Department Of Justice: Continued Actions Needed to Enhance Program Efficiency and Resource Management
Published: 2017-03-21T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2016, DOJ's $29 billion budget funded a broad array of national security, law enforcement, and criminal justice system activities. GAO has examined a number of key programs where DOJ has sole responsibility or works with other departments, and recommended actions to improve program efficiency and resource management.
This statement summarizes findings and recommendations from recent GAO reports that address DOJ's (1) law enforcement activities, (2) custody and care of federal prisoners and inmates, (3) grant management and administration, and (4) use of alternative sources of funding.
This statement is based on prior GAO products issued from February 2012 to November 2016, along with selected updates obtained as of March 2017. For the selected updates on DOJ's progress in implementing GAO recommendations, GAO analyzed information provided by DOJ officials on actions taken and planned.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOJ has not fully addressed most GAO recommendations related to its law enforcement activities. The Department of Justice (DOJ) undertakes a number of activities to enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States. Key findings and recommendations from six recent GAO reports include, among other things, that DOJ should: better adhere to policies on collecting firearms data, assess opportunities to more efficiently share information on missing persons, better ensure the privacy and accuracy of face recognition technology, provide more information to entities that handle controlled substances, and improve the handling of whistleblower complaints. Collectively, these reports resulted in 28 recommendations. As of March 2017, DOJ has fully implemented 5 of these recommendations, begun actions to address 11, has not taken actions for 8, and disagreed with 4 recommendations.
DOJ has not fully addressed most GAO recommendations related to the custody and care of federal prisoners and inmates. DOJ is responsible for the custody and care of federal prisoners and inmates, for which the President's Budget requested $8.8 billion for fiscal year 2017. GAO's recent reports highlight areas for continued improvements in DOJ incarceration and offender management, including better assessing key initiatives to address overcrowding and other federal incarceration challenges, better measuring the outcomes of alternatives to incarceration, improving the management of new prison activations, better estimating cost savings for prisoner operations, and improving notification to tribes about registered sex offenders upon release. Since August 2014, GAO has made 17 recommendations to DOJ in five reports related to these issues, and DOJ generally concurred with them. As of March 2017, DOJ has fully implemented 7 of the recommendations, partially implemented 8, and has not taken actions for 2 recommendations.
DOJ has implemented most GAO recommendations to improve grant administration and management. DOJ supports a range of activities—including policing and victims' assistance—through grants provided to federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, as well as national, community-based, and non-profit organizations. Congress appropriated $2.4 billion for DOJ grant programs in fiscal year 2016. Four recent GAO reports highlight DOJ's overall grant administration practices, management of specific programs, and efforts to reduce overlap and duplication amongst its grant programs. The four reports include 17 recommendations to DOJ, and the department generally concurred with all of them. As of March 2017, DOJ has fully implemented 15 of the 17 recommendations and partially implemented the remaining two.
DOJ has partially implemented GAO recommendations designed to improve management of funds collected through alternative sources. DOJ has the ability to fund programs using money it collects through alternative sources, such as fines, fees, and penalties in addition to its annual appropriations. For example, in 2015, we reported that DOJ collected $4.3 billion from seven alternative sources of funding in 2013. This statement highlights three reports that address DOJ's collection, use, and management of these funds. One of the three reports includes three recommendations, which DOJ has partially implemented.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO has made several recommendations to DOJ in prior reports to help improve program efficiency and resource management. DOJ generally concurred with most of these recommendations and has implemented or begun taking action to address them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss our  prior work on ways in which the Department of Justice (DOJ) can  increase efficiencies and better manage its resources across key  programs. In fiscal year 2016, DOJ’s enacted budget was about $29  billion and its appropriation was among the top 10 of all federal agencies.  DOJ has a leading role in administering a wide variety of programs to  fulfill its mission to, among other things, enforce the law and provide  federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime. With the federal  government currently facing an unsustainable long-term fiscal path, it is  increasingly important for DOJ and other executive branch agencies to  improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government programs.
As requested, my testimony today is based on our recent work examining  programs across an array of DOJ components. In some of these program  areas, DOJ has sole responsibility, while in others DOJ works with other  departments and agencies. This statement addresses four key areas in  which we have issued reports and highlights our recommendations to  DOJ to enhance program efficiency and resource management.  Specifically, this statement addresses DOJ’s (1) law enforcement  activities; (2) custody and care of federal prisoners and inmates; (3) grant  management and administration; and (4) use of alternative sources of  funding, such as fines, fees, and penalties. In each of these areas, we  discuss a number of our products that encapsulate how DOJ is  accomplishing its mission.
