Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Acquisition Is Under Way, but Improvements Needed in Management and Oversight
Published: 2009-04-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), with the aid of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), plans to procure the next generation of geostationary operational environmental satellites, called the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-R). GOES-R is to replace the current series of satellites, which will likely begin to reach the end of their useful lives in approximately 2014. This series is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting through the year 2028. GAO was asked to (1) determine the status of the GOES-R program, (2) evaluate whether plans for the acquisition address problems experienced on similar programs, and (3) determine whether NOAA's plan will be adequate to support current data requirements. To do so, GAO analyzed contractor and program data and interviewed officials from NOAA and NASA.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: NOAA has made progress on the GOES-R acquisition, but the program's cost, schedule, and scope have changed. The GOES-R program has moved into the development phase of its acquisition life cycle. It has awarded development contracts for the instruments and plans to award contracts for the spacecraft and ground segments by mid-2009. However, after reconciling program and independent cost estimates, the program established a new cost estimate of $7.67 billion--a $670 million increase from the prior $7 billion estimate. The program also reduced the number of products the satellites will produce from 81 to 34 and slowed the delivery of these products in order to reduce costs. More recently, the program also delayed key milestones, including the launch of the first satellite, which was delayed from December 2014 to April 2015. Such delays could lead to gaps in satellite coverage if NOAA experiences problems with its current operational satellites before a backup satellite is in orbit. GOES-R has taken steps to address lessons from other satellite programs, but important actions remain to be completed. NOAA has made progress in its efforts to address prior lessons by taking steps to ensure technical readiness on key components, using an acceptable cost estimating approach, implementing techniques to enhance contractor oversight, and regularly briefing agency executives. However, technical challenges remain on both the ground segment and the instruments. In addition, the program did not perform a comprehensive review after rebaselining a critical instrument, and it has not documented all of the reasons for cost overruns. Until these issues are addressed, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES-Rprogram will repeat the same mistakes that have plagued other satellite programs. NOAA has a plan to meet some, but not all, data requirements. An instrument that was originally planned as part of the GOES-R satellite was to meet requirements for 15 products that are currently produced, as well as 11 new, technically advanced, products. When NOAA removed this instrument from the GOES-R satellite program, it arranged to obtain the current products from another instrument. However, the agency has not developed plans or a timeline to address the requirements for the new products. Doing so would include justifying the funding for any new initiatives within the agency's investment decision process. Until a decision is made on whether and how to proceed in providing the advanced products, key system users, such as weather forecasters, will not be able to meet their goals for improving the accuracy of severe weather warnings. Further, climate research organizations will not obtain the data they need to enhance the science of climate, environmental, and oceanic observations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Operational geostationary environmental satellites play a critical role in  Operational geostationary environmental satellites play a critical role in  our nation’s weather forecasting. These satellites—which are managed by  our nation’s weather forecasting. These satellites—which are managed by  the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric  the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric  Administration (NOAA)—provide critical information on atmospheric,  Administration (NOAA)—provide critical information on atmospheric,  oceanic, climatic, and solar conditions that help meteorologists observe  oceanic, climatic, and solar conditions that help meteorologists observe  and predict global and local weather events. They also provide a means to  and predict global and local weather events. They also provide a means to  identify severe storm conditions, such as hurricanes and tornadoes, and to  identify severe storm conditions, such as hurricanes and tornadoes, and to  track the movement and intensity of these storms once they develop.  track the movement and intensity of these storms once they develop.
NOAA, with the aid of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration  NOAA, with the aid of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration  (NASA), is procuring the next generation of geostationary satellites, called  (NASA), is procuring the next generation of geostationary satellites, called  the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) series.  the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) series.  The GOES-R series is to replace the current series of satellites, which will  The GOES-R series is to replace the current series of satellites, which will  likely begin to reach the end of their useful lives in approximately 2014.  likely begin to reach the end of their useful lives in approximately 2014.  This new series is expected to mark the first major technological advance  This new series is expected to mark the first major technological advance  in GOES instrumentation since 1994. It is also considered critical to the  in GOES instrumentation since 1994. It is also considered critical to the  United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for  United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for  weather forecasting through the year 2028.  weather forecasting through the year 2028.
This report responds to your request that we review NOAA’s management of  This report responds to your request that we review NOAA’s management of  the GOES-R program. Specifically, we were asked to (1) determine the status of  the GOES-R program. Specifically, we were asked to (1) determine the status of  the program, (2) evaluate whether plans for the GOES-R acquisition address  the program, (2) evaluate whether plans for the GOES-R acquisition address  problems experienced on similar programs, and (3) determine whether NOAA’s  problems experienced on similar programs, and (3) determine whether NOAA’s  plan to address the capabilities that were planned for the satellites, but then  plan to address the capabilities that were planned for the satellites, but then  removed, will be adequate to support current data requirements.  removed, will be adequate to support current data requirements.
