictions have used various means to establish and compile voter  registration lists. Prior to HAVA, we noted in our October 2001  comprehensive report on election processes nationwide that in compiling  these lists, election officials used different methods to verify the  information on registration forms, check for duplicate registrations, and  update registration records, and we noted that states’ capabilities for  compiling these lists varied. At the time, some states had statewide voter  lists, but others did not and were not required to do so. Moreover, most  jurisdictions we visited at the time maintained their own local,  computerized voter lists. Under HAVA, this has changed. HAVA requires  the chief election official in the state to implement a “single, uniform,  official, centralized, interactive, computerized statewide voter registration  list” that must contain the name and registration information of every  legally registered voter in the state. Under HAVA, states were required to be  in compliance with the statewide voter registration list requirement by  January 2004 unless they obtained a waiver until January 2006. Forty-one  states and the District of Columbia obtained a waiver and thus, for the 2004  general election, were not required to have their statewide voter  registration lists in place.
With respect to the HAVA required statewide voter registration list, states  are to, among other things:  Make the information in such lists electronically accessible to any  election officials in the state.
Ensure that such voter lists contain registration information on every  legally registered voter in the state, with a unique identifier assigned  to each legally registered voter.
Verify voter identity; most states are required to match voter  information obtained on the voter registration application for the  applicant’s drivers’ license number or the last four digits of the voter’s  Social Security number, when available, to state MVAs or the Social  Security Administration databases. In connection with this  requirement to verify voter registration application information,  states must require that individuals applying to register to vote  provide a current and valid driver’s license number, or the last four  digits of their Social Security number; if neither has been issued to  the individual, then the state is to assign a unique identifier to the  applicant. The state MVA must enter into an agreement with the  Social Security Administration (SSA), as applicable, to verify the  applicant information when the last four digits of the Social Security  number are provided, rather than a driver’s license number or state  ID number.
Perform list maintenance on the statewide voter registration lists by  coordinating them on a regular basis with state records on felony  status and deaths, in order to identify and remove names of ineligible  voters. List maintenance is also to be conducted to eliminate  duplicate names.
Implement safeguards ensuring that eligible voters are not  inadvertently removed from statewide lists.
Include technological security measures as part of the statewide list  to prevent unauthorized access to such lists.
Except for the 9 states that did not obtain a waiver from HAVA’s  requirements for establishing a statewide voter registration list, all other  states subject to the statewide list requirement were not required to  perform list maintenance activities as defined in HAVA until the extended  waiver deadline of January 2006. By the November 2004 general election,  states were in various stages of implementing provisions of HAVA related  to their statewide voter registration lists and performing voter list  verification and maintenance, and had different capabilities and  procedures at the state and local levels for performing required list  maintenance functions. Many states reported that their statewide voter  registration systems implementing the statewide list requirement include  or will include additional election management features not required under  HAVA.
section_title: Progress Establishing Statewide Voter Registration Lists Varied
paragraphs: Voter registration system development was an ongoing process in 2004 and  2005. For the November 2004 general election, the use of technology to  compile voter registration information remained an issue. Developing and  implementing statewide computerized voter lists has been an ongoing  process for many states, and state and local election officials reported  encountering difficulties along the way. Our state survey and site visits  suggest that states and jurisdictions were still coming to terms, as of the  last half of calendar year 2005, with how their systems should be updated  and whether states or jurisdictions should control the flow of information  into statewide registration systems.
As mentioned in chapter 1, HAVA vests the Attorney General with the  responsibility of enforcing certain HAVA requirements with respect to the  states. In January 2006, the Justice Department asked all states, the District  of Columbia, and other covered territories to provide a detailed statement  of their compliance with voting systems standards and implementation of a  single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide  voter registration list. If the states, the District of Columbia, or covered  territories were not implementing HAVA’s requirements for the  computerized statewide voter registration lists as of January 2006, the  Justice Department reported that it then asked them to identify steps they  planned to take to achieve full implementation of the HAVA-compliant  statewide voter registration list and the date on which each step would be  accomplished. According to Justice Department officials, they are  reviewing the information provided by the states, the District of Columbia,  and such territories to make determinations of what, if any, enforcement  action might be needed. The Department of Justice reports that it entered  into a memorandum of agreement with California in November 2005 after  that state realized it would not be able to fully meet HAVA’s requirements by  the January 1, 2006, deadline. On March 1, 2006, the Department of Justice  also filed suit in a federal district court against the state of New York  alleging the state not to be in compliance with, among other things, HAVA’s  requirement for a computerized statewide voter registration list and  seeking a judicial determination of noncompliance and a court order  requiring the state to develop a plan for how it will come into compliance.
During our site visits in 2005, we asked local election officials about the  status of their statewide registration systems. Election officials in some  local jurisdictions we visited cited difficulties related to implementing their  statewide voter registration systems involving, among other things, internal  politics and technology-related challenges. For example, election officials  in a large jurisdiction reported that a disagreement between the State  Board of Elections and local election officials over the type of system to  implement delayed the project for a year. State election officials wanted a  system requiring all voter registrations to be entered at the state level but  maintained locally. The local election officials expressed the view that such  a system would result in a lack of control over data entry at the local level  at the front end, while imposing accountability on them on the back end  (data maintenance). During our interview in August 2005, these election  officials told us that a statewide registration system had not been  implemented yet. In some jurisdictions, the difficulties cited by election  officials may have reflected the fact that they were establishing statewide  voter registration systems for the first time. For example, in 1 large  jurisdiction that was establishing a HAVA voter registration list from  scratch, local election officials noted that at the time of our interview in  August, the system was behind schedule, lacked the ability to identify  duplicates, had no quality control, and was not planned to function as a  real-time system.
subsections: section_title: State Capabilities for Matching Voter Registration Lists with State and Federal Records, as Required by HAVA, Were Under Way or Not Yet Achieved
paragraphs: In our survey of states and the District of Columbia, and our survey of local  election jurisdictions nationwide, among other things, we inquired about  the status of their capabilities for meeting HAVA provisions for (1) verifying  voter registration application information against MVA and SSA databases  and (2) maintaining the statewide voter lists by comparing information on  the statewide voter registration list against state death records and felon  information, and discussed the issues during our local site visits. Our work  focused on how states had matched or planned to match voter registration  lists against other state records, as required by HAVA. However, it is  important to note that the success of such matching in ensuring accurate  voter registration lists is dependent upon the accuracy and reliability of the  data in the databases used for matching. If that state’s MVA databases, felon  records, death records, or other records used for matching are inaccurate,  they can result in voter registration list errors.
When a driver’s license or driver’s license number is presented as  identification when registering to vote in an election for federal office,  HAVA requires that states match the voter registration application  information presented with that in the MVA records. In our survey of state  election officials, we asked states whether their voter registration systems  would have the capability to perform electronic matching of such voter  registration information with state motor vehicle agency records for the  purposes of verifying the accuracy of information on the registration  application. Twenty-seven states reported they will have or currently had  the capability to match on a real-time basis, 15 states and the District of  Columbia reported they will have or currently had capability to match in  batches, and 4 states reported they would not have the capability to  perform electronic matching. The remaining 4 states included 2 states that  reported that they are not subject to HAVA’s registration information  verification requirement because they collect the full Social Security  numbers on voter registration applications; 1 state, North Dakota, which  does not require voter registration, did not respond, and 1 state reported  that it was uncertain of its capability to perform electronic matching.
With respect to matching voter information with SSA data when a Social  Security number is presented instead of a driver’s license, in our state  survey, 7 states had and 26 states and the District of Columbia reported that  they would have the capability, by January 1, 2006, to electronically match  voter registration information with SSA (through the MVA); 10 states  reported they planned to have this capability in place but not by January  2006; and 6 states had not yet determined whether they could do so. Many  states reported concerns with whether SSA would be able to return  responses to verify requests in a timely manner. Specifically, 30 states and  the District of Columbia reported some level of concern about the issue.  When asked whether they thought local jurisdictions would be able to  resolve nonmatches resulting from SSA verification checks, opinions were  divided, with a number of states (21) expressing some degree of concern  about this, while a nearly equal number (22 states and the District of  Columbia) did not.
In our June 2005 report on maintaining accurate voter registration lists, we  found that in one state (Iowa) that had verified its voter registration list  with SSA before the 2004 general election, there was no unique match for  2,586 names, according to the SSA records. As we stated in our report,  Iowa officials said that the biggest problem they faced was that SSA did not  specify what specific voter information did not match (i.e., was the  mismatch in name, date of birth, or final four-digit Social Security number).  Without that information, they were not able to efficiently resolve the non- matching problems. In that same report, we also noted that an SSA official  said that the system established to perform the HAVA matching on the four- digit Social Security number is not able to provide that detail. In addition,  we found that use of SSA’s database to identify deceased registrants, which  is linked with the system established to perform the HAVA verification of  voter registration application information, had matching and timeliness  issues.
As shown in figure 8, many states reported that they faced significant  challenges when trying to match voter registration information with state  records. For example, in our survey, 29 states and the District of Columbia  reported that records with incomplete data posed a challenge; 19 states and  the District of Columbia reported that obtaining records not maintained  electronically was a challenge; and 23 states reported that verifying  information against incompatible electronic record systems was also a  challenge.
During our site visits to local jurisdictions, we obtained additional views on  how well, in general, states were believed to perform various data- matching functions. We asked local election officials to describe their  state system’s ability to match voter registration information with MVA and  SSA records and the system’s ability to verify information on eligibility  status for felons, noncitizens, and others with other state databases or  records. One jurisdiction in Illinois reported it was not sure how or if its  voter registration system would be able to match data with MVA and SSA  databases or to verify eligibility status for felons and by age. An official in a  jurisdiction in Florida said that Florida’s system could not verify  information on the eligibility status of felons, noncitizens, the mentally  incompetent, or the underaged—though plans were under way to obtain  information from the Clerk of Courts Information System to perform some  of these tasks.
section_title: Removing Voters Names from the Registration List
paragraphs: HAVA’s list maintenance provisions require states to match the statewide  voter registration list information against certain state records to identify  ineligible voters and duplicate names. If a voter is ineligible under state  requirements and is to be removed from the statewide voter registration  list, states are generally required to remove such names in accordance with  NVRA provisions relating to the removal of voter names from registration  lists for federal elections. Under NVRA, in the administration of voter  registration for federal elections, states may not remove the names of  people who are registered to vote for nonvoting and names may be  removed only for certain specified reasons: at the request of the registrant;  by reason of criminal conviction, as provided by state law; by reason of  mental incapacity, as provided by state law; or pursuant to a general  program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible  voters from the official lists by reason of the death of the voter or on the  ground that the voter has changed address to a location outside the  election jurisdiction on the basis of change of address information from the  U.S. Postal Service (but only if either (1) the voter confirms in writing a  change of address to a place outside the election jurisdiction or (2) the  voter has failed to respond to a confirmation mailing and the voter has not  voted or appeared to vote in any election between the time of such notice  and the passage of two federal general elections).
Reasons Names Removed from Registration Lists In our survey of local election jurisdictions nationwide, we asked about the  reasons names were removed from voter registration lists. On the basis of  our survey of local election jurisdictions, the following table shows various  reasons that jurisdictions removed names from voter registration lists for  the 2004 general election and our estimates of how frequently names were  removed for that reason. For example, the most frequent reason was the  death of the voter (76 percent). Names were removed with about equal  frequency because the voter requested that his or her name be removed (54  percent) or the registrant’s name appeared to be a duplicate (52 percent).  The least frequent reason was for mental incompetency (10 percent). In  many jurisdictions, names were not removed but rather placed on an  inactive list for a period of time. In our survey of local jurisdictions, nearly  half, or an estimated 46 percent, took this step.
In our June 2005 report on maintaining accurate voter registration lists,  on the basis of interviews of election officials in 14 jurisdictions and 7 state  election offices, we reported that in larger jurisdictions, the task of  identifying and removing registrants who died can be substantial. For  example, in the city of Los Angeles, in 1 week in 2005 alone, almost 300  persons died.
The issue of felons voting unlawfully—that is, voting when their felony  status renders them ineligible to voter under state law—was a high-profile  issue in some jurisdictions. According to an election official in a  Washington jurisdiction we visited, this issue was identified during the  November 2004 general election. This official also told us that the Secretary  of State is working to establish a database that will indicate felony status  and cancel the registration of felons. This election official noted that the  jurisdiction rarely receives information from federal courts on felony  convictions. Under federal law, U.S. Attorneys are to give written notice of  felony convictions in federal district courts to the chief state election  official of the offender’s state of residence. In our June 2005 report on  maintaining accurate voter registration lists, we found that U.S. Attorneys  had not consistently provided this information, and while the law did not  establish a standardized time frame or format for forwarding the federal  felony conviction information, election officials in 7 states we visited  reported that the felony information received from U.S. Attorneys was not  always timely and was sometimes difficult to interpret. We recommended  that the U.S. Attorneys provide information in a more standardized manner.
Under HAVA, duplicate names on the statewide voter registration list are  also to be identified and removed. In our state survey, 49 states and the  District of Columbia reported that their voter registration systems will  include a function for checking duplicate voter registration records. On  the basis of our nationwide survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that  72 percent of local jurisdictions employed a system of edit checks  (automated controls to identify registration problems) to identify  duplicates. Our prior work has also found that states were, for the most  part, able to handle duplicate registrations—though obtaining timely,  accurate data to facilitate the identification of duplicate registrations has  been viewed as a challenge among some state election officials.  Specifically, in our February 2006 report on certain states’ (9 states that did  not seek a waiver until January 1, 2006 and were to implement a  computerized statewide voter registration list by January 1, 2004)  experiences with implementing HAVA’s statewide voter registration lists,  we found that 8 of the 9 states we reviewed screened voter applications to  identify duplicate registrations, and most did so in real time. We also  reported that 8 of these 9 states checked voter registration lists for  duplicate registrations on an annual, monthly, or other periodic basis. And  4 of the 9 states reported that implementing the HAVA requirements led to  some or great improvement in the accuracy of their voter lists by reducing  duplicate registrations or improving the quality of voter information before  it was entered into the statewide voter list.
Checking for duplicates remained a challenge for some in 2004 and 2005,  however. In our June 2005 report on maintaining accurate voter  registration lists, we noted that officials in 7 of the 21 local election  jurisdictions we spoke with during 2004 and 2005 had some concern about  the accuracy and timeliness of data they received to identify duplicate  registrants and verify that registrants resided within the jurisdiction.   They noted that the matching and validation of names are complex and  made more so when considering aliases and name changes, as are matches  such as “Margie L. Smith” with “Margaret Smith.” Officials from several  states who reported, at the time of our review, that their state had not  implemented a statewide voter registration system noted that there was no  way to identify duplicates outside their jurisdiction.
section_title: Most States Reported Having Established Centralized Voter Registration Systems, and Half Reported They Can Enter Voter Information on a Real-Time Basis
paragraphs: While HAVA requires that both state and local election officials have  immediate electronic access to information in the statewide voter  registration list, HAVA grants states discretion as to the method used to  ensure that this capability is established. According to EAC, state and  local election officials may determine whether to establish (a) a top-down  system, whereby the statewide voter registration list resides on a state  database hosted on a single, central platform (e.g., a mainframe or client  servers), which state and local election officials may query directly;   (b) a bottom-up system, whereby the statewide voter list is stored on a  state-level database that can be downloaded to jurisdictions and updated  by the state only when the jurisdictions send new registration information  back to the state; or (c) take another approach. According to the EAC  voluntary guidance on HAVA’s statewide voter registration system, the   top-down approach most closely matches HAVA requirements—but other  configurations may be used as long as they meet the HAVA requirement   for a single, uniform list that allows election officials to have   immediate access.
Our 2005 survey of state election officials sought information on how states  were implementing statewide computerized voter registration systems. We  asked, among other things, whether states were using a top-down or a  bottom-up approach. In response, 40 states and the District of Columbia  reported that they have a database maintained by the state, with  information supplied by local jurisdictions (top-down system); 4 states  reported that local jurisdictions retain their own lists and transmit  information to a statewide list (a bottom-up system); and 5 states reported  they use a hybrid of these two options. We also asked whether state  election officials would have immediate, real-time access to their state lists  for the purposes of entering new voter registration information, updating  existing information, and querying voter registration records. About half  the states and the District of Columbia reported they had or would have all  these capabilities. Specifically, 24 states and the District of Columbia  reported they had or would have as of January 2006, real-time access for  entering new voter registration information, while 23 states reported they  did not plan to do so and 2 states did not respond. In addition, 26 states and  the District of Columbia reported that they had or would have as of January  2006, real-time access for updating existing voter registration information,  while 21 states reported they did not plan to do so and 2 states did not  respond. And 47 states and the District of Columbia reported they had or  would have as of January 2006 real-time access for querying all state voter  registration records, while 1 state reported it would not do so and 1 state  did not respond. For each of these questions, one state reported it too  would have these capabilities, but not by the January 1, 2006, HAVA  deadline.
We also sought state election officials’ views on whether election officials  in local jurisdictions would have immediate, real-time access to voter list  information for the same three purposes stated above: entering new  information, updating existing information, and querying records. In our  state survey, most states and the District of Columbia reported that local  jurisdictions had these capabilities. Specifically, 46 states and the District  of Columbia reported that local jurisdictions had or would have as of  January 2006, real-time access for entering new voter registration  information, and 3 other states reported that they planned to do so as well,  but not by January 1, 2006. Also, 46 states and the District of Columbia  reported that local jurisdictions had or would have as of January 2006,   real-time access for updating existing voter registration information, and   3 other states planned to do so as well, but not by the deadline. Finally,   47 states and the District of Columbia reported local jurisdictions had or  would have as of January 2006 the capability to query records for their  jurisdictions in real time, and 2 states planned to do so, but not by January  2006. Figure 9 compares the capability of state and local jurisdiction  election officials to access the voter registration lists to perform certain  tasks.
While HAVA’s list maintenance provisions require states to coordinate  statewide voter registration list information with certain other state  records within their state in order to identify and remove ineligible names,  the act does not specifically provide that such coordination must be done  electronically. However, to determine whether state systems had or would  have the capability to perform electronic data matching, our survey asked  states about existing or planned electronic capability. As shown in figure  10, more than half the states reported that they had, or planned to have, the  ability to match voter registration information electronically with state  records on felony convictions and deceased registrants. Specifically,   25 states reported they had and 15 states reported that they would have the  capability to electronically match against state death records as of January  2006, and 6 states and the District of Columbia planned to have the  capability, but not by January 2006. Three states reported that they did not  plan to have this capability. With respect to identifying ineligible felons,   16 states reported they had, and 15 reported they would have the capability  to electronically match against felony conviction records as of January  2006, while 9 states planned to do so but would not have done so by  January 2006. In addition, 7 states and the District of Columbia did not plan  to have this capability, and 2 states had not determined whether to have the  capability.
On the topic of states’ efforts to meet HAVA’s data-matching requirements  electronically—as opposed to transmitting paper records—EAC  recommends that voter registration information be transmitted  electronically, particularly between states and their MVAs. EAC further  recommends that to the extent allowed by state law and available  technologies, the electronic transfer between statewide voter registration  lists and coordinating verification databases should be accomplished  through direct, secure, interactive, and integrated connections. While EAC  provided guidance to states for their statewide systems, under HAVA, the  states are to define the parameters for implementing interactive and  integrated systems.
section_title: Security of Voter Information in the Statewide Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: HAVA requires election officials to provide adequate technological  database security for statewide voter registration lists that is designed to  prevent unauthorized access. EAC provided states with voluntary  guidance, issued in July 2005, to help clarify HAVA’s provisions for  computerized statewide voter registration lists. Among other things, the  EAC guidance noted that such computer security must be designed to  prevent unauthorized users from altering the list or accessing private or  otherwise protected information contained on the list. Access may be  controlled through a variety of tools, including network- or system-level  utilities and database applications (such as passwords and “masked” data  elements). Special care must be taken to ensure that voter registration  databases are protected when linked to outside systems for the purposes of  coordination. Any major compromise of the voter registration system could  lead to considerable election fraud.
We sought information on what documented standards or guidance for  computer and procedural controls would be in place to prevent  unauthorized access to the lists. In our state survey, 45 states and the  District of Columbia reported having such standards or guidance, 3 plan to  do so, and 1 reported that it did not know. We also asked states what  actions they had taken or planned to take to deal with privacy and intrusion  issues. We asked, for instance, what, if anything, had been done to install or  activate mechanisms to detect or track unauthorized actions affecting the  state’s computerized voter registration system. A majority of states  reported actions had been taken or were to be taken at some point.  Specifically, 26 states reported taking action as of August 1, 2005, while   12 states and the District of Columbia reported they would do so by  January 1, 2006. An additional 4 states reported that actions were planned,  but at no particular point in time. In a related question, we asked what  actions had been taken or were planned to install or activate mechanisms  to protect voter privacy. Again, a majority of states reported actions had  been taken or were to be taken at some point. Specifically, 32 states  reported taking action as of August 1, 2005, while 13 states and the District  of Columbia reported they would do so by January 1, 2006. Two other  states reported actions would be taken at a later point in time.
During our site visits, we asked local election officials what standards or  procedures were used for the November 2004 general election to help  ensure that the registration list was secure and that the privacy of  individuals was protected. Election officials in most jurisdictions reported  that voter information (such as name and address) is public information if  it is to be used for political purposes—though some do not release Social  Security numbers, and others limit access to this information by requiring a  fee. Some local election officials noted that security standards for this  information were not set by the state but rather at the county or local level,  though many look to the state for future guidance on standards. The type of  security in place to restrict access to voter registration records varied by  jurisdiction; among the procedures commonly used were password  protection (so that only certain election officials could log onto the voter  registration system to access the information); storage of voter registration  records in locked facilities; use of “best practice” protocols such as system  firewalls; and in some cases, registration information is maintained on a  computer system that is separate from the jurisdiction’s central system.  Along these lines, 1 jurisdiction noted that it planned to implement a public  key infrastructure (PKI). A PKI is a system of computers, software,  policies, and people that can be used to facilitate the protection of sensitive  information and communications. The official noted it is a felony in that  jurisdiction to use a PKI authorization without authorization from the State  Board of Elections. Election officials in another jurisdiction we visited told  us that all voter registration system users must log on using unique user IDs  and passwords, which are maintained by the county registrar. The system  tracks all data entries and changes, which user made them, and when they  were made. In a few jurisdictions, election officials said they grant  additional privacy to the records of voters involved in domestic disputes or  other law enforcement matters.
When asked whether they had any plan to develop or change existing  security standards or procedures, local election officials in 16 of the   28 jurisdictions we visited told us there were no plans to alter current  practices, though some noted they were not sure. Among those indicating  that security procedures were being enhanced, election officials in 1 large  jurisdiction said they planned to enclose their computer systems server in a  secure case with restricted access. Another official in a large jurisdiction in  another state said that because of a change in state law in 2004, a hard copy  of voter records was no longer available for public inspection.
section_title: Sharing Registration and Eligibility Information among States Is Limited
paragraphs: As mentioned earlier, the HAVA computerized statewide voter registration  list provisions require states to perform list maintenance to identify  duplicate registrations, deceased registrants, and registrants who may be  ineligible to vote under state law based upon a felony conviction. However,  we note that requirements for matching voter registration lists with certain  state records leaves some potential gaps for incomplete and inaccurate  voter registration lists because election officials may not have information  regarding registered voters who die out of state or who are in prison in  another state and ineligible because of a criminal conviction. To determine  whether states went beyond HAVA requirements to share voter registration  data with other states to identify registrants who died in another state,  were incarcerated in another state, or registered in another state, we asked  on our survey of state election officials whether they had taken action to  electronically exchange voter registration information with at least 1 other  state and whether they were sharing registration information routinely with  other states. In our state survey, 31 states and the District of Columbia  reported that they did not plan to electronically exchange voter registration  information with another state. However, 35 states and the District of  Columbia reported they share information with states when a new  registrant indicates he or she previously resided in another state. Other  types of information sharing across state lines were less common. For  instance, 6 states reported sharing voter registration information with  neighboring states, and 1 state reported that it shared information with  states where an individual is known to reside part of the year. In our state  survey, 14 states reported they do not currently share voter registration  information with other states.
We analyzed state and federal voter registration applications to determine  whether these applications provided space for applicants to indicate they  were registered in other states or in other jurisdictions within the same  state to identify duplicate registrations. We obtained state application  forms during site visits with local election jurisdictions, from state Web  sites or, if not available from there, we obtained the application from the  state. Registration forms were those on the Web site or obtained from the  states as of January 2006. Applications for the 46 states and the District of  Columbia and both federal applications had a place on their registration  application where registration applicants could indicate prior registration  in another state on their forms. Three states (Kentucky, Texas, and  Wyoming) did not include a place on their registration forms to identify  prior registration information in another state. Forty-five states and the  District of Columbia included a space for registration applicants to indicate  prior registration in another jurisdiction within their state on their forms,  or in the case of the District of Columbia applicants were to indicate the  address of their last registration. Four states (Alaska, Hawaii, Kentucky,  and Wyoming) did not provide space to indicate prior registration within  their state. Figure 11 is an example of a state registration form that  provided a space for the voter registration applicant to indicate that he or  she had registered in another state.
On the basis of our survey of local election jurisdictions, we estimated that  12 percent of local jurisdictions administered their own registration  application form in addition to the state registration application. Of the   12 percent who had their own form, we estimate that 70 percent had space  on their voter registration applications so that an applicant can indicate whether he or she was previously registered in another state. However,  we estimate that about a third did not capture this information on their  forms.
section_title: Many States Have or Plan to Have Additional Election Management Features in Voter Registration Systems
paragraphs: Although HAVA’s voter registration-related provisions focus primarily on  state election management activities for developing, verifying, and  maintaining voter lists, we sought information on what other types of  registration system upgrades, if any, states planned, and we asked at the  sites we visited what additional system capabilities, if any, had been  implemented or planned. In our state survey, 15 states reported taking  action to upgrade the processing speed or records capacity of their systems  as of August 2005; 6 states reported that such actions would be taken by  January 2006; and 12 states and the District of Columbia reported they  would take such action at a later time.
In other recent work, we have also looked at selected states’ efforts to  enhance their statewide voter list systems. In our February 2006 report on  certain states’ experiences with implementing HAVA’s statewide voter  registration lists, we found that 7 of 9 states that reported implementing  HAVA provisions for a computerized, statewide voter registration system  by January 1, 2004, also reported that they have upgraded or enhanced their  systems, or planned to so do, to include additional election management  capabilities. For example, Arizona reported plans to upgrade its current  system to reflect reciprocity agreements with other states, so that election  officials can be alerted when a voter moves from state to state, and will  allow election officials to retrieve data on such issues as voter petitions,  provisional ballots, poll worker training, and polling locations. Other states  reported adding or planning similar enhancements. Kentucky reported  another type of enhancement: It has used its statewide computerized voter  registration system to establish voter information centers on the state’s  Web site, to assist applicants and staff in the voter registration process.
During our site visits, we asked local election officials to comment on the  election management functions their voter registration systems might  perform. While some local election officials noted they were not certain  whether their new statewide voter registration systems would include the  same array of features as the local county versions, other local election  officials in some jurisdictions responded that they expect their statewide  systems to be able to perform some or all of the following functions:   maintain records confirming mailings to new registrants,  generate letters informing rejected applicants of reasons for   generate forms or mailing labels,  note status or date of absentee applications and ballots sent and   identify polling places for use on Election Day, and  identify poll workers.
In some jurisdictions, other capabilities were mentioned; 2 large  jurisdictions noted, for instance, that bar coding would be used to identify  registrants, and 2 other large jurisdictions indicated that their systems  would track and maintain candidate petition information.
Not all jurisdictions expressed equal confidence in the extra (non-HAVA- related) capabilities of their systems. Election officials in a couple of large  jurisdictions, for instance, told us they were not certain their statewide  voter system would have features comparable to those already in place,  and that their vendor or state was taking a one-size-fits-all approach for all  jurisdictions regardless of size, rather than taking specific local needs into  account. In some jurisdictions, election officials stated that their statewide  systems were still too new to know whether these additional functions  would be operational, and some said they were not yet familiar with all the  system’s capabilities.
section_title: Implementation of Identification Requirements for First-Time Mail Registrants Varied
paragraphs: HAVA imposed new identification requirements for certain mail  registrants—such as, individuals who register by mail and have not  previously voted in a federal election within the state. These individuals  (first-time mail registrants) must provide certain specified types of  identification either by submitting copies of such identification during the  mail registration process or by presenting such identification when voting  in person for the first time following their mail registration. Moreover,  first-time mail registrants are to be informed on the application that  appropriate identifying information must be submitted with the mailed  form in order to avoid additional identification requirements upon voting  for the first time. An individual who asserts that he or she has registered by  mail and desires to vote in person but who does not meet the identification  requirements may cast a provisional ballot under HAVA’s provisional  language. However, according to election officials in some jurisdictions we  visited, casting a provisional ballot requires that these voters are to provide  identification to election officials by a specified time (e.g., by close of polls  on Election Day or within a certain number of days following Election Day)  to have their ballot count. On the basis of our local survey, we estimate that  32 percent of local jurisdictions encountered a problem in counting  provisional ballots because voters did not provide identification as  specified by HAVA for mail-in registrants and were voting for the first time  in the precinct or jurisdiction. Our discussion of provisional voting  processes appears in chapter 5.
HAVA, in general, provides states with discretion as to the methods of  implementing HAVA’s identification requirements for first-time mail  registrants, such as ensuring that voters comply with the requirements and,  subject to certain limitations, allows states to establish requirements that  are stricter than those required under HAVA. According to our state  survey, 7 states reported that such HAVA requirements were already  covered by existing state legislation or some type of state executive action  (such as orders, directives, regulations, or policies); 44 states and the  District of Columbia reported that they enacted new legislation or took  some type of state executive action (such as orders, directives, regulations,  or polices) to address the identification requirements in HAVA for first-time  mail registrants.
We analyzed state and federal (NVRA) voter registration application forms  to determine whether the applications provided instructions on  identification requirements for individuals registering in a jurisdiction for  the first time. We obtained some state application forms during site visits  with local election jurisdictions, and others from state Web sites or, if not  available from there, we obtained the application from the state.  Registration forms were those on the Web site or obtained from the states  as of January 2006. Our analysis showed that 39 states and the District of  Columbia had information on their application forms and 10 states did not  provide this information on their forms. The NVRA voter registration form  included this information. Figure 12 is an example of a voter registration  form that included instructions for first-time mail registrants.
During our site visits, we asked local election officials whether they  considered registering by mail to only include when someone mails in a  single application or to also include mailed-in applications from voter  registration drives. Five local jurisdictions told us that applications  received by mail as a result of voter registration drives are not treated as  mail-in applications and therefore are not treated as subject to mail  registration identification requirements under HAVA; 3 jurisdictions told us  that applications submitted by voter registration drives were treated as  mail-in applications subject to HAVA’s mail registration identification  requirements. Election officials in 1 of these jurisdictions told us that under  their state law (Pennsylvania) all voters who are voting for the first time in  a district must show a valid form of identification, regardless of how they  registered to vote.
Also, during our site visits we asked local election officials how they  processed voter registration applications from first-time mail registrants  for the 2004 general election. Election officials reported taking different  approaches, many involving mailed communications from election officials  sent back to the applicant, particularly if required information was missing.  For example, at least 2 large jurisdictions reported that first-time voters  who did not mail in identification with their applications were sent letters  instructing them to do so. Similarly, officials in 2 jurisdictions in another  state said letters were sent to applicants whose applications were  incomplete, advising them of the need to provide photo ID—and informed  applicants that if they failed to do so, they may have to use a provisional  ballot on Election Day, which would be subject to the voter subsequently  providing identification. In other jurisdictions, though local election  officials reported taking steps to process incomplete applications from  first-time voters, they did not necessarily give the applicant a chance to  correct the application prior to Election Day. For example, in a medium  jurisdiction we visited, first-time voter applicants who did not submit  proper identification were to have been given provisional ballots. However,  the election official told us her office did not inform them about this in  advance for the 2004 general election.
In addition to contacting applicants to inform them of the need to provide  identification discussed above, 1 jurisdiction we visited told us that it  periodically provided a list of applicants who provided driver’s license  numbers but did not provide identification at the time of registration to the  state MVA as another means to verify the registrant’s identity. In this case,  the MVA compared the county clerk office’s registration list against its list  of licensed drivers to see if the name, date of birth, and driver’s license  number matched, and returned the results to election officials. If all these  data elements matched, the election official certified the records and these  prospective voters were not required to show identification at the polling  place.
If a registrant did not provide identification prior to Election Day, local  election officials at all 28 sites we visited reported having a system for  recording first-time voters who failed to provide identification and  transferring that information to a polling site by annotating the poll book.  One large jurisdiction, for example shaded the voter line in the poll book,  while another printed the words “ID required” next to the voter’s name.  With respect to voters who presented themselves at a polling place and did  not have identification, election officials at some local jurisdictions we  visited described different ways that the voter’s provisional ballot could  become verified. For example, a jurisdiction in Georgia said that if a voter  did not provide identification at the polls, it allowed the voter to vote a  provisional ballot and the voter had until 2 days after the election to  provide identification. Another jurisdiction in Kansas told us that the voter  had until the day that votes were canvassed to provide identification. Other  jurisdictions told us that voters would have until the close of the polls on  Election Day to provide identification to election officials. A local  jurisdiction in Washington told us that if the voter did not have  identification on Election Day, the voter would vote a provisional ballot  and election officials would subsequently have the voter’s signature  matched against the registration application to verify the voters identity.
section_title: Processing Registration Applications Received from MVAs and Other NVRA Entities Remained a Challenge
paragraphs: Citizens generally have numerous opportunities to apply to register to vote.  Figure 13 shows several of these opportunities—such as applying at a local  election office, at a motor vehicle agency, or through a voter registration  drive—and the processes used to submit an application.
Problems with applications submitted to MVAs have been identified as a  challenge since 1999. Our October 2001 report on election processes found  that 46 percent of local jurisdictions nationwide had problems processing  applications submitted at MVAs and other public registration sites designated pursuant to NVRA requirements. In its reports to Congress on  the impact of NVRA on federal elections in 1999 through 2002, the Federal  Election Commission (FEC) found that several states reported problems  with election officials receiving applications from MVA offices in a timely  manner, resulting in, the FEC stated, “the effective disenfranchisement” of  citizens who had applied to vote but were not processed by Election Day.  FEC recommended in both reports that states develop ongoing training  programs for personnel in NVRA agencies, such as MVAs.
HAVA includes requirements providing that voters who contend that they  registered (at MVAs or through other means) in the jurisdiction in which  they desire to vote, but whose names are not on the voter registration list  for that polling place, be allowed to cast a provisional ballot. HAVA also  requires that voters who an election official asserts is not eligible to vote  also be permitted to cast a provisional ballot. Election officials would  determine the voter’s eligibility under state law and whether the vote  should count as part of the vote counting process. From our local  jurisdiction survey, we estimate that for the 2004 general election,   61 percent of local jurisdictions had a problem in counting provisional  ballots because of insufficient evidence that individuals had submitted  voter registration applications at MVAs. In addition, we estimate that   29 percent of local jurisdictions had a problem in counting provisional  ballots because of insufficient evidence that individuals had submitted  voter registration applications at NVRA agencies other than MVAs. Also,  our September 2005 report on managing voter registration reported that   4 of 12 jurisdictions we surveyed reported that election office staff  experienced challenges, either to a great extent or some extent, receiving  voter registration applications from motor vehicle agencies. They  reported taking steps to address the problem by hiring additional staff to  handle the volume of applications received and by contacting applicants to  obtain correct information.
There is evidence that, at least in 1 jurisdiction, election officials took steps  since the 2000 general election to address the MVA voter registration issue,  though problems persisted for the November 2004 general election. When  we revisited the same small jurisdiction in 2005 that we had visited in 2001,  election officials reported they were still experiencing problems receiving  registration forms from the MVA, for all those who registered to vote  there—but noted that the process had improved. For example, they said  elections staff now have access to the MVA database directly, so they can  verify whether someone who claimed to have registered at the MVA  actually did so.
In our local jurisdictions survey, we estimate that few jurisdictions  provided training to MVA or other NVRA agencies. Specifically, for the 2004  general election, we estimate that 12 percent of local jurisdictions provided  training or guidance to MVA offices and an estimated 3 percent provided  training to other NVRA entities regarding procedures for distributing and  collecting voter registration applications. Large jurisdictions are  statistically different from small or medium jurisdictions, and medium  jurisdictions are statistically different from small jurisdictions. Specifically,  we estimate that 34 percent of large jurisdictions provided training to MVA  offices, an estimated 18 percent of medium jurisdictions did so, and an  estimated 9 percent of small jurisdictions did this. In addition, large  jurisdictions are statistically different from both medium and small  jurisdictions in providing training to other NVRA entities.
In our October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes  nationwide, we identified measures such as improving the training of MVA  staff as a means of addressing challenges related to applications received  from MVAs. After the November 2004 general election, the National Task  Force on Election Reform—composed almost exclusively of officials who served in voter registration and administration of elections capacities— reported that while the NVRA expanded the number of locations and  opportunities where citizens can apply to register to vote, supporting the  voter registration application process is a secondary duty for entities that  do so under this law. The task force report noted that it is a challenge for  these entities to provide this service in a consistent manner and to transfer  the registrations collected accurately and efficiently to voter registration  offices.
section_title: Jurisdictions Encountered New Challenges Processing the Large Volume of Voter Registration Applications for the November 2004 General Election
paragraphs: In our October 2001 report on election processes, some election officials  noted that while extending voter registration deadlines gave voters  additional chances to register, it shortened the time for processing  applications. And a few election officials raised concerns about short time  frames for processing applications in relation to the possibility of voter  fraud if there was insufficient time to verify an applicant’s eligibility. For  the 2004 general election, the time frame for processing applications had  the potential to pose an even greater challenge given the increase in the  number of voter registration applications that elections officials reported  receiving for the November 2004 general election. The conditions that  election officials experienced in processing the volume of voter  registration applications, such as long hours and lack of time to fully train  temporary workers, could have resulted in data entry errors that would  have had the impact of not properly registering eligible voters and not  identifying ineligible voters.
During our site visits to local jurisdictions, election officials told us that for  the 2004 general election, entering applications in a timely manner was  possible—but challenges did arise, and election officials described actions  taken to help ensure that voters were properly registered. Furthermore, on  the basis of our survey of local election jurisdictions, we estimate that 81  percent of local jurisdictions were able to process applications received  just prior to the registration deadline—though we estimate 19 percent of  the jurisdictions received applications just prior to the registration deadline  that posed problems in entering them prior to Election Day. As shown in  figure 14, we estimate that large jurisdictions experienced problems in  entering the number of voter registration applications more than small and  medium jurisdictions. Large jurisdictions are statistically different from  both medium and small jurisdictions. This may be attributable to larger  jurisdictions having larger populations with more registration activity,  among other things.
All jurisdictions we visited reported that they were able to enter all eligible  applications into the voter registration lists. Nevertheless, most reported it  was a challenge to process the large volume of applications received. For  example, 1 large jurisdiction we visited reported that on a daily basis it was  30,000 to 40,000 applications behind in data entry. As a result, election  officials reported that they hired 80 full-time temporary workers who  worked two full-time shifts to enter all eligible applications into the voter  registration list used at the polls on Election Day. Election officials in  another large jurisdiction told us that they unexpectedly received about  10,000 last-minute registrants. Another large jurisdiction reported it was  “swamped” with registration applications right before the registration  deadline and was not prepared for the volume of applications submitted.  Several jurisdictions required permanent employees to work extended  hours or on weekends. To manage registration workloads, other  jurisdictions reported hiring temporary workers and recruiting county  employees to handle processing workloads. Figure 15 shows the reported  spike in voter registration applications received prior to Election Day in   1 large jurisdiction. Some applications were received after the final week  allowed for voter registration and could not be registered for the 2004  general election but were registered for future elections.
In our state survey, a few states reported that since the 2000 general  election they increased the time that voters in their states have to register.  Although setting registration deadlines close to Election Day itself provides  citizens increased time to apply to register, reducing the number of days  from the registration deadline to Election Day can make it difficult for  election officials to ensure that all eligible voters are included on the voter  registration list. Specifically, in our state survey, 3 states (Maryland,  Nevada, and Vermont) reported changing their registration deadlines for  the November 2004 general election. For the 2000 general election,  Maryland’s registration deadline had been 25 days before the election, but  for the 2004 general election, the deadline for registration was 21 days  before the election, extending the time that voters could register by 4 days.  Nevada’s 2000 registration deadline (9 p.m. on the fifth Saturday preceding  any primary or general election) remained the same for mail-in  registrations. However, for the 2004 general election, the state extended in- person registration by 10 days. Vermont’s voter registration deadline  changed from the second Saturday before the election to the second  Monday before the election, allowing voters 2 more days to register.  Appendix VI provides information on state laws pertaining to registration  deadlines.
On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, entering all voter registration  applications for the time between the registration deadline and the  November 2004 general election posed problems for large jurisdictions  more than it did for small and medium jurisdictions. Specifically, we  estimate that 41 percent of large jurisdictions experienced problems,   18 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 13 percent of small jurisdictions.  Large jurisdictions are significantly different from both medium and small  jurisdictions. Inasmuch as large jurisdictions have more potential  registrants, it is reasonable to expect that they would experience more  difficulty entering all voter registration applications by Election Day than  smaller ones would.
For the 2004 general election, while many states reported having  registration deadlines that were 20 to 30 days prior to Election Day, a few  states reported having registration deadlines that were 10 days or less prior  to Election Day, and some states reported having same-day registration.  Four states (Alabama, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont) reported  having registration deadlines that were 10 days or less prior to Election  Day. Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming  reported having Election Day registration at the polling place.
subsections: section_title: According to Our Nationwide Survey and Jurisdictions Visited, Some Jurisdictions Lacked Sufficient Staff to Process Applications
paragraphs: Having sufficient staff to process the increased number of voter  registration applications was an issue for large local election jurisdictions.  On the basis of our nationwide survey, most local jurisdictions (an  estimated 89 percent) had a sufficient number of election workers  (whether full-time, part-time, or temporary) who were able to enter  registration applications in a timely manner. However, we estimate that   11 percent had an insufficient workforce for this task. Large jurisdictions  experienced problems with insufficient election workers to enter voter  registrations applications more than small and medium jurisdictions did, as  shown in figure 16. The difference between large jurisdictions and both  medium and small jurisdictions is statistically significant. This difference  could be attributable to larger jurisdictions having a greater need for  additional staff.
Several jurisdictions we visited reported that there was a price to pay for  the large volume of registration applications received, such as the need to  hire temporary workers or extend the hours of permanent employees in  order to process voter registration applications for the November 2004  general election. Election officials in several jurisdictions we visited  commented on the financial impact of the temporary workers hired,  overtime hours, and the purchase of needed equipment, such as computers.
In our September 2005 report on managing voter registration, we noted that  all but 1 of the 14 jurisdictions we surveyed faced challenges receiving and  processing voter registration applications during the 2004 general election  and took various steps to address them. For example, election officials in  7 of the 14 jurisdictions reported challenges checking voter registration  applications for completeness, or for accuracy, or for duplicates. At that  time, as in our more recent site visits, jurisdictions reported hiring extra  staff, among other things, to address these challenges.
section_title: Larger Jurisdictions More Likely than Small or Medium Ones to Provide Training to Staff and Track Receipt of Voter Applications
paragraphs: Providing training to data entry staff and tracking applications provide  ways for election officials to manage the flow of applications for  processing that can help ensure that voter registration applications are  appropriately entered into the voter registration list. As part of our inquiry  into the methods jurisdictions used to enter completed registration  application data into voter lists, our questionnaire to local election  jurisdictions asked how they went about accomplishing this task. On the  basis of our survey, we estimate that 76 percent of all local jurisdictions  provided training to data entry staff about the processing and inputting of  registration applications. Seventy-five percent of small jurisdictions  provided this training, 73 percent of medium jurisdictions did so, and   94 percent of larger jurisdictions did so, too. Large jurisdictions are  statistically different from both medium and small jurisdictions. Another  activity that election officials undertook when entering completed  registration applications included tracking incoming registrations. The  results of our survey show that over half of local jurisdictions tracked  incoming registration applications to ascertain the total number received,  the number entered into registration lists, and the number not processed  because of omission or application error, and to identify ineligible voters  based on age or residence. Again, large jurisdictions are statistically  different from both medium and small jurisdictions. Table 2 provides  information on the different activities that local election jurisdictions  undertake when entering completed registration applications into the  official voter registration list.
section_title: Processing Applications Obtained through Voter Registration Drives Posed Additional Challenges for Some Jurisdictions
paragraphs: Nongovernmental organizations in many states sponsored voter  registration drives for the November 2004 general election in an effort to  increase the number of citizens eligible to vote. Voter registration drives  pose a dilemma for some election officials. On one hand, voter registration  drives provide another means by which persons can apply to register to  vote. On the other hand, they pose challenges in assessing the validity of  submitted registrations and in processing large numbers of registrations  submitted close to the registration deadline. For the November 2004  general election, election officials in some jurisdictions we visited told us  they encountered challenges validating and processing the large number of  voter registration applications obtained through voter registration drives  that employed either paid staff (where workers are paid for each voter  registration application completed and submitted to election authorities  prior to Election Day) or used volunteers. For example, Wisconsin’s state  legislative audit bureau conducted an evaluation of the 2004 general  election in its state. It found, among other things, that many registration  deputies appointed for the November 2004 general election worked for  special interest groups or political parties interested in increasing voter  turnout. The evaluation states that investigators found that registration  deputies had submitted 65 falsified names for the 2004 general elections  and that district attorneys in two counties charged four individuals with  submitting fraudulent registration forms. According to the evaluation  report, these registration deputies were reportedly paid by their employer  on a per registrant basis, which may have encouraged them to submit  fraudulent registration forms to increase their compensation.
Such questions about the integrity of the voter registration process were of  particular concern in battleground states such as Florida, Ohio, and  Pennsylvania, where margins of victory were slim and accurate tallies of  eligible votes were therefore of consequence. In our state survey several  states reported that their state election provisions do not address the issue  of voter registration drives that involve payment per application, while  relatively fewer states reported prohibiting them outright. Specifically,   19 states and the District of Columbia reported that state laws or executive  actions are silent about these drives (that is, it is left up to each local  jurisdiction to decide). However, 1 of these 19 states further reported that  while its state law does not address voter registration drives that involve  payment per application, the conduct of such drives is not left up to each  local jurisdiction—the local jurisdictions have no authority in regulating  such matters. Sixteen states reported that voter registration drives are  allowed either by state law or by executive action, 13 states reported that  they are prohibited by state law, and 2 states did not respond.
In addition, our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions inquired  about their awareness and handling of registration drives, and any actions  taken to deter fraudulent applications from being submitted by persons or  groups participating in paid registration drives, and we discussed this  matter during our site visits to selected jurisdictions as well. In our  nationwide survey, we estimate that 91 percent of all local jurisdictions  were not aware of such drives, while 9 percent were aware. About a third  (an estimated 32 percent) of the large jurisdictions—those with  populations greater than 100,000—were aware of such drives. We also  queried local election jurisdictions whether any names on voter  registration applications appeared to be fraudulent. On the basis of our  local survey, nearly all jurisdictions—an estimated 95 percent—did not  have any names that appeared to be fraudulent. Although only 5 percent of  local election jurisdictions had voter registration applications that  appeared to have fraudulent names, an estimated 70 percent identified  receiving 10 fraudulent applications or fewer, an estimated 14 percent  identified receiving 10 or more fraudulent applications, and an estimated   16 percent did not know the volume of fraudulent applications received.  The distribution of the volume of fraudulent applications received is of a  smaller subset of our total sample and therefore has larger confidence  intervals than other estimates. Figure 17 shows the extent to which local  jurisdictions identified experiencing fraudulent voter registration  applications.
In addition, our prior work raised concerns about the quality of voter  registration applications obtained through voter registration drives. In our  September 2005 report on managing voter registration, we reported that  among 12 of 14 local jurisdictions we surveyed, processing applications  received from voter registration drives sponsored by nongovernmental  organizations posed a challenge to election officials because applications  were incomplete or inaccurate.
subsections: section_title: Election Officials’ Views on Irregular Voter Registration Applications from Registration Drives
paragraphs: During our site visits, we sought local officials’ views on a host of issues  related to the integrity of the voter registration process, including how or  whether voter registration drive applications were tracked, how many  registration applications were submitted by volunteer or paid registration  drives in calendar year 2004 leading up to the November election, and how  their jurisdictions dealt with irregular applications. (We defined irregular  applications as those using fictitious names, unusual dates of birth,  nonexistent addresses, or fake signatures or party affiliations.) We also  asked election officials whether they had the ability to determine if  individuals were using false or fictitious names. Many local jurisdictions  that we visited told us that they did not have specific procedures to ensure  that voter applications obtained through voter registration drives were  collected or tracked. This was because, in some cases, the application  forms could simply be downloaded from the Internet. One large  jurisdiction that did not track applications coming from various sources  told us it planned to begin doing so, using a drop-down menu in its  statewide voter registration system that will allow staff to record the  information.
