Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted Personnel Recruitment and Retention Challenges
Published: 2005-11-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) must recruit and retain hundreds of thousands of servicemembers each year to carry out its missions, including providing support in connection with events such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In addition to meeting legislatively mandated aggregate personnel levels, each military component must also meet its authorized personnel requirements for each occupational specialty. DOD reports that over half of today's youth cannot meet the military's entry standards for education, aptitude, health, moral character, or other requirements, making recruiting a significant challenge. GAO, under the Comptroller General's authority (1) assessed the extent to which DOD's active, reserve, and National Guard components met their enlisted aggregate recruiting and retention goals; (2) assessed the extent to which the components met their authorized personnel levels for enlisted occupational specialties; and (3) analyzed the steps DOD has taken to address recruiting and retention challenges.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD's active, reserve, and National Guard components met most aggregate recruiting and retention goals for enlisted personnel from fiscal years (FY) 2000-2004. However, for FY 2005, 5 of 10 components--the Army, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Air National Guard, and Navy Reserve--missed their recruiting goals by 8 to 20 percent. Most of the components met their aggregate retention goals for FY 2000-2004, but the Navy experienced shortages in FY 2005 of up to 8 percent. Also, factors such as the shrinking numbers of new recruits in delayed entry programs and the use of stop loss, which delays servicemembers from leaving active duty, indicate that the components may experience future recruiting challenges. All components exceeded authorized personnel levels for some occupational specialties and did not meet others. Specifically, GAO found that 19 percent of DOD's 1,484 occupational specialties were consistently overfilled and 41 percent were consistently underfilled from FY 2000-2005. While the components offered reasons why occupational specialties may be over- or underfilled, GAO believes that consistently over- and underfilled occupational specialties are a systemic problem for DOD that raises two critical questions. First, what is the cost to the taxpayer to retain thousands more personnel than necessary in consistently overfilled occupational specialties? Second, how can DOD components continue to effectively execute their mission with consistently underfilled occupational specialties? In FY 2005, almost 31,000 more servicemembers than authorized served in occupational specialties that have been consistently overfilled. GAO determined that it costs the federal government about $103,000 annually, on average, to compensate each enlisted active duty servicemember in FY 2004. In contrast, DOD was unable to fill over 112,000 positions in consistently underfilled occupational specialties, raising concerns about the validity of the authorized personnel levels. DOD requires the active components to report on critical occupational specialties for recruiting and retention, which amounts to at most 16 percent of their 625 specialties. However, DOD does not require them to report on their noncritical occupational specialties, and does not require the reserve or National Guard components to report on any of their 859 specialties. Consequently, DOD does not have the necessary information to develop an effective plan to address the root causes of the components' recruiting and retention challenges. DOD has taken steps to enhance recruiting and retention, but lacks information on financial incentives provided for certain occupational specialties. GAO found that the components offered financial incentives to servicemembers in consistently overfilled occupational specialties. However, because DOD only requires the components to provide minimal justification for their use of financial incentives, it lacks the information needed to provide assurance to the Secretary of Defense, Congress, and the taxpayer that the increasing amount of funding spent on recruiting and retention is appropriately and effectively targeted to occupational specialties for which the components have the greatest need.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) faces a significant challenge in  recruiting and retaining hundreds of thousands of new servicemembers  each year, not only to meet annual legislatively mandated aggregate  personnel levels, but also to meet authorized personnel requirements  within its hundreds of occupational specialties. To further complicate an  already challenging recruiting environment, DOD reports that over half of  today’s youth between the ages of 16 and 21 are not qualified to serve in the  military because they fail to meet the military’s entry standards for  education, aptitude, health, moral character, or other requirements.  Furthermore, parents, teachers, and other influencers are less inclined to  encourage young people to join the military. In fiscal year 2005 alone, DOD  had goals to recruit almost 170,000 personnel into its active duty forces and  about 131,000 personnel into its reserve and National Guard components.  Additionally, in 2005, DOD had to retain tens of thousands of personnel to  sustain its force of about 2.7 million military servicemembers. Today’s  immediate military recruiting and retention challenge centers on the  continuing deployment of over 180,000 ground forces from the active,  reserve, and National Guard components to the war zone in Iraq. Military  officials have testified that fiscal year 2005 proved to be a difficult  recruiting year and believe the recruiting environment will become even  more challenging in fiscal year 2006.
The key to managing the force to meet operational demands is for DOD’s  components to balance accessions and losses within the confines of their  legislatively mandated personnel levels. However, simply meeting these  mandated aggregate personnel levels could present a misleading picture of  recruiting and retention challenges. Detailed information concerning  whether the components have met their authorized personnel levels for  occupational specialties, the reasons why certain occupational specialties  may be over- or underfilled, and justifications for the use of incentives  provided to servicemembers are important elements of an effective  recruiting and retention plan.
Given the extraordinary scope of the current military overseas operational  commitments, many members of Congress have expressed considerable  interest in DOD’s ability to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of  servicemembers with the required skills and experience to accomplish its  multiple missions. In response to this broad congressional interest, we  undertook a review, under the authority of the Comptroller General, of  military recruiting and retention. In March 2005, we submitted a statement  for the record to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on  Armed Services, House of Representatives, which outlined our preliminary  observations on DOD’s enlisted personnel recruiting and retention issues.  This report, which updates that statement, addresses enlisted  servicemembers only. Specifically, for this report we: (1) assessed the  extent to which DOD’s active, reserve, and National Guard components  met their enlisted aggregate recruiting and retention goals; (2) assessed the  extent to which the components met their authorized personnel levels for  enlisted occupational specialties; and (3) analyzed the steps DOD has taken  to address recruiting and retention challenges.
To address these objectives, we examined DOD policies, regulations, and  directives related to recruiting and retention of military servicemembers.  We also reviewed recruiting and retention reports and briefings issued by  GAO, DOD, the military services, the Congressional Research Service, the  Congressional Budget Office, and research organizations such as RAND.  Additionally, we visited and interviewed officials within the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and DOD’s 10  components, including the active duty, reserve, and National Guard  components’ headquarters and their recruiting commands to obtain  insights into recruiting and retention challenges. We also analyzed  individual component databases containing recruiting and retention data  on active, reserve, and Guard servicemembers. We relied primarily on data  covering fiscal years 2000 through June 30, 2005, the last fiscal quarter for  which data were complete, but in certain cases, we were able to update the  data with more current information. We also determined that the data used  in this report were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted our  work from January 2005 through October 2005 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Additional information  on our scope and methodology is presented in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Conditions today present some of the most difficult recruiting and  retention challenges DOD has experienced in recent history. Since the  September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, DOD has  launched three major military operations requiring significant numbers of  military servicemembers: Operation Noble Eagle, which covers military  operations related to homeland security; Operation Enduring Freedom,  which includes ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and certain  other countries; and Operation Iraqi Freedom, which includes ongoing  military operations in Iraq. These military operations have greatly  increased personnel tempo, especially in the Army, Marine Corps, Army  National Guard, and Army Reserve, which have provided the bulk of the  military servicemembers for operations in Iraq. Additionally, when  Hurricanes Katrina and Rita hit the Gulf Coast in August and September  2005, respectively, resulting in possibly the largest natural disaster relief  and recovery operations in U.S. history, DOD was called upon to provide  extensive search and rescue, evacuation, and medical support.