This statement is based on reports we issued from February 2012 to  November 2016, and includes updates on selected reports as of March  2017. For our prior work, we analyzed documentation, such as program  policies and procedures, and interviewed DOJ officials responsible for the  identified DOJ programs. More information about the scope and  methodology of our prior work can be found in those reports. To update  the status of DOJ’s efforts to address the recommendations we made in  these reports, we collected information from DOJ program officials on  actions they have taken or planned in response. We conducted our work  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the  evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: DOJ Has Not Fully Addressed Most GAO Recommendations Related to its Law Enforcement Activities
paragraphs: As part of its mission to enforce the law and defend the interests of the  United States, DOJ undertakes a number of law enforcement activities  through its component agencies. The following six reports—which we  issued in 2015 and 2016—contain key findings and recommendations in  this area, and highlight potential areas for continued oversight.  Collectively, the reports resulted in 28 recommendations to DOJ; the Drug  Enforcement Administration (DEA); the Federal Bureau of Investigation  (FBI); the National Institute of Justice (NIJ); the Bureau of Alcohol,  Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); and other DOJ components. As  of March 2017, DOJ and its component agencies have implemented 5 of  the 28 recommendations. DOJ and its components have also begun  taking actions to address 11 of the remaining recommendations, which  remain open. DOJ or its components have not taken actions for 8 of our  recommendations and disagreed with the remaining 4 recommendations.
DOJ and ATF have not always complied with federal law and ATF  firearm-related policies. In June 2016, we reported that ATF did not  always comply with the appropriations act restriction prohibiting  consolidation or centralization of federal firearm licensee records, and did  not consistently adhere to ATF policies. To carry out its enforcement  responsibilities, ATF maintains 25 firearm-related databases, 16 of which  contain firearms purchaser information from a federal firearm licensee.  While ATF has the statutory authority and responsibility to obtain firearms  transactions records from federal firearms licensees under certain  circumstances, ATF is restricted from using appropriated funds to  consolidate or centralize federal firearm licensee records. We examined  four federal firearm licensee databases—selected based on factors such  as the inclusion of retail purchaser information and original data—and  found that two of the four did not always comply with ATF appropriations  act restrictions and two of the four did not adhere to ATF policies. ATF  addressed the violations of the appropriations act restrictions during the  course of our review. To address identified policy deficiencies, we made  three recommendations that ATF provide guidance to federal firearm  licensees, align system capabilities with ATF policies, and align timing  and ATF policy for deleting records related to multiple firearm sales. ATF  concurred with the recommendations. As of March 2017, ATF has  implemented one recommendation and reported progress towards  implementing the other two recommendations by improving practices and  modifying data systems to better align with ATF policy.
DOJ should study options for reducing overlap and fragmentation  on missing persons databases. In June 2016, we reported that DOJ  could facilitate more efficient sharing of information on missing persons  and unidentified remains. The FBI’s National Crime Information Center  database includes criminal justice agency information and is restricted to  authorized users. DOJ’s NIJ oversees the National Missing and  Unidentified Persons System, a database open to the public for access to  published case information. We found that data contained in these  systems were overlapping and fragmented, creating the risk of  duplication. Because there is no mechanism to share information  between the systems, users relying on only one system may miss  information that could be instrumental in solving these types of cases.  Although federal law precludes full integration, there may still be  opportunities to share information between the systems, which could  reduce overlap and fragmentation of data on missing and unidentified  persons.
To allow for more efficient use of missing and unidentified persons  information, we recommended that the FBI and NIJ evaluate options to  share information between the two systems. DOJ disagreed with our  recommendation, citing that it lacks legal authority. In March 2017, DOJ  reiterated its position that any such sharing was prohibited by the law.  Specifically, DOJ stated that the FBI’s system can only share information  with authorized users, dissemination is limited to those individuals  performing law enforcement, and that additional efforts to examine other  options would waste taxpayer funds. We continue to believe that our  recommendation is valid and that DOJ should further study options for  sharing information within the confines of its legal framework. For  example, our work identified a variety of solutions to address the  fragmentation and overlap between the two systems such as developing  a notification alert for the FBI’s system when related case data was also  present in the other system.