Overall, at local jurisdictions that we visited where applications from voter  registration drives were tracked or at least estimated, the number and  proportion of applications submitted through voter registration drives  relative to total registrations—and the number and proportion considered  irregular—varied widely. For example, in 1 large jurisdiction, election  officials reported that approximately 30,000 registrations received in  2004—about 90 percent—were submitted by registration drives. Of these,  the election officials estimated that only about 50 applications were  irregular—that is, they were unreadable, had questionable signatures, were  incomplete, or had invalid addresses. The election official from this  jurisdiction noted that it appeared some of the applications had been filled  out by individuals who took addresses from the phone book and changed  them slightly. In another large jurisdiction in a battleground state, local  election officials estimated that 70,000 registration applications were  submitted by volunteer or paid registration drives, and here too  irregularities were noted—such as fictitious names and fake signatures— but election officials stated that these irregular applications represented a  “low” percentage of the total. In other large jurisdictions, fewer voter  registration applications were received; 1 jurisdiction, for example, in  another battleground state, reported receiving 2,500 such applications and  estimated that about 20 percent of them were irregular. Two medium  jurisdictions we visited reported receiving a few hundred voter registration  applications or fewer, and both reported that there were no irregularities.  One small jurisdiction did not report any voter registration drives taking  place.
When we asked local election officials during our site visits whether they  had the ability to determine whether a person actually tried to vote using a  false or fictitious name, responses were mixed: Election officials in 3 large  jurisdictions we visited told us they did not have the ability to make this  determination. An election official in another large jurisdiction stated that  “there is no way to know if someone falsely registered has voted.” Others,  however, reported that they were able to determine whether false identities  had been used. For example, in 1 large jurisdiction, election judges check  voter IDs and signatures at the polls to prevent the use of fictitious  identities. One large jurisdiction verifies voter registration information  against Social Security and driver’s license information and checked voter  history internally; election officials in this jurisdiction reported that they  believe anyone who attempted to use a false or fictitious name in the  November 2004 general election would have been caught. And in another  jurisdiction, election officials told us that if an individual attempted to vote  using a fictitious name that was not in the poll book, that individual would  be issued a provisional ballot—which would not be verified if it was  determined that the name was indeed fictitious. Election officials in some  jurisdictions we visited said there was no way to know whether the poll  book already contained fictitious names.
When asked what steps, if any, local jurisdictions we visited took to notify  law enforcement or other legal authorities on irregular registration  applications received, most reported taking some actions. For example,   1 large jurisdiction we visited reported providing irregular registration  applications to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the district  attorney’s office and to the Secretary of State’s office for investigation.  Both the FBI and the district attorney declined to pursue the matter on the  ground that they were understaffed, the jurisdiction reported. The  Secretary of State’s office concluded that while the registration  applications were fraudulent or fictitious, a purposeful fraud was not  committed and that the people completing the fake applications were not  trying to alter an election, but to obtain money by working for the  registration drives. Four other jurisdictions that we visited said they  contacted appropriate state or federal authorities, such as state law  enforcement, a State’s Attorney, a state election enforcement agency, or the  FBI, but election officials did not know whether any action had been taken.
In addition, in our June 2005 report on maintaining voter registration lists,  we reported that election officials in seven locations we visited referred  reported instances of voter registration fraud allegations to appropriate  agencies, such as the district attorney and the U.S. Attorney for  investigation. Also, EAC issued voluntary guidance in July 2005 to help  states implement HAVA. EAC’s guidance suggested that when the voter  registration verification process indicates the possible commission of an  election crime, such as the submission of false registration information,  such matters should be forwarded to local, state, and federal law  enforcement authorities for investigation.
section_title: Some Jurisdictions Have Controls to Manage Registration Drives
paragraphs: When we asked local jurisdictions that we visited whether they had  procedures in place for registration groups to follow when submitting  applications, election officials in most jurisdictions reported that some  type of system was in place to control registration drives. For example,   1 large jurisdiction reported that it had a program to train volunteer field  registrars to register citizens on behalf of the county registrar; these field  registrars were to comply with all registration rules and laws and must  themselves be registered voters, and noncandidates, have proof of identify,  complete a 2-hour training course, and pass a brief examination before  taking an oath. In addition, this same jurisdiction required that any group  requesting more than 50 voter registration forms was required to provide a  plan to the state elections department for when, where, and how it would  distribute the forms—all of which were numbered so that election offices  could track them. Some jurisdictions reported, however, that no  procedures were in place that registration groups had to follow. One large  jurisdiction, for instance, reported that anyone can run a voter registration  drive simply by downloading the voter registration form from the election  office Web site.
On the topic of what actions, if any, local jurisdictions had taken to deter  paid registration drives from submitting fraudulent registration  applications, from our nationwide survey, we estimate that roughly half of  the estimated 9 percent of local jurisdictions that were aware that paid  registration drives were occurring provided training or guidance on how to  accurately complete an application, and an estimated 41 percent of these  jurisdictions notified the persons or groups engaged in paid registration  drives that they had submitted incomplete, inaccurate, or fraudulent  applications. In addition, on the basis of our survey, 41 percent of local  jurisdictions that were aware of the drives helped prevent submission of  incomplete, inaccurate, or fraudulent applications by working with persons  and groups engaged in paid registration drives.
section_title: Actions Taken to Help Prevent Fraudulent Registrations and Ensure Submission of Registrations to Election Offices
paragraphs: In a couple of jurisdictions, election officials told us they took other steps,  such as meeting with registration drive organizers and contacting the  registrant identified on the application, to help prevent fraudulent  registrations. A jurisdiction in Colorado reported that numerous  complaints had been received from voters who claimed to have completed  registrations through a drive but for whom the county had no record of  application. The jurisdiction reported that Colorado’s legislature passed a  bill pertaining to voter registration drives. Subsequently, Colorado enacted  legislation effective in June 2005 that, among other things, requires voter  registration organizers to file a statement of intent with the Secretary of  State, fulfill training requirements pursuant to rules promulgated by the  Secretary of State, and, in general, submit or mail registration applications  within 5 business days. In addition, the 2005 state legislation provides that  voter registration organizers may not compensate persons circulating voter  registration application forms based on the number of applications  distributed or collected. The Secretary of State issued rules in November  2005 implementing such requirements, including rules that require  registration drive organizers to file a statement of intent with the Secretary  of State and require persons circulating such application forms to ensure  that the tear-off receipt on the application is completed and given to the  applicant. Election officials in 17 jurisdictions we visited told us that they  had procedures in place for managing voter registration drives to some  extent. For example, in 1 medium jurisdiction, election officials stated that  groups or persons seeking to run registration drives must be trained and  deputized by the registrar’s office.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: In 43 of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, successfully registering  to vote prior to Election Day is a prerequisite for casting a ballot and having  that ballot counted. States are still working to fully implement HAVA’s voter  registration requirements. As states gain more experience with their  statewide voter registration and data matching systems and processes, it is  likely their systems and processes will evolve. Given the continuing  challenge of maintaining accurate voter registration lists in a highly mobile  society, this is to be expected.
For election officials, the voter registration process presents a continuing  challenge in balancing ease of registration for eligible voters with sufficient  internal controls to help ensure that only eligible voters are added to and  remain on the voter registration rolls. To maintain accurate voter  registration lists, election officials must use and rely upon data from a  number of sources, such as state death and criminal records and  applications from MVAs.
HAVA’s requirements for creating and maintaining statewide voter  registration lists and its identification requirements for first-time voters  who register by mail were designed to help improve the accuracy of voter  registration lists and reduce the potential for voter fraud. Specifically,  HAVA’s requirements for creating and maintaining a statewide voter  registration list was designed to improve voter registration list accuracy by  identifying duplicate registrations within the state and identifying those  ineligible to vote because of death, criminal status, or other reasons. HAVA  requires states to match the names and other identifying information on  their statewide voter registration lists against death and felony records in  the state. States may voluntarily match their voter registration lists with the  voter registration lists, death, felony, or other records in other states. In the  absence of voluntary cross-state matching, it is possible to fully implement  HAVA’s statewide voter registration provisions and still have ineligible  persons on the state’s voter registration rolls on Election Day, such as those  who died out of state or were convicted in federal courts or other states.  Nor would implementing HAVA’s statewide matching requirements identify  persons who are registered to vote in more than one state. Although some  states report sharing registration and eligibility information among states,  the practice was generally limited to neighboring states or dependent upon  a registrant indicating that he or she previously resided in another state.
HAVA includes a provision that requires certain first-time voters who  register by mail to provide identification as proof of their identity and  eligibility to vote in the jurisdiction. Which voters must present  identification either with their mail application or when they vote for the  first time depends upon how states and local jurisdictions define “mail  registrations” subject to HAVA’s identification requirement. In our site  visits, we found that some local jurisdictions considered registration  applications submitted by registration drives to be mail registrations  subject to HAVA’s identification requirement for first-time voters, while  other jurisdictions did not consider such registrations to be mail  registrations subject to the identification requirement. This distinction has  importance on Election Day for first-time voters who registered through  registration drives. In those jurisdictions that considered mail registrations  to include registration drive applications, first-time voters who registered  through registration drives would be required to show an acceptable form  of identification at the polls on election day. If they did not do so, they are  to be permitted to cast a provisional ballot, but the ballot would only be  counted upon a state determination that the voter is eligible to vote under  state law. In contrast, in those jurisdictions that did not consider mail  applications to include those submitted through registration drives, first- time voters would not be treated as subject to the HAVA identification  requirement and could generally cast a regular ballot that would be  counted with all other regular ballots.
Election jurisdictions continue to face challenges in obtaining voter  registration applications from NVRA entities, including MVAs. Some local  jurisdictions have established processes to manage receipt of voter  registration applications from these entities, such as training for staffs of  these agencies. To the extent that NVRA entities do not track and forward  to the appropriate election jurisdiction the voter applications that they  have received, voters may be required to cast provisional ballots instead of  regular ones because their names do not appear on the voter registration  lists. In addition, the provisional ballot will not be counted if the voter’s  valid registration cannot be verified. Our survey of local election  jurisdictions found that many local jurisdictions encountered problems  counting provisional ballots in cases where voters claimed to have  registered at an MVA or some other NVRA entity but there was insufficient  evidence that the voter had submitted a registration application at the MVA  or NVRA entity.
A surge of last-minute registrations in many jurisdictions prior to the  November 2004 election illustrated the challenge of balancing ease of  registration with assurance that only eligible voters are on the registration  rolls. Some election jurisdictions reported registration drive groups  submitted hundreds or thousands of applications just before the  registration deadline. When the registration deadline is close to Election  Day, processing these applications presents a tremendous challenge in  checking applications for completeness, having time to contact applicants  to obtain missing information, verifying applicants’ eligibility to vote, and  adding the name of eligible voters to the registration list. Some  jurisdictions reported hiring and training temporary employees to process  the applications. The enormous workload and time constraints associated  with processing large numbers of last-minute applications can increase the  chances that errors will be made in determining voter eligibility, and the  names of some eligible voters may not be added to the list in time for  Election Day.
section_title: Absentee and Early Voting
paragraphs: A growing number of citizens seem to be casting their ballots before  Election Day using absentee and early voting options that are offered by  states and local jurisdictions.
However, circumstances under which these voters vote and the manner in  which they cast their ballots before Election Day differ because there are  51 unique election codes. Because of the wide diversity in absentee and  early voting requirements, administration, and procedures, citizens face  different opportunities for obtaining and successfully casting ballots before  Election Day.
To collect information about absentee and early voting options, in our state  and local surveys we asked questions about each of these voting options  separately. We defined absentee voting as casting a ballot, generally by  mail, in advance of Election Day (although ballots could be returned  through Election Day and dropped off in person). We defined early voting  as generally in-person voting in advance of Election Day at specific polling  locations, separate from absentee voting. However, there is some measure  of overlap between absentee voting and early voting reported by the states,  especially where states have reported in-person absentee voting to be, in  effect, early voting. This may be due, in part, to the fact that the relational  statutory framework for early voting and absentee voting varies among the  states—with some states, for example, providing early voting within the  context of the state’s absentee voting provisions, while others, for example,  provide for absentee voting within the context of the state’s early voting  provisions. Similarly, local jurisdictions that completed our survey may  also have had some measure of overlap in relation to their practices for  absentee and early voting. During our interviews with local election  officials in jurisdictions that offered early voting, we were able to obtain  more detailed information about absentee and early voting procedures and  practices for those jurisdictions.
On the basis of our site visits to jurisdictions that had early voting, absentee  and early voting were similar in some ways and distinct in others. Election  officials described to us that when voters cast absentee ballots, they  typically followed a specific process including applying for and receiving  the ballot and returning their marked ballots before Election Day or, in  some cases, returning the ballot up until the close of polls on Election Day.  According to the description that election officials gave us, early voting  was distinct from in-person absentee voting in that in-person absentee  voters usually applied for and received a ballot, and cast it at the registrar’s  office, while early voters reported to a voting location where early voting  staff verified their eligibility to vote, usually by accessing the jurisdiction’s  voter registration list. Also, early voting usually did not require citizens to  provide an excuse, as some states required for absentee voting, and it was  usually allowed for a shorter period of time than absentee voting. For  example, in the 14 jurisdictions we visited in 7 states that reported having  early voting, the time frame allowed for absentee voting was almost always  at least twice as long as that for early voting (e.g., Colorado allowed 30 days  for absentee voting and 15 days for early voting). Early voting was similar  to Election Day voting in that the voting methods were usually the same.  However, according to election officials in jurisdictions we visited that had  early voting, voters were not limited to voting in their precinct because all  early voting locations had access to a complete list of registered voters for  the jurisdiction (not just precinct specific) and had appropriate ballots that  included federal, state, and precinct-specific races. Appendix VII provides a  description of selected characteristics of the early voting jurisdictions we  visited.
In this chapter, we will discuss changes since 2000 and challenges related  to (1) absentee voting in general, (2) overseas military and civilian absentee  voting, and (3) early voting.
subsections: section_title: Overview
paragraphs: Some states have increased the opportunities for citizens to vote absentee  or early. For the November 2004 general election, 21 states reported that  they no longer required voters to provide excuses such as being ill, having a  disability, or being away from the precinct on Election Day to vote  absentee—an increase of 3 states from the November 2000 general  election. Three states reported expanding their provision for permanent  absentee status (usually reserved for the elderly or those with disabilities),  allowing voters to receive absentee ballots for a state-specified time period,  such as 4 years. One state reported eliminating its requirement that mail-in  absentee voters provide an attestation from a notary or witness for their  signature along with the completed absentee ballot. Eliminating the need  for a notary or witness removes a potential barrier to an absentee ballot  being counted. According to election officials in 2 jurisdictions in 1 state  we visited that required a notary or witness signature, an absentee ballot  may not be counted if voters neglect to have their ballots witnessed or  notarized. Furthermore, HAVA amended the Uniformed and Overseas  Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) to, among other things, extend the  period of time that can be covered by a single absentee ballot application  by absent uniformed service voters and certain other civilian voters  residing outside of the United States from the year during which the  application was received to a time period covering up to the two next  regularly scheduled general elections for federal office.
Election officials reported facing some of the same challenges in the  November 2004 general election that they had identified to us for the  November 2000 general election, and they also reported some new  challenges. Continuing absentee voting challenges included (1) receiving  late absentee voter applications and ballots; (2) managing general  workload, resources, and other administrative constraints; (3) addressing  voter error issues such as unsigned or otherwise incomplete absentee  applications and ballot materials; and (4) preventing potential fraud.
Election officials also told us that they encountered new challenges in the  November 2004 general election. Some election officials said that the  increased early voter turnout during this election resulted in long lines. In  some local jurisdictions we visited, election officials said that factors such  as inadequate planning on their part, limitations on types of facilities that  could be used for early voting locations, and funding constraints on hiring  more staff or acquiring more voting locations affected their management of  large early voter turnout. In addition, some election officials reported that  they encountered a challenge handling disruptive third parties as they  attempted to approach early voters who were in line to vote. Another  challenge could develop as a result of a 2002 HAVA amendment to  UOCAVA. In an effort to help make registration and voting easier for absent  uniformed service voters and certain other civilian voters residing outside  of the United States, this 2002 amendment, as noted above, extended the  period of time that can be covered by a single application from the year  during which the application was received to a time period covering up to  the next two subsequent general elections for federal office. Election  officials in 4 jurisdictions we visited told us that a possible unintended  consequence of this amendment could be that when uniformed services  personnel are reassigned to other duty posts, absentee ballots may not be  sent to the correct address for subsequent general elections. Even with a  2005 revision to the ballot request form whereby voters can indicate that  they want ballots for one federal election only, election officials in 3 of  these jurisdictions were concerned many absentee ballots would be  returned as undeliverable.
section_title: Absentee Voting
paragraphs: Absentee voting allows citizens the opportunity to vote when they are  unable to vote at their precinct on Election Day. Although availability,  eligibility requirements, administration, and procedures vary across the   50 states and the District of Columbia, absentee voting generally follows a  basic process. As figure 18 shows, this process included four basic steps for  the November 2004 general election.
Jurisdictions we visited typically provided absentee ballot applications that  registered voters used to request absentee ballots in a standard state or  jurisdiction form, as shown in figure 19.
According to our state survey, state election officials reported that  registered voters could visit or write their local election office, or in some  cases visit a state or local election Web site, to obtain an application or  learn what information was required to request an absentee ballot. State  election officials reported registered voters could return a completed  absentee ballot application via the U.S. mail or in many other different  ways as allowed by state absentee ballot provisions. Also, some election  officials in jurisdictions we visited told us that voters could complete any  part of the absentee voting process in person at their local elections office.  Table 3 shows the various options allowed by states for requesting and  returning absentee ballot applications. However, it is important to note that  particular local jurisdictions might not have offered all of the options  described below.
According to our state survey results, states reported that applicants could  find out the status of their absentee ballot application after it was  submitted and offered at least one of several ways, including telephoning a  state or local jurisdiction office, telephoning a hotline or toll-free number,  or e-mailing a state or local jurisdiction office. For example, in 49 states  and in the District of Columbia, applicants could telephone a state or local  jurisdiction office, and in 47 states and in the District of Columbia,  applicants could e-mail a state or local jurisdiction office to find out their  absentee ballot applications’ status. Thirty-nine states and the District of  Columbia notified the applicant if the application was rejected.
While absentee ballots are generally provided to the voter through the mail,  unless voting in person, on the basis of our survey of a representative  sample of local jurisdictions nationwide, some jurisdictions provided  absentee ballots using fax and e-mail. Specifically, for the November 2004  general election, we estimate that 17 percent of local jurisdictions provided  absentee ballots by fax, and 4 percent of local jurisdictions provided  absentee ballots by e-mail. On the basis of our discussions with election  officials in jurisdictions we visited, absentee ballots are generally returned  through the mail.
Election officials in most jurisdictions we visited said that voters used a  combination of envelopes for returning completed absentee ballots so that  voters’ indentities would be distinct from the ballots they were casting. For  example, a voter would place the completed ballot in a secrecy (inner)  envelope, which would then be placed in an outer envelope. The secrecy  envelope would be to ensure that the voted ballot was not linked to the  voter, while the voter’s affidavit information, such as a name, address, and  signature, needed to certify that the voter was eligible to vote, would be  marked on the outer envelope. Election officials in some jurisdictions  provided examples of the envelopes used to return absentee ballots. One of  these examples had a separate affidavit envelope, which was to be placed  in a pre-addressed return envelope and mailed to the local elections  jurisdiction. Other examples allowed the voter to include the affidavit  information on the back of the pre-addressed return envelope. Once the  local elections jurisdiction certified that the absentee ballots could be  counted using the affidavit information, election officials in jurisdictions  we visited told us that they removed the secrecy envelope (with the voted  ballot sealed inside) and set it aside for counting. Figure 20 shows  examples of absentee ballot return envelopes and the inclusion of affidavit  information.
In our survey of state election officials, we asked whether absentee voters  were able to find out the status of their submitted absentee ballots in  various ways. According to our state survey, 44 states and the District of  Columbia reported that absentee voters were able to telephone a state or  local jurisdiction office, 32 states and the District of Columbia reported  that absentee voters were able to e-mail a state or local jurisdiction office,  16 states reported that absentee voters could telephone a hotline or toll- free number, and 5 states reported that absentee voters’ ballot status was  available via a Web site. Furthermore, 16 states reported that either state or  local jurisdictions would notify the voter if the absentee ballot was not  counted. However, 6 states reported that they do not allow voters to check  the status of their absentee ballots at all. For example, Vermont reported  that state law does not allow voters to find out whether or not the absentee  ballot was counted. Kentucky reported that it does not track whether or  not an individual voter’s ballot was counted because linking a voted ballot  back to a specific voter violates that voter’s right to a secret ballot.
subsections: section_title: A Few States Reported Changes to Absentee Voting Requirements since 2000
paragraphs: A few states reported changes to their requirements with respect to  absentee voting by (1) no longer requiring a reason or excuse for voting  absentee; (2) eliminating the need for a mail-in absentee voter to have a  notary or witness for the voter’s signature to accompany the ballot; and   (3) not limiting permanent absentee voting status to individuals with  disabilities or the elderly.
subsections: section_title: Excuse Requirement
paragraphs: According to our state survey regarding the November 2004 general  election, all 50 states and the District of Columbia had some provisions  allowing registered voters to vote before Election Day, but not every  registered voter was eligible to do so. Twenty-one states reported allowing  voters to vote absentee for the November 2004 general election without  first having to provide a reason or excuse. The other 29 states and the  District of Columbia reported requiring voters to meet one of several  criteria, or “excuses,” to be eligible to vote before Election Day, such as  having a disability, being elderly, or being absent from the jurisdiction on  Election Day. The following are examples of excuses that some states  required:  absent from the state or county on Election Day;  a member of the uniformed services or a dependent;  a permanent or total disability;  ill or having a temporary disability;  over a certain age, such as 65;  at a school, college, or university;  employed on Election Day in a job for which the nature or hours  prevent the individual from voting at his or her precinct, such as an  election worker; and  involved in emergency circumstances, such as the death of a family  member.
In our survey of local jurisdictions, we asked about problems encountered  when processing absentee ballot applications. As shown in figure 21, we  estimate that 9 percent of local jurisdictions received absentee applications  that did not meet the excuse required by law, in states where excuses were  required. The issue of applicants not meeting the required excuse is more  of a problem for large jurisdictions than small or medium jurisdictions.
According to our state survey, the number of states that allowed absentee  voting without an excuse increased from 18 in 2000 to 21 in 2004. Since  November 2004, 2 more states reported that they have eliminated their  excuse requirement. Specifically, during visits to local jurisdictions in New  Jersey, election officials told us that state law had changed since the  November 2004 general election. According to these officials, no-excuse  absentee voting was adopted by the New Jersey legislature and became  effective in July 2005. Ohio also amended its absentee voter provisions,  effective January 2006, to provide for no-excuse absentee voting.
section_title: Notary or Witness Signature Requirement
paragraphs: Election officials in 2 jurisdictions in 1 state we visited told us that if voters  returned a completed (voted) ballot without having the signature notarized  or affirmed by a witness, the vote would be disqualified and not counted.  For the November 2004 general election, according to our state survey,   12 states reported requiring that mail-in absentee ballots contain  attestation by a notary or witness for a voter’s signature to accompany the  absentee ballot. From the November 2000 election to the November 2004  election, Florida was the only state that reported in our state survey that it  had dropped the requirement that mail-in absentee ballots contain  attestation by a notary or witness for a voter’s signature.
section_title: Permanent Absentee Voting
paragraphs: Permanent absentee voting, which typically was available to individuals  with disabilities or the elderly, was another way some states sought to help  enfranchise certain categories of voters. Permanent absentee status, where  offered, generally allowed the voter to apply for mail-in absentee ballots  once (rather than for each separate election) over a specified time period.  State requirements dictated when and how often a voter must apply for  permanent absentee status. For example, for the November 2004 general  election, in a New Jersey jurisdiction that we visited, election officials told  us that state law required those eligible for permanent absentee status to  apply at the beginning of the calendar year to receive absentee ballots for  that year. According to the absentee ballot application provided by this  jurisdiction, a voter’s permanent absentee status remains in effect  throughout that year unless the voter notifies the election office otherwise.  An election official in a Pennsylvania jurisdiction we visited said that his  state allowed permanent absentee voters to apply once every 4 years. In  this state, permanent absentee voters were to receive absentee ballots for  all elections during the 4-year period, according to the election official. In   2 Washington jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that any  voter could qualify for permanent absentee status for all future elections  (e.g., no time period specified). In one of these Washington jurisdictions,  election officials provided a copy of the permanent absentee application  instructing voters that their permanent absentee status would be  terminated upon the (1) voter’s written request, (2) cancelation of the  voter’s registration record, (3) death or disqualification, or (4) return of an  ongoing absentee ballot as undeliverable.
Our state survey results showed that since the November 2000 general  election, 3 states (California, Rhode Island, and Utah) reported state  changes that expanded, in some manner, the use of permanent absentee  voting. For example, California, reported changes for the November 2004  election that allowed any voter to apply for and receive permanent  absentee status. For the November 2000 general election, California  previously reported that only certain categories of voters with disabilities  (e.g., blind voters) were eligible for permanent absentee status. Overall, the  results of our state survey showed that at the time of the November 2004  general election, 17 states reported having some provision for permanent  absentee status, 32 states and the District of Columbia reported that they  did not provide for permanent absentee status, and Oregon reported  conducting its election entirely by mail—making permanent absentee  status unnecessary in this state.
Appendix VIII provides information on states’ requirements for no-excuse  absentee voting and witness or notary signature provisions for the  November 2000 and 2004 general elections and shows where changes  occurred. States did not report any changes to their permanent absentee  requirements since the November 2000 general election.
section_title: Receiving Late Absentee Ballot Applications and Ballots for the November 2004 General Election Continued to Be a Challenge
paragraphs: The results from our state survey show that deadlines for voters to both  apply for absentee ballots and return them to local jurisdictions to be  counted differed among states. According to our state survey for the  November 2004 general election, 47 states and the District of Columbia  reported that they had absentee ballot application deadlines that ranged  from Election Day (5 states: Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, Ohio, and  South Dakota) to 21 days before Election Day (Rhode Island). Three states  (Florida, New Hampshire, and Oregon) reported having no absentee ballot  application deadline, although ballots in these states had to be returned by  the close of polls on Election Day.
With respect to state deadlines for returning absentee ballots, many states  reported having more than one deadline to correspond with differing  methods of returning such ballots to election officials. In our state survey,  44 states reported having provisions requiring that absentee ballots be  returned by or on Election Day; 7 states reported having provisions  requiring that absentee ballots be returned a certain number of days before  Election Day; and 8 states and the District of Columbia reported having  provisions allowing mailed absentee ballots to be returned a certain  number of days after Election Day, if such ballots were postmarked by a  specified date. For example, for the 2004 November general election,  Alaska reported two deadlines: (1) mail-in absentee ballots were to be  received by close of business on the 10th day after the election when  postmarked on or before Election Day, and (2) in-person absentee ballots  were to be delivered by 8:00 p.m. on Election Day.
Also, according to our state survey, Nebraska reported that for absentee  ballots returned by mail, the deadline changed from no later than 2 days  after Election Day for the November 2000 general election to the close of  polls on Election Day for the November 2004 general election. According to  our state survey, these deadlines may be different for absent uniformed  service voters and certain other civilian voters residing outside the United  States, a subject that will be discussed later in this chapter.
In our October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes, we  reported that election officials for the 2000 general election identified  receiving applications and ballots after state statutory deadlines as a  challenge. According to our nationwide survey, local jurisdictions  encountered similar problems with processing absentee ballot applications  and absentee ballots for the November 2004 general election. More  specifically, on the basis of our survey, we estimate that 55 percent of local  jurisdictions received absentee ballot applications too late to process. We  also estimate 77 percent of local jurisdictions encountered problems in  processing absentee ballots because ballots were received too late.  Furthermore, we asked jurisdictions about which problems were  encountered most frequently. An estimated 25 percent of local jurisdictions  encountered the ballot lateness problem most frequently. Figure 22 shows  that medium and large jurisdictions encountered lateness with absentee  ballots more than small jurisdictions did.
Appendix VIII summarizes states’ deadlines for receiving domestic mail-in  absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots.
Election officials in the local jurisdictions we visited told us that they tried  to approve applications and mail absentee ballots to voters as quickly as  possible, assuming that the ballots had been finalized and printed. In   8 jurisdictions we visited in 5 states (Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico,  Pennsylvania, and Washington), election officials said that their states  mandated that local election jurisdictions process absentee ballot  applications within a specified time period, such as within 24, 48, or   72 hours of receipt of the application. In 2 Pennsylvania jurisdictions we  visited, election officials stated that they established a local policy  encouraging election staff to process absentee ballot applications faster  (such as on the day of receipt) than the time period specified in state law  (which was 48 hours). In 1 Illinois and 1 Nevada jurisdiction we visited,  election officials said that while a 24- or 48-hour turnaround time for  absentee ballot applications was not mandated in state law, local office  policy was to process them as quickly as possible—such as within 24 hours  of receipt of the application.
During our site visits, election officials in 9 jurisdictions stated that they  received large numbers of mail-in absentee ballot applications just prior to  the deadlines prescribed by state law. Most of these election officials said  they were able to meet their state-mandated or office policy application- processing time, although they had to work long hours and hire additional  staff to process the absentee ballot applications by the deadline. In   1 Florida jurisdiction we visited, local election officials said that even  though they had no absentee ballot application deadline, they processed  applications using “long hours and extra people” and tried to send out  absentee ballots within 24 hours of receiving a complete application.
In jurisdictions we visited in Pennsylvania and Colorado, election officials  said that sometimes the 24- or 48-hour turnaround was impossible to meet  because the state did not finalize the ballots for printing until the days  immediately preceding Election Day for the November 2004 election. For  example, an election official in the Pennsylvania jurisdiction we visited told  us that determining whether or not an independent presidential candidate’s  name was to be included on the November 2004 general election ballot  proved to be a challenge. In this jurisdiction, the validity of petition  signatures supporting the independent candidate’s request to be included  on the ballot was challenged in state court about 10 weeks before the  election. As a result, according to the election official, election officials  were required to participate in a court-mandated process of verifying the  signatures. According to the election official, it took about 10 days in court  to resolve the situation, which delayed the printing of the ballots.
In 6 jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that slowness in the  delivery of the mail added to the processing time crunch during the week  before Election Day—a problem that is out of election officials’ control and  may contribute to the local election officials’ receipt of absentee voting  materials after state-mandated deadlines. Although envelopes can use an  “official election mail” designation, election officials in these 6 jurisdictions  we visited said that the U.S. Postal Service did not always process absentee  voting materials in a timely manner. For example, in one New Mexico  jurisdiction we visited, election officials stated that they experienced  serious problems with the U.S. Postal Service delivering absentee ballot  applications. These officials felt that the post office ignored the envelopes’  official election mail designation and did not process and deliver them  quickly. Election officials in this jurisdiction said that their telephone  system crashed numerous times leading up to Election Day in November  2004, given the heavy volume of incoming calls from voters checking on the  status of their absentee ballot applications. In one Pennsylvania  jurisdiction that we visited, election officials said that postal concerns were  raised when some college students’ absentee ballot applications were  received after Election Day. These officials could not definitely say at what  point these applications might have been delayed and explained that the  mail delivery delay could have been attributable to either the U.S. Postal  Service or the university’s mailing center. Figure 23 illustrates the use of  special postal markings for absentee ballot materials.
While election officials in 6 jurisdictions we visited told us about challenges  with mail delivery, election officials in 7 jurisdictions we visited told us that  they did not have problems with mail delivery or coordinating with the U.S.
Postal Service. In an Illinois jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us  that prior to the election, staff from his office met with the postmaster to  establish a good working relationship. Election officials in a New  Hampshire and Ohio jurisdiction we visited stated that the post office was  very helpful. In a Nevada jurisdiction we visited election officials said that  they received excellent service from the postal service.
When an absentee application was received after the state-mandated  deadline, election officials in 13 jurisdictions we visited told us that they  often sent these applicants a letter explaining that their application was  received too late. In 5 of these same jurisdictions, election officials said  they also provided an alternative to absentee voting such as early voting,  voting on Election Day, or in-person absentee voting, where the voter could  visit the election office and complete the absentee voting process in  person.
section_title: Voter Errors in the November 2004 Election Continued to Be a Challenge with Processing Absentee Ballot Applications and Ballots
paragraphs: In our October 2001 report on election processes, we reported that election  officials for the 2000 general election identified voters’ failure to provide  critical information, with respect to signatures and addresses, as  challenges to successfully processing mail-in absentee applications and  verifying ballots for counting. According to our nationwide survey for the  November 2004 election, local jurisdictions encountered similar voter  errors that could affect the jurisdictions’ ability to establish voter eligibility  or approve the ballot for counting when processing absentee ballot  applications and absentee ballots.
subsections: section_title: Absentee Ballot Applications
paragraphs: In our nationwide survey, we asked local jurisdictions what problems they  encountered in processing absentee ballot applications. We estimate that  48 percent of them identified problems receiving absentee ballot  applications that contained a missing or illegible voter signature.  Furthermore, we asked about which problems were encountered most  frequently. An estimated 20 percent of local jurisdictions encountered the  problem of receiving absentee ballot applications that contained a missing  or illegible voter signature most frequently. Table 4 shows our estimates of  the types of voter errors local jurisdictions encountered with absentee  ballot applications submitted for the November 2004 general election.
On the basis of our nationwide survey, large jurisdictions had more of a  problem than small or medium jurisdictions concerning missing or illegible  signatures. Specifically, we estimate that 73 percent of large jurisdictions  encountered this problem, while we estimate 44 percent and 55 percent of  small and medium jurisdictions respectively encountered it. Large  jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and small jurisdictions.
When elections officials were unable to process absentee ballot  applications, our nationwide survey showed that some local jurisdictions  contacted applicants to inform them of the status of their application using  the methods listed in table 5. Specifically, on the basis of our survey of local  jurisdictions, we estimate that 72 percent of all jurisdictions telephoned  applicants when their absentee applications could not be processed. We  found no significant difference based on the size of the jurisdiction with  regard to this contact method. However, we estimate that 84 percent of  medium jurisdictions and 90 percent of large jurisdictions contacted  absentee applicants by U.S. mail. In contrast, 63 percent of small  jurisdictions contacted absentee applicants with problem applications via  U.S. mail. Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and  large jurisdictions. We also estimate that 10 percent of local jurisdictions  did not inform any applicants about the status of their application.
In an Illinois jurisdiction that we visited, elections officials told us that they  would do everything possible in an attempt to obtain complete absentee  applications from voters. If the absentee ballot application was incomplete,  election office staff said they contacted the voter and attempted to resolve  the problem in the best way practical, according to the election officials.  For example, if the application was missing the voter’s signature and there  was enough time, the staff mailed the application back to the voter for  signature. If time was limited, the staff called the voter and asked him or  her to visit the election office to sign the application. An election official in  a Pennsylvania jurisdiction we visited told us that if applicants forgot to  include one part of an address, such as a ZIP code, but election staff could  match the rest of the address and voters’ identifying information with their  registration information, the application was approved. Election officials in  another Pennsylvania jurisdiction and a Nevada jurisdiction told us that the  voter registration system automatically generated letters to voters when  the application could not be processed for any reason.
section_title: Absentee Ballots
paragraphs: In our nationwide survey, we asked local jurisdictions what problems they  encountered in processing submitted absentee ballots. We estimate that   61 percent of all jurisdictions reported that absentee ballots were received  without the voter’s signature on the envelope. We estimate 54 percent of  small jurisdictions, 76 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 90 percent of  large jurisdictions encountered this problem. Jurisdictions of all sizes are  statistically different from one another. Table 6 shows our estimates of the  types of problems election officials encountered on absentee ballots. We  estimate that 81 percent of local jurisdictions encountered at least one of  the problems listed.
If the ballot was not able to be verified, election officials in some  jurisdictions we visited told us that they attempted to contact the voter,  time permitting, so that the affidavit envelope could be corrected and  approved for counting. In 10 jurisdictions we visited, election officials said  that they reviewed the affidavit envelope information to approve the ballots  as they received them rather than waiting until Election Day. On the basis  of our nationwide survey, we estimate that 40 percent of local jurisdictions  contacted the voter by mail in an attempt to address a problem with the  affidavit envelope, and 39 percent contacted the voter via telephone. Table  7 shows our estimates of the contact methods used by local jurisdictions  when absentee ballots had problems that could prevent them from being  approved for counting if not corrected.
Differences in whether voters were contacted by mail when there were  problems with their absentee ballots were based on the size of the local  elections jurisdiction. Specifically, we estimate that 31 percent of small,   61 percent of medium, and 66 percent of large jurisdictions contacted  voters by mail. Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium  and large jurisdictions.
While election officials in 10 jurisdictions we visited told us that they  qualified absentee ballots prior to Election Day—allowing them time to  follow up with voters, in 6 local jurisdictions we visited, election officials  told us that they qualified or approved absentee ballots for counting on  Election Day. According to election officials in these jurisdictions,  contacting the voter for corrected or complete ballot information was not a  viable option because there was not enough time. These election officials  stated that absentee ballots with incomplete or inaccurate information on  the affidavit envelope would not be qualified or counted.
Some election officials in jurisdictions we visited told us that voters can  visit local election offices and complete all or part of the absentee process  in person. Some election officials told us that when voters vote in-person  absentee, officials are well situated to help ensure that the application and  ballot are complete and accurate before accepting them. For example, in  one Connecticut jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us that they  did not have incomplete absentee ballot applications from voters who  visited the office in person because they reviewed the application and  required the person to correct any errors before leaving.
section_title: Some Election Jurisdictions Continued to Have Concerns about Fraud and Had Procedures to Address the Potential for Fraud
paragraphs: In our October 2001 report on election processes, we reported that election  officials for the 2000 general election had concerns with mail-in absentee  voting fraud, particularly regarding absentee voters being unduly  influenced or intimidated while voting. However, we also reported that  election officials identified that they had established procedures to address  certain potential for fraud, such as someone other than the registered voter  completing the ballot or voters casting more than one ballot in the same  election.
Once the voters received and voted absentee ballots in accordance with  any state or local requirements (such as providing a signature or other  information on the affidavit envelope), such ballots were to be returned to  specified election officials. In general, local election officials or poll  workers were to review the information on the affidavit envelope and  subsequently verified or disqualified the ballot for counting based on  compliance with these administrative requirements, according to election  officials in some local jurisdictions we visited.
In our state survey, we asked states whether they specified how local  jurisdictions were to determine eligibility of absentee ballots. According to  our survey, 44 states and the District of Columbia reported that at the time  of our survey, they specified how to determine absentee ballot eligibility,  while 6 states reported that they did not. Colorado, for example, specified  that the poll worker is to compare the signature of the voter on a self- affirmation envelope with a signature on file with the county clerk and  recorder. Wisconsin specified, among other things, that inspectors  ascertain whether a certification has been properly executed, if the  applicant is a qualified elector of the ward or election district, and that the  voter has not already voted in the election.
Our survey of local elections jurisdictions asked election officials if they  used any of the procedures described in table 8 to ensure that the absentee  voter did not vote more than once for the November 2004 general election.
These procedures could have been conducted either manually by elections  officials or through system edit checks. On the basis of our survey of local  jurisdictions, we estimate that 69 percent of jurisdictions checked the  Election Day poll book to determine whether the voter had been sent an  absentee ballot, and 68 percent of jurisdictions checked the Election Day  poll book to determine whether the voter had completed an absentee  ballot.
On our survey of local jurisdictions, we also asked if any of the procedures  listed in table 9 were in place to ensure that the absentee ballots were  actually completed by the person requesting the ballot. On the basis of our  survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 70 percent of jurisdictions  compared the absentee ballot signature with the absentee application  signature.
With respect to comparing the absentee ballot application signature with  the absentee ballot signature, there were differences based on the size of  the jurisdiction. On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we  estimate that 72 percent of small, 69 percent of medium, and 40 percent of  large jurisdictions compared these signatures. Large jurisdictions are  significantly different from small and medium jurisdictions. One reason  that large jurisdictions may differ is that they have a large volume of  absentee ballots to process and it may be too resource intensive to  compare signatures, among other things.
During our site visits, elections officials provided examples of the  procedures they used to ensure against fraud. For example in 20 local  jurisdictions that we visited, election officials said that when the ballot  signature was compared with the absentee application signature, voter  registration signature, or some other signature on file, the signatures had to  match for the ballot to be approved and counted. In addition to matching  signatures, election officials in 2 Illinois jurisdictions and 1 New Jersey  jurisdiction we visited told us that during the Election Day absentee ballot  qualification process, poll workers were instructed to check the poll book  to determine if the voter had cast an Election Day ballot. In 1 of these  Illinois jurisdictions, if poll workers found both an Election Day and  absentee ballot were cast, they were instructed to void the absentee ballot  so that it would not be counted. In addition to matching signatures, election  officials in a Nevada jurisdiction we visited said that they used an  electronic poll book to manage absentee, early, and Election Day voting to  ensure that voters cast only one ballot. Once a ballot was cast in this  jurisdiction, the electronic poll book was annotated and the voter was not  allowed to cast another ballot.
Although election officials in the 20 jurisdictions mentioned above told us  that they had procedures in place designed to help prevent fraud during the  absentee voting process, election officials told us that they still suspected  instances of fraud. For example, in a Colorado jurisdiction we visited,  election officials told us that they referred 44 individuals who allegedly  voted absentee ballots with invalid signatures to the district attorney for  investigation. In a New Mexico jurisdiction that we visited, election  officials told us that organized third parties went door to door and  encouraged voters to apply for absentee ballots. Once these voters  received their ballots, according to election officials, the third parties  obtained the voters’ names (in New Mexico this is public information,  according to such officials), and went to the voters’ homes and offered to  assist them in voting the ballots. These election officials said that they were  concerned that the latter part of this activity might be intimidating to voters  and could result in voter fraud.
section_title: Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting
paragraphs: In general, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act  requires, among other things, that states permit absent uniformed services  members and U.S. citizen voters residing outside the country to register  and vote absentee in elections for federal office. In addition, states also  generally offer some measure of absentee voting for registered voters in  their states not covered under UOCAVA. The basic process for absentee  voting under UOCAVA is generally similar to that described in figure 18 for  absentee voters not covered under UOCAVA in that UOCAVA voters also  must establish their eligibility to vote on their absentee ballot application,  and the ballot must be received by the voter’s local jurisdiction to verify it  for counting. Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited told us that  they allow UOCAVA voters to submit a voted ballot via facsimile—a  method that might not be allowed for absentee voters not covered under  UOCAVA because of concerns about maintaining ballot secrecy. In   6 jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that they require voters  under UOCAVA to submit a form acknowledging that ballot secrecy could  be compromised when ballots are faxed.
One mechanism used to simplify the process for persons covered by  UOCAVA to apply for an absentee ballot is the Federal Post Card  Application (FPCA), which states are to use to allow such absentee voters  to simultaneously register to vote and request an absentee ballot. On our  survey of local jurisdictions, we asked if any problems were encountered in  processing absentee applications when the applicant used the FPCA. We  estimate that 39 percent of local jurisdictions received the FPCA too late to  process—a problem also encountered with other state-provided absentee  ballot applications. Table 10 shows our estimates of problems local  jurisdictions encountered when processing Federal Post Card  Applications. In addition, we asked about which problems were  encountered most frequently when the FPCA was used, and an estimated  19 percent of local jurisdictions encountered the problem of receiving the  FPCA too late to process more frequently than other problems.
Also, uniformed services voters and U.S. citizen voters residing outside of  the country are allowed to use the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot to vote  for federal offices in general elections. This ballot may be used when such  voters submit a timely application for an absentee ballot (i.e., the  application must have been received by the state before the state deadline  or at least 30 days prior to the general election, whichever is later) but do  not receive a state absentee ballot. Some states’ absentee ballot application  forms included serving in a uniformed service or residing outside the  country as excuses for voting absentee. According to our state survey,   4 states (Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island) reported that  they require attestation by a notary or witness for a voter’s signature on  voted mail-in absentee ballots but do not require uniformed service voters  and U.S. citizen voters outside the country to provide this on their voted  ballots.
For the 2004 November general election, according to our state survey,   9 states reported having absentee ballot deadlines for voters outside the  United States that were more lenient than the ballot deadlines for voters  inside the United States. Table 11 lists these 9 states and the difference  between the mail-in ballot deadline from inside the United States and the  mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States.
HAVA amended the UOCAVA to, among other things, extend the period of  time that can be covered by a single absentee ballot application—the  Federal Post Card Application—by absent uniformed service voters and  citizen voters residing outside the United States from the year during which  the application was received to a time period covering up to the two next  regularly scheduled general elections for federal office. To illustrate, if  uniformed service voters or civilian voters residing outside the United  States submitted a completed FPCA in July 2004, they would have been  allowed to automatically receive ballots for the next two federal general  elections, including those held in 2004 and 2006. (See fig. 24 for an example  of the FPCA used in 2004.)
In 4 local jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that the  amendment described above may present a challenge for successfully  delivering absentee ballots to the uniformed services members because  they tend to move frequently. For example, in a North Carolina jurisdiction  that we visited, election officials stated that addresses on file for such  voters at the time of the November 2004 general election may be no longer  correct and that mail sent to these voters could be returned as  undeliverable. Also, in 1 jurisdiction in Georgia that we visited, election  officials told us that they were concerned that many of the absentee ballots  sent in subsequent general elections would be returned as undeliverable. In  an Illinois jurisdiction we visited, elections officials expressed concerns  about paying the postage for mail that may be undeliverable will be a  challenge in future years. Also, we noted in our March 2006 report on  election assistance provided to uniformed service personnel, that one of  the top two reasons for disqualifying absentee ballots for UOCAVA voters  was that the ballots were undeliverable.
The Federal Post Card Application was revised in October 2005, after the  November 2004 general election, and now allows overseas military and  civilians to designate the time period for which they want to receive  absentee ballots. (See figure 24 for the revised FPCA.) Those who do not  wish to receive ballots for two regularly scheduled general elections can  designate that they want an absentee ballot for the next federal election  only and then complete the form and request a ballot for each subsequent  federal election separately. The FPCA used at the time of the November  2004 election did not allow overseas military and civilian voters to make  this designation.
Even with the revised FPCA, some applications might not have this box  checked, and jurisdictions could continue to have absentee ballots  returned as undeliverable. In an attempt to mitigate these problems,  election officials in 3 local jurisdictions we visited told us that they planned  several activities in an attempt to maintain and update the addresses of  uniformed services voters and civilian voters residing outside the country.  In a Washington jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us that they  began requesting e-mail addresses from such voters so that any problems  with these applications or ballots could be corrected more efficiently. In  previous elections, when e-mail addresses were not available, elections  officials in this jurisdiction told us that many absentee applications and  ballots sent to uniformed services members and civilian voters residing  outside the United States were often returned as undeliverable. In a  Georgia jurisdiction that we visited, election officials said that they planned  to create a subsystem within their voter registration system. This  subsystem will, according to the election officials, allow staff in the  election office to produce a form letter for each uniformed services voter  that will verify the voter’s current address. The election officials also told  us letters will be mailed in January asking the voter to contact the  jurisdiction to confirm that he or she continues to reside at the address on  the letter. If the jurisdiction does not receive confirmation from the  uniformed services voter, the election officials told us that they will contact  the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) for assistance in locating  the voter. In an Illinois jurisdiction we visited, election officials stated that  they plan to canvass all uniformed services members and civilians residing  outside the United States who are registered in the state in 2006. Election  officials in this jurisdiction told us that they had approximately 7,400 such  registered voters who completed the FPCA and that the jurisdiction  planned to canvass these voters to confirm that they continued to reside at  the address on the FPCA. This jurisdiction expects that as many as half of  these canvass cards will be returned as undeliverable. Once the cards are  returned, state law allows those voters whose canvass cards are returned  to be deleted from the voter registration list, according to the election  officials.
section_title: Early Voting
paragraphs: Early voting is another way to provide registered voters with the  opportunity to cast ballots prior to Election Day. However, conducting  early voting is generally more complicated for election officials than  conducting Election Day voting. In the jurisdictions we visited in 7 states  with early voting, election officials described early voting as generally in- person voting at one or more designated polling locations usually different  from polling locations used at the precinct level on Election Day. The  voting may or may not be at the election registrar’s office. Early voting is  distinct from in-person absentee voting in that in-person absentee voters  usually apply for an absentee ballot at the registrar’s office and vote at the  registrar’s office at that time. Also, early voting usually does not require an  excuse to vote, which some states require for absentee voting, and in the  jurisdictions we visited in 7 states with early voting, it was usually offered  for a shorter period of time than absentee voting. The time frame allowed  for absentee voting was almost always at least twice as long as for early  voting. For example, election officials in the Colorado jurisdictions we  visited said that they allow 30 days for absentee voting and 15 days for early  voting. In the jurisdictions we visited in 7 states with early voting, election  officials said early voting is similar to Election Day voting in that the voter  generally votes using the same voting method as on Election Day. However  they added that it differs from Election Day voting in that voters can vote at  any early voting polling location because all early voting locations have  access to a list of all registered voters for the jurisdiction (not just precinct  specific) and can provide voters with appropriate ballots that include  federal, state, and precinct-specific races.