DOD relies on four active components—the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and  Air Force—and four reserve and two National Guard components—the  Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve,  Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve—to meet its mission. Each  year, Congress authorizes an annual year-end authorized personnel level  for each component. In fiscal year 2005, the authorized personnel levels for  the four active, four reserve, and two National Guard components totaled  approximately 2.3 million military servicemembers. In order to meet  legislatively mandated authorized personnel levels, DOD must balance  accessions and losses. Meeting this authorization requirement is a function  of recruiting and retention.
The term recruiting refers to the military components’ ability to bring new  members into the military to carry out mission-essential tasks in the near  term and to begin creating a sufficient pool of entry-level servicemembers  to develop into future midlevel and upper-level military leaders. To  accomplish this task, active, reserve, and National Guard components set  goals for accessions, or new recruits, who will enter basic training each  year, and strive to meet their annual goals through their recruiting  programs; advertising; and, where needed, financial incentives. The term  retention refers to the military services’ ability to retain servicemembers  with the necessary skills and experience. Again, the components rely on  financial incentives, where needed, to meet their retention goals.
The components further delineate their force structure through  occupational specialties. These occupational specialties, totaling about  1,500 across DOD in the active, reserve, and National Guard components,  represent the jobs that are necessary for the components to meet their  specific missions. These occupational specialties cover a variety of jobs,  such as infantrymen, dental technicians, personnel clerks, journalists, and  air traffic controllers.
section_title: DOD’s Components Met Most Aggregate Recruiting and Retention Goals in the Past 6 Fiscal Years, but Recent Trends Prompt Concerns
paragraphs: While DOD’s active, reserve, and National Guard components met most of  their aggregate recruiting and retention goals in the past 6 fiscal years, they  faced greater recruiting difficulties in fiscal year 2005. With respect to  recruiting, most components met overall goals from fiscal years 2000  through 2004, but 5 of the 10 components experienced recruiting  difficulties in fiscal year 2005. Most components also met their aggregate  retention goals in the past 6 fiscal years, but the Navy experienced  retention shortages in fiscal year 2005. We note, however, that the  components have taken certain actions that suggest they may be  challenged to meet future recruiting and retention goals.
subsections: section_title: Components Generally Met Aggregate Recruiting Goals in Past 6 Fiscal Years, but Five Components Experienced Recruiting Difficulties in Fiscal Year 2005
paragraphs: The active, reserve, and National Guard components generally met their  aggregate recruiting goals for enlisted servicemembers for the past 6 fiscal  years, but 5 of the 10 components experienced recruiting difficulties in  2005. DOD’s recruiting data presented in table 1 show that with the  exception of the Army, all of the active duty components met their overall  recruiting goals. By the end of fiscal year 2005, the Army achieved about 92  percent of its recruiting goal.
Table 2 shows that, while DOD’s reserve and National Guard components  generally met or exceeded their enlisted aggregate recruiting goals for  fiscal years 2000 through 2004, four components missed their recruiting  goals in 1 or 2 years during that period by 6 to 20 percent. For example, the  Army National Guard achieved 82 percent and 87 percent of its recruiting  objectives in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, respectively, and the Air National  Guard achieved 87 percent and 94 percent of its recruiting objectives in  fiscal years 2001 and 2004, respectively. Additionally, in fiscal year 2000,  both the Navy Reserve and Air Force Reserve missed their recruiting goals  by 19 percent and 20 percent, respectively.
Reserve and National Guard recruiting data through the end of fiscal year  2005 show that the reserve and National Guard components experienced  difficulties in meeting their 2005 aggregate recruiting goals. Only the  Marine Corps Reserve, achieving 102 percent, and the Air Force Reserve,  achieving 113 percent, surpassed their goals. The Army Reserve achieved  84 percent of its overall recruiting goal; the Army National Guard, 80  percent; the Air National Guard, 86 percent; and the Navy Reserve, 88  percent. Appendix II contains more detailed information on components’  recruiting goals and achievements.
section_title: Components Met Aggregate Retention Goals in Past 6 Fiscal Years, but the Navy Experienced Retention Difficulties in Fiscal Year 2005
paragraphs: As with recruiting, the active, reserve, and National Guard components  generally met or surpassed their enlisted aggregate retention goals during  the past 6 fiscal years, but in fiscal year 2005, 1 of the 10 components  experienced retention shortages. DOD’s active components track retention  by years of service and first, second, or subsequent enlistments. Table 3  shows that from fiscal years 2000 through 2004, the Army met all of its  retention goals and that the 3 remaining active components missed some of  their retention goals in 1 or 2 years during that period by at most 8 percent.  For example, the Air Force did not meet its goal for second term  reenlistments by up to 8 percent during this period. In fact, the Air Force  did not meet this goal in 4 of the past 6 fiscal years and missed its goal for  career third-term reenlistments in 2000, 2001, and 2002. The Navy did not  meet its goal for reenlistments among enlisted servicemembers who have  served from 10 to 14 years in 3 of the past 5 fiscal years, and the Marine  Corps did not meet its goal for subsequent reenlistments in fiscal year 2003  only.
In fiscal year 2005, retention data again show most active components  generally met their enlisted aggregate retention goals, with the exception of  the Navy. The Navy did not meet its end-of-year retention goals for  servicemembers with less than 6 years of service by about 2 percent, and  for servicemembers with 6 to 10 years of service by about 8 percent.  Appendix III contains more detailed information on active components’  retention goals and achievements.
