Bureau of Prisons: Improved Evaluations and Increased Coordination Could Improve Cell Phone Detection
Published: 2011-09-06T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The rates Bureau of Prisons (BOP) inmates pay to make phone calls generate revenue that funds inmate wages and other amenities; however, inmates' contraband cell phone use is growing. The Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 criminalized cell phone possession in federal prisons and mandated that GAO study related issues. In response to the mandate, this report addresses (1) how telephone rates for BOP inmates compare with other correctional systems and the implications of lowering rates; (2) the number of cell phones confiscated in BOP and selected states, and any reported impact; and (3) the extent to which BOP and selected states have taken actions to minimize cell phone smuggling, these actions' effectiveness, and how BOP has coordinated internal and state information sharing. GAO reviewed BOP's policies, procedures, and cell phone confiscation data (2008-2010). GAO also interviewed BOP officials within BOP's 6 regions and 4 of its 116 institutions--as well as officials from 8 state correctional departments--selected for their cell phone detection efforts or challenges faced. The results are not generalizable, but provide insights.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: BOP's rates for inmate telephone calls typically are lower than selected state and military branch systems that also use telephone revenues to support inmate activities; lowering rates would have several implications. Inmates would benefit from the ability to make cheaper phone calls, but lower rates could result in less revenue and lower profits, and therefore fewer funds available for inmate wages and recreational activities. According to BOP officials, when inmates have fewer opportunities for physical activity, idleness increases, and the risk of violence, escapes, and other disruptions also rises. BOP and selected states confiscated thousands of cell phones in 2010, and these entities believe that rising inmate cell phone use threatens institutional safety and expands criminal activity. All of the BOP officials, as well as officials from all eight of the state departments of correction with whom GAO spoke, cited cell phones as a major security concern, given the potential the phones provide for inmates to have unmonitored conversations that could further criminal activity, such as selling drugs or harassing other individuals. BOP and selected states have taken actions to address contraband cell phone use in their correctional institutions, but BOP could better evaluate existing technologies to maximize its investment decisions. BOP screens visitors and staff to detect contraband and has also tested multiple cell-phone detection technologies. However, BOP has not developed evaluation plans for institutional use to measure the effectiveness of these tests, which could help ensure that such tests generate information needed to make effective policy decisions. Moreover, while BOP has shared detection strategies with state agencies to some extent, BOP's regional offices have only had limited interaction with states, and could increase coordination and knowledge sharing to better identify and benefit from other strategies being used. This is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified - law enforcement sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2011. Information that the Department of Justice deemed sensitive has been omitted.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that BOP's Director formulate evaluation plans for cell phone detection technology to aid decision making, require use of these plans, and enhance regional collaboration with states. The Department of Justice concurred with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Bureau of Prisons (BOP) provides  telephone service to federal inmates to facilitate their contact with family  and friends and to help maintain inmates’ ties to the community.  Research has shown that such contact reduces the likelihood of inmates’  return to prison once they complete their sentences. BOP records  inmates’ calls and charges inmates rates for telephone use. In recent  years, there have been rising incidents of federal and state inmates using  contraband cell phones to circumvent correctional institutions’ telephone  systems. Some prisoner advocates believe that inmates are increasingly  using contraband cell phones because of the rates correctional  institutions charge for telephone service. However, by circumventing the  correctional institutions’ telephone systems, inmates also avoid the  monitoring of their calls, and a number of reports have demonstrated that  inmates are smuggling in cell phones to coordinate criminal activity, such  as drug sales, assault, and murder. Various federal entities and state  departments of corrections (DOC) have voiced concerns over the  increasing number of contraband cell phones in correctional institutions,  stressing the potential for these devices to facilitate further criminal  misconduct. To help address this issue, the Cell Phone Contraband Act of  2010 criminalized possession of cell phones in federal prisons by defining  them as a “prohibited object” punishable by a fine or imprisonment for not  more than 1 year or both.
The Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 also mandated that we study  both telephone rates and contraband cell phones in prisons. Thus, this  report addresses the following questions:  1. How do BOP’s inmate telephone rates compare to those charged by  other correctional systems; how does BOP use the revenues generated  by its telephone charges; and what are the implications of lowering its  rates?  2. How many cell phones have been confiscated within BOP and selected  state institutions, and what is the reported impact, if any, of cell phone  use on overall prison security and criminal activity?  3. To what extent have BOP and selected state prisons taken actions to  prevent or minimize cell phone smuggling and use; what is known about  the actions’ effectiveness; and how has BOP coordinated information  sharing internally and with states?
This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we  provided to you. DOJ deemed some of the information in the prior report  as sensitive but unclassified - law enforcement sensitive, which must be  protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits sensitive  information about methods by which cell phones are smuggled into  prisons. In addition, at DOJ’s request, we have omitted information  regarding BOP conclusions on strategies tested and implemented by  BOP to address cell phone smuggling and use. Although the information  provided in this report is more limited in scope, it addresses the same  questions as the sensitive report. Also, the overall methodology used for  both reports is the same.
To determine how BOP’s prison telephone rates compare to those  charged by other correctional systems, BOP’s use of telephone revenues,  and the implications of lowering rates, we reviewed BOP’s policies and  procedures related to its inmate telephone system, the costs and  revenues of this system, the rates BOP charges inmates, inmate  amenities funded through the system, and data on phone services from  2008 through 2010. We also interviewed and gathered data from BOP  management—including officials with the BOP Trust Fund, which  manages the finances of the inmate telephone system—as well as  officials with the Department of Defense, which also provides phone  services to inmates, in order to determine how their rates compare with  those charged by BOP. In addition, from March through June 2011, we  gathered and analyzed data on inmate telephone rates from eight  selected state DOCs.
