Electricity: Federal Efforts to Enhance Grid Resilience
Published: 2017-01-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:
The nation's electricity grid faces potential threats from natural disasters and deliberate attacks. We looked at the federal government's efforts to enhance the grid’s resilience—its ability to adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover from potentially disruptive events (such as the loss of power lines).
The 27 federal efforts to enhance grid resilience focused on enhancing awareness of potential disruptions, coordinating responses, and sharing information between government and private industry (which owns most of the electricity grid). We found these efforts helped enhance and sustain coordination between federal agencies.

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In light of increasing threats to the nation's electricity grid, national policies have stressed the importance of enhancing the grid's resilience—its ability to adapt to changing conditions; withstand potentially disruptive events, such as the loss of power lines; and, if disrupted, to rapidly recover. Most of the electricity grid is owned and operated by private industry, but the federal government has a significant role in promoting the grid's resilience. DOE is the lead agency for federal grid resiliency efforts and is responsible for coordinating with DHS and other relevant federal agencies on these efforts.
GAO was asked to review federal efforts to enhance the resilience of the electricity grid. This report (1) identifies grid resiliency efforts implemented by federal agencies since 2013 and the results of these efforts and (2) examines the extent to which these efforts were fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative, and the extent to which agencies had coordinated the efforts.
GAO reviewed relevant laws and guidance; identified a list of federal grid resiliency efforts; sent a questionnaire to officials at DOE, DHS, and FERC to collect information on each effort and its results; analyzed questionnaire responses and agency documents to assess whether federal efforts were fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative and how agencies coordinated those efforts; and interviewed agency officials and industry group representatives.
This report contains no recommendations. DOE, DHS, and FERC provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reported implementing 27 grid resiliency efforts since 2013 and identified a variety of results from these efforts. The efforts addressed a range of threats and hazards—including cyberattacks, physical attacks, and natural disasters—and supported different types of activities (see table). These efforts also addressed each of the three federal priorities for enhancing the security and resilience of the electricity grid: (1) developing and deploying tools and technologies to enhance awareness of potential disruptions, (2) planning and exercising coordinated responses to disruptive events, and (3) ensuring actionable intelligence on threats is communicated between government and industry in a time-sensitive manner. Agency officials reported a variety of results from these efforts, including the development of new technologies—such as a rapidly-deployable large, high-power transformer—and improved coordination and information sharing between the federal government and industry related to potential cyberattacks.
Federal grid resiliency efforts were fragmented across DOE, DHS, and FERC and overlapped to some degree but were not duplicative. GAO found that the 27 efforts were fragmented in that they were implemented by three agencies and addressed the same broad area of national need: enhancing the resilience of the electricity grid. However, DOE, DHS, and FERC generally tailored their efforts to contribute to their specific missions. For example, DOE's 11 efforts related to its strategic goal to support a more secure and resilient U.S. energy infrastructure. GAO also found that the federal efforts overlapped to some degree but were not duplicative because none had the same goals or engaged in the same activities. For example, three DOE and DHS efforts addressed resiliency issues related to large, high-power transformers, but the goals were distinct—one effort focused on developing a rapidly deployable transformer to use in the event of multiple large, high-power transformer failures; another focused on developing next-generation transformer components with more resilient features; and a third focused on developing a plan for a national transformer reserve. Moreover, officials from all three agencies reported taking actions to coordinate federal grid resiliency efforts, such as serving on formal coordinating bodies that bring together federal, state, and industry stakeholders to discuss resiliency issues on a regular basis, and contributing to the development of federal plans that address grid resiliency gaps and priorities. GAO found that these actions were consistent with key practices for enhancing and sustaining federal agency coordination.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The electricity grid delivers the electricity essential to modern life. As a  result, the reliability of the grid—its ability to meet consumers’ electricity  demand at all times—has been a long-standing area of national interest.  According to the 2015 Quadrennial Energy Review, natural and human- made threats to the grid are increasing and are expected to continue to  grow in frequency and magnitude. In light of these increasing threats and  with recognition that it is not possible to prevent all disruptions to the  electricity grid, government and industry have focused on enhancing the  grid’s resilience. This focus on resilience complements the long-standing  focus on reliability. Resilience represents the grid’s ability to adapt to  changing conditions and withstand potentially  disruptive events—such as  the loss of power plants or power lines—and, if disrupted, to rapidly  recover. In particular, government and industry recently have  emphasized efforts to improve the grid’s resilience to high-consequence,  low-probability events, including severe natural disasters such as  Hurricane Sandy; major geomagnetic disturbances; significant  cyberattacks on computer systems that control parts of the system; and  coordinated terrorist attacks on specific facilities.
