Reserve Forces: Army Needs to Reevaluate its Approach to Training and Mobilizing Reserve Component Forces
Published: 2009-07-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Army's strategy for training its reserve component calls for units to conduct training on the primary missions for which they were organized and designed as well as the missions units are assigned in support of ongoing operations. The training is to be conducted over a 5-year cycle with a focus on primary missions during the early years and assigned missions during the later years. In response to mandates, GAO assessed the extent to which (1) the Army is able to execute its strategy for training reserve component forces for their primary and assigned missions; (2) mobilization and deployment laws, regulations, goals, and policies impact the Army's ability to train and employ these forces; and (3) access to military schools and skill training facilities and ranges affects the preparation of reserve component forces. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed relevant training strategies and policies, laws, and data and surveyed 22 Army reserve component units returning from deployments in the past 12 months.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army is able to execute the portion of its reserve component training strategy that calls for units to effectively train for their assigned missions in support of ongoing operations, but faces challenges in executing the portion of the strategy that calls for units to effectively train on primary missions. Unit training for assigned missions, which is conducted in the later years of the 5-year training cycle, is generally effective because the Army prioritizes its available resources to support units that are preparing to deploy for ongoing operations--units receive increased training time; mission requirements and personnel levels are stabilized; and personnel and equipment shortages are addressed while support is increased. Conversely, units training for their primary missions in the early years of the cycle receive less time to train and experience equipment and personnel shortages, which adversely affect teamwork and unit cohesion. Also, support for their training is limited. These challenges limit the effectiveness of primary mission training and could impact their ability to conduct their primary missions within the current strategy's time frames. While DOD's current 12-month mobilization policy has not hindered the Army's overall ability to train its reserve component forces and has reduced the length of deployments, it has not fully achieved its intended purpose of reducing stress on the force by providing predictability to soldiers. Because units must spend part of their mobilization periods in training, they are actually deploying for about 10 months under this 12-month mobilization policy, whereas they typically deployed for periods of 12 to 15 months under the previous policy. Under the current policy, the Army's reserve component forces are deploying more frequently and spending more time away from home in training when they are not mobilized. Moreover, unit leaders and personnel GAO interviewed said that the 12-month mobilization policy has decreased predictability and increased stress for individuals. GAO noted alternate approaches that can improve predictability. For example, the Air Force recently developed a deployment model categorizing five grouped occupational specialties based on operational requirements and length of time home between deployments. The model is intended to increase predictability for its forces and thus reduce their stress. Reserve component forces are generally receiving access to training facilities necessary to prepare them for their assigned missions, but the Army lacks capacity to prepare all of its forces for the full range of training requirements. In addressing capacity shortages, the Army has given priority to deploying units and personnel. As a result, active and reserve component forces without assigned missions often experience delays in accessing training for their primary missions. Although the Army is reviewing some aspects of its training capacity, it has not fully identified its training requirements and capacity and therefore will not have a sound basis for prioritizing available resources and cannot be assured that the initiatives it has under way will fully address gaps in its training capacity.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required the involvement  of large numbers of Army National Guard and Army Reserve personnel  and demands on the Army’s reserve component forces are expected to  continue for the foreseeable future. In addition, the high demand for  ground forces has led DOD to retrain some units for missions that are  outside of their core competencies. Our past reports have noted a number  of personnel, equipment, and training challenges that the Army’s reserve  component forces have faced since the start of the global war on terrorism  in 2001. For example, we have noted that preparation for ongoing  operations has often required different types of training as units are being  tasked to perform assigned missions such as convoy security or detainee  operations, which may differ significantly from their primary missions,  such as artillery.
The Army has changed the approach it uses to train its reserve component  forces. The Army had traditionally viewed its reserve component forces as  a strategic reserve, and its training strategy called for 39 days of training  per year, which was to be followed by extensive training after  mobilization and prior to deployment. All of this training was supposed to  prepare units for the primary missions they were designed or organized to  perform. In the last two decades, the Army’s reserve component forces  have been called upon to support operational requirements in the Balkans  and then the Middle East. The Army now views the reserve component as  an operational reserve that regularly supports deployment requirements.  Furthermore, the Army has made adjustments to its actual training of  reserve component forces in order to support operational requirements.  Specifically, it increased the amount of time forces spend in training prior  to mobilization, referred to as pre-mobilization training, and training  became more focused on units’ assigned missions (i.e., missions that units  are assigned to perform in support of current or ongoing operations)  rather than their core or primary missions. In 2008, the Army issued two  updated field manuals—3-0 Operations and 7-0 Training for Full  Spectrum Operations—which called for units to be trained and ready to  operate across a full spectrum of operations. In accordance with that  guidance, the Army’s reserve components developed strategies that called  for their forces to conduct training on both primary and assigned missions  in order to progressively build capabilities across a 5-year cycle. During  the early years of the cycle, the strategy calls for training which is similar  to the traditional strategy—39 days of training focused on primary  missions. However, in the later stages of the cycle, the current strategy  calls for training that differs from the traditional strategy. Specifically, the  new strategy calls for increased training—up to 109 days a year—prior to  unit mobilizations and decreased training after units are mobilized. In  addition, both the increased pre-mobilization training and the decreased  post-mobilization training are to focus on assigned missions rather than  units’ primary missions.
Several variables can affect the numbers of forces that are available to  support ongoing operations, including the size and structure of active and  reserve component forces and policies concerning the length of  deployments and reserve component mobilizations. On January 19, 2007,  the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum that changed DOD’s  mobilization and deployment policies. It eliminated a previous policy that  had limited involuntary mobilizations to 24 cumulative months and thus  made virtually all reserve component personnel available on an indefinite  recurrent basis. However, the policy also limited involuntary mobilizations  to a maximum of 12 months at a time.