DOD tracks reserve and National Guard components’ retention through  attrition rates, a measure of the ratio of people who leave those  components in a given year compared to the components’ total authorized  personnel levels. These components establish attrition goals, which  represent the maximum percentage of the force that they can lose each  year and still meet authorized personnel levels. Annual attrition ceilings  were originally established in fiscal year 2000 and have remained  unchanged for each of the components.  Table 4 shows that the reserve and  National Guard components were generally at or below their attrition  thresholds, thereby meeting their retention goals. Only three components,  the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and Air National Guard exceeded  their attrition thresholds during fiscal years 2000 through 2003, and these  thresholds were exceeded by about 1 percentage point or less.
section_title: Several Factors Suggest Recruiting and Retention Difficulties Are Likely to Continue
paragraphs: Several factors suggest the components are likely to continue experiencing  difficulties in meeting their aggregate recruiting and retention goals in the  future. DOD previously reported that over half of today’s youth between  the ages of 16 and 21 are not qualified to serve in the military because they  fail to meet the military’s entry standards. In addition, all active  components are experiencing reduced numbers of applicants in their  delayed entry programs. Also, each of the components initiated a stop loss  program at various times in the past 6 fiscal years that prevented  servicemembers from leaving active duty after they completed their  obligations, although the Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve  are the only components still employing stop loss. Furthermore, the Army  Reserve has recalled members of the Individual Ready Reserve.
subsections: section_title: Delayed Entry Program
paragraphs: All of the active components are experiencing shrinking numbers of new  recruits in their delayed entry programs. According to a DOD official from  the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the delayed entry program is viewed  as a depository for future soldiers, sailors, and airmen.  When prospects  sign their contracts, they enter into the pool of applicants awaiting the date  that they report to basic training. While in the delayed entry program, the  applicants are the responsibility of the recruiter and, as such, are taught  basic military protocols and procedures, such as saluting and rank  recognition. Applicants generally spend no more than a year in the delayed  entry program and no less than 10 days. Before being released from the  delayed entry program, applicants are medically qualified, take an initial  oath of enlistment, and perform other personal business prior to reporting  to basic training. According to the same DOD official, a healthy delayed  entry program is imperative to a successful recruiting year. If the active  components come in at or near their delayed entry program goals for the  year, they can be relatively sure they will achieve their annual recruiting  goals. If they fall short of their delayed entry program goals, the  components try to make up the shortfalls by sending individuals to basic  training as early as the same month in which they sign enlistment papers.
Typically, the active components prefer to enter a fiscal year with 35  percent to 65 percent of their coming year’s accession goals, depending on  the component, already filled by recruits in the delayed entry program.  Figure 1 shows the percentage of new recruits in the delayed entry  programs compared to the components’ goals for fiscal years 2003 through  2006. For example, the Army’s goal is to enter each fiscal year with 35  percent of its upcoming annual accession goal already in the delayed entry  program. The Army exceeded this goal when it entered fiscal year 2004  with 46 percent of its annual accession goal already in the program.  However, it entered fiscal year 2005 with only 25 percent of its accession  goal in the program and, as of August 2005, is projected to enter fiscal year  2006 with 4 percent of its accession goal in the program. The Navy, with an  annual goal of 65 percent for its delayed entry program, is projected to  enter fiscal year 2006 with almost 36 percent of its accession goal in the  program. The Marine Corps, with an annual delayed entry program goal of  43 percent, entered fiscal year 2004 well above this goal, with 71 percent of  its accession goal in the program, 54 percent in 2005, and a projected 26  percent in fiscal year 2006. Similarly, the Air Force, with a delayed entry  program goal of 43 percent, projected to enter fiscal year 2006 with almost  22 percent of its accession goal in the program. The fact that all the active  duty components entered fiscal year 2006 with at least 40 percent fewer  recruits in their delayed entry programs than desired suggests that the  active duty components will likely face recruiting difficulties in fiscal year  2006.
Although some components have employed stop loss over the past several  years, the Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard are the only  components currently using it. The stop loss program, according to several  Army officials, is used primarily for units that are deployed and is intended  to maintain unit cohesion. A DOD official told us that in June 2005, the  Army stop loss program affected over 15,000 soldiers, or less than one- tenth of a percent of DOD’s total military force—9,044 active component  soldiers, 3,762 reserve soldiers, and 2,480 National Guard soldiers.  The  active Army and Army Reserve stop loss program takes effect 90 days prior  to unit deployment or with official deployment order notification, and  remains in effect through the date of redeployment to permanent duty  stations, plus a maximum of 90 days.  Army headquarters’ officials said that  several Army initiatives, such as restructuring and rebalancing the active  and reserve component mix, will, over time, eliminate the need for stop  loss.  Congress has expressed concern that the use of stop loss to meet  overall personnel requirements may have a negative impact on recruiting  and retention and the public’s perception of the military. Another Army  official told us that the attention this program has received in the media  may have created some of the negative implications on the public’s  perception of military service. Additionally, an Army Reserve official we  spoke with stated that when active duty units are affected by stop loss,  servicemembers who have not completed their military obligations in those  units may be delayed in transitioning from active duty into the reserve or  National Guard components, potentially creating more difficulties for these  components to meet their recruiting and retention goals.
section_title: Individual Ready Reserve
paragraphs: The Army Reserve has also recalled members of the Individual Ready  Reserve—which, according to an Army Reserve official, is used to fill  personnel shortfalls in active, reserve, and National Guard units—to  address recruiting and retention difficulties. All soldiers, whether in an  active, reserve, or National Guard component, agree to at least an 8-year  service commitment in their initial enlistment contracts. This obligation  exists regardless of how much time is to be served in the active, reserve, or  National Guard component, or some combination of the active and reserve  or National Guard components under the enlistment contract. If the soldier  is separated from the active duty Army, reserve, or National Guard  component before the 8-year commitment has been completed, the soldier  may elect to remain in active duty Army, affiliate with the reserves, or be  assigned to the Individual Ready Reserve. In the latter case,  servicemembers are subject to recall, if needed. Almost 7,000 soldiers,  including about 600 servicemembers who volunteered to serve and about  6,400 others under contractual obligation, have been deployed from the Individual Ready Reserve since 2002. As of August 2005, over 4,000 of these  soldiers were still on active duty, serving a maximum of 2 years.
section_title: Components Have Exceeded Authorized Personnel Levels for Some Occupational Specialties and Experienced Shortages in Others
paragraphs: All components exceeded authorized personnel levels for some  occupational specialties and did not meet others. Specifically, we found  certain occupational specialties have been consistently over- or underfilled  when compared to their actual personnel authorizations. We believe these  consistently overfilled and underfilled occupational specialties raise  critical questions. First, what is the cost to the taxpayer to retain thousands  more personnel than necessary in consistently overfilled occupational  specialties? Second, how can DOD components continue to effectively  execute their mission with consistently underfilled occupational  specialties? However, because DOD lacks information from the  components on all over- and underfilled occupational specialties, including  reasons why these occupational specialties are over- and underfilled, it  cannot address these questions and develop a plan to assist the  components in addressing the root causes of its recruiting and retention  challenges.
subsections: section_title: Certain Occupational Specialties Have Been Consistently Over- or Underfilled Compared to Their Authorized Personnel Levels
paragraphs: Of nearly 1,500 enlisted occupational specialties across DOD, about 19  percent were consistently overfilled and about 41 percent were  consistently underfilled from fiscal years 2000 through 2005, as shown in  figure 2. In fiscal year 2005 alone, within the occupational specialties that  consistently exceeded authorization, there were almost 31,000 more  servicemembers in these occupational specialties than authorized. At the  same time, DOD was not able to fill over 112,000 positions in consistently  underfilled occupational specialties.
