National Airspace System: DOT and FAA Actions Will Likely Have a Limited Effect on Reducing Delays during Summer 2008 Travel Season
Published: 2008-07-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Flight delays and cancellations have plagued the U.S. aviation system. According to the Department of Transportation (DOT), more than one in four flights either arrived late or was canceled in 2007--making it one of the worst years for delays in the last decade. Delays and cancellations were particularly evident at certain airports, especially the three New York metropolitan commercial passenger airports--Newark Liberty International (Newark), John F. Kennedy International (JFK), and LaGuardia. To avoid a repeat of last summer's problems, DOT and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have worked with the aviation industry over the past several months to develop and implement several actions to reduce congestion and delays for the summer 2008 travel season. This testimony addresses (1) the trends in the extent and principal sources of flight delays and cancellations over the last 10 years, (2) the status of federal government actions to reduce flight delays and cancellations, and (3) the extent to which these actions may reduce delays and cancellations for the summer 2008 travel season. This statement is based on an analysis of DOT data on airline on-time performance, a review of relevant documents and reports, and interviews with officials from DOT, FAA, airport operators, and airlines, as well as aviation industry experts and associations. DOT and FAA provided technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOT data show that flight delays and cancellations have increased nationwide and especially in the New York region; however, the data provide an incomplete picture of the source of delay. Since 1998, the total number of flight delays and cancellations nationwide has increased 62 percent, while the number of scheduled operations has increased about 38 percent. Flight delays and cancellations in the New York region are even more pronounced. Specifically, since 1998, the number of flight delays and cancellations in the New York region has increased about 111 percent, while the number of operations has increased about 57 percent. DOT data on the sources of delays provide an incomplete picture. For example, in 2007, late arriving aircraft accounted for 38 percent of delays nationwide, but this category indicates little about what caused the aircraft to arrive late, such as severe weather. To reduce delays and congestion beginning in summer 2008, DOT and FAA are implementing several actions that for the purposes of this review GAO is characterizing as capacity-enhancing initiatives and demand management policies. Some of these actions are already in effect, such as 11 of the 17 short-term initiatives designed to improve capacity at the airport or system level and the hourly schedule caps on operations at the New York area airports. The other actions are being developed but are unlikely to be in effect by this summer. For example, DOT and FAA are soliciting comments on the proposed rule to establish slot auctions at JFK and Newark until July 21, 2008. DOT's and FAA's capacity-enhancing initiatives and demand management policies may help reduce delay, but the collective impact of these actions on reducing delay in 2008 is limited. For example, the benefit of the 17 initiatives--which range from efforts to reduce excessive spacing on final approach before landing to new procedures for handling air traffic during severe weather conditions--is generally expected to come from the initiatives' combined incremental improvements over time and in certain situations. The demand management policies may have a more immediate but limited effect on delays since the caps at Newark and LaGuardia were set at a level that was generally designed to avoid an increase in delay over 2007 levels. For example, the caps at Newark are set at a level that that is not expected to bring a delay reduction as compared to delays in 2007.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on the federal  government’s efforts to reduce aviation congestion and delays for this  summer’s travel season. In recent years, flight delays and cancellations  have plagued the U.S. aviation system. According to the Department of  Transportation (DOT), more than one in four flights either arrived late or  were canceled in 2007, affecting approximately 163 million passengers and  making it one of the worst years for delays in the last decade. A recent  report by the Senate Joint Economic Committee found that collectively,  passengers were delayed 320 million hours in 2007 and estimated that  domestic flight delays last year cost as much as $41 billion to the U.S.  economy. Delays were particularly evident at certain airports, especially  those in the New York region. For the past 10 years, the three principal  New York metropolitan commercial passenger airports—Newark Liberty  International (Newark), John F. Kennedy International (JFK), and  LaGuardia—have often ranked at or near the bottom of DOT’s lists of  airport on-time arrivals and departures. Since one-third of aircraft in the  national airspace system move through the New York area at some point  during a typical day, delays in this region can have a disproportionate  impact on delays experienced throughout the rest of the system.
Consumer complaints and media coverage of airline service problems,  combined with congressional hearings on these issues, have recently put  flight delays in the spotlight. Most aviation industry experts believe that  substantial gains in reducing aviation congestion and delays can be  achieved in the long term through investment in airport infrastructure,  Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) technologies,  and/or more efficient pricing of the nation’s aviation infrastructure.  However, to avoid a repeat of last summer’s delays, DOT and its operating  agency, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), have worked with the  aviation industry since the fall of 2007 in an effort to develop and  implement several near-term actions to reduce delays for the summer 2008  travel season.
