Oil and Gas Management: Key Elements to Consider for Providing Assurance of Effective Independent Oversight
Published: 2010-06-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The catastrophic oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico has drawn national attention to the exploration and production of oil and gas from leases on federal lands and waters. The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) oversees onshore oil and gas activities, the Minerals Management Service's (MMS) Offshore Energy and Minerals Management oversees offshore oil and gas activities, and MMS's Minerals Revenue Management collects revenues from oil and gas produced. Interior's oil and gas oversight has long been the subject of audits and investigations by GAO, Interior's Office of Inspector General (OIG), and others. In response to the recent oil spill, the Secretary of the Interior has proposed reorganizing MMS. Over the past 5 years, GAO has issued numerous recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior to improve the agency's management of oil and gas resources--most recently resulting in two reports in March 2010. Overall, GAO's work in this area can be useful in evaluating key aspects of the Secretary's plans to reorganize MMS. In particular, GAO's findings and recommendations can provide guidance on how to achieve effective oversight of federal oil and gas management by improving (1) technical expertise in the agency, (2) performance of analyses and reviews, (3) enforcement of laws and regulations, (4) public access to information, and (5) the degree of independence in the agency.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Technical Expertise. Oil and gas production methods on federal lands and waters have become increasingly sophisticated over the past decade. GAO found in a March 2010 report that Interior had challenges in hiring, training, and retaining key staff, leading to questions about the technical capacity of Interior staff overseeing oil and gas activities. Interior's challenges partly stem from competition with the oil and gas industry, which can pay staff higher salaries. Moreover, key technical positions responsible for oversight of oil and gas activities have experienced high turnover rates, which, according to Interior officials, impede their capacity to oversee oil and gas activities. Ability to perform reviews and require that findings be addressed. In several recent reports, GAO found that Interior was unable to complete necessary reviews, including environmental and oil and gas production verification inspections, and had an ill-defined process for conducting certain offshore environmental analyses. For example, GAO reported in March 2010 that MMS faced challenges in Alaska conducting required environmental reviews, because although Interior policy directed MMS to prepare a handbook providing guidance on how to conduct these reviews, MMS lacked such a handbook. This lack of guidance also left unclear MMS's policy on what constitutes a significant environmental impact. Enforcement Authority. In a March 2010 review, GAO determined that in some instances, Interior was uncertain about its legal authority for undertaking potential necessary enforcement actions, and that Interior may be inconsistently using its enforcement authority. For example, staff from one BLM office told us that they were not issuing enforcement actions for unauthorized devices intended to modify gas flow upstream of the measurement meter--which may result in inaccurate measurement of gas production volumes. These staff explained that this was due to measurement regulations that were out of date. Public Access. In its preliminary results from ongoing work on public challenges to BLM's federal onshore oil and gas lease sale decisions in the four Mountain West states responsible for most federal oil and gas development, GAO found state-by-state variation in what protest-related information was made publicly available across BLM state offices. GAO also found that stakeholders, including industry groups and nongovernmental organizations representing environmental, recreational, and hunting interests, expressed frustration with the transparency and timeliness of the information. Independence. During GAO's work in 2009 and in Interior OIG reports in 2008 and 2010, several instances were identified where Interior staff had inappropriate relationships with oil and gas industry personnel, raising questions about whether Interior's oversight efforts were sufficient. The OIG found numerous instances of inappropriate contact between industry and Interior staff, including staff receipt of gifts.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing to discuss the  Secretary of the Interior’s proposal to reorganize the Minerals  Management Service (MMS) in response to the Deepwater Horizon drilling  rig disaster. The tragic loss of life, damage to natural resources, loss of  livelihoods, and harm to local economies that resulted from the explosion,  fire, and catastrophic oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico have again drawn  national attention to federal oversight of exploration and production of oil  and gas from federal land and waters. Under the current organizational  structure, the Department of the Interior’s bureaus are responsible for  regulating the processes that oil and gas companies must follow when  leasing, drilling, and producing oil and gas from federal leases as well as  ensuring that companies comply with all applicable requirements.  Specifically, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) oversees onshore  federal oil and gas activities, and MMS’s Offshore Energy and Minerals  Management (OEMM) oversees offshore oil and gas activities.  Additionally, MMS’s Minerals Revenue Management (MRM) is responsible  for collecting royalties on oil and gas produced from both onshore and  offshore federal leases. In fiscal year 2009, Interior reported collecting  over $9 billion in royalties for oil and gas produced on federal lands and  waters, purchase bids for new oil and gas leases, and annual rents on  existing leases, making revenues from federal oil and gas one of the largest  nontax sources of federal government funds.
