Capitol Police Board: Fully Incorporating Leading Governance Practices Would Help Enhance Accountability, Transparency, and External Communication
Published: 2017-02-07T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Board is charged with overseeing and supporting the Capitol Police. GAO was asked to review the Board's operations, including the Board's accountability and level of communication. This report examines (1) the roles and responsibilities of the Board and the Police Chief and the comparability of the Board's scope to other law enforcement oversight entities; (2) the extent to which the Board's Manual incorporates leading practices for accountability, transparency, and external communication, and how the Board implements these practices; and (3) Congressional stakeholder perspectives on the Board's approaches and adjustments to enhance them.
To complete this review, GAO analyzed relevant statutes and Board governing documents and operations. GAO also used internal control and corporate governance standards to articulate the key principles of accountability, transparency, and effective external communication; identified six leading practices that facilitate these principles; and analyzed the Board's Manual against each. GAO also interviewed Board members and staff, Congressional stakeholders, and experts selected for their knowledge of law enforcement oversight.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Capitol Police Board (Board) has wide-ranging responsibilities and according to experts with knowledge of law enforcement oversight bodies, like civilian oversight boards, the Board's scope is unique by comparison. For example, the Board has authority for security decisions, as well as certain human capital and personnel matters, including the approval of officer terminations.
In 2013, the Board adopted a Manual of Procedures (Manual) that references its operations and establishes protocols for outreach with the Congressional committees and leadership offices (stakeholders) with whom the Board interacts. This Manual fully incorporated one and partially incorporated five of the six leading practices that facilitate the principles of accountability, transparency, and effective external communication; however, the Board has not always implemented these practices, such as notifying stakeholders that certain information on the Board's decisions and operations is available to them.
Some stakeholders raised concerns, such as the Board not adequately soliciting their input, and suggested adjustments to enhance the Board's approaches. Board officials told us that the Manual has not incorporated some leading practices, in part because they address activities beyond statutory requirements. Leading practices note that effective governing bodies make commitments to stakeholders that exceed basic requirements, and GAO found the Manual includes activities that go beyond what is statutorily prescribed. Working to fully incorporate leading practices into its Manual and operations would help the Board enhance its accountability, transparency, and effective external communication with stakeholders.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Board revise its Manual to fully incorporate leading practices, including evaluating its performance, and engage with stakeholders and incorporate their views, as appropriate, on any changes. The Board did not state whether it concurred with the recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The U.S. Capitol is one of the most recognizable symbols of American  democracy and, as such, is a target for terrorist activity. The U.S. Capitol  Police is responsible for protecting the Congress, as well as its members,  staff, visitors, and facilities so that it can fulfill its constitutional and  legislative responsibilities in a safe, secure, and open environment. By  statute, the Capitol Police Board (Board) is charged with overseeing and  supporting the Capitol Police, which in turn is to police the Capitol  buildings and grounds under the direction of the Board. The Board is  comprised of the Senate and House Sergeants-at-Arms, the Architect of  the Capitol, and the Chief of the Capitol Police, who is a non-voting  member. The Board and the Capitol Police interact with multiple  committees and congressional offices in their respective capacities,  including the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, the  Committee on House Administration, and the Senate and House  Legislative Branch Appropriations Subcommittees.
The House Committee on Appropriations’ July 2001 report that  accompanied the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2002 stated that  correspondence and answers related to routine budget matters that the  Committee was seeking from the police had to be routed through the  Capitol Police Board where they were held up pending review. In  particular, the report noted that “the unnecessary bureaucracy of the  review process added by the Board impedes appropriations review and  oversight.” The committee’s 2001 report also included a provision for us  to review the Board’s structure. Thus, in 2002 we provided insights into  the Board’s operations, internal controls, and standardized governance  practices, as well as alternatives to the existing Board’s design. Although  the Board has undergone some changes since that time— such as  designating the Chief of the Capitol Police (Chief) as a non-voting  member in 2003 and adopting a Manual of Procedures (Manual) in 2013  to document, among other things, its mission, purpose, and  composition—according to some Congressional stakeholders,  accountability and communication challenges persist. In light of this, you  asked us to review similar topics as those we explored in 2002.
In this report, we examine the following:  1.  What are the roles and responsibilities of the Board and the Chief of  the Capitol Police, as set out in statute and in the Board’s Manual of  Procedures, and how does the Board’s scope compare to other law  enforcement oversight entities?  2.  To what extent does the Board’s Manual incorporate leading practices  from internal control and other standardized governance principles to  facilitate accountability, transparency, and effective external  communication and in what ways is the Board implementing these  practices?  3.  What are Congressional stakeholder perspectives on the degree to  which the Board is accountable, transparent, and effective in its  communication approaches and what options exist to enhance the  Board’s approaches?
To examine the roles and responsibilities of the Board and the Chief of  Police as set out in statute and in the Board’s Manual, and to determine  how the Board’s scope compares to other law enforcement oversight  entities, we reviewed and analyzed the relevant provisions of statute  pertaining to the Board as well as the Board’s Manual.  We also  conducted interviews with officials from four organizations with expertise  in law enforcement oversight and governance issues, which we selected  in order to understand how entities overseeing law enforcement agencies  are structured and how they function. We selected these particular  organizations because they have a breadth of knowledge about law  enforcement oversight structure and functions in other settings. We also  spoke with the National Council on State Legislatures (NCSL) to  understand how law enforcement oversight efforts are structured and  function at state capitols and identify the similarities and differences to the  operations of the Capitol Police Board. In addition, we solicited input  through interviews, phone calls, and emails with current Board members,  Board staff, and stakeholders.
To examine the extent to which the Board’s Manual  incorporates leading  practices from internal control and other standardized governance  practices that facilitate accountability, transparency and effective external  communication and describe the ways the Board is implementing these  practices, we first identified the applicable leading practices. To do so, we  relied on (1) federal internal control standards and (2) principles  originating from the Business Roundtable and the Organization for  Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Each standard and  principle reflected the specific activities in which effective governing  bodies should engage to facilitate accountability, transparency, and  effective external communication. For our purposes, and using these  practices as a guide, we used the following definitions for each term:
Accountability  occurs when an entity acknowledges and assumes  responsibility for its actions and is answerable for any resulting  consequences.
Transparency occurs when an entity records and communicates  information on activities to stakeholders who need it in a form and  timeframe that allows these stakeholders to carry out their  responsibilities.
Effective external communication occurs when an entity utilizes  various modes of communication, proactively when possible, to  convey information to stakeholders.
We then analyzed the Board’s Manual for provisions related to these  terms and assessed the extent to which the Manual  incorporated the  leading practices. A determination of “fully incorporated” means that  procedures in the Manual  align with all activities associated with the  leading practice. A determination of “partially incorporated” means that  procedures in the Manual  align with some activities associated with the  leading practice. A determination of “not incorporated” means that no  provisions in the Manual align with any activities associated with the  leading practice. We also obtained and analyzed Board documentation  illustrative of its practices, such as the minutes of Board meetings held in  fiscal years 2014 and 2015, and year-end reports for calendar years 2013  through 2015. We focused on documentation developed in 2014 and  2015 because the Board adopted the Manual in June 2013. In addition,  we interviewed Board officials to understand their practices.  To identify the Congressional stakeholder perspectives on the degree to  which the Board is accountable, transparent, and effective in its  communication approaches and options that exist to enhance the Board’s  approaches, we sought stakeholder views from the majority and minority  staff of the committees who engage with the Board—Senate Committee  on Rules and Administration, Committee on House Administration, and  the Senate and House Legislative Branch Appropriations  Subcommittees—as well as the majority and minority staff representing  the leadership from the Senate and the House. We also solicited Board  and stakeholder input and asked the organizations we had earlier  identified as having expertise in law enforcement oversight and  governance issues for their perspectives. We then analyzed the  information we collected to identify the key themes in order to inform our  analysis. For additional details on our scope and methodology, see  appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2016 to February  2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: History of the U.S. Capitol Police and the Capitol Police Board
paragraphs: Tracing its inception to 1828, the U.S. Capitol Police is responsible for  protecting the Congress, its members, Capitol buildings and grounds,  staff, and visitors from threats of disruption and crime. The Capitol Police  carries out its responsibilities to protect what has been referred to as the  Capitol complex by, among other activities, policing the Capitol buildings  and grounds and protecting members of Congress. For fiscal year 2016,  the Capitol Police had an enacted budget of $375 million with over 2,100  sworn officers and civilian personnel.