My testimony today addresses (1) the trends in the extent and principal  sources of flight delays and cancellations over the last 10 years, (2) the  status of federal government actions to reduce flight delays and  cancellations by the summer of 2008, and (3) the extent to which these  actions may reduce delays and cancellations for the summer 2008 travel  season. To determine trends in the extent and sources of delays, we  analyzed DOT data on airline on-time performance, including sources of  delays, by airport and for the entire airspace system, for 1998 to 2007. To  assess the reliability of the data, we interviewed agency officials about  data quality control procedures, reviewed relevant documentation, and  electronically tested the data to identify obvious problems with  completeness or accuracy. We determined that the data were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of this report. We also reviewed relevant  documents and reports and interviewed DOT and FAA officials, airport  operators in Boston, New York, and Chicago, major commercial airlines,  and aviation industry experts and associations on the status and potential  impact of the federal government’s actions to reduce delays. Although its  scope covers the national airspace system as a whole, our work especially  focuses on the New York region because of the New York area airports’  persistent problems with flight delays and cancellations and the federal  government’s actions focused on reducing delays in this region. We  conducted our work from December 2007 to July 2008 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the study to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our study objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The national airspace system is a complex, interconnected, and  interdependent network of systems, procedures, facilities, aircraft, and  people that must work together to ensure safe and efficient operations.  DOT, FAA, airlines, and airports all affect the efficiency of national  airspace system operations. DOT works with FAA to set policy and  operating standards for all aircrafts and airports. As the agency  responsible for managing the air traffic control system, FAA has the lead  role in developing technological and other solutions to airspace issues.  FAA also provides funding to airports. The funding that major airports  receive from FAA to make improvements at the airports is conditioned on  open and nondiscriminatory access to the airlines and other users, and  the airlines are free to schedule operations at any time throughout the day,  except at airports that are subject to limits on scheduled operations. The  airlines can also affect the efficiency of the airspace system by the number  and types of aircraft that they choose to operate.
As we have previously reported, measuring the capacity of the airspace  system and achieving its most efficient use are both difficult challenges  because they depend on a number of interrelated factors. The capacity of  the aviation system is not a simple measurable element—in addition to  being related to airports’ infrastructure, capacity is affected at any given  time by such factors as weather conditions and airline flight schedules.  For example, because some airports have parallel runways that are too  close together for simultaneous operations in bad weather, the number of  aircraft that can take off and land is reduced when weather conditions  worsen. Achieving the most efficient use of the national airspace system is  contingent on a number of factors, among them the procedures that FAA  uses to manage traffic, how well FAA’s air traffic control equipment  performs, the proficiency of the controllers to efficiently use these  procedures and equipment to manage traffic, and how much users are  charged for the use of the airspace and airports.
FAA has had a long history of attempting to address congestion by  managing demand through administrative controls. FAA began  establishing limits on the number of takeoffs and landings at five  airports—Chicago O’Hare International, Newark, JFK, LaGuardia, and  Washington Reagan National—in 1968. The High Density Rule, as it was  known, instituted limits, or caps, on the number of takeoff and landings of  the incumbent airlines serving each of the these airports. DOT lifted the  restrictions at Newark in 1970, and in 2000, with the passage of the  Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century  (AIR-21), caps on operations were to be eliminated at Chicago O’Hare by  July 2002, and at LaGuardia and JFK by January 2007. AIR-21 also  immediately exempted certain types of aircraft from the caps, a change  that resulted in unanticipated increases in demand, especially at  LaGuardia. In 2000, airlines took advantage of AIR-21’s small regional jet  exemptions and rapidly initiated a large number of new flights to and from  LaGuardia. FAA chose to impose a moratorium on additional flights at  LaGuardia in November 2000 to limit delays and reduced flights at  LaGuardia to a level consistent with the airport’s capacity under optimal  weather conditions. On the basis of this experience and FAA’s inability to  adopt a final congestion management rule for LaGuardia, FAA issued a  December 2006 order to maintain the cap of 75 hourly scheduled  operations at LaGuardia until a final rule can be adopted. Chicago O’Hare  also experienced increased operations after its caps were eliminated,  prompting FAA to again limit operations at the airport beginning in spring  2004 through a series of voluntary agreements and ending with a new rule  in late summer 2006. These caps on Chicago O’Hare’s operations are  effective through October 2008, which coincides with the scheduled  opening of the airport’s new runway in November 2008.
In response to the near-record delays in summer 2007, which followed the  expiration of the High Density Rule for the New York airports and  increasing volumes of domestic air traffic, DOT convened a special  aviation rulemaking committee (New York ARC) in the fall of 2007  specifically to address delays and other airline service issues in the New  York metropolitan area. The New York ARC, which consisted of  stakeholders representing government, airlines, airports, general aviation  users, and aviation consumers, was tasked with identifying available  options for changing current policy and assessing the potential impacts of  those changes on airlines, airports, and the traveling public. The New York  ARC had three specific objectives: (1) to reduce congestion, (2) to allocate  efficiently the scarce capacity of New York area airports, and (3) to  minimize the disruption associated with implementing any of the  suggested improvements. The New York ARC issued its findings and  options for reducing congestion to the Secretary of Transportation in  December 2007. One of the committee’s working groups assessed 77  operational improvement initiatives for the New York area and identified  key items to focus on within the list of 77, such as reducing excess spacing  on final approach when landing.
section_title: Data Show That Delays and Cancellations are Increasing, but Provide an Incomplete Picture of the Extent and Sources of Delays
paragraphs: Nationwide, according to DOT data the annual number of domestic airline  flight delays and cancellations has increased about 62 percent (from 1.2  million to 2.0 million), while the annual number of scheduled flights has  increased about 38 percent (from 5.4 million to 7.5 million) since 1998. In  the New York area, the trend is even more pronounced, as the number of  domestic flight delays and cancellations at the three main commercial  airports has increased about 111 percent, while the number of domestic  operations has increased about 57 percent since 1998.
