Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed
Published: 2009-11-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program stores and processes biometric and biographic information to, among other things, control and monitor the entry and exit of foreign visitors. Currently, an entry capability is operating at almost 300 U.S. ports of entry, but an exit capability is not. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has previously reported on limitations in DHS's efforts to plan and execute its efforts to deliver US-VISIT exit, and made recommendations to improve these areas. GAO was asked to determine (1) the status of DHS's efforts to deliver a comprehensive exit solution and (2) to what extent DHS is applying an integrated approach to managing its comprehensive exit solution. To accomplish this, GAO assessed US-VISIT exit project plans, schedules, and other management documentation against relevant criteria, and it observed exit pilots.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DHS has established a Comprehensive Exit project within its US-VISIT program that consists of six components that are at varying stages of completion. To DHS's credit, the US-VISIT program office has established integrated project management plans for, and has adopted an integrated approach to, interacting with and involving stakeholders in its Comprehensive Exit project. However, it has not adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, executing, and tracking the work that needs to be accomplished to deliver a comprehensive exit solution. Rather, it is relying on several separate and distinct schedules to manage individual components and the US-VISIT prime contractor's work that supports these components. Moreover, neither of the two component schedules that GAO reviewed are reliable because they have not been derived in accordance with relevant guidance. Specifically, both the Air Exit Pilots schedule and the Temporary Worker Visa Exit Pilot schedule only fully meet one of nine key schedule estimating practices, and either partially, minimally, or do not meet the remaining eight. In contrast, the prime contractor's schedule is largely reliable, as it fully or substantially meets all nine practices. Without a master schedule for the Comprehensive Exit project that is integrated and derived in accordance with relevant guidance, DHS cannot reliably commit to when and how the work will be accomplished to deliver a comprehensive exit solution to its almost 300 ports of entry, and it cannot adequately monitor and manage its progress toward this end.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: For many years, Congress and the executive branch have sought better  ways to record and track the arrival and departure of foreign travelers  through U.S. air, sea, and land ports of entry (POE). Pursuant to a series of  statutory mandates, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in  coordination with the Department of State, established a program to use  biometric and biographic information to control and monitor the pre- entry, entry, status, and exit of certain foreign visitors and immigrants.
This program, which is called the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status  Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program, is intended to enhance the  security of U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel and trade,  ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and protect the  privacy of visitors to the United States. Since 2006, DHS has been  operating a US-VISIT entry capability at about 300 air, sea, and land POEs,  and has conducted evaluations and proof-of-concept experiments relative  to a US-VISIT exit capability. However, it has yet to develop and deploy an  operational exit solution at U.S. POEs. The program’s current efforts to  develop an exit capability are collectively referred to as the  Comprehensive Exit project.
Because of the strategic importance of a US-VISIT exit capability to our  nation’s evolving immigration and border management missions, you  asked us to determine (1) the status of DHS’s efforts to deliver a  comprehensive exit solution and (2) to what extent DHS is employing an  integrated approach to managing its Comprehensive Exit solution. To  accomplish our objectives, we reviewed key program documentation,  including plans and schedules, to determine the composition of the  Comprehensive Exit project and the status of its components. We also  reviewed key Comprehensive Exit project management documentation  and compared it with guidance relevant to the management of interrelated  initiatives.
We conducted this performance audit at the US-VISIT Program Office in  Arlington, Virginia; U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)  headquarters offices in Washington, D.C.; Transportation Security  Administration (TSA) headquarters offices in Arlington, Virginia; Detroit  Metropolitan Wayne County Airport in Detroit, Michigan; and Hartsfield- Jackson Atlanta International Airport in Atlanta, Georgia, from January  2009 to November 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. For more details  on our objectives, scope, and methodology, see appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: US-VISIT’s goals are to (1) enhance the security of U.S. citizens and  visitors, (2) facilitate legitimate travel and trade, (3) ensure the integrity of  the U.S. immigration system, and (4) protect the privacy of visitors. The  program is to achieve these goals by    collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on certain foreign  nationals who enter and exit the United States;  identifying foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms  of their visit; (2) can receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status; or  (3) should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials;    detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying visitor identity, and  determining visitor admissibility through the use of biometrics (digital  fingerprints and a digital photograph); and  facilitating information sharing and coordination within the immigration  and border management community.
subsections: section_title: Federal Statutes Provide a Strategic Framework for US-VISIT
paragraphs: A series of statutes that date back more than a decade have provided a  framework for developing and deploying US-VISIT entry and exit  capabilities. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility  Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) required the Attorney General to develop an  automated system to record the departure of every foreign national from  the United States and then match it to the individual’s arrival record.  Subsequently, section 2(a) of the Immigration and Naturalization Service  Data Management Improvement Act (DMIA) of 2000 amended the original  entry-exit provisions of IIRIRA and required the Attorney General to  implement an integrated entry and exit data system for foreign nationals.  More specifically, DMIA required an electronic system that would provide  access to and integrate foreign national arrival and departure data that are  authorized or required to be created or collected under law and are in an  electronic format in Department of Justice or Department of State  databases, such as those used at POEs and consular offices. The system,  as described in DMIA, is to compare available arrival records with  available departure records, allow online search procedures to identify  foreign nationals who may have overstayed their authorized period of  admission, and use available data to produce a report of arriving and  departing foreign nationals. DMIA also required the implementation of the  system at airports and seaports by December 31, 2003, at the 50 highest- volume land POEs by December 31, 2004, and at all remaining POEs by  December 31, 2005.
Subsequent laws added specific biometric requirements. The USA  PATRIOT Act of 2001, as amended, required the development and  certification of a technology standard by January 26, 2003, including  appropriate biometric identifiers that can be used to verify the identity of  persons applying for a U.S. visa or seeking to enter the United States  pursuant to a visa, for the purposes of conducting background checks,  confirming identity, and ensuring that a person has not received a visa  under a different name. The act also required DHS and the Department of  State to focus on the utilization of biometric technology and the  development of tamper-resistant documents readable at POEs for the  integrated entry and exit data system.