The Capitol Police Board is charged with overseeing and supporting the  Capitol Police. The origins of the Board trace back to 1867 when  responsibility for the Capitol Police force was transferred by statute from  the Commissioner of Public Buildings to the Sergeants-at-Arms of the  House and the Senate. The 1867 statute also required the two  Sergeants-at-Arms to “appoint the members of the Capitol Police.”  Several years later, in 1873, the Architect of the Capitol was added to the  Board; however, it was not until 1882 that federal law first referred,  formally, to the “Capitol Police Board.” The composition of the Board  remained unchanged until 2003 when the Chief of the Capitol Police was  added as a non-voting, ex-officio member of the Board.
Over time, laws have changed the roles of the Board and the Chief of the  Capitol Police with respect to their authority to appoint members of the  police force. In addition, various Congressional acts have sought to  strengthen the qualifications for officers’ appointment. For example, in the  early days of the Capitol Police, the Sergeants-at-Arms appointed force  members. In 2003 however, an appropriations act delegated appointment  and hiring authority to the Chief, who currently has the authority to set the  terms, conditions, and privileges of employment with the Capitol Police.  Further, beginning in the early 1900s, federal law began requiring more  stringent hiring standards, resulting in a police force with an increasing  amount of law enforcement expertise. Specifically, in 1919, an  appropriations act provided that any appointments to the Capitol Police  be based “solely on account of efficiency and special qualifications.”  Later, in 1935, an appropriations act specified that all appointees to the  Capitol Police were required to meet hiring standards that the Board  prescribed.
section_title: Capitol Police Board Structure, Composition, and Relationships to Stakeholders
paragraphs: The Board is comprised of the Senate and House Sergeants-at-Arms, the  Architect of the Capitol, and the Chief of the Capitol Police. The chairman  is the presiding officer of the Board and this position alternates annually  between the two Sergeants-at-Arms. The Capitol Police Board also has  one staff member assigned—the executive assistant, who is to serve as a central point for communication and to enhance the overall effectiveness  and efficiency of the Board’s administration activities. In addition, the  Board’s counsel consists of the general counsels for the Senate and  House Sergeants-at-Arms, the Architect of the Capitol, and the Chief.
As figure 1 illustrates, the Board members come into their positions in  different ways and the Board and the Capitol Police have different  reporting relationships to the congressional committees of jurisdiction.
As table 1 below shows, each of the committees of jurisdiction also has  unique yet related responsibilities for helping to maintain and secure the  Capitol grounds and Capitol complex operations. Recognizing the  importance of these committees, the Board considers all of these  committees to be stakeholders for engagement.
section_title: Board’s 2003 Review of its Structure and Functions
paragraphs: The Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, directed the Board to  examine its mission and assess the effectiveness and usefulness of its  statutory functions. In response, the Board issued a report to the  Congress in 2003 that analyzed corporate governance standards, such  as Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and the  Business Roundtable’s Principles of Corporate Governance, and the  applicability of those standards to the Board. The Board’s report also  detailed the Board’s roles and responsibilities, including the statutory  authorities to address such responsibilities, and its administrative  structure and reporting requirements. The Board also made  recommendations in that report concerning its mission, administration,  processes, alternative operating structures, and the elements for  necessary legislative adjustments that the Board believed would help it  more effectively carry out its mission. For example, the Board  recommended that:  “… should serve as the board of directors for the Capitol Police in  accordance with current corporate governance principles to include  incorporation of articulated processes and procedures, defined roles and  responsibilities, established structures for information flow and formalized  mechanisms for independent self-management.” –The Board in its 2003  report to Congress.
The Board also stated in that report that corporate governance theory  would provide an effective model for the Board to follow in terms of roles,  functions and processes for the future.
In addition, the Board’s report stated that the Board intended to develop  and maintain a procedures manual that would formalize existing operating  procedures and, at a minimum, include new procedures for: (1)  documentation of functions and processes; (2) meetings; (3) internal and  external communication; and (4) periodic review and evaluation of the  Board’s mission and processes. The Board’s report outlined the  importance of these areas to its successful operation.
section_title: Board’s 2013 Manual of Procedures
paragraphs: The Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, also directed the  Board to document its functions and processes. While in its 2003 report  to Congress the Board spoke of its plans to develop such a document, it  was not until 2013 that the Board adopted its official Manual of  Procedures. The Manual serves as a reference tool to assist Board  members in their oversight and support of the Capitol Police and helps  ensure continuity when membership and chairmanship of the Board  change. It describes the Board’s purpose, mission statement, internal  procedures, authorities relating to its oversight roles and responsibilities  over the Capitol Police, and authorities relating to the security of the  Capitol complex. The Manual also identifies areas where the Board has  statutory authority to issue regulations regarding the Capitol Police and  the security of Congress. Further, the Manual  identifies instances where  the Board is required to obtain approval from, consult, or provide  documentation to congressional leadership or committees.
section_title: The Board and the Chief of Police Have Varied Responsibilities, and the Board’s Scope of Duties is Unique Among Law Enforcement Oversight Organizations
subsections: section_title: The Board Has a Broad Oversight Role and Shares Management Responsibilities with the Chief
paragraphs: In statute and as outlined in its Manual,  the Capitol Police Board has  varied and wide-ranging roles and responsibilities. Its purpose is to  oversee and support the Capitol Police in its mission and to advance  coordination between the Capitol Police and the Sergeants-at-Arms, in  their law enforcement capacities, and the Congress. With respect to  oversight, in general, the Capitol Police is to police the U.S. Capitol  buildings and grounds, under the direction of the Board, and is authorized  to protect, in any area of the United States, members of Congress, under  the direction of the Board. The Board appoints the Chief of the Capitol  Police, who serves at the pleasure of the Board, and the Board meets at  least once annually to review the Capitol Police’s annual budget request  to Congress. The Board must approve in advance any deployment of  Capitol Police officers by the Chief outside the jurisdiction of the Capitol  Police, and in an emergency situation, as determined by the Board, the  Chief must obtain Board approval before appointing special officers.  The Board also has authority to issue regulations that govern the law  enforcement authority of the Capitol Police.
The Board has several oversight responsibilities related to human capital.  For example, the Board is to establish and maintain unified schedules of  rates of pay for the Capitol Police, with the approval of the Committee on  House Administration and Senate Committee on Rules and  Administration, and the Board and the Chief have authority to determine rates and amounts of basic pay, among other things. Further, the Chief  may terminate an officer, member, or employee of the Capitol Police only  after notifying and receiving the Board’s approval.
Although some human capital responsibilities are shared with the Board,  the Chief has certain separate responsibilities in this area as well. For  example, the Chief may appoint, hire, suspend with or without pay,  discipline, discharge, and set the terms, conditions, and privileges of  employment of Capitol Police employees. The Chief may also establish  regulations to provide for training of employees  and may establish an  educational assistance program for employees to recruit or retain  qualified personnel.
In addition to its oversight responsibilities, the Board also has separate  security responsibilities. For example, the Board has responsibility for  maintaining the security systems for the Capitol buildings and grounds,  under the direction of the Committee on House Administration and  Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. The Board also has  exclusive charge and control of the regulation and movement of all  vehicular and other traffic, including parking, within the U.S. Capitol  grounds. Figure 2 provides additional details on the specific roles and  responsibilities of the Board and the Chief and highlights areas where  there are joint responsibilities.
section_title: The Board’s Scope is Unique Among Law Enforcement Oversight Entities
paragraphs: As depicted in Figure 2, the Board’s current scope is wide, ranging from  making security decisions and establishing unified schedules of rates of  pay, to approving terminations. According to officials representing two of  the four law enforcement expert groups with whom we spoke, such a  wide ranging scope for an oversight body is atypical. Two of the four  groups we spoke with indicated that typically, law enforcement oversight  bodies focus exclusively on a narrow range of issues. For example,  according to two of the law enforcement expert groups we spoke with,  many of these bodies are responsible for setting the strategic and policy  direction of the law enforcement agency, which the Chief of Police is then  responsible for implementing, but they do not have day to day input or  authority over matters such as the termination of officers. Further, an  official from one of the law enforcement expert groups told us that other  oversight entities, such as law enforcement civilian oversight boards, may  direct their attention on the appropriateness of the law enforcement  agency’s policies and training but do not have a more expansive purview.
Officials from three of these four law enforcement groups emphasized  that a police chief generally has, or should have, the leeway to execute  the decisions of the oversight body as he or she sees fit and some groups  saw the scope of the Board as an anomaly among the other law  enforcement entities with which they are familiar. An official from one of  these groups added that putting management decisions, such as  approving terminations, up to a vote as is done by the current Board, may  hinder a chief’s ability to effectively lead the agency. We discuss  possible adjustments to the Board’s scope later in this report.
