Border Security: Actions Needed by DHS to Address Long-Standing Challenges in Planning for a Biometric Exit System
Published: 2016-01-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Each year, millions of visitors come to the United States legally on a temporary basis. Overstays are individuals who were admitted legally on a temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a plan to accelerate implementation of a biometric entry and exit data system that matches information provided by foreign nationals upon their arrival and departure. Since 2004, DHS has tracked foreign nationals' entries into the United States, and since December 2006, a biometric entry capability has been fully operational at all ports of entry. However, GAO has identified a range of challenges that DHS has faced in its efforts to deploy a corresponding biometric exit capability. DHS's CBP is primarily responsible for implementing a biometric exit program.
This statement discusses the extent to which DHS has made progress in developing a biometric exit system and reporting overstay estimates. This statement is based on a report GAO issued in July 2013 ( GAO-13-683 ), with selected updates conducted in January 2016 to obtain information from DHS on actions it has taken to address prior recommendations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) faces long-standing challenges in developing a biometric exit system and reporting reliable overstay data. In July 2013, GAO reported that DHS had not fulfilled statutory requirements to implement a biometric exit capability and report data on overstays. As of January 2016, DHS has planning efforts underway but has not yet met these statutory requirements. Specifically, in May 2012, DHS internally reported recommendations to support planning for a biometric exit capability at airports. However, as of January 2016, the department has not yet fully addressed those recommendations. For example, DHS has not completed an evaluation framework that, among other things, assesses the value of collecting biometric data in addition to biographic data, as it recommended in May 2012. In July 2013, GAO recommended that DHS establish time frames and milestones for a biometric air exit evaluation framework to help guide its assessment efforts. DHS concurred with the recommendation, and has actions planned or underway to address it. Specifically, in January 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials stated that they were continuing to develop an evaluation framework by developing metrics for measuring the performance and effectiveness of biometric air exit technologies.
Moreover, in July 2013, GAO reported that, according to DHS officials, the department's goal was to develop information about options for biometric air exit and report to Congress in time for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle regarding the benefits and costs associated with a biometric air exit system. GAO found that, without robust planning that includes time frames and milestones to develop and implement an evaluation framework, DHS lacked reasonable assurance that it would be able to provide an assessment to Congress as planned. As of January 2016, DHS is working to develop this report for Congress, and CBP officials told GAO they were unable to estimate when it would be completed. Since GAO's 2013 report, DHS has also implemented several projects to test and evaluate biometric air exit technologies. For example, in July 2015, CBP began testing a handheld mobile device to collect biographic and biometric exit data from randomly-selected, foreign national travelers at 10 selected airports. Finalizing the evaluation framework consistent with GAO's recommendation would help guide DHS's efforts to assess the benefits and costs of various air exit options.
GAO also reported in July 2013 that challenges in developing a biometric exit system, as well as weaknesses in departure data, have affected the reliability of DHS's data on overstays. Because of concerns about the reliability of the department's overstay data, neither DHS nor its predecessor has regularly reported annual overstay data to Congress since 1994. In July 2013, GAO found that, although DHS had taken action to strengthen its overstay data, DHS had not validated or tested the reliability of those actions and challenges to reporting reliable overstay data remained. GAO recommended that DHS assess and document the reliability of its overstay data, and DHS concurred with the recommendation. However, as of January 2016, DHS has not yet reported overstay data or documented its reliability, and DHS officials could not provide a time frame for when they would address GAO's recommendation.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO previously made recommendations to DHS to establish time frames and milestones for a biometric air exit evaluation framework and assess the reliability of its overstay data. DHS concurred with the recommendations, and has actions underway to address them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the status of the Department of  Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to implement a biometric exit system.  Each year, millions of visitors come to the United States legally on a  temporary basis either with a nonimmigrant visa or, in some cases, as  visitors who were allowed to enter without a visa. Overstays are  individuals who were admitted into the country legally on a temporary  basis but then unlawfully remained in the country past the conclusion of  their authorized periods of admission. We have previously reported that  most overstays are likely motivated by economic opportunities to remain  in the United States beyond their authorized periods of stay. However,  overstays could pose homeland security concerns—for example, 5 of the  19 September 11, 2001, hijackers were overstays.
