Critical Infrastructure: DHS Needs to Refocus Its Efforts to Lead the Government Facilities Sector
Published: 2012-08-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: U.S. government facilities have been the target of foreign and domestic terrorists. Government facilities are one of 18 critical infrastructure sectors designated under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for identifying, prioritizing, and coordinating the protection of critical infrastructure that, if destroyed, could have a debilitating impact on governance, the economy, national morale, or public health and safety. DHS defines critical infrastructure sector responsibilities in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the Federal Protective Service (FPS) is the lead agency for the government facilities sector. As such, FPS is to develop and implement a government facilities sector-specific plan, which was first issued in 2007 and updated in 2010, in coordination with governmental partners. In this report, GAO assesses FPSs efforts as the lead agency for the government facilities sector. To do this, GAO reviewed HSPD-7, the NIPP, the 2010 plan and other related documents to compare FPSs actions and the goals for the sector. GAO also interviewed DHS agency officials and 16 selected sector partners about activities for, and coordination with, the sector.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Federal Protective Service (FPS) has not been effective as the lead agency for the government facilities sector, which includes facilities at the federal, state, local, tribal and territorial level. Under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the 2010 sector-specific plan, FPS is responsible for establishing a risk management approach and developing effective partnerships for the sector. However, FPS has not implemented a risk management approach. According to FPS, it has not identified or obtained data on facilities at the federal, state, local, tribal and territorial level, which are fundamental for employing a risk management approach. In addition, despite providing information on the principles of threat, vulnerability, and consequence, FPS has not coordinated or assessed risk across government facilities, another key element of risk management. FPS also lacks effective metrics and performance data to track progress toward implementing a risk management approach and for the overall resilience or protection of government facilities. Consequently, FPS does not have a risk management approach for prioritizing and safeguarding critical government facilities. Furthermore, FPS has not built effective partnerships across different levels of government. While FPS chairs the Government Coordinating Council (the Council)a mechanism intended to help share activities and policy across different levels of governmentthe Councils membership lacks a full spectrum of sector partners, particularly non-federal. All five state and local government and non-governmental members of the Council that GAO contacted were unaware of, or did not consider themselves to be part of, the Council. FPS also has not leveraged the State, Local, Tribal and Territorial Government Coordinating Council, an existing mechanism to coordinate with non-federal government organizations, although FPS officials reported recent efforts aimed at enhancing this partnership.
As the lead agency for the sector, FPS faces challenges associated with funding and its lack of an action plan. According to FPS officials, FPS has no dedicated line of funding for its activities as the lead agency and resource constraints hinder FPSs capacity to lead this large and diverse sector, which is comprised of more than 900,000 federal assets, as well as assets from 56 states and territories; over 3,000 counties; 17,000 local governments; and 564 federally recognized tribal nations. FPSs use of fee-based revenue to perform homeland security activities not directly related to federal facility protection is inconsistent with the Homeland Security Act of 2002. FPS does not have a full understanding of the resource requirements for serving as the lead agency, because it has not completed a cost estimate or an action plan to guide implementation of the 2010 plan. According to DHS officials, HSPD-7 will be updated, which may result in structural changes to the sector that could affect the lead agencys responsibilities and available resources. An action plan could serve as a valuable tool for FPS and DHS to identify priorities that can be feasibly achieved and the resources required, in tandem with any potential structural changes.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Secretary of DHS direct FPS, in partnership with others, to develop and publish an action plan that identifies sector priorities and resource requirements, and addresses steps needed to implement a risk management approach and develop effective partnerships. DHS concurred with the recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Foreign and domestic terrorists have targeted U.S. government facilities,  including the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, 1998 embassy bombings in  East Africa, and 2001 attack on the Pentagon. More recent incidents at  government facilities include shootings at a federal courthouse in Las  Vegas and the state capitol of Texas. Government facilities are 1 of 18  critical infrastructure sectors designated under Homeland Security  Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), which is designed to identify, prioritize,   Critical infrastructure  and coordinate protection of critical infrastructure.is defined as systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to  the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a  debilitating effect on governance, the economy, national morale, or public  health and safety. HSPD-7 defines critical infrastructure sector  responsibilities for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other  federal agencies that lead coordination within and across the 18 sectors.  As the lead agency for the government facilities sector, DHS is  responsible for working with various partners—including other federal  agencies; state, local, tribal, and territorial governments as well as other  sectors—to develop and implement the government facilities sector- specific plan, which was last updated in 2010 (the 2010 plan), and issue  annual reports on the status of DHS’s efforts.