The private sector and the government share responsibility for the  resilience of the electricity grid. Most of the electricity grid—the  commercial electric power transmission and distribution system  comprising power lines and other infrastructure—is owned and operated  by private industry. However, federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial  governments also have significant roles in enhancing the resilience of the  electricity grid. In 2013, the President directed federal agencies to work  with owners and operators of critical infrastructure and state, local, tribal,  and territorial governments to take proactive steps to manage risk and  strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure from all  hazards, including natural disasters, cyberattacks, and acts of terrorism.  The Department of Energy (DOE) was designated as the lead agency for  federal resiliency efforts in the energy sector, which includes the  electricity grid. In this role, DOE is responsible for coordinating with the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS), itself responsible for  coordinating the overall federal effort to promote the security and  resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure. DOE is also responsible for  coordinating with other relevant federal agencies and for collaborating  with critical infrastructure owners and operators to prioritize and  coordinate federal resiliency efforts. In addition, the Federal Energy  Regulatory Commission (FERC), which regulates the interstate  transmission of electricity, is responsible for reviewing and approving  standards developed by the North American Electric Reliability  Corporation (NERC) to provide for the reliable operation of the bulk power  system. These standards include requirements for planning and  operating the bulk power system to provide for its reliable operation. For  example, one reliability standard requires that system planners plan and  develop their systems to meet the demand for electricity even if  equipment on the bulk power system, such as a single generating unit or  transformer, is damaged or otherwise unable to operate. According to  FERC officials, these reliability standards can lead to actions that  enhance the resilience of the electricity grid by improving the grids’ ability  to withstand potentially  disruptive events and, if disrupted, to rapidly  recover.
The fact that multiple agencies have roles in enhancing the resilience of  the electricity grid raises questions about the potential for fragmentation,  overlap, or duplication in federal efforts. As we have previously reported,  federal programs can be inefficient or ineffective if they are fragmented,  overlapping, or duplicative. We have routinely reviewed federal programs  to identify any that may pose these problems; each year since 2011, we  have reported on programs that do pose these problems. Fragmentation  occurs when more than one federal agency—or more than one  organization within an agency—is involved in the same broad area of  national need. Overlap occurs when multiple agencies or programs have  similar goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve these  goals, or target similar beneficiaries. Duplication occurs when two or more  agencies or programs have the same goals, are engaged in the same  activities, or provide the same services to the same beneficiaries. We  have previously reported that coordination across programs may help  address fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. We also have reported  that, in some cases, it may be appropriate or beneficial for multiple  agencies or entities to be involved in the same programmatic or policy  area because of the complex nature or magnitude of the federal effort.
In this context, you asked us to review federal efforts to enhance the  resilience of the electricity grid. Our objectives were to identify (1) grid  resiliency efforts implemented by federal agencies since 2013 and their  known results and (2) the extent to which these federal grid resiliency  efforts were fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative, if at all, and the  extent to which agencies have coordinated these efforts.
To conduct this work, we reviewed relevant laws, orders, and guidance  and interviewed agency officials and industry group representatives. To  identify grid resiliency efforts implemented by federal agencies since 2013  and their known results, we first reviewed agency documents and  interviewed DOE, DHS, and FERC officials to develop an initial list of  potentially relevant federal efforts to enhance grid resilience. Next, we  provided each of the three agencies with a list of its potentially relevant  grid resiliency efforts, along with our definitions and criteria, and asked  the agencies to confirm that the listed efforts were relevant, to add any  relevant grid resiliency efforts that were not on the list, and to identify any  other federal agencies that might have implemented relevant grid  resiliency efforts from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2016. If  officials wanted to remove an effort from our list, we requested additional  information to support the removal. Using this process, we determined  that there were 27 federal grid resiliency efforts across the three agencies  that met our criteria.
