Department of Homeland Security: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Strategic Planning and Management Functions
Published: 2012-02-03T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act) requires that beginning in fiscal year 2009 and every 4 years thereafter the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conduct a review that provides a comprehensive examination of the homeland security strategy of the United States. In February 2010, DHS issued its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) report, outlining a strategic framework for homeland security. In July 2010 DHS issued a report on the results of its Bottom-Up Review (BUR), a departmentwide assessment to implement the QHSR strategy by aligning DHSs programmatic activities, such as inspecting cargo at ports of entry, and its organizational structure with the missions and goals identified in the QHSR. This testimony addresses DHSs efforts to (1) strategically plan its homeland security missions through the QHSR, (2) set strategic priorities and measure performance, and (3) build a unified department. This testimony is based on GAO reports issued in December 2010, February 2011, and September 2011.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DHSs primary strategic planning effort in recent years has been the QHSR. In September 2011, GAO reported on the extent to which DHS consulted with stakeholders in developing the QHSR. DHS solicited input from various stakeholder groups in conducting the first QHSR, but DHS officials, several stakeholders GAO contacted, and other reviewers of the QHSR noted concerns with time frames provided for stakeholder consultations and outreach to nonfederal stakeholders. Specifically, DHS consulted with stakeholdersfederal agencies; department and component officials; state, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; academics; and policy expertsthrough various mechanisms, such as the solicitation of papers to help frame the QHSR. DHS and these stakeholders identified benefits from these consultations, such as DHS receiving varied perspectives. However, stakeholders also identified challenges in the consultation process, such as concerns about the limited time frames for providing input into the QHSR or BUR and the need to examine additional mechanisms for including more nonfederal stakeholders in consultations. By providing more time for obtaining feedback and examining mechanisms to obtain nonfederal stakeholders input, DHS could strengthen its management of stakeholder consultations and be better positioned to review and incorporate, as appropriate, stakeholders input during future reviews.
DHS considered various factors in identifying high-priority BUR initiatives for implementation in fiscal year 2012 but did not include risk information as one of these factors, as called for in GAOs prior work and DHSs risk-management guidance. Through the BUR, DHS identified 43 initiatives aligned with the QHSR mission areas to serve as mechanisms for implementing those mission areas. According to DHS officials, DHS did not consider risk information in prioritizing initiatives because of differences among the initiatives that made it difficult to compare risks across them, among other things. In September 2011, GAO reported that consideration of risk information during future implementation efforts could help strengthen DHSs prioritization of mechanisms for implementing the QHSR. Further, GAO reported that DHS established performance measures for most of the QHSR objectives and had plans to develop additional measures. However, with regard to specific programs, GAOs work has shown that a number of programs and efforts lack outcome goals and measures, hindering the departments ability to effectively assess results.
In 2003, GAO designated the transformation of DHS as high risk because DHS had to transform 22 agenciesseveral with major management challengesinto one department, and failure to effectively address DHSs management and mission risks could have serious consequences for U.S. national and economic security. DHS has taken action to implement, transform, and strengthen its management functions, such as developing a strategy for addressing this high-risk area and putting in place common policies, procedures, and systems within individual management functions, such as human capital, that help to integrate its component agencies. However, DHS needs to demonstrate measurable, sustainable progress in implementing its strategy and corrective actions to address its management challenges.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO made recommendations in prior reports for DHS to, among other things, provide more time for consulting with stakeholders during the QHSR process, examine additional mechanisms for obtaining input from nonfederal stakeholders, and examine how risk information could be used in prioritizing future QHSR initiatives. DHS concurred and has actions planned or underway to address them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss Department of Homeland  Security (DHS) strategic planning. Various strategies and plans exist for  guiding homeland security efforts across the homeland security  enterprise. For example, the May 2010 National Security Strategy  outlines key security priorities and the 2007 National Homeland Security  Strategy defined the homeland security mission for the federal  government. More specific to DHS, the Implementing Recommendations  of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act) requires that  beginning in fiscal year 2009 and every 4 years thereafter DHS conduct a  review that provides a comprehensive examination of the homeland  security strategy of the United States. In February 2010, DHS issued its  first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) report, outlining a  strategic framework for homeland security to guide the activities of  homeland security partners, including federal, state, local, and tribal  government agencies; the private sector; and nongovernmental  organizations.
