Rail Security: Some Actions Taken to Enhance Passenger and Freight Rail Security, but Significant Challenges Remain
Published: 2004-03-23T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Passenger and freight rail services are important links in the nation's transportation system. Terrorist attacks on passenger and/or freight rail services have the potential to cause widespread injury, loss of life, and economic disruption. The recent terrorist attack in Spain illustrates that rail systems, like all modes of transportation, are targets for attacks. GAO was asked to summarize the results of its recent reports on transportation security that examined (1) challenges in securing passenger and freight rail systems, (2) actions rail stakeholders have taken to enhance passenger and freight rail systems, and (3) future actions that could further enhance rail security.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Securing the passenger and freight rail systems are fraught with challenges. Some of these challenges are common to passenger and freight rail systems, such as the funding of security improvements, the interconnectivity of the rail system, and the number of stakeholders involved in rail security. Other challenges are unique to the type of rail system. For example, the open access and high ridership of mass transit systems make them both vulnerable to attack and difficult to secure. Similarly, freight railroads transport millions of tons of hazardous materials each year across the United States, raising concerns about the vulnerability of these shipments to terrorist attack. Passenger and freight rail stakeholders have taken a number of steps to improve the security of the nation's rail system since September 11, 2001. Although security received attention before September 11, the terrorist attacks elevated the importance and urgency of transportation security for passenger and rail providers. Consequently, passenger and freight rail providers have implemented new security measures or increased the frequency or intensity of existing activities, including performing risk assessments, conducting emergency drills, and developing security plans. The federal government has also acted to enhance rail security. For example, the Federal Transit Administration has provided grants for emergency drills and conducted security assessments at the largest transit agencies, among other things. Implementation of risk management principles and improved coordination could help enhance rail security. Using risk management principles can help guide federal programs and responses to better prepare against terrorism and other threats and to better direct finite national resources to areas of highest priority. In addition, improved coordination among federal entities could help enhance security efforts across all modes, including passenger and freight rail systems. We reported in June 2003 that the roles and responsibilities of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) in transportation security, including rail security, have yet to be clearly delineated, which creates the potential for duplicating or conflicting efforts as both entities work to enhance security.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on the security of our  nation’s rail systems. Although most of the early attention following the  September 11 attacks focused on aviation security, emphasis on the other  modes of transportation has since grown as concerns are voiced about  possible vulnerabilities, such as introducing weapons of mass destruction  into this country through ports or launching chemical attacks on mass  transit systems. Moreover, terrorist attacks around the world, such as the  recent terrorist attack in Spain, have shown that rail systems, like all  modes of transportation, are potential targets of attack.
As you requested, our testimony today focuses on (1) challenges in  securing rail systems, (2) steps rail stakeholders have taken to enhance  security since September 11, and (3) future actions that could further  enhance rail security. Our comments are based on our reports and  testimonies on the security of the entire transportation system, the  security of mass transit systems, and railroad safety and security as well  as a body of our work undertaken since September 11 on homeland  security and combating terrorism.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Passenger and freight rail services help move people and goods through  the transportation system, which helps the economic well-being of the  United States. Passenger rail services can take many forms. Some mass  transit agencies, which can be public or private entities, provide rail  services, such as commuter rail and heavy rail (e.g., subway) in cities  across the United States. Through these rail services, mass transit  agencies serve a large part of the commuting population. For example, in  the third quarter of 2003, commuter rail systems provided an average of 1.2  million passenger trips each weekday. The National Railroad Passenger  Corporation (Amtrak) provides intercity passenger rail services in the  United States. Amtrak operates a 22,000-mile network, primarily over  freight railroad tracks, providing service to 46 states and the District of  Columbia. In fiscal year 2002, Amtrak served 23.4 million passengers, or  about 64,000 passengers per day. The nation’s freight rail network carries  42 percent of domestic intercity freight (measured by ton miles) in 2001— everything from lumber to vegetables, coal to orange juice, grain to  automobiles, and chemicals to scrap iron.