The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act required DHS to develop and  implement a fully automated system to control entry and exit of aliens at  airports and seaports who enter the United States under the Visa Waiver  Program. The act was subsequently amended to require, not later than  August 3, 2008, an exit system that uses biometric information and records  every alien participating in the Visa Waiver Program that departs the  United States by air.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires  the collection of biometric exit data for all categories of individuals  required to provide biometric entry data under US-VISIT, regardless of the  POE where they entered the United States. The law also required DHS to  develop a plan to accelerate the full implementation of the program.
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007  further addressed the Visa Waiver Program by restricting DHS’s authority  to admit additional countries into the Visa Waiver Program until the  department, among other things, was able to certify that it could verify the  departure of not less than 97 percent of foreign nationals who exit from  U.S. airports and had incorporated biometric indicators (such as  fingerprints) into the air exit system by June 30, 2009.
section_title: Overview of US-VISIT Scope and Systems Environment
paragraphs: US-VISIT supports a series of homeland security-related mission processes  that cover hundreds of millions of foreign national travelers who enter and  leave the United States at about 300 air, sea, and land POEs. These five  processes are described in the next section and depicted in figure 1.
Pre-entry: the process of evaluating a traveler’s eligibility for required  travel documents, enrolling travelers in automated inspection programs,  and prescreening travelers entering the United States.
Entry: the process of determining a traveler’s admissibility into the United  States at air, sea, or land POEs.
Status management: the process of managing and monitoring the  changes and extensions of the visits of lawfully admitted nonimmigrant  foreign nationals to ensure that they adhere to the terms of their admission  and that they notify appropriate government entities when they do not.
Exit: the process of collecting information on travelers departing the  United States.
Analysis: the process of continuously screening against watch lists of  individuals enrolled in US-VISIT for appropriate reporting and action.
To support these processes, US-VISIT systems and equipment must  exchange data with a variety of other systems, some of which are owned  by other agencies. For example, US-VISIT’s Automated Biometric  Identification System (IDENT) collects and stores biometric data about  foreign visitors, including information from the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement  information on deported felons and sexual offender registrants, and DHS  information on previous criminal histories and previous IDENT  enrollments. IDENT connects to a number of different systems, some of  which are described here.
Arrival and Departure Information System is owned by US-VISIT and  stores noncitizen traveler arrival and departure biographic data received  from air and sea carrier manifests. It matches entry, immigration status  updates, and departure data to provide immigration status, including  whether the individual has overstayed his or her authorized period of stay.
Consular Consolidated Database is owned by the Department of State and  includes information on visa applicants.
TECS, formerly known as the Treasury Enforcement Communications  System, is owned by CBP and maintains lookout (i.e., watch list) data,  interfaces with other agencies’ databases, and is currently used by CBP  officers at POEs to verify traveler information and update traveler data.
U.S. Coast Guard’s Mona Pass Proof-of-Concept is determining the  feasibility of deploying a mobile biometrics identification capability on  Coast Guard cutters in the Mona Passage and in the Coast Guard’s South  Florida patrol area.
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System is owned by FBI  and is the bureau’s automated 10-fingerprint matching system and is  electronically connected to all 50 states, as well as some federal agencies.
section_title: Overview of US-VISIT History, Organizational Placement, and Progress
paragraphs: The US-VISIT program has roots in a program known as Entry Exit, which  was established by the former Immigration and Naturalization Service in  2002 in response to IIRIRA and other relevant legislation. Following the  merger of the functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service into  DHS in 2003, the program was placed in DHS’s Border and Transportation  Security Directorate and renamed US-VISIT. In 2007, US-VISIT was moved  to DHS’s National Protection and Programs Directorate.
DHS has delivered US-VISIT entry, and evaluated exit, capabilities in a  series of increments. As a result, a biometrically enabled entry capability  has been fully operational at about 300 air, sea, and land POEs since  December 2006 (115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154 of 170 land ports), but  an exit capability has yet to be fully deployed. Increment 1 (air and sea  entry), Increment 2B (land entry), and Increment 3 (land entry)  addressed the deployment of an entry capability, while Increment 1B (air  and sea exit) and Increment 2C (land exit) evaluated different alternatives  for collecting exit information. The timing and purpose of each increment,  as well as the delivery of other significant US-VISIT capabilities, are  depicted in figure 2 and described after the figure.
Increments 1, 2B, and 3, which largely involved building interfaces among  existing systems and enhancing the systems’ capabilities and supporting  infrastructure, were delivered sequentially from January 2004 to December  2006. Specifically, in January 2004, the program office began operating  most aspects of its planned biometric entry capability at 115 airports and  14 seaports for certain foreign nationals, including those from visa waiver  countries (Increment 1). This capability was expanded to the 50 busiest  land POEs by December 2004 (Increment 2B) and essentially deployed to  104 remaining land POEs by December 2005 (Increment 3). As of  December 2006, the program office was operating this entry capability at  154 of 170 land POEs.
According to DHS, US-VISIT entry operations have produced mission  value. For example, as of June 2009, the program reported that it had more  than 150,000 biometric hits in entry resulting in more than 8,000 people  having adverse actions, such as denial of entry, taken against them.  Further, about 43,000 leads were referred to the U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement immigration enforcement unit, resulting in 1,691  arrests. Although difficult to demonstrate, officials have also cited the  possible deterrence of terrorist entry due to the program’s publicized  capability to verify visitor identity at U.S. borders during entry and to  match visitors against watch lists of known and suspected terrorists.
In parallel with the delivery of entry capabilities, DHS examined the use of  technology for recording the exit of travelers in the air, sea, and land  environments.
Increment 1B consisted of a series of air and sea biometric exit pilots that  operated from January 2004 to May 2007 at 14 U.S. POEs. The purpose of  these pilots was to evaluate three different types of technology solutions:  self-service kiosk, mobile device, and a combination of the two. All three  solutions involved capturing a traveler’s digital photograph and  fingerprint. The pilots established the technical feasibility of a biometric  exit solution at air and sea POEs. They also identified issues that limited  the operational effectiveness of the solution (e.g., unacceptably low  traveler compliance rates).