Proponents argue that early voting is convenient for voters and saves  jurisdictions money by reducing the number of polling places and poll  workers needed on Election Day, and also provides the voter with more  opportunity to vote. Opponents counter that those who vote early do so  with less information than Election Day voters, and there is no proof that  early voting increases voter turnout. Statistics on voter turnout for early  voting can be difficult to come by, partly because some states and localities  combine early and absentee voting numbers. Nevertheless, early voting in  certain jurisdictions appears to be popular with voters and on the rise. In a  New Mexico jurisdiction, election officials told us that early voting  accounted for about 34 percent of the ballots cast in that jurisdiction. In  North Carolina and Colorado elections jurisdictions we visited, election  officials said that early voters cast about 35 and 38 percent of the  jurisdictions’ total votes in the November 2004 election, respectively. In a  Nevada jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us that the percentage  of voters who voted early steadily increased over time. The officials said  that in 1996, about 17 percent of voters voted early; in 2000, 43 percent  voted early; and in the November 2004 general election, about 50 percent  (271,500) of their voters voted early.
Our prior work on the 2000 general election did not identify states that  offered early voting as we have defined it. Rather, we reported on absentee  and early voting together. Thus, we are unable to identify the change in the  number of states that offered early voting for the November 2000 general  election and the November 2004 general election. We describe the  availability of early voting throughout the nation and the challenges and  issues that election officials encountered in the November 2004 general  election as they conducted early voting in selected jurisdictions. Many  early polling locations in Florida and elsewhere received media publicity  about voters standing in long lines and waiting for long periods of time to  vote early. In half of the local election jurisdictions we visited, election  officials described encountering challenges that included long lines, and  some identified challenges dealing with disruptive third-party activities at  the polls.
subsections: section_title: Early Voting Appears to Be Gaining in Popularity
paragraphs: For the November 2004 general election, in our state survey, 24 states and  the District of Columbia reported offering early voting. In addition,   2 states—Illinois and Maine—reported, in our state survey, that they had  enacted legislation or taken executive action since November 2004 to  provide for early voting in their states. Another 7 states reported that with  respect to early voting, they (1) had legislation pending, (2) considered  legislation in legislative session that was not enacted, or (3) had an  executive action that was pending or was considered. Figure 25 shows  where early voting was provided for the November 2004 general election.
On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate 23 percent of  jurisdictions were in states that offered early voting. Furthermore, we  estimate that 16 percent of small jurisdictions, 40 percent of medium  jurisdictions, and 52 percent of large jurisdictions were in states that  offered early voting. Small jurisdictions are statistically different from both  medium and large jurisdictions.
section_title: The Number of Days and Hours to Conduct Early Voting
paragraphs: The number of days that early voting was available in these 24 states and  the District of Columbia varied. In some cases, early voting was allowed no  sooner than a day or a few days prior to Election Day, while in other cases  voters had nearly a month or longer to cast an early ballot. Table 12 shows  the range of days for early voting among the states and the District of  Columbia that reported providing early voting for the November 2004  election.
On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that   75 percent of the jurisdictions that offered early voting offered it for 2 or  more weeks prior to Election Day. Figure 26 shows the estimated  percentage of local jurisdictions that offered early voting for various time  periods.
Among the local jurisdictions that we visited in the 7 states that provided  early voting, we found that the shortest time frame allowed for early voting  was in Georgia, which had 5 days, and the longest time frame allowed for  early voting was in New Mexico, with 28 days. Furthermore, in the local  jurisdictions we visited in the 7 states that provided early voting, election  officials supplied information on early voting hours that ranged from  weekday business hours to those that included weekends and evenings.  For more details on the characteristics of early voting sites we visited, see  appendix VII.
During the course of our work, a limited review of state statutes showed,  for example, that Nevada statute requires early voting polling places be  open Monday through Friday, 8 a.m. to 6 p.m., during the first week of early  voting and possibly to 8 p.m. during the second week, dependent upon the  county clerk’s discretion. In addition, under the Nevada provision, polling  places must be open on any Saturdays within the early voting period from  10 a.m. to 6 p.m., and may be open on Sundays within the early voting  period dependent upon the county clerk’s discretion. Under these  provisions, the early voting period is to begin the third Saturday prior to an  election and end the Friday before Election Day. Similarly, Oklahoma  statute provides that voters be able to cast early ballots from 8 a.m. to   6 p.m. on the Friday and Monday immediately before Election Day, and  from 8 a.m. to 1 p.m. on the Saturday immediately before Election Day.  Some states’ statutes are less prescriptive, such as those of Florida, where  the statute specifies that early voting should be provided for at least   8 hours per weekday during the early voting period, and at least 8 hours in  the aggregate for each weekend during the early voting period, without  specifying the specific hours such voting is to be offered. Other states, such  as Kansas, however, do not specify in statute the hours for voting early.  Kansas statute, in general, leaves it to county election officials to establish  the times for voting early. Officials at some local jurisdictions we visited  said that their hours of operations were set based on the hours of the  election office or by the hours of the facility that was hosting early voting  such as a shopping mall or a library.
According to our survey of local jurisdictions, an estimated 34 percent of  local jurisdictions that provided early voting for the November 2004 general  election offered early voting during regular business hours (e.g., from   8 a.m. until 4 p.m.) on weekdays, and 16 percent offered early voting  during regular business hours on weekdays and during other hours. Other  hours included weekday evenings (after 4 p.m. or 5 p.m. until 7 p.m. or   9 p.m.) and Saturdays (all day) and Sundays (any hours) for about 2 percent  of the jurisdictions, respectively.
section_title: Determining Number and Types of Early Voting Locations
paragraphs: As with early voting time frames, some states reported having requirements  for local election jurisdictions regarding the number of early voting  locations. In our state survey, 17 of the 25 entities (including 24 states and  the District of Columbia) that reported offering early voting for the  November 2004 general election also reported having requirements for  local jurisdictions regarding the number or distribution of early voting  locations. Kansas election standards, for example, provide for one such  voting location per county unless a county’s population exceeds 250,000, in  which case the election officer may designate additional sites as needed to  accommodate voters.
Election officials in 1 jurisdiction we visited said that state statute  determined the number of locations, while election officials in 13 other  jurisdictions told us they decided the number of locations. For example,  New Mexico’s early voting statutory provisions specifically require that  certain counties with more than 200,000 registered voters establish not  fewer than 12 voting locations each. During our site visits, we asked  jurisdictions how they determined the number of early voting locations. In  a Nevada jurisdiction that we visited, election officials said that the number  of locations was determined by the availability of resources such as fiscal  and manpower needs. In a Colorado jurisdiction we visited, an election  official said he would like to have had more early voting locations but could  not because the jurisdiction did not have the funds to pay for additional  costs associated with additional sites, such as the cost for computer  connections needed for electronic voter registration list capability. In a  North Carolina jurisdiction we visited, election officials said that they had  only one early voting location because they did not have election staff that  would be needed to manage another site.
section_title: Conducting Early Voting
paragraphs: In many ways, early voting is conducted in a manner substantially similar  to Election Day voting in that polling locations are obtained, workers are  recruited to staff the sites for each day polling locations are to be open, and  voting machines and supplies are delivered to the polling locations.  However, as described by election officials in jurisdictions we visited that  had early voting, early voting differs from Election Day voting in that staff  are generally required to perform their voting day-related duties for more  than 1 day, and staff generally do not use poll books to identify eligible  voters and check them in. Instead, as described by some of these  jurisdictions, early voting staff usually access the jurisdiction’s voter  registration list to identify eligible voters and to indicate the voter voted  early to preclude voting on Election Day or by absentee ballot. Also,  election officials told us that, generally, staff must possess some computer  skills and need to be trained in using the jurisdiction’s voter registration  system. Furthermore, staff must be aware that ballots are specific to the  voter’s precinct.
In our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, we asked about the  type of staff who worked at early voting polling places. According to our  survey for the November 2004 general election, local election jurisdictions  relied on permanent election jurisdiction staff most often to work at early  voting polling locations. As table 13 shows, we estimate 30 percent of local  jurisdictions offered early voting using only permanent election jurisdiction  staff to work at the early voting polling places; we estimate that 14 percent  of local jurisdictions used poll workers exclusively; and we estimate   14 percent used other staff (e.g., county or city employees).
Election officials at 11 jurisdictions we visited emphasized the importance  of staffing early voting locations with experienced staff such as election  office staff or experienced and seasoned poll workers. Even with  experienced staff working early voting locations, election officials at local  jurisdictions we visited mentioned that staff were required to take training  and were provided tools to help them perform their duties.
In our nationwide survey, we asked local jurisdictions that provided early  voting about the ways that staff were trained for early voting. As shown in  table 14, the majority of jurisdictions used methods, such as providing a  checklist of procedures, written guidance for self-study or reference, and  quick reference materials for troubleshooting, to train early voting staff.
Local jurisdictions could do more than one of the above ways to train early  voting staff. On the basis of our local survey, we estimate that 14 percent of  local jurisdictions used classroom training, written guidance for self-study  or reference, a checklist of procedures, and quick reference materials for  troubleshooting to train early voting staff.
When asked about what worked particularly well during early voting,  election officials in 1 jurisdiction we visited in Colorado said that that they  provided 8 hours of training and had on-site supervision that they thought  contributed to a successful early voting experience. The election officials  also said they used a feature in their electronic poll book system to track  the number of ballots used at each site to determine whether sites had  adequate inventories of ballots. The program for the poll book system had  an alarm that went off if any site was running low on ballots, according to  these election officials. Two other jurisdictions we visited in Kansas and  Florida noted the importance of having experienced staff for early voting,  with the election officials in 1 Kansas jurisdiction saying that designating a  group of workers to work on early voting helped the process run effectively  and the election officials in 1 Florida jurisdiction saying that having the  supervisor of elections office staff on site to support early voting helped  make the process work well.
subsections: section_title: Some Local Jurisdictions We Visited Encountered Long lines Resulting from Larger than Expected Early Voter Turnout
paragraphs: When asked about challenges with early voting faced during the November  2004 general election, in half of the local jurisdictions we visited that  offered early voting election officials identified long lines as a major  challenge. Election officials at 5 local jurisdictions we visited said that they  had not anticipated the large number of voters who had turned out to vote  early. Officials attributed challenges handling the large number of voters  and resulting long lines to problems with technology, people, and  processes. Election officials at local jurisdictions we visited made the  following comments:   Election officials in one Florida jurisdiction we visited said that their  jurisdiction faced more early voters than anticipated and this fact,  coupled with slowness in determining voter eligibility, resulted in  long lines. They said that on the first day of early voting, staff was  unable to access the voter registration list because laptops were not  functioning properly. To address the problem, a worker at the early  voting location paired with another worker, who called the  supervisor of elections office to obtain voter registration information  and provide information on the voter seeking to vote early.
An election official in another Florida jurisdiction said that while  state law provides for early voting in the main office of the supervisor  of elections, other locations may be used only under certain  conditions. For example, in order for a branch office to be used, it  must be a full-service facility of the supervisor and must have been  designated as such at least 1 year prior to the election. In addition, a  city hall or public library may be designated as an additional early  voting location, but only if the sites are located so as to provide all  voters in the county an equal opportunity to cast a ballot, insofar as is  practicable. The official thought more flexibility was needed to allow  him to either have more early voting locations or use other types of  facilities, such as a local community center, that could accommodate  more voters.
An election official in a Nevada jurisdiction we visited said that the  jurisdiction’s process flow was inadequate to handle the large turnout  for early voting. The election official said that the jurisdiction had not  planned sufficiently to manage the large turnout for early voting and  did not have enough staff to process voters. The election official said  that in the future, he will hire temporary workers and will assign one  person to be in charge of each process (e.g., checking in voters,  activating the DRE machine, etc.) In addition, the election official  said that, in hindsight, he made a questionable decision to close all  but two early voting locations for the last day of early voting. The  closing of all but two locations on the last day of early voting  coincided with a state holiday so children were out of school. The  decision to close all but two locations caused 3 to 3½ hours of wait  time, with parents waiting in line with children. The election official  said he has set a goal for the future that no wait time should be longer  than half an hour.
To address challenges related to heavy early voter turnout, election  officials in 1 Nevada jurisdiction said they have gradually added new early  voting locations each year to keep up with the increasing number of people  who vote early. In a New Mexico jurisdiction we visited, election officials  said that they used a smaller ratio of voters to machines than required by  state statute. According to these election officials, the state required at  least one machine for every 600 voters, and during early voting, the election  officials said they used one machine for every 400 voters registered in the  jurisdiction.
In 1 Colorado jurisdiction we visited, election officials said that they  addressed the challenge of long lines by having greeters inform voters  about the line and make sure the voters had required identification with  them. They said they provided equipment demonstrations and passed out  sample ballots so people in line could consider their choices, if they had  not already done so. They also said they offered people in line the option of  absentee ballot applications.
section_title: Some Jurisdictions We Visited Encountered Challenges Dealing with Disruptive Third-Party Activities
paragraphs: In 3 jurisdictions we visited, election officials stated that they encountered  challenges dealing with disruptive third-party activities at early voting sites.  In particular, concerns were raised about various groups attempting to  campaign or influence voters while the early voters waited in line. State  restrictions on various activities in or around polling places on Election  Day include prohibitions relating to, for example, the circulation of  petitions within a certain distance of a polling place, the distribution of  campaign literature within a certain distance of the polls, the conduction of  an exit or public opinion poll within a certain distance of the polls, and  disorderly conduct or violence or threats of violence that impede or  interfere with an election. Election officials in 1 jurisdiction we visited  stated that campaign activities too close to people waiting in line were a  concern to the extent that police were called in to monitor the situation at  one early voting location. Election officials in a Florida jurisdiction we  visited said that they were concerned about solicitors, both candidates and  poll watchers, approaching people waiting in line to vote early and offering  them water or assistance in voting. While Florida’s statutory provisions in  place for the November 2004 general election contained restrictions of  various activities in or around polling places on Election Day, such  provisions did not explicitly address early voting sites. Amendments to  these provisions, effective January 2006, among other things, explicitly  applied certain restrictions of activities in or around polling places to early  voting areas. With respect to poll watchers, these amendments also  prohibit their interaction with voters to go along with the pre-existing  prohibition on obstructing the orderly conduct of any election by poll  watchers.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Making voting easier prior to Election Day has advantages for voters and  election officials, but also presents challenges for elections officials. Many  states and local jurisdictions appear to be moving in the direction of  enabling voters to vote before Election Day by eliminating restrictions on  who can vote absentee and providing for early voting. Many states allowed  voters to use e-mail and facsimiles to request an absentee ballot application  and, in some cases, to return applications. To the extent that large numbers  of voters do vote absentee or early, it can reduce lines at the polling place  on Election Day and, where permitted by state law, ease the time pressures  of vote counting by allowing election officials to count absentee and early  votes prior to Election Day.
However, there are also challenges for election officials. An estimated   55 percent of jurisdictions received absentee ballot applications too late to  process, and an estimated 77 percent received ballots too late. Although we  do not know the extent of these problems in terms of the number of  applications and ballots that could not be processed, the estimated number  of jurisdictions encountering these problems may be of some concern to  state and local election officials. Absentee application deadlines close to  Election Day provide citizens increased time to apply to vote absentee.  However, the short time period between when applications are received  and Election Day may make it difficult for election officials to ensure that  eligible voters receive absentee ballots in time to vote and return them  before the deadline for receipt at election offices.
Voter errors on their absentee applications and ballots also create  processing problems for election officials. These include missing or  illegible signatures, missing or inadequate voting residence addresses, and  missing or incomplete witness information for a voter’s signature or other  information. In addition, mail-in absentee ballots are considered by some to  be particularly susceptible to fraud. This could include such activities as  casting more than one ballot in the same election or someone other than  the registered voter completing the ballot. Despite efforts to guard against  such activities, election officials in some of the jurisdictions we visited  expressed some concerns, particularly regarding absentee voters being  unduly influenced or intimated by third parties who went to voters’ homes  and offered to assist them in voting their ballots. Some election officials  expressed similar concerns about the influence of third parties on early  voters waiting in line who were approached by candidates and poll  watchers. After this happened in Florida in November 2004, the state  amended its election provisions to prohibit such activity with respect to  early voters.
Getting absentee ballots to uniformed service personnel and overseas  citizens is a continuing challenge. UOCAVA permitted such voters to  request an absentee ballot for the upcoming election, and HAVA extended  the covered period to include up to two subsequent general elections for  federal office. Because the duty station of uniformed service personnel  may change during the period covered by the absentee ballot requests,  election officials in jurisdictions we visited were concerned that they have  some means of knowing the current mailing address. Some jurisdictions  are taking action to ensure that they have the correct address for sending  absentee ballots for the November 2006 election, such as requesting e-mail  addresses that can be used to obtain the most current address information  prior to mailing the absentee ballot. To the extent there are problems  identifying the correct address, uniformed service personnel and overseas  civilians may either not receive an absentee ballot or receive it too late to  return it by the deadline required for it to be counted.
section_title: Conducting Elections
paragraphs: Whether voters are able to successfully vote on Election Day depends a  great deal on the planning and preparation that occur prior to the election.  Election officials carry out numerous activities—including recruiting and  training poll workers; selecting and setting up polling places; designing and  producing ballots; educating voters; and allocating voting equipment,  ballots, and other supplies to polling places—to help ensure that all eligible  voters are able to cast a ballot on Election Day with minimal problems. In  our October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes nationwide  we described these activities as well as problems encountered in  administering the November 2000 general election. Since then, federal and  state actions have been taken to help address many of the challenges  encountered in conducting the November 2000 general election. However,  reports after the November 2004 general election highlighted instances of  unprepared poll workers, confusion about identification requirements, long  lines at the polls, and shortages of voting equipment and ballots that voters  reportedly encountered on Election Day. This chapter describes changes  and challenges—both continuing and new—that election officials  encountered in preparing for and conducting the November 2004 general  election.
subsections: section_title: Overview
paragraphs: States and local jurisdictions have reported making changes since the  November 2000 general election as a result of HAVA provisions and other  state actions to improve the administration of elections in the United  States. In addition to establishing a commission—the U.S. Election  Assistance Commission—with wide-ranging duties that include providing  information and assistance to states and local jurisdictions—HAVA also  established requirements with respect to elections for federal office for,  among other things, certain voters who register by mail to provide  identification prior to voting; mandated that voting systems accessible to  individuals with disabilities be located at each polling place; and required  voter information to be posted at polling places on Election Day. HAVA also  authorized the appropriation of federal funds for payments to states to  implement these provisions and make other improvements to election  administration. Since the November 2000 general election, some states  have also reported making changes to their identification requirements for  all voters.
Election officials reported encountering many of the same challenges  preparing for and conducting the November 2004 general election as they  did in 2000, including recruiting and training an adequate supply of skilled  poll workers, locating a sufficient number of polling places that met  requirements, designing ballots that were clear to voters when there were  many candidates or issues (e.g., propositions, questions, or referenda),  having long lines at polling places, and handling the large volume of  telephone calls received from voters and poll workers on Election Day.  Election officials in some of the jurisdictions we visited also reported  encountering new challenges not identified to us in the 2000 general  election with third-party (e.g., poll watchers, observers, or electioneers)  activities at polling places on Election Day. On the basis of our survey of a  representative sample of local election jurisdictions nationwide and our  visits to 28 local jurisdictions, the extent to which jurisdictions  encountered many of these continuing challenges varied by the size of  election jurisdiction. Large and medium jurisdictions—those jurisdictions  with over 10,000 people—generally encountered more challenges than  small jurisdictions. In most results from our nationwide survey where there  are statistical differences between the size categories of jurisdictions, large  jurisdictions are statistically different from small jurisdictions.
section_title: HAVA Made Changes Intended to Improve Election Administration
paragraphs: HAVA established EAC to provide voluntary guidance and assistance with  election administration, for example, by providing information on election  practices to states and local jurisdictions and administering programs that  provide federal funds for states to make improvements to some aspects of  election administration. HAVA also added a new requirement for states to  in turn require certain first-time voters who register by mail who have not  previously voted in a federal election in the state to provide identification  prior to voting, and jurisdictions reported taking steps to implement this  requirement and inform voters about it. In addition, HAVA includes  provisions to facilitate voting for individuals with disabilities, such as  requirements for accessible voting systems in elections for federal office. HAVA established voter information requirements at polling places  on the day of election for federal office and authorized the appropriation  of funding for payments to states to expand voter education efforts.
subsections: section_title: HAVA Established EAC to Provide Guidance and Assistance with Election Administration
paragraphs: HAVA established EAC, in part, to assist in the administration of federal  elections by serving as a national clearinghouse for information and  providing guidance and outreach to states and local officials. In our  October 2001 report on election processes, we estimated that on the basis  of our survey of local election jurisdictions in 2001, 40 percent of local  election jurisdictions nationwide were supportive of federal development  of voluntary or mandatory standards for election administration similar to  the voluntary standards available for election equipment. We also reported  in 2001 that some election officials believed that greater sharing of  information on best practices and systematic collection of information  could help improve election administration across and within states. To  assist election officials, since its establishment, EAC has produced two  clearinghouse reports, one of which covers election administration. EAC  released a Best Practices Toolkit on Election Administration on August 9,  2004, to offer guidance to election officials before the November 2004  general election. The document is a compilation of practices used by  election officials that covers topics such as voter outreach, poll workers,  polling places, and election operations. Of note, this compilation provided  election officials with a checklist for HAVA implementation that covers  identification for new voters, provisional voting, complaint procedures,  and access for individuals with disabilities. EAC has made this guidance  available to states and local jurisdictions via its Web site and engaged in  public hearings and outreach efforts to inform the election community  about the resource tool.
EAC also administers programs that provide federal funds for states under  HAVA to make improvements to aspects of election administration, such as  implementing certain programs to encourage youth to become involved in  elections; training election officials and poll workers; and establishing toll- free telephone hotlines that voters may use to, among other things, obtain  general election information. The results of our state survey of election  officials show that as of August 1, 2005, most states reported spending or  obligating HAVA funding for a variety of activities related to improving  election administration. For example, 45 states and the District of  Columbia reported spending or obligating HAVA funding for training  election officials, and 32 states and the District of Columbia reported  spending or obligating funding to establish toll-free telephone hotlines.
section_title: HAVA Added a New Requirement for Certain Voters, and Jurisdictions Reported Taking Steps to Inform Voters
paragraphs: As discussed in chapter 2, under HAVA, states are to require certain first- time voters who registered to vote by mail to provide identification prior to  voting. Voters who are subject to this provision are those individuals who  registered to vote in a jurisdiction by mail and have not previously voted in  a federal election in the state, or those who have not voted in a federal  election in a jurisdiction which is located in a state that has not yet  established a computerized voter registration list, as required by HAVA.  When voting in person, these individuals must (if not already provided with  their mailed application) present a current and valid photo identification,  or a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, government check,  paycheck, or other government document that shows the name and  address of the voter. Under HAVA, voters at the polls who have not met this  identification requirement may cast a vote under HAVA’s provisional voting  provisions. Additional information on provisional voting processes and  challenges is presented in chapter 5.
Election officials in 21 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported  encountering no problems implementing the HAVA first-time voter ID  requirement, and officials in some of these jurisdictions provided reasons  why there were no problems. For example, election officials in   2 jurisdictions in Colorado told us that they did not encounter  implementation problems because all voters, under state requirements,  were required to show identification. Election officials in some other  jurisdictions we visited reported that they took steps to inform voters of  the new HAVA ID requirement for such voters registering by mail. For  example, election officials in a jurisdiction in Ohio reported that they  contacted about 300 prospective voters twice, either by phone or by letter,  prior to the election to inform them that that they needed to show  identification. Figure 27 illustrates a poster used in a jurisdiction we visited  to inform prospective voters about the new identification requirements.
section_title: HAVA Includes Provisions to Facilitate Voting for Individuals with Disabilities
paragraphs: HAVA contains provisions to help facilitate voting for individuals with  disabilities, including requirements for the accessibility of voting systems  used in elections for federal office, effective January 1, 2006. HAVA also  authorized the appropriation of funding for payments to states to improve  the accessibility of polling places. In October 2001, we issued a report that  examined state and local provisions and practices for voting accessibility,  both at polling places and with respect to alternative voting methods and  accommodations. We reported in 2001 that all states and the District of  Columbia had laws or other provisions concerning voting access for  individuals with disabilities, but the extent and manner in which these  provisions addressed accessibility varied from state to state. In addition, in  our 2001 report we noted that various features of the polling places we  visited had the potential to prove challenging for voters with certain types  of disabilities. On the basis of our observations on Election Day 2000, we  also estimated that most polling places in the contiguous United States had  one or more physical features, such as a lack of accessible parking or  barriers en route to the voting room, that had the potential to pose  challenges for voters with disabilities. Results from our 2005 surveys  show that at the time of the November 2004 general election, many states  and local jurisdictions had taken steps to meet HAVA’s requirement for  accessible voting systems, as well as making other changes to help improve  the accessibility of voting for individuals with disabilities.
subsections: section_title: HAVA Requirements for Accessible Voting Systems
paragraphs: HAVA requires that, effective January 1, 2006, each voting system used in a  federal election must meet certain accessibility requirements. These voting  systems are required to provide individuals with disabilities with the same  opportunity for access and participation (including independence and  privacy) as for other voters. These HAVA requirements specify that such  accessibility include nonvisual accessibility for voters who are blind or  visually impaired. HAVA provides for the use of at least one DRE or other  voting system equipped for voters with disabilities at each polling place.  The results of our state survey show that as of August 1, 2005, 41 states and  the District of Columbia reported having laws (or executive action) in place  to provide each polling location with at least one DRE voting system or  other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities by January 1,  2006. Of the remaining 9 states, 5 reported having plans to promulgate laws  or executive action to provide each polling location with at least one DRE  voting system or other voting system equipped for individuals with  disabilities, and 4 reported that they did not plan to provide such  equipment or were uncertain about their plans.
Some local election jurisdictions provided accessible voting machines at  polling places for the November 2004 general election. On the basis of our  survey of a representative sample of local election jurisdictions  nationwide, we estimate that 29 percent of all jurisdictions provided  accessible voting machines at each polling place in the November 2004  general election. Further, more large and medium jurisdictions provided  accessible voting machines than small jurisdictions. We estimate that   39 percent of large jurisdictions, 38 percent of medium jurisdictions, and   25 percent of small jurisdictions provided accessible voting machines at  each polling place. The differences between both large and medium  jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically significant. Election  officials from some small jurisdictions who provided written comments on  our survey questionnaire expressed concerns about how this requirement  would be implemented in their jurisdictions and whether electronic voting  machines were the best alternative. For example, one respondent wrote:  “We  in a small town … and use paper ballots and that has worked  very well in the past and I believe will work very well in the future. Voting  machines should be decided on for much larger areas with a lot more than  our 367 population with 150 voters.” Another wrote: “We are a small rural  township with about 160 voters. Our 2004 election went well; as usual, we  had no problems. We use paper ballots. We have some concerns with the  implementation of HAVA. We are being forced to use expensive voting  machines that will require expensive programming for every election. We  are concerned about these costs.… If our limited budget can’t afford those  expensive machines and programming, we may need to combine our  township polling place with another township—maybe several townships.  The additional driving to a different polling place miles away will  discourage voters from voting—particularly our elderly residents. So these  efforts (HAVA) to help voters will actually hinder voters.”
In an effort to address these issues, Vermont, which has about 250 small  and medium election jurisdictions that use paper and optical scan ballots,  took an alternative approach to meeting the HAVA requirement, according  to an election official. Instead of providing one DRE machine for each of its  280 polling places, Vermont plans to implement a secure vote-by-phone  system that allows voters to mark a paper ballot, in private, using a regular  telephone at the polling place. According to the Vermont’s Secretary of  State’s Office, a poll worker uses a designated phone at the polling place to  call a computer system located at a secure location and access the  appropriate ballot for the voter. The computer will only permit access to  the system from phone numbers that have been entered into the system  prior to the election, and only after the proper poll worker and ballot  access numbers have been entered. The phone system reads the ballot to  the voter, and after the voter makes selections using the telephone key pad,  the system prints out a paper ballot that is automatically scanned by the  system and played back to the voter for verification. The voter may then  decide to cast the ballot or discard it and revote. The system does not use  the Internet or other data network, and it produces a voter-verified paper  ballot for every vote cast. In addition, according to an election official,  voters are able to dial into a toll-free telephone number for at least 15 days  prior to an election to listen to, preview, and practice with the actual ballot  they will vote on Election Day. This is a way of providing a sample ballot to  voters, as well as providing an opportunity for voters to become familiar  with using the telephone system.
section_title: Provisions for Polling Place Accessibility and Other Accommodations
paragraphs: For our October 2001 report on voters with disabilities, our analysis  included a review of state statutes, regulations, and written policies  pertaining to voting accessibility for all 50 states and the District of  Columbia, as well as policies and guidelines for a statistical sample of   100 counties. As part of our 2005 surveys, we asked states to report on  provisions concerning accessibility and local jurisdictions whether they  provided accommodations or alternative voting methods for individuals  with disabilities in the November 2004 general election. While the  methodologies in the 2001 report and this report differ, results of our   2005 surveys show that states and local jurisdictions have taken actions to  help improve voting for individuals with disabilities by, for example, using  HAVA funds, taking steps to help ensure accessibility of polling places, and  providing alternative voting methods or accommodations.
Most states reported that they had spent or obligated HAVA funding to  improve the accessibility of polling places, including providing physical or  nonvisual access. The results of our state survey of election officials show  that as of August 1, 2005, 46 states and the District of Columbia reported  spending or obligating HAVA funding for this purpose. For instance,  election officials in a local jurisdiction we visited in Colorado told us they  had used HAVA funds to improve the accessibility of polling places by  obtaining input from the disability community, surveying the accessibility  of their polling places, and reviewing the DRE audio ballot with  representatives of the blind community.
States and local jurisdictions reported taking a variety of actions designed  to help ensure that polling places are accessible for voters with disabilities,  including specifying guidelines or requirements, inspecting polling places  to assess accessibility, and reporting by local jurisdictions on polling place  accessibility to the state. In our October 2001 report on voters with  disabilities, we noted that state involvement in ensuring polling places are  accessible and the amount of assistance provided to local jurisdictions  could vary widely. For example, in 2001 we reported that 29 states had  provisions requiring inspections of polling places, and 20 states had  provisions requiring reporting by local jurisdictions. According to our  2005 state survey, 43 states and the District of Columbia reported requiring  or allowing inspections of polling places, and 39 states and the District of  Columbia reported that they required or allowed reporting by local  jurisdictions. From our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that   83 percent of jurisdictions nationwide used state provisions to determine  the accessibility requirements for polling places. During our site visits to  local jurisdictions, we asked election officials to describe the steps they  took to ensure that polling places were accessible. Election officials in  many of the jurisdictions we visited told us that either local or state  officials inspected each polling location in their jurisdiction using a  checklist based on state or federal guidelines. For example, election  officials in the 4 jurisdictions we visited in Georgia and New Hampshire  told us that state inspectors conducted a survey of all polling locations.  Election officials in the 2 jurisdictions we visited in Florida told us that they  inspected all polling places using a survey developed by the state.  Appendix IX presents additional information about state provisions for  alternative voting methods and accommodations for the November 2000  and 2004 general elections.
In addition to making efforts to ensure that polling places are accessible,  some local jurisdictions provided alternative voting methods pursuant to  state provisions (such as absentee voting) or accommodations at polling  places (such as audio or visual aids) that could facilitate voting for  individuals with disabilities. Table 15 presents results from our survey of  local election jurisdictions about the estimated percentages of jurisdictions  that provided alternative voting methods or accommodations to voters for  the November 2004 general election.
section_title: HAVA Helped to Expand State and Local Jurisdictions’ Voter Education Efforts
paragraphs: Election officials’ efforts to educate citizens can help minimize problems  that could affect citizens’ ability to successfully vote on Election Day.  Informing the public about key aspects of elections includes  communicating how to register, what opportunities exist to vote prior to  Election Day, where to vote on Election Day, and how to cast a ballot. This  information can be distributed through a number of different media,  including signs or posters, television, radio, publications, in-person  demonstrations, and the Internet. In our October 2001 report on election  processes, we stated that lack of funds was the primary challenge cited by  election officials in expanding voter education efforts. From our 2001  survey of local election jurisdictions, we estimated that over a third of  jurisdictions nationwide believed that the federal government should provide monetary assistance for voter education programs. Since the  November 2000 election, changes in voter education efforts include HAVA  requiring certain information to be posted at polling places and authorizing  the payment of federal funds to states to use for educating voters, and  states and local jurisdictions reported expansion of voter education efforts.
subsections: section_title: HAVA Required Voter Information at Polling Places and Provided for Funding to States
paragraphs: To help improve voters’ knowledge about voting rights and procedures,  HAVA required election officials to post voting information at each polling  place on the day of each election for federal office and authorized the  payment of funding to states for such purposes. This required voting  information includes a sample ballot, polling place hours, instructions on  how to vote, first-time mail-in instructions, and general information on  federal and state voting rights laws and laws prohibiting fraud and  misrepresentation. Results of our state survey of election officials show  that as of August 1, 2005, 40 states and the District of Columbia reported  spending or obligating HAVA funding for voting information, such as  sample ballots and voter instructions, to be posted at polling places.  Election officials in all 28 jurisdictions we visited told us they posted a  variety of voter information signs at polling places on Election Day 2004.  Figure 28 illustrates examples of some of these signs.
HAVA also authorized the payment of funding for voter education programs  in general, and according to our state survey, as of August 1, 2005, 44 states  and the District of Columbia reported spending or obligating HAVA funding  for these programs. For example, according to its HAVA plan, Florida  required local election officials to provide descriptions of proposed voter  education efforts, such as using print, radio, or television to advertise to  voters, in order to receive state HAVA funds in fiscal years 2003 and 2004.  Election officials in 2 jurisdictions we visited in Florida provided us  information about voter education campaigns that they implemented.  Election officials in 1 of these jurisdictions reported designing election  advertisements to be shown on movie theater screens in the beginning of  the summer season; election officials in the other jurisdiction told us they  implemented a “Get Out the Vote” television advertising campaign with a  cable company intended to reach hundreds of thousands of households  during the weeks prior to the November 2004 general election.
section_title: Variety of Local Election Jurisdictions’ Actions to Educate Prospective Voters
paragraphs: More local election jurisdictions appear to have taken steps to educate  prospective voters prior to Election Day in 2004 than in 2000, and on the  basis of our 2005 survey of local jurisdictions, more large and medium  jurisdictions took these steps than small jurisdictions. In our October 2001  report on election processes, we noted that local election jurisdictions  provided a range of information to prospective voters through multiple  media. For example, on the basis of our 2001 survey of local jurisdictions,  we reported that between 18 and 20 percent of local jurisdictions  nationwide indicated they placed public service ads on local media,  performed community outreach programs, or put some voter information  on the Internet. On the basis of our 2005 survey, we estimate that more  jurisdictions provided these measures. For instance, we estimate that   49 percent of all jurisdictions placed public service ads on local media, and  43 percent of all jurisdictions listed polling places on the Internet. However,  increases in the overall estimates from the 2001 and 2005 surveys are, in  part, likely due to differences in the sample designs of the two surveys and  how local election jurisdictions that were minor civil divisions (i.e.,  subcounty units of government) were selected. Because of these sample  design differences, comparing only election jurisdictions that are counties  provides a stronger basis for making direct comparisons between the two  surveys’ results. These county comparisons show increases as well. For  instance, for the November 2000 election, we estimate that 21 percent of  county election jurisdictions placed public service ads on local media,  while for the November 2004 election, we estimate that 61 percent of  county election jurisdictions placed such ads.
In our 2005 survey, we also looked at whether there were differences  between the size categories of jurisdictions, and generally, more large  jurisdictions provided voter education prior to Election Day than medium  and small jurisdictions. For instance, we estimate that 88 percent of large  jurisdictions, 46 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 38 percent of small  jurisdictions listed polling place locations on Internet Web sites. Table  16 presents estimated percentages of jurisdictions that provided various  voter education steps prior to the November 2004 general election.
Large jurisdictions may have provided voter education through multiple  media in order to reach a broader audience of prospective voters. For  instance, Web sites were used to provide information to voters by nearly all  large jurisdictions. On the basis of our 2005 survey of local jurisdictions, we  estimate that 93 percent of large jurisdictions, 60 percent of medium  jurisdictions, and 39 percent of small jurisdictions had a Web site. The  differences between all size categories are statistically significant. During  our site visits, election officials in large jurisdictions described a variety of  voter education mechanisms used to reach a number of prospective voters.  For example, election officials in a large Nevada jurisdiction we visited told  us that their office partnered with power, water, and cable companies to  provide voter registration information in subscribers’ billing statements.  Election officials in other jurisdictions we visited reported using a variety  of other media to encourage participation or provide information to a  broad audience of prospective voters. For example, figure 29 illustrates a  billboard, cab-top sign, and milk carton used in local jurisdictions we  visited.
section_title: Some States Reported Changing Identification Requirements for All Prospective Voters
paragraphs: Whether or not all voters should be required to show identification prior to  voting is an issue that has received attention in the media and reports since  the November 2000 general election. Recent state initiatives, such as those  in Georgia, that in general require voters to provide photo identification,  exemplify the challenge that exists throughout the election process in  maintaining balance between ensuring access to all prospective voters and  ensuring that only eligible citizens are permitted to cast a ballot on Election  Day. Results of our state and local jurisdiction surveys show that while  providing identification could be one of several methods used to verify  identity, it was not required by the majority of states, nor was it the only  way used to verify voters’ identities in the majority of local jurisdictions for  the November 2004 election. Voter identification requirements vary in  flexibility, in the number and type of acceptable identification allowed, and  in the alternatives available for verifying identity if a voter does not have an  acceptable form of identification.
Results of our state survey of election officials show that for the November  2004 general election 28 states reported that they did not require all  prospective voters to provide identification prior to voting in person.  Twenty-one states reported that they required all voters to provide  identification prior to voting on Election Day 2004. However, 14 of these  states reported allowing prospective voters without the required  identification an alternative. In 9 of these 14 states the alternative involved  voting a regular ballot in conjunction with, for example, the voter providing  some type of affirmation as to his or her identity. For example,  Connecticut, in general, allowed voters who were unable to provide  required identification to swear on a form provided by the Secretary of  State’s Office that they are the elector whose name appears on the official  registration list. Kentucky allowed an election officer to confirm the  identity of a prospective voter by personal acquaintance or by certain types  of documents if the prospective voter did not have the required  identification. The other 5 states reporting that they offered an alternative  did so through the use of a provisional ballot if a prospective voter did not  have the required identification. For the November 2004 election, 5 of the  21 states that reported having identification requirements also had  statutory provisions requiring, in general, that such identification include a  photograph of the prospective voter. For the other 16 states that reported  requiring identification, there was a range of acceptable forms of  identification, including photo identification, such as a driver’s license, and  other documentation, such as a copy of a government check or current  utility bill with a voter’s name and address. Figure 30 presents information  on the identification requirements for prospective voters for the November  2004 general election for all 50 states and the District of Columbia.
In our nationwide survey, we asked local jurisdictions about how they  checked voters’ identities, such as by asking voters to state their name and  address, verifying voters’ signatures, or asking voters to provide a form of  identification or documentation. On the basis of this survey, we estimate  that 65 percent of all local jurisdictions checked voters’ identification as  one way to verify their identities on Election Day. However, in an estimated  9 percent of all jurisdictions, providing identification was the only way  voters could verify their identities.
Since the November 2004 general election, several states have reported  that they have considered establishing identification requirements for all  prospective voters, and some reported that they have implemented  requirements. Results of our state survey show that at the time of our  survey, 9 states reported having either considered legislation (or executive  action) or legislation (or executive action) was pending to require voters to  show identification prior to voting on Election Day. Four states, at the  time of our survey, reported having taken action since November 2004 to  require that voters show identification for in-person Election Day voting.  For example, changes in Arizona law and procedure emanating from a  November 2004 ballot initiative were finalized in 2005 after receiving  approval from the Department of Justice. These Arizona changes require  voters to present, prior to voting, one form of identification with the voter’s  name, address, and photo, or two different forms of identification that have  the name and address of the voter. Indiana enacted legislation in 2005  requiring, in general, that voters provide a federal- or state-of-Indiana- issued identification document with the voter’s name and photo prior to  voting, whereas 2005 legislation in New Mexico and Washington imposed  identification requirements but allowed prospective voters to provide one  of several forms of photo or nonphoto forms of identification. In all four  states, if voters are not able to provide a required form of identification,  they are allowed to cast a provisional, rather than a regular, ballot. Finally,  a state that had identification requirements in place for the November 2004  general election may have taken additional actions to amend such  requirements. Georgia, for instance, required voters in the November 2004  general election to provide 1 of 17 types of photo or nonphoto  identification. In 2005 Georgia enacted legislation that, in general, amended  and reduced the various forms of acceptable identification and made the  presentation of a form of photo identification, such as a driver’s license, a  requirement to vote.
section_title: Recruiting a Sufficient Number of Skilled, Reliable Poll Workers Continued to Be a Challenge for Large and Medium Jurisdictions
paragraphs: Having enough qualified poll workers to set up, open, and work at the polls  on Election Day is a crucial step in ensuring that voters are able to  successfully vote on Election Day. The number of poll workers needed  varies across jurisdictions, and election officials recruit poll workers in a  variety of ways using different sources and strategies. Some poll workers  are elected, some are appointed by political parties, and some are  volunteers. Election officials in jurisdictions we visited reported  considering several different factors—such as state requirements,  registered voters per precinct, historical turnout, or poll worker functions  at polling places—to determine the total number of poll workers needed.  On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that recruiting  enough poll workers for the November 2004 general election was not  difficult for the majority of jurisdictions. However, large and medium  jurisdictions encountered difficulties to a greater extent than small  jurisdictions. To meet their need, election officials recruited poll workers  from numerous sources, including in some cases, high schools and local  government agencies, to help ensure that they were able to obtain enough  poll workers for Election Day. Poll workers with specialized characteristics  or skills were also difficult for some large and medium jurisdictions to find.  Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited reported that finding  qualified poll workers could be complicated by having a limited pool of  volunteers willing to work long hours for low pay. Poll worker reliability  continued to be a challenge for some jurisdictions—especially large  jurisdictions—that depend on poll workers to arrive at polling places on  time on Election Day.
subsections: section_title: Recruiting Enough Poll Workers Was Not Difficult for the Majority of Jurisdictions, but Many Large and Medium Jurisdictions Encountered Difficulties
paragraphs: We estimate that recruiting enough poll workers for the November 2004  general election was not difficult for the majority of jurisdictions, and may  have been less of a challenge for the November 2004 election than it was  for the November 2000 election. For example, on the basis of our 2001  survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate 51 percent of county election  jurisdictions found it somewhat or very difficult to find a sufficient number  of poll workers for the November 2000 election. In contrast, from our  2005 survey, we estimate that 36 percent of county election jurisdictions  had difficulties obtaining enough poll workers for the November 2004  election. In our 2005 survey, there are differences between size categories  of election jurisdictions in the difficulties encountered obtaining a  sufficient number of poll workers, with more large and medium  jurisdictions encountering difficulties than small jurisdictions. As shown in  figure 31, we estimate that 47 percent of large jurisdictions, 32 percent of  medium jurisdictions, and 14 percent of small jurisdictions found it difficult  or very difficult to obtain a sufficient number of poll workers.
Election officials in large and medium jurisdictions, with typically more  polling places to staff, are generally responsible for obtaining more poll  workers than officials in small jurisdictions. For example, election officials  in a large jurisdiction we visited in Illinois told us that recruiting enough  poll workers for Election Day was always a challenge and November 2004  was no different. They said that state law specifies a minimum of 5 poll  workers per precinct, and there were 2,709 precincts in their jurisdiction  for the November 2004 general election, requiring at least 13,545 poll  workers. In contrast, election officials in a small jurisdiction we visited in  New Hampshire told us that they never had difficulties finding poll workers  because they were able to use a pool of volunteers to staff the 9 poll worker  positions at their one polling place.
While election officials in 10 of the 27 large and medium jurisdictions we  visited told us they had difficulties recruiting the needed number of poll  workers, election officials in the other 17 jurisdictions did not report  difficulties. These officials provided a variety of reasons why they did not  encounter difficulties, including having a set number of appointed or  elected poll workers for each precinct, having a general public interest in  being involved in a presidential election, and using a variety of strategies  and sources to recruit poll workers. For example, election officials in a  large jurisdiction in New Mexico told us that their lack of problems with  recruitment was due to the fact that they had a full-time poll worker  coordinator who began the search for poll workers very early and, as a  result, was able to fill all of the positions needed (about 2,400) for the  November 2004 election. Election officials in other large jurisdictions  reported that they were able to obtain enough poll workers by relying on  multiple sources. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in  Kansas told us that they made an exhaustive effort to recruit about   1,800 poll workers for the November 2004 general election that included  soliciting from an existing list of poll workers, working with organizations,  using a high school student program to obtain about 300 student poll  workers, recruiting from a community college, using county employees,  and coordinating with the political parties. On our nationwide survey we  asked local jurisdictions about the sources they used to recruit poll  workers for the November 2004 general election, and table 17 presents  estimates from this survey on a variety of sources that jurisdictions used.
In our October 2001 report on election processes, we identified several  recruiting strategies that election officials reported helped in their efforts  to obtain enough poll workers. On the basis of our local jurisdictions  survey, student poll workers and county or city employees were used as  sources for poll workers by many medium and large jurisdictions in the  November 2004 general election, as shown in table 17. These two sources  were also cited as having worked well by election officials in several of the  jurisdictions we visited. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in  Colorado told us that their high school student poll worker programs  helped them to obtain a sufficient number of skilled poll workers and  reported that 200 of their about 600 poll workers were high school  students. Election officials in other jurisdictions we visited reported that  high school students often helped them in obtaining enough poll workers  with specialized skills or characteristics, such as needed language skills.  According to our state survey, 38 states and the District of Columbia  reported allowing poll workers to be under the age of 18.
Local government offices were another source of poll workers for the  November 2004 general election. As shown in table 17, we estimate that   65 percent of large jurisdictions, 25 percent of medium jurisdictions, and   12 percent of small jurisdictions recruited poll workers from city or county  government offices. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in  Nevada told us that the chief poll worker at most of the jurisdiction’s   329 polling places is a county employee, and described benefits of  recruiting local government employees as poll workers, including their  experience in dealing with the public.
section_title: According to Our Nationwide Survey, Poll Workers with Specialized Skills Were Difficult to Find for Some Jurisdictions
paragraphs: The specific skills and requirements needed for poll workers varies by  jurisdiction, and in some cases by precinct, but can include political party  affiliation, specific technical or computer skills, or proficiency in languages  other than English. On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we  estimate that most jurisdictions nationwide did not encounter difficulties  recruiting poll workers with these specific skills and requirements.  However, the results show that the ease of obtaining poll workers with  these skills varied by the size of the election jurisdiction, with large and  medium jurisdictions generally experiencing more difficulties than small  jurisdictions.
Some states require political balance between poll workers at polling  places. For example, New York election law, which requires that each  election district must be staffed with four election inspectors (i.e., chief  poll workers) and a variable number of poll workers (depending upon  specified conditions), requires that appointments to such positions for  each election district be equally divided between the major political  parties. Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited told us that even  though not required, they tried to maintain a balance in poll workers’  political party affiliation. Recruiting enough poll workers with specific  political party affiliations continued to be a challenge for some, in  particular large and medium jurisdictions. From our local jurisdiction  survey, we estimate that 49 percent of large jurisdictions, 41 percent of  medium jurisdictions, and 22 percent of small jurisdictions had difficulties  recruiting enough Democratic or Republican poll workers, as shown in  figure 32.