To learn more about the level of prison cell phone confiscations, and  inmates’ cell phone use and implications, we collected data on cell phone  confiscations for all BOP institutions and the same eight selected state  correctional systems for 2008 through 2010. We obtained information  from relevant officials about the steps taken to ensure the accuracy of all  of the above data and found the data to be sufficiently reliable for our  purposes. We also interviewed BOP officials in the Correctional Programs  Division, which is responsible for ensuring a safe institutional  environment; BOP’s Office of Security Technology (OST), which identifies  and evaluates security technology equipment within BOP, among other  things; and each of BOP’s six regions and four of its institutions. We  selected these institutions based on specific technologies adopted to  defeat cell phones, as well as other challenges posed by inmate  communications. In addition, we interviewed officials from eight state  DOCs. The views of the officials from these BOP institutions and state  departments are not generalizable to other BOP institutions or states, but  do provide valuable insights into issues surrounding cell phones in  prisons. We also researched state laws to gain an understanding of the  types of state statutory provisions that have been adopted to penalize  possession or smuggling of contraband cell phones.
To determine actions being taken to prevent or minimize cell phone  smuggling, the effectiveness of these actions, and BOP’s coordination of  information sharing, we interviewed and gathered documents from  officials in BOP’s OST, regional offices, and our selected institutions to  learn about agency efforts in testing and evaluating cell phone detection  equipment and how it shares such information internally. We then  compared these efforts with BOP’s program statements governing  technology evaluations, as well as GAO’s internal control standards and  GAO criteria on evaluation plans for new technology tests and  collaboration with other agencies. We also interviewed state correctional  department officials and met with a nonprobability sample of officials from  DOJ’s National Institute of Justice (NIJ); NIJ’s National Law Enforcement  and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC) system; the Federal  Communications Commission (FCC); the Department of Commerce’s  National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA); the  Association of State Correctional Administrators (ASCA); CTIA-the  Wireless Association; and two companies that make cell phone detection  and defeat equipment. We identified these agencies and organizations  based on their involvement in combating contraband cell phones, such as  taking part in public forums to discuss the issue. The views of those  representing these agencies are not generalizable, but they provide  valuable insights.
We conducted this work from August 2010 to September 2011 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: As a component of DOJ, BOP’s mission, in part, is to protect society by  confining federal offenders in the controlled environments of prisons and  community-based institutions that are safe, humane, cost-effective, and  appropriately secure. In fiscal year 2010, BOP oversaw more than  209,000 inmates, housing more than 170,000 of these inmates in its 116  institutions and relying on privately managed secure institutions;  residential reentry centers, also known as halfway houses; bed space  secured through agreements with state and local entities; and home  confinement to secure the rest. In fiscal year 2011, approximately   $6.4 billion was appropriated for BOP to carry out its mission.
subsections: section_title: Features of BOP’s Inmate Telephone System
paragraphs: While there is no specific statutory provision requiring BOP to provide  inmates with telephone services or privileges, BOP extends telephone  privileges to inmates and asserts that telephone privileges help inmates  maintain family and community ties and facilitate the reintegration of  inmates into society upon release from prison. However, limitations and  conditions may be imposed upon an inmate’s telephone privileges to  ensure that these are consistent with other aspects of BOP’s correctional  management responsibilities. For example, the length of telephone calls  is generally limited to 15 minutes, and the warden may restrict or suspend  temporarily an inmate’s regular telephone privilege when there is  reasonable suspicion that the inmate has acted in a way that threatens  the safety, security, or good order of the institution, or the protection of  the public. For many years, BOP provided inmates with collect-call  service only—whereby the receiving party, and not the inmate, bore the  cost of the call. In 1988, BOP began to shift to its current Inmate  Telephone System (ITS), which provides both a collect call and a direct- dial option, emphasizing inmates’ financial responsibility and reducing the  burden on others of inmates’ calls.
BOP personnel within the individual prisons maintain the ITS. Specifically,  BOP staff are responsible for installing, maintaining, and repairing the  telephone system. Vendors provide the hardware and software that  enable ITS, also known as TRUFONE, to perform the following:    use voice recognition to identify inmates placing calls;    provide each inmate with a “personal access code,” which allows  inmates’ TRUFONE accounts to be debited for the cost of their calls;  check the inmate’s TRUFONE account to make sure the inmate has  sufficient funds for a one-minute phone call;          deny particular inmates access to telephones as warranted; and   terminate all prison telephone service if security needs dictate.  record all calls automatically;  restrict inmates’ calls to numbers on the inmates’ contact lists;  require placement of calls only from specific telephones;  In addition to direct-dial telephone service, BOP has recently made e-mail  available to inmates in all of its institutions through an electronic- messaging system. Through this electronic-messaging system, inmates  can communicate with a list of contacts, but they cannot access the  Internet. Both inmates and persons in the community with whom they  correspond must consent to having all incoming and outgoing electronic  messages monitored and retained by staff.
section_title: BOP’s Trust Fund and the Inmate Amenities It Supports
paragraphs: BOP established commissaries to allow inmates to purchase items not  issued by prisons. Inmates purchase commissary items with funds  available in individual inmate accounts managed by BOP. Funds are  placed into these accounts by friends and family members (through  BOP), or may be earned as wages through work performed in Federal  Prison Industries or other on-site work at an institution (e.g., food service,  laundry). In 1998, the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency  Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 provided BOP with the authority  to accept revenues and make expenditures from the Commissary Fund of  the Federal Prison System in order to pay for ITS as well as other  prisoner amenities. This authorized trust fund is a self-sustaining  revolving fund account in which BOP deposits revenues generated by  inmate telephone charges through ITS and pays the expenses of ITS  operations—rather than through appropriations. BOP uses the profits (the  amount of revenue that exceeds expenses) from operating the inmate  telephone service, as well as those from the commissary and other  services, to provide inmate amenities, such as employment opportunities  and educational and recreational activities, that are not currently  supported through appropriations. By providing amenities like these  through telephone system profits, BOP is similar to other federal  correctional institutions like those within the Department of Defense. In  particular, the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps all charge inmates  rates above cost for telephone service. The Navy uses the profits to  provide items or activities, such as movies and sports contests, for the  benefit of the inmates exclusively, while the Army and the Marine Corps  use the funds to provide amenities to all persons on the base.