The percentage of consistently over- and underfilled occupational  specialties varies across the components. For example, from fiscal years  2000 through 2005, the percentage of consistently overfilled occupational  specialties ranged from 1 percent in the active Navy to 44 percent in the  Navy Reserve. Similarly, from fiscal years 2000 through 2005, the  percentage of consistently underfilled occupational specialties ranged from  16 percent in the active Army to 65 percent in the active Navy. Table 5  provides information on consistently over- and underfilled occupational  specialties for each component. Appendix IV provides more detailed  information on the occupational specialties that were consistently over-  and underfilled for each component.
Our analysis further shows the number of servicemembers that exceeded  the authorizations assigned to occupational specialties ranged from just 1  servicemember to almost 6,000 servicemembers. For example, the active  Army Reserve Technical Engineer occupational specialty was overfilled by  1 servicemember in fiscal year 2000, and the active Navy Seaman  occupational specialty was overfilled by almost 6,000 servicemembers in  that same year. Similarly, we found shortages in the number of  servicemembers assigned to occupational specialties ranged from just 1  servicemember to over 8,200 servicemembers. For example, the Marine  Corps Reserve Parachute Rigger occupational specialty was underfilled by  1 servicemember in fiscal year 2000 and the active Navy Hospital Corpsman  occupational specialty was underfilled by over 8,200 servicemembers in  that same year.
Table 6 presents several reasons provided by component officials to  explain why certain occupational specialties have been consistently  overfilled. For example, an Air Force Reserve official told us that this  component recruited more Tactical Aircraft Avionics Systems personnel  than authorized because it is a high-demand, technical occupational  specialty that is critical to one of the Air Force Reserve’s missions. As a  result, this occupational specialty has been consistently overfilled by about  160 to 240 individuals each year for the past 6 years. Furthermore, we  found that the Army’s Cavalry Scout occupational specialty was overfilled  by over 200 to almost 1,000 individuals in the past 5 years and an Army  official stated that this occupational specialty was anticipated to increase  its personnel authorization levels. According to Army projections, the  current strength is still 1,700 short of the fiscal year 2007 target. Moreover,  several component officials told us that some of their occupational  specialties have consistently been overfilled because their components  needed to meet legislatively mandated aggregate personnel levels, and to  do so, they assigned personnel to occupational specialties that did not  necessarily need additional personnel.
Table 6 also presents several reasons provided by component officials to  explain why certain occupational specialties have been consistently  underfilled. For example, component officials told us that extensive  training requirements have led the Army’s Special Forces Medical Sergeant,  the Army National Guard’s Power-Generation Equipment Repairer, and the  Marine Corps’s Counterintelligence Specialist occupational specialties to  be consistently underfilled for the last 5 or 6 years. Furthermore, an official  in the Army National Guard stated that the occupational specialty, Motor  Transport Operator, was consistently underfilled by at least 1,800 to about  4,800 individuals in the past 6 years because the entire nation is short of  truck drivers, which poses a recruiting challenge.
We believe that consistently over- and underfilled occupational specialties  are a systemic problem for DOD that raises questions about the validity of  occupational specialty authorizations. The fact that DOD has consistently  experienced almost 280 overfilled occupational specialties raises particular  questions about affordability. We determined that it cost the federal  government about $103,000 annually, on average, to compensate each  enlisted active duty servicemember in fiscal year 2004. Accordingly,  compensating the almost 31,000 servicemembers who served in  occupational specialties that exceeded authorized personnel levels for  fiscal year 2005 was costly. Similarly, the consistently underfilled  occupational specialties raise the question about the components’ ability to  continue to achieve their mission. The fact that over 112,000 positions in  consistently underfilled occupational specialties were vacant in fiscal year  2005 raises concerns about whether the authorized personnel levels for  these occupational specialties are based on valid requirements.
section_title: DOD Lacks Information on Recruiting and Retention Challenges for All Over- and Underfilled Occupational Specialties
paragraphs: While the active components have started reporting information to DOD on  certain occupational specialties, the department currently lacks  information on all occupational specialties, which prevents a complete  understanding of the components’ recruiting and retention challenges. The  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) for Personnel and  Readiness directed the active components to report their critical  occupational specialties for recruiting, beginning in 2004, in OUSD’s  personnel and readiness report—an update provided to the Secretary of  Defense each quarter. Table 7 provides the OUSD-defined criteria for  occupational specialties that are critical for recruiting. An occupational  specialty must meet at least one criterion to be considered critical; the fact  that an occupational specialty is underfilled is only one of the criteria.  Accordingly, the active components identify and report to OUSD about 10  percent of their occupational specialties that they deem critical for  recruiting. For example, in OUSD’s third quarter fiscal year 2005 personnel  and readiness report to the Secretary of Defense, the active components  reported accessions information on 67 occupational specialties. In  addition, the active components reported the reason why the occupational  specialties reported were deemed critical, the accession goal for these  occupational specialties, and year-to-date accessions achieved. Beginning  in 2005, OUSD further directed the active components to report critical  occupational specialties for retention as well. Table 7 also provides the  OUSD-defined criteria for occupational specialties that are critical for  retention. In fiscal year 2005, each of the active components reported 10  occupational specialties, for a total of 40 occupational specialties, which  they deemed critical for retention. Again, the active components reported  the reason why the occupational specialties reported were deemed critical;  the retention goal; number of personnel retained to date; and the number of  servicemembers authorized and assigned, or the fill rate, for each  occupational specialty reported. These 40 occupational specialties,  however, represent only 6 percent of the 625 total active duty occupational  specialties. Collectively, the critical occupational specialties (such as Army  Infantrymen and Marine Corps Counter Intelligence Specialists) that the  active components report on represent at most 16 percent of the 625 active  duty occupational specialties. Therefore, OUSD is not receiving  information on at least 84 percent of active duty occupational specialties.  Furthermore, the reserve and National Guard components are not required  to report to OUSD any information on their combined 859 occupational  specialties. This means that OUSD receives fill rate information on less  than 3 percent of all occupational specialties.