Regardless of what the specific roles and responsibilities of an oversight  body are, officials from all four of these expert groups emphasized the  importance of having clearly defined roles and responsibilities between  the oversight body and the police chief.
section_title: The Board’s Manual Has Fully or Partially Incorporated Leading Practices to Facilitate Accountability, Transparency, and Effective External Communication, but the Board Has Not Always Implemented Manual Provisions as Designed
paragraphs: The Board’s Manual of Procedures fully incorporated one of the six  leading practices and partially incorporated the other five to facilitate  accountability, transparency, and effective external communication. We  identified these six leading practices—broad areas that represent a  summary of the activities that effective governing bodies should adopt— from established internal control and corporate governance standards.  These six practices are: (1) defining roles, responsibilities, and areas of  authority; (2) overseeing functions of the corporation—or in the Board’s  case, the Capitol Police; (3) conducting performance evaluations and  reviews; (4) developing processes for internal functions of the board; (5)  disclosing information to stakeholders; and (6) developing processes for  communication with stakeholders. As noted earlier, the Board stated in its  2003 report to Congress that it found significant value in adopting  corporate governance principles, at least as a standard of guidance given  the unique characteristics of the Board and Congress. Further, according  to the Board, in developing its mission-related processes, the Board was  guided by corporate governance standards and best practices, federal  standards for internal controls, and other related sources. Fully  incorporating these leading practices into its Manual would better position  the Board to have reasonable assurance that its approaches facilitate  accountability, transparency, and effective external communication. Table  2 illustrates each of the six leading practices; the implications for  accountability, transparency, and effective external communication; and  the extent to which the Board’s Manual incorporates them.
In the following sections, we describe the six practices and the activities  associated with each. We also assess the Board’s incorporation of these  practices into its Manual as well as its implementation.
subsections: section_title: Accountability Leading Practice 1: Define Roles, Responsibilities, and Areas of Authority
paragraphs: The Manual  partially incorporated this leading practice, as Table 3  illustrates.
The following sections outline the extent to which the Board incorporated  each of the four activities within this practice area into its Manual and  discusses how it implemented them.
Clearly define key areas of authority and responsibility and establish  appropriate lines of reporting. The Manual  fully incorporated this activity.  For example, it presents areas where the Board has statutory authority  and responsibilities regarding the Capitol Police and the security of the  Capitol complex. The Manual also sets out the various reporting  requirements of the Chief and Inspector General of the Capitol Police to  the Board. In practice, the Chief reports routinely to the Board on Capitol  Police initiatives such as security projects and the Inspector General  reports quarterly on audit findings. In addition, the Manual,  based on  statutory provisions, identifies areas where the Board is to obtain  approval from, consult with, or provide documentation to its stakeholders.  As appendix II, table 9 illustrates, federal law establishes these lines of  reporting, and each provision makes varying distinctions between  congressional stakeholders, including leadership offices and committees,  when determining to whom the Board is accountable in specific instances.  In practice, the Board has followed the Manual’s directives, though as we  later show, stakeholders continue to express concerns that the Board’s  roles and responsibilities remain, in some cases, unclear to them.
Clearly understand decisions that require specific board approval. The  Manual fully incorporated this activity. In particular, the Manual presents  areas where the Chief is to obtain the Board’s approval on Capitol Police  matters. In practice, the Board has implemented this provision, such as  when it directs the Chief to submit formal notice to the Board so that it can  review a potential officer termination.
Limit access to records to authorized individuals and assigning and  maintaining accountability of records. The Manual fully incorporated this  activity. For example, it sets out the review process for the release of  security information by the Capitol Police. In addition, the Manual includes  the Board’s policy for retaining official records and sets out the  responsibilities of the executive assistant in supporting this policy. In  practice, Board officials explained that the Board assigns records  retention responsibilities to its executive assistant and this individual  maintains records and keeps a log to track any incoming or outgoing  Board documents. As a part of the security review, Board officials  review outgoing documents for possible redactions of security  information.
Educate stakeholders about the board’s role and its oversight  responsibilities. The Manual partially incorporated this activity. It  establishes materials that the Board develops, such as the Manual,  minutes of Board meetings, and year-end reports, which provide  summary information to a prescribed list of stakeholders regarding its  operations. However, the Manual does not address how the Board should  educate stakeholders who do not have access to these materials about  its roles and responsibilities. For example, the Manual  establishes that  the Board is to distribute its year-end report to the leadership offices, as  well as to the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, the  Committee on House Administration, and the Senate and House  Legislative Branch Appropriations Subcommittees. While the Board  provides the committees with the year-end report, with regard to the  Manual and meeting minutes, the Board largely follows statute which  directs the Board to make the Manual and meeting minutes available to  certain leadership offices and does not list the committees. In practice,  Board officials told us that they used the statute as the baseline when  creating the Manual, but they did not reconcile inconsistencies in access  to materials that could inform and educate stakeholders in instances  where the statute was silent. According to the Board, it prepared a high- level briefing that was delivered to stakeholders in the House with an  overview of Board operations but it has not developed any other related  briefings for stakeholders. As we will later describe, some stakeholders  expressed a concern that the roles of the Board and the Chief are not  clear to them and they wished for more information about the breadth of  the Board’s oversight. Providing briefings or taking other efforts to  educate stakeholders on its role—and formalizing such activities with  references in the Manual—could help the Board fully incorporate this  leading practice.
section_title: Accountability Leading Practice 2: Oversee Functions of the Corporation
paragraphs: The Manual  partially incorporated this leading practice, as Table 4  illustrates.
The following sections outline the extent to which the Board incorporated  each of the six activities within this practice area into its Manual and  discusses how it implemented them.
Select and oversee the chief executive officer and senior management.  The Manual  fully incorporated this activity. For example, it sets out the  Board’s procedures for selecting, reviewing, and removing the Chief. In  addition, the Manual states that the Board is to review the Chief’s  leadership, management, and administration of the police department  every three years. In practice, Board officials explained that the Board  has not yet overseen a Chief for longer than three years since the Board  adopted the Manual, and therefore has not completed a review of the  Chief’s performance.
Oversee the corporation’s legal and ethical compliance. The Manual fully  incorporated this activity. For example, the Manual states that the Chief is  to report to the Board about ongoing and pending legal issues and the  Inspector General is to report to the Board on any of the police  department’s violations of laws and other serious problems, abuses, or  deficiencies. In practice, the Chief and the Inspector General report to the  Board as these matters arise.
Oversee the corporation’s internal audit function. The Manual partially  incorporated this activity. It states that the Inspector General reports to  the Board, but it does not address any Board responsibilities in ensuring  that the inspector’s audit findings and recommendations are promptly  resolved as internal control standards suggest. In practice, Board  members and staff explained that they do work with the Capitol Police to  ensure recommendations from the Inspector General’s reports are  implemented, but these efforts are not codified in the Manual to help  ensure accountability. Ensuring the Manual  reflects the Board’s oversight  has been consistent with leading practices would help ensure that the  accountability provisions are preserved when Board members transition.
Oversee the corporation’s strategic plans. The Manual partially  incorporated this activity. For example, the Manual states that the Chief’s  semi-annual report is to include a status report on the goals, objectives,  and strategic plan of the Capitol Police; however, it does not address any  Board responsibilities in monitoring implementation of the plan by the  Capitol Police to facilitate accountability, as governance principles  suggest. In practice, Board officials explained that the extent of the  Board’s monitoring is limited to when Capitol Police officials bring up  matters related to the strategic plan to the Board. Including a provision in  the Manual  to direct the Board to monitor implementation would help the  Board hold the Chief accountable to the department’s goals and  strategies.
Oversee the corporation’s annual operating plans and budgets. The  Manual partially incorporated this activity. The Manual states that the  Board will meet at least once a year to review the Capitol Police’s annual  request for funding and accompanying budget justification before  submitting it to the appropriations committees but it does not detail the  Board’s responsibilities for providing input to the request for funding or  approving the request in areas where it has statutory responsibility, such  as determining Capitol Police amounts and rates of pay. In practice,  Board members and staff explained that the Board reviews and approves  the Capitol Police’s budget justification in its entirety before it is submitted  to the appropriations committees. In our discussions with the Board,  officials explained that the Board and the Chief may discuss the  manpower needed to support an initiative or project included in the  justification and as needed, they may also discuss projects that  leadership offices would like to include in the department’s justification.  After the Board approves the justification, Capitol Police management  works with the appropriations committees, and the Board members may  reach out to the committees if additional communication is necessary. In  addition, the Manual states that the Chief’s semi-annual report is to  include a status report on the Capitol Police’s spend plan. However, it  does not address any Board responsibilities in monitoring budget  execution by the Capitol Police, which may include activities such as  assessing whether the budget is appropriately responsive to changing  security conditions, as governance principles suggest. In our discussions  with the Board, officials explained that the Board proactively monitors the  police department’s execution of the budget but these efforts are not  codified in the Manual. Codifying them as such could help the Board  ensure the police department’s accountability for sound fiscal  stewardship.