DHS has designated the Federal Protective Service (FPS) as the lead  agency for the government facilities sector—a collateral duty to FPS’s  traditional role protecting over 9,000 owned or leased federal facilities  under the custody and control of the General Services Administration  (GSA). FPS employs about 1,225 federal staff and oversees about  14,000 contract security guards. Over the last decade, FPS has  experienced well-documented management and funding challenges that  have hampered its ability to protect federal facilities. Furthermore, we  have reported on gaps and overlap with respect to DHS’s efforts to  protect critical infrastructure.
You asked us to assess DHS’s activities related to the government  facilities sector; particularly FPS’s leadership of the sector. To meet this  objective, we reviewed HSPD-7, DHS’s National Infrastructure Protection  Plan (NIPP), and the 2010 plan. Based on these documents, we identified  the implementation of a risk management approach and development of  effective partnerships as two key activities that lead agencies are  responsible for. We also reviewed the 2010 and 2011 sector annual  reports to identify what actions FPS had taken, and any gaps between  these actions and the stated goals and activities in the 2010 plan. We  interviewed DHS and FPS officials, and selected 16 of the 26 members of  the Government Facilities Sector Government Coordinating Council (the  Council) —a collaborative body, which shares approaches to  infrastructure protection. We chose Council members based on their  significant involvement within the sector, among other criteria, as well as  all 5 state, local, and non-governmental members. Lastly, we reviewed  our prior reports and DHS Office of Inspector General reports on critical  infrastructure to identify any challenges FPS faces in leading the  implementation the 2010 plan. See appendix I for a detailed description of  our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2011 to August  2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 2003, HSPD-7 established a national policy for critical infrastructure  and key resources. HSPD-7 designated DHS as the agency responsible  for coordinating the nation’s efforts to protect critical infrastructure. The  Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) within DHS fulfills the functions  associated with managing and coordinating the national protection efforts.  In June 2006, DHS issued the first NIPP as required by HSPD-7. The  NIPP provides a risk management framework and sector partnership  model for developing, implementing, and maintaining a coordinated  national effort to manage the risks to critical infrastructure.
FPS is the lead agency for the government facilities sector (the sector),  and assumes multiple roles and responsibilities for the sector, which is  comprised of a wide variety of facilities and assets owned or leased by  federal, state, local, tribal, or territorial governments, located both  domestically and overseas. Under the NIPP risk management  framework, FPS is responsible for leading and coordinating six major  elements sector-wide to identify, prioritize, and measure progress towards  protecting critical infrastructure. See figure 1.
Additionally, the NIPP sector partnership model calls on FPS to form and  chair a government coordinating council comprised of representatives  from different levels of government to share activities, policy, and   FPS also participates in or interacts with the following  communications.cross-sector councils, which facilitate relationships within and among the  18 sectors:
The State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating  Council (SLTTGCC), which coordinates with non-federal government  organizations across all 18 sectors;  the Regional Consortium Coordinating Council, which represents a  variety of distinct collaborative efforts between state, local, and private  sector partners focused on critical infrastructure found in multistate  regions or within a given city; the NIPP Federal Senior Leadership Council, which is a DHS-chaired  council that consists of federal department and agency  representatives from lead agencies named in HSPD-7; and the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, which is a  partnership between government and private sector owners and  operators of critical infrastructure to effectively coordinate federal  protective programs.
The NIPP requires each lead agency to develop and revise a sector- specific plan that addresses critical infrastructure protection. FPS has  responsibility for updating the plan to adequately represent the sector and  involve Council members. Every 4 years, FPS must:  identify gaps between the plan and guidance from IP, policy changes,  and best practices; identify and develop a consolidated list of actions required to close  gaps; obtain, and incorporate input from sector partners and the Council in obtain final approval from IP and release the plan to sector partners  and the Council.
FPS and DHS issued the first sector-specific plan in 2007 and an update  to the plan in 2010, in which they identified goals and objectives for the  sector, shown in table 1.
As the lead agency, HSPD-7 also requires FPS to provide the Secretary  of Homeland Security with annual reports to assess progress and  effectively prioritize sector-specific activities and gaps, among other  things. This process involves consulting the Council, similar to the 2010  update to the plan.