To determine GOES-R acquisition status, we evaluated program  To determine GOES-R acquisition status, we evaluated program  documents, including cost and schedule estimates, contractor  documents, including cost and schedule estimates, contractor  performance reports on instrument development, and executive briefings.  performance reports on instrument development, and executive briefings.  To evaluate whether NOAA’s acquisition plans address problems  To evaluate whether NOAA’s acquisition plans address problems  experienced on similar programs, we identified lessons learned from other  experienced on similar programs, we identified lessons learned from other  major space acquisitions and compared them with relevant program and  major space acquisitions and compared them with relevant program and  contractor documents, including instrument technical reviews, and risk  contractor documents, including instrument technical reviews, and risk  lists. We assessed the GOES-R cost estimate by comparing the process  lists. We assessed the GOES-R cost estimate by comparing the process  used to develop the estimate with best practices identified in our cost  used to develop the estimate with best practices identified in our cost  estimating guide. To determine the adequacy of NOAA’s plan to support  key data requirements, we compared original and revised data  requirements, determined whether the agency had developed plans for  addressing different types of requirements, and discussed agency plans  and options for addressing the requirements with key data users. For all  objectives, we interviewed the applicable agency and contractor officials  and consulted with GAO subject matter experts.
We performed our work at NOAA and NASA offices in the Washington,  D.C., metropolitan area. We conducted this performance audit from May  2008 to April 2009, in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I  contains further details on our objectives, scope, and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the 1960s, geostationary and polar-orbiting environmental satellites  have been used by the United States to provide meteorological data for  weather observation, research, and forecasting. NOAA’s National  Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service is responsible for  managing the civilian operational geostationary and polar-orbiting satellite  systems as two separate programs, called GOES and the Polar-orbiting  Operational Environmental Satellites, respectively.
Unlike polar-orbiting satellites, which constantly circle the earth in a  relatively low polar orbit, geostationary satellites can maintain a constant  view of the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in space. NOAA  operates GOES as a two-satellite system that is primarily focused on the  United States (see fig. 1). These satellites are uniquely positioned to  provide timely environmental data about the earth’s atmosphere, its  surface, cloud cover, and the space environment to meteorologists and  their audiences. They also observe the development of hazardous weather,  such as hurricanes and severe thunderstorms, and track their movement  and intensity to reduce or avoid major losses of property and life.  Furthermore, the satellites’ ability to provide broad, continuously updated  coverage of atmospheric conditions over land and oceans is important to  NOAA’s weather forecasting operations.
To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several satellites  at a time as part of a series and launches new satellites every few years  (see table 1). NOAA’s policy is to have two operational satellites and one  backup satellite in orbit at all times.
Four GOES satellites—GOES-10, GOES-11, GOES-12, and GOES-13—are  currently in orbit. Both GOES-11 and GOES-12 are operational satellites,  with GOES-12 covering the east and GOES-11 the west. GOES-13 is  currently in an on-orbit storage mode. It is a backup for the other two  satellites should they experience any degradation in service. GOES-10 is at  the end of its service life, but it is being used to provide limited coverage  of South America. The others in the series, GOES-O and GOES-P, are  planned for launch over the next 2 years. NOAA is also planning the next  generation of satellites, known as the GOES-R series, which are planned  for launch beginning in 2015.
Each of the operational geostationary satellites continuously transmits  raw environmental data to NOAA ground stations. The data are processed  at these ground stations and transmitted back to the satellite for broadcast  to primary weather services and the global research community in the  United States and abroad. Raw and processed data are also distributed to  users via ground stations through other communication channels, such as  dedicated private communication lines and the Internet. Figure 2 depicts a  generic data relay pattern from the geostationary satellites to the ground  stations and commercial terminals.
subsections: section_title: GOES-R Program—An Overview
paragraphs: NOAA plans for the GOES-R program to improve on the technology of  prior series, in terms of both system and instrument improvements. The  system improvements are expected to fulfill more demanding user  requirements by updating the satellite data more often and providing  satellite products to users more quickly. The instrument improvements are  expected to significantly increase the clarity and precision of the observed  environmental data. NOAA originally planned to acquire six different types  of instruments. Furthermore, two of these instruments—the Advanced  Baseline Imager and the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite—were  considered to be the most critical because they would provide data for key  weather products. Table 2 summarizes the originally planned instruments  and their expected capabilities.