Prior to September 11, 2001, DOT—namely, the Federal Railroad  Administration (FRA), Federal Transit Administration (FTA), and  Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA)—was the primary  federal entity involved in passenger and freight rail security matters.  However, in response to the attacks on September 11, Congress passed the  Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which created TSA  within DOT and defined its primary responsibility as ensuring security in  all modes of transportation. The act also gives TSA regulatory authority  over all transportation modes. With the passage of the Homeland Security  Act, TSA, along with over 20 other agencies, was transferred to the new  Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Throughout the world, rail systems have been the target of terrorist  attacks. For example, the first large-scale terrorist use of a chemical  weapon occurred in 1995 on the Tokyo subway system. In this attack, a  terrorist group released sarin gas on a subway train, killing 11 people and  injuring about 5,500. In addition, according to the Mineta Institute, surface  transportation systems were the target of more than 195 terrorist attacks  from 1997 through 2000. (See fig. 1.)
section_title: Numerous Challenges Exist in Securing Rail Systems
paragraphs: Passenger and freight rail providers face significant challenges in  improving security. Some security challenges are common to passenger  and freight rail systems; others are unique to the type of rail system.  Common challenges include the funding of security improvements, the  interconnectivity of the rail system, and the number of stakeholders  involved in rail security. The unique challenges include the openness of  mass transit systems and the transport of hazardous materials by freight  railroads.
subsections: section_title: Common Security Challenges Confront Passenger and Freight Rail Systems
paragraphs: A challenge that is common to both passenger and freight rail systems is  the funding of security enhancements. Although some security  improvements are inexpensive, such as removing trash cans from subway  platforms, most require substantial funding. For example, as we reported  in December 2002, one transit agency estimated that an intrusion alarm  and closed circuit television system for only one of its portals would cost  approximately $250,000—an amount equal to at least a quarter of the  capital budgets of a majority of the transit agencies we surveyed. The  current economic environment makes this a difficult time for private  industry or state and local governments to make additional security  investments. As we noted in June 2003, the sluggish economy has further  weakened the transportation industry’s financial condition by decreasing  ridership and revenues. Given the tight budget environment, state and  local governments and transportation operators, such as transit agencies,  must make difficult trade-offs between security investments and other  needs, such as service expansion and equipment upgrades. Further  exacerbating the problem of funding security improvements are the  additional costs the passenger and freight rail providers incur when the  federal government elevates the national threat condition. For example,  Amtrak estimates that it spends an additional $500,000 per month for  police overtime when the national threat condition is increased.
Another common challenge for both passenger and freight rail systems is  the interconnectivity within the rail system and between the  transportation sector and nearly every other sector of the economy. The  passenger and freight rail systems are part of an intermodal transportation  system—that is, passengers and freight can use multiple modes of  transportation to reach a destination. For example, from its point of origin  to its destination, a piece of freight, such as a shipping container, can  move from ship to train to truck. The interconnective nature of the  transportation system creates several security challenges. First, the effects  of events directed at one mode of transportation can ripple throughout the  entire system. For example, when the port workers in California, Oregon,  and Washington went on strike in 2002, the railroads saw their intermodal  traffic decline by almost 30 percent during the first week of the strike,  compared with the year before. Second, the interconnecting modes can  contaminate each other—that is, if a particular mode experiences a  security breach, the breach could affect other modes. An example of this  would be if a shipping container that held a weapon of mass destruction  arrived at a U.S. port where it was placed on a train. In this case, although  the original security breach occurred in the port, the rail or trucking  industry would be affected as well. Thus, even if operators within one  mode established high levels of security, they could be affected by the  security efforts, or lack thereof, in the other modes. Third, intermodal  facilities where passenger and freight rail systems connect and interact  with other transportation modes—such as ports—are potential targets for  attack because of the presence of passengers, freight, employees, and  equipment at these facilities.
