Defense Acquisitions: Assessments Needed to Address V-22 Aircraft Operational and Cost Concerns to Define Future Investments
Published: 2009-05-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since the 1980s, the V-22, developed to transport combat troops, supplies, and equipment for the U.S. Marine Corps and to support other services' operations, has experienced several fatal crashes, demonstrated various deficiencies, and faced virtual cancellation--much of which it has overcome. Although until recently deployed in Iraq and regarded favorably, it has not performed the full range of missions anticipated, and how well it can do so is in question. In view of concerns about the V-22 program, you asked us to determine if the V-22 will perform as promised, and if it will, at what cost. GAO reviewed (1) current MV-22 operations in Iraq; (2) strengths and deficiencies in terms of the capabilities expected of the V-22; and (3) past, current, and future costs. GAO reviewed a range of program documents and data, interviewed program officials, operators and others; and observed MV-22 operations in Iraq and shipboard.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As of January 2009, the 12 MV-22s (Marine Corps variant of the V-22) in Iraq successfully completed all missions assigned in a low threat theater of operations--using their enhanced speed and range to engage in general support missions and deliver personnel and internal cargo faster and farther than the legacy helicopters being replaced. Noted challenges to operational effectiveness raise questions about whether the MV-22 is best suited to accomplish the full repertoire of missions of the helicopters it is intended to replace. Additionally, suitability challenges, such as unreliable component parts and supply chain weaknesses, led to low aircraft availability rates. MV-22 operational tests and training exercises identified challenges with the system's ability to operate in other environments. Maneuvering limits and challenges in detecting threats may affect air crew ability to execute correct evasive actions. The aircraft's large size and inventory of repair parts created obstacles to shipboard operations. Identified challenges could limit the ability to conduct worldwide operations in some environments and at high altitudes similar to what might be expected in Afghanistan. Efforts are underway to address these deficiencies, but some are inherent in the V-22's design. V-22 costs have risen sharply above initial projections--1986 estimates (stated in fiscal year 2009 dollars) that the program would build nearly 1000 aircraft in 10 years at $37.7 million each have shifted to fewer than 500 aircraft at $93.4 million each--a procurement unit cost increase of 148 percent. Research, development, testing, and evaluation costs increased over 200 percent. To complete the procurement, the program plans to request approximately $25 billion (in then-year dollars) for aircraft procurement. As for operations and support costs (O&S), the Marine Corps' V-22's cost per flight hour today is over $11,000--more than double the targeted estimate.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since the V-22 Osprey began development in the mid-1980s, it has  experienced several fatal crashes, demonstrated a variety of deficiencies,  and faced the virtual cancellation of the program—much of which it has  been able to overcome. There are two variants of the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft  currently being used: the MV-22 variant for the Marine Corps will replace  the CH-46E helicopter as the Marine Corps’ medium-lift aircraft—to be  used along with the heavy-lift CH-53—to fulfill operational requirements  such as transporting combat troops, supplies, and equipment.  The Air  Force’s CV-22 variant will augment existing U.S. Special Operations  Command (USSOCOM) aircraft and the MV-22.  Until recently, the MV-22  was deployed in Iraq and, while it accomplished assigned missions there,  its usage did not encompass the full range of tasks anticipated for the  aircraft, and identified operational challenges raise questions concerning  how effectively it can perform the full range of anticipated missions.
In view of our past work and others’ highlighting concerns about the V-22  program, you asked us to determine whether the V-22 will perform as  promised, and if it will, at what cost. To do this, we reviewed the V-22  aircraft from a variety of perspectives: (1) its current operations in Iraq;  (2) its strengths and deficiencies in terms of the capabilities expected of it;  and (3) its past, current, and future costs.
In the process of conducting our review, we examined how well the  aircraft has performed in theater since October 2007; key testing, safety,  and production quality issues that might affect its ability to perform  planned missions; its costs, schedule, and quantities since 1986; and  changes in key performance parameters (KPP) and other requirements.  Throughout our report, “requirements” refers to MV-22 capabilities stated  in the Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA), Joint  Operational Requirement Documents (JORD), and Capabilities Production  Documents (CPD) and Capabilities Development Documents (CDD).  We  reviewed a wide range of documents containing MV-22 program data  related to cost and other factors dating from program start in 1986 to the  present; past and current KPPs and other critical requirements; test  assessments, development and operational tests, and internal program  documents; and briefs and reports. We interviewed a wide range of  Department of Defense (DOD), Marine Corps, V-22 program, and  contractor officials; MV-22 operators, maintainers, logisticians, combat  troops and their commanders; and others both in the United States and in  Iraq. We also observed MV-22 shipboard operations during training off the  coast of North Carolina and operation of the 12 MV-22s deployed in Iraq.  Our assessment focuses on the MV-22 but in most instances applies to the  CV-22, as the two variants have a common airframe and engine, but  avionics do vary.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 to May 2009 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.  An expanded version of the methodology  used to conduct this audit may be found in Appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft—one that operates as a helicopter  for takeoffs and landings and, once airborne, converts to a turboprop  aircraft—developed to fulfill medium-lift operations such as transporting  combat troops, supplies, and equipment for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps  and Air Force special operations. Figure 1 depicts V-22 aircraft in various  aspects of use.
There are two variants of the V-22’s design. The Marine Corps variant (MV- 22) was slated to replace the CH-46E and CH-53D helicopters (see figure 2)  to become the Marine Corps’ only medium-lift, assault support aircraft.  Currently, the MV-22 is going to replace only the CH-46E. The Air Force  variant (CV-22) will augment existing U.S. Special Operations Command  (USSOCOM) aircraft.
The Osprey program was started in December 1981 to satisfy mission  needs for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Originally spearheaded by the  Army, the program was transferred to the Navy in 1982 when the Army  withdrew from the program citing affordability issues. The program was  approved for full-scale development in 1986, and the first aircraft was  flown in 1989. A month after the first flight, the Secretary of Defense  stopped requesting funds for the program due to affordability concerns. In  December 1989, DOD directed the Navy to terminate all V-22 contracts  because, according to DOD, the V-22 was not affordable when compared  to helicopter alternatives, and production ceased. Congress disagreed with  this decision, however, and continued to fund the project. Following a  crash in 1991 and a fatal crash in 1992 that resulted in seven deaths, in  October of 1992 the Navy ordered development to continue and awarded a  contract to a Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing Helicopters joint venture  (Bell-Boeing) to begin producing production-representative aircraft.