Election officials in 11 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported  experiencing some difficulties finding enough poll workers with needed  party affiliations. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in  Connecticut told us that because their jurisdiction was predominantly one  political party it was difficult to find minority party poll workers. Election  officials in these 11 jurisdictions told us that they recruited independents,  unaffiliated persons, or student poll workers to fill minority party poll  worker positions.
Recruiting poll workers with necessary information technology skills or  computer literacy was also a challenge for some large and medium  jurisdictions, according to our survey of local jurisdictions. We estimate  that 34 percent of large jurisdictions and 28 percent of medium  jurisdictions found it difficult or very difficult to obtain poll workers with  these skills, whereas, we estimate that 5 percent of small jurisdictions had  difficulties, as shown in figure 33.
Election officials in 23 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited told us that  computer or technically skilled poll workers were not needed in their  jurisdictions for the November 2004 general election. However, election  officials in some of these jurisdictions reported that they foresaw a need  for poll workers with these skills with the implementation of electronic poll  books or new voting technology. Among the reasons cited for not needing  technically skilled poll workers were the use of paper ballots or lever  machines, the ease of use of DRE voting equipment, and that any needed  skills were taught. In addition, election officials in many jurisdictions we  visited told us that they recruited and trained technicians or  troubleshooters to maintain, repair, and in some cases set up voting  equipment prior to Election Day.
Some jurisdictions may be required under the language minority provisions  of the Voting Rights Act to, in general, provide voting assistance and  materials in specified minority languages in addition to English. We asked  on our survey of local jurisdictions whether jurisdictions encountered  difficulties recruiting poll workers who were fluent in the languages  covered under the Voting Rights Act for their jurisdiction and estimate that  for the majority (61 percent) of all jurisdictions, this requirement was not  applicable. We estimate that 15 percent of all jurisdictions indicated that  recruiting poll workers fluent in languages other than English was difficult  or very difficult. Jurisdictions of all size categories may encounter  difficulties recruiting poll workers with needed language skills for different  reasons. For instance, small jurisdictions may find it difficult to recruit  enough poll workers fluent in other languages because of a limited pool of  potential recruits, whereas large jurisdictions may be required to provide  voters with assistance in multiple languages other than English. Los  Angeles County, for example, was required to provide voters assistance in  six languages other than English for the November 2004 election. Election  officials in some of the large jurisdictions we visited reported encountering  difficulties obtaining poll workers with needed language skills, but these  officials also told us about their efforts to recruit poll workers with  language skills. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in  Illinois reported that they recently established an outreach department to  assist in the recruitment of poll workers with specialized language skills.  The jurisdiction has hired outreach coordinators for the Hispanic, Polish,  and Chinese communities to assist with recruiting. Figure 34 illustrates  materials used by election officials in some jurisdictions we visited to  recruit poll workers with a variety of skills for the November 2004 general  election.
section_title: Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Described Factors That Affected Recruiting Poll Workers
paragraphs: In our October 2001 report on election processes, we identified long hours,  low pay, and an aging volunteer workforce as factors that complicated  election officials’ efforts to recruit enough poll workers. Election officials  in some, but not all, of the jurisdictions we visited in 2005 told us that one  or more of these factors complicated their efforts to find enough quality  poll workers for the November 2004 general election. For example, election  officials in a large jurisdiction in Nevada told us that it was difficult to find  people who wanted to work, considering that most families are two-income  households and Election Day is a long—14 hours—grueling day. Election  officials in a large jurisdiction in Washington told us that they never have  enough poll workers, noting that the pay is minimal, the hours are long, and  the majority of the poll worker population is elderly. Election officials in  several of these jurisdictions we visited reported concerns about finding  poll workers in light of a limited pool of volunteers. For example, election  officials in a large jurisdiction in Colorado told us the average age of poll  workers was over 70 years old and expressed concerns about obtaining  poll workers who could physically work a 12-hour day. Alternatively,  election officials in a large jurisdiction in Florida told us that the younger  generation does not have the same commitment to civic duty that the older  poll worker generation had and recruiting enough qualified poll workers  may be a challenge in the future. These officials noted that about three- quarters of their poll workers are return participants. An election official in  a large jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, where the median age of poll workers  is about 75 years old, suggested that serving as a poll worker should be  treated similarly as serving on jury duty—it should be everyone’s civic duty  to serve as a poll worker.
section_title: Poll Worker Reliability Continued to Be a Challenge, Especially in Large Jurisdictions
paragraphs: In our October 2001 report on election processes, we noted that poll  worker reliability was a challenge for election officials, who depended on  poll workers to arrive on time, open, and set up polling places. Poll  worker absenteeism was a challenge for large and, to some extent, medium  jurisdictions in the November 2004 general election. On the basis of our  nationwide survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 61 percent of  large jurisdictions, 20 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 2 percent of  small jurisdictions encountered problems with poll workers failing to show  up on Election Day. The differences between all size categories are  statistically significant. One way that election officials in several large  jurisdictions we visited minimized the impact of poll worker absenteeism  was to recruit backup poll workers to ensure that polling places were set  up and adequately staffed, even if some poll workers failed to show up. For  example, election officials in a large jurisdiction we visited in Illinois  reported that approximately 1 to 2 percent of about 13,000 poll workers did  not show up on Election Day. However, these officials reported that they  had recruited stand-by judges who were to report to the elections office on  Election Day in case an already scheduled judge did not show up. Election  officials in a few other jurisdictions we visited told us that they called poll  workers before Election Day to help ensure they showed up. For instance,  election officials in a large jurisdiction in Pennsylvania told us that they  called all of the chief poll workers—about 1,300 people—during the week  prior to the election. Election officials in a large jurisdiction we visited in  Connecticut went a step further, reporting that in addition to placing wake- up calls to all of the chief poll workers, they offered rides to poll workers to  help ensure they showed up on time.
section_title: Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported on Challenges Training Poll Workers
paragraphs: Voters’ experiences on Election Day are largely informed by their  interactions with poll workers, who are responsible for conducting many  Election Day activities, such as setting up polling places, checking in voters  and verifying their eligibility to vote, providing assistance to voters, and  closing the polling places. Although these workers are usually employed  only for 1 day, the success of election administration partly depends on  their ability to perform their jobs well. Depending on the applicable state  requirements and the size of the jurisdiction, the steps that election  officials take to adequately prepare all of their poll workers can vary, but  may include training, testing, or certification. Ensuring that poll workers  were adequately trained for Election Day was a challenge reported by some  election officials in large and medium jurisdictions we visited, but these  officials also reported a variety of steps they took to help prepare poll  workers for Election Day.
subsections: section_title: State Requirements for Training Poll Workers Varied
paragraphs: Most states and the District of Columbia reported having training  requirements for poll workers for the November 2004 general election, but  the frequency and content of training varied. Some states also reported  providing guidance related to the training of poll workers. According to our  state survey, for the November 2004 general election, 18 states reported  having had poll worker training requirements and providing guidance;   20 states and the District of Columbia reported having had training  requirements; 9 states reported providing guidance; 1 state reported that it  did not require training nor provide guidance; and Oregon, which  conducted all-mail voting on Election Day 2004, indicated this requirement  was not applicable. Figure 35 shows reported state requirements for  training for the chief poll worker at a precinct or polling place and for poll  workers.
About half of the states with training requirements reported requiring that  poll workers be trained prior to every election or every general election.  According to our survey, of the 38 states and the District of Columbia that  reported having training requirements for poll workers, 22 states and the  District of Columbia reported requiring poll workers to be trained prior to  every election or every general election. For example, Florida provisions in  place for the November 2004 general election required that poll workers  have a minimum of 3 hours of training prior to each election and  demonstrate a working knowledge of the laws and procedures relating to  voter registration, voting system operation, balloting, and polling place  procedures, and problem-solving and conflict resolution skills. These  Florida provisions also require, among other things, that local election  officials are to contract with a “recognized disability-related organization”  to develop and assist with training for disability sensitivity programs,  which must include actual demonstrations of obstacles confronted by  persons with disabilities during the voting process, including obtaining  access to the polling place and using the voting system. Ten states reported  requiring that poll workers be trained on a scheduled basis (e.g., yearly or  every 2 years). For example, under provisions in place for the November  2004 general election, New Jersey required that all district board members  attend training sessions for each election at least once every 2 years. The  other 6 states reported that training was required at least once, but not  prior to every general election; that the frequency of training was not  specified; or that they did not know.
For the November 2004 general election, fewer states reported requiring  testing or certification than training for poll workers. According to our  state survey, 12 states reported having requirements for testing or  certification for poll workers, and 16 states reported having these  requirements for the chief poll worker at a precinct or polling place.  Election officials in 6 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported that poll  workers were certified or tested after training. Election officials in 6 other  jurisdictions told us that they used informal tests or quizzes or informally  monitored poll workers performance in training. For instance, election  officials in a jurisdiction in Kansas told us that they gave poll workers a  nongraded quiz at the end of training. In Nevada, where state election  officials indicated in our state survey that there are no requirements for  poll worker training or testing, election officials in the 2 jurisdictions we  visited told us that they required poll workers to attend training. Election  officials in 1 of these jurisdictions required all poll workers to attend a  training class each year and to pass a hands-on performance test in which  they demonstrate their ability to perform their assigned function, such as  checking in voters or programming the DRE voting equipment.
section_title: Election Officials Reported on Training Conducted and Challenges Encountered
paragraphs: Training provided to poll workers varies greatly among local election  jurisdictions. Therefore, we asked questions about training challenges as  part of our site visits only where we were able to gain an understanding of  the types of training and specific conditions faced by local jurisdictions.  Election officials in a small jurisdiction we visited in New Hampshire  reported that they did not conduct training for the November 2004 general  election because poll workers only receive training if they have not  previously worked in the polling place, and all nine poll workers had  worked in the polling place before. Election officials in the 27 other  jurisdictions we visited described the training that they provided poll  workers for the November 2004 general election. According to these  officials, poll worker training generally occurred in the weeks or month  before the election and ranged from 1 hour to 2 days, depending on the type  of poll worker being trained. Election officials in most of these  jurisdictions reported that training was mandatory. However, the frequency  varied, with election officials in the majority of jurisdictions reporting that  they required training prior to every election. Election officials in a few  jurisdictions reported that poll workers received training at least once or  on a scheduled basis, such as once every 2 years. Election officials in many  jurisdictions told us that poll workers were paid to attend training, and  payments could range from $5 to $50.
While election officials in nearly all of these jurisdictions reported that  training was conducted by these officials and their staffs, the manner in  which the training was conducted varied. For example, election officials in  a large jurisdiction in Nevada told us that poll workers were trained in a  workshop fashion in which 15 to 20 poll workers were provided hands-on  training for their specific function, such as operating voting machines or  processing voters. In a large jurisdiction in Kansas, election officials told us  that they conduct the training for between 70 and 100 poll workers using a  formal presentation as well as the documents poll workers use on Election  Day and the voting equipment. Election officials in a large jurisdiction in  Washington told us that poll worker training consisted of a PowerPoint  presentation conducted in a train-the-trainer style where election officials  trained the chief poll workers, who then trained the poll workers.
Election officials in 9 of the 27 large and medium jurisdictions we visited  reported encountering some challenges with training poll workers, but  generally reported that they overcame them. Some of the challenges  reported by these officials included keeping poll workers informed about  new or changing requirements, conveying a vast amount of information  about election processes to a large number of people in a limited time, and  ensuring that poll workers understand their tasks and responsibilities. For  instance, election officials in a large jurisdiction in Ohio told us that it was  challenging keeping up with state changes and incorporating such changes  into poll worker training. Election officials in a large jurisdiction in  Connecticut told us that effectively training poll workers on a variety of  new changes (such as those required by HAVA) could be challenging  because the procedures can be difficult to understand, especially for  tenured poll workers who have been working at the polls for many years.  Election officials in a large jurisdiction in Kansas noted that addressing the  need to have a systematic way to evaluate poll worker performance at  polling places was a challenge. These officials said that they currently rely  on the fact that the poll worker showed up, general observations of the poll  workers’ performance, and feedback cards completed by voters exiting the  polls. Election officials in the jurisdictions we visited reported taking steps  to address these challenges, such as providing poll workers training  manuals or booklets for reference on Election Day, training poll workers to  perform one function, and conducting training in a workshop fashion with  smaller class sizes.
section_title: Poll Worker Performance Problems in Some Large and Medium Jurisdictions
paragraphs: Election officials and poll workers perform many tasks throughout the day  to ensure that elections run smoothly and that voters move efficiently  through the polling place. These activities can include checking in voters,  providing instructions for voting machine operation, or assisting voters at  the polls. We asked on our survey of local jurisdictions whether for the  November 2004 general election jurisdictions encountered poll workers  failing to follow procedures for a variety of activities, including, among  others, procedures for voter identification requirements, providing correct  instructions to voters, and voting machine operation. Overall, according to  this survey, most local election jurisdictions nationwide did not encounter  problems with poll worker performance. For example, we estimate that  90 percent of all jurisdictions did not encounter poll workers failing to  follow procedures related to voter identification requirements,  92 percent of all jurisdictions did not encounter poll workers failing to  provide correct instructions to voters, and  94 percent of all jurisdictions did not encounter poll workers failing to  follow procedures for voting machine operation.
However, we estimate that poll worker performance problems encountered  varied by size category of jurisdiction, with more large jurisdictions  encountering problems than medium and small jurisdictions. For example,  we estimate that 37 percent of large jurisdictions, 19 percent of medium  jurisdictions, and 3 percent of small jurisdictions encountered problems  with poll workers failing to follow procedures related to voter  identification requirements. In terms of providing correct instructions to  voters, we estimate that 31 percent of large jurisdictions, 12 percent of  medium jurisdictions, and 1 percent of small jurisdictions encountered  problems with poll worker performance in this area. For both results, the  differences between all size categories are statistically significant.
Large jurisdictions could have encountered problems for a variety of  reasons, including having more poll workers to train and oversee or having  fewer options for recruiting skilled poll workers. While jurisdictions may  have reported on our survey that they encountered problems with a  particular aspect of poll workers’ performance, written comments  provided on the questionnaire indicated that these problems may not have  been widespread or may have been easily remedied after they occurred.  For example, one survey respondent wrote: “Errors were few and far  between, but with 4,500 poll workers, it is very difficult to answer that [our  jurisdiction did not encounter any problems with poll workers’  performance.]” Election officials in 12 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited  reported that they encountered some problems with poll workers’  performance, but that generally the majority of poll workers performed  well. For example, an election official in a large jurisdiction in  Pennsylvania we visited told us that while the jurisdiction did not  encounter serious problems with performance, in the official’s opinion, it  would be disingenuous to report that there were no problems with the  6,500 poll workers working the polls on Election Day.
subsections: section_title: Most Jurisdictions Provided Guidance at Polling Places to Help Poll Workers
paragraphs: In an effort to minimize poll worker confusion or performance problems,  many jurisdictions provided written guidelines or instructions for poll  workers to use at the polling place. On our nationwide survey we asked  local jurisdictions whether or not for the November 2004 general election  they had written guidelines or instructions at the polling place for poll  workers covering a variety of topics, such as voting equipment operation;  procedures related to verifying voters’ eligibility to vote; and assisting  voters with special needs, such as voters with disabilities or who spoke a  language other than English. We estimate that 94 percent of all jurisdictions  had at least one set of written guidelines at polling places for poll workers.
Further, more large and medium jurisdictions provided instructions to poll  workers than small jurisdictions. For example, we estimate that 99 percent  of large jurisdictions, 96 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 80 percent of  small jurisdictions provided written instructions for poll workers to use at  polling places if a voter’s name was not on the poll list. In addition, we  estimate that 96 percent of large jurisdictions, 92 percent of medium  jurisdictions, and 71 percent of small jurisdictions provided written  guidelines to use at the polls for identification requirements for first-time  voters who registered by mail and did not provide identification with their  registration. For both of these results, small jurisdictions are statistically  different from both medium and large jurisdictions.
During our site visits, election officials in 26 of the 28 jurisdictions we  visited reported that they provided written instructions or checklists for  poll workers to have at polling places. Election officials in the 2 smallest  population size jurisdictions we visited reported that they did not provide  written instructions for poll workers. As the officials in a small jurisdiction  in New Hampshire said, they are at the polling place to resolve issues  personally as they arise. Figure 36 illustrates examples of some checklists  that election officials in jurisdictions we visited provided to us.
Written instructions and checklists may help poll workers, but problems on  Election Day can still be encountered with some issues, in particular issues  related to voter registration. We asked on our survey of local jurisdictions  whether for the November 2004 general election jurisdictions maintained a  written record to keep track of issues or problems that occurred on  Election Day. We estimate that 55 percent of all jurisdictions nationwide  maintained a written record to keep track of issues. Of those that did  maintain a record and provided written comments on our survey, the issues  most frequently cited by election officials were problems with voter  registration (e.g., not being registered, being registered at another polling  location, or being in the wrong polling location).
section_title: Obtaining Enough Polling Places That Met Standards Continued to Be a Challenge for Some Jurisdictions
paragraphs: Election officials are responsible for selecting and securing a sufficient  number of polling places that meet basic requirements and standards.  Polling place locations vary across jurisdictions but can include public and  private facilities, such as schools, government buildings, fire departments,  community centers, libraries, churches, and residential facilities. To meet  the needs of the voting population, polling places should be easily  accessible to all voters, including voters with disabilities. Polling places  also need to have a basic infrastructure, including electricity, heating and  cooling units, and communication lines, to support some voting machines  and be comfortable for voters and poll workers. In our October 2001 report  on election processes, we stated that obtaining polling places for the  November 2000 election was not a major challenge for most jurisdictions.  On the basis of our 2005 survey of local jurisdictions, obtaining a sufficient  number of polling places was not difficult for the majority of jurisdictions.  However, finding polling places that met these standards was generally  more difficult for large and medium jurisdictions than for small  jurisdictions. Election officials in many jurisdictions reported combining  precincts in one polling place, with minimal challenges, for the November  2004 general election.
subsections: section_title: Finding a Sufficient Number of Polling Places Was Difficult for Some, but Not Most, Jurisdictions
paragraphs: For the November 2004 election, obtaining a sufficient number of polling  places was not difficult for the majority of jurisdictions. On the basis of our  survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 3 percent of all jurisdictions  found it difficult or very difficult to obtain a sufficient number of polling  places for the November 2004 general election. However, the difficulty  encountered in finding enough polling places varied by the size category of  jurisdiction. We estimate that 14 percent of large jurisdictions, 8 percent of  medium jurisdictions, and 1 percent of small jurisdictions had difficulties  obtaining enough polling places, as presented in figure 37.
Small jurisdictions may not experience difficulties obtaining polling places  for a variety of reasons, among them because they do not have to find as  many locations to support an election as large jurisdictions do. For  example, election officials in a small jurisdiction we visited in New  Hampshire told us that because of the small voting population (about  1,200), they only needed to use one polling place—the town hall—for the  November 2004 general election, as shown in figure 38.
In contrast, large jurisdictions could be responsible for selecting hundreds  of polling places for Election Day. Election officials from a large  jurisdiction we visited in Illinois reported that they used over 1,800 polling  places for the November 2004 election and hired staff to find polling places  that met standards for their jurisdiction. Although election officials in some  large and medium jurisdictions told us that they needed to find numerous  polling places, officials in only 1 large jurisdiction we visited in Kansas told  us that they encountered difficulties finding suitable polling places, in part  because of low payments provided to use polling place facilities. Election  officials in this jurisdiction reported that in 2003 they implemented a  campaign to “recruit” polling places and sent letters to schools and other  possible locations in addition to conducting site visits and inspections.  These election officials reported that after their efforts, they added about  70 polling places for use on Election Day 2004.
section_title: Finding Accessible Polling Places and Polling Places with Parking and Phone Lines Was Difficult for Some Jurisdictions
paragraphs: Selecting accessible polling places includes assessing parking areas, routes  of travel, exterior walkways, and entrances, as well as interior voting areas.  In our October 2001 report on voters with disabilities, we identified a  variety of challenges faced by election officials in improving the  accessibility of voting—including the limited availability of accessible  buildings and the lack of authority to modify buildings to make them more  accessible. Finding accessible polling places continued to be a challenge  for some jurisdictions for the November 2004 general election. On the basis  of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 36 percent of large  jurisdictions, 25 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 5 percent of small  jurisdictions found it difficult or very difficult to find enough accessible  polling places, as shown in figure 39.
Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited told us that they  encountered challenges finding accessible polling places. For example,  election officials in 2 large jurisdictions we visited reported that it was  challenging to find polling places that were accessible because many of the  public buildings in their jurisdiction were older facilities and were not  compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). However,  election officials reported taking steps to help ensure that polling places  were accessible. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in  Georgia reported that they hired a private company to conduct surveys of  the polling locations and determine whether they were accessible and  what, if any, changes needed to be made to make the facilities compliant.  Some election officials described making minor or temporary  modifications to polling places to ensure that they were accessible, for  example, by adding ramps, using doorstops for heavier doors, or clearly  identifying accessible entrances.
In addition to being accessible for all voters, polling places should have  sufficient parking for voters and phone lines to provide for communication  on Election Day. From our local jurisdiction survey, more large and  medium jurisdictions encountered difficulties in finding polling places with  these characteristics than small jurisdictions. On the basis of this survey,  we estimate that 38 percent of large jurisdictions, 18 percent of medium  jurisdictions, and 4 percent of small jurisdictions had difficulties obtaining  polling places with adequate parking. The differences between all size  categories are statistically significant. In terms of finding polling places  with adequate phone lines, we estimate that 35 percent of large  jurisdictions, 33 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 9 percent of small  jurisdictions had difficulties obtaining polling places with adequate phone  lines. Providing cell phones to poll workers was one way for some  jurisdictions to help ensure communication between polling places and the  election office on Election Day. Also on the basis of our survey, we estimate  that cell phones provided by the jurisdiction were the primary means of  communication for 29 percent (plus or minus 9 percent) of large  jurisdictions, 15 percent (+9 percent, -6 percent) of medium jurisdictions,  and 3 percent of small jurisdictions. For both of these results, the  differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small  jurisdictions are statistically significant. Election officials in some large  jurisdictions we visited included cell phones as part of the supplies  provided to each polling place. For example, officials in a large jurisdiction  we visited in Nevada told us they paid poll workers $5 to use their own cell  phones.
section_title: Combining Precincts at a Polling Location Continues to Be a Strategy to Address Challenges with Obtaining Polling Places
paragraphs: We identified several strategies in our October 2001 report on election  processes that election officials said helped in their efforts to obtain  enough polling places, including locating more than one precinct at a single  polling place. Results of our 2005 state and local surveys and site visits  show that combining precincts at a polling location continued to be a  strategy used by local jurisdictions, predominantly large and medium  jurisdictions, to find adequate polling locations for voters in all precincts.  According to our state survey, nearly all states (47) reported that they  allowed precincts to be colocated in a polling place for the November 2004  general election. Ten states reported allowing colocation only under  specified conditions, for instance, if no suitable polling place existed for a  precinct, and 37 states reported allowing colocation but did not specify  conditions. On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate  33 percent of all jurisdictions had multiple precincts located in the same  polling place. However, more large and medium jurisdictions combined  precincts than small jurisdictions. We estimate that 78 percent of large  jurisdictions, 63 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 19 percent of small  jurisdictions had multiple precincts located in the same polling location.  The differences between all size categories are statistically significant.  During our site visits, election officials in 22 of the 28 jurisdictions we  visited told us that they combined precincts in the same polling location for  the November 2004 general election. Included in the 6 jurisdictions that did  not report combining precincts in a single polling place were the 1 small  and 2 medium jurisdictions we visited. Further, in many of the large  jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that most of their polling  places had more than one precinct. For example, election officials in a  large jurisdiction in Ohio told us that there was an average of three  precincts per polling location, but that there could be up to nine precincts  in one polling place.
Although combining precincts may help solve the issue of obtaining a  sufficient number of voting places that meet requirements, other  challenges may surface, including voter confusion in not finding the correct  precinct at a location, poll worker confusion about eligibility if a voter is  not in the correct precinct poll book at a polling place, and the possibility  of voters voting on the wrong voting machine for their precinct. However,  on the basis of our local survey, few challenges were encountered in polling  places where precincts were combined for the November 2004 general  election. We estimate that of the 33 percent of jurisdictions with multiple  precincts at a polling location, 85 percent (+6 percent, -5 percent) did not  experience challenges in terms of voters locating their correct precinct.  Election officials in jurisdictions we visited described steps they took to  help ensure that voters were able to easily find their correct precinct,  including posting signage to direct voters to the correct precinct, using  specially designated poll workers as greeters to direct voters as they  entered the polling location, setting up separate tables or voting areas for  each precinct, and locating the precincts in distinct areas of the building,  for example, in the gym and cafeteria of a school building.
Election officials in a few jurisdictions we visited told us that they  consolidated functions, such as the check-in table or voting equipment, for  precincts located in the same polling location in order to avoid voter  confusion or problems with voting. For example, election officials in a  jurisdiction in Kansas reported that they used one registration table with a  consolidated poll book for all precincts at a polling location. As a result,  voters only needed to locate one table. Election officials in a jurisdiction in  Nevada reported that once voters checked in, they were able to vote on any  voting machine in the polling location because the machines were  programmed with ballots from each of the precincts located at the polling  place, and poll workers activated the particular ballot style for a particular  voter.
Beyond consolidating some functions at a polling place, in 2004 Colorado  authorized the use of “vote centers,” which are polling places at which any  registered voter in the local election jurisdiction may vote, regardless of the  precinct in which the voter resides. Each vote center is to use a secure  electronic connection to a computerized registration list maintained by the  local election office to allow all voting information processed at any vote  center to be immediately accessible to computers at all other vote centers  in the jurisdiction. Larimer County, with 143 precincts and about   200,000 registered voters, reported using 31 vote centers for the November  2004 general election. Election officials in Larimer County described  several benefits of vote centers, including voter convenience; cost- effectiveness; minimal voter wait time on Election Day; and overall easier  management, including requiring fewer poll workers. Election officials told  us that voters liked the convenience of being able to vote anywhere in the  jurisdiction, regardless of the precinct they live in. Vote centers can also be  cost-effective, according to election officials, for jurisdictions faced with  replacing voting equipment to comply with HAVA accessibility  requirements for voting systems used in federal elections. Using vote  centers also reduces the number of polling places a jurisdiction needs,  which can be cost-effective with respect to finding enough accessible  polling places. Election officials also told us that on Election Day they were  able to avoid having long lines at most vote centers by issuing media  announcements to voters throughout the day specifying which vote centers  were busy and which were not, and by using their electronic poll book  technology to process voters quickly and to monitor ballots and supplies.  Officials told us that on average there was a 15-minute wait time for voters.  Finally, officials told us that from the perspective of election officials, vote  centers facilitated aspects of election administration because there were  fewer locations (about 30 instead of about 140) and fewer poll workers  overall to recruit and train.
While other jurisdictions in Colorado have used vote centers since the  November 2004 election or are planning to pilot vote centers in elections in  2006, election officials in a second jurisdiction we visited in Colorado  explained why their jurisdiction opted to not use vote centers. Officials  told us that their jurisdiction assessed the feasibility of implementing vote  centers and concluded that despite several advantages offered by vote  centers, the cost of implementation was prohibitive. For example, election  officials identified costs including the connectivity for the electronic poll  books, so that voters can be credited with voting in real time; potential  rental costs for facilities, such as hotels, to house vote centers; and the  expense of purchasing additional voting equipment. Because a voter in a  jurisdiction using vote centers can vote at any vote center, each vote center  needs to be stocked with all applicable ballot styles for an election or have  DRE voting machines capable of being programmed with all applicable  ballot styles, according to election officials. For the November 2004 general  election, these officials told us that they used optical scan for absentee and  Election Day voting and DREs for early voting. To avoid the cost and  confusion of having to print and keep track of ballot styles for their   378 precincts—compared to Larimer County’s 143 precincts—election  officials said that they would need to purchase additional DRE voting  machines if they were to implement vote centers.
section_title: Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported That Designing Clear Ballots Continued to Be a Challenge
paragraphs: Election officials are responsible for designing ballots that meet various  state requirements, possibly federal requirements under the minority  language provisions of the Voting Rights Act relating to offering voting  materials in specified minority languages in addition to English, and the  requirements of the particular voting equipment, and these ballots must be  easy for voters to understand. Ballot design generally involves both state  and local participation. Most states (46 states and the District of Columbia)  were involved in ballot design for the November 2004 general election. For  instance, according to our state survey, 17 states and the District of  Columbia reported designing ballots for local jurisdictions, 3 states  reported requiring approval of the ballot design, and 26 states reported  having requirements for local jurisdictions regarding ballot design   (e.g., layout, candidate order, or paper stock). Specifically, election  officials must determine all races, candidates, and issues that voters in  each precinct in a jurisdiction will vote on and construct layouts for these  races and issues for the particular types of ballots used with their election  equipment. Figure 40 illustrates an optical scan ballot used in El Paso  County, Colorado, for the November 2004 general election.
In our October 2001 report on election processes, we noted that despite the  controversy over the “butterfly ballot” and other ballot problems in the  aftermath of Florida’s 2000 general election, very few jurisdictions  nationwide thought that confusing ballot design was a major problem.  Ballot design problems were not highlighted by voters as a problem in the  November 2004 election; therefore, we did not inquire about the extent of  ballot design problems in our local survey of jurisdictions. However, we  asked about ballot design processes and problems during our visits to local  election jurisdictions. Election officials in all of the jurisdictions we visited  reported that they did not encounter voter problems with confusing ballot  designs for the November 2004 general election. However, election officials  in 7 jurisdictions we visited told us that designing easily understood ballots  that meet the particular constraints of the voting equipment can be  challenging when there are a large number of races or issues to include on  the ballot. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction we visited in  Colorado that used optical scan ballots told us that fitting all of the races  and questions on the ballot is always challenging, but they managed to do  so by limiting the number of words on ballot questions and using small  fonts. These officials noted that they provided magnifying glasses at polling  places to assist voters. Election officials in a jurisdiction we visited in  Florida reported that they had to use oversized optical scan ballots to  accommodate the number of constitutional amendments that had to be  included on the ballot.
Some ballot design options taken to help ensure clarity for voters could  lead to problems later. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in  Kansas reported that they used a two-sided ballot design requiring that the  optical scan counting equipment read the ballot front and back, which  presented a problem. Chapter 6 discusses challenges with counting ballots.  The requirements of the voting equipment may also limit options election  officials can take related to ballot design. For example, election officials in  a jurisdiction in Illinois that used punch cards reported that lengthy ballots  could have been a problem in the November 2004 election, but they  decided to change the type of punch card ballot used. These officials told  us that increasing the number of punch positions allowed for more space  on the ballot and prevented challenges related to length of ballot. However,  with punch card ballots, the greater the number of choices on a punch card,  the greater the potential for voter error in punching the preferred choice, as  voters must align the ballot carefully.
Election officials in jurisdictions we visited that designed their ballots  described steps they took to ensure that ballots were clear to voters,  including using templates from the state or election management systems,  proofreading both before and after printing, and public viewing or testing  of ballots. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in Colorado told  us that prior to printing they send proofs of the ballot designs to candidates  for their review. After printing, election officials said that staff members  and representatives of the political parties test the ballot designs to ensure  that there are no problems with how the ballots are processed through the  counting equipment. Election officials in another jurisdiction in Colorado  reported conducting a mock election with county employees to review the  ballot and test a ballot from each package of printed ballots. Election  officials in a jurisdiction in Ohio told us that they displayed the ballots for  the general public to view and test.
section_title: Preparing Ballots or Voting Equipment Not a Problem Reported by Most Jurisdictions, but These Activities Can Be a Challenge for Some Jurisdictions
paragraphs: The activities and plans that election officials undertake related to  preparing ballots or voting equipment can have a direct impact on a voter’s  Election Day experience. For example, reports about the November 2004  election highlighted shortages of ballots and voting machines at some  polling places. While election officials may not be able to prepare for every  contingency that could affect a voter’s wait time or experience at the polls,  ensuring that there is a sufficient number of ballots or voting machines can  minimize potential problems. On the basis of our survey of local  jurisdictions, we estimate that few jurisdictions had problems with ballot  or voting equipment shortages for the November 2004 general election. We  estimate that 4 percent of all jurisdictions experienced problems with  Election Day ballot shortages, and an estimated 4 percent of all  jurisdictions did not have enough voting equipment on Election Day.  However, there were statistical differences between large and small  jurisdictions in having enough voting equipment. We estimate that   12 percent of large jurisdictions, 4 percent of medium jurisdictions, and   3 percent of small jurisdictions did not have enough voting equipment.  Election officials in 23 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported that they  encountered no challenges with preparing and delivering ballots, voting  equipment, and supplies for the November 2004 general election. However,  these activities could present logistical challenges for jurisdictions if there  are unexpected delays, or for jurisdictions that are required to prepare  ballots in multiple languages or prepare and deliver numerous voting  machines to a large number of polling places.
To ensure that there is an adequate supply of machine-readable paper  ballots on Election Day, election officials may conduct numerous activities,  such as designing, reviewing, proofreading, printing, and testing ballots.  Uncertainties about ballot content, such as whether or not certain  candidates or issues will be included on the ballot, could affect these  activities by delaying printing or leading to a last-minute rush to ensure that  ballots are printed in time for the election. While election officials in most  of the jurisdictions we visited did not report encountering these  uncertainties, election officials did in 4 jurisdictions. For example, election  officials in a jurisdiction in Colorado reported that ballot printing was  delayed by three statewide lawsuits regarding the content of the ballot.  These officials reported that they prepared two ballot designs—one with a  particular candidate’s name and one without—so that they would be  prepared to send the ballots to an external printer regardless of the  lawsuits’ outcome.
Some jurisdictions are required to provide ballots in languages other than  English. Producing ballots in multiple languages can add to the complexity  of preparing ballots because election officials must take steps to ensure  proper translation and printing for each required language. On the basis of  our local jurisdictions survey, we estimate that 6 percent of jurisdictions  nationwide provided ballots in other languages. We estimate that  significantly more large jurisdictions provided ballots in languages other  than English than medium and small jurisdictions. We estimate that   26 percent of large jurisdictions (compared to 10 percent of medium  jurisdictions and 3 percent of small jurisdictions) provided ballots in  languages other than English.
Once voting equipment, ballots, and supplies have been prepared, ensuring  that they are transported to polling places can be a logistical challenge for  jurisdictions with thousands of voting machines and hundreds of polling  places. Election officials in 18 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited told us that  they contracted with moving companies to deliver voting equipment to  polling places prior to Election Day. For example, election officials in a  jurisdiction in Pennsylvania told us that they contract with a moving  company that transports about 1,000 DREs to about 400 polling places in  the week prior to Election Day. Election officials in a jurisdiction in Nevada  told us that to ensure that voting machines were delivered to the correct  polling places, they bar-coded each DRE and also assigned a bar code to  each polling place. Upon delivery, contract movers used scanners to read  the bar codes on each DRE and the bar code for the specific polling place.  Prior to Election Day, these officials said that teams of election staff  technicians then went to each polling place to set up the DREs and verify  the scanned bar codes. After setting up the DREs, the rooms in which they  were located were secured until Election Day. In contrast, in a jurisdiction  we visited in New Hampshire, two election workers delivered 12 optical  scan counters to the 12 polling places at 4:00 a.m. on Election Day. Figure  41 shows stored voting equipment—with accompanying delivery  instructions for each DRE for 1 location—in 3 large jurisdictions we visited  that needed to be prepared and delivered to polling places prior to   Election Day.
section_title: Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported Experiencing Long Lines on Election Day, while Officials in Other Jurisdictions Did Not
paragraphs: Long voter wait times are a problem that election officials try to avoid.  However, voters waiting in line at the polls was an issue identified in  reports reviewing the November 2004 general election. These reports  identified a variety of factors, including confusion about a voter’s  registration status, ballot or voting equipment shortages, or malfunctioning  voting equipment that led to long voter wait times. We asked election  officials during our site visits whether or not any polling places in their  jurisdictions had long lines during the November 2004 general election and  to describe factors they thought contributed to or helped to reduce long  lines.
Election officials in 17 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported having  long lines at one or more polling places in their jurisdiction at some point  on Election Day. However, there was variation in the reported voter wait  times, times of day, and numbers of polling places with lines. For instance,  election officials described voter wait times that ranged from 15 minutes to  1 ½ hours. Some election officials reported that the longer lines occurred in  the morning; others told us that they kept polling places open past the  official closing time to accommodate voters who were in line when the  polls closed. Election officials in over half these 17 jurisdictions attributed  long lines to higher than expected voter turnout, both in general and at  peak voting times. Some of these jurisdictions were located in states where  the presidential race was considered close (often referred to as  “battleground states”). For example, the election official in a jurisdiction  in Nevada attributed long lines to using a new voting system in addition to  being a battleground state and encountering high voter turnout. This  official estimated that there were between 30,000 and 35,000 more voters  for the November 2004 general election than in previous elections. Election  officials in 2 jurisdictions we visited in Ohio told us that higher than  expected voter turnout in some precincts led to long lines. For example,  election officials in 1 of these jurisdictions reported that at a polling place  where two precincts were located there was higher than expected turnout  because of a school board race. According to these officials, at this polling  place there was a single line for voters from both precincts to check in at  the registration table, and this line backed up. Election officials in another  jurisdiction in Ohio told us that some precincts had long lines, and one  precinct in particular had a waiting time of up to 1 hour. These officials said  that one precinct closed 30 to 45 minutes after closing time for the voters  that were in line at 7:30 p.m.
Election officials in 11 of 28 jurisdictions we visited told us that none of the  polling places in their jurisdictions had long lines, and some described  factors that helped to reduce or prevent lines. High voter turnout prior to  Election Day—either during early voting or through absentee voting—was  one factor they identified. For example, election officials in 2 jurisdictions  we visited—a second jurisdiction in Nevada and 1 in New Mexico—told us  that about 60 percent of those who cast ballots voted early or absentee.  Election officials in a jurisdiction we visited in Washington (which reported  that it did not require or allow early voting) told us that they attributed their  lack of long lines on Election Day to the fact that two-thirds of voters in  their jurisdiction vote by absentee ballot. Election officials in a jurisdiction  in Florida reported that in planning for the November 2004 general  election, they decided to encourage early and absentee voting as  alternatives to Election Day voting in anticipation that there would be  heavy turnout for the general election. Their voter education campaign,  which included buying airtime on radios and in movie theaters, stressed  early voting options. In the end, about 40 percent of voters cast early  ballots, which, according to election officials, made crowds easier to  manage on Election Day.
section_title: Overloaded Phones on Election Day Posed Problems for Some Large and Medium Jurisdictions
paragraphs: On Election Day, poll workers may need to communicate with election  officials at the central office for a variety of reasons—to inquire about a  person’s eligibility to vote if his or her name does not appear in the poll  book, to report voting equipment problems, or to report other issues that  could occur at a polling place on Election Day. On the basis of our  nationwide survey of local jurisdictions, for the November 2004 general  election, we estimate that for 48 percent of all jurisdictions, the primary  means of communication between polling places and the central office was  telephones installed at polling places. Cell phones were also used as a  primary means of communication in some jurisdictions. For example, on  the basis of our local survey results, we estimate that for 25 percent of all  jurisdictions, personal cell phones were the primary means of  communication.
Having inadequate communication lines on Election Day was a problem for  election officials in the November 2000 election, as we noted in our  October 2001 report on election processes. On the basis of our 2005  survey of local jurisdictions, communication problems between polling  places and the election office on Election Day were a challenge for some  jurisdictions in the November 2004 election, and these problems varied by  the size category of jurisdiction, with more large jurisdictions encountering  major problems than medium and small jurisdictions. We estimate that   36 percent of large jurisdictions, 63 percent of medium jurisdictions, and   89 percent of small jurisdictions encountered no major problems with the  communication system used at polling places. Small jurisdictions may not  have experienced communication problems on Election Day for a variety  of reasons, among them because a single polling place is located in the  same building as the central election office, allowing the election officials  to be physically present to resolve any questions or issues. Election  officials in small jurisdictions provided comments on our nationwide  survey of local jurisdictions about the primary communication system used  in their jurisdictions on Election Day, including “personal contact—the  clerk’s office is across the hall from the polling place,” “ yelled across  the room,” or “we are the central office and the polling place.” In addition,  the election official in the small jurisdiction we visited in New Hampshire  told us that the town clerk was on site at the one polling place.
Election Day communication problems encountered by some large and  medium jurisdictions included overloaded phones because of the volume  of calls. On the basis of our local jurisdictions survey, we estimate that   49 percent (plus or minus 8 percent) of large jurisdictions, 14 percent of  medium jurisdictions, and 1 percent of small jurisdictions experienced  overloaded phone systems. The differences between all size categories  are statistically significant. Election officials in many large jurisdictions we  visited reported receiving numerous phone calls on Election Day, both  from polling places and from the public. In addition to poll workers calling  from polling places, election officials at the central office may receive  phone calls from citizens asking about the location of their polling place or  whether or not they are registered to vote. For example, a large jurisdiction  we visited in Nevada reported receiving over 35,000 calls on Election Day  2004, about three times the number reportedly received in 2000. Election  officials reported that most calls received were from people wanting to  know whether or not they were registered or where their polling place was,  despite providing polling place locations on their Web site, printing the  locations in the newspaper, and mailing a sample ballot listing polling place  locations to every registered voter in the jurisdiction. Election officials in   2 other large jurisdictions in Florida and Kansas reported that the volume  of calls received was extremely high and that most inquiries concerned  voter eligibility. In 1 of these 2 jurisdictions, election officials told us that  many poll workers could not get through to the elections office to verify  voter registration information, which may have increased the number of  provisional ballots issued during the election.
Election officials in many of the large jurisdictions we visited reported  taking steps to manage, or even reduce, the volume of calls from both  polling places and the public. These actions included setting up call centers  or phone banks, installing additional phone lines in their offices, or hiring  temporary workers. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in  Pennsylvania reported that after experiencing problems being able to  handle the volume of calls on Election Day 2000, they implemented a call  center at their office with 30 phone lines for the November 2004 election.  While these election officials reported receiving “a lot” of calls for the 2004  general election, they said they were able to successfully handle the  volume because of the new phone lines. Election officials in a large  jurisdiction in Illinois reported that a feature, new for the November 2004  election, on the jurisdiction’s Web site that allowed voters to determine  their polling place online helped to reduce the number of phone calls  received from people asking about polling location.
section_title: Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported That Third-Party Observers Were a Challenge on Election Day 2004
paragraphs: After the November 2004 general election, some reports highlighted  allegations of voter intimidation by third parties (e.g., poll watchers,  observers, or electioneers) at polling places. To gain a better understanding  of the extent to which this alleged behavior occurred and because the  range of behaviors and circumstances in which they could have occurred  was difficult to capture on a structured survey, we asked election officials  during our site visits about challenges they faced conducting voting on  Election Day—specifically, we asked them about any problems they  encountered with voter intimidation. Election officials in 19 of the   28 jurisdictions we visited did not report experiencing problems with third  parties on Election Day. However, election officials in 9 jurisdictions we  visited in battleground states reported challenges with disruptive third- party activities. In some instances these third parties simply increased the  number of people that poll workers were to manage at a polling location; in  others, election officials told us third-party observers provided  misinformation to voters or even used intimidation tactics.
Election officials in a jurisdiction in Nevada told us that poll watchers were  the biggest challenge on Election Day. Poll watchers, according to election  officials, had been bused in from another state to observe the election  because Nevada was a battleground state, which led to having 14 poll  watchers at some locations. These officials noted that while most poll  watchers simply observed, the poll watchers did increase the number of  people at polling places, creating more for poll workers to manage.  Election officials in other jurisdictions reported that third-party behavior  negatively affected poll workers and voters. For example, election officials  in a jurisdiction in Pennsylvania reported that one of the biggest challenges  on Election Day was managing poll workers’ stress levels in an especially  contentious election where poll watchers and observers yelled at them  throughout the day. Election officials in another jurisdiction in Nevada told  us that outside observers’ behavior was disruptive and noted that the  observers were contentious, violated electioneering limits at the polling  place, and questioned every action that poll workers made. Election  officials in a jurisdiction in Colorado reported that at one polling location  on a college campus, poll watchers and representatives of a national  organization were encouraging students to go to the polling place at one  time to create a disruption. Students were also being encouraged to get  back in line after they had voted, which caused long lines for other voters.  Election officials said that they ended up calling security officers to help  manage the situation.
In other instances, election officials reported that observers provided  misinformation to voters or even used intimidation tactics. Election  officials in a jurisdiction in Florida reported that third-party organizations  caused confusion at polling places by misinforming voters and staging  demonstrations. In a jurisdiction we visited in Colorado, election officials  told us that poll watchers caused problems at some polling places by  providing misinformation to voters, such as informing them that their  provisional ballots would not be counted. In a jurisdiction in New Mexico,  election officials said that one polling place had to remain open until   10:30 p.m. because voters were encouraged by local political advocates to  go to that polling place to vote even though the polling location for their  precinct had been changed. As a result, according to these officials,  hundreds of provisional ballots were cast at the polling place, which made  for long waiting times. Election officials in another jurisdiction in New  Mexico reported that outside candidate advocates and observers from  political parties tried intimidation tactics and treated people at the polls  “terribly.” For example, these election officials told us that some advocates  were observed taking photographs of the license plates of Hispanic voters  as they arrived at polling places.
We did not ask a specific question about third-party activities at polling  places on our survey of local jurisdictions because of the complexities in  capturing the range of alleged behaviors on a structured survey. However,  we asked whether local election jurisdictions maintained a written record  of issues that occurred on Election Day and, if so, what issue or problem  occurred most frequently on Election Day. Several election officials from  jurisdictions in battleground states that provided comments on our  nationwide survey wrote that electioneering or poll watchers did. For  example, election officials from Florida, Colorado, and Iowa wrote “voters  complained about being harassed by demonstrators while waiting in line to  vote,” “poll watchers acting aggressively,” and “poll watchers (who were  attorneys, mostly) were interfering with the process, intimidating precinct  officials, and giving erroneous advice to voters who showed up at the  wrong polling place.”
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Administering an election in any jurisdiction is a complicated endeavor that  involves effectively coordinating the people, processes, and technologies  associated with numerous activities. Many of the challenges that election  officials reported encountering in preparing for and conducting the  November 2004 election were not new. Recruiting and training an adequate  supply of poll workers, finding accessible polling places, and managing  communications on Election Day were challenges we identified in our  October 2001 report on the November 2000 election.
Data from our local elections jurisdiction survey and site visits to   28 locations, indicate that more large, and to some extent medium,  jurisdictions encountered challenges in preparing for and conducting the  November 2004 general election than did small jurisdictions. This is not  surprising. Larger, diverse jurisdictions may face challenges smaller  jurisdictions do not, such as recruiting poll workers with non-English  language skills. Larger jurisdictions are also likely to need to rely to a  greater degree on technology to manage their elections administration  process, and this brings its own set of challenges. The complexity of  administering an election and the potential for challenges increase with the  number of people and places involved, the ethnic diversity and language  skills of the voting population, and the scope of activities and processes  that must be conducted. Many of the election officials in large jurisdictions  we visited told us that being well prepared, having established policies and  procedures in place, and having qualified election staff were factors that  contributed to a smooth Election Day. One problem that occurred on  Election Day in some jurisdictions that election officials reported  encountering was the actions of poll watchers and other third parties that  election officials considered disruptive. This presents another issue that  election officials may need to include in their Election Day preparations  and training.
section_title: Provisional Voting
paragraphs: A goal of the election process is to ensure that every eligible voter is able to  cast a vote and have that vote counted. In the November 2000 general  election, reports of some voters showing up at the polls and not being able  to vote raised concerns about eligible voters’ names not appearing on the  voter registration list at the polling place or poll workers not otherwise  being able to determine voters’ eligibility. While many jurisdictions  reported in 2001 having at least one procedure in place to help resolve  eligibility questions for voters whose names did not appear on a polling  place registration list, only 20 states plus the District of Columbia reported  using some form of provisional ballot for the 2000 general election.
