Depot Maintenance: Additional Information Needed to Meet DOD's Core Capability Reporting Requirements
Published: 2013-02-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD uses both military depots and contractors to maintain many complex weapon systems and equipment. Recognizing the key role of the depots and the risk of overreliance on contractors, Section 2464 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code requires DOD to maintain a core maintenance capability--a combination of personnel, facilities, equipment, processes, and technology (expressed in direct labor hours) that is government-owned and government-operated--needed to meet contingency and emergency requirements. Section 2464 directs DOD to provide a Biennial Core Report to Congress and include three elements: (1) core capability requirements, (2) planned workloads, and (3) explanations and mitigation plans for any shortfalls between core capability requirements and planned workloads. In response to a requirement in Section 2464, GAO assessed the extent to which the report complied with the statute and included supporting information from the services as required by DOD. GAO reviewed relevant legislation, DOD's 2012 Biennial Core Report, the services' submissions to support the report, and related DOD guidance.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense's (DOD) 2012 Biennial Core Report complies with two of the three biennial reporting elements of Section 2464 by including information on core capability requirements and planned workloads available for maintaining these requirements. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reported core capability requirements totaling about 70 million direct labor hours for the military services. Also, OSD reported a total of about 92 million direct labor hours for planned workloads with an estimated cost of about $12 billion. OSD reported complete information on core requirements and planned workload at the top-level categories, such as Sea Ships, of the work breakdown structure. The statute directs that this information be organized by work breakdown structure, which is a group of categories of equipment and technologies. The top-level category--an entire type of system or equipment--can be broken down into lower levels of detail or subcategories, such as Aircraft Carriers or Submarines, that make up the system or equipment. DOD's overall planned workloads exceed its core capability requirements, but the report shows shortfalls in certain categories for the Army and the Air Force.
The report partially complies with the third biennial reporting element. DOD's report includes information on shortfalls at the top-level categories and plans to mitigate all shortfalls--where requirements exceed planned workload--identified in the report. However, the report does not include required information on the rationale for some of these shortfalls--reasons why the services do not have the workload to meet core requirements. The Navy and Marine Corps did not identify any shortfalls and were not required to provide explanations or mitigation plans. The report includes mitigation plans for shortfalls identified by the Army and the Air Force but does not always provide detailed explanations for why the Army and Air Force do not have sufficient planned workload to meet core requirements. The report does not always include detailed explanations for identified workload shortfalls, because the Army and Air Force did not always provide explanations for them. Without reporting clear explanations for why the services have shortfalls, Congress does not have visibility on whether the services' plans to correct or mitigate the shortfalls will address the cause of the shortfalls.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD improve its Biennial Core Report by including detailed explanations of why the services do not have the workload to meet core maintenance requirements for each identified shortfall. In written comments on a draft of the report, DOD concurred with the recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains many complex weapon  systems—such as aircraft and ships—and equipment—such as  generators and radars—that require regular and emergency maintenance  to continue being available for DOD to meet national security goals. To  sustain these systems and equipment, at the depot level, the department  uses a combination of military depots—public-sector facilities that are  government-owned and government-operated—and private-sector  contractors. Depots play a key role in sustaining the complex weapon  systems and equipment both in peacetime and during surge conditions  like those created by the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Through these  depots, DOD has what is referred to as the “capability” to perform needed  repair work by maintaining a combination of skilled personnel, facilities,  equipment, processes, and technology for each category of maintenance  work being done.
Pub. L. No. 98-525 § 307 (1984). This section was originally codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2304  (note). competence and resources to ensure effective and timely response to  mobilizations, contingencies, or other emergencies and assign these government-owned and operated facilities (the depots)   to ensure that the department can maintain cost  sufficient workloadefficiency and technical competence during peacetime while  preserving the ability to respond to a mobilization, contingency, or  emergency.
DOD has a process to implement this statutory requirement in which the  services are required to use a computational methodology to identify their  essential core capability requirements and the planned workloads to help  support this core maintenance capability. The services are then required  to submit biennially to the Secretary of Defense an internal report that  summarizes the results of this process and identified shortfalls between  requirements and planned workload.
