Nuclear Security: DOE Must Address Significant Issues to Meet the Requirements of the New Design Basis Threat
Published: 2004-04-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: A successful terrorist attack on Department of Energy (DOE) sites containing nuclear weapons or the material used in nuclear weapons could have devastating consequences for the site and its surrounding communities. Because of these risks, DOE needs an effective safeguards and security program. A key component of an effective program is the design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies, among other things, the potential size and capabilities of terrorist forces. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, rendered the then-current DBT obsolete, resulting in DOE issuing a new version in May 2003. GAO (1) identified why DOE took almost 2 years to develop a new DBT, (2) analyzed the higher threat in the new DBT, and (3) identified remaining issues that need to be resolved in order for DOE to meet the threat contained in the new DBT.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOE took a series of actions in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While each of these has been important, in and of themselves, they are not sufficient to ensure that all of DOE's sites are adequately prepared to defend themselves against the higher terrorist threat present in the post September 11, 2001 world. Specifically, GAO found that DOE took almost 2 years to develop a new DBT because of (1) delays in developing an intelligence community assessment--known as the Postulated Threat--of the terrorist threat to nuclear weapon facilities, (2) DOE's lengthy comment and review process for developing policy, and (3) sharp debates within DOE and other government organizations over the size and capabilities of future terrorist threats and the availability of resources to meet these threats. While the May 2003 DBT identifies a larger terrorist threat than did the previous DBT, the threat identified in the new DBT, in most cases, is less than the threat identified in the intelligence community's Postulated Threat, on which the DBT has been traditionally based. The new DBT identifies new possible terrorist acts such as radiological, chemical, or biological sabotage. However, the criteria that DOE has selected for determining when facilities may need to be protected against these forms of sabotage may not be sufficient. For example, for chemical sabotage, the 2003 DBT requires sites to protect to "industry standards;" however, such standards currently do not exist. DOE has been slow to resolve a number of significant issues, such as issuing additional DBT implementation guidance, developing DBT implementation plans, and developing budgets to support these plans, that may affect the ability of its sites to fully meet the threat contained in the new DBT in a timely fashion. Consequently, DOE's deadline to meet the requirements of the new DBT by the end of fiscal year 2006 is probably not realistic for some sites.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work for this Subcommittee  on physical security at the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National  Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)—a separately organized agency  within DOE. Specifically, today we are issuing our report, Nuclear  Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues Before It Fully Meets  the New Design Basis Threat (GAO-04-623).
DOE has long recognized that a successful terrorist attack on a site  containing nuclear weapons or the material used in nuclear weapons— called special nuclear material—could have devastating consequences for  the site and its surrounding communities. Because terrorist attacks against  sites that contain special nuclear material could have such devastating  consequences, DOE’s effective management of the safeguards and security  program, which includes developing safeguards and security policies, is  essential to preventing an unacceptable, adverse impact on national  security. For many years, DOE has employed risk-based security  practices. To manage potential risks, DOE has developed a design basis  threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies the potential size and  capabilities of terrorist forces. DOE’s DBT is based on an intelligence  community assessment known as the Postulated Threat. DOE requires the  contractors operating its sites to provide sufficient protective forces and  equipment to defend against the threat contained in the DBT. The DBT in  effect on September 11, 2001, had been DOE policy since June 1999. DOE  replaced the 1999 DBT in May 2003 to better reflect the current and  projected terrorist threats that resulted from the September 11, 2001,  attacks.
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, you asked us to  review physical security at DOE sites that have facilities with Category I  special nuclear material. Category I special nuclear material includes  specified quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in forms of  assembled nuclear weapons and test devices, major nuclear components,  and other high-grade materials such as solutions and oxides. Specifically,  we examined, among other things, (1) the reasons DOE needed almost 2  years to develop a new DBT; (2) the higher threat contained in the new  DBT; and (3) the remaining issues that need to be resolved in order for  DOE to fully defend against the threat contained in the new DBT.
