Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Collaborative Mechanisms along the Southwest Border
Published: 2014-06-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: According to DHS's CBP, Arizona and South Texas represent some of the highest-threat areas along the southwest border for illegal entrants and smuggling. DHS and CBP coordinate border security with interagency partners, including other federal, state, local, and tribal entities. DHS established collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to integrate CBP operations and improve interagency coordination.
GAO was asked to review DHS efforts to coordinate resources along the southwest border. This report (1) describes how DHS uses collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to coordinate border security efforts, and (2) examines the extent to which DHS has established performance measures and reporting processes and how, if at all, DHS has assessed and monitored the effectiveness of the collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas. GAO analyzed documentation, such as campaign plans for the mechanisms; conducted visits to Arizona and South Texas; and interviewed CBP components and interagency partners selected on the basis of agency type and level of participation in the mechanism. Information from these interviews cannot be generalized to all components and partners, but provided insights into the mechanisms.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has coordinated border security efforts using collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas, specifically (1) the Joint Field Command (JFC), which has operational control over all U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) resources in Arizona; (2) the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT), which is a multiagency law enforcement partnership in Arizona; and (3) the South Texas Campaign (STC), which integrates CBP resources and facilitates coordination with other homeland security partner agencies. Through these collaborative mechanisms, DHS and CBP have coordinated border security efforts in (1) information sharing, (2) resource targeting and prioritization, and (3) leveraging of assets. For example, to coordinate information sharing, the JFC maintains an operations coordination center and clearinghouse for intelligence information. Through the ACTT, interagency partners work jointly to target individuals and criminal organizations involved in illegal cross-border activity. The STC leverages assets of CBP components and interagency partners by shifting resources to high-threat regions and conducting joint operations.
DHS and CBP have established performance measures and reporting processes for the JFC and ACTT in Arizona and the STC in South Texas; however, opportunities exist to strengthen these collaborative mechanisms by assessing results across the efforts and establishing written agreements. Each collaborative mechanism reports on its results to DHS or CBP leadership through a variety of means, such as accomplishment reports and after-action reports. However, CBP has not assessed the JFC and STC mechanisms to evaluate results across the mechanisms. JFC and STC components GAO interviewed identified challenges with managing resources and sharing best practices across the mechanisms. For example, officials from all five JFC components GAO interviewed highlighted resource management challenges, such as inefficiencies in staff conducting dual reporting on operations to CBP leadership. Best practices for interagency collaboration call for federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts to create the means to monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas for improvement. An assessment of the JFC and STC could provide CBP with information to better address challenges the mechanisms have faced. In addition, DHS has not established written agreements with partners in the ACTT and STC Unified Command—the entity within STC used for coordinating activities among federal and state agencies—consistent with best practices for sustaining effective collaboration. Officials from 11 of 12 partner agencies GAO interviewed reported coordination challenges related to the ACTT and STC Unified Command, such as limited resource commitments by participating agencies and lack of common objectives. For example, a partner with the ACTT noted that that there have been operations in which partners did not follow through with the resources they had committed during the planning stages. Establishing written agreements could help DHS address coordination challenges, such as limited resource commitments and lack of common objectives.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that CBP assess the JFC and STC, and that DHS, among other things, establish written agreements with ACTT and the STC Unified Command partners. DHS concurred with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The United States shares over 1,900 miles of border with Mexico, with  Arizona and South Texas sharing 387 and 697 miles of that border  respectively. The border with Mexico and these two states includes  different types of terrain that represent a significant challenge to border  security efforts. For example, in Arizona, the border is characterized by  desert and rugged mountains, while in South Texas, the border is divided  by the Rio Grande. Threats along the southwest border include illegal  entrants and the smuggling of drugs, firearms, and currency by criminal  networks. According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),  corridors in Arizona and South Texas represent some of the highest- threat areas along the southwest border for illegal entrants and  smuggling.
Ports of entry are officially designated places that provide for the arrival at, or departure  from, the United States. national border between the POEs, within maritime operating areas, and  within the nation’s interior. DHS and CBP and its components coordinate  their border security efforts with various federal, state, local, and tribal  entities.
DHS has established collaborative mechanisms throughout the southwest  region that are designed to help integrate CBP operations and improve  interagency coordination. In September 2013, we reported that DHS has  established collaborative mechanisms with both similarities and  differences in how they are structured, which missions or threats they  focus on, and which agencies participate in them, among other things. In  Arizona, CBP realigned its resources in February 2011 through the Joint  Field Command (JFC), wherein the operations of all CBP components in  Arizona—OFO, Border Patrol, and OAM—report to a single commander.  CBP also coordinates with interagency partners in Arizona through the  Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT), which is a multiagency  forum initiated in September 2009 to integrate intelligence and operations  among homeland security partners, including DHS’s U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Arizona Department of Public  Safety, among others. In South Texas, CBP instituted the South Texas  Campaign (STC) in February 2012 to help integrate the activities of CBP  components to accomplish specified objectives, such as targeting criminal  networks, and to facilitate coordination with homeland security partners,  such as ICE and the Drug Enforcement Administration.
You asked us to review how DHS is coordinating resources along the  southwest border to achieve an integrated law enforcement response to  border security threats. This report addresses the following two questions:
How does DHS use collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South  Texas to coordinate border security efforts?
To what extent has DHS established performance measures and  reporting processes and how, if at all, does DHS assess and monitor  the effectiveness of the collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and  South Texas?
To address these objectives, we visited the JFC and the ACTT in Arizona  and the STC in South Texas and conducted interviews with officials in  CBP headquarters. In Arizona, we visited JFC and ACTT headquarters in  Tucson and observed the JFC’s Joint Intelligence and Operations Center  and an ACTT leadership meeting. We also conducted interviews with JFC  and ACTT headquarters officials. In South Texas, we visited STC  headquarters in Laredo, where we observed operations at Border Patrol  checkpoints and POEs as well as the South Texas Border Intelligence  Center, and conducted interviews with STC headquarters officials. During  our site visits to Arizona and South Texas, we also met with officials from  OFO, Border Patrol, and OAM. Additionally, we conducted semistructured  interviews via telephone with officials from 5 CBP component offices from  the 21 CBP component locations in Arizona and 5 CBP component  offices from the 43 CBP component locations in the South Texas region.  We also conducted semistructured interviews via telephone with officials  from 6 ACTT partner agencies from the 66 ACTT partner agencies in  Arizona and 6 STC Unified Command partner agencies from the 33 STC  Unified Command partner agencies in South Texas.component offices to interview based on type of component, the level of  threat as defined by the number of CBP apprehensions of illegal entrants,  and geographic location. We selected interagency partners to interview  based on type of governmental unit and level of participation in the  mechanisms. While we cannot generalize information obtained from  these interviews to all CBP component offices and interagency partners in   We selected  Arizona and South Texas, information from these interviews provided us  with insights into how CBP has coordinated border security efforts.