In 1994, the Navy chartered a medium lift replacement COEA, which  reaffirmed the decision to proceed with the V-22. It also provided an  analytical basis for KPPs to be proposed for the system. This analysis  defined the primary mission of a medium-lift replacement aircraft to be the  transport of combat troops during sea-based assault operations and during  combat operations ashore. Secondary missions included transporting  supplies and equipment during assault and other combat operations as  well as supporting Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) special operation  forces, casualty and noncombatant evacuation operations, tactical  recovery of aircraft and personnel operations, combat search and rescue  operations, and mobile forward area refueling and re-arming operations.  These original mission descriptions and aircraft employment were  reaffirmed by the Marine Corps in 2003 and again in 2007. The existing  medium-lift aircraft fleet needed to be replaced due to inventory shortfalls  and reduced aircraft reliability, availability, and maintainability—needs  accentuated by the increasing age and limited capabilities of its current  fleet of helicopters.
The analysis concluded that the V-22 should be the Marine Corps’ choice.  The analysis considered a number of helicopter candidates—including the  CH-46E and CH-53D—and the V-22 tiltrotor—judging each candidate  based on their performance characteristics and expected contribution to  tactics and operations. A sensitivity analysis was conducted which   measured candidate aircraft against specific performance parameters— including KPPs. The analysis used models to assess research and  development, production or procurement, and operations and support  cost and concluded that for non-assault missions, such as medical  evacuation missions, the V-22 was the most effective option because of its  greater speed, increased range, and ability to deploy in one-third the time  of the alternative candidates. For assault missions, the analysis concluded  the V-22 would build combat power in the form of troops and equipment  most quickly, was more survivable, would maximize the arrival of forces  and minimize casualties, and would halve helicopter losses. In terms of  affordability, the analysis concluded that, holding V-22 and helicopter  force sizes equal, the V-22 would be the most effective but at a higher cost.  The analysis further noted that while the major factor in favor of the V-22  was its speed, at short distances greater speed offers little advantage.
Subsequently, Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) began with five aircraft  in 1997, increasing to seven each year in 1998 and 1999. In 2000, the  program undertook operational evaluation testing, the results of whi the Navy’s operational testers to conclude that the MV-22 was  operationally suitable for land-based operations and was opera effective. Later evaluations resulted in testers concluding that the MV-22 would be operationally suitable on ships as well. Based on the same tests DOD’s independent operational testers concluded that the MV-22 was  operationally effective but not operationally suitable, due in part to  reliability concerns. Despite the mixed test conclusions, a Program  Decision Meeting was scheduled for December 2000 to determine wh the V-22 should progress beyond LRIP production and into full-rate  production. Following two fatal crashes that occurred in 2000 and re in 23 deaths, the last one occurring just before the full-rate production  decision, the V-22 was grounded and, rather than proceeding to full-rate production, the program was directed to continue research and  development at a minimum sustaining production rate of 11 aircr year.  aft per  Before the V-22 resumed flight tests, modifications were made to  requirements and design changes were made to the aircraft to correct  safety concerns and problems. The aircraft nacelles were redesigned to  preclude line chafing; a robust software qualification facility was built; and  Vortex Ring State, a dangerous aerodynamic phenomenon that all rotor  wing aircraft are subject to and was reported to have contributed to one of  the fatal V-22 crashes in 2000, was further investigated. Requirements for  landings in helicopter mode in which engine power had failed  (“autorotation”) and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons protection  among others were eliminated, and some KPPs were modified, prior to  conducting a second round of operational testing with modified aircraft in  June 2005. Testers then recommended that the aircraft be declared  operationally effective and suitable for military use. The Defense  Acquisition Board approved it for military use as well as full-rate  production in September 2005. DOD is procuring the V-22 in blocks. Block  A is a training configuration, while later blocks are being procured and  fielded as the operational configurations. Tables 1 and 2 provide a  summary of the upgrades to be incorporated in each block configuration.
The MV-22 Block B attained Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in June  2007 and was used in Iraq from October 2007 until April 2009 to support  operations from Al Asad Air Base in Iraq’s Anbar province. Three Marine  squadrons used the same 12 MV-22s for three consecutive deployments.  In March 2008, the Navy awarded Bell-Boeing a 5-year, $10.4 billion  production contract for 141 MV-22s and 26 CV-22s. This multiyear contract  was awarded to achieve anticipated procurement cost savings. In 2008,  after undergoing operational testing, 4 Air Force variant CV-22s self- deployed to participate in a multinational training effort in a remote  location in Mali, and were used to conduct simulated long-range air-drop  and extraction missions. The first shipboard deployment of MV-22s is  scheduled for mid-2009.
section_title: MV-22 Operations in Iraq Demonstrated Effectiveness for Assigned Missions but the Aircraft Continues to Experience Challenges
paragraphs: As of January 2009, the 12 MV-22s stationed in Iraq had successfully  completed all missions assigned to them in what is considered an  established, low-threat theater of operations. The deployments confirmed  that the V-22’s enhanced speed and range enable personnel and internal  cargo to be transported faster and farther than is possible with the legacy  helicopters it is replacing. The aircraft also participated in a few  AeroScout missions and carried a limited number of external cargo loads.  However, questions have arisen as to whether the MV-22 is best suited to  accomplish the full mission repertoire of the helicopters it is intended to  replace. Some challenges in operational effectiveness have been noted.  Also, suitability challenges, such as unreliable parts and an immature parts  supply chain drove availability significantly below minimum required  levels.
subsections: section_title: The MV-22 Successfully Completed Assigned Missions in Iraq, Although Some Operational Challenges Were Identified
paragraphs: The Marine Corps considers the MV-22 deployments in Iraq to have been  successful, as the three squadrons consistently fulfilled assigned missions.  Those missions were mostly general support missions—moving people  and cargo—in the low-threat operational environment that existed in Iraq  during their deployments. The aircraft’s favorable reviews were based  largely on its increased speed and range compared with legacy helicopters.  According to MV-22 users and troop commanders, its speed and range “cut  the battlefield in half,” expanding battlefield coverage with decreased  asset utilization and enabling it to do two to three times as much as legacy  helicopters could in the same flight time. In addition, the MV-22’s ability to  fly at higher altitudes in airplane mode enabled it to avoid the threat of  small arms fire during its Iraq deployment. Figure 3 compares the flight  radius of the MV-22 to that of legacy CH-46s.
Commanders and operators have noted that the speed and range of the  Osprey offered some significant advantages over the legacy platforms it  replaced during missions performed in Iraq, including missions that would  have been impossible without it. For example, it enabled more rapid  delivery of medical care; missions that had previously required an  overnight stay to be completed in a single day; and more rapid travel by  U.S. military and Iraqi officials to meetings with Iraqi leaders, thus  allowing greater time for those meetings.