To carry out our objectives, we reviewed draft DBTs, the final May 2003  DBT, and DOE policy and planning documents, including orders,  implementation guidance, and reports. We met with officials from DOE  and NNSA headquarters and field offices. We obtained information  primarily from DOE’s Office of Security, Office of Independent Oversight  and Performance Assurance, and Office of Environmental Management;  NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Security; and NNSA’s Nuclear  Safeguards and Security Program. We visited all three of NNSA’s three  design laboratories and its two production plants that possess Category I  special nuclear material, as well as NNSA’s Office of Secure  Transportation. We also visited the four EM sites that, at the time,  contained Category I special nuclear materials. At each site we met with  both federal and contractor officials and reviewed pertinent supporting  documentation. We also discussed postulated terrorist threats to nuclear  weapon facilities with two Department of Defense (DOD) organizations:  the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,  Communications, and Intelligence; and the Defense Intelligence Agency.  We also reviewed The Postulated Threat to U.S. Nuclear Weapon  Facilities and Other Selected Strategic Facilities, henceforth referred to  as the Postulated Threat, which is the intelligence community’s January  2003 official assessment of potential terrorist threats to nuclear weapon  facilities.
We performed our work from December 2001 through April 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
In summary, we found that while DOE has taken some important actions  in its response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DOE  struggled to develop its new DBT. The DBT that DOE ultimately  developed, however, is substantially more demanding than the previous  one. Because the new DBT is more demanding and because DOE wants to  implement new protective strategies within 2 years, DOE must press  forward with additional actions to ensure that it is fully prepared to  provide a timely and cost effective defense of its most sensitive facilities.  Specifically, we found the following:    Development of the new DBT took almost 2 years because of (1) delays in  developing an intelligence community assessment—known as the  Postulated Threat—of the terrorist threat to nuclear weapon facilities, (2)  DOE’s lengthy comment and review process for developing policy, and (3)  sharp debates within DOE and other government organizations over the  size and capabilities of future terrorist threats and the availability of  resources to meet these threats.
While the May 2003 DBT identifies a larger terrorist threat than did the  previous DBT, the threat identified in the new DBT, in most cases, is less  than the threat identified in the intelligence community’s Postulated  Threat, on which the DBT has been traditionally based. The new DBT  identifies new possible terrorist acts such as radiological, chemical, or  biological sabotage. However, the criteria that DOE has selected for  determining when facilities may need to be protected against these forms  of sabotage may not be sufficient. For example, for chemical sabotage, the  2003 DBT requires sites to protect to “industry standards;” however, such  standards currently do not exist.
DOE has been slow to resolve a number of significant issues, such as  issuing additional DBT implementation guidance, developing DBT  implementation plans, and developing budgets to support these plans, that  may affect the ability of its sites to fully meet the threat contained in the  new DBT in a timely fashion. Consequently, DOE’s deadline to meet the  requirements of the new DBT by the end of fiscal year 2006 is probably not  realistic for some sites.
In our report to you, we made seven recommendations to the Secretary of  Energy that are intended to strengthen DOE’s ability to meet the  requirements of the new DBT, improve the department’s ability to deal  with future terrorist threats, and better inform Congress on departmental  progress in meeting the threat contained in the new DBT and reducing  risks to critical facilities at DOE sites. DOE did not comment specifically  on our recommendations other than to say that the department would  consider them as part of its Departmental Management Challenges for  2004. DOE has identified the DBT as a major departmental initiative within  the National Security Management Challenge.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Category I special nuclear materials are present at the three design  laboratories—the Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New  Mexico; the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore,  California; and the Sandia National Laboratory in Albuquerque, New  Mexico—and two production sites—the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas,  and the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, operated by NNSA. Special  nuclear material is also present at former production sites, including the  Savannah River Site in Savannah River, South Carolina, and the Hanford  Site in Richland, Washington. These former sites are now being cleaned up  by DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (EM). Furthermore,  NNSA’s Office of Secure Transportation transports these materials among  the sites and between the sites and DOD bases. Contractors operate each  site for DOE. NNSA and EM have field offices collocated with each site. In  fiscal year 2004, NNSA and EM expect to spend nearly $900 million on  physical security at their sites. Physical security combines security  equipment, personnel, and procedures to protect facilities, information,  documents, or material against theft, sabotage, diversion, or other criminal  acts.