section_title: The Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 and BOP’s Process for Addressing Cell Phone Possession
paragraphs: In August 2010, the Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 was passed and  amended 18 U.S.C. § 1791 to prohibit an inmate of a prison from  possessing, obtaining, or attempting to obtain a cell phone. The Cell  Phone Contraband Act also provided for punishing such possession with  a fine or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both. BOP stated that  cell phones are considered hazardous tools, as defined by BOP policy as  tools most likely to be used in an escape attempt or to serve as weapons  capable of doing serious bodily harm to others; or those hazardous to  institutional security or personal safety. According to officials in BOP’s  Correctional Programs Division, when an inmate is caught with a cell  phone, an incident report is filed and the inmate is subject to BOP’s  disciplinary process, which involves an administrative hearing. The  inmate ultimately could face a range of sanctions from transfer to a  higher-security institution to loss of “good time” or other privileges. BOP  may refer the case to a law enforcement agency with criminal  investigative authority for investigation, and/or to the local U.S. Attorney’s  Office, which maintains discretion for prosecution.
section_title: Other Federal Agencies’ Roles in Exploring and Addressing Contraband Cell Phone Issue
paragraphs: In addition to BOP, various federal agencies serve as key stakeholders in  exploring and addressing the illicit use of cell phones in federal and state  prisons. For example, DOJ’s National Institute of Justice (NIJ)  coordinates subject matter experts into three technical working groups to  address, among other topics, illicit cell phone use. Further, at its 2010  National Conference, NIJ convened a plenary panel to discuss the  detection and defeat of cell phone use in prisons. NIJ also funds the  National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center  (NLECTC) system, which assists state, local, tribal, and federal  correctional agencies, as well as law enforcement and criminal justice  agencies, in addressing technology needs and challenges, such as  contraband cell phones.
NIJ also hopes to soon establish an interagency working group with  representatives from BOP, the Federal Communications Commission  (FCC), and the National Telecommunications and Information  Administration (NTIA), to continue working on solutions to overcome illicit  cell phone use in prisons, subject to the availability of funds. In  particular, the FCC maintains an important role in combating illicit cell  phone use in prisons because the FCC, in general, executes and  enforces the provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, which  prohibits nonfederal entities—such as state correctional institutions—from  intentionally interfering with or blocking radio communications signals,  which include cell phone transmissions. In addition, NTIA is a critical  partner for the research capacity it possesses. Specifically, in December  2009, Congress directed NTIA, in coordination with BOP, FCC, and NIJ,  to develop a plan to investigate and evaluate how wireless jamming,  detection, and other technologies might be used for corrections  applications in federal and state prison institutions. In response to this  congressional direction, in May 2010, NTIA issued a Notice of Inquiry  seeking public comment on “technologies that would significantly reduce  or eliminate contraband cell phone use without negatively affecting  commercial wireless and public safety services … in areas surrounding  prisons.” These technologies include the following:    Jammers: Devices that transmit on the same radio frequencies as  cell phones, disrupting the communication link between the phone  and the cell phone tower, essentially rendering the cell phone  unusable until the jamming stops.    Managed access systems: Those that intercept, or re-route, certain  cell phone calls (i.e., unauthorized calls that inmates attempt) away  from carrier networks, preventing them from reaching towers and  completing the call.    Detection systems/devices: Those that locate, track, or identify  unauthorized cell phones by, for example, scanning frequencies within  correctional institutions to detect the location of a caller.
After analyzing the comments it received, NTIA issued observations on  advantages and disadvantages of each of these strategies, as detailed in  appendix I. NTIA also reported that prison officials should be able to use  technology for combating prison cell phone use while not disrupting public  safety and federal government entities’ use of spectrum or citizens’ use of  airwaves for cell phone communications.
section_title: States and Nonfederal Entities’ Roles
paragraphs: A number of states have expressed concerns over threats posed by  contraband cell phones in their correctional institutions and sought out  both independent solutions and federal assistance. In particular, during  2009, officials from 31 state and 2 regional (i.e., city-based) prison  systems requested that the FCC initiate rulemaking to permit jamming of  commercial mobile radio services (which would include cell phone  signals) within correctional institutions. Also, officials from Texas and  Maryland correctional departments have testified before Congress about  the dangers posed by cell phones in prisons and to support passage of a  bill known as the Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009.
States have implemented different means to define the legality of cell  phone possession in prisons. Some states have specific statutory  provisions making it illegal for inmates to possess cell phones while  incarcerated in a state prison institution, while other states have  statutorily defined cell phones to be contraband that is prohibited within a  state prison institution. In addition, there are other states that have  general statutory provisions banning contraband and allow the  department of corrections to define what items are contraband  administratively.
In addition, the Association of State Correctional Administrators (ASCA)— an organization comprised of both BOP and state correctional officials  that seeks to improve correctional services and practices—has been  active in studying the issue of cell phones in prisons. For example, in July  2010, ASCA hosted a symposium to discuss the problem of cell phone  smuggling and potential solutions to address the issue.
section_title: BOP Telephone Rates Typically Are Less Than Other Correctional Systems’ Rates and Fund Inmate Wages and Recreation; Lowering Rates Would Decrease Costs for Inmate Calls but Could Reduce Revenue
paragraphs: BOP’s rates for inmate telephone calls typically are lower than selected  states’ and military branch systems that also use inmate telephone  revenue to support inmate amenities, and lowering rates would have  several implications. BOP charges inmates $0.06 per minute for local  calls and $0.23 per minute for long distance calls, with no connection  charge. BOP sets its rates to cover the cost of operating the telephone  system and to generate profits, which BOP uses to provide the majority of  funding for inmate amenities—the most significant of which are wages for  inmate employment and expenses associated with inmate recreational  activities. If BOP reduced inmate telephone rates, inmates would benefit  from the ability to make less expensive phone calls. However, lower rates  also could result in less revenue, lower profits, and therefore fewer funds  available for inmate wages and other amenities, unless BOP recovers  these funds through other sources. According to BOP officials, when  inmates have fewer opportunities for physical activity, idleness increases  and the risk of violence, escapes, and other disruptions also rises.
subsections: section_title: BOP’s Inmate Telephone Rates Typically Are Less Than Those Charged by Other Correctional Systems That Also Fund Inmate Amenities
paragraphs: Currently, for direct dial calls, BOP charges inmates per minute rates of  $0.06 for local calls and $0.23 for long distance calls with no connection  charge. For collect calls, both local and long distance, BOP charges a  connection fee and per minute charge. The rates that BOP charges  inmates for a 15-minute direct-dial local call typically are lower than rates  charged by most other correctional systems, such as state systems and  Department of Defense military prisons that also use telephone system  revenue to help finance prisoner amenities. As illustrated by table 1, a  direct dial long distance call lasting 15 minutes would cost a BOP inmate  significantly less than if he or she made that call in most other selected  comparable correctional systems.