To describe how DHS uses collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and  South Texas to coordinate border security efforts, we reviewed  documents from 2009 through 2014 obtained from JFC, ACTT, and STC  officials, such as charter documents, establishment memos, and  organizational charts, to identify the structure and roles and  responsibilities for each mechanism. We also reviewed campaign and  operational plans, as well as performance reports, to determine  coordination efforts of the mechanisms. To examine the extent to which  DHS has established performance measures and reporting processes  and how, if at all, DHS has assessed and monitored the effectiveness of  the collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas, we analyzed  campaign plans, after-action reports, and accomplishment reports from  2011 through 2014 obtained from the collaborative mechanisms to  determine what measures are in place to track outcomes and assess  progress. We also conducted interviews with officials from Border Patrol,  OFO, and OAM headquarters to determine the extent to which CBP and  its components are assessing the benefits and challenges of the JFC,  ACTT, and STC. We compared the mechanisms’ structures and  operations with best practices to enhance and sustain interagency  collaboration and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government.scope, and methodology.
Appendix I presents more details about our objectives,  We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to June 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: CBP’s three components—OFO, Border Patrol, and OAM—maintain a  field structure across the United States and its territories consisting of 20  OFO field offices, 20 Border Patrol sectors, and 3 OAM regions. Within  this field structure, each component also manages individual locations;  OFO field offices provide oversight of POEs, Border Patrol sectors  oversee stations, and OAM regions oversee branches. For example,  OAM’s Southwest Border Region provides oversight of individual air and  marine branches across the southwest border, including locations in both  Arizona and South Texas.
As stated in CBP’s Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan, providing  security along the northern, southern, and coastal borders requires  effective coordination and integration of all of CBP’s operational  components, along with the guidance and assistance of essential CBP  mission support personnel. One of CBP’s objectives is to establish and  maintain effective control of air, land, and maritime borders through the  use of the appropriate mix of infrastructure, technology, and personnel.  To that end, CBP’s strategic plan states that gaining and maintaining  effective control of the nation’s border requires useful intelligence and  strong partnerships with federal, state, local, tribal, and foreign  governments. The JFC, ACTT, and STC are intended to help CBP  achieve these objectives, according to CBP documents. For example, the  2011 memo establishing the JFC states that the JFC’s responsibility will  be to ensure full strategic integration of all CBP assets where feasible and  possible in order to maximize operational effectiveness and efficiencies.  The ACTT’s charter states that the ACTT is to be an effort to maximize  the cooperation and coordination of interagency law enforcement efforts  in Arizona. Moreover, the STC’s establishment memo notes the STC  Commander is to serve as the CBP integrator in South Texas, increasing  CBP’s operational effects through partnerships with stakeholders and  communities of interest in South Texas. Figure 1 shows the geographic  area that the JFC, ACTT, and STC cover within the southwestern United  States.
The three mechanisms have varying structures that aim to integrate CBP  operations and improve interagency coordination, as described below.
JFC: The JFC is an entity, under the direction of a commander, with  operational control over CBP’s resources in Arizona, including OFO,  Border Patrol, and OAM resources. Intended to maximize operational  effectiveness and efficiencies, the JFC exercises the authority to  reallocate staffing and resources among CBP components in Arizona.  While the JFC Commander maintains operational control of resources  in Arizona, each component’s headquarters has authority over  administrative decisions for the component, such as providing  funding, equipment, and training. The JFC has a dedicated budget of  approximately $5 million in fiscal year 2014 that primarily covers  personnel costs.
ACTT: The ACTT is a multiagency law enforcement partnership in  Arizona designed to address smuggling of aliens, drugs, and bulk  cash; exportation of weapons; and hostage taking, among other illegal  activities. While it is a DHS initiative, the ACTT concept was  implemented by CBP and other federal, state, and local agencies.  According to the ACTT Chief of Staff, the ACTT is not under the  authority of the JFC; however, the JFC approves CBP-level  participation in ACTT operations. The JFC utilizes the ACTT to  prioritize tactical targets and coordinate operations with homeland  security partners. The ACTT is composed of more than 60 partners  representing federal, state, local, military, and tribal organizations.
Arizona’s ACTT is headed by a 13-member Unified Command,  including three JFC component heads, which provides strategic  direction to the ACTT as well as guidance for partner interaction. The  ACTT does not have a dedicated budget, although CBP components  and interagency partners provide funds for administrative, personnel,  and operational costs. See appendix II for a full list of ACTT  participants.
STC: The STC is an entity that realigned CBP resources, as well as a  mechanism for fostering interagency partnerships. As a hybrid of the  mechanisms that DHS has in place in Arizona, the STC is intended to  enhance coordination both within CBP, as well as with external  partners in South Texas. Like the JFC, the STC is managed by a  commander; however, the STC Commander exercises less control  over the day-to-day operations of CBP components, instead assuming  operational control as it specifically relates to the STC mission and  objectives, such as conducting targeted operations to disrupt and  degrade transnational criminal organizations. As with the JFC, each  component’s headquarters has authority over administrative  decisions, such as providing funding, equipment, and training. The  STC Commander coordinates with a Unified Command composed of  approximately 30 partners representing federal, state, and military  organizations (see app. II for a full list of STC Unified Command  participants). While the STC does not have a dedicated budget, the  STC has received discretionary funds from the CBP Commissioner’s  Office, as well as funds from the components, such as resources from  Border Patrol targeted for border security efforts in the Rio Grande  Valley area.
Table 1 provides additional information on each mechanism, including the  staffing, participants, and purpose.
CBP oversees the JFC and the STC through the Joint Operations  Directorate (JOD). The JOD was created by the Secretary of Homeland  Security in February 2011 and is part of the Office of the CBP  Commissioner. The JOD’s purpose is to help ensure that CBP-wide  missions are being carried out and that CBP maintains a nation-wide  focus. Headed by an Executive Director, the JOD is intended to address  CBP joint operations coordination, incident management, strategic  planning, deliberate planning, and operational doctrine and policy. The  JOD is also responsible for defining metrics to determine effectiveness  and link CBP strategies to the budget cycle. The JOD is staffed by  personnel from CBP components and funding is provided through the  Office of the Commissioner. The JOD serves as a liaison for the JFC to  Border Patrol, OFO, and OAM headquarters, and the CBP Commissioner  for staffing, operations, and other requirements and, according to the JOD  Executive Director, plans to serve as a liaison for the STC in the future as  well.
section_title: DHS Uses Collaborative Mechanisms to Share Information, Target Resources, and Leverage Assets
paragraphs: DHS has taken a number of actions to coordinate border security efforts  both within CBP and externally with interagency partners using  collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas in three primary  areas: (1) information sharing, (2) resource targeting and prioritization,  and (3) leveraging of assets. Coordination efforts have involved sharing of  information across geographic areas and organizations, strategic  placement of resources to address threats, and the implementation of  joint operations, among others.
Information sharing. DHS and CBP have coordinated information  sharing among CBP components and participating agencies in the JFC,  ACTT, and STC through the development and implementation of various  programs or initiatives within these collaborative mechanisms. For  example, in Arizona the JFC maintains the Joint Intelligence and  Operations Center, which is an operations coordination center and  clearinghouse for intelligence information. The Joint Intelligence and  Operations Center is staffed by an integrated team of Border Patrol, OFO,  and OAM officers and agents that use data, video, and communications  systems to coordinate statewide operations. For example, the center  monitors real-time air traffic in Arizona and moves air assets where  needed in support of ground operations. In addition, the Joint Intelligence  and Operations Center disseminates strategic intelligence to all Arizona  field components for immediate action, such as information on targets in  Arizona. Among other things, the ACTT initiated focus area meetings in  each of five geographic areas of Arizona to allow interagency partners to  collaborate and share information related to their specific regions, such as  tactics used by drug and alien smugglers, including types of vehicles and  common routes. In addition, the ACTT provides intelligence briefings  and support to the partners in all of the focus areas. Information sharing  in South Texas is facilitated by the South Texas Border Intelligence  Center, which the STC created to share intelligence at a centralized  location. The South Texas Border Intelligence Center was established to  facilitate the sharing and fusion of law enforcement information and  intelligence among Border Patrol, OFO, OAM, and interagency partners,  such as the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Texas Department  of Public Safety. Among other things, the STC has facilitated information  sharing between OFO and Border Patrol through OFO sharing knowledge  regarding technology used at ports that Border Patrol is leveraging to  conduct electronic scans of a larger number of vehicles moving through  checkpoints.