One of the major changes since the 2000 general election has been the  implementation of a HAVA provision requiring, in general, that states  permit individuals, under certain circumstances, to cast provisional ballots  in elections for federal office. In general, under HAVA, voters who claim to  be eligible to vote and registered in the jurisdiction they desire to vote in  but whose names do not appear on the polling place registration list are to  be allowed to cast provisional ballots in a federal election. These ballots  are called provisional because they are counted only if an election official  determines that the voter is eligible under state law to vote. In terms of  ballot access, provisional ballots benefit voters by allowing an individual to  cast a vote, in general, when there is some question as to the individual’s  eligibility such as when the individual’s name is not on the registration list  or the individual’s eligibility has been questioned by an election official. In  terms of ballot integrity, provisional ballots benefit election officials by  allowing them to determine voter eligibility prior to counting such ballots  (i.e., verifying provisional ballots).
In this chapter, we describe (1) events that preceded HAVA’s provisional  voting requirements, (2) how states and local jurisdictions implemented  the requirement to provide provisional ballots, (3) how states and local  election jurisdictions qualified provisional ballots for counting, and (4) the  difficulties of estimating and comparing the number of provisional ballots  that were cast and counted.
subsections: section_title: Overview
paragraphs: Concerns were raised with respect to the November 2000 election that  some eligible voters were not allowed to vote because of questions  regarding the voters’ eligibility. HAVA required that by January 1, 2004,  most states permit the casting of provisional ballots in elections for federal  office by voters who affirm in writing that they believe they are eligible to  vote and registered in that jurisdiction, but are not found on the voter  registration list. Such states are also required under HAVA to provide  provisional ballots in federal elections under other circumstances such as  for certain voters who registered by mail and do not have required  identification, and where an election official asserts that an individual is  ineligible to vote. Provisional votes cast under HAVA’s provisional voting  requirements are to be counted in accordance with state law if election  officials determine that the voter is eligible to vote under state law. Under  HAVA, 6 states are exempt from the act’s provisional voting requirements  because they either permitted the voter to register on Election Day or did  not require voter registration.
On the basis of reports from state election officials and in local election  jurisdictions we surveyed and visited, states and local jurisdictions varied  in a number of ways regarding how they implemented HAVA’s provisional  voting requirements in the November 2004 election. Among other things,  we found variation in the  additional circumstances, apart from those circumstances specified  in HAVA, where a provisional ballot would be offered, such as when  voters claimed they did not receive an absentee ballot;  design of ballots themselves and how they were tracked; and   voting method used for casting provisional ballots, such as optical  scan ballots or DRE.
With respect to the counting of provisional votes, states reported various  differences in their counting processes such as the prescribed location  from which a voter must cast a provisional ballot in order for it to be  counted. Also, with respect to the counting of provisional ballots,  according to our estimates from our survey of local election jurisdictions  nationwide, a voter not meeting residency requirements was the most  frequently cited problem, followed by insufficient evidence that the voter  was registered. In jurisdictions we visited, election officials also varied in  how they handled a lack of information from the voter that was needed to  verify a provisional ballot.
National figures on provisional ballots for the November 2004 election are  difficult to estimate because of a lack of data on provisional ballots cast  and counted, and variation in how states implemented provisional voting.  Nevertheless, we estimate that between 1.1 million and 1.7 million  provisional ballots were cast in the November 2004 election. The variation  in how provisional voting was implemented makes it difficult to compare  the use and counting of provisional ballots among jurisdictions. A number  of factors can affect the number of provisional ballots cast and counted.  For example, one such factor could be an instance in which the polling  location hours were extended and votes cast during the extended hours  were cast provisionally.
section_title: Events in the November 2000 Election Preceded the HAVA Requirement for Provisional Ballots
paragraphs: Following the November 2000 election, in our October 2001 comprehensive  report on election processes nationwide, we noted that the biggest  problems on Election Day involved resolving questions about voter  eligibility. Typically, a voter’s eligibility is established before a voter  receives a ballot, most often by a poll worker examining a poll book or  registration list for the person’s name. If the name appears on the list and  other identification requirements are met, the voter is given a regular ballot  and is allowed to vote. We also noted in our report that in the November  2000 election, a large number of voters with eligibility issues created  frustration for voters, long lines, and problems communicating between the  polls and election headquarters as workers tried to resolve eligibility  issues.
For the 2000 general election, when the voter’s name did not appear on the  registration list, we reported in October 2001 that jurisdictions had  different procedures for dealing with the question of the voter’s eligibility.  More specifically, we reported that 20 states plus the District of Columbia  used some form of provisional ballot when a voter’s name was not on the  voter list, with verification of registration conducted after the election. As  we reported, provisional balloting measures went by different names  among the states, including provisional ballot, challenged ballot, special  ballot, emergency paper ballot, and escrow ballot. Further, in 5 states in the  2000 general election, we reported that voters could complete an affidavit  when voting with no further verification of their registration information  being required by state law prior to the ballot being counted.
The U.S. Census Bureau estimated that of the 19 million registered voters  who did not vote in 2000, 6.9 percent did not vote because of uncertainty  regarding their registration. In our October 2001 report, we noted that  headlines and reports questioned the effectiveness of voter registration by  highlighting accounts of individuals who thought they were registered  being turned away from polling places on Election Day and jurisdictions  incorrectly removing the names of eligible voters from voter registration  lists. Our report also found that almost half of the jurisdictions nationwide  in 2000 reported having problems with registration applications submitted  at motor vehicle agency offices that election officials believed could result  in individuals showing up at the polls to vote and discovering that they  were not registered.
Numerous recommendations were made for federal regulations to require  that all states provide provisional voting. For example, the Federal Election  Commission in June 2001 recommended that all states devise procedures  for voters to cast provisional ballots at the polls under certain conditions,  as did the National Commission of Federal Election Reform in August 2001  and the National Task Force on Election Reform in July 2001, among  others.
Under HAVA, in an election for federal office, most states are to permit  individuals to cast a provisional ballot under certain circumstances. The  statutory deadline for implementing HAVA’s provisional voting requirement  was January 1, 2004. For federal elections, states are, in general, required to  allow the casting of a provisional ballot by an individual   asserting to be registered in the jurisdiction in which the individual  desires to vote and eligible to vote but whose name does not appear  on the official list of eligible voters for the polling place, or  whom an election official asserts to be ineligible to vote, or  who registered to vote by mail but does not have (and has not  previously provided) the required registration identification when  trying to vote in person or by mail, or   casting a vote pursuant to a court order or other type of order  extending poll closing times.
HAVA requires that an individual be permitted to cast a provisional ballot  upon the execution of a written affirmation before an election official at the  polling place. The written affirmation must state that the individual is  registered to vote in that jurisdiction and eligible to vote in that election.  HAVA specifies that either the provisional ballot or the written affirmation  information be transmitted to an appropriate election official for a  determination as to whether the individual is eligible to vote under state  law. Under HAVA, if an individual is determined to be eligible, the  provisional ballot is to be counted as a vote in accordance with state law.  Election officials, under HAVA, are to give the individual written  information on how to ascertain whether the vote was counted and, if the  vote was not counted, the reason the vote was not counted. HAVA directs  that state or local election officials establish a free access system, such as a  toll-free number, for provisional voters to ascertain such information.
While HAVA established conditions under which an individual must be  allowed to cast a provisional ballot, states are not prohibited from offering  provisional ballots for other reasons, or from using ballots with other  names (e.g., a challenged ballot) to serve provisional vote purposes. HAVA  explicitly provides that the specific choices on the methods of complying  with certain act requirements, including the provisional voting  requirements, are left to the discretion of the state. In addition, HAVA  provides that a state may establish election technology and administration  requirements that are stricter than HAVA requirements, so long as they are  not inconsistent with other specified federal requirements.
section_title: State and Local Jurisdictions Varied in Their Implementation for Providing Provisional Ballots for the November 2004 Election
paragraphs: On the basis of reports from state election officials and in local election  jurisdictions we surveyed and visited, states and local jurisdictions  provided for provisional voting in a variety of ways for the November 2004  election. These differences contributed to the variation in the number of  provisional votes cast among jurisdictions.
The results of our state survey of election officials show that states  reported using new or existing legislative or executive actions (which  included executive orders, directives, regulations, or policies) to  implement HAVA’s provisional voting requirements. Specifically, our state  survey showed   27 states reported enacting new legislation or taking executive action to  meet HAVA’s provisional voting requirements;  11 states and the District of Columbia reported using the state’s existing  legislative or executive action to meet the requirements;   7 states said HAVA provisional requirements were met by a combination  of new legislation or executive action and existing actions;   5 states (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and  Wisconsin), in response to the question of how their state established  the provisional voting requirements set forth in HAVA, answered that  they were exempt from such requirements; these 5 states are exempt  from HAVA provisional requirements, in general, because they have  same-day voter registration or no voter registration.
Connecticut officials responded, for example, that the state enacted  legislation after HAVA to establish HAVA provisional voting requirements.  Connecticut state laws were enacted in June 2003 related to the application  for a provisional ballot, casting of the ballot, and determination of eligibility  for counting of provisional ballots, among other things. In contrast, Alaska  election officials reported that existing legislation met HAVA’s provisional  voting requirements. According to Alaska’s 2005 updated HAVA plan, the  state had an existing provisional voting process known as Questioned  Voting. This process, established in the early 1980s, required only minimal  changes to meet HAVA provisional voting requirements. Alaska requires  use of a questioned ballot for any voter who votes at a polling location  where his or her name does not appear on the precinct register, or if the  voter does not have identification and is not personally known by the  election official. In our state survey, New Jersey reported meeting HAVA  provisional voting requirements with a combination of existing and new  legislation. In one New Jersey jurisdiction we visited, election officials  stated that state provisional voting procedures were first established in  1999. According to these officials, the state amended its provisional ballot  election law after HAVA to allow use for voting by court (or other) order  after the polls have closed, and by first-time mail registrants who do not  provide identification.
subsections: section_title: Paper Ballots and DRE Were Voting Methods Used to Cast Provisional Ballots
paragraphs: Election officials in 25 of the 26 jurisdictions we visited that provide for  provisional voting told us that they used some form of paper ballot for  Election Day provisional voting for the November 2004 election. For  example, election officials in the Illinois jurisdictions we visited said that  the regular punch card ballot was used by provisional voters, and then  placed in provisional ballot envelopes. In the New Jersey jurisdictions we  visited officials said that provisional votes were cast on paper ballots that  could be counted with optical scan machines (if voters were determined to  be eligible). Election officials in Connecticut jurisdictions said that they  used hand-counted paper ballots for provisional voters.
According to election officials in 1 Ohio jurisdiction and 1 Nevada  jurisdiction, DRE was used for Election Day provisional voters. According  to election officials or documents they provided in the 2 jurisdictions we  visited that used DRE for provisional voting on Election Day, the processes  used for casting provisional votes were as follows:   In the Ohio jurisdiction, election officials said voters first completed an  affidavit statement with a preprinted code number, and signed a special  section of the poll book. The poll worker then inserted a unit into the  DRE that contained the ballot for the precinct. The poll worker then  pressed the provisional ballot selection on the DRE and entered the  code number for the individual voter associated with the voter’s  affidavit statement. The individual then voted.
In one Nevada jurisdiction, DREs were used for Election Day  provisional voting, but optical scan ballots were used for provisional  voters participating in early voting. According to the poll worker’s  manual provided by election officials, Election Day provisional voters  completed an affirmation with identifying information and the reason  they were casting a provisional ballot. As described to us by election  officials at this jurisdiction, the poll worker then added precinct  information, and both signed the affirmation. The poll worker then  activated the DRE with a card. To indicate that the ballot was  provisional, the poll worker pressed “0” and the machine provided a  provisional voter identification number that the poll worker copied onto  the voter affirmation and provisional voter receipt. The voter then  voted.
section_title: The Provisional Ballot Design and Tracking Procedures Varied among States
paragraphs: According to election officials in the jurisdictions we visited, the design of  provisional ballots varied for the November 2004 election. The provisional  ballot differences included variation in terms of the races included, ballot  and envelope color, the envelopes they were placed in, and the information  included on the provisional ballot envelopes. For example, in the Nevada  jurisdictions, the provisional ballot only included races for federal offices,  while in the Kansas jurisdictions, officials said that the provisional ballot  was the same as a regular ballot. In 1 Georgia jurisdiction, election officials  stated that they were using an absentee ballot for provisional voters but  were inserting it into a salmon-colored envelope, whereas in an Illinois  jurisdiction we visited, “Provisional” was printed in pink letters across the  punch card ballot used in that jurisdiction so that these ballots were  distinguishable from other ballots.
The provisional ballot envelopes also varied in terms of what information  was provided in the jurisdictions we visited, according to example  envelopes provided to us (or described) by election officials. The outside of  the provisional ballot envelopes in most of the jurisdictions we visited  served as the voter’s written affirmation that is required by HAVA. For  example, in a jurisdiction in Illinois, the ballot envelope included  instruction to voters on how to cast a provisional ballot; in a Florida  jurisdiction (as well as in Illinois) the provisional envelope includes  information on the reason why the provisional ballot was cast. In New  Mexico and Colorado jurisdictions we visited, the envelope included a tear- off tab with information on how voters could find out whether their vote  counted, and if not, why it was not counted. In addition, election officials in  some jurisdictions we visited described provisional ballots being placed in  envelopes, sometimes with a second security envelope covering the ballot  inside. Figure 42 shows an example of a provisional ballot envelope.
Officials in jurisdictions we visited described a variety of methods used for  tracking provisional ballots in the November 2004 election. Methods  included having individual ballots numbered, maintaining an inventory or  log, accounting for provisional ballots at the beginning and end of Election  Day, and using specially colored ballots or envelopes for holding  provisional ballots. The following are examples of how election officials in  four jurisdictions we visited said they tracked provisional ballots for the  November 2004 election:   In a Pennsylvania jurisdiction, election officials tracked provisional  ballots cast at the polling place on a form provided by the election  officials. Provisional ballots were marked with a sticker indicating  that they were provisional. The sticker also had an identification  number for tracking the ballot, and the voter was provided a receipt  with the identification number to use when calling for information on  the status of their ballot. All provisional ballots were placed inside of  green envelopes.
In a New Mexico jurisdiction, an election official said that ballots  were numbered sequentially, so that the poll workers could track the  numbers. The precinct judges certified the numbers of the ballots  they received, used, delivered, and destroyed.
In a New Jersey jurisdiction, the municipal clerk issued a specific  number of provisional ballots (25) to each precinct, with a “Custody  Receipt” form that identified who was in possession of the orange  bag with the provisional ballots and an accounting of all ballots  originally issued. A ballot that had been voted was enclosed in a gray  envelope and then put back in the orange bag.
In a Kansas jurisdiction, separate poll books, separate envelopes for  provisional ballots, and separate pouches for envelopes containing  provisional ballots (all blue in color) facilitated tracking the ballots  as separate items from regular Election Day ballots. No tracking of  the actual ballot occurred (before it was voted) because the same  optical scan paper ballot was used for regular Election Day voters.
section_title: Additional Circumstances for Using Provisional Ballots Varied for the November 2004 Election
paragraphs: Apart from permitting voters to cast provisional ballots under the  circumstances specified in HAVA, some jurisdictions we surveyed or spoke  with had additional reasons for providing provisional ballots to voters in  the November 2004 election and other types of ballots that could be used  for different circumstances. In addition, election officials in jurisdictions  we visited told us about different approaches for offering provisional  ballots.
subsections: section_title: Provisional Ballots Were Provided for a Variety of Reasons in Jurisdictions We Visited
paragraphs: In the local election jurisdictions we visited, election officials described  various circumstances, in addition to those required by HAVA, in which a  provisional ballot was provided to a prospective voter in the November  2004 election. The additional circumstances under which provisional  ballots were provided are established by state officials. For example,  In one Colorado jurisdiction we visited, election officials stated that  provisional ballots were available to voters who did not have the  identification required of all voters in the state and also available if a  person was listed as a felon in the poll book. Further, election  officials told us that the Colorado Secretary of State issued guidance  just prior to the 2004 general election that allowed individuals— claiming to have registered at a voter registration drive but for whom  the jurisdiction had no record—to vote provisionally.
Election officials in jurisdictions we visited in Colorado, Florida,  Kansas, Ohio, and Washington said that voters claiming they had not  received their absentee ballots were provided with provisional  ballots. In other jurisdictions, such as the 2 we visited in Connecticut,  voters were allowed to vote regularly if their absentee ballot did not  arrive.
Kansas election officials reported that they allowed voters to cast  provisional ballots if the voter did not trust the voting machines and  wanted a paper ballot, or if the voter had a different last name than  the listed one because of marriage or divorce.
The extent to which voters are provided with provisional ballots varied  depending on whether states required identification of all voters or only  certain voters, according to our state survey. Some states reported that  they require all voters to provide identification; some reported that they  require only provisional voters to produce identification, while others  reported that they do not require identification from voters other than first- time voters who registered by mail, as required by HAVA. Chapter 4 on  conducting elections discusses state requirements for voter identification  for all voters. According to our state survey, 6 states—Arizona,  Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, Utah, and Wisconsin—reported  requiring identification from only provisional voters in the November 2004  election, but Michigan and Utah reported allowing an alternative to  identification for provisional voters who did not have required  identification. In Michigan, for example, a voter receiving a provisional  ballot who was unable to meet the identification requirement was  permitted, according to election officials responding to our state survey, to  fax, mail, or hand-deliver an acceptable form of photo identification to the  clerk anytime during the 6 days following the election.
section_title: Alternatives to Provisional Voting Available in Some Jurisdictions We Visited
paragraphs: Some jurisdictions we visited reported that Election Day voting options  other than provisional ballots were available. For example, election  officials in jurisdictions we visited in Ohio said that provisional ballots  were the only special ballots available for that election. In contrast, in a  New Mexico jurisdiction we visited, election officials said the state offered  an in-lieu-of ballot for voters who requested an absentee ballot, and  claimed it did not arrive. These election officials said the in-lieu-of ballot  was the same as a provisional ballot, but it was placed in a different sleeve  for later determination of whether an absentee ballot had been cast or not.  At a Connecticut jurisdiction we visited, election officials described the  state’s presidential ballot, available at the clerk’s office on Election Day for  the November 2004 election. A presidential ballot, according to election  officials and documents they provided, allowed voting for president and  vice-president by former Connecticut residents who had moved to another  state within 30 days of the election and for that reason could not vote in  their new state of residence.
Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited, such as 1 jurisdiction in  Florida and 2 jurisdictions in New Jersey, said their procedures allowed  challenged voters to sign a statement, such as an affidavit declaring their  eligibility, and to vote on a regular ballot that would be counted with other  ballots on Election Day. According to poll worker guidance provided by  election officials in the Florida jurisdiction, a written challenge must be  submitted under oath and given to the voter; then the voter has the right to  submit an oath affirming his or her eligibility. The polling place clerk and  inspectors must resolve the challenge by majority vote, providing a regular  ballot if the decision is in the prospective voter’s favor. The guidance states  that a challenged voter who refuses to sign the oath must be offered a  provisional ballot. In both jurisdictions we visited in New Jersey, voters  who were challenged were not issued a provisional ballot, according to  documents provided by election officials. As stated in the poll worker  manual for one of the jurisdictions for the 2004 general election, a voter  who was challenged completed a challenged voter affidavit, as shown in  figure 43. The manual stated that the location’s four poll workers take a  vote to decide whether the voter would be allowed to vote. On the basis of  the decision, the challenged voter cast a regular ballot or was not allowed  to vote, according to the manual (in case of a tie, the voter was allowed to  vote).
In our survey of local election jurisdictions nationwide, we asked for  information on the use of provisional ballots, challenged ballots, or other  types of ballots under various scenarios for the November 2004 election.  Table 18 shows the extent to which we estimate that local jurisdictions  provided provisional ballots as compared to providing other types of  ballots.
Apart from permitting voters to cast provisional ballots under the  circumstances specified in HAVA, election officials in jurisdictions we  visited described differing approaches under which provisional ballots  were utilized for the November 2004 election.
Election officials in most of the 28 jurisdictions we visited said that in the  November 2004 election they would not refuse an individual a provisional  ballot. In a Colorado jurisdiction, election officials said that election judges  were instructed to direct all voters meeting the criteria for voting  provisionally (e.g., claiming to be registered and eligible, but with some  eligibility question) to the provisional voting table. In 1 Nevada jurisdiction,  the election official said that anyone could receive a provisional ballot. He  said that they had Las Vegas tourists who wanted to vote a provisional  ballot, even though they were informed that it would not be counted.  Election officials in 1 Washington jurisdiction said voters knew that they  could cast a ballot regardless of circumstances, and election officials in the  other Washington jurisdiction said that provisional ballots served as a  conflict avoidance tool at the polls. Election officials in both New Mexico  jurisdictions said that if a voter was not on the registration list, he or she  was immediately given a provisional ballot. According to the New Mexico  election officials, precinct officials were not to direct a voter to the correct  precinct; instead, under the provisional voting rule, they were to offer a  provisional ballot to the voter.
Election officials in some other jurisdictions we visited told us that poll  workers may have taken certain steps before providing a voter with a  provisional ballot. In 1 Illinois jurisdiction, an election official said that if a  potential voter was not listed, the poll workers first tried to determine if the  voter was registered in another jurisdiction. If that was the case, the poll  workers then directed the voter to that jurisdiction, but they did not refuse  to provide a provisional ballot if a voter requested one. In 1 Ohio  jurisdiction, election officials told us that if a voter was registered in Ohio,  everything was done to get the voter to the correct precinct. In a New  Jersey jurisdiction we visited, election officials explained that poll workers  take several steps when the voter’s name was not listed in the poll book.  Poll workers were instructed, according to the poll worker’s manual, to  check the poll book for misspellings or for the name being out of  alphabetical sequence, and to check the county street guide to see if the  voter was in the wrong location. Election officials in this jurisdiction also  told us that voters who were in the wrong location were directed to the  correct location. They added that voters who did not wish to vote  provisionally were told to go before a superior court judge to plead their  cases.
In 5 jurisdictions we visited, election officials said there were instances  where election officials would refuse to provide a provisional ballot on  Election Day. In 1 Ohio jurisdiction, election officials said that a provisional  ballot was provided if the potential voter appeared at the polling place.  However, if the person came to the election office on Election Day and no  record of voter registration was found by the Registrar, then the voter was  not allowed to vote provisionally. A potential voter stating that he or she  was not registered or not a resident was a reason not to offer the individual  a provisional ballot, according to election officials in 1 jurisdiction in  Nevada, and 1 in New Jersey, and both jurisdictions in North Carolina.  Officials in 1 Georgia jurisdiction we visited said that an individual might  not be offered a provisional ballot if he or she was on the voter registration  list and therefore eligible to vote a regular ballot.
Whether a provisional ballot was provided or not might have been based, in  part, on the size of the jurisdiction and the familiarity of the poll workers  with the voters. Several election officials in small local jurisdictions  included in our nationwide survey made this point in written comments.  For example, comments included the following:  “This is a small township. We don’t have the problems big cities have.  People know who lives in the township. They know their neighbors.”   “Most voters are personally known, including their addresses.”   “We were told that the state voter list was the bible for the day. But we  had one lady who should have been provisional but we all knew where  she lived so we let her vote. It was the choir lady’s niece. Her signature  was on file.”
In larger jurisdictions, poll workers might be less likely to know the voters  in the precinct and may have made greater use of provisional ballots than in  smaller jurisdictions.
section_title: Newness of Providing Provisional Ballots Presented Some Challenges in November 2004
paragraphs: Some jurisdictions we visited reported that knowing how many provisional  ballots to have available for the November 2004 election was a challenge.  However, on the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that  for the November 2004 election, only 1 percent of jurisdictions had a  shortage of provisional ballots. The difficulty with anticipating the need for  provisional ballots, according to an Illinois jurisdiction election official,  was that officials had no historical experience to rely upon in deciding how  many to make available at each site. In this jurisdiction, provisional ballots  were used for the first time in the November 2004 election, according to the  election official. Similarly, in a Pennsylvania jurisdiction we visited,  election officials stated that they had no basis to plan for the number  needed, and that they had to rush to produce (e.g., placing a provisional  ballot sticker over an absentee ballot) additional provisional ballots at the  last minute because some precincts needed more than were initially  allocated. Election officials in one Nevada jurisdiction we visited said some  polling places were overstocked while others were understocked, requiring  them to shuttle the ballots between polling places. In a Colorado  jurisdiction we visited, election officials said that last-minute changes by  state officials created a need for more provisional ballots because this  change allowed individuals who registered during a voter registration drive  but who were not on the voter list to vote provisionally.
On the basis of our local survey, poll workers failing to follow procedures  for conducting provisional voting surfaced as an issue in some jurisdictions  in the November 2004 election. We estimate that 12 percent of jurisdictions  nationwide encountered poll worker performance problems related to their  failure to follow procedures with provisional voting. The newness of the  provisional procedures or last-minute changes in the guidance were  challenges that confused poll workers, according to election officials in  jurisdictions we visited. Specifically,  In a Georgia jurisdiction, election officials told us there was a question  regarding whether several college students were eligible to vote  provisionally, and state election officials were called for clarification  (the students were allowed to vote provisionally).
In a Connecticut jurisdiction, election officials said poll workers were  confused about the process, issuing provisional ballots in some cases  before checking with the Registrar to try to locate the prospective  voters in the statewide database.
In both Nevada jurisdictions, election officials we visited identified poll  worker training needs; for example, in 1 of the Nevada jurisdictions  election officials said provisional ballot materials were not adequately  tracked and returned.
In an Ohio jurisdiction, election officials identified poll worker handling  of provisional ballots as an area for improvement based on finding valid  provisional ballots returned in envelopes for soiled and defaced ballots.  In addition, they said about half of the provisional voters did not sign the  poll book, as they were supposed to have done under this jurisdiction’s  requirements. Furthermore, voters were to place their provisional  ballots in a colored provisional sleeve for determination of eligibility  before the vote was submitted, but the election official estimated that  about 10 percent of the provisional ballots were placed directly in the  ballot box instead.
Some election officials in jurisdictions we visited described actions they  took to implement provisional voting that worked well for the November  2004 election. Several identified training given to poll workers that  prepared them for provisional voting, or had staff dedicated to handling  provisional votes, or poll workers with prior provisional voting experience.  For example, election officials in 1 Colorado jurisdiction said that they had  election judges whose sole responsibility was conducting provisional  voting. According to these election officials, the election judges (i.e., poll  workers) were well trained and sat at a separate table to handle provisional  voting. One jurisdiction we visited in Illinois had specific instructions on  the voter affidavit for election workers to follow. Figure 44 provides an  example of the affidavit.
section_title: State and Local Jurisdictions Reported Variation in Several Areas Affecting whether Provisional Ballots Are Counted
paragraphs: HAVA specifies that voters casting ballots under HAVA’s provisional  balloting requirements must, in general, execute a written affirmation  stating that they are registered in the jurisdiction in which they desire to  vote and that they are eligible to vote in that election. Polling place  officials, under HAVA, are to transmit either the ballot or the written  affirmation information to an appropriate election official for verification  to ascertain if the individual is eligible to vote under state law. In the  November 2004 election, state requirements regarding the location from  which voters had to cast their provisional ballot in order for it to be  counted (e.g., in the specific precinct in which the voter is registered or  anywhere within the county—city, parish, township—in which the voter  was registered) was one key difference among states. States also varied in  how missing voter information was handled and how voters were informed  whether their vote was counted or not. On the basis of our national survey  of local jurisdictions, the most frequent problem encountered by local  jurisdictions in counting provisional ballots was that voters did not meet  residency eligibility requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction.
subsections: section_title: Location Where Voters Must Cast Their Ballots in Order to Be Counted Varied among States
paragraphs: HAVA requires states to provide provisional balloting where, among other  things, individuals assert that they are registered in the jurisdiction in  which they desire to vote. The term “jurisdiction” in HAVA’s provisional  voting requirements is not specifically defined. As a result, states establish,  under their own election codes, the applicable jurisdiction where voters  must cast their provisional ballot from in order for such ballot to be eligible  to be counted. For example, in some states this location is the specific  precinct in which the voter is registered, and in other states, the voter may  be anywhere within the county (city, parish, township) in which the voter  resides and is registered. Our survey of state election officials asked where  a provisional voter needed to cast a vote in order for it to be counted for  the November 2004 election. Figure 45 shows where states reported that  provisional voters needed to cast their votes in order for such votes to be  eligible to be counted.
Variation in state requirements as to the location where a provisional ballot  must have been cast in order to be counted was also evident in the  jurisdictions we visited. For example, voters in Kansas could, according to  election officials, vote provisionally in precincts other than where they  were registered (but within the same county) and if otherwise eligible to  vote have their vote partially counted (e.g., for county, state, or federal  offices or issues). Nevada election officials said they count provisional  votes cast anywhere in the county where the voter was registered and  otherwise eligible, but all provisional ballots only included federal races.  Election officials in both Washington jurisdictions we visited reported that  a voter in the November 2004 election was allowed to cast a provisional  ballot anywhere in the state of Washington, and the ballot would be  forwarded to the correct county (if the ballot was cast in a county other  than the one in which the voter was registered) and counted if the voter  was eligible. Election officials in 1 Washington jurisdiction we visited said  that county election workers mailed the provisional ballots for non- Washington residents to the Secretary of State of the state where the voter  claimed to be registered, but these officials were not knowledgeable of  what became of the ballots.
Election officials in several states have faced court challenges to their state  requirements regarding the location where a provisional ballot must have  been cast in order to be counted. The litigation has primarily arisen in  states requiring that a provisional voter had to cast a vote in the specific  precinct in which he or she was registered, in order for that vote to be  counted. In this context, the courts have generally held that HAVA does not  require a state to count provisional votes cast in the wrong precinct as legal  votes when they would otherwise be considered invalid under state law.
In our state survey, we also asked state election officials if they anticipated  that their state would change, by November 2006, where a provisional voter  must cast a vote for it to be counted. Forty states reported that they did not  anticipate such rules would change. Election officials in 4 states reported  they anticipated a change by November 2006. Three out of the 4 states  (Arkansas, Nevada, and New Jersey) reporting that they anticipated a  change for 2006 had reported for the November 2004 general election that a  provisional voter could have cast a vote anywhere within the county (city,  parish, township) in which the voter resides and have such vote counted.  The fourth state, Colorado, had reported for the November 2004 general  election that provisional voters had to cast their votes in the specific  precincts in which they were registered in order for their votes to be  counted. Georgia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia said they did not  know whether rules specifying where a provisional voter must cast a ballot  in order to be counted could be anticipated to change, and the remaining   4 states responded that they will not have provisional voting. These 4 states  are not subject to provisional voting requirements.
section_title: Residency Requirements and Evidence of Registration Were the Most Frequent Problems Nationwide Affecting whether Provisional Ballots Were Counted
paragraphs: In our survey of local election jurisdictions nationwide, we asked about  problems that local jurisdictions encountered during the November 2004  election in counting provisional ballots. On the basis of our survey, in  jurisdictions where provisional ballots were cast we estimate that the most  frequent problems concerned voters not meeting residency requirements  or lacking evidence that the voter was registered. Specifically, we estimate   66 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) of jurisdictions had a problem with  voters not meeting residency eligibility requirements for the precinct or  jurisdiction, 61 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) received insufficient evidence that  individuals had submitted voter registration applications at motor  vehicle agency offices,  61 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) had instances of insufficient  evidence that individuals had registered or tried to register directly with  the election office,   34 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) had registration applications  received by the registrar very close to or after the registration deadline,  32 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) had voters not providing  identification as specified by HAVA for registrants who registered by  mail and were voting for the first time in the precinct or jurisdiction,  29 percent (plus or minus 6 percent) received insufficient evidence that  individuals had submitted voter registration applications at National  Voter Registration Act agencies other than motor vehicle agency offices,  28 percent (plus or minus 6 percent) had provisional ballot envelopes or  ballots that were incomplete or illegible, and  20 percent of jurisdictions had problems with voters who did not sign a  sworn statement that they met the qualifications to be eligible to vote in  the precinct or jurisdiction.
Written comments made by local election officials in our nationwide survey  identified some additional problems encountered with counting provisional  ballots. Examples included uncertainty whether a convicted felon’s voting  rights, lost as a result of such conviction, had been restored; a voter’s  registration records that had been sealed by a court; and the state changing  the rules several times right up to Election Day, creating confusion,  according to election officials.
section_title: Jurisdictions Visited Identified Variations in How Missing Information Was Handled when Provisional Ballots Were Counted
paragraphs: In addition to variation in where states required provisional ballots to be  cast in order to be counted for the November 2004 election, local  jurisdictions we visited reported a variation in how to handle a lack of  identification or a missing signature. For example, election officials in one  New Mexico jurisdiction we visited said that first-time voters that did not  provide the required identification had until the close of the polls on  Election Day to bring their identification to the county clerk’s office. In  contrast, according to election officials in a New Jersey and a Georgia  jurisdiction, provisional voters were allowed up to 2 days to produce  identification for their vote to be counted, and in a Nevada jurisdiction,  voters had until 5:00 p.m. the Friday after the election.
With respect to mail registrants who were permitted to cast provisional  ballots because they did not provide required identification when voting for  the first time, election officials in 1 Illinois jurisdiction we visited reported  a lack of clarity as to what subsequent identification-related verification  was needed prior to counting provisional ballots. According to the Illinois  election officials, the state’s guidance resulted in a situation where one  Illinois jurisdiction required the voter to provide to the county clerk’s office  identification with an address that matched the address in the voter  registration list within 48 hours after the election in order to be counted,  while another jurisdiction did not require the two such addresses match.  The Illinois officials stated that this issue has been clarified.
Jurisdictions we visited also varied in how they handled a missing voter  signature. For example, in 1 Colorado jurisdiction, election officials said  that they mailed letters to voters who failed to sign their provisional ballot  envelopes and allowed the voters up to 10 days after the election to come in  and sign so that their votes would be counted. This was not a procedure  described in all jurisdictions we visited. In 1 jurisdiction in New Mexico,  ballots would not be counted for voters who did not sign the provisional  ballot affidavit or roster. In 1 Georgia jurisdiction we visited, voters had to  complete a new voter registration form or their provisional ballots were not  counted.
section_title: Telephone Was Used Most Often to Provide Voters with the Outcome of Their Provisional Vote
paragraphs: HAVA requires that provisional voters be provided with written information  about how to find out whether their vote was counted (and if not, why)  using a free access system established by state or local election officials.  On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that the majority  of local jurisdictions that had provisional ballots cast used the telephone  (often toll-free) as the free access system for voters in the November 2004  election to obtain information on whether their provisional ballot was  counted, and if not counted, why not. Table 19 shows the estimated  percentage of jurisdictions that used various methods. Some jurisdictions  used more than one method.
Election officials from jurisdictions we visited described a number of ways  that provisional voters were provided information about how to learn the  outcome of their votes for the November 2004 election, such as ballot  receipts, a copy of the voter’s affidavit, a form letter, or a tear-off portion of  the provisional ballot envelope. In a New Jersey jurisdiction we visited,  provisional voters were given a toll-free number at which to leave their  name and address, and then the results were mailed to them, according to  election officials. The jurisdiction election officials noted that this process  worked well. Figure 46 provides examples of the information voters were  provided to inquire whether their vote was counted.
In our local jurisdiction survey, we asked how soon after Election Day  information on the outcome of a provisional ballot was made available to  voters. According to written comments, feedback was reported by some  election officials to be available to voters after the November 2004 election  as early as the next day, or within 7 days after the election, although some  allowed 1 month, or until the election was certified.
Election officials in some of the jurisdictions we visited reported that few  voters called to find out if their provisional votes were counted. For  example, in a Colorado jurisdiction, officials reported approximately   100 calls out of over 6,100 ballots cast; a Kansas jurisdiction election  official estimated receiving calls from 6 provisional voters out of over   3,600 that voted; a New Jersey jurisdiction reported receiving 69 inquiries  from voters out of over 6,300 cast; and in 3 other jurisdictions we visited,  election officials reported no one called to find out if his or her vote was  counted.
section_title: A Number of Factors Contribute to Difficulties in Estimating and Comparing Provisional Ballots Cast and Counted
paragraphs: Estimating the number of provisional ballots initially cast and those that  were counted in the November 2004 election is difficult because complete  information is not available, and because of differences in how state and  local jurisdictions have implemented HAVA provisional voting  requirements affecting how and whether such ballots are provided and  counted. Those same factors limit the value of comparing provisional  ballots cast and counted among jurisdictions. Although estimation is  difficult, our survey allowed us to estimate provisional ballots cast, but  with strong caveats.
While HAVA required that most states permit individuals to cast provisional  ballots under certain circumstances, not all jurisdictions reported having  provisional ballots cast in their jurisdiction in the November 2004 election.  On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that  provisional votes were cast in 33 percent of jurisdictions and none were  cast in 67 percent of jurisdictions. Our estimates varied by size of  jurisdiction regarding whether provisional votes were cast or not. We  estimate that in 99 percent of large jurisdictions, 84 percent of medium  jurisdictions, and 12 percent of small jurisdictions provisional votes were  cast in the November 2004 election. The differences between all sizes of  jurisdictions were statistically significant.
The difference between different sizes of jurisdictions’ use of provisional  ballots may be explained in part by comments from election officials in  local jurisdictions surveyed and from officials in jurisdictions we visited.  For example, officials in several smaller jurisdictions included in our  nationwide survey who reported that provisional ballots were not cast in  their jurisdiction had indicated in written comments that election workers  are likely to have personal knowledge of a voter’s eligibility. As one election  official from a Wisconsin jurisdiction wrote, provisional ballots were  available, but use of the ballots was not necessary. Similarly, in a small  jurisdiction we visited in New Hampshire, election officials told us that  given the town’s small population of roughly 1,600 residents, 99 percent of  the time someone in the room knew the individual and could vouch for his  or her identity. In this circumstance, according to election officials, no  verification was necessary at the poll to ensure the voter's identification.
subsections: section_title: Data Were Lacking for National Estimate of Provisional Votes Cast and Counted
paragraphs: The number of provisional ballots cast and counted nationally is difficult to  estimate with precision because of the limited data available and data  quality concerns. Estimates that are available, however, do serve as an  indication that the HAVA provisional voting requirements have allowed  potentially eligible voters who otherwise might have been turned away to  participate. We requested November 2004 data on provisional ballots cast  and counted in our survey of local election jurisdictions nationwide, but  because of missing information and other methodological concerns, our  estimate is provided only with strong caveats. We estimate that a total of  between 1.1 million and 1.7 million provisional ballots were cast. Our range  reflects the fact that an estimated 20 percent of the jurisdictions in our  survey did not provide data on how many provisional ballots were cast. We  could not estimate the number of provisional ballots that were counted  with any level of certainty, because of a very high level of missing data—an  estimated 40 percent of the jurisdictions did not provide data on the  number of provisional ballots counted.
In addition, some jurisdictions in our survey providing the number of  provisional ballots cast may have actually provided the number of  provisional votes counted. It is possible this may have occurred because  jurisdictions would more likely have a record of the number of provisional  votes determined to be qualified and counted than they would have the  number of provisional votes originally submitted at polling places (cast).  For example, in 1 jurisdiction we visited, provisional ballot numbers were  provided only on the number of provisional votes that were counted. If  some responses to our survey of local jurisdictions actually provided the  number of votes counted rather than the number of votes cast, then our  estimate of provisional votes cast may be an underestimate.
HAVA specifies that information be made available to individuals through a  free access system (such as a toll-free telephone number or an Internet  Web site) regarding whether their provisional votes were counted and, if a  vote was not counted, the reason it was not counted. The specifics of  implementing such a system, such as the methods by which such  information is to be identified, collected, and maintained, however, under  HAVA, are left to the discretion of state and local election officials. The  National Task Force on Election Reform recommended that states develop  a uniform method for reporting provisional ballots at the state and national  levels, and also that states collect data on the number of provisional ballots  cast on Election Day. Some states might require the information on ballots  cast and counted be sent for statewide figures. Election officials in a  Connecticut jurisdiction we visited, for example, said that the Registrar  completed a provisional ballot report for the Secretary of State in  accordance with state guidance.
Other national estimates of the number of provisional votes cast and  counted in the November 2004 election have been affected by data quality  issues. The Election Assistance Commission, using data from its survey of  election administrators, estimated that 1.9 million voters cast provisional  ballots at the polls in November 2004, and that 1.2 million of those votes  cast were counted. As with our estimates, EAC cautioned that the  coverage, or response rate, for its estimates was limited. The response rate  for provisional ballots cast and counted was 46 percent and 38 percent,  respectively. The report authors stated that data quality issues, such as  missing data or data error entries (such as in 15 jurisdictions in the EAC  report where the number of provisional ballots counted was greater than  the jurisdiction reported as cast) were identified and corrected where  possible.
On the basis of data collected at different times from different sources in  different states, electionline.org estimated that over 1.6 million provisional  ballots were cast, and nearly 1.1 million of them were counted. However,  readers are cautioned here as well about the limitations of the available  data. For example, figures are not definitive because of the variation in  requirements and procedures among (or even within) states, and estimates  are based on incomplete information. The authors stated that they  provided provisional voting estimates with the intent of moving the  discussion of provisional voting forward.
section_title: Number of November 2004 Provisional Votes Cast and Counted in Local Jurisdictions We Visited
paragraphs: Information provided by some of the jurisdictions we visited illustrates the  variation in the reported number of provisional ballots cast and counted  during the November 2004 election, as shown in table 20.
When looking at provisional ballots cast and counted for a particular  jurisdiction, the variability in the implementation of provisional voting by  states and jurisdictions makes interpretation and comparison among  jurisdictions difficult. As mentioned earlier, the number of provisional  votes cast and counted may vary based on a number of factors. In general,  states and jurisdictions vary in why and how provisional ballots are  provided to potential voters, as well as the state and local procedures for  how provisional ballots are counted. A partial list of these factors includes  the following:  State provisions varied regarding the additional circumstances (apart  from the minimum requirements specified in HAVA) under which a  provisional ballot may be offered.
Some states offered other voting options in addition to provisional  ballots to voters with eligibility issues (such as signing an affidavit,  then voting normally or casting a challenged ballot).
The manner and extent to which the provisional ballot options  available to voters are actually utilized varied in connection with the  size and approach of the jurisdictions. For example, smaller  jurisdictions were, according to election officials, less likely to use  the provisional ballot option than larger jurisdictions because they  were more knowledgeable of voters in their jurisdictions and  therefore better positioned to address eligibility issues than larger  jurisdictions, and some jurisdictions reported taking additional steps  to send the voter to the correct precinct before offering a provisional  ballot, whereas other jurisdictions might not do so.
States established the location where voters must cast their  provisional ballots from in order for such ballots to be eligible to be  counted. For example, in some states this location is the specific  precinct in which the voter is registered, and in other states, the voter  may be anywhere within the county (city, parish, township) in which  the voter resides and is registered.
States or local jurisdictions established other conditions (e.g., the  time limit for providing required identification) that varied in  determining whether a provisional vote was to be counted.
There were other factors, such as instances in which the polling  location was kept open late because of a federal court, state court, or  other order extending the polling hours.
Notwithstanding the variations we have identified in provisional voting  processes and challenges identified by some election officials in  jurisdictions we visited, several election officials reported that they  thought the provisional voting process worked well for the November 2004  election, in that people who would normally not have been able to cast a  ballot were allowed to do so, and some of those ballots were counted.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: While many jurisdictions reported that for the November 2000 election  having at least one procedure in place to help resolve eligibility questions  for voters whose name did not appear on a polling place registration list,  only 20 states plus the District of Columbia reported using some form of  provisional voting in the November 2000 election. In those states in which  it was not available, voters whose names did not appear on polling place  registration lists, but stated they had properly registered to vote, were often  not permitted to cast a regular ballot. Provisional voting is an important  means of enhancing voter access to the polls.
HAVA required all states that required registration prior to Election Day to  provide for provisional balloting by the November 2004 election, but left to  states the specific choices on how they would implement that requirement.  In exercising this discretion, states have created varied provisional voting  rules and practices. Under HAVA, provisional ballots are to be counted as a  vote under state law if the person casting the ballot is determined to be  eligible to vote under state law. These statutory provisions and  determinations of eligibility and what constitutes a properly voted ballot  vary by state and thus affect the state rules and procedures used to  determine whether provisional ballots are counted. At least 1 state, for  example, allows voters to cast a provisional ballot for statewide offices  anywhere in the state, with the ballot returned for eligibility verification  and counting to the jurisdiction in which the voter said he or she was  registered. Other states required that voters cast provisional ballots in their  assigned precinct for the ballots to be counted. The actual impact of these  varying practices on provisional balloting and vote counting is unknown.  Comparable data across states are not available to determine whether or  how these variations affect the number of voters who are permitted to cast  provisional ballots or the percentage of provisional ballots that are actually  counted. Thus, it is difficult to assess the potential impact of a state  changing its existing rules and practices. However, based on the data that  are available, it is clear that provisional voting has helped to facilitate voter  participation of those encountering eligibility-related issues when  attempting to vote.
section_title: Counting the Votes
paragraphs: Once the polls close on Election Day, the process of determining and  certifying the final results begins. Vote counting is a complex, multistep  process with many variations across the nation. The exact process depends  upon a number of variables. Among them are state requirements that define  standards for determining voter intent for ballots that are not clearly  marked, deadlines for certifying the final count, and specifications for  conducting recounts when required. The types of ballots to be counted  affect vote tabulations because absentee and provisional ballots typically  undergo some type of verification before counting, while early and regular  Election Day ballots typically do not require this processing. The types of  technology used for vote casting and counting—hand-counted paper  ballots and machine-counted ballots (punch card, optical scan, and those  cast electronically)—also add variance to how votes are handled. The  counting process requires attention to detail, and problems in any one  election stage can affect the final vote count. Moreover, its orchestration  requires the effective interaction of people, processes, and technology. This  chapter discusses the continuity and key changes since the 2000 general  election and challenges—new and ongoing—encountered by election  officials in the 2004 general election with respect to counting votes.
subsections: section_title: Overview
paragraphs: In the 2004 general election, vote counting remained an intricate, multistep  process characterized by a great variety of local procedures depending on a  local jurisdiction’s technology, size, and preferences. As with the 2000  general election, the proportion of jurisdictions nationwide reporting  recounts or contested elections remained small in the 2004 general  election. There were some notable developments related to vote counting.  A significant change was the fact that by the 2004 general election more  states had developed guidance for determining voter intent on unclear  ballots. Eighteen states that reported not having guidance in the 2000  general election reported in our survey they had such guidance in place for  the 2004 general election. In addition, 9 states reported changes relating to  the process of conducting recounts. Some added requirements for  mandatory recounts. Others changed their conditions and guidance for  conducting recounts. The results of our state survey showed that while 29  states and the District of Columbia did not require audits of vote counts, 9  states reported having taken some legislative or executive steps toward  doing so.
Many of the problems in managing people, processes, and technology that  had confronted election officials across the country in the November 2000  general election continued to challenge them in the 2004 general election.
Equipment problems, poll worker errors, and voter errors made it difficult  to tabulate the votes quickly and accurately, according to some election  officials. A new phenomenon emerged as a challenge to election officials,  as well: Some jurisdictions reported difficulty completing the extra steps  required to verify and count provisional votes within the time allowed for  tallying the final vote count. Finally, while recounts and contested elections  remained rare in the 2004 general election, those that did occur,  particularly in Washington state, revealed the intricacies and vulnerabilities  of the election process.
section_title: In the 2004 General Election the Vote- Counting Process Remained Complex and Marked by Local Diversity
paragraphs: The basic elements of the vote-counting process we described in our  October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes nationwide  remained in practice for the general election of 2004. Of necessity, it was a  complex, multistep process, with many variations, depending on a  jurisdiction’s technology, size, and preferences. As with other elections,  vote counting in the 2004 general election involved certain common steps:  closing and securing the polls and voting equipment; securing the ballots;  reconciling the number of ballots at the polls (e.g., the number available at  the polls compared to the number cast, spoiled, and remaining);  transporting ballots and equipment from the polling places to a central  location where they were secured; in some cases electronically  transmitting results from polling place voting equipment to a central tally  location; verifying provisional and absentee ballots for counting;  determining whether and how to count ballots that may be improperly or  unclearly marked; conducting any necessary recounts; and certifying the  final count.
subsections: section_title: Local Jurisdictions We Surveyed and Visited Secured Machines and Ballots in a Variety of Ways
paragraphs: Preliminary to counting, a key step was to secure the voting machines and  ballots so that no additional votes could be cast. Procedures for securing  equipment varied with the equipment that was in use. However, on the  basis of our survey of a representative sample of local election jurisdictions  nationwide, we estimate that 91 percent of all jurisdictions used hardware  locks and seals as one of their predominant security measures. In our site  visits, local election officials also described securing DRE tapes and  cartridges under lock and key before and after they were delivered to  boards of elections or other authorities. For example, election officials  from 1 jurisdiction we visited described securing memory cards in optical  scan counting machines by attaching a plastic band with a serial number.  The band would have to be severed in order for the memory card to be  removed, according to election officials. One such band is shown in Figure  47 securing a voting equipment bag.