In fiscal year 2010, BOP’s inmate telephone system generated  approximately $74 million in revenue, cost approximately $39 million to  operate, and showed a profit of approximately $34 million. Records  provided by BOP for the first quarters of 2009, 2010 and 2011 indicated  that inmates’ long distance calls generated more than 90 percent of  BOP’s telephone revenues. According to BOP officials, over the past  12–18 months, the inmate telephone service has generated significantly  less revenue as inmates purchased more local minutes and fewer long  distance minutes. Figure 1—which shows the local and long distance  phone minutes used and phone-system revenues for the first quarters of  2009, 2010, and 2011—illustrates this trend.
BOP officials attribute this shift from long distance to local minute calls to  the emergence of technology that allows inmates’ friends and family who  do not live within the inmates’ local calling area to acquire telephone  numbers local to the inmates’ prison locations. As a result, long distance  calls that previously cost inmates $0.23 per minute can now be made for  the local rate of $0.06 per minute—a savings of more than 70 percent on  a 15-minute call. BOP officials told us that this trend has prompted them  to consider eliminating the distinction between local and long distance call  rates and instead set a uniform price for calls of either type that would fall  somewhere between the current local and long distance rates. According  to officials, this would lower rates for approximately 84 percent of the calls  made by inmates that are long distance. BOP officials told us that while  they anticipate losing some of the revenue generated by long distance  minutes, they believe the sale of access minutes for their electronic  messaging system, which has recently become available in all federal  prisons, will compensate for some lost revenue. BOP officials told us  that the number of electronic message minutes sold in 2010, at $0.05 per  minute, was more than twice the number sold in 2009, and they expect  even more minutes to be sold in 2011.
With respect to telephone system costs, in fiscal year 2010, BOP spent  approximately $39 million to operate the telephone system. About   $9.7 million of this amount covered the costs of the telephone system’s  physical resources, including hardware and software, which were  purchased through competitively bid, governmentwide contracts. Just  over $22 million covered labor costs, including technical, operational, and  administrative costs of the inmate telephone system at each of the  institutions. Another $7.5 million covered personnel salaries and benefits  of headquarters staff, who provide administration and program  management, including policy and procedures development, and training.
BOP’s telephone system generated more than $34 million in profits in  fiscal year 2010. Since BOP both receives and disburses money to pay  for telephone service operations through its Trust Fund, profits from  telephone service are also retained therein. In fiscal year 2010, BOP’s  Trust Fund had total revenues, which included collections from BOP’s  commissary services, of $331 million. After paying all related costs for  phones and commissary provisions, there were Trust Fund revenues in  excess of expenses of over $46 million and BOP’s phone service was  responsible for $34 million, or 74 percent of this amount, while Trust Fund  profits from all other sources amounted to almost $12 million, as shown in  figure 2.
BOP officials told us that BOP uses revenue from its Trust Fund to pay for  various inmate amenities, such as wages to inmates and recreational  materials—as illustrated by table 2. However, by law, there are some  specific inmate amenities, among other items, that cannot be purchased  with Trust Fund revenues. BOP officials told us that all aspects of  BOP’s work are audited annually by an independent auditing and  accounting firm, including BOP’s financial records; officials told us that  BOP has been certified as in compliance since 1999.
Lowering the rates it charges inmates for phone calls would have several  implications for BOP and inmates. The primary advantage would be that  inmates would incur lower costs for making calls. This could possibly  encourage greater communication between inmates and their families,  which BOP has stated facilitates the reintegration of inmates into society  upon release from prison. In contrast, reducing inmate telephone rates  could also have some disadvantages. BOP officials told us that lowered  rates would likely result in lower revenues for the Trust Fund and  therefore less profit, unless some provision was made to replace the lost  revenue. With fewer profits, BOP would have less Trust Fund money to  spend on inmate amenities. As a result, unless BOP recouped these  revenues from other sources, BOP would have to reduce the wages it  pays inmates for their labor and/or scale back the number and type of  other educational and recreational activities it currently offers using  revenue from the Trust Fund. According to BOP officials, such reductions  could make prisons more dangerous to manage and more expensive to  operate. For example, BOP officials said that inmates perform electrical  work, which keeps prisons well lighted, as well as janitorial services,  which preserve order and cleanliness—both of which contribute to  institutional safety and reduce inmate idleness. According to BOP  officials, inmate idleness increases the risk of violence, escapes, and  other disruptions. BOP officials also reported that inmate work  programs—which teach inmates, many of whom have never held a  traditional job before, work skills and a work ethic (e.g., coming to work on  time, taking directions from a supervisor, working effectively with co- workers)—can help inmates assimilate back into society upon completion  of their prison sentence. This helps to reduce recidivism and thus  contributes to public safety.
