Yemen: DOD Should Improve Accuracy of Its Data on Congressional Clearance of Projects as It Reevaluates Counterterrorism Assistance
Published: 2015-04-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is one of the top U.S. national security threats. AQAP is based in Yemen, where political conflict, including a Houthi insurgency, has complicated stability. Since fiscal year 2006, DOD and State have allocated over $500 million to provide training and equipment to the Yemeni security forces to assist Yemen in combating AQAP. Such assistance has been provided through three main programs: Section 1206 and Section 1207(n), which have been used to build Yemeni capacity, and FMF, which has been used to maintain equipment provided to Yemen.
A Senate report included a provision for GAO to review U.S. security assistance to Yemen. GAO examined (1) the disbursement of funds allocated to key security assistance programs for Yemen since fiscal year 2009, (2) the timeliness of Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance, and (3) DOD plans for maintaining equipment provided to Yemen under Section 1206 and 1207(n), including the use of FMF. GAO reviewed agency documents, analyzed DOD and State data, and met with U.S. officials based in Washington, D.C., and Sanaa, Yemen.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2009, the Department of Defense (DOD) has disbursed almost $256 million of the $401 million allocated to Yemen under the Section 1206 and 1207(n) security assistance programs, while the Department of State (State) has committed $34 million of the $95 million allocated under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. In light of Yemen's currently unstable situation, security assistance programs to Yemen are temporarily suspended.
After correcting errors in DOD data, GAO determined that at least 60 percent of the Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance from fiscal years 2009 through 2013 was timely, but delays affected 10 of 11 projects. DOD notified Congress that all training and equipment for each project would be transferred to Yemeni security forces within DOD's established deadline of 18 months. However, DOD's data contained inaccurate information regarding when the congressional notification period ended, which clears DOD to implement these projects. The inaccurate data limit DOD's and third parties' ability to readily assess the extent to which these projects met the 18-month deadline or to report to Congress on the status of assistance projects. Specifically, after correcting errors in DOD data, GAO found that at least 60 percent of the items were transferred on time, 4 percent of the items were late, and the remaining 36 percent of items were shipped but DOD's data system did not have information on when they were transferred to Yemen. The 4 percent of late items were arrayed among 10 of 11 projects.
DOD plans for short-term (i.e., 2 years) maintenance needs for Section 1206 and 1207(n) projects and has resumed requesting the source and amount of long-term maintenance funds. A presidential directive and DOD guidance call for long-term maintenance planning, regardless of the partner country's ability to contribute. From fiscal years 2011 through 2014, DOD requested specific information on the amount and source of anticipated U.S. maintenance funding, if any, in the Section 1206 project proposal template. The fiscal year 2015 template did not request such information, but after reviewing a draft of GAO's report, DOD provided a copy of its fiscal year 2016 template, which requests additional information on long-term maintenance plans. DOD officials noted that several factors impede maintenance efforts and some equipment is not fully operational.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD take steps to improve the accuracy of data regarding Section 1206 congressional notification clearance. DOD concurred and noted steps it took in fiscal year 2013 to improve overall data collection, but did not discuss improving data on congressional notification clearance dates. GAO continues to maintain that DOD should take steps to improve the accuracy of its data on congressional notification clearance dates.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Yemen has been an important partner in the fight against al Qaeda in the  Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), a terrorist group based in Yemen that  continues to plot against the United States. To help combat AQAP, U.S.  agencies have allocated more than $500 million to Yemeni security forces  since fiscal year 2006. Much of this funding has been through the Section  1206 and 1207(n) programs. Political instability in Yemen has further  complicated U.S. efforts to combat the threats emanating out of Yemen.  In January 2015, the Houthis, a northern Shiite tribal group, consolidated  control of significant territory in Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa. In  response to growing security threats, in February 2015, the Department  of State (State) temporarily suspended operations and removed all staff  from the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa. In March 2015, the Department of  Defense (DOD) removed its last remaining staff in Yemen. Security  assistance programs in Yemen are temporarily suspended.
Given the threats emanating from Yemen and the significant U.S.  investment in assistance to Yemen, a 2014 Senate report included a  provision for GAO to review U.S. security assistance to Yemen. This  report examines (1) the disbursement of funds allocated for key security  assistance programs for Yemen since 2009, (2) the timeliness of Section  1206 and 1207(n) assistance, and (3) DOD’s plans for maintaining  equipment provided to Yemen under Section 1206 and 1207(n).
To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed relevant national  security strategies, key congressional legislation, and agency planning  documents related to U.S. security assistance to Yemen. We analyzed  funding data including allocations, obligations, and disbursements for  Yemen from fiscal years 2009 through 2014. We also reviewed DOD and  State documents and analyzed DOD transfer data against criteria  identified in congressional notifications. Specifically, in these  congressional notifications, DOD described the 15 fiscal year 2006-2014  Section 1206 and 1207(n) projects it intended to implement and  established an 18-month deadline for transferring all equipment and  completing all training related to the projects to Yemeni security forces.  This 18-month process begins on the date the congressional notification  period ends, which is at least 15 days after DOD notifies the designated  congressional committees, making this date essential for assessing  timeliness. During the course of our review, we found inaccuracies in  DOD’s data regarding the date when the congressional notification  periods ended. We therefore used the congressional notification letters  and legislation to determine the earliest possible date that the  congressional notification period could have ended for each project. For  the transfer date, we found that DOD’s data were sufficiently reliable. We  used these two dates—the congressional notification period end date,  and the transfer date—to determine the timeliness of transfer of Section  1206 and 1207(n) equipment. The 4 fiscal year 2014 projects had  deadlines that have not yet passed, therefore, we assessed timeliness for  the 11 fiscal years 2009-2013 Section 1206 and 1207(n) projects, which  consisted of 4,323 line items.