In September 2006, however, NOAA decided to reduce the scope and technical  complexity of the GOES-R program because of expectations that total costs,  which were originally estimated to be $6.2 billion, could reach $11.4 billion.  Specifically, NOAA reduced the minimum number of satellites from four to  two, cancelled plans for developing the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite  (which reduced the number of planned satellite products from 81 to 68), and  divided the Solar Imaging Suite into two separate acquisitions. The agency  estimated that the revised program would cost $7 billion. Table 3 provides a  summary of the timeline and scope of these key changes.
NOAA’s acquisition strategy was to award contracts for the preliminary  design of the GOES-R system to several vendors who would subsequently  compete to be the single prime contractor responsible for overall system  development and production. In keeping with this strategy, NOAA  awarded contracts for the preliminary design of the overall GOES-R  system to three vendors in October 2005. However, in March 2007, NOAA  revised its acquisition strategy for the development contract. In response  to recommendations by independent advisors, the agency decided to  separate the overall system development and production contract into two  separate contracts—the spacecraft segment and the ground segment.
In addition, to reduce the risks associated with developing technically  advanced instruments, NASA awarded contracts for the preliminary  designs for five of the planned instruments. NASA subsequently awarded  development contracts for these instruments and, upon completion, plans  to turn them over to the prime contractor responsible for the spacecraft  segment of the GOES-R program. The sixth instrument, the Magnetometer,  is to be developed as part of the spacecraft contract.
subsections: section_title: Program Office Structure
paragraphs: NOAA is solely responsible for GOES-R program funding and overall  mission success. However, since it relies on NASA’s acquisition  experience and technical expertise to help ensure the success of its  programs, NOAA implemented an integrated program management  structure with NASA for the GOES-R program (see fig. 3). NOAA also  located the program office at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. Within  the program office, there are two project offices that manage key  components of the GOES-R system. These are called the flight and ground  segment project offices. The flight project office, managed by NASA, is  responsible for awarding and managing the spacecraft contract and  delivering flight-ready instruments to the spacecraft. The ground segment  project office, managed by NOAA, oversees the ground contract, satellite  data product development and distribution, and on-orbit operations of the  satellites.
section_title: Prior Report Noted the Likelihood of Continued Cost Growth and Recommended Steps to Mitigate Program Risks
paragraphs: In October 2007, we reported that NOAA had completed preliminary  design studies of GOES-R, but that program costs were likely to grow and  schedules were likely to be delayed. At that time, GOES-R was estimated  to cost $7 billion and scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch  in 2014. However, independent studies showed that the program could  cost about $2 billion more than the program’s cost estimate, and the first  satellite launch could be delayed by 2 years. NOAA officials stated that  they were working to reconcile the two different cost and schedule  estimates.
We also reported that while the program had implemented a risk  management program, it had multiple risk lists that were not always  consistent, and key risks were missing from the risk watch lists—including  risks associated with unfilled executive positions, insufficient reserve  funds for unexpected costs, and limitations in NOAA’s insight into NASA’s  deliverables. Specifically, we noted that in past GOES procurements,  NOAA did not have the ability to make quick decisions on problems  because it lacked insight into the portions of the procurement that were  managed by NASA. We recommended that the GOES-R program office  manage risks using a program-level risk list and address the additional  risks we identified. Over the past year, the program office has improved  the integration of its risk management process and taken steps to mitigate  the risks we identified.
section_title: GOES-R Is in Development, but Costs Have Increased, Envisioned Functionality Has Been Reduced, and Schedules Have Been Delayed
paragraphs: The GOES-R program has moved from the preliminary design and  definition phase to the development phase of its acquisition life cycle.  Program officials have awarded contracts for the five instruments, and  they plan to award contracts for the spacecraft and ground segments later  this year. However, the program’s cost, scope, and schedule have changed.
subsections: section_title: Progress Has Been Made on GOES-R Procurement Activities
paragraphs: NOAA and NASA have made progress on the GOES-R program. In January  2008, NOAA approved a key decision milestone that allowed the program  to move from the preliminary design and definition phase to the  development phase of the acquisition life cycle. This approval also gave  the program the authority to issue the requests for proposals for the  spacecraft and ground segment projects—which it did in January 2008 and  May 2008, respectively. The program office plans to award the prime  contract for the spacecraft in May 2009 and the contract for the ground  segment in June 2009.
In addition, between September 2004 and December 2007, the GOES-R  program awarded contracts for the development of five key instruments.  Table 4 briefly describes each of these instruments, their contract award  dates, and their cost and schedule estimates, while figure 4 depicts the  schedule for both the program and key instruments.