Resource targeting and prioritization. DHS and CBP, through the JFC,  ACTT, and STC, have established strategies or mechanisms to target  and prioritize resources among participating components and interagency  partners. For example, in Arizona the JFC created an air integration  strategy and a coordinated process of prioritizing and managing air  assets through the establishment of an oversight mechanism known as  the Air Council. The Air Council sets strategic goals and objectives for the  management of all aviation assets in Arizona and meets weekly to set the  aviation support air schedule, coordinating with military and other air  partners to ensure that geographic areas are prioritized and covered  appropriately without the overlap of air assets. In addition, the JFC  monitors and analyzes real-time operational data to help target  enforcement efforts against transnational criminal organizations. The  ACTT is to act as a “force multiplier,” as interagency partners can  leverage one another’s resources and capabilities to target individuals  and criminal organizations involved in illegal cross-border activity.
Specifically, partners identify targets based on geographic vulnerabilities  and emerging threat information, among other things. The ACTT targets  are identified through established focus area meetings and  communications between ACTT partner agencies, among other things. In  South Texas, the STC jointly selects and prioritizes targets based on  intelligence by collaborating with interagency partners through the Unified  Command. The STC also established Joint Targeting Teams, which are  focused on Unified Command approved targets, which present the  highest threats to the area. In addition, the STC formalized an OFO  operation that is designed to target transnational criminal organization  leaders, members, associates, and family members to cancel their  nonimmigrant visas, or place those that have legal permanent resident  status in removal proceedings.
Leveraging of assets. DHS and CBP, through the JFC, ACTT, and STC,  have leveraged assets of CBP components and interagency partners  through resource sharing or joint operations. In Arizona, the JFC  established the Canine Council, which integrates OFO and Border Patrol  canine resources. In particular, OFO and Border Patrol representatives  are to meet on a regular basis to discuss how canines might be used to  address threats specific to their geographic areas. For example, Border  Patrol canine assets are used at Arizona POEs to cover over 200 shifts  per month. The ACTT has leveraged interagency partners’ assets by  conducting a number of joint operations with interagency partners,  including an operation that involved the deployment of increased  resources from Border Patrol, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and  local law enforcement agencies at a Border Patrol checkpoint and  surrounding highways in the western part of Arizona. The operation was  designed to disrupt transnational criminal organization activity along the  Interstate 10 highway in Arizona. The ACTT also has provided partner  agencies with access to resources, such as OAM air support and  planning assistance for operations. The STC leverages component and  interagency partners’ assets in South Texas. For example, the STC  shifted Border Patrol assets from Laredo to the Rio Grande Valley in  order to augment existing Border Patrol resources and address the  current threat environment in the Rio Grande Valley area. Further, the  STC conducted joint operations such as an operation that involved assets  from multiple Border Patrol stations, OAM, the Department of Defense,  the government of Mexico, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office. The purpose of  the operation was to strategically place resources at and between POEs  in South Texas in order to increase border security.
section_title: DHS Has Established Performance Measures and Reporting Processes for the JFC, ACTT, and STC, but Could Strengthen These Collaborative Mechanisms
subsections: section_title: DHS and CBP Have Performance Measures and Reporting Processes in Place for Collaborative Mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas
paragraphs: DHS and CBP have established processes, including objectives and  performance measures, to report on the results of the JFC, ACTT, and  STC, and these reporting processes vary across the mechanisms. For  example, the STC develops and reports on specific quantitative  performance measures for operations, while the JFC and the ACTT use  and report on a mix of quantitative and qualitative measures to assess  their activities. Some of the quantitative performance measures  developed by the JFC, ACTT, and STC are existing metrics used by CBP  and its components to assess and report on progress of their specific  border security activities. For example, the ACTT reports on seizures of  narcotics and currency as performance measures to assess efforts to  disrupt, degrade, and dismantle criminal organizations operating in  Arizona. CBP established these measures to assess and report on border  security efforts. Further, the STC reports on apprehensions of illegal  entrants as a performance measure to assess the success of various  operations. This measure was established by Border Patrol to assess and  report on its enforcement efforts between POEs. The objectives and  performance measures reported by each collaborative mechanism are  summarized in table 2.
The type and frequency of reporting varies by each collaborative  mechanism. Each collaborative mechanism reports on its results to its  leaders, or DHS or CBP leadership, through a variety of means, such as  accomplishment reports and after-action reports, as discussed below.
JFC. The JFC reports on its results through quarterly progress  reports, an initial accomplishment report, and operational after-action  reports. First, the JFC develops quarterly progress reports, which are  to be reviewed by JFC leadership. The quarterly progress reports  began in fiscal year 2014 and provide information on new threats,  high-traffic areas, and available resources. JFC leadership reviews  the reports to assess progress made toward the JFC’s objectives and  to determine whether changes are needed to JFC priorities based on  changes to threats or border security activities identified in the report,  according to JFC officials. Second, the JFC developed a report  providing information on its initial accomplishments from its  establishment in 2011 through 2013. This report provided information  on JFC accomplishments in the areas of integrated operations and  planning, sharing of information and skills among components, joint  intelligence gathering, military coordination, and integrated resources.  Finally, the JFC is to prepare after-action reports for each operation.  These after-action reports provide information on the operation’s  mission, use of resources, and operational results. For example, in an  operation from October 2012 through July 2013, the JFC reported the  following statistics from sustained outbound inspections:  approximately $5.3 million in seized currency and 881 arrests. The  JFC uses these after-action reports to debrief operations and to  provide comments and recommendations for future operations. JFC  and component leadership also discuss results of operations during  biweekly teleconferences, according to JFC documents.
ACTT. The ACTT reports information on its results through annual  accomplishment reports; periodic, ad hoc reports; and after-action  reports. For example, the ACTT produces annual accomplishment  reports to report its results. In these accomplishment reports, the  ACTT reports information on operations, tactics employed,  intelligence, trends, and partner activities. The ACTT also reports on  its results to DHS, CBP, and ICE leadership on an ad hoc basis upon  request. For example, CBP has periodically requested ACTT progress  reports on such things as the number of joint operations completed  and their results, in connection with its year-end accomplishment  reporting. In addition, the ACTT is to prepare after-action reports for  each of its operations. These after-action reports contain information  intended to help ACTT leadership determine whether the ACTT  should engage in additional phases of an operation. For example, a  joint operation of Border Patrol and ICE, under the auspices of the  ACTT, during November 2013, reported 34 arrests, 381 pounds of  marijuana seized, and 1 recovered stolen vehicle.