If BOP wanted to lower inmate telephone rates while maintaining the  current level of inmate services, BOP could explore one of two  approaches: (1) recoup lost revenue resulting from lowered telephone  rates by increasing prices inmates pay for other services, such as  commissary items or electronic messaging system access, or (2) seek  authorization allowing BOP’s general appropriation to be available for  inmate amenities in addition to the funds from the Trust Fund. Regarding  the first approach, BOP officials told us that they already receive inmate  complaints related to current commissary prices, and as a result, the  officials indicated reluctance to choose this option. In addition, raising  commissary prices could result in inmates purchasing fewer items, and  coupled with decreased telephone rates, overall Trust Fund revenues  could decline, resulting in less funding available for inmate amenities,  including wages. With respect to the second approach, if BOP reduced  rates for telephone service and was given authority to replace the lost  revenue with its appropriations, BOP could maintain both the inmate  wage rate and the type and variation of inmate activity, and keep the  prices inmates pay for other services from increasing. However, to  accomplish this, BOP would have to seek authorization allowing BOP’s  general appropriation to be available for inmate amenities, in addition to  the funds from the Trust Fund. BOP officials told us they did not think  this option was a realistic possibility, as they do not believe Congress  would appropriate money for prisoner amenities.
section_title: BOP and Selected States Confiscated Thousands of Cell Phones in 2010 and Believe That Rising Inmate Cell Phone Usage Threatens Institutional Safety and Expands Criminal Activity
paragraphs: BOP and officials from most of the selected states we contacted reported  increases in the numbers of cell phones confiscated at prisons over the  last 3 to 4 years and cite cell phone use as a security concern. All of the  BOP officials, as well as officials from all eight of the states’ DOCs with  whom we spoke, cited cell phones as a major security concern, given the  potential the phones provide for inmates to have unmonitored  conversations that could further criminal activity, such as selling drugs or  harassing other individuals.
subsections: section_title: BOP’s and Selected States’ Cell Phone Confiscations Have Increased in the Last 2 Years
paragraphs: BOP has tracked the number of cell phones confiscated at its institutions,  by prison camp and secure institutions, since 2008. Table 3 shows that  the number of cell phones confiscated has increased each of the last 2  years. As the data also illustrate, over three-fourths (77 percent) of all cell  phones confiscated at BOP institutions are found at prison camps, or  “minimum security” institutions—this despite the fact that prison camps  have accounted for only about 13 percent of BOP’s inmate population  from fiscal years 2008-2010. Prison camps typically are located adjacent  to larger, higher-security institutions but are usually not surrounded by  perimeter fencing. In some instances, camps are located very near local  roads or wooded areas.
To illustrate the extent of the problem at one federal correctional complex,  figure 3 shows cell phones confiscated by BOP from a federal prison and  its adjacent work camp over a 1-year period.
Officials from BOP’s Correctional Programs Division and three of the six  regions that we spoke with attribute the rise in confiscated cell phones to  the ease of availability of small, low cost cell phones that allow inmates to  carry on unmonitored conversations with the desired contacts. In addition,  officials we interviewed from two of the six regions also cited increasingly  stringent search procedures by staff at some prisons resulting in a greater  number of cell phone confiscations. Correctional Programs Division  officials added that a combination of easier access to cheaper cell  phones, better awareness by staff conducting contraband searches, and  better collection of intelligence have all contributed to these increases, but  it is difficult to determine how much each factor has resulted in increased  cell phone confiscations.
We selected and obtained information from eight states during the course  of our review, and these selected states in general are also dealing with  increasing numbers of contraband cell phones, as shown in table 4.  Some of these selected states maintain cell phone confiscations in the  aggregate and have not broken it out by camps as compared to secure  institutions.
The types of institutions in which most cell phones are found varied  among the states we contacted. For example, officials we interviewed  from two of the eight states indicated that based on their experience,  most phones were found in prison camps, while officials from five other  states said that their states have confiscated greater numbers of cell  phones in more secure institutions. Officials from the eighth state said the  number of cell phones found in camps and secure institutions was about  equal. Three states also attribute the increase in cell phone confiscations  to the availability of smaller, cheaper cell phones and additional search  and detection efforts they have employed to identify cell phones.
section_title: BOP and Officials from Selected States Reported That Contraband Cell Phones Can Threaten the Safety within Institutions and Expand Criminal Activity
paragraphs: Officials we contacted from BOP’s Correctional Programs Division, six  regional offices, and four institutions—as well as from each of the eight  states we selected for our review—all cited contraband cell phones as an  issue of serious concern. According to BOP officials in particular, inmates  with cell phones are able to circumvent the approved prison telephone  system and thus are able to hold unmonitored conversations. This, the  BOP officials reported, could lead to several actions that threaten the  security of prisons and expand criminal activity both inside and outside of  a prison institution. For example, inmates could use cell phones to  arrange the delivery of contraband drugs or other goods, transmit  information on prison staff to or from noninmates, harass witnesses or  other individuals, or potentially coordinate an escape.
BOP management does not currently compile any specific data or  prepare comprehensive reports of situations where contraband cell  phones were used to conduct criminal activity in federal prisons—nor do  DOJ or the Cell Phone Contraband Act require that these things be done.  However, BOP officials we interviewed from two of the regions provided  examples of criminal activity linked to cell phones. In one case, in January  2011, an inmate at a federal institution was sentenced to an additional 14  years in prison for running an identity-theft ring using a contraband cell  phone. This inmate and his accomplices obtained personal information on  credit card holders at various retailers and impersonated these account  holders to fraudulently purchase over $254,000 worth of merchandise.
In addition, officials from seven of our selected eight states provided  examples of specific criminal actions that occurred as a result of inmate  cell phone use. For example, in October 2008, a death row inmate in a  Texas state prison used a smuggled cell phone to threaten a state  Senator and his family. This same phone was also used by a number of  other inmates within the prison. In addition, in 2007, an inmate in a  Maryland detention center ordered the murder of a state witness via a cell  phone. In 2005, an inmate in a New Jersey state prison—serving time for  previously shooting at two police officers—used a contraband cell phone  to order the murder of his girlfriend, who had previously testified against  him during a trial.
BOP and officials in selected states acknowledged that definitively linking  the possession of a contraband cell phone to an individual can be  challenging. For example, officials we interviewed from BOP’s  Correctional Programs Division, and two of the four BOP institutions that  we interviewed say that cell phones are often found on the grounds of an  institution or in “common areas” such as bathrooms or television rooms  rather than in the possession of an inmate directly. Cell phones are also  frequently passed around and used by several different inmates, making  it difficult to link the ownership of a cell phone to a particular inmate.
