Afghanistan Security: Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress and Sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces
Published: 2012-07-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 2002, the United States and other nations have worked to develop ANSF. In 2010, the United States, NATO, and other coalition partners agreed to transition responsibility for the security of Afghanistan from the international community to the Afghan government by the end of 2014. According to NATO, a successful security transition requires ANSF capable of addressing security challenges in Afghanistan. To support its development, the United States has allocated $43 billion to train, equip, and sustain ANSF from fiscal years 2002 to 2011, appropriated $11.2 billion in fiscal year 2012, and requested about $5.8 billion for fiscal year 2013.
To assist Congress in its oversight, GAO has issued over 20 reports and testimonies on ANSF since 2005. This testimony discusses findings from GAO reports and ongoing work that cover (1) progress reported and tools used to assess ANSF capability, (2) challenges affecting the development of capable ANSF, and (3) use of U.S. Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams to advise and assist ANSF. To perform this work, GAO reviewed DOD and NATO documents, and met with officials in Washington, D.C.; Tampa, FL; Brussels, Belgium; and Kabul, Afghanistan.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) report progress developing capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), but tools used to assess the performance of ANSF units have changed several times. In April 2012, DOD reported progress increasing the number and capability of ANSF, with 7 percent of army units and 9 percent of police units rated at the highest level of capability. GAO has previously found the tools used by DOD and NATO to assess ANSF reliable enough to support broad statements regarding capability. However, issues related to these tools exist. When GAO reported on ANA capability in January 2011, the highest capability rating level was independentmeaning that a unit was capable of executing the full spectrum of its missions without assistance from coalition forces. As of August 2011, the highest level had changed to independent with advisorsmeaning that a unit was capable of executing its mission and can call for coalition forces when necessary. DOD reports, these changes, as well as the elimination of certain requirements for validating units, were partly responsible for the increase in ANSF units rated at the highest level.
Several long-standing challenges may affect the sustainment of capable ANSF, including cost, key skill gaps in Afghan forces, and limited ministerial capacity. First, while the Afghan government and coalition partners agreed in May 2012 to a sustainment model for ANSF, with an annual budget of $4.1 billion, GAO has previously reported the Afghan government has limited ability to financially support its security forces and is dependent on donor contributions. Second, shortfalls in leadership and logistics capabilities in ANSF persist. Addressing such gaps is necessary to reduce ANSF reliance on coalition support. Finally, the Ministries of Defense and Interiorwhich oversee the Afghan army and policecontinue to require coalition support to accomplish their missions. DOD has also reported these ministries face challenges, such as lack of expertise in human capital and problems with corruption. GAO has made recommendations to address these challenges, including addressing shortages of trainers. Since GAO made its recommendations, additional trainers have deployed to Afghanistan.
As part of the overall transition of lead security responsibility to ANSF, starting in early 2012, the Army and Marine Corps began training and deploying small teams of advisors with specialized capabilities, referred to as Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams (SFAATs). These teams will be located throughout Afghanistan and will work with ANSF personnel from the headquarters to the battalion level and advise and assist in areas such as command and control and intelligence. GAOs past work examining the use of training and advisor teams in Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted certain areas relevant to DODs plans to provide SFAATs in support of the current mission in Afghanistan. For example, GAO found it is important that DOD assign officers and non-commissioned officers to advisor teams in a timely manner so they can train and exercise as a team prior to deployment. In addition, commanders need to set clear priorities between the advising mission and other operational requirements such as counterinsurgency operations. Given the key role of advising teams in supporting the transition process, these areas will be important considerations for DOD as it continues to refine its plans for forming, deploying, and using advisor personnel to mentor and develop the ANSF.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is not making new recommendations but has made numerous recommendations in prior reports aimed at improving efforts to develop ANSF capabilities. DOD has generally concurred with most of these recommendations and has taken or has planned steps to address them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since 2002, the United States and  other nations have worked to develop  ANSF. In 2010, the United States,  NATO, and other coalition partners  agreed to transition responsibility for  the security of Afghanistan from the  international community to the Afghan  government by the end of 2014.  According to NATO, a successful  security transition requires ANSF  capable of addressing security  challenges in Afghanistan. To support  its development, the United States has  allocated $43 billion to train, equip, and  sustain ANSF from fiscal years 2002 to  2011, appropriated $11.2 billion in  fiscal year 2012, and requested about  $5.8 billion for fiscal year 2013.