We also examined plans for maintenance in Section 1206 and 1207(n)  project proposals, analyzed executed projects for the inclusion of  maintenance training and spare parts, and analyzed plans to finance and  provide future maintenance support to Yemeni security forces. Further,  we discussed U.S. strategies, programs, and activities related to security  assistance to Yemen with U.S. officials from DOD, State, the U.S.  embassy in Yemen, and the intelligence community. Appendix I includes  a complete description of our objectives, scope, and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2014 to April 2015  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Yemen has been an important U.S. partner that faces significant  humanitarian, economic, and security challenges. As figure 1 shows,  Yemen shares a land border with Saudi Arabia, a key U.S. ally, and a  maritime border with a critical shipping lane connecting the Red Sea and  the Arabian Sea. The most impoverished country in the Middle East and  North Africa region, Yemen is experiencing a rapidly growing population,  which is estimated at about 25 million; increasing scarcity of natural  resources, including water; the steady decline of oil, its primary export;  extremely high unemployment; and dwindling revenues that decrease the  government’s ability to fund basic operations. Moreover, Yemen is a safe  haven for the terrorist group AQAP, which has been reported as al  Qaeda’s most active affiliate, and which the Commander of the U.S.  military’s Central Command identified as one of the most dangerous al  Qaeda affiliates.
Adding to these challenges, Yemen faces political instability following the  unrest of the 2011 Arab Spring, an ongoing Houthi insurgency, and a  southern separatist movement. In early 2011, mass protests began  against the 33-year regime of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, resulting in  his removal from office later that year, transferring power to his Vice  President, Abdo Rabu Mansour Hadi, who was subsequently elected  president in February 2012. Since coming to power, President Hadi has  faced numerous challenges. In 2014, the Houthis, a northern Shiite tribal  group, gained control of significant territory in Yemen, which led to their  control of the capital, the seizure of key military bases, and control over  key port facilities. According to State, as of March 2015, President Hadi  had relocated to Saudi Arabia, where he continues his duties as  President. The unstable security situation led State to temporarily  suspend operations and remove all staff from the U.S. embassy in Sanaa.  Other countries have also stopped operations at their embassies.
According to State, the overarching objective of U.S. policy in Yemen is a  successful democratic transition that promotes political, economic, and  security sector reforms that will enable the Yemeni government to  respond to the needs and aspirations of its people. National strategies  related to broad U.S. counterterrorism and security assistance goals  identify building partnership capacity as a key component of the U.S.  counterterrorism strategy. Such strategies also stress a whole-of- government approach and synchronization of U.S. efforts across  government agencies.
Prior to the current instability, to assist in countering the AQAP threat,  since fiscal year 2006, State and DOD have collectively allocated over  $500 million in security assistance to Yemen through DOD’s Section 1206  and Section 1207(n) programs and State’s Foreign Military Financing  (FMF) program. As seen in table 1, these programs have various goals,  including building the capacity of military forces to conduct  counterterrorism operations. In June 2014, State and DOD began an  interagency effort to evaluate security assistance goals and priorities for  Yemen, including how to employ the funding sources available in concert  to build Yemeni security force capacity. According to DOD and State  officials, this review has been paused as of March 2015 pending the  resolution of Yemen’s unstable situation.
Section 1206 and 1207(n) projects are implemented via a multi-step  process involving both State and DOD officials. A key step in the process  is developing a specific proposal for a project, which is entered into a  template that seeks information on, among other things, the nature of the  threat, the desired capability, and benefits to the United States so that  State and DOD officials can evaluate the proposals.
section_title: DOD and State Have Disbursed or Committed Almost $290 Million in Security Assistance to Yemen since 2009, but Are Reevaluating the Way Forward Given Yemen’s Instability
paragraphs: DOD and State have disbursed or committed almost $290 million of the  nearly $500 million allocated to Sections 1206, Section 1207(n), and FMF  assistance to Yemen since fiscal year 2009. DOD has disbursed about  $256 million of the approximately $401 million Section 1206 and 1207(n)  funds allocated to Yemen. State has committed $34 million of the $95  million FMF funds allocated to Yemen. Given the uncertainty in Yemen,  security assistance programs are temporarily suspended.
subsections: section_title: Since Fiscal Year 2009, DOD Disbursed More Than $250 Million of Sections 1206 and 1207(n) Funds
paragraphs: Since 2009, DOD disbursed almost $256 million, or almost two-thirds of  the approximately $401 million allocated to Section 1206 and 1207(n)  projects for Yemen. This Section 1206 and 1207(n) funding for fiscal  years 2009 through 2014 comprised 15 counterterrorism capacity-building  projects in Yemen, including efforts to enhance Yemeni security forces’  communications, border security, and special operations capabilities to  combat terrorists and other violent extremists. See appendix II for a  description of each project.
As shown in table 2, DOD originally allocated $452 million but then  reallocated almost $51 million for projects outside of Yemen. While DOD  has obligated all of the remaining $401 million, as of the end of fiscal year  2014, DOD had $145 million in unliquidated obligations for Section 1206  and 1207(n) projects in Yemen. Funds for equipment and training under  Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs must be obligated by the end of the  fiscal year in which they are appropriated.
DOD officials stated that, given the uncertainty in Yemen, they are  reviewing security assistance planned for Yemen, including the $145  million in unliquidated obligations. Specifically, they are determining (1)  how to proceed with respect to those funds that have been obligated for  activities that have not yet occurred and may not occur; (2) whether to  reduce future requests for Section 1206 and 1207(n) funds to Yemen,  including the allocation of fiscal year 2015 funds; and (3) whether to  redirect equipment already purchased but not yet transferred to Yemen.
section_title: State Has Committed $34 Million of FMF Funds Allocated to Yemen since Fiscal Year 2009
paragraphs: State has allocated $95 million of FMF assistance to Yemen since fiscal  year 2009 and committed $34 million, more than one-third of the total  FMF funds allocated to Yemen since fiscal year 2009, as shown in table  3. State allocated about $20 million per year to Yemen from fiscal years  2011 through FY 2014. However, State did not commit FMF funds in  Yemen in fiscal years 2012, 2013, or 2014. As a result, more than $60  million in FMF funds were uncommitted. In addition, State’s fiscal year  2015 and 2016 budget requests included an additional $25 million for  Yemen. According to State officials, they have temporarily suspended  FMF assistance to Yemen and determining whether to use uncommitted  FMF funds for other countries remains an option. State has the authority  to deobligate FMF funds and reobligate them to other purposes.
