Homeland Defense: Planning, Resourcing, and Training Issues Challenge DOD's Response to Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Incidents
Published: 2009-10-07T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD plays a support role in managing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents, including providing capabilities to save lives, alleviate hardship or suffering, and minimize property damage. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DOD's CBRNE consequence management plans and capabilities are integrated with other federal plans; (2) DOD has planned for and structured its force to provide CBRNE consequence management assistance; (3) DOD's CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF) are prepared for their mission; and (4) DOD has CCMRF funding plans that are linked to requirements for specialized CBRNE capabilities. GAO reviewed DOD's plans for CBRNE consequence management and documents from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FEMA. GAO also met with officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S Northern Command, the military services, the National Guard Bureau, and some CCMRF units.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD has its own CBRNE consequence management plans but has not integrated them with other federal plans because those federal entities have not completed all elements of the Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in December 2007. The system is to develop and link planning documents at the federal, state, and local levels. While the system's framework is established, the CBRNE concept and strategic plans that provide further guidance are incomplete. DOD has had operational plans in place and revises these plans regularly. However, until the Integrated Planning System and its associated plans are complete, DOD's plans and those of other federal and state entities will not be integrated, and it will remain unclear whether DOD's CCMRF will address potential gaps in capabilities. We previously recommended and DHS agreed that FEMA should develop a program management plan and schedule to complete the planning system. With a goal to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous, catastrophic CBRNE incidents, DOD has plans to provide needed capabilities, but its response times may not meet incident requirements, it may lack sufficient capacity in some capabilities, and it faces challenges to its strategy for sourcing all three CCMRFs with available units. Without assigned units and plans that integrate the active and reserve portions of CCMRF, and agreements between DOD and the states on availability of National Guard units and the duty status in which they would respond to an incident requiring federal forces, DOD's ability to train and deploy forces in a timely manner is at risk. DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the readiness of units assigned to the first CCMRF, increasing both individual and collective training focused on the mission and identifying the mission as high priority. However, the CCMRF has not conducted realistic full force field training to confirm units' readiness to assume the mission or to deploy rapidly. Competing demands of overseas missions may distract from a unit's focus on the domestic mission, and some CCMRF units rotate more frequently than stated goals. These training and force rotation problems have prevented DOD from providing the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to build cohesiveness. DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to identify all requirements have not been completed, and funding responsibilities are spread across the department and are not subject to central oversight. When the CCMRF mission priority increased in the spring of 2008, more funding was provided. However, units did not have dedicated funding and thus purchased equipment with funding also used for other missions. DOD lacks visibility over total funding requirements. Without an overarching approach to requirements and funding and a centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been identified and funded, DOD's ability to ensure that its forces are prepared to carry out this high-priority mission remains challenged.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security highlighted the  continuing threat posed to the United States by the potential use of  weapons of mass destruction by terrorist organizations. In addition to  efforts focused on preventing such attacks, the strategy highlights the  need for a comprehensive capability to mitigate the consequences of an  attack involving weapons of mass destruction. Such a capability is also a  key pillar of the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass  Destruction. The Department of Defense (DOD) characterizes weapons  of mass destruction in terms of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclea and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) materials. Incidents involving CBRNE  could range in magnitude, from such things as accidents like chemical  spills that likely could be addressed by local responders to catastrophic  incidents such as terrorist attacks involving nuclear material that could  result in extraordinary levels of casualties and property damage.
A catastrophic CBRNE-related incident occurring within the United States  would require a unified, national response, including action by DOD. The  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for coordinating  federal disaster response planning, with the Federal Emergency  Management Agency (FEMA) serving as the primary federal agency under  DHS for coordinating federal assistance in response to an incident. DOD  would act in support of the primary federal agency. In addition to  establishing CBRNE response units in the National Guard, including the  Civil Support Teams and CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages,  DOD is establishing CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces  (CCMRF). A CCMRF is roughly a brigade-sized force (approximately 4,500  troops) that provides federal military assistance when a CBRNE incident  exceeds local and state capabilities. DOD relies on its existing force  structure, which it refers to as “dual-capability forces,” to support the  domestic CBRNE consequence management mission as well as overseas  missions.
In May 2006, we reported that the National Guard Weapons of Mass  Destruction Civil Support Teams were generally organized and prepared  for their mission, and we highlighted management challenges that needed  to be addressed. In response to your request that we assess DOD’s federal  role in CBRNE consequence management efforts, we initiated a review  focusing on federal military planning and preparedness efforts and  CCMRF. Our objectives for this report address the extent to which           (1) DOD’s plans and capabilities are integrated with other federal  government plans to address capability requirements, (2) DOD has  planned for and structured its force to provide CBRNE consequence  management assistance, (3) DOD’s CCMRF are prepared to perform their  mission, and (4) DOD has funding plans for CCMRF that are linked to  requirements for specialized CBRNE capabilities. As agreed with your  offices, we will conduct a review of the operational effectiveness of the  National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (commonly  referred to as CERFP) as a follow-on effort.
To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for CBRNE  consequence management operations and has integrated its plans with  other federal government plans, we reviewed and compared current DOD  operational- and tactical-level plans for civil support and CBRNE  consequence management with existing FEMA and DHS planning efforts.  We also met with officials of DHS, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Homeland Defense, and U.S Northern Command  (NORTHCOM). We reviewed our prior reports and worked with other  GAO staff currently examining the overall domestic homeland security  planning integration process. To determine how prepared CCMRF is to  perform the mission, we compared existing DOD policy and practices on  readiness with the current process used to prepare CCMRF units and  report mission readiness. We also met with U.S. Joint Forces Command  and U.S. Army Forces Command—which are responsible for providing  ready forces to the combatant commands—to discuss the manpower  sourcing process followed for CCMRF. We obtained readiness reports for  CCMRF units from U.S. Northern Command and from judgmentally  selected units that were part of task force operations—which contain most  of the specialized capabilities. To determine CCMRF funding planning and  the linkage of funding to mission requirements, we met with Army and  U.S. Northern Command officials to obtain guidance on the topic and to  discuss mission requirements, funding needs, and sources. We compared  funding sources to known CBRNE consequence management  requirements and highlighted areas where funding was not identified for  key activities or areas relevant to unit preparedness. We also met with the  National Guard Bureau to discuss their current capabilities, identified  shortfalls, and approach to mitigating any identified shortfalls.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to October 2009  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD plays a support role in CBRNE consequence management, including  providing those capabilities needed to save lives, alleviate hardship or  suffering, and minimize property damage caused by the incident. DOD  generally provides defense support of civil authorities only when (1) state,  local, and other federal resources are overwhelmed or unique military  capabilities are required; (2) assistance is requested by the primary federal  agency; or (3) NORTHCOM is directed to do so by the President or the  Secretary of Defense. DOD has designated NORTHCOM to lead the  federal military portion of such a support operation in direct support of  another federal agency—most often FEMA. DOD could be the lead federal  agency for CBRNE consequence management or any other civil support  mission only if so designated by the President. To be effective,  NORTHCOM’s efforts must support a wide range of federal departments  and agencies—including FEMA and the Departments of Health and Human  Services and Justice—in order to support 50 states, the District of  Columbia, six territories, and hundreds of city and county governments.
The National Response Framework establishes the principles that guide  all response partners in preparing for and providing a unified national  response to disasters.  Under the Framework, disaster response is tiered;  local governments and agencies typically respond immediately following  an incident. When additional resources are required, states may provide  assistance with their own resources or may request assistance from other  states through interstate mutual agreements or the Emergency  Management Assistance Compact. Localities and states usually respond  within the first several hours of a major incident. The federal government  provides assistance to states if they require additional capabilities and they  request assistance. In the event of a catastrophic incident, such as one  involving CBRNE, the framework also calls for federal response partners  to anticipate the need for their capabilities before their assistance is  requested. The framework lists 15 emergency support functions and  designates federal lead agencies in areas such as search and rescue, public  health and medical services, and transportation. DOD is a supporting  agency for all 15 emergency support functions but is also one of the  primary agencies for search and rescue and public works and  engineering. Additional tools to guide response efforts are provided by  The National Preparedness Guidelines, including National Planning  Scenarios, Target Capability Lists and Universal Target Lists, and national  priorities.
The federal government has a wide array of capabilities and resources that  can be made available to assist state and local agencies in responding to  incidents. NORTHCOM would command the federalized DOD capabilities  and coordinate the efforts of state controlled DOD capabilities. Figure 1  shows the organizational structure of key DOD CBRNE Consequence  Management Organizations under federal and state control.
In framing its role in providing CBRNE consequence management  assistance, DOD has set its standard of preparedness as the ability to  prepare for and mitigate the effects of multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE  events. DOD has significant capabilities that could be used to augment a  federal CBRNE response and also contributes to the organization, training,  and equipping of several state-controlled military units focused on  consequence management, including the following.