While in Iraq, the MV-22 also conducted a few AeroScout raid and external  lift missions. These types of missions were infrequent, but those that were  carried out were successfully completed. Such missions, however, were  also effectively carried out by existing helicopters. AeroScout missions are  made by a combination of medium-lift aircraft and attack helicopters with  a refueling C-130 escort that, according to Marine Corps officers, find  suspicious targets and insert Marines as needed to neutralize threats. In  participating in these missions, the MV-22 was limited by operating with  slower legacy helicopters—thus negating its speed and range advantages.  Similarly, external lift missions do not leverage the advantages of the V-22.  In fact, most Marine equipment requiring external transport is cleared only  for transit at speeds under 150 knots calibrated airspeed (kcas), not the  higher speeds at which the MV-22 can travel with internal cargo or  passengers. According to Iraq-based MV-22 squadron leadership, the CH- 53, which is capable of lifting heavier external loads, was more readily  available than the MV-22 to carry out those missions and, as such, was  generally called on for those missions, allowing the MV-22 to be used more  extensively for missions that exploit its own comparative strengths.
The introduction of the MV-22 into Iraq in combination with existing  helicopters has led to some reconsideration of the appropriate role of  each. Battlefield commanders and aircraft operators in Iraq identified a  need to better understand the role the Osprey should play in fulfilling  warfighter needs. They indicated, for example, that the MV-22 may not be  best suited for the full range of missions requiring medium lift, because the  aircraft’s speed cannot be exploited over shorter distances or in  transporting external cargo. These concerns were also highlighted in a  recent preliminary analysis of the MV-22 by the Center for Naval Analysis,  which found that the MV-22 may not be the optimal platform for those  missions.
The MV-22’s Iraq experience also demonstrated some limitations in  situational awareness that challenge operational effectiveness. For  example, some MV-22 crew chiefs and troop commanders in Iraq told us  that they consider a lack of visibility of activity on the ground from the V- 22’s troop cabin to be a significant disadvantage—a fact previously noted  in operational testing. They noted that the V-22 has only two small  windows. In contrast, combat Marines in Iraq stated that the larger troop  compartment windows of the CH-53 and CH-46 offer improved ability to  view the ground, which can enhance operations. In addition, CH-53s and  CH-46s are flown at low altitude in raid operations. According to troop  commanders this low altitude approach into the landing zones combined  with the larger windows in CH-53s and CH-46s improves their (the troop  commanders) situational awareness from the troop compartments,  compared with the situational awareness afforded troop commanders in  the MV-22s with its smaller windows and use of high altitude fast descent  approach into the landing zone. The V-22 program is in the process of  incorporating electronic situational awareness devices in the troop cabin  to off-set the restricted visibility. This upgrade may not fully address the  situational awareness challenges for the crew chief, who provides visual  cues to the pilots to assist when landing. Crew chiefs in Iraq agree that the  lack of visibility from the troop cabin is the most serious weakness of the  MV-22.
section_title: Iraq Deployment Demonstrated Continuing Suitability Challenges
paragraphs: Availability challenges continue to affect the MV-22. In Iraq, the V-22’s  mission capability (MC) and full mission capability (FMC) rates fell  significantly below required levels and significantly below rates achieved  by legacy helicopters. The MV-22 has a stated MC threshold (minimum  acceptable) requirement of 82 percent and an objective (desired) of 87  percent. In Iraq, the three MV-22 squadrons averaged mission capability  rates of about 68, 57, and 61 percent respectively. This experience is not  unique to the Iraq deployment, as low MC rates were experienced for all  MV-22 squadrons, in and out of Iraq. The program has modified the MC  requirement by stating that this threshold should be achieved by the time  the fleet completes 60,000 flight hours, which officials expect to occur  sometime near the end of 2009. Figure 4 illustrates the MC rates between  October 2006 and October 2008.
By comparison, the mission capability rates of the Iraq-based CH-46Es and  CH-53s averaged 85 percent or greater during the period of October 2007  to June 2008.
Although FMC is no longer a formal requirement, it continues to be  tracked as an indicator of aircraft availability. The Osprey’s FMC rate of 6  percent in Iraq from October 2007 to April 2008 was significantly short of  the 75 percent minimum requirement established at the program’s outset.  According to MV-22 officers and maintainers, the low FMC rate realized  was due in part to unreliability of V-22 Ice Protection System (IPS)  components. Although the faulty IPS had no effect on the MV-22’s ability  to achieve missions assigned in Iraq, in other areas, where icing conditions  are more likely to be experienced—such as Afghanistan—IPS unreliability  may threaten mission accomplishment.
section_title: Repair Parts Issues and Maintenance Challenges Affected the Availability of MV-22s in Iraq
paragraphs: Although MV-22 maintenance squadrons stocked three times as many  parts in Iraq as the number of deployed MV-22 aircraft called for, they  faced reliability and maintainability challenges. Challenges were caused  mostly by an immature parts supply chain and a small number of  unreliable aircraft parts, some of which have lasted only a fraction of their  projected service life.
The MV-22 squadrons in Iraq made over 50 percent more supply-driven  maintenance requests than the average Marine aviation squadron in Iraq. A  lack of specific repair parts was a problem faced throughout the Iraq  deployments despite deploying with an inventory of spare parts to support  36 aircraft, rather than the 12 MV-22 aircraft actually deployed. Despite the  preponderance of parts brought to support the MV-22s in Iraq, only about  13 percent of those parts were actually used in the first deployment. In  addition, some aircraft components wore out much more quickly in Iraq  than expected, which led to shortages. Thirteen MV-22 components  accounted for over half the spare parts that were not available on base in  Iraq when requested. Those components lasted, on average, less than 30  percent of their expected life, with six lasting less than 10 percent of their  expected life. The shortages caused MV-22 maintainers to cannibalize  parts from other MV-22s to keep aircraft flying, and significantly increased  maintenance hours. Parts were cannibalized not only from MV-22s in Iraq  but also from MV-22s in the United States and from the V-22 production  line. The shortages also contributed to the low mission capability rates, as  an aircraft in need of maintenance or spare parts may not be considered  mission capable. Figure 5 depicts both the percentage of predicted mean  flight hours before failure achieved by these 13 parts and their average  requisition waiting time during the Iraq deployments.