The five key instruments are currently in varying stages of development.  One instrument, the Advanced Baseline Imager, has experienced technical  issues leading to cost overruns and schedule delays. The program office  rebaselined the cost and schedule of the program in February 2007 and  then rebaselined the schedule again in March 2008. Since February 2007,  the contractor incurred a cost overrun of approximately $30 million and,  since March 2008, the contractor has delayed $11 million worth of work.  Program officials reported that they have sufficient management reserves  to address the overruns experienced to date. The other instruments are  still very early in development. Table 5 describes the status and risk level  of each instrument.
section_title: GOES-R Cost Estimate Has Increased, Envisioned Functionality Has Been Reduced, and Key Milestones Have Slipped
paragraphs: NOAA has made several important decisions about the cost, scope, and  schedule of the GOES-R program. After reconciling the program office’s cost  estimate of $7 billion with the independent cost estimate of about $9 billion, the  agency established a new program cost estimate of $7.67 billion. This is an  increase of $670 million from the previous estimate. Program officials plan to  revisit this cost estimate after the spacecraft and ground segment contracts are  awarded. However, agency officials, including NOAA’s Chief Financial Officer  and NOAA’s National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service  Assistant Administrator, stated that this estimate was developed with a  relatively high level of confidence and that they believe that any adjustments  would be well within the $7.67 billion program budget.
To mitigate the risk that costs would rise, program officials decided to  remove selected program requirements from the baseline program and  treat them as options that could be exercised if funds allow. These  requirements include the number of products to be distributed, the time to  deliver the remaining products (product latency), and how often these  products are updated with new satellite data (refresh rate). Specifically,  program officials eliminated the requirement to develop and distribute 34  of the 68 envisioned products, including aircraft icing threat, turbulence,  and visibility. Program officials explained that these products are not  currently being produced by legacy GOES satellites; they are new products  that could be produced from the advanced GOES-R instruments. In  addition, the program slowed planned product latency on the remaining  products by as much as 10 minutes for hurricane intensity and 6 minutes  for volcanic ash detection and height. It also reduced the refresh rates on  these products by as much as 55 minutes for sea surface temperatures,  cloud top observations, and vertical moisture profiles in the atmosphere.  Program officials included the restoration of the products, latency, and  refresh rates as options in the ground segment contract—items that could  be acquired at a later time.
NOAA also delayed GOES-R program milestones, including the dates for  issuing the requests for proposals and awarding the contracts for the  spacecraft and ground segments. The dates when the satellites would be  available for launch have also slipped by 4 months, with the first satellite  launch now scheduled for April 2015. Program officials attributed these  delays to providing more stringent oversight before releasing the requests  for proposals, additional time needed to evaluate the contract proposals,  and funding reductions in fiscal year 2008. Table 6 identifies delays in key  GOES-R milestones.
Further delays in the launch of the first GOES-R satellite would run  counter to NOAA’s policy of having a backup satellite in orbit at all times  and could lead to gaps in satellite coverage. Specifically, in 2015, NOAA  expects to have two operational satellites in orbit, but it will not have a  backup satellite in place until GOES-R is launched. If NOAA experiences a  problem with either of its operational satellites before a backup satellite is  in orbit, it will need to rely on older decommissioned satellites that may  not be fully functional.
section_title: The GOES-R Program Office Has Taken Steps to Address Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs, but Important Actions Remain
paragraphs: GOES-R has taken steps to address lessons from other satellite programs,  but important actions remain to be completed. Satellite programs are often  technically complex and risky undertakings and, as a result, they often  experience technical problems, cost overruns, and schedule delays. We  and others have reported on repeated missteps in the acquisition of major  satellite systems, including the National Polar-orbiting Operational  Environmental Satellite System, the GOES I-M series, the Space Based  Infrared System High Program, and the Advanced Extremely High  Frequency Satellite System. Key lessons learned from these other satellite  programs include the importance of (1) ensuring sufficient technical  readiness of the system’s components prior to key decisions, (2)  establishing realistic cost and schedule estimates, (3) providing sufficient  management at the program and contractor levels, and (4) performing  adequate senior executive oversight to ensure mission success.
subsections: section_title: NOAA Has Taken Steps to Ensure Technical Readiness, but Key Risks Remain
paragraphs: Space programs often experience unforeseen technical problems in the  development of critical components as a result of having insufficient  knowledge of the components and their supporting technologies prior to  key decision points. One key decision point is when an agency decides  whether the component is sufficiently ready to proceed from a preliminary  study phase into a development phase; this decision point results in the  award of the development contract. Another key decision point occurs  during the development phase when an agency decides whether the  component is ready to proceed from design into production (also called  the critical design review). Without sufficient technical readiness at these  milestones, agencies could proceed into development contracts for  components that are not well understood and enter into the production  phase of development with technologies that are not yet mature.