DOT statistics indicate that 2007 was the second worst year on record for  U.S. airlines’ on-time performance, and the trends in the percentage of  flight delays and cancellations appear to be worsening. As shown in  figure 1, about 20 percent of flights in the system were delayed and nearly  3 percent were canceled in 1998, compared to about 24 and 2 percent in  2007, respectively. The data also show that flight delays and cancellations  have been steadily increasing since 2002, although the percentage of  cancellations in 2007 is still lower than it was from 1998 through 2001.  However, cancellations have become more problematic in recent years as  the airline industry is now operating with fewer empty seats on flights. As  a result, passengers on canceled flights must wait longer to be rebooked,  and in some cases may be forced to spend the night before resuming travel  the next day.
Flights delays are also becoming longer. According to DOT data, the  average length of a flight delay increased from more than 49 minutes in  1998 to almost 56 minutes in 2007, an increase of nearly 14 percent  throughout the system. Despite this relatively small increase in average  flight delay length, far more flights were affected by long delays in 2007  than in 1998. For example, the number of flights delayed by 180 minutes or  more increased from 25,726 flights in 1998 to 64,040 flights in 2007, or  about 150 percent. In addition, DOT’s data indicate that the number of  flights in which an aircraft has departed the gate, but remained for an hour  or more on the ground awaiting departure, has increased over 151 percent  since 1998.
Because the entire airspace system is highly interdependent, delays at one  airport may lead to delays rippling across the system and throughout the  day. This delay propagation appears to be increasing and leading to more  delays in the system overall. For example, researchers at George Mason  University’s Center for Air Transportation Systems have found that 46  percent of delays in the system in 2007 were caused by flight delays  occurring earlier in the day. Flight delays in the New York metropolitan  region also appear to have a disproportionate impact on delays  experienced throughout the rest of the airspace system. During a typical  day, approximately one-third of the aircrafts in the national airspace  system move through the New York airspace. According to preliminary  research conducted by the MITRE Corporation for FAA, an average of 40  percent of the flight delays in the system are from delays that originate in  the New York metropolitan area.
Compared to the rest of the country, where flight delays and cancellations  have been steadily increasing, the magnitude and upward trend of the  problem in the New York region is greater than the rest of the airspace  system. For example, over a third of all flights in the New York  metropolitan region in 2007 were delayed or canceled, according to DOT  statistics. Figure 2 shows that the percentage of late arriving and  canceled flights at each of the three major New York area airports was  considerably higher than the systemwide averages. Since 2003, the  percentage of late arriving and canceled flights has been increasing faster  in the New York area than in the rest of the system.
Since 1998, the New York area’s three major airports have often been  among the airports with the lowest on-time performance records. In 2007,  DOT reported that LaGuardia, Newark, and JFK had the lowest on-time  performance rates among major domestic airports, followed by Chicago  O’Hare International Airport, Philadelphia International Airport, and  Boston Logan International Airport. Table 1 shows the ranking of major  airports by the lowest on-time arrival performance in 2007.
While DOT data show that the trends in delays and cancellations are  getting worse, current on-time performance data do not capture the full  extent of delays and cancellations or the extent to which passengers’  average travel times have increased in recent years. For example, airlines  have, in many cases, opted to lengthen scheduled flight times to enhance  on-time results, particularly along heavily congested and frequently  delayed routes. DOT data do not account for the increased average flight  times that are masked by these schedule changes. Also, available DOT  data may not necessarily reflect passengers’ experience of delay because  DOT tracks flights, not passengers. Passengers can experience delays to  their trips because of missed connections resulting from delayed or  oversold flights or lengthy delays due to flight cancellations—elements  that are not measured in current statistics. According to a recent study by  George Mason University, roughly one in four passengers experienced a  passenger trip delay in 2007 and the average duration of delay experienced  by these passengers was 1 hour 54 minutes, an increase of 24 minutes over  2006. In addition, the study found that the average delay for passengers  on canceled flights was 11 hours in 2007. Passenger delays are affected by  record-level airline load factors (percentage of seats occupied on aircraft),  which result in fewer available empty seats on subsequent flights for those  passengers who experience canceled flights. According to DOT’s Air  Consumer Report, flight problems involving cancellations, delays, or  missed connections were the number one consumer complaint in 2007.
subsections: section_title: DOT Data Provide an Incomplete Picture of the Sources of Delays
paragraphs: The data collected by DOT on the sources of delays provide information  about where delays occur and what causes them, but the data are  incomplete. The primary purposes for collecting these causal data are to  inform the traveling public and categorize delays and cancellations so that  the parties most capable of addressing the causes of delays and  cancellations can take corrective action. Since 2003, airlines have reported  the cause of delay to DOT in one of five broad categories: late arriving  aircraft, airline, national aviation system, extreme weather, and security.
Late arriving aircraft means a previous flight using the same aircraft  arrived late, causing the subsequent flight to depart late. In 2007,  approximately 38 percent of delays were assigned to this category.
Airline delays include any delay or cancellation that was within the  control of the airlines, such as aircraft cleaning, baggage loading, crew  issues, or maintenance. Roughly 29 percent of the delays in 2007 were  attributed to airline delays.