In order to gain useful information—such as phone numbers or text  messages—that could link a cell phone to an individual inmate or related  criminal activity, BOP conducts forensic investigations of the cell phones  it confiscates.
section_title: BOP and Selected States Have Implemented Cell Phone Search and Detection Technologies, but BOP Could Evaluate Technologies Better and Increase Coordination
paragraphs: BOP and the eight selected states we contacted have taken steps to  address growing contraband cell phone smuggling and use in their  correctional institutions, but BOP could evaluate existing technologies  better to maximize its investment decisions. BOP has tested multiple cell  phone detection technologies; however, it has not developed evaluation  plans to measure the effectiveness of these tests. Moreover, BOP has  shared information with state agencies to some extent on strategies for  combating contraband cell phones, but BOP’s regional offices could  pursue more direct connections with states in accordance with relevant  BOP policy that encourages them to do so. By enhancing information  sharing, BOP could gain knowledge from states’ practices and lessons  learned and likewise, states’ practices could be better informed by  learning more about BOP’s efforts related to cell phone detection.
subsections: section_title: BOP and Selected States Have Implemented a Variety of Strategies to Prevent and Minimize Cell Phone Smuggling and Use
paragraphs: BOP and officials from all eight selected state correctional departments  we contacted have developed multiple methods for preventing cell  phones from entering prison institutions and being used by inmates.  These include search procedures for visitors and correctional staff as well  as cell phone detection technologies, which identify the use of cell phones  once they have reached the inmate population.
Through policy memorandums and program statements that govern its  protocols, BOP has implemented agencywide screening procedures for  all visitors, contractors, and staff for detecting contraband items. These  procedures include the use of x-ray screening machines, walk-through  metal detectors, and hand-held metal detectors. Though these  procedures are not cell phone specific, BOP officials told us they  represent a concerted effort in keeping contraband out of prisons in  general. See appendix II for more information on the direction that BOP  provides for screening of visitors, staff, and inmates.
In addition to its search procedures, BOP has employed technology to  stem the rise in cell phone smuggling. In particular, BOP has  implemented two large-scale sensor-based cell phone detection systems  at two of its prison institutions, a technology BOP officials described as  being the only effective solution at this time. The Radio Frequency (RF)  sensor based system detects the presence of cell phones and displays  their approximate location using a monitored computer screen.
In April 2007, BOP installed the original prototype sensor system in three  housing units within one building, which included the purchase of a  server, computer work station, and switches. According to BOP officials,  the manufacturer provided the actual sensors and software at minimal  costs in order to assist in research and development for the project, while  other fiber and wiring were obtained from surplus supplies at no cost to  BOP. Additionally, BOP officials told us that BOP staff installed the sensor  system, helping cut costs that an outside party might have otherwise  charged for installation. Because of these factors, BOP officials said a  similar system installed by a contractor at other prison institutions would  be more expensive. For example, BOP officials told us that it cost them  approximately seven times more than the original system to install  equipment for a newer-generation version of BOP’s prototype RF sensor  system at a second prison institution in December 2010, even though  BOP officials were able to install it themselves as they had in the first  location. According to BOP officials, the second system covers 11  housing units in both an institution and prison camp, and is also  configured so that officials throughout the prison can view areas of cell  phone detection, which BOP officials said accounted for a higher  installation cost.
We found that all eight of the selected state officials we interviewed cited  using entrance screening practices such as use of walk-through metal  detectors or x-ray machines at their secure institutions; and, six of these  states are using different cell phone detection techniques that BOP has  not yet employed, such as canines and managed access.
Additional information on cell phone detection strategies tested or  deployed by BOP and selected state DOCs—as well as these officials’  perspectives on their utility—is deemed law enforcement sensitive and  not included in this report.
section_title: BOP Has Steps in Place to Identify Promising Cell Phone Detection Technologies, but Lacks Sound Evaluation Plans
paragraphs: BOP takes several steps to determine which cell phone detection  technologies to test. BOP’s OST is tasked with identifying promising  technology in the area of cell phone detection, and all five OST staff  share responsibility for testing and evaluating technology security  initiatives throughout BOP. To make determinations about which  technology BOP should test, OST officials told us that they familiarize  themselves through working groups with other federal and state  organizations and discussions with all interested product vendors with  equipment that other federal or state correctional entities use. OST  officials also explained that they have developed criteria over several  years that they believe should be met before they will test any given  approach. These four criteria are:  1.  The equipment must work without affecting or collecting information  from the general public located outside the correctional facilities’  secure perimeter.  2.  The solution should have no legal restrictions.  3.  The equipment must work with all cellular phone protocols.  4.  The overall cost of equipment and installation must be fair and  reasonable.
Once OST is satisfied that the technology meets most of these criteria,  OST tests the equipment at BOP headquarters and then sends it out to  one or more prison institutions for testing by staff in a prison environment.  Once tested, institutional staff then provide OST with a brief written  response or phone call regarding their views of the equipment’s  effectiveness. Once OST receives feedback from the prison institution,  OST may then send the equipment to another institution for further testing  by prison staff.
