Security Assistance: U.S. Government Should Strengthen End-Use Monitoring and Human Rights Vetting for Egypt
Published: 2016-04-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The U.S. government has allocated an average of about $1.3 billion annually in security assistance for Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through 2015. DOD and State have established end-use monitoring programs to ensure that military equipment transferred to foreign countries is safeguarded and used for its intended purposes. In addition, legal requirements, known as the Leahy laws, prohibit DOD- and State-funded assistance to units of foreign security forces if there is credible information that these forces have committed a gross violation of human rights.
This report examines, for fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the extent to which the U.S. government (1) committed or disbursed funds allocated for security-related assistance for Egypt, (2) implemented end-use monitoring for equipment transferred to Egyptian security forces, and (3) vetted Egyptian recipients of security-related assistance for human rights concerns. GAO analyzed U.S. agency data and documentation; conducted fieldwork in Egypt; and interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and Cairo, Egypt. This is the public version of a sensitive but unclassified report issued in February 2016.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: U.S. agencies allocated approximately $6.5 billion for security-related assistance to Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through 2015. As of September 30, 2015, over $6.4 billion of the $6.5 billion total had been committed or disbursed. The majority of the funding (99.5 percent) was provided to Egypt through the Department of State's (State) Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account. The funds from this account were used to purchase and sustain a wide variety of military systems, including F-16 aircraft, Apache helicopters, and M1A1 tanks.
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State implemented end-use monitoring for equipment transferred to Egyptian security forces, but challenges including obtaining Egyptian government cooperation hindered some efforts. DOD completed all required end-use monitoring inventories and physical security inspections of storage sites for missiles and night vision devices (NVD) in fiscal year 2015, but DOD lacked documentation showing that it completed physical security inspections for these sensitive items in prior years. Despite agreeing to give access, the Egyptian government prevented DOD officials from accessing a storage site to verify the physical security of some NVDs prior to 2015, according to DOD officials and documents. State conducted 12 end-use checks of U.S. equipment exported to Egypt in fiscal years 2011 to 2015, but State data indicate that the Egyptian government's incomplete and slow responses to some inquiries limited U.S. efforts to verify the use and security of certain equipment, including NVDs and riot-control items. Despite this lack of cooperation, since 2008, State has not used outreach programs in Egypt that are intended to facilitate host country cooperation and compliance with State's monitoring program. According to State officials, this was due to the small number of end-use checks conducted in Egypt and the lower priority assigned to Egypt than to other countries.
The U.S. government completed some, but not all, human rights vetting required by State policy before providing training or equipment to Egyptian security forces. State deemed GAO's estimate of the percentage of Egyptian security forces that were not vetted to be sensitive but unclassified information, which is excluded from this public report. Moreover, State has not established specific policies and procedures for vetting Egyptian security forces receiving equipment. Although State concurred with a 2011 GAO recommendation to implement equipment vetting, it has not established a time frame for such action. State currently attests in memos that it is in compliance with the Leahy law. However, without vetting policies and procedures, the U.S. government risks providing U.S. equipment to recipients in Egypt in violation of the Leahy laws.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is making six recommendations to strengthen State's implementation of end-use monitoring and human rights vetting, including utilizing its end-use monitoring outreach programs and developing time frames for establishing policies and procedures for equipment vetting. State generally agreed with these recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: For over 30 years, Egypt has been a key strategic partner of the United  States on a range of issues, including maintaining peace in the Middle  East and countering terrorism and violent extremism in the region. U.S.  officials cite significant benefits associated with the strategic partnership,  including expedited transit through the Suez Canal for U.S. Navy ships,  approval of U.S. military overflights, and cooperation with U.S.  counterterrorism and counterproliferation efforts. Since the signing of the  Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1979, the United States has provided Egypt  with about $41 billion in security-related assistance, making Egypt one of  the top recipients of such assistance in the world. Through programs  administered by the Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD),  the United States has supplied the Egyptian military and law enforcement  agencies with training and equipment, including, among other things,  Apache attack helicopters, F-16 aircraft, Stinger man-portable air-defense  missiles, and night vision devices.
Since January 2011, Egypt has been governed by three different elected  presidents, the Egyptian military, and one interim president appointed by  the military. Throughout this period, State and nongovernmental  organizations have reported a wide range of human rights abuses and  other repressive practices by the Egyptian government. Additionally,  Egypt has faced terrorist threats from groups now affiliated with the  Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), such as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis.  Concerns have been raised in Congress about whether the U.S.  government is taking the necessary steps to safeguard and ensure the  appropriate use of U.S. military equipment provided to Egypt—a process  known as end-use monitoring—and to ensure that U.S. assistance is not  provided to Egyptian security forces that have committed human rights  violations.
You asked us to review various aspects of security-related assistance to  Egypt. This report examines, for fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the  extent to which the U.S. government (1) committed or disbursed funds  allocated for security-related assistance for Egypt, (2) implemented end- use monitoring for equipment transferred to Egyptian security forces, and  (3) vetted Egyptian recipients of U.S. security-related assistance for  human rights concerns.
To address these objectives, we analyzed State funding data on  assistance to Egyptian security forces in fiscal years 2011 through 2015.  We examined documents from State and DOD, such as agency guidance  and procedures, apportionment memos, cables, purchase agreements,  and compliance and inventory reports, and we analyzed end-use  monitoring and human rights vetting data. We interviewed officials from  State, DOD, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland  Security in Washington, D.C., Arlington, Virginia, and in Cairo, Egypt. We  also conducted audit work in Cairo and interviewed officials from the  Egyptian Armament Authority, which Egyptian officials described as a unit  of the Egyptian Armed Forces responsible for procuring U.S. military  equipment and communicating end-use monitoring requirements to units  that use this equipment. During our fieldwork in Egypt, we requested to  meet with officials of several Egyptian government ministries to discuss  their understanding of U.S. laws that prohibit assistance to units that  commit gross violations of human rights and U.S. government human  rights vetting efforts; however, the Egyptian government did not respond  to our request. To assess accountability and physical security, we  selected a generalizable random sample of Stinger missiles that Egypt  procured from the United States, and we inspected these items during  audit work in Cairo. We also observed DOD officials conducting end-use  monitoring for F-16 aircraft. To assess whether State completed human  rights vetting before providing training to Egyptian security forces, we  obtained training rosters for security-related training and selected a  generalizable random sample of 166 names from these rosters. We then  cross-checked these names with State human rights vetting data. To  assess the reliability of the data that State and DOD provided, we  reviewed information from the agencies regarding their underlying data  systems and the checks, controls, and reviews the agencies used to  ensure the data’s accuracy and reliability. We determined that the data  we used were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
This report is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified report that  was issued on February 18, 2016. State and DOD regarded some of the  material in that report as sensitive but unclassified information, which  must be protected from public disclosure and is available for official use  only. This public version of the original report does not contain certain  information deemed to be sensitive but unclassified by State, including  the details of some training the United States provided to Egyptian  security forces; our estimate of the percentage of Egyptian security forces  that were trained with U.S. assistance from seven accounts in fiscal year  2011 through March 31, 2015, who were not vetted for human rights  violations; and the details of challenges experienced by State officials  implementing human rights vetting. This public version also excludes  information on the number of defense articles purchased by Egypt from  the United States, which DOD deemed to be sensitive but unclassified.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2015 to April 2016   in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: U.S.-Egypt Strategic Partnership and Security Assistance Accounts
paragraphs: Egypt is a key strategic partner of the United States and is among the top  recipients of U.S. security-related assistance. According to U.S. officials,  the U.S.-Egypt strategic partnership is based on shared interests of  promoting a stable and prosperous Egypt, securing regional peace and  maintaining peace between Egypt and Israel, and countering violent  extremism throughout the region. For example, Egypt has been a  member of the U.S. coalition against ISIL since September 2014. In  support of this strategic partnership, the U.S. government provides  security assistance to Egypt through a number of accounts. Table 1  describes these accounts, the agencies responsible for funding and  implementing programs under these accounts, and the goals of these  programs.
By law, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds are obligated upon  apportionment from the Office of Management and Budget. DOD  therefore refers to the subsequent designation of FMF funds for a  particular program or contract as a “commitment.” For programs funded  with appropriations from the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining,  and Related Programs (NADR); International Narcotics Control and Law  Enforcement (INCLE); and International Military Education and Training  (IMET) accounts, funds are considered to be obligated once a legal  liability of the U.S. government for the payment of goods and services  ordered or received has been created. An unobligated balance is the  amount of budget authority that has not yet been obligated. Unliquidated  obligations, also known as obligated balances, are the amount of  obligations already incurred for which payment has not yet been made.  Disbursements are the amounts paid by federal agencies to liquidate  government obligations.
section_title: End-Use Monitoring Requirements for Security- Related Assistance
paragraphs: The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 authorizes the President to control  the export of defense articles and services. The act authorizes the sale  of defense articles and services to foreign countries through Foreign  Military Sales and authorizes commercial exports of U.S. defense articles  and services to foreign countries through direct commercial sales. State  makes policy determinations for Foreign Military Sales, including which  countries are eligible to participate, and DOD’s Defense Security  Cooperation Agency administers the Foreign Military Sales program.
State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls administers direct  commercial sales by licensing exports of U.S. defense articles and  services from U.S. companies to foreign entities.
In 1996, Congress amended the Arms Export Control Act to require the  President to establish a program for monitoring the end use of defense  articles and services sold, leased, or exported under the Arms Export  Control Act or the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, including through  Foreign Military Sales and direct commercial sales. The law required  that, to the extent practicable, the program should be designed to provide  reasonable assurances that recipients comply with restrictions imposed  by the U.S. government on the use, transfer, and security of defense  articles and defense services and that such articles and services are  being used for the purposes for which they are provided. DOD’s Defense  Security Cooperation Agency administers the Golden Sentry program,  which was established to monitor the end use of defense articles and  defense services transferred through Foreign Military Sales, and officials  at the Office of Military Cooperation–Egypt (OMC-E) implement  monitoring in Egypt. Under the Golden Sentry program, DOD implements  two levels of end-use monitoring—enhanced and routine—and conducts  periodic Compliance Assessment Visits. DOD requires enhanced end-use  monitoring for sensitive defense articles, services, or technologies  specifically designated by the military departments’ export policy, by the  interagency release process, or by DOD policy as a result of  consultation with Congress. DOD requires routine end-use monitoring for  all defense articles and services provided through government-to- government programs. Routine end-use monitoring is conducted in  conjunction with other security cooperation functions and uses any readily  available source of information.