Since the late 1990s, NOAA has taken a series of steps to help mitigate  technical readiness issues on GOES-R. Specifically, the agency    conducted preliminary studies on the technologies to be used on the    awarded contracts for the preliminary design of the planned instruments  and the overall GOES-R system;    awarded instrument development contracts that include provisions to  develop prototypes or engineering models before the flight units for each  instrument are developed;    conducted a major review of the Advanced Baseline Imager before the    certified that the technology for the spacecraft and ground segments was  mature before awarding the contracts;  removed the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite from the GOES-R series  after preliminary studies showed that it was technically complex;    established independent review teams responsible for assessing the  program’s technical, programmatic, and management risks on an annual  basis to ensure sufficient technical readiness prior to the critical design  review milestone; and    established processes for reviewing the maturity and readiness of  algorithms for each of the products.
However, key technology risks remain—affecting both the ground  segment and the instruments. Specifically, while the hardware that is to be  used for the ground segment is mature, key components have not  previously been integrated. Consequently, if the components do not work  together, the program might have to procure separate antennas, which  would impact the program’s cost and schedule. The ground segment  project office utilizes an integrated product team to manage and mitigate  this risk and released a request for information to industry in January  2009.
In addition to the ground segment risks, technical risks remain on the  development of the instruments. For example, the contractor responsible  for developing the Advanced Baseline Imager estimates that the  instrument is over 50 percent complete and reports that it has experienced  technical issues, including problems with the quality of components in the  focal plane module, mirrors, and telescope. As of November 2008, the  contractor incurred a cost overrun of approximately $30 million and  delayed $11 million worth of work. The other instruments are earlier in  their development. Since none has yet been demonstrated in a lab or test  environment, the risk remains that the technologies are not sufficiently  mature. The program plans to continue efforts to demonstrate  technologies before key decision milestones on each instrument.
section_title: Program Estimates Were Developed Using an Acceptable Methodology, but an Underlying Assumption Is Overly Optimistic
paragraphs: In 2007, we reported that cost-estimating organizations throughout the  federal government and industry use 12 key practices—related to  planning, conducting, and reporting the estimate—to ensure a sound  estimate. Table 7 lists these practices.
The GOES-R program’s cost estimate fully implemented 11 and partially  implemented 1 of the 12 best practices for developing a credible cost  estimate (see table 8). The practices that were fully implemented include  clearly defining the purpose of the estimate and the program’s  characteristics, establishing and implementing a sound estimating  approach, and appropriately assessing the risk and sensitivity of its  estimate. The practice that was partially implemented involved ground  rules and assumptions. The program defined and documented all of the  ground rules and assumptions used in the estimate. However, an  independent review team found that the assumed inflation rates used for  the ground segment were overly optimistic and could lead to a shortfall of  hundreds of millions of dollars. Specifically, the agency used the  Department of Defense’s inflation rates rather than NASA’s historical  experiences, which are more conservative. Program officials responded  that the agency’s long experience in developing ground systems would  balance the optimistic inflation rates and that they could adjust the  inflation rates, if warranted, in later years.
section_title: NOAA Has Improved Program Management, but Work Remains on Key Program Controls
paragraphs: In the past, we have reported on poor performance in program  management. The key drivers of poor management often include  ineffective risk management, insufficient staff to implement earned value  management, and inadequate levels of management reserve. In 2006 and  2007, we reported that, while NOAA had taken steps to restructure its  management approach on the GOES-R procurement in an effort to  improve performance and to avoid past mistakes, key program  management areas needed additional attention. We recommended that  NOAA improve the consistency of its risk management process, assess and  obtain the resources it needed for overseeing the earned value of its  contracts, and provide sufficient management reserves to address  unexpected issues in instrument development. NOAA subsequently  implemented these recommendations by streamlining its risk management  processes, supplementing oversight resources, and reassessing its  management reserves. Since we last reported on this issue, the program  office has made additional progress in earned value management, but  more remains to be done.
subsections: section_title: Program’s Approach to Earned Value Management Has Shortfalls
paragraphs: Earned value management provides a proven means for measuring  progress against cost and schedule commitments and thereby identifying  potential cost overruns and schedule delays early, when the impact can be  minimized. Two key aspects of this process are conducting comprehensive  integrated baseline reviews and using monthly variance reports to manage  the program. An integrated baseline review is a process used by  stakeholders to obtain agreement on the value of planned work and to  validate the baseline against which the variances are calculated. These  reviews assess the technical scope of the work, key schedule milestones,  the adequacy of resources, task and technical planning, and management  processes; they are completed whenever a new baseline is established.  Once an integrated baseline review has been completed and the project  management baseline has been validated, monthly variance reports  provide information on the contract status, the reasons for any deviations  from cost or schedule plans, and any actions taken to address these  deviations.