According to DOD data, nearly 75 percent of FMF funding allocations  from fiscal year 2009 through 2014 were planned to be used to maintain  previously furnished equipment, including some provided through the  Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs. Because of the pause in FMF  commitments from fiscal years 2011 through 2014, Yemen accumulated  over $60 million in uncommitted FMF funding. Even with the accumulation  of these funds, it is unclear if maintenance for all Section 1206 and  1207(n) equipment could have been fully funded.
section_title: Corrected DOD Data Reveal That Most Security Assistance Items Were Timely, but Delays Affected Nearly All Section 1206 and 1207(n) Projects
paragraphs: After correcting errors in DOD data, we determined that since 2009, at  least 60 percent of overall assistance was on time; however, delays  affected 10 of 11 Section 1206 and 1207(n) projects from fiscal years  2009 through 2013. We found weaknesses in DOD’s data systems  regarding the congressional notification clearance date, which we  corrected for, and the date when assistance was provided to Yemeni  security forces, both of which are necessary to determine timeliness.  DOD officials reported that many factors may hinder or help the speed of  security assistance deliveries to Yemen. DOD has taken steps to address  those factors that can cause delays, including creating a consolidation  point for equipment. DOD officials report that these steps have improved  accountability throughout the delivery process, addressed some logistical  challenges, helped address challenges related to political protests and  insecurity in Yemen, and improved efficiency.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Plans Call for Completing Security Assistance to Yemeni Security Forces within 18 Months of Clearing the Congressional Notification Period
paragraphs: Congress requires DOD to notify it of planned Section 1206 and 1207(n)  projects at least 15 days before beginning implementation of the  projects. Once the congressional notification period ends, equipment is  procured and then shipped to Yemen via a process that can include  multiple waypoints. DOD notified Congress of plans to implement 15  Section 1206 and 1207(n) capacity-building projects for Yemen between  FY 2009 and 2014. These congressional notifications stated that DOD  would complete training and transfer associated equipment to Yemeni  security forces within 18 months from the date the projects clear the  congressional notification process. DOD can initiate an activity 15 days  after it provides the required notification to Congress. Figure 2 shows  the shipment process for Section 1206 and 1207(n) security assistance to  Yemen.
Equipment destined for Yemen may stop en route. DOD began using one  potential stop, the Joint Consolidation Point (JCP) in Pennsylvania, for  security assistance shipments in 2010. Equipment arrives at the JCP from  various vendors and DOD implementing agencies at different times and is  then shipped to Yemen. Following delivery in country, equipment is  transferred to Yemeni security force recipients. According to DOD plans,  this final phase must be completed within 18 months to meet the deadline  stated in the congressional notifications.
section_title: DOD Data Systems Used to Track Section 1206 and 1207(n) Assistance to Yemen Contain Inaccuracies and Omissions
paragraphs: We found weaknesses in DOD’s data systems used to collect information  on key dates throughout the shipment process for Sections 1206 and  1207(n) assistance. First, the data systems included incorrect information  regarding the congressional notification clearance date. Second, DOD’s  data systems did not contain complete information regarding when  training is completed and equipment is transferred to the Yemeni security  forces, though the quality of these data have improved in recent years  following DOD implementation of a prior GAO recommendation. These  dates are needed to determine whether equipment and training is  transferred to Yemen on time.
First, the date the congressional notification period ends is the date when  DOD begins implementing projects to meet the 18-month transfer  deadline, making it an essential starting point for assessing timeliness.  For 11 of the 15 Section 1206 and 1207(n) projects notified to Congress  from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, DOD data contained inaccurate  dates for when the congressional notification period ended, which we had  to correct in order to assess timeliness. Specifically, we found that 4 of  the 15 congressional notification clearance dates in DOD’s data system  were the same date DOD had notified Congress, another 6 dates were 1  to 3 days after Congress was notified, and 1 date was 9 days prior to the  date Congress was notified. However, DOD officials reported they were  unaware of any instances in which Congress had cleared projects prior to  15 days, despite these 11 instances of the DOD data indicating the  contrary. Further, DOD was only able to produce the documentation  needed to correct one of these dates. We confirmed that DOD did not  implement any cases prior to the legally mandated 15-day notification  period. However, the inaccurate data limit the ability of DOD and others to  effectively assess the extent to which Section 1206 and 1207(n)  assistance is transferred to Yemen on time or report to Congress on the  status of assistance projects.
Second, in order to determine whether the process for providing  assistance met the 18-month deadline, it is essential to know when the  equipment and training finally reached the Yemeni security forces (i.e. the  transfer date). Although DOD collects data on the dates when Section  1206 and 1207(n) equipment first ships, its data systems do not contain  complete information on when the training and equipment are finally  transferred to the Yemeni security forces. Each of the 11 projects for  which we assessed timeliness contained some line items for which the  final transfer date was not documented in the data. DOD data indicated  that these items were usually shipped in less than 18 months, although  the items may have stopped at various waypoints and their date of final  transfer cannot be determined. As a result, timeliness for those items  could not be determined.
Our previous work has identified similar issues related to the quality of  DOD’s data on the delivery of security assistance programs, including  Section 1206 and 1207(n). Specifically, we reported in 2012 that DOD  data on the status of fiscal years 2007 through 2011 security assistance  deliveries had information gaps such as missing information on the dates  items departed U.S. shipping locations, and the date of receipt at the final  destination. As a result, we recommended that DOD establish procedures  to help ensure that DOD implementing agencies populate these data  systems with complete data. In response to our recommendation, in May  2014, DOD updated its security assistance management manual to  require security cooperation officers to report the delivery of equipment in  DOD data systems within 30 days of delivery, programmed its systems to  update shipment tracking information more frequently, and developed  plans to ensure that accurate and timely delivery status information will be  maintained in a new information system that DOD is developing.