Section 344 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for  Fiscal Year 2009 directed GAO to report on the correlation between the  preparation and operational use of the Army’s reserve component forces  to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of  Representatives. This report addresses that mandate and also responds to  a portion of Section 343 that directs GAO to report on training constraints  that limit access to military schools and skill training as well as facilities  and ranges, including the combat training centers, and that could provide  challenges to the reserve components in their role as an operational  reserve. In responding to both mandates, our objectives are to determine  the extent to which 1) the Army is able to effectively implement its  strategy for training reserve component forces for their primary and  assigned missions, 2) mobilization and deployment laws, regulations,  goals, and policies impact the Army’s ability to train and employ reserve  component forces, and 3) access to military schools and skill training,  facilities, and ranges affect the preparation of reserve component forces.
To address these objectives we obtained and analyzed documentation  concerning reserve component training strategies, policies, laws, and  goals, and data associated with the mobilizing, and deploying of the  Army’s reserve component forces. We also interviewed Army and other  DOD officials concerning the impact of the current strategies, guidance,  and goals. We surveyed 22 Army National Guard or Army Reserve units  who returned from deployments in the last 12 months and conducted  follow-up interviews with officials from 15 of these units. Our survey,  based on a non-probability sample, and interviews addressed a range of  issues including deployment notification time lines; the timing and  effectiveness of pre-deployment, post-deployment, and in-theater training;  and access to training facilities, schoolhouses, and ranges. Additionally,  we interviewed leaders and personnel from two Army National Guard  brigade combat teams during their training exercises at the National  Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and at Camp Blanding, Florida.  We assessed the reliability of training, mobilization, and attrition data used  in this report and determined the data was sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report. We conducted this performance audit from  September 2008 through May 2009 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and  perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The  scope and methodology used for this audit are described in further detail  at appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Army has two reserve components, the Army National Guard and the  Army Reserve. Both reserve components are composed primarily of  citizen soldiers who balance the demands of civilian careers with military  service on a part-time basis. During the Cold War, it was expected that the  reserve forces would be a strategic reserve to supplement active forces in  the event of extended conflict. However, since the mid-1990s, the reserves  have been continuously mobilized to support operations worldwide,  including those in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as operations in Afghanistan  and Iraq. In today’s strategic environment, the Army’s reserve components  have taken on a variety of different overseas missions as well as traditional  and emerging domestic missions.
The Army Reserve and the Army National Guard are part of the total Army,  which also includes the active component. The Army Reserve is a federal  force that is organized primarily to supply specialized combat support and  combat service support skills to combat forces. The Army National Guard  is composed of both combat forces and units that supply support skills.  The Army National Guard, when mobilized for a federal mission, is under  the command and control of the President. When not mobilized for a  federal mission, Army National Guard units act under the control of the  governors for state missions, typically responding to natural disasters and  more recently protecting state assets from terrorist attacks.
Individual training is a building block of the Army training process. It  includes basic military training as well as occupational specialty training.  Acquiring advanced individual skills enables a soldier to move into a unit,  but acquisition of such skills does not necessarily equate with operational  preparedness. It must be integrated with unit training in a group situation,  which is referred to as collective training, to achieve operational  objectives.
Traditionally, the Army used a mobilize-train-deploy strategy to prepare its  reserve component units to act as a strategic reserve that was available to  augment active forces during a crisis. Figure 1 shows that the traditional  reserve component strategy called for a constant level of training until a  unit was mobilized and underwent extensive post-mobilization training to  prepare for deployment.
Under the traditional training strategy, all training was focused on a unit’s  primary missions and units were to be deployed to perform their primary  missions.
As reserve component requirements increased in recent years, the Army  began to move away from its traditional strategy and began adopting a  train-mobilize-deploy strategy that prepares reserve component forces to  serve as an operational reserve, which regularly supports deployment  requirements. Figure 2 shows that the Army’s current reserve component  training strategy is based on a 5-year cycle during which training is  increased to build capabilities.
The current train-mobilize-deploy strategy is designed to train individuals  and units to a prescribed level of readiness prior to mobilization in order  to limit post-mobilization training.
Several variables can affect the numbers of forces that are available to  support ongoing operations, including the size and structure of active and  reserve component forces and policies concerning the length of  deployments and reserve component mobilizations. On January 19, 2007,  the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum that changed DOD’s  mobilization and deployment policies. It eliminated a previous policy that  had limited involuntary mobilizations to 24 cumulative months and thus  made virtually all reserve component personnel available on an indefinite  recurrent basis. However, the policy also limited involuntary mobilizations  to 12 months at a time. It also established a reserve component unit  planning objective of 1 year mobilized to 5 years demobilized, and created  a requirement for mobilizations, including training and deployment, to be  managed on a unit basis.
In January 2008, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves  recommended that the Secretary of Defense ensure that training  institutions and facilities were resourced to meet the needs of the total  force. In particular, it recommended that institutions meet the current  training needs of the reserve component personnel and that each service  reassess the number of training and administrative days the reserve  component units and members need prior to activation. The Commission  further recommended that the services fund and implement policies to  increase pre-mobilization training and focus training on mission  requirements. The commission also stated that training equipment should  be sufficient to give service members regular access to modern  warfighting equipment so that they could train, develop, and maintain  proficiency on the same types of equipment that they would use when  deployed.
In February 2009, the Army Audit Agency reported that Army National  Guard and Army Reserve units often were unable to complete pre- mobilization training tasks because they were not able to stabilize staffing  levels and obtain equipment needed for training. They further reported  that units did not execute training requirements in the most efficient  manner.
section_title: The Army Faces Challenges in Executing Its Reserve Component Training Strategy
paragraphs: The Army is able to effectively execute the portion of its reserve  component training strategy that calls for training units on their assigned  missions, but faces challenges in effectively executing the portion of the  strategy that calls for training units on their primary missions.