The National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support  Teams. These 22-person units are composed of full time National  Guard personnel and are located in each state and territory. Their  mission is to assist civil authorities in responding to actual or  suspected CBRNE incidents by identifying agents and substances,  assessing consequences, advising civil authorities on response  measures, and assisting with requests for additional support. The  teams are under the control of the governors of their respective states  and territories unless they are activated for federal service, at which  time they would come under the control of DOD.
The National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages.
Each of these larger force packages (about 200 soldiers) is composed  of personnel from numerous existing National Guard units; these  personnel remain in the same status as most National Guard personnel  and must be mobilized for duty. Their mission is to provide follow-on  assistance in such areas as casualty search and extraction; patient  decontamination; and emergency medical triage, treatment, and  stabilization. There are currently 17 authorized response force  packages, including at least one in each of the 10 FEMA regions of the  country. Like the Civil Support Teams, the force packages are intended  to be part of the state response to an incident and therefore remain  under the control of the respective governors. States that do not have  this capability can access these force packages through preestablished  agreements. In rare instances, the force packages can also be  federalized and placed under DOD authority.
The DOD CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces  (CCMRF). These forces, when fully established, are intended to be  three brigade-sized forces (approximately 4,500) that provide federal  military assistance when a CBRNE incident exceeds local and state  capabilities, including the National Guard forces described previously.
The CCMRFs are comprised of many individual units that are of  different types and sizes (for example, platoons, companies, battalions,  and brigades), from multiple military services and DOD agencies, from  the active, reserve, and National Guard, and are geographically  dispersed throughout the United States. The response force is intended  to provide assistance in such areas as command and control, technical  search and rescue, explosive ordnance disposal, aviation evacuation,  medical response, and CBRNE detection and decontamination. DOD’s  stated requirement is to have three of these forces. An important  element of the first CCMRF is the unique capabilities provided by the  Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), which is a U.S.  Marine Corps unit consisting of about 400 personnel that assist local,  state, or federal agencies and designated combatant commanders in  the conduct of CBRNE consequence management operations. CBIRF  maintains capabilities for agent detection and identification, casualty  search, rescue, personnel decontamination, and emergency medical  care and stabilization of contaminated personnel. Plans call for CBIRF  to respond as part of the lead element for the first of three CCMRFs.  DOD originally intended for all three to be comprised strictly of active  duty military units. However, DOD’s current plan is to have the first  force, established October 1, 2008, be comprised predominately of  active duty military units. The second and third response forces, which  are scheduled to be fielded on October 1, 2009, and October 1, 2010,  respectively, are expected to be comprised mostly of National Guard  and Army Reserve units. DOD is currently working with the states and  the National Guard Bureau on incorporating these units into the  structure of the response forces.
Figure 2 shows the approximate time frames for response to a CBRNE  incident involving the forces discussed above.
With the exception of key specialized capabilities, such as the National  Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, DOD relies on  its “dual-capability forces” to provide all other CBRNE consequence  management capabilities in addition to existing overseas missions. The  CCMRFs—the only force listed above that is not under the control of state  governors and adjutants general—is composed of forces that will come  under the operational control of NORTHCOM in the event of an incident.  The force is organized for a CBRNE incident under three task forces:    Task Force Operations, which is to coordinate with local emergency  responders; conduct decontamination operations; survey, monitor, and  mark incident sites; provide security for DOD forces; and command  and control of DOD general support operations, mortuary affairs, and  transportation.
Task Force Medical, which is to provide triage and treatment,  definitive care, medical logistics, hospital augmentation,  epidemiological support, agent technical support, stress management,  preventative medicine, veterinary support, and prophylaxis and  immunization (primarily in support of CCMRF personnel).
Task Force Aviation, which is to provide medical evacuation, medical  lift capability, air transport personnel, air transport supplies, search  and rescue, and limited aircraft maintenance.
The Joint Task Force Civil Support is the command element that provides  command and control for the first CCMRF. Joint Task Force Civil Support  is a subordinate command of U.S. Army North (also the Joint Force Land  Component Commander), which is the Army component command of  NORTHCOM. Joint Task Force Civil Support is a permanent standing task  force that has been in existence since 1999 and plans and integrates DOD  support to the designated lead federal agency for domestic CBRNE  consequence management operations. When directed by the NORTHCOM  Commander, Joint Task Force Civil Support will deploy to the incident  site, establish command and control of the first CCMRF or other  designated DOD forces, and direct military consequence management  operations in support of civil authorities. Additional command and control  organizations are being established for the second and third CCMRFs.
section_title: DOD Has Its Own CBRNE Consequence Management Plans in Place but is Unable to Fully Integrate Them with Other Federal Plans, Which Are Incomplete
paragraphs: DOD has operational plans for CBRNE consequence management.  However, DOD has not integrated its plans with other federal government  plans because the concept and strategic plans associated with the  Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in  December 2007 have not been completed.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Developed Plans for CBRNE Consequence Management
paragraphs: Unlike most federal agencies, DOD has had CBRNE consequence  management operational plans for over 10 years. DOD, NORTHCOM, and  its components have prepared individual plans that address CBRNE  consequence management following DOD’s well-established joint  operation planning process. This process establishes objectives, assesses  threats, identifies capabilities needed to achieve the objectives in a given  environment, and ensures that capabilities (and the military forces to  deliver those capabilities) are distributed to ensure mission success. Joint  operation planning also includes assessing and monitoring the readiness of  those units providing the capabilities for the missions they are assigned.  DOD and NORTHCOM routinely review and update their plans as part of  DOD’s joint planning system. For example, the most recent NORTHCOM  CBRNE consequence management plan was completed in October 2008.  DOD and NORTHCOM have also developed such planning documents as  execute orders that are key to linking immediate action to those plans, as  well as scenario-based playbooks to guide the planning, operations, and  command and control of military forces for CBRNE efforts.
section_title: Governmentwide Integrated Planning System Is under Development but Not Yet Complete
paragraphs: DHS is leading a governmentwide effort to develop an Integrated Planning  System that would link the plans of all federal agencies involved in  incident response, including DOD’s; however, this effort is not yet  complete. While much in the way of federal guidance has been  developed, to be most effective, policy documents must be operationalized  by further detailing roles and responsibilities for each entity that may be  involved in responding to high-risk or catastrophic incidents.
In December 2007, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1,  mandated that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with  the heads of other federal agencies with roles in homeland security,  develop an Integrated Planning System to provide common processes for  all of the entities developing response plans. The Integrated Planning  System is intended to provide a framework to link the family of related  U.S. preparedness planning documents at the federal, regional, state, and  local levels that are called for in the directive, such as strategic plans,  concepts of operations plans, and operations plans related to the 15  National Planning Scenarios.  DHS has grouped the 15 national planning  scenarios on which preparedness plans are to be based into 8 scenario  sets, of which 5 are CBRNE-related. Each of the scenarios, listed in table 1,  includes a description, assumptions, and likely effects, so that entities at  all levels can use them to guide planning.
The directive required that the Integrated Planning System be submitted to  the President for approval within 2 months of the directive’s issuance in  December 2007. As we have reported, the Integrated Planning System was  approved in January 2009 by former President Bush, but is currently under  review by the new administration, and no time frame for its publication  has been announced. The approval of the CBRNE plans required under  the directive (see table 2 below) would be a step toward unifying and  integrating the nation’s planning efforts. For example, for each National  Planning Scenario, a strategic guidance statement is intended to establish  the nation’s strategic priorities and national objectives and to describe an  envisioned end-state. Strategic guidance statements will have  corresponding strategic plans, which are intended to define roles,  authorities, responsibilities, and mission-essential tasks. Under each  strategic plan, a concept of operations plan will be developed, and federal  agencies are further required to develop operations plans to execute their  roles and responsibilities under the concept of operations plan.
As of July 2009, strategic guidance statements have been approved for all  five CBRNE-related scenario sets. Four of the five required strategic plans  have also been completed. The remaining strategic plan (chemical attack)  was begun in June 2009 upon the approval of the strategic guidance  statement for that scenario. One of the five required overall federal  concept plans—that for terrorist use of explosives attack—has been  completed. Table 2 shows the status of federal CBRNE strategy and plans  called for under Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8  Annex 1.
DOD’s plans and those of other federal and state entities cannot be fully  integrated until the supporting strategic and concept plans are completed.  As we have previously reported, apart from the sequential timelines  required in HSPD-8 Annex 1, FEMA and DHS have no schedule or project  plan for completing the guidance and plans. We have recommended and  DHS generally agreed that FEMA should develop a program management  plan in coordination with other federal entities to ensure completion of  key national preparedness policies and plans called for in such sources as  presidential directives and that the plan should, among other things, define  roles and responsibilities and planning processes, as well as identify a  schedule for completion.
section_title: Current Capability Assessments at Local, State, and Federal Levels May Provide Insufficient Data for DOD to Shape Its Response to CBRNE Incidents
paragraphs: A number of efforts to develop capability assessments are under way at  local, state, and federal levels, but these efforts may not yet be sufficiently  mature to provide DOD with complete data that it can use to shape its  response plans for CBRNE-related incidents. For example, in fiscal year  2007, FEMA developed its Gap Analysis Program, which focuses on seven  general capabilities that are often needed in the aftermath of a hurricane.  These are: evacuation, medical needs, debris removal, commodity  distribution, sheltering, interim housing, and fuel availability. While these  capabilities would be needed for most scenarios, including CBRNE-related  scenarios, the Gap Analysis Program does not identify unique capabilities  needed for CBRNE incidents, such as decontamination assets or detection  assets. In 2008, FEMA expanded the program to include not only  hurricane-prone states, but all states and all hazards. However, FEMA  officials stated that neither their questionnaires—which were used to  query states about potential gaps in their capabilities—nor any of their  other guidance specified how states should identify requirements unique  to a CBRNE-related incident.