After identifying these 27 efforts, we developed a questionnaire to collect  additional information from officials at the three agencies about each  effort. This questionnaire included questions to collect information on an  effort’s key characteristics; funding; actions to coordinate internally and  with other federal agencies, states, and industry; and results. We  conducted pretests with officials involved in three different efforts at three  different agencies to check that (1) the questions were clear and  unambiguous, (2) terminology was used correctly, (3) the questionnaire  did not place an undue burden on agency officials, (4) the information  could feasibly be obtained, and (5) the questionnaire was comprehensive  and unbiased. An independent GAO reviewer also reviewed a draft of the  questionnaire prior to its administration. Based on feedback from these  pretests and independent review, we revised the questionnaire to improve  its clarity. We administered the questionnaire and received responses for  each effort, resulting in a response rate of 100 percent. After we  reviewed the responses, we conducted follow-up e-mail exchanges or  telephone discussions with agency officials as needed. Because this was  not a sample questionnaire, it has no sampling errors. To determine  funding levels for the 27 efforts, we asked the agencies about their  obligations for each effort. To assess the reliability of obligations data,  we included questions about the data systems used to generate those  data. Based on the responses we received, we determined that the data  used in this report were of sufficient quality for the purposes of our  reporting objectives. To identify the extent of any fragmentation, overlap,  and duplication among federal grid resiliency efforts, as well as the extent  to which agencies have coordinated those efforts, we analyzed the  information we collected from our questionnaire to determine the extent of  fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in the goals and activities of  federal grid resiliency efforts. We then interviewed agency officials  responsible for federal grid resiliency efforts for follow-up information as  needed. In addition, we used agency documents, questionnaire  responses, and interviews to identify coordination activities within and  among the three agencies and with states and industry. For a copy of our  questionnaire, see appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2016 to January 2017  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Recent national policies and federal preparedness efforts have  highlighted the importance of enhancing the resilience of the nation’s  critical infrastructure, including the electricity grid. Presidential Policy  Directive 21, issued in February 2013, established national policy on  critical infrastructure security and resilience. The directive expanded the  nation’s focus from protecting critical infrastructure against terrorism to  protecting critical infrastructure and increasing its resilience against all  hazards, including natural disasters, terrorism, and cyber incidents. In  addition, the directive recognizes that proactive and coordinated efforts  are necessary to strengthen and maintain critical infrastructure that is  secure and resilient. It also identifies 16 critical infrastructure sectors,  including the energy sector—which encompasses the electricity grid—and  designates lead federal agencies to coordinate and prioritize security and  resiliency activities in each sector. DOE was designated as the lead  federal agency for the energy sector. Reflecting the shift in focus in  Presidential Policy Directive 21, the December 2013 update to the  National Infrastructure Protection Plan elevated security and resilience to  be the primary aim of federal critical infrastructure planning efforts. The  update established a set of broad national goals for critical infrastructure  security and resilience and directed that each of the 16 critical  infrastructure sectors update its sector-specific plan—a planning  document that complements and tailors the application of the National  Infrastructure Protection Plan to the specific characteristics and risks of  each critical infrastructure sector. In response, DOE in 2015 led the  development of an updated Energy Sector-Specific Plan to help guide  and integrate efforts to improve the security and resilience of the energy  sector’s critical infrastructure, including the electricity grid. The plan  identified three federal priorities for enhancing the security and resilience  of the grid: (1) developing and deploying tools and technologies to  enhance awareness of potential disruptions, (2) planning and exercising  coordinated responses to disruptive events, and (3) ensuring actionable  intelligence on threats is communicated between government and industry in a time-sensitive manner. In addition, in 2016 the United States  developed an action plan and issued a joint strategy with Canada for  strengthening the security and resilience of the North American electricity  grid.
As table 1 shows, federal roles and responsibilities related to enhancing  the resilience of the electricity grid are defined in policy and law, including  Presidential Policy Directive 21 and certain provisions of the Fixing  America’s Surface Transportation Act of 2015.