Oversee the corporation’s risk assessment and management processes.  The Manual  partially incorporated this activity. As discussed above, the  Manual states that the Chief reports to the Board on the Capitol Police’s  strategic planning and the Inspector General reports to the Chief and the  Board on findings or operational deficiencies from audits. Internal control  standards consider strategic planning and consideration of audit findings,  among others, to be methods for identifying internal or external risks to an  organization for achieving its objectives. However, beyond addressing  these actions that can help identify risk, the Manual does not address any  Board mechanism for overseeing the Capitol Police’s analysis and  management of such risks, as governance principles suggest. Such  responsibilities could include estimating the significance of the risk,  assessing the likelihood of its occurrence, and deciding how to manage  the risk and what actions should be taken. In practice, the Chief explained  that he monitors the impact of a risk, such as workforce gaps, and reports  this to the Board; however, Board officials did not specify their level of  engagement in risk assessment and management and the Manual is  silent on the issue. Determining how the Board could enhance the Chief’s  accountability for department-wide risk assessment and management  could enhance the Board’s oversight. Further, documenting this effort in  the Manual  would codify the procedures once implemented.
section_title: Accountability Leading Practice 3: Conduct Performance Evaluations and Reviews
paragraphs: The Manual  partially incorporated this leading practice, as Table 5  illustrates.
The following sections outline the extent to which the Board incorporated  each of the three activities within this practice area into its Manual  and  discusses how it implemented them.
Continuously review the internal structure of the corporation to ensure  clear lines of accountability. The Manual partially incorporated this  activity. For example, it states that the Chief is to report any proposed  changes to the Capitol Police including employment and personnel  procedures, organizational restructuring and security procedures.  However, the Manual does not address any Board responsibilities related  to monitoring the internal structure of the police department to ensure  there are clear lines of accountability for management. In practice, Board  officials explained that the Board monitors specific mission or operational  areas of the Capitol Police through the Inspector General’s work.  However, these efforts are not codified in the Manual.  Codifying them as  such would help the Board ensure that the department has a sound  internal management structure in place, thereby helping the Board to  enhance its overall oversight.
Set performance objectives for the corporation and monitor  implementation and performance. The Manual has not incorporated this  activity. In the Board’s year-end reports, the Board includes highlights of  the Capitol Police’s performance, such as the number of vulnerability  assessments conducted by the Capitol Police and the number of  individuals screened at the U.S. Capitol Visitor Center and congressional  office buildings, among other areas of performance. However, the Manual  does not address any Board responsibilities in setting objectives or  monitoring performance in these areas as governance principles suggest.
In practice, Board officials told us that the Board and the Chief are  engaging in these activities. The Chief develops any metrics that may be  needed and the Board measures the police department’s performance  and gauges effectiveness or areas where the department may need to be  improved. Codifying these practices would formalize performance  monitoring and help ensure the department is accountable to the Board  for the metrics it has established.
Evaluate board performance on a continuing basis. The Manual has not  incorporated this activity. In the Board’s 2003 report to Congress, it stated  that a forthcoming procedures manual would include a directive for the  Board to evaluate its mission, structure, and functions at the beginning of  the second session of each Congress to identify opportunities for  improvement. However, the Manual  that the Board ultimately approved in  2013 does not include such a directive. In practice, Board officials told us  that the Board has not evaluated its performance or its mission, structure,  and functions since 2003 when it was directed by law to do so.  Determining how the Board could best self-assess on a continuing basis  could enhance the Board’s accountability to the police department and to  stakeholders. Further, documenting this effort in the Manual  would codify  the performance self-assessment methods once implemented.
section_title: Accountability Leading Practice 4: Develop Processes for Internal Functions
paragraphs: The Manual  fully incorporates this leading practice, as Table 6 illustrates.
The Manual  fully incorporated each activity within this practice area. For  example, the Manual establishes the frequency of Board meetings,  including regular executive sessions, and has a process for developing  meeting agendas and describes the contents of its orientation materials  for new members. In practice, the Board has implemented all of these  provisions to hold itself accountable and to remain accountable to the  department and its stakeholders. For example, the Board met regularly in  calendar years 2014 and 2015 to discuss security issues, initiatives  across the Capitol complex, and Capitol Police matters. The Board also  documented these discussions in the meeting minutes. Further, the  executive assistant maintains a log to track the status of ongoing projects  and the Board member with the responsibility for implementation, and the  Board uses this log to ensure progress.
section_title: Transparency Leading Practice: Disclose Information to Stakeholders
paragraphs: The Manual  partially incorporates this leading practice, as Table 7  illustrates.
The following sections outline the extent to which the Board incorporated  each of the three activities within this practice area into its Manual  and  discusses how it implemented them.
Clearly document internal control, transactions, and significant events and  make them readily available. The Manual  fully incorporated this activity.  For example, the Manual includes the Board’s policies and processes for  reviewing security information before its release, and preserving  documents and materials that may be relevant to lawsuits or  investigations. In addition, the Manual  sets out the Board’s procedures for  significant events such as votes on issues that require a decision by the  Board and documenting these decisions in Board meeting minutes. In  practice, the executive assistant is responsible for documenting these  controls, transactions, and events, and has made decisions and records  available when necessary.
Oversee the process of disclosure and communication of information for  stakeholders to make informed decisions. The Manual  partially  incorporated this activity. For example, the Manual sets out the types of  official records the Board maintains, such as the meeting minutes;  however, it does not address stakeholders’ access to information.  According to statute and the Manual, the Board is to make the meeting  minutes available for distribution to the House Speaker and Minority  Leader and the Senate President pro tempore and Minority  Leader. In  practice and in accordance with the Manual, the executive assistant  records the minutes for Board meetings as the Manual dictates. However,  although the executive assistant told us that the Board sends a letter to  these leadership offices notifying them that the minutes are available,  the  Board sent these letters for the first time in May 2016. Nevertheless,  Board members and staff told us that, in their opinion, stakeholders face  no barriers to information. They also asserted that Board members  routinely make themselves available for discussion with stakeholders as  needed. Further, they told us that if they were to receive requests for  written materials they would consider the facts and circumstances of each  request and work to ensure that any stakeholder with a need to know  would receive a satisfactory response. Governance principles assert that  a strong disclosure regime that promotes transparency is central to  stakeholders being able to access regular, reliable, and comparable  information. The principles also suggest that the information must be in  sufficient detail for stakeholders to assess management’s operational  stewardship—in the Board’s case, this equates to oversight of the Capitol  Police and maintenance of security across the Capitol complex. As we  describe later in this report, several stakeholders relayed concerns about  the Board’s transparency with respect to disclosure practices. Enhancing  the Manual  to reflect the Board’s willingness to engage and determining  the specific procedures to facilitate disclosure would help the Board  improve its transparency and codify the procedures once implemented.
Disclose corporate governance structure and policies. The Manual  partially incorporated this activity. For example, the Manual  presents the  Board’s governance structure including the division of authorities between  the Board, Capitol Police, and congressional leadership offices and  committees. However, as previously described, the Board largely limits  the Manual’s availability  to select stakeholders identified in statute.  Specifically, the Manual states that the Board will make the Manual  available to the leadership offices, Chief, and Comptroller General; but  this list does not include the committees that the Board considers its  stakeholders— Senate Committee on Rules and Administration,  Committee on House Administration, and the Senate and House  Legislative Branch Appropriations Subcommittees. In practice, the Board  sends a letter notifying the parties listed in the Manual that the Manual is  available to them. However, the Board notified those parties that the  Manual was available approximately a year and a half later than the  designated timeframe—at the beginning of the next Congress. In addition,  the Board did not notify all of the designated recipients, such as the  Comptroller General, that the Manual  was available. The Board also did  not submit a biannual report to the joint leadership on the status of the  legislative branch’s emergency preparedness programs, as the Manual  directs. Board officials explained that the Senate and House Sergeants- at-Arms individually  report out on such programs. Nevertheless, such a  separate reporting structure does not promote transparency and  coordination across the two chambers in regards to emergency  preparedness. Given that it has limited the availability  of the Manual to  leadership offices, based largely on statute, the Board could identify other  mechanisms to communicate its corporate governance structure and  policies to committee stakeholders who do not receive the Manual in  order to fully incorporate this practice. Appendix II table 9, to which we  have already alluded, outlines the distinct disclosure practices that statute  requires.
section_title: Effective External Communication Leading Practice: Develop Processes for Communication with Stakeholders
paragraphs: The Manual  partially incorporates this leading practice, as Table 8  illustrates.