State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls administers the Blue  Lantern program, which was established to monitor the end use of  defense articles and services exported through direct commercial sales.  State officials at the U.S. embassy in Cairo, Egypt—in this report,  “Embassy Cairo”—are primarily responsible for conducting Blue Lantern  checks in Egypt. Under its Blue Lantern program, State is required to  conduct end-use monitoring checks on the basis of a case-by-case  review of export license applications against established criteria for  determining potential risks. To determine whether to conduct a Blue  Lantern check, State considers 20 indicators, such as unfamiliar end  users, foreign intermediate consignees with no apparent connection to  the end user, and requests for sensitive commodities whose diversion or  illicit retransfer could have a negative impact on U.S. national security.  See appendix II for an overview of the Blue Lantern and Golden Sentry  end-use monitoring programs and for more details on DOD and State  accountability efforts.
section_title: Restrictions on Security- Related Assistance Based on Human Rights Concerns
paragraphs: To help ensure that U.S. assistance is not used to support human rights  violators, Congress prohibits the provision of certain types of assistance  to foreign security forces implicated in human rights abuses. Section  620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, known colloquially as the  State Leahy law, prohibits the United States from providing assistance  under the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act to any  unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has  credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of  human rights. Section 1204(a)(1) of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck”  McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, known  colloquially as the DOD Leahy law, prohibits the use of DOD funds for  any training, equipment, or other assistance for a unit of a foreign security  force if the Secretary of Defense has credible information that the unit  committed a gross violation of human rights. According to State, the  Leahy laws and the corresponding policies developed to enforce and  supplement these laws (see text box) are intended to leverage U.S.  assistance to encourage foreign governments to prevent their security  forces from committing human rights violations and to hold their forces  accountable when violations occur.
Key Terms of the Leahy Laws as Defined in State and DOD Policy  The State and DOD Leahy laws (22 U.S.C. § 2378d, 10 U.S.C. § 2249e) do not define several key terms used in the laws. State and  DOD have sought to define these terms in policy documents.
Security forces of a foreign country. State guidance defines a “security force” as any division or entity (including an individual)  authorized by a state or political subdivision to use force (including but not limited to the power to search, detain, and arrest) to  accomplish its mission. Therefore, the guidance states that “security forces” could be units of law enforcement or the military.  According to DOD’s Office of General Counsel, DOD also adheres to this definition. However, DOD may sometimes request vetting  for individuals or groups that would not constitute foreign security forces, such as a government bureaucrat.
Credible information. State guidance notes that the legislative history indicates that credible information is not intended to mean  only evidence that would be admissible in a court of law and that the standard should generally be regarded as low. The guidance  provides latitude in evaluating the credibility of information and advises personnel conducting human rights vetting to exercise good  judgment and common sense. It notes that major international nongovernmental organizations and most independent newspapers  are considered to be relatively credible, whereas credibility among opposition groups and smaller nongovernmental organizations  varies. According to DOD’s Office of General Counsel, while DOD retains legal authority for final decisions regarding specific cases  funded with DOD appropriations, it relies on State’s judgment in assessing the credibility of available information.
Gross violation of human rights. State guidance notes that the Leahy laws do not contain a definition of “gross violations of human  rights.” State therefore uses the definition included in Section 502B(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as its working standard:  “Gross violations of internationally recognized human rights include torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;  prolonged detention without charges and trial; causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of  those persons; and other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of person.” State guidance further clarifies that this  definition includes extrajudicial killing and politically motivated rape.
For a comparison of the provisions in the State and DOD Leahy laws, see  appendix III.
section_title: U.S. Human Rights Vetting Process
paragraphs: To determine whether there is credible information of a gross violation of  human rights in accordance with both the State and DOD Leahy laws,  State has established a human rights vetting process. As illustrated in  figure 1, State’s process for human rights vetting in Egypt consists of  vetting by personnel representing selected agencies and State offices at  Embassy Cairo and at State headquarters in Washington, D.C., by  State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) and  Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA). According to State officials, the  State offices and other U.S. government agencies at Embassy Cairo that  participate in the vetting process for Egypt are State’s Consular Section,  Political Section, and Regional Security Office; the Department of  Justice’s Office of the Legal Attaché and Drug Enforcement  Administration; and the Department of Homeland Security. The embassy  and headquarters personnel screen prospective recipients of assistance  by searching relevant files, databases, and other sources of information  for credible information about gross violations of human rights. State  processes, documents, and tracks human rights vetting requests and  results through its International Vetting and Security Tracking (INVEST)  system, a web-based database. DRL is responsible for overseeing the  vetting process and for developing human rights vetting policies, among  other duties.
section_title: Agencies Committed All FMF Funds and Disbursed About 40 Percent of Other Security-Related Assistance Funds Allocated for Egypt in Fiscal Years 2011- 2015
paragraphs: U.S. agencies have committed or disbursed almost all of the  approximately $6.5 billion allocated for security-related assistance for  Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through 2015. The U.S. government allocated  security-related assistance for Egypt from a number of accounts during  this period; however, almost all of this funding—99.5 percent—was from  the FMF account. As of September 30, 2015, State had committed 100  percent of the FMF funds allocated for Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through  2015. Of the total of almost $6.5 billion, State had disbursed about 40  percent of more than $32 million allocated for Egypt from four other  security-related assistance accounts during this period, as of the same  date.
subsections: section_title: Agencies Committed or Disbursed More Than $6.4 Billion of the Almost $6.5 Billion Allocated for Egypt in Fiscal Years 2011-2015
paragraphs: Of the almost $6.5 billion in security-related assistance funds allocated for  Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through 2015, U.S. agencies had committed or  disbursed more than $6.4 billion, or almost 100 percent, as of September  30, 2015. Table 2 shows the status of U.S. security-related assistance  funds allocated for Egypt over the 5 fiscal years from 2011 through 2015,  as well as totals for the period, as of September 30, 2015. Some of the  unobligated balances shown in table 2 are no longer available to incur  new obligations. However, many of these unobligated balances remain  available for obligation for an additional 4 years beyond their initial period  of availability, by operation of law. For the full disposition of these  unobligated balances for each account, see appendix IV.
section_title: State Committed All of Approximately $6.4 Billion in FMF Funds Allocated for Egypt in Fiscal Years 2011-2015
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the U.S. government funded bilateral  security-related assistance to Egypt from a number of accounts; however,  almost all of this allocated funding (99.5 percent) was from the FMF  account. As shown in table 3, State committed all of the approximately  $6.4 billion in FMF funding allocated for Egypt in fiscal years 2011  through 2015, as of September 30, 2015.
State was able to commit all of the FMF funding allocated for Egypt in  fiscal years 2011 through 2015 in part due to unique authorities  associated with FMF funding for Egypt. Annual appropriations acts for  fiscal years 2011 through 2015 contain language stating that FMF funds  shall be obligated upon apportionment. In addition, the U.S. government  has historically provided Egypt with FMF assistance through a statutory  cash flow financing arrangement that provides Egypt the ability to agree  to the purchase of defense goods and services in a given year and then  pay for them over time, using FMF funds allocated from future  appropriations. Cash flow financing gives Egypt the flexibility to commit  to major acquisitions in one year that will be paid for over time, similar to  installment payments. Because of Egypt’s payment schedules on existing  contracts, much of its FMF funding for fiscal years 2011 through 2015 is  committed shortly after being obligated, according to State and DOD  officials. Egypt generally uses the majority of its allocated FMF funds to  purchase defense goods and services through the Foreign Military Sales  program. However, it also uses FMF funds to make some direct  commercial sales purchases. Egypt is one of only 10 countries that  Congress has made eligible to use FMF funds to make direct commercial  sales purchases. Egypt has used FMF funding to purchase and sustain a  wide array of military systems, including major systems such as F-16  aircraft, Apache helicopters, and M1A1 tanks (see fig. 2).
section_title: State Disbursed About 40 Percent of Funds Allocated for Egypt from Four Other Security- Related Assistance Accounts in Fiscal Years 2011-2015
paragraphs: As of September 30, 2015, State had disbursed less than half of the  funding allocated for Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through 2015 from the  IMET, INCLE, and NADR Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) accounts and  had disbursed about 56 percent of NADR Export Control and Related  Border Security (EXBS) account funding (see table 4). In total, State  disbursed about 40 percent of the more than $32 million allocated for  Egypt from these four accounts during this period. Table 4 provides  detailed information on the amount of funds allocated, unobligated, and  disbursed for each of these accounts for fiscal years 2011 through 2015.
The majority of the funding that State had not disbursed as of September  30, 2015, was appropriated in fiscal years 2014 and 2015. However, each  of the accounts also had funding dating back to fiscal years 2011 through  2013 that had not been disbursed. For example, as of September 30,  2015, State had not disbursed 22 percent of IMET funding, 34 percent of  INCLE funding, 58 percent of ATA funding, and 27 percent of EXBS  funding appropriated for Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through 2013. Of the  amounts not disbursed from the four accounts, 95 percent of the funds  allocated in fiscal years 2011 through 2015 remained available for  obligation as of September 30, 2015. The majority of the remaining 5  percent had expired and was no longer available for disbursement, as of  September 30, 2015.
State officials noted various challenges since the beginning of fiscal year  2011 that affected State’s ability to obligate and disburse funds from  these accounts for Egypt, including Egypt’s political transitions, the  security situation in Egypt, and various legal and policy restrictions on  assistance for Egypt. For example, Embassy Cairo officials noted that  concerns about the ability to clear key Egyptian interlocutors through the  Leahy vetting process affected their ability to obligate and disburse funds  from some accounts, such as NADR ATA. Appendix V provides more  details on the status of funds for these four accounts.
The U.S. government has used funding from these accounts for a range  of security assistance activities. For example, the U.S. government has  used IMET funding to provide training to Egyptian military personnel on  U.S. military doctrine and values, INCLE funding to train the Egyptian  police on forensic investigative techniques and community policing  models, and NADR funding to expand cooperation with the Egyptian  government related to efforts to target and disrupt international terrorism  and weapons smuggling groups.
section_title: DOD and State Completed End-Use Monitoring of U.S.- Provided Equipment but Faced Some Challenges Carrying Out These Efforts
paragraphs: DOD and State implemented end-use monitoring for equipment  transferred to Egyptian security forces; however, challenges associated  with obtaining Egyptian government cooperation sometimes hampered  these monitoring efforts, and a lack of agency documentation limited  accountability for some of them. Under its Golden Sentry program, DOD  conducted required serial number inventories and physical security  inspections for sensitive equipment in 2015 as well as routine end-use  monitoring for less sensitive items, but the department lacked  documentation of some prior year monitoring efforts. DOD officials also  faced challenges in gaining access to Egyptian government storage  facilities to conduct physical security inspections. Under its Blue Lantern  program, State conducted 12 end-use monitoring checks in fiscal years  2011 to 2015, but slow and incomplete responses from the Egyptian  government and periods of limited staffing at Embassy Cairo limited the  effectiveness of some checks.
subsections: section_title: DOD Met Golden Sentry End-Use Monitoring Requirements for Equipment in Egypt in Fiscal Year 2015 but Lacked Documentation of Some Monitoring for Prior Years
paragraphs: Under the Golden Sentry program in Egypt, DOD implements two levels  of end-use monitoring and conducts compliance visits. In fiscal years  2011 through 2015, DOD conducted annual serial number inventories for  sensitive equipment provided to Egypt, including Harpoon Block II  missiles, night vision devices (NVD), and Stinger missile systems, as  required by its enhanced end-use monitoring policy. In fiscal year 2015,  DOD also completed physical inspections of storage sites for these items,  as required by its enhanced end-use monitoring policy, but lacked  evidence of having completed these required inspections in prior years.  DOD officials in Cairo also noted challenges in gaining access to an  Egyptian government storage facility for NVDs prior to 2015 to verify the  physical security for these items. For less sensitive items, DOD  documented 49 routine end-use monitoring observations since 2012,  including observations of M1A1 tanks and Apache helicopters.
subsections: section_title: DOD Is to Conduct Two Levels of Golden Sentry End-Use Monitoring in Egypt, As Well As Periodic Compliance Visits
paragraphs: Under its Golden Sentry program, DOD has implemented two levels of  end-use monitoring—enhanced and routine—and is to conduct periodic  Compliance Assessment Visits.