The engines on the MV-22s deployed in Iraq also fell short of their  estimated “on-wing” service life, lasting less than 400 hours before having  to be replaced. The program estimated life is 500-600 hours. The program  office noted that there is no contractually documented anticipated engine  service life. Figure 6 illustrates the average engine time on wing for the  three MV-22 squadrons that have been deployed to Iraq.
Squadron maintainers explained that the lower engine life span has not  affected aircraft availability, as spare engines are readily available and  easily replaced. Program officials plan to replace the existing power-by- the-hour engine sustainment contract with Rolls Royce, which expires in  December 2009, with a new sustainment contract. According to the  program office, the new engine sustainment contract is likely to result in  higher engine support costs—an issue further discussed later in this  report.
section_title: Operational Tests and Training Exercises Have Revealed Other Challenges to the MV- 22 in Accomplishing Its Full Range of Possible Operations
paragraphs: While the MV-22 successfully accomplished missions assigned to it in Iraq,  those missions represent only a portion of the operations envisioned for  the system. Operational tests and training exercises have provided  additional insights into the aircraft’s capabilities and have identified  challenges to the MV-22’s ability to conduct operations in high-threat  environments, carry the required number of combat troops, transport  external cargo, operate from Navy ships, and conduct missions operating  in environments throughout the world. While efforts are underway to  address these challenges, how successful they will be is uncertain, as  some challenges arise from the inherent design of the V-22.
subsections: section_title: MV-22 Faces Challenges in Operating in High-Threat Environments
paragraphs: The Osprey was intended to operate across the full spectrum of conflicts,  facing a broad range of enemy land- and sea-based weapons. Although the  Iraq deployments validated the ability of the MV-22 to conduct missions in  Iraq’s low-threat environment, its ability to conduct operations and survive  in higher threat environments is less certain. Maneuvering limits may  affect air crew ability to execute the correct evasive action. Currently, the  Marine Corps intends to employ the aircraft in a manner that limits its  exposure to threats—a change from the original intent, that the system  would be able to operate in such environments. In addition, the MV-22  does not have an integrated defensive weapon, a system requirement.
Although the speed, range, and altitude capabilities of the MV-22 reduce its  overall susceptibility to threats as compared to legacy transport  helicopters, operational testers identified flight limits that restrict the  aircraft’s flight parameters and could influence its ability to respond to  threats. Restricted maneuverability limits its ability to perform defensive  maneuvers. Flight limits have been imposed while the aircraft is in  helicopter mode to avoid a loss of controlled flight.
Limits have been imposed to avoid Vortex Ring State (VRS), a condition  that can cause a loss of lift and control of the aircraft when it is in  helicopter mode. VRS can occur in any rotorcraft, and in the V-22 is now  considered well defined and avoidable when the aircraft’s forward speed  and descent rate stay within prescribed ranges. However, specifically in  the V-22, VRS can result in loss of lift on one proprotor and not the other,  causing the aircraft to invert. Testers previously recommended that follow- on tests should involve multiple aircraft, at heavy weights, in close  proximity as might be anticipated in the conduct of a combat assault  mission. The test could increase confidence that appropriate, safe tactics  exist to enable the MV-22s to deliver assault forces to a small area in a  short time while avoiding undue exposure to enemy threats.
Although an integrated defensive weapon system—needed to suppress  threats while approaching a landing zone, disembarking troops within the  landing zone, or while leaving the landing zone—is a requirement, the MV- 22 does not have such a system. The MV-22 currently has only a rear ramp- mounted defensive weapon system that is not integrated into the aircraft  and only covers its rear quadrants. Based on Iraq experiences, this  defensive weapon was viewed as lacking flexibility due to its ability to  only point in one direction when employed in the “ground fire” position  and because it was not of sufficient caliber to be effective in all scenarios.  Some air crews commented that the capabilities of the MV-22 offset  previous notions about the requirement for defensive fire power. However,  commanders stated that while the current defensive weapon system was  sufficient for the Iraq deployment, many other scenarios are easily  envisioned where an improved defensive weapon system would be much  preferred. A belly-mounted Interim Defensive Weapon System (IDWS)  capable of covering all quadrants is being tested. However, in tests, the  system jammed frequently. Additionally, it will not be fully integrated into  the aircraft systems and is not currently compatible with the shipboard  environment. Furthermore, integration of the IDWS into MV-22s will result  in a loss of two combat troop seats to accommodate the IDWS avionics  rack.
section_title: MV-22 Faces Challenges in Capacity to Transport Personnel and External Cargo
paragraphs: Additional missions for the MV-22 include internal and external transport  of supplies and equipment during assault and other combat operations.  Operational tests and shipboard training exercises have determined that  the capacity of the MV-22 to transport troops and external cargo is, in  some cases, below program requirements.
The ability to transport 24 troops equipped with a full combat load is a key  performance parameter for the MV-22. While officials and Marine combat  units who have flown in the MV-22 say it can carry 24 troops, a Marine  Corps after-action report indicates that the MV-22 can not carry 24 troops  if they are equipped as intended. The MV-22 operational requirements  document based the 24 troop number for the MV-22 variant on an  assumption of an average weight for a fully equipped combat troop of 240  pounds; however, improvements in body armor and equipment have raised  the weight projection for each Marine with combat equipment to 400  pounds. As a result, the aircraft’s planned capacity to transport fully  loaded combat troops is 20 rather than 24.
Aircraft troop-carrying capacity may be further reduced in other  configurations and flight scenarios. As previously stated, the belly- mounted interim defensive weapon system will reduce the number of  combat troops that can be transported by two. When the platoon of  Marines transported is configured with heavy weapons, the number of  embarked troops may be reduced due to limited cabin volume. Further,  according to a crew chief interviewed, when combat loads placed in the  aisle restrict crew chief movement, a second crew chief may be needed to  guide aircraft landings, reducing troop capacity. Figure 7 illustrates troops  embarked in the MV-22 troop compartment.
External transport of cargo is another requirement of the MV-22. However,  most external loads have not been certified by DOD for high-speed  transport and thus would not leverage the V-22’s speed. Furthermore,  according to a 2007 Center for Naval Analysis study, the MV-22 will not be  able to externally transport heavier equipment, such as the Joint Light  Tactical Vehicle—which is to replace the Marine Corps Humvee. The study  concluded that there would be less need to use the MV-22s for external  lifting and an increased requirement for heavier lift helicopters, such as  the CH-53K.