FEMA also collects capability data by other means. However, none of  these efforts—either individually or in the aggregate—has provided a  comprehensive capability assessment. The Post-Katrina Emergency  Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act) requires that FEMA  report to Congress on federal preparedness, in part by collecting  information on state capability levels; states receiving DHS federal  preparedness assistance must provide preparedness reports. FEMA also  requires these reports in order for states to qualify for its grant funds.  States, territories, and the District of Columbia completed and submitted  their first state preparedness reports to FEMA in the spring of 2008 and  have also submitted reports in the spring of 2009. However, as we have  previously reported, the state capability data that FEMA has collected do  not provide a comprehensive picture of national capability gaps, because  they are incomplete and the states do not use common metrics to assess  their capabilities. FEMA officials stated that in order to provide the  comprehensive capability-based assessment that Congress requires, the  next National Preparedness Report, which as of September 2009 is being  drafting and reviewed, will apply one, comprehensive, capability based  analytical framework to meet a series of preparedness reporting  requirements. FEMA anticipates that through this effort, it will be able to  gain a more complete picture of national preparedness.
As noted in DHS’s January 2009 Federal Preparedness Report, several key  components of the national preparedness system are still works in  progress, and not all data required for the federal government to assess its  preparedness are available. As DHS also states in its report, standards for  reporting operational readiness are not fully developed, and DHS does not  possess the authority to compel the submission of data from other federal  homeland security partners. Moreover, according to DOD and FEMA, even  to the extent that states have capability data available, their sensitivity  about disclosing data that highlight the state’s capability gaps has limited  the degree to which they share these data with DOD or with entities  responsible for developing DOD’s plans and related capabilities. DOD  officials stated that in the absence of a comprehensive capability  assessment, they continue to work with FEMA and continue to build  relationships with individual states to collect data on their capabilities.
section_title: DOD’s Planned Response to CBRNE Incidents May Be Insufficient
paragraphs: DOD has had plans to provide CBRNE consequence management support  to civil authorities since before 9/11 and in the last few years has set higher  goals in the expectation of being able to provide expanded capabilities  through its three CCMRFs. However, its ability to respond effectively may  be compromised because (1) its planned response times may not meet the  requirements of a particular incident, (2) it may lack sufficient capacity in  some key capabilities, and (3) it faces challenges in adhering to its strategy  for sourcing CCMRFs with available units.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Planned Response Times May Be Too Long
paragraphs: In 2005, DOD established a standard for itself that called for the ability to  respond to multiple, simultaneous catastrophic incidents, and it initiated  efforts to create three CCMRFs. For the first 3 years, DOD did not  regularly assign units to the CCMRF mission, and this decreased DOD’s  ability to actually field any of the CCMRFs within the timelines it had  established. In October 2008 DOD sourced the first CCMRF, primarily with  active force units. A second CCMRF, comprised primarily of reserve units,  will assume the mission in October 2009 and a third in October 2010. In the  absence of national guidance suggesting what level of response capability  DOD should have available within a specified time frame, DOD’s plans use  a phased deployment to allow the first CCMRF to be able to provide  consequence management support to civilian authorities within 48-96  hours of being notified of a CBRNE incident. The earlier phases of the  deployment will provide the lifesaving capabilities. However, multiple  DOD estimates for some of the more catastrophic scenarios, such as a  nuclear detonation, have identified significant gaps between the time  certain life saving and other capabilities would be needed and DOD’s  planned response times. For example, victims of a nuclear attack would  require decontamination, which medical experts have established must be  provided as soon as possible after exposure. If DOD adheres to its planned  response times in such a scenario, the capabilities of early responders  such as local police and fire departments would likely be overwhelmed  before DOD arrived at the incident site. NORTHCOM’s assessment  and  other DOD estimates demonstrated that, for a number of capabilities,  DOD’s response would not be timely. Table 3 shows one estimate of the  potential shortfall in decontamination capabilities that could result.
DOD has also identified several other areas where it may not be able to  provide the needed capabilities as quickly as required. These areas  included CBRNE search and rescue, transportation, mass care support,  and mortuary affairs.
DOD’s efforts to determine the types and quantities of capabilities that will  likely be needed to augment local, state, and federal response forces are  based on general requirements and tasks spelled out in federal guidance  such as the National Response Framework and the National  Preparedness Guidelines. For example, CCMRF planning documents  indicate that the DHS Universal Task List, which is described in the  Guidelines, includes over 1,600 tasks that need to be performed in order  for entities to be prepared to address the National Planning Scenarios.  However, the task list is not prescriptive in determining which agency  should do which tasks, how they should be done, or when they might be  needed. Additionally, the Target Capability List, which is a companion  document to the Guidelines, contains 37 key capabilities. As they relate to  the CCMRF, key response capabilities include emergency triage and  prehospital treatment, weapons of mass destruction and hazardous  materials response and decontamination, and medical surge. The  NORTHCOM capability-based assessment suggests that without a national,  risk-based determination of DOD’s share of the federal capability  requirements, DOD will be unable to determine whether its planned  response times should be adjusted.
section_title: DOD’s Planned Force May Lack Sufficient Capacity in Some Key Capabilities Needed for Catastrophic Incidents
paragraphs: In addition to timeliness issues, DOD’s planned force has limited quantities  of some of the needed life saving capabilities, such as medical and  decontamination services. For example, some nuclear detonation  scenarios project that hundreds of thousands could be killed, injured,  displaced, contaminated, or in need of medical care. CCMRF would be  able to provide only a small portion of the necessary capability. Although a  CCMRF is estimated, under optimal circumstances, to be capable of  decontaminating several thousand people per day, some estimates project  that the gap between needed decontamination capabilities and what local,  state, and other entities could provide would be tens of thousands. DOD  recognizes that it may need additional units to augment CCMRF, and it has  made some tentative estimates. For example, DOD plans anticipate that in  the case of a blister agent event, an additional medical package would be  needed beyond what is in included in CCMRF. For a nerve agent incident,  plans anticipate that an additional mortuary affairs package would be  needed. For a chlorine tank explosion, additional packages for both  medical and mortuary affairs would be needed, beyond those that that are  included in CCMRF.
However, DOD has not designated specific units to augment CCMRF.  Unless these units are identified in advance and trained for the mission,  they may be unable to deploy rapidly. By not aligning CCMRF objectives  with the projected need for response capabilities and clearly delineating  national expectations for timely response, neither DOD nor other entities  involved in incident response can be certain that the CCMRFs will be able  to respond adequately to mitigate the consequences of a catastrophic  CBRNE incident.
section_title: DOD Faces Challenges in Adhering to Its Strategy for Sourcing CCMRFS with Available Units
paragraphs: In sourcing its three CCMRFs, DOD has encountered challenges in  implementing an approach that could enhance unit availability and  training and readiness oversight for forces that are not assigned to  NORTHCOM. DOD originally intended all three CCMRFs to be comprised  entirely of federal active military forces, but the two follow-on CCMRFs  will be sourced with large numbers of National Guard and Army Reserve  units. The demands of ongoing overseas operations have led DOD to draw  more and more heavily on Guard and Reserve forces to fulfill civil support  functions. Because National Guard units have responsibilities in their  respective states, a competition for resources issue may arise between  DOD and the states. For example, while governors may need the same  capabilities within the state or to support mutual assistance agreements  with other states as would be needed to support a CCMRF, there is no  clear understanding between the governors and DOD to ensure that these  units will be available promptly if they are needed for a federal mission  without being federalized. Moreover, elements from a single unit can be  spread over many states, further complicating the task of coordinating  between DOD and each of the states. For example, one Army National  Guard aviation company belonging to one of the CCMRFs has elements in  Arkansas, Florida, and Alabama. Three different states would be required  to make these elements available to form the company. The potential rapid  deployment mission of CCMRF makes it imperative that specific  agreements be reached. However, the agreements that have been reached  to date are general in nature and do not specify how states are to ensure  that Guard units will be available for a CCMRF deployment.