Enhanced end-use monitoring. DOD requires enhanced end-use  monitoring for sensitive defense articles, services, or technologies  specifically designated by the military departments’ export policy, by the  interagency release process, or by DOD policy as a result of  consultation with Congress. As of November 2015, Egypt had three types  of sensitive military equipment that require enhanced end-use  monitoring—Harpoon Block II missiles, certain types of NVDs, and  Stinger missile systems (see fig. 3).
DOD’s policy in the Security Assistance Management Manual and  corresponding standard operating procedures for end-use monitoring at  the Office of Military Cooperation-Egypt (OMC-E) require DOD officials  annually to physically inventory designated equipment by serial number and conduct physical security checks of storage sites where designated  equipment is kept.
DOD policy requires DOD officials to conduct enhanced end-use  monitoring using physical security and accountability checklists. Inventory  results must be recorded in DOD’s Security Cooperation Information  Portal database—a web-based database that DOD designed to manage  various security assistance activities, including Golden Sentry end-use  monitoring. Completed checklists must be attached to inventory records  and maintained for 5 years.
Routine end-use monitoring. DOD requires routine end-use monitoring  for all defense articles and services provided through government-to- government programs. OMC-E personnel are required to observe and  report any potential misuse, or unapproved transfer, of U.S. defense  articles. Routine end-use monitoring is to be conducted in conjunction  with other security cooperation functions and uses any readily available  source of information. For example, when visiting a military installation on  other business, U.S. officials might observe how a host country’s military  is using U.S. equipment. DOD policy states that routine end-use  monitoring must be documented at least quarterly and records maintained  for 5 years. Inventories and physical security checks are not required as  part of routine end-use monitoring.
Compliance Assessment Visits. In addition to enhanced and routine  end-use monitoring, DOD is required to conduct periodic Compliance  Assessment Visits to review and evaluate OMC-E’s compliance with  Golden Sentry end-use monitoring policy and the Egyptian government’s  compliance with specific physical security and accountability  requirements and other terms of sale. Compliance Assessment Visits  may include facility visits, records inspections, reviews of routine and  enhanced end-use monitoring policies and procedures, and inventories of  U.S.-origin defense articles. DOD may consider various factors when  determining countries to be scheduled for visits, including the types and  quantities of defense articles requiring enhanced end-use monitoring, the  host nation’s history of compliance with transfer agreements, and the  region’s political or military stability. DOD conducted a Compliance  Assessment Visit in Egypt in February 2012. DOD’s overall assessment  based on this visit was “needs improvement.” According to the manager  of the Golden Sentry program, DOD planned to conduct another  Compliance Assessment Visit in Egypt in February 2016.
section_title: DOD Completed Annual Inventories for Sensitive Equipment Subject to Enhanced End-Use Monitoring in Fiscal Years 2011-2015
paragraphs: Under the Golden Sentry program in Egypt, DOD policy requires that its  personnel conduct annual serial number inventories for certain sensitive  equipment, including Harpoon Block II missiles, certain types of NVDs,  and Stinger missile systems. As of June 1, 2015, DOD data indicate that  OMC-E was compliant with required annual inventory requirements for  fiscal year 2015 and was able to account for 100 percent of the items  subject to enhanced end-use monitoring, including Harpoon missiles,  Stinger missiles, and NVDs. Furthermore, DOD data indicate that OMC- E was at least 98 percent compliant with annual inventory requirements at  the end of each of fiscal years 2011 through 2014.
In an effort to further assess the quality of DOD’s annual inventories,  during our June 2015 audit work in Cairo, Egypt, we conducted an  inventory check of serial numbers for a random sample of Stinger  missiles and were able to account for all of the missiles in our sample.  We physically verified serial numbers for 95 percent of the missiles in our  sample. For the remaining 5 percent, Egyptian officials provided  documentation showing that, since DOD’s previous inventory, the  Egyptian Armed Forces had either fired the missiles in testing or deployed  them, rendering them unavailable for observation. In advance of our trip,  we also requested to inventory a sample of NVDs subject to enhanced  end-use monitoring inventory requirements in Egypt. According to the  OMC-E official responsible for implementing the Golden Sentry program  in Egypt, OMC-E communicated our request to the Egyptian government  along with a list of serial numbers for NVDs subject to annual inventory  requirements. However, the NVD storage facility that the Egyptian  government arranged for us to visit did not house these NVDs, but rather  NVDs that did not require annual inventories. As a result, we were unable  to complete the planned inventory of NVDs subject to enhanced end-use  monitoring requirements. According to the OMC-E official responsible for  Golden Sentry in Egypt, Egyptian government officials may have been  confused by our request and arranged for us to visit this facility because  the NVDs stored there were subject to annual inventory requirements  until December 2014.
section_title: DOD Completed Required Annual Physical Security Inspections for Sensitive Equipment Subject to Enhanced End-Use Monitoring in Fiscal Year 2015
paragraphs: Under Golden Sentry enhanced end-use monitoring, DOD personnel also  are required to conduct annual physical security inspections of storage  sites where sensitive equipment subject to enhanced end-use monitoring  is housed. OMC-E officials said that they generally conduct physical  security inspections when they make facility visits to complete required  serial number inventories. DOD policy requires that a checklist must be  completed and attached to inventory records and maintained for 5  years. OMC-E provided completed checklists to us showing that it had  conducted all required physical security checks in fiscal year 2015.  Completed checklists showed that DOD personnel verified the physical  security of  the two facilities housing Harpoon Block II missiles, in March 2015;  the two facilities housing NVDs, in February and March 2015; and  the facility housing Stinger missiles, in March and June 2015.
During our June 2015 fieldwork in Egypt, we visited the storage facility for  Stinger missiles and independently verified the physical security of this  facility. For example, we verified that the facility had clear zones and  fences and had established procedures for accessing the bunkers where  the missiles are housed, including three-key entry and sign-in, sign-out  procedures. We also noted certain deficiencies. For example, the alarm  system and closed circuit TVs for the two bunkers were installed but not  operational. According to OMC-E officials, they were aware of these  issues, which were due to FMF funding shortfalls. As of October 2015, an  OMC-E official stated that the Egyptian Ministry of Defense had allocated  funds to resolve these issues and was working on a contract with the U.S.  Army Corps of Engineers to complete the necessary work.
section_title: DOD Lacked Evidence of, and Faced Challenges Conducting, Annual Physical Security Inspections for Sensitive Equipment Subject to Enhanced End-Use Monitoring before Fiscal Year 2015
paragraphs: OMC-E lacked evidence (i.e., completed checklists), required for  equipment subject to enhanced end-use monitoring, documenting any  physical security inspections conducted during facility visits in fiscal years  2013 and 2014. The OMC-E official responsible for Golden Sentry end- use monitoring in Egypt was unsure why checklists that may have been  used to conduct physical security checks during these years had not been  maintained along with the serial number inventory records, as required by  DOD’s Security Assistance Management Manual. OMC-E updated its  operating instruction in June 2015 to note, among other things, the  requirement to maintain records of completed physical security checks.
According to OMC-E officials and documentation, on at least two  occasions before fiscal year 2015, Egyptian officials prevented U.S.  personnel from conducting required physical security inspections at a  storage site housing many of Egypt’s U.S.-origin NVDs that at the time  were subject to Golden Sentry enhanced end-use monitoring. In each  instance, Egyptian officials brought the NVDs to a central location,  enabling DOD personnel to conduct serial number inventories. While  Egypt, as a sovereign nation, is not subject to U.S. government  requirements unless it has agreed to them with the U.S. government, the  Egyptian government has committed in writing to permit inspections of  NVD storage facilities. The Security Assistance Management Manual  includes standard terms and conditions that must be included in a Letter  of Offer and Acceptance, including a provision in which the purchaser  agrees to permit scheduled inspections or physical inventories upon the  U.S. government’s request, except when other means of end-use  monitoring verification shall have been mutually agreed. Five of the six  Letters of Offer and Acceptance covering NVDs subject to enhanced end- use monitoring physical security inspections as of December 1, 2014,  included such a provision. According to the manager of the Golden Sentry  program at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, one Letter of Offer  and Acceptance did not contain this provision because the NVDs were  provided on a grant basis and the Egyptian government agreed to permit  observation of the items under a separate exchange of letters. In addition  to the terms and conditions in the Letters of Offer and Acceptance, a June  2012 control plan for the physical security and accountability of NVDs  signed by the Egyptian Ministry of Defense notes that NVD storage  facilities will be subject to compliance assessments, audits, and  inventories by U.S. representatives.
Nonetheless, during a February 2012 Compliance Assessment Visit,  Egyptian officials prohibited DOD inspectors from accessing an NVD  storage facility, which prevented the inspectors from assessing whether  the proper physical security measures were in place, according to DOD  officials. This contributed to DOD’s assessment that Egypt’s procedures  to comply with the conditions of the transfer agreements for U.S.-provided  defense articles needed improvement. In October 2014, Egyptian officials  again prohibited OMC-E personnel from accessing the same NVD  storage facility to verify physical security, according to DOD  documentation. A senior OMC-E official stated that he asked Egyptian  officials to comply with the requirement to permit physical inspections of  NVD storage facilities but the officials did not comply. According to  another OMC-E official responsible for Golden Sentry end-use monitoring  in Egypt, the Egyptian Armed Forces told OMC-E officials that they  brought the NVDs to a central location to be inventoried for OMC-E’s  convenience and security because the NVDs were deployed with units  located around the country, including some unsafe locations. The same  official noted that the OMC-E explained to its Egyptian counterparts that  DOD’s policy required them to either verify the physical security of the  facilities where the NVDs were housed or review the Egyptian Armed  Forces’ log books to confirm that the NVDs were deployed with military  units in the field and were no longer in storage. However, Egyptian  officials were not responsive to either of these requests for reasons that  are unclear, according to the OMC-E official.
section_title: DOD Completed Routine End- Use Monitoring for Various Types of U.S.-Provided Equipment between July 2012 and June 2015
paragraphs: DOD personnel are required to conduct routine end-use monitoring in  conjunction with other security cooperation functions. According to DOD  policy, routine end-use monitoring must be documented on a quarterly  basis and the records must be maintained for 5 years. From July 2012  through June 2015, OMC-E documented 49 routine end-use monitoring  observations for a variety of military equipment, including M1A1 tanks,  Apache helicopters, and various types of fixed-wing aircraft. As shown in  table 5, OMC-E documented these observations during 9 of the 12  quarters of this period, with most occurring in fiscal years 2014 and 2015.  According to the manager of the Golden Sentry End-Use Monitoring  program at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, there may be  circumstances when DOD personnel are not able to perform routine end- use monitoring, as was the case when Embassy Cairo was under ordered  departure status from July to November 2013.