Increment 2C, land entry/exit proof-of-concept demonstrations, operated  at five ports of entry from August 2005 to November 2006. The purpose of  these demonstrations was to examine the feasibility of using passive radio  frequency identification (RFID) technology to record travelers’ entry and  exit via a unique ID number tag embedded in the Form I-94 and to provide  CBP officers in pedestrian lanes with biographic, biometric, and watch list  data. The demonstrations showed that RFID technology was too immature  to meet the requirements of a land exit solution.
Currently, US-VISIT development and deployment efforts consist of two  ongoing projects: (1) Unique Identity and (2) Comprehensive Exit.
Unique Identity is to establish a single identity for all individuals  encountered across the immigration and border mission area. This project  consists of developing and deploying three capabilities. First, 10-print  identification is to provide the means for capturing 10 fingerprints and  enables the other two Unique Identity components, and increases the  fingerprint matching accuracy in IDENT. DHS plans to complete 10-print  deployment to all POEs in the fall of 2009. Second, enumeration is to  associate the biometric and biographical data within IDENT and FBI’s  fingerprint identification system with individuals encountered by  immigration and border management entities. DHS reports that  enumeration is being used by DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration  Services. Third, IDENT interoperability with FBI’s fingerprint  identification system is to enable DHS and FBI to share biometric and  related biographic, criminal history, and immigration history data. DHS  reports the development of this interoperability is in the second of three  phases, each of which expands the types and amount of data shared  between DHS and FBI, and that planning has begun for the third phase. In  2007, DHS estimated that Unique Identity would cost the department  about $5.7 billion to acquire, and about $40.1 billion to operate and  maintain through the year 2020.
Comprehensive Exit was chartered in August 2007 to develop and deploy  air and sea exit capability and to plan for a land exit solution. Project  stakeholders include U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the  Office of Screening Coordination and Operations, CBP, air and sea  carriers, port authorities, TSA, and the U.S. Coast Guard.
In April 2008, DHS issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making to announce  the intent to implement biometric exit verification at air and sea POEs.  Under this notice, commercial air and sea carriers would be responsible  for developing and deploying the capability to collect the biometrics from  departing travelers and transmit them to DHS. According to program  planning documents, US-VISIT originally planned to publish a final rule in  June 2008 and for an initial capability to be deployed by December 2008.  However, a final rule has yet to be published and, according to US-VISIT  program officials, an official date for doing so has not been established.
Subsequent to the rule making notice, the Consolidated Security, Disaster  Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 mandated that no  US-VISIT fiscal year 2009 appropriations be used for the implementation of  an air exit solution pursuant to the rule making notice until DHS reported  to the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations on pilot tests that  had been conducted for at least two scenarios: (1) airline collection and  transmission of biometric exit data, as proposed in the rule making notice  and (2) CBP collection of such information at the departure gate.
Through fiscal year 2009, DHS had been appropriated about $2.5 billion for  US-VISIT. As of July 2009, the program reported that about $186 million of  that amount had been obligated to develop air/sea and land exit solutions  since 2002. The department requested about $356 million for US-VISIT in  fiscal year 2010 and was appropriated about $374 million.
section_title: Prior GAO Reviews of US- VISIT Exit Have Raised Challenges and Issues
paragraphs: Since 2004, we have identified a range of management challenges and  issues associated with DHS efforts to develop and deploy an exit solution.  For example, we reported in May 2004 that a limited exit portion of US- VISIT had deployed to only two POEs. In February 2005, we reported  that the ongoing air and sea exit pilot faced a compressed timeline, had  missed milestones, and potentially was to be reduced in scope and that the  changing facts and circumstances surrounding the exit pilot had  introduced additional risk. In December 2006, we reported that DHS  could not implement a biometric exit capability without incurring a major  impact on land POE facilities. In February and August 2007, we found  that DHS had not adequately defined and justified its proposed  expenditures for exit pilots and demonstration projects and that it had not  developed a complete schedule for biometric exit implementation.
In February 2008, we reported that the Comprehensive Exit project had  not been adequately defined, citing its lack of appropriate analysis to  support established high-level project milestones. Accordingly, we  recommended that DHS develop a plan for delivering a comprehensive  exit capability that included, among other things, key milestones and  performance measures. In September 2008, we further reported that DHS  was unlikely to meet its timeline for implementing an air exit system with  biometric indicators, such as fingerprints, by July 1, 2009, due to several  unresolved issues, such as opposition to the department’s published plan  by the airline industry. Most recently, in December 2008, we reported  that DHS still had not developed a schedule for the full implementation of  a comprehensive exit solution. In each of these reports, we made  recommendations to ensure that US-VISIT exit was planned, designed,  developed, and implemented in an effective and efficient manner. DHS  generally agreed with our recommendations.
section_title: US-VISIT Projects Governed by Life Cycle Development Methodology
paragraphs: The US-VISIT Enterprise Life Cycle Methodology (ELCM) is a framework  for planning, managing, and implementing capabilities program-wide that  applies to all US-VISIT program increments, task orders, mission  capability enhancements, projects, components, acquisitions, and all  agreements with partner/stakeholder and contractor organizations. Among  other things, the ELCM provides guidance for managing related US-VISIT  projects that have distinct cost, schedule, scope, and risk components, and  that may be at different project phases at a given time.
The ELCM consists of several process areas, such as program  management, project execution, and operations and maintenance. The  project execution process area includes seven subprocesses, or phases.  The subprocesses are    plan, which focuses on project-level planning for individual initiatives and  builds on the strategic planning that occurs in the program planning  process area;    analyze, which includes the gathering, identification, refinement, analysis,  and management of requirements;    design, which includes designing the applications, technical architecture,  technical infrastructure, and application training;    build, which includes the development of the application, technical  architecture, and technical infrastructure;    test, which includes testing the components built and validating the    deploy, which includes rolling out the application, technical architecture,  technical infrastructure, and training to the organization; and    transition, which includes ensuring that all identified transition tasks are  carried out and any open issues from deployment are documented and  addressed.
The operations and maintenance process provides for ongoing support of  a deployed system solution. A typical project will be planned, developed,  and deployed during project execution and sustained as part of operations  and maintenance.
