Space Station: Actions Under Way to Manage Cost, but Significant Challenges Remain
Published: 2002-07-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) revealed that the cost to complete assembly of the international space station has risen from $25 billion to $30 billion. Much of that cost growth is due to inadequate definition of requirements, changes in program content, schedule delays, and poor program oversight. Weaknesses in the program's cost-estimating process call into question the credibility of NASA's plans to carry out its budget through fiscal year 2006. The cost growth has also severely affected the space station's ability to conduct scientific research. NASA has instituted several management and cost-estimating reforms, including a life-cycle cost estimate, a program management plan, and a reprioritized science program. However, significant challenges remain. Preparation of the life-cycle cost estimate may be difficult because NASA's financial management system is unable to adequately track space station costs. Many tasks and studies being undertaken will not be completed until September 2002, leaving NASA with little time to incorporate its results into its budget for fiscal year 2004. Finally, NASA has yet to reach an agreement with its international partners on an acceptable on-orbit configuration, the sharing of research facilities, and cost sharing.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has reportedly  spent about $20 billion for developing and operating the International  Space Station, but faces many challenges in completing the development of  a station that will meet program objectives. The estimated cost to develop  the space station has increased by about $13 billion since 1995 while the  schedule has slipped about 4 years. Most recently, the agency revealed that  the estimated cost to complete assembly had increased by about $5  billion—from about $25 billion to about $30 billion. This reported cost- growth estimate might not be reliable, however, because NASA does not  have good cost-accounting systems or practices.
The estimated cost growth is having a profound effect on the utility of the  space station—namely, through substantial cutbacks in construction, the  number of crewmembers, and scientific research. Moreover, the severity of  these reductions has raised concerns among NASA’s international partners  and the scientific community about the viability of the program. In view of  the concerns surrounding the cost growth, you asked that we (1) identify  the reasons for the cost increase and analyze the mechanisms that should  have alerted NASA to the cost increase and the need for mitigation plans,  (2) assess the impact of the cost growth on the utility of the U.S. science  program, (3) identify the corrective actions planned by NASA, and (4)  provide any preliminary observations on the feasibility and status of  NASA's actions to mitigate the problem.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: NASA and its international partners (Canada, Europe, Japan, and Russia)  are building the space station as a permanently orbiting laboratory to  conduct materials and life sciences research and earth observations and to  provide for commercial utilization and related uses under nearly weightless  conditions. Each partner is providing hardware and crewmembers and  each is expected to share operating costs and use of the station. The  program’s highest-priority goals are to (1) maintain a permanent human  presence in space, (2) conduct world-class research in space, and (3)  enhance international cooperation and U.S. leadership through  international development and operations of the space station.
The technical achievements of the station program have been exceptional.  Assembly of the space station began in November 1998 with the launch of  the U.S.-funded, Russian-built Zarya module, followed by the launch of the  U.S. Unity module in December 1998. The station’s occupancy began in  October 2000 with the launch of the Expedition I crew. Since then, four  other three-person crews have occupied the station while assembly  continues. In addition, the crews have been conducting hands-on scientific  research. Figure 1 shows the International Space Station on-orbit.
Since its inception in 1984, the space station has undergone a number of  redesigns and has been mired by cost growth and schedule slips. In January  2001, NASA announced that an additional $4 billion in funding over the  next 5 years would be required to complete the station’s assembly and fund  its operation. By May 2001 the estimated cost growth had increased to $4.8  billion. In response to the announcement, the administration directed  NASA to take a number of actions, including terminating the propulsion  module, deferring the habitation module, deferring the crew return vehicle,  and reducing funding for scientific research to stay within the President’s  budget projections.
The President’s fiscal year 2002 budget blueprint and budget request for the  space station lay out a strategy for containing cost growth that ensures the  completion of the U.S. core station and deploys the elements of the  program’s international partners. To achieve this strategy, NASA was  required to construct a plan of action that addressed institutional and  program reforms to establish processes for executing the baseline  program.
In July 2001, the NASA Administrator appointed the International Space  Station Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force to conduct an  independent external review and assessment of the station’s cost, budget,  and management. The Administrator also asked the task force to provide  recommendations that could provide maximum benefit to the U.S.  taxpayers and the international partners within the President’s budget  request. The task force reported its findings to the NASA Advisory Council  in November 2001.