Election officials in 2 jurisdictions we visited also described a variety of  measures they took to ensure that ballots were not lost or miscounted. In   1 Washington jurisdiction, officials said they secured punch card ballots at  polling places for counting elsewhere by transporting ballots twice: once  earlier on Election Day and the other time after the polls had closed. These  officials also said that ballots were bundled into groups of 50, separated by  type (Election Day, provisional, and absentee ballots), and put into  transport carrier safe boxes. Two poll workers, one from each political  party, accompanied the ballots when they were transported to the elections  office for counting. Similarly, in a Colorado jurisdiction we visited, election  officials said that at the close of Election Day they sealed optical scan  ballots from the polling place and the optical scan counter to prevent  tampering. Then, two election judges transferred the ballots and optical  scan counter to the counting center.
While ballot-securing methods varied, the results of our local jurisdiction  survey showed that most jurisdictions had written policies and procedures  in place in the November 2004 general election to secure ballots (including  paper and electronically stored ballots). As shown in table 21, on the basis  of our survey we estimate that two-thirds of local jurisdictions had written  procedures for transporting ballots, and about three-quarters had written  procedures in place for secure ballot storage rooms.
In addition, reconciling ballots with the number of voters was a common  step in securing ballots before they were counted. According to our state  survey, 47 states and the District of Columbia reported that they required  jurisdictions to count or keep track of ballots that were unused, spoiled,  rejected, or issued but not returned. Two states, Montana and Maine,  reported not requiring jurisdictions to count or keep track of such ballots.  New York reported in our survey that because it does not have paper  ballots, such tracking was not necessary. New York reported that it did not  use paper, optical scan, or punch card ballots. During our visits to election  jurisdictions, we asked officials how they reconcile ballot and voter  numbers. The election officials reported conducting cross-checks in a  number of ways, but generally followed a process of reconciling any  discrepancies between the total numbers of ballots on hand at the  beginning of the day, the number of voters who signed in at the polling  place, and the number of ballots cast.
section_title: Counting, Canvassing, and Certifying the Vote Was an Intricate and Varied Operation
paragraphs: Once the ballots were reconciled in the November 2004 election, local  jurisdictions tabulated and canvassed (or reviewed) the vote. Both  counting and canvassing the count were an ongoing process in the effort to  ensure an accurate tally. After initial tabulations of votes on election night,  which were typically released to the public, canvassing was typically the  process of reviewing all votes by precinct, resolving problem votes, and  counting all types of votes (including absentee and provisional votes) for  each candidate and issue on the ballot and producing an official total for  each. The official total was usually certified by an election official. This  process varied among jurisdictions in terms of how and where it was done  and who was responsible.
The counting process involved several different types of ballots, cast under  different circumstances:   General election votes are cast at polling places on Election Day by  voters who appeared in the registration lists for that precinct and voted  a regular ballot.
Provisional votes are cast by those, for example, whose registration  (and qualification to vote) could not be established at the time of voting  at the polls on Election Day.
Absentee votes are generally votes received and cast by mail before  Election Day.
Early votes are generally cast in person before Election Day.
According to our local survey, for the November 2004 general election,  local jurisdictions nationwide used different voting methods for different  ballot types. As shown in table 22, we estimate the largest percentages of  jurisdictions used optical scan and paper hand-counted ballots for Election  Day. Also, optical scan and punch card vote-counting methods were used at  precincts or at central locations. Jurisdictions could check more than one  voting method.
In our local jurisdiction survey, we also asked what predominant voting  method was used to process the largest number of ballots in the 2004  general election. We estimate that hand-counted paper ballots were the  predominant tabulation method for 30 percent of all jurisdictions, although  these were almost all small jurisdictions. Specifically, we estimate that   41 percent of small jurisdictions, 3 percent of medium jurisdictions, and no  large jurisdictions hand-counted paper ballots. Small jurisdictions were  statistically different from large jurisdictions.
As in the November 2000 general election, the counting process for the  November 2004 election took place at precincts or at centralized locations,  such as election headquarters at town halls and even warehouses. In  jurisdictions we visited, we learned about some of the substantial  variations in the sequence, procedures, and precautions taken to conduct  the count. We found in our site visits that vote counting ranged from a very  simple process in a small jurisdiction to more complex processes in larger  jurisdictions. For example, a small New Hampshire jurisdiction, with just  over 1,000 registered voters, had one polling place and one precinct open  on Election Day, according to election officials. They told us the paper  ballots were not transferred to any location for counting and were hand- counted by 25 election workers. These officials also said that five teams of  five individuals each reviewed votes cast on each paper ballot and used  paper and pencil to record and tally vote totals. The final election outcomes  were written on a standard form and submitted to the New Hampshire  Secretary of State’s office, according to election officials.
In contrast, election officials in a large Washington jurisdiction described a  more complex process for their centralized vote count of punch card  ballots. As described by these officials, their process enabled them to begin  reporting results on Election Day evening by precinct and to provide  updates of the count every 30 minutes. Once Election Day ballots were  transferred to the election office by poll workers, the ballots were counted  to determine total numbers, according to election officials. They also told  us that after the ballots were separated by precinct, up to 20 inspection  boards, composed of two Republicans and two Democrats each, inspected  the ballots one precinct at a time. In the inspection process, the officials  said that the ballots were further separated into categories—those that  were machine-readable and those that required further examination, such  as ballots with write-in candidates or with a chad hanging by two or more  corners. Once all questions were resolved (including any that would  require review by a canvassing board), they told us ballots in batches of   500 each were placed in trays by precinct and brought to the ballot  tabulation area. According to these officials, the jurisdiction used a punch  card tabulator, which was connected to a computer and had a processing  speed of 600 ballots per minute (see fig. 48). Once all ballots were counted,  jurisdiction election officials told us they generated an unofficial report  with results for all races and voting propositions. This initial tally was  posted on the county Web site and released to the press, candidates, and  public, according to election officials.
Six of the jurisdictions we visited told us that they counted Election Day  votes at the local precinct, where poll workers would tabulate results and  resolve any ballot issues that could be handled locally. For example, in a  large Kansas jurisdiction, election officials said that voters were able to  place their ballots in an optical scanner at the polling place that read the  ballot and rejected it if there were any problems. According to officials  there, the machines could return to the voter any ballot that, for example,  had too few or too many votes for a specific office and provide a screen  message for what to correct before resubmitting the ballot. After the polls  closed, the optical scan machines with their memory cards—which had  been programmed for the specific precinct—were transferred to election  headquarters, according to election officials. The officials also said the  optical scan machines were linked electronically to one computer and data  from the memory cards were uploaded so that votes from all precincts  could be tallied.
section_title: Additional Steps Were Required to Manage Absentee, Provisional, and Early Votes
paragraphs: Absentee, provisional, and early votes each required some additional steps  to manage in order to include them in the vote count.
Absentee votes: According to our state survey, all states reported having  some provision for absentee voting in the 2004 general election. As we  discussed in chapter 3, on absentee voting, absentee ballots must typically  undergo some type of verification prior to counting. At 1 Colorado  jurisdiction we visited, officials said that they began verifying and counting  absentee ballots 10 days before Election Day. At 1 jurisdiction in  Washington election officials said that they qualified the absentee ballots as  they were received at the election office, but did not count the votes until  3:00 p.m. on Election Day. Additionally, at a jurisdiction in Illinois, election  officials said that they distributed most absentee ballots to their respective  precincts to be counted along with the Election Day ballots. In each of  these jurisdictions, however, according to election officials, the absentee  ballot results were not released until after the Election Day polls were  closed. Also, on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that  99 percent of election jurisdictions included the counts of qualified  absentee ballots in the final certified count, regardless of their effect on the  outcome.
Provisional votes: Provisional voting, which was required by HAVA in all  but 6 states during the 2004 general election, generally required several  steps. At all of the local jurisdictions we visited that used provisional  ballots, election officials said that the ballots were transferred to an  election office or central count location, where the eligibility of the voter  was verified before they were counted. We estimate, on the basis of our  local jurisdiction survey, that 83 percent of jurisdictions that provided  provisional ballots during the 2004 general election transferred the  provisional ballots to a central location for counting. Those jurisdictions  that did not engage in transfers may have been jurisdictions with only one  precinct, in which case, the votes were tallied on-site. At all of the  jurisdictions we visited that used provisional ballots election officials said  they included provisional ballots determined to be verified in certified vote  counts regardless of their effect on the outcome of the election.
Early votes: According to our state survey, for the November 2004 election,  24 states and the District of Columbia reported they allowed early voting,  and from our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that about 23 percent of  local jurisdictions allowed early voting in the election. In early voting  jurisdictions we visited, a variety of reconciliation and counting processes  were used, according to election officials. At one jurisdiction we visited,  election officials told us that early voting DRE votes were reconciled daily.  According to these officials, at the end of the early voting period, election  department staff shut down the DRE machines and removed the memory  cards (which stored cast votes). The officials said that the memory cards  were sealed and returned to the election department office for counting, in  a manner similar to Election Day DRE votes. In another jurisdiction we  visited that used optical scan machines for early voting, officials told us  that ballots were inserted by voters into the machines at the polls—the  same procedure used on Election Day. At the end of each early voting day,  according to the officials, the ballots from that day were physically  transferred to the clerk’s office and the optical scan results were submitted  by modem to the jurisdiction’s headquarters.
section_title: Election Certification Periods Varied by State
paragraphs: Election returns posted on election night are unofficial and are not  considered final until canvassing—the process described earlier of  reviewing all votes by precinct, resolving problem votes, and counting all  types of votes—is complete and the count is certified. Certification is when  the vote count is finalized, generally by state and local officials. Our state  survey showed that for the 2004 general election, states reported varied  practices for when counts were certified and by whom, similar to the  general election of 2000.
Our state survey showed that most states reported setting certification  deadlines, but the certification periods varied from state to state. Four  states (Alaska, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island) and the  District of Columbia reported not specifying a deadline following Election  Day for certification of election results, while all other states reported  specifying such a deadline. For example, certification on the second day  after Election Day was reported by Delaware, while not later than 40 days  was reported by Michigan. Some states reported caveats and varying levels  of specificity in the certification deadlines. Maine reported allowing 3 days  for local election official certification and 20 days for state-level  certification. Missouri’s reported deadline was by the fourth Tuesday  following the election. North Dakota reported a deadline of not less than   3 days, but not more than 6. Similarly, the requirement reported for Texas  was 15 to 30 days after the election.
section_title: For the 2004 General Election, More States Had Requirements or Guidance for Determining Voter Intent
paragraphs: An important facet of the canvassing process is the consideration that may  or may not be given to ballots that have not been marked properly. An  improper mark, for example, could be a circle around a candidate’s name  instead of a checked box on a ballot that is to be scanned optically. For  those states providing for the determination of voter intent, the importance  of having explicit and consistent criteria for treating unclear ballots  became evident in the 2000 general election when different interpretations  for punch card ballots in Florida made the close presidential race  extremely contentious. While subsequent federal reforms have not  specified standards for treating unclear ballots, HAVA requires that each  state adopt uniform standards, by January 2006, that define what  constitutes a vote and what will be counted as a vote for each category of  voting system used in the state.
In our state survey, 39 states and the District of Columbia reported that for  the November 2004 general election they had requirements or guidance for  determining voter intent that focused primarily on improper ballot marks.  Forty-five states and the District of Columbia reported they had  requirements or guidance for determining how or whether to count a  machine-unreadable ballot—one that cannot be processed by machine  because it is damaged.
Eighteen states that had reported not having provisions in place for the  2000 general election reported to us in our 2005 state survey that they had  voter intent guidance for the November 2004 general election. Georgia, for  example, had developed requirements for four methods: DRE machines,  lever-type machines, optical scan, and hand-counted paper ballots. Some of  Georgia’s requirements were for certain ballots rejected by optical scan  machines. These requirements provide for some measure of subjective  determination of a voter’s intent by election officials in certain specified  instances. In such an instance, a vote shall be counted, under these Georgia  provisions, if in the opinion of the vote review panel, the voter has clearly  and without question indicated a choice for which the voter desired to vote.  In addition, under specified circumstances, these Georgia provisions also  provide for a similar type of voter intent determination with respect to  hand-counted paper ballots.
As described below, we found in our site visits that under state or local  guidance, local jurisdictions we visited had gone to varied lengths in the  2004 general election to salvage ballots that were improperly marked or  that were machine unreadable. These efforts varied by the type of voting  equipment used in the jurisdiction.
Optical scan ballots: In some jurisdictions, election officials told us that  optical scan machines located at polling places could notify the voter of an  unreadable or incorrectly marked ballot at the moment it was submitted.  However, where the ballots were transferred to a central location for  counting this would not be the case. In one jurisdiction in Colorado where  optical scanning was done centrally for absentee ballots, election officials  told us they were required to interpret voter intent or replace an  unreadable ballot. According to election officials, the jurisdiction had  instructions, which they stated were based on state statutes, specifying that  bipartisan election judges would be the responsible parties for determining  voter intent. Their deliberations, however, would be observed by others,  according to the instructions. If a decision was reached on voter intent, a  replacement ballot could be created and run through the optical scanner,  according to the officials.
Officials in a Kansas jurisdiction we visited said that state election  standards were very specific for interpreting an incorrectly marked optical  scan ballot. They would count a vote if an oval shape is marked, near but  not inside the oval, and not closer to another candidate’s name. A  completed oval would also be counted if another oval for the same race  was scribbled or crossed out. If the ballot could be interpreted locally,  officials said election workers duplicated the vote on a new ballot for the  optical scanner to read. According to election officials, if the intent was not  clear, the ballot would be sent to the Board of Canvassers for further  examination. State guidance also included standards for hand-counted  paper ballots.
In Florida, guidance in place for the November 2004 general election was  even more specific than that provided in Colorado or Kansas. The guidance  specified, for example, that, with respect to manual recounts, a vote may be  counted if “there is an ‘X’, a check mark, a plus sign, an asterisk or a star,  any portion of which is contained in a single oval or within the blank space  between the head and tail of a single arrow and which does not enter into  another oval or the space between the head and tail of another arrow.” It  also allowed for a vote to be counted under additional specified  circumstances including if “there is a diagonal, horizontal, or vertical line,  any portion of which intersects two points on the oval and which does not  intersect another oval at any two points,” provided that the horizontal line  does not strike through the name of the candidate.
Punch cards: While federal election reforms included provisions  promoting replacement of punch card ballots, on the basis of our local  jurisdiction survey, some jurisdictions continued to use them in the 2004  election. As was the case for other types of ballots, levels of guidance for  interpreting voter intent varied by state. Illinois reported that it had no  requirements or guidance for determining voter intent, according to our  state survey. Election officials in 2 Illinois jurisdictions using punch card  ballots told us in our site visit that election workers did not attempt to  ascertain the intent of voters on punch card ballots that were improperly  punched. If the ballot could not be counted by a punch card-counting  machine because of an improper punch or mark, the votes were not to be  counted.
In contrast to Illinois, Washington reported that it had guidelines or  requirements regarding voter intent and allowed for remaking an  unreadable or damaged punch card. In a Washington jurisdiction we visited  that used punch card ballots in the 2004 general election, election officials  said that state law guided their jurisdiction’s written instructions for  determining voter intent. Election officials said voters were given very  specific instructions for how to change their vote before casting their vote,  if necessary, on a punch card ballot while at the polls. These officials also  said ballots could be either enhanced or duplicated if it was clear that a  voter had followed these instructions. Also, according to the officials, a  problem ballot could be enhanced or duplicated by officials if voter intent  could easily be determined. If voter intent was at all unclear, the ballot was  to be sent to the canvassing board for review. According to officials,  canvassing board meetings were open to the public and state guidelines  were to be used to interpret voter intent. Figure 49 shows a punch card  voting booth.
Hand-counted paper ballots: While we estimate, on the basis of our local  jurisdiction survey, that no large jurisdictions and only 3 percent of  medium jurisdictions used paper ballots in the November 2004 general  election for their predominant voting method, 41 percent of small  jurisdictions did. This voting method presented yet another variation in the  process of determining voter intent. For example, in one small jurisdiction  we visited in New Hampshire, election officials we spoke with said a senior  election official was on hand during ballot counting. They said if a ballot  was unclear, the senior official would be involved to discuss it. If it was still  unresolved, state guidance called for an unclear ballot to “be counted in  accordance with a majority vote of the election officials present.” The  guidance, which we examined, also provided examples of what marks on a  paper ballot to accept, as shown in figure 50.
section_title: Recounts and Contested Elections Remained Uncommon for the November 2004 General Election
paragraphs: As with the 2000 general election, recounts and contested elections were  an uncommon event in the 2004 general election. On the basis of our local  survey, we estimate that 92 percent of election jurisdictions nationwide did  not conduct a recount for federal or statewide office. Also on the basis of  our survey, recounts were more prevalent in large than in small election  jurisdictions. Specifically, we estimate that 4 percent of small jurisdictions,  16 percent of medium, and 24 percent of large jurisdictions conducted  recounts for federal or statewide offices. Both large and medium  jurisdictions were statistically different from small jurisdictions. Similarly,  in our state survey, 37 states and the District of Columbia reported they had  no recounts for federal or statewide offices during the primary or general  elections of 2004, as shown in figure 51.
Recounts are, in general, conducted because a candidate, voter, or group of  voters has requested it or because the margin of victory was within a  certain specified margin such that state provisions required or allowed for  a recount. Election officials in local jurisdictions we visited in several  states where recounts were conducted described to us the procedures they  used for their 2004 general election recounts. In a New Hampshire  jurisdiction, where a recount was conducted of the presidential race of  2004, officials said the recount was requested by a presidential candidate to  test the accuracy of the optical scan vote-counting equipment. The officials  provided the following description of the recount: Five wards in the  jurisdiction had been selected for a sample recount. It was conducted by  the New Hampshire Secretary of State’s office, not by the local election  jurisdiction. The jurisdiction’s only role in the recount was to provide the  Secretary of State with the optical scan ballots from the applicable wards.  After the Secretary of State recounted a portion of the optical scan ballots  and found no significant discrepancies between the initial vote tally and the  partial recount, a full recount was not conducted statewide, according to  these officials.
In North Carolina, races for two statewide offices (the Agricultural  Commissioner and the Superintendent of Public Instruction) were subject  to recounts because, under state law, the close margin of victory allowed  the losing candidates to request a recount, according to election officials.  In 1 North Carolina jurisdiction we visited, which used DRE machines,  local election officials described the recount process as follows: The  recount was conducted in a different manner from the initial count. For the  initial count, votes were electronically transferred from each DRE machine  to vote storage devices at the polls that stored the vote totals by precinct.  The precinct totals were then downloaded from the vote storage devices  onto a computer located at the jurisdiction’s election headquarters, and  vote tabulation software summed vote totals from each precinct for each  election contest in the jurisdiction. During the recount, rather than relying  on aggregated votes totaled by precinct for a vote count, officials tabulated  individual DRE ballots. To complete this process, the jurisdiction’s  tabulation software recognized individual ballot images from the DRE  machines rather than aggregated votes per precinct. The individual ballot  images were downloaded onto the computer in election headquarters, and  votes for the races in question were retabulated (by voter, rather than by  precinct as in the initial count). The outcomes of both the Agricultural  Commissioner and the Superintendent of Public Instruction races were  unaffected by the recount results.
Generally, contested elections are court actions initiated by a candidate or  voter alleging, for example, that some type of misconduct or fraud on the  part of another candidate, election officials, or voters, occurred in a  particular election. The results of our local survey indicate that contested  elections were rare during the period from 2001 to the 2004 general  election. In our local survey, we asked local jurisdictions whether they held  any primary or general elections for federal or statewide offices during this  period that were contested, and if so, whether the outcomes for these  elections changed. On the basis of our nationwide survey, we estimate that  5 percent of local election jurisdictions held a federal or statewide election  that was contested during this period. The contested elections in which the  winner did change involved races for offices such as state judge or  governor, or for the U.S. House of Representatives.
Perhaps the most heavily contested election in November 2004, which  received a great deal of press coverage, was the Washington state  governor’s race. A close margin of victory and a candidate request  prompted two recounts, and after the state certification of a winner in the  election, the second place candidate’s campaign and seven voters filed a  petition in a state Superior Court contesting such certification, alleging that  errors, omissions, mistakes, neglect, and other wrongful acts had occurred  in conducting the election. The Chelan County Superior Court dismissed  the election contest petition, finding that the petitioners failed to prove that  grounds for nullification of the election existed. The Superior Court held,  in general, that while there was some evidence of irregularities, the  petitioners failed to adequately prove that the outcome of the election was  changed as a result. The recount itself, however, revealed the substantial  complexities involved in accomplishing an error-free count. We discuss this  case more closely later in this chapter.
section_title: Several States Had Further Developed Their Specifications for an Election Recount since the 2000 General Election
paragraphs: State provisions for recount processes vary, and not all states have  provided for or required them in the past. For the November 2004 general  election, however, several states reported that they had introduced or  further developed their specifications for election recounts since the 2000  general election.
In our October 2001 report on election processes, we reported that   47 states and the District of Columbia had provisions for recounts, though  most did not have mandatory recount provisions. To better understand  recount reform efforts to help ensure vote count accuracy since the   2000 election, we asked states in our 2005 survey about changes to their  mandatory recount provisions in place for the November 2004 general  election. Nineteen states reported requiring a mandatory recount  predominantly in cases of a tie or close margin of victory, whereas in 2001,  17 states indicated they required mandatory recounts. Thus, 2 more states  reported requiring mandatory recounts for the 2004 general election than  for the 2000 general election. In addition, 3 other states reported amending  their existing provisions for mandatory recounts, while 3 said they had  changed their requirements or guidance for who may request a recount as  shown in table 23. Three states—Hawaii, Mississippi, and Tennessee— reported not having any formal provision for conducting recounts—both  for the 2000 or 2004 general elections.
Alabama, Pennsylvania, and Texas were the states that reported adding  mandatory recount provisions for the 2004 election. Alabama law, in place  for the 2004 general election, requires a recount when the election returns  for any public office indicate that a candidate or ballot measure is defeated  by not more than one-half of 1 percent of the votes cast for the office or the  ballot measure—unless the defeated candidate submits a written waiver. In  Pennsylvania, a recount is mandatory if an election is decided by one-half  of 1 percent or less—unless the defeated candidate requests in writing that  a recount and recanvass not be made. Texas reported that a recount was  required only if two or more candidates tie in an election.
For the 2004 general election, Arizona, Minnesota, and Washington  reported adding more specifications to the vote margins that trigger  recounts in their states than were in effect during the 2000 general election.  Arizona added triggers for different types of races. For the 2000 general  election, Arizona reported requiring a mandatory recount when the margin  of votes between the two candidates receiving the most votes was not more  than 0.1 percent of votes cast for both candidates, or 200 votes for  statewide offices and 50 votes for the state legislature. For the 2004 general  election, Arizona reported in our state survey that it had amended its  mandatory recount requirements so that the thresholds triggered by the  number of votes only applied when the total number of votes cast was  25,000 or fewer.
Washington’s mandatory recount provisions in place for the November  2004 general election had changed since the November 2000 general  election. The requirement in 2000 for a mandatory recount by machine was  a margin of 0.5 percent or less of total votes cast for the top two candidates.  If the margin was less than 150 votes and less than 0.25 percent of total  votes cast for the top two candidates, a manual recount was required. The  amended requirement, in place for the November 2004 general election,  specified that a recount by machine was required when the margin is both  fewer than 2,000 votes and less than 0.5 percent of total votes cast for the  top two candidates. If the margin was fewer than 150 votes and less than  0.25 percent of total votes cast for the top two candidates, there was to be a  manual recount.
Since the November 2000 election, Minnesota amended its mandatory  recount triggers to include a specific percentage margin of victory in  certain circumstances, rather than only a specified difference in the  absolute number of votes between the top two candidates. While a margin  of 100 votes or fewer in an election had previously triggered a recount for  the 2000 general election, Minnesota election officials reported in our state  survey that for the 2004 general election their state required a recount if the  margin was determined to be either less than one-half of 1 percent of the  total number of votes counted or, was 10 votes or less when no more than  400 votes are cast.
According to our state survey, state requirements or guidance for who may  request a recount, in place for the November 2004 general election,  changed in Florida, Maine, and Rhode Island since 2000. While any Florida  candidate or candidate’s political party in 2000 could request a recount, this  was no longer true for the November 2004 general election. For the 2004  general election, Florida election officials reported that no candidate or  political party could request a recount, and that the only authorized  recounts were mandatory recounts to be conducted when the margin of  victory was 0.5 percent or less of the total votes cast. Rhode Island, which  reported that for the November 2000 general election it had allowed  recount requests by any candidate who trailed the winning candidate by  less than 5 percent, reported that for the November 2004 general election, it  required a smaller margin before a losing candidate could request a  recount. For example, for races with between 20,001 and 100,000 votes,  Rhode Island reported that it required a margin of 1 percent or less (or   500 votes) before a trailing candidate could request a recount, and for races  with more than 100,000 votes the required margin was one-half of 1 percent  (or 1,500 votes) before a trailing candidate could request a recount. Maine,  on the other hand, reported that its recount provisions in place for the  November 2004 general election were clarified to provide that an apparent  losing candidate, rather than only the second-place candidate, could  request a recount.
section_title: Vote Count Audits Were Not Prevalent in the 2004 General Election, but Some States Reported Taking Action to Require Them
paragraphs: Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia reported that for the 2004  general election, they did not have provisions requiring or allowing local  jurisdictions to conduct a vote count audit of election results. However, in  our state survey, 9 states reported taking action since November 2004   (e.g., enacted legislation or took executive action) to require audits of vote  counts. As used in this report, a vote count audit is an automatic recount, in  full or in part, of the vote tabulation, irrespective of the margin of victory, in  order to ensure accuracy before certification.
On the basis of our state survey, as shown in figure 52, 8 states reported  that for the 2004 general election they had a vote count audit requirement  for all local jurisdictions, and 2 states reported requiring vote count audits  for some local jurisdictions. Election officials from 29 states and the  District of Columbia reported that for the 2004 general election they did not  require or allow local jurisdictions to conduct vote count audits. Eleven  states reported that they allowed them. We estimate, on the basis of our  local survey, that 15 percent of all local jurisdictions were required by their  states to conduct such audits as part of the certification process for the  2004 general election. Larger and medium jurisdictions were more likely to  have been required to do so than smaller jurisdictions. Nine percent of  small jurisdictions, 27 percent of medium, and 38 percent of large  jurisdictions conducted a required vote count audit of the 2004 general  election. Both large and medium jurisdictions were statistically different  from small jurisdictions.
Nine states reported in our state survey that they had enacted legislation or  taken some executive action to require audits since November 2004. For  example, in Washington, beginning January 1, 2006, prior to election  certifications, county officials must audit the results of votes cast on DRE  machines. The audit must be conducted by randomly selecting up to   4 percent of the DRE voting machines or one machine, whichever is  greater, and for each device, comparing the results recorded electronically  with the results recorded on paper.
During our visits to local election jurisdictions, election officials in 5  jurisdictions described conducting vote count audits as a part of the  election certification process for the November 2004 general election. For  instance, 2 large jurisdictions in Nevada reported that the state requires  each jurisdiction to randomly audit election results when DRE machines  were used. According to officials in 1 of these Nevada jurisdictions, they  were required to select 1 percent of DRE machines, or 20 machines,  whichever amount is greater, and to perform a manual audit of the  machine-tabulated vote totals. The officials said that they used a computer  program to randomly select which of the jurisdiction’s 740 DRE machines  to audit. To conduct a paper-based audit, they told us that for each  randomly selected machine, election workers printed the DRE result tapes  from the voter-verified paper trail printer, manually counted the vote data  on the tapes, and compared the manual count results to the original  electronic results.
In one large Illinois jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us they  were required by the state to automatically audit (by retabulating votes)  results of punch card ballots in 5 percent of their precincts, which were  randomly selected. According to the officials, the State Board of Elections  sent the jurisdiction officials a letter specifying which randomly selected  precincts had to retabulate their votes.
Election officials in a Pennsylvania jurisdiction we visited said that state  law required random audits when electronic voting machines were used.  According to these officials, they were required to audit 2 percent of DRE  vote totals following an election. They told us, however, that in practice  they actually audit all DRE machine vote totals to ensure an accurate vote  count. They stated that vote data stored on DRE backup memory cards is  printed and compared to vote data stored on DRE cartridges used in  original vote counts. They said they operated on the assumption that  because the internal memory cards serve as a backup system, there should  be no difference in the totals.
section_title: Local Jurisdictions Reported Some Mistakes and Technical Challenges in Counting Votes for the 2004 General Election
paragraphs: As in the general election of 2000, the 2004 general election saw failures to  properly employ voting equipment. At several of the jurisdictions we  visited, officials recounted mistakes in using the DRE systems, for  example, that echoed other recent findings (in our September 2005 report  on the security and reliability of electronic voting), noting inadequate  understanding of the equipment on the part of those using it.
In our September 2005 report on electronic voting, we noted that instances  of fewer votes counted than cast in one Pennsylvania county in the 2004  general election had resulted from incorrectly programmed DRE machines.  Similarly, in our 2005 site visits to election jurisdictions for this report,  officials with whom we spoke recounted difficulties that had resulted from  mistakes in programming the electronic equipment. In 1 Florida  jurisdiction, for example, officials reported that the storage capacity of an  optical scan accumulator (used to combine vote data from DREs and  optical scanners) had been inadequately programmed to capture all of the  votes cast. Officials there were able to discover and rectify the problem so  that all votes were counted. In a Nevada jurisdiction, officials said that on  Election Day, there were 198 provisional ballots (out of 4,532 cast) that  were incorrectly programmed on the DRE machines at several polling  locations, resulting in the provisional votes being counted without the  voter first being qualified. According to these officials, poll workers forgot  to add the “0” to the beginning of the precinct number. The officials noted  that 2004 was the first time that the jurisdiction had used provisional voting  and that in the future they planned to use paper provisional ballots to avoid  any confusion.
In a North Carolina jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us about  how a misunderstanding of the voting equipment resulted in the loss of  votes. Specifically, election officials were unclear about the vote storage  capacity of a DRE machine used in early voting and failed to notice the  machine’s warning that its file was full. The software installed on this  machine was an older version of the program and only recognized up to  3,500 votes, according to election officials. Election administrators  believed that it could recognize up to 10,500 votes. They discovered the  error at the close of Election Day when reconciling the number of votes  cast on the DRE machine used in early voting with the number of voters  credited with early voting at the polls. Furthermore they said it was not  until they subsequently conducted a simulation of votes cast that they  discovered the cause of the problem. They also discovered that while the  machine’s software flashed warnings on its screen when the voter file  became full, election workers had not seen it because of the screen’s  positioning. Also, according to the officials, they had been operating under  the assumption that the machine would have automatically stopped  accepting votes once the limit had been reached. Instead, the machine had  continued to accept votes cast, overwriting earlier votes in order to  accommodate the new ones. The officials said they determined that   4,235 votes were lost.
Not all equipment failures resulted in lost votes, but some did create  technical challenges. Officials in a Colorado jurisdiction stated that  memory cards for optical scan machines at early voting sites sometimes  failed, which meant that all affected optical scan ballots were rescanned  using a new card once poll workers realized that the original card was  malfunctioning. Also, in our September 2005 report on the security and  reliability of electronic voting mentioned earlier, we noted that a Florida  county experienced several problems with its DRE system, including  instances where each touch screen took up to 1 hour to activate and had to  be activated separately and sequentially, causing delays at the polling place.  In addition, we reported that election monitors discovered that the system  contained a flaw that allowed one DRE machine’s ballots to be added to the  canvass totals multiple times without being detected. In another instance,  our report notes that a malfunction in a DRE system in Ohio caused the  system to record approximately 3,900 votes too many for one presidential  candidate in the 2004 general election. We also reported that a state- designated voting system examiner in a Pennsylvania jurisdiction noted  that the county DRE system had technical problems, such as failure to  accurately capture write-in votes, frozen computer screens, and difficulties  sensing voters’ touches.
During our 2005 site visits, officials from 3 jurisdictions also described  several cases of jamming problems with optical scan and punch card ballot  tabulators. For example, election officials in a Kansas jurisdiction we  visited told us that an extensive two-sided optical scan ballot frequently  jammed voting machines because of its length. These officials told us that  they used a two-sided ballot design which required that the optical scan  counting equipment read the ballot front and back, which presented a  problem. According to the officials, the ballot was not scored properly to  feed easily through the equipment and paper jams occurred frequently.  Election officials said the ballots had to be hand-sorted into 13 groups  before scanning, which took time. Similarly, officials in a New Jersey  jurisdiction told us that their optical scan machines had frequently jammed  when reading provisional and absentee ballots. According to the officials,  the ballots had two or three folds, which in combination with the high  volume of ballots being read, jammed the machine regularly. To repair the  jams, officials told us they would straighten ballots and run them through  again, or, if needed, would remake the ballot. Also, officials in an Illinois  jurisdiction we visited said punch cards had also jammed in their tabulator.  Officials there said that this had been likely due to the punch cards swelling  in humid weather, and this problem had caused the scanner to misread  ballots on several occasions. In all of these instances, the problems were  corrected.
While we heard in our site visits about some human error at the polls, in  our survey of local jurisdictions we found that human error was a problem  for a small portion of election jurisdictions in terms of at least one key  function. Specifically, we estimate that 6 percent of local jurisdictions  nationwide experienced poll worker errors in tracking and accounting for  ballots. To the extent that these errors occurred, they were more common  in large jurisdictions. We estimate 1 percent of small jurisdictions,   14 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 34 percent of large jurisdictions  had these errors. The differences between all size categories are  statistically significant. In 10 of the jurisdictions we visited, election  officials cited poll worker or voter errors as the cause of discrepancies in  the number of ballots and voters. In 1 Ohio jurisdiction, for example,  election officials said the discrepancy in the number of ballots and votes  was caused by the fact that poll workers did not track some voters who left  the polling place without voting. In a Florida jurisdiction, according to  election officials, some voters left the polling place without signing a poll  book (which was used to reconcile voter numbers). Another cause for  discrepancies in the number of ballots and voters cited by election officials  in a Washington jurisdiction was that poll workers erroneously counted  some provisional ballots as regular Election Day ballots, which led to the  appearance of more regular Election Day ballots cast than voters credited  with voting in that manner.
Finally, from election officials in 2 jurisdictions we visited, we learned of  voter errors in using voting technology. In one Kansas jurisdiction, officials  reported that some voters did not know how to scroll down the electronic  screen to see all of the information. Also, we were told by election officials  in a New Jersey jurisdiction that poll workers had noticed that some voters  had failed to press a button to finalize their votes. According to these  officials, the poll workers watched for such a mistake, and in at least one  instance, reached under the curtain to register a vote while both a  Democrat and a Republican poll worker observed the maneuver.
section_title: In the 2004 General Election, Some Election Jurisdictions Reported Difficulty Meeting Deadlines for Certifying the Final Vote Count
paragraphs: According to state survey responses, 7 states (Arkansas, California,  Georgia, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia)  encountered a challenge during the 2004 general election related to timely  completion of the certification process. For example, Georgia election  officials reported difficulty in certifying election results in a timely manner  that would allow a runoff election to commence within 3 weeks of Election  Day. California officials responded that achieving an appropriate balance  between vote count accuracy and the speed of vote tabulation was a  challenge statewide. Arkansas officials said that the Secretary of State’s  office had to contact local election jurisdictions numerous times to receive  certified election results in a timely manner.
In some local jurisdictions we visited, we also heard about difficulty  meeting certification deadlines, particularly with regard to provisional  ballots. In 7 local election jurisdictions we visited, election officials cited  concerns with the timing requirements of election certifications.  Specifically, the task of verifying voter information with respect to  provisional ballots and counting provisional ballots made achieving  certification deadlines difficult. For example, officials in 1 Colorado  jurisdiction said that verifying and counting provisional ballots within the  state-mandated 12-day period required that the county hire additional  workers. A Florida jurisdiction reported a similar challenge, but in this  instance, these officials stated that the county canvassing board was  required to consider each provisional ballot individually, which added to  the challenge to meet the short state certification deadline. One large  jurisdiction in Illinois also reported that its 14-day certification deadline  was difficult to achieve because of the large number of provisional ballots  that had to be verified and counted. In a Washington jurisdiction, officials  stated that verifying and counting all ballots (including provisional ballots)  within state-mandated periods had been a challenge in 2004. In 2005, the  Washington state legislature extended the mandated certification deadline  from 15 to 21 days following any general election.
section_title: The Recount in Washington State Revealed the Intricacies of the Election Process, but Also Yielded Many State Reforms
paragraphs: While the 2004 recount in Washington was one of few statewide recounts  conducted across the country, the types of issues that surfaced during the  recount about Washington’s election system identified problems in all three  key elements of elections—people, process, and technology. The close  gubernatorial race and the recount subjected these elements to close  scrutiny, revealing the vulnerability and interdependence of the various  stages of the elections process and the unerring attention to detail that is  required to run an error-free election. It was, in fact, the closest  gubernatorial race in United States history. In the initial statewide count, a  mere 261 votes separated the top two candidates—about 0.001 percent of  the total votes cast. An initial recount reduced that margin of victory to just  42 votes out of more than 2.7 million cast, and the final recount resulted in  a 129-vote margin of victory for the candidate who came in second in the  first two vote counts.
In part because it is the largest election jurisdiction (in number of voters) in  Washington state, King County was the subject of some of the greatest  scrutiny. However, problems were identified by courts in other  jurisdictions in the state as well. As a result of this scrutiny, as discussed  below, Washington state, and King County itself, has subsequently  instituted many reforms.
subsections: section_title: Breakdowns in Interaction of People, Process, and Technology Can Impair the Vote Count
paragraphs: We reviewed a variety of reports and studies on this extraordinary election,  including state task force studies, an internal county review, a management  audit sponsored by the Election Center, and the findings of a state  Superior Court that resulted from a lawsuit challenging the results of the  final recount. The principal problems we identified in these materials  ranged from poll worker errors to challenges in using equipment.  Described here, they illustrate how breakdowns in the interface of people,  process, and technology may, at any stage of an election, impair an  accurate vote count.
subsections: section_title: Provisional Ballots Counted before Being Validated
paragraphs: In at least 11 counties provisional ballots were found by a Washington state  Superior Court to have been counted without verifying voter signatures or  before verification of voter registration status was completed. For  example, in Pierce County, Washington, 77 provisional ballots were found  by the Superior Court to have been improperly cast. Provisional ballots  were to have included on the ballot envelope the voter’s name and  residence. Because the provisional voter’s identity or residence was not  marked on the provisional ballot envelope for these 77 ballots, voter  registration status could not be verified. In King County, the court found  that 348 provisional ballots were improperly cast without verifying voter  eligibility. The Election Center management audit found this had occurred  because the provisional voters had been allowed to put their ballots, which  had not been verified, directly into the optical scan machines at the voting  precincts. The Superior Court found that of these 348 provisional ballots,  252 were ultimately determined to have been cast by registered voters.  According to the audit, this error resulted from poll worker confusion  about who was accountable for the provisional voting process at the polls.  No one poll worker was assigned responsibility for tracking provisional  ballots.
section_title: Illegal Votes Cast by Felons
paragraphs: The Superior Court also found that more than 1,400 votes had been cast  illegally by felons during the November 2004 general election in counties  across Washington. Under Washington state law, in general, persons  convicted of a federal or state felony are not eligible to vote unless their  right to vote has been restored. According to the King County audit, some  felons were registered to vote in King County. The audit stated that election  registration officials had very limited information available to them  regarding such felons that would have allowed them to periodically purge  the rolls. Moreover, according to the audit report, when a former felon who  wished to register signed an affidavit to attest to the fact that his or her  voting rights had been restored, election officials had no expedient way to  verify the claim, particularly for former felons convicted in a different  county. In addition, the audit report noted that election officials did not  necessarily have the authority to refuse to accept a registration form. In our  June 2005 report on maintaining accurate voter registration lists, we found  that similar challenges in identifying and removing felons from voter rolls  were reported in other states as well.
section_title: More Votes Counted than Cast
paragraphs: The Superior Court found that more votes were counted than the number  of voters credited with voting. Specifically, a judge cited evidence of   190 excess votes counted in Clark County, 77 excess votes counted in  Spokane County, 20 excess votes counted in Island County, and 14 excess  votes counted in Kittitas County. In a King County internal report, election  officials reported that the discrepancy between voters credited with voting  and ballots cast was about 0.2 percent, or over 1,000 votes. The Election  Center management audit concluded that the discrepancy may have been  due, in part, to the use of an electronic wand held by temporary employees  to scan the entry codes in the poll book when registrants came to vote. The  audit noted space limitations and difficulty hearing the wand’s beep when it  processed a bar code may have prevented an accurate count of voters.  During our site visit with King County officials, they told us that separate  from the wanding issue, poll worker training deficiencies may have  contributed to discrepancies in the number of votes credited and cast when  voter information was not entered properly into poll books.
section_title: Uncounted Ballots Discovered after Results Had Been Certified
paragraphs: According to the Superior Court’s findings, in several counties uncounted  ballots were discovered after the certification of the initial election results.  The Superior Court found that there were 64 uncounted absentee ballots  found in Pierce County and 8 in Spokane County. According to the Election  Center audit, in King County, the uncounted ballots were both absentee and  provisional ballots, and 22 absentee and provisional ballots were  discovered in the base units of optical scan machines after the election was  certified. The audit concluded that poll workers had failed to adhere to  their procedures for checking these units when reconciling ballots after the  polls closed, and recommended strengthening both procedures and  training.
section_title: Absentee Ballots Erroneously Disqualified
paragraphs: In King County, during the second recount, the King County Canvassing  Board discovered that election workers had disqualified 573 absentee  ballots during initial canvassing when they could not find the voters’  signatures in the county’s new computerized voter registration list for  verification. In addition, the election workers had not checked elsewhere  for these signatures, such as on the voters’ paper registration forms. In the  recount, the King County Canvassing Board decided to recanvass these  ballots to determine whether their disqualification had been appropriate or  whether these ballots should have been counted. According to the King  County audit, the voter registration list had been very recently updated, and  for this reason, not all voter signatures had been scanned and electronically  stored in time for the general election so that election workers would have  been able to find them.
Verifying absentee ballots was another issue highlighted during the  recount. According to press accounts, differences existed in how local  jurisdictions in the state verified the signatures of absentee and provisional  voters. The Seattle Times reported conducting a survey in which it found  that signatures went through as many as four levels of review in one county  and only one level in another. Also, the newspaper reported that some  counties would look for as many as six different identifying traits of a  signature, while others “eyeballed the handwriting.” Recommendations by  the Governor’s Election Reform Task Force identified the verification of  voter signatures as one of several areas needing more procedural  consistency among the counties.
section_title: The Washington Recount Fueled Several Reforms at the State and Local Levels
paragraphs: Washington enacted into law a series of election reform measures in 2005  designed to clarify, standardize, and strengthen election requirements and  procedures. Several of the statewide reforms specifically address problems  described above, but others are broader measures designed to improve  election administration. Examples of these measures are listed below.
Unique provisional and absentee ballots: All provisional and absentee  ballots are required to be visually distinguishable from one another and  must be either printed on colored paper or imprinted with a bar code for  the purpose of identifying the ballot as a provisional or absentee ballot.  The bar code must not identify the voter. Provisional and absentee  ballots must be incapable of being tabulated by polling place counting  devices.
Standardized guidelines for signature verification processes: The  Secretary of State is to establish guidelines for signature verification  relating to, for example, signatures on absentee and provisional ballot  envelopes. All election personnel assigned to verify signatures are  required to receive training on the established guidelines. State law also  provides that while signatures on certain mail-in ballot envelopes (such  as absentee ballots) must be compared with the voter’s signature in the  county registration files, variation between the signature on a return  envelope and the signature of that voter in the registration files due to  the substitution of initials or the use of common nicknames (e.g., Joseph  Smith versus Joe Smith) is permitted so long as the surname and  handwriting are clearly the same.
Triennial review of county election processes and reports listing  corrective actions: Instead of being performed periodically,   state-conducted reviews of county election-related policies, procedures,  and practices are to be performed at least once every 3 years. If staffing  or budget levels do not permit a 3-year review cycle, such reviews must  be done as often as possible. The county auditor or the county  canvassing board must respond to the review report in writing, listing  steps to be taken to correct any problems. Before the next primary or  general election, the Secretary of State’s office must visit the county and  verify that the corrective action has been taken.
Election law manuals for use in all vote-counting centers: The Secretary  of State must prepare a manual explaining all election laws and rules in  easy-to-understand, plain language for use during the vote counting,  canvassing, and recounting process. The manuals must be available for  use in all vote-counting centers throughout the state.
Option to conduct voting entirely by mail: Another change introduced by  the state, which may avoid errors at the polls, has been to give county  officials the option to conduct elections entirely by mail. The new  measure authorizes the use of all-mail voting in counties upon the  express approval by a county’s legislative authority and provides that  such approval must apply to all primary, special, and general elections  conducted by the county. For example, King County has announced  plans to conduct elections entirely by mail in 2007. The King County  Independent Task Force on Elections found in 2005 that the King  County election process basically involved simultaneously conducting  two dissimilar elections. The task force stated that increasingly, a  majority of King County voters (565,011, or slightly more than   62 percent in 2004) used the permanent absentee or vote-by-mail  process. Despite this fact, the task force reported that the county also  conducted a traditional election involving about 330,000 voters assigned  to over 2,500 precincts and 540 individual polling places, and the use of  hundreds of temporary election workers who must be trained and who  work at the polling places for more than 13 hours on election days.  Furthermore, the task force stated that both election processes contain  independent, complex, and often conflicting requirements that have  clearly caused significant problems for King County election officials.  Having one means of voting for all citizens is perceived to be both more  efficient and cost-effective than the previous process, according to the  task force.
Paper records for electronic voting devices and precertification audits  of electronic voting results: All electronic voting devices must,  beginning January 1, 2006, produce an individual paper record of each  vote, at the time of voting, that may be accepted or rejected by the voter  before finalizing his or her vote. This audit is to be conducted by  randomly selecting a specified percentage of electronic voting devices  and, for each device, comparing the results recorded electronically with  the paper records. The audit process must be open to observation by  political party representatives if such representatives have been  appointed and are present at the time of the audit.
Separate from changes made at the Washington state level, King County, as  reported in the Election Center audit, also implemented or was in the  process of implementing changes to improve election administration that  specifically address issues that arose during the 2004 general election.  Examples of such reported changes are below:   Controls to manage provisional ballots: Provisional ballots will be color- coded for easy recognition and will have timing marks that prevent the  counter at the polling place from accepting them. Therefore, the voter  has no option but to return his or her provisional ballot to a poll worker,  who will place it in a provisional envelope. One additional poll worker is  to be assigned to each polling place to exclusively manage provisional  ballots for all voters at that polling place.
Controls to prevent misplaced ballots: Poll workers are required to  record the serial number located at the bottom of the optical scan bins  on the ballot reconciliation transmittal form. The serial number is not  visible if any ballots remain in the bin. Increased poll worker training,  attaching a flashlight to the inside of each bin, and continued adherence  to existing procedures for troubleshooters to examine each bin before  certification are also intended to help ensure that all ballots are properly  handled and counted in future elections.
Additional procedures for tracking absentee ballots and registration  signatures: King County performed a database search of the entire voter  file prior to the fall 2005 elections, in order to identify missing or  unreadable signatures. On the basis of the search results, elections  personnel contacted voters and made significant progress in updating  the files. In addition, procedures at the absentee ballot operation center  have been enhanced. New logs were created for tracking absentee  ballots that required additional research because they were not easily  verified. Also, in any instance where a voter registration signature is not  on file, or is illegible, a search for the original record, as well as a call  and a letter to the voter, is required.
Improvements to procedures for reconciling ballots and voters: For the  2005 primary and general elections, the use of electronic hand wands to  scan poll books, when reconciling ballot and voter numbers, was to be  done at a county center where more space would be available. New  checklists were developed that required staff to balance the number of  signatures recorded with the wand against the number of ballots  counted by the computer. Also, the hand-wand process was to occur at  the beginning rather than at the end of the canvass to allow more time  for any necessary research into potential discrepancies.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Although the methods used to secure and count ballots vary across the   50 states and the District of Columbia, the goal of vote counting is the same  across the nation: to accurately count all ballots cast by eligible voters. As  with the elections process overall, conducting an accurate vote count is not  a simple process. It requires many steps, an unerring attention to detail,  and the seamless integration of people, processes, and technology.