Additionally, the program manager is currently tracking the projected  weight growth of the MV-22 Block C variant, and considers weight growth  a moderate risk to the program. External lift capability is likely to be  diminished if the weight of the MV-22 platform exceeds projected weight  growth. Furthermore, according to the MV-22 flight operations manual, the  current 10,000-pound maximum lift capacity of the MV-22 is achievable at  lower altitudes, but is reduced at higher altitudes. Weight growth in the  aircraft itself would further reduce the aircraft’s operational ability to  transport loads into higher altitude regions of the world, such as  Afghanistan.
section_title: MV-22 Faces Challenges Operating on Navy Ships
paragraphs: Efforts to ready the MV-22 for deployment on Navy ships identified  numerous challenges. Fewer MV-22s can operate on Navy flight decks. Its  larger size and large inventory of repair parts constrain hangar deck space.  In addition, safety concerns caused by its severe rotor downwash have  been documented during MV-22 ship-based testing and land-based testing  of the CV-22 variant.
The MV-22 is too large to operate in the same numbers (without altering  the ship’s current aviation complement) from ships certified for the CH-46  and CH-53 aircraft, including LHA- or LHD-class ships. The MV-22 has a  larger footprint than the CH-46, reducing the number of aircraft that can  be deployed on board any one ship. For example, the 22nd MEU will  deploy with 10 MV-22s rather than 12 CH-46s that previously deployed  with the same ship. Furthermore, MV-22 deck spot utilization also differs  from that of the CH-46: the aircraft is not cleared to take off and land using  the two deck spots adjacent to the tower of LHA- and LHD-class ships. As  a result, the MV-22 is only cleared to take off and land from four of the six  operational deck spots of the LHD- and LHA-class ships usable by CH-46s.  According to program officials, efforts are underway to try to approve  operational use of these deck positions for takeoff and landing on LHD  ships.
The repair parts inventory that a squadron of MV-22s deploys with is  significantly greater in volume and weight than that of the legacy  helicopters it is replacing and will impinge on maintenance and other  operations in the ship’s hangar space. The space needed for MV-22 repair  parts is so large that some parts may need to be pre-positioned ashore and  not housed shipboard. Hangar space is used to conduct maintenance on  aircraft sheltered from the elements or if the maintenance effort requires  the use of heavy lifting cranes located in the hangar deck ceiling. Training  exercises found that the larger MV-22 reduced the number of spots that  can be used in the hangar deck for maintenance from four to three, and  made movement of aircraft from the hangar deck to the flight deck  difficult if an MV-22’s wings were spread or an aircraft was on jacks  undergoing repairs.
The MV-22’s downwash has been described as significantly greater than  that of the CH-46. During prior operational tests, concerns were raised  about the effect of downwash on operations below the aircraft, including  troop embarkation and debarkation, hooking up external loads, and  fastroping. Recent shipboard tests have identified safety issues related to  MV-22 downwash, including dislodging equipment such as life raft  securing bands, and potentially blowing down the sailor who stands on the  flight deck of the ship guiding the aircraft to a safe landing. To resolve  these problems, life raft containers have been replaced through ship  alterations with containers intended to withstand the downwash, and,  during one training exercise on an L-class ship, another person was  assigned to physically hold in place the sailor acting as the landing guide  when MV-22s were landing. Downwash of the MV-22 interacting with other  aircraft was also noted onboard ship. In one documented incident,  downwash from a landing MV-22 exerted such force on the helicopter next  to it that the helicopter’s pilot had to take action to prevent his aircraft  from lifting off the ship. Downwash concerns, however, are not restricted  to shipboard operations. Recently completed tests on the CV-22 found that  the significant downwash also had various negative effects on the land- based missions.
section_title: Challenges Operating Globally in Extreme Environments
paragraphs: At the start of its development, the V-22 was intended to operate in many  different environments. However, its current capability to conduct  worldwide operations in many environments is limited. It is not able to  conduct unrestricted operations in tactical nuclear, biological, and  chemical (NBC) warfare; at high altitudes; or in adverse weather.
For example, the V-22 had a requirement that its fuselage and cockpit  design must restrict the entry of NBC contaminants into the aircraft and  must protect and isolate the primary flight crew during ground operations.  During developmental testing, numerous problems were encountered with  the seals intended to maintain the cabin pressure, so the system was not  used in operational testing in 2000. In the absence of such a system, the  DOD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation found that operational  MV-22s would be forced to avoid or exit areas of suspected nuclear,  biological, or chemical contamination and require time to decontaminate  affected aircraft—likely reducing their availability and sortie capability.  The NBC requirement has since been dropped.
The MV-22 is intended to be capable of supporting diverse mission  requirements that will require it to fly during the day or at night, in  favorable or adverse weather, across a range of altitudes from close to the  ground to above 10,000 feet above mean sea level and to make numerous  takeoffs and landings on different and difficult terrain conditions. Current  V-22 performance charts do not support helicopter operations above  10,000 feet. Furthermore, according to recent MV-22 tests, the V-22’s IPS is  not reliable. Flying through known or forecasted icing conditions is  currently prohibited. The status of the IPS is one of the main issues  preventing the MV-22 from being fully mission capable. Additionally, the  MV-22 currently does not have weather radar. Incorporation of weather  radar into a later Block upgrade is planned to give the aircraft the ability to  fly in other adverse weather conditions that may be encountered.
section_title: V-22 Business Case Challenged as Costs Have Risen While Performance Requirements Have Been Modified
paragraphs: The V-22 entered development with performance requirements and  expected costs that constituted a business case for starting the program.  The original program cost estimates have changed significantly as  research and development and procurement costs have risen sharply  above initial projections. With regard to operations and support costs for  the V-22, the current Flying Hour Program (FHP) cost per flight hour of the  MV-22 today is over $11,000—more than double the target estimate and  140 percent higher than the cost for the CH-46E. Furthermore,  performance standards and metrics for V-22 were modified throughout the  development effort.
subsections: section_title: V-22 Business Case and Acquisition Strategy Have Eroded as Costs Have Increased Significantly and Are Expected to Continue to Rise
paragraphs: From the start of initial development in 1986 through the end of 2007, the  program’s RDT&E cost increased over 200 percent from $4.2 to $12.7  billion, while its procurement cost increased nearly 24 percent from $34.4  to $42.6 billion. This increase in procurement cost occurred at the same  time that the number of aircraft to be procured was significantly  reduced—from nearly a thousand to less than 500 (most of which will be  procured for the Marine Corps), resulting in a 148 percent increase in  procurement unit cost for each V-22. Furthermore, operations and support  (O&S) cost will be higher than anticipated. Table 3 details key aspects of  the V-22 program’s cost and schedule experience from development start  to 2007.