DOJ and the FBI have not addressed privacy and accuracy concerns  related to the FBI’s use of face recognition technology. Whenever  agencies develop or change technologies that collect personal  information, federal law requires them to publish certain privacy impact  statements. In May 2016, we reported that the FBI did not publish  updated privacy impact assessments (PIA) and a System of Records  Notice (SORN) for a face recognition service that allows law enforcement  agencies to search a database of over 30 million photos to support  criminal investigations. Users of this service include the FBI and selected  state and local law enforcement agencies, which can submit search  requests to help identify an unknown person using, for example, a photo  from a surveillance camera. DOJ issued an initial PIA in 2008, before the  FBI and state and local law enforcement agencies began using this  service on a pilot basis. However, the FBI did not update the PIA until  September 2015, during the course of our review and after the system  underwent significant changes. Further, although the FBI, state, and local  law enforcement agencies had been using the system since 2011; DOJ  did not publish a SORN until May 2016, after completion of our review.  Similarly, DOJ did not publish a PIA for the FBI’s internal use of additional  face recognition technologies until May 2015, during the course of our  review and almost 4 years after the FBI began its new use of face  recognition searches. In addition, we found that the FBI had not audited  the actual use of face recognition technology and, as a result, could not  demonstrate compliance with applicable privacy protection requirements.
We also reported that the FBI had conducted limited testing to evaluate  the detection rate of the face recognition searches, but had not (1)  assessed how often errors occurred or (2) taken steps to determine  whether systems used by external partners are sufficiently accurate for  the FBI’s use. By taking steps to evaluate the detection rates of the  various systems, the FBI could better ensure the data received were  sufficiently accurate and do not include photos of innocent people as  investigative leads. We made three recommendations to DOJ and the FBI  to determine why privacy-related documents were not published as  required and to audit the use of the face recognition technology to better  ensure face image searches are conducted in accordance with policy  requirements. We made three additional recommendations to the FBI to  verify that the systems are sufficiently accurate and are meeting users’  needs. DOJ and the FBI partially agreed with two recommendations and  disagreed with one recommendation concerning privacy. The FBI agreed  with one recommendation and disagreed with two recommendations  concerning accuracy. In response, we clarified one recommendation  regarding accuracy testing and updated another regarding the SORN  development process, based on information DOJ provided after reviewing  our draft report. As of March 2017, DOJ has begun taking actions to  address three of our six recommendations, such as initiating audits to  oversee the FBI’s use of its face recognition technology.
DEA should better administer the controlled substance quota setting  process. In February 2015, we found that DEA had not effectively  administered the quota setting process that limits the amount of certain  controlled substances available for use in the United States. Each year,  manufacturers apply to DEA for quotas needed to make drugs. We found  that DEA did not respond within the time frames required by its  regulations for any year from 2001 through 2014, which, according to  some manufacturers, caused or exacerbated shortages of drugs. We  recommended that DEA take seven actions to improve its management of  the quota setting process and address drug shortages. DEA concurred,  and as of March 2017 has implemented four of the seven  recommendations, one related to establishing an agreement to facilitate  information sharing with the Food and Drug Administration regarding drug  shortages and the three others related to strengthening internal controls  in the quota setting process. DEA has also taken some actions towards  addressing the remaining three recommendations—including working  with the Food and Drug Administration to establish a work plan to  specifically outline the information the agencies will share and the time  frames for doing so—but needs to take additional actions to fully  implement them.
DEA needs to provide additional guidance to entities that handle  controlled substances. In June 2015, based on four nationally  representative surveys of DEA registrants—distributors of controlled  substances, individual pharmacies, chain pharmacy corporate offices,  and practitioners—we reported that many registrants were not aware of  various DEA resources, such as manuals for pharmacists and  practitioners. In addition, some distributors, individual pharmacies, and  chain pharmacy corporate offices wanted improved guidance from, and  additional communication with, DEA about their roles and responsibilities  under the Controlled Substances Act. We recommended that DEA take  three actions to increase registrants’ awareness of DEA resources and  improve the information DEA provides to registrants. DEA concurred and,  as of March 2017, has taken some actions towards addressing our three  recommendations, such as conducting and participating in conferences  and other industry outreach events. However, DEA needs to take  additional actions to fully implement the recommendations, including  establishing a means of regular communication with registrants, such as  through listservs, which would reach a larger proportion of registrants  than conferences and other events.