In response to the task force’s recommendations, NASA is undertaking a  number of initiatives to restore credibility to the station program. In  addition, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), with input from  NASA, is developing criteria that are to be used for measuring progress  toward achieving a credible program.
OMB has imposed a 2-year “probation” period on NASA to provide time to  reestablish the space station program’s credibility. Activities that are to  take place during this period include establishing a technical baseline and a  life-cycle cost estimate for the remainder of the program, prioritizing the  core complete science program, and reaching an agreement with the  international partners on the station’s final configuration and capabilities.  NASA is working toward completing these activities by September 2002 in  order to include results in its budget request for fiscal year 2004.
Over the past 8 years, we have performed a body of work that highlighted  the space station program’s cost growth and weaknesses in cost control. In  addition, we have pointed out weaknesses in the agency’s financial  management system as well as inadequate contract management oversight.  Appendix II lists prior GAO reports and testimonies related to the space  station program.
section_title: Reasons for Cost Increases and Mechanisms That Should Have Alerted NASA Management
paragraphs: According to NASA officials, as a consequence of the inadequate definition  of requirements, changes in program content, schedule delays, and  inadequate program oversight, the estimated development cost of the  space station has grown by about $13 billion since 1995 of which about $5  billion is attributable to growth since the fiscal year 2001 estimate.  However, the agency could not associate specific amounts of the estimated  growth with the reasons cited. The program did not utilize available cost  control tools to monitor and contain the growth and ignored NASA’s  guidance in many cases. In addition, because of its focus on managing  annual budgets, NASA failed to heed indicators of future cost growth that  contributed to the uncertainty regarding the ultimate cost of the space  station.
subsections: section_title: Reasons for Cost Growth
paragraphs: One of the major reasons for the cost growth was NASA’s inadequate  definition of requirements. For example, NASA originally estimated that  500,000 source-lines-of-code of space flight software would be required for  the station’s operations. However, that estimate has now tripled to 1.5  million lines of code. In addition, NASA assumed that it could rely on  computer simulations as opposed to rigorous ground testing to integrate  the hardware and software of the various elements. However, program  schedule slips permitted additional ground testing, which discovered  significant integration problems that escaped notice during the computer  simulations. As a result, the program established a more rigorous  multielement integrated testing program.
Changes in program content also contributed to the cost growth. A  significant item of cost was introduced to the program in 1997 through the  addition of the requirement for a crew return vehicle. NASA had planned to  use two Russian Soyuz vehicles, each with a maximum capacity of three  crewmembers, attached to the station for emergency crew return after  achieving permanent six-person crew capability. However, NASA later  determined that the Soyuz vehicle did not meet the requirements necessary  to return an ill or injured crewmember. Thus, the program was modified to  require a U.S.-built crew rescue capability for returning seven  crewmembers at an estimated total cost of about $1.5 billion. Also, because  of Russian funding problems that delayed the service module’s launch,  NASA took on an additional development effort in fiscal year 1997 to guard  against Russian nonperformance. The actions became collectively known  as Russian Program Assurance and included an interim control module and  a U.S. propulsion module in the event the Russians could not supply the  service module and propellant logistics flights. By February 2001, Russian  Program Assurance had added $1.3 billion in total estimated cost through  fiscal year 2006.
Schedule delays increased costs because, at a minimum, fixed costs such  as salaries, contractor overhead, and sustaining engineering continued for  a longer period than planned. When the space station was redesigned in  1993, NASA established May 1997 as the launch date for the first element  and June 2002 as the assembly’s completion date. However, the first  element was not launched until November 1998. By August 2000, the  assembly complete date had slipped to April 2006—a total slip of 46  months. On the basis of NASA’s projected spending rate, the program  incurred an additional cost of about $100 million for every month of  schedule slippage.
The magnitude of the cost growth began to surface in the spring of 2000  during program operating plan reviews in preparation of the fiscal year  2002 budget request. Following the program operating plan reviews, the  program manager ordered a detailed assessment of costs to more  specifically determine funding requirements through fiscal year 2006.
Table 1 shows some of the major events leading up to the identification of  the space station’s cost growth. The table illustrates that the program office  did not have a credible cost-estimating capability, as the cost estimate  changed and grew as the office continued to uncover additional growth  areas.
section_title: Mechanisms to Address Cost Growth Were Not Utilized or Were Ignored
paragraphs: NASA has controls in place that should have alerted management to the  growing cost problem and the need for mitigating action. These include  guidance requiring cost management on a project, and cost and risk  modeling capabilities. However, the management and cost evaluation task  force and the supporting studies found that NASA did not utilize or ignored  many cost control mechanisms because of its focus on fiscal year budget  management rather than on total program cost management.