In March 2008, the Navy awarded a 5-year procurement contract with the  expectation of achieving a savings of $427 million for a buy of 167  aircraft. To complete the total procurement, the program plans to request  approximately $25 billion (in then-year dollars) for aircraft procurement  beyond the $29 billion already appropriated and planned for development  and procurement. Design changes to the V-22 to address identified  shortcomings and reflect other upgrades to the aircraft continue—even as  the V-22 is in production—will incur costs that may offset savings from the  multiyear procurement contract. Design changes and increased  procurement and retrofit costs can be expected, such as the $107.8 million  requested in the fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terrorism budget for the  correction of deficiencies and upgrades to aircraft already produced.
section_title: Operations and Support Cost for the MV-22 Will Be Higher Than Anticipated
paragraphs: Operations and support (O&S) cost—typically the largest portion of a  weapon system’s total costs—are currently reported at $75.41 billion for  the life cycle of the program. O&S costs for the program are just beginning  and are expected to rise. An indication is the current cost per flying hour,  which is over $11,000—more than double the target estimate for the MV-22  as well as 140 percent higher than the cost for the CH-46E. The Osprey’s  Iraq experience demonstrated that the rise in cost is due in part to  unreliable parts, the cost of some parts, and required maintenance. Figure  8 shows the program’s current funding profile.
According to Marine Corps officials, the presence of unreliable parts  contributed to reliability and maintainability issues for MV-22 deployed in  Iraq. The inventory of repair parts needed to maintain the MV-22 is large.  Although the squadrons in Iraq were supported with a parts inventory  large enough for three times the number of aircraft deployed, certain  “high-demand, low-density items” were used and their spare inventories  depleted—driving the need for expensive and time-consuming  cannibalization of repair parts from other aircraft. A reliability and  maintainability program is in place to address underperforming  components. Efforts include a recently awarded joint performance-based  logistics contract to identify ways to improve aircraft reliability and reduce  the system’s logistics footprint. However, program management does not  consider the current reliability and maintainability strategy to be coherent.  Problems with parts reliability have resulted in more maintenance activity  than expected, and if there is no improvement, overall cost and  maintenance hours may remain high.
Changes to the current engine sustainment contract with Rolls Royce—the  V-22’s engine manufacturer—could also affect the program’s already rising  O&S costs. The government initially decided to use a commercial engine  and support approach. According to contractor officials, the billing  arrangement for the V-22 engine “power-by-the-hour” sustainment contract  with Rolls-Royce was originally based on complicated models that  attempted to estimate the degree of engine degradation that might take  place in a given number of flight hours, depending on the nature of the  mission. However, the MV-22 engines in Iraq are not lasting as long as  expected, and according to the program office, a new sustainment  contract is being negotiated with Rolls Royce.
In March 2008, a modification to the original contract with an option for a  1 year extension was awarded—changing the original billing arrangement.  According to contractor officials, under this bridge contract, engine  sustainment billing is now to be based on a straight flight hour basis.  Contract coverage for some repairs are excluded when engines are  operated without the Engine Air Particle Separator (EAPS) turned on and  for compressor repairs on deployed aircraft outside the United States  regardless of EAPS operations. Currently the excluded coverage  accounts for 47 percent of total engine support cost. In addition, the  bridge contract expires in December 2009 and the power-by-the-hour  arrangement is expected to be replaced by a new sustainment contract.  According to the program office, this new sustainment contract is likely to  result in higher engine sustainment costs and increased program support  cost.
section_title: Key Performance Standards and Other Performance Metrics for MV-22 Modified
paragraphs: Initially, the Marine Corps’ proposed performance parameters for the  medium lift replacement (MLR) aircraft were focused on speed, range, and  payload. However, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council deferred  consideration of system requirements until after completion of the 1994  Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) that validated the V- 22 over other alternatives. Some KPPs used to analyze the MLR alternative  candidates were consolidated or modified as the V-22 progressed through  development and operational testing, as shown in table 4.
While operational tests reports state that the MV-22 is meeting all its KPPs,  according to program officials, modifications were made to balance  aircraft operational requirements against technical risks and program  costs. For example, the amphibious external lift KPP was modified. In its  2000 operational test report, the office of the Director, Operational Test  and Evaluation (DOT&E) found the MV-22 operationally effective but  noted that weight increase of the aircraft could affect its performance  against two KPPs: amphibious external lift and land assault external lift.  Projections by DOT&E indicated that a 1,000-pound increase in aircraft  weight would reduce performance in these metrics below threshold  values. These two external lift KPPs of concern to DOT&E were combined  into the land assault external lift KPP that had previously existed. This is  one example of the 2001 modifications that consolidated 14 KPPs into 7  for the MV-22 variant.
In addition, during the 2000 operational test, DOT&E found the aircraft not  operationally suitable in part due to reliability concerns. Mission capability  (MC), one of the metrics used to measure suitability, was also modified in  2004 such that the MC rate does not have to be met until the aircraft  reaches system maturity (60,000 flight hours). According to Marine Corps  Headquarters officials, the aircraft currently has over 50,000 hours and  may reach the 60,000 hour threshold within a year.
Concerns about V-22 weight increase and how it may affect aircraft  performance have continued. In 2005, a DOT&E report on the second  operational test of the MV-22 predicted a drop in performance for Block B  aircraft due to weight increase. However, according to Navy operational  testers who tested the MV-22 Block B in 2007, performance did not drop.  DOT&E did not report on the 2007 Block B test. The program office is  currently tracking weight increase in the MV-22 Block C as a moderate risk  to the achievement of select KPPs.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: After more than 20 years in development and 14 years since the last cost  and operational effectiveness analysis was developed to reaffirm the  decision to proceed with the V-22 program in 1994, the MV-22 experience  in Iraq demonstrated that it can complete missions assigned in low-threat  environments. Its speed and range were enhancements. However,  operational tests and training exercises suggest that challenges may limit  its ability to accomplish the full repertoire of missions of the legacy  helicopters it is replacing. If so, those tasks will need to be fulfilled by  some other alternative. Viewed more broadly, the MV-22 has yet to fully  demonstrate that it can achieve the original required level of versatility. To  be useful to the warfighter in a variety of climates and places, its ability to  address and resolve a range of operational challenges must be evaluated.
Furthermore, suitability challenges that lower aircraft availability and  affect the operations and support funding that may be required to maintain  the fleet needs to be addressed. Based on the Iraq experience, the cost per  flight hour is more than double the target estimate. In addition, savings in  unit procurement cost expected as a result of the multiyear procurement  contract may be offset by modifications and upgrades required on already- produced aircraft. DOD is therefore faced with the prospect of directing  more money to a program, the military utility of which in some areas  remains unproven.
