Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel: Observations on the Key Attributes and Challenges of Storage and Disposal Options
Published: 2013-04-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Spent nuclear fuel, the used fuel removed from commercial nuclear power reactors, is one of the most hazardous substances created by humans. Commercial reactors have generated nearly 70,000 metric tons of spent fuel, which is currently stored at 75 reactor sites in 33 states, and this inventory is expected to more than double by 2055. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, directs DOE to investigate the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada--100 miles northwest of Las Vegas--to determine if the site is suitable for a permanent repository for this and other nuclear waste. DOE submitted a license application for the Yucca Mountain site to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2008, but in 2010 DOE suspended its licensing efforts and instead established a blue ribbon commission to study other options. The commission issued a report in January 2012 recommending a new strategy for managing nuclear waste, and DOE issued a new nuclear waste disposal strategy in 2013.
This testimony is primarily based on prior work GAO issued from November 2009 to August 2012 and updated with information from DOE. It discusses the key attributes and challenges of options that have been considered for storage or disposal of spent nuclear fuel.
GAO is making no new recommendations at this time.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In November 2009, GAO reported on the attributes and challenges of a Yucca Mountain repository. A key attribute identified was that the Department of Energy (DOE) had spent significant resources to carry out design, engineering, and testing activities on the Yucca Mountain site and had completed a license application and submitted it to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which has regulatory authority over the construction, operation, and closure of a repository. If the repository had been built as planned, GAO concluded that it would have provided a permanent solution for the nation's commercial nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste and minimized the uncertainty of future waste safety. Constructing the repository also could have helped address issues including federal liabilities resulting from industry lawsuits against DOE related to continued storage of spent nuclear fuel at reactor sites. However, not having the support of the administration and the state of Nevada proved a key challenge. As GAO reported in April 2011, DOE officials did not cite technical or safety issues with the Yucca Mountain repository project when the project's termination was announced but instead stated that other solutions could achieve broader support.
Temporarily storing spent fuel in a central location offers several positive attributes, as well as challenges, as GAO reported in November 2009 and August 2012. Positive attributes include allowing DOE to consolidate the nation's nuclear waste after reactors are decommissioned. Consolidation would decrease the complexity of securing and overseeing the waste located at reactor sites around the nation and would allow DOE to begin to address the taxpayer financial liabilities stemming from industry lawsuits. Interim storage could also provide the nation with some flexibility to consider alternative policies or new technologies. However, interim storage faces several challenges. First, DOE's statutory authority to develop interim storage is uncertain. Provisions in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, that allow DOE to arrange for centralized interim storage have either expired or are unusable because they are tied to milestones in repository development that have not been met. Second, siting an interim storage facility could prove difficult. Even if a community might be willing to host a centralized interim storage facility, finding a state that would be willing to host such a facility could be challenging, particularly since some states have voiced concerns that an interim facility could become a de facto permanent disposal site. Third, interim storage may also present transportation challenges since it is likely that the spent fuel would have to be transported twice--once to the interim storage site and once to a permanent disposal site. Finally, developing centralized interim storage would not ultimately preclude the need for a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel.
Siting, licensing, and developing a permanent repository at a location other than Yucca Mountain could provide the opportunity to find a location that might achieve broader acceptance, as GAO reported in November 2009 and August 2012, and could help avoid costly delays experienced by the Yucca Mountain repository program. However, developing an alternative repository would restart the likely costly and time-consuming process of developing a repository. It is also unclear whether the Nuclear Waste Fund--established under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, to pay industry's share of the cost for the Yucca Mountain repository--will be sufficient to fund a repository at another site.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on issues related to the  management of commercial spent nuclear fuel. Spent nuclear fuel—which  has been used and removed from the reactor core of a commercial  nuclear power plant—is considered one of the most hazardous  substances on earth, and without protective shielding, its intense  radioactivity can kill a person exposed directly to it within minutes, as well  as cause environmental contamination and long-term health hazards,  such as cancer, in those who receive smaller doses. As you know, the  Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) directed the Department of  Energy (DOE) to investigate sites for a federal deep geologic repository to  dispose of both civilian and defense-related spent nuclear fuel and other  high-level nuclear waste. DOE studied several sites throughout the  country. In May 1986, the Secretary of Energy recommended three  candidate sites for site characterization, including Yucca Mountain,  Nevada, and in 1987, Congress amended the act to direct DOE to focus  its efforts only on Yucca Mountain—a site about 100 miles northwest of  Las Vegas.