DOJ should improve handling of FBI whistleblower retaliation  complaints. In January 2015, we reported that unlike employees in other  executive branch agencies, FBI employees did not have a process to  seek corrective action if they experienced retaliation in certain  circumstances. Specifically, FBI employees could not seek corrective  action if they experienced retaliation based on a disclosure of wrongdoing  to their supervisors or others in their chain of command who were not  designated DOJ or FBI officials. We suggested that Congress consider  whether FBI employees should have a means to obtain corrective action  for retaliation for disclosures of wrongdoing made to supervisors and  others in the employee’s chains of command. In response to our report, in  December 2016, Congress passed and the President signed the FBI  Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2016, which, among other  things, provides a means for FBI employees to obtain corrective action in  these cases and brings FBI whistleblower protection in line with the  protection in place for employees of other executive branch agencies for  reporting wrongdoing to their chain of command. This change will help  ensure that whistleblowers have access to recourse, that retaliatory  action does not go unpunished, and that other potential whistleblowers  are encouraged to come forward.
We also reported that (1) DOJ and FBI guidance for making a protected  disclosure was not always clear; (2) DOJ did not provide whistleblower  retaliation complainants with estimates of when to expect DOJ decisions  throughout the complaint process; (3) DOJ offices responsible for  investigating complaints have not consistently complied with certain  regulatory requirements, such as obtaining complainants’ approvals for  extensions of time; and (4) although DOJ officials have ongoing and  planned efforts to reduce the duration of retaliation complaints, they have  limited plans to assess the impacts of these actions. To address these  deficiencies, we made eight recommendations that DOJ clarify guidance,  provide complainants with estimated complaint decision time frames,  develop an oversight mechanism to monitor regulatory compliance, and  assess the impact of efforts to reduce the duration of FBI whistleblower  complaints. DOJ concurred with these recommendations, but as of March  2017 has not provided documentation of actions taken to address them.
section_title: DOJ Has Not Fully Addressed Most GAO Recommendations Related to the Custody and Care of Federal Prisoners and Inmates
paragraphs: As part of their mission to enforce and control crime, DOJ and its  components—including the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the U.S.  Marshals Service (USMS)—are responsible for the custody and care of  federal prisoners and inmates. To carry out these responsibilities, the  President’s Budget requested $8.8 billion for fiscal year 2017. Our recent  reports on DOJ’s programs for incarceration and offender management  highlight areas for oversight, including better estimating costs and  measuring outcomes. Since August 2014, we have made 17  recommendations to DOJ, BOP, and USMS to improve the custody and  care of federal prisoners and inmates. As of March 2017, DOJ or its  component agencies have implemented 7 of the 17 recommendations,  have begun taking actions on 8 recommendations that remain open, and  have not taken actions for the remaining 2 recommendations.
DOJ could better assess federal incarceration initiatives. In June  2015, we reported that DOJ could better measure the efficacy of three  key new initiatives designed to address federal incarceration challenges,  such as overcrowding and rising costs. We found that the Smart on Crime  Initiative indicators were well-linked to overall goals, which includes  prioritizing prosecution of the most serious offenses, but many lacked  clarity and context. The Clemency Initiative, which encourages certain  inmates to petition to have sentences reduced by the President, does not  track how long it takes for the average petition to clear each step in the  review process. In addition, BOP created the Reentry Services Division in  2014 to improve inmate reentry into society, but we found that it lacked a  plan to prioritize evaluations among all 18 of the programs it lists in its  national reentry directory. To address these deficiencies, we made three  recommendations to improve measurement of the initiatives. DOJ  concurred with two of the recommendations and partially concurred with  the third. In May 2016, BOP finalized an updated evaluation plan for the  Reentry Services Division that was consistent with our recommendation  and we consider that recommendation to be implemented. As of March  2017, DOJ has not provided documentation of actions on the remaining  two recommendations.
DOJ and BOP could better measure the outcomes of alternatives to  incarceration. In June 2016, we reported that in part to help reduce the  size and costs of the federal prison population, DOJ has used a variety of  alternatives to incarceration before sentencing, but it does not reliably  track the use of some of these alternatives. For instance, we reported that  DOJ has used two types of pretrial diversion as alternatives to  incarceration—one at the discretion of the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the  other involving additional stakeholders, such as judges and defense  counsel. However, DOJ data on the use of pretrial diversion are  unreliable because DOJ’s database does not distinguish between these  different types of pretrial diversions and DOJ does not have guidance in  place to ensure that its attorneys consistently enter the use of pretrial  diversion into the database.