FPS’s role as the lead agency for the sector is an additional duty beyond  its traditional role of protecting over 9,000 owned or leased facilities under  the custody and control of GSA. As part of its mission, FPS conducts risk  assessments, recommends countermeasures, and performs law  enforcement activities, such as incident response. FPS’s activities are  funded by security fees collected from tenant federal agencies. As such,  FPS charges each tenant agency a basic security fee per square foot of  space occupied in a GSA facility, among other fees.
The Interagency Security Committee (ISC), which was established in  1995, develops policies and standards and facilitates security-related  information exchanges. While domestic non-military federal facilities— whether federally owned, leased, or managed—are required to adhere to  the ISC standards, these standards do not apply to state, local, tribal, and  territorial government facilities. ISC membership consists of over 100  senior executives from 51 federal agencies and departments, including  FPS. DHS is responsible for chairing the ISC and is authorized to monitor  federal agencies’ adherence to ISC standards.
section_title: FPS Is Not Effectively Leading the Sector
paragraphs: FPS’s leadership has not resulted in implementation of a risk  management approach for the sector, as called for under the NIPP  framework. Specifically, a lack of facilities data, risk assessments, and  effective metrics and performance data undermine the implementation of  a risk management approach. Under FPS’s leadership, effective  partnerships have also not developed. FPS faces challenges in leading  the sector linked to the sector’s size, diversity, and FPS’s fee-based  revenue structure. These challenges are compounded by the lack of an  action plan.
subsections: section_title: No Overarching Risk Management Approach in Place
paragraphs: Lack of facilities data: Asset identification is a crucial element for risk  management as outlined by both the NIPP framework and the 2010 plan.  According to the 2010 plan, the sector’s assets and systems must be  identified to determine which of these, if damaged, would result in  significant consequences for national economic security, public health or  safety, morale, or governance. The 2010 plan also states that identifying  and obtaining appropriate data on government facilities located  domestically and overseas is a sector objective. However, FPS officials  said that they have not identified or obtained data on federal, state, local,  tribal and territorial government facilities for the sector. According to FPS  officials, developing sector-wide data may be untenable and unwarranted,  because most federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government  facilities do not meet the threshold established by IP for the most critical  infrastructure and government facilities generally remain the same year  after year. Yet, the 2010 plan states that several circumstances may  require frequent updates to data on government facilities, including  changes in threat levels, large-scale facility renovations, or the  identification of a facility as supporting a nationally critical function or  critical asset. Moreover, the 2011 annual report states that functions  carried out in one government facility often directly support the functions  under way in many other government facilities. Thus, an incident at one  facility could have cascading impact across a range of functions essential  to governance. Without appropriate data on government facilities, FPS  has limited awareness of the potentially evolving universe of government  facilities as well as the interdependencies that may exist in the sector. As  a result, FPS may be overlooking facilities whose failure or degradation  could pose significant harm to the nation’s security, health, economy, or  morale.
While FPS officials said that they have neither identified nor obtained data  on the sector, FPS has contributed to the development of a database  maintained by IP, the IP Gateway / Infrastructure Information Collection  System. IP uses this database to identify critical infrastructure assets  and systems. According to FPS officials, they periodically review and  cross reference the information contained within the database against the  dataset that FPS uses as part of its role of protecting federal facilities.  However, FPS’s data do not encompass the full spectrum of sector  facilities, in particular non-federal facilities. In addition, we have previously  identified problems with FPS’s data, such as a lack of data on building  jurisdictional authorities. Consequently, FPS’s efforts to corroborate the  data contained within the IP Gateway / Infrastructure Information  Collection System are undermined by the limited scope and quality of its  data. To the extent that the IP Gateway / Infrastructure Information  Collection System is used to prioritize critical infrastructure, this effort may  also be detrimentally affected by weaknesses in FPS’s data.