In addition to the QHSR, in July 2010 DHS issued a report on the results  of its Bottom-Up Review (BUR), a departmentwide assessment to  implement the QHSR strategy by aligning DHS’s programmatic activities,  such as apprehending fugitive aliens and inspecting cargo at ports of  entry, and its organizational structure with the missions and goals  identified in the QHSR. The BUR report described DHS’s current  activities contributing to (1) QHSR mission performance, (2) departmental  management, and (3) accountability. Subsequent to publishing the BUR  report, DHS identified priority initiatives, such as strengthening aviation  security and enhancing the department’s risk management capability, to  strengthen DHS’s mission performance, improve departmental  management, and increase accountability.
DHS’s ongoing efforts to identify strategic goals and align key missions  and resources with those goals are supported by another key  departmental goal: building a unified department. In 2003, GAO  designated implementing and transforming DHS as high risk because  DHS had to transform 22 agencies—several with major management  challenges—into one department. Failure to effectively address DHS’s  management and mission risks could have serious consequences for  U.S. national and economic security. Our prior work, undertaken before  the creation of DHS, found that successful transformations of large  organizations, even those faced with less-strenuous reorganizations than  DHS, can take years to achieve. DHS is now the third-largest federal  department with more than 200,000 employees and $56 billion in budget  authority, and its transformation is critical to achieving its homeland  security missions.
My testimony today focuses on the findings from our prior work in three  key areas:
DHS’s efforts to strategically plan its homeland security missions  departmentwide through the QHSR,
DHS’s efforts to set strategic priorities and measure performance
DHS’s efforts to build and implement a unified department.
This statement is based on four past reports, issued in December 2010,  February 2011, and September 2011, related to DHS’s QHSR, GAO’s  high-risk series, and DHS mission implementation. For these past  reports, among other things, we interviewed DHS officials; analyzed DHS  strategic documents; and reviewed our past reports, supplemented by  DHS Office of Inspector General (IG) reports, issued since DHS began its  operations in March 2003. We conducted this work in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. More detailed  information on the scope and methodology from our previous work can be  found within each specific report.
subsections: section_title: DHS Strategically Planned Its Homeland Security Missions Departmentwide through the QHSR, but Stakeholder Consultations Could Be Enhanced
paragraphs: DHS’s primary strategic planning effort in recent years has been the  QHSR. DHS approached the 9/11 Commission Act requirement for a  quadrennial homeland security review in three phases.
In the first phase, DHS defined the nation’s homeland security  interests, identified the critical homeland security missions, and  developed a strategic approach to those missions by laying out the  principal goals, objectives, and strategic outcomes for the mission  areas. DHS reported on the results of this effort in the February 2010  QHSR report in which the department identified 5 homeland security  missions, 14 associated goals, and 43 objectives. The QHSR report  also identified threats and challenges confronting U.S. homeland  security, strategic objectives for strengthening the homeland security  enterprise, and federal agencies’ roles and responsibilities for  homeland security.
The QHSR identified five  homeland security missions— (1) Preventing Terrorism and  Enhancing Security, (2)  Securing and Managing Our  Borders, (3) Enforcing and  Administering Our Immigration  Laws, (4) Safeguarding and  Securing Cyberspace, and (5)  Ensuring Resilience to  Disasters—and goals and  objectives to be achieved  within each mission. A sixth  category of DHS activities— Providing Essential Support to  National and Economic  Security—was added in the  fiscal year 2012 budget  request but was not included in  the 2010 QHSR report.
In the second phase—the BUR—DHS identified its component  agencies’ activities, aligned those activities with the QHSR missions  and goals, and made recommendations for improving the  department’s organizational alignment and business processes. DHS  reported on the results of this second phase in the July 2010 BUR  report.
In the third phase DHS developed its budget plan necessary to  execute the QHSR missions. DHS presented this budget plan in the  President’s fiscal year 2012 budget request, issued February 14,  2011, and the accompanying Fiscal Year 2012-2016 Future Years  Homeland Security Program (FYHSP), issued in May 2011.
In December 2010, we issued a report on the extent to which the QHSR  addressed the 9/11 Commission Act’s required reporting elements. We  reported that of the nine 9/11 Commission Act reporting elements for the  QHSR, DHS addressed three and partially addressed six. Elements  DHS addressed included a description of homeland security threats and  an explanation of underlying assumptions for the QHSR report. Elements  addressed in part included a prioritized list of homeland security missions,  an assessment of the alignment of DHS with the QHSR missions, and  discussions of cooperation between the federal government and state,  local, and tribal governments.