The Army’s new training strategy is based on a five-year cycle that mirrors  the former strategy in the early years of the cycle, but calls for alterations  to the type and amounts of training conducted in the later years of the  cycle. Specifically, in the early years of the cycle, units conduct 39 days of  training that is focused on their primary missions just as they did under  the former strategy. However, under the new strategy, after a unit is  notified—generally in the middle to later stages of the training cycle (1 or  2 years prior to mobilization)— that it will be deploying for an operational  mission, all the unit’s training becomes focused on that assigned mission,  and training increases, up to 109 days in the year prior to mobilization.
subsections: section_title: New Training Strategy Contains a Number of Assumptions
paragraphs: The Army’s Field Manual 7-0 Training for Full Spectrum Operations  defines effective training as that which builds proficiency, teamwork,  confidence, cohesiveness, and allows organizations to achieve their  training objectives. The manual also specifies that organizations should  train the way they intend to operate and be efficient by making the best of  use of training resources, including training time. The Army’s reserve  component training strategy contains a number of assumptions related to  effective and efficient training. First, the strategy explicitly assumes that  the amount of training conducted after mobilization can be reduced  because of the increased training that is conducted prior to mobilization.  Second, it implicitly assumes that the training conducted in the early years  of the cycle lays a foundation that can be built upon throughout the later  stages of the cycle. Third, it implicitly assumes that units will have the  necessary time, personnel, equipment, and support to conduct effective  training on both individual and unit tasks throughout the training cycle.
section_title: Conditions for Effective Unit Training Occur Late in the Cycle
paragraphs: The Army currently prioritizes its available training resources and time to  support units that are preparing to deploy for ongoing operations. As a  result, unit training for assigned missions, which is conducted in the later  stages of the Army’s 5-year training cycle, is generally effective. Table 1  shows the typical status of reserve component units with respect to  available training time, personnel, equipment, and training support  throughout the 5-year cycle. The table shows that during the later stages of  the cycle, units have the necessary training time, and necessary personnel,  equipment, and support to support effective unit training.
According to the reserve component training strategy, units have their  yearly training increased during the 2 years prior to mobilization—up to 45  days, and up to 109 days, 1 year prior to mobilization. Because this  increased pre-mobilization training is focused on the same assigned  missions as the units’ post-mobilization training, the Army has been able to  reduce the amount of post-mobilization training. Furthermore, in the later  stages of the cycle, mission requirements are generally stabilized and the  Army has traditionally stabilized unit personnel levels through the use of  “Stop Loss” policies, which prevent personnel from leaving units. This  stabilization allows the Army to conduct effective unit training that builds  teamwork and unit cohesion. Units train the way they intend to operate— with the people who will deploy and on the missions they will perform.  Under DOD’s Stop Loss policy Army reserve component units were  subject to stop loss 90 days prior to mobilization. However, the Army  recently announced a comprehensive plan to eliminate stop loss,  beginning in August 2009, while retaining the authority for future use  under extraordinary circumstances.
Personnel from units in our sample indicated that they preferred to  conduct unit training later in the training cycle. They indicated that their  units generally had increased personnel levels during the later stages of  the cycle. Of the 22 units in our non-probability sample, 21 received  additional personnel from other units to help them achieve the units’  required deployment strengths. The brigade combat teams that we met  with also received significant numbers of personnel from other units to  help prepare them for their deployments in 2009. In each of these cases,  the units received the additional personnel during the later part of the  training cycle—in the year prior to the units’ mobilizations or at the  mobilization station. Personnel from the units we sampled also noted that  equipment is more available in the later stages of the training cycle when  units also receive additional training support including personnel who  support unit training events by acting as observers, controllers, and  trainers. Furthermore, the Army has found that the later stages of the cycle  are the optimum times to conduct unit training. In the Army’s 2009 Posture  Statement, the Army indicated that an extended training period close to, or  contiguous with, mobilization station arrival, enabled commanders to  attain the highest levels of readiness and unit capability. Additionally,  two February 2009, Army Audit Agency reports on Army National Guard  and Army Reserve pre-mobilization training found that the best practice  for completing required pre-mobilization training tasks was to conduct the  majority of those tasks immediately prior to mobilization when mission  specific equipment is more available. Finally, in a May 2009 letter to the  Secretary of Defense, the Adjutants General Association of the United  States stated that training late in the cycle just prior to mobilization is  often required to enhance soldier readiness.
section_title: Availability of Unit Training Enablers Varies throughout the Training Cycle
paragraphs: As noted previously in table 1, the Army is unable to set the conditions  required for effective unit training during the early years of the cycle,  when units are focused on primary mission training. Training time,  personnel, equipment, and training support are key enablers of effective  unit training, but the Army faces challenges that are associated with each  of these enablers during the early stages of the training cycle. In addition,  our current and prior reviews have found that units that are not scheduled  to deploy receive lower priorities for resources and training support.  Therefore, a number of reasons make it unlikely that units would be  adequately prepared to deploy and conduct their primary missions  following a reduced post-mobilization training period such as the one  called for under the current strategy.
First, units are receiving the same level of primary mission training as they  were under the former strategy that called for more lengthy post- mobilization training periods. Second, annual reserve component attrition  rates that typically approach 20 percent limit the effectiveness of unit  training that is conducted to build teamwork and unit cohesion. Because  the training strategy calls for a 5-year training cycle and attrition occurs  each year, unit training that is conducted early in the cycle and designed to  build teamwork and unit cohesion will become less beneficial with each  passing year, as team members depart the unit. DOD reports indicate that  attrition rates for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have ranged  from 17 percent to 22 percent from fiscal years 2003 through 2007.  Because of these attrition rates, a significant percentage of the unit  personnel who train on the units’ primary missions during the early stages  of the 5-year cycle will not be in the unit at the end of the cycle when the  unit is available to deploy. Third, units that are training for primary  missions during the early stages of the cycle also experience personnel  and equipment shortages, often because they are tasked to give up  personnel and equipment to support deploying units.
Personnel shortages result from a variety of reasons. Some personnel are  not available for training because they are recovering from injuries or  illnesses, while others are unavailable because of pending disciplinary  actions. In addition, many soldiers have not met individual training  requirements. According to the Army’s 2009 Posture Statement, the Army  National Guard had 67,623 soldiers who were non-deployable in fiscal year  2008 because of incomplete initial entry training, medical, or other  issues. For the same period, the Army Reserve had 36,974 soldiers who  were non-deployable for similar reasons. These personnel shortages can  directly impact the level of unit training that a unit is able to achieve prior  to mobilization.