DOD officials also reported that it has taken steps to address the gaps in  transfer data for Sections 1206 and 1207(n) for Yemen, and we found  evidence of recent improvements when we analyzed the data. For the  fiscal year 2009 and 2010 projects, the final transfer dates were available  for only 3 percent of items, whereas the final transfer dates were available  for 91 percent of the fiscal year 2012 and 2013 projects. Further, DOD  officials reported that since fiscal year 2013, DOD has automated more of  the data collection and hired additional personnel to manually enter the  remaining data. DOD officials noted that these and other processes put  into place in the last two years should help ensure that deliveries are  timely, accurate, and properly coordinated with U.S. representatives in  Yemen responsible for transferring the equipment to Yemeni security  forces.
section_title: At Least 60 Percent of Fiscal Year 2009-2013 Section 1206 and 1207(n) Assistance Met DOD Deadlines
paragraphs: After correcting DOD’s data, we were able to determine that at least 60  percent of fiscal years 2009-2013 Section 1206 and 1207(n) equipment  was on time and 4 percent was late. We could not determine timeliness  for the remaining 36 percent because of omitted transfer dates. Although  DOD data contained inaccurate congressional notification clearance  dates and lacked some final transfer dates, we were able to calculate the  earliest possible dates DOD could have started the projects and  assessed the timeliness of most security assistance for Yemen using a  combination of DOD data and congressional notification letters. As  shown in figure 3, at least 60 percent of the 4,323 line items of training  and equipment destined for Yemen from fiscal years 2009 through 2013  were transferred to Yemeni security forces on time.
For equipment that included transfer dates, we calculated that the length  of time it took to transfer items to Yemeni security forces ranged from 1  month to more than 4 years, with an average of 17 months. Some of the  items transferred on time included large items, such as aircraft, boats,  and trucks. For example, five boats were transferred within 17 months,  and several hand-launched unmanned aerial vehicles were transferred in  less than 15 months.
section_title: The 4 Percent of Items That Were Late Were Arrayed among 10 of 11 Section 1206 and 1207(n) Projects
paragraphs: The deadlines for the four fiscal year 2014 projects have yet to pass, but  for the remaining 11 projects for fiscal years 2009 through 2013, DOD  notified Congress that all equipment and training should have been  completely transferred to Yemeni security forces by the end of 2014.  However, 10 of the 11 projects did not meet established deadlines. These  11 projects consisted of a total of 4,323 line items for equipment and  training sessions, and each of the 10 projects notified to Congress from  fiscal years 2009 through 2012 included some items that did not meet the  DOD-established deadlines, as shown in figure 4.
Examples of items that were late included spare parts for nearly all the  projects and the following:  coastal patrol boats and training for the 2009 Coast Guard Patrol  Maritime Security Counterterrorism Initiative project; one CN-235 aircraft for the 2010 Yemen Fixed-Wing Capability
Humvee trucks, small arms, and radios for the 2010 Special  Operations Force Counterterrorism Enhancement;  training and eight-passenger coastal patrol boats for the 2012 Special  Operations Forces Counterterrorism Enhancement project; and  small arms, night vision goggles, and spare parts for small, hand- launched unmanned aerial vehicles, for the 2012 Section 1207(n)  project.
section_title: DOD Reported Taking Steps to Mitigate Factors That Affected Timeliness of Section 1206 and 1207(n) Equipment and Training for Yemeni Security Forces That Were Transferred Late
paragraphs: DOD officials indicated that several factors affected their ability to ensure  that Section 1206 and 1207(n) equipment was transferred to Yemeni  security forces within the planned timelines. These include security- related factors, partner country factors, and logistical factors.
Security-related factors. Because of the ongoing security threats in  Yemen, ports of entry have had periods of limited accessibility and the  U.S. embassy has had periods of reduced staffing. For example, prior  to the suspension of operations at the embassy in February 2015,  officials from the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation in Sanaa  responsible for transferring equipment to Yemeni security forces  indicated that it could take hours to conduct the required inventories of  equipment prior to its transfer. However, at various points in the past,  spending hours at an airport or seaport was considered too  dangerous and arranging for protection and transportation was time- consuming. As a result, some inventories—and therefore transfers— of equipment were delayed. In addition, DOD has intentionally  delayed deliveries in response to security threats. When protests  threatened security in 2011, DOD delayed delivery of one CN-235  aircraft, keeping it in Spain rather than delivering it to an uncertain  security environment. In November 2014, when Houthis seized control  of the port in Al Hudaydah, embassy officials worked with DOD to  delay a shipment of equipment for the 2013 Section 1206 Integrated  Border and Maritime Security project.
Partner country factors. Yemeni officials must be available to receive  the security assistance being delivered, yet political transitions and  cultural factors have affected their availability. For example, DOD  notified Congress of a Section 1207(n) project in June 2012.
However, as Yemeni security forces reorganized following the  transition from President Saleh to President Hadi, the recipient unit  within the Yemeni Ministry of Interior was not expanded as planned.  As a result, in July 2014, 2 years after the original project was  planned, DOD and State identified a new recipient and re-notified  Congress of their plan to redirect almost $58 million of the originally  notified $75 million in training and equipment. While many items were  delivered within 18 months, other items were not shipped until after  the re-notification, including sensitive equipment such as night vision  goggles, which embassy officials preferred to keep secure in U.S.  warehouses until the new Yemeni recipient was identified. As of  December 2014, U.S. embassy officials stated that all associated  equipment had been delivered to Yemen and most was being held in  Yemeni security force warehouses so human rights training could be  provided before transfer.