The Department of Defense (DOD) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization  (NATO) report progress developing capable Afghan National Security Forces  (ANSF), but tools used to assess the performance of ANSF units have changed  several times. In April 2012, DOD reported progress increasing the number and  capability of ANSF, with 7 percent of army units and 9 percent of police units  rated at the highest level of capability. GAO has previously found the tools used  by DOD and NATO to assess ANSF reliable enough to support broad statements  regarding capability. However, issues related to these tools exist. When GAO  reported on ANA capability in January 2011, the highest capability rating level  was “independent”—meaning that a unit was capable of executing the full  spectrum of its missions without assistance from coalition forces. As of August  2011, the highest level had changed to “independent with advisors”—meaning  that a unit was capable of executing its mission and can call for coalition forces  when necessary. DOD reports, these changes, as well as the elimination of  certain requirements for validating units, were partly responsible for the increase  in ANSF units rated at the highest level.
To assist Congress in its oversight,  GAO has issued over 20 reports and  testimonies on ANSF since 2005. This  testimony discusses findings from  GAO reports and ongoing work that  cover (1) progress reported and tools  used to assess ANSF capability, (2)  challenges affecting the development  of capable ANSF, and (3) use of U.S.  Security Force Assistance Advisory  Teams to advise and assist ANSF. To  perform this work, GAO reviewed DOD  and NATO documents, and met with  officials in Washington, D.C.; Tampa,  FL; Brussels, Belgium; and Kabul,  Afghanistan.
Several long-standing challenges may affect the sustainment of capable ANSF,  including cost, key skill gaps in Afghan forces, and limited ministerial capacity.  First, while the Afghan government and coalition partners agreed in May 2012 to  a sustainment model for ANSF, with an annual budget of $4.1 billion, GAO has  previously reported the Afghan government has limited ability to financially  support its security forces and is dependent on donor contributions. Second,  shortfalls in leadership and logistics capabilities in ANSF persist. Addressing  such gaps is necessary to reduce ANSF reliance on coalition support. Finally, the  Ministries of Defense and Interior—which oversee the Afghan army and police— continue to require coalition support to accomplish their missions. DOD has also  reported these ministries face challenges, such as lack of expertise in human  capital and problems with corruption. GAO has made recommendations to  address these challenges, including addressing shortages of trainers. Since GAO  made its recommendations, additional trainers have deployed to Afghanistan.
GAO is not making new  recommendations but has made  numerous recommendations in prior  reports aimed at improving efforts to  develop ANSF capabilities. DOD has  generally concurred with most of these  recommendations and has taken or  has planned steps to address them. View GAO-12-951T. For more information,  contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. at (202)  512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov, or Sharon  L. Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or  pickups@gao.gov.
As part of the overall transition of lead security responsibility to ANSF, starting in  early 2012, the Army and Marine Corps began training and deploying small  teams of advisors with specialized capabilities, referred to as Security Force  Assistance Advisory Teams (SFAATs). These teams will be located throughout  Afghanistan and will work with ANSF personnel from the headquarters to the  battalion level and advise and assist in areas such as command and control and  intelligence. GAO’s past work examining the use of training and advisor teams in  Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted certain areas relevant to DOD’s plans to provide  SFAATs in support of the current mission in Afghanistan. For example, GAO  found it is important that DOD assign officers and non-commissioned officers to  advisor teams in a timely manner so they can train and exercise as a team prior  to deployment. In addition, commanders need to set clear priorities between the  advising mission and other operational requirements such as counterinsurgency  operations. Given the key role of advising teams in supporting the transition  process, these areas will be important considerations for DOD as it continues to  refine its plans for forming, deploying, and using advisor personnel to mentor and  develop the ANSF.
Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Cooper, and Members of the  Subcommittee:  We are pleased to be here to discuss U.S. and international efforts to  develop capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Since 2002,  the United States and other nations have worked to develop the  capabilities of ANSF. In 2010, the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty  Organization (NATO), the Afghan government, and members of the  international community agreed to transition responsibility for the security  of Afghanistan from the international community to the Afghan  government by the end of 2014. In the past few months, NATO has  begun to shift the focus of its mission from combat to a support role more  focused on advising and assisting ANSF. According to NATO, a  successful transition requires that ANSF be fully capable of addressing  security challenges in Afghanistan on a sustainable basis. To support this  effort, the United States allocated $43 billion to build, train, equip, and  sustain ANSF from fiscal year 2002 to 2011, with an additional $11.2  billion appropriated in fiscal year 2012 and approximately $5.8 billion  requested by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) for fiscal year 2013.
To assist Congress in its oversight, since 2005 we have issued over 20  reports and testimonies focusing on ANSF. Our remarks are based on our  prior and ongoing work on this issue. Specifically, we address (1)  progress reported and tools used to assess ANSF capability, (2)  challenges affecting the development of capable ANSF, and (3) use of  U.S. Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams to advise and assist  ANSF. Detailed information on the scope and methodology for our prior  work can be found in the reports we have cited throughout this statement.  For the purposes of this testimony, we updated data on ANSF size and  capability using DOD and NATO progress reports. We obtained the views  of DOD on this information and incorporated the Department’s comments  where appropriate. We conducted the underlying performance audits in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audits to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: DOD and NATO Report Progress Developing Capable ANSF, but Assessment Tool Has Changed Over Time
paragraphs: DOD and NATO report progress in developing capable ANSF. In April  2012, DOD reported that the number of ANSF grew steadily and  exceeded growth targets. Similarly, as of May 2012, NATO reported that  the Afghan National Army (ANA) reached its October 2012 recruitment  growth goal of 195,000, while the Afghan National Police (ANP) reached  149,208 of its October 2012 goal of 157,000. We previously reported that  DOD reported similar progress in 2010, achieving its interim growth goals  for the ANA several months ahead of schedule. Further, DOD noted that  increased numbers of ANSF were accompanied by increased capability  of these forces, reporting that 7 percent (15 out of 219) of ANA and 9  percent (39 out of 435) of ANP units rated as operating independently  with the assistance of advisors.on DOD assessments of the ANA and ANP.
section_title: Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress and Sustainment of Capable ANSF
paragraphs: In April 2012, GAO issued a restricted report on the cost to build and sustain ANSF.
ANP required approximately 8,300. DOD has previously noted that  the development of leaders for ANSF is essential to improving its  capability. Additionally, despite reported progress in providing ANSF  with literacy training—a key prerequisite for learning specialized skills,  such as logistics, needed to reduce reliance on coalition forces—DOD  states that illiteracy remains a challenge. Further, despite the surge of  U.S. troops to Afghanistan, the training mission continues to  experience a shortfall in personnel needed to help address these key  skill gaps. According to DOD, as of March 2012, about 16 percent of  instructor positions to train ANSF were unfilled and NATO lacked  pledges to fill them.
Limited capacity of ministries supporting ANSF. We have previously  reported that limited capacity in the Afghan Ministries of Defense  (MOD) and Interior (MOI)—which oversee the ANA and ANP,  respectively—present challenges to the development and sustainment  of capable ANSF. For instance, MOI faced challenges, such as a lack  of consolidated personnel databases and formal training in properly  executing budget and salary functions. In April 2012, DOD reported  that the MOD was assessed as requiring some coalition assistance to  accomplish its mission—an assessment unchanged since October  2010, while the MOI was assessed as needing significant coalition  assistance—an assessment unchanged since 2009. Additionally,  DOD reported that the ministries face a variety of challenges,  including, among others, MOD’s lack of human capital in areas  requiring technical expertise and MOI’s continuing problems with  corruption.
section_title: Factors to Consider in Deployment and Use of Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams to Develop the ANSF
paragraphs: As part of the overall transition of lead security responsibility to the ANSF  by 2014, NATO’s mission in Afghanistan is shifting from a combat role to  more of an advising and assist mission. To that end, earlier this year, the  United States and coalition nations have begun providing specialized  teams, referred to as security force assistance advisory teams (SFAATs),  to provide leadership and expertise to ANSF personnel and units. At the  same time, overall U.S. troop levels are planned to draw down from about  87,000 as of the end of March 2012, to approximately 68,000 by the end  of September 2012.