DOE began studying the Yucca Mountain site as early as 1978 and has  spent billions of dollars on this effort. Activities at the site have included  investigating the characteristics of the site through surface, underground,  and laboratory tests, as well as computer simulations; constructing a 25- foot diameter, 5-mile-long main tunnel, located 800 feet underground and  a smaller tunnel nearly 2 miles long; and developing and submitting an  application for a license to construct a nuclear waste repository. After  submitting the license application in 2008 to the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission, which has regulatory authority over the construction,  operation, and closure of a repository, DOE took steps to terminate the  Yucca Mountain repository program. DOE officials did not cite technical or  safety issues with the Yucca Mountain site but stated that it was no longer  a workable solution and that there are better solutions that can achieve a  broader national consensus. DOE established the Blue Ribbon  Commission on America’s Nuclear Future in 2010 to review policies for  managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, including nuclear waste  management approaches. Staff from the commission consulted with us  and used some of our prior work in their analysis.
In its January 2012 report, the Blue Ribbon Commission recommended a  strategy for managing nuclear waste with eight key elements. These  included a new, consent-based approach to siting future nuclear waste  management facilities; a new organization, rather than DOE, dedicated  solely to implementing the program and empowered with the authority  and resources to succeed; and prompt efforts to develop facilities both for  interim storage and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. According to the  commission’s report, an interim storage site should be developed first and  focus on the spent fuel that is stored at closed reactor sites where nothing  exists at the site except for the spent nuclear fuel. At the same time, the  nation could be developing a final repository, which is likely to take  decades to develop but that needs to be started in conjunction with any  interim plans. In January 2013, DOE issued a strategy for the  management of spent nuclear fuel, which used the Blue Ribbon  Commission’s recommendations as a starting point and endorsed the  commission’s key principles. In summary, DOE’s strategy includes a  consent-based approach to siting and implementing a waste  management system and consists of developing and making available a  pilot interim storage facility by 2021, a larger interim storage facility by  2025, and a geologic repository by 2048. DOE’s January 2013 spent  nuclear fuel strategy also stated that legislation should include  requirements for a third party to manage the nation’s spent nuclear fuel  program.
Over the past decade, we have issued several reports related to the  management of spent nuclear fuel.reports the safety and security of spent nuclear fuel; the benefits,   We assessed in the findings of these  challenges, and costs of the Yucca Mountain repository and two potential  alternatives; lessons learned from the past 30 years of spent nuclear fuel  management; alternative uses of the Yucca Mountain site and related  challenges; and the challenges of accumulating quantities of spent  nuclear fuel at reactor sites. This testimony is primarily based on prior  work GAO issued from November 2009 to August 2012 and updated with  information from DOE. It discusses the key attributes and challenges of  options that have been considered for storage or disposal of spent  nuclear fuel. A detailed description of our methodologies can be found in  our published reports. We conducted the performance audit work that  supports this testimony in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform audits to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the publication of a 1957 report by the National Academy of  Sciences, a geologic repository has been considered the safest and  most secure method of isolating spent nuclear fuel and other types of  nuclear waste from humans and the environment. During the 1950s and  1960s, managing spent nuclear fuel received relatively little attention from  policymakers. The early regulators and developers of nuclear power  viewed spent fuel disposal primarily as a technical problem that could be  solved when necessary by application of existing technology. Attempts  were made to reprocess the spent nuclear fuel, but they were not  successful because of economic issues and concerns that reprocessed  nuclear materials raised proliferation risks. The Atomic Energy  Commission, a predecessor to DOE, attempted to develop high-level  waste repositories in Kansas and New Mexico in the late 1960s and early  1970s, but neither succeeded because of local community and state  opposition. NWPA established the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and  high-level nuclear waste as a federal responsibility. Briefly, NWPA  provided for the development of two geologic repositories and directed  the Secretary of Energy to recommend three candidate sites and conduct  studies to characterize each site. This same process was to be used for a  second set of sites for the second repository. Table 1 summarizes some  of the key decisions and events just prior to and as a result of NWPA.