DOD officials also reported that religious holidays and language  barriers have sometimes resulted in delayed deliveries and transfers  of equipment. Officials said they have had to delay deliveries of  security assistance to avoid transferring equipment during the month  of Ramadan, when Yemeni security forces responsible for receiving  transferred equipment are likely to be observing religious practices.  Officials also reported having delayed training because of the limited  number of English speakers among the Yemeni security forces  members with whom DOD officials work to complete transfers, as well  as among forces scheduled to receive the training.
Logistical factors. DOD officials reported that several logistical factors  have led to delays in transfers of equipment to Yemen, such as  paperwork errors, customs challenges, challenges presented by the  type of delivery vehicle used (sea versus air), as well as lengthy  equipment procurement timeframes and competing worldwide  procurement and shipment prioritizations. For example, a CN-235  aircraft was transferred more than 3 years after congressional  notification, in part because of a lengthy procurement process, in  addition to country and security factors described earlier. In April  2010, DOD notified Congress of the plan to transfer the aircraft and  associated training and spare parts within 18 months. However, the  aircraft was ultimately transferred to Yemeni security forces in  September 2013—more than 41 months after congressional  notification. Officials reported that procurement was delayed and,  although the contract was complete by September 2010, the aircraft  cost more than originally anticipated. As a result of this discovery late  in the fiscal year, DOD determined that the funding allocated to the  project would be used to cover the costs of the aircraft and a new  project would be developed with additional funding to provide the  training and 2 years of spare parts that had been included in the  original project. The transfer of the aircraft and training was further  delayed because of political unrest in 2011.
To address some of these factors and other challenges DOD previously  identified with shipping equipment for building partner capacity programs,  such as Section 1206 and 1207(n), DOD began using the JCP in  Pennsylvania in 2010. DOD officials report that the JCP is used to  consolidate equipment, generate additional data on equipment that  transits there, and ensure that the equipment is accompanied by  documents designed to improve customs processing and transfer  processes in Yemen. DOD officials report that the JCP helps ensure that  equipment that passes through the point is documented in DOD data and  includes sufficient documentation to aid its clearance through customs  and efficient transfer to partner country security forces, including those in  Yemen.
DOD assessments and DOD officials from the Office of Military  Cooperation in Sanaa reported that the JCP has improved the timeliness  of security assistance for Yemen. Our analysis of DOD data for security  assistance for Yemen from fiscal years 2009 from 2013 indicated that  equipment that passed through the JCP stayed there for an average of  about 10 months. JCP officials noted a number of criteria used to  determine when to time the shipments from the JCP to Yemen.  Specifically, officials reported that they work to balance delivering  equipment in a timely manner to address critical needs with making  efficient use of each shipment and trying to fill an entire government- contracted aircraft. They also aim, in consultation with the U.S. Office of  Military Cooperation in Sanaa, to deliver complete capabilities in one  delivery and to time these deliveries so training can begin on those  capabilities rather than delaying deliveries and training until shipment  processing of equipment for other capabilities is complete. Further, DOD  officials reported that DOD has conducted weekly teleconferences with  U.S. officials in Sanaa and has surveyed these officials following each  equipment transfer to determine their satisfaction with the timing of  shipments and transfers of security assistance, as well as identifying the  embassy’s priorities for future transfers. In addition, in December 2014,  DOD conducted a review with U.S. Central Command and the Office of  the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict to assess the extent to which these stakeholders were  satisfied with the transfer timeliness for each Section 1206 and 1207(n)  project whose deadlines had passed from fiscal years 2009 through 2013,  including equipment that passed through the JCP. These stakeholders  assessed each of the projects as successful. Even though some training  was not conducted, some equipment was not provided, and some  equipment and training arrived in Yemen late, they believed that the key  equipment arrived on time and thus the equipment was sufficient to begin  operations.
section_title: DOD Plans for Short- Term Maintenance of Section 1206 and 1207(n) Assistance and Has Resumed Requesting the Source of Long-Term Maintenance Funds
paragraphs: DOD includes 2 years of spare parts for short-term maintenance needs of  Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance and has resumed requesting the  source and extent of anticipated U.S. funds, such as FMF, that are  needed for longer-term needs. A presidential directive and DOD guidance  require planning for the maintenance of security assistance equipment,  regardless of the host nation’s capability to maintain it. Although FMF has  been a significant source of funds for maintaining Section 1206 and  1207(n) equipment, the fiscal year 2015 project proposal template for  Section 1206 projects did not require information regarding the source or  amount of U.S. funds needed for long-term maintenance, including any  anticipated FMF needs. After reviewing a draft of this report, DOD officials  provided updated documentation, including the fiscal year 2016 project  proposal template. As it did through fiscal year 2014, the fiscal year 2016  template resumes asking for specific information on the availability of  FMF if a partner country is unlikely to cover the expected costs of  maintenance. DOD officials have also indicated several factors that  impede maintenance efforts, including factors related to security, the  partner country, and logistics. In some cases where maintenance has not  been performed, some equipment was no longer fully operational.
subsections: section_title: Presidential Directive and DOD Policy Require Maintenance Planning as Well as Maintenance Funding for Section 1206 and 1207(n) Projects
paragraphs: DOD guidance and a presidential directive require planning for  maintaining security assistance, including Section 1206 and 1207(n)  projects. Presidential Policy Directive 23 stresses the need for long-term,  sustainable commitments. DOD guidance acknowledges that adequate  maintenance is a long-term need. Specifically, DOD’s Joint Doctrine Note  1-13 (Security Force Assistance) states that sustainability is essential to  security force assistance activities—regardless of the host nation’s  capability to sustain them. The Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense  Authorization Act also includes a requirement that DOD notify Congress  of any arrangements for the sustainment of a Section 1206 project, the  source of any maintenance funds, and the performance outcomes it  expects to achieve beyond the project’s planned completion date.