In addition, equipment and support issues are also a concern early in the  training cycle when units are training for their primary missions. In his  March 2009 statement before the Senate Armed Services, Subcommittee  on Personnel, the Director of the Army National Guard stated that the lack  of equipment availability for training remains an issue. Further, the 2008  Army Reserve Posture Statement noted that the Army Reserve was forced  to expend significant resources to move equipment between units and  training locations to address shortages. Units in our sample also  experienced equipment challenges during the early stages of the training  cycle when they were training for their primary missions. Specifically, 12  of the 22 units in our sample faced equipment shortages that impacted  their ability to train early in the cycle. Furthermore, training support is  limited during the early years of the cycle. For example, the Army’s active  component does not provide observers, controllers, and trainers to reserve  component units to support their primary mission training, which is  conducted early in the cycle.
section_title: DOD’s Mobilization Policy Has Presented Challenges as the Army Trains and Deploys Its Reserve Component Forces
paragraphs: While DOD’s 12-month mobilization policy has not hindered the Army’s  overall ability to train its reserve component forces and has reduced the  length of deployments, it has not fully achieved its intended purpose of  reducing stress on the force by providing predictability. According to  testimony by the Secretary of Defense, the intended purpose of DOD’s  mobilization policy was to reduce stress on the force by, in part, improving  predictability. While the policy has led to shorter deployments, it has also  caused units to mobilize and deploy more frequently, and units are also  spending more time away from home in training when not mobilized.
subsections: section_title: The 12-Month Mobilization Policy Reduces Many Deployments to Less Than 10 Months
paragraphs: The 12-month mobilization policy has significantly reduced the length of  deployments for the Army’s reserve component forces. Because units must  spend part of their mobilization periods training for their assigned  missions, they are actually deployed for only part of the time that they are  mobilized. Under the previous mobilization policy, reserve component  mobilizations were limited to 24 cumulative months and many reserve  component units were deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan for 12 to 15  months. Under the current policy, which limits mobilizations to 12 months,  deployments are averaging 9 to 10 months.
section_title: Reduced Deployment Times Lead to More Frequent Deployments
paragraphs: Because the demand for reserve component forces has remained high and  reserve component force levels have remained fairly stable, the 12-month  mobilization policy, which has resulted in shorter deployments, has also  resulted in more frequent deployments. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship  between the length of deployments and the number of deployments when  requirements and force structure are steady. It shows that 12-month  deployments, which were typical under the previous policy, result in 3  deployments over a 36-month period. However, 9-month deployments,  under the current policy, require 4 deployments to support the same  requirements over a 36-month period.
section_title: More Deployments Result in Less Time at Home to Conduct Training
paragraphs: As previously noted, the Army’s reserve component strategy calls for  reserve component units to have 4 years of training between deployments,  but the 12-month mobilization policy, with its associated shorter  deployments and more frequent mobilizations, has led to situations where  units do not have 4 years available to conduct training. Demands for  certain occupational specialties have remained particularly high. Army  leadership recently testified that reserve component soldiers are  experiencing less than 3 years between deployments, and personnel in  some high demand units, such as civil affairs units, are receiving as little  13 months between deployments. For example, personnel from one of the  units in our sample, an aviation battalion, experienced frequent  deployments. Personnel from the battalion returned from deployment in  2008 and were notified that the unit will be mobilized again in 2011.
section_title: Reduced Time at Home Leads to Additional Training under the Current Training Strategy
paragraphs: As previously noted, under the Army’s reserve component strategy, unit  training requirements build from 39 days in the first 2 years of the training  cycle to as high as 109 days in the year prior to mobilization. However, the  12-month mobilization policy is leading to more frequent deployments, and  units are mobilizing and deploying after 3 years at home rather than after  4. Because units are supposed to receive initial notification of their  assigned missions two years prior to mobilization, the extended assigned  mission training that is scheduled to occur after notification is still  maintained under the compressed schedule, but the 39 days of primary  mission training that is scheduled to be conducted in the second year of  the training cycle, just prior to notification, is often eliminated. Therefore,  since the extended training periods are maintained and the shorter  training periods are eliminated, units are required to spend a higher  proportion of their “at home” time conducting training.
section_title: Flexible Approaches Provide Better Predictability Than the Firm 12-Month Mobilization Policy
paragraphs: As part of its mobilization policy, DOD has established a goal that calls for  reserve component forces to be mobilized for 1 year and demobilized for 5  years. However, the Army’s reserve component forces are not meeting this  goal because of high operational requirements, stable force structure, and  the 12-month mobilization policy that is causing more frequent  deployments. When the Secretary of Defense testified that the mobilization  policy was intended to reduce stress on the force by, in part, improving  predictability in the mobilization and deployment process, he also noted  that the department is not achieving its goal of 1 year mobilized to 5 years  demobilized. Earlier, in September 2007, the Defense Science Board  evaluated DOD’s mobilization policy and concluded that the goal of 1 year  mobilized and 5 years not mobilized could not be achieved given the level  of operational demand and the end-strength increases that had been  planned.  Thus, for the foreseeable future, DOD’s goal will be difficult to  achieve because operational demands for reserve component forces are  expected to remain high and force structure levels are expected to remain  relatively constant. Furthermore, the Army does not expect to reach the  goal of 1 year mobilized and 5 years not mobilized in the near future. In its  2009 Posture Statement, the Army indicated that it expected to progress to  1 year mobilized to 4 years demobilized by 2011 due, in part, to the  drawdown in Iraq. However, the statement does not address the impact  that increased operations in Afghanistan may have on the projected  progress.