In 2009, we reported that DOD, through this internal biennial reporting  process, had not comprehensively and accurately assessed whether it  had the required core maintenance capability to support systems  currently in use in the military depots. We found, among other things,  that DOD’s method of compiling and internally reporting core capability  requirements and planned workloads did not reveal shortfalls between the  requirements and the planned workloads for specific categories of  weapon systems or equipment that we had identified. Further, we found  that Congress lacked visibility into DOD’s process, because there was no  requirement for DOD to provide its Biennial Core Report to Congress. We  recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology and Logistics take several actions related to improving the  Biennial Core Report, including requiring DOD to compile and report the  services’ core capability requirements, planned workloads, and any  shortfalls in workloads by work breakdown structure category.included a matter for congressional consideration to require DOD to  provide this report to Congress. Appendix II provides more information on  our recommendations and actions DOD has taken to implement them.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 Section 2464 to require DOD to, among other things, submit to Congress  a biennial report, no later than April 1 of each even-numbered year. The  statute states that DOD is required to identify the following three items for  each military service, for the subsequent fiscal year:  1.  The core depot-level maintenance and repair capability requirements  and sustaining workloads, organized by work breakdown structure  expressed in direct labor hours.  2.  The corresponding workloads necessary to sustain core depot-level  maintenance and repair capability requirements, expressed in direct  labor hours and cost.   3.  In any case where core depot-level maintenance and repair capability  requirements exceed or are expected to exceed sustaining workloads,  a detailed rationale for the shortfall and a plan either to correct or  mitigate the effects of the shortfall.
In this report, we summarized these three elements as: (1) the required  workload to sustain core maintenance capability; (2) the planned  workload available; and (3) in any case where the required workload  exceeds the planned workload—where there is a shortfall—a detailed  explanation of why planned workload is insufficient and a plan to fix the  effects of the shortfall.
Pub. L. No.112-81, § 327 (2011). requires us to provide findings and recommendations after DOD submits  its report to Congress. DOD submitted its first Biennial Core Report to  Congress on September 4, 2012, and we also received the report on that  date.
In response to the mandate, we reviewed the extent to which the report  complies with the statutory requirements and is complete. To assess the  extent to which DOD’s 2012 Biennial Core Report complies with Section  2464, we analyzed the text of the report and obtained information on the  process by which DOD identified its essential core capability  requirements and the workloads needed to support this core maintenance  capability for fiscal year 2013. In those cases where we had determined  that the report did not include a required element, we discussed our  preliminary analyses with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)  and military service officials to seek additional information. To assess the  report’s level of completeness, we obtained and analyzed the data and  other information that OSD required the military service headquarters to  submit in support of the report.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to February 2013  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We discuss our scope and  methodology in more detail in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Determining Core Maintenance Capability
paragraphs: DOD Instruction 4151.20 prescribes a “depot maintenance core  capabilities determination process” to identify, in part, the (1) required  core capabilities for depot maintenance and (2) planned workloads  needed to support those capabilities. The instruction describes a series of  mathematical computations and adjustments, which the military services  use to compute their core capability requirements and to identify planned  workloads needed to support these requirements. First, the services  identify the weapon systems required to execute the Joint Chiefs of Staff  contingency scenarios, which represent plans for responding to conflicts  that may occur in the future. After the systems are identified, the services  compute annual depot maintenance capability requirements for  peacetime in direct labor hours to represent the amount of time they  regularly take to perform required maintenance. Then contingency  requirements and resource adjustments are made to account for  applicable surge factors during the different phases of a contingency,  such as preparation/readiness and sustainment. Further adjustments are  made to account for redundancy in depot capability. For example, a  service may determine that repair capabilities for specific systems  maintained in military depots are so similar that the capabilities for one  system can effectively satisfy the requirements of another. Core capability  requirements are also adjusted when one service’s maintenance  requirements will be supported by the maintenance capabilities of other  services.