To its credit, the GOES-R program office is using earned value  management to oversee the key instrument contracts and plans to use it  on the spacecraft and ground segment contracts. To date, the program  office has performed integrated baseline reviews on the instruments and  obtains and reviews variance reports for each of the instruments.
However, there are shortfalls in the program’s approach. The program’s  integrated baseline review for the Advanced Baseline Imager did not  include a review of schedule milestones, the adequacy of how tasks are  measured, and the contractor’s management processes. Further, the  variance reports for two instruments—the Advanced Baseline Imager and  the Geostationary Lightning Mapper—do not describe all of the significant  variances. The imager’s reports only describe the five largest cost and  schedule variances and do not include variances associated with  overhead. For example, the reasons for cost and schedule variances  exceeding $1 million were not disclosed in October and November 2008  cost reports. Moreover, while the reports identified problems that  resulted in cost growth and schedule slippage for the five largest  variances, the reports did not identify the actions taken to address them.  The mapper’s reports also did not disclose the reasons for selected  variances, including a $197,000 cost overrun in August 2008 and a $141,000  cost overrun in October 2008. Program officials explained that they meet  with the contractor on a monthly basis to discuss all of the variances, but  they were unable to provide documentation of these discussions or the  reasons, impact of, or mitigation plans for the variances. As a result of  these shortfalls, the program office has less assurance that key  instruments will be delivered on time and within budget, and it is more  difficult for program managers to identify risks and take corrective  actions.
section_title: Executive-Level Involvement Is Occurring
paragraphs: Executive-level involvement is a key aspect of program success, and it is  occurring on the GOES-R program. The Office of Management and Budget  guidance calls for agencies to establish executive-level oversight boards to  regularly track the progress of major system acquisitions. In addition, in  2007, NOAA and NASA signed both an interagency agreement and a  management control plan that defined the agencies’ respective roles and  responsibilities. Among other things, the agreements called for the  program to provide monthly status review briefings for executives on  NOAA’s Program Management Council and NASA’s Goddard Space Flight  Center Management Council.
Since these agreements were approved, the program has consistently  briefed senior management at monthly meetings and has effectively  communicated the program’s status and key risks. Additionally, key  representatives of NOAA’s Program Management Council attend the NASA  council’s meeting, and senior NASA executives attend NOAA’s council  meetings.
section_title: NOAA Plans to Address Requirements for Current Products but Has Not Developed Plans for Meeting Requirements for Advanced Products
paragraphs: The Hyperspectral Environmental Suite instrument was originally planned  as part of the GOES-R satellite to meet requirements for products that are  currently produced by GOES satellites (such as temperature and moisture  profiles at different atmospheric levels), as well as new technically- advanced products (such as moisture fluctuations and ocean color) that  are not currently produced by GOES satellites. Table 9 lists the current  and new products that were originally planned to be provided by the  Hyperspectral Environmental Suite.
NOAA still considers these requirements to be valid. According to National  Weather Service meteorologists, users depend on the products that they  currently receive from GOES satellites in orbit for hourly and daily  weather observations. In addition, NOAA and the science community still  have a need for the advanced products. NOAA had planned to use the new  sounding products to improve its performance goals, such as helping to  increase the lead times associated with severe thunderstorm warnings  from an average of 18 minutes in 2000 to as much as 2 hours by 2025, and  helping to increase the lead times associated with tornado warnings from  an average of 13 minutes in 2007 to as much as 1 hour by 2025. In  addition, NOAA had planned to use the new coastal waters imaging  products to provide more accurate and quantitative understanding of areas  along the U.S. East Coast (within 50 miles of the shore) and 130 estuaries  throughout the United States—areas for which NOAA has management  responsibilities.