In July 2005, DOD issued Directive 1304.20 that requires the components to  meet aggregate and occupational-specialty-specific authorized personnel  levels. However, this directive does not include any reporting requirements  and therefore does not specifically require the components to report on  over- and underfilled occupational specialties. Until all components are  required to provide complete information on all over- and underfilled  occupational specialties, including reasons why these occupational  specialties are over- and underfilled, and DOD determines if the new  directive is having its desired effect, the department cannot develop an  effective plan to assist the components in addressing the root causes of  recruiting and retention challenges. Moreover, DOD is not in the position to  assess the economic impact on the taxpayer of thousands of consistently  overfilled occupational specialties or determine whether it can continue to  effectively execute the mission requirements with consistently underfilled  occupational specialties.
section_title: DOD Has Taken Steps to Enhance Recruiting and Retention Efforts, but Limited Information Makes It Difficult to Determine Financial Incentives’ Effectiveness
paragraphs: DOD’s components spend hundreds of millions of dollars each year on  programs to enhance their recruiting and retention efforts; however, the  department lacks the information needed to determine whether financial  incentives are targeted most effectively. Budgets for these programs— recruiting, advertising, and financial incentives—have fluctuated over the  last 6 fiscal years. Specifically, in fiscal year 2005, five components  increased their recruiter forces and three components revised their  advertising programs. Additionally, various components increased  enlistment and reenlistment bonuses to enhance recruiting and retention  for specific occupational specialties. However, because OUSD does not  require the components to fully justify the financial incentives paid to  servicemembers in all occupational specialties, DOD lacks the information  needed to ensure that funding spent on recruiting and retention is  appropriately and effectively targeted to occupational specialties for which  the components have the greatest need or to determine if other types of  corrective action are needed. In fact, our analysis shows that components  offered some of these incentives to servicemembers in consistently  overfilled occupational specialties.
subsections: section_title: Recruiting Programs, Advertising, and Financial Incentive Budgets Have Fluctuated
paragraphs: Budget data for fiscal years 2000 through 2006 show that DOD’s recruiting  programs, advertising, and financial incentive budgets fluctuated from  $1.7 billion to $2.1 billion during those years, and that DOD spent a total of  $9.9 billion on these programs over the first 5 years. Fiscal years 2005 and  2006 budget estimates for these programs total $1.7 billion and $1.8 billion,  respectively.
DOD’s overall annual expenditures for recruiting programs fluctuated from  approximately $631.6 million to $800.7 million from fiscal years 2000 to  2004, and budgeted estimates of recruiting expenditures for fiscal year 2005  were $639.5 million, and for fiscal year 2006, $726.2 million. These  recruiting expenditures cover essential items for recruiting commands and  stations throughout the United States, including meals, lodging, and travel  of applicants; recruiter expenses; vehicle operation and maintenance;  office spaces; and other incidental expenses. Figure 3 shows actual  recruiting expenditures for fiscal years 2000 through 2004 and budgeted  recruiting expenditures for fiscal years 2005 and 2006.
DOD’s annual advertising expenditures fluctuated from approximately  $506.6 million to $663.0 million from fiscal years 2000 to 2004, and  budgeted advertising expenditures for fiscal year 2005 were $570.7 million,  and for fiscal year 2006, $543.9 million—a decrease of almost $27 million.  Figure 4 shows actual advertising expenditures for fiscal years 2000  through 2004 and budgeted advertising expenditures for fiscal years 2005  and 2006.
DOD’s annual expenditures for enlistment bonuses—targeted to new  recruits—fluctuated from approximately $162.1 million to $301.2 million  from fiscal years 2000 to 2004, and budgeted enlistment bonus  expenditures for fiscal year 2005 were $149.3 million, and for fiscal year  2006, $175.0 million. Figure 5 shows actual enlistment bonus expenditures  for fiscal years 2000 through 2004 and budgeted enlistment bonus  expenditures for fiscal years 2005 and 2006.
DOD’s total expenditures for selective reenlistment bonuses—targeted to  servicemembers already in the military who reenlist for an additional  number of years—fluctuated from approximately $420.5 million to  $551.6 million from fiscal years 2000 to 2004, and budgeted reenlistment  bonus expenditures for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 were $346.1 million and  $387.7 million, respectively. Our analysis of actual expenditures for  reenlistment bonuses in fiscal year 2005 for the active Navy, Marine Corps,  and Air Force officials, show their expenditures to be within $13.5 million,  $4.8 million, and $11.0 million of their budgeted amounts, respectively.  However, it is significant to note that the active Army component spent  approximately $426.0 million on reenlistment bonuses in fiscal year 2005,  or almost eight times more than its budgeted amount of $54.3 million, to  meet its retention goals. Figure 6 shows actual selective reenlistment  bonus expenditures for fiscal years 2000 through 2004 and budgeted  selective reenlistment bonus expenditures for fiscal years 2005 and 2006.
section_title: Five Components Have Increased Number of Recruiters
paragraphs: While the actual number of recruiters fluctuated for all components from  fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, five components—the Army, Army  Reserve, Air Force, Air National Guard, and Army National Guard— increased their numbers of recruiters between fiscal years 2004 and 2005.  Table 8 shows that the Army added almost 1,300 recruiters for a total of  6,262 recruiters, and the Army Reserve added over 450 recruiters for a total  of 1,296 recruiters from September 2004 through June 2005. The Air Force  and Air National Guard also increased their number of recruiters, from  1,480 to 1,487, and from 373 to 376, respectively. Of all the components, the  Army National Guard has shown the greatest increase in its recruiter  force—increasing the total number of recruiters from 2,702 in fiscal year  2004 to 4,448 in fiscal year 2005.
section_title: Some Components Have Made Adjustments to Their Advertising Programs
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2005, the Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard  made specific adjustments to their advertising programs. A primary focus  of their recent advertising efforts has shifted to the “influencers,” those  individuals who play a pivotal role in a potential recruit’s decision to join  the military, including parents, teachers, coaches, other school officials,  and extended family members. For example, the Army focused efforts on  using its recruiting Web site as a vehicle to provide video testimonials of  soldiers explaining, in their own words, what it means to be a soldier and  why others should enlist. The Army and Army Reserve increased support to  local recruiters through more public affairs efforts and by encouraging  command support of their Special Recruiter Assistance Program. This  program offers soldiers who have served in Operation Iraqi Freedom or  Operation Enduring Freedom the opportunity to return to their hometowns  and assist the local recruiters in gaining high school graduate leads and  enlistments.