In addition, over the past 7 years, BOP has increased its use of  incarceration alternatives, such as the placement of inmates in residential  reentry centers (also known as halfway houses) and home confinement.  However, we found that while BOP has tracked data on the cost  implications of using these alternatives, it does not track the information  needed to help measure the outcomes of incarceration alternatives.  Similarly, we found that DOJ has not measured the outcomes or identified  the cost implications of pretrial diversion programs. To address these  deficiencies, we made six recommendations that DOJ enhance its  tracking of data on the use of pretrial diversions and that DOJ and BOP  obtain outcome data and develop measures for alternatives used. DOJ  concurred and, as of March 2017, has fully implemented the two  recommendations on tracking data by revising its system to separately  track the different types of pretrial diversion programs and providing  guidance to its attorneys on the appropriate way to enter data. DOJ and  BOP have partially addressed the remaining four recommendations.
BOP faces challenges in activating new prisons. In August 2014, we  found that BOP was behind schedule in activating six new prison  institutions designed to handle the projected growth of the federal inmate  population, and that BOP did not have a policy or best practices to guide  the activations or activation schedules. Activation of the prisons—the  process by which BOP prepares institutions for inmates—was delayed, in  part, because of schedule challenges, such as staffing, posed by  locations of the new institutions. We also found that BOP did not  effectively communicate to Congress on how the locations of the new  institutions may affect activation schedules. To address these  deficiencies, we recommended that (1) DOJ use its annual budget  justification to communicate to Congress factors that might delay prison  activation; (2) BOP analyze institution-level staffing data and develop  effective, tailored strategies to mitigate staffing challenges; (3) BOP  develop and implement a comprehensive activation policy; and (4) BOP  develop and implement an activation schedule that reflects best practices.  DOJ and BOP concurred, and as of March 2017 have implemented two of  the four recommendations by enhancing recruitment approaches to  address staffing challenges and developing a policy to guide future  activations. Additional actions are needed to address the remaining two  recommendations.
U.S. Marshals Service could better estimate cost savings and  monitor ways to achieve efficiencies. In May 2016, we found that the  U.S. Marshals Service’s largest prisoner costs were housing payments to  state, local, and private prisons. For example, in fiscal year 2015, USMS  spent approximately $1.2 billion on these costs. USMS has implemented  actions that it reports have saved prisoner-related costs from fiscal years  2010 through 2015, which include automating detention management  services, developing cost-saving housing options, investing in alternatives  to pre-trial detention to reduce housing and medical expenditures, and  improving medical claim management. For actions with identified savings  over this time period, however, we found that about $654 million of the  USMS’s estimated $858 million in total savings was not reliable because  the estimates were not sufficiently comprehensive, accurate, consistent,  or well-documented. For example, USMS identified $375 million in  savings from the alternatives to pre-trial detention program for fiscal years  2010 through 2015, but did not verify the data or methodology used to  develop the estimate or provide documentation supporting its reported  savings for fiscal years 2012 onward. We also found that USMS has  designed systems to identify opportunities for cost efficiencies, including  savings. For example, the agency requires districts to conduct annual  self-assessments of their procedures to identify any deficiencies that  could lead to cost savings. However, USMS cannot aggregate and  analyze the results of the assessments across districts.
To address these deficiencies, we recommended that USMS (1) develop  reliable methods for estimating cost savings and validating reported  savings achieved, and (2) establish a mechanism to aggregate and  analyze the results of annual district self-assessments. USMS concurred,  and as of March 2017 has provided us with information on how it plans to  move forward in addressing the recommendations, but needs to take  additional actions to fully implement them.
DOJ has improved outreach to states to notify tribes about  registered sex offenders who plan to live, work, or attend school on  tribal land. In November 2014, we found that most eligible tribes have  retained their implementation authority, and have either substantially  implemented or were in the process of implementing the Sex Offender  Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). In our survey of tribes that  retained their authority to implement the act, the four most frequently  reported implementation challenges were the inability to submit convicted  sex offender information to federal databases, lack of notification from  state prisons upon the release of sex offenders, lack of staff, and inability  to cover the costs of SORNA implementation. SORNA established the  Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending,  Registering, and Tracking (SMART Office) within DOJ to administer and  assist jurisdictions with implementing the law. However, we found that  some states had not notified tribes when sex offenders who will be or  have been released from state prison register with the state and indicate  that they intend to live, work, or attend school on tribal land, as SORNA  requires. We found that the SMART Office has taken some actions, but  could do more to encourage states to provide notification to tribes. To  address this deficiency, we made two recommendations to DOJ related to  the SMART Office encouraging states to notify tribes about offenders who  plan to live, work, or attend school on tribal land upon release from  prison. DOJ concurred with these recommendations and has fully  implemented them.