Providing eligible voters multiple means and times within a jurisdiction for  casting their ballots—early, absentee, provisional, and Election Day  voting—enhances eligible voters’ opportunity to vote. At the same time,  multiple voting methods and types of ballots can make the vote-counting  process more complicated. In addition, short deadlines for certifying the  final vote—as little as 2 days in 1 state—provide little time for election  officials to review, verify, and count provisional and absentee ballots.  Larger jurisdictions generally face more challenges than smaller  jurisdictions because of the sheer volume of votes cast by all ballot types— absentee, provisional, and regular ballots. Provisional ballots were new for  many jurisdictions in November 2004 and created some challenges in  tracking, verifying, and counting. On the basis of their experience in  November 2004, some jurisdictions are implementing new procedures for  provisional voting, such as printing provisional ballots in a color different  from other types of ballots or using paper ballots rather than DRE  machines for provisional voters.
Two jurisdictions we visited in Washington have announced plans to move  to all-mail elections, which was authorized on a county-wide basis by  recent state law. Although replacing in-person voting with all-mail voting  eliminates some challenges—e.g., poll worker training on voting equipment  operations and provisional voting or the chance of malfunctioning voting  equipment at the polls—in some circumstances it could magnify the  importance of other aspects of state election processes, such as verifying  votes, accurately matching voter signatures and having guidance for  determining voter intent from improperly or unclearly marked ballots. For  those jurisdictions allowing or requiring the determination of a voter’s  intent from an improperly or unclearly marked ballot, the importance of  having explicit and consistent criteria for treating such ballots became  evident in the 2000 general election when different interpretations for such  ballots in Florida made the close presidential race extremely contentious.  Eighteen states that reported they did not have voter intent guidance in  place for the November 2000 general election reported to us in our state  survey that they did have voter intent requirements or guidance in place for  the November 2004 general election. While federal election provisions do  not address the state counting issue of ascertaining voter intent, HAVA did  require states to adopt, by January 2006, uniform and nondiscriminatory  standards defining what constitutes a vote and what will be counted as a  vote for each type of voting system used by the state.
The recount in the close gubernatorial election in Washington revealed the  interdependence of every stage of the elections process in ensuring an  accurate vote count. That experience also illustrated how small errors in  election operations can affect the vote counting process. Were any state’s  election processes subjected to the very close scrutiny that characterized  the recount in Washington state, it is likely that imperfections would be  revealed. Votes are cast and elections are conducted by people who are not  and cannot be 100 percent error free in all their tasks all the time. Thus, the  consistently error-free vote count may be elusive, particularly in very large  jurisdictions with hundreds of thousands of ballots cast in person,  absentee, or provisionally. However, diligent efforts to achieve consistent  error-free vote counts can help to ensure that any errors are reduced to the  minimum humanly possible.
section_title: Voting Methods and Technologies
paragraphs: Voting methods can be thought of as tools for accommodating the millions  of voters in our nation’s more than 10,000 local elections jurisdictions.  These tools are as simple as a pencil, paper, and a box, or as sophisticated  as programmable computer-based touch screens. Regardless of method,  however, the proper operation and functioning of each depends on its  effective interplay with the people who participate in elections (both voters  and election workers) and the processes (governed by policies,  procedures, and so forth) that govern the interaction of people with one  another and with the voting method.
This chapter focuses on voting methods—the technology variable in the  people, process, and technology election equation. It describes the use of  voting methods in the 2004 general election, compares this technology  environment with that of the 2000 general election, and examines plans for  voting technologies in the 2006 election, particularly in light of the roles  being played by states and HAVA. It also examines efforts to measure and  understand how well voting equipment performed in the 2004 election   (see fig. 53 for equipment examples), including the state of performance  standards and local jurisdictions’ overall satisfaction with their respective  voting methods. Additionally, this chapter discusses the state of practice  relative to voting system security, testing, and integration, and presents key  challenges facing all levels of governments as voting systems, related  election systems, and supporting technologies continue to evolve.
subsections: section_title: Overview
paragraphs: The technology of the voting environment can be characterized as varied  and evolving, according to our 2005 state survey results and local  jurisdiction survey estimates. We estimate on the basis of our local  jurisdiction survey that the predominant voting methods most often used  for the 2004 general election by large jurisdictions were DRE and precinct  count optical scan, while medium jurisdictions most often used precinct  count optical scan and small jurisdictions most often used paper ballot. In  addition, the predominant voting method most often used for large  jurisdictions changed from precinct count optical scan in 2000 to both DRE  and precinct count optical scan in 2004, while the predominant voting  methods remained the same for the other jurisdiction sizes. Also in the  2004 general election, an estimated one-fifth of jurisdictions used multiple  voting methods to support voting activities. Most states generally exercised  influence over the voting methods used by their respective elections  jurisdictions through a range of approaches such as requiring the use of  one specific voting method, helping with local acquisition efforts, or  eliminating voting methods, according to our 2005 state survey. Ten states  and the District of Columbia reported that they required the use of one  specific method for the 2004 general election, and 4 additional states  planned to require a specific method for the 2006 general election. Sixteen  states and the District of Columbia reported that they were involved to  some extent in local jurisdiction efforts to acquire voting systems,  components, and services. States also reported that they were eliminating  lever and punch card equipment between the 2000 and 2006 general  elections. Specifically, for the November 2000 general election, 37 states  reported that they used lever or punch card voting equipment; by the  November 2006 general election, only 4 states had plans to use lever and  punch card equipment. HAVA has influenced state and local decisions  regarding particular voting methods by providing funds to states to replace  punch card and lever voting equipment with other voting methods. This  greater state involvement in jurisdictions’ choice of voting methods,  combined with federal funding to replace lever and punch card voting  equipment and certain HAVA requirements—among other factors—is likely  to influence the adoption of DRE and optical scan voting methods.
Federal and state standards provide an important baseline for the  performance of voting systems and were widely adopted for the 2004  general election. However, according to our local jurisdiction survey, voting  equipment performance was not consistently measured during the 2004  general election and varied by jurisdiction size and voting method, in part  because some types of measures were not well suited to particular voting  methods. For example, small jurisdictions were generally less likely to  collect accuracy measures such as accuracy of voting equipment  (estimated at 31 percent for small jurisdictions) than large and medium  jurisdictions (66 percent and 54 percent, respectively), and this may be  because the predominant voting method most used by small jurisdictions  was paper ballot. On the other hand, on the basis of our local jurisdiction  survey, we estimate that the vast majority of all jurisdictions were very  satisfied or satisfied with their systems’ performance during the 2004  general election. For instance, we estimate that 78 percent of jurisdictions  were very satisfied or satisfied with the accuracy of their voting system  performance. The estimated high satisfaction levels demonstrated across  different voting system performance areas and jurisdiction sizes contrast  with our lower estimates of the performance measures that were collected  for the 2004 general election. Although the reasons for moderate collection  levels for performance measures are unclear, jurisdictions that may not  have collected performance data or may have considered such information  not applicable to their situation may lack sufficient insight into their system  operations to adequately support their satisfaction in the variety of  performance areas we surveyed. The moderate collection levels of data on  operational voting system performance may present a challenge to state  and local election officials in their efforts to make informed decisions on  both near-term and long-term voting system changes and investments.
A wide range of recently published concerns for the security of voting  systems and the development of nationwide mechanisms under HAVA to  improve security standards and processes have not yet produced a  consistent approach across all jurisdictions for managing the security of  voting systems. Our 2005 local jurisdiction survey and our visits to local  jurisdictions found that voting system security has been primarily  shouldered by local jurisdictions. However, states, vendors, law  enforcement officials, and others shared in these efforts to varying degrees  for the 2004 general election. Our state survey for the 2004 general election  and visits to local jurisdictions indicated that security mechanisms  employed by some states—but not others—included promulgation of  policies and guidance, compliance of voting equipment with security  standards, and monitoring and evaluation of implemented security  controls. According to our local jurisdiction survey estimates and visits to  local jurisdictions, jurisdictions and their support organizations were  largely responsible for implementation of security controls, such as access  restrictions to voting equipment, system backup capabilities, and security- related testing. Estimates from our local jurisdiction survey also showed,  however, that many jurisdictions nationwide had not documented their  security measures, and we found that several of the jurisdictions we visited  reported that they had not implemented recommended measures, such as  security plans, training, and documentation of policies and procedures.  Furthermore, decisions by states to continue using outdated voting system  standards may allow the vulnerabilities of newer technologies to go  unevaluated and impair effective management of the corresponding  security risks. States and local jurisdictions face the challenge of regularly  updating and consistently applying appropriate standards and other  directives to meet the vulnerabilities and risks of their specific election  environments.
Testing and evaluation of voting systems also varied across states and  jurisdictions for the 2004 general election. Our state survey found that most  states required certification testing of their voting systems using a range of  criteria. However, responsibility for purchasing a certified system typically  rested with local jurisdictions. Other results from our 2005 state survey and  responses from jurisdictions we visited indicated that acceptance testing  continued to be commonly performed, but there was wide variation in the  responsibilities and practices for this type of testing, including whether  such testing was applied to new systems or upgrades, the extent of vendor  participation, and the coverage of hardware and software functions. Also  on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that most  jurisdictions conducted readiness (logic and accuracy) testing for the 2004  general election as they did for the 2000 election, but in some jurisdictions  we visited, we found they used different procedures that may have  included one or more processes such as diagnostic tests, mock elections,  or suites of test votes. In contrast, our local survey estimates indicate that  parallel testing was employed by fewer than an estimated 2 percent of  jurisdictions. This may be due to, in part, the lack of directives for  conducting such tests. Finally, postelection voting system audit tests were  conducted by fewer than half of jurisdictions for the 2004 general election,  according to our local survey estimates, although many more large and  medium jurisdictions performed these tests than small jurisdictions. As  with other types of testing, the requirements and practices for audit tests  were diverse. Factors associated with the testing of voting systems may  further challenge states and local jurisdictions as they adapt to changes in  voting system capabilities, standards, and national certification for the 2006  general election. Those factors are likely to include increased certification  testing workloads to recertify systems with new capabilities, ongoing limits  to the number of available testing laboratories until a new laboratory  accreditation process becomes fully operational, and more complex testing  because a new version of the federal voluntary voting system guidelines  has been added in 2005 to older federal standards from 1990 and 2002 that  states are already using.
The number of jurisdictions that had integrated particular aspects of voting  system components and technologies was limited for the 2004 general  election, according to estimates from our local jurisdiction survey and  visits to local jurisdictions for the selected areas of integration we  examined, such as electronic programming or setup and electronic  management. Two-thirds of the jurisdictions we visited told us that they  used electronic programming or setup of voting equipment, and an  estimated 7 percent of jurisdictions that used voting methods other than  paper ballots, according to our local survey, connected their voting  equipment via a local network at polling locations. Relatively few local  jurisdictions we visited also reported having plans for integrating or further  integrating their election-related systems and components for the 2006  general election, and in the instances where jurisdictions reported plans,  the scope and nature of the plans varied. For instance, officials at 5  jurisdictions we visited reported plans to introduce a voter-verifiable paper  trail (VVPT) capability for future elections, and officials from 1 jurisdiction  reported plans to purchase an optical scanner with the ability to tabulate  both DRE and optical scan election results. Nevertheless, the potential for  greater integration in the future does exist as states and jurisdictions act on  plans to acquire the kind of voting equipment (e.g., optical scan and DRE  products) that lends itself to integration. For example, on the basis of our  local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that at least one-fifth of jurisdictions  plan to acquire DRE or optical scan equipment before the 2006 general  election, and officials from 2 jurisdictions we visited who used DRE  equipment told us that their state planned to purchase electronic poll  books for its precincts to use during the 2006 elections to electronically  link its voter registration system with its voting systems. It is unclear if and  when this migration to more technology-based voting methods will  produce more integrated election system environments. However, suitable  standards and guidance for these interconnected components and  systems—some of which remain to be developed—could facilitate the  development, testing, operational management, and maintenance of  components and systems, thereby maximizing the benefits of current and  emerging election technologies and achieving states’ and local  jurisdictions’ goals for performance and security. The challenge inherent in  such a dynamic environment is to update system standards so that  emerging technical, security, and reliability interactions are systematically  addressed.
section_title: Voting Methods Vary among Jurisdictions and Are Being Influenced by States’ Choices and HAVA
paragraphs: The technology of the voting environment can be characterized as varied  and evolving, according to our 2005 state survey results and local  jurisdiction survey estimates. We estimate on the basis of our local  jurisdiction survey that the predominant voting methods most often used  for the 2004 general election by large jurisdictions were DRE and precinct  count optical scan, while medium jurisdictions most often used precinct  count optical scan and small jurisdictions most often used paper ballot.
Two key patterns emerged in the use of voting methods between the 2000  and 2004 general elections. First, we estimate that the percentage of large  jurisdictions using DREs doubled from 15 percent in the 2000 general  election to 30 percent in 2004. The predominant voting method for large  jurisdictions changed from precinct count optical scan in 2000 to both DRE  and precinct count optical scan in 2004. In contrast, we estimate that the  predominant voting methods remained the same for small and medium  jurisdictions (paper ballots and precinct count optical scan, respectively)  from 2000 to 2004. Furthermore, on the basis of our local jurisdiction  survey, we estimate that at least one-fifth of jurisdictions plan to acquire  DRE or optical scan equipment before the 2006 general election. Second, in  response to our state survey, 9 states reported that they eliminated the  lever machine and punch card voting methods for the 2004 general  election. In addition, 18 other states plan to eliminate lever or punch card  voting methods for the 2006 general election. This greater state  involvement in jurisdictions’ choice of voting methods, the availablilty of  federal funding to replace lever and punch card voting equipment, and  certain HAVA requirements—among other factors—are likely influences on  the adoption of DRE and optical scan voting methods.
subsections: section_title: Voting Methods Differ by the Size of Local Jurisdictions and States’ Choices
paragraphs: Since the November 2000 general election, the DRE voting method has  become more widely used in large jurisdictions, according to our local  jurisdiction 2005 survey. During the same period, states’ reported use of  lever machine and punch card voting methods has decreased, according   to responses to our 2005 state survey. Our state and local jurisdiction  surveys also indicate plans for changes to voting technologies for the 2006  general election.
Overall, the estimated percentages of predominant voting methods used by  local jurisdictions in the 2000 and 2004 general elections did not change  appreciably. In particular, from our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate  that the mix of predominant voting methods used in the November 2000  general election was 5 percent DRE, 21 percent central count optical scan,  26 percent precinct count optical scan, 5 percent central count punch card,  2 percent precinct count punch card, 8 percent lever, and 31 percent paper.  In comparison, we estimate that the mix for the November 2004 general  election (in the same order) was 7 percent DRE, 21 percent central count  optical scan, 30 percent precinct count optical scan, 2 percent central  count punch card, 2 percent precinct count punch card, 7 percent lever,  and 30 percent paper. Figure 54 compares these percentage changes.
According to our local jurisdiction survey, there may have been a small  shift away from punch card and lever machine voting methods (estimated  at 3 percent or 1 percent loss of jurisdictions, respectively) and may have  been an increase in optical scan and DRE voting equipment (estimated at   5 percent and 2 percent gain of jurisdictions, respectively) for the 2004  general election. However, these differences are not statistically  significant. During the same time frame, we estimate that 16 percent of  jurisdictions acquired new voting equipment through their own purchases  or leases and 15 percent of jurisdictions through purchases or leases by  their state. Thus, the new voting equipment acquired by many jurisdictions  since 2000 did not substantively affect the predominant voting methods  that were already in use.
One notable change did occur, however, in the use of predominant voting  methods in the 2000 and 2004 general elections. The percentage of large  jurisdictions using DREs doubled (estimated at 15 percent in 2000 and   30 percent in 2004, respectively)—an increase that is statistically  significant. This increase in the use of DREs changed the predominant  voting method most often used for large jurisdictions, which was precinct  count optical scan in 2000, to both DRE and precinct count optical scan in  2004. A smaller increase in the use of DREs among medium jurisdictions  (from an estimated 13 percent in 2000 to 20 percent in 2004) is not  statistically significant, and there was virtually no change in DRE use  among small jurisdictions (an estimated 1 percent for both elections). In  contrast, the use of paper ballots as a predominant voting method did not  appreciably change between the 2000 and 2004 general elections (with  overall use at 30 percent in 2000 and 31 percent in 2004, respectively).  Small jurisdictions were the major contributors to this steady use of paper  ballots (estimated at 43 percent in 2000 and 41 percent in 2004,  respectively); medium jurisdictions were minor contributors (3 percent for  each election). (No large jurisdictions used paper ballots as their  predominant voting method for either of these elections.) We also estimate  that use of precinct count optical scan as the predominant voting method  for medium jurisdictions did not change appreciably between the 2000 and  2004 elections (estimated at 35 percent in 2000 and 39 percent in 2004,  respectively). Figure 55 shows the estimated use of predominant voting  methods for small, medium, and large jurisdictions in the 2004 general  election.
The more widespread adoption of DREs by large jurisdictions was  consistent with their greater proportion among jurisdictions that acquired  voting equipment since 2000. According to our local jurisdiction survey, we  estimate that 37 percent of large jurisdictions bought or leased new voting  equipment since 2000, compared with 21 percent of medium jurisdictions  and 12 percent of small jurisdictions, where the differences between large  jurisdictions and both medium and small jurisdictions are statistically  significant.
Furthermore, on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that  at least one-fifth of jurisdictions plan to acquire DRE or optical scan  equipment before the 2006 general election. Both large and medium  jurisdictions are more likely to have plans to acquire DREs before the  November 2006 general election (estimated at 34 percent each) than small  jurisdictions (estimated at 13 percent), while small jurisdictions are more  likely to have plans to acquire precinct count optical scan voting equipment  (estimated at 28 percent) than medium or large jurisdictions (estimated at  17 percent and 15 percent, respectively). In general, fewer jurisdictions  expected to acquire central count optical scan voting equipment than the  other two voting methods, although the differences were not statistically  significant. The percentages of jurisdictions planning to acquire the newer  voting systems before the next general election are shown in figure 56 by  the size of jurisdiction.
Another interesting pattern emerged in voting methods between November  2000 and November 2004 at the statewide level. Thirty-seven states  reported that at least 1 jurisdiction used lever machine or punch card  voting equipment for the November 2000 general election. By the time of  the November 2004 general election, the number of states that continued to  employ these voting methods decreased to 28. Specifically, our state survey  results show that 9 states reported that they completed replacement of all  their punch card or lever voting equipment before the November 2004  general election, and 4 other states reported that they completed their  replacements since the 2004 election. Of the remaining 24 states that  reported using the punch card and lever methods in 2000 but had not yet  replaced them at the time of our survey, 18 reported that they planned to  replace all punch card and lever voting equipment by the November 2006  general election, while 3 planned to replace a portion of their equipment by  then. One state reported no replacement plans prior to the November 2006  general election. Figure 57 summarizes the states’ progress and plans for  replacing punch card and lever voting equipment.
Our local jurisdiction survey provided insight into jurisdictions’ plans for  acquiring technology-based voting methods and the time frames for  executing these plans, which may increase the predominance of these  methods in future elections. Specifically, we estimate that 25 percent of  local jurisdictions are planning to acquire precinct count optical scan  machines by the November 2006 general election, 19 percent expect to  acquire DREs by then, and about 7 percent plan to acquire central count  optical scan equipment before that election. In addition, we estimate that  between 4 and 10 percent of local jurisdictions had plans to acquire  additional equipment in each of these voting methods but had not set a  target date for doing so at the time of our survey.
During visits to election jurisdictions across the country, local election  officials explained some of their motivations behind plans to acquire DRE  or optical scan voting equipment. For example, election officials in   6 jurisdictions cited HAVA as the reason for purchasing new DRE  equipment, particularly HAVA’s requirement that each voting place have at  least one voting method that is accessible to persons with disabilities, as  we discussed earlier in chapter 4. More specifically, officials in 1 large  jurisdiction in Connecticut said that they would evaluate the use of DREs  to meet HAVA accessibility requirements before deciding whether to  purchase more DREs in time for the November 2006 general election.  Election officials from 5 other jurisdictions stated that they planned to  purchase new voting equipment to provide a VVPT, a requirement levied by  3 of the 14 states we visited (Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico). Officials  from 5 other jurisdictions said that they expected to acquire new voting  equipment but did not give a reason and, in some cases, did not yet know  what type of equipment they would obtain. Officials in jurisdictions that did  not plan to purchase new voting equipment told us that their existing  equipment was sufficient or that budget constraints prevented the  acquisition of new equipment, among other reasons.
section_title: More Jurisdictions Used Several Voting Methods
paragraphs: As for the 2000 general election, some jurisdictions used multiple voting  methods to support the 2004 general election, and some of these methods  were more widely used than others for particular types of voting. In our  October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes nationwide, we  reported that 5 percent of jurisdictions used more than one voting method.  On the basis of our 2005 local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that   21 percent of jurisdictions used more than one voting method in the  November 2004 general election, with the most common combination of  methods being central count optical scan with paper ballot (estimated to be  5 percent of jurisdictions). Other common combinations in 2004 were  lever machine with paper ballot (4 percent) and DRE with paper ballot   (3 percent). DRE with central count optical scan was one of numerous  other combinations used by 2 percent or less of local jurisdictions. Figure  58 shows the estimated proportion of jurisdictions with the most prevalent  single and combination voting methods.
The specific mix of voting methods used can also be viewed with respect to  particular types of voting (e.g., absentee, early, provisional) that were  supported in the 2004 election. In this regard, some voting methods were  applied to a particular type of voting more frequently than others. We  estimate that paper ballot was the most widely used voting method for  absentee voting (36 percent of jurisdictions), provisional voting   (18 percent), and early voting (8 percent). Precinct count optical scan  (shown in fig. 59) was generally the second most widely used voting  method for these types of voting (24 percent of jurisdictions for absentee,  10 percent for provisional, and 5 percent for early voting, respectively),  while central count optical scan was the third most widely used method   (20 percent of jurisdictions for absentee, 9 percent for provisional, and   5 percent for early voting, respectively).
section_title: Jurisdictions’ Voting Methods Were Influenced by the States and HAVA
paragraphs: Most states have generally exercised influence over the voting methods  used by their respective elections jurisdictions through a range of  approaches. In particular, for our state survey, a majority of states (32) and  the District of Columbia said that they restricted the voting methods  employed by local jurisdictions in the 2004 election either by requiring the  use of one specific method (10 states and the District of Columbia) or  providing a list of approved voting methods for the jurisdiction to select  from (22 states). An alternate approach reported by 10 states was to require  local jurisdictions to obtain state approval when selecting a voting method.  The remaining 8 states said that local jurisdictions chose the voting method  they used without any state involvement.
In addition to affecting the choice of voting methods, 16 states and the  District of Columbia reported that they were involved to some extent in  local jurisdiction efforts to acquire voting systems, components, and  services. For example, 1 state reported that it evaluated voting equipment  options and vendors, and then contracted with a single vendor to supply  voting equipment for all jurisdictions in the state. Jurisdictions within this  state then had the option of purchasing additional voting equipment from  this vendor, as needed. The top map of figure 60 shows the role of each  state in the selection of specific voting methods for jurisdictions in the 2004  general election.
Washington, D.C.
Washington, D.C.
Responses to our state survey indicate that state influence over the voting  methods to be used in the November 2006 general election will continue to  increase. Four additional states planned to require the use of a single voting  method statewide, which will bring the total number of states doing so to  14, and the District of Columbia will do so as well. Also, 5 additional states  reported that they will require local jurisdictions to select a voting method  or methods from a state-approved list, bringing this total to 27; 8 states  intended to continue to allow local jurisdictions to select their voting  methods with state approval. Only 1 state was not expecting to be involved  in decisions on voting methods for its jurisdictions for 2006. The bottom  map of figure 60 shows the role of each state in the selection of specific  voting methods for jurisdictions in the 2006 general election.
Consistent with state survey responses indicating their contributions to  local jurisdictions’ selection of voting methods and on the basis of our local  jurisdiction survey, one of the most frequent factors that influenced the   16 percent of local jurisdictions that bought or leased new voting  equipment since the November 2000 general election was state  requirements or certification of the equipment (an estimated 83 percent of  the 16 percent of jurisdictions that bought or leased the new voting  equipment). Other widely influential factors included ease of equipment  use (91 percent), vendor demonstrations (72 percent), and affordability   (68 percent). In contrast, local requirements and HAVA funding were less  influential factors for local jurisdictions’ acquisition of voting equipment  (44 percent and 45 percent of jurisdictions, respectively). (See fig. 61.)
HAVA has also influenced state and local decisions regarding particular  voting methods through mechanisms to encourage the adoption of  technology. Among other things, HAVA provided funds to states to replace  punch card and lever voting equipment with other voting methods (Section  102 funds). During fiscal year 2003, the General Services Administration  (GSA) reported distributing about $300 million to 30 states that applied for  these funds. Figure 62 depicts an overview of the funds distributed to states  specifically to replace lever machines and punch card voting equipment.  (Fig. 57 presented an overview of states’ progress in replacing lever and  punch card voting equipment.) In responding to our state survey, 24 of the  30 states reported that they had invested at least a portion of these funds to  replace lever or punch card voting equipment as of August 1, 2005.
In addition to the funding that HAVA earmarked for voting equipment  replacement, states could also apply for other HAVA funds that could be  used for multiple purposes, including replacement or upgrade of voting  systems (Section 101 funds). In its 2004 annual report, EAC reported that  almost $344 million had been distributed to each of the 50 states and the  District of Columbia under this multiple purpose funding category. In all,   44 states and the District of Columbia reported in our state survey that they  had spent or obligated funds from one or both of these HAVA funding  sources in order to improve, acquire, lease, modify, or replace voting  systems and related technology. EAC requires states to submit detailed  annual reports on the use of those funds but has not yet compiled data from  the state reports about spending for voting equipment covered in HAVA  Section 101.
Besides authorizing funding for changes to voting methods, HAVA also has  the potential to influence voting methods through new requirements for the  usability and accountability of voting systems. Among other things, HAVA  requires that voting systems used in federal elections provide voters with  ballot verification and correction capabilities by January 1, 2006, including  the opportunity to verify their ballots in a private and independent  manner before they are cast;   the ability to change their ballots or correct any error in a private and  independent manner before the ballots are cast and counted; and  the capability to both notify the voter whenever more than one  candidate has been selected for a single office and correct the  ballots.
HAVA also requires voting equipment to generate a permanent paper record  with manual audit capacity as an official record of the election.
Our October 2001 report on election processes described how voting  methods varied in their ability to support features such as error identification and correction for voters. With regard to minimizing voter  error at the polls, our local jurisdiction survey for the 2004 general election  found that, for instance, voters were provided the opportunity to correct a  ballot or exchange a spoiled ballot for a new one in most jurisdictions, and  such capabilities were largely available for all voting methods. Our  estimates of the availability of ballot correction capabilities range from   100 percent (for jurisdictions whose predominant voting method was  central count punch cards) to 70 percent (for jurisdictions predominantly  using DREs). However, the differences among these voting methods were  not statistically significant. Figure 63 shows one approach that allows  voters to verify and correct their ballots using a particular voting method  (DRE).
With regard to voting equipment that generated a permanent paper record  with a manual audit capability for election audits in the 2004 general  election (including solutions such as VVPT), we estimate that few  jurisdictions that used DREs had this capability. Specifically, from our  local jurisdiction survey, a small proportion of jurisdictions that used DREs  for the 2004 election had manual audit capabilities such as VVPT  (estimated at 8 percent of DRE jurisdictions) or printing of ballot images  (11 percent of DRE jurisdictions). An estimated 52 percent of  jurisdictions using DREs had equipment that produced an internal paper  record that was not voter-verifiable. With this limited implementation of  HAVA-related capabilities in the 2004 general election, it appears that most  of the voting system and election process changes to comply with these  specific HAVA usability and accountability requirements will need to be  satisfied by jurisdictions for the 2006 general election.
section_title: Voting Equipment Performance Was Not Consistently Measured during the 2004 General Election, but Estimated Levels of Performance Satisfaction Were High
paragraphs: Voting system performance can be viewed in terms of accuracy, reliability,  and efficiency. Accuracy refers to how frequently the equipment  completely and correctly records and counts votes; reliability refers to a  system’s ability to perform as intended, regardless of circumstances; and  efficiency refers to how quickly a given vote can be cast and counted.  Performance in each of these areas depends not only on how well a given  voting system was designed and developed, but also on the procedures  governing its operation and maintenance and the people who use and  operate it. Thus, it is important that system performance be measured  during an election when the system is being used and operated according  to defined procedures by voters and election workers. As we have  previously reported in our October 2001 report on election processes,  measuring how well voting systems perform during a given election allows  local election officials to better position themselves for ensuring that  elections are conducted effectively and efficiently. Such measurement  also provides the basis for knowing where performance needs,  requirements, and expectations are not being met so that timely corrective  action can be taken.
HAVA recognized the importance of voting system performance by  specifying requirements for error rates in voting systems and providing for  updates to the federal voting system standards, including the performance  components of those standards. Moreover, according to our local  jurisdiction survey, most local jurisdictions adopted performance  standards for the 2004 general election—usually standards selected by  their respective states. As was the case for the 2000 general election,  jurisdictions collected various types of voting system performance  measures for the 2004 general election, although some types of measures  were collected by fewer jurisdictions than others—in part because they  were not well suited to particular voting methods. Furthermore, from our  local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that the vast majority of all  jurisdictions were very satisfied or satisfied with their systems’  performance during the 2004 general election, even though performance  data may not have been collected to an extent that would provide firm  support for these views.
subsections: section_title: HAVA Has Increased the Focus on Voting System Performance
paragraphs: In our October 2001 report on voting equipment standards, we reported  that the national voluntary voting system standards being used by some  states and local jurisdictions at that time were originally approved in 1990  and were thus out of date. Among other things, these standards identified  minimum functional and performance thresholds for voting systems in  terms of accuracy, reliability, and efficiency. In 2002, the Federal Election  Commission updated these standards and, in doing so, provided new or  enhanced coverage of certain performance requirements for, among other  things,   voting system components that define, develop, and maintain  election databases; perform election definition and setup functions;  format ballots; count votes; consolidate and report results; and  maintain records to support vote recounts;  direct feedback to the voter that indicates when an undervote or  overvote is detected in DRE and paper-based voting systems that  encompass punch cards and optical scan;  system standards to meet the needs of voters with disabilities,  including specific standards for DREs; and  strengthened election record requirements to address a range of  election management functions, including such functions such as  ballot definition and election programming.
HAVA further focused attention on voting system performance by  establishing a performance requirement for systems used in elections for  federal offices and by providing for updates to federal voting system  standards. Specifically, HAVA required that voting systems used in federal  elections comply with error rate standards specified in the 2002 federal  voting system standards. Under these standards, the maximum  acceptable error rate during testing is 1 in 500,000 ballot positions. In  addition, HAVA directed EAC to revise the voluntary national voting system  standards, and to test, certify, decertify, and recertify voting system  hardware and software with respect to national voting system standards  using accredited testing laboratories.
section_title: Most Jurisdictions Adopted Voting System Performance Standards, but Collection of Performance Measures Varied by Jurisdiction Size and Voting Method
paragraphs: On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that the vast  majority of jurisdictions that used some type of automated voting  equipment on Election Day generally established written standards for the  performance of their voting equipment for the November 2004 general  election. Of these, most jurisdictions (an estimated 77 percent) had  adopted their state’s standards or requirements pertaining to voting system  performance, although a few had adopted performance standards from a  source other than their state (10 percent) or developed their own   (8 percent). The apparently high adoption rate for standards among states  and local jurisdictions is important because it indicates broad acceptance  of a basic management tool needed for systematic performance  measurement and evaluation.
Consistent with our results on voting system performance measurement  from our October 2001 report on election processes, estimates from our  local jurisdiction survey indicated that jurisdictions used several specific  measures that could be generally grouped into the areas of accuracy,  reliability, and efficiency to assess the performance of their voting systems  for the 2004 general election. However, jurisdictions measured how well  their systems actually performed in the 2004 election to varying degrees. In  the discussion below, we compare jurisdictions’ collection of selected  information on voting system performance for the 2000 and 2004 general  elections, and then examine jurisdictions’ performance monitoring in each  of the three performance areas.
On the basis of on our local jurisdiction surveys for the 2000 and 2004  elections, we estimate that about 50 percent of jurisdictions collected  performance information in both elections using three measures— accuracy, undervotes, and overvotes. The percentage of jurisdictions that  collected information on a fourth performance measure—average time to  vote—was much smaller (estimated at 10 percent or less). The differences  between estimates for the two elections are not statistically significant.  Figure 64 shows the percentages of jurisdictions that collected these  performance measures for the 2000 and 2004 general elections.
In the area of accuracy, we estimate that 42 percent of jurisdictions overall  monitored the accuracy of voting equipment in the 2004 general election.  Other widely used measures of accuracy in the 2004 general election were  spoiled ballots (estimated at 50 percent of jurisdictions), undervotes   (50 percent of jurisdictions), and overvotes (49 percent of jurisdictions).
During our visits to local jurisdictions, election officials in several  jurisdictions told us that measuring overvotes was not a relevant  performance indicator for jurisdictions using lever machines and DREs  because neither permits overvoting. Election officials in several local  jurisdictions we visited also told us that undervotes were not a meaningful  metric because most voters focused on a limited range of issues or  candidates and thus frequently chose not to vote on all contests.
Jurisdictions’ collection of the accuracy measures we studied for the 2004  general election varied according to jurisdiction size, with small  jurisdictions generally less likely to collect these measures than other  jurisdiction sizes. Both large jurisdictions (an estimated 66 percent) and  medium jurisdictions (54 percent) were significantly more likely than small  jurisdictions (31 percent) to collect data on vote count accuracy. In  addition, large jurisdictions (65 percent) were significantly more likely than  small jurisdictions (47 percent) to collect data on undervotes. (See fig. 65.)  This disparity may be due to the proportion of smaller jurisdictions that use  paper ballots and for whom collection of these data would be a manual,  time-consuming process.
In the area of reliability, we estimate that 15 percent of jurisdictions  measured the reliability of their voting equipment in terms of pieces of  equipment that failed, and 11 percent measured equipment downtime.
As with accuracy, a higher percentage of large and medium jurisdictions  collected such reliability data than small jurisdictions, and in the case of  equipment failures, there were statistically significant differences in the  collection of this information among different sizes of jurisdictions.   (See fig. 66.) Importantly, an estimated 55 percent of all jurisdictions kept a  written record of issues and problems that occurred on Election Day,  which could be a potential source of reliability data.
Collection of reliability data for automated voting equipment was also  related to the predominant voting method used by a jurisdiction, with  jurisdictions that predominantly used DREs more likely to collect  reliability data than those that used optical scan voting methods.
An estimated 45 percent of jurisdictions whose predominant method was  DREs collected information on the number of pieces of voting equipment  that failed. The next most frequently collected information on machine  failures was for precinct count optical scan systems (an estimated   23 percent of jurisdictions) and central count optical scan systems   (an estimated 10 percent). The differences in data collection on equipment  failures among jurisdictions that predominantly used DREs and those that  used precinct count optical scan or central count optical scan voting  methods are statistically significant. (See fig. 67.)
In the area of efficiency, we estimate that 13 percent of jurisdictions  measured their voting system’s speed of counting votes, 17 percent  measured the time it took for election workers to set up equipment, and   4 percent measured the average length of time it took for voters to cast  ballots on Election Day. Large jurisdictions (34 percent) were significantly  more likely than were both medium jurisdictions (19 percent) and small  jurisdictions (9 percent) to collect information on counting speed. There  were no significant differences for other efficiency measures by  jurisdiction size. (See fig. 68.)
It is worth noting that for several types of performance measures in our  local jurisdiction survey, jurisdiction size was a factor in whether system  performance information was collected. Generally, large jurisdictions were  most likely to record voting system performance and small jurisdictions  were least likely, with medium jurisdictions in between. Moreover, large  jurisdictions were more likely to keep a written record of issues or  problems that occurred on Election Day. Specifically, on the basis of our  local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 79 percent of large jurisdictions  kept such records, compared with 59 percent of medium jurisdictions and  52 percent of small jurisdictions. The differences between large  jurisdictions and both medium and small jurisdictions are statistically  significant. The responsibilities for monitoring or reporting voting system  performance most often rested with local jurisdictions. On the basis of our  local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 83 percent of local jurisdictions  had local officials responsible for performance monitoring or reporting,  while states or other organizations (such as independent consultants or  vendors) held such responsibilities in 11 percent and 13 percent of  jurisdictions, respectively.
Information obtained during our visits to local election jurisdictions was  generally consistent with the above estimates from our local jurisdiction  survey. For example, election officials in the 28 jurisdictions we visited  most frequently cited number of undervotes (14 jurisdictions), overvotes  (10 jurisdictions), and equipment failures (10 jurisdictions) as types of  performance metrics collected. Another collected metric (cited by election  officials in 6 jurisdictions we visited) was equipment speed, measured in  terms of how fast the voting equipment downloaded vote totals or  transmitted totals to its central count location, and the time required to  cast a vote (reported by election officials in 4 jurisdictions, although  officials in 2 of these 4 jurisdictions limited their measurements to early  voting). Another measurement that election officials in some jurisdictions  told us they collected was comments from poll workers and voters on the  efficiency of the equipment. For instance, an election official in a large  jurisdiction in Georgia told us that poll workers commented that it took   20 minutes to vote using the voting equipment’s audio feature. In addition,  election officials in several jurisdictions that we visited told us that they  had established performance management programs for their voting  systems. For example, election officials in 1 jurisdiction reported that they  collected data on the time it took to vote to better allocate its voting  equipment to various locations. Officials in a large jurisdiction in Kansas  said they had conducted a survey of voters concerning their satisfaction  with the ease of use of voting equipment during the 2004 general election  and determined that they were very satisfied.
section_title: Local Jurisdictions Were Generally Satisfied with Their Voting Systems in 2004, although Some Problems Were Reported
paragraphs: In our October 2001 report on election processes, we reported that   96 percent of local jurisdictions nationwide were satisfied with the  performance of the voting equipment during the November 2000 general  election. On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey for the 2004 general  election, we estimate that election officials were generally satisfied with  their voting system performance. Estimated satisfaction varied for specific  areas of voting system performance, ranging from relatively high levels for  accuracy (78 percent), speed of vote counting (73 percent), time to set up  equipment (63 percent), and number of spoiled or ruined ballots   (61 percent), to relatively low levels for equipment failures (37 percent),  and downtime (36 percent). Some of these measures may not be  applicable to all jurisdictions, such as those using only hand-counted paper  ballots. When jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots were  excluded from our results, satisfaction levels were higher in all  performance areas—accuracy (86 percent), speed of vote counting   (83 percent), time to set up equipment (76 percent), number of spoiled  ballots (68 percent), equipment failures (54 percent), and downtime   (52 percent). However, even with the exclusion of paper ballot  jurisdictions, “not applicable” responses were often selected by  jurisdictions in the areas of equipment failures (41 percent not applicable)  and downtime (43 percent not applicable).
Also on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, for five of six satisfaction  measures, we estimate that medium and large jurisdictions were satisfied  or very satisfied with their voting systems more frequently than small  jurisdictions and that most of these differences are statistically significant.  These ratings may be related to the widespread use of paper ballots by  small jurisdictions, where this voting method was predominant in an  estimated 41 percent of jurisdictions. Figure 69 shows the frequency of  satisfaction in each of six performance areas for large, medium, and small  jurisdictions.
The estimated high satisfaction levels demonstrated across different voting  system performance areas and jurisdiction sizes contrast with our lower  estimates of the performance measures that were collected for the 2004  general election. Although the reasons for moderate collection levels for  performance measures are unclear, jurisdictions that may not have  collected performance data or may have considered such information not  applicable to their situation may lack sufficient insight into their system  operations to adequately support their satisfaction in the variety of  performance areas we surveyed.
Local election officials at most of the 28 jurisdictions we visited also  expressed satisfaction with the performance of their voting systems or  method. For example,  Election officials in several jurisdictions using optical scan systems  stated that they were pleased with their equipment because it  produced a paper trail and permitted fast processing. Officials in   1 large jurisdiction in Florida added that their use of the same  equipment over several elections made it easy for voters to use the  equipment in both 2000 and 2004.
Election officials in several other jurisdictions using DREs told us  that their equipment was easy to use and provided results that were  accurate and timely. Officials in 1 large jurisdiction in New Jersey  reported that, in contrast to paper ballots, DREs do not require poll  workers to interpret a voter’s ballot.
Election officials in a large Connecticut jurisdiction using lever  machines said that voters were happy with the equipment and that it  had worked well for over 60 years. They emphasized that the  simplicity and transparency of the equipment’s counting mechanisms  gave voters confidence that their votes would be counted correctly.
Election officials in a small New Hampshire jurisdiction using paper  ballots reported that they had used the same hand-counted paper  ballot system for decades and it has been very cost-effective for the  small population of voters in the jurisdiction.
Overall, election officials in few of the 28 jurisdictions that we visited  reported substantive performance issues, such as overvoting, undervoting,  or equipment failure.
Although the estimated level of satisfaction with voting equipment  performance in the 2004 general election was high overall, some  dissatisfaction existed. On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we  estimate that between 1 and 4 percent of jurisdictions were dissatisfied or  very dissatisfied with their voting systems in the 2004 general election for  the six performance areas of our survey.
Our local jurisdiction survey provided additional insight into the role of  voting equipment in jurisdictions’ dissatisfaction ratings. Of almost   300 responses to our open-ended question about the issue or problem that  occurred most frequently on Election Day, November 2004, fewer than   20 responses were specifically related to voting equipment. The most  frequent reason for voting system dissatisfaction was voting equipment  malfunction. Ballot errors related to voting equipment were much less  frequently mentioned.
Although such problems were rarely mentioned by election officials during  our visits to local jurisdictions, some did describe a few reasons for  dissatisfaction with voting equipment, including   the additional time required to count ballots using DREs versus the  optical scan equipment previously used,   the perceived lower reliability and greater failure rates of DREs over  the voting equipment used in the past,  accuracy problems with DRE computer programs, and   difficulty in first-time poll worker operation and voter use of DREs.
Election officials in a few jurisdictions we visited noted situations that  required considerable effort to resolve. For example, as mentioned in our  discussion of vote counting in chapter 6, election officials in a North  Carolina jurisdiction told us that 4,235 ballots were lost by one of the DREs  used for early voting because the software manufacturer had not installed  an upgrade that would have allowed the machine to record up to 10,000  ballots rather than its original limit of 3,500 ballots. The machine continued  to show the number of people who voted on the machine after 3,500 ballots  had been cast, but did not store the results of their ballots. As a result, the  jurisdiction switched to hand-counted paper ballots for elections after the  2004 general election until its state can approve a new automated system  for use. Given the real and potential impacts of situations where  dissatisfaction was reported, systematic collection and analysis of  performance information may help provide election officials with objective  support for decisions to improve the operation and upgrade of these  systems.
section_title: Attention to Voting System Security Management Continues to Vary amid Published Concerns and Federal Improvement Efforts
paragraphs: Having secure voting systems is essential to maintaining public confidence  in the election process, and accomplishing this is a shared responsibility  among federal, state, and local jurisdiction authorities. Among other things,  voting system security involves ensuring that technical security controls  embedded in voting equipment operate as intended, as well as ensuring  that security policies and procedures governing the testing, operation, and  use of the systems are properly defined and implemented by state and local  election officials.
Our October 2001 report on election processes identified voting system  security challenges facing local jurisdictions, such as consistent  application of controls and adequacy of resources. HAVA recognized  some of these challenges by requiring specific system security controls and  providing improved security management guidance. Nevertheless, while  we estimate from our local survey that most jurisdictions have assigned  responsibility for voting system security to individuals and implemented  certain security controls, the nature and extent of their respective security  efforts and activities varied widely. In particular, according to our state  survey, estimates from our local jurisdiction survey, and visits to  jurisdictions, there are differences across jurisdictions in the (1) adoption  of system security standards, with some states requiring jurisdictions to  use outdated standards for voting systems; (2) reported implementation of  system security controls; and (3) testing performed to ensure that security  controls are functioning properly. For instance, we estimate on the basis of  our local jurisdiction survey that at least 19 percent of local jurisdictions  nationwide (excluding jurisdictions that reported using paper ballots) did  not conduct security testing for the systems they used in the November  2004 general election. In addition, 27 states reported in our state survey  that they are requiring jurisdictions to apply federal standards to voting  systems used for the first time in the November 2006 general election that  are outdated, unspecified, or entail multiple versions. This variability in  implementation and testing of controls is generally consistent with what  we reported for the 2000 general election. Moreover, our September 2005  report on the security and reliability of electronic voting highlighted  substantial security issues and concerns for more modern electronic voting  systems and reinforced the importance of effective security management.
subsections: section_title: HAVA Has Increased Focus on Voting System Security
paragraphs: HAVA recognized the importance of effective voting system security  through two primary mechanisms. First, it required voting systems to  produce a permanent paper record that provides a manual review  capability and constitutes the official record for recounts by January 1,  2006. The paper record can be compared with polling place records and  voting system documentation to ensure that authorized ballots have been  completely and accurately counted. Second, HAVA provided various means  to assist states and localities in acquiring and operating secure voting  systems. These include provisions for EAC to (1) update voting system  standards for voting systems, including standards for security;   (2) establish processes for accrediting voting system testing laboratories  and conducting tests of voting systems against the standards; and   (3) create a process for federal certification of voting systems that undergo  the testing process. In doing so, HAVA created tools and resources that  states and local jurisdictions can leverage when, for example, acquiring  systems from vendors, conducting system testing, and operating and  auditing voting systems.
However, delays in establishing EAC and commission funding challenges  resulted in the first update to the 2002 voluntary voting system standards,  and its provisions for system security, not being approved until   December 2005. Further, commission efforts to establish processes for  accrediting testing laboratories, conducting testing, and certifying systems  are still under way.
section_title: Efforts to Address System Security Continued to Vary Widely, and Jurisdictions Were Inconsistent in Following Common Security Practices
paragraphs: As was the case for the November 2000 general election, the nature and  extent of voting system security efforts and activities during the 2004  election varied among jurisdictions. Moreover, these efforts and activities  do not in all cases reflect the use of recommended system security  management practices and current voting system security standards.
In our October 2001 report on election processes, we reported that  jurisdictions had taken a number of steps to manage the security of their  respective voting systems for the 2000 general election. In particular, we  estimated that 89 percent of the local jurisdictions assigned responsibility  for performing security-related functions to one or more individuals, and  implemented some type of controls to protect their equipment during the  election. Examples of implemented security controls included such  physical controls as locks and surveillance, and such embedded controls as  access restrictions and firewalls. However, we also reported in 2001 that an  estimated 40 percent of the jurisdictions had not assessed the security  threats and risks on which their controls were based, and 19 percent had  not reviewed the sufficiency of their security controls. Moreover, the  nature of established controls varied by type of system, and these controls  were not uniformly followed across jurisdictions.
For the November 2004 general election, jurisdictions addressed system  security to varying degrees and through various means. At the foundation  of these approaches, responsibilities for voting system and network  security were distributed among local officials, the state, and third parties  (e.g., independent consultants and vendors) in varying proportions. On the  basis of our 2005 local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 90 percent of all  jurisdictions (excluding those that used only hand-counted paper ballots on  Election Day) specifically assigned responsibility for voting system  security in the 2004 general election. We estimate that 67 percent of these  local jurisdictions assigned responsibilities for voting system and network  security to local election officials, 14 percent relied on state officials to  perform these responsibilities, and 24 percent assigned them to third  parties. Moreover, this distribution varied somewhat according to  jurisdiction size, with large jurisdictions depending on local officials the  most and medium jurisdictions depending on local officials the least.  Figure 70 shows how voting system and network security responsibilities  were distributed among various parties for each size of jurisdiction.
On the basis of our visits to local jurisdictions, the types of system security  responsibilities and the groups that performed them further demonstrate  the variation among security approaches and controls applied to voting  systems. Specifically, election officials in these jurisdictions were typically  responsible for implementing security controls, state officials were usually  involved with developing security policy and guidance and monitoring local  jurisdictions’ implementation of security, and third parties performed tasks  such as ensuring adequate security of voting equipment during transport or  storage. Table 24 shows examples of security tasks and the parties that  performed them as reported to us by election officials in the jurisdictions  that we visited.