Similar issues arise with the Army Reserve. The training demands of the  CCMRF mission have caused DOD to authorize additional training days,  but according to Army Reserve officials, reservists cannot be compelled to  attend training events beyond their annual training requirement. They  stated that, as a result, units must rely on the voluntary participation of  their personnel for training beyond the requirement, which reduces their  assurance that these personnel will be available for other necessary  CCMRF training. For example, one reserve company was unable to fulfill  all aspects of its mission requirements because of low participation at a  training event. Unit officials stated that some of the unit’s members had  school or work obligations that conflicted with this training. Moreover,  reserve unit officials stated that, unlike with active unit officials, they  cannot restrict the personal travel of unit members to ensure that they will  be available if they are needed to support an unexpected federal CBRNE  incident response. These challenges to sourcing the CCMRFs increase the  risk that DOD’s ability to effectively respond to one or more major  domestic CBRNE incidents will be compromised. That risk can be  mitigated by plans that integrate the Active and Reserve Component  portions of the CCMRFs and agreements between DOD and the states on  the availability of National Guard units and the duty status under which  they would respond to a major incident requiring federal forces.
DOD’s decision to change its approach to how NORTHCOM will routinely  interact with units designated for CCMRF will present additional  challenges. In 2008, DOD’s sourcing approach was to assign the first  CCMRF (primarily active forces) to NORTHCOM and allocate the  remaining two CCMRFs (mix of Guard and Army Reserve) to  NORTHCOM. Beginning in October 2009, DOD will allocate the units  from all three CCMRFs to NORTHCOM, rather than assigning them to the  NORTHCOM commander outright. As a result, despite the fact that  NORTHCOM’s commander is responsible for commanding the federal  military domestic CBRNE response in the continental United States,  NORTHCOM will have no CBRNE forces under its direct control. There  are advantages to assigning forces directly to NORTHCOM. For example,  the command would have direct authority over the units’ day-to-day  activities, including training and exercise schedules, and would be better  able to monitor readiness. Additionally, there would be fewer  administrative steps required for the NORTHCOM commander to activate  and deploy CCMRF units in the event of an incident. This would be crucial  for deploying the critical initial response elements of the overall force.  Under DOD’s current allocation approach, NORTHCOM would have  authority over units while they are participating in scheduled NORTHCOM  training events, but would have to coordinate with multiple commands to  enable participation from these units. Current guidance states that other  commands should make their units available for scheduled NORTHCOM  exercises “to the greatest extent possible.” However, NORTHCOM cannot  always be assured that units will be available for these exercises. In  addition, NORTHCOM remains uncertain about the extent to which it will  have oversight of CCMRF units’ day-to-day training activities and be able  to confirm that these units are ready to perform their mission even when  they are under the authority of another command.
section_title: DOD Has Taken Actions to Improve CCMRF Readiness, but Training Gaps and Conflicting Priorities May Degrade Performance
paragraphs: DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the  readiness of the first fielded CCMRF. However, DOD faces challenges in  providing the training necessary to ensure readiness for the full CCMRF.  We found that CCMRF may be limited in its ability to successfully conduct  consequence management operations because (1) it does not conduct  realistic full-force field training to confirm its readiness to assume the  mission or to deploy rapidly and (2) conflicting priorities between the  CBRNE mission and overseas deployments affect some units’ mission  preparation and unit cohesion.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Taken Actions to Improve CCMRF Readiness
paragraphs: The initial assignment of CCMRF to NORTHCOM in October 2008, and the  increased priority DOD has placed on the CBRNE consequence  management mission, have resulted in a number of improvements in the  preparation of the units that comprise the first fielded CCMRF. The Army,  in coordination with NORTHCOM and its subordinate commands, has  established guidance for both individual and collective training—including  joint mission essential task lists—for units designated for CCMRF.  Therefore, for the first time, identified units have been conducting both  individual and collective training focused on the CBRNE mission. For  example, at the individual level, soldiers were required to be proficient in a  number of skills, including skills related to operating in a CBRNE  environment. Individual soldiers were also required to take online courses  on operating in a domestic environment supporting civil authorities. Table  4 shows examples of some CBRNE-related training tasks that individuals  should be able to perform before assuming the CBRNE mission as part of  CCMRF.
Also, key leaders such as brigade task force headquarters personnel and  battalion commanders are required to participate in a number of command  and control training events to gain an understanding of how to organize  and conduct operations in a complex interagency environment under  catastrophic disaster conditions. For example, commanders are required  to attend resident Defense Support to Civil Authorities courses and to  participate in a number of command and control training events, to ensure  that unit leaders are familiar with DHS’s National Planning Scenarios and  with operating in a civil support role. These training events that leaders  participate in include tabletop exercises—which provide participants  opportunities to simulate interagency planning, discuss simulated  scenarios, and assess plans and procedures for CBRNE consequence  management—as well as command-post exercises. In order to confirm  CCMRF’s readiness prior to mission assumption, U.S. Army North  conducted a command-post mission rehearsal exercise that included key  leaders from each of CCMRF’s three task forces—Operations, Medical,  and Aviation. The goal of this exercise is to give the participants  experience in organizing and conducting operations in a complex  interagency environment in support of civil authorities under catastrophic  disaster conditions. The leadership simulates the full participation of units  through modeling. Under U.S. Army North’s current training guidance, this  exercise validates CCMRF’s pre-mission readiness.
In addition, units are training on and reporting their proficiency to perform  CCMRF Joint Mission Essential Tasks. We had previously reported that, in  2007, NORTHCOM had developed a list of joint mission-essential tasks— including the major tasks that units are required to perform to respond to  potential domestic CBRNE incidents. These include both tasks that units  typically perform as part of their wartime missions and some tasks that  would be emphasized during or be unique to a domestic CBRNE incident.  For example, among other mission-essential tasks, the Task Force  Operations element of each CCMRF  commands and controls subordinate units;  conducts nuclear, chemical, and biological route, zone, area, and point  reconnaissance;  conducts agent detection, casualty search, technical rescue, hot zone  extraction, personnel decontamination, and time-critical medical care  and stabilization;  conducts CBRNE incident response force operations;  assesses tactical and operational situation;  identifies nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards; and  conducts mortuary affairs operations.
Further, we previously reported that NORTHCOM and Joint Task Force  Civil Support officials had difficulties tracking the readiness of units that  were identified for the CBRNE consequence management mission,  because so few of the units were actually filled with the necessary  personnel and equipment. However, the increased priority given to  CCMRF in the spring of 2008 has led to designated units receiving  personnel and equipment ahead of many other units that are not  designated for CCMRF. Consequently, most units that assumed the  mission in October 2008 reported that they were prepared to perform the  mission and had been provided by their respective military service with  the personnel and equipment they needed to meet established guidance.
section_title: Lack of Sufficient Field Training Affects CCMRFs’ Ability to Perform Effectively
paragraphs: Although individual units were certified as ready prior to assuming the  CBRNE mission in October 2008, it is unclear whether the full CCMRF can  effectively perform CBRNE consequence management operations  throughout the 1-year mission to which it is assigned, because the  readiness of the full CCMRF is not confirmed through a realistic field  training exercise before the force assumes the mission, nor have its rapid  deployment capabilities been fully assessed. Before individual units  designated for CCMRF assume the CBRNE mission, the military services  are required to certify that these units are trained to perform that mission.  However, there is currently no requirement for all of the units that  comprise CCMRF to participate together in a realistic full-force field  training exercise that could confirm that the full CCMRF can perform its  required tasks in an integrated manner before it takes on the CBRNE  consequence management mission. While other brigade-sized units  typically conduct this type of training prior to an overseas deployment,  and NORTHCOM and U.S. Army North (in its role as Joint Force Land  Component Commander) training officials have discussed the desirability  of such an exercise, the first fielded CCMRF has not had the opportunity  to have the entire force train together; only a subset of CCMRF units have  trained together in field exercises. Further, these exercises were  conducted several months after these units had assumed the CCMRF  mission and had already been certified as trained to perform it.
Joint military guidance describes training as a key element of readiness,  which is defined in two parts—unit level and joint level readiness.  However, current DOD and NORTHCOM CCMRF guidance does not  require the full CCMRF to conduct a joint field exercise to confirm its  readiness prior to assuming the mission. Rather, DOD guidance requires  that NORTHCOM annually confirm that the designated headquarters  organizations can deploy operationally and employ their respective  CCMRF elements. While DOD’s guidance further requires that supported  combatant commands, such as NORTHCOM, confirm unit readiness and  the ability to activate, deploy, employ, and command and control CCMRF  assets effectively, it does not specifically require that the full CCMRF  conduct a field training exercise to confirm readiness before units assume  the mission, as is the case with other missions such as overseas  deployments. Such training is a particularly important matter for CCMRF,  since this force does not exist as a standing unit that typically operates  together. Moreover, training officials at Joint Task Force Civil Support,  Army North, and NORTHCOM have cited the desirability of such  exercises, which could allow the full CCMRF to demonstrate its ability to  operate in an integrated manner in a tactical environment. According to  Joint Task Force training officials, full-force field exercises could  strengthen unit integration and facilitate units’ gaining familiarity with the  different capabilities comprising CCMRF. However, as previously stated,  NORTHCOM confirms the readiness of each CCMRF through a command- post exercise directed by U.S. Army North, as the designated Joint Force  Land Component Commander, and these exercises do not include all of  the personnel from each unit. For example, less than 20 percent of CCMRF  participated in the 2008 mission readiness exercise that was used to  confirm readiness.