The following sections outline the extent to which the Board incorporated  each of the five activities within this practice area into its Manual and  discusses how it implemented them.
Respond in a timely manner to stakeholder concerns. The Manual fully  incorporated this activity. It contains procedures, including timeframes, for  responding to written inquiries from congressional leadership offices,  committees, and members that require a substantive response from a  Board member. In practice, Board officials implemented these provisions  as designed and Board members explained that the nature of their  informal interactions with members of Congress often does not warrant  this formal process.
Provide relevant and material information to stakeholders on a timely and  regular basis. The Manual partially incorporated this activity. The Manual  states that the Board is to make the Manual available to specified  recipients at the beginning of each Congress; however, the Manual does  not include timeframes for providing stakeholders with access to Board  materials aside from the Manual on either a routine or ad hoc basis. In  practice, Board officials said that Board members and/or their staff have  regular communication with members of Congress and their staff and the  Board also conducts meetings as situations dictate. However, these  efforts are not codified in the Manual to help ensure effective  communication. Codifying existing approaches and expanding the Manual  to document procedures for providing relevant and timely information to  stakeholders could help address some of the stakeholder concerns we  describe in the section that follows.
Allow stakeholders to approve and participate in decisions. The Manual  partially incorporated this activity. The Manual identifies areas where the  Board is required by statute to obtain approval from congressional  leadership offices or the committees of jurisdiction before issuing  regulations. However, the Manual does not address any Board  responsibilities in allowing stakeholders to participate, as appropriate, in  other decisions concerning changes across the Capitol—such as certain  initiatives for the Capitol Police—that may affect stakeholders and their  responsibilities. In practice, Board members and staff explained that they  routinely communicate with the committees multiple times a day to ensure  effective communication, but these efforts are not codified in the Manual.  As we will later describe, some stakeholders also expressed a concern  about the timing and nature of their engagement on key decisions.  Codifying in the Manual these ongoing engagement efforts and taking  time to assess gaps in provided and desired levels of communication  could help the Board develop new practices to enhance its outreach.
Use appropriate mechanisms to communicate with stakeholders, solicit  their views, and obtain feedback. The Manual partially incorporated this  activity. For example, as discussed above, the Manual directs Board  communication with its stakeholders in a number of ways, such as  through written correspondence or by the distribution of materials such as  its year-end reports. Governance principles recognize that an  organization may use a number of mechanisms—both formal and  informal to communicate with its stakeholders, and should consider  mechanisms for soliciting feedback from its stakeholders, such as through  periodic meetings to provide opportunities for them to ask questions and  discuss matters that the Board is considering. In practice, Board officials  and congressional stakeholders told us that the full Board has met with  stakeholders on an ad hoc basis, but these efforts are not codified in the Manual to help ensure effective communication. As noted below, this area  remains a concern to some stakeholders. Codifying existing practices in  the Manual,  and working to understand and address stakeholder  concerns could help the Board more effectively communicate with  stakeholders.
According to the Board, it limits its activities to areas specifically  prescribed in statute. Therefore, the Board has not fully incorporated  some leading practices into its Manual because it believes that some of  them address areas beyond what is required in statute. However, in  developing the Manual, the Board did incorporate some practices that  were not set out in statute, as we have shown. For example, the Board  included in its Manual a provision that it is to develop a year-end report  and distribute it to congressional stakeholders—a practice that is not  statutorily prescribed. G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance  states that:  “The rights of stakeholders are often established by law…  even in  areas where stakeholder interests are not legislated, many firms make  additional commitments to stakeholders and concern over corporate  reputation and corporate performance often requires the recognition of  broader interests.” - G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance,  2015  In addition, the Board also explained that challenges to providing more  transparency into its operations stem from the sensitivity of the law  enforcement information for which it has responsibility.
Moving forward, fully incorporating these leading practices into its  Manual—or codifying where the Board had been demonstrating such  leading practices—would allow the Board reasonable assurance that its  approaches facilitate accountability, transparency, and effective external  communication with its stakeholders.
section_title: Most Congressional Stakeholders Expressed Concern Regarding the Board’s Accountability, Transparency, and Communication Approaches, and Opportunities Exist to Enhance the Board’s Operations
paragraphs: Our outreach to 11 congressional stakeholders —seven stakeholders  from the committees and four stakeholders from the leadership offices— showed differences of opinion between stakeholders in leadership offices  and those representing committees regarding the Board’s accountability,  transparency, and effective external communications approaches. In  addition, some of these stakeholders offered adjustments to the Board’s  structure and operations for consideration for addressing the concerns  they raised.
subsections: section_title: Leadership and Committee Stakeholder Perspectives Differed, but Concerns Exist About Board Approaches
subsections: section_title: Accountability
paragraphs: Three of the four stakeholders from leadership offices generally  expressed satisfaction with the level of accountability the Board has  demonstrated, while all seven stakeholders from the committees  identified factors that limit their ability to hold the Board accountable.  One stakeholder from a leadership office noted that the bicameral  structure of the Board precludes it from being accountable to any one  person or entity in Congress, but this individual did not see this as a  challenge. Rather, the individual observed that the Board’s structure  serves as an appropriate buffer between political influences and security  decisions. In contrast, four of the seven committee stakeholders told us  they saw the bicameral structure as a factor limiting accountability and  that this, at times, challenges their oversight. For example, a single  committee cannot call all of the Board members to a committee hearing  because one of the two Sergeants-at-Arms is not under that chamber’s  jurisdiction. In addition, one stakeholder told us that that there may be a  perception that the Architect of the Capitol as a Board member is not fully  accountable to the House committees because the Architect is confirmed  by the Senate. Aside from the bicameral structure, another factor that  some committee stakeholders noted precluded them from ensuring  accountability from the Board was a lack of insight into the Board’s  decision-making. For example, one stakeholder pointed to the difficulty in  discerning whether the Board or the Chief made a decision regarding the  Capitol Police. As a result, the Chief is, at times, held accountable for  decisions made by the other Board members. According to several  committee staff, this factor hinders their ability to determine who is  responsible for Board decisions that have implications for their  committees’ work. In its written comments on a draft of this report, the  Board indicated that no one outside of the U.S. Capitol Police and the  Board should know how the Board reached a decision, as once a  decision is reached, it is unanimous (see appendix III).
Three of the four leadership stakeholders found the roles, responsibilities,  and lines of reporting between the Board and the Chief to be clear  enough to promote accountability, unlike six of the seven committee  stakeholders who did not. Five of these six committee stakeholders  noted that in their view, the Board intervenes in the Chief’s management  of the police department. For example, in the view of some committee  stakeholders, the Board decides on and directs “a lot” of the Capitol  Police department’s spending, which they feel should be left to the  discretion of the Chief. Some committee stakeholders also noted that the  Sergeants-at-Arms told Capitol Police officers that they may come to the  sergeants with any issues they may face within the police department. In  the views of these stakeholders, officers should go to the Chief, not the  Board, as this is a part of the day-to-day management of the department.  Two committee stakeholders added that the Chief does not appear to  have a sufficient voice in Board decisions regarding the Capitol Police  and added that it appears the Chief does not provide his opinion if it is  different from the Board’s. These stakeholders perceived that this was the  case because the Board hires the Chief. As committee stakeholders  explained, as a result of unclear roles and responsibilities, it is difficult for  them to determine what the Capitol Police—the department over which  they have oversight authority—needs rather than what the Board needs.  Further, across both leadership offices and committees, some  stakeholders pointed out that the level of clarity in the roles and  responsibilities of the Board and the Chief depends on the personalities  or individual expectations of the Board members and the Chief.
Stakeholders also provided their perspectives of the Board’s role overall.  Some committee stakeholders said the Board did not involve the  respective committee in decisions in areas where, in their view, the  committee has authority, such as controlling access to the Capitol  buildings and grounds, which further limited the Board’s accountability. In  addition, one leadership stakeholder noted that the issues encountered  with the Board stem from their view that the Board is not proactively  identifying issues and taking steps to address them, such as when this  stakeholder had to take the initiative to get the Board to address a  security issue that had existed for nearly 15 years. This stakeholder said  that such issues may be a result of how Board members perceive the  Board’s role in security matters. In its written comments on a draft of this  report, the Board had indicated that it had brought this security issue to  stakeholders’ attention in 2003, but no action had been taken until the  leadership stakeholder became aware of the issue and pushed the issue  to conclusion (see appendix III).
section_title: Transparency
paragraphs: We also found differences of opinion between leadership and committee  stakeholders with respect to their views on the Board’s transparency.  Three of the four leadership stakeholders told us that the Board operates  in a transparent manner. One of these stakeholders noted that more  insight into the Board’s plans and progress on security initiatives would  help the leadership office ensure that the Board is addressing necessary  security issues around the Capitol complex. On the other hand, six of the  seven committee stakeholders told us that the Board does not operate in  a transparent manner.