Army officials stated that this program not only improves the number of  contacts it makes, but it also provides interested individuals with a  different perspective on operations overseas, which can assist in  counteracting some of the negative information potential recruits receive  from the media or influencers. The Army National Guard refocused its  advertising by standardizing the appearance of its storefront recruiting  offices to increase recognition and opening career centers in locations that  provided it greater market exposure and access to the target populations.  Additionally, the Army National Guard initiated a new “American Soldier”  campaign that refines its message since September 11, 2001, and reflects  the new realities of a prolonged recruiting and retention environment.
section_title: Some DOD Components Have Increased Financial Incentives to Recruits and Servicemembers
paragraphs: DOD components also made adjustments to their financial incentives—the  most costly of the three tools—to improve their ability to recruit and retain  servicemembers. Over the last fiscal year, DOD made changes to existing  financial incentives and introduced new financial incentives. For example,  DOD expanded the pool of servicemembers who are eligible to receive a  selective reenlistment bonus. Selective reenlistment bonuses are designed  to provide a financial incentive for an adequate number of qualified mid- career enlisted members to reenlist in designated “critical” occupational  specialties where retention levels are insufficient to sustain current or  projected levels necessary for a component to accomplish its mission. The  statutory authority for this bonus was amended in the Fiscal Year 2004  Authorization Act to allow the Secretary of Defense to waive the critical  skill requirement for members who reenlist or extend an enlistment while  serving in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Kuwait in support of Operations Enduring  Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.
In addition, in February 2005, DOD announced a new retention bonus for  Special Operations Forces servicemembers (Army Special Forces, Navy  SEALs, Air Force pararescue, plus a few other occupational specialties)  who decide to remain in the military beyond 19 years of service. The largest  bonus, $150,000, may be provided to eligible servicemembers who sign up  for an additional 6 years of service. Eligible servicemembers who sign up  for shorter extensions may qualify for smaller bonuses; servicemembers  who extend for 1 additional year, for example, receive $8,000.
Individual components also implemented changes over the last fiscal year.  Specifically, to address recruiting, the active Army component  implemented a minimum $5,000 bonus for all qualified recruits—generally  based on graduation from high school and their scores on the Armed  Forces Qualification Test—who enlist for 3 or more years in any military  occupational specialty. Additionally, qualified recruits with bachelor’s  degrees who enlist for 2 or more years in any occupational specialty may  now receive bonuses up to $8,000; previously there were no bonuses for  recruits with those educational qualifications. The Army also increased its  maximum enlistment bonus amount, from $10,000 up to $14,000, for  applicants who enlist for 3 or more years into certain occupational  specialties, such as Cannon Crewmember, Cavalry Scout, and Crypto- Linguist Analyst.
To address retention, the active Army, Navy, and Air Force components  implemented the Critical Skills Retention Bonus program and the  Assignment Incentive Pay program. The Critical Skills Retention Bonus  program allows the components to target reenlistment bonuses at certain  occupational specialties that have been identified as critical. The bonus is  adjusted to meet current operational needs. For example, in fiscal year  2004, the Army offered the Critical Skills Retention Bonus to soldiers who  were serving in special operations occupational specialties. In fiscal year  2005, the Army granted eligibility to 11 additional occupational specialties.  These occupational specialties included recruiters, unmanned aerial  vehicle operators, psychological operations specialists, and explosive  ordnance disposal specialists. The Assignment Incentive Pay program,  which provides up to $1,500 a month for enlisted servicemembers, was  approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for implementation by the  Navy, Air Force, and Army in early 2005. Assignment Incentive Pay is used  to encourage servicemembers to volunteer for difficult-to-fill occupational  specialties or assignments in less desirable locations. For example, for  personnel in special operations occupational specialties to qualify for this  pay, servicemembers must have more than 25 years of service, be  designated by the Special Operations Command combatant commander as  “operators,” and remain on active duty for an additional minimum of 12  months.
The Army also implemented a Life Cycle Unit Bonus program designed to  encourage servicemembers to commit to hard-to-fill occupational  specialties in targeted units in fiscal year 2005. Army officials stated that  this may help them address shortages of soldiers assigned to units at  certain locations. When the program began, soldiers received up to $15,000  if they reenlisted and agreed to serve in certain units stationed at Fort  Campbell, Kentucky; Fort Bliss and Fort Hood, Texas; and Fort Lewis,  Washington.
During fiscal year 2005, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard also  increased some of their incentives to address recruiting and retention  efforts. In fiscal year 2005, the Army allowed the reserve and National  Guard components to increase their prior service enlistment bonus from  $8,000 up to $15,000. Additionally, the bonus amount for a new recruit with  no prior military experience increased from $8,000 to $10,000.
section_title: Components Provide Limited Justifications to DOD on Financial Incentives Given to Servicemembers in Overfilled Occupational Specialties
paragraphs: Although we found that the components regularly offered financial  incentives to servicemembers in consistently underfilled occupational  specialties, we also found that each of the active duty components  provided enlistment bonuses, selective reenlistment bonuses, or both to  servicemembers in consistently overfilled occupational specialties. DOD  only requires the components to provide general justifications for their  financial incentives in their budget documents and does not require the  components to specifically provide justifications for these incentives for  noncritical occupational specialties, which make up at least 84 percent of  all occupational specialties. Table 9 shows the number of consistently  overfilled active component occupational specialties in which  servicemembers received enlistment bonuses, selective reenlistment  bonuses, or both, from fiscal years 2000 through 2005.
The number of consistently overfilled occupational specialties in which  servicemembers received enlistment bonuses, selective reenlistment  bonuses, or both for 5 or 6 years is relatively low when compared to the  total number of occupational specialties. However, the number of  overfilled occupational specialties for which bonuses were authorized in a  particular year can be considerably higher.
Table 10 shows the number of all overfilled occupational specialties in  which servicemembers received either an enlistment or selective  reenlistment bonus for fiscal years 2000 through 2005. For example, in  2003, 278 out of all 625 active duty occupational specialties, or 44 percent,  were overfilled, and servicemembers in these occupational specialties  received enlistment or selective reenlistment bonuses.