In addition to NNSA and EM, DOE has other important security  organizations. DOE’s Office of Security develops and promulgates orders  and policies, such as the DBT, to guide the department’s safeguards and  security programs. DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight and  Performance Assurance supports the department by, among other things,  independently evaluating the effectiveness of contractors’ performance in  safeguards and security. It also performs follow-up reviews to ensure that  contractors have taken effective corrective actions and appropriately  addressed weaknesses in safeguards and security. Under a recent  reorganization, these two offices were incorporated into the new Office of  Security and Safety Performance Assurance. Each office, however, retains  its individual missions, functions, structure, and relationship to the other.
The risks associated with Category I special nuclear materials vary but  include the nuclear detonation of a weapon or test device at or near design  yield, the creation of improvised nuclear devices capable of producing a  nuclear yield, theft for use in an illegal nuclear weapon, and the potential  for sabotage in the form of radioactive dispersal. Because of these risks,  DOE has long employed risk-based security practices.
The key component of DOE’s well-established, risk-based security  practices is the DBT, a classified document that identifies the  characteristics of the potential threats to DOE assets. The DBT has been  traditionally based on a classified, multiagency intelligence community  assessment of potential terrorist threats, known as the Postulated Threat.  The DBT considers a variety of threats in addition to the terrorist threat.  Other adversaries considered in the DBT include criminals, psychotics,  disgruntled employees, violent activists, and spies. The DBT also considers  the threat posed by insiders, those individuals who have authorized,  unescorted access to any part of DOE facilities and programs. Insiders  may operate alone or may assist an adversary group. Insiders are routinely  considered to provide assistance to the terrorist groups found in the DBT.  The threat from terrorist groups is generally the most demanding threat  contained in the DBT.
DOE counters the terrorist threat specified in the DBT with a multifaceted  protective system. While specific measures vary from site to site, all  protective systems at DOE’s most sensitive sites employ a defense-in- depth concept that includes sensors, physical barriers, hardened facilities  and vaults, and heavily armed paramilitary protective forces equipped with  such items as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body armor,  and chemical protective gear.
Depending on the material, protective systems at DOE Category I special  nuclear material sites are designed to accomplish the following objectives  in response to the terrorist threat:    Denial of access. For some potential terrorist objectives, such as the  creation of an improvised nuclear device, DOE may employ a protection  strategy that requires the engagement and neutralization of adversaries  before they can acquire hands-on access to the assets.
Denial of task. For nuclear weapons or nuclear test devices that terrorists  might seek to steal, DOE requires the prevention and/or neutralization of  the adversaries before they can complete a specific task, such as stealing  such devices.
Containment with recapture. Where the theft of nuclear material (instead  of a nuclear weapon) is the likely terrorist objective, DOE requires that  adversaries not be allowed to escape the facility and that DOE protective  forces recapture the material as soon as possible. This objective requires  the use of specially trained and well-equipped special response teams.
The effectiveness of the protective system is formally and regularly  examined through vulnerability assessments. A vulnerability assessment is  a systematic evaluation process in which qualitative and quantitative  techniques are applied to detect vulnerabilities and arrive at effective  protection of specific assets, such as special nuclear material. To conduct  such assessments, DOE uses, among other things, subject matter experts,  such as U.S. Special Forces; computer modeling to simulate attacks; and  force-on-force performance testing, in which the site’s protective forces  undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists.