In the Secretary of Energy’s February 2002 recommendation to the  President that Yucca Mountain be developed as the site for an  underground repository for spent fuel and other radioactive wastes, the  Secretary described the three criteria to make the determination that  Yucca Mountain was the appropriate site. Specifically:  Is Yucca Mountain a scientifically and technically suitable site for a  repository?
Are there compelling national interests that favor proceeding with the  decision to site a repository there?
Are there countervailing considerations that would outweigh those  interests?
The Secretary also described the steps DOE had taken to inform  residents and others. Specifically, DOE held meetings in the vicinity of the  prospective site to inform the residents of the site’s consideration as a  repository and receive their comments, as directed by NWPA. The  Secretary added that DOE went beyond NWPA’s requirements for  providing notice and information prior to the selection of Yucca Mountain.  He concluded that the Yucca Mountain site was qualified as the site for  the repository and accordingly recommended the site to the President.
Since the Secretary’s recommendation was made, the nation’s inventory  of commercial spent nuclear fuel has continued to grow. The nation  currently has about 70,000 metric tons of commercial spent nuclear fuel  stored at 75 sites in 33 states (see fig. 1). This inventory is expected to  more than double by 2055—assuming that the nation’s current reactors  continue to produce spent nuclear fuel at the same rate and that no new  reactors are brought online, and that some decline in the generation of  spent fuel takes place as reactors are retired. Although some elements of  spent nuclear fuel cool and decay quickly, becoming less dangerous,  others remain dangerous to human health and the environment for tens of  thousands of years.
Most commercial spent nuclear fuel is stored at operating reactor sites; it  is immersed in pools of water designed to cool and isolate it from the  environment. Without a nuclear waste repository to move the spent  nuclear fuel to, the racks in the pools holding spent fuel have been  rearranged to allow for more dense storage of the spent fuel. Even with  this rearrangement, spent nuclear fuel pools are reaching their capacities.  As reactor operators have run out of space in their spent nuclear fuel  pools, they have turned increasingly to dry cask storage systems that  generally consist of stainless steel canisters placed inside larger stainless  steel or concrete casks. A dry storage facility typically consists of security  and safety mechanisms, such as a defensive perimeter with intrusion  detection devices and radiation monitors surrounding a concrete pad with  the dry storage casks emplaced on it. Regulatory requirements for  radiation exposure for this type of facility are significantly different from  those of a repository. For example, spent fuel need only be stored safely  for the life of the storage facility, currently 40 years, which is in contrast to  the 1 million year period for which safe storage must be demonstrated  under the Environmental Protection Agency regulation promulgated for  the Yucca Mountain repository. In August 2012, we reported that reactors  at nine sites have been retired and that seven of these sites have  completely removed spent fuel from their pools, as well as removing all  infrastructure except that needed to safeguard the spent fuel. Since then,  an eighth site has also emptied its pool, and is in the process of removing  associated infrastructure. These sites serve no other purpose than to  continue storing this spent fuel. As additional reactors retire, reactor  operators will likely move all their spent nuclear fuel to dry storage and  remove all other structures. We reported in November 2009 that experts  we spoke with stated that dry cask storage systems are expected to be  able to safely store spent nuclear fuel for at least 100 years. The experts  said that, if these systems degrade over time, the spent nuclear fuel may  have to be repackaged, which could require construction of new spent  nuclear fuel pools or other structures to safely transfer the spent nuclear  fuel to new storage systems. In addition, the experts said that spent fuel  in centralized interim storage could present future security risks because,  as spent fuel cools, it loses some of its self-protective qualities, potentially  making it a more attractive target for sabotage or theft.