In September 2011, we reported on the extent to which DHS consulted  with stakeholders in developing the QHSR. DHS solicited input from  various stakeholder groups in conducting the first QHSR, but DHS  officials, stakeholders GAO contacted, and other reviewers of the QHSR  noted concerns with time frames provided for stakeholder consultations  and outreach to nonfederal stakeholders. DHS consulted with  stakeholders—federal agencies; department and component officials;  state, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; academics; and  policy experts— through various mechanisms, such as the solicitation of  papers to help frame the QHSR and a web-based discussion forum. DHS  and these stakeholders identified benefits from these consultations, such  as DHS receiving varied perspectives. However, stakeholders also  identified challenges in the consultation process. For example:
Sixteen of 63 stakeholders who provided comments to GAO noted  concerns about the limited time frames for providing input into the  QHSR or BUR.
Nine other stakeholders commented that DHS consultations with  nonfederal stakeholders, such as state, local, and private-sector  entities, could be enhanced by including more of these stakeholders  in QHSR consultations.
Reports on the QHSR by the National Academy of Public  Administration, which administered DHS’s web-based discussion  forum, and a DHS advisory committee comprised of nonfederal  representatives noted that DHS could provide more time and  strengthen nonfederal outreach during stakeholder consultations.
By providing more time for obtaining feedback and examining  mechanisms to obtain nonfederal stakeholders’ input, DHS could  strengthen its management of stakeholder consultations and be better  positioned to review and incorporate, as appropriate, stakeholders’ input  during future reviews. We recommended that DHS provide more time for  consulting with stakeholders during the QHSR process and examine  additional mechanisms for obtaining input from nonfederal stakeholders  during the QHSR process, such as whether panels of state, local, and  tribal government officials or components’ existing advisory or other  groups could be useful. DHS concurred and reported that it will endeavor  to incorporate increased opportunities for time and meaningful  stakeholder engagement and will examine the use of panels of nonfederal  stakeholders for the next QHSR.
section_title: DHS Did Not Prioritize QHSR Missions or Use Risk Assessments to Help Set Strategic Priorities and Could Improve Departmentwide Performance Measures
paragraphs: The 9/11 Commission Act called for DHS to prioritize homeland security  missions in the QHSR. As we reported in December 2010, DHS  identified five homeland security missions in the QHSR, but did not fully  address the 9/11 Commission Act reporting element because the  department did not prioritize the missions. According to DHS officials,  the five missions listed in the QHSR report have equal priority—no one  mission is given greater priority than another. Moreover, they stated that  in selecting the five missions from the many potential homeland security  mission areas upon which DHS could focus its efforts, the five mission  areas are DHS’s highest-priority homeland security concerns.
Risk management has been widely supported by Congress and DHS as a  management approach for homeland security, enhancing the  department’s ability to make informed decisions and prioritize resource  investments. In September 2011, we also reported that in the 2010 QHSR  report, DHS identified threats confronting homeland security, such as  high-consequence weapons of mass destruction and illicit trafficking, but  did not conduct a national risk assessment for the QHSR. DHS officials  stated that at the time DHS conducted the QHSR, DHS did not have a  well-developed methodology or the analytical resources to complete a  national risk assessment that would include likelihood and consequence  assessments—key elements of a national risk assessment. The QHSR  terms of reference, which established the QHSR process, also stated that  at the time the QHSR was launched, DHS lacked a process and a  methodology for consistently and defensibly assessing risk at a national  level and using the results of such an assessment to drive strategic  prioritization and resource decisions. In recognition of a need to develop a  national risk assessment, DHS created a study group as part of the  QHSR process that developed a national risk assessment methodology.  DHS officials plan to implement a national risk assessment in advance of  the next QHSR, which DHS anticipates conducting in fiscal year 2013.  Consistent with DHS’s plans, we reported that a national risk assessment  conducted in advance of the next QHSR could assist DHS in developing  QHSR missions that target homeland security risks and could allow DHS  to demonstrate how it is reducing risk across multiple hazards.
subsections: section_title: DHS Could Strengthen Its Use of Risk Information in Prioritizing Initiatives and Planning and Investment Decision Making
paragraphs: DHS considered various factors in identifying high-priority BUR initiatives  for implementation in fiscal year 2012 but did not include risk information  as one of these factors as called for in our prior work and DHS’s risk  management guidance. Through the BUR, DHS identified 43 initiatives  aligned with the QHSR mission areas to help strengthen DHS’s activities  and serve as mechanisms for implementing those mission areas (see  app. I for a complete list). According to DHS officials, the department  could not implement all of these initiatives in fiscal year 2012 because of,  among other things, resource constraints and organizational or legislative  changes that would need to be made to implement some of the initiatives.