The results of these assessments are documented at each site in a  classified document known as the Site Safeguards and Security Plan. In  addition to identifying known vulnerabilities, risks, and protection  strategies for the site, the Site Safeguards and Security Plan formally  acknowledges how much risk the contractor and DOE are willing to  accept. Specifically, for more than a decade, DOE has employed a risk  management approach that seeks to direct resources to its most critical  assets—in this case Category I special nuclear material—and mitigate the  risks to these assets to an acceptable level. Levels of risk—high, medium,  and low—are assigned classified numerical values and are derived from a  mathematical equation that compares a terrorist group’s capabilities with  the overall effectiveness of the crucial elements of the site’s protective  forces and systems.
Historically, DOE has striven to keep its most critical assets at a low risk  level and may insist on immediate compensatory measures should a  significant vulnerability develop that increases risk above the low risk  level. Compensatory measures could include such things as deploying  additional protective forces or curtailing operations until the asset can be  better protected. In response to a September 2000 DOE Inspector  General’s report recommending that DOE establish a policy on what  actions are required once high or moderate risk is identified, in September  2003, DOE’s Office of Security issued a policy clarification stating that  identified high risks at facilities must be formally reported to the Secretary  of Energy or Deputy Secretary within 24 hours. In addition, under this  policy clarification, identified high and moderate risks require corrective  actions and regular reporting.
Through a variety of complementary measures, DOE ensures that its  safeguards and security policies are being complied with and are  performing as intended. Contractors perform regular self-assessments and  are encouraged to uncover any problems themselves. DOE Orders also  require field offices to comprehensively survey contractors’ operations for  safeguards and security every year. DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight  and Performance Assurance provides yet another check through its  comprehensive inspection program. All deficiencies identified during  surveys and inspections require the contractors to take corrective action.
section_title: Development of the New DBT Took Almost 2 Years Because of Delays in Developing the Postulated Threat and DOE’s Lengthy Review and Comment Process
paragraphs: In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, DOE officials realized  that the then current DBT, issued in April 1999 and based on a 1998  intelligence community assessment, was obsolete. The September 11,  2001, terrorist attacks suggested larger groups of terrorists, larger vehicle  bombs, and broader terrorist aspirations to cause mass casualties and  panic than were envisioned in the 1999 DOE DBT. However, formally  recognizing these new threats by updating the DBT was difficult and took  21 months because of delays in issuing the Postulated Threat, debates over  the size of the future threat and the cost to meet it, and the DOE policy  process.
As mentioned previously, DOE’s new DBT is based on a study known as  the Postulated Threat, which was developed by the U.S. intelligence  community. The intelligence community originally planned to complete  the Postulated Threat by April 2002; however, the document was not  completed and officially released until January 2003, about 9 months  behind the original schedule. According to DOE and DOD officials, this  delay resulted from other demands placed on the intelligence community  after September 11, 2001, as well as from sharp debates among the  organizations developing the Postulated Threat over the size and  capabilities of future terrorist threats and the resources needed to meet  these threats.
While waiting for the new Postulated Threat, DOE developed several  drafts of its new DBT. During this process, debates, similar to those that  occurred during the development of the Postulated Threat, emerged in  DOE. Like the participants responsible for developing the Postulated  Threat, during the development of the DBT, DOE officials debated the size  of the future terrorist threat and the costs to meet it. DOE officials at all  levels told us that concern over resources played a large role in developing  the 2003 DBT, with some officials calling the DBT the “funding basis  threat,” or the maximum threat the department could afford. This tension  between threat size and resources is not a new development. According to  a DOE analysis of the development of prior DBTs, political and budgetary  pressures and the apparent desire to reduce the requirements for the size  of protective forces appear to have played a significant role in determining  the terrorist group numbers contained in prior DBTs.