During our fieldwork in Egypt in June 2015, we accompanied OMC-E  personnel on a routine end-use monitoring visit to observe F-16 aircraft at  an airbase outside of Cairo. During this visit, we observed six aircraft  parked on the tarmac and an emergency shelter constructed to house a  new aircraft upon delivery from the United States. OMC-E officials  conducted this visit in accordance with DOD policy, and we did not  observe any end-use monitoring violations.
section_title: State Completed Blue Lantern End-Use Monitoring Checks in Egypt despite Egyptian Government’s Slow and Incomplete Responses and Embassy Staffing Challenges
paragraphs: Under the Blue Lantern program, in fiscal years 2011 through 2015, State  conducted 12 end-use monitoring checks of Egyptian government entities  that purchased U.S. equipment through direct commercial sales.  However, State was unable to complete all but two of these checks within  its self-imposed time frames, in part because of the Egyptian  government’s slow responses to Blue Lantern inquiries. In addition, for  some Blue Lantern checks, State received no response or partial  responses from the Egyptian government to inquiries about the end use  of equipment transferred through direct commercial sales. Although State  has outreach programs to foster cooperation and compliance with Blue  Lantern checks, it did not conduct any such outreach in Egypt in fiscal  years 2011 through 2015.
subsections: section_title: State Conducted 12 Blue Lantern Checks on Egyptian Government Entities in Fiscal Years 2011-2015
paragraphs: Under its Blue Lantern program, State is required to conduct end-use  monitoring checks based on a case-by-case review of export license  applications against established criteria for determining potential risks. To  determine whether to conduct a Blue Lantern check, State considers 20  indicators that may trigger a check, such as unfamiliar end users, foreign  intermediate consignees with no apparent connection to the end user,  and requests for sensitive commodities whose diversion or illicit retransfer  could have a negative impact on U.S. national security. However, State is  not required to conduct a particular number of Blue Lantern checks in a  given fiscal year. State conducted two types of end-use monitoring  checks in Egypt during fiscal years 2011 through 2015—prelicense  checks and postshipment verifications (hereafter, postshipment checks).  State conducts prelicense checks prior to issuance of a license and  conducts postshipment checks after an export has been approved and  shipped. According to State’s Blue Lantern Guidebook, prelicense checks  are generally used to verify the security of facilities where items may be  temporarily or permanently housed and to ensure that the details of a  proposed transaction match those on a license application, among other  things. Postshipment checks are used to inquire with the end user about  the specific use and handling of exported articles or about other follow-up  matters related to the transaction and compliance with U.S. regulations  and laws, among other things.
As shown in figure 4, State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls  requests a Blue Lantern check in Egypt by sending a cable to U.S.  Embassy Cairo. The cable may request that embassy personnel make  inquiries to confirm the bona fides of the end user or other party to the  transaction and may include specific questions for the embassy to ask the  subject of the check. State officials at Embassy Cairo conduct the check  by sending letters to the Egyptian government or another entity. When  embassy personnel receive a response to their inquiries, they send a  return cable with their findings. Directorate of Defense Trade Controls  officials then determine whether to close the case favorably or  unfavorably. The results of Blue Lantern checks inform decisions on  whether to approve licenses for the export of U.S. defense articles. State  officials at Embassy Cairo responsible for Blue Lantern checks in Egypt  during fiscal years 2013 through 2015 reported never having conducted a  site visit to physically verify the security and end use of the items.  According to State officials, the Egyptian government has resisted such  visits, and Blue Lantern guidance does not require them.
From October 2010 to April 2015, 1,280 license applications were  submitted for the permanent export of defense articles to Egypt through  direct commercial sales. Of those 1,280 license applications, State  approved 937 licenses for the export of defense articles to Egypt. In fiscal  years 2011 through 2015, State conducted 12 Blue Lantern checks on  Egyptian government entities that purchased a variety of security-related  equipment through direct commercial sales, including missile equipment,  explosives, satellite components, riot control items, and NVDs. Of these  12 checks, 8 were prelicense checks and 4 were postshipment checks,  as shown in table 6.
State reported favorable results for 8 of the 12 checks and unfavorable  results for 4. According to State guidance, if the critical questions have  been answered satisfactorily, the transaction appears legitimate, and the  bona fides of the end users or other parties are confirmed, the case will  likely be closed as “favorable.” If the transaction’s legitimacy cannot be  confirmed, the consignees or end user appear untrustworthy, or if there  are other troubling discrepancies, the case will likely be closed as  “unfavorable.” The reasons for checks in Egypt closed as unfavorable  include a lack of response from the Egyptian government and the  government’s denial that it had ordered the equipment subject to the  check, according to our analysis of State data.
section_title: State Faced Some Challenges Completing Blue Lantern Checks due to Egyptian Government’s Slow and Incomplete Responses and Limited Embassy Staffing
paragraphs: While State completed 12 Blue Lantern checks from fiscal years 2011  through 2015, it faced challenges due to slow and incomplete responses  from the Egyptian government and other factors such as periods of  limited staffing at Embassy Cairo.
Slow responses to Blue Lantern checks and limited embassy  staffing. Embassy Cairo completed 2 of 12 Blue Lantern checks in Egypt  from fiscal years 2011 through 2015 within State’s recommended time  frames. According to the Blue Lantern Guidebook, prelicense checks are  requested to be completed within 30 days and postshipment checks are  requested to be completed within 45 days. In fiscal years 2011 through  2015, Embassy Cairo conducted 1 of its 8 prelicense checks within  State’s 30-day goal, and completed 1 of 4 postshipment checks within  State’s 45-day goal. On average, during this period, State completed its  Blue Lantern checks on Egyptian entities in about 134 days, with  prelicense checks averaging about 105 days and postshipment checks  averaging 191 days. Seven of 12 Blue Lantern checks on Egyptian  entities took 100 or more days to complete, and 1 of these 7 checks took  over 300 days to complete during fiscal years 2011 through 2015 (see  table 7). According to State guidance, State should defer making a  decision on a license application until the results of prelicense checks are  received. We found that State generally complied with this guidance for  prelicense checks in Egypt. Lengthy delays in completing prelicense  checks can be costly to U.S. exporters and foreign end users and  ultimately harm U.S. competitiveness, according to State guidance.
According to State officials, some of the delays in completing Blue  Lantern checks in Egypt were due to the Egyptian government’s slow  responses to State’s inquiries. For example, in one postshipment check  requested in June 2013, the Egyptian government did not respond to  questions related to this Blue Lantern check for over 8 months, according  to our analysis of State cables. This check involved thermal imagers,  which are considered to be sensitive night vision equipment. As a result,  State experienced substantial delays verifying the location, security, and  end use of these items. According to our analysis of State data, in  another postshipment check requested in October 2013 involving satellite  components, State did not receive information it deemed sufficient to  close the check from the Egyptian government for more than 6 months  and, according to State officials, the satellite was launched before State  was able to complete the Blue Lantern check. Another two Blue Lantern  checks requested in May and June 2013 took over 100 days to complete.  According to State officials, political instability in Egypt and tensions in the  U.S.-Egypt relationship at the time affected the timeliness of the Egyptian  government’s response to these four checks. In the two most recent  Blue Lantern prelicense checks, both of which involved NVDs going to the  Egyptian Ministry of Interior, a State official noted that there were delays  in obtaining a response because inquiries first had to be routed through  the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For one of these checks, State did not  receive a response to two of its initial Blue Lantern inquiries, and as a  result, completing the check took 4 months.
State officials also noted that Embassy Cairo was under ordered  departure status from July to November 2013, which limited staffing at the  embassy, and a staffing transition in 2014 also contributed to delays in  completing some checks. For instance, limited staffing at Embassy Cairo  during the latter half of 2013 affected the timeliness of four Blue Lantern  checks active during that period. According to State officials, the lack of  available staff at Embassy Cairo during the ordered departure caused  embassy officials to request additional time to complete Blue Lantern  checks and to request that at least one Blue Lantern check be put on a  temporary hold during that period. As a result of the hold and the  Egyptian government’s slow response time, this check took 8 months to  complete. A State official also noted that a staffing transition in the  summer of 2014 affected another check. In this case, Embassy Cairo  took 52 days to contact the Egyptian government after receiving the Blue  Lantern cable requesting the prelicense check, and as a result, the check  took more than 60 days to complete.
Incomplete responses to some Blue Lantern checks. During fiscal  years 2011 through 2015, the Egyptian government provided complete  responses to 4 of 12 Blue Lantern checks. For 6 of the 12 checks, it  provided partial responses to the questions asked by State officials from  Embassy Cairo. For 1 of the 12 checks, the Egyptian government did not  provide any response. For another 1 of the 12 checks, State officials from  the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls did not receive a response  from Embassy Cairo officials, so we were unable to determine whether  Embassy Cairo made inquiries with the Egyptian government and  whether the Egyptian government responded to any inquiries that may  have been made. Directorate of Defense Trade Controls officials closed  the 2 cases for which it received no response, both prelicense checks, as  unfavorable and recommended that the license applications not be  approved. In the 6 Blue Lantern cases where the Egyptian government  partially responded to the questions asked by State officials at Embassy  Cairo, State closed the cases as favorable in 5 of the 6 cases. In one  prelicense check, the Egyptian government did not respond to questions  about the physical security of the storage site where they planned to store  NVDs, nor did it specify the branch of the Ministry of Interior—an  organization identified by State as having security force units of concern  for human rights violations—that would be the end user of the NVDs. In  another prelicense check, State asked the Egyptian government to  confirm the involvement of intermediaries from two other countries in the  transaction as well as the specific type and quantity of the items it had  ordered; however, the Egyptian government only confirmed the  involvement of one of the intermediaries and did not provide any  information about the type and quantity of items ordered. In a  postshipment check involving the transfer of riot control items, such as  rubber ball cartridges and smoke grenades, to the Egyptian Ministry of  Interior, the Egyptian government did not respond to a question about the  disposition and use of the items, according to a cable from Embassy  Cairo. State closed each of these three checks as favorable. Table 8  shows a breakdown of the response-completeness status for the 12 Blue  Lantern checks and the corresponding count of favorable and unfavorable  results.