Leaders and soldiers in one of the larger units we contacted said that the  12-month mobilization policy, which has led to more frequent deployments  and training periods, has actually increased stress and decreased  predictability. Specifically, they stated that they would prefer to be away  from home for a single longer period of time rather than many shorter  periods of time. However, in our other readiness work, we have found that  the Air Force has developed an alternative approach to provide better  predictability for its deploying active and reserve component personnel.  The Air Force deployment model groups occupational specialties into 5  different “tempo bands” based on ongoing operational requirements.  Personnel in the first band should expect to be deployed about the same  length of time as they are home between deployments. Personnel in bands  two, three, four, and five can expect to respectively be home two, three,  four, or five times longer than they are deployed. The Air Force expects  this model to increase predictability for its forces.
section_title: Reserve Component Forces Assigned Missions in Support of Ongoing Operations Have Access to the Training Needed, But Constraints Delay and Limit Training Opportunities for Some Forces
paragraphs: In accordance with DOD Directive 1200.17, which directs the Secretaries  of the military departments to ensure that facilities and training areas are  available to support reserve component training requirements, reserve  component forces are generally receiving the access to training facilities  that is necessary to prepare them for their assigned missions. However,  the Army’s training facilities lack the capacity necessary to prepare all of  the Army’s forces for the full range of individual and unit training  requirements, including those associated with primary as well as assigned  missions. In addressing its capacity shortages, the Army has given priority  access to personnel and units that have established mobilization dates or  assigned missions. As a result, active and reserve component forces  without assigned missions often experience delays in gaining access to  training needed to prepare them for their primary missions. While the  Army is exploring or has several initiatives under way to address training  constraints, it has not identified the total requirements associated with its  reserve component training strategy or the training capacity necessary to  support the strategy.
subsections: section_title: Reserve Component Forces That Have Assigned Missions in Support of Ongoing Operations Have Necessary Access to Training Facilities
paragraphs: DOD Directive 1200.17 directs the Secretaries of the Military Departments  to ensure facilities and training areas are available to support reserve  component training requirements. It also directs the Secretaries to  allocate resources where required to support a “train-mobilize-deploy”  construct. As previously discussed, reserve component forces undergo  individual training as well as collective (unit) training at various times in  their training cycles in order to prepare them for their primary and  assigned missions. Individual training is typically conducted at military  schools or other specialized training sites while collective training occurs  at larger training centers, such as the Combat Training Centers, and  mobilization sites where units complete their final deployment  preparations. Once units are assigned missions in support of ongoing  operations, they are granted necessary access to training facilities.  According to officials from the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command,  missions and mobilization dates are two key factors that drive individual  training opportunities and access to training facilities. U.S. Forces  Command officials also said that priority access to training facilities is  based on units’ mobilization and latest arrival in theater dates, rather than  their status as part of the active or reserve component.
Based on information from the units we contacted, we found that units  generally had access to training facilities once they were assigned  missions. Personnel from the units in our sample and the brigade combat  teams we met with reported that they had been granted priority access to  individual and collective training once their units were assigned missions.  Specifically, in preparing for their most recent missions, 23 of the 24 units  reported that they did not have access issues involving collective training  facilities and 22 units reported that they did not have access issues  involving individual training facilities. Officials from one of the units that  reported access issues explained that this was because their soldiers did  not receive necessary orders until a few days before they were mobilized.  Officials from one of the other units explained that the access issues were  because of the fact that the unit was under tight time constraints because  it was part of the 2007 surge force that deployed to Iraq. Officials from the  third unit that reported access issues explained that it trained using a  motor pool to simulate a detention facility because it could not access a  more appropriate training facility.
section_title: Constraints in Capacity Delay and Limit Training Opportunities for Some Forces at Individual and Collective Training Facilities
paragraphs: Capacity constraints involving personnel, equipment, and infrastructure,  limit training opportunities for some forces at individual and collective  training facilities. In some cases, the Army is exploring or has ongoing  initiatives that are intended to help address constraints on individual and  collective training.
subsections: section_title: Individual Training Facilities
paragraphs: Because deploying forces have higher priority and existing training  facilities do not have sufficient capacity to accommodate all training  needs, reserve component forces that have not been assigned missions  often experience delays in gaining access to individual training needed to  prepare them for their primary missions. While both the Army Reserve and  Army National Guard are limited in their ability to fully train all soldiers on  individual tasks within desired time frames, the effect of these limitations  is particularly significant for the Army National Guard. The Army National  Guard’s individual training goal is to have no more than 15 percent of its  soldiers awaiting individual training at any given time. However, table 3  shows that the Army National Guard has not been able to achieve this goal  since 2001, as a result of the individual training capacity limitations.
Although the percentage of Army National Guard soldiers awaiting  individual training declined to 17 percent in 2004 and 2005, it has remained  at or above 22 percent since that time. Furthermore, Army National Guard  training officials stated that they do not expect the number of soldiers  awaiting training to change their specialty to decrease from the March  2009 level. In March 2009, 80,000 Army National Guard soldiers were  awaiting various types of individual training, of whom 35,000 were  awaiting training to change their specialty, such as from aviation to  infantry.
In both the active and reserve components, incoming recruits often prefer  to sign contracts to begin basic training in the summer. This Army-wide  preference exacerbates capacity constraints at individual training facilities  during the summer months. While the number of soldiers awaiting training  decreases over the summer months because most soldiers begin training  at that time, Army officials said backlog could be reduced further if the  Army fully accounted for this summer surge during its planning process,  but the Army plans as if individual training requirements are evenly  distributed across the fiscal year. The Army National Guard expects to  reduce the number of soldiers awaiting basic training from 30,000 to  10,000 by September 30, 2009, but this number could be reduced even  further if capacity constraints were addressed. While capacity is not an  issue during the fall and winter months, Army officials expect the number  of soldiers awaiting training to increase during those months because  incoming recruits generally do not want to begin training during those  months. Army officials said they are exploring ways to even out the  training demand such as offering bonuses for soldiers to enlist and attend  basic training outside of the summer months. Additionally, the Army  formed an integrated process team specifically to develop options for  mitigating the summer surge, including options to expand capacity. At the  time of our review, the team’s work was ongoing, and it was too soon to  know what, if any, actions would be taken as a result of its efforts.