STC. The STC reports on its results through annual, weekly, and  after-action reports. Specifically, the STC reports on its results  through an annual accountability report provided to CBP  headquarters. These annual accountability reports provide information  on the STC’s progress toward meeting operational and administrative  milestones, accomplishments related to each of the STC’s five  objectives, and best practices across the South Texas region.  Reported accomplishments in the fiscal year 2013 accomplishment  report include intelligence sharing among interagency partners to  identify targets and the completion of several joint operations. The  report also includes performance measures for several operations,  such as the number of arrests and seizures of drugs and currency.  Across the South Texas region, the STC reported the disruption and  degradation of the capabilities of transnational criminal organizations  through the arrest of 231 approved targets. Beginning in fiscal year  2014, the STC also prepares weekly status reports for Unified  Command members and CBP headquarters, which include  information on coordination efforts with other agencies as well as  updates on operations. Additionally, the STC prepares an after-action  report for each operation. For example, in an operation from June  through September 2013, under the auspices of the STC, the Rio  Grande Valley sector reported making 2,756 apprehensions of illegal  entrants and seizing approximately 4,585 kilograms of marijuana.  During the same operation, the Laredo sector reported making 223  apprehensions of illegal entrants and seizing 4,085 kilograms of  marijuana. According to STC officials, they use after-action reports to  confirm whether the operation achieved the anticipated results and to  determine if new strategies are necessary for future operations. The  STC uses information in after-action reports to brief the STC Unified  Command at quarterly meetings and provide ad hoc updates to the  CBP Commissioner.
According to a senior JOD official, the JOD is working with components to  standardize reporting processes among the JFC, STC, and ACTT.  According to the official, the JOD envisions obtaining regular (e.g.,  biweekly) reports from each mechanism regarding progress made toward  achieving its annual objectives. The intent of these reports, once  implemented, will be to help ensure that CBP’s collaboration with other  agencies is carrying out CBP’s mission.
section_title: Assessment of Collaborative Mechanisms, Written Agreements, and a Monitoring Mechanism Could Strengthen Integration and Coordination Efforts along the Southwest Border
paragraphs: Opportunities exist to strengthen collaborative mechanisms by conducting  an assessment of results across the mechanisms and establishing written  agreements and a strategic-level mechanism to monitor coordination  efforts. Specifically, DHS has not assessed the JFC and STC  mechanisms to determine their relative benefits and challenges.  Moreover, DHS has not established written agreements or a monitoring  mechanism that could help facilitate and strengthen coordination with  interagency partners in the ACTT and the STC Unified Command.
subsections: section_title: DHS Could Benefit from an Assessment of the JFC and STC Mechanisms
paragraphs: CBP has not assessed the JFC and STC to evaluate results across the  mechanisms to identify any possible areas for improvement. Our analysis  of CBP documentation on the JFC and STC as well as our interviews with  headquarters and field officials identified two primary challenges  experienced by the JFC and STC: (1) resource management challenges  and (2) limited sharing of best practices across mechanisms. An  assessment of the JFC and STC mechanisms could provide CBP with  information to help better address these challenges.
Resource management challenges. JFC and STC component officials  reported to us resource management challenges that, while different in  nature, could be evaluated through an assessment of these mechanisms.  The Fiscal Year 2013 JFC Campaign Plan states that the JFC mission is  to integrate organizational responsiveness, resource allocation, and  decision-making capabilities to improve efficiencies and effectiveness;  however, our interviews with officials from all five JFC components  highlighted resource management challenges with the JFC. For example,  the JFC Chief of Staff stated that Border Patrol canine teams have been  successfully used at POEs in Arizona for a number of years and that  Border Patrol station and OFO port leadership jointly determine canine  requirements and priorities and address any gaps in coverage and  operational needs with their combined canine assets. In addition, the JFC  Chief of Staff stated that Border Patrol and OFO canines are routinely  used at POEs and can be interchanged between CBP components in  many environments. The Chief of Staff noted that the deployment of  Border Patrol canine teams to POEs serves as a force multiplier.  However, some officials we interviewed provided different perspectives  on the use of canines. For example, three JFC component officials in  Arizona we interviewed cited challenges, from their perspective, in how  the JFC has used Border Patrol and OFO canine resources. For example,  these officials in Arizona told us that the JFC has attempted to integrate  the canine resources of Border Patrol and OFO by reassigning canines  from Border Patrol stations to POEs; however, they stated that, in their  view, the reassignment of canines can contribute to inefficiencies  because, among other things, Border Patrol canines are not used to  working in the POE environment. CBP headquarters officials from both  OFO and Border Patrol stated that canines are not easily interchanged  between CBP components. Specifically, according to OFO officials,  Border Patrol canines have less frequent contact with passengers, do not  receive training on searching pedestrians, and can be more aggressive  than OFO canines, which are used to working closely with passengers  entering and leaving the United States. According to a Border Patrol  headquarters official, in his view, the JFC has shifted canines from  higher-threat areas along the border to a lower-threat POE, despite the  fact that the port is not an area priority and receives a nominal amount of  traffic.
Moreover, CBP component officials stated that dual reporting on JFC  activities can contribute to inefficiencies in the use of resources and could  result in duplication of effort. In its initial accomplishment report, the JFC  notes as a success the consolidation of reporting through the Joint  Intelligence and Operations Center to provide CBP field and  headquarters’ leadership with a single source for all Arizona operational  reporting. However, our interviews with officials from all five CBP  components identified challenges in the reporting of information from the  field to headquarters units. For example, according to JFC officials, all  JFC components—OFO, Border Patrol, and OAM—are required to report  operational matters, such as significant incidents involving the use of  weapons, through the Joint Intelligence and Operations Center to the  CBP Commissioner’s office. However, according to CBP component  officials, the heads of OFO, Border Patrol, and OAM have identified a  need to receive the same information on these operational matters. Thus,  OFO, Border Patrol, and OAM officials in Arizona typically report  information to both the JFC and their own chains of command in their own  components, resulting in dual reporting. In addition, CBP component  officials in Arizona stated that it can be challenging reporting port-related  information to the JFC because JFC staff members may not have  knowledge of port operations. For example, a senior OFO official stated  that the JFC has directed a significant amount of follow-up questions to a  POE on the data it reported because Border Patrol agents handle the  JFC reporting process, and these Border Patrol agents do not have  familiarity with port operations, which can create a burden for the  components.
In addition, officials we interviewed stated that the STC has experienced  resource challenges related to limited funding and personnel. The STC  has no permanent staff and depends on a rotation of personnel from CBP  components (e.g., Border Patrol, OFO, OAM) through the STC, as  additional positions were not created to support the STC. Four of five  CBP component officials we interviewed stated that limited resources are  an overall challenge of the STC, and three of these component officials  noted that detailing personnel to the STC can create staffing challenges.  An official from one Border Patrol station in South Texas stated that the  STC is pulling top resources from the station and that this creates  challenges with backfilling the positions at the station and training the new  staff. OFO officials also told us that POEs in South Texas have limited  personnel to conduct port operations, making it difficult for POEs to  provide personnel resources to the STC. In January 2013, the STC  completed a staffing forecast, projecting ongoing staffing and resource  needs that discusses the STC’s dependence on components to provide  staff and resources to support the STC. The staffing forecast noted that  this practice is not sustainable. According to senior STC headquarters  officials, CBP headquarters has not taken any action on the STC’s  staffing forecast because of staff turnover. An assessment of the JFC and  STC could help CBP better understand areas for possible improvement  related to resource management, such as the resources needed to  implement these mechanisms and how to use the mechanisms’  resources efficiently.