Finally, DOE developed the DBT using DOE’s policy process, which  emphasizes developing consensus through a review and comment process  by program offices, such as EM and NNSA. However, many DOE and  contractor officials found that the policy process for developing the new  DBT was laborious and not timely, especially given the more dangerous  threat environment that has existed since September 11, 2001. As a result,  during the time it took DOE to develop the new DBT, its sites were only  required to defend against the terrorist group defined in the 1999 DBT,  which, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, DOE officials realized was  obsolete.
section_title: The May 2003 DBT Identifies a Larger Terrorist Threat, but in Most Cases is Less Than the Terrorist Threat Identified by the Postulated Threat
paragraphs: While the May 2003 DBT identifies a larger terrorist group than did the  previous DBT, the threat identified in the new DBT, in most cases, is less  than the terrorist threat identified in the intelligence community’s  Postulated Threat. The Postulated Threat estimated that the force  attacking a nuclear weapons site would probably be a relatively small  group of terrorists, although it was possible that an adversary might use a  greater number of terrorists if that was the only way to attain an important  strategic goal. In contrast to the Postulated Threat, DOE is preparing to  defend against a significantly smaller group of terrorists attacking many of  its facilities. Specifically, only for its sites and operations that handle  nuclear weapons is DOE currently preparing to defend against an  attacking force that approximates the lower range of the threat identified  in the Postulated Threat. For its other Category I special nuclear material  sites, all of which fall under the Postulated Threat’s definition of a nuclear  weapons site, DOE is requiring preparations to defend against a terrorist  force significantly smaller than was identified in the Postulated Threat.  DOE calls this a graded threat approach.
Some of these other sites, however, may have improvised nuclear device  concerns that, if successfully exploited by terrorists, could result in a  nuclear detonation. Nevertheless, under the graded threat approach, DOE  requires these sites only to be prepared to defend against a smaller force  of terrorists than was identified by the Postulated Threat. Officials in  DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance  disagreed with this approach and noted that sites with improvised nuclear  device concerns should be held to the same requirements as facilities that  possess nuclear weapons and test devices since the potential worst-case  consequence at both types of facilities would be the same—a nuclear  detonation. Other DOE officials and an official in DOD’s Office of the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications,  and Intelligence disagreed with the overall graded threat approach,  believing that the threat should not be embedded in the DBT by adjusting  the number of terrorists that might attack a particular target.
DOE Office of Security officials cited three reasons for why the  department departed from the Postulated Threat’s assessment of the  potential size of terrorist forces. First, these officials stated that they  believed that the Postulated Threat only applied to sites that handled  completed nuclear weapons and test devices. However, both the 2003  Postulated Threat, as well as the preceding 1998 Postulated Threat, state  that the threat applies to nuclear weapons and special nuclear material  without making any distinction between them. Second, DOE Office of  Security officials believed that the higher threat levels contained in the  2003 Postulated Threat represented the worst potential worldwide  terrorist case over a 10-year period. These officials noted that while some  U.S. assets, such as military bases, are located in parts of the world where  terrorist groups receive some support from local governments and  societies thereby allowing for an expanded range of capabilities, DOE  facilities are located within the United States, where terrorists would have  a more difficult time operating. Furthermore, DOE Office of Security  officials stated that the DBT focuses on a nearer-term threat of 5 years. As  such, DOE Office of Security officials said that they chose to focus on  what their subject matter experts believed was the maximum, credible,  near-term threat to their facilities. However, while the 1998 Postulated  Threat made a distinction between the size of terrorist threats abroad and  those within the United States, the 2003 Postulated Threat, reflecting the  potential implications of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, did not  make this distinction. Finally, DOE Office of Security officials stated that  the Postulated Threat document represented a reference guide instead of a  policy document that had to be rigidly followed. The Postulated Threat  does acknowledge that it should not be used as the sole consideration to  dictate specific security requirements and that decisions regarding  security risks should be made and managed by decision makers in policy  offices. However, DOE has traditionally based its DBT on the Postulated  Threat. For example, the prior DBT, issued in 1999, adopted exactly the  same terrorist threat size as was identified by the 1998 Postulated Threat.