In 1996, federal law required the development of an automated entry and  exit control system to match arrival and departure records for foreign  nationals entering and leaving the United States, and to enable  identification of overstays. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism  Prevention Act of 2004 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to  develop a plan to accelerate implementation of an automated biometric  entry and exit data system that matches available information provided by  foreign nationals upon their arrival in and departure from the United  States. In 2003, DHS initiated the legacy U.S. Visitor and Immigrant  Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to develop a system to  collect biographic data (such as name and date of birth) and biometric  data (such as fingerprints) from foreign nationals at U.S. ports of entry.  Since 2004, DHS has tracked foreign nationals’ entries into the United  States as part of an effort to comply with legislative requirements, and  since December 2006, a biometric entry capability has been fully  operational at all air, sea, and land ports of entry. However, in various  reports, we have identified a range of long-standing challenges that DHS  has faced in its efforts to fully deploy a corresponding biometric exit  capability to track foreign nationals when they depart the country and to  use entry and exit data to identify potential overstays. For example, in  November 2009, we found that DHS had not adopted an integrated  approach to scheduling, executing, and tracking the work that needed to  be accomplished to deliver a biometric exit system. In April 2011, we  found that DHS’s efforts to identify and report on overstays were hindered  by unreliable data, and we identified various challenges to DHS’s efforts  to identify potential overstays, including the incomplete collection of  departure data from nonimmigrants at ports of entry. Most recently, in  July 2013, we reported on DHS’s progress in developing and  implementing a biometric exit system, as well as DHS’s efforts to identify  and address potential overstays. In these reports, we made  recommendations intended to help ensure that a biometric exit capability  was planned, designed, developed, and implemented in an effective and  efficient manner and to strengthen DHS’s efforts to identify and report on  overstays. DHS generally agreed with our recommendations and has  implemented actions or has actions underway to address them.
DHS has primary responsibility for implementing an entry and exit data  system and using those data to identify and address overstays. Within  DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is tasked with, among  other duties, inspecting all people applying for entry to the United States  to determine their admissibility to the country. CBP collects biographic  and biometric information to document nonimmigrants’ entry into the  country and biographic information to document their exit. CBP is also  responsible for implementing a biometric exit program, and since fiscal  year 2014, has partnered with DHS’s Science and Technology  Directorate (S&T) in a joint S&T-CBP Air Entry/Exit Re-Engineering Apex  project intended to develop tools to model and simulate entry and exit  operational processes that could be used at airports. Within DHS’s  National Protection and Programs Directorate, the Office of Biometric  Identity Management (OBIM) manages the Automated Biometric  Identification System, which maintains biometric information that DHS  collects from nonimmigrants upon their entry into the United States.  OBIM also manages the Arrival and Departure Information System  (ADIS), which tracks and matches arrival and departure records for the  purpose of identifying potential overstays. DHS’s U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the lead agency for enforcing immigration  law in the interior of the United States and is primarily responsible for  overstay enforcement. To identify potential overstays, ICE primarily  analyzes biographic entry and exit data collected at land, air, and sea  ports of entry. Specifically, ICE analysts use ADIS to identify arrival  records for which the subject’s authorized period of admission has ended  and for whom DHS does not have a corresponding departure record,  which may indicate that the subject of the record is an overstay.  ICE  analysts also determine whether the subject of the record meets ICE’s  overstay enforcement priorities based on national security and public  safety criteria. Most records of potential overstays do not result in  enforcement action because they do not meet ICE’s overstay  enforcement priorities.
My statement today is based on our July 2013 report on DHS’s overstay  enforcement and biometric exit planning efforts, with selected updates  conducted in January 2016.  Like that report, my statement discusses  the extent to which DHS has made progress in developing and  implementing a biometric exit system at air ports of entry—which  is  DHS’s priority area of focus for a biometric exit capability—and reporting  overstay estimates. For our report, we reviewed statutory requirements  for a biometric exit system and analyzed DHS documents, including a  May 2012 report on the status of efforts to implement a biometric exit  capability at airports that was based on analysis that DHS’s S&T  conducted. We compared the status of DHS’s efforts against statutory  requirements and standard practices for project management. We  interviewed DHS Office of Policy and S&T officials regarding DHS’s plans  for addressing recommendations in the department’s May 2012 report  and other ongoing efforts to develop a biometric exit system. We also  analyzed DHS documents and data related to overstays and interviewed  relevant DHS officials. Specifically, we analyzed DHS planning  documents and reports on processes to review potential overstay records  and collect additional data to improve overstay identification.  For the  updates, we reviewed DHS documents and interviewed officials regarding  the status of actions taken in response to the recommendations made in  our 2013 report. Our July 2013 report provides further details on our  scope and methodology. We conducted the work on which this statement  is based in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: DHS Faces Long- Standing Challenges in Planning for and Developing a Biometric Exit System and Reporting Overstay Estimates
paragraphs: As we reported in July 2013,  DHS had not yet fulfilled the 2004 statutory  requirement to implement a biometric exit capability or the statutory  requirement to report overstay estimates, and as of January 2016, DHS  has planning efforts underway but has not yet met these requirements.  Various planning, evaluation, and data reliability challenges have affected  DHS’s efforts to meet these requirements.