An additional common challenge for both passenger and rail systems is the  number of stakeholders involved. Government agencies at the federal,  state, and local levels and private companies share responsibility for rail  security. For example, there were over 550 freight railroads operating in  the United States in 2002. In addition, many passenger rail services, such  as Amtrak and commuter rail, operate over tracks owned by freight  railroads. For instance, over 95 percent of Amtrak’s 22,000-mile network  operates on freight railroad tracks. The number of stakeholders involved  in transportation security can lead to communication challenges,  duplication, and conflicting guidance. As we have noted in past reports,  coordination and consensus-building are critical to successful  implementation of security efforts. Transportation stakeholders can have  inconsistent goals or interests, which can make consensus-building  challenging. For example, from a safety perspective, trains that carry  hazardous materials should be required to have placards that identify the  contents of a train so that emergency personnel know how best to respond  to an incident. However, from a security perspective, identifying placards  on vehicles that carry hazardous materials make them a potential target  for attack.
section_title: Passenger and Freight Rail Systems Also Face Unique Challenges
paragraphs: In addition to the common security challenges that face both passenger  and rail systems, there are some challenges that are unique to the type of  rail system. In our past reports, we have discussed several of these unique  challenges, including the openness of mass transit systems and the size of  the freight rail network and the diversity of freight hauled.
According to mass transit officials and transit security experts, certain  characteristics of mass transit systems make them inherently vulnerable to  terrorist attacks and difficult to secure. By design, mass transit systems  are open (i.e., have multiple access points and, in some cases, no barriers)  so that they can move large numbers of people quickly. In contrast, the  aviation system is housed in closed and controlled locations with few  entry points. The openness of mass transit systems can leave them  vulnerable because transit officials cannot monitor or control who enters  or leaves the systems. In addition, other characteristics of some transit  systems—high ridership, expensive infrastructure, economic importance,  and location (e.g., large metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)—also  make them attractive targets because of the potential for mass casualties  and economic damage. Moreover, some of these same characteristics  make mass transit systems difficult to secure. For example, the number of  riders that pass through a mass transit system—especially during peak  hours—make some security measures, such as metal detectors,  impractical. In addition, the multiple access points along extended routes  make the costs of securing each location prohibitive.
Further complicating transit security is the need for transit agencies to  balance security concerns with accessibility, convenience, and  affordability. Because transit riders often could choose another means of  transportation, such as a personal automobile, transit agencies must  compete for riders. To remain competitive, transit agencies must offer  convenient, inexpensive, and quality service. Therefore, security measures  that limit accessibility, cause delays, increase fares, or otherwise cause  inconvenience could push people away from mass transit and back into  their cars.
The size and diversity of the freight rail system make it difficult to  adequately secure. The freight rail system’s extensive infrastructure  crisscrosses the nation and extends beyond our borders to move millions  of tons of freight each day (see fig. 2.). There are over 100,000 miles of rail  in the United States. The extensiveness of the infrastructure creates an  infinite number of targets for terrorists.
Protecting freight rail assets from attack is made more difficult because of  the tremendous variety of freight hauled by railroads. For example,  railroads carry freight as diverse as dry bulk (grain) and hazardous  materials. The transport of hazardous materials is of particular concern  because serious incidents involving these materials have the potential to  cause widespread disruption or injury. In 2001, over 83 million tons of  hazardous materials were shipped by rail in the United States across the  rail network, which extends through every major city as well as thousands  of small communities. (Figure 3 is a photograph of a rail tanker car  containing one of the many types of hazardous materials commonly  transported by rail.) For our April 2003 report on rail security, we visited a  number of local communities and interviewed federal and private sector  hazardous materials transportation experts. A number of issues emerged  from our work:  the need for measures to better safeguard hazardous materials temporarily  stored in rail cars while awaiting delivery to their ultimate destination—a  practice commonly called “storage-in-transit,” the advisability of requiring companies to notify local communities of the  type and quantities of materials stored in transit, and the appropriate amount of information rail companies should be required  to provide local officials regarding hazardous material shipments that pass  through their communities.