The six committee stakeholders who felt transparency could be improved  said they lacked insight into the Board’s decision-making in areas where  the committees have responsibilities, such as Capitol Police matters or  campus-wide security. For example, one stakeholder said that committee  staff do not know if and when the Chief disagrees with a Board decision.  Further, one committee stakeholder underscored a leadership  stakeholder’s perspective, noting that the Board is not upfront with  congressional staff about the Board’s security projects, so congressional  staff have to ask very specific questions to obtain the information they  need. Another committee stakeholder told us that the Board decided to  close an area of the Capitol for recent events that had typically been open  to members of Congress and their guests. In so doing, the Board  informed leadership in a letter after rendering the decision, but did not  consult with congressional staff from the cognizant committee prior to  finalizing this decision. This stakeholder pointed out that the committee,  not leadership, has jurisdiction over the chamber’s grounds so the Board  should be more transparent with its decisions. According to this  stakeholder, the Board also does not trust congressional staff with  security related information and the individual  attributed this to the fact  that congressional staff, for the most part, are not former law enforcement  or security officials like the Board members.
The one committee stakeholder who was satisfied with the level of the  Board’s transparency acknowledged that based on personal opinion,  additional transparency is not necessary because the Board deals with  sensitive security-related matters better left discussed discreetly. Further,  this stakeholder pointed out that the chamber’s Sergeant-at-Arms keeps  staff apprised of information that the committee needs and, if questions  arise, the stakeholder knows who to contact.
section_title: Effective External Communications
paragraphs: Effective external communication is closely related to transparency and  similarly, opinions were mixed between leadership and committee offices  with respect to how well the Board communicates its decision-making.  Specifically, all four leadership stakeholders expressed satisfaction with  the Board’s communication practices while five of the seven committee  stakeholders stated otherwise.
In particular, all four of the leadership stakeholders expressed their  satisfaction with the level of communication they had with individual  Board members, even though one acknowledged that the Board as a  whole could still take steps to improve stakeholder communication.
In contrast, five of the seven committee stakeholders stated that the  Board does not communicate with them to solicit feedback when making  decisions related to their committees’ jurisdiction. For example, some  stakeholders on the appropriations committees reported that the Board  did not communicate its plans when initiating security projects in the  middle of the fiscal year that had not been included in the annual budget  request. These stakeholders shared the view that initiating significant  security projects without their input limits transparency. One stakeholder  found out about changes to security initiatives that have implications for  future year appropriations in a widely-distributed notice of the changes,  but not directly from the Board. Further, some stakeholders also  expressed frustration with “going through” the Board when they have  questions or concerns about the Capitol Police’s budget justification. One  of these stakeholders said that for other agencies within the committee’s  jurisdiction, staff can discuss matters directly with the leader of that  agency and they perceived the Board as an unnecessary intermediary.
One of the committee stakeholders who felt satisfied with the level of the  Board’s communication told us that the congressional staff initiates a lot  of the communication with individual Board members, in particular the  Sergeant-at-Arms, and that practice met the individual’s needs. The other  stakeholder from that committee found that communication between  committee staff and the Board depended on the personalities of individual  Board members and that was not problematic. For example, the  Sergeant-at-Arms from their committee’s chamber discusses items and  issues the Board is considering with the congressional staff. Further,  when this Sergeant-at-Arms took chairmanship of the Board, he met with  committee and leadership stakeholders to discuss and solicit feedback on  security issues he envisioned the Board tackling during his chairmanship.
section_title: Options Exist for Adjustments to the Board’s Operations and Structure
paragraphs: Our analyses and discussions with law enforcement expert groups,  congressional stakeholders, and others who are familiar with the workings  of the Capitol Police Board identified options to enhance the Board’s  approaches that fall into two categories: (1) adjustments the Board might  consider without any statutory change required, and (2) adjustments that  would require statutory change.
subsections: section_title: Adjustments That Would Not Require Statutory Change
paragraphs: 1. The provision of regular opportunities for the committees of  jurisdiction and the leadership offices to meet with the full Board.
Some stakeholders suggested that more routine contact could enhance  accountability, transparency, and communication. For example,  congressional staff suggested periodic meetings between stakeholders  and all four Board members in one setting or the Board could invite staff  to scheduled Board meetings. These opportunities could address some  stakeholders’ concerns that they do not have insight into the Board’s  decision-making on security matters. One stakeholder told us that the  existing monthly meetings on the House side between congressional staff  from the leadership offices and the appropriations committees, as well as  the House Sergeant-at-Arms, the Chief, and the Architect of the Capitol,  are helpful tools. These meetings provide a platform for the relevant  parties to discuss security issues that need to be addressed and projects  that need to be funded. This individual wondered why the Board does not  similarly coordinate meetings with all of the appropriate stakeholders from  leadership offices or committees when it identifies security issues that  require input from these stakeholders. Leadership and committee  stakeholders who made these suggestions said that since congressional  staff do not meet regularly with the full Board, additional opportunities to  meet with all of the Board members at once would enhance transparency  by providing insight into the Board’s decision-making and allow  stakeholders to be more informed of the Board’s plans for the security of  the Capitol complex. In addition, some of the stakeholders asserted that  involving congressional staff in these meetings could also address their  concerns related to ensuring accountability of the full Board.  2. The development and implementation of a consistent outreach  strategy for soliciting stakeholder feedback, as appropriate, when  the Board contemplates changing or issuing new security  approaches.
One stakeholder noted that such a strategy would help ensure  consistency in how the Board solicits feedback before finalizing decisions  and would improve external communication. From this individual’s  perspective, issues between congressional stakeholders and the Board  arise from the Board not communicating effectively with stakeholders.  Further, a strategy to discuss decisions that the Board is considering  could also address other stakeholders’ concerns about the lack of insight  into the Board’s decisions in areas where stakeholders have specific  responsibilities. For example, one stakeholder noted that the Board could  better inform stakeholders on the reasons why the Board wants to pursue  one option or initiative over another.   3. The clarification for stakeholders of when a decision is within the  authority of the Board or the Chief.
Some stakeholders conveyed frustration that they did not always know  the impetus for a decision and this affected who they could hold  accountable. For example, some stakeholders commented that in their  view, the Chief is at times held accountable for decisions made by the  other Board members. Other stakeholders commented that the Board is  too heavily invested in operational matters such as budget justification  review and personnel matters, although the statutory framework supports  this role. Thus, if the Board were more transparent about distinguishing  between areas within the Board’s domain versus the Chief’s, which some  stakeholders noted was unclear to them, it could reduce some degree of  confusion. Likewise, if the Board better explained its roles as directed by  statute, and how it operationalized those requirements, it could address  some stakeholders’ concerns that the Board inappropriately  intervenes in  the Chief’s management of the department.
section_title: Structural Adjustments that Would Require Statutory Change
paragraphs: 1.  A change to the scope of the Board’s duties.
As mentioned earlier, the scope of the current Board’s duties ranges  widely from managing certain human capital and personnel issues to  making security decisions. This contrasts from the scope of other law  enforcement oversight entities that we noted earlier when recapping the  views of the law enforcement expert groups with whom we spoke. In  addition, some stakeholders expressed frustration concerning the wide  scope of the Board’s duties despite the professionalization of the Capitol  Police department over time. For example, they noted that the Board’s  involvement in the budget process encroaches on their committees’ ability  to interact directly with the Chief on the Capitol Police’s budget  justification. Statutory change to reduce the Board’s scope, expand its  scope, or eliminate the Board altogether could also have practical  implications on the Capitol Police. For example, if the Board’s scope were  to be reduced, the Chief may have to assume new responsibilities or  adapt to a different level of oversight in the midst of ongoing Capitol  Police operations. If the Board’s scope were to expand, it would require  the Board to quickly adapt to fulfill its new responsibilities and add  competing pressures on their time. If the Board were to be eliminated  entirely, some of its responsibilities may be reassigned to various entities,  including the Chief, all the while having to maintain some type of  congressional oversight structure for the Capitol Police.  2.  A change to the composition and size of the Board.