While NORTHCOM’s October 2008 mission execution order did not  contain a requirement for full-force pre-mission field training, it did  include a requirement for CCMRFs to conduct a full field training exercise  during the mission period—that is, after the units have already assumed  the mission. However, no full-force CCMRF training exercise was  conducted during fiscal year 2009. Rather, subsets of CCMRF have  conducted field exercises, but these exercises usually did not include all of  the key units with which they might work during an incident. For example,  members of the First Brigade Combat Team of the Third Infantry Division  conducted search and extraction exercises with the Marine Corps’s  Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) in November 2008.  No other units from Task Force Operations participated in this training  exercise. In addition, CBIRF participated in a number of other field  training exercises, and Army Reserve chemical companies—including  companies not designated for CCMRF—also participated in field training  events for tasks such as mass decontamination.
Further, in January 2009, officials from Task Force Operations—one of the  three CCMRF task forces—and the Joint Task Force-Civil Support  proposed that a field training exercise be conducted in March 2009 at a  training site in Florida. The exercise was approved by U.S. Army North  and NORTHCOM, and plans were put in place to include other units from  CCMRF. The exercise was successful in getting participation from about  1,500 personnel of the approximately 4,500 —about a third of the  personnel that comprise the full CCMRF, including 1,200 from Task Force  Operations. A Joint Task Force-Civil Support training official stated that     2 months was an extremely short time frame in which to coordinate  exercise participation and that with such a short time frame not all  potential participants would be available. For example, the Army Reserve  chemical company that would provide decontamination and  reconnaissance resources was unable to attend the field training exercise  because, company officials stated, the unit was not notified in time to  program funding to attend the exercise and did not have enough lead time  for some of its soldiers to arrange leave from their civilian employment.  Their participation would have addressed a previous recommendation  from U.S. Army North that the chemical company should conduct training  in a realistic CBRNE environment with other CCMRF units such as a  medical support company and the Marine Corps CBIRF, in part to observe  other military units with similar technical support capabilities and to  obtain a better understanding of the sequence of events in a joint  collective training exercise. Absent a directive for CCMRF to conduct a  full-force exercise prior to units assuming the mission, there is increased  risk that units may have to respond in support of an incident without prior  experience or training that simulated such conditions.
NORTHCOM is taking steps to train the full CCMRF through field  exercises in the future, but this training is not planned to take place until  at least several months after CCMRF assumes responsibility for the  CBRNE mission. For example, in March 2009, NORTHCOM provided  additional training guidance that has led to NORTHCOM and U.S. Army  North developing plans for all future CCMRFs to conduct field training  exercises beginning in fiscal year 2010. However, units will already have  been on the mission for at least 2 months—and as many as 8 months— before these exercises take place.
In addition to the importance of confirming the proficiency of the entire  CCMRF for conducting its mission, DOD has stated that its forces must be  available in a timely and reliable manner and must be able to deploy  rapidly. To accomplish this, units must demonstrate that they will be able  to meet the required CCMRF response times once they assume the  mission. However, neither NORTHCOM nor Army North has yet  conducted deployment readiness exercises for the full CCMRF, and it is  not clear if its plans for future CCMRFs will include such exercises.  Officials from various units that comprise the first CCMRF have expressed  concerns about being able to deploy rapidly from their home stations. For  example, Task Force Operations headquarters officials stated that one of  their primary challenges in conducting the CCMRF mission is deploying  rapidly from their home stations; these units are accustomed to deploying  overseas on established schedules and do not have experience deploying  on short notice. Deployment readiness exercises are important because  they test units’ ability to ascertain how quickly personnel can be notified  and assembled, equipment prepared and loaded to fit in potential  transportation modes such as trucks and airplanes, and both staff and  equipment moved to the designated point of departure. DOD has provided  general guidance that supported commands, such as NORTHCOM, should  confirm the ability of CCMRF units to activate and deploy. In addition,  NORTHCOM has established guidance that directs U.S. Army North (as the  Joint Force Land Component Commander) to conduct deployment  readiness exercises when they are initiated by NORTHCOM. These  deployment exercises could be conducted to test all processes and  procedures needed for deployment or to test only those process and  procedures that do not involve unit movement. Moreover, the  NORTHCOM guidance does not specify whether these exercises should be  conducted with or without prior notice. U.S. Army North guidance  includes a requirement for two deployment exercises per year to confirm  the ability of CCMRF and Joint Task Force Civil Support to deploy within  time frames established by NORTHCOM. However, training officials at  both Joint Task Force headquarters and U.S. Army North said that there  have been no deployment readiness exercises for the full CCMRF or for  any of the CCMRF force packages. A Joint Task Force Civil Support  training official added that a no-notice readiness exercise was being  considered by NORTHCOM and U.S. Army North to test alert notification  and the deployment processes and procedures of the full CCMRF, but  officials were uncertain when such a deployment exercise would take  place. Training officials also expressed concern that it could become more  difficult in the future to have no-notice exercises when units from all three  CCMRFs are no longer under the direct authority of NORTHCOM.
As was the case with field training exercises, individual units have  separately conducted deployment readiness exercises that involved all  phases of deployment preparation, including movement of personnel and  equipment. However, in these exercises, deployment was planned well in  advance. For example, staff from units in Task Force Operations that  incorporated a deployment exercise prior to conducting a March 2009 field  exercise had up to 45 days to plan for the exercise. However, many  anticipated CBRNE incidents can occur without notice. With no program  in place to test the ability of all units in CCMRF to meet specified response  times on short notice, NORTHCOM and DOD will continue to be unable to  verify the ability of CCMRF units to deploy.
section_title: Units’ Preparation for the CCMRF Mission and Efforts to Achieve Unit Cohesion Are Affected by Other Missions
paragraphs: The demands that other missions are placing on the Army also may put the  effectiveness of the CCMRF’s mission at risk. DOD has identified CCMRF  as a high-priority mission; however, the Army has at times designated units  for CCMRF when they have just returned from overseas missions. When  units first return from overseas, they are in the “reset” phase of the Army  Force Generation process, over the course of which they progress through  three sequential readiness pools. The reset phase is typically when units  reconstitute by repairing equipment, receiving new equipment, and  assigning new personnel, and begin training to achieve the capabilities  necessary to enter the ready force pool. Because these units are at the  beginning of their reset phase, they often lack personnel and equipment.  Although the Army attempts to accelerate the fill of personnel and  equipment to these units, some units may not receive their personnel and  equipment in sufficient time to allow them to meet all of the requirements  of the CBRNE consequence management mission before they assume it. In  contrast, units are deployed for overseas missions only when they have  progressed to the “ready” or “available” phase of the cycle. In most cases,  units reported having received the necessary personnel and equipment  before the October mission assumption date, but their personnel had not  always completed all of the CCMRF-related training before the assumption  date.
Army Forces Command officials acknowledged that a number of units  were still receiving personnel and equipment while preparing for the  mission. For example, several units, while stating they were prepared to  perform the mission, still had key personnel that needed training related to  performing the CCMRF mission. In one instance, a medical company that  assumed the mission on October 1, 2008, did not complete its post- deployment reconstitution until October 31, 2008. While the company’s  assigned personnel had completed the required training at the time of  mission assumption, newly assigned personnel did not receive the  required training until November 2008. Another medical unit had  significant personnel turnover in July 2008 and stated that the turnover  affected its ability to conduct all CCMRF-related training before its  mission assumption date. Army Forces Command officials said that its  units are designated for CCMRF while in the reset phase because there are  not enough units in the available force pool to sufficiently source CCMRF  in addition to meeting other combatant command requirements for  overseas deployments. Moreover, many CCMRF units will be deployed  overseas after they have completed their CCMRF rotations, and  anticipating future deployment may distract them from their CCMRF  training. For example, officials from the Task Force Operations  headquarters said that they had conducted a number of field exercises at  the brigade and battalion levels at the beginning of these units’ CCMRF  rotations. In contrast, CCMRF sustainment training in the latter half of the  year was conducted by telephone because the units were focused on their  upcoming overseas missions and were unavailable for field training.
Moreover, unit cohesiveness and training proficiency have been affected  by the frequent turnover in units that were assigned to the first fielded  CCMRF in fiscal year 2009. While the goal has been to have units assigned  for at least 12 months and to have standard start and end dates for each  rotation, several critical units have been unable to complete their full       1-year rotation in the fiscal year 2009 CCMRF, and other units will not be  assigned on the same rotation schedule for fiscal year 2010. For example,  the brigade headquarters for the aviation task force has changed three  times, and the brigade headquarters for the medical task force rotated out  of the CBRNE consequence management mission after only 6 months.