While BOP has put the above criteria in place, it does not have a sound  evaluation plan that includes, among other dimensions, criteria or  standards for determining how well the technology works. OST officials  told us that they rely on the process discussed above to make decisions  regarding the effectiveness of cell phone detection equipment, but they  acknowledged that the tests each institution conducts may vary in scope  and rigor and that they have no evaluation plan to govern this process.  OST officials told us they previously attempted to distribute consistent  evaluation questions to institutional staff testing each technology, using  an “Initial Technology Assessment” form, but that OST abandoned this  practice because it rarely received the form back from prison institutions.  Further, officials told us that when institutions do respond with technology  test results, OST receives very little feedback. OST officials told us that  institutional staff have limited time and resources for assisting them with  cell phone detection technology evaluations because such testing is in  addition to their normal duties. Also, OST has stated that some  institutions are more eager than others for the opportunity to test new  technology; thus, some institutions may not have the interest or expertise  to contribute information to a technology assessment. In addition,  according to OST, the role of the individual conducting the test can vary  by institution. Specifically, equipment could be tested by a correctional  officer, a lieutenant, or a computer specialist, a situation that OST officials  said results in inconsistent testing methods because these individuals  have different skills and knowledge levels. In addition, the OST official  tasked with addressing contraband cell phone detection issues told us  that BOP regions and local prison institutions regularly test cell phone  detection devices and approaches, as well as other types of equipment,  without OST’s knowledge and most often do not inform OST of their  findings. For example, the official explained that in some instances,  vendors notify OST of technology tests conducted at local prison  institutions that OST was unaware of at the time. GAO’s internal control  standards require that an agency’s organizational structure clearly define  key areas of authority and responsibility, and establish appropriate lines  of reporting. Thus, while OST applies its criteria to screen new  technologies before sending them to prison institutions for testing, it lacks  clearly defined responsibilities for the individuals conducting tests and  sound evaluation methods to fully evaluate such technologies once  institutional testing has been completed. As a result, BOP has  implemented—and discarded—some technologies without fully evaluating  them and documenting results as discussed below.
We have previously reported that for tests of new technology, a sound,  well-developed and documented evaluation plan should include:  1.  well-defined, clear, and measurable objectives;  2.  criteria or standards for determining program performance;  3.  clearly articulated methodology, including sound sampling methods,  determination of appropriate sample size for the evaluation design,  and a strategy for comparing the pilot results with other efforts;  4.  a clear plan that details the type and source of data necessary to  evaluate the pilot, methods for data collection, and the timing and  frequency of data collection; and  5.  a detailed data analysis plan to track the program’s performance and  evaluate the final results of the project.
Certain details on the tests OST has conducted and the conclusions it  has drawn have not been included here due to law enforcement  sensitivities.
OST officials explained that BOP has a policy, called Pilot Initiatives,  Approval and Evaluation, that identifies numerous criteria that should be  followed when implementing and evaluating pilot programs. The policy  includes practices such as defining goals and objectives, developing an  evaluation plan, describing costs for the program, and identifying  advantages and disadvantages related to a broader implementation of the  technology, all of which align with established best practices. According to  OST officials, however, they have not designated the testing phase of any  cell phone technologies as “a pilot” by the definition included in their  policy, and OST does not apply the policy to any of their testing. In our  view, BOP could benefit by using its pilot initiative-evaluation criteria as a  best practice when evaluating cell phone detection tests to better inform  decisions about whether investments on a larger scale are warranted.
When we requested reports and documentation—including evaluation  plans and reports—resulting from tests of the technologies that OST  explained to us, officials sometimes provided us with brief overviews of  testing methods that did not meet best practices. For example, OST told  us it has not subjected its RF sensor system—currently deployed in two  institutions—to any final assessment or evaluation outlining when and  how BOP would determine whether adopting this system on a wider scale  would be feasible and effective. On the other hand, in one instance, OST  officials told us BOP did adhere to more rigorous evaluation procedures.  Specifically, with assistance from OST, one prison institution has  deployed the Ground Observation Reconnaissance Transmitter (GORT)  in one of its institutions. When testing the GORT system, officials  identified system goals and objectives; identified criteria for determining  program performance; completed a final product evaluation that  documented advantages and disadvantages of the system; and  concluded that GORT successfully reduced smuggling of contraband  including cell phones at the test location. OST officials told us the  assessment of the GORT differed from assessments of its other  technologies because the level of evaluation performed was at the  discretion of the local prison institution implementing the system. OST  officials agree that developing a sound evaluation approach that could be  used by prison institution staff for testing cell phone detection  technologies would strengthen BOP’s approach for combating the issue  of contraband cell phones in prisons. Having an evaluation plan for  selected cell phone detection technology that follows BOP pilot evaluation  criteria or other best practices could help BOP more effectively measure  how well each piece of equipment functions. Moreover, these steps could  better allow OST to better inform BOP leadership’s decisions regarding  the adoption of such technology and the associated resource allocations.
section_title: BOP Could Take Steps to Enhance Information Sharing with States
paragraphs: BOP reports that OST collaborates with various state-level agencies, but  has opportunities to improve coordination between its regional offices and  states in identifying effective strategies and technologies for combating  contraband cell phones in prisons. BOP recognizes the importance of  outreach with state and local entities and has developed a policy  statement governing such interaction. This policy notes that  “communication and understanding among  institutions and regional  offices and their local communities will be enhanced by formal and  informal contacts between  staff and local agencies and  organizations.” It further states that “Regional Directors and Wardens  shall include in their lists of annual accomplishments a summary of all  organizations with which their institutions or regional offices are formally  associated, including a general statement about any significant  contribution to  operations or criminal justice relationships that have  resulted from those associations.” Further, we have previously reported  on the importance of interagency coordination and information sharing  across federal, regional, state, and local government entities. We also  previously reported that making efficient use of security technology to  supplement and reinforce other security measures is a key practice for  protecting federal institutions, but that the type of technology to use  should be carefully analyzed.
OST, located at BOP headquarters in Washington, D.C., reported  coordination with state-level agencies through direct information sharing,  professional organizations, and established working groups. In particular,  ASCA officials told us BOP coordinates with their group through panels,  demonstrations, and briefings. For example, OST also participates in  multiple NIJ/NLECTC technology working groups (TWG) involving cell  phone detection. OST also coordinates with representatives from  multiple state DOCs on an individual basis after establishing relationships  as members of professional organizations, committees, and working  groups. For example, OST provided the New York correctional  department with 30-day access to a cell phone detection device after the  state demonstrated interest in the technology. According to OST, BOP  has also shared information on its practices for detecting contraband cell  phones with states such as Pennsylvania, Texas, and Florida.