NASA guidance requires that life-cycle cost be estimated, assessed, and  controlled throughout a program’s life cycle. The estimates are to be  prepared to support major program reviews and the development of budget  submissions. A handbook instructs cost estimators in selecting a cost  model for use in the estimating process and on the proper documentation  of the results of the cost analysis.
NASA has considerable cost-modeling capability, including several cost  models and information related to the type of costing situations for which  they would be appropriate. A study performed by the Rand Corporation for  the Office of Science and Technology Policy, which supported the  management and cost evaluation task force, noted that NASA has “very  good” cost and risk modeling capabilities. However, the study found that  the in-house capabilities were not well integrated into the program’s  planning and management. Because of its short-term budget focus, the  program had been reluctant to integrate cost estimation and control  practices sufficiently robust to yield confidence in its budget estimates.
The management and cost evaluation task force found that the final space  station’s cost estimate at completion had not been a management criterion  within NASA. According to the task force, because of NASA’s focus on  executing the program within annual budgets, total cost and schedule  became variables. To stay within the annual budget limits, the program’s  basic content slipped, and total program cost grew. In addition, the cost  analysis team that supported the task force cited NASA’s culture of  managing the program to its annual budgets as perhaps the single greatest  factor in the program’s cost growth.
The management and cost evaluation task force made recommendations  aimed at restoring cost credibility to the program. Some of those  recommendations mirror requirements already contained in NASA  guidance, as follows:  Develop a life-cycle technical baseline to use as the basis for a formal  cost estimate.
Develop a full space station cost estimate using the Department of  Defense’s (DOD) cost assessment approach, including the use of a cost- analysis requirements document to document the assumptions and  results of the cost analysis.
Prepare an integrated program management plan delineating the work  to be accomplished, the work breakdown structure, required resources,  and schedules.
section_title: Impacts on Space Station’s Utility
paragraphs: In an effort to mitigate the effects of the large cost growth, NASA reduced  planned funding for space station research by about $1 billion for fiscal  years 2002 through 2006. The mitigation actions resulted in significant and  perhaps long-term reductions in the scope and capability of the station for  conducting scientific research. NASA proposed major changes in the  station’s design for fiscal year 2001 that resulted in fewer on-orbit scientific  facilities, and less research, and limited the crew available for conducting  research. The research communities, international partners, and recent  studies have raised concerns about the viability of the space station’s  science program.
subsections: section_title: Baseline Science Program Restructure
paragraphs: The restructured science program will provide fewer facilities needed for  conducting scientific research on board the space station. The station’s  baseline for fiscal year 2001 supported a crew of six to seven astronauts  and provided for the outfitting of 27 U.S. research facilities and experiment  modules for research in a range of science disciplines. Following the  announced cost growth, NASA’s Office of Biological and Physical Research,  Office of Space Flight, and the space station’s Payloads Office at the  Johnson Space Center initiated a program restructuring activity to align the  research program with the on-orbit capabilities and resources available.  This activity slowed down selected fiscal year 2001 expenditures to better  match the availability of resources for fiscal year 2002 and optimized the  scientific utilization of the reduced on-orbit capability. The reduction of  content to the revised baseline was not reconciled against standing  agreements with the program’s international partners.
The budget content for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 for the core-complete  station provides for the outfitting of 20 research facilities, known as  “racks,” leaving about one fourth of the previously planned racks and their  utilization unfunded. Some research disciplines were severely affected by  the fiscal year 2002 reduction. For example, significant experiments  planned to conduct research on materials such as metals, alloys, glasses,  and ceramics, and in biotechnology were canceled.
In addition to less hardware for research, there are constraints to  utilization of the science facilities principally because the station’s crew  size will be reduced from a planned seven to three. This will limit the  crewmember hours that can be devoted to research. For example,  astronauts will have limited time to be used as subjects in research on the  effects of space flight on humans. According to NASA officials, crew  research hours will be a major limiting factor on the number and  complexity of experiments after the arrival of the international partner  modules in 2004-2005, particularly constraining research that requires the  crew’s interaction. NASA officials stated that some crew interaction is  required for nearly all space station investigations. These activities include  testing, monitoring, sampling, instrument readings, completing  questionnaires, and recording results. NASA currently estimates that a  minimum of 2.5 crewmembers will be required for maintaining the station,  exclusive of their science-related duties during assembly.