Similarly, the environmental science communities have continued to  express a need for the advanced products. In 2007, the National Research  Council recommended that NOAA develop a strategy to restore the  planned geostationary advanced sounding capability that was removed  from the GOES-R program in order to allow high-temporal and high- vertical resolution measurements of temperature and water vapor. As  part of that strategy, the report recommended that NOAA work with NASA  to complete a demonstration satellite in the near term.
subsections: section_title: NOAA Plans to Fulfill Requirements for Current Products
paragraphs: In light of the cancellation of the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite,  NOAA decided to use the planned Advanced Baseline Imager to develop  the products that are currently produced by the GOES satellite sounders  now in orbit. In mid-2006, NOAA compared the imager’s anticipated  capabilities with the legacy GOES sounder instrument and reported that  the advanced imager would be able to produce the necessary data 20 times  faster than the legacy sounder and with comparable or better spatial  resolution. However, NOAA also reported that the advanced imager will be  less accurate than the legacy sounder for four of the seven product groups.  Table 10 compares the capabilities of the Advanced Baseline Imager with  the legacy sounder in seven product groups.
In an effort to obtain consensus from the GOES user community, NOAA  briefed sounding experts on the Advanced Baseline Imager’s ability to  develop products currently produced by the legacy GOES sounder. These  experts included representatives from the National Weather Service; the  National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Services; the  Department of Defense’s satellite data processing centers; academia; and  attendees at a weather-related conference. NOAA reported that users  accepted this plan as a suitable alternative until an advanced sounder  could be flown on the GOES series. NOAA noted that users were pleased  with the anticipated improvements in refresh rates.
While satellite data users were eager to obtain faster refresh rates, recent  contract changes have since reduced these expected rates. As previously  reported, when the program office reconciled its cost estimate with the  independent estimate, the program removed or reduced selected  capabilities from the ground segment project. One of the reduced  capabilities was the refresh rates for most of the products. Instead of  refresh rates that are 20 times faster, current plans call for refresh rates  that are only 2 to 4 times faster than current products. The faster refresh  rates are now options in the contract.
section_title: NOAA Assessed Alternatives for Addressing Requirements for Advanced Products but Has Not Yet Defined Its Plans
paragraphs: In addition to efforts to address the requirements for existing products  that were removed with the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite, NOAA,  NASA, and the Department of Defense assessed alternatives for obtaining  advanced sounding and coastal waters imaging products from a  geostationary orbit. The options include placing an advanced instrument  on a stand-alone satellite or on later GOES satellites. The results of the  analysis recommended that NOAA work with NASA to develop a  demonstration sounder to fly on an as-yet undetermined satellite in order  to build a foundation for an eventual operational advanced sounder on a  future GOES satellite. For coastal waters imaging, the analysis  recommended that, in the near-term, NOAA evaluate a hyperspectral  imager that is planned to be included on the International Space Station  and that NOAA and NASA coordinate to identify and evaluate other  options for the future. NOAA plans to assess the technical feasibility of  various options and to have the National Research Council make  recommendations on long-term options for coastal waters imaging.
However, NOAA has not defined plans or a timeline for implementing any  of the options or for addressing the requirements for advanced products.  Further, agency officials were unable to estimate when they would  establish plans to fulfill the requirements. Doing so would include  justifying the funding for any new initiatives within the agency’s  investment decision process. Until a decision is made on whether and how  to proceed in providing the advanced products, key system users such as  the National Weather Service will not be able to meet their goals for  improving the lead times or accuracy of severe weather warnings,  including warnings for tornadoes and hurricanes. Further, climate  research organizations will not obtain the data they need to enhance the  science of climate, coastal, environmental, and oceanic observations.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The GOES-R satellite series is now in development, but program costs  have increased, schedules have been delayed, and the scope of the  program has been reduced. Unless the program exercises contract  options, key benefits in terms of new products and faster data updates will  not be realized. In addition, recent events make it likely that schedules will  continue to slip. Any delays in the launch of the first satellite in the   GOES-R program increase the risk of gaps in satellite coverage.
The program office has made repeated and continuing efforts to learn  from problems experienced on other satellite programs, but more can be  done in selected areas. Specifically, the program has improved the  technical readiness of key components, adopted many sound estimating  practices, implemented an earned value management process for  overseeing contracts, and is obtaining executive-level oversight. However,  the program’s approach to earned value management has shortfalls. The  program did not perform a comprehensive review after rebaselining a  critical instrument—the Advanced Baseline Imager—and has not  documented the reasons for all cost overruns. Until these issues are  addressed, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES-R program will  repeat the cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that  have plagued other satellite programs.
In addition, while the GOES-R program office plans to recover existing  product capabilities that were lost when a critical sensor was removed  from the satellites, NOAA has not yet developed a plan or a timeline for  recovering the advanced capabilities that were removed. Doing so would  include justifying whether and how to proceed in fulfilling the advanced  requirements. Until such decisions and plans are made, the geostationary  satellite user community may not be able to make significant  improvements in their severe weather forecasts.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve NOAA’s ability to effectively manage the GOES-R program, we  recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA  Administrator to ensure that the following three actions are taken:    As part of any effort to rebaseline the cost and schedule of the Advanced  Baseline Imager, perform an integrated baseline review and ensure that  the review includes an assessment of key schedule milestones, the  adequacy of resources, task and technical planning, and management  processes.