The V-22 program has already received or requested over $29 billion in  development and procurement funds. The estimated funding required to  complete development and to procure additional V-22s is almost $25  billion (then-year dollars). In addition, the program continues to face a  future of high operations and support cost funding needs, currently  estimated at $75.4 billion for the life cycle of the program. This estimate  may not accurately reflect the high cost per flight hour experienced by the  MV-22 fleet so far. In light of the significant funding needs of a program  that has not yet achieved all expected capabilities, now is a good time to  consider the return on this investment as well as other less costly  alternatives that can fill the current requirement.
To resolve this dilemma, the uses, cost, and performance of the V-22 need  to be clarified and alternatives should be considered once again. To what  degree is the V-22 a suitable and exclusive candidate for the operational  needs of the Marine Corps and other services? How much will it cost?  How much can DOD afford to spend? To what degree can a strategy be  crafted for ensuring control over these future costs? If the V-22 is not or is  only partially suitable, to what degree can another existing aircraft or  some mixture of existing aircraft (even including V-22s) or a new aircraft  perform all or some of its roles more cost effectively? Some consideration  should be given to evaluating the roles such aircraft play in today’s  theaters of war and whether their performance warrant their cost.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions.
Given the difference between the now demonstrated and previously  expected operational capabilities and costs of the V-22, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense re-examine the V-22 by requiring a new  alternatives analysis to redefine and revalidate the proper mix of aircraft  to achieve the Marine Corps’ current and future medium-lift needs,  possibly to include other services’ operational uses. Such an analysis  should weigh V-22 capabilities and costs against the capabilities and costs  of other existing helicopters and aircraft, upgrades to existing helicopters  and aircraft, and potential future acquisitions, such as the upgrade to the  CH-53 currently under development. This analysis should be conducted  within the context of anticipated future budgetary constraints, and the  services should then adjust total V-22 procurement and annual production  and acquisition plans accordingly.
Given the unresolved operational effectiveness and suitability issues and  increasing costs associated with the V-22 system, we also recommend that  the Secretary of Defense require the Marine Corps to develop a prioritized  strategy to improve system suitability (including identifying why measures  such as component reliability and aircraft availability are low), reduce  operational costs, and align future budget requests accordingly.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are  reprinted in appendix II. DOD also separately provided technical  comments, which we reviewed and incorporated as appropriate. In its  written comments, DOD concurred with our recommendation for the  development of a prioritized strategy to improve system suitability, reduce  operational costs, and align future budget requests accordingly and non- concurred with our recommendation for a new V-22 alternatives analysis.
In its overall comments on our report, DOD wrote that “the report  properly identifies reliability and availability concerns and also asserts  that the operational effectiveness of the MV-22 may be deficient in some  other environments.” DOD noted that correcting the reliability and  availability problems are a priority of the department and that actions are  being taken to address these issues. DOD further commented that the MV- 22 deployments in Iraq support “an assessment of operational  effectiveness in the situation that existed.” DOD also stated that our report  leads to a similar conclusion. We note, however, that DOD does not  address the concerns expressed in our report about operational challenges  in “other environments.”
DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop a prioritized strategy  to improve system suitability, reduce operational costs, and align future  budget requests commenting that neither it nor the Marine Corps are  satisfied with current reliability of the aircraft. They stated that their  ability to adjust for components that have not achieved reliability rates  projected by analytical models has been very limited. They further  commented that the Program Manager’s prioritization strategy will be  reviewed by the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics.
In non-concurring with our recommendation for a new V-22 alternatives  analysis, DOD stated that it supports validating required MV-22 quantities  and the proper mix of aircraft, but not by means of a new V-22 alternatives  analysis. DOD states that planning for all elements of Marine Corps  aviation (including required quantities, location, and employment of  medium-lift assets) and total force affordability are reviewed and updated  annually in the Marine Aviation Plan. It notes that previous aviation plans  have adjusted required quantities of aircraft and that more recently the  fiscal year 2009 plan addressed the needs created by sustained irregular  combat and adjusted CH-53K, AH-1Z, and UH-1Y quantities. It also  comments that the Marine Aviation Plan is formulated in a constrained  budget environment which ensures that both warfighting needs and  affordability are weighed in deriving the optimum aviation force structure  and that the Navy budget is scrutinized yearly during fall program reviews.  While these studies provide useful information to decision-makers on  aviation readiness, transition timetables, and the cost to acquire, maintain  and support assets, they do not offer a comparison of a fuller range of  medium-lift alternatives, including their costs, operational suitability, and  operational effectiveness under varying scenarios and threat levels. Also,  they do not include a sensitivity analysis to changes in key assumptions as  would an alternatives analysis. We still believe the recommendation for a  new V-22 alternatives analysis is warranted given the difference between  the now demonstrated and previously expected operational capabilities  and costs of the V-22.  Furthermore, the development of a V-22 alternatives  analysis could assure congressional decision-makers that a reasoned  business case exists that supports the acquisition of an additional 282 V- 22s and an expenditure of almost $25 billion in procurement funds in fiscal  years 2010 and beyond.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its  issue date.  We will then send copies of this report to the Secretary of  Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Secretaries of  the Air Force and Navy. This report will also be available at no charge on  GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report or need additional information,  please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report were  Bruce H. Thomas, Assistant Director; Jerry W. Clark; Kathryn E. Bolduc;  Bonita J.P. Oden; Jonathan R. Stehle; Johanna Ayers; Jason Pogacnik;  Robert S. Swierczek; Hi Tran; William Solis; and Marie P. Ahearn.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine how the V-22 performed while deployed to Iraq, we gathered  documents that identified the Osprey’s performance requirements. By  examining the program’s Joint Operational Requirements Document and  subsequent revisions, Capabilities Development Documents, and  operational test reports (with a particular emphasis on sections pertaining  to performance criteria), this allowed us to document required V-22  performance capabilities and its intended operational use. We interviewed  officials at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, the V-22  Program Office, and Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force  to discuss the V-22 key performance parameters and other performance  measures. We gathered actual deployment data (including aircraft  missions flown, utilization rates, maintenance actions, and logistics  support needs) from interviews with deployed squadrons and databases  maintained at the squadron level, as well as from presentations and  briefings. In addition to the GAO headquarters team meeting with officials  from the first deployed squadron upon their return to the United States,  we leveraged support from our audit team based in Iraq. The team  interviewed deployed squadron officials, operators, maintainers, and  contractor support personnel, observed the aircraft in operation, and had  an opportunity to fly on the Osprey. We also received information  compiled by the deployed squadron, briefings, lessons learned reports,  after action reports, and consulted with other organizations (officials at  the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation and Center for Naval  Analysis) currently monitoring the aircraft. We compared expected to  actual performance and during our interviews discussed changes in  performance metrics.