NASA had planned that crew time for scientific research would be 100 +  hours per week, but the crewmember reduction would limit time to a  minimum of 20 hours per week. The 20-hour minimum threshold was  established by the space station program manager but has not been met.  Table 2 shows NASA’s calculation of how the 20 research hours per week  would be allocated among the station partners. NASA is looking at ways to  mitigate the impact of this reduction.
In addition to the funding-driven research cuts cited above, the United  States would receive less research capability from an existing major barter  arrangement with the Japanese. In return for NASA’s launch of the  Japanese Experiment Module, Japan is providing the centrifuge  accommodation module and centrifuge rotor, which are essential for  conducting controlled biological experiments. As a result of technical risk  and cost issues associated with the proposed design, NASA accepted a  Japanese Space Agency request to reduce the number of science habitats  supported from eight to four.
section_title: Concerns Over Science Restructure
paragraphs: The research communities and international partners are not satisfied with  reductions in the space station’s capabilities. In the fall of 2000, Congress  directed the National Research Council and the National Academy of  Public Administration to organize a joint study of the status of microgravity  research in the life and physical sciences as it relates to the station. In a  late 2001 report, the team concluded that the viability of the overall science  program in microgravity would be seriously jeopardized if the space  station’s capabilities were reduced below fiscal year 2001 levels and there  were no annual microgravity research dedicated shuttle flights. The study  found that the U.S. scientific community is ready now to use the space  station but that this readiness cannot be sustained if (1) proposed  reductions in the scientific capabilities occur, (2) slippage continues in  both the development and science utilization schedules for the space  station, or (3) uncertainties continue in funding for science facilities and  flight experiments on the space station. The study observed that readiness  is beginning to deteriorate and that it will continue to erode with further  delays in the completion of the space station. NASA officials stated that the  station’s international partners have major concerns regarding the  uncertainty that NASA will meet its international commitments for the  habitation function and crew rescue capability. According to NASA, the  partners have stated that a station configuration that provides for only  three crewmembers is unacceptable. NASA plans to develop an optional  space station configuration and hopefully obtain appropriate U.S. and  partner concurrence by November/December 2002.
Several recent studies and NASA’s actions highlight concerns regarding the  space station’s science program. The November 2001 report of the  management and cost evaluation task force found that the U.S. core  complete configuration as an end-state would not achieve the unique  research potential of the space station. A December 2001 NASA  Independent Implementation Review found that budget reductions, crew  hour limitations, and the realization of other resource constraints have all  significantly reduced the anticipated space station research content in  terms of quality and quantity. For example, there are fewer flight  investigations and tests, and some science disciplines cannot achieve  planned program goals. In addition, the scientific community and the  international partners have raised concerns. The research reductions, if not  mitigated, may jeopardize the scientific community/partner’s capacity for  conducting high value research.
section_title: Reforms Are Under Way or Planned
paragraphs: NASA has several institutional and program reforms under way to respond  to the management and cost evaluation task force’s recommendations and  to bring cost-estimating credibility to the space station program.  Specifically, the agency is preparing a life-cycle cost estimate, developing a  plan to strengthen program management and controls, and reprioritizing  the station’s science program. NASA is attempting to complete many of  these tasks by September 2002 to influence its fiscal year 2004 budget  submission.
subsections: section_title: Cost-Estimating and Program Management Reforms
paragraphs: In July 2001, NASA developed a plan that described the actions that the  agency believed were required to respond to the President’s budget  blueprint requirements, defined conditions for closing the actions, and  provided for OMB to monitor NASA’s progress in implementing the  reforms. The plan called for measures to improve cost-management and  cost-estimating accuracy, such as metrics designed to alert management to  pending problems, including an early warning system for potential cost  growth, and the establishment of a cost-estimating capability to take  advantage of the latest estimating and management tools and techniques.
To strengthen the cost-estimating and control function, the program office  is also establishing a management information system and hiring cost  estimators. An interim management information system will be used  initially, and the permanent system is to be available by March 2003 during  the implementation of a key component of the Integrated Financial  Management Program at the Johnson Space Center. The program office has  the authority to hire 10 estimators, which it plans to use to establish a cost- estimating capability in the station’s program office. NASA is in the process  of preparing its life-cycle cost estimate using the DOD cost assessment  approach and plans to have it completed in early August 2002. An  independent team headed by a DOD Cost Analysis Improvement Group  official will prepare an independent cost estimate, also scheduled for  completion in August 2002. The in-house and independent cost estimates  will then be reconciled.