In recent years, we and others, including Interior’s Office of Inspector  General (OIG) have conducted numerous evaluations of federal oil and gas  management and revenue collection processes and practices and have  found many material weaknesses (see app. II for related GAO reports).  Our work included reviews of Interior’s oversight practices, operations,  and rules, and our conclusions have been remarkably consistent: the  agency has not done enough to meet the challenges it faces. Others,  including the Interior OIG and a panel of experts convened by Interior  have drawn similar conclusions. As a result, Interior staff are in the midst  of attempting to implement over 100 recommendations spanning the scope  of the department’s operations. We acknowledge Interior’s efforts to  reassess key oil and gas policies addressing revenue collection and rates  of development on federal lands and waters as an important first step to  address material weaknesses. In addition, the Secretary of the Interior  announced several changes to BLM’s leasing process in May 2010.
Because of the recent announcement of the Secretary’s proposed  reorganization, we have not conducted a detailed analysis of these  reorganization plans. However, our recent work on oil and gas  management as well as work in the area of strengthening independent  oversight of nuclear facilities and operations can be useful in evaluating  key aspects of the Secretary’s plans to reorganize MMS. In a 2008 report,  we identified the following key elements that any nuclear safety oversight  organization should possess in order to provide effective independent  oversight:    Technical expertise: The organization should have sufficient staff with  the expertise to perform sound safety assessments.
Ability to perform reviews and require that findings be addressed:  The organization should have the working knowledge necessary to review  compliance with requirements, developed through periodic reviews, and  should also have sufficient authority to require the program offices to  effectively address its review findings and recommendations.
Enforcement authority: The organization should have sufficient  authority to achieve compliance with requirements.
Public access: The organization should provide public access to its  reports so that those most affected by operations can get information.
Independence: The organization conducting oversight should be  structurally distinct and separate from the entities it oversees.
When coupled with findings and recommendations about the management  of federal oil and gas leases from our prior and ongoing work, these key  elements may provide the Secretary and Congress with a useful  framework for evaluating proposed reorganizations. While nuclear safety  differs from safety associated with offshore oil and gas development, we  believe there are similarities that make the key elements applicable.  Specifically, as has been made clear by the recent oil spill disaster in the  Gulf of Mexico, Interior is responsible for overseeing an industry with  potentially significant impacts on workers, the environment, and vast  areas of our oceans. Further, as with nuclear safety, even small probability  adverse events can have significant and far-reaching effects.
My testimony today uses the five key elements for effective independent  oversight to broadly frame examples from our prior work on the  management of federal oil and gas activities issued from June 2005  through March 2010, as well as preliminary results from our ongoing  review on public challenges to federal onshore oil and gas leasing  decisions, to assist the committee as it considers changes to Interior’s  oversight. We developed these preliminary results from June 2009 through  June 2010 by reviewing federal laws, regulations, and guidance; analyzing  data from Interior on the four Mountain West states (Colorado, New  Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) responsible for 69 percent of the oil and 94  percent of the natural gas produced on federal lands during fiscal years  2007 to 2009; and interviewing BLM officials and stakeholder groups— including representatives from the energy industry, state government, and  nongovernmental organizations representing environmental, hunting,  fishing, and recreational interests. We conducted the performance audit  work that supports this statement in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and  perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to produce a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our statement today.
subsections: section_title: Technical Expertise
paragraphs: Agencies should have sufficient staff with the technical expertise to  oversee the activities under their authority. Oil and gas production  methods on federal lands and waters have become increasingly  sophisticated over the past decade. Additionally, oil and gas companies  now rely on information technology to manage and oversee their  operations. In a March 2010 review, we found that Interior had challenges  in hiring, training, and retaining staff in critical oil and gas oversight roles,  leading to questions about the technical capacity of Interior staff  overseeing oil and gas activities.