States and industry also play key roles in enhancing the resilience of the  electricity grid. States, through their public utility commissions, regulate  retail electricity service and facility planning and siting. States also enact  policies that can affect the resilience of the portion of the electricity grid  that is within their borders. Industry owns and operates most of the  electricity grid, so the actions that owners and operators take to protect  and maintain their assets can contribute to grid resilience. In addition,  owners and operators of the electricity grid are responsible for complying  with mandatory reliability standards that can contribute to grid resilience.
section_title: Three Federal Agencies Implemented 27 Grid Resiliency Efforts since 2013 and Reported a Variety of Results
paragraphs: DOE, DHS, and FERC reported implementing 27 grid resiliency efforts  since 2013 that supported a range of activities and that addressed  multiple hazards and federal priorities for enhancing the resilience of the  electricity grid. Agency officials reported a variety of results stemming  from these efforts.
subsections: section_title: DOE, DHS, and FERC Efforts Addressed a Range of Activities, Hazards, and Federal Priorities
paragraphs: In response to our questionnaire, DOE, DHS, and FERC officials reported  implementing 27 efforts since 2013 that aimed at enhancing the resilience  of the electricity grid. Of these 27 efforts, 12 were FERC regulatory efforts  tied to the agency’s role in reviewing and approving mandatory reliability  standards for the bulk power system. FERC officials also reported that the  agency oversaw another effort in which it acted on a petition by a private  company to provide regulatory findings related to the company’s plan to  establish a subscription service for spare critical transmission equipment,  including transformers. The remaining 14 efforts—11 implemented by  DOE and 3 by DHS—were programmatic in nature. Federal funding for  the DOE and DHS grid resiliency activities from fiscal year 2013 through  fiscal year 2015 totaled approximately $240 million. The 27 efforts that  DOE, DHS, and FERC officials reported implementing supported a range  of activities, addressed a variety of potential threats and hazards, and  addressed federal priorities for enhancing the resilience of the electricity  grid (see app. II for more information on each effort).
subsections: section_title: Types of Activities
paragraphs: As table 2 shows, the reported federal grid resiliency efforts supported a  range of activities, with the most prevalent being: emergency preparedness and response activities (e.g. providing  coordination, planning, training, and exercise programs to prepare for  potential disaster operations; providing situational awareness during  an event; coordinating response efforts; and helping facilitate system  restoration);  research and development activities (e.g. pursuing tools,  technologies, and demonstrations aimed at bringing new and  innovative technologies to maturity and helping them transition to  industry); modeling, analytics, and risk assessment activities (e.g. modeling,  simulation, and analysis of electricity grid risks and vulnerabilities);  and standard-setting activities (e.g. the development or approval of  standards for industry).
For example, DOE reported that its Strategic Transformer Reserve effort  supported emergency preparedness and response activities through  planning for the potential loss of large, high-power transformers by  evaluating the feasibility of establishing a reserve of those transformers  for use during an emergency. Similarly, FERC reported that its efforts  supported emergency preparedness and response activities as well as  activities to set standards by approving a reliability standard that requires  owners and operators of the electricity grid to develop and implement  procedures to mitigate the potential effects of geomagnetic disturbances  on the bulk power system. In addition, DHS reported that its Recovery  Transformer Program supported research and development activities by  designing and demonstrating a type of rapidly deployable large, high- power transformer for use in the event of the unexpected loss of multiple  large, high-power transformers.
As table 3 shows, the agencies reported that their federal grid resiliency  efforts addressed a range of threats and hazards, including cyberattacks  (i.e. computer-related attacks); physical attacks (e.g. attacks on physical  infrastructure such as targeted shooting of transformers or intentional  downing of power lines); natural disasters (e.g. extreme weather events  and geomagnetic disturbances); and operational accidents (e.g.  unintentional equipment failures or operator error). For example, DOE  and FERC reported implementing several grid resiliency efforts to  address the threat of cyberattacks. DOE’s Electricity Subsector  Cybersecurity Capability Maturity  Model effort was a public-private  partnership that developed a tool kit modeled on a common set of  industry-vetted cybersecurity practices; the effort made this tool kit  available to the electricity industry to help owners and operators evaluate,  prioritize, and improve their cybersecurity capabilities. Similarly, of the 12  reliability standards FERC approved, several require owners and  operators of the electricity grid to take actions to mitigate the threat posed  by cyberattacks on the bulk power system.