Within each subprocess, the ELCM specifies certain activities that are to  be performed. For example, the test subprocess defines a series of nine  tests that are to be conducted, including user acceptance testing, which  verifies that the system meets user requirements, and operational  readiness testing, which ensures the operational environment’s readiness  to accept the new system.
section_title: Comprehensive Exit Project Consists of Six Components That Are in Various Phases of Delivery
paragraphs: Comprehensive Exit was initiated to develop and implement a means to  capture biometric information from travelers who are subject to US-VISIT  as they exit the United States, and to do so in a way that integrates  biometrics collection into existing exit procedures at air, sea, and land  POEs and enables the matching of biometric exit and entry records to  determine which travelers have left the country. According to DHS, this  capability will allow the department to confirm the identity of a person  leaving the country, and thereby (1) maximize investigative resources by  preventing searches for travelers who have already left the country; and  (2) identify overstays by country and by visa category, to better inform  policy decision makers.
DHS is pursuing the Comprehensive Exit project through six component  efforts, each of which addresses either the air/sea or land environments:    The air/sea environment is being addressed through Air/Sea Biometric Exit  Release 1, Reporting Phase 1, the Air Exit Pilots, and Long-term Air/Sea  Exit.
The land environment is being addressed through the Temporary Worker  Visa Exit Pilot and Long-term Land Exit.
The two long-term components for Air/Sea and Land have yet to begin.  They are to be informed or supported by the four other components.  According to program officials, planning for the two long-term  components is contingent upon departmental decisions that have not yet  been made.
DHS is employing the ELCM to manage each component. The status of  each exit component relative to the ELCM project execution subprocesses  is summarized in figure 3 and discussed in more detail after the figure.
subsections: section_title: Air/Sea Biometric Exit Release 1
paragraphs: The purpose of Air/Sea Biometric Exit Release 1 is to modify IDENT to  collect, validate, and store the biometric and biographic data for travelers  who are subject to US-VISIT and exiting the United States via the air or sea  environments. For example, this component allows for the biographic and  biometric information provided by a departing passenger to be matched  against a watch list and, if a hit is found, the passenger’s IDENT record is  annotated to make the information available for any future encounters  between that individual and other agencies, such as CBP, U.S. Immigration  and Customs Enforcement, or local law enforcement. According to  program officials, Release 1 was initiated to support the Long-term Air/Sea  Exit solution, but it will also allow IDENT to process land POE exit-related  data.
Testing for this component is in progress, and its completion depends  upon the completion of another component. Requirement validation  testing of Release 1 was completed in October 2008, with all planned test  cases executed. According to program officials, final testing of the release  will not occur until data from the Long-term Air/Sea Exit solution are  available.
section_title: Reporting Phase 1
paragraphs: The purpose of Reporting Phase 1 is to enhance IDENT’s reporting  capabilities in order to support the information needs of a wide range of  US-VISIT users, including the analysis and evaluation of the Air Exit Pilot  results. Additional phases are envisioned to deliver other US-VISIT  reporting capabilities, such as text-based reporting, charts and graphs,  spreadsheet downloading to authorized users’ workstations, on-demand  reporting, and near real-time reporting. However, these additional phases  have yet to be defined.
Final testing of Phase 1 was completed in April 2009, with all planned  requirements and test cases executed and five problems of low and  medium severity detected. All five were addressed during final testing.  Phase 1 was deployed in April 2009 and has transitioned to the operations  and maintenance process area.
section_title: Air Exit Pilots
paragraphs: The purpose of the Air Exit Pilots was to evaluate the impact on airport  exit operations of identifying, verifying, and collecting information from  passengers who were subject to US-VISIT and leaving the United States.  More specifically, the pilots are to    evaluate identity verification and exit-recording capabilities when used  with existing POE operations and infrastructure and    biometrically and biographically verify the identity, record the exit, and  update the IDENT and Arrival and Departure Information System records  of each subject traveler departing the United States at the pilot locations.
DHS originally announced the purpose and conditions of an air exit  capability in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published by DHS in  April 2008. As noted earlier, the Consolidated Security, Disaster  Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 subsequently  required DHS to pilot the two exit operational scenarios described in the  notice: airline collection and transmission of biometric exit data and CBP  collection of such information at the departure gate. DHS decided to pilot  two government alternatives: passenger screening by CBP officers at the  departure gate (as required by the act) and passenger screening by TSA  officials at the TSA security checkpoint. DHS did not pilot the airline  alternative because the airlines decided not to participate.
The CBP alternative was piloted at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County  Airport and the TSA alternative at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International  Airport. Pilot testing at both locations was completed in May 2009, using  biographic and biometric data collected from a sampling of travelers who  were subject to US-VISIT. Although one system problem was found  (collected fingerprint images appeared upside down and mirrored), it was  corrected and all planned requirements and test cases successfully  executed. The pilots began in May 2009, and they operated until July 2009,  as planned. The US-VISIT Comprehensive Exit project manager told us  that the pilots have been decommissioned. According to the Air Exit Pilots  schedule, the only remaining activity for this component is developing and  issuing the final rule for the Long-term Air/Sea Exit component.
The Air Exit Pilots used two types of portable biometric collection  devices: (1) a hand-held device (“mobile device”) that scanned information  on travel documents and collected biometrics one fingerprint at a time and  (2) a small suitcase (“portable device”) that contained a laptop computer,  document scanning device, and a biometric scanner that collected a four- print slap. (See fig. 4.) The Detroit pilot used both devices. According to a  TSA official, only mobile devices were used in Atlanta because of the  limited space available within the checkpoint area.
The pilots consisted of these four steps:    Identification. For the CBP pilot, CBP officers prescreened passengers  after they provided their boarding passes to airline employees to identify  passengers who were subject to US-VISIT and to then direct them to a  CBP processing station in the jetway. For the TSA pilot, a TSA Ticket  Document Checker prescreened every passenger entering the checkpoint  to identify subject passengers who were escorted to a processing station  manned by Transportation Security Officers equipped with mobile devices.
Collection. Both CBP and TSA officers scanned a machine-readable  travel document presented by a passenger to collect biographic data. If the  document did not scan correctly, the officers were instructed to enter the  biographic data manually into the device. The officers then used the  mobile or portable device to collect an index and middle fingerprint or a  four-print image, respectively.