NWPA also authorized DOE to contract with commercial nuclear reactor  operators to take custody of their spent nuclear fuel for disposal at the  repository beginning in January 1998. Ultimately, DOE was unable to  meet this 1998 date. As we reported in August 2012, because DOE did  not take custody of the spent fuel starting in 1998, as required under  NWPA, DOE reported that, as of September 2011, 76 lawsuits had been  filed against it by utilities to recover claimed damages resulting from the  delay. In August 2012, we reported that these lawsuits have resulted in a  cost to taxpayers of about $1.6 billion from the U.S. Treasury’s judgment  fund. We also reported that DOE estimated that future liabilities would   In November 2012,  total about an additional $21 billion through 2020.DOE reported that the cost to taxpayers is now $2.6 billion and that future  liabilities are now approximately $19.7 billion for a total of about $22.3  billion. DOE has also estimated that future liabilities may cost about $500  million each year after 2020.
section_title: Attributes and Challenges of the Yucca Mountain Repository
paragraphs: In November 2009, we reported on the attributes and challenges of a  Yucca Mountain repository. We reported that DOE had spent billions of  dollars for design, engineering, and testing activities for the Yucca  Mountain site and had submitted a license to the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission. If the repository had been built as planned, we stated that it  would have provided a permanent solution for the nation’s nuclear waste,  including commercial nuclear fuel, and would have minimized the  uncertainty of future waste safety. Based on a review of key documents  and interviews with DOE, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and  numerous other officials, we also reported in November 2009 that the  construction of a repository at Yucca Mountain could have allowed the  government to begin taking possession of the nuclear waste in about 10  to 30 years. DOE had reported in July 2008 that its best achievable date  for opening the repository, if it had received Nuclear Regulatory  Commission approval, would have been 2020. If the Yucca Mountain  repository was completed and operational sooner than one or more  temporary storage facilities or an alternative repository, it could have  helped address the federal liabilities resulting from industry lawsuits  related to continued storage of spent nuclear fuel at reactor sites. We also  reported in August 2012 that states and community groups had raised  concerns that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was extending the  licenses of current reactors or approving licenses for new reactors without  a long-term solution for the disposition of spent nuclear fuel. If Yucca  Mountain was licensed and constructed and began accepting spent  nuclear fuel for disposal by 2027, which was the earliest likely opening  date we estimated in our August 2012 report, some of these concerns  could have been addressed.
GAO-11-229. face challenges in reconstituting its work force. According to DOE,  contractor, and former DOE officials we spoke with, it could take years for  DOE to assemble the right mix of experts to restart work on the license  application. When DOE terminated its licensing efforts, many of the  federal and contractor staff working on the program retired or moved on  to other jobs. Third, project funding could continue to be a challenge. As  we reported, DOE’s budget for the Yucca Mountain repository program  was not predictable because annual appropriations varied by as much as  20 percent from year to year. We recommended that Congress consider a  more predictable funding mechanism for the project, which the Blue  Ribbon Commission also recommended in its January 2012 report.
section_title: Attributes and Challenges of Centralized Interim Storage
paragraphs: We reported in November 2009 on several positive attributes of  centralized interim storage—a near-term temporary storage alternative for  managing the spent fuel that has accumulated and will continue to  accumulate. First, centralized interim storage could allow DOE to  consolidate the nation’s nuclear waste after reactors are  decommissioned, thereby decreasing the complexity of securing and  overseeing the waste located at reactor sites around the nation and  increasing the efficiency of waste storage operations. Second, by moving  spent nuclear fuel from decommissioned reactor sites to DOE’s  centralized interim storage facility and taking custody of the spent fuel,  DOE would begin to address the taxpayer financial liabilities stemming  from industry lawsuits. Third, centralized interim storage could prevent  utilities from having to build additional dry storage to store nuclear waste  at operating reactor sites. Fourth, centralized interim storage could also  provide the nation with some flexibility to consider alternative policies or  new technologies by giving more time to consider alternatives and  implement them. For example, centralized interim storage would keep  spent fuel in a safe, easily accessible configuration for future recycling, if  the nation decided to pursue recycling as a management option in the  future.