To identify challenges the V-22 is experiencing, we examined the October  2000 Operational Evaluation/Operational Assessment report, the August  2005 Operational Evaluation report on the Block A configuration, and the  June 2007 Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation report for the MV-22  Block B. This allowed us to document deficiencies in the aircraft’s  performance. To support the current status of the aircraft’s limitations,  capabilities, and shortcomings, we obtained copies of the Yellow Sheet  deficiency reports, Defense Acquisition Executive Summaries, the V-22  program office risk assessments, Naval Air Training and Operating  Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) flight manuals (which identify  operating limits for the aircraft), Director, Operational Test and Evaluation  assessments of the Osprey, and Defense Contract Management Agency  production reports along with aircraft acceptance forms, listing deviations  and waiver. We also reviewed the Air Force’s CV-22 Initial Operational  Test & Evaluation report. We interviewed officials from the V-22 test  community (Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force),  program office, officials at Marine Corps Headquarters assigned to the V- 22 program, members of the crew and contractor support personnel  onboard the U.S.S. Bataan and maintainers and operators that participated  in the Realistic Urban Training exercise and discussed the aircraft’s  capabilities and shortfalls.
To assess whether the V-22 can accomplish planned operations, we  reviewed the program’s Joint Operational Requirements Document and  subsequent revisions, Capabilities Development and Production  Documents, the 1994 Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis for the  Medium Lift Replacement Aircraft (which concluded the V-22 was the  most cost-effective alternative) and the December 2003 Concept of  Employment. We compared assumptions regarding the aircraft’s  characteristics and capabilities found in these studies to the V-22’s current  status and discussed the aircraft’s performance with officials at the Marine  Corps Headquarters, Center for Naval Analysis and in the Director,  Operational Test and Evaluation office. We also examined reports  published by other organizations monitoring the V-22.
In assessing program cost and lowered performance requirements, we  evaluated actual cost data in the Selected Acquisition Reports from 1986  through 2007 and funding requests in the budget justification support for  the V-22 program. This allowed us to document the increase in cost and  expected funding needs over time and its impact on procurement unit  cost. Data is presented in fiscal year 2009 dollars except for figure 8, which  is in then-year dollars. In a note to figure 8, we provide those amounts in  constant fiscal year 2009 dollars. To arrive at these amounts, we used base  year 2005 dollar amounts from the December 2007 Selected Acquisition  Report for the V-22 and escalated those amounts to constant fiscal year  2009 dollars using an inflation factor derived from the National Defense  Budget Estimates For 2009. We examined data regarding the cost to  correct deficiencies and fund planned upgrades, the multi-year  procurement contract modification, modifications to the engine  sustainment contract, service life expectancy for select aircraft  components, Defense Contract Management Agency reports, and the cost  for unreliable parts. During our interviews with deployed squadrons, we  obtained cost data associated with maintaining and operating the aircraft  in Iraq. We held discussions with the V-22 program office, officials at the  Marine Corps Headquarters, contractor staff representing the prime  contractor and the engine manufacturing company to better understand,  factors impacting operations and support costs, and efforts in place to  mitigate the risk of continued rising costs. We also examined the Navy and  industry’s plan to address reliability and maintainability concerns as  documented in executive supportability summit briefings. In assessing  whether or not the aircraft has met key performance parameters, we  examined the 1994 Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis for the  Medium Lift Replacement Aircraft to gain an understanding of the  assumptions used in the study and their impact on the V-22’s effectiveness  over the helicopter candidates along with each candidate’s life cycle cost  estimates. Using recent requirements documents, we identified changes in  the V-22 performance parameters since the 1994 COEA was published.
In performing our work, we focused our work efforts primarily on the MV- 22 and obtained information and interviewed officials from the V-22  Program Office, Patuxent River, Maryland; Headquarters United States  Marine Corps (Pentagon) Arlington, Virginia; Marine Medium Tiltrotor  Squadron (VMM 263 and 266), New River, North Carolina; Director,  Operational Test and Evaluation, Arlington, Virginia; Center for Naval  Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia; Defense Contract Management Agency,  Amarillo, Texas; Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force,  Norfolk, Virginia; Marine Corps Combat Development Command  (MCCDC), Quantico, Virgina; Rolls Royce, NAVAIR and the Center for  Naval Analysis representatives on board the U.S.S. Bataan. Our audit team  in Iraq met with the Commanding General, Multi-National Force-West;  Commanding Officer - Third Marine Air Wing Forward Aviation Logistics  Department; Commanding Officer and personnel from the Regimental  Combat Team; Commanding Officer and personnel from HMM 161, CH-46  squadron; VMM-266 (maintainers, operators, and crew chiefs); V-22  contractor representatives; all located at Al Asad Air Base, Anbar  Province.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 to May 2009 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.   GAO-09-326SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.   GAO-08-467SP. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Practices and Processes for Multiyear  Procurement Should Be Improved. GAO-08-298. Washington, D.C.:  February 7, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.   GAO-07-406SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.  GAO-06-391. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.  GAO-05-301. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs.   GAO-04-248. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs.   GAO-03-476. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.
Defense Acquisitions: Readiness of the Marine Corps’ V-22 Aircraft for  Full-Rate Production. GAO-01-369R. Washington, D.C.: February 20, 2001.
Navy Aviation: V-22 Cost and Capability to Meet Requirements Are Yet  to Be Determined. GAO/NSIAD-98-13. Washington, D.C.: October 22, 1997.
Navy Aviation: V-22 Development—Schedule Extended, Performance  Reduced, and Costs Increased. GAO/NSIAD-94-44. Washington, D.C.:  January 13, 1994.
Naval Aviation: Status of V-22 Osprey Full-Scale Development. GAO/T- NSIAD-91-19. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 1991.
Naval Aviation: The V-22 Osprey—Progress and Problems. GAO/NSIAD- 91-45. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 1990.
Defense Acquisition Programs: Status of Selected Systems. GAO/NSIAD- 90-30. Washington, D.C.: December 14, 1989.
DOD Acquisition Programs: Status of Selected Systems. GAO/NSIAD-88- 160. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 1988.
DOD Acquisition: Case Study of the Navy V-22 OSPREY Joint Vertical  Lift Aircraft Program, GAO/NSIAD-86-45S-7. Washington, D.C.: July 31,  1986.