National aviation system delays and cancellations refer to a broad set of  circumstances affecting airport operations, heavy traffic volume, and air  traffic control. This category also includes any nonextreme weather  condition that slows the operation of the system, such as wind or fog, but  does not prevent flying. The national aviation system accounted for about  28 percent of delays in 2007.
Extreme weather includes serious weather conditions that prevent the  operation of a flight. Examples of this kind of weather include tornadoes,  snow storms, and hurricanes. In 2007, nearly 6 percent of delays were  assigned to extreme weather.
Security accounted for less than 1 percent of delays in 2007. Examples of  security delays include evacuation of an airport, reboarding due to a  security breach, and long lines at the passenger screening areas.
Since 2003, despite the increasing number of delays, there have been no  significant changes in the trends of these sources of delay. Figure 3 shows  the DOT-reported sources of delay in 2007.
The distribution of delay by source is very different in New York than for  the country as a whole and reflects the New York area’s greater level of  congestion. For example, national aviation system delays account for  nearly 58 percent of all delays in New York as compared to approximately  28 percent for the country as a whole in 2007 (see fig. 4). As noted earlier,  the three major New York area airports have experienced more than a 50  percent increase in traffic levels since 1998, while runway capacity at  these airports has not changed. As a result, FAA must resort to a  complement of traffic management initiatives, such as ground delay or  flow control programs, which are used to restrict the flow of traffic and,  accordingly, lead to delays.
For several reasons, the data provide an incomplete picture of the  underlying causes of delays. First, the DOT-reported categories are too  broad to provide meaningful information on the root causes of delays. For  example, delays attributed to the airlines could consist of causes such as a  late crew, aircraft maintenance, or baggage loading, but these more  specific causes are not captured in DOT data. Second, the largest source  of systemwide delay—late arriving aircraft, which represents 38 percent of  the total delay sources (as fig. 3 shows)—masks the original source of  delay. For example, the original source of delay for a late arriving aircraft  may be the result of other sources—such as a severe weather condition,  the airline, security, or the national airspace system—or a combination of  one or more of these sources. Finally, the data do not capture what many  economists believe is the fundamental cause of much of the flight delays— a mismatch between the demand for and capacity to provide aviation  services. While the data provide airlines’ view of the reason that particular  flight segments were delayed, DOT does not report data on the extent to  which flights are simply overscheduled in particular places at particular  times relative to the capacity of the airports and air traffic control system  to provide aviation services. The DOT Inspector General analyzed airline  schedules at 15 airports and found that 6 of the airports had flights  scheduled either at or over maximum airport capacity at peak hours of the  day during the summer of 2007. When this is the case, assigning the cause  of delay to one of the five DOT categories masks that the fundamental  cause is this mismatch of demand for and supply of these services.
section_title: DOT and FAA Are Implementing Actions Intended to Reduce Delays
paragraphs: DOT and FAA are implementing several actions intended to reduce flight  delays beginning in summer 2008. Due to the high proportion of delays at  the three major New York area airports and their effect on the rest of the  airspace system, many of these actions are specifically designed to  address congestion in the New York area. For purposes of our discussion,  we grouped the various actions into one of two categories—capacity- enhancing initiatives and demand management policies—both of which  are intended to reduce flight delays. Capacity-enhancing initiatives are  intended to increase the efficiency of existing capacity by reducing delay  and maximizing the number of takeoffs and landings at an airport. By  contrast, demand management policies influence demand through  administrative measures or economic incentives. Some of these capacity- enhancing initiatives and demand management policies will be fully or  partially implemented by summer 2008, but others will not be completed  or even initiated until later this year or beyond.
DOT and FAA have announced multiple capacity-enhancing initiatives  designed to reduce delays in the New York region for this summer and  beyond. In general, adding substantial new airspace system capacity is  costly and time consuming. Thus, in March 2007, DOT and FAA convened  a workgroup that identified 17 short-term initiatives that better utilize  existing capacity at the airport or system level through procedural and  other changes in airport and airspace operations and could be completed  by summer 2008. Eleven of the 17 short-term initiatives have been  completed, and FAA plans to implement the remaining initiatives, which  require more planning and coordination, by September 2008. See  appendix I for a list of the 17 short-term initiatives and their status. The  initiatives range from new procedures and reroutes for handling air traffic  during severe weather conditions to efforts to reduce excessive spacing on  final approach before landing, and to an airspace flow program that allows  New York departures to move more freely while delays are redistributed  to airports within the region. In addition to the 17 short-term initiatives,  other capacity-enhancing initiatives are under way. These include  improving coordination with DOD for airlines’ use of military airspace and  redesigning the airspace around the New York, New Jersey and  Philadelphia metropolitan area. FAA is in the process of drafting letters  of agreement that would help establish more formal processes for  communicating with DOD for the release of specific portions of military  airspace on an as-needed basis. In December 2007, FAA initiated the first  phase of the planned 5-year implementation of the airspace redesign, with  new departure headings at Newark and Philadelphia airports. In April  2008, FAA appointed a New York Airspace “Czar”—whose official title is  Director for the New York Area Program Integration Office—to coordinate  regional airspace issues and projects. Table 2 lists the capacity-enhancing  initiatives and their status. More detailed information on the actions— including descriptions, geographic focus, and status—can be found in  appendix II.