As table 4 shows, the reported federal grid resiliency efforts collectively  addressed each of the three federal priorities for enhancing the security  and resilience of the electricity grid that were identified in the 2015 Energy  Sector-Specific Plan. For example, DHS’s Solar Storm Mitigation  effort  addressed the federal priority of developing  and deploying tools and  technologies to enhance awareness of potential disruptions; the effort  addressed this priority by providing owners and operators of the electricity  grid with advanced and actionable information about anticipated impacts  of a solar storm. Similarly, DOE’s Cybersecurity Risk Information Sharing  Program addressed the federal priority to ensure actionable intelligence  on threats is communicated between government and industry in a time- sensitive manner; the effort addressed this priority by facilitating the  timely sharing of unclassified and classified cybersecurity threat information and developing situational awareness tools to better identify,  prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical electricity infrastructure.
section_title: Agencies Reported a Variety of Results from Their Efforts
paragraphs: In their questionnaire responses, agency officials reported a variety of  results from both ongoing and completed federal grid resiliency efforts. As  shown in the selected examples in table 5, these results included the  development, and in some cases the deployment, of new technologies  and analytical tools; the planning and exercising of coordinated  responses to disruptive events; and improved coordination and  information sharing between the federal government and industry related  to potential cyberattacks and other threats or hazards to the electricity  grid.
section_title: Federal Efforts Were Fragmented with Some Overlap but Were Not Duplicative, and Agencies Have Taken Actions to Coordinate Their Efforts
paragraphs: We found that the 27 federal efforts to enhance the resilience of the  electricity grid were fragmented across DOE, DHS, and FERC and  overlapped to some degree, but we did not find any instances of  duplication among these efforts. In their questionnaire responses, agency  officials reported engaging in a number of activities and mechanisms to  coordinate their efforts and avoid duplication. These activities and  mechanisms include serving as members on formal coordinating bodies  that bring together federal, state, and industry stakeholders in the energy  sector to discuss resiliency issues on a regular basis; contributing to the  development of federal plans and reviews that address grid resiliency  gaps and priorities; and participating in direct coordination activities at the  program level.
subsections: section_title: Efforts Were Fragmented Across Agencies with Some Overlap but Were Not Duplicative
paragraphs: According to our analysis of agency questionnaire responses, federal grid  resiliency efforts were fragmented and overlapped to some degree, but  none were duplicative. In addition, industry group representatives we  interviewed did not identify any instances of duplication among federal  grid resiliency efforts.
Fragmentation. The 27 federal efforts to enhance the resilience of the  electricity grid were fragmented in that they were implemented by three  different agencies—DOE, DHS, and FERC—and addressed the same  broad area of national need: enhancing the resilience of the electricity  grid. We have previously reported that fragmentation has the potential to  result in duplication of resources. For example, fragmentation can lead  to technical or administrative functions being managed separately by  individual agencies, when these functions could be shared among  programs. However, we also have reported that fragmentation, by itself, is  not an indication that unnecessary duplication of efforts or activities  exists. There can be advantages to having multiple federal agencies  involved in a broad area of national need; for example, agencies can  tailor initiatives to suit their specific missions and needs, among other  things. In the case of federal grid resiliency efforts, we found that DOE,  DHS, and FERC generally have tailored their efforts to contribute to their  specific missions and needs. For example, DOE’s 11 efforts related to its  strategic goal to support a more secure and resilient U.S. energy  infrastructure; DHS’s 3 efforts addressed its strategic priority to enhance  critical infrastructure security and resilience by, among other things,  promoting resilient critical infrastructure design; and FERC’s 13 efforts  related to the agency’s roles in reviewing and approving reliability  standards and regulating the interstate transmission of electricity.  Moreover, fragmentation of federal grid resiliency efforts within agencies  is limited—10 of the 11 DOE efforts, all 13 FERC efforts, and all 3 DHS  efforts were implemented by one organization within each respective  agency.
Overlap. We found that 23 of the 27 federal grid resiliency efforts  overlapped to some degree with at least one other effort in that they  addressed similar goals. These overlaps included:
12 efforts with similar goals related to enhancing the cybersecurity of
4 with similar goals related to enhancing the resilience and availability  of large, high-power transformers;
3 with similar goals related to enhancing the grid’s resilience to
2 with similar goals related to enhancing energy storage technology;
2 with similar goals related to enhancing the resilience of the grid’s  distribution system.