section_title: DOJ Has Implemented Most GAO Recommendations to Improve Grant Administration and Management
paragraphs: DOJ supports a range of activities—including policing and victims’  assistance—through grants provided to federal, state, local, and tribal  agencies, as well as national, community-based, and non-profit  organizations. Congress appropriated $2.4 billion for DOJ discretionary  grant programs in fiscal year 2016. The Office of Justice Programs (OJP)  is the largest of DOJ’s three granting components and operated with an  enacted discretionary budget of approximately $1.8 billion in fiscal year  2016. The four reports discussed below highlight DOJ’s overall grant  administration practices, management of specific programs, and efforts to  reduce duplication in grant programs across the federal government. The  four reports included 17 recommendations to DOJ. The department  concurred with these recommendations, and as of March 2017 had taken  actions to fully implement 15 of the 17 recommendations. DOJ has also  begun taking actions on the remaining 2 recommendations, which are still  open.
DOJ has addressed recommendations to reduce the risk of grant  program overlap and unnecessary duplication. In July 2012, we found  that DOJ had not assessed its grant programs department-wide to identify  overlap, which occurs when multiple agencies or programs have similar  goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve them, or target  similar beneficiaries. We reported that DOJ published 253 fiscal year  2010 grant solicitations to support crime prevention, law enforcement,  and crime victim services. We also found that DOJ did not routinely  coordinate grant awards to avoid unnecessary duplication, which occurs  when two or more agencies or programs are engaged in the same  activities or provide the same services to the same beneficiaries without  being knowledgeable about each other’s efforts. Further, we reported that  DOJ could take steps to better assess the results of all the grant  programs it administers. As result, we made eight recommendations to  DOJ. The department concurred with these recommendations and has  fully implemented them.
DOJ has addressed recommendations for improving management of  the bulletproof vest partnership. In February 2012, we found that  DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance—within the Office of Justice  Programs—could enhance grant management controls and better ensure  consistency in management of the bulletproof vest partnership grant  program. For example, we found that DOJ could better manage the  grant program by improving grantee accountability in the use of funds for  body armor purchases, reducing the risk of grantee noncompliance with  program requirements, and ensuring consistency across its efforts to  promote law enforcement officer safety. We made five recommendations  to DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance. The department concurred with  these recommendations and has fully implemented them.
DOJ could better manage the Victims of Child Abuse Act grant  program. In April 2015, we found that OJP’s Office of Juvenile Justice  and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) had several administrative review  and approval processes in place that contributed to delays in grantees’  ability to begin spending their award funds. For example, for the 28  Victims of Child Abuse Act (VOCA) program grants awarded from fiscal  years 2010 through 2013, grantees had expended less than 20 percent,  on average, of each grant they received during the original 12-month  project period. In particular, we found that OJJDP’s processes for  reviewing grantees’ budgets and conference planning requests were  contributing to delays in grantees’ ability to begin spending their funds.  Further, we found that OJJDP’s guidance on grant extensions was  unclear and irregularly enforced. For example, OJJDP approved 72 of 73  extension requests from fiscal years 2010 through 2013 without the  required narrative justification. We also found that OJJDP did not have  complete data to assess VOCA grantees’ performance against the  measures it had established because the tools it used to collect this  information did not align to the measures themselves. As a result, we  made four recommendations to OJP and the office concurred. As of  March 2017, OJP has implemented two recommendations by establishing  and enforcing clear guidance related to grant extensions and enhancing  its performance management capacity. DOJ has partially taken action to  address the remaining two recommendations.