State officials offered various reasons to explain why the Egyptian  government provided partial responses to Blue Lantern inquiries and why  State did not make greater efforts to obtain complete responses.  According to State officials, the Egyptian government is sensitive to  questions that it views as possibly infringing on its sovereignty, including  questions about its purchases of U.S. military equipment. In addition, one  State official who has conducted Blue Lantern checks in Egypt noted that  the Egyptian government may not entirely understand Blue Lantern  inquiries. According to State officials, a response to every question posed  in a Blue Lantern check is not necessary for a licensing determination.  These officials also noted that if their key concerns have been addressed,  they are generally comfortable closing the check. However, as previously  noted, because State officials at Embassy Cairo do not conduct optional  site visits, written responses from the Egyptian government provide the  only available information on the use and security of equipment  purchased through direct commercial sales. Without timely and complete  information, State may not be able to provide reasonable assurance  within its own recommended time frames that some recipients are storing,  handling, and using this sensitive U.S. equipment properly.
section_title: State Has Not Utilized Outreach Programs in Egypt Designed to Elicit Host Government Cooperation with Blue Lantern End-Use Monitoring since 2008
paragraphs: State has two optional programs that are designed to facilitate  cooperation and compliance with Blue Lantern end-use monitoring  requirements. However, State has not used either program in Egypt since  2008, despite the Egyptian government’s limited cooperation in providing  complete and timely responses to Blue Lantern inquiries. One such  program consists of outreach visits conducted by State officials from the  Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, who travel to meet with U.S.  embassy, host government, and local business officials to educate them  about the Blue Lantern program and to elicit cooperation with Blue  Lantern end-use monitoring. State guidance outlines six criteria that  officials use when deciding whether to conduct a Blue Lantern outreach  visit. We determined that Egypt meets the following three of these  criteria:
High percentage of unfavorable results. The average global rate of  unfavorable checks for the Blue Lantern program over the last 4 years  reported (fiscal years 2011-2014) was 21 percent. Over the same  period, 36 percent of Blue Lantern checks in Egypt were closed as  unfavorable. State conducted 1 Blue Lantern check in Egypt in fiscal  year 2015 and closed it as favorable, which lowered the unfavorable  rate for Blue Lantern checks in Egypt to 33 percent during fiscal years  2011 through 2015.
Need to provide education on U.S. export law and regulations.
According to our analysis of State documents and data, the Egyptian  government provided partial responses to 6 Blue Lantern inquiries,  gave no response to at least 1 inquiry, and did not respond to at least  5 inquiries within requested time frames in fiscal years 2011 through  2015. As previously mentioned, this resulted partly from a lack of  understanding about the program, according to a State official.
No prior outreach visit. According to State officials in Washington,  D.C., and Cairo, Egypt, as of November 2015, no Blue Lantern  outreach visit had been conducted in Egypt since 2008, prior to  Egypt’s political transitions in 2011 and 2013.
In addition, in July 2015, State introduced the Blue Lantern Post Support  Program, which provides funding for outreach and educational activities  and events hosted by U.S. embassies or consulates to improve  compliance with U.S. export control laws and regulations, among other  things. State guidance for this program notes that when considering and  prioritizing proposals to fund, State will consider various criteria, including  the host government’s cooperation with Blue Lantern checks and the  government’s level of understanding of U.S. commercial defense trade  controls. According to a State official who conducted Blue Lantern checks  in Egypt in 2013, outreach to the Egyptian government on the Blue  Lantern program would be worthwhile. However, Embassy Cairo did not  submit a proposal for funding under the Blue Lantern Post Support  Program in 2015. According to State officials, they did not conduct any  outreach in Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through 2015 because the number  of Blue Lantern checks conducted in Egypt during this period was small  and because they prioritized outreach to other countries. Without the  cooperation of the Egyptian government, State may continue to face  challenges in obtaining complete and timely responses to Blue Lantern  inquiries.
section_title: U.S. Government Completed Some Human Rights Vetting in Egypt but Has Weaknesses or Gaps in Procedures, Documentation, and Policies
paragraphs: The U.S. government completed human rights vetting for 5,581 Egyptian  security forces before providing U.S.-funded training in fiscal year 2011  through March 31, 2015; however, our analysis of a sample of names  from training rosters of Egyptian security forces who received U.S.-funded  training shows that that the U.S. government did not complete all required  vetting prior to providing training, in violation of State’s and DOD’s  policies. In contrast to State’s vetting requirements for training, State’s  policies and procedures encourage, but do not specifically require, vetting  for foreign security forces that receive U.S.-funded equipment, including  those in Egypt. The primary method State uses in Egypt to comply with  Leahy law requirements when providing equipment is to attest in memos  that State is in compliance with Leahy law requirements. Various factors  have posed challenges to the U.S. government’s efforts to vet recipients  of U.S. assistance. Gaps and uncertainties in information have made it  challenging for U.S. officials to vet some cases before providing training.  Additionally, State has not established procedures for clearing smaller  units or individuals within a larger unit that has been deemed ineligible to  receive assistance. Finally, Embassy Cairo has recorded little information  on human rights abuses by Egyptian officials in INVEST since the  beginning of fiscal year 2011, despite State requirements to do so.
subsections: section_title: The U.S. Government Completed Some but Not All Required Vetting before Providing Training to Egyptian Security Forces and Has Not Established Specific Vetting Policies and Procedures for Equipment Recipients
paragraphs: As shown in table 9, the U.S. government completed human rights vetting  for a total of 5,581 Egyptian individuals or units before providing training  from fiscal year 2011 through March 31, 2015.
Of the individuals and units submitted for vetting, State approved training  for approximately 90 percent of the Egyptian security forces it vetted  during this period. State suspended about 9 percent of the vetting cases  for Egyptian security forces, suspending some cases for administrative  reasons and suspending other cases because of potentially derogatory  information related to the individuals or units being vetted that could not  be resolved before the start of the planned training. In some cases, this  potentially derogatory information related to human rights abuses, and in  other cases it related to other types of potentially derogatory information,  such as involvement in terrorism. For example, State suspended an  individual in fiscal year 2015 because it was unable to clear the  individual’s unit from involvement in torture at a military prison prior to the  start of the planned training. According to State, Embassy Cairo was able  to subsequently provide additional information to DRL that cleared this  individual’s unit from involvement in the incident at the prison. Embassy  Cairo then resubmitted the individual for vetting, and State approved him  to participate in a different course, later in fiscal year 2015. State also  suspended an individual in fiscal year 2015 because it had identified  potential terrorism links that could not be ruled out prior to the start of the  planned training. According to State officials, Embassy Cairo found no  information credibly linking this person to terrorism activity; however,  before further checks could be conducted, he was dropped from the  course at the request of OMC-E to avoid holding up other participants.  State also rejected training for Egyptian security forces in a limited  number of cases due to credible information of gross violations of human  rights. State rejected a total of 18 cases in fiscal year 2011 through  March 31, 2015—less than 1 percent of the total cases vetted. It has not  rejected any cases since fiscal year 2013, including no cases since the  removal of President Morsi in July 2013. According to State officials,  these rejections were related to both acts committed by specific  individuals, as well as credible information about gross violations of  human rights involving an individual’s unit. According to State officials,  State has rejected a limited number of cases, including no cases since  fiscal year 2013, due in part to problematic units and individuals being  filtered out by the embassy before they are formally submitted for training.  Finally, State cancelled 34 cases (less than 1 percent of the total cases  vetted) for administrative reasons from November 2014, when this new  disposition option was created in INVEST, through March 2015.  According to State officials, these cancellations were due to issues such  as training courses being cancelled and data entry errors.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Government Did Not Complete Required Vetting before Providing Training in Some Cases and Did Not Maintain Training Records for One Account
paragraphs: We determined that the U.S. government did not conduct required vetting  before providing training for some of the Egyptian security forces that  were trained with U.S. security-related assistance from seven accounts in  fiscal year 2011 through March 31, 2015. To make this determination,  we selected a generalizable stratified random sample of 166 names from  training rosters of Egyptian security forces who received training funded  through these seven accounts during this period. We then cross-checked  the 166 names in our sample with human rights vetting data from the  INVEST system to verify that the Egyptian security forces were vetted  before receiving the training. State deemed our estimate of the  percentage of Egyptian security forces that were not vetted and some  aspects of the methodology we used to generate this estimate to be  sensitive but unclassified information. We therefore omitted that  information from this report. By not conducting all required human rights  vetting prior to providing U.S. training to Egyptian security forces, State  and DOD are not in compliance with their policies regarding human rights  vetting.
In addition to examining rosters for training funded through the seven  accounts, we also requested training rosters from State for Egyptian  security forces who had received training funded through the NADR  account; however, State was unable to provide this information. We  therefore did not include this account in our analysis. While INVEST data  show that State vetted a number of Egyptian security forces that received  NADR-funded training in fiscal year 2011 through March 31, 2015,  without the NADR training roster we were not able to assess the extent to  which State completed all required human rights vetting for Egyptian  security forces that were trained using funding from the NADR account.  State’s Foreign Affairs Manual notes, among other things, the importance  of producing and maintaining adequate documentation of the agency’s  activities. In addition, federal Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government states that agencies should clearly document  transactions and all significant events, the documentation should be  readily available for examination, and all documentation should be  properly managed and maintained. Without the training roster for the  NADR account, State cannot provide assurance that all Egyptian security  forces that received NADR-funded training were vetted as required.
section_title: State Policies and Procedures Encourage, but Do Not Specifically Require, Human Rights Vetting before Providing Equipment
paragraphs: The State and DOD Leahy laws’ prohibition against providing assistance  to units of foreign security forces for whom there is credible information of  a gross violation of human rights also applies to equipment. However,  unlike its required process for vetting individuals and units nominated to  receive U.S.-provided training (see fig. 1), State does not have policies or  procedures specifically requiring vetting of Egyptian security forces slated  to receive U.S.-funded equipment. State policy encourages the use of the  INVEST system to conduct vetting for equipment recipients but allows  posts the flexibility to use other methods to comply with the Leahy laws.  For Egypt, State uses memos to attest to its compliance with the Leahy  laws for equipment provided to Egyptian security forces. While the  memos declare State’s compliance with the Leahy laws, State officials  acknowledged that there is no required process used to support the  statements in the memos and that INVEST is not used to vet Egyptian  recipients of U.S. equipment.
We reviewed the eight memos that State drafted for fiscal years 2011  through 2015 that covered all FMF assistance allocated for Egypt during  this period. The purpose of these memos is to request the Office of  Management and Budget’s approval for the apportionment of FMF funds  allocated for Egypt. In each of the memos, State included a statement  that it was not aware of any credible information of gross violations of  human rights by any unit to which assistance would be provided. More  recent memos also included a statement that State would ensure that  FMF assistance for Egypt would be provided only to units the department  had positively determined not to have been linked to human rights  violations. None of the memos we reviewed specified particular Egyptian  units that were authorized to receive the FMF assistance covered by the  memo. However, two of the eight memos we reviewed identified particular  Egyptian security forces that would not be receiving assistance covered  by the memo. For example, a September 2013 memo requesting the  apportionment of approximately $584 million in fiscal year 2013 FMF  funds stated that no funds would be used to support the Cairo military  police. State’s three memos requesting the apportionment of fiscal years  2014 and 2015 funds noted that violent incidents in Egypt in July and  August 2013 and the Egyptian military’s operations in the Sinai remained  under review.