The pace of this turnover affects the ability of units and personnel to both  conduct initial training and sustain training. For example, the medical  brigade originally assigned to CCMRF participated in the mission rehearsal  exercise conducted in September 2008. The assignment of a second  medical brigade in February 2009 required the Joint Task Force Civil  Support to alter the focus of a planned command-post exercise from  rehearsing its processes and procedures and those of subordinate task  forces staff to confirming the readiness of Task Force Medical, which was  preparing to assume the mission in March 2009. Also, while elements from  the Aviation Task Force headquarters participated in the same 2009  exercise, the Aviation Task Force currently assigned to CCMRF did not  participate in the field exercise because it had not yet assumed the  mission. Officials from another unit cited a challenge associated with the  frequent higher-level headquarters and other unit rotations. These officials  stated that the frequency of these rotations means that units have to  continuously dedicate both time and people to learning the requirements  of higher headquarters and adjacent units and that turnover in  headquarters leadership could cause the unit to change its tactics,  techniques, and procedures. The frequent rotations of units could also  result in the need for more frequent exercises, since not all CCMRF units  have had the opportunity to train with the full CCMRF as an integrated  force. DOD officials have acknowledged that providing aviation and  medical capabilities to the CCMRFs will continue to be a challenge, due to  the high demand for these capabilities for other missions.
These training and force rotation issues have prevented DOD from  providing the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to build  cohesiveness. Because key leaders from units of the entire force attend a  mission rehearsal exercise prior to mission assumption, the replacement  of these units after only a few months negated much of the value that was  gained from these three task forces working together and deprived the  replacement task force leaders of having the same opportunity.
section_title: CCMRF Requirements Have Not Been Fully Developed, and Funding and Oversight Are Decentralized
paragraphs: DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and  equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to  identify total program requirements have not been completed, and its  approach to providing program funding has been fragmented because  funding responsibilities for CCMRF-related costs are dispersed throughout  DOD and are not subject to central oversight.
subsections: section_title: CCMRF Mission Requirements Have Not Been Fully Developed
paragraphs: The units initially designated for the CCMRF mission did not have fully  developed funding and equipment requirements. In addition, the recent  NORTHCOM Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities-Based  Assessment report highlighted a number of systemic capability gaps that  need to be addressed and may generate additional funding requirements.  Moreover, other important requirements for this mission have not been  identified and funded. The Joint Forces Land Component Commander  (U.S. Army North) and the Joint Task Force Civil Support are responsible  for developing and approving service-specific equipment unique to the  CCMRF’s Joint Mission Essential Tasks. However, to date, mission- essential equipment requirements have not been fully developed. While  some equipment requirement lists have been developed and are being  reviewed by NORTHCOM, equipping officials said that lists have not been  developed for nonstandard equipment that units may need in order to  support civil authorities in a CBRNE environment. As a result, some units  in fiscal year 2009 have determined requirements based on their own  independent mission analyses. Unit officials stated that filling some of the  needs they identified—such as the need for nonstandard communications  equipment that is compatible with civilian equipment—was difficult  because the units lacked a documented requirement for their planned  acquisition. In addition, the review process did not always include the  command organizations that are responsible for the mission. Thus,  decisions on what to buy and in what quantity were not consistently vetted  to ensure standardization in equipping various units. U.S. Army North  officials stated that they were in the process of developing mission- essential equipment lists and hope to have them completed in time for the  next rotation, which begins in October 2009.
DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support recognized the  importance of proper funding and budget oversight for the CBRNE  consequence management mission and noted that the mission’s funding is  not accounted consistently. However, provision of funding for the mission  is fragmented and is not monitored centrally within the department. While  CCMRF is a joint mission, funding guidance leaves the funding  responsibilities for most requirements to the respective military  departments or defense agencies. For example, it is up to the military  departments to determine day-to-day funding requirements and fund unit  training. Moreover, DOD has not created an integrated, fully dedicated,  and consistent approach and funding strategy across the department,  instead dispersing responsibility for funding CCMRF among the military  services, NORTHCOM, and other entities. For example, while NORTHCOM  funds predominately joint mission training for the current force, the day- to-day funding for CCMRF-assigned units and individual mission training  continue to comes from the services. However, the services are also  simultaneously scheduling and funding the training required to meet the  units’ wartime mission requirements for which they are responsible after  the CCMRF mission ends. Table 5 shows funding responsibilities for some  CCMRF activities.
Starting in fiscal year 2010, NORTHCOM expects to fund training for two  CCMRFs, including mission rehearsal, mission readiness, command post,  and field training exercises. However, unit training not directed by  NORTHCOM is not funded centrally and must be funded by the military  services. This fragmentation in funding responsibilities is normal in DOD,  but the lack of a coordinated plan that allows visibility over all CCMRF- related funding increases the risk that NORTHCOM would be unaware of  whether individual units have the necessary resources to effectively  conduct the pre-mission training they need. DOD’s guidance does not  identify a single organization to provide oversight of total program  requirements and available resources. We have previously reported that  adequate oversight, including program direction and visibility of all costs  and individual program efforts, provides stronger assurance to DOD that it  is making the most effective use of departmentwide resources to meet  mission needs. Without this kind of funding strategy and oversight, DOD  cannot develop a complete understanding of mission activities, priorities,  and shortfalls or identify resource redundancies and gaps.
section_title: Extent of Dedicated Funds for Some CCMRF Training Affects Mission
paragraphs: In the spring of 2008, sourcing priority for the CCMRF mission increased  substantially within the department, and funding was provided for specific  aspects of the mission. For example, NORTHCOM’s training program  includes more than $33 million to design, plan, and manage exercises as  well as funds for participant costs for CCMRFs for fiscal year 2010. The  Army Reserve planned funds of more than $37 million for fiscal years 2009  and 2010 to support additional full-time personnel and training days that  have been authorized to support the CCMRF mission. In addition, while  the military services have not planned funds for equipment specifically for  the CCMRF mission, some nonstandard equipment has been purchased  with other remaining funds. In other cases, purchase requests for certain  equipment were denied by administrative parent commands because, unit  officials believed, the equipment was considered noncritical by reviewing  officials. Moreover, units must fund their CCMRF training activities from  their operations and maintenance accounts, which were developed and  approved months before units knew they would be assigned to CCMRF.  According to unit officials, many units were not provided with additional  funds for the CCMRF mission. As a result, these units sometimes have  funds allocated from other sources to meet identified requirements for the  CCMRF mission. Also according to these officials, while the lack of  planned funds for CCMRF has been mitigated to some extent by the  mission’s high-priority level, they have found it necessary to curtail or  cancel some desirable training because funding was unavailable. Army  officials told us that if funding shortfalls develop because units lack  sufficient funds to conduct both CCMRF and follow-on mission training,  units can request additional funds from the Army. However, unless units  assess their total funding requirement for CCMRF and their other  designated mission and receive funding based on both missions, CCMRF  units may be at risk of not having enough funding to conduct all of their  CCMRF training. This, in turn, puts units at risk of not being fully prepared  if they are needed to respond to an incident.
DOD lacks visibility across the department over the total funding  requirements for this mission because it has no funding strategy for  meeting CBRNE mission requirements. The services, in the absence of  funding dedicated to the CBRNE mission, have been using existing  operations and maintenance accounts to meet mission requirements.  Without an overarching approach to developing requirements and a  funding strategy for meeting these requirements, DOD’s ability to carry out  this high-priority homeland security mission efficiently and effectively is at  risk.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Our nation faces a continuing threat of the potential use of weapons of  mass destruction by terrorist organizations, and the federal government  recognizes the need for a comprehensive capability to mitigate the  consequences of such an attack. A domestic, catastrophic CBRNE-related  incident would require a unified, whole government, national response.  DOD plays a crucial role in support of civil authorities for CBRNE  consequence management and under certain circumstances might even be  designated as the lead federal agency for such an incident. To provide  timely and effective support when local and state capabilities are no  longer adequate, it is crucial that DOD be able to integrate its plans with  those of other federal agencies involved in disaster response. Until all  CBRNE plans that are being developed under the Integrated Planning  System are complete, it will be difficult for DOD to know whether its  considerable body of operational plans will adequately address anticipated  gaps in the capabilities needed to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous,  CBRNE incidents. DOD will also need to overcome challenges related to  sourcing its CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces,  including issues regarding coordinating with states about the availability  and deployment status of National Guard units, integrating Guard and  Reserve units with active duty forces, and ensuring that forces charged  with dual missions are properly trained to function effectively when called  on for consequence management response.
Because each of the CCMRFs are comprised of units that are  geographically dispersed, from both the Active and Reserve Components,  and from all of the military services, it must have opportunities to train as  a complete force before assuming the mission and to demonstrate its  capability to successfully conduct the mission, including the ability to  deploy rapidly. For the mission to succeed, it is critical to ensure that each  unit can meet its designated response time. Because DOD has not  developed complete and approved requirements for the CCMRF mission  and fully defined and monitored funding responsibilities, it lacks full  visibility across the department for this mission. Without an overarching  approach to develop full and complete mission requirements, an approach  and mechanisms in place to fully support those requirements, and a  centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been identified  and fully funded, DOD’s ability to carry out this high-priority homeland  security mission efficiently and effectively could be in jeopardy.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In the absence of completed plans under the Integrated Planning System  or other specific guidance on DOD’s expected contribution to the federal  response to a domestic CBRNE-related incident, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs to work with DHS,  FEMA, and other interagency partners to agree on  interim goals, objectives, and planning assumptions for DOD’s role in  responding to one or more simultaneously occurring CBRNE incidents  in the United States.; and  the specific types and quantities of capabilities that DOD is expected  to contribute and the time frames in which those capabilities are to be  provided.