As noted earlier, Section 1206 and 1207(n) projects are implemented  following a process involving both State and DOD officials. A key step in  the process is developing a specific proposal for a project, which is  entered into a template and contains information such as the nature of the  threat, the desired capability, and benefits to the United States so that  State and DOD officials can evaluate the proposals. For short-term  maintenance needs, the Section 1206 and 1207(n) project proposal  template, starting in fiscal year 2011, has indicated that each project  should contain spare parts for 2 years of maintenance. Our analysis  found that all Section 1206 proposals since 2012 included 2 years worth  of spare parts.
section_title: The Fiscal Year 2016 Section 1206 Project Proposal Template Has Resumed Requesting the Source of U.S. Long-Term Maintenance Funds
paragraphs: The template for fiscal year 2016 Section 1206 project proposals has  resumed including fields identifying the source and amount of anticipated  U.S. funding for long-term maintenance if partner country funds are not  expected to cover the anticipated costs of long-term maintenance. After  the 2-year spare parts package is exhausted, DOD has generally relied  on FMF funding to provide maintenance. Prior to fiscal year 2015, the  project proposal templates included fields related to maintenance in  addition to any anticipated FMF needs in the future. Specifically, from  fiscal years 2011 through 2014, Section 1206 project proposal templates  included maintenance-related fields regarding the anticipated transition to  FMF, whether an FMF request had been submitted, and the duration of  the need for FMF. Additionally, in fiscal years 2013 and 2014, the  templates also asked for an estimated annual cost for FMF needs.
The fiscal year 2015 Section 1206 proposal template no longer requested  information on the source of long-term maintenance funding, including  FMF needs if the partner country could not cover expected long-term  maintenance costs, but the fiscal year 2016 template has resumed  collecting information on FMF. While the fiscal year 2015 guidance called  for detailed sustainment plans, the fiscal year 2015 project proposal  template only solicited information on general sustainment costs and the  partner nation’s ability to contribute to sustaining the project. In an  attempt to streamline its template, DOD officials removed explicit  mentions of FMF in the fiscal year 2015 project proposal template.  According to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special  Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, the change reflects new legislative  language in the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act that requires  information on the sustainment plan for the proposed program, which  could include information on FMF. DOD data show that nearly 75 percent  of FMF funding allocations from fiscal years 2009 through 2014 for  Yemen were planned to be used in support of previously furnished  equipment, including equipment provided through the Section 1206 and  1207(n) programs.
section_title: Some Equipment Provided to the Yemeni Security Forces Is Not Fully Operational Because of Factors Impeding Maintenance Efforts
paragraphs: Some equipment provided by Section 1206 is not fully operational and  needs either repairs or spare parts. For example, according to DOD  officials, a CN-235 aircraft provided to Yemen by a Section 1206 project  was grounded in October 2014 because it lacked spare tires, resulting in  a loss of medium-lift capability for the Yemeni Air Force. Embassy  documents report that, as of August, 2014, three of four Huey II  helicopters provided by another Section 1206 project were minimally  operational. They could only be flown safely for training purposes and  were unable to conduct counterterrorism missions. In addition, both of the  large coastal patrol boats provided to the Yemeni Coast Guard by Section  1206 funding were in disrepair and require a maintenance overhaul. DOD  has noted that maintenance and sustainment continue to be key priorities  for security assistance.
DOD officials indicated that several factors impede their ability to ensure  that Section 1206 and 1207(n) equipment is properly maintained in  Yemen, including security-related factors, partner country factors, and  logistical factors.
Security-related factors. Because of ongoing political instability and  security threats in Yemen, the U.S. embassy has ordered some of its  employees to depart from the country twice in the past few years, and  since February 2015 the U.S. embassy has temporarily suspended  operations. DOD officials indicated that this has hampered their efforts  to maintain relationships with their Yemeni counterparts and ensure  that Section 1206 and 1207(n) equipment is properly maintained. In  addition, some DOD officials stated that even when the embassy was  open, their ability to travel outside of Sanaa was limited because of  security concerns, which also limits the extent to which U.S. officials  can monitor or inventory the U.S.-funded equipment.
Partner country factors. U.S. officials must work with their Yemeni  counterparts to use FMF funds. According to DOD officials, while  Yemeni cooperation in executing maintenance programs is important,  ensuring collaboration in developing requests and prioritizing  maintenance requirements is often a lengthy process and can delay  requests for maintenance funding. For example, the development of a  proposal with Yemen to maintain an airplane purchased under  Section 1206 took 9 months.
Logistical factors. DOD officials reported that lengthy equipment  procurement timeframes and competing worldwide procurement and  shipment priorities can delay maintenance equipment bound for  Yemen. DOD officials also explained that paperwork errors and  customs challenges sometimes delay maintenance for certain  equipment in Yemen.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: AQAP terrorists based in Yemen continue to be a threat to the United  States and Yemen’s national security. The United States has invested  more than $500 million in security assistance to Yemen since fiscal year  2006 to build Yemen’s counterterrorism capacity—much of this amount  has been Section 1206 and 1207(n) funding to provide equipment for  Yemeni security forces to combat security threats. DOD is required to  notify Congress of Section 1206 and 1207(n) projects and wait 15 days  before implementing them. However, we found that DOD’s data systems  used to track related security assistance contain inaccurate information  regarding when projects clear the congressional notification period. We  also found incomplete information on the transfer of over one-third of the  equipment intended for Yemeni security forces, although the  completeness of information had improved since 2013. As a result,  DOD’s data do not allow it or a third party to accurately and readily  assess its performance against the 18-month transfer deadlines set in its  notifications to Congress.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To further improve the ability of U.S. government agencies and others to  assess the timeliness of U.S. security assistance to Yemen, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense take steps to improve the  accuracy of data used to track when Section 1206 projects are  congressionally cleared for implementation.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to State and DOD for their review and  comment. State provided technical comments, which we have  incorporated as appropriate. DOD provided written comments, which are  reprinted in appendix III. DOD concurred with our recommendations.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to improve the accuracy of data  used to track congressional notification clearance dates. DOD noted  steps taken since fiscal year 2013 to improve data collection. We  acknowledge DOD’s progress in ensuring the accuracy of dates of final  transfer, as we previously recommended in GAO-13-84. We maintain that  the dates of the congressional notification process are also important in  determining timeliness and thus should be accurate.