Processing. Once the device indicated that the collected prints were of  sufficient quality, the CBP and TSA officers directed the passenger to  continue onto the departing aircraft or through the normal checkpoint  security screening.
Transmission. US-VISIT staff uploaded the information from the devices  to a dedicated workstation and transmitted the data to IDENT via a secure  network connection. Once transmitted, the data were matched to existing  records.
DHS approved a report on the pilot results in October 2009. We are  statutorily required to review this report.
section_title: Long-term Air/Sea Exit
paragraphs: According to program officials, planning for a target solution for air and  sea POEs will begin once the pilots have been completed and after the  final rule has been published. According to the US-VISIT Deputy Director,  an official date for publishing the final rule has not been established. In  general, program officials said that the final rule is to specify how and  when an operational air/sea exit solution will be implemented.
section_title: Temporary Worker Visa Exit Pilot
paragraphs: The purpose of the Temporary Worker Visa Exit Pilot is to capture the  final departure of certain H2 visa temporary workers at two land border  crossings. The pilot is to use kiosks adapted for outdoor use to record the  exit of H-2A and H-2B visa holders who (1) previously entered and are  now departing the United States through either San Luis, Arizona, or  Douglas, Arizona, and (2) are required to record their final departure with  CBP. In December 2008, DHS issued two Federal Register notices  announcing the implementation of the pilot, one addressing H-2A visa  holders and one addressing H-2B visa holders. According to the notices,  the pilot was to be deployed in August 2009. However, according to the  US-VISIT Comprehensive Exit Project Manager, the pilot was suspended  during the testing subprocess due to lack of CBP funding. The CBP  Program Manager for Admissibility and Passenger Programs told us that  the pilot is now scheduled for deployment in December 2009.
Both the US-VISIT program office and CBP are involved in the pilot. The  program office is responsible for project management and kiosk design,  development, and operations and maintenance. CBP is to support the  development and deployment of the kiosks, and is to operate the pilot. As  with the Air Exit Pilots, exit information collected from departing travelers  is to be transmitted to IDENT, where it is to be matched against existing  records. Assembly testing was completed in May 2009, with all planned  requirements and test cases executed.
The pilot was originally planned to run for 1 year, after which its  effectiveness and feasibility as a potential part of Comprehensive Exit was  to be analyzed. However, according to the CBP Program Manager for  Admissibility and Passenger Programs, CBP intends to assess the pilot  after 6 months of deployment to determine whether to continue it.  According to US-VISIT and CBP officials, the pilot results will help inform  future decisions on the pedestrian component of the Long-term Land Exit  component.
section_title: Long-term Land Exit
paragraphs: According to the US-VISIT Program Director and program documentation,  a land exit strategy for recording biometric exit at land POEs was  completed in November 2008 as planned, and is currently being reviewed  by DHS leadership. The Program Director further told us that until the  strategy is approved, no other Land Exit activities will be initiated. As a  result, this component has yet to begin the first ELCM project execution  subprocess.
section_title: DHS Approach to Managing Comprehensive Exit Project Is Not Fully Integrated
paragraphs: Given that the Comprehensive Exit project is part of the larger US-VISIT  program and consists of multiple components involving several DHS  component organizations, it is important for the project to be planned and  executed in an integrated fashion. To this end, the US-VISIT program  office has established integrated project management plans, and has  adopted an integrated approach to interacting with and involving project  stakeholders, both of which are important ingredients to project success.  However, US-VISIT has not developed and employed an integrated  approach to scheduling, executing, and tracking the work that needs to be  accomplished to deliver the Comprehensive Exit solution. Rather, it is  relying on several separate and distinct schedules to manage individual  aspects of the project. Moreover, not all of these individual schedules are  reliable because they have not been derived in accordance with relevant  schedule estimating guidance. Without a Comprehensive Exit integrated  master schedule that is derived in accordance with relevant guidance, the  program office cannot reliably commit to when and how the work needed  to deliver the Comprehensive Exit solution will be performed, and it  cannot adequately manage and measure its progress in executing the work  needed to deliver it.
subsections: section_title: Comprehensive Exit Project Management Plans Are Integrated
paragraphs: According to relevant guidance, a key to project success is a well-defined  project management plan that provides a complete and integrated view of  how the project is being managed. Among other things, the project  management plan should (1) define or reference key project management  processes, (2) be integrated with other plans that affect project  management, and (3) reflect the current and complete scope of the  project.
The US-VISIT program has developed a plan for managing Comprehensive  Exit that is largely well defined. Specifically, the project management plan  calls for tailoring the ELCM framework, which defines a standard set of  project management processes. Further, the program office has applied  this tailored approach to individual Comprehensive Exit components (e.g,  Release 1, Reporting Phase 1, and Air Exit Pilots). In addition, the project  management plan is aligned with relevant US-VISIT program plans and  procedures, as well as individual Comprehensive Exit component plans.  For example, it incorporates by reference a number of key management  processes defined in the US-VISIT program-level management plan, such  as risk management, configuration management, requirements  management, and schedule management. Also, it is referenced in, and  aligned with, the component management plan for the Air Exit Pilots.  Further, the project management plan has recently been revised, as called  for in the plan, to define a more current and complete scope of the project,  and to incorporate actual and planned project changes.
By having a Comprehensive Exit management plan that reflects an  integrated approach to project management, the US-VISIT program office  has established an important means for managing project activities in a  standard and consistent manner.
section_title: DHS Stakeholders Have Been Integrated into Comprehensive Exit Pilots
paragraphs: Relevant system acquisition guidance recognizes that collaboration among  relevant stakeholders is an important part of an integrated project  management approach. We have reported that such collaboration can  produce better results and outcomes than could be achieved when  stakeholders do not act in an integrated and coordinated manner. In this  regard, our research shows that effective collaborative activities involve  the following practices.
Establishing common outcomes: defining and articulating a shared or  common outcome(s) or purpose(s) that organizations or programs are  mutually seeking to achieve and that are consistent with their respective  goals and missions.
Establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies: creating  strategies that work in concert with those of partner organizations or  programs, or that are joint in nature.
Leveraging resources: identifying the human, technological, physical,  and financial resources needed to initiate or sustain the collaborative  effort.