The program office is also developing a plan to strengthen program  management and controls. According to NASA officials, cost, schedule, and  technical reviews will be implemented to provide the program manager  with an early warning of potential problems, such as cost growth and  budget overruns. The program will also develop risk analysis tools and  improve risk system and cost integration.
section_title: Science Program Reprioritizing
paragraphs: NASA is also taking steps to reprioritize the science to be performed on the  space station. In consultation with the White House Office of Science and  Technology Policy and OMB, NASA has assembled an ad-hoc external  advisory committee to assist the agency in prioritizing its entire research  program, including both station-based research as well as nonstation-based  research. Consistent with recommendations from the management and  cost evaluation task force, NASA is attempting to place the highest priority  on investigations requiring access to the space environment. The scientific  community will have representation on the ad-hoc committee and will  therefore be involved in helping to reestablish science objectives and  improving scientific productivity.
The research advisory committee’s charter is to evaluate and validate high- priority science and technology research that will maximize the research  returns within the available resources. It plans to (1) assess the degree to  which key research objectives can or should be addressed by the space  station, (2) identify and assess how options among the key research  objectives would change if the station remains at the U.S. core-complete  configuration or evolves with additional funding, and (3) recommend  modification or addition to the Office of Biological and Physical Research’s  goals and objectives. In addition, the advisory committee will also identify  and recommend criteria that can be used to implement specific research  activities and programs on the basis of priorities. According to a NASA  official, the agency plans to report the advisory committee’s findings to  OMB in August 2002. The report is to include the prioritized research  program and the roadmap to getting there. NASA’s goal is to reflect the  science research priorities in its fiscal year 2004 budget submission.
section_title: Challenges Ahead
paragraphs: Successfully completing these initiatives is vitally important, since they are  integral to providing Congress and agency decision makers with the  information they need to make decisions on the future of the space station.  But there are significant challenges facing NASA in completing them.
NASA’s milestones provide for almost no slippage. Specifically, the  preparation of a reliable life-cycle cost estimate may be difficult because  NASA currently lacks a modern integrated financial management system to  track and maintain data needed for estimating and controlling costs. Such a  system was not available when NASA prepared the $4.8 billion cost growth  estimate and thus the accuracy of that estimate is questionable. The NASA  Administrator has established the integrated financial management  program as one of his top priorities. The successful implementation of the  first major component, the core financial system, by June 2003 is critical to  the agency’s ability to control costs. In addition, many tasks and studies  being undertaken will not be completed until September 2002, leaving  NASA with a very short time frame to incorporate its results into the 2004  budget. These include NASA’s study and independent validation of life- cycle costs, its assessment of long-and short-term options for increasing  the station’s crew complement, and its assessment of how research can be  maximized with limited deliveries of samples and equipment. (Deliveries  would be limited because NASA plans to reduce space shuttle flights from  seven to four per year.)
Lastly, NASA has not yet reached agreements with its international partners  on an acceptable on-orbit configuration as well as how research facilities  and costs should be shared. Such agreements are important not only to  reach a decision on the end-state of the space station but also to strengthen  support of the program’s international partners.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: NASA is at a critical juncture with the space station program. Because of  the cost growth, the program is essentially unable to carry out the full  intent of its original objectives. This has raised concerns from NASA’s  international partners. To begin working through this dilemma, NASA must  first develop a credible budget for the core-complete station, define a  station configuration that will be acceptable to the international partners,  and obtain OMB’s approval. This is a difficult endeavor in itself, since NASA  is facing a highly compressed schedule and does not have an integrated  system for estimating and controlling costs. The agency is attempting to  use the latest estimating and management tools and techniques but needs  accurate, detailed cost data and the ability to compare resulting estimates  with actual costs. If NASA cannot succeed with a viable budget for fiscal  year 2004, it will jeopardize the opportunity for Congress and the  administration to regain confidence in the program.