In identifying which BUR initiatives to prioritize for implementation in fiscal  year 2012, DHS leadership considered (1) “importance,” that is, how soon  the initiative needed to be implemented; (2) “maturity,” that is, how soon  the initiative could be implemented; and (3) “priority,” that is, whether the  initiative enhanced secretarial or presidential priorities. Risk information  was not included as an element in any of these three criteria, according to  DHS officials, because of differences among the initiatives that made it  difficult to compare risks across them, among other things. However,  DHS officials stated that there are benefits to considering risk information  in resource allocation decisions. Consideration of risk information during  future implementation efforts could help strengthen DHS’s prioritization of  mechanisms for implementing the QHSR, including assisting in  determinations of which initiatives should be implemented in the short or  longer term. In our September 2011 report, we recommended that DHS  examine how risk information could be used in prioritizing future QHSR  initiatives. DHS concurred and reported that DHS intends to conduct risk  analysis specific to the QHSR in advance of the next review and will use  the analysis as an input into decision making related to implementing the  QHSR.
Further, in September 2011, we reported on progress made by DHS in  implementing its homeland security missions since 9/11. As part of this  work, we identified various themes that affected DHS’s implementation  efforts. One of these themes was DHS’s efforts to strategically manage  risk across the department. We reported that DHS made important  progress in assessing and analyzing risk across sectors. For example, in  January 2009 DHS published its Integrated Risk Management  Framework, which, among other things, calls for DHS to use risk  assessments to inform decision making. In May 2010, the Secretary  issued a Policy Statement on Integrated Risk Management, calling for  DHS and its partners to manage risks to the nation.
We also reported that DHS had more work to do in using this information  to inform planning and resource-allocation decisions. Our work shows  that DHS has conducted risk assessments across a number of areas, but  should strengthen the assessments and risk management process. For  example:  In June 2011, we reported that DHS and Health and Human Services  could further strengthen coordination for chemical, biological,  radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) risk assessments. Among other  things, we recommended that DHS establish time frames and  milestones to better ensure timely development and interagency  agreement on written procedures for development of DHS’s CBRN  risk assessments. DHS concurred and stated that the department had  begun efforts to develop milestones and time frames for its strategic  and implementation plans for interagency risk assessment  development.
In November 2011, we reported that the U.S. Coast Guard used its  Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model at the national level to  focus resources on the highest-priority targets, leading to Coast  Guard operating efficiencies, but use at the local level for operational  and tactical risk-management efforts has been limited by a lack of  staff time, the complexity of the risk tool, and competing mission  demands. Among other things, we recommended that the Coast  Guard provide additional training for sector command staff and others  involved in sector management and operations on how the model can  be used as a risk-management tool to inform sector-level decision  making. The Coast Guard concurred and stated that it will explore  other opportunities to provide risk training to sector command staff,  including online and webinar training opportunities.
In November 2011, we reported that the Federal Emergency  Management Agency (FEMA) used risk assessments to inform  funding-allocation decisions for its port security grant program.  However, we found that FEMA could further enhance its risk-analysis  model and recommended incorporating the results of past security  investments and refining other data inputs into the model. DHS  concurred with the recommendation, but did not provide details on  how it plans to implement it.
In October 2009, we reported that TSA’s strategic plan to guide  research, development, and deployment of passenger checkpoint  screening technologies was not risk-based. Among other things, we  recommended that DHS conduct a complete risk assessment related  to TSA’s passenger screening program and incorporate the results  into the program’s strategy. DHS concurred, and in July 2011 reported  actions underway to address it, such as beginning to use a risk-  management analysis process to analyze the effectiveness and  efficiency of potential countermeasures and effect on the commercial  aviation system.
section_title: DHS Has Established Performance Measures, but Has Not Yet Fully Developed Outcome-Based Measures for Many of Its Mission Functions
paragraphs: In September 2011, we reported that DHS established performance  measures for most of the QHSR objectives and had plans to develop  additional measures. Specifically, DHS established new performance  measures, or linked existing measures, to 13 of 14 QHSR goals, and to 3  of 4 goals for the sixth category of DHS activities—Providing Essential  Support to National and Economic Security. DHS reported these  measures in its fiscal years 2010-2012 Annual Performance Report. For  goals without measures, DHS officials told us that the department was  developing performance measures and planned to publish them in future  budget justifications to Congress.