Agreeing on roles and responsibilities: working together to define and  agree on partners’ respective roles and responsibilities, including how the  collaboration efforts will be led.
Establishing a compatible means to operate across organizational  boundaries: creating compatible standards, policies, procedures, and data  systems that will be used in the collaborative effort.
Developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on  results: putting in place the means to monitor, evaluate, and report on the  collaborative effort to identify areas for improvement.
As previously discussed, the Comprehensive Exit project’s pilot  components involve multiple stakeholders, including the US-VISIT  program office, CBP, and TSA. To their credit, these stakeholders have  collaborated in a manner that is consistent with these practices. As a  result, they have established the means to align their activities, processes,  and resources to accomplish the objectives of the Comprehensive Exit  project pilots.
subsections: section_title: Establishing Common Outcomes
paragraphs: Within DHS, the US-VISIT program office, along with CBP and TSA, share  a common mission to secure our nation’s borders. Consistent with this  shared mission, these organizations have defined a common purpose for  both the Air Exit Pilots and the Temporary Worker Visa Exit Pilot.  Specifically, the shared purpose of the Air Exit Pilots was to evaluate the  operational impact of collecting biometric exit data from travelers near the  departure gate and at the TSA security checkpoint, and thereby help  inform the implementation of the Air Exit solution. The shared purpose of  the Temporary Worker Visa Exit Pilot is to ensure that temporary guest  workers depart the United States at the completion of their work  authorizations and to analyze the effectiveness and feasibility of one part  of the overall Land Exit solution.
section_title: Establishing Mutually Reinforcing or Joint Strategies
paragraphs: The US-VISIT program office, CBP, and TSA have established joint  management strategies for executing the Air Exit Pilots and the  Temporary Worker Visa Exit Pilot. Specifically, an Integrated Project  Team, which is led by the program office and includes representatives  from CBP and TSA, was assigned responsibility for planning, execution,  and control of both pilots. In addition, the program office developed an Air  Exit Pilots Management Plan that defines the project management  approach for implementing the Air Exit Pilots. While the program office  did not establish a comparable management plan for the Temporary  Worker Visa Exit Pilot, it developed a business concept of operations that  documents the proposed business process and operational changes  needed to implement the Temporary Worker Visa Exit Pilot. Both  documents were reviewed by relevant stakeholders.
section_title: Leveraging Resources
paragraphs: As previously noted, an Integrated Project Team was assigned  responsibility for planning, execution, and control of both pilots. This  team has leveraged human, technological, physical, and financial  resources provided by the program office, CBP, and TSA. Specifically, key  personnel from each organization are members of the Integrated Project  Team, and are involved in supporting the execution of the pilots. For  example, CBP and TSA provided or plan to provide personnel for  collecting biometrics during the pilots, and the program office provided or  plans to provide on-site technical support during the pilots. In addition, the  program office and CBP have funded their respective efforts, while an  interagency agreement has been executed for the program office to fund  TSA personnel needed for pilot operations. Also, the program office  provided or plans to provide the technology (e.g., mobile and portable  devices and kiosks for collecting biometrics and the IDENT system to  process and store the biometric data received). Further, CBP and TSA  leveraged their physical presence at the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne  County Airport and the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport.  Also, CBP is leveraging and augmenting its physical infrastructure at the  San Luis and Douglas POEs in Arizona. For example, it is ensuring that  proper network connectivity exists from the kiosks to IDENT and that  needed electrical and facility modifications are made at the sites.
section_title: Agreeing on Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: The program office, CBP, and TSA have defined and agreed on roles and  responsibilities for the Air Exit Pilots and the Temporary Worker Visa Exit  Pilot. Specifically, the Air Exit Pilots Management Plan and business  concept of operations documents define roles and responsibilities for the  program office, CBP, and TSA, and these documents were reviewed or  approved by all relevant parties. For example, the Air Exit Pilots Business  Concept of Operations states that the program office is to evaluate and  determine which biometric data collection devices will be used and  provide these devices, as well as the necessary training, to CBP and TSA,  while CBP and TSA are to collect the biometric exit data from travelers  who were subject to US-VISIT during the pilot. Also, the Air Exit Pilots  Management Plan identifies individual roles and responsibilities for key  program personnel providing direct support to the project. Further, the  Temporary Worker Visa Exit Pilot business concept of operations states  that the program office is to serve as the overall project manager and  acquire the kiosks, while CBP is to serve as the operational manager and  perform the day-to-day maintenance and operation of the kiosks once they  have been deployed to the sites. It also defines more detailed roles and  responsibilities for specific groups within the program office and CBP,  such as US-VISIT Project Management, US-VISIT Information Technology  Management, CBP Office of Field Operations, and CBP Office of  Information Technology.
section_title: Establishing a Compatible Means to Operate Across Organizational Boundaries
paragraphs: As the overall project management lead for both pilots, the program office  established an Integrated Project Team that includes CBP and TSA and  has aligned the pilots with the ELCM and other project management  procedures to ensure they are managed consistently. For example, CBP  and the program office were both involved in developing requirements for  the Temporary Worker Visa Exit Pilot. As another example, when CBP  officials identified a lack of CBP funding for the Temporary Worker Visa  Exit Pilot, they reported this to the program office as a risk. The risk was  subsequently tracked through the risk management process. As another  example, CBP required a change in the kiosk solution for the Temporary  Worker Visa Exit Pilot to allow it to withstand outdoor use, and submitted  a change request through the established change management process to  “ruggedize” the kiosks.
section_title: Developing Mechanisms to Monitor, Evaluate, and Report on Results
paragraphs: The Comprehensive Exit project management approach includes  mechanisms for monitoring, evaluating, and reporting on the results of  project efforts. For example, the project management plan discusses  quality assurance activities, such as peer review of project artifacts and  deliverables, and testing and evaluation of hardware and software. As  another example, the project management plan identifies status reporting  requirements, such as quarterly program management reviews, which  provide an overview of the project’s status, budget, resource levels, and  any outstanding issues. In addition, the program office has applied pilot- specific mechanisms for monitoring, evaluating, and reporting on results.  For example, the Air Exit Pilots Management Plan describes a five-step  process improvement model for identifying, implementing, and evaluating  solutions to problems during the execution of the pilots. Also, this plan  establishes a stakeholder communication matrix, which documents the  activities and reports for intra/inter-agency communication throughout  different phases of the pilot (e.g., ongoing, predeployment, deployment,  pilot operations, and disposition and analysis). Further, the program office  defined performance metrics for the evaluation of the Air Exit Pilots, and  it involved CBP and TSA in doing so.