State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is responsible for drafting the  FMF memos for Egypt, including the statements regarding compliance  with the Leahy laws; however, the bureau said that it does not play a role  in supporting the statements in the memos and that this was the  responsibility of DRL. The DRL official responsible for reviewing these  memos told us that he may check the unit names of the prospective  equipment recipients if that information is available at the time the memos  are drafted, to see if he is aware of human rights concerns with any of the  recipient units; however, State officials told us that the specific items to be  financed and the specific units or individuals to receive the items are not  generally known at the time the memos are circulated and may not be  known until many months or even years later. According to State  officials, this is due to the Foreign Military Sales process, which can  involve lengthy negotiations with Egypt and other partner countries about  their requirements and extended contracting processes for complex  military systems. Also, according to State officials, the receipt of sale and  transfer of equipment is often concluded in the United States, with the  Egyptian government then responsible for freighting the equipment to  Egypt. This can result in delays in the final Egyptian recipients receiving  the equipment, according to State officials. In addition, State does not  currently have policies or procedures in place to require vetting after the  equipment has been furnished to the Egyptian government and the  ultimate end-user unit or individual is known, according to State officials.  State officials noted that in some cases, Egyptian security forces receive  training in association with equipment that they are provided and are thus  vetted through INVEST before receiving the training. Finally, State  officials said that in cases where there is no direct recipient for U.S.  assistance, such as when bulk equipment and other forms of assistance  (e.g., ammunition, uniforms, radios, spare parts) are provided to a  country’s military services or the armed forces as a whole for general use,  it is a challenge for State to verify the identity of the final recipients of this  equipment.
Additionally, key officials with information about human rights violations in  Egypt are not involved in drafting and reviewing these memos. Embassy  Cairo officials who are responsible for managing Leahy vetting at the post  stated that they do not play a role in the development of these memos.  These Embassy Cairo officials stated that it was not clear what role, if  any, the post should be playing in ensuring Leahy law compliance for  Egyptian equipment recipients and that more guidance from State  headquarters on this issue would be beneficial. NEA and DRL officials in  State headquarters who were responsible for conducting human rights  vetting for Egyptian training recipients also stated that they do not play a  role in ensuring Leahy law compliance for equipment provided to  Egyptian security forces.
We previously reported on State’s use of memos to comply with Leahy  law requirements for equipment in a 2011 report examining human rights  vetting in the Persian Gulf countries. In that report, we found that State  did not conduct comparable human rights vetting for recipients of  equipment as it did for recipients of training. We recommended that State  implement individual- and unit-level human rights vetting for recipients of  U.S.-funded equipment to reduce the risk that U.S.-funded equipment  might be used by violators of human rights in the Persian Gulf countries.  State concurred with our recommendation, but as of November 2015,  State had not implemented it. DRL officials we interviewed acknowledged  that the current approach to complying with the Leahy laws for equipment  needs to be strengthened to ensure that equipment will not be provided to  security forces that have committed gross violations of human rights.  According to DRL officials, State is continuing to work to develop and  implement a comprehensive policy on equipment vetting that is different  from the current, memo-based procedure, but it has not established a  specific time frame for doing so. In addition, a DRL official noted that DRL  is working on a revised version of the INVEST system, to be completed in  May 2016, that is expected to help facilitate equipment vetting. However,  the DRL official stated that DRL has not made specific determinations  about what functions related to equipment vetting will be included in the  updated system or about time frames for developing agency policies and  procedures that would require use of the updated system for equipment  vetting. Standard practices in program management include, among other  things, developing a plan to execute projects within a specific time  frame.
Because State has not developed policies or procedures specifically  requiring vetting for Egyptian recipients of U.S. equipment, it is more  difficult to reasonably ensure that U.S. equipment will not be provided to  Egyptian security forces for whom there may be credible information that  a unit has committed gross violations of human rights. This increases the  risk that State may violate the prohibition in the Leahy laws as well as its  own policy that it should ensure that its programs are efficiently and  effectively carried out in accordance with applicable laws.
section_title: Various Factors Affected State’s Efforts to Ensure Compliance with the Leahy Laws
paragraphs: Various factors affected State’s implementation of the Leahy laws. For  example, gaps and uncertainties in information have challenged U.S.  efforts to vet for training. In addition, the Egyptian government has  routinely been unwilling to provide information that would facilitate the  vetting process, according to State officials. Moreover, State has not  established procedures for clearing smaller units or individuals within a  larger unit that has been deemed ineligible to receive assistance. Finally,  Embassy Cairo has populated little information about human rights  abuses in Egypt in the INVEST system, despite State requirements to do  so.
subsections: section_title: Lack of Information from the Egyptian Government Has Hampered U.S. Efforts to Vet for U.S. Training
paragraphs: Embassy Cairo and State officials noted that the Egyptian government  has routinely been unwilling to provide information that would facilitate the  vetting process. According to U.S. officials, the Egyptian government  sometimes does not provide the unit-specific information necessary to  complete vetting. Embassy Cairo and State headquarters officials also  stated that the Egyptian government was unwilling to provide  organizational charts and other information for certain key ministries that  would facilitate the vetting process. For example, U.S. officials said that  more detailed organizational charts for the Egyptian Ministry of Interior  (MOI) would help the U.S. government differentiate between, on one  hand, MOI subunits that were of concern for gross violations of human  rights and thus were not able to receive U.S. assistance and, on the other  hand, those MOI subunits that were not likely involved in the incidents for  which State had credible information that human rights violations had  occurred.
The State Leahy law requires that State develop procedures to ensure  that when an individual is designated to receive U.S. training or other  assistance, the individual’s unit is vetted as well as the individual. State  guidance notes that country security assistance teams should be well  informed about the force structure and unit descriptions for the security  forces with which they work and thus should be able to provide the  appropriate unit-level identification for vetting purposes. State guidance  directs embassies to work with host-country counterparts to identify units  for the purposes of vetting and notes the importance of host-country  cooperation.
Embassy Cairo officials noted that issues related to Leahy vetting have  been a significant source of tensions with the Egyptian government. In  some cases, Egyptian agencies refused to allow any of their members to  attend training events if any individuals from their organizational unit  failed to clear vetting. In addition, embassy officials acknowledged that  they stopped proposing training to the Egyptian government under certain  programs, such as NADR ATA, because they did not want to risk causing  further strain in the bilateral relationship if Egyptian officials were not  approved through the vetting process. U.S. officials noted that this  cessation in submitting candidates for training was one of the reasons  that, since fiscal year 2013, no Egyptian security forces had been rejected  through the Leahy vetting process due to credible information of a gross  violation of human rights.
We requested to meet with several Egyptian government ministries to  obtain their perspective on the Leahy vetting program during our fieldwork  in Egypt, but the Egyptian government did not respond to our request,  according to State officials. Additionally, although the Egyptian  government initially approved our request to meet with officials of the  Egyptian Training Authority to discuss Leahy vetting for Egyptian military  students, the government subsequently decided not to hold the meeting.
section_title: U.S. Government Has Not Established Procedures for Approving Training for Members of Subunits within Larger Units Prohibited from Receiving Assistance
paragraphs: When units have been rejected through the vetting process and deemed  ineligible to receive assistance under the Leahy laws, the U.S.  government cannot provide the unit further assistance unless the  requirements for an exception have been met. In February 2015, State  and DOD issued a joint remediation policy that outlined standards for  exercising these exceptions in the Leahy laws and allowing assistance to  resume to units previously deemed ineligible. However, State officials we  interviewed said that if a larger unit is rejected in INVEST, it is possible for  smaller units within that larger unit to be subsequently approved for  training without having to meet the standards in the February 2015 State- DOD guidance, if it can be demonstrated that these smaller units were  not implicated in the gross violation of human rights. This is consistent  with State’s 2012 Leahy vetting guide, which states that the relevant unit  for vetting purposes is the lowest deployable organizational element of a  security force capable of exercising command and discipline over its  members. State officials said the policy allows State to approve training  for smaller units or individuals within a larger unit that is ineligible to  receive assistance, if it can be demonstrated that the smaller units or  individuals, by the nature of their duties, geographic location, or other  circumstances, would not have been involved in the gross violation of  human rights. According to U.S. officials, this approach has been used in  Egypt on certain occasions. State has also used this approach in cases  where units have not been officially rejected in INVEST but have been  suspended because State has identified human rights concerns with the  unit and there is a lack of sufficient information to complete vetting for the  nominated individuals or units.
While this approach has been used in Egypt, and although State’s policy  allows smaller units to be identified as discrete units for purposes of  Leahy vetting, State has not established specific procedures for clearing  smaller units within a larger security force organization that has been  rejected due to credible information of a gross violation of human rights.  For example, State’s Leahy vetting guide, Embassy Cairo’s standard  operating procedures, and State and DOD’s joint remediation guidance  do not specifically discuss the ability to clear such units and do not  establish procedures for doing so. State’s Foreign Affairs Manual  highlights the importance of ensuring that key polices are documented.  Without established procedures for clearing smaller units within larger  organizations that have been deemed ineligible to receive assistance due  to a gross violation of human rights, Embassy Cairo and other embassies  do not have clear guidance on the extent to which they are able to use  this option and in what situations it is or is not appropriate to seek to do  so.
section_title: Embassy Cairo Has Not Complied with State Requirements to Document Information on Human Rights Abuses in the INVEST Database
paragraphs: The State Leahy law requires State to establish procedures to ensure that  information on gross violations of human rights by security force units is  evaluated and preserved. In addition, State’s 2012 Leahy vetting guide  states that embassies in particular are required to populate the INVEST  system—in conjunction with vetting or otherwise—with information on  human rights abuses as these abuses come to light. However, Embassy  Cairo has recorded limited information on human rights abuses by  security forces in Egypt in INVEST since the beginning of fiscal year  2011, despite State’s findings of a range of human rights abuses by  security forces in Egypt and despite State having vetted thousands of  cases since then. As of October 2015, Embassy Cairo had uploaded only  three documents to INVEST since fiscal year 2011 and no documents  since fiscal year 2013, according to DRL officials.
DRL officials stated that it is common for posts to not use the document  library function in INVEST despite the requirement in its Leahy guide that  they do so and, instead, to maintain this information in other formats,  such as spreadsheets Embassy Cairo officials told us that they use to  track individuals and units of concern. However, by not uploading relevant  information into INVEST, Embassy Cairo is not maintaining a centralized  repository of information on human rights abusers in Egypt that can be  used by others in the agency. Without a centralized repository of this  information, State cannot be assured that all current and future officials  vetting cases in INVEST will have the information needed to make  accurately informed and timely decisions regarding whether or not to  approve Egyptian security officials for U.S.-funded training.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The United States provides about $1.3 billion in security-related  assistance to Egypt annually. DOD and State established the Golden  Sentry and Blue Lantern programs, respectively, to provide reasonable  assurance that military equipment transferred or exported to foreign  governments is used for its legitimate intended purposes and does not  come into the possession of individuals or groups who pose a threat to  the United States or its allies. However, gaps in the implementation of  these end-use monitoring programs—in part due to limited cooperation  from the Egyptian government—hampers DOD’s and State’s ability to  provide such assurances. For instance, the Egyptian government’s  incomplete and slow responses to U.S. inquiries hindered State’s efforts  to ensure that equipment sold through direct commercial sales is used as  intended. State has recently made funding available for activities to foster  greater host government cooperation with Blue Lantern requirements in  some countries. However, such activities have not been used in Egypt to  help improve the completeness and timeliness of these end-use  monitoring checks targeting U.S. arms and other military items sold  through direct commercial sales.