We found that Interior has faced difficulties in hiring, retaining, and  training staff in key oil and gas oversight positions. Specifically, we found  that staff within Interior’s program for verifying that oil and gas produced  from federal leases are correctly measured—including petroleum  engineers and inspectors—lacked critical skills because, according to  agency officials, Interior 1) has had difficulty in hiring experienced staff, 2)  has struggled to retain staff, and 3) has not consistently provided the  appropriate training for staff. Interior’s challenges in hiring and retaining  staff stem, in part, from competition with the oil and gas industry, which  generally pays significantly more than the federal government. Moreover,  key technical positions responsible for oversight of oil and gas activities  have experienced high turnover rates, which, according to Interior  officials, impede these employees’ capacity to oversee oil and gas  activities. These positions included petroleum engineers, who process  drilling permits and review oil and gas metering systems, and inspection  staff—including BLM’s petroleum engineer technicians and production  accountability technicians onshore—who conduct drilling, safety and oil  and gas production verification inspections (see app. I). For example, we  found that turnover rates for OEMM inspectors at the four district offices  we reviewed between 2004 and 2008 ranged from 27 to 44 percent.  Furthermore, Interior has not consistently provided training to the staff it  has been able to hire and retain. For example, neither onshore nor  offshore petroleum engineers had a requirement for training on the  measurement of oil and gas, which is critical to accurate royalty  collections and can be challenging at times because of such factors as the  type of meter used, the specific qualities of the gas or oil being measured,  and the rate of production. Additionally, although BLM offers a core  curriculum for its petroleum engineer technicians and requires that they  obtain official BLM certification and then be recertified once every 5 years  to demonstrate continued proficiency, the agency has not offered a  recertification course since 2002, negatively impacting its ability to  conduct inspections. It is important to note that BLM’s petroleum engineer  technicians are the eyes and ears for the agency—performing key  functions and also perhaps the only Interior staff with direct contact with  the onshore lease property itself.
We also found that Interior’s efforts to provide its inspection staff with  mobile computing capabilities for use in the field are moving slowly and  are years from full implementation. Interior inspectors continue to rely on  documenting inspection results on paper, and later reentering these  results into Interior databases. Specifically, Interior’s BLM and OEMM are  independently developing the capacity for inspection staff to (1)  electronically document inspection results and (2) access reference  documents, such as American Petroleum Institute standards and  measurement regulations, via laptops while in the field. BLM initiated  work on developing this capacity in 2001, whereas OEMM is now in the  preliminary planning stages of a similar effort. According to Interior  officials, widespread implementation of a mobile computing tool to assist  with production verification and other types of inspections, potentially  including drilling and safety, are still several years away. Interior officials  said having such a tool would allow inspection staff to not only easily  reference technical documents while conducting inspections to verify  compliance with regulations but also to document the results of those  inspections while in the field and subsequently upload them to Interior  databases.
section_title: Ability to Perform Reviews and Require that Findings Be Addressed
paragraphs: An effective oversight program should include a component for systematic  inspections and reviews, whose findings should be documented and  subsequently addressed. In several recent reviews, we found that Interior  had been unable to complete its necessary reviews, including both  environmental and oil and gas production verification inspections and  certain offshore environmental analyses.
We found that Interior was unable to meet its goals for conducting  environmental and oil and gas production verification oversight  inspections because of a management focus on drilling. For example, in  June 2005,  we reported that Interior devoted fewer resources to  completing onshore environmental inspections—inspections to ensure  that oil and gas companies are complying with various environmental laws  and lease stipulations. According to Interior staff, one of the principal  reasons was that management shifted available resources to processing  drilling permits. More recently, in March 2010, we reported that Interior  had only been able to complete approximately one-third of the required  onshore oil and gas production verification inspections, raising concerns  about the accuracy of the oil and gas volumes reported to MRM.
In another March 2010 report, we found that MMS faces challenges in the  Alaska Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Region in conducting reviews of oil  and gas development under the National Environmental Protection Act  (NEPA), which requires MMS to evaluate the likely environmental effects  of proposed actions, including oil and gas development. Although Interior  policy directed its agencies to prepare handbooks providing guidance on  how to implement NEPA, we found that MMS lacked such a handbook.  The lack of comprehensive guidance in a handbook, combined with high  staff turnover in recent years, left the process for meeting NEPA  requirements ill defined for the analysts charged with developing NEPA  documents. It also left unclear MMS’s policy on what constitutes a  significant environmental impact as well as its procedures for conducting  and documenting NEPA-required analyses to address environmental and  cultural sensitivities, which have often been the topic of litigation over  Alaskan offshore oil and gas development. We also found that the Alaska  OCS Region shared information selectively, a practice that was  inconsistent with agency policy, which directed that information,  including proprietary data from industry, be shared with all staff involved  in environmental reviews. According to regional MMS staff, this practice  has hindered their ability to complete sound environmental analyses under  NEPA.