We recommended in April 2003 that DOT and DHS develop a plan that  specifically addresses the security of the nation’s freight rail  infrastructure. This plan should build upon the rail industries’ experience  with rail infrastructure and the transportation of hazardous materials and  establish time frames for implementing specific security actions necessary  to protect hazardous material rail shipments. DHS has informed us that  this plan is in progress.
section_title: Rail Stakeholders Have Taken Steps to Improve Security
paragraphs: Since September 11, passenger and freight rail providers have been  working to strengthen security. Although security was a priority before  September 11, the terrorist attacks elevated the importance and urgency of  transportation security for passenger and rail providers. According to  representatives from the Association of American Railroads, Amtrak, and  transit agencies, passenger and freight rail providers have implemented  new security measures or increased the frequency or intensity of existing  activities, including:    Conducted vulnerability or risk assessments: Many passenger and  freight rail providers conducted assessments of their systems to identify  potential vulnerabilities, critical infrastructure or assets, and corrective  actions or needed security improvements. For example, the railroad  industry conducted a risk assessment that identified over 1,300 critical  assets and served as a foundation for the industry’s security plan.
Increased emergency drills: Many passenger rail providers have  increased the frequency of emergency drills. For example, as of June 2003,  Amtrak had conducted two full-scale emergency drills in New York City.  The purpose of emergency drilling is to test emergency plans, identify  problems, and develop corrective actions. Figure 4 is a photograph from  an annual emergency drill conducted by the Washington Metropolitan  Area Transit Authority.
Developed or revised security plans: Passenger and freight rail  providers developed security plans or reviewed existing plans to  determine what changes, if any, needed to be made. For example, the  Association of American Railroads worked jointly with several chemical  industry associations and consultants from a security firm to develop the  rail industry’s security management plan. The plan establishes four alert  levels and describes a graduated series of actions to prevent terrorist  threats to railroad personnel and facilities that correspond to each alert  level.
Provided additional training: Many transit agencies have either  participated in or conducted additional training on security or  antiterrorism. For example, many transit agencies attended seminars  conducted by FTA or by the American Public Transportation Association.
The federal government has also acted to enhance rail security. Prior to  September 11, DOT modal administrations had primary responsibility for  the security of the transportation system. In the wake of September 11,  Congress created TSA and gave it responsibility for the security of all  modes of transportation. In its first year of existence, TSA worked to  establish its infrastructure and focused primarily on meeting the aviation  security deadlines contained in ATSA. As TSA worked to establish itself  and improve the security of the aviation system, DOT modal  administrations, namely FRA, FTA, and RSPA, acted to enhance passenger  and freight rail security (see tab. 1.). For example, FTA launched a  multipart initiative for mass transit agencies that provided grants for  emergency drills, offered free security training, conducted security  assessments at 36 transit agencies, provided technical assistance, and  invested in research and development. With the immediate crisis of  meeting many aviation security deadlines behind it, TSA has been able to  focus more on the security of all modes of transportation, including rail  security. We reported in June 2003 that TSA was moving forward with  efforts to secure the entire transportation system, such as developing  standardized criticality, threat, and vulnerability assessment tools; and  establishing security standards for all modes of transportation.
section_title: Risk Management and Coordination Key to Enhancing Security
paragraphs: Although steps have been taken to enhance passenger and freight security  since September 11, the recent terrorist attack on a rail system in Spain  naturally focuses our attention on what more could be done to secure the  nation’s rail systems. In our previous work on transportation security, we  identified future actions that the federal government could take to  enhance security of individual transportation modes as well as the entire  transportation system. For example, in our December 2002 report on mass  transit security, we recommended that the Secretary of Transportation  seek a legislative change to give mass transit agencies more flexibility in  using federal funds for security-related operating expenses, among other  things. Two recurring themes cut across our previous work in  transportation security—the need for the federal government to utilize a  risk management approach and the need for the federal government to  improve coordination of security efforts.