The United States has a policy interest in leveraging U.S. assistance to  encourage Egypt and other foreign governments to prevent their security  forces from committing human rights violations and to hold their forces  accountable when violations occur. However, the U.S. government has  not consistently vetted all individuals and units in the Egyptian security  forces for human rights concerns before providing training, as required by  its policies. State also does not have policies or procedures for vetting  specific individuals and units before it provides equipment, even though  military equipment constitutes the vast majority of U.S. assistance to  Egypt. Without such vetting, the U.S. government risks providing U.S.  equipment, in violation of the Leahy laws, to Egyptian security forces that  have committed human rights abuses. Additionally, gaps in  documentation and procedures may limit the effectiveness of State’s  process for vetting prospective recipients of training. The absence of  certain training rosters for Egyptian security forces that received U.S.  training limits the ability of U.S. agencies and third parties to verify  whether these forces were properly vetted in accordance with State’s  policies. This also limits accountability over U.S. efforts to train and equip  Egyptian security forces. State’s lack of procedures for determining when  individuals or subunits may be eligible to receive training, despite being  part of larger entities prohibited from receiving assistance under the  Leahy laws, increases the likelihood that these determinations may be  applied inconsistently. Finally, Embassy Cairo’s minimal use of the  INVEST system as a centralized repository for information on human  rights abuses in Egypt limits the availability of relevant information to  other U.S. officials conducting human rights vetting of candidates for  U.S.-funded training in Egypt.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To strengthen assurances that military equipment sold through direct  commercial sales is used as intended, we recommend that the Secretary  of State take the following action:
Utilize available Blue Lantern outreach programs to help improve the  completeness and timeliness of responses from the Egyptian  government.
To strengthen compliance with the Leahy laws and implementation of  State’s human rights vetting process and to help ensure that U.S. funded  assistance is not provided to Egyptian security forces that have  committed gross violations of human rights, we recommend that the  Secretary of State take the following two actions:
Determine, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the factors  that resulted in some Egyptian security forces not being vetted before  receiving U.S. training, and take steps to address these factors, to  ensure full compliance with human rights vetting requirements for  future training.
As State works to implement a revised version of the INVEST system  that is expected to help facilitate equipment vetting, develop time  frames for establishing corresponding policies and procedures to  implement a vetting process to help enable the U.S. government to  provide a more reasonable level of assurance that equipment is not  transferred to foreign security forces, including those in Egypt, when  there is credible information that a unit has committed a gross  violation of human rights.
To strengthen State’s documentation and procedures related to its human  rights vetting process, we recommend that the Secretary of State take the  following three actions:
Take steps to ensure that State maintains training rosters or similar  records of Egyptian security forces that have received U.S.-funded  training to allow verification that required human rights vetting was  completed before the individual or units received the training.
Issue guidance establishing procedures for determining when  subunits—and individuals within those subunits—are eligible to  receive U.S. assistance when they are part of a larger unit that has  been deemed ineligible to receive assistance under the Leahy laws.
Direct Embassy Cairo to comply with the State requirement to record  relevant information it obtains regarding gross violations of human  rights in INVEST.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of the sensitive but unclassified version of this report  to the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice for  review and comment. State and the Departments of Homeland Security  and Justice provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate. State also provided written comments, which are reproduced  in appendix VI. State generally concurred with our recommendations.  DOD did not provide comments.
State agreed with our recommendation to utilize available Blue Lantern  outreach programs to help improve the completeness and timeliness of  responses from the Egyptian government and noted that it would do so,  subject to restrictions on travel to Egypt and any limitations inherent in the  United States’ current political relations with the Egyptian government.  State also agreed with our recommendation to determine and address the  factors that led to some Egyptian security forces not being vetted before  receiving training and asserted that the department remains committed to  ensuring that perpetrators of gross violations of human rights do not  receive U.S. training or assistance. Additionally, State agreed with our  recommendation to develop time frames for establishing policies and  procedures to provide a more reasonable level of assurance that the  department is complying with the Leahy laws for recipients of equipment.  Although State acknowledged challenges identifying recipients of  equipment across the range of assistance activities, it noted that it would  continue to update its systems—including a new version of the INVEST  system—and procedures to facilitate human rights vetting for recipients of  equipment.
State partially agreed with our recommendation to maintain training  rosters or other records of Egyptian security forces that have received  U.S.-funded training. State indicated that it would attempt to implement  this recommendation but noted resource constraints at Embassy Cairo  may hinder its ability to do so. State also partially agreed with our  recommendation to develop policies and procedures for determining  when individuals and subunits may receive U.S. assistance while part of  larger units that have been deemed ineligible to receive assistance. While  State acknowledged that criteria for making these determinations are not  covered in its guidance, it noted that it already takes such considerations  into account on a case-by-case basis during internal policy deliberations  to restrict or deny assistance and is currently discussing revisions to its  guidance regarding this issue. State agreed with our recommendation  that Embassy Cairo comply with the State requirement to record relevant  information it obtains regarding gross violations of human rights in  INVEST. Accordingly, State noted that it would maintain in INVEST, and  periodically update, a version of the spreadsheet it uses to track Egyptian  security force units of concern and other allegations of human rights  abuses.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30  days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report  to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of State,  Defense, and Homeland Security; and the Attorney General of the United  States. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. GAO staff who  made contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of this review were to examine, for fiscal years 2011  through 2015, the extent to which the U.S. government (1) committed or  disbursed funds allocated for security-related assistance for Egypt, (2)  implemented end-use monitoring for equipment transferred to Egyptian  security forces, and (3) vetted Egyptian recipients of U.S. security-related  assistance for human rights concerns.
To determine the extent to which the U.S. government committed or  disbursed funds allocated for security-related assistance to Egypt in fiscal  years 2011 through 2015, we collected and analyzed data from the  Department of State’s (State) Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance  Resources, by appropriation account, on allocations, unobligated  balances, unliquidated obligations, and commitments or disbursements.  Recognizing that different agencies and bureaus may use slightly  different accounting terms, we provided State with definitions from GAO’s  A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process and requested  that it provide the relevant data according to those definitions. The data  State provided were as of the end of fiscal year 2015. State provided data  on bilateral security assistance from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF);  International Military Education and Training (IMET); International  Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); and Nonproliferation,  Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) accounts.  Because FMF funds are budgeted and tracked differently than for other  foreign assistance accounts, State provided data on FMF funding that  was uncommitted or committed rather than data on unliquidated  obligations and disbursements. To assess the reliability of the data  provided, we requested and reviewed information from State regarding  the agency’s underlying financial data systems and the checks, controls,  and reviews used to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the data  provided. We determined that the data State provided were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of this report. To gather additional information on  the status of assistance to Egypt, we interviewed State and Department  of Defense (DOD) officials and reviewed agency documents to identify  factors that contributed to any unobligated balances and unliquidated  obligations. Finally, we identified any relevant legal authorities related to  these accounts, including the periods of availability for funds to be  obligated from each of these accounts.
To determine the extent to which the U.S. government implemented end- use monitoring for equipment transferred to Egyptian security forces, we  reviewed agency guidance, analyzed end-use monitoring data and  documentation, interviewed U.S. and Egyptian officials, and conducted  on-site inspections of military equipment during fieldwork to Egypt in June  2015. To determine the extent to which DOD implemented Golden Sentry  end-use monitoring for equipment transferred to Egyptian security forces  through government-to-government programs, we reviewed relevant  program guidance in the Security Assistance Management Manual and  standard operating procedures used by the Office of Military  Cooperation–Egypt (OMC-E). We also reviewed the terms and conditions  of the Letters of Offer and Acceptance for transfers of U.S.-origin night  vision devices (NVD) to Egyptian security forces, the Egyptian Ministry of  Defense’s June 2012 control plan for the physical security and  accountability of NVDs, and DOD’s April 2013 criteria for end-use  monitoring of man-portable NVDs. We reviewed a report summarizing the  findings from DOD’s February 2012 Compliance Assessment Visit in  Egypt, two U.S. Central Command Inspector General reports for OMC-E,  and correspondence from OMC-E to the Egyptian Ministry of Defense  communicating end-use monitoring findings. We interviewed or obtained  written information from DOD officials in the Defense Security  Cooperation Agency, Defense Technology Security Administration, and  U.S. Central Command. During fieldwork in Cairo, Egypt, from June 7  through June 11, 2015, we interviewed DOD officials from OMC-E and  Egyptian officials from the Egyptian Armament Authority, a unit within the  Egyptian Armed Forces responsible for overseeing the procurement of  U.S. military equipment and communicating end-use monitoring  requirements to units that use this equipment, according to Egyptian  officials. We reviewed and analyzed data and management reports from  DOD’s Security Cooperation Information Portal database to identify  defense articles provided to Egypt and determine compliance with  enhanced end-use monitoring inventory requirements. We compared the  data with management reports and other documents and determined that  the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our analysis.
Using data provided by DOD, we drew a random sample of Stinger  missiles out of the total number that the U.S. government had transferred  to Egypt through government-to-government programs as of April 2015,  and we inventoried the missiles in our sample by serial number during  fieldwork in Egypt. Our sample was generalizable to the population of  Stinger missiles available for observation. We also requested to inventory  a sample of NVDs subject to enhanced end-use monitoring during our  fieldwork in Egypt, but we were unable to complete this inventory  because the NVD storage facility we visited housed NVDs that were not  subject to enhanced end-use monitoring. During our fieldwork in Egypt,  we also observed DOD officials conducting routine end-use monitoring for  F-16 aircraft. To assess evidence of enhanced and routine end-use  monitoring in Egypt, we reviewed enhanced end-use monitoring physical  security and accountability checklists and routine end-use monitoring  reports.