However, centralized interim storage also presents challenges. First, as  we reported in November 2009 and August 2012, a key challenge  confronting centralized interim storage is the uncertainty of DOE’s  statutory authority to provide centralized storage. Provisions in NWPA  that allow DOE to arrange for centralized storage have either expired or  are unusable because they are tied to milestones in repository  development that have not been met. It is not clear what other authority  DOE or an independent entity might use for providing centralized interim  storage of spent nuclear fuel. A second, equally important, challenge is  the likelihood of opposition during site selection for a centralized interim  storage facility. As we reported in November 2009, even if a community  might be willing to host such a facility, finding a state that would be willing  to host it could be extremely challenging, particularly since some states  have voiced concerns that a centralized interim facility could become a de  facto permanent disposal site. In 2011, the Western Governors  Association passed a resolution stating that no centralized interim storage  facility for spent nuclear fuel can be established in a western state without  the expressed written consent of the governors. Third, centralized interim  storage may also present transportation challenges. As we reported in  August 2012, it is likely that the spent fuel would have to be transported  twice—once to the centralized interim storage site and once to a  permanent disposal site. The total distance over which the spent fuel  would have to be transported would likely be greater than with other  alternatives. The Nuclear Energy Institute has reported that of all the  spent fuel currently in dry storage, only about 30 percent is directly  transportable because of its current heat load, particularly since the  nuclear industry packaged some spent nuclear fuel in dry storage  containers to maximize storage capacity. We also reported in August  2012 that officials from a state regional organization that we spoke with  said that transportation planning could be a complex endeavor, potentially  taking 10 years to reach agreement on transportation routes and safety  and security procedures. Fourth, although DOE had previously estimated  that it could site, license, construct, and begin operations of a centralized  interim storage facility within 6 years, it could take considerably longer  depending on how long it takes to find a willing state and community, as  well as license and construct the facility. Finally, as we reported in  November 2009, developing centralized interim storage would not  ultimately preclude the need for final disposal of the spent nuclear fuel.
section_title: Attributes and Challenges of a Permanent Repository at a Location Other Than Yucca Mountain
paragraphs: As we reported in November 2009, siting, licensing, and developing a  permanent repository at a location other than Yucca Mountain could  provide the opportunity to find a location that might achieve broader  acceptance than the Yucca Mountain repository program. If a more widely  accepted approach or site is identified, it carries the potential for avoiding  costly delays experienced by the Yucca Mountain repository program. In  addition, a new approach that involves a new entity for spent fuel  management, as we concluded in our April 2011 report and the Blue  Ribbon Commission recommended in January 2012, could add to  transparency and consensus building.
However, there are also key challenges to developing an alternative  repository. First, as we reported in April 2011, developing a repository  other than Yucca Mountain will restart the likely time-consuming and  costly process of siting, licensing, and developing a repository. We  reported that DOE had spent nearly $15 billion on the Yucca Mountain   It is not yet clear how much it will ultimately cost to begin the  project.process again and develop a repository at another location. Moreover, it  is uncertain what legislative changes might be needed, if any, in part  because the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended, directs DOE to  terminate all site specific activities at candidate sites other than Yucca  Mountain. Second, it is unclear whether the Nuclear Waste Fund will be  sufficient to fund a repository at another site. The fund was established  under NWPA to pay industry’s share of the cost for the Yucca Mountain  repository and was funded by a fee of one-tenth of a cent per kilowatt- hour of nuclear-generated electricity. The fund paid about 65 percent, or  about $9.5 billion, of the expenditure for Yucca Mountain. According to  DOE’s fiscal year 2012 financial report, the Nuclear Waste Fund currently  has about $29 billion and grows by over $1 billion each year from  accumulated fees and interest. However, utilities only pay into the fund for  as long as their reactors are operating, and it is not clear how much  longer reactor operators will be paying into the fund. For example, two  utilities have announced plans—one in 2010 and the other in 2013—to  shut down two reactor sites prior to their license expiration. As reactors  are retired, they will need to be replaced by new reactors paying into the  fund, or according to DOE officials, the fund might be drawn down faster  than it can be replenished when developing a new repository.
When more comprehensive information becomes available both about the  process that DOE, or another agency, will be using to select a site and  possible locations for a permanent repository, additional positive  attributes as well as challenges may also come to light.
Chairman Frelinghuysen, Ranking Member Kaptur, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony,  please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this statement. Janet Frisch, Assistant Director,  and Kevin Bray, Robert Sánchez, and Kiki Theodoropoulos made key  contributions to this testimony.
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