Limited sharing of best practices across mechanisms. Opportunities  also exist for CBP components to share best practices across Arizona  and South Texas. The CBP Commissioner’s fiscal year 2014 operational  priorities state that CBP should take the best practices of existing  innovative and successful initiatives and apply them agency-wide.  Further, both the STC Campaign Plan and the JFC Commander’s intent  state that the mechanisms should capture and replicate best practices to  better fulfill their missions and improve strategies; however, CBP has not  assessed the potential application of best practices across these  mechanisms. The JFC has shared some of its practices with the STC,  such as sending officials to the STC to help establish standard operating  procedures and sharing various initiatives, such as a visa revocation  program. The STC has compiled a list of 40 administrative and  operational best practices throughout the South Texas region for the  potential application of the practices region-wide. The STC has  implemented two of the identified best practices, an OAM fuel-saving  program that provides bulk fuel prices for marine vessels and a physical  training regimen to improve the daily duty performance of employees, and  as of April 2014, according to STC officials, was also in the process of  implementing an auto parts concession program. However, this list of  best practices compiled by the STC has not been shared with other CBP  collaborative mechanisms, as CBP has not assessed the extent to which  best practices could be identified and shared among the mechanisms.
JFC and STC officials identified opportunities for the sharing of best  practices across the various mechanisms. For example, an official at one  STC component we interviewed noted that the STC should encourage  additional sharing of best practices and that components should seek  them out for continued growth. However, a senior STC official was  unaware of efforts to apply STC best practices outside of the South Texas  region. CBP headquarters officials stated that the STC planners used  some informal lessons learned from the JFC when planning the STC and  noted that the STC benefitted from the JFC having been established first.  Sharing of practices, however, has not been ongoing. JFC officials stated  that some JFC practices, such as the coordinated process of prioritizing  and managing air assets, should serve as best practices for potential  replication in other parts of the country, but that CBP has not made a  systematic effort to share these practices, although the JFC has shared  some practices on an ad hoc basis. An assessment of the JFC and STC  mechanisms could help provide CBP with insights on areas for possible  improvement and best practices that could be shared among the  mechanisms.
In addition to resource management challenges and limited sharing of  best practices across the mechanisms, CBP officials we interviewed  identified concerns regarding the structure and operations of the JFC.  Specifically, senior Border Patrol officials in Arizona told us that, in their  view, the JFC has added an unnecessary layer to CBP operations in the  state and that it was unclear to them what added capabilities the  mechanism was providing. Border Patrol headquarters officials stated  that, in their view, CBP should evaluate the JFC to determine whether  changes are needed to the way the mechanism is structured and  operated. These officials suggested that changes could be made to the  JFC, such as letting POEs maintain responsibility for their daily  operations and focusing more on targeted enforcement instead of  focusing primarily on the allocation and control of CBP resources.
JFC officials noted that the establishment of the JFC was a major  realignment of CBP operations in Arizona as well as a cultural change for  personnel in the field. The officials noted that field-level resistance to the  JFC is not unexpected given the massive undertaking of the realignment,  and that the components are now recognizing the benefits of the JFC.  However, an assessment of the JFC and STC could help position CBP to  evaluate the effects of these mechanisms, best practices that could be  shared among the mechanisms, and any areas for possible improvement,  such as management of resources. Senior JOD officials stated that the  JOD could help to ensure that JFC and STC local operational objectives  are in line with nationwide objectives and make sure that the objectives  are being met for more consistent nationwide monitoring. These officials  stated that since the JOD is a new organization that is developing and  being shaped by CBP, it has not assessed CBP’s collaborative  mechanisms, including reviewing the potential sharing of best practices.  These officials stated that CBP at the agency level needs to decide which  mechanisms are working and to fund them based on an informed  analysis. However, no entity within CBP has been directed to complete an  assessment.
CBP and its components have taken some steps to assess the JFC and  STC; however, these actions have not been completed and do not  evaluate the effects of these mechanisms, best practices that could be  shared among the mechanisms, and any areas for possible improvement,  such as management of resources. First, CBP initiated a review of the  costs and benefits of the JFC. CBP’s Office of Administration (OA) began  work on the cost-benefit analysis of the JFC in April 2013 in response to  direction in the explanatory statement accompanying the fiscal year 2013   According to CBP officials, a draft cost-benefit  DHS Appropriations Act.analysis was completed in September 2013 and provided to the CBP  Commissioner’s office for review; however, as of April 2014, the analysis  has not been approved by the Commissioner and CBP officials could not  provide us with a time frame for when the analysis would be approved.  CBP OA officials stated that the draft cost-benefit analysis has no findings  or recommendations. According to these officials, the draft analysis  describes the costs, which are primarily personnel related, and discusses  the qualitative benefits of the JFC related to its stated objectives;  however, the draft analysis does not address resources needed to  maintain the JFC going forward, nor does it evaluate the results achieved  through the JFC. Further, according to OA officials, there is no consensus  among CBP officials regarding the purpose of the analysis or how it will  be used.
In addition to this CBP-wide cost-benefit analysis of the JFC, OFO is  conducting its own internal assessment of the benefits and challenges  associated with OFO’s involvement in collaborative mechanisms, such as  the JFC and STC. Senior OFO officials stated that they are conducting  this assessment to better understand the various collaborative  mechanism structures as well as to determine how OFO is integrated into  each mechanism and what resources it is contributing to the  mechanisms. The officials said that they anticipate presenting the final  assessment to the OFO Assistant Commissioner by July 2014. According  to the officials, this assessment by OFO will focus on that component’s  inputs to the JFC and STC, but is not intended to address other CBP  components’ input and benefits from participation in those mechanisms.
Although CBP and OFO have taken steps toward assessing the JFC and  STC, these assessments are not intended to provide CBP with  information to evaluate challenges across components participating in  these mechanisms or determine ways to address those challenges. Best  practices for interagency collaboration call for federal agencies engaged  in collaborative efforts to create the means to monitor and evaluate their  efforts to enable them to identify areas for improvement. Further,  according to these best practices, reporting on these activities can help  key decision makers within the agencies, as well as clients and  stakeholders, to obtain feedback for improving both policy and operational  effectiveness. Best practices also indicate that collaborating agencies  should identify the human, information, technology, physical, and financial  resources needed to initiate or sustain their collaborative effort.
In September 2013, we reported that collecting and assessing information  on existing collaborative mechanisms would enable DHS to better monitor  these mechanisms. could benefit from an assessment of operations along the northern border  to identify outstanding challenges and develop planned corrective  actions. Specifically, we found that officials in the field were left to  resolve coordination challenges without adequate headquarters  involvement. While CBP’s current efforts to assess the JFC and STC are  limited, or focus on a single component, an assessment of the JFC and  STC could help CBP better determine the effects of these mechanisms,  best practices that could be shared among the mechanisms, and any  areas for possible improvement, such as management of resources.  CBP’s memo to the Secretary of Homeland Security establishing the JFC  in February 2011 notes that Arizona will be the site of CBP’s first JFC  structure, suggesting that CBP may seek to establish additional JFC  structures in other geographic areas. Senior CBP officials explained that  CBP may look to expand these mechanisms; however, CBP has not  finalized the cost-benefit analysis and has not made efforts to evaluate  the STC. An assessment could help inform CBP decision making  regarding any future uses or changes to the collaborative mechanisms.
section_title: DHS Could Strengthen Coordination by Establishing Written Agreements and a Monitoring Mechanism
paragraphs: GAO-13-734.