section_title: Comprehensive Exit Schedules Are Not Integrated and Reliable
paragraphs: The success of a project depends in part on having an integrated and  reliable master schedule that defines, among other things, when work  activities will occur, how long they will take, and how they are related to  one another. As such, the project schedule not only provides a road map  for systematic project execution, but also provides the means by which to  gauge progress, identify and address potential problems, and promote  accountability. In addition, US-VISIT’s program and project management  guidance and plans recognize that schedule management plays a critical  role in the success of its activities. For example, the program management  plan requires a tiered and integrated master schedule that includes  contractor schedules for each task order and a project level schedule.  Further, US-VISIT’s program guidance states that the integrated master  schedule provides a means to ensure attainability of program objectives  and evaluate the project’s progress in doing so.
Program officials told us they do not have an integrated master schedule  for the Comprehensive Exit project. Instead, each ongoing project  component has its own separate schedule. In addition, the US-VISIT  prime contractor has its own schedule to support the project components,  although program officials said that the work in this schedule is manually  incorporated into each component schedule. However, our analysis of the  schedules for ongoing Comprehensive Exit components, as well as the  contractor’s schedule, did not show any evidence of this, and the program  office provided no other documentation to demonstrate that the manual  incorporation exists. According to program officials, DHS cannot develop  a complete schedule for the Comprehensive Exit project until decisions  have been made on the direction and scope of the Air/Sea and Land exit  solutions. However, relevant guidance states that a comprehensive  schedule should reflect all activities for a project and recognizes that there  can be uncertainties and unknown factors in schedule estimates due to,  among other things, limited data. In light of such uncertainties and  unknowns, the guidance discusses the need to perform a schedule risk  analysis to determine the level of uncertainty and to help identify and  mitigate the risks.
As a result, DHS does not have a comprehensive project view of the work  that must be, among other things, sequenced, timed, resourced, and risk- adjusted to deliver the Comprehensive Exit solution. Without such a view,  a sound basis does not exist for knowing with any degree of confidence  when and how the project will be completed.
The lack of an integrated master schedule is compounded by the fact that  the individual component schedules are not reliable. Our research has  identified nine practices associated with developing and maintaining a  reliable schedule. These practices are (1) capturing all activities,   (2) sequencing all activities, (3) assigning resources to all activities,   (4) establishing the duration of all activities, (5) integrating schedule  activities horizontally and vertically, (6) establishing the critical path for  all activities, (7) identifying float between activities, (8) conducting a  schedule risk analysis, and (9) updating the schedule using logic and  durations to determine the dates. In addition, the project management  plan states that a project schedule should reflect the work breakdown  structure for the project as well as ELCM required artifacts. The plan also  requires that the project schedule be horizontally and vertically integrated,  that all scheduled milestones and tasks be linked logically, and that  schedule status be captured on a regular basis.
Both the Air Exit Pilots schedule and the Temporary Worker Visa Exit  Pilot schedule only fully meet one of the nine key schedule estimating  practices, and either partially, minimally, or do not meet the remaining  eight. In contrast, the prime contractor’s schedule is largely reliable, as it  fully or substantially meets all nine practices. To be considered reliable,  relevant guidance states that a schedule needs to fully meet all nine  practices. The extent to which the two component schedules and  contractor’s schedule meet the nine practices are summarized below and  in table 1. A detailed discussion of the extent to which each schedule  meets the nine practices is in appendix II.
Component schedules: Both the Air Exit Pilots and Temporary Worker  Visa Exit Pilot schedules establish the duration of time planned for  executing key activities, and they detail work activities that are integrated  with higher-level milestones and summary activities. However, neither  schedule reflects a valid critical path due to a high number of missing  dependencies and rigid schedule constraints. For example, the schedule  contains 16 remaining activities that identify dates when the activities  must begin. These are rigid schedule constraints and such dates remain  fixed regardless of the allocation of resources or predecessor activities  finishing on time, earlier, or later. This is important because the critical  path represents the longest chain of activities through the network and  determines the length of the project. Thus, delays in an activity that is on  the critical path would cause the entire component effort to slip. Without a  valid critical path, the program office cannot accurately determine the  amount of time required to complete the project component and assess  how delays impact the projected completion date. According to program  officials, they manage each exit component to a critical path that is  calculated by the scheduling software on a weekly basis. However, as  noted above, the critical paths are not valid due to missing dependencies  and rigid schedule constraints.
In addition, neither schedule is based on a schedule risk analysis. A  schedule risk analysis is important because it allows high-priority risks to  be identified and mitigated, and the level of confidence in meeting  projected completion dates to be predicted. Also, officials stated they do  not perform regular, electronic checks on the schedules to know the true  status of the components and thus ensure the integrity of the schedules’  logic. Furthermore, neither schedule assigns resources to activities, which  limits insight into current or projected resource allocation issues. Without  assigning resources, the risk of the projected completion date slipping is  increased.
Contractor schedule: The prime contractor’s schedule reflects a number  of best practices. For example, this schedule can be traced to the  contractor’s work breakdown structure, activities have appropriate logical  sequencing, and resources are assigned to activities. In addition,  contractor representatives stated they have performed a risk assessment  of the schedule and regularly update the status and perform tests to ensure  the integrity of schedule logic. However, the schedule does not reflect a  valid critical path because it contains two separate critical paths that are  not linked. By definition, the critical path must run from the first event to  the last event without a break in continuity. As stated previously, without  a valid critical path, the contractor cannot accurately determine the  amount of time required to complete scheduled work.