Finally, the department’s criteria for determining the severity of  radiological, chemical, and biological sabotage may be insufficient. For  example, the criterion used for protection against radiological sabotage is  based on acute radiation dosages received by individuals. However, this  criterion may not fully capture or characterize the damage that a major  radiological dispersal at a DOE site might cause. For example, according  to a March 2002 DOE response to a January 23, 2002, letter from  Representative Edward J. Markey, a worst-case analysis at one DOE site  showed that while a radiological dispersal would not pose immediate,  acute health problems for the general public, the public could experience  measurable increases in cancer mortality over a period of decades after  such an event. Moreover, releases at the site could also have  environmental consequences requiring hundreds of millions to billions of  dollars to clean up. Contamination could also affect habitability for tens of  miles from the site, possibly affecting hundreds of thousands of residents  for many years. Likewise, the same response showed that a similar event  at a NNSA site could result in a dispersal of plutonium that could  contaminate several hundred square miles and ultimately cause thousands  of cancer deaths. For chemical sabotage standards, the 2003 DBT requires  sites to protect to industry standards. However, we reported March 2003  year that such standards currently do not exist. Specifically, we found  that no federal laws explicitly require chemical facilities to assess  vulnerabilities or take security actions to safeguard their facilities against  a terrorist attack. Finally, the protection criteria for biological sabotage  are based on laboratory safety standards developed by the U.S. Centers for  Disease Control and not physical security standards.
section_title: DOE Has Been Slow to Resolve a Number of Significant Issues That May Affect the Ability of its Sites to Fully Meet the Threat Contained in the New DBT
paragraphs: While DOE issued the final DBT in May 2003, it has only recently resolved  a number of significant issues that may affect the ability of its sites to fully  meet the threat contained in the new DBT in a timely fashion and is still  addressing other issues. Fully resolving all of these issues may take several  years, and the total cost of meeting the new threats is currently unknown.  Because some sites will be unable to effectively counter the higher threat  contained in the new DBT for up to several years, these sites should be  considered to be at higher risk under the new DBT than they were under  the old DBT.
In order to undertake the necessary range of vulnerability assessments to  accurately evaluate their level of risk under the new DBT and implement  necessary protective measures, DOE recognized that it had to complete a  number of key activities. DOE only recently completed three of these key  activities. First, in February 2004, DOE issued its revised Adversary  Capabilities List, which is a classified companion document to the DBT,  that lists the potential weaponry, tactics, and capabilities of the terrorist  group described in the DBT. This document has been amended to include,  among other things, heavier weaponry and other capabilities that are  potentially available to terrorists who might attack DOE facilities. DOE is  continuing to review relevant intelligence information for possible  incorporation into future revisions of the Adversary Capabilities List.
Second, DOE also only recently provided additional DBT implementation  guidance. In a July 2003 report, DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight  and Performance Assurance noted that DOE sites had found initial DBT  implementation guidance confusing. For example, when the Deputy  Secretary of Energy issued the new DBT in May 2003, the cover memo said  the new DBT was effective immediately but that much of the DBT would  be implemented in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. According to a 2003 report  by the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, many  DOE sites interpreted this implementation period to mean that they  should, through fiscal year 2006, only be measured against the previous,  less demanding 1999 DBT.
In response to this confusion, the Deputy Secretary issued further  guidance in September 2003 that called for the following, among other  things:    DOE’s Office of Security to issue more specific guidance by October 22,  2003, regarding DBT implementation expectations, schedules, and  requirements. DOE issued this guidance January 30, 2004.
Quarterly reports showing sites’ incremental progress in meeting the new  DBT for ongoing activities. The first series of quarterly progress reports  may be issued in July 2004.
Immediate compliance with the new DBT for new and reactivated  operations.