The delays in individual training opportunities that are caused by capacity  constraints are distributed across the Army in both the active and reserve  components. The Army has a review process that compares Army-wide  individual training requirements to the training capacity at the Army’s  active training facilities and allocates training quotas to the active and  reserve components. The 2008 data from the process is depicted in table  4 and shows that the active and reserve components have approximately  the same level of unmet training requirements at Army Training and  Doctrine Command schools.
Capacity constraints at collective training facilities such as the Army’s  combat training centers and mobilization stations have limited training  opportunities for both active and reserve component units. As we have  previously reported, the Army’s strategy requires that all brigade combat  teams be trained at the combat training centers prior to deployment.  Because the combat training centers do not have adequate capacity,  training opportunities are now limited to only those active and reserve  brigade combat teams that have been assigned missions requiring them to  control battle-space. As a result, most active and reserve components  units, including brigade combat teams that are assigned detainee  operations or convoy security missions, do not train at the combat training  centers. These units conduct training at other locations such as the Army’s  mobilization stations.
In the past, capacity constraints have also limited reserve component  access to facilities at certain mobilization stations. For example, officials  from First Army, which is responsible for training mobilized reserve  component units, stated that facilities have not always been accessible at  sites such as Ft. Bragg and Ft. Dix because they were being used by active  component forces. Because of this, First Army is realigning its resources  and will no longer be using the constrained facilities to train mobilized  reserve component forces. First Army officials expect the realignment to  increase training capacity because its resources will be concentrated at  mobilization stations where it has greater control over scheduling.
However, DOD’s 2008 Sustainable Ranges Report identified shortfalls at a  number of major collective training facilities, including the mobilization  stations that First Army plans to continue to use. These shortfalls involve  land and airspace, ranges, infrastructure and feedback/scoring systems, as  well as a number of other resources. Four of the 24 units we contacted  identified shortfalls at the mobilization stations where they conducted  collective training in preparation for their most recent missions. Two of  these units stated that their mobilization stations did not have adequate  infrastructure, citing shortfalls in maintenance and hangar facilities  respectively. The other two units stated that their mobilization stations  were in geographic locations that hindered training because of the terrain,  explaining that Mississippi and western Oklahoma did not realistically  replicate conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively. Army Reserve  officials told us that similar shortfalls characterize many of the collective  training facilities owned by the reserve components because the Army  employed tiered resourcing for several years, which relegated reserve  component requirements to a lower priority for funding than active  component requirements. These facilities are commonly used by reserve  component units to execute collective training prior to mobilization.
Initiatives to Help Address Training Capacity Constraints  The Army has several initiatives under way to help address individual and  collective training capacity constraints. For example:    The Army has developed a database, which is intended to account for  both active and reserve component individual training facilities under  a “One Army School” system. However, the Army has not accounted  for reserve component individual training facilities when filling  training requirements, and in its 2007 Training Capacity Assessment,  the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command found that a significant  reserve component infrastructure was available to meet individual  training requirements.
The Army is attempting to address individual training capacity  constraints through the use of mobile training teams. These mobile  training teams contain transportable training assets—facilities,  equipment, and personnel—which deploy to units’ home stations to  provide individual training. Mobile training teams are currently being  used to provide classes that are in high demand, such as professional  military education, foreign language, and cultural awareness. These  mobile training teams partially relieve capacity constraints resulting  from limited infrastructure at training facilities.
The Army National Guard has established an Exportable Combat  Training Center program, to address facility, personnel, and equipment  limitations that impact pre-mobilization collective training for Army  National Guard units. The program enhances training by providing  instrumentation to collect and record individual and unit performance,  exercise control personnel, opposition forces, and civilians on the  battlefield; program officials also coordinate the use of appropriate  facilities. Exportable Combat Training Center events are intended to  serve as the culminating collective training event prior to a unit’s  mobilization and are designed to validate training proficiency up to the  company level. The Army National Guard conducted four Exportable  Combat Training Center program training events from 2005 through  2008, and it intends to conduct 5 training events from 2009 through  2010.
The Army Reserve has a concept plan for a Combat Support Training  Center to address capability constraints in combat support and combat  service support collective training 1 to 2 years prior to a unit’s  mobilization. This concept has been approved at the Department of the  Army level but is currently unfunded. The Combat Support Training  Center would leverage existing active and reserve component combat  support and combat services support expertise and thus not have to  compete with active component forces capabilities. The Combat  Support Training Center program is expected to provide  instrumentation, an operations group, opposition forces, civilians on  the battlefield, interpreters, media teams, and realistic training  environments, similar to Combat Training Centers such as the National  Training Center at Ft. Irwin, California. The first Combat Support  Training Center event is scheduled to occur in July 2009 at Fort  McCoy, Wisconsin.
section_title: The Army Has Not Identified the Total Personnel, Equipment, and Facility Requirements Needed to Meet Reserve Component Training Requirements
paragraphs: While the Army has a number of initiatives intended to relieve training  capacity constraints, it has not identified the total personnel, equipment,  and facility resources needed to support its reserve component training  strategy. As previously discussed, DOD Directive 1200.17 directs the  Secretaries of the Military Departments to ensure facilities and training  areas are available to support reserve component training requirements. It  also directs the Secretaries to allocate resources where required to  support a “train-mobilize-deploy” construct. In November 2008, the  Secretary of Defense directed the Secretaries of the Military Departments  to review the capacity of their training institutions to determine if they are  properly resourced to prepare all military members to meet mission  requirements.