subsections: section_title: Planning for and Developing a Biometric Exit System
paragraphs: Development and implementation of a biometric exit capability has been a  long-standing challenge for DHS. Since 2004, we have issued a number  of reports on DHS’s efforts to implement a biometric entry and exit  system. For example, with regard to an exit capability at land ports of  entry, in 2006, we reported that according to DHS officials, for various  reasons, a biometric exit capability could not be implemented without  incurring a major impact on land facilities.  For example, at the time of  our 2006 report, DHS officials stated that implementing a biometric exit  system at land ports of entry would require new infrastructure and would  produce major traffic congestion because travelers would have to stop  their vehicles upon exit to be processed. With regard to an air exit  capability, in February and August 2007, we found that DHS had not  adequately defined and justified its proposed expenditures for exit pilots  and demonstration projects and that it had not developed a complete  schedule for biometric exit implementation. Further, in September 2008,  we reported that DHS was unlikely to meet its timeline for implementing  an air exit system with biometric indicators, such as fingerprints, by July  1, 2009, because of several unresolved issues, such as opposition to the  department’s published plan by the airline industry. In 2009, DHS  conducted pilot programs for biometric air exit capabilities in airport  scenarios, and in August 2010 we found that there were limitations with  the pilot programs. For example, the pilot programs did not operationally  test about 30 percent of the air exit requirements identified in the  evaluation plan for the pilot programs, which hindered DHS’s ability to  inform decision making for a long-term air exit solution and pointed to the  need for additional sources of information on air exit’s operational  impacts.
In October 2010, DHS issued a memo, in which it identified three primary  reasons why it has been unable to determine how and when to implement  a biometric exit capability at airports: (1) the methods of collecting  biometric data could disrupt the flow of travelers through airport terminals;  (2) air carriers and airport authorities had not allowed DHS to examine  mechanisms through which DHS could incorporate biometric data  collection into passenger processing at the departure gate; and (3)  challenges existed in capturing biometric data at the point of departure,  including determining what personnel should be responsible for the  capture of biometric information at airports. According to DHS officials,  the challenges DHS identified in October 2010 continue to affect the  department’s ability to implement a biometric air exit system as of  January 2016.
As discussed in our July 2013 report, following this memo, DHS took  additional steps to plan and test options for a biometric exit capability at  airports.  Specifically, in 2011, DHS directed S&T, in coordination with  other DHS component agencies, to research long-term options for  biometric air exit. S&T conducted analysis of previous air exit pilot  programs and assessment of available technologies, and in May 2012,  the department reported internally on the results of S&T’s analysis. In  that report, DHS concluded that the building blocks to implement an  effective biometric air exit system were available. In addition, DHS's  report stated that new traveler facilitation tools and technologies—for  example, online check-in, self-service, and paperless technology—could  support more cost-effective ways to screen travelers, and that these  improvements should be leveraged when developing plans for biometric  air exit. However, DHS officials stated that there may be challenges to  leveraging new technologies to the extent that U.S. airports and airlines  rely on older, proprietary systems that may be difficult to update to  incorporate new technologies. Furthermore, DHS reported in May 2012  that significant questions remained regarding (1) the effectiveness of  current biographic air exit processes and the error rates in collecting or  matching data, (2) methods of cost-effectively integrating biometrics into  the air departure processes (e.g., collecting biometric scans as  passengers enter the jetway to board a plane), (3) the additional value  biometric air exit would provide compared with the current biographic air  exit process, and (4) the overall value and cost of a biometric air exit  capability. The report also included nine recommendations to help inform  DHS's planning for biometric air exit, such as directing DHS to develop  explicit goals and objectives for biometric air exit and an evaluation  framework that would, among other things, assess the value of collecting  biometric data in addition to biographic data and determine whether  biometric air exit is economically justified.