In this section of the report, we provide the results of interviews with ACTT and STC  Unified Command partners, including the number of partners of each mechanism that  identified a specific area as a coordination challenge, such as limited resource  commitments by participating agencies. The other ACTT and STC Unified Command  partners did not identify these areas as challenges during the interviews. planning for joint operations. For example, CBP headquarters officials  and partners noted that intelligence sharing among agencies has  improved because of the establishment of the ACTT and STC Unified  Command. However, our discussions with officials from ACTT and the  STC Unified Command partner agencies identified three barriers that they  most frequently stated hindered effective coordination within their  mechanisms: (1) limited resource commitments by participating agencies,  (2) lack of common objectives, and (3) limited outreach to interagency  partners. Written agreements and a strategic-level monitoring  mechanism could better position DHS to address these challenges and  strengthen coordination among partner agencies participating in the  ACTT and STC Unified Command.
Limited resource commitments by participating agencies. Our  interviews with officials from ACTT and STC Unified Command partner  agencies identified challenges associated with limited partner resource  commitments to the collaborative mechanisms. As stated in the ACTT  charter, the ACTT is intended to engage individual agencies through a  joint and cooperative effort to maximize resources toward a common  strategy; however, officials from three of six ACTT partner agencies we  interviewed cited resource challenges as a barrier to effective  coordination. For example, a partner with the ACTT noted that resources  are limited for all partners, and that there have been operations in which  partners did not follow through with the resources they had committed  during the planning stages. Specifically, this official explained how his  agency was responsible for leading an overnight operation, which  involved the commitment of other ACTT partners. However, the official  said that other ACTT partners decided to cover a portion of the overnight  operation, rather than the entire operation, without communicating the  change in resources to the lead agency or the ACTT, a decision that  shortened the length of the operation. Also, another ACTT partner stated  that an operation was hampered by lack of resources from an interagency  partner. In this case, the ACTT partner said that his agency was unable to  apprehend a group of illegal entrants because it did not have the authority  to detain or arrest the entrants, and the agency did not have resources  from an interagency partner with those authorities. The ACTT partner  stated that it would be helpful to establish a partnership agreement  regarding the level of resources that agencies can commit to joint  operations.
Additionally, according to ACTT officials, the ACTT has experienced  challenges finding interagency partners to contribute personnel to the  ACTT staff. Border Patrol, ICE, the Arizona Department of Public Safety,  and the Arizona National Guard are the four entities that provide staff to  the ACTT. While the ACTT Charter states that the ACTT staff is to be  recruited by individual agencies, there is no agreement among ACTT  partners regarding how many staff will be provided or by which partners.  Members of the ACTT staff said that, in their view, a number of different  interagency partners should have the opportunity to lead the ACTT to  better reflect a whole-of-government effort, in which partners participate  jointly, as noted in the ACTT Charter; however, they stated that no  agencies other than CBP and ICE have expressed an interest in  assuming a leadership role in the ACTT.
Further, the STC Campaign Plan reflects the intention of the STC Unified  Command to take a whole-of-government approach, with partner  agencies contributing resources to enhance operations; however, officials  from five of six STC Unified Command partners we interviewed cited  resource challenges as a barrier to effective coordination. For example,  an STC Unified Command partner stated that it can be difficult to address  specific targets, such as a “stash house,” which is a property that a  criminal network may use to harbor illegal entrants, because of not having  a sufficient resource commitment from investigative agencies. This  partner stated that the success of the STC’s Unified Command is  predicated on a whole-of-government approach in which all partner  agencies provide ample resources. Another STC Unified Command  partner stated that agencies may be reluctant to share personnel with the  STC Unified Command because of pressure within these agencies to  dedicate resources strictly for internal agency initiatives, rather than  multiagency efforts.
Lack of common objectives. Our interviews with officials from ACTT  and STC Unified Command partner agencies identified lack of common  objectives as a barrier to coordination, which could result in limited  sharing of information between interagency partners. Officials from three  of six ACTT partner agencies and four of six STC Unified Command  partner agencies cited lack of common objectives as a challenge.
Specifically, according to officials from some of these partner agencies,  as CBP is a lead agency of the ACTT and the STC, those mechanisms  have been more focused on helping CBP achieve its interdiction  objectives, rather than the missions of the various interagency partners.  For example, one ACTT partner stated that the ACTT has not taken the  priorities of investigative agencies into account when planning joint  operations, which has marginalized these agencies. This partner noted  that in some instances valuable operations have collapsed prior to  implementation because ACTT partners could not reach consensus  regarding whether and how to proceed because of the ACTT’s focus on  interdictions. An STC Unified Command partner also noted that, in his  view, the STC Unified Command has been more focused on interdictions,  which has resulted in inadequate information sharing between CBP and  investigative agencies, such as ICE and the Drug Enforcement  Administration. In addition, DHS and CBP headquarters officials stated  that the lack of common objectives between CBP and investigative  agencies has been an ongoing challenge and has resulted in limited  information sharing between the agencies.
Limited outreach to interagency partners. Our interviews with officials  from ACTT and STC Unified Command partner agencies identified  challenges associated with limited outreach from the mechanisms to  interagency partners. Specifically, officials from two of six ACTT partner  agencies cited limited outreach as a barrier to coordination. One partner  stated that the ACTT has not provided partner agencies with a sufficient  understanding of how the ACTT is different from other multiagency task  forces and initiatives in Arizona, in his view contributing to less support for  the mechanism among interagency partners. Another partner noted that  the ACTT has not communicated its approach to prioritizing resources  across the focus areas, which has created a lack of alignment between  the focus areas. Moreover, officials from four of six STC Unified  Command partner agencies we interviewed noted that STC leadership  could improve its outreach to federal, state, and local entities in order to  increase awareness of how the STC Unified Command can serve  different partners’ needs. For example, one partner stated that the STC  Unified Command has incorporated one of the partner agency’s locations  in South Texas into the STC Unified Command; however, the STC  Unified Command has not conducted outreach to the agency’s other  locations in the area. Consequently, the official stated that these other  locations either do not know about the STC Unified Command or are not  yet aware of the value that the mechanism can provide. This partner  noted that gaining the support of all area offices is important in helping  the STC Unified Command to build cases against criminal networks as  opposed to making individual apprehensions without knowledge of the  broader threat environment. Senior STC headquarters officials noted that  the STC Unified Command can do a better job of conducting outreach to  interagency partners.
Establishing ACTT- and STC Unified Command-specific agreements with  interagency partners could help better position DHS to address these  challenges. While there are broader agreements in place between some  federal agencies relating to agency authorities, protocols, and  responsibilities along the southwest border, ACTT- and STC Unified  Command-specific partnership agreements have not been developed or  implemented. Best practices for interagency collaboration call for the  development of written agreements to document collaboration. These  practices indicate that as agencies bring diverse cultures to the  collaborative effort, it is important to address these differences to enable  a cohesive working relationship and to create the mutual trust required to  enhance and sustain the collaborative effort. Written agreements, in part,  provide a legal framework to improve partnerships, facilitate information  exchange, define tasks to be accomplished by each entity, and establish  written assurances of each entity’s commitments.