No sector-wide risk assessments: FPS is not currently positioned to  assess risk across the sector. Assessing risks and coordinating risk  assessment programs are another key element of the NIPP framework  and a sector objective. The plan and annual reports provide information  about the principles of threat, vulnerability, and consequence as well as  discuss different types of risks and threats faced by government facilities,  but no standardized tool for performing risk assessments exists at the  federal level, much less the state, local, tribal, and territorial levels. FPS promoted its Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP) as a  risk assessment tool in the 2010 plan and sector annual reports, as well  as in past Council meetings. However, the scope of RAMP was not  originally intended to address non-federal facilities and has never become  fully operational. Therefore, its usefulness as a sector-wide risk  assessment tool is not clear. In fact, RAMP has been terminated  according to a senior FPS official, and FPS is working on developing a  replacement. According to this official, a new risk assessment tool and  methodology will be released for use by sector partners at a future,  unspecified date. FPS officials acknowledged the absence of a sector- wide risk assessment. Without this, FPS cannot prioritize facilities or  implement protective programs, both activities predicated on effective risk  assessment.
No effective metrics and performance data: FPS has not established  effective metrics and performance data, which hampers its ability to  monitor the sector’s progress toward the sector goal of implementing a  long-term government facility risk management program as described in  the 2010 plan. An effective metric is one that can adequately indicate  progress toward a goal and that is objective, measureable, and  quantifiable. Data to track metrics need to be sufficiently timely, complete,  accurate, and consistent. Further, DHS has established guidance on metrics to assess improvements in the protection and resiliency of critical  infrastructure, which lead agencies can use to guide these efforts in their  respective sectors. We have reported that without effective performance  data, decision makers may not have sufficient information to evaluate  whether investments have improved security and reduced a facility’s  vulnerability, or to determine funding priorities within and across  agencies.
In 2000, FPS transitioned all alarm-monitoring and dispatching capabilities from several  regional control centers to four MegaCenters. Currently, each MegaCenter monitors  multiple types of alarm systems, closed circuit television, and wireless dispatch  communications within federal facilities throughout the nation. These centers—located in  Michigan, Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Maryland—are equipped with state-of-the-art  communication systems and operate continuously. terms of timeliness, completeness, accuracy, or consistency. Until it  establishes quantifiable metrics and performance data, FPS will be  unable to gauge progress toward implementing a risk management  approach, specifically, and the protection or resiliency of critical  government facilities, overall.
section_title: FPS Has Not Built Effective Partnerships across Different Levels of Government
paragraphs: To effectively implement the NIPP and achieve the goals of the sector,  partnerships are essential. As previously discussed, the NIPP sector  partnership model integrates partners into the planning and operational  activities for a collaborative approach to the protection of critical  infrastructure. Likewise, the 2010 plan places a significant emphasis on  the role of partnerships. However, of the 16 Council members we  contacted, 13 indicated that they had little or no involvement in  developing the sector plan and annual reports, and for at least 8 agencies  these documents were of negligible value. To offset low Council member  response, FPS officials reported relying on open source information (e.g.,  annual federal budget) to develop the annual report. Relying primarily on  open source information does not fully or effectively leverage the  knowledge and experience of Council members, potentially undermining  the value of the plan as a means to promote collaboration in critical  infrastructure protection. Consequently, this key coordination goal of the  2010 plan has not been met, and as a result, FPS is limited in its ability,  as lead agency for the sector, to productively contribute to the larger DHS  effort to prioritize and safeguard the nation’s most critical infrastructure.  FPS’s role as lead agency for the government facilities sector is  particularly critical because according to the 2011 annual report,  government facilities have been the most frequently attacked sector since  1968 and the sector involves a very dynamic threat environment. FPS’s  compilation of reports that hold little value for sector partners, leaves FPS  and its sector partners less able to engage in a comprehensive risk  management framework that addresses this threat environment.
Furthermore, while FPS chairs the Council, the principle mechanism for  engaging partners, FPS has not involved the full spectrum of sector  partners. FPS officials said that they use an informal process to manage  the Council membership and have repeatedly reported that they actively  seek to add members to expand state and local representation. Of the  Council members identified by FPS, 21 of the 26 are federal agencies, 3  are state or local agencies, and 2 are non-governmental organizations.  Officials from all 5 state and local government and non-governmental  organizations told us that they were either unaware or did not consider  themselves to be members of the Council. Furthermore, the Council  currently has no representation from tribal and territorial governments.  Having active representation from state, local, tribal, and territorial  governments on the Council would be particularly helpful, given that  FPS’s interaction with the cross-sector councils that represent these  perspectives has been limited or non-existent. As previously discussed,  the SLTTGCC provides all 18 sectors a mechanism to coordinate with  non-federal government organizations. According to the 2010 plan, the  SLTTGCC had liaisons who were fully integrated into the Council.  However, both SLTTGCC officials and FPS officials indicated that there  has been limited interaction. During our review, FPS reached out to the  SLTTGCC to discuss opportunities to increase partnering activities. FPS  officials reported having never worked with the Regional Consortium  Coordinating Council, which includes state and local government  representatives. With limited representation on the Council and little or no  interaction with certain cross-sector councils, the sector is missing  opportunities to engage and integrate the experience, knowledge, and  priorities of state, local, tribal and territorial partners into the plan to help  ensure buy-in for protecting critical infrastructure across all levels of  government.