To determine the extent to which State implemented Blue Lantern end- use monitoring for equipment transferred to Egyptian security forces  through direct commercial sales, we reviewed State guidance on the Blue  Lantern program, including the Blue Lantern Guidebook and the Standard  Operating Procedures for the Blue Lantern program. We also reviewed  relevant cables on the Blue Lantern program. To determine the timeliness  and completeness of responses to Blue Lantern checks, we reviewed the  cables associated with each Blue Lantern check conducted in Egypt in  fiscal years 2011 through 2015. We also reviewed correspondence  between the U.S. embassy in Cairo—in this report, “Embassy Cairo”— and the Egyptian government on Blue Lantern checks conducted from  July 2014 to September 2015. To determine the number, type, and  results of Blue Lantern checks conducted on Egyptian entities in fiscal  years 2011 through 2015, we obtained and analyzed Blue Lantern data  for Egypt. We also used these data in our analysis of the length of time it  took to complete Blue Lantern checks, the commodities subject to the  checks, and the reasons for unfavorable Blue Lantern checks in Egypt in  fiscal years 2011 through 2015. We reviewed the information in the Blue  Lantern cables for consistency with corresponding data in the Blue  Lantern database and determined that the Blue Lantern data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our analysis. In addition, we  analyzed State’s direct commercial sales licensing data on defense  articles exported to Egypt to identify the number of licenses going to  Egyptian end users and intermediaries from fiscal year 2011 to April  2015, as well as State’s determinations on such licenses subject to Blue  Lantern checks during that period. We interviewed State officials in the  Directorate of Defense Trade Controls in Washington, D.C., who are  responsible for managing the Blue Lantern program as well as the State  official at Embassy Cairo who is responsible for conducting Blue Lantern  checks in Egypt. In addition, we interviewed a State official who  conducted Blue Lantern checks in Egypt from December 2012 to April  2014 to obtain information on the extent to which Egypt’s 2013 political  transition affected Blue Lantern checks conducted during that time.
To assess the extent to which the U.S. government vetted Egyptian  security forces for human rights concerns, we reviewed both the State  and DOD Leahy laws. In addition, we analyzed State documents  establishing its policies and procedures for complying with the Leahy laws  and conducting human rights vetting. For example, we analyzed State’s  2012 Leahy vetting guide, State’s 2010 International Vetting and Security  Tracking (INVEST) user guide, and a number of other relevant State  cables and policy documents issued since the beginning of fiscal year  2011 that establish further requirements or provide additional guidance on  various aspects of the human rights vetting process. We also analyzed  DOD’s 2014 implementation guidance for the DOD Leahy law. In addition,  we assessed Embassy Cairo’s 2014 Guide for Leahy Law Human Rights  Vetting, which establishes the embassy’s standard operating procedures  for complying with the Leahy laws. To gather additional information on  human rights vetting in Egypt, we conducted interviews with State officials  from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) and the  Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) who are responsible for conducting  or overseeing human rights vetting in Washington, D.C. DRL officials also  provided us a demonstration of the INVEST system. At Embassy Cairo,  we interviewed State officials from the Political Section who oversee  human rights vetting at the post.
To gather further information on the human rights vetting process at  Embassy Cairo, we interviewed State officials from the International  Narcotics and Law Enforcement Section and the Regional Security Office,  DOD officials from OMC-E, Department of Homeland Security officials  from Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Customs and  Border Protection, and Department of Justice officials from the Federal  Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration. These  officials were responsible for vetting Egyptian security officials for training,  for sponsoring training that required Egyptian participants to be vetted, or  for both. During our fieldwork in Egypt, we also requested to meet with  officials of several Egyptian government ministries to obtain their  perspective on the Leahy laws and U.S. government human rights vetting  efforts; however, according to an Embassy Cairo official, the Egyptian  government did not respond to our request. The Egyptian government  initially approved our request to meet with officials of the Egyptian  Training Authority to discuss human rights vetting for Egyptian military  students; however, the Egyptian Training Authority later declined to  participate in the meeting.
We also analyzed State data on human rights vetting results in Egypt  from the INVEST system for fiscal year 2011 through March 31, 2015, to  determine the extent to which State approved, rejected, suspended, or  cancelled vetting cases for Egyptian officials nominated for U.S.-funded  training. To assess the reliability of the INVEST data, we reviewed  documentation on the INVEST system and conducted interviews with  State officials knowledgeable of the system. We determined that the  INVEST data State provided were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  this report.
To assess the extent to which the U.S. government conducted required  vetting of Egyptian security officials before they received U.S.-funded  training, we collected rosters of Egyptian security forces that received  U.S.-funded training from State and DOD in fiscal year 2011 through  March 31, 2015. In total, we received rosters for training funded through  seven appropriations accounts. These seven accounts included four  State accounts—FMF, IMET, INCLE, and Peacekeeping Operations— and three DOD accounts—the Countering Terrorism Fellowship Program,  the DOD Regional Centers, and Joint Combined Exchange Training.  Using these training rosters, we developed a generalizable random  sample of 166 names from a population of 3,743 Egyptian security forces  that received training funded through these seven accounts during this  period. The sample included names from the roster for each of the seven  accounts. We then cross-checked the names in our sample with human  rights vetting data from the INVEST system to verify that the Egyptian  security forces were vetted before receiving the training. In addition to  receiving rosters for training funded through the seven accounts, we also  requested training rosters from State on Egyptian security forces that had  received training funded through the NADR account. However, State told  us that it was unable to provide this information. As a result, we were not  able to include the NADR account in our sample and we were not able to  assess the extent to which State had completed required human rights  vetting for Egyptian security forces that received training funded through  this account.
To gather additional information on how State ensures compliance with  the Leahy laws for equipment that it provided to Egyptian security forces,  we also reviewed eight State apportionment memos covering all FMF  assistance for Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through 2015. We assessed the  extent to which each of these memos addressed Leahy vetting  compliance in Egypt. Finally, we assessed State’s actions to ensure  compliance with the Leahy laws against standards in its Foreign Affairs  Manual related to creating records and management controls. We also  assessed State’s actions against established internal control standards in  the federal government and against standards established by the Project  Management Institute.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2015 to April 2016 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Overview of Department of Defense’s (DOD) and Department of State’s (State) End-Use Monitoring Programs
paragraphs: DOD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency administers the Golden  Sentry program to monitor the end use of defense articles and defense  services transferred through Foreign Military Sales. Under this program,  DOD implements two levels of end-use monitoring—enhanced and  routine—and conducts periodic Compliance Assessment Visits. DOD  requires enhanced end-use monitoring for sensitive defense articles,  services, or technologies specifically designated by the military  departments’ export policy, the interagency release process, or by DOD  policy as a result of consultation with Congress. DOD requires routine  end-use monitoring for all defense articles and services provided through  government-to-government programs. Routine end-use monitoring is  conducted in conjunction with other security cooperation functions and  uses any readily available source of information.
State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls administers the Blue  Lantern program to monitor the end use of defense articles and services  exported through direct commercial sales. Under its Blue Lantern  program, State is required to conduct end-use monitoring checks based  on a case-by-case review of export license applications against  established criteria for determining potential risks. To determine whether  to conduct a Blue Lantern check, State considers 20 indicators that may  trigger a check, such as unfamiliar end users, foreign intermediate  consignees with no apparent connection to the end user, and requests for  sensitive commodities whose diversion or illicit retransfer could have a  negative impact on U.S. national security.
Table 10 provides an overview of the Golden Sentry and Blue Lantern  end-use monitoring programs.
section_title: Appendix III: Comparison of the Provisions in the Department of State and Department of Defense Leahy Laws
paragraphs: Department of State Leahy law  No assistance shall be furnished under the  Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or the Arms  Export Control Act to any unit of the security  forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State  has credible information that such unit has  committed a gross violation of human rights.
Department of Defense Leahy law  Of the amounts made available to the Department of  Defense, none may be used for any training, equipment,  or other assistance for a unit of a foreign security force if  the Secretary of Defense has credible information that the  unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. The  Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the  Secretary of State, ensure that prior to a decision to  provide any training, equipment, or other assistance to a  unit of a foreign security force full consideration is given to  any credible information available to the Department of  State relating to human rights violations by such unit.
Prohibition does not apply if the Secretary of State  determines and reports to specified congressional  committees that “the government of such country  is taking effective steps to bring the responsible  members of the security forces unit to justice.”
Prohibition does not apply if the Secretary of Defense,  after consultation with the Secretary of State, determines  that the government of such country has taken all  necessary corrective steps, or if the equipment or other  assistance is necessary to assist in disaster relief  operations or other humanitarian or national security  emergencies. Not later than 15 days after the use of the  exception, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the  appropriate congressional committees a report providing  notice of the use of the exception and stating the grounds  for the exception.
The Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the  Secretary of State, may waive the prohibition if he  determines that such a waiver is required by extraordinary  circumstances. Not later than 15 days after the exercise of  any waiver, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report  to the appropriate congressional committees describing  the information related to the gross violation of human  rights; the extraordinary circumstances that necessitate  the waiver; the purpose and duration of the training,  equipment, or other assistance; and the U.S. forces and  the foreign security force unit involved.
In the event that funds are withheld from any unit  pursuant to the law, the Secretary of State shall  promptly inform the foreign government of the  basis for such action and shall, to the maximum  extent practicable, assist the foreign government  in taking effective measures to bring the  responsible members of the security forces to  justice.
Department of Defense Leahy law  The Secretary of Defense shall establish, and periodically  update, procedures to ensure that any information in the  possession of the Department of Defense about gross  violations of human rights by units of foreign security  forces is shared on a timely basis with the Department of  State. ensure that for each country the Department  of State has a current list of all security force  units receiving U.S. training, equipment, or  other types of assistance;  facilitate receipt by the Department of State  and U.S. embassies of information from  individuals and organizations outside the U.S.  government on gross violations of human  rights by security force units;  routinely request and obtain such information  from the Department of Defense, the Central  Intelligence Agency, and other U.S.  government sources;  ensure that such information is evaluated and  preserved;  ensure that when an individual is designated  to receive United States training, equipment,  or other types of assistance the individual’s  unit is vetted as well as the individual;  seek to identify the unit involved when  credible information of a gross violation exists  but the identity of the unit is lacking; and make publicly available, to the maximum  extent practicable, the identity of those units  for which no assistance shall be furnished  pursuant to the law.
The Secretary of Defense shall submit a report to  congressional appropriations committees not later than  March 31, 2015, and annually thereafter through 2024,  providing information on  the total number of cases submitted for vetting, and  the total number of such cases approved, suspended,  or rejected for human rights reasons, non-human  rights reasons, or administrative reasons;  in the case of units rejected for non-human rights  reasons, a detailed description of the reasons relating  to the rejection;  a description of the interagency processes used to  evaluate compliance with vetting requirements; and  any comments from commanders of the combatant  commands about how the Department of Defense  Leahy law affects their theater security cooperation  plans, among other things.
section_title: Appendix IV: Summary of U.S. Security- Related Assistance for Egypt, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, as of September 30, 2015
paragraphs: Table 11 provides a summary of the status of all bilateral security-related  assistance allocated for Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through 2015, as of  September 30, 2015.
section_title: Appendix V: Status of U.S. Security-Related Assistance for Egypt by Account, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, as of September 30, 2015
paragraphs: The U.S. government provides bilateral security-related assistance to  Egypt through a number of accounts, including the Foreign Military  Financing; International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement;  International Military Education and Training; and Nonproliferation, Anti- terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs accounts. Tables 12 through  15 provide information on the status of funds allocated for assistance for  Egypt from these accounts for fiscal years 2011 through 2015, as of the  end of fiscal year 2015.
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Jeff Phillips (Assistant Director),  Drew Lindsey (Analyst-in-Charge), Ryan Vaughan, Rachel Dunsmoor,  Ashley Alley, Tina Cheng, David Dayton, Justin Fisher, Jeff Isaacs, and  Oziel Trevino made key contributions to this report.