As figure 1 illustrates, we also found that all but one federal grid resiliency  effort overlapped to some degree with at least one other effort by  supporting similar types of activities to achieve their goals.
Duplication. We did not find any instances of duplication among the 27  federal grid resiliency efforts because none of the efforts had the same  goals or engaged in the same activities. For example, although 4 efforts  overlapped in that they had similar goals related to enhancing the  resilience of large, high-power transformers and improving their  availability,  those efforts were not duplicative because their goals were  not the same. Specifically, DHS’s Recovery Transformer Program, begun  in 2008 and completed in 2014, aimed to design and demonstrate a  rapidly deployable large, high-power transformer that could be used to  enable rapid recovery of the grid in the event of multiple large, high-power  transformer failures. In contrast, DOE’s Transformer Resilience and  Advanced Components Program, launched in 2016, is focused on  ensuring the resilience of aging transformers and accelerating the  development, demonstration, and deployment of next-generation  transformer components. Furthermore, DOE’s Strategic Transformer  Reserve effort is an analytical and planning activity with a goal of  developing a plan for Congress related to establishing a strategic  transformer reserve. Similarly, a fourth effort led by FERC was distinct  from the other three efforts in that its goal was to act on a petition from a  private company for regulatory findings related to the company’s plan to  establish a subscription service for spare critical transmission equipment,  including transformers.
section_title: Agencies Reported Coordinating Efforts through Formal Coordinating Bodies, Joint Planning, and Other Activities
paragraphs: In their questionnaire responses, DOE, DHS, and FERC reported  coordinating with each other on their federal grid resiliency efforts through  a variety of activities and mechanisms. In particular, agency officials  associated with all of the programmatic efforts that we identified as having  overlapping characteristics (in that they supported similar goals and types  of activities) reported coordinating with other federal agencies.  Furthermore, many reported coordinating their efforts with states, and  most also reported coordinating their efforts with industry. Coordination is  important because, as we have previously reported, it can preserve  scarce funds and enhance the overall effectiveness of federal efforts.
We also have previously reported that coordination across programs may  help address fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. We found that  coordination activities and mechanisms among DOE, DHS, and FERC  were consistent with key practices we have previously identified that can  help enhance and sustain federal agency coordination, such as (1)  defining and articulating a common outcome; (2) establishing joint  strategies, which helps align activities, core processes, and resources to  accomplish a common outcome; (3) leveraging resources, which helps  obtain additional benefits that would not be available if agencies or offices  were working separately; and (4) developing mechanisms to monitor,  evaluate, and report on results. We analyzed and grouped into seven  categories the various coordination activities and mechanisms that  agency officials reported in their questionnaire responses. These  categories and examples of specific activities are:
Participating in formal coordinating bodies. Agency officials  reported participating in several formally established coordinating  bodies. In particular, DOE and DHS officials identified the Electricity  Subsector Coordinating Council and the Energy Sector Government  Coordinating Council as key mechanisms that help coordinate grid  resiliency efforts across federal agencies and with states and industry  stakeholders. According to the Electricity Subsector Coordinating  Council’s charter, the council’s purpose includes coordinating  activities and initiatives designed to improve the reliability and  resilience of the electricity subsector, including the electricity grid, and  serving as the principal liaison between the council’s membership and  the Energy Sector Government Coordinating Council. The Energy  Sector Government Coordinating Council is the government  counterpart of the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council, and its  purpose is to enable interagency and cross-jurisdictional coordination  on planning, implementing, and executing resilience programs for the  nation’s critical energy infrastructure. Agency officials told us that  federal grid resiliency efforts and their results are discussed at  meetings of these two councils as a way to share information,  coordinate efforts, and avoid duplication. We have previously found  that federal programs that contribute to the same or similar results  should collaborate to ensure that goals are consistent and, as  appropriate, program efforts are mutually reinforcing.
Contributing to federal planning efforts. Agency officials reported  contributing to federal plans and reviews that addressed grid  resiliency gaps and priorities. For example, DOE and DHS officials  said they contributed to the development of the 2015 Quadrennial  Energy Review, which, among other things, assessed the  vulnerabilities of the electricity grid and recommended ways to  enhance its resilience. Agency officials also told us that they  collaborated on the development of the 2015 Energy Sector-Specific  Plan, which identified three federal priorities for enhancing the security  and resilience of the electricity grid. We have previously reported  that it is important for collaborating agencies to establish strategies  that work in concert with those of their partners or that are joint in  nature, because such strategies help align the agencies’ activities to  accomplish a common outcome.