Moreover, the Council has become progressively less active over the  years. According to the 2011 annual report, the lead agency convenes  Council meetings quarterly and communicates information about threats,  incidents, and effective protection-related practices to sector partners.  However, Council members indicated that the frequency of meetings has  steadily declined over the years. In 2011, FPS held only one meeting in  January; its next meeting was held in May 2012. No working groups or  other activities occurred in the interim. At the 2011 meeting, there was a  total of four non–DHS Council members who attended. FPS’s May 2012  Council meeting may have reflected increased interest, with 14 agencies  other than DHS in attendance. However, only one attendee represented  state, local, tribal or territorial governments; all other attendees were from  federal agencies. FPS officials acknowledged that participation of Council  members has been decreasing every year. Most Council members  representing federal agencies said that interaction with the sector had not  been helpful since their agencies actively participate in the ISC, which  provides the guidance their agencies need to meet federal physical  security standards. Nevertheless, some Council members said that the  sector was valuable as a resource for coordinating security activities and  potentially developing a uniform risk assessment tool. Since the sector  covers a larger and broader set of government facilities than the ISC— such as military, state, local, tribal and territorial facilities—the potential  benefits of collaboration, as discussed earlier, could lead to a more  comprehensive approach to protecting critical government facilities.
section_title: FPS’s Capacity to Lead the Sector Hindered by Its Fee Structure and Lack of Action Plan
paragraphs: FPS has identified its limited resources as a significant challenge to  leading a sector as large and diverse as the government facilities sector.  The 2010 plan states that the sector includes more than 900,000 federal  assets, as well as assets from 56 states and territories; more than 3,000  counties; 17,000 local governments; and 564 federally recognized tribal  nations. In addition, these facilities represent a wide variety of uses, both  domestically and overseas, ranging from office buildings and courthouses  to storage facilities and correctional facilities. FPS officials indicated that  they have very limited staffing and no dedicated line of funding for  activities related to leading the sector, and it was unclear if FPS’s security  fees could be used to cover the costs of serving as the lead agency for  the sector. Because of limited resources, FPS officials said that they  could only meet the NIPP’s minimum reporting requirements and did not  engage in other activities that could address the issues discussed earlier.  For example, FPS officials said that they abandoned efforts related to  strategic communications and marketing as described in the 2010 annual  report, aimed at increasing awareness and participation across the sector  because of resource constraints. FPS reported in 2010 that it did not have  the capability to plan for any sector-specific agency investments. In 2011,  FPS had less than one full-time equivalent employee engaged in sector- specific agency activities, which represents a decline from prior years  when FPS had a full-time equivalent employee and several contract  employees assisting with its sector responsibilities.
As discussed above, FPS is funded using a fee-based structure in which  it collects funds from federal tenant agencies for security and protective  services. We have previously reported that FPS’s involvement in  homeland security activities not directly related to facility protection is  inconsistent with a requirement in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 that  FPS use funding from the fees it collects solely for the protection of  federal government buildings and grounds. We recommended to DHS  that if FPS continues its involvement in activities not directly related to the  protection of federal buildings and grounds, a funding process would be  needed that is consistent with the requirement regarding the use of funds  from agency rents and fees.
Notwithstanding issues related to how its fees may be used, FPS has not  fully assessed the resource requirements for serving as the lead sector  agency, because it has not completed an action plan or cost estimate for  carrying out the 2010 plan. The 2010 plan states that determining the  sector’s priorities, program requirements, and funding needs for  government facility protection is a sector objective. FPS previously  reported it was developing an action plan to guide its implementation of  the 2010 plan, but according to FPS officials, they are no longer pursuing  this, because identifying steps FPS can and will take is difficult without  knowing what funding or resources are available. FPS officials also told  us that they originally estimated the cost of serving as the lead agency to  be around $1 million, but did not provide us with the analysis to support  this estimate.