The Army has ongoing efforts to address this tasking, but these efforts do  not fully address all individual and collective training requirements. In  June 2009, the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command is scheduled to  produce an update to its 2007 Total Army Capacity Assessment of  individual training requirements. However, both the 2007 and 2009  assessments focus exclusively on training infrastructure, and neither  assessment addresses personnel and equipment constraints that have  limited training in the past. Further, the Army’s efforts to identify  collective training requirements are affected by inaccurate assumptions  regarding the use of ranges. Specifically, the Army Range Requirements  Model, which is used to determine Army range requirements, calculates  requirements based on an assumption that reserve component forces will  be mobilized for 1 of 6 years. Since reserve component forces are being  mobilized more frequently—about 1 of 3 years, according to Army  officials—the model understates actual training requirements. The model  also understates active component range requirements since it calculates  requirements based on planned operational tempos rather than the actual  higher tempos that are occurring to support ongoing operations. Because  the model understates current requirements, it does not accurately project  the full magnitude of capacity constraints at the Army’s ranges.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In recent years, reserve component units have successfully deployed for a  wide range of assigned missions, and the training and preparation for  these assigned missions, which is conducted in the later stages of the  Army’s 5-year cycle, was generally effective. However, collective training  for primary missions, conducted in the early stages of the 5-year cycle,  generally is not optimized because of various challenges. Such challenges  include limited training time, changing personnel because of attrition,  personnel and equipment shortages, and limited training support. Given  that ongoing operations are expected to continue for some time, it is  imperative that the Army has a strategy that is executable and provides for  efficient use of training resources. Otherwise, units may continue to use  limited training time and resources to build teams that are unlikely to  deploy together and to train units for collective tasks that they may not  perform. In light of the continued high demand for reserve forces and the  Army’s existing force structure levels, DOD’s 12-month mobilization policy  is likely to continue to result in more frequent and less predictable  deployment and training periods, particularly for personnel in high  demand occupational specialties, raising questions about the need to  reevaluate the policy and consider alternatives. Furthermore, without  complete information concerning the personnel, equipment, and facilities  support that is necessary to execute reserve component training strategy,  the Army will not be able to identify total requirements for its strategy,  establish priorities and related resource needs, and be assured that current  initiatives are addressing priority needs.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the Army’s training strategy and DOD’s mobilization policy for  Army reserve component personnel, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense take the following three actions:  To better ensure the Army has an executable strategy for effectively  training its reserve component forces, we recommend the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to reevaluate and adjust its  reserve component training strategy to fully account for the factors that  limit the effectiveness of unit training for primary missions in the early  years of the 5-year cycle. Elements that should be considered in re- evaluating the training strategy should include:    Whether the total training days allotted for reserve component training  are adequate to train units for both primary and assigned missions,  which may require significantly different resources and skill.
Whether consolidating collective training later in the training cycle, as  opposed to spreading it through the cycle, would enhance the  effectiveness of the training and increase predictability.
To better ensure DOD’s mobilization policy is having the intended effect of  providing reserve component personnel with predictable training,  mobilization, and deployment schedules while also improving DOD’s  ability to effectively train and employ its reserve component forces, we are  recommending that the Secretary of Defense reevaluate DOD’s  mobilization policy for Army reserve component personnel and consider  whether a more flexible policy that allows greater variations in the length  of mobilizations or which establishes deployment goals based on  occupational specialty or unit type would better meet DOD’s goals to  reduce stress on the force and improve predictability for personnel.
To better ensure that the Army has a reserve component training strategy  that it is able to execute, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Secretary of the Army to determine the range of resources and  support that are necessary to fully implement the strategy. Elements that  should be accounted for include:  the personnel, equipment, and facilities required to fully support  individual training requirements;  the range space required to fully support individual and collective  training requirements; and  the full support costs associated with the Army reserve component  training strategy— including personnel, equipment, and facilities.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially  concurred with all of our recommendations. Specifically, DOD concurred  with the element of our first recommendation that calls for the Secretary  of Defense to direct the Secretary of the Army to consider, when  reevaluating the Army’s reserve component training strategy, whether the  total training days allotted for reserve component training are adequate to  train units for both primary and assigned missions. DOD noted that  reserve component units do not always have sufficient time in their  baseline training year to prepare for both a primary and assigned mission  when those missions are substantially different. DOD also stated that  today’s global demand for Army forces prevents reserve component units  from sustaining their 5-year training cycle, since the Army must  continuously balance its strategic depth against available resources to  meet current operational requirements. DOD, however, did not state that it  would take any action. We agree with DOD’s comments, and in fact, these  comments reflect the same conditions that led us to conclude that current  operational realities necessitate a reevaluation of the Army’s reserve  component training strategy, including the adequacy of training time  allotted for reserve component training. Therefore, we continue to believe  our recommendation has merit. DOD partially concurred with the second  element of our first recommendation that the department, in reevaluating  its training strategy, consider whether consolidating collective training  later in the training cycle, as opposed to spreading it through the cycle,  would enhance the effectiveness of the training and increase  predictability. In comments, DOD noted that concentrating training later in  the cycle compounds the existing resource-constrained environment and  accentuates competition for limited training resources, facilities,  equipment, and ranges. DOD, however, did not state that it plans to take  any specific action. As noted in our report, the Army faces challenges  associated with training time, personnel, equipment, and training support  during the early stages of the training cycle and is, therefore, unable to set  the conditions required for effective unit training during the early years of  the cycle. Further, units we sampled indicated they preferred to conduct  collective training later in the training cycle when personnel and  equipment levels are more stable. The Army has also acknowledged, in its  2009 Posture Statement, that an extended training period close to or  contiguous with arriving at the mobilization station allowed commanders  to achieve the highest levels of readiness and unit capability. We continue  to believe that collective training should be conducted when training  enablers such as personnel and equipment are present to ensure the  training is most effective and that the Army should reevaluate its current  approach.
DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that the  Secretary of Defense reevaluate DOD’s mobilization policy for Army  reserve component personnel and consider whether a more flexible  policy, which allows greater variations in the length of mobilization or  which establishes deployment goals based on occupational specialty or  unit type, would better meet DOD’s goals to reduce stress on the force and  improve predictability for personnel. In DOD’s response, the department  noted the Secretary of Defense will continue to evaluate those  circumstances that warrant changes or exceptions to the mobilization  policy but commented that the 1-year mobilization has reduced stress on  service members, their families and employers. DOD also acknowledged  the challenge associated with implementing a 5-year training and  preparation cycle and identified several innovations designed to enhance  predictability and reduce stress on reserve component soldiers and units  including the Regional Training Centers developed by the Army Reserves  to assist units in preparing for mobilization and the consolidation of its  training support structure at six mobilization training centers to better  support all deploying units. Our report acknowledges department  initiatives to increase training capacity and support to units through  initiatives like those pointed out by the department. However, we also  note that in spite of these initiatives, DOD’s mobilization policy is not  achieving the intended purpose of reducing stress on the force by  providing predictability. For example, our report discusses how the 1-year  mobilization, while limiting the amount of time reserve component  soldiers and units are deployed, is resulting in more frequent deployments  and is, therefore, not reducing stress on soldiers and units. We continue to  believe the mobilization policy needs to be reevaluated to determine  whether a more flexible approach that recognizes variances in deployment  frequency based on occupational specialty and unit type would improve  predictability.
DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to determine the  range of resources and support that are necessary to fully implement the  Army’s strategy for training its reserve components. In comments, DOD  noted that an all volunteer force trained to meet its persistent operational  requirements will require sufficient resources in order to be trained and  ready. To do so, DOD further noted, will require a holistic approach that  leverages the consolidation of training locations in conjunction with the  utilization of live, distributed learning, virtual, and constructive  technologies to deliver more training to home station locations. DOD also  stated the Army will need to prioritize the allocation of funds supporting  training initiatives while embedding the costs to implement them in its  Program Objective Memorandum. We agree that the Army’s various  training initiatives, many of which are discussed in our report, should be  prioritized and the costs associated with those initiatives should be  reflected in the Army’s Program Objective Memorandum. However, we  believe the Army must first determine the full range of resources and  support required to implement its training strategy in order to establish  priorities and resource needs in order to be assured that current initiatives  are addressing priority needs.
The full text of DOD’s written comments is reprinted in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional  committees and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, this report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributors to this  report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Army is able to effectively  implement its strategy for training Reserve Component forces, we  reviewed documentation outlining the Army’s approach to training its  reserve component forces such as Field Manual 7.0, Training for Full  Spectrum Operations and Department of the Army Executive Order 150- 08, Reserve Component Deployment Expeditionary Force Pre-and Post- Mobilization Training Strategy. Additionally, we discussed the training  strategy, factors that limit execution of the strategy, and initiatives under  way to address any limiting factors with officials responsible for training  including officials from the Department of the Army Training Directorate,  U.S. Army Forces Command, the Army National Guard Readiness Center,  First Army, the Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the U.S. Army  Reserve Command. To determine the impact personnel levels have on  training effectiveness, we obtained and reviewed data on attrition. To  assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed documentation and  interviewed officials and determined these data to be sufficiently reliable.
To assess the extent to which mobilization and deployment laws,  regulations, goals, and policies impact the Army’s ability to train and  employ Reserve Component forces, we reviewed laws, regulations, goals,  and policies that impact the way the Army trains and employs its reserve  component forces such as relevant sections of Titles 10 and 32 of the U.S.  Code and DOD’s January 2007 mobilization policy. Additionally, we  interviewed Army officials from organizations such as U.S. Army Reserve  Command, the National Guard Bureau, and U.S. Joint Forces Command to  discuss the impact of mobilization and deployment documents. Lastly, we  reviewed and analyzed data from units and various Army offices, including  data showing trends in pre- and post-mobilization training time, to assess  how mobilization and deployment laws, regulations, goals, and policies  may be impacting reserve component units and personnel.
To determine the extent to which access to military schools and skill  training, facilities. and ranges affect the preparation of reserve component  forces to support ongoing operations, we reviewed documentation such as  DOD’s 2008 Sustainable Ranges Report, the 2007 Total Army Training  Capacity Assessment, and outputs from DOD’s Structure Manning  Decision Review. To determine how training requirements are prioritized,  we also interviewed officials from the Army’s Training and Doctrine  Command and the U.S. Army Forces Command. These commands  schedule units and soldiers to attend individual and collective training.  Further, we reviewed documentation and interviewed officials to  determine initiatives that the Army has under way to address capacity  constraints and to assess total training requirements. We also obtained and  reviewed data on Army National Guard soldiers awaiting individual  training. We assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing existing  documentation and interviewing knowledgeable officials and found these  data to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. Lastly, we observed  Training at the Army’s National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California,  and the Army National Guard’s exportable training conducted at Camp  Blanding, Florida.
To inform all three of our objectives, we sent a list of questions to U.S.  Central Command and to Northern Command and held a follow-on video  teleconference to discuss in more detail Northern Command’s response to  our questions. Additionally, we surveyed a non-probability sample of 22  Army National Guard or Army Reserve units and conducted follow-up  interviews with officials from 15 of these units. While the results of our  survey and discussions are not projectable to the entire reserve  component, we chose units of different types and sizes for our sample. In  addition, we chose the proportion of Army National Guard and Reserve  units for our sample based on the proportion of mobilized forces from  each of the components. Our surveys and interviews addressed a range of  issues including: deployment and notification timelines; the timing and  effectiveness of pre-deployment, post-deployment, and in-theater training;  and access to training facilities, schoolhouses, and ranges. Additionally,  we interviewed commanders and personnel from two Army National  Guard brigade combat teams that were training at the National Training  Center at Fort Irwin, California, and at Camp Blanding, Florida. Of the  total of 24 units in our non-probability sample, 22 had returned from  supporting on-going operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Kosovo, and 2 were  preparing for deployment. We conducted this performance audit from  September 2008 through June 2009 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and  perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Michael Ferren, Assistant  Director; Grace Coleman; Nicole Harms; Ron La Due Lake; Susan Tindall;  Nate Tranquilli; and John Vallario made key contributions to this report.