DOT and FAA have also introduced demand management policies—most  notably, hourly schedule caps on takeoffs and landings at the three major  New York area airports—to its pool of delay reduction efforts. DOT and  FAA believe that caps on scheduled operations are necessary at some  airports where available capacity cannot meet demand. The caps are  currently in place to limit scheduled operations at all three major New  York area airports, with hourly scheduled operations capped at 81 at both  JFK and Newark, and at 75 at LaGuardia. The most recent caps at JFK and  Newark are scheduled to be in place until October 2009. At LaGuardia, a  December 2006 order maintained caps that had been in place since  November 2000. The institution of caps, however, does not necessarily  mean that total operations at each of the three airports will decrease. For  example, at JFK, the total number of daily scheduled operations will  increase by 50 flights per day over summer 2007 levels, when no caps were  in place, but scheduled operations will be spaced more evenly throughout  the day in an attempt to minimize peak period congestion.
Two other demand management policies under way include an amendment to  the Rates and Charges policy and proposed rules to establish slot auctions at  all three New York area airports. The amendment to the Rates and Charges  policy clarifies that airport operators may establish a two-part landing fee  structure, consisting of both an operation charge and an aircraft weight-based  charge, and include rule changes that would expand the costs congested  airports could recoup through airfield charges. The proposed slot auctions  for the three New York area airports would lease the majority of operations  (takeoffs and landings, or slots) to incumbent operators and help develop a  market by annually auctioning off leases for a limited number of slots during  the first 5 years of the rule.
These two demand management policies are being developed, but it is  unlikely that they will be in effect by this summer. DOT and FAA just recently  announced the final Rates and Charges policy amendment, so it is unlikely the  policy will have an impact this summer. Furthermore, existing use and lease  agreements between airlines and airport operators could prevent any changes  to rates and charges for many years, until existing lease agreements expire.  DOT and FAA are currently reviewing comments for the proposed rule to  establish slot auctions at LaGuardia and will be collecting comments on the  proposed rule to establish slot auctions at JFK and Newark until July 21, 2008;  thus it is unlikely the final rules will be issued during the summer. Table 3 lists  the demand management policies and their status. More detailed information  on the actions—including descriptions, geographic focus, and status—can be  found in appendix II.
section_title: DOT’s and FAA’s Actions May Help Reduce Delays, but the Extent of Delay Reduction in Summer 2008 Will Likely Be Limited
paragraphs: DOT’s and FAA’s capacity-enhancing initiatives have the potential to  reduce congestion and thereby avoid delays, according to FAA and  stakeholders we consulted, but the effect will likely be limited for the  summer 2008 traveling season. DOT’s and FAA’s demand management  policies—in particular, caps on scheduled operations at all three New  York area airports—are expected to have some delay avoidance impact in  the near term. DOT and FAA set the caps at Newark and LaGuardia at a  level intended to avoid an increase in delays above that experienced in  2007 and set the caps at JFK to generate a 15 percent reduction in average  departure delays over 2007 levels. The projected impact of the various  actions undertaken by DOT and FAA is also expected to be muted because  several will not be in place until next year or beyond. Finally, other  mitigating economic factors could lead to fewer operations in 2008, which  might also lead to fewer delays.
Although DOT and FAA have not analyzed the potential near-term benefit  of the capacity-enhancing initiatives, FAA officials and stakeholders that  we spoke with anticipate that the capacity-enhancing initiatives will  generally have a positive, but fairly small, impact on reducing delays in the  near term. For example, while FAA has not analyzed the estimated impact  of the 17 short-term initiatives, aviation stakeholders, including airport  operators, airlines, and aviation industry associations, believe that these  initiatives will have a positive impact in summer of 2008. However, most  think the initiatives—when taken together—will result only in incremental  improvements and in certain situations and alone will not provide  sufficient near-term gains to accommodate the peak hour schedules at the  New York area airports’ current or forecast levels of demand.  Furthermore, given that the final plan for coordinating the use of military  airspace is still under development, the potential impact of this effort  remains unknown. However, airlines agree that increasing use of military  airspace through advanced coordination holds promise, and the release of  military airspace over recent holiday weekends has been beneficial.  Finally, although the impact of the newly appointed aviation czar is also  unknown, some airlines and New York airport operators have supported  the appointment of a czar, but also expressed concern that the czar, who is  currently lacking a dedicated budget or staff, will not have sufficient  authority to direct and coordinate delay reduction efforts across FAA and  DOT offices.
Of the capacity-enhancing initiatives, FAA has estimated the potential  future delay reduction benefits of one—the New York-New Jersey- Philadelphia Airspace Redesign. FAA estimates that the airspace redesign  will result in a 20 percent reduction in national airspace system delays for  the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia study area airports as compared to  taking no action. According to FAA, estimated delay reduction will vary by  airport and will be achieved only once the redesign has been fully  implemented. The airspace redesign, scheduled to be completed in 2012, is  highly controversial because residents living in affected areas have raised  concerns about potential increases in aircraft noise and other  environmental effects.