Using risk management principles to guide decision-making is a good  strategy, given the difficult trade-offs the federal government will likely  have to make as it moves forward with its transportation security efforts.  We have advocated using a risk management approach to guide federal  programs and responses to better prepare against terrorism and other  threats and to better direct finite national resources to areas of highest  priority. As figure 5 illustrates, the highest priorities emerge where  threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality overlap. For example, rail  infrastructure that is determined to be a critical asset, vulnerable to attack,  and a likely target would be at most risk and therefore would be a higher  priority for funding compared with infrastructure that was only vulnerable  to attack. The federal government is likely to be viewed as a source of  funding for at least some rail security enhancements. These enhancements  will join the growing list of security initiatives competing for federal  assistance. A risk management approach can help inform funding  decisions for security improvements within the rail system and across  modes.
A risk management approach entails a continuous process of managing,  through a series of mitigating actions, the likelihood of an adverse event  happening with a negative impact. Risk management encompasses  “inherent” risk (i.e., risk that would exist absent any mitigating action), as  well as “residual” risk (i.e., the risk that remains even after mitigating  actions have been taken). Figure 6 depicts the risk management  framework. Risk management principles acknowledge that while risk  cannot be eliminated, enhancing protection from known or potential  threats can help reduce it. (Appendix I provides a description of the key  elements of the risk management approach.) We reported in June 2003  that TSA planned to adopt a risk management approach for its efforts to  enhance the security of the nation’s transportation system. According to  TSA officials, risk management principles will drive all decisions—from  standard-setting, to funding priorities, to staffing.
Coordination is also a key action in meeting transportation security  challenges. As we have noted in previous reports, coordination among all  levels of the government and the private industry is critical to the success  of security efforts. The lack of coordination can lead to such problems as  duplication and/or conflicting efforts, gaps in preparedness, and  confusion. Moreover, the lack of coordination can strain  intergovernmental relationships, drain resources, and raise the potential  for problems in responding to terrorism. The administration’s National  Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for the Physical  Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets also emphasize the  importance of and need for coordination in security efforts. In particular,  the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures  and Key Assets notes that protecting critical infrastructure, such as the  transportation system, “requires a unifying organization, a clear purpose, a  common understanding of roles and responsibilities, accountability, and a  set of well-understood coordinating processes.”
We reported in June 2003 that the roles and responsibilities of TSA and  DOT in transportation security, including rail security, have yet to be  clearly delineated, which creates the potential for duplicating or  conflicting efforts as both entities work to enhance security. Legislation  has not defined TSA’s role and responsibilities in securing all modes of  transportation. ATSA does not specify TSA’s role and responsibilities in  securing the maritime and land transportation modes in detail as it does  for aviation security. Instead, the act simply states that TSA is responsible  for ensuring security in all modes of transportation. The act also did not  eliminate DOT modal administrations’ existing statutory responsibilities  for securing the different transportation modes. Moreover, recent  legislation indicates that DOT still has security responsibilities. In  particular, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 states that the Secretary of  Transportation is responsible for the security as well as the safety of rail  and the transport of hazardous materials by all modes.
To clarify the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in transportation  security matters, we recommended that the Secretary of Transportation  and Secretary of Homeland Security use a mechanism, such as a  memorandum of agreement to clearly delineate their roles and  responsibilities. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOT  disagreed with our recommendation, noting that DHS had the lead for the  Administration in transportation security matters and that DHS and DOT  were committed to broad and routine consultations. We continue to  believe our recommendation is valid. A mechanism, such as a  memorandum of agreement, would serve to clarify, delineate, and  document the roles and responsibilities of each entity. This is especially  important considering DOT responsibilities for transportation safety  overlap with DHS’ role in securing the transportation system. Moreover,  recent pieces of legislation give DOT transportation security  responsibilities for some activities, including the rail security.  Consequently, the lack of clearly delineated roles and responsibilities  could lead to duplication, confusion, and gaps in preparedness. A  mechanism would also serve to hold each entity accountable for its  transportation security responsibilities. Finally, it could serve as a vehicle  to communicate the roles and responsibilities of each entity to  transportation security stakeholders.