During this process of identifying the systems for which they will be  required to maintain repair capabilities, the services organize and  aggregate their capability data by categories of equipment and  technologies known as work breakdown structure categories. The work  breakdown structure provides a way for DOD to break down a category of  weapon system or equipment into subcategories of its parts at  increasingly lower levels of detail. The work breakdown structure can be  expressed at any level of detail down to the lowest-level part, such as a  bolt. These categories, the programs or systems they include, and the  lower-level elements or subcategories of defense materiel or equipment  into which they are broken down are referred to by DOD as “levels of  indenture.” There are eleven categories at the top level—“first” level—of  the work breakdown structure. A first-level category summarizes  information for an entire type of system or equipment, such as aircraft or  ground vehicles. Table 1 shows the eleven first-level categories of the  work breakdown structure.
A first-level category can be broken down into second-level  subcategories, which are the major elements that make up the system or  equipment in the first-level category. For example, the first-level category  for Aircraft can be broken down into the second-level subcategories for  Airframes, Aircraft Components, and Aircraft Engines, which are major  elements that make up an aircraft. The second-level subcategories can  be further broken down into third-level subcategories, which are  subordinate elements that make up the major elements in the second- level categories. For example, the second-level subcategory for Airframes  is further divided into the third-level subcategories—different types of  airframes, such as Rotary, Fighter/Attack, or Bomber. The subcategories  can be further broken down to the lowest-level element of the system.  Table 2 shows an example of the top three levels of the work breakdown  structure for Aircraft.
After the services have identified their core capability requirements, they  identify the amount of available planned workload within the work  breakdown structure categories and subcategories.
section_title: Reporting Core Maintenance Capability
paragraphs: DOD Instruction 4151.20 requires the military services to report biennially  to OSD their core capability requirements and planned workloads, in  accordance with a tasking memorandum issued for each reporting cycle.  The instruction includes a worksheet that the services must fill out and  submit to OSD. The worksheet calls for information to be organized by  the work breakdown structure to various subcategory levels, mostly at the  second-level subcategories. Appendix III provides a table listing these  categories and subcategories.
On April 9, 2012, OSD issued the tasking memorandum for the 2012  Biennial Core Report, which directed the services to use DOD Instruction  4151.20 as basic guidance and included further guidance on how to meet  the requirement under Section 2464 to report this information to  Congress. The memorandum augments the worksheet by adding another  column for the estimated costs of performing the planned workloads at  the first level of categories. The instruction and tasking memorandum also  require the services to provide additional information when reporting  shortfalls in planned workloads. If a military depot does not have sufficient  workload to sustain the required level of capability that has been  identified, a shortfall exists—in other words, the military depots have not  been assigned the depot maintenance workloads that would enable them  to sustain their identified core capability requirements. For example, a  depot may have identified 10,000 direct labor hours of core capability  requirements for ground vehicles but have only 4,000 hours of assigned  depot maintenance work for ground vehicles. This depot will have a  shortfall of 6,000 hours. The instruction requires that the services report  on shortfalls by providing a description along with the worksheet, but the  shortfalls are not calculated in the worksheet.
section_title: DOD’s 2012 Biennial Core Report Partially Complies with Section 2464 and Includes Information for Each of the Military Services
paragraphs: DOD’s 2012 Biennial Core Report to Congress complies with two of the  required reporting elements of Section 2464—including core capability  requirements and planned workload—and partially complies with the third  element by including mitigation plans, but not all detailed rationales for   workload shortfalls. Further, the report provides complete information for  each of the military services as aggregated to the top-level categories of  the work breakdown structure. However, without providing clear  explanations for the workload shortfalls that clarify why the services do  not have the workload to meet core maintenance requirements, DOD’s  report does not fully comply with Section 2464 and Congress lacks full  visibility over DOD’s management of its shortfalls.
subsections: section_title: The Report Includes Information on Core Capability Requirements
paragraphs: OSD included in the report the requirements information expressed in  direct labor hours for each of the military services. As reported, DOD’s  total core capability requirements are about 70 million direct labor hours.  Table 3 shows a summary of these core capability requirements by  military service.