DHS reported in May 2012 that it planned to take steps to address these  recommendations by May 2014, and DHS has begun some  implementation steps. For example, in March 2014, DHS took initial steps  by finalizing goals and objectives for a biometric system, which CBP  plans to use to evaluate system performance. However, as of January  2016, the department has not yet fully addressed the May 2012 report  recommendations. For example, as discussed in more detail below, DHS  has not completed an evaluation framework to guide its assessment  efforts.  In fall 2012, DHS developed a high-level plan for its biometric air  exit efforts, which it updated in May 2013, but we reported in July 2013  that this plan did not clearly identify the tasks needed to develop and  implement an evaluation framework. For example, the plan did not  include a step for developing the methodology for comparing the costs  and benefits of biometric data against those for collecting biographic data,  as recommended in DHS's May 2012 report. Furthermore, the time  frames in this plan were not accurate as of June 2013 because DHS was  behind schedule on some of the tasks and had not updated the time  frames in the plan accordingly. For example, DHS had planned to begin  scenario-based testing for biometric air exit options in August 2013;  however, DHS did not open the facility used to conduct this testing until  June 2014. A senior official from DHS's Office of Policy told us that DHS  had not kept the plan up-to-date because of the transition of  responsibilities within DHS; specifically, in March 2013, pursuant to the  explanatory statement for DHS's fiscal year 2013 appropriation, CBP was  named the lead agency for coordinating DHS's entry and exit policies and  operations, with responsibility for implementing a biometric exit  program.
Various challenges have affected DHS’s efforts to develop and implement  a biometric exit system. For example, in July 2013, we reported DHS  officials stated it had been difficult coordinating with airlines and airports,  which have expressed reluctance about biometric air exit because of  concerns over its effect on operations and potential costs. To address  these concerns, DHS was conducting outreach and soliciting information  from airlines and airports regarding their operations. In addition, in July  2013 we reported that DHS officials stated that the department's efforts to  date had been hindered by insufficient funding. The Consolidated  Appropriations Act, 2016 (Public Law 114-113), provides a mechanism for  additional funding to implement a biometric entry and exit system of up to  $1 billion through temporary fee increases for certain visa applicants.   Moreover, in July 2013, we reported that DHS officials told us the  department's goal was to develop information about options for biometric  air exit and to report to Congress in time for the fiscal year 2016 budget  cycle regarding (1) the additional benefits that a biometric air exit system  provides beyond an enhanced biographic exit system and (2) costs  associated with biometric air exit. However, as of January 2016, DHS is  working to develop such a report, and CBP officials told us they were  unable to estimate when the report would be completed. According to  DHS officials, implementation of a biometric air exit system will depend on  the results of discussions between the department and Congress after the  department provides its assessment of options for biometric air exit.
We concluded in our July 2013 report that, without robust planning that  includes time frames and milestones to develop and implement an  evaluation framework, DHS lacked reasonable assurance that it would be  able to provide an assessment to Congress for the fiscal year 2016  budget cycle as planned. Furthermore, because any delays in providing  this information to Congress could further affect possible implementation  of a biometric exit system to address statutory requirements, we  recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security establish time  frames and milestones for developing and implementing an evaluation  framework to be used in conducting the department’s assessment of  biometric exit options. DHS concurred with this recommendation and  indicated that its component agencies planned to finalize the goals and  objectives for biometric air exit and use those goals and objectives in the  development of an evaluation framework.  CBP has finalized goals and  objectives for a biometric system and, in November 2014, provided us  with a copy of its draft evaluation framework. The draft evaluation  framework included preliminary information about how DHS will evaluate  different biometric air exit options, but had limited information regarding  time frames and milestones for assessing the options. In January 2016,  CBP officials stated that they were continuing to refine metrics for  measuring performance and effectiveness, which they planned to  incorporate into the evaluation framework. In addition, officials stated that  CBP was conducting additional planning and analysis to ensure that  proposed biometric solutions could integrate with existing CBP data  systems. CBP officials stated that they plan to address our  recommendation by June 30, 2016. To fully address our  recommendation, DHS should finalize its evaluation framework, including  time frames and milestones for assessing biometric air exit options.