In our draft, we also included a second draft recommendation that DOD  resume identifying the amount of anticipated long-term maintenance  funds for Section 1206 projects.  DOD concurred with our second  recommendation.  In addition, after reviewing a draft of our report, DOD  provided updated documentation that included the fiscal year 2016  Section 1206 project proposal template, which reinstated a request for  information on the amount of anticipated long-term maintenance funds, if  any. The fiscal year 2016 template addresses our concerns because it  provides a means to collect information regarding FMF and other  potential U.S. funding options that could be used if the partner nation is  unlikely to cover expected long-term maintenance costs. As a result, we  removed this second recommendation from the final report.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Secretaries of Defense and State. In addition, the  report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In 2014, Senate Report 113-176, which accompanied the proposed Carl  Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act  of 2015, S. 2410, included a provision for GAO to report on several issues  pertaining to security assistance to Yemen. This report examines (1) the  disbursement of funds allocated for key security assistance programs for  Yemen since 2009, (2) the timeliness of Section 1206 and 1207(n)  assistance, and (3) the Department of Defense’s (DOD) plans for  maintaining equipment provided to Yemen under Section 1206 and  1207(n).
To address our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed relevant national  security strategies, key congressional legislation, and planning  documents related to U.S. security assistance to Yemen. We discussed  U.S. strategies, programs, and activities related to security assistance to  Yemen with U.S. officials from DOD, the Department of State (State), the  U.S. embassy in Yemen, and the intelligence community. We planned to  travel to Yemen but were unable to do so because of Yemen’s unstable  security environment during the time of our review. However, we were  able to interview officials from the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation and  Special Forces in Yemen via video teleconference and in person while  they were in Washington, D.C.
To address security assistance disbursements, we reviewed authorizing  legislation for Section 1206, Section 1207(n), and State’s Foreign Military  Financing (FMF) programs. We also analyzed funding data including  allocations, obligations, and disbursements for Yemen from fiscal years  2009 through 2014. DOD and State provided data on allocations,  amounts reallocated, unobligated balances, unliquidated obligations, and  either disbursements of Section 1206 and 1207(n) funds or commitments  of FMF funds. We analyzed these data to determine the extent to which  funds from these three programs had been disbursed or committed. We  assessed these data by interviewing cognizant agency officials and  comparing the data with previously published data, as well as verifying  them with congressional notifications and case closure receipts to  determine that they were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
To assess the extent to which transfers of fiscal years 2009 through 2014  Section 1206 and 1207(n) equipment and training to Yemeni security  forces have been timely and the efforts State and DOD have made to  address factors affecting the timeliness of these transfers, we reviewed  DOD and embassy documents, analyzed DOD transfer data against  criteria identified in congressional notifications, and interviewed DOD and  State officials. We used these sources to describe the key steps in the  process for shipping assistance to Yemen and associated timelines. In  the congressional notifications, DOD described the Section 1206 and  1207(n) projects it intended to implement and established an 18-month  deadline for transferring all equipment and services related to the projects  to Yemeni security forces. The process includes two dates that are key  to assessing whether DOD has met its 18-month deadline: the date the  congressional notification period ends, allowing DOD to begin  implementing a project, and the date the equipment and training are  transferred to Yemeni security forces.
During the course of our review, we found inaccuracies in DOD’s data  regarding the congressional notification period and omissions in the data  regarding the transfer dates. DOD notified Congress of plans to  implement 15 Section 1206 and 1207(n) projects in fiscal years 2009  through 2014. For two-thirds of these projects, DOD data contained  inaccurate congressional notification clearance dates—the initial step in  the 18-month shipment and transfer process. However, using the  legislation and copies of congressional notifications, we were able to  calculate the earliest possible dates DOD could have started  implementing the Section 1206 and 1207(n) projects. We obtained  documents indicating the dates when DOD notified Congress of its  planned Section 1206 and 1207(n) projects for Yemen, added the  required minimum of 15 days to those dates, and used these new dates  as the start of the 18-month deadline. We then used DOD data on  shipments and transfers of equipment and training to assess the extent to  which security assistance was transferred to Yemeni security forces  within 18 months. However, as we relied on the earliest possible dates  DOD could have begun implementing the projects, and the 18-month  timeline starts at implementation, our analysis may understate the  timeliness of transfers as, in some cases, implementation could have  begun several days afterwards because Congress may have requested  additional information that delayed the start.
Of the 15 Section 1206 and 1207(n) projects notified to Congress in fiscal  years 2009 through 2014, 11 had deadlines that had already passed at  the time of our review; we did not assess timeliness for the remaining 4  projects because their deadlines had not yet passed. We assessed  timeliness for the 11 fiscal years 2009 through 2013 Section 1206 and  1207(n) projects, which consisted of a total of 4,323 line items. Projects  ranged from 1 line item to 1,897 line items. DOD data contained dates for  the final transfer of equipment for 62 percent of the line items related to  fiscal years 2009 through 2013 Section 1206/1207(n) projects. For the  remaining 38 percent, we calculated whether shipment took place prior to  established transfer deadlines. DOD data were current as of January 7,  2015. Shipment indicates the first step in the process of shipping items,  though equipment may stop at various waypoints between initial shipment  and final transfer to Yemeni security forces. We used the following criteria  for classifying the timeliness of items:
On time: The transfer date fell on or before the 18-month deadline.
Late: The transfer date fell after the 18-month deadline, or—for items  lacking a transfer date—the shipment date fell after the 18-month  deadline for transfer.