As we previously described, the Board is currently comprised of the  House and Senate Sergeants-at-Arms, the Architect of the Capitol, and  the Chief of the U.S. Capitol Police who serves in a non-voting, ex-officio  capacity. In speaking with law enforcement expert groups about the  Board, one group specifically mentioned that the current Board is smaller  than the size of traditional oversight bodies, which generally include at  least seven members. Another law enforcement expert group mentioned  that the Board could benefit from expanding its size, and therefore its  composition, to include representatives from other law enforcement  agencies who could add a broader perspective. For example, one  stakeholder suggested adding another Board member with specific  expertise on counterterrorism. Further, corporate governance standards  encourage the use of independent directors on a Board who do not have  a material or financial connection to the corporation they oversee.  Including representatives from outside law enforcement agencies could  be one way to incorporate the use of independent directors into the  Board’s structure.
Congressional stakeholders also commented that the Capitol Police  Board is smaller in size and composition compared to another body that  has some similarities in role. For example, the Joint Congressional  Continuity Board shares similar security related responsibilities but is  larger than the Capitol Police Board. The Joint Congressional Continuity  Board, while not a statutorily created organization like the Capitol Police  Board, is comprised of the current Capitol Police Board members with the  exception of the Architect of the Capitol, but also includes the Secretary  of the Senate, the Clerk of the House, and the Chief Administrative  Officer of the House.
Changes to the Board’s composition and size could impact how the Board  operates. For example, increasing the size of the Board may complicate  its decision-making process and the Board’s current practice to operate  under consensus. In addition, according to the Board, the small size of  the current Board makes it more nimble and adding additional members  could negatively impact the accountability of individual  members to  Congressional stakeholders. Board members added that there may be  challenges associated with adding more people to the Board because any  new members may become involved in lawsuits that the Board may be  involved with at any given time and face liability,  which could impact their  desire to serve on the Board. In addition, according to the Board, the  structure and composition of the Board is its strength because it  combines the law enforcement credentials of the Board members with the  campus and infrastructure knowledge of the Architect of the Capitol.  However, as some stakeholders and law enforcement expert groups have  suggested, the Board may benefit from including other perspectives.  3.  A change to Board members’ selection processes, voting rights,  and leadership assignments.
As we previously described, Board members come into their positions in  different ways. The Speaker of the House and the Majority  Leader in the  Senate select the House and Senate Sergeants-at-Arms, respectively,  the Architect of the Capitol is selected by the President and confirmed by  the Senate, and the Chief of Police is selected by the Board. The  mechanisms by which members are placed into their positions may have  an impact on the Board’s accountability to Congressional stakeholders.
For example, some committee stakeholders noted that in their view, the  Board members are accountable to congressional leadership and not the  committees. Additionally, one law enforcement expert group we spoke  with indicated that police chiefs are often selected by elected officials,  rather than the oversight organization, which differs from the Board’s  current practice of selecting the Chief. With respect to voting, currently, all  Board members vote except for the Chief of Police since one of the voting  decisions that is made by the Board involves the hiring and firing of the  Chief. The Board also has three voting members so that there is a tie- breaker, which serves a useful function in the event of disagreement and  this principle may be valuable to retain if changes to voting are made.  Changes to roles of the members, such as the voting status of members,  may impact the amount of weight individual  perspectives have in the  Board’s decision-making process. With respect to how the chairmanship  of the Board is determined, the position rotates between the House and  Senate Sergeants-at-Arms on a yearly basis but that could change to  allow the Architect of the Capitol to serve in that role or to change the  timing of the rotation. Changes to the current practice of alternating  chairmanship of the Board could impact the continuity of Board initiatives,  as individual members of the Board may have different priorities.  4.  A change to the oversight of the Board’s activities.
As we mentioned earlier, a number of the Board’s activities are subject to  the oversight of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, the  Committee on House Administration, and the Senate and House  Legislative Branch Appropriations Subcommittees, but four of the seven  Congressional stakeholders we spoke with from the committees stated  that they believed that the Board does not sufficiently take into account  the role of these committees in making decisions involving the U.S.  Capitol Police.
Changes to the oversight into the Board’s activities could take many  forms. For example, our prior work on the Board found that oversight of  the Board and the U.S. Capitol Police could be consolidated into a single  joint congressional committee, which could address concerns about  holding the entire Board accountable as the joint committee would be  bicameral and therefore would have jurisdiction over all the Board  members. However, according to the Congressional Research Service,  joint committees generally lack legislative authority, so their ability to  streamline legislative action would be limited, and as one Congressional  stakeholder we spoke with commented, joint committees can be difficult  to form. During outreach for our current study, we learned from a National  Council on State Legislatures (NCSL) representative that security and law  enforcement at many state capitols is managed this way. Oversight of  security and law enforcement at other state capitols is conducted by  members of the legislature, such as in California—according to the  representative from NCSL. Also, as this individual from NSCL described  it, in New Mexico, a legislative council comprised of the leaders from the  state House and Senate chambers oversees security. Changes to the  oversight of the Board’s activities may have practical implications. For  example, if oversight were to be consolidated into a joint committee, this  would establish a single focal point within the Congress for oversight.
Changes to the oversight into the Board’s activities could also include  restructuring the way in which the Board’s initiatives are funded.  Representatives from another law enforcement expert group we spoke  with indicated that law enforcement oversight bodies typically have  funding that is separate from the law enforcement entity that they are  overseeing, which enhances their independence and adds a layer of  accountability to their appropriators. Further, Congressional stakeholders  we spoke with indicated that, if the Board had separate funding, it would  be required to follow the established budget justification process that  requires engagement with the appropriators, which would also enhance  the transparency of the Board’s activities.
Regardless of what change is made to the oversight of the Board’s  activities, it is important that the Board’s relationship to the oversight  committees is clear to both sides, given the perception among some  Congressional stakeholders that the Board does not always appropriately  acknowledge committees’ roles in oversight.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Board has taken action to document its practices into a Manual of  Procedures. While the Manual  has incorporated some leading practices  to facilitate accountability, transparency, and effective external  communication, and the Board has taken action to implement many of  these provisions, Congressional stakeholders still have reservations  about the Board’s effectiveness. As a key governing document, the  Manual could thus be strengthened to more fully incorporate the leading  practices we identified, such as turning inward to assess its own  performance, and thus address the stakeholder concerns we reported. In  some instances, the Manual is silent on the effective governance  practices that the Board is implementing and it could be strengthened by  codifying these activities. In other instances, the Board is not  implementing particular practices that the Manual directs. Adherence is  thus warranted, and also could positively impact stakeholder relations.  Finally, in some cases, the Manual is silent on a practice and the Board  has not been addressing it either. In this last case, adjusting the Manual  accordingly could help establish and routinize the desired leading practice  on a prospective basis and also could alleviate some stakeholder  concerns.
Revising the Manual to fully incorporate leading practices for internal  control and governance standards would provide a sound and robust  governing document, inclusive of all the Board currently does while also  establishing new processes for the Board to do in the future. Additionally,  revising the Manual would help the Board better ensure that its practices  are designed to facilitate constructive and productive relationships with  stakeholders while maintaining the Board’s critical security focus. As the  Board contemplates these revisions to the Manual,  it would benefit from  working to engage stakeholders in the process. The Board could do this  by soliciting stakeholder input as it considers the non-statutory changes  that stakeholders suggested to address their concerns, such as  developing strategies for obtaining stakeholder feedback when making  security decisions. Further, if the Board determines that statutory changes  are needed, it should coordinate with stakeholders on such changes.  Identifying  and communicating potential changes to its congressional  stakeholders, and incorporating their views into the revision process, as  appropriate, would help the Board ensure that steps to revise its Manual  best address both the leading practices and chief stakeholder concerns.
Our work indicates that stakeholders hold widely divergent views about  the appropriate role of the Board, the level of transparency concerning its  operations, and the extent to which it engages stakeholders when making  decisions. These divergent views reflect a variety of competing interests  and priorities. Our report also outlines a number of options requiring  statutory change, which could further address concerns about the Board’s  operations, but could also pose new challenges. These options center on  changes to the Boards’ scope and duties, its composition and size, and  alternatives to congressional oversight of the Board, among other things.  Ultimately, the decision of whether to implement these options, and if so,  how to implement them, involves fundamental policy choices that only  Congress can make taking into account the results of our analyses and  discussions with law enforcement groups and stakeholders.
section_title: Recommendation
paragraphs: To ensure that the Capitol Police Board’s current and any new  approaches help enhance accountability, transparency, and effective  external communication with its stakeholders, we recommend that the  Board revise its Manual of Procedures to fully incorporate each of the  leading practices for internal control and governance standards discussed  in this report. In so doing, the Board should engage stakeholders in the  revision process, such as by soliciting their input on any non-statutory  changes that could particularly address the concerns stakeholders have  raised, and incorporating their views as appropriate. If, in making  revisions to its Manual, the Board determines that statutory changes may  be helpful to enhance Board operations, then the Board should also  engage with stakeholders on such proposed changes.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Board for their review and  comment. The Board provided written comments, which are summarized  below and reproduced in appendix III.  The Board also provided technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We also provided a  draft of this report to congressional leadership—the Speaker of the  House, Senate Majority  Leader, and the Senate and House Minority  Leaders.