In September 2011, we also reported that DHS had not yet fully  developed outcome-based measures for assessing progress and  performance for many of its mission functions. We recognized that DHS  faced inherent difficulties in developing performance goals and measures  to address its unique mission and programs, such as in developing  measures for the effectiveness of its efforts to prevent and deter terrorist  attacks. While DHS had made progress in strengthening performance  measurement, our work across the department has shown that a number  of programs lacked outcome goals and measures, which may have  hindered the department’s ability to effectively assess results or fully  assess whether the department was using resources effectively and  efficiently. For example, our work has shown that DHS did not have  performance measures for assessing the effectiveness of key border  security and immigration programs, to include:  In September 2009, we reported that U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) had invested $2.4 billion in tactical infrastructure  (fencing, roads, and lighting) along the southwest border under the  Secure Border Initiative—a multiyear, multibillion dollar program  aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration.   However, DHS could not measure the effect of this investment in  tactical infrastructure on border security. We recommended that DHS  conduct an evaluation of the effect of tactical infrastructure on  effective control of the border. DHS concurred with the  recommendation and subsequently reported that the ongoing analysis  is expected to be completed in February 2012.
In August 2009, we reported that CBP had established three  performance measures to report the results of checkpoint operations,  which provided some insight into checkpoint activity. However, the  measures did not indicate if checkpoints were operating efficiently and  effectively, and data reporting and collection challenges hindered the  use of results to inform Congress and the public on checkpoint  performance. We recommended that CBP improve the measurement  and reporting of checkpoint effectiveness. CBP agreed and, as of  September 2011, reported plans to develop and better use data on  checkpoint effectiveness.
Further, we reported that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement  (ICE) and CBP did not have measures for assessing the performance  of key immigration enforcement programs. For example, in April 2011,  we reported that ICE did not have measures for its overstay  enforcement efforts, and in May 2010 that CBP did not have  measures for its alien smuggling investigative efforts, making it  difficult for these agencies to determine progress made in these areas  and evaluate possible improvements. We recommended that ICE  and CBP develop performance measures for these two areas. They  generally agreed and reported actions underway to develop these  measures.
section_title: DHS Has Taken Action to Implement, Strengthen, and Integrate Its Management Functions, but Needs to Demonstrate Sustainable Progress
paragraphs: In 2003, GAO designated the transformation of DHS as high risk because  DHS had to transform 22 agencies—several with major management  challenges—into one department, and failure to effectively address DHS’s  management and mission risks could have serious consequences for  U.S. national and economic security. This high-risk area includes  challenges in strengthening DHS’s management functions—financial  management, human capital, information technology, and acquisition  management—the impact of those challenges on DHS’s mission  implementation, and challenges in integrating management functions  within and across the department and its components. Addressing these  challenges would better position DHS to align resources to its strategic  priorities, assess progress in meeting mission goals, enhance linkages  within and across components, and improve the overall effectiveness and  efficiency of the department.
On the basis of our prior work, in September 2010, we identified and  provided to DHS 31 key actions and outcomes that are critical to  addressing the challenges within the department’s management functions  and in integrating those functions across the department. These key  actions and outcomes include, among others, validating required  acquisition documents at major milestones in the acquisition review  process; obtaining and then sustaining unqualified audit opinions for at  least 2 consecutive years on the departmentwide financial statements  while demonstrating measurable progress in reducing material  weaknesses and significant deficiencies; and implementing its workforce  strategy and linking workforce planning efforts to strategic and program- specific planning efforts to identify current and future human capital  needs.
In our February 2011 high-risk update, we reported that DHS had taken  action to implement, transform, and strengthen its management functions,  and had begun to demonstrate progress in addressing some of the  actions and outcomes we identified within each management area. For  example, we reported that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of  Homeland Security, and other senior officials, have demonstrated  commitment and top leadership support to address the department’s  management challenges. DHS also put in place common policies,  procedures, and systems within individual management functions, such  as human capital, that help to integrate its component agencies. For  example, DHS  revised its acquisition management oversight policies to include more  detailed guidance to inform departmental acquisition decision making.  strengthened its enterprise architecture, or blueprint to guide  information technology acquisitions, and improved its policies and  procedures for investment management. developed corrective action plans for its financial management  weaknesses, and, for the first time since its inception, DHS earned a  qualified audit opinion on its fiscal year 2011 balance sheet; and  issued its Workforce Strategy for Fiscal Years 2011-2016, which  contains the department’s workforce goals, objectives, and  performance measures for human capital management.