Cannot determine: The shipment date that fell prior to the 18-month  deadline but no transfer date was documented. Such items may have  been transferred on time, they may have been late, or they may not  have been transferred yet. Discussions with DOD officials and review  of DOD documents indicated that some of these items were ultimately  transferred on time and some were transferred late, but the transfer  dates were not included in the data. DOD also shipped some items to  its Joint Consolidation Point in Pennsylvania or other waypoints en  route to Yemen and then held the equipment at those waypoints  because of security concerns, leaving these items without transfer  dates because transfer has not yet occurred.
To assess the reliability of the transfer dates that DOD provided, we  interviewed cognizant officials about their processes for entering data,  performed basic logic checks, and spot-checked receipts that DOD  provided for certain items that had been transferred. Based on our  assessment, we determined that the transfer data in the database were  sufficiently reliable for our purposes. DOD officials noted several reasons  38 percent of data were missing transfer dates, including the failure of  security cooperation officers to enter the dates in the data system, or the  failure of vendors delivering large items directly to Yemen to submit the  relevant information. They reported that DOD began efforts to address  these challenges in 2012. In fact, for the fiscal years 2009 and 2010  projects in our review, the final transfer dates were only available for 3  percent of items, whereas transfer dates were available for 91 percent of  the fiscal year 2012 and 2013 projects. Our previous work has identified  similar issues related to the quality of DOD’s data on the delivery of  security assistance programs, including Section 1206 and 1207(n). In  2012, we recommended that DOD establish procedures to help ensure  that DOD implementing agencies populate these data systems with  complete data. In response to our recommendation, in May 2014, DOD  updated its security assistance management manual to require security  cooperation officers to report the delivery of equipment in DOD data  systems within 30 days of delivery, programmed its systems to update  shipment tracking information more frequently, and developed plans to  ensure that accurate and timely delivery status information will be  maintained in a new information system that DOD is developing.
We assessed the other variables that we used, namely the project titles,  lines items, and project year, by crosschecking them against information  from DOD officials, congressional notifications, and other DOD  documents to determine that they were sufficiently reliable for our  purposes. However, we determined that the data on the value of each line  item were not sufficiently reliable to determine timeliness by percentage  of dollar value transferred per project. Therefore, in table 4 of this report  (see app. II), we report overall project allocation and descriptions of each  project. In addition, as noted above, our estimates may understate  timeliness because we estimated based on the earliest possible  implementation dates rather than the actual implementation dates.
To analyze the extent to which equipment provided to Yemen under  Section 1206 and 1207(n) has been maintained, we examined legislation,  presidential directive, and agency guidance to determine the  requirements for short- and long-term maintenance planning. We also  reviewed plans for maintenance in Section 1206 and 1207(n) project  proposals to determine whether they included the source and amount of  funding proposed for maintaining the equipment. We analyzed DOD data  on Section 1206 and 1207(n) projects for the inclusion of line items  related to maintenance training and spare parts. We also analyzed plans  to finance and provide future maintenance support to Yemeni security  forces. We interviewed DOD and embassy officials on the maintenance  status of equipment already in Yemen and to identify factors that impeded  maintaining equipment provided under Section 1206 and 1207(n).
We conducted this performance audit from December 2014 to April 2015  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Training and Equipment Provided to Yemen through Section 1206 and 1207(n) Assistance Programs
paragraphs: From fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the Department of Defense (DOD)  allocated $401 million in counterterrorism training and equipment to  Yemeni security forces through its Section 1206 and Section 1207(n)  security assistance programs. Table 4 identifies the 15 projects that DOD  undertook using Section 1206 and Section 1207(n) funding and the  specific capabilities DOD planned to build through these efforts.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
subsections: section_title: See comment 3.
paragraphs: The following are GAO comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)  letter in response to GAO’s draft report.  1.  DOD concurred with our recommendation, but did not address how  DOD would specifically improve the accuracy of data regarding dates  when a Section 1206 project is congressionally cleared for  implementation. Rather, DOD’s response highlights changes DSCA  made in fiscal year 2013 to improve overall data collection, including a  discussion of the Joint Consolidation Point. We found improvements  in DOD’s data on transfer dates for Sections 1206 and 1207(n)  assistance to Yemen, but we continue to believe DOD needs to take  steps to ensure that accurate dates for congressional clearance are  reflected in its data systems.  2.  DOD concurred with our recommendation but suggested that our  analysis of sustainment costs did not reflect the full picture. After  reviewing a draft of our report, DOD provided updated documentation,  including the fiscal year 2016 Section 1206 project proposal template.  We have updated the report to include additional information,  including information regarding the fiscal year 2016 project proposal  template.  The fiscal year 2016 template addresses our concerns by  asking for information on the source of any U.S. funding if a partner  country is not expected to fully cover the costs of long-term  maintenance. We have thus removed this recommendation from the  final report.  3.  DOD asserted that our timeliness assessment should have focused  on larger end items. Our report acknowledged that, in some cases,  large end items were transferred within the 18 months and that this  focus on key capabilities is a priority for DOD. Other large end items— such as the CN-235 aircraft that was transferred more than 41 months  after congressional notification—were late. In addition, as noted in our  report, in its notifications to Congress, DOD has stated that all  deliveries will be complete within 18 months. DOD has not indicated in  these notifications that this deadline applies only to what it considers  to be the main components. Further, DOD’s data lack final transfer  dates for larger end items as well as for smaller ones. Finally, as  noted in our report, DOD data on the key dates related to timeliness  were not sufficiently reliable at levels other than the requisition-level,  and the data on dollar value at this level of detail were not available.  Therefore, we could only assess timeliness based on the transfer of  individual pieces of equipment rather than dollar value or other  criteria.
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331, or johnsoncm@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Jason Bair (Assistant Director),  Brian Hackney (Analyst-In-Charge), Katherine Forsyth, Kathryn Bolduc,  Lynn Cothern, Martin De Alteriis, and Mark Dowling made key  contributions to this report. Tina Cheng also provided technical  assistance.