GAO, Border Security: Partnership Agreements and Enhanced Oversight Could  Strengthen Coordination of Efforts on Indian Reservations, GAO-13-352 (Washington,  D.C.: Apr. 5, 2013). on federal lands. The agreement defines the resource commitments of  each agency related to areas such as operations and training, outlines  common goals, and specifies outreach activities designed to enhance  communication among the parties. In November 2010 we found that  DHS, DOI, and USDA could better implement some provisions of the  agreement; however, we concluded that information sharing among the  parties increased since establishment of the MOU.
Officials from CBP noted that ACTT- and STC Unified Command-specific  partnership agreements do not exist because there is a tendency to  depend on informal relationships among partner agencies and there may  be some concern about making a written commitment, which would hold  agencies accountable for multiagency efforts in addition to their internal  agency initiatives. However, written agreements could serve as a guiding  document or overarching statement of principles for ACTT and STC  Unified Command participants, including specifying the types and levels  of participation and resources by agencies, delineating common  objectives, and defining outreach activities to enhance awareness across  agencies. For example, the ACTT Chief of Staff stated that the ACTT is  facing coordination challenges, such as lack of common objectives, and  noted that a partnership agreement could help document partner  resource commitments and achieve higher-level buy-in to ACTT  objectives and missions. According to this official, establishment of such a  written agreement would need to be initiated at a higher level, such as by  DHS, since many partners are components within larger organizations.  Senior Border Patrol officials in South Texas stated that the STC Unified  Command would also benefit from an overarching written agreement, or  agreements, with partner agencies, which could serve as a road map  among the agencies and could help delineate resource commitments.
In addition, establishing a monitoring mechanism could help better  position DHS to address challenges and strengthen coordination among  DHS components and components from other federal, state, and local  agencies that participate in the ACTT and STC Unified Command. There  is no DHS headquarters-level monitoring mechanism for coordination  among DHS components participating in the ACTT and the STC Unified  Command, or the external coordination efforts of the ACTT or the STC  Unified Command. However, such a mechanism could help DHS, at a  strategic level, to monitor the implementation of any written agreements  to address the coordination challenges we identified, particularly related  to agencies’ resource commitments to the ACTT and STC Unified  Command and establishment of common objectives. For example, as  previously discussed, officials from ACTT and STC Unified Command  partner agencies we interviewed identified challenges associated with  limited partner resource commitments to the collaborative mechanisms.  Written agreements could help document partner resource commitments  to the ACTT and STC Unified Command, and a DHS-level monitoring  mechanism could help the department monitor implementation of  resource commitments identified in the written agreements. Moreover, as  previously discussed, officials from some ACTT and STC Unified  Command partner agencies we interviewed cited challenges related to  lack of common objectives. As the ACTT and STC Unified Command are  led by DHS component agencies, a DHS strategic-level monitoring  mechanism could help support and review the establishment of common  objectives among partner agencies and help better ensure that those  common objectives are appropriately balanced among the missions of  interagency partners.
Officials from both the ACTT and STC have also said that a DHS-level  monitoring mechanism could strengthen these collaborative mechanisms.  For example, ACTT staff members noted that DHS is not involved with  the ACTT and stated that more DHS headquarters involvement is needed  to monitor the whole-of-government effort and to create a unified strategy.  The ACTT Chief of Staff suggested that increased DHS engagement at  the strategic level could improve coordination among DHS component  partners, help better integrate ACTT partners, and serve as an example  for other partners to increase their participation. Moreover, senior STC  headquarters officials stated that operations in the field are evolving more  quickly than operations at the headquarters level, and the success of  collaborative mechanisms is predicated on headquarters-level monitoring.  Further, the Executive Director of the JOD stated that a DHS-level  mechanism to monitor the ACTT and STC Unified Command would help  in ensuring that these mechanisms are operating in a strategic manner.
In addition, an assessment of DHS’s collaborative mechanisms by the  Homeland Security Advisory Council found that DHS’s collaborative  mechanisms would benefit from strategic-level monitoring at the  headquarters level. Specifically, this assessment found that  headquarters-level support could help to set and monitor specific  objectives for the mechanisms and improve outreach to interagency  partners, among other things. Further, in documentation establishing  another border security collaborative mechanism, DHS identified the  importance of a DHS headquarters leadership entity or monitoring  mechanism. For example, the charter establishing DHS’s ACTT in New  Mexico and West Texas stated that a leadership group at the DHS  headquarters level would be beneficial in providing guidance to  collaborative mechanisms, and should be composed of senior officials  from each DHS component.
GAO-13-734. council to oversee coordination efforts or conducting regular progress  reviews.
DHS could benefit from strategic-level monitoring of the ACTT and the  STC Unified Command, as the department is accountable for the  resources that support these mechanisms and ensuring that components,  such as CBP and ICE, are integrated. In addition, DHS is better  positioned than the components to increase collaboration and resolve  potential issues with other departments participating in collaborative  mechanisms, such as the Department of Justice. Specifically, a DHS- level monitoring mechanism could help address the coordination  challenge that the ACTT and the STC Unified Command are facing  related to lack of common objectives across agencies. A department-level  monitoring mechanism could also help better position DHS to ensure that  DHS agencies participating in the ACTT and the STC Unified Command  are following provisions established in any written agreements, including  resource commitments.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Security threats along the southwest border highlight the importance of  integrated operations and interagency coordination with respect to DHS’s  border security efforts. DHS has established collaborative mechanisms in  Arizona and South Texas to help better integrate CBP components and  facilitate coordination with federal, state, local, tribal, and military  homeland security partners. These mechanisms have coordinated CBP  and interagency partner efforts through areas such as information  sharing, resource targeting and prioritization, and leveraging of assets.
DHS and CBP have established processes to report on the results of the  JFC, ACTT, and STC. Although these reporting processes are in place,  opportunities exist for CBP to more thoroughly address integration and  coordination challenges. For example, CBP has not completed an  assessment of the benefits and challenges of the JFC and STC. An  assessment looking across the JFC and STC could help CBP evaluate  the effects of these mechanisms, best practices that could be shared  among the mechanisms, and any areas for possible improvement, such  as management of resources. Moreover, while interagency partners  report benefits of participation in these collaborative mechanisms,  participants we interviewed identified barriers to effective coordination,  including limited partner resource commitments and lack of common  objectives. Written agreements specific to ACTT and STC Unified  Command participation could provide a mechanism to help resolve  coordination issues, such as resource commitments. Further, DHS does  not have a headquarters-level monitoring mechanism to oversee the  interagency coordination efforts of the ACTT or STC Unified Command. A  monitoring mechanism could help address ACTT and STC Unified  Command coordination challenges related to lack of common objectives,  resolve potential issues among interagency partners, and help ensure  that partner agencies are following parameters established in partnership  agreements, including resource commitments. Establishing written  agreements and a monitoring mechanism could be helpful in minimizing  ongoing coordination issues related to the ACTT and the STC Unified  Command and help DHS to develop more effective collaborative field  mechanisms.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To strengthen coordination within the JFC and STC, we recommend that  the Commissioner of CBP complete an assessment of the JFC and STC,  including evaluating the effects of these mechanisms, best practices that  could be shared among the mechanisms, and any areas for possible  improvement, such as management of resources.
To strengthen coordination among partner agencies participating in the  ACTT and the STC Unified Command, we recommend that the Secretary  of Homeland Security take the following two actions:  1.  establish written agreements with interagency partners participating in  the ACTT and the STC Unified Command, and  2.  establish a strategic-level mechanism to monitor the interagency  coordination efforts of the ACTT and the STC Unified Command.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense,  Homeland Security, the Interior, and Justice for review and comment. The  Departments of Defense, the Interior, and Justice did not provide  comments on our draft report. DHS provided written comments, which are  summarized below and reproduced in full in appendix III, and technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS concurred with  the three recommendations in the report and described actions underway  or planned to address them.