Further, the information in DOD’s report on core capability requirements  for each of the military services is complete as aggregated to the top-level  categories of the work breakdown structure. Section 2464 requires the  information in the Biennial Core Report to be organized by work  breakdown structure; however, the statute does not specify at which  category level of the work breakdown structure the information should be  reported. To obtain the information needed to support the 2012 report,  OSD’s memorandum directed the services to provide to OSD, among  other things, information on core requirements and planned workloads at  various lower-level subcategories. The memorandum also directed the  services to provide, in any instance where core requirements exceed  planned workloads, additional information on a plan to address workload  shortfalls. Each of the services provided information in response to OSD’s  memorandum.
section_title: The Report Includes Information on the Planned Workloads That Are Available for Supporting Core Capability
paragraphs: In response to the tasking memorandum, the services provided data on  their planned workloads—the amount of available work used to maintain  the required capability—by the top categories and various levels of  subcategories in the work breakdown structure. In the report, OSD  included complete information on the amount of planned workload that is  available to maintain the required capability, expressed in direct labor  hours at the top-level categories and the estimated cost of these  workloads for each of the military services. As reported, DOD has a total  planned workload of about 92 million direct labor hours at an estimated  cost of about $12 billion. Table 4 shows a summary of these workloads.
However, we identified an anomaly in the information reported for the  Marine Corps. Its planned workload for the sea ships category was  reported as 15,124 direct labor hours, without any reported cost. Because  the estimated cost of this workload is reported as $0, it is unclear whether  the cost for this work is accounted for in DOD’s report. OSD and Marine  Corps officials stated that the workload hours to do these repairs are to  be performed by the Marine Corps for the Navy. The Navy would  reimburse the Marine Corps for the workload hours. However, the Navy’s  submission for the report did not include these workload hours to be  performed by the Marine Corps. Thus, these hours and cost were not  clearly accounted for in the workload cost figures included in the report.  OSD officials stated that they noticed the anomaly, but that their reporting  time constraints precluded them from thoroughly investigating it. The  report shows that the Navy had a workload of 8.9 million direct labor  hours above the core maintenance requirement in the Sea Ships  category. Because of this, OSD officials believed that the estimated  workload was sufficiently covered and this error would not result in a  shortfall.
section_title: The Report Includes Information on Shortfalls and Mitigation Plans but Does Not Include Detailed Explanations for Some Shortfalls
paragraphs: While DOD’s overall planned workloads exceed its core capability  requirements, DOD’s report shows shortfalls in certain categories for the  Army and the Air Force. The report includes complete information on  shortfalls at the top-level categories and plans to mitigate all of the  shortfalls identified in the report. However, the report does not include  required information on the rationale for some of these shortfalls—the  reasons why the services do not have the workloads to meet core  maintenance requirements. Section 2464 requires that DOD include in its  report “in any case where core depot-level maintenance and repair  capability requirements exceed or are expected to exceed sustaining  workloads,”—that is, in any case where there are shortfalls—“a detailed  rationale for the shortfall and a plan either to correct, or mitigate, the  effects of the shortfall.”
Consistent with how it reported the core requirements and planned  workloads, OSD aggregated the workload shortfalls under the top-level  categories of the work breakdown structure for each service. The report  shows that the Navy and Marine Corps did not identify any shortfalls in  the workloads available to support their core capability requirements. In  assessing the completeness of DOD’s report, we determined that the  Navy and Marine Corps did not have workload shortfalls at any of the  lower-level categories at which they provided information to OSD. The  report shows workload shortfalls for the Army and Air Force totaling about  1.4 million direct labor hours. Table 5 shows the shortfalls identified in the  report.