A third important DBT-related issue was just completed in early April  2004. A special team created in the 2003 DBT, composed of weapons  designers and security specialists, finalized its report on each site’s  improvised nuclear device vulnerabilities. The results of this report were  briefed to senior DOE officials in March 2004 and the Deputy Secretary of  Energy issued guidance, based on this report, to DOE sites in early April  2004. As a result, some sites may be required under the 2003 DBT to shift  to enhanced protection strategies, which could be very costly. This special  team’s report may most affect EM sites because their improvised nuclear  device potential had not previously been explored.
Finally, DOE’s Office of Security has not completed all of the activities  associated with the new vulnerability assessment methodology it has been  developing for over a year. DOE’s Office of Security believes this  methodology, which uses a new mathematical equation for determining  levels of risk, will result in a more sensitive and accurate portrayal of each  site’s defenses-in-depth and the effectiveness of sites’ protective systems  (i.e., physical security systems and protective forces) when compared with  the new DBT. DOE’s Office of Security decided to develop this new  equation because its old mathematical equation had been challenged on  technical grounds and did not give sites credit for the full range of their  defenses-in-depth. While DOE’s Office of Security completed this equation  in December 2002, officials from this office believe it will probably not be  completely implemented at the sites for at least another year for two  reasons. First, site personnel who implement this methodology will require  additional training to ensure they are employing it properly. DOE’s Office  of Security conducted initial training in December 2003, as well as a  prototype course in February 2004, and has developed a nine-course  vulnerability assessment certification program. Second, sites will have to  collect additional data to support the broader evaluation of their  protective systems against the new DBT. Collecting these data will require  additional computer modeling and force-on-force performance testing.
Because of the slow resolution of some of these issues, DOE has not  developed any official long-range cost estimates or developed any  integrated, long-range implementation plans for the May 2003 DBT.
Specifically, neither the fiscal year 2003 nor 2004 budgets contained any  provisions for DBT implementation costs. However, during this period,  DOE did receive additional safeguards and security funding through  budget reprogramming and supplemental appropriations. DOE is using  most of these additional funds to cover the higher operational costs  associated with the increased security condition (SECON) measures. DOE  has gathered initial DBT implementation budget data and has requested  additional DBT implementation funding in the fiscal year 2005 budget: $90  million for NNSA, $18 million for the Secure Transportation Asset within  the Office of Secure Transportation, and $26 million for EM. However,  DOE officials believe the budget data collected so far has been of generally  poor quality because most sites have not yet completed the necessary  vulnerability assessments to determine their resource requirements.  Consequently, the fiscal year 2006 budget may be the first budget to begin  to accurately reflect the safeguards and security costs of meeting the  requirements of the new DBT.
Reflecting these various delays and uncertainties, in September 2003, the  Deputy Secretary changed the deadline for DOE program offices, such as  EM and NNSA, to submit DBT implementation plans from the original  target of October 2003 to the end of January 2004. NNSA and EM approved  these plans in February 2004. DOE’s Office of Security has reviewed these  plans and is planning to provide implementation assistance to sites that  request it. DOE officials have described these plans as being ambitious in  terms of the amount of work that has to be done within a relatively short  time frame and dependent on continued increases in safeguards and  security funding, primarily for additional protective force personnel.  However, some plans may be based on assumptions that are no longer  valid. Revising these plans could require additional resources, as well as  add time to the DBT implementation process.
A DOE Office of Budget official told us that current DBT implementation  cost estimates do not include items such as closing unneeded facilities,  transporting and consolidating materials, completing line item  construction projects, and other important activities that are outside of the  responsibility of the safeguards and security program. For example, EM’s  Security Director told us that for EM to fully comply with the DBT  requirements in fiscal year 2006 at one of its sites, it will have to    close and de-inventory two facilities,    consolidate excess materials into remaining special nuclear materials  facilities, and    move consolidated Category I special nuclear material, which NNSA’s  Office of Secure Transportation will transport, to another site.