In order to ensure that DOD’s plans are consistent with stated program  goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander  of NORTHCOM and the military services to  align plans for all parts of CCMRF, including specialized and general- purpose units, with stated objectives for CCMRF, and include in their  planning efforts the extent to which existing CCMRF capabilities  contribute to identified response requirements and stated CCMRF  mission goals; and    work with the state governors through the states’ Adjutants General  and the National Guard Bureau to create a long-term plan for sourcing  CCMRF and ensure that the agreements being established between  DOD and state governors include specific terms on National Guard  force availability and duty and response status.
In order to increase the assurance that CCMRF can effectively provide  CBRNE consequence management in support of civil authorities, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of  NORTHCOM—in coordination with the military services—to include in  the CCMRF training program requirements that  the entire CCMRF conduct a joint field training exercise as part of its  mission validation, and  the entire CCMRF conduct at least one no-notice deployment  readiness exercise annually.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander  of NORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, the Joint Forces Command and the Service  Secretaries to    determine the time needed by units to perform the necessary pre- mission CCMRF training, and  examine sourcing options that would ensure that units had adequate  time to train prior to mission assumption once they had all required  personnel and equipment.
In order to provide a departmentwide understanding of requirements,  priorities, and resource shortfalls and to identify potential redundancies  and gaps in CCMRF resourcing, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense, in coordination with the Commander of NORTHCOM, the  Secretaries of the military services, the National Guard Bureau, and the  heads of participating defense agencies    determine the total requirements for CCMRF, including unique,  nonstandard equipment requirements for each type of unit that  comprises CCMRF, and develop a plan on how those requirements will  be filled;    develop an overall funding strategy for establishing, fielding, and  exercising CCMRF and designate a single focal point for coordinating  this strategy.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with the  intent of our recommendations and discussed steps it is taking or plans to  take to address these recommendations. DOD also provided technical  comments, which we have incorporated into the report where appropriate.  DHS also reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments,  which we have incorporated into the report where appropriate.
In response to our recommendation that DOD work with DHS, FEMA, and  other interagency partners to agree on interim goals, objectives, and  planning assumptions for DOD’s role in responding to CBRNE incidents in  the United States, DOD agreed and stated that in addition to its routine   planning activities, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs emphasizes the need for  the kind of planning we discuss in the report and our recommendation.  DOD stated that it recently convened an advisory panel to evaluate and, as  appropriate, make recommendations on modifying DOD authorities,  capabilities, plans and programs, and policies to assist civil authorities in  preventing or responding to CBRNE incidents. DOD stressed that this  panel is authorized to coordinate directly with any department or agency  the panel considers necessary to carry out its duties. We believe the panel  DOD described will be a suitable mechanism for coordinating with DHS,  FEMA, or any other relevant federal agency in addressing the substance of  our recommendation.
DOD also agreed with our recommendation that DOD work with DHS,  FEMA, and other interagency partners to agree on the specific types and  quantities of capabilities that DOD is expected to contribute and the time  frames in which those capabilities are to be provided. DOD reiterated that  the panel discussed above will assist in addressing the recommendation.  Additionally, DOD highlighted a number of ongoing efforts within the  department (such as the Quadrennial Defense Review), and efforts being  coordinated with DHS, FEMA, and other interagency partners (such as the  Task Force for Emergency Readiness) to more fully understand the  capabilities that may be required of DOD in the event of a CBRNE  incident. DOD stressed and we agree that realistic, detailed, and  coordinated planning at the federal, state, and local levels is essential to  resolving the uncertainty over just what specific CBRNE consequence  management capabilities DOD should be preparing to provide in the event  of an incident. We believe that if consistently pursued and coordinated, the  ongoing efforts DOD described should help address this recommendation  and greatly assist overall federal, state, and local planning and  preparedness for responding to CBRNE incidents.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that it align plans for all parts of  the CCMRFs, including the specialized and general purpose units, with  stated objectives for the CCMRF to include the extent to which existing  CCMRF capabilities contribute to identified response requirements and  stated CCMRF mission goals. DOD stated that it would continue to  evaluate changes to the CCMRF’s roles, missions, and requirements and  make the necessary adjustments to the units’ missions and goals.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that it work with the state  governors through the states’ adjutants general and the National Guard  Bureau to create a long-term plan for sourcing the CCMRFs and ensure  that the agreements being established between DOD and state governors  include specific terms on National Guard force availability and duty and  response status. DOD stated that the Secretary of Defense has directed the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a long-term total force  sourcing plan for the CCMRFs and to ensure that as they are fielded, the  CCMRFs remain appropriately sourced. DOD stated that it continues to  work with the Departments of the Army and Air Force, and the National  Guard Bureau along with states’ adjutants general, to address resourcing  and readiness matters. We believe DOD’s approach to developing a long- term CCMRF sourcing plan will help build stability into its preparedness  efforts. We continue to believe that negotiating and coordinating clear  agreements between DOD and the states on the availability and duty status  of National Guard units designated as part of CCMRF is critical to the  overall DOD CCMRF capability. If the specific availability and duty status  of these units is consistently pursued and coordinated, DOD’s efforts vis-à- vis the states should help in this regard.
In response to our recommendation that the Commander of  NORTHCOM—in coordination with the military services—include in the  CCMRF training program requirements that the entire CCMRF conduct a  joint field training exercise as part of its mission validation, DOD agreed  but cautioned that the availability of funds to conduct full force exercises  was a critical factor in fully addressing the recommendation. We agree that  field exercises for each of the CCMRFs requires considerable logistical  effort and associated costs. However, establishing a requirement for the  entire CCMRF to exercise would allow DOD to evaluate the relative  priority of the domestic CBRNE consequence management mission against  other requirements and would allow DOD to evaluate potential risk if full  funding is not available.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that NORTHCOM—in coordination  with the military services—include in the CCMRF training program  requirements that the entire CCMRF conduct at least one no-notice  deployment readiness exercise annually. DOD stated that NORTHCOM has  a field training exercise requirement in its proposed CCMRF training plan  and that the command is working with the services and U.S.  Transportation Command to determine the transportation requirements   associated with a no-notice exercise for CCMRF. We agree that these  efforts should help NORTHCOM and DOD continue to develop the CCMRF  exercise plan. We continue to believe that given the rapid response  requirement of the mission, the geographic dispersion of CCMRF units  (Active, Reserve, or National Guard), and the fact that these units do not  work together routinely underscore the importance of no-notice  deployment readiness exercises.
In response to our recommendation that DOD determine the time needed  by units to perform the necessary pre-mission CCMRF training, DOD  agreed and stated that it is developing guidance that will direct force  providers to facilitate NORTHCOM access to allocated CCMRF units       180 days prior to mission assumption to synchronize CBRNE training and  exercises. We continue to believe that allocating CCMRF units to  NORTHCOM rather than assigning them curtails the commander of  NORTHCOM’s ability to ensure adequate CCMRF training and monitor  readiness. However, we believe that if consistently implemented, the  guidance DOD describes will help DOD ensure that CCMRF units and their  parent commands can adequately plan for critical training.
In response to our recommendation that DOD examine sourcing options  for the CCMRF that would ensure that units had adequate time to train  prior to mission assumption once they had all required personnel and  equipment, DOD partially agreed. DOD stated that the Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff has responsibility for sourcing the CCMRFs and that  the services and the National Guard Bureau support the Joint Staff in this  responsibility. DOD stated that it is preparing guidance that will task  components to allocate properly equipped, manned, and trained forces to  NORTHCOM to accomplish the CCMRF mission. We believe that if  consistently implemented such guidance will help DOD components and  commands better plan for and conduct the necessary CCMRF training.  However, we believe that DOD should continue to assess the sourcing and  timing of CCMRF unit assignments with respect to force rotations to  DOD’s vital commitments overseas. Because the domestic CBRNE  consequence management mission is so different from DOD’s warfigthing  missions, it is all the more important to account for adequate time to train  for it.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that DOD determine the  total requirements for the CCMRF, including unique, nonstandard  equipment requirements for each type of unit that comprises the CCMRF,   and develop a plan on how those requirements will be filled. DOD stated  that NORTHCOM and the services are working on a Joint Mission- Essential Equipment List that defines CCMRF equipment requirements and  that NORTHCOM is working with the Army on procurement, storage, and  management of personal protective equipment for CCMRF units. We  believe that to the extent these efforts address standard and nonstandard  equipment needed by units designated for CCMRF, they should help DOD  provide more stable CCMRF equipment planning and reduce the  uncertainty of unit commanders about what equipment is needed but not  clearly identified in existing equipment lists. In addition, as we have  previously stated, we believe that DOD must identify all requirements for  CCMRF to provide decision makers with complete visibility over the status  of filling CCMRF requirements and to highlight potential risks.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that DOD develop an  overall funding strategy for establishing, fielding, and exercising the  CCMRF and designate a single focal point for coordinating this strategy.  DOD stated that it has developed a CCMRF funding strategy and that the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’  Security Affairs is the appropriate focal point for coordinating the funding  strategy for DOD assistance to civil authorities in response to a CBRNE  incident. DOD stated that the assistant secretary will examine, in  coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, secretaries of  the military services, and appropriate defense agencie, what additional  steps should be taken to streamline coordination of the CCMRF funding  strategy. DOD added that as the employer of the CCMRF during an actual  incident, NORTHCOM also plays a significant role. While we do not  believe DOD’s existing funding efforts constitute a complete CCMRF  funding strategy, particularly in light of all requirements not having been  defined, we agree that the steps DOD describes in further developing or  refining its funding strategy should help address the recommendation and  better assist DOD to plan for and oversee CCMRF preparedness.
DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary  of Homeland Security, and other interested parties. In addition, the report  will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has  planned for and structured its force to provide chemical, biological,  radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) consequence  management assistance, we met with DOD officials and reviewed DOD’s  plans to determine sourcing requirements for the CBRNE Consequence  Management Response Force (CCMRF). We reviewed the DOD, Northern  Command, Army North, Joint Task Force Civil Support, Army Forces  Command, and Army Reserve Command execution orders to determine  the requirements for the number of CCMRFs, planned response time  frames, force composition, sourcing, training, and readiness. We also  reviewed concept and operations plans for CBRNE. We discussed DOD’s  plans for providing units to CCMRF with officials from the Joint Forces  Command, Army Forces Command, Northern Command, Army North,  Joint Task Force Civil Support, U.S. Army Reserve Command, and the  National Guard Bureau. To determine DOD’s approved incremental  sourcing of the three CCMRFs, we interviewed officials from the Office of  the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’  Security Affairs and the Joint Staff to assess the CCMRF sourcing  requirements in structuring the force. We discussed with officials from the  U.S. Army Reserve Command, Joint Forces Command, Army Forces  Command, and Army North the sourcing requirements for CCMRF  technical support forces (which perform in the contaminated or hot zone)  and general support force to determine how units are selected for CCMRF  and to obtain perspectives on sourcing challenges. We also reviewed  documentation and interviewed National Guard Bureau officials to  determine its unit sourcing plans for future CCMRFs.
To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for CBRNE  consequence management operations and integrated plans with other  federal government plans, we met with officials from the Department of  Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and  the Joint Task Force Civil Support. For example, we met with the  Department of Homeland Security officials to discuss the interagency  process used to support planning for responding to a domestic incident.  Additionally, we met with Northern Command, Army North, and Joint  Task Force Civil Support to discuss their plans for supporting federal  CBRNE consequence management efforts and to discuss how their plans  are integrated with those of federal agencies that DOD will support and  reviewed plans, playbooks, and briefing documents that described DOD’s  responsibilities related to provided capabilities in support of others in  response to a CBRNE event. Further, we reviewed Joint Task Civil  Support playbooks relevant to each of the Department of Homeland  Security’s National Planning Scenarios to determine the extent to which  DOD has planned for CBRNE consequence management operations. We  reviewed relevant reports and documents that govern the national  response to disasters. We discussed with Department of Homeland  Security and Federal Emergency Management Agency official their efforts  to establish roles and responsibilities in response to a CBRNE event. We  also reviewed our prior work on national preparedness to determine the  status of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) efforts to  complete and integrate plans. We also reviewed the Department of  Homeland Security’s National Response Framework, National  Preparedness Guidelines, and Target Capabilities List to assess DOD’s  and other federal departments’ roles and responsibilities in providing  support to civil authorities in response to a CBRNE event.
To determine how prepared the CCMRF is to perform the CBRNE  consequence management mission, we compared existing DOD readiness  policies and practices to the practices for preparing CCMRF units and  plans for assessing and reporting mission readiness. We discussed these  issues with officials from the U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Army  Forces Command, U.S. Army Reserve Command, the Joint Staff, U.S.  Northern Command, and U.S. Army North. Further, we discussed the  assignment of forces and readiness reporting with officials at the U.S.  Joint Forces Command to assess the CCMRF sourcing priority  requirements and the readiness reporting guidance for designated units  assigned to the CCMRF mission. We also discussed with these officials  their plans for training and assessing the readiness of units designated for  CCMRF to determine CCMRF training and readiness certification and  validation requirements. In determining the requirements, we reviewed  pre-mission training, exercise, and validation guidance that was used to  assess unit readiness. We also reviewed training requirements and spoke  with officials to determine individual and unit mission-essential tasks  identified for CCMRF. We also reviewed our prior work on U.S. Northern  Command planning efforts for homeland defense and civil support to  assess mission-essential tasks previously reported for units assigned to the  CCMRF mission. Additionally, we reviewed the Defense Science Board’s  report, Unconventional Operational Concepts and the Homeland to  obtain their assessment of training and readiness of military units for the  domestic homeland security mission and recommendations for providing  realistic training and exercises. Further, we reviewed our prior work on  the Army’s overall training strategy to determine how it is supported by  the Army Force Generation Model and to determine the effect of overseas  deployments on the preparation for units designated for CCMRF.
We reviewed readiness briefings and mission readiness exercise lessons-  learned reports to determine pre-mission assumption validation  requirement challenges for task force units. To determine criteria for  training and readiness of designated units for the CCMRF mission, we  reviewed orders and plans that discussed individual, leader, and unit  training requirements and discussed those issues with Joint Staff,  Northern Command, Army North, Army Forces Command, and Army  Reserve Command officials. We also discussed with CCRMF unit officials  the guidance and resources that they were provided to prepare for the  mission to determine preparation challenges. These units were  judgmentally selected. While we cannot generalize the results of these  discussions to all units, they were selected to provide a cross section of  units from different services, from both the active and reserve forces, and  from units that will provide either specialized CBRNE capabilities or  general support capabilities.
To determine CCMRF fund planning and the linkage to mission  requirements, we met with officials from Northern Command, Army North,  Army Forces Command, and the Army Reserve Command to discuss  mission funding requirements and funding sources. We also reviewed  guidance and funding plans to determine efforts to develop CCMRF-unique  requirements and to identify the status of funding plans for meeting  requirements. We met with the National Guard Bureau to discuss their  current capabilities, identified shortfalls, and their approach to mitigate  any identifiable shortfalls. Further, we reviewed program-identified  funding shortfalls to determine the impact of planning, coordination, and  execution of homeland defense training and readiness exercises. We  discussed with unit officials the funding guidance that their units were  provided to meet the CCMRF mission and obtained their perspectives on  the extent to which additional specialized equipment beyond the units’  standard equipment would be needed to perform the CCMRF mission. We  also discussed funding requirements with officials from the Department of  the Army to determine long-term funding plans for units designated for the  CCMRF mission. We also met with U.S. Army Reserve Command officials  to determine equipment and training costs for general support and  commercial-off-the-shelf equipment costs for technical support units for  the CCMRF mission.
In addressing our objectives, we reviewed plans and related documents,  obtained information, and interviewed officials at the following locations:    United States Northern Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado   Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia    The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.    The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.   Joint Task Force Civil Support, Ft. Monroe, Virginia    U. S. Army North, Ft. Sam Houston, Texas    Army Forces Command, Ft. McPherson, Georgia    Army Reserve Command, Ft. McPherson, Georgia    National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia    Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C.    Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C.
We conducted our review from February 2008 to October 2009 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Davi M. D’Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Joseph Kirschbaum, Assistant  Director; Rodell Anderson; Sandra Burrell; David Fox; Joanne Landesman;  Greg Marchand; Robert Poetta; and Jason Porter made key contributions  to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise  Program, but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be  Improved. GAO-09-849. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.
National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to  Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts.  GAO-09-369. Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2009.
Emergency Management: Observations on DHS’ Preparedness for  Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-08-868T. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008.
National Response Framework: FEMA Needs Policies and Procedures to  Better Integrate Non-Federal Stakeholders in the Revision Process.   GAO-08-768. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008.
Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern  Command’s Coordination with States and the National Guards Bureau,  but Gaps Remain. GAO-08-252. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.
Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but  Needs to Address force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other  Issues. GAO-08-251. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.
Continuity of Operations: Selected Agencies Tested Various Capabilities  during 2006 Governmentwide Exercise. GAO-08-105. Washington, D.C.:  November 19, 2007.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Action to  Address Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion  Centers. GAO-07-1241T. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare  for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address  Related Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-1142T. Washington,  D.C.: July 31, 2007.
Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands’ Preparedness Efforts  Could Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk  Mitigation. GAO-07-696. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007.
Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters.   GAO-07-395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and  Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-903. Washington,  D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil  Support Teams’ M9ission and Address Management Challenges.   GAO-06-498. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the  Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-643.  Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the  Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-643.  Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.:  March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges  Associated with major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,  D.C.: February 23, 2006.
GAO’S Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response  to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.:  February 1, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All- Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.:  July 11, 2005.
Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport  Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.:  January 14, 2005.
Homeland Security: Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental  Cooperation Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable  Communications. GAO-04-740. Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for  Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related  Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.