DOJ and other federal agencies have taken steps to avoid  duplication among human trafficking grants. In June 2016, we  identified 42 grant programs with awards made in 2014 and 2015 that  may be used to combat human trafficking or assist victims of human  trafficking, 15 of which are intended solely for these purposes. Although  some overlap exists among these human trafficking grant programs,  federal agencies have established processes to help prevent  unnecessary duplication. For instance, in response to recommendations  in a prior GAO report, DOJ requires grant applicants to identify any  federal grants they are currently operating under as well as federal grants  for which they have applied. In addition, agencies that participate in the  grantmaking committee of the Senior Policy Operating Group—an entity  through which federal agencies coordinate their efforts to combat human  trafficking—are to share grant solicitations and information on proposed  grant awards, allowing other agencies to comment on proposed awards  and determine whether they plan to award funding to the same  organization.
section_title: DOJ Has Partially Implemented GAO Recommendations Designed to Improve Management of Funds Collected through Alternative Sources
paragraphs: DOJ has the ability to fund programs using money it collects through  alternative sources, such as fines, fees, and penalties, in addition to the  budget authority Congress provides DOJ through annual appropriations.  For example, the Crime Victims Fund, which is financed by collections of  fines, penalties, and bond forfeitures from defendants convicted of federal  crimes, obligated almost $2.4 billion for a variety of grants and programs  to assist victims of crimes in fiscal year 2015. The following three reports  highlight DOJ’s collection, use, and management of these funds. One of  the three reports contains three recommendations, which have been  partially implemented.
DOJ could better manage alternative sources of funding. In February  2015, we reported that DOJ could better manage its alternative sources  of funding—collections by DOJ from sources such as fines, fees, and  penalties—which, in fiscal year 2013, made up about 15 percent of DOJ’s  total budgetary resources. Specifically, DOJ collected about $4.3 billion  from seven major alternative sources of funding—including the Assets  Forfeiture Fund, the Crime Victims Fund, and non-criminal fingerprint  checks fees, among others. We found that two of these funds could be  better managed. For example, DOJ has the authority to deposit up to 3  percent of amounts collected from DOJ’s civil debt collection litigation  activities, such as Medicare fraud cases and referred student loan  collections, into the Three Percent Fund. Collections are used to defray  DOJ’s costs for conducting these activities. However, the department had  not conducted analyses of the fund that include elements such as  projected collections or the impact of previous obligations rates on  unobligated balances. In addition, the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information  Services collects fees for providing non-criminal justice fingerprint-based  background checks. We found that the FBI was not transparent in how it  sets its fees, and did not evaluate the appropriate range of carryover  amounts for a portion of those fees, even though unobligated balances  had been growing.
As a result, we recommended that (1) DOJ develop a policy to analyze  unobligated balances and develop collection estimates for the Three  Percent Fund; (2) the FBI publish a breakdown of how it assesses its  fingerprint check fees to better communicate the cost of the service to  users; and (3) the FBI develop a policy to analyze and determine an  appropriate range for unobligated balances from a portion of those fees.  DOJ partially concurred with the first recommendation and generally  concurred with the other two recommendations. As of March 2017, DOJ  is working to improve how it analyzes unobligated funds needed for future  fiscal years for the Three Percent Fund; however, it provided various  reasons why it does not calculate revenue estimates. Our report  recognized DOJ’s concerns and we continue to believe that DOJ could  develop an estimated range of potential collections based on historical  trends and current collection activities. The FBI has partially implemented  our recommendations to be more transparent with its fees and improve  how it analyzes unobligated balances from a portion of the fingerprint  checks fees.
DOJ distributes fines, penalties, and forfeitures from financial  institutions to support program expenses and victims of related  crimes. In March 2016, we reported that since 2009, the federal  government had assessed financial institutions about $12 billion in fines,  penalties, and forfeitures for violations of the Bank Secrecy Act’s anti- money-laundering regulations, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, and  U.S. sanctions programs requirements. Of this amount, about $3.2 billion  was deposited into DOJ’s Assets Forfeiture Fund (AFF). Funds from the  AFF are primarily used for program expenses, payments to victims of the  related crimes, and payments to law enforcement agencies that  participated in the efforts resulting in forfeitures. For example, as of  December 2015, approximately $2 billion of forfeited funds deposited in  the AFF was planned for distribution to victims of fraud.
DOJ retained a portion of selected mortgage-related financial  institution settlement payments for its Three Percent Fund. In  November 2016, we reported that federal agencies have collected billions  of dollars in settlement payments and penalties from financial institutions  for violations alleged to have been committed during the mortgage  origination process, servicing of mortgages, and in the packaging and  sale of residential mortgage-backed securities. Several federal agencies  have responsibility for regulating financial institutions in relation to these  activities, and these agencies may engage DOJ to pursue investigations  of financial institutions and individuals for civil or criminal violations of  various laws and regulations. We reviewed a sample of nine cases where  federal agencies, in some instances including DOJ, either reached  settlements with or assessed penalties against financial institutions in  connection with alleged mortgage-related violations. Financial institutions  in these nine cases were assessed a total of about $25 billion, generally  in penalties, settlement amounts, and consumer relief.