Maintaining a record of federal, state, and industry efforts. DOE  officials reported that the agency maintains a record of federal-, state-,  and industry-critical energy sector infrastructure programs and  initiatives; this record includes federal grid resiliency efforts. Officials  told us that they update the record, which was created in 2013, as  new programs and initiatives are identified at meetings of the  Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council and the Energy Sector  Government Coordinating Council. DOE officials said that they use  the record as an internal tool for tracking energy-sector programs and  initiatives and as a means to share information about those efforts  with federal, state, and industry stakeholders, as needed. We have  previously found that it is important for federal agencies engaged in  collaborative efforts to create the means to monitor and evaluate their  efforts. Furthermore, we have concluded that developing and  maintaining a record of federal efforts with similar goals can improve  visibility over the full range of those efforts and reduce the potential for  duplication.
Participating in formal joint efforts. Some agency officials reported  that their grid resiliency efforts were joint efforts with other federal  agencies or industry partners. For example, DHS officials reported  that both the Resilient Electric Grid Program and the Recovery  Transformer Program were jointly funded by DHS and industry under  formal agreements. Similarly, DOE officials reported that the  Cybersecurity Risk Information Sharing Program was a formal joint  effort of DOE, the federal intelligence community, and NERC. We  have previously found that by leveraging partner resources, agencies  can obtain additional benefits that would not be available if they  worked separately.
Soliciting input from stakeholders. Some agency officials reported  formally soliciting input on their grid resiliency efforts from federal,  state, and industry stakeholders. For example, FERC officials  reported that they formally seek comments on proposed reliability  standards and routinely receive comments from federal, state, and  industry stakeholders. FERC officials said that the agency considers  these comments when determining whether to approve a reliability  standard and, as a result of these comments, in some cases directs  NERC to make changes in proposed standards. Similarly, DOE  officials responsible for the Strategic Transformer Reserve effort  reported seeking input from relevant federal agencies—including  DHS, the Department of Defense (DOD), and FERC—states, industry,  and others as they developed their analysis.
Sponsoring and participating in conferences, webinars, and  workshops. Agency officials reported sponsoring and participating in  conferences, webinars, and workshops that included discussions  about grid resiliency priorities and how to address those priorities  among federal, state, and industry stakeholders. For example, officials  who implement DOE’s Electric Distribution Grid Resilience Research  and Development Program reported that they held a workshop with  stakeholders to define in greater detail research and development  needs related to the distribution grid’s resilience. We have previously  found that collaboration can help agencies define and articulate the  common federal outcome.
Coordinating directly through agency staff. Agency officials also  reported that agency staff responsible for grid resiliency efforts  pursued a number of informal activities to directly coordinate these  efforts with related federal and industry efforts; these activities  included periodic meetings, telephone calls, and e-mails to coordinate  and share information. We have previously reported that frequent  communication among collaborating agencies is a means to facilitate  working across agency boundaries.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft copy of this report to DOD, DOE, DHS, and FERC for  review and comment. DOE, DHS, and FERC provided technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD indicated it had  no comments on the report.
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If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs are on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the Resilience of the Electricity Grid
section_title: Appendix II: Characteristics of Efforts to Enhance the Resilience of the Electricity Grid at Three Federal Agencies
paragraphs: We identified 27 efforts across three agencies—the Department of  Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)—that aimed to enhance  the resilience of the electricity grid. Tables 6, 7, and 8 provide  descriptions of the efforts at each agency as agency officials reported in  their responses to our questionnaire and as we identified in agency  documents.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Other key contributors to this report were Jon Ludwigson, Assistant  Director; Stephanie Gaines; and David Marroni. Important contributions  were also made by Ben Atwater, Antoinette Capaccio, Nancy Crothers,  Laura Durland, Philip Farah, Cindy Gilbert, Brian Lepore, Dan Royer,  Stephen Sanford, Marylynn  Sergent, Maria Stattel, Barbara Timmerman,  and Greg Wilshusen.