Demand management policies, which do not require long-term  investments, will likely have a more immediate but similarly limited effect  on relieving congestion and reducing delays. Because of increasing  congestion at JFK and Newark, in the fall of 2007, FAA used models to  analyze the airlines’ proposed 2008 summer schedules and determine  potential future delays at these airports and the effect of caps. The  proposed summer schedules submitted by the airlines for these airports  would have constituted substantial scheduling increases over summer  2007. On the basis of these proposed schedules, DOT and FAA set the caps  at JFK at a level that is projected to decrease average departure delays by  15 percent over 2007 levels. However, the caps at LaGuardia and Newark  are set at a level to avoid an increase in delays over 2007 levels. For  example, at Newark, FAA estimates about a 23 percent reduction in the  average delay per operation relative to a situation with no cap. Newark’s  caps were designed to ensure that delays did not get significantly worse in  2008 based on the airlines’ proposed summer schedules and the potential  for increased operations diverted from JFK. Thus, the caps at Newark are  not expected to bring a delay reduction benefit as compared to delays  experienced in 2007.  At LaGuardia, which already had caps in 2007, FAA  estimated that the long-term implementation of caps would reduce delays  by 32 percent as compared to no cap.
Caps at the New York area airports will help the region avoid additional  delays in the near term, but there are also policy trade-offs to consider. In  general, FAA, airlines, and aviation experts have stated that when  available capacity cannot meet demand, managing operations at the  airport level is necessary to reduce congestion and limit delays in the short  run. FAA noted that imposing caps is an effective, but not efficient, way to  reduce delays. Airlines generally support caps as a short-term solution for  addressing congestion at the New York airports because of the worsening  delays at these airports. FAA stated that some airlines may support caps at  airports they already serve because caps generally protect incumbent  airlines and limit competition from airlines that are interested in beginning  service at these airports (or new entrants). However, some airport  operators strongly oppose flight caps because they state that caps could  constrain the economic growth of the surrounding region. In addition,  some airport operators and aviation experts are concerned that using caps  as a long-term solution can mask the need for capacity enhancements and  shift the focus away from important long-term solutions that may provide  a more lasting solution to the delay problem.
The proposed slot auction rules for the three major New York area  airports are currently out for comment and will not be implemented by  this summer, but even if they were in place, they would not directly reduce  delays. DOT and FAA intend the slot auctions to help create a market for  slots in the New York area that allows new entrants better access to the  airports and encourage airlines currently holding slots to place a greater  value on the use of their slots. By itself, a slot auction will not reduce  delays. But DOT and FAA believe that by helping to reveal the economic  value of slots, the policy may help to develop a more robust secondary  market for slots, which will, in turn, lead to greater efficiency in their  allocation and use. DOT and FAA believe that doing so may increase the  size of aircraft used at the airports and thereby increase the number of  passengers served. The proposed rules for the three New York area  airports include different slot auction options. Only one of the two options  for LaGuardia would have a direct delay reduction impact. Specifically,  this option would require approximately 18 slots to be retired over 5 years,  and would result in an estimated 1 minute of delay reduction for each  takeoff and landing at the airport. One slot auction proposal for Newark  and JFK would reallocate 10 percent of eligible capacity via annual  auctions over 5 years, and FAA would retain the net auction proceeds for  use on unspecified capacity improvements in the New York area. The  second slot auction option at JFK would reallocate 20 percent of eligible  slots over 5 years, and the net auction proceeds would be granted to the  carrier whose previously held slots were auctioned. Under this option,  carriers whose slots are returned for auction would not be allowed to bid  on their own slots. Some airline officials and airport operators stated that  airlines have made substantial investments at these airports that would be  diminished if they lose operating rights. Airlines and New York airport  operators strongly oppose the proposed slot auctions because they do not  think that FAA has the legal authority to implement these auctions.
The potential impact of the Rates and Charges policy— a policy that is  unlikely to be implemented by this summer because the final notice was  only announced on July 8, 2008— was not analyzed by DOT and FAA.  However, DOT and FAA assert that, if implemented, the amendment to the  Rates and Charges policy may help to reduce congestion, and thus delay,  by encouraging airlines to use larger aircraft and schedule fewer  operations during peak usage hours. Some airport operators support this  policy because it provides them with more flexibility in setting landing  fees and another option for addressing delays, but the extent to which  airports can or will implement the policy is unknown. Some airlines,  airport operators, and aviation experts assert that an airport’s  implementation of a two-part landing fee under the Rates and Charges  policy may not reduce delays because the policy requires these fees to  remain revenue neutral. In other words, for congested airports, the policy  will not enable the differential between peak and off-peak prices to be  large enough to change airline behavior while adhering to revenue  neutrality. Some airlines and airport operators opposed the amendment  because they think that it could discriminate against airlines whose fleets  include mostly small aircraft because the amendment creates a fee  differential for small to medium-sized aircraft while having a negligible  effect on larger aircraft. Airlines and certain airport operators also  expressed concern that under such a policy, service to small cities would  be dropped because carriers would favor using larger aircraft to serve  larger cities. Several airlines stated that the Rates and Charges policy does  not address the bigger problem of lack of capacity in the airspace system.