Mentoring, advising, and partnering with ANSF units has been a key part  of NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. For the U.S. contribution, DOD has  used a variety of approaches to provide U.S. forces to carry out the  advise and assist mission, including forming individual training teams as  well as augmenting existing brigade combat teams with additional  personnel to serve as advisors. Starting in early 2012, the Army and  Marine Corps began training and deploying small teams of advisors with  specialized capabilities, or SFAATs. These teams will be located  throughout Afghanistan and are comprised of officers and senior-grade  non-commissioned officers. They will work with ANSF personnel from the  headquarters to the battalion level and advise and assist in areas such as  command and control, intelligence, and logistics. In addition, the SFAATs  will work with the ground commander to arrange for these units to provide  any necessary support to ANSF units such as fire support or medical  assistance. To initially provide these teams, the Army and Marine Corps  in some cases created these teams by drawing personnel from units that  had already deployed to Afghanistan. In other cases, they created teams  by drawing personnel from U.S. based units. As the Army and Marine  Corps plan to provide additional teams of advisors for future deployments,  they are exploring whether to use the same approaches or other options  for organizing and deploying these personnel. In addition, coalition  nations are expected to provide a number of similar advisor teams.
Our past work examining the use of training teams and advisor teams in  Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted certain areas that we believe are  relevant to DOD’s plans to provide the SFAATs in support of the current  mission in Afghanistan. For example, our recent work focused on the  Army, which in 2009 shifted its approach and began replacing individual  training teams with brigade combat teams augmented with advisor  personnel. Specifically, we identified challenges related to the sourcing  and training of personnel, balancing missions, defining command and  control relationships, and providing support to advisor personnel once  deployed.
Sourcing and training of advisor personnel. Neither the training teams  nor the augments provided to the Army’s brigade combat teams  existed in any of the services’ doctrinal structures. Instead, they were  typically sourced with personnel who were identified individually, and  generally consisted of company and field-grade officers and senior  non-commissioned officers who were taken from other units. We  found that DOD faced some difficulty in providing the required field  grade officers or specialized capabilities to these teams, because of  widespread demand for these personnel, whose numbers were  already in short supply. In addition, DOD faced challenges getting  personnel assigned to advisor teams in a timely manner, limiting their  ability to train and exercise as a team prior to deployment.
Balancing advising activities with other missions. We found that units  in Afghanistan faced some challenges because commanders did not  always set clear priorities between the advising mission and other  operational requirements, such as counterinsurgency operations or  performing missions such as conducting checkpoints. As a result, in  kinetic combat environments, commanders prioritized the combat  mission and directed their resources accordingly.
Defining command-and-control relationships. Theater commanders  did not always provide clear guidance on command and control  structures for the advisors. In some cases, the lack of clarity on  command relationships between brigades and advisor teams led to  the reassignment of advisors to the control of a division or a brigade  that they had not trained and deployed with.
Provision of support to advisor teams. We found that brigades in  Afghanistan sometimes faced challenges providing the necessary  support to advisor teams such as transportation assets, force  protection resources, and equipment because support requirements  had not always been clearly identified, these items and capabilities  were in limited supply and were, at times, also needed to support  combat operations.
We made several recommendations to DOD to enhance the  Department’s ability to support the advising mission, including clearly  defining the requirements for the number, ranks, and capabilities of  advisors, the relative priority of the advising mission, and the support that  advisor teams require. DOD concurred with our recommendations and  has taken some actions to implement them. Given the key role of advising  teams in supporting the transition process, these areas will be important  considerations for DOD as it continues to refine its plans for forming,  deploying, and using advisor personnel to mentor and develop the ANSF.
Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Cooper, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be  happy to answer any questions you may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information on this statement, please contact Charles Michael  Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov, or Sharon L.  Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. In addition, contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key  contributions to this statement include Tetsuo Miyabara, Assistant  Director; James A. Reynolds, Assistant Director; Ashley Alley; Teakoe  Coleman; Tara Copp; Thomas Costa; Joyee Dasgupta; David Dayton;  Martin deAlteriis; Hynek Kalkus; Farahnaaz Khakoo; Christopher Mulkins;  Marcus Lloyd Oliver; Nina Pfeiffer; Lisa Reijula; Biza Repko; Luis  Rodriguez; Pierre Toureille; and Sally Williamson.
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