In assessing the completeness of DOD’s report, we determined that the  Army and Air Force identified shortfalls at lower-level subcategories and  submitted supplemental information to OSD describing these anticipated  shortfalls. For the report, OSD aggregated the information on core  requirements and planned workloads provided by the services at the top- level categories of the work breakdown structure. OSD officials told us  that the shortfalls included in the report were calculated by taking the  difference between the total requirements and planned workload at the  top-level categories.
Because of this calculation, some of the workload shortfalls identified by  the services at the lower-level categories were balanced out by surplus  workload in other lower-level categories under the same top-level  category. Thus, these lower-level shortfalls were not included in the  report. For the Army, the report showed that there are workload shortfalls  of approximately 1 million direct labor hours in the top-level categories for  Ground Vehicles and Support Equipment. The Army also submitted  information to OSD on additional shortfalls in lower-level subcategories  totaling approximately 1.5 million direct labor hours. These shortfalls are  anticipated in various third-level subcategories under the top categories of  Aircraft; Ground Vehicles; Communication/Electronic Equipment; Support  Equipment; and Ordnance, Weapons, and Missiles. For example, the  Army identified a shortfall of about 625,000 direct labor hours under the  third-level subcategory of Communication Systems Equipment, which is  under the top-level category for Communication/Electronics Equipment.  For the Air Force, the report reflects total workload shortfalls of  approximately 404,000 direct labors hours in the two top-level categories  of Communication/Electronic Equipment, and Ordnance, Weapons, and  Missiles. However, the Air Force also provided information to OSD on  additional shortfalls of about 64,000 direct labor hours for the second- level subcategory of Aircraft Components, under the broader Aircraft  category.
OSD officials told us that they chose to report at the top level because  they believe this best reflects the services’ ability to provide core  maintenance, as surplus planned workload in lower-level categories could  make up for shortfalls in other categories. They noted that skills, facilities,  and equipment are transferrable from one system to another within the  top-level category of a work breakdown structure, and that aggregation of  workload to the top level presents a more-accurate picture of shortfalls.
The report provides mitigation plans for identified shortfalls in the Army  workload but does not provide explanations for all shortfalls to clarify the  reasons why the Army does not have sufficient workload to meet core  maintenance requirements. The report identifies Army shortfalls of  869,547 direct labor hours that are needed to support its required core  maintenance capability to maintain equipment under its Ground Vehicles  category of work and 112,462 direct labor hours under its Support  Equipment category of work.
The report stated that the shortfall in the Ground Vehicles category  includes workload shortfalls for two subcategories—combat vehicles and  tactical wheeled vehicles. The report provides both an explanation and a  mitigation plan for the shortfall in the combat vehicles subcategory, but  does not provide an explanation for the workload shortfalls in the tactical  vehicle subcategory. For the combat vehicles shortfall, the report states  that the workload shortfall is a result of low usage of ground combat  vehicles in current operations. In addition, the report states that in recent  years, the Army has executed robust programs to recapitalize and  upgrade depot maintenance. Army officials responsible for compiling the  Army’s input stated that this resulted in positive health and condition of  these systems. Because of this low usage and the recent improvements  in the systems, the Army anticipates minimal depot repair for these  vehicles at this time. The Army plans to mitigate this shortfall by allowing  military depot workers to repair similar vehicles that are used to support  other maintenance programs.
For tactical wheeled vehicles, the report states that there is a workload  shortfall for tactical wheeled vehicles at Red River Army Depot, but does  not provide a reason for the shortfall. Army officials stated that the  reasons for these shortfalls are the same as the reasons for shortfalls for  ground combat vehicles—low usage and recent improvements resulted in  reduced workloads in this area. Army officials told us that the Army is  anticipating force structure reductions that will significantly lower the  amount of tactical wheeled vehicles and result in a lower core  maintenance requirement. Army officials told us that the Army is also  forming an Integrated Process Team to review the core maintenance  requirements for all ground vehicle systems. However, this shortfall  mitigation information was not included in the report.