Likewise, the EM Security Director told us that to meet the DBT  requirements at another site, EM will have to accelerate the closure of one  facility and transfer special nuclear material to another facility on the site.  The costs to close these facilities and to move materials within a site are  borne by the EM program budget and not by the EM safeguards and  security budget. Similarly, the costs to transport the material between sites  are borne by NNSA’s Office of Secure Transportation budget and not by  EM’s safeguards and security budget. A DOE Office of Budget official told  us that a comprehensive, department-wide approach to budgeting for DBT  implementation that includes such important program activities as  described above is needed; however, such an approach does not currently  exist.
The department plans to complete DBT implementation by the end of  fiscal year 2006. However, most sites estimate that it will take 2 to 5 years,  if they receive adequate funding, to fully meet the requirements of the new  DBT. During this time, sites will have to conduct vulnerability  assessments, undertake performance testing, and develop Site Safeguards  and Security Plans. Consequently, full DBT implementation could occur  anywhere from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2008. Some sites may be able  to move more quickly and meet the department’s deadline of the end of  fiscal year 2006.
Because some sites will be unable to effectively counter the threat  contained in the new DBT for a period of up to several years, these sites  should be considered to be at higher risk under the new DBT than they  were under the old DBT. For example, the Office of Independent Oversight  and Performance Assurance has concluded in recent inspections that at  least two DOE sites face fundamental and not easily resolved security  problems that will make meeting the requirements of the new DBT  difficult. For other DOE sites, their level of risk under the new DBT  remains largely unknown until they can conduct the necessary  vulnerability assessments.
In closing, while DOE struggled to develop its new DBT, the DBT that  DOE ultimately developed is substantially more demanding than the  previous one. Because the new DBT is more demanding and because DOE  wants to implement it by end of fiscal year 2006—a period of about 29  months—DOE must press forward with a series of additional actions to  ensure that it is fully prepared to provide a timely and cost effective  defense of its most sensitive facilities.
First, because the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks suggested larger  groups of terrorists with broader aspirations for causing mass casualties  and panic, we believe that the DBT development process that was used  requires reexamination. While DOE may point to delays in the  development of the Postulated Threat as the primary reason for the almost  2 years it took to develop a new DBT, DOE was also working on the DBT  itself for most of that time. We believe the difficulty associated with  developing a consensus using DOE’s traditional policy-making process  was a key factor in the time it took to develop a new DBT. During this  extended period, DOE’s sites were only being defended against what was  widely recognized as an obsolete terrorist threat level.
Second, we are concerned about two aspects of the resulting DBT. We are  not persuaded that there is sufficient difference, in its ability to achieve  the objective of causing mass casualties or creating public panic, between  the detonation of an improvised nuclear device and the detonation of a  nuclear weapon or test device at or near design yield that warrants setting  the threat level at a lower number of terrorists. Furthermore, while we  applaud DOE for adding additional requirements to the DBT such as  protection strategies to guard against radiological, chemical, and  biological sabotage, we believe that DOE needs to reevaluate its criteria  for terrorist acts of sabotage, especially in the chemical area, to make it  more defensible from a physical security perspective.
Finally, because some sites will be unable to effectively counter the threat  contained in the new DBT for a period of up to several years, these sites  should be considered to be at higher risk under the new DBT than they  were under the old DBT. As a result, DOE needs to take a series of actions  to mitigate these risks to an acceptable level as quickly as possible. To  accomplish this, it is important for DOE to go about the hard business of a  comprehensive department-wide approach to implementing needed  changes in its protective strategy. Because the consequences of a  successful terrorist attack on a DOE site could be so devastating, we  believe it is important for DOE to better inform Congress about what sites  are at high risk and what progress is being made to reduce these risks to  acceptable levels.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy  to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee  may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Robin M.  Nazzaro at (202) 512-3841. James Noel and Jonathan Gill also made key  contributions to this testimony.
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