In an August 2009 report examining Interior’s royalty-in-kind (RIK)  program, we found that although MRM staff had made progress in  conducting reviews of gas imbalances—instances where Interior may not  be receiving the total amount of royalties due from gas production—they  were unable to determine the exact amount the agency was owed for  imbalances because it lacked certain key information. For example, MRM  did not verify production data to ensure it received its entitled percentage  of RIK gas from leases taken in kind. Without these and other data, MRM  staff were unable to quantify revenues from imbalances, leading to forgone  revenues and uncertainty about how much gas the government is owed.
Until recently, Interior has left key functions it oversees without review for  long periods. In two reports issued in 2008, we noted that Interior received  less in royalties and other payments for development of its oil and gas  resources than many other countries and that Interior did less than other  landowners to encourage development of resources it leased for  development. In a September 2008 report on royalties and other  payments, we found that Interior had not done a comprehensive analysis  of its royalty and other revenue structure in over 25 years, and we  recommended that it do so. In an October 2008 report, we found that  Interior had done less than selected states and private landowners to  encourage development of oil and gas leases, and we recommended that it  develop a strategy to evaluate options to encourage faster development on  federal lands. Just this year, Secretary Salazar directed Interior to conduct  studies examining these issues. We are encouraged that Interior is  undertaking these efforts and hopeful that the findings of the studies will  identify opportunities to improve Interior’s oversight of oil and gas  development.
section_title: Enforcement Authority
paragraphs: Oversight entities must have the authority to ensure that all regulated  entities fully comply with the law and applicable regulations. In our March  2010 report, we determined that in some instances Interior is uncertain  about its legal authority for undertaking necessary enforcement actions  and may be using its enforcement authority inconsistently.
We found that Interior had not determined the extent of its authority over  key elements of oil and gas production infrastructure necessary for  ensuring accurate measurement. This infrastructure includes meters in (or  after) gas plants, which may include the meter where oil and gas are  measured for royalties and meters owned by pipeline companies. These  companies frequently own, operate, and maintain the meter used at the  official measurement point on federal leases and own the production data  the meter generates. Because it did not know the extent of its authority,  Interior did not know what steps it could take to enforce its standards and  regulations for meters. Thus it lacked assurances that royalty-bearing  volumes of oil and gas were correctly measured.
We also found that Interior inspection staff were not, in all cases, pursuing  enforcement actions when they identified oil and gas production activities  not in compliance with its regulations. Specifically, we found that some  Interior staff were not issuing incidents of non-compliance—a type of  enforcement action—when they identified certain measurement devices  during the course of their inspections, as they believe the current  measurement regulations were out of date. If staff do not uniformly ensure  compliance with regulations through specified procedures and document  their findings, Interior is at risk of not capturing data to know the full  extent of particular violations.
section_title: Public Access
paragraphs: Organizations should make relevant information widely available to  ensure that those most affected by operations, including the public, can  fully participate in decision-making processes that can, ultimately, have  significant impacts. We recently found that Interior has been providing  inconsistent and limited information with respect to its use of categorical  exclusions in approving onshore oil and gas activities. Also, in preliminary  results from our ongoing work on public challenges to BLM’s federal  onshore oil and gas lease sale decisions, we found that BLM state offices  provide limited and varying amounts of information to the public on their  leasing decisions.
In September 2009, we found that BLM’s use of categorical exclusions was  not fully transparent. In addressing long-term energy challenges,  Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 2005, in part to expedite oil and  gas development within the United States. This law authorizes BLM, for  certain oil and gas activities, to approve projects without preparing new  environmental analyses that would normally be required by NEPA. Section  390 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 does not specify procedures for  involving or informing either the public or other government agencies  when section 390 categorical exclusions are used. According to Interior  and BLM officials, there is no requirement to publicly disclose that BLM  used a section 390 categorical exclusion to approve a project or to  disclose approved section 390 categorical exclusion decision documents.  Instead, the public depends on the discretion of each field office for such  disclosure. We found that BLM field offices had different degrees and  methods of disclosing information related to decisions on section 390  categorical exclusions. For example, some field offices, such as White  River and Glenwood Springs, Colorado, publicly disclosed online which  Applications for Permit to Drill they approved with section 390 categorical  exclusions. In contrast, other field offices, such as Price/Moab, Utah, and  Pinedale, Wyoming, did not publicly disclose their decisions to use section  390 categorical exclusions and, in fact, required the public to file Freedom  of Information Act requests to identify which projects BLM approved  using section 390 categorical exclusions and to obtain copies of approved  section 390 categorical exclusion decision documents. In some cases, it  was difficult for other governmental agencies—including state  environmental agencies—and the public to determine whether BLM had  used a section 390 categorical exclusion until it was too late to comment  on or challenge BLM’s action. When the public and other federal and state  agencies do not have a reliable or consistent way of determining which  projects have been approved with section 390 categorical exclusions, they  lack a fundamental piece of information needed to hold BLM accountable  for their use.