Finally, other interrelated factors beyond government initiatives, such as  the financial state of the aviation industry, increasing jet fuel prices, and  the downturn in the economy, may also result in fewer delays during 2008,  but their impact is uncertain. The Air Transport Association expects a 1  percent reduction in the number of passengers for the summer 2008 travel  season as compared to the 2007 summer travel season, and many airlines  are planning more substantial reductions in capacity and schedules for the  fall and winter 2008 seasons. Economic conditions, rising fuel costs, and  airline initiated capacity cuts could affect demand for air travel or  available capacity in the coming months. These factors also reduce  congestion and, accordingly, delays and could make it difficult to  determine how much of the delay reductions, if any, might be attributed to  the capacity-enhancing initiatives or demand management policies  planned for summer 2008.
In closing, DOT and FAA should be commended for taking steps to reduce  mounting flight delays and cancellations for the 2008 summer travel  season. However, delays and cancellations this summer could still be  significant given the likely limited impact of DOT’s and FAA’s actions.  Capacity-enhancing initiatives can provide some limited benefit in the near  term, but they do not fundamentally expand capacity. Demand  management policies, especially those that artificially restrict demand— like schedule caps—may limit increases in delays, but should not be  viewed as a meaningful or enduring solution to addressing the  fundamental imbalances between the underlying demand for and supply of  airspace capacity. The growing air traffic congestion and delay problem  that we face in this country is the result of many factors, including airline  practices, inadequate investment in airport and air traffic control  infrastructure, and how aviation infrastructure is priced. Addressing this  problem involves difficult choices, which affect the interests of  passengers, airlines, airports, and local economies. If not addressed,  congestion problems will intensify as the growth in demand is expected to  increase over the next 10 years.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased  to respond to any questions that you or other members of the  subcommittee may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Susan Fleming at  (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions  to this testimony include Paul Aussendorf, Amy Abramowitz, William  Bates, Jonathan Carver, Jay Cherlow, Lauren Calhoun, Delwen Jones,  Heather Krause, Sara Ann Moessbauer, and Maria Wallace.
section_title: Appendix I: New York Short-Term Initiatives
paragraphs: Daily planning teleconferences to provide a common  situational awareness for customers—such as airlines,  airport operators, the military, and general aviation—on  the planned daily operations at JFK.
Simultaneous runway approaches to 31L/R will allow  approximately 4 to 6 more aircraft to land on this runway  configuration when weather conditions are classified as  instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).
3. Accessing J134/J149 from Eliot Intersection (for use  during Severe Weather Avoidance Programs)
When thunderstorms affect the west departure routes,  aircraft will be rerouted using the Eliot departure fix.  Benefits have not been identified, but are available for use  as weather events dictate.  4. Pass Back Departure Restrictions—700 mile restriction  Pass back restrictions were removed on October 11,  2007, beyond 700 miles for traffic destined for the  New York airports. Departure restrictions to airports often  lead to delays as controllers have to wait to release  aircraft. Eliminating this airport restriction and allowing en  route controllers to build in the spacing improves airport  efficiency.
Briefings and trainings at major facilities are planned to  speed implementation of changes associated with the  “proximity event” category. Intent is to help educate  controllers that reducing excessive spacing between  aircraft on final approach can help reduce delay and  should not be considered an error, because it does not  pose a safety risk.
Under certain conditions, control of the holding pattern  airspace will transfer from the New York Air Route Traffic  Control Center (ZNY) to the New York TRACON (N90).  This allows aircraft to transition out of the holding pattern  using terminal separation standards (3 miles) as opposed  to the en route separation standards (5 miles).
7. NY Area Severe Weather Avoidance Procedure Action  Team Items—Route Availability Planning Tool (RAPT)
When affected by thunderstorms, controllers and traffic  flow managers will use a weather forecasting technology  to identify the availability of departure routes, and provide  traffic management specialists with the ability to more  quickly open and close routes and to reroute aircraft.
Creating another westbound departure route parallel to  J80 has the potential to mitigate westbound delays from  JFK.
A reallocation of the lower part of sector 73 at the New  York Air Route Traffic Control Center will allow the  remaining sector to focus on aircraft departing  Philadelphia and New York.
Move current BOS arrivals via J79 to the east and reduce  congestion at the MERIT departure fix.
SWAP escape routes in Canadian airspace are used and  coordinated daily with Canada’s civil air navigation  services provider (NAV CANADA). Used mostly during the  summer because of thunderstorms and winds in the  United States.
Allows for more efficient arrivals from the north into  Newark by moving or eliminating crossing traffic. No  added capacity benefits are expected. Do expect to get  some added operational efficiency for aircraft while in the  en route portion of flight.
A procedure that allows for simultaneous arrivals on  runways 4L and 4R, when weather permits.
Traffic management procedure to allow EWR arrival  aircraft to fly at higher altitudes and in a less circuitous  route. No added capacity benefits are expected.
Procedures currently allow for these runway  configurations to be used in Visual Meteorological  Conditions (VMC). Waiver has been signed to allow  arrivals to land on Runway 29 while landing on Runway  4R.
section_title: Appendix II: Status and Reported Benefits of Capacity-Enhancing Initiatives and Demand Management Policies
paragraphs: The New York Aviation Rulemaking  Committee (ARC) recommended a  list of 77 items for consideration and  implementation in the New York  area. From these, FAA identified 17  short-term initiatives for immediate  action.