According to DHS officials, HSPD-7 is in the process of being updated to  reassess how the NIPP and the sectors are overseeing the protection of  critical infrastructure, which may result in the sector being restructured.  For example, according to DHS, GSA, and Department of the Interior  officials, GSA will become a co-lead agency, the monuments and icons  sector will be subsumed within the government facilities sector, and an  executive committee that includes the ISC may be formed to help advise  the sector. Such changes may affect FPS’s workload and resources as  the lead agency.
An action plan could help FPS and DHS refocus efforts in the sector. We  have recommended that agencies leading intergovernmental efforts use  an action plan to establish priorities, provide rationale for resources, and  to propose strategies for addressing challenges.enable FPS and DHS to manage change by prioritizing the activities  required of the sector’s lead agency and identifying those activities that  can be feasibly carried out by FPS given its current resource constraints.  An action plan may also be useful to FPS for justifying additional  resources, which may help address the challenge posed by its fee-based  revenue structure.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: FPS is responsible for leading efforts to identify, prioritize, and protect  critical government facilities across all levels of government under the  NIPP. The loss of critical government facilities and the people who work  in them because of terrorism, natural hazards, or other causes could lead  to catastrophic consequences. The lack of facility information, the  absence of sector-wide risk assessments, and ineffective metrics and  data undermine the implementation of a risk management approach as  outlined by the NIPP risk management framework and envisioned in the  2010 plan. In addition, FPS has not effectively employed the NIPP sector  partnership model to engage the Council and represent the depth,  breadth, and interests of the sector, particularly non-federal partners.  Consequently, key goals of the 2010 plan have not been met, and FPS is  limited in its ability to productively contribute to the larger DHS effort to  prioritize and safeguard the nation’s most critical infrastructure. According  to DHS officials, structural changes to the sector may already be under  way. Yet, FPS and DHS do not have an informed understanding of the  priorities and resources needed to fulfill the lead agency responsibilities,  and structural changes may affect these priorities and available  resources. An action plan could serve as a valuable tool for FPS and  DHS to identify, in tandem with any structural changes, priorities that can  be feasibly achieved and the associated resource requirements given  FPS’s fee-based revenue structure. This may, in turn, help address the  overall limited progress made to date in the sector with implementing a  risk management approach and developing effective partnerships.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enhance the effectiveness of the government facilities sector, we  recommend that the Secretary of DHS direct FPS, in partnership with IP  and Council members, to develop and publish an action plan that  identifies sector priorities and the resources required to carry out these  priorities. With consideration of FPS’s resource constraints, this plan  should address FPS’s limited progress with implementing a risk  management approach and developing effective partnerships within the  sector. The plan should address, at a minimum, steps needed to:  1.  develop appropriate data on critical government facilities;  2.  develop or coordinate a sector-wide risk assessment;  3.  identify effective metrics and performance data to track progress  toward the sector’s strategic goals; and 4.  increase the participation of and define the roles of non-federal  Council members.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft report to DHS, GSA, Department of Education,  Department of Health and Human Services, Department of State,  National Archives and Records Administration, National Aeronautics and  Space Administration, National Institute of Standards and Technology,  Department of the Interior, Environmental Protection Agency, and  Department of Justice. DHS concurred with our recommendation to  develop and publish an action plan for the sector. DHS’s full comments  are reprinted in appendix II. The National Archives and Records  Administration also agreed with our findings.  DHS, GSA, and the  National Institute of Standards and Technology provided technical  comments, which we considered and incorporated, where appropriate.  The other agencies did not provide comments on our draft report.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its  issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary  of Homeland Security, appropriate congressional committees, and other  interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on  the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions on this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-2834 or GoldsteinM@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. Contact information and key contributors to the report  are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the Federal Protective Service’s (FPS) leadership of the  government facilities sector, we reviewed Homeland Security Presidential  Directive 7, Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) National  Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), and the 2010 Government Facilities  Sector-Specific Plan (the 2010 plan). Based on these documents, we  identified the implementation of a risk management approach and  development of effective partnerships as two key activities of the NIPP  and the 2010 plan that lead agencies are responsible for. These activities  form the foundation for identifying, prioritizing, and protecting critical  infrastructure. We reviewed the outcomes reported in the 2010 and 2011  sector annual reports to determine FPS’s actions, and identified gaps  between these actions and the goals and activities in the 2010 plan. We  reviewed prior GAO reports and DHS Office of Inspector General reports  on critical infrastructure to identify any challenges that FPS faces in  leading the implementation of the 2010 plan and key practices on  establishing performance metrics and interagency collaboration.