In preliminary results from our ongoing work on public challenges to  BLM’s federal oil and gas lease sale decisions in the four Mountain West  states responsible for most onshore federal oil and gas development, we  found the extent to which BLM made publicly available information  related to public protests filed during the leasing process varied by state  and was generally limited in scope. We also found that stakeholders— nongovernmental organizations representing environmental, recreational,  and hunting interests that filed protests to BLM lease offerings—wanted  additional time to participate in the leasing process and more information  from BLM about its leasing decisions. In May 2010, the Secretary of the  Interior announced several agencywide leasing reforms that are to take  place at BLM, some of which may address concerns raised by these  stakeholder groups. For instance, BLM state offices are to provide an  additional public review and comment opportunity during the leasing  process. They are also required to post on their Web sites their responses  to letters filed in protest of state office decisions to offer specific parcels  of land for oil and gas development.
section_title: Independence
paragraphs: The agency should be free from the direct and indirect influence of the oil  and gas industry. Our past work, as well as that of Interior’s OIG, has  identified several instances where Interior staff had inappropriate  relationships with oil and gas industry personnel, raising questions about  whether Interior’s oversight efforts were sufficient.
During the course of our audit work for our report on Interior’s use of  categorical exclusions, allegations were made about inappropriate  relationships between Interior management and the oil and gas industry.  We referred these allegations to Interior’s OIG, which initiated an  investigation. The results of the investigation substantiated these  inappropriate contacts, the details of which are included in an Interior OIG  investigative report.
Additional reports by Interior’s OIG have also identified instances that call  into question the independence of key staff working in Interior’s oil and  gas program. In August 2008, Interior’s OIG reported on inappropriate  relationships between staff working in Interior’s RIK program and the oil  and gas industry. Specifically, the OIG found that between 2002 and 2006  nearly one-third of the RIK program staff socialized with and received a  wide array of gifts and gratuities from oil and gas companies with whom  the program was conducting official business. Most recently, in May 2010,  the OIG reported on inappropriate relationships between Interior’s  offshore inspection staff and certain oil and gas companies operating in  the Gulf of Mexico. Interior’s Acting Inspector General stated that her  greatest concern is the environment in which these inspectors operate,  particularly the ease with which they move between industry and  government.
In conclusion, over the past several years, we and others have found  Interior to be in need of fundamental reform. This past work has found  weaknesses across a wide range of Interior’s oversight of onshore and off  shore oil and gas development. Secretary Salazar has taken notable steps  to begin comprehensive evaluations of leasing rules and practices as well  as the amount and ways in which the federal government collects  revenues. Interior is also currently implementing a number of our  recommendations aimed at making improvements within the existing  organization of Interior’s functions.
As the Secretary and Congress consider what fundamental changes are  needed in how Interior structures its oversight of oil and gas programs, we  believe that our and others’ past work provides a strong rationale for  broad reform of the agency’s oil and gas oversight functions—at MMS to  be sure, but also across other parts of Interior, including those responsible  for oversight of onshore areas. If steps are not taken to ensure effective  independent oversight, we are concerned about the agency’s ability to  manage the nation’s oil and gas resources, ensure the safe operation of  onshore and offshore leases, provide adequate environmental protection,  and provide reasonable assurance that the U.S. government is collecting  the revenue to which it is entitled. Reorganization and fundamental change  can be very difficult for an organization. Although we have not conducted  a detailed evaluation of Secretary Salazar’s proposals for reforming MMS,  we believe that regardless of how MMS is ultimately reorganized, Interior’s  top leadership must also address the wide range of outstanding  recommendations for any reorganization effort to be effective.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  respond to any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee  may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgement
paragraphs: For further information on this statement, please contact Frank Rusco at  (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov. Contact points for our Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs offices may be found on the last page of this  statement. Other staff that made key contributions to this testimony  include, Ron Belak, Dan Feehan, Glenn C. Fischer, Jon Ludwigson, Ben  Shouse, Kiki Theodoropoulos, and Barbara Timmerman.
section_title: Appendix II: Related Prior GAO Reports
paragraphs: Oil and Gas Management: Interior’s Oil and Gas Production Verification  Efforts Do Not Provide Reasonable Assurance of Accurate Measurement  of Production Volumes, GAO-10-313, (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2010).