The report does not clearly provide an explanation for why there is a  workload shortfall in the Ground Support Equipment work—why the Army  estimates it will not have the workload to meet its core maintenance  requirements. The report only states that the shortfall is related to the  repairs of the Rhino Passive Infrared Defeat System and Floating  Bridges, as well as other repairs for equipment, such as equipment  related to bulk petroleum oil and lubricant distribution. Army officials  stated that the reasons for these shortfalls are the same as the reasons  for the shortfalls for ground vehicles—low usage and recent  improvements resulted in reduced workloads in this area. The Army  assessed this category to be at minimal risk, and it plans to use similar  workloads to mitigate this shortfall. Further, Army officials stated that they  project a decrease in core maintenance requirements in this area  because of anticipated force structure changes. However, this shortfall  mitigation information was not included in DOD’s report.
The report provides mitigation plans for identified shortfalls in the Air  Force core capabilities but does not provide explanations for all of the  shortfalls. The report identifies an Air Force shortfall of 260,698 direct  labor hours that are needed to support its required core capability for  maintaining equipment under its Communication/Electronic Equipment  category of work. The report also identifies an additional Air Force  workload shortfall of 143,280 direct labor hours that are needed to  support the Air Force’s required core capability in maintaining equipment  under its Ordnance, Weapons, and Missiles category of work.
The report does not clearly provide an explanation for why the Air Force  anticipates insufficient workload to meet its core maintenance  requirements in the Communication/Electronic Equipment category. The  report identifies only that the shortfall in communications workload is  primarily for unmanned aerial systems ground stations. We asked Air  Force officials to clarify the reason for the shortfall, and they told us that  the shortfall is caused by the lack of organic (military) depot capability to  repair unmanned aerial vehicle ground stations for the anticipated  increase in manufacturing of the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaperaircraft. According to Air Force officials, contractors currently repair the  stations. However, this shortfall explanation information was not included  in the report.
Capital investment refers to improvements made to facilities or equipment that would  make production more efficient or meet expected future needs.
The report does not clearly provide an explanation for why the Air Force  anticipates insufficient workload to meet its core maintenance  requirements in the Ordnance, Weapons, and Missiles category. The  report states only that for the Ordnance, Weapons, and Missiles category,  the workload shortfall is in missile components. When asked to provide a  reason for the shortfall, Air Force officials told us that this shortfall is  driven by the lack of organic (military) depot capability for Missile  Components work. However, this information is not included in the report.
The Air Force plans to mitigate this shortfall by assigning work to Air  Force depots to support existing and new weapon systems, such as  missile launchers and defensive missile systems for the MQ-1 Predator  and MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial systems. According to the report, the  Air Force plans to begin the work on the MQ-1 and MQ-9 to mitigate the  shortfall in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2012 and complete this work  by fiscal year 2017. Additional work on other aircraft weapon systems,  such as for the F-35, will also be used to mitigate this shortfall. This  additional work will begin in the first quarter of fiscal year 2013, with full  implementation over the following 12-24 months.
In addition, because the Air Force does not currently have the facilities  and personnel at the military depots to execute the identified planned  workload, it also identified a capability shortfall. Air Force officials told us  that the Air Force had no scheduled capital investments for the assigned  work at the military depots at the time of the report.