Further, in January 2011, DHS provided us with its Integrated Strategy for  High Risk Management, which summarized the department’s preliminary  plans for addressing the high-risk area. Specifically, the strategy  contained details on the implementation and transformation of DHS, such  as corrective actions to address challenges within each management  area, and officials responsible for implementing those corrective actions.  DHS provided us with updates to this strategy in June and December  2011. We provided DHS with written feedback on the January 2011  strategy and the June update, and have worked with the department to  monitor implementation efforts. We noted that both versions of the  strategy were generally responsive to actions and outcomes we identified  for the department to address the high-risk area. For example, DHS  included a management integration plan containing information on  initiatives to integrate its management functions across the department.  Specifically, DHS plans to establish a framework for managing  investments across its components and management functions to  strengthen integration within and across those functions, as well as to  ensure that mission needs drive investment decisions. This framework  seeks to enhance DHS resource decision making and oversight by  creating new department-level councils to identify priorities and capability  gaps, revising how DHS components and lines of business manage  acquisition programs, and developing a common framework for  monitoring and assessing implementation of investment decisions. These  actions, if implemented effectively, should help to further and more  effectively integrate the department and enhance DHS’s ability to  implement its strategies. However, we noted in response to the June  update that specific resources to implement planned corrective actions  were not consistently identified, making it difficult to assess the extent to  which DHS has the capacity to implement these actions. Additionally, for  both versions, we noted that the department did not provide information  on the underlying metrics or factors DHS used to rate its progress,  making it difficult for us to assess DHS’s overall characterizations of  progress. We are currently assessing the December 2011 update and  plan to provide DHS with feedback shortly.
Although DHS has made progress in strengthening and integrating its  management functions, the department continues to face significant  challenges affecting the department’s transformation efforts and its ability  to meet its missions. In particular, challenges within acquisition,  information technology, financial, and human capital management have  resulted in performance problems and mission delays. For example, DHS  does not yet have enough skilled personnel to carry out activities in some  key programmatic and management areas, such as for acquisition  management. DHS also has not yet implemented an integrated financial  management system, impeding its ability to have ready access to  information to inform decision making, and has been unable to obtain a  clean audit opinion on the audit of its consolidated financial statements  since its establishment.
Going forward, DHS needs to implement its Integrated Strategy for High  Risk Management, and continue its efforts to (1) identify and acquire  resources needed to achieve key actions and outcomes; (2) implement a  program to independently monitor and validate corrective measures; and  (3) show measurable, sustainable progress in implementing corrective  actions and achieving key outcomes. Demonstrated, sustained progress  in all of these areas will help DHS strengthen and integrate management  functions within and across the department and its components.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions that you may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact David C. Maurer at  (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement  include Rebecca Gambler, Acting Director; Ben Atwater; Scott Behen;  Janay Sam; Jean Orland; and Justin Dunleavy. Key contributors for the  previous work that this testimony is based on are listed within each  individual product.
section_title: Appendix I: Bottom-Up Review Initiatives
paragraphs: Initiatives selected by DHS for implementation in fiscal year 2012 listed in  bold.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Coast Guard: Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, but More Training  Could Enhance Its Use for Managing Programs and Operations.   GAO-12-14. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.
Port Security Grant Program: Risk Model, Grant Management, and  Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-12-47.  Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: Enhanced Stakeholder  Consultation and Use of Risk Information Could Strengthen Future  Reviews. GAO-11-873. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2011.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining  in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11.   GAO-11-881. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2011.
National Preparedness: DHS and HHS Can Further Strengthen  Coordination for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Risk  Assessments. GAO-11-606. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2011.
Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, Assessing,  and Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS’s Efforts but Would Have Costs.  GAO-11-411. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2011.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C: February  2011.
Alien Smuggling: DHS Needs to Better Leverage Investigative Resources  to Measure Program Performance along the Southwest Border.   GAO-10-328. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2010.
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: 2010 Reports Addressed Many  Required Elements, but Budget Planning Not Yet Completed.   GAO-11-153R. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2010.
Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and  Begun Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but  Continue to Face Challenges. GAO-10-128. Washington, D.C.: October  7, 2009.
Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the  Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-1013T.  Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2009.
Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol’s Mission, but  More Consistent Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could  Improve Effectiveness. GAO-09-824. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2009.
Transportation Security: Comprehensive Risk Assessments and Stronger  Internal Controls Needed to Help Inform TSA Resource Allocation.   GAO-09-492. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2009.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and  Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure.  GAO-06-91. Washington. D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005.
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