In the cases involving DOJ, the department generally retained 3 percent  of the settlement and penalty amounts paid and deposited this amount in  its Three Percent Fund. For example, in 2016, one financial institution  agreed to pay $1.2 billion to settle DOJ’s claims brought on behalf of the  Federal Housing Administration. DOJ collected the entire $1.2 billion  settlement amount from this case and retained $36 million (3 percent of  the total collection) and deposited this amount in its Three Percent Fund.  DOJ distributed $622.7 million to the Federal Housing Administration and  deposited the remaining amount—$541.3 million—in an account in the  Treasury General Fund.
Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, and Members of the  Committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to  respond to any questions that you may have.
section_title: GAO Contacts
paragraphs: For further information about this statement, please contact Diana Maurer  at (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Individuals who made key contributions to this statement include Eric  Erdman (Assistant Director), Claudia Becker, Joy Booth, Willie Commons  III, Tonnye’ Connor-White, Karen Doran, Chris Hatscher, Rebecca  Hendrickson, Paul Hobart, Valerie Kasindi, Beth Kowalewski, Susanna  Kuebler, Dawn Locke, Kristy Love, Tarek Mahmassani, Jeremy Manion,  Mara McMillen, Adrian Pavia, Geraldine Redican-Bigott, Christina Ritchie,  Michelle Serfass, Jack Sheehan, Janet Temko-Blinder, and Jill Verret.  Key contributors for the previous work on which this testimony is based  are listed in each product.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Financial Institutions: Penalty and Settlement Payments for Mortgage- Related Violations in Selected Cases. GAO-17-11R. Washington, D.C.:  Nov. 10, 2016.
Firearms Data: ATF Did Not Always Comply with the Appropriations Act  Restriction and Should Better Adhere to Its Policies. GAO-16-552.  Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2016.
Human Trafficking: Agencies Have Taken Steps to Assess Prevalence,  Address Victim Issues, and Avoid Grant Duplication. GAO-16-555.  Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2016.
Federal Prison System: Justice Has Used Alternatives to Incarceration,  But Could Better Measure Program Outcomes. GAO-16-516.  Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2016.
Missing Persons and Unidentified Remains: Opportunities May Exist to  Share Information More Efficiently. GAO-16-515. Washington, D.C.: June  7, 2016.
Prisoner Operations: United States Marshals Service Could Better  Estimate Cost Savings and Monitor Efforts to Increase Efficiencies.  GAO-16-472. Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2016.
Face Recognition Technology: FBI Should Better Ensure Privacy and  Accuracy. GAO-16-267. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2016.
Financial Institutions: Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures for Violations of  Financial Crimes and Sanctions Requirements. GAO-16-297.  Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2016.
Prescription Drugs: More DEA Information about Registrants’ Controlled  Substances Roles Could Improve Their Understanding and Help Ensure  Access. GAO-15-471. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2015.
Federal Prison System: Justice Could Better Measure Progress  Addressing Incarceration Challenges. GAO-15-454. Washington, D.C.:  June 19, 2015.
Victims of Child Abuse Act: Further Actions Needed to Ensure Timely Use  of Grant Funds and Assess Grantee Performance.  GAO-15-351.Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2015.
Department of Justice: Alternative Sources of Funding Are a Key Source  of Budgetary Resources and Could Be Better Managed. GAO-15-48.  Washington, D.C.: Feb. 19, 2015.
Drug Shortages: Better Management of the Quota Process for Controlled  Substances Needed; Coordination between DEA and FDA Should Be  Improved. GAO-15-202. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 2015.
Whistleblower Protection: Additional Actions Needed to Improve DOJ’s  Handling of FBI Retaliation Complaints. GAO-15-112. Washington, D.C.:  Jan. 23, 2015.
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act: Additional Outreach and  Notification of Tribes about Offenders Who Are Released from Prison  Needed. GAO-15-23. Washington, DC: Nov. 18, 2014.
Bureau of Prisons: Management of New Prison Activations Can Be  Improved. GAO-14-709. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 22, 2014.
Justice Grant Programs: DOJ Should Do More to Reduce the Risk of  Unnecessary Duplication and Enhance Program Assessment.  GAO-12-517. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2012.
Law Enforcement Body Armor: DOJ Could Enhance Grant Management  Controls and Better Ensure Consistency in Grant Program Requirements.  GAO-12-353. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2012.
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