The report does not always include detailed explanations for identified  workload shortfalls, because the Army and Air Force did not always  provide explanations for them. Without clear explanations for why the  services do not have the workload to meet core maintenance  requirements, Congress does not have visibility whether the services’  plans to correct or mitigate the shortfalls will address the cause of the  shortfalls.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Section 2464, among other things, requires DOD to maintain a core  maintenance capability that is government-owned and government- operated, assign sufficient workload to support this capability, and report  information on this capability to Congress. DOD’s first report to Congress  includes most of the required elements. However, it did not provide  explanations for all of the identified workload shortfalls. Clear reasons for  why the services do not have the workload to meet core maintenance  requirements would provide key information for Congress about how the  services’ plans to correct or mitigate the shortfalls would be addressing  the cause of the shortfalls. Without complete and clear information on this  element of the statute, Congress may lack full visibility into the status of  DOD’s management of its core capabilities.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that Congress has visibility over the status of DOD’s core  depot-level maintenance and repair capability, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  (Maintenance, Policy, and Programs) to include in the Biennial Core  Report to Congress detailed explanations for why services do not have  the workload to meet core maintenance requirements for each shortfall  identified in the report.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written  comments, reproduced in appendix IV, DOD concurred with our  recommendation and stated that the department will include an  explanation and mitigation plan for each workload shortfall identified in all  future reports.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Assistant Secretary of  Defense (Maintenance, Policy, and Programs); the Secretaries of the  Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps;  and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no  charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-5257 or merrittz@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense’s (DOD)  2012 Biennial Core Report complies with Section 2464 of Title 10 of the  United States Code and includes service data and information required by  DOD to support the report, we analyzed the text of DOD’s Biennial Core  Report and obtained supporting information on DOD’s core determination  process for 2013. One of our analysts reviewed DOD’s report to  determine the extent to which it included each element of the mandate,  and a second analyst reviewed the first analyst’s conclusions. All initial  disagreements between analysts were discussed and resolved through  consensus. When the report explicitly included all parts of the mandated  element, our assessment is that DOD “complied” with the element.  When  the report did not explicitly include any part of the element, our  assessment is that DOD “did not comply” with the element. If the report  included some aspects of an element, but not all, then our assessment is  that DOD “partially complied” with the element. We checked to see that  the services were each providing the same type of information.
To assess the level of completeness of the information, we obtained and  analyzed the data and other information that the Office of the Secretary of  Defense (OSD) required the military service headquarters to provide in  support of the report. We compared the services’ submissions to the  reporting template in DOD Instruction 4151.20 in order to determine the  extent to which the services submitted information required by DOD’s  instruction and identify any inconsistencies or errors. We conducted data- reliability assessments for all the data analyzed and reported upon by  performing independent reliability assessments through which individual  team members reviewed the services’ submissions to determine (1)  whether the requirements were met, and (2) the extent to which the data  that was provided supports the responses. The team also reviewed the  data provided by the services to OSD to support their respective  responses for the Biennial Core Report. Individual team members  compared the data provided to OSD to the data published in the report to  ensure consistency. The team also met with knowledgeable officials to  obtain clarification and understanding of the content of the submissions.  From these analyses, the team concluded that the data were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to February 2013  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Prior GAO Work on Core Logistics Capability
paragraphs: In 2009, we reported that the Department of Defense (DOD), through its  biennial core process, had not comprehensively and accurately assessed  whether it had the required core capability to support fielded systems in  military depots.  We found that, among other things,
DOD’s method of compiling and internally reporting core requirements  and associated workloads did not reveal specific shortfalls; and
Congress lacked visibility of DOD’s core process, because there was  no requirement for DOD to provide its Biennial Core Report to  Congress.
We recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology and Logistics take several actions related to improving the  Biennial Core Report, including requiring DOD to compile and report the  services’ core capability requirements, planned workloads, and any  shortfalls by work breakdown structure category, and requiring DOD to  provide this report to Congress. Table 6 details the three  recommendations and one matter for congressional consideration we  made in our 2009 report that are relevant to this review of the Biennial  Core Report, and the respective actions taken by DOD.
section_title: Appendix III: Category Levels from DOD’s 2012 Depot Maintenance Core Capability Worksheet
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Carleen Bennett, Assistant  Director; Gina Hoffman; Joanne Landesman; Jennifer Madison; Michael  Silver; Jose Watkins; and Michael Willems made key contributions to this  report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Logistics:  DOD Input Needed on Implementing Depot  Maintenance Study Recommendations. GAO-11-568R. Washington,  D.C.: June 30, 2011.
Depot Maintenance:  Actions Needed to Identify and Establish Core  Capability at Military Depots. GAO-09-83. Washington, D.C.: May 14,  2009.
DOD Civilian Personnel:  Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Help  Ensure Viability of DOD’s Civilian Industrial Workforce. GAO-03-472.  Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003.