DHS has implemented several projects to test and evaluate biometric air  exit technologies since our July 2013 report. For example, in June 2014,  S&T and CBP opened a test facility to evaluate biometric technologies  and operational processes under simulated airport entry and exit  conditions. In July 2015, CBP began testing a handheld mobile device to  collect biographic and biometric exit data from randomly-selected, foreign  national travelers at 10 selected airports. According to CBP, during  testing, CBP officers stationed at the passenger loading bridge of  selected flights are to use the device to scan travelers’ fingerprints and  passports. CBP then plans to match the travelers’ data to the data  collected when they entered the United States. CBP plans to conduct this  test for approximately 1 year.  Finalizing the evaluation framework  consistent with our recommendation would help guide DHS’s efforts to  assess the benefits and costs of various air exit options.
section_title: Reporting Reliable Overstay Data
paragraphs: As we have previously reported, challenges in developing and  implementing a biometric exit system, as well as weaknesses in  departure data, have affected the reliability of DHS’s data on overstays.  Specifically, in April 2011, we found that DHS’s efforts to identify and  report on overstays were hindered by unreliable data, and we identified  various challenges to DHS’s efforts to identify potential overstays,  including the incomplete collection of departure data from nonimmigrants  at ports of entry, particularly land ports of entry, and the lack of  mechanisms for assessing the quality of leads sent to ICE field offices for  investigation.
Because of concerns about the reliability of the department’s overstay  data, neither DHS nor its predecessor has regularly reported annual  overstay rates to Congress since 1994. According to statute, DHS is to  implement a program to collect data, for each fiscal year, regarding the  total number of nonimmigrant foreign nationals who overstayed their  authorized periods of admission in the United States; and submit an  annual report to Congress providing numerical estimates of the number of  aliens from each country in each nonimmigrant classification who  overstayed an authorized period of admission that expired during the  fiscal year prior to the year for which the report is made. In April 2011,  we reported that DHS officials stated that the department had not  reported overstay estimates because it had not had sufficient confidence  in the quality of its overstay data. DHS officials stated at the time that, as  a result, the department could not reliably report overstay estimates in  accordance with the statute. In February 2013, the Secretary of  Homeland Security testified that DHS planned to report overstay  estimates by December 2013. We reported in July 2013 that, according  to DHS Office of Policy officials, the department was better positioned  than in the past to describe the limitations in the overstay data. As of  January 2016, DHS has not reported overstay estimates. The  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, directed DHS to provide to  Congress within 30 days of enactment a report on nonimmigrant overstay  data by country, and a comprehensive plan for implementation of the  biometric entry and exit data system, both of which are required by law.  In addition, the Act withheld $13 million from the Office of the Secretary  and Executive Management until DHS provides the overstay report and  comprehensive plan.
Our July 2013 report found that, although DHS had taken action to  strengthen its overstay data, DHS had not yet validated or tested the  reliability of those actions and challenges to reporting reliable overstay  data remained. We reported that DHS had taken action to strengthen its  processes for reviewing records to identify potential overstays, including  (1) streamlining connections among DHS databases used to identify  potential overstays and (2) implementing the Beyond the Border initiative,  which collects information from the Canadian government about those  exiting the United States and entering Canada through northern land  ports of entry.  However, our July 2013 report also found that DHS had  not assessed or documented how its changes to database connections  had improved the reliability of its data for the purposes of reporting  overstay rate calculations and had not analyzed the incremental  improvements that database changes made in data quality. Furthermore,  although DHS had improved connections among its various databases  used to help identify potential overstays, the improvements did not  address some of the underlying data quality and reliability issues we  previously identified, such as incomplete information on nonimmigrants  departing the United States through land ports of entry. The Beyond the  Border initiative is intended to help address this issue by collecting proxy  data on individuals exiting from the United States at northern border ports  of entry, but as of January 2016, DHS has not yet identified mechanisms  for collecting data on individuals exiting through southern border ports of  entry.
In our July 2013 report, we concluded that without an assessment and  documentation of improvements in the reliability of the data used to  develop overstay estimates and any remaining limitations in how the data  can be used, decision makers would not have the information needed to  use these data for policy-making purposes. Therefore, we recommended  that DHS assess and document the reliability of its overstay data. DHS  concurred with the recommendation and stated that it was establishing a  working group that would include representation from DHS component  agencies with responsibility for collecting, recording, and analyzing entry  and exit data. In November 2015, CBP officials told us that CBP  submitted a draft overstays report for fiscal year 2014 to DHS for review  in December 2014. However, as of January 2016, DHS could not provide  a timeframe for when they would report overstay data or address our  recommendation. To address our recommendation, DHS should assess  and document the extent to which the reliability of the data used to  develop any overstay estimates has improved and any remaining  limitations in how the data can be used.
Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Schumer, and members of the  subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy  to respond to any questions you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For information about this statement, please contact Rebecca Gambler,  Director, Homeland Security and Justice, at (202) 512-8777 or  gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this  statement. Other individuals making key contributions include Adam  Hoffman, Assistant Director; Ashley Vaughan Davis; Jon Najmi; and  Robin Nye.
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