With regard to the first recommendation, that CBP complete an  assessment of the JFC and STC, DHS concurred and stated that CBP’s  Joint Operations Directorate will develop a plan to conduct an  assessment of the JFC and STC, including the criteria to be evaluated, a  timeline for the assessment, and courses of action to conduct the  assessment. DHS stated that, based on the plan, the CBP Commissioner  will designate an entity to conduct the assessment. With regard to the  second recommendation, that DHS establish written agreements with  interagency partners participating in the ACTT and the STC Unified  Command, DHS concurred and stated that the department will establish a  process to develop MOUs for coordination mechanisms along the  southern border, including the ACTT and STC Unified Command. DHS  noted that it has already taken initial steps in addressing this  recommendation, such as creating a strategic framework to guide  development of a campaign plan for the southern border. DHS stated  that, once completed, this plan will, among other things, include  approaches for improved information sharing and inform related efforts,  including the development of MOUs with federal, state, local, and  international governments. With regard to the third recommendation, that  DHS establish a strategic-level mechanism to monitor the interagency  coordination efforts of the ACTT and the STC Unified Command, DHS  concurred and stated that the DHS Office of Operations Coordination and  Planning, in coordination with other components, will establish a strategic- level mechanism to monitor the interagency coordination efforts of the  ACTT and STC Unified Command. DHS noted that it has initiated steps  toward addressing this recommendation, such as creating the strategic  framework to guide development of a campaign plan for the southern  border. DHS stated that this plan, once completed, will promote further  development of mechanisms for enhanced strategic-level monitoring and  interagency coordination. If fully implemented, these and other actions  noted in DHS’s written comments should help address the intent of the  recommendations.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, appropriate congressional committees, and other interested  parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report (1) describes how the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) uses collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to  coordinate border security efforts, and (2) examines the extent to which  DHS has established performance measures and reporting processes  and how, if at all, DHS has assessed and monitored the effectiveness of  the collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas.
To address these objectives we visited the Joint Field Command (JFC)  and the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT) in Arizona and  the South Texas Campaign (STC) in South Texas and conducted  interviews with officials in U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)  headquarters. In Arizona, we visited JFC and ACTT headquarters in  Tucson and observed the JFC’s Joint Intelligence and Operations Center  and an ACTT leadership meeting. We also conducted interviews with JFC  and ACTT headquarters officials. In South Texas, we visited STC  headquarters in Laredo, where we observed operations at Border Patrol  checkpoints and ports of entry (POE) as well as the South Texas Border  Intelligence Center, and conducted interviews with STC headquarters  officials. During our site visits to Arizona and South Texas, we also met  with officials from the Office of Field Operations (OFO), Border Patrol,  and the Office of Air and Marine (OAM). Additionally, we conducted  semistructured interviews via telephone with CBP component officials in  Arizona and South Texas. We selected nonprobability samples of 5 CBP  component locations from the 21 CBP component locations in Arizona  and 5 CBP component locations from the 43 CBP component locations in  the South Texas region. Concerning the JFC, we conducted interviews  with officials from the Yuma and Casa Grande Border Patrol stations, the  Nogales and San Luis POEs, and the Tucson Air Branch. Regarding the  STC, we conducted interviews with officials from the McAllen and Laredo  South Border Patrol stations, the Brownsville and Eagle Pass POEs, and  the McAllen Air Branch. We selected these JFC and STC component  locations based on (1) the type of component (Border Patrol station, OFO  POE, or OAM air branch), (2) the level of threat as defined by the number  of CBP apprehensions of illegal entrants, and (3) geographic location.
Further, we conducted semistructured interviews via telephone with  officials from interagency partners participating in the ACTT and the STC  Unified Command. We selected nonprobability samples of 6 ACTT  partners from the 66 ACTT partners in Arizona and 6 STC Unified  Command partners from the 33 STC Unified Command partners in South  Texas. With respect to the ACTT, we interviewed officials from the U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), National Park Service,  Arizona National Guard, Arizona Department of Public Safety, Sierra  Vista Police Department, and Tohono O’odham Police Department.  Regarding the STC Unified Command, we interviewed officials from the  CBP Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol station; CBP Laredo Field Office;  Drug Enforcement Administration (Houston); ICE (San Antonio); Bureau  of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (San Antonio); and the  U.S. Assistant Attorney’s Office (Laredo). We selected these agencies  based on a range of factors, including (1) type of governmental unit  (federal, state/county, local, tribal, or military), and (2) the level of  participation in the mechanism as defined by leadership role. While we  cannot generalize information obtained from these interviews to all CBP  component offices and intergovernmental partners in Arizona and South  Texas, we selected these locations and partners to provide examples of  the way CBP has integrated and coordinated border security efforts. We  used the results of semistructured interviews with CBP component offices  in the field and interagency partners to identify the primary areas of  integration and coordination of the collaborative mechanisms.
To describe how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) uses  collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to coordinate  border security efforts, we reviewed program documentation and  interviewed officials from CBP. Specifically, we reviewed documents  obtained from JFC, ACTT, and STC officials covering the time frame  2009 through 2014, such as charter documents, establishment memos,  and organizational charts, to identify the structure and roles and  responsibilities for each mechanism. We also reviewed campaign and  operational plans, as well as performance reports, to determine  coordination efforts of the mechanisms. Further, we interviewed CBP  headquarters officials, including officials from the Office of Administration  (OA) and the Joint Operations Directorate (JOD), regarding DHS’s  coordination efforts in Arizona and South Texas.
To examine the extent to which DHS has established performance  measures and reporting processes and how, if at all, DHS has assessed  and monitored the effectiveness of the collaborative mechanisms in  Arizona and South Texas, we analyzed campaign plans, after-action  reports, and accomplishment reports from 2011 through 2014 obtained  from the collaborative mechanisms to determine what measures are in  place to track program results and outcomes. In addition, we conducted  interviews with officials from Border Patrol, OFO, and OAM headquarters  to determine the extent to which CBP and its components are assessing  the benefits and challenges of the JFC, ACTT, and STC. We used our  interviews with CBP’s JOD and OA to determine the extent to which CBP  is evaluating the JFC and STC mechanisms to identify challenges and  potential best practices for replication. Additionally, we reviewed  partnership agreements in place among interagency partners in Arizona  and South Texas, as well as a previous DHS assessment of collaborative  mechanisms in the field. We evaluated CBP’s integration and  coordination efforts against best practices for implementing interagency  collaboration. We also compared CBP’s monitoring efforts against  criteria in the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to June 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: List of Partners in the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats and South Texas Campaign Unified Command
subsections: section_title: Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats
paragraphs: U.S. Border Patrol Tucson and Yuma Sectors  U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Field Operations  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security  Investigations (HSI)
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Enforcement and Removal  Operations (ERO)
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
U.S. Attorney’s Office  U.S. Department of the Interior  Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
section_title: South Texas Campaign Unified Command
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Jeanette Espínola (Assistant  Director), David Alexander, Molly Callaghan, Frances Cook, Joseph Cruz,  Anthony Fernandez, Eric Hauswirth, Lauren Membreno, and Jessica Orr  made key contributions to the report.