In its written comments, the Board did not state whether or not it  concurred with the contents of our draft report or our recommendation.  However, the Board did present several areas that it wanted emphasized,  such as its reporting structures and member credentials, both of which it  asserts as strengths.  Further, the Board noted that its Manual is an  internal reference tool to guide current and prospective Board members  and not a governance document.  With respect to reporting lines, we  revised our figure accordingly. With respect to the Manual,  we are not  making revisions to our report because the Manual  serves as the sole  document to guide Board operations.
Additionally,  the Board expressed concern with the applicability of the  corporate governance leading practices we identified. In particular, the  Board stated that such practices are geared towards corporations and not  Congressional entities, such as the Capitol Police or the Board. We  disagree. As we noted in our report, these standards have broad  relevance to governing bodies seeking to facilitate accountability,  transparency, and effective external communication in a range of  contexts. Further, in identifying the leading practices, we were mindful of  choosing practices that would be pertinent to the Board, given that it does  not operate in a corporate setting. Additionally,  the Board utilized an  earlier version of these same practices in its 2003 report to Congress, as  we cited. Relatedly, in the Board’s 2003 report, it noted that the Board  serves as the Board of Directors for the Capitol Police and indicated that  following corporate governance standards would provide an effective  model for the Board in setting out its roles, functions, and processes for  the future.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Board. In addition, the report is available at no  charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-8777 or goodwing@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In this report, we examine the following objectives:  (1) What are the roles and responsibilities of the Capitol Police Board  (Board) and the Chief of the Capitol Police (Chief) as set out in  statute and in the Board’s Manual  of Procedures and how does  the Board’s scope compare to other law enforcement oversight  entities?  (2) To what extent does the Board’s Manual of Procedures  incorporate leading practices from internal control and other  standardized governance principles to facilitate accountability,  transparency, and effective external communication and in what  ways is the Board implementing these practices?  (3) What are Congressional stakeholder perspectives on the degree  to which the Board is accountable, transparent, and effective in its  communication approaches and what options exist to enhance the  Board’s approaches?
To examine the roles and responsibilities of the Board and the Chief of  the Capitol Police as set out in statute and in the Board’s Manual of  Procedures (Manual) and to determine how the Board’s scope compares  to other law enforcement oversight entities, we reviewed the relevant  statutes that set out the Board and the Chief’s roles and responsibilities.  We also reviewed the Board’s Manual to identify areas where it identifies  the Board’s roles and responsibilities, as well as those of the Chief in  relation to the Board. We then analyzed the relevant statutory and Manual  provisions to inventory the various roles and responsibilities of the Board  and the Chief.
In addition, we conducted interviews with officials from organizations with  expertise in law enforcement oversight and governance issues, such as  the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies  (CALEA), Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), International  Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), and National Association for  Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE), to understand how  organizations overseeing law enforcement agencies are structured and  how they function. We also spoke with the National Council on State  Legislatures (NCSL) to understand how law enforcement oversight efforts  are structured and function at state capitols and whether any parallels  exist to the Capitol Police Board. We selected these organizations  because we spoke to many of the same organizations for our prior work  on the Board and they have a breadth of knowledge about law  enforcement oversight structure and functions in other settings.
Further, we interviewed current Board officials—members, such as the  House Sergeant-at-Arms, general counsel, and the executive assistant— as well as a former Board member, a former Chief of the Capitol Police,  and current Capitol Police union officials. We also conducted semi- structured interviews with congressional staff from the majority and  minority sides of the committees that interact with the Board—Senate and  House Legislative Branch Appropriations Subcommittees, Senate  Committee on Rules and Administration, and Committee on House  Administration—as well as leadership offices—Speaker of the House and  Senate Majority and Minority Leaders. We spoke with these  congressional staff to solicit their views on the roles and responsibilities of  the Board and Chief. The information collected from interviews with these  staff cannot be projected to all staff from the committees of jurisdiction  and leadership offices. However, these interviews provided us with the  perspectives of staff who work with the Board in their capacity as  committee and leadership staff.
To examine the extent to which the Board’s Manual  incorporates leading  practices from internal control and other standardized governance  practices to facilitate accountability, transparency and effective external  communication and describe the ways the Board has implemented these  practices, we first assessed the Manual using internal control and  corporate governance principles. For our purposes, and using these  practices as a guide, we used the following definitions for each term:
Accountability  occurs when an entity acknowledges and assumes  responsibility for its actions and is answerable for any resulting  consequences.
Transparency occurs when an entity records and communicates  information on activities to stakeholders who need it in a form and  timeframe that allows these stakeholders to carry out their  responsibilities.
Effective external communication occurs when an entity utilizes  various modes of communication, proactively when possible, to  convey information to stakeholders.
To identify the leading practices that reflect the specific activities that  effective governing bodies should engage to facilitate accountability,  transparency, and effective external communication, we consulted  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, the Business  Roundtable’s Principles of Corporate Governance and the  G20/Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development’s  Principles of Corporate Governance. We reviewed these sources to  identify the standards that pertain to accountability, transparency, and  effective external communication and would also be relevant to the  Board, given that it does not operate in a corporate setting. Through this  process, we identified six leading practices and 24 specific activities, or  criteria, they encompass. The six leading practices reflect the specific  activities in which effective governing bodies should engage to facilitate  accountability, transparency, and effective external communication.  These leading practices are: (1) defining roles, responsibilities, and areas  of authority; (2) overseeing functions of the corporation; (3) conducting  performance evaluations and reviews; (4) developing processes for  internal functions of the board; (5) disclosing information to stakeholders;  and (6) developing processes for communication with stakeholders.  We then assessed procedures in the Manual against the activities  associated with each leading practice we identified and determined the  extent to which the practices were incorporated. To do this, we used a  scale of “fully incorporated,” “partially incorporated,” and “not  incorporated.” A determination of “fully incorporated” means that  procedures in the Manual  align with all activities associated with the  leading practice. A determination of “partially incorporated” means that  procedures in the Manual  align with some activities associated with the  leading practice. A determination of “not incorporated” means that no  provisions in the Manual align with any activities associated with the  leading practice. One analyst independently  reviewed the Manual and  made the initial determination. A second analyst then verified the  decision.
We also obtained and analyzed Board documentation illustrative of its  practices, including the 2003 Board report to Congress, minutes of Board  meetings held in fiscal years 2014 and 2015, orders issued by the Board  in calendar years 2014 and 2015, year-end reports for calendar years  2013 through 2015, and a briefing that provides an overview of the Board.  We focused on documentation developed in 2014 and 2015 because the  Board adopted the Manual in June 2013. In addition, we interviewed  Board officials to understand their practices.
To identify the Congressional stakeholder perspectives on the degree to  which the Board is accountable, transparent, and effective in its  communication approaches and options that exist to enhance the Board’s  approaches, we sought stakeholder views from the majority and minority  staff of the committees who engage with the Board – Senate Committee  on Rules and Administration, Committee on House Administration, and  the Senate and House Legislative Branch Appropriations Subcommittees  – as well as the majority and minority staff representing the leadership  from the Senate and the House, to provide insight into how the Board’s  practices were meeting their needs for accountability, transparency, and  effective communication when interacting with the Board and to solicit  feedback on the options to alternative Board structures that we found in  our prior work on the Board, options proposed by the Congressional  Research Service in 2009, and to identify any other options that may  address any concerns they have in interacting with the Board. We also  solicited Board and stakeholder input and asked the organizations we had  earlier identified as having expertise in law enforcement oversight and  governance issues for their perspectives. We then incorporated the  information collected from interviews with congressional staff and experts  into the alternative structures for the Board we found in our prior work on  the Board. In addition, we interviewed a former Chief of the Capitol Police  to understand implications that alternative structures may have on the  Chief. Further, we solicited the perspectives of the Board on the  implications that alternative structures may have on its operations.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2016 to February  2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Capitol Police Board
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, individuals making key  contributions to this report were Joy Booth, Assistant Director; Julia  Vieweg, Analyst-in-Charge; Ji Byun; Dina Shorafa; Helen Desaulniers,  Patrick Dibattista; Kaitlin Farquharson; Tracey King; Thomas Lombardi,  Amanda Miller; Jan Montgomery; and Kate Siggerud. Ben Atwater; Seto  Bagdoyan; Katherine Davis; Eric Hauswirth; Nima Patel-Edwards, and  Adam Vogt also provided valuable assistance.