In addition, we interviewed FPS officials in Washington, D.C., about the  2010 plan, its sector-related activities as the lead agency, and any  challenges to implementing the plan. We interviewed DHS officials from  the Office of Infrastructure Protection and Interagency Security  Committee about their role as sector partners and their interaction with  FPS as the lead agency. We also interviewed members from the sector’s  Council about their role and participation in the Council and their  interaction with FPS. We selected 16 of the 26 members of the Council  based on several criteria, including their level of activity as determined by  contributions to the 2010 plan and sector annual reports, or participation  in the 2011 Council meeting, and all 5 of the state and local government  members, and non-governmental organization members. Among federal  members of the Council, we also selected federal agencies that served as  the lead agencies for the monuments and icons sector, water sector,  commercial facilities sector, and education subsector, and federal  executive branch agencies with expertise in law enforcement or physical  security applicable to the protection of government facilities.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2011 to August  2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, David Sausville, Assistant  Director; Friendly Vang-Johnson; Jennifer DuBord; Delwen Jones; Steven  Putansu; and Kathleen Gilhooly made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Federal Protective Service: Better Data on Facility Jurisdictions Needed  to Enhance Collaboration with State and Local Law Enforcement.   GAO-12-434. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2012.
Federal Protective Service: Actions Needed to Resolve Delays and  Inadequate Oversight Issues with FPS’s Risk Assessment and  Management Program. GAO-11-705R. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2011.
Homeland Security: Protecting Federal Facilities Remains a Challenge for  the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Protective Service.   GAO-11-813T. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2011.
Budget Issues: Better Fee Design Would Improve Federal Protective  Service’s and Federal Agencies’ Planning and Budgeting for Security.  GAO-11-492. Washington, D.C.: May 20, 2011.
Homeland Security: Ongoing Challenges Impact the Federal Protective  Service’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities. GAO-10-506T. Washington,  D.C.: March 16, 2010.
Homeland Security: Greater Attention to Key Practices Would Improve  the Federal Protective Service’s Approach to Facility Protection.   GAO-10-142. Washington, D.C.: October 23, 2009.
Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Has Taken Some Initial  Steps to Address Its Challenges, but Vulnerabilities Still Exist.  GAO-09-1047T. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2009.
Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several  Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities.   GAO-08-683. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on the Federal Protective  Service’s Efforts to Protect Federal Property. GAO-08-476T. Washington,  D.C.: February 8, 2008.
Homeland Security: Guidance and Standards Are Needed for Measuring  the Effectiveness of Agencies’ Facility Protection Efforts. GAO-06-612.  Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to Coordinate Federal  Agencies’ Facility Protection Efforts and Promote Key Practices.   GAO-05-49. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2004.
Homeland Security: Transformation Strategy Needed to Address  Challenges Facing the Federal Protective Service. GAO-04-537.  Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2004.
subsections: section_title: Critical Infrastructure Protection
paragraphs: Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Has Taken Action Designed to  Identify and Address Overlaps and Gaps in Critical Infrastructure Security  Activities. GAO-11-537R. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2011.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Efforts to Assess and Promote  Resiliency Are Evolving but Program Management Could Be  Strengthened. GAO-10-772. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2010.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Update to National Infrastructure  Protection Plan Includes Increased Emphasis on Risk Management and  Resilience. GAO-10-296. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2010.
The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Critical Infrastructure  Protection Cost-Benefit Report. GAO-09-654R. Washington, D.C.: June  26, 2009.
Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Address Critical Infrastructure  Protection Challenges That Require Federal and Private Sector  Coordination. GAO-08-36. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2007.
Critical Infrastructure: Sector Plans Complete and Sector Councils  Evolving. GAO-07-1075T. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2007.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Plans and Sector Councils  Continue to Evolve. GAO-07-706R. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2007.
Critical Infrastructure: Challenges Remain in Protecting Key Sectors.  GAO-07-626T. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2007.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Progress Coordinating Government and  Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors’ Characteristics. GAO-07-39.  Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2006.
Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More  Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical  Infrastructure Information. GAO-06-383. Washington, D.C.: April 17,  2006.