Offshore Oil and Gas Development: Additional Guidance Would Help  Strengthen the Minerals Management Service’s Assessment of  Environmental Impacts in the North Aleutian Basin, GAO-10-276,  (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2010).
Energy Policy Act of 2005: Greater Clarity Needed to Address Concerns  with Categorical Exclusions for Oil and Gas Development under Section  390 of the Act, GAO-09-872, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2009).
Federal Oil And Gas Management: Opportunities Exist to Improve  Oversight, GAO-09-1014T, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 2009).
Royalty-In-Kind Program: MMS Does Not Provide Reasonable Assurance It  Receives Its Share of Gas, Resulting in Millions in Forgone Revenue,  GAO-09-744, (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 14, 2009).
Mineral Revenues: MMS Could Do More to Improve the Accuracy of Key  Data Used to Collect and Verify Oil and Gas Royalties, GAO-09-549,  (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2009).
Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Issues Regarding the Inclusion of Refined  Petroleum Products as Part of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve,  GAO-09-695T, (Washington, D.C.: May 12, 2009).
Oil and Gas Management: Federal Oil and Gas Resource Management and  Revenue Collection In Need of Stronger Oversight and Comprehensive  Reassessment, GAO-09-556T, (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 2009).
Oil and Gas Leasing: Federal Oil and Gas Resource Management and  Revenue Collection in Need of Comprehensive Reassessment,  GAO-09-506T, (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2009).
Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service: Royalty Relief  for Deepwater Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leases—Conforming  Regulations to Court Decision, GAO-09-102R, (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,  2008).
Oil and Gas Leasing: Interior Could Do More to Encourage Diligent  Development, GAO-09-74, (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 3, 2008).
Oil and Gas Royalties: MMS’s Oversight of Its Royalty-in-Kind Program  Can Be Improved through Additional Use of Production Verification Data  and Enhanced Reporting of Financial Benefits and Costs, GAO-08-942R,  (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2008).
Mineral Revenues: Data Management Problems and Reliance on Self- Reported Data for Compliance Efforts Put MMS Royalty Collections at  Risk, GAO-08-893R, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2008).
Oil and Gas Royalties: The Federal System for Collecting Oil and Gas  Revenues Needs Comprehensive Reassessment, GAO-08-691, (Washington,  D.C.: Sept. 3, 2008).
Oil and Gas Royalties: Litigation over Royalty Relief Could Cost the  Federal Government Billions of Dollars, GAO-08-792R, (Washington, D.C.:  June 5, 2008).
Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Improving the Cost-Effectiveness of Filling  the Reserve, GAO-08-726T, (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 24, 2008).
Mineral Revenues: Data Management Problems and Reliance on Self- Reported Data for Compliance Efforts Put MMS Royalty Collections at  Risk, GAO-08-560T, (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008).
Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Options to Improve the Cost-Effectiveness of  Filling the Reserve, GAO-08-521T, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2008).
Oil and Gas Royalties: A Comparison of the Share of Revenue Received  from Oil and Gas Production by the Federal Government and Other  Resource Owners, GAO-07-676R, (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2007).
Oil and Gas Royalties: Royalty Relief Will Cost the Government Billions of  Dollars but Uncertainty Over Future Energy Prices and Production Levels  Make Precise Estimates Impossible at this Time, GAO-07-590R,  (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 2007).
Royalties Collection: Ongoing Problems with Interior’s Efforts to Ensure A  Fair Return for Taxpayers Require Attention, GAO-07-682T, (Washington,  D.C.: Mar. 28, 2007).
Oil and Gas Royalties: Royalty Relief Will Likely Cost the Government  Billions, but the Final Costs Have Yet to Be Determined, GAO-07-369T,  (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2007).
Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Available Oil Can Provide Significant  Benefits, but Many Factors Should Influence Future Decisions about Fill,  Use, and Expansion, GAO-06-872, (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 24, 2006).
Royalty Revenues: Total Revenues Have Not Increased at the Same Pace  as Rising Oil and Natural Gas Prices due to Decreasing Production Sold,  GAO-06-786R, (Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2006).
Oil and Gas Development: Increased Permitting Activity Has Lessened  BLM’s Ability to Meet Its Environmental Protection Responsibilities,  GAO-05-418, (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2005).
Mineral Revenues: Cost and Revenue Information Needed to Compare  Different Approaches for Collecting Federal Oil and Gas Royalties,  GAO-04-448, (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2004).
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