section_title: Observations
paragraphs: Securing the nation’s passenger and freight rail systems is a tremendous  task. Many challenges must be overcome. Passenger and freight rail  stakeholders have acted to enhance security, but more work is needed. As  passenger and freight rail stakeholders, including the federal government,  work to enhance security, it is important that efforts be coordinated. The  lack of coordination could lead to duplication and confusion. More  importantly, it could hamper the rail sector’s ability to prepare for and  respond to attacks. In addition, to ensure that finite resources are directed  to the areas of highest priority, risk management principles should guide  decision-making. Given budget pressures at all levels of government and  the sluggish economy, difficult trade-offs will undoubtedly need to be  made among competing claims for assistance. A risk management  approach can help inform these difficult decisions.
This concludes our prepared statement. We would be pleased to respond  to any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For information about this testimony, please contact Peter Guerrero,  Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, on (202) 512-2834; or Norman  Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on  (202) 512- 8777. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony  included Nikki Clowers, Susan Fleming, Maria Santos, and Robert White.
section_title: Appendix I: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach
paragraphs: Threat Assessment. Threat is defined as potential intent to cause harm  or damage to an asset (e.g., natural environment, people, man-made  infrastructures, and activities and operations). A threat assessment  identifies adverse events that can affect an entity and may be present at  the global, national, or local level.
Criticality assessment. Criticality is defined as an asset’s relative worth.  A criticality assessment identifies and evaluates an entity’s assets based on  a variety of factors, including importance of a function and the  significance of a system in terms of national security, economic activity, or  public safety. Criticality assessments help to provide a basis for  prioritizing protection relative to limited resources.
Vulnerability assessment. Vulnerability is defined as the inherent state  or condition of an asset that can be exploited to cause harm. A  vulnerability assessment identifies the extent that these inherent states  may be exploited, relative to countermeasures that have been or could be  deployed.
Risk Assessment. Risk assessment is a qualitative and/or quantitative  determination of the likelihood of an adverse event occurring and the  severity, or impact, of its consequences. It may include scenarios under  which two or more risks interact, creating greater or lesser impacts, as  well as the ranking of risky events.
Risk characterization. Risk characterization involves designating risk on  a categorical scale (e.g., low, medium, and high). Risk characterization  provides input for deciding which areas are most suited to mitigate risk.
Mitigation Evaluation. Mitigation evaluation is the identification of  mitigation alternatives to assess the effectiveness of the alternatives. The  alternatives should be evaluated for their likely effect on risk and their  cost.
Mitigation Selection. Mitigation selection involves a management  decision on which mitigation alternatives should be implemented among  alternatives, taking into account risk, costs, and the effectiveness of  mitigation alternatives. Selection among mitigation alternatives should be  based upon pre-considered criteria. There are as of yet no clearly  preferred selection criteria, although potential factors might include risk  reduction, net benefits, equality of treatment, or other stated values.  Mitigation selection does not necessarily involve prioritizing all resources  to the highest risk area, but in attempting to balance overall risk and  available resources.
Risk mitigation. Risk mitigation is the implementation of mitigating  actions, depending upon an organization’s chosen action posture (i.e. the  decision on what to do about overall risk). Specifically, risk mitigation  may involve risk acceptance (taking no action), risk avoidance (taking  actions to avoid activities that involve risk), risk reduction (taking actions  to reduce the likelihood and/or impact of risk), and risk sharing (taking  actions to reduce risk by sharing risk with other entities). As shown in  figure 6, risk mitigation is best framed within an integrated systems  approach that encompasses action in all organizational areas; including  personnel, processes, technology, infrastructure, and governance. An  integrated systems approach helps to ensure that taking action in one or  more areas would not create unintended consequences in another area.
Monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring and evaluation is a continuous  repetitive assessment process to keep risk management current and  relevant. It should involve reassessing risk characterizations after  mitigating efforts have been implemented. It also includes peer review,  testing, and validation.
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