We corroborated BOP headquarters’ level of coordination with these  groups and multiple state DOCs. At the regional level, we found that  BOP’s regional offices had limited coordination with states regarding  contraband cell phone issues. For example, one BOP regional director  stated that his region coordinated with officials from ASCA, but said he  has not coordinated with state entities because such coordination occurs  through BOP officials in headquarters. Another regional director  concurred, reporting that nobody in his region participates in any task  forces, working groups, or other collaborative efforts with federal or state  entities concerning cell phone detection issues because this should be  occurring through headquarters’ outreach. As discussed earlier, some  states have taken efforts that BOP does not currently use to combat  contraband cell phones, such as canine detection units. Thus, enhanced  coordination could allow BOP to better leverage information on potentially  employing these state efforts to combat contraband cell phones.  Likewise, while BOP has shared practices with states in the past, OST  officials agreed that BOP could improve coordination efforts by its  regional offices as well.
In addition, while BOP policy states that “over the years, formal and  informal employee relationships with organizations, such as advisory  committees, law enforcement coordinating councils, criminal justice  councils, and state and local planning organizations, have enhanced   operations,” we found limited BOP regional-office interaction with  state and local government agencies concerning contraband cell-phone  smuggling and use. For example, according to BOP officials, Regional  Directors and Wardens annually prepare a Performance Work Plan that  lists, among other things, efforts made in establishing relations and  collaborating with other state and local correctional and law enforcement  entities in their communities. However, BOP officials have informed us  that these plans do not provide a level of detail—such as including  lessons learned on cell-phone-smuggling approaches and the  technologies to address them—to inform BOP’s central office of the  nature of issues discussed. Our review of the three work plans with which  BOP provided us confirmed the limitations in the information they  contained. As we have previously reported, by having a process in place  to obtain and share information on potential threats, agencies can better  understand the risk they face and more effectively determine what  preventive measures should be implemented. Regularly reaching out to  coordinate with key stakeholders, particularly at the state level, to learn  about their cell phone–combating efforts could help improve BOP’s ability  to address cell phone smuggling and use in prisons. Conversely, BOP’s  outreach and coordination with states at the regional level—to highlight  practices BOP believes are useful—could help inform state practices as  well. Further, keeping records of these exchanges, through Performance  Work Plans for example, could help the regional offices provide BOP with  greater problem-solving information by leveraging states’ experience in  addressing contraband cell phones.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: BOP provides a variety of options to its inmates for making phone calls to  friends and families—at rates that compare favorably to correctional  institutions operated by states and other federal agencies. Nevertheless,  the number of contraband cell phones in prisons is rising. As documented  in our discussions with federal and state officials, the illicit use of cell  phones can pose a danger to staff and inmates, as well as to the public at  large. BOP has reviewed a number of technologies and adopted large- scale sensor detection systems at two of its institutions in an attempt to  combat this problem. BOP does have opportunities, however, to enhance  assessments of how well these technologies can work. For example, if  BOP formulated well-developed and well-documented plans for testing  and evaluating cell phone detection and defeat technologies—including  the establishment of goals, objectives, and criteria—and defined  evaluation-related responsibilities for individuals performing the tests, it  would be better positioned to make decisions before adopting these  technologies. BOP also has opportunities to better leverage what states  are learning in their attempts to better detect and prevent cell phone  smuggling. In particular, if BOP encouraged its regional offices to improve  coordination with its local counterparts, BOP could be better positioned to  track and monitor what states were experimenting with and what their  evaluation results have been. By taking these steps, BOP could make  more well-informed decisions as it moves forward in addressing the  growing safety and security threats posed by contraband cell phones in  its prisons.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help BOP respond more effectively to contraband cell phone  challenges, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the BOP  Director to take the following three actions:    Direct OST to formulate evaluation plans that both support a  consistent approach to testing cell phone detection technologies and  strengthen decisions about deploying cell phone detection projects.  Such plans should include key characteristics of successful evaluation  methods, such as defining measurable objectives and including a  detailed data analysis plan. The plans should also clearly define  evaluation-related responsibilities for the individuals conducting the  test at each institution.    Develop a policy to require that regions and institutions apply OST’s  evaluation plans when testing the technology that OST believes may  be viable for detecting or combating contraband cell phones. This  policy should also require OST to provide the results of these  evaluations to BOP leadership to better inform BOP-wide decisions  regarding the adoption of such technology.    Enhance regional office collaboration with other federal, state, and  local organizations; document what is learned; and share it throughout  BOP to enhance agencywide knowledge of key efforts to prevent or  minimize cell phone smuggling in prisons.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DOJ, and  also requested comments from the Department of Commerce, FCC, and  Department of Defense on nonsensitive draft excerpts related to these  agencies. The agencies did not provide written comments. However, in  an e-mail received July 12, 2011, the DOJ liaison stated that DOJ  concurred with our recommendations. DOJ, FCC, and Department of  Defense provided written technical comments, which we incorporated into  the report, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General, Secretaries  of Commerce and Defense and the Chairman of the Federal  Communications Commission. In addition, this report will also be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  David Maurer at (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov or Mark Goldstein  at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report  are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) Observations on Technologies to Combat Contraband Cell Phones
paragraphs: In 2010, NTIA sought out and received public comments on “technologies  that would significantly reduce or eliminate contraband cell phone use  without negatively affecting commercial wireless and public safety  services … in areas surrounding prisons.” NTIA analyzed the comments  received and reported its observations on advantages and disadvantages  of each of these technologies, as illustrated in table 5.
section_title: Appendix II: BOP’s Policy Memorandums and Program Statements Governing Entrance- Screening Protocols at Prison Institutions
paragraphs: Table 6 describes BOP memorandums or program statements related to  entrance-screening procedures for staff and visitors at BOP institutions.
Figure 4 provides examples of the types of equipment BOP uses to  screen staff and visitors entering BOP institutions, as well as inmates on  institution grounds.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contacts named above, Mike Clements and Joy Booth,  Assistant Directors, and Adam Couvillion, Analyst-in-Charge, managed  this assignment. Raymond Griffith and Nancy Zearfoss made significant  contributions to the work. David Alexander, Madhav Panwar, and Ramon  Rodriguez assisted with design and methodology. Willie Commons III  provided legal support and Katherine Davis provided assistance in report  preparation.