Improve the agency’s ability to oversee contractor performance by  ensuring that the reasons for cost and schedule variances are fully  disclosed and documented.
If feasible and justified, develop a plan and timeline for recovering the  advanced capabilities that were removed from the program when the  Hyperspectral Environmental Suite was cancelled.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of  Commerce’s Acting Secretary stated that the report did a fair and thorough  job of assessing the status of the GOES-R program and NOAA’s efforts to  leverage lessons learned from similar programs. The department agreed  with our findings and recommendations and outlined steps it is taking to  implement them. For example, the department stated that NOAA will  perform an integrated baseline review on the Advanced Baseline Imager,  as part of any effort to rebaseline its cost and schedule, and that the  GOES-R program office will ensure full disclosure of cost and schedule  variances. The department also provided technical comments on the  report, which we incorporated as appropriate. The department’s  comments are provided in appendix II.
In addition, NASA’s Associate Administrator for the Science Mission  Directorate provided written comments on a draft of this report. In those  comments, the Associate Administrator stated that the report is complete  and accurate in its assessment of NASA’s participation in the GOES-R  program. The department’s comments are provided in appendix III.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of NASA, the  Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other interested  parties. The report also will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site  at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at pownerd@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major  contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to (1) determine the status of the Geostationary  Operational Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-R) program, (2)  evaluate whether the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s  (NOAA) plans for the GOES-R acquisition address problems experienced  on similar programs, and (3) determine whether NOAA’s plan to address  the capabilities that were planned for the satellites, but then removed, will  be adequate to support current data requirements.
To determine the program’s status, we evaluated various programmatic  and technical plans, management reports, and other program  documentation. We reviewed the spacecraft and ground segment requests  for proposals, cost and schedule estimates, contractor performance  reports on instrument development, planned system requirements, and  monthly executive-level management briefings. We also interviewed NOAA  and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) officials from  the GOES-R program office.
To evaluate whether NOAA’s acquisition plans address problems  experienced on similar programs, we identified lessons learned from other  major space acquisitions by reviewing prior GAO reports and interviewing  space acquisition experts. We compared these lessons learned with  relevant program and contractor documents and risk lists. Key lessons  were related to technical readiness, cost and schedule estimates, program  management, and executive-level involvement. Specific steps in each of  these areas are as follows:    Technical readiness: We reviewed program, flight project, and ground  segment risks, and instrument technical reviews.
Cost and schedule estimates: We identified the process used to develop  NOAA’s cost estimate by reviewing the program cost estimate, the Cost  Analysis Requirements Document, and program cost estimate briefings.  We then compared NOAA’s process with the 12 steps of a high-quality cost  estimating process identified in our cost estimating guide. For each step,  we assessed whether the GOES-R estimate fully met, partially met, or did  not meet the practices associated with a sound cost estimate. We also  interviewed government and contractor cost estimating officials.
Program management: We analyzed the program’s risk management plan,  risk lists, cost performance reports, and integrated baseline reviews.
Executive-level involvement: We analyzed the program’s management  control plan, attended NOAA and NASA executive council meetings and  reviewed the program’s briefings to executives at both agencies. We also  discussed these topics with appropriate agency officials.
To determine the adequacy of NOAA’s plans to address the capabilities  that were removed from the program, we identified the requirements for  existing and advanced products that were associated with the cancelled  Hyperspectral Environmental Suite instrument. We reviewed agency plans  to fulfill requirements for the existing products and the analysis  supporting this decision. We compared this analysis with an external  scientific publication and interviewed satellite data users about the  implications of plans to use the Advanced Baseline Imager to provide  legacy products. To assess NOAA’s plans to fulfill requirements for  advanced products, we reviewed NOAA’s analysis of options for  addressing the advanced products, as well as National Research Council  reports on priorities in satellite observation. We also interviewed satellite  data users, including forecasters and modelers from the National Weather  Service, and satellite data processing experts from the National  Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service.
We performed our work at NOAA and NASA offices in the Washington,  D.C., metropolitan area. We conducted this performance audit from May  2008 to April 2009, in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Colleen M. Phillips, Assistant  Director; Carol Cha; William Carrigg; Neil Doherty; Franklin Jackson;  Kaelin Kuhn; Lee McCracken; Adam Vodraska; and Eric Winter made key  contributions to this report.