If NASA does succeed with the fiscal year 2004 budget, it still faces  considerable challenges with the space station program. In the short run, it  must successfully work with its international partners to decide how to  best use the resources that remain available to the program. This is a  significant challenge because it involves prioritizing research programs for  which partners already have a vested interest. Moreover, in the long run,  NASA must find ways to make sure that the restructured program stays on  track. This not only means making sure that the root causes of problems  that have plagued the program are sufficiently addressed, but that any  schedule slippage or cost growth is immediately addressed and that  oversight mechanisms already in place are vigilantly adhered to.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, NASA’s Associate Deputy  Administrator for Institutions said that the report represents the issues and  actions taken to address cost growth. He also stated that other external  reviews are scheduled for September 2002 and that continued evaluations  by GAO would be appreciated.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the reasons for the cost growth, we evaluated previous  internal and independent analyses of the space station’s cost growth. We  also interviewed NASA officials regarding cost estimates and the process  by which cost information is studied and communicated throughout NASA.
To assess program oversight mechanisms, we reviewed NASA’s policies and  procedures governing program management. We also interviewed  procurement and program management officials to identify specific tools  used in the program’s oversight and assessed the extent to which the  program relies on contractor inputs to perform its internal cost analyses.
To assess the impacts of cost reduction proposals on the space station’s  utility, we evaluated the minutes from Space Station Utilization Advisory  Subcommittee meetings, along with internal and external studies on the  effects of cost reduction proposals on station research activities. In  addition, we reviewed a report by the National Research Council related to  the research capabilities of the space station. We also interviewed  cognizant program officials and officials within the research community.
To accomplish our work, we visited NASA headquarters, Washington, D.C;  Johnson Space Center, Texas; and Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama.  We also coordinated our work with independent and NASA-internal teams  performing space station program reviews.
We conducted our work from June 2001 through April 2002 in accordance  with generally accepted government standards.
Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further  distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we  will send copies to the NASA Administrator; the Director, Office of  Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will also make  copies available to others on request. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staffs have any questions  about this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix  III.
section_title: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
section_title: Prior GAO Reports and Testimonies Related to the International Space Station Program
paragraphs: NASA: Compliance With Cost Limits Cannot Be Verified. GAO-02-504R.  Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2002.
NASA: Leadership and Systems Needed to Effect Financial Management  Improvements. GAO-02-551T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 20, 2002.
NASA: International Space Station and Shuttle Support Cost Limits.  GAO-01-100R. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2001.
Space Station: Inadequate Planning and Design Led to Propulsion  Module Project Failure. GAO-01-633. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2001.
Space Station: Russian-Built Zarya and Service Module Compliance With  Safety Requirements. GAO/NSIAD-00-96R. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2000.
Space Station: Russian Compliance with Safety Requirements. GAO/T- NSIAD-00-128. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2000.
Space Station: Russian Commitment and Cost Control Problems.  GAO/NSIAD-99-175. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 17, 1999.
Space Station: Cost to Operate After Assembly Is Uncertain. GAO/NSIAD- 99-177. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6, 1999.
Space Station: Status of Russian Involvement and Cost Control Efforts.  GAO/T-NSIAD-99-117. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 1999.
Space Station: U.S. Life-Cycle Funding Requirements. GAO/T-NSIAD-98- 212. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 1998.
International Space Station: U.S. Life-Cycle Funding Requirements.  GAO/NSIAD-98-147. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 1998.
Space Station: Cost Control Problems. GAO/T-NSIAD-98-54. Washington,  D.C.: Nov. 5, 1997.
Space Station: Deteriorating Cost and Schedule Performance Under the  Prime Contract. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-262. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 1997.
Space Station: Cost Control Problems Are Worsening. GAO/NSIAD-97-213.  Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 1997.
NASA: Major Management Challenges. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-178. Washington,  D.C.: July 24, 1997.
Space Station: Cost Control Problems Continue to Worsen. GAO/T-NSIAD- 97-177. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 1997.
Space Station: Cost Control Difficulties Continue. GAO/T-NSIAD-96-210.  Washington, D.C.: July 24, 1996.
Space Station: Cost Control Difficulties Continue. GAO/NSIAD-96-135.  Washington, D.C.: July 17, 1996.
Space Station: Estimated Total U.S. Funding Requirements. GAO/NSIAD- 95-163. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 1995.
Space Station: Update on the Impact of the Expanded Russian Role.  GAO/NSIAD-94-248. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 1994.
Space Station: Impact of the Expanded Russian Role on Funding and  Research. GAO/NSIAD-94-220. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 1994.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: Jerry Herley, James Beard, Fred Felder, Erin Baker, Cristina Chaplain,  Belinda LaValle, and John Gilchrist made key contributions to this report.
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