Component officials provided reasons why they offered enlistment and  selective reenlistment bonuses to servicemembers in overfilled  occupational specialties. Specifically, an Army official explained that they  will target their bonuses to servicemembers at specific pay grades that are  actually underfilled, even if the occupational specialty as a whole may be  overfilled. Additionally, an official we spoke with stated that the  requirement to meet legislatively mandated aggregate personnel levels  results in, at times, offering bonuses to servicemembers who will serve in  overfilled specialties, simply to meet their overall mandated personnel  levels.
Because enlistment and selective reenlistment bonuses generally range  from a few thousand dollars up to $60,000, providing these bonuses to  servicemembers in overfilled occupational specialties can be quite costly.  While OUSD requires components to report incentives given to  servicemembers in critical occupational specialties, it does not require the  components to provide fully transparent rationales for incentives it  provides to servicemembers in noncritical occupational specialties, which  as we have stated, make up at least 84 percent of the components’ total  occupational specialties. Some of these noncritical occupational  specialties have been consistently overfilled in the past 6 fiscal years. By  not requiring the components to fully justify their rationale for providing  incentives to servicemembers in the consistently over- and underfilled  occupational specialties, OUSD lacks the information needed to provide  assurance to the Secretary of Defense and Congress that the amount of  funding spent on recruiting and retention efforts is appropriately and  effectively targeted to occupational specialties for which the components  have the greatest need.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Although DOD has reported that the components have generally met  overall recruiting and retention goals for the past several years, meeting  these goals in the aggregate can disguise the true challenges behind the  components’ ability to recruit and retain servicemembers in the  occupational specialities needed to fulfill their mission requirements. The  fact that several occupational specialties have been consistently overfilled  raises critical questions about affordability and whether the department is  using its recruiting and retention resources most effectively. Similarly,  DOD’s consistently underfilled occupational specialties raise concerns as  to how the department can meet operational demands with what appear to  be chronic shortages in certain occupational specialties. This latter issue is  particularly relevant given the stresses on the force from prolonged  operations in Iraq; the Global War on Terrorism; and most recently,  significant disaster relief efforts in the Gulf Coast region. DOD is not in a  position to develop a comprehensive recruiting and retention plan to  address these and other issues because it lacks complete information from  the 10 components on the occupational specialties that are over- or  underfilled and the reasons why these conditions exist. Moreover, without  this information, the department is not in a position to effectively  communicate its true recruiting and retention challenges to Congress.
Recently, Congress has provided increasing amounts of funding to assist  DOD’s recruiting and retention efforts. While some components have used  this funding to increase financial incentives to address both aggregate and  occupational-specialty-specific recruiting and retention challenges, these  increases in incentives are costly. Given the fiscally constrained  environment we are facing now and in years to come, DOD can no longer  afford to take a “business as usual” approach to managing its force. In some  cases, DOD’s components have provided financial incentives to  servicemembers in occupational specialties that are overfilled. While there  may be valid reasons for providing these incentives to some  servicemembers in these occupational specialities, DOD does not require  the components to fully justify their decisions on financial incentives,  which restricts the department’s ability to provide assurance to the  Secretary of Defense, Congress, and the taxpayer that the increasing  funding spent on recruiting and retention is appropriately and effectively  targeted to occupational specialties for which components have the  greatest need.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To provide greater understanding of the recruiting and retention issues and  improve the department’s oversight for these issues, we recommend that  the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness, in concert with the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Reserve Affairs, to take the following two actions:  Require the 10 components to  report annually on all (not just critical) over- and underfilled  occupational specialties,  provide an analysis of why occupational specialties are over- and   report annually on and justify their use of enlistment and  reenlistment bonuses provided to servicemembers in occupational  specialties that exceed their authorized personnel levels.
Develop a management action plan that will help the components to  identify and address the root causes of their recruiting and retention  challenges.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with  our two recommendations. DOD’s comments are included in this report as  appendix V.
DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation to require the ten  components to report annually to the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness on all over- and underfilled  occupational specialties; provide an analysis of why specific occupational  specialties are over- and underfilled; and report annually on and justify  their use of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses provided to  servicemembers in occupational specialties that exceed their authorized  personnel levels.  DOD stated that it already has visibility over  occupational specialties deemed most critical for retention, which it  captures through the Balanced Scorecard process.  However, as we note in  this report, the occupational specialties that the components report as  critical for recruitment or retention account for only a small percentage of  the total number of occupational specialties—at most only 16 percent of all  occupational specialties are reported as critical.  Therefore, the department  does not have visibility over at least 84 percent of its occupational  specialties.  DOD asserted that our definition of over- and underfilled  occupational specialties (those that were over- or under their authorized  levels by one or more individuals) is unreasonably strict.  However, as we  note in this report, we established this definition because we found that  DOD lacks common criteria that define thresholds for over- and underfilled  occupational specialties.  In prior work, we determined that it costs the  federal government about $103,000 annually, on average, to compensate  each enlisted active duty servicemember in fiscal year 2004; thus we  believe each individual serving in an occupational specialty that is over the  authorized personnel level represents a significant cost to the government.   For example, we found about 8,400 active duty servicemembers serving in  consistently overfilled occupational specialties in 2005.  If we apply the  2004 average compensation amount to the 8,400 servicemembers, the  additional cost to the taxpayer would be about $870 million.  In addition,  the taxpayer bears the unnecessary costs of supporting over 22,000  servicemembers in consistently overfilled occupational specialties in the  reserve and National Guard components.  DOD also provided in its  response an example of an overfilled occupational specialty, and its  rationale that this occupational specialty was overfilled as a function of  ramping up to meet a future strength requirement.  Our report  acknowledges this and other reasons the components provided for over-  and underfilled occupational specialties.  We believe that this example  underscores the need for our recommendation that the components  provide an analysis of why occupational specialties are over- or underfilled.   Without this type of analysis, OSD is not in a position to assess the extent to  which all specialties are over- or underfilled, determine if the overfilled and  underfilled positions are justified, and identify any needed corrective  action.  Also, DOD agreed with the need to closely manage financial  incentive programs.  However, we believe that DOD needs sufficient  information from the components to determine if the reasons for offering  bonuses to individuals in consistently overfilled occupational specialties  are, indeed, justified.  We continue to be concerned that all financial  incentives may not be justified.  Currently, the components are not required  to provide fully transparent rationales for bonuses they provide to  servicemembers in noncritical occupational specialties, which as we have  stated earlier, make up at least 84 percent of the components total  occupational specialties.  Without greater transparency over the use of  financial incentives, the department cannot truly know if funding spent on  recruiting and retention efforts is appropriately and effectively targeted to  occupational specialties for which the components have the greatest need.
DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation to develop a  management action plan that will help the components to identify and  address the root causes of their recruiting and retention challenges.  In  response, DOD noted that its Enlisted Personnel Management Plan  (EPMP), formally established by DOD Directive 1304.20 in July 2005,  substantially achieves this recommendation.  We believe DOD is moving in  the right direction in addressing recruiting and retention challenges and, in  this report, we acknowledge that DOD issued directive 1304.20 that  requires the components to meet aggregate and occupational specialty  specific authorized personnel levels.  However, this plan cited in DOD’s  comments did not exist at the time we conducted our audit work and we  believe DOD needs to continue to move forward to establish this plan.
DOD also stated that it has already laid the framework for this type of plan  through monthly reviews of other reports and quarterly reviews of its  Balanced Scorecard reports.  DOD claimed these omissions in our draft  report result in an incomplete description of management controls.  We  disagree since as stated earlier, the EPMP did not exist at the time we  conducted our audit work and furthermore, we do acknowledge in this  report that the department receives quarterly updates of critical  occupational specialties through the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense’s personnel and readiness report.  Nevertheless, we continue to  believe that these updates do not provide OSD with full transparency and  oversight since these quarterly updates do not include information on at  least 84 percent of active duty occupational specialties or any of the  combined 859 occupational specialties of the reserve and National Guard  components.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional members;  the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force; the  Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Chiefs of the National Guard  Bureau, the Army Reserve, the Army National Guard, the Air Force  Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Navy Reserve, and the Marine Corps  Reserve. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff members who made key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To conduct this body of work, we examined Department of Defense (DOD)  policies, regulations, and directives related to recruiting and retention of  military servicemembers. We also reviewed recruiting and retention  reports and briefings issued by GAO, DOD, the military services, the  Congressional Research Service, the Congressional Budget Office, and  research organizations such as RAND. Furthermore, we analyzed  individual components’ databases containing recruiting and retention data  on active, reserve, and National Guard servicemembers. In the course of  our work, we contacted and visited the organizations and offices listed in  table 11.
To determine the extent to which the active duty, reserve, and National  Guard components met their aggregate recruiting and retention goals, we  compared accession and reenlistment goals to their actual figures for fiscal  years 2000 through 2005. Additionally, through interviews with agency  officials, we obtained data on the extent to which the components have  instituted stop loss in some units, recalled members of the Individual  Ready Reserve, and recruited new enlistees into their delayed entry  programs.
To determine the extent to which the components have met their  authorized personnel levels for specific occupational specialties, we  obtained data from the components on the number of servicemembers  authorized and assigned for each occupational specialty as of September 30  for fiscal years 2000 through 2004 and June 30 for fiscal year 2005. We  calculated the fill rate for each occupational specialty by dividing the  number of servicemembers assigned to the occupational specialty by the  authorization. We then counted the number of years that each occupational  specialty in each component was over- or underfilled. Because most of the  components have not identified acceptable thresholds for over- and  underfilled occupational specialties, we used the strictest interpretation of  these terms. In our analysis, if a component had one person more than its  authorization, we considered the occupational specialty to be overfilled.  Similiarly, if a component had one person less than its authorization, we  considered the occupational specialty to be underfilled. If an occupational  specialty was overfilled for at least 5 of the 6 years, we considered the  occupational specialty “consistently” overfilled. Similarly, if an  occupational specialty was underfilled for at least 5 of the 6 years, we  considered the occupational specialty “consistently” underfilled. Some  occupational specialties have changed over the 6-year period of our  analyses. In these cases, we combined the original and new occupational  specialties. For example, in the Army, the occupational specialty for Divers  changed the identifier from 00B to 21D in 2004. We combined these two  occupational specialties by summing the entries for each year and retaining  it in our data set as one entry. In those cases where we could not determine  how to merge occupational specialties, we retained the original data in our  data set.
To analyze the steps DOD and the components have taken to address their  recruiting and retention difficulties, we interviewed key DOD officials from  each component, including headquarters and recruiting commands, to  obtain an understanding of recruiter, advertising, and incentive programs  as well as overall recruiting and retention difficulties. We determined,  through a review of DOD budget justifications for fiscal years 2000 through  2006, the associated costs of these programs. We also interviewed Office of  the Secretary of Defense officials to understand overall DOD policies and  future direction for reviewing recruiting and retention goals. We obtained  and reviewed various accession plans, incentive programs, and marketing  initiatives. To determine the extent to which personnel in consistently  overfilled occupational specialties received bonuses, we obtained data  from the active components on the occupational specialties for which  servicemembers were qualified to receive enlistment or reenlistment  bonuses in fiscal years 2000 through 2004 and for fiscal year 2005 as of  June 30. We compared the occupational specialties for which  servicemembers received bonuses to those occupational specialties that  we found to be consistently overfilled, as well as those that were overfilled  in any year. We limited our analysis to the active components because the  reserve components tend to provide enlistment and reenlistment bonuses  geographically. All dollar amounts were adjusted for inflation using the  gross domestic product price index published by the Bureau of Economic  Analysis.
To determine the reliability of data obtained for this report, we interviewed  personnel from each component knowledgeable about the data sources we  used, inquiring about their methods for ensuring that the data were  accurate. We reviewed available data for inconsistencies and, when  applicable, followed up with personnel to assess data validity and  reliability. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to answer  our objectives.
We conducted our work from January 2005 through October 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Enlisted Aggregate Recruiting Goals and Achievements for Fiscal Years 2000 through 2005
paragraphs: Tables 12 and 13 show the active, Reserve, and National Guard  components’ recruiting achievements for fiscal years 2000 through 2005.
section_title: Active Duty Enlisted Aggregate Retention Goals and Achievements for Fiscal Years 2000 through 2005
paragraphs: The Air Force introduced new metrics—Average Career Length and Cumulative Continuation  Rates—in July 2005 to more accurately measure enlisted retention patterns.
The tables presented in appendix IV show each component’s consistently  over- and underfilled occupational specialties for fiscal year 2000 through  June 2005.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Derek Stewart, (202) 512-5559 (stewartd@gao.gov)
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, David E. Moser, Assistant  Director; Michael A. Brown II; Jonathan Clark; Alissa H. Czyz; James A.  Driggins; Joseph J. Faley; Neil D. Feldman; Ronald L. Fleshman; Shvetal  Khanna; Marie A. Mak; Maewanda L. Michael-Jackson; Christopher R.  Miller; Hilary L. Murrish; Brian D. Pegram; James W. Pearce; and Terry L.  Richardson made key contributions to this report.