Eleven of the 17  short-term  initiatives are  currently complete.  The others are  planned for  completion by the  end of fiscal year  2008.
Not analyzed but likely to be small.
FAA is working with DOD to explore  the current use of special use  airspace, develop proposals for  increased civil use of military  airspace, and evaluate letters of  agreement that provide operational  direction for the shared uses of  special use airspace.
FAA’s efforts to  standardize use of  military airspace  with DOD are  ongoing and the  outcome is  uncertain.
Final plan unknown, therefore  benefit unknown.
The Airspace Redesign of the  NY/NJ/PHL metropolitan area  involves changes to airspace  configurations and air traffic  management procedures. The  selected alternative (Integrated  Airspace Alternative with Integrated  Control Complex) integrates the  entire airspace with a common  automation platform. Air traffic  controllers can reduce aircraft  separation rules from 5 to 3 nautical  miles over a larger geographical  area than the current airspace  structure allows.
Implementation  began on  December 19,  2007, with the  introduction of  additional  departure  headings at  Philadelphia  International and  Newark  International  airports. FAA has  stated that it does  not believe there  will be additional  changes  implemented until  fall 2008. Final  implementation by  2012.
When the redesign is fully  implemented in 2012, FAA  estimated a 20 percent reduction  in national airspace system delay  in the study area as compared to  taking no action. Estimated arrival  and departure delay reduction  varies between airports.
ARC participants agreed that  appointing a New York aviation czar  to coordinate regional airspace  issues and all projects and initiatives  addressing problems of congestion  and delays in New York would be  beneficial. As a result, the Director of  the New York Integration Office  position was created.
Marie Kennington- Gardiner has been  appointed Director  of the New York  Integration Office.
In January 2008, FAA issued an  order setting a cap on the number of  hourly operations at JFK.  The order  took effect March 30, 2008, and will  expire October 24, 2009.
Operations are  capped at 81 per  hour.
FAA estimates that caps would  reduce average departure delays  by 5.5 minutes, or 15 percent.   The number of departure delays of  60 minutes or more would  decrease 31 percent. Based on  proposed summer 2008  schedules, estimated delays could  have increased by up to 150  percent.
In March 2008, FAA proposed an  order to cap flights at Newark. The  final order was issued on May 21,  2008, and takes effect on June 20,  2008, and expires October 24, 2009.
Scheduled  operations  capped at 81 per  hour by summer  2008.
Slight reduction in arrival delays  offset by slight increase in  departure delays with no  estimated net change in average  delay between 2007 and 2008.   The purpose is to keep delays  from worsening at Newark in 2008  because of caps at JFK.  Based  on proposed summer 2008  schedules, estimated arrival  delays would increase by as much  50 percent in 2008 without the  limits.
In December 2006, FAA published a  temporary order maintaining the  same caps and exemptions in place  since November 2000. In April 2008,  FAA also published an order limiting  unscheduled operations to 3 per  hour.
Scheduled  operations will  be capped at 75  per hour during  summer 2008.
FAA estimates 32 percent  reduction in average delay as  compared to no cap. As the caps  were already in place, no new  benefit is expected in summer  2008.
In April 2008, FAA issued a  supplemental rulemaking to lease  the majority of slots at the airport to  the incumbent operators and to  develop a market by annually  auctioning off leases for a limited  number of slots during the first 5  years of the rule.  Two options to  annually auction these slots were  proposed.
Comment period  ended June 16,  2008. DOT is  reviewing  comments.
Will depend on the option  selected.  Option 1 (slot retirement  of 1.5 slots per year) estimated to  result in 1 minute of average delay  reduction. Option 2 does not retire  slots. DOT believes the proposal  will help reveal the economic value  of slots, and may increase the size  of aircraft used at the airports, and  thereby increase the number of  passengers served.
In May 2008, FAA issued a notice of  proposed rulemaking to assign to  existing operators the majority of  slots at Newark and JFK, and create  a market by annually auctioning off a  limited number of slots in each of the  first 5 years.
In comment  period until July  21, 2008.
FAA states that the immediate  impact will be to prevent a return  to, or worsening of, the conditions  and delay experienced during  summer 2007. By itself, a slot  auction will not reduce delays.  However, DOT believes the  proposal will help reveal the  economic value of slots, and may  increase the size of aircraft used  at the airports, and thereby  increase the number of  passengers served.
Announced in July 2008, the policy  clarifies the ability of airport  operators to establish a two-part  landing fee structure consisting of  both an operation charge and a  weight-based charge, giving airports  the flexibility to vary charges based  on the time of day and the volume of  traffic. It also permits the operator of  a congested airport to charge users  a portion of the cost of airfield  projects under construction and  expands the authority of an operator  of a congested airport to include in  the airfield fees of congested airports  a portion of the airfield fees of other  underutilized airports owned and  operated by the same proprietor.
U.S.
Final policy  issued July 8,  2008.
Not assessed, it is unknown to  what extent airports can or will  implement this policy or the  airlines’ response if it is  implemented. ome ction, DOT has ted dditionl benefit nrelted to dely redction.
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