Without a fully integrated and reliably derived schedule for the entire  Comprehensive Exit project, the program office cannot identify when and  how a full exit capability will be delivered, and it cannot adequately manage  and measure its progress in executing the work needed to deliver it.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: To DHS’s credit, it has completed or has under way five of six components  that fall under the auspices of its US-VISIT Comprehensive Exit project,  the status of which range from preplanning to transitioning to operations  and maintenance, and it is managing some aspects of these various project  components in an integrated manner. For example, each component is  being governed by a defined and standardized US-VISIT project execution  methodology, and each component is subject to the management  processes, such as processes managing project risks. Further, those  components that involve multiple organizational stakeholders are being  executed to ensure that stakeholders interact in an integrated and  coordinated manner.
Nevertheless, if and when Comprehensive Exit will be operational remains  unclear, in part because DHS still does not have an integrated master  schedule defining the timing and sequencing of the work and events  needed to deliver US-VISIT exit capabilities to its air, sea, and land ports of  entry. Instead, it has separate schedules for managing individual  components, as well as the prime contractor’s schedule that supports all  the components, that do not collectively provide a road map for delivering  a comprehensive exit solution, including things such as the sequencing  and timing of the work needed to produce the solution, a realistic target  date for doing so, and the resources associated with executing the work.  Moreover, even the individual schedules governing the execution of what  DHS described as unrelated components are not sufficiently reliable as  standalone schedules. For the Comprehensive Exit project to be managed  in a fully integrated manner, it is important for DHS to develop and  implement an integrated master schedule. If it does not, it will not be able  to commit to when and how the exit side of US-VISIT will become  operational, and it will not have a key aspect of the means by which to get  there and to measure its progress in doing so.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better ensure the successful delivery of a comprehensive US-VISIT exit  solution, we are augmenting our prior recommendations aimed at  strengthening Comprehensive Exit project planning. Specifically, we  recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the  Undersecretary for National Protection and Programs to have the US- VISIT Program Director develop and maintain an integrated master  schedule for the Comprehensive Exit project in accordance with the nine  practices discussed in this report.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, signed by the Director,  Departmental GAO/Office of the Inspector General Liaison Office and  reprinted in appendix III, the department stated that it concurred with our  recommendation.
DHS also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into  this report as appropriate.
We will send copies of this report to the Chairman and Ranking Member of  the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,  the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate and House  Appropriations Committees, and other Senate and House committees and  subcommittees that have authorization and oversight responsibilities for  homeland security. We will also send copies to the Secretary of Homeland  Security and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  www.gao.gov.
Should you or your offices have any questions on matters discussed in this  report, please contact me at (202) 512-3439 or at hiter@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to determine (1) the status of the Department of  Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to deliver a comprehensive exit  solution for the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator  Technology (US-VISIT) program and (2) the extent to which DHS is  applying an integrated approach to managing its comprehensive exit  solution.
To determine the status of efforts to deliver a comprehensive exit solution,  we first identified the component efforts which constitute the  Comprehensive Exit project, and then we identified the status of each  relative to the phases in the US-VISIT Enterprise Life Cycle Methodology  (ELCM). We reviewed key program documentation, such as the US-VISIT  Comprehensive Exit Project Plan and Comprehensive Exit project  documentation (e.g., concepts of operation, design documents, project  schedules, requirements documentation, and test plans). In doing so, we  focused on determining such key factors as what project activities were  planned, when and how they were to be accomplished, and whether  activities were completed as planned. We also interviewed officials from  the US-VISIT program office, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),  and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to determine how  the comprehensive exit solution is being designed and implemented, and  what future plans for the project have been developed. Finally, we visited  the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport and the Hartsfield-Jackson  Atlanta International Airport to observe the operation of the Air Exit Pilots  and interviewed officials from US-VISIT (both locations), CBP (Detroit),  and TSA (Atlanta) to obtain details as to how the pilots were operating.
To determine the extent to which DHS is applying an integrated approach  to managing the Comprehensive Exit Project, we assessed project  planning, stakeholder coordination, and schedule estimation efforts  against relevant best practices. Specifically,    To identify the extent to which DHS is applying an integrated approach to  project planning, we reviewed key project planning documentation, such  as the US-VISIT Comprehensive Exit Project Plan and Air Exit Pilots  Management Plan, and compared it with relevant best practices for  integrated project management.
To establish the extent to which DHS is applying key stakeholder  coordination and collaboration practices to the Comprehensive Exit  project, we reviewed key project planning documentation (e.g.,  Comprehensive Exit Project Plan, Air Exit Pilots Management Plan,  concepts of operation, and project tailoring plans) and compared it with  relevant best practices.
To determine the extent to which DHS is applying key schedule estimating  practices to the Exit Project, we reviewed schedule estimates for ongoing  exit work (Air Exit Pilots schedule, Temporary Worker Visa Exit Pilot  schedule, contractor schedule) and compared them with relevant best  practices. In doing so, we categorized our determinations as either met,  substantially, partially, minimally, and not met. Our determinations were  also based on interviews with knowledgeable US-VISIT, CBP, and TSA  officials.
We conducted this performance audit at the US-VISIT Program Office in  Arlington, Virginia; CBP headquarters offices in Washington, D.C.; TSA  headquarters offices in Arlington, Virginia; Detroit Metropolitan Wayne  County Airport in Detroit, Michigan; and Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta  International Airport in Atlanta, Georgia, from January 2009 to November  2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Detailed Results of GAO Assessment of Schedules for Ongoing Comprehensive Exit Components and Prime Contractor Schedule
paragraphs: Our research has identified nine practices associated with effective  schedule estimating: (1) capturing all activities, (2) sequencing all  activities, (3) assigning resources to all activities, (4) establishing the  duration of all activities, (5) integrating schedule activities horizontally  and vertically, (6) establishing the critical path for all activities,   (7) identifying float between activities, (8) conducting a schedule risk  analysis, and (9) updating the schedule using logic and durations to  determine the dates.
For the Comprehensive Exit project, we analyzed schedules representing  ongoing work, which included the Air Exit Pilots component schedule, the  Temporary Worker Visa Exit Pilot component schedule, and the prime  contractor schedule, against the nine best practices. Tables 2, 3, and 4  provide the detailed results of our analyses of these schedules.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Paula Moore, Assistant  Director; Justin Booth; Neil Doherty; Rebecca Eyler; Nancy Glover;  Richard Hagerman; Dave Hinchman; Jason Lee; Karen Richey; and Jeanne  Sung made key contributions to this report.