Responses to our state survey showed that both states and third parties  participated in security responsibilities related to monitoring and  evaluating security and privacy controls. Although the most frequently  cited party responsible for this area was local officials (identified by 38  states), just less than one-half of the states (22 states and the District of  Columbia) reported that they had some level of responsibility for security  monitoring and evaluation as well. In addition, 22 states responded that  third parties (e.g., independent consultants or vendors) were involved in  monitoring and evaluating controls. Overall, security monitoring and  evaluation was performed by two or more entities in 26 of the states.
The use of certain security controls was similarly varied. On the basis of  our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 59 percent of jurisdictions  used power or battery backup, 67 percent used system access controls,   91 percent used hardware locks and seals, and 52 percent used backup  electronic storage for votes. We further estimate that 95 percent of  jurisdictions used at least one of these controls, with hardware locks and  seals being most consistently used across the automated voting methods  associated with this survey question. Furthermore, we estimate that a  lower percentage of small jurisdictions used power or battery backup and  electronic backup storage of votes for their voting equipment than large or  medium jurisdictions, and these differences are statistically significant in  most cases. Figure 71 presents the use of various security controls by  jurisdiction size.
We estimate that a small percentage of local jurisdictions (10 percent)  provided remote access to their voting systems for one or more categories  of personnel—local election officials, state election officials, vendors, or  other parties. Small jurisdictions, in particular, were less likely to provide  remote access to their voting systems (estimated at 7 percent) than either  medium jurisdictions (13 percent) or large jurisdictions (19 percent). The  difference between small jurisdictions and large jurisdictions is statistically  significant. For each category of personnel—local officials, state election  officials, vendors, or other parties—7 to 8 percent of jurisdictions did not  know if remote access was available to their systems, a situation that could  increase the risk of unauthorized access to these systems. Some of the  jurisdictions responding to this survey question described a variety of  protections to mitigate the risk of unauthorized remote access, including  locally controlled passwords, passwords that change for each access, and  local control of communications connections.
Among the jurisdictions that we visited, election officials reported that  various security measures were in use during the 2004 general election to  safeguard voting equipment, ballots, and votes before, during, and after the  election. However, the measures were not uniformly reported by officials in  these jurisdictions, and officials in most jurisdictions reported that they did  not have a security plan to document these measures or other aspects of  their security program. The security controls most frequently cited by  officials for the jurisdictions that we visited were locked storage of voting  equipment and ballots, and monitoring of voting equipment. Other security  measures mentioned during our visits included testing voting equipment  before, during, or after the election to ensure that the equipment was  accurately tallying votes; planning and conducting training on security  issues and procedures for elections personnel; and video surveillance of  stored ballots and voting equipment. Table 25 summarizes the types and  frequency of security measures reported by election officials in the  jurisdictions we visited.
Notwithstanding this range of reported security controls that were used in  the 2004 general election by jurisdictions we visited, jurisdictions’ activities  and efforts for managing voting system security were not always in line  with recommended system security practices. Our research of  recommended practices shows that effective system security management  involves having, among other things, (1) defined policies governing such  system controls as authorized functions and access, and documented  procedures for secure normal operations and incident management;   (2) documented plans for implementing policies and procedures;   (3) verified implementation of technical and procedural controls designed  to reduce the risk of disruption, destruction, or unauthorized modification  of systems and their information; and (4) clearly assigned roles and  responsibilities for system security.
On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 46 percent of  election jurisdictions nationwide that used some type of automated voting  method had written policies for voting system security and access in place  for the November 2004 general election, while 45 percent had formal  security procedures. Written security policies were more prevalent among  large jurisdictions, an estimated 65 percent, compared to an estimated   52 percent of medium jurisdictions and an estimated 41 percent of small  jurisdictions. The difference between large and small jurisdictions is  statistically significant. More large and small jurisdictions had formal  security procedures (an estimated 51 percent and 47 percent, respectively)  than medium jurisdictions (an estimated 39 percent), although these  differences are not statistically significant. Figure 72 shows the estimated  percentages of jurisdictions with written security policies and procedures  by jurisdiction size.
In our earlier discussion of local survey responses related to counting votes  in chapter 6, we estimated that many jurisdictions had written policies and  procedures for ballot security in the 2004 general election. However, we  estimate that up to one-fifth of jurisdictions did not have written policies  and procedures uniformly in place, including policies and procedures for  transporting unvoted and voted ballots or electronic memory, storing  unvoted and voted ballots, and electronic transmission of voted ballots.  The disparity in written policies and procedures was observed for  electronic transmission of voted ballots for counting, where an estimated  18 percent of jurisdictions had such security management tools,  compared with between 66 and 76 percent of jurisdictions for each of the  other four types of ballot controls—a difference that is statistically  significant but which may be linked to the percentage of jurisdictions that  used paper ballot and older technologies in the 2004 general election. Yet  we also found that an estimated 17 percent of jurisdictions whose  predominant method was DRE had no policies or procedures for electronic  transmission of voted ballots for counting. In addition, the differences in  estimates of policies and procedures for electronic ballot transmission  among jurisdictions whose predominant voting method was punch cards  and those whose methods were DRE or optical scan are statistically  significant. Figure 73 shows the variation in estimates of documented  policies and procedures for electronically transmitting ballots among  jurisdictions that used specific voting methods.
Moreover, our visits to local jurisdictions found diverse approaches to  documenting security policies and procedures. Election officials in 8 of the  jurisdictions that we visited told us that they had written instructions for  managing security aspects of their voting equipment and processes.  However, some guidance we reviewed did not cover these topics. Election  officials in some jurisdictions stated that their security measures were  contained in the voting process documentation for the voting system or  were covered in election worker training. For example, the hardware guide  for the voting system used by some jurisdictions described the verification  and authentication functions that were built into the system to secure vote  counts during transmission of the precinct results to the jurisdiction,  including processes for ballot creation and vote tabulation that also  included security procedures. In contrast, several other jurisdictions that  we visited had published detailed security policies and procedures for their  voting systems that included, for example, network security policies for  election tabulation, procedures for securing and protecting election  equipment and software, testing voting equipment to ensure accurate  recording of votes, and disaster recovery plans, and they provided them to  GAO. Officials in several jurisdictions also described their steps to ensure  that election workers had access to, and were trained in, the contents of  the policies and procedures for securing ballots and voting equipment.
Information system security plans typically identify the responsibilities,  management approach, and key controls to be implemented for an  information system, based on an assessment of identified risks to the  information. Election officials in a few of the jurisdictions that we visited  told us that they had security plans in place for the November 2004 general  election (8 of 28). Officials at 4 of the jurisdictions that we visited stated  that they had security plans or plan components that were approved at the  state level, and officials in 1 large jurisdiction in Nevada reported having a  state statutory requirement for a voting system security plan. However,  jurisdictions that employed advanced security technologies, such as  encryption, in their systems did not always have a plan that would  document how the elections people, process, and technologies would work  together to provide comprehensive protections. Moreover, the contents of  plans we obtained from our visits to local jurisdictions varied widely. One  of the jurisdiction security plans we examined covered most aspects of the  voting process, from ballot preparation through recount, while another  plan focused on the security of its vote-tallying system in a stand-alone  environment. Two security plans covered several security topics including  risk assessment, physical and personnel controls, and incident response.  Table 26 shows the variation in topics covered in the security plans we  reviewed.
Security testing is an important way to verify that system security controls  have been implemented and are functioning properly. From our survey of  state election officials, 17 states and the District of Columbia reported that  they had conducted security testing of the voting systems used in the 2004  general election, and 7 other states reported that they required local  jurisdictions to conduct such testing. The remaining 22 states said that they  did not conduct or require system security testing. (Three states reported  that security testing was not applicable for their voting systems.) Moreover,  from our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that at least 19 percent of  local jurisdictions nationwide (excluding jurisdictions that reported that  they used paper ballots) did not conduct security testing for the systems  they used in the November 2004 general election. Although jurisdiction size  was not a factor in whether security testing was performed, the percentage  of jurisdictions performing security testing was notably higher when the  predominant voting method was DRE (63 percent) and lower for  jurisdictions where the predominant method was central count optical  scan (38 percent) or precinct count optical scan (45 percent). However,  the difference in the percentages of jurisdictions performing security  testing on DRE or central count optical scan is not statistically significant.
Beyond jurisdictions’ efforts to verify implementation of voting system  security controls, some states required that their voting systems be  nationally qualified against the federal voluntary voting system standards,  which include a security component. In particular, from our state survey,  most states that used a new voting system for the first time in the  November 2004 general election said that they required the system to go  through qualification testing. For example, all 26 states that used DREs for  the first time in the 2004 general election, as well as the District of  Columbia, required qualification testing and approval by the National  Association of State Election Directors (NASED). Similarly, of the   35 states and the District of Columbia that used optical scan systems for  the first time in the 2004 general election, 31 reported that they required  voting systems to be qualified. Nine of the 10 states that used new punch  card systems for the first time in the 2004 general election also reported  that they required voting systems to be qualified.
section_title: Security Standards Being Used Vary by State and Jurisdiction
paragraphs: States and jurisdictions are applying a variety of security standards to their  voting systems, some of which are no longer current. Specifically, 44 states  and the District of Columbia reported on our state survey that they were  requiring local jurisdictions’ voting systems being used for the first time in  the November 2006 general election to comply with voluntary federal  voting system standards, which include security standards. However, they  are not all using the same version of the voluntary standards. This is  troublesome because the 2002 standards are more stringent than the 1990  standards in various areas, including security. For instance, the 2002  standards establish security requirements and acceptable levels of  performance for the telecommunications components of voting systems,  while the 1990 standards do not include detailed requirements for this  control measure.
According to our analysis of responses states reported in our state survey,  17 of the 44 states and the District of Columbia reported that their voting  systems must comply solely with the 2002 standards that were developed  and approved by the Federal Election Commission and later adopted by  EAC. However, 27 other states are requiring their jurisdictions to apply  federal standards to their new voting systems that are outdated,  unspecified, or entail multiple versions. In the case of 5 of these 27 states  where multiple versions of voluntary federal standards will be applied, one  of the versions is the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, which was  approved by the EAC in December 2005. These guidelines promote  security measures that address gaps in prior standards and are applicable  to more modern technologies, such as controls for distributing software  and wireless operations. Nevertheless, these same 5 states reported that  they will also apply older federal standards to systems that are new to the  2006 election. Furthermore, 2 other states responded that they do not plan  to require their voting systems to comply with any version of the voluntary  federal standards, while 3 additional states reported that they had not yet  made a decision on compliance with voluntary federal standards for 2006.  (One state did not respond.) Figure 74 depicts the number of states that  reported applying voluntary federal voting system standards to their new  voting systems. Appendix X summarizes responses for all states and the  District of Columbia regarding reported requirements for local  jurisdictions’ use of federal standards for their voting systems.
Simultaneous use of multiple versions of voting system standards is not  new for the 2006 election. Not all NASED-qualified voting systems that may  have operated during the 2004 election were tested against a single version  of security standards. For example, many systems that were qualified  before the 2004 general election had been tested against the 1990 Federal  Election Commission standards, rather than the more stringent 2002  standards.
The use of outdated system security standards increases the risk of system  integrity, availability, and confidentiality problems for all voting methods,  but it is of special concern for jurisdictions that use their systems in a  networked environment or transmit election data using  telecommunications capabilities. This is because the use of such  connectivity introduces vulnerabilities and risks that the older versions of  the standards do not adequately address, as we have previously described  in our September 2005 report on the security and reliability of electronic  voting.
section_title: Recent Studies and Analyses Have Raised Concerns about the Security Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses of Modern Voting Systems
paragraphs: After the 2000 general election, Congress, the media, and others cited  numerous instances of problems with the election process. As the use of  electronic voting systems expanded and the 2004 general election  approached, the media and others continued to report problems with these  systems that caused some to question whether they were secure and  reliable. To clarify the wide range of concerns and issues raised and  identify recommended practices for addressing them, our September 2005  report on the security and reliability of electronic voting analyzed over   80 recent and relevant studies related to the security and reliability of  electronic voting systems. We focused on systems and components  associated with vote casting and counting, including those that define  electronic ballots, transmit voting results among election locations, and  manage groups of voting machines.
In summary, our September 2005 report stated that while electronic voting  systems hold promise for a more accurate and efficient election process,  numerous organizations and individuals have raised concerns about their  security, citing instances of weak security controls, system design flaws,  inadequate system version control, inadequate security testing, incorrect  system configuration, poor security management, and vague or incomplete  voting system standards, among other issues. For example, we reported  that studies found (1) some electronic voting systems did not encrypt cast  ballots or system records of ballots, and it was possible to alter both  without being detected; (2) it was possible to alter the files that define how  a ballot looks and works so that the votes for one candidate could be  recorded for a different candidate; and (3) vendors installed uncertified  versions of voting system software at the local level. We also reported that  some of these concerns were said to have caused local problems during  national elections—resulting in the loss or miscount of votes. We added,  however, that many of the reported concerns were drawn from specific  system makes and models or from a specific jurisdiction’s election, and  that there has been a lack of consensus among election officials and other  experts on the pervasiveness of the concerns.
We also reported in September 2005 that federal organizations and  nongovernmental groups have issued recommended practices and  guidance for improving the election process, including electronic voting  systems, as well as general practices for the security of information  systems. For example, in mid-2004, EAC issued a collection of practices  recommended by election experts, including state and local election  officials. This guidance includes approaches for making voting processes  more secure and reliable through, for example, risk analysis of the voting  process, poll worker security training, and chain of custody controls for  Election Day operations, along with practices that are specific to ensuring  the security and reliability of different types of electronic voting systems.  As another example, in July 2004, the California Institute of Technology and  the Massachusetts Institute of Technology issued a report containing  recommendations pertaining to testing equipment, retaining records of  ballots, and physically securing voting systems. In addition to such  election-specific practices, numerous recommended practices are available  that are relevant to any information system. For instance, we, the National  Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), and others have issued  guidance that emphasizes the importance of incorporating security and  reliability into the life cycle of information systems through practices  related to security planning and management, risk management, and  procurement. We noted that the recommended practices in these election- specific and information technology-focused documents provide valuable  guidance that, if implemented effectively, should help improve the security  of voting systems.
Further, our September 2005 report stated that since the passage of HAVA,  the federal government has begun a range of actions that are expected to  improve the security and reliability of electronic voting systems.  Specifically, after beginning operations in January 2004, EAC was leading  efforts to (1) draft changes to the existing federal voluntary standards for  voting systems, including provisions related to security; (2) develop a  process for certifying, decertifying, and recertifying voting systems;   (3) establish a program to accredit the national independent testing  laboratories that test electronic voting systems against the federal  standards; and (4) develop a software library and clearinghouse for  information on state and local elections and systems. However, we  observed that these actions were unlikely to have a major effect in the 2006  federal election cycle because at the time of our report publication the  changes to the standards had not yet been completed, the system  certification and laboratory accreditation programs were still in  development, and the software library had not been updated or improved  since the 2004 elections. Further, we stated that EAC had not defined tasks,  processes, and time frames for completing these activities, and we  recognized that other organizations had actions under way that were  intended to improve the security of electronic voting systems. These  actions include developing and obtaining international acceptance for  voting system standards, developing voting system software in an open  source environment (i.e., not proprietary to any particular company), and  cataloging and analyzing reported problems with electronic voting systems.
To improve the security and reliability of electronic voting systems, we  made recommendations to EAC for establishing tasks, processes, and time  frames for improving the federal voluntary voting system guidelines,  testing capabilities, and management support available to state and local  election officials. The EAC commissioners agreed with our  recommendations and stated that actions to address each were either  under way or intended, and the NIST director agreed with our conclusions.
section_title: Certain Types of Tests and Evaluations Were Widely Performed on Voting Systems, while Others Were Less Common
paragraphs: To ensure that voting systems perform as intended during use, the systems  must be effectively tested, both before they are accepted from the  manufacturer and before each occasion that they are used. Further  confidence in election results can be gained by conducting Election Day  and postelection audits of voting systems. For the November 2004 general  election, voting system testing was conducted for almost all voting  systems, but the types and content of the testing performed varied  considerably. Most states and local jurisdictions employed national and  state certification testing and readiness testing to some extent, but the  criteria used in this testing were highly dependent on the state or  jurisdiction. Also, many, but not all, states and jurisdictions conducted  acceptance testing of both newly acquired systems and those undergoing  changes or upgrades. In contrast, relatively few states and jurisdictions  conducted parallel testing during elections or audits of voting systems  following elections.
To assist election officials in testing voting systems for the 2004 general  election, most local jurisdictions documented policies and procedures  related to some types of testing, according to estimates based on our  survey of local jurisdictions. However, the testing approaches embodied in  policies and procedures that the local jurisdictions we visited shared with  us varied considerably. Furthermore, in jurisdictions we visited, few voting  system problems were reported as a result of local testing, and  correspondingly few changes were made to the systems or election  processes. The variability in testing approaches among states and  jurisdictions underscores our previously reported concerns from our  September 2005 report about whether actual testing of voting systems is  sufficient to ensure satisfaction of system requirements, including those  associated with accuracy, reliability, and security.
Voting system test and evaluation can be grouped into various types or  stages: certification testing (national level), certification testing (state  level), acceptance testing, readiness testing, parallel testing, and  postelection voting system audits. Each of these tests has a specific  purpose, and is conducted at the national, state, or local level at a  particular time in the election cycle. Table 27 summarizes these types of  tests.
Many states have laws or regulations that mandate specific types of testing  for voting equipment and time frames for conducting those tests.  Documented policies and procedures for testing and evaluation provide an  important means for ensuring that testing is effectively planned and  executed. Effective test and evaluation can greatly reduce the chances of  unexpected or unknown equipment problems and errors. From our local  jurisdiction survey for the 2004 election, we estimate that 85 percent of  local jurisdictions had documented policies and procedures for some type  of voting system testing, 6 percent of jurisdictions did not have policies and  procedures for testing, and 9 percent did not know whether their  jurisdictions had them. Larger jurisdictions were more likely to have these  management tools than smaller ones. An estimated 96 percent of large  jurisdictions had documented testing policies and procedures, compared  with 89 percent of medium and 82 percent of small jurisdictions. The  difference between large and small jurisdictions is statistically significant.
The testing policies and procedures of the local jurisdictions we visited  presented a wide variety of approaches and details for the 2004 general  election. For instance, election officials in 1 large jurisdiction in  Connecticut told us that they did not conduct acceptance testing on their  lever equipment, which had been in use for many years, and did not  conduct either parallel testing or audit testing, stating that these tests were  not applicable to its systems for 2004. However, officials said they did  conduct readiness testing at the polling place prior to the election. Election  officials in a large Ohio jurisdiction that used punch card voting equipment  told us that readiness testing had been conducted by local officials.  However, election officials stated that certification and acceptance testing  were not performed for 2004 because this system had been used in prior  elections. They also said that neither parallel testing nor audit testing of  voting systems was performed. Officials in a large Colorado jurisdiction we  visited that used central count optical scan equipment told us that they  obtained state certification of the newly purchased equipment, conducted  acceptance and readiness testing prior to the election, and executed  another readiness test following the election. Election officials in a large  Georgia jurisdiction that used DRE voting equipment reported that the  state performed both certification and acceptance testing when the  equipment was purchased and conducted a parallel test of the tabulation  system during the election. Further, local officials reported that they  conducted readiness testing prior to the election, but did not perform  postelection audit testing. For the 5 local jurisdictions that provided us  with copies of procedures for readiness testing, three sets of procedures  were developed by the jurisdictions themselves and two sets were  developed by the voting equipment vendors.
subsections: section_title: National Certification Testing Was Widely Performed, but Its Standards and Usage Varied
paragraphs: The enactment of HAVA in 2002 established federal responsibilities for the  certification of voting systems to meet federal standards and provided the  framework for a national testing program. The act charged EAC, supported  by NIST, with instituting a federal program for the development and  adoption of voluntary voting system guidelines against which voting  systems can be evaluated, establishing processes and responsibilities for  accrediting laboratories to test systems, and using the results of testing by  the accredited labs to certify the voting systems. In 2005, EAC developed  guidelines for the certification process and defined the steps needed for the  process to transition from NASED to EAC. States and local jurisdictions  are to decide whether and how to use the testing and certification results  from the federal program in their elections processes.
Most states continued to require that voting systems be nationally tested  and certified. In our October 2001 report on election processes, we  reported that 38 states required that their voting systems meet federal  standards for the November 2000 general election, which meant that the  systems were tested by NASED. For voting systems being used for the first  time in the 2004 general election, national certification testing was almost  uniformly required. From our prior discussion of state survey responses in  the context of voting system security, 26 of 27 states using DRE for the first  time in this election, as well as the District of Columbia, required them to  be nationally certified, while 9 of the 10 states using punch card equipment  for the first time, and 30 of 35 states and the District of Columbia using  optical scan equipment for the first time, said they had such requirements.
It is unclear whether the proportion of nationally certified systems changed  between the 2000 and 2004 general elections. In our October 2001 report on  election processes nationwide, we reported that an estimated 39 percent of  jurisdictions used NASED-qualified voting equipment for the 2000 general  election. However, for the 2004 general election, we estimate that   68 percent of jurisdictions did not know whether the respective systems  that they used were NASED-qualified. This uncertainty surrounding the  national qualification status of a specific version of voting system at the  local level underscores a concern we recently reported with respect to  electronic voting security and reliability in our September 2005 report on  this topic—that is, even though voting system software may have been  qualified and certified at the national or state levels, software changes and  upgrades performed at the local level may not be qualified and certified.
The upcoming 2006 general election can be viewed as a challenging  transition period in the voting system capabilities, standards, and national  certification, with several testing-related factors potentially increasing the  difficulty of this transition. First, HAVA’s requirements for voting system  capabilities, such as voter error correction and manual audit, along with  the attendant new guidelines, are likely to require additional testing at the  national level to recertify previously fielded and certified systems that have  been upgraded. Second, this increased workload is not likely to be met with  added national testing capacity, since the process for accrediting new  voting system testing laboratories is not expected to produce newly  accredited labs in time for the 2006 election. Third, the complexity of the  testing being performed is likely to increase because states report that they  will collectively apply the full range of available standards—1990, 2002, and  2005 standards, as well as various combinations of these—to voting  systems first used for the November 2006 election. As a result, a range of  test protocols must be developed or maintained, and a variety of  corresponding tests must be planned, executed, and analyzed to meet the  variety of standards.
section_title: States Generally Required Certification of Voting Systems Using a Range of Criteria
paragraphs: Most states continue to certify voting systems to ensure that they meet  minimum state election requirements. In our October 2001 report on  election processes, we reported that 45 states and the District of Columbia  had certification programs for their voting systems, 38 of which required  that the systems be tested before they were certified for the 2000 general  election. In addition, we reported that an estimated 90 percent of local  jurisdictions used state-certified voting equipment for the November 2000  general election. However, we also reported that state officials had  expressed concerns with voting system changes that did not undergo  recertification. Since then, we have reported that security experts and  election officials have expressed similar concerns.
For the November 2004 general election, 42 states and the District of  Columbia reported on our state survey that they required state certification  of voting systems. (See fig. 75.) Seven states required certification of the  voting equipment purchased at the state level for local jurisdictions in the  2004 election. However, in 35 states and the District of Columbia, officials  reported that responsibility for purchasing a state-certified system rested  with the local jurisdiction. While state certification requirements often  included NASED testing, as well as approval or confirmation of  functionality for particular ballot conditions, some states also included  additional requirements for features such as quality of construction,  transportation safety, and documentation. Although the remaining 8 states  did not require state certification, the officials we contacted described  other mechanisms to address the compliance of voting equipment with  state-specific requirements, such as a state approval process or acceptance  of voting equipment based on federal certification. Figure 75 shows states’  reported certification requirements for voting systems used in the 2004  general election.
For the 2006 general election, 44 states reported that they will have  requirements for certification of voting systems, 2 more states than for the  2004 general election. The District of Columbia reported that it will not  require voting system certification for the 2006 general election. Of the   44, all but 1 expected to conduct the certification themselves; the 1 state  reported that it would rely solely on a national independent testing  authority to make its certification decision. Furthermore, of the 43 other  states conducting certification themselves, 41 reported that they would  include testing of system functions to obtain certification. In addition,   18 of the 43 states planned to involve a national testing laboratory in their  certification process.
section_title: Acceptance Testing Continued to Be Commonly Performed, but Implemented Practices Varied Widely
paragraphs: As we reported previously in our October 2001 report on election  processes, either states or local jurisdictions conducted acceptance tests  prior to the 2000 general election. However, the testing processes, test  steps, and involvement of vendors in the testing performed varied by  jurisdiction and by type of equipment. Also, we reported in our 2001 report  that states and local jurisdictions sometimes relied heavily on vendors to  design and conduct acceptance tests. With respect to vendor involvement  in particular, we reported that vendors were sometimes heavily relied upon  to design and conduct acceptance tests.
For the 2004 election, the extent and variety of acceptance testing was  similar to those for the 2000 election. With regard to state roles and  involvement in acceptance testing of new voting systems, 26 states and the  District of Columbia reported responsibilities at some level of government.  Specifically, 8 states and the District of Columbia reported on our survey  that they had responsibility for performing acceptance testing, 15 states  required local jurisdictions to perform such testing, and 3 states reported  that requirements for acceptance testing existed at both the state and local  levels. Twenty-two states either did not require such testing or did not  believe that such testing was applicable to them. (Two states did not know  their acceptance testing requirements for the 2004 election.) More states  required that acceptance testing be performed for changes and upgrades to  existing systems than they did for new systems—30 states in all and the  District of Columbia. Specifically, 15 states and the District of Columbia  were responsible for performing acceptance tests for changes and  upgrades, 10 states required local jurisdictions to perform these tests, and   5 states required acceptance testing at both the state and local levels.
Election officials at a majority of the local jurisdictions that we visited told  us that they conducted some type of acceptance testing for newly acquired  voting equipment. As with the 2000 general election, these officials  described a variety of approaches to acceptance testing for the 2004  general election. For example, the data used for testing could be vendor- supplied, developed by election officials, or both, and could include system  initialization, logic and accuracy, and tamper resistance. Other steps, such  as diagnostic tests, physical inspection of hardware, and software  configuration checks, were also mentioned as testing activities by local  election officials. Further, election officials from 3 jurisdictions that we  visited said that vendors were heavily involved in designing and executing  the acceptance tests, while officials from another jurisdiction that we  visited said that vendors contributed to a portion of their testing. In   2 jurisdictions in Georgia, officials said that acceptance tests were  conducted at a university center for elections systems.
section_title: Readiness Testing Continued to Be Widely Performed Using Various Approaches
paragraphs: Most jurisdictions conducted readiness testing, also known as logic and  accuracy testing, for both the 2000 and 2004 general elections. In addition,  some states reported that they conducted readiness testing for the 2004  general election. The content and nature of these tests varied among  jurisdictions.
According to our state survey, 49 states and the District of Columbia  reported that they performed readiness testing of voting systems at the  state level, the local level, or both (1 state did not require readiness  testing). Most states required local jurisdictions to perform readiness  testing (37 states in all). However, 7 states reported that they performed  their own readiness testing of voting equipment for the 2004 general  election in addition to local testing. Five states and the District of Columbia  reported that they had no requirements for local jurisdictions to perform  readiness testing but conducted this testing themselves. State laws or  regulations in effect for the 2004 election typically had specific  requirements for when readiness testing should be conducted and who was  responsible for testing, sometimes including public demonstrations of  voting system operations. For example, one state mandated that local  jurisdictions conduct three readiness tests using all types of election  ballots including audio ballots. One test took place before Election Day and  two occurred on Election Day—before the official counting of ballots  began and after the official counting had been completed. Another state  required the Secretary of State to conduct testing using pre-audited ballots  before Election Day, as well as on Election Day before ballots were  counted.
On the basis of a subgroup of local election jurisdictions from our 2000  election survey, we estimate that 96 percent of jurisdictions nationwide  conducted readiness testing before the 2000 general election. For a  comparable subgroup of jurisdictions in the 2004 general election, we  estimate that 95 percent of local jurisdictions conducted readiness testing.  The frequency with which readiness testing was conducted in 2004 was  largely stable across all jurisdictions of various sizes that did not solely use  hand-counted paper ballots, ranging between an estimated 90 percent (for  small jurisdictions) to an estimated 96 percent (for large jurisdictions).  Whenever the sample of jurisdictions permitted statistical comparison,  there were also no significant differences between the percentages of  jurisdictions that said they conducted readiness testing for various  predominant voting methods.
The variety of readiness testing activities performed by jurisdictions for the  2000 general election was also evident for the 2004 general election.  Election officials in all of the local jurisdictions we visited following the  2004 election reported that they conducted readiness testing on their voting  equipment using one or more of the approaches we identified for the 2000  election, such as diagnostic tests, integration tests, mock elections, and  sets of test votes. Election officials in many of these jurisdictions told us  that they combined test approaches. For example, officials in 1 large  jurisdiction in Florida told us that they conducted pre-election testing using  complete ballots (not test decks) to determine the accuracy of the marks  and to see if there were any errors in voting machine programming. They  told us that logic and accuracy testing was performed for each machine  using undervoted ballots and overvoted ballots, and that zero tapes were  run for each voting machine before the election. In addition, a diagnostic  test was run before the election on each voting machine. According to the  local officials, this was the test approach described in the manufacturer’s  preparation checklist. Election officials in another Florida jurisdiction  stated that readiness testing included integration testing to demonstrate  that the voting system is properly programmed; the election is correctly  defined on the system; and all system inputs, outputs, and communication  devices are in working order. In the case of these jurisdictions, the state  requires logic and accuracy testing and submission of the test parameters  to the state.
section_title: Parallel Testing Was Not Frequently Performed
paragraphs: Parallel testing was not widely performed by local jurisdictions in the 2004  general election, although 7 states reported on our state survey that they  performed parallel testing of voting systems on Election Day, and another   6 states reported that this testing was required by local jurisdictions.  From our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 2 percent of  jurisdictions that did not solely use hand-counted paper ballots conducted  parallel testing for the 2004 general election. Large and medium  jurisdictions primarily performed this type of testing (7 percent and   4 percent of jurisdictions, respectively). The percentage of small  jurisdictions performing this type of testing was negligible (0 percent). The  differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small  jurisdictions are statistically significant.
Our visits to local jurisdictions affirmed the limited use of parallel testing.  Specifically, election officials in 2 of the 28 jurisdictions that we visited told  us that they performed parallel testing. Officials in 1 large jurisdiction in  Georgia told us that parallel testing was conducted by the state in  conjunction with a university center for voting systems. In another case,  officials in a large jurisdiction in Kansas told us that parallel testing was  required by the local jurisdiction and was publicly conducted. In both  cases, the tests were conducted on voting equipment for which security  concerns had been raised in a voting equipment test report issued by the  state of Maryland prior to the 2004 general election. Local officials who told  us that parallel testing was not performed on their voting systems  attributed this to the absence of parallel testing requirements, a lack of  sufficient voting equipment to perform these tests, or the unnecessary  nature of parallel testing because of the stand-alone operation of their  systems.
section_title: Postelection Voting System Audit Requirements and Practices Were Diverse
paragraphs: According to our state survey, 22 states and the District of Columbia  reported that they performed postelection voting system audits for the 2004  general election. Specifically, 4 states and the District of Columbia reported  that they conducted postelection audits of voting systems themselves,   16 states required that audits of voting systems be conducted by local  jurisdictions, and 2 states reported that audits of voting systems were  performed at both the state and local levels. State laws or regulations in  effect for the 2004 general election varied in when and how these audits  were to be conducted. In addition, a variety of statutes cited by states for  testing requirements did not mention postelection voting system audits,  and the one that did lacked details on the scope or components of such  audits.
According to our local jurisdiction survey, postelection voting system  audits were conducted by an estimated 43 percent of local jurisdictions  that did not solely use hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day. This  practice was much more prevalent at large and medium jurisdictions   (62 percent and 55 percent, respectively) than small jurisdictions   (34 percent). The differences between small jurisdictions and both  medium and large jurisdictions are statistically significant. We further  estimate that these voting system audits were conducted more frequently  in jurisdictions with central count optical scan voting methods (54 percent)  than they were in jurisdictions with precinct count optical scan voting  methods (35 percent). Figure 76 shows the estimated use of postelection  audits for jurisdictions with different voting methods in the 2004 general  election.
Election officials in 14 of 28 local jurisdictions that we visited told us that  they conducted postelection voting system audits. However, the conditions  and scope of voting system audits varied. Some were routine, while others  were conducted only in the event of close races or challenges to results.  Among the 14 jurisdictions, most of the officials we spoke with said that  they focused on reconciling voting machine counts with known votes, and  officials in 2 of these jurisdictions characterized the voting system audits  largely as voting system logic and accuracy tests. However, officials with a  few jurisdictions told us that they also reviewed voting machine logs,  sampled results from random precincts, or employed independent auditors  to repeat and verify vote counting. In 1 large jurisdiction in Nevada, an  election official told us that paper results were compared to the tabulated  results of votes counted on 24 machines. In addition, every voting machine  was activated and the same scripts used for pre-election testing were rerun  through the machines. According to the election official, this level of  testing was required by law.
section_title: Information on Jurisdictions’ Election Technology Integration Is Limited, but Current and Emerging Technologies Offer Greater Opportunities
paragraphs: The number of jurisdictions that have integrated particular aspects of  voting system components and technologies was limited for the 2004  general election for the areas of integration we examined, based on  estimates from our local jurisdiction survey and visits to local jurisdictions.  For the areas of integration we did examine, the scope and nature of this  integration was diverse and included remote programming of electronic  ballots, statewide tabulation of voting results, and end-to-end management  of the election process. Nevertheless, the potential for greater integration  in the future does exist as states and jurisdictions act on their earlier  discussed plans to acquire the kind of voting equipment (e.g., optical scan  and DRE products) that lends itself to integration. It is unclear if and when  this migration to more technology-based voting methods will produce more  integrated election system environments. However, suitable standards and  guidance for these interconnected components and systems—some of  which remain to be developed—could facilitate the development, testing,  operational management, and maintenance of components and systems,  thereby maximizing the benefits of current and emerging election  technologies and achieving states’ and local jurisdictions’ goals for  performance and security.
subsections: section_title: Reported Instances of Certain Election Systems Integration Approaches Have Been Inconsistent
paragraphs: Various voting systems, components, and technologies—some of which  have been available since the 2000 general election—encompass a wide  range of functional capabilities and system interactions. According to our  local jurisdiction survey estimates and visits to election jurisdictions for  the 2004 general election, officials reported various types of integration,  but there were few instances. The areas in which integration was reported  can be grouped into four categories: (1) electronic programming or setup  of voting equipment from a centralized facility, (2) electronic aggregation  and tabulation of voting results from multiple voting systems or locations,  (3) add-on voting features and technologies, and (4) electronic  management of voting equipment and operations.
subsections: section_title: Electronic Programming or Setup
paragraphs: Electronic programming or setup of voting equipment involves integration  between an administrative system and voting equipment to initialize vote  count totals, load ballot definitions, and authorize voter access. As we  previously reported in our September 2005 report on the security and  reliability of electronic voting, this type of integration has raised security  concerns. Election officials in 19 of the 28 jurisdictions that we visited  used portable memory cartridges or cards for electronic programming or  setup of their voting equipment. To accomplish programming or setup,  officials at some of the local jurisdictions that we visited said that they used  a computer to preload voting equipment with ballots or tabulation logic  prior to transporting the equipment to polling locations. At 1 large New  Jersey jurisdiction, officials stated that the administrative computer used a  dedicated connection to the election server to electronically transmit the  data and logic necessary to program and enable the units for the election.  Election officials in some jurisdictions told us that an administrative  system loaded ballot definitions onto portable electronic devices, such as  memory cartridges or smart cards, which were then physically transported  to the locations where the voting equipment was being prepared for the  election—either at a storage facility or polling location (see fig. 77). The  cartridges or cards were then inserted into individual voting units to  prepare or activate them for the election. Some electronic ballot cards  were provided directly to the voter to activate the voting equipment, then  returned to election workers when the ballot has been cast.
Electronic aggregation or tabulation of cast ballots also requires  integration between voting equipment and another computer system that is  responsible for collecting and aggregating the votes. Figure 78 shows  examples of computer systems used for vote tabulation.
Transfer of votes or election results between the voting equipment and the  central tabulator may employ portable electronic media or  telecommunication lines. Portable electronic media were the means that  officials at 7 of the 28 jurisdictions that we visited said they used to  electronically aggregate election results from multiple voting locations. For  DRE equipment, memory cartridges that stored cast ballots from individual  voting units were transferred to the election office, and the data they  contained were uploaded and tallied by an electronic tabulation system.
Some jurisdictions also used telecommunications services to transfer  election data from polling locations or election coordination centers to  tabulation facilities, although how these services were used varied.  Officials at 4 jurisdictions that we visited told us that they employed dial-up  connections to transmit local vote tallies for further tabulation. For  instance, election officials in a large jurisdiction in Washington told us that  after the polls were closed and all ballots were scanned and recorded by  the optical scan machines at each polling place, the machines were taken  to storage areas, where the results were transmitted to the central  computer for tabulation using the jurisdiction’s phone line. Officials at a  large jurisdiction that we visited in Ohio said that they had election judges  take voting machine memory cartridges from their polling locations to  facilities where laptop computers would read the cartridges and transmit  vote tallies over phone lines to a remote access server at the elections  office. In a large jurisdiction that we visited in Illinois, election officials told  us that they took their portable precinct ballot counters to 1 of 10 stations  throughout the city, where vote totals from the counters were encrypted  and transmitted to a remote access server via a cellular network.
section_title: Add-on Features and Technologies
paragraphs: Add-on features and technologies to ensure the accuracy of votes, provide  easier access to persons with disabilities or special needs, and enhance  security or privacy were also integrated into voting systems by a few states  and jurisdictions for the 2004 general election. Officials at both large  jurisdictions in Nevada that we visited told us that they had integrated a  VVPT capability into their DREs to meet a state requirement for VVPT.  Figure 79 shows one example of a VVPT voting system component. Overall,  we estimate that about 8 percent of jurisdictions operating DRE voting  equipment in the November 2004 general election produced VVPT.
Audio features were also added to voting systems for the 2004 election.  Officials at 6 of the jurisdictions that we visited reported that they had  incorporated an audio ballot component into their DRE machines for  voters with sight impairments. Election officials in 3 jurisdictions reported  that they offered audio ballots in languages other than English.
Security and privacy capabilities, such as data encryption and virtual  private networks, were also reportedly integrated into several jurisdictions’  voting system environments for the 2004 general election to protect  electronically transferred election data or to secure remote system access.  Election officials at 6 of the 28 jurisdictions that we visited said they used  encryption to protect ballots during electronic storage. Officials at both  jurisdictions in Georgia explained that their state-selected DRE equipment  used individual access cards for each voter, uniquely encrypted data on the  card (including the voter’s cast ballot) for each polling location, and a  separately encrypted electronic key needed to access the voter’s ballot.  Officials at 7 jurisdictions said they applied encryption to the transmission  of election results during the 2004 general election. Election officials in   1 large Colorado jurisdiction stated that they used a virtual private network  to ensure the secrecy of data and authenticity of parties when transmitting  election results from jurisdictions to the state.
section_title: Electronic Management
paragraphs: Electronic management of voting equipment and operations was another  form of integration employed for the 2004 general election. Electronic  management covers such functions as equipment testing, initializing,  operational monitoring, diagnosis, troubleshooting, shutdown, and  auditing. It also includes election operations that affect voting equipment,  such as voter processing at the polling place and handling of absentee  ballots. We previously reported that some of these capabilities were  available during the 2000 general election in our October 2001 report on  election processes. For the 2004 general election, on the basis of our local  jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 7 percent of jurisdictions that used  voting methods other than paper ballots connected their voting equipment  via a local network at their polling locations. The frequency with which  remote access to voting systems was provided for the 2004 general election  was similarly low (estimated at 10 percent of jurisdictions that used voting  methods other than paper ballots) but was again affected by the size of  jurisdictions. We estimate that a higher percentage of large jurisdictions  used remote access to voting equipment (estimated at 19 percent) than  medium jurisdictions (13 percent) or small jurisdictions (7 percent). The  difference between large and small jurisdictions is statistically significant.  Furthermore, we estimate that remote access was primarily provided to  local election officials (in 6 percent of jurisdictions) and to a lesser extent,  state election officials, voting equipment vendors, and third parties. Figure  80 shows the estimated percentages of jurisdictions of various sizes that  used networking or various types of remote access. These capabilities pose  voting system security and reliability concerns as reported in our  September 2005 report on the security and reliability of electronic voting.  From approximately 20 open-ended text responses to our survey of local  jurisdictions that described steps taken to prevent unauthorized remote  access to voting systems, four safeguards were identified: employing  passwords for remote users, limiting operations to specific election  activities, use of virtual private networks, and system monitoring.
As we previously reported in our September 2001 report on voting  assistance to military and overseas citizens, state and local election  officials used technologies like electronic mail and faxing to better  integrate activities during the 2000 general election and to improve  communications with absentee voters. According to our estimates from  the local jurisdiction survey for the 2004 election, jurisdictions continued  to use electronic mail to interact with voters and also relied on Web sites  for a variety of election needs including voter registration status, the  application and processing of absentee ballots, and the status of  provisional ballots. For seven items in our survey where we asked about  jurisdictions’ use of e-mail and Web sites for voter services, we estimate  that large jurisdictions generally used these technologies more frequently  than both medium and small jurisdictions, and that differences in six of  these items were statistically significant. Figure 81 shows the extent to  which jurisdictions of different sizes employed e-mail and Web sites for  selected voter services. In addition to using technology to support  individual voters, election officials in 1 large jurisdiction we visited in New  Mexico described their use of telecommunications technology to support  early voting at multiple locations. This jurisdiction connected its  registration database to its early voting locations with dedicated phone  lines, thus making voter registration information electronically available at  each location.
section_title: Prospects for Expanded Use of Integrated Election Systems Are Unclear
paragraphs: Relatively few local jurisdictions we visited reported having plans for  integrating or further integrating their election-related systems and  components for the 2006 general election, and in cases where they had  plans, the scope and nature of the plans varied. At the same time, we  estimate on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey that a relatively large  proportion of jurisdictions expect to acquire DREs and optical scan  systems, which will introduce greater integration opportunities. However,  given the uncertainty surrounding the specific types of systems and  features to be acquired, the extent and timing of greater integration of  voting systems and components, as well as election-related systems,  remains to be seen.
More specifically, officials in several jurisdictions that we visited told us  about plans to integrate relatively modular add-on components to their  systems, while officials with several other jurisdictions described plans for  more complex end-to-end interactions among election systems and  technologies. For example, officials at 5 jurisdictions that we visited  reported plans to introduce a VVPT capability for future elections, and  officials at 2 jurisdictions reported plans to integrate an audio component  to comply with HAVA requirements. In another case, officials in   2 jurisdictions told us that their state is planning to purchase electronic poll  books for its precincts to use during the 2006 elections to electronically  link its voter registration system with its voting systems. Officials at  another jurisdiction told us that they plan to obtain a new optical scanner  that will be used to tabulate both DRE and optical scan election results.
The scope and magnitude of election system integration may be influenced,  in part, by the jurisdictions’ adoption of the optical scan and DRE voting  methods and the corresponding products that support add-on automated  features, such as languages and accessibility tools, and interactions among  automated components of the election process, such as ballot generation  and tabulation. As we discussed earlier in this chapter, one-fifth of local  jurisdictions are planning to acquire new optical scan and DRE voting  equipment in time for the 2006 general election. For instance, on the basis  of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 25 percent of  jurisdictions plan to acquire precinct count optical scan voting equipment  by the November 2006 general election. However, some jurisdictions had  not yet finalized their time frame for acquiring voting equipment at the time  of our survey. In addition, their acquisition plans also include technologies  for their election Web sites. Figure 82 estimates the percentages of  jurisdictions with acquisition plans for various technologies and their  implementation time frames. While the advent of more technology-based  voting methods provides greater opportunities for integration, the  uncertainty around the timing and nature of their introduction makes the  future extent of this integration unclear at this point.
It is important for voting system standards developers to recognize the  opportunity and potential for greater integration of election systems. EAC  recently adopted a new version of the voluntary voting system guidelines in  December 2005 that will become effective in December 2007. However, this  version does not address some of the capabilities discussed above. For  instance, the guidelines do not address the integration of registration  systems with voting systems. Neither do they address commercial-off-the- shelf devices (such as card readers, printers, or personal computers) or  software products (such as operating systems or database management  systems) that are used in voting systems without modification. EAC has  acknowledged that more work is needed to further develop the technical  guidelines in areas such as voting accessibility, usability, and security  features. Such efforts have the potential to assist states and local  jurisdictions in maximizing the benefits of emerging election technologies.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: The challenges confronting local jurisdictions in acquiring and operating  voting technologies are not unlike those faced by any technology user— adoption and consistent application of standards for system capabilities  and performance, reliable measures and objective data to determine  whether the systems are performing as intended, rigorous and disciplined  performance of security and testing activities, and successful management  and integration of the people, process, and technology components of  elections during system acquisition and operation. These challenges are  heightened by other conditions common to both the national elections  community and other information technology environments: the  distribution of responsibilities among various organizations, technology  changes, funding opportunities and constraints, emerging requirements  and guidance, and public attention.
The extent to which states and local jurisdictions adopt and consistently  apply up-to-date voting systems standards will directly affect the security  and performance of voting systems. A substantial proportion of  jurisdictions have yet to adopt the most current federal voting system  standards or related performance measures. Even if this happens, however,  other challenges loom because systems will need to be tested and  recertified by many states (and by federal processes whenever states have  adopted national standards) to meet any newly adopted voting standards  and HAVA requirements for accuracy. Organizations involved with  recertification—including federal, state, and local governments; testing  authorities; and vendors—may need the capacity to assume the workloads  associated with expected increases in the adoption of current standards  and the use of new voting systems so that potential risks to near-term  election processes are minimized.
Reliable measures and objective data are also considered essential  management practices for determining whether the technology being used  is meeting the needs of the jurisdiction’s user communities (both the voters  and the officials who administer the elections). Looking back to the  November 2000 and 2004 general elections, we estimate that the vast  majority of jurisdictions were satisfied with the performance of their  respective technologies. However, considering that our local jurisdiction  surveys for the 2000 and 2004 elections indicated limited collection of  voting system performance data, we conclude that estimated levels of  satisfaction with voting equipment found in our local surveys have been  mostly based on a patchwork of operational indicators and, based on site  visits to local jurisdictions, have involved anecdotal experiences of election  officials. Although these impressions should not be discounted, informed  decision making on voting system changes and investment would benefit  from more objective data about how well existing equipment is meeting  specific requirements, such as those governing system accuracy, reliability,  efficiency, and security. No one voting method, or particular voting system  make and model, will meet the needs of every jurisdiction. The challenge is  thus to ensure that decisions about staying with an existing voting method  or investing in new or upgraded voting equipment are made on the basis of  reliable and relevant data about the operational performance of the  existing method against requirements and standards, as well as the benefits  to be derived versus the costs to be incurred with each choice.
Effective execution of well-planned security and testing activities provides  opportunities to anticipate and address potential problems before they  affect election results. This is important because even a few instances of  election errors or disruptions can have a sizable impact if election results  are close. We estimate that the vast majority of jurisdictions performed  security and testing activities in one form or another for the 2004 general  election. However, the nature and extent of these activities varied among  jurisdictions—to some degree by jurisdiction size, voting method, or  perceived applicability of the activities. These activities were also largely  responsive to—and limited by—formal state and local directives. When  appropriately defined and implemented, such directives can promote the  effective execution of security and testing practices across all phases of the  elections process. As voting technologies and requirements evolve, states  and local jurisdictions face the challenge of regularly updating and  consistently implementing the directives to meet the needs of their specific  election environments.
As we noted for the 2000 general election, managing the three election  components of people, process, and technology as interrelated and  interdependent variables presents an important challenge in the acquisition  or operation of a given voting method. Whether a state or jurisdiction is  acquiring, testing, operating, or maintaining a new voting system or an  existing one, how successfully the system actually performs throughout the  election cycle will depend not only on how well the technology itself has  been designed, but also on how well the people and processes associated  with the system fulfill their roles for each stage. The technical potential of  more extensive integration of voting equipment, components, and election  systems also holds the prospect for even more interrelationships and  interdependencies among the people, processes, and technologies, with all  their attendant risks. In addition to establishing minimum functional and  performance requirements and processes for voting system aspects of the  election process, system standards can also be used to govern the  integration of election systems; address the accuracy, reliability, privacy,  and security of components and interfaces; and deliver needed support for  the people and processes that will use the integrated election systems.  Timely development of integration standards presents a challenge to the  election community to keep pace with the advancement of election  systems and technology.